A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME I
A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME I

BY

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PREFACE

The book consists of two volumes. The first volume deals with the evolution of religious thought and philosophical speculation from the principal Upaniṣads to the Purāṇas and the Gītās through the Manusamhitā, the Mahābhārata, the Rāmāyaṇa, and the minor Upaniṣads, traces the germs of the different systems to the Upaniṣads, explains the ideas common to them, and treats of the Čārvāka, the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya, the Navya Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā, and the Śābvika systems. The second volume published in 1952 deals with the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, and the Jaina systems, early Buddhism, the Schools of Buddhism, the philosophies of the Upaniṣads, Gauḍapāda, and the Yogavāsiṣṭha, Śāṅkara's Advaitavāda, the philosophies of the Bhagavadgīlā, the Vaṇḍarātra, and the Bhagavata, Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭadvaitavāda, Madhva's Dvaitavāda, Nimbārka's Dvaitādvaitavāda, Vallabha's Śuddhādvaitavāda, Caitanya, Jīva Gopālī, and Baladeva's Acintyabhedābhedavāda, Saivism and Śāktism.

The book is based on the study of the original texts. It deals with the Epistemology, Logic, Ontology, Psychology, Ethics and Theology of the different systems, though it specializes in their Ontology. It gives comprehensive accounts of the Čārvāka, the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya, and the Navya Nyāya Logic of Gaṅgēśa. It deals with Bhartrhari's linguistic monism as expounded in his Vākyapadiya (Brahmakāṇḍa), which is a unique type of philosophy. It elaborately discusses the theistic proofs of the later Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya, and the Navya Nyāya of Gaṅgēśa, and their refutation of the antitheistic objections of the atheists. The treatment of psychological topics is not adequate, because they are elaborately discussed in my Indian Psychology: Perception (1934) and my forthcoming book entitled Indian Psychology: Emotion and Will. The treatment of each topic is historical. The views of the different eminent philosophers of different schools in their historical development are noted. Western analogues are mentioned, but not elaborated owing to shortness of space. Brief critical
estimates of the different systems are given at the end of the different chapters.

The second volume was published earlier because my *Introduction to Indian Philosophy* published in 1949 dealt with the Cārvāka, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Mīmāṃsā, which are elaborately treated in the present volume. Inordinate delay in its publication is due to my serious illness, domestic calamities, and insufficient supply of antique paper.

I acknowledge my indebtedness to Sir Brajendra Nath Seal, Ph.D., whose *The Syllabus of Indian Philosophy* provided the outline of this book and its arrangement of topics, Mahāmohopādhyāya Phani Bhusana Tarakavāgiśa whose volumes on Nyāya Darśana (Bengali) greatly helped me in comprehending the ancient Nyāya system, and Pandit Heramba Nath Tarka-tirtha who kindly helped me through the difficult texts of Vātsyāyanabhāṣya (last chapter), Nyāyamaṁjarī, Nyāyakusumāṇjali, Atmatattvaviveka and Tattvacintāmaṇī. I acknowledge my gratitude to Prof. Sushil Kumar Maitra, M.A., P.R.S., Ph.D., and Prof. Haridas Bhattacharya, M.A., B.L., P.R.S., who helped me with valuable suggestions, and my friend, Mr. Jogesh Chandra Das, who helped me with rare books. I am grateful to the Librarian, Asiatic Society Library, Calcutta, who readily lent me the requisite books and journals, the Manager, Sri Gourangā Press, Calcutta, who undertook its printing in spite of its references to numerous long and difficult Sanskrit texts, and my sons, Prof. Ajit Kumar Sinha, M.A., Ph.D. (Illinois), who prepared the contents, and Mr. Amiya Kumar Sinha, Advocate, Calcutta High Court, who took great pains to see it through the press and get it published.

JADUNATH SINHA

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CHAPTER X

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CHAPTER XI

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THE SĀBDIKA PHILOSOPHY

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ABBREVIATIONS

AG. = Avadhāntagītā (Poona, 1915).
AG. = Aṣṭāvakrāgītā ( ), ( ), 
AKV. = Ablādīharmakṣavāyākhyā (Vasubandhu), Calcutta, 1949.
ATV. = Āṭmatattavaviveka (Udayana), B. I., 1939.
ATVD. = Āṭmatattavavivekādīdhiti (Raghunātha), B. I., 1939.
ATVK. = Āṭmatattavavivekākalpalatā (Śaṅkara Miśra), B. I., 1939.
ATVP. = Āṭmatattavavivekaprakāśikā (Bhaṭṭiratha Ṭhakkura), B. I., 1939.
BG. = Bhagavad Gītā.
B.I. = Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta).
BP. = Bhāṣāpariccheda (Vidvanātha), Bombay, 1916.
BPh. = Buddhist Philosophy (A. B. Keith).
BPR. = Bhāvapradipa (Śṛṣṭa Nārāyaṇa Śukla), a commentary on VPD.
Br. = Brhatī (Prabhākara), a commentary on SBh. (Madras).
BrG. = Brahmagītā (Poona, 1915).
BS. = Brahmāsūtra (Bādarāyaṇa).
B.S.S. = Benares Sanskrit Series.
Ch. S. S. = Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series (Benares).
DP. = Dhammapada.
ERR. = Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
E.T. = English translation.
E.H. = Ethics of the Hindus (Sushil Kumar Maitra), Calcutta, 1925.
FD. = Fragments from Diṇṇāga (Randle).
GG. = Gaṇeṣagītā (Poona, 1915).
G.O.S. = Gaekwar Oriental Series (Baroda).
HIL. = History of Indian Logic (S. C. Vidyabhushan), Calcutta, 1921.
HIP. = A History of Indian Philosophy (J. Sinha), Calcutta, 1952.
IIP. = Introduction to Indian Philosophy (J. Sinha), Agra.
I.IA. = Indian Logic and Atomism (A. B. Keith), 1921.
IPM. = Introduction to Purva Mimāṃsā (Pashupati Sāstri), Calcutta, 1923.
IPP. = Indian Psychology: Perception (J. Sinha), (Kegan Paul, London.
1934).
JMS. = Mimāṃsā Śutra (Jaśmin).
KK. = Kṛṣṇakānti (Kṛṣṇakānta Vidvāgīśa), a commentary on SSP.
(Ch. S. S., 1909).
KM. = Kārma Mimāṃsā (A. B. Keith).
KNR. = Kaṇḍaraḥasya (Śaṅkara Miśra).
K.S.S. = Kāśi Sanskrit Series (Benares).
KU. = Khaṇḍanoddhāra (Vācaspati Miśra), Benares, 1909.
KV. = Kīraṇāvalī (Udayana), Benares, Saṅvat 1941.
KV. = Kīraṇāvalībhāṣaka (Padmanābha Miśra), S.B.T., 1930.
KVP. = Kīraṇāvalīprakāśa (Vardhamāna), Benares, Saṅvat 1941.
KVVP. = Kīraṇāvalīprakāśavākyākhyā (Bhaṭṭiratha Ṭhakkura), Benares, Saṅvat 1941.
LD. = Laghudīpti, a commentary on TR., Benares, 1903.
LS. = Lankāvatārasūtra (Kyoto, 1935).
MB. = Mitabhaśini (Mādhava Sarasvatī), a commentary on SP., V.S.S., 1893.
MBh. = Mahabhārata (with Nīlakanṭha), Bombay, Śaka 1785.
AP. = Anuśāsana Parva (MBh.).
SP. = Sānti Parva (MBh.).
MK. = Mādhyamikākārikā (Nāgārjuna).
MK. = Mādhyamikākārikāvṛtti.

MS. = Mansabīdhti.

MSIL. = Medī vál SCHOOL of INDIAN Logic (S. C. Vidyabhushan), Calcutta.

NB. = Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti), K. S. S., 1924.

NB. or Nbh. = Nyāyabhāṣya (Vātsyāyana) on NS., Jīvāṇanda, Calcutta, 1919.


NBTr. = Nyāyabinduṭṭikā (Dharmottara), K. S. S., 1924.

ND. = Nyāyadarśana (Bengali) (Pīṇḍī Bhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa), Baṅgiya Sāhitya Pariṣat, Calcutta.

NK. = Nyāyakandaḷi (Śrīdhara), V.S.S., 1895.

NEL. = Nyāyakalikā (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa), S.B.T., 1925.

NKS. = Nyāyakusumāṇjī (Udayana), Benares, 1912.

NKSb. = Nyāyakusumāṇjīvalī (Varadarāja), S.B.T., 1922.

NKS. = Nyāyakusumāṇjīvalī (Haridasāvyākhyā), Benares, 1913.

NKSs. = Nyāyakusumāṇjīvalī (Rucidatta), Benares, 1912.

NKS. = Nyāyakusumāṇjīvalīprakāśa (Vardhamāna), Benares, 1912.

NL. = Nyāyālaṅkārti (Vallabha), N.S.P.

NM. = Nyāyamāṇjari (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa), V.S.S., 1895.

NMS. = Nyāyamāṇjariśāra (Yadavācārya), a commentary on NMS., Benares, 1916.

NNP. = Nyāyaṇilandaḥprakāśa (Vardhamāna), B.I., 1911.

NP. = Nyāyapraveśa (Dīnāga), G.O.S., No. 38, 39.

NPR. = Nyāyasparīṣṭa (Udayana), Calcutta, 1938.

NPRP. = Nyāyasparīṣṭgāna (Vardhamāna), Calcutta, 1938.

NR. = Nyāyaratnakāra (Pārthasaṃrathi Miśra), a commentary on SV., Ch. S.S., 1898-99.

NRM. = Nyāyaratnamālā (Pārthasaṃrathi Miśra), G.O.S., No. 75, 1937.

NS. = Nyāyasūtra (Gautama), Jīvāṇanda, Calcutta, 1919.

NSS. = Nyāyasūtra (Bhāṣarvaśa), B.I., 1910.

NSG. = Nyāya Sūtras of Goṅaṇa (S. C. Vidyabhushan), S.B.H.

NSM. = Nyāyasiddhāntamaṇjarī (Jñānakātha), Benares, 1916.

N.S.P. = Nyāyakāvya Sāgara Press, Bombay.

NSV. = Nyāyasūtrakṛtya (Viṣṇuṇātha), Jīvāṇanda, Calcutta, 1919.

NTD. = Nyāyatātparyadyotpikā (Jayasimhāsūri), B.I., 1910.

NV. = Nyāyavārttika (Uddiyotakara), B.I., 1887-1904.

NVTP. = Nyāyavārttikatattparyadyotparyāśiddhi (Udayana), a commentary on NVTT., B.I., 1911.

NVTT. = Nyāyavārttikatattparyadyotparyāśiddhi (Vācaspati Miśra), V.S.S., 1898.

NYK. = Nyāyakapāṇī (Vācaspati Miśra), a commentary on VDV., Benares, 1907. (Reprint from Pandit).

NYR. = Nyāyakarata (Rāmānujaśārya), commentary on NRM., G.O.S., No. 75, 1939.

O.U.P. = Oxford University Press.

PIL. or PBH. = Prāṣastapaḍabhāṣya (Padarthadharmasāṅgraha), V.S.S., 1895.


PKM. = Pratyayakamalamārtanda (Prabhāśandra), N.S.P., 1912.

PP. = Prakarāṇaṇpāṇīka (Śālikānātha), Ch. S.S., 1903-04.

PSAH. = The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus (Brajendra Nath Seal), Longmans.

PSPM. = The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (Gaṅgā Natha Jhā), Indian Thought, Allahabad, 1911.

RA. = Rāmāyaṇa (Vālmīki), E.T., Manmatha Nath Dutt, Calcutta, 1893.

AK. = Avidhyā Kāṇḍa (RA.).

AK. = Atānya Kāṇḍa (RA.).

BK. = Bāla Kāṇḍa (RA.).

KK. = Kīśkindhyā Kāṇḍa (RA.).
VDV. = Vidhiviveka (Maṇḍana-mīra), Benares, 1907.
VP. = Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Dharmarāja-līlāvairindra), Bombay, Samvat 1968.
VPD. = Vākyapadiya (Bhartṛhari), Benares.
VPR. = Viṣṇuprāṇa.
VPS. = Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha (Mādhava-cārya Viṣṇu-raṇya), V.S.S., 1893.
VS. = Vaiśeṣika Sūtra.
VSB. = Bhāṣya on VS. (Candrakānta).
V.S.S. = Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares.
VSU. = Upaskāra (Śaṅkara Mīra), Gujrati Press, 1913.
VSV. = Vaiśeṣikasūtravivṛti (Jayanāra-yāṇa), 1913.
VV. = Vyomavati (Vyomaśivācārya), Ch. S. S., 1924.
YS. = Yogasātra (Patañjali), Benares, 1911.
YSP. = Yuktisnehaprapāraṇī (Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa), a commentary on ŚD.
YVS. = Yogavāsiṣṭha.
CHAPTER I

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANIŚAD S

1. The Philosophy of the Vedas.

The orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Sāmkhya, the Yoga, the Mīmāṃsā, and the Vedānta believe in the authority of the Vedas. But the heterodox schools, the Čārvaka, the Buddhist and the Jaina reject their authority. The Upaniṣads contain the germs of the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy. They are parts of the Vedas. There are four Vedas, Rg Veda, Sāma Veda, Yajur Veda, and Atharva Veda. The first three constitute the triad (traya), which are the original Vedas, and which enjoy higher authority. The Atharva Veda is a later addition. Each Veda has three divisions, viz., the Sāthhitās, the Brāhmaṇas, and the Āraṇyakas. The Sāthhitās are mostly verses. The Brāhmaṇas are commentaries in prose. The Āraṇyakas are forest treatises. The Upaniṣads are mostly parts of the Āraṇyakas. The Sāma Veda contains the hymns of the Rg Veda, which are to be chanted in sacrifices. The Yajur Veda contains large portions of the Rg Veda. The Atharva Veda also contains many mantras of the Rg Veda, which is the earliest. The Vedas may be assigned latest to about 1500 B.C.

The Vedas represent different phases of religious thought. There are manifest signs of polytheism, organized polytheism, henotheism, monotheism, and monism. The grand, sublime, beautiful and useful aspects of nature are personified and deified. They are regarded as supernatural and superhuman spirits akin to human spirits. They are the deities presiding over the diverse phenomena of nature. They are not natural phenomena. They are pervasive supernatural entities, which govern the phenomena of nature, and which are benevolent to their worshippers, but terrific to their haters. They are mighty, invincible, wise, merciful, omniscient, pervasive, righteous, truthful and benevolent. They are easily propitiated by hymns, prayer, oblations, offerings and sacrifices. They give worldly
prosperity, wisdom and moral qualities. They give victory in battles, wealth, long life, sons, grandsons, and happiness. The gods of fire (Agni), the sun (Sūrya), the dawn (Uṣas), the earth (Pṛthivi), the sky (Dyaus), the bright sky and day (Mitra), the dark sky and evening (Varuṇa), the rain-cloud (Parjanya), the storms (Maruts), the winds (Vāyu, Vāta), the morning sun (Savītr) and the like are mentioned.

The different gods are personifications of the different powers of nature. They are sometimes worshipped individually. This phase of religious thought is not naturalism, but anthropomorphic polytheism. The gods are supernatural and superhuman powers, and endowed with spiritual qualities. They preside over particular phenomena of nature, but they are not confined to them. They pervade the whole of nature and beyond, or a considerable part of it, and are endowed with some qualities of the supreme god-head. This is the element of polytheism in the Vedas.

Sometimes the gods are invoked and worshipped in groups. Sometimes two gods, sometimes three, four, or more gods are invoked. Sometimes all gods (viśve devāḥ) are worshipped together, who are implicitly believed to be partial aspects of one supreme God. This phase of religious thought may be called organized polytheism.

The gods are gradually related to one another as the major and the minor, as dependent on one another, and as generating one another. Heaven and Earth are the mothers of Agni. Rudra is the father of the Maruts. Aditi is the mother of the Adityas. The Āsūrs are the brothers. Indra maintains the Earth and the Sky in their places. He is a major god. They are minor deities. The Maruts maintain the Sun, the Wind, and the Fire gods in the sky. They are superior to the three gods. Varuṇa, Mitra and Aryaman kindle Agni, and are glorious through him. They are interdependent on one another. This phase of religion is organized polytheism.

Among the multitude of gods any one is treated as the supreme god for the time being when he is worshipped. Maxmuller calls this religion henotheism.\(^1\) 'O Agni, thou art mighty Indra, the wide-ruling Viṣṇu, the king Varuṇa, the

\(^1\) *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, 1903, p. 40.
wondrous Mitra, Aryaman, the lord of beings. Thou art Rudra, the Maruts, the Winds, and Pūṣan. Thou art Savitri, a bestower of treasures, Bhaga, the lord of wealth, Rbhu, Aditi, Bhārati, Iḍā and Sarasvati. Thou art united with all gods, equal to them in strength, nay, thou surpassest them, when thy power has expanded over heaven and earth. Here Agni is identified with many gods, and treated as superior to them. This phase of religious thought is called henotheism. It is a step from polytheism to monotheism.

The conception of Rta further harmonizes the gods with one another, and paves the way for monotheism. Rta is the physical order. It governs the uniformities of nature. Rta reigns everywhere, in the sky, in the sun, in the mountain, in the sacrifices, and in truth. It is the course of nature. It is the natural order. The sacrifices should conform to Rta. It is the law of rites. It is the social law. It is the law of truth, right, and justice. It is the moral law. Varuṇa is the custodian of the moral law or Rta. He adheres to the right, and punishes sins. The gods follow the laws of Rta. It is the physical order and the moral order. It points to the existence of one supreme God, whose law is unalterable and inviolable. The conception of Rta prepares the way for monotheism, though it is an impersonal order, which upholds the gods and the world.

Hiranyagarbha or Prajāpati, Viśvakarmā, and Parama Puruṣa gradually take the place of one supreme God. Hiranyagarbha is Prajāpati, the Lord of all creatures. He arose in the beginning. He established the earth and heaven. He is the sole king of the entire universe. He rules over the mountains, the seas, and the rivers. He governs men and beasts. His commands are followed by other gods. He alone is God above all gods. He may claim the rank of one supreme God.

Viśvakarmā is the creator of the entire universe. He creates the sky and the earth. He is the world-architect. He is the seer of all. His eyes are everywhere. His face is everywhere. He is of all hands and feet. He is one God.
There is a Cosmic Person (Parama Puruṣa) who has a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, and a thousand feet. He pervades the entire universe and transcends it. Whatever exists, existed, and will exist is this Supreme Person. He is the Lord of immortality. He is not affected by the fruits of actions. The entire universe is only one-fourth of his being. The remaining three fourths remain in celestial immortality. The Parama Puruṣa is both transcendent and immanent. He is immanent in the whole world. He transcends it, and remains beyond it in his immortal glory. The Puruṣa Śūkta teaches panentheism. These are the monotheistic tendencies in the Rg Veda.

Monotheism leads to monism. One Reality is conceived, which is manifested in diverse ways. 'There is one reality; sages call it by various names; they call it Agni, Yama, Mātariśvan.' "That One' (tadekam) is not personal; it is neither male nor female; it is neuter. It is an impersonal principle. There was nothing other than it." The Nāsadiya Śūkta clearly brings out the monism of the Rg Veda. 'That One' (tad ekam) was later identified with the Atman or Brahman in the Upaniṣads.10

2. The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

The monism adumbrated in the Rg Veda is developed into idealistic monism in the Upaniṣads, which regard Brahman, the infinite, eternal, omnipresent, omniscient, and pure Spirit as the ultimate reality. The temporal, spatial and causality-bound world is the manifestation of this infinite and eternal Spirit. It is permeated by Brahman. It shines by its light. It manifests the glory of Brahman. It is sometimes regarded as a mere appearance, a 'name and form'. It is a mere appearance of Brahman, which is one, non-dual, undifferentiated and pure consciousness. Brahman is non-temporal, non-spatial, and non-causal. It is impersonal, transcendent, indefinable, incomprehensible and unknowable. Brahman is sometimes conceived as transcendent and immanent. Transcendent Brahman is acosmic (niśprapañca), attributeless (nirguṇa), higher (para) Brahman.

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1 R.V., x. 99. 1-3.
2 Ekāṁ sat viprā vahudhā vadanti agnim yamāṁ mātariśvānam. R.V., i. 164. 46.
Immanent Brahman is cosmic (sapraṇaśa), lower (apara) Brahman endowed with attributes and related to the world. Para Brahman is the impersonal and indeterminate Absolute, the ultimate reality. Apara Brahman is personal God (Īśvara), who is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world, the moral governor, and the inner controller of the world and the individual souls. Īśvara is the Lord of the Law of Karma. The individual souls are sometimes regarded as parts of Brahman, which are akin to him, and guided by him. They are sometimes regarded as Brahman limited by the adjunct of the mind-body-complex, which are identified with Para Brahman or Atman, when their limiting adjuncts are destroyed.


The Upaniṣads speak of Para Brahman and Apara Brahman. The former is higher Brahman. The latter is lower Brahman. The former is indeterminate, unconditioned and devoid of attributes (nirguṇa). The latter is determinate, conditioned and endowed with attributes (saguṇa). The former is unqualified and incomprehensible. The latter is qualified and comprehensible. The former is transcendent and non-phenomenal (nīspraṇaśa). The latter is immanent in the phenomenal world (sapraṇaśa). The former is non-spatial, non-temporal, non-causal and acosmic. The latter is the Lord of the spatial and temporal world governed by causality. The former is the transcendental Being (sat), Consciousness (cit), and Bliss (ānanda), which constitute its essence. The latter is the infinite, eternal, omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent creator, preserver, and destroyer of the universe, the moral governor, and the Lord of the Law of Karma. He is immanent in the world and the individual souls as their inner controller (antaryāmin). He transcends them as their knower, governor and guide. He is both immanent and transcendent in relation to the world and the individual souls. He is Īśvara or Lord of the empirical world. The higher Brahman is transcendent, acosmic and trans-empirical. It transcends the spatio-temporal order governed by causality. It is the goal of higher knowledge (parā vidyā), while Īśvara is the goal of lower knowledge (aparā vidyā). Higher knowledge is supra-intellectual intuition.
Lower knowledge is intellectual and discursive. The higher Brahman is the Ātman, pure universal consciousness, which is the foundational reality in the individual selves. It is the transcendent ground of the empirical world. It is the ultimate reality. It is the ground of the universe and the finite selves. Para Brahman and Apara Brahman are the two aspects of Brahman.

"This Brahman is higher and lower."11 Brahman has two forms, formed and formless, perishable and imperishable, static and dynamic, empirical and transcendental.12 Brahman created the world, entered into it, and became the empirical world and the transcendent reality, the definable and the indefinable, the grounded and the ungrounded, the conscious and the unconscious, and the real and the unreal.13

The higher Brahman (Para Brahman) is described by the method of negation. The lower Brahman (Apara Brahman) is described by the method of affirmation. Para Brahman is described in neuter gender. It is impersonal and devoid of all sensible qualities. It is one and without any second. It is partless (niṣkala), inactive (niṣkriya), calm (śānta), flawless (niravadya), and taintless (nirañjana). It is devoid of sound (aśabda), touch (asparśa), colour (arūpa), taste (arasa), and smell (agandha). It is neither red (alohita), nor viscid (asneha), nor shady (acchāya), nor dark (atamas). It is neither air (avāyu), nor ether (anākāsa), nor fire (atejaska). It is neither any of the material elements nor any of the sensible qualities. It is devoid of eyes (acakṣuska), ears (āsrōtra), hands and feet (apāpipāda), life (aprāpa), the vocal organ (avāk), mouth (amukha), and manas (amanas). It has no descent (agotra) and caste (avarṇa). It is neither male nor female. It sees without eyes and hears without ears. It takes without hands and walks without feet. It is devoid of all sense-organs, and yet possessed of the powers of all senses.14

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12 Dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe murtitaṁ cāmūrttaṁ ca, sthitam ca yat ca, sat ca tyat ca. Br. Up., ii. 3. 1.
14 Sarvendriyagāmbhāsāṁ sarvendriyavivarjitaṁ. Śvet. Up., iii. 17. Kaṭh. Up., i. 3. 15; Mund. Up., i. 1. 6; ii. 1. 2; iii. 1. 8; Chānd. Up., vi. 2. 1; Śvet. Up., vi. 16; Br. Up., iii. 8. 8.
Para Brahman is unborn, eternal, abiding, and ancient.\textsuperscript{15} It is infinite (avyaya), beginningless (anādī), endless (ananta), ubiquitous (vībhū), omnipresent (sarvagata), and immortal (amṛta). It is pure (śukra), self-luminous, eternal (sanātana), and immutable (aṅkāra).\textsuperscript{16} It is imperceptible, indefinable, ungrounded, and essenceless. It is invisible, unusable, incomprehensible, indeterminate, inconceivable, indescribable, non-phenomenal, immutable, undifferentiated and good. It is one homogeneous consciousness. It is the Ātman or Self.\textsuperscript{17} Para Brahman is the Ātman. The Absolute is the universal Self.

It is neither gross nor subtle, neither long nor short. It is greater than the greatest, and subtler than the subtlest. It is finer than the atoms. It is farther than the farthest, and nearer than the nearest. It is hidden here in the cavity of the heart. It is extremely subtle and present everywhere. It is ubiquitous and eternal.\textsuperscript{18} It is spaceless and devoid of spatial characters, and yet the ground of the spatial order.

It is without beginning and end. It has nothing prior to it, and nothing posterior to it. It is devoid of temporal sequence. It is beyond the past and the future. It transcends the past, the present, and the future, which exist in the empirical world, and yet it is their ground. It is not affected by time, which changes into days and years in the world.\textsuperscript{19} It is timeless and devoid of temporal characters, and yet the ground of the temporal order.

Para Brahman is without before and after, and inside and outside. It is the Ātman. It is the one, undifferentiated, homo-

\textsuperscript{15} Ajo nityaḥ śāsvato' yam puraṇaḥ. Kaṭh. Up., i. 2. 18.

\textsuperscript{16} Kaṭh. Up., i. 3. 15; ii. 1. 2, 4; ii. 2. 8, 15; ii. 3. 1; i. 2. 16.

\textsuperscript{17} Bha etasmiṃ adṛṣyeyā 'nāmye 'nirukte' niyave 'bhayaṁ pratiśthām vindate. Tait. Up., ii. 7.


geneous consciousness without inside and outside.  It is timeless and spaceless.

It is self-caused (svayambhū), unborn (aja), unageing (ajara), undying (amara), imperishable (akṣara), and immortal (amṛta). It is devoid of origin (anādi) and end (ananta). It is devoid of cause and effect. It is not produced by any cause. It is different from cause and effect. It is not produced by any cause. It is neither becoming nor non-becoming. It is beyond the category of causality. It is non-causal, and yet it is the ground of the empirical world governed by causality.

It is motionless, and yet it moves faster than the manas. It is immobile and yet moving. It is unmoved, and yet it moves to a distant place. It is inactive, and yet it goes everywhere. It is the unmoved mover. Motion is change and mutation, which cannot affect the indeterminate Brahman, which is changeless and immutable. Modification is a mere word, a name, an appearance. It cannot affect Brahman, which is eternal, fixed and immobile.

Para Brahman is one only and without any second. It is one, undivided, partless, and devoid of duality and plurality. It is the supreme reality. There is nothing higher than Brahman. There is nothing other than Brahman. Distinction, duality and plurality are appearances. They have empirical reality. They are phenomena. The indeterminate Brahman is one, non-dual, undifferentiated and distinctionless. There is no distinction of knower and known in it.

Para Brahman is infinite (bhūmā). The bhūmā is devoid of distinction of subject and object. None sees, none hears, and none knows, other than the Infinite Spirit. In the finite there is a distinction between the knower and the known. The infinite

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is immortal. The finite is mortal.\textsuperscript{24} The infinite Brahman abides in its own glory.\textsuperscript{24}

Though Para Brahman is indeterminate, unconditioned and attributeless (nirguna), yet it has three essential characters. It is pure being, pure consciousness, and pure bliss. It is not empirical being determined by time, space, causality and forms. It is imperceptible through the senses, and incomprehensible through the manas. It is not empirical consciousness which involves the distinction of subject and object. It is subjectless transcendental consciousness, which is not determined by the intellectual categories of time, space and causality. It is infinite, eternal, universal and absolute consciousness. It is the foundational consciousness. It is the ultimate ground of the universe and the finite selves. It is the pure self-luminous consciousness. It is the light of lights. The universe is illuminated and manifested by its light. It is transcendental bliss which transcends pleasure and pain, joys and sorrows, which are due to the intercourse of the senses and their objects. It is infinite, eternal, supreme and indefinable bliss. It is the infinite, eternal, supreme, transcendental being, consciousness and bliss.

Para Brahman is the truth of truth, the reality of reality. It is the infinite truth. It is the eternal reality in formed and formless beings. It is the transcendental reality in being and non-being. It is the supreme reality beyond empirical existence and non-existence. It is the trans-empirical reality beyond the temporal, spatial and causality-bound empirical world. It is the highest Being adored by all. It is the supreme goal of all finite beings. It is their highest good. It is to be realized by all. It transcends human knowledge.\textsuperscript{25}

‘Para Brahman is truth, knowledge, and infinite’. It is the infinite truth, knowledge or consciousness. It is omniscient, all-knowing experience of the universe. It is one homogeneous consciousness (ekātmāpratyayaśāra). It is one, undifferentiated, eternal consciousness. The knowledge of the Ātman is eternal, since it is never destroyed. It is the witness. It is conscious.

\textsuperscript{24} Yo vai bhūmā tad amṛtam atha yad alpaṁ tan martyam. Chānd. Up., vii. 24. 1.
\textsuperscript{25} Brahma śve mahimmi pratiśthitaḥ. Chānd. Up., vii. 24. 1.
detached and devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas. It is transcendental consciousness. It is one, infinite, eternal, non-dual, undifferentiated, subject-objectless consciousness. There is no duality of subject and object in it. Sometimes Brahman is described as knowledge, consciousness, or experience. Sometimes it is described as the unknown knower. It is the light of lights. All shine by its light. Brahman is self-luminous. It illumines the entire universe. But it is not illumined by any thing. It is self-revealing. It is not manifested by any finite object or being. It transcends the known and the unknown. It is immeasurable and unfathomable, and yet it is certain and self-revealing. It is one undivided consciousness devoid of inside and outside. Self-revealing consciousness constitutes its essential nature.28

Para Brahman is transcendental bliss. It is knowledge and bliss. Consciousness and bliss characterize the eternal being. Ānanda is bliss or freedom. It is the quintessence of love and joy (rasa). It is eternal joy (amṛta). It is the embodiment of joy. It reveals itself out of the fullness of joy. Eternal love, joy, or bliss is the source of self-revelation. It is the fountain of life. It sustains the life of all finite beings. Who would live, if Brahman (ākāśa) were not in the nature of bliss? All creatures are animated and sustained by the eternal joy of Brahman. The finite souls attain bliss by attaining Brahman, which is eternal bliss. Brahman makes them blissful. They become fearless when they find their abode in Brahman. When they realize the bliss of Brahman, they are not afraid of any being.29 All creatures spring from bliss, are sustained by bliss,

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and are absorbed in bliss. Brahman is the Self or Atman. The Atman is dearer than sons, dearer than wealth, dearer than all other things. Husband, wife, sons, wealth and other cherished objects are not dear for their own sake, but for the sake of the Atman in them. The Atman or Brahman is the fountain of infinite and eternal bliss. The finite creatures become happy with its particles only. Their earthly joys are its imperfect reflections. There is bliss in the Infinite; there is no bliss in the finite.

Para Brahman is detached (asaṅga), pure (śuddha), untainted (nirāṇjana), sinless (apāpavādha), and free from attachment (viraja). It is beyond virtue and vice. It transcends empirical morality, and has supermoral transcendental purity. 'It is not this, not this'. Determination is negation. Empirical attributes cannot be ascribed to it.

Para Brahman is the Atman, the witness (sākṣīn), the seer (draṣṭṛ), and the knower (viṣṇāṭ). It is not an object (idam). The conscious Self is the prins and presupposition of empirical objects. It cannot be derived from, and resolved into objects. It is not manifested by words which are manifested by it. It is not perceived by the external senses, which are created and directed by it to perceive external objects only. It is not comprehended by manas, which is enlightened by it. It is not grasped by life, which is urged by it to perform its functions. 'How can the Knower be known?' It transcends the known and the unknown. Yet it is not unknowable. It is known by intuition (prajñāna) which is above discursive intellect (viṣṇāna). It is not known by reason (atarkya), but by intuition due to meditation. It is experienced through spiritual realization.

40 Tad etat preyahi putraḥ preyahi vittāḥ preyo nyasmat sarvasmat antarutaranah yad yāyam ātmā. Br. Up., i. 4. 8. 
41 Br. Up., ii. 4. 5. 
45 Kena Up., i. 2. 3. 5-8. 
47 Anyadeva tad viditād atoḥaviditād adhi. Kena Up., i. 4. 
48 Atarkyaṃ anupramāṇāt. Kaṭh. Up., i. 2. 8. Nāṣa tārakeṇa matir
4. Saguṇa Brahman orĪśvara.

Para Brahman is the indeterminate Absolute. Apara Brahman is the determinate Lord orĪśvara related to the empirical world and the individual souls. The Absolute related to the spatio-temporal world is God (Īśvara). The cosmic (saaprāpañca) Brahman is the omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent creator, preserver and destroyer of the world, the inner controller (antaryāmin) of the universe and the individual souls, the Lord of the Law of Karma, the moral governor, and the harmonizer of all worlds. He is possessed of good qualities, and devoid of bad qualities. He is pure, sinless, untainted and holy.

Īśvara is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world (tajjalān). All created beings spring from him (tajja), live by him (tadan), and are absorbed in him (talla). All this world is Brahman.40 He is the origin of creatures (bhūtāyoni), the source of Hiranyagarbha (brahmayoni), the creator of the world (jagat kartā), the material cause and the efficient cause of the world. He is omniscient and all-knowing. He created the world of determinate objects by the penance of knowledge. He created formed and formless, temporal and non-temporal, contingent and necessary, conscious and unconscious beings, and the real and the unreal.41 Akāśa or Brahman is the creator of names and forms or diverse objects of experience.42 The omniscient Lord created Brahms, names and forms, and edible objects.43 The Upaniṣads do not use the term 'nāmarūpa' in the sense of appearances. They use it in the sense of diverse determinate objects.

The world is said to be created by God. It is also said to emanate from him, even as sparks emanate from a burning fire.44 It is the manifestation of his glory. It is covered with him. It is clothed in his glory.45 All created beings have their roots

41 Muṇḍ. Up., i. 1. 6, 9; ii. 1. 3-9. Tait. Up., iii. 1-6; ii. 6.
43 Tasmād etad brahma nāma rūpaṁ annaṁca jāyate. Muṇḍ. Up., i. 1. 9.
44 Muṇḍ Up., i. 1. 9; ii. 1. 1.
45 Yasvajāśa mahima bhumī. Muṇḍ Up., ii. 2. 7. Śa vāsyām idam sarvam. Śa Up., 1.
in Being; they exist in Being; they are grounded in Being." Being is Brahman. The world is real. It is a manifestation of Brahman. There are two kinds of manifestations, gross and subtle, formed and formless. All gross and subtle things are manifestations of Brahman. The world is an expression of God, as if it were his cloth tinged with yellow colour. "All this is, indeed, Brahman". "All this is nothing but Atman". "Brahman is the creator of the world, the maker of all. The world is his; it is, indeed, Brahman." These texts clearly show that the world is real, that it is not an appearance, and that it has no existence apart from Brahman. It is an expression of God.

Isvara is the ruler and governor of the world. The sun, the moon, the earth and the sky are kept in their places by his command. The wind blows, the sun rises, fire burns, the cloud thunders, and death overtakes all created beings at his command. He is the harmonizer of the different worlds. They are kept together by his unifying will. His will maintains, supports and harmonizes them. He is the bridge, the support and the unifier of all worlds.

Isvara is the inner controller (antaryāmin) of the whole world with all its objects, and of the individual souls. "He who resides in earth, water, fire, air, ether, heaven, space, the sun, the moon, stars, darkness, life, speech, eye, ear, manas, skin, and intellect, yet who is different from them, whose body they are, whom they do not know, who controls them from within, is thy immortal Atman and inner controller." "He who resides in all creatures, who is different from them, whom they do not know, whose body they are, who controls them from within, is thy immortal Atman and inner controller." "He who resides in the self, who is different from it, whom it does not know,
whose body it is, whom he controls from within, is thy immortal Ātman and inner controller.\(^{34}\) Brahman is the world-soul. He is the inner controller of the entire universe. He is the inner controller of each finite object in it. He is the inner controller of each finite self. He is immanent in the universe and finite selves.

Īśvara is everywhere, upward and downward, before and behind, northward and southward. The east, the west, the north, the south, up and below are filled with him. Heaven is his head; the sun and the moon are his eyes; the directions are his ears; air is his life; the world is his heart; the earth is his foot. He is the inner soul of all creatures (sarvabhitāntarātma).\(^{35}\) 'The universe is God himself.\(^{36}\) 'All these, present, past and future, are God himself'.\(^{37}\) He is immanent in the entire universe.

But God is not immanent only. He also transcends the world. He is infinite and eternal, and so transcends the spatial and temporal world. 'Brahman has four quarters. The universe is one quarter. His three quarters are immortal in heaven. The universe is the manifestation of his glory. He is greater than his expression'.\(^{38}\) 'Heaven, the earth, the sky, the vital forces, and the internal organs exist in him.\(^{39}\) 'He is the Lord of the past and the future.\(^{40}\) The past, the present, and the future are Brahman. What is beyond the three times is Brahman.\(^{41}\) Names and forms or diverse determinate objects exist in Brahman.\(^{42}\) He exists within all. He exists outside all.\(^{43}\) All worlds are founded in him; none can transcend him.\(^{44}\) He transcends avyakta or prakṛti, which is the root of the universe. He is immanent in it.\(^{45}\) All gods are subordinate

\(^{34}\) Br. Up., iii. 7. 22.
\(^{35}\) Chānd. Up., vii. 25. 1; Māṇḍ. Up., ii. 2. 12; ii. 1. 4, 9.
\(^{36}\) Puruṣa evedam viśvam. Māṇḍ. Up., ii. 1. 10.
\(^{37}\) Puruṣa evedam sarvam yad bhūtam yacca bhavyam. R.V.
\(^{39}\) Māṇḍ. Up., ii. 2. 5.
\(^{40}\) Īśānāṁ bhūtābhāvyasya. Kaṭh. Up., ii. 1. 5.
\(^{41}\) Māṇḍ. Up., i. 1.
\(^{43}\) Tad-antarasya sarvasya tad u sarvasyasya bāhyataḥ. Iṣa. Up., 5.
\(^{44}\) Tasmānlokoḥ śrītāḥ sarve tad u nātyeti kaścana. Kaṭh. Up., ii. 2. 8.
\(^{45}\) Kaṭh. Up., i. 3. 11; Subāla Up., 7.
to him; none can transcend him.** He exists in all creatures. They exist in him.** He transcends the known and the unknown.***

He is the eternal ground of the temporal world. He is the self-caused cause (svayambhū) of the world governed by causality. He is the necessary ground of the contingent world. He is the self-luminous light of lights. He illumines the universe. It is illumined and manifested by him. It abides in him.** He is Bhāmāni, the illuminer of the universe.*** He is the knower of the known world. But he is not known by any knower.*** God, as the knower, transcends the known universe. Brahman is the infinite and eternal consciousness (prajñāna). All are governed by this consciousness. Eternal consciousness is the ground of all. Brahman is consciousness.*** This is the idealistic interpretation of the universe given by the Upaniṣads. This is the basic concept of all schools of Vedānta.

Īśvara is the Lord of all creatures. He is the Lord of the universe. He is the ruler of all, the master of all, the Lord of all. He is their inner guide. He is perfect. He is not increased by righteous actions. He is not decreased by unrighteous actions.*** All gods are subordinate to him, who execute his commands. All creatures, all worlds, all vital forces, and all finite souls are subordinate to him.*** He is the cause of the universe, but he has no cause. He is the Lord of the universe, but he has no Lord.*** He is the abode of all creatures. He is the inner Soul of all finite souls. He enters into them, and rules over them.*** He is immanent in them, and transcends them.

God is the Lord of the Law of Karma (karmādhyakṣa). He accords fruits to all creatures in accordance with their merits and demerits. He fulfills their desires according to their moral

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** Kaṭh. Up., ii. 1. 9.  
*** Kena Up., i. 4.  
*** Mund. Up., ii. 2. 11; iii. 2. 1; Kaṭh. Up., ii. 2. 2.  
*** Chiṇḍ. Up., iv. 15. 4.  
*** Sa vetti vedyah na ca tasyaṁ ca vettā. Svet. Up., iii. 19.  
*** Mund. Up., i. 6.  
*** Kaṭh. Up., ii. 1. 9; Br. Up., ii. 5. 15.  
*** Antahpraviṣṭah āśātā janānāṁ sarvāṁ. Taṅtirīya Aranyaka, iii. 2. 10.
deserts. He is the giver of the fruits of actions (vasudāna). He is the giver of boons (sāhyadvāma). He rewards virtues (vāmanī), and punishes sins. He gives virtues, and destroys sins. He is the moral judge and moral governor. He is the supreme Person.\textsuperscript{17}

God manifests himself in various ways.\textsuperscript{18} He creates the world by māyā or various powers. One God is the omnipotent magician. He governs all worlds with his infinite powers. His supreme powers are of various kinds. They constitute māyā or prakṛti. God is endowed with the power of māyā. He creates the world with his power of māyā. One God conceals his nature with the guṇas of prakṛti, even as a spider conceals itself in its cobweb. He is devoid of the guṇas, sattva, rajas and tamas, which are his inessential powers. His intrinsic nature is hidden by them. He creates the world with his powers or guṇas. They constitute māyā or prakṛti. Māyā is not an appearance. It is not the root of unreal names and forms or phenomenal appearances.\textsuperscript{18}

God is the infinite (ananta), eternal (nitya), imperishable (aṅkṣara), omnipresent (sarvagata), omniscient (sarvajña), and omnipotent (vaśi) creator, preserver and destroyer of the universe (tajjalān). He is the inner guide of the world and finite selves. He is their master, ruler, and moral governor. He is sinless (apāpaviddha), pure (śuddha), moral (dharmya), holy (pūta) and perfect (pūrina). He is of true desire (satyakāma) and true resolve (satyasaṅkalpa). He is the eternal embodiment of moral perfection. He does not become perfect by righteous actions. Nor does he become imperfect by unrighteous actions.\textsuperscript{18} He is our maker, friend and moral governor.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{17} Dharmāvahatam pāpanudam bhageśam. Svet. Up., vi. 6, vi. 11. Kāth. Up., i. 3, 11; ii. 3, 8; ii. 2, 13; ii. 1, 5; Br. Up., iv. 4, 24; Chānd. Up., iv. 15, 2-4.
\textsuperscript{18} Indro māyābhī pararūpa ībate. Br. Up., ii. 5, 19.
\textsuperscript{18} Sa na sādhana karmanā bhāyān na evasādūmnā kanyān. Br. Up., iv. 4, 22; Chānd. Up., iii. 24, 2; vii. 1, 5; vii. 7, 1; iii. 14, 2; Iṣa Up., 8; Kath. Up., i. 2, 13; ii. 3, 17; ii. 2, 8; Mānd. Up., ii. 2, 7, 10, 12; iii. 1, 5; i. 1, 6, 9; i. 2, 11, 13; ii. 1, 2; Maitrāyaṇī Up., ii. 4, 11.
\textsuperscript{11} Sa no bandhur janītaḥ sa vidhātā. Nārāyaṇopaniṣad, 4.
God is the creator of the Vedas, Rk, Sāma, Yajus, and Atharva. He is the author of the moral laws (vidhi). He is the protector of the moral order. He is the goal of our life. He is the highest end to be realized. He is the supreme way to life eternal.

Brahman is both indeterminate and determinate. In his transcendental aspect Brahman is devoid of attributes (nirguṇa). But in his relation to the world and the individual souls he is endowed with attributes (saguṇa). Śaṅkara regards the indeterminate and unqualified Brahman, which is the transcendental being, consciousness and bliss, as the ontological reality. He regards the determinate and qualified Brahman or Iśvara, the individual souls and the world as appearances. But Rāmānuja regards the determinate and qualified Brahman or Iśvara, who has internal difference, as the ontological reality. He regards the conscious souls and the unconscious world as attributes, modes or accessories of God. Both these interpretations are one-sided. The temporal and the eternal, the determinate and the indeterminate, the grounded and the ungrounded, the transcendent and the immanent both constitute Brahman. The world is the expression of his glory. The individual souls are his parts. The world partakes in his being. The finite souls partake in his consciousness and bliss. But Brahman transcends the known and the unknown in his inexpressible essence. He is indefinable, inconceivable, incomprehensible, immeasurable and extremely subtle in his transcendental aspect. His transcendental essence can be known by intuition (prajñāna) or spiritual illumination (ādhyātmayoga).

5. The Individual Soul (Jīvātman).

The individual soul (ātman) is different from the body, the sense-organs, manas and buddhi. The body is the chariot, which is guided by the self, which is the charioteer. The intellect (buddhi) is the driver. The manas is the bridle. The sense-organs are the horses. The objects apprehended by them are the field. The sense-organs are directed by the manas. The
mnas is directed by the buddhi. The buddhi is directed by the self. The manas is superior to the sense-organs. The buddhi is superior to the manas. The atman is superior to the buddhi. The body is its material vehicle. The sense-organs, manas and buddhi are its instruments of knowledge and action. It is their agent and master. It is a knower (jñātā), enjoyer (bhoktā), and active agent (kartā). It experiences joys and sorrows, which are the fruits of its actions. It is eternal, conscious and many. It is unborn and devoid of infinite knowledge and sovereignty. It is imperishable and immortal. It does not perish when its body dies. It is a disembodied, unborn and eternal spirit. It has no birth and death. It is unborn, eternal, immutable and ancient. It does not perish when the body dies. The atman associated with the sense-organs and manas is the individual self, that enjoys the fruits of its actions.

A finite self with an uncontrolled and impure mind and devoid of discrimination enters into bondage, and undergoes birth and death. But one with a controlled and pure mind and endowed with discrimination realizes Brahman, and is freed from bondage, birth and death. An individual self acquires merits and demerits by its righteous and unrighteous actions, and experiences happiness and misery. It becomes virtuous by right actions, and vicious by wrong actions. This implies that it has freedom of the will. The atman (jiva) has desire; as it desires, so it wills; as it wills, so it acts; as it acts, so it becomes. Its character is built on its desire and will. Virtue and vice are the results of free voluntary actions. They are the expressions of volitions. Volitions are prompted by desires chosen by the self. It acquires virtue and vice through its free moral and immoral actions.

It does not perish with its body. It transmigrates from one body to another. It is associated with an appropriate body,

**Atmendriyanamavuktam bhoktetyahur manishinah. Kaṭh. Up., i, 3. 4. Ibid, i. 3. 3. 9. 10. Nitya nityānām cetana cetanānām. Ibid, ii. 2. 13. Ajo nityāḥ sāvato'yaṁ purāno, na hanyate hanyāmāne śāitre. Ibid, i. 2. 18; Mund. Up., iii. 1. 1, 2; Svet. Up., i. 9. 10, 12.

**Kaṭh. Up., i. 3. 1, 7. 9; Mund. Up., iii. 1. 1, 2.


**Sadhuśāri sadhur bhavati pāpakāri pāpo bhavati. Ibid, iv. 4. 5.

**Kāmamaya evayaṁ puraśāḥ. Sa yathākāmo bhavati tatkrtur bhavati yat karmā sat karma kurute yat karma kurute tad abhisamādyate. Ibid, iv. 4. 8.
human, superhuman or subhuman in accordance with its merits and demerits. Just as corns wither away and germinate again, so mortal beings die and are reborn according to their moral deserts (yathākarma). It washes off merits and demerits, and acquires identity with God, when it knows him.

The individual soul has four conditions. In the waking condition it is called the Viśva, which knows and enjoys gross external objects through the external sense-organs. In the condition of dream it is called the Taijasa, which knows and enjoys subtle internal objects or cognitions through the manas. In the condition of dreamless sleep it is called the Prājñā, which is one homogeneous consciousness and bliss, which does not apprehend external objects and internal cognitions. In the fourth ecstatic (turiya) condition it is called the Ātman, which knows neither external objects nor internal cognitions, which is neither conscious nor non-consciousness. It is one, non-dual, transcendental consciousness. The Ātman is one universal super-consciousness. This Ātman is Brahman.

The individual self is encased in five sheaths (koṣa). The body and the sense-organs constitute its bodily sheath (annamaya koṣa), which is sustained by food. The self is first identified with its body and its senses. Within the bodily sheath there is the vital sheath (prāṇamaya koṣa). The vital forces (prāṇa), which animate the body, are its parts. The vital sheath is composed of the vital forces. It is sustained by them. The self is identified with the vital forces, which maintain the body. Within the vital sheath there is the mental sheath (monomaya koṣa), which depends on the manas. Volitions directed to selfish ends constitute the mental sheath. The self is identified with manas and its functions. Within the mental sheath there is the intellectual sheath (vijñānamaya koṣa), which depends on the intellect and its functions. Discriminative knowledge, which depends upon the distinction of subject and object, constitutes the intellectual sheath. The self is identified with the intellect and its knowledge involving distinction of subject and object. Within the intellectual sheath there is the blissful sheath (ānandamaya koṣa). Subject-objectless consciousness and

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**Kath. Up., ii. 2. 7. Chând. Up., v. 10. 7.**

**Mañj. Up., iii. 4. 3.**

**Mañj. Up., i. 2-4. Ayam Ātmā brahma. i. 2.**
bliss constitute the blissful sheath. Ananda is absolute freedom. It is infinite and non-empirical. It is not pleasure or joy due to the intercourse of the sense-organs or the manas with empirical objects. Ananda does not constitute a sheath of the self. But it constitutes the very essence of the self. The self with its transcendental consciousness and bliss or freedom is the Atman or Brahman. The Atman, the inner core of the empirical self, is absolute freedom (ananda). It is identical with Brahman. The intellectual self is the knower and doer. It guides the external sense-organs and the manas. It is founded in the supreme imperishable Atman or Brahman. When it knows the supreme Atman, it becomes omniscient. The nondual blissful Atman cannot be comprehended by the manas, and described by speech.

Brahman or the Atman resides in the cavity of the heart. The Atman is the transcendental Self, which is the inner Soul (antarātmā) of the empirical self. It is the imperishable Brahman. It is super-moral, non-temporal, and non-causal. It is full of bliss. When the individual self knows it by meditative trance, it is filled with bliss. A mortal person lives not through life, but through the Atman in which it abides. There is God, the self-luminous Lord of the past and the future, within the individual self. When it purges off all its impurities and knows Brahman, Isvara, or Atman within it, it becomes Atman. The intellectual self (jīvātman) becomes identical with the supreme infinite Self. The infinite Self, God, or Brahman within the individual self is to be realized. There is a thin distinction between the individual self and the supreme self in the earlier Upaniṣads.


'Two birds, friendly to each other, sit in the same tree. One eats the sweet fruit thereof, while the other merely looks on. The jīva deluded by lack of freedom and sovereignty

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93 Tait. Up., ii. 9.
94 Vijñānamayaśca ātma pare' vyāye sarva ekabhavanti. Mund. Up., iii. 2. 7. iii. 1. 7. Kaṭh. Up., i. 2. 13, 14, 16; ii. 1. 12, 13, 15; ii. 2. 5, ii. 3. 17.
sorrows. But when it sees the adorable Lord and his glory, it is freed from misery'. When it sees the luminous Lord, it is purged of merits and demerits, becomes tasteless and pure, and attains identity with him. The individual soul and the supreme soul both reside in the cavity of the heart of the same body as darkness and light. The former experiences the fruits of actions, and feels happiness and misery. The latter does not experience them, but merely looks on as an indifferent spectator. When the jīva, the enjoyer of fruits of actions, knows God within him, he sheds all fear. Brahman, Īśvara, or Ātman, the inner Soul and guide within the individual self, is not affected by its joys and sorrows, merits and demerits, attachment and aversion.

Both are unborn and eternal. The supreme soul is omniscient and omnipotent. The individual soul is ignorant and impotent. Its sorrow and bondage are due to its ignorance and impotence. Sometimes freedom of the individual soul is admitted. It becomes virtuous by righteous actions. It becomes vicious by unrighteous actions. Sometimes its freedom of the will is denied, and immanence of God is over-emphasized. He is all-doer (sarva-karmā). He causes those jīvas to do right actions, whom he desires to elevate from these worlds. He causes those jīvas to do wrong actions, whom he desires to degrade from them.

Some texts clearly show the identity of the individual soul with the supreme soul. 'I am the person who dwells within the sun'. 'This Ātman is Brahman.' 'That thou art'. 'One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman'. 'The jīva, who realizes Brahman, delights in the Self (ātmarati), becomes united with the Self (ātmamithuna), enjoys bliss in the self (ātmānanda), and becomes sovereign of his self (svarāt)'. 'One who knows Brahman, delights in himself (ātmarati), and sports with himself (ātmakriḍā)'. 'One who purges off merits and demerits,'}

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93 Mund. Up., iii. 1. 1-2; Svet. Up., iv. 6, 7.
94 Mund. Up., iii. 1. 3.
95 Kaṭh. Up., i. 3. 1; ii. 1. 5, 12, 13; ii. 2. 11-13.
96 Svet. Up., i. 9; iv. 9; Mund. Up. iii. 1. 2.
97 Br. Up., iii. 2. 13.
attains perfect identity with Brahman.' "The individual soul, that knows the Lord, is divested of its names and forms, and attains him, even as rivers merge in the sea leaving their names and forms.' "One who makes any distinction is haunted by fear. But one who realizes identity, becomes fearless.'

"I am Brahman.'

"Aksara Brahman is the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, the unknown knower. There is no other seer, no other hearer, no other thinker, no other knower than this. This is thy Self, the immortal inner controller.' "There is no plurality here. One who sees plurality, as it were, here, meets death after death.'\(^{103}\) 'So long as knowledge of duality (dvaita) persists, the individual self sees another thing, smells another thing, hears another thing, speaks another thing, knows another thing, as it were. But when it realizes one Atman in all things, the distinction between it and the Atman vanishes, and one Atman shines as the knower'. "When one realizes its identity with Brahman or Atman, it does not see, hear, smell, taste, touch, think, and know anything distinct from itself'. "The individual soul becomes identified with the universal self (atman)'. "Where there is duality, as it were, one sees, smells, tastes, hears, speaks, touches, thinks and knows another entity distinct from oneself. But where all become one Atman, who will see, smell, taste, hear, speak, touch, think and know what? Who can know that through which one knows all?'\(^{104}\) These texts treat duality of subject and object, distinction of the individual soul and the supreme soul, and plurality and difference of things and selves as appearances.

But there are some texts, which clearly show the difference of the individual self and the universal self. 'Brahman who exists in the self (atman), yet who is different from it, whom it does not know, whose body it is, who guides it from within, is thy Atman, immortal inner controller'. "The individual self attains immortality by knowing the inner guide as different from it.' "God is the Lord of the individual souls, who are the masters of the sense-organs'. 'God and the individual soul both are

\(^{103}\) Isa Up., 16; Br. Up., ii. 5. 14; iv. 4. 25; Chând. Up., vii. 25. 2; Mund. Up., iii. 1. 3, 4; iii. 2. 8-8.

\(^{104}\) Br. Up., iii. 8. 11; iv. 3. 24-30; iii. 7. 23; iv. 4. 19. Kâth. Up., ii. 1. 11.
eternal. God is omniscient and omnipotent. The individual soul is ignorant and dependent. 'God endowed with the power of māyā creates the world. The individual soul is bound by māyā.' 'God is the Lord of prakṛti and individual souls.' 'He is the eternal Lord among eternal souls. He is the supreme conscious Being among many conscious beings. He is the one Lord, who fulfils the desires of many souls.' 'The individual soul and Brahman reside in the same body. The one eats its sweet fruits. The other does not eat, but only looks on.' 'God moves within the individual soul (akṣara), which is his body, whom it does not know, and is the inner Self of all created beings, the one, sinless, luminous Nārāyaṇa'. These texts show the difference between the individual self and Brahman or God. 'The liberated soul enjoys all objects of desire with omniscient Brahman.' It retains its integrity, and remains distinct from Brahman. It does not become identical with the supreme Self. Saṅkara stresses the 'identity' texts (abhedaśruti). Rāmānuja emphasizes the 'difference' texts (bhedaśruti). Nimbārka reconciles them with one another, and advocates the doctrine of identity-in-difference.


Ignorance (avidyā) is non-discrimination of the eternal and the non-eternal. Knowledge (vidyā) is discrimination between them. Avidyā is knowledge of distinction, plurality, and individuality. It is intellectual knowledge involving distinction of subject and object. It is knowledge of things limited by time and space, and determined by causality. Vidyā is intuition of identity. It is above intellectual knowledge. It is not determined by time, space and causality. Avidyā is the sphere of actions, which spring from the knowledge of plurality. Vidyā is the sphere of higher knowledge of identity. Avidyā is the cause of bondage and transmigration. Vidyā is the cause of liberation from bondage.188

The individual soul's individuality is due to avidyā. It erroneously identifies itself with the body, the sense-organs, the

184 Br. Up., iii. 7. 22; Svet. Up., i. 5; vi. 9; i. 9; iv. 9; iv. 6; vi. 13;
Suhāla Up., vii. 1.
188 Tait., ii. 1.
188 Isā Up., 9-11; Br. Up., iv. 4. 10; Kath. Up., i. 1. 6; i. 2. 4. 5.
manas, and the buddhi, and is entangled in bondage. When it knows its identity with Brahman or Atman, it realizes its innate freedom. Actions, which spring from avidyā, cannot lead to liberation. Knowledge of the Atman is liberation.\textsuperscript{187}

Actions (karma), concentration of mind (yoga), devotion (bhaktī), and knowledge (jñāna) are the means to the attainment of liberation (mokṣa). But knowledge is the pre-eminent means. The duties should be performed with knowledge that God pervades the world. One who performs his duties is not entangled in them. Prescribed duties should be performed throughout life. But actions are non-eternal; their fruits are non-eternal. Performance of duties leads to the attainment of heaven, which is non-eternal. Eternal Brahman cannot be attained by performance of duties. One who realizes the non-eternal nature of their fruits, acquires detachment, and seeks knowledge of the eternal Atman. Prescribed duties are a shaky boat to cross the ocean of sāṃśāra with.\textsuperscript{188} Actions spring from desires. Happiness springs from fulfilment of desires. Earthly and heavenly happiness is agreeable (preyās). But realization of the Atman is the highest good (sreyās), which can be achieved by extinguishing desires.\textsuperscript{189} Freedom from desires gives true happiness. The mind is the cause of bondage and liberation. An impure mind is the cause of bondage. A pure mind is the cause of liberation. A mind tainted by desires for pleasure is impure. A mind free from the taint of desires for pleasure is pure. A mind attached to objects of enjoyment produces bondage. A mind detached from them produces liberation. Purity of mind destroys merits and demerits, which are the fruits of righteous and unrighteous actions.\textsuperscript{118} Egoism is the cause of bondage. Egolessness is the cause of liberation. Selfishness is bondage. Selflessness is liberation.\textsuperscript{111} Immortality cannot be achieved by performance of prescribed duties, gift of wealth, or procreation of children, but by renunciation (tyāga)

\textsuperscript{187} Br. Up., iv. 4. 23; i. 4. 2; Čhānd. Up., iii. 14. 4; iv. 14. 3; vii. 4. 3; viii. 4. 1; viii. 12. 1; Taitt. Up., ii. 4; Munḍ. Up., iii. 2. 4. 8. HIP., Vol. II., pp. 436-39.
\textsuperscript{189} Kaṭh. Up., i. 2. 2-20.
\textsuperscript{118} Maitrāyaṇī Up., iv. 3. 4. 6. 11; Brahmabindu Up., 1. 2; Maitreyī Up., i. 5. 6. Nirnaysagar Press, Bombay, 1925.
\textsuperscript{111} Paṅgala Up., iv. 19; Varāha Up., ii. 43. Bombay, 1925.
only. One who has renounced all desires (niṣkāma), is free from desires (akāma), and completely fulfilled (āptakāma). One whose desires for happiness are worn out (jñānakāma) and directed to the Ātman (ātmakāma), are completely fulfilled (āptakāma). Extinction of desire for sons (puttraiśanā), desire for wealth (vittaiśanā), and desire for power in this world (lokaiśanā) is necessary for realization of the Ātman. This is the note of asceticism.

Discipline of body and mind and practice of yoga purify the mind, and make it fit for acquiring knowledge of the Ātman. Penances (tapas) generate purity of mind. Sense-control (śama), mind-control (dama), withdrawal of the senses from their objects (uparatī), endurance of physical hardships (tītikṣā), and trance due to meditation (samādhi) are pre-requisites for the intuitive realization of the Ātman within the individual self. The sixfold yoga consisting of breath-control (prāṇāyāma), withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects (pratyāhāra), fixation of the mind on parts of the body (dharāṇā), reflection in harmony with the Vedas (tarka), meditation (dhyāna), and trance (samādhi) are prescribed. Bodily posture (āsanā) also is mentioned, but not included in the sixfold yoga. The eightfold yoga consisting of yama, niyama, posture of body (āsanā), breath-control (prāṇāyāma), withdrawal of the senses from their objects (pratyāhāra), fixation of the mind (dharāṇā), meditation (dhyāna), and trance (samālhi) mentioned by Patañjali in the Yogasūtra is prescribed. There are ten yamas: non-injury (ahimsā), truthfulness (satya), non-stealing (āsteya), sex-restraint (brahmacarya), compassion (dayā), sincerity (ārjava), forgiveness (kṣamā), firmness in the knowledge that 'I am Ātman' (dharma), temperance in eating (mitāhāra), and cleanliness (saucha) of body and mind. Non-injury, truthfulness, sex-restraint and non-stealing should be rigidly observed in body, mind and speech. There are ten niyamas: penance (tapas), contentment (santoṣa), faith in the scriptures (āstikya), charity (dana), worship of God (īśvaraprājana), listening to the scrip-

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112 Br. Up., iv. 4. 6; Kaivalya Up., 3; Nārāyaṇa Up., xii. 3. Bombay, 1925.
113 Br. Up., iii. 5. 1; Subāla Up., 13. Bombay, 1925.
114 Maitreyī Up., 1. 2; Kaivalya Up., 1. 4.
tures (siddhāntaśravaṇa), shame at immoral actions (hṛi), reverence for the Vedas (śraddhā), recitation of mantra (japa), and vows (vrata).¹¹⁷

Devotion to God (bhakti) also is a means of liberation. The Ātman cannot be realized by the teaching or the study of the Vedas or the power of retaining them. He can be realized by one, whom he chooses, and to whom he reveals his real nature. One who is devoid of attachment realizes the glory of the Ātman or the Lord through his grace, and becomes free from sorrow.¹¹⁸ God reveals himself to those, who have supreme devotion to him, and take refuge in him. Knowledge of Brahman can never be attained without devotion.¹¹⁸

Knowledge is the supreme means of liberation. One who knows Brahman, attains the supreme goal. One who knows Brahman, becomes Brahman.¹²⁸ Brahman is Ātman. The Ātman should be seen, heard, reflected and meditated on, because it is the dearest of all, and because by knowing it the whole world is known. We should meditate on the dear Ātman. We should pray to the Ātman. We should know the Ātman only, and give up all other talks. By knowing one Ātman in all creatures one becomes immortal.¹³¹ One who consciously lives in Brahman, attains immortality.¹³²

The Ātman cannot be known by the senses. It cannot be known by reason (tarka). It is incomprehensible by discursive thought (vijñāna). It can be known by intuition (prajñāna), which is above reason (vijñāna). It can be known by meditative trance (adhyātmayoga). Intuition can be attained by non-commission of sins, control of the senses, concentration of mind, and abstention from sensual pleasures. The senses should be subordinated to the manas, the manas to the buddhi, and the buddhi to the Ātman. When the mind is completely concent-

¹¹⁷ Sāndhya Up., i, 2. Jāvaladarśana Up., i, 5, 6; ii, 1.
¹²⁶ Br. Up., ii, 4, 5; i, 4, 18; iv, 5, 6; Mūnd. Up., ii, 2, 5, 6.
trated on the Ātman, and absorbed in it, and identified with it (bhāgavatena cetasā), it can know it. The Ātman reveals itself to one whose mind becomes pure. It can be realized by pure knowledge (visuḍhḍa jñāna). It can be realized by integral knowledge (samyagjñāna), when the mind is purged of all afflictions, attachment, aversion and the other emotions and passions, and freed from all desires. One who abstains from sensual pleasures, concentrates his mind on Brahman, and is contented with supreme knowledge, enters into Brahman. Discrimination of happiness (preyās) and the highest good (sreyās), renunciation of enjoyments, extinction of desires, and purity of mind lead to the saving knowledge. 123

Mokṣa is freedom from bondage. Avidyā is bondage. Vidyā is mokṣa. Vidyā is knowledge of Brahman or Ātman in oneself and in all creatures. It is intuitive realization of one infinite, eternal, universal Spirit. Knowledge of Brahman is becoming Brahman. Mokṣa is becoming Brahman (brahmapān). It is becoming all (sarvabhāva). It is the vision of one Self in all (ekātmadāraśana). It is the vision of the Self of the universe (sarvātmabhāvadāraśana). It is life eternal (amṛta). It is a state of identity (śāmya, ekatva) of the individual self with the supreme self. It is free from love, hatred, delusion, joy, sorrow, and fear. It is free from merits and demerits. It is a state of supermoral transcendental purity. It is eternal peace (śāsvatā śanti). It is indefinable supreme bliss. It is a sense of perfect fulfilment (kṛtakṛtya). It is a state of delight in the Ātman (ātmakriḍā), and union with it (ātmamithuna). It is complete autonomy (svārājya) or freedom (ānanda). It is a sense of oneness, devoid of duality and plurality. It is pure subject-objectless consciousness. It is a state of supreme wisdom, selfless will, and ineffable bliss. One who is free from all desires attains immortality on earth. One who lives, moves, and has his being in Brahman, becomes immortal. One who knows the Ātman hidden in one's heart enjoys all objects of desire with Brahman. 124

123Ma Up., 6; Kath. Up., i. 2, 8, 9, 12, 24; ii. 3, 9, 14; i. 3, 7-9;
Mund. Up., i. 2, 13; ii. 2, 3; iii. 1, 5, 8, 9; iii. 2, 2, 6.
124Ma Up., 6, 7; Kath. Up., i. 2, 12, 13; ii. 2, 12-14; ii. 3, 14, 15;
Mund. Up., ii. 1, 10; iii. i. 3, 4; iii. 2, 7, 8, 9; Chānd. Up., vii. 25. 2;
viii. 3. 4; Tait. Up., ii. 1.
8. The World.

The world is real. It is the expression of the glory of Brahman. It springs from him, is sustained by him, and absorbed in him. All created beings abide in him, originate in him, and are founded in him. Brahman is the cause of names and forms or determinate objects. It existed in an unmanifest condition in Brahman before creation. It was made manifest by him. The world is pervaded by Brahman. It is his cloth, as it were, tinged with yellow colour. The past, the present, and the future are Brahman. The south, the north, the east, the west, up and down are Brahman. The whole spatio-temporal order is Brahman. It exists in him. It has its root in Brahman, who transcends it. The uniformities of nature are controlled by his will. The world is permeated by the divine spirit.

The origin of the world is traced to creation or emanation. All creatures come out from the Ātman or Brahman, as sparks come out from fire, as plants shoot forth on the earth, as hairs spring from a living body, or as threads come out from the body of a spider. The world emanates from the fulness of Brahman, and returns to it. This is the doctrine of emanation. The material elements,—ether, air, light, water, and earth,—life, the sense-organs, and manas spring from Brahman. The rivers, seas, mountains, and plants spring from him. Plants, vital forces, and corns spring from him. Gods, men, beasts, and birds spring from him. The Vedas, Rk, Sāma and Yajus spring from him. The moral laws (vidhi) and duties (karma) spring from him. Brahman is the source of the cosmic order and the moral order.

Brahman ejects the world out of himself, and withdraws it into himself, even as a spider ejects threads out of its own body, and withdraws it. Brahman creates the world out of his own nature, and absorbs it in himself. He does not create it
out of pre-existing material. There was one Ātman before creation. There was nothing else. He resolved: 'I shall create the worlds.' He created the worlds. He created the formed and the formless, the subtle and the gross. Ether was created out of the Ātman; air was created out of ether; fire was created out of air; water was created out of fire; earth was created out of water; and plants were created out of earth. The world was in an unmanifest (avyākṛta) condition in Brahman. He made it manifest (vyākṛta). He created names and forms or multiform objects. He manifested them. He differentiated them, which were in an undifferentiated condition. Creation or evolution is transition from an undifferentiated to a differentiated state. 'Names and forms' (nāma-rūpa) do not appear to mean appearances, though Śaṅkara takes them in the sense of appearances.

- The Śvetāsvatara, a later Upaniṣad, advocates theism, and refers to the creation of the world by God out of māyā or prakṛti, which is constituted by his various powers. God is the Lord of prakṛti and individual souls. He is endowed with māyā. Māyā is prakṛti. God, possessed of māyā, creates the world. His powers are supreme and various. These powers constitute māyā or prakṛti, which is real. One God creates diverse objects by means of his various powers. He conceals himself with the products of prakṛti by nature, as a spider conceals itself with its own threads. God, the great magician, creates and rules over all worlds with his various governing powers. Prakṛti is one, unborn, composed of sattva, rajas, and tamas, and mutable. It creates many similar products out of these gunās. Though God is devoid of sattva, rajas, and tamas (nirguna), they are his powers by which he conceals his essential nature,

127 Yathorpaṇanābhibhūṣjate grīṁate ca. Mūḍi. Up., i. 1. 7.
128 Ait. Up., i. 1.
129 Taitt. Up., ii. 1, 6, 7.
131 Taddhādham taryagyākṛtam āṣīt tānmārāpāḥbhāvyāṃ eva vyākriyāyatānam. Br. Up., i. 4. 7.
132 Māyāṃ tu prakṛtīnāṃ vidyān māyinām tu maheśvaram. Śvet. Up., iv. 10.
133 Māyāṃ sṛjate viśvam. Ibid. iv. 9. Parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śāṅkara. Ibid., vi. 8.
134 Ibid, iv. 1; vi. 10; iii. i. Atharvaśīra Up., 4.
135 Ajāṁ ekāṁ lohitāśeklakṛṣṇaṁ bhūtiḥ prajāḥ sṛjamanām sarūpāḥ. Ibid., iv. 5; i. 10.
and creates the world. He is the ruler of the guṇas.\textsuperscript{138} This concept of prakṛti is different from the Sāṅkhya concept. Here prakṛti is the power of God. But the Sāṅkhya does not believe in God. Prakṛti, according to it, is composed of sattva, rajas, and tamas, unborn, eternal, and mutable, but independent of God, who is non-existent.

Brahman is the infinite and eternal consciousness devoid of sattva, rajas, and tamas. Prakṛti, composed of the guṇas, is his own power (svaśakti). He creates the world out of his own power or prakṛti. Prakṛti is the conscious power of God, which can create the multiform world of various objects.\textsuperscript{139}

The Subāla Upaniṣad gives the following account of creation and dissolution of the world. ‘There was neither being, nor non-being, nor being and non-being both. From this tamas was created. Primal matter (bhūtādi) was created out of tamas. Ether was created out of bhūtādi. Air was created out of ether. Fire was created out of air. Water was created out of fire. Earth was created out of water’. ‘All creatures are dissolved in earth. Earth is dissolved in water. Water is dissolved in fire. Fire is dissolved in air. Air is dissolved in ether. Ether is dissolved in the sense-organs. The sense-organs are dissolved in the subtle essences (tanmātra). The subtle essences are dissolved in primal matter (bhūtādi). Primal matter is dissolved in mahat. Mahat is dissolved in avyakta. A vyakta is dissolved in akṣara. Akṣara is dissolved in tamas. Tamas merges in the supreme Lord (para deva). Beyond is neither being, nor non-being, nor being and non-being both.\textsuperscript{140} A vyakta is prakṛti. Akṣara is Brahmā or Ṛṣi puruṣa. Para Brahma, Apara Brahma or Iśvara, tamas, Akṣara, avyakta, mahat or cosmic intellect, primal matter (bhūtādi), the five tanmātras, and the five material elements constitute the order of creation. A similar account of cosmic creation is found in the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas. The Sāṅkhya theory of cosmic evolution resembles it. Only the Sāṅkhya does not believe in God or Brahmā. The five tanmātras are mentioned.\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid. vi. 10, 11, 16.
\textsuperscript{139} Nānāavictranirmanāpanasāmarthyabuddhirāpā prakṛtīb. Nirālamba Up., Bombay, 1925, p. 217.
\textsuperscript{140} Subāla Up., 1, 2.
\textsuperscript{141} Praś. Up., iv. 8; Maitrāyaṇī Up., iii. 2.
tioned as the constituents of prakṛti. Puruṣa, Ātman, or Brahman is higher than avyakta or prakṛti.

The doctrines of triplication (trīṣṭikaraṇa) and quintuplication (pañcikaraṇa) are suggested. The elements of fire, water and earth are combined in such a manner that one of them becomes the principal element while the other two become subordinate elements. In fire the element of fire is the principal element, and earth and water are the subordinate elements. In water the element of water is the principal element, and earth and fire are the subordinate elements. In earth the element of earth is the principal element, and water and fire are the subordinate elements. This is called the doctrine of triplication of elements. The doctrine of quintuplication is mentioned.

Earth is modified into various kinds of earthen vessels. Earth is the reality of these modifications. Iron is modified into various kinds of articles. Iron is the reality of these modifications. Black iron is modified into various kinds of things. Black iron is the reality of these modifications. A modification is a mere word, a mere name. Śaṅkara cites the text in support of his doctrine of Vivartavāda, which regards the cause, Brahman, as real, and the effect, the world, as an unreal appearance. Rāmānuja cites it in support of his doctrine of Satkāryavāda, which regards the cause, Brahman, as real, and the effect, the world, as a modification of Brahman. Brahman is unmodified in his essential nature, but he is modified in his inessential nature as modes. The cause and the effect both are real. The effect cannot exist apart from its cause. It is a modification of its cause.

The philosophy of the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas is a synthesis of the absolutism of the Upaniṣads and the Śaṅkhya dualism of prakṛti and puruṣas or individual souls. The blend of absolutism and dualism is found in the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad. It is a later Upaniṣad which advocates theism. The concepts of prakṛti and puruṣas supervised by God find prominence in it. The germs of Saivism are found in it. It makes an attempt to
synthesize the dualism of prakṛti and puruṣas with the monism of Brahman.

9. The Philosophy of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.

The Śvetāśvatara regards Śiva as Brahman. He is also called Rudra, Hara, and Maheśvara. Theism is the predominant note of this Upaniṣad.¹⁴⁸ Brahman is the Lord (iṣa). He is the Lord of prakṛti and individual souls.¹⁴⁹ There are three eternal realities, the omniscient (jñā) and omnipotent Lord (iṣa), the ignorant (ajñā) and non-sovereign (aniṣa) individual souls (ajñā), and one eternal prakṛti, the root-evolvent of multiform objects of experience. But these three principles are the forms of Brahman, the infinite Self, which is not an agent.¹⁵⁰ The Lord, the individual souls, and prakṛti are not independent realities. The indeterminate, attributeless, and impersonal Brahman is the ultimate reality. The Lord is the eternal among the eternal realities, the omniscient soul among the intelligent souls.¹⁵¹ He is the reality in prakṛti and individual souls. The supreme Brahman (paraṁ brahma) is the impersonal reality, which is the imperishable foundation of the triad of the Lord, prakṛti and individual souls.¹⁵² Prakṛti is mutable (kṣara). The Lord is immutable (aṅkṣara). He rules over prakṛti and the individual souls.¹⁵³ Brahman is manifested in three forms, the experiencing souls, the world of experience, and the Lord, who impels them both, and brings about the souls' experience of the world.¹⁵⁴

God is one, infinite, eternal, omnipresent, self-luminous Self. He is unageing, ancient, self-caused and immortal. He is the supreme reality, without equal or superior, origin or end. He is the uncaused cause, the First cause. He is unborn and eternal. He is the creator, preserver, protector, and destroyer of the world. He is the knower of the universe, illumines it

¹⁴⁸ i. 10; iii. 2, 4, 5; iv. 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 21, 22; v. 14; vi. 7.
¹⁴⁹ Pradhānakṣetra-jñāpatis ganeśah. vi. 16.
¹⁵⁰ Jñājaiva dvājāvānājāvājā, hyekā bhoktirbhogyārthayuktā, ananta-scátmā viśvarūpo byakartā, trayam yadā vindate brahman etat. 1. 9.
¹⁵¹ Nityo nityāṇam cetanā cetanāṁ, vi. 13.
¹⁵² Udghātan etat paramaṁ tu brahma, Taśminstrayam supratiṣṭhākṣaraṁ ca. i. 7.
¹⁵³ i. 10.
¹⁵⁴ Bhoktā bhogyam preritāraṁ ca matvā, Sarvam prakīrṇam trividhanā brahman etat. i. 12.
with his knowledge, and rules over it. He is the supreme God above all gods, and the supreme Lord above all lords. He creates, controls, and maintains the world by his powers, and withdraws it into himself. He supports the universe perishable and imperishable, manifest and unmanifest. He reveals the Vedas.

God is spaceless, timeless, and causeless. He is minuter than the minutest, greater than the greatest, formless and motionless. The past, the present, and the future are nothing but the supreme Lord. But he transcends them as the Lord of immortality. He is beyond the threefold time. He is the creator and destroyer of time. He envelopes the entire universe, and exists beyond it. He is immanent and transcendent.

God is the inner Self of all creatures (sarvabhuṭāntarātma). He is hidden in their hearts. He is their abode. He is their inner controller. He does not act, but he impels them to act. He is one and partless. He is the immanent Self in all individual selves,—the infinite light of consciousness. He is self-luminous, and illumines the universe by his knowledge. He is devoid of sense-organs, and yet he knows all. He is not known as an object by any one.

God is good. He is endowed with all good qualities. He is the repository of all sciences. He is the foundation of all knowledge. He is inactive, perfect, faultless and spotless. He is calm and free from pain. He is eternally fulfilled. He is the foremost being, consciousness, and bliss. He is the infinite and eternal pure consciousness.

God is the adorable Lord, endowed with the powers of sovereignty. He has manifold supreme powers. His knowledge, strength, and action are natural and spontaneous. He is the giver of boons. He matures the merits and demerits of the individual souls, and makes them enjoy and suffer according to their deserts. He dwells in their hearts as the inner Self, as a spectator, while the souls enjoy and suffer according

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138 i. 3, 4, 8; ii. 4, 15-17; iii. 2, 9, 10, 14, 15, 21; v. 13; vi. 2, 7-9, 11, 16, 17.
139 vi. 18.
140 iii. 9, 14, 15; iv. 14; vi. 2, 5, 16.
141 Sa vetti vedyam, na ca tasyāsti vettā. iii. 19.
142 i. 3, 4; iii. 11, 12, 19; vi. 11, 19; i. 11; iii. 10, 11; vi. 19.
143 Purāṣya śaktir vividhaiva śriyate.
144 Śvābhāviki jñānabalakriyā ca. vi. 8.
to their merits and demerits. God neither enjoys nor suffers. He is the source of righteousness and the destroyer of sins. He is endowed with all excellent qualities. He is the Witness and the Lord of the Law of Karma. He is the Friend and Refuge of all. This is theism.

Prakṛti is one, unborn, eternal, and composed of sattva, rajas, and tamas. It is the root-evolvent of the universe. It is modified into multiplicity of objects, which are the modifications of sattva, rajas, and tamas. Prakṛti is māyā. The Lord is possessed of the power of māyā. Prakṛti is real, but dependent on God. It is the power of God. The Lord of māyā creates the universe and the embodied souls. He creates the world out of his own power or prakṛti, and covers himself with its products, even as a spider makes a cobweb of threads drawn out of its own body. He manifests himself as the diverse world by his inscrutable power of māyā, and rules over it with his countless powers. He manifests himself in the world, and withdraws it into himself. He alone exists at the time of creation and dissolution. He conceals his power with sattva, rajas, and tamas, which are his own energy.

The individual souls are unborn and eternal. But they are associated with bodies by God. He is the creator of embodied souls. They are ignorant and dependent on God. They are neither male, nor female, nor neuter. They are disembodied souls, which assume various bodies according to their merits and demerits. Their connection with bodies is due to desire, contact, perception, and delusion. They are associated with the bodies composed of sattva, rajas, and tamas, perform actions for the sake of their fruits, experience happiness and misery, and transmigrate to other bodies according to their moral deserts. They forget their intrinsic divine nature, and identify themselves with their bodies. They are attached to prakṛti, and entangled in bondage. They experience its modifications, are detached from them, and become free. Ignorance is bondage. Knowledge is freedom. The individual souls are subtle, but they are capable of attaining infinitude.

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142 Māyām tu prakṛtīṁ vidvān māyināṁ tu maheśvaram. iv. 10; iv. 5.
143 Āsmān māyāḥ stīrtaḥ visvam etat. iv. 9.
144 vi. 10; iii. 1.
145 iv. 5; v. 7, 9-12.
"Two birds, inseparable friends, live in the same tree. One eats its sweet fruits, while the other looks on without eating them." The individual soul and the supreme soul live in the same body. God, the supreme soul, the inner guide of the individual soul, neither enjoys nor suffers, but merely witnesses the jīva's enjoyments and sufferings. But the jīva enjoys and suffers according to its deserts. The individual soul forgets its divine nature, is entangled in bondage, and suffers. But when it dispels avidyā, knows its inner Lord and his glory, it is relieved of misery and released. Ignorance is the cause of bondage. Knowledge is the cause of release.

Mokṣa is infinite peace, freedom from sorrow, eternal bliss. Extinction of desire is extinction of sorrow. Realization of the Ātman extinguishes sorrow. Mokṣa is merging of the individual soul in Brahman.

The Ātman, the supreme Self, can be known by concentrated mind and intellect, truthfulness and penance, meditation, and intuition. Posture, breath-control, fixation of mind on the heart, withdrawal of the senses from their objects, and yoga are the auxiliary means to the knowledge of the Ātman. Self-surrender (prapatti) and supreme devotion to the preceptor and God, and grace of God are necessary for acquiring saving knowledge.

Meditation on God leads to union with him, which dispels avidyā and appearance of the world. It generates knowledge of God, which destroys all afflictions (klesa). When they are destroyed, fetters are broken. Knowledge of God leads to immortality. There is no other way to achieve the goal. When darkness of ignorance is dispelled, the one imperishable and auspicious Lord shines; there remains neither being nor non-being. He can be known by intuition only. In the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad there is a blend of absolutism with theism, though theism is its predominant note.

10. The Germs of the Systems of Indian Philosophy in the Upaniṣads.

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117 iv. 6.  118 iv. 7; i. 8.  
119 iv. 11, 14; ii. 14; iii. 20; i. 7; vi. 12, 20.  
120 i. 3, 4, 10, 11, 16; ii. 2, 3, 8, 9, 11, 12; iii. 20; iv. 21; vi. 18, 21, 23.  
121 i. 10, 11; iii. 8, 13; iv. 18, 20.
The different schools of the Vedānta directly originate in the Upaniṣads, and try to interpret the important texts and harmonize them with one another in the light of their own doctrines.

Saṅkara, the founder of the Advaita Vedānta, emphasizes the texts that clearly show the identity of the individual soul with the supreme soul or Brahman. He takes names and forms (nāmarūpa) in the sense of appearances. He takes undeveloped, unmanifested, and undifferentiated names and forms (avyākṛta nāmarūpa) as māyā, the matrix of the world-appearance. He identifies avidyā with māyā. He regards modifications as mere words, names and forms, or appearances. He regards Brahman, the ground of the world, as real, and the world as a false appearance. He regards the individual souls (jīva) and God (Īśvara) or determinate and qualified Brahman also as phenomenal appearances. He regards indeterminate and unqualified Brahman as the ontological reality, which is an impersonal pure subject-objectless consciousness and bliss. He regards knowledge (jñāna) as the only means of liberation. Action (karma) is avidyā. Higher intuitive knowledge is vidyā. Knowing Brahman is being Brahman (brahmabhavana) and being all (sarbabhavana). Brahman or Ātman can be realized here on earth in an embodied condition, when avidyā is destroyed and desires are eradicated. There is gradual release (kramamukti). Worship of Īśvara gives gradual release. Intuition of Brahman gives embodied release (jīvanmukti).\textsuperscript{112}

'There is no plurality in this world'. 'Where is duality, as it were, one sees another'. 'One who sees plurality, as it were, meets death after death'. 'But where all is realized as one Ātman only, there is neither the knower nor the known'. 'All this is Ātman'. 'This Ātman is Brahman'. 'Brahman is veiled by falsehood. Though Brahman is true, it is covered by falsehood'. 'One who sees one Brahman does not meet death'. 'Brahman or Ātman is eternal, and cannot be attained by actions, which are non-eternal'. 'One who knows Brahman,

\textsuperscript{112} Kath. Up., ii. 1. 15; ii. 3. 9, 14; i. 2. 4; Isa Up., i. 2. 15; Mund. Up., i. 2. 7; ii. 1. 10; ii. 2. 5; iii. 1. 3, 5, 8; iii. 2. 5, 7, 8; Br. Up., iv. 4. 2, 5, 7, 10, 19-22, 25; iv. 5. 15; Chānd. Up., vi. 1. 4-6; vi. 3. 2-3; vi. 11. 3; vii. 23. 1; viii. 14. 1.
becomes Brahman’. ‘That thou art’. Such texts are the foundation of the Advaita Vedānta.

Rāmānuja, the founder of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, lays stress on the texts that indicate difference between the individual souls and the world, on the one hand, and Brahman, on the other. He identifies Brahman withĪśvara. ‘This Ātman is free from sin, old age, death, sorrow, hunger and thirst, desirous of truth, and resolved on truth.’ This text shows that God is devoid of impure qualities and possessed of excellent qualities. He is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world, the inner controller of the world and the individual souls (antaryāmin), and the Lord of the Law of Karma. He is the Lord of mutable prakṛti and immutable souls. He impels the world of enjoyable objects and experiencing souls. He is the eternal Soul among eternal souls. He is the conscious Soul among conscious souls. He is their supreme Lord. He fulfills the desires of many souls in accordance with their merits and demerits. He is their inner controller. They experience the fruits of their actions. But he merely looks on as an indifferent spectator. He does not experience their joys and sorrows. He dwells within the world and the selves, who is different from them, whom they do not know, whose body (śarira) they are and who guides them from within. The world and the individual souls are his body. He is their soul. They are inseparable from one another. There is inseparable relation among them.

God endowed with māyā creates the world. Māyā is prakṛti. It is the power of God. It is real and composed of sattva, rajas and tamas, which are divine energy. God has infinite multiform powers. They constitute prakṛti. God manifests the world and embodied souls, which exist in an unmanifest condition during dissolusion in Brahman. They exist in a causal state in him during dissolution. They exist

173 Br. Up., iv. 4, 5, 7, 10, 22, 25; iv. 3, 32; iv. 5, 7, 15; viii. 3, 1-2; Chānd. Up., vi. 12, 3; Kath. Up., ii. 1, 10, 11; i. 2, 10; HIP., Vol. II, Ch. VII.
175 Chānd. Up., iii. 14, 1; Svet. Up., vi. 16; i. 10; vi. 9; i. 12 vi. 13; i. 3, 4, 8; ii. 4, 15-17; iii. 2, 9, 10, 14, 15, 21; v. 2, 7-9; Kath Up., ii. 2, 13; Māṇḍ. Up., iii. 1, 1, 2; Br. Up., iii. 7. 3-22; Subāla Up., 7.
176 Svet. Up., iv. 9, 10; vi. 8.
in an effected state after creation. The world is real. It is rooted in Being. It abides in Being. It is grounded in Being. Being is Brahman. Rāmānuja advocates Sātkāryavāda. The effect pre-exists in its cause. It is its modification. Both cause and effect are real. The effect cannot exist apart from its cause. Brahman and the world both are real as cause and effect.

God is omniscient and omnipotent. The individual souls are ignorant and devoid of sovereignty over the world. He is their inner guide. They are eternal and immutable. Their bondage is due to their ignorance of God. Their liberation is due to their knowledge of God. Performance of duties (karma), devotion (bhakti), and knowledge (jñāna) lead to liberation. Release is essential similarity between the individual soul and Brahman. It is not identity.

The individual soul is minute, atomic, or monadic (ānu). It is a knower. It is not mere knowledge. It does not lose its knowerhood in the state of release.

The Sāṅkhya dualism of prakṛti and puruṣas can be traced to the Upaniṣads. If the concept of God is excluded from the philosophy of the Svetāsvatara Upaniṣad, it becomes the Sāṅkhya philosophy. There is one, unborn, mutable, eternal and unconscious prakṛti composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. Its products are objects of experience. They also are composed of the three guṇas. One puruṣa is entangled in bondage by erroneously identifying itself with prakṛti or its product, the mind-body-complex. Another puruṣa realizes its difference from prakṛti, gives up attachment for it, and is liberated. Avidyā or non-discrimination is the cause of bondage. Vidyā or discrimination is the cause of liberation.

The individual souls are eternal and conscious. They are not rulers (āṇśa) of the world. They are immortals (aṅkāra). They are enjoyers in the state of bondage. They are knowers (draṣṭā), witnesses (sākṣīn), and non-doers (akartā). They are devoid of merits and demerits. They are pure, taintless, and

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179 Svet. Up., i. 9; Munḍ. Up., iii. 1. 2.
180 Munḍ. Up., iii. 2. 8.
182 Bh. Up., iii. 7. 23; HIP., Vol. II, Ch. IX.
183 HIP., Vol. II, Ch. I.
devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas. They are, in their essential
nature, eternally pure, conscious, and liberated.134

Prakṛti is made of sattva, rajas and tamas. Mahat springs
from avyakta or prakṛti. Primal matter (bhūtādi) springs from
mahat. Five tanmātras or subtle essences spring from
bhūtādi. Ether springs from tanmātras. Air springs from ether.
Fire springs from air. Water springs from fire. Earth springs
from water. This is the order of creation. Dissolution is the
reverse process.135 Manas is superior to the sense-organs.
Buddhi is superior to manas. The Ātman is superior to buddhi.
Avyakta or prakṛti is superior to mahat or cosmic intellect.
Puruṣa is superior to avyakta. There is nothing higher than
puruṣa.136 The ŚāNKhya doctrine of atheism cannot be traced
to the Upaniṣads whose central concept is Brahman or Iśvara.
The ŚāNKhya doctrine of Satkāryavāda is found in the Upa-
niṣads. There was Being (sat) before creation. The world was
created out of Being. An effect is a real modification of its
cause. It cannot exist apart from its cause.137 The main
elements of the ŚāNKhya philosophy except atheism are found
in the Upaniṣads.

The Yoga philosophy can be traced to the Śvetāsvatara
Upaniṣad. God is the Lord of prakṛti and puruṣas. He is
devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas, taintless, and free from
merits and demerits. The individual souls are immutable and
eternal knowers. They are devoid of the guṇas. Prakṛti is
composed of sattva, rajas and tamas, mutable and eternal. It
is the root-evolvent of the world of knowable and enjoyable
objects. Non-discrimination of puruṣa and prakṛti is the cause
of bondage. Discrimination is the cause of liberation. Non-
discrimination is ignorance (avidyā). Discrimination is know-
ledge (vidyā). The individual self (puruṣa) can be known by
intuition due to meditation (adhyātmyoga). It cannot be
known by discursive knowledge (vijñāna), but by intuition

134 Śvet. Up., iv. 9, 10; i. 9; iv. 5; v. 7, 9-12; iv. 7, i. 8; vi. 13;
i. 10; Br. Up., iv. 3, 30; iii. 4, 2; iii. 7, 23; vi. 3, 9; ii. 4, 14; Chānd.
Up., vii. 26, 2; Muṇḍ. Up., iii. 1, 3; Mahānārāyaṇa Up., x. 5; Kath.
Up., i. 2, 4, 5, 12, 14.
135 Subāla Up., i. 2.
136 Kath. Up., i. 3, 10, 11.
137 Br. Up., iii. 2, 11; Chānd. Up., vi. 8, 6; vi. 2, 1; HIP., Vol. II,
Ch. 1.
(prajñāna). The Ātman is to be heard, reflected and meditated on. Nididhyāsana is meditation. Sama is sense-control. Dama is mind-control. Titikṣa is endurance of hardships. Uparati is withdrawal of the senses from their objects (pratyāhāra). Samādhi is absorption or trance. Yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and samādhi are mentioned. The practice of yoga is mentioned in the Upaniṣads.

The Nyāya ontology can be traced to the Upaniṣads. God is the omnipresent, omniscient, eternal and perfect Lord. He is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world. He is the Lord of the Law of Karma. He is the originator of the moral laws (vidhi). He is the creator of the Vedas. The individual souls are knowers (jñātā), enjoyers (bhoktā), and doers (kartā). The world is composed of earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, life, and organisms. The body is the vehicle of experience. It is an instrument of the self, which is its controller. The sense-organs are the organs of its knowledge. Manas is superior to the sense-organs. The self is superior to the manas and the sense-organs. The Nyāya doctrine of Asatkāryavāda is found in the Upaniṣads. "There was non-being at first, being was produced out of non-being." The effect does not pre-exist in its cause. The doctrine of creation of the world by God out of the pre-existing atoms of earth, water, fire, and air is not found in the Upaniṣads. Ignorance is the cause of bondage. Knowledge is the cause of liberation. Liberation is the pure state of the self free from merits and demerits, joys and sorrows, attachment and aversion.

The Vaiśeṣika ontology of nature, souls and God resembles the Nyāya ontology. The atoms are mentioned. "The self is

188 Svet. Up., i. 9, 12; vi. 13, 16; iv. 5; v. 7, 9-12; iv. 7; i. 8; i. 3, 4, 10; i. 11, 16; ii. 2, 3, 8, 9, 11, 12; iii. 20; iv. 21; Br. Up., iv. 4, 23; Iṣa Up., ii. 11; Kath. Up., i. 2, 4, 12, 14, 24; ii. 3, 9, 11; Amṛṭanāda Up., 6, 17, 19; Kaivalya Up., i. 4; Sabāla Up., 9; Sāṅgīyā Up., 1, 2; Jāvaladarśana Up., i. 5, 6; ii. 1; HIP., Vol. II, Ch. II.

189 Mund. Up., i. 1, 6, 7, 9; ii. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7; ii. 2, 7; Iṣa Up., 8; Svet. Up., vi. 11; Chānd. Up., vi. 14, 1.

190 Kath. Up., i. 3, 4; Ait. Up., iii. 1, 2; Br. Up., v. 4, 2; ii. 4, 14; iii. 4, 2; iii. 7, 23; iv. 3, 23, 30.

191 Kath. Up., i. 3, 3, 4, 10; ii. 3, 7, 8; Ait. Up., iii. 3.

192 Asad vā idam agra āsit. Tato vai sad ajāyata. Tait. Up., ii. 7.

193 Chānd. Up., vi. 1, 1.

194 Mund. Up., i. 2, 8; ii. 1, 10; iii. 1, 2, 3; Iṣa Up., 9, 10, 11.
subtler than atoms'. The Vaiśeṣika categories cannot be traced to the Upaniṣads.

The Mīmāṃsā atheism is foreign to the spirit of the Upaniṣads. Its philosophy of nature and souls resembles the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Karma is the chief means of liberation. The Upaniṣads recognize it as a means of mokṣa. The Mīmāṃsā doctrine of eternity of sounds may be traced to eternity of the sound 'Om', which is identical with Brahman. The past, the present, and the future constitute 'Om'. What transcends the three times constitutes 'Om', which is eternal. The chief elements of the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy are found in the Upaniṣads.

The Cārvāka doctrine of the self as identical with the body, non-existence of future life, and pleasure as the highest good is mentioned in the Upaniṣads, and it is criticized by them. The Buddhist doctrine of impermanence is the antithesis of the Upaniṣadīc doctrine of eternity of Brahman or Ātman. It is a variant of the Upaniṣadīc doctrine of non-eternity of all that is not Ātman. Avidyā is the cause of bondage according to both. Knowledge of the non-eternal body, vital forces, and the sense-organs, the manas and the buddhi as the eternal Ātman is avidyā according to the Upaniṣads. Knowledge of the eternal and permanent is avidyā according Buddhism, which regards the Ātman as a flux of impermanent bodily processes and cognitions, feelings and volitions. The Jaina doctrine of manifoldness of reality may be traced to the Upaniṣadīc doctrine of Brahman as the synthesis of contradictory qualities. Brahman is static and dynamic, immobile and mobile, far and near, subtle and great. The Jaina regards the reality as multiform. The Cārvāka, the Buddhist and the Jaina reject the authority of the Vedas, and deny the existence of Brahman. They are the heterodox schools of Indian philosophy.

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194 Ānubhavo'pi anuḥ. Mūnd. Up., 11. 2. 2.
195 Kurvanveha karmāpi jītiṣet. Iśa Up., 2.
197 Āt. Up., 1. 2. 6, 22; 1. 3. 3. 4; 1. 2. 1; Br. Up., 11. 4. 12.
198 Iśa Up., 4, 5; Kaṭh. Up., 1. 2. 20.
CHAPTER II

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EPICS

1. Introduction.

The philosophy of the Epics is theistic. They believe in prakṛti and puruṣas or souls, which are real forms of Brahman. They conceive of Brahman as the Lord of prakṛti and puruṣas, invested with moral attributes, and adapting them to each other to realize the moral ends of individual souls. God is the moral governor.

He is the dispenser of the fruits of actions. He gives happiness as the reward of right actions, and misery as the punishment for wrong actions. He is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world. Prakṛti is the eternal root-evolvent, which is composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. It is modified into the physical, biological, and psychical entities. It is the power of God, who, though devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas, creates them, and modifies them into the world. It is the magical power of God, the great magician. The puruṣas are eternal conscious principles, which are associated with the physical organism, manas, buddhi, and ahamkāra. They are spiritual entities. They are sometimes described as mere reflections of Brahman in avidyā, or limitations of Brahman by it, which realize their identity with him, when avidyā is destroyed. Brahman is conceived as the Lord of the world and the finite souls, which are distinct from them. But sometimes Brahman is conceived as one, infinite, eternal, pure and attributeless consciousness, which appears to be the multiform world and multiplicity of finite souls. These two phases of thought are found in the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad. There is a thin distinction between the individual soul and the universal soul or Brahman. Human freedom is practically denied, though the necessity of rigid control of the senses and mind, austerities, moral observances, and meditation is emphasized, which implies freedom of the will. Determination of human action by the will of God is emphasized. The role of psychical predispositions
acquired in previous births (prārabdha karma) in determining human actions is very much stressed. Time (kāla) is personified and deified. It is supposed to guide the destiny of man. All things are subject to the yoke of time. Pre-determination of human actions by God is predestination. But predetermination of them by time is fatalism. There is a strong note of predestination and fatalism in the Epics. Yet human freedom is grudgingly recognized. Destiny (daiva) without freedom is unavailing. Human freedom (puruṣakāra) is necessary for achievement of the ends of life (puruṣārtha). The importance of human freedom is minimized. The freedom, sovereignty, and omnipotence of God are over-emphasized. Yet ascetic morality, which depends upon human freedom and control of sensibility by reason, is the key-note of the ethics of the Epics. The philosophy of the Mahābhārata resembles that of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad and the Manusamhitā. The philosophy of the Rāmāyaṇa also is theistic. It discusses morality more than philosophy. The philosophy of the Manusamhitā is sketched below.

2. The Manusamhitā.

The Manusamhitā is held in great respect among the Dharmasāstras. Maxmuller opines that Manusmṛti is based on an ancient Dharma Sūtra. It is a recast and versification of it. Sir William Jones dates the Code of Manu 1250 B.C.; Schlegel dates it 1000 B.C. Whitney assigns it to the Epic period. Manu is mentioned in the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata. Common verses occur in the Manusamhitā and the Mahābhārata. The Manusamhitā appears to be prior to the Mahābhārata. Common ethical concepts occur in the Manusamhitā and the Bhagavad Gītā, both of which are mainly ethical treatises. Both inculcate mental purity, and condemn ritualistic morality. The ethics of the Bhagavad Gītā is more comprehensive, personal and reflective than Manu's ethics. It is discussed in the second volume.

The Code of Manu is mainly a treatise on ethics and law. But it gives a cosmology and an ontology of the crude type. Its cosmology is a blend of the Śāṅkhya dualism and theism. It advocates theistic Śāṅkhya, like the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas.
The cosmology of Manu is based on the hymn of creation of the Rg Veda. Brahman is the ultimate reality. He manifests himself as Hiranyagarbha and Prakṛti. He created the waters, and placed his seed in them. The seed became the golden egg. He was born in it as Brahmā. He divided the egg into two halves, heaven and earth. This world was enveloped in darkness all round before creation. It was sleeping as it were. It was in a state of prakṛti, which was imperceptible, indeterminate, incomprehensible by reason, and unknowable. Then the Lord, who is self-born and imperceptible, impelled prakṛti to evolve into the world. He who is subtle, unmanifest, eternal, imperceptible, inconceivable, and immanent in all creatures, manifested himself in the world. He created mahat, ahaṅkāra, manas, the five organs of knowledge, the five subtle essences (tanmātras), and the five elements. All evolutes of prakṛti are composed of the three guṇas, sattva, rajas, and tāmas. The five gross elements are composed of the five tanmātras.

Mahat, impelled by the Lord, creates ākāśa, which has sound. Ākāśa is modified into air endowed with touch. Air is modified into light endowed with colour. Light is modified into water endowed with taste. Water is modified into earth endowed with odour. The Lord creates and destroys the world in sport.¹

The Sāṅkhya does not believe in God as the creator of the world. Prakṛti is modified into the world for the enjoyment and liberation of individual souls (puruṣa). It evolves into mahat, ahaṅkāra, manas, sensory and motor organs, five tanmātras, and five elements. This is the Sāṅkhya theory of evolution. But the Lord, according to Manu, creates all these out of prakṛti.

The Lord creates inanimate and animate creatures according to the Law of Karma. He creates them in accordance with their merits and demerits. Manu believes in rebirth. The sāttvika souls are reborn as gods. The rājasā souls are reborn as men. The tāmasā souls are reborn as lower animals. Owing to vices due to mental actions human souls are born in lower castes. Owing to vices due to verbal actions they are born as birds and beasts. Owing to vices due to bodily actions

¹ i. 5-7; i. 14-16; xii. 30; i. 27; i. 75-78, 80.
they are born as unmoving creatures. The Lord creates the four castes, Brāhmaṇas, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas, and Śūdras.3

The supreme Self (para puruṣa), the Lord of all creatures, subtler than the subtle, is known by the stilled manas entirely withdrawn from the world. Worship of the eternal Lord is the best.9 Here the Lord is called Brahman, the supreme Self. The entire universe abides in it. The Ātman associates the individual souls (kṣetrajña) with merits and demerits. Here the Lord is called the Ātman. He revolves all creatures in the cycle of births and deaths. All creatures are in the Ātman. The Ātman is in all creatures.4 Absolutism, pantheism, and theism of the Upaniṣads are blended in Manu’s theology.

The individual soul transmigrates into human or animal bodies with a subtle body (sūkṣma śarira) according to its merits and demerits due to mental, verbal, and bodily actions. The subtle body is made of the subtle essences (tanmātra) of the five elements. The soul can enjoy or suffer through it. There are eleven sense-organs, the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, and manas, which is a sensori-motor organ. The Buddhi is made of sattva, rajas, and tamas. Sattva gives knowledge and pleasure. Rajas gives desire, aversion, and pain. Tamas gives ignorance and delusion.8 This is the Sāṅkhya doctrine.

Manu tries to reconcile daiva with puruṣakāra. The merits and demerits acquired in the previous births (prārabdhu karma), which are the results of free voluntary actions, constitute daiva karma. It is not fate, destiny, or chance, which is independent of free volitions. But mānuṣa karma (puruṣakāra) consists of free human actions in the present birth. Daiva karma cannot be ascertained by human thought. But mānuṣa karma can be ascertained and evaluated. So a person should make free exertions for accomplishment of ends.*

The Manuṣanāhita is mainly concerned with duties and virtues, the supreme ends of life, and the means to the realization of the highest good. Manu’s ethics is a blend of customary morality and personal reflective morality. He tries to

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* i. 41-42; i. 28; xii. 40; xii. 9; i. 31.
* xii. 122-23.
* xii. 5, 119, 124, 91, 125; vi. 63.
* xii. 3, 16, 17; i. 89-92; xii. 26, 29.
* vii. 205; Cp. MBh,
formulate the criteria of rightness and wrongness and arrive at a conception of the highest good.

Dharma is prescribed by the Vedas. It is a means to the highest good.\(^7\) Rk, Vajuṣ, Śāma, and Atharva, Smṛti, good conduct (śīla) of persons well-versed in them, conduct (ācāra) of virtuous persons, and satisfaction of the self (ātmanaḥ tuṣṭi) are the sources of Dharma.\(^8\) A moral action is approved by conscience, and gives satisfaction to the soul (ātmatuṣṭi).\(^9\) One should do what is approved by one’s conscience.\(^10\) Dharma is prescribed by the Vedas. What is prescribed by them is the supreme Dharma. What is prescribed by persons well-versed in them is the highest Dharma. It is not what is prescribed by thousands of ignorant persons.\(^11\) Perception, reason, and the Sāstras are the means of knowing Dharma. Instructions of sages in harmony with the prescriptions of the Vedas and reason (tarka) also are the means of knowing it. Reason deduces concrete duties in particular situations from the injunctions of the Vedas. The Brāhmaṇas of good conduct, well-versed in the Vedas, are competent judges in the determination of duties.\(^12\) The Vedas, Smṛti, good conduct of virtuous persons (sadācāra), and what pleases the self are the sources of Dharma.\(^13\) The Shruti is the highest source of Dharma.\(^14\) Brahmā revealed the three Vedas, Rk, Śāma, and Yajus.\(^15\) Manu regards the Divine Law as the moral standard. What is commanded by God is right. What is forbidden by him is wrong. His injunctions and prohibitions are known from the Vedas revealed by him. They are also known from the conduct of persons well-versed in them (sadācāra). They are the competent judges in determining duties. We should be guided by them. But what is approved by them is not contrary to reason. It is approved by reason or conscience. Dharma is what is done by persons well-versed in the Vedas, and always approved by the conscience of virtuous persons.\(^14\) Manu believes in personal reflective morality also. What is approved by conscience is right, and what

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\(^{7}\) Vedapramāṇapakapāk Śreyahsādhanaṁ dharmah. ii. 1.  
\(^{8}\) ii. 6.  
\(^{9}\) xii. 37.  
\(^{10}\) Manahpātām samācāret. vi. 46.  
\(^{11}\) xii. 113.  
\(^{12}\) xii. 105-06, 108-09; Kullāka’s Commentary, xii. 106.  
\(^{13}\) Svaya ca priyam ātmanāḥ. ii. 12; ii. 7-10.  
\(^{14}\) ii. 13.  
\(^{15}\) Hṛdayenābhyanujñātaḥ. ii. 1.
is disapproved by conscience is wrong. What gives satisfaction to the soul is right. What gives dissatisfaction to it is wrong. But he does not give superiority to conscience over the Vedas. He does not regard the Internal Law of conscience as superior to the External Law of God revealed in the Vedas. His ethics is more authoritarian than rational and personal. He believes in the Social Law also as the moral standard. He recognizes the customary morality of the society. But it should be in conformity with the Sruti and the Smṛti. The traditional good conduct of generations ⁴⁴ of virtuous persons in a country is called sadācāra or ācāra. It constitutes the Ethos of a community. One who observes customary conduct (ācāra) lives long, and attains happiness. One who violates customary morality is condemned by all and becomes unhappy. Traditional customary morality (śāṅkhrā ṣācāraḥ) should be observed by the four castes. Ācāra is a source of Dharma. It is the supreme Dharma, which is in conformity with the Sruti and the Smṛti. It should always be observed by a person, who intends to realize the highest good. One who deviates from customary conduct (ācāra) does not achieve good. One who observes it achieves good.¹⁹ One should observe the Ethos of one's community. But Manu condemns customary morality, if it violates the commands of the Vedas or the Divine Law. Ācāra in harmony with the Divine Law is a source of Dharma.²⁰ Thus Manu regards the Divine Law as the supreme Dharma. He regards the Ethos, custom, or the Social Law also as a subordinate criterion of the rightness and wrongness of actions. He regards conscience also as a faculty of determining rightness and wrongness of actions. What is approved by conscience is right. What excites self-complacency is right. What excites remorse and dissatisfaction is wrong. Thus Manu does not ignore the authority of reason or conscience in morality. He gives a subordinate place to the Internal Law of conscience and the Social Law. He gives superiority to the Divine Law as the moral standard.

Manu regards happiness (kāma), wealth (artha), virtue (dharma), and liberation (mokṣa) as the ends of life. Sattva,

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²⁷ iv. 161.
²⁸ Pāramparyakramāgataḥ. li. 18.
²⁹ ii. 18; iv. 156; ii. 157; i. 107, 108, 110; v. 4.
³⁰ i. 108.
rajas and tamas are the springs of action. Tamas seeks happiness. Rajas seeks wealth. Sattva seeks virtue. Sattva is superior to rajas. Rajas is superior to tamas. Wealth is higher than happiness. Virtue is higher than wealth.\textsuperscript{31} Wealth and happiness, which are repugnant to virtue, should be discarded.\textsuperscript{32} But Manu does not altogether disregard the claim of happiness. Dharma is the cause of happiness. Vice is the cause of misery.\textsuperscript{33} Happiness is higher than sentient pleasure. It is not repugnant to virtue. It is rational. Even virtue, which brings unhappiness at the end, should be avoided.\textsuperscript{34} Wealth and happiness are transient. But dharma alone accompanies the soul to the other world.\textsuperscript{35} Dharma or virtue is the permanent excellence of character, which is the result of habitual performance of duties. A person should acquire dharma slowly by performing his duties always.\textsuperscript{36} Dharma takes him to heaven quickly. He can avoid suffering in hell with the aid of dharma.\textsuperscript{37} Non-injury is a great virtue. One should always acquire dharma without causing pain to all creatures.\textsuperscript{38} It is wrong to think that Hindu ethics is egoistic.

Manu’s ethics tends to be anti-hedonistic. Desire is never pacified by its gratification. The more it is gratified, the more it is intensified.\textsuperscript{39} Renunciation of desires is better than their fulfilment.\textsuperscript{40} Contentment is the root of happiness. Discontentment is the root of unhappiness.\textsuperscript{41} One should control his desires, and cultivate contentment in order to attain happiness.\textsuperscript{42} The supreme ends of life should be realized with all the senses completely controlled and the manas perfectly disciplined.\textsuperscript{43} Mann recognizes the importance of human freedom. Misery is subject to others. Happiness is subject to self.\textsuperscript{44} One should give up actions whose fulfilment depends upon others. One should carefully perform actions, which depend on oneself.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{31} xii. 38. \textsuperscript{32} vi. 170. \textsuperscript{33} iv. 176. \textsuperscript{34} iv. 239. \textsuperscript{35} vi. 64. \textsuperscript{36} iv. 42. \textsuperscript{37} iv. 242-43. \textsuperscript{38} Sarvabhūtānāpyādiyā. i.v. 238. \textsuperscript{39} Na jātū kāmāṁ kāmāṁm upahogena śāmyati. ii. 94. Cp. MBh. \textsuperscript{40} Prāpañat sarvakāmānāṁ paritvāgo vīśīyate. ii. 95. \textsuperscript{41} Santṣogamlāṁ hi sukhāṁ duḥkhamālaṁ vīparīayaḥ. iv. 12. \textsuperscript{42} i. 100. \textsuperscript{43} Sarvam paravaśāṁ duḥkham sarvam ātmavaśāṁ sukham. iv. 160. \textsuperscript{44} iv. 159.
Manu’s ethics tends to be ascetic. All human happiness springs from penance. This happiness is different from pleasure. Happiness springs from conquest of desires. Pleasure springs from gratification of desires. Manu believes in atonement for sins. Sins are expiated by penance. Penance purifies the soul. It leads the soul to heaven. It leads to the attainment of the highest good (niḥśreyasa), when it is accompanied by the knowledge of Brahmā. Recitation of gāyatṛi is atonement for sins.

Duties for the fulfilment of desires (kāmya karma) lead to happiness on earth or in heaven. They are the cause of bondage. So they should not be performed. But daily obligatory duties (nitya karma) and occasional duties (naimittika karma) should be performed. They purify the mind, and make it fit for acquiring the knowledge of the Ātman.

Manu enjoins the performance of certain duties. One should study the scriptures daily, endure hardships, give charity, make sacrifices, abstain from accepting gifts from others, and cultivate friendship for all (maitra), compassion for all creatures (sarvabhūtānukampā), and self-control. Patience (dhr̥tī), forgiveness (kṣamā), control of passions (dama), non-stealing (asteya), purity (śauca), sense-restraint (indriyanigraha), knowledge of the scriptures (dhi), knowledge of the self (vidyā), truthfulness (satya), and absence of anger (akrodha) are the ten virtues. Firm resolution, tenderness, penance, non-injury, sense-restraint, charity, and avoidance of cruel persons lead to heaven. Learned persons are purified by forgiveness, wrong-doers by charity, and persons well-versed in the Vedas by penance. Secret sins are expiated by reciting the name of God. The mind is purified by truth, the buddhi by knowledge, and the soul by learning and penance. Truthfulness, absence of enmity, and absence of anger should be cultivated. One should speak the truth. One should not speak falsehood. One should tolerate the abuse of others. But one should not insult others. One should not bear enmity to any person. One should control

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88 Topomālaṁ sarvaṁ mānuṣakaṁ sukhām. xi. 234.
89 Tapas̄ kiśiṣāṁ hanti. xii. 104.
89 iv. 109, 246; xii. 104; xi. 225.
89 ii. 2. Kullinga’s commentary, ii. 2.
89 vi. 8; iv. 227.
89 vi. 92.
89 iv. 246.
one's anger completely. One should not get angry with an angry person. One should be courteous to a person, who abuses him. One should treat all creatures as equal.44

The duties prescribed by the Vedas are two-fold, pravṛtti and nivṛtti. Duties prompted by desire for fruits here or in heaven (kāmyakarma) constitute pravṛtti karma. They are prudential duties. Duties free from desire for fruits (niśkāma karma) and preceded by the knowledge of Brahmān constitute nivṛtti karma. They are rational duties. The former give happiness and prosperity here and in heaven. The latter lead to the attainment of the highest good (niḥśreyasa). The former lead to a status equal to that of gods. The latter lead to cessation of birth.44 Harmlessness, truthfulness, non-stealing, purity, and sense-restraint are the common duties of the four castes. Harmlessness is the primary duty. Non-injury to the preceptor, the spiritual guide, the expounder of the Vedas, father, mother, Brāhmaṇas, hermits, and cows is specially obligatory. Unbelief or disbelief in after-life, cavilling at the Vedas, and reviling gods should be avoided. Hatred, boastfulness, pride, wrath, and cruelty should be eschewed.44 The specific duties of the Brāhmaṇas are the study and the teaching of the scriptures, charity, performance of sacrifices for themselves and others, and acceptance of gifts. Those of the Kṣatriyas are protection of subjects, charity, performance of sacrifices, study of the scriptures, and absence of attachment for objects of enjoyment. Those of the Vaiśyas are tending cattle, charity, sacrifices, study of the scriptures, trade, agriculture, and lending money. Those of the Śūdras are the service of the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣatriya, and Vaiśya.44 The specific duties are those relating to the castes and the stages of life. One should always perform one's own specific duties prescribed by the Vedas and the Smṛtis with great care. One's own specific duties even ill-done are superior to others' specific duties well-done.44 Manu recognizes the supremacy of the Brāhmaṇas. They are the highest of the four castes. They preserve the social order by examples and precepts. They are the masters.44

44 v. 107, 109; vi. 66. 44 x. 63; iv. 162, 163.
44 xii. 88-91. Sp. MBh. 44 x. 75-80; i. 88-91.
44 Vāruṇa svadharmo vigunop na pārakyaḥ svamunṣthitaḥ. x. 97.
44 iv. 155. Cp. BG, iii. 35. 44 i. 93, 99.
Manu enjoins the performance of five kinds of sacrifices (pañcayajña). Brahmmanyajña is the study and the teaching of the scriptures and the recitation of the name of God. Pitṛyajña is the performance of Śrāddha and offering oblation to the departed ancestors, and procreation of sons. Devayajña is the performance of sacrifices. Nṛyajña is hospitality to guests. Bhūtayajña is giving food to animals. Here Manu takes the sacrifices in a figurative sense.

Manu enjoins purity of mind and purity of overt actions. He does not enjoin purity of external conduct only. He speaks of three kinds of sins, mental, verbal and bodily. Intention to steal others’ wealth, harbouring thought of injury to others, disbelief in the next world are the three kinds of immoral mental actions. Speaking harsh words, speaking falsehood, speaking ill of others behind their back, irrelevant talk, and idle gossip are the four kinds of immoral verbal actions. Stealing others’ wealth, killing animals forbidden by the scriptures, and adultery are the three immoral bodily actions.

Truthfulness is restraint of speech; non-persecution of others (apidana) is restraint of hands; temperance is restraint in eating. Hypocrisy is falsehood. Truth is harmony of words with thoughts, Untruth to save the life of Brahmans, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas, and Śūdras is better than truth. Truth should be subordinated to humanitarian considerations.

Harmlessness is a common duty of all. Killing animals (ahiṁśa) prescribed by the Vedas in sacrifices should be considered as non-killing (ahiṁśa). One who kills animals for his own pleasure, does not attain happiness here or hereafter. Non-injury to animals in the form of avoidance of oppression, causing pain to animals, and killing them leads to supreme happiness. One who kills an animal, or who permits another to kill it, or who buys or sells flesh, or who cooks it, or who serves or eats it, is guilty of killing. One who desires the good of all creatures, attains supreme happiness. Delight in truth (satya), virtue (dharma), good conduct worthy of an

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48 iii. 70-74; iv. 21. 49 xii. 5-7; vii. 47, 48, 49; xii. 33.
55 v. 44, 45, 51.
56 Sarvasya hitaprapṣuḥ sukham atyantam aśnate. v. 46.
Arya or a cultured person (āryavṛtta), and purity (sauca) should be practised.\textsuperscript{43}

One who refrains from mental, verbal, and bodily sins, is an ascetic with three staffs (tridaṇḍin). One who refrains from threefold sins in relation to all creatures, and controls lust and anger, attains perfection.\textsuperscript{44} Manu enjoins purity of mind, speech, and body, control of passions, non-injury to all creatures, and devotion to the good of all. Knowledge of duties is better than ignorance of them. Performance of duties is better than mere knowledge of them. Virtue is not mere knowledge, but habit of performing duties.\textsuperscript{45}

Sattva, rajas, and tamas are the basic springs of action. Greed, drowsiness, intolerance, cruelty, disbelief in the next world, violation of customary morality, begging, and negligence in the performance of duties are the indications of tamas. Delight in actions for the sake of fruits, impatience, commission of sins, and pursuit of objects of enjoyment are the indications of rajas. The study of the Vedas, penance, knowledge, purity, sense-restraint, performance of duties, and meditation on the self are the indications of sattva.\textsuperscript{46} One is ashamed of an action prompted by tamas done, to be done, or caused to be done by a person. It is disapproved by all. It is immoral. One desires to attain fame or welfare on earth by an action prompted by rajas, and grieves if the end is not achieved. One is not ashamed of an action prompted by sattva, when it is done, and feels self-complacency. It is approved by conscience, and gives satisfaction to the soul. It is moral.\textsuperscript{47} An action prompted by sattva is moral. An action prompted by rajas is moral or immiral. An action prompted by tamas is immoral. A moral action is approved by conscience, and praised by the society. An immoral action is disapproved by conscience, and condemned by the society.

Manu advocates non-hedonistic morality. Renunciation of love and hatred, equanimity undisturbed by joy and sorrow, non-injury, detachment from pleasure, performance of daily obligatory duties (nityakarma), penances, sense-restraint, regular study of the scriptures, service to preceptors, and

\textsuperscript{43} iv. 175.  
\textsuperscript{44} i. 96-97.  
\textsuperscript{45} xii. 35-37.  
\textsuperscript{46} xii. 10-11.  
\textsuperscript{47} xii. 31-33.
knowledge of Brahman are the means to the highest good (mokṣa). Knowledge of Brahman is the chief of these means to mokṣa. It leads to immorality (amṛta). One who sees his Self in all creatures and all creatures in his Self, and who offers sacrifices to his Self, attains freedom.** Intuitive knowledge of Brahman leads to liberation. Ignorance is the cause of bondage. True knowledge (vidyā) is the cause of mokṣa.** Integral vision or intuitive realization (brahmasākṣātkāra) leads to release.** This is the teaching of the Upaniṣads. Manu seems to advocate idealistic monism.

Manu enjoins the practice of yoga, breath-control (prāṇāyāma), withdrawal of mind from the objects of enjoyment (pratyāhāra), fixation of it on a part of the body (dhāraṇā), and meditation (dhyāna). Recitation of the name of God (japa-yaññā) is prescribed. It is better than ceremonial sacrifice (vidhi-yaññā). Mental recitation is superior to audible recitation, which is superior to audible recitation.** Manu lays stress on purity of mind as an indispensable condition of the attainment of mokṣa.

3. The Mahābhārata

The Mahābhārata refers to the Upaniṣads, Manu, Kapila, Āsuri, Pañcaśikha, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pañcarātra, Vaiśeṣika, and the Vedānta.** It advocates theistic Sāṅkhya philosophy like the Purāṇas. It preaches the cults of Nārāyaṇa, Vāsudeva, or Viṣṇu and Śiva. But it does not regard them as different deities. It does not believe in polytheism. It takes each deity as the supreme Lord. It appears to advocate henotheism and monotheism. Sometimes it advocates idealistic monism or absolutism.

Brahman is self-proved, self-existent and unconditioned (nirūpādhī). He is infinite, eternal, and pure consciousness (cinmātra). He is inactive and immutable (kūṭasta). He is the

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** Sarvabhūṭaṁ cātmānaṁ sarvabhūtāni cātmāni,
Samaṁ paśyannāṁ mayāṁ svārājyaṁ adhigacchati. xii. 91.
Cp. xii. 125; vi. 44, 74, 75, 81; xii. 12, 85, 86, 104.
Cp. BG., vi. 29; Isa Up., 6.


** Samyagdarśanasampannāṁ karmabhīr na nibadhhyate,
Dūrṣamena vīhānaṁ saṁsāram pratyādyate. vi. 74.

** vi. 70, 72; ii. 85; xi. 225.

** SP., 218, 9, 10-12, 13; 338; 47, 70; 195, 15, 19-22.
omnipresent and omniscient inner Self of all creatures (sarva-bhūtapratyagātma). Infinite consciousness, bliss and freedom constitute his nature. He is supersensible, imperceptible, inconceivable, inscrutable, and immeasurable. He is Para Brahman. He is the Atman or Paramātman. The Atman is only one. There is none other than the Atman.68 Brahman is the Witness (sākṣīn).

Brahman is expressed in māyā (māyāśruta), which is created by him. His body is made of māyā (māyāśruti). He is the great magician (māyāvin). He is the Lord of cosmic nescience (mahāmāyādhara). He is cosmic nescience (mahāmāyā) or cosmic energy (mahāśakti). He has manifold magical powers (anekamāya). Brahman is self-luminous. He is the seed of the universe. He created it through avidya.69 Prakṛti is avidyā or māyā. He manifests himself in the world through māyā or prakṛti. Prakṛti is his māyā. When the knowledge of Brahman dawns upon the mind, the entire universe is known as Brahman.70

God, the supreme Self, reproduces himself in infinite ways in finite creatures. He is their inner Self (pratyagātman).71 The individual soul is identical with the supreme Soul. Knowledge of duality or difference is the cause of bondage. Knowledge of non-duality (ekatva) or non-difference (samatva) is the cause of liberation.72 Nilakaṇṭha takes non-difference as divinity (brahmabhrāva) of the self. He regards the individual self as a reflection or appearance (cidābhāśarūpa) of the supreme Self or Brahman. He regards Brahman as the one Witness (kevalasākṣīrūpa). There is non-difference between subject (dṛṣṭi) and object (dṛṣṭya), which are mere appearances of the Absolute Self or pure undifferentiated consciousness.73 The sages realize the identity of the individual self and the Absolute Self.74 Mokṣa is a state of pure objectless consciousness.75 Thus Brahman is one, infinite, eternal, undifferentiated, objectless

68 Ātma hyevātmana hyeko'nyas tasmāt paro bhavet. SP., 318, 104.
69 Brahma tejomayaḥ śukraḥ yasva sarvam idam jagat... srjate avidyavā-jagat. SP., 232, 1-2.
70 Sarvaḥ viśvam brahma caitat samastam. SP., 318, 89.
71 Koṭiśaśra karotyeṣa pratyagātmānam ātmān. SP., 314, 3.
72 Sa mīmāṁśa kālasya vadaikatyānaḥ na buddhayate. Unmājjati hi kālaḥyā samatvānabhisahityeḥ. SP., 318, 76.
73 Paśyopaśyam yo na paśyate kṣemāḥ tattvam. SP., 318, 82.
74 Adhyātmam kevalam jñānam uttamaṃ. SP., 194, 55.
75 Tatsthamacānupāyaṃ eka eveti sādhavaḥ. SP., 318, 78.
76 Kevalam nirvāṇayam kāvalayam. Nilakaṇṭha, SP., 194, 55.
consciousness. The world is an appearance of Brahman due to "mâyâ or avidyâ. The individual soul is identical with Brahman. Virtue and vice, merit and demerit, truth and untruth, birth and death are appearances (prâkrtâ). The Sâmkhya and the Yoga consider them to be the effects of prakrti and its evolutes. But the pure and wise know the one eternal Brahman as the only transcendental reality, which is beyond pleasure and pain and other empirical qualities. This is the element of idealistic monism or absolutism in the Mahâbhârata borrowed from the Upaniâsads.

Brahman is two-fold: Sabda Brahman and Para Brahman. The Vedas (Logos) are Sabda Brahman. The supreme Brahman is Para Brahman. One who is well-versed in Sabda Brahman knows Para Brahman. The Mahâbhârata does not take Para Brahman in the sense of indeterminate Brahman, and Sabda Brahman in the sense of determinate Brahman or the Lord here. God created Logos, reason (vidyâ) or word (vâk), which is without origin or end. The Vedas sprang out of Logos. God is their creator.

God is manifested in prakrti and the world. He is the connecting thread of existence in the multiform world (jagadanyaya). It is his form (rûpa) or embodiment (mûrti). He is devoid of the guaras (nirguna), and yet he is their soul (guptatman) and is manifested in them. Sattva, rajas and tamas are his manifestations. He is invested with the three guaras (triguana). The guaras are interconnected with one another by God as a thread running through them. Being and non-being, gross and subtle things exist in him. The world is his body (visvanga). He is the world-soul (visvâtmâ), the origin of the world (visvasamkhava), and the impeller of all its phenomena (visvakarmâ). He is the world (bhû). He transcends it (atibhû), and is its supreme Lord (samrât). He is autonomous (svarât). He is the Lord without origin and end. He creates all conscious and unconscious beings. He abides in them, and they abide in him. He is the mutable world (ksha), and the

72 Isâniistavimuktam hi tathau brahma parat param. Nityam tadâhur vidvâmsaj. SP., 318, 101-02.
73 AP., Ch. 17, 18, 149; SP., 338, 43; 232, 1-2; 339, 45, 338.
74 Dve brahmapi veditavye sabdabrahman para ca yat, sabdabrahmanâ nishtâta param brahmâdhiacchati. SP., 270, 1-2.
75 CP, BG., vii., 7.
immutable Lord (akṣara). He is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world and time. He is without origin, middle, and end. He is omnipresent, infinite, eternal, great, uncaused and inactive. He is the Lord of the past, the present, and the future (bhūtabhavyeṣa). He is the indwelling spirit in all phenomena (sarvātovṛtta). He is formless (nirvṛttarūpa) and unmanifest. He transcends the entire universe, which is spatial, temporal, changing, and caused. He is spaceless, timeless, inactive, uncaused, and immutable. He transcends space, time, and causality. He is transcendent and immanent in relation to the world.78 Sattva, rajas, and tamas are of the nature of God.79 He is the world, which is his form or body. He takes the form of the individual soul, which is merged in him.80 He is its inner guide, and moves it to action. He is the agent (kartā) in the jīva. It has no freedom. It does whatever it is impelled to do by him. He is the only ruler. There is no other ruler. A person considers himself to be a free agent through ignorance.81

God is the guṇas, the basic springs of action. He is all emotions and passions, which spring from them. He is lust and anger, morality and immorality, and desire to act (pravṛtti) and desire to abstain from action (nivṛtti). He is sense-restraints (yama), moral observances (niyama), great observance (mahāniyama), penance (kṛcchra), great penance (mahākṛcchra), and all austerities (sarvakṛcchra). He is the sustainer of moral observances (niyamadhara). He resides in vows, sense-control, penance, learning, fame, glory, fortune, prosperity, and all other things. He is the ground of the outer nature and the inner nature. He is immanent in the universe.82 This is the element of pantheism in the Mahābhārata.

God is sinless (anagha), pure (śuci), holy (pavitra), and good (maṅgala). He is the supreme Good (śiva). He is the untainted fountain of good. He is the promulgator of dharma (dharmakartā), the protector of dharma (dharmagoptā), and the

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78 SP., Ch. 338; 341, 12, 5; 47, 18-22; 43, 5, 11; 280, 19, 20.
79 Rajas tamas ca sattvam ca vidhī nāryāyanātmakam. SP., 280, 24.
80 Ahaṁ hi jīva-adhirūla mayi jīvaḥ samāhitah. SP., 339, 47.
81 Ekaḥ śāstā na dvitiyāḥ ... puruṣam śāstī. SP., 228, 7.
82 Dukkhametat yaddveṣṭā kartāham iti manyate. SP., 226, 13. Cp. B.G., iii. 27.
83 SP., Ch. 338; AP., Ch. 16; Ch. 17.
embodiment of dharma (dharmin). He is the foundation of
dharma, and the observer of dharma. He is the adorable Lord.
He is the Providence (dhātā), the moral Governor (vidhātā),
and the preceptor of the world (guru). He is the Moral Judge
of the actions of persons, and the giver of fruits of their actions
(vasuprada) according to the Law of Karma. He is the giver of
boons (varaprada). He is the dispenser of the Moral Law
dharmādhyaṅkaṣa). He is Truth (satya), Good (maṅgala), and
Beauty (kānta). He is supremely beautiful (sarvāṅgasundara)
and terrible (bhima). He is the doer of good (kṣemakṛt). He
is kind, quenches all desires, and dispels all doubts. He is the
most merciful Being. Persons attain heaven and liberation
through his grace. He is friend (suḥṛt) and refuge (śaraṇya)
of all. He is fond of devotees (bhaktavatsala). He accepts all
acts of worship of his devotees, who have a single-minded devo-
tion. None is dearer to him than his devotee. He fulfills all
his desires (sarvakāmaṇaprada). He is the highest goal of all.
He is the Witness of the universe (lokāṅkaṣaṅ), the Seer of all
(sarvadarśin), their controller (mīyantā). He is the infinite
Person (anantapurusa), the supreme Person (mahāpurusa), and
the perfect Person (puruṣottama). He is the creator of the moral
laws (pravṛttavedakriya), and the embodiment of holiness
(mahātmyāśarīra). He is beyond the reach of reason (apra-
tarkya), incomprehensible (agṛhīya), and unknowable (avijñeyā).
He can be known by single-minded devotion (ekāntadarsana)
only. 88 This is the element of theism in the Mahābhārata.

God is Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva. All attributes of God
are ascribed to Viṣṇu and Śiva. Each of them is treated as the
supreme Lord for the time being. This is henotheism. The
Mahābhārata believes in one God, and advocates monotheism.
It believes in the four divine forms (caturvṛtya): Vāsudeva,
Śaṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vāsudeva is God.
He is unborn, eternal, partless, and devoid of the guṇas. He
is the omnipresent, eternal, and supreme soul (paramātmā). He
is the indwelling soul and Witness (sākṣina) of all creatures.
He is not touched by merits and demerits of the individual
souls. He is the creator of sattva, rajas, and tamas, which act
under his guidance, but cannot affect him. He is the one eternal

88AP., Ch. 149, 16, 17; SP., 47, 37; 334, 54-55, 64, 345, 3, 341, 5, 12;
47, 33, 36, 37, 50; 340, 95; 338; 280, 20, 24; 41, 18-21.
Person, whose body is the entire world. He becomes the individual souls (jiva). Sānkṛṣṭaṇa is their controller. Vāsudeva becomes the minds (manas) of all creatures. Pradyumna is their controller. Then Vāsudeva becomes egoisms (ahāṅkāras). Aniruddha is their controller. He is the unmanifest ruler of all actions. Vāsudeva is the individual soul (kṣetrajñā) devoid of the guṇas. He is Sāṅkṛṣṭaṇa. Pradyumna is created out of Sāṅkṛṣṭaṇa. Aniruddha is created out of Pradyumna. The four Vyūhas are the manifestations of Vāsudeva. The entire world, conscious and unconscious, is created by him. He is the inactive Soul, the twenty fifth principle. The individual soul is not regarded here as a distinct entity. There is a belief in the incarnations of God (āvatāra).

God is the ground of prakṛti and puruṣas. Both are eternal, unmanifest, and ubiquitous. Both are without origin and end. But prakṛti creates sattva, rajas and tamas, and creates the world out of them. But the puruṣa or individual soul (kṣetrajñā) is simple, disembodied, and not creative. It is devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas. Prakṛti and its modifications are known (dṛṣṭya). The self is their knower (dṛṣṭā). It is imperceptible because it is indeterminate. Both prakṛti and puruṣa are eternal, formless, unmoving, and imperceptible. But prakṛti is unconscious, while puruṣa is conscious. Prakṛti, which is unconscious by nature, is supervised by God, the supreme Self, becomes conscious, and creates and destroys creatures. Prakṛti is in the nature of guṇas. It can never be divested of them. But puruṣa can never be invested with guṇas. It is by nature conscious and devoid of the guṇas. But it appears to be tinged with them, even as a crystal appears to be tinged with the red colour of a javā flower. When it is free from the apparent colouring of the guṇas, it is devoid of them. Prakṛti is eternal, mutable, and unconscious. Puruṣa is eternal, immutable, and conscious. When puruṣa is associated with the guṇas owing to ignorance (ajñāna), it cannot know its intrinsic spiritual nature, and is entangled in bondage. Here puruṣa is taken in the sense of the individual soul.

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* Aham hi puruṣo jñeyo niṣkriyāh pañcavrinśakaḥ. SP., 339, 43.
* SP., 339, 22-31; 340, 82; 341, 27, 43; 339, 83, 104; 32-42.
* Guṇasvabhiṣaṅgas tvaryavakte guṇān naivaśvāntara. SP., 315, 1.
* Na śakṣyo nirguṇas tāta guṇākartum viśāmpate. 315, 1.
* SS., 217, 7-10; 314, 13-14; 315, 1, 3, 6, 15.
Puruṣa creates and destroys the guṇas, and permeates them. Puruṣa is one, who exists in all creatures, but who is detached from them. So the wise call puruṣa one and eternal, and prakṛti one and non-eternal or mutable. Puruṣa is taken here in the sense of the supreme Soul. But some regard prakṛti as one, and puruṣas as many and numberless. The Sāṁkhya admits the reality of one prakṛti and many puruṣas, but it does not believe in God, the supreme puruṣa. But the Mahābhārata believes in one God, the ground of prakṛti and puruṣas, one prakṛti and many puruṣas. Sattva, rajas and tamas constitute prakṛti, and are not its products according to the Sāṁkhya. But the Mahābhārata and the Bhavagad Gītā regard them as products of prakṛti. The eternal puruṣa and mutable prakṛti can exist together, though they are distinct from each other, even as water can exist on a lotus leaf, or fire can exist in an oven.

The individual soul (kṣetrajña, puruṣa) is eternal and ubiquitous, disembodied and conscious. It is simple and devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas. It is the knower of prakṛti and its modifications. It is never known as an object. The Ātman knows the guṇas. But they cannot know it. Buddhi or intellect is made of sattva, rajas and tamas. The Ātman and buddhi are associated with each other in an embodied soul, though they are different from each other. The Ātman is the knower of buddhi and ahaṁkāra. But they are unconscious, and cannot know the self. The self is self-luminous and knows itself like a lamp.

The Cārvāka identifies the self with the body. Consciousness is generated by the material ingredients of the body, even as fire is generated by friction of wood. This view is wrong. If consciousness were a property of the body, it would persist in it even after death. Consciousness is formless (amūrta). It cannot be generated by the material elements, which are endured with forms (mūrta).

The individual self is called puruṣa, because it exists in the body. It is unmanifest and immortal. It is beyond

- Avyaktākṣatvam ityāhan naṁtvasi puruṣās tathā. SP., 315, 11; 315, 9-10.
- SP., 315, 12-15.
- SP., 194, 40-41, 45.
- Nānyo jīvakārikārāśya nāṭikānāṁ maṁ sthitāḥ. SP., 218, 28.
- SP., 218, 29-31.
prakṛti and its modifications,—the body, the sense-organs, manas, buddhi, and ahanikāra. It is different from the sensory organs, which are the instruments of its knowledge. It is different from the motor organs, which are the instruments of its action. It is the knower. It is the agent of all actions. The sense organs are the products of prakṛti. But the self transcends prakṛti (prakṛteḥ paraḥ). It is immaterial and spiritual. It is in the nature of consciousness (jñānātman). It is intuited by yoga.

The self is eternal, unborn and immortal. But God associates it with a body. So he is the creator of the embodied self. It is born in conjunction with sattva, rajas, and tamas, which constitute its psychophysical organism. It is covered by them, and cannot be perceived through the sense-organs.

The gross body is composed of the five elements, earth, water, fire, air, and ether. There is a subtle body (liṅga śarira) within it. It is composed of the manas, the five cognitive organs, the five motor organs, sound, colour, taste, smell, and touch. Probably the tanmātras or subtle essences of these qualities are means. Merits and demerits (aḍṛṣṭa) reside in the subtle body. The self transmigrates into another body with it. It assumes another body, and is called an embodied self.

Merits and demerits acquired by right and wrong actions in the past births are the prārabdha karma. They are like seeds, which mature in course of time, and bear fruits in this life under the guidance of God. They follow a person like a shadow. The subtle body is their abode, which sticks to the self, until the store of merits and demerits is exhausted. The self is not born when its afflictions (kleśa) are burnt by true knowledge (jñāna), even as seeds burnt by fire do not germinate.

There is a strong belief in the Law of karma and rebirth in the Mahābhārata.

The self is a disembodied, organless, unmanifest (avyakta), and imperceptible spirit. It is ksara or changing in all creatures. It is aksara or immutable, when it is untouched by the adjuncts of the bodies. The self impels the manas to act, which

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**Śa kartā sarvakarmaṇām. SP., 210, 40.**
**SP., 210, 42.**
**SP., 217, 11-12.**
**SP., 232, 12; 184, 4; 275, 30; 204, 17, 21.**
**SP., 249, 31-34.**
guides the sense-organs. It comes into contact with the manas, which comes into contact with the sense-organs. The self (jīvātmān) perceives colour, smell, taste, sound, and touch through them, and feels pleasure and pain. The sense-organs have the function of indeterminate perception (ālocana). The manas has the function of doubt (sahāsyā). The buddhi has the function of determinate knowledge (adhyaśasyā). The self is their witness (sākṣī) or knower. They are made of sattva, rajas and tamas, which are known (dṛṣya). The self is devoid of them, and a knower (драṣṭā). The manas is superior to the sense-organs. The buddhi is superior to the manas. The self (kṣetrajña) is superior to the buddhi.\textsuperscript{108}

The self (kṣetrajña) persists in the waking state, dream, and deep sleep. In the waking state it experiences external objects through the external sense-organs. During sleep they become tired, but the manas does not cease to operate. It is prompted by sattva, rajas and tamas, the basic springs of action, and experiences subtle objects. Dream-cognitions are recollections of past perceptions due to subconscious impressions. They are due to the bodily humours, flatulence, bile and phlegm, and desires (kāma) of the mind, which are not gratified. During deep sleep the manas is merged in ahaṅkāra, and therefore there are no cognitions at the time. Deep sleep is the effect of tamas. The self persists in it. But there is no contact of the self with the manas, of the manas with the sense organs, and of the sense-organs with their objects during deep sleep.\textsuperscript{101} The individual self is overpowered by ignorance in the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. But the supreme Self, abiding in it, transcends the three states, and is never tainted by ignorance (ajñāna). It is different from the individual self.\textsuperscript{102}

The supreme Self (paramātmā) manifests itself in the form of the individual self (jīvātmān). It is its inner controller. It becomes the individual self in conjunction with the body. The Ātman, the supreme Self, associated with the body, composed of the five elements, becomes the kṣetrajña, the individual self. When it is dissociated from it, it becomes the supreme Self.

\textsuperscript{108} SP., 247, 17, 18; 239, 11; 275, 16, 18; 194, 13.
\textsuperscript{101} SP., 219, 37; 216, 4-12.
\textsuperscript{102} SP., 215, 25, 26.
The individual self is the supreme Self finitized by the body. It is immortal. It transmigrates with the subtle body, and assumes another gross body, human or subhuman, according to its deserts. The supreme Self associates the individual self with a body, and is the creator of the embodied self. The individual self experiences pleasure and pain through the sense-organs and manas, which act under its guidance. They are composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. The individual self acts in association with the guṇas. But the supreme Self, abiding in it, is devoid of them, and is not touched by the actions of the individual souls, and does not experience their fruits.

The Mahābhārata sometimes advocates absolutism and makes no distinction between the individual soul and the supreme Soul. God, the omnipresent, omniscient, and subtle ground of causes and effects, and all created beings, endowed with excellent qualities, is limited by the adjunct of the body, even as light becomes great or small through the adjunct of a limited space. He is the inner Self of all creatures (sarvabhuṭaprayatātmā). He is the individual self (kṣetrajña). He enters into the subtle body of a finite creature, though he is devoid of it. He is the inactive, immutable, and omnipresent Soul untouched by the guṇas. The inactive Soul or God is the twenty-fifth principle. Prakṛti, mahat, ahamkāra, manas, the five cognitive organs, the five motor organs, the five subtle essences (tanmātras), and the five elements are the twenty-four principles. God, the inactive Soul, is the twenty-fifth principle. The individual soul is omitted from the list. It has no reality.

The individual self (puruṣa) is not a free agent. Only an ignorant person regards it as a free agent. It cannot achieve good, and avoid evil. Good and evil are due to merit and demerit (karma), which are products of sattva, rajas and tamas. Right actions produce merits. Wrong actions produce demerits.

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103 Puramātmānam śānam ātmanah prabhavaṁ tathā. SP., 339, 117.
104 SP., 47, 52; 340, 28; 206, 32; A.P., 111, 24; 39-58, 80.
105 Ajaraḥ so'ṁaras caiva vyaktāvyaktopadeśavitān vyāpakaḥ sagunah sākṣmaḥ sarvabhuṭagunāśrayaḥ, yathā dīpaḥ prakāśatān hrasavo va yadi va mahān. SP., 38, 30.
106 Satyaṁ liṅgam aviśva nirlīṅgam api tat svayam. SP., 224, 40.
107 Aham hi puruṣo jñeyo niskriyā pañcaviṁśākaḥ. SP., 339, 43.
108 SP., 224, 49-49; 339, 49, 43-44.
These actions spring from the guṇas, sattva, rajas and tamas. They are done by the manas, which do not affect the individual self. It is inactive and untouched by the guṇas. If it were a free agent, it would be able to conserve good, and prevent evil. But it is powerless to do so. Even wisdom and peace are due to prakṛti. The self transcends prakṛti and its guṇas. It is pure and transcendent in its essential nature. It is not a free agent. God, the inner guide, moves it to action. It wrongly thinks itself to be free. "Neither you, nor I, nor any body else is free." There is no human freedom. There is divine determination of human actions. God impels a person to do whatever he does. He has no freedom, but he wrongly considers himself to be free. He treads the path chalked out by God for him. He attains whatever he is destined to attain. He enjoys and suffers as he is destined to do. This is the doctrine of predestination. Whatever is to happen must happen. None can overcome it. This is fatalism.

Some regard human freedom (puruṣākāra) as the impelling force of all human actions. Some regard an unseen supernatural force (daiva) as their motive force. Some regard prakṛti (svabhāva) as the cause of all actions. Some regard an unseen force, freedom of the will, and sattva, rajas and tamas (svabhāva) as their cause. Some regard them individually as their cause. Others regard them collectively as their cause. But one, who knows the truth, regards God as the cause of all human actions. Daiva and puruṣākāra both are the will of God. This is a trend of thought in the Mahābhārata, which clearly advocates pantheism, determinism, predestination and fatalism.

There is another trend of thought in it, which regards God, prakṛti and puruṣas as eternal. The individual souls are active, free spirits, which do right actions and wrong actions, and acquire merits and demerits. They cannot override and efface the prārabdha karma. But their free exertions are

109 Karmajāti tvihā manyante phalayogam śubhāśubham. Evasi sarvāṇi karmāṇi svabhābasyaiva lakṣaṇam. SP., 222, 24-25.
110 SP., 222, 17-20, 34.
111 Nāhaṁ kartā na caiva tvāṁ nānayaḥ kartā. SP., 224, 45.
112 SP., Bhavitaryāṁ yathā yacca bhavatyeva tathā tathā. SP., 226, 10.
113 SP., 225, 7, 12; 226, 21-22.
114 SP., 232, 19-21.
necessary for the fruition of the past karmas. Destiny (daiva) is unavailing without free exertion (puruṣākāra), even as the soil, unsown with seeds, though tilled, becomes fruitless. Destiny is compared to seeds. It is the sum of merits and demerits due to actions in the previous births. The crops grow from the union of seeds with the soil. Destiny alone cannot bear fruits. It bears fruits, when it is combined with free exertion. Destiny does not work, when free exertion diminishes. Free exertion also, aided by destiny, becomes efficacious. Destiny and free exertion are aided by each other. They are interdependent. "Noble persons regard free good actions as superior to unseen force. Impotent persons worship unseen force."114 "Everything can be achieved by free exertion."115 The individual soul is sometimes regarded as a free agent working out its destiny. It is regarded as the twenty-fifth principle. God is regarded as the twenty-sixth principle.116

Sometimes prakṛti is described as infinite, eternal, ubiquitous, indeterminate and unmanifest. It without origin and end. Sometimes it is described as created by God. Prakṛti is māyā, avidyā, or cosmic nescience. God created the world through avidyā. He manifests himself in the world through māyā and prakṛti. He is superior to māyā created by him. God is the Lord of māyā.117 Sattva, rajas and tamas are the products of prakṛti.118 They are not its constituents as the Sāṁkhya maintains. They are never destroyed. God manifests himself in infinite ways in the world with the guṇas, which are sometimes said to be his manifestations. They have God for their essence (nārāyaṇapātmaka).119

Prakṛti is unconscious. When it is supervised by God, it becomes conscious, and creates and destroys the world. It is formless, unmovinf, imperceptible, eternal, mutable and unconscious in itself. It is never divested of its nature.120

God created mahat out of prakṛti. Ahaṁkāra was created out of mahat. Ākāśa was created out of ahaṁkāra. Air was

114 Daivāni puruṣākāraśca sthitāvanyonyasamārāyāt, udārāpāṁ tu satkarma, daivam klīvā npāsate. SP., 139, 82.
117 SP., 217, 7-10; 340, 28-36; 232, 1-2; 229, 2; 338.
118 Sattvam avyaktajgam. SP., 210, 35.
119 SP., 230, 24. 120 SP., 314, 12-14; 315, 5.
created out of ether. Fire was created out of air. Water was created out of fire. Earth was created out of water. Five gross elements were created out of ahamkāra. The whole world is composed of the eightfold prakṛti. Prakṛti, mahat, ahamkāra, ether, air, fire, water, and earth constitute eightfold root-evolvent (mūla prakṛti). The manas, the five cognitive organs, and the five motor organs were created out of them. Ears, skin, eyes, tongue, and nose are the cognitive organs, which are composed of ether, air, light, water, and earth respectively. They apprehend sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell respectively. Hands, feet, anus, the generative organ, and the vocal organ are the motor organs. The manas is the integral organ composed of sattva. It can apprehend all sensible objects through the sense-organs. The manifest world is created out of unmanifest prakṛti.

There is a belief in periodic creation and dissolution of the world (mahākalpa). Thousands of periodic creation and dissolution have passed. Earth is dissolved in water; water, in fire; fire, in air; and air, in ether. Ether is dissolved in ahamkāra or manas. Manas, the supreme element, is dissolved in prakṛti or avyakta. Avyakta is dissolved in the inactive supreme soul or God. There is nothing higher than God. Aparā prakṛti is mentioned.

Manas is higher than the sense-organs. Buddhi is higher than manas. Mahat is higher than buddhi. Avyakta (prakṛti) is higher than mahat. Brahman is higher than prakṛti. He is the supreme Being, the supreme Self abiding in all creatures.

Sattva, rajas and tasmas are the basic springs of action. Sattva produces determinate knowledge, retention, recollection and pleasure. Rajas produces lust, anger, greed, fear, fatigue and inattention. Tamas produces pain, grief, conceit, pride and cruelty. Joy, bliss, affection, peace, virtue and health of mind spring from sattva. Pain, self-conceit, falsehood, greed, delusion and intolerance spring from rajas. Delusion, negligence, sleep, dozing and waking spring from tasmas. Sattva

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122 SP., 262, 1; 182, 11-14; 340, 28-36; 210, 35.
123 SP., 275, 14, 19; 210, 35; 340, 28-36; 339, 74, 115; 184, 5.
125 SP., 340, 14.
produces pleasure; rajas, pain; and tamas, delusion. These different accounts are given of the effects of sattva, rajas and tamas. Sattva is the predominant quality of the Brāhmaṇas; rajas, of the Kṣatriyas; rajas and tamas predominate in the Vaiśyas; tamas is in excess in the Śūdras. The sattvika persons perform righteous actions, and go to heaven. The rājasa persons perform right and wrong actions, and are reborn as men. The tāmasa persons perform unrighteous actions, and are reborn as beasts. Sattva is the spring of moral actions, Rajas is the spring of moral and immoral actions. Tamas is the spring of immoral actions. Those who are actuated by sattva, rajas and tamas are reborn as men, which are the basic springs of action.

Evil passions are overcome by contrary emotions and mental processes. Anger is overcome by forgiveness; desire by renunciation; desire, aversion and lust by patience; greed, by contentment; self-conceit, by compassion; thirst for enjoyment, by contentment; fear, by courage; doubt, by certain knowledge of the Vedas; garrulity, by silence; sleep, by temperance in eating; fear of public censure, by caution; ignorance, by true knowledge of reality; disease, by temperance; vice, by compassion; hankering for worldly pleasures, by knowledge of their evil nature; expectation of future pleasure, by renouncing objects of enjoyment; affection for persons, by knowledge of their transitoriness.

Anger springs from greed. It is increased by fault-finding, decreased by forgiveness, and destroyed by compassion. Desire springs from the will to enjoy, is increased by gratification, and decreased by abstention from gratification. Envy springs from anger, greed, and fault-finding. It is destroyed by compassion and true knowledge of reality. Delusion springs from ignorance and vice. It is destroyed by true knowledge. Grief springs from loss of dear ones owing to excessive love for them. It is destroyed by the knowledge of transitoriness of all things. Greed springs from ignorance of the true nature of the objects that excite it. It is destroyed by the true knowledge of their transitoriness and dispassion. Pride springs from false prestige

126 SP., 194, 30-32; 247; 212, 22-23.
128 SP., 274, 5-11.
of wealth and learning. It is destroyed by true knowledge of their real nature. Jealousy springs from lust. It is destroyed by wisdom (prajñā). Pity arises from the sight of a distressed person. It is destroyed by acquisition of dharma. Desire to abuse arises from the perception of an action condemned by the society. It is decreased by indifference. Impotent anger arises from inability to take revenge on a powerful enemy. It is destroyed by extreme kindness. These faults are destroyed by the emotion of peace (śānti). This method corresponds to Patañjali’s method of killing passions by cultivating opposite virtues (pratipakṣabhāvavana).

Happiness (kāma), wealth (artha), virtue (dharma) and liberation (mokṣa) are the four ends of human life. Happiness springs from the gratification of desires. It is inferior to wealth, the pursuit of which requires sacrifice of happiness. Wealth is inferior to virtue. Mokṣa or perfection of the self is superior to virtue. Happiness, wealth, and virtue sustain the life of persons. Virtue is the foundation of the entire universe. Wealth is a means to dharma. Vedic rites can be performed by means of wealth. Wealth is a means to happiness also. Desires are directed to the three ends of happiness, wealth, and dharma. They give rise to actions, which constitute pravṛtti. Dharma is pursued for preservation of life; wealth, for virtue; happiness, for fulfillment of desires. These ends are pursued by persons in whose nature rajas predominates. They should not be renounced totally. But they should be pursued with dispassion. Desire for mokṣa arises when they are pursued with detachment. Aversion to enjoyment is the impurity of happiness. Reluctance to make gifts is the impurity of wealth. Desire for fruits is the impurity of dharma. The three ends untainted by these impurities are conducive to mokṣa. It consists in renunciation of happiness, wealth and dharma. Abstention from actions prompted by desires constitutes nivṛtti.

There is a conflict among happiness, wealth and dharma. They are hindered by each other. Wealth is hindered by dharma. Dharma is hindered by wealth. Wealth and dharma

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139 SP., 163, 7-22.  
138 YS., ii. 34.  
137 Dharmamālāḥ sadaivārthah kāmo‘rthaphalam ucyate. SP., 123, 4.  
136 Nivrṛṭtih mokṣa ucyate. SP., 123, 5.  
135 SP., 167, 2, 3-9; 123, 4-8, 9-10.
are hindered by happiness. Mean persons regard wealth as the fruit of dharma, happiness as the fruit of wealth, and sensual pleasure as the fruit of desire. Wise persons regard purification of mind as the fruit of dharma, performance of sacrifices as the fruit of wealth, preservation of life as the fruit of desire. Happiness, wealth, and dharma ought to be pursued after duly considering their relative strength and consequences. They should be pursued by all with a pure heart.\textsuperscript{134}

Mokṣa is superior to happiness, wealth, and dharma. One who renounces desire for fruits, does not pursue happiness, wealth, and dharma, abstains from actions enjoined and forbidden by the Vedas, cultivates tranquillity unperturbed by joys and sorrows, looks upon stone and gold as equal, and is untainted by sin, can attain mokṣa.\textsuperscript{135}

The \textit{Mahābhārata} does not advocate a completely ascetic view of morality. It gives due importance to happiness and wealth. It enjoins pursuit of them in due subordination to dharma. But dharma also should be transcendened in order to attain mokṣa. Dharma is not the supreme end. Mokṣa is the supreme goal of life. It is a state of supermoral perfection beyond virtue and vice.

The ethics of the \textit{Mahābhārata} is predominantly anti-hedonistic. One, who runs after pleasure, suffers. One, who renounces desires, becomes happy. Pleasure springs from gratification of desires. Happiness springs from renunciation of desires. It is not transitory sentient pleasure. It is abiding rational joy due to conquest of desires. Constant pursuit of pleasure is suicidal, and leads to destruction. The pleasure of fulfilment of desires and happiness of heaven are not even a fraction of the joy of dispassion (vairāgya). Desire is the cause of suffering. Renunciation of worldly pleasures is the highest kind of purity. It is the best penance. Sense-gratification leads to misery. Sense-restraint leads to happiness. There is no happiness like the joy of detachment. Renunciation of desires brings on happiness. The greater is the renunciation of them, the greater is happiness. Desires are not pacified by

\textsuperscript{134} SP., 140, 57, Nilakaṇṭhi; 123, 3,
\textsuperscript{135} SP., 167, 44.
their fulfilment; the more they are gratified, the more they are intensified.138

Pleasure and pain go together. Pleasure is followed by pain. Pain is followed by pleasure. Ungratified desire for pleasure gives rise to pain. Destruction of pain gives rise to pleasure. Pain springs from non-attainment of pleasure or excess of pleasure. Pleasure and pain succeed each other. They are transient. Sentient pleasure or pain is not eternal. Body is the source of sensuous pleasure and pain. Attachment to objects of enjoyment generates affection for them. When they are lost, grief arises. Loss of wealth and dear ones gives rise to grief. So pleasure cannot be the goal of life.137

Egoism is the root of love and hatred, pleasure and pain. It is the sense of 'I' and 'mine'. Pleasure and pain can be conquered by indifference, discrimination, and knowledge of reality. Detachment only can destroy attachment and give rise to supreme bliss. True knowledge of the self as distinct from the body can destroy desire for pleasure. Complete renunciation of desires for pleasure is a condition of intuition of the self.138

The Mahābhārata, like the Manusāṁhitā, gives various definitions of dharma. God is the author of dharma (dharma-kartā), the protector of dharma (dharma-goptā), and the possessor of dharma (dharmin). He is the creator of the Vedas, which prescribe certain actions and prohibit others. What are prescribed by them are right. What are forbidden by them are wrong. God is the promulgator of moral laws (pravṛttavedakriya). He is the embodiment of holiness (māhātmāyāsāri). The Divine Law is the moral standard. But it is not arbitrary. What is right is commanded by him. What is wrong is forbidden by him. Moral perfection constitutes his nature.138

Dharma sustains the social order, protects the people, and brings about social cohesion.140 The Vedas, Smṛtis, and customary conduct (ācāra) are the sources of morality.141 Ācāra is

137 SP., 177, 48; 22, 24; 160, 12-13; 147, 177.
138 SP., 174, 18-51.
139 SP., 338.
140 Dhāraṇād dharṇam ityāhur dharmeṇa vidhṛtāḥ prajāḥ. Yaḥ syād dhāraṇāṣaṇyuktāḥ sa dharma iti niścayaḥ. SP., 109, 11.
141 Saliṣṭāraḥ śuṣṭir vedās trividhānām dharma-lakṣāṇam. SP., 259, 3.
the foundation of dharma. Good conduct is dharma. Virtuous persons are characterized by it. It is the principal characteristic of dharma. Sometimes it is regarded as superior to the Vedas. The conduct of virtuous persons is called good conduct (sadācāra). Actions which are praised by the society ought to be done. Actions which are condemned by it ought not to be done. Dharma is customary conduct (ācāra). Dharma is what is approved and performed by virtuous persons everywhere. Dharma is what is approved by one's own conscience. Sometimes a doubt is expressed as to the validity of the Vedic injunctions, which prescribe killing animals for sacrifices. But dharma is non-injury to all creatures. What is conducive to non-injury is dharma. What is conducive to good, non-injury, and preservation of all is dharma. What is conducive to the good of all creatures is dharma. The Vedic prescriptions, customary conduct, good conduct of virtuous persons, and social welfare are regarded as dharma. The good of mankind or social solidarity is the highest dharma. The conduct of the virtuous for the good of mankind is the best.

Dharma is of two kinds: (1) dharma prompted by desire for fruits (sakāma); (2) dharma free from desire for fruits (niṣkāma). The former leads to happiness in heaven, which is non-eternal. The latter leads to realization of identity with Brahman. Abstention from actions for realization of empirical ends is dharma.

When there is a conflict of duties, the authority of the Vedas (āgama) is final. Reasoning (hetuvāda) is subordinate to scriptural authority. It cannot determine duties without the guidance of the Śāstras. The Vedas, reason and good conduct of virtuous persons are the means of knowing dharma, which is

142 Dharmasya niṣṭhātvācāraḥ. SP., 259, 6.
143 Sadācāro mato dharmāḥ santo cācāralakṣanāḥ. SP., 260, 4.
144 SP., 104, 9.
146 Sa dharmāḥ sakṛtaḥ sadbhir bhūtipravakāraṇaḥ. Hydayena−bhyanijato yo dharmas tathī vyavasyati. SP., 132, 19.
148 Praḥtavārthāya bhūtānām dharmapravacanāṃ kṛtam. Praḥtavasanyuktāḥ sa dharmā iti niṣcayāḥ. SP., 109, 10.
149 Lokasaṁghaḥsanyuktāṃ vidhātra vīhitaṃ purā. Sūkṣma−dharṁarthanīyataḥ satāḥ caritaṃ uttamaṁ. SP., 259, 26.
150 SP., 184, 13.
151 Niyṛṭtilakṣaṇo dharmāḥ. SP., 341, 39.
one and uniform. The conscience of every person is the true test of dharma. It is the innate faculty of discerning right and wrong actions. Persons who are devoted to the Vedas, contented, free from greed and delusion, and averse to wealth and happiness are the competent judges of duties.\textsuperscript{142}

Mokṣa is the highest good. It is a supersensible eternal state. It transcendents virtue and vice, merit and demerit. Extinction of merits and demerits leads to disembodied release and attainment of Brahman. Mokṣa is an unchanging, inexhaustible, eternal, immutable, immortal and supersensible state free from avidyā and pain. It is a state of pure knowledge of the self. It is objectless pure consciousness.\textsuperscript{143} It is ineffable supreme bliss.\textsuperscript{144}

Ignorance is the cause of bondage and rebirth. Knowledge is the cause of mokṣa, which is life eternal.\textsuperscript{145} Knowledge of difference between the self and God is the cause of bondage. Knowledge of non-difference between them is the cause of mokṣa. It is attained by supreme wisdom. It is realization of one eternal Brahman as the only reality. One who realizes the pure Ātman, attains embodied release (jīvan-mukti).\textsuperscript{146} This is monism.

The ethics of the Mahābhārata is altruistic, anti-hedonistic, internal, and has an ascetic tendency. It enjoins cultivation of egoistic virtues and social virtues. It inculcates disinterested performance of duties with detachment. It demands performance of common duties and specific duties relating to the castes and the stages of life. It requires an aspirant to transcend morality, and attain supermoral perfection.

The Mahābhārata is mainly altruistic. It gives the highest place to non-injury (ahimsā) and benevolence. Manu has praised ahimsā. It is the highest virtue. Dharma is non-injury to all creatures. Non-injury to all creatures in thought, word, and deed, charity to proper persons, and kindness to all constitute good conduct.\textsuperscript{147} One should never do to another

\textsuperscript{142} SP., 162, 8-10, 13, 16, 20-21; 61, 15-16.
\textsuperscript{143} SP., 315, 7-9; 275, 38; 195, 22; 394, 10.
\textsuperscript{144} Ādi SCHOOL: SP., 318, 87.
\textsuperscript{145} SP., 318, 91-92; 318, 76, 78; 314, 10; 310, 101-02; 180, 2; 196, 18.
\textsuperscript{146} Adrohaḥ sarvabhūteṣu karmanā manasā girā. Anugrahaḥ ca dānām ca śīlam etat praśasyate. SP., 124, 66.
person what one regards as injurious to oneself. This is, in brief, the rule of rightousness.\footnote{128} When one does harm to another person, the injured person does harm to the injurer. Similarly, when one does good to another person, the benefitted person does good to him in return. One becomes guilty of injury through thoughts, words, and deeds. One should discard injury mentally at first, then through words and acts. Non-injury is the highest virtue, the highest penance, and the highest truth, from which all duties spring. Actions, which are not conducive to the good of others, should not be done. One should always think of the good of humanity.\footnote{129} One should cultivate non-injury to all creatures and compassion for all, and do good to all (sarvabhūtaahita). One should cultivate non-ennui, forgiveness, good-will for friend and foe, friendship for all, and equality in treatment with all. One should not cause fear and anxiety to any body, even if one is frightened by him.\footnote{130} One should not do injury to another, even if one is injured by him. One should return good for evil. One is virtuous, who does good to mankind without attachment and aversion. Endurance is necessary for doing good to humanity (lokaṃahgra). It is due to patience, which consists in being unperturbed by joy and sorrow. Patience can be acquired by conquest of fear, anger, and joy with truthfulness and compassion. Patience brings on tranquillity. Benevolence or doing good to others leads to the highest good or mokṣa. Do unto others as you would do to yourself.\footnote{131}

Social virtues are stressed. Harmlessness, generosity, and kindness to all constitute good character. Ahimsā, truthfulness, sincerity, compassion for all, forgiveness, equality to all, and non-neglect of duties should be cultivated. Harmlessness, truthfulness, conquest of anger, forgiveness, compassion, sense-restraint, and sincerity or non-crookedness are the true characteristics of dharma. Non-injury, friendship (maitra) for all, compassion (dayā) for all, equal treatment with all, good will for friend and foe, unselfishness, non-stealing, generosity, non-
oppression of all creatures, non-enmity, forgiveness, benevolence or doing good to all creatures, pursuit of the good of humanity (lokāhita), devotion to the good of all creatures (sarvabhūtahita), service to the elders, hospitality to guests, and equality (samatā) are the social virtues. Tolerance, forgiveness, and compassion make for holiness.¹⁴³

The Mahābhārata mentions the five kinds of sacrifices, sacrifice to gods (devayajña), sacrifice to the fathers (pitṛyajña), sacrifice to creatures (bhūtayajña), and sacrifice to men (manuṣyayajña) like the Manusasyaṅkha. It mentions five kinds of debts also like it. The debt to the gods (deva-ṛṣa) is discharged by performing sacrifices. The debt to the sages (ṛṣi-ṛṣa) is discharged by studying the Vedas. The debt to the fathers (pitṛ-ṛṣa) is discharged by procreating sons. The debt to the Brahmaṇas (brahma-ṛṣa) is discharged by making gifts to them. The debt to men (ṁṛ-ṛṣa) is discharged by offering hospitality to the guests.¹⁴⁴ These sacrifices and debts emphasize the importance of social duties.

The Mahābhārata emphasizes inner purity of mind as the root of self-regarding and social virtues. The mind is the root of virtuous life. Purity of mind, speech, and body is the foundation of all virtues. There is nothing purer than the heart. Non-injury in thought, word and deed is a means to the attainment of Brahman. One should not harbour ill-will against others, and think of doing injury to others. Constant thought of the good of all creatures should be cultivated.¹⁴⁵ Concealment of a righteous action increases its merit. But concealment of an unrighteous action increases its sinfulness.¹⁴⁶ There is nothing better than good character. Dharma is good character, which can conquer the world. By doing right actions and abstaining from wrong actions always one can attain good character.¹⁴⁷ Sins are mental, verbal and bodily. Not only verbal and bodily sins, but mental sins also should be avoided. Mental purity is the foundation of righteousness. The Mahābhārata ethics is not

¹⁴³ SP., 124, 66; 215, 6; AP., 22, 19; SP., 340, 88-89; 236, 27-30; 222, 30, 34; 219, 9-15; 290, 20.
¹⁴⁴ AP., 37, 17-18.
¹⁴⁵ Mānasāṁ sarvabhūtānāṁ dharmaṁ āhur mānasiṁhanaḥ. Tasmāt sarveṣu bhūteṣu manasaḥ śivam ācāre. SP., 193, 31. SP., 214, 6; AP., 182, 49.
¹⁴⁶ SP., 193, 28.
¹⁴⁷ SP., 124, 1, 18, 20, 61.
only objective but subjective. It not only stresses observance of social duties but also rigid control of the senses and the mind, inner purity, and good character.

Sense-restraint is the foundation of self-regarding and social virtues. It gives rise to patience, truthfulness, efficiency, firmness, self-confidence, contentment, non-envy, non-anger, straightness, sweet speech, greedlessness and detachment, which are the self-regarding virtues. It gives rise to non-injury, forgiveness, tenderness, compassion, modesty, reverence, benevolence and equality in treatment, which are the other-regarding virtues. One who has restrained his senses, never indulges in cruelty, falsehood, insult, abuse and flattery, and eschews lust, anger, greed, boastfulness, self-praise, jealousy, and attachment for worldly pleasures. He neither praises nor blames any body. He overcomes egoism, and avoids pain due to it. He eschews vulgar conduct, and cultivates good conduct and culture. Sense-restraint is the foundation of truthfulness and penance.  

Sense-restraint, control of mind, overcoming distraction of mind, concentration of mind, sex-restraint, desirelessness, unperturbability, firmness, spiritedness, straightness, simplicity, temperance, contentment, patience, mastery over self, firm resolve, non-enterprise, truthfulness, eschewing flattery, gossiping, praise and blame, non-gambling, efficiency in work, wisdom, culture, good character and purity of mind are the self-regarding virtues. Absence of inadvertence, absence of greed, absence of anger, absence of envy, absence of insincerity, absence of pride, absence of jealousy, absence of self-conceit, absence of hypocrisy, absence of flattery, absence of abuse, absence of attachment for objects of enjoyment, and absence of self-abasement are the self-regarding virtues. Cultivation of them gives rise to true happiness. Equanimity of mind is stressed. A wise person is not elated by success, and depressed by failure. He passes through all conditions that give joy and sorrow with an unperturbed mind. He is as firm as the Himalayas. Absence of enterprise (asamrambha) is praised.  

The Mahābhārata stresses niṣkāma karma. Duties should be done without any desire for fruits. They should be done for

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168 SP, 236, 26-29; 222, 30, 34; 219, 9-15; 290, 20; 226, 15-16.
169 SP, 226, 15-16.
the sake of duty with perfect detachment. Attachment for actions leads to bondage. Renunciation of actions leads to mokṣa. It is renunciation of fruits of actions. One who has no desire for fruits, should renounce attachment for enjoyments, abstain from all actions, concentrate one’s mind on the Ātman, and know its nature. One should, then, concentrate one’s mind on Brahman, and seek absorption in him. One who renounces all desires, actions, and fruits, and concentrates one’s mind on Brahman, is absorbed in him. He realizes the pure Ātman, and attains mokṣa. He is released from transmigration. He attains embodied release (jīvannukti).179

The Mahābhārata ethics is ascetic in tendency. True happiness springs from renunciation of desires. Sentient pleasure due to fulfilment of desires is not true abiding happiness. Desires are not pacified by gratification but by renunciation. Attachment is the root of misery. It springs from egoism or the sense of 'I' and 'mine'. It is the cause of love and hatred, sentient pleasure and pain. They can be conquered by destruction of egoism. Detachment destroys attachment, and gives rise to supreme bliss. Renunciation of prudential duties (kāmya karma), detachment, and withdrawal of mind from worldly pleasures lead to mokṣa. Nīṣkāma dharma is a means to release. It is renunciation of the fruits of actions. Renunciation and humility are the best penance. Complete renunciation of desires for enjoyment and penance lead to the knowledge of the Ātman, which is the chief means to mokṣa. Penance purifies the mind. Penances are of various kinds. Fasting is the best of them. It is better than ahimsā, truthfulness, charity and sense-restraint. The effects of sacrifices are invisible. Their fruits are enjoyed in the next world. But the fruit of penance is enjoyed on earth. It purifies the mind, and gives knowledge of the Ātman. God created the world by penance. The efficacy of penance in bringing about purity of mind is stressed.171

Some virtues like ahimsā, benevolence, truthfulness, charity, hospitality, and service to the elders are emphasized. Ahimsā and truthfulness are given the highest place among the virtues. Truth is harmony of thoughts with words, and of words with actions. It should be in harmony with righteous-

179 SP., 196, 10-18.
171 SP., 161, 3, 7, 8; 174; 221, 5, 201, 14; 273, 20-24.
ness. It should be moderately devoid of injury, censure, fraudulence, harshness and cruelty. Truthfulness consistent with non-injury should be cultivated. Truth may be sacrificed to save the life of a person. It may be sacrificed to protect the wealth of others, promote others’ dharma, and further others’ perfection. Delusion leads one to death. Truth leads one to immortality. One should not deviate from truth except to promote dharma. Immortality is founded on truth. Truthfulness is sometimes said to be the highest virtue, of which ahimsā is a form. There is no greater virtue than truthfulness. There is no greater sin than falsehood. It is a mine of virtues. It is better than a thousand horse sacrifices. Sometimes it is taken in a wide sense. Sense-restraint, equality, forgiveness, modesty, endurance, patience, renunciation, compassion, non-injury, simplicity, absence of envy, absence of jealousy, and meditation are the kinds of truth. They are in the nature of truth. Truthfulness is the eternal virtue. It is the supreme goal of virtuous persons. It can never be tainted. It is penance, yoga and sacrifice. Truth is Para Brahman. It is the foundation of all.¹¹²

Charity is a common duty of all. But indiscriminate charity is forbidden. Even if a person can afford, he should not give charity to sinful persons. If he does so, he is sure to come to grief. Charity to vicious persons leads to happiness on earth. Charity to virtuous persons leads to happiness in heaven.¹¹³

Service to father, mother, and other elders is emphasized. Whatever they command, being well-served, should be done without reflection. What is against their will should never be done. There is none superior to mother. But the preceptor is superior to parents. The body given by them is perishing. But the instruction given by the preceptor never perishes. The parents should be maintained, even if they are haters of virtue. They should never be killed, even if they do harm a thousand times.¹¹⁴

Slight harmfulness (ahimsā) is permitted for livelihood. The State cannot exist without punishing the criminals. In extreme cases they should be killed. Capital punishment is not a sin. Cheats earn their livelihood by dishonest means. They

¹¹² SP., 162, 3-10, 26; 215, 10-11; 109, 14-16, 19, 20, 4.
¹¹³ SP., 100, 17; 191, 2-4.
¹¹⁴ SP., 108, 3-5, 18-20.
should be adequately punished. One should be straight and sincere to a virtuous person, and crooked and insincere to a cheat. The *Mahābhārata* does not teach only ideal morality intended for saints, but also practical morality for worldly persons.

It enjoins the performance of common duties and specific duties relating to the castes and the stages of life (varṇaśrama-dharma). The common duties and virtues have already been described. Non-injury, truthfulness, charity, forgiveness, purity of body and mind, conquest of anger, simplicity, procreation of sons in one's wife, and maintenance of servants are the common duties of all castes. All castes can perform all sacrifices mentally with reverence. Reverence is the best sacrifice (śraddhāyajña).

Sense-restraint, study of the Vedas, good conduct, charity, sacrifice, earning livelihood by honest means, marriage, and procreation of sons are the duties of the Brāhmaṇas. The first three are sometimes said to be their supreme duties. Sense-control, purity, and simplicity are sometimes said to be their supreme duties. Sense-restraint is sometimes said to be their highest duty. A true Brāhmaṇa is self-controlled, compassionate, patient, greedless, kind, forgiving, patient, calm, simple, tender, and of good character. A sinful Brāhmaṇa cannot be called a Brāhmaṇa. The Brāhmaṇas are forbidden to adopt fighting, agriculture, trade, tending cattle, and service for livelihood. Even service of the king is forbidden to them. They should eschew crookedness, licentiousness, and usuriousness. Aloneness, equality, truthfulness, good character, non-injury, simplicity, penance, and abstention from sacrifices are sometimes said to be their supreme virtues.

Charity, sacrifice, study of the Vedas, and protection of subjects are the supreme duties of the Kṣatriyas. Good conduct and protection of people are their essential duties. Fighting in the battle-field and killing robbers are their supreme duties. Teaching, begging, and worshipping for others are forbidden to them. The king's duties protect all castes in performing their duties.

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178 SP., 109, 29, 21, 22; 262; 267.
179 Māyācāro māyayāh bādhitavyaḥ sādhyacāraḥ sādhunā pratyupayaḥ. SP., 109, 30.
177 SP., 60, 7-8, 45-54.
176 SP., 60, 9-12; 65, 6, 2, 3; 160, 7; 175.
duties, and maintain the social order. Those of the Kṣatriyas are conducive to happiness and good of all. They are therefore supreme.⁷⁷⁸ Charity, sacrifices, study of the Vedas, acquisition of wealth by honest means, and tending cattle with affection are the duties of the Vaiśyas.⁷⁷⁹ Serving the Brāhmaṇas, the Kṣatriyas, and the Vaiśyas is the supreme duty of the Śūdras. They can perform sacrifices. But they cannot utter mantras. They should not accumulate wealth for enjoyment. They should be maintained by their masters, and be provided with clothes, umbrellas, shoes and other necessities by them.⁷⁸¹ These are the specific duties (śvadharma) of the different castes (varpa-dharma). Those who perform their specific duties go to heaven. Those who do not perform them are deluded.⁷⁸²

There are specific duties relating to the four stages of life (āśramadharma). The Brāhmaṇas should observe the duties of the four āśramas. A student (brahmacārin) should be initiated, self-controlled, and impartial, study the Vedas and the Vedāngas, perform breath-control, renounce desires for enjoyment, eschew the company of vicious persons, revere his preceptor, and observe celibacy. A householder should marry, be faithful to his wife, have sexual intercourse for procreation of children only, perform sacrifices and other duties prescribed by the Vedas, give food to the Brāhmaṇas, make gifts of wealth to hermitages, be truthful, grateful, forgiving, self-controlled, temperate in eating, and devoted to the gods, and eschew cruelty, crookedness and jealousy. Truthfulness, straightforwardness, hospitality, acquisition of wealth for a virtuous life, and devotion to a lawfully married wife lead to his happiness here and hereafter. The study of the Vedas and maintenance of children are the essential duties of a householder. He should perform sacrifices and other prescribed duties. Then he should retire with or without his wife to a forest and enter upon vānaprastha life. He should conquer his senses, observe sex-restraint, and be a perfect master of his self. He should study the Āranyaka Śāstra, and meditate on Brahman. Then he should enter upon the life of an ascetic (bhikṣu). He should give up fixed abodes, live on whatever he gets, give up desire for enjoyment, be un-

perturbed by joys and sorrows, treat all as equal, restrain his
senses, be self-controlled, and realize Brahman. Sannyāsa is
renunciation of the fruits of actions and performance of duties
for the sake of duty. Non-injury, truthfulness, and conquest of
anger are the best penance in all stages of life. Sense-restraint
is the best vow in the four āśramas.143

All castes can perform daily obligatory duties (nitya karma).
The Mahābhārata is liberal enough to give a rational evaluation
of the castes. One born in a Brāhmaṇa family and behaving
like a Sūdra should be considered to be a Sūdra. One born in
a Sūdra family and behaving like a Brāhmaṇa should be con-
sidered to be a Brāhmaṇa.144 Persons are born in different castes
because of their merits and demerits (karma) due to actions done
in the previous births.145

The Mahābhārata believes in atonement (prāyaścitta) for
sins. Sins are washed off by atonement. They are expiated by
repentance, confession, and penance. A sin committed should
never be concealed. Concealment of it enhances its sinfulness.
Confession of it to good persons destroys it. One who has com-
mitted a sin through ignorance, and repents for it, has not to
suffer from its consequences. One is absolved from sin by re-
pentance. The more he repents for it, the more he is absolved
from it. If one, who has committed a sin, confesses it to a
Brāhmaṇa, who is well-versed in duties, is absolved from it.
Sins are expiated by penances. A slight sin can be expiated by
observing a vow or by undergoing a penance. A grave sin can
be expiated by undergoing penance for a longer period. Fasting
is an atonement for sins. The mind is purged of all kinds of
sins, mental, verbal and bodily by repentance, confession and
penances.146

The Mahābhārata prescribes yoga as a means to the realiza-
tion of Brahman. It takes yoga in the sense of the union of
the soul with Brahman. It does not take it in the sense of total
suppression of mental functions like Patañjali. The Purāṇas
also take it in the sense of union of the soul with Brahman.
The eightfold yoga with restraints (yama), moral observances

143 SP., 61, 2, 10-12, 14-16, 4-9; 191, 15, 2; 160, 10.
144 SP., 188, 14; 189, 7-8. 145 SP., 188, 10, 14.
146 SP., 110, 30; 165, 49-78; AP., 162, 55-59; 112, 4-5, 7.
(niyama), posture (āsana), breath-control (prāṇāyāma), withdrawal of the senses from their objects (pratyāhāra), fixation of mind (dhāraṇā), meditation on Brahman (dhyāna), and absorption in him (samādhi) is mentioned. The senses are controlled by the mind (manas). The mind is controlled by meditation. The sense-organs should be concentrated on the manas, the manas on ahamkāra, ahamkāra on buddhi, and buddhi on prakṛti. Then the self should meditate on Brahman. When the Yogin acquires steadfastness in concentration on Brahman, undisturbed by thousands of distractions, he acquires intuition of Brahman. Steadfast meditation on Brahman produces trance (samādhi). It is complete absorption in Brahman. Three kinds of trance, vicāra, vitarka and viveka are mentioned. The eight-fold yoga should be carefully practised. When the senses and the manas are completely controlled, the self achieves union with Brahman, and enjoys ineffable supreme bliss. Meditation and yoga lead to nirvāṇa. Yoga gives true knowledge of Brahman and union with him.

The Mahābhārata regards knowledge of difference between the individual self and the supreme self or Brahman as the cause of bondage, and knowledge of non-difference between them as the cause of mokṣa. The knowledge of non-difference can be induced by yoga. The method of meditation and knowledge preceded by rigid self-control and moral life appears to be the principal method of attaining mokṣa. It has already been discussed.

Niśkāma karma or performance of common duties and specific duties relating to the castes and the stages of life without attachment for fruits is another method of attaining mokṣa. Attachment is bondage. Detachment leads to release. Performance of duties for the sake of duty with perfect detachment purifies the mind, and makes it fit for acquiring knowledge of Brahman. Renunciation of all desires gives supreme happiness. Dispassion, absence of attachment for wealth, renunciation of desire for actions, and realization of equality in all lead to mokṣa. Extinction of egoism and attachment is an indispensable condition of niśkāma karma. Karmayoga appears to be subordinate

\[117\] SP., 195, 5-15, 22; 316, 7-10, 12, 14-7, 19-25; 195, 15, 19-22, 274, 13, 14; 340, 47.

\[118\] SP., 318, 91-92, 76, 78, 87; 319, 101-02; 180, 2.
to jñānayoga. Wisdom is the only means to the attainment of mokṣa.188

The method of devotion (bhaktiyoga) also is prescribed for union with Brahman. Single-minded devotion (ekāntabhakti) to God, complete self-surrender (prapatti) to him, dedication of property and dear ones to him (tadiyabhāva), taking refuge in him (saraṇāgati), and constant recitation (japa) of the name of God are mentioned as the means of realizing God. The devotees, with the senses and the mind perfectly controlled, and with the mind concentrated on and absorbed in God, and surrendering themselves to him with single-minded and unswerving devotion, enter into him.189 Karmayoga, bhaktiyoga and jñānayoga are prescribed as the means to mokṣa. But jñānayoga appears to be the supreme method of attaining the transcendental state of supermoral perfection.

4. The Rāmāyaṇa.

The Rāmāyaṇa refers to the Vedas, the Vedāngas, Manu, the Purāṇas, and the Vedānta.190 Its philosophical speculations are scanty in comparison with those of the Mahābhārata. It mentions the deities of the Vedas and the Purāṇas. It mentions Indra, Varuṇa, Āditya, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Agni, Vivasvat, Maruts, Soma, Savitā, Prajāpati, Yama, Umā, Lakṣmī, Sarasvatī, Kārtikeya, Nārāyaṇa, Vāsudeva, Kuvera, Dāttā, Vidhāta, Gāyatrī and Skanda. But it does not appear to believe in polytheism. It ascribes the attributes of God to each deity. It appears to believe in henotheism. It treats a god as the supreme Lord for the time being. It describes the sun-god, Āditya, as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Siva and other gods. He is omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent. He is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. He resides in the hearts of all creatures, and rules over them. He is the beloved of all. He is the destroyer of ignorance. He is the illuminer of the soul. He assumes the form of the universe. He is the sacrifices, the gods, and the fruits of sacrifices.192 This passage shows that

188 S.P., 177, 2-3, 48, 53; 180, 2; 318, 91-92, 76, 78, 87; 106, 10-18.
189 S.P., 340, 35, 47; 110, 28, 31, 47; 338; 246; A.P., 14, 337.
190 E.T., Manmatha Nath Dutt, Calcutta, 1893, BK., Ch. 12; UK., 37; BK., 6, 30; KK., 3, 18; AK., 50.
192 BK., 106.
the Rāmāyaṇa believes in pantheism and monotheism. Siva also is described as the supreme Lord like Aditya. He is unborn, unmanifested and adorable. He is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. He is the ruler of all creatures. He is the supreme preceptor of all. He is the Lord of gods. This passage shows that the Rāmāyaṇa believes in henotheism and monotheism. It believes in divine government of the world. The entire universe is guided by God’s dispensation. He is the Lord of the Law of Karma. He administers happiness and misery according to this law. None can violate his dispensation.

Happiness and misery are subject to the Law of Karma. They are the fruits of merits and demerits acquired by righteous and unrighteous actions in the previous births. Persons reap the fruits of their actions in this world or the next. Misfortune is due to misdeeds in the past births. Terrible disasters are due to mighty inequities in the previous births. This is the Law of Karma.

The belief in the Law of Karma sometimes degenerates into predestination and fatalism. Destiny impels a person to desire an object. It urges him to have a set purpose. It has a mighty power. All are subject to its influence. None on earth can withstand the course of destiny. It is irresistible. Mighty is the course of destiny in all creatures. Even gods in heaven are subject to its influence and subject to happiness and misery. One does an action under the influence of Fate, which misguides a person to commit a sin. This is fatalism.

Sometimes time is personified and supposed to determine human actions with the aid of karmas. Time is the prime cause in the world. It urges persons to do right and wrong actions. It accomplishes the ends of their actions. It aids the fruition of merits and demerits. They cannot bear fruits without its aid. None can withstand the course of time. Even the eternal Being cannot override it. It is inexorable and inflexible. Even it is not subject to itself. It is not subject to decay. Virtue, wealth and happiness are subject to it. Kāla is irresistible. It predestines destruction. Men can never avert its destined
course. The Law of Karma. This appears to be complete determination of human actions. The Law of Karma, destiny, and time are too strong to leave any room for human freedom.

Yet the Rañāyaṇa recognizes the value of human freedom. It declares that weak and impotent persons follow the track of destiny, but that energetic persons can override destiny and avert its consequences by their manliness. Destiny can be overcome by prowess. Energy is essential to the realization of ends. Mighty is the course of energy. There is no greater power on earth than this. There is nothing unattainable on earth by a person gifted with energy. Perseverance is the source of good fortune. It brings to people all profitable objects and supreme happiness. Whatever one does with vigour bears fruit. Still the belief in destiny is stronger than that in human freedom.

There are four ends of human life: happiness (kāma), wealth (artha), virtue (dharma) and liberation (mokṣa). Happiness and wealth are subordinate to virtue. Rañā sacrifices them for virtue. He pursues the four ends in their relative importance. Virtue gives wealth and happiness. One who pursues happiness, wealth and virtue in time acquires right understanding. Virtue is the only intrinsic value. It can be attained by self-restraint. Pursuit of pleasure can never lead to virtue crowned with felicity. Virtue and wealth produce prosperity, happiness in heaven and liberation. But vice produces evil and harm. The way of virtue is narrow. Virtue is the supreme way. Virtue leads to heaven. Vice leads to hell.

An act is right, which is prescribed by the Vedas. An act is wrong, which is forbidden by them. They determine rightness and wrongness of actions. Dharma is the course of high-souled persons. Adharma is the course of wicked persons. Good conduct (sadācāra) of virtuous persons is the criterion of rightness and wrongness. Custom (ācāra) also is the test of right and wrong actions. What is approved by the society and in harmony with dharma is right. What is condemned by the society and repugnant to dharma is wrong. One should engage

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192 KK., 17, 20, 25; AK., 44, 58.  
193 AK., 23.  
194 SK., 12.  
195 AK., 4, 9, 11, 74; UK., 63, 64, 3.
in an action after considering what is right and what is wrong. What is right should be done. What is wrong should not be done. Reason is subordinate to the Vedas. It determines rightness and wrongness of actions after due consideration. What is conducive to the welfare of all beings is the supreme duty. Devotion to the good of humanity is the highest virtue.  

Non-injury, truthfulness, sex-restraint and benevolence are the cardinal virtues. A person should not do injury to others without their hostility. Even a Kṣatriya should not do harm to others, unless they are hostile to him. One should not hate another person. Forgiveness, compassion for all, kindness, and devotion to the welfare of mankind are the altruistic virtues. Kindness is the prime virtue. Charity should not be given lightly or disrespectfully. A gift bestowed on a person with disrespect destroys the donor.

Truthfulness is a basic virtue. That is no dharma that does not contain truth. That is no truth, in which there is hypocrisy. Breaking a promise is a sin. One who breaks a promise made to a benefactor is vile. Rāma is established in virtue and truth. Truth is ever dear to him. It is dearer to him than life. He always speaks the truth and never tells a lie. He would rather renounce his life than break a promise. He embraces exile for fourteen years to fulfil his father’s promise.

Sexual purity is a fundamental virtue. Chastity is given a very high place among virtues. “According to the Vedas and the other sacred texts, wives are inseparably blended with their husbands.” Sitā has her mind fixed upon Rāma, whose mind is fixed upon Sitā. They maintain their being in separation by virtue of their all-consuming love for each other. Sitā is known all over the world for her chastity. She is protected by virtue of her own character in Laṅkā. As the rays of the sun belong to it, so Sitā belongs to Rāma. A husband is the preceptor of a woman. She is ever devoted to him. She cannot confer her heart on any other person. She cannot touch any other person’s body.

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291 AK., 50; UK., 18, 3, 71; YK., 17, 18; AK., 6, 11, 66; KK., 4, 51; AK., 39, 47, 50, 65, 7.  
292 KK., 13; UK., 72, 119; KK., 4.  
293 SK., 15, 17, 24, 28, 38, 21.
The Rāmāyaṇa, like the Mahābhārata, stresses purity of mind. Even desire to steal without an overt act is a sin. Even dreaming of another man's wife is a sin. To lust after another's wife mentally is a sin. The mind directs the senses to their functions. If the mind is righteously disposed, the senses cannot go astray. One should practise righteousness ever cherishing one's heart in purity.

Self-restraint, mildness of temper, patience and indifference are the self-regarding virtues. High-souled persons have no objects of love or hatred. They have perfect self-control and detachment. Anger is the root of all kinds of sins. It can be controlled by forgiveness and good sense. Self-discipline makes a person irrepressible.

The ethics of the Rāmāyaṇa is anti-hedonistic and ascetic in tendency. Evil springs from desire. Pursuit of happiness can never lead to virtue. True happiness springs from virtue. Addiction to carnal pleasures is repugnant to virtue. Asceticism produces righteousness. It consists in renunciation of pleasures. It purifies the soul. It enhances physical and mental power. It gives the power of knowing the past, the future and the remote. It gives the power of knowing the thoughts and desires of others' minds. Austerities and yoga conserve youth and prolong life. Detachment and indifference are necessary for asceticism. Control of anger and restriction of fare are indispensable for it. Constant recitation of the name of God (japa) is a kind of penance. Women also may observe vows and perform austerities. The gods are pleased with severe austerities, and confer boons on the ascetics.

The duties of the four castes (varṇa) and the four stages of life (āśrama) are mentioned. The supremacy of the Brāhmaṇas is recognized. The authority of the Vedas and the Smṛtis is admitted. Verses are quoted from the Manusamhitā. Daily prayer (sandhyā), gāyatri, oblation of water to ancestral spirits (tarpaṇa), Agniṣṭoma sacrifice, Aśvamedha sacrifice, offerings to the fathers (śrāddha), yoga, meditation and the like are mentioned. There is belief in heaven and hell. There is a very strong belief in the Law of Karma, predestination, and rebirth.
The triumph of virtue over vice, of soul-force over brute physical power and oppression is the moral lesson of the Rāmāyaṇa.²⁶⁸

Injury to others, falsehood and adultery are the three kinds of sins. Falsehood, cunning, craftiness, deceit and dishonesty are sins. There is no greater sin on earth than carrying away another’s wife. People are absolved from their sins, when they confess their sins and are punished or forgiven. But the State must punish the criminals. The king who does not punish a criminal, commits a great sin. Sins are expiated by penance and repentance. No soul is condemned to eternal perdition. It has intrinsic purity.²⁶⁹ The Rāmāyaṇa, preaches the subjective morality of purity of mind and self-control and the objective social morality of the pursuit of common good of humanity. It enjoins ritualistic and ceremonial morality, but it does not over-estimate its importance. It lays great emphasis on purity of mind, truthfulness, non-injury, benevolence, self-control, and devotion to human welfare. It stresses reverence for the parents, affection for children, love for husband and wife, and love for brothers, which are the virtues of family life. It idealizes the king’s devotion to the welfare of the subjects at the sacrifice of his own personal welfare. The Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata have exerted the most paramount influence on the minds of the Hindus in India for centuries, and moulded their character. They have common ethical concepts and common philosophical ideas based on the teachings of the Upaniṣads.

²⁶⁸ ĀK., 11, 68, 75, 4, 9; KK., 4, 5; BK., 35.
²⁶⁹ KK., 18, 35; ĀK., 18, 11; BK., 48.
CHAPTER III

THE CULTS IN THE MINOR UPANIŚADS

There are one hundred and eight Upaniṣads. They are mentioned in Muktikopaniṣad. Iṣa, Kena, Kaṭha, Praśna, Muṇḍaka, Māṇḍukya, Taittirīya, Aitareya, Chāndogya and Brhadāraṇyaka have commentaries written by Śaṅkara (800 A.D.). A commentary on Śvetāśvatara also is ascribed to him. Śaṅkara quotes from Kaiṣitakī, Jābāla, Brahmabindu, Mahānārayana, and Kaivalya besides these eleven Upaniṣads in his commentaries on Brahma Sūtra and the Bhagavad Gītā. Rāmānuja (1100 A.D.) quotes from the eleven Upaniṣads together with Subāla, Mahānārayana, Jābāla, Kaiṣitakī, Ātharvāśikhā, Nṛsiṃhapūrṇatāpaniṣad, Mahopaniṣad, Gārīha and Mantriopaniṣad in his Śrī Bhāṣya on Brahma Sūtra. There are many minor monistic Upaniṣads which are not mentioned by Śaṅkara. There are some theistic Upaniṣads which are not mentioned by Rāmānuja. He quotes profusely from the theistic Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. It is extremely difficult to assign dates to the minor Upaniṣads. The later Upaniṣads incorporate texts from the earlier ones. Some incorporate verses from the Bhagavad Gītā. It can safely be concluded that many minor Upaniṣads belong to the post-epic and later period. They contain the philosophical basis of Śaivism, Sāktism, Vaiṣṇavism and other minor cults of Hinduism. They centre round Śiva, Śakti, Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa, Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Gaṇēśa, Sūrya and other deities. Each deity is regarded as Brahman or Iśvara. The Saiva Upaniṣads teach idealistic monism or absolutism. The Śaṅkta Upaniṣads also advocate absolutism (advaita). They lay stress on the dynamic nature of the creative power of Brahman. The Vaiṣṇava Upaniṣads are dualistic (dvaitavādin), and regard the distinction between the supreme Self or Brahman and the individual self as real. But they also are not free from a note of monism. Monism is the predominant note of the minor Upaniṣads.

1 i. 30-40, Nirmayasagar Press, Bombay, 1948.
1. The Philosophical Basis of Saivism.

Siva is the indeterminate Absolute (para brahman). He is the supreme reality. He is self-existent and self-luminous. He is characterized by being, consciousness and bliss (saccidānanda). He is indeterminate, formless, non-temporal, non-spatial and non-causal. He is one, infinite, eternal, partless, subtle and taintless. He is perfect and absolute. He is the imperishable, supreme Self. He is full of eternal consciousness. He is devoid of homogeneous, heterogeneous and internal difference. He is undifferentiated all-pervading consciousness. He is the Witness (sākṣīn). He is the Self of all. He is the infinite ground of the universe. He is its Witness. He is devoid of all empirical attributes (sarvasānyasvarūpa). He is devoid of appearance (nirābhāsa). He is devoid of names and forms. He is devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas. He is trans-empirical. He is beyond empirical existence and non-existence. He is non-phenomenal, acosmic, inactive and groundless. He is the ground of being and non-being. He is the one supreme transcendental reality. His nature is one, uniform and undivided. The inner Self of the self is undifferentiated consciousness, which is uncaused, peerless and indescribable. He is inconceivable, inscrutable, unmanifest, calm, immortal and unconditioned consciousness. He is indicated by silence only.

He is a mass of consciousness (vijñānahāna). He is the embodiment of knowledge (jñānavigraha). He is the light of lights. He is the supreme light of consciousness. He is self-luminous by nature. He is the inner Self (pratyagātman). He is self-manifest. He cannot be proved by reasoning. He is the revealer of all objects of experience, all experiencers, and all experience. He is the one, partless, supreme Self (paramātman) in the heart of every creature. He is the foundational consciousness (ādicaitanya). He is the transcendental ground of the empirical selves. He is full of eternal consciousness. He is devoid of the distinction of knower, known and knowledge. He is pure, self-luminous and blissful. He is not veiled by cosmic nescience (māyā). He is devoid of negation. He is the unconditioned, indeterminate, self-existent Absolute. He is self-proved.²

²TB., iii. 1-7, 11-13, 18, 21, 22, 26, 31, 38-40, 47; Mantrika, 16, 19; JD., x. 2, 3; Mait., iii. 2, 12, 13, 19, 20, 24; Kaiv., i. 6, 7, 18; ii. 1;
Siva is the determinate Lord (apara brahman). He becomes Isvara when he is limited by the adjunct of maya. He is the ancient Person (purusha) endowed with inconceivable powers. He is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. He is devoid of origin and end. He is immaterial, bodiless and organless. He is the knower of all. But he is not known by any body. He is the knower of all empirical selves and empirical objects. He is devoid of merit and demerit. He is auspicious and good. He is all, past, present and future. He is the Lord of the past and the future.

Siva is the omniscient and omnipotent Lord. He is endowed with all powers. He creates the world with his power called prakriti, and controls it from within. Prakriti is the conscious power of Brahman, which can create the multiform world in proximity to him. Siva is groundless. He creates the world with his power of avidya or cosmic nescience. His maya deludes all. Para Brahman is the eternal, indeterminate, indefinable, immutable, pure consciousness. Parā Sakti is the self-luminous creative power born of Brahman. Sakti is called maya. The world-appearance is cosmic nescience (maya, ajñāna). Siva is pure consciousness (sūdha caitanya) free from the adjunct of maya. He is the ground of Sakti. He is the Witness of cosmic nescience or the power of maya. Brahman associated with maya (sakti) creates avyakta or unmanifest prakriti and the manifest world. The empirical world is an appearance of Brahman associated with infinite power. Siva is one, but he appears to be the multiform world. Brahman associated with cosmic nescience (avidya) is the cause of the world.

YS., i. 5, 20, 21, 66; MA., vi. 7; BV., 78, 81-98, 100, 104-10; Nirvāṇa, p. 347; DM., 1; Sānd., ii. 1, p. 418; Adhyāt., 60-64, 68-69; RH., 42, 44, 49; Nādābīndu, 17-19; VK., 25, 35; Dhyānābīndu, 6-8; TSB., 1, p. 328; 156, p. 336; NA., p. 254; Sar., 20; SK., 1-5; Atm., 1; Var., ii. 20-21; iii. 2; PBr., 16, 17, 20, 21; AS., ii. 3; VC., 72; KR., 8, 28, 27; Nirmānasagar Press, Bombay, 1948.

Brahmaṇgaḷī sakāśamānāvicitrājagānirnāmāmarthavabuddhirūpā brahmaśaktir eva prakṛtiḥ. NA., p. 255; JD., x. 4; TSB., 1, 9, 11; Kaiv., i. 9, 20-23. MA., vii. 8; BV., 45, 46, 77, 78, 82-110; Sānd., ii. 2.


Nityaḥ sañcāharindraḥ nivikalpaḥ nirābhīṣṭaḥ puriiṣiḥ pariṣiḥ brahma, tasmāj jātā pariṣiḥ svayamānātīrṣitaṁ. YC., 72.

Māyopādhiśvarīnirnāmakaḥ sañcāharindraḥ (caitanyaṁ). KR., 38.

Pratyagātmānam ajñānamābhāsakteś ca sākṣiptam. Ibid, 12.

Avidyāśabalaḥ brahma. Brahmaṇaḥvyaktam. TSB., 1. Ibid. 9.
manifest world is a form of Sakti. Siva is its unmanifest essence. All created beings, inanimate and animate, are in the nature of Siva and Sakti. The world-appearance is non-existent; it is never produced. There is no mâyā. There is no unconscious prakṛti. Brahmā is the only reality. The world is unreal apart from Brahmā. It is a false appearance. It is Brahmā. There is no mâyā. There is no effect of mâyā. All causes and effects are God. One Brahmā does not really become the diverse world. It is a false appearance. It is mere mâyā. One Brahmā is real. The world-appearance is unreal.

Siva is the one supreme master of gods. He is the most adorable Lord. He is sometimes said to be the creator of Brahmā and Viṣṇu. He is sometimes identified with them. 'He is Brahmā. He is Viṣṇu. Siva is the heart of Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu is the heart of Siva. Siva takes the form of Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu takes the form of Siva. Viṣṇu is full of Siva. Siva is full of Viṣṇu. There is no difference between them.' Siva is the cause. Viṣṇu is the effect. Brahmā is causal action. Siva is one. But he becomes Trinity to fulfil his purpose. He is full of all gods. They are in the nature of Siva. He is the creator and ruler of all gods. He is their Self. He is adored by them.

Siva is the knower and creator of the Vedas. He is known through them. He is the preceptor of all. The Vedas are Siva. He is the Lord, the Master.

Siva is the Lord of creatures (paśupati). He is their omniscient ruler. The jivas overcome by egoism and bound to embodied life are paśus. They are ignorant like cattle who are

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9 Vvaktam sarvam umārūpam avyaktam tu maheśvaram. RH., 10.
KR., 13.
11 Brahmāmātraṁ jagad idam. Māyākāryādiṁ nāsti māyā nāsti. Ibid., v. 31, 33.
12 Kāryāṁ kāraṇam ṣvaraṁ. Ibid, v. 43.
13 Ekaḥ sarbbhidhyate bhrāntyā māyayā na svarūpaṁ. Advaitam evāsti na praṇāśitaṁ. Māyāmātraṁ jagat. JD., x, 2, 3, 12.
15 Kāryāṁ viṣṇuḥ kṛityā brahmā kāraṇaiṁ tu maheśvaram. Prayojanārthāṁ rudrāṁ mārtiṁ ekā trīdhā kṛṣṇ. RH., 15.
16 Sarvadevātmako rudrāḥ sarve devāḥ śivaṁ prabhū. Ibid, 4.
17 Pañcabrahma, 1, 13, 15.
18 Śīvo guruḥ śīvo vedaḥ śīvo devāḥ śīvaḥ prabhū. Var., iv, 32.
Kaiv., i, 22; Sar., 2.
goaded by the peasant to till the land, and endure all kinds of suffering. The jivas are ignorant of their identity with Siva, and endure all kinds of misery. Avidyā is the fetters (pāśa) that bind them to saṁsāra. 19

Siva is the inner Self (pratyagātman) of the individual selves. He directs their sense-organs, life-forces and manas to perform their functions. He does not direct them by his intrinsic nature. He directs them through his power of māyā. 20 Siva becomes jīva owing to egoism (ahārkhāra). It produces the organism made of sattva, rajas and tamas, five elements and bodily humours. Siva is the transcendental Self, which is entangled in the psychophysical organism, and becomes the empirical self (jīva). The jīva is not real. It is a false appearance. It has an apparent existence like an illusory serpent in a rope. It is always Siva. It is deluded by non-discrimination of itself from prakṛti. Its false identification with prakṛti is the cause of its empirical life. 21 It acquires various kinds of bodies owing to attachment (vāsanā). When it acquires knowledge of the Self, it realizes its identity with Brahman. 22

The jīva and Siva reside in the same body. The empirical self is mutable. The indwelling Spirit is immutable. The former experiences the fruits of actions in the shape of happiness and misery. But the latter does not experience them. Siva looks on as a mere Witness. The jīva is Siva deluded by māyā. It assumes a body, and experiences various objects in waking, dream, and deep sleep. It is grounded in infinite consciousness and bliss. 23

Siva is one, but he appears to be many jīvas owing to avidyā or superimposition of nescience. When avidyā and egoistic actions produced by it are destroyed, the jīva becomes Sadāśiva. Brahman becomes jīva, when he is limited by the adjunct of avidyā, even as all-pervading ether is enclosed in a jar, and becomes limited ether. When avidyā is destroyed, the jīva becomes Brahman, even as ether enclosed in a jar becomes all-pervading when the jar is destroyed. When the limiting

20 Pbr., 7-10.
21 VS., iv. 1-2; TSB., 16.
22 TSB., 18-19.
23 Ibid., 13; RH., 41-42; Kaiv., i. 14.
adjunct of avidyā is destroyed, the jīva becomes distinctionless Brahman.\(^{24}\) The jīva is the Witness (sākṣin). It is neither its body, nor vital forces, nor sense-organs nor mind. It is not the empirical self bound to saṁsāra. It is, in reality, Brahman (Śiva).\(^{25}\)

The empirical self (jīva) has five sheaths. The bodily self is pervaded by the vital self. The vital self is pervaded by the mental self. The mental self is pervaded by the intellectual self. The intellectual self is pervaded by the blissful self. The blissful self (jīva) is pervaded by Brahman, the Witness, infinite being, consciousness and bliss.\(^{26}\)

There are seven forms of pure consciousness, limited by different adjuncts. Brahman or Śiva is pure consciousness (śuddha caitya) free from the adjunct of māyā. Īśvara is the eternal consciousness associated with māyā. The jīva is the eternal consciousness limited by avidyā. The knower (pramāṭr) is the eternal consciousness limited by the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) or mind. The means of knowledge (prameya) is the eternal consciousness limited by a mental mode (antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti). The object of knowledge (pramiti) is the consciousness limited by an empirical object, which is not yet known. Valid knowledge (pramiti) is the consciousness limited by a known empirical object.\(^{27}\)

The jīva is, in reality, the Ātman, Brahman, or Śiva. It is not any of its sheaths. It transcends the bodily, vital, mental, intellectual and blissful sheaths. They are mutable. But the Ātman is immutable. It is not the gross body (sthūla deha), the subtle body (sūkṣma deha), and the causal body (kāraṇa deha) composed of avidyā. It is beyond the waking state, dream and deep sleep. It transcends all empirical states. It is neither its body, nor sense-organs, nor internal organs, mind (manas), intellect (buddhi), and egoism (ahāṃkāra). It is a bodiless, organless, immutable spirit. It is the Witness (sākṣin). It reveals the unreal empirical objects. The body, the sense-organs, the mind, intellect, egoism and mental modes are mutable, known, empirical objects. They are unreal appearances.

\(^{24}\) Sār., 28; NA., p. 253; Ātm., 21-22; JD., x. 2, 4.
\(^{25}\) Saṃsārakirti Śivavācāra, śāstra evaṁ kevalāḥ. Ibid., x. 5.
\(^{26}\) KR., 17-22.
\(^{27}\) Ibid., 37-42. Cp. Vedāntaparibhāṣā.
They cannot be the trans-empirical, immutable Witness. The knower cannot be reduced to the known. The Self (atman) cannot be reduced to the not-self (anatman). It is pure, eternal consciousness.\footnote{TB., iii. 44, 45, 48, 49; v. 16, 17, 103.}

The jiva is Brahman limited by the triple body. The gross body is composed of the five elements, the vital forces, the sense-organs, and the internal organs. The subtle body (līṅga sarīra) is composed of the five cognitive organs, the five motor organs, the five vital forces, manas and buddhi. The causal body is made of sattva, rajas and tamas. Viśva is the self in the waking state. Taijasa is the self in dream. Prājña is the self in deep sleep. Ātman is the self in superconscious trance. Viśva experiences gross objects. Taijasa experiences subtle objects. Prājña experiences bliss. Ātman is the witness of all.\footnote{YC., 72.}

The Ātman is neither bound nor released. Bondage and release do not exist, in reality, in it. Brahman or Ātman is the only eternal reality, which cannot be veiled by any other entity, since it is non-existent. Bondage and release are imagined in the Self. They are false creations of māyā. The Self is one, non-dual, undivided, inactive, calm, taintless, perfect, supreme Being devoid of bondage and release.\footnote{Māyā kṛiptau bandhamokṣau na cātman. Ātm., 29. Ibid, 26, 27, 30, 31.} It is the transcendent Witness. It has neither birth nor death nor transmigration. It is taintless, partless, immutable and inactive. It is pure undifferentiated consciousness. It is Brahman.\footnote{Atmasannijñaḥ śivaḥ sūdha eka evādvayaḥ sadā. Brahmarūpataya brahma kevalam pratibhāṣate. Ibid, 1.}

Māyā is the limiting adjunct of Īśvara. Avidyā, an effect of māyā, is the limiting adjunct of a jiva. Māyā and avidyā are empirical appearances. So Īśvara and jiva are appearances. When māyā and avidyā are destroyed by integral knowledge of Siva, Brahman or Ātman, God and the individual self cease to exist.\footnote{Evam mayi cidākāše jīvēṇaḥ parikalpatau. Var., ii. 81. Māyātātkāryavilaye neśvaratvāh na jīvātā. Ibid, ii. 52. RH., 42, 43.}
When it acquires knowledge of its identity with Śiva or pure consciousness, it neither sorrows nor is deluded. It becomes non-dual supreme bliss or Śiva. The jīva is always Śiva or pure consciousness (cit). If it differs from cit, then it is unconscious or material (jaḍa). Pure consciousness is always one. It has no real forms.

The world is a false appearance of Śiva, as a serpent is a false appearance of a rope. It is non-different from him. He is its reality. He is the First Cause. He is the ground of the world. It is non-different from him. Its distinctness from Śiva is a false appearance. It is real as Śiva, and unreal apart from him. Its cause is one, eternal and non-different. Difference is false. One pure consciousness (śuddha caitya) is the cause of the world. It is an appearance of pure consciousness which is its ground. It is a false appearance like a mirage. It is, in reality, pure being or Brahman. The world, heaven and hell are false appearances. They are really pure consciousness. Śiva or pure consciousness is the material cause of the world-appearance. It is not made of any other stuff. It is nothing but Brahman. It is not pervaded by Brahman, since the distinction of the pervader and the pervaded is false. All is Ātman. All is Brahman. The world-appearance is false. When it is known to be an appearance, its reality is known to be Brahman. The world is full of māyā. Śiva is its reality. The false world-appearance vanishes at the dawn of true knowledge. It is non-existent. It is pure consciousness (cit). It is full of pure consciousness (cinmaya). It appears to be different from it. One who knows Brahman, does not know the world as different from the Absolute. There is no māyā. There is no prakṛti. There is no world. The Ātman alone is real. The not-self is not real.

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The phenomenal reality of the world is admitted. Siva is the creator of the world-appearance. He was the only Being before creation. There was none other distinct from him. He created the world, and entered into it. He is eternal and non-eternal, unmanifest and manifest, immutable and mutable. He is transcendent and immanent. He rules over all worlds with his governing powers. He is the support and unifier of the worlds.

Brahman (Siva) associated with māyā creates avyakta or unmanifest prakṛti. He creates mahāt out of avyakta, ahaṅkāra out of mahāt, five tannātrās out of ahaṅkāra, five material elements out of five tannātras, and the world out of the elements. Tannātras are the subtle essences of sound, colour, taste, smell and touch.

Sometimes subjective idealism is advocated. The whole world is a creation of the mind. Earth, water, fire, air and ether are ideas of the mind. Colour, taste, smell, sound and touch are its ideas. Waking experience, dream and deep sleep are subjective states of the mind (manomaya). Earth, heaven and hell are mere creations of the mind. The gods are subjective (manomaya) fictions. The empirical material world is mental (mānasā). The embodied life is subjective. The individual self (jīva) is a creation of mind. Time is an idea of the mind. The whole world is non-existent. This doctrine is an echo of the idealism of Lāṅkāvatārasūtra.

Sometimes objective idealism is advocated. The world is an expression of the mind of Siva endowed with all powers. It is a manifestation of the mind of omnipotent God. It is a display of the restless vibration of the divine mind. The mind is by nature restless, active and creative. The mind of God is restless, active and vibrating. The world is an expression of the vibration of the mind of God. Siva is full of Śakti. The whole world

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48 Aś., i. 1, 21; ii. 5, 7. 49 TSB., 1.
51 Hipp., Vol. II, pp. 386-76.
is pervaded by them. But subjective idealism and objective idealism are the temporary trends of thought in the Saiva Upaniṣads. The main trend is absolutism or idealistic monism.

Śiva or Brahman is self-luminous pure consciousness. How can māyā, which is in the nature of darkness or ignorance, originate in the self-luminous light of consciousness? From the empirical standpoint, there is a distinction of knowledge (vidyā) and ignorance (avidyā). From the ontological standpoint, Brahman alone exists, that is always self-manifest. There is no māyā, avidyā, prakṛti, or the world. There is no empirical self (jīva), or God (iśvara). These are phenomenal appearances. Brahman cannot even be said to be the Witness (sākṣin) because there is no object of consciousness. Śiva is the only reality. He is self-aware. He is the pure subject-objectless consciousness.

Māyā does not exist in reality. It does not exist as distinct from Being or Brahman. It is imagined in the Ātman. It is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. The Ātman is Brahman. Māyā is neither existent nor non-existent, nor both. It is characterless and indefinable. It is without origin. It is the matrix of the world-appearance. It is the common object of both valid knowledge and invalid knowledge, which apprehend empirical appearances. A person who knows Brahman, knows the world to be non-distinct from the Ātman. He does not perceive the world as such, but as pure consciousness. Though he knows the empirical selves (jīva), he does not know them as such, but as pure consciousness. He does not perceive the world as full of misery, but as full of joy.

The empirical self (jīva) is bound to sāṁsāra owing to ignorance (avidyā, ajñāna), egoism (ahamkāra), desire (vāsanā), afflictions (kleśa) or emotions and passions, and egoistic actions (karma). Ignorance is the cause of attachment. Attachment is the cause of desire. Desire is the cause of action. So ignorance is the root cause of bondage. Ignorance is non-discrimination of the Self (ātman) from the not-self or the mind-body-complex. It is the knowledge of difference. It can be destroyed by true knowledge of the Self or non-difference. Knowledge (jñāna) is

43 BI., II. 9. 44 PBr., 17-19, 27.
the means of release. Knowledge of difference between jīva and Siva is ignorance. Knowledge of non-difference is right knowledge.

Knowledge can be attained by renunciation (tyāga) of desires. Renunciation is not the giving up of actions. It is the conquest of egoistic desires. It is the extermination of the primal desires for wealth (vittaiśaṇā), sons (puttraiśaṇā) and enjoyment on earth and in heaven (lokaśaṇā). It is detachment. It is not only abstention from worldly pleasures, but complete absence of desire for happiness here or hereafter. Detachment can be attained by purity of mind. Mind is pure or impure. Pure mind is desireless. Impure mind is full of desires. Desire means egoistic desire. One is bound, whose mind is full of egoistic desire and determination. One is released, whose mind is free from selfish desire and resolution. The mind attached to objects of sentient pleasure is the cause of bondage. The mind attached to Brahmaṇ is the cause of release. So love for objects of pleasure should be directed to Brahmaṇ. The mind should be diverted from objects of empirical pleasure to the inner Self or Brahmaṇ. Empirical objects give transient and ephemeral pleasure. They are finite and temporal. But Brahmaṇ is infinite and eternal bliss. The mind should be diverted from transitory pleasure to eternal joy. Attachment for objects should be transformed into perennial love for the Atman or Brahmaṇ. When the mind is purged of attachment for empirical pleasure and egoistic desires, becomes free from distraction, and is concentrated on Brahmaṇ, it ceases to be mind. It becomes supermind, and is identified with Brahmaṇ. Purity of mind destroys good and evil actions, and merits and demerits. It brings about supermoral perfection. So purity of mind should be assiduously cultivated.44

Purity of mind can be brought about by the performance of duties (karma) relating to the castes and the stages of life. Righteous actions purify the mind. Unrighteous actions pollute it. One who performs one’s specific duties, reaps the fruits of one’s actions in the shape of happiness and misery. But

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one should renounce the desire for fruits. Only disinterested performance of duties (niṣkāma karma) is conducive to purification of mind. But the duties relating to the castes and the stages of life are non-eternal. They involve great hardships. They are not adequate to the attainment of mokṣa. One should renounce all actions, give up egoism and love for near and dear ones, and cultivate love for the Ātman. One who delights in the Ātman, experiences supreme bliss. The supreme state is desirelessness.

The eightfold yoga is conducive to right knowledge. Knowledge aided by yoga is a means to release. Penance produces purity of mind (sattva). The Self can be realized through a pure mind. Self-realization stops birth and death. The mind ceases to function, when it is concentrated on Brahman. Brahman is realized through supreme knowledge (parā vidyā), truthfulness, austerities, sex-restraint and moral observances. Purity of food produces purity of mind. Purity of mind produces right knowledge. The knots of the heart are broken at the dawn of right knowledge. Sense-restraint, control of mind, simplicity, performance of Vedic duties, observance of vows, good conduct, good character, reverence for preceptors, and devotion to Siva lead to the highest goal. All actions should be dedicated to Brahman. All should be sacrificed to him. The mind should be absorbed in him. These acts lead to the attainment of Brahman. They bring about knowledge of identity with him.

Devotion (bhakti) aids knowledge (jñāna). Siva breaks all fetters of his devotees. He gives boons to them. He gives them peace that breaks the fetters of bondage. Devotion to the preceptor and devotion (parā bhakti) to the Lord produce the knowledge of Brahman. He favours his devotees with the saving knowledge. So devotion, meditation, and disinterested performance of duties are auxiliary to knowledge. But its main auxiliary means is renunciation, egolessness and desirelessness. Immortality can be attained by renunciation. It cannot be

48 Mait., i. 13-14; ii. 30.
49 YS., i. 13, 14; Mait., i. 2-4; TSB., 19.
50 Prbr., 32, 36, 37.
51 Sur., 26, 33, 34, 36; BhJ., ii, p. 580.
52 AS., ii. 5.
53 6A., 30.
54 Mahēśvarāḥ bhaktan jñāneṇa anugṛhṛati. AS., ii. 4.
achieved by performance of prescribed duties, procreation of children, or acquisition of wealth.\(^8\)

The body is the temple of God. The self in it is nothing but Śiva. He should be worshipped as identical with the self. The worshipper should think of himself as Śiva. "I am He."\(^9\) Knowledge of difference between the worshipper and the worshipped is ignorance (ajñāna). Knowledge (jnāna) is the vision of non-difference between them.\(^9\) Constant thought of non-duality (advaita) or Brahman is mendicancy (bhaikṣya). Constant thought of duality or difference is non-mendicancy. There is no need of daily prayer (sandhyā), when the true knowledge dawns on the mind and pure consciousness (cit) constantly shines. Renunciation (saṁyāsa) is not renunciation of actions. It is the realization of identity of jīva and Atman. One who has destroyed the sense of identity of the self with the body and the primal desires for wealth, sons, and happiness here and hereafter is fit to enter upon an ascetic's life. One who has acquired dispassion (vairāgya) for all objects of enjoyment, should adopt it. One is sure to fall, if one adopts it with attachment for worldly pleasures. A person who adopts an ascetic's life for food and clothes, articles of luxury, or fame, leads neither a householder's life nor an ascetic's life. He never acquires fitness for release.\(^9\) Unfortunately most Hindu ascetics fall under this category.

Thought of Brahman is the best. Thought of the Śastra is inferior to it. Thought of mantras is inferior to it. Pilgrimage is inferior to it. Thought of Brahman without experience is in vain. It is like delight in the imaginary taste of a fruit on the top of a tree reflected in water. Faith produces detachment and knowledge. So faith must be acquired. It ultimately leads to release. A person tossed in doubt is never released. Knowledge is better than learning. Worship of an idol or an image leads to happiness in heaven, which is followed by rebirth. So a yati should give up external worship to escape from rebirth. He should worship Śiva in his heart as identical with his self. He should transcend the empirical knowledge of duality.

\(^8\) Kaiv., i. 3.
\(^9\) Dehi devālayah próktah sa jīvāḥ kevalāḥ sivāḥ. Sk., 10.
\(^9\) Abhedadāsanaḥ. Ibid., 11.
give up thoughts of the knower, the known and knowledge, destroy their impressions (vāsanā), meditate on the Atman alone, and be absorbed in and identical with pure consciousness. Identity-consciousness with absolute desirelessness is the highest state. He should be full of pure consciousness and bliss, Atman, or Brahman, within and without, like a vessel plunged in an ocean, which is full of water inside and outside. One who has once tasted the nectar of knowledge of identity with Brahman, gives up all duties, and runs after the perennial joy. When avidyā is completely destroyed by the knowledge of identity, the self becomes identical with Brahman, and attains disembodied release (videhakāivalya). It consists in the realization of one undivided being and consciousness. Embodied release (jīvanmukti) consists in complete destruction of desires. Desires can be destroyed by firmness in meditation on Brahman and the experience of Brahman in all beings. The accumulated store of merits and demerits is uprooted by the eradication of desires. Embodied release consists in the constant absorption of the mind in Brahman, realization of identity of the self with Brahman, and enjoyment of supreme bliss. One who is contented with the nectar of knowledge of identity with Brahman, is completely fulfilled, and has no duties to perform. He is immersed in the nectar of infinite bliss. He has no love or hatred. One who has embodied release is tasteless, pure, transparent, and devoid of emotions.

There are seven stages in the attainment of embodied release. The first stage is the good will (śubhechchā) with detachment acquired from the study of the Śāstras and the company of saints. The second stage is determination (vicārapā). It is the desire to do right actions (sadācāra). It is preceded by the practice of detachment, company of saints, and the study of the scriptures. The third stage is attenuation of attachment for objects of sentient pleasure (tanumānasā) preceded by the practice of good will and determination to practise good conduct. The fourth stage is acquisition of purity of mind (sattvāppatti). The purity of mind is produced by dispassion for sentient pleasure.

\[\text{Mait., ii. 21-24, 26, 28-30.}\]
\[\text{Antahpurgo bahiṇpūraṇā pārṇakumbha ivārṇave, Ibid, ii, 27.}\]
\[\text{JD., vi. 48.}\]
\[\text{Ātm., 21-24.}\]
\[\text{Adhyātma, 12, 13, 39, 42-44.}\]
\[\text{JD., i. 23-24.}\]
\[\text{Adhyātma, 66; VS., 47.}\]
owing to the practice of the first three stages. The fifth stage is absolute detachment (asamsakti). It is due to excessive purity of mind produced by abstention from enjoying pleasant objects and practice of the first four stages. The sixth stage is reflection (padārthabhāvanā) on the unreal nature of all external and internal objects owing to delight in the Ātman generated by the practice of the first five stages. The seventh stage is the attainment of superconsciousness (turīyagā) or consciousness of intrinsic identity owing to the non-apprehension of difference generated by the repeated practice of the six stages. When identity-consciousness is firmly established, consciousness of duality and distinction vanishes. In the last stage there is neither ego nor egoism. There is only faint reflection on identity-consciousness. The self becomes full of Brahman inside and outside. It is immersed in Brahman. The person who is free from attachment, desire and egoism, and who has transcended dualistic consciousness, and attained identity-consciousness, is released in life. He rests in pure absolute consciousness with an unperturbed mind. He has no consciousness of the world, his own self, and other selves.

Knowledge is of two kinds, higher and lower. The knowledge of the Vedas is lower knowledge (apāra vidyā). The knowledge of the indeterminate Brahman is higher knowledge (parā vidyā). Saṃsāra can be stopped by knowledge (jñāna). It cannot be ended by the performance of duties (karma). But devotion (bhakti) to God, repetition of a mantra or Om (japa), chanting his name (kirtana), and dedication of all actions to him purify the mind, and make it fit for receiving the saving knowledge.

Karmayoga consists in performing prescribed duties for the sake of duty and pursuing the good with a pure mind. It consists in dedicating all actions to God with a mind firmly fixed on him. It is performance of all duties as prayer to God.

There is a spiritual interpretation of some duties in the Saiva Upaniṣads. Yama is dispassion for the body and the

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**Var., iv. 1-10, 11, 17, 18. Mahopaniṣad, V. 23-37.**

**Ibid., iv. 19-21, 23, 25, 28, 30. Cp. YVS, ch. 120, 1-6.**

**RH., 28-31, 35, 17; JD., ii. 12-16; BhJ., pp. 563, 566; SA., 37; Vc., 87, 88; Sānd., 2.**

**TSB., 25-26; Sar., 26; BhJ., p. 566; JD., vii. 3-4.**
sense-organs. Niyama is attachment for the supreme reality or Brahman. Āsana is indifference to all objects. Prāṇāyāma is experience of the falsity of the world-appearance. Pratyāhāra is turning the mind inward to the Atman. T1 Or it consists in dedication of all actions, right or wrong to God or performance of duties as prayer to God. T2 Dhāraṇā is concentration of the mind. Dhyāna is meditation on the pure consciousness (cinmātra) or Brahman as identical with the self. T3 It is objectless mind. T4 Samādhi is complete forgetfulness of meditation. It is complete identification of the mind with Brahman, when all its functions are entirely suppressed. It is merging the mind in Brahman completely. It is the cessation of mind (manolaya). It is the dawn of consciousness of identity of jiva and Brahman. T6

Cleanliness (saucha) is the restraint of the senses. It is the knowledge that 'I am pure'. Purity of knowledge or internal purity is real cleanliness. Cleanliness of the body with a polluted mind is useless. It is destruction of egoism or the sense of 'I' and 'mine'. It is destruction of the desire for wealth and happiness, the sex-urge, and the will-to-power. It consists in purifying the mind, and enlightening it with knowledge and detachment. Ablution (snāna) is washing off the impurities of mind. T8 Brahmacarya consists in living, moving and being in Brahman mentally. T7 Mortification of the body for acquiring supernatural powers is worthy of a demon (āsura). True penance (tapas) consists in burning the desire for occult powers by the fire of direct experience of the truth of Brahman, and of the falsity of the world-appearance. T8

Mendicancy (bhākṣya) consists in drinking the nectar of Brahman. It is constant thought of non-duality (advaita) or Brahman. Non-mendicancy is constant thought of duality or difference. Mendicancy is living according to the precepts of the preceptor and the Sāstras. Solitary life consists in abiding in non-dualistic consciousness. T9 An ascetic's bed is patience,

T1 TSB., 28-30. T2 JD., vii. 3-4. T3 Mait., ii. 2. T4 TSB., 31; JD., ix. 1-5. T5 Mait., ii. 2. T6 TSB., 32; 160-63; Manḍ., v. 1; Śānd., 37-40; JD., x. 1. T7 Sk., 11; JD., i. 20-22; Mait., ii. 2, 8, 9. T8 Sk., 12; Mait., ii. 10, 15. T9 NA., p. 256.
extirpation of merits and demerits, and destruction of avidyā and egoism. His loin-cloth is indifference, destruction of passions, and vision of Brahman. His staff is contemplation and experience of pure consciousness. Restraint of the senses and the mind is his moral observance. His efficiency is in complete self-control. His renunciation consists in eschewing passions and tasting the joy of union of jiva with Brahman. Joy is his temple. Joy is his food. Living in joy is his forest life. Living without any support is his livelihood. His sacred thread is superconscious trance. His tuft of hair is knowledge of Brahman. The external symbols are false appearances. Experience of the foundational consciousness is his end. Making the mind super-mind (unmanī) or merging it in pure consciousness is the means. Absolute freedom of action is his release.88

The company of saints is heaven. The company of vicious worldly persons is hell. Happiness is the blissful state due to the experience of Brahman as pure being, consciousness and bliss. Misery is desire for objects of pleasure. Desire is bondage. Desire for occult powers is bondage. Desire for the practice of yoga is bondage. Desire for the worship of men and gods is bondage. Desire for the performance of the prescribed duties relating to castes and stages of life is bondage. Desire for performing sacrifices, vows, austerities, charity, and Vedic rituals is bondage. Desire for worldly pleasures is bondage. Even desire for release is bondage. Freedom from desire is release. Egolessness is release.89

A paramahamsa, who has realized the highest state of identity-consciousness, dispenses with the external symbols of a sacred thread, a tuft of hair, a staff and the like. He dispenses with uttering mantras, meditation, prayer and worship. He has no birth or death. He is neither bound, nor released, nor desirous of release. He has neither virtue nor vice, purity or impurity, merit or demerit, good or evil. He has no caste or family. He has no preceptor or disciple, friend or enemy. He has no attraction or repulsion, distraction or concentration, duality or non-duality, knowledge or ignorance. He worships neither Brahmā, nor Viṣṇu, nor Śiva. He has no craving for the abode of any of these deities. He dispenses with prayer,

88Nirvāṇa, pp. 346-47.
89NA., pp. 255-56.
meditation, chanting hymns, and worship with flowers, fruits, leaves, incense and lamp. He dispenses with vows, austerities and pilgrimage. He has no end to realize. He has no end to reject. He is completely fulfilled and blessed. He is full, complete and perfect. 84

2. The Philosophical Basis of Sāktaism.

The Sākta Upaniṣads teach absolutism (advaitavāda) like the Saiva Upaniṣads. They emphasize the dynamic nature of the conscious creative power, whereas the latter stress the static nature of the indeterminate Brahman. The former sometimes regard Sakti as Brahman. Sometimes they regard Sakti as the creative power of Śiva or the Lord. Farquhar assigns 1000 A.D. to the Sākta Upaniṣads. 85

Sakti is Brahman. She is the mother of the universe. She is the creator of prakṛti, puruṣas or individual souls, and the world. She is the power of the Ātman (ātmāsakti) or Śiva. She is cosmic nescience (kālārātri), prakṛti composed of sattva, rajas and tamas, and the power of Viṣṇu (viṣṇavi). She is eternal and temporal, non-spatial and spatial, conscious and unconscious. She is knowledge (vidyā) and ignorance (avidyā), joy and sorrow. She is one and many. Though she is one, she manifests herself as many. She is devoid of definite characteristics. So she is incomprehensible. Even gods do not know her real nature. She is without origin and end. She is one, unborn, infinite, eternal, indefinable and unknowable. She manifests herself as the manifold universe. 86 She is the embodiment of all gods. She is infinite wisdom (mahāvidyā) and pure consciousness (cinmayi). She transcends all knowledge. She is the Logos, the origin of mantras and sounds. She is the Witness of the void. She is inaccessible and delivers the distressed from great dangers. So she is called Durgā. She is good, and the giver of good. She gives prosperity and release. She is the goddess of fortune. She is merciful, and destroys sufferings through her grace. She is the great purifier. She destroys sins

84 TB., iv. 13-19, 21, 27; v. 12-14, 20, 23, 24, 36-38, 42-44; vi. 11, 16-18, 23, 24, 27, 28; AD., 2, 6, 8, 21; PH., p. 160.
and vices. She destroys the darkness of ignorance. Complete self-surrender to her brings down her grace."

Siva is the omnipotent Lord. Sakti is his creative power or Hros (ādiśakti, kāmakalā). She is the creative knowledge (ādividyā). Siva manifests himself through Sakti in the universe. He is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. He is its efficient cause. Sakti is its material cause. Siva and Sakti both are the cause of the the universe." She is māyā. She becomes sattva, rajas and tamas which constitute prakṛti. She is higher knowledge (para vidyā). She is lower knowledge (apara vidyā). She is the origin of Rk, Sāma, Yajus and Atharva.

The Sākta Upaniṣads, like the Saiva Upaniṣads, regard Sakti as the creative power of Śiva without which he cannot create the universe. Śiva is Para Brahman, the eternal reality. He is the predicateless, stainless, unconditioned and indeterminate Absolute. He creates Sakti or creative energy, and manifests himself as the world of empirical objects. The world is born of the union of Śiva and Śakti. Śiva is the supreme Lord. Sadāsiva is the supreme Self (paramātman). He is the supreme Person (parama puruṣa), who is Para Brahman or pure consciousness determined by Śakti or the ultimate, supreme māyā. He is the inner Self (antaḥ puruṣa) in all created beings. He is one in reality. The individual souls (jīva) are reflections of Brahman in avidyā like reflections of the moon in many vessels full of water. Or they are limitations of Brahman by avidyā or its products, the mind-body-complexes like ether enclosed in jars. When avidyā is destroyed, they realize their identity with Brahman. There is one Ātman in the waking state, dream and deep sleep. The mind is the cause of bondage and release. The mind attached to objects is bondage. The mind detached from objects is release. When the mind is withdrawn from external objects, concentrated on

"Ibid, 1, 3, 4-7, 9, 10, 16-19, 21.
"T., 8, 11, 13-15; TT., 1. 1.
"T., 8, 4, 14, 16; TT., 1. 1.
"Ibid, v. 11.
Brahman or the infinite, eternal and indeterminate consciousness, and is merged in and identified with it, the jiva realizes identity with Brahman. When the mind becomes non-mind, and is lost in Brahman, the jiva realizes identity-consciousness. In superconscious trance the identity-consciousness is realized. The Sākta Upaniṣads advocate idealistic monism. They do not recognize the ontological reality of the jivas.

Sakti existed in the beginning. She is the creative power (kāmakāla). She is the Ātman. She is Brahman. She is pure consciousness, one and without a second, beyond empirical being and non-being. She is an ocean of being, consciousness and bliss. She is lower prakṛti (aparā sakti). She is higher prakṛti or the inner consciousness (pratyak citi). She created Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra. She created the world, inanimate and animate. She became empirical selves determined by time, space, and threefold bodies. She enters into all created beings and shines in them. She is their indwelling spirit. Being is the ground of all unconscious beings. Consciousness is the ground of all conscious beings. Bliss is the ground of all objects of joy. Sakti is infinite and eternal being, consciousness and bliss. She is the ground of the world, the empirical selves, and all gods. She is the Ātman or Self, the only reality. The not-self (anātman) is unreal. The finite self (jīva) is Brahman. Bahyacopaniṣad identifies Sakti with the Absolute and the Lord, and regards the world and the finite selves as appearances.

Sakti is the root-evolvent (mūlaprakṛti), the unmanifest cosmic nescience (mahāmāyā), the Logos (śabdabrahma), the origin (prakṛti) of the mystic syllable Om. She is unmanifest and manifest. Sitā is Sakti. In proximity to Rāma, the Lord, she creates, preserves and destroys the world. She is unmanifest in her essential nature. But she is manifested in the world. She is manifested in conscious beings and unconscious objects. She is manifested in gods, men, demons, ghosts, beasts, birds and inanimate objects according to their qualities and actions. She is manifested in the sense-organs, the internal organs and the vital forces. She is the causes and their effects. She is

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the ground of all. She is all gods. She is all Vedas. She is all worlds. She is virtue and glory. She is the goddess of fortune (mahālakṣmi). She is neither different nor non-different from the Lord. 85

Sakti is threefold: will-power (icchāsakti), power of action (kriyāsakti), and direct power (sākṣāt sakti). The will-power is the power of sustaining the created beings. The power of action is Logos (śabda brahma). It produces the mystic sound Om, the Vedas and the other branches of learning. Direct power is the power of creation, maintenance and destruction of the world by unfoldment and enfoldment through sheer will. Will-power is of three kinds: yagaśakti or the power of resting in the Lord in the state of dissolution of the world; bhogaśakti or the power of enjoying the devotees' moral and religious observances for the delight of God; vīraśakti or supernatural powers including the power of being separate from the Lord to create all causes and effects. 86 Sitopaniṣad describes the different kinds of Sakti. It mentions Sakti to be both different and non-different from the Lord. There is a note of pantheism in it.

Annāpurṇopaniṣad teaches idealistic monism or absolutism. There is one infinite and eternal being, consciousness and bliss. That is the goddess, Brahmān, the ground of bindu, nāda and kalā. She is groundless, pure and taintless. She is the supreme Self (paramātman). She is one, infinite, eternal, unmanifest, calm, pure consciousness (cinmātra) beyond time, space and empirical forms. 87 The eternal pure consciousness is also called Śiva. He is the pure Self or Witness of the world. He is a mass of consciousness (prajñānagāhana). He is one undifferentiated being, consciousness and bliss. He is the ground of the world-appearance. Śiva appears as the world. The finite self (jīva) and the infinite Self (Śiva) reside in the same body. The former is the experiencer (bhoktā) of happiness and misery. The latter is the Witness (sākṣin). The difference between them is an imaginary construction of māyā. The jīva does not differ from pure consciousness. If it differs from eternal consciousness, it

85 Sa mahālakṣmi deveśaśya bhūmībhīmnarūpā. Sitopaniṣad, 2.
86 Ibid, 1, 2.
88 1, 4, 5; v. 55, 56, 64-67.
becomes unconscious and ceases to be a self. It is pure consciousness limited by avidyā. The self-luminous Witness (Śiva) residing within it is not apprehended by it owing to ignorance. When ignorance is destroyed and attachment, aversion and other impurities are exhausted, it knows the indwelling infinite spirit. The world is only a fragment of the vibration of pure consciousness. It is not a permanent reality different from it.

There are five kinds of error. The first error is the difference between the jīva and God. The second error is the real agency of the self (atman). The third error is that the jīva is associated with the causal body, the subtle body and the gross body. The fourth error is mutability of the cause of the world. The fifth error is the reality of the world as different from its cause. The first error is dispelled by the knowledge that the jīva is a reflection of God in avidyā. The second error is destroyed by the knowledge that agency of the internal organ or egoism is attributed to the self. The third error is removed by the knowledge that the triple body is the limiting adjunct of the self, which being destroyed makes the self infinite. The fourth error is annulled by the knowledge that the world is a false appearance of Brahman that is never modified. The fifth error is ended by the knowledge of the world-appearance being non-different from Brahman. Annāparānyopānīsad teaches absolute idealism or pure monism. It teaches the ontological reality of Brahman, Śiva or Sakti only and the empirical reality of the jivas and the world-appearance due to nescience. It regards the world, heaven and hell as false appearances, which are neither existent nor non-existent.

The world burns with misery so long as the mind burns with desires. The world becomes cool or full of joy, when the mind becomes cool or free from desires. Until all objects are renounced, the Ātman cannot be realized. When they are renounced and desires for them are destroyed, the Ātman shines forth. When the mind is withdrawn from all objects and merged in Brahman, supreme wisdom (parā prajñā) dawns. It is called trance (samādhi). It is perfect calmness of the mind free from

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AP., iv. 26-29, 32-37.
Svārah jagat cinnispandāh śamātraṁ tannānyat kim ca na śāvatam. Ibid., i. 47.
Ibid., i. 13-16.
Ābhāsamātraṁ evedam na sāmāsaj jagat-trayam. Ibid., v. 33.
egoism and thought of distinction. It is an unperturbed state of mind. It is unshakable firmness of mind like that of a mountain, devoid of love and hatred, realizable and avoidable ends. It is fulfilledness of mental functions in Brahman, identification of it with pure consciousness (cit), and its manifestation. There is emergence of supreme bliss that constitutes the body of God. Trance depends upon meditation. Meditation (dhyāna) is desirelessness of mind. Trance is identification of it with Brahman (kevalibhāva) consequent on its pacification. When the mind becomes desireless, it ceases to act. The desireless mind becomes pure and free. The mind tainted by desires becomes desireless through penance for a long time. A person with a detached and desireless mind is free. He is not a doer or an enjoyer of fruits of actions, even if he does actions. He is not attached to actions. Nor does he seek actionlessness (naishkarmya). He is an ascetic, who is devoid of attachment. He is free from attachment, who does not give up all actions, but who renounces their fruits mentally. He is detached from all objects, thoughts and actions. He has no attachment for objects. But he has attachment for the Ātman only. His mind rests in it only. One who delights in the Ātman, is not affected by actions or abstention from actions. When avidyā and egoism are destroyed and fetters (pāśa) are broken, the finite self becomes the infinite Self.

Bondage is due to attachment (sanga). It is due to false identification of the self with the mind-body-complex. It is destroyed by the knowledge of identity of the self with Brahman. Ignorance is destroyed by the knowledge of non-dualism. Attachment is bondage. Detachment is release. It is desirelessness. It makes the mind functionless. Desire (vāsanā) is attraction for objects. When attachment and aversion are destroyed, the mind becomes free from all thoughts of objects. When it ceases to think, it ceases to function, and becomes non-mind (amamās). When desires are burnt by true knowledge, the mind becomes non-mind. Desires are the springs of action, and motivate thinking of desired objects. Release is purging

187 Ibid, i. 28-57.
188 Sarvakarmaphaladīnāh manasaiva na karmāṇa. Nipunyo yaḥ parityāgya saṃsārastva iti upaśāh. Ibid, ii, 6. cp. BG., xviii. 11.
189 Ibid, ii, S-16.
190 Ibid, ii. 24.
the mind of thoughts and desires of objects. Desires should be turned from external objects inward to the Âtman. Desires should be destroyed with superhuman effort, and the mind should abide in the eternal Âtman even for a moment. 103

Bondage is due to knowledge of empirical objects. Release is due to destruction of knowledge of them. It is due to destruction of mind consequent on eradication of desires and hopes. 104 It is due to destruction of all thoughts (manana) of empirical objects, and of all desires for them, and rest of the mind in Brahman, the foundation of all. Dualistic consciousness is due to desires and thoughts of desired objects. So the mind should be withdrawn from empirical objects, and fixed on the inner Self or Âtman. Desires do not arise in a mind, which is completely fulfilled and desireless. The Âtman is realized, when the net-work of desires is completely destroyed. 105 The mind is the cause of sorrow. Its destruction is the cause of happiness. 106 Happiness which springs from the fulfilment of a desire is transient. It continues until another desire appears with its attendant pain. So all desires should be renounced. The mind becomes free from evil desires, when it cultivates good will and friendship (maitra) for all. 107 When it is purified of rajas and tamas, filled with satvta, and identified with Brahman or pure consciousness, it attains embodied release (jivanmukti). When it is purified of satvta also, and completely identified with pure consciousness (cit), it attains disembodied release (videhamukti). 108 When the mind is perfectly stilled, it attains nirvâpa. When it becomes free from all affections and abides in pure consciousness, it attains embodied release. Identity-consciousness dawns upon it with no trace of difference. 109

The knowledge of Brahman is due to destruction of mind (manonâsa). The destruction of it is due to destruction of desires. The destruction of them is due to absorption of mind in Brahman. This is due to complete withdrawal of mind from external objects. It is due to destruction of attachment for

103 Ibid, V. 4, 5, 7, 38; iv. 74-75.
104 Sarvâsâmsânsâya cetaâkṣayo mokṣâya. Ibid, ii. 23. Ibid, ii. 18, 22.
105 ii. 18, 24-27; iv. 7-8.
106 Citaâsatthe daâkhâya citaânâsâya sukhâya ca. Ibid, iv. 15.
them. Attachment is due to false identification of the self with the mind-body-complex. This false knowledge is due to egoism. Egoism is destroyed by true knowledge of the Ātman. So the knowledge of the Ātman, complete pacification or destruction of mind and extinction of desires depend upon one another.\textsuperscript{116}

There are seven stages in the process of realizing the Ātman. The first stage is the practice of detachment which arises from the company of saints and the study of the Sāstras. It gives rise to desire for release. The second stage is resolution to do right actions. The third stage is the performance of preliminary acts necessary for self-realization. The fourth stage is extinction of desires. The fifth stage is the emergence of indistinct pure consciousness and bliss. This is embodied release. The sixth stage is abiding in a mass of bliss in an unconcious condition. The seventh stage is superconscious trance or experience of one, pure, blissful homogeneous consciousness. It is disembodied release or nirvāṇa.\textsuperscript{111} Annāparāsyopaniṣad compares the state with void (śūnya) of the Buddhist Nihilists (śūnyavādin) (200 A.D.—700 A.D.) and pure consciousness (vijñānamātra) of the Buddhist Vijñānavādins (400 A.D.—800 A.D.).\textsuperscript{114}

3. The Philosophical Basis of Vaiṣṇavism.

The Vaiṣṇava Upaniṣads regard Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa as Brahmaṇ. They regard him as Para Brahmaṇ and Apara Brahmaṇ. They believe in māyā and avidyā. Māyā is the limiting adjunct of Īśvara. Avidyā, an effect of māyā, is the limiting adjunct of the jīva. They believe in the identity of jīva and Brahmaṇ. Though they advocate idealistic monism (advaita-vāda), they regard devotion (bhakti) as a means to knowledge (jñāna). Sometimes they emphasize the blissful nature of God, regard him as dearest to us, and consider the jīvas to be partakers in his bliss. Sometimes they regard their supreme state as union or communion with God. Sometimes they regard the world as manifestation of his glory, and consider creation to be evolution and dissolution to be involution. Sometimes the determinate nature of Brahmaṇ is stressed, and he is considered to be the Lord.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., V, 81-86.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., V, 81-86.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., iv, 81.
Mahāviṣṇu is one, infinite, eternal, pure, enlightened, free, undifferentiated, unlimited, formless, groundless, self-luminous being, consciousness and bliss. He is attributeless (nirguṇa), unlimited by time, space and objects. He is immeasurable, indescribable and incomprehensible. He is unconditioned, indeterminate, omnipresent, untainted, non-spatial, non-temporal and non-causal. He is the self-luminous light of consciousness. He is unequalled and unexcelled. He is one infinite bliss. He is eternally fulfilled and perfect. He is the supreme self (paramātmā), and the inner Self of all finite selves (ātmāntarātmā). He is trans-empirical. He is devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas. He is unchanging and immutable. He is the transcendental reality beyond mayā (tamas). He is Ātman. He is Brahman. He is not touched by mayā. 118

Mahāviṣṇu is the omniscient, omnipotent Lord of the universe. He is the creator, preserver and destroyer of it. He is its controller and moral governor. He is immanent in the world and transcends it. He is the subtlest and the greatest Being. He is the First Cause. He is the collection of all causes. He is each cause. He is empirical being and non-being. He is distinct from them. He is all knowledge. He is beyond all knowledge. He is knowable through knowledge. He is the abode of cosmic nescience. He is manifested in cosmic nescience. He is the destroyer of nescience. He is all. There is nothing distinct from him. He is the Absolute Person (brahmapuruṣa) full of inner bliss (pratyagānanda). He is endued with attributes (saguṇa). He is the perfect, pure, blissful, eternal Person. He is the supreme Lord (paramēśvara). He transcends space and time, and yet pervades the spatial and temporal order. He is the groundless ground of all. He is the uncaused cause of all. All are founded in him. He is the creator of prakṛti. He creates the world out of fullness of joy. He creates it for his sport. He is one, and yet resides in the heart of all creatures. He is their abode. He is the Lord of the Law of Karma (karmadhyaṅka). He is our father, friend and providence. He is the redeemer. He delivers all from distress and bondage. He is the Lord and Master of the world. He enjoys it and gives delight to all. He purifies all and purges them of their mental

118 TVN., i. 1; MN., i. 2, 5, 6, 8; xi. 7; NāS., 4; PG., i. 1; NUT., i. 1; ii. 1, 2; NPT., iv. 1; v. 1.
verbal and bodily sins. He is the most beautiful and adorable. He is the dearest (priyatama, preśṭha) to us. He is the object of love of all persons (sarvapremāspada). He is sinless, pure, holy, auspicious and excellent. He is the embodiment of bliss (ānandagāhana). He is our friend, father, mother, brother, shelter, home, and providence. He is the highest goal. He is merciful. He delivers us from bondage through his grace. He is the infinite and eternal good. He is eternally fulfilled. He transcends the known and the unknown. He can be known through devotion. He gives us joy. He is God of love.

Mahāviśpu is the root-sound Om. He is the origin of all mantras. He is to be sought through the Vedas and the Sāstras. The whole world is a manifestation of sound. Nothing in it is soundless. All objects are modifications of sound. The Lord is full of pure consciousness and root-sound (Logos).

Nārāyaṇa is the creator of Brahmā and Rudra. He is Brahmā and Śiva. He is time, space and akṣara, and their Lord. He pervades the entire universe and sustains it. All worlds are harmonized by him.

Sometimes māyā or Sakti is said to create, preserve and destroy the world. Māyā pervades the world. But it cannot touch the Ātman or Brahman. The world is a false appearance due to cosmic nescience. In reality, it is Ātman. God is invested with the power of cosmic nescience (mahāmāya). The Ātman is one, but appears to be different through māyā. There is no difference. The multiform world is a false appearance (tuccha). It is, in reality, Ātman.

Brahman or Ātman becomes māyā and avidyā. Īśvara is Brahman limited by māyā. Jīva is Brahman limited by avidyā. They are appearances. Māyā is a conscious power different

114 NAŚ., 4; MN., i. 2, 5, 8; ii. 3; v. 3, 9; xi. 4, 14, 6-9; xii. 3; xiii. 2; xix. 1; xx. 16; TVN., i. 1; vi. 1; Vāsudeva, p. 466; PG., i. 1; Mahāpaniṣad, i. 1; GPT., i. 2, 8; ii. 2, 9; GUT., 7, 15, 17, 18; Kṛṣṇa, i; NUT., ii, v, viii, ix.

115 Sa no bandhur janitā vidhātā. MN., i. 5; Īśvaraḥ sarvasya jagataḥ prabhuh prīṇati viśvabhū. Ibid, xvi. 3.

Māti pātā bhūtā nīvaśaḥ saṣṭamāḥ subād gātir nārāyaṇaḥ. Subāla, vi. TVN., i. 1; ii. 1.

Omāra vāgevedaṁ sarvaṁ na hyaśabdam iḥāsti cinmayo hyauḥ-kāraṇaḥ paraṁśvarah. NUT., viii.

117 Nātra kācama bhidāasti. NUT., viii. Ātmaiva māyayā hyanyad īva... Saṁśa vādyā jagat sarvan atmā paramātmava. Ibid, ix. NAŚ., i. 2; MN., ii. 3, xi. 2, 13; NUT., v.
from sattva, rajas and tamas.\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Nyāsaṅhāpūrvaratāpini} and \textit{Nyāsaṅhottaratāpini} advocate pure monism (advaita), and regard Īśvara, jīvas and the world as appearances. They regard Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva as forms of māyā. They consider Mahāviṣṇu, Brahmān, or Ātman as the only reality. They regard jīva as identical with Brahmā. They describe Brahmā as Śūnya.\textsuperscript{118} They are acquainted with Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of Śūnyavāda. It is curious that Viṣṇu Upaniṣads should advocate pure monism and regard Īśvara and jīvas as appearances, and yet consider devotion to be the means of knowing Brahmā. But this position is taken by the Bhāgavata.\textsuperscript{120}

\textit{Tripiṭāvibhūtinārāyaṇa Upaniṣad} regards Mahāviṣṇu as attributeless (nirguṇa) and endowed with attributes (saṅguṇa), formless and formed, and invested with unconditioned forms and conditioned forms.\textsuperscript{121} He is formless in his essential nature. But he assumes forms for his sport. He assumes the conditioned form of the universe with the limiting adjunct of cosmic nescience (avidyā) and its products, the net-work of causes and effects. He assumes three unconditioned forms through his knowledge (vidyā), bliss (ānanda), and both, He becomes the embodiment of knowledge through excess of knowledge. He becomes the embodiment of bliss through excess of bliss. He becomes the embodiment of knowledge and bliss through excess of both. But how can one, undivided, supreme Brahmā characterized by infinite bliss be possessed of two contradictory qualities of formedness and formlessness? Just as all-pervading air is formless and formed in closed vessels, so omnipotent Brahmā can be formed and formless both. His formedness and formlessness are essential to his intrinsic nature. If he were merely formless, he would be unconscious like matter.\textsuperscript{122}

Nārāyaṇa, the self-contented, perfect embodiment of supreme bliss, of his own will, expands and contracts. When he expands by will, he is manifested as avyakta. Then out of avyakta he manifests himself as cosmic nescience (mūlāvidyā).

\textsuperscript{114} Jīvesāvibhāṣena karoti māyā cāvidyā ca svayameva bhūbati. \textit{Ibid}, ix.

\textsuperscript{118} NUT., ix, vi.

\textsuperscript{120} HIP., Vol. II, pp. 636-45.


\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Ibid}, ii, 1, pp. 360-61.
Associated with the knowledge of Brahman it is called being. Out of being he is manifested as mahat. Out of mahat he manifests himself as ahamkāra. Five tannātras are created out of ahamkāra. Five gross elements are created out of five tannātras. The world is created out of them. Another account of creation is found.

There was one, eternal, immutable Brahman, characterized by being, consciousness and bliss. There was the root-evolvent (mūlaprakṛti) composed of sattva, rajas and tamas in equipoise as an appearance in him. Brahman reflected in mūlaprakṛti is called the witness-consciousness (sāksicaitanya). Prakṛti was modified into avyakta with excess of sattva, which is called the concealing power (āvaraṇaśakti). Brahman reflected in avyakta or veiling power with excess of sattva is called Īśvara. He is independent of māyā. He is an omniscient and omnipotent creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. He unfolds and enfolds the world of creatures in accordance with their merits and demerits. Mahat was evolved out of avyakta guided by Īśvara; with excess of rajas it is called the power of projecting (vikṣepa-śakti). Brahman reflected in mahat or projecting power with excess of rajas is called Hiraṇyagarbha. Ahamkāra was evolved out of mahat or projecting power guided by Hiraṇyagarbha; with excess of tamas it is called gross power (sthūlaśakti). Brahman reflected in ahamkāra with excess of tamas is called Virāt. The preserver of the gross world evolved out of ahamkāra is called Viṣṇu. This account of creation is found in the Advaita Vedānta literature. The account of creation in Subāla Upaniṣad has already been given.

Īśvara is Brahman limited by the adjunct of māyā. Jīva is Brahman limited by the adjunct of avidyā, or the internal organ, which is its product. The self in the waking state is called viśva. It is limited by the gross body. In dream it is called tājasa. It is limited by the subtle body. In deep sleep it is called prājña. It is limited by the causal body. It becomes identical with the supreme Self in release.
But some Vaiṣṇava Upaniṣads regard them as different from each other. Brahma and the individual souls are eternal. He is supreme among them. He fulfils their desires. Brahma is pure, tasteless and free from sorrow. But jivas are impure, tainted and full of sorrow. Brahma is omniscient and omnipotent. But jivas have finite knowledge and power. Brahma and jiva reside in the same body. Jiva is an experiencer (bhoktā) of happiness and misery as fruits of actions. But Brahma does not experience them. He merely looks on as their spectator (sākṣī). He is full of knowledge (vidyā) and free from avidyā. So he cannot experience joy and sorrow, which arise from avidyā. But jivas are subject to avidyā, desire objects of enjoyment, and are filled with sorrow. They are parts of Brahma. In release they have union or communion but not identity.

The Vaiṣṇava Upaniṣads lay stress on devotion (bhaktiyoga) as the means of release. The path of devotion is the easiest. Devotion produces the knowledge of Brahma. Unswerving and single-minded devotion to God leads to attainment of him. It leads to release. All other means should be given up, and devotion should be resorted to. Devotion produces integral knowledge (samyag jñāna). It brings about intimate union. Attachment for God and detachment from worldly objects, non-injury to all creatures in thought, word and deed, doing good to all beings, non-enmity to all, renunciation of prudential duties and duties involving killing of living beings, and control of body, speech and mind, complete renunciation of all attachment for worldly pleasures, egolessness and impartiality, transparency and absolute purity of mind, return of good for evil, and constant pursuit of the highest good are subsidiary to the attainment of release.

4. The Philosophical Basis of the cults of Gaṇeṣa, Śūrya, and Rāma.

The Upaniṣads preaching the cult of Gaṇeṣa advocate pure monism (advaita). Gaṇeṣa is Para Brahma. He is the supreme
real. He is without any equal or superior. He is one, non-dual, taintless, infinite, eternal, immutable, pure being, consciousness and bliss. He is self-luminous light of consciousness. He is devoid of avidyā and its effects. He is free from bondage, pure, self-manifest, omniscient and omnipotent. He is the groundless ground of the world. He is indefinable, incoherent, non-phenomenal and transcendent. He is devoid of distinction. He is Brahman.121

He is the ancient, first, infinite, eternal, supreme Person (mahān puruṣa). He is the Lord, the inner controller, creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. He is devoid of guṇas, egoism, desires and forms. He is Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Siva. He is all gods. He is one. He is the Self of all. He is the Self of gods. He is the ruler of all worlds. He is the creator of māyā or prakṛti and puruṣas. He becomes inanimate and animate, unconscious and conscious creatures. He is their Master. He transcends prakṛti and puruṣas. He is merciful to the devotees. He is Logos (vānmaya). He is beyond the three guṇas, the threefold time, and the triple body.

One immutable pure consciousness or Brahman became associated with māyā. Māyā is prakṛti, pradhāna, threefold power of sattva, rajas and tamas, which is the seed of the world. It is indefinable. The Lord created mahat out of māyā, and ahaṅkāra out of mahat. Ahaṅkāra is sāttvika, rājas and tāmasa. Sāttvika ahaṅkāra is the power of knowledge (jñāna-śakti). Rājas ahaṅkāra is power of action (kriyāśakti). Tāmasa ahaṅkāra is power of matter (dravyaśakti). The presiding deities were created out of the first. The five cognitive organs, the five motor organs, and the five vital forces were created out of the second. The five tanmātras or subtle elements were created out of the third. They were quintupled and modified into the five gross elements. Fourteen worlds were created out of them. The collection of jīvas in them with their gross bodies is called Virāt. Brahmā is invested with rajas; Viṣṇu, with sattva, and Siva, with tamas. Gāṇeśa is the Lord of all. All creatures are created by him. They are not different from him. He is one. He is the Lord of sattva, rajas and tamas and their modifications (gupeśa). He is the Lord of all gods and created beings.
He is the mystic sound *Om*. He is non-temporal and temporal. He is indeterminate Brahman. He is the determinate Lord. He is non-dual (advaita) and dual (dvaita), formless and formed. He is the great sound (*nāda*), which is the root of all objects. One who knows Brahman (gaṇeṣa) becomes Brahman. The *jīva* realizes identity with Brahman through knowledge. Brahman is one *Ātman*. Para Brahman is predicateless *Sūnya*. *Ganesottaratāpinī Upaniṣad* is acquainted with *Sūnyavāda* (200 A.D.—700 A.D.).

The *Upaniṣads* preaching the cult of Sūrya or Sun-God advocate pantheism and pure monism. Sūrya is one, unborn, infinite, eternal, pure, enlightened, free, non-dual being, consciousness and bliss. He is beyong avidyā and appearances. He is indescribable and incomprehensible. He is the mystic sound *Om*. He is Rk, Sāma, Vajus and Atharva. He is Brahmar, Viṣṇu and Rudra. He is the creator of air, earth, water, fire and ether. He is the origin of gods. He is Brahman. He is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. He pervades all space. He is the moral governor. He is the creator of the finite selves (*ātman*). He is the four internal organs, manas, buddhi, ahaṅkāra and citta. He is the five cognitive organs, the five motor organs, and the five vital forces. He is the waking self (*viśva*), the dreaming self (*taijasa*), and the sleeping self (*prājñā*). He is the sensible qualities of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. There is no ego or egoism. The *jīva* is not a doer. God is the only doer. The world is an appearance. Duality, distinction and plurality are appearances due to avidyā. Brahman transcends avidyā and false appearances that arise from it. The world-appearance vanishes at the dawn of identity-consciousness. When the mind is firmly established in non-dualism, dualism vanishes. ‘I am Brahman’. The *jīva* is Brahman.

Pantheism and pure monism or absolutism are advocated. Disinterested performance of duties

132 GNPT., i. 2; ii. 3; iii. 1; GNUT., i. ii. iii. iv.; GP., pp. 570-71.
133 GNUT., i. ii.
134 *Ya evam veda sa gaṇeṣo bhavati*. GNUT., iv.
135 *Sūnyaḥ vai paraṃ brahma*. GNPT., iii. 1.
136 Sūrya, p. 510; Akṣi, 3, 47, 49, 50.
without attachment, non-commission of sins, performance of meritorious actions, good conduct approved by the Vedas and Sūtris, truthfulness, conquest of passions, non-injury, detachment, study of the Śāstras, company of virtuous persons and preceptors, meditation and destruction of mind (cittakṣaya) or absorption of it in Brahman are prescribed for realizing identity-consciousness.  

Rāma is Para Brahman, the supreme Self, one homogeneous being, consciousness and bliss. He is free from māyā. Brahman associated with māyā creates prakṛti and puruṣas. The world created out of prakṛti exists in him. Rāma is an incarnation of Mahāviṣṇu. Though he is one, undivided, bodiless, pure consciousness, he assumes a concrete form for the purpose of devotees' worship and prayer. They think of him as male and female. Prakṛti is his power, which is the origin of the world. He creates the world with māyā or prakṛti. He creates it with sattva, rajas and tamas through his power of consciousness (cicchakti). He is the ground of the world. He pervades the spatio-temporal world. He is free from māyā or avidyā. He is endowed with the power of māyā. He is the embodiment of Atman or Brahman. He is the omniscient Lord, creator, preserver and destroyer of the world, and its inner controller. Sītā is mūlaprakṛti, which creates, preserves and destroys the world in proximity to, and guided by Rāma. Prakṛti is the power of Brahman; they are inseparable from each other. They are the two aspects of the supreme reality.

5. Pure Monism.

Brahman is one, homogeneous, undifferentiated pure consciousness. The Atman, jīvas, and the world-appearance are, in reality, pure consciousness. Iśvara, māyā, avidyā, superimposition (adhyāsa), the individual selves (jīvātmā), the supreme Self (paramātmā), the Witness, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra and other goods are pure consciousness. The knower, the known.

\[\text{Akiś, 4-50.}\]
\[\text{Rāmarāhasya, i. 6; v. 4, 10, 11.}\]
\[\text{Upāsakānāṁ kāryārthāṁ brahmaṁ rūpakalpaṁ. RPT., i. 7.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., i. 1, 8.}\]
\[\text{RPT., ii. 1-2; iii. 8; iv. 3-4; x. 8; RUT., i. 3, 4; ii. 1, 8, 35-36.}\]
knowledge, 'I', 'this', five sheaths (kośa), the causal body, the subtle body, the gross body, manas, buddhi, ahaṅkāra, citta, the cognitive organs, the motor organs and life-forces are pure consciousness. Time, space, substance, cause, effect, subtle elements, gross elements and all worlds are pure consciousness. The three states of waking, dream and deep sleep, knowledge (vidyā), ignorance (avidyā), bondage, release, virtue, vice, good, evil, purity, impurity, birth, death, species, castes, male, female, this life, the next life, preceptors, disciples, joy, sorrow, ends, means, 'mine', 'thine' realizable ends, avoidable ends, truth, sacrifice, utterance of mantras, worship, sacrifice, meditation, penance, vows, hymns, obeisance, listening to the Vedas, reflection on them, contemplation, detachment, silence, the Vedas, the Śāstras, the Purāṇas, restraints, moral observances, the primal desires (ēṣāṇā), the threefold misery (tāpa), enjoyment, concentration of mind, friends, foes, fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, passions, peace, contentment, the conscious, the unconscious, māyā, prakṛti, the void (śānya), and the non-void (aśānya) are pure consciousness. Names and forms are pure consciousness. One pure being, consciousness and bliss is the only reality. It is undifferentiated, indeterminate and unconditioned.142 This truth can be realized in the highest state of monistic consciousness.

An avadhūta is an ascetic who has realized the supreme state. He is not subject to avidyā. He has completely destroyed his false sense of identity with body. He has destroyed his merits and demerits. He constantly experiences Brahmān or Ātman, and abides in it. He is full of supreme bliss. He has renounced his duties relating to the caste and the stage of life. He is completely free from social and religious duties. There is no distinction of virtue and vice, Vedic injunctions and prohibitions, purity and impurity, realizable ends and avoidable ends for him. His mind is neither distracted nor concentrated. He is neither bound nor released nor desirous of release. He is perfectly fulfilled. He enjoys worldly objects without being affected by them. He may perform social and religious duties,

142 TB., ii-vi; Paramahamsa, p. 166; GUNT., iii, p. 635; NP., vi. 15; Atmaprabodha, 19. Cp. Aṣṭāvakraγīṭā, Poema, 1915, 1. 5, 6; ii. 15, 16, 20; iii. 3, 11; viii. 4; x. 2; xv. 4, 18; xvii. 5-6; xviii. 12, 66, 71-74, 80.
but they are not necessary for him. He has attained transcendental perfection, and abides in blissful identity-consciousness.\textsuperscript{144}

6. The Ascetic Morality of the minor Upaniṣads.

The Ātman is the supreme reality. It can be realized by knowledge (jñāna). Knowledge is intuition (prajñāna). It is direct and immediate experience which transcends intellectual knowledge. It can be attained by nivṛtti, which is abstention from actions for the attainment of empirical ends. Pravṛtti is the performance of actions for the gratification of desires.\textsuperscript{145}

Bondage is due to actions. Release is due to knowledge.\textsuperscript{146} Immortality is attained by renunciation, but not by action.\textsuperscript{147} Actions spring from desires (kāma). Desires spring from attachment (vāsanā, rāga). Attachment springs from egoism (ahārīkāra) or the sense of 'I' and 'mine'. Egoism springs from ignorance (avidyā). Ignorance is false identification of the Ātman or Self with the body or not-self. All desires should be extinguished. The primal desires for wealth (vittaiśāna), sons (puttraiśāna), and happiness here and hereafter (lokaiśāna) should be eradicated. The sex-urge, the will-to-power and the will-to-happiness should be uprooted. Desires are not pacified by their gratification, but by their regulation. Attachment is the cause of bondage. Detachment is the cause of release. Egoism is bondage. Egolessness is release. A selfless, detached and desireless life should be cultivated\textsuperscript{148} Attachment should be diverted from the not-self or empirical objects to the Ātman or Self. Detachment (vairāgya) is conducive to integral knowledge (samjñadarśana). When egoism is destroyed, love, hatred and other passions are destroyed. The body, mind and speech should be controlled. Purity of mind is essential to self-realization.

\textsuperscript{144} AD., 2, 3, 8, 11, 14, 17, 21-32; NP., vi. 15, 34, 38. Cp. Avadhūta. Gītā, Poona, 1915, i. 17, 23, 27-32, 43, 45, 48, 50, 51, 54, 59, 66; ii. 38; iii. 5, 20, 31, 34, 41; iv. 1, 6, 12, 21; v. 19; vi. 12; vii. 22, 23.

\textsuperscript{145} Pravṛtti-lakṣaṇaṁ karma jñānaṁ saṁyāsa-lakṣaṇaṁ. NP., iii. 16; ix. 19.

\textsuperscript{146} Karmanā badhyate jantur vidyāva va vinmcyate. Saṁyāsa Up., 98.

\textsuperscript{147} Na karmanā...tyāgenaie amṛtatvam ānaṁḥ. A.D., 5.

\textsuperscript{148} Bandaya visayāsaktamсутvai nirviśayam (manah). BB., 2; MA., vi. 34. Manmetya badhyate jantur nirmametvā vinmcyate. Var., ii. 43-44; Mah., iv. 72; PG., iv. 20; AP., v. 4; v. 102. Yasya nirvāsano bodhaḥ sa jivanmuktā acyate. Var., iv. 24; ii. 36; iv. 25. SA., 1-4; Adhyāt., 12; Muktika Up., ii. 16, 28-29; NUT., vi; NP., iv. 31, 38; iii. 18, 37.
Perfect equanimity (samatva) unperturbed by joy and sorrow, gain and loss, fortune and misfortune, and success and failure should be cultivated. There should be equality (samadarśana) in treatment with all, high and low, since Brahmān is equally manifested in them. Sense-restraint (dama), tranquillity (śama), endurance of hardships (titikṣā), withdrawal of the senses from their objects (uparati), truthfulness, harmlessness, simplicity, absence of crookedness, contentment and good-will for all should be cultivated. Disinterested performance of duties (niṣkāma karma) purifies the mind. Righteous actions produce merits. Unrighteous actions produce demerits. Merits and demerits are destroyed by breath-control and repetition of the praṇava (Om). Actions should be done for the good of humanity (lokasaṅgraha). Universal benevolence (sarvabhaṭahita) and non-enmity (nirvairatva) for all are necessary for self-realization. But, at the last stage, renunciation of all actions (naiṣkarmya), even of benevolent actions for the good of all, destruction of all desires, emotions and actions, and extinction of egoism and ignorance (avidyā) or false identification of the Self are necessary for true knowledge. The eightfold yoga with meditation on pure consciousness (Brahman) and absorption of the mind in it is an indispensable condition of it. Destruction of the mind and its modes (manonāśa) and its complete identification with Brahmān lead to the realization of identity-consciousness. 149

Karmayoga, bhaktiyoga and jñānayoga are mentioned as the means for the attainment of mokṣa. Duties should be performed for the sake of duty without any desire for fruits and without being prompted by love, hatred and other emotions. They should be performed without any thought of success or failure, gain or loss, victory or defeat, praise or blame. All actions should be done for the sake of God, and dedicated to him. This is karmayoga. 150 Bhaktiyoga is free from difficulties. Devotion to God yields knowledge of him. So we should give up all other means, take refuge in God, pray to him, and give

149 NP., iii. 18, 33, 34, 39, 45, 54, 55, 86; vi. 35-38; TSB., 28-34, 155-63; Sānd., i. 1, 2, 39-42, 70-72; Mahopaniṣad, iv. 19; AP., ii. 5; iv. 15, 18, 81.
150 Karma kartavyam ityeva vilhitayeva karmasu.
Bandhanam manaso nityam karmayogah sa ucyate.
TSB., 25-26; Madarpitakarmaṇāṁ madrīpaṭāḥ bhavati. BhJ., p. 566. Mah., ii. 49; Var., iv. 25; AP., ii. 4-6; Sar., 26; SA., 25.
him single-minded devotion. Devotion to a spiritual guide and God is a means to the attainment of him. 131 Jñānayoga is the supreme method of realization of Brahman. It has been discussed.

The sectarian Upaniṣads were written obviously to give an air of sanctity to their deities. Many of them are mere elaborations of some texts of the earlier Upaniṣads, which are bodily incorporated in them. The texts of Chāndogya, Brhadāraṇyaka, Iṣa, Kena, Kaṭha, Muṇḍaka, Muṇḍukya, Atharvya, Taśtrīṭīya and Svetāṣvatarā are freely used and elaborated. The technical terms of Śaivism and the Tāntric terms of Śāktism, e.g., paśu, paśupati, pāśa, Siva, Sadāśiva, Śakti, spanda, haṁsa, nāḍa, bindu, kalā, nyāsa, mudrā, kuṇḍalinī, śaṭcakra, the union of Siva and Śakti in the highest cakra and the like are used. 132 The Tāntric elements were introduced into the Purāṇas in the ninth century. 135 Some Upaniṣads are profoundly influenced by the Buddhist Sūnyavāda (200 A.D.—700 A.D.) and Vijnānavaśa (450 A.D.—800 A.D.). 134 Māya, prakṛti, space, time, elements, subject, object, body, manas, buddhi, ahaṁkāra, citta, mental modes, waking, dream, deep sleep, birth, death, good, evil, purity, impurity, injunction, prohibition, virtue, vice, Vedas, Sméricī, Purāṇas, Iśvara, gods, avidyā, vidyā, release, jīva, duality and non-duality are non-existent. 136 This kind of negativism is an unmistakable evidence of the influence of Sūnyavāda. The concept of Śunya is turned into that of Brahman. The seven stages in acquiring identity-consciousness (saptabhūmi) mentioned in Varāha and Annapūrnā Upaniṣads

132 TT., p. 538; YK., i. 85, 82; ii. 16; iii. 5, 6, 9, 10; JD., iv. 11; Var., v. 55; Jāhāli, p. 628; BV., 21, 60-62; TB., v. 4; Nādaśivindu, 30, 42, 46, 50; DB., 2, 68, 88; YT., 28, 99; YC., 54, 55, 58, 60, 69; Maṇḍ., v. 1; Sar., 12; RPT., i. 1; vi. 8; RUT., 2; Sānd., 1. 54, 56; YS., 1. 131; iii. 2, 3; vi. 60; AP., i. 4; PB., 4, 7.
135 TB., ii-vi; NP., vi. 15; AD., 8.
occur in *Yogavāsiṣṭha*¹³⁶ (700 A.D. or 800 A.D.). Some texts in *Jābaladarsana* and *Rudrahādaya* *Upaniṣads* occur in *Skandapurāṇa*¹³⁷ (700 A.D.). *Yājñavalkya* *Upaniṣad* quotes a text from *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*¹³⁸ (600 A.D.). The ten yamas and the ten niyamas mentioned in *Sāṅgīlīya*, *Jābaladarsana* and *Varāha* *Upaniṣads* occur in *Skandapurāṇa*.¹³⁹ Hence the minor *Upaniṣads* cover a period of several centuries from the third century to the tenth century or later. They contribute little to metaphysical thought. Their predominant note is pure monism (advaita).¹⁴⁰ They advocate anti-hedonistic and ascetic morality. They lay stress on jñānayoga with meditation and trance as the pre-eminent method of realizing Brahman. They recognize karmayoga and bhaktivāya as subsidiary methods. They do not appear to be influenced by the mediaeval cults of bhakti, which are excessively emotional and sentimental. But they are influenced by the Vedāntist asceticism.

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¹³⁶ Var., iv, 1-18; AP., v. 81-86. YVS., ch. 120, 1-6.
¹³⁷ JD., i, 14; Skandapurāṇa, ii, 13, 11; RH., 44-45; Brahmagīta (Skandapurāṇa), Poona, 1915, vii, 52, 53.
¹³⁸ Jāvaro jīvakalayā praviṣṭo bhagavān iti. Yājñavalkya Up., 4; Kapilagīta (Bhāgavata), Poona, 1915, v. 34.
¹³⁹ Sāṅgī, i, 1-2; JD., i, 6; ii, 1; Var., v, 12-14; Skandapurāṇa, Poona, 1893, ii, 13, 3; ii, 14, 2.
¹⁴⁰ Sīvāgamaśu cādvaitāṁ bābhāṣe pārameśvaraḥ.
Nārāyana'pi cādvaitāṁ bābhāṣe śvāgamaśu ca.
Brahmagīta, ix, 41-42. TSB., 163; TVN., p. 383; PG., iv, 10; Mah., v, 55-56; vi, 61, 62.
CHAPTER IV

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PURĀNAS:
VIŚNUISM, SAIVISM AND SĀKTAISM

1. The Cults and Karmayoga, Bhaktiyoga and Jñānayoga in the Purānas.

The Purānas are popular treatises on Brāhmaṇism or Hindu religion. They were composed after the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata and the decay of Buddhism and Jainism to popularise the Hindu religion of Brāhmaṇism. The early Purānas were written in the Gupta period (400 A.D.—500 A.D.) when Brāhmaṇism was revived. They were recast later with additions. The later Purānas were written between 500 A.D. and 1000 A.D., and recast and enlarged later. They contain all elements of popular Hinduism, rites, ceremonies, vows, modes of worship, heaven, hell, virtues, sins, atonements, pilgrimage, reverence for gurus and Brāhmaṇas and the like. They preach the cults of Viṣṇu, Śiva, and Śakti, and wrangle over the superiority of one over the others. They have great philosophical importance, since they treat of the nature of Brahman, prakṛti, puruṣa, creation and dissolution of the world, bondage, liberation, virtues, vices, and the means to liberation. Their philosophy is mainly theistic Śaṅkhya, but it contains absolutism or pure monism, panentheism, pantheism, and theism. There is a strong note of pantheism in them. The Vaiśṇava Purāṇas which preach the cults of Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu, or Kṛṣṇa are theistic. The Saiva Purāṇas which preach the cult of Śiva, Rudra, or Pāśupati are monistic with a blend of pantheism and theism. Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa which preaches the cult of Śakti is pantheistic with a blend of henotheism, theism and monism. Devi Bhāgavata, a Śaṅkta Upapurāṇa, which preaches the cult of Śakti is monistic. All trends of thought are blended together in the Purāṇas, though they are not consistent with one another. They discuss the nature of Brahman, the self (jīva), the world, the relation of the self and the world to Brahman, the nature of mokṣa and the means of attaining it.
They inculcate performance of prescribed duties (karmayoga), devotion (bhaktiyoga), and knowledge or experience of Brahman (jñānayoga). The Viṣṇuite Purāṇas lay stress on devotion, whereas the Saiva Purāṇas emphasize knowledge as the means of release. The eightfold yoga is enjoined for union of the individual soul with the supreme Soul or Brahman. Patañjali’s conception of yoga as complete suppression of mental functions for isolation (kaivalya) of the soul is not recognized. Brahma, Padma, Viṣṇu, Siva, Bhāgavata, Bhavīṣya, Nārādiya, Mārkaṇḍeya, Agneya Brahmacarvārta, Liṅga, Varāha, Skanda, Vāmana, Kurma, Matsya, Garuḍa and Brahmāṇḍa are the eighteen Purāṇas mentioned in Skandapurāṇa. Rāmānuja (1017-1157 A.D.) quotes from Viṣṇu, Garuḍa, Bhavīṣya and Brahma-carvārta Purāṇas in his Śrī Bhāgya on Brahma Sūtra. Madhvā (1199-1278 A.D.) quotes from Bhāgavata, Skanda, Padma, Vāmana, Brahmacarvārta and other Purāṇas. Here we shall deal with the philosophy of some typical Viṣṇuite, Saiva and Sākta Purāṇas.


Pargiter and Winternitz assign it to 500 A.D. Farquhar and R. C. Hazra date it 400 A.D. It is held in great respect by the theistic Vedāntists, and often quoted by them in support of their views. Rāmānuja profusely quotes from it. He quotes from it the verses which expound the doctrine of monism (advaita). He quotes texts from it in support of his doctrine of theism or qualified monism (viśiṣṭādvaita). It teaches absolutism or idealistic monism, pantheism, and theism with a strong monistic bias. Its cosmology is similar to that of the Śaṅkhya with the only difference that it believes in God, who evolves the world out of prakṛti which is his own form. It believes in prakṛti and puruṣas, which are the forms and manifestations of God. The Śaṅkhya is atheistic and dualistic. It conceives prakṛti and puruṣas to be eternal. The philosophy of Viṣṇupurāṇa is a mixture of Śaṅkhya dualism and Vedāntic monism and theism. Its philosophy, in general outline, is similar to that of the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad and the Mahābhārata.

The Upaniṣads advocate twofold Brahman, Para Brahman and Apara Brahman. Para (higher) Brahman is the attributeless,
indeterminate Brahman. Apara (lower) Brahman is the determinate Brahman endowed with qualities. The indeterminate Brahman is pure, eternal, infinite, impersonal being, consciousness and bliss. The determinate Brahman is the Lord, who is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the universe, the Moral Governor, the inner controller of the souls, and the dispenser of the moral law.

**Viṣṇupurāṇa** regards Viṣṇu as Para Brahman. He is higher than the highest. He is self-existent, immutable, predicateless pure Being. He is the supreme reality, devoid of origin, growth, modification and destruction. He is attributeless or devoid of sensible qualities. He abides in himself. He abides in all things of the universe. So he is called Vāsudeva. He is the supreme Self.† Para Brahman is infinite knowledge (ākhiḷajñānamaya). He is devoid of difference (abhedin). He is infinite, eternal, pure consciousness.⁷ Pure consciousness constitutes his nature (śuddhajñānasvabhāva). He is indeterminate being and self-awareness. He has three powers of being (sandhini), consciousness (samvit) and bliss (hādini).⁸ He is predicateless (āviśeṣaṇa). He cannot be known through any predicate or attribute.⁹

Viṣṇu is pure, infinite, eternal, omnipresent and undifferentiated consciousness.¹⁰ He is calm, objectless, eternal and unthinkable consciousness.¹⁰ He is one, infinite, eternal and indivisible. He is the ground of the entire universe. He is the foundation of the souls. He is Para Brahman.⁷ He is devoid of the guṇas. But he appears to be invested with them owing to error. Para Brahman, who is transcendental pure consciousness, appears to be the empirical world of objects owing to avidyā.¹¹ He is devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas. So he is devoid of their qualities, pleasure, pain and delusion.¹² He is

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† i. 2. 9-11. Paraḥ parāṇāṁ paraṁ ātmātmātmāmāsvatāṁ. Rūpavarpādinirdeśaḥavisēṣaṇavivārjitaḥ. i. 2. 9.
‡ Viśādhavaḥ bodhanoṁ niyam ajoṁ akṣayaṁ avyayaṁ. i. 9. 50.
§ Ātmāmahābhū坦aḥ sattāmātmām alakṣayaṁ. i. 22. 48. Hādini sandhini samvit tvaṁekā sarvasamsthitaṁ. i. 12. 49.
¹ i. 4. 21; i. 9. 39, 50, 51, 54, 60.
¹ Amalaṁ niyam vyāpakam akṣayaṁ samastabhedarahitaṁ viṣṇavākhyāṁ paraṁ paraṁ padam. i. 22. 51.
¹ i. 22. 49. vi. 8. 53.
¹ i. 12. 70.
one, unborn, immortal, infinite, eternal and homogeneous consciousness. He is eternally pure and untainted by avidyā. He is different from the world. But it is not different from him. It is non-different from him. He is absolutely pure and perfect knowledge in his essential nature. He is eternal, pure or subject-objectless consciousness. But he appears to be the world of empirical objects to the empirical selves (jīva) owing to ignorance. The world is an appearance. It is non-different from Brahman, who is pure subject-objectless consciousness beyond appearance. Para Brahman is the end (sādhya). Knowledge of him is the means (sādhanā). He can be known by integral experience or intuition. It is pure, untainted, supreme, transcendental, homogeneous knowledge. It is not lower discursive knowledge. It is higher intuitive knowledge. It is the means of knowing and realizing him. It is true knowledge (jñāna). Any other kind of knowledge is ignorance (ajñāna). Brahman is one undifferentiated consciousness devoid of distinction of means and end.

Para Brahman is pure consciousness. His essence is inconceivable and indescribable. Still he is described as the Lord (Bhagavat) for worship. He is Vasudeva. This is the element of absolutism in Viṣṇupurāṇa, which is not different from the monism of the Advaita Vedānta.

A distinction is made between Para Brahman and Sabda Brahman. After Sabda Brahman is known, Para Brahman can be known. The Vedas are Sabda Brahman (Logos); they indicate the existence of Para Brahman.

The Lord, the infinite puruṣa, is the first manifestation of Para Brahman. He may be said to be Apara Brahman. He is the determinate Brahman endowed with attributes. He is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. He creates sattva,
rajās, tamas, time, prakṛti, mahat, ahañkāra, and the world. 

Hari, the Lord of the world, is invested with rajās, and creates the world as Brahmā. He is invested with sattva, and preserves the world as Viṣṇu. He is invested with tamas, and dissolves the world as Rudra.

God is the First Person (pumān ādyāḥ). Viṣṇu is all-powerful. He is the repository of all powers. He is the inferior essence of Para Brahman. He is the supreme of all divine powers. He is just inferior to Para Brahman. He is the manifestation of Brahman. He is full of Brahman.

Brahman is devoid of sattva, rajās and tamas, and unlimited by space, time and forms. He is devoid of attachment and aversion. How can he create the world? Powers of all things are incomprehensible by knowledge. God's powers of creation, preservation and destruction are still more inconceivable.

Viṣṇu or the Lord has three powers, the supreme power of consciousness (cit-śakti), and the inferior powers of avidyā and karma. Avidyā limits his pure consciousness, and produces individual selves (jīva). Karma is cosmic nescience, which projects the appearance of the world. Śrīdharasvāmi interprets the text thus. Parā Śakti is the power of pure consciousness, which constitutes his essence. Avidyā is the inferior power, which limits the pure consciousness, and creates individual selves. Karmaśakti is māyā which projects the multiform world-appearance. The individual selves are limitations of the eternal, universal Self due to avidyā. This interpretation is in keeping with absolutism of Advaita Vedānta.

The Lord (Bhagavat) is the First Person (ādi puruṣa). He is the first manifestation of Para Brahman. He is the mani-

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22 i. 2. 35, 61; i. 4. 31.
23 i. 2. 35, 61-62; i. 4. 15; i. 19. 68.
24 i. 9. 43.
25 Sarvaśaktimayo viṣṇuḥ svarūpam brahmaṇoparam. i. 22. 59.
27 Śaktayah sarvabhāvānāṁ acintyājānāgocarāḥ. Yato'brahmaṇas tāstu sargādyāḥ bhāva-śaktayāḥ. i. 3. 2.
28 Viṣṇu-śaktiḥ paraṁ prokta kṣetrajñākhyaḥ tathā'paraḥ. Avidyā karma-saṃjñā'nyā trayā śaktir iyate. vi. 7. 61.
festation of the supreme Self. He indicates the infinite and eternal Self.\textsuperscript{39}

Bhagavat is the First Cause and ground of the universe. He is sometimes described as the efficient cause (nimitta kāraṇa) of the world. The powers of prakṛti are described as its material cause (upādāna kāraṇa), which are helped by God to be transformed into the manifest world.\textsuperscript{39} Prakṛti supervised by God is modified into the world. It is the manifestation of his glory. He pervades it. It is full of him.\textsuperscript{38} But prakṛti is a form of God. So God is both efficient cause and material cause of the world.\textsuperscript{31}

Bhagavat is endowed with all supernatural powers (aśvārya), righteousness (dharma), glory (yaśas), fortune (śri), knowledge (jñāna), and detachment (vairāgya). He is possessed of excellent qualities, viz., infinite knowledge (jñāna), infinite power (śakti), infinite strength (bala), infinite sovereignty (aśvārya), infinite prowess (virya), and infinite effulgence (tejas). But he is devoid of the opposite inauspicious qualities.\textsuperscript{35} He is possessed of all auspicious qualities.\textsuperscript{32} He is the Moral Governor, Providence (vidhātṛ) and Master (prabhu). He does good to the world in various ways. He gives fruits of actions and knowledge to all. He is the supervisor of the Law of Karma. He is the supreme Person (puruṣottama).\textsuperscript{34} This is the element of theism in Viṣṇu-pūrṇa.

God is one as cause, and many as effects. He is subtle and gross. He is unmanifest prakṛti. He is the manifest world. He is cause and effect. He is the First Cause or the cause of causes. He is the effects of effects. He is the creator and the created. He is the enjoyer and the enjoyed objects.\textsuperscript{38} He is manifest and unmanifest, formless and formed, existence and non-existence. He is devoid of the guṇas, and inspires them with his power. He is one and many.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{39} vi. 5. 69.
\textsuperscript{38} i. 4. 51-82.
\textsuperscript{38} Tavaïsa malimā yena vyāptam etaccarācaram. i. 4. 38; i. 2. 49;
i. 1. 5. Cpt. Munḍ. Up., ii. 2. 7.
\textsuperscript{35} Karta’san jagato’ya jagacca-saḥ. i. 1. 35.
\textsuperscript{35} Vinā heyair guṇādibhiḥ, vi. 8, 79. Cpt. Rāmānuja. HIP., Vol. II, ch. IX.
\textsuperscript{34} Samastakālyāṅguṇātmako hi. vi. 5. 84.
\textsuperscript{38} vi. 5. 71-74, 79, 82, 84; i. 2. 5; i. 15. 87-88.
\textsuperscript{35} i. 2. 3; i. 9. 49-49.
\textsuperscript{36} i. 20. 9-12; i. 22. 76.
God is knowledge and ignorance, truth and falsehood, nectar and poison. He is beautiful and terrible. He is the means of all actions. He is all actions prescribed by the Vedas. He is the fruits of all actions and their enjoyer. The world is his great form. He is the inner soul (antarātmā) in all creatures. The inconceivable supreme Self exists in every finite self. The entire universe is interpenetrated by him. He is the entire universe. The world originates in him, and exists in him. He is the whole world. The entire world, knowable and unknowable, is the form of God. He is all (sarva), and the ground of all (sarvāśraya). He is the Soul of all creatures (sarva-bhūtātmā). He is immanent in the world.

Brahman is formless and formed. He is Akṣara and Kṣara. Akṣara is Para Brahman. Kṣara is the entire universe. The whole world is the power of Para Brahman. There are different degrees of divine power in gods, men, beasts, birds, reptiles, trees and creepers. They are different degrees of manifestations of God.

God is the individual Lord. He is the corporate Lord. He is the supreme Lord. He is the four Vyūhas, manifestations, Vāsudeva, Saṁkarśaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. He is of the unmanifest essence and the manifest forms. He is the omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent Lord of all. Vāsudeva is the immanent essence of the entire universe. This is the element of pantheism in Viṣṇupurāṇa.

God whose essence is Brahman, and who is the supreme, inconceivable Lord (Nārāyaṇa), is the creator of the entire universe. He is the Self (Ātman) of all creatures, the supreme Self (Paramātman), and the Lord of all creatures. He is the Self of all selves and the Self of the universe (viśvātman). Nārāyaṇa is all (sarva), and the Lord of all (sarveṣa). He is the ground of the universe. He pervades it by a fraction of his infinite power. He transcends the guṇas and their modifications. He transcends the entire universe. It exists in him.
He exists in all creatures. He is immanent and transcendent in relation to the world. This is the element of panentheism in Viṣṇupurāṇa.

Para Brahman is infinite, eternal and pure consciousness. The Lord, the infinite Puruṣa, is the first manifestation of Brahman. Prakṛti, mahat, ahaṅkāra, time and the world are his later manifestations. Brahman is unmanifest and manifest. Prakṛti is the power of God. Power and the possessor of power are non-different from each other. Prakṛti, guided by God, creates the world. He turns unmanifest prakṛti into the manifest world. But prakṛti is a form or manifestation of God. So, in one sense, prakṛti is the material cause of the world. In another, God is both efficient and material cause of the world.

Prakṛti is the eternal, unmanifest and subtle cause of the world. It is called pradhāna. It is infinite, ungrounded, immeasurable, undecaying, immobile and devoid of colour, sound and touch. It is composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. It is without origin and end. It is the origin of the world. It is both cause and effect. It is unmanifest as cause and manifest as effects. It is the material cause of the world. All physical, biological, and psychical entities are its modifications. The whole world is the expression of the power of Para Brahman.

Prakṛti and puruṣas exist in Brahman at the time of dissolution. They are forms of Brahman. Time also which is without origin and end, is a manifestation of Brahman. Creation, maintenance and dissolution are beginningless and endless. They are perpetual in parts of the world. They are periodical in relation to the whole world.

At the time of dissolution sattva, rajas and tamas constituting prakṛti are in the state of equilibrium, and puruṣa exists separately. Time also exists. Then God (Viṣṇu) enters of his free will into prakṛti and puruṣa, and agitates them. The agitation produced by him associates prakṛti and puruṣa, and starts evolution of prakṛti. He upsets its equilibrium by mere proximity. He is the unmoved mover of prakṛti. The supreme Person (puruṣottama) is the agitator and the agitated. He abides in

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44 vi. 5. 75, 80
45 1. 4. 21, 51, 52; 1. 3. 3; 1. 1. 35; 1. 2. 49, 51.
46 Parnasa brahmaṇaḥ śaktis tathāghatāh akhilam jagat. 1. 22. 35, 1. 2. 18-20.
47 1. 2. 23. Cp. MBh.
48 1. 2. 25.
prakṛti by contraction. He evolves the world by expansion. Equilibrium of the guṇas is his contraction. Their disequilibrium or evolution is his expansion. Creation or evolution of the world is unfoldment (āvirbhāva). Its destruction is unfoldment or involution (tirobhāva). God interpenetrates prakṛti in evolution and dissolution. He is unmanifest prakṛti and the manifest world.

Mahat was evolved from prakṛti, the equipoise of sattva, rajas and tamas, supervised by the puruṣa (kṣetrajña). The 'puruṣa' must be the supreme Person (ādipuruṣa). Mahat was pervaded by prakṛti. It was sāttvika, rājasa, and tāmasa. Vaikārika ahaṁkāra was evolved from sāttvika mahat. Taivāsa ahaṁkāra was evolved from rājasa mahat. Tāmasa ahaṁkāra was evolved from tāmasa mahat. Threefold ahaṁkāra was pervaded by mahat. Primal matter (bhitādi) was evolved from tāmasa ahaṁkāra. The sense-organs and the elements were evolved from threefold ahaṁkāra. Primal matter was modified into the subtle essence of sound (śabdatanmātra). Ākāsa endured with the quality of sound was evolved from the sound-essence. The sound-essence and ākāsa were pervaded by primal matter. Ākāsa was modified into the subtle essence of touch (sparśatanmātra). It was pervaded by ākāsa. It was modified into air endured with the quality of touch. Air was modified into the subtle essence of colour (rūpatanmātra). It was modified into light endured with the quality of colour. Colour-essence and light were pervaded by air. Light was modified into the subtle essence of taste (rasatanmātra). It was modified into water endured with the quality of taste. Taste-essence and water were pervaded by light. Water was modified into the subtle essence of smell (gandhatanmātra). Smell-essence was modified into earth endured with the quality of smell. Earth was an aggregate of five kinds of tanmātras. They are the subtle essences of those elements, which have those qualities in a manifest condition. They are the potentials of the sensible qualities. They are non-specific (aviñēṣa), because they do not produce pleasure, pain and delusion. The tanmātras were evolved from tāmasa.
ahāmkāra. The five cognitive organs and the five motor organs were evolved from tajasa ahāmkāra. Manas was evolved from sāttvikāhāmkāra. Ears, skin, eyes, tongue and nose are the cognitive organs. Hands, feet, vocal organ, sex organ, and excretive organ are the motor organs. The ears perceive sound; the skin perceives touch; the eyes perceive light; the tongue perceives taste; and the nose perceives smell. Ether, air, light, water, and earth have different qualities. They produce pleasure, pain and delusion, and are specific (viṣeṣa). They were in the state of atoms. Atoms of the five elements combined with one another, and produced units of matter by integration. The theory of evolution propounded in Vīṣṇupuruṣa closely resembles the Sāṃkhya-Yoga theory of evolution. The Sāṃkhya does not believe in God. The Yoga believes in God, who disturbs the equilibrium of prakṛti, and starts its evolution. But it does not regard prakṛti, as a form, manifestation, or power of God.

The individual self is pure knowledge and peace (nirvāṇa). It is associated with buddhi, a modification of prakṛti, and erroneously identifies itself with it. Ignorance, pain, vice and the other qualities of buddhi are ascribed to the self. It seeks and enjoys the qualities of buddhi owing to its false identification (abhimāna) with buddhi, which is due to avidyā. The afflictions (kleśa) including avidyā can be destroyed by yoga. The concept of the self propounded here is identical with the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view. Prakṛti and souls are the powers of Brahman. They are founded in the Paramātman, who is the ground of prakṛti and puruṣas.

The manas alone is the cause of bondage and release. When it is attached to objects of enjoyment, it entangles the self in bondage. When it is detached from them, the self is released. A wise person should withdraw his manas from worldly pleasures, and meditate on God for release. He attracts the self meditating on him to himself, and identifies it with himself, even as a magnet attracts iron to itself. Yoga is the union of the manas with God owing to the efforts of the self. One who is a novice in the art of yoga, is called yogayuk. One

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50 Saktih sāpi tathā viṣṇuḥ pradhānapuruṣatmanāḥ, ii. 7. 31. ii. 7 29-31; vi. 4. 35-39.
who is advanced in it, is called yuñjāna. One who has realized Para Brahman, is called vinŚpanniśnasamādhi. He attains embodied release (jivanmuktik). His karmas are quickly burnt by the fire of yoga. Yoga is not total suppression of mental functions as Patañjali defines it.

The aspirant should renounce desires, practise non-injury, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-restraint, and greedlessness or non-acceptance of gifts, and make his manas fit for meditating on God. He should study the scriptures, practise purity of body and mind, contentment, and penance with sense-control, and make his manas fit for meditation on Brahman. These are the five kinds of yama and the five kinds of niyama mentioned by Patañjali. Bodily posture, breath-control, withdrawal of the senses from their objects, fixation of mind, meditation and trance also should be practised. The performance of these duties gives special fruits, if they are practised with desire for fruits. If they are performed without desire for fruits, they bring about release. Niśkāma Karma is conducive to release. Mental dispositions (bhāvanā) due to knowledge are threefold, disposition relating to Brahman, disposition relating to karma, and disposition relating to both. Until dispositions relating to karma are completely destroyed, the world appears to be different from Brahman, and the knowledge of difference is not negated. When potencies of actions are destroyed, the knowledge of difference disappears, and the whole world is known as pure Being or Brahman only. This indescribable knowledge, which is aware of itself, is the knowledge of Brahman. There is no difference between the individual self and Brahman in this highest state of trance.

Performance of duties without attachment for their fruits (niśkāma karma) wears off merits and demerits, and leads to liberation. Viṣṇu as Para Brahman, the formless, eternal, infinite Self (paramātman), or pure consciousness, distinct from his cosmic form, can be realized by concentration of mind on him with single-minded devotion (ekāntaraṇi) purified by moral
observances. He can be known by absorption in him devoid of distinction of subject, object and act of meditation, brought about by intense meditation. Integral knowledge (vijnāna) is the means of knowing Brahman. The jīvātmā devoid of threefold dispositions (bhāvanā) is led by integral knowledge to realize Para Brahman. When integral knowledge fulfils its function of effecting realization of Brahman, it vanishes. The jīva becomes identified with Para Brahman by constant meditation on him. But his knowledge of difference persists for some time owing to ignorance (ajñāna). When ajñāna is destroyed, the pure eternal consciousness shines forth, without any difference. Niṣkāma karma, yoga, devotion and integral knowledge lead to the realization of Brahman. The emphasis is laid on the knowledge of identity or non-difference as in the Advaita Vedānta. The philosophy of Viṣṇupurāṇa is a blend of the Sāṅkhya dualism of prakṛti and puruṣa and absolutism of the Advaita Vedānta with a strong monistic bias. It is theistic Sāṅkhya blended with pure monism. It resembles the philosophy of Bhāgavata Purāṇa, to a certain extent, which is predominantly monistic.


Nāradīya Purāṇa (850–950 A.D.) advocates the duality of prakṛti and puruṣa, evolution of the world out of prakṛti, Brahman and mâyā or śakti, and moral government of the world. It conceives of Brahman in various ways. It advocates pantheism, panentheism, theism, and absolutism or idealistic monism. It regards the individual self as veiled by avidyā, and conceives of bondage and release as phenomenal due to attachment and detachment of the mind. It inculcates a rigid moral life and purity of mind. It prescribes the triple method of action (karmayoga), devotion (bhaktiyoga), and knowledge (jñānayoga) for the realization of Brahman. It prescribes the method of meditation and trance also as the final phase of sādhanā like the Bhagavad Gitā.

Mahāviṣṭu is self-luminous consciousness. He creates Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Siva from within his body with the three

**Tadbhāvabhhavāpannaḥ tatoṣau paramātmanā. Bhavatyabhedī bhedāśca tasya jñānākṛto bhavet.** vi. 7. 93.

**vi. 7. 90-93, 101-103.**
guṇas, rajas, sattva and tamas. They are the creator, the preserver, and the destroyer of the world. His supreme power (parā śakti) creates it. It is in the nature of existence and non-existence. It is vidyā and avidyā. The power of Mahāviṣṇu, which appears to be the multiform world, is called avidyā. It is the cause of bondage and misery. It produces distinction of the knower and the known. When this avidyā is destroyed, the knowledge of identity is revealed, which is called vidyā. Māyā or avidyā of Mahāviṣṇu creates difference and saṁsāra. His vidyā or knowledge of identity destroys saṁsāra. Avidyā is ignorance or knowledge of difference. Vidyā is true knowledge or knowledge of identity. Parā śakti is avidyā and vidyā. Padma Purāṇa also regards the power (ādyā prakṛti) of Mahāviṣṇu as consisting of vidyā and avidyā.

Mahāviṣṇu appears to be the diverse world owing to the adjunct of māyā, even as ether appears to be different in conjunction with the limiting adjuncts. He pervades the universe. His power also permeates it, even as the burning power of fire pervades fire. The power of Mahāviṣṇu cannot be separated from him. His power (śakti), in its unmanifest and manifest forms, permeates the world. It is manifested as prakṛti, puruṣa, and time. His Śakti, Mahāmāyā, preserves the world. Evolution of the world from prakṛti is described.**

Mahāviṣṇu is the infinite, eternal, pure Self (Paramātman), devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas. He is imperishable, pure and eternally fulfilled. He is the embodiment of pure being, consciousness and bliss. He is devoid of all adjuncts. He is comprehended by knowledge only.***

Viṣṇu has three kinds of śakti. Parā śakti is the higher power of consciousness. Kṣetrajña-śakti is the lower power that sustains the individual souls. Avidyā-karma is the power that creates the world.**** Viṣṇupurāṇa also speaks of these three powers of Viṣṇu.

Para Brahman can be known by discrimination. Apara Brahman or Sabda Brahman can be known through the Vedas. One who is well-versed in the Vedas can know Para Brahman. There are two kinds of vidyā: parā vidyā and aparā vidyā.

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**[Footnotes]

2. I. 3. 21-22.
3. II. 47. 37-38; I. 49. 29-34.
Parā vidyā is the higher knowledge by which the imperishable Brahman is known. Aparā vidyā is the lower knowledge of the Vedas. The Akṣara Brahman is the unmanifest, unborn, unageing, inexhaustible, formless, omnipresent, eternal, inactive, and uncaused cause of the world, permeating all creatures. He is the essence of the supreme Self (Paramātman) called the Lord (Bhagavat).

The Paramātman is one, devoid of the guṇas, and of the nature of infinite bliss. He is the highest reality. He appears to be multiform owing to differences of cognitions. One perceives difference in the Paramātman owing to māyā of God. So māyā should be discarded through yoga.

Māyā is neither existent nor non-existent nor both. It is indescribable. It produces the knowledge of difference. Māyā is nescience (ajñāna). One who conquers māyā, destroys one's nescience.

The self (ātman) is stainless, pure being, consciousness and bliss. It is free from all limiting adjuncts. It is a disembodied spirit (nirguṇa). Still it appears to be embodied. The infinite Ātman, the supreme light of consciousness, appears to be endowed with māyā to those who are deluded by nescience (ajñāna). When nescience is destroyed, the Ātman shines as a self-luminous spirit. One, stainless, infinite consciousness, without any second, resides in the hearts of all creatures as their inner controller. The individual self (jīvātman) is the Ātman limited by egoism. The knowledge of identity of the jīvātman and the Paramātman is called yoga. The Paramātman, the inner guide of the jīvātman, is neither an agent nor an enjoyer. The jīvātman's knowledge of the Paramātman is mokṣa. Its knowledge of its non-difference from the Paramātman breaks

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[i. 46. 4-8. Cp. MBh.; MS.
ii. 46. 9-12.
iii. vijñānabhedena bahurūpadharo’vayaḥ. i. 33. 67.
iv. Māyino māyāvā bhedaṃ paśyanti paramātmanī. i. 33. 68.
Bombay, Sarvat, 1962.
Nāsadrūpā na sadrūpā māyā naivobhayātikā.
Anirvācyā tato jñeyā bhedābuddhipradāyinī. i. 33. 69.
vi. i. 33. 70.
Parah jyotir ameyātma māyāvān iva māyinām.
Tasmāt nirmalaṁ brahma prakāśayati pañcita. i. 33. 147.
vi. i. 33. 148.
vii. Tayorahbedavijñānaṁ yoga ityabhidhitaye. i. 33. 57.
its fetters. Ignorance is bondage. Knowledge is liberation. Knowledge of difference of the jiva from Brahman is bondage. Knowledge of its non-difference from Brahman is release.¹⁴ This is the element of idealistic monism or absolutism in Nārādīya Purāṇa.

The Lord (Bhagavat) is possessed of infinite knowledge, power, strength, sovereignty, heroism and glory. He is devoid of inauspicious qualities. Vāsudeva is the Lord. He is endowed with all auspicious qualities. There is no trace of afflictions in him. He is the moral Governor. He is the goal of virtue, austerities and knowledge. He is the supreme goal. He is the supreme reality. He is the reality of the universe. There is no other reality than Vāsudeva. He is the groundless, immeasurable, unageing, imperishable, eternal, inconceivable, indefinable, calm, ancient Puruṣa. He is the supreme light of consciousness, and the embodiment of existence, consciousness and bliss. He is devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas, and yet he assumes them. He is beyond māyā, and yet he assumes it to create the world-appearance. He is formless, and yet assumes many forms. He is the adorable supreme Lord. He pervades the universe. He assumes its form through his power of avidyā-karma. He is without any veil. He is kind to the devotees, who take refuge in him.¹⁵

Vāsudeva is the creator and moral Governor of the world. He voluntarily assumes the form of the world for its infinite good. He is Paramātman, the supreme Self. He lives in all creatures as their inner controller. They live in him. He transcends prakṛti and its evolutes, guṇas and their defects. He is the Ātman of the universe without being veiled by it. He dwells in its heart in his innate purity. He has individual form and collective form. He has unmanifest form and manifest form. He is the omnipotent, supreme Lord.¹⁶ God is conceived as transcendent and immanent. This is panentheism. He is conceived as the moral Governor, endowed with auspicious qualities, devoid of inauspicious qualities, and kind to his devotees. This is theism. So Nārādīya Purāṇa also contains elements of absolutism, panentheism and theism blended together.

¹⁴ i. 33. 60, 63, 65. ¹⁵ i. 3. 80-83; i. 8. 37-44; i. 47. 37-38; i. 49. 29-34; i. 46. 22-23. ¹⁶ i. 46. 22-25 Cp. VPR. Cp. Vāmana Purāṇa, Ch. 29: 17-25.
The mind is the cause of bondage and release. When it is attached to objects of enjoyment, it is the cause of bondage. When it is devoid of attachment for them, it is the cause of release. Attachment leads to bondage. Detachment leads to release.¹⁷

Mokṣa can be attained by righteous actions (karma), devotion (bhakti), and knowledge (jñāna). Karma generates devotion. Supreme faith (śraddhā) destroys sins. Buddhi becomes pure, when sins are destroyed. Knowledge attained by pure buddhi is jñāna. Jñāna is assisted by yoga to bring on release. Yoga is twofold, kriyāyoga and jñānayoga. Without kriyāyoga jñānayoga does not bear fruit. Kriyāyoga consists in observing fasts, hearing Purāṇas, and worshipping Viṣṇu. Non-injury, veracity, non-anger, sex-restraint, greedlessness, absence of envy, and compassion constitute kriyāyoga. It consists in doing good to mankind by thoughts, words, and deeds, and worshipping God.¹⁸ Devotion destroys all sins committed in previous births. When all sins are destroyed, buddhi is purified. Pure Buddhi can acquire true knowledge (jñāna). True knowledge or yoga is the knowledge of non-difference of the individual soul and the supreme Soul, God, or Brahman.¹⁹ Eternal knowledge is the nature of Para Brahman. It can be realized by true knowledge (jñāna). Ignorance (ajñāna) is destroyed by the eightfold yoga and conquest of desires. Desires are never pacified by their gratification.²⁰

Nārādīva Purāṇa lays great stress on mental purity. Performance of sacrifices without mental purity is fruitless. All prescribed duties without purity of mind are unavailing. So attachment and other afflictions (kleśa) should be rooted out. Worship of a deity without inner purity of mind leads to hell. One who has external purity without mental purity is like a decorated jar full of liquor. A pilgrim without mental purity is not purified by pilgrimage. One who preaches dharma, but commits sins in thought, is the worst of sinners. One who practises righteousness with a pure mind, attains infinite happi-

¹⁷ i. 47. 4. Cp. BB., 1-2.
¹⁸ Karmaneśu manasā vaca sarvalokahite rataḥ. Samarcayai deveśah kriyāyogah sa ucyate. i. 33. 42.
¹⁹ i. 33. 29-32, 35, 42-46, 57.
²⁰ i. 33. 98. Cp. MBh.; MS.
This happiness is not sentient pleasure due to the gratification of desires, but abiding joy due to the conquest of desires. Benevolence, harmlessness, control of passions, and purity of mind are the indispensable prerequisites of the attainment of mokṣa.

Virtuous persons distinguish between right and wrong actions, and perform right actions. Performance of right actions (karma) purifies the mind, and generates devotion. Devotion destroys all sins and impurities of mind. The pure mind, purged of ignorance (ajñāna), acquires knowledge of non-difference of the jīva and Brahman. Yoga is the union of the mind with Brahman. Nārādiya Purāṇa prescribes the triple method of karmayoga, bhaktiyoga, and jñānayoga with concentration of mind (yoga) for the realization of Brahman. The eightfold yoga is subsidiary to the union of mind with Brahman.


Āgneya Purāṇa (800 A.D.) preaches the cult of Viṣṇu, and regards him as pure consciousness or Para Brahman and also as the Lord, creator and moral Governor of the world. It identifies the Ātman with Brahman, and inculcates rigid moral life, purity of mind, and eightfold yoga for the realization of Brahman. It enjoins the triple method of action (karma), devotion (bhakti), and knowledge (jñāna) attended with yoga. It regards yoga as union of the mind with Brahman. It advocates absolutism, panentheism, and theism, the duality of prakṛti and puruṣa with the Lord as their inner controller, evolution of the world out of prakṛti under his guidance, and its dissolution. Its ontology is a blend of the Sāṅkhya dualism and the Upaniṣadic monism and theism.

Āgneya Purāṇa advocates pure monism or absolutism, and regards the jīva as identical with Brahman, and Brahman as one, infinite, eternal, pure consciousness beyond all distinctions.

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*1 i. 33. 34; i. 33. 72-79, 83, 84, 87, 88, 90-92, 97, 98, 100, 102, 104-06; i. 16. 24-28; i 47. 12-13.
**i 16. 28-31.
**i. 47. 7; i. 33. 27, 44-46.
**i. 47. 7; 16-21, 54-55, 67.
**Cp. MBh., BG.
Brahman is non-dual being, consciousness and bliss. It is pure consciousness (cinmātra) and witness (sākṣin). It is infinite truth, knowledge and bliss. It is the supreme light of consciousness. It is neither empirical existence nor non-existence, devoid of difference and non-difference, devoid of distinction of knower, known, means of knowledge, and object of knowledge, neither cause nor effect, devoid of organs of knowledge and action, vital forces, manas, buddhi, citta, and ahaṅkāra, beyond the waking state, dream, and deep sleep, and realizable by superconscious trance (turiya). Brahman is the Ātman.

The Ātman is stainless knowledge and full of peace (nirvāṇa). It is detached, pure, imperishable, calm, devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas, and superior to prakṛti and its modes. It is one, infinite, changeless, omnipresent, pure consciousness, equally present in all. The Ātman is beyond Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājñā. The individual self in the waking state is called Viśva. In dream it is called Taijasa. In deep sleep it is called Prājñā. In superconscious trance it is called Ātman. The jīva is Brahman. ’That thou art’, ’I am Brahman’. This consciousness of identity can be induced by a spiritual guide (guru). Ignorance is bondage. Knowledge is release. The knowledge of Brahman leads to release. The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman. This is the element of monism in Āgneya Purāṇa. The Viṣṇuite Purāṇas teach monism (advaita), though Vaiṣṇava Vedānta is theistic.

Viṣṇu is the supreme light of consciousness. Brahman is twofold, Para Brahman and Sabda Brahman. There are two kinds of knowledge, higher knowledge (parā vidyā) and lower knowledge (aparā vidyā). The former is the knowledge of Brahman. The latter is the knowledge of the Vedas and the Vedāṅgas. Viṣṇu is Para Brahman.

He is also the Lord endowed with virtue, knowledge, detachment, auspicious qualities, and sovereignty. He is beyond prakṛti and puruṣa. The Lord is formless and formed, partless and with parts, and all-knowing and known. He is omnipresent,
omniscient and omnipotent. He is the supervisor of the Law of Karma. He associates karmas with fruits. He is calm, non-phenomenal (nirābhāsa) and stainless. The universe is a false appearance. It is not real, but appears to be real.²² God is transcendent and immanent. He is the moral Governor. These are the elements of panentheism and theism.

Creation is the sport of Viṣṇu. He is the creator, and assumes sattva, rajas and tamas, though he is devoid of them. He agitates prakṛti and puruṣa, and starts evolution. Mahat emerged from prakṛti. Ahaṁkāra emerged from Mahat. Primal matter (bhūtādī) emerged from tāmasa Ahaṁkāra. The five tanmātras emerged from bhūtādī. The sense-organs emerged from tajjasā ahaṁkāra. Their presiding deities emerged from vaikārika ahaṁkāra. Ether, air, fire, water, and earth gradually emerged from the tanmātras. The subtle body composed of the five unquintupled tanmātras emerged. Then the gross body composed of the five quintupled elements emerged.²²

Four kinds of dissolution are recognized. Death of creatures every moment is perpetual dissolution (nitya pralaya). When Brahmacārya sleeps occasionally, there is temporary dissolution (naimittika pralaya). When the world is dissolved in prakṛti, there is prakṛta pralaya. When the individual self is merged in the supreme Self, there is complete dissolution (ātyantika pralaya).²²

The Ātman is not identical with the body, because it is a knower, while the body is known. It persists in deep sleep and after death of the body. It is changeless, while the body is subject to change. The sense-organs and the internal organs, manas and buddhi are the organs of the Ātman. They are its instruments of knowledge. It is not identical with them. It is not the life-forces because they operate in deep sleep without consciousness. It is not egoism (ahaṁkāra) because there is no egoism in deep sleep. It is different from them all. It is infinite knowledge and bliss. It resides in all individual souls. It is all-knowing. The Ātman is identical with Brahman. It is the supreme Self (Paramātmā). 'That thou art'. 'I am Brahman'.

²² Ch. 17, 2-6; Ch. 377, 8-10.
²² Ch. 368, 1-2.
This is the monistic view of the Ātman. The individual self (jiva) is not regarded as an independent principle. Prakṛti, mahat, shāhākāra, the five cognitive organs, the five motor organs, manas, the five tanmātras, and the five elements are the twenty-four principles. God is the twenty-fifth principle. He transcends the adjunct of sattva. The jivātman is not an independent principle.

It is interesting to note that the Buddha is regarded as an incarnation of God (avatāra). The son of Šuddhodana became deluded by māyā, and deluded demons (asura) and made them discard the Vedic religion. The Buddha converted others to non-Vedic religion. The Buddha later became Ārhat, and converted others to his religion. They are impostors and advocates of non-Vedic religion. They deserve hell. The Purāṇas revive orthodox Hinduism, and condemn Buddhism and Jainism as heresy. The Buddha was regarded as an Avatāra in 600 A.D.

Rigid self-control and purity of mind are indispensable prerequisites for attainment of mokṣa. The objects of enjoyment are modifications of prakṛti or sattva, rajas and tamas, which are also the primary springs of action. Tamas should be overcome by rajas. Rajas should be overcome by sattva. External sacrifices involve killing of animals. They are impure, and yield transient fruits. So they should be given up, and the sacrifice of meditation (yoga), free from injury to animals, should be practised. It is superior to animal sacrifice. It is the highest, pure, and stainless sacrifice, which purifies the mind, and leads to mokṣa. Ritualistic morality is discouraged, and the inner purity of mind is emphasized. The eightfold yoga is enjoined. Conquest of the sense and control of the mind constitute the supreme virtue. If the senses are not controlled, they lead to hell. If they are controlled, they lead to heaven. They should be withdrawn from their objects by detachment. The self should be withdrawn from worldly pleasures by great effort, and directed to true knowledge. Meditation on Brahman should be accompanied by knowledge, detachment, faith and

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88 Ch. 377, 2-7: 20-23.
89 Sattopādhīgaṁśāttaḥ puruṣaḥ paricavinhākaḥ. Ch. 374, 18.
90 Ch. 16, 4-5. Cp. Varāha Purāṇa (Calcutta, 1893), iv. 2.
91 Ch. 374, 18. Cp. BG., ii. 43-45; x. 25.
92 Ch. 372, 2, 3, 5, 7-11, 14-19, 33; Ch. 373, 1-12, 15, 16, 20, 21; Ch. 374, 3, 4, 8-13; Ch. 375, 1-3; Ch. 376, 1.
forgiveness. It should be accompanied by devotion to God. It is contemplation of Brahman with an undistracted and concentrated mind. It is a continuous stream of the thought of Brahman undisturbed by the thought of any other object.109 One should meditate on Viṣṇu in the heart of the body and mind, and worship him in an impure or pure state, in the waking state or sleep. Meditation is a means to release. The mind should be fixed on formless or formed Viṣṇu. Trance is the result of meditation on him. It is consciousness of Brahman only, which is the only Self or pure consciousness like an unruﬄed ocean.110 Yoga is union of the mind with Brahman. It is complete absorption of the mind in the Absolute. It is the knowledge that reveals Brahman.111 Patañjali’s concept of yoga as complete suppression of all mental modes is rejected. It is said to be beyond the jīva and Brahman.112 The eightfold yoga is emphasized as the praxis for the realization of Brahman.113 In superconscious trance the yogin’s sense-organs do not apprehend their objects, his mind does not doubt, his egoism does not appropriate objects known, and his intellect does not understand. His external and internal organs cease to function. He becomes completely absorbed in Brahman.114


Kūrmapurāṇa (550-650 A.D.) preaches the worship of Śiva, and regards him as indeterminate, attributeless, pure, eternal consciousness, which appears to be the multiform world and finite souls owing to māyā. Śiva has Sakti or power of consciousness and bliss, which is non-different from him. It transcends Māyā. Prakṛti is his lower unconscious power, which is modified into the world. Prakṛti and puruṣa are his appearances. Śiva is the Lord, who is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world, and the moral Governor. There is a blend

108 Ch. 374, 3. Cp. YS, iii. 2.
109 Yaddātmaṁatāṁ nirbhāsam stimitodadhivet sthitam.
Caitanyakāpavād dhīyānaṁ tat samādhir ihacyate.
Ch. 376, 1. Cp. TSB, 31; YT, 107.
110 Brahmaprakāśānaṁ jñānaṁ yogab, tatraikacittattā. Ch. 372, 1.
Ch. 378, 25.
111 Cittavrttinirūdhaṁ jīvabrahmacitmanoḥ paraṁ Ch. 372, 2.
112 Ch. 372, 5, 7-11, 15, 17, 18, 19, 33; Ch. 373, 1-12, 15, 16, 20, 21;
Ch. 374, 3, 4, 8-13, 18; Ch. 375, 1-3; Ch. 376, 1.
113 Ch. 376, 2-4, 15.
of pantheism, panentheism, theism, and pure monism or absolutism. Monism is emphasized. Knowledge of non-difference and absorption in Brahman are stressed.

Karma Purāṇa preaches the cult of Siva, and contains the main elements of Saivism. The Lord is called Pati or Paśupati, because he is the ruler of the individual souls. The embodied souls are called Paśus. The Lord binds them to saṁsāra in sport, and releases them from bondage. The afflictions (kleśa) are the fetters called pāsa. They bind the souls to saṁsāra. They are ignorance (avidyā), egoism (asmitā), attachment (rāga), aversion (dveṣa), and fear of death (abhiniveśa). Dharma and adharma are called karma. They also fetter the souls to saṁsāra. Māyā is the cause of afflictions. The Lord is the only reality. He is bondage, creator of bondage, the fetters, and the bound souls. He is prakṛti with its modes and puruṣa. This is the element of pantheism.

Siva is the infinite Self (Paramātman). He is calm (śānta), partless (niṣkala), imperishable (aṅkara), supreme light of consciousness (paraṁ jyoti). He is pure, spotless, ungrounded, formless, enlightened, and free from appearance (nirābhāsa). His forms are creations of Māyā or Sakti. He is the self-existent witness of the universe (sarvasākṣin) and eternal bliss (nityānanda). He transcends the world-appearance (niṣprapañca). He creates the world according to the Law of Karma. He is the supreme Good and Providence. He is endowed with knowledge, detachment, sovereignty, penance, truth, forgiveness, patience, knowerhood, self-consciousness, and power of being the inner guide, which always exist in him. This is the element of theism.

Siva is possessed of Māyā (māyāvin). Māyā is his power or Sakti. He creates the world with his power of Māyā, which is without origin and end. Māyā is eternal and multiform. It is expressed in the multiform world. Siva has power of knowledge (jñānasakti), power of creation (kriyāsakti), and power of sustenance (prāpaṇāsakti), which are the forms of Māyā. He is the

188 Cp. VS., ii. 3.
189 Kārma Purāṇa (edited by Nilmapi Makhopādhyāya, Calcutta, 1889), Ch. 7, pp. 466-87.
184 Bk. 1. Ch. 10, pp. 92-97.
186 i. 10, pp. 98-99.
Lord of all powers. Prakṛti and puruṣa are the forms of Māyā, which is one, infinite, all-pervading, partless and good. Siva also is one and possessed of Śakti. Siva and Śakti, the possessor of power and power, are said to be different in reality. But the yogin realizes non-difference between them. Śakti is one, but it appears to be manifold owing to its limiting adjuncts. There is no dualism of Siva and Śakti. Śakti is non-different from Siva, and exists in him. It is the power of consciousness (cicchakti) in the heart of all things. It is one, infinite, intelligent, good and sovereign. It is without origin and end, the source of all powers and existences. It is the source of mūlaprakṛti, the root-evolvent. It is spotless and pure, and transcends Māyā (māyātīta). It is Logos (nāda), cosmic nescience (mahāmāyā), the root-evolvent (mūlaprakṛti). It is prakṛti and puruṣa, and beyond them. It is full of consciousness (cintayai). It is the power that creates individual souls (kṣetrajña-śakti). It is diversified into prakṛti composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. It is neither created nor destroyed. But it creates, preserves and destroys things. It is the ground of the universe, and manifested in infinite forms. It is beyond the past, present, and future. It exists in Brahman, and springs from Siva. It is conscious (cit) and free from pain. It is the power of consciousness and bliss. It is formless and formed. It is transcendent and immanent. It is always auspicious, and expressed in the Vedas. It rules over prakṛti and puruṣas or individual souls. It is the witness of Siva. It is devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas. Śakti is the power of consciousness and bliss. It is the power that creates individual souls (kṣetrajña-śakti) and unconscious mūlaprakṛti composed of the guṇas.

One undifferenced Brahman becomes the manifold world and souls, when it is associated with Māyā, though it is unmanifest and eternal. Māyā always appears as the world by
the command of God.\textsuperscript{116} The world is made of cosmic nescience (māyā).

Māyā is the beginningless and endless power, which is the root of the manifest world. Unmanifest Māyā, the source of infinite unmanifest powers, is the cause of the world-appearance (prapaṇca). It is the unmanifest cause of the manifest world. It is imperishable bliss, which exists in the Lord. Creation is the manifestation of his infinite and eternal bliss, which is called Māyā. It is a mere instrument in creating the multiform world.\textsuperscript{117}

Brahman is one, unmanifest, indeterminate, imperishable, attributeless, self-luminous consciousness. It is the supreme reality (parama tattvam). It is pure, untainted, spotless, indeterminate knowledge.\textsuperscript{118} It is indeterminate knowledge and eternal bliss.\textsuperscript{119} It is the supreme reality or Śiva, without beginning, middle or end.\textsuperscript{120} It is one, undivided, indeterminate, pure, infinite light of consciousness, which illumines the entire universe. It is the eternal being, consciousness and bliss. The world is not real but phenomenal. There is neither earth, nor water, nor fire, nor air, nor ether, nor mind, nor intellect. There is no other conscious being or individual self. The world of finite objects, and finite souls are appearances. A single, self-luminous light of consciousness or Śiva shines.\textsuperscript{121} Brahman is unmanifest (avyakta). It is the ground of the universe, though it is devoid of dualism (dvaitavarjita). It is infinite, eternal, indeterminate (nirvikalpa), undifferenced (abhinna), non-phenomenal (nirābhāsa), attributeless (nirguna), supreme light of consciousness (paramam jyotiḥ). It is of the essence of knowledge and eternal bliss. It is omnipresent and immanent in all creatures, who exist in it. It permeates the universe.\textsuperscript{122} The word ‘Brahman’ is used in neuter gender. Śiva is conceived as the Para Brahman of the Upaniṣads, or indeterminate, attributeless Brahman, which appears to be the multiform world

\textsuperscript{116} Māyā vivartate nityam sāpiśvaraniyogataḥ. ii. 6, p. 483.
\textsuperscript{117} ii. 9, pp. 492-93.
\textsuperscript{118} Yaj jñānāṁ nirmalaṁ suddhāṁ nirvikalpanaṁjanam. ii. 10, p. 496.
\textsuperscript{119} Nityānandam nirvikalpaṁ satyāpam. ii. 10, p. 497.
\textsuperscript{120} Anādīmadhyāntam vastvekaṁ paramaṁ śivāḥ. ii. 10, p. 497.
\textsuperscript{121} Vibhūti devaḥ śiva eva kevalaḥ. ii. 10, p. 498. Cp. TB., ii-vi.
\textsuperscript{122} Rka eva śivo nīyastato nyat sakalāṁ mrṣā. Sar., 30.
and individual souls. This is the element of pure monism or absolutism.

Siva is also the Lord. He is the omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, untainted, good redeemer. He has six qualities, omniscience, omnipotence, eternal consciousness, eternally manifested powers, eternal bliss, and independent will. He is one. But he manifests himself in the manifold world, enters into all creatures and impels them to action by his kriyāsakti, and sports with the multiplicity of souls and diverse objects. He is the Lord of prakṛti and puruṣas (pradhānapuruṣeśa). He is the creator, preserver and destroyer. Invested with rajas he becomes Brahmā; invested with sattva he becomes Viṣṇu; invested with tamas he becomes Hara. The Lord is infinite, and so called Brahmā. He is omnipresent, and so called Viṣṇu. He is the destroyer, and so called Hara. God is one. But he assumes the forms of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Hara with the three guṇas. The concept of Trinity (trimūrti) does not involve polytheism. Hara is the destroyer. But Siva is the supreme Lord. This is the element of theism.

Prakṛti is a state of equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas (guṇasāmya) in dissolution. The puruṣa also exists in this state. Prakṛti is devoid of all sensible qualities, smell, colour, taste, sound and touch. It is self-existent, but it has no existence apart from Brahman. It is composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. It is the unmanifest, eternal, unmoving, inexhaustible cause of the manifest world. It is devoid of origin and end. It pervades the past, the present, and the future. It is modified into all elements. It is unmanifest and manifest. It is the lower unconscious power of Brahman. It is unconscious Māyā.

The supreme Lord (Maheśvara) enters into prakṛti and puruṣa, and agitates them by yoga. He is the agitator and the agitated. He becomes prakṛti, equipoise of sattva, rajas and tamas, by contraction (saṁkōca) of his powers. He becomes the world by expansion (vikāsa) of them. Creation is expansion or

123 Anekabhedabhinnas tā kriyāte paramēśvarab. i. 4, p. 49.
124 i. 4, p. 49, 92; i. 6, p. 478; i. 2. 28. Cp. Vāmana Purāṇa, Calcutta, 1950, Ch. 47, 70, 71, 87-89, 106, 112, 113, 120, 132, 135; Ch. 49, 11, 16; Ch. 44, 5-6.
125 ii. 7, p. 487; i. 4, p. 41. Pradhānapah jagato yonīr māyātattvam acetanam. ii. 45, p. 785.
unfoldment. Dissolution is contraction or involution. There is no dualism of God and prakṛti. Prakṛti is the eternal Brahma, the source of the world. Mahat emerged out of the agitated prakṛti and the ancient puruṣa. Mahat is in the nature of prakṛti and puruṣa. He is the great Soul, Brahmā. He has intellect, knowledge and wisdom. Ahaṁkāra emerged out of Mahat. He has self-consciousness (abhimāna). He is a thinker and an active agent. The evolution of the cognitive and the motor organs, manas, the five tanmātras, and the five elements is on the lines of the Sāṁkhya theory.

Manas, buddhi, ahaṁkāra, ether, air, light, water, and earth are the eight prakṛtis. The five cognitive organs, the five motor organs, sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, and the eight prakṛtis are the twenty three principles (tattva), or evolutes of prakṛti. Prakṛti is the twenty fourth principle. The embodied soul experiences the objects, which are modifications of prakṛti. The soul (puruṣa) free from egoism is the twenty fifth principle. It is not an individual soul. Siva, the single immutable, conscious self is the twenty fifth principle. The individual self has no independent existence.

Four kinds of dissolution are recognized: perpetual (nitya), occasional (naimittika), dissolution of the world in prakṛti (prākṛta), and absolute dissolution (ātyantika pralaya) or complete merging of the individual soul in the infinite Self due to knowledge.

Happiness, wealth, virtue and liberation are the ends of life. Tamas pursues happiness. Rajas pursues wealth. Sattva pursues virtue (dharma). Dharma is superior to happiness and wealth, and should therefore be practised. Happiness and wealth in conflict with dharma should be avoided. Even dharma conflicting with customary good conduct (ācāra) should be avoided. Dharma yields happiness and wealth. It brings on mokṣa also. So dharma should be practised. One who pursues wealth and happiness in harmony with virtue, attains happiness on earth and immortality after death. One who pursues happiness, wealth, virtue and mokṣa, attains infinitude. Dharma is

176 Jagadyonir mahābhūtaṁ parabrahma sanātanan. i. 4, p. 41.
177 i. 4, pp. 40-44.
178 i. 7, pp. 480-87; i. 3, p. 462.
179 ii. 45, pp. 784-85.
180 ii. 45, pp. 784-85, 775-82.
a means to the attainment of all kinds of good. It sustains the physical, social, and moral order.\footnote{131}

Dharma can be achieved by the performance of duties (karma) and true knowledge (jñāna). So karmayoga with jñāna should be practised. The duties prescribed by the Vedas are positive (prāvritti) or negative (nivṛtti). Prāvritti is the positive method of performing duties, which fulfil desires for happiness here or hereafter. It does not lead to mokṣa. Nivṛtti is the negative method of denying desires fulfilment. It leads to mokṣa, the supreme status. Prāvritti leads to saṁhsāra. Nivṛtti leads to mokṣa.\footnote{132}

Nivṛtti is not pure asceticism. Forgiveness (kṣamā), compassion (dayā), charity (dāna), truthfulness (satya), contentment (santoṣa), reverence (śraddhā), regard for Brāhmaṇas, faith in God, worship of deities, simplicity (ārjava), non-crookedness (avakratā), sincerity (apaisumaya), sense-restraint (indriya-nigraha), harmlessness (ahimsā), renunciation (tyāga), absence of greed (aloḥa), absence of envy (anasyā), agreeable speech (priyavāditva), and self-control (dama) are the common virtues of the four castes enjoined by Manu.\footnote{133}

Niśkāma karma is enjoined. Duties should be performed without desire for fruits. The fruits of actions should be surrendered to God. Egoism should be eradicated. A person should feel that all actions are done by God. He should surrender his will to the divine will. This is self-surrender to God (brahmārpa) or self-dedication to him. Prescribed duties should be done for the sake of duty without attachment for their fruits. One is bound by the fruits of actions, if they are not surrendered to God. Attachment leads to bondage. Niśkāma karma destroys vices, and produces calmness of mind (manahprasāda). It purifies the mind, and reveals the knowledge of Brahman. It is a means to true knowledge (jñāna) and perfect yoga or union of the mind with the infinite Self. Jñāna becomes untainted, when it is combined with niśkāma karma. One who performs niśkāma karma, attains mokṣa, which is a state of actionlessness (naishkarmya). He becomes egoless, calm, and alone, realizes Śiva, the infinite Self, the

\footnote{131} Dharmęṣa dhāryate sarvam jagat sthāvarajaṅgamam. i. 2, p. 28. 
\footnote{132} i. 2, p. 28. 
\footnote{133} i. 2, p. 28.
supreme Brahman, enjoys eternal bliss, transcends appearances, and merges in Brahman. He attains embodied release (jīvamukti). One who has acquired integral vision (samyagdarśana) is a yogin. The eightfold yoga is prescribed for the union of mind with Brahman as an auxiliary method. Devotion to God (bhaktiyoga) with mind dedicated to him, self-surrender to him (prapatti), and taking refuge in him (śaraṇāpatti) also are prescribed. The grace of God is mentioned. The triple method of action, devotion and knowledge attended with yoga is enjoined. Five kinds of sacrifices, devayajña, pitryajña, bhūtayajña, nṛyajña, and brahmayajña are mentioned. Harmlessness (ahimsā) is the supreme virtue. Pain should not be caused to any creature at any time in thought, word, and deed. There is no higher happiness than ahimsā. But injury (himsā) prescribed by the Vedas for dharma is considered as non-injury. Rigid self-discipline and purity of mind are prescribed.


Garuḍa Purāṇa (700-800 A.D.) preaches the worship of Siva, advocates pure monism or absolutism, and prescribes knowledge (jñāna) as the means to mokṣa. Siva is the one, non-dual, partless, infinite, eternal, changeless, attributeless, self-luminous, supreme reality. He is Para Brahman of the Upaniṣads. Siva is also the omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent Lord of the universe. He is stainless and devoid of action and fatigue.

The individual self (jīva) is a part of Siva. It is a part of God, conditioned by beginningless avidyā. The individual selves are the limitations of the supreme Self by the adjuncts of the mind-body-complex and merits and demerits. The species, the nature of body, the span of life, and enjoyments and sufferings are due to karmas. The souls transmigrate with their subtle bodies (liṅga śarira).

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184 i. 3, pp. 37-38. Cp. MBh. and BG.
185 i. 2, p. 41. Cp. Śaṅkara.
186 i. 11, pp. 501-05, 508, 512.
187 i. 2, p. 22; i. 12, p. 132; i. 11, p. 512.
188 ii. 18, p. 558.
189 Ahimsāyāb paro dharma nāsyahimsāparam sukham. i. 11, p. 501. Cp. DP., xix. 15.
191 xvi. 7-10.
Egoism is the cause of bondage. Egolessness is the cause of release. Mokṣa is aloneness (kaivalya). It is not effected by the study of the scriptures, but by true knowledge (jñāna). Performance of duties relating to the stages of life purifies the mind. Only knowledge is the cause of mokṣa, which is due to the study of the scriptures and discrimination. Sabda Brahma is studied. Para Brahma is known by discrimination. The Vedas are Sabda Brahma. That is action (karma), which does not bind the soul to saṁsāra. That is knowledge (vidyā), which releases it from bondage.\(^{142}\)

Austerities, vows, pilgrimage, recitation of mantras, oblations, worship, and study of the scriptures should be continued till the knowledge of truth dawns. Knowledge of truth leads to mokṣa or absorption in Brahma. Knowledge with dispassion is a means to release. Integral experience (pūrṇadṛśti) with a tranquil self and detachment leads to mokṣa.\(^{143}\)


Vāyu Purāṇa (400 A.D.) preaches the worship of Śiva, advocates the duality of prakṛti and puruṣa, and evolution of the world out of prakṛti under the guidance of the Lord. Its philosophy is a blend of the Sāṅkhya dualism and theism of the Upaniṣads.

Brahman is the supreme reality. He is the finest and the greatest. He is subtle, eternal, absolute bliss. He is devoid of sattva, rajas, and tamas. He is omnipresent, unmoving, self-luminous, and conscious. He is the divine Person (divya puruṣa). He is the omniscient, ancient, moral Governor. He is the Lord and creator of the universe. He is the supreme Self (Paramātman), the self of all (sarvātman), the self of all creatures (bhūtātman). He permeates the universe. He is the supreme Person.\(^{144}\)

Prakṛti is called pradhāna or avyakta. It is the unborn, inexhaustible, self-existent, eternal and unmanifest cause of the world. It is beginningless and endless, subtle, infinite, and

\(^{142}\) xvi. 8-10, 91, 93, 94. Cp. EB., 1-2, 17; MA., vi. 22, 34; YT., 16; YC., 84; PG., iv. 19-20.
\(^{144}\) xiv. 3, 6-8, 13-14.
composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. It is devoid of smell, colour, taste, sound and touch.145

Prakṛti is the state of equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas in dissolution. Maheśvara (Siva) enters into prakṛti and puruṣa, agitates prakṛti by yoga, and starts evolution. When the guṇas are thrown into disequilibrium, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Agni emerge. Brahmā is produced from rajas; Viṣṇu, from sattva; and Agni, from tamas. Brahmā is the creator. Viṣṇu is the preserver. Agni is the destroyer.146

Prakṛti, the equipoise of the guṇas (guṇasāmyya), is guided by Kṣetrajña or the First Person (ādipuruṣa), and gives rise to Mahat, that manifests being only through preponderance of sattva. Mahat has consciousness (citi) and wisdom (praṇā), and is called Brahmā, since he causes the growth of all beings. He is called Buddha, since it makes him know all good and evil things. He directly knows all things, and is so called the great soul (mahātmā) or Ruler (īśvara). Mahat is the first category of all products. Ahamkāra emerges from Mahat through preponderance of rajas. Primal matter (bhūtādi) emerges from Ahamkāra through preponderance of tamas. The five tanmātras emerge from primal matter. The five elements emerge from the five subtle essences. The tanmātras are called aviśeṣa, since they are incapable of producing pleasure, pain, and delusion. Ākāsa has sound. Air has sound and touch. Light has colour, sound and touch. Water has taste, colour, sound and touch. Earth has smell, taste, colour, sound and touch. These elements are called viśeṣas, since they produce pleasure, pain, and delusion.

The five cognitive organs, the five motor organs, and manas emerge from Ahamkāra through preponderance of sattva.147 When all things merge in prakṛti, and are resolved into sattva, rajas and tamas in a state of equilibrium, there is dissolution. When the guṇas are thrown into a state of disequilibrium, there is creation. Three kinds of dissolution, prakṛtika, naimittika and ātyantika, are mentioned.148

Mokṣa is a supermoral state of perfection, which is devoid of merits and demerits. Complete renunciation of righteous

145 iv. 17, 18, 20.
146 v. 11, 14.
148 v. 8; iii. 2.
and unrighteous actions leads to mokṣa. One who is perfectly pure and sinless, can know Para Brahman. Vidyā leads to mokṣa. It destroys avidyā. True knowledge is the means of attaining Brahman. Superconscious trance gives true knowledge, which experiences Brahman or the supreme Self.

The eightfold yoga is enjoined. An ascetic with three staffs is one who has controlled his speech, actions and mind. Absolute harmlessness in thought, word and deed, and inner purity of mind are emphasized. Even unintended injury should be expiated by severe penance. Three kinds of sins, bodily, verbal and mental, are recognized. Sins are expiated by penances and purity of mind.


Skanda Purāṇa (700 A.D.) is of great philosophical importance. It preaches the cult of Siva, and advocates pure monism. It contains Brahmagītā which discusses the nature of Brahman, Iśvara, māyā, jīva, world-appearance and causality from the standpoint of pure monism (advaita). Śivagītā, a part of Padmapurāṇa (700-800 A.D.) also teaches pure monism.

Siva is one, pure, non-dual Ātman. He is Para Brahman characterized by infinite and eternal being, consciousness and bliss. He is the Ātman of all, the Witness (sāksin), the inner Self (pratyagātman) of all creatures. He is infinite, eternal, pure, undifferentiated consciousness. He is self-proved, self-existent, perfect and absolute. He is partless, inactive, calm, excellent, stainless, predicateless, formless, imperceptible and incomprehensible. He is devoid of plurality and beyond appearance. He is supreme bliss, the object of supreme love, the dearest Ātman. He is distinct from empirical selves (bhoktā), empirical objects (bhoga), and experience (bhoga). He is Sādāśiva. He is by nature one ontological reality.

Iśvara, jīvas, cosmic nescience (ajñāna), and the world-appearance are unreal appearances. They are, in reality,
Brahman.\textsuperscript{133} Isvara is Brahman limited by māyā. Brahman is the Witness of Sakti, māyā or cosmic nescience. The world is created by Isvara or Brahman associated with Sakti. Sakti is the power of Siva, conscious and blissful, non-different from him. She is supreme wisdom (prajñā) which is the foundation of the universe. She is the mother of the world and the Vedas. She is pure consciousness and supreme bliss. She is non-different from Siva who is an embodiment of pure consciousness. Siva is the static Absolute. Sakti is his dynamic divine power. She is not an independent principle, like another self. Sakti cannot exist without Siva. Siva cannot exist without Sakti. Siva without Sakti is absolutely powerless to act.\textsuperscript{136} The power of consciousness (cicchakti) is the essence of Para Siva. It has three forms: the power of will (icchāsakti); the power of knowledge (jñānasakti); and the power of action (kriyāsakti). Conscious Sakti assumes sattva, rajas and tamas, and becomes unconscious māyā (jaḍāsakti). Brahman limited by māyā with the excess of pure sattva is Isvara, the creator and controller of the world. He is not subject to the influence of māyā. Brahman limited by avidyā or māyā with the excess of impure sattva is the individual self (jīva). The jīva is deluded by avidyā and bound to saṁsāra.\textsuperscript{137} Māyā with the excess of tamas is the material of the world-appearance. But māyā subsists in the power of supreme consciousness, and is its modification.\textsuperscript{138} Māyā or cosmic nescience does not exist in reality, since it is contradicted by Brahman or pure self-luminous knowledge. It does not exist as distinct from Brahman or Siva. There is only perfect Siva. There is no other reality.\textsuperscript{139} Vidyā and avidyā are real from the empirical standpoint. They are not real from the ontological standpoint. The self-luminous eternal

\textsuperscript{133}Jagajjīveśvaratvādi sarvam brahmaiva kevalam. Ibid, v. 110.


\textsuperscript{135}Māyākāreṇa saṁbuddhah jagadāsakte saṁsavya tu.

Jñānam śvarasahjāmānaṁ ca niyamtr jagato bhavet. Ibid, iv. 10. 4.

Śakṣer avidyākāreṇa saṁbuddham jīvāsanājītatam.


\textsuperscript{137}Sīvagītā, ix. 4.

\textsuperscript{138}Sīvarūpātirekeṇa nāsti māyā ca vastutaḥ. Brahmabīja, iv. 63.
consciousness never lapses. It always shines. There is no māyā in the supreme Self.\textsuperscript{148} Cosmic nescience does not really exist, since it contradicts the self-luminous nature of pure consciousness. It is a mere appearance. It is, in reality, Brahman.\textsuperscript{141}

Siva is one. But he appears to be the multiple world-appearance owing to error due to māyā. He does not really become the world. Non-duality alone is real. The world-appearance is not real. Sāṃśāra is not real.\textsuperscript{143} Infinite consciousness (vijñāna) is said to produce the world. But it is unmodifiable, and cannot be modified into the world. If it is modified into the world, it becomes unconscious and material (jaḍa). Only matter is modifiable. Further, consciousness (jñāna) is regarded by others as a quality. But a quality cannot be modified into an effect. Only a substance can undergo modification. Again, there are no distinctions in infinite consciousness before creation of the world. So various objects in the world cannot be produced by undifferentiated consciousness. So production of the world by infinite consciousness is illusory. Brahman is existent and eternal. If the world were produced by him, it would be real and eternal. Brahman, the Witness (sākṣī), the Ātman manifests the world-appearance. He appears to be the world-appearance owing to his imaginary relation to cosmic nescience. The mind (citta) is produced by ajñāna. It is tainted by attachment, aversion and other afflictions. The false empirical objects appear to the mind through its modes owing to their relation to the eternal consciousness associated with ajñāna. Pure consciousness (cit) manifests empirical objects to the mind through the external senses sustained by the vital forces and the body which are produced by ajñāna. It manifests the false world-appearance. Brahman is the cause of names and forms.\textsuperscript{143}

One undifferentiated pure consciousness is the cause of the world-appearance. Brahman produces it with the aid of unconscious power (māyā) invested with tamas. Non-being cannot be its cause. Non-being only can be the effect of non-being.

\textsuperscript{148} Svaprapakṣaśaṅkhārśaṅkhāśaṅkhaśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāśaṅkhāš


\textsuperscript{143} Skandapurāṇa, ii. 20. 4. Śivaśākṣā, Poona, 1915, Ch. 7, 28; Ch. 13, 12.

\textsuperscript{144} Brahmagītā, iii. 1-17. Ibid., vi. 30.
Non-being cannot produce empirical objects through its own power, since non-being can have no power. Being only can have causal power. Non-being is not found to produce any effect. The so-called power of non-being is either real, or unreal, or both. If it is real, it cannot abide in non-being. A real being can abide in a real entity only. If the power is unreal, it cannot produce the world-appearance. Only a real being is found to produce an effect. The power cannot be both real and unreal, since it involves the difficulties of both positions. Therefore non-being cannot produce the world-appearance through its own power. Only being is the cause of the world-appearance. It is non-dual eternal being or pure consciousness. 144

Effect is non-different from cause. It is neither different from its cause nor different from and identical with it. If the effect is different from its cause, it is either real or unreal or both. If it is real, its reality is either the reality of its cause, or the reality of effect, or a reality different from both. If its reality is the reality of its cause, then it is not different from its cause, or its reality is not distinct from the reality of its cause. If the effect has no distinct reality, it is non-being. If the effect is non-existent, it is useless to speak of its being produced by a being. If the reality of the effect is different from that of its cause, then it is different from the latter either as being or as non-being. If it is different from the latter as being, then one being cannot differ in the reality of cause and the reality of effect. If it is different from the latter as non-being, then it has no being. If it is a non-being, then it is śūnya or void. If it is a non-being, then it is not an effect. Even destruction or posterior non-existence cannot be an effect, since it cannot be produced and related to a cause. Non-existence is characterless śūnya. It cannot be produced. If non-existence as an effect has a distinctive character (vīśeṣa), it must have a distinct relation to its cause. But its cause with a distinct character is non-existent. So a non-being cannot be an effect. Nor can it be a being and non-being both. So an effect is non-different from its cause. 145 Production, destruction and causal efficiency

144 Ibid., v. 38-44, 29, 31.
are empirical appearances. They appear to be real owing to ignorance. Effect is non-different from its cause. It is nothing but cause. Different things have no differentiating attributes. They are false appearances. One being is real. Brahman is the ground of the world-appearance. It is not real as distinct from Brahman. It is real from the empirical standpoint. Brahman alone is real from the ontological standpoint.

Brahman appears to be jiva owing to ignorance (ajñāna). Jiva is Brahman limited by avidyā. It experiences the fruits of its actions. Siva or Brahman resides in its heart as the Witness (sākṣīn). The empirical self is bound to saṃsāra by avidyā. Its knowledge of the reality of the world is the cause of its empirical life. Its knowledge of the falsity of the world-appearance destroys its embodied life. Jivas are in reality Brahman. Pure consciousness is the intrinsic nature of jiva and Siva. There is real identity between them. The apparent difference between them is destroyed by vidyā. When it is destroyed, their identity is realized. Bondage is destroyed by knowledge (jñāna), and not by performance of duties (karma). Jiva becomes Siva or pure consciousness through knowledge of identity. Siva is the embodiment of pure consciousness (cidvāpa). He can be known by ecstatic experience (paramāñu-bhūti). When Siva alone shines and the false world-appearance vanishes, there is neither birth nor death. The jiva’s agency, enjoyments and sufferings, merits and demerits, and being ruled by God are completely destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman, and it realizes its intrinsic absoluteness.

Ignorance (ajñāna) is the cause of desire (vāsanā). Desire is the cause of action (karma). Performance of daily prayers (nitya karma) destroys all sins, and purifies the mind. The purity of mind and knowledge of the faults of embodied life produce detachment through the grace of Siva. Detachment produces

170 Brahmagītā, v. 175; vii. 44, 51.
171 Skandapurāṇa, iv. 39. 72, 41.
renunciation of actions. Renunciation generates true knowledge (jñāna). Knowledge destroys ignorance (ajñāna), breaks fetters (pāśa) of bondage, and brings on release. Knowledge of nonduality or identity is the means of release. The practice of yoga and supreme devotion are subsidiary to true knowledge.


Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa (500-600 A.D.) contains Caṇḍi which preaches the worship of Dūrga, the goddess of Śakti. She is pure consciousness (citī). She is the power of Śiva, the māyā of Viṣṇu. She produces sattva, rajas and tamas. She is prakṛti, the primal root-evolvent. She is the homogeneous and undifferentiated ground of the universe. She is the creative energy (śakti). She is the omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent creator, preserver and destroyer of the universe. She is the material and efficient cause of the universe. She is immutable, but the world is her mutation. She is devoid of guṇas, and assumes them, and creates the world out of them. She is eternal, assumes the forms of time, produces modifications of prakṛti, and dissolves them in prakṛti. She is of the nature of the universe (viśvātmikā), the ground (viśvāśrayā) and ruler of the universe (viśvesvāri). She is the omnipotent power of Viṣṇu or Śiva, cosmic nescience (mahāmāyā), the seed of the world. She is pure consciousness (citī), one and uniform. But through cosmic nescience she assumes the form of the multiform world. She deludes all creatures with avidyā, and entangles them in bondage. She invests them with egoism and attachment, and whirls them in the wheel of samsāra. She is immanent in the world, and transcends it. She pervades the world as pure consciousness; it is her form and manifestation.

Dūrga is the foundation of the world. She exists in all creatures as the power of Viṣṇu (viṣṇumāyā), consciousness.

119 Ibid. iv. 14. 51-53; iv. 28. 72, 73. Brahmagītā. v. 135-36; 152-54; xii. 16, 19; xi. 68, 71. Cp. Śivagītā, r. 38.
117 Tvaṁ vaiṣṇavi śaktir anantāviryāṁ,
Viśvasya bijam paramāsti māyāṁ.
Caṇḍī, Calcutta, 1388, xi. 5. Ibid, xi. 4, 9, 11, 14,
24, 33; xii. 37; xiii. 2, 3; i. 48, 49, 51, 57, 63,
68-73.
116 Mamatvagarte' timahāndhakāre,
118 Cimitāpeṣa yā kṛṣṇam etad vyāpya sīhīta jagat. Ibid, v. 80.
(cetanā), power (śakti), hunger, thirst, sleep, nourishment, livelihood, beauty, genus, intellect, forgiveness, conscience, memory, reverence, compassion, contentment, fortune, and error. She exists in them as her reflections (chāyā). She is the supreme goddess, the all-pervading conscious power (vyāpti-devī), the eternal mother (mātrā). She is the presiding deity of their sense-organs. This is the element of pantheism. She is good fortune of righteous persons, adversity of vicious persons, conscience of the pure in heart, pious persons' faith in God, and virtuous persons' aversion to wrong actions. She is saving knowledge (mahāvidyā) and cosmic nescience (mahā-māyā), great recollection (mahāmedhā) and great oblivion (mahā-smṛti), power of Śiva (mahādevi) and power of demon (mahāsuri) and great delusion (mahāmoha). The pantheistic concept of God is more pronounced here.

Durgā is the highest knowledge (paramā vidyā) that leads to release. She is the giver of boons. She is the embodiment of mercy. She delivers her devotees from distress through her grace, and destroys their sins. She gives them worldly prosperity and enjoyment, heavenly happiness, and release from bondage. She gives wealth, happiness, dharma and mokṣa. She is the supreme goddess. She is the supreme good (śivā), the most auspicious, the fulfiller of desires, the refuge of all, and the deliverer from distress. She is called Durgā because she is the boat to cross the impassable ocean of saṁsāra with. She is the Logos (śabdamahā) and origin of the Vedas. She is the highest goddess among the gods. She is the Divine Mother who ever protects her erring children with loving care. This is the element of theism with a pantheistic bias.

The nature of prakṛti, evolution and dissolution are described on the lines of theistic Sāṁkhya. Creation is unfoldment. Dissolution is contraction of God.

The self is neither body, nor manas, nor, buddhi, nor ahaṁkāra. It is a non-physical, non-mental, spiritual entity. It is entangled in bondage owing to attachment. Attachment

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116 Ibid., v. 14-80; 1. 75.
117 Ibid., iv. 5.
118 Ibid., 1. 72-73.
119 Parāparānāṁ paramā tvam eva paramesvair. Ibid., 1. 77. Ibid, i. 81, 82; iv. 10, 11, 17; v. 9, 11, 12; xi. 3, 6-8, 10, 12, 31; i. 63; v. 71.
120 Markendey Purāṇa, 45, 32-61, 72, 73; 46. 5, 6, 12. (B.I.) Calcutta, 1862.
is due to egoism. Destruction of egoism destroys attachment. Egolessness leads to happiness. Detachment produces true knowledge (vidyā), which is integral knowledge (samyag jñāna). It is due to yoga, which annuls ignorance, and disjoins the self from the guṇas of prakṛti. Yoga is the union of the soul with Brahman. Purity of body, speech and mind is an indispensable condition of mokṣa. Self-surrender, devotion and grace of God lead to mokṣa.\textsuperscript{111}


\textit{Devi Gitā} is a part of \textit{Devī Bhāgavata}. It preaches the cult of Sakti. It concives of God as the Divine Mother. She is Para Brahman, Ātman, pure consciousness (cit) and bliss. Para Brahman has a power (sakti) called māyā, which is neither existent nor non-existent nor both but different from them. Māyā is a positive (vastu) entity. It always exists in Brahman or Ātman as heat exists in fire. It conceals the nature of Brahman, and is a defect (doṣa). Brahman in conjunction with Sakti is the seed of the world. Māyā is the material cause of it, since it is modified into it. It is its efficient cause in conjunction with Brahman or pure consciousness (caitanya). Māyā is called pradhāna, prakṛti, Sakti or avidyā. The Saivas call it vimarṣa. It is unconscious because it is known. What is known (dṛśya) is unconscious. Māyā is non-existent because it destroys knowledge.\textsuperscript{112}

Brahman, Ātman or pure consciousness is the only reality. Pure consciousness cannot be known. If it were known, it would be unconscious. Consciousness is self-manifest. It is not manifested by any other entity. It is not manifested even by itself, since it cannot be both subject and object. It manifests other objects. But it is not manifested by any entity. Consciousness is eternal. It never lapses in waking state, dream and deep sleep, in which objects are not always known. Ātman or Brahman is the Witness (sākṣin) or an embodiment of consciousness (sahvidvapaṇu). He is eternal bliss. He is absolute, detached and unrelated, since all other entities are

\textsuperscript{111} 37, 37-39; 39, 1-4; 41, 22-26; 84, 8. Cāṇḍi, iv. 3, 30; xi. 3, 10, 12, 16, 29, 33-35.

\textsuperscript{112} Devīgītā, Poona, 1915, i, 2-11.
false appearances. He is infinite and unlimited. Knowledge is not its quality. If it were a quality, it would be unconscious. But knowledge cannot be unconscious. It is consciousness. It cannot differ from consciousness. So knowledge or consciousness is the essence of Brahman or Ātman. He is perfect, absolute, non-dual being, consciousness and bliss. Brahman has the power of will (icchāsakti), the power of knowledge (jñānasakti), and the power of action (kriyāsakti). He creates the world with the aid of māyā. Prakṛti, avyakta, or māyā is the material cause of the world. It is the power of Brahman. Māyā is composed of sattva. Avidyā is composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. Īśvara is the reflection of Brahman in māyā. He is the omniscient and omnipotent creator of the world. The individual self (jīva) is the reflection of Brahman in avidyā. The causal body, the subtle body, and the gross body are produced by avidyā. Ātman limited by avidyā or the causal body is prājñā. Ātman limited by the subtle body is tajāsā. Ātman limited by the gross body is viśva. Brahman limited by māyā composed of sattva is Īśvara. Brahman limited by undifferentiated names and forms is Śūtrātmā. Brahman limited by the gross world is Virāt. Īśvara impelled by the power of Brahman creates the world of diverse objects for the experience of finite souls.

The world is an imaginary construction of the power of māyā (māyāsakti) of Brahman. In reality māyā does not exist as distinct from Brahman. It is avidyā from the empirical standpoint. All empirical objects are different forms of māyā. The distinction of jīva and Īśvara is an imaginary construction of māyā. The distinction of jīva and paramātman also is an appearance due to māyā. The plurality of Īśvaras, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra, and the plurality of jivas are creations of māyā. Jīva, Īśvara and the world-appearance have no existence apart from Brahman. They have being in the being of Brahman. They are empirical appearances.
Performance of duties (karmayoga), right knowledge (jñānayoga) and devotion (bhaktiyoga) are the three paths to liberation. The path of devotion is the easiest. It is mental, and does not torment the body. A devotee knows God as non-different from him through primary devotion. He worships the Divine Mother with single-minded devotion and feels a rapture of joy. He meditates on her alone, and thinks of nothing else. He is merged in Brahman. The highest stage of devotion is knowledge (jñāna). The highest stage of detachment (vairāgya) also is knowledge. Brahman, the supreme goddess, is eternal consciousness in the inner core of every heart. One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman. When ignorance (ajñāna) is destroyed by knowledge (jñāna), Brahman existing in the heart is known. Knowledge of identity devoid of distinction leads to release. Mokṣa is the realization of Brahmanhood. Dharma produces devotion. Devotion produces knowledge. Knowledge leads to release. Yoga is identity of the finite soul with the infinite self. Performance of prescribed duties (karma) purifies the mind, and prepares it for the advent of knowledge. Karma is ignorance which is contradictory to knowledge. So karma and knowledge cannot exist together. The combination of knowledge and action is not a means to release. Knowledge only is the means of attaining mokṣa. It is aided by devotion and yoga. Karma, detachment and purity of mind are subsidiary to it. Though Sāktaism advocates pure monism (advaita), it finds a place for devotion as a means to the attainment of the knowledge of identity.


Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa (700 A.D.) preaches the worship of Kṛṣṇa. Nārāyaṇa is devoid of guṇas and invested with them, formless and formed, independent and dependent, indeterminate and determinate, detached and related to the finite selves, and transcendent and immanent. He is infinite, eternal, immutable, omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent. He is the supreme

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118 Svāhāhedaiva māṁ nityam jānāti na vibhedataḥ. Ibid, vi. 15.
119 Aikyaṁ jñātmanor āhur yogam yogavīśāradāḥ. Ibid, iv. 2.
Self and Witness. He is the uncaused, non-spatial and non-temporal ground of the world. He is unmanifest and manifest. He is prakṛti and puruṣas and their cause. He is the First Cause. He is the essence and the Lord of all. He is eternal consciousness and bliss. He is the repository of all virtues. He is the embodiment of asceticism and yoga. He is the source of virtue. He is kind and affectionate to his devotees. He is a friend of the distressed. He is dispassionate and yet has passions. He is desireless, self-contented and perfect, and yet engaged in the sport of creation. He is inconceivable and indescribable. He is beyond meditation and adoration. He can be known by devotion.\textsuperscript{191}

Mokṣa is eternal communion with God. A devotee does not seek the knowledge that ends in the merging of the soul in Brahman. Devotion is the means of attaining communion with God. A person who drinks the nectar of the name of Hari consecrates his birth. There are nine indications of devotion to God: adoration of Hari, his worship, recitation of his mantra, his service, recollection of him, singing his hymns, listening to his attributes, self-surrender to Hari, and bondage to him. One who cherishes the nine kinds of devotion, who is fond of hearing of Hari, whose mind is immersed in Hari, who feels a thrill of rapture, and sheds tears at the mention of Hari, is called a devotee. One who treats all creatures in thoughts and deeds as the creatures of Hari, is a devotee. One who is kind to all creatures, and views the world as full of Hari is the best and wisest devotee. The worship of Hari is the root of all good. It is superior to acts of charity, holy pilgrimage, and study of the Vedas. Whoever remembers Hari internally and externally is released in his life time.\textsuperscript{192} Devotion is the primary means of attainment of God. Knowledge and yoga are auxiliary to it. Devotion to God is expressed in love of mankind and sentient creation. Kṛṣṇa is the life of his devotees; they are his life. He always remains by their side to protect them.\textsuperscript{193}

\textsuperscript{191} Brahmacāvarta Purāṇa, Poona, 1935, Kṛṣṇajjanmakhaṇḍa, ch. 18, 36-46; ch. 19, 87-88; ch. 20, 37-50; ch. 21, 209-12.
\textsuperscript{193} Ahaṁ prāṇaḥ ca bhaktānāṁ bhaktāḥ prāṇāḥ mamāpica. Ibid, vi, 52.
Ahāṁ bhaktāntike śaśvat teśāṁ rakṣapahetave. Ibid, vi, 47.

Bhāgavata Purāṇa (600 A.D.) preaches the worship of Kṛṣṇa, and advocates a kind of monism. It is regarded as the best work in Sanskrit devotional literature. It regards Brahman as one undifferentiated consciousness (advaya jñāna), that appears as the multiform world-appearance through mâyā or prakṛti composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. Mâyā is the wonderful power of Brahman. He is the supreme Self (Paramātmā) residing in the finite selves (jīva). The Ātman or Paramātmā limited by egoism (aharhākāra) due to avidyā is the jīva. God (Bhagavat) is the supreme Person (Puruṣottama). He is transcendent and immanent, formless and formed, devoid of guṇas (nirguṇa) and invested with them (saguṇa). The supreme Person is superior to Brahman and Paramātmā, the aspects of God. The Lord enters into a finite self as a part. The jīva is a disembodied spirit distinct from the body and the mind which are the products of sattva, rajas and tamas. It wrongly identifies itself with the guṇas and the mind-body-complex, and is bound to saṁsāra. It forgets its divine nature owing to ignorance, and is entangled in bondage. Attachment for guṇas and their products is the cause of bondage. Detachment from them is the cause of release. Devotion to God produces dispassion for sensual pleasure. The company of saints destroys all sins. Faith in God and devotion to him arise from listening to the sweetness of God from saints. Devotees are those who have renounced all attachment for worldly objects and all actions for fulfilment of desires, who suffer all kinds of hardships, and who fix their minds on God, take refuge in him, and always hear and speak of him. Endurance of hardships, compassion, good will and love for all persons, non-enmity for all and imperturbability are the qualities of devotees. Their minds are filled with sattva or purity. They delight in the service of God. They do not care for identity (ekātmāta) with him. They always act for his delight. Intense devotion to God enlightened by true knowledge and purified by detachment with mind fixed on him is a means to the highest good. A devotee enters into the feet of the Lord without any fear. Intense devotion

attended with purity of mind, pure knowledge of Brahma, and intense detachment destroy afflictions and passions due to avidya, and produce bliss or moksha. This cult of devotion (bhaktiyoga) leads to the experience of the Atman, merging in Brahma and attainment of God, the supreme Person.186

Devotion is of two kinds: saguṇa and nirguna. Saguṇa devotion is prompted by the guṇas, sattva, rajas and tamas. Nirguna devotion is free from them. Saguṇa devotion is of three kinds: tāmasa, rājasa and sāttvika. Tāmasa devotion is prompted by tama and motivated by envy, boastfulness and malevolence. Rājasa devotion is prompted by rajas and motivated by the desire for fame, wealth and worldly pleasures. Sāttvika devotion is prompted by sattva and motivated by the desire to destroy merits and demerits by dedicating all actions to God. Three kinds of saguṇa devotion are attended with knowledge of difference. Sattva is a pure impulse. Rajas is inferior to it. It is the spring of self-aggrandisement. Tamas is an evil impulse of aggression and destruction. It is inferior to rajas. Nirguna devotion is superior to saguṇa devotion. It is unmotivated, immediate and spontaneous. It is constant and uninterrupted devotion to God, which spontaneously surges up in the heart of a devotee187 Spontaneous and unmotivated devotion to God does not seek identity (ekatmatā) with him. It seeks service of God and action for his delight. It refuses to accept moksha in the form of residence in the abode of God, or proximity to him, or community in nature with him, or equality of divine powers, or identity with him. A devotee always takes delight in serving God.188 This unswerving devotion to God quickly produces detachment, knowledge and intuition of Brahma. It is not a blind sentimental emotion. It is enlightened by knowledge and selfless detachment. It leads to eternal communion with God and his service. Devotion is generated by hearing, chanting, repeating the name of God, and recollection of him. It is produced by egolessness, abstention from actions which lead to happiness, disinterested performance of specific duties (svadharma) and their dedication to God,

186 Ibid, i. 15-27, 33-34, 43-44; ix. 22-30.
187 Manogatir avicchimā ... lakṣaṇam bhaktiyogasya nirgnaṇasya ... ahaityukavyavahitā ya bhaktibh prasottama. Ibid, v. 11-12.
188 Ibid, v. 13; i. 32-34.
detachment and purity of mind due to niskāma karma. A life of devotion is a selfless life of service to God and mankind enlightened by integral knowledge and love.194


Bhakti or devotion is of the nature of intense love (parama prema) for God. It is single-minded, undivided, unswerving, manifested in thought, word, and action, and an end in itself. It is unalloyed love, which is not eclipsed by knowledge and action. It is of the nature of nectar or immortality (amṛta). Intense love for God makes one immortal. Its nature is as indescribable as the taste of a dumb person. It does not necessarily depend upon knowledge. It is both means and end. It is free from desire, which is directed to objects of enjoyment. It is of the nature of inhibition (nirodhā) of desires. Desires are not suppressed, but fulfilled in it.

In devotion all desires are directed to God, all passions are cherished for him, and all actions are dedicated to him. The sense-organs, mind, and intellect are directed to him; the whole being of a devotee is dedicated to him. His egoism and attachment are extinguished, desire and aversion are conquered, pleasure and pain are renounced. His mind is filled with lasting peace.

There are two kinds of devotion, secondary and primary. Secondary devotion is born of desire. It is sāttvika, rājas, and tāmasa, according as sattva, rajas, or tamas is predominant in it. Primary devotion has God only for its end. Though devotion is of one kind, it has eleven forms: love of the attributes and greatness of God, love of his beauty, love of his worship, love of recollection of God, love of a servant, a friend, a parent, and a wife for him, love of self-consecration to him, love of absorption in him, and love of separation from him. Nārada lays stress on constant servitude and constant wifely love for him. A devotee should rise above secondary devotion, and cultivate love and love alone for God. He should always strive after love of God alone. He should always pray to him with a single-minded devotion. God quickly reveals himself to the devotee, and fills him with his influence.

194 Ibid., viii. 23, 5-6; ix. 6.
Primary devotion makes one fulfilled, contented and immortal. All his desires are fulfilled in God. His hatred in burnt by his consuming love of God. He loves humanity and sentient creation. He becomes completely self-satisfied, absolutely quiet, and intoxicated with joy. He delights in his self (ātmarati) in communion with God. He feels his presence everywhere. He dedicates his whole being to him. He belongs to God, and not to himself. His only end of life is service of God.

Conquest of egoism, pride and other passions, direction of them to God, complete surrender of the human will to the divine will, humility in spirit, renunciation of worldly pleasures, shunning evil company, avoiding talks of sex, wealth, and atheists, regular study of the scriptures, constant thought of their teachings, performance of duties enjoined by them, observance of non-injury, truthfulness, kindness, purity of body and mind, faith in God, and cultivation of other excellences of character are the means to the attainment of devotion. Listening to and singing the attributes of God in the company of the devotees and constant prayer to God are the potent means to its attainment. The desire for prayer is awakened by the grace of God and his devotees.

Devotion is higher than knowledge, action and concentration of mind (yoga). Knowledge and action are actuated by egoism and pride. They cannot attract the grace of God. He shows his grace to a humble devotee, who surrenders his whole being to him. Devotion is its own end. It is the highest good. It is superior to knowledge, action and yoga. It fills the soul with peace and ecstasy of joy. It is open to all. There is no distinction of birth, family, wealth and the like among the devotees, since they all belong to him, and are filled with his spirit. 669

14. Śaṅḍilya Sūtra: The Cult of Devotion.

The philosophy of Śaṅḍilya as expounded by Svapneśvara is given here. Brahman or God is the infinite and eternal being, consciousness and bliss. His activity is natural and

spontaneous. He acts through the adjunct of cosmic nescience or māyā, which is never destroyed. Prakṛti is God’s unconscious power of māyā, through which he acts spontaneously, but he does not undergo any modification. He creates the world through māyā or prakṛti. Brahman is conscious. Prakṛti is unconscious. Brahman knows prakṛti, and acts upon it. It is the object of his knowledge and material of his creative activity. Both are real and interdependent. Both are the cause of the world. The world is real. Though it is an unconscious modification of prakṛti, it is of the nature of God in its essential nature. Māyā or prakṛti cannot be unreal, since it is God’s power and object of knowledge. Its modification, the world, is real. It is not a false appearance. God’s power is called māyā, since it is an object of knowledge like unconscious matter.

God incarnates in human form out of compassion for creatures for alleviation of their misery. He assumes a human body out of his own power of māyā. His body is not composed of the physical elements. It is produced out of his own power of māyā. The form of Kṛṣṇa is Para Brahman himself.

The self (ātman) is the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) of error and knowledge of truth, which are the attributes of manas. Knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are the modes of manas. They are not the modifications of the self, which is unchanging and immutable. Egoism also is a mode of manas. When it is destroyed, egoism disappears. The manas or buddhi is an adjunct of the jīva. It appears to know, feel, and will owing to its connection with buddhi, which is its limiting adjunct. Its bondage is due to lack of devotion (abhakti). It is not due to ignorance (ajñāna). Its release is due to primary devotion, which destroys the adjunct of buddhi, and makes it realize the eternal bliss of Brahman. Release is its natural state. Bondage is apparent and contingent upon

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Kartṛtvādeḥ paramesvarasya svābhāvyāt. Parasānya māyau-
203 jagata eva paramesvarātmatvāt. SSS., i. 1. 2.
204 Saktīvāṁ nāṁrīm vedyam. SSS., ii. 1. 42.
205 Tuccaktit māyā jājasāmānyāt. SSS., iii. 1. 88.
206 Jivaśārātvamā bhūtopādānakatvam. Api tu svamāyāsakti-
kṛtaṁ. SSS, ii. 1. 48. iii. 1. 52.
207 Paraḥkuttamātreyā buddher atyauntalaye sati brahmānandāvāpti-
laksāṇā muktih. SSS., iii. 2. 96.
its limitation by buddhi. God, being attracted by single-minded devotion of a devotee, destroys his buddhi completely, and makes him realize his inherent infinitude and eternal bliss. He is the cause of release. Knowledge of the self destroys the impurities of faith and purifies the mind. But it cannot destroy the limiting adjunct of buddhi. Svapneśvara regards the world as real, since it is a modification of prakṛti, māyā, or power of God. It is the object of his knowledge and manifestation of his power. God and the world are related to each other as subject and object. But Svapneśvara regards the individual self (jīva) as a limitation of Brahman by buddhi, which is its adjunct. When its determinant buddhi is destroyed, it realizes its inherent infinitude and eternal nature. It is destroyed by primary devotion through the grace of God. Svapneśvara's position is not like that of idealistic monism. He does not regard māyā as false or indefinable, and the world as a false appearance. But he regards the self as essentially divine and free, which appears to be bound owing to its association with buddhi and lack of devotion. Its bondage is not due to ignorance (ajñāna). It is released from bondage by primary devotion, which annihilates its determinant buddhi. Release is the realization of intrinsic divinity or identity with Brahman. This is the element of monism in Svapneśvara's philosophy.

Devotion is the most intense attachment for God. Attachment for earthly objects is transient. But attachment for God is abiding. Primary devotion is constant, intense, and uninterrupted love for God. It brings on immortality.

Devotion is not knowledge. Even a hater of God has knowledge of him, but no devotion. Devotion is attachment (rāga), which is opposed to hatred (dveṣa). When attachment for earthly objects is destroyed, attachment for God springs up. Wise persons surrender themselves to God after many births. Knowledge is followed by self-surrender (prapatti), which is devotion. Devotion is preceded by knowledge. It is not identical with knowledge. Knowledge purifies the mind. When

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207 SSS., iii. 2. 94-96. 98.
208 Jvānāṁ brahmabhāväpatīr muktīḥ.
209 Jvāsca brahmaśopātyantam abhinnāḥ, teṣāṁ saṁsāraṁ triguṇātma-kāntaḥkaraṇopādhibhātī na sāhajikaḥ. SSS., i. 1. 1.
210 Sā parāmrakāt īhäuser. SS., i. 1. 2.
211 SS., i. 1. 2-3.
it is purified, primary devotion wells up. Devotion produces knowledge of God.²¹¹

Devotion is not action. It cannot be produced by human effort and volition. What cannot be accomplished by human volition, is not an action. The fruit of an action is finite and transient. But the fruit of devotion is infinitude (ānāntyā) and eternal life. So devotion cannot be of the nature of an action.²¹²

Devotion is not faith (śraddhā). Faith or belief is a pre-condition of action. But devotion is not a means to action. It is an end in itself. It is the fruit of itself. It is unmotived love for God for his own sake.²¹³

Though devotion is attachment (rāga), it is not an evil. Attachment for earthly objects is an evil. But attachment for God is not an evil. The former is the cause of bondage. The latter is the cause of release.²¹⁴

Sāndilya divides devotion into primary devotion and secondary devotion. Secondary devotion is a means to primary devotion. Chanting the name of God, obeisance to him, worship of him, prayer to him, surrender of all actions to him, meditation on him, recollection of him, recitation of his mantra, and the like are secondary devotion. They destroy the impurities of mind, and purify it. These auxiliary acts please God, and through his grace generate primary devotion. Any one of them is strong enough to produce primary devotion, if it is practised continuously with firmness and ardour. Surrender of all actions to God leads to release. Right actions and wrong actions surrendered to God cannot produce merits and demerits, and bring about bondage. In fact, one who surrenders all actions to God, has no desire to commit sins.²¹⁵ Devotion of the distressed (ārta), devotion of the seeker of knowledge (jijnāsu), and devotion of the seeker of earthly good (arthārthi) are secondary devotion. Devotion of the wise (jñānīn), which is undivided, is primary. It is whole-hearted and single-minded devotion (ekāntabhāva). It leads to attainment of divinity (brahmacārya-pati). There is no distinction of caste or sex in the

²¹¹ BG., vii. 19; SS., i. 1. 46; i. 1. 9; i. 1. 15; BG., xviii. 55.
²¹² SS., i. 1. 7, 8.
²¹³ SS., i. 1. 24.
²¹⁴ SS., i. 1. 21.
²¹⁵ SS., SSS., ii. 2. 30, 38, 89, 63, 64.
²¹⁶ BG., vii. 43; SS., SSS., ii. 2. 72, 83, 94.
culture of devotion. Honour, excessive honour, thrill of joy of union, pangs of separation, aversion to anything but God, constant singing of his glory, preservation of life for him, the consciousness that all belong to him, the consciousness that all things are full of him, and absence of hostility towards him are the marks of devotion.

15. The Ethics of the Purāṇas.

Dharma is what is prescribed by the Vedas or commanded by God, approved by virtuous persons, approved by one’s conscience or pleasing to the self, and conducive to the good of all persons. Adharma is what is forbidden by the Vedas or God, disapproved by virtuous persons, disapproved by one’s conscience or displeasing to the self, and repugnant to the good of others. Dharma is what is prescribed by the Vedas and the Smṛtis. What is prescribed by the other Śastra is a semblance of dharma (dharmabhāsa). The Vedas are created by God. They are valid because they are free from ignorance. The Smṛtis elaborate the prescriptions of the Vedas, and are therefore valid. The Divine Law is the moral standard. Dharma is the root of good conduct; wealth is its branch; happiness is its flower; mokṣa is its fruit. Customary good conduct (sadācāra) produces merits. Sacrifices, charity and austerities cannot yield good to an individual, who violates customary good conduct. Caste duties (jātīdharma), duties to the country (desādharma), family duties (kula-dharma), and duties relating to one’s clan (svagotradharma) should not be violated. One should conform to the ethos of the people, and should not perform an action condemned by the society. Rigid sense-restraint, purity of mind, and altruistic virtues are emphasized. Happiness does not arise from gratification of desires. But it arises from control and regulation of desires. A person of vile conduct can never attain happiness here and hereafter. One should not commit mental, verbal and bodily sins, and should be pure in body and mind.

217 SS., SSS., ii. 2. 78. 218 SS., ii. 1. 44. 219 Nāradīya, i. 16. 220 Devigīta, viii. 15. 221 Ibid., viii. 16-20. 222 Bāṇamā, Calcutta, 1950, xiv. 19, 38, 39. 223 Ibid., xiv. 15-17; viii. 58-59.
not go to holy places. The Ātman is like a river. Sense-restraint is the holy place. Truth is its water. If a person of good conduct bathes in the Ātman, endowed with sense-restraint and control of mind, he is purified. The inner Self is never purified by water. So the supreme duty of a person is to be immersed in the joy of the knowledge of the Ātman. Realization of the Ātman is the highest good. Realization of one's intrinsic infinitude and perfection is the sumnum bonum. The virtues conducive to the inner purity of mind and the good of others are conducive to one's welfare in the next world.\footnote{Ibid., ch. 43, 24-26; ch. xv. 3.}

The body is the basis of acquiring wealth, happiness, virtue and mokṣa. So it should be tended with great care.\footnote{Dharmārthakāmamokṣanāṁ īśārum śādhanam. Brahma, Calcutta, 1316, ch. 228, 45.} A householder should pursue wealth, happiness and virtue in harmony with one another. They are not subversive of one another. They are favourable to one another. They are interdependent on one another. Wealth promotes happiness and virtue. Happiness furthers wealth and virtue. Virtue does not thwart wealth and happiness. It promotes them.\footnote{Dharmo dharmānbandhārtho dharmo nātmārthapādākāḥ. Brahma, ch. 221, 16. Ibid., ch. 221, 16, 14.} A householder should not perform the specific duties of an ascetic. A virtuous person is one who performs one's specific duties (svadharma) prescribed by the Vedas, desists from committing sins, and is free from evil desires. A vicious person is one who does not perform one's specific duties, commits sins, and is full of evil desires.\footnote{Padma, Calcutta, 1320, Kriyāyogasāra, ch. 16, 85-86.}

Truthfulness, kindness, calmness, and harmlessness are the four parts of dharma.\footnote{Satyam dayā tathā śāntir ahimsā dharmasyāvayavāḥ. Bhad- dharma, B.I., Calcutta, 1888, i, 44.} Truthfulness consists in speaking the truth, fulfilling promises, speaking agreeable words, service of the preceptor, rigid observance of vows, faith in God, company of virtuous persons, doing good to parents, purity of body, speech and mind, shame at immoral conduct, and absence of hoarding.\footnote{Ibid., ii, 2-4.} It consists in speaking the truth conducive to the general happiness. Mendacity consists in speaking falsehood.
conducive to the misery of all. Veracity should be in harmony with virtue, repugnant to vice, and conducive to the good of all (sarvalokahita). Mendacity is repugnant to all good. Disagreeable truth and agreeable falsehood should be discarded. Kindness consists in benevolence, modesty, humility, equal treatment with all, and speaking always with a smiling face. It consists in alleviating the sufferings of others. Calmness (sánti) consists in absence of envy, contentment with little, restraint of the senses, sex-restraint, silence, desire to worship God, fearlessness, gravity, firmness of mind, mildness, absence of greed, resoluteness, abstention from sins, equanimity in praise and blame, praise for others' excellence, patience, endurance, non-thieving, hospitality, repeating mantras, meditation, sacrifice, pilgrimage, service of the cultured, absence of jealousy, knowledge of bondage and release, disposition for asceticism, tranquillity in joys and sorrows, absence of self-abasement, and absence of ignorance. Peace (sánti) is contentment with little. Non-injury (ahíñsá) consists in steadiness in posture, non-oppression of others, reverence, hospitality, peaceful appearance, fellowship for all, and treating others as oneself. Harmlessness is non-injury to others in thought, word and deed. It is abstention from causing fear, anxiety, or pain.

Sweet speech, kindness, charity to worthy persons, entertaining pious persons, and prayer to God are the qualities of a virtuous person. Harsh speech, unkindness, miserliness, wrathfulness, company of vicious persons, dirtiness, and vile conduct are the qualities of a vicious person. Control of lust, anger, greed, delusion, pride, and envy, giving up falsehood, and injury to others, kindness, calmness, abstention from sins, equanimity in joys and sorrows, treating friends and foes alike, and prayer to God are the qualities of a virtuous person.

The sixfold yoga consisting of restraints (yama), moral observances (niyama), posture (āsana), breath-control (prāṇāyāma), withdrawal of the senses from their objects (pratyāhāra),

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230 Padma, Calcutta, 1320, Kriyāyogasāra, ch. 16, 44-45.
231 Nārādya, i. 16; 33, 77; Āgneya, ch. 372, 7-8.
232 Brhaddharma, ii. 4-5. Padma, ch. 16, 97.
233 Brhaddharma, ii. 6-10; Padma, ch. 16, 98.
234 Kāyena munasa vācch hiṣasā hiṣasā ca na cānyāthā. Skanda, Śūraśāṁhitā, ii. 13, 4. Nārādya, i. 33, 76; Brhaddharma, ii. 11-12; Āgneya, ch. 272, 5, 234.
235 Padma, Sṛṣṭikhanda, ch. 49, 129-32; ch. 16, 72, 73.
fixation of mind (dhāraṇa), meditation (dhyāna), and trance (samādhi) is enjoined. Different lists of yamas and niyamas are given. Āgneya Purāṇa includes non-injury (ahīṃsā), veracity (satya), non-stealing (asteya), sex-restraint (brahmacarya), and non-acceptance of unnecessary gifts (apigaraha) in the yamas. Patañjali gives the same list. Skanda Purāṇa enumerates ten yamas: non-injury, veracity, non-stealing, sex-restraint, compassion (dayā), sincerity (ārjaya), equanimity (kṣamā), firmness in true knowledge (dhṛti), temperance (mitāhara), and purity (śauca). Non-injury to other creatures in thought, word and deed is ahiṃsā. Sex-restraint consists in non-adultery in thought, word and deed, and in sexual intercourse with one’s wife for procreation of children only. It consists in living, moving and being in Brahman. Compassion consists in treating all creatures like oneself in thought, word and deed. Sincerity consists in treating one’s wife, sons, friends and foes alike in thought, word and deed. Equanimity consists in absence of agitation of mind, even when one is persecuted by foes in thought, word and deed. Firmness consists in knowing that release from bondage can be achieved by the knowledge of the Vedas. It is the knowledge that ‘I am Ātman’. Temperance consists in eating moderately, which is favourable to the practice of yoga. Bodily purity consists in washing the impurities of the body with water. Mental purity consists in knowing that the self is pure. Āgneya Purāṇa enumerates five moral observances (niyama) like Patañjali: purity (śauca), contentment (santoṣa), penance (tapas), study of the scriptures (svādhya), and worship of God (īśvarapāñjana). Purity is purity of body and mind both. Santoṣa is contentment with whatever is attained without effort. Penance is conquest of the mind and the senses. Worship of a deity is bodily penance. Extinction of attachment is mental penance. Repetition of the mystic syllable Om is svādhya. Repeating it 12000 times daily for one year will bring about revelation of Brahman to an aspirant.

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228 Āgneya, ch. 372, 2, 3; ch. 373, 1-12, 20; ch. 374, 3-13; ch. 375, 1-3; ch. 376, 1. Cp. VS., ii. 29.
229 Ibid, ch. 372, 2. VS., ii. 30.
charity, worship of God, listening to the Vedânta, shame at immoral actions (hri), faith in duties prescribed by the Vedas (mati), repetition of mantras (japa), and vows (vrata). Japa is verbal and mental. Verbal japa is inaudible and audible. Mental japa is superior to verbal one. Inaudible japa is better than audible one. Harmlessness, truthfulness, non-stealing, charity, forgiveness, sense-restraint, control of mind, generosity, purity and penance are the ten virtues, which are common to the four castes. The Purâṇas inculcate the inner purity of mind, universal benevolence and harmlessness. They forbid the egoistic qualities of self-conceit, boastfulness, self-glorification and self-aggrandisement, and extol the altruistic virtues of compassion, charity, forgiveness, harmlessness, and devotion to the good of all. Conquest of attachment (râga), absolute harmlessness, compassion for all creatures, absence of greed for wealth found even in a forest, non-adultery in thought, word and deed, and good will and love for all creatures are the qualities of a virtuous person. Cruelty to all creatures, greed for others' wealth, adultery in thought, word and deed, injury to others, and harbouring ill-will against others are the qualities of a vicious person. One who kills another creature, or causes another to kill it, or approves of the act, is guilty of killing. Virtue is purity of mind; it is not conformity of an overt action with an externally imposed law. It is excellence of character which is expressed in the pursuit of the good of all.

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444 Agneya, ii. 14. 2. Cp. Śāṅg, i. 2; Var., v. 14.
461 Agneya, iii. 20; xi. 23-24; xiv. 1-2.
441 Brahma, Calcutta, 1316, ch. 224, 6-10, 30-31, 36, 49-50, 54-55.
CHAPTER V

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GĪTĀS:
THE WAYS TO THE GOAL

The Vedas, the Upaniṣads, the Rāmāyaṇa, the Mahābhārata, and the Purāṇas are the foundation of Hinduism. The Gītā also are important religious treatises of the Hindus. The Bhagavat Gītā, which is a part of Bhīṣmaparva of the Mahā-
bhārata, is the most important of them. It is the most popular and authoritative work, and has several commentaries written by the Vedāntists of different schools. It is called the Gītā by the Hindus. It advocates dualistic monism, preaches the cult of Vāsudeva or Kṛṣṇa, and enjoins works (karmayoga), devotion (bhaktiyoga) and knowledge (jñānayoga) for the attainment of God. The other Gītās preach other cults, and enjoin either knowledge or devotion, and regard works as auxiliary to it. They owe their exposition of the methods of realizing God to the Bhagavat Gītā. They borrow their main ideas about sādhanā from it, and adapt them to their own cults. The Gaṇeśa Gītā is a conscious adaptation of the Bhagavat Gītā to the cult of Gaṇeśa, though it emphasizes identity of the finite self with the Absolute. It advocates monism, and prescribes the triple method of action, devotion and knowledge, laying stress on the knowledge of identity. The Aṣṭāvakra Gītā and the Asadhūta Gītā advocate absolutism (advaitavāda), and enjoin the knowledge of identity. They do not recognize the importance of works and devotion. The Sūrya Gītā advocates monism, preaches the cult of Sūrya, identifies him with Śiva, enjoins the knowledge of identity, and regards the performance of prescribed duties as auxiliary to knowledge. The Brahma Gītā, a part of the Skandapurāṇa, advocates absolutism, preaches the cult of Śiva, and prescribes the knowledge of identity. It gives an excellent summary of the monistic Upaniṣads, and attempts solutions to some ontological problems from the standpoint of pure monism like that of Gauḍapāda and Saṅkara. It has great philosophical importance. The Īśvara Gītā, a part of the Kūrmapurāṇa, advocates monism, identifies Para Brahma with Śiva, and
prescribes the knowledge of identity. The Śiva Gītā, a part of the Padma Purāṇa, preaches the cult of Śiva, advocates monism, and enjoins works, devotion and knowledge. The Devī Gītā, a part of the Devī Bhāgavata, preaches the cult of Śakti, the eternal conscious and blissful power of Brahman or Śiva, advocates monism, and prescribes the triple method. The Brahma Gītā, a part of the Yogavāsiṣṭha, advocates absolutism blended with Nāgārjuna’s nihilism, the Yogācāra’s absolute idealism, the subjectivism of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, and the Śaiva doctrine of Sāṇḍha. The philosophies of the Bhagavat Gītā and the Yogavāsiṣṭha are discussed in the second volume. The philosophies of the Brahma Gītā (Skanda Purāṇa), the Śiva Gītā, and the Devī Gītā have been considered along with the Purāṇas. The Yama Gītā, a part of the Viṣṇupurāṇa, the Yama Gītā, a part of the Nyāsihapurāṇa, the Kapila Gītā, a part of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, and the Pañcava Gītā preach the cult of Viṣṇu, Vāsudeva or Kṛṣṇa, and enjoin devotion with its auxiliary for the attainment of God. The Rāma Gītā advocates absolutism, prescribes the knowledge of identity, and regards works and devotion as auxiliary to it.


The Bhagavat Gītā teaches theism, and regards God as the supreme and perfect person (puruṣottama). He is Para Brahman, the holy, eternal, divine person. He is the supreme person (parama puruṣa). He is the foundation of the infinite and eternal Brahman, the eternal moral order, and supreme supersensuous bliss. The determinate Brahman or Iśvara is the foundation of the indeterminate Brahman. Iśvara is the concrete embodiment of Brahman or infinite and eternal being, consciousness and bliss. He is the infinite, eternal, subtle, inconceivable, omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent creator, preserver and destroyer of the universe. He is the self-luminous,

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1 Paraṁ brahma paraṁ dhāma pavitraṁ paramaṁ bhavān. Puruṣaṁ śāvatam divyam ādidevam ajām vibhum. Brahmān po hic pratiṣṭhāham amṛtasvāyavasya ca. Śāvatasya ca dharmaṁ sukhasyaikāntikasya ca. BG., x. 12; xiv, 27. Ibid. viii. 8. Brahmapo haṁ pratiṣṭhā prātimaṁ ghanibhūtahm brahmaivāhah, SSBG., xiv. 27.
trans-empirical Spirit, the Witness, the Seer of the empirical world composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. The whole world is pervaded by him through his subtle form, and sustained by him by a fraction.² He is transcendent and immanent in relation to the world. He is unequalled and unexcelled. He is the adorable preceptor, father, mother, grandfather, dear friend, and gracious redeemer from bondage. He is fond of his devotees. He is the protector of eternal dharma (śāyata-dharmagopta). He is the supreme destiny of man,—the ultimate goal of humanity. He is the ultimate ground and the supreme end of cosmic evolution and the history of humanity. He is the alpha and omega of existence. He is the ground of empirical being and non-being. He is the trans-empirical supreme person (puruṣottama) beyond Kṣara Puruṣa and Akṣara Puruṣa. The Kṣara Puruṣa is the infinite mobile Spirit, which is manifested in the corporate body of conscious embodied souls. The Akṣara Puruṣa is the infinite immobile Spirit, which transcends the infinite mobile Spirit. God, as Puruṣottama, transcends both, and yet he is not an abstract universal, but the concrete, determinate Spirit, the embodiment of eternal being, consciousness and bliss, and eternal dharma. He is the moral governor,³

Prakṛti is the material cause of the world. It is modified into the world under the guidance of God, who is its efficient cause. God has lower (apara) prakṛti composed of earth, water, light, air, ether, manas and buddhi,—which is the material cause of the physical and biological world and psychical entities. He has higher (para) prakṛti, which sustains the finite embodied souls. Unconscious prakṛti is the material cause of the universe. Conscious prakṛti is the sustainer of conscious souls. Lower prakṛti and higher prakṛti are the powers of God. So God is both material and efficient cause of the world and embodied

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² Viṣṇubhyāham idam kṛṣṇam ekāṁśena sthito jagat. BG., x. 42.
³ BG., vii. 6, 7; viii. 8, 9; ix. 4-6; x. 42; xi. 18, 38, 40, 43, 44. 
Pitāham asya jagato mātā dhātā pitāmaḥaḥ. 
Gatir bhūtā prabhūḥ sākṣi nivāsaḥ śāraṇaṁ saḥ. 
Prabhavaḥ pralayaḥ athāṁ saṁ nidadhām bhijam avyayam. 
Dvāviman puruṣau loke kṣaraśākṣara eva ca. 
Kṣaraḥ sarvāṁ bhūtāṁ kiṁstho'kṣaraṁ ucya. 
Yasmat kṣaram atito'ham aksarādapi cottomah. 
Ato'ami loke vede ca prathitaḥ puruṣottamaḥ. 
BG., ix. 17, 18; xv. 16, 18.
souls. He is the seed of all creatures. Rāmānuja's concepts of cit and acit as attributes of Brahman or Iśvara are developed from the concepts of parā prakṛti and aparā prakṛti of the Bhagavat Gītā. Prakṛti is God's māyā composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. They are products of prakṛti. Māyā is not an appearance. It is a real power of God. He creates various creatures out of his prakṛti according to their merits and demerits.

Prakṛti and puruṣa both are eternal. They are neither created nor destroyed. God is eternal. So prakṛti, the power of God, is eternal. But prakṛti is mutable while God is immutable. God is immanent in prakṛti, and transcends it.

The finite selves are the eternal parts of God. The body is limited by time and space, produced and destroyed. But the soul, that is embodied in it, is neither born nor destroyed nor limited by time and space. It is imperishable, immeasurable, unborn, immortal, infinite and eternal. It is inconceivable, inexpressible, immutable, and indissoluble by the physical elements. It is pervasive, eternal, static, immobile and inactive. It is a supra-organic, supra-mental, supra-intellectual, egoless spirit. It has pre-existence and future life, which are not perceived. Its embodied existence only is perceived. When its body is worn out, it discards the old body, and assumes a fresh body. It transmigrates from one body to another. The body has birth and death. But the soul is unborn and immortal.

The finite self (ātman) is an immaterial spirit. It transcends sattva, rajas and tamas, which are products of prakṛti. They are the basic springs of action. Sattva produces pleasure. Rajas

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*Mayādhyaṣṭa prakṛtāh sāvate sacarācaram.  
Hetumānena kaunteya jagad viparītavate.  
Bhūmirāpo'nalo vāyuh khan mano buddhir eva ca.  
Ahaṁkāra iti yam me bhinnā prakṛtir aṣṭādhaṁ.  
Apareyamitaśtvanyāṁ prakṛtim viddhi me parāṁ.  
Jivabhūtāṁ mahābāho yayedam dhāraye jagat.  
BG., ix, 10; vii. 4. 5. Ibid., vii, 10; xiv. 3.

* Daivi hyesā guṇamayī mama māyā duratyayā.  

* BG., ix. 8, 10.

* Prakṛtim puruṣah caiva viddhyanādī ubhāvapi.  
BG., xiii. 19.

* Mamavāṁśo jivaloke jivabhūtaḥ sanātanaḥ.  
BG., xv. 7.

* BG., li. 17-28, 30.  
Ajo nityah śāsvato'yaṁ parāpo  
Na hanyate hanyāmāne śarīre.  
Nityaṁ sarvagataḥ sthāṇur acala'yaṁ sanātanaḥ,  
Avyakto'yaṁ acintyo'yaṁ avikāryo'yaṁ ucayate.  
produces pain. Tamas produces delusion. Emotions and passions are the modifications of these three guṇas. Manas, buddhi and ahaṅkkāra are composed of the guṇas. The sense-organs also are composed of them. The sensible objects also are modifications of sattva, rajas and tamas. When the external and internal organs act on their proper objects, the guṇas act upon guṇas. The guṇas are actors. Or egoism (ahaṅkkāra) is the actor. It is the sense of T'. It is the empirical ego. But the Ātman, the transcendental ego, is the inactive witness or seer. It transcends the guṇas and their modifications. The embodied soul becomes free from sufferings due to birth, old age and death, when it transcends the guṇas, which produce its body. A person, who has transcended the three guṇas, is not moved by them, and remains an indifferent spectator of their functions. He becomes devoid of positive action (pravṛtti) and negative action (nivṛtti). He does not exert himself to realize an empirical end or abstain from an action to avoid an undesirable end. He transcends empirical knowledge derived through the sense-organs. He abides in the essential nature of his self (svastha) free from pleasure, pain and delusion. He is unperturbed by joy and grief, praise and blame, honour and dishonour. He is free from love and hatred, and equal to friend and foe. He is free from greed, and makes no distinction between a stone and a lump of gold. He gives up all actions for the fulfilment of egoistic desires.

All actions are actuated by sattva, rajas and tamas, which are psychical impulses and basic springs of action. Egoism (ahaṅkkāra) is a modification of the guṇas. It is the empirical ego. The Ātman is the trans-empirical self or pure spirit. It is immutable and therefore inactive. It is the seer (draṣṭā) or witness (sākṣin). It is eternally pure and autonomous. It erroneously identifies itself with egoism, and regards itself as an


11 Mānāpamāmāyasūvāyaśas tuṣya mitrāripakṣayaḥ. Sarvārambhāparītyaṁ guṇāṁśu sa ucyate.

BG., xiv, 19, 20; iii. 28.
active agent. It is deluded by the guṇas of prakṛti, and erroneously identifies itself with them and their modes, the mind-body-complex. It wrongly attributes the functions of the body, the sense-organs, manas, buddhi and ahaṅkāra to itself, though it is a pure spirit. Knowledge is the essence of the self. It is obscured by emotions and desires, which spring from the body, the sense-organs, mind (manas) and intellect (buddhi), which are its ground. Insatiable desire deludes a finite self, and obscures its knowledge. So the sense-organs should be controlled by the mind; the mind should be controlled by the intellect; the intellect should be controlled by the self (ātman), which transcends it. The sentient self should be controlled by the rational self. The rational self should be controlled by the transcendental or spiritual self, which is, in its essential nature, pure and free. The Bhagavat Gītā admits freedom of the will or reason from the empirical standpoint. The severe moral discipline inculcated by it for the attainment of union with God or perfection presupposes human freedom (puruṣakāra).

But from the ontological standpoint egoism (ahaṅkāra), which is the doer (kartā), is actuated by sattva, rajas and tamas, which constitute its stuff. Tamas is controlled by rajas. Rajas is controlled by sattva. But egoism cannot do away with the guṇas, which are its indestructible elements. The Ātman is the witness, seer, or knower. It transcends the objective order completely. When it ceases to identify itself with the body, life, mind, intellect and egoism, and completely isolates itself from them, and is not overpowered by sattva, rajas and tamas, it realizes its intrinsic freedom. It is autonomous. In this sense, the Bhagavat Gītā believes in empirical necessity and transcendental freedom. One who transcends the three guṇas com-

13 Prakṛteḥ kriyamāṇāni guṇāh karmāpi sarvāḥ. Ahaṅkāravimūḍhātmā kartāham iti manyate. BG., iii. 27.
14 Prakṛteḥ guṇasamāśaṅghāḥ sajjante guṇakarmasa. BG., iii. 29.
15 BG., iii. 37-40.
16 BG., i. 41, 42. cp. Kath. Up., i. 3. 3-4, 10-11.
17 Buddhāḥ param Buddhāḥ saṁstabhāyātmanām ātmanā.
18 Jātiḥ saṁrūhi mahābhāho kāmarūpati durāsadam. BG., iii. 43.
19 Uddhāraṇāt ātmanātmānasāt nātmānām avasādāyet.
20 Bandhur ātmanām tasya yenaḥ saṁstabhāyātmanā jītaḥ. BG., vi. 5, 8.
21 Prakṛtyayāva ca karmāpi kriyamāṇāni sarvāḥ. Yaḥ pāyati tathātmānam akartāram sa pāyati. BG., xiii. 29.
pletely, acquires community of nature with God, and shares in his freedom.\(^{18}\)

Prakṛti is the cause of pleasure and pain. Or the five cognitive organs, the five motor organs, manas, buddhi and ahaṅkāra, which are the modifications of prakṛti or sattva, rajas and tamas, are the causes of all mental modes. The finite self is their experciencer owing to its proximity to them and false identification with them, though it is immutable pure consciousness in its essential nature. It erroneously identifies itself with the modifications of the guṇas, is attached to them, and entangled in bondage. The association of the pure spirit with the unconscious mind-body-complex is the cause of its embodied life and transmigration. Its complete detachment and isolation from the guṇas and their modes brings about its release. When it ceases to identify itself with the mind-body-complex, and is not at all affected by the changes in the psychophysical organism, it realizes its intrinsic autonomy and purity. Complete transcendence of the three guṇas is the prerequisite of the realization of the transcendental freedom of the finite spirit.\(^{19}\)

God gives relative freedom to the finite souls by exercising which they do right or wrong actions and earn merits or demerits. God does not compel them to perform right actions or commit wrong actions. They reap the fruits of their actions in the shape of happiness and misery.\(^{20}\) God, their inner controller, does not experience them. He looks on as an impartial spectator. When the finite will is attuned to the divine will, and is motivated by the divine purpose, it consciously becomes an instrument of the divine will, and acts to realize the purpose of God.\(^{21}\)

Prakṛti and puruṣa both are uncaused and therefore eternal. Prakṛti is the power of God, and so eternal. Puruṣa or the

19 Kāryakāraṇakartrtye hetuḥ prakṛtrīrya ucayate.
Puruṣaḥ sukhaduhkhānāṁ bhoktrīrye hetuḥ ucayate.
Puruṣaḥ prakṛtistha hī bhūṅkte prakṛtijān guṇān.
Kāraṇān guṇasaṅgo'ṣaya sadasadyonijanmasa,
20 Paramātmā karmanispatān pradhānahetuḥ. Svayaṁ sa jīvātmā
tadāhitaśaktiṣaṁ san vucchayā prayaṇam āraḥha-te.
Tadantaravasthitaḥ paramātmā svānumatidāna tamaṁ pravartayate.
21 Hīnaṁ sarvabhūtānāṁ hṛdeṣe'ṛjuna tiṣṭhāti.
Bhirāmayan sarvatbhūtāṁ yantrāraṇāṁ māyāyā
B.G., xviii. 61. Ibid, xiii. 22.
finite soul also is a part of God and so eternal. Prakṛti is māyā composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. Māyā is the real power of God. It is not a false appearance. It is the superhuman power of creating diverse objects. The world is not a false appearance. The finite selves (puruṣa) also are ontological entities. They are eternal parts of God. They are not unreal appearances. They exist in God. He exists in them. He is their inner guide. He is not affected by their happiness and misery, even as ether is not affected by air which always exists in it. Sometimes the Gītā says: "The finite creatures exist in God, but God does not exist in them." The text means that God is the ground of the finite souls, which cannot exist apart from him; but that God is detached (asaṅga) from them, and consequently not affected by their experiences. The incorporeal finite self maintains its body, and remains attached to it through egoism (ahāṅkāra). So the incorporeal supreme Self or God maintains the embodied creatures in him, but he remains detached from them because he is devoid of egoism.

The finite selves are real and eternal parts of the infinite Self. They are not appearances due to avidyā. They are not produced by God. They are not destroyed by him. They are eternal spirits. They have community in nature (sādharmya) with God. When they completely dissociate themselves from their psychophysical vestments, they attain intimate union with him, and abide in him. The Yogi who worships one God in all creatures, exists in him. God resides in his devotees; they reside in him. These texts clearly show that the finite souls are eternal sparks of God, who consciously realize their essential community with him when they attain perfection. There is an inseparable relation between them. The finite souls also are inseparably related to one another. The Yogi intuits

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**Notes:**

32 Anāder āvarasya faktitvāt prakṛter anādītvam puruṣo'pi tadān- śatvād anādīreva. SSBG., xiii. 19.
34 Matsathāni sarvabhiḥfāni na cāhāṁ teṣvasthitāḥ. BG., ix. 4. Ibid, ix 6; viii. 22. SBG., RBG., SSBG., ix. 4.
35 SBG., ix. 5.
36 Idam ānṝnam upārītya mama sādharmyam āgaṇāḥ. BG., xiv. 2.
37 Yogi matsathāṁ adhigacchati. BG., vi. 15.
38 Sa yogi mayi vartate. BG., vi. 31.
39 Ye bhajanti māṁ bhaktyā mayi te teṣu cāpyaham. BG., ix. 29.
God in all creatures and all creatures in God. There is an inseparable relation of the finite souls and God to one another.

The Bhagavat Gitā believes in God of love and divine incarnation. Though he is unborn and infinite, and the transcendent Lord of all creatures, he assumes a human body by limiting his infinitude through his prakṛti or power of māyā. Whenever there is decrease of righteousness with triumph of unrighteousness, he incarnates in a human body. He is born as a human being,—a Saviour,—to protect the virtuous and destroy the vicious and re-establish the moral order. An Avatāra is a descent of God to man,—not an ascent of man to God. A human being, however perfect and holy, can never attain the status of a divine incarnation. God himself assumes a human body, and lives and acts like a human being with all its frailties, and fulfills his mission on earth. He brings down the ‘Kingdom of God’ on earth by cleansing the hearts of men of their impurities, narrowness and isolation, expanding and elevating them, and filling them with love and good-will for all. He spiritualizes their brute nature by infusing his boundless love into them. He is the incarnation of God of love and grace. He teaches men by example. His birth and actions are inconceivable. Ignorant persons despise him in his human form, because they do not know his divine nature in a human body. The supreme Lord of all creatures assumes a human body to redeem humanity from moral degradation and spiritual stupor and give them a glimpse of his unbounded love. Blessed are the few who know God in human form in his real nature through his grace. An Avatāra always comes before his age with a new message, and is misunderstood, calumniated and persecuted by his contemporaries. His message is understood by a few, and gradually

10 Sarvabhūtāstham ātmānām sarvabhūtānām cātmanān. Ikṣate yogayuktātmā sarvatra saṁadārṣṇah. Yo māṁ paśyati sarvatra sarvam ca mayi paśyati. Tasyāham na praṇaṣṭyānām sa ca me na praṇaṣṭyāti. 


12 Janma karma ca me divyam. 

13 Ayajjānati māṁ mādhā mānaṃ tu nānum āśritam. Parmāvām ajānanto mama bhūtamaheśvaram.
spreads and takes a firm hold on the hearts of men. He is the initiator of a new age. The idea of divine incarnation is common to many religions. "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us... full of grace and truth" Christianity believes in Jesus Christ as the Incarnation of God. Hinduism believes in Kṛṣṇa as an Incarnation of God.

The Bhagavad Gītā inculcates the threefold method of karmayoga, bhaktiyoga and jñānayoga. The yoga is union of the finite soul with God. The union can be accomplished through actions, devotion and knowledge. It is not partial union but complete union of the finite spirit with the divine spirit. It is complete transformation of the finite spirit into a conscious instrument of the divine spirit. It is transformation of the organic being, the vital being, and the mental being of a finite self. It is attunement of the human will to the divine will. It is single-minded devotion to God. It is immediate intuition of God in oneself and the universe. The union of the finite self with God can be effected through works, devotion and knowledge.

Karmayoga unites the human will with the divine will. One should always do one’s appointed duties. Action is better than inaction. Inaction is death. Action is life. None can remain inactive for a single moment. He cannot but act for the preservation of his life. One is compelled to act by one’s organic needs and psychical impulses. Every individual is born with certain aptitudes and predispositions which constitute his innate nature (svabhāva), and determine his station in the society. His special vocation (svakarma) in life is determined by his native endowment (svabhāva). He ought to perform his specific duties for the sake of duty, which fit in with his native abilities. He can attain his highest personal good thereby, and contribute to the social good. He worships God through his own specific duties. "All work is worship." It

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44 The Bible: St. John’s Gospel, i. 14.
45 Niyataṁ karaṁ karaṁ tvaṁ karaṁ jāyā yo hyakarmaṇaḥ. Sarīrayātra vai ca te na prasiddhyed akarmaṇaḥ. BG., iii. 8.
46 Na hi kaścit kṣaṇam api jātu tāguḥkṣyayakarmakṛt. BG., iii. 5. Ibid, xviii. 11.
47 Kāryate bhavaṁ karma sarvaṁ prakṛtiṣyair guṇaṁ. BG., iii. 5.
48 Sve sva karmayabhiraṁ saṁsiddhiṁ labhate naraṁ. Svakarmaṇa tasmabhṛteva siddhiṁ vindati mānaṁ. BG., xviii. 45-46.
is better to perform one’s own specific duties imperfectly than to perform another’s specific duties.38 One should always do one’s specific duties, and should not discard them even if they are tainted with faults.40 It is better to die in performing one’s appointed duties than to perform some other’s specific duties. It is dangerous to arrogate to oneself some other’s works.41 One is bound to prove a misfit in another’s field of action. There are different classes of men with different native endowments (guṇa) in the society. Their vocations (karma) differ according to their different qualities (guṇa). The Brāhmaṇas are teachers and priests, because sattva predominates in their nature. The Kṣatriyas are soldiers, because rajas predominates in their nature, to which sattva is subordinate. The Vaiṣṇavas are peasants and traders, because rajas predominates in their nature, to which tamas is subordinate. The Śūdras are servants of the higher classes, because tamas predominates in their nature, to which rajas is subordinate.42 Each class of persons ought to do its own duties, and refrain from meddling with others’ duties. “Each individual”, says Plato, “should pursue that work in this city for which his nature was naturally most fitted, each one man doing one work. . . . Our classes are three, meddling among them is the greatest of injuries to the city, and might justly be described as the extreme of evil-doing. . . . When one of the warriors aspires to the counselling and guardian class when he is unworthy of it, such meddling among those classes is death to the city.”43 The Hindu concept of four classes anticipates Plato’s concept of different classes of men in the society with different duties for the highest social good. It is the clear duty of a Kṣatriya or a soldier to fight a just battle. He has no other higher duty. He should die fighting the enemy rather than fly from the battle-field.44 The Bhagavat Gītā anticipates Bradley’s conception of “my station and its duties.” Every person is born with particular aptitudes

38 Śreyaṁ svadharmo vigūṇaṁ paradharmatvat svanuṣṭhitat. BG., xviii. 47; iiii. 35.
39 Sahajam karma kaunteya sadogam api na tyajet. BG., xviii. 48.
40 Svadharme nīdhami śreyaṁ paradharmo bhavyāvaḥ. BG., iiii. 35.
41 Cāturvāryṇām mayā sṛṣṭām guṇakarmavibhāgaḥ. BG., iv. 13. SBG., iv. 13. BG., xviii. 41.
42 The Republic. Every Man’s Library, 1950, pp. 120-21.
43 Dharmakāyādhi yuddhācchreṇyeyat kṣatriyasā na vidyate. BG., ii. 31.
in a social environment. His specific duties are strictly determined by his particular station in the society. He should perform these duties faithfully to realize his highest personal good and the general good. A person’s station is determined by his innate aptitudes. So his specific duties (svadharma) are determined by his native constitution (svabhāva). This ethical teaching of the Bhagavat Gītā, Plato and Bradley is in keeping with the teaching of modern psychology. The Gītā enjoins the performance of specific duties (svadharma) for the good of humanity (lokasamgraha) and attainment of God (bhagavatprāpti), while Bradley enjoins the performance of duties appropriate to one’s station in the society for self-realization or realization of the infinite self.

A person ought to perform his appointed duties for the sake of duty without attachment or aversion and any desire for enjoying their fruits.\(^4\) He ought to renounce all desires for their fruits, which are not within his control. He has right to actions but not to their fruits. So he ought to renounce the fruits of his actions, and perform his specific duties with perfect detachment. A person, who hankers after fruits of his actions, is an object of pity.\(^4\) He ought to perform his duties in a disinterested spirit without egoistic desires. One who is attached to fruits of one’s actions is bound by his attachment. But one who has no desire for fruits of one’s actions, and who renounces them to God enjoys freedom and peace.\(^4\) A person ought not to be actuated by love or hatred, anger or fear, joy or sorrow. He ought not to be impelled by feelings, emotions and passions, which belong to his mental being, and are foreign to his spiritual being. All base emotions and passions such as envy, greed, boastfulness, hypocrisy, malevolence, harmfulness, lust, greed, pride and the like ought be conquered.\(^4\) He ought to cultivate equanimity unperturbed by joy or sorrow. He ought not to be

\(^4\) Kāryam ityeva yat karma niyataṁ kriyate'ṛjuna.
Saṅgam tyaktvā phalaṁ caiva sa tyāgaḥ sāttvika matalḥ.

BG., xviii. 9. Ibid, ii, 51; iii. 8, 19; v. 12; vi. 1, 2, 4;
xii. 11, 12; xvii. 25; xviii. 2, 6, 7, 11, 23.

\(^4\) Karmayevadwikāraste mā phaleṣu kādācāna.
Mā karmaphalahetur bhur mā te saṅgo’s tvakarmanī.
Kṛpaṁ phalabhātavāḥ. Ibid, ii, 49.

\(^4\) Yuktaḥ karmaphalām tyaktvā sāntim āpraty naiṣṭhikam.
Ayuktah kāmakāreṇa phale sakto nibadhyate. BG., v. 12.

\(^4\) BG., xii. 15, 17, 18; xvi. 3, 10, 12, 16-18, 21; xviii. 53.
eled by the smile of fortune, or depressed by the frown of misfortune. He ought to cultivate an unruffled temper of tranquillity. He ought not to be perturbed by praise or blame, joy or grief. He ought to cultivate equality (samatva), impartiality, or dispassionate attitude. He ought to be equal to friend and foe. Egoistic desires for success or failure, pleasure or pain, victory or defeat, profit or loss, glory or inglory should be conquered. Egoistic desires should be conquered. Egoism or the sense of 'I' and 'mine' should be eradicated. One who renounces all selfish desires, who lives a selfless and desireless life devoid of egoism, acquires peace. One who runs after various objects of desire never knows peace. But one who is unperturbed by desires and unruffled like a deep ocean acquires peace. Selfish desires ought to be sublimated. Altruistic desires ought to be cultivated. Narrow love for wife, sons and family should be transcended. Universal love should be cultivated. The good of all creatures (sarvabhūtalita) and welfare of humanity (lokāsāṁgraha) should be the ends of actions. Those who are engaged in doing good to humanity and sentient creatures attain God. "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it, but whosoever shall lose his life, the same shall save it." Janaka and others attained perfection through actions only. So one should do good to humanity. One who is devoid of enmity to all creatures undoubtedly attains God. The Bhagavat Gītā does not inculcate the eradication of all desires. It enjoins sublimation of egoistic desires into altruistic desires. It does not enjoin a feelingless and desireless life of inaction. Renunciation of actions is not true renunciation (sannyāsa). It

"Samaḥ śatru ca mitre ca tathā mānāpamānayoḥ.
Sītoṣṇaśukhādhiṁ keṣāṃ samah saṅgavivartitaḥ.
Mānāpamānayoṣṭūlayastulyo mitrāripaśayoḥ.
BG., xii. 18; ii. 57; xii. 17; xiv. 25. Ibid, xiv. 24.

"Sukhādhiṁ keṣāṃ kṛtvā labhālabhāna jayājayaṁ.
Sīdhvāsiddhyoḥ samo bhūtvā samatvam yogam ucyate.
BG., ii. 38, 48. Ibid, iv. 22; xii. 13, 17, 19.

"Vihāya kāmān yaḥ sarvān pumāntācarati utṣprḥaḥ.
Nirvāma nirahāṅkāraḥ sa śāntim adhisaccati.
BG., ii. 71. Ibid, ii. 70.

"Asaktir anabhāyaṅgāḥ putradārgrāhādiṣu.
BG., xiii. 9.

"Te prāpnuvanti mām eva sarvabhūtahиe ratāḥ.
BG., xii. 4. Ibid, v. 24.

BG., iii. 20.

"Nirvāraḥ sarvabhūteṣu yaḥ sa mām eti pāṇḍava.
BG., xi. 55."
never leads to perfection. Renunciation of fruits of actions to God is true renunciation. Renunciation of prudential duties for the fulfilment of egoistic desires is said to be true renunciation. One’s appointed duties relating to one’s station in the society should never be renounced. Renunciation of one’s specific duties owing to delusion is prompted by tamas. The performance of one’s specific duties without attachment and desire for fruits is true renunciation. The performance of the specific duties without attachment and aversion and desire for fruits is the best of actions. Such actions should be dedicated to God. One attains perfection by doing one’s specific duties with detachment, and worships God by dedicating them to him. All actions should be dedicated to God, and lust, anger, conceit and other base passions should be sublimated by diverting them to him.

The Gītā ethics is ethics of activism (karmayoga). It is not ethics of inaction or renunciation of action (sannyāsa). It does not teach anti-social escapism. Both renunciation (sannyāsa) and discharge of duties with detachment are conducive to the highest good. The life of action is better than renunciation. The ethics of the Bhagavat Gītā is not ascetism, but perfectionism. The highest good of an individual is God—realization though selfless pursuit of the good of humanity (lokasaṅgraha). The Gītā enjoins a life of dedication of all actions to God. All actions should be performed as service to God. Whatever action is done, whatever is eaten, whatever is offered in a sacrifice, whatever is given in charity, whatever penances are undergone, should be dedicated to God.

Na karmāṇām anārambhāṃ naiṣkarmyaṃ puruṣo ‘ṃnte.
Na ca samīṣmaḥ eva siddhiṃ samadhi-gacchati. BG., ili. 4.
Kāmyāṇāṁ karmāṇāṁ nyāsām samīṣmaḥ kavyaṇaḥ viduḥ.
Sarvakarmaphalatvāṇi prābhuh tyāgam vicākṣapaḥ. BG., xviii. 2.
Niṣatasya tu samīṣmaḥ karmajyo nipapadyate.
Mohīḥ tasya parityāgasya tamasaḥ parikṛtītaḥ. BG., xviii. 7.
Yastu karmaphalatvāgyi sa tyagītyabhidhīhyate.
BG., xviii. 11. Ibid., xviii. 9.
Niṣatāni saṅgārahitam arāgadveṣataḥ kṛṣṇam.
Aphalapreṣṇūnā kāma yat tath sāttvikam ucyate. BG., xviii. 23.
Tadarpitākhalācārah san kāmakrodhābhīhāmundikāṃ tasminneva karānīyam. NBS., 65. BG., xviii. 45, 46.
Samīṣmaḥ karmayogācaṁ niḥśreyasakara-vahūn.
Taveṣu karmasamīṣmaḥ karmayoḥ viśiyate. BG., v. 2.
Yat karoṣi yad aṣṭāni yajjuhoṣi dadāsi yat.
Yattapasyaṇi kaunteya tūt kuruṣva madarpanam. BG., ix. 27.
dedicating all actions to God, which are done without attachment, one is never tainted with sins. He lives a detached life dedicated to and sanctified by God.46 He lives, moves and has his being in God, dedicating all actions to him mentally, without feeling that he is the agent of any action.46 He lives a life of dedication.

There is some similarity between the Gītā ethics of niṣkāma karma and Kant's ethics of duty for duty's sake. Both enjoin the performance of duties for the sake of duty without being actuated by love, hatred, fear, anger, greed and other emotions. Both enjoin the performance of duties without any desire for fruits or any consideration of ends and consequences. Both are anti-hedonistic and anti-utilitarian. So far they resemble each other. But they differ in some essential points. First, the Gītā regards the attainment of God as the highest good.47 Duties ought to be done for the realization of God. Kant regards the good will or the rational will as the highest good. The good will is the will following the categorical imperative, which is unconditionally obligatory. Kant does not regard the realization of God as the highest good. Secondly, Kant's categorical imperative is an impersonal moral law. But the Gītā regards the Śāstras as the source of right and wrong actions.48 They are commands of God. So the moral law is a command of God. Thirdly, the Gītā enjoins the performance of duties for the welfare of humanity (lokaṇaṅgṛaha). Duties ought to be performed for the good of all creatures (sarvabhūtaḥita). The good (hita) is not happiness but moral good. The highest personal good is the highest social good. It is conducive to the attainment of God. But Kant enjoins the performance of duties for the sake of duty only. The categorical imperative or moral law is unconditionally obligatory. It is an end in itself. It is not a means to a higher good. Kant’s ethics is jural or legal, while the Gītā ethics is teleological. Kant lays stress on the

46 Brahmaṇyādāya karmāṇi saṅgatī tyaktvā karoti yaḥ. Ėppaye na sa pāpena padmapatram ivāmbhāṣā. BG., v. 10.
48 BG., xii. 4; xvii. 46.
BG., xvi, 23, 24.
concept of right and duty. The Gitā lays emphasis on the concept of good. It regards good as superior to right. God-realization is the highest good. The good of humanity and perfection of a person are subordinate to it. Fourthly, Kant’s ethics is ascetic, while the Gitā ethics is not ascetic. Kant enjoins extirpation of all feelings and emotions except respect for the moral law. But the Gitā enjoins the cultivation of goodwill and love for all creatures, compassion for the distressed, forgiveness for the guilty, faith in and devotion to God, though it enjoins the subjugation of attachment, aversion, delusion, lust, fear, anger, grief, hatred, envy, malevolence, ill-will and other base emotions.49 It teaches the ethics of God-realization through selfless service of humanity. Fifthly, Kant does not recognize the specific duties of different groups of persons (svadharma). But the concept of svadharma as determined by one’s innate endowment (svabhāva) is the central concept of the Gitā ethics. Lastly, the Gitā believes in super-moral perfection of the finite self, which transcends virtue and vice, merit and demerit.50 But Kant regards virtue, good will, or rational will as the highest good, and virtue in harmony with happiness as the complete good. He does not believe in super-moral perfection of the finite self. So the ethics of the Gitā essentially differs from that of Kant.

The Bhagavat Gitā stresses the purity of the mind, the inner purity of motives and intentions. It condemns ritualism and ceremonialism. The sense-organs should be controlled and withdrawn from immoral objects. All actions of the sense-organs and the vital forces should be controlled by the Self (ātmān). The vital forces should be regulated by breath-control, and the organism should be made a fit medium for furthering spiritual life by rigid observance of temperance. The sacrifice of knowledge (jñānayajña) is better than the sacrifice of clarified butter to fire (dravyayajña). The sacrifice of the utterance of the name of God (svādhyāyayajña), the sacrifice of knowledge (jñānayajña), the sacrifice of austerities (tapoyajña), and the sacrifice of meditation (yogayajña) are better than physical sacrifices (dravyayajña) with articles like ghee, incense and the like. They

49 BG., iii. 20; v. 25, 26, 28; xi. 55; xii. 13, 15, 16; xiii. 7-9; xvi. 2-4.
50 Buddhīyukto jahātiha ubhe sukṛtaṃdūṣkṛte. BG., ii. 50. Ibid, ix. 28.
purify the mind, enlighten it with knowledge, and purge it of all vices. The true sacrifice is the sacrifice of all actions, bodily, verbal and mental,—to God. One attains the eternal Brahman by sacrificing all actions to God and living on whatever he gets by his grace.71

Bhaktiyoga is the union of the finite soul with the supreme Soul through devotion. Bhakti is the most intense attachment or supreme love for God. It is of the nature of nectar which makes one immortal. Love for God is ineffable. It is indescribable like the taste of a dumb person. It is single-minded and unswerving devotion to God.72 Sraddhā is faith in God. It culminates in bhakti. There are four classes of devotees, the distressed, the inquisitive, the selfish, and the wise. The distressed devotee prays to God for deliverance from distress. The inquisitive devotee prays to him for knowledge of his nature. The selfish devotee prays to him for the gratification of his desires. The wise devotee knows the nature of God and prays to him for his sake. He has single-minded and undivided devotion to him, and is ever united with him. He is excessively dear to God.73 Devotion is undivided love for God untainted by any selfish motive. It involves constant thought of God and dedication of all actions to him. God is easily accessible to one who constantly thinks of him, surrenders himself completely to him, takes shelter in him, and gives up his whole being to him.74 God cannot be attained by the study of the Vedas, austerities, charity or sacrifices. He can be attained by single-minded devotion only.75 Devotion generates knowledge of God. The devotee knows God through devotion and enters into him.76 He undoubtedly enters into him through supreme

71 Yajñasīstāmṛtabbhujopā yanti brahma sanāta nan.
72 Mām ca yo vyābhicāreṇa bhaktiyogena sevate. BG., xiv. 26. Sā parānuraktirāvare. SS., i. 1. 2.
Sā taśmin paramapremarūpā. Amrtaśvarūpā ca.
Anirvacanīyam premasvarūpam. Mākāsvadānavat. NBS., 2, 3, 51, 82.
73 Arto jīnāsūr ardhārthā jñānti ca bhāratarasaḥ.
Teṣām jñāṇi nityayuktā ekabhaktir viśiṣyate. BG., vii. 16, 17.
74 Anayaacetāḥ satatam yo mām sāmaratī nityaṁ.
Tasyaḥ naśaḥ jñānaḥ pariṣṭhā nityayuktasya yogīnaḥ.
75 BO., xil. 53, 54; xil. 2, 6; xvii. 56-58, 62, 65, 66.
76 Bhaktāṁ maṁ abhirājānti yāvāṁ yaścāmi tattvataḥ.
Tato maṁ tattvato jñātvā viśate tadanantaram. BG., xviii. 55.
devotion." His manas is fixed on God; his buddhi is concentrated on him; his will is surrendered to him; his whole being is dedicated to him. All his actions are consecrated to him. The finite spirit is resigned to God, and suffused with the divine spirit. It enters into the infinite Spirit, and the infinite Spirit enters into it. Devotion brings about complete union of the finite spirit with the infinite Spirit. There is ingress of the finite spirit into the infinite Spirit, and of the infinite Spirit into the finite spirit. God is fond of his devotee. Devotion is expressed in self-surrender (prapatti) to God and taking shelter in him (śaraṇāgati). Those who take refuge in God can cross the impassable ocean of māyā composed of sattva, rajas and tamas, realize their trans-empirical spiritual nature, and attain mokṣa through his grace. Mokṣa is affinity with God, eternal peace, infinite bliss. Lord Kṛṣṇa says: "Give up all dharmas and take refuge in me alone. Grieve not. I will deliver thee from all sins." Constant utterance of the name of God (japa) and chanting his glory (kīrtana) generate primary devotion.

Jñānayoga is the union of the finite self with the infinite Self through intuition. There are three degrees of knowledge. Tāmasa knowledge is the knowledge of the body as the self (ātman) or an image as God or the infinite Self. Both body and image are finite and material effects. They can never be identical with the self and God respectively, that are uncaused and pervasive. Rājasa knowledge is knowledge of the finite selves in different bodies as absolutely different from and unrelated to one another without any unity. Sāttvika knowledge is the knowledge of one undivided supreme Self in different bodies and material objects. The three degrees of knowledge

"Bhaktiṁ mayi pariṁ kṛtvā māmevaśyatyāsamyāṁśayah; BG., xviii. 68.
"Mayyarpitamohadibuddhir yo madbhaktaḥ sa me priyah.
Mayyeva mana śadhatva mayi buddhiṁ niveśaya.
Nivāsīyasi mayyeva ata ārddhvaṁ na saṁśayah.
Ye bhajanti māṁ bhaktyā mayi te teṣu cāpyaham.
BG., xii. 14, 8; ix. 29.
"Māmeva ye prapadyante māyāṁ etāṁ taranti te.
"Sarvadharmāṁ parityayā mayaṁ ekaṁ śaraṇāṁ braja.
Ahaṁ tvāṁ sarvapāpebhya mokṣāyam avyayaṁ ma śacaḥ.
BG., xviii. 66. Ibid., xviii. 62, 65.
"BG., x. 25; ix. 14.
"Sarvabhūteṣu yenaikāṁ bhāvaṁ ayavayam ikṣate.
Adbhaktad udbhaktēṣu taj jānaṁ viddhi sāttvikam.
BG., xviii. 20. Ibid, xviii. 21, 22. BG., SSBG., xviii. 20-22.
roughly correspond to common knowledge, scientific knowledge and philosophical knowledge. The sāttvika knowledge is the knowledge of unity in plurality with stress on unity. It is integral knowledge. God is one and undivided and still exists in diverse creatures as if divided.\textsuperscript{43} God is the one knower of the universe. But he appears to be multiplied in diverse created beings, gods, men and beasts, being finitized by their bodies. He is one as cause, but he appears to be divided in the variety of effects.\textsuperscript{44} The Yogin unites his self with Brahman with a completely pacified mind untainted by all impurities, and enjoys perennial bliss. He acquires a mystic vision of the supreme Self or God in all creatures and all creatures in God, enters into life eternal, and abides in him.\textsuperscript{45} This intuitive knowledge can be acquired by complete transcendence of sattva, rajas and tamas and complete mastery over the senses and the manas. It depends upon extirpation of all egoistic desires and base emotions and passions. It depends upon the complete withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects, and the inner harmony of spirit (prasāda) due to complete self-mastery and destruction of attachment and aversion. Wisdom (prajñā) dawns on the intellect concentrated on God. Wisdom brings on peace, when egoism is destroyed. Firm wisdom or integral knowledge leads to abiding in God (brāhma sthiti). It brings on extinction of egoism in Brahman (brahmanirvāṇa) after death. It leads to intimate union with God.\textsuperscript{46} The saving knowledge cannot be acquired without rigid self-control and moral discipline. The Gītā teaches integral union of the finite spirit with the infinite Spirit through works, devotion and knowledge.

\textbf{2. Pure Monism: Jñānayoga.}

The Gāṇeśa Gītā advocates absolutism, and prescribes jñānayoga with action and devotion auxiliary to it. Gāṇeśa is

\textsuperscript{43} Avibhaktām ca bhūteṣu vibhaktam iva ca sthitam. \textsuperscript{44} Bhūteṣa kāraṇātmanā' bhinnam kāryātmā vibhaktam bhinnam iva sthitam. \textsuperscript{45} Bhūteṣa kāraṇātmanā' bhinnam kāryātmā vibhaktam bhinnam iva sthitam. \textsuperscript{46} Bhūteṣa kāraṇātmanā' bhinnam kāryātmā vibhaktam bhinnam iva sthitam.

BG., xiii. 16.

SSBG., xiii. 16. RSBG., xiii. 16.

\textsuperscript{49} BG., ii. 45, 55-72.

BG., vi. 29. Ibid, vi. 28-31.
Para Brahman or the infinite, eternal, unmanifest, immeasurable, immutable, all-pervading consciousness and bliss. He is Iśvara, the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. He creates it with the aid of māyā or prakṛti composed of sattva, rajas and tamas in sport. It is the power of God, which deludes all creatures. Iśvara is the protector of dharma, the inner guide of all finite selves, and the Witness of their actions, but not their experancer. Brahman transcends the Kṣara Puruṣa or the universe of the five material elements and the Akṣara Puruṣa beyond it. He is devoid of the guṇas, but rules over them. He is devoid of the sense-organs, but manifests and knows all sensible objects. He is one infinite Self, but appears to be manifold. He is detached, absolute, and beyond māyā. But he appears to be finite empirical selves (jīva) limited by the adjuncts of the mind-body-complexes made of sattva, rajas and tamas. Para Brahman can be realized through integral knowledge (vijñāna) or identity-consciousness (abhedabuddhi). Gaṇeśa is Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva, Śakti and Śūrya. He is Sadāśiva, Mahāviṣṇu and Mahāśakti. Yoga is knowledge of their identity.

Yoga is the union of the finite soul with Brahman through complete absorption of the mind in him. It is constant experience of Brahman or supreme bliss. It is not union with fortune, kingdom, sovereignty, heaven, or immortality. It can be accomplished through meditation. Ignorance (ajñāna) is the cause of bondage. Knowledge (jñāna) is the cause of release. Knowledge of identity is revealed to a person who has destroyed ignorance by discriminative knowledge (viveka), perfectly controlled his senses and mind, conquered passions, expelled all doubts, and delights in Ātman only.

Ignorant persons perform their duties with a knowledge of difference and desire for fruits, and are bound to saṁsāra. Actions motivated by egoistic desires are the cause of bondage. But actions performed without attachment and desire for fruits purify the mind, generate identity-consciousness, and make for
release. The knowledge of difference should be transcended. Attachment, desire and egoism should be eradicated. All actions should be dedicated to God with knowledge of non-difference. Detached actions for the good of humanity (sarvabhūtaḥita) and social cohesion (lokasaṃgraha) dedicated to God without egoism lead to perfection and knowledge of identity. Renunciation of all egoistic desires and egoism generates true knowledge. Niṣkāma karma purifies the mind, and prepares it for the dawn of identity-consciousness. Superconscious trance (tūryāvasthā) leads to embodied release. A true karmayogin with knowledge of identity becomes Brahmān.⁴⁴

Devotion to God also is auxiliary to knowledge. A devotee lives for God, does all actions for him, destroys attachment and anger, and treats all as equal. He worships God with unswerving devotion, and does good to humanity and sentient creation. Sūka, Sanaka, Nārada and others attained God through devotion only. Mental worship of God with single-minded sāttvika devotion is better than external worship with flowers, fruits, and articles of food. Unconscious mental worship is better than conscious voluntary worship. Constant utterance of the name of God (japa), self-surrender to God, taking shelter in him, dedication of all actions to him, meditation on him, and consecration of the self to him generate primary devotion. Devotion generates knowledge. Knowledge generates identity-consciousness through the grace of God. Aversion to worldly pleasures, dispassion, the company of holy persons, the repeated practice of yoga, and the grace of a spiritual guide are favourable to devotion.⁴⁵

The Śūryagītā advocates pure monism, and prescribes jñāna-yoga and karmayoga. Para Brahmān is one infinite, eternal, indeterminate consciousness. Īśvara is a reflection of Para Brahmān on cosmic nescience (māyā) with pure sattva. Avidyā is a fragment of māyā. Jīvas are reflections of Brahmān in avidyās. Brahmān is inactive. But Īśvara is active. He is the omniscient and omnipotent creator of the world. Īśvara is not bound by māyā. He is superimposed on Brahmān. Māyā and avidyā are produced by Brahmān's power of consciousness.

⁴⁴GG., ii. 8-9, 20, 25, 26; iii. 13, 14; iv. 6, 9-11, 24; vii. 21, 22; ix. 12, 13; xi. 34.
⁴⁵GG., iii. 14, 47; vi. 27; vi. 29; vii. 8-11, 16-18, 20-23; viii. 26; ix. 4, 10, 35; xi. 18; v. 22, 23.
cit-śakti). Jivas are bound to empirical life by impure actions due to avidyā. They are released by pure actions due to vidyā. Sūrya is the knower of all actions and their fruits, merits and demerits. God impels jivas to act. Jivas act with relative freedom granted by God. Brahma is the ground of Iśvara who is dependent. Brahma is Śiva.44

Impure actions actuated by egoistic desires are the cause of bondage. Actions prescribed by the Vedas produce merits. Actions forbidden by them produce demerits. Merits and demerits are the cause of saṁsāra. Meritorious actions actuated by desire for fruits cannot purify the mind. Extirpation of egoistic desires produces purity of mind. Niśkāma karma purifies the mind, and facilitates the dawn of true knowledge. The study of the Śāstras which teach mokṣa is conducive to desirelessness (naiṣkāmya). Experience of happiness and misery produces aversion to the world. Discrimination produces detachment and desirelessness. Detachment produces thirst for knowledge. Listening to the Śāstras, reflection and meditation produce integral knowledge of Brahma. It brings about release, which is the existence of the self in its essential nature.45

At the first dawn of knowledge empirical duties for the fulfilment of desires (kāmya karma) are renounced. The occasional duties (naimittika karma) are renounced when the second integral knowledge (samyagjñāna) emerges. The daily obligatory duties (nitya karma) are renounced when the third perfect knowledge (pūrpa jñāna) arises. The specific duties relating to castes and stages of life are renounced when the fourth knowledge of non-duality (advaitabodha) dawns. The performance of daily obligatory duties and occasional duties with knowledge of identity brings on gradual release (kramamukti). The performance of daily obligatory duties with integral knowledge leads to embodied release (jīvanmukti). Perfect knowledge generates lasting release (śāsvati mukti) or disembodied release (videha mukti). Actionlessness (naiṣkarmya) produces continuous and unobstructed embodied release. The combination of works and knowledge (jñānakarmeṣu mukti) produces actionlessness (naiṣkarmya). Disinterested action, knowledge and

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44 SG., (Poona, 1915), i. 5, 13, 14, 19, 20, 23-27; 29; iv. 2, 23, 35, 37, 45, 46, 49, 57, 63; iii. 60.
45 SG., i. 34-36, 42-43, 49-54.
meditation or prayer (upāsanā), which are interdependent on one another should be continued till disembodied release (videha mukti) is attained. They lead to supreme release (parā mukti).**

The disciplines differ with different persons with different mental equipments and capacities. The varṇaśramadharmas are adapted to persons with different mental traits and in different stages of mental development*** Disinterested performance of duties without any desire for fruits, withdrawal of the senses from their objects, cessation of the functions of the mind, knowledge of the falsity of difference, and absorption of the mind in the Ātman lead to embodied release. The mind is the cause of misery. When it runs after objects of desire, it comes to grief. When it ceases to think of objects of desire, and is absorbed in the Ātman, it becomes non-mind. Actionlessness (naiṣkarmya) is the effect of the destruction of mind. It produces lasting peace. One whose egoism or false sense of identity of the self with the mind-body-complex is completely destroyed, and does not recur even in dream, attains disembodied release. It requires complete destruction of mind or its functions. One who does not enjoy or suffer, though his body, the vehicle of feeling, is present, who is devoid of egoism or the sense of 'I' and 'mine', who has destroyed the three primal desires (esānā), who realizes the Ātman in waking state, dream and deep sleep, who renounces all actions, and abides in the Ātman, realizes disembodied release (videha mukti). He who is completely free from dualism and distinction, and who has attained disembodied release, is actionless, though he does pure actions without any desire and egoism. He who is engaged in pure actions, knowledge and meditation is the best actor (karmiśrēṣṭha). The Śūryagītā reconciles jñānayoga with karmayoga.†††

The Iśvara Gitā teaches absolutism, prescribes the knowledge of identity, and regards niṣkāma karma, devotion and meditation as auxiliary to knowledge. Its philosophy has been considered in connection with the Kūrma purāṇa. Ignorance (ajñāna) is the cause of bondage. Knowledge (jñāna) is the cause of release. The empirical self (jīva) is superimposed on the

** SG., i. 74-81; ii. 17-21.
*** SG., ii. 28-30.
Atman or Brahman. Egoism (ahānikāra) is an enjoyer and doer. It is not-self attributed to the Atman. Suffering is due to false identification of the Self (ātman) with the not-self. The reality is one infinite and eternal pure consciousness. It appears to be multiform objects to many empirical selves owing to ignorance, which is dispelled by the knowledge of identity. Detachment, renunciation of fruits of actions to God, dedication of all actions to God, non-covetousness, mendicancy, utterance of the mystic syllable Om, devotion, and eightfold yoga are auxiliary to knowledge. The performance of specific duties relating to castes and stages of life purifies the mind, and prepares it for the dawn of true knowledge. The practice of yoga burns all sins, and generates knowledge. Knowledge also facilitates meditation (yoga). They are interdependent on each other. Knowledge and meditation lead to release through the grace of God. Meditation on the void (śunya) devoid of all empirical contents leads to the mystic vision of the Atman. Supreme meditation is concentration of the mind on God. The eightfold yoga is recognized. The study of the scriptures and constant muttering of mantras purify the mind. Firm devotion to God and worship of him are inculcated as a moral observance. The conquest of attachment, fear and anger, and taking refuge in God are stressed. Sex-restraint, non-injury, endurance, purity of body and mind, austerities, sense-restraint, control of mind, contentment, truthfulness, faith in God, and observance of vows are prescribed. These are auxiliary to the knowledge of identity. The jiva becomes Atman when it is freed from egoism.104

The Brahma-gītā, a part of the Yogacārā-sūtra, advocates a type of absolutism modified by Nāgärjuna’s nihilism, subjectivism of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, and the Śaiva doctrine of Spanda. The ultimate reality is Brahman or pure undifferentiated consciousness, which appears as the multiform world of empirical selves (jiva) and empirical objects through avidyā. They are vibrations (spandāna) of the motionless ocean of pure absolute consciousness. They are radiations of pure consciousness (citcamatkṛti). They are imaginary constructions (kalpanā) of ideation. They are like dreams (svapnābha) and hallucinations. They are Mind-only (cittatāmātra). They are nothing

104 Kārmapurāṇa, B. L., Calcutta, 1890, pp. 455-56, 460, 462, 488-89; ch. xi.
but Brahman. Creation is unfoldment or vibration of Brahman. Dissolution is enfoldment or motionlessness of Brahman. Brahman or Ātman is pure consciousness. It is one, eternal, non-temporal, non-spatial, non-causal and non-empirical. There is neither cause nor effect, neither existence nor non-existence, neither being nor non-being nor becoming, neither void nor non-void. All is Brahman,—both Suchness (tathatā) and non-suchness (atathatā). The transcendental and the empirical both are Brahman. All is pure consciousness. There is, in reality, neither production nor destruction. The world, heaven and hell are pure consciousness. The world is a dream in waking life. One consciousness appears to be manifold as in a dream. There is no trace of creation in the Absolute Consciousness. The empirical selves are like persons in a dream (svapnanața). The immutable Brahman appears to be the mutable world. The Cosmic Mind appears as the world, heaven and hell. God is an imaginary construction.

Brahman appears to be an empirical self. Manas, buddhi, ahațkāra are forms of māyā. They are unreal appearances. The Ātman is indeterminate consciousness. But it imagines itself to be determinate through determinations of avidyā. The elements, the empirical objects, and the body are not real. Imperceptible and incorporeal merits of a past birth cannot produce the corporeal body. It is unreal like a castle in the clouds. All are imaginary constructions of avidyā. They are Brahman in their real nature. There is no en joyer (bhoktā) and doer (karta). The jivas are Brahman in their real nature. When beginningless avidyā which projects the world-appearance is experienced by a person as Brahman, he becomes Brahman. The jiva then becomes Ātman.

Brahman is ineffable, indescribable and indicated by silence only. It is predicateless, calm, fixed, taintless, and

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103 Nehā śūnyaḥ na vā śūnyaḥ na sannāśana madhyata. Sarvaṃ brahmaiva tad viññāti yat tathaivațathaśiṣu tatu. BrG., v. 11, 12.
104 BrG., v. 20, 22; vi. 23, 25, 42, 56-58; vii. 4, 7, 10, 16, 18, 20-22.
105 BrG., i. 17; iv. 14, 15, 22, 24, 25.
indeterminate. It is the ether of consciousness (cidvyoma), pure consciousness (cinnātra), supreme Self (paramātman). It is devoid of the duality of self and not-self. It is, non-dual Good or Siva.\textsuperscript{108}

Desire is bondage. Mokṣa is desirelessness. It is neither unconsciousness nor like deep sleep. It is a state of imperturbable superconsciousness (turiya). It is direct experience of the Ātman or Brahman. It is integral experience (samyakprabodha). There is no trace of object-consciousness in it. It is non-dualistic identity-consciousness.\textsuperscript{107}

Works (karma) cannot lead to mokṣa. Pilgrimage, charity, ablation in holy waters, learning, sacrifices, austerities, meditation and yoga lead to heaven. They are inadequate to attain mokṣa. Avidyā is annulled by integral knowledge (samyag-buddhi) or experience of the Ātman. The Śāstras teach the reality of the Ātman and the unreality of the not-self. Discursive knowledge of the Ātman is acquired from the Śāstras. Constant reflection produces a firm conviction as to the reality of the Ātman. Continuous discrimination deepens the conviction. Meditation is intensification of the integral experience of One (samyagbodhaikagahanatā). Supreme release is integral experience of identity. When avidyā is annulled, the jīva becomes Brahman.\textsuperscript{109} The seven stages in acquiring integral experience have already been discussed in connection with the minor Upa-niṣads.\textsuperscript{108} Actions are due to dualistic consciousness. Good conduct (sādācāra) touches the empirical reality. When the mind has an insatiable thirst for tasting the nectar of Brahman, it is absorbed in it, and identified with it. Without this burning desire Brahman cannot be experienced.\textsuperscript{110}

Aṣṭāvakragilā teaches pure monism, and enjoins renunciation and knowledge. The Ātman or Brahman is pure consciousness. The world is a false appearance. It is an imaginary construction of māyā. It is non-different from the Ātman, even as

\textsuperscript{104}BrG., iii. 24, 28, 29, 38, 48, 49, 58; iv. 15.
\textsuperscript{108}BrG., ii. 22-30; iv. 22; v. 43.
\textsuperscript{109}Var. Up., iv. 1-10; AP., v.*81-86.
\textsuperscript{110}Yogavaisiṣṭha, Bombay, (N.S.P.), 1918, Ch. 129, 1-6.
\textsuperscript{111}Yāśa yadrāśīkarāṁ cittāṁ tat tathā tasya gacchati. Brahmaikāraśikāṁ tēna manas tatāṁ samaśnute.
waves are non-different from the ocean. The formless Ātman is real and ground of the false world-appearance. The formed universe is unreal. It is a mere illusion (brāntimātra). Prakṛti, mahat and the world are mere names and forms. The material world is non-existent. Creation and destruction are unreal. The world-appearance is due to ignorance (avidyā), which vanishes when the knowledge of the Ātman dawns. The Ātman appears to be a jīva owing to the adjunct of avidyā. The jīva appears to be real so long as the world appears to be real. It is, in reality, Ātman or pure consciousness. It is not really an enjoyer and doer. Isvara, the creator of the world, is an unreal appearance. He is, in reality, non-dual Ātman. Joy and sorrow, bondage and release, heaven and hell, means and end, knowledge and ignorance, creation and dissolution, time, space and causality, waking, dream, deep sleep and superconscious trance, desire and its fulfilment, positive action (pravṛtti) and negative action (nivṛtti), duality and non-duality, wealth, happiness, virtue and release—all are unreal appearances. They are pure consciousness or Brahmān. This is pure monism like that of Tejobindu Upaniṣad.

Attachment for objects of enjoyment is bondage. Dispassion for them is release. Egoism is bondage. Egolessness is release. So long as the mind desires and grieves, there is bondage. When it neither desires nor grieves, there is release. Desire (vāśanā) is bondage. Renunciation of desire is release. Thirst (trṣṇā) is bondage. Extinction of thirst is release. Freedom from desire, attachment and aversion, hankering for good, aversion to evil, egolessness, equality, equanimity and imperturbability are conducive to release. Release can be attained by true knowledge (vijñāna) only, but not by actions (karma). The supreme status, eternal peace, perennial bliss can be attained by complete freedom (svātantrya) of the Self. The released person is

111 AG., Poona, 1918, i. 10, 12, 16, 18, 20; ii. 4-8; iii. 3, 11; vi. 2; vii. 5; x. 5; xv. 17; xviii. 69, 70; xx. 7.
112 AG., i. 8, 15, 17, 22; iii. 3, 4; xv. 4.
113 AG., iv. 5; xv. 8.
114 AG., viii. 4; xv. 18; xviii. 12, 20, 66, 80; xix. 2-6; xx. 2-12.
115 Mokṣa viṣayavairasyaṁ bandho vaiṣayiko rasaḥ. Yadā nāhauṁ tādā mokṣo yadāhūṁ bahuḥ saṁvandhauṁ tādā.
116 AG., xv. 2; viii. 4.
117 AG., l. 2; vii. 1-2; ix. 8; x. 3-4; xvii. 11-12.
118 AG., xvii. 11-12, 18-20; xviii. 21-23.
an embodiment of the full experience of the Ātman (pūrṇapasvarasañgriha). He is neither desirous of enjoyment nor of release. He has no unfilled desires and no duties to perform. He rests in his Self, and is fulfilled and contented.\textsuperscript{118}

The Avadhūta-gītā teaches pure monism, and prescribes the knowledge of identity. Brahman or Ātman is the only ontological reality. The material world is a false appearance like a mirage,—a mere construction of māyā. The finite self (jīva) is a mere reflection of Brahman in avidyā. But māyā is a mere appearance, and a reflection is a mere reflection.\textsuperscript{119} The body, the sense-organs, mind, intellect, egoism and their functions are false appearances. The knower, the known and knowledge are unreal. The jīva is really a bodiless immortal spirit devoid of mind, intellect and egoism. It is intrinsically pure, stainless, blissful and free. It has no birth and death, good and evil, union and separation, attachment and aversion, joy and sorrow, merit and demerit, heaven and hell. It is ever pure, enlightened and free. It is an embodiment of freedom. The Ātman is the only reality devoid of difference and non-difference, duality and non-duality. All is Brahman, Ātman, or pure consciousness. Neither the world nor the finite selves are real.\textsuperscript{120}

Desire for identity-consciousness (advaitavāsanā) is due to the grace of God. Knowledge of duality and plurality is due to attachment. It vanishes when attachment is destroyed.\textsuperscript{121} The self is always pure. It is not purified by the sixfold yoga, destruction of manas (manonāsa) or instructions of a spiritual guide. Its intrinsic purity is realized by integral knowledge (samyagniṇāna). True knowledge dawns on a pure mind. Extinction of attachment and aversion, dispassion for the world, firm knowledge of the reality, renunciation of renunciation, doing good to all creatures (sarbabhūtahita), and the grace of a spiritual guide with intuition of Brahman (guruprajñāprāsaḍā) lead to the supreme status.\textsuperscript{122} Sense-restraint, control of mind, tenderness, purity, non-possession, non-enterprise, temperance, dutifulness,

\textsuperscript{118} AG., xlvii, 56, 59, 67, 68, 82, 93, 98.

\textsuperscript{119} Māyā māyā katham ātata chāyā chāyā na vidyate. ADG., i. 43.

\textsuperscript{120} Ātmaiva kevalam sarvāṁ bhedābheda na vidyate. ADG., i. 4.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., i. 3, 5, 6, 13, 15, 17, 28, 59; ii. 38; iii. 27, 31. Brahmaikarūpaṇi paramārthañātthavam. i. 34.

\textsuperscript{122} Rāgatyāgūni punaś cittam ekānekaṁ na vidyate. ADG., i. 22.

\textsuperscript{123} ADG., ii. 23, 24; iii. 46.
firmness, imperturbability, endurance, humility, reverence, compassion, tolerance, truthfulness, equality, benevolence, goodwill and love for all, absence of malevolence, mastery over passions, and flawless character are conducive to the dawn of integral knowledge.  

The Rāmagītā advocates pure monism, and enjoins the knowledge of identity. The Ātman or Brahman is one, formless, pure consciousness. It is limited by the gross body, the subtle body, and the causal body made of avidyā which is the differentiating adjunct of each body. Egoism, a modification of avidyā, is superimposed on the Ātman, and produces in it a false sense of 'I' and 'mine'. The body, the sense-organs, manas, buddhi and ahaṅkāra are evolutes of avidyā. The jīva is a reflection of the Ātman in buddhi. The Ātman is pure consciousness (cit), distinct from unconscious buddhi, its Witness. They are superimposed on each other. So buddhi appears to be conscious, and the Ātman appears to be an enjoyer and doer, though happiness, misery and action belong to ahaṅkāra. When ignorance is destroyed by true knowledge, the Ātman free from the limiting adjuncts is experienced.

Mokṣa is identity of jīva with Brahman or Ātman. It is realized by true knowledge. Actions spring from attachment which is due to ignorance. They are always due to false identification of the Self with the mind-body-complex. Actions cannot be destroyed by actions. They can be destroyed by knowledge only. Knowledge (vidyā) arises from listening (śravaṇa) to the Identity-texts, reflection (manana), meditation (nididhyāśana), and instructions of a competent spiritual guide. One who has realized identity-consciousness can impart it to a person fit to receive it. The specific duties (svadharma) should be performed without desire for fruits so long as the Self is identified with the body. When the falsity of the not-self (anātman) is realized, all duties should be given up. Actions (karma) do not lead to release, since they spring from the knowledge of distinction. True knowledge (jñāna) is knowledge of non-difference or identity. Actions and knowledge are contradictory to each other. They cannot be combined with each other. The combination of actions with knowledge cannot bring about

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123 ADG., viii. 2-4.
release. The withdrawal of the senses from their objects, the conquest of passions, purity of mind, meditation on the mystic syllable $Om$, devotion to and constant meditation on Atman lead to release. The realization of the falsity of the world-appearance is an indispensable prerequisite of the dawn of identity-consciousness. One whose mind is purified by meditation on Brahman, and absorbed in and identified with it, is filled with bliss. The knowledge of identity of jiva and Atman leads to perennial bliss. It is acquired through renunciation of actions, hearing of the Såstras, reflection, meditation, trance, reverence, devotion, and grace of a competent spiritual guide (guruprasāda). The Rāmagītā inculcates jñānayoga with devotion. These are the teachings of the monistic Gitās. The religious literature of the Hindus is saturated with monistic thought (advaítavāda). There is scanty ancient literature on dualism (dvaitavāda) of the finite souls and the supreme Soul. It becomes prominent in the medieval religious literature. Monism appears to be the genius of Hinduism.

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134 RG., 46, 48, 53, 54, 56, 58, 62.
CHAPTER VI

THE COMMON IDEAS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

1. The Spiritual Background of Indian Philosophy.

The Upaniṣads are the foundation of Indian Philosophy. The Rāmāyaṇa, the Mahābhārata, and the Purāṇas contain ethical, religious, and philosophical concepts without any attempt at systematization. They are popular treatises, which profoundly influence the minds of the Hindus. They draw their inspiration from the Upaniṣads, which teach spiritual monism and mysticism. The systems of Indian philosophy are systematic speculations on the nature of the Reality in harmony with the teachings of the Upaniṣads, which contain various aspects of the truth. They aim at the knowledge of the Reality with a view to transforming and spiritualizing human life. Philosophical knowledge does not aim at merely satisfying our theoretical and speculative interest, but also at realization of the highest truth in life.

"Indian philosophy is essentially spiritual. Philosophy and religion are intimately connected with each other in India. Religion is not a system of dogmas, but a living experience. It is the practical realization of the spiritual truth. Philosophy is the theory of the Reality. It is an insight into the nature of the Reality, which leads to liberation. So Indian philosophy is not idle theorizing, but a spiritual quest."

Philosophy is called Darśana, which means vision. Philosophy is the vision of the Reality as a whole. It is an insight into the nature of the whole reality.

Indian philosophy is based on logical reason subordinate to the authority of the Vedas, which are believed to embody the intuitions of seers of truth. The authority of the Vedas is that of intuition. Logical reason is subordinate to intuition. So Indian philosophy is based on rational speculation in harmony with the Vedas, and consciously aims at achieving the highest perfection (mokṣa) attainable in human life.

1 J. Sinha: Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Agra, 1940, p. 1.
Rigid self-control, inner purity of mind, renunciation of narrow egoistic motives, universal and catholic outlook in life, and dispassionate quest of truth are the indispensable prerequisites of philosophical knowledge. Philosophical pursuit is not mere idle theorizing. It is intensely practical, but not pragmatic. It aims at realization of the highest attainable perfection. But it does not aim at success and exaltation in life.

2. The Schools of Indian Philosophy.

It is customary to divide the schools of Indian philosophy into two broad classes, viz., orthodox (āstika) and heterodox (nāstika). The orthodox schools recognize the authority of the Vedas. The heterodox schools do not recognize their authority. The Cārvāka, the Baudhā, and the Jaina are the heterodox schools. They are called heterodox not because they are atheists, but because they reject the authority of the Vedas. The Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṁkhya, the Yoga, the Mīmāṁsā, and the Vedānta are the orthodox schools. They believe in the authority of the Vedas. Among them the Sāṁkhya and the Mīmāṁsā are atheists. The Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Yoga, and the Vedānta are theists. The Sāṁkhya advocates dualism of prakṛti and puruṣas or individual selves. The Vedānta advocates spiritualistic monism, and recognizes the reality of Brahman or the Absolute Spirit. It regards the world and the individual selves as their appearances or parts, or attributes, modes or accessories of Brahman. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika advocate the reality of God, plurality of individual souls, and the world of diverse objects. They consider the world to be composed of the eternal atoms of earth, water, fire, and air existing in self-existent and eternal time and space. The Mīmāṁsā recognizes the reality of individual selves and the self-existent material world. The Sāṁkhya and the Mīmāṁsā are atheists. They reject the concept of God as the creator of the world. The Yoga grafts the notion of God on the Sāṁkhya dualism of prakṛti and puruṣas, and makes it theistic. So it is called the theistic Sāṁkhya.

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika have a common philosophy of Nature, Soul, and God, though they have minor differences. They were blended with each other at a later stage, and formed
a Syncretic school called the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. They are realists. They recognize the reality of the extra-mental world, and regard it as composed of atoms. They recognize the reality of ether (ākāśa), time, and space, which are eternal. They look upon God as the efficient cause of the world, and the atoms of earth, water, fire and air as its material cause. God is not the creator of the atoms, ether, time and space, which are coeternal with him. He combines the atoms with one another into dyads, triads and gross objects, and adapts them to the enjoyments and sufferings of the individual souls according to their merits and demerits. He is the dispenser of the Law of Karma. The effects in the world are real, and do not pre-exist in their causes. They are fresh creations (ārāmbha) emerging out of their material causes, which assume new collocations in them. They are real, unique, and distinct from one another. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika insist on the reality, novelty and distinctness of the manifold objects of the world. They regard physical causation as subservient to moral causation, and the realm of nature as subordinate to the realm of spirits with God as their moral governor. They conceive of God as external to the world, who creates it out of the pre-existing atoms. They recognize the reality of the individual souls, which are eternal, and not created by God. He is like their father, who rewards them for their virtues, punishes them for their vices, and guides them to their destined goal. The individual souls are knowing, feeling, and active agents, endowed with limited freedom. They are not conscious in their essential nature. They acquire consciousness in conjunction with bodies and internal organs (manas). They have pre-existence before birth and future life after death. Their bondage is due to ignorance. Their liberation is due to true knowledge. They transmigrate into other bodies, human, subhuman, or superhuman, appropriate to their moral equipments until they achieve liberation. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy admits the reality of the external world independent of the perceiving selves. It advocates dualism of matter and souls, and of the individual souls and the supreme Soul. It recognizes the plurality of the individual souls and the finite objects. It admits the reality of God as transcending the world. It advocates realism, dualism, pluralism and deism.
The Nyāya emphasizes epistemology and logic, and discusses the nature, conditions, and validity of perception, inference, comparison and testimony. It especially deals with the nature, kinds, ground, and object of inference, and fallacies of inference. The other systems are largely indebted to it for their treatment of inference and fallacies.

The Vaiṣeṣika emphasizes the seven categories: substance, quality, action, community, particularity, inference, and negation. It discusses the nature of time, space, ether (ākāśa) and the different kinds of qualities and actions. It specializes in the philosophy of nature.

The Sāṅkhya advocates dualism, pluralism and atheism. It recognizes the reality of prakṛti and puruṣas or individual souls. Both are eternal. Prakṛti is unconscious. Puruṣas are conscious. Prakṛti is active and mutable. Puruṣas are inactive and immutable. Prakṛti is composed of sattva, rajas and tamas, which are finer than atoms and modified into all physical, biological and psychical entities. The mind (manas), the intellect (buddhi) and egoism (ahāṅkāra) are modifications of prakṛti, which is the root-evolvent of matter, life and mind. Prakṛti evolves for the experience of puruṣas, and dissolves for their liberation. There is unconscious finality in its evolution and dissolution. The world is real and independent of the perceiving selves. The effects are real modifications of their causes. They pre-exist in their causes. They are mere redistributions of sattva, rajas and tamas contained in their causes. Sattva is mind-stuff or essence. Rajas is energy. Tamas is mass. Evolution is unfoldment. Dissolution is involution or enfoldment. The theory of evolution is propounded by the Sāṅkhya in a scientific manner. The individual souls are essentially conscious and eternal. They are knowers of the modifications of prakṛti including mental modes. Feeling, willing and activity belong to buddhi, which is a modification of prakṛti with preponderance of sattva. The souls are eternally pure and liberated. They are reflected in buddhi which is transparent, erroneously identify themselves with it, and are bound to empirical life. They wrongly think themselves to be enjoying, suffering and active agents. Non-discrimination is the cause of their bondage. Discrimination is the cause of their liberation. When they know themselves to be absolutely
distinct from their minds and bodies, they realize their intrinsic freedom and absolute purity. The Sāṁkhya advocates spiritualistic pluralism, and rejects the notion of God as the creator of the world. Its atheism is antagonistic to the absolutism of the Upaniṣads. But its concept of the self as pure consciousness, witness, or seer resembles the Upaniṣadic concept of the Atman, though it is uncompromising in its spiritualistic pluralism.

The Yoga engrafts the concept of God upon the Sāṁkhya dualism of prakṛti and puruṣas, and makes it theistic. It is called the theistic Sāṁkhya. Prakṛti is eternal, unconscious and mutable. Puruṣas are eternal, conscious and immutable. God upsets the equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tāmas by mere proximity, and starts the evolution of prakṛti. He directs its evolution as the efficient cause of the modifications of sattva, rajas and tāmas into the various kinds of physical, biological and psychical entities by removing barriers to their production. He does not create prakṛti or the world. He merely removes obstacles to the modification of sattva, rajas and tāmas into diverse effects. He does not create the individual souls. They can attain liberation without meditation on God, which is one of the means of attaining superconscious trance and liberation. He helps an aspirant practise the art of yoga by removing impediments to it. He is the supreme, omniscient, perfect person. He is not the creator of prakṛti and puruṣas. He is not immanent in them. He transcends them. He is not intimately connected with them. So the concept of God is not organically connected with the concepts of prakṛti and puruṣas in the Yoga system.

The special feature of this system is comprehensive treatment of the art of yoga, which is assumed to be one of the methods of achieving mokṣa by all other systems. The eightfold yoga consists in discipline of the body, regulation of life-forces, and concentration of mind. It aims at absolute control over the psychophysical organism. It seeks to uproot the unconscious individual and racial dispositions (sāṅskāra) of false knowledge (avidyā) which is the cause of bondage. It is a means to the intuitive realization of the self as an eternally pure and free spirit. The practice of yoga liberates occult powers of the mind, such as clairvoyance, clairaudience, telepathy, thought-transference and the like, which are consi-
dered to be impediments to the realization of mokṣa when they are consciously pursued and utilized for worldly powers.

The Mīmāṁsā is atheistic. It rejects the notion of God as the creator of the world. It admits the reality of the world and the finite souls. The world is self-existent and composed of the atoms of earth, water, fire, and air. But these atoms are the least perceptible particles of matter corresponding to the triads of the Vaiṣeṣikīka. The material objects are produced by their causes, and adapted to the enjoyments and sufferings of the individual souls according to the impersonal Law of Karma, which is not administered by God. Physical causation is subservient to moral causation. But it is not grounded in the will-causality of God. The individual souls are eternal spirits. They are knowing, feeling, and active agents. They can attain liberation by action (karma) and knowledge (jñāna). The Mīmāṁsā is called Karma-Mīmāṁsā because it lays stress on the performance of duties prescribed by the Vedas.

There are two schools of Mīmāṁsā founded by Prabhākara and Kumārila. There are essential differences in their epistemology and ontology. But both admit the self-validity of knowledge, eternity of the Vedas, and eternity of sounds, and reject the concept of God as the creator of the world and the composer of the Vedas. Prabhākara recognizes the categories of substance, quality, action, generality, subsistence or inherence, force and similarity. He rejects the Vaiṣeṣikīka categories of particularity and non-existence. Kumārila admits the categories of substance, quality, action, generality, and non-existence. He rejects the Vaiṣeṣikīka categories of particularity and inherence. He rejects the categories of force and similarity recognized by Prabhākara. The Mīmāṁsā philosophy of nature resembles the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣikīka view.

The Vedānta deals with the nature and knowledge of Brahman. Its central concept is Brahman or God. It systematizes the teachings of the Upaniṣads. There are two main schools of the Vedānta: (1) the Advaita Vedānta founded by Śaṅkara; (2) the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta founded by Rāmānuja. Śaṅkara advocates absolutism or spiritualistic monism. He regards the indeterminate Brahman as the ontological reality, and God, the individual souls and the world as phenomenal appearances which have only empirical reality. Brahman
associated with Māyā or cosmic nescience is God (Īśvara), the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world, and the dispenser of the Law of Karma. Brahman limited by avidyā, a fragment of cosmic nescience, or its product, the psychophysical organism, is an individual self (jīva). The world-appearance is false; it is a modification of Māyā which is neither existent nor non-existent, but indefinable. It projects the false appearance of the multiform world. It is a power of Īśvara who is not deluded by it. The finite self is identical with Brahman or Ātman, which is the eternal, undifferenced, pure consciousness and bliss. It realizes its infinitude and absoluteness when it destroys avidyā and acquires vidyā or intuition. Knowledge is the means to liberation. Brahman is pure identity devoid of difference. Saṅkara is a staunch advocate of pure monism. His uncompromising absolutism satisfies the irrepressible monistic impulse of the philosophical mind. He believes in degrees of reality,—the ontological reality of Brahman or Ātman, the empirical reality of the individual souls and the world, and the illusory reality of dreams, reveries and illusions. He recognizes the empirical reality of morality and religion, which should be transcended by integral knowledge or intuition of Brahman as pure identity. He believes in progressive transcendence of empirical individuality, and intuitive realization of its identity with Brahman. He recognizes gradual release through the worship of God and the performance of the prescribed duties, and embodied release here and now through integral knowledge.

Rāmānuja is the founder of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta or qualified monism. He identifies Brahman with Īśvara, and regards him as the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world, and the Lord of the Law of Karma. He conceives of God as endowed with excellent qualities and devoid of impure qualities. He recognizes internal difference within Brahman. The conscious souls (cit) and the unconscious world (acit) are the attributes, modes, or accessories of Brahman, which are inseparably related to him. They constitute his body. Brahman is their soul. He is a unity-in-difference. There is a difference of attributes or modes in the unity of the divine substance. God is the efficient cause and the material cause of the world. It is a modification of prakṛti which is a power of God. Māyā is
prakṛti which is real. It is composed of sattva, rajas and tamas which are divine powers. It is modified into the world which is real. The individual souls are real and eternal egos. They have knowledge of external objects. They are knowers, and not pure consciousness. Knowledge without a knowing self and known objects is an unreal abstraction. Bondage is due to ignorance. Liberation is due to the triple method of disinterested actions (niṣkāma karma), devotion (bhakti), and knowledge (jñāna) of God. It is not identity (sāmya) but essential community (sādharmya) with God. The finite souls, which are conscious monads, do not lose their integrity in Brahman in the state of release. The world, the finite souls and God are real and inseparably related to one another. During dissolution the world and the individual souls exist in Brahman in a causal condition. After creation they exist in him in a manifest, effected condition. The souls (cit) and the world (acit) are the attributes of Brahman, and cannot exist apart from him. The divine substance also cannot exist apart from its attributes, conscious and unconscious. There is inseparable relation (apṛthaksiddhi) among them. The souls (cit) are irreducible to matter (acit). Matter is irreducible to soul or spirit. Brahman is immanent in the finite souls and the world as their inner guide (antaryāmin), and transcends them as their Lord. He harmonizes all differences within his all-embracing unity. He is the perfect person. He redeems the human souls from bondage by his grace. Rāmānuja’s qualified monism satisfies the religious impulse for communion with God, the eternal embodiment of the intrinsic values. He advocates theism as distinguished from Śaṅkara’s Absolutism.

There are other minor schools of theistic Vedānta founded by Madhva, Nimbārka, Vallabha and Jīva Goswāmī. They recognize the reality of the determinate and qualified Brahman or God, the individual souls and the world. Madhva advocates pluralistic theism. He admits the fivefold difference between God and the finite souls, God and matter, souls and matter, one soul and another, and one material thing and another. These eternal distinctions are held together in the integrity of Brahman. Nimbārka recognizes difference and non-difference or identity between Brahman and the individual souls and the world. The world is the transformation of the conscious energies
(cit-śakti) and the unconscious energies (acit-śakti) of Brahman. The individual souls are parts of Brahman. Vallabha recognizes three grades of reality. Brahman is the full manifestation of his being, consciousness, bliss and qualities of sovereignty. The individual souls are different parts of Brahman with the quality of bliss suppressed. Matter is Brahman with consciousness and bliss suppressed. There is concealment of the divine qualities in the jivas and matter. The souls are God’s own parts. There is non-difference between the whole and its parts. God is immutable and yet modified into the world. He creates prakṛti and its guṇas, which are modified into the world. All material objects are parts of his being, which are non-different from him. The jivas and the world are essentially non-different from God. This doctrine is called pure monism (śuddhādvaitavāda). Jīva Goswamī conceives of the Lord as the perfect being possessed of infinite qualities. He exists in his essential nature in a transcendental sphere through his essential power. He exists as jivas or souls through his inessential power. He exists as unconscious prakṛti through his external power of māyā. He creates the world through his māyāsakti. He conceals the knowledge of the souls through his jīvamāyā. The jivas and the world are the energies of God. The essential divinity of the jivas is concealed by avidyā which is dispelled by the grace of God. All schools of theistic Vedānta lay stress on devotion and self-surrender to God as the primary means of release.

Sometimes Mīmāṁsā is called Pūrva Mīmāṁsā because it deals with rituals (karma) whose performance is a propædeutic to the pursuit of the knowledge of Brahman. The Vedānta is called Uttara Mīmāṁsā because it deals with the nature of Brahman and the means of knowing him. Dharma is the central concept of the Mīmāṁsā. Brahman is the central concept of the Vedānta.

The Cārvāka, the Buddhist, and the Jaina are the heterodox schools. They reject the authority of the Vedas and the concept of God. The Cārvāka advocates materialism, atheism, positivism, and hedonism. He admits the reality of the world only, composed of the gross elements of earth, water, fire, and air which are perceptible. He regards consciousness as an epiphenomenon of the body, and the self as the body endowed with consciousness. He denies the existence of God and the
permanent self, pre-existence and future life, heaven and hell, and transmigration and liberation. He condemns religion as priestcraft, and enjoins the pursuit of bodily pleasure. He denies the existence of all supersensible entities.

The Buddhists are phenomenalists. They regard change or becoming as the stuff of reality. Everything is impermanent. The Brahman of the Upaniṣads, that is eternal and unchanging, is a figment of imagination. There is no permanent self. The self is an aggregate of changing bodily and mental processes. It is a series of momentary cognitions, feelings, volitions, and mental dispositions. The material objects are conglomerations of impermanent sensible qualities. The world is dynamic and subject to the law of causality. The Law of Karma governs the physical order, the biological order, and the moral order. The Buddhists believe in pre-existence, future life, transmigration, and liberation. They lay stress on the conquest of passions and the cultivation of non-injury, good-will and love for man-kind and sentient creatures.

The Hinayāna Buddhists are realists, while the Mahāyāna Buddhists are idealists. The Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas are Hinayānists. The former advocate direct realism, and maintain that external objects are directly perceived. The latter advocate indirect realism, and maintain that impermanent external objects are inferred from their ideas in the mind. The Yogācāras and the Mādhyamikas are Mahāyānists. The former are generally subjective idealists, who deny the existence of external objects, and regard them as ideas of the percipient mind or stream of ideas. Some Yogācāras are absolute idealists, who regard the eternal, pure consciousness (vijñānapāta) as the absolute reality. It is transformed into the Ālayavijñāna, the cosmic mind, which generates empirical subjects and empirical objects. The Mādhyamikas regard the reality as essenceless, predicateless, indefinable and incomprehensible, and look upon external objects and subjective ideas as mere appearances. The Mahāyānists smuggle in the concept of the Absolute discarded by the Buddha.

The Jainas are avowed atheists. They deny the existence of God as the creator of the world. They admit the reality of the world and the permanent souls which are heterogeneous in their nature. The world is material while the souls are spiri-
tual. Matter, the principle of motion (dharma), the principle of rest (adharma), space, and time constitute the non-soul (ajīva). The world is composed of homogeneous atoms. It is multiform and diverse, and contains an infinite number of substances with infinite qualities, modes and relations to one another. It contains being and becoming, permanence and change, unity and plurality, generality and particularity, and various other aspects. It is self-existent and not created by God. The souls are permanent spiritual entities endowed with infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss, and infinite power. They can realize these innate qualities, when they remove the crust of karma-matter on it by rigid moral discipline. Karmas are infra-atomic particles of matter produced by impure thoughts, emotions and actions, which encrust the souls and veil their innate powers. When they are completely destroyed, the souls shine forth in their innate glory, and become omniscient. They work out their own salvation by right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct. Matter and spirits constitute the reality, which are irreducible to each other. The Jainas advocate realism, dualism, spiritualistic pluralism, and atheism. They profess religion without God like early Buddhism.

The Cārvāka, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Mīmāṁsā are dealt with in this volume. The Sāṁkhya, the Yoga, Buddhism, Jainism, and the Vedānta are discussed in the second volume.

3. The Common Ideas in the Systems of Indian Philosophy.

1. The Reality of the World.

All schools of Indian philosophy recognize the reality of the world. The Cārvāka admits the reality of the world composed of the gross elements of earth, water, fire and air. The Buddhist realists maintain that the world is composed of atoms, which are combined into gross impermanent objects. The Vaibhāṣikas regard them as objects of direct perception. The Saṁ克拉nicas regard them as objects of inference. The Jainas regard the world as composed of homogeneous atoms. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika recognize the reality of the world in time and space, which is composed of heterogeneous atoms, governed by the law of causality, and subservient to the Law
of Karma. The world is a physical order and a moral order. Physical causation is subservient to moral causation. The Mīmāṃsā also regards the world as formed out of atoms under the guidance of the Law of Karma. The Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, and the theistic Vedānta regard the world as evolved out of prakṛṭi consisting of sattva, rajas and tamas. Sattva is the principle of manifestation. Rajas is the principle of energy. Tamas is the principle of obstruction or inertia. The theistic Vedānta regards prakṛṭi as the power of God. The Yoga regards prakṛṭi as independent of God. The Sāṅkhya does not believe in God.

The Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara regards the world as a false appearance from the standpoint of the Absolute. But it recognizes the empirical reality of the world-appearance. It does not consider it to be an illusion. But it denies the ontological reality of the world. The Mādhyamika also recognizes the empirical reality of the world-appearance. The Yogācāra reduces the external objects to mere ideas of the perceiving mind. He does not recognize their extra-mental reality. The majority of the systems of Indian philosophy admit the reality of the world.

The world is a spatio-temporal and causal order. It exists in time and space, and is governed by causality. Time-relation, space-relation, and cause-effect-relation are constitutive of the cosmic order. Every finite positive entity is produced and destroyed. But atoms are indivisible and eternal. Causation is production or modification. An effect is a fresh emergence out of its cause or its modification. Causation is subject to a law. There is uniformity of causation. Particular causes produce particular effects in particular times, in particular places, and under particular circumstances. All events are governed by the law of causation. Physical causation is subordinate to moral causation. Diverse effects are adapted to enjoyments and sufferings of the individual souls. Periodic creation and dissolution of the world are generally admitted. The theory of cosmic evolution is clearly enunciated in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga literature. Evolution is transition from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from the indeterminate to the determinate, from the incoherent to the coherent. Every system of philosophy must admit the reality of the world, at least as an appearance, account for its variety and multiplicity, and provide for the
realization of our practical needs. It must not undermine our practical life.

2. The Reality of the Self.

The reality of the permanent self is generally admitted. Among the heterodox schools the Cārvāka denies the reality of the self, and identifies it with the body endued with consciousness. He regards consciousness as an epiphenomenon of the body. The Buddhist denies the reality of the permanent self, and regards it as a series of momentary ideas. Only the Jaina admits the reality of the permanent self as a knowing, feeling and active agent. All orthodox schools of Indian philosophy admit the reality of the Ātman or self as a permanent spiritual substance. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika regard the self as an eternal substance endued with cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit and demerit. Consciousness is not its essence, but an adventitious quality. It acquires consciousness in conjunction with the body and the internal organ (manas). The Mīmāṃśā also holds the same view. Kumārila regards knowledge as a mode or activity of the self. Prabhākara regards it as a quality of the self. In dreamless sleep and release the self is devoid of consciousness. The Sāṃkhya and the Yoga regard the self as an eternal spirit whose essence is consciousness. Consciousness is its essential property, not an adventitious quality. Feeling and activity are qualities of the intellect (buddhi), which is a modification of prakṛti. But the self (puruṣa) is devoid of them; it is feelingless and inactive; it is only a knower of the modifications of prakṛti. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, and the Mīmāṃśā admit the plurality of selves to account for their variety of experiences, bondage and liberation. But the Advaita Vedānta admits the reality of one Self or Ātman, which is pure being, pure consciousness and pure bliss. It identifies the Ātman with Brahma. It regards the individual self (jīva) as the Ātman limited by avidyā, or the mind-body-complex produced by it. It recognizes the empirical reality of the individual self. It denies its ontological reality. The Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta admits its ontological reality, and regards it as a part of Brahma. The concept of the Ātman is fundamental in Indian philosophy.
The Sāṃkhya and the Mīmāṃsā deny the existence of God, but they admit the reality of the self, and its bondage and liberation. The Jaina also denies the existence of God, but admits the reality of permanent souls and their bondage and liberation. The concept of God is not so fundamental in the systems of Indian philosophy as that of the self (ātman).

3. The Law of Karma.

All schools of Indian philosophy except the Cārvāka believe in the Law of Karma. As we sow, so we reap. A right action inevitably produces a good consequence. A wrong action inevitably produces a bad consequence. Performance of a duty or a prescribed action produces a merit (puṇya) or virtue (dharma) in the soul. Violation of a duty or commission of a forbidden action produces a demerit (pāpa) or vice (adharma) in it. A merit or virtue produces happiness. A demerit or vice produces misery. Merit and demerit are unseen agencies (adrṣṭa) which mature in course of time and bear fruits either in this life or in a future life. They are predisposing causes of happiness and misery while external objects are their exciting causes. There is no escape from the consequences of actions. Their fruits must be reaped in this life or in a future life. What is sown must be reaped. There is no destruction of the fruits of right and wrong actions (kṛtapraṇāśa). But what is not sown cannot be reaped. One can never reap the fruits of actions undone (akṛtābhīyāgama). The Laws of Karma is the inexorable law of moral causation.

The Buddhist, the Jaina, the Sāṃkhya and the Mīmāṃsā believe in an impersonal Law of Karma which adjusts the realm of nature to the realm of spirits. It adapts the physical order to the moral order. It adjusts physical objects to the souls’ happiness and misery in accordance with their merits and demerits. But the other systems believe in God who is the dispenser of the Law of Karma. He creates the physical objects out of atoms or prakṛti or his own nature and adjusts them to the unseen agencies (adrṣṭa) in the individual souls.

Merits and demerits are called karmas. At a particular time we have accumulated karmas of the past births (prārabdha karma) and karmas which are being acquired in this birth
(saṃciyamāna karma) to which will be added karmas which will be acquired in future (anārabdha karma). They determine the kind of birth, length of life, and enjoyments and sufferings. The Jaina regards karmas as infra-sensible particles of matter generated by passions and evil actions, which encrust the soul and obscure its innate qualities.

4. Transmigration.

Metempsychosis or transmigration of the soul is a corollary of the Law of Karma, which demands that right actions must have good consequences and that wrong actions must have bad consequences. Merits and demerits produced by right and wrong actions determine the kinds of birth. Excessive merits transport the souls to heaven, and make them celestial beings. Excessive demerits make them assume the bodies of beasts, birds and insects. Well-balanced merits and demerits make them transmigrate into human bodies. The souls are eternal. They are neither born nor destroyed. Their birth is association with bodies. Their death is dissociation from bodies. They survive the death of their bodies and assume other bodies, superhuman, human or subhuman, which are appropriate to the moral outfits acquired by them in the present births. They reincarnate in the bodies which will be the fit vehicles for enjoying the consequences of their actions in this life. The same soul continues through different births. Transmigration presupposes the permanence and continuity of the soul which assumes different bodies. All orthodox schools believe in the permanence and transmigration of the soul.

The Cārvākas do not admit the reality of the soul as distinct from the body, and so do not believe in its transmigration. The Baudhās do not recognize the permanence of the soul. They regard it as a flux of ever-changing psychoses. But still they believe in its transmigration. The last psychosis embodying the dispositions of all past psychoses in the stream of consciousness assumes a body appropriate to it, and produces the initial consciousness in the new foetus. There is continuity of the same series of consciousness in its different births. There is

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'transmigration of character' from the present birth to the future birth. Though the Buddhists deny the permanence of the soul, they believe in the transmigration of the same series of cognitions. The Jaimas recognize the reality of the permanent soul and its transmigration. The idea of transmigration is common to all systems of Indian philosophy except the Cārvāka school.

5. Saṁsāra.

Saṁsāra is a beginningless series of births and deaths. It is bondage (bandha) to embodied life in the spatio-temporal world. It is imprisonment of the eternal pure spirit in a destructible impure body. It is due to ignorance (avidyā) or false knowledge (mīthyājñāna). The Sāṅkhya and the Yoga regard non-discrimination (aviveka) of the self (puruṣa) and prakṛti as the cause of bondage. The Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta consider the soul to be eternal. When it is erroneously identified with the impermanent mind-body-complex, it is entangled in bondage. The Nyāya describes the cause of bondage thus: pain is due to birth; birth is due to actions; actions are due to faults; faults are due to false knowledge (mīthyājñāna). Attachment, aversion and delusion are faults which are the springs of action. They are due to false knowledge of painful and transitory objects as pleasant and eternal. So bondage is due to false knowledge. Buddhism considers the self to be an impermanent aggregate of bodily and mental processes, and ascribes bondage to a false sense of individuality. The impermanent mind-body-complex is wrongly considered to be the permanent self. This false knowledge gives rise to bondage. Bondage is produced by false knowledge. It is terminated by true knowledge.

6. Initial Pessimism and Ultimate Optimism.

Indian philosophy is branded as pessimistic. Life abounds in suffering. Pain is the invariable accompaniment of embodied life. Saṁsāra is a beginningless series of births and deaths which are painful. The Buddha says: "Birth is painful, decay is

*NS., i. i. 2.
painful; disease is painful; death is painful; union with the unpleasant is painful; separation from the pleasant is painful. Life is full of suffering. The world is a vale of tears. But the Buddha preaches the four noble truths: (1) There is suffering. (2) There is a cause of suffering. (3) There is cessation of suffering. (4) There is a way to stop suffering. Nirvāṇa is absolute extinction of suffering. The Sāṅkhya recognizes three kinds of pain; pain due to bodily diseases and mental troubles (ādhyātmika); pain due to other men and animals (ādhibhautika); and pain due to supernatural agencies (ādhidaivika). Embodied life full of suffering is bondage. Absolute negation of the three-fold suffering is release. The Yoga admits three kinds of pain. The enjoyment of sensual pleasures gives rise to painful consequences. Thirst for them is intensified by enjoyment. The pain generated by the enjoyment of sensual pleasures is consequential (parījāmaduṅghka). Attachment for sensual pleasures involves aversion to those who thwart the desire for their enjoyment, which is painful (tāpaduṅghka). Feelings of pleasure and pain produce their dispositions (samskāra). They produce recollections of pleasure and pain. They produce actions. They produce merits and demerits. They produce pleasure and pain. The cycle of pain due to dispositions (samskāraduṅghka) continues. Release is complete destruction of these dispositions and absolute freedom of the self from the mind and its modes. All kinds of pain are extirpated in the state of release. So Indian philosophy is characterized by initial pessimism and ultimate optimism.

7. Mokṣa.

The idea of liberation (mokṣa) is common to all systems of Indian philosophy. Only the Cārvāka materialist does not believe in it. He regards dependence as bondage, and independence as release. Buddhism regards complete extinction of suffering as nirvāṇa. Joy, sorrow, anger, fear, and lust are

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"The Taithtirya Upaniṣad says, "All creatures spring from bliss, are sustained by bliss, and reabsorbed in bliss." "Who would live if Brahman were not bliss?" Joy is the sustaining principle in life. This is optimism."
passions, which are compared to fire. Nirvāṇa is complete extinction of the fire of passions. Some Buddhists regard it as a state of positive bliss. Others regard it as an ineffable state beyond empirical pleasure and pain. The Jaina considers complete destruction of karma-matter investing the soul and realization of its infinite perception, infinite knowledge, infinite bliss and infinite power as release. Omniscience is liberation.

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika look upon the existence of the self in its natural condition as liberation. It consists in absolute cessation of pain. It consists in complete destruction of the qualities of the soul,—cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, disposition, merit and demerit. The Mīmāṃsā also considers complete destruction of merit and demerit and absolute extinction of pain as release. In release the self is divested of all experience, and remains in its pure essence. The Sāṁkhya considers absolute negation of threefold suffering as release. In the state of release there is complete isolation of the self from the mind-body-complex, which is a modification of prakṛti. There is complete destruction of mental functions and dispositions. The Yoga also considers complete isolation (kaivalya) of the self from the mind (buddhi) and its modes and dispositions as release. In the state of release the self abides in its essential nature, and realizes its intrinsic nature. The Advaita Vedānta regards the intuitive realization of identity of the individual self with Brahman or the eternal being, consciousness and bliss as release. Release is a state of infinite bliss. The Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta regards similarity of the self with God in essence (sādharmya) as release, which is a blissful state. So the idea of liberation (mokṣa) is common to all systems of Indian philosophy.

8. The Unity of Śādhanā.

They also lay down the means to the attainment of liberation. Disinterested performance of the prescribed duties relating to the castes and the stages of life (niṣkāma karma) purifies the mind. Sometimes niṣkāma karma is said to be the means to perfection. Work with dispassion and equanimity of mind unperturbed by pleasure and pain is the moral ideal for the regulation of life. Devotion (bhakti) and self-surrender to God
(prapatti), taking refuge in him (śaraṇāpatti), and service to the preceptor are considered to be the means of release. Unmotived and unswerving devotion to God brings down his grace on the devotee, which gives him release. Devotion gives the saving knowledge. Yoga facilitates the attainment of true knowledge. It consists in sense-restraints, moral observances, bodily posture, breath-control, withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects, fixation of mind, meditation, and trance. When the mind meditates on the self, and is absorbed in it, it dissolves, as it were, in the self, which manifests itself in its real nature. Yoga is a method of acquiring knowledge of the self and God, which is regarded as a means of release. Morality is an indispensable preliminary to meditation and trance. Non-injury, non-stealing, truthfulness, sex-restraint and non-covetousness are the restraints (yama). Purity of body and mind, contentment, penance, study of the scriptures, and meditation on God are the moral observances (niyama). They are included in the eightfold yoga. Discrimination of the eternal and the non-eternal, dispassion for enjoyment of happiness on earth and in heaven, sense-control, mind-control, endurance, withdrawal of the senses from their objects, faith in the Atman or Brahman, and desire for release are auxiliary to enquiry into the nature of Brahman. True knowledge depends upon conquest of the lusts of the flesh and passions and desires of the mind, purity of body and mind, freedom from selfishness and egoism, tolerance of spirit, universal good-will and selflessness. Morality is an indispensable propaedeutic to acquisition of true knowledge. Knowledge (jnāna) is considered to be the chief means of release. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika considers true knowledge of the reality (tattvajñāna) as the means of liberation. True knowledge destroys false knowledge, which generates attachment, aversion and delusion, which are the springs of action. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga regards discrimination (viveka) of the self from the not-self or prakṛti and its modifications as the cause of release. The Advaita Vedānta considers the intuitive knowledge of identity of the jīva with Brahman as its cause. The knowledge of difference is ignorance (avidyā). The knowledge of identity is vidyā, which leads to life eternal. The Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta considers disinterested performance of duties, devotion and self-surrender to God, taking shelter in him,
and knowledge of the self's dependence on God as the means of release. It looks upon essential similarity with God as liberation. Mokṣa is a state of transcendental purity beyond empirical morality. There is complete transcendence of virtue and vice in it. Even the potencies (vāsanā) or dispositions (sānskāra) of actions are completely destroyed in it.

But though supermoral perfection (mokṣa) is the supreme end, happiness (kāma) and virtue (dharma) are the subordinate ends. Wealth (artha) also as a means to happiness is a subordinate end. Wealth should be subordinated to happiness. Happiness should be subordinated to virtue. Virtue should be subordinated to mokṣa. Kaṇāda defines virtue as what is conducive to earthly happiness and mokṣa.* A well-integrated harmonious life of enlightened intellect, selfless emotions, and disciplined will in pursuit of happiness, virtue, transcendental purity, and good of mankind (lokasaṅgraha) is the ideal.


Indian philosophy is not dogmatic and uncritical. Every system of philosophy is based on epistemology or theory of knowledge. The Cārvāka recognizes perception only as a means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). The Baudhāya recognizes perception and inference as pramāṇas. The Vaiśeṣika also holds the same view. The Sāṁkhya recognizes perception, inference and testimony as pramāṇas. The Nyāya recognizes perception, inference, comparison and testimony as pramāṇas. Prabhākara (Mimāṁsā) recognizes perception, inference, comparison, testimony and presumption as pramāṇas. Kumārila (Mimāṁsā) and the Advaita Vedānta recognize perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), testimony (śābda), presumption (arthāpatti), and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as pramāṇas. They discuss the nature, object, conditions and grounds of valid knowledge. Inference is a chief means of valid knowledge.

10. The Authority of the Vedas.

All orthodox schools of philosophy recognize the authority of the Vedas. They cite the authority of the Upaniṣads in

*Yato bhyudayaniḥśreyasasidhiḥ sa dharmaḥ. VS., i. 1. 2.
support of their views, and build up their systems of philosophy on rational speculation (tarka) in harmony with the teachings of the Vedas. Reason cannot yield unquestionable certainty in respect of supersensible entities. Reason is overthrown by reason. It cannot land us in the solid foundation of truth. Reason is subordinated to the authority of the Vedas, which is regarded as the authority of intuition. Intuition is the immediate apprehension of the reality. It is not immediate perception. It transcends discursive thought. It is supra-intellectual direct apprehension. It is higher immediacy. Reason (tarka) is regarded as subordinate to intuition (anubhava). Intuition can override reason. But reason cannot overthrow intuition. Reasoning should be carried on under the guidance of intuition. But the different schools of Indian philosophy are not mere elaborations of the teachings of the Upaniṣads with the help of reason. They invent different theories of the Reality by systematic logical reasoning, appeal to those texts of the Upaniṣads which are in favour of their conclusions, and consider those opposed to their theories as spurious or explain them away. Even the different schools of the Vedānta build their theories of the Reality on logical reason and philosophical speculation, and endeavour to harmonize the relevant texts of the Upaniṣads with one another in the light of their preconceived theories. The Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṁkhya, the Yoga, the Mimāṃsā, and the Vedānta widely diverge from one another in their philosophical speculations, though they all accept the authority of the Vedas. They all regard consciousness as the fundamental test of the real. What is actually experienced by consciousness (samvit) is considered to be real, and what is not so experienced is considered to be unreal. Consciousness is the ultimate court of appeal in knowing anything to be real.* So orthodox Indian philosophy is not dogmatic and authoritarian.

*Saṁvid eva hi bhagavat viśayatvāt vā vagame ṣaraṇam. PP., p. 22.
CHAPTER VII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CARVAKA

1. Materialism, Hedonism and Secularism.

The word Carvaka is derived from either Caruvak or sweet-tongued, or carv, to eat. The Carvakas were exponents of the doctrine of egoistic hedonism. Their motto was: 'Eat, drink, and be merry'. Their views were attractive to the common people. Therefore they were called Lokayatikas, and their doctrine was called Lokayatamata. Bṛhaspati is said to be the founder of the Carvaka philosophy. About a dozen aphorisms (sūtra) are ascribed to him, which are quoted by Kamalaśila, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Prabhācandra, Mādhavācārya and Gunaratna. A work in verse is ascribed to Bṛhaspati. Some verses are quoted by Mādhavācārya in Sarvadārśanasaṅgraha in his exposition of the Carvaka system. Lokāyata, Bṛhaspati and his followers (bārhaspatya) are mentioned in Arthaśāstra. A consistent and complete account of the Carvaka system is not found in any work written by a Carvaka thinker. It has to be reconstructed from the exposition of the doctrine by its Buddhist, Jaina, and Hindu critics. Accounts of the Carvaka system are found in Sarvadārśanasaṅgraha and Saḍdarśana-samuccaya.

The Carvakas regard perception as the only means of valid knowledge, and reject the validity of inference. They are free thinkers. They reject the authority of the Vedas and the supremacy of the Brāhmaṇas. They are naturalists and accidentalists, and reject final causes and universality of causation. They are materialists, positivists, atheists and hedonists. They identify the soul with the body, and deny pre-existence, future life, Law of Karma, heaven and hell, bondage and release, and the existence of God. They admit the reality of gross matter. Only they advocate egoistic hedonism in ethics.

1 Hiriyanna: Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 187; Das Gupta: History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III, p. 533; TRD. on SDSM., p. 309; Arthaśāstra, Mysore, 1924, pp. 6, 63, 177, 192.
The germs of the doctrine are found in the earlier texts. In *Kaṭhopaniṣad* Naciketas asks Yama whether there is existence after death. Some assert survival after death. Others deny it. Yama replies that the persons, who are dull of intellect like children and infatuated with pride of wealth assert the reality of this world only, and deny the reality of the next world. This implies that a view was current that there was no future world or the next world. The Čārvāka denial of the next world is adumbrated here. In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* also this view is given. Yājñavalkya speaks to Maitreyi, "Arising out of these material elements one enters into them again and vanishes. After death there is no consciousness." Here Yājñavalkya refers to the materialistic view of the self as identical with the body and denial of its survival after death. In *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* Prajāpati explains the nature of the self (ātman) to gods (deva) and demons (āsura). Virocana, a demon, instructed by him, clothes his body with a fine dress, adores it with ornaments, and looks into the image of his body in a pan of water. Prajāpati says, 'That is the Self, the immortal, the fearless'. Virocana departs with a tranquil heart, and teaches the demons this doctrine: 'A person should make himself happy here on earth. He should serve himself. He who makes himself happy here on earth, who serves himself, obtains both this world and the next world.' One who is a non-believer, who does not practise charity and sacrifices, who adorns the body of a dead person with fine dress and ornaments, and thinks that thereby he will win the next world, is a demon. Thus Virocana represents the Čārvāka doctrine of denial of the soul as different from the body, and of the next world. He advocates the secular doctrine of egoistic hedonism. *Svētāsvatara Upaniṣad* refers to time (kāla), nature (svabhāva), destiny (niyati), chance (yadṛccchā), material elements (bhūttāni), and the union of the male sex with the female sex as the causes of the origin of creatures. They are not adequate to explain the

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8*Yeyah prete vicikitsā manāṣye'stītyeke nāyam asti caite, i. 1. 20. Na sāṁparāyaḥ pratibhāti bālam pramādyantānān vittamohena ghoram. Ayaṁ loko nāsti para iśā māṁ punaḥ punaḥ vāśām āpāyate me. i. 2. 6.*

9Tadiha viśāṅgahana evaitibhyo bhūteḥbhīyaḥ samutthāya tāny e-vānuvāsa-yātā, na pretya sarṣi-jāati. ii. 4. 12; iv. 5. 13. SDS., Ch. I.

*Atmaivehā mahāyya ātmā paricorya ātmanam evah mahayannātmānam paricaramubbhau lokāvāpātātmānam: cāmuh ceti, viii. 8. 4.*

*vii. 8. 5.*
origin of the universe. The individual self is dependent (aniśa), and not master of itself, since it enjoys pleasure and suffers pain, and is bound. The Ātman or supreme Self only can adequately explain the universe. Here the Cārvāka view is referred to and summarily dismissed. The Cārvākas explain the world by nature, chance, or the material elements.

Manu calls one, who condemns the Vedas (vedanindaka) and refutes them and the Smṛtis with the aid of dialectics, a nāstika. The Cārvākas, the Buddhists, and the Jainas are nāstikas according to this definition. The Mahābhārata describes a Cārvāka as a demon (rākṣasa) in the garb of a Brāhmaṇa. He performed austere penances, and got a boon from Brahmā that he would be immune from injury at the hands of all creatures. He was warned not to offend the Brāhmaṇas. Armed with this boon he began to torment the gods. They approached Brahmā to compass his destruction. He assured them that he would meet with destruction by insulting the Brāhmaṇas. Stripped of poetic metaphors, the story indicates that Cārvākas did not believe in the superiority of the Brāhmaṇas and the existence of gods or heaven, and that they sought their own pleasure by injuring others. In the Rāmāyāna Jābali represents the Cārvāka view.

The Bhagavad Gītā represents the Cārvāka materialists as demons (asura), who maintain that the universe is not created and governed by God, that it is unreal and without any foundation, and that creatures are born of the union of the male and female parents. They are of dull intellect; they attend to sensible objects only. They indulge in injuring others. They are engaged in injuring and killing others to acquire power, lordship and pleasure. They despise others on account of their pride of wealth and power. Infatuated by delusion (moha) they are addicted to the gratification of sensual desires. They are filled with insatiable desires (kāma), pursue evil, indulge in impure acts, and are actuated by boastfulness, self-conceit, and pride. Their highest end is sensual pleasure due to the gratification of carnal desires (kāmopabhogaparamāḥ). All their

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4 Kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatiḥ yadrechā bhūtani yoniḥ. i. 2. Cp. MA., vii. 8-9.
5 MS., ii. 11.
thoughts revolve round this central aim. They acquire wealth by dishonest means for the gratification of their sentient desires (kāmabhoga). They are actuated by lust, anger, and hope for sensual pleasure. They constantly hanker after the fulfilment of their desires, and run after wealth and sensual pleasure. They are intoxicated with the pride of wealth, and perform sacrifices with hypocrisy without regard to the Vedic ordinances. They hate God dwelling in all creatures. They do not know what actions ought to be done and what actions ought not to be done. They do not observe truth, purity, and customary morality. Śāṅkara takes this account as the Cārvāka view (lokāyatokadṛṣṭi). The Cārvākas deny virtue and vice, the ruler of the universe, the ground of the world and its truth, and the Law of Karma. God and karma are supersensible entities, and therefore rejected. Sensual pleasure alone is the supreme end of life.

In Viṣṇupurāṇa there is an account of the materialists, who are described as demons (asura). They have inordinate desire for worldly pleasures. They condemn the Vedas, their injunctions, the sacrifices enjoined by them, the articles of sacrifices, and the deities to whom sacrifices are offered. These vile-hearted and vicious persons of bad conduct, calumniators of the Vedas, put an end to the path of positive action for prosperity and heavenly happiness (pravṛttimārga). They are materialists. Brahma-vaivartapurāṇa describes demons as those persons, who are hostile to the Brāhmaṇas and gods, who are slanderers of their preceptors and gods, who rebel against the authority of their spiritual guides, who do not worship gods and offer sacrifices to them, and who are devoid of virtue and mercy.

In the Pāli canon the materialistic view of Ajita Keśa Kambala is given. He maintains that a body is composed of earth, water, fire and air, which return to the respective elements on death, and that there is no survival after death. He denies virtue and vice, heaven and hell, and fruits of actions. Pāyāsi

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8 Asatyan apratiṣṭhānā te jagad āhur anāṃśvaram. Aparasparasamabhūtaṁ kimanyat kāmabhūtakam. BG., xvi. 8. Ibid., xvi. 9-18.
9 SBG., xvi. 8, 12.
10 I., 6, 29-31.
also identifies the soul with the body, and denies future life and rebirth. These views are similar to Cārvāka materialism.

Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad refers to accidentalism (yaḍṛcchāvāda). Saṅkara explains it as the doctrine of accidental production of effects. They are due to chance. Saṅkarānanda explains it as the doctrine of accidental conjunction of two events. Production of an effect is its sudden appearance. Accidentalism is also called the doctrine of sudden emergence (ākasmikatva-vāda). Amalānanda explains it as the doctrine that effects are produced at any time without depending on definite causes. An effect does not depend on any cause; it suddenly comes into being. Accidentalism believes in spontaneous generation of an event. It had antecedent non-existence and has subsequent existence at any time. A thing by its nature comes into existence at a particular time without any cause. Its appearance is uncaused. Gotama explains accidentalism as the doctrine that an effect is produced without any cause like sharpness of thorns and the like. The Cārvākas are accidentalists.

Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad mentions svabhāva or nature as the cause of the world. Saṅkara explains it as the natural powers inherent in different things, e.g., heat of fire. Saṅkarānanda explains it as the power of producing a particular effect inherent in a particular thing. Fire has a natural power of burning. Water has a natural power of flowing downward. Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad mentions accidentalism (yaḍṛcchā) and naturalism (svabhāva) separately. Vācaspati and Amalānanda also mention them separately. Amalānanda explains nature (svabhāva) as that which exists so long as the thing exists. Breathing exists so long as the living body exists. So it is the nature of the living

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14 DN., i. 2; MN., ii. 1. 10; ii. 6. 6; SN., iii; DN., ii. 10; BP., pp. 97, 135; Barna: Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, 1921, pp. 290-96; HIP., Vol. II, p. 339; Jaina Sūtras (S.B.E.), Part II, 1886, Bk. I. Ch. 1, 7-8, 12.
15 SB., i. 2; Dipikā, i. 2.
16 Niyatanimitta anapekṣya yadākādācit pravṛttiyadayo yaḍṛcchā. Kalpataru, ii. i. 33.
17 Ākasmād eva bhavati, na kiṃcidapekṣam kāryam. Haridāśājīkā on NKS., Benares, 1913, p. 9.
19 Animittato bhāvotpattib kaṇṭakataikṣṇyādiderājanāt. NS., iv. 1.
20 i. 2; SB., i. 2; Dipikā, i. 2.
body. Asvaghosa explains naturalism (svabhavavada) as the doctrine that all effects are produced by their very nature,—that they cannot be produced voluntarily. Sharpness of thorns, and various colours of beasts and birds are due to their very nature. They are not produced by anybody. Fire is hot; water is cool, air has cool touch. Who has made them various? Their differences are due to their inherent natures. Some entities are eternal beings, others are eternal non-beings. Different things have different characteristics. Their peculiarities are due to their different natures inherent in them. The Carvakas are naturalists.

2. The Denial of Causation.

They do not believe in causality and its universality. Causality is an imaginary relation between antecedents and consequents, which are perceived together on many occasions. Only antecedence of one event and consequence of another event are perceived. Invariable antecedence of one event and invariable consequence of another event are never perceived. Perception is confined to particular instances. It can never apprehend all instances in the present, past, and future. The sequence of two events perceived in the past on numerous occasions may fail in future under unforeseen circumstances. No necessary connection can be known to exist between an antecedent and a consequent. Repeated observation of one event being followed by another produces an expectation in the mind that the antecedent will be followed by the consequent in future on all occasions. Conjunction of two events on numerous occasions produces an expectation that they will be always conjoined. The Carvakas do not believe in production of an effect by a

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22 Ikhāmati, SBS., ii. 1. 33. Svabhāvas tu sa eva yāvad vastubhāvī yathā śvāsādau. Kalpataru, SBS., ii. 1. 33.
24 Agnir uṣṇo jalaḥ śītan śītaspāras tathāṁilaḥ. Kenaṁ citrītaḥ, tasmāt śvabhāvāt tadbhavasthitīḥ. SDS., Ch. I; NKSP., i. 5, p. 19.
25 Nityasattvāḥ bhavantyeke, nityasattvācā ca kecana. Vicitrāḥ kecit ityatra tattvabhāvo nityānakaḥ. NKSP., i. 5, p. 19.
26 Satakrtvo'pi tadṛṣṭau svabhācārasya sambhavat. NM., p. 119.
definite cause and in necessary and invariable connection between them.

3. The Denial of Inference.

The Čārvākas recognize perception as the only means of valid knowledge. They reject inference and testimony as means of valid knowledge. Perception is either external or internal. External perception is due to the intercourse of the five sense-organs with their objects. Internal perception depends upon external perception. The manas can work upon the material supplied by external perception. It is not independent of the external sense-organs. The perceptible world is the only reality. The things perceived by the five sense-organs only are real. The other things beyond the reach of perception are not real. Heaven and hell are not real, because they are not perceived. The tactual organ perceives softness, hardness, heat, cold, roughness, smoothness and the like. The gustatory organ perceives sweet, sour, pungent, astringent and other tastes. The olfactory organ perceives agreeable and disagreeable odours. The visual organ perceives walls, jars, posts, men, beasts, earth, mountains and the like. The auditory organ perceives various kinds of sounds. The perceptible world is real. It is an aggregate of perceptible things and qualities. The Čārvākas advocate naïve realism and empiricism. They regard perception as the only means of valid knowledge.

The Čārvākas reject inference as a means of valid knowledge. The Nyāya believes in a five-membered inference (parārthānu-māna) for demonstration to others as shown below:

1. The hill is fiery;
2. Because it is smoky;
3. Whatever is smoky is fiery, like a kitchen;
4. The hill is smoky;

∴ 5. The hill is fiery.

The first three or the last three members of the inference are enough for inference for oneself. Inference depends upon

Antahkaranasya bahirindriyatantaritveṇa bāhyেरthe svātāntreyena pravṛttīyaṃ papiṭṭhe. SDS, Ch. I.

the universal concomitance (vyāpti) between the middle term and the major term. The middle term (e.g., smoke) is the sign (liṅga), which indicates the existence of the major term (e.g., fire). It must be found to exist in the minor term (pakṣa) or the subject of inference (e.g., the hill). The middle term must be invariably accompanied by the major term. The invariable concomitance of the middle term or probans (sādhanā) with the major term or probandum (sādhyā) is called Vyāpti. It is the ground of inference. This universal relation must be unconditional. It must not be vitiated by any conditions (upādhi). The vyāpti does not cause inference by virtue of its existence, but by virtue of its being known. But how can vyāpti, the ground of inference, be known? It cannot be known by perception, external or internal. External perception arises from the intercourse of the sense-organs with their proper objects. There can be no intercourse of the sense-organs with all individuals, past, remote, and future. Vyāpti is the invariable concomitance of all cases of the middle term with all cases of the major term. But all instances of the middle term and the major term cannot be perceived with the external sense-organs. Nor can vyāpti be known by internal perception. The manas is not independent of the sense-organs in apprehending external objects. It can elaborate the material supplied by external perception. Knowledge of vyāpti is not the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the genus of the probans (e.g., the genus of smoke, dhūmatva) and the genus of the probandum (e.g., the genus of fire, agnītva), because class-characters are not known by perception. Even if they are known by it, the invariable concomitance between their class-characters does not establish the invariable concomitance between the particular instance of the probans and the particular instance of the probandum. Nor can vyāpti be known by inference, since it would lead to infinite regress (anavasthā). One vyāpti is known by inference, which is based on another vyāpti. This vyāpti is known by another inference, and so on to infinity. Nor can vyāpti be known by testimony, because it is included in inference as the Vaiśeṣika maintains. If testimony is not included in inference, it depends upon the words of a reliable person. The words are the signs of their meanings. They denote definite objects. Comprehension of the meanings of words depends upon
the knowledge of universal concomitance of words with their meanings. So vyāpti cannot be known by testimony, which also depends on the knowledge of another universal concomitance. It involves argument in a circle. We cannot believe in another person's statement that there is invariable concomitance between the probans (e.g., smoke) and the probandum (e.g., fire) any more than we can believe in a dogmatic assertion of Manu. If vyāpti is known by testimony only, there can be no inference for oneself, in which the vyāpti is not pointed out by any other person. Nor can vyāpti be known by comparison (upamāṇa), because it depends upon the universal relation between words and objects (saṃjñāsaṃjñāsaṃbandha) signified by them. Comparison is the knowledge of an object (e.g., a wild cow) indicated by the statement of a forester that 'a wild cow is like a cow'. So it depends upon invariable concomitance between words and their meanings. Hence vyāpti cannot be known by comparison. It is not known by perception, inference, testimony and comparison. Inference is not possible, since vyāpti, which is its ground, cannot be known.

Vyāpti is the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum free from all conditions (upādhi). A condition is that which does not invariably accompany the probans, but which invariably accompanies the probandum. The absence of all conditions, which vitiate the inference, can never be known. All conditions can never be perceived. The absence of all conditions can never be known by non-perception. If they are known by inference, testimony or comparison, the same difficulty will arise. Further, the knowledge of a condition must precede the knowledge of its absence. The knowledge of invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term depends upon the knowledge of the absence of the conditions. The knowledge of the absence of the conditions depends upon the knowledge of the conditions. The knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyāpti), again, depends upon the knowledge of the conditions. Thus there is reasoning in a circle. Vyāpti, the ground of inference, can never be known. Therefore inference is not possible.

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**Avyāptasādhano yaḥ śādhyaśāmasyāvyāptibh u pādhiḥ. SDS., Ch. I.**

**Avinābhāvasya durbodhatayā nānumānādyavakāśaḥ. SDS., Ch. I.**
Vyāpti is said to depend on uniform and uncontradicted perception. It is an enumerative induction based on simple enumeration (bhuyodarśana). It is based on observation of concomitance of the probans (e.g., smoke) with the probandum (e.g., fire) on numerous occasions. But even if they have accompanied each other on numerous occasions in the past, they may not accompany each other in future. The invariable concomitance between them observed so far may have exceptions in future. No necessary connection has been established between them. The invariable concomitance between smoke and fire in all times, in all places, and under all circumstances can never be known. If all instances of smoke and fire in all times and in all places in the whole world be not perceived, the doubt will persist that smoke may exist without being accompanied by fire. Even if their agreement in presence be known by observation of numerous instances of their co-presence, their agreement in absence can never be known by observation of numerous instances. It is impossible to observe that all cases of the absence of fire are the cases of the absence of smoke. Non-fiery things are all things in the world other than fire. The non-existence of smoke in all non-fiery things can never be perceived. Thus universal concomitance of the middle term with the major term can never be known, since their agreement in presence and agreement in absence in the whole world in the past, the present and the future can never be observed. Their invariable concomitance cannot be known through their class-characters because there are no class-characters or universals. So vyāpti, the ground of inference, can never be known. It cannot exist between all particular instances of the probans and the probandum with their infinite peculiarities due to different times, places, and circumstances. Vyāpti can neither exist nor be known. So inference is not possible. It can never be valid.

The Cārvākas do not believe in causation and its universality.

90 Bhūyodarśanagamyā’pi na vyāptir avakalpate. Sahasraś’pi taddṛṣte vyabhicārāvadāhāraṇāt. NM., p. 119.
91 Bhūyo drṣṭvā ca dhūmo’gnisahacārītā gamyatām. Anagnau tu a nastī na bhūyodarśaṇād gatiḥ. NM., p. 119.
92 Sāmānyadvārakopyausti nāvinābhāvaniścayāḥ. Vastavāni hi na sāmānyata nāma kih cana vidyate. NM., p. 119.
93 Deśākālādasaḥbhāvavinicītrāmasu vāṣṭuṣu. Avinābhāvaniyamo na śākyo vastum āha ca. NM., p. 119.
94 SDS., Ch. I; NM., pp., 119-20.
There is no necessary connection between cause and effect. There is only accidental conjunction of an antecedent and a consequent. The two events are found together on numerous occasions, and therefore produce an expectation in the mind that they will always go together. But there is no certainty about their co-presence. This accidental conjunction of an antecedent and a consequent cannot ensure vyāpti, which is the ground of inference.

Sāntarakṣita (705-762 A.D.) mentions the following Čārvāka argument. Inference for oneself cannot be valid for the following reasons also: (1) Because it is brought about by the middle term with three characteristics, which is invalid, like a wrong cognition. 'One's sense-organs are for the use of others, because they are composite things, like a chair.' This is a wrong inference, though the middle term has the three required characteristics. It is present in the minor term. It exists in the positive instances in which the major term exists. It does not exist in the negative instances in which the major term does not exist. (2) Because the presence of the three characteristics in the middle term cannot be the means of inference. They are present also where there is no inference, like the two characteristics of the middle term. (3) Because in every inference contradiction of it is possible. 'The major term cannot reside in the minor term, because it is a part of all the factors necessary for inference, like the minor term itself.' (4) Because an inference drawing a conclusion may be contradicted by another valid inference. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a jar.' This inference is contradicted by the inference 'Sound is eternal, because it is a quality of ākāśa, which is eternal.' (5) Because, in every inference, it is possible to find a middle term, which has invariable concomitance with the contradictory of the major term. The inference 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a jar' is contradicted by the inference 'Sound is eternal, because it is perceptible by the ear, like the genus of sound'. So inference for oneself is invalid.

Purandara (700 A.D.), a Čārvāka, argues that inference is valid in regard to the perceptible world, but that it is not valid.

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in regard to supersensible entities. But the other Cārvākās deny the validity of inference in regard to both perceptible objects and supersensible entities. "But we often act in life on inference. Some inferences lead to successful actions. Some inferences lead to unsuccessful actions. The Cārvāka holds that this is purely accidental (yādṛcchika). Inference may be accidentally true. But truth is not the essential character of inference. It is an accident of inference. In fact, probability is the guide of life."  

Perception is the only means of valid knowledge. The objects, which are perceived, exist. Imperceptible entities do not exist. If imperceptible objects are supposed to exist, then even imaginary things would exist, and the poor would remove their poverty with imaginary wealth, the servants would become masters by imagining themselves to be rich, and all would fulfill their desires with imaginary objects. The distinction between perceptible things and imaginary things would be abolished. There would, therefore, be total collapse of practical life, which depends upon the distinction between perceptible and imaginary things. Therefore imperceptible things do not exist. The perceptible world as an aggregate of perceptible things and qualities exists.

4. The Denial of the validity of the Vedas.

The Cārvākās reject the validity of the Vedas, because they are vitiated by falsehood, contradiction and tautology. They are incapable of being the means of valid knowledge. They are false because they make statements, which are false. They are contradictory because they make statements, which are incompatible with one another. They are tautologous because they repeat the same statement several times. A Vedic text declares 'one who desires a son should perform the Putreṣṭi sacrifice.'

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37 Purandara śāha—lokaprasiddham anumānam cārvākoir apiyata eva, yat tu, kaiścīlaukikam mārgam atikramya anumānam ucyate tanniśidhyate. TSP., 1482-83, p. 431.
38 IIP., p. 18. SDS., Ch. I.
Yet we find that a son is not born after the sacrifice has been performed. The text is false. Another Vedic text declares 'one who desires to go to heaven should perform the *Agnihiotra* oblation'. If a text is false with regard to perceptible results, one with regard to imperceptible results must be false. In regard to the *Agnihiotra* oblation there are the Vedic injunctions: (1) 'The oblation should be offered before sun-rise'; (2) 'The oblation should be offered after sun-rise'; (3) 'The oblation should be offered before sunrise after the stars have become invisible.' These injunctions are incompatible with one another. So at least some of them must be false. There is a Vedic text 'one should repeat the first verse thrice and the last verse thrice'. But a tautological assertion is made by a demented person.\(^{41}\) There is want of agreement (*asamvāda*) among some Vedic texts. There is incompatibility (*visamvāda*) among others. There is contradiction (*vyāghāta*) among others. So the Vedas have no validity as a source of knowledge.\(^{42}\) The three Vedas are inventions of cheats, knaves and demons. Their injunctions are meaningless jargon.\(^{43}\) The rites and ceremonies enjoined by the Vedas are the inventions of the Brāhmaṇas, who cheat the other castes to earn their livelihood. They are devoid of intelligence and manliness, and cannot earn their living by honest means.\(^{44}\) The Vedas are mere incoherent ramblings of knaves. The religious rites enjoined by them are intended to be the means of their subsistence.\(^{45}\) Religion is priestcraft. If a beast killed in a sacrifice goes to heaven, why does not the person sacrifice his own father? If the food offered at the Śrāddha ceremony appeases the hunger of the departed souls, what is the need of supplying travellers with food for the journey? Their hunger may as well be appeased by offerings of food at home. If the departed souls are gratified with the food offered on earth, why are not persons on the first floor gratified with the food offered on the ground floor? If the soul, issuing out of its body, goes

\(^{11}\) NB., NV., ii. 1. 56. Cp. UNC., UNCT., xvii., 63, 64, 67.
\(^{41}\) Asamvādavisamvādbhāvyam upramānām vedah, vyāghāta ca, NM., p. 273.
\(^{42}\) Trayō vedasya karuṇo bhashadhūrtaniśācarāb. Jarphuri turpharitvādi panditānāṁ vacabhi murtam. SDS., Ch. I.
\(^{43}\) Buddhispurusāṁatināṁ jivikā. SDS., Ch. I.
\(^{44}\) Trayā dhūrtapralāpamātratvena agnihiotrāder jivikāmātra-prayojanavā. SDS., Ch. I.
to the next world, why does it not return to this world out of affection for the dear ones? When the body is burnt to ashes, how can it come back again? The soul is identical with the body. The rites are the inventions of impostors for their livelihood.\textsuperscript{46}


The Cārvākakas admit the existence of the world. It is composed of four elements, earth, water, fire and air,\textsuperscript{47} which are perceived. The existence of ether (ākāśa) is denied, because it is not perceived. The world is composed of the four gross elements. There are no atoms of earth, water, fire and air, because they are not perceived. Some Cārvākakas admit the existence of ether (ākāśa), and regard the world as composed of the five gross elements.\textsuperscript{48} The body is a mere aggregate of the material elements. Some Cārvākakas believed in the existence of atoms. The sense-organs are produced by the atomic arrangement of the elements. Consciousness is produced by the material elements even as intoxicating liquor is produced by molasses when it undergoes fermentation.\textsuperscript{49} When they are destroyed, consciousness is destroyed. Consciousness is found in the modifications of the unconscious material elements of the body, even as red colour is found in the combination of betel, arica nut, and lime.\textsuperscript{50} Some Cārvākakas hold that consciousness is manifested by the material elements constituting the body. Consciousness is produced or manifested by the material ingredients of the body, even as intoxicating liquor is produced or manifested by its unintoxicating material ingredients. But it is objected that consciousness is always produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects in the form of sensations of colour, smell, taste, and the like. How can consciousness, then, be said to be produced by the material elements?

\textsuperscript{46} Prāti vi jalaih tvatā tejo vāyurbhūtacaturāntayam. Ādhāro bhūmir eteṣām. SDSm., 83. SDS., Ch. I. RA., ii. 108. 14-16.
\textsuperscript{47} SDSm., 83: SDS., Ch. I.
\textsuperscript{48} Kecit tu ākāśah bhūtam abhimanyamānāh paścabhūtātmakehi jagad iti nigadanti. TRD., SDSm., B.I., p. 300. Jaina Sūtras, (S.B.E.), Part II, 1895, i. 1. 7-8, p. 236.
\textsuperscript{49} Madaśaktivat ca itanyam upajāyate. SDS., Ch. I; SDSm., 84.
\textsuperscript{50} Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha.
The Cārvāka replies that the sense-organs and objects are mere aggregates of earth, water, fire and air, which are objects of direct perception. An aggregate is a mere collection of the constituent elements. It has no existence apart from that of the elements. When there is invariable concomitance between two things, they are causally connected with each other, one being the material cause of the other, which is its effect. Lamp and light are always found together. Therefore lamp is the material cause of light. There is invariable concomitance between a body and consciousness. So the body is the material cause of consciousness.

The soul is the body endowed with consciousness. There is no proof for the existence of the soul apart from the body. Consciousness is an emergent quality of the body, because it is not a quality of its ingredients. Life, voluntary actions, consciousness, recollection and the like, are said to belong to the self. But they are always perceived inside the body, and never outside it. The body is said to be the substratum of the self. The qualities of the self, which is contained in the body, cannot be identical with those of the body, which is the substratum. Cognitions, feelings, and volitions are said to be the qualities of the self, but they are erroneously identified with those of the body. This is wrong. Curds are contained in a vessel. But the coldness of curds is never regarded as the quality of the vessel. So the body is not the substratum of the self, but it is identical with the self. Cognition is a quality of the body, because it is perceived as identical with it like its complexion. ‘I see’. It means that the body has visual sensation.

References:

3. TSP., 1886, pp. 525-26, 53.
4. Caitanyavādiṣṭadeha evātmā. SBS., Ch. I. Jaina Sūtras, Part II, i. i. 12.
5. Prācacetā Caitanyasūṣṭ DeepCopy antareva deha upalabhyaṁmāh baliścānupalabhyaṁmāh dehadharmaṁ eva bhavitum arhanti. SBS., iii. 3. 53.
7. Sūtraśvākāraḥ etvād teṣam sārīraguṇavatvam. PP., p. 147. UNC., xvii. 52; UNCT., xvii. 52, 54.
If they were attributes of the soul, they could not produce changes in the body. Actions to attain an object of desire and avoid an object of aversion are perceived in the body. They are expressions of desire and aversion, which therefore must belong to the body. Desire and aversion arise from cognitions of their objects. So cognitions also must belong to the body. The gross (dhūrtā) Cārvākas identify the soul with the body endowed with consciousness. There is no soul distinct from the body, whose consciousness may exist in it, and which may go to heaven or attain liberation. The body itself is conscious. It is the soul. What exists, when another entity exists, and what does not exist, when that entity does not exist, is a property of that entity. Heat and light exist, when fire exists. They do not exist, when it does not exist. So heat and light are properties of fire. Likewise, consciousness in its various forms exists, when the body exists, and it does not exist, when the body does not exist. Further, consciousness is experienced in the body, and it is never experienced outside it. So it is a property of the body. It is not a property of the soul distinct from the body. Kambalāśvatara (500 B.C.), a Cārvāka, holds that consciousness springs from the body itself through the operation of the vital forces. Some identify him with Ajita Keśakambala, a contemporary of the Buddha.

The soul's identity with the body is proved by such common experiences as 'I am fat', 'I am lean', 'I am fair', 'I am black', 'I am going' etc. Fatness, leanness, fairness, blackness, movement etc., are qualities of the body. Therefore the soul is identical with the body endowed with consciousness. This is the view of the gross Cārvākas.

But the cultured (susūkṣita) Cārvākas maintain that there is a soul apart the body, which is the permanent knower, recollector and enjoyer of all experiences, but that it is destroyed along
with the body.\textsuperscript{42} It does not survive the death of the body, and transmigrate into some other body. If there were a transmigrating soul, it would recollect the experiences of the past births, even as a person recollects his past experiences of this life during childhood and youth. So the soul persists till the destruction of the body.

Some Cārvākas identify the soul with the body on the strength of such common experiences as 'I am fat', 'I am lean' etc. Some identify it with the external sense-organs on the strength of such common experiences as 'I am blind', 'I am deaf' etc. Some identify it with life on the strength of such common experiences as 'I am hungry', 'I am thirsty' etc. Others identify it with manas, the internal organ, on the strength of such common experiences as 'I am resolved,' 'I am in doubt' etc. Resolution and doubt are functions of manas.\textsuperscript{43}

6. No Pre-existence and Future Life.

The Cārvākas deny pre-existence. The body is the cause of consciousness. There was no pre-existent soul before the birth of the present body. The manas in the past body cannot produce the manas in the present body, because they reside in different bodies. Or the last cognition in the past body cannot produce the first cognition in the present body, because the two cognitions belong to two different series. There can be no causal connection between them. Therefore there is no pre-existence.\textsuperscript{44}

The Cārvākas deny future existence. Consciousness is generated by the four material elements,—earth, water, fire and air. Consciousness emerges from them, when they are transformed into the body. It is destroyed, when it disintegrates into its constituent elements. It does not persist after disintegration of the body. The Buddhists hold that the dying consciousness

\textsuperscript{42} Suśiṣṭa ś cārvāka śuh. Yāvaccharāram avaśhitam ekaṁ pramāṇārthatvam annaandhānādīvyavahārasamantham astu nāma. Na ca pārvivalāram apahāya ivaśrīantarur samikrāmati pramāṇā. NM., p. 467.


\textsuperscript{44} Kāryakāraṇād nāti vivāda-puduceṣuḥ. Vibhinnadharṣṭītvād gavāśvajñānamayoriva. TS., 1861. TSF., 1861-62.
of an Arhat does not produce another body. The Cārvākas argue that the last cognition of an ordinary person tainted with afflictions cannot produce another body, even as the last cognition of an Arhat free from afflictions does not produce another body. Therefore there is no future life.\textsuperscript{45}

It may be urged that there is potency of consciousness in the foetus, which is produced by the dying consciousness in the past body. Therefore consciousness cannot be said to spring from the body itself only. The Cārvākas argue that there can be no consciousness in the foetus, which is devoid of the sense-organs. Consciousness is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with objects. But in the foetus there are neither sense-organs nor objects. So there can be no consciousness as their effect. Just as in a state of swoon there is no consciousness, so there can be no consciousness in the foetus. It cannot exist in a latent form also in it, because there is no substratum in which it can exist. There is no soul in which it can exist. There is no series of cognitions in which it can exist. The body only can be the substratum of consciousness. The past body ceased to exist. Therefore the dying consciousness could not exist in the form of a potency. Therefore there is no future birth or transmigration.\textsuperscript{46}

It may be argued that dying consciousness in the past body produces consciousness in an intermediate body, which is produced immediately after death, in which it exists. But the Cārvākas argue that the intermediate body is not perceived and therefore non-existent, and further that consciousness in different bodies cannot belong to the same chain. The consciousness in the dead body and the consciousness in the intermediate body exist in different bodies. Therefore they cannot belong to the same chain, even as the consciousness of an elephant cannot exist in the body of a horse. The cognitions belonging to the same 'chain' of cognitions cannot exist in different bodies. So the consciousness produced by the dying consciousness cannot

\textsuperscript{45} Sarāgamaranam cittam na cittāntarmanandhikrt.
Maranajñānabhāvena vitakleśásya tad yathā. TS., 1863.
TSP., 1858-59. RA., ii. 108. 17.

\textsuperscript{46} Jñānadhārātmano'sattve deha eva tadāśrayaḥ.
Ante dehanivṛttan ca jñānavṛttih kimāśraya.
TS., 1868. TSP., 1864-67.
exist either in the permanent soul, which is non-existent or in an intermediate body. Therefore there is no rebirth.87

The Cārvākās deny the reality of souls, virtue (dharma) and vice (adharma), merit (puṇya) and demerit (pāpa), actions (karma) and their fruits (phala).88 They deny pre-existence, future life, transmigration, Law of Karma, heaven, hell, and liberation. They are not perceived; therefore they are non-existent. There are no duties relating to the castes and the stages of life (varpāśramadharmā), which can produce fruits in the form of happiness and misery. The material world is perceived, and therefore existent. The variety in the world is natural.89

Heaven is non-existent. Heavenly happiness is a figment of imagination. No sacrifices (e.g., Agnisṭoma) involving expenditure of a large amount of money and intense bodily pain should be performed, because they do not produce happiness in heaven, which is non-existent. Sacrifices, charity and other acts of piety are performed for profit, fame, self-glorification and acquiring power over other people for success in battles. They are motivated by self-interest and prudence. No actions are altruistic and disinterested.

Hell is non-existent. There is no other hell than bodily pain produced by thorns and the like. Mundane pain is hell. It ought to be avoided. God is non-existent. The king, who rules over the people, is the supreme Lord (parameśvara). He is perceived by all. The extinction of the body is liberation.90 There is no supra-mundane non-temporal good. Actions cannot have visible and invisible effects. They have not two series of consequences, mundane and supra-mundane. They have no deferred effects, which will appear in the next world or in a future birth.

87 TSP., 1890-70.
88 Rājaśekhara Sāri: Saṭārṣanasamuccaya, Benares, Yaśovijaya-jainagranthamālā, No. 17, 188-60. Jaina Śūtras, Part II, i. 1, 12, p. 237.
89 Svābhāvikārā jagadvaicitryam.
Śridhara Swāmi’s commentary, B.G., xvi. & SDS., Ch. I.
 Lokāyata va daityevam nāsti devo na uvaḥḥitvā.
Dharmādharman na vidyate na phalaḥ puṇyapāpayoḥ.
SDSṁ., 86.

The Cārvākas reject dharma and mokṣa as the ends of life. They regard sensual pleasure (kāma) as the supreme end. It is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects. Pleasure arising from the embrace of a woman and other objects of enjoyment is the highest good. Sensual pleasure does not cease to be good because it is mixed with pain. Pleasure only should be enjoyed. Pain that inevitably accompanies pleasure should be avoided as far as possible. Unavoidable pain that accompanies pleasure should be experienced for the sake of pleasure. A person should separate bones and scales from the fish to enjoy the pleasure of eating it. He should not discard it because it has scales and bones. He should take the trouble of separating the husk from the paddy to enjoy the pleasure of eating fine rice. He should not discard rice because he has to separate it from the husk. It is foolish not to sow seeds of corns because there are wild animals, which may devour the corns. It is foolish not to cook food because beggars may pester us for a share of food. It is improper to discard pleasure through fear of pain that inevitably accompanies it. One who rejects sentient pleasure, which is actually experienced, for fear of its accompanying pain, is as stupid as a beast. It is foolish to think that pleasure should be relinquished, which is produced by the intercourse of the senses with their objects, because it is attended with pain. Hedonistic calculus has to be employed. The maximum of sensual pleasure with the minimum of pain is the highest good. There is no supra-mundane happiness or good. Injunctions and prohibitions should be discarded.

Wealth is a means to pleasure. It ought to be acquired for the sake of pleasure. Pleasure is an intrinsic value. Wealth is an instrumental value. Pleasure and wealth both constitute the human good. This is the view of the authors of Nītiśāstra

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11 Kāma evaikāh puruṣārthāh. Śrīdhara's commentary, BG., xvi. 11, Kāmopahboṣtraparamāh. BG., xvi. 11. Paramāh puruṣārthāh kāmopahboṣtra. SBG., xvi. 11. RA., i., 106, 13.
12 Aṅganāṃgaṇāḍijanyāṁ sukhanāva puruṣārthāh. SDS, Ch. I. UNC., xvii. 69. UNCT., xvii. 69.
13 Duḥkhaḥbhayānānakūlaivedaniyāṁ sukhaṁ tyaktum uṣṭam. SDS., Ch. I.
14 Tyāyaṁ sukhaṁ viṣayasaṅgamajantaṁ pūrisāṁ duḥkhoparṣṭam iti mūrkhaṁvīcāraṇaṁ. Prabodhacandrodaya, Act II, 23. SDS., Ch. I. UNC., UNCT., xvii. 83.
and Kāmaśāstra. It is accepted by the Cārvākas, who deny the other-worldly good.\textsuperscript{19} Virtue consists in the enjoyment of sensual pleasure due to the gratification of desires. It is the highest virtue. Supreme happiness springs from the gratification of desires.\textsuperscript{18}

Righteousness consists in conduciveness to sensual pleasure. Wrongness consists in conduciveness to bodily pain. An action, which gives excess of pleasure over pain, is right. An action, which gives excess of pain over pleasure, is wrong. The Cārvākas advocate gross egoistic hedonism like Aristippus. The Brāhmaṇas, who are consummate in the art of fraudulence, and who composed the Vedas, delude foolish people to think that certain articles of food and drink are permitted while others are forbidden,—that fidelity to one's wife is a virtue while adultery is a vice. They enjoin bodily austerities on the gullible people in the vain expectation of happiness in heaven, which is never perceived. They produce in the ignorant people foolish other-worldly madness of religion.\textsuperscript{22}

'Eat, drink, and be merry.' The past is dead and gone. It never returns.\textsuperscript{20} Youth never returns, make the most of the present youth. Bodily pleasures of this world are perceptible and certain. The pleasures of heaven attainable through mortification of the body are imperceptible, uncertain and illusory. Pursuit of distant, uncertain, and supersensible heavenly happiness at the cost of certain, immediate, perceptible earthly pleasures is foolish.\textsuperscript{21} Penances are deprivations of pleasure. Religious rites are childish play. Enjoy all kinds of pleasures attainable from earthly objects.\textsuperscript{22} After death nothing remains.

\textsuperscript{19} Nitikāmaśāstrānāreṇa arthakāmāveva puruṣārthaiḥ manyamānāḥ pāralaukikam artham apahnuvānāḥ cārvākamatamānnavartamānāḥ. SDS., Ch. I. BG., xvi. 12.

\textsuperscript{18} Dharmah kāmāḥ na paraḥ. Kāma eva parama dharmah, tajjāntaneva paramastu sukham. TRD., SDSm., 86, p. 308.

\textsuperscript{20} Ami dharmacchādhabhūtāḥ paravaṇica-prapraṇaṇaḥ yat kim ēd annamānāgamādilāṃkāryam ādārśya vyartham mugdhajanān svargād-pratītalabhyābhoga-hoṣapralabhanyāḥ bhakṣyābhakṣyagamyāgamyāhyopadeyādi saṅkṣete pātavyanti, mugdhādbhāmakāndhyām cotpādayanti. Laghuvrīttī, SDSm., 81, p. 73.

\textsuperscript{21} Piva khaḍa ca, yad atitam tanna ite. SDSm., 82.

\textsuperscript{22} Laghuvrīttī, SDSm., 85, pp. 75-76; TRD., p. 395.

\textsuperscript{22} Yāraja[jīva] sukha[ḥ] jīva[t] āvāṣyakah sukham, Bhāsnibhūtasya dehasya punarāgamanam kutaḥ.

TRD., p. 302. UNCT., xvii. 69.
The body is a fortuitous combination of the material elements. There is no pre-existence nor future life nor rebirth. The body is not due to the merits and demerits of the past birth. Pleasure and pain are not due to the maturation of the merits and demerits of the past birth. They are due to the intercourse of the senses with their objects. The fortuitous conjunction of the material elements is liable to destruction at any moment. The present is certain. The past is gone. The future is uncertain. So enjoy pleasures of the present moment disregarding the past and the future. Enjoy the maximum of bodily pleasure with the minimum of pain disregarding the next world. This is gross egoistic hedonism like that of Aristippus.

But Vātsyāyana, the author of Kāma Sūtra, makes a distinction between higher pleasures and lower pleasures, rational pleasures and sensual pleasures. He regards happiness (kāma), wealth (artha), and virtue (dharma) as the supreme ends of life. Wealth and happiness should be pursued in harmony with virtue. They should not be cultivated at the sacrifice of one another. Harmony of happiness, wealth and virtue is the highest good. One who pursues the triple ends (trivarga) enjoys supreme happiness on earth and in heaven after death. Wealth is superior to happiness. Happiness is superior to virtue (dharma). When there is a conflict among them, the former should be pursued at the sacrifice of the latter, but the latter should not be pursued at the sacrifice of the former, since the former are superior to the latter. If there is no incompatibility among the three ends, all should be pursued. This is the best course. If they are not realizable at the same time owing to their incompatibility, then two of them should be attained. This is the middle course. If even the two ends cannot be realized simultaneously owing to their incompatibility, only one of them should be achieved. This is the worst course. Excessive charity is conducive to dharma; but it exhausts wealth, and thwarts happiness. Excessive penance sacrifices happiness, undermines health, and destroys the capacity for earning wealth. Excessive hoarding.

61 Bhūta-catuṣṭayasya-saṃbandhāṁ eva kāya, na ca pūrvabhāvādiśabhaśabha-karmavipākavedyānuskhañākhahādisavyapakeśāḥ. Paralokashākānkeṣāya tapaścarapādikāṣṭakriyābhirīhatyasukhopeṣā vyarthā. Laghuvyṛti, SB Sm., 82, pp. 73-74.
of wealth sacrifices happiness and dharma. Excessive indulgence in sexual pleasure sacrifices wealth and dharma. So these should be avoided. When an action is conducive to one end and repugnant to the others, its comparative merits and demerits should be considered. Wealth, happiness and virtue should be pursued in harmony with one another; they should not be pursued as destructive of one another. There are sixty-four fine arts (kalā) which yield refined pleasure. Both sensual pleasure and refined pleasure should be pursued. So Vātsyāyana, like Epicurus, is an advocate of refined egoistic hedonism. The Bhāgavata Puraṇa refers to persons who pursue the three ends of wealth, happiness and virtue (traivargika), and are averse to God. Jayamaṅgalā interprets Vātsyāyana’s doctrine as refined egoistic hedonism, which regards wealth and virtue as means to happiness. Vātsyāyana regards happiness as the only intrinsic value, and wealth and virtue as instrumental and extrinsic values.\(^4\)

The Čārvākas criticize the other systems. The Advaita Vedāntists maintain that in saṁsāra jīva and Brahman both exist, but that in release jīva is destroyed when its avidyā is destroyed. Mokṣa is destruction of self. It is mukti indeed! Extinction of oneself (jīva) for the sake of One is pursued by a fool! The Vedāntists are fools. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika mokṣa is the extinction of all specific qualities of the soul, which is as good as petrifaction. It is not at all covetable. God of the Naiyāyika, the creator of the world, is said to be compassionate and truthful. Why does he not, then, make us happy by his mere words? If God is the supervisor of merits and demerits, he unnecessarily courts our displeasure, since merits and demerits inevitably bear their fruits and he does not give us fruits of our actions. If he gives us fruits by activating merits and demerits, he is not kind to creatures. So the hypothesis of God is gratuitous. All systems of philosophy are false, since they contradict

\(^4\) Dharmārthakāmebhyo namā. Kāmasūtra, K.S.S., Benares, 1929, i. 1. Anyonyānumbhādham parasparānupaghātakam trivargam seveta. Ibid, ii. 1; ii. 49.

Api nāma trivargesmin sevetottarabādhakam.

Pārvasya tu pradhānāvānā sevanyak pārvabādhakah.


Sukhārtham dharmārthayoh sevā. Ibid, ii. 47. ep. Kapilaghtā (Bhāgavata), viii. 18.
one another, and are based on reason which can be overthrown by stronger reason.***

8. Criticism of the Carvāka doctrines of Accidentalism and Naturalism.

The Nyāya criticizes the Carvāka doctrine of accidentalism (yadṛcchāvāda) or spontaneous generation. Gotama mentions a doctrine that things are produced without any cause, like sharpness of thorns and the like. Vātsyāyana interprets it as the doctrine that bodies and other effects are without any efficient causes, like sharpness of thorns, various colours of the minerals of mountains, hardness of stones and the like. They have material causes, but no efficient causes. Vātsyāyana urges that if things originate from a non-cause (animitta), then the non-cause being a cause, production of an effect is not uncaused or spontaneous.** Whatever a thing springs from is its cause. It is said to be produced from a non-cause. Therefore the non-cause is its cause. Uddyotakara argues that if we do not perceive the efficient cause of a thing, we can know it by inference. Thorns, minerals, stones and the like have shapes like a jar. So they must have efficient causes as a jar has. Uddyotakara asks whether only production of certain things like thorns and the like is without causes or whether production of all things is without causes. If thorns and the like only are without causes, then all other things are produced by causes. If, on the other hand, all things are without causes, then it involves self-contradiction. The exponent of the doctrine expounds his view to produce conviction in others. He intends to produce conviction in others. He intends to produce conviction, which is an effect, in others' minds by expounding his doctrine that all things are without causes. His enunciation of his doctrine implies a belief in the view that an effect is produced by a cause. Therefore his doctrine involves self-contradiction. Thorns and the like have particular arrangements of parts, and must therefore have causes.*** Udayana interprets accidentalism (ākasmikatva-

*** Tarkāpratīṣṭhāyā sāmyād anyonyasya vyatīghatām. Nāprāmāṇyam matānām avat keśām satpratipakṣavat.

** Animittato bhāvotpattiḥ. NS., iv. 1. 22. Animittasya nimitratvāt na animittā bhāvotpattiḥ. NB., iv. 1. 23.

vāda) as denial of a cause, denial of production of an effect, denial of a cause other than the effect itself, denial of an undefinable or unreal cause, or affirmation of nature (svabhāva) as a cause. If an effect has no cause, it is uncaused or eternal. If it is not produced, it is uncaused or eternal. If it has no other cause than itself, then also it is uncaused or eternal. If it has an indefinable or unreal cause, it cannot be produced. If it spontaneously emerges, then it would appear at all times. But it appears at a particular time. Its appearance at a particular time contradicts its spontaneous generation. If an effect suddenly emerged without a definite cause, or if it appeared at any time, then it would not appear at a particular time. But it is perceived to appear at a particular time. This proves that an effect has a definite cause. Occasionalness of an effect precludes all the hypotheses mentioned above.

Rājaśekhara Sūri criticizes accidentalism thus. If effects did not depend upon definite causes, they would either always exist, or they would always not exist. But if they depend upon other causes, then only they can appear at a particular time. So they are produced by particular causes. Rājaśekhara mentions time (kāla), nature (svabhāva), destiny (niyati), and fate (bhavatvayāt) as causes of all things.

Udayana and Vardhamāna criticize naturalism (svabhāvavāda). Svabhāva is one's own nature or peculiar character. It is either the peculiar nature of the cause or the peculiar nature of the effect. If it is the peculiar nature of the effect, it does not exist before the effect, and so cannot determine its production at a particular time. The nature of an effect cannot exist before its production. If svabhāva is the nature of the cause, then the effect has a cause. If the cause does not exist, it cannot have a nature (svabhāva). If it exists and has a nature from which the effect springs, then it has a cause. Thus naturalism is undermined. Svabhāva may be said to be the

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**References:**

Tbid, 179.
power (śakti) of a cause. But the Nyāya does not admit the reality of power. If svabhāva is the nature of an effect, then the effect is produced spontaneously, or it is its own cause. But the effect does not exist before its production. So the nature of the effect cannot be its cause. If the effect is said to be without a cause or emerge out of its own nature, then it would always be produced. But an effect is produced at a particular time and in a particular place. It is restricted to a particular time and place, and to a particular cause. If it were unrestricted, it would be produced at all times and in all places. A particular effect depends upon a particular cause. Otherwise, it would not be produced at a particular time. Therefore mere inherent natures (svabhāva) cannot account for production of particular effects by particular causes at particular times. Thus naturalism is not tenable.\textsuperscript{90}


The Cārvāka holds that consciousness is generated by the material elements, which are combined and transformed into the body. He argues that consciousness is a quality of the body, because it is present when the body is present, and because it is absent when the body is absent. The joint method proves that body is the cause of consciousness.

The Nyāya refutes the Cārvāka doctrine. Vātsyāyana argues that though consciousness is perceived in the body, it may not be its quality. Fluidity and heat are perceived in water. Fluidity is its quality. But heat is the quality of fire. Likewise, consciousness may not be a quality of the body in which it is perceived. It may be a quality of the soul, which is different from the body. Consciousness is not a quality of the body like its complexion, because complexion continues to exist as long as the body lasts, but consciousness ceases to exist in a dead body. Therefore it is not a quality of the body, just as heat is not a quality of water. Further, consciousness pervades the entire body, which consists of many component parts. If consciousness were a quality of the body, it would be a quality of its component parts. But they are not found to be sentient. The qualities of

\textsuperscript{90} NKS., NKSP., i, 5, pp. 15-20.
the body are either perceptible by the external sense-organs or imperceptible. Its complexion is perceived by the visual organ. Its gravity is not perceptible. But consciousness is neither perceptible by the external senses nor imperceptible. It is perceived through the manas. Therefore it is the quality of a substance, which is different from the body. It is not a quality of the body.  

The Cārvāka maintains that consciousness is not eternal and all-pervading, but that it is a subtle form of matter, which is transformed into the body. Udayana urges that if consciousness were a quality of the body, there could be no recollection in youth of what was perceived in childhood, just as what was perceived by Caitra cannot be remembered by Maitra. The body undergoes modification. It increases and decreases. It does not remain the same. The size of the young body is larger than that of the child body. The smaller dimension of the former is succeeded by a larger dimension of the latter. Destruction of the child body is the cause of destruction of its small dimension. Therefore recollection in youth of what was perceived in childhood is not due to the sameness of the body. Nor can there be recollection by a subsequent body, of what was perceived by an antecedent body owing to transference of impressions (vāsanā- satiksrama), the latter being the cause of the former. If it were possible, what was perceived by the mother would be remembered by the child, the mother being the cause of the child. The Cārvāka may argue that there is transference of impressions from the material cause to the effect i.e., from the antecedent body to the subsequent body. Then there could be no recollection of what was perceived by a hand, when it is severed from the body, because a severed hand is not a material cause of the subsequent body. Nor can the Cārvāka argue that the atoms of the body, which are permanent, remember past experiences. If it were so, then recollection would not be perceived because the atoms in which it subsists are imperceptible. But, in fact, recollection is perceived through the manas. There would be no recollection of what was perceived by the atoms of the hand severed from the body, because there is no longer con-

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NB., iii. 2. 46, 47, 50, 53; NV., iii. 2. 35; NVTT., iii. 2. 81; V.S.S., Benares, 1886, p. 407.
junction of the atoms with the body. Therefore consciousness cannot be a quality of the body.\(^22\)

Jayanta argues that recollection and apperception become inexplicable, if the body is the substratum of consciousness. The body undergoes modification. The subsequent body cannot remember what was perceived by the antecedent body, because they are different. The unity of consciousness cannot be accounted for by the diversity of bodily modifications. The body is an aggregate of many parts with a particular arrangement. Consciousness is not a quality of the body, because it does not persist so long as the body persists.\(^23\) A dead body is devoid of consciousness. If consciousness were a quality of the body, any increase or decrease of the body would bring about increase or decrease of consciousness. But this is never found. Therefore consciousness can never be a quality of the body. The sense-organs are material, and cannot have consciousness. If the sense-organs had consciousness, there could be no apperception of the impressions of colour, taste, smell, extension, and temperature of an object apprehended through different sense-organs into the unity of knowledge. The sense-organs are many, and they have diverse consciousnesses. They cannot have unity of consciousness. But the manas is one, eternal, non-physical, and apprehends all objects. So it may be said to have consciousness. But this is not tenable. The manas is an internal organ of the self, through which it perceives cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition. Non-simultaneity of experiences is due to the atomic nature of the manas, which comes into contact with the different sense-organs in succession. If the manas itself were conscious and endued with the power of apperception, there would be no succession of sensory experiences. Therefore the manas cannot be the substratum of cognition, pleasure, pain, and volition. If the Čārvāka persists in regarding it as conscious, his manas differs from the self (ātman) in name only. Voluntary actions in the body are due to its being guided by the self. Volitions to achieve good and avoid evil belong to the self, which are expressed in the voluntary actions of the body. So consciousness is not a quality of the

\(^{22}\) NKS., i. 15, pp. 74-75; NKSM., i. 15, pp. 75-76.
\(^{23}\) Na śāfradharmaś caityanyam ayāvadṛvyatḥāvītvāt. NM., p. 429.
body, or the sense-organs, or the manas. It is a quality of the self (atman).

The Sāmkhya refutes the Čārvāka doctrine of the origin of consciousness. Vijñānabhaiku argues that consciousness is not a natural quality of the body, because it is not found in its material elements when they are separated from one another. It is due to other conditions. If it were a natural quality of the body, it would persist in it in deep sleep, swoon, and death. But it is never found in these states. So it is not a natural quality of the body, since a natural quality persists so long as the substance persists. Consciousness may be said to be generated by the combination of the material elements of the body, which is a quality of their aggregate, even as inebriating power exists in liquor, which is an aggregate of its ingredients, though it does not exist in its ingredients. But Vijñānabhaiku argues that if consciousness exists in the separate elements of the body, then only it can be generated by their combination in the whole body. But consciousness is not found in the separate parts of the body. Inebriating power exists in a latent condition in the ingredients of liquor. Therefore it is generated by them, when they are combined with one another. But consciousness does not exist in the material ingredients of the body. Its existence in them cannot be proved by any means of valid knowledge. The Čārvāka may argue that the existence of consciousness in a latent condition may be inferred from its existence in the whole body. But the assumption of many powers of consciousness in the parts of the body is useless, because it violates the parsimony of hypotheses. It is more rational to assume the existence of one permanent soul in the body, whose essence is consciousness. It may be argued that as large magnitude and the power of containing water are found in a jar, though they are not found in its parts, so consciousness is found in the whole body, though it is not found in its separate parts. This argument is invalid. The specific qualities of a material product (e.g., a jar) are produced by the similar qualities of its material cause. So if consciousness does not exist in parts of the body, it cannot be produced in the whole body.

**NM., pp. 430-41.
** Svabhāvasya yavaddrayahbhāvitāt. SPB., iii. 21.
** Rkasyaiva nityacarviṣeṣyasya kalpanaucityāt. SPB., iii. 22.
** Kāraṇe caitanyān vinā dehe caitanyaśambhavāt. SPB., iii. 22.
Consciousness is not found in its separate parts. So it cannot be produced by their combination."

The Advaita Vedāntists, Śaṅkara and Vācaspati, refute the Cārvāka doctrine of the origin of consciousness. Consciousness is not a quality of the body for the following reasons. First, consciousness does not exist in deep sleep, swoon and the like, though the body exists. If it is a quality of the body, it must be a specific quality. It is not a generic quality, like number, magnitude, conjunction and the like. But a specific quality exists as long as the substance exists. Consciousness sometimes does not exist, when the body exists. So it is not its specific quality. Secondly, colour and other qualities of the body are perceived by all persons. But a person’s consciousness can be perceived by him only. Therefore it is not a quality of the body. Thirdly, consciousness may exist in the disembodied soul after death of the body. Even this doubt disproves the Cārvāka doctrine that consciousness is a property of the body. Fourthly, if consciousness is generated by the material elements, is it material or immaterial? The Cārvāka does not admit the reality of anything but the four material elements. So consciousness is not immaterial. It cannot be generated by the material elements, because it apprehends them and their products as objects. Colour cannot apprehend itself or the colour of any other thing. But consciousness apprehends the internal qualities of the self and the external material elements and their products. A quality of matter is insentient, and cannot apprehend itself as an object of consciousness. But consciousness apprehends matter and its qualities, and must therefore be different from them. Consciousness is self-luminous, but objects are manifested by consciousness. Therefore consciousness can never be identical with its objects. Fifthly, if the body is endued with consciousness, it cannot account for memory, recognition, and unity and continuity of consciousness, which presuppose the identity of the permanent self. Sixthly, consciousness cannot be a quality of the body, because there are many dream-cognitions during sleep, when the body becomes inactive. Lastly, there cannot be visual perception without light; but it is not a property of light. Light is a condition of visual perception. There is no consciousness

without body in our embodied life. But it is not a property of the body, which is an instrument or auxiliary condition of consciousness to apprehend objects. Therefore the soul is different from the body, and consciousness is not a quality of the body.\(^{89}\)

Rājaśekhara Sūri criticizes the Čārvāka doctrine thus. 'I know a jar'. This knowledge bears testimony to the existence of 'I' or the self, the act of knowing, and an object of knowledge. The existence of the self cannot be denied. The body is unconscious, and cannot therefore be a knower. It cannot acquire consciousness, when the material elements are combined with one another and constitute the body. The self is one. It combines sensations of colour, sound, taste, smell and touch into the unity of an object. It remembers an object perceived in the past. The body cannot generate the unity of apperception and identity of the perceiving and remembering self. One's own self can be known by self-consciousness (svāsaṁvedana) in one's own body. The self in another's body can be known by inference. A voluntary action is preceded by prevision of an end. So there must be consciousness which prompts the action. The existence of consciousness cannot be denied. It is not a quality of the body, but of the self. The self in a body is one, permanent, and has personal identity. It accounts for the unity of knowledge.\(^{100}\)

Vidyānandisvāmi, a Jaina philosopher, criticizes the Čārvāka doctrine of the origin of consciousness. The existence of the self is proved by self-consciousness (svāsaṁvedana), which is not contradicted. If consciousness were a modification of the material elements, and a quality of the body composed of them, it could never be known by self-consciousness, which is uncontradicted. It is known by self-awareness, which refers to 'I' (ahātikārāspada). The material elements are known by external perception through the sense-organs, which refers to 'this'. They are known as objects. If consciousness were not known, it could not apprehend objects. If it were known by another consciousness, it would lead to infinite regress. Consciousness is self-aware. 'I am happy'. This is known by self-awareness. It is different from the material elements.

The body and consciousness have different characteristics. The body has hardness. Consciousness has self-awareness. The

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\(^{89}\) SRS., Bhāmatī, iii. 3. 54; HP., pp. 26-27; Kalpatarn, SBS., iii. 3. 54.

\(^{100}\) SDSmr., 165-70.
body is known by external perception through the sense-organs. Consciousness is known by self-awareness, which is independent of the external sense-organs. So consciousness is different from the body.

The body is not the cause or the manifest of consciousness. Consciousness is always manifested, like the material elements. It is not produced by them at some time. If it is produced by them, it cannot be manifested by them. Only a pre-existent entity can be manifested. A non-existent entity cannot be manifested.

The material elements are not the auxiliary causes of consciousness. Consciousness has no material cause. In the absence of its material cause (upādāna kāraṇa), the material elements, which are auxiliary causes, cannot produce consciousness. It may be argued that consciousness is produced by the material elements in the absence of its material cause, even as fire is produced by wood in the absence of its material cause. This is wrong. Invisible fire is the material cause of visible fire. So dormant consciousness must be the cause of manifest consciousness, when it is produced by the material elements, which are its auxiliary causes (sahakāri kāraṇa).

A subtle material element may be said to be the material cause of consciousness. It is either homogeneous with consciousness or heterogeneous from it. If it is heterogeneous from it, it cannot be its material cause. The material cause must be of the same kind as its effect. Cow-dung, which is different from scorpions, may be said to be their material cause. This is wrong, because matter (pudgala) is the material cause of the body of a scorpion, and cow-dung is its auxiliary cause.

The subtle element may be said to be homogeneous with consciousness because of its possessing beinghood (sattā) or the genus of substance (dravyatva). Then earth, water, fire, and air also are the material causes of one another because of their possessing beinghood or the genus of substance. If the material elements are the material cause of one another, they are either not contained or contained in one another. If they are not contained in one another, then consciousness also is not contained in the subtle matter, which is its material cause, and therefore is an immaterial entity different from matter. If the material elements are contained in one another, then there is only one matter,
and there are not four material elements, as the Cārvāka maintains. But this is wrong, since they cannot, in that case, be causes or effects.

If the subtle element is different from the material elements and akin to consciousness, and therefore its material cause, then it is devoid of the properties of matter, apprehended by self-consciousness, or by inference, and is the fifth entity called the self.

If the sense-organs are the material cause of consciousness, then it must exist when they exist. But there is consciousness, even when the sense-organs are destroyed, and there is no consciousness, even when they exist in deep sleep and swoon. If the body is the material cause of consciousness, it should exist in a dead body, which is not a fact of experience.

If consciousness is generated by the aggregate of the material elements, it should appear when earth, water, fire and air are combined with one another. But it is not true. If they generate consciousness, they are endued with consciousness. If the body and the sense-organs generate consciousness, they must possess consciousness. If they are conscious, they can generate consciousness. So consciousness only can be the material cause of consciousness. Therefore the body is neither the cause nor the manifestor of consciousness.

If consciousness were a quality of the body, it would exist in a dead body, and be perceived by an external sense-organ. But it neither exists in a dead body nor is perceived by an external sense-organ. If consciousness is said to be imperceptible through the external senses because of its subtlety, like atoms of the body, in which it exists, then consciousness would not be perceived in a living body also. It cannot be said that the qualities of the parts of the body are not qualities of the body, because the parts and the whole are not different from each other in nature. Consciousness is perceived in a living body. But it is not perceived in a dead body. If consciousness existed in the atoms of the body, it would be imperceptible in a living body and a dead body alike.

Consciousness is not apprehended by perception through the external sense-organs. But it is apprehended by self-awareness. So it is not a quality of the body. If it is a quality of the body in spite of its being apprehended by self-awareness, then its
touch also would be apprehended by self-awareness, which is not true.

If consciousness is a special quality of the living body like life, then it would be perceptible through the external senses like life, which is perceived through the tactual organ. Further, if it is a special quality of the body, it must pre-exist in its constituent material elements. If it does not pre-exist in them, it cannot be produced in the body, which is their product.

If consciousness is a general quality of the body in common with its constituent material elements, then it should exist in them like touch, even when they are not transformed into the body, and it should not be generated by them at a particular time, when they are transformed into the body. If consciousness is not produced in them because they are not transformed into a particular form called ‘body’, then it is a special quality of the material elements transformed into the body. It has already been shown to be untenable. These defects can be removed by discarding the hypothesis that consciousness is a quality of the body, produced or manifested by its constituent material elements, and by admitting that it is a quality of an entity different from the body called the self.101

‘I am happy’. This consciousness does not belong to an object. If it were so, it would be apprehended by perception through the external sense-organs. It belongs to the knowing self, which experiences happiness. It cannot exist without any substratum, which must be different from the body, the sense-organs, and objects. It perceives, remembers, recognizes, apperceives past and present experiences, feels and acts. It is a knower, enjoyer and active agent. It is permanent and endured with the quality of consciousness.102

Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, Buddhist philosophers, criticize the Carvāka doctrine of consciousness. The body cannot be the cause of consciousness. The Buddhist maintains that consciousness itself is the cause of a body,—that initial consciousness produces a foetus. So consciousness cannot be generated by the present body. If the body is the cause of

101 TSV., Bombay, (NSP.) 1918, i. 96-136.
102 TSV., i. 137-59. Sa evāmā ārāṇāvatā prākāsanā kartāṁabhabhavita smartānumahādā. TSV., l. 139.
consciousness, it is its cause either as a composite whole, or as an aggregate of atoms, either with the sense-organs or without them. The body, as a single composite whole (avayavin) cannot be the cause of consciousness, since there is no whole other than an aggregate of parts. The Buddhist denies the existence of the whole. Further, earth, water, fire and air cannot form a single whole. Nor can the body, as an aggregate of atoms, be the cause of a cognition. The atoms of the body severally cannot produce the cognition, which would then be a collection of many cognitions produced by them. Nor can the atoms collectively produce the cognition, since a defect in any part of the body would stop the production of it. A defect in a part of the seed stops the production of a sprout. The body with the sense-organs cannot produce consciousness. The sense-organs severally cannot produce consciousness, because consciousness is produced even when the motor organs are paralysed, and because consciousness appears even when the cognitive organs are destroyed one after another. Nor can the sense-organs collectively produce consciousness, because in that case, the absence of any one of them would prevent the appearance of consciousness. The body without the sense-organs also cannot produce consciousness, since then the body would produce visual sensations even when it is devoid of the eyes. The body with the sense-organs also cannot produce consciousness. The body cannot be the material cause of consciousness. That is regarded as a material cause of an effect, which undergoing modifications modifies its effect. Clay is the material cause of a jar, because it undergoes successive modifications to produce a jar. If an effect is modified without modification of another entity, that cannot be its material cause. Consciousness cannot undergo such modifications as good intention, evil intention and the like without any modifications of the body, which cannot determine the peculiar features of consciousness. Therefore the body cannot be the material cause of consciousness. Love, hate, and other modifications of consciousness are not always preceded by modifications of the body. Therefore they are not directly produced by the body. It cannot be an auxiliary cause of consciousness. Auxiliary causes have a direct bearing on their effect. But the body has no direct bearing on consciousness. Love and hatred are due to the
awakening of the antecedent impressions (vāsanā), which are their material cause. Even if the body has sometimes a direct bearing upon consciousness, which is produced by its material cause, consciousness does not cease on the cessation of the body, even as the jar does not cease to exist on the cessation of fire, which is its auxiliary cause. Hence the body cannot be the material cause or the auxiliary cause of consciousness. ¹⁰³

10. Criticism of the Cārvāka denial of Pre-existence.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila criticize the Cārvāka doctrine of denial of pre-existence. The Cārvāka denies pre-existence and future life because they are not perceived. The Buddhists ask if the ‘other world’, which is denied by the Cārvāka, is different from the chain of causes and effects consisting of cognition and the other four states of consciousness, or the same chain. If it is different from the chain of cognitions, it is not admitted by the Buddhists, and so the Cārvāka argument is beside the point. If it is the same chain of cognitions related to each other as cause and effect, which is beginningless and endless, the Buddhists admit it. The preceding life and the future life are continuous with the present life. They belong to the same chain of cognitions. The Cārvāka also maintains that an action done by a person and pleasure attained by him belong to the same chain of cognitions. He may attain pleasure in some other part of the visible world at some other time. But the Cārvāka contends that because the chain is a non-entity, pre-existence and future life which belong to it must be non-existent. The Buddhists reply that the ‘chain’ is nothing but ‘the members of the chain’, which are entities, and spoken of collectively as a chain. So pre-existence and future existence may belong to the chain of cognitions, which are related to each other as cause and effect. ¹⁰⁴

But the Cārvāka asks why the Buddhists speak of the chain as a non-entity, where they declare it to be illusory. The Buddhists reply that the ‘chain’, which is assumed to be one, is neither identical with, nor different from, the members of the chain, and for this reason, it has been declared to be a

¹⁰⁴ T.S.P., 1872-77.
'non-entity' like 'a series of sky-lotuses'. The Buddhists do not admit the existence of the 'chain' as different from its members, and so declare it to be illusory. The existence of the members of the chain cannot be denied because it is actually perceived. Only its beginninglessness or endlessness can be denied. If its beginninglessness is denied, then the first cognition at birth would be either without cause, or be produced by an eternal cause like God, soul, manas, or time, or be itself eternal, or be produced or manifested by the material substances, earth, water, fire, and air, or be produced by a cognition in some other chain. If it is without cause, it would not depend on any condition, and would therefore be eternal. If it is produced by an eternal cause, it would be eternal. It cannot be one and eternal, since cognitions of colour, sound, taste, smell and the like are clearly perceived. Nor can it be produced or manifested by the material elements, earth, water, fire and air as shown above. They are admitted to be permanent. Therefore the first cognition would be permanent. The permanent material elements cannot produce the first cognition with the aid of auxiliary conditions, because they can render no help to it. If the Cārvāka regards the material elements as momentary, the Buddhists argue that there is no proof of a causal connection between the body or the material elements composing it and the first cognition. The joint method cannot prove it. We do not observe agreement in presence and agreement in absence between the body and the cognition. In the foetus the body alone is not perceived before the emergence of the first cognition. Nor is it perceived apart from the cognition. There is thus no positive concomitance between the body and the cognition. Nor is there any certainty about negative concomitance between them. When another person's body is absent, his cognition may not be absent, which cannot be perceived by any other person. So there is a doubt about its presence or absence. The body is not the material cause or an auxiliary cause of consciousness. Nor is it the manifest of consciousness. The material elements constituting the body, either severally or collectively cannot produce consciousness.

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188 TS., TSP., E.T., 1878-83.
189 TS., TSP., 1886.
If a cognition in another chain, i.e., the 'chain of cognitions' in the parents be the cause of the first cognition, then it is either its material cause or its auxiliary cause. If it be its material cause, then the learning and culture of the parents should continue in the child’s chain of cognitions. If, on the other hand, a cognition in another chain be an auxiliary cause of the first cognition, then the Buddhists admit it.\(^{107}\) Therefore pre-existence is established.

The dying cognition tainted with affections can produce another cognition because it is tainted with affections, like the cognition in the previous state.\(^{108}\) The body cannot be the cause of cognition. If it were so, all cognitions would appear simultaneously, because no other auxiliary causes are necessary. But a cognition is found to be the cause of another cognition. A pleasant cognition is the cause of attachment. Practice in the art of learning produces improvement in the later cognitions. Lack of practice produces deterioration in them. So a cognition is the cause of another cognition. The dying cognition can produce another cognition in the fetus.\(^{109}\)

The Cārvāka argues that there can be no causal relation between the dying cognition in one body and the initial cognition in a new body, because they 'subsist' in different bodies. This argument is not valid. The reason (hetu) put forward is not valid, because if 'subsistence' means the relation of the container and the contained, then the body, which is corporeal, cannot contain a cognition, which is incorporeal. A cognition does not require any container. If 'subsistence' means 'identification', the reason is not valid, because the Cārvāka does not identify cognition with the body. He regards matter or body as the fundamental reality. The Buddhist idealists (Vijñānavādin) regard cognition as the fundamental reality, and regard the body also as of the nature of Alayavijñāna.\(^{110}\) Consciousness is not identical with the body. A person's body is perceived

\(^{107}\) TS., TSP., E.T., 1895-96.
\(^{108}\) TS., TSP., 1899.
\(^{110}\) Amūrtacetasa vṛttiḥ kā vā kāyeṣvapātinaḥ.
Tadātmyena sthitir vṛttiḥ iha cet parikalpyate.
Sāpyayuktā na hi jñānānāḥ yuktāni kāyatmakāni tava.
TS., 1906, 1908.
Vijñānamātravādina ālayavijñānāsvabhātvāt kāyasata. TSP., 1908.
by himself and others. But his love and hatred are perceived by himself alone. They cannot be perceived by others. Therefore consciousness is different from the body. If the 'subsistence' of the cognition means that it is produced by the body, then it is produced in the sense that it has the body for its 'substratum' as visual perception is produced by the eye, which is its substratum, or in the sense that it is inseparable from the body, as smoke is inseparable from fire. 'Subsistence' is not possible in both the senses. A cognition does not abide in the body, like visual perception in the eye, because it is not always preceded by a change in the body, as visual perception is always preceded by a change in the eye. Nor is it inseparable from the body, because formless negations are cognitions without the body. If a cognition is said to subsist in the body in the sense that it is produced in it as its substratum, the reason put forward is invalid. The body undergoes destruction every moment. A prior cognition produces an unbroken series of cognitions in the series of momentary succeeding bodies. If the two succeeding bodies in two moments are said to be not different from each other owing to their occurring in the same chain, then the dying cognition in the last body also may be held to produce the first cognition in another newly born body. The two cognitions are different from each other, though they belong to the same chain of cognitions, just as the two bodies, the dead body and the newly born body are different from each other, though they belong to the same chain of bodies. Just as the two bodies are continuous, so the two cognitions are continuous.\[111\]

The Cārvāka argues that the dying cognition of a person does not produce the first cognition in the foetus, like the dying cognition of an Arhat, free from the taint of affections. The Buddhists urge that the Cārvāka cannot cite the instance of an Arhat as an instance corroborating the conclusion. He does not accept the authority of the Buddhist doctrine. If he accepts the authority of the Buddhists, he may as well accept their doctrine of 'the next world'. Then, again, all Buddhists do not admit the corroborative instance that an Arhat's dying consciousness does not produce any other consciousness. The Mahā-
yânists (Mâdhyamikas) maintain that the 'nirvâna' of the Buddhâs consists in the absence of finality. They have no 'cessation of consciousness and rebirth'.

The Cârvâka argues that it is sheer audacity to assert that there is consciousness in the foetus, because there are no sense-organs in it. The Buddhists urge that there may be consciousness in the foetus, even though there are no sense-organs in it, because all cognitions are not produced by the sense-organs and objects. Dream-cognitions are not produced by the sense-organs or objects. Then, again, in swoon there is dim consciousness, which does not assume the form of cognitions of objects. Therefore consciousness may exist in the foetus, though it is devoid of the sense-organs. It may be urged that consciousness may exist in a latent form in the foetus, but that it cannot exist in an actual form. The Buddhists reply that consciousness exists in it in an actual form.

The Cârvâka may argue that there is no actual consciousness in the foetus, because there is no actual consciousness during deep sleep and swoon. But how does he know that there is no actual consciousness during deep sleep and swoon? If he infers it from the absence of consciousness during deep sleep and swoon, then how can the absence of consciousness be known? It is known by consciousness. If it is urged that we do not apprehend any consciousness at the time, then there is consciousness of the absence of consciousness at the time. It may be argued that because there is no recollection of consciousness during deep sleep and swoon on awaking from sleep and on recovering from swoon, therefore there is no consciousness during deep sleep and swoon. The Buddhists reply that the absence of recollection of consciousness during these states is due to the absence of vividness, repetition and interest in the consciousness at the time. The indistinct consciousness of the new-born baby cannot be remembered afterwards. But the absence of its recollection does not prove its non-existence. The Buddhists maintain that consciousness is independent of the sense-organs and objects, as in deep sleep and swoon. It depends entirely on its own cause. For instance, the cognitions of the sky-lotus and the like are independent of the sense-organs and

objects. When the body is modified in the state of paralysis, consciousness is not always modified. Therefore consciousness is independent of the body. Consciousness, being independent of the body, in which it does not subsist, may continue to exist through the force of its own cause, even when the body has perished. There is no incongruity in this supposition.\[113\]

Consciousness is beginningless and endless. The dying consciousness produces the initial consciousness in the new-born body. The foetus is not perceived owing to defects in the sense-organs. But non-perception of it does not prove its non-existence. The foetus is perceived by persons of supernormal vision. Beginninglessness and endlessness of the 'chain of cognitions' prove the reality of the next world or future life. But the Čārvāka asks how cognitions subsisting in the perishing body and the new-born body be regarded as belonging to the same chain, because the bodies are different from each other. The Buddhists reply that the cognitions in the present birth appear with the same peculiarities as the cognitions in the previous birth. The new-born baby exerts himself to suck the breast, and feels displeasure when his effort is baffled. This shows that he has recollection of his experience in his previous birth. His recollection is due to the revival of the subconscious impressions left by the repeated experiences of his previous births. Thus the existence of future rebirth is established.\[114\]

111 TS., TSP., 1920-31; 1934-36.
Tathā hi na vikalpānām indriyārdhavayeṣu.
Tadavyāpārādhavēpi bhāvād vyomotpalādiṣu.
Tad dehasa vināṣe'pi manodhir atadāśrayā.
Svopādānabalemaiva vartamānāvirodhini. TS., 1931; 1938.

validity of inference. They ask how the Cārvāka knows that his opponents admit the validity of inference. He cannot know the idea of another person by sense-perception, which is the only means of valid knowledge according to him. He infers it from the verbal statement of the opponent. Therefore he must admit the validity of inference.\textsuperscript{116}

Veṅkaṭanātha, a follower of Rāmānuja, criticizes the Cārvāka refutation of the validity of inference. Invalidity of inference is not known by perception. Nor is it known by inference, because this inference would then be valid. Invalidity of all inferences cannot be proved by a valid inference, because it is self-contradictory. The Cārvāka argues that inference prompts positive action (pravr̥tti) and negative action (nivr̥tti), because it is doubtful. Then perception also prompts positive action and negative action, because it is doubtful. Just as perception is regarded as certain, because it is not contradicted by a sublating definite knowledge, so inference also should be regarded as certain because it is not contradicted by a sublating definite knowledge. If inference is regarded as doubtful in the absence of definite knowledge, then perception also should be regarded as doubtful in the absence of definite knowledge. In fact, inference is not of the nature of doubt, since all persons know it to be definite knowledge.

The Cārvāka argues that no inference is possible owing to the absence of any reason (hetu). Inference of a particular instance of the probandum (e.g., fire) from a particular instance of the probans (e.g., smoke) is not possible, because the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between particular instances of the probans and particular instances of the probandum can never be known. The Cārvāka advances a reason (hetu) or probans to prove the invalidity of inference. So he must admit the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum in order to prove the invalidity of his inference. If he admits the invariable concomitance between them, then there is no invariable concomitance between particular instances of the probans and particular instances of the probandum in his inference also. So he contradicts himself, when he proves

\textsuperscript{116} Ajñātārthaprakāśatvād apramāṇam tadd ṣāyate.
Nāsaktasācaśātaṁ tāvākiraṁ tathā naṁ. TS., 1486.
TS., TSP., 1482-86.
the invalidity of inference by an inference through a reason (hetu).

The Carvaka argues that there is no vyapti because it cannot be ascertained. This reason (hetu) is either pervaded or not pervaded by the probandum. If it is pervaded by it, vyapti is admitted. If it is not pervaded by it, vyapti cannot be denied.

The Carvaka argues that all reasons are vitiated by conditions (upadh). Then the reason cited by him to prove the invalidity of inference also is vitiated by conditions, and cannot therefore prove the invalidity of inference. If the reason cited by him is held to be not vitiated by any condition, then it is wrong to assert that all reasons are vitiated by conditions. Therefore the Carvaka arguments for the invalidity of inference are self-contradictory.

The Naiyayika, Udayana, criticizes the Carvaka doctrine of invalidity of inference. The Carvaka maintains that inference is not valid, but that probability (sambhavana) is the guide of life. Perception of a particular smoke produces a presumption that there may be fire. The presumption leads a person to bring fire. If he gets fire, the presumption or probability is wrongly regarded as valid knowledge. It is purely accidental (kakataliya) that probability leads to successful activity. Such presumption is the basis of life-activities. Inference is not a means of valid knowledge.

Udayana urges that it is wrong to hold that presumption of the existence of fire on perception of smoke leads a person to bring fire, and that such presumption is the basis of life-activities. Presumption is a kind of doubt, which is indefinite knowledge. But a doubt cannot arise. When smoke is perceived, there is the definite knowledge of smoke. When smoke is not perceived, there is the definite knowledge of the non-existence of smoke. This definite knowledge is opposed to doubt. A doubt as to the existence or the non-existence of an object is opposed to the certain knowledge of its existence or non-existence.

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119 NKS., iii. 6.
The Cārvāka urges that inference is not valid, because vyāpti, which is the ground of inference, cannot be obtained. Certain knowledge of invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum is necessary for inferring the existence of the probandum from the probans. The Nyāya regards observation of concomitance and non-observation of non-concomitance of the probans with probandum as the cause of the knowledge of vyāpti. But non-observation of non-concomitance is not possible, because a doubt will always persist as to non-concomitance of the probans with the probandum. Is 'smoke' non-concomitant with 'fire'? Does 'smoke' exist in a place where 'fire' does not exist? This doubt will always persist. It cannot be completely dispelled. Therefore vyāpti cannot be ascertained. So inference is not a means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa).

Further, the Nyāya regards vyāpti as a uniform relation of the probans with the probandum which is not vitiated by a condition (upādhi). Relation is either natural or conditional. The relation of a red flower (javā) with redness is natural. But the relation of a crystal with redness is conditional; it depends upon the condition of the red flower, which is reflected in the crystal. The natural relation is invariable and unconditional. 'Smoke' has unconditional relation with 'fire'. Wherever there is 'smoke', there is 'fire'. But fire exists in smokeless places; so its relation to smoke is not natural but conditional, for the fire, which is in conjunction with wet fuel, gives rise to smoke. So the relation of 'fire' with 'smoke' is conditional; it depends upon the condition of wet fuel. A condition (upādhi) is co-extensive with the probandum, but it does not pervade the probans.¹¹⁸ This place is smoky, because it is fiery'. In this inference 'wet fuel' is the condition, because it is co-extensive with the probandum 'smoke', but it does not pervade the probans 'fire'. There is 'fire' without 'smoke'. So the probans, which is free from a condition (upādhi), has invariable concomitance with the probandum. The probans, which is non-concomitant with the probandum has no unconditional relation with it. But how to make sure that the probans is devoid of conditions? The Cārvāka urges that it is not possible to

¹¹⁸ Upādhiḥ sādhanāvyāpakatvā sati sādhyavyāpakah. NKS., iii. 7, p. 30. Sādhanāvyāpakah sādhyasamavyāptāḥ upādhayāḥ. TB., p. 66; KV., p. 301.
get a probans free from all conditions. He does not recognize non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as a means of valid knowledge. So non-apprehension does not prove the non-existence of conditions. So the absence of all conditions vitiating an inference cannot be determined. There will always be a doubt as to the existence of conditions along with 'smoke', from which the existence of 'fire' is inferred. So vyāpti or unconditional invariable concomitance of 'smoke' with 'fire' can never be ascertained. In some other place and at some other time there may be non-concomitance of 'smoke' with 'fire', or there may be a conditional concomitance between them. So an inference is always vitiated by a doubt (śaṅkā) as to the possible existence of conditions (upādhi) at some other time or in some other place, which may invalidate it.

But Udayana replies that if there is doubt, then there must be inference, and that if there is no doubt, then inference must be valid. The Cārvāka refers to future time and remote places when and where there may be conditions (upādhi), which may vitiate the invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum. But how can the Cārvāka prove the existence of future time and remote places, which are not perceived? If they are existent, their existence can be proved by inference. Therefore, even the doubt of the Cārvāka as to the existence of conditions presupposes the validity of inference, which proves the existence of future time and remote places.

Udayana further urges that doubt presupposes certain knowledge. 'Is it a post or a man?' This doubt arises from perception of common characters of the two objects and recollection of their individual characters. What is called inference of fire from smoke by others is called presumption (sambhūvanā) by the Cārvāka. Presumption or probability is doubt. Doubt as to the existence of fire presupposes the previous perception of fire, which is definite, and which has left an impression of it. Define knowledge of future time and remote places is necessary for doubt as to the existence of conditions at the time and in the places. It is not derived from perception. It is derived from inference. Therefore even doubt implies the validity of inference. Further, the Cārvāka argument 'this reason is not the probans, because it is infected by doubt as to its non-concomitance with the probandum' depends
upon the validity of inference. Doubt as to non-concomitance implies the existence of concomitance and non-concomitance between the probans and the probandum, which must be definitely known. Therefore doubt as to non-concomitance implies definite knowledge of concomitance. Hence inference, which depends upon it, is valid.

The Čārvāka argues that doubt as to non-concomitance of the probans with the probandum at some time or in some place is possible, and that it can never be completely dispelled. Preclusion of a contrary instance cannot be entirely ruled out. So long as there is apprehension of non-concomitance, there can be no inference. Udayana replies that there is no apprehension (saṅkā) of non-concomitance in all cases. Hypothetical reasoning (tarka) is the limit of apprehension. Where tarka removes all apprehension of non-concomitance of the probans with the probandum, their invariable concomitance (vyāpti) is ascertained, which makes inference possible. Wherever smoke is present, fire is present. Wherever fire is absent, smoke is absent. In the presence of all other causal conditions than fire, smoke is not present. In the absence of fire, smoke is absent. If smoke were present in a fireless place, fire could not be the cause of smoke. In the presence of fire, there is the presence of smoke. In the absence of fire, there is the absence of smoke. We observe uniform co-presence of smoke and fire and uniform co-absence of fire and smoke. So fire is the cause of smoke. This argument removes all apprehension as to the non-concomitance of smoke with fire. Hence apprehension of non-concomitance cannot invalidate inference.

The Čārvāka urges that even tarka, which is said to remove apprehension of non-concomitance of the probans with the probandum, depends upon vyāpti. So it would lead to infinite regress. If vyāpti cannot be determined, tarka would not be possible. Vyāpti cannot be known, because there is always apprehension as to non-concomitance of the probans with the probandum. Udayana replies that doubt as to non-concomitance continues till it comes into conflict with successful action. A person perceives smoke, infers fire from it, and proceeds to bring fire. His doubt as to the existence of fire continues till he proceeds to act. He cannot act to bring fire, if he has a doubt as to its existence. His being prompted to action shows that
he has no doubt. Conflict with action is the limit of doubt. Therefore there is no infinite regress.

But the Cārvāka may doubt the existence of the cause-effect-relation. Udayana replies that if the cause-effect-relation is doubted, then no doubt can arise anywhere. Even doubt has a cause. If it had no cause, then any effect would arise out of any cause. So the Cārvāka must admit that doubt has a cause. But how can he know its cause to be its cause beyond doubt? If he ascertains it by the method of agreement in presence (anvaya) and agreement in absence (vyatireka), then the cause-effect-relation of fire and smoke also can be ascertained by the same method of agreement in presence and agreement in absence. In fact, the causal relation is established beyond doubt by the double method of agreement. So it is known for certain that fire is the cause of smoke. The undoubted knowledge of the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire is the ground of the valid inference of fire from smoke.

12. Criticism of the Cārvāka denial of the validity of the Vedas.

Udayana refutes the Cārvāka repudiation of the authority of the Vedas. He urges that they are authoritative, because they are accepted as valid by the great saints, who practised the Vedic sacrifices with earnestness, untainted by such vicious causes as intention to deceive, association with heretics, secret designs, eagerness for false disputation due to habit, desire for livelihood, and reckless desire for delicious food and drink, whether they are permitted or forbidden by the scriptures. The Vedas are not inventions of crafty priests for their livelihood. Veṅkaṭaṅaṭha also gives the same argument. The Brāhmaṇas, who were averse to all enjoyments, and imposed upon themselves severe penances, and possessed supreme wisdom, could not compose the Vedas in order to deceive the people. The Vedas must be regarded as valid, since they are accepted as valid by great saints. The Cārvāka philosophy

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119 Saṅkī ca adumaśtyeva na cecchaṅkā tatatarām, Vvāgātāvadhir saṅkā, tarkāb saṅkāvadhir matalā. NKS, iii 7; p. 23. Ibid, pp. 23-30; NKSP.
120 NKS, ii 3, p. 65; Haridāsa’s commentary, Calcutta, 1864, ii 3.
is severely criticized not only by the orthodox systems but also by Buddhists and Jainas. The heterodox systems of Buddhism and Jainism are dealt with in the second volume. The validity of the Vedas according to the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsā will be considered later.
CHAPTER VIII

THE VAIŚEŚIKA PHILOSOPHY

1. *Introduction.*

The term *Vaiśeṣika* is derived from the term *viṣeṣa*. The Vaiśeṣika system lays stress on particularity (*viṣeṣa*) of the eternal substances. Ether, space, time, soul and mind (*manas*) are eternal substances. The atoms of earth, water, fire and air are eternal. Each of them has a particularity which is its distinctive feature. The Vaiśeṣika emphasizes the plurality and distinctness of physical things and finite souls. Its special feature is the doctrine of atomism. Kapāda (300 B.C.) is the author of the *Vaiśeṣika Śūtra*. He clearly propounds the doctrine of atomism. The Vaiśeṣika specializes in the philosophy of nature. Kapāda speaks of the six categories: (1) substance (*dravya*), quality (*gurṣa*), action or motion (*karma*), community (*śāmānya*), particularity (*viṣeṣa*), and inference (*samāvāya*). Śivāditya (1000 A.D.) clearly recognizes non-existence (*abhāva*) as the seventh category. Non-existence is implied by the *Vaiśeṣika Śūtra*. Kapāda does not clearly mention God in the *Vaiśeṣika Śūtra*. Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara and Udayana discuss the theistic proofs, the nature of God, and his creation of the world out of the atoms and dissolution of it into them. The Vaiśeṣika discusses the nature of the finite self, the proofs for its existence, the plurality of finite souls, and their bondage and liberation. Kapāda appears to be an atheist, though his followers are theists. The earlier Vaiśeṣika is atheistic. The later Vaiśeṣika is theistic.

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika are the allied systems (samānatantra). They both recognize the reality of God, the finite souls, physical things, atoms of earth, water, fire, and air, space, time, and ether. They both hold the same views of the nature of the finite soul and its bondage and liberation. They both insist on the plurality of the individual souls. They both entertain the deistic conception of God. They both advocate realism and pluralism. They admit the reality of the
external world independent of the perceiving souls. They admit the plurality and distinctness of the finite souls and physical objects. They recognize the dualism of matter and spirits which are irreducible to each other. They reject materialism and idealism both.

But they differ from each other in three main points. First, the Nyāya specializes in epistemology and logic, while the Vaiśeṣika specializes in the philosophy of nature. Secondly, the Nyāya recognizes four means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. But the Vaiśeṣika recognizes perception and inference only as pramāṇas. Thirdly, the Nyāya recognizes sixteen categories, while the Vaiśeṣika recognizes seven categories. The Nyāya categories are the main topics of a treatise on logic. The Vaiśeṣika categories are the main kinds of objects of knowledge. The Nyāya categories are logical, whereas the Vaiśeṣika categories are metaphysical.¹

Kanāda (300 B.C.) was the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system. He composed the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra. Rāvaṇa Bhāṣya and Bhāradvāja Vṛtti on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra seem to be lost. Padmanābha refers to the former in Kīrtāṅgavilībhāskara. The latter is referred to as Vṛtti in some Vaiśeṣika works. Śaṅkara Miśra (1500 A.D.) wrote a commentary called Upaskāra on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra. He wrote an independent treatise called Kaṇḍāsakrasya. Jayānārāyaṇa (1700 A.D.) wrote a commentary on Vaiśeṣika Sūtra entitled Kaṇḍāsāpurāṇaviṇī. Prasāstapāda (400 A.D.) wrote a running commentary on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra called Padārthadharmasāṅgraha. It is regarded as an authoritative work on the Vaiśeṣika system. It is also called Prakāśastapaḍa Bhāṣya. Some scholars are of opinion that it is a different work which is lost. Śrīdhara (1000 A.D.) wrote an elaborate commentary on Padārthadharmasāṅgraha called Nyāyakāndali (913 Saka year). Udayana (1000 A.D.) wrote a well-reasoned commentary on it called Kīrtāṅgavali. Vyomaśivācarya (1000 A.D.) wrote a commentary on it called Vyomavati, which is partly published. It is probably older than the two commentaries mentioned above or at least equally old. Padmanābha Miśra (1600 A.D.) wrote a commentary on it called Setu.

¹ HP., pp. 127-28.
Jagadīśa Tarkālakāra (1700 A.D.) wrote a commentary on it called Sūkti. Vardhamāna (1400 A.D.), Gangeśa’s son, wrote a commentary on Kīraṇāvalī called Kīraṇāvaliśrāvaśa. Padmanābha Miśra (1600 A.D.) wrote a gloss on it called Kīraṇāvaliśrāvakārama. Bhaṭṭāja Vādindra (1300 A.D.) wrote a commentary on Guṇakīraṇāvalī called Rasasāra. Bhāgiratīa Ṭhakkura wrote a commentary on Vardhamāna’s Kīraṇāvaliśrāvaśa called Kīraṇāvaliśrāvaśavāyākhyā. Raghunātha Siromaṇi (1475-1550 A.D.) wrote a commentary on it called Kīraṇāvaliśrāvaśavīrti. Mathurānātha Tarkavīgīśa (1660-1675 A.D.) wrote a commentary on it called Guṇakīraṇāvaliśrāvaśavīrttiśrāvakārama. Sivāditya (1000 A.D.) wrote Saṃpadyārthī in which he discussed seven categories including negation (abhāva). Mādhava Sarasvati wrote a commentary called Mitabhāṣīṇī on it. Vallaḥa’s (1200 A.D.) Nyāyālīlāvārtti is a work on the Vaiśeṣika system. Vardhamāna wrote a commentary called Nyāyālīlāvaliśrāvaśa on it. Bhāgiratīa Ṭhakkura wrote a commentary called Nyāyālīlāvaliśrāvaśavīrtti on it. Praṣastapaḍa’s Padārthadharmasamābhāva, Śrīdhar’s Nyāyakanda and Udayaṇa’s Kīraṇāvali are the most important works on the Vaiśeṣika system. The treatment of the system given here is mainly based on these works, though Vyaṃvali, Sātu and Sūkti have been used to throw light on important problems. Kaṇḍa’s Vaiśeṣika Sūtra is older than the present redaction of Gotama’s Nyāya Sūtra. The former does not refer to the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness, vijñānavāda and śūnyavāda, which are criticized in the current Nyāyasūtra.

I

EPISTEMOLOGY

2. Extrinsic Validity and Invalidity of Knowledge (paratasāvīrtti).

The Vaiśeṣika agrees with the Nyāya in its doctrines of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) and its extrinsic validity and invalidity (paratasāvīrtti). Valid knowledge (vidyā) is what apprehends the real nature of its object. Invalid knowledge (avidyā) is what apprehends an object as it is not in its real nature.2

2 VS., VSU., ix. 2. 11, 12.
Validity of knowledge is produced by the excellence (guna) of its causes. Invalidity of knowledge is produced by the defects (doṣa) of its causes. Validity of knowledge is known by successful activity (pravṛttiśamarthya). Invalidity of knowledge is known by unsuccessful activity. Validity of knowledge is due to extraneous conditions. Its knowledge also is due to extraneous conditions. Invalidity of knowledge is due to extraneous conditions. Its knowledge also is due to extraneous conditions. Correspondence of knowledge with its object constitutes truth. Disharmony of knowledge with its object constitutes falsity. But correspondence is known by fruitful activity, and disharmony is known by unfruitful activity. Correspondence is the content of truth. Practical efficiency is the test of truth. The Vaiśeṣika, like the Nyāya, adopts the realistic test of correspondence and the pragmatic test of practical efficiency or workability. Knowledge is not valid in itself, and validity of knowledge is not known by itself. The Vaiśeṣika rejects the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of self-validity of knowledge (svataḥprāmāṇya).

3. Criticism of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of Self-validity of Knowledge (svataḥprāmāṇya).

The Mīmāṃsā advocates the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge. Knowledge is valid in itself. It is intrinsically valid. It does not owe its validity to adventitious conditions. But Śrīdhara asks whether validity of knowledge consists in its invariable concomitance with an object (arthāvyabhicāra) or whether it consists in apprehending an object in its real nature (yathārthaparicchedakatva). It does not consist in its invariable concomitance with an object, since an illusory perception which has invariable concomitance with an object, is invalid. It apprehends an object as different from it. If validity of knowledge consists in apprehending an object in its real nature, Śrīdhara asks whether validity of knowledge is known by itself, or whether it is produced by itself, or whether it functions by itself. The first alternative is not tenable. If validity of knowledge is known by the knowledge itself, then there would be no doubt at any time as to whether a knowledge is valid, or whether it is invalid, and an illusion would never prompt an action. But sometimes a doubt arises as to whether a knowledge is valid or
whether it is invalid; an illusory perception of a shell as silver prompts a person to pick up the illusory silver. So validity of knowledge is not known by the knowledge itself. It may be urged that knowledge cannot apprehend its validity without apprehending itself, and that knowledge cannot apprehend itself, since it is self-contradictory; that validity of knowledge, being an object of knowledge, must be apprehended by some other knowledge, which, again, must be apprehended by some other knowledge, and that this would lead to infinite regress. The Mīmāṃsā replies that there is no infinite regress in the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge. There is not always an enquiry into the validity of knowledge. A valid knowledge knows its object as soon as it is produced. It does not know its object after it has known its validity. Sometimes for some reason or other a doubt arises whether a knowledge is valid or invalid, when it apprehends its object. On such an occasion there is no action of the person on account of doubt. He desires to know the validity of knowledge in order to act. Until he knows the validity of knowledge, his doubt is not dispelled. But when a doubtless valid knowledge arises owing to its great frequency or perception of all individual peculiarities of its object, it apprehends the object in its real nature as soon as it is produced, and the knower has no desire to prove the validity of the knowledge, and does not seek any other knowledge to prove its validity. Doubt is dispelled by valid knowledge of an object itself. Śrīdhara urges that validity of knowledge is known by successful activity (pravṛtti-sāmarthya); that when the object of knowledge is actually attained, the knowledge is known to be valid; that the knowledge of the validity of knowledge of one who has attained the object of knowledge is determined by the nature of the object (vastusāmarthya); and that successful activity invariably accompanies validity of knowledge. So Śrīdhara concludes that validity of knowledge is not known by itself.\footnote{NK., p. 218.}

The second alternative also is not tenable. Validity of knowledge is not produced by itself. If we assume that knowledge is first produced and then apprehends an object in its real nature, then we must admit that we know the validity of the knowledge that apprehends the real nature of its object after knowing the
causes that produce the knowledge, and that validity of knowledge is produced by the causes of the valid knowledge. Therefore validity of knowledge is not produced by itself. It may be argued that if a valid knowledge itself produces its validity, then it is not valid in itself. The Mimāṃsa argues that this argument is wrong, because a knowledge does not depend upon any other causes than its own cause for production of its validity; that the causes that produce the knowledge produce its validity; and that this amounts to the admission that knowledge is valid in itself. This argument is invalid. If the causes of valid knowledge are neither more nor less than those of the knowledge itself, then there can be no illusions. The Mimāṃsa replies that the causes of knowledge by their very nature produce valid knowledge; that when they are tainted by defects (doṣa), they produce invalid knowledge; and that when they are not tainted by defects, they produce valid knowledge by their very nature. This argument is wrong. Then validity of a sentence is produced by the mere knowledge of the speaker, and all sentences are equally valid, since they are produced by the knowledge of the speaker. If validity of a sentence is produced by valid knowledge (prāmāṇajñāna), then validity of knowledge is not produced by the very nature of the causes of knowledge, but by their excellence (guṇa). The knowledge of an object is the cause of a sentence (śabda). Its excellence (guṇa) is apprehension of the real nature of an object (yathārthatva). Its defect (doṣa) is apprehension of an object as it is not in its real nature. If apprehension of the real nature of an object is the cause of validity of a sentence, then its validity is due to the excellence of its cause (kāraṇa-guṇa), but not to the very nature of its cause. If validity of a sentence is due to the excellence of its cause, then validity of any other knowledge also is due to the excellence of its cause. So validity of knowledge is not produced by itself.

The third alternative also is not tenable. Valid knowledge does not produce activity by itself. It may be argued that in verbal knowledge there is activity when the excellence of its cause is free from defects, and that activity is not due to production of its validity. This argument is not valid. The excellence of the cause of knowledge counteracts its defects. Let there be non-production of invalidity of knowledge, which is
the effect of the absence of defects. There is absence of an effect when there is absence of a cause. But there cannot be production of an opposite effect when there is absence of a cause. Validity of knowledge may be said to be due to the mere nature of the knowledge itself (jñānasvarūpamātra). But this is not right. The so-called cause has no distinctive character to produce validity of knowledge. The distinctive character of knowledge is its relation to its object. If it is not a condition of the production of validity of knowledge, then a sentence would not have a particular meaning, since the absence of the distinctive character of knowledge would then produce the distinctive knowledge of a particular meaning. It may be argued that the knowledge, which apprehends a particular object, produces a sentence conveying a particular meaning. Then validity of the knowledge produces the validity of a sentence. The mere nature of knowledge as consciousness does not produce the validity of a sentence. Therefore the validity of a sentence is produced by the excellence of knowledge; it is not due to the mere nature of knowledge, which is mere consciousness. But it is due to validity of knowledge or its apprehending the real nature of its object. Let us assume that activity (pravṛtti) follows excellence (guṇa) in the absence of defects. Then also validity due to extraneous conditions is not disproved. If activity is produced by the absence of defects, then the absence of defects, which is different from the nature of the cause, would be the cause of fruitful activity. In the presence of the absence of defects there would be fruitful activity. In the absence of the absence of defects there would not be fruitful activity. It may be argued that there is absence of illusion in the absence of defects, that validity of knowledge is due to the nature of the sense-organs, and that production of validity of knowledge is obstructed by defects. Then why is not illusion assumed to be produced by the mere nature of the sense-organs? If it cannot be assumed because an illusion is produced in the presence of defects, and because it is not produced in the absence of defects, then validity of knowledge also is produced in the presence of the non-existence of defects (doṣābhāva), and it is not produced in the absence of the non-existence of defects, and therefore an illusion is not due to the mere knowledge of the sense-organs, and validity of knowledge is not due to the
mere nature of the knowledge itself, and activity is due to validity of knowledge. Validity of knowledge is ascertained by fruitful activity. That knowledge is not valid, which does not depend upon prior non-existence or posterior non-existence of defects. Thus the function of production of activity by knowledge is due to the mere nature of knowledge. Activity in the form of attaining an object or avoiding or rejecting it depends upon the knowledge of favourableness or unfavourableness of the object of knowledge. So knowledge is not valid in itself; its validity is due to extraneous conditions. Validity of knowledge is produced by the excellence or proficiency (guṇa) of the causes of knowledge. Invalidity of knowledge is produced by faults or deficiencies (doṣa) of the causes of knowledge. Validity of knowledge is known by successful activity. Invalidity of knowledge is known by unsuccessful activity. The act of acceptance is prompted by the knowledge of favourableness of its object. The act of rejection is prompted by the knowledge of unfavourableness of its object. Thus validity of knowledge is produced by extraneous conditions; it is known by extraneous conditions; valid knowledge prompts activity through extraneous conditions. The Mīmāṃsā doctrine of self-validity of knowledge is not valid.


Knowledge is a quality of the self, which inheres in it. It is in the nature of manifestation. It manifests an object, physical or mental. The genus of knowledge inheres in it. There are innumerable cognitions apprehending an infinite number of objects. But knowledge is mainly of two kinds, valid knowledge (vidyā) and invalid knowledge (avidyā). Valid knowledge is what apprehends an object in its real nature. Invalid knowledge is what apprehends an object as different from it. It is of four kinds: (1) doubt (sarṣaya), (2) illusion (viparyaya),

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* Pravṛttividikārjayananayāpāra'pi pramāṇasya parata eva, na svārūpamātrādhiṣṇa upakārāpakaśādiśāpekṣasya pravṛttividikārjayanesu kavat. NK., p. 220.
* NK., pp. 217-290.
* Buddhīhitavāmānyavat ātmārayavaḥ prakāśo buddhiḥ. SP., p. 47.
* VS., VSU., ix. 2. 11, 12. Tat tvamabhavyaḥ pramā. Atattvaṇānaṁ apramā. SP., p. 59.
(3) indefinite perception (anadhyavasāya), and (4) dream (svapna).

Doubt is indefinite knowledge. It is internal or external. Internal doubt is produced by the attributes of the knowing self. Will the lunar eclipse predicted by astrologers happen or not? This doubt is caused by the expectation of the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event. External doubt is produced by the attributes of external objects. External doubts are either in regard to perceptible objects or in regard to inferable objects. The perception of the common quality of two objects and the recollection of their peculiar qualities generate a doubt as to whether the object perceived is one or the other. The common quality of a post and a man e.g., height, is perceived. Then their special qualities are remembered. The mind oscillates between the two memory-images. This is doubtful perception of an external perceptible object, which is expressed in such a form: 'Is it a post or a man?' With regard to inferable objects the perception of a common probans and the recollection of the special qualities of the two objects indicated by it generate a doubt as to whether the object inferred from the probans is one or the other. The perception of horns only in a forest and the recollection of the peculiar qualities of a cow and a wild cow (gavaya) indicated by them produce a doubt as to whether the horns belong to a cow or a wild cow.

Error (viparyaya) is the knowledge of one object as another different from it. It is a definite knowledge which does not apprehend the real nature of an object. A cow is misperceived as a horse. Illusion is wrong perception by a sense-organ vitiated by the bodily humours, flatulence, bile, or phlegm, an impression (sāṁskāra) produced by the perception of an object which is not present, conjunction of the self with manas, and demerit. Inference also may be wrong. We wrongly infer the existence of fire from moisture which appears to be smoke. We wrongly infer the existence of a cow from the perception of the horns of a wild cow. Wrong inference is inference of a non-existent object from the wrong perception of another

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*Anavadhāraṇāṁ jñānam saṁdāyaḥ. SP., p. 59.
*PB., pp. 174-75.
object. Considering the body, the sense-organs, or the manas as the self, considering produced things as eternal, knowing good as evil, regarding evil as good, and the like are wrong knowledge.\textsuperscript{11}

Anadhyavasāya is indefinite knowledge in which both alternatives are unmanifest.\textsuperscript{12} Uha is a doubtful perception in which only one alternative is manifest to consciousness.\textsuperscript{13} Indefinite knowledge (anadhyavasāya) is perceptual or inferential. When a familiar or an unfamiliar object is perceived as ‘something’ owing to inattention or interest in a special thing, we have indefinite perception.\textsuperscript{14} A person unfamiliar with a jackfruit tree has an indefinite perception of it. He has definite knowledge of an entity endued with beinghood, genus of substance, genus of earth, genus of tree, colour, and the like. He also perceives the genus of jackfruit tree. But he does not know that its name is jackfruit tree. He has indefinite knowledge of its name. His indefinite perception of the jackfruit tree as ‘something’ is anadhyavasāya. A person unfamiliar with a cow perceives the dewlap only of an animal, and infers ‘what this animal may be.’ He has indefinite inference.\textsuperscript{15}

Dream (svapna) is mental perception of a person through the sense-organs, whose sense-organs have ceased to function, and whose manas is overpowered by sleep.\textsuperscript{16} It arises from a particular conjunction of the self with manas called sleep, subconscious impressions, and merit or demerit. It appears like perception of unreal objects through the sense-organs. It is of three kinds. It arises from the strength of subconscious impressions, or defects of bodily humours, or merits and demerits.\textsuperscript{17} A person dreams of his beloved woman owing to the intensity of the subconscious impression of her generated by repeated thoughts of her. One dreams of flight in the sky owing to flatulence. One dreams of entering into fire owing to excess

\textsuperscript{11} PB., pp. 177, 170. IPP., pp. 281-82.
\textsuperscript{12} Anālingitorbhayakotyanavādhipapajñānam anadhyavasaśāyaḥ. SP., p. 69. IPP., pp. 268-71.
\textsuperscript{13} Utkatātakotikāh saṁśaya uhaḥ. SP., p. 69. IPP., pp. 266-67.
\textsuperscript{14} Prasiddhārthyaṇaprasiddhārthṣu vyaśāṅgād arthitvād vā kīmityālocanāntaram anadhyavasaśāyaḥ. PB., p. 182.
\textsuperscript{15} PB., p. 182.
\textsuperscript{16} Uparatendriya-gṛihāsya pratīkānamakṣaṇyendriyaśvāṛaṇaśaiva yad anāhavanam mānasam tai svapnapajñānam. PB., p. 183.
\textsuperscript{17} Sansākārapātavād dhātudṛṣṭād adṛṣṭāc. PB., p. 184.
of bile. One dreams of crossing a river owing to predominance of phlegm. These dreams are due to defects of bodily humours. The auspicious dreams such as riding on elephants, getting an umbrella and the like which betoken good are due to merit. The inauspicious dreams such as besmeasuring the body with oil, riding on a donkey or a camel and the like which betoken evil are due to demerit. Dreams within dreams are recollections of dream-cognitions due to revival of their subconscious impressions during sleep. Dreams are cognitions produced by the internal organ overpowered by sleep. Sleep is the existence of the manas in an organless place without the aid of the merit born of yoga or meditation. Thus doubt, error, indefinite perception, and dream are the different kinds of invalid knowledge.

5. Kinds of Valid Knowledge (Vidyā).

Valid knowledge is of four kinds, perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāṇa), recollection (smṛti), and intuition due to austerities (ārṣajñāna). Perception is external or internal. Internal perception is due to conjunction of the self with the internal organ (manas). Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are apprehended by internal perception. External perception is of five kinds, olfactory, gustatory, visual, tactual, and auditory. Perception is either indeterminate (nirvikalpa) or determinate (savikalpa). Earth, water, and fire are perceived owing to the conjunctions of the self with the manas, of the manas with the sense-organs, and of the sense-organs with the objects, when they have extension and manifest colour, and consist of many parts. The substances endued with qualities, actions and communities, and qualified by other substances are perceived. 'A white cow possessing horns is going.' The perception apprehends a substance qualified by another substance and endued with a quality and an action. Colour, taste, smell and touch inhering in substances consisting of many parts are perceived owing to the intercourse of the proper sense-organs with their substrates. Sound is perceived through the auditory organ as inhering in it owing to the intercourse of the self with

18 PB., p. 184.  
19 Nidrāduṣṭāntahkārṇavajah jñānair sadvānābh. SP., p. 68.  
20 SP., p. 99. IPP., pp. 306-08.
the manas, and of the manas with the auditory organ, which is ether (ākāśa) limited by the ear-hole. Number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, viscosity, fluidity, force, and motion inhering in perceptible substances are perceived through the visual organ and the tactual organ. Beinghood, genus of substance, genus of quality, genus of action and the like inhering in their substrates are perceived through the sense-organs which apprehend their substrates. Yogic perception of one’s own self, the other selves, ether, space, time, atoms of earth, water, fire and air, and manas, and qualities, actions, communities and particularities inhering in them, and inheritance is acquired through the manas perfected by merits born of meditation. It is yuktrapratyākṣa or intuition of those who are in trance. The yogic perception of subtle, hidden and remote objects through the fourfold intercourse owing to the power of merits born of meditation is viyukta pratyākṣa or perception out of trance. Perception is the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). The self is the knower (pramātā). Knowledge of substance and the like is pramiti. Substance and the like are objects of knowledge (prameya). Or perceptual knowledge is the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). Knowledge of excellence, defect, or neutral character of objects is pramiti. Perception is a kind of valid knowledge. Inference will be dealt with in the next section.

Recollected (smṛti) is produced by a particular conjunction of the self with manas, a subconscious impression, and suggestive forces or cues. The self is the inherent cause (samavāyi kāraṇa); conjunction of the self with manas is the non-inherent cause (asamavāyi kāraṇa); a subconscious impression (sabinskāra) is the efficient cause (nimitta kāraṇa) of recollection. It apprehends a past object, seen, heard, or felt in the past owing to a particular conjunction of the self with manas and revival of its subconscious impression produced by intensity, frequency, or emotional appeal of a past experience. Perception, recollection, or thought of a connected experience is the exciting cause of recollection. Attention, intention to recall, inhibition of contrary suggestive forces, perception of a similar object and

12 VS., VŚU., VŚV., ix. 2. 6.
13 PB., 256.
the like are its exciting causes. Recollection is a kind of valid knowledge. It apprehends the real nature of an object perceived in the past.

Arṣajñāna is the intuition of the sages, who are the authors of the scriptures. It is immediate apprehension of the real nature of the past, present and future objects, of Dharma or the Moral Law and other supersensible objects mentioned or not mentioned in the scriptures owing to a particular conjunction of the self with manas and a peculiar merit born of austerities. It is akin to yogic perception. It is produced by a special kind of merit born of austerities, while yogic perception is due to intense meditation. It is produced by the internal organ (manas), and not by the external sense-organs. It is a distinct and vivid perception through the internal organ called prātibhajñāna. The sages have this kind of intuition in abundance. But even the common people have momentary flashes of intuitive non-sensuous perception. A young girl says, "My heart says: my brother will come tomorrow". This is non-sensuous intuition (prātibhajñāna). It is a kind of valid knowledge.

Siddhadarśāna is occult perception. It is perception of subtle, hidden and remote sensible objects through the sense-organs refined and strengthened by the application of certain occult medicines. It is not perception of supersensible objects. It is not produced by the internal organ (manas) owing to a special kind of merit born of meditation or austerities. It is occult sensuous perception. It is a kind of valid knowledge.

6. Inference (Anumāna).

Kapāda (300 B.C.) defines inference as the knowledge derived from the mark (līṅga), from which the existence of the probandum (sādhya) is inferred as its effect, or cause, or conjunct, or antagonist, or inherent. From a rainfall in the source of a river (cause) a flood in the river (effect) is inferred. From smoke (effect) the existence of a fire (cause) is inferred. From a body (conjunct) the existence of the tactual organ (conjunct)

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24 NS., iii. 2. 44.
24 PB., NK., pp. 258-59.
conjoined with it is inferred. From an infuriated serpent the existence of a mongoose (antagonist) hidden behind a bush is inferred. From the heat of water the existence of a fire (inherent) is inferred. Heat inheres in fire, but not in water. The mark is the means of inference, which is based upon the relations of causality, conjunction, opposition and inference. The causal relation between the probans and the probandum is shown by the members of an inference. A mark or probans (apadesa) preceded by the knowledge of a well-known and well-established general principle (prasiddhi) leads to the knowledge of the probandum. Kaṇāda is aware of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) of the probans with the probandum and its necessity for inference. He calls it prasiddhi, which is a general principle of universal relation. A faulty reason (apadesa) is not pervaded by the prabandum (aprasiddha). Kaṇāda mentions three fallacies of reason (hetvābhāsa), aprasiddha, asan, and saṁdigdha. Aprisiddha is the unproven reason. Asan is the unreal or nonexistent reason. Saṁdigdha is the doubtful or inconclusive reason. He gives two examples. 'This is a horse, because it has horns.' 'This is a bull, because it has horns. It is an example of inconclusive reason.' Praśastapāda interprets the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra as mentioning three fallacies, contradictory, unproven, and inconclusive reasons. He equates aprasiddha with viruddha, asan with asiddha, and saṁdigdha with anaikāntika. Śaṅkaramiśra, Jayanārayāṇa and Čandrakānta interpret it in different ways.

Praśastapāda (400 A.D.) clearly recognizes vyāpti or invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum. He calls it a general principle (vidhi, samaya) of invariable concomitance (sāhacarya) or inseparable relation (avītābhāva) derived from the observation of particular instances of co-presence and co-absence of the probans and the probandum. He declares that the mark (liṅga) inseparably related to the probandum (sādhyya)

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in all times and places leads to the inference of it. Inference is based upon real universal relations. Causality, conjunction, opposition, and inference are only illustrative examples. They do not exhaust all universal relations, which are the ground of inference.\textsuperscript{30} Praśastapāda clearly recognizes three characteristics of the reason or probans. A mark which is related to the subject of inference, known to exist in the locus of the probandum, and known not to exist in the locus of its absence, leads to the inference of the probandum. It exists in the subject and the cases homogeneous with the probandum, but it does not exist in those heterogeneous with it.\textsuperscript{31} Dr. Keith interprets 'anumeya' as inferable property or probandum (sādhya). But Sridhara rightly interprets it as the subject of inference. Gotama sometimes uses 'sādhya' in the sense of the subject of inference, and Vātsyāyana follows him.\textsuperscript{32} Gotama (200 B.C.) and Vātsyāyana (400 A.D.) also recognized three characteristics of the mark (liṅga) of inference.\textsuperscript{33} Praśastapāda's fallacy of anumeyyasiddha means āśrayāsiddha or unreal subject, where he uses 'anumeya' in the sense of the subject of inference. He does not use the terms 'pakṣa', 'sapakṣa' and 'vipakṣa'. But he clearly states three characteristics of the reason or probans. Three fallacies of contradictory (viruddha), unproven (asiddha), and doubtful (sandigdha) reasons are due to the violation of these characteristics. Praśastapāda divides inference into dṛṣṭa and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. He distinguishes between inference for oneself and inference for others. He recognizes five members of the latter, and calls them pratijñā, apadeśa, nidāraṇa, aṇumāṇikāya and pratvāṃśa. He divides examples into two kinds, homogeneous and heterogeneous. He mentions different kinds of fallacies of proposition (pratijñābhāsa) or fallacious subjects,
fallacies of reason (hetvābhāsa), and fallacies of example (nidarśanābhāsa).

Diṇṇāga, a Buddhist logician, recognized the general principle of invariable concomitance (vyāpti), three characteristics of a valid reason, inference for oneself and inference for others, unknown to Kaṇāda and Gotama, fallacies of the subject (pakṣābhāsa) and example (dṛṣṭāntābhāsa) in addition to fallacies of reason (hetvābhāsa). Diṇṇāga regards the subject (S) as qualified by the probandum (P) as the object of inference, which is not P, nor the relation between S and P. Praśastapāda also regards a proposition as a judgment about the subject qualified by the inferable property. Vātsyāyana also regards the object of inference as the inferable attribute qualified by the subject (SP) or the subject qualified by the inferable attribute (PS).

Jacobi opines that Buddhist Logic derives from the Vaiśeṣika. A. B. Keith is definitely of opinion that Praśastapāda borrowed his doctrine of inference, especially his idea of vyāpti, from Diṇṇāga. But he suggests that both might derive their doctrine of inference from a school not yet known to us. Randle shows "a very close similarity between the logic of Praśastapāda and that of Diṇṇāga." Stcherbatsky first advanced the view that Diṇṇāga was prior to Praśastapāda, and then reversed their order, and maintained that Praśastapāda was either prior to, or contemporaneous with, Vasubandhu, the teacher of Diṇṇāga. Faddegon controverts the earlier view of Stcherbatsky that Praśastapāda borrowed from Diṇṇāga, and suggests that both were indebted to writers, whose works are lost. Randle also repeats this suggestion. Stcherbatsky adduces two significant arguments to prove his later view that Praśastapāda was a predecessor or a contemporary of Vasubandhu, the Buddhist teacher of Diṇṇāga. First, Vasubandhu quotes the definition of conjunction (saṁhyoga) not from the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra but from

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44 PB., pp. 231-52, 263-64.
45 NP., pp. 1-5, 7-8.
46 Atra Diṇṇāgena dhīmād agnirūpadharmāntarānānām agraśayaṁ sambandhanānām ca dhūrayitva'gniviśiṣṭadesāyanānāṁ samarāhitam. NVTT., p. 120. History of Indian Logic, pp. 281-82. FD., pp. 18-21. MSII., p. 88n.
Pratipipādayiṣṭadharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmaṁ addesamātram pratiṣṭhā. PB., p. 233.
Sādhyān ca dvividhān dharmiviśiṣṭo vā dharmah dharmaviśiṣṭo vā dharmi. NEh., I. 1. 30.
Praśastapādabhāṣya, viz., ‘aprāptayoh prāptih’. Conjunction is the union of two united substances. Secondly, Vasubandhu criticizes the Vaiśeṣika theory of sound—that it consists of a series of sound-waves terminating at the organ of hearing; that is found in Praśastapādabhāṣya but not in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra. The dates of Diṅnāga and Praśastapāda are not certain. S. C. Vidyābhūshan and Winternitz assign Diṅnāga to 500 A.D. A. B. Keith assigns him to 400 A.D., though he admits that his date is not yet certain. He assigns Praśastapāda to 500 A.D. There is no doubt that Praśastapāda is later that Vātsyāyana and earlier than Uddyotakara.

There is no positive evidence to prove conclusively that Praśastapāda borrowed his doctrine of inference from Diṅnāga. He borrowed his doctrines of vyāpti, three characteristics of a valid reason, the nature of sādhyā, homogeneous and heterogeneous examples, and five members of an inference from Kaṇḍa, Gotama and Vātsyāyana, the Brāhmaṇa logicians. His fallacies of example (nidarsanābhāsa) have a close similarity with drṣṭāntabhāsas of Nyāyapraveśa ascribed to Diṅnāga. He mentions four kinds of fallacies of proposition (pratijñābhāsa), whereas Diṅnāga mentions nine kinds of fallacious subjects (pakṣābhāsa). His four kinds of unproven reason (asiddha) correspond to those of Diṅnāga. His fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa) do not correspond to those of Diṅnāga. They partly resemble Gotama’s hetvābhāsas.

Praśastapāda’s logic is basically different from Diṅnāga’s logic. First, Praśastapāda recognizes the reality of universals (sāmānyā), which is in harmony with his doctrine of vyāpti as a real universal principle of invariable concomitance. Diṅnāga, a Buddhist logician, denies the reality of universals, which ill accords with his doctrine of vyāpti. Secondly, Praśastapāda’s inference is based upon real universal relations, whereas Diṅnāga’s inference depends upon general relations which are imposed by the intellect (buddhyārūḍha) upon phenomena. Praśastapāda is a realist while Diṅnāga is an idealist (vijñānavādin).

Praśastapāda recognizes five members of an inference for others: (1) proposition (pratijñā), reason (apadeśā), example (nidārṣana), application (anusandhāna), and conclusion (pratyāmānāya). He does not use the terms of the Nāya Śūtra. (1) The thesis (pratijñā) is the statement of a proposition. It states that the subject of inference is proposed to possess the inferable property or probandum. 'The air is a substance.' The thesis must not be contradicted by perception, inference, scriptural testimony, and the Vaiśeṣika tenets. (2) The reason (apadeśā) is the statement of the mark or probans which is invariably concomitant with the probandum. It has three characteristics already stated. 'Because it has qualities and actions.' They exist in the air, and all other substances, but not in non-substances. (3) The example (nidārṣana) is of two kinds, affirmative and negative. The affirmative example (sādharmyān nidārṣana) illustrates the invariable concomitance between the presence of the probans in general and the presence of the probandum in general. 'Whatever has action is a substance, for example, an arrow.' A negative example illustrates the invariable concomitance between the absence of the probandum and the absence of the probans. 'Whatever is a non-substance is devoid of action, for example, beinghood.' (4) The application (anusandhāna) consists in applying the general principle of invariable concomitance of the genus of the perceived probans and the genus of the probandum to the subject of inference. It states that the probans invariably accompanied by the probandum exists in the subject of inference. "The air has action." (5) The conclusion (pratyāmānāya) is the restatement of the proposition in order to convince another person. 'The air is, indeed, a substance.' Apadeśā corresponds to hetu; nidārṣana, to udāharaṇa; anusandhāna, to upamāṇa; and pratyāmānāya, to nigamana of Gotama.

Praśastapāda divides inference into two kinds: (1) drṣṭa; (2) sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. We perceived a dewlap in a cow in a town. Then we perceive a dewlap in an animal in a forest. From this we infer it to be a cow. This is a drṣṭa inference. There is absolute identity in the genus of the animal perceived in the past and the animal perceived at present. The genus of cow

"Nidārṣane'numeyasamānyena saha drṣṭasya liṅgaśāmānyasyānumeyena
nvānayanam anusandhānam. PB., p. 234;"
(gotva) inferred in the individual perceived in the forest was already perceived (drṣṭa) in the cow in a town. So it is called drṣṭa anumāṇa. We perceive that the voluntary actions of peasants, traders, government officers and the like are directed to the realization of perceptible results. So we infer that the performance of duties relating to castes and stages of life are directed to the attainment of heaven and other imperceptible results. There is absolute difference between the two kinds of actions. The former are directed to perceptible results, whereas the latter are directed to imperceptible results. But there is invariable concomitance between the community of actions (liṅga) and the community of having results (sādhyā). This kind of inference is sāmānyatodrṣṭa anumāṇa.**

Praṣastapāda regards vyāpti as the ground of inference. Wherever there is the probans (e.g., smoke), there is the probandum (e.g., a fire). Wherever there is the absence of the probandum, there is the absence of the probans. A person who knows the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire, has undoubted perception of smoke, remembers the universal relation between smoke and fire, and then infers the existence of a fire. His inferential knowledge of a fire is definite. The knowledge of the probans is pramāṇa or instrument of valid inference. The knowledge of the probandum is pramiti or valid inference. Or, the knowledge of the probandum is pramāṇa. The knowledge of its excellence, defect, or neutral character is pramiti. This is Praṣastapāda’s analysis of inference for oneself (svārtham anumāṇa). Pramāṇa is the means of valid knowledge. Pramiti is valid knowledge.***

Praṣastapāda mentions four kinds of fallacies of proposition (pratijñābhāsa). ‘Fire is cold’. It is contradicted by perception. ‘The sky is a cloud’. It is contradicted by inference. ‘Liquor should be drunk by a Brāhmaṇa’. It is contradicted by scriptural testimony. ‘The effect pre-exists in its cause’. It is contradicted by the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of Asatkāryavāda. These correspond to the Kālātyayopadīṣṭa hetvābhāsa of the Nyāya. The subjects are the abodes of the reasons. When the abodes

**Drṣṭam prasiddhasādhyayor atyaantuajātīabhede 'numāṇam. Prasiddhasādhyayor atyaantuajātībhedo liṅgānumāyadharmasāmānyānumavṛttito' numāṇam sāmānyatodṛṣṭam. PB., p. 212.

***PB., p. 206.
are vitiated, the contents are vitiated. So the Nyāya regards fallacious subjects (pakṣabhāsa) as fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa).

Praśastapāda mentions the fallacies of examples (nidarsanābhāsa). 'Sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal. Whatever is found to be incorporeal, is eternal, like atoms, or action, or a pot, or darkness, or ether'. The first is liṅgāsiddha, because incorporeality does not exist in atoms. The second is anumeyāsiddha, because eternity does not exist in action. The third is ubhayāsiddha, because neither incorporeality nor eternity exists in a pot. The fourth is āśrayāsiddha, because darkness is non-existent, and hence neither incorporeality nor eternity exists in it. The fifth is ananugata, because the invariable concomitance of incorporeality with eternity has not been proved, and hence we cannot know that both exist in ether. 'What is a substance is found to have action'. It is viparitānugata, because it should be stated as 'What has action is a substance'. Ether is a substance, but it is devoid of action. These are fallacious affirmative examples. 'Sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal; what is non-eternal, is corporeal, like action, or atoms, or ether, or darkness, or a jar'. The first is liṅgāvāvṛtta, because action is not excluded from incorporeality. The second is anumeyāvāvṛtta, because atoms are not excluded from eternity. The third is ubhayāvāvṛtta, because ether is not excluded from incorporeality and eternity. The fourth is āśrayāsiddha, because darkness is non-existent so that neither incorporeality nor eternity is non-existent in it. The fifth is avyāvṛtta, because it does not state that what is non-eternal, is corporeal, though incorporeality and eternity are non-existent in a jar. 'What is devoid of action, is a non-substance'. It is viparitāvāvṛtta, because it should be stated as 'What is a non-substance, is devoid of action'. The non-existence of the probandum is pervaded by the non-existence of the probans. These are fallacious negative examples.

7. Vyāpti.

Kaṇḍa calls vyāpti a well-known general principle (prasiddhi). Praśastapāda calls it a general principle (vidhi, samaya)
of invariable concomitance (sāhacarya) or inseparable connection (avinābhāya) between the probans and the probandum known by the repeated observation of their agreement in presence and agreement in absence. Udayana also defines it as a general principle of non-separateness of the probans from the probandum. It is invariable and unconditional concomitance between them. It is a universal and natural relation between them, which is not vitiated by any condition. Variable concomitance is conditional. Invariable concomitance is natural or unconditional.\textsuperscript{43} Vyāpti is not known by a single observation of the co-presence of the probans and the probandum. It is known by repeated observation of their co-presence and co-absence. It is known by the method of double agreement or agreement in presence and agreement in absence. Apprehension of conditions (upādhi-śaṅkā) is removed by repeated observation of their co-presence and co-absence.\textsuperscript{44} Invariable concomitance is not based upon causality and essential identity as the Buddhists maintain. It is natural or unconditional relation between the probans and the probandum, which is not vitiated by conditions.

There is variable concomitance (vyabhicāra), when the probans is vitiated by a condition (upādhi). There is invariable concomitance, when it is not vitiated by a condition. A condition must be present, when there is variable concomitance. A condition must be absent, when there is invariable concomitance. Where variable concomitance is evident, it is useless to find out conditions. But where variable concomitance is not evident, it can be proved by the presence of conditions which frustrate the relation. Tarka can remove all apprehension of possible conditions.\textsuperscript{45}

8. The Buddhist doctrine of Vyāpti.

The Buddhists maintain that the invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum is based on causality (tadutpatti) and essential identity (tādātmya), which are not derived from experience. If there were no causal relation or identity


\textsuperscript{44} Anvayavyaiitrakāveva bhūyodāraśamahacarīpaḥ tadgrahanopāyaḥ. KV., p. 286.

\textsuperscript{45} Tarkaḥ svuṣaḍaṅkānirākaraṇapaṭhyān virājate. KV., p. 301.
between them, there would be no uniform relation between them, and the presence of the probans in the positive instances of the probandum and its absence from its negative instances would not be able to prove the invariable concomitance between them, since there may be a doubt as to the possible existence of the probans in the negative instances of the probandum. But if the causal relation between them is proved, then we know for certain that wherever there is the probans (e.g., smoke), there must be the probandum (e.g., a fire). An effect (e.g., smoke) cannot exist without its cause (e.g., a fire). The causal relation can be established by the fivefold method. An effect is perceived after it is produced. It is not perceived before its production. The cause is an antecedent: The effect is a consequent. When the cause is perceived, the effect is perceived. When the cause appears, the effect appears. When the cause is introduced, the effect is introduced. When the cause is not perceived, the effect is not perceived. When the cause disappears, the effect disappears. When the cause is eliminated, the effect is eliminated. (1) An effect is an event. It is perceived after it is produced. (2) The cause is perceived. It is made to appear. (3) The effect is perceived. It is produced. (4) The cause is not perceived. It is made to disappear. (5) The effect is not perceived. It is not produced. Two non-perceptions of the effect and one perception of the cause,—perception and non-perception of the cause,—determine causal relation. By this fivefold method the causal relation is established between fire and smoke. In the presence of a fire there is smoke; in the absence of a fire there is no smoke. That is an effect, which exists when its cause exists, and which does not exist when its cause does not exist. A fire is the cause of smoke. When the causal relation is established between smoke and fire, we can infer with certainty the existence of a fire from the existence of smoke.

The Buddhists further maintain that the invariable concomitance can be determined by the knowledge of identity also. Everything has its own intrinsic nature (svabhāva). It cannot be divested of its nature. If it could be divested of its nature, it would be devoid of its intrinsic nature. Identity (tādātmya) of the probans with the probandum is determined by its absence in the negative instances of the probandum. If it is not absent
from them, a doubt will persist that it may exist in a negative instance of it, even if it is observed in a hundred positive instances of it.\footnote{NK., pp. 206-07. NBrh., pp. 37-60. Kāryakāraṇaprabhāvādāya svabhāvād vā nyāmakāt. Avinābhāvaniyamadṛśanāmān tu dṛśanāt. NK., p. 207.}

9. The \textit{Vaiśeṣīka} criticism of the Buddhist doctrine of \textit{Vyāpti}.

Śridhara refutes the Buddhist doctrine. He asks: Does the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum depend upon causality and identity? Or do causality and identity depend upon the invariable concomitance between them? Śridhara contends that the first alternative is not tenable. Though smoke is produced by fire, there is no invariable concomitance of earthiness, a property of smoke, with fire. So the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum does not depend upon the causal relation. Though there is identity between 'tree' in general (vrksatva) and a particular tree called śīṁśapā, there is no invariable concomitance between them. The second alternative also is not tenable. If causality and identity depend upon the invariable concomitance, then the universal relation (vyāpti) itself should be regarded as the indicator (gamaka) of the existence of the probandum, and causality and identity become useless. An effect as an effect is not an indicator. Nor is identity of nature (svabhāva) as nature an indicator (gamaka). Invariable concomitance (avyabhicāra) is the cause of the probans being an indicator of the existence of the probandum. Causality and identity are not causes of the probans being an indicator of its existence, because they are not always present. It is not proved that smoke is produced by a fire, because earthiness of smoke is not produced by a fire, and because smoke without earthiness cannot be produced by a fire. Nor is it proved that a śīṁśapā is identical with 'tree' (vrksatva), because 'tree' is not identical with a śīṁśapā, since it is common to all kinds of trees. If a śīṁśapā is identical with 'tree', then 'tree' should be identical with a śīṁśapā. But the nature of 'tree' (vrksatā) common to all kinds of trees is not the nature of a śīṁśapā. Therefore there is no identity (tādāmya) between them. If they are different in their nature, then they are not identical with each other. If there is identity
between them, then the nature of a śīṁśapā would be common to all kinds of trees, just as the nature of ‘tree’ is common to them. But when the nature of a śīṁśapā (śīṁśapātva) is apprehended, the nature of ‘tree’ (vṛksatva) is not apprehended. Identity (tādātmya) depends upon non-difference (abheda). So identity cannot be the cause of the probans being an indicator of the existence of the probandum. Moreover, a probans proves the existence of a probandum even in the absence of causality and identity. The setting of Kṛttikā indicates the rise of Rohiḍī. The rise of the moon indicates the rise of the sea tide and the blooming of the lotus. There is no causal relation between them. Therefore causality and identity are not the grounds of vyāpti. Sridhara further argues that a probans can prove the existence of a probandum because they are different from each other. If they were identical with each other, the former could never prove the existence of the latter. The Buddhists may argue that there is a difference between negation of non-tree and negation of non-śīṁśapā, but that their identity is conceptual. Then, Sridhara urges, determination of negation of non-tree in an individual by negation of non-śīṁśapā depends on the establishment of their identity, and the establishment of identity between them depends on the determination of negation of non-tree. This involves mutual dependence. If the Buddhists argue that the identity between the two negations imagined to be identical is established at the time of the apprehension of vyāpti, then the identity between the two negations is imaginary. If inference depends on attribution of imaginary identity, then there is no real probans. Then there may be identity between knowability (prameyatva) and non-eternity (anityatva) because they can be imagined to be identical with each other. It is true that because knowability exists in eternal entities also, it cannot be identical with non-eternity. But though there is no real identity between them, there is imaginary identity between them. Therefore non-eternity can be inferred from knowability. So identity cannot be the ground of vyāpti.

The natural relation between two things is constant, if it is not vitiated by conditions. A conditional relation ceases to exist,

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**Notes:**

1. *NK.*, p. 207.
2. *NK.*, pp. 209, 211.
when conditions are removed. But a natural relation does not cease to exist, because it does not depend upon conditions. If the relation of smoke to fire is due to conditions, then its conditions should be observed. If smoke and fire are observed together on numerous occasions, there is no reason why the conditions on which their relation depends should not be observed. If they are uniformly not observed, though they are capable of being observed, they are not conditions. If conditions follow from their very nature, then also there is invariable concomitance, because the relation following from conditions due to nature exists so long as the substances exist. If conditions are adventitious and due to extraneous causes, then also they would be observed. If both conditions and their extraneous causes are held to be imperceptible, then there are too many assumptions. If smoke has no conditions, then it should sometimes be perceived apart from the conditions. Smoky fire is due to its relation to wet fuel. Smokeless fire is due to its relation to dry fuel. But smoke is never observed to be fireless. Though co-existence of smoke and fire is perceived on the first occasion, yet their uniform coexistence is not perceived on the first occasion. Mere coexistence does not prove constant coexistence. Constant coexistence follows from unconditional coexistence. Unconditional co-existence is known by repeated observation of co-existence and non-observation of vitiating conditions on numerous occasions. So repeated observation of concomitance determines unconditional relation.\(^{39}\)

But how can invariable concomitance between individual smokes and individual fires, past, present and future be known? Sridhara replies that we observe invariable concomitance between smoke in general and fire in general. We do not observe invariable concomitance between individual smokes and individual fires. If we perceive invariable concomitance between two generalities, then we have no doubt as to the relation between their individuals at any time. But are not individuals perceived in the observation of invariable concomitance? They are perceived in their generalities, but not as individuals.\(^{31}\) So when

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\(^{39}\) NK., p. 200.

\(^{31}\) समान्यारूपतया ना विशेषारूपं व्याख्याय व्याप्तं प्रविष्टाः. NK., 210.
we perceive a particular instance of smoke, we enquire after fire in general, and do not care for a particular fire. If invariable concomitance between smoke in general and fire in general is known, and yet a doubt is entertained whether there is invariable concomitance between a particular smoke and a particular fire, then there is a scope for greater doubt whether there is invariable concomitance between a particular smoke and a particular fire, though a causal relation has been established between particular smokes and particular fires in other places and at other times as the Buddhists maintain. So Śridhara concludes that we do not know invariable concomitance between particular fires and particular smokes.

It may be urged that the causal relation is established by repeated observation (bhuyodārśana) of two events because a single observation does not remove a doubt as to its being vitiated by conditions. Repeated observation of things in general is possible, since momentary individuals vanish in a moment, and do not recur, and therefore cannot be observed again and again. Therefore the causal relation, which is established between negation of non-fire in general and negation of non-smoke in general in one place, holds true everywhere, since generality is one. Śridhara retorts that according to the Vaiśeṣika also invariable concomitance between smoke in general and fire in general is established by repeated observation of their co-presence and co-absence, and that it should appeal to the Buddhists. Further, according to them, generalities are non-entities and imperceptible, and therefore the causal relation between generalities cannot be perceived. Only particular individuals, which are existent, are perceived, and the causal relation between them, is perceived. In that case, no inference is possible about unperceived individuals. Individuals cannot be related to each other as the probans and the probandum, because they have never been observed to be causally related to each other. Nor can the individuals be comprised in one generality, because an entity and a non-entity cannot be related to each other. Individuals are entities while a generality is a non-entity according to the Buddhists. If a generality could comprise the individuals, without being related to them because of its being a non-entity, then anything could comprise anything. Therefore the causal relation cannot be the ground of Vyāpti,
which is the ground of inference.\textsuperscript{22} The Buddhist doctrine of Vyāpti as based on causality and identity is not valid.

10. Comparison, Testimony, Presumption, Non-apprehension, Inclusion, Tradition and Gesture are not pramāṇas.

A forester who has perceived a wild cow (gavaya) tells an inhabitant of a town, who has never perceived it, that a wild cow is like a cow. He goes to a forest, perceives an animal similar to a cow, and knows that it is a wild cow. The Nyāya calls this knowledge comparison (upamāna), and treats it as an independent pramāṇa. But the Vaiśeṣika regards it as inference. The knowledge of a wild cow depends upon testimony. It depends upon the validity of the statement of a reliable person or testimony. Testimony is inference. So comparison is non-different from inference.\textsuperscript{23}

It is urged that upamāna apprehends similarity. Similarity is community of many parts. A wild cow is similar to a cow. They have many common parts. 'This is similar to that'. It cannot be known by perception, since it has no intercourse with the sense-organs. Nor is it known by recollection, since it was not known by a distinct apprehension. So it is known by upamāna. But, in that case, Udayana argues, the fact 'this is dissimilar to that' also would be known by upamāna. It is also urged that the relation between a word and its meaning involved in upamāna is known by it, since it is not known by perception and other pramāṇas. This is wrong. The relation between a word and its meaning or object is known from the statement of a reliable person, which is testimony. Testimony is inference, since it depends upon the uniform relation between a word and its meaning. So upamāna is inference.\textsuperscript{24}

The Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsaka, Kumārila, regards the knowledge 'my cow is similar to this wild cow' as upamāna. When a wild cow is perceived in the forest, the cow perceived in the past is remembered. Then the cow's similarity with the wild cow is known by upamāna. The Vaiśeṣika regards it as mere recollection. Sridhara argues that similarity is confined to an individual,

\textsuperscript{23} Upamānen anumānāvyatyābhyam. NK., p. 220.
\textsuperscript{24} KV., pp. 21–22. VSL., ix. 3, 5.
and that it does not abide in two individuals like conjunction. Though a cow is not perceived, a wild cow in the forest produces the knowledge 'this is similar to a cow'. It produces a recollection 'a cow is similar to this'. So what is called upamāna by Kumārila is nothing but recollection.\(^{45}\)

Testimony (śabda) also is inference. Human testimony is a collection of sentences uttered by a person. Its validity depends upon the reliability of its speaker. Its invalidity depends upon the unreliability of its speaker. Testimony of the Vedas and Smṛtis is valid because their authors are reliable. They are free from the intention to deceive, errors, inadvertence and other defects. The Smṛtis are statements of sages, who are truthful, reliable and selfless seers. The Vedas are created by God. So they are valid. God perceives truths and communicates them through the Vedas. They are valid, not because they are eternal as the Mimāṃsaka holds, but because they are the utterances of God, who is free from all faults. Praśastapāda traces the validity of the Vedas to the reliability of the seers.\(^{46}\)

The sentences of the Vedas are composed by an intelligent agent, because they are compositions like ordinary sentences composed by human agents. They deal with supersensible entities which are known by God. It may be urged that God, who is devoid of a body, cannot utter sounds and arrange them in the form of intelligible words and sentences, and create the Vedas. Udayana replies that God assumes a body on rare occasions to create the world out of the atoms of earth, water, fire and air, and exhibit his glory. He does not deny the existence of a divine body. But he argues that Gods' activity is eternal, and that he can create the Vedas without a body. God is devoid of enjoyment and suffering. So he need not assume a body. He can act without an adjunct (upādhi) or vehicle.\(^{47}\)

Udayana argues that the Vedas have no intrinsic validity, but that they owe their validity to their being created by God, who is faultless and perfect. Validity and invalidity are due to extraneous conditions. Absence of faults and excellence of the speaker are the conditions of the validity of testimony. Presence

\(^{45}\) NK., pp. 220-21.  
\(^{46}\) Ph., p. 258. KV., p. 316.  
\(^{47}\) KV., p. 317.
of faults and absence of excellence of the speaker are the conditions of the invalidity of testimony.\textsuperscript{38} God who is eternal, omniscient and faultless, is the creator of the Vedas, and the source of their validity.\textsuperscript{39}

Testimony is inference, since it depends upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance between a word and its meaning. Just as the perception of smoke and the recollection of its invariable concomitance with fire lead to the inference of an unperceived fire, so the perception of a word and the recollection of its invariable concomitance with a meaning or object prove the existence of the object. The word is the probans. The object is the probandum.\textsuperscript{40}

It may be urged that there is no minor term (dharmin) in which the meaning (artham) is inferred from a word (śabdam), the middle term. A word is the middle term. Its meaning is the major term. But there is no minor term in which the major term is said to be inferred. The meaning (artham) is not the minor term, because it is not yet apprehended. If the word is the minor term and its possessing a meaning is the major term, then what is the relation between the word and the meaning? There is conjunction between a hill and a fire. But there is no conjunction between the word and its meaning. Nor is there inference between them. So it cannot be inferred that the word is possessed of a meaning. If the relation between them is one of the indicator and the indicated, it comes to exist after the meaning is comprehended. It cannot exist before the meaning is comprehended. Further, there is no invariable concomitance between a word and its meaning, as there is one between smoke and fire. The same word has different meanings at different times and in different places. But the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire has no exceptions at any time and in any place. So a meaning is not inferred from a word, and testimony is not inference.

But Śrīdhara replies that just as I utter the word ‘cow’ to denote a particular kind of animal with a hump and the like, so when another person utters the same word I infer that

\textsuperscript{38} KV., p. 318.
\textsuperscript{39} VSU., i. 3.
\textsuperscript{40} PB., p. 213.
he intends to denote the same kind of animal. So the compre-
prehension of the meaning of a word is inference. The person
who utters the word 'cow' to convey a particular meaning is
the minor term (dharmin). The word uttered by him is the
mark of inference (liṅga). The meaning inferred from it is the
major term (sādhya). The meaning exists in the intention of
the speaker. It is inferred from the intention of the speaker.
Sridhara further argues that there is a natural relation between
a word and its meaning, but that it depends upon the intention
of the speaker. So the relation between smoke and fire is
universal, but the relation between a word and its meaning is
not universal, but limited by time, place and intention of the
speaker. The word uttered by a person with the intention of
conveying a particular meaning is the mark (liṅga) from which
we infer a particular meaning. So the comprehension of the
meaning of a word is inference. Testimony is inference.

But why does not a word convey a particular meaning by
primary function? It cannot do so, because there is no relation
between a word and its meaning. If a word unrelated to a
meaning conveyed the meaning, any word would convey any
meaning. There cannot be a natural relation between a word
and its meaning, because the same word has different meanings
at different times and in different places. There is no evidence
to prove a natural relation between them. If a word has a
natural power (śakti) to convey a particular meaning, then a
person unacquainted with the conventional meaning of a word
also would be able to comprehend the meaning of the word.
If the knowledge of the natural relation between a word and
its meaning as distinguished from its mere existence be said
to be the cause of the comprehension of its meaning, then the
knowledge takes such a form 'this word has this meaning'. If
it arises from the usage of elderly persons (vṛddhavyavahāra),
this convention (sāmketa) with the aid of an impression
(saṁskāra) is the cause of the comprehension of the meaning
of a word. There is no use of another relation between a word
and its meaning called śakti. A word has its natural denotative
power. But it has an adventitious power of conveying a parti-
cular meaning in accordance with convention. We infer its

⁴¹ Āptābhīprāyād evārthasyādhibhāty. NK., p. 215.
meaning with the help of these two powers. The assumption of another relation between a word and its meaning is useless.\textsuperscript{42}

Kaṇḍāda says: "The Vedas are valid owing to the fact that they are utterances of that."\textsuperscript{43} He defines dharma in the preceding sūtra thus: "That is dharma which brings about abhyuddaya and mokṣa or the highest good," Śaṅkara Miśra opines that the validity of the Vedas is either due to the fact that they are utterances of God or due to the fact that they embody the moral laws (dharma) or injunctions and prohibitions. They are free from falsehood (anṛta), contradiction (vyāghāta) and tautology (punarukti).\textsuperscript{44} The Vedas are valid because they produce knowledge in all persons, which is in harmony with facts, like perception.\textsuperscript{45} Their validity is due to the reliability of their author, and not to their eternal and impersonal character. They are non-eternal and composed by an intelligent agent, because they are constructions of sentences, like secular compositions of sentences.\textsuperscript{46} Testimony is inference, since it depends upon the invariable concomitance between words and their meanings. It is not an independent means of valid knowledge.\textsuperscript{47} The Vaiśeṣika criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭavāda will be given along with the doctrine later.

Tradition (aithihya) is a succession of rumours emanating from past and remote speakers, who are not known. 'There is a ghost in this tree'. It is not derived from the statements of trustworthy persons like those of Śruti and Smṛti, which are valid, since they are instructions of authoritative persons. Such a tradition is an invalid inference, since it is a succession of statements of a multitude of untrustworthy persons, from which we infer their meanings. But sometimes tradition is valid testimony, since it is derived from a succession of statements of trustworthy persons. Valid testimony is a valid inference. Sometimes tradition owes its origin to customary conduct (sādācāra), which originates in Smṛti, which, in its turn, is inspired by

\textsuperscript{42} NK., pp. 216-17.
\textsuperscript{43} Tad vacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam. VS., i. 1. 3.
\textsuperscript{44} VSU., i. 1. 3.
\textsuperscript{45} Pramāṇam vedah sarveṣām avisāntvādijñānāheatvat pratyakṣaṃvat. NK., p. 217.
\textsuperscript{46} NK., pp. 216-17.
\textsuperscript{47} VSU., ix. 2. 5.
Sruti. Such a tradition is a valid inference, since it is a true statement of a reliable authority.\(^{44}\)

Presumption (arthāpatti) is inference. It is of two kinds: (1) dṛṣṭārthāpatti; (2) śrutārthāpatti. Devadatta is alive. But he is not present at home. These two facts are inconsistent with each other. The inconsistency can be removed by postulating that he is outside home. This presumption of his being outside home reconciles the two facts, which appear to be inconsistent with each other. The Vaiśeṣika regards it as inference. Though existence of a living person outside home is not contradictory to his absence from home,—one being favourable to the other and proving the other,—yet being alive and being absent from home are contradictory to each other. So Udayana regards such presumption (dṛṣṭārthāpatti) as an opposing inference (virodhi anumāna).\(^{46}\) Sridhara also regards it as an inference, since it depends upon the invariable concomitance between a living person’s non-existence at home and his existence outside home. If there were no invariable concomitance between them, from a living person’s non-existence at home some other fact might be presumed. So presumption is inference, since it presupposes the invariable concomitance between a probans and a probandum. ‘Devadatta, who is alive, exists outside home, because he does not exist at home, like me’. This is the form of inference.\(^{48}\) Śaṅkara Miśra also holds that what establishes (upapādaka) and what is established (upapādyā) are related to each other as a probans and a probandum. Non-existence at home of a living person is invariably accompanied by his existence outside home. This is the affirmative universal relation (anvayavyāpti) between the middle term and the major term. The non-existence of a living person at home is not proved without his existence outside home. This is the negative universal relation (vyatirekavyāpti) between the middle term and the major term. It may be urged that there is the universal relation between the probans and the probandum,—inconsistency of facts and an assumption,—but that it cannot be known. This argument is not valid. Presumption cannot give us new

\(^{44}\) Aitihyaṃ avitatham āpi topadesah. PK., p. 230. NK., pp. 230-31;
\(^{46}\) KV., p. 330; VSU., ix. 2. 5.
\(^{48}\) KV., p. 324.
\(^{48}\) NK., p. 223.
knowledge, if the universal relation is not known. The mere existence of the universal relation between them merely indicates the fact of inconsistency. So dṛṣṭārthāpatti is an inference.11

We hear that Devadatta, who is fat, does not eat food in the day time. So we presume that he eats at night. This is śrutārthāpatti. It also is an inference. We hear the statement of a reliable person that Devadatta is fat. We infer his fatness from it. Fatness is an effect. It is produced by eating food. We infer from his fatness his eating food at night, which is its cause. Udayana regards it as an inference from an inferred fact (anumitānāmāna). Saṅkara Miśra also maintains that śrutārthāpatti consists of two inferences.12

Kumārila holds that the non-existence of a jar on the ground is known by non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). But the so-called non-apprehension, according to Udayana, is sometimes perception and sometimes inference. Saṅkara Miśra also holds the same view. The ground is perceived through the eyes. They do not cease to function after perceiving the ground. They also perceive the non-existence of the jar on the ground. So sometimes non-apprehension is perception. The prior non-existence of a cause or a complement of causal conditions is inferred from an unproduced effect as a mark of inference, even as the prior existence of a cause or a complement of causal conditions is inferred from a produced effect as a mark of inference. The non-existence of a cause is inferred from the non-existence of an effect on the strength of the invariable concomitance between the non-existence of a cause and the non-existence of an effect.13

It may be urged that there is no mark (liṅga) from which non-existence may be inferred. But Udayana replies that the ground exists as qualified by the non-existence of a jar. The ground qualified by the existence of a jar can be apprehended by the same perception. But it is not known now as qualified by the existence of a jar. This is the mark (liṅga) from which the non-existence of a jar can be inferred. The bare ground

11VSU., ix. 2. 5.
12KV., p. 325; VSU., ix. 2. 5.
13KV., pp. 326-27; VSU., ix. 2. 5.
qualified by the non-existence of a jar is the mark of inference of the non-existence of a jar on the ground.

It may be urged that the knowledge of the non-existence of a jar on the ground is not perception, since its prior non-existence can be known even without the sense-organs. Perception and inference are different kinds of knowledge. So non-existence is not known by perception. But Udayana replies that this argument is not valid. The same object may be perceived and inferred at different times under different conditions. A fire is inferred from smoke. But it may be perceived with the eyes. If it were always inferred, it would never be perceived. In fact, non-existence is sometimes perceived and sometimes inferred. 14

But Sridhara regards non-apprehension as inference. The non-existence of a cause is inferred from an unproduced effect, as the existence of a cause is inferred from a produced effect. An unproduced effect is the mark of inference of the non-existence of its cause. 18

Inclusion (sambhava) is inference, since it depends on invariable concomitance between a probans and a probandum. A thousand includes a hundred. The former is invariably accompanied by the latter. An effect cannot be produced without a cause. A thousand is produced by ten hundred. So the existence of a hundred in a thousand is inferred from a thousand. A cause is inferred from an effect. 16 Udayana mentions two kinds of inclusion: (1) possible inclusion; (2) certain inclusion. The first is uncertain and therefore invalid. A Kṣatriya may possess heroism. A Brāhmaṇa may possess holiness. These are examples of possible inclusion. The second is certain and therefore valid. A thousand includes a hundred. This is a certain and valid inclusion, which is an inference. 17

Gesture (ceṣṭā) is regarded by the Tantras as an independent pramāṇa. But the Vaiṣeṣika regards it as an inference. We infer the meanings of particular gestures on the strength

14 Abhāvaḥ kvacit pratyakṣaḥ kvaciccāmmānīkaḥ. KV., p. 327; KV., pp. 326-29.
15 Abhāvo'numānam eva, anupamam kāryam kāraṇasadbhāve
liṅgam. PB., p. 225.
16 NK., p. 225.
17 KV., p. 326.
of invariable concomitance between them. One kind of gesture is a sign of calling. Another kind of it is a sign of dismissal. So Sridhara regards gesture as not a distinct pramāṇa, since it involves inference.78 Saṅkara Miśra points out that gesture either depends upon the conventional meaning of a word or does not depend upon it. The former reminds a person of the word intended by him. The remembered word is the mark (liṅga), which leads to the inference of its meaning. A word conveys its meaning through inference. The latter involves a uniform relation between a particular action and a particular meaning. A particular gesture reminds a person of the intention of its agent, and prompts him to do an action. It does not produce any valid knowledge. As soon as a conch-shell is blown, one should start for a place. As soon as a forefinger is raised, one should beat a person. Or the latter involves the uniform relation between an action and a particular meaning, and does not depend upon any convention. The raising of ten fingers indicates the number ten. Waiving the hand by contracting the fingers indicates a call to come. These gestures directly remind us of their meanings. They do not involve any knowledge of the relation between words and their meanings. So gesture is not an independent pramāṇa.79 Perception and inference only are the means of valid knowledge.

II

Ontology: The Categories.

11. The Categories.

Padārtha literally means the meaning of a word. It is an object of knowledge, and capable of being named. It is knowable (jñeya) and nameable (abhidheya). It is an object of valid knowledge.80 Kaṇāda brings all objects of valid knowledge under six categories. They are substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), action or motion (karma), generality (sāmāṇya), particularity (viśeṣa), and inference (samavāya).81 Kaṇāda

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78 PB., NK., p. 220.
79 VSU., ix. 2. 3.
80 Pramitivisayāh padārthāḥ. SP., p. 9.
81 VS., i. 1. 4.
does not mention non-existence or negation (abhāva). Śrīdhara, Udayana, Vyomasīva and Śivāditya add the seventh category of non-existence. Śivāditya (1000 A.D.) recognizes seven categories including non-existence or negation (abhāva) in his work entitled Saptapādārthī. Śrīdhara says, "Non-existence has not been mentioned separately, because it depends upon existence, not because it does not exist." Vyomasīva also is of the same opinion. Udayana also says, "Negation is not mentioned separately, though it has a real nature, since its nature is indicated by the categories of existence, which are its counter-entities, and not because it is unreal." He divides the categories into existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva), and subdivides existence into substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence. The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers recognize seven categories. "The sixteen categories (padārthā) of the Nyāya are the divisions of a treatise on Logic. But the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika are the different classes of the objects of knowledge. They are ontological categories. Hence the Syncretic writers generally adopt the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika." Substance (dravya) is the substratum of quality and action. A book is a substance. Its colour, extension, solidity, dimension and the like are its qualities. Its motion is its action. Its qualities and motion subsist in it. Quality (guṇa) cannot subsist in itself. It subsists in a substance, which is its substratum. Quality is comparatively permanent and passive. Action or motion is temporary and dynamic. The genus of man subsists in many individual persons. It is a generality or community (sāmānyya). An eternal substance has an ultimate individuality or particularity (viśeṣa). It distinguishes it from other eternal substances. Space is one, eternal and ubiquitous-substance. It has a particularity which distinguishes it from other eternal substances, time, ether and the like. An atom of earth is distinguished from another atom of earth by its particularity. Inherence (samavāya) is the inseparable relation between sub-

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32 ABBHĀVASYA PṛTHAG ANUPADEŚAḥ BHĀVAPĀRATANTRYA’NAH TVABHĀVAT. NK., p. 9. VY., p. 29 (Ja).
34 ABBHĀVASVATU SVARĪPAVĀN API PṛTHAK NODDIŠTĀH. PRATIYOGINIRṆAṆDAH DHIMANIRṆAṆDATVAT. NA TUM ECHATVAT. KV., p. 6.
36 LAKṢΑṆĀVALI, p. 1.
37 IIp., p. 131.
stance and quality, substance and action, a generality and an individual, an eternal substance and its particularity, and a composite substance and its component parts. Negation (abhāva) is not a logical category, but an ontological category. It is not mere negation of a substance in thought, but real non-existence of a substance. When a jar is destroyed, there is real negation of the jar. Substance (dravya) is the main category. All other categories depend on it for their existence. Substance is the substratum of quality, action, community, particularity, and inheritance. So it is mentioned first.**

The first six categories have existence (astitva), nameability (abhidheyatva) and knowability (jñeyatva). They are objects of the positive notion of being. They can be known without depending on their counter-entities. They are capable of being expressed by names. They are capable of being known, though they exist independently of being known. They are not subjective notions but ontological entities.*** The three categories of substance, quality and action are related to beinghood (sattasambandha), which subsists in them. The three categories of generality, particularity and inherence are related to themselves (svātmasattva); they are devoid of relation to beinghood. They are neither causes nor effects. They are eternal. They cannot be expressed by the word 'object' (artha). They are independent of time and space. They are ontological categories. They are non-spatial and timeless entities. Substance, quality and action are causes capable of producing effects and liable to destruction. They exist in time and space. Eternal substances are not liable to destruction.**** Their similarities and dissimilarities will be considered later. The nature of the categories is considered in the following sections.

12. (I) Substance (Dravya).

Kaṇāda defines a substance as an entity, which has qualities and actions; and which is the inherent or material cause of an effect.** The genus of substance (dravyatva) inheres in it. A

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** Adān dravyasyoddeśab sarvāśrayatvena prādhānyāt. PB., p. 7.
*** Saṃmāṇapi padārthānām sādharṇyam astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni. PB., p. 16.
**** PB., pp. 17, 19. III., pp. 120-33.
** Krivāguṇavat samavāyikaraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam. VS., i. 1. 15; x. 2. 1.
substance is the substrate of qualities and actions. It is not a mere conglomeration of qualities and actions. It is not a mere aggregate of qualities as the Buddhist realist maintains. Nor is it a mere complex of ideas as the Buddhist idealist maintains. It has a real, objective existence. It differs from qualities and actions because it is their substrate. They inhere in it. It is their substratum. If it were not different from them, it would not be their substratum. Qualities and actions are devoid of qualities and actions. They are not self-existent. They exist in a substance. The relation between a substance and its qualities and actions is inheritance.

A substance is the material cause of its effect. This characteristic distinguishes it from a quality and an action. A quality is a non-inherent cause (asamavāyi kāraṇa). Conjunction of threads, which is a quality, is the non-inherent cause of a cloth. An action also is a non-inherent cause. It is a non-inherent cause of conjunction and disjunction. I move my hand, and touch the table. The movement is the non-inherent cause of conjunction of my hand with the table. I move my hand away from the table. The movement is the non-inherent cause of disjunction. But a substance is only the inherent cause (samavāyi kāraṇa) of an effect.*8 Threads are the inherent cause of a cloth. They are the material out of which it is produced. A substance is an inherent cause of an effect, while a quality and an action are its non-inherent causes. The whole (avayavā) is not a mere conglomeration of parts (avayava) as the Buddhist realist maintains. It has an existence over and above that of its parts. They are its material cause. It inheres in them. The relation between a substance and its qualities and actions, and between a material cause and its product is inheritance.

The Vaiśeṣika maintains that a substance is devoid of qualities at the first moment of its production. It acquires them at the next moment. How, then, can it be defined as endued with qualities? The Vaiśeṣika replies that it is endued with qualities at any time. It is possessed of qualities in the sense that it is possessed of prior non-existence or posterior non-existence of qualities also. At the moment of its production it has prior non-

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*8 VSU., 1. 1. 15.
existence of qualities. At the moment of its destruction it has posterior non-existence of qualities. During its existence between the two moments it is the substrate of qualities. So it is the substrate of qualities either in the relation of prior non-existence, or inherence, or posterior non-existence. It is the substrate of qualities, actual or potential. It is a material cause of its effect at any time. It produced an effect in the past, or it produces it at present, or it will produce it in the future. It is capable of producing an effect out of its stuff.\(^{11}\)

A substance exists through relation to beinghood (sattā). It has a genus (dravyatva). Different kinds of substances have inferior genera. Earth has the genus of earth. Water has the genus of water.\(^{12}\) A substance is the substrate of qualities, actions and the like, which inhere in it. There are many substances, which are independent of one another. There is no one substance. Many substances exist; they are knowable and nameable. They exist in themselves. Their existence does not depend on their being known. But they are not unknown and unknowable. They can be known by the selves. They can be expressed by words. Their expressibility also does not constitute their existence. Their knowability and expressibility are accidental to their existence.\(^{13}\) They are objects of knowledge. They are apprehended by cognitions, perceptual or inferential. They are not mere cognitions or ideas. They are objects of cognitions.\(^{14}\) The Vaiśeṣika advocates realistic pluralism. It admits the reality of many self-existent and independent substances, which are independent of the cognitions apprehending them. The Vaiśeṣika advocates ontological dualism. It recognizes the existence of souls and material substances, which are irreducible to each other.

Substances are eternal and non-eternal. Non-eternal substances consist of parts, and are produced by their combination, and destroyed by their separation. Composite substances are produced and destroyed by something different from themselves. They are non-eternal. They are not self-subsistent and independent, but they subsist in their component parts.\(^{15}\) But simple-

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\(^{11}\) MB., p. 38; VSU., i. 1. 5.
\(^{12}\) PB., p. 17.
\(^{13}\) PB., NK., p. 16.
\(^{14}\) PB., NK., p. 17.
\(^{15}\) PB., pp. 16-18.
and partless substances like the atoms of earth, water, fire and air are eternal. They are neither produced nor destroyed. They are self-existent, independent and endued with particularities. Space, time, ether and souls, which are incorporeal and ubiquitous, are eternal. Minds (manas) are atomic and eternal. They are neither produced nor destroyed.

Substance is the fundamental category. Quality and motion inhere in a substance. Community inhere in an individual substance. Particularity inhere in an eternal substance. Inherence subsists in a substance. It is an intimate relation between a substance and its quality, action, community and particularity. It is the substrate of all other categories. It is the material cause of its product. So Kaṇḍāda mentions substance as the first category.

Sāntarakṣita, a Buddhist Vijñānavādin, refutes the Vaiṣeṣika category of substance. Permanent atoms cannot exist, since all things are momentary. Permanent things cannot produce effects either successively or simultaneously. Therefore they are non-existent. If atoms were permanent, they would produce mountains and other gross things at once, since they are independent of conjunction and other conditions, which cannot produce any peculiarity (aīśaya) in them. But such gross things as a house, a body and the like are produced successively. The causes that produce effects successively are impermanent. The atoms produce gross things successively. So they are impermanent. Sāntarakṣita further urges that there are no composite substances (avyayavim) distinct from their parts and qualities, since they are not perceived. The so-called composite substance is a mere aggregate of parts and qualities. Substance and quality are not distinct from each other. Whole and part are not distinct from each other. The composite substance is said to inhere in its component parts. If it inhere in its parts in its entirety, then it ought to be regarded as many. If it inhere in its parts in part, it would not be one. So neither atoms nor composite substances exist. The Vaiṣeṣika does not believe in impermanence, and severely criticizes it.

13. (II) Quality (Guṇa).

Kaṇḍāda defines a quality as an entity inhering in a substance, and devoid of quality, which is not an unconditional cause of

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**VS., VSU., i. 1. 8, 10, 12. SP., MB., pp. 37-38; BP., i. 3; SM., pp. 60-70; Tbh., pp. 20-23; TSG., pp. 5-10; TR., pp. 132-39.**

**NR., p. 7. Dravyasa sarvapadārthādāravatena samavāyikāraṇatvena ca prādhānāt prathamam uddeśaḥ. MB., p. 11.**

**TS., TSP., 551, 552, 559, 613.**
conjunction and disjunction. Praśastapāda adds one more characteristic of a quality. He defines it as an entity related to the genus of quality (guṇatva), abiding in a substance, and devoid of quality and action.\(^{99}\)

A quality inheres in a substance, which is its substrate. It is not self-existent. It depends upon a substance for its subsistence. But it is not identical with a substance. If it were so, it would not be related to a substance as the content (ādhēya) of a substrate (ādhāra). A substance is the substrate of its quality, which is its content. A substance is not a mere aggregate of qualities as the Buddhist realist maintains. Qualities inhere in a substance. But sometimes a substance also inhere in another substance. A composite substance inhere in its component parts. So a quality is defined as devoid of qualities. A composite substance is not devoid of qualities. But a quality is devoid of qualities. An action or movement also inhere in a substance, and is devoid of quality. It is an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction. But a quality is not an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction. The upward movement of a ball is a direct and immediate cause of its disjunction from the ground and its conjunction with an upper region of ākāśa. The motion of the ball is the cause of its conjunction and disjunction. Hence a quality is different from an action.\(^{100}\)

A quality is devoid of action. A substance only has an action. But its quality is incapable of action. A fan has motion. But its colour is devoid of motion. A quality has no motion. But it seems to be in motion because its substrate is in motion.\(^{101}\)

A quality is devoid of quality. Number is the quality of a substance. It is not a quality of its colours, odours, tastes and other qualities. Qualities have no qualities.\(^{102}\)

A quality has a community,—the genus of quality (guṇatva).\(^{103}\) A colour has the genus of colour. A quality differs from community, particularity and inherence, which are devoid

\(^{99}\) Dravyātārayagyaguṇatvān sadnyogavibhāgeśvakaśāram anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam. VS., i. 1. 16. Guṇānāṁ guṇatvāḥbhisambandho dravyātātyaṁ nirguṇatvāṁ niśkriyatvaṁ. FB., p. 94.

\(^{100}\) VSU., i. 1. 16.

\(^{101}\) NK., pp. 94-95.

\(^{102}\) NK., p. 94.

\(^{103}\) SM., p. 400; TBh., p. 24.
of community. It differs from a substance because it is devoid of qualities, while the latter is endowed with qualities. It differs from an action, which is devoid of qualities, but which is an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction. A quality is not their unconditional cause. A quality exists through relation to beinghood (sattā). The genus of quality (guṇatva) subsists in a quality. It may possess an inferior community also. A colour possesses the genus of colour (rūpatva) also.\textsuperscript{184}

A quality is a non-inherent cause (asamavāyi kāraṇa) without being an action.\textsuperscript{185} A substance is an inherent or material cause. A quality is a non-inherent cause. An action also is a non-inherent cause. Thus a quality is a non-inherent cause without being an action. The conjunction of the two halves of a jar, which is a quality, is a non-inherent cause of it. A quality is never an inherent cause.\textsuperscript{186}

Sivāditya defines a quality as an entity, which has the genus of quality, which is not an action, though possessed of a community, and which is not an inherent cause. Kesavamisra defines it as an entity subsisting in a substance, possessing a community, without being an action, and being a non-inherent cause.\textsuperscript{187} A quality is an enduring static feature of a substance. The different kinds of qualities will be considered later.

Sāntarakṣita refutes the category of quality. Substance has been proved to be non-existent. So qualities, which are said to subsist in it, are non-existent. If one colour exists in a permanent large substance, then it ought to be perceived in full, when only a part of the substance is perceived. If colour exists in parts in a substance, then there are atoms of colour in different parts of the substance,—which are then substances, and not qualities, since qualities are not divisible into parts. Further, qualities are nothing but momentary ideas. So qualities are non-existent.\textsuperscript{188} The Vaiśeṣika rejects phenomenalism and subjective idealism.

14. (III) Action or Motion (Karma).

Kaṇāda defines an action as an entity, which inheres in one substance, which is devoid of a quality, and which is an

\textsuperscript{184} PB., NK., p. 17. TR., pp. 139-40.
\textsuperscript{185} TBB., p. 24.
\textsuperscript{186} MB., p. 39.
\textsuperscript{187} SP., p. 38. Sāmānyavāṇa asamavāyikāraṇam aparastatām guṇaḥ sa ca dravyāyām eva. TBB., p. 24; BP., i. 4-5; TR., p. 139-41; TBB., p. 24; SP., MB., pp. 38-39.
\textsuperscript{188} TS., TSP., 634, 636-37.
unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction. Action is physical motion. It resides in a substance like a quality. But an action is its dynamic and temporary feature, whereas a quality is its static and enduring feature. Conjunction, which is a quality, resides in many substances, which are conjoined with each other. But an action or motion abides in one substance only. It does not reside in many substances. Conjunction of a book with a table resides in the two substances. But the motion of a fan resides in it only. An action, like a quality, resides in a substance, and is devoid of a quality. But it is an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction, whereas a quality is not their cause. The motion of a carriage is the direct and immediate cause of its disjunction from one part of the ground and conjunction with another part of it. An action is a non-inherent cause (asamavāyi kāraṇa) of conjunction and disjunction. The carriage which is a substance, is the inherent or material cause of its disjunction from one part of the ground, and of its conjunction with another part of it. But its motion is their non-inherent cause. Its colour, which is its quality, is never their non-inherent cause. Sivāditya observes that an action is a non-inherent cause of the first conjunction and disjunction, which are not produced by any prior conjunction and disjunction. Śaṅkara Miśra observes that an action does not depend upon any positive entity after its production to produce conjunction and disjunction. It depends upon their inherent cause and destruction of prior conjunction. The motion of the carriage depends upon it and destruction of its prior conjunction with another part of the ground to produce its disjunction from and conjunction with other parts of the ground. An action is a non-inherent cause of conjunction and disjunction. So it must depend upon their inherent cause to produce them. A mere non-inherent cause is not adequate to their production. But this does not make an action their conditional cause.

Motion resides in a corporeal substance of limited dimension. An incorporeal, ubiquitous substance, like ether, time,
space, or a soul, is incapable of motion.\textsuperscript{114} It cannot change its position.

The genus of action (karmatva) resides in an action which is non-eternal. It resides in a non-eternal entity. It is the next lower species of Being, which does not reside in substances and qualities, some of which are eternal. It is an inferior genus.\textsuperscript{113}

An action exists through relation to Being, the highest genus, which inheres in it. It has existence, knowability and nameability. Its existence is independent of being known. It is expressed by a word because it is known. Its existence is independent of its knowledge and expression. It resides in a substance, which is its substrate. It is not identical with a substance. If it were identical with a substance, it would not be its content. The container and the content are different from each other.

Thus an action resides in one substance only. It is devoid of qualities. It possesses the genus of action. It is the unconditional, non-inherent cause of conjunction and disjunction. It resides in a corporeal substance of limited magnitude. It resides in a non-eternal substance. It is non-eternal. It is liable to destruction in a short time. It is produced by heaviness, fluidity, effort and conjunction.\textsuperscript{114} It is destroyed by a subsequent conjunction with another substance or by destruction of its basic substance.

Five kinds of action or motion are recognized, \textit{viz.}, upward motion (utkṣeṣaṇa), downward motion (avakṣeṣaṇa), contraction (ākūṅcana), expansion (prasāraṇa), and locomotion (gamana). Upward motion brings a body into contact with a higher region, \textit{e.g.}, throwing a stone upward. Downward motion brings a body into contact with a lower region, \textit{e.g.}, throwing a stone downward from a tree to the ground. Contraction brings the parts of a body closer to one another, \textit{e.g.}, the rolling of a cloth. Expansion makes the parts of a body farther from one another, \textit{e.g.}, the unfolding of a cloth. All other kinds of motion are comprised in locomotion. Walking, evacuation, flow, flaming up, and slanting motion are different kinds of locomotion.\textsuperscript{114}
Sāntarakṣita criticizes the category of action. He urges that everything is momentary, and that there cannot be anything which may have action at some time, and may not have it at some other time. A momentary thing cannot have action at some moment, and be devoid of it at the next moment. The moment it gets action, it becomes a different thing, and the action is not different from the thing of the moment. A permanent thing cannot have action, because as soon as it gets action, it becomes a different thing. A thing which does not become different, cannot have action. An unchanging thing cannot have action. If action is the nature of a thing, it can never be inactive. Even when it is inactive, it would be in action. If it is inactive by nature, it cannot be active for a single moment. Even when it is in motion, it would be inactive. If it is active at one time and inactive at another time, then it becomes two different things, since it cannot possess contradictory characters at different times. A moving thing and an unmoving thing are two different things, since they possess contradictory characters. An impermanent thing or a permanent thing cannot have motion, since two disjoined things occupying different positions in space cannot be conjoined with each other. So action or motion is not possible. An illusion of motion is produced, when two similar things are produced at different places in quick succession by preceding things.\[134\] This criticism is in keeping with the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness and the subjective idealism of Sāntarakṣita and Kumāraliśa. It reminds us of Zeno’s argument against the possibility of motion. But the Vaiśeṣika is a realist and an empiricist. He cannot deny the existence of permanent things and their motion, which are perceived.

15. (IV). Community (Sāmānya).

Kaṇḍāda says, “Community and particularity depend upon the intellect to indicate their existence.”\[137\] They are not conceptual constructs. They have ontological existence. Praśastapāda describes community as the cause of assimilation.\[138\] It is the objective basis of the notion of common characters among many individuals. Śrīdhara describes it as the cause of the knowledge of common characters possessed by many individuals, which are quite different from one another.\[139\] Udayana des-

\[134\] TS., TSP., 692, 696-707.
\[137\] Sāmānyam viśeṣa iti buddhyapakṣam. VS., i. 2. 3.
\[139\] Atyantavyāvyutṣāhāṃ pindaṁ yataḥ kāraṇād anyonyasaarāpānugamaḥ pratiyate tat sāmānyam. NK., p. 11. Sākti, p. 82.
cribes it as the essential and common character of many individuals. It is natural. It is not accidental. It is one and eternal, and exists in many individuals. There is one community in many individuals. There is the genus of cow (gotva) in many cows. The genus is one. It does not differ in different individual cows. Community inheres in many individuals. Colour inheres in one substance. The colour of a flower inheres in it only. It does not inhere in many flowers. So it is not a community. Conjunction inheres in the substances, which are conjoined with each other. But it is temporary. Community is eternal. So conjunction is not a community. Community is a positive entity devoid of a community, different from particularity, and inhering in many individuals. Particularity also is devoid of a community. Therefore community is described as different from particularity. Inherence also is devoid of a community. But it does not inhere in any substance, whereas community inheres in many substances. So community is different from inherence.

Praśastapādā describes its characteristics. It inheres in all its proper individuals. It is identical in its nature. It exists in many individuals. It produces the inclusive notion of its own nature common to many individuals. It exists in many substrates entirely and simultaneously without differing in its essential nature. It is the cause of assimilation of many individuals. It produces an abstract universal concept of many individuals. (1) Community inheres in all its proper individuals. The genus of cow inheres in all individual cows. It does not exist in all individuals, cows, goats, sheep and the like. It is not perceived in all individuals. Though a community is not limited to a particular place, it exists in all its proper individuals, which are produced by their causes and collocations of conditions. They only are its substrates.

122 Samānyam bhāvaḥ svabhāviko'nāgantukō bahūnāh dharmāḥ sāmānyam. KV., p. 22. Sūkti, p. 52; Setu, p. 53; Vyomavati, p. 55.
123 Samānyam nityam ēkam anekasamavetam. SP., p. 39.
124 Bhāva'te sati samavetāṁ viśeṣāṁ anyad niḥsāmānyāṁ sāmānyāṁ. MB., p. 40.
125 Svaśījayaśarvagataṁ abhinnāmakaṁ anekavṛtti ēkādviḥduṣyāṃśvasvarūpāngamamaprayāyakāri svarūpabhedadūkhāreṣu prahandhena vartamānam anuvrttipratyayakāraṇam. PR., p. 311.
(2) Community is identical in its nature. It exists in all its proper individuals with an identical nature. It does not differ in its nature in different individuals. Its identical nature is indicated by the identical nature of the notion of inclusion produced by their common character. The identical assimilative concept indicates the existence of the identical nature of the community in them.\textsuperscript{126} (3) Community exists in many individuals. It is their common and essential nature. The genus of cow (gotva) exists in all cows. It exists in its identical nature in them. It is perceived as identical in many individuals. It does not exist in one individual. Ether (ākāśa) is one. So there is no genus of ether (ākāśatva). Similarly, there is no genus of time or space. Time is one. Space is one.\textsuperscript{128} (4) Community is the cause of the concept of common character in many individuals. It produces the notion of inclusion, because it exists in its identical nature in many individuals. It has an objective existence. It is the universal class-essence existing in many similar individuals. It produces a concept in the self. A concept is an assimilative cognition. It is produced by a community, which is its objective basis.\textsuperscript{127} (5) Community exists simultaneously in its identical nature in many individuals, and as such produces the assimilative cognition or concept of their common character. It does not cease to exist in one individual, when it comes to exist in another new-born individual. It exists entirely, simultaneously and continuously in many individuals. (6) Community is perceived in one individual, and remembered in the other individuals perceived in the past due to revival of their impressions, which were produced by their repeated similar perceptions.\textsuperscript{128} When we compare the perceived individual with the individuals remembered due to revival of their impressions, we recognize a certain common character among them, which inheres in them all. This common character is called community. It is the cause of an assimilative cognition in the self.\textsuperscript{128} (7) A community is one in all its substrates, because it has the same character in different individuals, and because it has no marks of special characters in

\textsuperscript{126} NK., p. 313.  
\textsuperscript{128} NK., p. 313.  
\textsuperscript{127} PB., p. 311.  
\textsuperscript{128} PB., p. 311; NK., p. 313.
them.\textsuperscript{120} (8) Community is eternal. It is different from the individuals, which are its substrates. They are produced and destroyed. But it is neither produced nor destroyed. The genus of substance is eternal. But the individual substances in which it inheres, are produced and destroyed. The genus of quality is eternal. But the individual qualities in which it subsists are generated and destroyed. The genus of action is eternal. But the individual actions, which are its substrates, are produced and destroyed. Community is one in many individuals. Therefore it is eternal. If it were not eternal, one community could not subsist in many non-eternal individuals, past, present, and future.\textsuperscript{121} (9) Community is different from the individuals, which are its substrates, because it is restricted to particular individuals, and because it produces a specific cognition. The genus of substance exists in substances only. The genus of quality exists in qualities only. The genus of action exists in actions only. If a community were not different from its substrates, it would be produced and destroyed with them. But it is not produced, when they are produced, and it is not destroyed, when they are destroyed. It is eternal, while they are temporary. The individuals are different from one another. They produce discriminative cognitions, which apprehend their different specific characters. But community produces assimilative cognition, which apprehends their common character. So a community is different from its proper individuals.\textsuperscript{122}

Community is one, eternal, and inheres in many individuals. Ether is one. But it does not inhere in many individuals. So it is not a community. Conjunction inheres in many substances, which are conjoined with each other. But it is not eternal. So it is not a community. The dimension of ether is eternal. It inheres in ether. But it does not inhere in many substances. So it is not a community. Absolute non-existence is eternal. It exists in many entities. But it does not inhere in them. So it is not a community. The colour of an atom of water is eternal. It inheres in many atoms of water. But it is not one. So it is not a community. Different atoms of water have

\textsuperscript{120} Pratyekam svāśrayeṣu lakṣaṇāviśeṣād viśeṣalakṣaṇābhāvācāvacaikatvaṃ. \textit{PB.}, p. 314.
\textsuperscript{121} \textit{PB.}, p. 314; \textit{NK.}, pp. 314-15.
\textsuperscript{122} \textit{PB.}, p. 314; \textit{NK.}, p. 316.
different colours numerically, though they have the same quality. So community is characterized by oneness, eternity, and inherence in many individuals. All these characteristics together characterize a community.\(^{122}\)

A community (jāti) is different from an upādhi. The former is a 'natural kind' or class, while the latter is an artificial class. Community is eternal, while upādhi is non-eternal. The former is the basis of natural classification, while the latter is the basis of artificial classification. Blindness is a non-eternal and accidental common character. It is an upādhi. It is not a jāti or natural class. If it be recognized as a jāti, blind persons, blind cows, and blind horses will be grouped under the same class. But, in fact, they belong to different classes. So blindness, fairness, deafness, and the like are accidental and temporary common characters (upādhi). Similarly, language, race, and religion are not natural classes (jāti), but accidental common characters (upādhi). If they are recognized as natural classes, the same persons will belong to different classes. So a jāti is different from an upādhi,\(^{124}\) which is an imposed property.

Udayana mentions six conditions which prevent a common quality from becoming a true community (jāti), viz., oneness of the individual, co-extensiveness, cross division, infinite regress, self-contradiction, and absence of relation. Ether is one individual. So the common quality of ether is not a jāti. The common quality of jars (ghaṭatva) and the common quality of pitchers (kalaśatva) are co-extensive with each other. They inhere in the same individuals. They are not different classes. They are different names of the same class. The groups, which are co-extensive with each other, are not jātis. The classes, which overlap one another, are not jātis. Earth, water, fire, air, and ether are the physical elements. Physicality (bhūtatva) is their common character. Earth, water, fire, air, and manas are corporeal. Corporeality (mūrtatva) is their common character. Ether has no corporeality. Manas has no physicality. Earth, water, fire, and air have physicality and corporeality both. So physicality and corporeality are partially co-extensive and partially not co-extensive. They overlap each

\(^{122}\) TR., p. 159; SM., pp. 72-73.

\(^{124}\) Preface to Tarkasāṅgraha (Bodas), pp. 92-93; IIP., p. 167.
other. "Ether is physical but not corporeal. Manas is corporeal but not physical." So physicality and corporeality are not jātis, because they involve cross division (saṅkara). A jāti is devoid of a jāti. If a jāti had another jāti, the second jāti also would have another jāti, and so on to infinity. This would involve infinite regress (anavasthā). So a class has no other class. A particularity is devoid of generality. Generality can never inhere in it. Particularity (viśeṣa) by itself distinguishes its substrate, an eternal substance, from the other eternal substances. If a generality (viśeṣatva) be supposed to exist in a particularity, that would distinguish its substrate from others, and make the assumption of particularity needless. Generality is inclusive and assimilative. Particularity is exclusive and discriminative. Particularity having a generality involves self-contradiction (rūpahāni). So a generality or a class cannot exist in a particularity. Inherence is devoid of generality, since there is no relation of inherence between the generality of inherence and inherence. Where there is no relation of inherence (asambandha) between a generality and its substrate, there can be no generality. Inherence is devoid of inherence. Oneness of an individual (vyakteḥ abhedaḥ), co-extensiveness (tulyatva), cross division (saṅkara), infinite regress (anavasthā), self-contradiction (rūpahāni), and absence of relation (asambandha) are the counteracting conditions of a jāti.

Prāṣāstapāda divides communities into two kinds, higher (pura) and lower (apara). Being (sattā) is the highest generality. It subsists in the largest number of objects. It is a generality only. The genus of substance (dravyatva), the genus of quality (guṇatva), and the genus of action (karmatva) subsist in a limited number of objects. They are lower generalities. They are generalities (sāmāṇya), because they assimilate their proper individuals to one another. They are lower generalities (viśeṣa), because they discriminate their proper individuals from other kinds of individuals. They are the causes of assimilation and discrimination both. They are sāmāṇya and viśeṣa both.

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116 IP., p. 167. Vyaṭatarahadastutulayatvam saṅkarothānavastrhitib. Rūpahānirasambandho jāṭībāḥkakasāṅgrahāḥ. (KV., p. 33); 119 KV., p. 33; SM., Dīnakārt, pp. 74-77. KNR., pp. 159-61; VSV., i. 2. 3.
They are not viśeṣa in the specific sense of the distinguishing characters of eternal individual substances.\(^{137}\)

The genus of earth is inferior to the genus of substance. The genus of colour is inferior to the genus of quality. The genus of upward movement is inferior to the genus of action. So there is a hierarchy of genera with Being as the highest genus and the lowest genera at the bottom. There is the highest genus (parā jāti). There are the lowest species (aparā jāti). There are the subaltern genera and species (parāparā jāti).\(^{138}\)

Being (sattā) is the highest generality. Substances, qualities, and actions exist through relation to Being. Being is common to them. But Being is different from them. Substances, qualities, and actions are different from one another. But Being is identical in them. So it is different from its substrates. It inheres in them.\(^{139}\) There is one Being in substances, qualities, and actions. It does not differ in its different substrates. We perceive them all as existing. Being is the one, identical, common factor in them. It has no special distinguishing marks. So Being is one.\(^{140}\)

16. The Vaiśeṣika criticism of the Buddhist denial of Community.

The Buddhists do not recognize the reality of universals. They are individualists and nominalists. They deny the existence of a generality or community. They argue that the same form is not perceived in different individuals, as a thread is perceived passing through the beads. Śrīdhara criticizes the Buddhist objection. A community (gotva) is perceived in many individual cows, which serves to distinguish them from individual horses and the like. If a community were not perceived in different cows, one individual cow would be perceived as different from another individual cow in the same manner as it would be from another individual horse. But, in fact, all individual cows are perceived to be alike. This points to the

\(^{137}\) PB., p. 11; NK., pp. 11-13; VS., VSU., i. 2. 5.

\(^{138}\) NK., p. 12; BP., 8-10; SP., p. 12; PB., pp. 311-12.

\(^{139}\) VS., VSU., i. 2. 7-8; PB., p. 17; NK., p. 17.

\(^{140}\) Sadāri līṅganviśeṣād viśeṣaṁśaṁ bhavevaṁcika bhavaṁ. VS., i. 2. 17. Taca dravyaṅgapakramas āsiṃśaṁ apiśati. VSU., i. 2. 17. NL., pp. 79-81; TBrh., p. 28; TR., p. 159; TSG., p. 94; SM., pp. 72-78; BP., i. 8-9; SP., MB., pp. 39-40; SP., p. 12; KN., pp. 159-60.
existence of a community present in all cows, and not present in horses and other animals. It serves the same purpose. It differentiates cows from the other animals.\footnote{Niyamena tu govyaktyalya pratyamānāḥ sarūpāḥ avavargasādhāraṇam avādīryāṃttam kācid ekau rūpaṃ ākṣipati ekārthakriyākāritvād ekahetutvācena. NK., p. 318. Cp. TS., TSP., 708-812.}

The Buddhists may argue that the unity is that of the individual cows. But Śrīdhara argues that if there were no community, there could be no unity among the individuals, their causes, and their effects, because they are different from one another. If the unity among them were due to the unity of their cause, then there would be no unity among those individuals that are produced by diverse causes. The same effect is produced by different causes. Fire is produced by friction of two pieces of wood, electricity, the rays of the sun falling on the sūryakānta gem, and the like. There could be no unity among these different kinds of fire, because there is no unity of their cause. If the unity among the individuals were due to the fact of their producing the same effect, then there would be unity even among entirely dissimilar individuals, cows, buffaloes and the like, because they give milk and carry burdens. Further, if there were no community, what would be denoted by a word? A specific individuality (śvalakṣaṇa) cannot be its object, since it is momentary and excluded from all other things. A word has a general meaning. It cannot denote a momentary specific individuality, which is distinct from the other individuals. Nor can a determination (vikalpa) of the cognition of an individual be denoted by a word, because it is momentary and not common to many individuals. If the form of determination (vikalpākāra) be said to be denoted by a word, the form is either different from the vikalpa or non-different from it. If it is different from it, it is either common to all such vikalpas, or different in each vikalpa. If it is common to all vikalpas, it is non-different from community. Only the Buddhists regard such community as a characteristic of cognitions (jñāna-dharma), whereas the Vaiśeṣika regards it as a characteristic of external objects (artha-dharma), because it is apprehended as something external to the self. If the form of determination differs in each individual, it cannot be the object of verbal convention. If the form of determination is non-different from the cognition, then
also it cannot be denoted by a word, because cognitions differ with different individuals.

The Buddhist realists may argue that determination or concrete qualification of a specific individuality imposes its own external form on its cognition, and thus makes it concrete and determinate, and that this form of determinate cognition imposed on it as if it were external, is the object of verbal convention. But Śrīdhara urges that the externally imposed form of determinate cognition is produced when the determinate cognition is produced, and that it is destroyed when the determinate cognition is destroyed. Thus it differs with each determination. It is not common to many determinations of individuals. So it cannot be the object of verbal convention. What differs with each individual cannot be denoted by a word.142

The Buddhist realists may argue thus. The determination of an individual cow imposes its external form on its cognition. The determination of another individual cow imposes a similar external form on its cognition. The determinations of cognitions apprehend their own forms. They can never apprehend the difference among the forms imposed by themselves, since the apprehension of difference depends upon the apprehension of both the members, which differ from each other. The forms of determinations are regarded as identical, because the difference among them is not apprehended. Therefore the determinations are considered to be identical. This apparent identity of the determinations of the specific individuals (sva lakṣaṇa) is the community. This community is negative in character, since it is absolutely different from the externally imposed forms of determinations. It combines with the specific individuality, its cognition, the form of its cognition, and the imposed form. With the form of externality imposed upon it, it is denoted by a word. The determinate cognition (adhyavasāya) of this community is the determinate cognition of a specific individual. The form in which the community is imposed is the form of the specific individuality. This community is in the nature of exclusion of all other things; it has both positive and negative forms. If it had only a positive form, the assertion 'the cow is' would be tautological. If it had

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142 NK., pp. 317-18.
only a negative form, the assertion 'the cow is not' would be tautological. But both assertions are significant. So the community denoted by a word has both positive and negative forms. It is on account of this community that different individuals appear to be identical. This community is the object of all determinations. The unity of determinations is due to the unity of this community. The unity of the indeterminate perceptions of the specific individuals, which are their causes, is due to the unity of the determinate cognitions. The unity of the specific individuals is apprehended owing to the unity of the indeterminate perceptions of the specific individuals.¹⁴³

Sridhara criticizes the Buddhist position. The Buddhists maintain that community is the imposed identity of the forms of determinate cognitions owing to non-apprehension of their difference. But Sridhara asks: Does the imposition of identity consist in non-apprehension of difference among the forms of determinate cognitions? Or does it consist in apprehension of non-difference? The first alternative is not tenable, because non-apprehension of difference may lead to the imposition of difference also. Just as difference among the forms of determinate cognitions is not apprehended, so non-difference also among them is not apprehended. So just as the imposition of identity is due to non-apprehension of difference among the forms of determinate cognitions, so non-apprehension of non-difference may lead to the imposition of difference. The imposition of difference cannot prompt action, which can be prompted by the apprehension of identity. It cannot be denoted by a word. The second alternative also is not tenable. The imposition of non-difference is not due to apprehension of non-difference. The apprehension of difference and non-difference presupposes the existence of a single self, which apprehends many objects and their difference and non-difference. But the Buddhists do not admit the existence of a single permanent self, which can apprehend many objects with their difference and non-difference. The self, according to them, is a series of fleeting ideas. Determinate cognitions apprehend their own forms. They cannot apprehend difference and non-difference among many objects. Even if there be a single permanent self, which

¹⁴³ NK., pp. 318-19.
apprehends many objects, it cannot apprehend non-difference among different forms without a cause of non-difference. Even if there were apprehension of non-difference, there would be apprehension of non-difference even among cows, horses and buffaloes owing to the absence of distinguishing characters among their differences.\footnote{NK., pp. 319-20.}

The Buddhists may argue that there is a single cause of apprehension of non-difference or identity among many individual cows in the form of exclusion of non-cows (agogyāvṛtti). But Śrīdhara asks: What are the non-cows, exclusion of which imposes non-difference or identity on the forms of cows? If the non-cows are those animals which are not cows, then what are the cows, which are not non-cows? The determination of the nature of non-cows would depend upon the determination of the nature of cows, and the determination of the nature of cows would depend upon the determination of the nature of non-cows. If one is not known, both cannot be known. Kumārila says, "The well-known cow would be in the nature of the negation of non-cows. What is the cow that is negated in a non-cow? Until the cow is known, there is no non-cow. If there is no non-cow, there is no cow."\footnote{SV., ch. on Apoha, 82, 83, 85; Apohasiddhi, pp. 1-19; NK., p. 320.}

The Buddhists may argue that negation of the contradictory (anyāpohā) is denoted by a word. Śrīdhara asks: What is the apoha? Is the apoha, negation of the non-cow, positive or negative in character? If it is positive, is it in the nature of an individual cow, or is it in the nature of an individual non-cow? If it is in the nature of an individual cow, then it pertains to a particular individual, and is not common to all individuals. So it cannot constitute the denotation of a word. If it is in the nature of an individual non-cow, then also it cannot be the object of verbal convention for the same reason. Further, the cow would not be denoted by the word 'cow'. If the apoha be regarded as a positive entity different from particular individuals and common to them all, it is nothing but community recognized by the Vaiśeṣika. There is a difference in name only. What is called sāmāṇya by the Vaiśeṣika is what is called apoha by the Buddhists. If the apoha be regarded as a negative entity, being in the nature of exclusion of the other
entities, it would not be apprehended by a positive cognition, since a negative entity cannot produce any effect, and what produces a cognition is apprehended by it. An entity, which is not apprehended by perception, cannot be denoted by a word. When a negative entity is apprehended by means of a word, a person, who hears the word, cannot be moved to activity with regard to a positive entity, since a negative entity is different from a positive entity, and there is no relation between them. 144

The Buddhists may argue that a word denoting a specific individuality is due to non-discrimination, since the individuality is apprehended in a negative form. Apprehension of the specific individuality is illusory due to non-discrimination of the perceptible and the imaginary and attribution of a character to it, which does not really belong to it.

Sridhara urges that this argument is not valid. There cannot be imposition of a negative entity as identical with it on what is not apprehended. A person on hearing a word cannot apprehend the object signified by it, since the word denotes something different from it, and there is no other means of apprehending it. Therefore a negation is not denoted by a word. A person is moved to activity towards a positive object on hearing a word. This proves that a positive entity is denoted by a word.

There is no other cause of unity in the forms of individual cows. All objects are mere negations of one another. They are apprehended as entirely new objects at every moment, which are absolutely different from one another. Therefore these entirely different negative individuals cannot be denoted by a word, which has a general significance. That which is not apprehended by perception cannot be an object of acceptance or rejection, since its conduciveness to pleasure or pain is not known. Yet we find that usage is based upon words. All persons, on hearing words, perceive their objects, which are positive in character, and are moved to activity in the shape of acceptance or rejection. It is this usage that proves the existence of a community, which is common to many individuals. It is a community that is denoted by a word. When a person knows pleasantness or painfulness of a class of objects,
he acts to obtain or avoid a particular object, even though he may not have perceived it before.

The assimilative cognition, which comprehends many individuals under a class, proves the existence of a community, which is its cause. If a community were a mere negation, the whole activity of the world would become impossible. So a community is a positive entity common to many individuals.\(^{147}\)

17. (v) Particularity (Viśeṣa).

The term 'Vaiśeṣika' is derived from the term 'viśeṣa'. The Vaiśeṣika recognizes particularity (viśeṣa) as a distinct category. The Sāṁkhya, the Yoga, the Mīmāṁsā, and the Vedānta do not admit it as an independent category. Vātsyāyana recognizes it as a distinct category, and mentions it among the six categories, substance, quality, action, community, particularity, and inherence, which exhaust all objects of knowledge.\(^{148}\) Madhva admits the reality of viśeṣa as a distinct category. But he takes viśeṣas in the sense of the distinctive characters of eternal and non-eternal substances. There are as many viśeṣas as there are qualities. They bind together the different qualities of a substance into an integral unity.\(^{149}\) So the recognition of viśeṣa as an independent category in the sense of the ultimate distinguishing feature of an eternal substance is a unique characteristic of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

Kaṇḍaṇa defines viśeṣa as the ultimate distinguishing feature of an eternal substance, which is known by its discrimination from the other eternal substances. It depends upon the intellect to indicate its existence.\(^{150}\) Praśastapāda also defines particularities as the ultimate distinguishing features of eternal substances. They are called viśeṣas, because they are the causes of the ultimate distinction of their substrates from one another.


\(^{148}\) Kim tat sarvam? Dravyagunakarmaśāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyaḥ. NBh., ii. 1. 32.


\(^{150}\) Sāmānyavati viśeṣa iti buddhynpekṣaṁ. Anyatrāntyebhyaḥ viśeṣebhyah. VS., i. 2. 3, 8.
They are the final distinctive characters of eternal substances. They subsist in the eternal substances,—the atoms of earth, water, fire and air, ether, time, space, self and manas. One particularity inheres in each of them, which distinguishes it from the other eternal substances. The assumption of many particularities in one eternal substance is needless. Eternal substances are infinite in number. So particularities also are infinite and innumerable.

Particularities do not require other particularities to distinguish them from one another, because it would lead to infinite regress. They distinguish themselves from one another. They not only distinguish their substrates from one another, but they also distinguish themselves from one another. They are self-distinguishing. They distinguish their substrates from one another without the aid of other attributes, because then they would lose their distinctive character. They directly distinguish their substrates from one another by their very nature (svato vyāvartaka). They are devoid of a community (viṣeṣatva). If they had a community, that would distinguish their substrates from one another. Particularities would distinguish their substrates from one another by virtue of their community, and lose their distinctive nature. They exist in single substances only. They are devoid of generality. They do not exist through inherence of Being in them, which is a generality.

Eternal substances have particularities, which distinguish them from one another. But their qualities have no particularities. They also are distinguished from one another by the particularities of their substrates.
Sivāditya defines a višeṣa as an entity inhering in a single substance, and devoid of a community. Community and inherence are devoid of community. But they subsist in many individuals, while a particularity subsists in one individual only. So it differs from them. The qualities (e.g., taste) of an eternal substance (e.g. an atom of water) have communities (e.g., the genus of taste), while its particularity has no community. So it differs from the qualities of its substrate. A community inheres in one individual, and is devoid of a community. The genus of a cow inheres in an individual cow, and is devoid of a genus. But it is not a particularity, which inheres in one individual only. A community does not inhere in one individual only. It inheres in many individuals. The genus of cow inheres in many individual cows. So a particularity is different from quality, inherence, and community.

Particularities subsist in eternal substances only. But composite non-eternal substances subsist in their non-eternal parts and eternal atoms. But atoms do not subsist in other substances. So particularities are different from substances. Qualities inhere in eternal and non-eternal substances. They possess communities. So particularities are different from qualities. Actions inhere in non-eternal substances. They possess communities. So particularities are different from actions. Communities subsist in non-substances, qualities and actions also. So particularities are different from communities.

Particularity is a positive entity. It inheres in its substrate. But non-existence is a negative entity. It does not inhere in its locus. So particularity is different from non-existence. It is different from substance, quality, action, community, inherence, and non-existence. It is a distinct ontological category.

Composite non-eternal substances are distinguished from one another by their parts, qualities, actions, conjunction with other substances, and the like. A white cow is distinguished by her quality. A cow moving fast is distinguished by her action. A cow with a large hump is distinguished by a part of her body. A cow with a large bell is distinguished by her

139 Višeṣastu sāmānyaratāta ekāvyaktivrttiḥ. SP., p. 40.
140 MB., p. 40. TR., pp. 159-60.
141 VV., p. 57.
142 Višeṣāḥ paramārthasantāḥ. VV., p. 87.
conjunction with another substance. But the two atoms of earth, which have the same form, quality, and action are distinguished from each other by their particularities. Composite substances are distinguished from one another by their parts or substrates. They do not require particularities to distinguish them from one another. But the eternal substances, for example, atoms, which are partless, homogeneous, and endowed with the same qualities and actions, are distinguished from one another by their particularities. Two liberated souls, whose special qualities are destroyed, are distinguished from each other by their particularities. If they had no particularities, they would be indistinguishable from each other. Particularities are necessary to ensure their existence as distinct entities.

The existence of particularities is proved by inference. Just as a jar has a distinguishing attribute because it is a substance, so the atoms of the same kind,—endued with the same qualities and actions must have particularities inhering in them, which distinguish them from one another, because they are substances. Similarly, the liberated souls also must have particularities inhering in them, which distinguish them from one another. Ether, time, space, liberated souls, and minds (manas) cannot be differentiated from one another without particularities inhering in them. So the existence of particularities in them must be inferred as the cause of their mutual distinction. The existence of particularities is inferred by ordinary persons. But they are actually perceived by the Yogins. They can distinguish the atoms of the same kind and endued with the same qualities and actions through their particularities. They can distinguish the liberated souls and minds from one another through their particularities. Without particularities they would be indistinguishable from one another.

It may be argued that the Yogins can distinguish them from one another by dint of their merits born of meditation without the aid of their particularities. But this argument is invalid. Just as they cannot perceive a white thing as non-white, and recognize a thing never perceived before by dint of their own merits, so they cannot distinguish

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188 NK., p. 323; SM., pp. 78-83; KV., p. 24; Setu, p. 56.
189 KV., pp. 24-25.
188 NK., p. 323.
the atoms of the same kind from one another by dint of them without
the aid of particularities. If they could distinguish them from one
another without particularities inhering in them, their perceptions
would be invalid.\textsuperscript{144} Merits born of meditation can produce perceptions
of supersensible entities. But they cannot produce perceptions, which
are not produced by their causes.\textsuperscript{145}

It may be argued that just as particularities are self-distinguishing
and do not require other particularities to distinguish them from one
another, so the Yogins can distinguish the atoms of the same kind
from one another without their particularities. This argument is not
valid. The perception of the Yogins cannot alter the nature of things.
They cannot apprehend things as different from what they are in their
nature. Just as a non-luminous jar is manifested by a luminous lamp,
but the lamp is manifested by itself, so similar atoms are distinguished
from one another by their particularities, but the particularities are
distinguished by themselves. The similar atoms cannot differentiate
themselves from one another. They are distinguished from one another
through their particularities.\textsuperscript{146}

Qualities may be said to serve the purpose of particularities.
But this is not possible. Qualities are eternal and non-eternal.
They have communities. They exist through relation to Being.
But particularities are eternal and devoid of community. They
do not exist through relation to Being. Two atoms of earth
have the same qualities, which cannot differentiate them from
each other. Mutual non-existence may be said to distinguish
the atoms of the same kind from one another. But this also is
not possible. Mutual non-existence exists in two entities, which
have dissimilarities. There is mutual non-existence of a cloth
and a jar in each other. But particularities exist in two eternal
substances, which have similar qualities, and distinguish them
from each other. So mutual non-existence cannot serve the
purpose of particularities. Distinctness may be said to distinguish
the atoms of the same kind. But this also is not possible.
Distinctness is determined by limits, which also depend on other
limits. So it also depends on dissimilarities of substances. But
particularities inhering in similar eternal substances distinguish
them from one another. So the existence of particularities must
be admitted to account for the ultimate distinction of eternal
substances. Particularities are the ultimate distinguishing

\textsuperscript{144} PB., pp. 321-22.
\textsuperscript{145} NK., pp. 333-24.
\textsuperscript{146} Paramāṇu śāmānyadharmaṇaśu viśeṣayogādeva pratyayavvārtrit
yuktā, na svarūpamātrā. NK., p. 324.
characters of the atoms of the same form, quality and motion, and of the released souls, and of the internal organs (manas) by which the Yogins distinguish them from one another. Raghunātha Siromaṇi rejects the category of viśeṣa.

Śantarākṣita criticizes the category of viśeṣa. He urges that there are no eternal substances in which viśeṣas may subsist. If viśeṣas can distinguish themselves from one another without further viśeṣas, as the Vaiśeṣika supposes, the atoms of the same kind may be held to distinguish themselves from one another without viśeṣas. Further, viśeṣas subsist in eternal substances, and are eternal. So they cannot produce discriminating cognitions. Production occurs in time. So momentary entities only can produce effects. Hence the category of viśeṣa is unnecessary.

18. (VI) Inherence (Samavāya).

Kaṇḍāda defines inherence as the relation between a material cause and its effect, which is the cause of the notion ‘this subsists in this abode.’ Praśastapāda defines it as the relation which subsists between two inseparable entities related to each other as the substrate and the content, and which is the cause of the notion ‘this subsists in this abode.’ Srīdhara defines it as the relation between two inseparable entities, which are of the nature of a substrate and its content. It is not the relation between two entities, which are capable of separate existence and subsistence in different substrates. Separable entities are capable of existing apart from each other and residing in different substrates. A cloth subsists in its constituent yarns. Though the yarns subsist in their parts, which are different from the cloth, yet both cannot subsist in different substrates apart from each other. The cloth subsists in the yarns, which compose it. Though they have an independent existence apart from the cloth, yet it has no independent existence apart from them. The yarns are the substrate, and the cloth is its content. They are its material cause. It subsists in them. Udayana defines inherence as an inseparable and intimate relation between two entities,
which can never be separated from each other.\textsuperscript{118} It is the relation that subsists between a substrate and its content, which is not adventitious, but natural.\textsuperscript{117} A natural relation is not produced. Conjunction is a contingent, temporary and accidental relation. But inherence is a necessary, uncaused, and inseparable relation.\textsuperscript{116} It is a relation between a substance and a quality, a substance and an action, a genus and an individual, an eternal substance and its particularity, a whole and its parts.\textsuperscript{119} A quality inheres in a substance. An action inheres in a substance. A genus inheres in an individual. A particularity inheres in an eternal substance. A composite whole inheres in its constituent parts. An effect inheres in its material cause.

Inherence is inseparable relation between two non-pervasive entities, which are restricted to particular places, and which are known to be different from each other.\textsuperscript{119} Inseparable relation implies incapacity of its relata for independent existence. It is an indissoluble union of two different entities.\textsuperscript{141}

Inherence is inseparable relation between two entities, one of which is incapable of separate existence apart from the other. The composite whole cannot exist apart from its parts. But when it is destroyed, the parts can exist apart from it. But so long as the whole exists, it and its parts cannot exist apart from each other. A quality cannot exist apart from its substance. But the substance can exist apart from its quality at the moment of its production. It acquires its qualities at the next moment. But so long as a quality persists, a substance cannot exist apart from it. An action cannot exist apart from its substance. But the substance can exist without its action. An action is temporary, while its substance is enduring. But so long as an action lasts, a substance cannot exist apart from it. An individual cannot exist apart from its genus. But the genus exists before the individual is born and after it is destroyed. But so long as the individual lasts, the genus cannot exist apart from it. The genus and the individual are inseparably related

\textsuperscript{117} KV., p. 26.
\textsuperscript{116} KVB., p. 48.
\textsuperscript{119} PB., p. 324: NK., p. 325; TR., p. 161; SM., i. 11, pp. 83-84.
\textsuperscript{141} Asuravatānym adhigatānyatvāntvānaviṣvagbhāvaḥ samavāyanākhyāḥ sambandhah. PB., pp. 324-25.
\textsuperscript{311} Apiḥhaṅbhāvo svātantryatu samavāyaḥ bhinnayoh parasparopās-leṣasya sambandhakartātvopalamḥāt. NK., p. 325.
to each other. The genus exists in the other individuals. But its existence in them does not affect its inseparable relation to a particular individual. So Padmanābha Miśra defines inherence as the relation that subsists between two entities, which are related to each other, while they are existent. A particularity cannot exist apart from an eternal substance. An eternal substance also cannot exist apart from its particularity. There is mutual dependence here. But in the other instances there is one-sided dependence. Therefore inherence is an intimate relation, but it is not an internal relation. It is an external relation.

Inherence is the relation between two inseparable entities, which are always related to each other, and incapable of separate existence, and which are related to each other as a substrate and its content. It is the relation between two inseparable entities, one of which is the substratum, and the other is its content. This definition obviates the objection mentioned above. So long as the two inseparable entities are related to each other as the container and the contained, the relation between them is inherence. It is a natural relation between a substantive (dharmin) and an attributive (dharma). It is not an adventitious relation between two entities, which acquire the nature of a substantive and an attributive.

'There is a bird in ether (ākāsa)'. Ether is the substrate, and the bird is its content. But the relation between them is not inherence, because they can exist apart from each other. 'There is a fruit in a plate'. The plate is the substrate, and the fruit is its content. The relation between them is the cause of the notion 'this subsists in this abode'. But it is not inherence, because it does not subsist between two inseparable entities. The fruit and the plate can exist apart from each other. The relation between a word and its object (vācyavācakabhāva) is not inherence, because they are not related to each other as a substrate and its content. A word denotes its object. It cannot exist apart from its object. But there is no relation of inherence between them, because their relation is not the cause of the notion 'this subsists in this abode'. The word does not

112 Samavāyasthule ubhaṁ vidyamānan sambaddhāveveti bhāvaṁ.
113 KVB, p. 47.
114 Aprthagbhātanāṁ sarvadā mithāṁ samavetānām ādhārayādhāra-

bhātanāṁ sambandhāḥ samavāyāḥ. Sūkṛtī, p. 58.
115 Setu, p. 69.
subsist in its object. A cognition cannot exist apart from its object, which is apprehended by it. But it does not subsist in its object. Therefore the relation between a cognition and its object (visayaviśayabhāva) is not inherence, because they are not related to each other as a substrate and its content.\footnote{NK., pp. 14-15; VV., pp. 108-09.}

Inherence is one, because it has the same distinguishing feature. There is no evidence of its distinctions.\footnote{SM., i. 11, pp. 85-86.} One inherence can account for all notions ‘this subsists in this abode’. So it is useless to assume many inferences. One inherence is enough to relate all its relata,—substances and their qualities, substances and their actions, wholes and parts, genera and individuals, eternal substances and their particularities.\footnote{NK., p. 328.} Though inherence is one only, there is a restriction due to the differences of the substrates and their contents. The genus of substance inheres in substances. The genus of quality inheres in qualities. The genus of action inheres in actions.\footnote{PB., p. 327.} Substances only have the power of manifesting the genus of substance. Qualities only have the power of manifesting the genus of quality. Actions only have the power of manifesting the genus of action.\footnote{PB., p. 327; Sākta, p. 58; Sp., p. 40; MB., p. 40.} Thus, though inherence is one, it has a restriction as to its substrate and its content due to the differences in the power of being the manifesteer and the manifested.\footnote{Dravyatvādānām api samavāyaśkatva’pi vyañhyavyañjakaśakti-bhedād ādharādiṣṭhitvāniyamānāḥ. PB., p. 327.}

Inherence is eternal, though its relata are transient. It is not produced by any cause. It is not a temporal relation. It does not pertain to relations in time. Śivāditya defines it as an eternal relation. It is different from conjunction, which is a temporary relation. Just as one Being inheres in many existing entities, so one inherence subsists between innumerable pairs of relata. Just as Being is eternal, so inherence is eternal. Inherence is different from conjunction, which is a temporary relation.\footnote{PB., p. 326; Sākta, p. 58; Sp., p. 40; MB., p. 40.} An effect is mainly produced by a material cause. It is produced by a non-material cause and an efficient cause with the aid of a material cause. If it had a material cause, it would be related to its cause either by itself or by another inherence. It cannot be related to its cause by itself, because
then it would be the substrate of itself. But no entity can be both a substrate and its content. No entity can subsist in itself. Nor can inherence be related to its cause by another inherence, since it would lead to infinite regress. Therefore inherence is uncaused and eternal.\(^{188}\)

Inherence is not perceptible. It is not perceived to subsist in perceptible entities. There is no distinct perceptual cognition of it. The relation between a rose and its colour is not perceived. It is inferred from the notion 'this subsists in this abode'. It is not perceived as an object (viṣaya).\(^{188}\) It is inferred from the qualified cognition of a substantive, an attributive, and relation between them. A jar is endued with a colour. The jar is a substantive; colour is an attributive. Inherence is the relation between them. The jar and its colour are perceived. But inherence between them is not perceived.\(^{188}\)

Inherence does not exist through the inherence of Being in it. It is not related to Being. It is self-subsistent (svātma-vṛtti).\(^{188}\) It does not require any other relation to relate it to its relata. Conjunction cannot subsist between inherence and its relata. It is a quality, which subsists in substances only. Inherence cannot subsist between inherence and its relata, because inherence is one only. There is no third relation, which can subsist between inherence and its relata. Inherence is one and indivisible relation, which subsists between its relata. It has no other relation by which it can relate itself to its relation. Therefore it is self-subsistent.\(^{188}\)

Inherence is not identity. The two inseparable entities, which are related through inherence, do not produce the cognition of one thing. They produce two different cognitions, which apprehend them. The cognitions have different contents. So the relata of inherence are different from each other. They are not really one and the same thing. Therefore inherence is not essential identity (svarūpābheda), but the relation between two inseparable entities, which cannot subsist in different substrates.

\(^{188}\) VSU., vii. 2. 26. \(^{188}\) PB., p. 339; Sūkti, p. 88.

\(^{188}\) SM., i. 11, p. 83; MB., p. 13.


\(^{188}\) Avibhāgino-vyāttiyāṁmakasya samāvāyasya nānyā vṛttir asti tasmat svātma-vṛtthiḥ. PB., pp. 328-29.
apart from each other. The relata of inherence are different from each other. Inherence is not non-difference or identity, as the Advaita Vedanta wrongly maintains.

Inherence is not svarūpasambandha, which is a relation that is identified with either of its relata. If there is svarūpasambandha between a jar and its colour, the jar itself is the relation of colour to it. Therefore an infinite number of svarūpasambandhas must be assumed to account for the relation between countless substances and their qualities and actions. This will contradict the law of parsimony of hypotheses. Further, the assumption of svarūpasambandha between a material cause (parts) and its effect (whole) would undermine the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of Asatkāryavāda. The effect is a new beginning (ārambha), which is different from, and inheres in, its material cause. The whole is different from its parts. It inheres in its parts. Therefore inherence is not svarūpasambandha.

The relation subsisting between the ground and the non-existence of a jar is not inherence. "There is non-existence of a jar on the ground". Here the non-existence of the jar does not inhere in the ground. The relation is not inseparable. If it were so, there would be the cognition of the non-existence of the jar on the ground, even when it is brought back to the ground. The relation between the non-existence of a jar and the ground is not inherence, but svarūpasambandha.

Inherence is not conjunction. Conjunction is a relation between two substances. But inherence is a relation between a substance and another substance or non-substance. It is a relation between a material cause (parts) and an effect (whole), a substance and a quality, or an action, or a community, or a particularity. Conjunction is a separable relation. Inherence is an inseparable relation. In conjunction the relata exist as unrelated to each other before they are conjoined. But in inherence the relata are always related to each other, when they are related as a substrate and its content.

Na svarūpāḥ bheda'pyayutasiddhiḥ kīṁ tvayutasiddhānāṁiti parasparāparihāreṇa prthagārihānāṁityarthah. NK, p. 15.

Samāvayinobhedat. KVB, p. 47.

SM, i. 11, pp. 85-86.

Dinakari on SM, i. 11, pp. 85-86.


Setu, p. 58; MB., p. 49, KVB, p. 47; PB, p. 326.
eternal, while conjunction is temporary. Conjunction is produced by the action of one or both of its relata, or by another conjunction. But inherence is not produced by the action of one or both of its relata. Conjunction is produced, but inherence is uncaused. Conjunction is destroyed by disjunction of its relata. But inherence is indestructible. 263 Conjunction is a relation between two independent substances. But inherence is a relation between a substrate and its content. 264 Inherence is the cause of the notion 'this subsists in this abode' with regard to the categories of substance, quality, action, community and particularity. But conjunction is not the cause of such a notion. It is a relation between two substances, which may not be related to each other as the container and the contained. Inherence is a natural and inseparable relation. Conjunction is an adventitious and separable relation. 263

Inherence is one, while conjunctions are many. Inherence is imperceptible, while conjunction is perceptible. Inherence is different from conjunction, because it is not produced by the action of any of its relata; because it is not destroyed by disjunction of its relata; because its relata are incapable of independent existence unrelated to each other; because it is inferred from the constant subsistence of a content in a substrate; because it is one, eternal, and imperceptible. 264

Inherence is different from substance, quality, action, community, and particularity, because it is a relation between a substance and the other categories. 265 It is different from non-existence. So it is a distinct category.

The category of inherence explains the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of causality as a new emergence. The effect is different from its material cause, in which it does not pre-exist before its production. The effect inheres in its material cause. There is an inseparable relation between them. The material cause is the substratum. The effect is its content. They cannot be separated from each other, while they are existent and

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263 VSU., vii. 2. 26; PB., p. 326.
265 NK., p. 326.
266 VSU., vii. 2. 26; PB., NK., 326.
related to each other as the container and the contained. The relation between them is not identity as the Sāṁkhya maintains. The cause and the effect both are real. The effect is not an appearance of the cause, which is real, as the Advaita Vedānta maintains. The category of inherence is necessary to relate a cause and its effect, both of which are real and different from each other. It is necessary to relate a substance to its quality, action, generality and particularity, which are all real. Therefore the category of inherence plays a very important part in upholding pluralistic realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is severely criticized by Śaṅkara, who is a staunch advocate of pure idealistic monism or Absolutism.298

Śaṅkarācārya urges that the non-existence of inherence is proved by such perceptions as ‘there are threads in a cloth’, ‘there are branches in a tree’, ‘there are stones in a mountain’, and the like. A cloth does not inhere in threads. Further, a composite whole does not differ from its component parts. It is a mere aggregate of parts. So the whole does not inhere in its parts. If two entities are different from each other, one may abide in the other. Mangoes exist in a plate. But a cloth cannot inhere in its threads, because it does not differ from them. There is colour or motion in a jar. But it does not require inherence. There is identity (tādātmya) of colour or motion with the jar. So inherence is identity. Further, if inherence is one, then a cloth should inhere in the parts of a jar, and a jar should inhere in threads. If a cloth inhere in threads and a jar inhere in its parts, then inherence being one, a cloth should inhere in parts of a jar, and a jar should inhere in threads. Further, if inherence is one, the genus of cow (gotva) would subsist in elephants. It may be argued that though inherence is one, it is restricted to a particular pair of substrate (ādāra) and content (ādheya); the genus of substance inhere in substances; the genus of quality inhere in qualities; the genus of action inhere in actions. This amounts to the admission that there are many inferences from which one inherence is generalized. Further, if inherence is eternal, its relata also must be eternal. If inherence of a jar in its parts is eternal, then the jar also must be eternal. Further, if the whole and the parts both are destroyed, how can inherence relating them to each other persist? So inherence cannot be eternal. When conjuncts are destroyed, conjunction is destroyed. So when the whole and the parts are destroyed, inherence must be destroyed. As there are many conjunctions, so there must be many inferences.299


Kaṇḍāda mentions the six categories of substance, quality, action, community, particularity, and inherence, the right knowledge of whose similarities and dissimilarities leads to liberation. He does not mention the category of negation or non-existence here. But he indicates non-existence with its four kinds as a possible object of knowledge. Śaṅkara Miśra interprets the aphorisms as referring to prior non-existence, posterior non-existence, mutual non-existence, and absolute non-existence. His interpretation appears to be right. Praśastapāda follows Kaṇḍāda in recognizing the six categories, and states that right knowledge of them is the means to liberation. But Udayana says, "Non-existence is a distinct ontological category. But it is not separately mentioned because it is indicated by the six categories of existence, which are its counter-entities." Śrīdhara also says, "Non-existence is not separately mentioned because it depends upon existence,—not because it does not exist." So Kaṇḍāda and Praśastapāda do not mention non-existence separately. Udayana and Śrīdhara recognize non-existence as a distinct category. Śivāditya distinctly recognizes seven categories including non-existence in Saṃpātīdārthika. The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers admit non-existence as a distinct category.

Udayana divides the categories into existence and non-existence. He divides the former into substance, quality, action, community, and particularity, and the latter into prior non-existence, posterior non-existence, absolute non-existence, and mutual non-existence. Śrīdhara and Śivāditya also recognize these four kinds of non-existence.

Prior non-existence (prāgabhava) is the non-existence of an effect in its material cause before its production. A jar is produced from clay. There is prior non-existence of the jar in clay. It is without a beginning. But it has an end. It is destroyed by the production of the effect. When the jar is

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213 VS., i. 1. 4; ix. 1. 1-10.
214 VŚ., ix. 1. 1-10.
216 SP., p. 10.
217 Laksāṇāvatār, Benares, 1897, pp. 1. 13
218 NK., p. 230; SP., p. 13.
produced, its prior non-existence is destroyed. Thus prior non-existence is not produced but destroyed. It is beginningless but non-eternal. If it is not destroyed, the effect cannot be produced. The Vaiśeṣika believes in Asatkāryavāda, which regards the effect as non-existent in the cause. 218

Posterior non-existence (pradhvanśabhāva) is the non-existence of an effect after its destruction. When an effect is destroyed, and loses its specific nature, it has posterior non-existence. It has a beginning, but no end. It is produced but not destroyed. When a jar is destroyed, it has posterior non-existence. It is not perceived again, because it is not produced again. Posterior non-existence is produced by the destruction of an effect, but it can never be destroyed. 219 The existence of the effect in its specific nature is prior non-existence of its destruction. Production of destruction of the effect is destruction of its prior non-existence, or its existence. 221 When the effect loses its existence, it is destroyed. When a jar is destroyed by the stroke of a club, it has posterior non-existence in its fragments, which is produced by an efficient cause. 222

The non-existence of a cow in a horse and the non-existence of a horse in a cow are mutual non-existence (anyonyābhāva). It is one and eternal in all objects. Its eternity is natural. 223 Just as a community is one and eternal, but it is related to an individual when it is generated, so mutual non-existence is one and eternal by nature, but it is related to different objects when they are produced. But there is a difference in apprehending them. No sooner than an individual is perceived, its community is perceived. Perception of its community does not depend upon perception of any other individual. But the knowledge of mutual non-existence in an individual depends upon the knowledge of another individual, which is its counter-entity. 224 The knowledge of non-existence of a cloth in a jar depends on the knowledge of the jar as well as the cloth, which is its counter-entity. Mutual non-existence has for its counter-

218 Prāgutpatteḥ kāraṇeṣu kāryasyābhāvaḥ prāgabhāvah. Sa cānādirppratipitah kāryotpādena tasya vināśāt avināśa ca kāryasya utpattypubhāvati. NK., p. 230.
220 NK., p. 230.
221 TBr., p. 29.
222 Itaretarabhāvah sarvatraikā nitya eva. NK., p. 230.
223 NK., p. 230.
entity identity between two things. Substance, quality, action, community, particularity, and inherence are different categories. They have mutual non-existence. Their difference implies mutual negation. It does not admit of difference in kind. Negation other than mutual negation is negation of relation (sahsargābhāva).

Absolute negation is denial of an absolutely non-existent entity, which is not limited by space and time, but which is only conceived by the intellect. There is no object of knowledge other than the six categories. If there were no absolute non-existence of any entity other than these, the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of six categories would fall to the ground. Absolute negation is non-existence in all times. There is absolute negation of colour in air. There is absolute negation of the genus of earth in water, and of the genus of water in earth. Absolute negation does not refer to production or destruction. It does not refer to the past or the future. It is neither prior negation nor posterior negation. It is negation in all times. It is neither produced nor destroyed. It is eternal by nature. Absolute negation is different from mutual negation. Mutual negation is denial of identity between two things, which have specific natures. But absolute negation is denial of an absolutely non-existent entity in all times and in all places.

The ancient Naiyāyikas maintain that there is no absolute negation in the locus of prior negation or posterior negation. When a dark jar becomes red owing to baking, the cognition ‘there is no red colour in the dark jar’ apprehends prior negation of red colour, and the cognition ‘there is no dark colour in the red jar’ apprehends posterior negation of dark colour. The first cognition does not apprehend absolute negation of red colour in the dark jar. The second cognition does not apprehend absolute negation of dark colour in the red jar. There is a contradiction between prior or posterior negation and absolute negation. The modern

225 Anyonyābhāvastu tādātya pratītyogiko bhāvāh. TBh., p. 29; Sm., 1. 12, pp. 90-92.
226 SM., i. 12, pp. 89-90.
228 NK., p. 230.
229 Trākāliko bhāve tyantābhāvah. TBh., p. 29; TSG., p. 96; VSU., ix. 1. 9.
230 Nāpyntipādavindāsaśīlo tyantābhāva eva, atantikācotpādavināśaśīlaśceti virodhāt. VSU., ix. 1. 10.
231 NK., p. 230.
Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, maintain that there is no evidence to prove that there is a contradiction between prior or posterior negation and absolute negation. So absolute negation exists even when prior negation or posterior negation exists at particular times. Prior or posterior negation exists at particular times. But absolute negation exists at all times.

Some Naiyāyikas maintain that there is another kind of negation, which is produced and destroyed. When a jar is removed from the ground and brought back to it, there is this kind of negation, which is produced and destroyed. When a jar is removed, negation of the jar is produced; when it is brought back, negation of the jar is destroyed. Such negation is not prior negation, because it is produced. Nor is it posterior negation, because it is destroyed. Nor is it absolute negation, because it is non-eternal. So it is a new kind of negation.

Udayana describes prior negation as limited by the future, posterior negation as limited by the past, mutual negation as limited by the present, and absolute negation as unlimited by any time. Prior negation is limited by production of an effect in future. Posterior negation is limited by its existence in the past. Mutual negation is negation of identity between two things at present, which is its counter-entity. It is limited by their specific natures. Absolute negation is non-existence of relation, which is not limited by any time. Negation is apprehended by a distinct cognition.

Absolute negation and prior negation are not produced. Mutual negation and posterior negation are produced by their efficient causes only. Negation does not inhere in any thing. So it has no inherent or material cause. Because it has no inherent cause, it has no non-inherent cause also, which is associated with the inherent cause. So it has efficient cause only. Posterior negation of a jar is produced by the stroke of a club. Though mutual negation is not produced, it is said to be produced because its counter-entity is produced. If a jar is not produced, there cannot be negation of a cloth in it. When a jar is produced, negation of a cloth in it is clearly perceived in it. Therefore mutual negation is said to be produced, though it is eternal.

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124 SM., i. 12, pp. 96-97. VSU., ix. 1. 5.
125 SM., i. 12, pp. 92-95. TCIA., p. 93.
126 Lakṣaṇapātā, p. 13.
127 Ibid., p. 13.
128 Atantābhāvaprajābhāvayorṇotpattat. MB., p. 75. Anyonyābhāvapradhīvanābhāvayostu nimitādeva kēvalādutpattat. SP., p. 75.
129 MB., p. 75.
nature, which is related to different things when they are produced.241

The category of negation or non-existence is absolutely necessary for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy of realistic pluralism. If there were no prior non-existence, an effect would not be produced. Production is transition from prior non-existence to actual existence with a specific nature.242 If there were no posterior non-existence, there would be no destruction of an effect. If there were neither prior non-existence nor posterior non-existence, there would be no non-eternal things. If there were no mutual non-existence, there would not be different things with specific natures. But there are non-eternal things, which are different from one another. If there were no absolute non-existence, all things would exist always and everywhere. The doctrine of the six categories implies absolute non-existence of any other object of knowledge.243 All things are not eternal: They are not identical. Countless objects are produced and destroyed. They have prior non-existence and posterior non-existence. They are non-eternal and temporary. They are different from one another. They have mutual non-existence in one another. Therefore realistic pluralism must admit the four kinds of non-existence.

The cognition of negation depends upon the cognition of its counter-entity.244 A counter-entity is in the nature of non-existence of its negation.245 A jar is the counter-entity of the negation of the jar. The non-existence of a jar on the ground is perceived. The non-existence of smoke is inferred from the non-existence of fire. So negation is known by perception and inference.246

But Kumārila may urge that the non-existence of a jar on the ground is not perceived, because there is no relation between a sense-organ and non-existence, but that it is apprehended by appropriate non-apprehension (yogāṇupalabdhi). The ground only, which is the locus of the negation of a jar, is perceived by a sense-organ. The Vaiśeṣika criticizes Kumārila's objections.

242 Prāgabhātasya paścād bhāva utpādaḥ. NK., p. 230.
243 NK., p. 230.
244 Pratīyogijjñānādhiṇājanāno bhāvah. SP., p. 40.
245 Svābhāvavirāhātman pratīyogī. MB., p. 40.
246 MB., pp. 77, 78.
The cognition of non-existence of a jar on the ground is perceptual and immediate. It is produced by a sense-organ, like the perceptual cognition of colour. Its immediateness and perceptual character are proved by the following inference. When a sense-organ is present, the perception of non-existence is present. When the former is absent, the latter is absent. So non-existence is perceived through a sense-organ. Kumārila may urge that negation cannot be perceived through a sense-organ, because there is no relation between negation and a sense-organ. But this argument is invalid. There is a relation between the visual organ and the ground qualified by negation of a jar so that negation of the jar on the ground is perceived through the visual organ. So negation is perceived through a sense-organ.

Just as a jar is distinctly perceived, so its prior or posterior negation also is distinctly perceived. Perception of prior negation of a jar is produced by the absence of perception of the jar to be produced, and perception of its aggregate of causal conditions, aided by hypothetical reasoning and recollection of a jar produced in the past by the aggregate of causal conditions. The jar to be produced is not perceived. Clay, a wheel, a staff, and a potter are perceived. If the jar were produced, it would be perceived. This is hypothetical reasoning. There is recollection of a jar produced by its causal conditions in the past. These factors produce perception of prior negation of a jar. Perception of posterior negation is produced by the absence of perception of the destroyed jar aided by hypothetical reasoning and recollection of the past jar, which is its counter-entity. If the jar were existent, it would be perceived. But since it is not perceived, it is non-existent. This is hypothetical reasoning. The destroyed jar was perceived in the past. It is not perceived but remembered now. So absence of perception of the past jar, its recollection, and hypothetical reasoning produce perception of posterior negation of a jar. Perception of mutual negation is produced by the absence of perception of its counter-entity, and perception of its locus aided by hypothetical reasoning and recollection of its counter-entity. Negation

\[444\] Indriyasambaddhābhūtalavīṣṇuvanavīṣṇuvabhāvasaivyendriyābhāva - sambhandhatvātt. MB., p. 77.
\[444\] VSU., ix. 1. 7.
\[444\] Ibid., ix. 1. 6.
of a cloth in a jar is apprehended by perception produced by the absence of perception of a cloth, and perception of the jar aided by hypothetical reasoning and recollection of a cloth. Prabhakara denies the existence of negation. He identifies negation (abhāva) with its locus (adhikaraṇa). The negation of a jar on the ground is nothing but the bare ground, which is a positive entity. There is no negation of the jar distinct from the ground. Negation is identical with its locus. The Vaiśeṣika may argue that if negation of a jar were identical with the ground, then the non-existence of the jar would be perceived even on the ground on which the jar exists. This argument is wrong. The negation of a jar is identical with the mere ground (kevala bhūtala), which is different from the ground on which the jar exists. It is the ground unqualified by the existence of the jar. Mutual negation is identical with different things with their specific natures. Negation of relation (sānasargabhāva) refers to positive entities. Prior negation of a jar refers to the parts of the jar from which it is produced. Posterior negation of a jar also refers to the fragments into which it is broken. Absolute negation of a jar on the ground refers to the mere ground, which is a positive entity. A positive entity is called a negation in relation to another positive entity. So there is no negation.

The Vaiśeṣika thinker, Mādhava Sarasvatī, urges that negation is a distinct category. If negation were non-existent, the notion and use of ‘non-existence’ would be devoid of an object. Use means speech and action. Use is the effect of the cognition of an object denoted by a word. The cognition of the negation of a jar has its negation for its object. It apprehends the non-existence of a jar. Neither the jar nor the mere ground is the object of the cognition of the negation of a jar. Negation of the jar is the object of its cognition. So negation is a distinct category, which is the object of the cognition of non-existence. Perception of non-existence would not be possible, if there were no negation. Negation has a counter-entity. Negation of a jar depends upon the jar, which is its counter-entity. There is no mere negation unrelated to a positive entity. Further, if

243 Ibid., ix. 1. 8.
244 Bhāvāntaram eva bhāvāntarāpekṣaya abhāvaḥ. Bhāvāntarād abhāvō'nyo na kaścid anirūpaṇāt. MB., p. 76.
mutual negation were the specific natures of different positive entities, there would be no doubt as to whether the trees perceived from a distance are one or many, because the perception of their specific natures would involve the perception of their mutual negation or difference. There would also be no illusion of a snake in a rope, because the perception of the rope would involve perception of its particular qualities, and because there would be no non-discrimination between the perceived element and the remembered element, which constitutes an illusion according to Prabhākara. If Prabhākara urges that there is no illusion because all knowledge is valid, it would contradict the experience of all. The existence of illusion is admitted by all common people and thinkers. Further, the mere ground is said to be identical with the non-existence of a jar. What is meant by the mere ground? If it is the ground unrelated to anything, then the ground on which a jar exists also would be spoken of as negation of the jar. If the mere ground is the ground, which is the locus of negation, then negation is admitted. If the mere ground is the ground, which is different from the ground with a jar, then also negation is admitted. Therefore negation must be admitted as a distinct category to account for the knowledge and use of non-existence.²²² Viśvanātha urges that negation exists in a locus, which is its abode. The relation of an abode (ādhāra) and a content (adheya) between the locus and negation is possible only if they are distinct from each other.²²³

III

The Philosophy of Nature.

The Vaiṣeṣika is a realistic system. It admits the reality of the external world of matter, space, time and ether. The self-existent atoms of earth, water, fire and air are combined into dyads, triads and gross objects in ether, space and time. The composite products (avayavin) are not mere conglomerations-

²²² MB, pp. 76-77.
of their component parts (avayava), but unique wholes with an existence over and above that of their parts. The Vaiśeṣika advocates the doctrine of Asatkāryavāda, and regards effects as not pre-existent in their material causes, but fresh beginnings (ārambha) of composite products. The external objects are real and stable. They are not momentary as the Buddhist realists maintain. They are not mere ideas as the Buddhist idealists maintain. They have ontological reality, and not merely empirical reality as the Advaita Vedānta maintains. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is uncompromising in its realism and empiricism. The Vaiśeṣika advocates pluralism, and regards all external objects as distinct from, and externally related to, one another. Substances, qualities, actions, communities, particularities, inherence and negation are real and objective entities. Inherence is inseparable relation between two entities, one of which cannot exist apart from the other. So it is not an internal relation, in which two relata cannot exist apart from each other. The material substances with their primary and secondary qualities are real. They are subject to the law of causality guided by God according to the Law of Karma. He adjusts the world to the merits and demerits of the individual souls. It is not mechanical but teleological. Mechanical causation is subservient to moral causation.

20. Earth, Water, Fire and Air.

Earth has the genus of earth. It has colour, taste, smell, touch, number, magnitude, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, acquired fluidity, and velocity. It has many kinds of colour, whiteness and the like. It has six kinds of taste, sweet, sour, salt, bitter, pungent, and astringent. It has two kinds of smell, agreeable and disagreeable. Its touch is neither hot nor cold, but due to heating.

Earth is eternal and non-eternal. The atoms of earth are eternal. Composite earthen substances, which are produced are non-eternal. They are stable, composed of parts arranged in a particular order, manifold and possessed of lower genera. They serve many useful purposes of selves. Bodies, sense-

334 Pbh., p. 27; BP., 1. 32; Thh., p. 20.
organs and objects are the three kinds of effects of earth. The bodies are of two kinds, those due to sexual union and those which are not due to sexual union. The bodies of sages in heaven are not due to sexual union. They are produced from the atoms of earth with the aid of specific merits. The bodies of small creatures are produced from the atoms of earth with the aid of the specific demerits. They are the vehicles fit for suffering pain. The bodies due to sexual union are born of the uterus or born of eggs. The olfactory organ is made of earth. It can perceive smell. Objects are dyads and their products. They are earth, stones, and plants. Regions of earth, walls, bricks and the like are pieces of earth. Stones, jewels, hail stones and the like are pieces of stone. Grass, herbs, trees, creepers and the like are plants. Colour, taste, smell, and touch of eternal and non-eternal earth are non-eternal and due to heating. Heating is contact with fire.

The genus of water inheres in water. It has: colour, taste, touch, natural fluidity, viscidity, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight and velocity. It has white colour, sweet taste, and cold touch. Viscidity is the quality of water only. It has natural fluidity.

Water is eternal and non-eternal. The atoms of water are eternal. Composite watery substances are non-eternal. The qualities of the eternal atoms of water are eternal. Those of non-eternal watery substances are non-eternal. The products of water are bodies, sense-organs, and objects. The denizens of Varupaloka possess watery bodies, which are not due to sexual union. They are composed of parts of earth also, which are subordinated to water. They are capable of producing pleasure and pain. The gustatory organ is composed of water. It perceives taste. Rivers, oceans, hail and the like are watery objects.

The genus of fire inheres in fire. It has colour, touch, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, acquired fluidity, and velocity. It has

344 TBh., p. 20.
345 PBh., pp. 35-36; TBh., p. 20; BP., 1. 31, 39.
346 TBh., p. 20.
347 PBh., p. 36; TBh., p. 20; TSG., p. 16; BP., 1. 40; SP., p. 14.
bright, white colour. It has hot touch. It has adventitious fluidity. 287

Fire is eternal and non-eternal. The atoms of fire are eternal. The composite fiery substances are non-eternal. The products of fire are bodies, sense-organs, and objects. Fiery bodies are not due to sexual union. They are possessed by the denizens of solar regions. They are composed of the parts of earth also, which are subordinated to fire. They are fit for producing pleasure and pain. The visual organ is composed of light. It perceives colour. Fiery objects are of four kinds, earthly, heavenly, intestinal, and mineral. Earthly fire produced by wood burns, cooks, evaporates etc. Lightning is heavenly fire. Intestinal fire digests food. Gold, silver and the like are mineral fires. 288

Fire is of four kinds, fire having manifested or perceptible colour and touch, fire having unmanifested or imperceptible colour and touch, fire having unmanifested colour and manifested touch, and fire having manifested colour and unmanifested touch. Blazing fire and rays of the sun have manifest colour and touch, which are perceptible. The light of the visual organ has unmanifested colour and touch, which are not perceptible. Fire in hot water has unmanifested colour, which is not visible. But it has manifested touch, which is tangible. The light of a lamp has manifested colour, which is visible. But it has unmanifested touch, which is not tangible. 289 The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika had some idea of infrasensible and sensible stimuli, which are capable of producing subliminal and supra-liminal sensations.

The genus of air inheres in air, which has touch, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, and velocity. Its touch is neither hot nor cold nor due to heating. 290 It is devoid of colour and endued with touch. 291

Air is eternal and non-eternal. The atoms of air are eternal. Composite aerial substances are non-eternal. The products of air are bodies, sense-organs, and objects. Aerial bodies are

290 PBrh., p. 44; TBrh., p. 21.
291 TSG., p. 19.
not due to sexual union. They are composed of parts of earth also, which are subordinated to air. They are fit for producing pleasures and pains. They are possessed by the denizens of the aerial regions. The tactual organ, which pervades the body, is composed of air. It perceives touch. Aerial objects are possessed of touch. They are indicated by touch, sound, support and trembling, which are their marks. They are capable of moving in oblique directions. They can support and waft clouds. Manifoldness of air, which is imperceptible, is inferred from the impact of two winds of equal force moving in opposite directions. The impact is inferred from the upward movement of two composite aerial objects, which is inferred from the movement of grass and the like. There is one vital force in the body. But it is said to be manifold according to its functions. Life sustains the vital functions. It directs chyle, humours, and other ingredients of the body. It is a kind of air.\textsuperscript{202}

There are atoms of earth, water, fire and air, which are eternal. They are neither created nor destroyed. They are combined into composite substances, which are transient. They are produced and destroyed. The qualities of atoms are eternal, but those of composite products are non-eternal.

The Vaiśeṣika recognizes the reality of ether, time, space, souls, and manas in addition to earth, water, fire and air. There is one, ubiquitous, eternal ether. There is one, ubiquitous, eternal time. There is one, ubiquitous, eternal space. There are many, ubiquitous, eternal individual souls. There are many atomic internal organs (manas). There is one ubiquitous, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent God or supreme soul. God creates the world out of the atoms of earth, water, fire and air in accordance with the merits and demerits of the individual souls. God does not create atoms, ether, time, space, souls, and internal organs. He is the architect of the world.

21. The Vaiśeṣika Theory of Atomism.

The Vaiśeṣika advocates the theory of atomism. Earth, water, fire and air are eternal as atoms, and non-eternal as composite products. There are atoms of earth, water, fire and air.

\textsuperscript{202} PBh., p. 44; SP., p. 15; TBh., p. 21; TSG., p. 19; RP., i. 43-44.
They are the minutest and indivisible units of physical substances. They have the minutest magnitude. They are globular, though they are partless. There is no intra-atomic space. Atoms cannot interpenetrate one another. They are inactive or motionless in themselves. Their motion is due to an external agent. The earlier Vaiśeṣikas maintain that motion is produced in the atoms by the unseen agencies (aḍṛṣṭa) in the individual souls. They bring about their combination into composite physical objects, which cause them pleasure and pain. The later Vaiśeṣikas maintain that God produces motion in the atoms, combines them into composite products with the aid of merits and demerits (aḍṛṣṭa) of the individual souls for their enjoyments and sufferings. Combination of atoms into composite products is not due to chance. It is teleological. It is adapted to the moral ends of the individual souls. It is not adapted by them to their ends. It is adapted by God to their enjoyments and sufferings in accordance with the Law of Karma. The physical order is subservient to the moral order. The world is not a fortuitous combination of atoms governed by the mechanical law of causality. It is governed by the law of causality subordinated to the Law of Karma. It is not blind to moral values, but a sphere of moral life, which affords opportunities to the individual souls to realize their moral purposes. It is supervised by God, the moral Governor.

The atoms of earth have odour, taste, colour, touch, acquired fluidity, gravity, and velocity. Those of water have taste, colour, touch, natural fluidity, viscosity, gravity and velocity. Those of fire have colour, touch, acquired fluidity, and velocity. Those of air have touch and velocity. These four kinds of atoms have also the general qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, and proximity. These qualities are eternal. Colour, odour, taste, and touch or temperature are said to be secondary qualities by Locke. Gravity, velocity, number, magnitude, remoteness, and proximity are said to be primary qualities by him. The atoms of earth, water, fire, and air have both primary and secondary qualities. The qualities of the composite effects are produced by those of their constituent atoms.  

The Vaiśeṣika maintains that a dyad (dvyaṅuka) is produced by the conjunction of two atoms (paramāṇu), which are active or moving. The two atoms are its inherent cause. Their conjunction is their non-inherent cause. The unseen agencies, merits and demerits of individual souls, are its efficient cause. When there is an activity among three dyads, they come into conjunction with one another, and produce a triad (trayaṅuka). The dyads are its inherent cause. Their conjunction is its non-inherent cause. The unseen agencies are its efficient cause. A quartrads (caturaṅuka) is produced by the conjunction of four triads, which are active. The quartrads are combined into larger and larger composite substances. The atoms of earth are combined in this manner into the great earth. The atoms of water are likewise combined into the great ocean. The atoms of fire are similarly combined into the large fiery bodies. The atoms of air are likewise combined into the great atmosphere. The qualities of the composite products are produced by those of the component atoms, which are their inherent causes. The qualities of causes produce those of their effects.  

An atom is eternal, because it is a substance, which is partless, like ether. A single atom is not productive. If it were productive, it would always produce an effect, since it is eternal, and its effect would never be destroyed, since there would be no cause of its destruction. The cause of destruction is either destruction of its substrate or disjunction of its parts. Three atoms also are not productive. When a composite substance of large magnitude is produced, it is produced by composite substances of smaller magnitudes. A triad is produced by composite parts, because it has large magnitude, like a jar. A single atom is not productive. So a triad is produced by three dyads, which are composite substances. A dyad is not composed of many atoms. The atomic magnitude of a dyad is due to the atomic magnitude of two atoms. The assumption of many atoms constituting a dyad is needless. A dyad is non-eternal, since its component atoms are disjoined from each

333 TBh., p. 21.
334 Paramāṇuḥ nityo dravyatve satyanavyayatvat akāśavat. NK., p. 31.
335 NK., pp. 31-32.
other. It consists of parts, but atoms are partless. If they are said to be composed of parts since they are corporeal or of limited magnitude, then there will be infinite regress. If atoms have parts, they also have parts, and so on to infinity. So atoms are partless and eternal. They are not non-spatial, but they have the minutest magnitude. They are spherical and supersensible. But they can be perceived by Yogins and God. They have atomic magnitude (āṇu). The magnitude of a dyad also is minute (āṇu), but it is greater than that of an atom. Dyads also are imperceptible to us, but perceptible to the Yogins and God. The magnitude of a dyad is due to the number of its constituent atoms. The magnitude of a product is due to the number, magnitude, and arrangement of its constituent parts. A triad is composed of three dyads, which is gross and perceptible. Its gross magnitude is due to the number, magnitude and arrangement of its constituent parts. The smallest visible particle is the mote in a sun-beam, which is a triad (trasareṇu). The large magnitude of triads, quartrads, and larger composite substances is due to the magnitude of their material causes or component parts as well as their arrangement. Atoms are inactive and motionless. Motion is produced in them by merits and demerits of the individual souls or by God. But Sīvāditya considers an atom to be active.

The following arguments are advanced by the Vaiśeṣika for the existence of atoms. Firstly, Śrīdhara argues that there are different degrees of magnitudes, which have the highest limit in the largest magnitude of ether, and which have the lowest limit in the minutest magnitude of an atom. There are larger and larger magnitudes, which culminate in the largest magnitude of ether. There are smaller and smaller magnitudes, which end in the minutest magnitude of an atom. An atom is the minutest part, which is indivisible. It cannot be divided into minuter parts. Udayana urges that this argument in-

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287 NK., p. 32.
288 NK., p. 31; SP., p. 51; MB., p. 52.
289 KNR., p. 9.
290 Niravasvāyāḥ kriyāvān paramāṇuḥ. SP., p. 51.
291 Anuparimāṇatāratamānār kvacid viśrāntiḥ parimāṇatāratamānāro mahatparimāṇatāratamāvat. Yatrādham viśrāntiḥ yataḥ paramāṇavīrāṇiḥ sa paramāṇuḥ. NK., p. 31. SM., i. 37, p. 182.
volves the fallacy of mutual dependence. The existence of the minutest magnitude proves the existence of an atom. The existence of an atom proves the existence of the minutest magnitude. Secondly, Śridhara argues that if atoms had parts, then they also would have parts, and so on to infinity. Then there would be no difference in the dimensions of things. If all things were endlessly divisible into parts, then there would be no larger and smaller number of their constituent parts, which are the causes of larger and smaller dimensions. But there are different dimensions of things. This proves that atoms are the minutest parts of composite things, which are indivisible, partless, minutest and eternal. If all substances were endlessly divisible into an infinite number of parts, then there would be no difference in the magnitude of things, and a mountain and a mustard seed would be of equal dimension. So we must admit that atoms are the minutest parts of composite substances, which are partless and indivisible. Thirdly, Viśvanātha argues that composite products are transient, changeable, divisible, produced and destroyed. Therefore they are composed of atoms, which are eternal, unchangeable, indivisible, unproduced and indestructible. Fourthly, if there were no indivisible atoms, there would be no dissolution. Dissolution is the disjunction of the component atoms of composite substances. Their destruction is due to disjunction of their parts. This argument is advanced by Vyomaśivaśārya and Saṅkarumiśra. Fifthly, triads are not the minutest parts of the composite substances, since they are gross and composed of parts, because they are visible. Being gross and composed of many parts is a condition of visual perception. A triad is visible, since it is gross and composed of three dyads. It is not composed of atoms. It produces a composite substance of large magnitude. So it must be composed of component parts. A

272 KV., p. 52; Paramāṇusiddhān anuparimāṇasiddhī. Tat-siddhān parāṇusiddhī, KVPV., p. 52n.
273 Asti tāvad ayah parimāṇabhedaḥ, tasmād anuparimāṇam kvacīn niratīśayam iti siddho nityab parāṇabh. NK., p. 31.
274 Anantāvayāvārabhāvatvāvīśeṣena meruṣaṣaṇapādiṇaḥ parimāṇabhedānupapattāḥ. KV., p. 51; SM., pp. 150-51; TRb., p. 22; MB., p. 14; VSU., iv. 1. 2.
276 VV., p. 224; VSU., iv. 1. 2.
triad is composed of three dyads. Dyads are composed of two indivisible atoms of the minutest magnitude.\textsuperscript{277}

The Vaiśeṣika atomism is not materialistic. The Vaiśeṣika admits the reality of individual souls and God, and the Law of Karma which is not a physical law. The souls are immaterial and conscious, and serve their own ends. But atoms are unconscious and serve the ends of individual souls. They are combined by God into composite physical substances to give pleasure and pain to them according to the Law of Karma. He is the efficient cause (nimitta kāraṇa) of the world while atoms are its material cause (upādāna kāraṇa).\textsuperscript{278}

The Vaiśeṣika atomism differs from Jainism atomism. The Vaiśeṣika maintains that there are different kinds of atoms, which have different qualities. The atoms of earth have odour, colour, taste and touch. Those of water have colour, taste and touch. Those of air have touch only. They have also number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness and proximity. The atoms of earth, water, light and air are not homogeneous, since they possess different qualities. But the Jainism maintains that each atom has colour, taste, odour and touch. It is devoid of sound, but it can produce sound in combination with many other atoms.\textsuperscript{279} The atoms are homogeneous, which are differentiated into the elements of earth, water, light and air. They possess the same qualities, which are subject to mutation,\textsuperscript{280} whereas the qualities of the atoms of earth, water, fire and air are eternal according to the Vaiśeṣika. The Jainism advocates atheistic atomism, and maintains that the atoms are not combined by God into the aggregates. But the later Vaiśeṣika advocates theistic atomism, and maintains that God creates motion in the atoms, and combines them into dyads, triads, quadraads, and larger objects. Both believe in the Law of Karma, which adjusts the aggregates of atoms to the merits

\textsuperscript{277} VSU., iv. 1. 2; KV., pp. 52-53; SM., p. 350; Tllh., p. 22. Trasareṇuḥ sāvayavāyaḥ cākṣusamahaitvāt ghaṭavat iti paramāṇudayatān-kayoh śiddheḥ. Setu, p. 200-07.
\textsuperscript{278} II., p. 142.
\textsuperscript{280} Dhātucatuskasya kāraṇam yastu sa jñeyah paramāṇah parināma-guṇah. Ibid, 78, p. 132.
and demerits of the individual souls. Both regard an atom as one, eternal, indivisible, ultimate, corporeal unit of matter.\textsuperscript{331}

The Buddhist realists recognize the reality of atoms. But they consider them to be momentary. The Vaibhāṣikas distinguish between perceptible atoms (aṇu) and imperceptible atoms (paramāṇu), and regard the former as aggregates of the latter. They also distinguish between a saṃghātaparamāṇu and a dravyaparamāṇu. The former is the subtlest state of visible matter. The latter is devoid of matter. There are eight dravya paramāṇus, \textit{viz.}, earth, water, fire, air, smell, taste, colour, and touch.\textsuperscript{332} The atoms are indivisible and impenetrable. They are invisible, inaudible, intangible, and untastable. They are transient. The Sautrāntikas also consider atoms to be partless and momentary. They do not admit contact of atoms with one another. If there were contact among them, then they would interpenetrate one another and would not be able to increase the dimension of their aggregate. Contact is close vicinity of two atoms.\textsuperscript{333} The Buddhist realists regard the atoms as transient, whereas the Vaiśeṣika regards them as eternal. The Vaiśeṣika admits contact among the atoms. The Sautrāntika does not admit contact among them. The Vaibhāṣika distinguishes between perceptible atoms (aṇu) and imperceptible atoms (paramāṇu). The Vaiśeṣika distinguishes between atoms and triads, and regards the former as imperceptible and the latter as perceptible. The Buddhist realists do not recognize the reality of dyads, triads, and quartrads. The Vaiśeṣika does not admit the atoms of smell, taste, colour, and touch like the Vaibhāṣika. The Buddhist realists do not admit the reality of wholes as distinct from the component parts. They consider the so-called wholes as mere aggregates of atoms which compose them. The Vaiśeṣika admits the wholes as distinct from mere aggregates of atoms. The Buddhist realists advocate atheistic atomism. The later Vaiśeṣika advocates theistic atomism. So the Vaiśeṣika atomism differs from the Buddhist atomism.

Some suggest that the Vaiśeṣika borrowed the theory of atoms from the Greek atomists, when India came into contact

\textsuperscript{331} Ibid., 77, p. 131. HIP., pp. 144-45. HIP., II, pp. 226-27.
\textsuperscript{332} AKV., ii. 22. HIP., II, p. 382.
\textsuperscript{333} The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 60. HIP., II, p. 385.
with Greece. This is a wrong surmise. The germs of atomism are found in the Upaniṣādās. There are fundamental differences between the Vaiśeṣīka atomism and the Greek atomism, though both recognize the reality of indivisible and imperceptible atoms, which constitute material things. First, Leucippus and Democritus (420 B.C.) consider the atoms to be homogeneous and identical in quality, but different in size, figure, weight, position, and arrangement. The atoms are devoid of qualities, but endowed with quantities. They have no qualitative differences, but only quantitative differences. But Kaṇāda (300 B.C.) recognizes qualitative differences in the atoms. The atoms of earth have the qualities of odour, colour, taste, and temperature. Those of water have the qualities of colour, taste, and temperature. Those of fire have the qualities of colour and temperature. Those of air have temperature. The different kinds of atoms have different kinds of secondary qualities. In addition to the secondary qualities, they have the common qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness and proximity, which may be said to be primary qualities. The atoms of Democritus and Leucippus are homogeneous and identical in quality. The atoms of Kaṇāda are heterogeneous and endowed with different secondary qualities. The former reduce qualitative differences to quantitative ones. The latter recognize the qualitative differences of atoms, though they are equally indivisible, and possess the same minutest magnitude (anuṣṭa) or spherical size (pārīmāṇḍalya). Kaṇāda does not reduce their qualitative differences into their quantitative differences. Secondly, Leucippus and Democritus consider the atoms to be in perpetual motion, while Kaṇāda considers them to be inactive and motionless. Motion is produced in them by merits and demerits of the individual souls according to the earlier Vaiśeṣīka. It is produced in them by God according to the later Vaiśeṣīka. Thirdly, Democritus considers the souls to be composed of the finest, smoothest, and most nimble atoms, while Kaṇāda considers them to be entirely different from atoms. The souls are conscious and spiritual, while atoms are unconscious and material. They are coeternal with, and irreducible to, one another. The Greek atomists are materialists. Kaṇāda is a dualist. He recognizes the reality of matter and souls. Fourthly, Leucippus and Democritus explain the universe by
atoms and their combination according to mechanical laws. They consider the world to be governed by necessity. The Vaiśeṣika explains the universe by atoms and their combination according to the moral Law of Karma. He does not advocate materialistic and mechanical conception of the universe. He considers the world to be teleological and adapted to the merits and demerits of the individual souls. The later Vaiśeṣika believes in God as the efficient cause of the world, who creates it out of the atoms according to the Law of Karma. The Greek atomists are materialists and atheists, while the later Vaiśeṣikas are dualists and theists.

Epicurus (340 B.C.—270 B.C.) believes in innumerable, uncreated, and indestructible atoms in perpetual motion. He believes in the possibility of chance or production of an effect without a cause. He explains the world by atoms, empty space, and weight. He explains it by mechanical causes without the aid of final causes. He also considers the soul to be composed of fine matter. So his materialistic atomism is different from the Vaiśeṣika atomism. Kapāda does not consider the atoms to be in motion. He does not consider their combination to be accidental. He does not view the world as mechanical and devoid of final causes. He does not regard the soul as material. So there is a wide divergence between Kapāda’s atomism and the Greek atomism in outlook. Therefore the hypothesis of Kapāda’s borrowing the theory of atomism from the Greek atomists is not acceptable.

22. The Nyāya theory of Atomism.

Gotama regards atoms as partless, indivisible, minutest parts of composite substances, which are not ultimately divisible into non-entities or void. An atom is not a product. So it has neither inside nor outside. It is partless and indivisible. It is said to be composed of parts, since it has a form, or a configuration, or conjunction with other atoms. But this argument is not valid. If it were infinitely divisible into parts, it would involve infinite regress, which is impossible. To avoid

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285 IIP., pp. 142-44.
286 Na pralayo'pasadbhāvat. *NS.*, iv. 2. 16.
287 NS., IV. 2. 20.
infinite regress, an atom must be admitted to be partless and indivisible. It is tangible and eternal.

Vātsyāyana argues that an atom is the minutest part of a composite substance, which cannot be divided into minuter parts. Uddyotakara argues that at atom ceases to be an atom, if it is divisible. It is indestructible, since it is not caused. A composite thing is destroyed by the destruction of its parts, which are its material cause, or by the division of its cause. But an atom has no cause. So it is indestructible. Vācaspati argues that an atom is so called, because it has the minutest magnitude which is not divisible into smaller parts. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues that atoms are atoms because they are partless. There is no valid reason for their possessing parts. They are neither produced nor destroyed. They are eternal.

Uddyotakara argues that division of composite substances either ends in void, or ends in atoms, or never ends. It cannot end in void or non-existence. If it ends in void (śūnya), the last division becomes devoid of parts. But there can be no division without parts. Nothing is perceived to be divided into non-entities. So division cannot end in non-existence. Nor can division be never-ending. It involves infinite regress. It makes a triad (truti) immeasurable, since it consists of an infinite number of parts. It makes a mustard seed and a mountain of equal magnitude, since both are infinitely divisible. So division must end in indivisible atoms of the minutest magnitude.

Udayana argues that atoms are indivisible and partless, and therefore uncaused. If they are divisible, they are products. If they are by nature indivisible and partless, they are not products. Indivisibility or partlessness and producedness are contradictory to each other. Atoms are indivisible and partless. Therefore they are not produced.

NS., iv. 2. 23-25.
Sparśavāṃścāṇur nityaḥ. NBh., ii. 2. 23.
N Bh., iv. 2. 16.
Yadi paramāṇur vibhajyate paramāṇur na sāyāt. NV., iv. 2. 22.
NV., iv. 2. 22.
Paramatvavāśiṣṭo hyaṃḥ paramāṇaḥ. NVTT., iv. 2. 17.
Nirvayavatvaye tu tasya paramāṇuvatvam. NM., p. 502.
NM., pp. 502-03.
NV., iv. 2. 25. NM., p. 503; NSV., iv. 2. 25.
ATV.
The Buddhist urges that an atom has parts, since it has a form. Uddyotakara asks: What is the form (mūrti) which makes an atom possessed of parts? It is either different or non-different from an atom. Colour and the like cannot be the form of an atom, since the Vaibhāṣika admits the reality of the minutest atoms of colour and the like. But an atom of colour cannot be ended with colour. What is ended with colour must be different from it. If there is no atom different from form, then the statement that atoms are composed of parts because they have forms is as meaningless as the statement that colour has colour because it is ended with colour. So the form (mūrti) of an atom must be different from it. Uddyotakara maintains that smallness, largeness, length, shortness, the shortest magnitude, and the minutest magnitude are the forms of substances of limited magnitude. The minutest magnitude is the form of an atom. But it has no parts. There is no evidence to prove that what has the minutest magnitude must be composed of parts.

The Buddhists urge that a substance of limited magnitude and ended with touch has a configuration (saṁsthāna) or arrangement of parts. It is said to be triangular, quadrangular, square, and globular. Atoms are of limited magnitude, ended with touch, and globular (parimaṇḍala). So they must have parts.

Uddyotakara points out that this argument is wrong. ‘Atoms have parts, since they have an arrangement of parts.’ Here the reason (hetu) is identical with the object of inference (sādhiya). Having an arrangement of parts is identical with possessing parts. If the magnitude of a thing is said to constitute its part, then it is wrong to argue that a thing has parts, because it has a form (mūrti), and because it has an arrangement of parts (saṁsthāna). This shows that a form is different from an arrangement of parts.

The Buddhists urge that an atom has conjunction with other atoms, and that therefore it has parts. Conjunction takes

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338 Mūrtimattvāt sāvayavāḥ paramāṇaḥ. NV., iv. 2. 28.
339 NV., iv. 2. 25.
340 NBh., iv. 2. 23.
341 NV., iv. 2. 25.
342 Sāvayavāḥ paramāṇavo mūrtimattvāt saṁsthānvattvāc. NV., iv. 2. 23.
place between two substances of limited magnitude. It takes place between their parts. So atoms, which come into conjunction with one another, must have parts.\footnote{NS., iv. 2. 24; NSV., iv. 2. 24.}

The Naiyāyika replies that the existence of partless atoms is proved by valid inference, and that their conjunction with one another also is proved by valid inference. Composite substances have conjunction with one another in their parts. But atoms have conjunction with one another without parts in different points of space.\footnote{Tatsthyogavacchedakā digvibhāgāh. NSV., iv. 2. 25.} The substance, which has conjunction, is its material cause. Conjunction does not depend upon its parts. So partless atoms can have conjunction with one another at different points of space. There is no contradiction in it.\footnote{ATVD. quoted in ND., v. p. 116n.}

The manas is partless. The self is partless. Yet they have conjunction with each other. So partless atoms can have conjunction with one another.

The Buddhist (Vasubandhu) urges that an atom has conjunction with six atoms, that it must therefore have six parts, and that if it has conjunction with six atoms in the same point of space, then the aggregate must be of atomic magnitude, since the atoms interpenetrate one another.\footnote{Satkena yugapadvogete paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍadhikātā. Sanātān samānadeśatve pūḍhaḥ svād anumātrākāh.}

Uddyotakara replies that an atom has conjunction with other atoms in different points of space because of its contact with space. Space is one and partless. Conjunction of an atom with different points of space does not make it possessed of parts. Atoms do not come into contact with one another at the same point of space. So they do not interpenetrate one another. They have contact at different points of space, though they have no parts. Further, a whole is different from parts, and has a larger magnitude than that of its parts. A composite substance is not a mere collection of its component atoms. So an aggregate of atoms is not of an atomic magnitude. A triad composed of six atoms or three dyads has a visible large magnitude.\footnote{Sanātān samānadeśatve pūḍhaḥ svād anumātrākāh. Vaiśeṣikākarikā. (NV., iv. 2. 25.)}

The Buddhist urges that an atom has contact with different points of space, which must have parts.
Uddyotakara replies that there are no real points of space, that there are no real parts of an atom, that there is contact of an atom with space, that the different points of space are mere contacts of an atom with space, that their existence is hypothetical and imaginary, and that the spatial points of an atom also are imaginary.\footnote{Digdeśabhedaḥśca dīśaḥ saṁyogāḥ parikalpitāḥśca digdeśabhedaṁ kalpayitvā, paramāṇāḥ digdeśabhedaḥ bhupagamyate mukhyastu na digdeśabhedaḥ nāpi paramāṇāḥ bhedāḥ paramāṇāḥ dīśaḥ saṁbadhyate. NV., iv. 2. 25.} So an atom is one and partless.

The Buddhist realist urges that an atom is produced by another preceding atom, and that the first atom may be said to be the part of the second atom. Uddyotakara replies that if an atom is produced by a preceding atom, then also none of them has parts, since a composite substance has many parts, while both atoms are single. A single atom cannot produce an effect. It depends upon a collocation of conditions to produce an effect. If a single cause produces an effect without the aid of auxiliary conditions, it will always produce an effect, since it is always present. But what has no prior non-existence cannot be produced. So an atom cannot produce another atom. Even if it does so, the first atom cannot be a part of the second atom, since it does not continue to exist when the latter is produced owing to its momentariness. The first atom, which is destroyed, cannot be a part of the second atom, which is produced. Thus atoms have no parts.\footnote{NV., iv. 2. 25.}

Some argue that atoms are non-eternal because they are active. Uddyotakara asks if activity is the cause or manifest of transience. If it is the cause, then what is inactive must be eternal. But this is contradicted by experience. Then what is activity? If it is production, then atoms are transient because they are produced. But their production is not proved by any valid means of knowledge. If activity is the manifest of transience of atoms, then there must be some other cause of their transience, which is manifested by activity. The manifestor does not produce what is manifested by it. A lamp does not produce an object and then manifest it. Movement cannot produce transience, since atoms are motionless in themselves. Activity of atoms is not inherence of motion in them. Atoms are not always in motion. There is no inseparable relation.
between motion and atoms. So motion does not inhere in atoms. Atoms cannot be said to be transient, because they are atoms. Here the reason (hetu) is identical with the subject of inference (paksā). So atoms are not transient because of their activity. They are indivisible, uncaused and indestructible. So they are eternal.

Atoms are of the minutest magnitude and imperceptible. Two atoms constitute a dyad (dyaṇuka). Three dyads constitute a triad (tryaṇuka, truṭi, trasareṇu). A dyad has no large magnitude, since two atoms have no plurality, grossness, and loose conjunction (praçaṇa). Duality of two atoms produces atomic magnitude. Plurality of three dyads produces the perceptible large magnitude of a triad. Dyads are the material cause of a triad. Atoms are not produced. They are eternal. God combines two atoms into a dyad, and three dyads into a triad, and triads into larger and larger composite substances in accordance with the merits and demerits of the individual souls for their enjoyments and sufferings. God divides composite substances into smaller and smaller parts, triads, dyads and atoms, and dissolves the world to give them rest for some period. If he does not combine atoms into dyads, and dyads into triads, and triads into larger objects, there can be no creation. If he does not divide them into atoms, there can be no dissolution. But God does not create or destroy atoms. The Nyāya believes in theistic atomism.

23. Ether (Ākāśa).

The Sāṅkhya maintains that exit and entrance are the marks of ether. They consist in motion of a substance possessed of touch. A substance endowed with touch cannot move from one place to another, if there is no ether in the nature of a vacuum which is not produced.

Kapāda refutes the Sāṅkhya view. Exit and entrance are movements. A movement does not subsist in an incorporeal

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310 NV., iv. 2. 25.
311 NM., pp. 503-04.
Tad evam anekātmasamavetadharmaḥ harmaśarispārthapākārnurūpaprastarādīvecchāparyamaṇaparamāṇukriyāṁapūrvavīrtiśvarāṁadvaśaṁ-
kādikāya-karameva śarādyāvayavāvīrtībhiḥ. NM., p. 504.
312 Niṣkramaṇada praveśanam ityākāśasya līṅgam. VS., ii. 1. 20.
V ŚU., II. 1. 20.
substance of unlimited magnitude like ether. It subsists in a
corporeal, tangible substance of limited magnitude. Ether is
devoid of movement because it is an incorporeal, intangible sub-
stance of unlimited magnitude. So it is not the inherent cause
of exit and entrance. Nor is it their non-inherent cause, since
it is a substance. 
Nor is it an efficient cause of movement.
Birds fly in ether (ākāśa). But ether is not the efficient cause
of their movement, since it is ubiquitous and eternal and never
absent. So non-production of a movement is not due to its
absence. It is due to counteraction of the cause of movement
due to conjunction with a substance of limited magnitude by
force, weight and the like. Therefore ether is not an efficient
cause of movement of a tangible substance. So the Śāńkhīya
view is not valid.

Kaṇāda proves the existence of ākāśa as the substrate of
sound. The specific qualities of the products of earth, water,
fire and air are produced by the qualities of their material
causes. Colour, taste, odour and temperature are special
qualities of this kind. But though sound is a special quality,
it is not produced by the quality of its material cause. It is a
special quality because it has the genus of sound, and because it
is perceived through one external sense-organ only. It is not a
special quality of earth, water, fire and air, which are tangible
substances, because different degrees of loudness and faintness
of sound are perceived, whereas different degrees of colour, taste,
smell or touch are not perceived in the same tangible sub-
stance. Sound is not a quality of air, because it is destroyed
even when air persists, while touch, a special quality of air,
is destroyed when air disappears. It is not a special quality
of a self or a manas, since it is perceived through an external
organ, and subsists in some other substance. It is not a quality

\textsuperscript{114} Tadālīṇgam ēkadravyatvāt karmaṇaḥ. VS., ii. 1. 21. VSU., ii.
1. 21. Ākāśasya niskramanapraṇaṇādau karmaṇi na samavāyikāraṇata
nāpyasamavāyikāraṇata. VSU., ii. 1. 22.
\textsuperscript{115} VSU., ii. 1. 23.
\textsuperscript{116} Kāraṇagunapārvakaḥ kāryaṅgūṇo dṛṣṭaḥ. VS., ii. 1. 24. VSU., ii.
1. 24.
\textsuperscript{117} Kārāntarāprādurbhāvaccā śabdāḥ sparśavatām agnirāḥ. VS., ii.
1. 25.
\textsuperscript{118} VSB., ii. 1. 25. SM., pp. 188-93.
\textsuperscript{119} Parāma samavāyat pratyakṣaṅtāvācca nātmagūṇo na manoguṇaḥ.
VS., ii. 1. 26. VSU., VSV.
of a self, since it is perceived through an external sense-organ. If it were its quality, it would be perceived even by a deaf person, and it would be perceived as 'I have sound'. Manas is atomic. So its qualities are imperceptible. Large magnitude is a condition of perception. So sound is not a quality of manas. It is not a quality of space and time whose qualities are imperceptible, while sound is perceptible. By elimination it subsists in ākāśa. It subsists in a substance because it is a quality which is perceptible through a single external sense-organ, like colour and the like. Though it is non-eternal, it subsists in ubiquitous ether, even as non-eternal cognition subsists in a ubiquitous self. Sound is perceived everywhere, which proves ubiquity of ether. There is no proof for the existence of its parts. It is partless, and consequently eternal.

Ether is ubiquitous, eternal and ever present. So it may be said to be the cause of all effects, since it is their invariable antecedent. This argument is invalid. Ether is an accidental antecedent of all effects. But it is the necessary, invariable antecedent of sound, and its inherent cause. It is not the cause of other effects. Sound inheres in ether as its special quality. Though ether is ubiquitous and eternal, it is the substrate and material cause of sound.

The Mīmāṃsaka urges that ether is not the cause of sound, since it is not produced but eternal. The Vaiśeṣika replies that sound is produced and non-eternal, and can be produced by ether. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka regards sound as a substance, which cannot be a special quality of ether. The Vaiśeṣika regards it as a quality, which is perceived through a single external sense-organ, like colour. It is a special quality of ether. It is not a special quality of space and time, which are devoid of special qualities.

Ether is one and homogeneous, since sound has no difference in kind. Sound is of different degrees of loudness. But they are not different kinds of sound. So they do not prove differences in ether. Sound subsisting in one substrate may

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81 VSU., VSV., ii. 1. 28. PBh., p. 88; Tlīh., pp. 22-23.
82 Parāśāśāṅgāmi ākāśasya. VS., ii. 1. 27. VSU., VS., ii. 1. 30.
83 KNR., pp. 28-29.
differ in loudness owing to different causes. But it is without any distinction in kind. So ether, in which it subsists, is one.\textsuperscript{232} Though ether is one, it is spoken of as many owing to its limiting adjuncts. We speak of infinite number of spaces such as jar-space and the like according to innumerable limiting adjuncts. Ākāśa is inferred from sound as its substrate, and all sounds subsist in one ākāśa.\textsuperscript{233} The assumption of many ethers as substrates of sounds is needless. The assumption of one ubiquitous ether is adequate to explain all sounds. The parsimony of hypotheses demands postulation of one ether devoid of distinction. Ether is one just as Being is one.\textsuperscript{234}

Ether is ubiquitous (vibhu), since it is the substrate of sounds produced everywhere, and comes into contact with all corporeal substances. It is not displaced by any resisting body as water is displaced by wood, since it is devoid of parts. It does not obstruct any moving substance, since it is intangible. It is pervasive, since it is impenetrable and unresisting.\textsuperscript{235}

Ether is one, distinct, ubiquitous, and devoid of a genus. It has sound, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction. It is the substrate and inherent cause of sound. It has conjunction and disjunction, since it is the cause of sound. It has qualities, and does not reside in a substrate. So it is a substance. It has no homogeneous or heterogeneous cause. It has no inherent cause, no dependent cause, and efficient cause. So it is eternal. Conjunction and disjunction are the non-inherent cause of sound, which is a quality of ether. So ether has conjunction and disjunction. A non-inherent cause must coinhere in the inherent cause. Ether is the inherent cause of sound. So conjunction and disjunction, which are its non-inherent cause, must inhere in ether. A non-inherent cause cannot inhere in a substrate other than the inherent cause. So

\textsuperscript{232} Sabdalingavideśād ekatvan siddham. PBh., p. 58. NK., pp. 61-62. VSU., ii. 1. 30.

\textsuperscript{233} A$kā$ṣaṃ ghatākā$ṣ$ādibhedabhinnno'nanta eva. SP., p. 18. A$kā$ṣaṃ tāvacchadbaliṅgaṃ sabdāśca sarve samānādhārāḥ. MB., p. 17.

\textsuperscript{234} Tattvaṃ bhāvena. VS., ii. 1. 29. Vaibhave sati sarvesāṃ sabdāṁ taddekkārṇavatayavopapattāvāsrayāntarakaalpanāyāṁ kalpanāgauravaṃsāngāḥ. VSU., ii. 1. 30.

\textsuperscript{235} Sabdasyaḥvagībhovaṃsā sarvaṃsaṃ. Avyāhāvīśtambhaviḥbhut-vāni cākāśādharmaḥ. NS., iv. 2. 21, 22. NSV., NBh., NV., iv. 2. 21, 22. Yata evāvyāhāvīśtambhāvata evāpratvāḥaṃ vibhutvam asya. NVTT., iv. 2. 22.
ether has conjunction and disjunction. It has conjunction with all corporeal substances. It is one, ubiquitous, eternal, imperceptible substance endowed with the special quality of sound. It has the largest magnitude.

24. Space (Dik).

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika recognizes the existence of space as an external reality. It is not a subjective form of perception, but an objective reality. It is one, ubiquitous, eternal, partless substance, which is the foundation of the world.

The existence of space is proved thus: First, space is inferred from the east, the west and the like. It is inferred from the cognitions of different directions. Taking a corporeal substance of limited magnitude as a limit, we perceive other corporeal substances as to the east, west, north, south, south east, north east, south west, north west, upward and downward. Space is the efficient cause of these cognitions of directions, because they cannot be produced by any other cause. Space is the efficient cause of these cognitions, even as time is the efficient cause of the cognitions of priority and posteriority. Corporeal substances of limited magnitude are mutually external to one another, and occupy different positions at different times. Their mutual externality is due to space. Therefore space is the efficient cause of the cognitions of mutual externality of corporeal substances, which are not their causes. If they were so, they would produce these cognitions, even if they were situated in some other order and occupied other positions. The qualities and actions of the corporeal substances also are not the causes of these cognitions. If they were so, the substances endowed with the same qualities and actions would not be known as situated in particular directions from each other. Hence space is the cause of these cognitions of directions. Spatial relations of corporeal substances presuppose the existence of space. If space were non-existent, their spatial relations would not be

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336 Guṇavatvatvād anāśkritavāca dravyam. Samānāsamānajātiyakāra-pābhavācā nityam. PBh., p. 53. Ākāše samyogavibhāgau siddhau vyavahāraśārasamavāyikāraṇatvābhavāt. NK., p. 62. KNR., 25; Tbh., pp. 22-23; SP., pp. 67, 17, 19; TR., pp. 137-38; TSG., p. 21; TSD., pp. 21-22; BP., 44; SM., pp. 188-95; KV., pp. 105-12.

337 Dik pūrvaparāśipratyayālingā. PBh., p. 66. NM., p. 140.
possible. So space exists as an objective entity.\(^{328}\) The cognitions of directions are not due to conjunction with the sun, since corporeal substances are not in conjunction with it. What is not related to corporeal substances cannot produce the cognitions of their directions and positions.\(^{329}\) Secondly, space is inferred as the locus of the non-inherent cause of remoteness and proximity of corporeal substances, which are not due to conjunction with the sun. Space is not the locus of remoteness and proximity.\(^{330}\) Remoteness and proximity are due to conjunction of corporeal substances with space, which is their non-inherent cause. The conjunction subsists in space, which is its locus. But space is not the locus of remoteness and proximity, which reside in corporeal substances with specific positions in relation to one another. But corporeal substances are in conjunction with space. So space is the locus of conjunction with corporeal substances. Remoteness and proximity are not due to conjunction with the sun. They are due to space.\(^{331}\) Thirdly, space is inferred from remoteness and nearness of corporeal substances in relation to an observing person, which are not fixed. Their spatial positions are not irreversible. They occupy different spatial positions in relation to different substances.\(^{332}\) But priority and posteriority of changing corporeal substances are not due to space, since they are fixed and unalterable, while the spatial positions of co-existent corporeal substances are reversible. Space admits of reversible positions in relation to one another. Co-existent corporeal substances can occupy different positions in relation to one another. But their positions in time are irreversible.\(^{333}\) Time is one, ubiquitous, eternal and irreversible. But space is one, ubiquitous, eternal and reversible. Both are in conjunction with corporeal substances. Matter exists in time and space. They are the determinants of material sub-

\(^{328}\) NK., pp. 67-68. KV., pp. 122-23; NM., 140-41; Trh., 23; TSG., p. 23; TR., p. 137.

\(^{329}\) NK., p. 68.

\(^{330}\) Adityasanyogotpadyaparatvaparastvāsamavāyikārāpādhāraḥ paratvāparatvānadhikāranāḥ dik. SP., p. 42. Na ca tāṃ antareṇa paratvāparatvān vātāravānu vātāravān nātāravān. VSU., II. 2. 10.

\(^{331}\) Adityasanyogānupādye paratvāparatve dikṣṛte. SP., p. 58. SM., p. 203.

\(^{332}\) Digampaniyataparatvāparatvābhyaḥ pramātṛviprakṛṣṭaḥ asmi nāśābhyaḥ kṛṣṭudeśavartipindaśamavāyikābhyaḥ anumāṃyate. MB., p. 17.

\(^{333}\) Niyatopādhyāmanyakāḥ kālayaḥ, aniyatopādhyāmanyikā dik. VSU., II. 2. 10.
stances, which undergo changes in the forms of origination, persistence and destruction, though they are eternal. Fourthly, space is the efficient cause of all effects as their locus. It is not their inherent cause nor non-inherent cause, but their efficient cause. God and merits and demerits of the individual souls also are efficient causes of all effects, but they are not their loci. Time and space are their efficient causes as their loci.

Space has no specific qualities. It has the generic qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction. It is one, distinct, eternal and ubiquitous. It has the largest magnitude. It has conjunction with corporeal substances, which determines their spatial positions. It has also disjunction from them. It has distinctness. It is a substance endowed with these qualities. Though it is imperceptible, it can produce the determinate cognitions of directions. They are produced everywhere, which do not differ in kind. It is the one substrate of conjunctions with corporeal substances, which are the non-inherent causes of spatial remoteness and proximity. Space is one, and therefore distinct.

It may be argued that there are different cognitions of east, west and the like in different places, which prove the existence of many spaces. But Sridhara refutes this argument. The very same object is perceived as situated to the east of another object and to the west of a third object. It would not be possible, if there were many spaces. But the same object is actually perceived to the east and west both in relation to different objects. Therefore there is one space, which is homogeneous and continuous. There are not many, heterogeneous and discontinuous spaces. Space is one and non-different. The difference of cognitions of different directions is due to different determining conditions (upādhi). The east is the direction determined by conjunction of space with the rising sun; the west is the direction determined by conjunction of space with the setting sun.

224 Dikkālovoḥ sarvottāpyaśūnām niṣṭātakārāṇaḥ, PM., p. 25.
225 Kāryamātraḥ prati adhikārāṇa-vidhayā niṣṭātakārāṇaḥ, Sūkṣmā, p. 167.
226 Setu; VV., p. 167.
227 Ṛṣṭi, p. 67.
The other directions are determined by reference to the east or the west. So space is one, but it appears to be many owing to its limiting conditions. Space is one, entire, undivided and partless. It is pervasive because the cognitions of spatial remoteness and proximity are produced everywhere. It is one, ubiquitous, eternal substance, which is the ground of the spatial order.

Raghunātha Siromaṇi, the author of Didhiti, does not admit the existence of space and time as independent entities. They have no existence apart from God, since there is no proof for it.

25. Time (Kāla).

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits the reality of time as an external entity. It is not a subjective form of perception. It is real and objective. It is one, ubiquitous, eternal substance, which is the foundation of all events.

The following arguments are advanced for the existence of time. First, time is inferred from the cognitions of temporal remoteness and proximity, simultaneity and succession, slowness and quickness. It is the efficient cause of these cognitions. Secondly, it is the efficient cause of production, persistence, and destruction of all effects. Thirdly, it is the cause of the notions of moments, hours, day, night, fortnight, month, year and the like.

First, time is inferred from temporal remoteness or oldness and temporal proximity or newness, which subsist in old and new created substances. Temporal remoteness is produced in an old substance after the lapse of a large number of motions of the sun from its production. It is an effect. Its non-inherent cause is conjunction of the old substance determined by the

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348 Ḫā dīk pratyayabhedastāpādhibhedaḥ. NK., p. 68. BP., i. 46-47. Sp., MB., p. 17; VS., VSU., VSV., ii. 2. 13; NM., p. 141. Svarūpeṣāṅkā dīk sarvagataḥ ca nāsyā bhedaḥsti. NVTT., p. 460.
349 Didhitiṃtastu dikkālaṃ nesvarād atiricyete mānābhavat. Dinakari, pp. 204-05.
350 Kālāḥ parāparasyatikarayangapadyāyangapadyacirakṣipaṃprataya- 
352 Pbh., p. 63.
motions of the sun with a ubiquitous substance, viz., time. Conjunction of a substance with time is the non-inherent cause of its temporal remoteness and proximity or oldness and newness, which are produced by the motions of the sun. Time is the locus of the conjunction. Temporal remoteness and proximity or oldness and newness reside in an individual substance. They do not subsist in time. So time is not their locus. Ether or self is not the locus of conjunction of a substance with a ubiquitous substance, because they have specific qualities like earth and the like. A substance itself is the inherent cause of its temporal remoteness or proximity. Its conjunction with time is their non-inherent cause, the substance being determined by the motions of the sun. Time is their efficient cause.

Simultaneity is occurrence at the same time. Succession is occurrence at different times. Slowness is duration for a long time. Quickness is duration for a short time. The motion of the sun is the limiting adjunct of time. Time is inferred from the cognitions of simultaneity, succession, slowness, quickness, oldness and youth, which are its marks. The self is the inherent cause of these cognitions. Time is inferred as the efficient cause of the cognitions of these temporal marks, which differ from the cognitions of substances, qualities and the like.

Some maintain that the cognitions of swiftness, slowness, oldness and newness are determined by the movements of the sun, planets and stars. But Śrīdhara argues that there is no relation between motions in the sun and oldness and newness of substances. If an entity unrelated to the effect can be a cause, any thing can be the cause of any other thing. So time is the efficient cause of oldness and newness or temporal priority and posteriority. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa urges that slowness and quickness, simultaneity and succession are perceived in
the motions of the heavenly bodies also, which must be due to
time as their efficient cause. Time is not identical with the
motions of the heavenly bodies, but it is different from them
because it produces their simultaneity and succession, quick-
ness and slowness. Time is the efficient cause of temporal
relations.

Same argue that time is imperceptible so that its invariable
concomitance with cognitions of simultaneity, succession and
the like cannot be known, which cannot, therefore, be inferred
as their efficient cause. But Śrīdhara urges that the cognitions
of simultaneity, succession and the like are produced in
external objects like substances. The substances are not their
causes, since the cognitions of these temporal relations are
different from the cognitions of these substances. But no effect
can be produced without a cause. So time is the efficient cause
of these cognitions.

It may be argued that time is imperceptible, and cannot
qualify the cognitions of simultaneity, succession, temporal
remoteness and proximity, and the like. Some reply that time
produces these determinate cognitions (viṣiṣṭapratyaya) like a
sense-organ, which is imperceptible. Time produces the cogni-
tions of temporal relations, but it does not qualify them as a staff
qualifies a person. But Śrīdhara replies that cognitions are in
the nature of consciousness, which have no other distinctive
character than their relation to the objects apprehended by
them. Time can qualify cognitions only as their object.
Conjunction with time is inferred as the cause of oldness and
youth indicated by the different conditions of the body. They
are due to its conjunction with time for a greater or shorter
period. So the cognitions of oldness and youth are produced
by time.

But the Nyāya regards time as perceptible, which is
perceived as a qualification (viṣeṣana) of effects, but not as an
independent entity. But why is it not perceived as an
independent entity? Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that it is due to

344 Grahatārādiparispandaḥ kāla ityucyate. Tad aṣaṁpratam. Na
grabādiparispandaḥ kālaṁ kim tu vastvantaram yatkrto'yaṁ kramādivyavahāraṁ. NM., p. 138.
345 NK., p. 84. Yuvasthavirayoh so'pi (viparyayab) vinā kālaṁ na
sidhyati. NM., p. 139.
346 NK., p. 65.
the Law of Nature (vastusvabhāva). Certain entities are perceived as independent entities, while others are perceived as qualifications owing to their very nature. Just as space is perceived as qualifying substances with spatial relations of remoteness and proximity, so time is perceived as qualifying substances with temporal relations of remoteness and proximity. Just as colourless community is perceived as qualifying a substance, so colourless time is perceived as qualifying a substance through the visual organ. An entity may be perceived either as an independent entity or as a qualification. Time is perceived as a qualification of effects. It is perceptible and inferable.\textsuperscript{311}

Some maintain that simultaneity is coexistence. This is not right. Coexistence implies the reality of time. It cannot be said to be mutual exclusion of entities with regard to a certain action, because there is no mutual exclusion of entities devoid of origin, persistence and destruction, which imply time. If coexistent entities are said to be excluded by one another, then the reality of time is admitted because coexistence implies time. Thus succession also implies time. Hence time is the efficient cause of simultaneity and succession.\textsuperscript{312} Śrīdhara and Jayanta give this argument.

Secondly, time is the cause of production, persistence and destruction of all effects. We speak of the time of production, the time of persistence, and the time of destruction. All effects are produced at a particular moment, persist for a certain duration, and are destroyed at a particular moment. Time is the efficient cause of production, persistence and destruction of all effects. Production is coming into existence. Persistence is relation to serial time. Destruction is cessation of existence. They would not be possible without the instrumentality of time.\textsuperscript{313}

The Buddhists identify time with change or action, and deny the reality of time as distinct from actions. There is no

\textsuperscript{311} Tasmāt svatantrabhāvena viśeṣaṇatayāpi vā. Cākṣuṣajñāṇanamanyāḥ yat tat prātyakṣam upayatām. NM., p. 137.

\textsuperscript{312} Śiddhaḥ kālaḥ cākṣuṣa laṅgiko vā. NM., p. 141.

\textsuperscript{313} NK., p. 64. Kāryaṁ paṭādihu nimitāntaraktuḥ kramādiyayavahāraḥ. Yugaśadādiyayavahārahetuḥ kālaḥ. NM., p. 139.

\textsuperscript{315} NK., p. 66; KV., p. 118.
time apart from actions. There is no perception of time at all, but only that of actions. The cognitions of slowness, quickness and the like apprehend actions only. But Jayanta Bhaṭṭa admits that there is no perception of time apart from actions. But he urges that from this it does not follow that there is no perception of time at all; that actions are always perceived as qualified by time. Hence time is perceived as a qualification (viśeṣaṇa) of actions, but not as an independent entity. When we perceive succession, simultaneity, quickness, slowness and the like, we do not perceive mere actions, but we perceive another entity, which qualifies these actions, and that is time. A peculiarity in cognitions is due to a peculiarity in their objects. Hence time is distinct from actions (kriyā). Śrīdhara also urges that time is not identical with actions like production, persistence and destruction, since time and action are known by different cognitions. An action presupposes time, and is not identical with it. The Buddhists erroneously identify time with change or action.

Slowness, quickness, simultaneity, succession and the like are absent from ether and other eternal substances. They are present in non-eternal substances. So time is the efficient cause of the production of all non-eternal effects. In the presence of time their is their production. In the absence of time there is no production of them. So time is the efficient cause of production of all effects. It is also the efficient cause of their persistence and destruction. Time is the abode of all effects or events, which cannot be related to each other as the abode (ādhāra) and its content (ādheya), since they occur at different moments in succession. It is the foundation of the world. It is the cause of all effects.

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334 Na tavad grhyate kālaḥ pratyakṣeṇa ghaṭādivat.
Cirakṣipradibho'pi kāryamātrāvalāmhanāḥ. NM., p. 130.
335 Pratyakṣagamavatāmeva ke cit kālasya manvate.
Viśeṣapateyā kāryapratyayey pratiḥāsanāt.
Na hi viśayātiṣayam antareṇa pratiḥāṣātiṣayovakalpate.
NM., p. 136. IPP., p. 152.
336 Na tu prārambhādikṣāya kālo vilākaṇṣānabuddhihīdayatvāt. NK., p. 66.
337 Sarvotpatimātāṁ kālaḥ kāraṇam. Nityeṣvabhūvāt anityeṣu bhāvāt. VSV., ii. 2. 9.
338 Janyāṇāṁ janakāḥ kālo jagatāṁ āśravo matalā. BP., 45. Nila-
kaṇṭhi on TSG., pp. 22-23.
Time is threefold, past, present and future. The future is indicated by the production of an effect; the present, by its persistence; and the past, by its destruction. When an effect is not yet produced, it is future. When it persists, it is present. When it is destroyed, it is past. When an action has not yet begun, it is future. When an action continues in a substance, it is present. When an action has ceased to exist, it is past. When an action is going on, it is perceived as present; when it is not yet produced, it is perceived as future; when it is no more, it is perceived as past. Time cannot be conceived in terms of space but in terms of action only. The past is the abode of the destruction of present existence. When an existing effect is destroyed, it becomes past. The future is the abode of prior non-existence of a present entity. The present is existence at a time before its destruction. Time is the common element in the past, the present, and the future. These temporal distinctions are inexplicable without it. They are not three distinct times, since the same moment may be past, present and future in relation to different events. Though time is one, it is spoken of as threefold owing to the limiting conditions of production, persistence, and destruction. Its relation to the limiting conditions is real.

Thirdly, time is the cause of moments, hours, days, months, years and the like. The time covered by the wink of an eye is called nimeṣa. The fourth part of it is a moment (kṣaṇa). Two moments make a lava. Kāṣṭhā, kalā, muhūrtā, yāma, day, night, fortnight, month, season, year and the like

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388 TSD., p. 22.

388 Ye hi anāgata iti parisphurati kālaḥ sa eva vartamāna bhavati bhūto bhavati ca. NM., p. 141.

388 NK., p. 66.

388 PBh., p. 63.

388 NK., p. 65.
are the artificial divisions of time. Time is the cause of the notions of these different divisions of time.\footnote{P Bh., p. 63. NM., pp. 139-40.}

Time is one, since its marks of priority, posteriority, simultaneity, succession, slowness and quickness are the same everywhere.\footnote{Kalalingaviveṣājā ekatvarah siddham. P Bh., p. 63. NK., p. 66.} There are no distinctive marks of different times. There is one time owing to the absence of different marks.\footnote{Sarvatrāviveṣājā viṣeṣalingabhāvaccikaḥ kalaḥ. NM., p. 139.} One time appears to be many owing to its limitations by the motions of the sun.\footnote{Tamānātyaḥ siddham aupādhiṣaṃ ca. NM., p. 141. SM., p. 197.} The cognitions of simultaneity, succession, and the like do not prove the existence of many times. Though time is one, different cognitions of simultaneity, succession and the like are due to different auxiliary conditions.\footnote{Kalabhudepi sahaśārīrhaḥ pratyayaḥ bhedaḥapattetaḥ. NK.}

Time is distinct because it is one. It has the largest magnitude. It is ubiquitous, because it has conjunction with all corporeal substances of limited magnitude, which depends on its ubiquity.\footnote{Na ca kālaḥ ānunātītaṃ tasyaśāmyogvikālaṃ v이는 vaitad upasadyate. KVII., p. 143.} It has conjunction, since conjunction of a corporeal substance with time is the non-inherent cause of its oldness or newness. It has disjunction, because it destroys the conjunction. It has no homogeneous or heterogeneous cause.\footnote{P Bh., pp. 63-64; NK., p. 66.} It is uncaused and eternal.

Time has number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction. It is endured with these qualities. It does not reside in any substance. So it is a substance.\footnote{Anāniratvād dravyam. NM., p. 139. P Bh., p. 63; NK., p. 66; VS., ii. 2, 7.} It is partless, since its parts are not perceived, in which it may subsist. It is an undivided whole.\footnote{Avayavārayaṃ upalambhād niravayavah. NM., p. 139.} It is eternal, since it is indestructible by the division of its parts.\footnote{NM., p. 139.} Time is one, partless, ubiquitous, eternal substance. It is the ground of the temporal order. It is the efficient cause of all effects,—their production, persistence, and destruction, which are real. They would not be real, if time were not real. The reality of time is the foundation of the realistic pluralism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.
The Vaiśeṣika makes a distinction between time and space. Space is the ground of the spatial order. Time is the ground of the temporal order. Both are efficient causes of all effects. Space is the efficient cause of spatial remoteness and proximity. Time is the efficient cause of temporal remoteness and proximity or oldness and youth. Space is one, but it appears to be manifold owing to its limiting conditions. Contact with corporeal substances is its limiting adjunct. Action is the limiting adjunct of time. Divisions of space are determined by the greater or smaller number of corporeal things that intervene between two points of space. Divisions of time are determined by production, persistence, and destruction of effects. The spatial relations are changeable and reversible. The temporal relations are constant and irreversible. A moment of time, which is present or future in relation to a particular event, is always so. But a point of space, which is to the east of one thing at one time, is to the west of it at another time. The divisions of time are fixed, while those of space are relative.

Some urge that one time cannot produce a variety of cognitions of temporal relations. Śrīdhara replies that one time produces different cognitions of temporal relations owing to a variety of conditions. An old substance is apprehended by a cognition. A new substance is apprehended by another cognition. The two substances, existing at the same time, are apprehended by the same cognition. But the cognitions of oldness of one and newness of the other are produced by time, which is their efficient cause. They are not produced by the substances themselves, but by time. The cognition of simultaneity of many objects, which are produced, co-existent and active, is produced by time. The cognition of slowness is produced by a large number of moments of time occupied by an action between its production and destruction. The cognition of quickness is produced by a small number of moments of time between its production and destruction.

Some deny the reality of time, and trace the variety of cognitions of temporal relations to different circumstances peculiar to each case. But Śrīdhara impugns the validity of this argument. If time were non-existent, there would be no

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419 VSU., ii. 2. 10.
419 NK., p. 64.
production. There is no production of an absolutely existent entity like ther. Nor is there production of an absolutely non-existent entity like the horn of a person. But an entity, which had prior non-existence, is produced. Production implies prior non-existence and posterior existence. Priority and posteriority involve time. Thus production involves the existence of time.\footnote{N.K., pp. 64-65. N.M., p. 139.}

The Mādhyamika denies the existence of present time. There is no present time, because when an object falls, there are the past or the time that has been fallen through and the future or the time that will be fallen through.\footnote{Vartamānābhāvaḥ patataḥ patitapatitavyakālopapatteḥ. N.S., ii. 1. 37.} When a fruit falls to the ground, it is detached from its stalk, and gradually comes nearer and nearer to the ground. When it has passed from $a$ to $b$, the space between them is traversed, and the time related to it is past. When it will pass from $b$ to $c$, the space between them will be traversed, and the time related to it is future. Apart from these two spaces there is no third space left, which may be related to the present time. So the present time does not exist.\footnote{N.Bh., ii. 1. 37. I.P.P., pp. 153-54.} The present being non-existent, the past and the future also are non-existent, since they depend upon the present.\footnote{Tavoryapabhāvo vartamānābhāve tadapekṣastvāt. N.S., ii. 1. 38. M.K., MKV., xix. 1-6, pp. 382-89. H.I.P., vol. II, pp. 401-02.} Gotama replies that the past and the future do not depend upon each other, that the present time also exists, which is perceived, and that the denial of the present time would lead to the non-apprehension of all things.\footnote{Nātānāgatayortaretarāpekṣaḥ Siddhāḥ. Vartamānābhāve sarvāgra-ham pratyakṣaṃnupatteḥ. N.S., ii. I. 39. 40.} He argues that the past is indicated by the cessation of an action, while the future is indicated by the non-commencement of it.\footnote{Kritakartavyatopapattesseśhayaśthāgrahāntam. N.S., ii. I. 41.} Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara elaborate his arguments. Vātsyāyana argues that time is not manifested by space, but by action. The present time is manifested by the continuity of an action begun; the past time, by its cessation; the future time, by its non-commencement.\footnote{Ārabhdhakriyāsantāno vartamānānāh kālaḥ. Kriyāsantānoparamo'ttataḥ kālaḥ. Kriyāsantāno'nārabhdhaḥ cikīrṣito'nāgataḥ kālaḥ. N.Bh., ii. I. 41.} The present time is sometimes indicated by the existence of a substance, or a quality, or an action. It is sometimes indicated by a series of the same kind of action, or
by a series of different kinds of actions. In cutting there is a repetition of the same kind of action. In cooking there are different kinds of actions.\textsuperscript{337} The present is perceived as unmixed with the past and the future in the existence of a substance. It is perceived as mixed with the past and the future in a series of actions. It is the 'specious present.'\textsuperscript{338} The past and the future are not dependent on each other, for there is no special reason for their mutual dependence. They are independent of each other like colour and touch, or taste and odour. If they were dependent on each other, the negation of one would involve the negation of the other, which would lead to negation of both. The past, the present and the future are independent of one another, and real and objective. They are three forms of one time.\textsuperscript{339}


The manas is the internal organ. It is one in each body. It is immaterial, corporeal, partless, atomic, unconscious, eternal, and capable of action or movement. It is a substance endowed with qualities. This is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of manas. Its existence is proved by the following arguments. First, though the self, the sense-organs, and the objects are present, perceptions of external objects are not present. Therefore the existence of manas is inferred from non-production and production of perceptions at particular times. The manas controls the external sense-organs.\textsuperscript{340} When there is the intercourse of the self with the sense-organs, and of the sense-organs with the objects, there is perception on condition that there is conjunction of manas with the self and the sense-organs. When the manas is present, there is perception. When it is absent,

\textsuperscript{337} Kālaḥ kvacit arthasadbhāvavantaṃ, kvacit kriyāsantānāvantaṃ. Nānāvidha caṅkārthā kriyāḥ kriyāsantānāḥ, kriyābhyāsāsa. NBh., ii. 1. 40. NV., ii. 1. 40. NBh., NV., ii. 1. 39.

\textsuperscript{338} So'yaṃ ubhayatā vartamāno ghraye, apaṇvyaṃ vyapārvktasca atithanāgatībhāyaṃ. NBh., ii. 1. 41. NV., ii. 1. 41.

\textsuperscript{339} NBh., NV., ii. 1. 39. NVTT., p. 282. According to the Buddhist philosopher, Basumitra (100 A.D.), an entity does not differ in the past, the present and the future. When its action is going on, it is called present; when its action has ceased, it is called past; when its action is going to happen, it is called future. TSP., p. 504.

\textsuperscript{340} Atmendriyārthaśanamikṣere jñānasya bhāvaḥ bhāvaścena manaso lingam. VS., ii. 2. 1. PBh., p. 89; NK., p. 90.
there is no perception. The conjunctions of the self with manas, of the manas with the sense-organs, and of the sense-organs with the objects are necessary conditions of perception. The manas, the internal organ, is necessary for perception of external objects. It is controlled by the self, and it controls the sense-organs. It is directed by the self to be disjoined from one sense-organ and conjoined with another sense-organ. The self has perception of external objects through the external sense-organs controlled by the internal organ (manas). Secondly, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are perceived. Cognitions of these qualities of the self are direct and immediate knowledge or perceptions. So they must have an organ. The external senses are not their organs. So the manas is their organ. Thirdly, recollections of colours, sounds, tastes, smells and touch are produced, even when the external sense-organs do not function. Therefore they must be produced by the internal organ (manas). The manas is the internal organ, through which the self recollects, infers, doubts and dreams. It cannot have these experiences without the internal organ.

Cognitions, volitions and the other perceptible qualities of the self are always successive. They are never simultaneous. Their non-simultaneity proves the existence of one manas in each body. If there were many minds (manas), they would come into conjunction with the different sense-organs, and produce different kinds of perceptions simultaneously. But colours, odours, tastes, sounds, and temperatures are never perceived simultaneously. So there is a single manas in each body. Sometimes they appear to be perceived simultaneously. But the appearance of simultaneous perceptions of them is due to their rapid succession due to quick movement of the atomic manas and its conjunctions with the different sense-organs in quick succession. The appearance is illusory.
Manas is atomic (anus). If it were of large magnitude, it would come into conjunction with all sense-organs at the same time, and produce perceptions of colours, smells, tastes, sounds and temperatures simultaneously. But they are not perceived simultaneously. They are perceived in succession because the atomic manas comes into conjunction with them successively. Non-simultaneity of perceptions proves the atomic magnitude of manas. It is needless to assume its many parts by whose contraction and expansion it comes into conjunction with the different sense-organs to account for simultaneity and succession of cognitions. It violates the parsimony of hypotheses. If the manas be ubiquitous like the self, then it cannot come into contact with the self. If there is no conjunction of the self with the manas, then cognitions, pleasures and other qualities of the self cannot be produced, because their non-inherent cause is absent. The conjunction of the self with objects is not their non-inherent cause, because cognitions are not produced at a place where objects exist. Qualities are produced at a place, which is not away from the non-inherent cause. The conjunction of the self with the external sense-organs is not their non-inherent cause. If it were so, then there would be no cognitions of sounds, because there is no conjunction of the self with the ear, which is äkāśa enclosed in the ear-hole,—both self and äkāśa being ubiquitous. So the conjunction of the self with manas is the non-inherent cause of cognitions, pleasures and the like. They would not be produced, if manas were ubiquitous. But they are produced. So the manas is not pervasive but atomic. It is not of intermediate magnitude. If it were so, it would be composed of parts, and be non-eternal. It is an atomic internal organ, which is capable of conjunction with the self. One self has one manas, with which it transmigrates from one body to another. There are an infinite number of souls. So there are an infinite number of minds (manas.)

The manas is capable of movement. If it were inactive and motionless, it could not supervise the external sense-organs. It is corporeal (mūrti) because it is capable of movement. An

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388 Anu manah jhānāyangapadyāt. NBh., iii. 2. 63. VSU., iii. 2. 1, 3; SM., p. 398.
394 NK., p. 93. KV., pp. 182-87.
incorporeal entity is incapable of movement. Though it is corporeal, it is eternal because it is partless and self-subsistent. Corporeality is not the cause of non-eternity. The manas is partless. There is no proof for the existence of its parts. Its atomic magnitude has been proved. It has velocity or power of quick movement without which it cannot come into contact with the sense-organs in quick succession. It can come into contact with them because it is a substance. It is a substance because it is endued with qualities and action. It is an unconscious organ of the self (ātman), which is its conscious agent. It serves its purpose. It is corporeal and of limited magnitude. It is devoid of specific qualities. It has the generic qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, and velocity. It is intangible, and cannot, therefore, produce physical effects. It is the unconscious organ of knowledge. If it were the knower, it would be both agent of knowledge and organ of knowledge, which is self-contradictory. Further, there would be neither volition to act nor volition not to act, because when the self wills to act, the manas may will to abstain from action, and when the self wills to abstain from action, the manas may will to act. So if the manas were the conscious knower, it would counteract the volitions of the self and paralyse its actions. But the self has volitions to act or abstain from actions. So the manas is not a conscious knower.

The manas differs from the external sense-organs. It is immaterial, while they are material. It apprehends all objects, while they apprehend specific objects. Colours, odours, tastes, sounds and temperatures are apprehended by the visual organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the auditory organ, and the tactual organ respectively. But all these are apprehended by the manas. The external sense-organs are endued with the same qualities as are apprehended by them. The visual, olfactory, gustatory, auditory, and tactual organs are endued with the qualities of colours, odours, tastes, sounds and temperatures respectively, and so they apprehend these qualities

488 NM., p. 498; PbH., p. 89; KNR., pp. 42-43; KV., pp. 156-57.
489 KB., pp. 156-57.
490 Bhāntikāmāndriyāni niyataviśayāni. Manastvabhautikān sarva-
viśayānti ca. NBH., I, I, 4.
respectively. But the manas apprehends all these qualities without being endowed with them. Vātsyāyana and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa regard it as immaterial, since it is not a product of matter, and devoid of is qualities. But Uddyotakara regards it as neither material nor immaterial. What is produced by matter is material. What is not produced by it is immaterial. The manas is not a product at all, and as such is neither material nor immaterial.

27. Similarities.

The seven categories of substance, quality, action, community, particularity, inherence, and non-existence have knowability, nameability, and demonstrability. They have ontological existence. They are capable of being known. They are capable of being expressed by names. They are objects of the knowledge of God.

The six categories of substance, quality, action, community, particularity, and inherence have existence, nameability, and knowability. They have their essential nature (svarūpa), which constitutes their existence (astitva). They have ontological positive existence. They are capable of being known and expressed by names. Their existence does not depend upon their being known or expressed. Their ontological status is not affected by their knowability and nameability. They exist in their essential nature. They become known and expressed in their different states. Their knowability and expressibility also constitute their essential nature. Existence is positive existence. Its nature is determined independently of the nature of its counter-entity. Expressibility is capability of being expressed by a word. Knowability is capability of being known or demonstrated.

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402 Saṇṇāṇāṁ eṣāṁ indriyabhāvāḥ. Nāsya saṇṇasyendriyabhāvāḥ. NBh., i. 1. 4. NM., p. 497.
403 Tāca na bhanīkam akāryatvād ata eva na tadgūṇayogi. NM., p. 497. IPP., pp. 18-20.
404 RP., SM., i. 13. pp. 18-19.
405 Saṇṇāṁ padārthānāṁ saḍharmyam astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni. Pbh., p. 16.
407 KEV., p. 27.
quality, action, community, particularity, and inherence are real and intelligible. The Vaiśeṣika recognizes their ontological existence, comprehensibility and demonstrability by the human intellect. It advocates realism, pluralism and rationalism. Non-eternal substances, qualities, actions, communities, particularities, and inherence reside in their substrates. Non-eternal substances are effects, which inhere in their inherent causes. Qualities and actions inhere in substances. Communities inhere in individual substances, qualities and actions. Particularities inhere in eternal substances. Inherence has no other inherence. It subsists by nature in a substrate. It is the relation between a content and a substrate, which are inseparable entities. It is an intimate relation between two inseparable entities, which subsists by nature in the relata. It is proximate to the substrate. So inherence also has the character of subsisting in a substrate, though it does not subsist in it through inherence. Its subsisting in a substrate does not mean its subsisting by inherence. Inherence does not inhere in a substrate. It has no other inherence. Subsisting in a substrate (aśritatva) means capability of being known as depending on another entity. Non-eternal substances, qualities, actions, communities, particularities and inherence are known as depending on other entities. They are not known as independent and self-subsistent entities. They are not self-existent. But eternal substances, the atoms of earth, water, fire and air, ether, time, space, self and manas are self-existent entities. They do not depend on other entities. Incorporeal substances, qualities, actions, communities, particularities and inherence are devoid of action or motion.

Substances, qualities, actions, communities and particularities inhere in their substrates, and are manifold. They subsist in their substrates through the relation of inherence. They do not possess inherence. Nothing subsists in communities through inherence. Though there are many kinds of non-existence, substances, qualities, actions, communities and parti-

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404 PBh., p. 16.
405 Samavāyasya samavāyantarābhāvē'pi svabhāvata evādhūrasannikṛṣṭatsvāt. KV., p. 27.
406 Aśritatvaṁ paratantratayopalabdhibh, na samavāyakṣaṇā vyūhiḥ samavāye ṭadābhāvāt. NK., p. 16.
411 NK., p. 16.
412 KV., p. 27.
cularities are many positive entities. They are not negative in character. There are many substances, qualities, actions, communities and particularities, which are different from one another. They are different from inherence.

Qualities, actions, communities, particularities and inherence are devoid of qualities and actions. They are qualified by the non-existence of qualities and actions. These two characters are their similarities.

Substances, qualities and actions are related to Being, possessed of higher and lower communities, expressed by the term 'objects' (artha), and capable of producing merits and demerits. These are their similarities. Being inheres in them. They exist through their relation to Being. They are the causes of assimilation and discrimination. They are the substrates of higher and lower generalities. The genus of substance inheres in substances. The genus of earth inheres in earthy substances. The genus of quality inheres in qualities. The genus of colour inheres in colours. The genus of action inheres in actions. The genus of upward motion inheres in upward motions. Substances, qualities and actions are called 'objects' in a special sense. They are causes of merits and demerits. The same substance produces merit, when it is given as charity. It produces demerit, when it is stolen. The same quality, conjunction, produces merit and demerit. Conjunction with a pure substance produces merit. Conjunction with an impure substance produces demerit. The same movement, viz., going produces merit or demerit. Going to a holy place produces merit. Going to a tavern to drink liquor produces demerit. So substances, qualities and actions have the power of producing merits and demerits. Communities are eternal and inactive, and therefore incapable of producing merits and demerits, which are non- eternal. They can only determine the nature of their substrates, substances, qualities and actions.

The substances, which have their causes, are non- eternal and produced. They are produced in the sense that they owe

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413 NK., p. 16. KV., p. 28.
414 PBh., p. 16; NK., pp. 10-17; KV., p. 28.
415 Dravyādānām trayāṇām sattāsambandhah sāmānyaviśeṣavattvān svāsamyārthaśabdhāh vidhyatvān dharmādharmakārttvām ca. PBh., p. 17.
416 NK., p. 17.
their existence to their causes. Being produced does not consist in inherence in the cause or in inherence of Being in a previously non-existent thing. Destruction is produced. But it does not inhere in its cause. Nor is there inherence of Being in a previously non-existent thing in it.\textsuperscript{414} Being produced consists in emergence into existence of a non-existent entity. Non-eternity consists in transition from existence to non-existence.\textsuperscript{419} It consists in destruction of essential nature.\textsuperscript{420} It is not liability to production and destruction. Prior negation is not produced. But it is non-eternal.\textsuperscript{421}

Substances, qualities other than the magnitudes of atoms and dyads, ubiquity of ether, time, space and self, the last sound, the magnitude of manas, remoteness and proximity, and actions are causes. Substances are the inherent cause. Qualities and actions are the non-inherent cause. Substances, qualities and actions are causes other than efficient causes.\textsuperscript{422}

Non-eternal substances, qualities and actions reside in substances. This is their similarity. Eternal substances do not reside in other substances. But non-eternal composite substances reside in their component parts. Qualities and actions reside in substances, which are their substrates.\textsuperscript{423}

Community, particularity and inherence are self-subsistent (svātmasattva), indicated by knowledge, neither effects nor causes, devoid of higher and lower communities, eternal, and unnameable as 'objects' (artha).\textsuperscript{424} They are self-subsistent, devoid of community, and unrelated to Being. Their self-subistence consists in their being devoid of Being, which is the highest genus. They do not exist through relation to Being.\textsuperscript{425} Their existence is proved by distinct kinds of knowledge. Community is proved by assimilative knowledge. Particularity is proved by discriminative knowledge. Inherence is

\textsuperscript{414} NK., p. 18. Kāryatvānityatvat kāraṇavatām eva. PBh., p. 17.

\textsuperscript{415} KV., p. 29.

\textsuperscript{416} Svarūpaviniśa evānityatvam. NK., p. 18.

\textsuperscript{417} NK., p. 18.

\textsuperscript{418} PBh., p. 18; NK., p. 18; BP., i. 15; SM., pp. 102-03.

\textsuperscript{419} PBh., p. 18; NK., p. 18.

\textsuperscript{420} Sāmānyavindinām ityādy api svātmasattvam buddhilakṣaṇatvam akāraṇatvam akāraṇatvam sāmānyavideśavatvam nityatvam arthaśabdāndhālohaśvatvam ceti. PBh., p. 19.

\textsuperscript{421} Teṣām aśattvam na sattāyogāb. NK., p. 19. Svātmasattvam sattāvirahal. KV., p. 30.
proved by the knowledge 'this subsists in that'. They are beginningless and unproduced. If they were produced, they would lose their essential nature. If communities were produced, individuals would be their inherent causes, and they would have origin and destruction like individuals, differ with different individuals, and thus cease to be common to many individuals. Thus if a community were produced, it would lose its essential nature. Community is eternal. It is related to the individuals, which are produced and destroyed. Particularity which resides in eternal substances, is eternal. Inherence also is not produced, since it is neither preceded nor succeeded by anything, nor co-existent with anything. If inherence of a cloth were produced before production of a cloth, how could a relation exist without a relatum coming into existence? If inherence were produced along with the cloth, then the cloth would not inhere in the yarns. If inherence were produced after production of the cloth, then also the cloth would not inhere in a substrate. A composite substance, which is produced, cannot exist without a substrate. Therefore inherence is not produced. Community, particularity and inherence are neither inherent nor non-inherent causes. But they are the efficient causes of their cognitions. They are not causes of entities other than their own characters. Community, particularity and inherence are devoid of community. They have no higher and lower genera. Community is devoid of community. If it had a community, it would lead to infinite regress. Particularity is the final distinctive feature of an eternal individual. If it had a community, that would contradict its nature. Inherence is one, and therefore cannot have community. Community, particularity and inherence are not produced, and therefore are not destroyed. Therefore they are eternal. They are not 'objects' in a technical sense according to the Vaiśeṣika. They are independent of causes.

The nine substances, earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, self and manas have the genus of substance, produce

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424 Anuvṛttabuddhirvāyāṃvṛttabuddhirhitā buddhirityeva hi sāmānyādityayā traye prakāram. KV., p. 30.
425 KV., pp. 30-31; NK., p. 30.
426 NK., pp. 19-20.
427 Akāraṇatvam atmadharmetarakāryāpekṣāya. KV., p. 31.
428 NK., p. 20.
429 KV., pp. 31-32.
effects inhereing in them, possess qualities, are not destroyed by their causes and effects, and possess final particularities. The genus of substance inhere in them. They produce effects, which inhere in them. They are their inherent causes. They are endowed with qualities. But qualities are not inherent causes. Nor are they endowed with qualities. Substances are not destroyed by their causes and effects. Eternal substances are not destroyed by their causes and effects. They are unproduced and indestructible. Non-eternal substances are produced and destroyed. But they are not destroyed by their causes. They are destroyed by their effects. This is the distinction between them. But a quality is sometimes destroyed by its cause, and sometimes by its effect. The last sound is destroyed by the preceding sound, which is its cause. The first sound is destroyed by the second sound, which is its effect. An action also is destroyed by a subsequent conjunction, which is its effect. Only eternal substances have particularities, which inhere in them. Composite substances have no particularities. The entities other than substances have no particularities. Visvanātha mentions possession of spatial and temporal remoteness and proximity, corporeality, velocity, and action as the similarities of the nine substances.

The substances other than composite substances do not reside in substrates, are eternal, and possess particularities. But the composite substances inhere in their component parts, are non-eternal, and devoid of particularities. The eternal substances have the other similarities of the nine substances. They possess the genus of substance, produce effects in themselves, possess qualities, are not destroyed by causes and effects, and possess particularities.

Earth, water, fire, air, self and manas are many and possess the lower genera. Each of them has many individuals, which are different from one another. The genus of earth inhere in earthy substances. The genus of water inhere in

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433 Prthivyādīnām navānām api dravyatvayogāh svātmāryārmbha-katvān guṇāvattvāni kāryakāraṇāvyrodhitvām antyaviśeṣavattvām. PBh., p. 20.

434 NK., p. 21.

435 XV., p. 34.

436 SM., 1, 24, p. 125.

437 PBr., p. 21; NK., p. 21; BP., 1, 24; SM., p. 124.

438 NK., p. 21.
watery substances. The genus of fire inhères in fiery substances. The genus of air inhères in airy substances. The genus of self inhères in many individual selves. The genus of manas inhères in many internal organs. So they possess the lower genera. They have also faculty (samskāra). Earth, water, fire, air and manas have velocity. The self has impressions of past experiences.

Earth, water, fire, air, and manas have power of action or movement, corporeality, remoteness, proximity, and velocity. They are capable of upward movement and the like. Corporeality is non-ubiquity or limited magnitude. Remoteness, proximity, and velocity inhère in them. Velocity is different from mere continuity of motion. Action is physical motion.

Ether, time, space and self are ubiquitous, of the largest magnitude, and in conjunction with all corporeal substances. They are inactive or motionless and incapable of moving to all places. They are ubiquitous in this sense. They have the largest magnitude. They are not limited by finite magnitudes. All corporeal substances, which are of limited magnitudes, and come into conjunction with one another, are co-existent with the ubiquitous substances. Ether, time, space and self are not substrates of corporeal substances. Still they may be figuratively said to be their substrates, because they are substrates of all conjunctions of corporeal substances. They are devoid of motion, remoteness, proximity, and velocity.

Earth, water, fire, air and ether are the physical elements, material causes of the external sense-organs, and are endued with specific qualities, which are perceptible through the specific sense-organs. The olfactory organ is made of earth. The gustatory organ is made of water. The visual organ is made of light. The tactile organ is made of air. The auditory organ is in the nature of ether limited by the ear-hole. Smell is the

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Prthivyādinām pañcānām api bhūtatvendriya-prakṛtitvabāhyākalkendriyagrāhyaviśeṣagunavattvāni. Pbh., p. 22; NK., p. 22.
KV., p. 34.
Mārtatvān avacchinnaparimāṇayogitvam. NK., p. 21.
Pbh., p. 21; NK., pp. 21-22; KV., pp. 34-35.
Akaśakāladitmanām sarvagatavān paramamahattvān sarvāsāmyogīṣmāmādeseśatvām eti. Pbh., p. 22; NK., p. 22; BP., i. 26; SM., p. 127.
KV., p. 35.
Pbh., p. 22. BP., i. 26; SM., pp. 127-28.
specific quality of earth; taste, of water; colour, of fire; touch, of air; and sound, of ether. Smell is perceived by the olfactory organ. Taste is perceived by the gustatory organ. Colour is perceived by the visual organ. Touch is perceived by the tactual organ. Sound is perceived by the auditory organ.

Earth, water, fire and air are the material causes of the substances, which are produced, and have the quality of touch. They are the material causes of bodies and sense-organs. The atoms of earth, water, fire and air have atomic magnitude. The other gross earthy, watery, fiery, and aerial substances have intermediate finite magnitudes. They have elasticity also.

Earth, water and fire are perceptible through the external sense-organs. They are endowed with colour and fluidity. They are of limited magnitude. So they are perceptible through the external sense-organs. Earth and fire have acquired fluidity. Water has natural fluidity.

Earth and water have weight and taste. They have weight, which produces falling. They have sweet and other tastes. They have colour which is not bright.

Earth, water, fire, air, ether and self have specific qualities. Earth has smell; water, taste; light, colour; air, touch; ether, sound; and self, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, merit and demerit. They have perceptible qualities. Only impression, merit and demerit are perceptible.

Earth, water and self have fourteen qualities. Earth has colour, taste, smell, touch, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, and velocity. Water has colour, taste, touch, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, viscosity, and velocity. The self has cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression,
merit, demerit, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, and disjunction.\textsuperscript{433}

Ether and self have specific qualities, which are transitory and confined to a particular place. Ether has sound, which is transient, and exists in a particular place. A self has cognition, which is transient, and exists in connection with a particular body. Though ether and self are of the greatest magnitude, their qualities exist in particular places and are quickly destroyed.\textsuperscript{434}

Space and time have the five generic qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction. They are the efficient causes of all effects.\textsuperscript{435} Particular causes produce particular effects in particular places and at particular times. They do not produce their effects in other places and at other times. So the time qualified by the particular causes and the space qualified by them are their auxiliary efficient causes. The yarns are the material or inherent cause of a cloth. Their conjunction is its non-inherent cause. Time and space qualified by the yarns are their efficient causes. If they were not so, the yarns would produce a cloth at any time and in any place. But particular causes never produce their specific effects at any time and in any place.\textsuperscript{436} No effect is produced independently of space and time. If an effect is produced in one place at a particular time, it is not produced in another place at another time. So space and time are the conditions of the production of all effects as their abodes.\textsuperscript{437} A self also is an efficient cause of all effects, which produce pleasure and pain in it according to its merits and demerits. But it is not their abode, whereas space and time are the efficient causes of the production of all effects as their abodes (ādhāra).\textsuperscript{438}

Earth and fire have acquired fluidity. Though butter is earthy, it becomes fluid when it is heated. Though gold is

\textsuperscript{433} Kṣityudakātmanāṁ caturdaśa-guṇavattam. PBh., NK., p. 25; KV., p. 38; TBh., pp. 20, 23.

\textsuperscript{434} PBh., NK., p. 25; KV., p. 38; BP., i. 27; SM., pp. 239-35.

\textsuperscript{435} Dikkālayov pañcaguṇavattam. Sarvotpattimagāṁ nimitthakāraṇavāṁ ca. PBh., p. 25.

\textsuperscript{436} Viśistadaśakālayo-rāṅgavāṁ kāraṇajñānāya taṁ kāraṇairapekṣa-tītyavāṁ. NK., p. 28.

\textsuperscript{437} Dikkālopaḥhyadhikaraṇā sarvotpattiḥ. KV., p. 39.

\textsuperscript{438} Adhikāraṇatayā tu sarvotpattimagāṁ nimitta-vādi vāyuvāsāt. KV., p. 39.
fiery, it becomes fluid when it is intensely heated. Water has natural fluidity. But earth and fire have acquired fluidity. Quality and action are devoid of quality and action.

The similarities of some are the dissimilarities of others. Earth has smell as a special quality. Water, fire, air and ether are devoid of smell. Earth and water have weight and taste. Fire, air and ether are devoid of weight and taste. Earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, and manas are unconscious, and serve the ends of the self. All substances except water are devoid of viscosity and natural fluidity. All substances except fire are devoid of heat and power of combustion. Water, fire and air have touch, which is not due to heating. Water and fire have colour, which is not due to heating. Time, space and manas are devoid of special qualities. Air, ether, space, time and manas are imperceptible and supersensible. Self and manas can produce pleasure and pain in conjunction with a body, which is their non-inherent cause. They are the substrates of the conjunction, which is the non-inherent cause of the experience of pleasure and pain. Air, ether, time, space, self and manas are devoid of colour. Ether, time, space, self, and manas are devoid of touch. Time, space, self, and manas are not physical elements.

28. The Vaiśeṣika theory of Asatkāryavāda and criticism of Satkāryavāda.

The Vaiśeṣika recognizes three kinds of causes, material or inherent cause (samavāyī kāraṇa), non-material or non-inherent cause (asamavāyī kāraṇa), and efficient cause (nimitta kāraṇa). Substances are inherent causes. Qualities and actions are non-inherent causes. Substances cannot be non-inherent causes. Qualities and actions cannot be inherent causes. Substances qualities and actions have the common characteristic of being causes other than efficient causes. A cause is what produces an effect. A material or inherent cause is what produces an effect.

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438 KV., p. 39; PBh., p. 28; NK., pp. 25-26; BP., i. 14; SM., pp. 138-37.
439 BP., i. 14; SM., p. 101.
440 KV., pp. 39-40.
441 Nimittakāraṇavilakṣaṇatayeyah sādhamyast kāraṇatvam) uktam. NK., 18.
which inheres in it. Clay is the material cause of a pot which inheres in it. A non-material cause is what produces an effect and is proximate to the material cause. The yarns are the material cause of a cloth. Conjunction of the yarns is its non-material cause. Both conjunction and the cloth inhere in the yarns. An efficient cause is different from a material cause and a non-material cause. A weaver is the efficient cause of a cloth.\textsuperscript{443}

According to the Sāṃkhya, an effect pre-exists (sat) in the cause for the following reasons. A non-existent entity is never found to be produced. A sky-flower is a non-entity; it can never be produced. Oil is crushed out of mustard, because it pre-exists in it. The effect is pre-existent in the cause, which is existent, because the effect partakes in the nature of its cause. Further, the effect is produced out of its material cause to which it is related. An effect unrelated to its material cause cannot be produced; and a relation between a material cause and an effect is possible, only if both are existent at the same time. So the effect must pre-exist in its material cause in order to be related to it. If an effect unrelated to its material cause is produced, then any effect can be produced out of any cause. Further, the Sāṃkhya asks whether a cause, which has capacity for producing an effect, produces it, or whether a cause, which has no capacity for producing an effect, produces it. In the second alternative, any cause would produce any effect, which is absurd! In the first alternative, does its capacity for producing an effect operate always or at some time? If it always operates, then it would always produce the effect. If it operates at some time, then the effect must exist in it, on which it operates. Power acts on an entity which exists. It cannot act upon a non-existent entity. Therefore the effect must pre-exist in its material cause; it cannot exist apart from its material cause.\textsuperscript{444}

Śrīdhara criticizes the Sāṃkhya doctrine of Satkāryavāda. He asks why a cloth is not perceived though the yarns, its material cause, are present, if a cloth pre-exists in its constituent yarns. If it is said to be not perceived because of its unmanifestness.

\textsuperscript{443} Kāryotpādakatvām kāraṇatvām. Svasmavetakāryotpādakatvārī samavāyikāraṇatvām. Samavāyikāraṇapratyāśānmān avadhyatasaṃtvām asamavāyikāraṇatvām. Uḥhyaviparītatavaṁ nimitta-kāraṇatvām. SP. 72.

\textsuperscript{444} NK., p. 143; SK., 9; HIP., ii, pp. 3-10.
(anabhivyaktatva), what is the nature of its unmanifestness? If it is the absence of practical efficiency or power of producing an effect which is capable of being perceived, then practical efficiency of the effect is non-existent in the cause at first, and then comes into existence. This amounts to the admission that an effect is not existent in its cause (asaṭkāryavāda). It may be argued that a cloth is not perceived in the yarns because the activity of an agent, a weaver, is not present. This is not right. Even if the activity of the weaver is present, a cloth is not perceived in the yarns. It may be argued that a cloth is not perceived in the yarns, because the activity of the cause (kārapavyāpāra) is present but unmanifested, which becomes perceptible when it is manifested by the causal conditions. If the manifestation of the activity of the cause is said to be unmanifested at first, and then becomes manifest, then the fact that an effect is not first perceived in its material cause, and then perceived can be explained only by the assumption that an effect is non-existent in its material cause and then produced out of it.

The Śāṅkhyā argues that a non-existent thing (*e.g.*, a sky-flower) cannot be produced. This argument is wrong. There are things of different natures. A sky-flower is absolutely non-existent. Jars and the like are non-existent at first, and then come into existence. They are non-existent in their material causes, and are produced anew out of them. But how can they be non-existent and existent both? Śridhara observes that there is no self-contradiction in it. They are non-existent at one time and existent at another time. But how does a non-existent entity become existent? A non-existent entity can be produced by an aggregate of proper causal conditions. Though a cloth is non-existent at first, it can be produced out of the yarns when they are woven by a weaver in a loom with the aid of a shuttle and other auxiliaries.

The Śāṅkhyā argues that if the effect is not related to the cause, any effect would be produced by any cause. This is not right. A cloth can be produced by the yarns only, which are its material cause. A particular material cause can produce a particular effect. The restriction of material causes to particular effects depends upon the nature of things (vastusvabhāva). It does not require pre-existence of particular effects in particular
material causes to which they are related. The effects are non-existent in their material causes; they are produced anew out of them which have capacity for producing them. That is the material cause of an effect, which being present, the effect is produced, and which being absent, the effect is not produced.  

The Sāṃkhya argues that the effect is non-different from the cause, and that the effect exists so long as the cause exists. This argument is not valid. We perceive that a cause and its effect are different from each other in their nature, power and arrangement. The yarns and a cloth are different in their nature and arrangement of their constituent parts, and have different powers. We cannot wear threads. But we can wear a cloth. If the world is non-different from its cause, viz., prakṛti, then it would be imperceptible like prakṛti. Therefore the effect does not pre-exist in its cause.

29. The Vaiśeṣika criticism of the Mīmāṁsaka doctrine of causal power (sakti).

The Mīmāṁsaka believes in the existence of causal power which is imperceptible. The cause can produce its effect through its causal power. Fire has the power of burning, which produces the burning of a combustible thing. But Śrīdhara urges that this view is not tenable. He argues, like David Hume, that there is no valid means of knowing power, which must, therefore, be non-existent. The Mīmāṁsaka may argue thus: A fire is perceived to produce burning; but it is not perceived to produce burning in the presence of an unguent. If the perceptible nature of the fire were the cause of burning, then even in the presence of an unguent, it would burn. But it does not burn in its presence. The non-production of burning in its presence proves the existence of an imperceptible power in the fire, which is counteracted by the unguent. The causal power in the fire is either overpowered or destroyed by this agent. It is overpowered where it is liberated by the removal of the counteracting agent. It is destroyed where it cannot produce burning even after the elimination of the counteracting agent.

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484 NK., p. 144.  
485 Kāvyakāraṇaṇayoj. svarūpaśaktisaṁśāntiḥānabhedasya pratyakṣasiddhāt. NK., p. 144.  
486 NK., pp. 143-44.
This argument is wrong. Non-production of burning in the presence of an unguent does not prove the existence of an imperceptible power in it. Just as a fire is the cause of burning, because in its presence there is burning and in its absence there is no burning, so the prior non-existence of negative conditions or counteracting agents also is the cause of burning. The fire is a positive condition of burning. An unguent is a negative condition of it. The positive condition must be present, and the negative condition must be absent for the production of burning. The effect (e.g., burning) is not produced, when its negative conditions are present. The production of the effect is counteracted by the presence of the negative conditions. Non-production of the effect is due to a defect of the collocation of the causal conditions. It is not due to a defect of the causal power. A cause is an aggregate of all conditions, positive conditions being present, and negative conditions being absent. The Vaiśeṣika definition resembles J. S. Mill and Bain’s definitions. “A cause is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative taken together.” (Mill). A cause is “the entire aggregate of conditions or circumstances requisite to the effect.” (Bain). The Mīmāṃsaka may argue that an existent cause can produce an effect which becomes existent, but that a non-existent cause cannot produce an effect which becomes existent. A positive cause can produce a positive effect, but a negative cause or condition cannot produce a positive effect. Śrīdhara refutes the validity of this argument. Non-performance of daily obligatory duties produces a sin. So a negative entity can produce a positive entity. If a sin were not produced by the non-performance of daily obligatory duties, no atonement would have been prescribed for it. It may be argued that it is not non-performance of daily obligatory duties that produces a sin, but that the performance of other actions does so. So the prior non-existence of daily obligatory duties does not produce a sin. The prior non-existence of the negative conditions is not the cause of an effect. This argument is not right. The non-performance of daily obligatory duties is conducive to the production of a sin. So it can act to produce a sin. Hence the absence of negative conditions can contribute

**NK., p. 145.**
to the production of an effect. It may be argued that if in the presence of the negative conditions there is non-production of an effect (e.g., burning), then when the negative conditions are counteracted by their negative conditions, there would be non-production of the effect, since the prior non-existence of the negative conditions ceases to exist. But when a mantra, which counteracts production of burning by a fire, is counteracted by another mantra, the fire produces burning. So the non-existence of negative conditions is not a cause. There is an imperceptible power in the cause, which is obstructed by a negative condition, and liberated by another condition. So the causal power cannot be denied. This argument is wrong. Sometimes the collocation of positive conditions together with the absence of negative conditions is a cause. Sometimes the collocation of positive conditions together with some other condition is a cause. There is no contradiction in it. The same effect is found to be produced by different collocations of causal conditions. Fire is produced by friction of two pieces of wood. It is also produced by concentration of the sun on a particular kind of gem (ṣūryakānta). There is plurality of causes. So the assumption of power in a cause is not justified.

30. The Different Kinds of Qualities.

Kanadā mentions seventeen qualities, viz., colour, taste, smell, touch, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort or volition. Praśastapāda adds seven more qualities, viz., heaviness, fluidity, viscosity, faculty, merit, demerit and sound. Some add lightness, hardness and softness. Some add laziness. But these four are not separate qualities. Lightness is the contradictory of heaviness. Laziness is the contradictory of effort or volition. Softness and hardness are different degrees of conjunction. Thus there are only twenty-four qualities. Demerit is not mere absence of merit. It is a positive quality. Pain is not mere absence of pleasure. It is a positive quality. Nearness is not mere absence of remoteness. It is a positive quality. Disjunction is not mere absence

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444 NK., pp. 144-46. 479 VS., i. 1. 6; PBh., p. 95.
of conjunction. It is a positive quality. So these qualities should be distinctly mentioned.\(^{471}\)

Qualities are divided into general (sāmānyā) and special (vaiśeṣīka). (1) General qualities are those which abide in two or more substances jointly. Number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, derived fluidity, gravity and velocity are general qualities. (2) Special qualities are those which abide in one substance only at the same time, and not in two or more substances jointly. Colour, taste, smell, touch, viscidity, natural fluidity, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, faculty, and sound are special qualities.\(^{472}\) Qualities are further divided into (1) those which are perceptible through one external sense-organ, \(e.g.,\) sound, touch, colour, taste, and odour; (2) those which are perceptible through two external sense-organs, \(e.g.,\) number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, fluidity, viscidity, and velocity; and (3) those which are imperceptible through the external sense-organs, \(e.g.,\) gravity, merit, demerit, and faculty (bhāvanā). Number, magnitude and the like are perceived through the visual and tactual organs. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are perceptible through the internal organ or manas.\(^{473}\) They are the qualities of the self (ātman). Qualities are divided into eternal and non-eternal. The qualities of eternal substance are eternal. The qualities of non-eternal substances are non-eternal. Colour, taste, odour, touch, remoteness, nearness, gravity, fluidity, viscidity, and velocity are qualities of corporeal substances (mūrtāgūṇa). Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, merit, demerit, and sound are qualities of incorporeal substances (amūrtāgūṇa). Number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction are qualities of both corporeal and incorporeal substances (mūrtāmūrtāgūṇa).\(^{474}\) Conjunction, disjunction, duality and other numbers, and distinctness between two or more substances are qualities which reside in many substances (anekāśritagūṇa). The remaining qualities \(e.g.,\) colour, taste, odour, touch, sound, oneness (number), distinctness (of one substance), remoteness, nearness, cognition, pleasure, pain,

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\(^{471}\) Preface to TSG. by Bodas and Athalye, pp. 83-84.
\(^{472}\) PBh., pp. 95-96.  \(^{473}\) PBh., pp. 95-97.  \(^{474}\) PBh., p. 98.
desire, aversion, gravity, fluidity, viscosity, faculty, merit and demerit are qualities which reside in one substance (ekadravyavyṛtti).\(^{472}\)

Colour which is not due to heat, taste, odour, touch, magnitude, oneness (number), distinctness of one substance, gravity, fluidity, viscosity, and velocity are preceded by the like qualities of the material cause. The colour of a cloth is due to the colour of its constituent yarns. But cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, faculty, and sound are not preceded by the like qualities of the material cause. Colour, taste, odour, touch other than hot, sound, dimension, oneness, distinctness of one substance, and viscosity produce the like qualities. Taste produces taste; smell produces smell; touch produces touch; sound produces sound in its own substrate. But pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition produce unlike qualities. Pleasure produces desire; pain produces aversion; desire and aversion produce volition; volition produces action. Conjunction, disjunction, number, gravity, fluidity, hot touch, cognition, merit, demerit, and impression (saṃskāra) produce like and unlike qualities. A prior conjunction produces a subsequent conjunction, and conjunction of two substances produces large magnitude. Disjunction produces disjunction and sound. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, faculty, and sound produce qualities in their own substrates. Pleasure is a quality of the self, which produces desire in it. Desire abides in the self, which produces volition in it. Colour, taste, odour, touch, magnitude, viscosity, and volition produce the like qualities in another substance. The colours of the parts produce a colour in the composite whole, which is different from the parts. A volition in the self produces an action in the body. Conjunction, disjunction, number, distinctness of one substance, gravity, fluidity, velocity, merit and demerit produce qualities in their own substrates and other substances. Merit and demerit produce pleasure and pain in the same self. They also produce burning in a fire.\(^{478}\)

Gravity, fluidity, velocity, volition, merit, demerit, and conjunction are the causes of action. Fall is due to gravity. Flow is due to fluidity. Velocity produces motion. Volition

\(^{472}\) P\(\text{Rh.}\), p. 95. \(^{478}\) P\(\text{Rh.}, \text{NK.}\), pp. 98-100.
produces action in the body. Colour, taste, odour, non-hot touch, number, magnitude, distinctness of one substance, viscosity, and sound are non-material causes (asamavāyi kāraṇa). Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and faculty are efficient causes. Conjunction, disjunction, hot touch, gravity, fluidity, and velocity are both non-material causes and efficient causes. Conjunction of a stick with a drum is the efficient cause of a sound. Conjunction of the drum with ether (ākāśa) is its non-material cause. The fluidity of drops of water is the non-material cause of the fluidity of water in a tank. The fluidity of water is the efficient cause of the movement of a fish in it. Remoteness, proximity, duality, and distinctness of two substances are neither non-material causes nor efficient causes. Conjunction, disjunction, sound, and the special qualities of the self reside in parts of their substrates. A sound is a quality of ether (ākāśa), which is ubiquitous. But it resides in a part of ether where it is produced. It does not pervade the whole of it. The remaining qualities pervade their substrates. Colour, taste, odour, and touch, which are not due to heating, magnitude, oneness, distinctness of one substance, natural fluidity, gravity, and viscosity exist so long as their substrates exist. But colour, taste and the like due to heating are destroyed even when their substrates continue to exist. The other qualities are destroyed even when their substrates exist.⁴⁶⁷

Colour is a special quality, which is perceived by the visual organ only. It resides in earth, water and fire. There are seven kinds of colour, e.g., white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown, and motley. All these qualities reside in earth. Colour is produced in earthly substances by the application of heat. So their colour is transient. The colours of the atoms of water and fire are eternal. Those of composite aqueous and fiery substances are transient. The colour of water is white but not bright. The colour of fire is bright white. The colours of all produced substances are produced by those of their material causes. They are destroyed when their substrates are destroyed. Taste is a special quality, which is perceived by the gustatory organ only. It resides in earth and water. There are six kinds of tastes, viz., sweet, sour, saline, bitter, pungent, and astrin-

⁴⁶⁷ PBh., NK., pp. 101-03.
gent. The tastes of earthy substances are due to the application of heat. They are of six kinds. The taste of water is sweet, and not due to the application of heat. Tastes of the atoms of water are eternal. Those of composite aqueous substances are transient. Odour is a special quality, which is perceived by the olfactory organ only. It resides in earth only. All odours are transient. There are two kinds of odour, agreeable and disagreeable. The odours of produced substances are produced by the odours of their material causes. They are destroyed when their substrates are destroyed. The odours in the atoms of earth are produced by the application of heat. They are not eternal. Touch or temperature is a special quality, which is perceived by the tactual organ only. It resides in earth, water, fire and air. There are three kinds of touch, viz., cold, hot, and neither cold nor hot. Water is cold. Fire is hot. Earth and air are neither hot nor cold. Hardness, softness and the like reside in earth only. Śrīdhara regards them as particular conjunctions, and not as kinds of touch. Temperatures of the atoms of water, fire and air are eternal. Those of their composite products are non-eternal. Sound is a special quality, which is perceived by the auditory organ only.

Number (saṁkhya) is a generic quality (sāmānya guṇa). It is the cause of mathematical enumeration. It is the cause of the use of one, two, three, etc. Of the numbers, unity (ekātva) is eternal in eternal substances, and non-eternal in transient substances. An atom is eternal, and its unity is eternal. A jar is transient, and its unity is non-eternal. Unity inheres in one substance. Duality (dvītva) and higher numbers inhere in many substances. Plurality is transient. When we perceive a jar, we know its unity. The cognition of unity is not objectless. It is a certain knowledge, which must have an object. It is not objectless (nirvīśaya). It is not an illusory cognition, since it is not contradicted like an illusion. The cognition of 'one jar' is a determinate cognition (viśiṣṭa pratyaya). It is produced by a qualification (viśeṣaṇa). The colour of a jar cannot produce it, since it is produced in the absence of its colour. The generic character of a jar (ghaṭatva) cannot produce it, since the cognition of unity is produced by

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418 PBh., NK., pp. 104-06; BP., SM., 100-04.
a cloth also. Unity is not a generic character like beinghood (sattā), since it does not inhere in substances, qualities and actions like sattā. Unity is a quality, which inhere in a substance. It is not the genus of substance (dravyatva), since it is not one, eternal, and inherent in many substances. It is not non-difference or identity in nature (svarūpabheda) as Bhūṣaṇa maintains. If unity of a jar consists in its non-difference or identity in nature, then unity would not be perceived in a cloth. So unity is a distinct quality of a substance, which produces the cognition of unity. It is not subjective but objective. The Vaiśeṣika is a realist, and recognizes the reality of number. It is not a category of thought, but a category of reality. When we perceive a jar, we perceive its unity (ekatva). When we perceive another jar, we perceive its unity. Then by the relating activity of thought (apekṣābuddhi) we think together the two unities, and produce duality. Duality (dvītva) and other numbers are produced by discriminative intellect (apekṣābuddhi). The two jars are the material cause, their unities are the non-material cause, and the relating activity of thought is the efficient cause of duality. The knowledge of all numbers beyond duality is due to the relating activity of thought. Duality is not due to difference in nature (svarūpabheda) as Bhūṣaṇa maintains, since difference in nature is common to three, four and other numbers.**

Magnitude (parimāṇa) is the specific cause of measurement. There are four kinds of magnitude: minuteness, largeness, length and shortness. Magnitude is eternal in eternal substances and non-eternal in transient substances. The magnitude of ether, time, space, and souls is the largest. It is eternal, since they are eternal substances. The magnitude of an atom and manas is the minutest. It is eternal, since these substances are eternal. A composite substance like a jar has medium largeness. The magnitudes of a dyad and a triad are non-eternal, since they are composite products. The non-eternal magnitude of composite products is determined by the number, magnitude, and arrangement of parts.*** Plurality in dyads is produced by

the relating activity of the thought of God. Plurality of dyads produces largeness and length in triads, which are produced at the same time when their colours and other qualities are produced. Largeness of composite products produced by two or more large substances is produced by the large magnitudes of their causes. It is not produced by their plurality. Minuteness of a dyad is produced by duality of two atoms. Its shortness also is produced by its duality. Largeness and length of a triad are produced by plurality, large magnitudes and loose conjunction of the homogeneous dyads. Four kinds of produced magnitudes are destroyed, when their substrates are destroyed.\footnote{Pdh., p. 121; KV., pp. 210-17; VSU., vii. 1. 8-10. Rusaśara, pp. 57-65.}

Distinctness (prthaktva) is the quality of a substance, which distinguishes it from other substances. It is the basis of distinction of things from one another. It is real and objective. It is not a mere mental concept. Distinctness inheres in one substance, or it inheres in many substances. It is eternal in eternal substances. It is non-eternal in transient substances. Distinctness of an atom is eternal, because it is eternal. Distinctness of a jar is non-eternal, because it is transient. Distinctness of a composite product is produced by its causes. It is destroyed when its causes are destroyed. Distinctness inhering in two substances is produced by the relating activity of thought (apekṣābuddhi). It is destroyed when the relating activity of thought is destroyed. Sometimes it is destroyed when its substrates are destroyed. Distinctness is not mutual negation (anyoyābhāva), 'A jar is distinct from a cloth.' 'A jar is not a cloth.' These two cognitions are different from each other. So their objects must be different from each other. Distinctness is a positive quality. It is different from negation. Distinctness is not qualifiedness (vaiśīṣṭya). If it were so, then Maitra with a staff would be known as distinct from Maitra without a staff, ether qualified by a sound would be known as distinct from ether without a sound, and the self qualified by a cognition would be known as distinct from it without a cognition. But these are not facts of experience. So distinctness is not qualifiedness. Nor is it dissimilarity (vaidharmya). If it were so, then a dark jar would be known as distinct from
the same jar baked red by heat. Nor is distinctness generic character (sāmānya), because community has no limit like distinctness. Further, a jar is distinct from a pitcher, though they have the same genus. There is not one distinctness. If it were one in many distinct substances, it would be a generic character (sāmānya) which is one and inheres in many substances. Sāmānya is the cause of assimilation. But distinctness is the cause of distinction. Distinctness is different from particularity (višeṣa). Distinctness of an eternal substance refers to its numerical difference from other substances. But particularity of an eternal substance refers to its qualitative uniqueness.\(^4\)

Conjunction (sāhyoga) is a quality, which is the cause of the knowledge of conjoined substances. It is the union of two substances which existed separately. It subsists in two substances, and does not pervade its entire substrates. It subsists in parts of its substrates. It is of three kinds: (1) conjunction due to the movement of one of the substances conjoined, e.g., the perching of a flying bird on a fixed pole; (2) conjunction due to the movement of two substances conjoined, e.g., the contact of two wrestlers or two sheep fighting with each other; (3) conjunction due to another conjunction, e.g., the contact of a body with a tree due to the contact of a hand with the tree. Conjunction is partial contact of two substances. It is not total interpenetration. It affects only parts of the two substances conjoined. It is destroyed by separation or by the destruction of its substrates. It is the non-material cause of a composite substance. The conjunction of the two halves of a jar directly produces a jar. It is the non-material cause of the jar. It is the non-material cause of the qualities of the jar. It depends upon the colours of the two halves of the jar to produce the colours of the jar. So conjunction is an independent non-material cause of a composite substance. But it is a dependent non-material cause of the qualities and actions of a composite substance. Two ubiquitous (vibhu) substances cannot have conjunction with each other, because they never exist separately. There can be no conjunction of time with space, of ether with

\(^4\) Prthaktyam apoddhārayavyavahārayakārayam. Prh., p. 138; NK., pp. 138-39; EV., pp. 218-29; Rasasāra, pp. 65-71; VSU., vii. 2. 2.
space, or of the self with time. There can be conjunction between two substances of limited magnitudes.\footnote{Aprāptayaḥ prāptih suṣṭhagāh sa ca trividhaḥ anyatatākarmajāḥ ubhaṇya-karmajāḥ suṣṭhagāḥ citī. Pbh., pp. 139-41; NK., pp. 141-51; KV., pp. 220-30; VST., vii. 2. 9; Rasasaśāra, pp. 71-75; BH., 115; SM., pp. 433-35.}

Disjunction (vibhāga) is a quality, which is the cause of the knowledge of divided substances. It is separation of the two substances, which were conjoined.\footnote{Prāptipārvika-prāptir vibhāgaḥ. Sa ca trividhaḥ. Anyatatākarma-jā ubhaṇya-karma-jā vibhagajāca vibhāgaḥ. Pbh., p. 151.} It subsists in the two substances which are disjoined. It is of three kinds: (1) disjunction due to the movement of one of the two substances disjoined, e.g., disjunction of a bird from a fixed pole, which flies away from it; (2) disjunction due to the movement of the two substances disjoined, e.g., disjunction of two wrestlers or two sheep fighting with each other; (3) disjunction due to another disjunction, e.g., disjunction of a body from a tree due to disjunction of a hand from the tree. Disjunction due to disjunction is of two kinds: (1) disjunction due to disjunction of causes only; (2) disjunction due to disjunction of causes and non-causal substances. There is action in one half of a jar. Then there is disjunction of two halves of the jar. Then the conjunction of the two halves, which produced it, is destroyed. Then the jar is destroyed. Then disjunction of the active half of the jar with ether (ākāśa) is produced by the disjunction of the two halves of the jar. Then conjunction with ākāśa is destroyed. Then there is conjunction with a portion of space. Then there is destruction of action in one half of the jar. Here the disjunction of one half of the jar from ākāśa is due to the disjunction of the two halves from each other, which are the material causes of the first disjunction. So they are indirectly the material causes of the second disjunction also. The second disjunction is due to the disjunction of the material causes \textit{viz.}, the two halves of the jar. There is disjunction of the body from a tree due to the disjunction of a hand from it, which, in its turn, is due to the movement of the hand. The movement of the hand subsists in the hand. Disjunction of the body from the tree subsists in the body and the tree. So the movement of the hand is not the cause of the disjunction of the body from the tree, because it does not coinhere in the same
substrate. Hence the disjunction of a body from a tree due to the movement of its hand is due to disjunction of a cause and a non-causal substance.\textsuperscript{444}

Remoteness (paratva) and proximity (aparatva) are the causes of the notions of 'far' and 'near'. Each of them is of two kinds, spatial and temporal. Spatial remoteness is expressed as farness. Spatial proximity is expressed as nearness. Temporal remoteness is expressed as oldness. Temporal proximity is expressed as youngness. Spatial remoteness involves a large number of contacts with space-points between the distant object and the body of the person. Spatial proximity involves a small number of contacts with space-points between the proximate object and the body of the person. Similarly, temporal remoteness or oldness involves a large number of contacts with time-points between the old object and the body of the person. Temporal proximity or youngness involves a small number of contacts with time-points between the young object and the body of the person. An object is remote in relation to a proximate object. An object is near in relation to a remote object. An object is old in relation to a young object. An object is young in relation to an old object. Remoteness and proximity are relative to each other. They depend upon the relating activity of thought (apekṣābhuddhi). Praśastapāda does not regard them as ultimate qualities of things. They are destroyed when the relating activity of thought is destroyed.\textsuperscript{445}

Gravity (gurutva) is a quality of earth and water, by virtue of which they tend to fall to the ground. Falling is due to gravity when conjunction, velocity and effort are absent. It is eternal in atoms of earth and water. It is non-eternal in the composite earthy and watery substances. Fluidity (dravatva) is the cause of flowing. It exists in three substances. It is of two kinds, natural and acquired. Natural fluidity is a quality of water. Acquired fluidity is the quality of earth and fire or light. Natural fluidity is eternal in atoms of water, and non-eternal in composite watery substances. Acquired fluidity of earth and fire is due to conjunction with heat. Gold and butter

\textsuperscript{444} PBh., pp. 151-52; NK., pp. 154-64; KV., pp. 230-49; BP., 119-20; SM., pp. 435-38.

\textsuperscript{445} PBh., pp. 164-67; NK., pp. 167-71; KV., pp. 249-57; BP., 121-25; SM., pp. 438-39; VSU., vii. 2. 21.
become fluid in contact with fire. Viscidity (sneha) is oiliness. It is a special quality of water, by virtue of which particles of a substance come together and form a lump. Powder of parched gram mixed with water forms a lump owing to oiliness of water.\(^{447}\)

Faculty (saṃskāra) is of three kinds: (1) velocity (vega); (2) disposition or impression (bhāvanā); and (3) elasticity (sthitisthāpakatā). Velocity is the cause of motion. It keeps a thing in motion. It exists in earth, water, light, air, and manas. Disposition exists in the finite souls only. It is produced by apprehension. It is the cause of recollection. Elasticity exists in some tangible substances. It is the quality of a substance, which makes it revert to its original state even when disturbed. The bow reverts to its original state by virtue of its elasticity when an arrow is discharged from it. Elasticity is the quality of the substances which are subject to contraction and expansion. Rubber is elastic. Elasticity is eternal in eternal substances and non-eternal in transient substances. When an arrow is discharged from a bow by a person with an effort or volition, the arrow is the material cause of its motion, impetus is its non-material cause, and volition and gravity are its efficient causes. The first motion in the arrow produces velocity in it. The velocity produces the second motion in it. Velocity is its non-material cause. The arrow is its material cause. Strong impetus is its efficient cause.\(^{448}\) Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, disposition, merit and demerit are the special qualities of the finite souls. They will be considered in connection with the self.

IV

The Philosophy of the Ātman.

31. The Proofs for the existence of the Finite Self (Ātman) and plurality of Finite Souls.

The self (ātman) is too subtle to be perceived. It cannot be perceived through the external sense-organs. It is an object

\(^{447}\) PBh., pp. 263-66.

\(^{448}\) Sāṃskāras trividha vega bhāvanā sthitisthāpakatā. PBh., pp. 266-67; NK., pp. 267-68; VŚC., v. i. 17; II², pp. 185-82.
of inference. First, the finite self (ātman) is inferred from the perception of sound and the other sensible qualities as its substratum. Perception is knowledge or consciousness. It is produced by the intercourse of the external sense-organs with certain external objects. Sound is perceived through the auditory organ. Colour is perceived through the visual organ. Different sensible qualities are perceived through the different sense-organs, which are the instruments (karaṇa) of knowledge. Knowledge as an effect must have a material cause. The finite self (ātman) is its material cause in which it inheres. Consciousness is not the quality of an object, because even when an object is not present, there is recollection of it. So recollection is not produced by the object. Hence consciousness cannot be a quality of an object. The body cannot be the substrate of consciousness. Consciousness cannot be a special quality of the body, since it is not found in a dead body. A special quality of a substance subsists in it so long as it continues to exist. A body continues to exist when it becomes dead; but consciousness ceases to exist in it. So consciousness is not its special quality. The material causes of the body are unconscious. So the body must be unconscious. If the ingredients of the body are assumed to be conscious, then there is a plurality of knowers (jñātrbahunya) in the same body, and hence there cannot be a unity of bodily action to realize a common end. So the body cannot be the substrate of consciousness. If the body which is produced by material ingredients, like a jar, were conscious, then a jar also would be conscious. But a jar is not conscious. So the body also cannot be conscious. The sense-organs also are not the substrates of consciousness. Even when they are destroyed, there is recollection of objects perceived through them in the past. Further, they are the instruments (karaṇa) of knowledge, and cannot be the knowing agents (karta). The internal organ, manas, which is eternal, and apprehends all objects, may be said to be conscious. If it perceives colours, sounds, tastes, odours and the like with the aid of an internal organ, it is nothing but the self (ātman). If it does not depend upon an internal organ, then it would

444 Indriyārthaprakāśakādhirindriyārthebhyo'arthāntarasya hetuḥ. VS, iii. 1. 2. VŚU, iii. 1. 2.
445 Viṣayaśāntidhve cānusmṛtidarśanāt. PBr, p. 69.
have simultaneous perception of colours, sounds, odours, tastes, heat and cold in the presence of the proper objects acting upon the sense-organs, and it would have simultaneous recollections in the absence of an atomic internal organ. But, in fact, there are neither simultaneous recollections nor simultaneous perceptions of the sensible qualities. Further, the manas is an organ (karaṇa) of knowledge, and cannot be the knowing agent. It is an atomic internal organ of knowledge. Knowledge is an effect. So it must have a material cause. The body, the sense-organs, and the manas cannot be its material cause. Therefore, by elimination, the self (atman) must be its material cause. The finite soul must be the substrate of consciousness. Secondly, the activity of the sense-organs (karaṇa) requires an agent (kartā) who uses them in order to know objects, even as an instrument (e.g., an axe) requires an agent to use it. The body, the sense-organs, and the manas cannot be the agent, since they are unconscious. They themselves are the instruments of experience. They require the finite self (atman) as the agent who uses them as organs of experience. 491 Thirdly, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are qualities. They are not qualities of the body or the sense-organs. They are not perceived by the external sense-organs. They persist even when the external senses are destroyed. They are always appropriated by the self. They are experienced as belonging to the ego. 'I feel pleasure'. 'I feel pain'. 'I feel desire'. 'I feel aversion'. 'I will to act'. So they cannot be the qualities of the body and the sense-organs. Ego-consciousness refers to the self, and not to the body and its senses. The same self has apprehension, recollection, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition, which cannot belong to the body or its sense-organs. Further, pleasure and pain are felt in connection with different parts of the body. 'I feel pleasure in the foot'. 'I feel pain in the head'. So pleasure and pain are not special qualities of the body and the sense-organs. Special qualities of a substance pervade the entire body of it. Colour subsists in a substance entirely. Pleasure and pain do not subsist in the entire body. So they cannot be its special quality. Pleasure and pain are not always experienced while the body

491 Vāsyaṭādīnāṁ iva karaṇānāṁ kartṛprayojayatvadālaṅkāt prasādha- ko'umālyate. Brh., p. 69.
lasts. So they are not its special qualities. They are not perceived through the external sense-organs like colour and temperature of the body, They are not imperceptible like its gravity. They are perceived through the manas. So they are not special qualities of the body. They are the qualities of the finite self (atman). Fourthly, recollection and recognition prove the existence of the self. An object is perceived. The perception produces an impression (saṃskāra), which produces a recollection of it. The perception, the impression and the recollection must inhere in the same substratum. The self is the substratum of all these qualities. The same self remembers an object, which it perceived in the past, and retained it in the form of an impression. Recollection proves the unity and identity of a finite soul. Recognition also proves the permanence and identity of the self. ‘This is that Devadatta’. The self perceived Devadatta in the past, and recognizes him at present. It is the same self that perceived him and recognizes him. There is unity and identity of the self. If the self were a series of momentary cognitions as the Buddhist holds, recollection and recognition would not be possible. An object perceived by a momentary past cognition cannot be remembered by a momentary future cognition. If it were possible, then an object perceived by Caitra would be remembered by Maitra. A series of momentary cognitions cannot account for recollection and recognition, which presuppose a permanent entity. The Ālayavijñāna also cannot account for them, since it is a series of momentary self-cognitions as distinguished from momentary object-cognitions. If it is supposed to be permanent, then it is identical with the self (atman). But the Buddhist does not believe in the permanent self. Cognitions are qualities. They cannot be the qualities of cognitions. The substrate (gūṇa) of qualities must be different from them (gūṇa). Momentary cognitions are the qualities of the permanent self.

Fifthly, the vital acts of inspiration and expiration, the opening and the closing of the eyes, the growth of the body, self-
recuperation of wounds, the movement of the manas, and the
impulsion of the sense-organs prove the existence of the self. These vital acts are not due to the vital forces only, but to the voluntary direction of the self. The growth of plant-bodies and self-recuperation of their injuries are due to the voluntary action of God who animates and directs them. Life and its acts, growth of the body, inhalation and exhalation in deep sleep, self-reparation of injuries and the like, depend upon a kind of volition (jīvanayoniprayatna) of the self. It is the self that directs the manas to apprehend its qualities, and to come into conjunction with the sense-organs to apprehend their objects successively. The self impels the sense-organs to function towards their proper objects. It is the agent that makes use of the manas and the external senses to perceive its qualities and those of external objects. Lastly, apperception proves the existence of the self. Colours, sounds, tastes, odours and temperatures of an object are perceived through the different sense-organs. Some of its qualities are remembered. They are combined into a single experience and referred to an external object by the self by its synthetic act of apperception. The self is like a person who perceives different objects through many windows of a room. A mango is perceived through the visual organ. Its taste is remembered. Then the mouth waters. It is the self that perceives the colour and shape of the mango through the visual organ, and remembers its taste. The recollection of its taste makes the mouth water. The synthetic act of apperception is the function of the self. These are the arguments for the existence of one’s own self. The following argument is given for the existence of another self. The voluntary actions of a body, which realize good and avoid evil, prove the existence of another self which directs the body, even as the movements of a chariot are guided by a charioteer. A self has knowledge of good and evil. It consciously and voluntarily directs its body to execute the movements, which

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488 Prāṇāpanimēṇaṁmenesajīvanānāmaṇogatiudrīyāntaravīkārah sukha-
dūkhāhecchādvēṣapratahānā cātmano lingānī. VS., iii. 2. 4; PBh.,
B.S.S., pp. 132-33; K.V., pp. 132-34.
489 NK., p. 83.
490 VSU., iii. 2. 4; PBh., pp. 69-70; NK., pp. 82-83; K.V., pp. 132-33.
491 Nayanāvishayālocanānāntarānī rasānuśrīkramena rasānavikriyā-
darśanād ubhaya darśā kaścid eko vijñāyate. PBh., p. 70; K.V., pp. 135-
36.
are conducive to the realization of the good and the avoidance of evil. The voluntary movements for the achievement of a good and the avoidance of an evil are the outward expressions of the volitions of a self. Thus we infer the existence of other finite souls after the analogy of our own souls.499

The Vaiśeṣika recognizes the plurality of finite souls, which is inferred from the variety of experiences and conditions of different souls. Some are happy while others are miserable. Some are bound while others are liberated. These differences in the status of individuals prove the existence of many souls.500 The plurality of finite souls is confirmed by the Vedas also. The Upaniṣads speak of two beautiful birds residing in the same tree, one enjoying the sweet fruit thereof, and the other merely looking on. They speak of the finite soul and the infinite soul residing in the same body, the finite soul being subject to happiness and misery, and the infinite soul, the inner controller, being a mere spectator without experiencing its happiness and misery. They advocate difference between the finite souls and the infinite soul.501 The Upaniṣadic texts emphasizing the identity of the finite soul with the infinite soul is intended to convey similarity (sāmya) but not identity (abheda) between them. If there were only one soul, the bondage of one would lead to the bondage of others, and the liberation of one would lead to the liberation of others. Each soul reaps the consequences of its own actions. It continues its identity in the midst of all its experiences. It transmigrates from one body to another to exhaust its own merits and demerits. Even in the state of liberation the finite soul retains its integrity, and is not merged in God. Each soul has its particularity (viṣeṣa) by virtue of which it is distinguished from the other souls and God. Each soul is eternal, and its viṣeṣa is eternal. The pluralistic bias of the Vaiśeṣika leads it to recognize the plurality of finite souls as ultimate.

The Advaita Vedānta urges that the differences in the status of individuals can be accounted for by the plurality of empirical selves (jīvātmā), though the ontological Self (ātman)

499 Pravṛtti nivruttī ca pratyagātmani dṛṣṭe paraśa liṅgam. VS, iii. 1. 10. Sarīrasaṃvāyinibhyāṁ hitāhitapraṇātiparārayogābhyaśāṁ pravṛtti-nivruttibhyāṁ vigrahasthānāśrāhāṃ sārṣhāḥ, VSU., iii. 1. 10. PBh., p. 69.
500 Vyavasthāto nāmā. VS., iii. 2. 20.
501 Sāstrasāmarthyāccha. VS., iii. 2. 21. VSU., iii. 2. 21.
is one. The Self is one. But the empirical selves limited by ignorance (avidyā) are many. Śrīdhara asks: To whom does avidyā belong? Does it belong to Brahman or to the jīvas or finite souls? Brahman is by nature eternally pure and enlightened, and cannot, therefore, be subject to avidyā. If the jīvas are subject to avidyā, then there is mutual dependence. The jīvas depend upon avidyā for their very existence, since they are Brahman or eternal consciousness limited by avidyā. Avidyā abides in the jīvas which are subject to it. This is mutual dependence. The Advaita Vedānta may argue that there is a beginningless series of avidyā and jīvas mutually causing each other like a beginningless series of seeds and sprouts causing each other. Śrīdhara contends that individual seeds are causes of individual sprouts, which are causes of other seeds, which are real, but that avidyā and jīvas are not ontologically real, which cannot, therefore, be related to each other by mutual causality. If the jīvas are assumed to be ontologically real and eternal like Brahman without origin and end, then monism of the Advaita Vedānta is undermined. If there is one ontological Self, then the variety of individual experiences cannot be accounted for. Hence the plurality of finite souls must be admitted.

32. The Qualities of the Finite Souls.

Knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and disposition or impression are the special qualities of the finite self (ātman). Number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction are its generic qualities. Knowledge (buddhi) is the manifestation or apprehension of objects. It is a quality of the self. The Sāṅkhya and the Yoga regard buddhi as an unconscious modification of prākṛti, the root-evolvent, in which the conscious self (puruṣa) is reflected. When buddhi catches the reflection of the self, it is intelligized, as it were, and appears to be conscious. This Sāṅkhya-Yoga view is wrong. Buddhi is apprehension or consciousness of objects. It is not an unconscious substance. It is a quality of the self. Knowledge, cognition and apprehen-

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392 Avidyākṛto jīvabhede jīvārārayāvidyeta. NK., p. 87.
393 NK., pp. 87-88.
sion are synonymous. There are an infinite number of cognitions, which apprehend an infinite variety of objects. But knowledge is mainly of two kinds, valid knowledge (vidyā) and invalid knowledge (avidyā). Valid knowledge is of four kinds, viz., perception, inference, recollection, and super-normal occult perception. Invalid knowledge is of four kinds, viz., doubt, illusion, indefinite knowledge (anadhyavasāya), and dream. These have already been considered. Pleasure (sukha) is an agreeable feeling produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with desirable objects, conjunction of the self with manas, and merit. Garlands, sandal-paste, women and the like produce sensuous pleasure. Rational happiness is produced by the conquest of passions, contentment, absence of greed, and knowledge of the self. Pleasure and happiness are expressed in brightness of the eyes and the face. Retrospective pleasure is due to the recollection of past objects. Prospective pleasure is due to the anticipation of future objects. Pleasure is not mere negation of pain. It is a positive feeling of enjoyment. Pain is a disagreeable feeling. It is produced by the intercourse of undesirable objects with the sense-organs, conjunction of the self with manas, and demerit. Pain is a feeling of injury to the self. It is a feeling of self-abasement. It is expressed in gloomy eyes and face. Retrospective pain is due to recollection of past hostile objects. Prospective pain is due to anticipation of future undesirable objects. Desire is a craving for the attainment of an unattained object by oneself or by another person. It arises from recollection of an object that yielded pleasure in the past. It is due to conjunction of the self with manas, and the feeling of pleasure. It is the cause of volition. Desires are of various kinds. Desire for indulgence in sexual pleasure, desire for food and drink, attachment or desire for repeated enjoyment of objects of pleasure, desire to act in future, desire to alleviate the miseries of others without any selfish motive, detachment for objects of enjoyment due to knowledge of their transitoriness, desire to cheat others, and unmanifest desire are the different kinds of desire. Desires are expressed in actions. Desire to do something, desire to steal

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204 Buddhārupaladhirājanaṇaḥ prayāva iti paryāyāḥ. Prbh., p. 171. NK., pp. 171-72; Cp. NS., l. 1. 15; NBh., l. 1. 15.
205 Prbh., pp. 172, 186.
and the like are the various kinds of desire. Aversion is in the nature of flaming up. The self flies into a rage which arises from pain, recollection of painful objects, and conjunction of the self with manas. Anger, malevolence, impotent rage, envy, and hate due to self-humiliation are the different kinds of aversion. Aversion is the cause of volition, which is an effort of will, enterprise or exertion. It is of three kinds, volition to maintain life and direct the vital acts of inspiration, expiration and the like during sleep (jivanayoniprayatna), volition to realize a good (hitapraťti) prompted by desire, and volition to avoid an evil (ahitaparihāra) prompted by aversion. Volitions are due to conjunction of the self with manas, desire and aversion. A disposition (bhāvanā) or impression (sāmkśāra) is produced by an intense perception, an agreeable or interesting experience, and conjunction of the self with manas. It is intensified by repetition of similar impressions. An impression is the cause of recollection and recognition. It is awakened by the perception of a similar or contiguous object, and produces recollection. Merit (dharma) is a special quality of the self, which is imperceptible and produced by the regular performance of duties relating to castes and stages of life prescribed by the Sāstras. It is the cause of pleasure, the means to pleasure, and release. It is produced by a conjunction of the self with manas, and pure intention. It is produced by the disinterested performance of duties without any selfish motives of profit, honour and the like and with purity of intention. It is destroyed by true knowledge of the last pleasure. It is destroyed by release, which is absolute extinction of all cognitions, pleasures, pains, desires, hates, volitions, dispositions, merits and demerits. Demerit (adharma) is a quality of the self. It is imperceptible, and produces pain and the means to pain. It is produced by the deliberate commission of sins forbidden by the Sāstras with an evil intention owing to a conjunction of the self with manas, and destroyed by the knowledge of the last pain. These are the specific qualities of the self. It has the generic qualities of number, distinctness, magnitude, conjunction and disjunction. There are many finite selves. Each finite self has the greatest

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448 PBh., NK., pp. 259-63.  
449 PBh., NK., pp. 267-68; pp. 256-57.  
447 PBh., NK., pp. 272-73, 278; p. 280.
magnitude. It is ubiquitous (vibhu). Its ubiquity consists in its relation to all corporeal substances. It is invested with pleasure, pain and the other special qualities owing to its conjunction with manas. It is divested of them owing to its disjunction from manas. So the self has conjunction and disjunction. Consciousness is not an essential quality of the self. It is its adventitious quality acquired from its conjunction with manas.⁴⁹⁹

33. The Vaiśeṣika criticism of Kumārila, Prabhākara and Samkara's views about the Knowledge of Cognition.

Kumārila, the founder of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, maintains that cognition is inferred from cognizedness (jñātata) produced by it in its object. It is manifestness (prākaṭya). Cognition cannot be perceived. It is inferred from cognizedness or manifestness, which is a quality of an object. Śrīdhara refutes this doctrine. First, cognizedness is not apprehended. It is perceptibility or capability of producing an act of acceptance or rejection, which also depends on relation to a cognition. It also must be apprehended by a cognition. So cognizedness is produced in it, which also must be apprehended. Hence the knowledge of an object requires an infinite series of cognizedness, which is absurd! If cognizedness of an object is apprehended by itself without requiring another cognizedness, then cognition also can be perceived without producing cognizedness in its object. Secondly, not only present objects but also past objects and future objects are apprehended. But cognizedness is not produced in them. But past and future objects apprehended by cognitions may be said to be determined by the present time. Their cognizedness may be said to consist in their being determined by the present time. But being determined by the present time is being qualified by the present time, which is a natural character of an object. It is not produced by a cognition. It exists in the object, which is simply apprehended by a cognition. So cognizedness of past and future objects cannot consist in their being qualified by the present time. But they are known by cognitions, which apprehend them without producing cognizedness in them. So cognitions

⁴⁹⁹ Pbh., p. 70; NK., p. 88.
can apprehend objects, past, present and future, without producing cognizedness in them. Further, cognizedness is a relation of an object to a cognition, which can be known only when its relata, the object and the cognition, are known. The knowledge of cognizedness presupposes the knowledge of cognition. So Kumārila’s doctrine involves the fallacy of hysteron proteron. If cognizedness is self-manifest, then cognition also may be regarded as self-manifest. So Kumārila’s doctrine of infer-ability of cognition from cognizedness is not tenable.⁴¹⁸

Some Mīmāṁsakas maintain that a cognition is inferred from the consciousness of an object. An act of cognition (jñānakriya) produces the consciousness of an object (viṣayasaṁvedana). The former is inferred from the latter.⁴¹¹ Sridhara refutes this doctrine. He asks whether the consciousness of an object inheres in the object or in the self. The object is unconscious. So it cannot inhere in the object. If it inhere in the self, what is the nature of the act of cognition which is inferred from it? It is either eternal or non-eternal. If it is non-eternal, its cause is the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ aided by the conjunction of the self with manas. Then this cause may as well produce the consciousness of an object. The assumption of the act of cognition is needless. If the cognitive act of the self is eternal, its occasionalness (kādācitkatva) with the aid of the intercourse of objects with sense-organs must be admitted to produce consciousness of objects. So the assumption of the cognitive act is useless. The intercourse of an object with the sense-organs may produce it. But object-consciousness may be said to inhere in the self only, if it is not endued with natural consciousness. But if it is unconscious by nature, in which object-consciousness may inhere, then it may as well inhere in the sense-organs which produce it, because they are unconscious. This objection is not valid. The Law of Nature (vastusvabhāva) demands that consciousness produced by the self and the sense-organs inhere in the former and not in the latter, even as a cloth produced by yarns and a shuttle inhere in the former and not in the latter. The yarns are not a cloth, but still a cloth inhere in them. Similarly, the self has no

⁴¹⁸ NK., pp. 96-97. IPP., pp. 204-05.
natural consciousness, but still object-consciousness inheres in it. So it is wrong to argue that object-consciousness cannot inhere in the self because it is devoid of natural consciousness. Hence cognition is not inferred from consciousness of an object.\textsuperscript{412}

Prabhākara, the founder of the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṁsā, maintains that a cognition apprehends itself, an object, and the self, which is its substrate, at the same time. This is the doctrine of triple perception (trīpuṭīpratyakṣa). Sridhara refutes this doctrine. He urges that in the perception 'this is a jar' only the jar is perceived, but that the self and the cognition are not perceived. They are not objects of visual perception. So when a jar is perceived through the eyes, they are not perceived. But in the cognition 'I know the jar' there is mental perception of the object as qualified by the self and the cognition. Or there is mental perception of a cognition qualified by the self and an object. There is a difference between object-consciousness and self-consciousness. The self does not always appropriate object-consciousness. Hence the doctrine of triple perception of cognition, self and an object is not tenable.\textsuperscript{413}

Sarhkara maintains that consciousness of the self is self-aware (svasahvedana). But Sridhara contends that if it were self-aware, then it would be manifested in the state of bondage also. But the consciousness of the self is not manifested in empirical life. It is said to be veiled by avidyā. But the self, according to Sarhkara, is Brahman. It is eternal. Its self-luminous consciousness is eternal, which can never be hidden by avidyā. If its consciousness is hidden by avidyā, it cannot manifest other objects. Further, when avidyā is nullified by a person, true knowledge (vidyā) dawns on him, and brings about his release. When one person is released, all persons would be released because the self is one and indivisible. Vidyā cannot be manifested in one part of it while avidyā persists in its other parts. Hence the doctrine of self-awareness of consciousness is not tenable.\textsuperscript{414} The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika regard consciousness as an object of mental perception.

\textsuperscript{412} NK., p. 97. IPP., pp. 210-12.
\textsuperscript{413} NK., pp. 91-92. IPP., p. 213.
\textsuperscript{414} NK., pp. 97-98.
V

The Philosophy of God.

34. The Concept of God in the Vaiśeṣika System.

Kaṇḍada does not refer to God or the supreme Soul in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra. The famous aphorism which is repeated twice by him does not distinctly refer to God. "The authority of the Vedas is due to the utterance of him or them." It may mean that the authority of the Vedas is due to the utterance of God or the seers. Kaṇḍada most probably traces their authority to the seers who perceive supersensible objects like dharma, adharma, heaven, hell and the like. He believes in supernormal perception of the sages (ārṣa jñāna) born of dharma due to austerities and meditation. He does not regard God as the efficient cause of the world. God is not the cause of the first motion in the atoms. He does not combine them into dyads, and dyads into triads. The unseen principles (adṛṣṭa), merits and demerits of the individual souls are the cause of the first motion in the atoms, which combine them into dyads, triads and gross objects of the world for the experiences of the finite souls. Saṅkara does not mention God as the cause of motion in the atoms or the creator of the world out of the atoms. He mentions unseen principles (adṛṣṭa) in the finite souls as the cause of motion in the atoms according to the Vaiśeṣika. So the early Vaiśeṣika was atheistic. It was made theistic by the later Vaiśeṣika thinkers. Praśastapāda traces the authority of the Vedas to that of the speaker. He speaks of the sages as the authors of the Vedas, who have supernormal intuition of the past, the present, the future, and supersensible entities like dharma and adharma. He faithfully represents the view of his master, Kaṇḍada, in regard to the authority of the Vedas. But he is a theist. He ascribes periodic creation and destruction of the world to the creative and destructive will of God (Maheśvara).

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313 Tadvacanād āmnāvaya prāmāṇyaṃ. VS., i. i. 3; x. ii. 9.
314 Ārṣaṁ siddhaṁ ārṣaṁ ca dharmabhyaḥ. VS., ix. 2. 13.
315 Anūnām ādyah karmā adṛṣṭakārtam. VS., v. 2. 13.
316 SSB., ii. 2. 11.
317 Amnāyō vaktrprāmnāpyapekṣāḥ tadvacanāt āmnāyapramāṇaḥ. PPh., p. 215.
318 Āmnāvavidhātṛṇām rṣiṁ dharmaś ca prāthhtam jñānam ntpadyate. PPh., p. 288.
319 PPh., pp. 48-49.
similarities and dissimilarities is the cause of liberation. It depends on dharma, which is enjoined by God. Duality (dvitva) and plurality (bahutva) are produced by discriminative intellect (apekṣā-buddhi). Large magnitude and length are produced in triads (tryaṇuka) by plurality of dyads, which is due to the discriminative intellect of God. Minuteness and shortness in a dyad (dvyaṇuka) are produced by duality, which is due to God’s discriminative intellect. Praśastapāda regards God as the efficient cause of the world, and atoms as its material cause. Sivāditya admits the reality of God as the supreme soul which is one, while the individual souls are infinite in number. Vyomaśiva, Śrīdhara, Udayana, Padmanābha Miśra, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, Mādhava Sarasvatī, Saṅkara Miśra and others advance arguments for the existence of God. The Vaiśeṣika system was atheistic in the beginning, but became theistic later. It advocates the dualism of matter and souls, which are irreducible to each other. It advocates the pluralism of atoms and finite souls, which are eternal and distinct from one another. The pluralistic theism of the later Vaiśeṣika does not regard God as the creator of the atoms, the finite souls, time, space, minds (manas) and ether, which are external to him. He creates the world out of the atoms according to the Law of Karma, and adapts it to the merits and demerits of the individual souls. The later Vaiśeṣika entertains a deistic conception of God. It does not regard the knowledge of God as a means of liberation, nor the union of the individual soul with God as mokṣa.

35. The Theistic Proofs.

The cosmological argument is advanced for the existence of God. The atoms of earth, water, fire and air are the material cause (samaṃvya kāraṇa) of the world. Their conjunction is its non-material cause (asamaṃvya kāraṇa). Merits and demerits of the individual souls are its auxiliary cause (saḥakāri kāraṇa). God is its efficient cause (nimitta kāraṇa). He creates the first motion in the atoms by which he combines the atoms into dyads, the dyads into triads and other gross objects for the

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diverse experiences of the finite souls in accordance with their merits and demerits. His discriminative intellect (apekṣā-buddhi) produces duality in two atoms, which produces minuteness and shortness in a dyad. It produces plurality in three dyads, which produces large magnitude and length in a triad. God produces gross objects out of the atoms of earth, water, fire and air with the aid of the souls' merits and demerits. He has immediate knowledge of the atoms, the material cause of the world, and desire and volition to create it.\textsuperscript{526} Vyomaśīva regards the conjunction of the souls with the atoms as the non-material cause of motion in them, the atoms as its material cause, and God's volition as its efficient cause. God has knowledge (jñāna), detachment (vairāgya), and power of sovereignty (aṅśvarya). His knowledge apprehends the atoms and merits and demerits of the finite souls. His detachment moves him to create the world of diverse objects impartially according to the Law of Karma. His sovereignty makes the souls' merits and demerits bear fruits when they mature.\textsuperscript{527} If God were ignorant, he would not be able to create the world owing to his ignorance of its material cause or atoms, even if he had power. If he were not detached, he would not create diverse objects in accordance with the souls' merits and demerits, and they would not reap the fruits of their actions, which they earned (kṛtaṁ) and they would experience unmerited happiness and misery (akṛtaṁ). If he were powerless, he would be unable to create proper objects of their experience according to their moral deserts (ādṛṣṭa).\textsuperscript{528} His motive for creation is compassion (karunā) for creatures. He creates the world for their benefit (parārtha). He creates variety in it according to the Law of Karma.\textsuperscript{529} Though he is moved by compassion, he creates the diverse world of happiness and misery to suit the souls' merits and demerits. He creates misery as the proper retribution for demerits, which has an educative value, since it produces detachment in the suffering creatures by chastening their spirit, and leads them to the highest good. Creation of misery does not conflict with God's compassion for

\textsuperscript{526} Mahāśvēracchā nimittakāraṇam ātmānāṁ anubhīb saṁyogācā- samavāyakāraṇam anuvastu saṁavāyaṁ ityānusū karmānyutpaṇdante. VV., p. 296. Setu, pp. 285-86, 288; Śūkṣti, pp. 280-82.

\textsuperscript{527} NK., p. 53.

\textsuperscript{528} KV., p. 95.

\textsuperscript{529} Adṛṣṭāpekṣayā vaicitryāṁ samarthayet. KV., p. 97.
creatures. He accords right punishment through his even-handed justice.429 His omnipotence and independence are not compromised by his acting according to merits and demerits of the individual souls. He is just and impartial. He accords appropriate rewards and punishments to them in accordance with their meritorious and demeritorious acts. The master who gives proper rewards and punishments to his servants according to their good and bad actions does not cease to be master. So God does not cease to be the omnipotent Lord, who respects the moral Law of Karma and awards proper rewards and punishments to his creatures in strict accordance with their moral deserts.431 But how could the creatures acquire merits and demerits before creation of the world? They acquired them in their previous births before dissolution of the world. There is an unending cycle of periodic creation and dissolution of the world.

The cosmological argument is formally stated thus. Four gross material elements of earth, water, fire and air are effects produced by an intelligent agent, who perceives the atoms, the material cause, out of which he produces them, even as a jar is an effect produced by an intelligent agent, a potter, who perceives clay, the material cause, out of which he produces it. Gross earth, water, fire and air are effects, since they consist of parts, like a jar. The atheist may urge that invariable concomitance between being an effect and being produced by an intelligent agent that perceives the materials out of which he produces it cannot be ascertained. The Vyāpti which is the ground of the inference, is not established. Though the production of a jar is perceived to be preceded by an intelligent agent, that is its efficient cause, the production of sprouts and the like is perceived to be preceded by the absence of an intelligent agent. The sprouts cannot be said to be produced by an intelligent agent. If the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between being an effect and being produced by an intelligent agent is already established, then only the sprouts may be said to be produced by an intelligent agent. The sprouts are always perceived to be not preceded by an

429 Na caivānti sati karmāvirodho duṣkhotpādasya vairāgyajanana- 
dvāraṇa paramāperuṣārthihhetutvāt. NK., p. 53.
431 NK., pp. 53-54.
intelligent agent as their efficient cause. The invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum itself is not yet ascertained. So the sprouts cannot be said to be the minor term (pakṣa) in which the probandum exists. Śrīdhara replies that in ascertaining the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum both may not be perceived. If in ascertaining vyāpti both must be always perceived, then there can be no sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference by which the movement of the sun is inferred from its successive changing positions, because the former is never perceived while the latter is perceived. If the sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is valid in spite of the movement not being perceived, then vyāpti can be known in spite of the probans being perceived and the probandum not being perceived. Vyāpti can be known by induction by simple enumeration unvitiated by conditions in this inference. Then the intelligent agent, God, is not perceived as the efficient cause of the sprouts, because he has no physical body. His not being perceived does not invalidate the vyāpti between being an effect and being produced by an intelligent agent that has immediate knowledge of its material cause, because it is established by an induction by simple enumeration unvitiated by conditions.

The atheist asks: Does the inference prove the existence of a mere intelligent agent like us? Or does it prove the existence of God, who can produce the gross elements of earth, water, fire and air? If the first alternative is true, then the Vaiśeṣika's purpose is not served. He does not seek to prove the existence of an intelligent agent like us. Such an agent with finite intelligence and will is incapable of producing them, since he does not know the atoms which are the stuff of the elements. The second alternative also is not true. The inference cannot prove the existence of God who is capable of producing them, since the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum has not been established. The existence of an intelligent agent like that of a jar cited as an example is inferred on the strength of the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. Hence the existence of God cannot

\[\text{N}a\ vṛṣṭigraḥaṁahetor nirūpādhipravrtytasya bhūyodarśanasya pratirodhah. NK., p. 54.\]

\[\text{N}a\ tena nirūpādhipravrtytasya bhūyodarśanasya sāmartyam upahanyate. NK., p. 54.\]
be inferred from the gross elements of earth and the like being effects like a jar. Sridhara replies that if the genus of being preceded by an intelligent agent is inferred from a thing being an effect on the strength of the invariable concomitance between them, then the existence of an intelligent agent preceding the production of the gross elements of earth and the like capable of producing them can be validly inferred from their being effects, because a genus not particularized in an individual cannot be inferred.\textsuperscript{324} It may be urged that even the genus of being an intelligent agent is not proved by the inference. But this is wrong, because the invariable concomitance between a thing being an effect and its being preceded by the genus of an intelligent agent is not contradicted. If a thing being an effect pervaded by being preceded by the genus of an intelligent agent cannot prove the existence of the latter, then the existence of the genus of fire cannot be inferred from the existence of smoke, which is pervaded by the genus of fire. The existence of a particular fire cannot be inferred from the existence of a particular smoke, because the invariable concomitance between them cannot be established. Only the existence of the genus of fire can be inferred from the existence of a particular smoke, which is particularized in an individual fire. The genus of fire cannot exist apart from a particular fire.

It may be urged that vyāpti and pakṣadharmatā are the essential characteristics of inference. A genus (sāmānya) of the probandum is inferred on the strength of vyāpti. A particular instance of it in which the genus subsists is inferred on the strength of pakṣadharmatā. The existence of the genus of fire is inferred from a particular smoke on the strength of the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. The existence of a particular fire in a hill is inferred on the strength of the existence of a particular smoke in the hill, which is invariably related to fire. Otherwise pakṣadharmatā would have no use, and the inference would not give any new knowledge. The inference gives the new knowledge that a particular fire exists in the hill, which has never been perceived before. The uniform relation between the genus of smoke and the genus of fire is already known by vyāpti. If the mere

\textsuperscript{324} NK., p. 55.
existence of the genus of fire is inferred from a particular smoke in the hill, the inference does not yield any new knowledge. It simply apprehends what is already apprehended. It involves the fallacy of *petitio principii*. Śrīdhara replies that the same argument applies to the inference for the existence of God. The existence of a particular intelligent agent or God is inferred on the strength of the vyāpti or invariable concomitance between being effects and being produced by intelligent agents, and of pākṣadharmaṭā or being effects abiding in gross earth and the like. If the existence of a particular fire in the hill can be inferred from the existence of a smoke in it, then the existence of God, an intelligent agent who perceives the atoms or the material cause of gross earth and the like, can be inferred from their being of the nature of effects.

The atheist may urge that individuals exist in different times and places, but that God does not exist in particular places and at particular times, whose existence may be inferred from gross earth and the like being of the nature of effects. The existence of God endowed with a body is not to be inferred, since even if he has a body and the sense-organs he cannot perceive the supersensible atoms of earth, water, fire and air, which are the material cause of gross earth and the like through his sense-organs, and cannot therefore produce them out of the atoms. The existence of God devoid of a body also cannot be inferred from gross earth and the like being of the nature of effects, since all agents (kartā) perceive the material causes, desire, will, and energize their bodies to act upon the materials to produce effects. All effects are produced by intelligent agents endowed with bodies. If effects are supposed to be produced by agents devoid of bodies, then they may as well be supposed to be devoid of intelligence. If it be urged that an agent ignorant of the nature of the material cause of an effect can never produce it, because an effect is never perceived to be produced by such an agent, then it may as well be argued that an agent devoid of a body can never execute his will to produce an effect out of the materials which he perceives. Therefore the existence of an intelligent agent in general cannot be inferred from gross earth and the like being of the nature of effects, because that agent cannot be proved to be either endowed with a body or devoid of it, embodiedness or
embodiedness particularizing the agent. The existence of an entity in general without being particularized in an individual can never be inferred. The existence of a particular intelligent agent with a body or without it cannot be inferred from gross earth and the like being of the nature of effects. The inference of an intelligent agent devoid of a body from gross earth and the like being of the nature of effects is contradicted by the knowledge that apprehends the uniform relation between the probans and the probandum. Jars and the like are always perceived to be produced by intelligent agents endowed with bodies. So there is the invariable concomitance between being effects and being produced by intelligent agents endowed with bodies. This is the position of the atheist. Śrīdhara refutes the antitheistic objection. Does agency consist in being endowed with a body? Or does it consist in impelling the material cause to produce an effect for which it has the requisite capacity? It does not consist in being endowed with a body, because then even a person in sleep or an indifferent person devoid of any desire and volition to produce anything would be an agent, since he is endowed with a body. Therefore agency consists in impelling a collocation of material causes to produce an effect, the agent’s being endowed with a body or devoid of it being immaterial. An agent may be embodied or bodiless. In that case, even an agent devoid of a body can impel a material cause to produce an effect, even as an individual self can impel its body without the help of another intermediate body. The self may be said to impel its own body because it has acquired it through its own merits and demerits due to actions done in the previous birth. It is true. But the self cannot act upon itself. It impels its body directly without any instrument of action. If the self can act upon the body directly, then God can act upon the atoms directly. As the body is acted on by the volition of the self, so the atoms are acted upon by the volition of God. It may be argued that the self impels the body through desire and volition

\[\text{NK.}, \ p. \ 56.\]
\[\text{Karīryavah paridṛṣṭasāmarthyakārakaprayojakatvam. NK.}, \ p. \ 56.\]
\[\text{Taccādārīrasāpyā nirvahati yathā svaśarīpreranāyām ātmānañā. NK.}, \ p. \ 56.\]
\[\text{Śāfrānt preriyatayāsīti cet, īsvarāpyā preritaḥ paramāṇurasti. NK.}, \ p. \ 56.\]
are present, the self's action on the body is present, and when they are absent, it is absent. This argument is wrong. The self is a cause of its own desire and volition also. In producing them, it does not require a body. Just as the self does not require a body to produce desire and volition, so God does not require a body to produce motion in the atoms, and produce gross earth and the like out of them. Being an effect is always pervaded by being produced by an intelligent agent, because an intelligent agent is sometimes found to produce an action in insentient matter through mere desire and volition without depending on the action of a body. Hence the existence of God can be inferred from gross earth and the like being of the nature of effects. It may be argued that the self requires a body in producing desire and volition. Sridhara replies that it may require a body in producing them because they are its accidental qualities. But God's desire and volition are not his accidental qualities. They are his essential qualities. His knowledge, desire and volition are eternal. Colour of an eternal substance is eternal, and transient in a non-eternal substance. So God does not require a body in having a desire and will to create the world out of the atoms. The atheist may urge that the atoms are impelled by the individual souls to produce the world. But Sridhara replies that they cannot act without bodies, because their knowledge depends on the sense-organs which they acquire through their merits and demerits, and their bodies are not created before creation of the world. Further, their knowledge is limited. They cannot know the infinite number of atoms, and create the world out of them. The selves may be said to be endowed with natural consciousness which is capable of apprehending all objects without depending on the sense-organs. But this is not tenable. If they have natural consciousness capable of apprehending all objects, it cannot be obstructed so that it seems to apprehend objects which were never known before. Their natural consciousness may be said to be merged in the self (atman) and concealed by the veil of the body, so that it does not turn outward and apprehend all objects. But this is wrong. Their natural consciousness is all-

336 Anapeksitaśāravāpyāparṇasya icchāprayatnamātrasacīvasya eva ce taśeṣasye kadācid acetanavyāparṇaṁ prati sāmarthyadārṣaṇāt buddhimad- ayabhićāri tu kāryatvam itittvasiddhiḥ. NK., p. 36.
pervading, always related to objects, and eternal. Hence its power of apprehending objects never ceases, and it can never be concealed by the veil of the body. Their natural consciousness capable of apprehending all objects may be said to be concealed by the absence of mental modes produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their proper objects. Then, Śrīdhara argues, consciousness can apprehend objects through mental modes owing to the sense-object-intercourse, consciousness of objects is not due to mere proximity, and consciousness of the self is not natural and all-pervading. Though consciousness of the self is said to be all-pervading (vyāpaka), it does not apprehend all objects owing to the absence of the corresponding mental modes and the absence of the intercourse of the sense-organs with the proper objects. This is tantamount to the admission that the selves cannot apprehend external objects except through the sense-organs, or that their cognitions of objects are accidental and produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects. Hence the finite selves devoid of bodies and sense-organs have no knowledge of the atoms, and cannot guide them to produce gross earth and the like. Therefore the existence of God or a superhuman intelligent agent with natural knowledge of all objects, who perceives all atoms, acts upon them, and produces gross earth and the like out of them should be assumed, since unconscious atoms cannot act without being supervised by an intelligent agent. God is the creator, maintainer, and destroyer of the world. He is the support of the world.

The Vaiśeṣika gives another argument for the existence of God. He is the author of the Vedas. Their authority is due to their being the utterances of God. The validity of scriptural testimony is due to the authority of God, who is free from error, inadvertence, deficiency of the sense-organs, fraudulence and the like. He is eternal, omniscient and faultless. The Vedas are not impersonal (apauruṣeya) as the Mīmāṃsaka maintains, because they are sentences like those spoken by us. They are not spoken by human beings because they are not omniscient.

186 Tebhyaḥ paraḥ sarvārthadārśisahaujañānamayaḥ kartavyabhāvaḥ ko'pyadhīśhapita kalpanyaḥ cetanam adhiśhātapam antareṇcetananām pravṛttyabhāvat. NK., p. 57. Ibid., pp. 54-57. KV., pp. 91-104. Sakti, pp. 280-82; Setu, pp. 233-97; VV., pp. 298-300; KVB., pp. 114-29; MB., pp. 4-8; NL., pp. 20-23. KNR., pp. 39-42.
faultless and aware of the supersensible entities like dharma, adharma, heaven, hell and the like. The validity of knowledge is produced by efficiency (gupta) in its cause. The validity of testimony is produced by the right knowledge of its speaker about the objects spoken of. The validity of the Vedas is produced by the right knowledge of the supersensible entities in God who is their speaker. Their validity is not due to their eternity as the Mimamsaka maintains. They are utterances of an omniscient and truthful person or God, because they are accepted as valid by great saints. This is the view of Udayana, Sankara Misra, Jayanarayana and others.

God is the promulgator of the Moral Law (dharma). Whatever is enjoined by him is right. Whatever is prohibited by him is wrong. The command of God is the standard of right and wrong. The Divine Law is the moral standard. This argument may be regarded as the moral argument for the existence of God. His injunctions and prohibitions are known from the Vedas, which are his utterances revealed to the sages.

36. The Nature of God.

The cosmological argument proves the existence of one God. If there are many gods, they are not omniscient like us, and so incapable of producing the world out of the atoms of which they are ignorant. If they are omniscient, one of them is competent to produce the world and the others become useless. If they are equal to one another, or if some are superior while others are subordinate, they would have no unity of purpose, and sometimes there would be no effect owing to the conflict of their wills. If they have the same purpose, one of them would be the sovereign Lord and the others would not be Lords, as there is the President of a council of advisers to administer a monastery. Hence the one sovereign Lord is God and others are not Lords. God is one.

He is omniscient. He knows all things with their distinctive characters. He is devoid of false knowledge which is due to non-apprehension of distinctive characters. False knowledge springs from attachment and aversion. They produce voluntary actions which are righteous or unrighteous. Righte-
ous actions produce merits. Unrighteous actions produce demerits. Merits are the predisposing causes of pleasure. Demerits are the predisposing causes of pain. God is devoid of attachment and aversion, volitions and actions actuated by them, merits and demerits, pleasure and pain. His knowledge is perceptual but not due to the sense-object-intercourse. He is devoid of impressions (sanskāra) and recollection. He has knowledge, desire, volition, number, magnitude, conjunction and disjunction. He has these eight qualities. This is the view of some Vaiśeṣikas. Others deny desire and volition to God. They maintain that his knowledge itself is the unobstructed power of action, and that his action is not preceded by desire and volition. He is devoid of afflictions (kleśa), or attachment, aversion, egoism and ignorance, which are the causes of bondage. He is neither bound nor liberated. He is not liberated, because liberation is freedom from bondage. He is eternally liberated. Śridhara conceives God as a particular self untouched by afflictions, merits and demerits, maturation of karma, and potencies of actions like Patañjali. Jayanārāyaṇa ascribes knowledge, desire and volition to God, which are eternal and relate to all objects. He is omniscient and omnipotent. His desire is one but becomes manifold owing to limiting conditions. His desire to create, desire to destroy and the like are due to upādhi. His will to create is subject to the Law of Karma. There is scanty material about the nature of God in the Vaiśeṣika literature. The Vaiśeṣika is more a philosophy of nature than that of the self and God, though its avowed aim is the liberation of the soul through the knowledge of the categories.

V

Ethics.

37. Moral and Non-moral Actions.

Actions are of two kinds, non-voluntary and voluntary. Non-voluntary actions are vital actions. They are due to an

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343 Kleśakarmāvipākāśayair aparāṁśaṭaḥ puruṣaṇiṣeyaṁ śevarah. NK., p. 58. VS., i. 34. NK., pp. 57-58.
344 Sāstrārthasaṅgrahā, Bombay, 1913, p. 368.
345 KV., p. 91.
effort of the soul, which prompts inhalation and exhalation during sleep and direction of manas to come into contact with the sense-organs in the waking state. Life is a particular conjunction of the self with manas due to merits and demerits. Voluntary actions are prompted by desire (icchā) or aversion (dveṣa). They are due to a conjunction of the self with manas and desire and aversion. They are consciously adapted to the attainment of a good (hitapraśpti) or the rejection of an evil (ahitaparighara). They aim at the attainment of pleasant objects or the avoidance of painful objects. The non-voluntary vital acts are unconsciously adjusted to organic ends.\textsuperscript{346}

Desire is of two kinds, viz., desire for an end (phala) and desire for a means (upāya). The end is pleasure and negation of pain. The knowledge of the end is the cause of desire for it. The knowledge of the means for the attainment of the end is the cause of desire for it. A positive action (pravṛtti) is produced by desire. A negative action (nivṛtti) is produced by aversion. The knowledge of the material, the knowledge that the action can be done by the will, and the knowledge of the desired end are the causes of a voluntary action prompted by desire. The absence of the knowledge of the means of an undesirable end also is its cause. Some regard the knowledge of what is not the means of an undesirable end as its cause. There is no desire to cross the ocean or wander aimlessly. Nor is there any desire to eat rice mixed with honey and poison. The knowledge of pain is the cause of aversion to it. The knowledge of the means of pain is the cause of aversion to it. There is no aversion to cooking though it involves pain, because it ultimately leads to pleasure.\textsuperscript{347}

The vital actions are non-moral. The random actions like the spontaneous movements of hands and legs of infants are non-moral. They do not produce merits or demerits. Actions done under coercion are devoid of moral quality. Voluntary actions produce merits and demerits. They have the moral quality of rightness and wrongness. They are prompted by delusion (moha), desire (icchā) and aversion (dveṣa). Voluntary actions prompted by attachment and desire, which are prescribed

\textsuperscript{346} \textit{Pībh., NK., 263; VSU., v. 1: 13; v. 2. 16.}

\textsuperscript{347} \textit{Sāstrārthasamgraha, p. 378.}
by the Vedas, produce merits. Those which are prohibited by them and prompted by aversion, produce demerits. Attachment, aversion and delusion are the causes of saṃsāra.\footnote{VSU., v. I. 11, 12; vi. 2. 14; VSV., vi. 2. 10.}


The end (prayaṇa) is what induces the self to act. The attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the natural ends of voluntary actions. Wealth (artha), happiness (kāma), virtue (dharma), and liberation (mokṣa) are the four moral ends. Kaṇḍa says: "Dharma is what accomplishes happiness (abhyudaya) and liberation (niḥśreyasa)."\footnote{Vato'bhyyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhib sa dharmah. VS., i. I. 2.} Abhyudaya is interpreted as happiness (sukha), heaven (svarga), true knowledge of reality (tattvajñāna), and welfare (maṅgala). It should be taken in the sense of worldly happiness and happiness in heaven. Kaṇḍa regards happiness as the end of positive actions (pravṛtti), and liberation as the end of negative actions (nivṛtti). The gratification of desires regulated by reason in conformity with the divine commandments is the end of pravṛtti. The extinction of desires, merits and demerits, and the absolute negation of pain are the ends of nivṛtti. Both ought to be pursued by every person for a harmonious and perfect life. Liberation is attained when merits due to the performance of duties are destroyed. Only true knowledge of reality (tattvajñāna) can lead to release. But it is aided by the purity of mind brought about by the performance of duties. Spiritual insight is the direct cause of liberation.\footnote{VSU., i. I. 2-4; vi. 2. 14; VSV., VSB., i. I. 2.}

Delusion (moha) is false knowledge. It is the cause of attachment (rāga) and aversion (dveṣa). They are the causes of bondage. A person who regards external and internal objects as the means of happiness, is ignorant. His mind is tainted with desire for enjoyment, attached to the objects of sentient pleasures, which are really painful in their intrinsic nature, but appear to be pleasant. He entertains intense desire for rebirth for greater enjoyment, and is entangled in bondage. Rebirth in higher and lower species is due to degrees of merits and demerits.\footnote{Pbh., pp. 280-81; NK., p. 281.}
Dharma and true knowledge of reality lead to the highest good. Worldly pleasures should be renounced. All external and internal objects are, in their ultimate nature, painful. A person who perceives the faults of the objects of enjoyment, destroys all attachment for them, gives up all desires, volitions and actions for enjoyment, performs duties prescribed by the Vedas and the Smṛtis without desire for their fruits, increases dharma due to abstention from sentient pleasures (nivṛtti), and practises and matures the knowledge of the self, attains mokṣa on destruction of his body and non-production of any other body. But dharma alone does not lead to mokṣa. It should be favoured by impulsion (codanā) or a particular volition of God. He produces inclination in a person to perform prescribed duties. Dharma and the knowledge of the self favoured by impulsion of God lead to liberation.\textsuperscript{328} This is Śrīdhara’s view.

Mokṣa is absolute negation of pain. It is prior negation of pain, which ends in complete destruction of all specific qualities of the self, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, merit and demerit. When they are destroyed, there is no destruction of the self, which is eternal. It exists in its essential nature.\textsuperscript{328}

What is the essence of the self? The Advaita Vedānta regards bliss as its essence. Śrīdhara asks whether bliss is experienced or not experienced in release. If it is not experienced, it is as good as non-existent, since it is incapable of being experienced. It cannot be experienced, since the body and the sense-organs, which produce pleasure, are destroyed in release. The manas in conjunction with the self cannot produce it, because it is not aided by merits and demerits, which are destroyed in release. It can function as an organ of experience, when it is aided by merits and demerits. A special merit born of yoga also cannot incline the self to use it as its organ, because it is transient and destroyed with other merits in release. So the manas in conjunction with the self cannot produce the experience of bliss in release. The self may be said to have natural consciousness (svābhāvikā citi). When it is drawn out by the external sense-organs, it turns to external objects, and

\textsuperscript{328} NK., pp. 7-8.  
\textsuperscript{328} VSU., i. 1. 4. Atmanal śvarūpaṇaṇaśthānam. NK., p. 6. Ibid., p. 286.
apprehends them. But when they cease to function, it is turned inward and merged in the blissful nature of the self. But Śridhara urges that it is real, if it apprehends an object, and that it is unreal, if it does not. If it does not apprehend an object, it is as good as non-existent. It is better to assume the self to be unconscious. Again, Śridhara asks whether the bliss of pure consciousness is natural or adventitious. It is not adventitious, since it has no cause, the body and the sense-organs being destroyed in release. It is not natural, because in that case it would be experienced even in the state of bondage. The natural blissful nature of the self is said to be veiled by avidyā. But the self is by nature blissful, and its bliss is eternal. Hence it can never be divested of its essence. The pleasures, that are experienced in the state of bondage, arise from knowledge due to the intercourse of objects with the sense-organs. Hence the self has no eternal bliss. It is not experienced because it is non-existent. Mokṣa is the existence of the self in its natural condition indicated by the destruction of all its specific qualities.\(^{354}\)

Ekadaṇḍi Vedāntists hold that mokṣa is destruction of avidyā. The existence of the self in its essential nature on destruction of avidyā is mokṣa. The self is essentially knowledge and bliss. So mokṣa is the knowledge and bliss of the self. But, Śridhara urges, there is no proof for knowledge and bliss being the essence of the self. The text ‘Brahman is eternal knowledge and bliss’ means that the self possesses knowledge and pleasure. There is no such experience as ‘I am knowledge’ or ‘I am pleasure’. Our knowledge and pleasure are transient. If the self is eternal knowledge and bliss, there is no distinction between a bound soul and a liberated soul. Further, annulment of avidyā cannot be the highest good, since it is different from the negation of pain. There is no proof for the existence of a beginningless positive entity called avidyā. Further, Brahman is eternal, and cannot, therefore, be accomplished (asādhyā). Direct intuition of Brahman or identification with Brahman also is unattainable. Eternal bliss, the essence of Brahman, also is unrealizable. So voluntary actions cannot be directed to the achievement of these ends.

Tridandi Vedantists maintain that moksa is the merging of the individual soul in the supreme soul. If merging is identification with the supreme soul, then it is not possible. The individual soul and the supreme soul differ from each other. They are eternal. The jiva can never be identical with the paramatman. If the merging (laya) means destruction of the subtle body (lingasatira), then it means destruction of the organs of pain. The subtle body, which is the limiting adjunct of the jiva, is composed of the five vital forces, the five cognitive organs, the five motor organs, manas, buddhi, and the five unquintupled subtle elements. It is the fine vehicle of experience. Hence the destruction of the subtle body means the destruction of the apparatus for the experience of pain. Saunkara Mishra and Jyanarayana thus refute the Ekadandi and Tridandi Vedantists' views of moksa. It is neither the annulment of avidva nor the merging of the individual self in the supreme self. It is absolute negation of pain.

The Bhatya Mimamsakas maintain that moksa is the experience of eternal happiness (nityasukhasatkara). The eternal happiness of the self is mentioned in the Upanisads. It is not experienced by the individual self in the state of bondage, because it is not manifest at the time. It becomes manifest and is experienced after the self is intuited. It is not experienced before the intuition of it. Saunkara Mishra contends that there is no proof for the existence of eternal happiness. If it exists, it must be eternally manifested and experienced by the self. So the distinction between a bound soul and a released soul vanishes. If the manifestation of eternal happiness be said to be produced by the intuition of the self, it can also be destroyed and bring about recurrence of bondage, for whatever is produced is liable to destruction. So moksa is not manifestation of eternal happiness. Padmanabha also refutes the Bhatya Mimamsaka doctrine of moksa. Moksa is said to be nityasukhabhivyakti. It may mean either eternal manifestation of happiness or manifestation of eternal happiness. If moksa is eternal manifestation of happiness, then there is no distinction between a bound soul and a released soul, since eternal manifestation is endless. If moksa is manifestation of eternal happi-

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\[\text{\textsuperscript{88} VSU, VSV, I, 1, 4. Setu, pp. 23, 25. TCIA, p. 182.} \]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{89} VSU, I, 1, 4.} \]
ness, then the first manifestation of it is either endless or destroyed. The first manifestation of eternal happiness is produced by the body. It is a positive entity which is an effect. So it cannot be endless. There is no evidence for a positive effect being endless. If the first manifestation produced by the body is destroyed, then the released soul's experience of eternal happiness also would be destroyed because it is produced by the body, and it would again be entangled in bondage. If a series of cognitions of the manifestation of eternal happiness of the released soul be admitted without being produced by the body, then happiness of heaven may be produced without the performance of the Vedic sacrifices, which involves great hardships and entails expenses of great wealth. So the Mīmāṁsaka emphasis on the performance of the Vedic sacrifices becomes meaningless. So mokṣa cannot be the experience of eternal happiness.

The Prābākara Mīmāṁsakas maintain that mokṣa is the prior negation of pain (duḥkha-prāgabhāva), which is not synchronous with the impression of false knowledge in the same self. Padmanābha refutes this doctrine. Prior negation is destroyed. So a released soul would be liable to bondage. If prior negation be said to be endless, it ceases to be prior negation. What happens when a person atones for his sins? Atonement destroys sins for some time, preserves prior negation of pain, and fulfills its function. Prior negation of pain produces pain again when another sin is committed. Prior negation of pain produces a sin similar to one destroyed by atonement. Or it produces a sin dissimilar to it. There is variety in prior negation. Different kinds of sins produce different kinds of pain. Hence mokṣa cannot be the prior negation of pain which is not coexistent with the impression of false knowledge in the same self.

The Cārvākas regard happiness and wealth as the ends of life, and deny the reality of release. Padmanābha refutes this doctrine. The reality of mokṣa is proved by inference and other means of knowledge. The Cārvākas identify the self with the body. So there is mokṣa when the body continues to exist. When the body perishes, there can be no mokṣa, because there is no self different from the body. If there is mokṣa after death, the self must be admitted to be different from the body.
The Buddhist realists, the Vaibhâvikas, hold that mokṣa is a series of cognitions devoid of afflictions. Padmanâbha refutes this doctrine. He contends that the afflictions of delusion, attachment and aversion do not exist in embodied release, which should consequently be identified with final release (parama mukti). Further, cognitions cannot be the end of life, since they are not the negation of pain.447 Saṅkara Miśra urges that there is no proof for the continuance of a series of cognitions. It depends upon the body and the sense-organs. So their continuance is necessary for mokṣa. The embodied life is bondage. So it cannot coexist with mokṣa. The extinction of pain and other afflictions (nirupapalavatva) is mokṣa. But a series of cognitions untainted by afflictions is not release.458

The Buddhist idealists, the Yogâcâras, regard mokṣa as emergence of untainted cognition consequent on destruction of the self, which is a series of cognitions.459 The criticisms of the Vaibhâsika doctrine apply to this doctrine also. Mokṣa is the absence of the impurities of delusion, attachment and aversion. But cognition which is not absence of pain cannot be the supreme end of life, though it is untainted by afflictions. Padmanâbha ascribes Patañjali’s doctrine of mokṣa to the Yogâcâras. Mokṣa is the complete suppression of mental functions,—cognitions, emotions and volitions. Cognitions are not sufferings. So destruction of cognitions is not the end of life.

The Buddhist realists, the Sautrântikas, regard mokṣa as a series of cognitions devoid of objects. But there is no evidence for the existence of cognitions, which do not apprehend objects. Cognitions always apprehend objects. Hence the Sautrântika doctrine is not tenable.

The Buddhist nihilists, the Mâdhyamikas, regard mokṣa as the extinction of the self (âtmanâhâni). If the self is transitory by nature, it will cease to exist of itself. There is no need of any effort to destroy it. If, on the contrary, it is eternal, it can never be destroyed. If extinction of the self is mokṣa, there is no released soul. If there is no released soul, we cannot speak of release. So mokṣa cannot be the extinction of the soul.

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448 VSI., i. 1. 1.
449 Dharminirvâtan nirmalajñânamayo mahodayaḥ. SDS., Ch. II.
The Digambara Jainas regard mokṣa as the destruction of the veil of the body (sarirāvaraṇapoccheda). The body is not a chief obstacle to mokṣa. Hence the destruction of it is not the end of life.\textsuperscript{369}

The Vaiśeṣika regards mokṣa as absolute negation of pain, or prior negation of pain, which ends in complete destruction of all specific qualities of the soul, or existence of the soul in its natural condition devoid of empirical contents. The destruction of merits and demerits is the indispensable prerequisite of mokṣa.

39. \textit{Duties and the Means of Liberation.}

Duties are the acts enjoined by the Vedas and the Śruti. They are common and specific. The common duties ought to be performed by persons of all castes. The specific duties are different for the different castes and for the different stages of life. The common duties are faith in virtue, non-injury, benevolence to all creatures, truthfulness, non-stealing, celibacy, purity of mind, conquest of anger, bath, use of purifying articles, devotion to a deity, fasting, and non-neglect of duties.\textsuperscript{381} Faith in dharma is the favourable inclination of the mind towards it. Non-injury is harmlessness to all creatures in thought, word and deed. Benevolence is doing good to all creatures. Non-stealing is abstention from misappropriating others' wealth and absence of covetousness. Celibacy is abstention from sex-gratification and indulgence in the thought of sexual pleasures. Purity of mind is purity of intention. All duties should be done without any selfish intention. Conquest of anger is control of anger, absence of the thought of anger, and absence of anger. Fasting is abstention from taking food on particular occasions e.g., on the eleventh day of the moon. Daily obligatory duties (nitya karma) and occasional duties (naimittika karma) must be performed. The performance of sacrifices, the study of the scriptures, and the practice of charity are the common duties of the Brāhmaṇas, the Kṣatriyas and the Vaiśyas. The specific duties of the Brāhmaṇas, the Kṣatriyas, the Vaiśyas, and the Śūdras are those mentioned in the \textit{Manuṣaṇhitā}, the \textit{Mahābhārata} and the \textit{Bhagavad Gītā}. There are different

\textsuperscript{369} Setu, p. 28; KVB, p. 14. \textsuperscript{381} PBh, p. 272.
specific duties for the different stages of life. The students should wait on the preceptors, make offerings to the sacrificial fires, beg for livelihood, eschew articles of luxury, and study the scriptures. The householders should marry and earn their livelihood by honest means. They should offer food to creatures (bhūtayajñā), entertain guests (manuṣyayajñā), make offerings to sacrificial fire (devayajñā), make oblations to the forbears (pitryajñā), study the Vedas (devayajñā), and procreate children for spiritual benefit. The recluses should retire to forests with or without wives, make offerings to the sacrificial fire, entertain guests, study the scriptures, and earnestly seek the truth. The ascetics, full of faith, should give up all duties for the fulfilment of desires (kāmya karma), cultivate good-will and love for all creatures, practise yamas and niyamas, acquire true knowledge of the categories, and practise concentration of mind and trance leading to the intuition of the self. Non-injury, non-stealing, truthfulness, sex-restraint, and non-acceptance of unnecessary gifts are the restraints (yama). Cleanliness, contentment, penance, the study of the scriptures, and devotion to God are the observances (niyama). The duties should be performed with purity of intention; they should not be performed with the selfish motives of profit, propitiation of a deity and the like.\[32\] The distinterested performance of duties with purity of mind in disregard of visible results produces merit.

Desire, attachment, neglect of duties, absence of faith, pride, conceit, envy and the like are the impurities of mind. They produce demerit. Faith, contentment, determination to perform the enjoined duties, and ascertainment of duties are the purities of mind (anupadhā). They produce merit. Purity of conduct without self-restraint (yama) is not conducive to welfare (abhyudaya). It is conducive to vice. Pure conduct with self-restraint is favourable to virtue. Self-restraint without purity of conduct also is not conducive to welfare. Both purity of mind and purity of overt behaviour are necessary for acquisition of merit.\[33\] Purity of mind is emphasized for moral life. Merit and demerit cause rebirth in a higher or lower plane of existence. They are the causes of bondage or cycle of birth and death. Birth is conjunction of the soul with a body. Death is

\[32\] PBh., pp. 272-73; NK., pp. 275-76, 277-78; VS., VSU., vi. 2, 2-9.

\[33\] VS., VSU., VSY., vi. 2, 4, 8, 9.
its disjunction from a body. Merit and demerit are destroyed by the intuition of the self and God, which is acquired by listening to the scriptures (sravana), reflection (manana), the practice of yoga, repeated meditation (nidadhyasana) with sense-control and control of mind. Liberation is due to true insight into reality (tattvajñana). It is absolute negation of pain or the existence of the self in its natural condition devoid of all empirical contents. It is not identity of the self with God. It is similarity in nature (sāmya) with him. The distinction between them is eternal and irresolvable. The self does not lose its integrity in the state of release.

Srīdhara maintains that knowledge of reality (jñāna) and the performance of duties (karma) both are necessary for mokṣa. Liberation is not due to knowledge alone, but to the combination of knowledge with duties (jñānakarmasamuccaya). The prudential duties (kāmya karma) should be discarded. But the compulsory daily (nitya) and occasional (naimittika) duties must be performed. Their non-performance produces sins of omission. The performance of them purifies the mind. Knowledge determines the nature of the self (ātman). Repeated practice of knowledge and obligatory duties leads to release. Udayana also maintains that the performance of obligatory duties and knowledge of the self are the prerequisites of release. But he does not regard them as co-ordinate or equal in importance, and consequently does not speak of the combination of knowledge and works (jñānakarmasamuccaya) as the means of release. The works are auxiliary to knowledge. They bring about purity of mind (sattvaśuddhi) which is necessary for true insight (jñāna) into the nature of the self. Hence the knowledge of the reality itself is the direct means of release. The performance of obligatory (nitya karma) and occasional duties (naimittika karma) without any egoistic desire for fruits purifies the mind and eliminates demerits. The elimination of demerits leads to right knowledge of reality (tattvajñana). It destroys false knowledge. Then the soul is released. The right knowledge of reality is the immediate antecedent of release. Nīkāma karma is its

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344 VS., VSU., vi. 2. 15, 16.
345 IIK., pp. 178-81; VSU., vi. 2. 18; VSV., ill. 2. 21.
346 NK., pp. 283-86. Muktibh jñānakarmasamuccayāt; Ibid., p. 283.
antecedent by mediation. True knowledge of reality destroys false knowledge by means of adřśṭa.

VI

Critical Estimate of the Vaisheshika Philosophy.

The Vaishēṣika recognizes seven categories: substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherence, and negation. But Śridhara admits that substance is the fundamental category. Quality and action cannot exist apart from a substance. But it can exist apart from them. It can exist without a movement, and is devoid of qualities in the first moment of its production. Quality and action are aspects of a substance, which are not co-ordinate with it. Inherence is an inseparable relation (ayutasiddhi) between a substance and an attribute or an action, a whole and a part, and a community and an individual. But it is not an inseparable relation, since only one term of the relation cannot exist apart from the other. Quality and action cannot exist apart from a substance, which can exist apart from them. A whole cannot exist without its parts. But when the whole is destroyed, its constituent atoms continue to exist. An individual cannot exist without its proper community, but a community exists before individuals are born and after they are destroyed. So inherence is not an inseparable relation either in space, or in time. If it is inseparable relation in nature, it does not differ from identity (tādātmya). Let us take inherence as R, substance as S, and quality as Q. If S requires R to be related to Q, then R, as an independent category, requires another R¹ to be related to S, and another R² to be related to Q, and so on to infinity. The infinite regress can be avoided, if inherence is regarded as essential identity.***

The Vaishēṣika recognizes the reality of community as the ontological basis of assimilation of individuals, and regards it as perceptible through the sense-organs and manas. It regards individuals as real and distinct from one another, since they are facts of experience. It does not deny universals like the Buddhists. Nor does it deny the individuals and differences like the Advaita Vedānta. It admits the reality of particularity

(viśeṣa) as the distinctive feature of eternal substances. But particularities are not perceptible to us. They are inferable to us, though they are perceptible to the Yogins. The Vaiśeṣika analyses matter into atoms, which exist in time and space without any necessary relation to one another. It regards external objects as real, stable, and directly perceptible. Its outlook is empirical, scientific, realistic and pluralistic.

The Vaiśeṣika advocates the popular dualism of matter and souls which are irreducible to each other. Souls are not functions of matter, and matter is irresolvable into subjective ideas. The souls are unconscious in themselves, and remain in their natural condition devoid of their special qualities in the state of liberation. They acquire consciousness in conjunction with the body and manas in their embodied condition. This conception of the soul as an essentially unconscious substance is philosophically unsound. But dualism of matter and soul is more rational than materialism and subjective idealism. The Vaiśeṣika concept of viśeṣa of each soul as its distinctive feature adumbrates the modern problem of the principle of individuation. The pluralism of individual souls irresolvable into one another and God or the supreme Soul is more sound than their pantheistic absorption in one God.

The earlier Vaiśeṣika is atheistic. It makes the unseen agencies (adṛśa) in the souls create motion in the atoms and combine them with one another into gross objects for their enjoyments and sufferings. But the unseen agencies, being unconscious, cannot combine them with one another and adjust them to the experiences of the individual souls. They cannot guide the world-process and account for creation and dissolution and variety of the world.

The later Vaiśeṣika becomes theistic, and introduces the deistic concept of God to account for creation and dissolution. God does not create atoms, ether, time and space. They are co-eternal with him. God creates motion in them and combines them into dyads, triads and gross objects for the enjoyments and sufferings of individual souls in accordance with their merits and demerits. This concept of God as Deus ex machina mechanically and externally relating the realm of nature with the realm of spirits, which are in themselves irreconcilable, is an arbitrary makeshift.
The Vaiśeṣika is avowedly pluralistic, and admits the reality of external relations only among reals. The world is a conglomeration of finite things externally related to one another. It is related to the finite souls through the Law of Karma as an external agency. The world, finite souls and God are related to one another externally. There is no integral relation among them. The later Vaiśeṣika, like Locke, the empiricist, admits the reality of God, individual souls and the world without any necessary relation to one another.

The Vaiśeṣika recognition of negation (abhāva) and its different kinds marks an advance in speculation. The problem of negation is a problem of modern Logic. Negation is not mere affirmation, though it implies it. Not-A is different from A, and its locus. It is different from not-B. A is different from B. There is negation of A in B, and negation of B in A. A and B are not identical with each other. Production and destruction are real. Production implies prior negation. Destruction implies posterior negation. Things have specific natures. There is absolute negation of tangibility in sound. These notions of negation are consistent with the logical realism and pluralism of the Vaiśeṣika.

But the Vaiśeṣika refuses to interrelate the reals, atoms, ether, time, space, souls and God to one another, and attempt a more rational and consistent world-view. Plurality can be reconciled with unity in a rational manner. The Vaiśeṣika theistic pluralism is not a satisfactory philosophical position. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and other Vedāntists mercilessly criticized the Vaiśeṣika atomism and pluralism.
CHAPTER VIII

The Nyāya Philosophy.

Gotama, Gautama or Aksapāda was the founder of the Nyāya philosophy, Mādhavācārya designates it as the Aksapāda system in his Saṭdarśanasamgraha. Vātsyāyana calls it the science of reasoning (nyāyavidyā, nyāyaśāstra) or the science of critical reasoning in harmony with perception and scriptural testimony (ānvīkṣikī). Jayanta Bhaṭṭa interprets ānvīkṣikī as the science of reasoning (nyāyavidyā). The Nyāya is the science of demonstration (pramāṇamimāṃsā) or the science of inference (tarkaśāstra). Jayanta interprets tarka and mimāṃsā as inference. The Nyāya is primarily concerned with epistemology and logic, and secondarily with ontology, psychology, ethics and theology. It deals with the sources of knowledge, viz., perception, inference, comparison and testimony, and conditions of their validity, and the nature of the world, souls and God.

Gautama (200 B.C.) was the author of the Nyāya-sūtra. Its present reедакtion mentions and criticizes the Mādhyamika doctrine of Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda of Laṅkāvalārasūtra. It is not earlier than 200 A.D. or 300 A.D. Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika school of Śūnyavāda, flourished in 200 A.D. The original Laṅkāvalārasūtra is assigned to 300 A.D. S.C. Vidyabhusan assigns the original Nyāyasūtra to 550 B.C. Kauṭilya (300 B.C.) mentions Ānvīkṣikī and includes Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata in it in Arthaśāstra. Probably ‘Yoga’ here means the Nyāya. Ānvīkṣikī is described as the lamp of all branches of learning. It is mentioned in the Rāmāyaṇa, the Mahābhārata and the Manusāṁhitā. The Mahābhārata refers to the Nyāya, Tarkaśāstra, and the five-membered inference. The Manusāṁhitā mentions Hetuśāstra. So the original Nyāyasūtra was not later than 200 B.C. Some scholars think that it dealt with sixteen topics of the first chapter only, and that the other

1 NBh., i. 1. 1; NM., pp. 4, 588.
2 RA., AK., Ch. 100, 39; MBh., SP., Ch. 288, 64; Ch. 10, 81; Ch. 318, 27, 28, 34, 47; Ch. 180, 47; Ch. 210, 22; Anuśasanaparva, Ch. 37, 12; Saṅhāparva, Ch. 8, 5; MS., Ch. i. 11; Ch. vii. 43.
chapters were added by different authors in different ages. Some regard Vātsyāyana (400 A.D.) as the author of the fifth chapter. He was earlier than Vasubandhu (450 A.D.) and Diṇnāga (500 A.D.), whose views he did not criticize in his Nyāyabhāṣya on the Nyāyasūtra. He closely followed Gautama in interpreting his aphorisms. Uddyotakara (600 A.D.) wrote Nyāyavārtika on Nyāyabhāṣya, deviated from Vātsyāyana sometimes and interpreted some aphorisms independently, and criticized Diṇnāga's views. Trilocana (800 A.D.) was the teacher of Vācaspati Miśra, whose works are not traceable. Vācaspati (1000 A.D.) wrote an illuminating commentary named Nyāyavārtikatātparyājīkā on Nyāyavārtika, in which he attacked Dharmakīrti (700 A.D.), who criticized Uddyotakara. He wrote Nyāyasucinibandha (976 A.D.), Sāmakhyatattvakaumudī, Bhāmati, Nyāyakanikā and Tatttvavaisāradī, and was considered to be an adept in all systems (sarvatantransatsattra). Udayana (1050 A.D.) wrote Nyāyavārtikatātparyapariśuddhi, a learned commentary on Nyāyavārtikatātparyājīkā, Nyāyapariśīṣṭa, Prabodhasiddhi or Bodhasiddhi, an independent commentary on the fifth chapter of the Nyāyasūtra, Ātmatattvaviveka, Nyāyakusumānjali, Kītāpavali and Lakṣapāvali (906 Saka, 984 A.D.). The first deals with all problems of the Nyāya; the second, with futile refutations (jāti) and grounds of defeat (nigraha sthāna); the third, with proofs for the existence of the self; the fourth, with those of God. The fifth and the sixth are works on the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (1000 A.D.) refers to Vācaspati and quotes from his Nyāyavārtikatātparyājīkā in his illuminating running commentary on the Nyāyasūtra named Nyāyamañjarī, which is a work of great authority for its exhaustive treatment of the Nyāya logic and ontology and incisive criticism of the rival schools. His Nyāyakalikā is a manual of the old Nyāya system. Varadarāja (1150 A.D.) wrote Tārkikarakaṭa, a manual of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, in which he elaborated the views of Udayana in dealing with the sixteen topics of Gautama. Bhāsarvajña (900 A.D.), the author of Nyāyasūra, was influenced by the Buddhist and Jaina logicians. He included comparison in testimony. Nyāyatātparyadīpikā of Jayasimhasūri (1400 A.D.) and Padārthapadapāṇicīkā of Vāsudevasūri are two important commentaries on it.

Gaṅgeśa (1200 A.D.) was the founder of the modern Nyāya
school known as Navya Nyāya. His Tattvacintāmaṇi is the classical work, which deals with perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Vardhamāna (1250 A.D.), son of Gaṅgeśa, wrote several commentaries, Nyāyakusumānjaliāprakāśa on Nyāyakusumānjali, and Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa on Nyāyavārti-katatparyapaśuriśuddhi. Rucidatta Miśra (1300 A.D.) wrote Prakāśa on Tattvacintāmaṇi and Makaranda on Nyāyakusumānjaliāprakāśa. Haridāsa Bhaṭṭācārya (1500 A.D.) wrote a short commentary on Nyāyakusumānjali. Jayadeva Miśra (1300 A.D.) wrote Aloka; Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīṣa (1600 A.D.), Rahasya; and Raghunātha Siromaṇi (1600 A.D.), Didhiti, on Tattvacintāmaṇi. Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra (1700 A.D.) wrote Jagadīśi; and Gadādharā (1700 A.D.), Vivṛti, on Didhiti.

The Syncretic writers combined the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems into one, recognized perception, inference, comparison and testimony as pramāṇas, like the former, and accepted the seven categories of the latter. Varadarāja’s Tarkikarakaśa, Keśavamīśra’s (1300 A.D.) Tarkabhāṣa, Annambhaṭṭa’s (1700 A.D.) Tarkasaṅgraha and Viśvanātha’s (1700 A.D.) Bhāṣāpariccheda and Siddāntamuktāvalī are important works of the Syncretist school.

The Nyāya deals with sixteen topics: (1) The instruments of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) are perception, inference, comparison and testimony. (2) The objects of valid knowledge (prameya) are self, body, sense-organs, objects, knowledge, manas, voluntary actions, faults, transmigration, fruits of actions, pain and liberation. Self comprises God and finite souls. Objects are the physical elements and their sensible qualities. (3) Doubt (sahsāya) is indefinite knowledge of an object as either one or the other, in which the mind oscillates between two alternatives. (4) Motive (prayojana) is the end of voluntary actions, which is the attainment of good or the rejection of evil. (5) An example (dṛṣṭānta) is an instance in which a probans is found to be accompanied by a probandum, and which is admitted to be valid by a disputant and an opponent. (6) A tenet (siddhānta) is proved by pramāṇas and accepted as true. (7) The members (avayava) of a demonstrative inference are proposition, reason, exemplification, application, and conclusion. (8) Hypothetical reasoning (tarka) favours one of the two alternative hypotheses.
by showing the absurd consequences of the other. (9) Ascertainment (nirṇaya) of the real character of an object is due to the consideration of a disputant’s argument for a thesis and an opponent’s counter argument for an antithesis. (10) Discussion (vāda) is a logical debate between a disputant and an opponent with the help of five-membered inferences for the ascertainment of truth without a desire for victory. (11) Wrangle (jalpa) is a debate actuated by a desire for victory, in which sophistical arguments are employed to vanquish an opponent. (12) Cavil (vitaṇḍā) is a wrangle in which a person merely refutes a disputant’s thesis but does not establish his antithesis. (13) Faulty reasons (hetvābhāṣa) are non-reasons which appear to be valid reasons and correspond to fallacies of the middle term in western logic. (14) Quibble (chala) is refutation of an argument by taking a word in a sense different from what is intended by the speaker. (15) Futility (jāti) is sophistical refutation of an argument on the ground of mere similarity or dissimilarity of the subject with an example. (16) Ground of defeat (nigrāhasthāna) is sophistical refutation due to non-comprehension or miscomprehension of the real character of an object. Reasoning in harmony with perception and Vedic testimony yields the knowledge of reality which leads to liberation. It should be stated in the form of five members, employ valid reasons, and avoid faulty reasons. Hypothetical reasoning is subordinate to it and conducive to the ascertainment of truth. Ascertainment is preceded by doubt, hypothetical reasoning, logical inference, and discussion. Wrangle and cavil are the means of protecting the knowledge of reality from attacks. Quibble, futility and ground of defeat are the means of sophistical refutation of an opponent’s antithesis, which should be avoided in establishing one’s thesis. Liberation is the highest end.¹

The methodology of the Nyāya consists of enunciation (uddeśa), definition (lakṣaṇa) and examination (parikṣā). A subject is first enunciated, then defined, and finally examined by valid reasoning. Enunciation is the statement of a subject in a general way. It comprises division (vibhāga) which is the enumeration of its different kinds. A subject in general is stated first, and then its subdivisions are stated. A definition expli-

¹ NS., i. 1. 1-3, 9, 13-15, 17-26, 32, 36, 40-45, 51, 59, 60; NBh., i. 1. 1; NM., pp. 7-11.
citly states the general characters and the special characters of an object by which it is distinguished from other homogeneous and heterogeneous objects. Division and definition help each other, and facilitate examination. The extent of a definition must be coextensive with the entire extent of the term defined. If its extent is narrower than that of the term, it is too narrow (avyāpti). If its extent is wider than that of the term, it is too wide (ativyāpti). A definition must not be too narrow or too wide. If the individuals belonging to two classes overlap one another, there is cross division (jātisamkara) which is fallacious. Enunciation, division and definition are the basis of examination which consists in proving one's view and refuting rival views about the nature of an object. Sometimes a hypothesis (kalpanā) is framed in order to explain certain phenomena. The parsimony of hypotheses (kalpanālāghava) demands the rejection of many hypotheses and the acceptance of one hypothesis. When two hypotheses can explain certain phenomena equally well, a crucial instance, which proves the validity of one and disproves the other, must be found out. Doubt, hypothetical reasoning, deductive-inductive reasoning, disputation, discussion, wrangle, and cavil are employed for the ascertainment of truth (siddhānta). The dialectic method is employed in examination of a subject. The opponent's antithesis (pārvapakṣa) with arguments is first stated. Then his arguments are criticized, and finally the Nyāya conclusion (uttarapakṣa) is stated. Reasoning is carried on by the dialectic method which consists in logical refutation of an antithesis and establishment of a thesis by logical reasoning based on perception and in harmony with Vedic testimony or intuition. The philosophical method is neither pure deduction from self-evident axioms or assumed truths nor pure induction from particular facts observed. It is inductive-deductive, speculative and dialectic. 

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Epistemology and Logic.


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*N Bh., NVTT., i. 1. 3; NM., p. 12. SIP., p. 21.*
The Nyāya epistemology deals with the nature of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), its instruments (pramāṇa), extrinsic validity (parataḥ pramāṇya) and invalidity of knowledge, and the tests of truth (pramāṇya-graha). The knower (pramātya), the known object (prameya), the instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa), and valid knowledge (pramāṇa, pramiti) constitute the reality. The self is the knower, which knows objects through pramāṇas, acts upon them, and experiences fruits of its actions. It desires to attain pleasant objects and avoid painful objects known through pramāṇas, acts for their attainment or rejection, and gets fruits of its efforts. Prameya is the object that is known. Pramāṇa is the instrument by means of which the self knows an object. Pramiti is the valid knowledge of an object. Pramāṇa is the collocation of conditions, which is the immediate antecedent of the production of valid knowledge. There are four pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference, comparison and testimony, which generate different kinds of valid knowledge. The self (pramātya) and an object (prameya) are the common causes of all cognitions of objects. In their absence there is no valid knowledge, which is produced when they are present. But even when they are present, it is not produced in the absence of a pramāṇa, which is its special cause. The self and an object are presupposed by a pramāṇa. It is an instrument (karaṇa) of the self by which it knows an object on which a pramāṇa operates. It is a special cause of valid knowledge because it has not yet realized its end. An instrument depends upon an agent, but the latter does not depend upon the former. An object is not sometimes present when valid knowledge is produced. A past object is known from a mark (liṅga) by inference. The same object may be known by any of the pramāṇas. Knowledge cannot be specified by the self or an object. The self is the common inherent cause of knowledge which inheres in it. The conjunction of the self with manas is the common non-inherent cause of it. Pramāṇa is the complement of conditions other than the self and an object, which immediately produce valid knowledge, which is undoubted and in harmony with the real nature of its object. It comprises conscious and unconscious factors.6

Vātsyāyana defines valid perception as the knowledge that

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*NBh., i. 1. 1.
*NVTT., i. 1. 1, pp. 18-17; NM., p. 12.
represents the real character of its object, or apprehends what exists in it. He defines error as the knowledge that does not represent the real character of its object, or apprehends what does not exist in it. So he regards the knowledge which corresponds with the real nature of its object as valid (pramā), and what does not correspond with its real character as invalid (āpramā). Uddyotakara defines valid knowledge as the certain knowledge of the real nature of an object (arthapariccheda). Vācaspati excludes recollection from valid knowledge, and defines it as the certain knowledge of an object, which is in agreement with its real character, independent of previous perception and different from recollection. Udayana defines valid knowledge as the right apprehension of an object. It apprehends its object in its real nature and not as contrary to it. Varadarāja, like Udayana, defines it as right apprehension. It is apprehension as distinguished from recollection. It is right apprehension as distinguished from illusion, doubt, hypothetical reasoning and the like. Recollection is produced by an impression (sahāskāra). But apprehension is produced by a special cause which is present at the moment or in the immediate past. Gaṅgeśa defines valid knowledge as the apprehension of what exists in its object, and invalid knowledge as the apprehension of what does not exist in it. Viśvanātha elaborates Gaṅgeśa's definition, and defines pramā as the knowledge of the generic character of an object as abiding in it, or as the apprehension of a mode (prakāra) corresponding to its object (viśeṣya), or the apprehension of a mode which does not accord with the absence of its object. A jar is the object of the knowledge of a jar, which is its substantive (viśeṣya). The generic character of a jar (ghaṭatva), which is manifested in consciousness is its cognized mode (prakāra). The cognized mode corresponds to its object in valid knowledge. But in error

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9 NBh., i. 1. 4.
10 Pramā smṛtārthaḥvābhirḥvā svaṭantaraḥ paricchedaḥ. NVTT., i. 1. 3. p. 63.
11 Mitthiḥ samvaktiḥ paricchitiḥ. Samicchino'nhavaḥ pramā. NRK., iv. 5. p. 25. NVTP., i. 1. 1. p. 46.
the cognized mode (prakāra) does not correspond to the object or substantive (viśeṣya) of knowledge. When a nacre is misperceived as silver, silver is the cognized mode (prakāra) that is manifested in consciousness, which does not correspond with the nacre (viśeṣya). The misapprehension of a nacre as silver is illusory because silver does not exist in it.13

The Nyāya definitions of knowledge are realistic. Truth is correspondence of an apprehension with its object. Valid knowledge implies a knowing self (pramātṛ), an object of knowledge (prameya), apprehension (pramiti) of it, and its harmony with its real character (yāthārthya). Correspondence is the content of truth.

There are four pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference, comparison and testimony. The same object may be known by any of the pramāṇas at a particular time. But it is not known by all pramāṇas at a time. This is called pramāṇasamplava. The self is known from Vedic testimony. It is inferred from desire, aversion, pleasure, pain and knowledge, which are its marks (liṅga). It is known by yogic perception due to a particular conjunction of the self with manas brought about by meditation. So the self is known by testimony, inference and perception. A person knows the existence of a fire in a place from testimony of a reliable person. He perceives smoke, and infers a fire from it. He comes nearer and perceives it. The existence of a fire is known by testimony, inference and perception. When a person knows an object by testimony, he desires to infer it from a mark. When he infers it from a mark, he desires to perceive it. When he perceives it, his desire to know it further ceases. Knowledge produced by inference, comparison and testimony depends on perception. Testimony depends on perception of a reliable person. Inference ultimately depends upon perception, though sometimes it depends upon inference. Comparison is inferior to inference, since it depends more on testimony than on perception. Perception is the strongest of all pramāṇas. When an object is perceived, it is not known by inference, comparison, or testimony.14

14 Pārun prayāksata upalabhyaṁ māṁ nānumāṇaṁ nāgamāḥ. Pratyakṣata upalabdhe 'rtive jiñāsā nivartate. NBh., i. 1. 3. NVTT., i. 1. 3, p. 68.
But sometimes an object is known by one pramāṇa only. 'The performance of Agnihotra oblation is a means to the attainment of heaven'. It cannot be known by perception and inference, but by Vedic testimony only. In regard to perceptible objects sometimes one pramāṇa is restricted to one object. This is called pramāṇavavasthā. When the roaring of a thunder is heard, the existence of a cloud is inferred, which is not known by testimony or perception at the time. When an object is known by a particular pramāṇa only, there is no ascertainment of the comparative strength of pramāṇas.  

Inference contradicted by perception and Vedic testimony is faulty (nyāyabhāsa). 'Fire is cold, because it is produced, like a jar'. This inference is contradicted by perception. Perception of coldness of fire cannot be overridden by the inference of its coldness, because perception is stronger than inference. Inference is contradicted by Vedic testimony. 'A human skull is pure, because it is a part of the human body'. This inference is contradicted by Vedic testimony, which declares it to be impure. Its purity cannot be inferred from the purity of all things. Inference is not contradicted by inference, because the same thing cannot be the object of two contradictory inferences. Two inferences of equal strength which seek to prove the presence and the absence of an inferable property in a subject (pakṣa) counterbalance each other. None of them is stronger than the other, which can invalidate it. But an inference is contradicted by previous perception of the absence of an inferable property in a subject. Invalidation of inference by perception and scriptural testimony is called pramāṇaviruddha.  

Knowledge is the manifestation or apprehension of objects. Valid knowledge is the apprehension of the real character of an object. Invalid knowledge is the apprehension of an object as it is not in its real character. Truth is correspondence of knowledge with reality. Error is disagreement of knowledge with reality. Correspondence is truth, and non-correspondence is error. Knowledge generated by its cause is the bare appre-
hension of an object, which is neither valid nor invalid in itself. Its validity (prāmaṇya) is produced by some positive excellence (guna) in the generating conditions of knowledge; and its invalidity (aprāmaṇya) by some positive defects (doṣa) in them. Validity and invalidity of knowledge are extrinsic, and depend upon extraneous conditions (parataḥ). Validity is neither produced by the general conditions of knowledge nor by the mere absence of defects (doṣābhāva), but by some proficiency (guna) in its cause. Invalidity is neither produced by the general conditions of knowledge nor by the mere absence of proficiency (gunābhāva), but by some deficiency (doṣa) in its cause. Knowledge is not intrinsically valid or invalid, but it acquires validity or invalidity from extraneous conditions. For example, the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object is the positive excellence (guna) which generates the validity of perception. Distance or minuteness of an object, defect of a sense-organ or manas, and the like are the positive defects (doṣa) which generate the invalidity of perception. A specific effect has a specific cause. Validity and invalidity are the specific characters of apprehensions, which are due to different specific characters of the general conditions of knowledge, which either promote or vitiate them. They are extrinsic or adventitious characters of knowledge due to extraneous conditions.14

Validity and invalidity of knowledge are not known by valid knowledge itself or by invalid knowledge itself. Validity of knowledge is inferred from its capacity to produce successful activity (pravṛttisāmarthya), and invalidity of knowledge, from its incapacity to produce successful activity (pravṛttivisaṁvāda). Truth leads to successful action, and error, to unsuccessful action. Practical efficiency and practical inefficiency are the tests of truth and error by which they are known (prāmaṇya-graha). Correspondence is the content of truth, but workability is its criterion. Non-correspondence is the content of error, but unworkability is its criterion.17

Vātsyāyana says, "An object is known through an instrument of knowledge; its validity is known by its workability.

14 Doṣo'pramāṇā janakaḥ pramāṇās tu guṇo bhavet. BP., 131. SM., pp. 443-44; NKS., ii, pp. 1-2, 5-6; NM., p. 171; NKS., ii, pp. 2-5.
There is neither valid knowledge of an object without a pramāṇa nor successful action without valid knowledge of it."¹⁸ Valid knowledge generated by a pramāṇa produces successful action from which its validity is inferred.

What is pravṛttiśāmartthya which determines the validity of knowledge? Vātsyāyana explains it as the fulfilment of activity prompted by the knowledge of an object. Pravṛtti means effort or activity; sāmartthya means attainment of fruition by activity; pravṛttiśāmartthya means the knowledge of action ending in fruition or fruitful action.¹⁹ The validity of the knowledge of an object, which was not frequently known before, is known by a fruitful action. But the validity of an object, which was frequently known before, is known from a similar mark even before it produces a successful action.²⁰ Action depends upon the knowledge of an object, but not upon the knowledge of its validity. Even doubt about an object gives rise to action. Valid knowledge is in harmony with the real character of its object, and capable of producing a successful action. Invalid knowledge is in disharmony with the real nature of its object and incapable of prompting a successful action.²¹ The Nyāya doctrine of extrinsic validity of knowledge does not involve infinite regress. The validity of knowledge is determined by the knowledge of successful action, which does not require determination of its validity by another successful action, because it has realized its end, and is not tainted with a doubt as to its validity or invalidity. When a person has the knowledge of water in a burning desert, he has a doubt as to its existence. But when he drinks water and quenches his thirst, his knowledge of successful action is undoubted.

2. The Nyāya Criticism of the Rival theories of Pramāṇya and Pramāṇa.

The Mīmāṁsaka regards validity of knowledge as intrinsic, and holds that knowledge apprehends its own validity which is generated by the causal conditions of knowledge itself.

¹⁸ Pramāṇātārthapratipattau pravṛttiśāmartthyaḥ arthavat pramāṇam. NBh., i. 1. 1. NVTT., i. 1. 1, p. 18.
¹⁹ Saṁhā pravṛttib, sāmartthyaḥ asyāḥ phalenaḥbhisambandhah. NBh., i. 1. 1. NM., p. 172.
²⁰ NVTT., i. 1. 1, p. 8.
²¹ NNP., i. 1. 1, p. 156.
Vācaspati argues that a knowledge which apprehends an object, does not apprehend itself and its validity. Cognition, which is common to valid knowledge and invalid knowledge, cannot apprehend its own validity. Even if a cognition apprehends itself, it does not apprehend its validity or correspondence with its object.\textsuperscript{22} Udayana argues that the validity of knowledge of an object which was not frequently known before is known from extraneous conditions because it is doubtful like its invalidity. If its validity is known by itself, then there can never be any doubt as to its validity. If it is known for certain, then there is no room for doubt. Doubt cannot arise from the perception of a common quality of a valid knowledge and an invalid knowledge, because then it would never cease. If doubt is due to the non-perception of the distinction between valid knowledge and invalid knowledge, then either the validity of knowledge is not apprehended, though the knowledge is apprehended, or the valid knowledge itself is not apprehended. In the first alternative, knowledge does not apprehend its own validity, because knowledge is apprehended, but its validity is not apprehended. In the second alternative, doubt as to the validity of knowledge is not apprehended, because the knowledge itself is not apprehended. Determination of validity of knowledge by itself does not consist in its being quickly followed by successful action, since prompt action does not depend upon knowledge of validity. Desire is the cause of action. The knowledge of the means conducive to good is the cause of desire. It depends upon the memory of its conduciveness to pleasure, which depends upon previous perception due to the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ. The knowledge of validity is not the cause of action. Even if it is so, it does not prove that the validity of knowledge is known by itself. Further, the capacity for producing successful action depends upon validity of knowledge or apprehension of its validity, but not upon self-validity of knowledge (svataḥ prāmāṇya). A thirsty person does not perceive the power of water to quench thirst before he actually quenches his thirst by drinking water. Successful action is a certain mark (liṅga) which proves the validity of knowledge beyond doubt.\textsuperscript{23} Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refutes Kumārila's

\textsuperscript{22} NVTT., i, 1, 1, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{23} NKS., ii, pp. 7-8, 13.
view of intrinsic validity of knowledge. First, a blue object is known by perception due to its intercourse with a sense-organ. If the perception knows its validity, then it knows either the validity of the knowledge or that of its result. Knowledge, according to Kumārila, is an act of the self, which is always inferred from cognizedness of its object. So perception does not apprehend the validity of knowledge. Cognizedness (jñātatā) or manifestness of an object, being in the nature of conciousness, is incapable of having intercourse with a sense-organ. So perception cannot apprehend its validity through the external sense-organs. Nor can it apprehend it through the manas, since mental perception is not apprehended at the time. A second cognition of the validity of the cognition of 'blue' succeeding the cognition of 'blue' is not experienced. Even if it is experienced, the validity of the first cognition is not apprehended by itself, but by the second cognition. This contradicts the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge. So the validity of knowledge is not known by perception. If it is known by inference, it apprehends the validity of knowledge or that of its result (jñātatā). The validity of cognizedness cannot be inferred, since there is no mark (liṅga). If the act of knowledge is the mark, then it can prove its existence only, but not its validity. If cognizedness unqualified by validity proves the validity of the act of knowledge, then any cognizedness can prove the validity of any knowledge, and no knowledge is invalid. If cognizedness qualified by validity is said to prove the validity of the cognitive act, then there is no means of determining the validity of cognizedness. If the apprehension of 'blue' is the means of determining its validity, then it manifesting itself is its validity. Then the cognition of silver in a nacre is valid, since there is no knowledge of validity other than the cognition of silver. If the validity of knowledge depends on the knowledge of the absence of a sublating cognition, then the second knowledge proves the validity of the first knowledge. Then knowledge does not apprehend its validity as soon as it is produced. If knowledge apprehends its object and its validity at the moment of its production because of the absence of a sublating knowledge, then it can never lead to unfruitful action. But a person in doubt acts to attain an object of knowledge, and is baffled. If doubt apprehends
itself as doubt and its object as non-existent, it cannot prompt a person to act. If doubt prompts an action because it is not known to be doubt, then what is its distinctive character (viṣeṣa) which is not apprehended? If it is distinctness (spaṣṭatā), then the manifestation of silver is distinct in the illusion of silver in a nacre. If it is steadiness (niṣkampatā), then also the manifestation of silver is steady. If it is undoubtedness, then also the cognition of silver is undoubted because two alternatives do not appear in it. If it is the absence of the knowledge of a sublating cognition when something exists, then its existence cannot be ascertained. If it is harmony with the real character of its object, then it is not experienced at the time. Hence the validity of knowledge is not known by the knowledge itself at the time when it is produced. Secondly, validity is an effect, since it is existent and non-eternal, and it depends upon its cause. There are two kinds of effects. Good effects are produced by proficiencies (guṇa) in their causes; and bad effects, by deficiencies (doṣa) in their causes. There are no causes devoid of excellence and defects. Valid knowledge is produced by some excellence in its cause, and invalid knowledge, by some defect in its cause. There is no neutral knowledge devoid of validity and invalidity arising from its cause devoid of proficiency and deficiency. Hence validity of knowledge is not independent of other conditions for its production. Thirdly, Kumārila regards knowledge as pramāṇa, which is said to be independent of other conditions in producing its effect. But knowledge is neither dependent nor independent of other conditions in producing its effect, since it being an effect does not produce any effect. Fourthly, Kumārila wrongly holds that ascertainment of validity of knowledge is independent of other conditions. When a cognition of 'blue' is produced, its validity is not ascertained by it at the time, but subsequently by a successful action. When knowledge is produced, there is a doubt as to its validity, which prompts action. If the action is successful, the knowledge is known to be valid. Hence the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of self-validity of knowledge is not tenable.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{24} NM., pp. 167-72.
Jayanta refutes the Sāṁkhya view which regards validity and invalidity of knowledge as intrinsic. The same knowledge cannot be both valid and invalid, since a valid knowledge leads to a fruitful action, and an invalid knowledge leads to a fruitless action. If the same knowledge is both valid and invalid, then the knowledge of silver in a nacre is either valid or invalid. If it is known to be valid, it should lead to the attainment of silver. If it is known to be invalid, it cannot prompt action for its attainment. So the Sāṁkhya doctrine of intrinsic validity and invalidity of knowledge is not tenable.

Jayanta criticizes the Buddhist view that cognitions are intrinsically invalid but extrinsically valid. If cognitions were intrinsically invalid, they could not prompt actions for the attainment of their objects. Further, the invalidity of knowledge depends, for its production, upon certain defects in its causes, and for its ascertainment, upon a sublating knowledge. The invalidity of knowledge is considered by some to be not due to certain defects in its cause, but to the absence of a real object as its objective basis. But this is wrong, since many invalid cognitions like doubt and illusion have real objects which produce them. So knowledge is not intrinsically invalid. The Buddhist view that validity of knowledge is due to extraneous conditions agrees with the Nyāya view. Hence the Buddhist view is not tenable.\(^{35}\)

Jayanta criticizes the rival theories of pramāṇa. The Sāṁkhya regards an unconscious mental mode (buddhīvṛtti) modified into the form of an object as pramāṇa, its reflection in the conscious self as valid knowledge (pramāṇa), the conscious self (puruṣa) as the knower (pramāṇāt), and the object that transforms the mental mode into its form as the object of valid knowledge (prameya). Jayanta urges that pramāṇa and pramāṇa do not abide in the same substratum. An unconscious mental mode (pramāṇa) does not exist in the self, and valid knowledge (pramāṇa) does not exist in the mental mode. The Sāṁkhya argues that the mind (buddhi) appears to be conscious in contact with the self and that the self gets a reflection of the mental mode. Then consciousness of the mind and knowledge of the self are unreal, since consciousness is attributed to the unconscious mind.

\(^{35}\) NM., p. 160.

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and an unconscious mental mode is attributed to the conscious self. Hence the Sāṁkhya view is not tenable.\(^{34}\)

Kumārila regards knowledge, an act of the self, as pramāṇa, which is inferred from its result or cognizedness. Jayanta refutes this view. First, a cognition is not inferable. The perception of cognizedness of an object presupposes the perception of the cognition that apprehends it. Secondly, cognition, which is an act of the self, is perceptible, because the self is admitted by Kumārila to be perceptible. Thirdly, action is physical motion (parispanda) which is perceived. There is no imperceptible action or physical motion. There is no action of the self, which does not produce physical motion through volition. Cognition is not an action, but a quality of the self, because it is in the nature of an accomplished result. It is perceptible. Thirdly, cognition cannot be inferred, because its invariable concomitance with cognizedness is not known. Fourthly, past and future objects being absent cannot be known, since cognition cannot produce cognizedness in them. Lastly, Kumārila excludes recollection from pramāṇa. But both apprehension and recollection are valid. Recollection is valid knowledge distinct from its previous perception. Pleasurable objects are repeatedly perceived to yield pleasure and sought in future. Painful objects are repeatedly perceived to yield pain and avoided in future. Perception does not lose its validity because of its frequency. So recollection of an object perceived in the past does not cease to be valid because it was perceived in the past. A serial perception is valid, though it does not apprehend more than what was apprehended by the first perception. Recollection is valid on the same ground. If recollection is invalid because it is not produced by an object at the time, then inference of a past object and intuition (prātiṣṭhā jāāna) of a future object are invalid for the same reason. But Kumārila regards them as valid. Further, if recollection is invalid because it is not produced by an object, then it is not due to the apprehension of an object which was not apprehended before. Hence Kumārila's view of pramāṇa is not tenable.\(^{37}\)

Prabhākara regards apprehension (anubhūti) as pramāṇa, which is distinct from recollection. Varadarāja criticizes this

\(^{34}\) NM., p. 26.
\(^{37}\) NM., pp. 16-23.
view. According to Prabhākara, both perception and recollection manifest the self as their substrate, themselves as cognitions, and their objects; apprehensions of the self and cognitions are perceptions, but the knowledge of the object in recollection is not perception, and therefore not valid. Varadarāja urges that it is not rational to argue that apprehensions of the self and recollection are valid, but that the knowledge of the object in recollection is invalid. If recollection is invalid, because it depends on a past perception, then determine perception and inference also are invalid, because they are produced by other cognitions, and not apprehensions. But Prabhākara regards them as valid. So there is inconsistency in his doctrine.\(^9\)

Some Buddhist realists define pramāṇa as a knowledge that is conducive to fruitful action, and validity as its power to lead the knower to the attainment of its object, if it is pleasant, and to its avoidance, if it is unpleasant.\(^9\) The capacity for leading to the attainment of an object (prāpakaṇṭva) is common to perception and inference. Perception apprehends a momentary specific individual which cannot be attained. But the same series (santāna) of the specific individual can be attained. The power of perception to lead to the attainment of an object consists in its producing a determinate cognition (adhyavasāya). Inference apprehends an unreal object which is attributed but non-existent at the time. It leads to the attainment of a real object to which an unreal form is attributed, even as light of a gem leads to the attainment of it. So a pramāṇa is the power of knowledge to lead to the attainment of an object as it is known.\(^9\)

Jayanta asks whether pramāṇa is a power to lead to the attainment of an object as it is shown or whether it is a power to lead to the attainment of an object as imagined. In indeterminate perception a specific individual is certainly shown, but it cannot be attained, since it is momentary. The attainment of a specific individual is not attainment of the same series, which is neither different nor non-different from its momentary members. In determinate perception an imaginary form is

\(^9\) TR., pp. 10-22.

\(^9\) Avasamvrddhakratvaṁ pramāṇasamānyalakṣaṇam. Prāpaṇaśaktiḥ pramānyam. NM., p. 23.

attributed to its object, which cannot be attained. Varadarāja argues that on the Buddhist view inference of past and future objects cannot be valid, because it cannot produce fruitful actions, and determinate perception becomes valid, because it produces fruitful action. But the Buddhists regard the former as valid and the latter as invalid. They regard indeterminate perception as valid. But it is not valid, since it cannot produce fruitful action. So a pramāṇa is not the capacity for leading to the attainment of an object shown by a cognition. Further, the knowledge of a neutral object, which is neither pleasant nor painful, is invalid, because it does not lead to the attainment or avoidance of an object. Hence the Buddhist realist view is not tenable.

Some Buddhist realists regard cognitions as pramāṇa, and consider momentary objects and cognitions arising from the same causal conditions as related to each other as apprehended objects and apprehending cognitions. Both depend upon the same causal conditions, viz., objects and cognitions. An object is the material cause of an object, and a cognition is its auxiliary cause. A cognition is the material cause of a cognition, and an object is its auxiliary cause. A cognition corresponding to an object is valid, both arising from the same causes. Jayanta urges that a cognition cannot manifest an object and correspond with it, because they are produced at the same moment out of the common mind-stuff and matter-stuff. It may be argued that a cognition is conscious, and therefore manifests an object which is unconscious. But a cognition cannot have a distinctive character and a power of apprehending an object, since it is produced by the same stuff with an object. So the Buddhist realist view is not tenable.

The Yogācāras deny the existence of the permanent self and external objects, and admit the reality of momentary cognitions with forms, which appear to be differentiated into apprehending cognitions and apprehended objects due to the potencies of beginningless nescience. They regard determinate cognitions as modifications of one formless consciousness. A determinate cognition with a particular form is an instrument of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). But the same determinate cognition, Jayanta

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31 NM., p. 24.
32 TR., pp. 44-46.
33 NM., p. 15.
34 NM., pp. 15-16.
argues, cannot be the apprehending cognition and the apprehended object. So a pramāṇa cannot consist in the capacity for leading to the attainment of an object. In fact, the distinction between a cognition and an object is imaginary, so that no cognition leads to the attainment of an object shown and no object is attained.\textsuperscript{33} So the Buddhist idealist view is not tenable.

The Mādhyamikas deny the validity of the instruments of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), because they do not precede, succeed, or coexist with the objects of valid knowledge (prameya) simultaneously. If a pramāṇa precedes an object, then perception cannot be produced by the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object. But perception is unerring, indeterminate and determinate knowledge produced by the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object. If a pramāṇa succeeds an object, it cannot be proved by it. An object proved by a pramāṇa is called an object of valid knowledge (prameya). Though the nature of an object of knowledge does not depend upon a pramāṇa, its knowability depends upon it. If a pramāṇa and an object are produced simultaneously, there can be no sequence of cognitions which are restricted to their proper objects. But, in fact, cognitions appear in succession. Nonsimultaneity of cognitions is a mark for the existence of manas. Therefore pramāṇas are devoid of validity.\textsuperscript{34}

There is no fixed rule, Vātsyāyana asserts, that a pramāṇa should always precede, succeed, or be simultaneous with an object of knowledge. The sun-light which is a condition of visual perception precedes an object revealed by it. A lamp which is an object of knowledge precedes its perception. Smoke which is a condition of inference and a fire which is an object of inference exist simultaneously. Similarly, a pramāṇa which is a condition of apprehension may precede, succeed, or be synchronous with an object of knowledge. The temporal relation of priority, posteriority or simultaneity does not affect the relation of pramāṇa and prameya. A pramāṇa proves the existence of a past object, or a present object, or a future object. The denial of validity of pramāṇas presupposes their existence.\textsuperscript{37} If the denial precedes what is denied, then it becomes unmean-

\textsuperscript{33} NM., pp. 10, 24.  
\textsuperscript{34} NS., NBh., ii. 1, 8-11. NVTT., p. 249.  
\textsuperscript{37} NBh., ii. 1, 11.
ing because its object does not exist. If the denial succeeds its object which is denied, then the object is not denied because the statement of denial is absent. If the denial and its object come into existence simultaneously, then the existence of the object of denial is admitted, and the denial becomes meaningless. If the statement of denial is not proved, then perception and the like are pramāṇas. The Mādhyamikas prove the non-existence of pramāṇas through a pramāṇa, and admits its validity. They cannot establish the denial of pramāṇas, because they deny the validity of all pramāṇas. If the reasoning advanced by the Mādhyamikas for the invalidity of pramāṇas be admitted to be valid, then there can be no denial of all pramāṇas. They urge infinite regress against the validity of pramāṇas. If pramāṇas are proved by others, then they are proved by others and so on to infinity. This argument is not valid. Just as a lamp does not require another lamp to manifest it, so pramāṇas do not require other pramāṇas to establish them. When apprehensions of objects through perception, inference, comparison or testimony lead to fruitful actions, they do not require any other proof. So there is no infinite regress. Hence the Mādhyamika doctrine of the invalidity of all pramāṇas is not tenable.


Gautama defines perception as the knowledge which is produced by the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ, undefinable, determinate, and in harmony with its object. It is produced by the intercourse of a present object with the external sense-organs, conjunction of them with manas, and its conjunction with the self. The sense-organs are directed by manas, which is directed by the self. Conjunction of the sense-organs with manas and conjunction of manas with the self are the general causes of perception. The intercourse of a sense-organ with an object is a special cause of perception. Perception is generated by it, and not revealed. It is the immediate knowledge of a present object through a sense-organ. Valid

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11 NS., NBh., ii. 1. 12-14. 14 NS., NBh., ii. 1. 18-19.
14 “Indriyārtha-सनिकारोपानां ज्ञानम अवयापदेवम अवयाबिधारी व्यवसायात्मकां प्रत्याक्षां. NS., i. 1. 4.”
perception apprehends the real character of an object (avyabhicārin). Illusion does not apprehend the real nature of its object. Perception is different from inference, comparison and testimony, which are not produced by the sense-object-intercourse. Visual perception of a jar is produced by its conjunction (saṁhyoga) with the visual organ, which is in the nature of light. Auditory perception of sound is produced by its inherence (saṁvāya) in the auditory organ or ether enclosed in the ear-hole. Visual perception of the colour of a jar is produced by the conjunction of the visual organ with the jar in which colour inhere. It is due to united-inherence (saṁhyukta saṁvāya). The manas is an internal organ. Perception of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition and cognition is produced by the manas in conjunction with the self.

There are two kinds of perception, viz., indeterminate and determinate. The former is undefinable (avyapadesya) and nameless. The latter is determinate (vyavasāyātmaka) and associated with a name. The ancient Nyāya regards the former as the apprehension of an object as qualified by a substance, quality, action and genus, but devoid of a name, and the latter as the apprehension of it as qualified by these qualifications but associated with a name.\(^{41}\) But the modern (navya) Nyāya regards the former as immediate, simple, non-relational apprehension of an object and its generic nature as unrelated to each other, and the latter as mediate, relational, synthetic apprehension of an object and its generic nature as related to each other.\(^ {42}\) Indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehension of an object and its qualifications unrelated to each other. It is devoid of subject-predicate-relation. It is not a perceptual judgment. Determinate perception involves analysis and synthesis, assimilation, discrimination and association. The Nyāya regards it as a logical stage of perception. It is inferred from determinate perception as its prior stage.

Gautama’s definition of perception does not apply to yogic perception which is non-sensuous. So Varadarāja defines perception as immediate valid knowledge, and Viśvanātha defines it as immediate knowledge which is not derived through the

\(^{41}\) NM., p. 99.

medium of any other knowledge. These definitions embrace all kinds of human perception. They exclude inference, comparison and testimony. Inference is produced by the knowledge of Vyāpti; comparison, by the knowledge of similarity; and testimony, by the knowledge of words.

Recognition is a kind of perception qualified by past perception. 'This is that Devadatta'. Perception is produced by the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ. Memory is produced by an impression (sāṁskāra). Recognition is produced by both together. It is a single unitary cognition, and not a synthesis of perception and recollection as the Buddhists maintain. It is perception because the sense-object-intercourse is its principal cause while an impression is its auxiliary cause.

Gāṅgeśa recognizes three kinds of extraordinary intercourse, viz., sāṁyayalakṣaṇa, jñānalakṣaṇa and yogaja. We perceive a smoke through ordinary intercourse. But when we perceive a smoke, we perceive all smokes through the perception of its generic character due to sāṁyayalakṣaṇa-sannikāra. All individual smokes are not perceived through the sense-organs, but they are indirectly perceived through the knowledge of their generic character. Gāṅgeśa admits this kind of perception to ensure the knowledge of invariable concomitance between all smokes and all fires. Jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikāra is the extraordinary intercourse through the knowledge of an object revived from a past perception of it. Visual perception of a fragrant sandal is due to the intercourse of the visual organ with the sandal and the recollection of its fragrance perceived in the past through the olfactory organ owing to association. The idea of fragrance revived in memory brings about the acquired visual perception of fragrant sandal. Yogic perception is produced by an extraordinary intercourse brought about by meditation (yogaja sannikāra). Intense meditation produces a peculiar merit in the self, by virtue of which it can perceive past, future, remote, hidden and subtle objects. This is intuition born of meditation. There are two kinds of yogic perception, yuktā and yuṇjāna. The former is the intuition of a Yogin whose self has attained union with God, which is constant and

44 NM., pp. 448-49; NVTT., i. 1. 4, p. 92.
effortless. The latter is the intuition of a Yogin, who is endeavouring to attain union with God, and puts forth effort of will to perceive all objects. The perception of a generic character (sāmānyā), a cognition (jñāna), and a supernatural power born of meditation (yoga) are the media of extraordinary intercourse.44

The ancient Nyāya regards indeterminate perception and determinate perception both as valid, when they are in harmony with the real nature of their objects. Determinate perception is valid, because it apprehends an object as it really is with its qualifications (vikalpa) which are real. Indeterminate perception is valid, because it is a means of valid determinate perception.44 But the modern Nyāya regards it as neither valid nor invalid, since it does not apprehend the relation between its object and its qualifications. Validity or invalidity of knowledge consists in relating the terms apprehended rightly and wrongly. Truth or falsehood is a predicate of the relational structure of knowledge, and not of non-relational immediate experience.44

Some urge that perception is not an independent pramāṇa, but inference, since the whole tree is inferred from the perception of its front part, even as a fire is inferred from the knowledge of smoke. The Nyāya argues that the composite whole is different from its component parts and that it is not a mere conglomeration of parts. When a front part of a tree is perceived, the whole tree is perceived, since the whole exists in each part. If the whole is to be inferred from the perception of a part, there must be a previous perception of the whole as related to that part; and if the whole is perceived, it cannot be inferred. Perception cannot be inference, since the cognition of the front part is perception, and inference depends upon the perception of the invariable concomitance of a probans with a probandum, the perception of an example in which they are found together, and the perception of a probans from which a probandum is inferred. So perception is not inference.44

44 SM., pp. 274-85; IPP., pp. 79-82; IPP., pp. 40-42; BP., 63-65; TCA., Benares, 1908, pp. 333-302.
44 NM., pp. 88, 96; PB., p. 187; NK., p. 199.
44 Na pramāṇābhramaḥ syām nirvikalpam. BP., 135.
44 NBh., ii. 1. 28-30.
The Sābdikas deny indeterminate perception which does not apprehend a name, and admit determinate perception only which apprehends a name. They identify objects with names, and regard perceptions of colour, taste, odour, sound and touch as determinate cognitions of their names. The Nyāya refutes the Sābdika view. Vātsyāyana argues that there is indeterminate perception of an object, when its relation to a name is not known, and that determinate perception of an object related to a name depends upon indeterminate perception of it and recollection of its name. Vācaspati argues that colour, odour, sound and the like, which are perceived, are not identical with Śabdabrahma, since it transcends perception. They are not identical with audible sounds, because infants and dumb persons have perceptions of colour, odour and the like which are devoid of names. There is a difference between objects and names, because objects are perceived, though their names are not perceived. Visual perception of colour apprehends colour only, but not its name. Audible perception of a name apprehends it only, but not colour. If colour were identical with its name, then auditory perception of a name would apprehend colour. But it cannot apprehend colour. Further, if colour were identical with its name, then a blind person would perceive colour through his auditory organ, and a deaf person would perceive sound through his visual organ. Therefore objects are not identical with their names. Jayanta further argues that a cognition by itself manifests or apprehends its object. It power of manifesting an object is not derived from its name. Nameability is not a property of an object like its colour so that it may be apprehended by indeterminate perception. It is the immediate apprehension of the nature of an object without a name. So the Sābdika doctrine is not tenable.

The Buddhists deny determinate perception. Diñmāga and Dharmakīrti define perception as the apprehension of a specific individual, which is non-erroneous and free from conceptual constructs (kalpanā). It is free from kalpanā which is cognition of an appearance capable of being associated with a name.

**Footnotes:**

48 NVTT., i. 1. 4, pp. 82-83; NBh., i. 1. 4.
49 NVTT., i. 1. 4, pp. 83-85.
50 NM., pp. 80-81.
51 Kalpanāpodham abhrāntam pratyakṣam. Abhīlāpasaṁsārgayogayaphatibbāsaprattith kalpanā tayā rahitum. NB., pp. 11, 13; NP., p. 7.
It is produced by the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ. A name does not exist in an object; nor is it in the nature of an object. Hence a cognition produced by an object apprehends the object only, but not its name. A name is general; it conveys a community which is unreal and imaginary. Perception apprehends a specific individual (svalakṣaṇa) only, unassociated with a name. What is perceived is not related to a name, and what is related to a name is not perceived. Perception is always indeterminate. Determinate perception does not apprehend the relation of an individual to a substance, a quality, an action, a genus, and a name, which are unreal conceptual constructs or determinations (vikalpa) of the intellect. It cannot apprehend the relation of a momentary specific individual to unreal determinations. These unreal concepts convert indeterminate perception to determinate cognition. Determinations consist in attributing difference to non-difference, and non-difference to difference. A substance is identical with its qualities and actions. A genus is identical with an individual. But difference is ascribed to these identical entities. An object is different from its name, but non-difference is attributed to them. Determinate cognition appears to apprehend a real object, because it quickly follows indeterminate perception which apprehends a specific individual. It appears to be distinct and apprehend thisness (idantā) for the same reason.  

Vācaspati criticizes the Buddhist view. A specific individual is not an object of perception. There is no contradiction between perception produced by an object and knowledge of its association with a name. Determinate perception apprehends an object as qualified by such qualifications as substance, quality, action, and genus, which are real. Determinations do not consist in attribution of difference to what is non-different and of non-difference to what are different. Quality and action are different from a substance, and inhere in it. A name is different from an object. A name remembered cannot suspend the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, which is the principal cause of determinate perception; an impression of a name or its recollection is its auxiliary cause. The self, which is the re-
ceptacle of impressions (vāsanā), is the perceiver, recollector and recognizer. It has indeterminate perception of an object, recollects its class and name due to revival of their impressions, and has determinate perception of it, which apprehends the relation between them. It is valid, because it apprehends an individual as an instance of a universal and bearing a name and qualified by determinations which are real.\(^{34}\) Jayanta criticizes the Buddhist view on the following grounds: (1) Determinate perception is not invalid because it apprehends an unreal universal (jāti) capable of being expressed by a word; for a universal is real and apprehended by determinate perception. (2) It is not invalid because it is contradicted by a sublating cognition; for it is never contradicted, like an illusion, by a sublating cognition. (3) It is not invalid because it is produced by the recollection of a name, and not by the intercourse of an object with a name; for it is produced by the sense-object-intercourse, the principal cause, aided by the recollection of a name, the auxiliary cause. The sense-object-intercourse continues when a name is remembered, and produces determinate perception. The remembered name manifests its object, and does not conceal its nature. (4) Determinate perception is not invalid because it involves great effort of the self to distinguish the qualified object from its qualifications and connect them together by a synthetic act; for, in that case, perception of objects from the top of a mountain would be invalid because it involves great effort in climbing the mountain. (5) Determinate perception is not invalid because it deliberates and comprehends the relation between a preceding cognition and a succeeding cognition; for it is the self that perceives, remembers, recognizes, deliberates, desires, hates, endeavours, accepts, rejects, and feels pleasure and pain. Cognitions are momentary, and cannot deliberate and interrelate preceding and succeeding cognitions. (6) Determinate perception is not invalid because it apprehends an object which has been apprehended by indeterminate perception; for novelty (anadhigatatva) is not a test of validity of knowledge. Even a cognition of an object which has been already apprehended is valid. (7) Lastly, determinate perception is not invalid because it apprehends an object qualified by

\(^{34}\) NVTT., i. 1. 4, pp. 90-95, 102.
substance, quality, action, genus and name which are unreal constructs of imagination; for they are real entities rightly apprehended by it. It is wrong to argue that determinate perception represents the semblance of an object because it quickly follows indeterminate perception which apprehends its real nature; for, firstly, determinate perception sometimes does not follow immediately upon indeterminate perception, because recollection intervenes between these two cognitions, which cannot represent the semblance of the object apprehended by indeterminate perception; and secondly, consciousness which is formless cannot assume particular forms without coming into contact with objects. Hence the Buddhist definition of perception as an unerring cognition devoid of mental constructs (kalpanā) is wrong.55

Jaimini defines perception as a cognition produced in the self by the sense-organs which have right intercourse with real objects, which apprehends a present object. It is not cause of the knowledge of Dharma or the Moral Law, which exists in all times.56 Vācaspati urges that illusions are produced by the right intercourse of real objects with sense-organs. The objects are present and act upon the sense-organs, but cognitions are faulty. A nača acts upon the visual organ, but it is misperceived as silver which is not present. According to Prabhākara, inference involves perception of the self, which is not possible, because the self cannot have right intercourse with a sense-organ. Jayanta urges that illusion and doubt are produced by the intercourse of objects with sense-organs, and are, therefore, valid perceptions. If they are excluded from perception because they are not produced by the right intercourse of objects with sense-organs, then how can right sense-object-intercourse be known? It is imperceptible through the sense-organs. So it must be inferred from a cognition, which is its effect. But the special character of the cognition is not defined, so that right sense-object-intercourse may be inferred from it. The Māṁsaka wrongly argues that Dharma is imperceptible, because it is apprehended by supernormal perception or intuition born of a special merit generated by intense meditation. Hence the Māṁsaka definition of perception is not valid.57

55 NM., pp. 94-97. 56 MSJ., i. i. 4.
57 NVTT., i. 1. 4, p. 103; NM., pp. 100-02.
Iśvarakṛṣṇa defines perception as determinate knowledge of an object as it really is. Jayanta urges that inference also is determinate knowledge of an object as it really is. The determinate knowledge of a jar through the visual organ is perception. The determinate knowledge of a fire from the knowledge of smoke is inference. If vividness is said to be the distinctive character of perception, then inferential knowledge of a fire from smoke is vivid. If what is not known through a mark or a word is perception, then it is not determinate knowledge of an object as it really is. Perception is known by its negative mark that it is knowledge which is not derived through the medium of a mark or a word. Its positive mark is its being produced by the intercourse of its object with a sense-organ. It is not mere determinate knowledge of an object as it really is. The Sāṁkhya regards indeterminate perception as a function of the sense-organs, which is modified into the form of its object. Vācaspati urges that this definition is wrong, since it includes doubt and illusion in perception. Hence the Sāṁkhya definition of perception is not tenable.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika advocates the Anyathākhyāti theory of error; an error or illusion is the apprehension (khyāti) of an object as otherwise (anyathā) or as a different object; it is misperception of an object (e.g., a nacre) as another object (e.g., silver). This theory of error is also called Viparītakhyāti. When we perceive the qualities of silver in a nacre, we have an illusion, which is a single cognition of a perceptual character. 'This' is, in reality, a nacre endowed with brightness which recalls the memory-image of 'silver' endowed with its distinctive characters. A nacre in intercourse with the visual organ vitiated by a defect and aided by the recollection of silver is actually perceived as silver. The recollection of silver is due to the revival of its impression by the perception of similarity, e.g., brightness. The modern Nyāya explains it by jñānalakṣaṇasannahṛṣa. There is an extraordinary intercourse here through the medium of the idea of silver revived in memory. It is an acquired visual perception of silver through association. An illusion has an objective basis. It is not purely subjective. It is right so far as it apprehends the subject or the substantive element 'this', but

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NM., p. 109; NVTT., i. 1. 4, p. 103.
wrong so far as it apprehends the predicate or the attributive element 'silver'. It is wrong perception of a nacre as silver. It is misperception. It is contradicted by the sublating cognition 'this is not silver'.

An illusion is different from doubt in nature and origin. First, an illusion is a definite false perception of an object as another, but doubt is an indefinite false perception in which the mind oscillates between two objects, e.g., 'Is it a post or a man?' Secondly, an illusion is produced by the recollection of the peculiar qualities of one object, e.g., silver, while a doubtful perception is produced by the recollection of the peculiar attributes of two objects, e.g., a post and a man. The perception of a common attribute revives the impressions of the peculiar attributes of one or two objects.

The Nyāya criticizes the rival theories of error. The Mādhyamikas advocate the theory of Asatkhyāti, and regard an illusion as the apprehension (khyāti) of a non-existent (asat) object. Jayanta asks: Is an absolutely non-existent object perceived in an illusion? Or is an object non-existent here but existent elsewhere perceived in it? An absolutely non-existent object, e.g., a sky-lotus, he argues, cannot produce a cognition, and so cannot be apprehended. In fact, it cannot produce any effect, and serve any practical purpose. Further, a non-existent object is perceived as existent. So the doctrine of Asatkhyāti implies Anyathākhyāti. If an object existing elsewhere is perceived, it is not non-existent. This is the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti. The cognition of an absolutely non-existent object cannot be produced by an impression (vāsanā), since it is an effect of a past perception of a real object. It cannot be produced by another kind of impression, since there is no reason why a cognition of silver is produced, but that of a sky-flower is not produced. Hence the Mādhyamika doctrine of Asatkhyāti is not tenable.

The Yogācāras advocate the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti, and regard an illusion as the apprehension (khyāti) of a cognition (ātma) by itself, since an external object does not exist. A

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\[\text{NM, p. 181; IPP, p. 283.}^{12}\]

\[\text{NM, pp. 197-98.}^{13}\]
cognition of silver apprehends itself, there being no external silver. If this doctrine were right, Jayanta argues, then the illusion of silver would be experienced as ‘I am silver’, and not as ‘this is silver’. An internal cognition is apprehended as an external object; so an error implies Anyathākhyāti. It implies Asatkhyaṭi also because the object of the cognition of externality is non-existent. Further, the object ‘silver’ is either non-existent here but existent in some other place or absolutely non-existent. In the first alternative, an error implies Anyathākhyāti. In the second alternative, it implies Asatkhyaṭi. A cognition is, Udayana argues, in the nature of an ‘I’, which is never apprehended as an object ‘silver’ even in dream. The sublating cognition ‘this is not silver’ denies the existence of external silver, but not of a subjective cognition or ‘I’. The denial of silver here proves its existence elsewhere. Hence the Yogacāra theory of Ātmakhyāti is not tenable.

Prabhākara advocates the doctrine of Akhyāti, Vivekākhyāti or Smṛtipramaṇa, and regards an illusion as non-apprehension (akhyāti) of the distinction of the elements of perception and recollection from each other. An illusion is a composite psychosis composed of a presentative element (‘this’) and a representative element (‘silver’), which are not distinguished from each other. It is non-discrimination (vivekāgraha). ‘This’ is perceived as brightness, a common quality of a nacre and silver, which revives the impression of silver, and produces recollection of it. But the recollection is not apprehended as recollection owing to obscurcation of memory (smṛtipramaṇa). The sublating cognition removes the non-distinction of the presentative element and the representative element from each other.

Jayanta criticizes Prabhākara’s doctrine of Akhyāti. An illusion is not composed of two cognitions, perception and recollection. It is experienced as a single cognition as perception like recognition. ‘Silver’ is apprehended as an object of perception, but not as an object of recollection. According to Prabhākara, a cognition manifests or apprehends itself. Then the cognition of silver apprehends itself. But it does not apprehend itself as recollection. If it is due to lapse of memory (smṛtipramaṇa), its nature is incomprehensible. If recollection is

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apprehended as perception, it implies Anyathākhyāti. It is not apprehended as pure consciousness, because there is no pure consciousness distinct from apprehension and recollection. It is not apprehended as absence of consciousness, because it is experienced as different from swoon and intoxication. The cognition of 'silver' is as distinct as that of 'this', both being equally distinct, 'this' cannot be perceived while 'silver' is remembered. What is apprehended as 'this'? If it is a nacre, then it is perceived with all its distinctive characters, and there can be no recollection of silver due to the perception of its brightness, which is common to it and silver. Even if there is recollection of silver due to the perception of similarity, it cannot be undistinguished from the perception of 'this'. The recollection of another similar person after the perception of Devadatta is distinguished from the perception. There is no non-discrimination (aviveka) between them. The perception of silver induces a person to exert himself for the attainment of it. Silver is actually perceived, but not remembered. There is no lapse of memory. Hence Prabhākara's doctrine of Akhyāti is not valid.

Some Mīmāṁsakas advocate the doctrine of Alaukikakhyāti. We have not been able to trace it in the Mīmāṁsaka literature. According to this theory, an illusion of silver is the apprehension (khyāti) of extraordinary (alaukika) silver. Ordinary silver is an object of practical use, but extraordinary silver does not serve any practical purpose. The so-called nacre is extraordinary silver, because it is perceived as silver and cannot serve any practical purpose. Jayanta urges that it is not silver, since it is contradicted by a sublating cognition 'this is not silver', which does not apprehend extraordinariness of silver. The mere apprehension of silver does not prove its existence; but the uncontradicted cognition of silver proves it. The distinction of ordinary silver from extraordinary silver does not depend upon cognitions. Sometimes there is a cognition of the existence of silver, and sometimes there is a cognition of its non-existence. But there are no cognitions of ordinary silver and extraordinary silver. The distinction between them does not depend upon desire to act and desire not to act for the attainment of the object. A person does not act for the

**NM., pp. 178-84.**

**Ajñāṇa ko'pri nāma mīmāṁśikā svāha. NM., p. 187.**
attainment of silver, because he knows that silver is non-existent, and not because he knows the extraordinariness of existent silver. If he knows that 'this' is extraordinary silver, he cannot exert himself for its attainment. If his action is due to his misapprehension of extraordinary silver as ordinary silver, then the doctrine of Alaukikakhyāti implies Viparitakhyāti. Hence the doctrine of Alaukikakhyāti is not sound.\textsuperscript{63}

The Advaita Vedāntists advocate the theory of Anirvacaniyakhyāti, and regard indescribable (anirvacaniya) silver as the object of the illusion 'this is silver'. It is neither existent nor non-existent but indescribable. 'This' is indescribable illusory silver. Vācaspati urges that the object of the illusion is described as existent so long as it lasts, and as non-existent when it is contradicted by a sublating cognition. It is described as either existent or non-existent. So it is not indescribable. It has no similarity with any object of experience, since it is devoid of all predicates. It produces an illusion. But if it is non-existent, it cannot produce any effect. So it is not non-existent.\textsuperscript{64} Udayana asks: What is the nature of indescribability? It is either the absence of description or the absence of the cause of description. It is not the first, because description is present: 'this is silver'; 'this is not silver'. It is not the second, since the cause of description is either a cognition or an object. A cognition is not absent, since the Advaita Vedāntists admit the presence of apprehension. Nor is an object absent. Is the object existent or non-existent? If it is existent, there is the apprehension of an existent object (satkhya). If it is non-existent, there is the apprehension of a non-existent object (asatkhyāti). If it is neither existent nor non-existent, then existence and non-existence are taken in a popular sense or in a contrary sense. If they are taken in a popular sense, they can neither be affirmed nor denied of the same thing. If they are taken in a contrary sense, there can be no denial of valid knowledge nor denial of its description, if a thousand extraordinary objects are non-existent. If an indescribable object is essenceless (niḥsvabhāva), then essence is taken in the sense of existence or non-existence. If it is beyond experience, it involves self-contradiction, since it is experienced that it is beyond

\textsuperscript{63} NM., pp. 187-88. \textsuperscript{64} NVTT., i. 1. 2, p. 85.
experience. If what is experienced is not as it is experienced, then there is the apprehension of an object as different from it. So the theory of Anirvacaniyakhyāti involves Anyathākhyāti. If a non-existent object is apprehended as existent, then it can be apprehended through similarity with an existent object, which is non-existent, and it cannot be acted on. If it is so apprehended without any similarity, then anything can be apprehended as anything, which is absurd! Hence the Advaita doctrine of Anirvacaniyakhyāti is not sound."


Inference is mediate knowledge of an object (e.g., a fire) derived through the medium of the knowledge of a mark (e.g., a smoke) by virtue of the relation of invariable concomitance between them. It depends upon the perception of a mark and the recollection of invariable concomitance. First, there is the perception of a mark (liṅga), reason (hetu), or probans (e.g., a smoke) in a subject (e.g., a hill). Secondly, there is the recollection of invariable concomitance of the reason with a predicate, probandum (sādhya) or inferable object (e.g., a fire). Thirdly, there is the inference of the existence of an unperceived object or predicate (e.g., a fire) in the subject (pakṣa, e.g., the hill). This is inference for oneself. This is the analysis of the psychological process of inference. Inference is mediate knowledge, while perception is immediate knowledge. Perception apprehends present and near objects, while inference apprehends past, future and remote objects as well as present and near objects. Perception does not depend upon the knowledge of vyāpti. But inference is based upon it without which it is not possible. There is no scope for inference where we can have perception. Inference is called anumāna because it is a kind of knowledge (māna) which we get after (anu) some other knowledge or perception.

Inference is of two kinds: (1) inference for oneself (svārtha-
numāna) and (2) inference for others (parārthānumāna). The first kind of inference is a psychological process which does not require the formal statement of its different members. A person knows the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire by repeated observation. He perceives smoke in a hill, and doubts that a fire may exist there. Then he remembers the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire: 'Whatever is smoky is fiery'. From this he infers that 'the hill has a fire'. This is the psychological analysis of inference for oneself.\(^7\) The second kind of inference is intended for convincing others. It is a demonstrative inference which consists of the following five members (avayava):

1. The hill is fiery (pratijñā);
2. Because it is smoky (hetu);
3. Whatever is smoky is fiery, for example, a kitchen (udāharaṇa);
4. The hill has smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire (upanaya);
5. The hill is fiery (nigamana).

The proposition (pratijñā) is the thesis to be established, which makes a statement. The reason (hetu) states the reason for the statement. The exemplification (udāharaṇa) is the universal proposition which shows the invariable concomitance between the reason (hetu) and the inferable predicate (sādhyā) supported by an example (dṛṣṭānta). The upanaya is the application of the universal proposition to a particular instance. The nigamana is the conclusion drawn from the preceding members.

There are three terms in the demonstrative inference. The pakṣa is the subject in which the predicate (sādhyā) or inferable object is doubted.\(^11\) The sādhyā is the object that is inferred in the subject. The hetu is the mark or sign (liṅga) which indicates the presence of the inferable object or predicate (sādhyā). The pakṣa, the sādhyā and the hetu correspond to the minor term, the major term and the middle term of the Aristotelian syllogism. In the example given above: 'the hill' is the pakṣa or minor term, 'fire' is the sādhyā or major term, and 'smoke' is the hetu or middle term, or the reason for establishing a relation between the subject (pakṣa) and the predicate.

\(^7\) TSG., p. 59.
\(^11\) Sandigdhasādhyavān pakṣaḥ. TSG., p. 58.
(sādhya). They do not stand for terms but for real objects. The Nyāya is realist Logic as distinguished from nominalist and conceptualist Logic. The sādhya is also called the vyāpakā or pervader because it pervades the hetu. The hetu is also called the vyāpya or pervaded because it is pervaded by the sādhya. The middle term is pervaded by the major term. For example, smoke (hetu) is pervaded by fire (sādhya): wherever there is smoke, there is fire, but fire is not pervaded by smoke: wherever there is fire, there is no smoke. The reason (hetu) is called liṅga (sign) because it indicates the presence of the predicate (sādhya). It is also called sādhana because it is the means of proving the existence of the predicate in the subject.

There are five characteristics of the reason (hetu) or mark (liṅga): (1) existence in the subject (pakṣadharman) ; (2) existence in similar instances (sapakṣasattva) in which the predicate exists; (3) non-existence in dissimilar instances (vipakṣasattva) in which the predicate does not exist; (4) uncontradictedness (abādhita-viṣayatva) ; and (5) uncounterbalancedness (asat-pratipakṣatva). It must be present in the subject; e.g., smoke must be present in the hill. It must be present in all homogeneous instances in which the predicate exists; e.g., smoke must be present in a kitchen in which fire exists. It must be absent from all heterogeneous instances in which the predicate does not exist; e.g., smoke must be absent from a lake in which fire does not exist. It must not be incompatible with the subject; e.g., it must not aim at proving the coolness of fire. It must not be counterbalanced by the absence of counteracting reasons leading to a contradictory conclusion. These are the five characteristics of a valid reason.14 A reason with these characteristics is probative of the predicate.

The pakṣa is the subject in which the existence of a character or predicate is sought to be proved. A similar instance (sapakṣa) is one in which an inferable character or predicate is certainly known to exist. A dissimilar instance (vipakṣa) is one from which a predicate is certainly known to be absent.15

There are five members (avayava) of a demonstrative

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14 Pakṣadharman sapakṣadharman vipakṣad vyārytār abādhita-viṣayatvam asat-pratipakṣatvam ceti. NM., p. 110.
inference. (1) The first member is the proposition (pratijñā) which is the statement of the thesis to be proved. It is a judgment due to synthesis of a subject with a predicate. It is affirmation or denial of a predicate of a subject; e.g., 'sound is non-eternal.' What is inferred (sādhyā) is of two kinds: (1) a predicate (P) as related to a subject (S); (2) a subject (S) as qualified by a predicate (P). A predicate (sādhyā) is 'non-eternity of sound' or 'sound is non-eternal.' This is Vātsyāyana's view supported by Uddyotakara, which is not evidently borrowed from Dīṇnāga (500 A.D.). The proposition is different from the conclusion which states the existence of the predicate qualified by its distinctive character and known as such in the subject qualified by its distinctive character. The former is a statement to be proved while the latter is a statement proved by the inference. (2) The reason (hetuvākya) is the statement of the reason (hetu) which is favourable to the inference of the predicate. It states similarity between the subject and an example in respect of a common character which is connected with the predicate, e.g. 'because of producedness.' Or, it states dissimilarity between the subject and an example in respect of a character which is connected with the absence of the predicate. It is either affirmative or negative. The former is called sādharmyahetuvākhyā while the latter is called vaiḍharmyahetuvākya. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced, like a jar.' 'Sound is not eternal, because it is not unproduced, like a soul.' Gautama knew the three characteristics of a valid reason. It must exist in the subject. It must exist in similar instances. It must not exist in dissimilar instances. He could not borrow it from Dīṇnāga, Vātsyāyana borrowed it from Gantama. (3) The exemplification (udāharana) is a general proposition which states the invariable concomitance of the reason with the predicate illustrated by an example in which they are perceived to exist. It is of two kinds. Either it states the invariable concomitance of the presence of the reason with the presence of the predicate. Or it states the invariable concomitance of the absence of the predicate with the absence of the reason. 'Whatever is
produced is non-eternal, like a jar'. 'Whatever is unproduced is eternal, like a soul'. The statement of an example shows that the general proposition is the result of induction. Its material truth is guaranteed by induction. It embodies affirmative uniform relation (ānāyavyāpti) or negative uniform relation (vyati-rekavyāpti) between the reason and the predicate. Examples are of two kinds: homogeneous example (sādharmyadrṣṭānta) which shows invariable concomitance of the presence of the reason with the presence of the predicate; heterogeneous example (vaidharmyadrṣṭānta) which shows invariable concomitance of the absence of the predicate with the absence of the reason. (4) The application (upanaya) states the existence of the reason in the subject, which is invariably concomitant with the predicate as stated in the exemplification. It is the application of a general principle to a particular instance. It conveys the knowledge of parāmarśa or the presence of the reason pervaded by the predicate in the subject, which leads to the conclusion. It removes all doubt as to the presence of the reason in the subject without which there can be no conclusion. The proposition, the reason, and the exemplification are not adequate to prove the conclusion. The application is a necessary member of a demonstrative inference. It is affirmative or negative. 'What is produced is found to be non-eternal, e.g., a jar. Sound is so produced.' 'What is unproduced is found to be eternal, e.g., a soul. Sound is not so unproduced'. There are two kinds of reason, two kinds of exemplification, and two kinds of application. The application shows that a demonstrative inference is deductive. So it is neither inductive nor deductive but inductive-deductive or formal-material. (5) The conclusion (nigamana) is the restatement of the proposition as established. The proposition states what is to be proved, but the conclusion states what is proved.11 It synthesizes all members of a demonstrative inference, and proves the existence of the predicate in the subject. It is not a mere restatement of the proposition. It conveys the knowledge of the predicate as existing in the subject, which depends upon the prior knowledge of parāmarśa. The reason is without any basis without

11 Sādhvanirdelo hi pratijñā siddhanirdesās tu nigamanam. NM, p. 583. Nigamante! nena pratijñāhetūdaharaṇopanayā ekatreti nigamanam. NBh, i. 1. 39. NS, NBh, i. 1. 33-39; NM, pp. 570-88.
the proposition. It states the mark or sign or similarity with an example. The exemplification states the invariable concomitance of the mark or reason with the predicate as shown in an example. The application removes doubt as to the existence of the reason in the subject by stating that the reason pervaded by the predicate exists in the subject. The conclusion proves the existence of the predicate in the subject after interrelating all the members of a demonstrative inference. It cannot be called a syllogism, because it is an inductive-deductive inference.

Some ancient Naiyāyikas recognized ten members of a demonstrative inference: (1) desire to know an object of inference (jñāṇa); (2) doubt (samskṛta) as to the existence of the predicate or its contradictory in the subject; (3) capacity of the inference to prove the existence of the predicate (śākyapraṇātī); (4) the end (prayojana) that will be served by the predicate; (5) removal of doubt (saṃsavyvṛtya) due to certain knowledge of the predicate after hearing the conclusion in addition to the five members mentioned above. Jayanta urges that they are not sentences, and therefore not parts of an inference, that enquiry, doubt and end are qualities of the self which are not parts of an inference, and that they are the causes of action on an object. Varadarāja regards them as unnecessary for the conclusion. Gaṅgeśa considers them to be devoid of the characteristics of a member (avayava) of an inference.

The Nyāya demonstrative inference may be compared with the Aristotelian syllogism. First, the former consists of five members while the latter consists of three propositions. ‘All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal.’ The first proposition is the major premise; the second, the minor premise; and the last, the conclusion. The first three propositions of the Nyāya demonstrative inference correspond to the conclusion, the minor premise, and the major premise of the Aristotelian syllogism. The last three propositions of the former correspond to the major premise, the minor premise, and the conclusion of the latter. Secondly, the Nyāya inference is inductive-deductive and concerned with material truth, while

**NM., p. 585.**
**NBL., i. 1. 92; BR., p. 184; Laghūdipāka, p. 184; NM., p. 570; TCA., III., p. 698.**
the Aristotelian syllogism is deductive and concerned with formal truth. The universal major premise of the latter is not shown to be the conclusion of induction. But the exemplification (udālaraṇa) or the universal major premise of the former is the conclusion of induction from known instances. It embodies a Vyāpti or universal relation of the reason with the predicate which is established by the joint method of agreement in presence and agreement in absence. Induction (vyāpti) is the ground of deduction in the Nyāya inference. It applies an induction reached by generalisation from particular instances observed to a particular instance. Thirdly, the universal major premise of the Aristotelian syllogism is not illustrated by an example. Fourthly, the application (upanaya) contains the major term (sādhya), the minor term (pakṣa), and the middle term (hetu) interrelated to one another, while no premise of the Aristotelian syllogism contains the three terms. It states the existence of the reason (hetu) pervaded by the predicate (sādhya) in the subject (pakṣa), which makes the conclusion possible. Hence Gautama's five-membered inference is not borrowed from Aristotle's syllogism.

Gautama mentions three kinds of inference: (1) Pūrvavat; (2) Seṣavat; and (3) Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. Vātsyāyana gives two meanings of each of them. (1) A pūrvavat inference is the inference of an unperceived effect from a perceived cause. A future rainfall is inferred from dense clouds which are perceived. (2) A seṣavat inference is the inference of an unperceived cause from a perceived effect. A past rainfall in the source of a river is inferred from its fulness, muddiness of water, and swiftness of current, which are perceived. These two kinds of inference are based on the causal relation. In the first, an effect is inferred from a cause. In the second, a cause is inferred from an effect. (3) A sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is the inference of an imperceptible object from a perceived mark, which is known to be uniformly related to it. The movement of the sun is inferred from its different positions in the sky, which are perceived, even as the movement of a person is inferred from his different positions on earth. Uddyotakara and Viśvanātha observe that sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is not based on the uniformity of causation but on the non-causal uniformity. The existence of water is inferred from a row of herons perceived in
the sky. There is no causal relation between them. Vātsyāyana gives other meanings also of these kinds of inference. (1) A pūrvavat inference is based on previous experience of invariable concomitance of two perceived objects. The existence of an unperceived fire is inferred from a perceived smoke on the ground of uniform relation between them perceived in the past. (2) A śeṣavat inference is inference by elimination (pariśeṣa). Sound is not a substance because it inheres in one substance, viz., ether. It is not an action, since it is a cause of another sound. It is not a community, a particularity or inherence. So it is a quality. (3) A sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is the inference of an unperceived object from a mark which is perceived, though the relation between them is not perceived. We infer the existence of the soul from the qualities of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition, which must inhere in a substance. The soul is inferred as the substance in which they inhere.

Uddvyotakara rejects pūrvavat as an inference from a cause to an effect, and śeṣavat as an inference from an effect to a cause. He defines sāmānyatodṛṣṭa as an inference which is based on uniformity of coexistence as distinct from uniformity of causation. He recognizes three kinds of inference: (1) Anvayi; (2) Vyatireki; and (3) Anvayavyatireki. (1) Anvayi is an inference in which the reason (hetu) exists in the subject (pakṣa) and similar instances (sapakṣa), but which is devoid of dissimilar instances (vipakṣa). 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced'. It is an Anvayi inference for the Buddhists who recognize non-eternity of all things, because there are no dissimilar instances or eternal entities. (2) Vyatireki is an inference in which the reason exists in the subject, but does not exist in dissimilar instances, there being no similar instances. 'This living body is not devoid of a soul, because then it would be devoid of life.' (3) Anvayavyatireki is an inference in which the reason exists in the subject and similar instances, but does not exist in dissimilar instances. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible through our sense-organ, being possessed of a higher genus and a lower genus.' Varadarāja also mentions

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"NV., i. 1. 8. Sāmānyatodṛṣṭam kāryakāraṇabhinnaliṅgakam.
NSV., i. 1. 5.
"NBh., i. 1. 5.
"NV., i. 1. 5."
three kinds of inference: (1) Anvayi or Kevalānvayi; (2) Vyāti-
reki or Kevalavyatireki; and (3) Anvayavyatireki. (1) In
Kevalānvayi inference the reason exists in the entire subject and
all similar instances, there being no dissimilar instances. 'All
are non-eternal, because they are knowable, like a jar.' It is
a Kevalānvayi inference according to the advocates of the
doctrine of non-eternity of all things. The reason 'knowability'
exists in the subject and all similar instances. (2) In Kevalavya-
tireki inference the reason exists in the entire subject, but does
not exist in dissimilar instances, there being no similar instances.
The Vedas are created by omniscient God, because they are the
Vedas. What is not created by omniscient God is not Veda, for
instance, Kūmārasambhava'. In this kind of inference the
predicate (sādhya) is an uncommon attribute of the subject only.
'Being endued with a dewlap and the like is the characteristic of
a cow'. (3) In Anvayavyatireki inference the reason exists in
the entire subject and all similar instances, but does not exist
in dissimilar instances. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is
produced, like a jar.' Producedness exists in sound and all non-
eternal entities. But it does not exist in eternal entities.
 Bhāsarvajña and Varadarāja distinguish between Dṛṣṭa or Viśeṣa
dṛṣṭa and Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inferences. In the former
a perceptible object (e.g., a fire) is inferred from the perception
of a mark (e.g., a smoke). But in the latter an imperceptible
object (e.g., the visual organ) is inferred from the perception of
a mark (e.g., a colour).**

Gangeśa also mentions three kinds of inference: (1) Kevalān-
vayi; (2) Kevalavyatireki; and (3) Anvayavyatireki. (1) In
Kevalānvayi inference the reason (hetu) has affirmative uniform
relation with the presence of the predicate (sādhya). It has an
affirmative reason (anvayi hetu) which exists in all similar
instances (sāpakṣa), and has no dissimilar instances (vipakṣa).
'The jar is nameable, because it is knowable'. The reason
'knowability' exists in all nameable objects. There are no
nameable objects which are not nameable. The reason is not
the counter-positive entity of the negation of the predicate.***

Here the major premise is a universal affirmative proposition; it

** TR., pp. 70-72; 81-82; NSār., p. 5.
*** Asādvipakṣa atvāntābhāvaprātiyogīsādhvyakam. TCD., Benares,
cannot be a universal negative proposition. The minor premise and the conclusion also are universal affirmative propositions. ‘All knowable objects are nameable; the jar is a knowable object: therefore, the jar is nameable’. Hence the Kevalānvayi inference is a syllogism of the first mood in the first figure called Barbara of western Logic. The uniform affirmative relation (anvayavyāpti) between the reason ‘knowability’ and the predicate ‘nameability’ is established by the method of agree-in presence (anvaya). (2) In Kevalavyatireki inference the reason has negative invariable concomitance with the absence of the predicate. Its reason exists in the subject only. It is devoid of similar instances (sapakṣa) in which the reason and the predicate may coexist. It depends upon a negative invariable concomitance (vyatirekavyāpti) or uniform relation between the absence of the reason with the absence of the predicate, which is established by the method of agreement in absence. For example: ‘Earth differs from the other elements, because it has odour’. Or, ‘what is not different from the other elements has no odour; earth has odour; therefore earth is different from the other elements’. In this inference the reason ‘odour’ is the uncommon attribute of the subject ‘earth’; it is coextensive with the subject; there is no similar instance in which it may exist." In Kevalavyatireki inference the reason is the counter-positive entity of the absence which pervades the absence of the predicate. Odour is the counter-positive entity of the absence of odour which pervades the absence of difference from the other elements. Presumption is not an independent pramāṇa. It is an instance of Vyatireki inference which depends upon the knowledge of universal negative relation of the reason with the predicate. In Kevalavyatireki inference the major premise is a universal negative proposition; the minor premise, a universal affirmative proposition; and the conclusion, a universal affirmative proposition. There is no valid mood corresponding to it in western syllogisms. (3) In Anvayavyatireki inference there is a universal affirmative relation of the reason with the predicate as well as a universal negative relation between them. The

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Asatasapakṣaḥ kevalavyatireki. SM., p. 463.
Śādiyabhāvavyāpakibhātibhāvapratiyogitvam. SM., p. 463. BP., 143.
BP., 144.
former is known by the method of agreement in presence, and the latter, by the method of agreement in absence. In this inference the reason is present in similar instances, and absent from dissimilar instances. For example: (1) All smoky objects are fiery; the hill is smoky; therefore, the hill is fiery. (2) 'No non-fiery objects are smoky; the hill is smoky; therefore, the hill is fiery.' Smoke exists in similar instances, e.g., a kitchen, in which fire exists. It does not exist in dissimilar instances, e.g., a lake, in which fire does not exist.

Uddyotakara recognizes three kinds of reasons (hetu), viz., affirmative (anvayi), negative (vyatireki), and affirmative-negative (anvayavyatireki). The first has uniform affirmative relation to the predicate. The second has uniform negative relation to the predicate. The third has uniform affirmative and negative relation to the predicate. Kevalänvayi, Kevalavyatireki and Anvayavyatireki inferences have these three kinds of reasons respectively. His views are elaborated by Udayana, Varadarāja, Gaṅgeśa and his followers.

Inference is based upon Vyāpti which is the invariable concomitance of the reason (hetu) with the predicate (sādhya). It depends upon two conditions. First, the reason must be known to be present in the subject (pakṣadharmatā). Secondly, it must be known to be invariably concomitant with the predicate (vyāpti). The universal relation of the reason with the predicate (vyāpti) is the logical ground of inference. Gautama speaks of niyama and aniyama in the sense of invariable concomitance and variable concomitance of the reason with the predicate. 'What has variable concomitance with the predicate is not a valid reason.' He defines a discrepant reason (anaikāntika) as one which has variable concomitance with the predicate. He defines futility (jāti) as a sophistical refutation on the ground of mere similarity and dissimilarity of the subject with an example. This implies that it is based on mere similarity and dissimilarity unaccompanied by invariable concomitance of the reason with the predicate. Vātsyāyana speaks of avinābhāva or inseparable

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88 Gṛhitānvayavyatirekisādhyaśaksam anvayavyatireki. TCD., Benares, Samvat 1964, p. 790.
89 Sataṣapakṣavipakṣo' anvayavyatireki. SM., p. 463.
90 NS., iii. 2. 12, 69, 71; ii. 2. 16. Vyabhicārād abetah. NS., iv. 1. 8. Ibid, i. 2. 46, 50.
relation of the reason with the predicate as the ground of inference, though he does not use the word ‘vyāpti’. He speaks of it as the relation of the reason (liṅga) with the predicate (liṅgin). It is the uniform relation between them which are found to coexist in an example. The inference of a predicate from a reason on the ground of mere similarity or dissimilarity with an example is invalid, because it is not based on invariable concomitance between the reason and the predicate. Hence Vātsyāyana regards Vyāpti as the logical ground of inference. Vācaspati, Jayanta, Udayana and Varadarāja define Vyāpti as a uniform (niyata), unconditional (anaupādhika), or natural (svābhāvika) relation between the reason and the predicate. There are two kinds of Vyāpti, viz., Anvayavyāpti and Vyatirekavyāpti. The former is invariable concomitance of the presence of the reason with the presence of the predicate. The latter is the invariable concomitance of the absence of the predicate with the absence of the reason. The Vyāpti is known by the joint method of agreement in presence and agreement in absence based on repeated observation aided by favourable hypothetical reasoning. When conditions (upādhi) are not observed to vitiate the natural relation in spite of the best efforts to find them out, it is taken to be unconditional. According to Jayanta, first there is the perception of a mark; then there is the recollection of Vyāpti; then there is the knowledge of the presence of the reason pervaded by the predicate in the subject (parāmarśa); then there is the inference of the predicate in the subject. The knowledge of parāmarśa is directly the cause of inference, while the perception of Vyāpti is its cause through its recollection. The knowledge of Vyāpti is the logical ground of inference, while that of parāmarśa is its psychological ground.

Vyāpti is the unconditional uniform relation of the reason to the predicate. It is free from conditions (upādhi). Smoke has unconditional relation to fire; it is pervaded by fire; wherever there is smoke there is fire. But fire has no unconditional relation to smoke; there is fire where there is no smoke;

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81 So’yam ekasmin dravyor dharmayoḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvḥ sādhar-myād vyavasthitā upalabhya’t. NBh., i. i. 39. Ibid, ii. 2. 1.
82 Sādharṇyamātreṇa vaidhārmyamātreṇa ca sādhyasādhane pratijāyamānē svād avyavasthā. NBh., v. i. 3. Ibid, iii. 2. 12.
83 NVTT., i. i. 5, pp. 110-11; KV., pp. 295, 297; TR., p. 65; NM., pp. 122-23, 125-26.
red hot iron ball is smokeless. The relation of fire to smoke is conditional; it depends upon the presence of wet fuel as a condition. 'The hill is smoky, because it is fiery'. Wet fuel is a condition which pervades smoke (sādhya), but does not pervade fire (sādhana). Thus a condition pervades the predicate, but does not pervade the reason. Varadarāja gives the same definition of it. Both mention two kinds of upādhi, certain (niścita) and doubtful (śāṅkita). The former is known for certain to pervade the predicate, but not to pervade the reason. The latter is not definitely known either to pervade the predicate or not to pervade the reason. 'The seventh son of Maitri will be dark, because he will be born of her like her other sons,' 'Being an effect of eating a particular kind of vegetables' is a doubtful condition, since its pervasion of darkness (sādhya) and non-pervasion of being born of Maitri are not known for certain.

Kanāda maintains that a mark (hetu) is related to an inferable object (sādhya) either as its cause, or its effect, or its conjunct, or its inherent, or its opposite. Vācaspati urges that these relations of causality, conjunction, inherence and opposition are not exhaustive, but that they are some specific instances of the uniform natural relation which is the ground of inference. Jayanta also urges that these relations do not exhaust all relations between a probans and a probandum. Smoke and fire, and rainfall and flood in a river are related to each other as the indicator (gamaka) and the indicated (gamyā) not because they are causes and effects, but because there is invariable concomitance (nitya sāhacarya) between them. Two opposite things, the Vaiśeṣika may urge, cannot coexist with each other and so cannot be related to each other as the indicator and the indicated because there is no invariable concomitance between them. An existing thing, Jayanta replies, and a non-existent thing are related to each other as the indicator and the indicated because there is invariable concomitance between them.

The Nyāya refutes the Buddhist doctrine that causality and

**Upādhiḥ sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakuh. NKS., iii, p. 30. TR., p. 68.
* NKS., iii, p. 30; TR., pp. 69-70.
** VS., ix. 2. 1; NVTT., i. 1. 5, p. 110; NM., p. 117.
identity are the grounds of Vyāpti. Jayanta urges that there can be no causal relation between two moments, all things being momentary according to the Buddhists. A momentary cause cannot produce an effect in the next moment, since it cannot continue to exist for more than one moment. Even if there is causal relation between them, it is too subtle to be perceived. There can be no causal relation between two series (santāna) either, since existence consists in causal efficiency and a series being imaginary cannot produce another series. A series consists of moments, and does not continue to exist for more than one moment; but it is imagined to continue for some time. So there is no causal relation between fire-series and smoke-series. Further, if a mark and a predicate are identical with each other, they cannot be related to each other as the indicator and the indicated. Relation presupposes difference. If they are imagined to be different from each other, they may be imagined to be non-different from each other. Imaginary difference is unreal. It cannot be the basis of real inference of a predicate (gamya) from a mark (gamaka). Coinherence in the same locus cannot be said to be identity. Colour and taste are different from each other, though they inhere in the same substance. When the mark is perceived, the predicate is either manifested or not manifested to consciousness. If it is not manifested, it cannot be known to be identical with the mark. If it is manifested, then it is perceived like the mark, and there is no need of inferring it. If treeness (vrksatva) is inferred from śīhṣapātva, the latter also may be inferred from the former, since there is identity between them. But treeness exists in all kinds of trees, and so cannot be inferred from a specific kind of tree (śīhṣapātva). If identity means generic identity of a mark and a predicate, which are different as species, then also there is no object of inference as Varadarāja argues. As soon as a species is known to be a species, the genus is known because a species is a species of a genus. If the species (liṅga) is not known to exist in the subject, then nothing can be inferred. If the mark is identical with the predicate, the knowledge of the mark is the knowledge of the predicate and there is no object of inference. Vyāpti is inseparable relation between two entities. If they are identical with each other, there can be no inseparable relation them. Vācaspati urges that taste is inferred from
colour, and tide is inferred from the moon-rise, though there is neither causal relation nor identity between them.\textsuperscript{37} Hence causality and identity are not grounds of Vyāpti.

There are no formal fallacies in the Nyāya, which is not concerned with formal truth. The fallacies are faulty reasons (hetvābhāsa). All fallacies of inference are due to the fallacies of the reason or middle term, which cannot prove the existence of the predicate in the subject. The fallacies of the subject, the example and the exemplification are mentioned; but they involve fallacious reasons. Fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa) are not-reasons which are devoid of the characteristics of a valid reason, but which appear to be reasons owing to their similarity with it. They hinder the production of a valid inference of a real object, when they are known. They should be determined for the ascertainment of truth and the achievement of victory in a philosophical disputation.\textsuperscript{38}

Gautama recognizes five kinds of fallacies of the reason: (1) inconclusive (savyabhīcāra); (2) contradictory (viruddha); (3) counterbalanced (prakaraṇasama); (4) disproved (sādhyāsama); and (5) mistimed (atitakāla) or contradicted (bādhita).\textsuperscript{39}

(1) Gautama defines an inconclusive reason (savyabhīcāra or anaikāntika) as one which has variable concomitance with the predicate. Vātsyāyana defines variable concomitance as the absence of uniform relation of the reason with the predicate. A reason is conclusive, which has uniform relation to the predicate. It is inconclusive if it has concomitance with the predicate and its absence. Uddyotakara defines variable concomitance as the existence of a reason in the subject (pakṣa), similar instances (sapakṣa), and dissimilar instances (vipakṣa).

'Sound is eternal, because it is intangible'. Intangibility is concomitant with eternity and non-eternity. Intangible souls are eternal, but intangible cognitions are non-eternal. So the reason is inconclusive, irregular, erratic, or discrepant (anaikāntika).\textsuperscript{40}

Uddyotakara mentions sixteen kinds of inconclusive reasons. Bhāsarvajña mentions eight kinds of them. (1) A reason existing

\textsuperscript{37} NM., pp. 113-14, 116; TR., LD., pp. 82-84; NVTT., i. 1. 5, pp. 105-09.
\textsuperscript{38} NBh., NV., i. 2. 45; NM., p. 596; TCA., Ch. S.S., Benares, 1909, pp. 1065, 1008.
\textsuperscript{39} NS., i. 2. 45.
\textsuperscript{40} NS., NBh., NV., NVTT., i. 2. 46.
in the subject, similar instances, and dissimilar instances is inconclusive. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable.' Knowability exists in all sounds (pakṣa), all non-eternal things, e.g., jars (sapakṣa), and all eternal things, e.g., ether, soul etc. (vipakṣa). (2) A reason existing in the entire subject, some similar instances, and some dissimilar instances is inconclusive. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible.' Perceptibility exists in all sounds (pakṣa). It exists in non-eternal jars (sapakṣa), but not in non-eternal dyads (sapakṣa). It exists in eternal community (vipakṣa), but not in eternal ether (vipakṣa). Perceptibility here means perceptibility through the sense-organs. (3) A reason existing in the entire subject, all similar instances, and some dissimilar instances is inconclusive. 'This is a cow, because it has horns.' Horns exist in the entire individual 'this' (pakṣa), all cows (sapakṣa), and all buffaloes (vipakṣa), but not in horses (vipakṣa). (4) A reason, which exists in the entire subject and all dissimilar instances, and some similar instances, is inconclusive. 'This is not a cow, because it has horns.' Horns exist in 'this' individual (pakṣa), all cows (vipakṣa), and buffaloes (sapakṣa), but do not exist in horses (sapakṣa). (5) A reason, which exists in a part of the subject, some similar instances, and some dissimilar instances, is inconclusive. 'Earth is non-eternal, because it is perceptible through the senses.' Perceptibility exists in composite earth (pakṣa), but not in the atoms of earth (pakṣa); it exists in jars (sapakṣa), but not in dyads (sapakṣa), both of which are non-eternal; it exists in eternal community (vipakṣa), but not in eternal ether (vipakṣa). (6) A reason, which exists in a part of the subject, some similar instances and all dissimilar instances, is inconclusive. 'Space, time and manas are substances, because they are incorporeal.' Manas is atomic and corporeal. Incorpo-reality does not exist in manas (pakṣa), but it exists in space and time (pakṣa); it exists in souls and ether (sapakṣa), which are substances, but it does not exist in earth, water, fire and air (sapakṣa), which are substances; it exists in all dissimilar instances (vipakṣa), viz., qualities, actions, community, particularity, inherence, and negation. (7) A reason, which exists in a part of the subject, some dissimilar instances, and all similar instances, is inconclusive. 'Space, time and manas are not substances, because they are incorporeal.'
Incorporeality exists in space and time (pakh\ṣa), but not in manas (pakh\ṣa); it exists in souls and ether (vipakh\ṣa), which are substances; but it does not exist in earth, water, fire and air (vipakh\ṣa), which are substances; it exists in all similar instances or non-substances (sapakh\ṣa), *viz.*, quality, action, community, particularity, inference and negation. 8 A reason, which exists in all similar and dissimilar instances, but in a part of the subject, is inconclusive. 'Ether, time, space, souls, and manas are not substances, because they are devoid of momentary specific qualities.' Ether (pakh\ṣa) has sound, and souls (pakh\ṣa) have cognitions; sound and cognitions are momentary specific qualities. So the reason exists in a part of the subject (pakh\ṣa). Quality, action, community, particularity, inference and negation (sapakh\ṣa) are devoid of momentary specific qualities. Earth, water, fire and air (vipakh\ṣa), which are substances, are devoid of them. So the reason exists in all similar and dissimilar instances. All these reasons are inconclusive (anaikāntika). 144 Varadarāja divides inconclusive reasons into common and uncommon ones. 1 The common (sādhāraṇa) inconclusive reason exists in the subject, similar instances, and dissimilar instances. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable'. 2 The uncommon (asādhāraṇa) inconclusive reason exists in the subject only, but not in similar instances which exist. 'Earth is non-eternal, because it has odour'. Odour exists in earth only, but not in composite water, fire and air, which are non-eternal. 145 Gaṅgeśa divides inconclusive reasons into three kinds: (1) common; (2) uncommon; and (3) indefinite. Viśva-nātha defines them in the following manner. (1) A common (sādhāraṇa) inconclusive reason is one which exists in the locus of the predicate and the locus of its absence. 'Sound is eternal, because it is intangible'. (2) An uncommon (asādhāraṇa) inconclusive reason is one which exists in the subject only, and is excluded from similar and dissimilar instances. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of sound'. The character of sound exists in sound only; it does not exist in other non-eternal objects (sapakh\ṣa) and eternal objects (vipakh\ṣa). (3) An indefinite (anupasānāhāri) inconclusive reason is one which is not a counter-positive entity of the absence of the predicate, or

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144 NSār., p. 10. NTD., pp. 123-25.
145 TR., p. 220.
which exists in all objects. 'All are eternal, because they are knowable'. It hinders the knowledge of invariable concomitance of the reason with the predicate, because there is a doubt as to the existence of the predicate in all objects.¹⁰³

(2) Gautama defines a contradictory (viruddha) reason as one which contradicts the predicate, though it is employed to prove its existence. Uddyotakara observes that it contradicts an admitted truth, and is contradicted by an admitted truth. It occurs when a proposition is contradicted by a reason or a reason is contradicted by a proposition. 'Sound is eternal, because it is produced'. Producedness of sound (hetu) is known to be true by a means of valid knowledge. It contradicts the proposition 'Sound is eternal'. Producedness is pervaded by non-eternity, and so it cannot prove the existence of eternity. 'The self does not exist, because it has qualities'. The proposition contradicts the reason. If the self does not exist, it cannot have qualities. Gaṅgeśa defines a contradictory reason as a counter-positive entity of the absence which pervades the predicate. It proves the non-existence of the predicate, though it is advanced to prove its existence. 'This is fiery, because it has the character of a lake'. The character of a lake (hetu) is pervaded by the absence of fire; so it cannot prove the existence of fire.

Viśvanātha distinguishes a contradictory reason (viruddha) from a counterbalanced reason (satpratipakṣa). A contradictory reason in an inference proves the non-existence of the predicate. But a reason in one inference is counterbalanced by another reason in a different inference, which proves the non-existence of the predicate. Uddyotakara and Vācaspati distinguish a contradictory reason (viruddha hetu) from contradicting the proposition (pratijñāvirodha) which is a ground of defeat (nigaṭha-sthāna). When contradiction is shown with reference to the reason, there is a contradictory reason. When it is shown with reference to the proposition, there is contradicting the proposition. The difference between them depends upon the difference in the locus of contradiction shown.¹⁰⁴

Bhāṣarvajña mentions eight kinds of contradictory (viruddha)

¹⁰³ NSV., i. 2. 46; SM., pp. 334-35.
¹⁰⁴ NS., NBh., NV., NSV., NVTT., i. 2. 47; TCA., p. 1130; SM., p. 335.
reasons. There are four kinds of contradictory reasons when similar instances (sapakṣa) exist. (1) A reason, which exists in the entire subject and dissimilar instances, is contradictory. 'Sound is eternal, because it is produced'. Producedness exists in sound (pakṣa) and a jar (vipakṣa), which is non-eternal. Souls (sapakṣa), which are eternal, exist, but they are not produced. So producedness is a contradictory reason. (2) A reason, which exists in the entire subject and some dissimilar instances, is contradictory. 'Sound is eternal, because it is perceptible through our external sense-organs belonging to a genus'. Perceptibility exists in sounds (pakṣa) and non-eternal jars (vipakṣa), but does not exist in non-eternal pleasures (vipakṣa). Community is perceived through the external sense-organs, but it does not belong to a genus. Atoms are perceived by Yogins through the external senses, but not by us. So the reason is contradictory. (3) A reason, which exists in a part of the subject and some dissimilar instances, is contradictory. 'Sound is eternal, because it is an effect of effort.' Uttered sounds only are effects of effort, but unuttered sounds are not so. Non-eternal jars (vipakṣa) are effects of effort, but non-eternal mountains, trees etc. are not so. So the reason exists in a part of the subject and some dissimilar instances, and is therefore contradictory. (4) A reason which exists in a part of the subject and all dissimilar instances is contradictory. 'Earth is eternal, because it is produced'. Producedness exists in all non-eternal things (vipakṣa); it exists in composite earth (pakṣa), but not in the atoms of earth (pakṣa); hence it is contradictory. There are four kinds of contradictory reasons when similar instances do not exist. (5) A reason, which exists in the entire subject and all dissimilar instances, is contradictory. 'Sound is a specific quality of ether, because it is knowable'. Knowability exists in all sounds (pakṣa) and all objects devoid of the specific quality of ether (vipakṣa). There is no similar instance (sapakṣa) here, because the specific quality of ether exists nowhere else than in sound. So knowability is a contradictory reason. (6) A reason which exists in a part of the subject and some dissimilar instances (pakṣavipakṣaikadesavṛtti) is contradictory. 'Sound is a specific quality of ether, because it is an effect of effort'. The first uttered sound is an effect of effort, but the subsequent sounds produced by a sound are not so.
Jars (vipakṣa) devoid of the specific quality of ether are effects of effort, but souls (vipakṣa) devoid of it are not so. There is no similar instance (sapakṣa) here, because sound is a specific quality of ether only. So an effect of effort, which exists in parts of the subject and dissimilar instances, is contradictory. (7) A reason which exists in the entire subject and some dissimilar instances is contradictory. 'Sound is a specific quality of ether, because it is perceptible through an external sense-organ'. All sounds (pakṣa) are perceptible through an external sense-organ. Jars (vipakṣa) devoid of the specific quality of ether are perceptible through an external sense-organ, but pleasures (vipakṣa) devoid of it are not so perceptible. So perceptibility through an external sense-organ exists in the entire subject and some dissimilar instances. There are no similar instances here, because sound is a specific quality of ether only. Hence the reason is contradictory. (8) A reason which exists in a part of the subject and all dissimilar instances is contradictory. 'Sound is a specific quality of ether, because it is not in the nature of a word'. Sounds are words (pada) and non-words (apada). All objects which are not specific qualities of ether (vipakṣa) are non-words. There are no similar instances (sapakṣa) here, because sound is a specific quality of ether only. The reason exists in a part of the subject and all dissimilar instances, and is so contradictory. 188

(3) The reason which is counterbalanced by another reason, and cannot resolve the controversy as to the real character of an object, is counterbalanced (prakaraṇasama). Vātsyāyana defines it as oscillation of the mind between two contradictory characters of an object due to the indeterminate nature of an argument and a counter argument which being equally strong cannot resolve the controversy. Vācaspati calls prakaraṇasama a counterbalanced reason (satpratipakṣa). Two reasons of equal strength, proving the presence and the absence of the predicate in two arguments are counterbalanced by each other. Varadāraja explains its nature clearly. When a weak inference is contradicted by a stronger inference, the reason is contradicted (bādhita). Two inferences cannot be of equal strength, one proving the existence of the predicate, and the other proving

188 NSār., p. 9; NTD., pp. 119-22.
its non-existence. But they appear to be equally strong, and appear to prove the contradictory characters of an object, since its specific characters are not known. Gaṅgeśa observes that satpratipakṣa is a temporary flaw in an inference, which continues till the doubt as to the existence of either of the two contradictory specific qualities is dispelled. It disappears when the real character of the object is known. 'Ether is eternal, because it is an incorporeal substance, like a soul' 'Ether is non-eternal, because it has a specific quality perceptible through our external sense-organs, like a jar'. 'Sound is eternal, because it is audible, like the genus of sound'. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced, like a jar'.

Jayanta and Vācaspati distinguish a counterbalanced reason (prakaraṇapāsama) from an inconclusive reason (anaitilāntika). In the former no common character of eternal and non-eternal things, for example, admitted by both parties is taken as a reason, whereas in the latter a common character is taken as a reason, which generates a doubt. Jayanta distinguishes a counterbalanced reason from a contradictory reason. The former is not known to exist or not to exist in similar instances; nor is it known to exist in dissimilar instances; whereas the latter is known to exist in dissimilar instances. Another difference between them has already been mentioned.

(4) Gautama defines an unproven reason (sādhyāyasama) as one that requires to be proved like the predicate. But it should not require any proof. Vātsyāyana regards it as not different in logical validity from the predicate inasmuch as it requires to be proved like it. Uddotakara calls it asiddha, and mentions its three kinds, viz., prajñāpaniyadharmasamāna, āśrayāsiddha and anyathāsiddha. 'Shadow is a substance, because it has motion'. The reason 'movement of a shadow' has to be proved. Does a shadow move like a person? Or does it appear to move, because the person who conceals light moves? The movement of a shadow requires to be proved like the predicate 'substance'. So the reason is unproven (asiddha). Vācaspati mentions four kinds of asiddha. (1) 'Sound is eternal, because it is visible'. Here the reason 'visibility' is svarūpāsiddha, because

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194 NS., NBh., NVTT., NSV., i. 2. 48; TR., p. 221; NSār., p. 12; TSD., p. 62; TCA., p. 1141.
195 NM., pp. 602-03. NVTT., p. 236. NSV., i. 2. 47.
it does not exist in sound. (2) 'God is not the agent of the world, because he is bodiless'. An atheist does not admit the existence of God; hence for him the reason ‘bodilessness’ is without any locus or āśrayāsiddha. (3) ‘He is dark, because he is a son of Maitra, like his other sons’. A son’s complexion has variable concomitance with heredity from his father, since it depends on the nature of the diet taken by the child, which is a condition (upādhi). So here the reason is anyathāsiddha. (4) A reason is ekadeśāsiddha or bhāgāsiddha, which exists in a part of the subject. ‘Sound is an effect of effort’. Uttered sounds only are effects of effort, but unuttered sounds are not so. So the reason is bhāgāsiddha.108 Jayanta mentions four new varieties of asiddha. (1) ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is visible’. The reason is ubhayāsiddha, because both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā admit that visibility does not exist in sound. (2) ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced’. The Mīmāṃsā regards it as unproven (asiddha), but the Nyāya regards it as proven (siddha). So it is anyatarāsiddha. (3) ‘This place is fiery, because it has doubtful smoke or vapour’. The reason is doubtful and unproven (sandīgdhāsiddha). (4) ‘Sound is eternal, because the crow is black’. The reason ‘blackness’ is vyadhikaraṇāsiddha, because it exists in a locus which is different from the subject. Bhāṣaravajña mentions some new varieties of asiddha. (1) A reason is viśeṣyāsiddha when the substantive (viśeṣya) in it is unproven. ‘Sound is non-eternal, because of its visibility (viśeṣya) while it comes under a genus’. Visibility of sound is unproven (viśeṣyāsiddha). (2) A reason is viśeṣaṇāsiddha when the attributive (viśeṣaṇa) in it is unproven. ‘Sound is non-eternal, because of its coming under a genus (viśeṣya) while it is visible (viśeṣaṇa)’. The reason is viśeṣaṇāsiddha, since visibility of sound is unproven. (3) A reason is vyarthaviśeṣyāsiddha when the substantive in it is needless. ‘Sound is non-eternal, because of its coming under a genus (viśeṣya) while it is produced (viśeṣaṇa)’. ‘Being produced’ is adequate to prove non-eternity; hence ‘coming under a genus’ is needless. (4) A reason is vyarthaviśeṣaṇāsiddha when the attributive in it is needless. ‘Sound is non-eternal, because of its producedness (viśeṣya) while it comes under a genus

108 NS., NBh., NV., i. 2. 49; NVTT., pp. 237-38.
'Producedness' is adequate to prove non-eternity - hence 'coming under a genus' is needless. (5) A reason is sandigdha-visēṣya-siddha when the substantive (visēṣya) in it is doubtful. 'Kapila is yet tainted with attachment and aversion, because of his unproduced knowledge of reality (visēṣya) while he is a person (visēṣaṇa). His being a person is not doubtful; but whether his knowledge of reality is unproduced is doubtful. So the reason is sandigdha-visēṣya-siddha. (6) A reason is sandigdha-visēṣaṇa-siddha when the attributive in it is doubtful. 'Kapila is yet tainted with attachment and aversion, because of his being a person (visēṣya) while he is always devoid of the knowledge of reality (visēṣaṇa). His being a person is not doubtful; but whether he is always devoid of the knowledge of reality is doubtful. So the reason is sandigdha-visēṣaṇa-siddha. (7) A reason is viruddha-visēṣya-siddha when the substantive in it, which is contradictory to the predicate, is unproven. 'Sound is non-eternal, because of its unproducedness (visēṣya) while it is incorporeal (visēṣaṇa). Incorporeal is not contradictory to non-eternity, since non-eternal cognitions are incorporeal. But unproducedness is contradictory to non-eternity, and it is not proved. So the reason is viruddha-visēṣya-siddha. (8) A reason is viruddha-visēṣaṇa-siddha when the attributive in it, which is contradictory to the predicate, is unproven. 'Sound is non-eternal, because of its incorporeality (visēṣya) while it is unproduced (visēṣaṇa). Its incorporeality is not contradictory to non-eternity, since incorporeal cognitions are non-eternal. But its unproducedness, which is contradictory to non-eternity, is unproven. Varadarāja mentions ajñāna-siddha and vyāpyatvāsiddha among the different kinds of asiddha. 'Devadatta will be rich, because he has merits which are the cause of richness. The reason is ajñāna-siddha, because the invariable concomitance of merits with richness is not known. What is called anyathā-siddha by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati is called vyāpyatvāsiddha by Varadarāja. He defines it as a reason which has variable or conditional concomitance with the predicate. Gaṅgeśa and his followers mention three kinds of unproved reasons (asiddha): (1) svarūpa-siddha; (2) āśraya-siddha; and (3) vyāpyatvāsiddha. Viśvanātha defines them as follows: (1) Svarūpa-siddhi is the
absence of a reason invariably concomitant with the predicate from the subject. 'A lake is a substance, because it has smoke'.

(2) Āśrayāsiddhi is the absence of a quality that determines the special character of the subject from it. 'A golden mountain is fiery, because it has smoke'. A mountain is not golden.

(3) Vyāpyatvāsiddhi is the absence of invariable coexistence of a reason and the predicate in the same locus. It is either sādhanāprasiddhi or sādhyāprasiddhi. Sādhanāprasiddhi or vyāpyatvāsiddhi is the absence of a quality which determines the distinctive character of a reason from it. 'The hill has a fire, because it has golden smoke'. Goldenness does not exist in smoke. Sādhyāprasiddhi is the absence of a quality which determines the distinctive character of the predicate from it. 'The hill has golden fire, because it has smoke'. Goldenness does not exist in a fire.\footnote{SM., pp. 338-39.}

(5) Gautama defines a mistimed reason (kālātyayopadīṣṭa) as one that partly exists at some other time than when it is intended. Vātsyāyana interprets it in this manner. 'Sound is durable, because it is manifested by conjunction, like colour'. The colour of a jar is manifested or perceived owing to the conjunction of the jar with light, which exists before its manifestation. So sound, which already exists, is manifested or perceived owing to the conjunction of a drum with a stick. Therefore sound is durable, because it is manifested by conjunction. Manifestability by conjunction is a faulty reason, because it is mistimed. The colour of a jar is perceived at the time when there is conjunction of the jar with light. But sound is perceived at a distance after conjunction of a drum with a stick has ceased. The perception of sound is not synchronous with the conjunction of a drum with a stick; hence it is not due to the conjunction. In the absence of the cause there is the absence of the effect. So manifestability by conjunction is a mistimed reason for durability of sound. Uddyotakara gives the same meaning of kālātyayopadīṣṭa.\footnote{NS., NBh., NV., i. 2. 50.} But Vācaspati takes it in the sense of a contradicted reason (bādhita). It is contradicted by perception, inference, and Vedic testimony. Varadarāja adds comparison which contradicts an inference. (1) 'Fire is cold, because it is a substance'. It is contradicted by perception.
which apprehends hotness of fire. (2) 'Atoms are made of parts, because they are corporeal'. It is contradicted by inference, which proves partlessness of atoms which have the minutest magnitude. (3) 'Sacrifices are not the means of attaining heaven'. It is contradicted by Vedic testimony. (4) 'An animal like a cow is not a gavaya (wild cow), because it is an object'. It is contradicted by comparison. Bhāsarvajña mentions (1), (2), (3), and the following three kinds of contradicted reason. (4) 'All fire is non-hot, because it has colour'. Moon-light is perceived to be non-hot. But fire, sun-light and the like are perceived to be hot. So a part of the subject having the predicate is contradicted by perception (pratyakṣaikadeśaviruddha). (5) 'Fluidity, colour, taste, smell, and touch of eternal substances are eternal, because they subsist in atoms, producing homogeneous substances without residing in a place, like oneness subsisting in them'. Acquired fluidity of the atoms of earth and fire is due to heating. Colour, taste, smell and touch of the atoms of earth are due to conjunction with heat. So a part of the subject having the predicate is contradicted by inference (anumānaikadeśaviruddha). (6) 'The bodies of gods and sages are made of earth, because they are bodies like ours'. The bodies of some gods and sages are declared by the Vedas to be made of water, fire and air. So a part of the subject having the predicate is contradicted by testimony (āgamaikadeśaviruddha). Jayanta denies an inference contradicted by another inference. Two inferences of equal strength do not contradict each other. If they are of unequal strength, the weaker inference is vitiated by a faulty reason. So it is not invalidated by another inference.\[113\]

A contradicted reason (bādhita) is one which is contradicted by some other means of valid knowledge, whereas a mistimed reason (kālātayayopadīṣṭa or kālāṭīta) is one which is not synchronous with the predicate and hence incapable of proving its existence in the subject. A contradicted reason (bādhita) is different from a contradictory reason (viruddha). The former is contradicted by some other pramāṇa, perception, inference, comparison or testimony,—which proves the contradictory of the predicate in the subject, while the latter proves the

[113 NVTT., p. 239; TR., pp. 228-30; NSār., p. 11; NKL., p. 15.]
contradictory of the predicate in the same inference. A contradicted reason (bādhita) is different from a counterbalanced reason (satpratipakṣa). The former is contradicted by some other pramāṇa, which indubitably proves the contradictory of the predicate, while the latter is counterbalanced by another reason in another inference which seeks to prove the contradictory of the predicate, and thus produces an unsettled state of the mind as to the real character of an object. In the former there is certain knowledge of the absence of the predicate, while in the latter there is a doubt as to the existence or the non-existence of the predicate in the subject. 114

6 Bhāsarvajñā mentions another fallacy of reason, viz., indeterminate reason (anadhyavasita), which exists in the subject only, and does not prove the existence of the predicate in it. It is different from Kevalānvayi inference in which the reason exists in the subject only. The former does not prove the existence of the predicate in the subject, while the latter proves it. Śivāditya defines Anadhyavasita as a reason which exists in the subject only, which does not exist in similar instances, and which is not excluded from dissimilar instances, and cannot, therefore, prove the existence of the predicate in the subject. Bhāsarvajñā mentions six kinds of indeterminate reasons.

1. An indeterminate reason exists in the subject, similar and dissimilar instances being absent. ‘All positive entities are eternal, because they are existent.’ Existence exists in all positive entities (pakṣa), there being no similar and dissimilar instances. It cannot prove the existence of eternity in them, since it is neither present in similar instances nor absent from dissimilar instances. (2) An indeterminate reason exists in a part of the subject, there being no similar and dissimilar instances. ‘All positive entities are non-eternal, because they are produced.’ Producedness exists in non-eternal entities, but not in eternal entities. It cannot prove the existence of non-eternity, because it is not present in similar instances and absent from dissimilar instances. (3) An indeterminate reason exists in the entire subject only, where there are similar and dissimilar instances. ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is a specific quality of ākāśa.’ There are other non-eternal things and eternal things.

114 NSV., i. 2, 47; NŚr., p. 7; PDP., pp. 35-36.
But sound is the specific quality of ākāśa only. It cannot prove non-eternity, since it is neither present in similar instances, nor absent from dissimilar instances. (4) An indeterminate reason exists in a part of the subject, where there are similar and dissimilar instances. 'All substances are non-eternal, because they are endued with action.' Qualities and actions are similar instances, because they are non-eternal. Community, particularity and inherence are dissimilar instances, because they are eternal. Earth, water, fire, air etc. are endued with action. But ether, space and time are inactive. So activity exists in a part of the subject. Corporeal substances only are active; incorporeal substances are inactive. Activity does not exist in similar instances and dissimilar instances. So being endued with action cannot prove non-eternity. (5) An indeterminate reason exists in a part of the subject, where similar instances exist, but dissimilar instances do not exist. 'All effects are eternal, because they are produced.' There are no dissimilar instances, since all non-eternal effects constitute the subject. Ether, time and space, which are eternal, are similar instances. But they are not produced. So producedness cannot prove eternity. (6) An indeterminate reason exists in a part of the subject, where similar instances exist, but dissimilar instances do not exist. 'All effects are eternal, because they are made of parts.' Being made of parts is being produced by them, which exists in jars and the like, but does not exist in cognitions and the like. It exists in a part of the subject. All effects being the subject, there are no dissimilar instances. Ether, space, time and souls being eternal are similar instances. But they are not made of parts, because they are incorporeal and partless. So being made of parts does not prove eternity.

Varadarāja includes the indeterminate reason (anadhyavasita) in the uncommon inconclusive reason (asādhāraṇa anaikāntika). 115

Some recognize aprayojakā hetu as another fallacy of the reason. A prayojakā hetu is a reason which is supported by a favourable hypothetical reasoning (tarka) which removes doubt as to its variable concomitance with the predicate. An aprayojakā hetu is devoid of such hypothetical reasoning. Jayanta and Varadarāja regard it as anyathāsiddha or vyāpyat-

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vāsiddha. Jayanta regards it as a reason that is not probative of the predicate, and is common to all fallacies of the reason. 'Atoms are non-eternal, because they are corporeal.' Corporeality is not probative of non-eternity; it is an aprayojaka hetu. Jayanta does not recognize an antinomic reason (viruddhāvyabhicāri). 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced, like a jar.' 'Sound is eternal, because it is audible, like the genus of sound.' Two reasons proving the existence of two contradictory properties cannot exist in the same subject. These two inferences produce a doubt in the mind as to whether sound is non-eternal or eternal. They are devoid of the characteristics of inconclusive reasons (anaikāntika).

Fallacies of the example (dṛṣṭāntābhāsa) are mentioned. Jayanta mentions three kinds of faulty homogeneous examples: (1) devoid of the predicate (sādhyavikala); (2) devoid of the reason (sādhanavikala); (3) devoid of both (ubhayavikala). (1) 'Sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal; whatever is incorporeal, is eternal, like a cognition'. The example, cognition, is devoid of the predicate, eternity (sādhyavikala) (2) 'Like an atom'. The example, an atom, is devoid of the reason, incorporeality (sādhanavikala). (3) 'Like a jar'. The example, a jar, is devoid of eternity (sādhya) and incorporeality (sādhanā). There are three kinds of faulty heterogeneous examples: (1) not excluded from the predicate (sādhyāvyāvṛtta); (2) not excluded from the reason (sādhanāvyāvṛtta); (3) not excluded from both (ubhayāvyāvṛtta). (1) 'Sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal; whatever is devoid of incorporeality, is devoid of eternity, like atoms'. Atoms are not devoid of eternity (sādhyaāvyāvṛtta). (2) 'Like a cognition'. Cognition is not devoid of incorporeality (sādhanāvyāvṛtta). (3) 'Like ether'. Ether is not devoid of eternity and incorporeality (ubhayāvyāvṛtta). These are the six kinds of faulty examples. But Jayanta considers them to be really fallacies of the reason (hetvābhāsa). Varadarāja does not mention them, because they are included in faulty reasons.

Fallacies of the subject (pakṣābhāsa) are mentioned. Jayanta mentions eleven kinds of faulty subjects. (1) 'Fire is non-hot'. It is contradicted by perception (pratyakṣaviruddha). (2) 'The visual organ does not apprehend colour'. It is contradicted

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118 NM., pp. 697, 611; TR., p. 232; NKL., p. 15.
117 NKL., pp. 19, 11. TR., p. 236.
by inference (anumānaviruddha). (3) 'Liquor should not be drunk by a Brāhmaṇa'. It is contradicted by scriptural testimony (āgamaviruddha). (4) 'The moon is not possessed of a hare' (sāṣi). It is contradicted by common usage (lokapraśiddhaviruddha). The big cavity in the moon is called a hare by common people. (5) 'Sound is eternal'. It is contradicted by the Nyāya doctrine (svaśiddhāntaviruddha). (6) 'My mother is barren'. It is self-contradictory (svavacanaviruddha), because there is a contradiction between the subject and the predicate of the proposition. (7) 'The animal resembling a cow is not a wild cow (gavaya)'. It is contradicted by comparison (upamānaviruddha). (8) 'This earth is rent by the horns of a hare'. The qualification of the subject is known to be non-existent (aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa). (9) 'The horn of a hare is sharp'. The subject is known to be non-existent (aprasiddhaviśeṣya). (10) 'This son of a barren mother is armed with a bow made of the horns of a hare'. The subject and its qualification both are known to be non-existent (aprasiddhaviśeṣyaraviśeṣaṇa). (11) If the subject and the predicate of a proposition are proved by some other means of valid knowledge, then there is a faulty subject (pakṣābhāsa) because there is nothing to be proved. 'Fire is hot'. 'Snow is cold'. These are known by perception, and do not require any inference to prove them. Jayanta considers the fallacies of the subject as really faulty reasons.118

Bhāsarvajña mentions twelve kinds of faulty exemplifications (udāharanābhāsa). They appear to be exemplifications (udāharana), though they are devoid of their characteristics. The conclusion 'the manas is non-eternal, because it is corporeal'. It is based on the following fallacious exemplifications. (1) 'What is corporeal is non-eternal, like atoms'. Atoms are devoid of non-eternity. So the exemplification is devoid of the predicate (sādhya-vikāla). (2) 'What is corporeal is non-eternal, like action'. Action is devoid of corporeality. So the exemplification is devoid of the reason (sādhanavikāla). (3) 'What is corporeal is non-eternal, like ether'. Ether is devoid of non-eternity and corporeality. So the exemplification is devoid of the predicate and the reason (ubhayavikāla). (4) 'What is corporeal is non-eternal, like the horn of an ass'. An ass has

118 NKL., pp. 9-10.
no horn. The exemplification is devoid of an example or locus (āśrayaḥśa). (5) 'Like a jar'. There is no mention of invariable concomitance of the reason with the predicate in the exemplification (avyāptyaabhidhāna). (6) 'What is non-eternal is corporeal'. The exemplification mentions an opposite invariable concomitance (vīpārtīvyāptyaabhidhāna). The manas is non-eternal. Therefore it is corporeal. But the given conclusion is 'The manas is non-eternal'. Here the predicate and the reason are replaced by each other. These are the fallacies of homogeneous exemplification (sādharmyodāharaṇābhaṣa). (7) 'What is not non-eternal is not corporeal, like atoms'. Atoms are not devoid of corporeality. So the exemplification is not excluded from the reason (sādhanāvyāvṛtta). (8) 'What is not non-eternal is not corporeal, like action'. Action is not devoid of non-eternity. So the exemplification is not excluded from the predicate (sādhyāvyāvṛtta). (9) 'What is not non-eternal is not corporeal, like a jar'. A jar is not devoid of non-eternity and corporeality. So the exemplification is not excluded from the predicate and the reason (ubhayāvyāvṛtta). (10) 'What is not non-eternal is not corporeal, like a sky-flower'. A sky-flower is non-existent. So the exemplification has no locus standi (āśrayaḥśa). (11) 'Like ether'. Here the invariable concomitance of the reason with the predicate is not mentioned. So the exemplification is devoid of vyāpti (avyāptyaabhidhāna). (12) 'What is not corporeal is not non-eternal, like ether'. The reason and the predicate are replaced by each other. So the exemplification mentions an opposite vyāpti (vīpārtīvyāptyaabhidhāna). These are the fallacies of heterogeneous exemplifications (vaidharmyodāharaṇābhaṣa).

Bhāsarvajña mentions eight other fallacious exemplifications on the basis of doubt. (1) 'This person will become a sovereign of a large kingdom, because he is born of Soma family like a royal person' (sandigdhasādhya). The predicate is doubtful, because all persons born of Soma family may not become sovereigns. (2) 'This person is not omniscient, because he has attachment and aversion, like a man in the street' (sandigdhasādhuha). Here the reason is doubtful. It is doubtful that attachment and aversion are the reason for non-omniscience. (3) 'This person will go to heaven, because he has acquired pure virtue, like Devadatta' (sandigdhoṣhaya). Here the predicate
and the reason both are doubtful. (4) 'This person is not omniscient, because he talks much like a future son of Devadatta' (sandigdhaśraya). The example, a future son of Devadatta, is doubtful. These are doubtful homogeneous exemplifications.

(5) 'He who will not be a sovereign of a large kingdom, will not be born of Soma family, like another royal person' (sandigdhasādhyāvṛttta). The example is not devoid of the doubtful predicate. Sovereignty of a person not born of Soma family is doubtful. (6) 'He who is omniscient, is devoid of attachment like a person, versed in all Sāstras'. A person versed in all Sāstras is not devoid of the doubtful reason 'being endued with attachment' (sandigdhasādhanāvyāvṛttta). (7) 'He who will not go to heaven, has not acquired pure virtue, like a distressed person'. A distressed person is not devoid of the doubtful reason and the doubtful predicate (sandigdhobhayāvṛttta). (8) 'He who is omniscient will not talk much, like an unborn son of Devadatta'. The example is doubtful (sandigdhaśraya). These are doubtful heterogeneous exemplifications.\textsuperscript{119}

Certain other fallacies are exposed by critics in the arguments of the opponents in the philosophical treatment of a topic, viz., begging the question (ātmāśraya), mutual dependence (anonyāśraya), vicious circle (cakraka), and infinite regress (anavasthā). Varadarāja and Viśvanātha include them in hypothetical reasoning (tārka), which are not favourable to a valid conclusion. (1) Ātmāśraya corresponds to begging the question (petitio principii). It occurs when the proposition depends upon itself, and not on an independent reason, or when the reason depends upon the proposition, and gives rise to an undesirable contingency. It takes three forms, as the predicate of the proposition depends upon itself for its production, existence, and knowledge. 'This is a jar, because it is produced by this jar'. If this jar were produced by itself, it would not exist at a succeeding moment which is not the locus of this jar. 'This is a jar, because it exists in this jar'. If this jar exists in itself, it is not pervaded by this jar. 'This is a jar, because it is identical with the knowledge of this jar'. If this jar is identical with its knowledge, it will be produced by the aggregate of the causes of its knowledge. These are examples of ātmāśraya.

\textsuperscript{119} NSār., pp. 13-14.
(2) Mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya) occurs when the proposition depends upon the reason, and the reason depends upon the proposition, and these give rise to an undesirable contingency. It is mutual dependence of the proposition and the reason. The Advaita Vedāntist argues that ignorance (avidyā) resides in the individual self (jīva), which is Brahmān limited by ignorance (avidyā). This argument involves mutual dependence. Avidyā depends upon the jīva, and the jīva depends upon avidyā.

(3) Argument in a circle (cakraka) occurs when the conclusion of a chain of arguments is already assumed as a reason at the outset. Here also there is mutual dependence of the proposition and the reason in a chain of arguments. Viśvanātha confines this fallacy to a chain of not more than four arguments.

(4) Infinite regress (anavasthā) consists in regressus ad infinitum. It occurs when a reason requires to be proved by another reason, that reason by another, and so on ad infinitum. In it no reason is established in a chain of arguments. A reason must be accepted by a disputant and an opponent in every valid inference. Equalizing infinite regress also involves infinite regress. It consists in opposing an argument by urging that its reason requires to be proved by another reason, which depends on another reason, and so on to infinity. Varadarāja considers these four fallacies as unfavourable hypothetical reasoning. A reason vitiated by them commits svarūpāsiddhi, but not vyāpītyāsiddhi. These fallacies should be avoided in a philosophical discussion.\textsuperscript{188}

5. Philosophical Disputation (Kathā), Quibbles (Chala), Sophistical Refutations (fāti), and Grounds of Defeat (Nigrahasthāna).

Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara mention three kinds of philosophical disputation (kathā), viz., discussion (vāda), wrangle (jalpa), and cavil (vitaṇḍā). Vācaspati defines kathā as a chain of arguments and refutations by many disputants and opponents. In it a thesis is established by a disputant, which is refuted by an opponent, who establishes an antithesis. Discussion is carried on between a pupil and a teacher for the ascertainment of truth. Wrangle and cavil aim at victory in debate. Varadarāja

\textsuperscript{188} NSV., i. 1. 40; v. 1. 9; TR., p. 234; NM., p. 527.
describes its different parts. Some mention its six parts: (1) enunciation of the object of investigation and determination of the means of proving it; (2) the kind of philosophical disputation to be employed; (3) fixing the disputant and the opponent; (4) appointing the president and fixing his power of regulating the conduct of the members of the assembly; (5) the parties' promise to expose some or all points of defeat; (6) convention to wind up the discussion. Others mention four parts of a philosophical disputation: (1) the procedure of the disputant's argument; (2) the procedure of the opponent's refutation; (3) the regulation of the conduct of the assembly; (4) the fixing of the powers of the president. A writer agreed upon by both parties to put down the arguments and the refutations should be appointed, if one is found necessary. The disputant and the opponent should be of equal intellectual equipment as far as possible, and be able to carry on discussion as experts on a philosophical topic. A discussion between a specialist and a novice is fruitless. The members of the assembly should be of an odd number, approved by both parties, devoid of attachment and aversion, well-grounded in the subject-matter of discussion, and able to comprehend and remember the arguments and refutations. The president should be approved by the parties and the members of the assembly, be impartial and dispassionate, and able to favour a rational argument and disfavour a fallacious argument. He should announce the result of the philosophical disputation in conformity with the verdict of the majority of the members of the assembly in the absence of unanimity. Discussion (vāda) may be carried on without interrogators between teachers and pupils. Casual visitors approved by both parties may be admitted to the assembly and permitted to expose fallacies in arguments and refutations in a discussion for the ascertainment of truth.¹⁷¹

Discussion (vāda) is the establishment of a thesis by a disputer and its refutation and the establishment of an antithesis by an opponent by means of five-membered inferences and hypothetical reasoning (tarka) without deviating from the established tenets. Two parties dispute about an object, and defend their thesis and attack their antithesis by inferences formally stated

¹⁷¹ NBh., NV., i. 2. 42; TR., 76; LĐ., pp. 206-09. NSār., p. 15; NVTT., i. 2. 1.
in the form of five members and hypothetical reasoning (tarka), which is an aid to valid reasoning. The conclusions established should not deviate from the established tenets. The self is either existent or non-existent. It cannot be both. Discussion aims at the ascertainment of the real character of the self. It does not require an assembly, an impartial expert, a president, and members. An interrogator is not indispensable, but if one comes by chance, he should not be excluded. A disputant and an opponent end the dispute by themselves without the help of an interrogator. A pupil and a teacher carry on discussion for the determination of truth without aiming at victory. Discussion (vāda) differs from a wrangle (jalpa) and a cavil (vitaṇḍā) which are motivated by a desire for victory. It differs from a wrangle, which employs quibbles (chala), futileities (jāti), and processes worthy of rebuke (nigrahaśthāna), which are not employed in it. Valid inference and hypothetical reasoning are not employed in a wrangle. A discussion differs from a cavil in which a caviller refutes a thesis, but does not establish his antithesis by adducing a reason for it. It results in certain knowledge of the real character of an object which was not known before, removal of doubt, and acceptance of the position proved by valid inference and hypothetical reasoning.\(^{122}\)

There should not be faulty members of an inference (avaya-vābhaśa) and faulty reasons (hettvābhāsa) in a discussion. All grounds of defeat (nigrahaśthāna) should not be exposed in it. Only the incomplete (nyūna), the overcomplete (adhika), deviating from the accepted truth (āpasiddhānta), and faulty reasons (hettvābhāsa) should be exposed. This is the view of some Naiyāyikas. But Jayanta opines that all fallacies should be exposed in a discussion for the ascertainment of the real character of the object of investigation. One should not think, Vācaspati asserts, that the grounds of defeat, which are exposed in a discussion, should not be exposed in a wrangle and a cavil, and that those which are exposed in them should not be exposed in a discussion.\(^{123}\)

A wrangle (jalpa) is the establishment of a thesis by a five-membered inference and its refutation by quibbles, futileities and

\(^{122}\) NBh., NV., NVTT., NSV., i. 2. 42; TR., 77, pp. 210-11; NV., i. 2. 42; NM., p. 593; NKL., pp. 13-14; NVTT., i. 2. 42.

\(^{123}\) NM., p. 593; NBh., NVTT., i. 2. 42.
processes containing grounds of defeat. In it a disputant proves a thesis by a valid inference and a valid hypothetical reasoning without violating the accepted tenets, and an opponent refutes it by means of quibbles, futilities and processes worthy of rebuke. Quibbles are fallacies of equivocation. Futilities are sophistical refutations on the ground of mere parity and disparity. The processes worthy of rebuke are grounds of defeat due to mis-comprehension or non-comprehension. Vātsyāyana thinks that in a wrangle quibbles, futilities and grounds of defeat are employed as subordinate to a valid inference to protect one's thesis from attacks, but that they can independently refute an antithesis. But Uddyotakara and Vācaspati opine that quibbles, futilities and grounds of defeat can never prove or disprove anything either independently or as subordinate to valid inferences because they are invalid sophistical arguments, and can never protect one's thesis from attacks. But they are employed for the achievement of victory in a philosophical disputation. A wrangle is actuated by a desire for victory, and not by a desire for the determination of truth.\textsuperscript{124}

A cavil (vitaṇḍā) is a kind of wrangle (jalpa) in which an opponent simply attacks a disputant's thesis, but does not establish his antithesis. It is a philosophical disputation which is motivated by a desire for victory and devoid of the establishment of an antithesis. In it a caviller refutes a disputant's thesis by employing quibbles, futilities and grounds of defeat, but he neither enunciates his thesis nor proves it by adducing any reason for it. A wrangle and a cavil should be employed to protect the ascertainment of truth from attacks, even as sprouts are protected by a fence of thorns. They should be employed to refute the arguments of heterodox thinkers in order to protect the earnest seekers of truth from laxity of faith in the reality.\textsuperscript{125}

A quibble (chala) consists in attacking a proposition by assuming another meaning of a word, which is not intended by the speaker. It is of three kinds, viz., verbal quibble (vākchala), quibble in respect of a genus (sāmānyachala), and metaphorical quibble (upacārachala). (1) A verbal quibble consists in intentionally taking a word in a sense different from what is intended

\textsuperscript{124} NS., NBh., NV., NVTT., l. 2. 43.
\textsuperscript{125} NS., NBh., NVTT., l. 2. 44; NM., p. 596; TR., pp. 214-16; NS., iv. 2. 50; NKL., pp. 13-14.
by the speaker. A speaker says, 'This boy is navakambala (possessed of a new blanket)'. A quibbler attacks his proposition by saying, 'This boy is not navakambala (possessed of nine blankets), for he has only one blanket'. The word nava means 'new' and 'nine'. The speaker uses it in the first sense. The quibbler uses it in the second sense. (2) A quibble in respect of a genus consists in asserting the falsity of a proposition, which is true in a generic sense. A speaker says, 'A Brähmana is possessed of learning and good conduct'. A quibbler replies, 'Then a Brähmana, who is not yet invested with sacred thread, should possess learning and good conduct'. The speaker means that a Brähmana, who is invested with sacred thread and has learnt the Śāstras from a teacher, is possessed of learning and good conduct. He does not mean that a Brähmana, who has not yet attained the age of studying the Śāstras, is possessed of learning and good conduct. Here the quibble consists in intentionally widening the meaning of a word, which is used in a narrow sense by a speaker. This quibble is in respect of a generic character. Birth in a Brähmana family is not a valid reason for the possession of learning and good conduct. The speaker does not intend it as their mark. Study and sense-control are their mark without which a Brähmana cannot possess learning and good conduct. (3) A quibble in respect of a metaphor consists in denying the intended metaphorical meaning of a word by taking it in a literal sense. A speaker says, 'The scaffolds cry out'. A quibbler replies, 'The persons on the scaffold cry out'. Here a word taken in a metaphorical sense by a speaker is intentionally taken in a literal sense by a quibbler. Or, a word taken in a literal sense by a speaker is intentionally taken in a metaphorical sense by a quibbler. A speaker says, 'The jar is blue'. A quibbler replies, 'The jar cannot be identical with blue colour'. A word should be taken in the sense which is intended by the speaker. It should not be taken in a different sense, which is not intended by him.\footnote{NS., NBh., i. 2. 51-55.}

It is urged that a quibble in respect of a metaphor does not differ from a quibble in respect of a word, because in both a word is taken in a sense different from what is intended by
the speaker. This is not right. A metaphorical quibble is different from a verbal quibble. In a metaphorical quibble there is a denial of the existence of the object (dharmin) conveyed by a metaphor. Those who cry are not the scaffolds. But in a verbal quibble there is no denial of the existence of the object conveyed by a word, but its attribute is taken in a different sense. There is no denial of 'blanket' in a boy, but its attribute nava is taken in the sense of 'nine'. So in a verbal quibble there is attribution of a different meaning to a word. In a metaphorical quibble the existence of an object possessed of an attribute (dharmin) is denied, whereas in a verbal quibble the existence of an attribute (dharma) is denied, though the object is admitted to exist. If a metaphorical quibble is non-different from a verbal quibble because of some similarity between them, then a verbal quibble also is non-different from a generic quibble because of some similarity between them. Thus there is only one kind of quibble. But, in fact, there are three kinds of quibbles. 127

Futility (jāti) is a sophistical refutation of an argument on the ground of mere similarity or dissimilarity without the support of invariable concomitance of the reason with the predicate. Vātsyāyana opines that both an argument and a counter argument are based on mere similarity or dissimilarity. But they are not equal (sama), according to Uddyotakara and Vācaspati; there is no real equality, but a semblance of equality between them. The argument is either valid or invalid, but the counter argument is always invalid. 128

There are twenty four kinds of futilities. We shall use D for a disputant, O for an opponent, S for the subject or minor term, P for the predicate or major term, M for the reason or middle term, E for the example, and E¹ for the counter example.

1) Equalizing the likeness (sādharmyasama) consists in opposing an argument on the ground of mere similarity of S with E. D proves his thesis on the ground of mere similarity of S with E. O opposes it by adducing a counter argument on the ground of mere similarity of S with E¹ in order to prove

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127 NS., Nīlī., NV., NVTT., i. 2. 61-58. NM., pp. 613-18; NKL., p. 16: NSār., pp. 16-17; TR., pp. 240-46.
128 NS., Nīlī., NV., i. 2. 69. Abhimānikāṃ sāmyagā na vāstavam. NVTT., v. 1. 1.
the absence of P in S. (i) D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a jar'. O—'Sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, like ether'. D's argument is valid (sadviṣaya) since it is based on invariable concomitance between products and non-eternity. O's counter argument is invalid, since it is based on mere similarity of sound with ether in respect of incorporeality, though it is not pervaded by eternity. Cognitions are incorporeal, but non-eternal. So it is a futility based on mere similarity. (ii) D—'Sound is eternal, because it is intangible, like ether'. O—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable, like a jar'. D's argument is invalid (asadviṣaya), since intangibility is not pervaded by eternity. O's argument also is invalid, since knowability is not pervaded by non-eternity. (iii) D—'Sound is eternal, because it is audible, like the genus of sound'. O—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is similar to a non-eternal jar, in being a product'. Here a mere statement (uktiviṣaya) is refuted without reference to its meaning. Udayana mentions these three kinds of equalizing the likeness.\[128\]

(2) Equalizing the unlikeness (vaidharmyasama) consists in opposing an argument by citing a heterogeneous example. O opposes D's argument by adducing a counter argument on the ground of mere dissimilarity of S with E\[1\] in order to prove the absence of P in S. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a jar'. O—'Sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, unlike a jar'. If sound is non-eternal because of its similarity with a non-eternal jar in being a product, it is eternal because of its dissimilarity with a non-eternal jar in being incorporeal. The counter argument is based on mere dissimilarity of sound with a jar.\[160\] Equalizing the likeness and equalizing the unlikeness are futile refutations because they depend upon mere similarity or dissimilarity between S and E or E\[1\], whereas a valid argument depends on universal concomitance between M and P, or between not-P and not-M, and not on mere similarity or dissimilarity of S with E or E\[1\]. A reason which has invariable concomitance with the predicate only can prove the presence of the predicate in the subject.\[181\]

\[128\] NS., NBh., NPR., v. 1. 2.
\[160\] NS., NBh., v. 1. 2; NM., pp. 822-23; TR., pp. 253-56; NSār., p. 18.
\[181\] Svābhāvikasaṃśadhābhaṃ gamakatvāt. NVTT., v. 1. 3. NM., p. 823; NS., NBh., v. 1. 3; NSār., p. 18.
(3) Equalizing an addition (utkarṣasama) consists in opposing an argument based on a certain character of an example by ascribing an additional character of it to the subject, in which it does not exist. Uddyotakara opines that addition consists in ascribing a non-existent character to the subject. D—‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a jar’. O—‘Sound is non-eternal and coloured, like a jar, owing to its similarity with a jar. If sound is not coloured, then it is not non-eternal also’. The counter argument is equalizing an addition, because it ascribes an additional character (e.g., colour) of the example to the subject, in which it is non-existent. Udayana takes equalizing the addition in a wider sense. It consists in ascribing an additional character of an example to the subject, in which it does not exist, or in ascribing an additional character of the subject to an example, in which it is non-existent, without depending on universal concomitance between the reason and the predicate. D—‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced like a jar’. O—‘A jar is non-eternal and audible, because it is a product, like a sound’. Here an additional character of the subject is ascribed to the example, in which it is non-existent. Viśvanātha follows Udayana in this wider interpretation of equalizing the addition.

(4) Equalizing the reduction (apakarṣasama) consists in opposing an argument based on a certain character of an example by ascribing the non-existence of a character of it to the subject in which it is known to exist. This is Vātsyāyana’s interpretation. Equalizing the reduction, according to Uddyotakara, consists in subtracting an existing character from the subject, which is non-existent in the example. D—‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect of effort, like a jar’. O—‘Sound is non-eternal but inaudible, because it is an effect of effort, like a jar, which is inaudible. If it is not inaudible like a jar, then it is not non-eternal like a jar’. Here audibility which exists in sound is denied, because it is non-existent in

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113 Drīḍāntadharmamā sādhyena samāsañjayam utkarṣasamah. NBh., ν. 1. 4. Sādhyam sādhyadharmin or pakṣa.
114 Avidyamāñadharmadhyāropa utkarṣaḥ. NV., ν. 1. 4.
115 NVTT., ν. 1. 4; NM., p. 623; NSār., p. 18; TR., p. 257.
116 NSV., NPR., ν. 1. 4.
117 Sādhyān dharmadhyānāḥ drīḍāntā prasañjayato pakarṣasamah. NBh., ν. 1. 4. NSār., p. 18; NM., p. 623.
a jar. Udayana takes equalizing the reduction in a wider sense. It consists in ascribing the absence of a character in an example to the subject, or in ascribing the absence of a character in the subject to the example without depending on invariable concomitance between the reason and the predicate. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a jar'. O—'Sound is non-eternal and colourless; so a jar also is non-eternal and colourless'. A jar is known to have colour; but it is subtracted from a jar, because sound is devoid of colour. Here the absence of a quality, which is non-existent in the subject, is ascribed to the example. The counter arguments are futile, because they show equality of two arguments in respect of a certain character lacking in the example or the subject and therefore in the subject or the example respectively.137

(5) Equalizing the questionable (varṇyasama) consists in opposing an argument by considering the existence of the predicate in the example as questionable (varṇya) as it is questionable in the subject.138 The existence of the predicate or inferable property (sādhya) in the subject (pakṣa) is questionable or doubtful (varṇya); but its existence in the example is unquestionable, which is admitted by a disputant and an opponent both. But in equalizing the questionable the existence of the predicate in the example is doubted by the opponent. It is due to the ascription of questionability of the existence of the predicate in the subject to the example, or to the ascription of the questionable character of the subject to the example. D—'Sound is non-eternal because it is a product, like a jar'. O—'Non-eternity of a jar also is questionable'. So it cannot serve as an example. Here the opponent alleges that if non-eternity of sound is doubtful, then non-eternity of a jar also is doubtful, since both are products.

(6) Equalizing the unquestionable (avarṇyasama) consists in opposing an argument by considering the existence of the predicate in the subject as unquestionable (avarṇya) as it is unquestionable in the example. The existence of the predicate in the example is undoubted, but its existence in the subject is doubtful. If it is considered to be undoubted, there is no use of inference. Equalizing the unquestionable is due to ascription of the un-

137 NM., p. 623; NPR., NSV., v. 1. 4.
questionable character of the example to the subject.\textsuperscript{139} D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a jar'. O—'Non-eternity of sound is as unquestionable as non-eternity of a jar'. O alleges that if non-eternity of a jar is unquestionable, non-eternity of sound also is unquestionable, because both are products, so that D's argument is unnecessary.

(7) Equalizing the variable (vikalpasama) consists in opposing an argument by ascribing variable existence of the predicate to the subject by showing variable existence of another character in the example besides the reason.\textsuperscript{140} This is Vātsyāyana's interpretation. Uddyotakara also follows him. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a jar'. O—'Sound is produced by disjunction, though it is a product. But a jar is not produced by disjunction, though it is a product. So sound is eternal, though it is a product, and a jar is non-eternal, though it is a product. Just as among products, some are produced by disjunction while others are not so produced, so some products (e.g. sound) are eternal while others (e.g. a jar) are non-eternal. This is equalizing the variable.\textsuperscript{141} Udayana takes equalizing the variable in a wider sense. In it an argument is opposed by showing variable concomitance of the reason with the predicate by showing variable concomitance of the reason with another character, or that of another character with the predicate, or that of another character with another character. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product'. O—'A product has variable concomitance with heaviness; heaviness has variable concomitance with non-eternity; non-eternity has variable concomitance with corporeality. Every character has variable concomitance with another character. So a product also has variable concomitance with non-eternity.' Varadarāja and Viśvanātha follow Udayana in interpreting equalizing the variable in a wider sense.\textsuperscript{142}

(8) Equalizing the predicate (sādhyasama) consists in opposing an argument by urging equality of the example with

\textsuperscript{139} Pakṣe asandigdhasādhyakatvāpādānam avarṇyasamā. NSV., v. 1. 4. NVTT., v. 1. 4. NM., p. 623. TR., p. 262.
\textsuperscript{140} Sādhanadharmayukte drṣṭante dharmāntaravikalpāt sādhyadharmavikalpari prasañjjayata vikalpasamāḥ. NBh., v. 1. 4. NM., p. 623.
\textsuperscript{141} NV., v. 1. 4.
\textsuperscript{142} NPR., v. 1. 4; TR., p. 263; NSV., v. 1. 4.
the subject in respect of provability. D—"Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a jar". O—"What is the reason of non-eternity of the jar? Its non-eternity also must be inferred like non-eternity of sound'. Here the example is alleged to be equal to the subject. If the existence of the predicate in the subject is to be inferred, its existence in the example also is to be proved. Udayana, Varadaraja and Visvanatha interpret equalizing the predicate in a wider sense. It consists in opposing an argument by urging that the subject, the reason, or the example also is to be proved, like the predicate. This opposition is futile, since an example is known to be possessed of the predicate by both parties, and the reason is known to be invariably concomitant with the predicate. Only the existence of the predicate in the subject is an object of inference.

(9) Equalizing the co-presence (praptisama) consists in opposing an argument based on the co-presence of the reason and the predicate by showing their non-distinction from each other. D—"The hill is fiery, because it is smoky, like a kitchen". O—"The hill is smoky, because it is fiery, like a kitchen'. Smoke and fire are taken as the reason and the predicate by D. But they are in the same locus, and so non-distinct from each other, and for this reason, fire may be taken as the reason and smoke as the predicate. This is O's counter argument. If the reason and the predicate are non-distinct from each other, they cannot be related to each other as cause and effect, or as the indicator and the indicated, because their relation is known already. The opposition is futile because a cause produces an effect in the same locus. The agent, the material and the instrument are present in the same locus where an effect is produced. The reason (e.g., smoke) which has invariable concomitance with the predicate (e.g., a fire) can prove its existence without getting at it. The relation of pervasion and being pervaded prevents the reason and the predicate from being

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142 Sādhvyadṛṣṭāntayaḥ sādhvatvāpādānena pratyavasthānāṁ sādhyasya-saṁaḥ. NM., p. 624.
143 Pakṣaḥetudṛṣṭāntā hi pramāṇāntaraśiddhā anumāṇāṅgāṁ nāśiddhāḥ. NPR., v. i. 4. TR., p. 266; NSV., v. i. 4.
144 NBh., v. i. 6; NS., i. 1. 25.
145 Prāptyā pratyavasthānāṁ prāptisamaḥ. NBh., v. i. 7. TR., p. 269.
non-distinct from each other. Vācaspati rightly urges that
relation implies the existence of the relata, since a non-existent
thing cannot be related to the reason, but that an existent thing
is not inferred. If the predicate is certainly known to be
existent in the subject, inference becomes useless.\[147]\n
(10) Equalizing the mutual absence or non-relation (aprāpti-
sama) consists in opposing an argument based on mutual absence
of the reason and the predicate existing in remote sites by
showing that the former cannot prove the existence of the
latter. D—"The hill is fiery, because it is smoky, like a kitchen'.
O—"The hill is not fiery, because it is smoky'. If the reason
proves the existence of the predicate, which is absent from the
subject, without being related to it, then on the same ground it
can prove the non-existence of the predicate in the subject,
without being related to it. But just as a lamp cannot illumine
an object without being related to it, or just as a cause cannot
produce an effect without getting at it, so the reason cannot
prove the existence of the predicate without being related to
it.\[148\] This opposition is futile, because sometimes a cause can
produce an effect from a distance; for example, black magic
does harm to a distant enemy. So the reason can prove the
existence of the predicate, without being related to it.\[148\]

(11) Equalizing the infinite regress (prasaṅgasama) consists
in opposing an argument by showing that the example has not
been proved by reason. Gautama and Vātsyāyana interpret it
in this sense. Udayana, Varadarāja and Viśvanātha interpret
it in a wider sense. They regard it as opposing an argument
by showing that the subject, the reason, or the example has not
been proved by reason.\[149\] D—"Sound is non-eternal, because
it is a product, like a jar'. O opposes it by urging that the jar,
or a product has not been proved to be non-eternal by a reason,
or that the subject has not been proved to exist. This opposition
is futile, because the example is known to be the locus of the
predicate by both parties, and the reason (e.g., a product) is
known to be invariably concomitant with the predicate (e.g.,
non-eternity), and the subject is known to exist, and does not

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\[147\] NSV., v. 1, 7; NVTT., p. 477.
\[148\] Aprāpya śādhanam na bhavati. Niḥ., v. 1, 7.
\[149\] NS., Niḥ., v. 1, 8.
\[150\] NPR., v. 1, 9. Anumitajñānaḥ tetānāṃ paksahetudṛṣṭāntānāh
siddhānām api kāraṇāntaranū vācyam. TR., p. 274.
require any reason to prove its existence. What is unproved is proved by inference; what is already known to be true does not require any proof.\footnote{Asiddham hi nama sādhyate na siddham. NM., p. 625. NBh., v. I. 10.}

(12) Equalizing the contrary example (pratidṛṣṭāntasama) consists in opposing an argument on the strength of a mere contrary example without showing any reason or invariable concomitance between it and the predicate. D—‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is like a jar’. O—‘Sound is eternal, because it is like ether’. If sound is non-eternal on the strength of the mere example of a jar, then it is eternal on the strength of the mere contrary example of ether. This opposition is futile, because a mere contrary example unsupported by a reason is not conducive to any conclusion. If it can prove eternity of sound, then a mere example also can prove its non-eternity. Viśvanātha distinguishes equalizing a contrary example from equalizing the likeness. In the former an argument is opposed by a mere contrary example, whereas in the latter it is opposed by showing similarity between the subject and a counter example.\footnote{NS., v. I. 11; NSV., v. I. 9.}

(13) Equalizing the non-production (anupattisama) consists in opposing an argument by urging that the reason is absent from the subject, which is not yet produced. D—‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect of effort, like a jar’. O—‘Sound is eternal, because it is a non-effect of effort, like ether’. The reason ‘being an effect of effort’ does not exist in the subject (e.g., sound), because it is not yet produced owing to the absence of its cause. When sound is produced, it is called ‘sound’; and endued with the property of being a product. So sound is eternal, because it is not an effect. This opposition is futile. When sound is produced, it is called ‘sound’; there is no sound before its production. An existent sound is an effect of effort, and so non-eternal. Until it is produced, it is not the subject of inference.\footnote{NS., NBh., v. I. 13; NM., p. 626.}

Udayana interprets equalizing the non-production in a wider sense. It is an opposition based on the absence of the reason before production of the subject, the reason, the predicate,
the example, or its cognition. Varadarāja and Viśvanātha follow him.

(14) Equalizing the doubt (samāśayasama) consists in opposing an argument by urging that the existence or the non-existence of the predicate in the subject is doubtful because of its similarity with one example in which the predicate is present, and with another example from which it is absent. Though there is a cause of the definite knowledge of the existence of a distinctive character in the subject, the opponent urges that its existence or non-existence in the subject is doubtful. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect of effort, like a jar.' O—'Is sound non-eternal or eternal, because it is perceptible by an external sense-organ, like a jar or the genus of a jar?' A jar is non-eternal, but its genus is eternal. So eternity or non-eternity of sound is doubtful, because it has similarity with eternal genus of a jar and a non-eternal jar. This opposition is futile, because doubt arises from the knowledge of the common character of two objects, but it does not arise from the knowledge of the distinctive character of one object. If doubt arises from the knowledge of the common character and the distinctive character both, it never ends. The doubt that arises from the knowledge of the common character is destroyed by the knowledge of the distinctive character. When sound is known to be non-eternal because it is an effect of effort, there is no scope for doubt as to its being either eternal or non-eternal. Its distinctive character being known, its similarity with an eternal entity cannot generate doubt. Sound is known for certain to be endowed with non-eternity, which is pervaded by being produced by an effort. When its distinctive character of non-eternity is definitely known, no doubt can arise as to its being eternal or non-eternal. Uddyotakara distinguishes between equalizing the doubt and equalizing the likeness. The former is based on similarity of the subject with two things, whereas the latter is based on its similarity with one thing.

(15) Equalizing the controversy (prakārapasama) consists in opposing an argument on the strength of similarity of the

144 Dharmiliṅgasādhyadṛṣṭāntataijñānānāṁ anupattir vyāpyate. NPR., v. 1. 12; TR., p. 278; NSV., v. 1. 12.
145 NS., NBh., NSV., v. 1. 14, 15; NM., p. 627; TR., pp. 281-82.
146 Udbhavādharmanyāt samāśayasamaḥ ekasādharmanyāt sādharmya-sāma iti viśeṣāḥ. NV., v. 1. 14.
subject with two examples having contradictory characters. It is refutation of an argument by provoking the controversy to settle which it is employed.\textsuperscript{134} D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect of effort, like a jar'. O—'Sound is eternal, because it is audible, like the genus of sound'. O urges that non-eternity of sound cannot be proved, because the reason 'audibility', which is homogeneous with non-eternal sound and eternal genus of sound, provokes the very controversy which is to be settled by it. This opposition is futile. The original argument is valid. Non-eternity of sound is proved by the reason 'being an effect of effort' which is pervaded by non-eternity. So there is no room for controversy which arises from the absence of knowledge of the real character of an object. The counter-argument is invalid, because audibility is not pervaded by eternity, and so cannot prove eternity of sound. Udayana and Varadarāja opine that there is a false ascription of contradiction (bādha) in equalizing the controversy, in which O admits that D's reason is equally strong as his own reason, and yet opposes his argument by urging that his reason is stronger than D's reason.\textsuperscript{134}

Vācaspati distinguishes equalizing the controversy from the counterbalanced reason. The former is a futile refutation (jāti), while the latter is a faulty reason (hetvābhāsa). In the former both parties think their reasons to be equally strong, which give rise to a deadlock; while in the latter there is no deadlock, because the reason of one party is stronger than that of the other, which silences it. Uddyotakara distinguishes equalizing the controversy from equalizing the likeness and equalizing the doubt. Equalizing the likeness is based on similarity of the subject with one example. Equalizing the doubt is based on its similarity with two examples. But equalizing the controversy is not based on similarity, but on two sides which appear to be equally strong. According to Jayanta, in equalizing the controversy O seeks to prove the apparent validity of his counter argument, whereas in equalizing the likeness and equalizing the unlikeness O seeks to prove the invalidity of D's argument.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{134} Prakaraṇānātivṛttā pratyayavsthānam prakaraṇasamāḥ. NBh., v. 1. 15.
\textsuperscript{134} NBh., NV., NPR., NSV., v. 1. 16; TR., p. 283.
\textsuperscript{139} NVTT., p. 481; NSV., v. 1. 16; NV., v. 1. 14, 16; NM., p. 627.
(16) Equalizing the non-reason (ahetusama) consists in opposing an argument by showing that the reason is neither prior, nor posterior to, nor simultaneous with, the predicate. If it is prior to the predicate, it cannot be the reason of the latter, which is non-existent. If it is posterior to the predicate, it cannot be its reason, since its existence is proved by a prior reason only. If it is simultaneous with the predicate, it may be the predicate and the predicate may be the reason. Hence the reason which neither precedes nor succeeds nor coexists with the predicate is a non-reason (ahetu). Equalizing the non-reason is opposing an argument by showing similarity of the reason with the non-reason. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect of effort, like a jar'. O—'Being an effect of effort is neither prior nor posterior to, nor simultaneous with, non- eternity. So it is similar to the non-reason'. O seeks to refute the reason-predicate-relation or the cause-effect-relation. This kind of opposition is futile, since the predicate is proved by a prior reason. It is not indicated without a prior reason which is its indicator. So it is absurd to argue that reason does not exist at three times. The opposition is invalid, since it cannot precede, succeed, or coexist with what is opposed. O's counter reason being invalid for the same reason, D's reason is valid. The opposition being invalid, the original argument is valid. Thus the opposition is self-contradictory.

(17) Equalizing the presumption (arthāpattisama) consists in opposing an argument on the ground of presumption in favour of the counter argument. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect of effort, like a jar'. O—'Sound is presumed to be eternal, because it is intangible like ether'. If sound is non-eternal, because it has similarity with a non-eternal jar in respect of being an effect of effort, it may be presumed to be eternal, because it has similarity with eternal ether in respect of being intangible. O opposes D's argument by setting false presumption in favour of his counter argument. The opposition is futile, because O does not prove his counter argument with the aid of invariable concomitance. Further, the presumption adduced by O is inconclusive; if it proves eternity of sound

184 Ahetusā sadharmyāt pratyavasthānam ahetusamah. NBh., v. 1.
185 NS., NV., v. 1. 19; NBh., v. 1. 20.

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because of its similarity with eternal things, it also proves its
non-eternity because of its similarity with non-eternal things.
So this opposition involves self-contradiction. Further, there is
only a semblance of presumption, which does not prove the
counter argument. If a solid stone falls to the ground, it does
not imply that liquid water does not fall to the ground. 182

(18) Equalizing the non-difference (aviṣeṣasama) consists in
opposing an argument by showing that all things are non-
different from one another, because they possess the common
property of existence, if the subject and the example be regarded
as non-different from each other, because they possess a common
property. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect of
effort, like a jar'. Sound and a jar are non-different from each
other, because they possess the common property of being effects
of effort. This is the implication of the argument. O—'All
things are non-eternal, because they are existent. So they are
non-different from one another, because they possess the
common property of existence'. Equalizing the non-difference
is an opposition based on false attribution of non-difference to
all things because of their possessing the common property of
existence. O alleges that if D admits non-difference of all
objects, he cannot infer non-eternity of sound from its being an
effect of effort, because the subject, the predicate, the reason,
and the example are non-different from one another; and that
if he admits non-difference of all objects in the form of possession
of a common property, then there being no distinction of non-
eternal and eternal entities, all things including sound are eternal.
So D cannot infer non-eternity of sound. If he admits that all
entities are non-eternal, his argument to prove non-eternity of
sound is needless. This kind of opposition is futile, since D's
argument is valid. But O's counter argument is invalid, since
the reason 'existence' is not pervaded by the predicate 'non-
difference', and cannot prove non-difference of all objects.
Further, 'all objects' being the subject of inference, there is no
example, in the absence of which there can be no inference. If
O proves non-difference of all objects in respect of being non-
eternal with a jar as an example, then he admits non-eternity
of sound and cannot oppose it. If he opposes it, his opposition

182 NS., NBh., NV., NVTT., NSV., v. I. 20, 21, 22; NM., p. 629;
TR., pp. 285-86.
is self-contradictory. Uddyotakara distinguishes equalizing the non-difference from equalizing the likeness. Both are based on similarity. But the former is based on similarity of all objects, while the latter is based on similarity of the subject with one example.

(19) Equalizing the proof (upapattisama) consists in opposing an argument on the ground that both arguments are justified by valid reasons. This is the view of Gautama and Vātsyāyana. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect, like a jar'. O—'Sound is eternal, because it is intangible, like ether'. O urges that both arguments are justified by valid reasons, and seeks to create a deadlock by his counter argument. Being an effect is a valid reason for non-eternity, and intangibility is a valid reason for eternity. But Varadarāja and Viśvanātha interpret equalizing the proof in another way. It consists in opposing an argument by urging that there may be a proof in favour of the opposite side. O opposes D's argument by urging that there may be some reason for eternity of sound. O argues: 'My side has a reason like your side, because it is one of the two sides'. This opposition is futile, since D's argument is valid and O's counter argument is invalid because intangibility is not pervaded by eternity. Cognitions are intangible but non-eternal. O admits the validity of the reason of D's argument, and so cannot oppose it. If he opposes it, he cannot regard both reasons as valid. If he admits the validity of both reasons, he cannot oppose D's argument. If O urges that non-eternity and eternity cannot exist in the same thing (e.g., sound), this self-contradiction cannot prove the validity of the counter argument. Self-contradiction proves neither non-eternity nor eternity of sound. Admission and opposition cannot exist together. Uddyotakara distinguishes equalizing the proof from equalizing the controversy. In the former the two reasons are supposed to be equally valid, while in the latter there is opposition of the two sides. Jayanta distinguishes equalizing the proof from

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188 NBh., NVTT., NSV., v. i. 23; NM., p. 629; TR., p. 287; NVTT., v. i. 24.
189 NV., v. i. 23.
190 Udbhayakāranopapattisamāha. NS., v. i. 25.
191 NBh., NV., v. i. 25; NM., p. 630.
192 TR., p. 289; NSV., v. i. 25.
193 NS., NBh., v. i. 26; TR., p. 290.
equalizing the likeness and equalizing the controversy. The first futility is employed with a view to defeating the other side, while the second and third are employed with a view to setting up an opposite side and creating a lack of decision respectively. Varadarāja takes equalizing the proof in a different sense. So he distinguishes it from equalizing the likeness, equalizing the unlikeness and equalizing the controversy in a different manner. In the first futility O urges that there may be a reason for the opposite conclusion without stating a definite reason. But in the last three futilities O seeks to prove his conclusion by an established reason.168

(20) Equalizing the perception (upalabdhisama) consists in opposing an argument on the ground that we perceive the predicate in the subject even without a definite reason. D—‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect of effort, like a jar’. O urges that we perceive non-eternity of sound produced by the branch of a tree broken by the impact of a wind even without the reason that it is an effect of effort. This kind of opposition is futile, because non-eternity of sound has many causes. When D infers non-eternity of sound from its being an effect of effort, he does not deny other causes of its non-eternity. The same effect is produced by many causes. Plurality of causes is not denied for practical purposes. There is nothing to be opposed, because the inferable character is produced by other causes also. Vātsyāyana interprets equalizing the perception and its refutation as defined by Gautama in this manner. But Uddyotakara gives another interpretation of equalizing the perception as opposing an argument by showing the absence of the reason from the subject by taking it in a wider sense. D—‘All are non-eternal, because they have higher and lower universals, and are perceptible by our external sense-organs’. O urges that the reason is absent from the dyads which are imperceptible but non-eternal; that D’s argument commits the fallacy of partial unproven reason (bhāgāsiddhi). It is objected that equalizing the perception in this sense is not a futile opposition, because it is not based on similarity or dissimilarity. Uddyotakara replies that it is a futility because it is opposition of an argument on the ground of similarity with an argument without a reason.170

Varadarāja and Viśvanātha take equalizing the perception in another sense. It consists in opposing an argument by contradicting each alternative arising from the reason, the subject, or the predicate in order to ascertain the meaning of the argument. D—'The hill is fiery, because it has smoke'. O—'Is it fiery, because it has smoke only? It is fiery, because it has light also'. 'Is the hill only fiery, because it has smoke? The kitchen also is fiery, because it has smoke'. 'Is the hill fiery only, because it has smoke? It is a substance also, because it has smoke'. This kind of opposition is futile, because it misinterprets the meaning of the argument opposed. D sets forth his argument to prove the existence of fire in the hill, which is doubtful. He does not seek to prove that the hill is fiery, because it has smoke only, or that the hill only is fiery, or that the hill is fiery only.\textsuperscript{111} Udayana takes 'perception' in equalizing the perception as an illustrative example only. He uses it in a comprehensive sense, which includes perception, non-perception, desire, non-desire, aversion, non-aversion, volition, non-volition, potency, impotency, production, non-production, use, non-use and the like.\textsuperscript{112}

(21) Equalizing the non-perception (anupalabdhisama) consists in opposing an argument which proves the non-existence of an object by non-perception of it, by proving its existence by non-perception of non-perception. D—'The veil of sound is non-existent, because it is not perceived. So sound is non-existent before it is uttered, because it is not concealed by a veil. Hence it is non-eternal'. O—'The veil exists, because non-perception of the veil is not perceived'. If non-perception of the veil proves its non-existence, the non-perception of non-perception proves the non-existence of non-perception. The non-existence of non-perception is the existence of perception. If the veil is perceived, its existence is proved. So sound is eternal, because it exists before it is uttered as concealed by a veil, which is removed by utterance. This is O's counter argument. This kind of opposition is futile, because non-perception is a mere negation of perception, and so is an invalid reason. Perception proves existence, and non-perception proves non-existence. The non-perception of non-perception is a mere

\textsuperscript{111} NSV., v. 1. 27-28; TR., pp. 290-91.
\textsuperscript{112} NPR., v. 1. 29.
negation of non-perception. It does not prove the existence of an object. The non-perception of non-perception of the veil of sound does not prove the existence of the veil. Further, we have internal perception of non-perception or non-existence of knowledge. 'I am not sure'. 'I have doubt'. But there is no non-perception of non-perception. So equalizing the non-perception is futile. Udayana takes 'non-perception' in a wide sense, and comprehends desire, non-desire and the like in it. Varadarāja accepts his wider interpretation of equalizing the non-perception.172

(22) Equalizing the non-eternal (anityasama) consists in opposing an argument by attributing non-eternity to all things, because things that are homogeneous possess equal characters. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a jar'. O—'If sound is non-eternal, because it is homogeneous with a jar in some respect, then all things are non-eternal, because they are homogeneous with a jar in respect of existence'. This is equalizing the non-eternal. It is a futile opposition, because mere homogeneity unsupported by invariable concomitance of the reason with the predicate cannot prove anything. Non-eternity of sound is proved by its being a product which is invariably accompanied by non-eternity; it is not proved by homogeneity of sound with a non-eternal jar in respect of existence. Uddyotakara and Jayanta distinguish equalizing the non-eternal from equalizing the non-difference. The former attributes non-eternity to all things because of their homogeneity with a non-eternal object, while the latter attributes non-difference to all things because of their existence. Varadarāja and Vardhamāna distinguish them in another manner. In equalizing the non-eternal the character of the subject as having the predicate (sapakṣatva) is attributed to dissimilar things (vipakṣa) which are devoid of the predicate. Udayana takes equalizing the non-eternal in a wider sense. It consists in opposing an argument by attributing non-eternity to all things, because things that are homogeneous or heterogeneous have equal characters. Varadarāja also holds the same view. Viśva-nātha gives this example. D—'The hill is fiery, because it is homogeneous with a kitchen, which is fiery'. O—'All things

172 NS., NBh., v. i. 29-31; NPR., v. i. 29; TR., p. 293.
are fiery, because they are homogeneous with a kitchen, which is existent'. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is heterogeneous with ether, which is eternal'. O—'All things are non-eternal, because they are heterogeneous with ether, which is eternal'.

(23) Equalizing the eternal (nityasama) consists in opposing an argument by attributing eternity to a non-eternal thing, because it is eternally non-eternal. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a jar'. O—'If non-eternity always exists in sound, it must be eternal, and if it does not always exist in it, it must be eternal'. This kind of opposition is futile, because the subject (e.g., sound) is always non-eternal. O admits that non-eternity always exists in sound, and so cannot deny its non-eternity. It is futile to argue that a thing is eternal, because it is eternally non-eternal inasmuch as non-eternity and eternity are contradictory qualities, and cannot coexist in a thing at the same time. Udayana and Varadarāja take equalizing the eternal in a wider sense. It consists in opposing an argument by showing that the subject cannot have a particular property, because it or its contradictory cannot exist in it. Nityasama is an illustrative designation, which includes such alternatives as eternal, non-eternal, different, non-different, effect, non-effect, subsistent, non-subsistent, valid, non-valid, existent, non-existent, stable, non-stable, one, many, common, non-common, attribution, non-attribution, dependent, independent, sequence, non-sequence, definable, indefinable, indirect, direct, present, non-present, avoidable, non-avoidable, coexistent, non-coexistent, contradictory, non-contradictory, known, unknown, desired, undesired, hated, non-hated, done, undone, potent, impotent, produced, unproduced, used, non-used, jar, non-jar, doubtful, undoubted and the like. D—'Sound is non-eternal'. O—'Is non-eternity a product or a non-product? If it is a product, is it produced simultaneously with sound, or before it, or after it? It cannot be produced simultaneously with sound, because sound being its material cause must be prior to non-eternity. It cannot be produced before sound for the same reason. It cannot be produced after sound, because sound would be eternal before production of non-eternity. If non-eternity is not produced,

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sound also, which is its substrate, is not produced. Hence it must be admitted to be eternal. This kind of opposition is futile. If the reason and the predicate are not admitted to be related to each other as pervaded and pervader, the former cannot prove the existence of the latter. If they are admitted to be so related, the former can prove the existence of the latter.  

(24) Equalizing the effect (kāryasama) consists in opposing an argument by showing diversity of effects of effort. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect of effort, like a jar'. A jar was non-existent at first; then it is brought into existence by effort. So it is non-eternal. O—'Sound is eternal, because it is an effect as manifestation brought about by an effort'. An effect is either a product or a manifestation of something already existent. A jar is produced anew by an effort. But sound is manifested by an effort which produces utterance. It was existent before utterance. It has no special property which proves it to be a product, and not a manifestation. So it is eternal. This kind of opposition by showing the absence of a distinguishing character of an effect of effort is equalizing the effect. This opposition is futile. Sound is non-existent before effort, because there is non-perception of it. Non-perception of it is not due to a veil which conceals it, because the veil is not perceived. Hence sound is an effect, which is not manifested, but produced. If it be urged that there is no special reason for sound being an effect in the nature of a product of effort and therefore being non-eternal, it may be equally urged that there is no special reason for sound being an effect in the nature of a manifestation brought about by effort. Thus both reasons are inconclusive. If a special meaning is attached to the opposition, the same meaning may be attached to the original argument. So both sides are equal.

Udayana and Varadarāja give a wider meaning to equalizing the effect. It consists in O's opposing an argument by showing the inability of the reason, the subject, or the example to prove the existence of the predicate, by adducing his own reason for the non-existence of the predicate, and showing the invalidity of his own reason also. Viśvanātha defines this futility as opposing an argument by refuting the undesired special meaning of

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177 NS., NBh., NPR., v. 1, 35, 36; TR., pp. 309-03.
its reason which is stated in a general way. He includes all other futile refutations in it. Equalizing the devil of uncertainty (pišācīsama) or opposing an argument by urging that it may be vitiated by an undetected flaw, though no flaw is found in it, is included in equalizing the effect.

Uddyotakara distinguishes equalizing the effect from equalizing the doubt and equalizing the likeness. Equalizing the doubt is based on similarity of the subject with two examples endowed with contradictory characters. But equalizing the effect is based on diversity of effects, but not on similarity. Equalizing the likeness is based on similarity of the subject with an example, but not on false attribution of a reason. But equalizing the effect is based on false attribution of a reason. Thus jātis are sophistical refutations of arguments based on mere parity or disparity.

Nigrahasthānas are grounds of defeat in a philosophical debate. They are occasions for rebuke due to wilful misunderstanding or want of understanding. They consist in one’s inability to refute an opponent’s thesis or to establish one’s own thesis refuted by him. There are twenty two kinds of nigrahasthāna.

(1) Hurting the proposition (pratijñāhāni) arises when a person admits in his example (svadṛṣṭānta) the character of a counter example (pratidṛṣṭānta). D—‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible by a sense-organ, like a jar’. O—‘Sound is eternal, because it is perceptible by a sense-organ, like a genus, which is eternal’. D—‘If a perceptible genus is eternal, a jar also is eternal’. He admits in his example (e.g., a jar) the character (e.g., eternity) of the counter example (e.g., genus). He denies non-eternity of a jar admitted by him, admits its eternity which is the character of the counter example, and hurts his proposition. This is Gautama and Vātsyāyana’s view. But Uddyotakara interprets one’s own example (svadṛṣṭānta) as one’s own thesis (svapakṣa), and counter example (pratidṛṣṭānta) as antithesis (pratipakṣa). D—‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible’. O—‘Sound is eternal, because it is perceptible, like a genus’. D—‘If a perceptible genus is eternal, then sound also is eternal’. Thus D hurts his thesis ‘sound is

**NS., NBh., NV., NPR., v. 1. 37, 38. TR., p. 306. NM., p. 634.**
non-eternal'. Vācaspati and Jayanta support Uddyotakara's view. Viśvanātha follows Udayana, and recognizes five kinds of pratijñāhāni. (1) D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible through a sense-organ'. O—'The reason is inconclusive'. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product'. This involves hurting the reason (hetuhāni). (2) D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product'. O—'It is contradicted by recognition'. D—'A jar is non-eternal'. This involves hurting the subject (pakṣahāni). (3) D—'The hill is fiery, because it has smoke, like burning iron'. O—'The example is devoid of reason. Burning iron is smokeless'. D—'Like a kitchen'. This involves hurting the example (dṛṣṭāntahāni). (4) D—'The hill is fiery, because it has smoke'. O—'It involves proving what is already proved'. D—'The hill has fuel, because it has smoke'. This involves hurting the predicate (sādhyahāni). (5) D—'The hill is fiery, because it has blue smoke'. O—'Blue is redundant'. D—'Because it has smoke'. This involves hurting the qualification (viśeṣapahāni). Varadarāja mentions many kinds of pratijñāhāni. Viśvanātha distinguishes pratijñāhāni from apasiddhānta. Hurting the proposition consists in admitting the character of the opponent's position, but not in deviating from one's thesis, because it is not distinctly stated.177

(2) Shifting the proposition (pratijñāntara) arises when a person defends his position attacked by the opponent by ascribing new characters to the example and the counter example. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible by a sense-organ, like a jar'. O—'Sound is eternal, because it is perceptible by a sense-organ, like a genus'. O—'A genus is perceptible by a sense-organ and pervasive. A jar is perceptible by a sense-organ and non-pervasive. Sound is non-eternal and non-pervasive'. D shifts his proposition. His original proposition was 'sound is non-eternal'. His modified proposition is 'sound is non-eternal and non-pervasive'. Udayana and Varadarāja distinguish pratijñāntara from pratijñāhāni. In hurting the proposition the original proposition is completely discarded. But in shifting the proposition the unqualified proposition is discarded, but the proposition qualified by a qualification is not

discarded. So shifting the proposition is not hurting the proposition. Udayana and Varadarāja recognize four kinds of shifting the proposition. (1) D—‘Uttered sounds are eternal, because they are audible like the genus of sound’. O—‘Unuttered sounds also are audible’. D—‘Unuttered and uttered sounds are eternal’. This involves shifting the subject (pakṣāntara). D—‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product’. O—‘Unuttered sounds are already proved to be non-eternal’. D—‘Uttered sounds are non-eternal’. This involves shifting the qualification of the subject (pakṣavišeṣaṇāntara). (3) D—‘The hill is fiery, because it has fragrant dirty smoke’. O—‘The qualification ‘fragrant dirty’ is needless’. D—‘The hill has black agaru wood fire’. This involves shifting the predicate (sādhyāntara). (4) ‘An effect is preceded by an intelligent agent as an efficient cause’. O—‘It is admitted to be proved’. D—‘An effect is preceded by an intelligent agent who has knowledge of its material cause’. This involves shifting the qualification of the predicate (sādhyavišeṣaṇāntara).

(3) Contradicting the proposition (pratijñāvirodha) arises when the proposition and the reason contradict each other. ‘Substance is distinct from quality, because it is not perceived to be distinct from colour and the like’. Here there is opposition between the proposition and the reason. If substance is distinct from quality, then non-perception of a substance as distinct from colour and the like is not possible. The reason ‘substance is non-distinct from colour’ contradicts the proposition ‘substance is distinct from quality’. This is Vātsyāyana’s interpretation. In pratijñāvirodha, according to Uddvyotakara, the proposition is contradicted by the reason (hetuvirodha), the reason is contradicted by the proposition, and the proposition contradicts itself, e.g., ‘the nun is pregnant’. If the proposition is contradicted by the example, it involves dṛṣṭāntavirodha, ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable like ether’. Ether is not non-eternal. The example contradicts the proposition. When the reason, Vācaspati observes, is contradicted by the example, it involves dṛṣṭāntavirodha, ‘Sound is eternal, because it is perceptible by the sense-organs, like an imperceptible dyad’. A dyad is not perceptible. The example contradicts the reason.

**NS., NRh., NSV., NPR., v. 2. 3; TK., pp. 325-27.**
If there is a contradiction, Udayana observes, between two terms or members of the same inference, contradicting the proposition occurs. 'The self does not exist'. 'The Lord is not an agent'. 'The past exists'. 'Atoms are composed of parts'. Varadarāja follows Udayana. 'The hill is fiery; because it has smoke; whatever has smoke is non-fiery'.

Vācaspati distinguishes contradicting the proposition from contradictory reason. The former is a ground of defeat, while the latter is a fallacious reason. In the former contradiction between the proposition and the reason does not depend upon the recollection of invariable concomitance between the reason and the predicate, but upon mere statements of them, whereas in the latter contradiction between the reason (e.g., product) and the predicate (e.g., eternity) depends upon the recollection of invariable concomitance between the reason and the absence of the predicate. Varadarāja distinguishes between contradicting the proposition and deviating from the accepted tenet. In the former there is contradiction between two terms or propositions of the same inference of a person, whereas in the latter a person deviates from his accepted tenet in different inferences.

4. Renouncing the proposition (pratijñāsahinyāsa) consists in denying the import of the proposition when it is attacked. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible by a sense-organ, like a jar'. O—'Sound is eternal, because it is perceptible by a sense-organ, like a genus'. D—'Who says that sound is non-eternal?' He denies the import of his original proposition. This is renouncing the proposition. Udayana regards denial of one's reason or example also as renouncing the proposition. It takes four forms: (1) 'Who said this? Not I'. (2) 'I stated the antithesis'. (3) 'You said this, not I'. (5) 'I repeated O's statement'. Udayana distinguishes contradicting the proposition from hurting the proposition. In the former a person denies the import of the proposition, the reason, or the example, whereas in the latter a person discards anything stated by him. Udayana includes denial of the subject also in renouncing the proposition. Varadarāja accepts his interpretation of it.

111 NS., NBh., NV., NVTT., NPR., v. 2. 4; TR., pp. 327-29; NM., pp. 642-44.
112 NVTT., v. 2. 4, p. 497; TR., p. 329.
113 NS., NBh., NV., NPR., v. 2. 5; NM., pp. 644-45; TR., pp. 329-30.
(5) Shifting the reason (hetvāntara) consists in investing the reason with a special character, when the reason of a general character is opposed. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible by an external sense-organ'. O—'Sound is eternal, because it is perceptible by an external sense-organ, like a genus'. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible by an external sense-organ, coming under a genus'. A genus is perceptible by an external sense-organ, but it does not come under a genus. So it is eternal. But sound comes under a genus, and so it is non-eternal. Thus D shifts his original reason. Udayana and Varadarāja extend the meaning of shifting the reason. If the reason, the example, the application, and the refutation are changed by adding qualifications to them, shifting the reason occurs. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible through our external sense-organs, like a jar'. O—'Sound is eternal, because it is perceptible through our external sense-organs, like a genus'. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible through our external sense-organs, like a jar coming under a genus'. Here the example is modified by a qualification.\(^{182}\)

(6) Shifting the topic (arthāntara) consists in setting aside the real topic and introducing an irrelevant topic. D—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced'. Being opposed, D argues: 'Sound is a quality; it is a quality of ether'. This is shifting the topic. Udayana and Varadarāja recognize four kinds of shifting the topic: (1) the statement of one's own view; (2) the statement of another's view; (3) the statement of a common view; and (4) the statement of a view which is neither one's own view nor another's view. (1) 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible by the sense-organs; it is a quality of ether; the ear is ether limited by the ear-hole; sound is perceived by it through inference; inference is an eternal relation'. This irrelevant argument states the Nyāya view. (2) 'Sound is a substance; it is perceived by the ear through conjunction, and manifested by the activity of the palate and the like'. It states the Mīmāṃsaka view. (3) 'Eternity of sound is inferable; inference is a means of valid knowledge; there are four kinds of valid knowledge; there are six kinds

\(^{182}\) NS., NSV., NPR., v. 2. 6; TR., pp. 330-31.
of valid knowledge'. This states the Nyāya view and the Mīmāṁsaka view. The former recognizes four kinds of valid knowledge; the latter recognizes six kinds of valid knowledge. (4) 'Hetu' is a word derived from the root ki with the suffix tu. It states the view of neither party.\(^{113}\)

(7) The meaningless (nirarthaka) ground of defeat consists in basing an argument on unmeaning combination of letters in a series. 'Sound is eternal, because ka, ca, ṭa, ṭa, and ṭa are ja, va, ga, ḍa, da, and sa like jha, bha, ṇa, gha, ḍha, dha, and sa'. The letters are meaningless. So this is a meaningless ground of defeat. Varadarāja extends its meaning. If there is a confusion in the use of gender, number, suffix, and the like, or if an argument is commenced in Sanskrit but finished in Apabhraṁśa, the meaningless ground of defeat occurs.\(^{114}\)

(8) The unintelligible (avijnātārtha) is an argument, which is not understood by the audience or by O, though it is repeated three times. D being opposed by O tries to hide his inability to defend himself by using words, which have double meaning, or which are not in common use, or which are too quickly uttered to be intelligible. 'Śveto dhāvati'. It means 'a white being runs'. But if a person uses it in the sense of 'a dog runs away from here' (svā āto dhāvati), he commits the unintelligible ground of defeat. The 'unintelligible' is different from the 'meaningless'. In the former meaningful but unintelligible words are used, whereas in the latter meaningless words are used. If a Dravidian, ignorant of Sanskrit, argues with an Aryan in his own language, he commits the 'meaningless'; but if he knows Sanskrit and argues with an Aryan in Drāviḍa language in order to hide his inability to defend himself, he commits the 'unintelligible'.\(^{115}\)

(9) The 'incoherent' (apārthaka) is an argument in which words or sentences are combined without any syntactical order, which do not convey any connected meaning. The 'incoherent' is of two kinds, viz., incoherent words and incoherent sentences. 'Ten pomegranates, six cakes, goat's skin, a lump of meat' are incoherent words. 'A person rice in a tank eating goes and

\(^{113}\) NS., NSV., NPR., v. 2. 7; TR., pp. 332-33.

\(^{114}\) NS., NBh., NSV., v. 2. 8; TR., pp. 333-34.

\(^{115}\) NS., NBh., NSV., v. 2. 9; TR., p. 335.
bathing'. It is an incoherent sentence devoid of meaning. Uddyotakara distinguishes between 'incoherent' and 'meaningless'. Though in both meanings are not intelligible, in the former incoherent words or sentences are used, whereas in the latter meaningless letters are used. Vācaspati observes that in an 'incoherent' argument meaningful words or sentences are used, but they are not combined in a coherent order, and do not convey any connected meaning. Viśvanātha distinguishes between an incoherent, and an unintelligible ground of defeat. In the former incoherent words or sentences are used, which do not convey any meaning, whereas in the latter the words are intelligible to the person who uses them, but they are unintelligible to others. Udayana distinguishes between an incoherent ground of defeat and shifting the topic. In the former unconnected words or sentences are used, whereas in the latter they are used with a syntactical order, but they are irrelevant. 146

(10) The inverted (aprāptakāla) ground of defeat consists in stating the members of an inference in an illogical order. There is a definite order among the members of an inference: (1) proposition, (2) reason, (3) example, (4) application, and (5) conclusion. The logical order among them conveys a connected meaning of the argument. If it is reversed, it cannot convey any connected meaning. Viśvanātha follows Udayana in widening the scope of an inverted argument. If the order of the steps of a logical debate is reversed, then also inverted arguments occur. 'The hill is fiery; whatever is smoky is fiery, like a kitchen; because it is smoky; therefore the hill is fiery; the hill is smoky'. It is an inverted argument. 147

(11) The incomplete (nyūna) ground of defeat consists in omitting one member of an inference. All the five members of a demonstrative inference are indispensable for proving a conclusion. If any member is left out, the conclusion cannot be proved. 'The hill is fiery; whatever is smoky is fiery, e.g., a kitchen; the hill is smoky; therefore the hill is fiery'. It is an incomplete argument. Dīnāga does not admit an incomplete argument without a proposition (pratijñānyūna). Uddyotakara

147 NS., NBh., NV., NPR., NSV., v. 2. 11; NM., p. 649.
refutes this view, and urges that the statement of the proposition to be established is necessary, like that of flawless reason, for proving it; and that if it is not regarded as necessary, then we must admit that a thesis (sādhyā) is proved without a proof (sādhana). The Buddhists argue that the proof of the conclusion is the proposition. But Uddyotakara urges that a proposition is a necessary means (sādhana) of proving the conclusion. The conclusion (siddhānta) is the certain knowledge of an object possessed of its generic and specific characters. But the thesis (pratijñā) is a proposition stated to prove a conclusion. Vācaspati also argues that a conclusion is an established truth, while a proposition is the truth to be established. Viśvanātha distinguishes between an incomplete argument and deviating from an accepted tenet. In the former there is no admission of anything contradictory to the accepted tenet, but there is suppression of a member of an argument owing to anger of the assembly or some other cause, whereas in the latter a tenet is admitted at first, and then something contradictory to the accepted tenet is admitted. Varadarāja regards an argument as incomplete, if one of the steps in a logical debate also is omitted. 164

(12) The overcomplete (adhika) argument consists in stating more than one reason or example. One reason or example is enough to prove the conclusion. The additional reason or example is needless. 'The hill is fiery, because it is smoky and lighted, like a kitchen and a furnace'. In this argument the second reason and the second example are redundant. It furnishes an occasion for rebuke, since it states too much. Some urge that stating two reasons or two examples to prove a conclusion more convincingly is not a ground of defeat. But Uddyotakara urges that this is a ground of defeat, because one reason or example being sufficient to prove the conclusion, the statement of the additional reason or example is needless. Vācaspati also argues that when certain knowledge of a conclusion is proved by one pramāṇa, any other pramāṇa is unnecessary. Udayana extends the meaning of an overcomplete argument, and defines it as the statement of any needless part of an inference,—a reason, or an example, or any other,—which is

164 NS., NBh., NV., NVTT., NSV., v. 2. 12; TR., p. 342.
connected, relevant and unpeated, without any purpose. If there are unconnected words in an argument, it is incoherent. If there are connected words which are irrelevant to the conclusion, it involves shifting the topic. If the same part is uselessly repeated, it involves useless repetition (punarukti).\textsuperscript{136}

(13) Repetition (punarukta) consists in repeating a word or a meaning except in reinculcation in an argument. 'Sound is non-eternal. Sound is non-eternal'. Here there is repetition of the same word. 'Sound is non-eternal. Echo is perishable'. Here there is repetition of a meaning. Though the conclusion is a repetition of the proposition, yet it serves a special purpose. The conclusion is the thesis proved, while the proposition is the thesis to be proved. So it is not a ground of defeat. Purposeless repetition, Viśvanātha observes, of a word or a meaning is repetition (punarukta), but repetition which serves a purpose is not repetition. Reinculcation serves the purpose of explanation. Repetition also consists in repeating a thing by name, though it has been indicated by implication. Some do not regard repetition as a ground of defeat, since it does not affect the validity of an argument, but contributes to clearer comprehension of its meaning. But Uddyotakara urges that repetition cannot re-establish a truth, which has already been established. So it is an occasion for rebuke, because it is needless. Vācaspāti regards it as a ground of defeat, because it unnecessarily produces a doubt in O's mind as to its significance. Repetition in a discussion, according to Jayanta, for the ascertainment of the real character of an object is not a ground of defeat, but in a wrangle and a cavil, which are actuated by a desire for victory, it is so. Jayanta distinguishes repetition from an overcomplete argument. In the former the same reason or example is repeated, while in the latter another reason or example is added in an argument.\textsuperscript{139}

(14) Non-assertion (ananubhāṣana) consists in O's not stating the proposition, which is repeated thrice by D and understood by the audience. When D establishes his proposition and repeats it thrice, which is comprehended by the audience, but O does not repeat it in order to refute it, he is guilty of non-assertion.

\textsuperscript{136} NS., NBh., NV., NVTT., NPR., v. 2. 13; TR., LD., pp. 344-45.
\textsuperscript{139} NS., NBh., NV., NVTT., NSV., v. 2. 14-16; NM., pp. 651-52; TR., pp. 346-47.
The Buddhists urge that O is not guilty of a ground of defeat, if he does not repeat D's proposition, but refutes it by valid reasoning. But Uddyotakara replies that O is certainly guilty of non-assertion, because he cannot effectively refute D's proposition without stating his proposition, and he does not state it owing to ignorance. But Jayanta does not regard O's non-assertion of D's proposition in a discussion as a ground of defeat, because in it the statement of an argument aims at explaining it to the other side. But he regards it as a ground of defeat in a wrangle, which is actuated by a desire for victory. If O fails to comprehend the import of D's proposition, and consequently does not reassert it, though it is comprehended by the audience, he certainly deserves rebuke. Viśvanātha mentions four kinds of non-assertion: (1) repetition of a part of the proposition; (2) statement of the contradictory of the proposition; (3) statement of its refutation only; and (4) arrest of all actions.181

(15) Ignorance (ajñāna) is non-comprehension of the meaning of a proposition. If O fails to comprehend the import of D's proposition, though it is repeated thrice by him and understood by the audience, he betrays his ignorance and deserves rebuke. Ignorance is due to failure to understand the import of a proposition. O cannot refute D's proposition, if he fails to understand its meaning. Jayanta distinguishes between ignorance and non-assertion. Ignorance is non-comprehension of the meaning of a proposition, while non-assertion is failure to state a proposition, though its meaning is understood. Udayana and Varadarāja are of the same view. O's failure to state D's proposition, though it is understood by him, may be due to excitement of the assembly. So ignorance is different from non-assertion.182

(16) Non-ingenuity (apratībhā) is non-comprehension of the reply. When D proves his proposition by an argument, but O fails to hit upon a reply, he deserves rebuke for his lack of ingenuity. Uddyotakara asserts that in non-ingenuity O fails to give a reply to D's argument, and recites a verse to show contempt for him. Vācaspati distinguishes between non-ingenuity and shifting the topic. In the former contempt for D is shown by

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181 NS., NBh., NV., NSV., v. 2, 17; NM., p. 653.
182 NS., NBh., NV., NSV., NPR., v. 2, 18; TR., p. 348.
O by reciting a verse, which is irrelevant to the point at issue, whereas in the latter no such contempt is shown, though an irrelevant matter is introduced by O to puzzle D. Vācaspati regards O's silence or failure to reply to D's argument as evasion. Jayanta distinguishes between non-ingenuity and ignorance. Ignorance is non-comprehension of the meaning of a proposition. But non-ingenuity is inability to hit upon a reply to it, though its meaning is comprehended. Viśvanātha distinguishes between non-ingenuity and non-assertion. Non-ingenuity is non-comprehension of the reply, but non-assertion of a proposition may be due to the suppression of speech owing to excitement of the assembly, though he knows the reply.\footnote{NS., NBr., NV., v. 2. 19; NVTT., p. 509; NSV., NPRP., v. 2. 17; NM., p. 653; TR., p. 348.}

(17) Evasion (vikṣepa) occurs when a person stops an argument on the pretext of attending to another business. When D fails to defend his proposition or refute O's proposition, and goes away on the pretext that he has urgent business, he courts defeat through evasion. It is a ground of defeat, because it is a means of hiding one's ignorance. Evasion occurs when a person stops a discussion by resorting to falsehood in order to conceal his inability to carry on discussion. But it does not occur, when a person is compelled to stop the discussion owing to a headache or any other real cause. Vācaspati distinguishes evasion from shifting the topic, a meaningless argument, an incoherent argument, non-ingenuity, and a faulty reason. In shifting the topic a person uses irrelevant words to prove a proposition. But in evasion a person leaves the assembly at the start of the discussion by telling a lie. In a meaningless argument meaningless letters are used, but in evasion they are not used. In an incoherent argument unconnected words or sentences are used, which are meaningless, while in evasion they are not used. In non-ingenuity contempt for the opponent is shown, but in evasion no such contempt is shown. In a fallacy of reason a faulty reason is adduced to prove a proposition, but in evasion no faulty reason is adduced. Dharmakīrti regards evasion as a faulty reason. But a fallacy of reason, Jayanta argues, is a faulty reason, whereas evasion is a false pretext. Jayanta regards leaving an assembly before commencement of a discussion as
evasion. But Udayana and Varadarāja opine that evasion may occur at any stage of discussion from its beginning to its end.\textsuperscript{184}

(18) The admission of a defect (matāntujñā) consists in charging an opponent with a defect by admitting the same defect in oneself. D—'You are a thief, because you are a man.' O—'You too are a thief, because you are a man.' O does not refute D's charge, but he charges D with the same defect. The counter charge is an admission of a defect in oneself, which brings disgrace on him who makes it. One should remove a defect in one's argument first, and then charge the opponent with a defect in his argument. The Buddhists do not regard admission of a defect as a ground of defeat. When a person charges the opponent with the defect with which he is charged by him, he simply objects to the charge, but does not admit the same defect in his argument, and so does not deserve rebuke. Uddyotakara refutes the Buddhist view, and maintains that admission of a defect is a ground of defeat, because it betrays ignorance of the proper reply. If a person knows the right reply, he should refute O's charge. But he makes a counter charge against O, because he is ignorant of the right reply. Vācaspati supports Uddyotakara.\textsuperscript{185}

(19) Overlooking the censurable (paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa) consists in not censuring a person who deserves rebuke. In a discussion D may expose his own ground of defeat. But in a wrangle and a cavil the ground of defeat should be exposed by the assembly or an impartial expert. When one ground of defeat is exposed, though there are many grounds of defeat, overlooking the censurable does not occur. This is Viśvanātha's view. Some Buddhists do not recognize overlooking the censurable as a ground of defeat. But Uddyotakara refutes this view. O does not expose the ground of defeat in D's argument, and gives another reply, because he does not know the right reply. So his overlooking D's point of defeat is a ground of defeat. Vācaspati and Jayanta distinguish between overlooking the censurable and non-ingenuity. When D proves his thesis by a valid argument, but O cannot hit upon a right reply and establish his antithesis, O is guilty of non-ingenuity. But when D


\textsuperscript{185} NS., NBh., NV., NVTT., v. 2, 21.
proves his thesis by an invalid argument, but O fails to expose his point of defeat, O is guilty of overlooking the censurable. Varadarāja regards non-exposure of a ground of defeat at the right moment as overlooking the censurable.¹⁹⁶

(20) Censuring the non-censurable (niranuyoiyānuyoga) consists in rebuking a person who does not deserve rebuke. It involves misunderstanding (vipratipatti) or false ascription of a ground of defeat to a valid argument. Exposing a ground of defeat in a valid argument, or exposing a different one from what vitiates an argument, or exposing a ground of defeat not at the right moment involves censuring the non-censurable. Vacaspati and Jayanta distinguish between censuring the non-censurable and non-ingenuity. The former is misunderstanding a right reply as a wrong reply, whereas the latter is absence of knowledge of the right reply (apratipatti). The former is exposure of a non-existent flaw in an argument, whereas the latter is non-exposure of a real flaw in an argument. All futilities (jāti) are grounds of defeat.¹⁹⁷

(21) Deviation from a tenet (apasiddhānta) consists in admitting a tenet at first and then deviating from it in course of an argument. D argues according to the Sāmkhya philosophy: 'What is existent does not become non-existent; what is existent is not destroyed; what is non-existent is not produced. Prakṛti is modified because in it some characters (dharma) are destroyed and others are produced'. Thus he deviates from the Sāmkhya tenet which he accepted at the outset. Vācaspati distinguishes between deviation from a tenet and contradicting the proposition. In the former there is no verbal contradiction between the proposition and the reason: 'The derivatives of the same prakṛti are its modifications' and 'because they are derived from the same prakṛti', whereas in the latter there is a verbal contradiction between the proposition and the reason: 'Substance is different from quality, because it is not perceived as different from quality'. Varadarāja makes it more clear. In deviation from the accepted tenet there is contradiction between two parts of an argument according to a particular system of philosophy. In the example given above there is contradiction according to

¹⁹⁶ NVTT., p. 510; NM., p. 655; TR., pp. 354-55; NS., NBh., NV., NSV., v. 2. 22.
¹⁹⁷ NS., NBh., v. 2. 23; TR., pp. 354-55; NM., p. 657; NVTT., p. 511.
the Śāṁkhya system. The production of some characters and the extinction of others in modifications of prakṛti contradict the Śāṁkhya doctrine of Satkāryavāda which denies production of the non-existent and extinction of the existent. But in contradicting the proposition there is contradiction between the proposition and the reason according to the arguer's own standpoint.188

(22) The fallacies of reason (hetvābhāsa) are grounds of defeat. One who employs invalid reasons certainly deserves rebuke. Futile refutations, fallacious examples, begging the question (ātmāśraya), mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya), argument in a circle (cakraka), and infinite regress (anavasthā) are grounds of defeat which must be exposed.189

6. Doubt (Saṁśaya), Example (Drśṭānta), Accepted Tenet (Siddhānta), Hypothetical Reasoning (Tarka), and Ascertainment (Nirñaya).

Gautama defines doubt as indefinite knowledge, which seeks to know particular features of an object, and springs from the perception of the common character of two objects, or the perception of the common character of many homogeneous and heterogeneous objects, contradictory views, irregularity in perception, and irregularity in non-perception. (1) There is a doubt: 'Is it a post or a man?' It arises from the perception of height and girth, which are the common qualities of a post and a man, and the non-perception of their particular qualities which are remembered. It is indefinite knowledge. (2) Doubt arises from the knowledge of the common character of many homogeneous and heterogeneous objects. Sound is known to be produced by disjunction. This knowledge gives rise to a doubt whether it is a substance, or an attribute, or an action. The distinguishing characters of any of them are not perceived in it. (3) Doubt arises from contradictory views about the same object, which cannot have contradictory characters at the same time. No proof in favour of any of the conflicting views is known. The Āravaka denies the existence of the self. The Nyāya

188 NS., NBh., v. 2. 24; NVTT., p. 512; TR., p. 300.
189 NS., NBh., v. 2. 25; TR., pp. 300-01.
admits its existence. But it cannot have existence and non-
existence at the same time. So a doubt arises whether it exists
or whether it does not exist. (4) Doubt arises from irregularity
in perception. Existent water is perceived in tanks, rivers and
the like. Non-existent water is perceived in the rays of the sun
in a desert. So when water is perceived from a distance, a
doubt arises whether it is existent and non-existent. Reasons
for its existence or non-existence are not known. (5) Doubt
arises from irregularity in perception. Roots, underground
water, nails driven into a wall and the like are not perceived,
though they are existent. Unproduced and destroyed things
are not perceived. So when there is non-perception of an
object, a doubt arises whether it is existent or non-existent.
Reasons for its existence or non-existence are not known.
Vācaspati distinguishes doubt from valid knowledge (pramāṇa)
and illusion (viparyaya). Doubt is indefinite knowledge, and
therefore invalid. It is not an illusion, which is definite know-
ledge of one object as another. Doubt is indefinite invalid
knowledge. Illusion is definite wrong perception. Valid know-
ledge is definite right knowledge.209

First, the opponent urges that doubt does not arise from the
mere existence of a common quality, but from the certain know-
ledge of it. Vātsyāyana replies that the certain knowledge of a
common quality of an object with a desire to know its particular
qualities is a cause of doubt; that an unknown common quality
is as good as non-existent. The opponent urges that a common
quality always exists in an object (dharmin), so that doubt can
never cease. Vātsyāyana replies that doubt does not arise from
the existence of a common quality, but from certain knowledge
of it and recollection of specific qualities, so that doubt ceases
when specific qualities are known for certain; that the un-
known common quality cannot produce doubt. The opponent
urges that the perception of the common quality (dharma) of a
post and a man involves the knowledge of the two substances
(dharmin) which have the common quality; and that if the
substances are known, doubt cannot arise. Vātsyāyana replies
that the substance (dharmin) in general is known, though it
is not known with its particular qualities; that the knowledge

209 NS., NBh., NVTT., i. 1. 23.
of the substance in general does not prevent a doubt as to its being either of the two, which is destroyed when the specific qualities of either of them are known. The opponent urges that certain knowledge of a common quality (dharma) cannot produce a doubt as to the existence of two substances (dharma). Vātsyāyana replies that only certain knowledge of an entity is not the cause of doubt as to a different entity; but that certain knowledge of a common quality of two objects in an entity and absence of certain knowledge of the specific qualities of any of them are the cause of doubt. The opponent urges that certain knowledge cannot be the cause of doubt, because the cause and its effect are similar in their nature; that certain or definite knowledge cannot be the cause of doubt or indefinite knowledge. Uddyotakara replies that there is no definite knowledge of specific qualities in the certain knowledge of the common quality, which is the cause of doubt, and that there is no definite knowledge of specific qualities in doubt, which is its effect. The absence of definite knowledge of specific qualities is the similarity between doubt and its cause. Secondly, the opponent urges that mere conflicting views which are not known and mere irregularity in perception or non-perception, which is not known cannot produce doubt. But the certain knowledge of statements about conflicting views and the certain knowledge of irregularity in perception or non-perception cannot produce doubt. Vātsyāyana replies that certain knowledge of conflicting views about an object cannot prevent the production of doubt, because the special qualities are not known by which one object (dharma) can be known for certain; and that certain knowledge of irregularity in perception or non-perception cannot prevent the production of doubt, because there is no certain knowledge of specific qualities. Thirdly, the opponent urges that conflicting views (vipratipatti) involve certain knowledge (sampratipatti) of the thesis and the antithesis of two contending parties, which also is a cause of doubt. Vātsyāyana replies that certain knowledge of conflicting views about an object with a desire to know its specific qualities can produce doubt. Fourthly, the opponent urges that uncertainty is certain in its own character, which cannot produce doubt. If, on the other hand, uncertainty is not certain in its own nature, then also it cannot produce doubt. Vātsyāyana replies that uncertainty never
becomes certainty, because it is uncertain in its real nature, and so it can produce doubt. An example (drṣṭānta) is an instance which is accepted by the two parties in a discussion. Vātsyāyana regards it as what is accepted by an ordinary person and an expert logician. But Vātsyāyana and Jayanta define it as what is admitted to be valid by a disputant (vādin) and an opponent (pratīvādin). Vātsyāyana mentions three characteristics of an example. (1) The thesis of a disputant can be established by showing that there is co-presence or co-absence of the predicate and the reason in the example. (2) The antithesis of the opponent can be refuted by showing that there is no co-presence or co-absence of the predicate and the reason in the example. (3) The third member of a demonstrative inference is a universal proposition stating the co-presence or co-absence of the predicate and the reason everywhere illustrated by an example. It is the locus of their co-presence or co-absence, in which their concomitance or non-concomitance is observed. There are two kinds of examples, homogeneous (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta) and heterogeneous (vaidharyadṛṣṭānta) which have been discussed already.

An objection is raised against its being treated as an independent category. If it is meant for knowledge of similarity, it does not differ from comparison, and is included in pramanā. If it is a means of proving the existence of the predicate, it does not differ from an exemplification, and is included in members of a demonstrative inference. So it is not an independent category. The objection is not sound. An example is not comparison or knowledge of an unfamiliar object on the ground of its similarity with a familiar object indicated by the verbal statement of a reliable person. Nor does it prove invariable concomitance of the reason with the predicate. But it is an instance which is observed to be the locus of their co-presence or co-absence, and accepted by both parties in a logical discussion. It is not a member of a demonstrative inference. But it illustrates the universal major premise, which indicates invariable concomitance of the reason and the predicate.

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\[41\] NS., NBh., NV., il. 1. 1-6.
\[42\] NS., NBh., NV., NVTT., NSV., i. 1. 25; NM., p. 564; TR., pp. 108-69.
A tenet (siddhānta) is a conclusion established by valid reasoning about an object, and admitted to be valid. It is an accepted truth about an object that it is endowed with some generic and specific qualities. The reasoning which establishes a tenet in a particular system is regarded as valid by it only. But it is considered to be invalid by a rival system. There are four kinds of accepted tenets. (1) A universally accepted tenet (sarvatantrasiddhānta) is one that is admitted by all systems of philosophy, and stated in a system or systems. The olfactory organ, the visual organ, the auditory organ, the gustatory organ, and the tactual organ are the sense-organs. Odour, colour, sound, taste and touch are the sensible objects. Earth, water, fire, air and ether are the physical elements. The objects are apprehended by the means of valid knowledge. Uddyotakara distinguishes between a universally accepted tenet and an example. The former is accepted as true by all schools of philosophy, while the latter is accepted as true by a disputant and an opponent in a discussion. The former is not the basis of inference, while the latter is. (2) A tenet of a system (pratitantrasiddhānta) is a doctrine, which is admitted by one system of philosophy and an allied system, but not admitted by the rival systems. There is no production of a non-existent entity, nor destruction of an existent entity. The selves are unmodifiable, but the body, the sense-organs, manas, and their causes are modifiable. These are the Sāṅkhya tenets. A non-existent entity is produced, and a produced thing is destroyed. The selves have pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit and demerit. Attachment, aversion and delusion are the causes of voluntary actions. These are the Nyāya tenets, which are admitted by the allied Vaiśeṣika system. (3) A derived tenet (adhikarapasiddhānta) is a doctrine which follows as a corollary to another established conclusion. The tenets which are the basis of an established conclusion are derived. The knowing self is distinct from the body and the sense-organs, because it apprehends the same object through the visual organ and the tactual organ. This truth is based upon the admission of the following truths. There are many sense-organs which apprehend different kinds of objects. They apprehend those objects with whose qualities they are endowed. They are the self's organs of knowledge. A substance is the substrate of its qualities, and different
from them. If these truths are not admitted, the self as the knower of different qualities of an object cannot be proved. God is omniscient. It is a corollary to the conclusion that the earth and the like are produced by God as their efficient cause.

(4) A provisionally accepted tenet (abhypagamasiddhānta) is a contingency which is admitted without proof as the basis of another thesis about its special features. A sound is a substance. This tenet is admitted by the Mīmāṁsā (pratitantrasiddhānta) only. A Naiyāyika admits for the sake of argument that sound is a substance, examines its eternity or non-eternity, and proves its non-eternity. This provisional admission of the Naiyāyika is an abhyupagamasiddhānta. It is not his pratitantrasiddhānta. An intelligent person admits such a conclusion tentatively to show off his superiority in intelligence and defeat his opponent. Vātsyāyana regards an object (artha), which is admitted to be true, as an accepted tenet (siddhānta). But Uddyotakara regards an admission (abhyupagama) as an accepted tenet. Udayana rightly observes that there is no material difference between the two views. Vātsyāyana lays stress on the object which is admitted, while Uddyotakara lays emphasis on the admission of an object.  

Tarka is hypothetical reasoning about an unknown object with a view to ascertaining its real nature by stating reasons in favour of one of the alternatives about it. There is a doubt as to the nature of the self: Is it non-eternal or eternal? A hypothetical reasoning is adduced in favour of one of the alternatives. If the self is eternal, it can reap the fruits of its actions, and can be bound or released. If it is produced, it cannot reap the fruits of its actions, will be destroyed with the body and the sense-organs, and will not be associated with them and dissociated from them. So this hypothetical reasoning indirectly proves the eternity of the self, and disproves its non-eternity. Tarka is indefinite knowledge, and consequently cannot ascertain the real nature of an object. It is not an independent means of valid knowledge, but an aid to valid knowledge. Sometimes a pramāṇa cannot establish a truth without the aid of a hypothetical reasoning. Tarka is probable reasoning.
(sambhava), in which an object is presumed to exist by reason of a character known to exist in another object, with a view to determining the real nature of an object by resolving a doubt. 'Is it a post or a man?' Horses are ridden in this place. Riding a horse is the character of a man. So a man is presumed to exist.\textsuperscript{304} Uddyotakara distinguishes hypothetical reasoning from doubt, ascertainment, and inference. Tarka is indefinite or general knowledge of an object with a desire to know its particular features. But it differs from doubt, since it supports one of the alternatives. It is not ascertainment, since it does not determine the real nature of an object. Nor is it inference, since it does not conclusively prove the real character of an object by adducing valid reasons for it. In an inference a character (sādhya) is inferred in a subject (pakṣa) from another character (hetu) of it, which is known. But in hypothetical reasoning an object is presumed to exist. Vācaspati regards tarka as a probable reasoning which presumes the truth of one of the two alternatives by showing that its falsity would lead to an undesirable contingency, and thus resolves a doubt. Udayana and Varadarāja explain the undesirable contingency as rejection of what is known to be true as false, or as admission of what is known to be false as true. If there were no fire in a place, there would be no smoke there, which is actually perceived. If drunk water did not quench thirst, no thirsty person would drink water. If it burnt the inner body, it would burn mine also. Tarka is an aid to perception, inference and testimony. It removes doubt about the object of inference. Jayanta distinguishes hypothetical reasoning from doubt, ascertainment, and valid knowledge. In doubt two alternatives are present to the mind as equally strong. In ascertainment one alternative only is known to be true. In hypothetical reasoning one alternative is presumed to be true. It is not inference, which is valid knowledge. But it is an aid to valid knowledge. Viśvanātha regards tarka as a means of removing doubts that frustrate an inference, and as an aid to the knowledge of invariable concomitance of a reason and a predicate. If smoke had variable concomitance with fire, it would

\textsuperscript{304} Na tattvajñānam evetī, anavadhāraṇāt. NBh., i. 1. 40. Tarka na pramāṇāntaram, pramāṇānāṁ anugrahaṁ tattvajñānāya kalpayate. NBh., i. 1. 1 NS., i. 1. 40.
not be produced by fire. Tarka is an indirect aid to the determination of vyāpti by removing doubt as to the presence of vitiating conditions.\(^{208}\) It corresponds to a destructive hypothetical inference. If A is B, then C is D; but C is not D; therefore A is not B. If the lake were smoky, it would be fiery; but it is not fiery; therefore it is not smoky.

The Nyāya regards tarka as an aid to a pramāṇa, since it indirectly contributes to the determination of truth. But the Vaiśeṣika regards it as a valid inference which proves the falsity of one alternative by a valid inference and its invariable concomitance with a probandum. It is a condition of proof or disproof. It disproves an antithesis by producing a stronger reason in support of a thesis. But Uddyotakara and Vācaspati refute the Vaiśeṣika doctrine that tarka is a valid inference.\(^{206}\)

Ascertainment (nirṇaya) is the determination of the real nature of an object by considering the arguments of the two opposite sides. It is the reasoning by which the reasoning of one party is accepted and that of the other party is rejected. It removes doubt as to the existence of two contradictory characters in the same object propounded by a disputant and an opponent. It is certain knowledge of one of the contradictory characters of an object. The real character of an object is known directly by perception. This certain perceptual knowledge also is ascertainment. In discussion and scriptural authority the real nature of things is determined without prior doubt. But in investigation ascertainment is preceded by doubt. It ends in the acceptance of the thesis of one party and the rejection of the antithesis of the other party. The means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) and hypothetical reasoning (tarka) are the means of arriving at a definite conclusion.

Some do not regard ascertainment as a distinct category, since it is nothing but inference. Uddyotakara refutes it on the following grounds. First, ascertainment does not depend upon the recollection of the relation of the reason with the predicate like inference. Secondly, ascertainment is the result of a means

\(^{206}\) Hetur vyāptigraha tarkaḥ

Kvaicchāṅkāṇivartakaḥ. BP., i. 37. NSV., i. 1. 40.

Upādhvihīḍhamane'pi tarkaḥ pravartate. TR., p. 198.

of valid knowledge, whereas inference is a means of valid knowledge. Ascertainment is the effect of inference. Thirdly, ascertainment is valid knowledge of its object, whereas inference is the means of knowing the predicate through the knowledge of the mark. Valid knowledge of smoke through perception is ascertainment. But the knowledge of a fire from that of smoke is inference. Jayanta does not regard perceptual knowledge as ascertainment. He regards inference and hypothetical reasoning as the means of ascertainment, which terminates a further desire for knowledge and reasoning.

7. Comparison (Upamāna).

Comparison is the means of knowing an unknown object through its resemblance with another well-known object. A person familiar with a cow in a town learns from a reliable forester that a wild cow (gavaya) resembles a cow. He goes to a forest, perceives a strange animal resembling a cow, remembers that a wild cow resembles a cow, and knows the animal to be a wild cow through the knowledge of its resemblance with a well-known cow. His knowledge that the strange animal bears the name 'gavaya' is comparison. Comparison contains the following factors: (1) the perception of an unfamiliar object which was not perceived before; (2) the indirect knowledge of its resemblance with a familiar object, which is acquired from testimony of a reliable person who perceived them both and knew their similarity; (3) the perception of resemblance of the unfamiliar object with the well-known object; (4) the recollection of the verbal statement of the reliable person; and (5) the knowledge of the relation between a name and the unfamiliar object which is perceived. The knowledge of resemblance involves testimony and perception. The knowledge acquired from the verbal statement 'a wild cow is like a cow' is testimony. The knowledge 'this animal has similarity with a cow' is perception. The perception of similarity of the strange

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207 NS., NBh., NV., pp. 145-48; NSV., i. 1. 40; NM., pp. 500-92; NKL., p. 13; Tr., p. 208. Praśastapāda defines ascertainment as definite knowledge derived from perception or inference, which resolves doubt. Pbh., p. 345. B.S.S.

208 Prasiddhasādharmyāśādhyāsādhanām upamānām. NS., i. 1. 6.

209 Upamānāt saññjñāsaññjñisambandham pratipadyamānāt. NBh., i. 1. 6.
animal with a well-known cow aided by the recollection of the verbal statement of the forester is the cause of the knowledge of the relation between it and the name 'gavaya'. A person who does not perceive the similarity of a wild cow with a cow, does not know on the strength of the mere verbal statement of a forester that the wild cow is called a 'gavaya'. Nor does he know it through the perception of similarity without the verbal statement of the forester. So comparison is different from testimony and perception. It is due to the knowledge of similarity aided by the recollection of the verbal statement. Recollection is due to the revival of the impression of the knowledge of the verbal statement. The perception of similarity aided by the recollection of the forester's statement produces the knowledge of the relation between a name (vācaka) and an unknown object (vācyā). The knowledge of similarity is upamāna (pramāṇa). The knowledge of the relation of a name to an object is upamiti.\footnote{NVTT., i. 1. 6, p. 133. Sambandhasya paricchedāḥ sanijñāyāḥ sanjijninā saha upamānaphalam. NKS., iii. 10. TR., p. 89.}

It is neither perception, nor inference, nor testimony. A wild cow and its similarity with a cow are perceived. But that it bears the name 'gavaya' is not perceived. Nor is comparison inference, since there is no knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyāpati) between a name and an object in it. Nor is it testimony, since the knowledge of the verbal statement of the forester is testimony which cannot yield the knowledge 'this animal bears the name gavaya' before it is perceived. The perception of similarity with or without the knowledge of the verbal statement is not comparison. Nor is testimony without the perception of similarity comparison. It is an independent means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). It is not recollection, because it was never perceived in the past.\footnote{NV., ii. 1. 45, p. 260; NKS., iii. 10, pp. 49-50; Bīnākarti, pp. 350-59.}

It is objected that if there is perfect similarity (e.g., 'a cow is like a cow'), there can be no comparison; that if there is great similarity (e.g., 'a buffalo is like a cow'), no comparison is possible; and that if there is slight similarity (e.g., 'Mount Meru is like a mustard seed'), there can be no comparison. The Nyāya replies that these objections are beside the mark.
Comparison does not depend upon the quantity of similarity, perfect, great, or slight. But it depends upon perceived similarity of an unknown object with a well-known object, which indicates the relation of an unknown object with a particular name. It apprehends something which is not apprehended by perception, inference, or testimony.\textsuperscript{212}

Gaṅgēśa defines comparison as the knowledge that a word denotes the generic character of an unfamiliar object, which coexists with its similarity or dissimilarity with a known object.\textsuperscript{213} An individual endowed with the generic nature of its class is denoted by a word. The word 'gavaya' denotes the community of wild cows (gavayatva), which is indicated by similarity with a cow. The parsimony of hypotheses demands that the generic character of wild cows be denoted by the word 'gavaya', which is suggested by the perception of similarity. It cannot denote an individual wild cow through recognition of its similarity with a cow without apprehending the generic character of wild cows (gavayatva), because it denotes other wild cows also which are not perceived. The generic character of wild cows is suggested by the perception of similarity of a wild cow with a cow. When an animal resembling a cow is perceived, the forester's statement 'an animal resembling a cow is called gavaya' is remembered. Then the knowledge that an individual endowed with the generic character of wild cows (gavayatva) is called gavaya is produced, which is upamiti.\textsuperscript{214} Or it is the knowledge of an object, which is denoted by a word, which is not known by convention to denote a specific kind of object, and which is indicated by the verbal statement of a reliable person.\textsuperscript{215} Its generic character is manifested as a prakāra in it. Viśvanātha regards the perception of similarity as the instrument (karaṇa), the recollection of the verbal statement of a reliable person as the causal operation (vyāpāra), and the knowledge 'a wild cow is called gavaya' as the result of comparison (upamiti). The knowledge 'This is called gavaya' is

\textsuperscript{212} NS., NBh., ii. 1. 42-43; NVTT., pp. 284-85.
\textsuperscript{213} Niyatadharmanādhi karaṇasabdapravṛtyaparayottamajñānam upamiti.

\textsuperscript{214} Sādṛṣyādhyānapalakṣite gavayatvāda gavayādipādānān māktib.

\textsuperscript{215} Aghrīśasamayasaṃjñāyā vākyārthāgamānādhi karaṇyena saṃjñā nimittraprakāraatāparicchedo va. TCU., pp. 99-100.
not upamiti, because then any other wild cow cannot be called gavaya.\textsuperscript{216}

Uddyotakara and Vācaspati mention two kinds of comparison: (1) comparison based on similarity (sādharmyopamāna); and (2) comparison based on dissimilarity (vaidharmyopamāna). Varadarāja mentions (3) comparison based on certain qualities (dharmamātropamāna). A person recognizes an animal as a horse, because it has, unlike cows, no cloven hocks. This is comparison based on dissimilarity. A south Indian's knowledge that an animal is a camel on the strength of the verbal statement of a person of northern India that 'a camel has a long neck and hanging lips, and eats sharp thorns' is comparison based on certain qualities. Vācaspati regards it as a comparison based on dissimilarity. Gaṅgeśa recognizes the first two kinds of comparison.\textsuperscript{217}

Comparison is different from analogy of Western Logic. Analogy takes the form: S and P resemble each other in many respects; S has another characteristic $x$; therefore P also may have $x$. The earth and Mars resemble each other in many respects, e.g., temperate climate, atmosphere, clouds, rain, etc. The earth has another characteristic that it is inhabited by living beings. Comparison is not analogy, though both are based on similarity. First, unlike analogy, comparison depends upon testimony. Secondly, unlike analogy, comparison yields the knowledge of the relation between a name (saṁjñā) and an object (saṁjñī). Thirdly, unlike analogy, comparison sometimes depends upon dissimilarity.

The Mīmāṁsā and the Advaita Vedānta regard the knowledge of similarity of a remembered cow with a perceived wild cow as comparison.\textsuperscript{218} Jayanta urges that no such knowledge is produced. Similarity of an unknown object with a known object is known. But similarity of a known object with an unknown object is not known. A person hears a forester's statement 'a wild cow is like a cow', goes to a forest, perceives an animal like a cow, and knows 'this strange animal is like a

\textsuperscript{216} BP., 79, 80; SM., pp. 355-59.
\textsuperscript{217} NAVTT., i. 1. 6, p. 134; TR., pp. 87-88; TCU., pp. 61-62.
cow'. He has no knowledge 'the cow is like this strange animal'. Even if he has such knowledge, it is mere recollection. The Mīmāṃsaka may argue that the knowledge of the cow at present is a recollection, but that its being endued with similarity with a wild cow was not perceived in the past, since the wild cow is perceived now for the first time. Jayanta replies that the cow's similarity with a wild cow was indistinctly perceived when the cow was perceived, and that when a wild cow is perceived for the first time, the cow's similarity with it is remembered distinctly. Recollection of similarity presupposes previous perception of similarity, which was not distinct at the time. So the cow's similarity with a wild cow is nothing but recollection. But the Mīmāṃsaka may urge that the cow's similarity with a wild cow cannot be known without the knowledge of a wild cow. But the Mīmāṃsaka himself admits, Jayanta retorts, that similarity, which consists in the possession of many common parts, can be known without the knowledge of its correlate (pratīyogī). The common parts in a cow can be perceived even without the knowledge of a wild cow. The perception of the common parts in a cow produces the knowledge 'this animal is like a cow'. Therefore the indistinct perception of the common parts or similarity in a cow before a wild cow is perceived produces the distinct knowledge 'the cow is like this animal', which is nothing but recollection. Varadarāja urges that the so-called comparison of the Mīmāṃsaka is inference which may be formally stated thus: 'A cow is like a wild cow, because it is the correlate of similarity in a wild cow; whatever is the correlate of similarity in another entity, is like it, as a twin is similar to another twin'. The inference is based on the uniform relation between two similar entities. Further, if the knowledge of similarity in a remembered object derived from the perception of a similar object (e.g., a wild cow) is a pramāṇa, then the knowledge of dissimilarity in a remembered object derived from the perception of a dissimilar object also should be regarded as a pramāṇa. But the Mīmāṃsaka does not regard it as a distinct means of valid knowledge. Hence the Mīmāṃsaka view of comparison is not sound.

218 NM., pp. 146-48; TR., pp. 92-94.
The Vaiṣeṣika regards comparison as testimony, which produces the knowledge of relation between a name and an object. The testimony of a reliable person is the essential element in comparison. So comparison is testimony. But Jayanta urges that in comparison a reliable person makes a statement 'a wild cow is like a cow', and indicates another means, i.e., the perception of an unknown object similar to a cow in a forest through which an inhabitant of a town knows that it is a wild cow. He perceives an animal similar to a cow in a forest as instructed by a reliable forester. So his knowledge that it is a wild cow is not produced by testimony, but by comparison.²²⁶

It is objected that comparison is inference, since an unperceived relation of a name (gavaya) to an object is inferred from a perceived similarity of an unfamiliar animal with a cow. The Nyāya replies that, first, when a wild cow is perceived, it is known by comparison to bear the name 'gavaya'. It cannot be known by inference. Secondly, comparison is intended for another person. A person who has perceived a cow and a wild cow both makes a statement 'a wild cow is like a cow' for the benefit of another person, who has perceived a cow only, but not a wild cow. He knows through comparison that a wild cow bears the name 'gavaya'. Thirdly, comparison is based on the knowledge of similarity, while inference is based on the knowledge of vyāpti. In comparison there is the knowledge of similarity 'a wild cow is like a cow'. But in inference there is no knowledge of similarity 'a fire is like a smoke'. So comparison is different from inference.²²⁷

The Jaina includes comparison in recognition which takes such forms: 'this is that'; 'this is like that', 'this is different from that'; 'this is the correlate of that', and the like. The knowledge 'a wild cow is like a cow' is recognition. It is a pramāṇa, because it is in harmony with the object apprehended by it and not contradicted by a sublating cognition. Comparison or recognition based on similarity is a pramāṇa for the same reason. Prabhācandra criticizes the Nyāya view of comparison. The verbal statement of a forester 'a wild cow is like a cow' produces the knowledge of the relation of the name and the

²²⁷ NS., NBh., ii. 1. 44-46.
object. When a wild cow is perceived in a forest, the impression of that knowledge is revived, and the perception and the recollection produce the recognition 'a wild cow is like a cow.' This view is wrong. The knowledge of the relation of the name (gavaya) and its object is not acquired from the verbal statement 'a wild cow is like a cow', because a wild cow is not perceived at the time, and when it is perceived for the first time it cannot be recognized. Hence it is wrong to include comparison in recognition. It is neither perception, nor recollection, nor recognition.

8. Testimony.

Gautama defines testimony as the instruction of a trustworthy person, who has immediate knowledge of the Moral Law (Dharma), and who is competent to guide others in the performance of their duties and the abstention from sins for the attainment of good and the avoidance of evil. Trustworthy (āpta) persons are those who perceive objects as they exist in their real nature, and communicate their right knowledge to others for their benefit out of compassion for them. They are free from attachment and aversion, and have immediate knowledge of eternal verities that exist in all times. Sages (ṛṣi) are the seers of truths. The assertions of those who know truths but speak falsehoods are not valid. The assertions of those who are ignorant of truths, but speak what they know are not valid. The assertions of trustworthy persons, which are not fit for guiding persons in the performance of right actions and the non-commision of sins are not testimony. Untrustworthy persons are tainted with delusion, mendacity and fraudulence. Testimony is an instruction which is expressed in a sentence or proposition. The knowledge of a proposition is testimony (pramāṇa), and the knowledge of its meaning (artha) is the result (pramiti). Or, the knowledge of the meaning of a proposition is testimony, and the knowledge of acceptability, avoidability, or neutral character of an object is the result. According to Viśvanātha, the knowledge of words is the instrument

334 PKM., pp. 97-100.
335 Āptopadesaḥ śabdāḥ. NS., i. 1. 7. Āptaḥ khalu sāksātkṛtāḥ dharma vathādṛṣṭasyārthasya cikhyāpaviśayā upadeśa. NBh., i. 1. 7. NVTT., i. 1. 7, pp. 135-36; NM., pp. 150-52; Tr., p. 95.
(karapa); the recollection of the meanings of words is the
causal power (vyāpāra); the knowledge of the denotative
power (śakti) of words or the relation of words to the objects
denoted by them is the auxiliary cause; and the verbal know-
ledge of a sentence is the result (phala). Testimony is due
to the knowledge of a sentence or words, while perception is
due to the sense-object-intercourse, inference, to the knowledge
of vyāpti, and comparison, to the knowledge of similarity or
dissimilarity.

Testimony is of two kinds, viz., testimony about perceptible
objects and testimony about imperceptible objects. The former
objects are found in this world. The latter are found in the
next world, such as heaven, hell, transmigration and the like.

The modern Naiyāyikas divide testimony into two kinds,
viz., secular (laukika) testimony and scriptural (vaidika) testi-
mony. The Vedas are not impersonal but personal (puruṣeya)
compositions of God, the omniscient person, and are therefore
valid. The secular testimony of trustworthy persons is valid,
while that of untrustworthy persons is invalid.

Testimony is expressed in a sentence, which is a combina-
tion of words conveying a meaning. Its comprehensibility
depends upon certain conditions. First, a sentence consists
of words which imply one another. Mutual implication is called
expectancy (ākāṅkṣā). A word cannot by itself convey a full
meaning. It must be related to other words in order to convey
a complete meaning. The word 'bring' does not make full
sense. It produces an expectancy in the mind for some other
word or words. The sentence 'bring a horse' makes full sense.
The words imply one another, and convey a complete meaning.
Secondly, a sentence consists of words which have fitness
(yogyatā) for one another. Mutual fitness of words is another
condition of the intelligibility of a sentence. The sentence
'quench your thirst with water' conveys a meaning, because its
component words have mutual fitness or compatibility. But
the sentence 'quench your thirst with fire' is unintelligible,
since its constituent words are incompatible with one another.
Thirdly, a sentence consists of words which are in close

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224 NVT, I. 1. 7, p. 135; TR., p. 95; BP., 81; SM., pp. 300-01.
225 NS., i. 1. 8. NBh., i. 1. 8.
226 TSG., p. 79; NVTT, i. 1. 7, p. 136.
proximity (sannidhi) to one another. The words constituting a sentence should be uttered in close succession without a long interval between one word and another. If the words 'bring', 'a', and 'horse' are uttered at long intervals, they do not convey any meaning. Proximity of words is a condition of the comprehension of a sentence. Sentences devoid of expectancy, compatibility, and proximity are not means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). Fourthly, the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence depends upon the knowledge of the intention (tātparya) of the speaker. The sentence 'saindhavam ānaya' means 'bring a horse', when the speaker gets ready for starting on a journey. It means 'bring salt' when the speaker is taking his meal. It has different meanings in different contexts according to the intentions of the speakers. Some opine that the context, which determines the intention of the speaker, is a cause of understanding the meaning of a sentence. But it is wrong, since there is no common property in the contexts of different sentences. Some opine that the knowledge of the speaker's intention is a cause when some word in a sentence is equivocal. Hence a sentence, in order to be intelligible, must consist of words, which are interdependent on, compatible with, and juxtaposed to, one another, and convey a meaning in conformity with the speaker's intention. Compatibility implies formal consistency, while the knowledge of the speaker's intention implies material consistency. This is the syntactical analysis of a sentence.

A sentence is a combination of words which fulfil the four conditions. There are two main theories of the import of a sentence, viz., Anvītābhidhāna and Abhīhitānvaya. Prabhākara advocates the doctrine of Anvītābhidhāna according to which the words denote a unitary meaning of a sentence enjoining an action, which is different from their separate meanings. The Nyāya advocates the doctrine of Abhīhitānvaya according to which the words denote their separate meanings, which being related to one another by their mutual expectancy, proximity and compatibility produce the knowledge of their interrelation; the separate meanings of words produce the connected meaning of a sentence. The meanings of words are learnt from the usage

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227 NVTT., i. 1. 7, p. 139; NM., pp. 399-401; TSG., p. 38; BP., 82-84; SM., pp. 389-94.
of elders. The knowledge of their meanings is a precondition of the knowledge of the connected meaning of a sentence. Different words denote a substance, a quality, an action, and a genus. When they are combined with one another, they produce the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence, which is their conjoined effect. They singly produce the knowledge of their separate meanings. Words denote their separate meanings through their denotative power, and produce the knowledge of their relation through their power of expressing the speaker's intention. Hence the words do not denote the connected meaning of a sentence; but they produce the knowledge of their connected meaning. The Nyāya rejects the doctrine of Anvītābhidhāna, but it admits that the words produce the knowledge of the connected meaning of a sentence jointly.  

According to the doctrine of Anvītābhidhāna the meanings of words as related to one another in a sentence are denoted by them. They cannot constitute a sentence, if they do not denote its unitary meaning. The meanings of words are not learnt from the usage of the elders. But those of sentences are learnt from them. Jayanta refutes this doctrine. First, if the entire meaning of a sentence is learnt from their usage, then the meaning of the same word occurring many times in different sentences has to be learnt afresh every time, which is not possible. Thus the meanings of words cannot be learnt, and the words used cannot convey any meanings. This would make language useless. Secondly, if the first word denotes the unitary meaning of a sentence, its subsequent words become useless. Thirdly, proximity of the second word cannot be the auxiliary cause of denoting the meaning of the second word by the first word by its mere nature, because it does not render any aid to the first word in doing so inasmuch as its relation to the second word is not known. If the proximity of the second word is an auxiliary cause by denoting its meaning, then there is synthesis (anvaya) of the meanings denoted (abhihita) by the constituent words of a sentence. This amounts to the doctrine of Abhihitānvaya. Hence the doctrine of Anvītābhidhāna is not right.


234 NM., pp. 395-96.
Some advocate the doctrine of Anviyamānābhidhāna according to which words convey their meanings as they are related to one another in a sentence. The meaning of a sentence is not independent of the separate meanings of words. Others advocate the doctrine of Abhidhiyamānānvaya according to which a sentence conveys an integral meaning as determined by the separate meanings of words. The meaning of a sentence depends on analysis and synthesis both. The first doctrine emphasizes synthesis, while the second stresses analysis. Jayanta refutes these doctrines. Two separate acts of denotation of meanings by words and synthesis of their meanings are not experienced in comprehending the meaning of a sentence. If the act of synthesis is prior to the act of denotation of meanings by words, then it is Anvītābhidhāna. If the act of denotation by words is prior to the act of synthesis, then it is Abhīhitānvaya. The two acts are not synchronous, because they are not experienced together. "The cow is white". "The cow" denotes an individual belonging to the genus "cow"; "white" denotes a quality. The genus "cow" and the quality "white" inhere in the same individual substance. This is the meaning of the sentence. But it cannot be known without knowing the separate meanings of words. There is one act of denotation of meanings by words without which there can be no synthesis of them. These two doctrines do not contain any new truths. They are only new statements of the two main doctrines.²³⁹

The Nyāya regards a sentence as the verbal expression of determinate knowledge of a substantive (viśeṣya) as qualified by an attributive (viśeṣaṇa). It contains two terms, viz., the subject (uddeśya) and the predicate (vidheya), in which the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject. The subject is the substantive, while the predicate is the attributive. A sentence may not contain a copula or a verb, though it is the expression of a predicative judgment. It may not contain a subject or a predicate. "The horse runs", "Go out", "The hill fiery" (parvato vahmīnān). These are sentences.²³¹ The subject and the predi-
cate are real facts; and a sentence expresses a real relation between real facts.\(^{332}\)

A negative sentence is the expression of a negative judgment. It refers to a real fact of which something is negated. 'A hare's horn does not exist'. It means that the absence of a horn exists in a hare, which is its real locus. This negative sentence implies the existence of a real locus of negation. The act of negation is not possible, if the fact of which something is negated is not real. A real fact is a counter-positive entity (pratiyogin) of negation (abhāva). It is in the nature of the absence of negation. A jar is the counter-positive entity of the negation of a jar. It is in the nature of the absence of the negation of a jar, or a positive entity. It is negated by the negation of a jar. A counter-positive or negated entity depends on negation, and is consequently the negation of a negation. An unreal imaginary object cannot be the counter-positive entity of a negation. An unreal object cannot be the substantive of a real attributive. The proposition 'a sky-flower is red' is meaningless, because an unreal sky-flower cannot have the real quality of redness. The sentence 'a hare's horn does not exist' means that a hare is not the locus of a horn. It produces the knowledge of the absence of a real object. A counter-positive entity (pratiyogin) and a locus (adhikarana) of negation are real facts. An object, which is never perceived, is not capable of being negated. The negation of such an object is the presence of an aggregate of all other objects. Negation implies affirmation. There is no bare negation unfounded in reality.\(^{333}\)

A sentence is a combination of words. The denotative power (śakti) of words is the convention (saṁketa) of God that particular words denote particular kinds of objects. The convention is learnt from the usage of the elders (vṛddhavyavahāra). An elder person says to another, 'Bring a jar'. The latter brings a jar. Again, the former says to the latter, 'Remove the jar'. He removes the jar. A child knows the meaning of the word 'jar' through its presence and absence. He knows it by induction from many particular facts of its presence and absence

\(^{332}\) Vākyārthaḥ paramārtha eva tadayah no kalpanānirmitaḥ, NM., p. 306.

indicated by the commands and actions of the elders relating to jars. Then the meanings of words are learnt from dictionaries, grammar, comparison, testimony, and a context. The different meanings of the same word are learnt from dictionaries. The correct uses of words are learnt from grammar. The meaning of a wild cow (gavaya) is known from comparison. The meanings of some words are learnt from the testimony of experts. When the same word has different meanings, its meaning in a particular sentence is determined by its context. Sometimes the meaning of an unknown word is known from its proximity to some known words. Sometimes the meanings of words are known from their roots. Sometimes the meaning of a word is extended to another object of the same kind from the description of others.  

Denotation (abhidhā) is the primary function of a word. It is called śakyārtha. Lakṣaṇa is the secondary or indirect meaning or implication. It is either pure (śuddhā) or subordinate (gaunī). The first is through a relation different from similarity. The second is through similarity. 'A house on the Gaṅgā' means a house on its bank, which is near its current; proximity is a direct relation. 'The fire of a man' means a man as pure as fire. It directly denotes a fire, whose purity is indirectly related to a man. Lakṣita-lakṣaṇa is the implication which is indirectly related to the primary meaning. The word 'dvirepha' means a bee (bhramara) through lakṣita-lakṣaṇa. Again, implication (lakṣaṇa) is of three kinds: (1) jahatsvārtha; (2) ajahatsvārtha; and (3) jahadajahallakṣaṇa. In the first kind the primary meaning is altogether discarded. 'The scaffolds cry out'. It means 'the persons on the scaffolds cry out'. In the second kind the primary meaning is not altogether discarded. 'Persons bearing umbrellas (chatriṇaḥ) or barbers are coming'; 'chatrin' primarily means a person bearing an umbrella; but it secondarily means a barber who generally bears an umbrella. This secondary meaning retains its primary meaning. In the third kind a part of the primary meaning is discarded, and another part of it is retained. 'This is that Devadatta'.

\[224\] SSP., 20, pp. 104-105; NM., pp. 404-21; KK., pp. 105-13; SM., pp. 361-68; TSC., p. 72n.
'Thisness' (idantā) exists at the present time, but 'thatness' (tattā) does not.\textsuperscript{236}

There are four kinds of words: (1) yaugika; (2) rūḍha; (3) yogaraṇḍha; and (4) yaugikarūḍha. (1) A word is yaugika when its meaning is determined by those of its parts, e.g., 'grahita' meaning a person who receives. (2) A word is rūḍha when its meaning is determined by convention, and not by the meanings of its component parts, e.g., a jar. (3) A word is yogaraṇḍha when its meaning is determined by its etymology and convention, e.g., 'paṇkaja' meaning a lotus, though its etymological meaning is what grows in mud, e.g., a water-lily. (4) A word is yaugikarūḍha when its meaning is determined by convention connected with its etymological meaning, e.g., 'maṇḍapa' meaning a temporary hall erected for sacrificial purposes where priests drink (pa) liquor (maṇḍa) in connection with religious rites. It primarily means a drinks of liquor, but it secondarily means a temporary hall. Some include yaugikarūḍha words in yogaraṇḍha words.\textsuperscript{238}

The Nyāya holds that a word denotes an individual bearing a genus and with a particular form or configuration.\textsuperscript{239} The word 'cow' denotes an individual cow bearing the genus 'cowness' (gotva) and with a particular configuration or arrangement of parts, e.g., a hunch, horns and a dewlap. An individual is a perceptible substance endowed with qualities and movements. It is a corporeal body composed of parts which are united with one another. A genus subsists in many individuals, produces a common concept of them, and brings many individuals under one class. A configuration is a definite arrangement of parts, which is the peculiar mark of a genus.\textsuperscript{238}

Some maintain that a word denotes an individual (vyakti). 'A cow exists or sits'. An individual cow only can exist or sit. The genus 'cowness' is incorporeal and motionless. The individual cows are corporeal and moving. 'A group of cows' means a group of individual cows, because the genus 'cowness' is one. 'He is giving a cow to a Brāhmaṇa'. An individual cow is given or received, since the genus 'cowness' is incorporeal

\textsuperscript{236} KK, pp. 154-55; TSC, pp. 72-73; SSP, 25; SM, pp. 373-76.

\textsuperscript{238} SSP, 16; KK, pp. 72-75; TSC, pp. 72-73; SM, pp. 371-72.

\textsuperscript{239} Vyaktyākṛitijātayastu padārthaḥ. NS, ii. 2. 68.

\textsuperscript{238} NS, NBH, ii. 2. 69-71.
and so incapable of being given or received. 'A Brähmaṇa's cow' means an individual cow belonging to a Brähmaṇa. An individual cow can be owned, but the genus 'cowness' cannot. 'Ten cows' mean ten individual cows which can be enumerated. 'A cow is increasing or decreasing in bulk'. Individual cows only are capable of increase or decrease. 'A white cow' means an individual cow endowed with white colour. The genus 'cowness' is devoid of qualities. 'A cow produces another cow'. An individual cow only can produce another individual cow. The genus 'cowness' is eternal and so incapable of producing or being produced. Hence a word denotes an individual.²³³

The Nyāya refutes this view. A word is general, and so cannot be restricted to a particular individual, because there are innumerable individuals. The relation of a word to an infinite number of individuals cannot be known and conveyed to others. A word denotes an individual in which a genus abides. But though it does not denote an individual unqualified by a genus, it may be applied to it figuratively. 'The cows are grazing in the Gaṅgā'. It means that the individual cows are grazing near it.²³⁴

Some maintain that a word denotes a configuration (ākṛti), because a particular kind of individual has a peculiar arrangement of parts. The word 'cow' denotes a particular form, configuration, or arrangement of parts. A genus abides in all proper individuals which manifest it; so it cannot be brought or removed. But a configuration is common to all individuals coming under the same genus. So a word denotes a configuration. The Nyāya refutes this view. An individual, which is the substrate of a genus, is denoted by a word. A genus does not subsist in a configuration, which has no relation to it. But an individual, which has a configuration, and which is related to a genus, is denoted by a word. 'A cow is white'. Its configuration is not white, but both it and white colour subsist in an individual. So a word does not denote a configuration.²³⁵

The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that a word denotes a genus (jāti). 'Give a cow to a Brähmaṇa'. It means: 'Give an individual cow in which cowness (gotva) subsists, and which has

²³³ NS., NBh., ii. 2. 52.
²³⁴ NS., NBh., ii. 2. 64; NM., pp. 318, 319-20.
²³⁵ NS., NBh., ii. 2. 65; NM., p. 319.
a particular configuration, to a Brāhmaṇa'. If the word 'cow'
denotes an individual qualified by the genus 'cowness', then it
denotes 'cowness', which is a qualification (viśeṣaṇa) of an
individual cow which is the qualified (viśeṣya) object. A quali-
fied object cannot be known without the knowledge of its
qualification. So the genus 'cowness' is denoted by the word
'cow'. A genus is capable of movement through an individual
in which it abides. An earthen cow is an individual with a
configuration, which is not denoted by the word 'cow' because
it is devoid of the genus 'cowness'. So neither an individual
nor a configuration, but a genus only is denoted by a word.
The Nyāya refutes this view. The perception of a genus
depends upon those of an individual and a configuration. A
mere genus is not denoted by a word. It denotes an individual
with a particular configuration bearing a genus. 'The cow is
white'. If a word denotes a mere genus, it means 'cowness is
white', which is absurd! But it means 'an individual cow is the
abode of cowness and white colour'. Hence a word does not
denote a mere genus. 242

Maṇḍana Miśra regards the genus as the primary meaning
of a word, but an individual bearing the genus as its secondary
or implied meaning. The genus 'cowness' is neither born nor
destroyed, since it is eternal. But individual cows in which
'cowness' subsists, which are implied by the word 'cow' are
produced and destroyed. 243 Jagadīśa contends that the word
'cow' does not denote the genus 'cowness' apart from an
individual cow, and so it cannot imply the latter. 244

The Prābhākaras maintain that a word denotes a genus,
and not an individual. Its denotative power (śakyatva) does not
consist in its producing the verbal knowledge of it, but it
consists in its being an object of the verbal knowledge that is
produced. Just as 'cowness' is the object of the verbal know-
ledge of 'cow', so an individual cow also is its object. The
genus 'cowness' only is denoted by the word 'cow'. The parsim-
ony of hypotheses demands it. An individual cow being
denoted by it contains a greater number of elements. So it is

242 NS., NBh., ii. 2. 66-68; SM., pp. 370-71; NM., pp. 320-22; TCS.,
pp. 536-93.
243 Gotvādijātiśaktenaiva gavādipadenā lakṣaṇayā gotvādiviśiṣṭā
vyaktir bodhyate. SSP., p. 87.
244 SSP., pp. 87-88.
not denoted by the word 'cow'.\textsuperscript{244} Jagadīśa refutes this view. 'Bring a cow'. Here the word 'cow' denotes an individual cow, because it produces the knowledge of an individual cow, which is not produced after the knowledge of the genus 'cowness'. It cannot denote the genus 'cowness', and imply an individual cow, which is the attributive (viśeṣaṇa) which qualifies the genus 'cowness' (viśeṣya). Both are objects of determinate perception. An object of an action is an individual cow in which the genus 'cowness' subsists. A word denotes an individual with a particular configuration, wherein a genus abides. It produces the verbal knowledge of an individual because of its being the abode of a genus.\textsuperscript{245}

There is a controversy between the Mīmāṁsā and the Nyāya as to the relation between words and objects. There is a natural eternal relation, according to the former, between them; words have natural power (śakti) of denoting their objects. But the relation between them, according to the latter, depends upon convention created by the will of God. The Mīmāṁsā argues that the relation between them does not depend upon volitions. It is neither conjunction nor inference nor any other relation based thereon. Words are not directly related to objects, because they exist in different places. Sounds are non-pervasive and incapable of reaching objects. The Mīmāṁsā puts forward the following objections against the Nyāya doctrine of convention. First, convention is created by man, but the nature of things does not depend upon human volitions. If they determined the relation of words to objects, they could invert the relation between them, and make objects denote words. Just as there is a natural inseparable relation between smoke and fire, which can be known from the observation of numerous instances of their agreement in presence and agreement in absence, and on whose strength we can infer a fire from a smoke, even if we do not desire it, so there is a natural relation between words and objects, which is learnt from the usage of the elders. Words have a natural power of denoting their objects, even as lamps can illumine objects. Words are the means of conveying the

\textsuperscript{244} Na jātēriṣva vyakṣerapi śakyaṇṭvam āvaśyakam, na hi gavādi-padaśaya śakyaṇṭvam janyatvam api tva janyaśabdadhīviśayatvam, tacc ca gotvasyeyva guruṇavyāśitaṁ iti vācyam. SSP., p. 91. Ibid, pp. 90-92. Jātīkākāryena vyaktinā bodhayatītīguravah. TCS., p. 570.

\textsuperscript{245} SSP., pp. 99, 102.
knowledge (jñāpaka) of their objects, which are made known (jñāpya) through them. Hence words do not depend upon convention to produce the knowledge of their objects. Secondly, convention is knowledge that particular words denote particular kinds of objects, which exists in the self, and cannot be a relation between words and objects. Thirdly, convention is either created anew by every person, or by one at the time of every utterance, or it is an old one repeated. If a different convention is created by every person, then the same word cannot convey the knowledge of the same object. If the same convention is created by every person, then the creation of it is needless, since the relation of a word to an object, which is natural and existent, is known only. Convention cannot be created by God once before creation of the world, because he is non-existent and there is no time when there is no use of words to convey the knowledge of objects. Fourthly, if convention determines the relation of words to objects, then any word can be made to denote any object. Hence the relation of words to objects is eternal, which is learnt from the usage of the elders, and not created.

Jayanta refutes these objections of the Mīmāṁsaka. First, the relation between words and objects is not eternal, because it is not known by any means of valid knowledge, though they are known. There is no subtle power (śakti), which is different from the nature of a cause and auxiliary causes. Words are perceived, but their denotative powers are not perceived. They cannot be inferred from their effects, which can be otherwise explained. Even if they are assumed, convention is indispensable, because words cannot denote objects without convention. If convention is admitted, the hypothesis of denotative power (śakti) or natural eternal relation of words to objects is gratuitous. Words cannot manifest objects without the aid of convention. There is no inseparable relation (avinābhāva) between them like what exists between smoke and fire. Fire is inferred from the knowledge of the uniform relation between

249 Prakāsakatvam api śabdasya samayaprāsidopanatam eva na svābhāvikam. NM., p. 243.
them. But an object is known directly from a word without the knowledge of their relation. So there is no inseparable relation between them. If words have a natural power of manifesting objects, their meanings need not be learned from the usage of the elders. Words depend upon convention to convey the knowledge of words. They are instruments of this knowledge. Hence convention is the relation between words and objects.\(^{216}\) Secondly, though convention being in the nature of knowledge cannot exist in words and objects, it can apprehend the relation between them.\(^{241}\) Thirdly, the Nyāya does not admit that different conventions are created by different persons or by the same person at different times when he utters a word. It regards God as the creator of convention, who created it once at the time of creating the world. Fourthly, all words are not equal, because God created the convention that particular words denote particular objects.\(^{252}\) The meanings of words are learnt from the speech and actions of the elders. This proves that their relation to their objects is not eternal. There is no union (sātīśleṣa), or cause-effect relation, or substrate-content relation, or inseparable relation between them. Convention is the relation between words and objects, which is a rule which regulates the denotation of objects by words.\(^{262}\)

A word consists of sounds. Sounds are of two kinds, viz., inarticulate sounds (dīvani) and articulate sounds or letters (vaṇṇa) uttered by human beings. Letters are either spoken or written. The former are known through auditory perception, while the latter are known through visual perception. Sound is not a substance, since it subsists in a single substance, e.g., ether. It is not an action, since it produces another sound, but an action does not produce another action. Nor is it community, particularity or inherence, which is not related to beinghood (sattā), since it is related to the genus of sound (śabdādīva). So it is a quality.\(^{244}\)

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\(^{216}\) Tasmāt samaya eva sambandha iti vaktam. NM., p. 245.

\(^{241}\) Tatāśrayatavābhāve'pi jñānasya tadviśayatvopapatteḥ. NM., p. 244.

\(^{252}\) Tadevad śabdasya māyārkaśaktyārmakasambandhilābhāvāt śrīva- 

nviratitasamayamayabandhanah śabdādīvavahārō nānādī. NM., p. 245. 

\(^{262}\) Sabdārthayoh sambandhah samayāb. Abhidhānābhidheyanamani- 

yogah samaya uvate. NM., p. 241.

\(^{244}\) NM., p. 229.
The Nyāya regards sound as non-eternal. First, sound is non-eternal, since it is produced by conjunction and disjunction, and not manifested. Different sounds are produced by different vocal organs. Sound is not manifested by conjunction at the same point of space. When conjunction of an axe with a tree ceases, sound is heard by a person at a distance. A manifestable entity is not known in the absence of the manifester. So conjunction does not manifest, but produces a sound. Hence even when conjunction is destroyed, sound is perceived. Just as an inarticulate sound is produced by conjunction, disjunction, or another inarticulate sound, so an articulate sound is produced by the vocal organs, and not manifested by them. Sound is not perceived before being uttered, because it is then non-existent. It is produced by the vocal organs, and then destroyed. It cannot be hidden by a veil, since the veil is not perceived. Non-perception of it proves its non-existence. The air cannot hide a sound, since it is incorporeal, and corporeal substances only can hide other corporeal substances. Sound is not by nature imperceptible. It exists so long as it is heard. Secondly, just as pleasure and pain, which are of different degrees of intensity, are produced, so sounds, which are loud and faint, are produced. The Mīmāṁsaka urges that loudness and faintness of sound are due to the different degrees of intensity of the manifester. The Nyāya replies that the same sound is not loud and faint; that one sound is loud and another is faint; that, in fact, there is neither loudness nor faintness in sound, but that they are different degrees of intensity in the cognitions of sound. Thirdly, if sound is produced, it can be overpowered. But if it is manifested, it cannot be overpowered. The loud sound of a drum can overpower the faint sound of a violin. An entity can overcome another entity of the same kind, but not of a different kind. Sounds are produced, of which some are loud and others are faint. Loud sounds overcome faint sounds. The Mīmāṁsaka does not admit difference in sounds, and so cannot account for the overcoming (abhibhava) of sounds. If sound is eternal and manifested by a manifester in the same point of space, it cannot overcome another sound owing to the absence of direct relation (prāpti). The sound of a drum is not related to that of a violin, and so cannot overpower it. If it can overcome the
latter without being related to it, then it can overcome even distant sounds of violins. But if sounds are produced, a loud sound can overcome a faint sound. Fourthly, the Nyāya criticizes the Mīmāṃśaka arguments for eternity of sound. The Mīmāṃśaka argues that sound is eternal, because it is intangible like ether. The Nyāya contends that intangibility is an inconclusive reason for eternity, because tangible atoms are eternal and intangible actions are non-eternal. The Mīmāṃśaka argues that repetition of the same sound proves its identity and permanence, which exists before its utterance, and is manifested by it. The Nyāya replies that repetition does not prove identity and permanence of the same sound; that sounds are numerically different, which are said to be identical and repeated because of their similarity. The Mīmāṃśaka argues that sound is eternal, because the cause of its destruction is not perceived. The Nyāya retorts that if sound is not destroyed because the cause of its destruction is not perceived, then sound will always be heard because the cause of its being not heard is not perceived; that the absence of its manifest is not the cause of non-perception of it. The Mīmāṃśaka argues that producedness cannot prove non-eternity of sound, since posterior negation or destruction of a jar is produced, but endless. The Nyāya refutes this argument. Eternity is either primary or secondary. What is not produced has primary eternity, since it is not destroyed. But what is destroyed after being produced has no primary eternity. Prior negation is not produced. Posterior negation is not destroyed. They are not eternal, but like eternal entities. But sound is non-eternal, because it is produced and destroyed. The Mīmāṃśaka argues that perceptibility through the sense-organs cannot prove non-eternity of sound, because community is eternal, though it is perceptible through the senses. The Nyāya refutes this argument. Sound is non-eternal, not because it is an object of perception produced by the auditory organ, but because it is a series of sounds reaching the auditory organ and producing perception of it. The Mīmāṃśaka argues that sound is not non-eternal, because it is spoken of like a non-eternal entity. We speak of a part of ether and a part of the self, though they are partless. But we metaphorically speak of them, the Nyāya replies, because sound is produced by conjunction with ether in a particular region,
and because a cognition is produced by a conjunction of the self with a body. Sound does not pervade ether; cognition does not pervade the self. Hence sound is non-eternal.\footnote{N.S., NBh., NV., NVTT., ii. 2. 14-23; 30-38; NM., pp. 231-32.}

The articulate sounds (varṇa) are non-eternal. Words composed of sounds are produced by volition. Sentences composed of words are produced by the volition of a person. The Vedas consist of sentences, and are produced by the will of God, who knows the supersensible entities described therein. God is the one composer of the Vedas. Hence they are the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). They are not valid because they are impersonal (apauruṣeya) and eternal as the Mīmāṁsaka maintains. They are valid because they are created by God who is omniscient and trustworthy. He has direct knowledge of Dharma, compassion for creatures, and desire to speak the truth. He is the author of the Vedas, Rk, Sāma, Yajus and Atharva. The validity of testimony is due to the excellence (guṇa) of the speaker, and its invalidity, due to his defects (doṣa). The validity of the Vedas is like that of the science of medicine. It is admitted by great saints of pure character, who realize their truth by austerities, meditation and intuition. The Nyāya criticism of the Čārvāka objections against the validity of the Vedas has already been given.\footnote{Āptoktavāt eva vedāḥ pramāṇāḥ na nityatvāt. NM., p. 248. Ibid, pp. 246-81. NS., NBh., ii. 1. 67. Sarvajñapranītā vedāḥ, vedatvāt. NKS., V, p. 62. Mahājana-parigrahāt vaktāprāmāṇyam anumāṇa ayurveda naiṣṛṣya-kāmavat. ATP., p. 908.}

The Vaiśeṣika urges that testimony is an inference, because the meaning of a word is not perceived. Just as an unperceived fire is inferred from a perceived smoke, so an unperceived meaning is inferred from a sentence. Testimony can convey the knowledge of the past, the present, and the future like inference. Just as an inference depends upon the knowledge of vyāpti, so testimony also depends upon vyāpti between a word and its meaning. A word has uniform affirmative and negative relation to its meaning. It proves the existence of an object denoted by it by the method of agreement in presence and agreement in absence. The apprehension of the meaning of a sentence does not differ from that of an object of inference. There are two kinds of knowledge, direct and indirect. Perception is
direct knowledge, and inference, indirect knowledge. So testimony is inference.\textsuperscript{367}

The Nyāya criticizes the Vaiśeṣika view. The testimony of a reliable person only conveys valid knowledge. The apprehensions produced by testimony and inference are different. Heaven is known from testimony, but not by inference. The relation between a word (pada) and its meaning or object (artha) is determined by convention. There is no natural relation between them, which determines vyāpti. If there is a direct relation (prāpti) between a word and its object, they should be near each other and perceived by the same sense-organ. But they are not near each other. If they were directly related to each other, the utterance of the words ‘food’, ‘fire’ and ‘sword’ would produce perceptions of filling the mouth, burning and cutting respectively. Again, the vocal organs and efforts to exercise them are not present near the objects. So words do not accompany their objects, and there is no direct relation between them. The Vaiśeṣika urges that the natural relation between words and objects is inferred from the regular use of particular words to denote particular objects. If there were no natural relation between them, then any word would denote any object. So there is a natural relation between them. The Nyāya replies that the relation between words and objects is determined by the convention (samaya) that particular words denote particular objects. If the convention is not known, the meanings are not known even if the words are heard. So the meanings of words are not inferred from their natural relation (prāptisambandha), which is non-existent. If there were a natural relation between them, it would be invariable. But the same object is denoted by different words, and the same word conveys different meanings in different places. So there is no natural relation between them. It is determined by convention which depends upon the volitions of persons. It is the usage of the elders handed down from generation to generation, which is ultimately due to the will of God at the time of creation that particular words will mean particular objects.\textsuperscript{368} Hence testimony is a means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). The Nyāya

\textsuperscript{367} NBh., ii. 1. 47-49; NV., p. 261; NSV., ii. 1. 49; NVTT., p. 286.

\textsuperscript{368} NBh., NV., ii. 1. 50-55; NVTT., pp. 291-92.
criticism of the doctrine of Sphota or word-form will be given later.

II

Ontology.


The Nyaya conception of the world is the same as the Vaiseshika view of it with slight variations. It is composed of the five physical elements, earth, water, fire, air and ether. There are the atoms of the first four elements. Ether is one, ubiquitous, and eternal. Time and space are one each, ubiquitous and eternal. Ether, time, and space are undivided, unique wholes. Atoms, ether, time and space are coeternal with souls and God. Atoms are the material cause of the world, while God is its efficient cause. Causation is real and objective. Effectuation is emergence of new effects from their causes, in which they did not pre-exist. Causation is teleological and subservient to the moral Law of Karma. Atoms are combined with one another by God into gross material objects, living organisms, and the multiform world, and adapted to the enjoyments and sufferings of individual souls in accordance with their merits and demerits. Difference of objects is real and not illusory or apparent. All things are not eternal, or non-eternal, or momentary, or diverse. The atoms are eternal, while their composite products are non-eternal. The objects are real and not mere subjective ideas. They are not mere appearances of a void. Nor are they false appearances (prapancha) of one eternal undifferentiated consciousness or Brahman. Nor are they mere appearances of one eternal Sound or Logos (sabdabrahma). The composite products are wholes which are not mere aggregates of parts. Substances are not mere conglomerations of qualities. Universals are real and eternal, and subsist in individuals. They are not unreal and imaginary and mere negations of contraries. Qualities and actions are real. Particularity, inherence and negation are real. The Nyaya advocates realistic pluralism, dualism and Deism. It admits the reality of diverse objects externally related to one another, dualism of matter and souls, and the existence of God external to the world and finite souls.
The body is the seat of voluntary actions, sense-organs and objects. It is not a mere aggregate of parts, but a unique, undivided whole. The whole living organism is the vehicle of experience (bhogāyatana). The self, which is all-pervading, experiences pleasure and pain through it only. It is not the seat of vital acts only. If it were so, then plants also would have bodies. It is the seat of voluntary actions for the attainment of good and the avoidance of evil. Conjunction of the self endowed with volition is their non-inherent cause. The living organism is the seat of the sense-organs, which are affected by its health and disease in apprehending their objects. The imperceptible atoms which produce them are their receptacles in which they reside. Earth is the principal ingredient of the body, and odour is its special quality.

The sense-organs are the instruments of direct valid knowledge in contact with the organism only. They are organs of perception. They are direct causes of valid perception, but they produce illusions with the aid of impressions. They are composed of the physical elements. The auditory organ or ether limited by the ear-hole and manas are eternal and devoid of substrates. The olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the visual organ, the tactual organ, and the auditory organ are composed of earth, water, light, air, and ether respectively, endowed with odour, taste, colour, touch, and sound respectively, and consequently perceive these qualities respectively. They can perceive those qualities with which they are endowed in excess.

The Sāmkhyya regards the sense-organs as produced by egoism (ahātmkāra), and puts forward the following objections against the Nyāya view. First, if the sense-organs are products of physical elements, they cannot reach distant objects in order to perceive them. But if they are products of egoism or mind, mental functions can reach their objects and be modified into their forms. Secondly, the visual organ can perceive an object bigger or smaller than itself. But if it were physical, it would perceive an object of its own dimension only. Thirdly, if the sense-organs were physical, they would perceive themselves and other objects like a lamp which manifests itself and other objects. The Nyāya refutes these objections. First, the visual organ is not the eye-ball but its light which issues out of the pupil, and reaches a distant object to perceive it.
Secondly, the light of the eye can spread over a small or big object, and perceive it. Thirdly, the sense-organs endowed with certain qualities can perceive them in their objects. They do not perceive themselves in the absence of their sense-organs. Hence they are products of physical elements.

Earth, water, light, air, and ether are the elements. Odour, taste, colour, touch, and sound are their qualities. Earth has odour, taste, colour and touch. Water has taste, colour and touch. Light has colour and touch. Air has touch. Ether has sound. A sense-organ can perceive that quality which it has in excess. The objects which are perceived through the sense-organs produce pleasure and pain in the self, which are experienced by it through the body. It is the seat of voluntary actions, sense-organs, and objects of enjoyment and suffering.\textsuperscript{238}

The Nyāya gives an empirical definition of a cause. Udayana defines it as an invariable antecedent of an effect.\textsuperscript{239} He also regards it as its unconditional or necessary antecedent. If an unconditional antecedent, which is always present when an effect is present, and which is always absent when an effect is absent, were not regarded as its cause, then the effect would be uncaused.\textsuperscript{240} Gaṅgeśa also defines a cause as an unconditional or necessary, invariable antecedent of an effect. Vardhamāna, Viśvanātha and others also define it in the same manner.\textsuperscript{242} Vardhamāna, Rucidatta, Bhagiratha Tākkura, Saṅkara Miśra, Raghunātha Siromani, Dinakara Bhaṭṭa, Mukunda Bhaṭṭa and others define a cause as an unconditional, invariable, immediate antecedent of an effect.\textsuperscript{243} Laugākiśi Bhāskara adds that a cause must exist in the same place at the immediately preceding moment.\textsuperscript{244} Gaṅgeśa defines a cause also as a necessary invari-

\textsuperscript{238} NS., i. 1. 11; NBh., i. 1. 11-14; NM., pp. 474-86; TR., pp. 121-26; SM., pp. 156-61.
\textsuperscript{239} Kāraṇatvam kāryāṁ niyataṁ pūrabhāvaṅī. NK̃S., i, p. 89, cp. David Hume.
\textsuperscript{240} Ananyathāsiddhānvayavyatirekavatāṁ akāraṇatve kāryasyākāmikatva-prasāṅgāṁ. ATV., p. 69.
\textsuperscript{243} Niyatapūrvavrtitvam cāvyavahitapūrvakālāvacchedena kāryadeśe sattvam. TK., p. 7.
able antecedent, which is synchronous and coexistent with it. This definition applies to the inherent cause, the non-inherent cause, and the efficient cause. If a cause were not synchronous with its effect, then it would be produced at a moment when its counteracting cause is present, though it was absent at the immediately preceding moment. Hence a cause must continue to exist at the moment when it produces its effect. A fire-extinguishing gem is a counteracting cause of burning. It is absent at the immediately preceding moment. But it is present at the moment when burning is produced. If a cause were an immediately preceding antecedent only, and not synchronous with it, then the presence of a fire-extinguishing gem, which was absent at the immediately preceding moment, would not prevent a fire from burning. A cause is an antecedent in relation to its effect. It is produced by the activity of a principal or material cause in co-operation with the auxiliary causes, and consequently exists immediately after the assemblage of the auxiliary causes. It exists at a time when it is produced by its cause and related to it. A cause coexists with the prior non-existence of its effect, and so it must be its antecedent. Though a cause is an immediate antecedent of its effect, it is also synchronous with it.

A cause is an antecedent of an effect, since it produces the effect. It is not a variable antecedent, but an invariable antecedent which is always followed by an effect. An ass is a variable antecedent of all jars, and consequently not their cause. But some invariable antecedents of an effect are not necessary for its production. The colour or the generic character of a staff is an invariable antecedent of a jar, but it is not its cause. There are some invariable antecedents which are unnecessary, conditional and casual antecedents. A conditional (anyathā-siddha) antecedent depends upon other conditions in order to be followed by an effect, which is not necessary for its production. It is an unnecessary concomitant of an effect. A cause is not a remote antecedent of its effect, but its immediate antecedent. Immediacy follows from unconditionality. A is a cause of B; B is a cause of C; A is a remote antecedent of C. A is followed

by C after being followed by B. A's antecedence of C depends upon its antecedence of B. So A is a conditional antecedent of C. But B is an unconditional, immediate antecedent of C, and hence its cause. A cause is an unconditional or necessary antecedent which produces an effect.

Gaṅgeśa mentions four kinds of unnecessary (anyathā-siddha) antecedents. (1) That which is antecedent to an effect by virtue of its relation to its inherent cause, is its unnecessary antecedent. The colour of a staff depends upon it as its inherent cause in order to be invariably followed by a jar. So it is its unnecessary antecedent. (2) That which is known to be antecedent to an effect after it is known to be antecedent to some other effect as its cause, is its unnecessary antecedent. Ether is already known to be an antecedent of sound as its inherent cause. So it is an unnecessary antecedent of a jar, though it is its invariable antecedent, since it is not necessary for its production. A cause is determined by its presence and absence both,—not by its presence only. Eternal and ubiquitous substances, which cannot be eliminated, are unnecessary antecedents.246 (3) That antecedent, which is other than the invariable, necessary antecedent of an effect, is its unnecessary antecedent. The prior non-existence of colour is an unnecessary antecedent of smell due to heating, since the prior non-existence of smell is its invariable, necessary antecedent or cause. (4) That which cannot be known to be antecedent to an effect without knowing its antecedence to its cause is its unnecessary antecedent. The cause of a cause is not the cause of an effect, but its unnecessary antecedent. A potter is the efficient cause of a jar, and hence its invariable necessary antecedent. But the potter's father, who is a cause of the potter, is its unnecessary antecedent. A cause is not a remote antecedent, but an immediate antecedent of its effect.247 Vardhamāna adds another kind of unnecessary antecedent. (5) That which is antecedent to the effect, together with the cause, is its unnecessary antecedent. A staff is an auxiliary cause of a jar, whose presence is followed by its production, and whose absence is followed by its non-production. It is its necessary antecedent. But the

246 Na ca nityavibhannāṁ vyatirekasambhavaḥ. NKS., 1, p. 88.
247 TCIA., p. 56.
generic character of a staff is not followed by the production of a jar independently of the staff. Hence it is its unnecessary antecedent. Viśvanātha mentions these five kinds of unnecessary antecedents. He borrows them from Gaṅgeśa and Vardhamāna. A cause is an unconditional, invariable, immediate antecedent of an effect, which is an unconditional, invariable, immediate consequent of a cause. An effect is a counter-positive entity of its prior non-existence.

The Nyāya admits three kinds of causes, viz., the material cause, the non-inherent cause and the efficient cause. Causal activity is in the nature of physical motion (parispanda), which requires the direction of a conscious agent (karta), who exerts action upon an object (karma). He produces an effect with the aid of an instrumental cause (karaṇa) for the benefit of some conscious being (sampradāna) out of a particular unconscious material cause, which is its locus (adhi-karaṇa). Sometimes he separates a part from a whole (apādāna), e.g., when he cuts a branch from a tree. Thus an effect is produced by a collocation of causes (kārakacakra) centring round a conscious energiser (karta). The unconscious factors of a cause depend on a conscious agent without whose direction they are ineffective.

An instrumental cause (karaṇa) is an auxiliary cause, which by its activity (vyāpāra) immediately brings about an effect. In this sense, it is called a special cause (asādharāṇa karaṇa) or the most effective cause (sādhakatama karaṇa). Its activity being produced by it produces its effect. An axe is the instrumental cause of cutting. Its activity is its conjunction with a tree, which is produced by it, and produces its effect (e.g., cutting). The ancient Nyāya regards an instrument as an instrumental cause. But the modern Nyāya regards its action (vyāpāra) as an instrumental cause. God, his knowledge, desire and volition, prior non-existence, time, space, and merits and demerits are the common causes of all effects. Hence by the causes of effects we mean their special causes or necessary, invariable, immediate antecedents.

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366. NKSP., i. p. 65; NKSM., i. pp. 45-48; BP., 19-22; SM., SMD., pp. 114-22; KU., pp. 152-60.
367. TBh., p. 3; TSG., p. 40.
368. ATV., pp. 854, 858; NM., p. 494.
369. Tajjanaye sati tajjanayajanko vyāpārah. TK., p. 6; TA., p. 4; TBh., p. 2; TSG., p. 38; TSN., p. 38.
The Nyāya regards causal activity as physical motion (bhautika vyāpāra) or movement (paripāda). It does not believe in imperceptible causal power of the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsaka, nor in potential energy of the Sāńkhya, but it regards all energy as kinetic energy or motion.²⁷² It regards a cause as an aggregate of necessary, invariable, immediate antecedents (kāraṇasāmagri, kāraṇacakra), which are positive causal conditions, and the absence of counteracting causes or negative conditions (pratibandhakābhāva) of an effect.²⁷³ A cause is the aggregate of the principal or material cause and auxiliary causes which render an aid to it. When they are present, an effect is produced; when they are absent, it is not produced. There is no causal power in addition to them.²⁷⁴ Straw, fire and blowing together are the cause of burning, each of which singly is not its cause. But they are its positive conditions only, which can produce its effect when its negative conditions are absent. A fire-extinguishing gem (candrakāntamaṇi) is its negative condition, which must be absent in order that burning may be produced. A counteracting cause is the counter-positive entity of the negation that constitutes the nature of a cause.²⁷⁵ It is the counter-positive entity of the absence of the absence of a cause. Fire is the cause of burning. A fire-extinguishing gem is its counter-acting cause (pratibandhaka). It is the absence of fire. The cause is the absence of the absence of fire, or fire. So a fire-extinguishing gem or the absence of fire is a counter-positive entity of the absence of the absence of fire. Just as the presence of the positive conditions is a cause, so the absence of the negative conditions is a cause.²⁷⁶ The absence of any member of the aggregate of causal conditions,—the principal cause and the auxiliary causes,—is the main counteracting cause.²⁷⁷ The entire collocation of positive causal conditions

²⁷⁵ Pratibandhakatvam kāraṇībhūtābhāvapratiyagítvam. TCI., Ch. S.S., p. 37.
²⁷⁶ Bhāva yathā tathābhāvah kāraṇam. NKS., i, 10.
²⁷⁷ Pratibandho visāmagri. NKS., i. 10. Samagrivaikalyam pratibandhapadārīko mukhyaḥ. Ibid., i, p. 47.
must be present and the counteracting causes or negative conditions must be absent in order to produce an effect. But when a fire-exciting gem (sūryakāntamaṇi) is present, burning is produced even in the presence of a fire-extinguishing gem. So the aggregate of causes is other than the absence of the absence of a counteracting cause qualified by the absence of an exciting cause. However, burning is produced when a counteracting cause is absent, or when a counteracting cause and an exciting cause both are present, or when both are absent. There is not always a relation between the absence of a counteracting cause and the absence of an exciting cause.

According to Murārimiśra, neither a power nor the absence of counteracting causes is a cause, but a particular cause other than the counteracting causes at a particular time is the cause of a particular effect at that time, and the absence of counteracting causes is a determining property of the cause. Gaṅgāśa refutes this view thus. When a fire and the absence of counteracting causes are present, burning is produced, and when they are absent, burning is not produced. So both are the causes of burning. Whatever being present and being absent, an effect is produced and not produced respectively, is its cause, and not its determining property. The absence of counteracting causes is an invariable antecedent of an effect, and hence its cause, and not its determinant (avacchedaka).

The Nyāya rejects plurality of causes. The causal relation is reciprocal. The same cause produces the same effect. The same effect is produced by the same cause. But sometimes we find that the same effect is produced by a variety of causes. Burning is produced by straw, fire and blowing together, or by two pieces of araṇi wood and intense friction together, or by a fire-exciting gem and concentration of the rays of the sun on it. The Nyāya argues that the specific causes produce specific effects. The effects appear to be the same, but really they have special

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279 Sa ca pratibandhakābhāve pratibandhakottejakasadbhāve ubhāvabhāhe cāsti, sarvatra pratibandhakottejakābhāvavyohi sambandho nāstīti prattiṣṭh. TCIA., p. 41.
280 Pratibandhakābhāvah kāraṇatāvacchedako na tu kāraṇam. TCIA., p. 44. NKSIB., i, p. 49.
281 TCIA., pp. 44-45.
attendant consequences. If they are considered with their distinctive features, then specific effects have specific causes. If there is a specific difference in the causes, there must be a specific difference in the effects, even though they appear to be homogeneous. If specific effects are not due to specific causes, their specific characters will be uncaused. The specific differences in the effects are due to the specific differences in the auxiliary causes which produce different peculiarities (atiśaya) in the same homogeneous cause and diversity it. A specific cause has a specific effect. Diversity of effects requires diversity of causes. Where a generic effect is observed, a generic cause should be regarded as its cause. The generic character of fire is the effect of conjunction of a combustible substance with light ended with a particular degree of heat. Specific effects cannot be produced by a generic cause. One cause (e.g., Brahman) cannot produce diverse objects.

An effect is a new creation (ārambha). It is non-existent in its material cause, but it is produced anew out of its material cause owing to the rearrangement of its atoms. Curd is non-existent in milk, but it is produced from milk owing to the dis-integration of its parts and a fresh collocation of its atoms. The particles of milk ended with a particular colour and a particular taste produce curd with a particular taste due to the peculiarity produced by heating (pākajāviśeṣa). Likewise a sprout is produced from a seed owing to the rearrangement of its atoms due to heat. They are qualified by a peculiarity (viśeṣa) due to heat, and produce a new effect. They produce a first peculiarity (atiśaya) in the shape of the first swollen condition, then an intermediate swelling, and then the last peculiarity in the shape of germination. Atiśaya is an aid, excess or

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284 Vicitra-vat kāryasya karaṇenaḥ aśicīreṇa bhavita-vat. NKS., i, p. 32.


286 Sānkhya-viśeṣaḥ kāryasanaviveśeṣaḥhetuḥ. NKS., p. 32. NKS., i, p. 58.
additament produced in the principal material cause by the auxiliary causes for the production of an effect, which is therefore not momentary. It is an intermediate aid favourable to the production of an effect.\textsuperscript{226} The Nyāya advocates Asatkāryavāda.

The Nyāya criticism of the Śāṅkhya doctrine of Satkāryavāda is similar to the Vaiśeṣika criticism of it. An effect is non-existent before its production, since it is found to be produced and then destroyed. What already exists cannot be produced. Production is a fact. What is produced must be non-existent before its production. If there is no production, there is no destruction.\textsuperscript{227} The Śāṅkhya argues that if there were no permanent relation between a cause and an effect, any effect would be produced by any material cause. There can be no relation between an existent cause and a non-existent effect. The Nyāya replies that an effect is non-existent before its production and becomes existent after its production, so that it can inhere in its material cause when it is produced. The Śāṅkhya doctrine of Satkāryavāda itself cannot account for particular effects being produced by particular material causes. If all effects are modifications of sattva, rajas and tamas, there can be no particular causes of particular effects.\textsuperscript{228} The Nyāya, on the other hand, holds that particular material causes only can produce particular effects owing to their particular natures. Satkāryavāda denies production of a new entity and destruction of an old entity, and so leads to collapse of all practical life.\textsuperscript{229} The Śāṅkhya holds that an effect pre-exists in its material cause in a potential condition, and is manifested when it is produced. What is the nature of manifestation (abhivyakti)? If it is a property of an effect (kāryadharma), then it was non-existent before its production. If it is perception of an effect (upalabdhi), then it is produced after the effect is produced. If it is existence as an effect of what was existent as a cause, then it was non-existent before its production. If it is a particular arrangement of parts (saṁsthānaniśeṣa), then it was non-existent at first and then

\textsuperscript{226} NKS., i, pp. 53, 57. NKS., pp. 29-29, 31.
\textsuperscript{227} Sati kārye prāg utpattir utpattir eva nāsti. NBh., iv. 1. 88. Prāgutpattir utpattidharmakam asad ityadha' atpādavyayadarsanat. NS., iv. 1. 49.
\textsuperscript{228} Satkāryavāde upādānaniyamām durghatah sarvasya sarvatra bhāvāt. NM., p. 495.
\textsuperscript{229} Satkāryavādānaḥ sarvalokavayavahāra uchchidyata ityuktah nāpāravat jāyate na pārvaḥ vinaśyatī. NV., iv. 1. 50.
becomes existent. If it is development of the intrinsic nature of the cause (svalakṣaṇapuṣṭi), then also it did not exist before production of an effect. All these alternatives undermine Satkāryavāda, and imply Asatkāryavāda.\textsuperscript{233} The Nyāya asks in what form a jar exists in clay. If it exists as a lump of clay, then a jar does not exist in its material cause. If it exists as a power (śakti) in its cause and then as its manifestation in the effect, then it cannot be ascertained whether manifestation is different or non-different from its essence or power, or whether it is existent or non-existent in the cause. The so-called power is nothing but a material cause limited by a capacity and auxiliary causes.\textsuperscript{291} It is essential and adventitious. Essential power is the intrinsic nature of a material cause limited by existence. Adventitious power is its conjunction with auxiliary causes. An effect is produced by these two powers, a material cause with a particular nature and co-operation of auxiliary causes. Capacity (yogyatā) is nothing but a particular substance (vastuvisēṣa). Power itself is not an effect, because it is perceived to be different from power. If power is an effect, then an effect is produced by an effect. But a jar is not produced by a jar. Hence power is different from an effect, which does not pre-exist in its cause. The Sāmkhya argues that an effect must pre-exist in its cause because it is non-different from its material cause. The Nyāya replies that an effect (e.g., a jar) is perceived to be different from its cause (e.g., clay). Though there is identity of genus between them, they are different as individuals.\textsuperscript{234} Hence the doctrine of Satkāryavāda is not tenable.

According to Prabhākara, there is an imperceptible causal power (śakti) in a cause, which is inferred from its effect. Fire burns. But it does not burn when its counteracting cause is present, which destroys its causal power. Its power is destroyed, when it cannot produce burning in future. It is overpowered, when it produces burning on removal of the counteracting cause. From this the existence of causal power is inferred.\textsuperscript{232} The Nyāya refutes Prabhākara's doctrine of causal power. The so-called power is the nature of the cause. Different things

\textsuperscript{233} NV., iv. 1. 49.
\textsuperscript{291} Yogyatāvacchinnaśvarūpasānahakārisannidhānam eva śaktiḥ. NM., p. 495.
\textsuperscript{234} NM., pp. 493-96.
\textsuperscript{232} PP., pp. 81-82.
have different natures which cannot be altered by human volitions. Water cannot warm us, and fire cannot quench our thirst. Fire cannot burn when a counteracting cause is present, not because it obstructs its causal power, but because it generates another collocation of conditions, which produces non-burning. Fire in co-operatin with the auxiliary causes and in the absence of counteracting causes is the cause of burning. A counteracting cause does not destroy the causal power or its property, because when it is withdrawn, fire produces burning. If it hinders the causal power, it may as well hinder the nature of the cause itself. If it produces another contradictory property, then its absence produces the effect. This amounts to the admission that the absence of a property is a cause. Then the absence of a counteracting cause may as well be regarded as a cause. If causal power or its property is destroyed by a counteracting cause, and produced again by an exciting cause, then an effect has no uniform cause. Further, an exciting cause does not counteract the power of the counteracting cause, nor does it produce any positive causal power. It is needless to assume so many powers. Further, the causal power of a cause is either uncaused or caused. If it is uncaused, it will always produce the effect. If it produces the effect in co-operation with the auxiliary causes, then the nature (svarūpa) of the cause in co-operation with them can do so. If it is caused, it is produced by the nature of the cause only, or by the cause with the aid of the auxiliary causes. In the first alternative, it is always produced by the cause, since it is always present, and then it will always produce the effect. In the second alternative, causal power is needless, since the cause and the auxiliary causes will produce the effect. If a cause devoid of causal power cannot produce an effect, then causal power also will depend on another causal power to produce an effect, and so on to infinity. Prabhākara may argue that a series of causal powers need not be admitted because one causal power is enough to account for the production of an effect. The Nyāya replies that an imperceptible causal power is unnecessary, because the perceptible nature of a cause is enough to produce an effect. A cause does not produce an effect without activity, which is

\[\text{Tadvināše taddharmavināše vā punaruttambhake na tajjanane niyatahetukatvam. NKS., i, p. 49.}\]
perceptible. Prabhākara argues that there is a common causal power in different collocations of conditions (kāraṇasāmagri), which produces the same effect. The Nyāya replies that different aggregates of causes produce different effects. There is no plurality of causes. A difference of classes (vaijñātya) resides in different fires produced by different collocations of causes, e.g., straw and blowing, araṇī wood and rubbing, and a burning gem and reflected rays of the sun. If there were the same causal power in them, then straw and rubbing, or a burning gem and blowing would produce burning. Hence the hypothesis of causal power is gratuitous.

The Buddhist realist holds that an existent effect is produced from the non-existence of its cause, since its production is always preceded by the destruction of its material cause. Until a seed is destroyed, a sprout is not produced. So the destruction of a seed is the cause of the production of a sprout. If it were not so, a sprout would be produced even when a seed was not destroyed. The Nyāya contends that this involves self-contradiction. What destroys is non-existent, and so cannot be the cause of destruction. If an effect destroys its cause, it cannot be produced after its destruction. If it is produced after destruction of the cause, it cannot destroy it. The destruction of a seed is not the cause of the production of a sprout. But it is produced from a fresh arrangement of the atoms of a seed, when the previous arrangement of its atoms is destroyed. Hence a seed or a particular arrangement of its parts is the material cause of a sprout. Existence can never be produced from mere non-existence. A certain activity or motion generated by a cause in the particles of a seed destroys the previous arrangement among them, and produces a new arrangement which produces a sprout. Hence an existent substance is the material cause of an existent effect, which is not produced from a non-existent cause. Further, there is no difference between the non-existence of paddy and the non-existence of barley seed, because non-existences are non-different. Therefore a barley sprout would be produced from the destruction of a paddy

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38 NM., pp. 41-43; NKS., i, pp. 48-49, 63, 26-27; NKSH., p. 11; SM., pp. 43-49; TCIA., pp. 36-50.
39 Vyāhatavyāhānām avyāvānāh pārvavāhānivṛttan vyāhāntarād dravyanispattib, na tvabhāvat. NBh., iv. 1, 18.
seed. If there is no difference in causes, there is no difference in
effects. Therefore different kinds of effects cannot be produced
from the destruction of different kinds of causes, because non-
existences have no intrinsic difference from one another. Further, prior non-existence being without origin, the production
of an effect would be without origin.

The Nyāya does not believe in the momentary existence
of cause and effect like the Buddhist realist who holds that an
effect is produced when the complement of its causal conditions
is destroyed. It admits that cause and effect can exist for two,
three or more moments, so that the effect can inhere in its
material cause after it is produced. The Nyāya doctrine of
Asatkāryavāda is different from the Buddhist doctrine of Asat-
kāryavāda. The Buddhist realist believes in the doctrine of
momentariness, and denies inherence of an effect in its material
cause. The Nyāya rejects the doctrine of momentariness, and
regards an effect as inherent in its material cause.

The Buddhist realist does not admit the existence of a com-
posite whole (avayavin) distinct from an aggregate of parts
(avayava) on the following grounds: Each component part
cannot exist in the entire whole, because a part is smaller than
the whole and cannot fill it up, and because the whole in which
the part exists cannot be related to the other parts, since it
exists in the entire whole. Nor does it exist in a separate part
of the composite whole, because it has no other parts than the
component parts. Nor can it exist in the whole of that part
or only in a part of it. A part cannot exist in any other part
of the whole. It cannot exist in its own part, because it can-
not be its own substratum. The container is different from its
content. The composite whole also cannot exist in its com-
ponent parts. It cannot exist entirely in each component part,
since they are of different extensive magnitudes. The whole,
which is of larger extension, cannot exist entirely in each part,
which is of smaller extension. It cannot exist entirely in a
single component part, because then it would be produced out
of a single substance, be indivisible and eternal. But there is
no instance of anything, which is produced and yet eternal.
Nor can it exist partly in the component parts, because it has

\[\text{Prāgabhāvānāṁ svabhāvikabhedavirahāt, NVTT., iv. 1, 17, p. 417.}\]

\[\text{NS., NBh., NV., NVTT., iv. 1, 14-18.}\]
no other parts than its component parts. So there is no composite whole distinct from the collection of parts. Further, the composite whole cannot subsist apart from its component parts, because, firstly, it is never perceived apart from them, and, secondly, if it subsists apart from them without a substratum, it will be eternal, since a substance without a substratum is always eternal. If the whole has any substratum, it must be its component parts. But it cannot exist entirely or partly in them. If it exists in them in parts, then it is nothing but a mere conglomeration of parts. If it exists in part only in one component part, then the whole will be perceived in that part. But a cloth is never perceived in a single yarn of it. Hence there is no composite whole. 399

The Nyāya refutes the Buddhist view. The question cannot be raised whether the whole subsists entirely or partly in the component parts, because it is a single entity without any difference. The term 'entire' denotes many individuals taken as a group. The term 'a part' denotes a few individual members of a group. Both terms indicate diversity within a unity. They are not applicable to a whole, which is a single entity devoid of difference. A composite whole is an effect, which subsists in its material cause, its component parts. The material cause does not subsist in its effect. The component parts do not subsist in the composite whole. But the whole subsists in the parts through inheritance. As the genus of substance subsists in a substance through inheritance, so the whole subsists in the parts through inheritance. A genus does not subsist in an individual either entirely or in parts. So a whole does not subsist in its component parts either entirely or in parts. 400 Subsistence (व्रत्ति) of the composite whole in its component parts means acquisition of the relation of substrate and content between one and many. 401 One whole subsists in many parts through the relation of substrate and content called inheritance. Of the two entities so related one can have no existence apart from the other. The whole, an effect, can have no existence apart from its component parts, its material cause. But the parts can exist apart from the

399 NS., NBh., NV., iv. 2. 7-10. SBNT., pp. 78-93.
400 Svarūpaṇaivāyavivino vrteḥ kṛtsnaikadesānyataraniyamo'prayo-jakāḥ. NSV., iv. 2. 12.
401 Ekasyānekatrāśrayāśritasambandhalakṣaṇā prāptiḥ. NBh., iv. 2. 12.
whole. This is the meaning of the whole subsisting in its parts. Hence the composite whole is a single entity distinct from a collection of its parts, though it is produced by them. It is known by valid, undoubted, uncontradicted perception.\textsuperscript{302}

The Nyāya admits the reality of a universal, community, or genus (jāti) which inheres in an individual like the Vaiśeṣika. The Buddhist denies its reality on the following grounds: A genus cannot be known by indeterminate perception due to the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, which apprehends one specific individual only unrelated to other individuals past and present. Nor can it be known by determinate perception which immediately succeeds it, and apprehends one specific individual qualified by determinations (vikalpa) which are unreal mental concepts. Nor can it be known by inference and testimony, because they also involve determinations, and cannot apprehend reality. Further, there is no genus different from an individual, because it is not perceived as different from it, or as occupying space different from its space. But the Nyāya may argue that a genus is not perceived as different from an individual, because it subsists in it. The Buddhist contends that a genus cannot subsist in an individual. If it subsists entirely in it, it cannot subsist in any other individual. If it subsists in part in it, it is not a universal, because it is said to subsist entirely in each individual. Further, it is partless, and so cannot exist in parts in many individuals. If it subsists entirely in one individual, it cannot subsist in any other individual without being generated again. But such an entity is never perceived. A genus is said to inhere in an individual. But inference is unintelligible. It is said to be a relation between two inseparable entities, which is the cause of the knowledge 'this subsists in that'. But such relation is not possible. Two entities which have separate existence can be related to each other. But inseparable existence is unity or identity which does not admit of any relation. There can be no relation between substance and quality, which are not distinct from each other, and not perceived apart from each other. Separable existence (yutasiddhi) of entities is their production as different entities or being perceived as different entities. Inseparable

existence is production as one entity or being perceived as one entity. It does not admit of any relation. Hence a genus cannot subsist in an individual.

Some Srotiyas admit rūpa-rūpi-relation between a genus and an individual. The Buddhist refutes this view. Rūpa is either colour, or form, or nature. It cannot be colour, because colourless substances such as air, manas etc., qualities and actions are said to have communities. Nor can it be form, because formless qualities are said to have communities. Nor can it be nature, for then a genus would be non-different from an individual. An entity is not perceived as different from its nature. Further, rūpa or a genus is either a reality, or a property of reality, or another reality. It is not perceived as a reality different from an individual. It is not perceived as a property of a reality distinct from an individual. It is not perceived as another reality. If it is not distinct from an individual, there can be no relation between them. The Srotiyas cannot explain the nature of rūpa-rūpi-relation as distinct from conjunction and inherence. So it is a non-entity. Further, a genus subsists in all individuals or in all proper individuals. In the first alternative, the genus of cow would exist in a horse, and the genus of horse would exist in a cow, and thus there would be a confusion of different kinds of individuals. The genus of cow may be said to be manifested by individual cows, though it exists in all individuals, so that there is no such confusion. But this is not possible. The genus of cow is partless, and so will be perceived in all individuals, though it is manifested by certain individuals. An individual may manifest the genus of cow like a lamp; but this does not prove that it exists in that individual. If it is perceived in all individuals, it must exist in them. But the genus of cow is not perceived in all individuals, and so it does not exist in them. In the second alternative, a cow cannot be perceived as a cow when it is born, since the genus of cow did not exist in it before, nor does it come from another cow, because it is devoid of motion. It does not exist in parts in individual cows, since it is partless. Hence a genus cannot exist in its proper individuals.\[83\]

\[83\] NM., pp. 297-300. SBNT., pp. 94-102.
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refutes the Buddhist criticism of the Nyāya view. A genus is apprehended by indeterminate perception and determinate perception both. If an individual is perceived by indeterminate perception as different from other individuals, it may as well be perceived as similar to other individuals. Both community and individuality are perceived by indeterminate perception, but not as related to each other or to the individual. They are so perceived by determinate perception. If individuality only is perceived by indeterminate perception, community cannot suddenly become an object of determinate perception. A genus is not a mere name or a mental concept (vikalpa), because an inhabitant of the Deccan can perceive the common quality of many camels without knowing their name. So a genus is not a mere name. We can perceive the common as well as distinctive characters of many new objects without knowing their names. When we perceive a similar object in future, we recognize it as of the same kind. Recognition apprehends a common character of a present object perceived and a similar object perceived in the past. It apprehends community. Determinations (vikalpa) involved in determinate perception are not merely mental concepts but ontological realities. In fact, both community and individuality of an individual are perceived by indeterminate perception and determinate perception. They are indistinctly perceived by the former and distinctly perceived by the latter. An object devoid of community and individuality cannot be perceived by indeterminate perception. If community cannot be perceived by it, because it is common to many individuals, then individuality also cannot be perceived by it, because it is distinct from other individuals. It cannot be argued that community and individuality cannot be perceived in the same object because they are contradictory to each other, since there is no contradiction between them. Hence community is real.

A genus exists in individuals as distinct from them, and is perceived as such. It is not perceived as occupying a space different from that of an individual, not because it is non-existent or non-different from it, but because it subsists in it. A genus exists in its entirety in an individual, and yet it is perceived in another individual also. It is partless, and cannot exist in parts in many individuals. It subsists entirely in each
individual. Subsistence (vṛtti) is inheritance. Inherence is the relation between two entities which have inseparable existence. A genus is distinct from an individual, because it is perceived as distinct from it by valid, uncontradicted and undoubted perception. But it does not exist in a separate space. As soon as an individual is born, it is related to a genus. It cannot exist without being related to it.

A genus exists in all individuals, but it is not perceived everywhere. It is perceived in certain individuals which manifest it. When a cow is brought here, the genus of cow is perceived in it, which is manifested by it in the space where it is perceived. It is not perceived in any other space. A genus exists in all proper individuals. When a cow is born, it is perceived as a cow. As soon as it is born, it is related to the genus of cow, which did not exist in it before, and does not come from any other cow. But a cow is produced by its cause as related to the genus of cow. This is the Law of Nature (vastusvabhāva). A genus is undeniable like an individual, because it is distinctly perceived. If it is not real, there can be no distinct perception of it.\textsuperscript{194} Jayanta refutes apohavāda like Sridhara.

The Nyāya maintains that a substance is distinct from its qualities. Udayana refutes the Buddhist doctrine that a substance is a mere collection of qualities. We perceive the same object through the visual organ and the tactual organ. I touch what I saw. I see what I touched. This proves that a substance is different from its qualities. We recognize the same object as endowed with qualities perceived through the different sense-organs. But the Buddhist does not admit it. So Udayana asks whether recognition apprehends either (1) one quality, \textit{viz.}, colour or touch, or (2) an aggregate of the two qualities, or (3) an object in addition to them, or (4) a form of cognition without an external object, or (5) an unreal object. (1) The first alternative is not tenable. Colour is not touch, since it is not perceived by the tactual organ. If it could be perceived through this sense-organ, blue colour could be perceived by a blind person through it. The Buddhist may argue that the same object

(e.g., colour) is perceived by the visual organ as colour, and by the tactual organ as touch. Udayana contends that this is not possible. Two conflicting qualities cannot exist in the same locus. If one quality only exists, there is nothing to determine whether colour or touch exists. This will lead to the possibility that the object is devoid of colour and touch both. If two conflicting qualities exist together, their substrates also must be different. If still they are non-different from each other, then there is nothing to determine difference and non-difference. 264 (2) The second alternative is not possible. The aggregate of colour and touch is either due to (i) their existing in the same space, (ii) or at the same time, or (iii) their producing the same effect, or (iv) their being produced by the same cause. (i) The Buddhist maintains that colour and touch have different material causes, and so cannot exist in the same space. If they have the same material cause, it is nothing but a substance. The Buddhist may argue that colour and touch called a jar exist in the same space because they exist on the same ground, which is their locus, so that a colour called a jar exists on another colour called the ground, because they are perceived by the visual organ, and a touch called a jar exists on another touch called the ground, because they are perceived by the tactual organ. Udayana contends that colour and touch both are not perceived to exist on colour called the ground by the visual organ or the tactual organ. The Buddhist may argue that the aggregate of colour and touch called a jar is perceived to exist on the aggregate of colour and touch called the ground. Udayana contends that this involves mutual dependence and infinite regress. Recognition of an aggregate of colour and touch depends on their existence in the same locus, and recognition of their existing in the same locus depends on recognition of them as an aggregate. This argument involves mutual dependence. Further, the aggregate of colour and touch called the ground also would depend on their existing in the same locus, and so on to infinity. This argument involves infinite regress. 265 (ii) Nor do colour and touch exist at the same time, because there is no proof for it. They are not perceived by the

264 ATV., pp. 710, 712; ATVK., pp. 710-11; ATVD., pp. 713-14.
265 ATV., p. 715; ATVK., pp. 715-16.
same sense-organ at the same time. They are perceived by
different sense-organs at different moments. If they form an
aggregate because they exist at the same time, then an elephant
and a camel existing at the same time will form an aggregate.
The Buddhist may argue that colour and touch form an aggre-
gate, because their difference is not perceived. Udayana con-
tends that they are always perceived as different from each other.
So non-perception of their difference is not the cause of their
forming an aggregate. (iii) Nor do they produce the same
effect, because colour or touch is not perceived to have the same
effect. Colour and touch both may be said to perform the
function of carrying water. But the Buddhist regards water
as an aggregate of colour, touch and the like. Neither colour
nor touch can carry water. Nor can their aggregate carry
water, since they do not exist at the same moment and form an
aggregate. (iv) Nor do they form an aggregate because they
are produced by the same cause. Colour, touch and the like
are produced by different causes. If they are produced without
any cause and form an aggregate, objects existing at different
times and in different places will form an aggregate. (3) The
third alternative is valid. The Nyāya admits that recognition
apprehends a substance in addition to its qualities, colour and
touch. (4) The fourth alternative is not right. Recognition
apprehends a mere form of cognition without depending on an
object, either because all objects are mere ideas as subjective
idealism (vijnānavāda) maintains, or because it apprehends an
unreal illusory object like the double moon. In the first alter-
native, colour and touch also are mere ideas, and not objective
qualities. The second alternative is not right, because the
object of recognition (e.g., a jar) is actually attained and pro-
duces successful action. A stable substance only can produce
an effect successively or simultaneously. (5) The fifth alter-
native also is not right. Recognition does not apprehend an
unreal illusory object, for then colour and other qualities also
will be illusory. The Buddhist argues that a substance is
non-different from its qualities because they are always per-
ceived together (sahopalambhāniyama). Udayana refutes it.
There is no rule of invariable simultaneous perception of a sub-
stance and its qualities. A conchshell is perceived without
whiteness by a jaundiced person who perceives it as yellow,
The Buddhist may argue that a conchshell is not perceived, but that a semblance of it is perceived like illusory hair due to a disease of the eye. This argument is wrong. Illusory hair is not real, because it cannot be touched, and serve any useful purpose. But a conchshell can be touched and blown by a jaundiced person, and hence it is real. The Buddhist argues that whiteness pervades conchshells, so that if whiteness is not perceived, a conchshell does not exist. Udayana asks what are the entities which are related to each other as pervader and pervaded. They are either whiteness and conchshell or perception of whiteness and perception of conchshell. The relation of pervasion between whiteness and conchshell is not denied. But if whiteness is not perceived, it cannot be said that a conchshell does not exist or is not perceived. If whiteness does not exist, a conchshell does not exist. But here whiteness is not perceived, but a conchshell is perceived. So pervasion (vyāpti) between perception of whiteness and perception of a conchshell is violated here. A yellow conchshell cannot be said to be produced here, because it is perceived as white by other persons of normal vision. The Buddhist may argue that a substance is non-different from its qualities, because qualities are perceived with a substance only, though a substance is not perceived with qualities. This argument is wrong. The non-bright colour of a jar is always perceived with the bright colour of light, but the former is different from the latter. The Buddhist may argue that the former is different from the latter, because they exist in different places, but that a substance is non-different from its qualities because they exist in the same space. But whiteness and a conchshell exist in different spaces. Whiteness exists in the space of a conchshell. But a conchshell exists in the space of its own parts. So it is different from its whiteness. Further, if a substance is non-different from its qualities, why are a few qualities of a tree perceived from near and many qualities of it perceived from afar, though it has not a twofold nature? It is recognized as the same substance existing in the same space even by persons near it. So a substance is different from its qualities.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{307}}\] ATV., ATV.K., ATVP., ATVD., pp. 717-32. NBh., iv. 1. 35, 36.
10. The Nyāya criticism of the Advaita Vedānta doctrine of Non-difference, and the doctrines of Eternity, Non-eternity, and Diversity of all things.

The Advaita Vedānta regards Brahman, Ātman, or one, undifferentiated, pure, self-luminous, eternally liberated Self as the only reality, and the multiform world-appearance and plurality of individual selves (jīva) as phenomenal appearances. Brahman assumes the appearance of an individual self, when it is limited by avidyā, which is the cause of bondage. Avidyā is a fragment of cosmic nescience (māyā) which produces a false world-appearance; it produces the mind-body-complex, binds a jīva to samsāra, and gives it the knowledge of difference. It may be argued that if avidyā is distinct from Brahman, it is a reality independent of Brahman, which undermines monism; and that if it is non-distinct from Brahman, then it is nothing but Brahman, and cannot be annulled. The Advaita Vedānta replies that avidyā is non-apprehension of reality, which cannot be a positive existent. The Nyāya contends that there is no abode of avidyā, which is non-apprehension of reality. Brahman cannot be its abode, since it is eternal, self-luminous consciousness. There is no other reality which can be its abode. The jīva is not an ontological reality, and so cannot be its abode. But false knowledge or non-apprehension of reality (avidyā) cannot exist without an abode. The Advaita Vedānta replies that an individual self is the abode of avidyā, which does not reside in Brahman. But an individual self, the Nyāya argues, is not different from Brahman, which must, therefore, be its abode. The jīvas, the Advaitist argue, are limitations of Brahman due to the limiting adjuncts (upādhi) of avidyā, experience its impurities in the shape of joys and sorrows, and are merged in Brahman, when their avidyā is destroyed, even as ether enclosed in a jar is a limitation of one ubiquitous ether, and is merged in it, when its limiting adjunct, the jar, is destroy. Avidyā veils the nature of Brahman, and makes it appear as a limited jīva, which realizes its identity with Brahman when avidyā is destroyed. Higher avidyā is the means of destroying lower avidyā and itself, even as a stronger poison is the means of destroying weaker poison and itself. Listening to the scriptures, reflection and meditation, which are higher
avidyā, being repeatedly practised, destroy lower avidyā and themselves. Higher avidyā destroys lower avidyā, and serves as a means of acquiring the knowledge of Brahman (vidyā). As an illusory snake produces the knowledge of a real rope, so avidyā can be a means of the knowledge of Brahman.308

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Advaitist concept of avidyā. Saṅkara regards avidyā as different from existence and non-existence and so indescribable.309 But avidyā, which is beginningless, which can veil the nature of Brahman, and which can be annulled, cannot be non-existent. Trees which exist can be felled. But horns of hares, which do not exist, cannot be destroyed. Avidyā which is destroyed must be existent, though it is not eternal. An existent but non-eternal entity can be destroyed. So avidyā is existent but non-eternal and destructible. It is not mere non-apprehension of reality, because doubt and illusion, which are non-apprehension of reality, are positive in their nature. Avidyā is positive false knowledge. Prior non-existence of apprehension also is not non-existent, because negation has an ontological reality. Hence avidyā is not entirely non-existent.310 If it is not non-existent, it must be existent. Something different from existence and non-existence is inconceivable.311 If avidyā is existent, monism is undermined. If avidyā is non-existent, it cannot limit Brahman. Ether is limited by a jar which exists. So the analogy is false. There are no jīvas, since there are no limiting adjuncts. There is mutual dependence of avidyā and jīvas upon each other. There is no beginningless series of avidyā and jīvas like a beginningless series of seeds and sprouts, because this implies that avidyā is existent and destroyed by counteracting conditions. If avidyā is non-existent, it cannot be a means of attaining knowledge of Brahman (vidyā). A non-existent entity, like a sky-flower, can never be a means of realizing an end. Avidyā can neither be a limiting adjunct nor a reflecting medium of Brahman, because it is said to be non-existent. So bondage and liberation of jīvas are not possible, because they can neither be associated with avidyā nor dissociated from it. The Advaita Vedānta can-

309 Tattvāntarāḥbhāyām anirvacanīyā avidyā. NM., p. 529.
310 Sarvāḥ nāṣatvavidyā. NM., p. 530.
311 Sadasatyaitrikto hi rāśi-atayantadurlabhyāḥ. NM., p. 530.
not adequately account for plurality of jivas and multiplicity of objects. If avidyā is existent, monism is wrong. If it is non-existent, all practical life collapses, since it presupposes the existence of plurality of individual souls and external objects. Further, if there is a real means of valid knowledge which establishes monism, then it is an entity distinct from Brahman, which undermines monism. If there is no means of valid knowledge to prove it, then monism is not tenable. What is not proved by any means of valid knowledge is non-existent. Hence the Advaita Vedānta doctrine of avidyā is not valid.\textsuperscript{312}

Jayanta criticizes the Advaita doctrine of non-difference (abheeda). He asks whether non-difference is admitted because difference is contradicted by valid knowledge, or whether it is admitted because non-difference is established by valid knowledge. Both alternatives are wrong. Perception, inference and testimony apprehend difference only. According to Śaṅkara, perception apprehends non-difference or Being, which is common to all objects. According to the Buddhist, on the other hand, perception apprehends specific individuals (svalakṣaṇa) which exclude other individuals, and it does not apprehend non-difference which depends on other individuals. Both views are one-sided. According to the Nyāya, perception apprehends both non-difference and difference,—community and individuality.\textsuperscript{313}

The five fingers are perceived as different from one another, and yet having community in nature. Inclusion (anuvṛtti) and exclusion (vyāvṛtti) both depend upon the relation of one object to other objects. Perception apprehends an object as blue as distinguished from yellow and other colours. It apprehends objects with distinctive characters, and so it cannot be said to apprehend non-difference only. Inference also apprehends difference, because it apprehends a particular object on the ground of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum, which are different from each other. So inference does not apprehend non-difference. Verbal cognition also apprehends difference. A sentence apprehends an aggregate of meanings interrelated to one another. Therefore, difference is not contradicted by valid knowledge. Nor is there any means of valid knowledge which apprehends non-difference. The

\textsuperscript{312} NM., pp. 528-31.

\textsuperscript{313} Bhedābhedaagrahaṇaṇipuṇam akṣajam. NM., p. 528.
Vedic testimony does not disprove non-difference. The monistic texts like 'The reality is one without a second', 'There is no plurality in the world' and the like are simply praises of one God. They do not disprove difference or plurality.\footnote{NM., pp. 528-29}

The Nyāya criticizes the doctrine that all things are eternal. Some regard all physical things as eternal, because their constituent elements are eternal. This view ascribed to the Sāṁkhya by Vācaspati and Viśvanātha is criticized by Gautama and Vātsyāyana. Prakṛti composed of sattva, rajas and tamas is eternal, while its modifications are non-eternal. All physical things are not eternal, because causes of their production and destruction are perceived. The conjunction of the two halves of a jar is the cause of its production. Striking it with a club is the cause of its destruction. So the jar is not eternal. It may be urged that the eternal atoms constituting a physical thing are not destroyed, so that production and destruction are illusory. This view is wrong. Firstly, a cause and its effect with similar qualities are perceived, which are not eternal. Production and destruction are real, and not illusory. Things are produced at particular times, persist for a certain duration, and then destroyed. If they are said to be manifested, their manifestation is non-eternal. Secondly, a person makes efforts to produce a thing that will give him pleasure, and destroy a thing that will give him pain. Human efforts depend upon the reality of production and destruction. Thirdly, a composite whole (avayavin) is different from its component parts, and produced by their combination, and destroyed by their disjunction. Fourthly, sound, motion, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are neither material elements nor possess their characteristics. They are not eternal. Hence all things are not eternal.\footnote{NS., NBh., NSV., NVTT., iv. 1. 29-32.}

The Yoga maintains that a substance (dharmin) is both different and non-different from its modifications (dharma). A substance undergoes change of quality (dharmanapariṇāma), change of mark (lakṣaṇapariṇāma) and change of state (avasthāpariṇāma). Clay is modified into a jar. This modification is change of quality. The quality of a jar passes from a potential
condition to an actual condition. This modification is a change of mark. The new jar becomes old in course of time. This modification is a change of state. These three kinds of modifications are partly different and partly non-different from the substance. They are eternal, because they are non-different from the substance. They are non-eternal or produced and destroyed, because they are different from it. They exist in their substance in a latent condition before their production, and in a sublatent condition after their destruction. So all things are eternal.

Vātsyāyana refutes this view. If produced and destroyed things are alike existent, there is no distinction between production and destruction of things, because they are devoid of distinctive characters, and the distinction of the past, the present, and the future vanishes. If all things are alike existent either as latent, or actual, or sublatent, then they exist at the present time only. But production is coming into existence of a non-existent thing or transition from the past non-existence to the present existence. Destruction is cessation of an existent thing or transition from the present existence to the future non-existence. Production and destruction are real. Hence all things are not eternal.316

Some maintain that all things are non-eternal, because they are produced and destroyed. An entity, which exists for some time, is non-eternal. What has the property of being produced is not non-produced, and has no existence before its production. What has the property of being destroyed is not non-destroyed, and has no existence after destruction. So what is produced and destroyed is non-eternal. All composite physical things and immaterial entities like cognitions are produced and destroyed, and so non-eternal. It cannot be asserted, Gautama urges, that 'all things' are non-eternal, because the doctrine that 'all things are non-eternal' is eternal. If the doctrine, Vātsyāyana argues, of non-eternity of all things is non-eternal, then all things are eternal. It may be argued that non-eternity of all things also is non-eternal, even as fire burns and then destroys itself. Non-eternity of all things destroys them and then destroys itself. Hence all things are non-eternal. But certain things,

Vātsyāyana contends, are produced and destroyed, and certain other things are neither produced nor destroyed. The former are non-eternal, whereas the latter are eternal. Atoms, ether, time, space, selves, manas, community, particularity and inherence are neither produced nor destroyed. Their production or destruction is not known by any means of valid knowledge. They are eternal. Hence all things are not non-eternal.\textsuperscript{411}

The Nyāya criticizes the Buddhist doctrine that all things are diverse (sarvān prthak). The Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas regard all things as diverse, since a so-called substance is an aggregate of qualities, and there is no composite whole distinct from its component parts. All things are conglomerations of their component parts and qualities, which are distinct from one another. A jar is a mere collection of odour, taste, colour and touch, and an aggregate of a bottom, sides and a neck. It is not distinct from them. There is no single entity called a jar. The Nyāya arguments for the existence of a substance as distinct from its qualities, and of a whole as distinct from its parts have already been given. A single entity is produced by many parts and qualities. A jar is not an aggregate of its parts and qualities. It is perceived as a single entity. Its constituent atoms are too minute to be perceived. The Buddhist realist denies the existence of a single entity because every entity is a mere aggregate. But if there is no single entity, there can be no aggregate, because it is a mere collection of several single entities, which are not aggregates. So the Buddhist argument involves self-contradiction. This is Vātsyāyana’s criticism. Uddyotakara offers the following arguments for the existence of single entities. Firstly, the word ‘jar’ denotes a single entity. One who says ‘Bring a jar’ means by ‘jar’ a single thing. One who hears it also brings a single jar. Thus a word used in singular number denotes a single thing. Secondly, the word ‘jar’ denotes a substance directly, and indicates its parts and qualities by implication. Thirdly, if every entity were a mere aggregate of component parts, then an atom also would be an aggregate of minuter parts, and all things would be infinitely divisible, and there would be no difference in magnitudes of physical things. But this is absurd! Atoms are indivisible,

\textsuperscript{411} NS., NBh., iv. 1. 25-28.
minutest, single entities. A small physical thing is composed of a small number of atoms. A large physical thing is composed of a large number of atoms. The Buddhist realist may argue that every entity is really diverse, being an aggregate of parts, but that its singleness is imaginary. Its manifoldness is real, while its singleness is imaginary. But singleness, Vācaspati argues, is never known to be real according to the Buddhist, and so cannot be known to be illusory. The Buddhist realist must admit that atoms are single indivisible entities, which constitute physical things of different magnitudes. Hence all entities are not diverse.  

11. The Nyāya criticism of the Buddhist doctrines of Momentariness, Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda.

According to the Buddhist realists, all things are momentary (kṣaṇika); there is an apparent identity in a thing, which is a rapid succession of momentary individuals, which are produced and destroyed. It exists for one moment, which is the minutest point of time. Just as a body constantly increases and decreases owing to digestion of food and its absence, and has an apparent identity, so a thing is a series of constantly produced and destroyed individuals. (1) There is no proof, Vātsyāyana argues, for constant growth and decay of all things, which are neither perceived nor inferred. A series of momentary individuals, which are produced and destroyed, may be said to be inferred from growth and decay of a body. But in a stone and a crystal growth and decay are not perceived from which series of momentary individuals, which are produced and destroyed, may be inferred. So they are not series of momentary individuals. (2) Further, when a thing is produced, the cause of its production is perceived; and when a thing is destroyed, the cause of its destruction is perceived. Increase of component parts is perceived to be the cause of production of an ant-hill. Disjunction of component parts is perceived to be the cause of destruction a jar. But the cause of production and the cause of destruction of the momentary individuals in a thing

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are not perceived, and consequently cannot be admitted. (3) Just as the cause of destruction of milk, the Buddhist argues, and the cause of production of curd are not perceived, but admitted to exist, so destruction and production of momentary individuals in a thing must be admitted in a crystal, though they are not perceived. The cause of destruction of milk, Vātsyāyana contends, is inferred from its destruction, and the cause of production of curd is inferred from its production, which are not unknown. But in a crystal the causes of destruction of one individual and production of another individual are not known. So it is not a series of momentary individuals, which are produced and destroyed, but which appear to be identical.\textsuperscript{110}

Uddiyotakara refutes the doctrine of momentariness thus. Firstly, an effect inheres in its material cause; there is a relation of a substrate (ādhāra) and a content (ādheya) between them. But if they are momentary, a material cause cannot be the substrate of its effect. If the cause is destroyed at one moment and the effect is produced at the next moment, the latter cannot inhere in the former. A material cause exists before its effect and at the time when the effect is produced, and so cannot be momentary. Secondly, if a thing is momentary because it is destroyed as soon as it is produced, then what is the cause of its destruction? The cause of production of a thing and the cause of its destruction cannot exist at the same moment. Therefore it cannot be destroyed as soon as it is produced. If the destruction of a thing is not due to any cause, then the Buddhist should be asked the following questions: (1) Is there no destruction, because there is no cause of destruction? (2) Or is destruction eternal, because there is no cause of destruction? According to the Buddhist realist, things without causes are either eternal or non-existent. But, according to the Nyāya, things without causes are eternal. If destruction of a thing is eternal because it is uncaused, then there can be no production of it. If there is production of it, then production and destruction, or existence and non-existence, would coexist at the same moment, which is self-contradictory. If, on the other hand, destruction is non-existent because it is uncaused, then there is no destruction of anything, and so all things are

\textsuperscript{110} NS., NBh., iii. 2. 11-18.
eternal. If destruction is without a cause because it is destroyed, then the notion that destruction is destroyed cannot be derived. If it is derived from the fact that destroyed things are not produced again, then does the Buddhist think that if destruction of a thing were destroyed, then the destroyed thing would be produced again? This is not right, for the production of a thing is not the destruction of its destruction. If it were so, then destruction of destruction of a thing would mean reproduction of it. But, in fact, production of a thing is due to a cause. Whenever there is a cause there is production of it. Further, destruction which has a cause is not destroyed, because it is a negation (abhāva). Only positive entities (bhāva) which have causes are destroyed. There is no such restriction in the case of negative entities. Prior negation has no cause, and yet it is destroyed when a thing is produced. Posterior negation which has a cause is not destroyed. If the destruction of a thing is due to a cause, then, the Buddhist argues, the cause which produces a thing will be its destroyer. The same contact with fire which produces colours due to heating also destroys them. This argument is wrong. The Buddhist misunderstands the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika, who maintains that the contact with fire, which destroys colours due to heating, is different from the contact with fire, which produces them. So what is the cause of production of a thing is not the cause of its destruction. If the Buddhist means that what is of the same nature as the cause of production of a thing cannot be the cause of its destruction, then it is not right, for contact with water produces a sprout and a similar contact with water destroys it. Thirdly, if momentariness of things is proved by the fact that they are destroyed, then the Nyāya admits it. If it is proved by the fact that they are quickly destroyed, then the qualification is without any significance, because the Buddhist does not admit anything, which is not quickly destroyed. If it is proved by the fact that they are produced and destroyed, then the Nyāya admits it. If the phrase 'produced and destroyed' means that they are produced and destroyed at the same moment, then there would be destruction of a thing which is not already produced, just as there would be production of a thing which is not already produced. But this is absurd! If the phrase means that a thing, being produced, is destroyed, then destruction must be due to
a cause like production which occurs at a particular time. The view that destruction is without a cause has already been refuted. Fourthly, the word ‘kṣaṇīka’ may mean ‘that which has destruction (kṣaya)’. This is not right, because what has destruction and destruction exist at different times. A thing which is destroyed ceases to exist, and cannot possess destruction, because they exist at different moments. The possessor and the possessed must exist at the same time. A thing cannot have a possessive relation with its destruction. So what has destruction (kṣaya) cannot be momentary (kṣaṇīka). Nor can ‘kṣaṇīka’ mean what exists for a moment (kṣana), because the Buddhist regards time as a mere name (saṁjñāmātra), a hypothetical entity devoid of real existence. What is a mere name cannot be the qualification of a real entity. Hence momentariness of all things is not tenable.\textsuperscript{338}

Productivity, Vācaspati argues, is not the nature (svabhāva) of a thing, but its property (dharma). A property differs from the thing which has a property. Producedness is not a reason for momentariness. If it were so, then destruction due to a cause also would be a reason for it. Production and destruction are not identical with each other. Existence also is not a reason for momentariness. It is not pervaded by succession and simultaneity, because stable things also can produce effects successively or simultaneously. A stable cause, e.g., a seed, aided by the auxiliary causes, e.g., soil, water, air, light etc., produces a sprout at the last moment. The principal cause depends upon the auxiliary causes which coexist with it to be able to produce a sprout. They also depend upon the principal cause which coexists with it to render an aid to it and enable it to produce a sprout. If they are momentary, they cannot render an aid to it. They are causes, and an aid or additament is an effect; cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, because then the right horn and the left horn of a calf springing up simultaneously will be causally related to each other. So the principal cause and the auxiliary causes must be stable in order to produce an effect.\textsuperscript{339}

Jayanta refutes the doctrine of momentariness. A momentary thing cannot produce a thing successively or

\textsuperscript{338} NV., iii. 2. 12, 14. NVTT., iii. 2. 12.
\textsuperscript{339} NVTT., iii. 2. 17, pp. 390-93.
simultaneously. It exists for one moment, and so cannot have succession. Cause and effect cannot be simultaneous. If a momentary thing produces an effect successively, then its different successive effects are due to its different natures, because it cannot produce them by virtue of its identical nature. If it has different natures, it is non-existent. If it produces successive effects by virtue of its different natures, it ceases to be momentary. Further, if a thing is momentary, then either one cause produces one effect, or many causes produce one effect, or one cause produces many effects, or many causes produce many effects. One cause does not produce one effect. A fire produces burning, smoke, ashes and modification of fuel. One momentary cause cannot produce one effect simultaneously or successively. Many causes with multiform natures cannot produce one effect, because diversity of causes must produce diversity of effects. If many causes produce one effect, then the effect is a single composite whole produced by many parts, which is not admitted by the Buddhist, who maintains that aggregates of atoms produce aggregates of atoms. If a single effect is produced by many causes, then it does not depend upon them and becomes uncaused. One cause cannot produce many effects, because then it would have multiform natures. If it is one despite its multiform natures, then a thing existing at different moments also should be admitted to be one. If many causes produce many effects, then a preceding uniform aggregate of many causes produces a succeeding similar aggregate of many effects, and a preceding multiform aggregate of many causes produces a succeeding dissimilar aggregate of many effects. An aggregate is not different from its members, because it is never perceived to be different from them. If a preceding aggregate produces a succeeding aggregate, then one member of the cause produces one member of the effect. But one cause does not produce one effect. Many causes jointly produce many effects in succession, and so cease to be momentary. If they produce many effects simultaneously, then all causes will produce all effects. If a cause produces an effect without an activity, then any cause will produce any effect. If a cause produces an effect by its activity, then it continues to exist at the moment when it is produced, and ceases to be momentary. Further, mere succession does not prove causal
relation, because two entities not related to each other as cause and effect are in succession. A past, present or future momentary entity cannot exercise activity (vyāpāra) to produce an effect. Existence is not pervaded by momentariness. An entity which comes into existence and exercises causal activity can produce an effect. So it must exist for two or three moments, and cannot be momentary. A cause produces an effect neither successively nor simultaneously. Whenever the assemblage of the material cause with auxiliary causes, the non-inherent cause and the efficient cause comes into being, it produces an effect. Only stable causes can produce effects.\footnote{NM., pp. 456-58.}

Udayana offers the following criticism of the doctrine of momentariness. The Buddhist argues that whatever is existent is momentary. But invariable concomitance between them cannot be proved. The Buddhist argues that a cause is found to be able to produce an effect at one time and unable to produce it at another time. Causal efficiency (sāmarthya) and causal inefficiency (asāmarthya) are contradictory qualities, and cannot exist in the same thing. So their substrates must be different. Therefore, a cause must be a series of momentary entities. But causal efficiency and causal inefficiency, Udayana urges, are not contradictory qualities, which exist in the same cause at different times, and prove its different conditions, but not its momentariness. Causal efficiency is neither production of an effect (karaṇa) nor capacity (yogyatā) for producing it. A seed in a granary does not produce an effect. There is no relation of pervader and pervaded between causal efficiency and production. If causal efficiency were the pervader of production, then a cause with causal efficiency would not produce an effect. If production were the pervader of causal efficiency, a cause devoid of causal efficiency would produce an effect. Capacity of a cause is either capacity of the aggregate of the auxiliary causes (sahakāriyogyatā) or capacity of the cause itself (sva-vipayogyatā). The Nyāya admits that a stable principal cause aided by the aggregate of stable auxiliary causes produces an effect. But the Buddhist does not admit it. So capacity of the aggregate of auxiliary causes is not a valid reason for momentariness. Capacity of the cause itself is either its generic
character whose presence produces an effect and whose absence does not produce it, or its subordinate genus in the form of incipient tendency to produce an effect, or its failure to produce an effect owing to the absence of the aggregate of auxiliary causes. It is not its generic character, since the generic character of seed is present in a seed in a granary, but it does not produce a sprout. The so-called incipient causal activity (kūrvadrūpavatva) admitted by the Buddhist is neither apprehended by indeterminate perception nor by determinate perception, nor inferred owing to the absence of a reason. If the cause by nature produces an effect immediately, then a seed in a granary will produce a sprout. If it by nature produces an effect after some delay, it will not produce an effect even in the presence of auxiliary causes. There is no proof for the existence of incipient causal activity. Production of an effect does not prove that a cause produces it by virtue of its incipient causal activity. The capacity of the cause itself (svarūpapayogatā) is not its failure to produce an effect owing to the absence of auxiliary causes, because it involves self-contradiction. What does not produce an effect in the absence of auxiliary causes, and produces it in their presence is not momentary. A cause does not by nature produce an effect immediately. Existence, the Buddhist argues, consists in producing an effect, which is either producing it with delay or producing it without delay. If its nature is producing an effect with delay, it will not produce it even in the presence of auxiliary causes. If its nature is producing an effect without delay, it will produce it immediately after coming into existence without auxiliary causes. But what is the meaning of absence of delay in producing an effect? It is either production of an effect immediately after being produced or production of it after being aided by auxiliary causes. What is the meaning of delay in producing an effect? It is either non-production of an effect until auxiliary causes co-operate with the cause or non-production of an effect at all times. The first and fourth alternatives, Udayana argues, are invalid, because there is no valid proof for them. The second and third alternatives are valid, because they are proved by perception. A seed does not produce a sprout in the absence of auxiliary causes, but it produces a sprout when they co-operate with it. There is no contradiction between
non-production of an effect in the absence of auxiliary causes and production of it in their presence, which exist in a stable cause at different times. Hence the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness is not tenable.

Uddyotakara adduces the following arguments for stability of things. Firstly, there is a relation of substrate and content between a material cause and its effect. So the cause must continue to exist till its effect is produced. Secondly, we perceive the same object continuously for a long duration through many successive cognitions. Continued perception of it proves its continued identity. Thirdly, what is perceived by one self can be remembered by the same self. Recollection presupposes permanence and identity of an individual self. Fourthly, the perceptions of colour, smell, taste and touch of the same object due to its action on the different sense-organs are synthesized into a unity by the same self. Fifthly, recognition of the same object at present, which was perceived in the past proves the continued identity of the object and the identity of the self. If the object were a mere series of momentary individuals, and if the self were a mere series of momentary ideas, recognition would not be possible. Hence the doctrine of momentariness is unsound.

The Nyāya criticizes the Yogācāra Vijnānavāda. Rational analysis, the Vijnānavādin argues, fails to give the knowledge of the real nature of things. When we perceive a cloth as a whole, the perception is invalid, since a whole is non-existent. The cloth is a collection of yarns. When we perceive a yarn as a whole, the perception is invalid, since it is an aggregate of atoms. Atoms are aggregates of minuter parts, till they end in void. The reason is invalid, Gautama argues, since it involves self-contradiction. If there is no apprehension of the real nature of things, they are not amenable to rational analysis. Rational analysis of things and absence of apprehension of the real nature of things contradict each other. If things are analysed by reason, then their real nature is not unknown. If it is not

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ATV., ATVE., ATVP., ATVD., pp. 22-34, 46-85. SBNT., pp. 20-77.

NV., iii. 2. 14. NM., pp. 489-61; ATV., pp. 267-68.


NS., iv. 2. 27. Buddhāya vivecanāh yādātyānānupalabhīś-ceti vyāhanyate. Nīḥ., iv. 2. 27.
known, then there can be no rational analysis of them.\textsuperscript{327} The existence and non-existence of things are determined by reason. Their real nature also is determined by it. Apprehension of the real nature of things by a means of valid knowledge is the same as their rational analysis. Further, if the real nature of things is known by a means of valid knowledge, then the non-existence of all things is not proved. If the non-existence of all things is proved by a means of valid knowledge, then also it is not proved, since the means of valid knowledge exists. If the non-existence of all things is proved without any means of valid knowledge, their existence also may similarly be proved. The whole exists as distinct from its parts, but it cannot be perceived apart from them, because it is related to them as a content and a substrate.\textsuperscript{328}

The so-called external objects, the Vijñānavādins argue, are illusory ideas like the objects of dreams, magic, mirage, cities in clouds etc., which have apparent existence only due to imagination, and are produced by a beginningless series of dispositions. There are neither means of valid knowledge nor objects of valid knowledge.\textsuperscript{329} The thesis of the Vijñānavādin, Gautama argues, cannot be proved, since there is no valid reason for it. The illusory objects of dreams are objects of past valid perceptions, like those of recollection and desire. Illusory perception is destroyed by valid knowledge of reality, even as wrong dream-cognitions are destroyed by valid waking cognitions. False knowledge exists and is produced by its cause. An illusion is wrong perception of a character which is ascribed to a reality. So it is not without a foundation in reality.\textsuperscript{330} Vātsyāyana elaborates Gautama’s arguments. (1) If the Vijñānavādin proves the non-existence of objects of dreams because they are contradicted by waking cognitions, then the objects of waking cognitions must exist. If non-perception of the objects of dream-cognitions proves their non-existence, then perception of the objects of waking cognitions proves their existence. If the objects of perception and non-perception are alike non-existent, then non-perception cannot prove non-existence.

\textsuperscript{327} Buddhaśa vivecanād bhāvānāṁ yāthātmyopalabdhiḥ. NBh., iv. 2. 29.
\textsuperscript{328} NS., NBh., iv. 2. 28-30.
\textsuperscript{329} NS., iv. 2. 32, 33. LS., ii. 149-60, 1-2; HIP., i. pp. 366-76.
\textsuperscript{330} NS., iv. 2. 33-37.
(2) Further, the variety of dream-cognitions is due to the variety of their causes which are real. Dreams are recollections due to the revival of dispositions which were produced by past perceptions which apprehended real objects. Just as recollection and desire have for their objects real things perceived in the past, and cannot prove their non-existence, so dream-cognitions, which are recollections, have for their objects real things perceived in the past, and cannot prove their non-existence. The Vijnänavadin does not admit the existence of external objects, and so cannot account for the variety of dreams. He regards dream-cognitions as false because they are contradicted by waking cognitions, and yet considers waking cognitions to be false like dream-cognitions. If there is no difference between dream-cognitions and waking cognitions because they are equally false, then the example of dreams is useless. The Vijnänavadin denies the validity of waking perceptions, and so cannot prove the falsity of dream-cognitions because they are contradicted by them. (3) In an illusion there is valid knowledge of a substance (dharmin) to which a quality (dharma) is wrongly attributed, but there is a false knowledge of the quality. When a post is wrongly perceived as a man, the knowledge of their common character is valid, but the knowledge of the individual peculiarity of a man attributed to it is wrong. The Vijnänavadin denies the existence of all external objects, and so cannot account for an illusion in which one of two similar objects is wrongly perceived as another. If a man has never been perceived, a post cannot be misperceived as a man. (4) False knowledge is destroyed by true knowledge. The wrong perception of a post as a man is destroyed by the true knowledge of a post as a post, which does not set aside the object common to a post and a man, but the wrong knowledge. Every wrong perception has a basis in a real object perceived by a person at some time, in some place. If all external objects were non-existent, there would be no distinction between valid perceptions and illusions, and waking cognitions and dream-cognitions. Even dream-cognitions are indirectly dependent upon external objects which are real.

Uddyotakara adduces the following arguments against

\[\text{NBR., iv. 2. 33-37.}\]
Vijñānavāda. (1) If there is no distinction between waking perceptions and dreams, then the distinction between morality and immorality which pertain to overt actions dealing with external objects will vanish, and dreaming of committing adultery will be regarded as a sin. (2) The Vijñānavādin distinguishes waking cognitions from dreams by stating that the former are distinct while the latter are indistinct. But indistinctness of dreams is due to the absence of their objects, while distinctness of waking perceptions is due to the presence of external objects. This is Uddyotakara's view. Vācaspati offers another explanation. Indistinctness of cognitions is due to their apprehension of common characters of objects, while their distinctness is due to their apprehension of common and distinctive characters of objects. If external objects are non-existent, neither their common characters nor their individual characters can be apprehended by cognitions. Hence cognitions cannot be indistinct or distinct. (3) The variety of waking cognitions is said to be due to the variety of dispositions (bhāvanā) like the variety of dreams. But even in a disposition there is a difference between an impression (bhāvaka) and an object (bhāvyā) which it represents.32 There are no impressions of unperceived objects. The diversity of dreams is due to the diversity of objects perceived in the past, which have left their impressions. So the diversity of waking cognitions must be due to the diversity of external objects perceived in the past. The variety of cognitions must ultimately depend on the variety of external objects. (4) The Vijñānavādin argues that objects do not exist independently of the mind because they are apprehended like feeling. But cognition (jñāna), Uddyotakara argues, is different from pleasure and pain (vedanā) which are apprehended by it. Cognition is apprehension (grahaṇa), while pleasure and pain are apprehended (grāhya). So they are different from each other. An action is different from its object.33 (5) The Vijñānavādin argues that diversity of waking cognitions is due to maturation of the like potencies of actions (tulyakarmāvipāka). The so-called external objects are mere projections of subjective cognitions due to ripened potencies of actions of a person. But this

32 Nābhinnatā bhāvyatā bhāvakatā ceti, NV., iv. 2. 34. NVTT., pp. 467-68.
33 Na hi karma ca kriyā ca ekaḥ bhavati. NV., iv. 2. 34.
view involves self-contradiction. Since there are no external objects, according to the Vijñānavādin, cognitions with particular forms cannot be produced in a particular place at a particular time. So the diversity of cognitions is not due to matura-
tion of potencies of actions.

Uddvyotakara gives the following arguments for the existence of external objects. Objects exist independently of my mind, because they have common and distinctive characters like other minds, because they are known by the means of valid knowledge, because they are produced by their causes and non-eternal, and because they are preceded by merits or demerits.234 Objects yielding pleasure and pain are perceived by a person in accordance with his merits or demerits.

Vācaspati adduces the following arguments against subjective idealism. (1) 'Blue' and 'cognition of blue', the Vijñānavādin argues, are non-different from each other, because they are always perceived together. But an object (artha) and a cognition (jñāna) are not cognized by the same cognition. If they are identical with each other, they cannot be perceived together. Two things can be perceived together, if they are different from each other. Hence the identity of an object and a cognition cannot be proved by invariable simultaneous perception of them (sahopalambhaniyama). When 'blue' is perceived, the 'cognition of blue' is not perceived. 'Blue' is perceived as extramental and devoid of the form of cognition. (2) The Vijñānavādin regards manifestation of an object and manifestation of a cognition as not different from the cognition, which manifests itself and its object. But a cognition cannot act upon itself and manifest itself, though it can manifest an object. An object is manifested by sense-perception, but its cognition is manifested by internal perception. Manifestation of an object does not depend upon manifestation of the apprehending cognition, but upon the existence of the apprehending cognition.235 A cognition is cognized, according to the Vijñānavādin, as soon as it is produced, because it does not depend upon any other condition, and it is not hindered by any obstacle, or it is not cognized at all. But this argument is

234 NV., iv. 2. 34.
235 Na ca pramāṇajñānaprakāśadhino’rthaparakāśaḥ, kiṃ tu pramā-
ṇajñānasaittadāhinaḥ. NVTT., p. 467. NM., pp. 541-42.
invalid. A cognition is not cognized, Jayanta argues, as soon as it is produced, because the causes of its cognition are absent at the time.  

(3) Further, apprehendedness (grāhyatva) is not pervaded by non-difference (abheda). An object is perceived by a cognition as large and extramental. Largeness consists in occupying many positions in space exclusive of one another. One, unextended, partless cognition cannot occupy many mutually exclusive positions in space. Likewise extramentality is not cognition. So an existent object is manifested to consciousness. But how can an inactive cognition manifest largeness? It manifests largeness by nature without any activity. An object is by nature apprehended by a cognition without depending upon any other condition. But how can an object be known by a cognition without being related to it? If the relation between them depends upon any other relation, it will lead to infinite regress. If a relation between two relata is possible without any other relation, then an object may be related to a cognition without depending on any other relation. A particular cognition produced by its cause knows a particular object by its nature without producing any other result. Hence apprehendedness is not pervaded by non-difference. In fact, it is pervaded by difference. Largeness of an object is different from the cognition which apprehends it.

Jayanta adduces the following arguments against Vijñānavāda. (1) One and the same cognition cannot be an apprehending cognition (grāhaka) and an apprehended object (grāhya), because they have contradictory characters. A cognition is subjective, attended with a feeling, and acts upon an object to apprehend it. But an object is external and devoid of feeling and action. A cognition is incorporeal, unextended, conscious, and manifests an object by nature. It does not require manifestation of itself to manifest an object. But an object is corporeal, extended, solid or liquid, and unconscious. A cognition refers to 'I' (ahaṅkarāspada), while an object refers to 'this'. Blue is known as 'this is blue, and not as 'I am blue'. So an object cannot be identical with a cognition. A cognition is a

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388 NM., pp. 541-42.
377 Svabhavaścarāthasya jñānam iti na tadiyatve anyad apekṣate NVTT., iv. 2, 35, p. 465.
means (upāya) of knowing an object (upeya) which is its end. Hence the existence of an object cannot be denied. (2) An object produces a cognition. It is proved by the joint method. When an object is present, there is perception of it. When it is absent, there is no perception of it. (3) As soon as a cognition or perception is produced, it apprehends an object, without being cognized. An uncognized cognition apprehends an object. (4) A cognition is not self-aware (svasamvedana), since no self-manifest things are perceived. A word depends upon the auditory organ to manifest itself. A light depends upon the visual organ to manifest itself. A cognition manifests an object, but does not manifest itself. It is not manifested, when it manifests an object, because the conditions of its manifestation or apprehension are absent. (5) Invariable simultaneous perception of an object and a cognition does not prove their identity. If they are identical, they cannot be perceived together (saha). Further, when blue is perceived, its cognition is not perceived. Sometimes an object is cognized without a cognition. Sometimes a cognition (e.g., memory-image) is cognized without an object. (6) Objects of perception are not unreal like dreams, illusions and hallucinations, because they are perceived as extramental and known by distinct, undoubted, valid perception. They must be admitted to be real. They cannot be creatures of imagination. (7) A woman excites disgust in an ascetic, lust in a lustful young man, and relish in a tiger. So she is nothing but ideas in the peripient minds. This argument of the Vijnānavādin is childish! The same object can excite different emotions in different minds according to their different dispositions (vāsanā). (8) Two synchronous momentary cognitions cannot be related to each other as subject (grāhaka) and object (grāhya) like the two horns of a cow. An apprehending cognition is a subject, and an apprehended object is an object. An antecedent cognition cannot apprehend

\[\text{N. M., p. 542.}\]

\[\text{N. M., p. 542.}\]

\[\text{N. M., p. 544.}\]

\[\text{N. M., p. 547.}\]

\[\text{N. M., p. 547.}\]
a succeeding cognition, unless it continues to exist till the latter comes into existence and ceases to be momentary. A succeeding cognition also cannot apprehend an antecedent cognition for the same reason. (9) One pure cognition (vijñāna) or consciousness assumes the illusory forms of subjects and objects, because it is tainted by dispositions (vāsanā) of beginningless ignorance (avidyā). Different dispositions are the causes of different perceptions of objects. There is a beginningless series of dispositions and perceptions like seeds and sprouts. This argument of the Vijnānāvādin is groundless. If dispositions are non-different from pure consciousness, they cannot be the cause of its impurities. If they are different from it, and produce perceptions, they are nothing but objects. If they are impressions (saṃskāra), then they are produced by perceptions, which are produced by external objects. If there are only discrete momentary cognitions, they cannot leave impressions which modify other cognitions. Only stable things (e.g., roses) can perfume stable things (e.g., water). There is no substrate of dispositions. The Ālayavijñāna cannot be their abode, because it is a series of momentary self-cognitions. Only the permanent self (ātman) can be their abode, which is denied by the Vijnānāvādin.  

Udayana, Saṅkara Miśra, Bhagiratha and Raghunātha elaborately criticize Vijnānāvāda. Their principal arguments are given here. Udayana asks: Does the Vijnānāvādin prove (1) identity of an object with a cognition, which are existent, or (2) their belonging to the same genus, or (3) unreality of the cognized object? In the first alternative, does he prove their identity by (i) invariable simultaneous perception of them (saḥopalambhāniyama), or (ii) apprehendedness (grāhyatva) of the object, or (iii) its being manifested to consciousness (prakāśa-mānātva)? (1) (i) An object and its cognition cannot be perceived together, if they are not different from each other. So simultaneous perception may mean that an object cannot be apprehended by a cognition which does not apprehend its cognition (tadaviṣayakajñānāviṣayatva). If an object is the subject (pakṣa), identity with its cognition is the predicate (sādhya), and being not apprehended by a cognition which does not not
apprehend its cognition is the reason (hetu), then the reason is unproven (asiddha), since the Nyāya does not admit self-manifestation of a cognition. In the cognition 'this is a jar' the cognition does not manifest itself. If a cognition is the subject, identity with its object is the predicate, and its not being apprehended by a cognition which does not apprehend its object is the reason, then also the reason is unproven, since there can be an apprehension of a cognition without an apprehension of an object, e.g., when we hear the word 'cognition'. So invariable perception of a cognition and an object does not prove their identity. This is Bhagiratha's argument. (ii) Apprehendedness (grāhyatva) is being apprehended by a cognition. An object is identical with its cognition, because it is apprehended by the cognition. If it were different from the cognition, then all objects would be apprehended by all cognitions. The argument implies that whatever is apprehended by a cognition is the cognition itself. But the Nyāya does not admit self-awareness of a cognition. So the reason is unproven (asiddha). (iii) A cognition is identical with its object, because it manifests or apprehends itself. Here also the reason is unproven, because a cognition is not self-aware. If an apprehending cognition and an apprehended object are identical with each other, all reasons to prove their identity are fallacious. An inference is possible, if there is a difference among the reason, the subject, and the predicate. This is Raghunātha's argument. Hence the first alternative is not tenable.

(2) If a cognition and its object belong to the same genus of cognition (sajātiya), then a cloth will be apprehended by the cognition of a jar, since all objects are cognitions. An object is a cognition, the Vijñānavādin argues, because it is manifested to consciousness; an unconscious object cannot be manifested to consciousness. A cognition, the Nyāya argues, apprehends an object, which is different from itself, but it does not apprehend itself. But, on the other hand, a cognition apprehends itself, the Vijñānavādin argues, but it cannot apprehend

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\[835\] Jñānasya jñeyabhede prakāśāmānāvatvāṁ sva-prakāśākāvatvāṁ hetuḥ. ATVD., p. 432.

an object. Udayana contends, if a cognition apprehends another cognition, which is different from itself, then it may as well apprehend an object, which is different from itself. The Vijñānavādin argues, a cognition apprehends another entity which is of the same material (upādāna), and this is possible, if it is of the nature of a cognition, and it is not possible, if it is of a different nature. He admits subject-object-relation among cognitions, which are of the same material. The Nyāya argues, a cognition is so produced by its complement of causes that it apprehends a jar only. The Vijñānavādin also admits that a cognition of blue apprehends blue,—which is of the nature of cognition, but different from it,—but that it does not apprehend yellow. So he also admits different powers of the causes of cognitions to enable them to apprehend different objects. Hence the second alternative is not tenable.\[44\]

(3) An object of cognition is non-existent, because the characteristics of an apprehended object are false. All characteristics of an apprehended object are false, whether it is different or non-different from a cognition. If there is a subject-object-relation (grāhya-grāhakabhāva), then the capacity of the complement of causes of a cognition may account for its apprehending a particular object. But if there is no subject-object-relation, then it cannot account for this fact. If an apprehended object is non-existent, whether it is different or non-different from its cognition, its complement of causes cannot regulate its being apprehended by a particular cognition. Does the Vijñānavādin seek to disprove (i) manifestedness of external objects or (ii) their existence because of the indescribability of the characteristics of apprehended objects? (i) The objects characterized by apprehendedness are perceived by all. Their existence cannot be denied, even if their characteristics are not known.\[44\] If they exist, then their characteristic of being apprehended also is proved. (ii) Nor is their existence disproved. If their non-existence proves their characteristic of being apprehended, then disproof of the character of apprehendedness will disprove the existence of an apprehended object. But if the characteristic of an apprehended object, whether it is different or non-different


\[44\] Na hi laksanāpārijñānamātreṇa spaṣṭadṛṣṭamapi laksyam apahnom-
tum lakyate. ATV., p. 490. ATVD., p. 491.
from its cognition, is disproved, why should the object be said to be non-existent? If non-existence is said to be the characteristic of an apprehended object, why should not existence be said to be its characteristic? Hence the object of a cognition is not non-existent.\textsuperscript{332}

The Nyāya criticizes the Mādhyamika doctrine of Sūnyavāda. (1) The Mādhyamika regards all things as non-entities (abhāva), because they are known to be mere negations of one another. But they are not non-existent, Gautama argues, because they are known to have specific natures. (2) The Mādhyamika denies specific natures of things, because they are relative. But their relativity, Gautama argues, does not prove their non-existence. If they are non-existent, they cannot be relative.\textsuperscript{331} Vātsyāyana elaborates Gautama's arguments. (1) In the first argument of the Mādhyamika there is a contradiction between the two terms of the proposition, and between the proposition and the reason. The proposition is 'all things are non-entities' (sarvam abhāvaḥ). The term 'all things' denotes several things entirely. The term 'non-entity' denotes negation of existence or non-existence. 'All' signifies existence with a definite character. 'Non-entity' signifies absence of a definite character. What is existent cannot be non-existent. What has a definite character cannot be characterized by absence of a definite character. A 'non-entity' devoid of any definite character cannot be predicated of 'all' or several things entirely. What is called 'all' may be said to be really 'non-entity'. But what is non-existent cannot be said to be 'all' or several things entirely. Therefore the terms 'all' and 'non-entity' are contradictory to each other. Further, the proposition 'all things are non-entities' and the reason 'because they are mutual negations among things' are contradictory to each other. The reason asserts 'mutual negations in existent entities'. On the strength of this reason it is sought to be proved that 'all things are non-entities'. But, if all things are non-entities, then there are no mutual negations among things; and if there are mutual negations among things, then all things are not non-entities. The reason admits the

\textsuperscript{332} \textit{ATV.}, pp. 491-92; \textit{ATV.K.}, p. 492.
existence of things in which there is mutual non-existence of things. The proposition asserts the non-existence of all things. So there is a contradiction between them. (2) The second argument of the Mādhyamika is invalid, because entities exist by virtue of their own specific natures. Substance, quality and action have the common character of existence (sattā) or beinghood. Community, particularity and inherence have their specific characters. Substances have the common character of having motion and the like. Each substance has its own specific qualities. But non-entities are devoid of any definite characters, though there are differences among things. So all things are not non-entities. Further, why does the Mādhyamika assert that 'a cow is a non-horse'? Why does he not assert that 'a cow is a non-cow'? Why is not a 'cow' non-existent as a cow? Why is a 'cow' non-existent as a horse? This commits the Mādhyamika to the view that a cow exists in its own nature. The assertions 'a cow is not a horse' and 'a cow is non-existent as a horse' deny identity of a cow and a horse. They do not signify that they are mere non-entities. A cow is a substance qualified by the genus of cow, and is not a mere negation. It is known by its own specific nature. (3) The Mādhyamika argues that there are no specific natures (svabhāva) of things, because they are entirely relative. So there are no entities with specific characters. A thing is long relatively to the short. A thing is short relatively to the long. There is no entity with its specific character, because it is entirely relative. This argument also involves self-contradiction. If length is relative to shortness, then shortness is absolute. If shortness is relative to length, then length is absolute. Relativity presupposes absoluteness. If length and shortness are relative to each other, the non-existence of one will imply the non-existence of the other, and so the non-existence of both. Hence relativity of specific characters is not proved. Length and shortness are specific magnitudes, which are natural qualities of existent entities. They do not depend for their production upon our knowledge of two things, though our knowledge of them depends upon our knowledge of each other. Their existence does not depend upon their relation to each other. Differences among things cannot be denied, because they are presupposed by our practical life. They are due to differences in their specific characters, which do
not depend upon their correlatives for their existence and production, though our knowledge of them depends upon our knowledge of their correlatives. Hence it is wrong to argue that things have no specific characters because they are relative and therefore non-existent. All things are not non-entities. The existence of certain things endowed with specific characters cannot be denied, because they are actually perceived. Nagārjuna did not regard the reality as void (śūnya) but as essenceless (niḥsvabhāva), predicateless and undefinable, which can be intuited. He did not deny the empirical reality of the world of different things, but emphasized their relativity. The Nyāya, however, recognizes the ontological reality of the world of different things with their specific natures, which are absolute positive entities, and gives an ontological status even to negation (abhāva), and admits its different kinds.

12. The Proofs for the existence of the Finite Self (Ātman).

The Nyāya arguments for the existence of the finite self are similar to the Vaiśeṣika arguments. The Nyāya admits the perception of the self, while the Vaiśeṣika denies it. According to the Nyāya, the self is an object of internal perception or T'-consciousness (ahampratyaya), inferred from marks (liṅga), and known from the testimony of the Vedas. (1) The self is an object of T'-consciousness or mental perception. It is perceived by intuition owing to a particular kind of conjunction of it with manas due to meditative trance. (2) The self is inferred from desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and cognition. Desire for an object depends upon the recollection of a similar object which was perceived in the past, and afforded pleasure. It proves the identity of the self which perceived a similar object in the past, remembers the pleasure yielded by it, and desires to attain a similar object. Similarly, aversion to an object depends upon the recollection of a similar object.

\[\text{Na vastudharma’yaṁ pariṣpekteṣāḥ Bhedaḥ vastuviśeṣaṁ naṁ patam vastvantaram apekṣate, kim in śvamirūpate. NVTT., iv. i. 40, p. 432.}\]

\[\text{NBh., NV., iv. i. 37-40.}\]

\[\text{Ahāmpratyayaviśayatvād ātmā tāvat pratyakṣaḥ. NV., iii. i. 1, p. 345.}\]

\[\text{Pratyakṣaṁ yuṣjānasva yogasamādhijam ātmamanasıḥ saṁyogaviśeṣaūd ātmā pratyakṣaḥ. NBh., i. i. 3.}\]
which was perceived in the past, and yielded pain. It proves the unity and permanence of the self, which perceived a similar object in the past, remembers the pain yielded by it, and avoids a similar object. Volition is actuated by desire and aversion. It is striving for the attainment of good which is an object of desire. Or it is striving for the rejection of evil which is an object of aversion. It proves the permanence and identity of the self, which is the agent of perception, recollection, desire, aversion, and volition. Pleasure arises from the perception of an object, because a similar object yielded pleasure in the past. It proves the unity and identity of the self which perceived a pleasant object in the past and remembers it now. Pain arises from the perception of an object, because a similar object yielded pain in the past. It proves the permanent identity of the self, which perceived a painful object in the past and remembers it now. Cognition also proves the existence of the self. It has a desire to know the real nature of an object. First, it has an indefinite, uncertain, doubtful knowledge of it. Then it has a definite, certain, undoubted knowledge of it. The same self has a desire for knowledge, indefinite knowledge, and definite knowledge. Thus desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and cognition prove the existence of the self. They are the qualities of the self in which they inhere.\textsuperscript{338} They are not qualities of the body, the sense-organs, or manas. (3) The self is inferred from the synthesis of the sensations of colour, taste, smell and touch of an object into a unity of perception. The visual organ gives the sensation of colour only; the gustatory organ, the sensation of taste only; the olfactory organ, the sensation of smell only; and the tactual organ, the sensation of touch only. These sensations are combined into a unitary perception of an object by the self. Perception depends upon the synthetic activity of the self. It is a unity which presupposes the identity of the self. It is not a mere series of momentary, discrete sensations. The sense-organs which apprehend their own objects, the different qualities of an object, cannot combine them into a unity. In fact, they are unconscious organs of perception, through which the conscious self perceives an object endowed with different qualities.\textsuperscript{341} (4) There is recognition of

\textsuperscript{338} NS., NBh., i. 1. 10; iii. 2. 36, 40.
\textsuperscript{341} NBh., iii. 1. 1-3.
an object perceived by the right eye, which was perceived by the left eye in the past. If the sense-organs were conscious, one sense-organ could not recognize an object perceived by another sense-organ. But there is such a recognition, which proves that the conscious self is distinct from the sense-organs, and is the agent of perception, recollection and recognition. If one sense-organ could remember the objects perceived by the other sense-organs, then the different senses would not be restricted to different kinds of objects. But one conscious self can perceive colour, taste, smell and touch through the visual organ, the gustatory organ, the olfactory organ, and the tactual organ respectively, synthesize them into a unitary percept, remember the different qualities perceived, and recognize the object through one sense-organ, which was perceived through another sense-organ.\(^{338}\) (5) I perceive the same object (e.g., a jar) through the tactual organ which I perceived through the visual organ. I recognize the object through one sense-organ, which I perceived through another sense-organ. These two perceptions are recognized as belonging to the same self or knower.\(^{338}\) They are not known by the body or the sense-organs. One sense-organ cannot remember the apprehension of another object by another sense-organ. They are restricted to their own objects. The conscious self perceives all objects and recognizes them.\(^{338}\) (6) Recollection is a quality of the self. It perceived an object in the past, retained an impression, revives it, and remembers the object at present. Perception produces an impression (samskāra), which abides in the self and produces recollection. The recollection of the object comprises the cognition of the object, the cognition of the past cognition, and the cognition of the cognizer, which are remembered. These three cognitions have only one knower; they are not without knowers, nor have they many knowers. There is one self in each body, which perceives all kinds of objects, remembers and recognizes them and its own cognitions. Perception and recollection of the same object are qualities of the same self or knower.\(^{338}\) Devadatta cannot remember what was perceived by Yajñadatta.

\(^{338}\) NBh., iii. 1. 7, 14.
\(^{338}\) Durśanasparśasāṁhitām ekārthagrahāṇāt. NS., iii. 1. 1. Ikaviśayāvan pratyayarvekārthakau pratisandhiyate. NBh., iii. 1. 1.
\(^{338}\) NBh., NV., iii. 1. 1-3.
\(^{338}\) NBh., iii. 1. 14, 15. NVTT., i. 1. 10.
Recollection is not produced by its object only, because it is past. Nor does it subsist in its object, since it is non-existent. Nor does it subsist in the sense-organs, since they are not so experienced. Nor does it subsist in the body, since its qualities are perceived by all. But my recollection is perceived by my self, and not by other selves. But it must subsist in a substance, since it is a quality. Hence it subsists in the self as its quality. Recollection is an effect of an impression, which cannot be without a substrate. The self is its substrate as its material cause. Momentary cognitions related to each other as cause and effect cannot account for recollection, since the antecedent cognition is destroyed no sooner than it is produced, and cannot modify the succeeding cognition with its residuum. The Alayavijñāna also cannot account for it, since it is a series of momentary self-cognitions. One permanent self only can account for it. (7) One perceives the colour of a mango, remembers its taste, and desires to taste it. His recollection of its taste produces saliva in his tongue. One sense-organ cannot directly produce a modification in another sense-organ. The self has visual perception of the colour of a mango, and recollection of its taste which produces saliva. The intervening recollection accounts for salivation. Recollection is not a quality of the body, because what was perceived in childhood is remembered in old age, though the old person's body is different from the child's body. The sense-organs, which are unconscious, cannot be the substrate of recollection. The conscious self is its substrate.

Udayana elaborately discusses the arguments for the existence of the self in Atmatattvaviveka. Saṅkara Miśra, Bhagiratha Thakkura and Raghunātha Śiromāṇi explain the subtleties in them. The self exists because it is perceived by every one through 'I'-consciousness or self-consciousness (ahānāpratyaya). The object of 'I'-consciousness is not unreal like the object of determinate perception according to the Buddhist. Nor is it doubtful, since it is never contradicted. Nor is it inferred, since one who does not perceive a mark (liṅga) of it

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343 NV., iii. 1. 14. 344 NVTT., i. 1. 10. 345 NS., NBh., iii. 1. 12-14; NVTT., iii. 1. 13, p. 389. 346 Atmacittāvve kim pramāṇam? Pratyakṣam eva tāvatt, aham iti vikalpaṣaya prāṇabhūṛṇmātrasiddhatvā. ATV., p. 743.
perceives it directly. Nor is 'T'-cognition recollection, since what is not perceived cannot be remembered. Nor is it due to a beginningless series of subconscious impressions (vāsanā), which are not produced by prior perceptions, because there is no causal relation between such impressions and 'T'-cognition. If the self is unreal, though it is an object of 'T'-cognition, then blue etc. are unreal, which are objects of external perception. If they are real, because they are objects of external perception, then the self also is real, because it is an object of internal perception. Both internal perception and external perception are equally valid. If the self is said to be an object of illusory perception, then also it is real, because an illusion implies valid perception of a substance to which an unreal attribute is attributed. If the self is unreal, because it is not an object of external perception, then a cognition also is unreal, because it is not an object of external perception. If a cognition is real because it is self-aware (svasaṅahvedana), then the self also is real, because it is known by mental perception (mānasa pratyakṣa).

If 'T'-cognition (ahampratyaya) has body for its object, then Maitra will have cognition of self in Caitra's body. If it has its own body for its object, what is the meaning of 'own'? 'Own' is 'non-different from itself'. If one's own body is the object of 'T'-cognition, then it is non-different from the self. But the body is not the object of 'T'-cognition. When the self is the knower and its known object, there is 'T'-cognition. It is the substance and material cause of a cognition. The body, the sense-organs and cognitions are different from the knowing self. The body is the object of 'this'-consciousness, while the self is the object of 'T'-consciousness. The body, the senses, and cognitions and feelings exist for the sake of another being (parārtha) viz., self, but the self is independent and self-existent. The body is the vehicle of enjoyments and sufferings of the self (bhogāyatana). The sense-organs are the instruments (karaṇa) of knowledge, while the self is the agent (kartā) of knowledge. The body and the senses are unconscious, and act under the

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466 ATV., pp. 743-46; ATVD., p. 745; ATVK., p. 747.
guidance of the conscious self. So it cannot be identified with them. The self is the knower or the agent of the act of knowledge. Knowledge is an act of knowing. The self is the knowing agent. It is different from cognitions as their substrate and material cause. They cannot be their own substrate and material cause. The self is different from cognitions, which are its effects. Just as blue and other objects are different from the cognitions which apprehend them, so the knowing self is different from its cognitions. Just as objects are manifested in cognitions, so the self is manifested in 'I'-cognition or self-consciousness. The self is a permanent knower. It is not a series of momentary self-cognitions (ālayavijñāna) different from a series of momentary object-cognitions (pravṛttivijñāna). It is an object of 'I'-cognition.

The permanent self is known by recognition like a stable jar. Just as a jar perceived in the past is recognized as the same jar at present, so the self is recognized as the same self as it was perceived in the past. Recognition of personal identity proves the permanence of the self. The Buddhist argument that recognition of personal identity is due to the fact that the original perception (cause) and the subsequent recollection (effect) belong to the same series is wrong, because they are definitely known to have the same knower.

The recognition of the same object also proves the permanence and identity of the self. 'I remember the same jar which I perceived in the past'. This is the nature of the experience. The Buddhist argues that it is due to the fact that the original perception is the material cause (upādāna) of the subsequent recollection (upādeya); that it does not prove the permanence of the self. The Nyāya replies that this argument is wrong, because the permanent self is the material cause, and the impression (saṃskāra) of the preceding perception is the efficient

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834 NBh., i. 1. 11; iii. 1. 1-3, 6; NVTT., iii. 1. 1, pp. 352-53; ATV., pp. 747-48.
838 Tasyāh kriyātvenānubhāyamānāya bhinnasya kartur ahani jñānāmyanubhavāt. ATV., p. 749.
879 ATV., p. 750.
875 Sa evahum iti pratyabhijñānām jñātur abhedasādhakam. ATV., p. 754. ATV., p. 752. ATV., p. 753.
876 Pārvaparadhiyām ekakartṛkatuyā viniścayaḥ. ATV., p. 752.
cause of the recollection. The preceding perception is not its cause. If a preceding similar momentary cognition were the material cause of a succeeding recollection, then a preceding similar perception of a teacher would be the material cause of a succeeding recollection of a pupil.\textsuperscript{373} The causal relation, the Buddhist argues, between a preceding perception and a subsequent recollection together with non-apprehension of difference (bhedāgraha) is the cause of recollection. In the same series of cognitions there is non-apprehension of difference of bodies. So there is a causal relation between a preceding perception and a subsequent recollection in it. But there is apprehension of difference of the bodies of a teacher and a pupil. So a preceding perception of a teacher is not the cause of a subsequent recollection in a pupil. But the Buddhist believes in a person (jātismara) who can remember the perceptions of his past life. He admits a causal relation between a perception in his past life and a recollection in his present life, though the difference between his two bodies is perceived. Further, a child who does not perceive the difference between his body and the body of his unperceived father, would have recollection of a similar perception of his father. Further, on the Buddhist theory, the two halves of a jar and a jar cannot be related to each other as cause and effect, because they are two different series existing at different moments. It may be argued that they are cause and effect, because they exist in the same substratum. But this argument is wrong, because they do not exist in the same space and time which are momentary. If their existence in the same substratum is imaginary, then a jar may exist in yarns, a cloth may exist in halves of a jar, and a cognition and a body may exist in the same substratum. Hence the Buddhist explanation of recollection is wrong.\textsuperscript{374}

If wood is said to be the material cause of charcoal because they are of the same kind, what is the nature of sameness (samatā)? It is either homogeneity (sājātya), or coexistence in the same space (sādesya), or coseriality (ekasantānativa) or belonging to the same series, or relation of material cause and effect (upādānopādeyabhāva), or capacity (yogyatā) for being

\textsuperscript{373} ATV., p. 752.
\textsuperscript{374} ATV., p. 757; ATVK., pp. 757-58; ATVP., pp. 788-59.
recognized as material cause and effect. Sameness is not homogeneity, because it is the relation of material cause and effect, and so is determined by itself. It involves *petitio principii* (*ātmāśraya*). Sameness is not coexistence in the same space, since momentary things cannot exist in the same space which is momentary. Sameness is not coseriality, because both homogeneous and heterogeneous things may belong to the same series. Coseriality does not mean being produced by the same series, because colour and taste both are produced, according to the Buddhist, by the same series of colour. An antecedent colour is the material cause of a succeeding colour, and the efficient cause of a succeeding taste. Sameness is not the relation of material cause and effect. If it were so, then recognition of identity among cognitions would be the effect of cognitions, which are its material cause. This would involve *petitio principii*.

Sameness is not capacity for being recognized as related as material cause and effect. If the capacity is a special power (*sāktivisesa*), it does not differ at different moments, so that a cognition of one moment will not be the material cause of the cognition of the next moment. The special power being the same at different moments, which are incapable of being determined, causal relation will be undetermined. There being no causal order, effects will be uncaused, and human efforts to produce effects will cease. If cognitions as cognitions be said to be the cause of recognition of personal identity, then an antecedent cognition of a teacher will be the cause of recognition of personal identity in a pupil. The special power in different series is not different owing to the absence of distinctive characters. The specific power in different series is not heterogeneous, because it is contradicted by perception. The cognitions of blue in a teacher and a pupil are not perceived to be heterogeneous in kind, though they belong to two different series. Hence recognition of personal identity is not due to homogeneity, coexistence in the same space, belonging to the same series, causal relation, or capacity for being recognized as causally related.

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834 Nāpi pratisatānānayaḥ (*sāktivisesaḥ*) viśeṣābhāvat. ATV., p. 764. ATVK., p. 763.
Generic causes produce specific effects with the aid of different auxiliary causes. If recognition of personal identity be due to difference in auxiliary causes, then such difference is the oneness of the knowing self in each body. Caitra cannot recognize the personal identity of Maitra. One knowing self is different from the other knowing selves.\footnote{Aṣṭa tarhi sahaṅkāribhedāni niyama iti cet. Sa evaṅkāh karteti givate. Tatkārttyāṃ bhinnakārttkebhhyo vyāvartate. \textit{ATV}, p. 772. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 774.} It is the material cause of perception and recollection.

The distinctive character (viśeṣa) in each person’s recognition of personal identity is either (1) the cognitions being endowed with different causal powers at different moments, or (2) the cognitions belonging to series of cognitions, or (3) the cognitions belonging to a series depending on an auxiliary cause, or (4) the specific nature of an assumed auxiliary cause. The first alternative is not possible. If different cognitions in a person have different causal powers, then recollection will be quite different from the original perception, so that there will be no recollection of a previous perception, and no recognition of personal identity. The second alternative would make a pupil’s recollection of a teacher’s perception possible, because both belong to series of cognitions. The fourth alternative also cannot regulate the recollection of a previous perception by the same self. It would make Maitra’s recollection of Caitra’s perception possible. The third alternative is right. The one permanent self is the auxiliary cause of the recollection of a previous perception by the same self.\footnote{\textit{ATV}, p. 772; \textit{ATVK}, p. 773; \textit{ATVD}, p. 774.}

The relation of material cause and effect is not a condition of the recognition of personal identity. If it depends on a condition in order to produce it, that condition is oneness of the knowing self. Does an omniscient person admitted by the Buddhist recognize his cognitions as known by one self? Or does he not recognize them to be so? In the first alternative, oneness of the self is proved, which is different from momentary cognitions, relates them to one another, and recognizes them to be its own cognitions. If the knowing self is momentary, then it cannot know its momentary cognitions and interrelate them to one another. So it is permanent and different from its fleeting
cognitions. If an omniscient person does not recognize his cognitions as known by one self, then such recognition is not due to mere cause-effectrelation. If in the presence of a cause its effect is not produced, then it is not due to that cause only. If the cognitions are related to each other as cause and effect, but there is no recognition of personal identity, then it is not due to the causal relation among them. It may be argued that there is recognition of personal identity, but that it is not valid, so that one knowing self cannot be proved by it. Then an omniscient person's recognition of personal identity also is illusory like that of an ordinary person. It is absurd to maintain that the former is valid, while the latter is illusory. If the causes are non-different, their effects must be non-different. If the causal relation among the cognitions is the cause of illusory identity in an ordinary person, then it is the cause of illusory identity in an omniscient person also. The argument that the identity of the self of an omniscient person is real owing to the apprehension of difference among the cognitions, while that of an ordinary person is illusory because of the non-apprehension of difference among them, is wrong, because he also apprehends the difference among the object-cognitions (pravṛttivijñāna). It cannot be argued that objects are manifested to consciousness as different from one another, but not their cognitions, because difference among the cognitions also is apprehended. Though the difference among objects is not manifested to consciousness in a serial perception of an object (dharavahiprathyakṣa), the difference among the cognitions is apprehended. If the non-apprehension of difference (bhedāgraṇa) among cognitions as cognition is said to be due to false attribution of non-difference (abedāropā), though the difference among the cognitions is apprehended, then wood, charcoal and ashes will be recognized as non-different from one another because they are earthy. But they are not recognized as identical with one another. So the unity of the self is not due to false attribution of non-difference to different cognitions.373

The argument that non-apprehension of difference of self-cognitions (ālayabhedāgraṇa) is the cause of the recognition of personal identity, even though the difference among

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373 ATV., pp. 774-775; ATVK., pp. 775-78; ATVP., pp. 778-78.
object-cognitions is apprehended is wrong. (1) Are self-cognitions or cognitions of 'self' (ahamāspada) different from object-cognitions (pravṛttivijñāna)? Or, (2) are they many self-cognitions emerging from an unknown source within the same series of object-cognitions? The first alternative is not tenable, because two independent series of self-cognitions and object-cognitions are not experienced. Even if they are experienced, they are not related to each other as material cause and effect, and so cannot produce recognition of identity of self. If self-cognitions and object-cognitions were so causally related, self-cognitions of Caitra and object-cognitions of Maitra would be related to each other as material cause and effect. If an antecedent self-cognition and an antecedent object-cognition both were the material cause of a succeeding object-cognition, then one cognition would subsist in many cognitions as its material cause, and one whole would subsist in many parts, which is denied by the Buddhist. If the whole is not real and cannot subsist in many parts, then one object-cognition cannot subsist in a self-cognition and an object-cognition, which are said to be its material cause. A self-cognition, the Buddhist may argue, is the material cause of an object-cognition, and an object-cognition is its efficient cause, so that an object-cognition does not subsist in a self-cognition and an object-cognition. This argument is invalid, because, according to the Buddhist, whatever is an efficient cause is a material cause as already explained. If a self-cognition is the material cause and an object-cognition is the efficient cause, then one self-cognition being destroyed, all series of self-cognitions will be destroyed, there being no difference among the series. If there is a cessation of a series, then the last cognition will not produce any other cognition, and will consequently cease to exist, since existence consists in producing effects. The last cognition being non-existent, the preceding cognition also would be non-existent. There would be no causal relation among cognitions, which is regarded by the Buddhist as the cause of recognition of personal identity. If self-cognitions different from object-cognitions be regarded as the material cause of object-cognitions, then these self-cognitions will require other self-cognitions as their material cause, and so on to infinity. Thus there will be an infinite series of self-cognitions. If a self-cognition does not depend upon any other
self-cognition, it cannot produce object-cognitions. If it depends upon another series of self-cognitions, then it will lead to an infinite series of self-cognitions. If there are two independent series of self-cognitions and object-cognitions, there can be no interrelation among them and recognition of identity of self among them. If a self-cognition and an object-cognition both are the material cause of another object-cognition, then the parts can be the material cause of the whole which is denied by the Buddhist. 488

The second alternative is not tenable. The ālayavijñāna is not a series of emergent self-cognitions within a series of object-cognitions. The non-apprehension of difference among such self-cognitions is either due to their mere nature (śvarūpa) or due to their objects (viṣaya). If it is due to their mere nature, it is either due to the preceding self-cognition alone or due to it and an object-cognition together. The cognition of the past self is not possible without knowing its difference from the present self and the future self. Even if it is somehow possible, it may account for recognition of identity of self among self-cognitions, but not for that among object-cognitions. That non-apprehension of difference is not due to object-cognitions has already been proved. The non-apprehension of difference among self-cognitions is not due to their objects. What is the object of a self-cognition? It is either a form, or another entity, or a non-entity? An object of a cognition is not its form. The Buddhists do not admit the self to be another entity, which is the object of a self-cognition. Even those who admit it recognize difference in the objects of self-cognitions owing to the false attribution of contradictory characters. If they are non-existent, then there is no difference in the objects of self-cognitions. In other words, there is one self. Udayana has proved their non-existence in refuting subjective idealism. The object of a self-cognition is not unreal. It has already been proved to be real. If objects of self-cognitions are not real, there can be no non-apprehension of real difference among them, because there is no real difference among unreal entities. Nor can there be non-apprehension of difference whose existence is unreal and attributed, because it involves self-contradiction. If difference is

488 ATV., pp. 779-80; ATVK., pp. 780-81.
not real but attributed, there can be no non-apprehension of it. Nor can there be non-apprehension of difference among entities to which non-existence is attributed, because if their non-existence is attributed, their existence is real. If non-apprehension of indescribable difference among entities which are not the substrates is the cause of false attribution of non-difference, then there will be non-difference everywhere. The recognition of personal identity is not due to non-apprehension of difference among self-cognitions. It is due to the identity of the self.

The Buddhist cannot account for recollection. Does a present perception produce a future recollection? Or does an impression produced by it produce a recollection? Is the impression imperceptible or perceptible? If it is imperceptible, does it exist at that time only? Or does it continue to exist? If it is perceptible, is it a series of subsequent cognitions, or different from it, or a series of particular cognitions of the same kind? Is the particular series (vīśeṣa) a mere effect of the perception or a special kind of a series of percepient cognitions? A past perception of blue which occurred long ago cannot produce a future recollection of blue without an intermediate activity. An unproduced cognition and a completely destroyed cognition have no differentiating character. There is no other perceptible distinctive character, because it is contradicted by non-perception. Nor is the distinctive mark a mere effect of a past perception. A mere effect of a past perception irrespective of its object 'blue' cannot be a recollection of 'blue'. If a past perception irrespective of its object could produce a recollection of blue, then recollection of an unperceived object would be possible, and there would be no recollection of a perceived object. But, in fact, there is recollection of a perceived object only.

Therefore, an imperceptible impression produced by a past perception is the cause of recollection. An impression with its material cause is stable. It produces recollection at some other time in the same self. The permanence of an impression subsisting in the permanent self must be admitted to be the cause of recollection at some other time. There can be no

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**Notes:**

331 ATV., pp. 787-88, 790; ATVK., pp. 788, 790.
332 ATV., p. 791.
imperceptible impressions according to the Buddhist. If they are cognitions, they cannot be unperceived. If they are not cognitions, they cannot be the material cause of recollections which are cognitions. If they are imperceptible cognitions in another series, recollection, pleasure etc. also in it cannot be perceived. Perception and recollection must belong to the same self.\textsuperscript{333}

The self is the substrate of consciousness, which has been shown not to be a property of the body, the sense-organs, and manas, the internal organ.\textsuperscript{334} Consciousness is not a property of an object. If it were conscious, there would be no recollection after consciousness was destroyed after destruction of it. It is not conscious of its own position, and of pleasure and pain produced by it. It does not move with intelligent purpose. The self is the substrate of consciousness, while an object is the object of consciousness. Cognition inheres in the self, but not in an object.\textsuperscript{335} Consciousness is not an essence but an accidental property of the self. It acquires consciousness owing to its conjunction with a body and manas. It is devoid of consciousness in trance, deep sleep, and liberation.\textsuperscript{336}


The Nyāya concept of the self is the same as that of the Vaiśeṣika. It is a substance, which has cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, merit and demerit. The first six qualities are transitory. The last three qualities are permanent. They subsist in the permanent self. Pleasure and pain are feelings, which are apprehended by a cognition, which is different from them. Cognition is apprehension, while feelings are apprehended. Desire is produced by the recollection of an object which produced pleasure in the past. Aversion is produced by the recollection of an object which produced pain in the past. Volition is produced by desire and aversion. It is an effort of the self to attain a good or pleasant object, or to reject an evil or painful object. An impression is a

\textsuperscript{333} ATV., p. 804.
\textsuperscript{334} Ate, pp. 254-57.
\textsuperscript{335} NBh., iii. 2. 42. NM., pp. 540-41; IIP., pp. 84-85.
\textsuperscript{336} TR., p. 130.
permanent, imperceptible residuum produced by a past perception, which is a cause of recollection. Merit and demerit also are permanent, imperceptible qualities produced in the self by free right and wrong actions, which are causes of pleasure and pain. Merits and demerits of the previous birth called karma determine the birth of the present body.388  

The self is a substance, because it is the inherent cause of cognitions. It is ubiquitous, because it is an eternal and incorporeal substance. It is incorporeal, because it is motionless. It is motionless, because it is eternal, perceptible, and the substrate of perceptible qualities. If it were not a substance, it would be devoid of qualities. If it were not ubiquitous, there would be no motion of a distant wind, whose non-inherent cause is conjunction with a self endued with merits and demerits. If it were endued with movement, it would be corporeal. If it were corporeal, it would not be the substratum of cognition, pleasure and other qualities which are perceived by us. If it were not ubiquitous, the manas would not be proved to be atomic, since the succession of its actions is due to its conjunction with the self, which accounts for the succession of cognitions.389  

The self has relative freedom of the will. Its freedom is limited by the divine will. Its free exertions bear fruit only when they are favoured by God. They become ineffective when they are not favoured by God. The self cannot command success of its free actions without the aid of God. It earns merits by free righteous actions, and earns demerits by free unrighteous actions. But its freedom is limited by the merits and demerits acquired by free actions in the past births, though it can counteract them by free actions in future. Hence the freedom of the finite self is subject to the divine will and the Law of Karma.390  

The self is an object of mental perception. It is an object of intuition born of meditation. This is the view of the Nyāya, 'I know'. This experience is undeniable. The self is the principal object of this experience. An object is its indirect

388 NS., NBh., iii. 2. 64, 69-72; iii. 2. 36, 45.  
389 ATV., pp. 809, 811-12.  
390 NS.; NBH., iv. 1, 9-21. IIIP., p. 86.
object. The self is perceptible, because it is perceived by 'T'-consciousness or self-consciousness.\(^{381}\)

The Nyāya refutes the rival views. Śāṅkara regards the self as pure consciousness, which is neither the subject nor the object of perception, but directly manifested to intuition. It is not manifested by produced knowledge, like a jar, but by itself. It is directly revealed by itself, not by any knowledge. Its consciousness is natural, and not acquired or due to its relation with consciousness produced by a sense-organ. It is intrinsically conscious and self-luminous. Jayanta adduces the following arguments against this doctrine. There is no experience which is not produced by an external sense-organ or manas. So the self must be manifested by an experience which is produced. If the self is manifested by nature, then other selves also should be alike manifested. Further, if the self is manifested, then it is apprehended; and if it is apprehended, it is apprehended as an object of apprehension. If it is not apprehended as an object, it cannot be perceived. It is self-contradictory to argue that the self is not perceived, but directly apprehended.\(^{383}\) If it is not an object of perception, there can be no immediate intuition of it. If the conscious self is manifested, it must be apprehended as an object. Hence the Advaita Vedānta doctrine of the knowledge of the self is not tenable. The self is not pure consciousness beyond subject and object. But it is the substrate of consciousness; it is the subject of consciousness or knower and the object of self-consciousness. There is no subject-objectless consciousness.\(^{383}\)

Prabhākara is an exponent of the doctrine of triple perception (trīpuṭipratyākṣa): Every act of perception manifests itself, its object, and its subject or self. The self is perceived as the subject (jñātā) of every perception of an object. It is never perceived as an object (jñeya),\(^{384}\) 'I know the jar'. In this perception there are 'T'-consciousness (āhaṁvīti), object-consciousness (viṣayavīti), and consciousness of cognition (svaṁvīti). Cognition is known as cognition, and not as an

\(^{381}\) Ahampratyayaagamyatvād ātmā pratyakṣah. NM., p. 430. NV., iii. l. 1; Nīḥ., l. 1. 3.

\(^{383}\) Pratyākṣaḥca na bhavatyaparokṣaḥca bhavatītī citram. NM., p. 432.

\(^{383}\) NM., pp. 431-32.

\(^{384}\) Ātmā grāhakatayaṁca prakāṣate na grāhyatayā. NM. p. 432.
object of cognition. Jayanta refutes Prabhākara's view. If
the self is perceived, it is perceived as an object of perception.
'This is a jar'. In this perception the jar only is perceived.
'I know the jar'. In this perception 'I' and knowledge both
are perceived. The self is an object of internal perception. If
cognition is perceived by internal perception, it is perceived
as an object. Cognition is not self-luminous; it does not appre-
hend itself, as Prabhākara thinks. Cognition is manifested or
apprehended by another cognition or internal perception. The
self is not perceived by external perception of an object as its
subject, but by mental perception as an object. It can be both
subject and object of internal perception. It is a fact of expe-
rience, and cannot be challenged. It is the nature of the self to
be both subject and object of self-consciousness. The Law of
Nature (vastuṇākti) is unchallengeable.

According to Kumārila, the self is a conscious substance;
as a substance it is the object of knowledge, and as conscious it
is a knower. It is unconscious and conscious both. Its un-
conscious part is the object, and conscious part is the subject.
Jayanta refutes Kumārila's view. If the self as a substance is
the known object, then the conscious self cannot be the knower.
The self as a substance is similar to a jar as a substance. It is
unconscious like a jar, and so cannot be a conscious knower.
The self as a knower, it may be argued, is the subject; but
there is a difference in it due to the condition (upādhi) of an
object; the knower of an object is the object of knowledge,
while the pure knower is the subject; elsewhere there is pure
knowledge of an object. 'This is a jar'. In this knowledge
the cognition apprehends an object only, and does not refer
to the self. 'I know the jar'. Here there is the knowledge of
an object as qualified by its cognition, or the knowledge of an
object as well as the knowledge of a cognition. Then what
knowledge apprehends the self or 'I'? In the very same cogni-
tion one part cannot be valid, and another part, invalid. Hence

393 Sahvit samvittayaiva sahvedyā, na vedyatayā. NM., p. 432.
394 NM., p. 432.
395 Dravyādīśvarūpam ātmano grāhyam jñātrāpyaḥ ca grāhakam.
NM., p. 430.
396 Jñātraivā grāhakas tathāpi viṣayopādikrto' styeva bhedah,
guṭāvaccimā hi jñātra grāhyā suddhaiva tu jñātra grāhikā. NM.,
p. 430.
the knowledge of the knowing self must be admitted. The self cannot be, Kumārila argues, subject and object of the same cognition. But even if there is a difference in the self due to the condition of an object, this difficulty cannot be obviated. In the knowledge ‘I know the jar’ the knowledge of the ‘jar’ and ‘knowledge’ apprehend the object; so the knowledge of ‘I’ must apprehend the self. It is pure and unconditioned, and subject and object both, so that the difference of subject and object is not due to the difference of states in the self. ⁴⁰⁹ If there is no difference in the pure knowledge, then the difference of subject and object is not real. This admission amounts to the Buddhist doctrine of idealism (vijñānavāda) which regards cognitions alone as real, and difference of subject and object as unreal and illusory. Hence Kumārila’s view is wrong. ⁴⁰⁹

The self is eternal and devoid of origin and end. It has pre-existence, and undergoes transmigration until it achieves liberation. It leaves a dead body, and assumes another body. Birth is association of the soul with a body. Death is its dissociation from a body. An organism is born and perishes, but a soul is unborn and immortal. If it perishes with the body, it cannot reap the fruits of its free right and wrong actions and the consequent merits and demerits, and it experiences joys and sorrows which are not earned by it, and thus the Law of Karma is nullified. ⁴⁰¹

A sperm and an ovum of the parents are the material cause of a body which is produced out of them. Merits and demerits of the soul which ensouls it are its instrumental cause, and God is its efficient cause, who associates it with the soul. The sexual intercourse of the parents only is not the cause of the birth of a body. When the peculiar merits and demerits of a soul are present, there is birth of a body, which is a fit vehicle for the experience of their fruits in the shape of enjoyments and sufferings. When they are absent, there is no birth of it. So they are its instrumental cause. The different kinds of bodies are born owing to the different kinds of merits and demerits

⁴⁰⁹ Tarhi sa eva ‘duddho’ vaśisyate grāhyagṛhakaś ceti nāvasthākṛtasa tadbhedalḥ samarthitaḥ svāt. NM., p. 431.
of different souls. When they are completely destroyed, there is no more birth. They are extirpated by true knowledge of the self. The same unseen agencies (adṛśta) cannot be the cause of birth and death. Death is due to the maturation of some karmas and their fructification and destruction. Rebirth is due to the other potencies of actions (karmāśaya) which have not yet matured and borne fruits. If a body were generated by the physical elements independently of the unseen agencies, there would be no cause of death of a body. When delusion is completely destroyed by true knowledge of the self, a soul purged of attachment does not perform any bodily, verbal and mental actions which produce merits and demerits and consequent rebirth. Since there are no causes of rebirth, the soul is not associated with any other body.

The Jaina regards merits and demerits as peculiar qualities of atoms, which impel them to combine with one another, and produce a body into which a manas enters. The soul has experience through the mind-body-complex impelled by merits and demerits of the component atoms. This view is wrong, because the atoms cannot be divested of them, which are their peculiar qualities, and consequently may produce a body for a soul in the state of liberation also. If merits and demerits were qualities of manas, then it would not have conjunction with, or disjunction from, a body, and the same merits and demerits would be the cause of its entrance into a body and departure from it, which is not possible. So the unseen agencies are not qualities of manas. They are qualities of the soul, which are the cause of transmigration.

A new-born baby feels emotions of joy, fear and sorrow, which are inferred from their actions which are their expressions. These emotions are produced by recollections of similar objects which were perceived frequently in his past birth, because he did not perceive them in his present birth. Emotions are due to recollections, both of which are his experiences in his present birth. Recollections are due to subconscious impressions.
(saniśkāra) which are retained by him in his soul. Impressions are due to repeated perceptions which must have occurred in his past life. Hence his soul had pre-existence. The emotional expressions of a new-born baby are not like the opening and closing of the petals of a lotus, which are due to disjunction and conjunction of them generated by movements, which, again, are due to the action of heat, cold and weather of the rainy season. The baby’s emotions are not uncaused, but due to recollections of frequent past experiences of the previous birth. Likewise a new-born baby is attracted to his mother’s breast, because he feels a desire to suck her milk. Desire is due to recollection of an object that produced pleasure in the past. So the baby’s desire for milk must be due to recollection of objects which were frequently perceived in the past birth to appease hunger of his previous body. It is the same soul, which departed from its past body, assumed its present body, recollects the appeasement of hunger by certain objects repeatedly perceived in the past birth, and desires to suck the breast of the mother. The same soul continues in the past body and the present body. The baby’s desire to suck his mother’s breast depends upon the recollection of its conduciveness to pleasure due to the revival of the impressions by his merits,—produced by the knowledge of conduciveness of food to pleasure acquired in his past birth. It cannot be explained without the hypothesis of the past birth. But it may be regarded as a reflex action. The new-born baby, it may be argued, sucks his mother’s breast without prenatal frequent experience of taking food and satisfying hunger, even as iron is attracted to a magnet automatically without prior frequent attraction to similar magnets. His action does not depend upon the prior knowledge of conduciveness of a means to pleasure. But the attraction of iron to a magnet is not without a cause. If it were uncaused, a stone and other things also would be attracted to a magnet. The uniform attraction of iron to a magnet points to a regular cause. So the repeated approach of a hungry new-born baby to his mother’s breast is an expression of a desire for milk, which must depend upon the recollection due to the frequent experience of taking food and appeasing hunger. The uniform action of the baby on a uniform

447 NS., NBh., NV., iii. 1. 19-21.
object is produced by a uniform cause, which is the recollection of a frequent uniform perception. It is not an automatic or reflex action. It is a voluntary action with deep roots in the past birth. Modern psychology does not consider it to be a voluntary action, but an instinctive action which is a racial habit.

III

ETHICS


Voluntary actions spring from faults (doṣa), which are attachment (rāga), aversion (dveṣa), and delusion (moha). They are the springs of action (pravartanā). They move the self to action. They are motives of action in the sense that they are the efficient causes of action. The idea of the end (prayojana) induces the self to act in order to realize it. It is the final cause of action. Attachment for an agreeable object and aversion to a disagreeable object spring from delusion. Delusion is false knowledge of the body, the sense-organs and manas as the self. It is the erroneous identification of the self with the mind-body-complex. It is the root cause of attachment and aversion. What satisfies the appetites of the body is regarded as favourable to the self, and what thwarts them is regarded as unfavourable to it. But, in fact, nothing is attractive or repulsive to it, which is quite distinct from the body. All emotions and passions are various forms of attachment and aversion, which arise from delusion. They are due to perversion of the intellect. They bind the self to the cycle of births and deaths (samsāra).

When false knowledge (mithyājñāna) is destroyed by true knowledge of the self (tattvajñāna), faults (doṣa) are destroyed. When faults which are the springs of action are destroyed, actions (pravṛtti) cease to be performed. When actions cease, merits and demerits are not produced, and there is no rebirth.

408 N.S., NBh., iii. 1. 22-24.
(janma). When rebirth ceases, pain disappears. Absolute cessation of pain is liberation (apavarga). Thus, true knowledge of reality is the cause of liberation, while false knowledge is the cause of bondage.\textsuperscript{449}

All emotions and passions are forms of attachment, aversion and delusion. Attachment includes lust (kāma) or attraction to the other sex for sex-gratification, avarice (matsara) or unwillingness to part with one’s inexhaustible possessions or desire to deprive others of the benefit of public wells and the like without any selfish gain, desire for appropriation of others’ property (sṛṣṭi) by lawful means, the will to live and be re-born (trṣṭa), and greed for others’ wealth and desire to misappropriate it by immoral means (lobha). Aversion includes anger (krodha), envy (irṣyā) or intolerance of ordinary advantages of others, jealousy (asūyā) or intolerance of the superiority of others, malevolence (droha) or desire to do harm to others without power to do so, and revengefulness (amarśa) or intolerance of harm. Delusion includes error (mithyājñāna) or false knowledge of one object as another object, doubt (sahsaya) or indefinite knowledge of an object as possessing either of two contradictory attributes, self-conceit (māna) or false ascription of nonexistent qualities to oneself, and wilful negligence of duty (pramāda). Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Jayanta mention these emotions as forms of attachment, aversion and delusion. Viśvanātha includes desire to deceive others (māyā) and boastfulness (dambha) or desire to display one’s superiority by hypocrisy in attachment, self-abasement (abhimāna) due to inability to take revenge on an offender in aversion, and fear (bhaya) due to the encounter of a calamity and impotence to overcome it and sorrow (śoka) due to loss of cherished objects which are irretrievable in delusion. He includes disparagement of superior persons by ascribing worthlessness to them in self-conceit (māna).\textsuperscript{450}

There are two kinds of desire (icchā): (1) desire to realize an end; (2) desire to attain the means to it. The end is pleasure and the absence of pain. The knowledge of the end is the cause of a desire to attain it. Pleasure and the absence of pain

\textsuperscript{449} Tattvajñānat apavargat, mithyajñānat saṁsārat. NBh., i. 1. 9.
\textsuperscript{450} NBh., NV., NSV., iv. 1. 3. NM., pp. 500-01.
are the psychological ends of action (puruṣārtha), which are consciously sought by the self by its effort or volition. Desire for these ends does not depend upon any other desire. Desire for the means depends upon desire for the end. The knowledge that the means is conducive to the realization of the end or good is a cause of desire for the means. The desire to act (cikīrṣā) depends upon the knowledge that something can be done by the volition of the self, the knowledge that it is conducive to the good, and the knowledge that it is not conducive to greater harm than good.411 The knowledge that an action will produce greater harm than good counteracts the desire to act. Some regard strong aversion as a counteracting condition (pratibandhaka) of a desire to act.

Aversion gives rise to a voluntary action to avoid its object. It depends upon the knowledge that the object to be avoided is conducive to harm, and the absence of the knowledge that it is conducive to greater good. The knowledge that the object is harmful to the self is a positive condition of aversion. The knowledge that it is conducive to its greater good is a counteracting condition of aversion.412

Udayana defines volition as effort or conscious activity of the self. It springs from desire, which arises from a cognition. The knowledge of a particular object gives rise to a desire, which produces a volition. The knowledge of a desire is not necessary for the production of a volition. It produces a volition by its mere existence.413 A volition or the knowledge of a volition is not the cause of another volition. But the mere existence of a desire is the cause of a volition.414

Viśvanātha mentions the conditions of volition. Volition for the attainment of an object (pravṛtti) depends on the following conditions: (1) desire to act; (2) the knowledge that the action can be done by the self’s volition; (3) the knowledge that

413 Nu cecchā jñāta pravatnajanam, kintu sattayā. NKSP., V, p. 82. Pravṛttihector icchāyā jñānayonitvāt. NKS., v, p. 81. NKS., v, 7.
414 NKS., v, p. 102.
it is conducive to its good; and (4) the perception of the material out of which the object is to be produced. All these conditions are necessary for the production of a volition for the attainment of an object. If any of them is absent, a positive volition (prāṛttii) does not occur. First, there must be a desire to act. Secondly, there must be a knowledge that the action is capable of being accomplished by the self’s volition. If it is lacking, a positive volition cannot occur. No sane person makes an effort to produce rain or catch hold of the moon. A person exerts himself to attain those objects which are within his power to attain. Thirdly, a person must have a knowledge that the object is conducive to his good. A person always exerts himself to realize his good. He never consciously wills to attain an evil. In a fit of rage or despair a person commits suicide, because he considers it to be good at the time in a pathological condition of mind, or because he does not consider it to be a great evil in an abnormal condition of mind. In normal conditions the knowledge that suicide is an evil is present, but in an abnormal condition it is absent. Fourthly, there must be perception of the material out of which the desired object is to be produced. Volition depends upon the knowledge that its object is conducive to good and not injurious to the agent at the time under particular circumstances. What is good to a person in one condition is not good to him in a different condition. A hungry person desires to get food, while one who is full has aversion to food. A person does not desire to taste honey mixed with poison, because he has a knowledge that the object is conducive to good but productive of greater harm. But a person desires to cook food, because he has a knowledge that it is productive of greater good than evil. He willingly undergoes the necessary pain which is entailed by the action for his greater good. Aversion or the knowledge that the object of aversion is injurious to the agent is the cause of a negative volition (nivrtti) to avoid it.

According to Prabhākara, the knowledge that an act can be accomplished by an effort of the self is the cause of a positive

\[14\] Cikīrṣā kṛtyādhyeṣṭasādhanatvamatiśtatā. Upādānasya cādhyakṣaṁ pravrtytān janakāṁ bhavet. BP., 150-51.
\[15\] SM., pp. 471-75; E.H., pp. 44-46; HP., pp. 87-89.
\[16\] BP., 151. SM., pp. 491-92.
volition (pravṛtti).\textsuperscript{411} The knowledge of its conduciveness to his good is not its cause as the Nyāya maintains, for then there would be a positive volition to bring down the moon, which cannot be accomplished through an effort of the self. The Nyāya replies that the knowledge that an act is incapable of being accomplished through an effort of the self is an obstacle to a positive volition. The knowledge of feasibility of an act through the self’s volition, Prabākara argues, is the cause of a positive volition, rather than the absence of an obstacle. If the knowledge that an act is incapable of being accomplished through the self’s volition is considered to be an obstacle, then the knowledge of its conduciveness to its good qualified by the absence of the obstacle should be considered to be the cause of a positive volition. But this violates the parsimony of hypotheses. It is better to consider the knowledge of feasibility of an act through the self’s effort as the cause of a positive volition. If the absence of an obstacle and the knowledge of conduciveness of an act to good both are regarded as the cause of a positive volition, then also too many assumptions are made unnecessarily. The Nyāya contends that, according to Prabhākara, a person will eat food mixed with honey and poison, because he has a knowledge that the act can be accomplished through his volition. Prabhākara urges that the knowledge of feasibility of an act through the self’s volition due to the knowledge of its conduciveness to its own good or the fulfilment of its own desire, and the knowledge that it is not productive of greater harm to it is the cause of a positive volition.\textsuperscript{412} A person whose hunger is satisfied does not make any effort to eat food, because desire for food is not a qualification of his self. The Nyāya replies that Prabhākara’s explanation is not simple. It is better to explain a positive volition by the knowledge of feasibility of an act through a volition of the self, which is known to be conducive to its good and not productive of greater harm to it than to explain it by the knowledge of its feasibility through the self’s effort produced by the knowledge of its conduciveness to good attended with the knowledge of its being non-productive of greater harm.

\textsuperscript{411} Kārvatvarjānāmī pravartakam iti guravah. TCS., B.I., Calcutta, 1901, pp. 6-7. SM., p. 471. Cikīrṣā svakrtisādhyatājñānamūrya. TCS., p. 16. SM., p. 472.

\textsuperscript{412} Svavidaśanavattāpratisandhānajanyah hi kārvatājñānam pravartakam. TCS., pp. 67-78. SM., pp. 472-73.
Prabhākara replies that the Nyāya contention is not right, because conduciveness to good and feasibility of an act by the self's effort cannot be known at the same time, since being an attainable end and being a means to it are contradictory. An end is not yet attained, but a means is already attained. So they can be known at the same time. A person cannot know the same object to be both accomplished and unaccomplished at the same time. So the means and the end are known at different times. The Nyāya replies that there is no contradiction between the same object being a means and an end at different times, and that it can simultaneously be known to be a means and an end; that it is better to maintain that the knowledge of feasibility of an act through the self's effort, coexisting with the knowledge of its conduciveness to its good without being productive of greater evil is the cause of a positive volition.

Voluntary actions only are the objects of moral judgments. Non-voluntary actions which do not involve the operation of free will are non-moral. Righteous actions produce merits, and unrighteous actions produce demerits. Merits and demerits are the subjective causes of pleasures and sufferings respectively. Man has relative freedom subject to the control of God. His voluntary actions are determined by his own free will (puruṣa-kāra). The Nyāya seems to advocate the doctrine of self-determinism: The agent himself determines his volition without being constrained by extraneous circumstances. The self freely wills and acts to realize its own good. Its volition is always apprehended as determined by the self. It is apprehended as a qualification (viśeṣaṇa) of the self.

The end (prayojana) is the idea of the object which induces a person to act. The object which is definitely known to be attainable or avoidable is the cause of a voluntary action. The attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the primary ends. The means to them are the secondary ends. The ideas of the primary or secondary ends induce a person to act. They

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426 TCS., 79-84; SM., pp. 475-76.
427 Ṭāṅgāche ṭaḷavandamāṇaḥubandhiṣṭasādhanaṁ sati kṛtisaṁdyavatāṭājanasya tatra hetutvāt. SM., p. 476. Ibid., pp. 471-77. TCS., pp. 144-47.
428 E.H., pp. 74-75.
429 Niyam artham adhikṛtya pravartate, tat prayojanam. NS., i. 1. 24.
are the final causes of actions, while passions or faults are their efficient causes. The secondary ends vary in different places, times and circumstances and with different persons. If an object was perceived to yield pleasure in the past, a similar object is expected to yield pleasure under the same circumstances. An end, it is argued, cannot induce a person to act, because it is not known to be existent or non-existent. This argument is wrong. The end is not unrealizable (asādhya) like a sky-flower. Nor is it realized (siddha) like an existent object. It induces a person to act as an idea of an object to be realized. The Nyāya believes in psychological hedonism, but not in ethical hedonism.

The Nyāya recognizes three kinds of actions: (1) bodily; (2) verbal; and (3) mental. Vātsyāyana mentions the following righteous bodily actions, viz., charity (dāna), succouring the distressed (paritrāṇa), and social service (parricaraṇa); the following righteous verbal actions, viz., truthfulness (satya), beneficial speech (hitavacana), agreeable speech (priyavacana), and study of the scriptures (svādhyāya); and the following righteous mental actions, viz., compassion (dayā), dispassion for worldly enjoyments (asphā), and faith (āraddhā) in future life. These actions produce merits. He mentions the following unrighteous bodily actions, viz., cruelty (hīṁsā), theft (steya), and forbidden sexual intercourse (pratīṣṭhāna); the following unrighteous verbal actions, viz., mendacity (anṛta-), injurious speech (ahita-), harsh speech (parusāvaca), insinuation (sūcanā), and irrelevant talk or gossip (asambaddhavacana); and the following unrighteous mental actions, viz., malevolence (parāroha) or doing harm to others, greed for others' property (paradravyābhisāpa), and absence of faith in future life (nāstikya). These actions produce demerits. The Nyāya recognizes the purity of mind and the purity of conduct as essential to moral life. It recognizes both egoistic and altruistic virtues. It regards impurities of mind and external conduct as vices. We should be pure in mind, words, and bodily actions, and cultivate purity of motives and intentions and overt behaviour.

Righteous actions are enjoined by the Vedas or prescribed

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426 NM., p. 563. NVTT., NSV., i. 1. 24.
427 NBh., i. 1. 2. NM., p. 499.
428 IFP., pp. 90-91.
by the Divine Law, and lead to the attainment of heaven. Unrighteous actions are prohibited by the Vedas or forbidden by the command of God, and lead to the attainment of hell. Rightness and wrongness of actions are determined by injunctions and prohibitions. The performance of right actions leads to heaven, and the commission of wrong actions leads to hell. Heaven is the highest happiness.  

God is the author of the Vedas. They embody the commands of God in the forms of injunctions and prohibitions. They are the expressions of the intentions of the trustworthy speaker about the distinction between right actions and wrong actions. Moral laws are positive commands of God imposed on the individual selves for their good, which are expressed in the Vedic prescriptions. They are not impersonal laws or categorical imperatives demanding fulfilment by human wills. What is commanded by God is right. What is forbidden by God is wrong. He is the creator and promulgator (vaktā) of moral laws, and the source of moral authority. 

Merits and demerits produced by righteous and unrighteous actions are dispositions of the self (ātmasaṁskāra), which persist in it until they bear fruits. They are not destroyed without producing enjoyments and sufferings respectively. They are destroyed by the last pleasure and pain respectively. There are no voluntary actions, mental, verbal and bodily, which do not produce merits and demerits. They are virtues and vices, excellences and flaws of the self. Both bind the self to the bodily and empirical life. Hence we should persistently aim at the extermination of merits and demerits both, and the attainment of transcendental perfection of the self.

15. Liberation (Apavarga) and its Means.

Liberation is absolute cessation of pain and rebirth. The body, the sense-organs and manas are the causes of pain.

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429 Kṛṣṇa eva hi vedō yathā paramesvaragocarāh. Svārthādvāraiva tātparyāh tasya svargādīvad vidihaḥ. NKS., v. 10.
430 NM., pp. 355 ff. NKS., v. 15.
431 NM., p. 500.
Pleasure is invariably accompanied or followed by pain. All these are pain in a derivative sense. At the time of dissolution the soul becomes free from pain. Its merits and demerits remain dormant during dissolution at the will of God, and are activated again at the time of creation, when it assumes a body fit for their maturation and consequent enjoyments and sufferings. So during dissolution the soul has relative freedom from pain and possibility of its recurrence and rebirth. But liberation is the soul’s absolute freedom from pain. The Nyāya view of liberation is the same as the Vaiśeṣika view. Liberation is the complete extinction of the special qualities of the soul, viz., cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and impression. The soul is free from cognition in the state of liberation. Cognition is produced by the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, the conjunction of a sense-organ with manas, and the conjunction of manas with the soul. But the body, the sense-organs and manas are destroyed in liberation. So there can be no cognition in it. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition also are experienced in connection with the body. When it is destroyed, they cannot be experienced. In fact, they are accidental qualities of the soul, while ubiquity is its natural condition. Liberation consists in the soul’s existence in its natural condition. It is the existence of the soul in its transcendental condition free from its empirical qualities. It is not in the nature of cognition. Its cognition is an adventitious quality. It has no natural consciousness, which is different from adventitious cognitions. In liberation the soul is devoid of merits and demerits, and consequently free from pleasure and pain. There is no transcendental bliss beyond empirical pleasure and pain due to the sense-object-intercourse.

But Bhāsarvajña, a Śaiva Naiyāyika, maintains that liberation consists in the experience of eternal happiness. The relation

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442 Tadatvayantavimokṣo pavargah. N.S., i. 1. 22. Tena duḥkhena janmanā' tyatam vimukτī apavargaḥ. NBh., i. 1. 22. NVTT., p. 162. Cp. BG., iv. 20.

443 Navānām ātmagupānām buddhisukhadubhkhecchādvesaprayatnādharmādvahasanikārāyām nirmāloccchedo' pavargah. NM., p. 508. VS., v. 2. 18.


of this happiness and knowledge, though caused, is not destroyed owing to the absence of its cause. So this happiness is always experienced in liberation. Liberation is absolute cessation of pain attended with eternal happiness.\textsuperscript{485}

Tutāta Bhaṭṭa regards liberation as manifestation of eternal happiness (nityasukhābhivyakti). Vātsyāyana criticizes a doctrine that liberation is the experience of eternal happiness. Perception, inference, or Vedic testimony does not prove its existence. What is the cause of the manifestation or experience of eternal happiness? Is it eternal or non-eternal? If it is eternal, the experience of eternal happiness is eternal, and there is no difference between a bound soul and a released soul. If it is non-eternal, it cannot be produced by the conjunction of the soul with manas, since it cannot produce pleasure without the aid of merit (dharma). Merit is non-eternal. What is its cause? If its cause is trance due to meditation, it is destroyed at the time of dissolution. If it is destroyed, it cannot produce the experience of eternal happiness. If it is not experienced, it is as good as non-existent. There is no proof for the existence of unexperienced eternal happiness. Merit is caused, and so destroyed. Merit born of meditation also is destroyed, since whatever is produced, is destroyed. So it cannot be the cause of the experience of eternal happiness. If its experience never ceases, its cause must be eternal. If its cause is eternal, then a bound soul and a released soul equally experience eternal happiness, and there is no distinction between them. In bondage the soul’s relation to the body may be said to be an obstacle to the experience of eternal happiness. This argument is wrong. The body and the sense-organs are the organs of the experience of pleasure, and cannot be an obstacle to it. There is no proof for the experience of happiness of a disembodied soul. Further, pleasure and pain are always accompanied by each other. Even in release there can be no unalloyed happiness. If there is experience of eternal happiness in release, then there must be eternal body, sense-organs, and intellect of a released soul. But this assumption is irrational. So the assumption of eternal happiness in release is irrational.\textsuperscript{487}

\textsuperscript{485}Anena sakhe na viśītāś tāntirik duṣkhaniyātīḥ purusasya mokṣay. NSār., p. 41. NTD., p. 293.
\textsuperscript{487}NBH., l. 1. 22. KV., p. 8.
Udayana criticizes the doctrine in the following manner. Eternal happiness is not real, because it is contradicted by appropriate non-perception. It is never perceived. If it is eternal, it cannot be an object of desire and volition. A person never desires what he always possesses. Eternal happiness cannot be accomplished, because it is eternal. It cannot be modified, because it is unmodifiable. It cannot be refined, because it is unrefinable. It cannot be attained, because the soul has an eternal relation to it. It is not to be known, since its knowledge is eternal. If its knowledge is non-eternal, it cannot be produced when the body and the sense-organs which produce it are destroyed. If it is produced in their absence, they are not its cause. If they are not the cause of knowledge, all will be omniscient, since the conjunction of the soul with manas is present in them all. If happiness and its knowledge both are eternal, the relation between them cannot be said to be produced but indestructible, like destruction. It is either a being or a non-being. It is not a negation, since it has no counter-positive entity. If it is a positive entity, it must be destroyed, if it is produced. There is no proof for the existence of eternal happiness and eternal knowledge. They cannot be said to be attained by the destruction of ignorance (avidyā). The Nyāya admits liberation to be absolute destruction of pain including ignorance. But it does not admit liberation to be eternal experience of eternal happiness. If a person is motivated by attachment for eternal happiness, he may be actuated by attachment for worldly happiness also. Attachment is bondage. It should be completely extirpated. Happiness is always produced by objects acting upon the sense-organs. It is produced by the recollection of pleasant objects also. Recollection is produced by impressions. In release there is neither body nor sense-organ nor impression. So it is not the eternal experience of eternal happiness.488

The Advaita Vedānta regards the self as in the nature of transcendental, self-luminous consciousness and bliss, which is concealed by ignorance (avidyā) in bondage. When ignorance is completely destroyed, its pure consciousness and bliss shine forth. Ignorance is destroyed by true knowledge (vidyā) of the

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nature of the self, which is the one transcendental Self distinct from the empirical self determined by the mind-body-complex. The Advaitist ridicules the Nyāya concept of release as extinction of consciousness as equal to the condition of a stone, which is not covetable. Bondage is better than release, because it abounds in misery relieved by occasional pleasures. Some enjoyment is better than none. This Advaitist view is wrong for the reasons stated above. Eternal happiness is neither perceived nor inferred. Nor is it proved by scriptural testimony. If it declares 'Brahman is knowledge and bliss', it declares also 'Pleasure and pain do not touch a disembodied soul'. Bliss (ānanda) signifies the absence of all pain. If the so-called eternal happiness is self-luminous, it should be experienced in bondage. The Ātman or Brahman is self-luminous, and cannot be concealed by avidyā which is insignificant. Hence release is not the experience of bliss.\footnote{NM., pp. 508-10.}

Tridāṇḍins regard release as extinction of the individual self in the blissful supreme self, due to the destruction of the subtle body, which determines its pleasure and pain.\footnote{Tridāṇḍinastu ānandamayaparamātmani jivātmalo yo mokṣaḥ. TCIA., B.I., p. 182.} Gaṅgeśa refutes this view. The destruction of the subtle body is not the supreme end, because it is the negation of the means of pain. Then, again, when the limiting adjunct is destroyed, the jīva limited by it is not necessarily destroyed. One’s own destruction cannot be the supreme end. Further, the jīva is non-different from eternal Brahman, and so cannot be destroyed. It cannot be different and non-different from Brahman,—different in bondage and non-different in release,—because it involves self-contradiction. Hence the view of the Tridāṇḍi Vedāntists is wrong.\footnote{TCIA., B.I., p. 182.}

The Sāṁkhya regards liberation as the existence of the self in its intrinsic nature, when the activity of prakṛti ceases for it because of its discrimination of itself from prakṛti. It regards release as absolute cession of pain like the Nyāya. But discriminative knowledge, the Nyāya urges, can abide neither in the self nor in prakṛti. It cannot abide in the self, because it is unmodifiable. Nor can it abide in prakṛti, because it is

\footnote{NM., pp. 508-10.}

\footnote{Tridāṇḍinastu ānandamayaparamātmani jivātmalo yo mokṣaḥ. TCIA., B.I., p. 182.}

\footnote{TCIA., B.I., p. 182.}
unconscious. Further, prakṛti is either active by nature or inactive by nature. In the first alternative, its activity never ceases, and, consequently, the self cannot be released. In the second alternative, the self cannot be bound, since the evolution of prakṛti accounts for its enjoyments and sufferings. Hence the Sāṁkhya view of liberation is wrong.

The Cārvāka regards release as independence, and bondage as dependence. Independence involves cessation of pain. So far the Cārvāka view is right. But independence as lordship is not the supreme end, since there are different degrees of lordship, higher and lower, and there is rivalry among lords of equal power. Hence the Cārvāka view of mokṣa is wrong.

Some Buddhists (Yogācāras) regard release as a series of cognitions untainted by ignorance. Gaṅgeśa criticizes this view. Destruction of ignorance is the negation of pain, and so the supreme end of volition. But a series of cognitions cannot be regarded as the highest good. Cognitions cannot be produced without a body, which is destroyed during release. The mind only (cittamātra) is not their cause, for then the body would be needless. There can be no cognitions in release, since their causes are non-existent at the time. Further, the soul being an impermanent series of momentary cognitions, it cannot be first in bondage and then released, and meditation on the four noble truths (bhāvanācatuṣṭaya) cannot generate any excellence in it and produce pure cognitions. Hence liberation is not pure cognitions untainted by illusion.

Some Buddhists (Mādhyamikas) regard release as the extinction of the soul, since it is the cause of pain. Gaṅgeśa refutes this view. The extinction of the self is not the highest good, because it is different from the negation of pleasure and pain. The self is said to be a series of momentary cognitions, which are destroyed without any effort. So the destruction of the self cannot be the supreme end of volition. Is the soul a series

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442 SDS., p. 209.
443 Pāraṇatraṁ bandhaḥ svātaṇtryaṁ mokṣaḥ. SDS., p. 209.
444 SDS., p. 209.
445 Amupaṭalva cittasaṅsatār apavargaḥ. TCIA., B.I., p. 182.
446 Ibid., p. 182.
447 All is pain; all is individual; all is momentary; all is void.
448 SDS., p. 208.
449 Duḥkhahetutvenātmamo hānaṁ eva muktiḥ. TCIA., p. 182.
450 TCIA., p. 183.
of cognitions or different from it? If it is the former, the Nyāya also maintains that release is the extinction of cognition, pleasure, pain and the like. If it is the latter, it is eternal and indestructible. Further, no one strives for the extinction of his soul which is the dearest of all.441

The Jaina regards release as the soul's transportation to a supramundane sphere on the destruction of its veil of subtle karma-matter. The Jaina view is right, if the veil that covers the soul is made of merit and demerit. The Nyāya admits that release consists in the destruction of merit and demerit, which are not subtle atoms (pudgala), but qualities of the soul. But the soul is ubiquitous and devoid of movement. Is it corporeal or incorporeal? If it is corporeal, it is either composed of parts or devoid of them. If it consists of parts, it is non-eternal. If it is destroyed, it is not rewarded for its righteous actions and punished for its unrighteous actions. If it is partless, it is like an atom, which is corporeal and partless, and hence its qualities are imperceptible like those of an atom, which is not true. If it is incorporeal, it is incapable of movement, for a corporeal substance only is capable of movement. Hence the Jaina view is wrong.442

The Prābhākaras regard release as absolute prior negation of pain.443 It implies non-recurrence of pain in future in consequence of complete destruction of its causes. Prior negation being without origin, it may be argued, is incapable of being produced by volition. But though prior negation of pain does not depend upon our volition, yet it can be brought about by volition, because destruction of demerits which are the cause of its counter-positive entity can be effected by volition. Demerits are destroyed by true knowledge of the self which can be attained by volition. When demerits are destroyed, there is prior negation of pain, which can thus be indirectly accomplished by volition.

Ganḍeṣa refutes the Prābhākaras' view. The destruction of demerits is not in itself the supreme end. It is necessary in so far as it is the cause of non-production of pain. But it has no use because prior negation of pain cannot be brought about

441 SDS., p. 207.
442 SDS., pp. 206-09.
443 Prābhākarāstu ātyantikadhākha-prāgabhāvo muktih. TCIA., p. 173.
by volition. Hence release is rightly said to be due to true knowledge of the self, which destroys faults; the destruction of faults destroys actions; the destruction of actions destroys rebirth; the destruction of rebirth destroys pain.\footnote{NS., I. 1. 2.} Otherwise non-production of false knowledge would not be the cause of non-production of pain, which would be wrong. Even supposing that prior negation of pain can be accomplished by volition, it produces pain in a released soul, which is its counter-positive entity, by its nature, even as prior negation of a jar produces it by its nature. If there is no production of pain in a released soul owing to the absence of demerits, body and other auxiliary causes, then prior negation of pain, being without origin and end, becomes absolute negation (atyantābhāva) of pain, and ceases to be its prior negation. It is absolute negation of pain, which is different from its prior negation, and not capable of being destroyed. Hence the Prābhākara’s view of release is not sound.\footnote{Apavargaḥ samānādhikaraṇa-duḥkha-prāgabhāvāsahavṛttiduḥkhadhvamāśaḥ. TCIA., p. 156.}

Gaṅgēśa regards release as the complete destruction of pain which does not coexist with the prior negation of pain in the same self.\footnote{Duḥkhasādhanadhyavamsasya svato puruṣārthatvā. TCIA., p. 171. Duḥkha-prāgabhāvo’stevam tasyaiva duḥkkhāntādārśepatvena puruṣārthātvaḥ. Ibid., p. 170. Ibid., pp. 167-68.} It is the destruction of all pain with its causes and non-production of future pain. It may be argued that the destruction of pain cannot be the supreme end of volition, because past pain is already destroyed, future pain cannot be destroyed, and present pain is destroyed without any human effort by a contradictory quality, like past pain. This argument has no force. Though other sufferings are destroyed without any human effort, future sufferings can be destroyed or prevented by the destruction of false knowledge with its potencies by true knowledge of the self which stops rebirth. The destruction of merits and demerits stops production of future pain. But the extinction of them is not an end in itself, but as a means to the highest good. The prior negation of pain is an end as non-production of pain, which is capable of being realized by volition through true knowledge and right action.\footnote{NS., I. 1. 2.} The Nyāya does not believe
in embodied release (jīvanmukti). The merits and demerits, which are not destroyed by atonements, are worn out by enjoyments and sufferings, and not by true knowledge of the self.⁴⁴⁸ So there cannot be embodied release.

True knowledge of the self (tattvajñāna) ultimately leads to liberation through the destruction of merits and demerits and the consequent cessation of rebirth. It destroys egoism (ahānikāra) or false identification of the self with the body. It dispels delusion and destroys attachment and aversion which arise from it. The soul can be known by listening to the scriptures, reflection and meditation. Eightfold yoga practices such as sense-restraints, observances, posture of the body, breath control, withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects, fixation of attention on parts of the body, meditation and trance are aids to the attainment of true knowledge. Faith in the Vedas, mental tranquility, endurance of physical pain, dispassion for worldly enjoyments, and concentration prepare the mind for the advent of true knowledge. Attachment is decreased by discerning the faults of the objects of enjoyment. It is removed by detachment. False knowledge is destroyed by true knowledge. Faults (doṣa) are attenuated by meditation on the contrary excellences (pratipakṣabhāvanā). When they are destroyed, actions are not conducive to bondage and rebirth. The performance of prudential duties (kāmyakarma) for the fulfilment of desires leads to heaven. The commission of forbidden acts or sins leads to hell. Both bring about bondage. The performance of daily obligatory duties (nityakarma) and occasional duties (naiṣmitika karma) saves an aspirant from sins of omission. Liberation cannot be achieved by the performance of duties,⁴⁴⁹ which can lead to heaven, which is non-eternal. The practice of yoga, austerities, the performance of duties, and abstention from sins are subsidiary to the acquisition of true knowledge. Release can be achieved by true knowledge or intuition of the self.⁴⁴⁹ It destroys false knowledge, and incapacitates merits and demerits from producing their effects like burnt seeds in the absence of passions (doṣa). The accumulated

⁴⁴⁸ Antarānaprāśaṃcittakarumaṇāṇaḥ bhogakārāṇāyaḥ tvā. Ibid, p. 171.
⁴⁴⁹ Na hi karmasādhyo mokṣaḥ. NM., p. 523.
merits and demerits of the past birth (prāktana karma) are held by some to be destroyed after producing the happiness of mental tranquillity and contentment born of yoga, and the bodily pain of enduring cold and heat and other austerities. They are held by others to be destroyed after producing appropriate pleasures and sufferings experienced by an aspirant through different bodies, sense-organs and internal organs created by him by supernatural powers born of meditation. They are held by others to be destroyed at once by the intuition of the self. Persons in all stages of life including householders can attain release through true knowledge directly, and not through merit (dharma). There is no embodied release. True knowledge is not discursive knowledge but immediate intuition of the self, which can destroy false knowledge with its potencies and stop rebirth.441

IV

Theology


Gautama devotes only three cryptic aphorisms to the concept of God, which are interpreted in different ways by the commentators. "God is the cause, because actions of the individual souls are found to be fruitless. No, fruits are not achieved in the absences of their actions. They are not the cause of their fruits, because they depend upon the favour of God".442 Vātsyāyana interprets the aphorisms in this manner. Uddyotakara also follows him in his interpretation. He adds that God is the efficient cause, while atoms are the material cause, their conjunction is the non-inherent cause, and the merits and demerits of the individual souls are the auxiliary cause of the world. Vacaspati opines that these aphorisms indirectly deny that God is the material cause of the world,

441 NS., i. 1, 2, 22; iv. 2. 38-47; NBh., i. 1, 2, 22; iv. 2. 42, 45, 46; NVTT., p. 479-71; ATV., pp. 935-36; NM., pp. 513-24. TCIA., pp. 183-88.
that it is a phenomenal appearance of Brahman, and that God is its efficient cause independently of the merits and demerits of the individual souls; and that they affirm that God dependent on the souls' unseen agencies (adṛśta) is the efficient cause of the world, while atoms are its material cause. God's being the efficient cause of the world is implied in Vātsyāyana's interpretation, because the fruits of the souls' actions and consequent merits and demerits are enjoyments and sufferings produced by gross external objects, which are created by God out of the atoms of earth, water, fire and air in accordance with the souls' deserts.

Vātsyāyana regards God as a particular soul endued with qualities. He has merit, knowledge, intuition and sovereignty. He is devoid of demerit, false knowledge and inadverrence. He has eight kinds of supernatural powers (aiśvarya) due to his merit and intuition. His merit is the result of his volition, and directs the merits and demerits of the individual souls and the physical elements to produce their effects.

Uddyotakara invests God with eternal knowledge, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction. His knowledge, desire and volition are untainted by afflictions and unrestricted in regard to their objects. He is devoid of demerit, and, consequently, of pain. He has no aversion and detachment, since he is devoid of pain. His lordship is eternal and independent of merit. God's merit mentioned by Vātsyāyana does not generate his sovereignty, but activates and directs the accumulated merits and demerits of the finite souls to produce their fruits. In fact, he is devoid of merit. His lordship is eternal. His knowledge is one, eternal and intuitive. He has perception of all past, present and future objects, which is not produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with objects. His knowledge is not derived from inference and testimony. He is devoid of impressions and recollection. He has one eternal

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463 NBh., NV., NVTT., iv. 1. 19-21.
464 Guṇavaiśāṃtaḥ ātmāntaram iṣvaraḥ. NBh., iv. 1. 21.
465 Saṅkalpānaāśrayaḥ cāya dharmāḥ pratyātmanvṛttin dharmādharmaśaṅcayān bhūtāni ca pravartayati. NBh., iv. 1. 21.
466 Saṅkhyaśāmyāparimāṇaprthaktyaśāmyāparimāṇaṁ viśvamāsanāḥ gāḍhāḥ. NV., iv. 1. 21.
467 Icchā tu vidyate' kliṣṭā' vyāhatā sarvārtheṣu yathā buddhiḥ. NV., iv. 1. 21.
cognition which apprehends all objects. If he had many cognitions apprehending different objects like human cognitions, they would be produced by a body and sense-organs. If his knowledge is produced by a body, it is either eternal or non-eternal. If it is non-eternal, it must be due to merits and demerits like a human body. If he is subject to them, he is not the Lord. If the divine body is eternal, it is contradicted by perception. We always perceive a mortal body. Hence the knowledge of God must be regarded as eternal. He has not a series of successive cognitions. His will is eternal and unrestricted, and yet limited by the Law of Karma and the Law of Nature. He is neither bound nor released. He is not bound, since he is devoid of pain. He is not released, since he was never bound. He is one. There are not many Lords. If there were many, their one. There are not many Lords. If there were many, their wills would come into conflict with one another, and arrest their actions. If one overpowers others and executes his will, he becomes the Lord.

Vācaspati admits that God's knowledge, desire, volition and sovereignty are eternal. But his supernatural powers are not eternal according to Vātsyāyana who regards them as dependent upon his merit. But there is no proof for the existence of merit in him. It is objected that God is all-pervading and incorporeal, and therefore motionless, so that he cannot create the world. God's agency, Vācaspati replies, consists in his knowledge, desire and volition. He has immediate knowledge of the atoms and merits and demerits of the finite selves, desire to create the world, and will to do so. His volition creates motion in the atoms. So he can be the efficient cause of the world. His knowledge is intuitive, non-sensuous and untainted by ignorance. He is omniscient, omnipotent, compassionate and independent; and yet he creates the world full of happiness and misery according to the Law of Karma and the Law of Nature.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa recognizes five qualities of God, viz., knowledge, happiness, desire, volition, and merit, which are eternal, and regards him as free from pain, aversion, demerit, impression,

488 NV., iv. 1. 21.
489 Tasya hi jñānakriyāsakti nitye iti aśvaryaḥ nityam. Cetano- payayam paśaṇgrahasvabhāvo'pi vastavaśbhāvam anursiondhyamānāḥ karmāśayānurodhena jagadvaiśryam vidhatte. NYTT., iv. 1. 21.
false knowledge, attachment, aversion, and delusion. His knowledge is eternal. If he ceased to know for a single moment, the world and human society would collapse, because they are sustained by his knowledge, desire and will. His knowledge is not destroyed at the time of dissolution, nor created at the time of creation, because there is no cause of its destruction or creation. It is one and eternal. It is neither successive nor simultaneous, because it is one. If it were successive, God would be devoid of knowledge for some time, and would dissolve the world for that duration. God is omniscient; his one cognition apprehends all objects, past, present, future, subtle and remote at a glance. If he had many cognitions of different objects, they might be simultaneous. His knowledge is immediate, intuitive or perceptual. Hence it is neither inferential nor representative. It does not depend upon the sense-organs and the conjunction of manas with the soul, because it is eternal and he is devoid of the sense-organs and manas. God's happiness is eternal and independent of the sense-object-intercourse and the mind-soul-contact. His desire and volition also are eternal and independent of the mind-soul-contact. His volition consists in a fiat of will (saṅkalpa). Though his will is eternal, it is sometimes directed to creation, sometimes to preservation, and sometimes to destruction of the world. Hence there is neither perpetual creation nor perpetual dissolution. His merit also is eternal, and maintains the moral order. It helps the souls' merits and demerits bear their fruits. God is a particular soul untouched by affictions, merits and demerits, their maturations, and potencies of actions. 476 He is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. He is bodiless and yet the creator of the world. He is one, eternal, ubiquitous, omniscient, omnipotent, compassionate creator, preserver, destroyer and moral governor of the world. 477 He is the promulgator of the moral codes and the creator of the Vedas which embody his injunctions and prohibitions. He is the embodiment of moral perfection. The Moral Law emanates from his moral will. He is the creator of convention which conjoins words with their meanings. He creates the world out of compassion for creatures. He is the efficient cause of

477 NM., pp. 200-02.
the world, while atoms are its material cause. He occasionally
incarnates to redeem the world from the burden of sins. He
is the merciful Lord and saviour of humanity. He is not the
creator of atoms and individual souls, which are coeternal
with him.\footnote{NMS., pp. 204, 232-40, 246, 269.} \footnote{ATV., p. 869; ATV.K., pp. 869-70. Na iyani
tyatvam eva jñānat-
varyavasthāpakā, karuṇā svāya
tyatvam eva jñānatvavyavasthāpakā. ATVP., p. 871.}

Udayana establishes the eternity and validity of divine
knowledge. It is contended that God's knowledge is not
eternal, because a cognition is always produced by the sense-
object-intercourse and the like. Udayana replies that there is
no invariable concomitance between a cognition and non-eternity,
and that there is no contradiction between eternity and cogni-
tion. The absence of cognition is not eternity, and the
absence of eternity is not cognition. A cognition is a cognition
because it apprehends an object, and not because it is non-
eternal; both eternal and non-eternal cognitions apprehend
their objects. Hence divine knowledge is eternal.\footnote{Yatharthānubhavo mānam ana
pekaśatayeye. NKS., iv. 1.} \footnote{Na ca grhita
tagrāhātvam, āvaraṇa jñānasāya, tadiya jñānāntarāgocara-
tvāt viśvasa. NKS., iv. p. 9. NKSP., iv. p. 9.}

(1) The Mīmāṃsāka contends that valid knowledge appre-
hends an object which was not apprehended before. But God's
knowledge is eternal and apprehends all objects; so it appre-
hends what was apprehended by God before, and is, conse-
sequently, invalid. Udayana rejects the Mīmāṃsāka definition
of valid knowledge, and defines it as the apprehension of an object
in its real nature.\footnote{An illusion at the second moment appre-
hends an object which was apprehended before, but is not valid.
A serial perception apprehends what was perceived before, but
is valid. So novelty (anadhigata) is not the criterion of valid
knowledge. It is the right apprehension of an object, which
is independent of any other knowledge. Further, divine know-
ledge does not apprehend an object which was apprehended by
him before, since it is one eternal cognition. It is the right
apprehension of all objects as distinct from recollection.} (2)
The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsāka contends that divine knowledge is
invalid, because it does not produce cognizedness (jñātātā) in
its objects; that a cognition apprehends that object in which it
produces cognizedness. Udayana replies that there is a natural subject-object-relation (viṣaya-viṣayi-sambandha) between a cognition and its object, so that the former apprehends the latter. If there is no such relation (viṣayata), cognizedness cannot be produced by a cognition in its object. The cognition of a jar cannot produce cognizedness in a cloth. Even if a cognition produces cognizedness in a present object, it cannot produce it in a past or future object, which must remain unknown. Divine knowledge apprehends past, present and future objects by its very nature owing to the cognitive relation (viṣayata) without producing cognizedness in them. Cognition is not an act; so it does not produce any peculiarity (atiṣaya) in its object. (3) The Mmāhśaka contends that divine knowledge is not valid knowledge (pramāṇa), because it being eternal is not a result (phala) of a means of valid knowledge; that it is not a means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), because it does not produce valid knowledge; and that God is not the agent of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), because he is not the abode of valid knowledge. Udayana replies that valid knowledge is the right apprehension of an object in its real nature; that the agent of valid knowledge is its substrate; and that validity is the absence of the absence of relation to valid knowledge. Divine knowledge apprehends all objects in their real character, and is, therefore, valid. God is the substrate of this valid knowledge (pramāṇa). Its validity is unrestricted, because God is not devoid of the absence of relation to valid knowledge. (4) It is contended that God is omniscient and so knows human illusions with their objects, so that his knowledge is illusory. If he does not know human illusions with their objects, he is not omniscient. Udayana replies that God knows a nacre as a nacre, though he knows the human illusion of silver in a nacre. So his knowledge of the illusion is not invalid. When we know that our knowledge of a nacre as silver is illusory, it is valid. Hence divine knowledge is not invalid.
that divine knowledge is neither perception, nor inference, nor testimony, because it is not produced by the sense-organs, marks (liṅga), or verbal statements. Udayana replies that it is perception, because it is immediate valid knowledge; and that human perception only is immediate knowledge produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with objects.488

God transcends the atoms, time, space and ether which are coeternal with him. He is the efficient cause of the world, but not its material cause. He is the architect of the world. He creates it out of the atoms in time and space by conjoining them with one another, and destroys it by disjoining them from one another. He creates it through his immediate knowledge of the atoms and the souls' merits and demerits, desire to create, and volition without a body.489 He creates motion (spanda) in them by a fiat of will and conjoins them, and produces dyads and gross physical objects. He preserves the world by his will, and destroys it by his will. Creation and destruction are periodical.

But God creates the world of manifold objects in accordance with the merits and demerits of the finite souls for their enjoyments and sufferings. He adjusts the world to their moral deserts, and makes it a proper sphere of their moral life. God's freedom is limited by the Law of Karma, which emanates from his moral will. So this limitation is self-limitation. The variety of the world is due to the variety of merits and demerits of the finite souls. If God created the world independently of the finite souls' merits and demerits, then he would be guilty of cruelty, the Moral Law would not be obligatory, and the finite souls would never be liberated. If he created miseries for the finite souls irrespective of their demerits, he would be cruel. If the virtuous were not rewarded with happiness, and the vicious were not punished with misery, the Moral Law would cease to be obligatory. If the finite souls did not exhaust their merits and demerits by appropriate enjoyments and sufferings, and eradicate the potencies of their actions by true knowledge, they would never be released.490 God's freedom is not indepen-

489 Karmabhīr vinā jagadvaicīrtvānnapatteḥ karmānāirpeksyapakṣe'pi śvārasya nirdaya-karmacodanānarthahāyaḥ anirimkoṣaprasāngasca. NM., p. 203.
dent of the Law of Karma. It consists in directing the merits and demerits of the finite souls. God cannot violate the destiny carved out by the finite souls by their own free actions, and so cannot but direct their demerits to bear their inevitable consequences. Though he is omnipotent, he cannot alter the nature of things. His freedom is limited in these two respects. God is not the creator of the finite souls. He transcends them in this sense. They have limited freedom to obey or infringe the Moral Law, perform righteous or unrighteous actions, earn merits or demerits, and experience proper retributions. They cannot escape from the operation of the Law of Karma.

God and the finite souls belong to the genus of soul. They are substances endowed with qualities. Non-eternal knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and impression are the acquired qualities of the finite souls. Eternal knowledge, happiness, desire, volition, and merit are the qualities of God or the supreme soul. Some deny happiness and merit to God. Both finite souls and the supreme soul possess the generic qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction. Both are ubiquitous and eternal substances. God is not the creator and destroyer of the finite souls. They are neither parts, nor qualities, nor modes of the divine substance. They are not unreal appearances of one impersonal Brahman. They are real and different from God who is not their immanent essence.

But God is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect, while the finite souls have limited knowledge, limited powers, and moral imperfections. God is free from pain, false knowledge, attachment, aversion, delusion, inadvertence, demerit, and impression, while the finite souls possess them all. God has eternal supernatural powers, while the finite souls are ordinarily devoid of them, but can acquire them to a limited extent through meditation and austerities. God has eternal moral perfection, while the individual souls can acquire moral purity by severe moral discipline and true knowledge. God is

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435 Kṣetrajñănāṁ niyatim alanghayatā śivarasya nādharmaya śakyonaśaddhiḥ. NVTT., iv. 1, 21, p. 419.
436 Atiśayitamahimāpi na vastūnāṁ sāmarthyam anyathākarmān pārayati. Ibid, p. 419.
neither bound nor liberated, while the finite souls are first bound by their own free actions, and then achieve release. God is never in bondage, and consequently cannot attain liberation.

God is like father to the individual souls. He treats them as a father treats his children. He teaches them the Moral Law, rewards them for their virtues, and punishes them for their vices. God is the moral guide of the finite souls, and the dispenser of the fruits of their actions. He cannot override the Law of Karma. He lays down moral injunctions and prohibitions for the good of mankind, and favours their free actions with their fruits. Without his favour free human actions are ineffective. The Nyāya advocates Deism.

But it is objected that God cannot guide the finite souls' merits and demerits, because he is not directly or indirectly related to them, and that their deserts (adṛṣṭa) cannot bear fruits without being supervised by him. Some Naiyāyikas maintain that there is an eternal relation among the finite souls, which being not denied here holds between them and God also. Just as ubiquitous ether is related to all corporeal objects, so all-pervading God is related to the finite souls. Others maintain that God is related to the minds (manas) of the finite souls, and thus indirectly related to them. There must be some relation of God to the finite souls, so that he may supervise their merits and demerits. Unintelligent moral deserts cannot produce their effects without divine guidance.

Uddvyotakara discusses some theories of creation. It is objected that an action is motivated by the idea of attaining a good or avoiding an evil. God has no unfulfilled desire or unrealized end. He is completely free from pain, and so cannot be actuated by the idea of avoiding an evil. He has no good to attain, and no evil to avoid. (1) Some maintain that God creates the world for sport (kṛiḍā). But this view is not right. A person feels discomfort, and plays to remove it and get pleasure. But God is absolutely free from pain, and so cannot indulge in creative sport for pleasure. God is endowed with

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eternal bliss, Jayanta argues, and has no need for creative play for the sake of pleasure. (2) Some maintain that God creates the world to display his infinite powers and glory (vibhūtikhyā-pana). But God is eternally perfect, Uddyotakara argues, and does not pass from imperfection to perfection. He does not gain anything by creation or lose anything by lack of it. (3) God creates the world by his nature. Creative activity follows from his nature. But if it follows from his nature, it may be objected, then it will never cease, and there will be no dissolution. His nature will produce all effects simultaneously, and there will be no order in creation. There will be no diversity of the world due to the uniform nature of God. Uddyotakara replies that the diversity of the world follows from the intelligent nature of God, who creates it with the aid of the finite souls’ merits and demerits which mature at different times. (4) Jayanta Bhaṭṭa maintains that God creates and destroys the world out of compassion (anukampā) for creatures. He creates the world, heaven and hell for the finite souls’ enjoyments and sufferings in accordance with their virtues and vices. He destroys the world, and makes their moral deserts dormant to give them respite from the round of births and deaths.

17. The Nyāya criticism of the Vedānta view that Brahman is the material cause of the world.

(1) Some Vedāntists maintain that Brahman is modified into the world, even as clay is modified into earthen vessels. Though Brahman is modified, he does not lose his eternal nature. This is the doctrine of modification of Brahman (brahmapariṇāmakā). (2) Others maintain that Brahman appears to be the phenomenal world-appearance through the limiting adjunct of beginningless cosmic nescience, which is the matrix of empirical names and forms. This is the doctrine of appearance of Brahman (brahmavivartavāda). Brahman limited by cosmic nescience (māyā, avidyā) is the ruler (iśvara) of the world. Rulership consists in the power of consciousness (cetanāsakti) and the power of creation (kriyāsakti), which exist in the Lord.

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484 Iśvaro'pi tatavābhāvyayāt pravartate. NV., iv. 1. 21, p. 467.
484 Sa kuṭu pravartamānām dvarmādbharmāyoh paripākālām apeksate. Ibid., p. 467.
484 NM., pp. 202-03.
He is the material cause of the world. Neither non-existence, nor prakṛti, nor atoms are its material cause, because they are unconscious. The Śruti says: "That resolved: I shall become many." So God is the material cause of the world.

Vācaspati Miśra criticizes the Vedanta doctrine. (1) If Brahman is modified into the world, as clay is modified into earthen vessels, he is either entirely modified or partially modified. If he is entirely modified into the world, he loses his essential nature. If he is partially modified into it, he has parts and is non-eternal. If Brahman is eternal in spite of his being modified into the world, then it also is eternal because it is characterized by the characteristics of its cause. Hence the world is not a modification of Brahman. (2) If Brahman appears as the false diverse world-appearance through the limiting adjuncts of empirical names and forms, which are modifications of beginningless cosmic nescience, then also the same difficulty will arise. One, partless, conscious, self-luminous Brahman cannot appear as the unconscious, material world of manifold objects. If one Brahman appears as many objects, he loses his identity. Then, what is the status of the world-appearance? It has the reality of Brahman, that is its ground. So it also is real and eternal. An illusion is due to the perception of the common characters of two objects and the non-perception of their individual peculiarities. A nacre is misapprehended as silver owing to the perception of brightness, which is their common character, and the non-perception of their individual peculiarities. One who knows the real character of a nacre, never misapprehends it as silver. But Brahman is one, partless, conscious and self-luminous, while the world is manifold, possessed of parts, unconscious and non-luminous. Hence there can be no perception of their common character and non-perception of their individual characters. Therefore, one, homogeneous, self-luminous Brahman cannot appear as the manifold, heterogeneous, non-intelligent world-appearance. Further, Jayanta urges, Brahman being pure and taintless cannot be the material cause of the impurities of the world-appearance. The world is real and non-eternal. It is material, and cannot be a modification of consciousness. That the world is a false appearance of Brahman is an irrational doctrine. ⁴⁹²

⁴⁹² NVTT., iv. 1. 20; NM., p. 536.
18. *The Nyāya criticism of the Sāṁkhya doctrine that Prakṛti is the material cause of the world.*

The Sāṁkhya regards prakṛti as the material cause of the world, which is modified into the physical world, organisms, sense-organs, manas (manas), intellect (buddhi) and egoism (ahaṅkāra) for the enjoyments and sufferings of the finite souls (puruṣa). Prakṛti is unconscious, active, modifiable and eternal. The souls are conscious, inactive, unmodifiable and eternal. Prakṛti is the equipoise of sattva, rajas and tamas, which are in the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. Prakṛti evolves into mahat, buddhi, or cosmic intellect, which evolves into ahaṅkāra or cosmic egoism. Ahaṅkāra evolves into the manas or mind, the five cognitive senses, and the five motor senses, on the one hand, and the primal matter (bhūtādi), the five subtle essences (tanmātra), and the five elements of earth, water, light, air, and ether. The five tanmātras of colour, sound, taste, odour and touch produce the five elements or substances. The finite souls are in the nature of transcendental consciousness; they are inactive and indifferent. They are reflected in transparent buddhis in which sattva predominates, which are modified into the form of objects; the mental modes are reflected in the conscious souls, and appear to be cognitions of the souls, though they are unconscious modes of buddhi. The inactive souls appear to be active owing to their reflection in buddhis. Erroneous identification of the souls with buddhis is the cause of their apparent bondage. Discrimination of the souls from buddhis is the cause of their apparent release. In reality, the souls are eternally pure, conscious and liberated. When they have discriminative knowledge of their essential nature as pure, transcendental consciousness, prakṛti ceases to evolve for them. But all souls are not liberated at the same time. So the evolution of prakṛti continues. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit and demerit are modifications of unconscious buddhi. Cognitions of objects due to the sense-object-intercourse also are modes of buddhi. The pure self transcends them all.

The Nyāya refutes the Sāṁkhya doctrine. Pleasure, pain and delusion are feelings of a conscious self, which are produced by physical objects. That physical elements are composed of these feelings is incomprehensible. Buddhi is the
knowledge of objects. Egoism is self-consciousness. They cannot produce the external sense-organs. Substances have qualities. But the subtle essences of odour, colour, sound, taste and touch cannot produce the physical substances of earth, water, light, air and ether. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit and demerit can exist in a conscious self, but not in unconscious buddhi. The Sāmkhya doctrine of Satkāryavāda has already been criticized. The self knows an object which is determined by buddhi owing to its reflection in buddhi which is reflected back in the self. But the self is immutable and immovable, and cannot be reflected in buddhi. If buddhi is reflected in the self, then it becomes known like buddhi. But the self is by nature a knower, and can never be known. Further, if the self is by nature a knower (draṣṭṛ), its reflection in buddhi is needless. If the self and buddhi are reflected in each other, and erroneously identified with each other, how can the former be known to be conscious and inactive, and the latter be known to be unconscious and active? The self cannot have cognition without an eternal internal organ, which is its instrument. The assumption of eternal unconscious buddhi is needless, and the attribution of cognition, volition and the like to it is unwarranted. It is absurd to maintain that unconscious prakṛti binds the soul to the chain of birth and death. Who guides prakṛti not to bind the soul which has discrimination of itself from prakṛti? The self is by its essential nature a knower; it is said to know its intrinsic nature in release. But why does not prakṛti bind a released soul? The soul is said to be in the nature of pure consciousness. But pure consciousness unproduced by an object is never experienced. So it cannot exist in the self in release, because there is no intercourse of the sense-organs with objects at the time.\(^{448}\) Cognition, desire, volition and the like are the qualities of the conscious and active self, and not of unconscious prakṛti or buddhi. If they are the qualities of buddhi, then its origin is due to merits and demerits, which are the auxiliary causes of all effects. These unseen agencies (adṛṣṭa) are modifications which can exist in prakṛti, and cannot be destroyed because prakṛti is eternal. If they exist in buddhi, which is supposed to be eternal, then reflec-

\(^{448}\) NM., pp. 488-92, 512.
tion of the self and buddhi in each other will continue for ever, and the unseen agencies of buddhi will always be attributed to the self, which cannot be released. Unconscious prakṛti cannot evolve and dissolve for the souls' bondage and release. Inactive souls cannot direct the evolution and dissolution of prakṛti. Further, bondage and release of the souls are not real, but apparent. So evolution and dissolution of prakṛti are apparent only. Hence the Saṁkhya doctrine is not tenable.\[444\]

19. The Proofs for the existence of God.

Gautama and Vātsyāyana give the moral argument for the existence of God by implication. God favours the free volitions of the finite souls with success, which are fruitless without his favour.\[445\] Uddyotakara gives the following arguments for the existence of god. (1) God is the efficient cause of the world, and directs the atoms, which are its material cause, and brings about their conjunction, which is its non-inherent cause. The movements of atoms are supervised by an intelligent agent or God, because they are unconscious, like an axe.\[446\] This is the cosmological argument. (2) The physical elements, which are unconscious and perceptible, are supervised by an intelligent agent, in order to produce pleasure and pain, because they have colour and other qualities, like a shuttle. God adjusts the material world to pleasures and miseries of the finite souls. This is a blend of the cosmological argument with the moral argument. (3) Merits and demerits are supervised by an intelligent agent in order to produce pleasures and sufferings of the finite souls, because they are instruments, like an axe.\[447\] They cannot be supervised by the finite souls, because they are unconscious of them. They have to be rewarded with happiness for their merits and punished with misery for their demerits. So they cannot be the arbiter of their own destiny. Their bodies are due to their merits and demerits. They are unconscious before the birth of their bodies, and so cannot guide their merits and demerits. So God who is conscious of their moral

\[444\] NKS., i, pp. 66-68. NV., iv. i. 21.
\[445\] NS., NBh., iv. i. 19-21.
\[446\] Paramāṇu karmāṇi prākṛti pravṛtti buddhīmatkāraṇādhiśthitāni pravartante aceramatvāt vāsāyātivat. NV., iv. i. 21.
\[447\] Dharmaḍharmam buddhīmatkāraṇādhiśthitam punaṣasavabhogam kuruh karaṇātvaḥ vāsāyātivat. NV., iv. i. 21. TS., 52, 53.
deserts conjoins them with adequate enjoyments and sufferings. This is the moral argument. (4) The unconscious atoms and merits and demerits are supervised by an intelligent agent or God, because they are unconscious. The atoms are self-existent and eternal. The merits and demerits of the finite souls are the effects of their free righteous and unrighteous actions. God creates the world of manifold objects in accordance with the finite souls' merits and demerits for their enjoyments and chastisements. This is a blend of the cosmological argument with the moral argument. (5) The activities of the different material elements are supervised by an intelligent agent or God, because they are unconscious, like an axe. All causes produce their effects under the guidance of God. He is the common cause of all effects. All physical causality is guided by the will-causality of God.

(1) Vācaspāti gives the cosmological argument. Buildings and the like are produced by conscious agents. Atoms, ether and the like are not produced by conscious agents. Atoms have the minutest magnitude. Ether has infinite magnitude. Buildings have intermediate magnitude. Atoms and ether are eternal. Bodies, trees, mountains and the like of intermediate magnitude are produced by an intelligent agent who knows their material, because they are produced or because they are made of unconscious material; whatever is an effect or made of unconscious material, is produced by an intelligent agent conscious of its material, like buildings; so are bodies, trees, mountains and the like; therefore, they are produced by an intelligent agent conscious of their material or atoms. Vācaspāti refutes objections against this causal argument. (2) He combines the cosmological or causal argument with the moral argument. The world is produced by an omniscient agent or God who knows the atoms and merits and demerits of the finite souls. God is conjoined with the atoms which are conjoined with the souls in which merits and demerits inhere. So God is indirectly related to the souls' merits and demerits, and guides them and

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500 Buddhīmatkāraṇādhihiṣṭhitāni svaśū svāsū kriyāśū mahābhūtāni pravartante acetanatvād vasyādīvat. NV., iv. 1. 21.
the atoms, and adjusts the physical objects to the unseen potencies of actions. The atoms and the unseen agencies cannot be guided by the finite souls, because they are ignorant of them.  

Jayanta gives both these arguments. The causal argument is a samānyatodṛṣṭa inference. (1) The earth and the like are produced by God who knows their material or atoms and purpose or the souls’ merits and demerits, because they are effects, like a jar. (2) The variety of the world is due to the souls’ merits and demerits which require the guidance of God who knows them. (3) Jayanta gives the teleological argument. The arrangements (sanniveśa) of mountains, rivers and other material objects are produced by an intelligent agent, like cloths produced by human agents. Whatever objects are arranged in an order are produced by an intelligent agent.  

Just as the arrangement, order and unity in jars, cloths and the like are not accidental, but produced by human agents endued with knowledge, desire and volition, so the arrangements of mountains, trees and other natural objects are not accidental, but produced by God who is omniscient and omnipotent. The arrangement and order of the world are designed, willed and produced by God. It may be objected that the arrangements of parts in the natural objects differ from those of human productions. Therefore we cannot infer the existence of God as the creator from the specific arrangements (sanniveśaviśeṣa) of the natural objects. Jayanta replies that there is an invariable concomitance between arrangement in general and the existence of a creator, just as there is an invariable concomitance between smoke in general and fire in general. The smoke and the fire in a kitchen differ from those in a forest; and yet we disregard their specific differences, and infer the existence of fire from the existence of smoke on the strength of the invariable concomitance between smoke in general and fire in general. Similarly, we infer the existence of God from the arrangement of the world as its creator on the strength of the invariable concomitance between arrangement in general and

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301 Dharmādhārman paramāṇān vā śvarah svakāryābhimukhaḥ kariṣyati. NVTT., iv. 1. 21, p. 425.  
the existence of a creator. This is the teleological argument. Śaṅkarācārya refers this argument to Aviddhakarṣaṇa, an ancient Naiyāyika, and criticizes it.

Udayana, the greatest ancient Naiyāyika, gives the following arguments for the existence of God. (1) God is the efficient cause of the world which is an effect (kārya). (2) He is the creator of motion which is the cause of conjunction of the unconscious atoms (āyojana). (3) He is the cause of preservation (dhṛti) and destruction (saṃbhāra) of the world. (4) He is the originator of language (pada) and creator of convention. (5) He is the creator of the Moral Law (vidhi) and the cause of authoritativeness (pratyaya) of the Vedas. (6) He is the creator of the Vedas (śruti). (7) He is the creator of the sentence (vākyā) in them. (8) He is the creator of particular numbers (saṃkhya-viśeṣa).

(1) The cosmological argument has already been explained. The earth and the like are produced by an agent, because they are effects. The antitheistic objections to this argument will be considered later.

(2) God is the creator of motion which is the cause of conjunction of the atoms into dyads. A dyad is produced by two atoms, the material cause, their conjunction, the non-inherent cause, and the agency of God, the efficient cause. The atoms are unconscious and inactive in themselves. They can be set in motion and conjoined with each other only when they are guided by an intelligent agent, like an axe. The activity of unconscious entities is known to be due to the volition of an intelligent agent that supervises them. The finite souls which are unconscious of the atoms and incapable of acting upon them cannot create motion in them and conjoin them with each other into dyads. Their merits and demerits also cannot bring about the activity and conjunction of the atoms, because they are unconscious. God only who is omniscient and omnipotent

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680 A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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680 Atha vīteṣaraḥitaṁ dhūmamātram agnīmatṛena vyāptam avagataṁ iti tatās tadamānānam ilāpi saṁnīveśaṁmatṝaṁ karṭmatṛena vyāptam iti tato'yu tadh anumīyatām. NM., p. 195.

684 TS., 47, 63-65, 72.


687 Parmanāvādayo hi cetānayojitaḥ pravarante acetāvat vāsyāvādivat. NKS., v., pp. 54-55.
can know the atoms, create motion in them, and combine them into dyads, triads, quartrads and gross physical objects. Though bodily action (ceṣṭā) is created by the human will, motion in the atoms cannot be created by it. A specific effect is produced by a specific cause. Bodily action is a specific effect; a human volition is a specific cause. Therefore a volition is a generic cause of activity or motion, which is a generic effect. It is determined by the method of double agreement. If the atoms act by themselves, then they are not unconscious. The imperceptible cause cannot dispense with the perceptible causes. In the absence of the cause its effect must be absent. A special effect has a special cause.

(3) The whole universe directly or indirectly depends upon the volition of God to support it in its place and prevent it from falling. God supports it by his sustaining will. He maintains all objects by his volition which directs them. Without his directing and sustaining will they cannot be maintained in their positions. Their relation with the knowledge, desire and volition of omniscient God is the cause of their maintenance. He rules over the world by a fiat of his will, which is unobstructed.

The whole universe including the dyads is destroyed by the will of God, because they are destructible. He creates motion by his destructive will, and disjoins the atoms of dyads and the like. He is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. The atoms are unconscious, and cannot disjoin themselves from one another. The souls' unconscious merits and demerits also cannot bring about their disjunction. Destruction of the universe is beyond the power of the finite souls with their limited knowledge and will. Hence God is the destroyer of it.

(4) God is the originator of arts and language. All arts, carpentry, smithy, weaving, speaking, writing and the like

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407 Svātmātre jadeṭhāṁ nirūḍhaṁ dṛṣṭāṅgāṅdhatākam.
Hetvabhāve phalābhāvo vīṣeṣāstu vīṣeṣavān. NKS., v. 4.
410 Kaśyādi brahmāṇḍaparyavān hi jagat sākṣāt paramparāvā vā vidhārakaprayatnādiḥ śŚhītum gurutve satyapatanādhamakatāt. NKS., v. p. 55.
ultimately originated in God, though the novices learned them from the actions of the elders (vṛddhayavahāra). There are degrees of skill in these arts, higher and lower. God, who is the embodiment of the highest skill, is the original artist, the founder of all arts, and the instructor of human artists. But how can he show artistic skill in physical action without a body, and guide human beings in acquiring skill in arts and crafts? Udayana replies that God assumes a body to manifest his glory and instruct humanity.¹¹²

He is the creator of language and the cause of convention (sāmketa). He connects different words with different objects, and first acquaints people with the meanings of the different words. The denotative power of words depends upon convention created by God. So he is the founder of language.¹¹³ Creation and destruction of the world have been proved. God creates arts and language at the beginning of creation. This argument is weak and obsolete.

(5) God guarantees the validity of the knowledge of the Vedas, which is produced by the proficiency (guna) of its generating conditions, because it is valid knowledge, like perception and the like. Knowledge has no intrinsic validity. It has extrinsic validity due to the excellence (guna) of its cause. The validity of testimony is due to the reliability of its speaker (vaktraguna). The validity of the Vedas which are accepted as authoritative by great saints, is due to the reliability of God, who is their speaker. It is not due to the authority of non-omniscient seers who are ignorant of the supersensible entities mentioned therein. It is guaranteed by God, who is the omniscient creator of the moral injunctions and prohibitions.¹¹⁴

God is the creator of the Moral Law (vidhi). It is not an impersonal moral imperative (niyoga) or a supersensuous verity (apūrva) as Prabhākara thinks. The acts enjoined by the Vedas do not constitute Dharma as Kumārila thinks. A moral injunction (vidhi) does not mean bodily action of a person on whom it is imposed, because the injunction 'Know thy self' cannot be executed by a bodily action. It does not mean desire of a

¹¹⁴ NKS, v, p. 62; NKS, p. 69.
person to act upon it, because it involves mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya). The knowledge of a Vidhi depends upon a desire to execute it, because it means a desire; and a desire to act upon it depends upon the knowledge of it. Further, if a Vidhi means the knowledge of a desire to act, then it cannot produce a volition and a consequent voluntary action, because it is non-existent at the time. Desire gives rise to a volition by its mere existence, and not by its knowledge. So a Vidhi does not mean a desire. Nor does it mean a volition, because the sentence 'He is going to a village' produces a knowledge of volition, but it is not a moral injunction. A moral law is a command (niyoga) which impels a person to act upon it with a view to realizing his good. It is not a property of a person who is under moral obligation to obey it,—either his desire, or volition, or bodily action. Nor is it a property of Apūrva or supersensuous moral imperative, or an action; it is not realizability of a transcendental imperative as Prabhākara thinks, or of a physical action as Kumārila thinks. Nor is it a property of a means, conduciveness to good, or the knowledge of the meaning of a moral injunction, or an effort to execute it. It is the property of a reliable person who imposes the moral law upon persons. It conveys the intention of the supreme person of moral authority. It is a personal command of God, which impels them to perform righteous actions and abstain from unrighteous actions. A voluntary action springs from a volition, which arises from a desire, which is due to the knowledge of what is realizable by volition and conducive to one's good. A moral injunction enlightens a person on what is a means to his good. This is the moral argument for the existence of God.

(6) The Vedas (śrutī) are created by omniscient God, because they are the Vedas. What are not created by an omniscient Being are not the Vedas, like sentences uttered by human beings. The Vedas deal with supersensible entities of which persons are ignorant. They do not originate in human

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311 Na cecchā jñātā priyamājanam, kintu satayā. NKSP., v. p. 82.
313 NKS., v. 7. Īṣṭasādhanatvānāmpaka aptābhiprāyo vihāpratya-yārthaḥ. NKS., p. 75.
perception. They are not creations of crafty priests, tainted with error and motivated by fraudulence. They have not their origin in tradition, because they are destroyed at the time of dissolution. They are created by God, because they cannot have any other origin. They are valid, because they are accepted as valid by great saints who act upon them and realize the supersensible truths enshrined in them.\(^\text{518}\)

(7) The sentences (vākya) in the Vedas are creations of a person, because they are sentences, like sentences composed by men. Just as the Kumārasamhāva was composed by Kalidāsa, so the Vedas were composed by God. Just as threads cannot arrange themselves into a cloth, so the words of the Vedas are not arranged into sentences by themselves. Just as a weaver arranges threads into a cloth, so God arranges the words of the Vedas into sentences.\(^\text{519}\) Just as the arrangement of a mountain differs from that of a jar, so the arrangement of the Vedas differs from that of a human composition. Just as a jar is produced by a human being, while a mountain is produced by God, so an epic is composed by a human being, while the Vedas are composed by God. Just as the different parts of an epic are composed by one poet, so the different branches of the Vedas are composed by one God, because they have unity of purpose. Parsimony of hypotheses demands one author of the four Vedas.\(^\text{520}\) The sentences in them praising righteous actions and condemning unrighteous actions are composed by omniscient God who knows their moral values.\(^\text{521}\) They are composed by God independently of the sense-organs, manas, and the vocal organs.\(^\text{522}\) Elsewhere Udayana expresses his belief in occasional divine incarnation to manifest his glory.\(^\text{523}\)

(8) The existence of God is inferred from number (sātkhyā). The magnitude of a dyad is an effect, since it is the quality of a caused substance. The magnitude of an atom is eternal and atomic, and cannot be the cause of the magnitude of a dyad. If the former were a cause of the latter, the latter

\(^{519}\) NKS., v. p. 63.
\(^{520}\) NM., pp. 236, 239, 240.
\(^{521}\) NKS., p. 83, NKS., v. 16.
\(^{522}\) Svatatrapuruṣapraṇītavāṁ hi puruṣeyatvam. NKS., v. p. 64.
\(^{523}\) NKS., p. 65.
\(^{524}\) NKS., v. p. 61.
would be a large magnitude (mahattva), like that of a triad which also is produced by the magnitudes of atoms. The magnitude of a dyad is not produced by the atomic magnitudes of atoms and their loose conjunction (pracaya), but to the number of duality, which depends upon discriminative intellect (apekṣā-buddhi). It is not the creation of human discriminative intellect, because human beings have no knowledge of the atoms, but that of the discriminative intellect of God.∗∗∗ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards only number one as perceptible, but the higher numbers as conceptual products. This argument rests upon the peculiar view that duality and other higher numbers are creations of the discriminative intellect.∗∗∗ Gaṅgeśa elaborates Udayana’s cosmological argument and refutes the antitheistic objections with great logical acumen.

20. The Nyāya refutation of Antitheistic Objections.

(1) The atheist objects that the inference ‘The earth, etc., are produced by an agent, because they are effects’ is contradicted (bādhita), because the reason is faulty. Agency is pervaded by embodiedness. Wherever there is an agent of an effect, he is found to have a body. God is not an agent of the world, because he has no body. When the subject has the absence of the predicate, there is contradiction (bādha). There is the absence of being produced by embodied God in the earth, etc. So the reason ‘being effects’ is vitiated by contradiction. There is no God as their agent, since there is no embodied God.∗∗∗ There is no body (viśeṣa) of God; so there is no God (viśiṣṭa) as the agent of the earth, etc. Udayana refutes this objection. Being effects pervaded by being made by an agent exists in the earth, etc. It is a flawless reason. So the cosmological argument is valid. The knowledge of God as not being an agent of the earth, etc., presupposes the knowledge of the existence of God, which is proved by the causal argument. If this inference is not admitted to be valid, the atheist

∗∗∗ Dvānapakparimāṇam sanikhyājanam parimānapracayājanyatve sati janyaparimāṇatvat. Dvitvasanikhyā ca nāmādityapekṣābuddhi, atas tādanāntanapekṣābuddhir īśvarasya. NKSII., pp. 69-70.
∗∗∗ Sariviviśiṣṭasya kartrtyā viśeṣaṇabādhātmako viśiṣṭabādhah. NKSII., p. 70.
cannot prove the absence of agency of the earth, etc., in God. So this objection is not sound. The cosmological argument is stronger than the antitheistic argument which is based upon it. It is neither contradicted by the perception of embodied agents of jars, etc., nor by the inference 'God is not an agent, because he is devoid of a body.'

(2) The atheist further objects that the cosmological argument is counterbalanced (satpratipakṣa) by the inference: 'The earth, etc., are not produced by an agent, because they are not produced by a body'; or, 'The earth, etc., have the absence of being produced by an agent, because they have the absence of being produced by a body'. Being produced by an agent is pervaded (vyāpya) by being produced by a body (vyāpaka). The absence of the pervaded is inferred from the absence of the pervader. So the absence of being produced by God is inferred from the absence of being produced by a body. The two inferences are equally strong. So the cosmological argument is counterbalanced by the antitheistic argument. Udayana refutes this objection. Two inferences of equal strength can counterbalance each other. But a weak inference cannot invalidate a stronger inference. The reason of the theistic inference is flawless. 'Being an effect' (hetu) is pervaded by 'being produced by an agent' (sādhya). The reason pervaded by the predicate is present in the subject, 'the earth, etc.'. The theistic inference 'The earth, etc., are produced by an agent, because they are effects' cannot be counterbalanced by the antitheistic inference 'The earth, etc., are not produced by an agent, because they are not produced by a body', because the reason 'being not produced by a body' is vitiated by vyāpyatva-siddhi, the qualification 'by a body' being needless. The reason 'being not produced' can counterbalance the reason 'being produced'. But 'being not produced' is an unproven reason, because the earth, etc., are produced (svarūpasiddhi). Hence the original reason is not counterbalanced by a counter reason.

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327 śivara dharmiṣṭ śartrābādhāt kartṛtvābādho na, adhikaranajānānām vinā abhāvyābhānāsambhavāt. NKSH., p. 71.
328 Kartṛjanyatvāvyāpakāśaśrajaṇyaatvābhāvāt kartṛjanyatvābhāvā iti satpratipakṣata. NKSH., p. 70.
(3) The atheist objects that the invariable concomitance between agency and embodiedness contradicts that between 'being produced' and 'being produced by an agent'\textsuperscript{300}. Udayana refutes this objection. There is an invariable concomitance between 'being produced' and 'being produced by an agent'. There is no invariable concomitance between 'being an agent' and 'being embodied'. The first uniform concomitance is strengthened by the presence of a valid reason in the subject and favourable hypothetical reasoning contradicting the second vyāpti. So it is not contradicted by the latter.\textsuperscript{321} The second vyāpti is vitiated by a doubt which can never be dispelled. Some agents may be embodied and others bodiless. There is no contradiction between them. A potter has a body, but God may be bodiless. Hence being an effect is a valid reason.

(4) The atheist objects that it must be admitted that an agent is embodied, because all human agents are found to be embodied. The inference of a bodiless agent on the strength of pakṣadharmatā from the earth, etc., being effects is invalid, because an embodied agent only can be inferred. A bodiless agent is unproven. There is a contradiction between the qualification and the qualified, embodied and God.\textsuperscript{322}

(5) The atheist objects that the theistic inference is vitiated by vyāpyatvāsiddhi, because there is variable concomitance between 'being produced' (hetu) and 'being produced by an agent' (sādhya). 'Being produced by a body' is a condition (upādhi) that frustrates the invariable concomitance between them. It pervades the predicate 'being produced by an agent', but does not pervade the reason 'being produced'. Whatever is produced by an agent is produced by a body. The earth, sprouts, etc., are produced, but not produced by a body. So the theistic inference is invalid.\textsuperscript{323} Udayana refutes this objection. 'Being produced by a body' is not a condition (upādhi) that frustrates the invariable concomitance between 'being produced' and 'being produced by an agent', because

\textsuperscript{300} Kartā śārīryeva iti vyāptir virodhini. NKSH., p. 70.
\textsuperscript{301} Kātyāvatvavāpyaḥ pakṣadharmatvasahakārāt vipakṣābhādhatarkatarkāvatālākā balavātivam, 'karta śārīryeva iti vyāptor durbalatayā na pratibandhau'. NKSH., p. 71.
\textsuperscript{302} Vyāpya śārīrī kartā upanevaḥ pakṣadharmatavā ca kṣīvyādāvaśārīrītī viśēṣaṇādhyāpvasiddhiḥ vīśeṣaṇa-viśeṣa vīrodhācā. Ibid, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{303} Śārīrajanyativādyupādhiḥ vyāpyatvāsiddhiḥ. NKSH., p. 70.
it does not pervade ‘being produced by an agent’ (śādhya). The earth, sprouts, etc., are admitted to be ‘not produced by a body’ by the atheist and the theist both. But they are admitted to be effects or ‘produced by an agent.’ So the theistic inference is not vitiated by vyāpyatvāsiddhi. There is no invariable concomitance between ‘being produced by an agent’ and ‘being produced by a body’ owing to the absence of a favourable hypothetical reasoning which may remove all doubts about the variable concomitance between them.\textsuperscript{534} Haridāsa explains Udayana’s arguments against antitheistic objections in this manner.

Udayana states the antitheistic arguments about an agent being embodied in the following six forms. (1) ‘God is embodied, because he is an agent.’ The argument commits the fallacies of āśrayāsiddhi, bādха, apasiddhānta, and pratijñāvirodha. The subject (pakṣa) ‘God’ is non-existent; the reason ‘agency’ has no locus standi. So there is āśrayāsiddhi. If God is proved by a means of valid knowledge, he is proved to be a disembodied agent. So the argument involves contradiction (bādha). If God is assumed to exist by the atheist, then his argument involves deviation from his accepted tenet (apasiddhānta). Further, the term Isvāra (Ruler of the universe) means a bodiless agent. So there is a contradiction between the subject ‘God’ and the predicate ‘embodied’; the proposition is self-contradictory (pratijñāvirodha). (2) ‘God is not an agent, because he is bodiless.’ This argument also involves the four fallacies mentioned above. (3) ‘The earth, etc., are produced by an embodied agent, because they are effects.’ There is no invariable concomitance between ‘effects’ and ‘being produced by an embodied agent’. The earth, etc., are effects, but not produced by embodied agents. So the inference is invalid. (4) ‘The earth, etc., are not effects, because they are not produced by a body.’ The earth, etc., are perceived to be effects; so they cannot be non-effects. The inference is contradicted by perception (bādha). The reason ‘not being produced by a body’ is inconclusive (anaikāntika), because it exists in effects and non-effects. (5) The earth, etc., are not produced by an agent, because they are not produced by a

\textsuperscript{534} NKSH., p. 72.
Na bādha‘avopajīvayavāt pratibandho na durbalaiḥ.
Siddhyasiddhyor virodho no nāsiddhir anibandhanā. NKSH., v. 2.
body'. The reason 'not produced' is enough to prove 'not produced by an agent.' The qualification 'by a body' is needless. So the inference involves vyāpyatvāsiddhi. If the qualification is discarded, the reason 'not produced' does not exist in the subject; the earth, etc., are produced. So the inference involves svarūpāsiddhi. (6) The atheist may cite a contrary invariable concomitance (viparitavyāpti). He seeks to prove by it either the opposite inference which contradicts the theistic inference, or to counterbalance it by a rival inference. Both are not possible. The theistic inference has pakṣadharmatā: 'Being effects' pervaded by 'being produced by an agent' exists in 'the earth, etc.' But the antitheistic inference is devoid of pakṣadharmatā. The contrary invariable concomitance takes such forms: (1) 'Whoever is an agent (hetu), is embodied (sādhyā). (2) 'Whoever is not embodied (hetu), is not an agent (sādhyā). The reason 'agency' pervaded by 'embodiedness' does not exist in 'the earth, etc.' (pakṣa). 'Non-embodiedness' (hetu) pervaded by 'non-agency' (sādhyā) does not exist in 'the earth, etc.', (pakṣa). The atheist argues that the negative uniform relation (vyatirekavyāpti) between 'not being produced by a body' and 'not being produced by an agent' invalidates the invariable concomitance between 'being produced' and 'being produced by an agent.' Ether is not produced by a body, and so it is a positive instance (sapakṣa) in which the predicate (sādhyā) exists. But in a negative uniform relation there is no such similar instance. So there is no vyatirekavyāpti between 'not being produced by a body' and 'not being produced by an agent.' Further, the invariable concomitance between 'being produced by a body' and 'being produced by an agent' is vitiated by vyāpyatvāsiddhi, because the qualification 'by a body' is needless (asamarthaviveśana). The atheist argues: 'An intelligent agent cannot be inferred from the earth, etc., being produced, but he can be inferred from being produced by a body.' Udayana replies that a specific effect is produced by a specific cause, but that it does not set aside the uniform relation between an effect in general and a cause in general. A seed is the cause of a sprout. A paddy seed is the cause of a paddy sprout. The

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second uniform relation does not set aside the first. Fire is not inferred from fragrant smoke, but from smoke in general. So an intelligent agent is inferred from the earth, etc., being produced, and not from their being produced by a body.

(7) The atheist objects that the existence of an embodied agent known on the strength of the invariable concomitance of effects with embodied agents contradicts the existence of a bodiless, omniscient agent of the earth, etc., known on the strength of the reason invariably concomitant with the predicate existing in the subject (pakṣadharmata). Udayana replies that there is no contradiction, because the existence of a bodiless, omniscient agent of the earth, etc., is proved by the uniform relation of effects with being produced by an intelligent agent (vyapti), and the existence of being effects invariably concomitant with being produced by an intelligent agent endowed with immediate knowledge of the atoms and desire and volition to create in the earth, etc., (pakṣadharmata). If such an agent is not known, the knowledge of pakṣadharmata is not possible. Udayana argues, if the invariable concomitance between 'being produced' and 'being produced by a body' is assumed, then the earth, etc., are not produced by the souls' merits and demerits (adrṣṭa). But the Buddhists, the Jainas and the Mimāṁsakas admit that they are produced by merits and demerits. (8) If an agent requires a body as the vehicle of enjoyment and suffering, God does not require it for he is devoid of them. If an agent requires a body in order to use other auxiliary causes, God does not require it, because he can directly produce an effect by his volition out of its material without auxiliary causes. (9) If being not endowed with a body is a condition (upādhi), then it pervades the predicate 'being produced by an agent.' Then a being not possessed of a body becomes an agent of an effect. But this is not admitted by the Buddhist atheist. So it is not a condition (upādhi). (10) If not being possessed of a body is not a certain condition (niṣcita upādhi), but a doubtful condition (śaṅkita upādhi), then, it may be argued, being produced by an agent cannot be inferred from.

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447 Kṣityāder adṛṣṭajanyatvam tvadabhunagatam. ATVK., p. 335.
an effect, because the inference is vitiated by the doubtful condition. Udayana replies that this argument is invalid. If not being possessed of a body is a condition (upādhi), then the existence of a bodiless agent is inferred from it. If it is not a condition, then also it is inferred from the earth, etc., being effects.\(^{339}\) (11) Further, does an intelligent, embodied agent employ the complement of unconscious causes through the action of the body? Or does he employ them by employing his body? The first alternative is wrong, because the body being a cause will require another body to employ it, and so on to infinity. This will lead to infinite regress. The second alternative also is wrong, because an expert can destroy poison in a body by mere meditation without employing his body. When a body is a cause, it must be guided by a conscious agent. When it is not a cause, it need not be guided by a conscious agent. A body is not the cause of all effects; nor is it necessary for employing the causes. All effects are not produced by embodied agents. A conscious agent does not require a body everywhere to produce effects.\(^{339}\) (12) No effect can be produced without a complement of unconscious causes, an object (karma), an instrument (karaṇa), a locus (adhiparaṇa) and the like, and a conscious agent (kārya). The unconscious causes are directed by a conscious agent without whose guidance they are ineffective. An effect is produced by an unconscious material cause and a conscious efficient cause together. In the absence of either of them no effect can be produced.\(^{340}\) (13) The atheist argues, there is a hypothetical reasoning against the absence of agency in God, and there is no hypothetical reasoning in favour of it; so it is possible to know for certain that God is not an agent. 'If God is an agent, let him be embodied, happy and unhappy. But he is not so; therefore, he is not an agent'. Udayana replies, this hypothetical reasoning is invalid, because the atheist does not believe in God, and so his inference is without a subject (āśrayāśiddhi). The theist, on the other hand, argues: 'If an

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\(^{339}\) Udayavādīvarīkatryavasthitinyamāt. ATV., p. 845.
effect were produced without an agent, it would lead to naturalism, which has been refuted, and non-production of all effects. So it strengthens the theistic inference instead of weakening it. (14) The atheist argues: 'God is non-existent, because he is not perceived.' Udayana replies, only perceptible objects are non-existent, if they are not perceived; but God being imperceptible by nature, non-perception of him does not prove his non-existence. Further, the existence of God is proved by a valid theistic inference. So his non-existence cannot be proved by non-perception of him. (15) The atheist argues: 'If God were an agent, he would be embodied.' This hypothetical reasoning, Udayana replies, involves self-contradiction, because Isvara is by nature bodiless, whose existence is denied by the atheist. Further, if the Vedic testimony is a means of valid knowledge, it contradicts the embodiedness of God; and if it is not a means of valid knowledge, then it cannot prove God's embodiedness. (16) Jayanta criticizes some antitheistic objections. The atheist objects that God cannot act upon the atoms without a body; that an agent is one who can create motion, which cannot be created without a body; that agency of a bodiless agent is never perceived. Jayanta replies, agency consists in being endued with knowledge, desire and volition to act, which certainly exists in God. Just as the unconscious body is impelled to act by the volition of the self which is bodiless, so the atoms are impelled to act by the volition of God who is bodiless. The self directly creates motion in the body through its volition. Similarly, God directly creates motion in the atoms through his volition without a body. (17) The atheist objects that merits and demerits are supervised by the conscious souls in which they inhere, and made to bear fruits; that they do not require supervision by God. Jayanta replies, the souls are many and have conflicting purposes, and, consequently, cannot produce the world in accordance with their merits and demerits.
of which they are unconscious. The variety of the world, according to the Buddhists, the Jainas, and the Mīmāṃsakas, is due to the finite souls' merits and demerits. But they cannot make physical objects produce merited enjoyments and sufferings without being guided by omniscient God. (18) The atheist objects that the world is not created by one God, but by two or many Gods. A building is made by many masons, who do not always act under the guidance of one architect. The ants build an ant-hill without the guidance of one ant. Nor do they consciously realize one common purpose. Similarly, the world may be the creation of many Lords without a unity of purpose. Or, it may be created by a council of Lords, as a monastery is administered by a council of counsellors. Or, it may be created by an assembly of devils with a unity of purpose, even as a gang of swindlers act with a unity of purpose. Jayanta replies, if there were two or many Lords, they would have conflicting wills and purposes, and arrest the creative act; some would be benevolent and strive to do good to creatures, while others would be malevolent and endeavour to do harm to creatures and kill them; or, some would thwart the wills of others who would cease to be Lords. So there is one Lord. (19) The Mīmāṃsaka argues: God is not the creator of the Vedas; letters are eternal, which are combined into words; their relation to their meanings or objects is eternal; the Vedas are not composed by God, because they are different from human compositions; they have intrinsic validity, and do not owe their validity to the reliability of their speaker or God. Jayanta replies, letters are not eternal; the denotative power of words is not eternal, but due to convention created by God; the Vedas have no intrinsic validity, but their validity is due to the veracity of God, their composer. (20) The atheist argues, the existence of God depends upon the testimony of the Vedas, which are created by God; so the theistic argument involves mutual dependence. The mutual dependence, the Nyāya replies, is either in existence or in knowledge. The existence of God does not

\[\text{NML, p. 203.}\]
\[\text{Eka śāvara iṣyate na dva bhūhavo vā bhimāhhiprayatayā lokānugrahapāghātavaiśāsannaprasaṅgāt. Ichāvisahvādassambhavena ca tataḥ kasyacit samkalpadvāraśvānāśvaryaprasaṅgād ityeka evaśvarāb. NML, p. 203. Ibid, p. 239.}\]
\[\text{NML, pp. 204, 231-40.}\]
depend upon that of the Vedas, which are non-eternal and created by God, who is eternal and self-existent. The existence of God is known from the testimony of the Vedas. But the knowledge of the Vedas is different from that of the existence of God. The existence of God is not known from the testimony of the Vedas only. It is inferred from the world as an effect. God is the creator of the world and the Vedas.\textsuperscript{144} (21) The atheist objects that God cannot create the Vedas, because he is bodiless. Jayanta, like Udayana, replies that God occasionally assumes a body to teach the Vedas and instruct mankind about moral injunctions and prohibitions. But this fact is not remembered because he does not regularly assume bodies.\textsuperscript{145} (22) The atheist objects to the validity of the reason 'being effects' (kāryatva) in the cosmological argument, which is unproven (asiddha). Jayanta replies that the atheists admit the reality of effects. The Cārvāka admits that the Vedas are produced by crafty priests. Why should he, then, deny that the earth, etc., are effects? The Mīmāṁsaka (Kumārila) admits that whatever is produced is destroyed; that cloths are produced by the conjunction of their constituent yarns, and destroyed by their disjunction. So he cannot deny that the earth, mountains, etc., which are produced by the conjunction of their parts, and destroyed by their disjunction, are effects. The Buddhist admits that all things are non-eternal, and, consequently, produced and destroyed. So he must admit that the earth, etc., are effects. Hence their being effects is undeniable and not unproven. The atheist contends that sprouts, creepers, trees, etc., are produced without anybody's effort, and not found to be produced by any intelligent agent; that their being produced by an intelligent agent is doubtful. Jayanta refutes this objection. If they are definitely known to be produced by an agent, they are similar instances (sapakṣa). If they are definitely known to be not produced by an agent, they are dissimilar instances (vipakṣa). If they are known to be effects, but not definitely known to be produced by an agent, then they are included in the subject (pakṣa). Doubt as to the existence of the predicate in the subject is not a flaw in an inference. If it were so, all inference would be abolished, and the existence of

\textsuperscript{144} SDS., pp. 215-16. NM., pp. 234, 238, 199, 203.

\textsuperscript{145} NM., p. 238.
a fire in a hill would not be inferred from a smoke in it, because its existence in a hill is doubted at first.\footnote{NM., pp. 196-97.} (23) The atheist argues: If God creates the world with a body, either he creates his own body, or, it is created by another God; he cannot create his own body; nor is it created by another God, for it would lead to infinite regress. Jayanta replies that God creates the world without a body by a mere fiat of will, which creates motion in the atoms. (24) The atheist argues: Either God creates the world with bodily actions, or he creates it by mere volition; he cannot create the world during hundreds of epochs with bodily actions; and unconscious atoms cannot follow his volition. Jayanta replies that God creates the world without bodily actions by producing motions among the atoms and combining them with one another by mere volitions. (25) The atheist argues: If God is motivated by compassion for creatures, why does he create evil and misery? If he creates them as retributions for the finite souls' sins and merits, then his freedom and sovereignty are limited by their potencies of actions (karma), and he ceases to be the independent Lord. Jayanta, like Vācaspati and Uddyotakara, replies that God creates the world out of the atoms with the aid of the finite souls' merits and demerits in order to make it a moral universe; that his sovereignty and omnipotence are limited by the Law of Karma and the Law of Nature; and that his mercy is subordinate to justice.\footnote{NM., pp. 91-92; 193-200.}

V

The Critical Estimate of the Nyāya Philosophy

The greatest contribution of the Nyāya to Indian philosophy is its logic and epistemology, which are adopted by the other systems with minor modifications. The different kinds of inference and fallacies have become a common place in Indian philosophy. The Nyāya treatment of the problems of logic and epistemology is most comprehensive. Its discussion of the criteria of truth, validity of knowledge, the nature of causality and vyāpti, and determination of them adumbrates the
philosophical discussion in modern western logic and epistemo-
logy. Its criticism of subjective idealism, absolute idealism, phe-
nomenalism and the like is incisive and thorough-going. Its out-
look is mainly empirical, though it recognizes the validity of
reasoning based on experience. It believes in intuition and
scriptural testimony. Reason does not distort and falsify the
reality, but comprehends it in its fulness. The reality is amen-
able to rational analysis and comprehension. The world is partly
experienced and partly known by reason. The self is known
by inner experience, intuition and reason. God is known by
reason and through revelation. Hence the Nyāya metaphysics
is based on experience, reason, intuition and revelation. It does
not advocate pure empiricism.

The Nyāya is uncompromising in its realism and pluralism.
It recognizes the reality of the world and its manifold objects
independent of the finite souls and God who perceive them.
The material objects with their primary and secondary qualities
are real. Their production and destruction are real. They exist
in time and space, and are governed by the Law of Causality.
The atoms, time, space, and ether are eternal, and not created by
God. The material objects and living organisms are produced
anew out of their material causes. So far the Nyāya conception
of the world is realistic. But it regards the world as subservient
to the Law of Karma, created by God out of the atoms, and
adjusted to the moral deserts of the finite souls. This is the
element of idealism in the Nyāya conception of the world.

The Nyāya conception of the soul as a substance with con-
sciousness as an adventitious quality is unsatisfactory. It is
unconscious in its essential nature, which it acquires in the state
of release. Its consciousness is due to the conjunction of the
self with a manas and a body. In release it is disjoined from a
mind and a body, and divested of cognition, pleasure, pain,
desire, aversion, volition, disposition, merit and demerit. But the
self is essentially an ego which is conscious. An unconscious
ego is devoid of egoity. Consciousness constitutes its essence.
It exists in itself and for itself. It is not a substance which exists
in itself, but not for itself. It is not an object among objects.
It is a knower of objects. The Nyāya conceives God as the
supreme Self, belonging to the genus of self and endued with
knowledge, desire, will and happiness, which are eternal and
not produced by the sense-object-intercourse. Then these are his essential qualities of which he is never divested. If they are God's essential qualities, they may legitimately be regarded as the essential qualities of the finite self. If God is essentially conscious, the finite self too may be regarded as essentially conscious and endued with knowledge, feeling and will, and its release may be conceived as spiritual illumination, bliss, and communion with God.

The Nyāya conception of God is deistic. God is transcendent in relation to the world and the finite souls. He is the world-architect, who fashions the world out of the atoms from the outside. God is omniscient and omnipotent. Why should he not be credited with the power of creating the atoms and destroying them? It is more rational to maintain that God creates the world out of his unconscious nature (acit, aparā prakṛti) and creates the finite souls out of his conscious nature (cit, parā prakṛti), sustains the world by his sustaining will, and reabsorbs it in himself. God is immanent and transcendent in relation to the world and the finite souls. This is the logical consequence of the Nyāya position.

The Nyāya maintains that God directs the individual souls, supervises their merits and demerits, and helps them produce their consequences in the shape of enjoyments and sufferings; that he gives them the Moral Law, and imposes moral obligation upon them, but that he is not immanent in them. He is like their father and externally related to them. It is more rational to hold that God is both transcendent and immanent in relation to the finite souls and their inner guide. There is inseparable relation between them. The Nyāya starts with the dualism of matter and souls, and then mitigates it by regarding God, the supreme Soul, as the controller and harmonizer of the realm of matter and the realm of spirits, who imposes his plan upon the world, and adapts it to the moral demands of the finite souls. Again, it starts with the dualism of body and soul, and then makes the body and the sense-organs instruments of the soul, which are partly due to its own merits and demerits acquired in the past birth. The logical consequence of the Nyāya doctrine is that God evolves the world from within his own nature, and that the soul is the entelechy of the body which is informed and inspired by it as its means. The Nyāya dualism logically leads
to spiritualistic monism. God should not be conceived as a *Deus ex machina*, who relates the world and the finite souls to each other in a mechanical manner. The Nyāya does not bring the world, souls, and God into intimate relation to one another, and make them an integral whole. The Nyāya ontology of realism, pluralism, and deism may be logically developed into a type of concrete monism, which regards God as an identity-in-difference, like Rāmānuja’s qualified monism. *\(^\text{122}\)\]

The Nyāya ethics is jural. It regards moral laws as personal commands of God imposed on the finite souls for their unconditional obedience. God is the seat of moral authority, and the source of moral obligation. He reveals the moral laws in the Vedas. This legalistic theological morality is archaic and obsolete. The moral laws are the laws of the self’s own being. The self is the source of moral obligation which is self-imposed. The Nyāya does not attach adequate importance to the moral reason which apprehends the moral laws conducive to self-realization. It gives relative freedom to man in the sense of self-determination. Its ethics is intellectualistic in so far as it regards the direct knowledge or intuition of the self as the highest good, which depends upon the control of passions, the discipline of the will, and the eradication of love and hatred. In its attempt to raise man above good and evil, virtue and vice, merit and demerit, and quest after transcendental perfection it merges morality in non-morality. It lays greater stress on egocentric virtues than on altruistic and social virtues. Its concept of release as a trans-empirical unconscious state of isolation does not satisfy the cravings of the human spirit. Its pluralistic theism does not satisfy the philosophical impulse and the religious aspirations. It has the merit of keeping close to the standpoint of common-sense.

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\(^{122}\) IIP., pp. 123-26.
CHAPTER X

The Navya Nyāya Philosophy

Gaṅgeśa is the founder of the new school of Nyāya called Navya Nyāya. He mainly deals with the four means of valid knowledge, viz., perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. His treatment of inference is most comprehensive. He deals with the proofs for the existence of God in Īśvarānumāna exhaustively. He incidentally treats of some ontological problems, e.g., the nature and definition of a cause, the unreality of causal power (śakti) and similarity as ontological categories, the nature of the self and its release, the nature of God, etc., and of some psychological problems, e.g., the nature and kinds of perception, memory, recognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition. His treatment of the nature of volition and voluntary action is a remarkable contribution to psychology. His treatment of the epistemological problem of validity of knowledge and criteria of truth anticipates the modern western theories of realism, idealism and pragmatism. His contribution to logical thought is profound and extensive. His logical discussion is not merely verbal and formal, and does not consist in hair-splitting arguments aimed at merely logical accuracy of definitions. He elaborates the views and thoughts of Udayana, criticizes some of his views, and directs logical thought in new channels. He invents technical terms which are elaborated and complicated by his followers to give precision to logical thought, though they are made unintelligible to the uninitiated. The later philosophical literature in the Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya is written in the technical language of Navya Nyāya, which is incomprehensible to many who can understand the pre-Navya Nyāya literature. Here we shall deal with the main problems of logic and the theistic proofs discussed by Gaṅgeśa in his Tattvacintāmaṇī.
I

Logic

1. Inference.

Inference (anumāna) is the knowledge produced by the knowledge of a reason pervaded by a predicate existing in the subject. Its instrumental cause (karaṇa) is a reason and consideration of a reason. It is not the reason which is considered. This is called anumāna. Elsewhere Gaṅgeśa distinguishes between an instrumental cause of inference and its operation. The knowledge of invariable concomitance of a reason with a predicate is the instrumental cause (karaṇa) of inference. The consideration of a reason or the knowledge of a reason pervaded by a predicate existing in a subject is the operation (vyāpāra) of the instrumental cause, which immediately produces inference. Viśvanātha follows Gaṅgeśa, and regards the knowledge of invariable concomitance as the instrumental cause, and the consideration of a reason or the knowledge of a reason pervaded by a predicate existing in a subject as the causal operation. The ancient Nyāya maintains that a reason or sign (liṅga) known as pervaded is the instrumental cause of inference. But, if a reason were the cause of inference, then a past reason or a future reason would be its cause, which cannot be its cause because it is absent at the time. The Nyāya Nyāya regards the knowledge of invariable concomitance as the instrumental cause, and the knowledge of a reason pervaded by a predicate existing in a subject as the causal operation (vyāpāra).

The Cārvāka contends that inference is not valid, because invariable concomitance which is the ground of inference cannot be ascertained. This objection has been refuted already. If inference is invalid, perception also is invalid, because validity can be inferred only from successful activity. If validity is supposed to be known by itself, there can be no doubt about it.

1 Vyāptiviśeṣa-pakṣadharmatājñānayāṁ jñānam anumānaṁ taikaraṇam-anumānaṁ tacca liṅgaparāmarśan na tu parāmrśayamānaṁ liṅgam. TCA., p. 2.
3 Anumānam vyāptijñānam karaṇaṁ parāmarśo vyāpāraḥ. SM., p. 280.
4 Vyāpārya pakṣāvṛttiśvūlliḥ parāmarśa ucyate. BP., 68. Ibid., 67.
5 TCA., pp. 21-24.
2. Vāpyāti.

Gaṅgeśa has criticized many definitions of invariable concomitance (vyāpyāti), of which some will be given here with his own definition. Invariable concomitance is nondeviation (avyabhicaritavā) or the absence of variable concomitance. (1) Invariable concomitance is the uniform absence of the reason (hetu) from the locus of the absence of the predicate (sādhya). *The hill is fiery, because it is smoky*. It is a valid inference. But 'smoke' (hetu) exists in its parts, which are the loci of the absence of 'fire' (sādhya), by inference; it exists in a lake, water, etc., which are the loci of the absence of 'fire' through temporal relation. So 'smoke' is not a valid reason for proving the existence of a 'fire' according to this definition. But it is known to be a valid reason for the existence of a 'fire'. To obviate these objections Mathurānātha states that a reason should not exist in the locus of the absence of the predicate by the same relation by which it exists in the subject. *Smoke* exists in 'a hill' by conjunction; so it should not exist in the locus of the absence of 'fire' by conjunction. So the objections mentioned above are obviated. The absence of the predicate from a locus means the absence of the predicate in general by the same relation by which the predicate exists in the subject. In the valid inference given above 'smoke' exists in its parts by inference, which are the loci of the absence of 'fire in general'; 'fire' exists by conjunction in a hill, which is the locus of the absence of 'individual fires' existing in kitchens, etc., and of the absence of fire and water taken collectively. This is not a flaw. *Smoke* is a valid reason for the existence of a 'fire' in a hill.

But in the valid inference 'This tree has contact with a monkey, because it has this-treeness', the reason 'this-treeness' exists in a root of this tree, which is the locus of the absence of the predicate 'contact with a monkey'. So the reason is invalid according to this definition, because it is not absent from the locus of the absence of the predicate (sādhyābhāva-vadavādṛtītvam. TCA., p. 27.


Sādhyābhāvāṅga sādhyatāvacchedakasambandhena sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnapratijogātāko bodhyāt. TCA., p. 30.
vṛttitva'). But it is known to be a valid reason. To obviate this objection the second definition of invariable concomitance is proposed.

(2) Invariable concomitance is the absence of the reason from the locus of the absence of the predicate in entities other than the locus of the predicate itself. In the inference given above the reason ‘this-treeness’ does not exist in entities other than ‘this tree’, which is the locus of the predicate ‘contact with a monkey’. So this inference is valid according to the second definition of invariable concomitance. The objection mentioned above is obviated by this definition.

But the reason ‘this-treeness’ does not exist in ‘motions and qualities of this tree’, which are the loci of the absence of the predicate ‘contact with a monkey’, and which are different from the locus of the predicate itself ‘this tree’. The reason is valid according to the second definition. But the inference ‘Motions and qualities of this tree have contact with a monkey, because of this-treeness’ is not valid. It may be argued that negations (abhāva) differ with their loci. But there is no evidence to prove that negations differ according as their loci differ,—that the absence of contact with a monkey from ‘this tree’ differs from the absence of contact with a monkey from ‘motions and qualities of this tree’. To obviate this objection the third definition is proposed.

(3) Invariable concomitance is non-co-presence of the reason with the mutual absence whose counter-positive is the locus of the predicate. ‘The hill is fiery, because it is smoky’. In this valid inference ‘smoke’ is the reason (hetu), and ‘fire’ is the predicate (sādhya). All ‘fiery things’ are the loci of fire (sādhyavat). They are the counter-positives (pratiyogi) of the mutual absence of ‘non-fiery things’. ‘Non-fiery things’ are the counter-positives of the mutual absence of ‘fiery things’ or loci of fire. Here invariable concomitance is non-co-presence of ‘smoke’ with the counter-positives of mutual absence of the loci of ‘fire’, or ‘non-fiery things’. Wherever ‘fire’ does not

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9 Sadhyavaddhinnasadhyabhāvavadavṛttitvam. TCA., pp. 27, 30.
11 Sadhyavatpratiyogikānyonyabhāvāsambhāvahikaranyam. TCA., p. 30.
exist, 'smoke' does not exist. 'Smoke' does not exist in a 'non-fiery thing'. Hence the third definition of invariable concomitance applies to the valid inference.

But it may be argued that this definition does not apply to the valid inference: 'The hill has a hilly fire, because it has smoke, like a kitchen', because 'smoke' exists in the example 'a kitchen', which is the locus of the mutual absence of 'a hilly fire', which is the predicate. In a 'kitchen' there is the absence of 'a hilly fire', but 'a fire of the kitchen' exists in it. So there is non-pervasion (avyāpti) of the third definition, because the reason exists in the example, which is other than the subject, which is the locus of the predicate.\(^\text{13}\) So the fourth definition of invariable concomitance is proposed.

(4) Invariable concomitance is the state in which the reason is the counter-positive of the absence abiding in all loci of the absence of the entire predicate.\(^\text{13}\) Allness is a qualification of the loci of the absence of the predicate, and of the predicate.\(^\text{14}\) In invariable concomitance the reason is the counter-positive of the absences abiding in as many loci of the absence of the predicate as there are.\(^\text{15}\) The absence of the predicate means the absence of the predicate in general. In a 'kitchen' there is no absence of 'fire in general', or 'all fire'. So the objection mentioned above is obviated by this definition of invariable concomitance. In the inference 'The hill is fiery, because it is smoky' 'smoke' is the counter-positive of 'the absence of smoke' abiding in all loci of 'the absence of fire' (e.g., lake, water, etc.) or 'non-fiery things'. The definition applies to this valid inference.

But it may be argued that this definition does not apply to an inference in which the predicate is one individual only,\(^\text{16}\) because there are not all individuals of the predicate (sakalāsadhyā). In the inference 'It has this colour, because it has this taste' 'this colour' is the predicate, which is an individual

\(^{12}\) Herōb sadhyavatpakṣabhinnadṛṣṭāntavṛttītvam avyāpteraḥ, sakalā, TCAD., Vyāli-pañcakam, pp. 19-20.
\(^{13}\) Sakalāyadhyāvavamishṭāhāvapratyayogitam. TCA., pp. 30-31.
\(^{14}\) Sakalāyam sadhyāvavatā sadhye ca bodhyam. TCAD., Vyāli-
\(^{15}\) pañcakam, pp. 20-21.
\(^{16}\) TCAR., p. 43.
\(^{17}\) Yatra ekavyaktikāṁ sadhyam tatra avyāptiḥ. TCAD., Vyāli-
\(^{18}\) pañcakam, pp. 25-26.
only, and does not admit of many individuals. So the fourth definition of invariable concomitance does not apply to this valid inference, and is vitiated by nonpervasion. To obviate this objection the fifth definition is proposed.

(5) Invariable concomitance is the absence of the reason from what is not the locus of the predicate. It means the absence of the existence of the reason from entities different from the loci in which the predicate exists. Such absence means such absence in general. The absence of 'smoke' from 'non-fiery things' in general is the invariable concomitance, which is the ground of the inference: 'The hill is fiery, because it is smoky, like a kitchen.' Though 'smoke' is present in entities different from the loci of 'individual fires', there is no nonpervasion.

All these definitions are defective, since they do not apply to Kevalānāvayi inference, because here there is no dissimilar instance (vipakṣa) in which the predicate does not exist. 'This is knowable, because it is nameable.' There is no dissimilar instance of knowable things. Hence these definitions are not adequate.

(6) Invariable concomitance is defined as the relation of the reason to the predicate in its entirety. This definition does not apply where the predicate is one individual only, because there is no entirety which denotes all individuals without leaving out any. Where the reason 'smoke' denotes many individuals, an individual 'fire' (e.g., a hilly fire) is not related to 'all smokes'. But invariable concomitance is the relation of the reason to all cases of the predicate. Where the reason is not coextensive with the predicate, the former is not related to the entire extent of the predicate. 'Smoke', which is narrower in extent than 'fire', is not related to the entire extent of 'fire'. 'Smoke' is not related to 'fire' in a red-hot iron ball. Entropy is either of the reason, or of the predicate, or of the loci of the reason,
or of a property which exists in the locus of the reason. Invariable concomitance is not co-presence of the predicate with the entire reason in the same locus, because it does not apply where the reason denotes one individual only. 'This has a quality, because it has substanteness (dravyatva)'. 'This has smell, because it has earthness (prthivitva)'. These inferences are valid, but there is no invariable concomitance according to this definition, because 'substanteness' is one, and 'earthness' is one. Invariable concomitance is not the existence of the predicate in all loci of the reason, because it does not apply where the reason exists in one locus only. 'Ether is a substance, because it has sound'. This is a valid inference. But there is no invariable concomitance in it according to this definition, because the reason 'sound' exists in one locus 'ether' only. 'Kitchenness' coexists with 'smoke' in 'a fire of a kitchen'; but it does not coexist with 'smoke' in 'a hilly fire'. So this definition of invariable concomitance suffers from nonpervasion.

(6) Udayana defines invariable concomitance as the natural relation. It is the unconditional relation. This definition will be considered later. The natural relation, Gaṅgeśa argues, is either the relation produced by the essential nature of the reason, or abiding in its essential nature. The first definition suffers from nonpervasion, because it does not apply to the valid inference: 'Earth is a substance, because it has earthness'. The relation of 'substanteness' to 'earthness' is eternal, since they are eternal, inasmuch as they are universals (jāti). So 'substanteness' cannot be produced by the essential nature of the reason 'earthness'. The second definition suffers from overpervasion, because it applies to the false inference 'This is a substance, because it has beinghood'. The predicate 'substanteness' resides in the reason 'beinghood' (sattva). 'Substanteness' and 'beinghood' both reside in a substance. They are related to each other by coinherence in the same substrate. There is pervasion here according to the second definition. But the inference is invalid, because there is the absence of 'substance-

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22 Atra kārttivyān sādhanaśya sādhyaśya sādhanāśrayasya sādhanasamānādhihkarāndharmasya vā vivakṣitam. TCAR., p. 86.
23 TCAR., pp. 86-87; NSM., pp. 73-74; NMS., p. 74.
25 Anupādhihkatvam eva svābhāvikatvam. KV., p. 300.
ness' in a quality and an action, though 'beinghood' exists in
them. Hence pervasion is not natural relation. 27

(8) Invariable concomitance is the non-existence of
the reason where the predicate is absent, or, the existence of the
reason in the locus of the absence of the predicate. This
definition is defective, because it does not apply to Kevalānvavīy
inference in which there is no dissimilar instance of the absence
of the predicate. 28

(9) Invariable concomitance is mere relation. 29 This defini-
tion suffers from overpervasion, because variable co-presence of
the reason with the predicate in the same locus, which is not
the ground of a valid inference, will be considered to be in-
variable concomitance according to this definition. 30

(10) Invariable concomitance is the state in which the
reason has not a locus in which there is non-co-presence of
the predicate. 31 It is the absence of the reason from what is
not a locus of the predicate. In the valid inference 'The hill is
fiery, because it is smoky' the reason 'smoke' has not a locus
in which the predicate 'fire' is not present. There is always
co-presence of 'smoke' with 'fire' in the locus of 'smoke'. But
there is no non-co-presence of 'fire' in the locus of 'smoke'.
The predicate is 'fire'. 'A lake of water' is not a locus of 'fire';
there is non-co-presence of 'fire' in it. The reason 'smoke' is
not present in 'a lake of water' in which the predicate 'fire'
is not present. So there is invariable concomitance here. But
in the false inference 'The hill is smoky, because it is fiery' the
reason 'fire' exists in 'a red-hot iron ball', which is not a locus
of the predicate 'smoke'. So there is no invariable concomitance
here.

(11) Invariable concomitance is the state in which the
reason has not a locus which is different from the locus of the
predicate. 32 The reason 'smoke' has not a locus which is
different from a locus of the predicate 'fire'. 'A lake of water'
is not a locus of 'fire'. It is not a locus of 'smoke'. 'Smoke'

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27 Nāpi svabhāvikāḥ saṃbandho vyāptīḥ, svaṃśavajānyatva tudā
ārūtavādau va avyāptiyāvyāptīḥ. TCA., p. 88.
28 Nāpi avināshvāhā, kevalānvavīyabhāvah. TCA., p. 88.
29 Nāpyavānāvavāh. TCA., p. 88. TCA., p. 88.
30 Śāntasāntāvānāvavāna-pakāraṇāḥ. TCA., p. 88.
31 Sāntasāntāvānāvavāna-pakāraṇāḥ. TCA., p. 88.
32 Šāntasāntāvānāvavāna-pakāraṇāḥ. TCA., p. 48.
33 Šāntasāntāvānāvavāna-pakāraṇāḥ. TCA., p. 49.
does not exist in 'a lake of water' which is different from a locus of 'fire'. So there is invariable concomitance in the valid inference 'The hill is fiery, because it is smoky'. But in the false inference 'The hill is smoky, because it is fiery' there is no invariable concomitance, because the reason 'fire' has a locus 'a red-hot iron ball', which is different from the locus of the predicate 'smoke'. These two definitions are called the Lion-Tiger definitions. They are defective, because they show that the reason has not a locus, which is not the locus of the predicate. But sometimes the reason has a locus, which is not the locus of the predicate. The reason 'smoke on a hill' has a locus 'a hill', which is not a locus of the predicate 'a fire in a kitchen'.

(12) Udayana defines invariable concomitance as the unconditional relation\(^{24}\) or the co-preservation of the reason with the predicate in the same locus, qualified by the absence of a condition.\(^{25}\) A condition pervades the predicate, but does not pervade the reason. It vitiates a false inference. 'The hill is smoky, because it is fiery'. This is a false inference. 'Wet fuel' is a condition (upādhi) which pervades the predicate 'smoke', but does not pervade the reason 'fire'. There is no 'wet fuel' in a red-hot iron ball in which there is 'fire'. Unconditional relation or invariable concomitance is the co-presence of the reason with the predicate, which exists in the locus of the absence of the counter-positives of as many absences as there are in its loci.\(^{26}\) The co-presence of the reason 'smoke' with the predicate 'fire', which is co-present with 'the absence of water', etc., in the same locus is an unconditional relation. In 'a hill' which is a locus of 'smoke' there is 'the absence of water' whose counter-positive is water. 'Waterlessness' is the limiting (avacchedaka) or limiting property of the counter-positive 'water'. 'Water' is limited (avacchinna) by the limitor of the counterpositive 'waterlessness'. The reason 'smoke' has

\(^{24}\) Na, tatra yatkiñcitsādhyānadhikarapādhikaraṇe dhīme cāsiddham. TCA., pp. 49-50. HILL., p. 423.

\(^{25}\) Pratibandhaḥ anapādhiḥ sambandhaḥ. KV., p. 297. TCA., p. 77.

\(^{26}\) Upādhyāvāvavāśṭaṃ sādhyanāmādhiḥkaraṇaṃ. TCA., p. 78.

\(^{27}\) Anapādhiḥkaraṇaṃ vyāptiḥ lacc ca yāvatsamādhiḥkaraṇapādyantābhāvapatrīyogitāvaccchedakahāvacinnaṃ yat tatpratīyogikātyantasābhavasamādhiḥkaraṇaṃ yat tena samānādhiḥkaraṇaṃ. TCA., pp. 149-50.
co-presence with the predicate ‘fire’, which is co-present with ‘the absence of water’ in the same locus. So there is an unconditional relation of ‘smoke’ with ‘fire’. It applies to the valid inference ‘The hill is fiery, because it is smoky’. But it does not apply to the false inference ‘The hill is smoky, because it is fiery’. Here the reason ‘fire’ is conjoined with a condition ‘wet fuel’. There is ‘the absence of wet fuel’ in a red-hot iron ball, which is a locus of the reason ‘fire’. The counter-positive of ‘the absence of wet fuel’ is ‘a locus of wet fuel’. The predicate ‘smoke’ is not co-present with ‘the absence of wet fuel’. So there is no unconditional relation of ‘fire’ to ‘smoke’.

Or, unconditional relation is the co-presence of all vyabhicārins of the vyabhicārī of the reason with the predicate in the same locus. ‘The hill is fiery, because it is smoky’. It is a valid inference. Here the reason is ‘smoke’. ‘A jar’ is its vyabhicārī, because it is the counter-positive of ‘the absence of a jar’ which abides in ‘a hill’, which is a locus of ‘smoke’. The vyabhicārī of ‘a jar’ is ‘the absence of a jar’, because it is absent from the ground, which is a locus of ‘a jar’. There is co-presence of ‘the absence of a jar’ with ‘fire’ in the same locus. So there is an unconditional relation here. But the inference ‘The hill is smoky, because it is fiery’ is false. Here the reason is ‘fire’. The vyabhicārī of the reason ‘fire’ is the condition ‘wet fuel’ (upādhi), which is absent from a red-hot iron ball, which is a locus of ‘fire’. The vyabhicārī of ‘wet fuel’ is ‘the absence of wet fuel’. There is no co-presence of the predicate ‘smoke’ with ‘the absence of wet fuel’ in the same locus. So there is no unconditional relation here. Gaṅgeśa explains the meaning of Udayana’s definition of vyāpti in this manner. (13) Gaṅgeśa defines invariable concomitance as the co-presence, in the same locus, of the reason with the predicate, which is not limited by the limitor of the counter-positive of the absence, which abides in the same locus with the reason, but abides in a locus different from the locus of the counter-positive. ‘The hill is fiery, because it is smoky’. In this

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97 Vāvat svayyabhičārīvyabhicārisādhhyāsāmāṇādhi karanyam anapādhitakatvam. TCA., p. 152.
98 TCA. p. 150.
99 Prativyayasa māṇādhi karaniyata sāmāṇādhi karapātyant ābhāvapratyogita vachchedakāvachinnanā yan na bhavati tenā samām tasya sāmāṇādhi karanyam vyāptih. TCA., p. 100.
valid inference there is co-presence of the reason 'smoke' with the predicate 'fire', which is not limited by the limitor ('jariness') of the counterpositive ('a jar') of 'the absence of a jar', which abides in the same locus ('a hill') with the reason 'smoke'; but 'the absence of a jar' abides in a locus 'the ground', which is different from the locus of the counter-positive 'the jar'. The predicate 'fire' is not the counterpositive of 'the absence of a jar', which abides in 'a hill', the locus of 'smoke'. But the inference 'The hill is smoky, because it is fiery' is invalid. There is no invariable concomitance here, because the predicate 'smoke' is not the counter-positive of 'the absence of smoke' residing in 'a red-hot iron ball', which is a locus of the reason 'fire'. 'Smoke' is not the counter-positive of 'the absence of smoke'.

'This tree has contact with a monkey, because it has this-treeness'. It is a valid inference. 'This-treeness' is the reason; its locus is 'this tree'. There is 'the absence of contact with a monkey' in 'a root of this tree' or 'this tree'. 'Contact with a monkey' is the counter-positive of 'the absence of contact with a monkey'. There is co-presence of 'contact with a monkey' and 'the absence of contact with a monkey' in 'this tree'. The definition of invariable concomitance given above without the qualification 'which absence does not reside in the locus of the counter-positive' does not apply to this valid inference. Hence this clause is added. The absence residing in the locus of the reason 'this-treeness' should not reside in the locus of the counter-positive 'contact with a monkey'. 'The absence of contact with a monkey' should not reside in 'this tree', which is the locus of the counter-positive 'contact with a monkey'.

This definition applies to a Kevalānvayi inference: 'This is knowable, because it is namable'. The reason is 'namability'; its locus is 'a namable thing'. 'The absences of jariness, clothness, etc.' reside in it; but 'the absence of knowability' does not reside in it. 'Knowability' is not the counter-positive of the absence which resides in 'a namable thing'. Hence the definition of invariable concomitance given above applies to this valid Kevalānvayi inference. It is called Siddhāntalaksana of invariable concomitance. Vyāpti is the logical ground of inference.

Viśvanātha defines invariable concomitance as the co-
presence, in the same locus, of the reason with the predicate, which is not the counter-positive of the absence residing in the locus of the reason. The co-presence of the reason ‘smoke’, in the same locus, with the predicate ‘fire’, which is not the counter-positive of ‘the absence of a jar’, ‘the absence of a cloth’, etc., which reside in the locus of the reason ‘a hill’ is invariable concomitance. There are ‘the absences of a jar, a cloth, etc.’, in ‘a hill’; but there is no ‘absence of fire’ in it. ‘Fire’ is the counter-positive of ‘the absence of fire’, but not of ‘the absences of a jar, a cloth, etc.’. The co-presence of ‘smoke’ with such ‘fire’ in the same locus is invariable concomitance.

3. The Means of the Knowledge of Invariable Concomitance (vyāptigrāhāpya).

Prabhākara regards repeated observation (bhūyodarśana) as the means of knowing invariable concomitance. Gaṅgeśa refutes this view. Each perception of the relation of the reason ‘smoke’ to the predicate ‘fire’ is not the cause of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. The successive perceptions are destroyed quickly, and, consequently, they collectively cannot produce the knowledge of pervasion (vyāpti). The impressions (saṃskāra) of these perceptions are not the cause of this knowledge, because they are the cause of recollection, and aided by the sense-object-intercourse they are the cause of recognition of pervasion of two entities perceived together in the past. The impression of one object cannot produce the recollection of another object. If it did, then a jar would produce the knowledge of a cloth. The impressions of ‘smoke’ and ‘fire’ can produce the recollections of ‘smoke’ and ‘fire’ respectively. But they cannot produce the knowledge of invariable concomitance which involves dissimilar things, e.g., occurrence of ‘smoke’ and ‘fire’ in a kitchen, a hill, etc. Further, what is the meaning of repeated observation of relation (sambandha-bhūyodarśana)? It means either observations in many places, or observations of many instances, or observation of the same instance many times. The invariable concomitance between

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40 Atthavā hetumannipātha-virahāpratiyoginā. Sādhyena hetorikādhikaranyān vyāptirucyate. BP., 69.
41 SM., pp. 297-98.
42 Vyāptir na bhūyodarśanagamā. TCA., p. 174. PP., pp. 70-71.
colour and taste is perceived in one place; that between 'sub-
stanceness' and 'jarness' which are one each is perceived. There is
no observation of many instances of 'substanceness' and
'jarness', which are universals. There is no element common
to numerosness (bhūyastva) like threeeness, fourness, etc.
There is no fixity as to the number of times the relation between
two things should be observed. The observation of a floor and
a pen even a hundred times cannot yield the knowledge of
invariable concomitance between them.\textsuperscript{49}

Some maintain that repeated observation aided by hypoth-
etical reasoning is the cause of the knowledge of invariable concomitance.\textsuperscript{44} Gaṅgeśa criticizes this view. Then let obser-
vation of concomitance aided by hypothetical reasoning be the
cause of its knowledge, because it is its necessary condition,
and let repeated observation be considered to be useless. It can-
ot be argued that hypothetical reasoning is not possible with-
out repeated observation, because a person who has acquired
knowledge of concomitance from the first observation can have
hypothetical reasoning. The knowledge of invariable concomi-
tance is the ground of hypothetical reasoning. If hypothetical
reasoning be thought to be the ground of invariable concomi-
tance, then it will lead to infinite regress.\textsuperscript{46} It may be argued,
a new-born baby's voluntary actions to realize a good and
avoid an evil depend on his inference that a particular action
will give pleasure or pain, which presupposes the knowledge
of invariable concomitance, but he has no hypothetical reason-
ing; so there is no infinite regress. Then hypothetical reason-
ing is not a cause of the knowledge of invariable concomitance,
because there are exceptions. The Navya Nyāya admits the
perception of all objects through an extraordinary intercourse
with their class-essence (sāmānyalakṣaṇā-pratvāsatti). But
Prabhākara does not admit such extraordinary intercourse with
the class-essence. It is a character common to many objects,
and, consequently, its knowledge depends upon repeated obser-
vation. A few observations, Prabhākara argues, are necessary
for removing doubt as to the concomitance being accidental.

\textsuperscript{44} TCA., pp. 174-77.
\textsuperscript{46} Tarkasaṃkhāraṇaḥ bhūyodarśanāḥ vyāptidhihetoḥ. TCAR., p. 178.
\textsuperscript{46} Tarkasa vyāptigrahāmūlakatvenānavasthānāt. TCA., p. 179.
But even these observations, Gaṅgeśa contends, may not remove doubt about the accidental nature of the concomitance.

The Nyāya considers the knowledge of the absence of frustrating conditions (upādhi) as a cause of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. The doubt about an object existing at the time and in the place being a condition is removed by the knowledge of its being a pervader (vyāpaka) of the reason or of its being pervaded by the predicate. Prabhākara argues that such doubt about an object being a condition is not removed without repeated observation. Gaṅgeśa contends that Prabhākara's argument involves infinite regress. The knowledge of the absence of an imperceptible condition depends upon inference. Inference depends upon the removal of doubt about an object being a vitiating condition, and so on to infinity. That much repeated observation is the cause of the knowledge of an object not being a condition, which is necessary for producing a certain knowledge of its not being a pervader of the predicate. But its exact number cannot be ascertained. Further, doubt about non-concomitance consequent on doubt about an imperceptible condition cannot be removed by repeated observation or by inference. Moreover, the impressions produced by repeated observations cannot aid the external sense-organs or the manas, because without their operation (vyāpāra) invariable concomitance is known by a person from observation of concomitance and non-observation of non-concomitance. If impressions aided them, then they as well as recollections produced by them would be means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). Hence invariable concomitance is known by a single observation. Repeated observation cannot remove doubts about non-concomitance. Hypothetical reasoning cannot be the cause of the knowledge of invariable concomitance, since it depends upon vyāptī, and will lead to infinite regress. Hence invariable concomitance cannot be known by repeated observation aided by hypothetical reasoning.

Gaṅgeśa maintains that invariable concomitance is known by the observation of concomitance and the absence of know-

**Ayogypādhīvyatirekasyānmānadhīnaṃjahñātvenānavasthāpātāt.**

**Parīṣēṇa sakṛddarśanagamyā sa.** TCA., p. 193. Ibid, pp. 177-93.

**Bhūvoddarśanam api sattāyākath tarkastevanavasthāgastā eva.** TCA., p. 269.
ledge of non-concomitance aided by hypothetical reasoning, which removes doubts about suspected conditions (upādhi). The knowledge must be certain. Apprehension sometimes arises from doubt about a suspected condition and sometimes from the perception of the common property of the reason and the predicate and the non-perception of their special qualities. The absence of conditions is known by hypothetical reasoning. Sometimes it is self-evident. Hypothetical reasoning should be continued until doubts are removed. So it does not lead to infinite regress. Where doubts do not arise owing to contradiction with effective actions, invariable concomitance is known without hypothetical reasoning.

4. Hyophothetical Reasoning (Tarka).

If smoke be not produced by an entity related to fire, being unproduced by an entity unrelated to fire, then it will not be produced. It will give rise to a doubt whether smoke will be produced by a non-fire only, or whether it will sometimes be produced without a fire, or whether it will be produced without a cause. If a person entertained doubt as to whether an effect is produced by a cause in whose presence he found it to be produced, and in whose absence he found it to be not produced, then he would have no action for the production of an effect, and he would not procure a fire to produce a smoke, food to satisfy his hunger, and use words to communicate his knowledge to others, because these effects would be produced without these causes. So procuring these causes to produce these effects is the counteracting cause of doubt. If there is doubt, there can be no uniform procuring of the particular causes for the production of particular effects. If there is uniform procuring of particular causes for the production of particular effects, then there is no doubt. Hence that is doubted, which being doubted, there is no arrest of one's action. One cannot entertain doubt as to fire, wet fuel, etc., being the cause of smoke, who regularly procures them in order to produce smoke. So

49 Ibid, pp. 211-12.
50 Madupādānām eva tādṛśa-saṅkārętibandhakah saṅkāyām na niyatopādānah niyatopādāne ca na saṅkā. TCA., pp. 229-31.
practical action is the end of doubt; they cannot coexist at the same time. Thus there is no infinite regress of hypothetical reasoning and invariable concomitance urged by some. One's practical action is the counteracting cause of doubt. The uniform procuring of a fire, wet fuel, etc., for the production of smoke is a proof of the absence of doubt about the cause-effect-relation. Hypothetical reasoning removes doubt. There is contradiction between doubt and practical action. So it is wrong to maintain with Śrīharṣa that there is doubt if there is practical action, that there is certainly doubt if there is no practical action in the absence of its counteracting cause, that doubt cannot be counteracted by practical action, and that hypothetical reasoning cannot remove doubt, because it depends upon invariable concomitance which depends upon hypothetical reasoning to infinity. Practical action does not depend upon doubt, but it terminates doubt. Hypothetical reasoning is necessary for the removal of doubt about vitiating conditions (upādhi). It is not possible without repeated observation (bhūyodarśana), which is therefore necessary, but which does not directly lead to the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Hypothetical reasoning is sometimes necessary for such knowledge, which depends upon repeated observation. But it is not valid knowledge. So the impressions of repeated observations are not independent means of valid knowledge.

It may be argued, the knowledge of the absence of doubt about non-concomitance and the knowledge of favourable hypothetical reasoning are present in an invalid inference like the observation of concomitance and the non-observation of non-concomitance, and, consequently, they cannot produce the certain knowledge of invariable concomitance. This argument is wrong. The real absence of doubt about non-concomitance and a real hypothetical reasoning are causes of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. The knowledge of such absence and the knowledge of a hypothetical reasoning are not causes of the

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82 Svakriyāyā eva śaṅkāpratibandhayat. TCA., p. 232.
83 Vyāghāto vadi śaṅkāstī na cecchānkā tatas tarāṁ. Vyāghātāvadāhā śaṅkā tarkā śaṅkāvadāhā katab.
84 Na ca tarkāvātāro bhūyodarśanāmī vineti bhūyodarśanādārāṁ, na ma svataeva pravojakāh. TCA., p. 233.
85 Tarkasyāpramātāhā. TCA., p. 223.
knowledge of pervasion. Valid hypothetical reasoning produces the valid knowledge of pervasion. Invalid hypothetical reasoning produces the invalid knowledge of pervasion. Where doubt about non-concomitance is absent, pervasion is known without hypothetical reasoning. So there is no infinite regress.\(^4\)

Others avoid infinite regress in another manner. The hypothetical reasoning, they argue, which depends upon the perception of pervasion (vyāpti), depends upon another hypothetical reasoning, but that which depends upon the recollection of pervasion, does not depend upon another, so that there is no infinite regress of hypothetical reasoning and pervasion. Hypothetical reasoning is a cause of the perception of pervasion, and not of its recollection.\(^5\) A new-born baby’s inference of an action being conducive to pleasure or pain depends upon the recollection of pervasion, because there is no cause of its perception; the recollection is due to the perception of pervasion in the past birth. So there is no infinite regress.

Others avoid infinite regress by regarding the certain knowledge of causes and effects as the cause of the removal of doubt in hypothetical reasoning, they being known from times immemorial.\(^6\) Gaṅgeśa contends that this view is wrong, because inference as distinguished from perception is necessary for the investigation of a means of valid knowledge, which depends upon hypothetical reasoning, so that it will lead to infinite regress. The knowledge of pervasion, which is the ground of hypothetical reasoning, may be said to be beginningless, because otherwise it cannot be established. This argument is invalid, because non-establishment is inference, which depends upon hypothetical reasoning.

Others maintain that the knowledge of pervasion depends upon hypothetical reasoning, because the absence of conditions (upādhi) depends upon it which disproves the opposite contingency. Gaṅgeśa contends that this view is wrong, because hypothetical reasoning is not a means of valid knowledge.\(^7\)

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\(^{4}\) TCA., pp. 233-34; TCAR., pp. 236-38.

\(^{5}\) TCA., p. 235. Vyāptyanubhavaḥḥ pratyeva tarkasyā hetuvat.

\(^{6}\) Anādīsiddhakārya-kāraṇabhavavirodhādhyāṃ kacit tarkāḥ. TCA., p. 238. TCAR., p. 239.

Hypothetical reasoning may be said to be auxiliary to perception, inference, etc., by removing doubt about non-concomitance. But this is wrong, because it will lead to infinite regress. There is practical action without hypothetical reasoning. Where doubt is absent, it is not necessary for the knowledge of pervasion.\(^4\)

Some maintain that the absence of imperceptible conditions (upādhi) is known by proving that they are not pervaders of the predicate and that they are pervaders of the reason. Gaṅgeśa argues that this leads to infinite regress. The knowledge of pervasion depends upon the knowledge of the absence of frustrating conditions (anaupādhikatva), which depends upon inference, which presupposes the knowledge of pervasion. There is no other means of the knowledge which can give this knowledge.\(^6\)

Gaṅgeśa does not regard hypothetical reasoning as a means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) or valid knowledge (pramāṇa). It is an aid to pramāṇa. Where there is no doubt about non-concomitance or vitiating conditions, it is not necessary for the knowledge of pervasion. But where there is such doubt, it is necessary for the knowledge of pervasion. It is not possible without repeated observation.\(^8\)

Viśvanātha follows Gaṅgeśa. His view is stated thus: The observation of concomitance between the reason and the predicate with the non-observation of non-concomitance between them produces the knowledge of pervasion. The knowledge of variable concomitance is a hindrance to it, and, consequently, its absence is a necessary condition of it. Repeated observation is not a cause of the knowledge of pervasion. Even a single observation of concomitance produces such knowledge, if variable concomitance is not known. On some occasions repeated observation becomes necessary to remove the apprehension of variable concomitance. Where it cannot remove such apprehension, hypothetical reasoning is required to disprove the opposite contingency. Where there is no apprehension, there is

\(^4\) Anye tu vipakṣabādhatakād anaupādhikatvagraha eva tadadhino vyāptigraha hi, tadapi na, tarkasyāpramāṇatvāt. TCA., p. 237.
\(^6\) TCA., pp. 228-39.
no need of hypothetical reasoning. Dinakara Bhaṭṭa mentions two kinds of hypothetical reasoning. (1) 'If an entity is devoid of fire, it must be devoid of smoke'. It gives certain knowledge of the causal relation between two objects (vīṣayaparīśodhaka). (2) 'If smoke is a variable concomitant of fire, then it will not be produced by fire'. It gives the knowledge of pervasion (vyāptigrāhaka).

5. Condition (Upādhi).

Invariable concomitance is an unconditional relation. The determination of the nature of a condition (upādhi) is necessary, because the nature of invariable concomitance cannot be ascertained, if a condition is known to be present, which produces the knowledge of variable concomitance. (1) Gaṅgēsa gives Udayana’s definition of a condition, and makes it more exact. It is non-pervasive (avyāpaka) of what is taken as the reason, and pervasive (vyāpaka) of what is taken as the predicate. The reason and the predicate mentioned here are not really so. The knowledge of the absence of a condition is not necessary for the knowledge of pervasion; for, if it were so, it would involve mutual dependence, since the definition of a condition contains the term ‘pervasion’, there being pervasion of it in the predicate. (2) Or, a condition is not the counter-positive of the absence residing in the locus of the predicate, and is the counter-positive of the absence residing in the locus of the reason. A condition is pervasive (vyāpaka) of the predicate and non-pervasive (avyāpaka) of the reason in this sense. This definition suffers from non-pervasion, because it does not apply to the conditions, which are pervasive of the predicate limited by the reason or by a property of the subject, which

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*Yatra bhāyodarśanād api śaṅkā nāpaiti tatra vīpakṣe bādhakata-rko’ pekṣitaḥ. SM., p. 454.
“SMD., p. 455.
Upādhiśānād vyabhicāraṇjāne sati na vyāptiniścaya ityupādhi nirāpyate. TCA., p. 294.
“Upādhiḥ sādhyaśvābhāmatavyāpakatve sati sādhanaśvābhāmatya-vyāpakah. TCA., pp. 294-95. NKSP., iii, p. 31; SM., p. 456.
TCA., p. 295.
Sādhyaśvāniniśhātyantābhāvapratītyogīve sati sādhanaśvāniniśhātyantābhāvapratītyogītvam upādhītvam. TCAR., pp. 296-97. TSG., p. 63.
“TCA., p. 296.
are not non-conditions, since they equally vitiate invariable concomitance. 'Air is perceptible, because it is the abode of touch'. 'Being endued with manifest colour' is a condition here; it is not pervasive of the predicate 'perceptibility', since the self is perceptible, but not endued with manifest colour. But the condition 'being endued with manifest colour' is pervasive of 'perceptibility' limited by a property of the subject 'air', viz., 'being an external substance'. 'He is dark, because he is a son of Mitrā'. 'Being produced by eating leafy vegetables' is a condition here; it is not pervasive of the predicate 'darkness', since a jar is dark, but its darkness is not 'produced by the eating of leafy vegetables'. But the condition 'being produced by eating vegetables' is pervasive of the predicate 'darkness' limited by the reason 'being a son of Mitrā'. The above definition of a condition suffers from overpervasion, because it applies to places other than the subject. 'The hill is smoky, because it is fiery'. 'Wet fuel' is a condition, which is pervasive of the predicate 'smoke' in the hill, but not in other places.

(3) Udayana defines a condition as what is non-pervasive of the reason and coextensive with the predicate, or pervasive of the predicate and pervaded by the predicate. Gaṅgēśa criticizes Udayana's view on the ground that what is not coextensive with, and pervasive of, the predicate is a condition. In being the cause of a flaw in an inference coextensiveness (samavāptatva) with the predicate is not necessary. That is not necessary for something, in whose presence it does not exist, and in whose absence it exists. A condition being pervaded by the predicate is not necessary.

(4) Udayana defines a condition as the property of an object which is reflected in another object. Redness of a javā flower is attributed to a crystal. The javā flower is a condition, because its redness is attributed to a crystal, which is taken as a reason. A condition is that whose being pervaded by the

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20 TCA., pp. 300-01. TCA., p. 300.
22 Nāpi sādhyasamavāptatve sati sādhanāvakatvam upādhitvaṃ, viśamavāptasyapyapādhićcitataḥ dūṣakatāyaḥ sādhyavyāpyatvasyāprayojakatvācchā. TCA., pp. 312-13.
predicate is attributed to the reason. Gaṅgeśa criticizes this definition. If a condition were merely pervaded by the predicate, then ‘kitchenness’ would be a condition in the inference ‘The kitchen is smoky, because it is fiery’, because it is pervaded by ‘smoke’. A condition must be not only pervaded by the predicate, but also pervasive of the predicate. ‘Kitchenness’ is not pervasive of ‘smoke’, and, consequently, is not a condition. In the popular sense, what attributes its property to another object is called a condition. But in Logic what is pervasive of the predicate and nonpervasive of the reason, frustrates the knowledge of pervasion, and vitiates an inference is called a condition.

(5) Others define a condition as that whose absence contradicts variable concomitance. In the absence of a condition there is invariable concomitance. The absence of what is not coextensive with the predicate (visamavyāpta) does not contradict variable concomitance; there is variable concomitance even in its absence. ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is a quality’. ‘Knowability’ is a condition. The condition ‘knowability’ is pervasive of the predicate ‘non-eternity’, but not pervaded by it; hence it is non-coextensive (visamavyāpta) with the predicate. The reason ‘quality’ is a variable concomitant of the predicate ‘non-eternity’. ‘Quality’ is present in a locus from which ‘non-eternity’ is absent. The condition ‘knowability’ is pervasive of the reason ‘quality’; it is not non-pervasive of the reason; so there is the absence of the condition ‘knowability’ as non-pervasive of the reason. But though the condition is absent, there is no pervasion (vyāpti) of ‘non-eternity’ in ‘quality’. ‘Qualityness’ is present in ‘eternal qualities’; from which ‘non-eternity’ is absent. So there is no invariable concomitance in the absence of a condition. Likewise, the absence of what is co-extensive with the predicate (samavyāpta), or of what is pervasive of, and pervaded by, the predicate does not contradict variable concomitance; there is variable concomitance even in its absence. Further, that in

45 Na ca vyāpatvamātreyā daśakatvam iti, sādhavyāpakatāpiṣyate. TCA., p. 315. TCAR., p. 315.
46 TCA., pp. 316-17.
47 Anye tu yadabhavo vyābhināravirodhi sa upādhiḥ. TCA., p. 317.
whose presence there is no inference is a flaw, but that in whose absence there is an inference is not a flaw.\[10\]

(6) Gaṅgēśa defines a condition as that from whose variable concomitance with the reason, the variable concomitance of the reason with the predicate is inferred.\[11\] 'The hill is smoky, because it is fiery'. This is a false inference. Where there is no condition 'wet fuel', there is the reason 'fire'; 'fire' is a vyabhicāri of 'wet fuel', because it is present in a red-hot iron ball from which 'wet fuel' is absent. A vyabhicāri of an entity is present in the locus of the absence of that entity (tadabhāva-vadvyṛtti). The reason 'fire' is a vyabhicāri of the predicate 'smoke', because it is a vyabhicāri of 'wet fuel'. A condition is non-pervasive of the reason, being pervasive of the determinate predicate. The determinate predicate is limited by that property limited by which it is known to be present.\[12\] 'The kitchen is smoky, because it is fiery'. 'Smoke' qualified by 'kitchenness' by the relation of co-presence is the determinate (paryavasita) predicate. It is evident that there is variable concomitance of the reason with the predicate because of its (hetu) variable concomitance with the condition which is pervasive of the predicate,—which is pervaded by the predicate, or which is not pervaded by the predicate,—because what has variable concomitance with the pervader has variable concomitance with the pervader.\[13\] The reason must have variable concomitance with the predicate, because it has variable concomitance with the predicate limited by the reason, or by a property of the subject.\[14\] 'Destruction is perishable, because it is produced'. 'Positive-beingness' (bhāvatva) is a condition. The predicate 'perishability' is present in 'prior non-existence'; but the condition 'positive-beingness' is not present in it; so the condition is not the pervader of the predicate. But it is the pervader of the predicate 'perishability' limited by the reason 'producedness'.

\[10\] TCA., pp. 317-23.
\[11\] Vyabhicāritvena sādhanaśya sādhvyavyabhicāritvaṁ sa upādhiḥ. TCA., p. 336. NKSP., iii, p. 36.
\[12\] Paryavasitasaśādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanaśyāpakatvaṁ, yaddharmavacchedena sādhyāṁ prasiddham tadacchinnaṁ paryavasitam sādhyam. TCA., pp. 336, 341. NKSP., iii, pp. 36-37.
\[13\] Samavyāptasya visamaavyāptasya vā sādhyavyāpakasya vyabhicāreṇa sādhanasya sādhyavyabhicāraṁ aṁśuta eva vyāpakavyabhicārinas tadvyāpyavyabhicāraniyamāṁ. TCA., p. 345. TCAR., pp. 345-46.
\[14\] Sādhanacchinna-pakṣaḥdharmanacchinnaśādhyavyāpakayor vyabhicāritvena sādhanasya sādhyavyabhicāritvaṁ eva. TCA., pp. 346-47.
'Air is perceptible, because it is an abode of perceptible touch'. 'Being endowed with manifest colour' is a condition. It is not a pervader of the predicate 'perceptibility', because 'perceptibility' is present in the self, but 'being endowed with manifest colour' is not present in it. 'Air' is an external substance. The condition 'being endowed with manifest colour' limited by 'being an external substance', which is a property of the subject, is a pervader of the predicate 'perceptibility'. If the reason which is an invariable concomitant (avyabhicāri) of a qualification of the predicate, has variable concomitance (vyabhicāra) with the qualified predicate, it must have variable concomitance with the pure predicate, because variable concomitance of the qualified predicate is identical with variable concomitance of the pure predicate.\(^13\) Invariable concomitance (avyabhicāra) with an entity consists in not being the counter-positive of the absence residing in the locus of that entity.\(^14\)

(7) Or, what is a variable concomitant (vyabhicāri) of the reason, and proves its variable concomitance with the predicate is a condition.\(^15\) A vyabhicāri of an entity is present in the locus of the absence of that entity.\(^16\) A condition is a vyabhicāri of the reason, and proves that the reason is a vyabhicāri of the predicate.

(8) Or, the property which being excluded excludes the predicate from the reason, or in whose absence there is the absence of the relation of the predicate to the reason in the subject, is a condition.\(^17\) 'Possessing wet fuel' is a condition in whose absence there is the absence of 'smokiness' in a red-hot iron ball, and there is the absence of the relation of 'smoke' to 'fire' in the subject 'hill'. Similarly, in the absence of 'positive-beingness' there is the absence of the relation of 'producedness' to 'non-eternity' in the subject 'destruction'.\(^18\)

\(^{13}\) Viśeṣanāvyabhicārini sādhane viśeṣatvavyabhicāraśaya viśeṣavyabhicārītvaniyamāt. TCA., pp. 346-47. Viśeṣādhyavyabhicāro viśeṣyitvabhotanādhiṣadhyavyabhicārāvadārāpāñj. TCAR., p. 346.

\(^{14}\) Ayyabhicārāh tatasmānādhiśkritānyatābhāvāpratīyogitāṃ. TCA., pp. 350-51.

\(^{15}\) Yāh sādhanaavyabhicārī sādhavyabhicāromāyakaḥ sa upādhiḥ. TCA., pp. 351-52. NKSP., iii, p. 37.

\(^{16}\) Tadābhāvadvṛttītvām tadvyabhicāritvām.

\(^{17}\) Ancy tu yadyāvṛttāya yasya sādhanaśya sādhyaṁ nivartate sa dharmas tatra hetuvapādhīh, sa ca dharma yasyābhyātām paksam sādhyaśādhanasambandhābhūtvā. TCA., pp. 365-66. NKSP., iii, p. 36.

(9) Some maintain that sometimes what is pervasive of the reason also is a condition.44 'A hail is earth, because it has contact with a solid substance'. In this false inference 'neither hot nor cold touch' is a condition, because it is pervasive of the reason 'contact with a solid substance', which is present in earth which has 'neither hot nor cold touch'. It may be argued that there is the fallacy of svarūpāsiddhi here. Gaṅgeśa replies that a condition has a mixture with some other flaw in an inference.45

(10) An entity other than the subject or non-S (pakṣetara), which is known for certain as pervasive of the predicate through contradiction (bādha) or certain knowledge of the absence of the predicate from the subject, can be a condition. The absence of the predicate from the subject is known for certain by bādha; so non-S is known as pervasive of the predicate, and, consequently, can be a condition. 'Fire is non-hot, because it is produced'. 'Hotness' of 'fire' is known for certain by perception; so 'non-fire' can be a condition, because it is known as pervasive of the predicate 'non-hot'.46 But an entity other than the subject, which is not known for certain as pervasive of the predicate through contradiction (bādha) or certain knowledge of the absence of the predicate from the subject, cannot be a condition, because if it were a condition, it would cease to be a cause of a flaw in an inference.47 Here there is no proof for the condition being pervasive of the predicate. There is a doubt about non-S being pervasive of the predicate; so it cannot be a cause of a flaw in an inference.

Some maintain that a condition shows that the reason of an inference is counterbalanced by another reason which proves the absence of the predicate from the subject. 'A red-hot iron ball is smoky, because it is fiery'. This inference is counterbalanced by the rival inference 'A red-hot iron ball is non-smoky, because it is devoid of wet fuel'. Gaṅgeśa criticizes this view. Just as in a counterbalanced reason (satpratipakṣa) no other counterbalancing reason is to be shown, so in it no

44 Kercit tu sādhana vyāpako'pyupādhiḥ. TCA., p. 375. SM., p. 460.
45 TCA., p. 375. SM., p. 460.
46 Bhāvanāmitapakṣetaratvam upāddhiḥ. NKSP., iii, p. 32. SM., p. 459. TCA., p. 360.
47 Bhāvanāmitapakṣetaratvānvāvivāpyupāddhītvam svavyāghātakatvam. TCA., pp. 388-89. SM., p. 459. NKSP., iii, p. 36.
condition is to be exposed. A number of counterbalancing inferences do not strengthen one's inference, even as a hundred blind persons cannot see. Invariable concomitance and pakṣadharmaṭā are the grounds of inference; they only are the grounds of its strength. A large number of flaws exposed in an opponent's inference do not lend strength to one's inference. The only ground of its strength is invariable concomitance accompanied by pakṣadharmaṭā.

A condition is pervasive of the predicate; it is wider in extent than the predicate which is included in it. It is non-pervasive of the reason; the extent of the reason is excluded from that of the condition. The reason is present in the subject; it (hetu) is excluded from the condition which is wider than the predicate. Hence the subject, the locus of the reason, must be excluded from the predicate. Hence a condition proves the absence of the predicate from the subject. The reason 'fire' is present in a red-hot iron ball, which is the locus of the absence of the condition 'wet fuel', which is pervasive of the predicate 'smoke'. So from the absence of the pervader 'wet fuel' the absence of the pervaded 'smoke' is inferred. Further, a condition is pervasive of the predicate, and the reason is not pervaded by the condition. So the reason is not pervaded by the predicate. Or, there is the absence of invariable concomitance between the reason and the predicate. When there is a certain knowledge of a condition, there is a certain knowledge of variable concomitance. When there is a doubt about a condition, there is a doubt about variable concomitance. Hence a condition proves variable concomitance of the reason with the predicate or the absence of invariable concomitance between them. Or, the reason occurring in the locus of the absence of a condition or the pervader of the predicate, its (hetu) variable concomitance with the predicate is inferred. A condition is the cause of invalidity of an inference for these reasons.

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42 Satpratipakṣe upādhiyudhāvānaṁ na syāt satpratipakṣāntaratvat. TCA., p. 308. Ibid., p. 384. NKSP., iii, pp. 32-33.
43 TCA., pp. 394-96. NKSP., iii, pp. 32-33.
44 Upādhiṃśayād vyabhicāraniścayāḥ tatasahāyāt tatasahāya iti vyabhicārāṇānāṁ vā śādhyavyāśākāvāpyatvāna vyāptivirahonānāvabhyātā śūnyāt vopādher dūṣyakatvam. TCA., pp. 394-95.
45 Vad vā śādhyavyāśāpakābhāvavadvrttāya śādhyavyabhicārītvam unnye m. TCA., pp. 395-96.
Udayana regards what is coextensive with (samavyāpta), and pervasive of, the predicate, and non-pervasive of the reason as a condition. Gaṅgeśa regards what is non-coextensive with (viṣamavyāpta), and pervasive of, the predicate, and non-pervasive of the reason also as a condition. Vardhamāna regards the former (samavyāpta) as a primary condition, and the latter (viṣamavyāpta) as a secondary condition.***


Invariable concomitance is the relation of all instances of the reason (e.g., smoke) to the predicate (e.g., fire). But how can all smokes be known? All smokes of all times and places are not known by perception through the sense-organs. If the relation of all smokes to fire is not known, the existence of a fire on a hill cannot be inferred from the perception of a smoke on it. Gaṅgeśa solves the problem by assuming an extraordinary kind of intercourse through the generic character (sāmāṇya-lakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti). When a particular smoke is perceived through the visual organ, all smokes are perceived in a non-sensuous way through their generic character (sāmāṇya) 'smokeness' which abides in them. Likewise, when an individual fire is perceived through the visual organ, all fires are perceived in a non-sensuous way through 'fireness' which is their generic character. Sāmāṇya-lakṣaṇā is an extraordinary non-sensuous perception of all objects qualified by the generic character, which is a qualification of a particular object which has intercourse with a sense-organ.** When a particular smoke is perceived in a kitchen, its class essence 'smokeness' is perceived, which is a qualification (viṣeṣaṇa) of the smoke which has intercourse with the visual organ, and through an extraordinary intercourse with 'smokeness' all smokes, in which it subsists, are perceived in a general way. Sāmāṇya-lakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti gives common knowledge (sāmāṇya-jñāna) of all objects of a particular class as distinguished from particular knowledge (viṣeṣajñāna) of them with their distinctive characters. The Mīmāṁsaka objects that if sāmāṇya-lakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti with

***NKSP., iii, p. 38.
'smokeness' be assumed to account for the perception of all smokes, then a person will become omniscient through the knowledge of the class essence of knowability (prameyatva). Gaṅgese replies that through sāmāṇya-lakṣaṇa-prattyāsatti all knowable objects are perceived in a general way as having the common character of knowability, but not with their distinctive characters.

The visual perception of a particular smoke is produced by its intercourse with the visual organ. But there is no sense-object-intercourse in the perception of remote and future smokes. 'Smokeness' is the qualification (viśeṣaṇa) of a 'smoke', which is the qualified object (viśeṣya). 'Smokeness' is an object of visual perception (prakāra) as a qualification (viśeṣaṇa) of a smoke (viśeṣya), qualified by which it is perceived. The character of being an object of the act of perception (prakārata) is the character of being a qualification (viśeṣaṇaṇa). 'All smokes' are the loci (dharmaṇi) of the generic character 'smokeness'. Their locuness (dharmaṇ) is determined (nirūpita) by the generic character (sāmāṇya). The knowledge of locuness is determined by the knowledge of the generic character. The extraordinary non-sensuous perception of 'all smokes', which are the substrates of 'smokeness', is due to sāmāṇya-lakṣaṇa-prattyāsatti. It produces the knowledge of the substrates of the generic character. This kind of non-sensuous perception of all smokes through the perception of 'smokeness', and of all fires through the perception of 'fireness' is necessary for the knowledge of invariable concomitance of all smokes with fire. This is Gaṅgese's view.

But the Mīmāṃsakas deny the existence of sāmāṇya-lakṣaṇa-prattyāsatti and non-sensuous perception of a whole class of objects due to it. They mention the following steps in an inference. (1) First, the pervasion (vyāpti) of fireness in

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100 TCA., pp. 256, 271.

101 Chakṣurādijana - jñānapraṇāṁhūtadhūmatvādi - sāmāṇyarūpāṇaḥ dharmātyāḥ viśeṣaṇapātaya sāmāṇyalakṣaṇaḥ. TCAR., p. 254.


'smokeness' abiding in a particular smoke which has intercourse with a sense-organ is known through perception. (1) Then there is the recollection of the pervasion of fireness in 'smokeness' abiding in a particular smoke in a hill. (3) Then there is the third consideration of the sign or reason (tr̥ṣya-lingaparāmarśa), in which the smoke pervaded by fire abiding in the hill is known. The knowledge of 'smokeness' is a necessary factor in the knowledge of paksadharma. (3) Then there is the inference of the existence of a fire in the hill. Either the perception of pervasion, or the recollection of it, or the knowledge of paksadharma is the cause of inference. The knowledge of paksadharma is the perception 'smoke is pervaded by fire'. It is not the knowledge 'all smokes are pervaded by fire'. Hence sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratystāti is not necessary for the non-sensuous presentative knowledge of all smokes.\(^{165}\)

Gaṅgēśa replies that if there were no sāmānya-lakṣaṇa perception, there would be no doubt about variable concomitance in a smoke in the absence of a favourable hypothetical reasoning. This doubt presupposes the knowledge of all smokes which were perceived in a general way as related to fires. When a smoke is perceived in a hill at another time and in another place, a doubt arises in the mind whether it is accompanied by a fire.\(^{166}\) A person strives to realize an unattained pleasure through an object which afforded him a similar pleasure in the past. When he perceived a pleasure in the past, he perceived all similar pleasures through sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratystāti. Therefore he strives to attain a similar pleasure now. There is no desire for the attainment of a realized object; and there is no knowledge of an unattained pleasure. Though an unattained pleasure is unknown, desire for it arises from the non-sensuous perception of all similar pleasures through the knowledge of their generic character, which was acquired when an attained pleasure was perceived.\(^{167}\) Knowledge is the cause of a desire; desire is the cause of a volition. Voluntary pursuits of future pleasures presuppose the sāmānya-lakṣaṇa perception of all similar pleasures. Further, the word 'cow' denotes an individual

\(^{165}\) TCA., pp. 271-75. TCAR., pp. 272-73.

\(^{166}\) Yadi sāmānya-lakṣaṇā naśī tadānukūlaṭarkādikam vinā dhāmādaya vyūdhicāraṣaṇāyā nā syāt. TCA., p. 283. Ibid, p. 284.

\(^{167}\) TCA., pp. 285-90.
cow bearing the genus ‘cowness’ and possessing a particular configuration of parts. It does not denote a particular cow only, but all cows in which the generic character ‘cowness’ inheres. The knowledge of the denotation of the word ‘cow’ presupposes sāmānya-lakṣaṇa perception of all cows through their generic character ‘cowness’ in a general way. A negative judgment ‘this is not a cow’ also presupposes the presentative knowledge of the whole class of cows which are denied of the subject ‘this’.

7. Pakṣatā.

Invariable concomitance is the logical ground of inference. Pakṣatā is the psychological ground of inference. (1) The ancient Nyāya defines the subject (pakṣa) as that in which the presence of the predicate is doubtful. Gaṅgeśa criticizes this definition. Doubt is not a qualification (viṣeṣaṇa) of the subject, because it is destroyed by the perception of a sign (liṅga), the recollection of invariable concomitance, etc., before the knowledge of the occurrence of the sign pervaded by the predicate in the subject (parāmarśa). (2) Nor is the absence of a valid evidence for the presence of the predicate in the subject, and of a valid evidence for the absence of the predicate from the subject both a qualification of the subject, because when each absence is present, there is the absence of both (ubhayābhāva). When A is absent, there is the absence of A and B both. When B is absent, there is the absence of A and B both. (3) The two absences individually are not the qualifications of the subject, because then the absence of a valid evidence for the absence of the predicate from the subject would be needless. ‘A lake is fiery, because it is smoky’. Such inference is not produced because the absence of fire from a lake is certain. (4) Nor is the absence of a valid evidence for the presence of the predicate in the subject a qualification of the subject, because even when the existence of the self is known for certain from testimony of the Vedas, it is known by inference. Even when an object is perceived, it is inferred. Even when an object is

\[\text{107 KU., p. 77. Ibid., pp. 77-83. TCAR., pp. 275-76. TCA., pp. 277-79.}
\[\text{108 Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, Calcutta, 1939, pp. 272-73, 229-30.}
\[\text{109 Sandhyāsaiddhyadharma tvaṁ pakṣatvam. TCA., p. 407.}
\[\text{110 TCA., pp. 407-08.}\]
inferred from one sign, it is inferred from another sign.\textsuperscript{111} (5) The subject is defined as the locus of the inferable property or predicate which is sought to be inferred in it.\textsuperscript{112} An aspirant after release infers the existence of the self, even after he knows its existence from the Vedic testimony, because he has a desire to infer its existence. Vācaspati says, "Persons fond of reasoning infer the existence of an object which is perceived by them." Again he says, "When a person perceives an elephant, he does not infer its existence." It may be said that the two statements of Vācaspati are not contradictory to each other, because when there is a desire to infer, the first statement is true, and when there is no desire to infer, the second statement is true. But Gaṅgeśa contends that the desire to infer is absent before the knowledge of parāmarsa, because it is destroyed like doubt by the recollection of invariable concomitance. Parāmarsa is the knowledge of the sign pervaded by the predicate occurring in the subject. The capacity for a desire to infer in the absence of such a desire also is not a qualification of the subject, because such a capacity cannot be ascertained. Even in the absence of a desire to infer a cloud is inferred from the roar of a thunder. An inference is produced by its own cause, \textit{viz.}, the third consideration of the reason or the knowledge of the reason pervaded by the predicate occurring in the subject even in the absence of a desire to infer.\textsuperscript{113} So the definition of the subject given above is defective.

(6) That is the subject, according to Gaṅgeśa, where there is the absence of a valid evidence for the presence of the predicate in the subject together with the absence of a desire to infer.\textsuperscript{114} Therefore there is no subject where there is a valid evidence for the presence of the predicate in the subject together with the absence of a desire to infer. There is the subject where there is the absence of a desire to infer, whether a valid evidence for the presence of the predicate in the subject is present or whether it is absent, or where there is the absence of both.

\textsuperscript{111} TCA., pp. 420-23.
\textsuperscript{112} Śiśādhayiśitaśādhyadhartā dharmā dharme pākṣaḥ. TCA., p. 423.
\textsuperscript{113} Śiśādhayiśāviraha'pi ghamagarjita meghānmnānāt, svakārpaḥ-dhinastrtryalinga-parāmarsa-balena-pēkṣitānmnānunādaśanācceti. TCA., pp. 427-28.
\textsuperscript{114} Śiśādhayiśāvirahassahakrta-sādhakapramānābhāvo yatrāśti sa pākṣaḥ. TCA., p. 431. SM., pp. 311-12; BP., 70.
owing to the qualified absence. A qualified absence (viśiṣṭābhāva) is either due to the absence of the qualification (viśeṣaṇa-bhāva) or due to the absence of the qualified (viśiṣṭābhāva). The valid evidence for the existence of the predicate or inferable property in the subject is the certain knowledge of it (siddhi). Its absence is the absence of certain knowledge of it (siddhyabhāva).

Viśvanātha sums up the conditions which determine the state of the subject (pakṣatā). There is no pakṣatā, where there is a desire to infer only. Clouds are inferred from the roar of a thunder even when a desire to infer is absent. There is no pakṣatā, where there is a doubt about the presence of the predicate in the subject, because clouds are inferred even in the absence of a doubt. There is inference where there is a desire to infer, even when there is certain knowledge of the presence of the predicate in the subject. There is pakṣatā where there is no certain knowledge of the presence of the predicate in the subject (siddhi), whether a desire to infer is present or absent. There is pakṣatā where there is a desire to infer, whether certain knowledge of the presence of the predicate in the subject is present or whether it is absent. There is no pakṣatā where there is certain knowledge of the presence of the predicate in the subject, and where there is no desire to infer, because such certain knowledge (siddhi) qualified by the absence of a desire to infer is present.

8. Paramarśa.

Gaṅgeśa regards the relation of the subject to the reason pervaded by the predicate as the cause of inference. This is called parāmarśa or consideration. It is also called consideration of the reason (liṅgāparāmarśa). It is the knowledge of the reason pervaded by the predicate, occurring in the subject. It is the knowledge of the relation of the subject to the reason, and of the reason as pervaded by the predicate. Gaṅgeśa regards the knowledge of invariable concomitance as the

115 Yatra sādhakapramāṇe sati satī vā sīṣādhyāsa, yatra vohayabbhavya tatra viśiṣṭābhavat pakṣatvam. TCA, pp. 431-32.
117 Pakṣadharmsaya vyūptiviṣṭaṭānam anumitiheṇuḥ. TCA., p. 442.
118 Vyūptiviṣṭastasya pakṣeṇa saja vaśiṣṭyāvagāhījñānam. SM., p. 289.
119 TCAR, p. 442.
instrumental cause (karaṇa) of inference, and consideration (para-
marṣa) as its function or operation (vyāpāra). The impression
of consideration is not its function. Consideration is the last
cause of an inference. So at the moment when it produces an
impression, it produces an inference. Hypothetical reasoning
also cannot be a function of consideration, because it is not
produced by consideration, nor does it produce an inference.

The ancient Naiyāyika regards a sign (liṅga) as the instru-
mental cause of inference. Gaṅgeśa criticizes this view. The
knowledge of a past smoke or of a future smoke also produces
the inference of a past fire or a future fire, though such sign
or its causal activity is not its immediate antecedent. Another
existent sign is not its cause, because it is not an object of the
knowledge of consideration. What is not an object of the know-
ledge of consideration is not the cause of an inference. Where
the subject is future and the sign is only one, there is no
other sign. If the sign is present only, then a present predi-
cate only can be inferred. It may be argued that a future
smoke is not a sign, but its prior negation which exists at
present is a sign from which a future fire may be inferred;
and that a past smoke is not a sign, but its posterior negation
which exists at present is a sign from which a past fire may
be inferred. The sign ‘smoke’ being known for certain as
existing in the past or in the future and being known as doubt-
ful at present, its posterior negation or prior negation is doubt-
ful, and, consequently, cannot serve as a sign. Further, there
is an inference of a fire from a smoke on a hill without the
knowledge of its being past, present, or future. What is the
cause of such an inference? Either prior negation, or posterior
negation, or absence of the absence of a sign may be said to
be the sign. The qualifications being needless, they are not
signs. When any of the qualifications is not known, there is
an inference of a fire from the knowledge of a smoke, which
only is necessary. Further, a sign is not the cause of all in-
ferences. Even in the absence of a smoke, a fire is inferred
from a cloud of dust mistaken for a smoke. A sign is not
the cause of a valid inference. But consideration is the cause
of an inference, valid consideration being the cause of a valid

119 Vyāptijñānāṁ karaṇāṁ paraṁarṣo vyāpāraḥ. TCA., p. 550.
120 TCA., p. 551.
inference, and invalid consideration being the cause of an invalid inference. A generic cause produces a generic effect. A specific cause produces a specific effect. It may be argued, a sign is the cause of a valid inference, because an existent sign is the object of the knowledge of a valid consideration. This argument is invalid, because there can be a valid consideration of a sign, past, future or existing at any time, as its object. The sign may not exist before an inference in order to produce it or make it valid. The inference of a fire existing at the time of a smoke is produced by the knowledge of the invariable concomitance: 'Wherever and whenever there is a smoke, there is a fire'. Or, the time of 'smoke' which limits the special character of the subject proves the existence of the predicate 'fire', which is co-present with the attribute which limits the special character of the subject on the strength of the knowledge of pakṣadharmatā. Thus a fire existing at the time of a smoke is inferred. Hence a sign is not the immediate cause of an inference, but the knowledge of its consideration (parāmarśa) is so. Gaṅgeśa regards qualified consideration (viśiṣṭaparāmarśa) as its immediate cause, which is the knowledge of a sign pervaded by a predicate existing in the subject.

But Prabhākara holds a different view. According to him, inference is produced by the perception 'the hill is smoky' (pakṣadharmatājñāna) and the recollection of the invariable concomitance 'smoke is pervaded by fire'. The perception of the sign existing in the subject and the recollection of the invariable concomitance through the knowledge of 'smokeness', the attribute which limits the special character of the pervaded by the predicate are the causes of the inference 'the hill is fiery'. The two cognitions separately produce the inference. They are necessary even for the knowledge of qualified consideration which is regarded by Gaṅgeśa as the immediate cause of inference, because the knowledge of a qualified object (viśeṣa) depends upon the knowledge of the qualification (viśeṣa) which qualifies it. It is needless to assume a separate

112 Ibid., pp. 548-50.
113 Vyāyāpatvāvacchedaka-prakāraṇa vyāpti-smaranaḥ pakṣa-dharmatā-jñānam iti jñānavayād evaṇumītiḥ. TCA., p. 442.
qualified consideration as the cause of inference, because the
two cognitions are adequate to produce it and the hypothesis
of qualified consideration violates the law of parsimony.

Gangeśa criticizes Prabhākara's view. Even where the attrib-
ute 'smokeness' which limits or determines the special character
of the pervaded by the predicate is not known, but there is
a certain knowledge of something pervaded by the predicate
existing in the subject, an inference is produced. There is a
certain knowledge 'smoke or light is pervaded by fire'. Then
there is the knowledge 'smoke or light pervaded by fire exists
on a hill'. This is qualified consideration. Then there is the
inference of a fire on the hill. Here there is no certain know-
ledge of 'smokeness' or 'lightness' which is the attribute which
limits the special character of the pervaded by the predicate
(vyāpyatvavacchēdākā-dharma) mentioned by Prabhākara. But
there is the knowledge of qualified consideration which pro-
duces the inference. Even where there are the two cognitions
mentioned by Prabhākara, the qualified knowledge of considera-
tion must be admitted to account for an inference. If the
recollection of invariable concomitance and the knowledge of
the sign existing in the subject were separately regarded as the
causes of an inference, then an inference would be produced
by the two cognitions 'smoke is pervaded by fire' and 'light
occurs on the hill'.

But how can qualified consideration (viśiṣṭa-parāmarśa) be
produced? There is no consideration of an imperceptible sign
through an external sense-organ. Nor is a perceptible sign
considered through it, because though there is the intercourse
of the sign (e.g., a smoke) and the subject (e.g., a hill) with
an external sense-organ, there is no such intercourse with the
predicate (e.g., a fire). Gangeśa gives the following reply. If
two objects were perceived in the past by two successive cogni-
tions, they were so associated with each other that when one
is perceived or remembered, the other is revived in conscious-
ness. Such knowledge is associated knowledge (upanita bhāna)
through an extraordinary intercourse called intercourse through
knowledge (jāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa). This is acquired percep-
tion. When a person perceives a smoke on a hill, there is no

134 TCA., p. 493; SM., pp. 393-94; NSM., p. 86.
intercourse of a fire on the hill with his visual organ. But his visual perception of a smoke revives the knowledge of a fire through the recollection of invariable concomitance, and brings the knowledge of the co-presence of fire with smoke on the hill. The invariable concomitance which was perceived in the smoke of a kitchen is present in the smoke perceived on the hill. The knowledge of a fire as an object of consideration is due to the intercourse through knowledge (jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannīkāra), because it has no intercourse with the visual organ at present. Consideration is the knowledge of the occurrence of the sign pervaded by the predicate in the subject. It is acquired through the internal organ (manas), because the predicate has no intercourse with an external sense-organ, and because a past, future, or remote sign is devoid of it. It is the immediate cause of an inference, which consists of the following steps: (1) The knowledge of invariable concomitance of a sign (e.g., smoke) and a predicate (e.g., fire) in a kitchen and other places; (2) the perception of the sign as related to the subject (e.g., a hill); (3) a recollection of the invariable concomitance ‘smoke is pervaded by fire’; (4) consideration of the sign as correlated to the predicate and the subject; (5) the conclusion relating the subject to the predicate. There can be no transition from the premises to the conclusion without consideration (parāmarśa) or synthetic correlation of the sign to the subject and the predicate. It is called the third consideration of the sign (trya-liṅga-parāmarśa). The sign (e.g., smoke) is first known as pervaded by the predicate (e.g., fire) when it is perceived as accompanied by it in some instances (e.g., a kitchen, etc.). It is known for the second time when it is perceived in the subject and produces a recollection of the invariable concomitance between the sign and the predicate. It is considered for the third time when it is known to be pervaded by the predicate and related to the subject. The third consideration immediately produces an inference.

The Advaita Vedāntin, Dharmarājādīvarindra, regards the knowledge of invariable concomitance as the instrumental cause, and its impression (saṃskāra) as its intermediate causal operation (vyāpāra) in the production of inference. It arises from

\[123\] TCA., pp. 468-516.  \[124\] TCA., pp. 526-27.  \[125\] SM., pp. 280-88.  \[126\] TA., p. 15; TK., p. 10; NSM., p. 88; KV., p. 296.
the two cognitions 'this has smoke' and 'smoke is pervaded by fire', when the impression of the perception of invariable concomitance is revived. The so-called third consideration of the sign 'this has smoke pervaded by fire' is not an instrumental cause or a cause of inference. Thus the Advaita Vedānta rejects the Nāyāra Nāyāya theory of the qualified consideration as the instrumental cause of inference, because there is no valid proof for it and it violates the law of parsimony.129

9. Does Inference involve Petition Principii?

First, every inference depends upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vṝṣpī) between the reason (e.g., smoke) and the predicate (e.g., fire). The universal proposition is derived from induction based on observation of their concomitance and non-observation of their non-concomitance strengthened by favourable hypothetical reasoning which eliminates suspected conditions that vitiate the invariable concomitance. Secondly, the universal proposition is obtained from induction with the aid of a non-sensuous perception of all instances of the reason and the predicate through an extraordinary intercourse with their generic characters (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāśatti). It gives common knowledge (sāmānya-jāana) of the universal proposition 'all smoky things are fiery' without reference to their particular instances. Thirdly, the exemplification (udāharaṇa) 'whatever is smoky is fiery, for instance, a kitchen' shows that it is derived from an induction based on the observation of particular instances. It is not a mere summation of particular truths observed. Fourthly, the conclusion follows from all premises taken together: It does not follow from the universal major premise (udāharaṇa) only, but from the minor premise or application (upanaya) also, which applies the universal truth embodied in the exemplification to a particular instance. It correlates the reason, the predicate, and the subject to one another. 'The hill has smoke pervaded by fire'. Unless the middle, the major, and the minor terms are correlated to one another, the major term cannot be related to the minor term in the conclusion. It follows from all members of an inference related to one another. It gives a

129 VP., pp. 191, 188-89, 196.
new truth which necessarily follows from the premises taken together, and yet goes beyond them. Its truth is not already contained in that of the exemplification or the universal major premise. All inference is inductive-deductive. It derives a universal proposition from an induction, applies it to a particular instance, and deduces a particular truth from it.

The Navya Nyāya admission of non-sensuous perception of a whole class of objects through sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti does not commit it to the fallacy of petitio principii in every inference, because it gives common knowledge of a class of objects participating in the genetic character (sāmānya), but not with their distinctive characters. If it gave particular knowledge of all individuals of a class with their distinctive characters, then a person would be omniscient through non-sensuous perception of all knowable objects through an extraordinary intercourse with their generic character (prameyatva).

The relation of the smokes in a kitchen and other known similar instances is known by perception. The smokes in other times and places are not known, because there is no proof for their existence. All smokes are perceived in a general way through an extraordinary intercourse with their generic character (e.g., smokeness). Thus the relation of smokeness to fireness is known in a general way. When another smoke is perceived in a hill, its relation to fire is not known for certain. So a doubt arises in the mind whether it is related to fire, which is dispelled by inference. Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa does not dispense with inference. So an inference does not involve petitio principii. This problem is discussed elaborately in the Mīmāṃsā system.

II

Theology

10. The Anti-theistic arguments.

Gaṅgeśa elaborately deals with the causal argument for the existence of God in Itivāravānumāna. He states the argument

188 TCA., pp. 279-80, 290-91.
189 Prasiddhādīrje vaiśnva-sambandhāvagamār kālāntariya-devāntariya-
dhāmasya mānāhāvēnājānātāt sāmānyena tu sakala-dhūmopasthitau
dhūmāntare viśeṣādātānāma sāṁśayo yajñate. TCA., p. 284.
thus: 'Gross earth, etc., are produced by an agent, because they are effects, like a jar'. 'Gross earth, etc.,' are the subject (pākṣa); 'produced by an agent' is the predicate (sādhya); and 'being effects' is the reason (hetu). Both a theist and an atheist admit that 'a jar', which is an example, is an effect and produced by an agent.

But the atheist contends that there is no subject of inference. (1) Every individual composite earthy substance is not the subject, because there are an infinite number of such substances which can never be known exhaustively. (2) Nor are all individual composite earthy substances collectively the subject, because there is no property common to them which determines the special character of the subject (pākṣātāvaceḥ-daka). (3) Nor are the effects which are not produced by bodies or agents dependent on their bodies the subject, because arts and crafts are taught by God through a body, and because embodied finite souls through their merits and demerits are the causes of earth, etc., which are the common causes of all effects. (4) Nor are the effects which are not produced by produced volitions of finite souls, or the effects which are different from those produced by volitions as admitted by both a theist and an atheist the subject, because earth, etc., are produced by produced volitions of the finite souls through their merits and demerits. (5) Nor are the effects which are not produced by the volition which produces merits and demerits the subject, because the volition of God is the common cause of all effects including the finite souls' merits and demerits. Hence gross earth, etc., cannot be the subject, because they are not effects which are not produced by a volition which produces the finite souls' merits and demerits. (6) Nor are the effects which are not directly produced by produced volitions the subject, because then jars, etc., which are known to be produced by produced volitions of human souls through bodily efforts are included in it. So the inference partly involves proving what is already admitted to be proved (siddhasādhana). (7) Nor is gross earth only the subject, because the presence of being an effect (kāryatva) in a sprout, which is a form of gross earth, is doubtful and inconclusive. 142

142 Nā ca kaṇṭhā eva pākṣaḥ, aṅkuresa sandīghānaikāntikavāt. TCIA., R.I., Calcutta, 1893, p. 4.
doubtful and inconclusive, only when there is a doubt about the presence of the reason in what is definitely known to be the locus of the absence of the predicate. This fallacy arises also when there is a doubt about the reason being present in the locus of the absence of the predicate, or about the locus of the absence of the predicate. This fallacy arises when there is a doubt about the presence of the reason in the locus of the absence of the predicate, or about the absence of the predicate in the locus of the reason. But a doubt as to the presence of the predicate in the subject, which is the locus of the reason, does not make it (hetu) faulty. If it did, there could be no inference. The reason 'being an effect' is doubtful and inconclusive, if there is a doubt about its presence in a sprout. If the reason is definitely known to be present in a sprout, there can be an inference of the predicate 'being produced by an agent' in it in which its presence is doubtful, because the aggregate of its causes including the subject is present. A sprout may be said to be paksasama, since it is different from the subject, and the presence of the predicate in it is doubtful. This argument is invalid. If a sprout is not the subject, then the reason 'an effect' does not exist in the subject, and a sprout is not an object of inference of the theist. If a sprout also is the subject, then shifting the proposition (pratijñāntara), which is a ground of defeat; occurs. If the predicate 'being produced by an agent' in a sprout is proved by another inference, and then it is proved in earth by an inference, then there is mutual dependence which vitiates each inference. If 'being produced by an agent' in a sprout is proved by another inference, then the reason 'an effect' becomes doubtful and inconclusive, because a sprout is a form of gross earth. Shifting the topic (arthāntara), another ground of defeat, also occurs in this inference, because 'being produced by an agent' in gross earth and a sprout both is disputed. Further, even if an agent possessing the knowledge of each material cause of a composite earthly substance is proved to exist, the existence of one omniscient God is not proved.²¹² (8) Nor are dyads at the time of creation the subject, because the Cārvāka atheist does not believe in creation.²¹⁴

¹²² Ekaikopādānkhñajñasiddhāvapi neśvarasiddhiḥ. TCIA., p. 5.
¹²⁴ TCIA., pp. 1-5.
The atheist further contends that there is no predicate (sādhyā) of the theistic inference. (1) 'Being produced by an agent' (sakartṭkatva) which is its predicate is either co-existence with, or being produced by, an agent endued with volition. But it is neither, since human agents also endued with volitions produce jars, etc., which are coexistent with, or produced by, them. This argument involves siddhasādhana. (2) 'Being produced by an agent' is being produced by an agent endued with immediate knowledge of the material, desire and volition to create. If immediate knowledge means immediate knowledge of any material of creation, then human agents also have such knowledge of the materials of their creations, and create jars, etc. Further, human agents' immediate knowledge, desire and volition to create with materials for their objects are the causes of composite earthy substances, etc., through merits and demerits produced by them, which are their auxiliary causes. So this argument also involves siddhasādhana. (3) 'Being produced by an agent' is being directly produced by a volition, which is either being directly produced by a volition without being produced by a product of volition, or being produced at the moment just after the volition which is its cause. This is wrong, because then a jar, which is an example, would be devoid of the predicate 'being produced by an agent', since it is produced by a bodily action (ceṣṭā), which is directly produced by a volition, and it is not produced immediately after volition. But bodily action may be cited as an example of the theistic inference, because it is produced just after the volition which is its cause. But, in that case, a jar, which is an effect, would not be produced by an agent, because it is indirectly produced by the volition of a potter through bodily action. Further, bodily action would be a condition (upādhi), because it is pervasive of the predicate 'being produced by an agent', but non-pervasive of the reason 'effect'. Wherever there is 'being produced by an agent' (sādhyā), there is bodily action. But it is absent from jars, etc., which are effects. Further, bodily action being absent from gross earth, sprouts, etc., 'being produced by an agent' also would be absent from them, because wherever there is the absence of the pervader (upādhi), there must be the absence of the pervaded (sādhyā). (4) 'Being produced by an agent' is being apprehended by the knowledge
of the materials of composite earthy substances, etc. This cannot be maintained, because there is no such knowledge. Such knowledge cannot be proved by testimony, since the Cārvāka atheists do not believe in testimony. Nor can it be proved by inference, since inference depends on invariable comcomitance which apprehends a common property. The class character of the materials may be said to be the common property apprehended by it. Then shifting the topic (arthāntara) occurs, since the knowledge of the class character of the materials is not the knowledge of the materials of composite earthy substances, etc. Further, if only individual materials of jars, etc., are known by potters, etc., and if their generic characters are never known by them, then invariable comcomitance will never be apprehended. Moreover, if the materials of composite earthy substances, etc., are perceived through sāmānya-lakṣaṇā-pratyāśatti, jñāna-lakṣaṇā-prattyāśatti, and yogaja sannikarṣa, then we also have immediate knowledge of their materials, desire and volition to create them, and hence the existence of God as their creator cannot be proved. Though the cognitions of the materials, desires and volitions to create are not present immediately before the creation of gross earth, etc., the finite souls are present before their creation, who can create them through their merits and demerits. It has already been proved that cognitions, etc., cannot directly produce effects. So the argument involves siddhasādhana. (5) 'Being produced by an agent' is being produced by an agent endowed with the immediate knowledge, desire and volition to create, but being not produced by merits born of meditation (yoga), determinate knowledge, and extraordinary perception through sāmānya-lakṣaṇā-prattyāśatti, while the subject (pakṣa) is effects which are not produced by agents endowed with immediate knowledge of materials, desire and volition to create, which are produced, —and which are not produced by merits born of meditation, determinate knowledge, and extraordinary perception through sāmānya-lakṣaṇā-prattyāśatti, so that yogins may not produce gross earth, sprouts, etc., through merits born of meditation. In the predicate (sādhya) the immediate knowledge of materials, desire and volition are not produced, while in the subject (pakṣa) they are produced. (6) Or, 'being produced by an agent' is being produced by an agent endowed with the
immediate knowledge of materials, desire and volition to create, —the immediate knowledge being not produced by an extraordinary intercourse which produces immediate knowledge of the future, without being produced by an agent endued with produced knowledge, (desire and volition), which is not produced by an extraordinary intercourse which produces direct knowledge of the future. An immediately preceding volition produces an effect. An immediately preceding desire produces the volition. An immediately preceding knowledge produces the desire. So the predicate is not unknown (sādhyāprasiddhi). Nor is it contradicted in gross earth, etc. This argument is invalid. The atheist does not admit direct knowledge of the future through merits born of meditation, extraordinary perceptions, and extraordinary intercourses. Nor does he admit direct knowledge of the future, which is not produced by these extraordinary intercourses. So the qualifications of the subject and the predicate being unproven, the argument involves āṣrayāsiddhi and sādhyāprasiddhi; there is no locus of the reason, and the predicate is uncommon. Even if the direct knowledge of the future produced by the extraordinary intercourses be admitted, the subject is not proved to be not produced by such direct knowledge. Therefore gross earth, etc., may be produced by volitions, desires, and immediate cognitions of the finite souls, which are not produced by the extraordinary intercourses, but which produce merits and demerits, which are said to be the cause of gross earth, etc. Hence the theistic argument involves siddhasādhana. Further, gross earth, etc., cannot be directly produced by such immediate knowledge of the material, because jars (drṣṭānta) are not directly produced by immediate knowledge. Immediate knowledge produces desire; desire produces volition; volition produces bodily action; and bodily action produces jars, etc. So the subject stated above is unproven. The predicate stated above also is uncommon (aprasiddha), because jars, etc., are produced by an agent endued with the inferential knowledge of jars, etc., being conducive to his good (iṣṭasādhanatājñāna), which is produced by determinate knowledge, since it is produced by the apprehension of invariable concomitance. Hence the predicate cannot be ‘being produced by an agent endued with immediate knowledge which is not produced’. Thus, both
subject and predicate stated in the theistic argument mentioned above are not possible.

It may be argued that the predicate is inferred on the strength of invariable concomitance which is in the form 'wherever there is an effect, there is its production by an agent endued with the knowledge of its material.' It is not in the form 'whatever is an effect is produced by an agent endued with the knowledge of any material.' So there is no inference of what is already admitted to be proved (siddhasādhana) in the argument: 'Earth, etc., are produced by an agent endued with the knowledge of their materials, because they are effects; whatever is an effect, is produced by an agent endued with the knowledge of its material'.

This argument is invalid. How is the invariable concomitance of the reason with the predicate apprehended? Is the invariable concomitance of the character of effect (kāryatva) in a jar and a cloth with being produced by an agent endued with the knowledge of the material of each jar and cloth, or with being produced by an agent endued with the knowledge of his own material, or with being produced by an agent endued with the knowledge of material? In the first alternative, the reason (kāryatva) is discrepant with the predicate 'being produced by an agent endued with the knowledge of the material of a jar'. In the second alternative, there is no apprehension of invariable concomitance, because there is no common element among the individual effects. In the third alternative, there is inference of what is already admitted to be proved (siddhasādhana).

It may be argued that dyads at the time of creation are produced by an agent endued with the knowledge of the material, viz., atoms, desire and volition to create, because they are effects, like a jar. Atoms are imperceptible to us. So the finite souls cannot produce dyads out of them. But imperceptible God, who perceives atoms, is the creator of dyads. This argument is invalid, because the atheist does not believe in creation. Further, even if the knowledge of the atoms, desire and volition to create are proved, they cannot create dyads, because there is no motive for creation. There is no hypothetical reasoning

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TCIA., pp. 5-10.
favourable to God's being the creator of dyads. So the argument that dyads are produced by divine volition which is simultaneous with the conjunction of atoms, which is their non-inherent cause, is invalid. It violates the law of parsimony, and is not strengthened by any favourable hypothetical reasoning.134

The atheist further urges that there is no reason (hetu) for the existence for God. (1) The character of being an effect (kāryatva) is not being produced by volition induced by meditation, since it is unproven (asiddha). (2) It is not being related to the future being, though devoid of existence at the time prior to its production, because the prior time of all things is unknown owing to the non-existence of any common element among their prior times. (3) It is not existing at a certain time without existing at other times. Prior negation exists at a certain time, but does not exist at other times. It is not produced by an agent. So the reason is without the predicate in prior negation, and, consequently, inconclusive. (4) It is not a counter-entity of prior negation, since even destruction is a counter-entity of prior negation, though it is devoid of being produced by an agent. When the parts of a jar, which are its material cause, are destroyed, the jar is destroyed, when its destruction is not produced by an agent. So the reason is inconclusive, since it is devoid of the predicate in destruction. (5) It is not a counter-positive of prior negation, being related to beinghood (sattā), since the atheist does not believe in sattā, and destruction has svarūpasattva.137

11. The Theistic argument.

Gaṅgeśa elaborately discusses the cosmological argument for the existence of God, and refutes the anti-theistic arguments.

Gross earth only is the subject. The reason 'being an effect' is not doubtful and inconclusive (sandigdhānaikāntika) in a sprout. Doubt about variable concomitance of the reason with the predicate in the subject or the paksasama is not a flaw in an inference.138 Invariable concomitance between 'being an

134 TCIA., pp. 10-12.
137 TCIA., p. 12.
138 Pakṣe paksasama vyabhicāro na doṣāya. TCIA., p. 31 n.
effect' and 'being produced by an agent' in jars, etc., is known for certain; 'the nature of effects' is perceived in gross earth and a sprout. So 'being produced by an agent' is inferred in both from their 'being effects'. There is no contradiction between the two inferences, which are independent of each other. There is no mutual dependence between them, because they do not depend upon each other. A sprout is described as pakṣasama, because it is not included in the subject of inference. It cannot be said that there is no knowledge of the reason pervaded by the predicate in a sprout, since it is not included in the subject. There may be the knowledge of 'being an effect' pervaded by 'being produced by an agent' (pakṣa-dharmatājñāna) in it also. The knowledge of a reason existing in an entity in which there is absence of proof for the existence of the predicate with the absence of a desire to infer it is the cause of every inference. There is the knowledge of 'the nature of an effect' as the reason pervaded by the predicate 'being produced by an agent' in gross earth (pakṣa). So its 'being produced by an agent' is proved by a five-membered inference. In a sprout (pakṣasama) also there is the knowledge of 'being an effect' pervaded by 'being produced by an agent'. There is the absence of proof for the existence of 'being produced by an agent' in it with the absence of a desire to infer it. So its 'being produced by an agent' is proved by itself. There is no difference between the two inferences. If a sprout is not known as an 'effect' for certain, while gross earth is definitely known to be an 'effect', the reason is not doubtful and inconclusive.

The atheist may contend that the knowledge of invariable concomitance in the reason 'being effects' is not produced owing to a doubt as to the co-presence of it with the predicate 'being produced by an agent' in a sprout, which is pakṣasama. If such knowledge of invariable concomitance is already produced, it will be counteracted by a doubt about variable concomitance of the reason with the predicate. Gaṅgeśa replies that, in that

139 Sisādhaviṣāviraha-sahakṛtapramāṇābhāvavatī lingajñānamayānumitī- mātrakāraṇaivāt taccā keśitā pañcāvayavena aṅkure svata eveti na kaścid viśesāh. TCIA., p. 21.
140 Yadi keśitā hetuṇiścaya-dasāyām aṅkuraśya hetumattaya na niścayas tada kva sandigdhānaikatvam. TCIA., pp. 21-22.
case, there can be no knowledge of invariable concomitance in the smoke in a kitchen owing to a doubt about variable concomitance of smoke with fire elsewhere, and that even if it is produced, it will be obstructed by the absence of a common property among all smoky objects, a hill and other objects in which the existence of fire is doubtful, which cannot, therefore, be the subject. Hence the certain knowledge of the existence of the reason in a thing in which the existence of the predicate is doubtful is not a defect, but a merit. Otherwise, there will be no inference. If the certain knowledge of the presence of a reason in a thing in which the presence of a predicate is doubtful were a defect, there would be no inference. \[141\] Doubt about the presence of the predicate in the subject or the pakṣasama is not a defect. Gross earth is the subject of the theistic argument. A sprout is pakṣasama, which is different from the subject, in which the presence of the predicate is doubtful. Further, if what is different from the subject means what is different from it in which the presence of the subject is sought to be inferred, and if doubt about the presence of the predicate in a sprout which is different from gross earth (pakṣa) be a defect, then there will be no inference of the enemy’s wealth which is not sought to be inferred. If what is different from the subject (pakṣānyā), in which the presence of the predicate is doubtful, is an entity different from an object in which there is absence of certain knowledge of the presence of the predicate as well as absence of certain knowledge of the absence of the predicate, then a sprout also is not different from the subject. If what is different from the subject depends upon another demonstrative inference, then there can be no inference for oneself, in which the subject is not proved by a five-membered inference.

If each dyad at the time of creation be the subject, then many agents endowed with the knowledge of the materials of the dyads are proved, but omniscient God is not proved. Gāṅgēśa replies that if the subject is qualified by being not produced by specific cognitions apprehending specific objects, then the existence of the knowledge of all objects or omniscient

\[141\] Sādhyasandehavyati hetumiṣcayo na doṣah, kintu guṇa eva, anyathā-numānumātram uchhidyeta. TCIA., pp. 22-23.
God can be proved. The finite souls are not omniscient, since their particular cognitions dependent on the sense-object-intercourse apprehend specific objects. So the existence of omniscient God whose one non-sensuous knowledge apprehends all objects is proved. So the dyads at the time of creation which are not produced by specific cognitions of specific objects, and volitions produced by the immediate knowledge of the materials not through the merits and demerits produced by them constitute the subject of inference. When the predicate ‘being produced by an agent’ is qualified by knowledge, desire and volition, it does not refer to individual souls, which have finite knowledge of some materials, desire and volition to create effects, but to God who has infinite knowledge of the materials of all objects, desire and volition to create them. So there is no shifting the topic (artha-nārā). If the predicate ‘being produced by an agent’ is mentioned without any qualification, its existence with a particular qualification, viz., omniscience, can be inferred on the strength of the knowledge of the reason pervaded by the predicate existing in the subject.

The atheist may contend that in the case of the first two predicates mentioned above, gross earth may be produced by the immediate knowledge of the materials of jars, etc., desire and volition to produce them, so that the theistic inference involves shifting the topic (artha-nārā). It cannot be said that they are not causes of gross earth, because in the beginningless cycle of creation and dissolution some finite soul at some time might have had immediate knowledge of the materials of the dyads of earth, which might produce the dyads of earth at the beginning of creation. Hence if the dyads of earth at the time of creation be the subject, the existence of God is not proved, since the atheist does not believe in creation. Gangeśa replies that the knowledge of the material, desire and volition to produce an effect are known to be the cause of that effect only, which inheres in the material, which is the object of the

144 Śādhya ca jiñānācchā-prayatnānāṁ viṣesāṇātvena viṣaṇṭa-sādhanatvam vivakṣitam tena na tadpadakṣitakṣetrajñānārāthāntaram. TCIA., pp. 24-25.
knowledge, desire and volition. So the knowledge, desire and volition of a finite soul are the cause of a jar or the like, and not the cause of gross earth.\textsuperscript{144} Hence the subject should not be qualified by the qualification of being not produced by the immediate knowledge of some other materials of effects, desire and volition to produce them.\textsuperscript{144} In the third predicate, there is no shifting the topic, since gross earth, etc., do not inhere in the materials of jars, etc.\textsuperscript{147} So gross earth, etc., cannot be produced by the immediate knowledge of the materials of jars, etc., desire and volition to produce them.

It may be argued that the finite souls' perception of the materials of gross earth, etc., due to sāmānya-lakṣaṇā-prattyāsatti is the cause of gross earth, etc., and that perception, desire and volition of God are not their cause, because they are non-existent, since their objects are non-existent. Before creation there are no objects of knowledge, desire and volition of God, which are, therefore, non-existent, and cannot produce gross earth, etc. Gaṅgeśa replies that the atheists do not admit perception due to sāmānya-lakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti, who cannot advance this hypothesis. Further, perception of the materials of jars due to sāmānya-lakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti or jñāna-lakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti does not produce them. The knowledge that proves the existence of 'being produced by an agent' in gross earth, etc., proves the existence of a particular agent, God, endowed with immediate knowledge of atoms, desire and will to create them.\textsuperscript{148}

The atheist may argue that human agents may produce dyads of earth and water by throwing water on earth or by moving hands through water of an ocean, and thereby conjoining couples of the atoms of earth and water, so that some dyads at least being produced by human efforts, God is not the agent of gross earth, etc., because it partly involves siddhasādhana.


\textsuperscript{144} Atu evānyopādāna-gocarāparokṣa-jñānādyajñāṇavyāvsaṁ paksā-viṣēṣpaṁ api na yuktam. TCIA., p. 26.

\textsuperscript{144} Trīta-sādhya tu nārīḥnātāṁ kṣīyādau ghaṭādyopādānāsama- vētavāt. TCIA., p. 26.

\textsuperscript{148} Kṣīyādau sakartīkatva-nirvālikāṁ jñānāṁ sidhyad vilakṣaṇam, eva siddhyati. TCIA., p. 26.
Gaṅgeśa replies that human agents destroy composite earthy and watery substances, but that they cannot produce dyads of earth, water, etc., because they do not perceive their constituent atoms, and have no desire and volition to produce them. They can never produce all dyads, because they are devoid of knowledge of their materials, desire and volition to produce them. They can never produce big oceans, etc., which are not the subject (pakṣa), but which are pakṣasama, because they are definitely known to be 'effects', though the presence of 'being produced by an agent' in them is doubtful.\footnote{TCIA., pp. 26-27.}

The atheist may argue that the example 'jar' is devoid of the predicate 'being produced by an agent' or self (sādhyāvikala), because it does not inhere in the self. A jar cannot be said to be produced by a self, with a cognition, as an example; which is produced by a self, and inhere in it, because 'being inherent in the self' is a condition (upādhi), because it pervades the predicate 'being produced by a self', but does not pervade the reason 'being an effect'. Just as being produced by ākāśa is not inferred in a jar from its being an effect, so its being produced by a self cannot be inferred from its being an effect. Gaṅgeśa replies that this argument is not valid. The conjunction of the self endued with volition, through bodily action, is a cause of a jar. So the self also, like its volition, is its cause.\footnote{Prayatnavidātmassāmyogad ceṣṭā-dvārā ghāṭahetur atah prayatna īva ātmāpi hetuḥ. TCIA., p. 27.} It may be contended that a volition only is a cause of a jar, because there is no bodily action without volition even in the presence of conjunction of the self. Gaṅgeśa replies that this argument is invalid, because an effect is not produced without an inherent cause.\footnote{Asamavāvikāraṇāt vinā kāryānupatteḥ. TCIA., p. 28.} The conjunction of the self with the body is the non-inherent cause of bodily action; volition is its efficient cause, which does not inhere in the body, but in the self; the self is its inherent cause. Mere conjunction is not a cause of an effect; but conjunction qualified by the conjunct is its cause.\footnote{Sāmyogamātrasyākāraṇatvena sāmyogī-viśeṣitasya hetuṁvā TCIA., p. 28.} So the conjunction with the body, qualified by the self, is the non-inherent cause of bodily action. Hence it is wrong to argue that the self is
not a cause of bodily action. The atheist may contend that conjunction with the self is not a cause of bodily action, because the absence of bodily action in the absence of conjunction with the self cannot be proved, since the self being eternal and ubiquitous can never be absent. Gaṅgeśa replies that this argument is invalid, because bodily action which is produced by a volition, which is a quality of the self different from the body is due to conjunction with the self as its non-inherent cause, since volition is produced by it. It cannot be argued that an action is due to conjunction with a corporeal substance as its non-inherent cause, because cognitions, etc., are not due to conjunction with a corporeal substance as its non-inherent cause, inasmuch as conjunction with the incorporeal self is a non-inherent cause of cognition, etc. The abode of conjunction, which is a non-inherent cause, is a cause of the effect. So the self must be the inherent cause of bodily action, its volition being its efficient cause, and body-self-conjunction being its non-inherent cause. Some maintain that an agent is the abode of a favourable volition, without being a cause. Thus the predicate of the theistic inference is ‘being produced by cognition, desire and volition’, and God is an agent as their abode. This view is not tenable, because an agent is generally regarded as a cause, and not merely the abode of knowledge, desire and volition which produce an effect.

The atheist contends that the knowledge of an object which is a means to the good which is to be realized by one’s volition (kṛtisādhya-stādhanatā-jñāna) is a cause through a desire to produce the object, and that such knowledge of a future object of desire is not perceptual but inferential, which makes the example, a jar, devoid of the predicate (sādhya-vikala), ‘being produced by the immediate knowledge or perception of the material of an effect’, or which makes the predicate unknown (sādhyāprāsiddhi). Gaṅgeśa replies that this argument is invalid, because volition can act on existing materials which are

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2. Asamavāyikāraṇasādhyogāśrayasya tattvāya-janakatva-niyamāt. TCIA., p. 29.
3. Anye tu anakula-kṛti-samavāyitvam karttvam, na tu janakaty eva sādhyam taddāśrayatvam evaśvarasya karttvam. TCIA., p. 29.
perceived with a view to producing a non-existent object. The materials of a jar are existent and perceived by a potter whose volition acts upon them in order to produce a non-existent jar. There is no voluntary action without perception of the materials of an effect, which is not affected by the inferential knowledge of the effect being conducive to the agent’s good, which is an inducing cause of a voluntary action. So the example is not devoid of the predicate ‘being produced by the immediate knowledge of the materials of an effect to be produced’.

The atheist may argue that God has eternal inference of the materials of the dyads, instead of perception of them, even as a potter has an inferential knowledge of a jar being conducive to his good (iṣṭādhanatājñāna), since non-eternal knowledge cannot produce a beginningless series of dyads. Just as the theist maintains that perception of God is eternal, though human perception is produced by the sense-organs, and, consequently, non-eternal, so the inference of God may be held to be eternal, though human inference is produced by the knowledge of a sign (liṅga). Gaṅgeśa replies that the inferential knowledge of an effect being conducive to pleasure or removal of pain is a cause of a voluntary action to produce a jar, but that God being devoid of a body and merits and demerits is devoid of pleasure and pain, and so cannot have inferential knowledge of gross earth, etc., being conducive to his pleasure or negation of pain, which may induce him to exert his volition to produce them. But he has perceptual knowledge of gross earth, etc., being conducive to the finite souls’ pleasure and negation of pain, which induces him to create them.

It may be argued that God has aversion which prompts his volition, even as a person has aversion which prompts his volition, and that God thus becomes bound like a bound person. Gaṅgeśa gives the following reply: Mere aversion to pain cannot produce a volition to destroy it; aversion produces a desire to destroy the means of pain or prevent the non-production of pain; desire is prompted by the knowledge of the means of the

119 Sīddhayāsiddhaviśayā hi kṛṣṇa yāsaya-pratyakṣe satī saṃbhavati. TCFA, p. 30.
120 Na ca sūryadhṛṣṭābhāvena sukham asti, ato na kṣitiyāda sukhāsatya tathāmahāvritr yathārthā saṃbhavati. TCFA, p. 31. TCIAA, p. 31.
desired end; desire only is the direct cause of volition, while aversion is its indirect cause, since it is destroyed by the subsequent desire. Further, God is devoid of aversion and pain, and so cannot be bound. 138

The atheist may argue that God is non-existent, because he is not perceived. Then, Gaṅgeśa, like Udayana, argues, all imperceptible objects (e.g., sense-organs) would be non-existent. But though atoms are imperceptible, their existence is inferred. The absence of perception of an object, which is capable of being perceived, may be said to prove its non-existence. But God or the supreme self is not capable of being perceived. Though he is imperceptible, his existence can be inferred from his action through knowledge, desire and volition. 139 Hence the existence of God cannot be denied on the ground of his imperceptibility.

The atheist may argue that invariable concomitance between the eternal will of God and effects (e.g., gross earth, etc.), cannot be known by the joint method of agreement in presence and agreement in absence, since the eternal divine will is always present, so that the absence of effects due to the absence of will in general cannot be proved. The presence of the eternal divine will also is not known as the invariable concomitant of all effects. But the presence and absence of effects are known. It may be argued that on the same ground ākāśa and ātman cannot be inferred as the inherent causes of sound and knowledge, because they are eternal and always present; and that their absence cannot be known as the invariable concomitants of the absence of sound and knowledge respectively. But they are inferred as the inherent causes of sound and knowledge, which are positive effects, and inhere in ākāśa and self respectively. The knowledge of the presence or the absence of an inherent cause is not a necessary condition of the apprehension of invariable concomitance between an inherent cause and an effect. Whatever inhere in an inherent cause is produced in it. Whatever does not inhere in an inherent cause is not produced in it. Sound which inhere in ākāśa is produced in it. Knowledge which inhere in the

138 TCIA., pp. 31-32
139 Nāyavayogyavart-nirūsaḥ, caṭayā jānādīmataḥ paramātmano'numānāt. TCIA., p. 33.
self is produced in it. What is not ākāśa is not the locus of a produced sound. What is not the self is not the locus of a produced cognition. The absence through which an inherent cause is known is not relational absence but mutual absence. Or, whatever is a positive effect, inheres in its inherent cause. Sound inheres in an inherent cause, because it is a positive effect. It does not exist in any other substance than ākāśa, which is, therefore, its inherent cause. Knowledge inheres in an inherent cause, because it is a positive effect. It does not exist in any other substance than the self, which is, therefore, its inherent cause.\textsuperscript{141}

Gaṅgeśa criticizes this argument. Invariable concomitance between fire in general and smoke in general is known from the observation of the co-presence and co-absence of particular fires and particular smokes, and it is applied to all smokes through their common property 'smokeness' or to a particular smoke perceived. Similarly, the knowledge of invariable concomitance between volition in general and an effect in general is derived from the observation of the uniform co-presence and co-absence of particular volitions and particular effects in the absence of any contradictory evidence. But the knowledge of the co-presence and the co-absence of the kitchen smoke and the kitchen fire derived from the knowledge of the existence of the reason in the subject (paksadharmatā) does not apprehend the invariable concomitance of the kitchen smoke with the kitchen fire. If it were so, then there would be no inference independent of a desire to infer. Where the co-presence of a particular reason and a predicate in the subject has been known, there cannot be an inference of the predicate in the subject without a desire to infer.\textsuperscript{142}

The atheist may argue that if an imperceptible agent is inferred on the strength of invariable concomitance between agent in general and effect in general, then an imperceptible fire in the stomach may be inferred from smoke pervaded by fire in general. Gaṅgeśa replies that a perceptible fire is the

\textsuperscript{141} TCIA., pp. 33-35.
\textsuperscript{142} Yadviśeṣayor anvaya-vyatireka-grahah tatsāmānyayor bādhakāṁ vinā vyāptigrahāḥ, . . . tathelapi kṛtyviśeṣa-kāryaviśeṣayor anvaya-vyatirekagraho bādhakāṁ antarena kṛti-kāryamātrayor vyāptigrahāṁ upāyaḥ, na tu paksadharmatābalalabhiya-viśeṣānvaya-vyatirekagrahaḥ, amāmāmāmātrocchedaprasāngā. TCIA., pp. 35-36.
cause of smoke, because smoke cannot be produced by an imperceptible fire.\footnote{TCIA., pp. 30-37.}

It may be argued that the absence of an effect is not due to the absence of knowledge, desire and volition taken collectively, but to the absence of any of them; that the existence of an agent qualified by knowledge, desire and volition together cannot be inferred from an effect, because his qualifications are needless (vyartha-viśeṣaṇa). The existence of an agent can be inferred from volition only, so that the absence of knowledge and desire is needless. Hence being produced by an agent endowed with knowledge, desire, and volition cannot be inferred from the character of effects in gross earth, etc., because the counter-positive of the absence which pervades the absence of the predicate is a sign of the existence of the predicate.\footnote{Na hetor viśeṣa-viruddha, because a bodiless omniscient agent endowed with eternal knowledge, desire and will is sought to be inferred in gross earth, etc., as effects on the strength of the observation of an embodied agent endowed with non-eternal knowledge, desire and will as the efficient cause of effects like jars, etc.\footnote{Asāte nityajñānamīn sarvaśyāḥ kartā pakṣe vivakṣito, ghaṭādān ca kārṣṭavya tadviparīta-kartṛ-sahacārendarśanād viśeṣa-viruddham iti cet. TCIA., pp. 37-38.}} Gaṅgeśa replies that knowledge, desire or volition is inferred from an effect, and that these three together are inferred as the cause of an effect on the strength of this inference.\footnote{Na hetor vivakṣita-sādhyā-viparītasahacārāmātrasyādāśakatvāt. Anyathānāmnānamātroccheda-prasaṅgāt. TCIA., p. 38.}

But the atheist contends that the theistic inference involves the fallacy of viśeṣa-viruddha, because a bodiless omniscient agent endowed with eternal knowledge, desire and will is sought to be inferred in gross earth, etc., as effects on the strength of the observation of an embodied agent endowed with non-eternal knowledge, desire and will as the efficient cause of effects like jars, etc.\footnote{Na hetor viśeṣa-viruddha, because a bodiless omniscient agent endowed with eternal knowledge, desire and will is sought to be inferred in gross earth, etc., as effects on the strength of the observation of an embodied agent endowed with non-eternal knowledge, desire and will as the efficient cause of effects like jars, etc.\footnote{Asāte nityajñānamīn sarvaśyāḥ kartā pakṣe vivakṣito, ghaṭādān ca kārṣṭavya tadviparīta-kartṛ-sahacārendarśanād viśeṣa-viruddham iti cet. TCIA., pp. 37-38.}} Gaṅgeśa replies that the concomitance of a reason with a predicate qualified by certain qualifications only does not hinder the inference of the predicate with opposite qualifications. Otherwise, there would be no inference.\footnote{Asāte nityajñānamīn sarvaśyāḥ kartā pakṣe vivakṣito, ghaṭādān ca kārṣṭavya tadviparīta-kartṛ-sahacārendarśanād viśeṣa-viruddham iti cet. TCIA., pp. 37-38.} The co-presence of a smoke due to charcoal with a fire which is not produced by straw observed in a kitchen (drśṭānta) does not prevent the inference of a fire produced by straw on a hill from a smoke perceived on it on the strength of the knowledge of the reason existing in the subject (pakṣadhārmatā). There is no invariable concomitance of an effect with an embodied,
non-omniscient agent endowed with non-eternal knowledge, on whose strength the inference of a bodiless, omniscient agent endowed with eternal knowledge may involve the fallacy of viśeṣa-viruddha. Such invariable concomitance is not admitted by the theist and the atheist both, since an embodied agent of sprouts, etc., is non-existent, because he is not perceived, though he is perceptible. Sprouts are admitted by both to be effects.

The atheist may object that there can be no such inference of an omniscient bodiless agent endowed with eternal knowledge from gross earth, etc., being effects, because an embodied agent endowed with non-eternal knowledge inferred on the strength of the invariable concomitance of effects with embodied agents endowed with non-eternal knowledge, and a bodiless agent endowed with eternal knowledge inferred from gross earth, etc., as effects on the strength of the knowledge of the existence of effects (hetu) in gross earth, etc., (pakṣa) contradict each other because their mutual assistance is absent. Gaṅgeśa argues that there is no contradiction between what is inferred on the strength of invariable concomitance and what is inferred on the strength of knowledge of the reason existing in the subject. Invariable concomitance of an effect with being produced by an agent endowed with non-eternal knowledge is not known. But invariable concomitance of an effect with being produced by an agent endowed with knowledge, desire and will is known. There is no contradiction between what is inferred on the strength of such invariable concomitance and what is inferred on the strength of the knowledge of the reason existing in the subject. There are no two independent inferences on the ground of invariable concomitance and pakṣadharma. They produce a single inference in co-operation with each other. If they produced two inferences independently, one of them would be needless to produce an inference. There is the fallacy of viśeṣa-virodha, when there is a contradiction between a

\[168\] Na cānityajñānāsamyajñā-śaṁkirikarttvena samān. kāryatvarya vyāptir asti yena viparīta-sadhane viruddhatvaṁ syāt. TCIA., p. 38.

\[169\] Añākūrādā mogyumupalambahena śārīri-kartṛkatvābhāvāt. TCIA., p. 38.

qualification of the reason and a qualification of the predicate. This has a fire produced by sandal wood, because it has non-fragrant smoke. In this inference there is a contradiction between 'produced by sandal wood' and 'non-fragrant'.

The atheist may argue that an agent-endued with eternal knowledge cannot be inferred, because the contradictory qualities of 'knowledge' and 'eternity', 'agency' and 'bodilessness' cannot exist in the same entity. Gaṅgeśa replies that the argument is invalid, because there is no example to corroborate the inference. In a jar there is a contradiction between its agent and bodilessness, and his knowledge and eternity. But there is no contradiction between an agent and bodilessness, and knowledge and eternity in God. If there were a contradiction between these sets of qualities, neither an embodied agent endued with non-eternal knowledge could be inferred from a jar, nor a bodiless agent endued with eternal knowledge could be inferred from gross earth, etc. Neither God nor his knowledge is perceived by us. Bodilessness of God is proved by the same inference as proves his existence. Eternity of divine knowledge is proved by the same inference as proves the knowledge of God. Atoms are inferred to be eternal, though composite substances are non-eternal. Likewise, God is inferred to be bodiless and endued with eternal knowledge, though human agents are embodied and endued with non-eternal knowledge. The inference of a bodiless agent endued with eternal knowledge as the efficient cause of gross earth, etc., is unobstructed, though agency and bodilessness, knowledge and eternity have not been found to accompany each other in any other being. Does God exist? Is his knowledge eternal? These may be said to be known by hypothetical reasoning. Gaṅgeśa urges that tarka is a kind of doubt in which the mind oscillates between two contradictory qualities of a known entity (dharmin). But God is not known, and, consequently, his existence and knowledge cannot be known by hypothetical reasoning.

176 Tarkasya prasañjanaaya saṁśayasya 'cāyaṁ' sambhavat. TCIA., p. 40.
The atheist argues that a volition produces an effect (e.g., a jar) not directly, but through bodily action only. God being a bodiless entity, his volition cannot produce effects, gross earth, etc., through bodily action. The production of an effect by a volition without bodily action is not perceived. Sprouts are not found to be produced by a volition through a body and its action, and, consequently, they are not produced by an agent. Gaṅgeśa refutes this argument. A volition is not a cause of an effect, through its effect, bodily action, because it produces bodily action without any intermediate bodily action. A human soul or its volition directly produces bodily action without an intermediate bodily action. So God, or his volition directly produces action in the atoms without any bodily action, and thus produces gross earth, etc. A volition qualified by bodily action is the cause of a jar or the like. So a volition unqualified by bodily action is the cause of an effect in general. If there is a causal relation between a specific volition and a specific effect, there must be a causal relation between a volition in general and an effect in general in the absence of a contradicting evidence. If the causal relation between two qualified entities is contradicted, then only the causal relation between two unqualified entities is contradicted. The fact that a qualified cause produces a qualified effect does not contradict that the same unqualified cause produces the same unqualified effect.

It may be argued that a volition is the cause of an effect other than bodily action through bodily action only; so that gross earth, etc., are not produced by a volition without bodily action. Gaṅgeśa replies that a volition is not the cause of an effect other than bodily action through bodily action only, because gross earth, etc., are produced without bodily action; but that a volition produces a specific effect (e.g., a jar) through bodily action only. It is objected that if a

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174 Sarīra-tadvāyāpārau cañkure bādhitāviti kartur api bādha eva. TCI., p. 40.
177 Na hi višeṣa-pravojakatvam sāmānye sāmānye-pravojakatva-vīroḍhi. TCI., p. 41.
volition of God without bodily action produced gross earth, etc., then a volition of a potter with a paralysed body would produce a jar without a bodily action. Gaṅgeśa replies that a jar, which is a specific effect, is produced by a volition and a bodily action, but that gross earth, etc., are produced by a volition only without a bodily action.\textsuperscript{179}

The atheist may argue that an embodied finite soul (kṣetrajña) may be inferred from gross earth, etc., as their efficient cause. Gaṅgeśa replies that if an embodied finite soul endued with a volition causing a bodily action were inferred as their efficient cause, then sprouts would be without an agent because his bodily action is non-existent, since it is not perceived, though it is capable of being perceived. If sprouts are said to be produced by an agent without a bodily action, then he must be God.\textsuperscript{180} Hence it is wrong to maintain that a volition produces an effect through a bodily action only, but that a pure volition cannot do so.\textsuperscript{181}

The atheist argues that 'being produced through a body', is a condition (upādhi) of an agent's producing an effect. An agent produces effects other than bodily actions through bodily actions only. An agent devoid of a body does not produce bodily actions and jars, etc. An agent is not the cause of an effect without the aid of a body. So whatever is produced by a body is produced by an agent. The condition pervades the predicate 'being produced by an agent.' Gaṅgeśa asks whether an agent is aided by a body in producing jars, etc., or all effects, or his own effect. The first alternative does not invalidate the theistic inference. If an agent is aided by a body in producing jars, etc., it does not affect the inference that an agent produces effects without a body. The atheist does not admit the second alternative that all effects, viz., gross earth, sprouts, etc., are produced by agents. If he admits it, then effects, which are not produced by bodies, are produced by agents, so that 'being produced by a body' does not pervade the predicate 'being produced by an agent'. The third alternative is not tenable, since it involves begging the question.

\textsuperscript{179}Ghate krivat hastādi-vyāpārasvayāpi hetuṁvāt. TCIA., p. 42.
\textsuperscript{180}Atha hastādi-vyāpāra-sānyā-krutam abhitmatas tada sa eva bhagavān iśvarah. TCIA., p. 42.
\textsuperscript{181}Atah śārira-vyāpāra-dvāraṁ kṛter janakaviṁ na kevalāya iti nirastam. TCIA., p. 43. TCIAA., pp. 43-44.
(ātmāśraya). 'Being produced by oneself' cannot be the limiting attribute of 'one's own effect'. The atheist argues that the condition 'being produced by a body' pervades the predicate 'being produced by an agent', but that its being pervaded by the reason 'effect' is doubtful, so that it is doubtful (sandigdha). Gaṇeśa replies that 'producedness' is the limiting attribute of 'being produced by an agent', but that 'being produced by a body' is not its limiting attribute, since it violates the law of parsimony, and does not pervade the predicate 'being produced by an agent', because water, which is an effect or produced by an agent, is not produced by a body.

The atheist raises the following objection. Agents are embodied only; knowledge is non-eternal only; knowledge is a cause through desire only; desire is a cause through volition only. These perceptions contradict invariable concomitance of effects with a bodiless agent endowed with eternal knowledge. Hence the existence of a bodiless agent endowed with eternal knowledge, desire and volition cannot be inferred from gross earth, etc., as their efficient cause. Nor can an eternal super-sensitive body of God be inferred, because there is invariable concomitance between a body and non-eternity. It cannot be said to be devoid of favourable hypothetical reasoning, because the invariable concomitance is not vitiated by any condition (upādhi). If there is an unconditional invariable concomitance between 'effects' and 'being produced by an agent', then the two inferences based on these two unconditional pervasions (vyāpti) being of equal strength counterbalance each other, and fail to establish either of the predicates. Hence gross earth, etc., are not proved to be produced by an agent. The reason 'being an effect' cannot be said to be stronger than the reason 'agency' because the former is known to exist in the subject 'gross earth, etc.', while the latter is not known to exist in the subject in the inference 'An agent is embodied only'. The invariable concomitance 'knowledge is non-eternal

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135 Svajanyatvaṁ na svajanyatavacchedakam ātmāśrayāṁ. TCIA., p. 54.
136 Lāghuvida bādhakaṁ vinā kartṛjanyatvaṁ hi janyatvaṁ avacchedakāṁ na tu śarirajanyatvaṁ gauravat, tathā ca śarirajanyatvaṁ na sakāryakatvavāpakam. TCIA., p. 55.
137 Nirupadhitvena śaṅkā-kālaṅkābhāvāṁ kāryatva-sakāryakatvavāyor api yadī nirupadhitvam asai tadāpi rulya-balatvena satpratipakṣavat pratirodha’ stū. TCIA., p. 46.
only' contradicts the inference 'gross earth, etc., are produced by knowledge'. All produced knowledge is produced by a body; but since there is no body before creation, there is no produced knowledge at the time. So gross earth, etc., are not produced by knowledge. There is a conflict between the knowledge 'all effects are produced by knowledge' and the knowledge 'all knowledge is non-eternal'. If all effects are produced by knowledge, then the knowledge that produces the first dyads is eternal. If this creative knowledge is eternal, then all knowledge is not non-eternal. If there is no conflict between the two cognitions, then both are equally valid. Then gross earth, etc., are produced by non-eternal knowledge of an embodied agent. This inference contradicts the theistic inference. Further, there is no certain or doubtful condition, which vitiates the invariable concomitance 'knowledge is non-eternal only', because eternal knowledge is unknown. But when invariable concomitance between 'effects' and 'being produced by an agent' is known, bodily action being uniformly present and being non-pervasive of 'effects' (letu), it may be regarded as a certain or doubtful condition. Gaṅgeśa replies that the above objections are groundless. The invariable concomitance of knowledge with non-eternity is not proved. There is no hypothetical reasoning against the existence of eternal knowledge. Invariable concomitance is known by the observation of uniform co-presence and co-absence of a reason and a predicate without any vitiating condition. Unconditional, uniform relation cannot be said to be a proof against the existence of eternal knowledge, because then the unconditional, invariable concomitance between parts and large dimension, and fire and manifest colour would disprove the existence of atoms and visual organ. But atoms are parts and yet of the minutest magnitude, and the light of the visual organ is devoid of manifest colour. The existence of eternal knowledge is inferred from the invariable concomitance between effects and knowledge and the knowledge of gross earth, etc., being effects (pakṣadhamma). It is not obstructed by the knowledge of

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188 Kārvaka jñānajanyam jñānam anityam evetyanayor virodha eva. TCIA., p. 47.
189 TCIA., pp. 46-47.
190 Nirṇāpāña-sahacāra-darśanavyabhicārādarśanād eva vyāptigrahaḥ. TCIA., p. 47.
invariable concomitance between knowledge and non-eternity, because our knowledge is found to be non-eternal, and God’s knowledge is inferred to be eternal. There is contradiction between two contradictory qualities, if they subsist in the same substance. But there is no contradiction between them, if they exist in different substances. There is no contradiction between eternity and non-eternity, if they exist in two substances belonging to the same genus. The knowledge of a finite soul is non-eternal, while that of the supreme Soul is eternal. There is no contradiction between them.\(^{166}\) The argument that all knowledge being known to be non-eternal, a particular knowledge cannot be known to be eternal is not valid, because divine knowledge being eternal, all knowledge cannot be said to be non-eternal. If all knowledge means human knowledge only, then its non-eternity does not hinder eternity of divine knowledge.\(^{166}\)

The atheist may argue that from ‘producedness’ (janyatva) limiting an effect (kārya) the existence of an agent (kartā) is not inferred, but that from a special effect (e.g., a jar) a special agent (e.g., a potter) is inferred, because in the presence of a special agent a special effect is produced, and in his absence it is not produced, even as a special fire is inferred from a special smoke. Otherwise, if an agent were the cause of an effect, as endowed with agency, then a weaver would be the cause of a jar, because he is endowed with agency. From a special effect (e.g., a jar) limited by a special attribute (e.g., jarness) a special agent (e.g., a potter) is inferred. Smoke in general is not an indicator of a fire. So an effect is not limited by producedness in general, from which the existence of a special agent is inferred. The theist may argue that there is a general rule that if there is a causal relation between a special cause and a special effect, then there is a causal relation between the same cause in general and the same effect in general, if there is no evidence against it. The atheist contends that the general rule holds good when there is no contradictory evidence.

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\(^{166}\) Pakṣadharmatābalām nityāṁ jñānaṁ siddhyad buddhir anityayetī vyāptipratyakṣena na pratibadhyate, asmād dibuddhimātra-viṣaya-katvena bhūna-viṣayatvāt eka-viṣaya-virodhī-jñānasayaṁ pratibandha-katvāt, nityavāniyayavyor ekajātiyadravye virodhāt. TCIA., p. 48.

\(^{166}\) TCIA., p. 48.
But here the existence of eternal knowledge cannot be inferred from gross earth, etc., as effects, because it is contradicted by the universal proposition 'knowledge is non-eternal only' reached by empirical generalisation. The invariable concomitance between effects (kāryatva) and being produced by an agent (sakartṛkatva) on the ground of the causal relation between them cannot be said to be stronger than the empirical generalization 'knowledge is non-eternal only', because the causal relation between them is disproved by contradicting perceptions. In smokes there is no common property of being produced by fire in general, from which a fire can be inferred as its cause. The empirical generalization 'knowledge is non-eternal only' is certain, because it is not contradicted by any opposite proof.¹⁸⁰

Gangesa replies that the knowledge of uniform co-presence of a reason and a predicate and the non-observation of vitiating conditions produces a doubt as to the invariable concomitance between them through the knowledge of their common character in the absence of a confirming or contradicting evidence.¹⁸¹ Otherwise, if the knowledge of the invariable concomitance 'the predicate always exists in loci other than the subject' proves, disproves, or produces a doubt about the relation of cause and effect, it will make all inference about causal relation impossible, and none will make any effort to produce effects. So producedness (janyatva) is the limiting property of effects. The general rule that there is a causal relation between A in general and B in general, if there is a causal relation between a special case of A and a special case of B, can be set aside by a stronger opposite proof only. But, in the present case, there is no stronger opposite proof. There is no opposite invariable concomitance which proves that 'knowledge is non-eternal only', or an invariable concomitance which proves that 'knowledge is never eternal'. Hence the general rule holds good. There is a causal relation between a special effect (e.g., a jar) and a special cause (e.g., an agent with non-eternal knowledge). Therefore, there is a causal

¹⁸⁰ TCIA., pp. 50-51.
¹⁸¹ Nirupādhyāyena sahaçārāvasāyasya sādhakañih bādhañih ca vinā sādhūrañyena vyāpti samāyādhiñyakatvā. TCIA., p. 51.
relation between an effect in general and a cause in general (e.g., an agent with eternal knowledge). \(^{182}\)

The later Naiyāyikas maintain that the inference of the existence of a bodiless agent endowed with eternal knowledge on the strength of the invariable concomitance 'all effects are produced by agents' and the knowledge of pakṣadharmatā is flawless. When such an agent is proved by the theistic inference, it may be contradicted by the invariable concomitance 'knowledge is non-eternal only', which is ineffective until what is contradicted is proved. An opposite invariable concomitance without the knowledge of pakṣadharmatā is not said to be a faulty reason, since it is set aside by the proof or disproof of the counter-positive of contradiction. \(^{183}\)

The atheist argues that the existence of one agent cannot be inferred from gross earth, etc., as effects, since there is no invariable concomitance between 'effects' and 'one agent'. One agent cannot be inferred from gross earth, etc., as effects according to the law of parsimony, since it is not a means of valid knowledge. The theist may argue that the theistic inference aided by the law of parsimony proves the existence of one agent. But the atheist contends that the law of parsimony is not an auxiliary cause of all inferences, because there is no proof for it and there are exceptions to it. If the parsimony of hypotheses were an auxiliary cause of an inference, it would not immediately follow upon the knowledge of pakṣadharmatā, but it would be delayed owing to the absence of the auxiliary cause. But this never happens. An inference always follows immediately upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance and the knowledge of pakṣadharmatā. If the inference of parsimony of hypotheses depended upon parsimony of hypotheses, there would be mutual dependence. The knowledge of parsimony (lāghava) would depend upon the inference of parsimony of hypotheses, which also would depend upon parsimony. This is mutual dependence. The theist may argue that the inference of an agent of gross earth, etc., is the inference of one agent, since there is no proof for the existence of many agents, who


\(^{183}\) Pakṣadharmatā-vinākṛtoṁ virodhyāpti-jñānaṁ na hetūbhāsan-tayoktam virodha-pratīyogī-siddhikā-siddhi-parāhataṁvā. TCIA., p. 52.
are, therefore, non-existent. The atheist contends that the same argument proves the antithesis; that the inference of 'agent' of gross earth, etc., is the inference of many agents, since there is no proof for the existence of one agent. 184

Gângâśa replies that the parsimony of hypotheses is an auxiliary condition of an inference, where oneness or manyness of the predicate is under dispute. If one agent can adequately account for all effects, the law of parsimony demands the rejection of the assumption of many agents. Gross earth, etc., can be produced by one agent. So the assumption of many agents of them must be rejected. 185 Hence one bodiless agent endowed with eternal knowledge, desire and will to create is the efficient cause of gross earth, etc., as effects, and he is God.

184 TCIA., pp. 76-77.
185 TCIA., pp. 77-79. Anumiter eva lâghava-sahakâreṇa ekatva-sâdhakatvâ. TCIA., p. 79. Dayal Krishna Sharma: Anumâna Chintâ-maši (Bengali), Silchar, 1932 (Bengali year), Ch. VI.
CHAPTER XI

The Mimāṃsā Philosophy

Jaimini (400 B.C.) was the author of the *Mimāṃsā Sūtra*, and the founder of the Mimāṃsā system. Bodhāyana, Upavarṣa, Bhavadāsa, and Ācārya Suṇḍara Pāṇḍya wrote commentaries on it. Savarasvāmin (300 A.D.) wrote a commentary called *Savara-Bhāṣya*, in which he criticized the views of the different schools of Buddhism. He stated his views on the principal philosophical topics, and raised the Pūrva Mimāṃsā to the status of an independent system. He refuted the theories of Bhavadāsa and other ancient Vṛttikāras, and adopted the views of Upavarṣa regarding the Atman and pramāṇas. Bhartṛmitra who followed Savara in his commentary on the *Mimāṃsā Sūtra* rejected some of his innovations, and upheld the earlier views of the Vṛttikāras.

Kumārika Bhaṭṭa (700 A.D.), the founder of the Bhaṭṭa school of Mimāṃsā, wrote a monumental work entitled *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, of which *Stlokavārtika* is only a digest. Sālikānātha, Pārthasārathī Miśra, Someśvara Bhaṭṭa and others refer to it, which is lost. Kumārika wrote *Tantravārtika* and *Ṭuṭṭikā* also. *Stlokavārtika* deals with the first part of the first chapter known as *Tarkāpāda*, and has great philosophical importance. Sucarita Miśra wrote a commentary entitled *Kāśikā* on it. Umbeka or Bhavabhūti also wrote a commentary on it. Pārthasārathī Miśra (900 A.D.) wrote a commentary known as *Nyāyaratnakara* on it, which eclipsed the other commentaries. He wrote *Nyāyaratnamālā*, *Tantraratna*, and *Śastraśīpikā*, which is a popular manual of the Bhaṭṭa school. Rāmākrṣṣa Bhaṭṭa, Somanātha, and Sudarśanācārya wrote commentaries entitled *Yuktisnehaprapūraṇī*, *Mayūkhamālikā*, and *Śastraśīpikāprakāśa* on it. Maṭḍalana Miśra (680-750 A.D.), an eminent disciple of Kumārika, wrote *Vidhiṉīveka*, *Bhāvanāviveka*, *Vibhramāviveka*, *Brahmasiddhi*, *Sphoṭasiddhi*, and *Mimāṃsāsūtrārāṇaṁ* on it. He supported the theories of Kumārika and criticized those of Prabhākara. Vācaspati Miśra (900 A.D.) wrote *Nyāyakāṇḍikā*, a commentary on *Vidhiṉīveka*, and *Tattvabindu*. Pārthasārathī
Miśra quoted from them in discussing Vidhiniṛpaya and Vākyārthanirṛpaya in his Nyāyaratnamālā.¹

Prabhākara Miśra (700 A.D.), probably a pupil of Kumārika, the founder of the Prabhākara school of Mimāṃsā, wrote two commentaries entitled Bṛhatī and Laghī on Savara-Bhāṣya. Sālikānātha Miśra (800 A.D.) wrote a commentary known as Rjuvimalāpaṇcikā on Bṛhatī, a commentary called Dīpaśīkhā on Laghī, and Prakaraṇapaṇcikā, a popular manual of the Prabhākara school of Mimāṃsā. Bhavanātha (900 A.D.) wrote Nayaviveka, in which he summarized Rjuvimalāpaṇcikā, Dīpaśīkhā and Prakaraṇapaṇcikā of Sālikānātha Miśra. Rāmānuja-cārya (1600 A.D.) wrote a commentary called Nāyakaratna on Nyāyaratnamālā, and Tantrarāhasya, which deals with Prabhākara’s views on epistemology, logic and ontology. Prabhākara’s doctrine is called gurumata, the view of the teacher.²

The third school of Mimāṃsā was founded by Murāri Miśra, whose works are lost.

The Mimāṃsā is called the Pūrva Mimāṃsā, while the Vedānta is called the Uttar Mimāṃsā. The former is earlier than the latter in the sense that it deals with rituals (karma), while the latter is concerned with knowledge (jñāna). The performance of rituals or acts of duty (dharma) leads to the knowledge of the reality. So the Pūrva Mimāṃsā, called the Mimāṃsā, is logically prior to the Uttar Mimāṃsā or the Vedānta, the former being concerned with Dharma, and the latter, with Brahman.

The Mimāṃsā is called Karma Mimāṃsā. It mainly deals with the Vedic injunctions about rituals, the rules of interpretation of the texts, which remove the apparent contradictions among them, and harmonize them with one another, and the philosophical justification of the beliefs underlying ritualism. It believes in the reality of the external world, the reality of the individual souls (ātman), and the Law of Karma. It believes in transmigration, heaven and hell, and liberation. It believes in many gods, who are worshipped through sacrifices. It rejects the notion of one God, who creates, preserves

¹ NRM., Introduction.
² TNR., p. 1; NRM., pp. XXVI-LVIII.
and dissolves the world. It frankly advocates atheism, and emphasizes the importance of ritualism. It believes in the eternity and infallibility of the Vedas, and rejects their divine authorship. Its philosophy of language, analysis and explanation of volitions, moral impulsion, moral obligation, Moral Law (Vidhi), Apūrva, Niyoga, and Dharma is profound. It has made a great contribution to epistemology and logic, and elaborately deals with the different kinds of pramāṇa. The Bhāṭṭa school and the Prabhākara school hold different views on many philosophical problems which will be noted in course of our discussion of the main problems.

The principal differences between Kumārila and Prabhākara’s views are mentioned here. (1) Kumārila recognizes six pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference, comparison, testimony, presumption, and non-apprehension. Prabhākara rejects non-apprehension, and admits five pramāṇas. (1) Kumārila recognizes five categories, viz., substance, quality, action, community, and negation. Prabhākara recognizes eight categories, viz., substance, quality, action, community, inherence, number, potency, and similarity. Both reject particularity (viṣeṣa) recognized by the Vaiṣeṣika. (3) Kumārila admits eleven substances, viz., earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, self, manas, darkness, and sound (varṇa). Prabhākara admits nine substances, and regards sound as a quality of ether, and darkness as the absence of light. (4) Kumārila regards action or movement as perceptible, while Prabhākara regards it as imperceptible. (5) Kumārila admits higher and lower communities. Prabhākara admits the communities of substance, quality, and action, but he rejects the highest genus or Beinghood (sattā). (6) Kumārila rejects inherence as an independent category, and regards it as identity. Prabhākara recognizes subsistence or inherence as an independent category, but he does not regard it as one and eternal. Inherence is eternal in eternal substances, and non-eternal in non-eternal substances. There are many inherences. (7) Kumārila considers negation as an independent category, and recognizes four kinds of negation, viz., prior negation, posterior negation, mutual negation, and absolute negation. Prabhākara rejects negation, and identifies it with the locus. (8) Kumārila rejects the categories of potency, number, and similarity recognized by Prabhākara.
(9) Both recognize the reality of the permanent self (ātman) different from the body, the sense-organs, manas, and fleeting cognitions. Kumārila regards the self as self-illumined, or perceptible through manas, while Prabhākara does not regard it as an object of mental perception, but as manifested as the knower in every act of perception of an object. (10) Kumārila regards a cognition as an act of the self, which is inferred from cognizedness (vijñātata) produced by it in an object, while Prabhākara regards a cognition as a quality of the self, which manifests itself, its substrate, the self, and an object (tripūṭi-pratyakṣa). (11) Kumārila regards validity of knowledge as intrinsic (svaṣṭh pramāṇya) and invalidity of knowledge as extrinsic (parastha pramāṇya) due to the knowledge of defects in its cause or that of a contradicting knowledge. Prabhākara regards all knowledge as valid. (12) Kumārila regards the cognition of an object which was not apprehended before, which is free from contradiction, and whose cause is free from defects as a means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). But Prabhākara regards apprehension (anubhūti) as a pramāṇa, which is different from recollection. (13) Kumārila regards an illusion as the apprehension of an object as different from it (viparitakhyāti), while Prabhākara regards it as non-discrimination (vivekākhyāti, akhyāti) of the element of perception (e.g., 'this') and the element of recollection (e.g., 'silver') due to lapse of memory (smṛtipramoṣa). (14) Kumārila advocates the doctrine of Abhihitānyaya as to the meaning of a sentence, while Prabhākara advocates the doctrine of Anvītābhidhāna. (15) Kumārila regards an act of sacrifice as Dharma or duty, while Prabhākara regards Apārva, a supersensuous Ought as Dharma. (16) Kumārila regards a volition of the self produced by a Vedic injunction (vidhi) as an incentive to a voluntary action, which is called śādābhāvanā. He regards a voluntary action of the person, who is enjoined to act, to realize an end as ārthībhāvanā. He advocates the doctrine of bhāvanā, moral causation, or a volition to produce a desired effect. But Prabhākara advocates the doctrine of Niyoga, a categorical imperative, or an unconditional command, which impels a person to act without any motive or thought of consequences.

The Mīmāṃsā philosophy will be discussed under four heads: Epistemology, Ontology, Ethics, and Religion.
Epistemology

1. The nature of Valid Knowledge (Pramāṇa), the Means of Valid Knowledge (Pramāṇa), Intrinsic Validity (Svataḥpramāṇya) of Knowledge, and Extrinsic Invalidity (Parataḥ apramāṇya) of Knowledge.

Kumārila regards a cognition as a means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) because it is apprehension. Prabhākara also regards apprehension (anubhūti), which is distinct from recollection, as a means of valid knowledge. Kumārila regards cognizedness (jñātatā) produced by a cognitive act as its result (phala). But Prabhākara identifies pramāṇa with pramāṇa or valid knowledge, and regards a cognition as manifesting itself, and not as inferable from cognizedness of its object. According to him, all cognitions as cognitions are valid, and their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their objects, so that wrongness does not belong to the cognitions themselves, but to the objects cognized. Kumārila agrees with Prabhākara as to the nature of valid knowledge, which is in the nature of apprehension (bodha), and can be set aside by its disagreement with the real nature of its object. Savara says, "It is strange, indeed, how a cognition is said to apprehend an object, and yet be invalid." Kumārila regards novelty, non-contradiction and correspondence with the object as the tests of truth. Pārthasarathī Miśra defines valid knowledge as the knowledge which represents the real nature of its object, which was not apprehended already, and which is not contradicted by a sublating knowledge. Kumārila regards recollection as invalid, because it apprehends what was apprehended already by perception. Prabhākara also excludes recollection from valid knowledge, which is in the nature of

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* Tasmād bodhātmaṇkaratvena práptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā. SV., 2, 53.
  * Anubhūtiśca naḥ pramāṇam. Br., p. 103.
* Arthānyathāvarttiththa-deśajānādīd apodyate. SV., 2, 53.
  * Sarvaṁ jñānāṁ vathārtham. TNR., p. 5.
* Arthaṁ cārabodhayati, arthāsaṁsparṣi ceti citram. SBh., quoted in Br., p. 24.
* Bādhaka-jñāna-rahitam agrītaṁ agrītāgrāhi jñānaṁ pramāṇam. Yathārtham agrītaṁ agrītāgrāhi pramāṇam. SD., p. 45.
apprehension, which is different from recollection. Recollection, which corresponds with the real nature of its object, is not valid, because it does not cognize it independently of the original perception, and it is produced by an impression only. But a serial perception is valid, because it is not produced by an impression (smśkāra), though it apprehends what is already apprehended. It is apprehension (anubhūti), and consequently valid.

Kumārila recognizes the intrinsic validity (svataḥ prāmāṇya) and the extrinsic invalidity (parataḥ aprāmāṇya) of knowledge. The validity of knowledge arises from the essential nature of its causes untainted by defects, and is known by the knowledge itself. It does not arise from any special excellence (gūḍa) in the causes of knowledge, and is not known by any other subsequent knowledge of fruitful action, or of the absence of a contradicting knowledge. Knowledge is valid in itself, and is not validated by any other knowledge. Intrinsic validity of knowledge consists in its being generated by the complement of causal conditions of the knowledge itself, and not by extraneous conditions besides them. The knowledge of validity also is generated by the same aggregate of causal conditions which make the knowledge known. But the invalidity of knowledge arises from defects in the causal conditions of the knowledge, and is known by the knowledge of them, and the knowledge of a contradicting knowledge.

The Sāṅkhya regards the validity of knowledge and the invalidity of knowledge both as intrinsic. Kumārila and Pārthasarathi Miśra refute this view. The same knowledge cannot be both valid and invalid, since it involves self-contradiction. As soon as a knowledge is produced, it is not known to be valid and invalid, or to agree and disagree with the real nature of its object. The Sāṅkhya may argue that some

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* Vijnānasamgrhiṇyatraṃ sati tadatirikta-hetvajñayatvam pramāyaḥ svatātvaṃ. Tatāha pramānaṇāpīt api jñāna-jñāpaka-sāmagrita eva jāyate. SDS., pp. 234-35. SV., ii. 44, 47.
* SV., ii. 53, 54. Svāraṇapātaḥ pramānaṇāvān mithyātvān parāśārataḥ. Ibid., ii. 187.
* Paratacaḥpramānaṇāvān bhādhaḥ-bhādhaḥ. NRM., p. 51.
* Svataś tāvad dvayaḥ nāhī nirodhāt. SV., ii. 35.
knowledge is intrinsically valid, while some other knowledge is intrinsically invalid; that valid knowledge knows its validity, while invalid knowledge knows its invalidity. But Pārthasārathi Miśra contends that we cannot distinguish between valid knowledge and invalid knowledge, if knowledge can reveal its validity or invalidity without depending on other conditions. So the Sāmkhya view is wrong.

The Buddhists regard invalidity of knowledge as intrinsic and validity of knowledge as extrinsic. Knowledge is invalid in itself, but it is validated by extraneous conditions. As soon as a knowledge is generated, it cannot apprehend the real nature of its object. It is uncertain at the time and liable to contradiction, and so should be regarded as invalid. Its validity is subsequently known by the knowledge of the excellence of its causes, or the knowledge of its harmony with the real nature of its object, or the knowledge of a fruitful action, and sets aside its intrinsic invalidity.

Pārthasārathi Miśra refutes the Buddhist view. If the validity of knowledge is determined by the subsequent knowledge of the excellence of its causes, or the knowledge of harmony with the real nature of its object, or the knowledge of a successful action, then the validity of the second knowledge also must be due to extraneous conditions, and so on to infinity. If the second knowledge is valid in itself, the first knowledge also should be regarded as valid in itself. If knowledge is not intrinsically valid, it cannot be validated by any other knowledge. If the knowledge of a fruitful action be said to be intrinsically valid, since it is not contradicted, then the knowledge of a fruitful action (e.g., drawing water) in dream is valid, since it is not contradicted during dream. If the knowledge of pleasure be regarded as a fruitful action, since it is not contradicted, inasmuch as there is no knowledge of pleasure in its absence, then it cannot determine the validity of an antecedent knowledge, because the invalid knowledge of union with the beloved wife produces the knowledge of pleasure in

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11 SD., pp. 20-21.
13 Parāpeksaṁ pramāṇatvam nātmānaṁ labhate kvaicit. SD., p. 22.
dream. So the validity of knowledge is intrinsic. Hence the Buddhist view is wrong.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards both validity and invalidity of knowledge as extrinsic due to excellence (guṇa) and defects (doṣa) of the causes of knowledge, and determined by the knowledge of a fruitful action and a fruitless action respectively. Kumārila criticizes this view. If validity and invalidity of knowledge were due to extraneous conditions, then prior to the knowledge of its validity or invalidity, the knowledge would be neutral and devoid of any logical value. But we never experience neutral knowledge, but only valid knowledge or invalid knowledge. If the validity of a knowledge depends upon the knowledge of excellence of its causes, or the knowledge of its agreement with its object, or the knowledge of a fruitful action, then the validity of the second knowledge also depends upon some other knowledge, and so on to infinity. If the second knowledge is valid in itself, the first knowledge also is intrinsically valid. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards the validity of knowledge as due to the excellence (guṇa) of its causes. But the so-called excellence of the sense-organs and the like is not known through any means of valid knowledge. The validity of perception is generated by the essential nature of the sense-organs untainted by any defects, but not by any special excellence of them. If there were neutral knowledge, valid knowledge, and invalid knowledge, they would be due to the essential nature, excellence, and defects of its causes respectively. But, in fact, we experience only valid knowledge and invalid knowledge. Invalid knowledge arises from causes tainted with defects. So valid knowledge must be held to arise from the essential nature of its causes untainted by defects. If the validity of knowledge were produced by a proficiency (guṇa) and the invalidity of knowledge were produced by a deficiency (doṣa) in its causes, then there would be no element of valid knowledge in the illusion of a yellow conchshell or the like produced by the sense-organs devoid of a proficiency and infected with a deficiency. But the knowledge of a conchshell is valid in the illusion. It is produced

14 SD., pp. 20-22. 15 SV., ii. 35-36. 16 Taamāt kāraṇa-uddhatvam jñānaprāmāṇya-kāraṇam. SV., ii. 44. YSP., pp. 21-22.
by the essential nature of the sense-organs. The invalidity of knowledge is produced by a deficiency in its causes. It is held by some to be due to the knowledge of its deficiency, and not to its nature. The validity of knowledge cannot be determined by the knowledge of any special excellence in its cause, or the knowledge of its harmony with the real nature of its object, or the knowledge of a fruitful action. It is determined by the knowledge itself. No special excellence of the causes of knowledge except their essential nature is perceived. If there is any special excellence in them, it hinders their defects, and is destroyed, and cannot, consequently, produce validity. If validity were due to an excellence, the Vedas would be devoid of validity, because they are not creations of a person, and so do not owe their validity to reliability (guna) of their speaker. Nor can the validity of knowledge be determined by the knowledge of its harmony with the real nature of its object. Validity or truth is harmony of a knowledge with the real nature of its object. The valid knowledge itself cognizes the real nature of its object by its very nature. It does not depend upon another knowledge of harmony to manifest its object, because it does not differ from the first knowledge. Hence it cannot be argued that the first knowledge is uncertain, while the second is certain. Nor can the validity of knowledge be determined by the knowledge of a fruitful action, for unless its validity is determined, it cannot determine the validity of the first knowledge. If it is determined by another knowledge of a fruitful action, it will lead to infinite regress. If it is determined by the first knowledge, then there is mutual dependence. The validity of the first knowledge is determined by the second, and that of the second knowledge is determined by the first. If the latter is determined by itself, the former also should be regarded as determined by itself. The knowledge of a fruitful action is considered to be valid in itself, since it is not contradicted. Or, it is said to be the experience

11 NRM., pp. 48-49; NYR., p. 49.
12 Svata eva jñānāt prāmāṇyaṁ niścīyate. Na tu guṇajñānāt saṁvādajñānād arthakriyajñānād vā. NRM., p. 52.
13 TNR., p. 8.
14 Jñānasvarūpād evārthaḥtathātvalakṣaṇaḥ prāmāṇyaṁ bhāti. TNR., p. 6.
15 TNR., p. 7.
of pleasure, which is valid, since it is uncontradicted. But even these have been proved already to be invalid. Nor can the validity of knowledge be determined by the knowledge of the absence of a contradicting knowledge, since it cannot be exhaustively known by us, because we are not omniscient. Further, it is known either at the time of ascertaining the validity of a knowledge or at a subsequent time. It very often appears at a subsequent time, and hence the knowledge of it cannot determine the validity of an antecedent knowledge. Hence valid knowledge is produced by the essential nature of its causes untainted by defects, and known by itself. Invalid knowledge is produced by causes tainted with defects, and known by the knowledge of the defects or the knowledge of a contradicting knowledge.

The Mīmāṃsakas differs from the Naiyāyikas in three respects. First, the former regards the validity of knowledge as intrinsic and the invalidity of knowledge as extrinsic, while the latter regards the validity and the invalidity of knowledge both as extrinsic. Secondly, the former regards novelty (agṛhita-grāhītvā), correspondence (artha-vyabhi-grāhītvā), and non-contradiction (abādhitatvā) as the characteristics of truth, while the latter regards correspondence as the content of truth, and workability (pravṛttisamartitya) as the test of the knowledge of truth. Thirdly, the former advocates realism, pure and simple, while the latter advocates realism and pragmatism, and regards validity as determined by the knowledge of practical efficiency, and invalidity as determined by the knowledge of practical inefficiency.

2. Perception (Pratyakṣa).

Savara and Kumārila recognize six pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference, comparison, testimony, presumption, and non-apprehension. Prabhākara rejects negation as an independent category, and non-apprehension as the means of knowing it.

88 SV., NR., ii. 34-37; SD., YSP., pp. 21-23.
89 Svata eva pramāṇyaṁ parataḥ ca pramāṇyaṁ doṣajānād bādhaka-jñānād va niṣceyam. NRM., p. 88.
90 IIP., pp. 189-97.
Jaimini defines perception as the knowledge produced in the self by the right intercourse of the sense-organs with existing objects.\textsuperscript{24} It is produced by real objects existing at present and acting upon the sense-organs. Past or future objects, which are non-existent at present, cannot act upon the sense-organs, and produce perception. When there is a right intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects, valid perception is produced. When there is a wrong intercourse between them, it is not produced.\textsuperscript{25} Kumārila says, "Right intercourse is the intercourse of the sense-organs untainted by defects with real objects." Illusions are produced by wrong intercourse.\textsuperscript{27} The self comes into contact with manas, the internal organ, which comes into contact with the sense-organs, which have right intercourse with real external objects. The olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the visual organ, the tactual organ, and the auditory organ, composed of earth, water, light, air, and space or ether, are the external organs. The Naiyāyika regards the auditory organ as ether limited by the ear-hole, while the Mīmāṃsāka regards it as space limited by the ear-hole. The external sense-organs can produce perceptions of odour, taste, colour, heat, cold, and sound, when they are supervised by the manas, which is the organ of internal perception. It is the organ of the perception of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition, which are the qualities of the self. The sense-object-intercourse has the capacity to manifest a sensible object. Perception can apprehend sensible objects only, but it cannot apprehend supersensible objects like dharma.\textsuperscript{28}

The Prabhākara defines perception as direct apprehension, or immediate knowledge, or distinct cognition.\textsuperscript{29} It relates to an object, the self, and the cognition. In every act of perception of an object, the self, the cognition, and the object are perceived. This is Prabhākara’s doctrine of triple perception (tripūţipratyakṣa). In regard to objects, there is the perception of substances, qualities, and universals due to the

\textsuperscript{24} JMS., i. 1. 4. 
\textsuperscript{25} SBh., i. 1. 4. 
\textsuperscript{26} Samyagarthe ca saṁ sahdo duśprayoganivāraṇaḥ. SV., iv. 38. Ibid, iv. 39. 
\textsuperscript{27} SV., iv. 60, 69, 83-85; 8D., pp. 35-36. 
\textsuperscript{28} Sākṣāt pratiṭiḥ pratyakṣam. Sākṣāttvam śāparokṣyate viśadāvabhāṣaḥ. TNR., p. 9. PP., p. 51.
intercourse of the sense-organs with them. With regard to the self, all kinds of knowledge as cognitions are apprehended as perceptions by it. Cognitions are self-manifest. But the self and an object are not self-manifest, but are manifested by a cognition, which is self-aware. It does not depend upon any other cognition to manifest it.

Kumārila and Prabhākara both recognize two stages of perception, viz., indeterminate perception and determinate perception. Kumārila defines indeterminate perception as simple apprehension of an object, pure and simple, similar to the apprehension of a baby or a dumb person. Neither the specific characters nor the generic characters are apprehended by it, but the individual object only, which is their substrate, is apprehended. Prāthasārathi Miśra defines it as a non-relational apprehension of an object only with its generic and specific characters, which cannot distinguish them from one another. It cannot apprehend the generic characters as generic and the specific characters as specific. It apprehends an object with its various properties, viz., genus, substance, quality, action, and name unrelated to each other just after the sense-object-intercourse. It apprehends a multiform object with its various properties in a non-relational manner. There is no apprehension of a subject-predicate relation in it.

Prabhākara defines indeterminate perception as a simple apprehension of the bare nature of an object. It apprehends a substance, a quality, and a genus as bare existences unrelated to each other just after the sense-object-intercourse. Its existence is proved by its self-awareness. It does not apprehend

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²⁰ Meyamātrpramāṇaṁ sā. Dravya-jātiguneśvindevindriyasamānyogothā sā pratyakṣā pratītiḥ. PP., p. 52.
²¹ Sarvāḥ ca prātisayaḥ svayaṁ pratyakṣāḥ prakāśante tāsānca yuktam eva svātmanī pratyakṣātvacem. PP., p. 82.
²² Sva-vyamprakāśaiva mitih. Meyānāṁ māntā ca svataḥ prakāśo suparādyate. PP., p. 57.
²⁵ Nirvikalpaṁ anekākāraṁ vastu saṁmudgahāṁ grhṇāti. SD., p. 41.
²⁶ Avyaviktaḥ pratyakṣāḥ haddhiḥ svarūpavayva. PP., p. 54.
an action which is not perceptible. It apprehends generic characters and specific characters, but it cannot cognize them as generic and specific, since it is devoid of recollection. Community is common to many individuals. Individuality is specific to one individual. The inclusiveness of community and the exclusiveness of individuality are not cognized by indeterminate perception, because it is devoid of recollection of other similar and dissimilar objects.44

Kumārila defines determinate perception as relational apprehension of the generic characters of an object as generic, and of its specific characters as specific. It contains an element of recollection of similar and dissimilar objects, and apprehends the community of its object with other similar objects and its distinction from other dissimilar objects. It apprehends an object and its generic and specific properties in a subject-predicate relation.45 Parthasarathi Miśra defines determinate perception as apprehension of an object with its various forms such as genus, substance, quality, action, and name as related to, and distinguished from, one another. It apprehends its object and its properties in a subject-predicate relation.46 It apprehends an object as belonging to a particular class (e.g., 'this is a cow'), as being qualified by another substance (e.g., 'this is with a staff'), as being enuced with a particular quality (e.g., 'this is white'), as doing a particular action (e.g., 'this is going'), and as bearing a particular name (e.g., 'this is Dittha').47

Prabhākara also regards determinate perception as the apprehension of the generic characters and the specific characters of an object as generic and specific respectively. It apprehends its object and its properties in a subject-predicate relation. It apprehends its object as a substance enuded with particular qualities and belonging to a certain genus. It contains an element of recollection produced by subconscious

44 Sāmānīya-viśeṣaṇa pratipadyamānam pratyakṣaṁ prathamam utpadate, kantu vastvantānamsandhāna-sānyatayā sāmānīya-viśeṣārūpāṇa na prativate. PP., pp. 84-85. TNR., p. 10.
45 SV., Iv. 120-125.
46 Savikalpakān tvekaikākāraṁ jātyādikāṁ vivicya viṣayikaroṁ, SD., p. 41.
47 Jātirdrayaupakriyānāmabhī pañicadhā savikalpeṇa viśakalyate, SD., p. 41.
impressions. It is immediate apprehension produced by the sense-object-intercourse aided by impressions (saṁskāra).\textsuperscript{42}

Kumārila recognizes the validity of indeterminate and determinate perception both. Indeterminate perception reveals the bare nature of an object. It is direct apprehension (apurokṣāvabhāsa), or clear and distinct cognition (visadāvabhāsa) of an object in itself, unrelated to other objects. Its validity consists in directness and immediacy. It yields new knowledge not acquired already. Though it is devoid of subject-predicate relation, it is valid. Determinate perception also is valid, since it is direct and immediate knowledge of an object and its properties as related to each other, which is produced by the sense-object-intercourse aided by impressions.\textsuperscript{43}

Prabhākara also regards indeterminate perception as valid, since it is sensuous apprehension of an object unrelated to other objects and devoid of recollection. Its validity is proved by self-awareness.\textsuperscript{44} He regards determinate perception also as valid, because it apprehends the subject-predicate relation between its object and its properties, substance, quality and genus, which is not apprehended by indeterminate perception. It is valid like a serial perceptual.\textsuperscript{45} Prabhākara regards direct apprehension as the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), and the subsequent knowledge of acceptance, avoidance, and indifference as the result of valid perception.\textsuperscript{46}

3. Inference (Anumāna).

Savara defines inference as the knowledge of an unperceived object, which is not present to a sense-organ, from the perception of another object, when a uniform relation has been

\textsuperscript{43} Vikalpasyāpi viṣadāvabhāsītvam iti pratyakṣatvopapatiḥ. Savikalpamapyanuparṇendriyavypārasya jāyamānam apurokṣāvabhāsātvāt prayuktaḥ eva. SD., pp. 38-39.
\textsuperscript{44} Svasthāvid evaṭra pramāṇam. PP., p. 54.
\textsuperscript{45} Savikalpasya gṛhitagraṅktive’pi dhārāvāhikānyāya prāmāṇyam veditavyam, viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvātirekenā gṛhitagraṅkatakāpi sambhavatvaya. PP., p. 56. IIP., pp. 198-206.
\textsuperscript{46} Śākṣātkarā pramāṇam. Hānopādānopēkṣābuddhayāḥ phalam. TNR., p. 11.
known to subsist between them.\textsuperscript{47} Kumārila follows Savara, and explains the relation as invariable concomitance of a sign or reason with a predicate, the former being pervaded by the latter, and being the indicator of the latter, which is indicated.\textsuperscript{44} The sign is called vyāpya because it is coextensive with, or narrower than, the predicate in time and place. The predicate is called vyāpaka because it is coextensive with, or wider than, the sign in time and place. The unperceived predicate is inferred from the sign perceived in the subject on the ground of the uniform relation between them known already in similar instances. Smoke was perceived to be accompanied by fire in a kitchen and other similar instances at certain times and in certain places. Smoke is subsequently perceived in a hill exactly in the same form. So the existence of a fire in the same form in a hill is inferred from it. The sign or reason (hetu) proves the existence of the predicate.\textsuperscript{45} The predicate alone (\textit{e.g.}, a fire) is not the object of inference because it is already known. The subject (\textit{e.g.}, a hill) as qualified by the predicate (\textit{e.g.}, a fire) is the object of inference. The subject alone unrelated to the predicate cannot be the object of inference. Nor can the subject and the predicate, singly or collectively, be the object of inference, independently of the other. The subject as qualified by the predicate is inferred from the sign perceived in it.\textsuperscript{46}

Pārthasarathi Miśra and Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa state that invariable concomitance expresses the relations of conjunction, inherence, coinherence in the same substance, causality, coexistence and the like between the reason and the predicate invariably perceived in similar instances. The existence of the predicate in the subject is inferred from the sign or reason perceived in it on the strength of the uniform relation between them, if they are not known to be identical with, or contradictory

\textsuperscript{47}Anumānaṃ iñātasambhandhasyaikadeśadarśānād ekadeśāntare' sansmārakṛte' thēh buddhīthī. \textit{SBh.}, p. 90.

\textsuperscript{44}Sambandho vyāptir īṣṭā'ṃ līṅgdharmasyā līṅgūnā. Vyāpyasya gamakatvāṃ ca vyāpakaṁ gamyam īlayate. \textit{SV.}, Anumāna, 4.

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{SV.}, Anumāna, 5, 5, 10, 11.

\textsuperscript{46}\textit{SV.}, Anumāna, 27, 28, 47, 48; NR.

Tasmād dharmaviśeṣāya dharmiṇaḥ syāt pramanayaś. \textit{Ibid}, 47.

Dharma = śādhyā. Dharmin = pakṣa.
to, each other by a stronger means of valid knowledge. The invariable concomitance, according to Kumārila, is known by repeated observation of concomitance of the two general properties of the reason and the predicate, and sometimes of two particular objects denoted by them, strengthened by the non-observation of contrary instances of their non-concomitance. The observation of concomitance of the reason and the predicate in numerous instances and the non-observation of non-concomitance between them are the means of knowing invariable concomitance. Pārthasārathi Miśra also holds the same view. The observation of the concomitance of all smokes with fires and the absence of smoke in all non-fiery objects is not necessary for the knowledge of the invariable concomitance. The observation of the concomitance of smoke with fire in numerous instances and the non-observation of the contrary instances are enough for the knowledge of the invariable concomitance. The knowledge of invariable concomitance is inferential, since the concomitance of smoke with fire in the past, the present, the future, and the remote places can never be perceived. The perceptual character of it is contradicted by consciousness, since it is not direct and immediate. Hence invariable concomitance is known by induction by simple enumeration.

Does inference involve the fallacy of *petitio principii*? Kumārila regards novelty as an essential characteristic of valid knowledge. It consists in not being apprehended already (agṛhitagrāhitva). It is objected that inference contains the recollection of invariable concomitance, which apprehends what has already been apprehended, and thus invalidates inference. Kumārila argues that though the concomitance of smoke and

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44 SD., YSP., pp. 60-61.
45 Bhūyodarśanagamyā ca vyāptih sāmānyadharmayoh. Jāyate bhedaḥānena kvacīcchāpi viśeṣayoh. ŚV., Anumāna, 12; NR.
46 Sāhitye mitadeśatvat prasadīde cāgnidhūmayoh. Vyatirekasya čādṛṣṭer gamakatvam prakāryate. ŚV., Arthāpatti, 42.
48 Yatra yatra dhūmas tatra tatragniririti yo'vagamaḥ so'pyānumaṇika eva parekṣijaptatās tasya tu pratvaksatvāṁ saḥvidvirddham āpurokṣyabhāvāt. NR., ŚV., Anumāna, 12. SD., p. 62.
fire in a kitchen and the like is certainly known in a general way, yet the relation between the present subject (e.g., a hill) and the predicate (e.g., a fire) is not already known. The hill was not already known, far less its fieriness. What is the novel factor, which was not already apprehended, in the inference? The fieriness of smoky objects is already known in a general way. The generic character of fire is already known. The hill is perceived. But the hill as qualified by a fire was not already known by any means of valid knowledge. 84

Prabhākara slightly amends Śāvara’s definition of inference. He defines it as the knowledge of a predicate in a subject from the perception of a sign or reason on the ground of the knowledge of a uniform relation between them, if the knowledge is not contradicted by another knowledge. 85 The uniform relation may express inherence, coinherence in the same substance, causality, and the like. The causal relation between smoke and fire is invariable. The relation between smell and earth is invariable. The relation between taste and colour, which inhere in the same substance, is invariable. But the relation between colour and taste is not invariable. Whenever there is taste, there is colour, for instance, in water. But wherever there is colour, there is no taste, for instance, in light. An invariable relation is the ground of inference. 86

How is the invariable concomitance known? It is not known by sensuous perception, which cognizes objects here and now acting upon the sense-organs. Nor is it known by mental perception, since the manas cannot perceive external objects independently of the external sense-organs. Nor is it cognized by perception aided by the impressions of repeated perceptions, since they are the causes of recollections only. Nor is it known by inference, since it is the ground of inference. If it were known by inference, and inference were based on it, it would

84 Śāmānya hi dhāmatām agnīmatāvagata, parvatādesa tu devaśeṣasya svarūpam api prāg anavagataṁ no tarāṁ agnīmatvam. ŚD., p. 62. Kim atārghītaṁ, agniśāmānayānāyaūvagataṁ eva, parvato’pi pratyakṣeṣuvaagataṁ agnivishīṣṭas tu parvato na kenpyavagata iti so numeyo bhavisyati. Ibid., p. 63.
85 Jñātāsambandhāṃkaryāya kadeśasya darśanāt.
Ekadeśāṃ kauñāhā anumānamabādāhite.
Ekadeśa = liṅga. Ekadeśāntara = sādhyā.
86 PP., p. 68.
lead to infinite regress. Nor is invariable concomitance known by Vedic testimony, since it gives the knowledge of Ought (Apūrva) or duty (kārya) only. Nor is it known by comparison, since it cognizes similarity only. Nor is it known by presumption, since it also depends upon a constant relation like inference, and so will lead to infinite regress. So it is known by mental perception. This is the opponent’s contention.

Prabhākara maintains that smoke and fire are perceived as conjoined, since conjunction as a quality depends upon the substances which are conjoined. Time and place also are perceived as qualifications of substances. The conjunction of smoke and fire unlimited by time and place is perceived in a kitchen and the like. Hence their conjunction is natural, which depends upon the existence of smoke only. If the existence of smoke is known by perception, its relation to fire can at once be inferred. Hence the first perception cognizes the uniform relation of smoke with fire. Unconditionality of the relation is afterwards known by repeated observation, since vitiating conditions are not observed in spite of careful investigation. So Prabhākara recognizes the importance of repeated observation for the elimination of suspected conditions. But where the conjunction (e.g., of fire with smoke) cognized by the first perception is contradicted (e.g., in a red-hot iron ball), its limitation by time and place is afterwards considered, because it is not natural but conditional. Wet fuel is a condition here, since smoke is produced by wet fuel in conjunction with fire. Hence what proves the unconditionality of the relation of the pervaded to the pervader is the pramāṇa of invariable concomitance. Thus Prabhākara also regards induction by simple enumeration as the ground of invariable concomitance. He considers inference to be valid, since the knowledge of the predicate existing in the subject is in the nature of apprehension, though it is produced by the perception of the sign and the recollection of the invariable concomitance.

PP., pp. 68-69.
Prāthamikar amahāśādāvagner dhūmena saha sañyogadeśakālānavaśchinnena eva pratīyate. Sa tasmāt svabhāvikaḥ. TNR., p. 11.
TNR., pp. 11-12. PP., pp. 70-71.
PP., p. 71. Avyabhiścārastraśakṛddarśanagamyab. RVPr., p. 96.
Prabhākara admits inference for oneself and inference for others. Both consist of three members, viz., (1) the thesis or proposition (pratijñā), (2) the minor premise which states the reason (hetu), and (3) the universal major premise which states the uniform relation illustrated by an example (udāharaṇa). The proposition should be stated first, but the major premise and the minor premise may be stated in any order. Either the reason (hetu) or the application may be stated. The conclusion follows necessarily from the general principle of relation between the sign and the predicate. A heterogeneous example is needless, since a homogeneous example is enough to illustrate the general principle. Some Mīmāṃsāsakas do not admit a kevalavyatireki inference.\

Savara admits two kinds of inference, viz., pratyakṣato-dṛṣṭasambandha and sāmānyatodṛṣṭasambandha. Kumārila calls them dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇaparipāyaya and adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇaparipāyaya. Prabhākara calls them dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa and adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa. In the former there is the invariable concomitance between objects which are perceptible, as smoke and fire. In the latter there is the invariable concomitance between a perceptible object and an imperceptible object, as motion of the sun is inferred from its change of position in the sky. Prabhākara regards motion as imperceptible.\

Kumārila and Pārthasaṁratha Miśra mention asiddhi, anākāntika, and ādhyātaka as faulty reasons (hetvābhāsa). There are five kinds of asiddhi, viz., svarūpaśiddhi, sambhandhaśiddhi, vyatirekāśiddhi, āśrayāśiddhi, and vyāptyaśiddhi. (1) 'The Buddha knows virtue and vice, because he is omniscient'. It involves svarūpaśiddhi, because omniscience is non-existent. (2) 'Fire does not burn, because it is cold'. It involves sambhandhaśiddhi, because coldness has no relation to fire. (3) 'The word cow denotes a being possessing a dewlap and the like, because it has the genus of the word cow'. It involves vyatirekāśiddhi, because the reason does not differ from the subject. There is no genus of a word (śabdatva). (4) 'Ether is eternal, because it is a substance which is not composed of parts'. For the Sautrāntika it involves āśrayāśiddhi, because he denies the existence of ether (ākāśa). (5) 'Air and ether are

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44 TNR., pp. 12-13; PP., p. 85.
45 SBh., pp. 90, 100; PSPM., p. 49; PP., pp. 78-79; SD., pp. 64, 69.
non-eternal, because they are corporeal. It involves vyāptya-siddhi, because ether is incorporeal. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsāka's fallacy of vyāptyasiddhi corresponds to the Naiyāyika's fallacy of bhāgāsiddhi. Pārthaśarathi Miśra recognizes two kinds of anaikāntika, viz., savyabhicāra and sapratisādhana. (1) 'Sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal.' It involves savyabhicāra, because non-eternal motions are incorporeal. So incorporeality is an irregular reason. (2) (i) 'Air is imperceptible, because it is colourless, being a substance'. (ii) 'Air is perceptible, because it is tangible, having a large dimension'. These two inferences involve the fallacy of sapratisādhana corresponding to the Naiyāyika's satpratipakṣa. They are undecisive, because the comparative strength of both is not estimated here. The Mīmāṃsāka's fallacy of bādhaka corresponds to the Naiyāyika's fallacy of viruddha. There are six kinds of bādhaka. (1) 'Sound is eternal, because it is produced'. It involves dharmanvarūpābādha, because producedness of sound contradicts its eternality. (2) 'A word whose relation to an object is not known denotes an object, because it has a case-ending, like a word whose relation to an object is known already'. Here a word's denoting an object is inferred, prior to the knowledge of its relation to its object. But a word's denoting an object is pervaded by the prior knowledge of its relation to its object. It is a dharmaviśeṣa which is contradicted. So the inference involves dharmaviśeṣabādha. (3) 'Inference is different from a substance, because it is the cause of the knowledge 'this abides in that', like conjunction'. It involves dharmanvārūpābādha, because what is the cause of the knowledge 'this abides in that' is found to be non-inference and many, like conjunction. The dharmin is the subject (pakṣa) of inference, while the dharma is the predicate (sādhyā) inferred. (4) In this inference maniness of the subject contradicts the oneness of inference. So it involves dharmaviśeṣabādha. (5) 'The self is eternal, because it does not consist of parts, like ether'. For the Sautrāntika who denies the reality of the self as well as its eternity, it involves dharmanvārūpābādha. (6) 'The visual organ, etc., are the means for the experience of a self, because they are composed of sattva, rajas and tamas, like a bed and the like'. A bed, a body, etc., are composed of sattva, rajas and tamas and material. They are also the means
of the experience of a self. Hence the visual organ, etc., are material like them. This contradicts the Śāṅkhyā doctrine that they are the products of egoism (ahaṅkāra). So the inference involves dharmaviśeṣābādha. A bed, which is composed of parts and a means for the experience of another, is pervaded by materiality. So its being a means for the experience of a self is unproven. The visual organ, etc., may not be composed of parts, because even what is not composed of parts is found to be a means for the experience of another. So the inference involves dharmaviśeṣābādha. Thus it involves dharmadharmaviśeṣābādha. Some recognize only four kinds of bādha, and reject the last two kinds. Some recognize only one kind, the subordinate kinds being useless. Pārthaśārathī Miśra concludes that there are two kinds of bādha, viz., dharmasvarūpabādha and dharmaviśeṣabādha.44

Śālikānātha Miśra mentions anaikāntika, asiddha, and bādhaka or viruddha as fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa). He mentions three kinds of discrepant reason (anaikāntika) viz., sādhāraṇa, asādhāraṇa, and savyabhicāra. (1) 'Sound is eternal, because it is knowable'. It involves sādhāraṇa anaikāntika, because knowability is related to eternality, but not pervaded by it. (2) 'Earth is eternal, because it possesses odour'. It involves asādhāraṇa anaikāntika, because odour subsists in earth only, and is not pervaded by eternality. (3) 'The hill is smoky, because it is fiery'. It involves savyabhicāra anaikāntika, because fieriness is pervaded by smokiness when it is conjoined with the condition 'wet fuel'. Śālikānātha mentions (1) svarūpāsiddha and (2) ekadeśāsiddha as varieties of unproven reason (asiddha). 'The jar is eternal, because it is produced'. It involves contradictory reason (bādhaka, viruddha), because producedness is pervaded by non-eternality. Śālikānātha mentions pratijñābhāsa, pakṣabhāsa, and drṣṭāntabhāsa. He mentions false examples, viz., those devoid of the predicate (sādhya-vikala), devoid of the reason (sādhana-vikala), devoid of both (ubhayavikala), devoid of invariable concomitance (sambandha-niyamavikala), and stating the opposite invariable concomitance (viparitaniyam). He mentions some grounds of defeat such as

44 SD., pp. 64-68; SDP., pp. 282-84; SV., Anumāna, 11-107.
4. **Comparison (Upanāna).**

Śāvara defines comparison as the knowledge of similarity subsisting in an unperceived object (e.g., a cow) on the perception of a similar object. Pārthasārathi Miśra defines it as the knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object (e.g., a cow) with an object (e.g., a wild cow) perceived. The cow which was perceived by me in the past in a town is similar to this wild cow perceived in a forest at present. This is an example of comparison. The Prabhākara also defines comparison as the knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object, which arises from the perception of similarity. A person, who perceived a cow in a town in the past, perceives a wild cow in a forest, perceives its similarity with the cow, and then knows the similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow. The knowledge of similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow is comparison. Prabhākara’s view of comparison is identical with that of Kumārila. Both regard similarity as an object of comparison. Both regard similarity of a remembered object with a perceived object as known by comparison. But Prabhākara, unlike Kumārila, regards similarity as an independent category.

Comparison is not perception, since its object known to be similar (e.g., a cow) is not in contact with a sense-organ. Nor is it recollection, since there is the recollection of the object (e.g., a cow), but not of its similarity with a perceived object. The similarity of the cow with the wild cow was not perceived when the cow was perceived, and, consequently, cannot be remembered now. Nor is comparison inference, since it does not depend upon the knowledge of invariable

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48 Upamānānā sādṛśyam asannikṛṣṭe rthe buddhim utpādayati, yathā āvayavadarśanānāṁ gosmaraṇasya. Śīl., i. 1. 8, p. 107.
49 Pārvatīṣṭhe sāmarśamāpe rthe dṛśyamānārtha-sādṛśyajñānam upamānaṁ. SD., p. 74.
50 Sādṛśyadarśanottamānāṁ jñānam sādṛśyaviśayakam upamānam. PP., p. 110.
concomitance between the two objects, which are similar to each other. It may be reduced to an inference in the following manner. 'The cow is similar to the wild cow, because it is the substance of similarity with the wild cow, and whatever is the substance of similarity with another object is found to be similar to it, as one of the twins is similar to the other'. This is wrong, because the cow and the wild cow, which are similar to each other, were never perceived together in the past. So comparison is not inference. Nor is it testimony, since it does not depend upon verbal authority. So it is an independent means of valid knowledge.\textsuperscript{12}

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsāka and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsāka criticize the Nyāya view of comparison. Gautama defines it as the knowledge of similarity of an unknown object with a well-known object.\textsuperscript{13} A person knows from a forester that a wild cow is like a cow, goes to a forest, perceives an animal like a cow, and knows by comparison that it is a wild cow. The knowledge of the similarity of the perceived wild cow with the well-known cow is comparison. Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhāṭṭa contends that the so-called comparison of the Nyāya apprehends either the peculiar nature of the wild cow (gavayāśvarūpa) or the similarity with the cow subsisting in the wild cow (tadgatagosāḍrśya). It cannot apprehend the former, since it is in contact with the visual organ, and perceived through it. Nor can it apprehend the latter, since it is known through recollection of the verbal statement of the forester. The knowledge that the wild cow is similar to the well-known cow is obtained from the recollection of the past verbal cognition. Nor is the wild cow qualified by similarity with the cow (sāḍrśyaviśiṣṭagavyaya) apprehended by comparison. If the knowledge of it is not in excess of the recollection of the verbal cognition, it is nothing but recollection. If it is in excess of the recollection, it is nothing but perception, since it is produced by the sense-object-intercourse aided by the recollection, which is merely an auxiliary factor. Vātsyāyana defines comparison as the knowledge of the relation of a word to an object denoted by it.\textsuperscript{14} The

\textsuperscript{12} SD., pp. 75-76; TNR., p. 13; PP., p. 111.
\textsuperscript{13} Prasiddhasādharṇyāt sādhyasaśādhanam apamānam. NS., i. 1. 6.
\textsuperscript{14} Saṁjñāsaṁjñāsaṁbandhāpariccheda evopamānapalam. YSP., p. 74. NBh., i. 1. 6.
relation between a word and an object denoted by it is known from testimony. The relation of the word gavaya to a wild cow is known from the verbal statement of a forester, and not by comparison. So the similarity of the perceived wild cow subsisting in the remembered cow is known by comparison. Or, it is the remembered cow as qualified by similarity with the perceived wild cow. Though similarity with the cow subsisting in the wild cow is perceived, and the cow is remembered, yet the remembered cow as possessing similarity with the perceived wild cow is known by comparison.\footnote{\textit{VSP}, p. 74}

Sālikānātha Miśra criticizes the Nyāya view of comparison in a similar manner. The first knowledge 'The wild cow is like a cow' is derived from the testimony of a forester, and, consequently, a verbal cognition. The second knowledge of similarity with a cow subsisting in a wild cow in a forest is recognition, which is a kind of perception. The knowledge 'This animal is called gavaya' is inferential, since it depends on the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the word and its object. 'The name of this animal is already known by me'. This knowledge is mere recollection. Hence the Nyāya view of comparison is not right.\footnote{\textit{PP}, p. 112.}

5. Presumption (Arthāpatti).

Savara defines presumption as the assumption of an unperceived object without which inconsistency among perceived facts cannot be reconciled.\footnote{\textit{Arthāpatti\ driśab śruto vārtho nyathā nopapadyate ityarthakalpanā. SHII, p. 110; SD., p. 76; PP., p. 113.}} Pārthasārathi Miśra and Sālikānātha Miśra give the same definition of it, and illustrate it by the same example. If we know that Devadatta is alive, and perceive that he is absent from his house, we cannot reconcile his being alive with his non-existence in his house, unless we assume his existence outside his house. The assumption of this unperceived fact which reconciles two apparently inconsistent well-known facts is presumption. It is also called postulation or implication (arthāpatti). Kumārila and Prabhākara differ from each other in their views on presumption. Prabhākara maintains that there is an element of doubt in
preumption, while Kumārila denies its existence in it. There is doubt, according to Prabhākara, as to the truth of the two perceived facts which cannot be reconciled with each other. The assumption of another fact removes the doubt, and reconciles the apparently inconsistent facts. We know that Devadatta is living, and perceive his absence from his house. This perception generates a doubt about our knowledge that he is living. In order to remove this doubt we assume that he must be outside his house. This presumption removes the doubt as to his living, and reconciles the two apparently inconsistent facts of his living and non-existence in his house.¹⁷

The element of doubt, according to Prabhākara, distinguishes presumption from inference. There is no element of doubt in inference. From the undoubted perception of smoke we can infer the existence of fire. The sign is free from doubt. But the perceived absence of Devadatta from his house leads to the presumption of his living outside his house only when it has made the fact of his living doubtful. Thus there is doubt in presumption, while there is no doubt in inference. Presumption removes doubt, and reconciles two apparently inconsistent facts, and cannot be regarded as inference.¹⁸

There is no element of doubt, according to Kumārila, in presumption. We perceive the absence of Devadatta from his house. We know for certain that he is alive. In order to reconcile these two well-known and undoubted facts we assume that he has gone out of his house. Without this assumption the apparent inconsistency between his being alive and his absence from his house cannot be reconciled. If the knowledge of his living were doubtful, it could not be the sound basis of presumption.¹⁹ It removes the mutual inconsistency of two well-ascertained facts. The presumption of a third fact reconciles the two well-known facts perceived, which appear to be inconsistent with each other.

¹⁷ PP., pp. 113-15; PSPM., p. 70.
¹⁸ Tat sandehavyudhasya kalpanā yā pravartate.
Sandehāpādakād arthād arthāpattir asan sūrtā. PP., p. 115.
¹⁹ Na hi saṃdīgde jivane bahīr bhābhaḥ sākyate kalpayitum. Tena-
pramāpāśiddhayor dvayor arthayaḥ parsparaiḥ pratighāto' rthāpattelḥ
kāraṇam. SD., pp. 77-79.
Can inference be regarded as presumption? It may be argued, we know the invariable concomitance 'wherever there is smoke there is fire', and then we perceive a sign in the subject: 'there is smoke in the hill'; if there were no fire in the hill, then either the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire would be false, or the existence of smoke in the hill would be false. The existence of smoke in the hill is actually perceived. The invariable concomitance of smoke with fire is already known to be certain. These two apparently inconsistent facts can be reconciled with each other by the assumption of the existence of a fire in the hill. So inference may be regarded as presumption.\(^1\) Pārthasārathi Miśra criticizes this argument. It would be valid, if the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire could be known by any other pramāṇa than inference. But it is known by inference as has already been shown. The concomitance of smoke with fire in individual instances only was actually perceived; from these the invariable concomitance between them was known by inference. The perception of concomitance between them in the individual instances was perfectly certain, and did not suffer any contradiction without presumption of the invariable concomitance between them. So presumption is of no avail here. We must admit that inference is necessary in such cases. If presumption cannot serve the purpose of inference in some cases, inference must be regarded as an independent pramāṇa. Hence we may know the existence of a fire in the hill from the existence of smoke perceived in it either by inference or by presumption. But inference is not presumption, because in it there is no inconsistency between two well-ascertained facts, which cannot be reconciled without presumption of a third fact. In inference we perceive a sign (liṅga) in the subject (pakṣa) of inference, and then infer the existence of a predicate (sādhya) in it. We do not know them at the same time. There is no inconsistency between two equally certain facts. But in presumption two facts are well-known at the same time, which are irreconcilable with each other; but they are reconciled with each other by the presumption of some other fact. Hence inference cannot be regarded as presumption.\(^2\)

\(^{1}\) SD., p. 79.
\(^{2}\) SD., p. 79.
Presumption may be reduced to the disjunctive-categorical syllogism of Western Logic: 'Devadatta, who is alive, is either in his house or outside his house; he is not in his house; therefore, he is outside his house'. This is *modus tollendo ponens*. By denying one alternative of the major premise in the minor premise, we affirm the other alternative of it in the conclusion. The major premise is a disjunctive proposition; the minor premise is a categorical proposition; and the conclusion is a categorical proposition. But presumption is not a deductive inference in which a particular conclusion is drawn from a general proposition, which is already known to be true. So there is only a superficial resemblance between presumption and disjunctive-categorical syllogism.

6. Non-apprehension (*Anupalabdhī*).

Savara recognizes non-apprehension as an independent pramāṇa, and defines it as the absence of any means of valid knowledge, which cognizes the non-existence of an object, which is not present to a sense-organ. Kumārila follows Savara, and maintains that non-apprehension is the means of knowing the non-existence of an object, which cannot be known by perception, inference, comparison, testimony and presumption. Non-existence is real and apprehended by non-apprehension. The non-existence of curd in milk is prior non-existence (prāgabhāva). The non-existence of milk in curd is posterior non-existence (pradhvamsābhāva). The non-existence of a horse in a cow is mutual non-existence (anyonyabhāva). The non-existence of horns in a hare is absolute non-existence (atyantabhāva). If non-apprehension were not recognized as an independent means of knowledge, there would be the existence of curd in milk, of milk in curd, of a jar in a piece of cloth, and of horns in a hare. Non-existence is real, which is cognized by non-apprehension, just as existence is cognized by perception, inference, comparison, testimony, and presumption. Non-apprehension is non-production of perception and the like, but it is a cognition or a modification of

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88 Abhāvaḥ pramāṇābhāvaḥ ‘nasti’—ityasyārthasyāsannirṛatasya. SBh., p. 118.
of the self. Kumārila regards a cognition as a modal change or modification of the self. He considers non-apprehension to be of the nature of a cognition (vijñāna) or a modification of the self, which is not a pure non-entity. It has a subjective existence. It is the cognition of non-existence which has an ontological reality. It is a means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), since it cognizes non-existence which cannot be known by any other means of valid knowledge. Kumārila considers an object to be existent with regard to its own nature and non-existent with regard to another object. A jar is existent as a jar and non-existent as a cloth. The existence of the jar on the ground is cognized by perception, inference, comparison, testimony, and presumption. But its non-existence on the ground is known by non-apprehension. Perception and the like cognize the positive existence (bhāva) of an object. But non-apprehension cognizes its non-existence (abhāva); it is non-production of perception, inference, comparison, testimony and presumption. When there is an intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, there is the perception of its nature and existence. When there is the absence of an intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, there is the non-apprehension of its non-existence. How is the non-existence of a jar on the ground cognized? First, the ground, which is the locus of the non-existence of a jar, is perceived. Then the jar, the counter-positive entity of the non-existence, is remembered. Then a purely mental cognition of the non-existence of the jar, which is independent of the sense-object-intercourse, is produced.

A person first perceives the bare ground, then remembers a jar which existed on it. Then he cognizes the non-existence of the jar on the ground by means of non-apprehension.

Non-apprehension being negative in character, it cannot cognize positive existence. Similarly, perception, inference, comparison, testimony and presumption being positive in

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45 Gṛhitvā vastuadbhāvaṁ surtvā ca pratiyoginam. Mānasam niṣṭhitānāṁ jāyate kṣānapekṣanat. ŚV., Abhāva, 27.

SD., 12, 17, 26-28.
character, they cannot cognize non-existence. It is absurd to maintain that positive modes of knowledge only have validity, but that a negative form of knowledge has no validity.** Non-apprehension differs from perception and other positive forms of valid knowledge. It is their negation which cognizes the non-existence of their objects. Non-existence is cognized by a means of knowledge similar to itself, or negative in character.*** It is an object of appropriate non-apprehension.

But Prabhākara does not recognize non-apprehension as an independent pramāṇa. Nor does he recognize the category of non-existence (abhāva) which may be cognized by non-apprehension. He rejects both non-existence as an ontological reality, and non-apprehension as a distinct mode of knowing it. There is no non-existence besides existence. Sometimes the mere existence of an object unrelated to any other object is cognized. Sometimes it is cognized along with the existence of some other object. The mere existence of an object unrelated to any other is its mere nature.** When we perceive the existence of a jar on the ground, we perceive the existence of the ground as related to the existence of the jar. But when the jar is absent, we perceive the bare ground only. The non-existence of the jar is nothing but the existence of the mere locus, the ground. The perception of the mere locus (tattvādhi) is erroneously called non-apprehension by Kumārila. The so-called non-apprehension of the non-existence of the jar on the ground is nothing but perception of its mere locus, the bare ground. When we say, ‘the jar is not on the ground’, we mean that ‘if the jar were present, we should perceive it; but what we perceive is the bare ground’.** The perception of the bare ground is a positive cognition due to the contact of a sense-organ with the ground. It is not of a negative character and in the nature of non-apprehension. Every kind

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** Bhāvātmake tathā meye nābhāvasya pramāṇatā. Tathā' bhāvaprameye'pi na bhāvasya pramāṇatā. Ibíd, Abhāva, 46. Ibíd, 47.


** Na bhāvāttrikto bhāvo 'ṅgṛkriyate bhāva eva tvekākhi sadvitīyaś ceti dvayini avasthām annabhavati. Tairakākhi bhāvāḥ svarūpamātram nityate. PP., p. 122.

*** Iha bhūtājale ghaṭo nāṣṭi kim uktaṁ bhavati drāye'pi ghaṭe bhūtalamātram upalabhyyate. PP., p. 123.
of valid knowledge is invariably accompanied by an object. There is no distinct object of non-apprehension, and, consequently, no distinct means of knowing it. So non-apprehension is not an independent pramāṇa.\textsuperscript{31}

The locus of the so-called non-existence, e.g., the ground, is known in two ways. It is known as related to another object and as unrelated to it. It is known alone in two ways; when its related object is perceptible and when it is imperceptible. When it is perceptible, the knowledge of the mere ground is called non-existence of its related object. But when it is imperceptible, the knowledge of the mere ground is not called non-existence, because there is no knowledge of its distinguishing feature. 'There is no jar on the ground'. It has the following meaning. 'The jar being perceptible, the mere ground is perceived, but not the jar'. Hence the so-called non-existence is the cognition of its mere locus, when its counterpositive entity is perceptible.\textsuperscript{32}

Pārthaśārathi Miśra criticizes Prabhākara's view. He asks what is the object of the cognition of the non-existence of a jar on the ground after the perception of the jar has ceased. The ground is not its object, since it was perceived while there was the jar on it. If the non-existence of the jar on the ground is identical with the mere locus, the bare ground, then we should perceive its non-existence even while the jar exists on it, since we do not cease to perceive the ground when it is occupied by the jar. The perception of the ground is common to both perception of the existence of the jar on the ground and perception of its non-existence on the ground. If the perception of the bare ground (bhūtalamātra) or the ground alone (ekākibhūtalā) be the cause of the cognition of the non-existence of a jar on the ground, then there cannot be the knowledge of its non-existence on the ground, while it is occupied by a piece of cloth, because there is no perception of the bare ground in it. If the perception of the ground non-associated with the jar (ghaṭaviviktabhūtalopalambha) be said to be the cause of the cognition of its non-existence

\textsuperscript{31} Sarvāṇi pramāṇaṁ prameyāvinābhāvi. Na cābhāvākhyasya pramāṇasya prameyam kīcīt pratītibalasiddham. PP., p. 118, Prameyāsaddhāvāt na pramāṇāntaram avakalpate. Ibid., p. 125.

\textsuperscript{32} Draye pratyagīnī tattadādhikaraṇamātragocarā buddhīrevāśmākam abhāvaḥ. TNR., p. 18; PP., pp. 128-32.
on the ground, what is the meaning of non-association with the jar (ghaṭaviveka)? It cannot mean the bare ground (bhūtalarūpa), since it is present even when the jar exists on the ground. Nor can it mean the absence of conjunction with the jar (ghaṭasaṁhyogābhāva), since it is in the nature of non-existence (abhāva) which Prabhākara denies. Kumārila regards non-perception of a perceptible object as the cause of the cognition of its non-existence, which is the negation of perception, and cannot, consequently, be admitted by Prabhākara who rejects the category of non-existence. It may be argued, first there is the perception of the ground, and then there is the cognition of the non-existence of a jar on it. So the perception of the ground prior to the cognition of the non-existence leads to the knowledge of the non-existence. This argument is wrong, because at the moment when there is the cognition of the mere nature of the ground (bhūtalasvarūpajñāna), and there is the non-cognition of the jar and its non-existence, there is the knowledge of the bare ground without the knowledge of the jar and its non-existence. The knowledge of the mere ground (bhūtalamātra) implies the absence of the knowledge of the jar and its non-existence. When the mere ground is known, neither the jar nor its non-existence is known. If Prabhākara also admits the knowledge of the ground together with the absence of the knowledge of the jar, then he admits non-cognition (jñānabhāva). If he admits non-cognition, then he must also admit non-existence (abhāva). Non-cognition is nothing but non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). Hence perception of the mere locus by itself is not the cognition of the non-existence of something in it." Non-apprehension cognizes non-existence.

Non-existence is not cognized by perception, since there is no intercourse of a sense-organ with it. Nor can it be said to be cognized by indeterminate perception at first, and then remembered by determinate perception. The non-existence of an object can never be cognized by indeterminate perception, since it is non-relational apprehension. So it cannot be remembered by determinate perception. Nor can non-existence be inferred from the knowledge of a sign (liṅga), because the

"SD., pp. 83-84."
invariable concomitance between them is not known. Further, no sign pervaded by non-existence is known. Nor is non-existence known by testimony, comparison and presumption, because in the knowledge of non-existence there is neither knowledge of a verbal statement, nor knowledge of similarity, nor knowledge of inconsistency between two perceived facts which may be reconciled by presumption. It is known by appropriate non-apprehension (yogyānupalabdhi), which is a distinct means of valid knowledge.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not recognize non-apprehension as an independent pramāṇa. It accounts for the perception of the non-existence of a jar on the ground by its doctrine of a kind of sense-object-intercourse called viśeṣaṇātā, the relation of qualification and the qualified. The ground is perceived as qualified by the absence of the jar.

7. Testimony (Śabda).

Savara defines testimony as the knowledge of an object which is not present to a sense-organ, produced by the knowledge of words. Kumārila defines it as the knowledge of objects, which are supersensible, derived from sentences by comprehending the meanings of the constituent words. Testimony is verbal authority. Kumārila divides testimony into human and superhuman. The former is the testimony of trustworthy persons, while the latter is the testimony of the Vedas. The former is valid, if it is uttered by persons of trustworthy character, while the latter is valid in itself. Both are valid, since they are free from the defects of being composed by untrustworthy persons, and words are valid in themselves. Again, testimony may either give us knowledge of existing objects (siddhārtha), as ‘a jar exists’; or, it may direct us to perform an action (vidhāyaka), as ‘bring a jar’. The former gives us the knowledge of existential propositions, while the latter gives us the knowledge of injunctive propositions. Vedic testimony

\[\text{SD., pp. 86-87. TNR., p. 17. IIP., pp. 229-35.} \]
\[\text{IIP., pp. 77-79.} \]
\[\text{Śāstraṃ śabdavijñānāt asanmikrajęte vijñānam. ŚBh., p. 105.} \]
\[\text{Vākvārthe tvu padārthahihvahyā sambandhāanbhavād ṛte. Budhir utpayate tena bhinnāśavakṣabuddhivat.} \]
\[\text{ŚV., Śabda, 109.} \]
\[\text{SD., p. 72.} \]
gives us the knowledge of duties. Dharma is supersensible, and cannot be perceived through the sense-organs. Inference, comparison, presumption and non-apprehension also cannot yield the knowledge of Dharma, since they presuppose perception. The knowledge that the performer of the Agnistoma sacrifice will go to heaven cannot be given by them. Vedic testimony is the only source of our knowledge of duties relating to supersensible entities. The Vedic texts which enjoin us to perform certain actions which lead to beneficial results are authoritative. Injunctive sentences (vidhi) in the Vedas are authoritative, and prohibitions (niṣedha) are injunctions in disguise. The other Vedic texts are authoritative in so far as they help persons perform their duties.

Kumārila maintains that human testimony is valid, if the sentence is uttered by a person of trustworthy character, and that it is invalid, if it is spoken by a person of untrustworthy character. Human testimony has no intrinsic validity. It may be vitiated by carelessness, deliberate desire to cheat, and other defects of the speakers. But Vedic testimony has intrinsic validity, since the Vedas are impersonal and eternal, and not human compositions tainted with the defects of the speakers. Non-contradiction (abādhitatva) is a test of truth. A knowledge, which is contradicted by a subsequent valid knowledge, is invalid. But the Vedic injunctions are never contradicted by any subsequent valid knowledge. The objects denoted by them can never be known by perception, inference and other pramāṇas. Hence Vedic testimony is valid in itself.**

The Vaiśeṣika does not regard testimony as an independent pramāṇa, which is included in inference by it. Testimony is inference, since it depends upon the knowledge of a permanent relation between words and their meanings. The words are the signs of their objects. They are inferred from the words which are perceived.

Pārthaśārathī Miśra criticizes this view. Verval knowledge is either the knowledge of a word or that of a sentence. The knowledge of an object denoted by a word was perceived in the past, and is remembered at present. The present recollection of it is not valid, since it cognizes an object which was

** SD., pp. 87-88.
perceived in the past. The knowledge of an object denoted by a word may be said to be valid, since it is not contradicted. This argument is wrong. A word denotes either a perceptible object or an imperceptible object. If it denotes a perceptible object after its relation to its object has already been known, then it cognizes what has already been cognized, and is, consequently, invalid. If it denotes a perceptible object without its relation to its object being known, then it cannot produce any knowledge of it. If it denotes an imperceptible object without its relation to its object being known, then also it cannot produce any knowledge of it. If its object is not perceived at present, though it is known to be denoted by the word, then its knowledge is recollection. The knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not an inference, since it is directly generated by the meanings of the component words without depending upon the knowledge of the permanent relation between the words and their objects. Absolutely new meanings of sentences about remote objects are known through the meanings of their constituent words. The validity of a sentence uttered by a person is inferred from the knowledge of the trustworthy character of the person. But the meaning of the sentence is not inferred from the knowledge of the trustworthy or untrustworthy character of the person. Just after hearing a sentence its meaning is known through the meanings of the words without the knowledge of the trustworthy or untrustworthy character of the person who utters it. The meaning of a sentence composed even by an absolutely unknown person is comprehended just after hearing it by means of the constituent words which directly denote their objects. Then a doubt arises whether it is valid or invalid. If the person composing it is known to be of reliable character, its validity is inferred from it, and if he is known to be of unreliable character, its invalidity is inferred from it. But the meaning of a sentence uttered by a person is known by testimony, which is distinct from inference, and independent of the knowledge of

108 Padārtha jñānām avagatārthaviṣayatvāt pramāṇam eva na bhavati. SD., p. 73.
109 Vākyārtha jñānām agrhitasambandhaireva padārthair upajāyamaṇāmi nānumānumāṇaṁ saṁkām arhati. SD., p. 73.
110 Vākyāravānapānapānam eva hyāptānāptajñānānānepekṣair eva padārthair vākyārtho vagamyate. SD., p. 73.
its validity or invalidity. The Vedas are not personal creations, and have intrinsic validity. Vedic testimony can never be regarded as inference. Hence testimony is an independent pramāṇa.103

Kumārila maintains that there is a natural relation between a word and its object, which is not created by a person, human or divine. It is contended that there is no relation between a word and its object. So the question of its being impersonal or created by a person is irrelevant. There is no conjunction between them, since if it were so, the utterance of the word 'razor' would cut the mouth uttering it. The word may be said to be a mere cognition, which is the cause of the cognition of its object, which is its effect, both word and its object being mere cognitions. This argument is invalid, because a cognition cannot ultimately be produced without an external object. If a word denotes an object because it has denotative power, then it involves petīlio principii (ātmāsraya). If there were no relation between them, then any word would denote any object, and the relation between them would be accidental, and, consequently, the knowledge of an object denoted by a word would be invalid. Even if human testimony were not valid, human actions depending on the use of words would be possible through some other pramāṇa. But Vedic sentences would not impel persons to act, since they depended upon testimony only without any foundation in truth. It would be so, if there were no relation between words and their objects. But there is a relation of denoting and being denoted between them. A word naturally denotes an object, which is denoted by it, there being no other relation between them. A word is a verbal sign (saṃjñā) which signifies an object (saṃjnī). The knowledge of an object just after hearing a word is the pramāṇa of its denoting an object.104

The knowledge of an object denoted by a word may be said to be derived from the inference of the intention of the person uttering it. This argument is wrong, because even in dreams the knowledge of objects denoted by words devoid of intentions is acquired. Further, a sentence uttered by a person ignorant of its meaning and an impersonal Vedic sentence

103 SD., YSP., p. 73.
104 SD., p. 90.
produce the knowledge of objects denoted by the component words in persons who are acquainted with their meanings. So words have the natural power of denoting their objects. But they do not produce the knowledge of their objects when they are heard for the first time, because they are devoid of the aid of a necessary auxiliary cause. That particular words denote particular objects is learnt by ignorant persons from others who are acquainted with their meanings. But this does not affect the natural denotative power of words. 194

Is a word a collection of letters or a different entity? The Jainas consider letters to be composed of material parts. But this view is wrong, because the parts are never perceived. The letters are neither perceived as a collection of parts nor as devoid of parts. Nor are the parts inferred, because their relations to any signs (liṅga) are not known. Nor can they be inferred by sāmānyatodṛśta inference, because whatever are objects are not composed of parts, since atoms are devoid of parts. If they had parts, then a mustard seed would be made of an infinite number of parts, and pervade the universe. So the atoms are devoid of parts. For the same reason the letters also are partless.

There is no genus of a letter 'g' or 'au', since there is no proof for its existence. The same letter is recognized, whether it is uttered as long or short. This does not prove that there is the genus of the letter. The recognition of the same letter can be accounted for by the identity of the individual, which is perceived in different conditions. Quickness or slowness of the same letter does not prove the difference of the individual letters. 194

The letters (varṣa) are individuals without any genera. They are ubiquitous and eternal, though they are successively manifested by uttered sounds. So they cannot produce words, which are composite wholes. If they produced such words, they would always produce them everywhere. Further, the dimension of an effect is larger than that of its cause. A cloth is larger than the component yarns. But the constituent letters being ubiquitous, the composite word cannot be of a larger

194 SD., pp. 90-91.
dimension. There can be no genus of the word 'go' (gósabdātva), since there is no composite word 'go'. So words are nothing but letters. The word 'go' means a cow.

It is contended that the knowledge of an object denoted by a word is not produced by the knowledge of the first letter uttered. The letters are uttered successively, and so cannot be simultaneous. They are quickly destroyed, and cannot produce the knowledge of an object denoted by a word. They may be said to leave their impressions. But there is no proof for their existence. This contention is baseless. The letters, though uttered successively, can produce a single effect collectively, even as the successive acts of a sacrifice can produce a single effect collectively. But, it may be argued, the successive acts of a sacrifice produce a single effect collectively through Apūrva, an imperceptible intermediate effect, whereas the letters uttered successively cannot produce a single effect through an intermediate agency. This argument is invalid. Just as the production of Apūrva is assumed to account for a single effect of the successive acts of a sacrifice, so the production of impressions (saṃskāra) produced by the letters successively uttered is assumed to account for the knowledge of a single object denoted by the word. They cannot denote a single object without the aid of their impressions.

But, the Sābdiṅa argues, the assumption of one word-form (padasphoṭa) is better than that of many impressions of the constituent letters of a word. This is wrong, because such a word-form is not perceived, though it is perceptible. A word is perceived, and, consequently, admitted. It consists of letters, which are manifested by perception. So a word-form does not exist. Even the Sābdiṅa, who believes in a word-form, must admit that every uttered sound does not manifest a word-form, but that the successively uttered sounds simultaneously manifest the so-called word-form through their impressions. So the hypothesis of word-forms is irrational. The doctrine of Sphoṭa will be considered in the next chapter.

A word consists of letters which are eternal. It denotes a class or genus (jāti), and not an individual. It denotes an

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193 Varṇā eva śabdāḥ. SD., p. 94.
194 SD., VSP., p. 94.
195 SD., pp. 95-96.
individual indirectly through a class denoted by it. A word has a permanent relation to an object (artha), which is impersonal. It is neither created by God nor by persons. It is only learnt from the speech and actions of the elders acquainted with the meanings of words.

A sentence is composed of words. It conveys a meaning through the meanings of the constituent words indirectly. Neither a sentence nor its component words directly convey a meaning. But the meaning of a sentence is indirectly expressed by the meanings of the words denoted by them. The meaning of a sentence is conveyed indirectly by the meanings of its constituent words.

Kumārila believes in Abhihitānayavāda. The words themselves can express their separate meanings by their denotative power (abhidhā) independently of their combination in an injunction sentence. They are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing a connected meaning. The meaning of a sentence is due to the combination of the manings of the constituent words. The Nyāya doctrine of Abhihitānayavāda has already been considered. There is no sentence-form (vākyasphoṭa).

Prabhākara regards testimony as the knowledge of supersensible objects depending on the knowledge of words. There is no other testimony than scriptural testimony. The supersensible object is Apūrva, Niyoga, or Kārya. Apūrva is the supersensuous Ought, Categorical Imperative, or Duty. The entire Vedas are the means of knowing Apūrva or Duty. Apūrva or the moral command (niyoga) is the object of Vedic testimony, which cannot be known by any other pramāṇa. The Vedas are not composed by any person, human or divine.

117 SD., p. 117.
118 Padābhihitaiḥ padārthair lakṣaṇayā vākyārthāḥ pratipādyate. SD., p. 154.
119 NRM., pp. 120, 125.
120 SD., p. 155. HP., p. 224.
122 Su punar asannikṛṣṭo'rthe niyogārtha eva. PP., p. 91.
123 Kṛṣṇa eva vedo'vabodhe'pūrve kāryātmānī pramāṇaṁ. PP., p. 91.
124 Niyogo hi pramāṇāntarānavagatam apūrvam artham avabodhayati. PP., p. 91.
God is not their author. No agent of them is known. The sentences in the Vedas manifest their meanings by their inherent powers. They enlighten us on Apūrva, which is incomprehensible by the human reason. Vedic sentences are intrinsically valid, and always yield valid cognitions, since they are impersonal and devoid of human origin. The entire Vedas which prescribe the Moral Law (vidhi) are intrinsically valid. The Moral Law is Ought or Duty (Kārya), which is realizable by human volition. The affix Liṅ conveys the knowledge of duty.

Prabhākara includes human testimony in inference. Sentences uttered by persons cannot by themselves guarantee the real existence of objects which they mean. They often contain great falsehood and are not in harmony with real objects. The validity or the invalidity of a sentence spoken by a person is inferred from the trustworthy or untrustworthy character of the person who utters it. The knowledge of the person is the cause, and the sentence uttered by the person is the effect. The effect is inferred from the cause. So human testimony is included in inference. All words used by persons denote things that can be known by perception and inference also. But the meanings of the Vedic texts are not known by inference. They are not inferred from the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the constituent words and their objects. All words naturally denote their objects. They have inherent denotive power, which is obscured by suspicion as to the trustworthy character of the speaker in the case of those uttered by a person. But it is not obscured by any suspicion in the case of Vedic words, since they are not spoken by persons. They are impersonal and superhuman, and, consequently, intrinsically valid.

Prabhākara advocates the doctrine of Anvītābhīdhāna, and maintains that the meanings of words can be known only when they are connected with one another in a sentence enjoining

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120 Puruṣā ca nāpūrvaḥ buddhau nivesayitum alam. PP., p. 99.
122 Laukikād vacasā lingabahuḥ vaktṛjñānam anumīyate. Atu eva lautikē vacane na śābdam pramāṇam. PP., p. 95. Ibid., pp. 95-97.
123 PP., p. 109.
124 PSPM., pp. 63-66.
us to perform a duty. The words can express their meanings only when they are related to one another in an injunctive sentence. They cannot express any meanings apart from their relation to one another in an injunctive sentence. They express an action or something connected with it. The affix *Liṅ* directly denotes an action which ought to be done. The other words indirectly imply an action. Words directly denote their objects, but they are only manifested by their speakers. The doctrine of Anvītābhīdhāna has already been fully discussed.

The Mīmāṁsāsakas maintain that words are eternal, and their relations to their objects also are eternal. The Nyāya regards words as non-eternal on the following grounds. (1) All words are produced by human effort, which have a beginning, and were non-existent before this effort. (2) They are destroyed as soon as they are uttered. (3) They are not manifested by human utterance. There is no proof for their existence before they are uttered. (4) Men talk of producing words, just as they speak of producing ordinary articles. If words were eternal, they would not be produced. (5) The same word is uttered, at one and the same time, by many persons in different places. If it were an eternal and all-pervading entity, it would not be possible. (6) The volume of the same word is increased or decreased, when it is uttered by one person or many persons. If the word were eternal, its volume would not increase or decrease.

Jaimini refutes these arguments, and proves the eternal character of words. (1) Words are not created by human effort, but only manifested by it. The Nyāya regards the human utterance of a word as a creation. The Mīmāṁsā regards it as a manifestation of a pre-existent entity. (2) Words are not destroyed after being uttered, but they become unmanifest again when the manifesting agency of the human effort in the shape of utterance has ceased. (3) Persons do not produce words, but they produce sounds which merely manifest words. This manifesting agency is certainly due to human effort, which can never produce words. (4) Just as many persons in

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11² Anvīte śaktigrahād anvītābhīdhāyitvāh padānāṁ siddham. Sarve gām padānāṁ kāryaparātyaṁ avagantavyam. TNK., p. 33. Ibid., p. 41.

11⁶ SB., i. 1. 6-9.
different places can simultaneously perceive the single sun, so they can simultaneously utter and hear the same word in different places. (5) The volume of the word uttered by one person or many persons is never increased or decreased. It is only the sound produced by human effort that increases or decreases. Thus Jaimini refutes the Nyāya view of the non-eternal character of words.\(^{127}\)

Jaimini gives positive arguments in favour of his theory. (1) The word is eternal and not created by human utterance, but only manifested by it. Human effort can manifest it only because it already exists. A non-existent thing cannot be manifested. (2) When persons utter the word 'cow' at different times and places, they always recognize it to be the same word. So the word is ever present, but it is manifested at different times and places by different agents. (3) People speak of uttering the word 'cow' three or four times, and not of uttering three or four such words. So the word is one and ever present, though it is manifested three or four times. (4) We perceive the causes of production and destruction of transient things. But we do not perceive the causes of production and destruction of words. So they are neither produced nor destroyed. (5) The word is said to be produced from air. This view is wrong. The sound is produced from the air, which manifests the word, which is quite different from it. If the word were made of parts of air, it would be tangible. But it can never be perceived by touch. So it is not a product of air. (6) There are many Vedic texts which lay down the eternal character of words. Hence the word is eternal.\(^{128}\)

Words denote their objects by nature. Their denotative power is natural and permanent, and not determined by convention (sankheta), human or divine. The Nyāya maintains that God fixes the meanings of words by convention. But the Mīmāṁsā does not believe in the conventional meanings of words. They have natural and eternal relations to the objects denoted by them. Prabhākara regards the meanings of proper names as fixed by convention, but does not consider the meanings of common words to be determined by convention, which are independent of human agency.

\(^{127}\) JMS., i. 1. 12-17.  \(^{128}\) JMS., SBh., i. 1. 18-23.
The Vedas are neither created by God nor composed by seers. They are unproduced and eternal. The words in the Vedic texts denote their proper objects by their very nature. Their denotative power does not depend on any convention determined by God or men. The Vedas are self-sufficient and independent of all personal agency. They mainly enjoin the performance of certain duties, which generates an apūrva, an invisible subtle potency, leading to a desirable result. No person can have any knowledge of duties independently of the Vedas. Hence the denotative powers of the Vedic words are eternal and independent of conventions, human or divine. 136

Both Prabhākara and Kumārila maintain that a word denotes a class, and indirectly refers to an individual through it. All injunctions would be meaningless, if words did not refer to classes. The word 'cow' denotes the class 'cow'. The generic idea of 'cow' represents the class 'cow'. A word cannot denote a single individual, an aggregate of individuals, or all individuals. If a single individual only were denoted by it, there could be no eternal relation between it and its object, and no action would be possible, since one could not make sure which individual was meant by the word. Nor can it denote an aggregate of individuals, since all the individuals cannot be known, and, consequently, their aggregate cannot be known. Even if it could be known, the meaning of the word would constantly change, since some individuals are born and others perish. Nor can a word denote all individuals, since they can never be known, and, consequently, its meaning can never be fully comprehended. Hence a word denotes a class at first, and then an individual through it.136

Kumārila and Prabhākara reject other means of knowledge. Inclusion (sambhava) is included in inference, since it depends upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the sign and the predicate. A thousand includes a hundred. This is an example of inclusion. A large number has invariable

136 Śrāvānīkhyākrtīn śaktir vyaktan in tattvabandhanā. NRM., p. 121. Sādhaprāprītigocarīvāvīśeṣe jāte evābhādheyaśvam vyakte tu ākṣepagamyatvam. NYR., p. 123.
concomitance with a small number. Tradition (aitihya) is not a means of valid knowledge, since its source is not certain. If it is known to be certain, it is included in testimony according to Kumārila. Prabhākara rejects it as a pramāṇa, since its origin in some other pramāṇa is not known. Tradition is a series of rumours handed down from generation to generation. 'To-morrow my brother will come'. This is intuitive knowledge (prātibha-jñāna). It is a false inference, since it is based on an illusory sign (liṅgābhāsa). The intuition of sages also (ārṣajñāna) generated by merit born of austerities is not valid. The Mīmāṃsā does not believe in yogic intuition. Universal assent (lokaprasiddhi) is included in perception and other means of knowledge. The Mīmāṃsā rejects gesture (ceṣṭā), which is recognized by the Tantra as a distinct pramāṇa.\footnote{SD., p. 87. PP., p. 123.}


Kumārila regards an error or illusion as a false perception or misperception of one object as a different one, and advocates the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti or Viparītakhyāti like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In the illusion 'this is silver' 'this' or the brightness of a nacre, which it has in common with silver, is perceived owing to its intercourse with the visual organ; then 'silver' is remembered owing to the revival of the impression (sahskāra) of silver. So far Kumārila agrees with Prabhākara. But he maintains that the nacre then is perceived as silver owing to some defect, though it is remembered. He regards the illusion as a single false perception. He does not regard it as mere non-apprehension of distinction between the perceived element and the remembered element, but positive false knowledge due to false identification of the remembered element with the perceived element. Prabhākara considers an illusion to be non-apprehension of distinction (bhedāgraha), while Kumārila considers it to be false perception of identity (abhedāgraha) of the remembered element with the perceived element.\footnote{SD., pp. 49-50.} The cognition of identity of the nacre present to the visual organ with the silver remembered is of the nature of
perception or immediate knowledge due to its intercourse with the visual organ, which does not cease to function at the time.\textsuperscript{122}

Kumārila maintains that an illusion as a cognition \textit{per se} is valid, but that its validity is destroyed by the subsequent knowledge of its disagreement with its object and of defects in its causes.\textsuperscript{124} If a defect in its cause cannot be found even after a careful search, or a sublating cognition does not contradict it, a cognition is valid.\textsuperscript{122} But if a cognition is contradicted by the knowledge of the contrary nature of its object, or superseded by the knowledge of some defect in its cause, it is invalid. But an invalid cognition is valid as cognition \textit{per se}; its intrinsic validity is destroyed by the extraneous conditions mentioned above.

Rāmākrṣaṇa Bhaṭṭa criticizes Prabhākara’s doctrine of Vivekākhyāti or Akhyāti. Prabhākara regards non-apprehension of distinction of the perceived element and the remembered element as illusion. But non-apprehension (agrahaṇa) is negation (abhāva) of apprehension (grahaṇa). Prabhākara does not admit negation as an independent category. So negation of apprehension cannot constitute illusion. Prabhākara regards an illusion as an instance of lapse of memory (smṛtipramoṣa). But recollection, which does not appear as recollection to the self, cannot be said to be non-apprehension, because then every recollection would be a non-apprehension of difference and an illusion. But we do not experience an illusion, whenever we recollect. Again, there is no rule that a person, who remembers silver, should exert himself to pick it up when he perceives a nacre only. It is right to maintain that when he perceives a nacre as silver, he exerts himself to pick it up. It cannot be argued that a person exerts himself to pick up a nacre, since he perceives it to be similar to silver, because then he would have a cognition ‘this is similar to silver’, but he would not have a cognition ‘this is silver’. The illusion ‘this is silver’ is contradicted by the sublating cognition ‘this is not

\textsuperscript{122} SD., p. 50.
\textsuperscript{124} Jñānasvarasād eva viṣayaśya tathātvam añhyavasīyate, tadbhāvaḥ- tvam tu kāraṇadōṣajñānād arthānyathātvajñānād vāvagantavyam, SD., p. 50.
\textsuperscript{126} Yatra prayatnenaivyaśya pari kāraṇadoṣo bādhakajñānām vai nopalabhaye tat pramāṇam, itaracchāpramāṇam, SD., p. 50. SV., ii. 53.
silver'. It is absurd to argue that the sublatine cognition (bādhakapratyaya) does not really contradict the illusion, but simply distinguishes the two cognitions, perception and recollection, which were not distinguished from each other before. So it is right to maintain that an illusion, which is wrong perception of one object as another (anyathākhyāti), is contradicted by a sublating cognition. The visual organ vitiated by some defect in intercourse with a nacre can produce the wrong perception of silver. The defect of the sense-organ is the cause of wrong perception. So an illusion is not mere non-apprehension of distinction, but positive wrong knowledge. Prabhākara regards an illusion as a composite psychosis made of a presentative element and a representative element, while Kumārila regards it as a single psychosis, a false perception. Prabhākara regards error as due to omission, while Kumārila regards it as due to commission.

Prabhākara advocates the theory of Vivekākhyāti or Akhyāti. In the illusion 'this is silver' 'this' is perceived, and 'silver' is remembered; there is non-discrimination (aviveka) of the two psychoses from each other. Non-discrimination is non-apprehension (akhyāti) of distinction (viveka). It is non-cognition of difference (bhedāgraha). The distinction between the perceived element 'this' and the remembered element 'silver' is not apprehended. Non-apprehension of the distinction leads to the illusion 'this is silver'. It is not a single psychosis of false perception of one object as another as Kumārila and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintain. The two elements of perception and recollection are not distinguished from each other owing to lapse of memory (smṛtipramoṣa). When a nacre is perceived as silver, only the common quality of them, viz., brightness, is perceived, since it predominates over the peculiar qualities of the nacre. Then the perception of brightness revives the impression (saṁskāra) of silver owing to similarity. But the recollection of silver does not appear to be recollection owing to obscuration of memory due to a defect of the mind (monodoṣa). Though silver is remembered, it is not remembered as 'that'—something perceived in the past owing to lapse of memory. The illusion is not experienced as 'this is that

134 SD., YSP., pp. 49-50.
silver', but as 'this is silver'. Non-distinction prompts the self to put forth an effort to appropriate the illusory silver. When the illusion is said to be contradicted by a sublating cognition, the distinction between the two elements is apprehended, and, consequently, the self does not put forth any effort to appropriate the silver.

Some illusions are devoid of the element of recollection. A person with jaundiced eyes has an illusion of a yellow conch-shell, in which there are the two perceptions of the yellow colour of the bile in the visual organ, and of the conch-shell except its white colour, which are not distinguished from each other. The white colour of the conch-shell is not perceived owing to a defect in the visual organ. In the illusion of bitter sugar there are the two perceptions of bitterness of the bile in the tongue, and of tasteless sugar, which are not distinguished from each other. In the illusion of the double moon there are two visual perceptions of the same moon, because two distinct rays of light fall from the two eyes on the moon and two images are imprinted on the retina. The two distinct perceptions due to two retinal images appear in quick succession, and generate the illusion of the double moon. So in all illusions there is no recollection or lapse of memory. 127

Prabhākara defines valid knowledge as apprehension (anubhūti), and regards all apprehension as valid. In the illusion 'this is silver' the perception of 'this' is valid, since it is not contradicted, and the recollection of 'silver' is invalid, because it is recollection, and contradicted by a sublating cognition. 128 The illusory perception of bitter sugar is invalid owing to non-apprehension of the distinction between the perception of bitter taste and that of tasteless sugar, each of which is valid. The illusion is invalid because of coalescence of the two elements. In the doubtful perception 'Is this a post or a man?' the perception of 'this' or some tall object is valid, but the recollections of 'a post' and 'a man' revived by the per-

128 Idam iti anubhavarūpaḥ pramāṇam isyata eva. Rajatam iti samarapānuḥ tasya-kauhavarūpatvān na prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāḥ. PP., p. 43.
ception of the tall object are invalid. The elements of recollection invalidate the doubtful perception.\textsuperscript{138}

According to Prabhākara, the element of apprehension involved in an illusion is valid, while that of recollection in it is invalid. But a cognition, which is found to disagree with the real nature of its object, as cognition, is valid. Prabhākara does not recognize error as error. He does not distinguish between truth and error from the logical point of view. But he distinguishes between them from the practical point of view. Knowledge is subservient to practical action. The knowledge that leads to successful action is true, and that which leads to unsuccessful action is false. We cannot speak of truth or falsity of knowledge prior to action prompted by it. We cannot brand a knowledge as false until it leads to unsuccessful action.\textsuperscript{140} True knowledge is not the knowledge that apprehends the real nature of its object, but it is the knowledge that leads to the attainment of it, which is capable of a fruitful action.\textsuperscript{141} When the object that is manifested to consciousness is attained by an action prompted by it, it is regarded as true.\textsuperscript{142} Thus Prabhākara distinguishes between truth and error from the standpoint of practical utility. He appeals to the pragmatic test to distinguish between truth and error.

Śālikānātha criticizes Kumārila's theory of Anyathākhyāti. An illusion is not misperception of one object as another. One object cannot be manifested to consciousness as another object. A nacre cannot be perceived as silver. Silver is not perceived, since it is not present to the visual organ, but it is remembered owing to the revival of the impression of silver by the perception of a similar object as a nacre. In the illusion 'this is silver' the perceived element of 'this' is never contradicted. It persists when the sublating perception contradicts the remembered element of 'silver'. An illusion is not a single cognition, but it consists of two cognitions.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{138} PP., pp. 36, 37, 43.
\textsuperscript{139} Yatra tu vyavahāravaisaṁvādo nāsti tatra bhāntir api na vyapa-diśyate. PP., p. 43.
\textsuperscript{140} Na vayaṁ yathāvasthitārthagrāhakam avisaṁvādakam abhidadh-mahē, kintvarthakriyāśamarkhavastuparāprāpakam. PP., p. 39.
\textsuperscript{141} Pramāṇam avisaṁvādiṣṇānam arthākriyāsthītiḥ avisaṁvādanam. PP., p. 39.
\textsuperscript{142} PP., pp. 43, 32-36.
II

Ontology


Kumārila divides categories into positive (bhāva) and negative (abhāva). He recognizes four positive categories, viz., substance (dravya), quality (guna), action (karma), and community (sāmānya). He admits four kinds of non-existence, viz., prior non-existence, posterior non-existence, mutual non-existence, and absolute non-existence. He rejects the Vaiśeṣika categories of particularity (viśeṣa) and inference (samaṇaya).

A substance is the substratum of dimension and quality. Kapāla defines a substance as the substratum of qualities. The Vaiśeṣika mentions twenty-four qualities. Number which is a quality abides in qualities. So the definition suffers from overpervasion. A substance is not an inherent cause as the Vaiśeṣika maintains, since there is no inherence. The definition does not suffer from nonpervasion on the ground that dimension is a quality, that qualities are produced only at the second moment, and that at the first moment a substance is not the substratum of dimension; because the Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsaka admits that a substance and a quality are produced at the same moment, and non-different from each other, since both of them are produced by the same causal conditions taken together. They are produced at the same moment, and found to be related to each other as cause (upādāna) and effect (upādeya). This perception is not illusory, because it is not sublated. Therefore, a substance is the substratum of dimension and quality.

Kumārila admits eleven substances, viz., earth, water, fire, air, ether, self, mind (manas), time, space, darkness, and sound. Earth has smell. The sense of smell is made of earth. The body is made of earth. Water has natural fluidity. The sense of taste is made of water. Fire has touch. The visual organ is made of fire. Air has touch, but no colour.

144 SV., Abhāva, 2-4. MM., p. 148.
145 Parimāṇagunādharatām dravyatā dravyavādād vidhū, MM., p. 149.
146 MM., pp. 149-50.
147 MM., p. 151.
Darkness has colour, but no touch. It has black colour, which is manifested in the absence of light. It can be apprehended by the visual organ only. Ether is one, eternal, partless, and ubiquitous. Saṅkara regards it as a product of the Ātman, and, consequently, non-eternal. This view is wrong. Ether is indivisible, and so eternal, like the self. Time and space also are eternal, partless, and indivisible. Time, space, and ether are perceptible, because they are ubiquitous, like the self, while they are not manas. Further, if they were not perceptible, then their existence would be disproved, because it cannot be proved by any other pramāṇa.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contends that their existence can be proved by inference. Sound is a specific quality which cannot exist without a substance. So ether is a substance in which sound exists. Time is inferred from the notions of simultaneity, succession and the like. Space is inferred from the notions of east, west, north, south and the like. So the existence of ether, time and space is proved by inference.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka replies that sound is not a quality, which may subsist in ether, but that it is a substance. Even if it is admitted to be a quality, it may subsist in space. The assumption of ether (ākāśa) is needless. The Prābhākaras maintain that ether is imperceptible. Nārāyaṇa replies that all persons, young and old, perceive ether just on opening the eyes. The existence of ether cannot be denied, even as that of a fruit in the palm of the hand cannot be denied.

Nor is time inferred from the notions of simultaneity, succession and the like. These cognitions have time as their content. If simultaneity, succession and the like, which are the probans (hetu), are not perceived to be related to time, it cannot be inferred from them. If their relation to time is known by perception, then time is perceptible. If time is the content of the notions of simultaneity, succession and the like, they are produced either by the sense-organs or by a probans. They are not produced by a probans (līṅga), because no probans other than simultaneity and succession is admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. If the notions of simultaneity and
succession are the probans, they are self-dependent (ātmā śraya). If they are produced through the sense-organs, then time becomes perceptible, because the notions of simultaneity and succession are produced through the sense-organs, and have time as their content. 'It is morning time'. 'It is evening time'. These notions are produced by the visual organ assisted by the sight of the sun-rise. So time is perceptible; it is perceived by the six sense-organs.\textsuperscript{131}

Space too is perceptible, because the notions of east, west, up, down, forward, backward, etc., are produced by the visual organ, and have space as their content. It is not inferred from the notions of forward and backward as a probans, because then a jar also which is in front would be inferable from the notion of 'front'.\textsuperscript{132} Pārthasārathi Miśra regards time and space as perceptible as qualifications of other substances.\textsuperscript{133} Space is one and ubiquitous. It appears to be many and limited on account of its limiting adjuncts.

Ether is one and ubiquitous. But it appears to be limited on account of its limiting adjuncts (upādhi). It is perceptible. The inferences that seek to prove its imperceptibility are invalid, since they are contradicted by presumption.\textsuperscript{134}

The Nyāya regards darkness (tamas) as the absence of light. But this view is wrong. Darkness has qualities and motions. It is perceived as existent, and its counter-positive entity is not remembered. So it is certainly a positive entity (bhāvarūpa). The Nyāya argues: 'what has blue colour is tangible; darkness is not tangible; so it cannot have colour'. This argument is not sound, because every tangible substance is found to have colour also, and because air has no colour, it cannot be tangible. Hence darkness is a substance, because it has blue colour, like a blue lotus.\textsuperscript{135}

Earth, water, fire, air, and darkness are composed of atoms. The whole is distinct from the parts. The perception 'this jar is one and gross', which is valid and uncontradicted, proves the existence of the whole distinct from the parts. The whole does not inhere in the parts, since there is no inherence. It is

\textsuperscript{131} MM., pp. 189-90.  
\textsuperscript{132} S.D., pp. 140, 45-46.  
\textsuperscript{133} MM., pp. 180, 163.  
\textsuperscript{134} MM., p. 190.  
\textsuperscript{135} MM., pp. 199-91.
different and non-different from them. There is identity-in-difference between them. The whole is not a different substance from its parts. It is a different condition of them.\(^1\) Owing to a particular conjunction, they become one substance of a large dimension. As parts they are many, and as a whole it is one. A cloth is one, while the yarns are many.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka maintains that composite things are made of atoms, which are of the dimension of motes in a sun-beam. They correspond to the triads of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which are perceptible. The minuter primary atoms of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are non-existent, since there is no pramāṇa by which they can be known. There is no yogic perception which may cognize primary atoms. A thing may be considered to be large, if another thing of a smaller size is perceived. Atoms of smaller size than motes in a sun-beam are not perceived.\(^2\)

Sound is an eternal and ubiquitous substance, which is perceived by the auditory organ, and which has the genus 'śabdatva'. It is self-existent and devoid of a substratum. It is directly perceived by the auditory organ through a direct relation. It is ubiquitous, because it is an intangible, partless substance, which is not a cause. It has a large dimension, because the same sound is simultaneously perceived by many persons in different places. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accounts for the simultaneous perception of the same sound by different individual sounds, which are destructible. It explains the recognition of the same sound 'g' by assuming the genus of 'g'. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka urges that this argument is not sound. The recognition of the same sound 'g' is due to the identity of it, even as the recognition 'this is that Devadatta' is due to the identity of the individual. It is not contradicted by any sublating valid knowledge. So sound is all-pervading.

Sound is made manifest and unmanifest by the proximity and remoteness of a manifesting condition, even as ether, which is all-pervading, is made manifest by digging earth, and unmanifest by filling it up. It is eternal, because it is not produced. The vocal organs do not produce it, but only manifest

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\(^1\) Vavyām tu bhinnābhinnatvam. Ayavānāmi eva-vasthāntaram avayāvi na dravyāntaram. S.D., p. 106.
\(^2\) Ibid, pp. 106-07. MM., p. 163.
it. Their activity is its manifesting agent, even as digging manifests the subsoil water. The audible sound manifests sound which is eternal. It has different degrees of loudness, and transfers these attributes to the sound manifested by it. The sound 'g' which is simultaneously heard by many persons in different places is one. Sound is an eternal and ubiquitous substance:

There are two kinds of sounds, significant (vācaka) and non-significant (avācaka). Audible sounds produced by beating a drum are non-significant. Letters manifested by the audible sound produced by the activity of the vocal organs are significant. A word is a collection of sounds, which signifies a single object. It denotes a genus directly, and an individual by implication. If sounds were not eternal, the Vedas, which consist of sentences, would not be eternal.138

The manas is the internal organ through which cognition, pleasure and other qualities of the self are perceived. It is all-pervasive and motionless139. It is not atomic in dimension as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains. It is all-pervasive, because it is an intangible substance, which is neither a cause nor an effect, and because it is the substratum of a conjunction, which is the non-inherent cause of knowledge, like the self. It is all-pervading, and, consequently, motionless, like ether. Though it is all-pervading, it is limited by the entire body, and serves as the organ of internal perception. Both self and manas are all-pervading, and their conjunction is natural and not produced by an action.

A quality is distinct from action, has a subordinate genus (gunaṭva), and is not a material cause. There are twenty four qualities: colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, viscosity, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, audible sound (dhvani), manifestness (prākatya), and potency (śakti). Audible sound is a quality of air, which manifests sound. An object is the substrate of manifestness, which is its qualification called

139 Antarindriyaṃ vibhuparimāṇam aspandam ca manaḥ. MM., p. 214.
manifestation. It determines what becomes an object of knowledge. It is known by perception through the relation of identity with what is in conjunction. Though it abides in substances only, it abides indirectly in genus, quality and action owing to the relation of identity with them, and also in non-existence of which they are counter-positive entities. They become objects of knowledge through the manifestness of substances. Distinctness exists in all substances, eternal and non-eternal. Distinctness in produced substances is not admitted by Prabhākara. But it is admitted by Kumārila, because difference among the produced substances is perceived. Distinctness is the cause of the empirical use of difference. It may be argued that the natures (svarūpa) of substances constitute their distinctness; that these are perceived in produced substances, which do not require distinctness; but that in eternal substances whose distinguishing attributes are not perceived, their distinctness as a distinguishing quality may be inferred. This argument is wrong. The intrinsic nature (svarūpa) of a substance does not constitute its difference (bheda). If it did so, the cognition of difference as a relatum as in the form ‘the difference of a jar’, or as an attribute as in the form ‘a cloth is different from a jar’ would have no substratum, and the words ‘jar’ and ‘difference’ would be synonyms. So distinctness exists in all substances.

Potency (śakti) abides in substance, quality and action, and has the genus of potency (śaktitva). It is known by presumption and from Vedic testimony. It is empirical (laukika) and scriptural (vaidika). The first, e.g., the power of burning in fire is known by presumption. The second, e.g., the potency of a sacrifice to produce happiness in heaven is known from injunctions of the Vedas only. The potency of burning abides in a substance (e.g., fire). The potency of a white offering to Vāyu to generate plenty of wealth exists in a quality (e.g., white colour). The potency of killing to produce misery in hell abides in an action. The Nyāya denies the existence of potency (śakti), and explains the potency of fire to burn by its distinctive nature (svabhāva). This view...
is wrong, because the nature of a thing exists so long as the substance lasts. But the power of burning can be destroyed by a particular kind of gem, incantation, etc. Then, again, 'nature' is another name for 'potency' (śakti). The non-existence of a counteracting agent (pratibandhaka) is not the cause of burning, because non-existence is never a causal condition. So burning is due to the power of burning. The Prabhākaras regard potency as a distinct category. This view is wrong, since it violates the law of parsimony. There is needless prolixity (gauravā) in assuming potency as a distinct category. It is more rational to regard it as a quality. The Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsaka does not deny potency, but denies it as a distinct category. He admits it to be a quality, which is known by presumption. The same kind of conjunction with fire which is always followed by burning, is not followed by it in the presence of a fire-extinguishing gem or a charm. Therefore, there is some additional cause over and above the conjunction with fire, either perceptible or imperceptible, which is the cause of burning. If such an additional cause in the form of potency is not assumed, burning in the absence of a fire-extinguishing gem or a charm, and non-burning in its presence cannot be accounted for. Hence an imperceptible cause in the form of potency, which is a quality, must be assumed.\footnote{MM., pp. 259-63; SD., p. 80.}

Action or motion abides in non-pervasive substances only, is perceptible, and the cause of conjunction and disjunction. It is of five kinds, viz., upward motion, downward motion, contraction, expansion, and locomotion. Kumārila recognizes also action in the self. Physical motion (parispanda) is not the only form of action. Motion in a substance, which brings about conjunction and disjunction in space, is perceived.\footnote{SV., Ātmavāda, 74; MM., p. 277; SD., p. 71.}

Kumārila admits the existence of generality like Prabhākara. It is the cause of the knowledge of non-difference among different individuals. 'This is a cow'. 'That also is a cow'. There is the genus 'cowness' (gotva) in different individual cows, which is common to them. Community (sāmānya) is the ground of assimilation (anvṛtti). Individuals are the ground of discrimination (vyāvṛtti). There would be no assimilation, if there were no community in the individuals. A single
community subsists in many individuals. It cannot be said to subsist in them either in its entirety or in its parts, since it is devoid of parts. But we perceive it to subsist in them. There is no inherence (samavāya) between a universal and an individual, since there is no inherence. Further, inherence is said to be a relation between two inseparable entities, which is the cause of the notion 'this subsists in it'. But we have such a perception as 'this is a cow', and not as 'cowness (gotva) subsists in this cow'. There is identity-in-difference between the universal and the individual. The universal is not entirely different from the individual. Nor is it entirely identical with it. It is partly different from, and partly identical with, the individual. Generality and individuality subsist in the same locus, the individual. This proves their non-difference or identity. 'Cowness' (gotva) and 'cow' are not synonymous. This proves their difference. Hence there is no contradiction between difference and non-difference between the universal and the individual.181

Kumārila denies the category of inherence (samavāya). It is said to be a relation between two inseparable entities, substance and quality, substance and action, the whole and the parts, and the universal and the individual, which is the cause of the notion 'this subsists in it'. Kumārila regards inherence as identity (tādatmya). If it is different from the relata such as the universal and the individual, it cannot subsist as a relation between them. If, on the other hand, it is identical with them, they cannot be different from each other. Inherence is identity between two inseparable entities. It is a particular phase of them. If it be an external relation between substance and quality, or the like, which relates them to each other, then it would require another inherence to relate it to each of the two relata, and so on to infinity. This infinite regress can be avoided, if inherence is regarded as identity in essence. Further, inherence is said to be inseparable relation, which is the absence of separable relation. Separable relation is either having separate movements or subsisting in different substrates. Parts of a whole can have movements, though the whole is

181 SD., pp. 99-101; SV., Ākṛtivāda, 52-62; Vanavāda, 24, 32-34; PSPM., p. 94; IPP., pp. 188-89; MM., p. 229.
motionless. The whole subsists in its parts, which subsist in their parts. They subsist in different substrates. The genus subsists in an individual, which subsists in its parts. So there is a separable relation between the whole and its parts, and the genus and the individual. There is no inference between them.

Kumārila rejects the categories of potency, number and similarity recognized by Prabhākara. Potency (śakti) is an unperceived quality in a substance, which is inferred from its effect. It is generated along with the substance. Number is a quality. Similarity is a quality which consists in the possession of the same arrangement of many parts by two substances. It is not a distinct category, since it admits of degrees. Thus potency, number and similarity are not distinct categories.


Prabhākara recognizes the eight categories of substance, quality, action, community, inherrence, potency, number, and similarity. Substance is the substrate of qualities. There are nine substances: earth, water, fire, air, ether, self, manas, time, and space. Earth, water, fire, and air are visible and tangible. Ether is not visible, because it is colourless. It appears to be white owing to the particles of fire in it. It appears to be dark at night owing to the absence of light. It is imperceptible, but inferred as the substratum of sound. Air is perceptible. It is neither hot nor cold. It appears to be hot owing to the particles of fire in it. It appears to be cool owing to the particles of water in it. Earth, water, fire, and air are perceptible in the non-atomic state. But ether, time, space, and manas are only inferable. Darkness is not a substance, but mere absence of light. There are twenty two qualities: colour, taste, smell, touch, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, viscosity, impression, sound, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire,

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164 SV., NR., iv. 146-50; SD., p. 100.
165 MM., pp. 258-63; 240; SD., p. 104.
166 Dravyagunākaramasāṁyasaṁamāvīṣaṇḍaktīsāṁkhyāsādhyāyānastam.
TNR., p. 20.
167 PP., pp. 143-45, 77-78; TNR., pp. 20-21.
aversion, volition, and merit. Action is imperceptible. It is inferred from a series of conjunction and disjunction.\textsuperscript{176}

Generality subsists in the individuals entirely, and is distinct from them. It is perceived by the sense-organs. It is common to many individuals which are different from one another. It is the ground of our conception of non-difference among different individuals. It is the basis of their assimilation.\textsuperscript{177} The genus is different from the individuals in which it inheres. There is a relation of subsistence (paratantratā) or inherence (samavāya) between them. When an individual is born, a new relation of inherence is generated, which relates it to the genus which subsists in the other individuals of the same class. When an individual dies, the relation of inherence between it and the genus is destroyed. Prabhākara admits the generalities of substance, quality and action. But he denies the reality of the sumnum genus or beinghood (sattā), which is recognized by the Vaiśeṣika. An individual thing has its specific existence (svarūpasattā), but no mere existence or beinghood (sattā). So Prabhākara denies the existence of the highest genus or beinghood.\textsuperscript{177}

Prabhākara admits the reality of subsistence (paratantratā) or inherence (samavāya). It is the relation between two inseparable entities. It is eternal in eternal substances, and non-eternal in non-eternal substances. There are many inferences. Inherence is produced, when an effect is produced, which inheres in its material cause. It is not perceptible, but always inferred.\textsuperscript{177} The Vaiśeṣika regards inherence as one and eternal.

Prabhākara recognizes the category of potency or power (sakti). It is the imperceptible energy which produces an effect. It is inferred from its effect. It is the energy by virtue of which a substance produces an effect. Fire has the power of burning, which is either overpowered or destroyed by a fire-extinguishing gem, a charm, or an unguent, when it does not burn. When the effect is never destroyed, the causal power is destroyed. When it is produced on removal of these countering agents, the causal power is overpowered. It is eternal.

\textsuperscript{176} TNR., p. 21.
\textsuperscript{177} Jātirāśrayata bhinnā pratyakṣajñānagocarā. PP., p. 17.
Anuvrttā hi jātiḥ. TNR., p. 21.
\textsuperscript{178} TNR., pp. 21-22; PSPM., p. 101.
\textsuperscript{177} TNR., p. 23.
in eternal substances, and non-eternal in non-eternal substances. It is generated along with the transient substances in which it subsists. Potency differs from velocity (sahskāra) in that the latter is transient in eternal things also, and dependent on other causes in transient things. The Nyāya criticism of Prabhākara’s doctrine of power has already been given.

Number is not a substance, since it subsists in qualities. There are two odours, three touches, and the like. The subsistence of number in qualities cannot be said to be figurative, since its subsistence in them in a primary sense is not contradicted. The argument that it cannot abide in them because it is a quality is wrong, since its being a quality cannot be proved. It is not a quality of a substance, since it abides in many substances like a genus. Nor is it a movement, since it is perceptible, unlike a movement. Nor is it a generality, since it is non-eternal. Hence number is a distinct category.

Similarity is not a substance, since it abides in qualities and motions. An odour is perceived as similar to another odour. A motion is inferred as similar to another motion. So it is neither a quality nor a motion. Nor is it a generality, since it is not the cause of the experience of being common to many entities. It subsists in generalities, but a generality does not exist in generalities. We know similarity between the genus of a cow and that of a buffalo. So similarity is different from generality. Inference is a kind of relation between a substance and its quality or motion, the genus and the individual, and a material cause and its effect. So similarity is not inference. It is a distinct category, which is perceived in perceptible things through the perception of the qualities, actions, and parts as common to two or more things. It is inferred in imperceptible things from many common features. Gaṅgeśa denies the category of similarity. He regards similarity with an object as being endowed with many qualities of it, which are not its common qualities.

Prabhākara rejects the Vaiśeṣika category of particularity (viśeṣa), which is said to abide in an eternal substance, that distinguishes it from another eternal substance possessing

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174 PP., pp. 81-82; TNR., p. 23; PSPM., pp. 89-91.
common qualities and actions. But distinctness can distinguish an eternal substance from another eternal substance having similar qualities and actions. So particularity is not different from distinctness, and so not a distinct category.  

Both Kumārila and Prabhākara recognize the reality of the external world independent of our cognitions. The Mīmāṁsā does not believe in the periodic creation and dissolution of the world by God. Production and destruction of things are constant. The parts of the world have an origin and an end, but the world, as a whole, has an origin and an end in time. There is no creator or destroyer of the world.


The Mīmāṁsā emphasizes ritualistic morality enjoined by the Vedas. The performance of sacrifices generates an imperceptible potency (āptūrva) in the self, which matures in course of time, and produces its consequence in another world. The potency subsists in the incorporeal soul, which leaves its mortal coil, and passes to another world where it enjoys and suffers the consequences of its actions.

Jaimini regards the self (puruṣa) as distinct from the sense-organs and cognitions. Savara regards it as a permanent entity distinct from the body, the vital forces, the sense-organs, and cognitions. It is known by itself, but not by others or shown to others. It is self-illumined (ātmajyotiḥ) or apprehended by itself. It has cognition, pleasure, desire, recollection and the like. It is an object of T'-consciousness (ahampratyaya).

Kumārila follows Savara in his conception of the self. It is different from the body, the sense-organs, and the intellect or cognitions. It is ubiquitous, eternal, incorporeal, immaterial and transmigrating. It is a knower (jñātā), enjoyer (bhoktā), and active agent (kartā). It is the substrate of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, merit and demerit, which are its modes. It undergoes modifications, and is yet eternal. Its modal changes do not compromise its eternal

116 PP., p. 119; TNR., pp. 22-23.
117 J. Sinha: Indian Realism, Ch. VI, SV., Sambandhakṣepaparāhāra, 42-40, 113-16.
118 JMS., 1, 1, 4. Svasaṁvedyāḥ sa bhavati, nāśāvanyena śuṣyate draṣṭum, katham asau nīdarāyeta. ŚBh., i. 1. 5, pp. 241-42.
nature. Cognition is an action (kriyā) or a modal change (parināma) of the self, which is not perceptible, but inferable from cognizedness (jñātata) or manifestness (prākatya) of the object. In deep sleep there is no cognition, but there is a potency of cognition. There is no pleasure in deep sleep. The so-called recollection of pleasure during deep sleep on waking from it is due to the absence of pain. The self is of the nature of potency of cognition.\textsuperscript{118}

Kumārila sometimes speaks of the self as self-illumined. It is cognized by itself, and not by others.\textsuperscript{119} Sometimes he speaks of it as an object of ‘I’-consciousness.\textsuperscript{120} When it is spoken of as imperceptible (agrāhya), it means that it is apprehended by itself, and cannot be perceived by others.\textsuperscript{121} Thus Kumārila regards the self as both self-illumined and an object of ‘I’-consciousness, which always points to the mere existence of the self, which is of the nature of pure consciousness.\textsuperscript{122}

But Pārthaśārathī Miśra regards the self as an object of ‘I’-consciousness or mental perception. He denies its self-luminosity on the ground that it is not manifested in dreamless sleep. So it is an object of mental perception. ‘I’-consciousness is mental perception.\textsuperscript{123} Pārthaśārathī Miśra agrees with the Naïyāyika in regarding the self as an object of mental perception.

Prabhākara does not regard the self as an object of ‘I’-consciousness or mental perception, because the same self cannot be the knower and the known. The knowing self can never be the known object. So Prabhākara maintains that the self is known as the subject of all cognitions of objects; that there is no ‘I’-consciousness in addition to consciousness of objects. Cognitions manifest themselves, their objects as objects (viṣaya),

\textsuperscript{118} Sarīrenādiyabuddhibhavo yastiriktavam ātmamāt. Jñānāsaktivahāvo to nityah sarvagatah parisāḥ. ŚV., Atmavāda, 7, 73. Ibid., 8, 20, 22, 20, 147.
\textsuperscript{119} Atmaiva prakāśyo‘yaṁ ātmā jñātirjñātītir. Atmajyotiṣṭhayavanantar parair ityavatīghate. Ibid., 142, 143.
\textsuperscript{120} Ahaṁpratyayavijñeyah svayam ātmopapadāye. Ibid., 107. Ibid., 110, 126.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 142-43.
\textsuperscript{122} Taṇḍavaśīka, H.T., p. 516.
and the self as the knower (jñātā), or the substrate (āśraya) in which they inhere.\\footnote{SD., p. 122.}

Pārthasārathi Miśra refutes the objection of Prabhākara. He evidently means by self-contradiction in the self’s being an object of ‘I’-consciousness or mental perception that it is simply the agent of the act of cognition which cannot produce its result (svaphala) in it. The result of the cognitive act is manifestation (bhāsana), which exists in the self, the agent of the cognitive act. It is an object of consciousness, since it is manifested by it. If it is not manifested by the cognitive act, it cannot be said to be revealed by it. If it is manifested by a cognition as Prabhākara maintains, then also it is both subject and object of consciousness. Thus he also cannot avoid self-contradiction.\\footnote{SD., p. 122. IPP., p. 230.} Pārthasārathi Miśra maintains that object-consciousness is not always accompanied by ‘I’-consciousness; that sometimes it is appropriated by the self, when it is known as an object of ‘I’-consciousness which is distinct from object-consciousness. The self is not always known as the subject or knower, as Prabhākara maintains. If it were always known as a knower, it could not be an object of recollection and recognition. In recollection and recognition both it is the object perceived in the past, that is represented to consciousness,—and not their subject. Hence in the recollection and recognition of the self, it is the self perceived in the past as an object of mental perception, that is represented to consciousness as the object of present recollection and recognition. Otherwise they would have no objects; but there can be no cognition without an object. Hence the self is an object of ‘I’-consciousness or mental perception.\\footnote{Yadyāpi viṣayavittivelāyām evātmāvabhāsas tathāpi na viṣayavittikartṛtyāvabhāsah, kintu māṇasāhāhyapratyaśyakarmatayaśvabhāsano na tadvitikarmatayāvyāpteḥ. Ye tu kartṛtyaivaśtmasiddhir na karmatayavāhnie tēṣām atmani śnraja-pratyaśyajñāne utopadayeṣām. SD., p. 123. IPP.; pp. 238-40.}

But how can the self be subject or agent (kartā) and object (karma) at the same time? The self, according to Kumārila, is a conscious substance; as conscious, it is the subject, and as a substance, it is the object.\\footnote{Dravyādīśvarūpam ātmano grāhyam jñātṛśūpam ca grāhakam. NM., p. 430.} Jayanta represents Kumārila’s
view in this manner. Madhusūdana Sarasvati also credits Kumārila with the view that the self is partly conscious and partly unconscious. It is the knower through the conscious part, and the object of knowledge through the unconscious part. It is transformed into cognition, pleasure and the like through it. Sadānanda Yati also credits Kumārila with this view. Kumārila struggled between two concepts of the self, the self as pure self-luminous consciousness and the self as a substance, partly conscious and partly unconscious, subject as well as object.

The self is distinct from the body, which is its organ of experience. It is material and unconscious, and cannot act by itself. It can act only when it is supervised by the conscious self, and realize its ends. The self is immaterial and devoid of physical motion, which is not the only form of action, as the Vaiśeṣika maintains. It assumes a particular body in accordance with its merits and demerits acquired in the past birth, and directs its actions. When the unseen potencies are exhausted, it ceases to have any body and direct its actions, and attains liberation. Though the self is devoid of physical motion, it can transmigrate into another body, since it is ubiquitous. It can produce physical motion through its body.

Kumārila cites the Sāṅkhya arguments for the distinction of the self from the body. The former is pure, simple, incorporeal, immaterial, and disembodied, while the latter is impure, complex, corporeal, material, and embodied. The body is an aggregate (saṃghāta) and an arrangement of parts (sanniveśa), which exist for a conscious self, and realize its purpose. The self is a conscious knower, which has experience through its body with a particular arrangement of parts to realize its ends. It is ubiquitous, eternal, conscious and active, while its body is limited, perishable, unconscious and inactive. The former is the knower (aham), while the latter is a known object (idam). The former is imperceptible to others, while the latter is per-

139 Iṣṭo bodhātmakaś ca iti bhaṭṭāb. Siddhārthabinda: IPM., p. 95.
140 ātmano' sti anīsādvayam cidadhiśo cidadhiśa ca cidadhiśena draśtria-

-vam acidadhiśena jñānānukhādloparipāmitvaṁ jñayatvamca. Nyāyaratvā-

vall. IPM., p. 96.
141 Advaṭabrahmasiddhi; BH., p. 260.
ceptible to them. So the self is distinct from the body. Its identification with the body is due to false knowledge.\textsuperscript{182}

Pleasure is inferred from a beaming face, which may be said to be a quality of the body. But it is not its quality, since it is not perceived inside the body when it is dissected. We can perceive the colour of its interior, but we cannot perceive pleasure. But pleasure is a quality, which must abide in a substance, and the substance in which it abides is the self. Similarly, cognition, desire, volition and the like are the qualities of the self, which is their substrate. Further, consciousness cannot be a quality of the material elements of the body either distributively or collectively. Earth, water, and the other elements separately do not possess consciousness, and, consequently, cannot possess it collectively. If consciousness belonged to all the elements of the body, then all being equal could not be related to one another. If it belonged to one of them, the other elements would be subordinate to it, which is contradicted by experience. Hence consciousness cannot be a quality of the body, which cannot be a knower.\textsuperscript{183}

Life is not a quality of the body, since it is destroyed when the body is not destroyed, or a contradictory quality is not produced in it. So life must be due to an effort of the self which guides the body. It has life so long as it is animated by the soul.\textsuperscript{184}

The self is distinct from the sense-organs. It is the conscious agent of them, which are its unconscious instruments. They cannot function without its guidance. Even on the destruction of a sense-organ, the self can remember objects perceived in the past through it. It can synthesize the sensations derived through the different sense-organs. It is eternal and all-pervading, while they are perishable and of limited magnitude. The mind (manas) cannot be the knower, since it is the internal organ by which the self can perceive its qualities. It is an unconscious instrument of the self which is its agent. So the self is distinct from the manas and the external sense-organs.\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{182} SV., Aitaväda, 7, 73, 74, 75-79, 112-14, 128-28, 147; SD., pp. 119-20, 121-22.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 98-101, 111, 113; NR., 111.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., 94-97.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 147; NR., SD., YSP., pp. 123-24.
The self, according to the Buddhists, is a series of momentary ideas (vijñānasantāna), each of which is modified by the impression (vāsanā) of the preceding idea. The idea that performs an action and the idea that reaps its fruit belong to the same series. The agent of an action and the experiencer of its consequence belong to the same series. Recollection and recognition are due to the transference of impressions (vāsanāsatākrama) from an antecedent idea to a subsequent idea in the same series. Momentary ideas do not require any permanent substratum.¹⁹⁶

Kumārila criticizes the Buddhist doctrine like the Naiyāyika. The Buddhist believes in transmigration. But if the soul is a mere series of momentary ideas, it cannot transmigrate from one body to another, and enjoy the fruits of actions done in the previous birth. Ideas being momentary, they can be neither a doer (kartā) nor an enjoyer (bhokta). They are immaterial, non-pervasive and motionless. So one and the same idea cannot transmigrate from one body to another. There is no subtle body through which an idea may pass into another body. Even if it existed, an idea could not pass with it. An idea cannot exist in the germ-plasm which cannot have cognitions, since it is devoid of sense-organs. An idea can exist in the form of a cognition which is due to the sense-object-intercourse. The Buddhist may argue that an idea exists in the embryo in the state of a latent potency (śaktī). But Kumārila urges that a potency cannot exist without a substratum (āśraya) in the embryo. If the material sense-organs were the substratum of the potency of ideas, then the sense-organs would be conscious and there would be no rebirth, since they would be destroyed with the body, and on their destruction the potency of ideas would be destroyed. Further, if the sense-organs were the substratum of the potency of ideas, they would manifest it and produce ideas. This would contradict the Buddhist doctrine that an idea is produced by a preceding idea only. Moreover, there is nothing to prove that the first cognition of a new-born child is produced by a preceding idea. Kumārila considers it to be produced by a sense-organ in

¹⁹⁶ SV., Ātmavāda, 32-34; SD., p. 120.
intercourse with an object. If the potency of ideas exists without any substratum in an embryo in order to produce subsequent ideas, then the so-called potency is another name for the soul. In fact, the potency of ideas can exist in the permanent soul only, which is its substrate. It cannot exist without a substrate. The first idea that acts and the last idea that reaps the fruits of its actions must have a common substrate, the permanent soul.

The Buddhist theory of the self cannot account for recollection and recognition. An object perceived by a past idea cannot be remembered by a present idea, even as an object perceived by Devadatta cannot be remembered by Vājñadatta. Recollection is due to the revival of an impression (samanāra) which cannot abide in ideas which are momentary. The permanent self only can be the substrate of impressions, which are produced by its past perceptions, revived by suggestive forces, and remembered by its recollection. The Buddhist theory of transference of impressions cannot account for recollection and recognition. Momentary ideas cannot leave their impressions (vāsanā) which modify the succeeding ideas. They are momentary, and cannot be their abode. Recollection and recognition of objects cannot be explained by momentary ideas and their impressions. Recognition of the identity of the self cannot be explained by momentary ideas and their impressions. The past cognition cannot be apprehended by the present cognition, since it no longer exists. The present cognition also cannot be apprehended by the past cognition which is non-existent. The object of recognition is neither the past cognition nor the present cognition. The permanent self only can be the substrate of impressions, and can account for recollection and recognition of objects and recognition of the identity of the self. 'I am the same self as I was yesterday'. This is recognition of personal identity, which proves the existence of the permanent self. Kumārila reiterates the Nyāya arguments for the existence of the permanent self, and criticizes the Buddhist theory of the self in a similar manner.


Prabhākara regards the self as distinct from the body, the sense-organs and the intellect or cognitions. It is eternal, ubiquitous and manifold. There is a distinct self in each body. It is manifested in all cognitions of objects. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī credits Prabhākara with the view that the self is an unconscious, pervasive agent and enjoyer. It is unconscious, since consciousness does not constitute its essence. It is known as the substrate of the cognition ‘I know’, but not as of the nature of consciousness. Prabhākara regards the self as a substance, which is not of the nature of consciousness, but a substrate of consciousness. Cognition is not a modification (parināma) of the self, as Kumārila maintains, but its quality, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinks. The self is manifested as the knower of all cognitions of objects. It is a knower or subject, and apprehended as such. It is never apprehended as an object.

The self has nine special qualities, viz., cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and impression, which are produced by its conjunction with manas, the internal organ. Cognition is self-aware. It is apprehension and recollection. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are apprehended by mental perception. Pleasure is a positive feeling. It is not a mere negation of pain. Impression is a peculiar quality of the soul, which is the cause of recollection. It is imperceptible but inferable from recollection. Unseen power (adrṣṭa) is merit and demerit. They are known from Vedic testimony. The self is the substrate of these nine specific qualities. Prabhākara's conception of the self resembles the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views.

Prabhākara regards the self as the inherent cause of cognitions, which depend upon the conjunction of the self with manas as the non-inherent cause. This mind-soul-contact is generated by a movement of the mind (manas) due to the effort

118 Buddhāndriyaśarirebhhyo bhūmnā ātmā vibhūr dhruvāḥ.
Nanabhūtaḥ pratikṣetram arthavittīṣu bhāsate. PP., p. 141.
119 Kārī bhoktā jaḍo vibhūr iti prabhākaravāraḥ. Siddhāntavīṇḍa; IPM., p. 85.
120 Sa ca jñānasvarūpapabhinnatvāt jaḍalā, jñāmitijñānāśrayatvena sa bhūtā, na jñānakarṣātvāna. Nyāyaratnāvalī; IPM., pp. 95-96.
121 Buddhīḥ svasamvedanāiddhā. PP., p. 149.
122 PP., p. 149.
of the soul or its merit and demerit produced by its previous actions. These efforts and merits and demerits are the effects of previous mind-soul-contacts and so on without a beginning. The action of the mind is not the inherent cause of cognitions, since it will require another action of the mind as its non-inherent cause. So the self is the inherent cause of cognitions which inhere in it, and the mind-soul-contact is their non-inherent cause.\footnote{PP., p. 149; PSPM., p. 76.}

The manas is the internal organ of the self, which is of atomic dimension. It is the organ of the perception of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition. It supervises the functions of the external sense-organs. It is eternal and capable of quick movement. Its conjunction with a soul depends upon its beginningless merits and demerits.\footnote{PP., p. 151.}

The self is the enjoyer (bhoktā); the body is the vehicle of enjoyment (bhogāyatana); the sense-organs are the instruments of experience (bhogasādhana); the external objects and pleasure, etc., are the objects of experience (bhoga); enjoyment (bhukti) is a feeling (vedanā) of pleasure; suffering is a feeling of pain. These five kinds of entities exhaust the reality.\footnote{PP., pp. 151, 149.}

The self is neither atomic nor coextensive with the body, but ubiquitous. It is the inherent cause of all its qualities, while the mind-soul-contact is their non-inherent cause. This conjunction subsists in the soul and the mind (manas) which cannot exist apart from the body. The qualities of the soul are not perceived apart from the body which is animated by it. The body is capable of movement, but the soul is motionless. It comes into contact with all things without movement. So it is all-pervading. But though it is ubiquitous, it can experience its qualities in connection with its own body which it has acquired by its merits and demerits. The sense-organs are a part of the body. The soul can have experience through its own body and sense-organs only, which are the fit media of its experience. It cannot have experience through others' bodies and sense-organs.\footnote{PP., pp. 157-59. PSPM., p. 81.} Though it is ubiquitous, it comes
into contact with the atomic manas and produces cognitions. If the manas were ubiquitous like the soul, there would be no contact between them. Two ubiquitous substances devoid of parts cannot come into contact with each other. The atomic manas comes into contact with the different sense-organs by its quick movement, and generates different cognitions in quick succession. They are never simultaneous, but appear to be so owing to the quick movement of the manas and its rapid contacts with the soul and different sense-organs. The mind-soul-contacts are due to the soul's merits and demerits acquired by its past actions.²⁸⁷

Prabhākara criticizes the Čārvaka and Buddhist views of the self like Kumārila and the Naiyāyika. He criticizes the Advaita Vedānta doctrine that the self is self-luminous. If the self were self-luminous, it would be manifested to consciousness during deep sleep, as it is manifested during the waking condition and dream. In the state of release there is absolute cessation of cognitions; so the self is not manifested to consciousness, but it remains in its pure condition devoid of all cognitions. The hypothesis of the self-luminosity of cognitions can adequately account for all states of consciousness. So it is needless to assume the self-luminosity of the self, which is distinct from cognitions. Cognitions only are self-luminous. The self is not of the nature of consciousness, but it is its substrate.

Prabhākara rejects also the Advaita Vedānta doctrine of the oneness of the self. It regards the self as one, eternal, immutable, undifferentiated consciousness. There is one self in different individuals. Though it is one, it appears to be many owing to the variety of the media in which it is reflected, even as the sun, which is one, appears to be many when it is reflected in different mirrors. The body, the sense-organs, and the internal organ are evolutes of nescience (avidyā). The one self appears to be many owing to the plurality of the internal organs (āntalākaraṇa) in which it is reflected. Just as the one luminous sun is invested with dirtiness when it is reflected in different mirrors, so the one self-luminous self is invested with pleasure, pain and the like, when it is reflected in different internal organs in different bodies. Prabhākara

²⁸⁷ PP., p. 149; PSPM., pp. 77-78.
contends that this analogy is false. As in the case of the sun, dirtiness and other qualities that appear different are only those that belong to the reflecting mirrors, and not to the sun which is reflected in them, so if the analogy were true, the diverse qualities of pleasure, pain and the like perceived by different individuals would belong to the different internal organs in which the self is reflected, and not to the self. But pleasure and pain are the qualities of the self. If they belonged to one self, pleasure and pain of one individual would lead to those of all others. But this is contradicted by experience. Hence they must belong to different souls, and not to their adjuncts (upādhi) or internal organs.\footnote{266}

There are many souls. Their experiences are different. They acquire different merits and demerits by their different voluntary actions. Their different lots and pleasures and pains are due to the variety of their merits and demerits. If there were one soul only, there would be no variety of merits and demerits. If there were no variety of them, there would be no variety of enjoyments and sufferings, which is a fact of experience. So there are many souls, one in each body. Oneness of the soul would lead to oneness of experience, which is contradicted by experience.\footnote{269} There is an irreducible plurality of souls with unique experience. They are moral agents experiencing diverse objects in accordance with their moral deserts. The Advaita Vedānta doctrine of oneness of the soul flatly contradicts the testimony of consciousness and undermines morality.\footnote{218} Just as the actions of my body are due to the volitions of my soul, so the actions of other bodies are due to the volitions of other souls, and not to those of my soul. I experience the volition of my soul producing actions of my body. But I never experience the volition of my soul producing actions of other bodies. So I infer that they must be due to the volitions of other souls. I have inferential knowledge of other souls. I infer them from the actions of their bodies produced by their volitions. One soul cannot be perceived by another soul.\footnote{211}

\footnote{268} PP., pp. 159-60; PSPM., p. 83.\footnote{269} Nānāvyavasthānā nānābhūtāḥ pratikṣetram puruṣāḥ. Dharmādharmasukhādīvyavasthādarṣanāt. PP., p. 159.\footnote{218} PP., p. 155.\footnote{211} PP., pp. 158-59.
The soul is neither produced nor destroyed. It is devoid of origin and end. It is uncaused and indestructible. It is immortal and eternal. It achieves its non-empirical, pure and transcendental condition by exhausting its merits and demerits. This is the state of liberation.

The self is not self-luminous, and does not apprehend itself. But a cognition is self-luminous, and apprehends itself. The self is known as the subject or knower (jñātā) in all cognitions of objects. Only objects are not apprehended, unless the self apprehending them is apprehended. It is not apprehended in the absence of cognitions of objects. Cognitions manifest themselves, the objects which produce them, and the self in which they exist. The self is apprehended as the knower of objects. It is manifested as the subject in all cognitions of objects. It cannot be the subject as well as the object of a cognition, since it is self-contradictory. The self is always the agent of knowledge, and never its object.

The self cannot be an object of mental perception as the followers of Kumārila and some Nāyāyikas maintain. It is self-contradictory to hold that the same self is the knowing subject and the known object. In the cognition "I know the jar" the self-luminous cognition manifests the jar as an object, and the self as its substrate. The self is apprehended as the knower of objects; it is always manifested as the subject or knower of object-cognitions; it is never known as an object.

The self is implicitly involved in all consciousness of objects. So far Prabhākara is right. But the self is not always explicitly manifested in all consciousness of objects. All consciousness of objects does not contain self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is a higher degree of consciousness. The self is explicitly manifested in self-consciousness. But the self is always a knower or subject (jñātā). It can never be an object (jñeya) of consciousness. The knower cannot be a knower object. The self is an ego or knower. So far Prabhākara is

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212 Avaśyāṁ jñātāṁ avabhāsao meyāmubhaveṣvamuvartate. PP., p. 148.
213 Nātmā viśayānauviddho'ravabhāsate na ca viśayā bodharyanavavabhāsamāne bhāsante. PP., p. 152.
217 VPS., p. 53.
right. The self is not known as an object of self-consciousness. It is immanent in experience and transcends it. It is not an object of experience. It is not even an object of self-consciousness. Kumārila is wrong when he regards the self as an object of mental perception or 'T'-consciousness. 118

13. Kumārila's theory of Inference of Cognition from Cognizedness of its object (Jñātātāvāda):
Theory of Knowledge.

Kumārila regards a cognition as an act of the self, or its mode, which is imperceptible, which is neither perceived by itself as Prabhākara thinks, nor by another cognition as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains. If there were no cognition, then we could not, in any other way, account for the cognizedness of an existing object; so after the object has been cognized, we know the existence of the cognition as a means of knowing the object. 119 Pārthasārathi Miśra explains it thus: First an object is cognized, then the existence of a cognition is known by presumption. If there were no cognition, cognizedness of the object could not be accounted for. In the absence of cognizedness of an object the existence of a cognition cannot be known by presumption. So presumption proves the existence of a cognition. 120 Pārthasārathi Miśra sets forth the following arguments to prove Kumārila's doctrine. (1) An act of cognition involves four factors, viz., an agent of the cognitive act (jñātā) or a cognizing self, an object of cognition (jñeya), an instrumental cognition (karaṇajñāna), and a result of cognition (phala) or cognizedness (jñātātā) or manifestness (prākātya) in its object, even as the act of cooking produces cookedness in rice. The act of cognition is the cause; cognizedness is the effect. The cognitive act as the cause is inferred from cognizedness as the effect. The cognitive act as the cause is inferred from cognizedness of its object as the effect. The objects of knowledge are either perceptible or inferable. Perceptibility

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118 IPP., p. 239.
119 Nāṇyāthā kṣaratasadbhāvo drṣṭaḥ sannupapadyate.
Jñānaiḥ cemnetyataḥ puṣṭat pramāṇam upajayate.
ŚV., v. 182, p. 318.
120 Arthāpattir jñānasya pramāṇam, să cārthasya jñātatvānyathānu-
papattiprabhavāy prāgarthasya jñātatvābhāvāmnopapadyate. ŚV., v. 182, NR., p. 318.
(āparokṣya) and inferability (pārokṣya) are produced by sense-perception and inference respectively in their objects. A cognition is imperceptible but inferable from cognizedness.\footnote{Jñānakriyā hi sakarmikā karmabhūte'rthe phalaṁ janayati pākāḍivat. Tadeva phalaṁ kāryabhūtam kārapabhūtam viñānam api kalpayati iti siddhvyayapratyaksam api jñānam. SD., p. 56.} (2) A cognition is inferred from the relation between the self and the object, which is apprehended by mental perception. The self is the knower, and the object is known. The self can know the object when it is related to it; and the relation between them is brought about by a cognition, which is the tertium quid between them, which relates them to each other. From the specific relation between the self and the object brought about by the cognition which is an adventitious condition we infer the existence of the cognition. The relation is known by mental perception. It cannot be said to be self-luminous, since there is no proof for its self-luminosity. It cannot be argued that a cognition is self-luminous (svaprapakṣa) which manifests an object. If an object is manifested by a self-luminous cognition, then what manifests the relation between the cognition and the object? The same cognition cannot manifest it, since when the cognition is produced, the relation between the cognition and the object does not yet come into existence. The relation of a cognition to its object consists in its manifesting the object. So when a cognition is produced and manifests its object, it ceases to operate, and cannot manifest the relation between the cognition and the object. Further, the cognition is momentary, and cannot manifest the object first, and then its relation to the object. Hence a cognition is inferred from the specific relation between the self and an object.\footnote{Jñānakriyādyāraka yaḥ kārtṛbhūtasyaṁmanāḥ karmabhūtasya cārthasaṁ parasparam sambandho vyāptīvyayatvalākṣaṇaṁ sa mānasapratyakṣaṁva gato viñānāṁ kalpayati. SD., p. 56.} (3) A cognition is inferred from the peculiarity (atiśaya) produced by it in its object.\footnote{Arthagato va jñānasajyo'tiṣayaṁ kalpayati jñānam. SD., pp. 56-57.} Even Prabhākara, who regards a cognition as manifesting itself, its object, and its substrate, the self, must admit this peculiarity. Manifestation (prakṣaṇa) is produced in the object by the cognition. It is cognizedness (jñātātā) from which the cognition is inferred. Kumārila agrees with Prabhākara in holding
that a perceptual cognition produces manifestation in its object. But he differs from Kumārila in holding that the cognition is not self-luminous, but inferred from manifestation or cognizedness of the object. An inferential cognition produces manifestation or cognizedness in past, future and remote objects, though they are non-existent at present. So the cognition is inferred from the manifestation of objects; it is not self-luminous. It cannot be argued that we experience that the cognition is perceived, because when the object is manifested to consciousness, the cognition is not manifested, nor is its perceptibility (äparokṣya) manifested. Hence a cognition is inferred from manifestation or cognizedness of its object, which is a peculiar property produced by it in its object, or the specific relation between the self and the object.


Prabhākara holds that perception apprehends the self, its object, and itself. Perception is direct apprehension, which cognizes these three factors. This view is called the doctrine of triple perception (tripūṭipratyakṣa). Cognition is self-luminous, and manifests itself. It is not manifested by any other cognition. But the self and the object are not self-luminous, and do not manifest themselves. They depend upon a cognition to manifest them. They are manifested by a cognition. In waking condition both the self and the object are manifested. But in dreamless sleep both are unmanifest, though they continue to exist during the period, since they are recognized on waking from sleep. If they were self-luminous, they would be manifested during deep sleep. They are not manifested at the time, because there is no cognition to manifest them. So they are not self-luminous, but they are manifested by a cognition which is self-luminous. The self

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224 Na ca pratitibalād api pratyakṣatvam arthāvabhāsasamaye saṁvidāḥ pratibhāsa eva nāsti, na tarām āparokṣyaṁ. SD., p. 57.
225 SD., pp. 56-57; PP., pp. 199-201; PP., pp. 236-40.
226 Śāksāt pratitiḥ pratyakṣam meyaṁatpramāsanā śā. PP., p. 127.
227 Aprakāṣaṇaṁ vabhāvāni meyāṁ mātā ca prakāṣaṁ apekṣantām. Prakāṣaṁ prakāṣātmakāvāṁ nānayam apekṣate. PP., p. 57.
228 Svaprakāṣaiva mitiḥ. PP., p. 57.
is directly manifested by every cognition, presentative or representative. There can be no cognition of an object apart from that of the self. In every cognition of an object there are a consciousness of the self (ahārīvitti), a consciousness of an object (visayavitti), and a consciousness of the cognition (svasānīvitti). In the cognition 'I know the jar' there is a triple consciousness, a cognition of the jar, a cognition of 'I' or the self, and a self-conscious cognition.

According to Prabhākara the self is always cognized as the knower (jñātā), a cognition, as a cognition (jñāna), and an object, as a known object (jñeya). The self is a knower, and can never be known as an object. A cognition can never be known as an object, but as a cognition. It is self-manifest or self-aware. If it were cognized by another cognition, it would not be self-luminous. If it were cognized as an object of another cognition, it would require another cognition to cognize it, and so on to infinity. So a cognition is self-conscious awareness. But Prabhākara is not a subjectivist. He holds that a cognition apprehends an object. Sāvāra says: 'It is certainly the object that is perceived,—not the cognition'. It does not mean that a cognition is not cognized, but that it is not cognized as an object of another cognition. It is certainly cognized as a cognition.

But Prabhākara holds that, though a cognition is apprehended by itself, its existence is inferred from the apprehension of its object. He says, "What is known by inference is not any object, but the existence of an object." We infer the existence of the cognition from the apprehension of its object. Prabhākara draws a distinction between 'saṃvedya' and 'prameya'. That is saṃvedya, whose form is apprehended; a cognition is formless, and, consequently, cannot be 'saṃvedya'. That is 'prameya', whose form is not manifested to consciousness, but which is an object of valid knowledge; the presence

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[Notes and references provided, if needed.]
of a cognition is inferred from the apprehension of its object, and so it is ‘prameya’.

Both Kumārila and Prabhākara admit that the existence of a cognition is known by inference. Kumārila regards it as inferred from cognizedness (jñātātā) or manifestness (prākatya) of its object, while Prabhākara regards it as inferred from the apprehension of objects. But Prabhākara regards cognitions as self-cognized or cognized as cognitions, but not as objects, while Kumārila regards them as inferable from their effects in the form of cognizedness or manifestness of objects.

Murāri Miśra holds a different view. He rejects both Kumārila and Prabhākara’s views. According to him, at first, there is a cognition of an object, e.g., ‘this is a jar’ (vyavasāya), and then there is appropriation of the cognition by the self, e.g., ‘I know the jar’ (anuvyavasāya). A self-appropriated cognition apprehends the cognition of an object.

Prabhākara refutes Kumārila’s doctrine of inferability of a cognition. There is no reason or mark from which it may be inferred. The existence of an object (arthasattā) cannot serve as the mark of inference, since it is not invariably accompanied by a cognition. An object exists without being known by a cognition. The cognition of an object (arthajñāna) cannot be the mark of inference. It cannot be a mark as soon as it is produced; but it can be so only when it is manifested to consciousness. If it is not manifested, it cannot be distinguished from an object-cognition which has not yet come into existence. A cognitive act cannot be inferred from non-manifestation (anavabhāsana) of the object-cognition (arthajñāna). The manifestation of the object-cognition does not depend upon any other cognition, since it is not known to exist. Thus, there is no mark (liṅga) from which a cognition can be inferred. Hence the cognition of an object is self-illumined. The so-called cognizedness (jñātātā) or manifestness (prākatya) of an object is nothing but the cognition of the object (arthajñāna), which is self-luminous. A cognition manifests an object,
but it manifests itself. A self-cognized cognition apprehends an object.

III

Ethics

15. Prabhākara’s Analysis of Voluntary Action and doctrine of Freedom of the Will.

Prabhākara analyses a voluntary action into the following steps: (1) The knowledge of something to be done (kāryatājñāna); (2) the knowledge that it can be done by an effort of will (kṛtisādhyatājñāna); (3) the desire to act (cikirsā); (4) the volition (kṛti); (5) the motor impulse in the body (cēṣṭā); and (6) the overt action (kriyā). The desire to act is generated by the knowledge that the action can be done by the agent’s volition. If there is the knowledge that the action cannot be done by his volition, it cannot produce the desire to act. The self must identify itself with the idea of the act chosen by it in order to execute it into action. If it does not identify itself with the idea of the act, it cannot desire to perform it. The idea of the act is appropriated by the self which converts it into an overt action by its volition. A voluntary action is determined by the self; it involves self-determination. It involves the knowledge that the act is to be done by the self. The knowledge of something to be done leads to volition through desire. It does not depend upon the knowledge that it is conducive to the agent’s good, or the knowledge that it is accompanied by stronger undesirable consequences as the Nyāya holds. The knowledge of something to be done is due to the self’s representation of the act to be done and identification with it.

There are two kinds of duties, viz., conditional or prudential duties (kāmya karma) for material gain and unconditional duties or daily obligatory (nitya karma) and occasional duties.

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(naimittika karma). Conditional duties are prudential acts prompted by desires for material gain. They involve empirical volitions and fulfill desires for selfish ends. But, according to Prabhākara, the mere knowledge of conduciveness to the agent's good (iṣṭasādhanatājñāna) does not bring about volition. The desire for the realization of the good as appropriated by the self is the real incentive for volition. Mere desire for pleasure is not the real motive force. But the self as qualified by the desire for pleasure is the spring of action. In unconditional duties there is no desire for pleasure. They are free from empirical motives, and involve purely rational will undetermined by any considerations of material gain or desire for pleasure. But the self's representation of the acts and identification of itself with them prompt it to will. In conditional duties there is the knowledge that the acts are conducive to the self's good, unaccompanied by the knowledge of stronger undesirable consequences. But unless the self identifies itself with the desire for the realization of the good, there can be no volition. In unconditional duties there is no desire for the realization of any good. But there is the desire to perform an action, determined by the pure sense of duty, undetermined by any empirical motive. But the mere desire to perform the action cannot lead to volition. The self represents the act to itself and identifies itself with it. The desire to act as specifying the self leads to volition. The act of self-appropriation is common to both conditional duties and unconditional duties. In both there is appropriation of desire by the self. Prabhākara emphasizes this element of self-reference in all voluntary acts.²²²

Prabhākara holds that in every voluntary action there is the consciousness of freedom or the knowledge that it can be done by the self's will. If there is no effort of its volition, the action cannot be done. The volition is determined by the self's own free will. It is not determined by any other person's will. The act of cooking, for instance, is to be accomplished by my will, since it cannot be accomplished except through

²²²Kāmye ca pākyayādau kāmanāsvaviśeṣaṇam tataḥ ca bala-
vadaniṣṭānām ahadiḥ kāmyasādhanatājñānena kāryatājñānam tataḥ ca
pravṛttih. Nitye ca śancādikāh puruṣaviśeṣaṇam tena śancādijñāna-
dhīnakṛitisādhyatājñānāt iatra pravṛttih. SM., pp. 473-74.
my will, which is conducive to my good. The volition to accomplish the act itself is determined by the self's free will. It is determined by the pure will of the self, which is undetermined. The knowledge that an action can be done by the self's volition implies the knowledge of the self's free or undetermined will to will. The freely willed will is known by an act of self-appropriation on the part of the self. Thus freedom of the will is implied by a voluntary action. There can be no volition without freedom. If an act is done under coercion of another person's will, it is not a voluntary action. An act of volition (kṛtī) is determined by the pure undetermined will of the self (svēcchā), which is appropriated by the self. Prabhākara believes in freedom as self-determination. The will to accomplish depends on the agent's undetermined freedom, but this undetermined freedom is itself determined by a process of mediation through self-reference. But this self-mediation of freedom is not pure indetermination but self-determination in so far as it implies an act of self-appropriation in the form of representation of the act as a specific determination of the self.

Prabhākara also gives the moral proof for freedom. The Moral Law is an injunction of the Vedas, which ought to be done. Therefore, it can be done. The Vedic injunctions are imperatives. They enjoin conditional duties and unconditional duties. The former are hypothetical imperatives in the language of Kant, since they are means to the realization of the good. The latter are categorical imperatives in Kant's language. They are not means to ulterior ends, but they are ends in themselves. But both are imperatives which ought to be done. They produce moral obligation in the self to accomplish them, but do not compel the agent to execute them. They do not involve constraint, but moral obligation. So they imply freedom of the will in the moral agent to accomplish them.

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329 Pāko mātrīsādhyāḥ mātrīṁ vinā' satvē sati madhīpāsādhanaṁ, SMD., p. 472.
331 HH., pp. 68-69.
This argument reminds us of Kant's moral argument for freedom of the will: 'Thou oughtst, therefore thou canst'.


Jaimini defines Dharma as a good which is of the nature of a command. Savara defines it as an utterance which prompts the self to act and carry it out. It is a command which leads it to the attainment of the highest good. It is a prescription of the Vedas, which indicates the nature of good (artha) and evil (anartha), and impels the self to realize the highest good (niḥśreyasa). Dharma can be revealed by the Vedic prescriptions only. It is not apprehended by perception, inference, comparison or any other means of knowledge. The Vedic prescriptions reveal past, present, future, subtle, remote and supersensuous objects. Dharma is non-temporal and supersensuous Duty or Moral Law. It is revealed by the Vedas, and impels the self to obey it.

Kumārila regards the Moral Law (vidhi) as a Vedic prescription or command which impels the self to act. What leads to the attainment of the good (śreyas) is dharma. The good is the happiness of the self. The performance of sacrifices and other rites and ceremonies prescribed by the Vedas is conducive to its happiness. Certain substances, qualities and actions are the material of these rites. So Kumārila regards the acts enjoined by the Vedas and all the ingredients necessary for them as dharma. External acts (kriya) prescribed by the Vedas and the substances, qualities, and actions which are required for them constitute dharma. The latter are regarded as dharma, because they are means to the performance of duties, though they are perceptible. The conduciveness of the acts and the auxiliary substances, qualities and actions to the highest good is always known from the Vedas.

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443 Codanālakṣaṇo'ṛtho dharmaḥ. Sūh., i. 1. 2.
444 SDS., pp. 288-89.
445 SV., Codanāśāstra, 1-7, NR.
446 Tena pravartakaṁ vākyam śāstre'śmin codanocyate. Ibid, 3.
Ibid, 11.
447 Śreyo hi parisaptishā drayugamakarmanāḥ.
Codanālakṣaṇāṁ sādhyā tasmin teśevas dharmatā. Ibid, 191.
Ibid, 191, 192.
448 Dravyakriyāgamādānāṁ dharmatvaṁ aṭhāpasyate.
Śreyoḥsādhanaṁ hyeśāṁ nityāṁ vedāt praśyate. Ibid, 190-91.
Vedic prescriptions are of two kinds: (1) injunctions (vidhī); and (2) prohibitions (nīṣedha). The former indicate the good to be realized, and the latter, the evil to be avoided. Right actions are enjoined by the Vedas, and wrong actions are prohibited by them. They determine rightness and wrongness of actions. We know our positive and negative duties through them only. They cannot be known by reason.248 There can be no perception, or inference or rational comprehension of duties. In Vedic injunctions the performance of certain acts for the attainment of happiness here or hereafter, or for the realization of transcendental freedom (mokṣa) is enjoined. In Vedic prohibitions dharma in the form of abstention from evil or sin is enjoined. Abstention from sins it itself a good, and therefore dharma. The performance of Jyotistama sacrifice leads to the attainment of unalloyed bliss in heaven. The killing of life leads to intense suffering in hell.

Kumārila regards the external acts prescribed by the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions as dharma. He advocates the ethics of ritualism and ceremonialism. He propounds an external and legalistic view of morality. The Moral Law is of the nature of an impersonal command (cudanā). It is not the command of a superior person or God. The Divine Law is not the moral standard.

Kumārila advocates also non-secular egoistic hedonism and eudæmonism. Prudential duties (kāmya karma) are conducive to happiness of the individual on earth or in heaven. It is the happiness of the individual himself which is the good (śreyas). It is the end of empirical duties. Dharma is a means to happiness in heaven. This is non-secular egoistic hedonism. Unconditional duties or daily obligatory duties (nitya karma) and occasional duties (naimittika) karma) are conducive to transcendental freedom (mokṣa), which is absolute extinction of all empirical contents of the self. This transcendental freedom is the individual’s highest good (nīṣṭreyasa). This is non-secular eudæmonism. Both non-secular hedonism and non-secular eudæmonism are foreign to western ethics.

Kumārila rejects utilitarianism. The Utilitarians hold that rightness consists in conduciveness to others’ happiness, and

wrongness consists in conduciveness to others’ pain and suffering. For them recitation of mantras would not be right, since it does not produce others’ happiness, and drinking liquor would not be wrong, since it does not produce others’ suffering. But the former is regarded as right, and the latter is regarded as wrong. Again, illicit sexual intercourse would be regarded by the Utilitarians as right, since it gives intense sexual pleasure to the agent which outweighs a little pain or remorse of conscience, and it gives intense pleasure to the woman. But it is condemned by all as wrong. If the Utilitarians urge that the remorse of conscience (āhrdayakroṣa) makes it wrong, they commit the fallacy of mutual dependence (itraetatarāśraya), since wrongness of the act depends upon remorse and remorse depends upon its wrongness. Further, savages do not feel remorse of conscience, and should therefore be devoid of morality. Hence rightness and wrongness of actions are not determined by conduciveness to one’s own or others’ happiness and misery, social utility or inutility. They are independent of empirical hedonism and utilitarianism. They are determined by Vedic injunctions and prohibitions. Therefore, leaving aside others’ happiness or suffering, or their opposites, social utility or inutility, those who desire to know right actions and wrong actions ought to look out for the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions. So Kumārila’s ethical doctrine is neither egoistic hedonism nor utilitarianism. It is a blend of impersonal legalism, non-secular egoistic hedonism and eudemonism. What is conducive to happiness or good and transcendental freedom has the character of dharma, only when it is distinctly enjoined by the Vedas.

Kumārila recognizes two kinds of duties, secular (laukika) and scriptural (sāstric) or non-temporal (pāramārthika). The secular duties fulfil perceptible secular ends (ādṛṣṭārthaka). The scriptural duties fulfil imperceptible supersensuous ends (adṛṣṭārthaka). They are of two kinds, viz., conditional duties and unconditional duties. The former are empirical duties for

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224 Anugrahaucca dharmatvam pīḍātaścāpyadharmatā. Ibid, 243.
225 Ibid, 243-47, NR.
the realization of desired ends (kāmya karma). The latter are obligatory daily duties (nitya karma) e.g., morning and evening prayers, and obligatory occasional duties (naimittika karma) e.g., bath in the Ganges on the occasion of the solar eclipse and the lunar eclipse. The performance of conditional duties leads to happiness. The performance of Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice produces happiness in heaven. The non-performance of unconditional duties produces sins of omission (pratyavāya) and consequent sufferings. But the performance of them does not produce merits and consequent enjoyments. Nor does it produce demerits and consequent sufferings. It purifies the mind, and generates the knowledge of the self. It wipes off past sins and prevents sins which would accrue to the self from the omission of unconditional duties. The conditional duties are obligatory when there is a desire for a particular end. The unconditional duties are obligatory independently of any desire. They are unconditionally obligatory. The scriptural duties are positive or negative. They are either injunctions or prohibitions. The former enjoin the performance of right actions, while the latter prohibit the commission of wrong actions.  

The Buddhists regard a good disposition (śubhā vāsanā) of the mind as dharma. The Jainas regard subtle, corporeal particles of matter (pudgala), which produce effects, as dharma. The Sāṃkhya regards a particular modification of the mind (manas) as dharma. It is not a quality of the self. The Vaiśeṣika regards a specific quality of the self as dharma. The Nyāya regards an unseen quality (apūrva) of the self produced by the performance of prescribed duties as dharma. Prabhākara regards a supersensuous transcendental ought (apūrva) as dharma. Kumārila regards the prescribed acts or duties which are conducive to good as dharma. It is indicated by the Vedic commands, and characterized as good. Good is earthly and heavenly happiness and transcendental perfection.

Śavara says, “Dharma is conducive to the highest good (śreyas) of the moral agent”. Prabhākara points out that Apūrva or the supersensible Moral Imperative (niyoga) is conducive

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to the highest good,—which is indicated by the Vedic injunctions.²⁹⁷ A Vedic injunction with the affix Liṅ enlightens us on the supersensible Ought which is our duty.²⁹⁸ A moral law is of the nature of duty.²⁹⁹ A duty is Apūrva because it is incomprehensible by any other means of knowledge than Vedic testimony. It is a command or Imperative (niyoga), because it impels a person to accomplish it.³⁰⁰ Apūrva is realizable by an action, which is its means. The supersensible Ought is the end of our moral actions.³⁰¹ There is a permanent relation between Apūrva and its accomplishment by a voluntary action. When there is a volition, there is the accomplishment of Ought. When there is no volition, there is the absence of its accomplishment. Volition is an effort of the self. It aims at the realization of Ought through a voluntary action.³⁰² Thus Dharma is Apūrva or supersensible Ought revealed by the authoritative suggestion (preraṇā) produced in the self by the Moral Imperative (niyoga). It is not a subjective category. It is neither a modification of the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) nor a quality of the self. It is an objective category. But it is not an external act enjoined by the Vedas as Kumārila holds. A person who performs the sacrifices enjoined by the Vedas is said to be virtuous (dhārmika) because he executes the Moral Imperative. He cannot be said to be virtuous, if he does not execute it. The accomplishment of the Moral Imperative (niyogasiddhi) is inferred from the performance of the sacrifices enjoined by the Vedas. The ceremonial acts are the contents of duty. They fulfil the Moral Imperative (niyoga), which is a transcendental verity revealed by the Vedic injunctions. They do not derive their authoritativeness from their conduciveness to any ulterior end or good (phala), but from their intrinsic validity as self-revealing, transcendental Moral Law. It is revealed by moral obligation (preraṇā) produced by the moral imperative (niyoga) in the self. It is revealed to the self by

²⁹⁷ Śrēvakara dharma ityukte katham kāryasya dharmatvam? Apūrvābhikaraṇe tasaya ś̄rēvakarasaya jñāpitavāt, Niyogasiddhiśc coditāvyādhyānāmṣthānām adhigamyā. RVP., p. 33.
²⁹⁸ Liṅāpratyaśya kāryatavya-pūryaṁ bodhayati. TNR., p. 66.
²⁹⁹ Kāryātmakah vidhitattvam. Ibid., pp. 81-82.
³⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 67; PP., p. 196. Niyogaśca vākyārthaḥ. PP., p. 188.
³⁰¹ Apūrvam hi kriyāśaḍhyamānāḥ śādhistā śādhanāṁ kriyā. PP., p. 105.
the unique feeling of moral obligation which is different from physical compulsion and psychical impulsion. Moral obligation is a self-revealing experience. The prescribed duties do not derive their authority from the Vedas, as Kumārila thinks, but from Apūrva or the moral imperative (niyoga) which is indicated by the Vedic injunctions. It is not a personal command, or a command of God as the Nyāya thinks. It is an impersonal Law which has intrinsic validity. It is a transcendental verity of the moral order, which is self-revealing and self-authoritative. It does not derive its authority from the will of a person or God, or from any ulterior end or good or consequences. It is a transcendental, impersonal Moral Law. It has some similarity with Kant's Categorical Imperative, which is unconditionally obligatory. It ought to be done for its own sake without any desire or feeling or consideration of any end, good, or consequences. But Kant's Categorical Imperative is a subjective law of practical reason, while Prabhākara's Apūrva or Niyoga is a supersensible verity of the moral order. Kant's Categorical Imperative is an Ought, while Prabhākara's Moral Imperative is also a transcendental Being or accomplished fact. So the similarity between them should not be pushed too far. Prabhākara is an advocate of rationalism and rigorism in ethics.

The relation of the Moral Imperative to the agent is that of a command to the agent commanded (prāṣṭaṃsambandha). It differs from causation (bhāvana) which is the relation of the act of willing to the willing agent (kriyākarṣamsambandha). Moral obligation is revealed through the relation of a command (preśa) to the agent commanded (prāṣṭya). It is a primary factor in moral obligation. The relation of the act (kriyā) to the moral agent (kartā) is only a secondary factor in it. He knows the Moral Imperative through the unique relation of a command to the agent commanded involved in moral obligation, and then accomplishes it. The accomplishment of it involves the relation of the act to the agent. Thus moral obligation involves both the relations. But the first relation is the primary factor, while the second relation is the derivative factor.  

Praśāñcāla kārṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ prathomam avagamyate.
Ayam ādyah sambandhaḥ pācātyaṃ kriyākārṣaṃ sambandhaḥ. NM., p. 247.
The Moral Imperative is an accomplished fact, and, consequently, cannot be brought into being by an act of volition. So the relation of the Imperative to the agent is not the relation of an act to the doer (kriyākārtyasambandha), or the relation of causation (bhāvanā) as Kumārila holds. It is a unique relation of a command to the agent commanded (pratisarṣa-sambandha). The former is a relation of causation, while the latter is a relation of revelation. Causation differs from revelation. The Moral Imperative is revealed by the unique relation of authoritative suggestion to the reason of the agent.\footnote{NM., p. 347.} It produces moral obligation in the self, which reveals the Moral Law through authoritative suggestion, but does not compel obedience. Moral obligation is of the nature of enlightenment or revelation of the Moral Law. It is of the nature of Ought, and not of the nature of Must. It is its own end, and not a means to any ulterior end or good. It does not interfere with the agent's freedom, and compel his will. It has intrinsic validity. It is the command and the object of the command.\footnote{Niyoga eva prerakāniyoga eva cānustheyaḥ. Na hi līṇādiyuktavākyena bhāvanā bhāvyāntaram apekṣate apūrvasya bhāvyasya svaśaiddhihitvat. NM., p. 349; PP., p. 5.} The Moral Imperative is a command revealed through moral obligation, an impersonal Law Communicated by a Vedic injunction. It is Dharma which cannot be known by any other means of knowledge.\footnote{Praśto nāma sā prerenaśa niyogasā vākyārthaḥ. Līṇ dharma hi niyogo vākyārthah sa dharma eva sa ca na pramāṇāntaragamyah. NM., pp. 348, 349.}

Prabhākara recognizes two kinds of duties, \textit{viz.}, conditional duties (kāmya karma) for the fulfilment of ends, and unconditional duties which are obligatory in themselves. Unconditional duties are obligatory daily duties (nitya karma) and obligatory occasional duties (nāmāntika karma). Both of them ought to be done out of the sense of duty (kāryatājñāna). They are authoritative because they embody Moral Imperatives (niyoga) indicated by Vedic injunctions. Their authoritativeness is not due to their conduciveness to any ulterior end or consequences. They ought to be performed for their own sake. Prabhākara is an exponent of rigorism in ethics.\footnote{PP., pp. 171-201; EH., ch. II; HP., pp. 288-94.}
Kumārila holds that the knowledge of an action as a means to the agent's good is an incentive to action. That ought to be done, which is conducive to good. What is repugnant to it ought not to be done. The Prābhākara criticizes Kumārila's view. A present action and a past action are conducive to one's good. But they are not what ought to be done (kārya). So what is accomplishable (kāryatā) is different from conduciveness to one's good (iṣṭasādhanatā). A voluntary action does not depend upon the mere knowledge of its conduciveness to the agent's good. It is done by an agent who ignores altogether its conduciveness to his good. This proves that duty is not determined by its conduciveness to good. Duty is what is aimed at by a volition. It is not what is accomplished by it. Desire is a cause of a voluntary action, but it is not indicated by a Vedic injunction. A voluntary action does not depend upon the knowledge of a desire. A desire is the cause of a voluntary action, but the knowledge of it is not its cause. The knowledge of what can or ought to be done (kārya) is an incentive to action. The knowledge of its being a means to one's good is not so. So a Vedic injunction enlightens us on a supersensuous Ought (Apūrva) or Duty (kārya).

Maṇḍana Miśra, a follower of Kumārila, criticizes Prabhākara's view of the Moral Imperative (niyoga). A mere command is not found in the world to be an incentive to a voluntary action. All persons are not impelled to act by it. But a subordinate command as to what is a means to the attainment of good, and what is a means to the avoidance of evil, is an incentive to action. This is known by some other pramāṇa than Vedic testimony. There is no person who issues commands in Vedic prescriptions. The Moral Imperative is not a means of knowledge of what are favourable to good and unfavourable to evil, because it is an object of valid knowledge. The knowledge of Niyoga is not a means of knowledge, because it apprehends it as its object. Further, a mere command is

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344 Kartur iṣṭābhyupāye hi kartavyam iti lokadbhiḥ. Viparitam tvakartavyam iti tadviṣaye tatāḥ. VDV., p. 302.
Putthaḥ neṣṭābhyupāyatvāt kriyāsvanyah pravartakah. VDV., p. 243.
343 Anyā kāryatā anyā iṣṭasādhanatā. Kāryatā hi na kṛtyadhīnásiddhiḥtrarṣaptā, kim tu kṛtīṁ prati pradhibhūtān sad yat tada dhinasattākam tat kāryam ucyate. PP., pp. 178, 179.
346 PP., pp. 178-79; TNR., p. 66.
not the cause of a voluntary action. So the knowledge of a command is useless.

Kumārila regards psychical causation (bhāvanā) initiated by an injunction as the cause of a voluntary action. An injunction produces two kinds of psychical causation, viz., śabdabhāvanā and arthabhāvanā. A moral law which impels the self to exert its volition is called śabdabhāvanā. It is called abhidhā bhāvana. It is the denotative power of an injunction, which moves a person to act. It is the causal activity of an injunction. The volition or activity of the self by which it executes the injunction is arthabhāvana. Śabdabhāvanā and arthabhāvanā accomplish the result which is conducive to the agent’s good. But Prabhakara regards the Moral Imperative (niyoga) or duty (kārya) as an incentive to action. It induces the self to act through moral obligation.

17. Apūrva.

The acts enjoined by the Vedas produce their fruits. The performance of the Jyotiṣṭama sacrifice produces happiness in heaven. The enjoined action is performed at one time. The fruition of the act follows much later. The Apūrva connects the act with its fruit. The performance of prescribed acts generates an unseen agency (apūrva) which produces their fruition at a later time. The deferred fruition of the performance of duties is due to the mediation of Apūrva. Kumārila posits Apūrva as a tertium quid between the prescribed acts and their deferred fruition. It is an imperceptible potency in the principal action, or in the self, which did not exist before the performance of the action. Before the prescribed acts are performed, there is an incapability in them for producing happiness in heaven, and there is an incapability in the self for attaining heaven. Both these incapacities are removed by the performance of sacrifices, which creates a

177 VDV., p. 105; NYK., p. 105; VDV., pp. 23, 60-61.
178 Puruṣapraṇātmako hi vidhiḥ śabdabhāvanā, NM., p. 343, Abhidhābhāvanām ātum avyām eva līñādayah. VDV., p. 15.
179 Śabdavyāpāraśca śabdabhāvanā. Puruṣavyāpāraścārthabhāvanā, NM., p. 343.
181 Taṇtravārtika, H.T., p. 504.
positive power (apūrva), by virtue of which heaven is attained. The imperceptible power called Apūrva is known by presumption. The hypothesis of Apūrva removes the apparent inconsistency between the performance of the prescribed sacrifice at one time and the attainment of heaven at a later time.\(^{318}\) The performance of the act produces directly a certain potency in the agent, which persists in him, and produces happiness in heaven after the death of his body. The causal relation between the prescribed act and its fruition cannot be explained without such an intervening potency, which is generated by the act in the self, and is the immediate cause of the final result. This view is similar to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that merit (dharma) is a subjective disposition of the self (ātmāsaṁskāra) generated by righteous acts. But Kumārila regards Apūrva also as an objective potency of the prescribed act itself (kriyā-śakti).\(^{327}\)

Prabhākara rejects Kumārila's view. A prescribed act, which is transient, cannot bring about its final result, the attainment of heaven, at a subsequent time. The Apūrva, or Ought, or Duty, which is different from the transient act, which is indicated by a Vedic prescription, and which is aimed at by a volition, generates the fruit. The volition is called bhāyanā, because it generates a voluntary action, which executes the Ought.\(^{328}\) The Moral Imperative (Niyoga) prompts the agent to put forth volition and exertion to accomplish the act. But it is difficult to explain how the Niyoga or Apūrva can lead the self to attain the final result of the prescribed act done by it without producing a potency or disposition in the permanent self. Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā says, "While Prabhākara appears to assume a Niyoga intervening between the action and something lasting that is produced in the agent, he does not call it a 'faculty' (disposition), but which comes to the same thing. In order to meet the difficulty, Sālikānātha has been forced to call in the aid of 'Fate'; he says that it is only when the Niyoga is aided by Fate, that it brings about the result".\(^{319}\) Sālikānātha thinks that the Niyoga produces an effect in the self in the form of a disposition which inheres in

\(^{318}\) PSPM., pp. 169-67.
\(^{318}\) Tantravārītika, H.T., p. 504; HH., p. 172. SD., p. 80.
\(^{318}\) FP., p. 197.
\(^{318}\) PSPM., p. 165.
it, and cannot be known by any other means of knowledge except moral obligation. The act is not permanent, but the self's disposition is permanent, which can bring about the accomplishment of the final result. 344

18. Liberation (Mokṣa).

Jaimini and Saṇvara enjoin the performance of duties as a means to the attainment of happiness in heaven. They do not attach any importance to the conception of liberation. Kumārila and Prabhākara consider the nature of liberation and the means of its attainment.

Kumārila regards liberation as negative in character, and, consequently, eternal. 341 If it be a state of positive happiness in heaven, it cannot be eternal. It is of the nature of negation, and therefore eternal. But negation cannot be the result of any action. Liberation is due to absolute extinction of merits and demerits. When they are completely destroyed, the body, which is the vehicle of experience, is destroyed. When no traces of them are left, no cause is left for the production of the body. 342 The self attains liberation on the destruction of the present body and the non-production of any future body. It is a state of absolute negation of all experience of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, impression, merit and demerit. It is the natural transcendental condition of the self free from empirical contents. It does not consist in enjoyment of happiness. If it did, it would be synonymous with heaven, and therefore perishable. Heavenly happiness is not eternal. When merit is worn off, it is succeeded by rebirth and bondage due to karma and connection with a body. Liberation is negation of this connection due to extinction of merits and demerits. 343

Pārthasārathi Miśra follows Kumārila in describing the nature of liberation. He does not conceive of it as cessation of the empirical world (prapañcavilaya), as the Advaita Vedānta holds, but as extinction of the relation of the self to the world (prapañcasambandhavilaya). The world binds the self through the body, the sense-organs and the external objects of

341 Na hyaḥbāvātmakarī muktvā mokṣanītyatvakāraṇam. SV., Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, 107.
342 Ibid., 105-9; NR.
343 Ibid., 105.
experience, which produce pleasure and pain in it. Release consists in the total destruction of this threefold bondage. It consists in the destruction of the present body, the sense-organs, and experiences of external objects, and the non-production of any future body, senses, and experiences. It can be brought about by completely wiping off all traces of merits and demerits acquired by past actions. Release is not a condition of self-luminous bliss, since it is not manifested in bondage. If it is said to be not manifested in bondage because it is overpowered, it means that self-luminous bliss is not manifested. But this involves self-contradiction, since what is by nature self-manifest cannot be unmanifested. If it be argued that bliss is non-existent in empirical life, and is produced in the state of liberation, then it must have a cause. Cognition cannot be the cause of its manifestation, because it depends upon the sense-organs which are destroyed in the state of release. It is a state of absolute negation of pleasure, pain and other experiences. It is devoid of the knowledge of the self. In it there is the existence of the self as a mere potency of knowledge, devoid of cognition and bliss. But Nārāyana Paṇḍita, a follower of Kumārila, regards the experience of bliss as release. The manas aided by the complete destruction of the body and the sense-organs is the organ of the experience of it. It is not produced by external objects. In bondage it is not experienced owing to the non-existence of the cause of the experience of eternal bliss (nityānanda). This view is opposed to Kumārila's view.

Kumārila regards action and knowledge both as necessary for the attainment of release. An aspirant for release should refrain from forbidden acts which produce suffering, and prescribed acts which generate happiness here and hereafter. But he should continue to perform daily obligatory and occasional duties in order to avoid sins which accruce from their non-performance.

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234 ŚD., p. 128.
235 Muktaśvātijñāṇasayābhāvo jānaśaktimārasyāvasthānāti śrutiā darśatam, tasmāni nihśambodho nirānandaśca mokṣaḥ. ŚD., p. 128.
237 Mokṣārthi na pravarṣe tatra kāmyanisiddhayoh. Nityanimitte kuryāt prayāvāyajñāsasya.

SV., Sambandhākṣepaparīhara, 110.
ends produce happiness on earth and in heaven. Forbidden acts generate sins and sufferings. They lead to transmigration and rebirth for the experience of the resulting enjoyments and sufferings. The knowledge of the self wipes off all traces of merits and demerits with the aid of the performance of obligatory daily and occasional duties, and prevents further accumulation of them. But mere knowledge of the self is not adequate to effect final release. It impels the self to perform enjoined duties. It must be accompanied by the performance of obligatory duties. Thus action and knowledge both are necessary for release.

Prabhākara describes heaven as unalloyed bliss free from pain. He defines release as the absolute cessation of merits and demerits and the consequent total destruction of the body. It is absolute cessation of the sufferings of empirical life consequent on the complete destruction of the self's contact with the body and the sense-organs, which are destroyed by the complete disappearance of merits and demerits. Prabhākara, like the Naiyāyika, regards consciousness as an accidental quality of the self, due to its conjunction with manas and a body. When manas, the body and the sense-organs are completely destroyed on the destruction of merits and demerits, the self is divested of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, and impression, and becomes unconscious. Release is absolute cessation of merit and demerit and the consequent pleasure and pain. It is negative in character, and consists in the complete destruction of the specific qualities of the self. Prabhākara agrees with the Naiyāyika in holding that release is the natural transcendental condition of the self free from empirical contents as an eternal and ubiquitous substance; that it is not a state of positive bliss, but a negative state of absolute extinction of pain.

The nature of release is the same according to Prabhākara and Kumārila.

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288 Karmaprayāttihetuvam ātmajñānasya lakṣyate. Ibid., 103.
289 SD., p. 103; MM., p. 89. (T.S.S.), 289 PP., pp. 102-103.
290 Ātyantiyakastu dehoccelho nibheṣadharmaḥ dharmaparikṣayaniḥ dhano mokṣaḥ. PP., p. 156.
291 Tayor ekāntochede/papagataheherediya-sanandhiḥ samutkhāta-nikhilasāṁsārika-dulokhhabandhano mukta ityucyate. PP., p. 156.
293 Śāṁsārikavividhahulokkhoparamarūpatvān mokṣasya. PP., p. 153.
294 NS., i, 1, 21, 22.
Prabhākara, like Kumārila, regards action and knowledge both as necessary for release. Abstention from all prescribed acts for the attainment of happiness, and from all forbidden acts for the avoidance of sins, and the performance of obligatory duties together with rigid moral discipline are the means to release. But action alone is not sufficient for the attainment of release. It must be supplemented by the knowledge of the self, which stops further accumulation of merit and demerit, and completely destroys the body, which is the vehicle of experience. Knowledge of the self is not subservient to action. Aided by sense-restraint, control of mind, sex-restraint, and other auxiliaries, it leads to release.282

IV. Theology.

19. Atheism.

The Mīmāṃsā teaches ritualistic morality and religion, and enjoins the performance of sacrifices to gods. But they are not objects of worship, and do not give the rewards of the offerings. The deities are only Beings to whom offerings are to be made, and who have existence beyond the spatio-temporal world. At the time of making an offering to a deity, a person has to think of his form. So the Mīmāṃsā believes in polytheism. But its belief in many gods is not serious, since they have no function. The later Mīmāṃsā denies their existence except in the mantras, and regards the references to them as mere praises of sacrifices. The performance of sacrifices generates an unseen potency (apurva) in the self, which generates their fruits without the intervention of gods. The Apūrva is the intermediate agency between the performance of sacrifices and the attainment of heaven.283 Heaven is unalloyed happiness for a long duration, which is terminated by the exhaustion of merits.284

Jainism does not refer to God. Prabhākara and Kumārila deny the existence of God. The Mīmāṃsā believes in polytheism but not in theism. It does not believe in the existence

282 PP., pp. 156-57.
283 SV., R.T., Introduction, p. xlv. PP., pp. 185-86.
284 PP., p. 184.
of God as the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world, or the apportioner of rewards and punishments, or the author of the Vedas. Its belief in many gods does not serve any useful purpose. They have no relation to the world and the finite souls. They are not organically connected with the Mimāṃsā system. Hence this system has rightly been branded as atheistic, though same regard it as theistic without sufficient evidence.

Kumārila and Prabhakara have a realistic and naturalistic view of the world. It is composed of atoms which are perceptible. External objects are real and permanent substances, which are not mere aggregates of qualities. A substance is permanent, though its qualities change. Kumārila rejects the notion of a substance as a self-identical unit devoid of difference. He advocates the doctrine of pariṇāmavāda or satkāryavāda, which regards an effect as a real modification of a cause. He regards the relation between cause and effect as identity-in-difference. He rejects the relation of inference between them. Kumārila and Prabhakara deny the existence of God as the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world, and periodical creation and destruction of the world. They believe in the constant process of its parts coming into existence and passing away without the intervention of God. Both deny the reality of God as the supervisor of merits and demerits of the finite souls, the apportioner of rewards and punishments, and the author of the Vedas and moral laws.

Kumārila offers the following arguments against the reality of God, which have already been mentioned and criticized by the Naiyāyikas. If God is the creator of the world, he must have a body. He cannot have desire to create without a body, since desire is produced by the contact of the soul with its manas and sense-organs. If God had a body before creation, it could not be created by himself, but by another God, whose body was created by another, and so on to infinity. If the body of God was eternal, it could not be material, since there

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89 Maxmiller: The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, Ch. V; IPM., Ch. III.
90 SV., Upamāna, 32-33.
were no earth and the like prior to creation. Again, if his body was material, it could not be eternal. If it was eternal, our bodies also must be eternal, since both are material. His body must have been produced by a cause, since it was composed of parts like our bodies. If God was the creator of his own body, then he created it without a body. But bodiless God, like a released soul, could not exercise any control over his body. Just as a jar is found to be made by an intelligent potter, who is perishable, so the body of God was made by an intelligent maker, who was perishable. If God had no body, he could not exert his will on the atoms. If he did not act on the unconscious atoms, they could not follow his will. The insentient atoms could not combine with one another, and form various substances under the guidance of the will of God. Similarly, they cannot separate from one another, and bring about destruction of the world under the guidance of the divine will.\(^4\)

Pārthasārathi Miśra offers the following antitheistic arguments. Bodiless God can have no knowledge, desire, and volition. He is devoid of the sense-organs, and, consequently, cannot have knowledge. His knowledge, desire and volition cannot be eternal, since all knowledge, desire and volition are found to be transient. The antitheistic argument may be stated thus: The earth and the like are not produced by a bodiless, intelligent agent, or by eternal knowledge, desire and volition, because they are effects, like a jar. If God’s body is supposed to be eternal, then gross earth, etc., are not effects, like the divine body. Grass, sprouts, etc., are not produced by an embodied agent.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that God creates the world out of the atoms with the aid of the finite souls’ merits and demerits, keeps them in abeyance during dissolution, activates them again at the time of creation, and creates the world in accordance with them for the souls' enjoyments and sufferings. Kumārila criticizes this view. All actions are destroyed with their effects, merits and demerits, when the world is destroyed. God cannot activate the finite souls’ merits and demerits at the time of the next creation. If he is omniscient and omni-

\(^4\) SV., Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, 45-49, 77-82, NR.
potent, he can create the world by his will without the aid of their merits and demerits. If he depends upon them for creation, he is not independent and omnipotent. If they are subject to the will of God, they are needless. Kumārila does not deny that the diversity of the world is due to the diversity of the souls' merits and demerits. But he denies the reality of God as the creator of the world. 832 Pārthasārathi Misra argues that the variety of effects cannot be due to the mere variety of the souls' merits and demerits (adṛṣṭa), but to the variety of perceived causes with the aid of the souls' merits and demerits. Palm trees can never grow without palm seeds in spite of the variety of the unseen agencies (adṛṣṭa). All effects cannot be produced by God's variety of powers without physical causes, since there is no evidence for it. 832

Kumārila argues that there is no evidence for God's creative activity. No one can testify to the creation of the world by God. The first creatures could not know how they were born. Nor could they know the state of things prior to the creation of the world by God. If they relied on the assertion of the Creator, they might be deceived. God might not create the world and yet tell them that he did so in order to show off his powers. So God cannot be regarded as the creator of the world. Similarly, there is no evidence to prove that God is the destroyer of the world. There is none to testify to the fact that he destroys the world. So God is neither the creator nor the destroyer of the world. 834

Further, God has no motive for creating the world. Compassion for living creatures could not be his motive, since there were no living creatures before creation, for whom he could feel compassion. Moreover, if he were moved by compassion to create the world, he would create only happy beings. But the world is full of suffering and misery. God, who is benevolent, cannot create so much suffering in the world. If he cannot create a world free from evil, he is not omnipotent. If he is omnipotent, he can certainly create a world free from evil. If he depended on moral laws and natural laws and

832 ŠV., Sambandhākṣepaparīhāra, 67, 72, 75, NR.
833 SD., pp. 116-17.
834 ŠV., Sambandhākṣepaparīhāra, 57-60, NR.
instruments, his independence would be compromised. If he created the world without a motive, then he is not intelligent. Even a fool does not act without a motive. If God created the world for amusement (kriḍā), he would not be perfectly happy and contented, and creation would involve him in wearisome toil. Pārthasārāthi Miśra argues that God is completely fulfilled (āptakāma), and cannot, therefore, realize any end in creation. If compassion is the motive for creation, it cannot be the motive for destruction. The same cause cannot produce contradictory effects,—creation and destruction. Hence God is not the creator or destroyer of the world.

God is not the author of the Vedas. Even if they were created by him, they are doubtful. They are not a sure proof for his existence. If they existed before creation, they could not be connected with the objects created. If they speak of creation as made by God, they are mere praises of certain injunctions about sacrifices. The Vedas are self-revealing, authoritative and eternal. They contain injunctions and prohibitions which embody positive and negative duties. God is not the author of the Vedas and the promulgator of moral laws. We can know dharma from the Vedas. Prabhākara agrees with Kumārila in regarding the Vedas as eternal and self-revealing. He regards the relation of words to the objects denoted by them as eternal, and rejects the notion of God as the creator of convention (saṅkilta).

Prabhākara argues that there is no evidence for the creation and destruction of the whole world at the same moment, though its parts are produced by the conjunction of their constituent atoms, and destroyed by their disjunction. All animals and men are born of their parents, and do not owe their existence to the intervention of God. Similarly, all things in the world are produced by their causes, and do not owe their existence to God. All effects are produced by their natural causes, and no supernatural causes are necessary for them.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argues that God is the supervisor of the finite souls' merits and demerits. They are unconscious,

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and so cannot produce their results without the guidance of a Being possessed of supreme intelligence. Omniscient God is the supervisor of the souls' merits and demerits. Prabhâkara urges that the finite souls may supervise their own merits and demerits. If they cannot supervise them because they have no knowledge of them, then God also cannot supervise them because he has no knowledge of them. He has no sense-organs through which he can perceive them. He cannot perceive them through manas, since it cannot perceive external objects without the aid of the external sense-organs. He has no merit and demerit which are the causes of a body, the sense-organs, and the contact of manas with the sense-organs. So he cannot perceive the souls' merits and demerits through the sense-mind-contact, and, consequently, cannot supervise them. His knowledge is not uncaused and eternal, since knowledge is always found to be caused and transient. So God's supervision of the souls' merits and demerits is unintelligible. He cannot supervise them without being related to them. His relation to them is either conjunction or inherence. It is not conjunction, since it holds between two substances only. God is a substance. But merits and demerits are the finite souls' qualities. There can be no conjunction between a substance and a quality. So there can be no conjunction between God and merits and demerits. Nor can there be inherence between them. Merits and demerits inhere in the finite souls, and cannot inhere in God, who is distinct from them. A carpenter's supervision of his tools consists in his contact with them. But God's supervision of the souls' merits and demerits does not consist in his contact with them. He cannot act upon their merits and demerits, because they are qualities, and so cannot supervise them. Hence God cannot create the world out of the atoms with the aid of the souls' merits and demerits.

It cannot be argued that God acts upon the atoms, even as the soul acts upon its own body by virtue of merits and demerits, because the atoms are not the body of God, on which he may act and create the world out of them. Even if God is supposed to have a body, his action on the body is due to volition. But there is no cause of his volition. If the divine volition were eternal, creation would be unceasing. Further, God cannot supervise the unconscious atoms, because he has no motive in
doing so. There is no need of a supra-mundane creator of the world. The existence of God is an unwarranted hypothesis.\textsuperscript{319}

The earlier Mīmāṁsakas did not believe in the existence of God, and regarded the world as self-existent and self-evolving. They looked upon effects as modifications (pariṇāma) of their causes under the influence of the finite souls’ merits and demerits, which are the supernatural agents in their production. They are otherwise due to purely natural causes. But the later Mīmāṁsakas smuggled the concept of God into the Mīmāṁsā system, and conceived him as the supervisor of the Law of Karma, the apportioner of rewards and punishments, and the Moral Governor of the world. Laugākṣi Bhāskara recognized the reality of God as the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world, the inner guide of the finite souls, and the Moral Governor. Vedānta Deśika brought the theistic tendency to the fullest development.\textsuperscript{319}

V

The General Estimate of the Mīmāṁsā System.

The Mīmāṁsā has made a great contribution to epistemology. Its theory of self-validity of knowledge, different kinds of valid knowledge, theories of error, Kumārila’s theory of cognizenedness or manifestation of objects and Prabhākara’s theory of triple perception show great philosophical insight. The six pramāṇas of Kumārila are adopted by the Advaita Vedānta.

Kumārila and Prabhākara have made a great contribution to the metaphysics of the self, though it is not quite satisfactory. Prabhākara regards the self as unconscious, and consciousness as its accidental quality. But if the self is unconscious in its essential nature, it is as good as matter. Moreover, if it is essentially an ego, it cannot be unconscious, since an unconscious ego or knower is self-contradictory. Prabhākara is right in holding that the self cannot be known as an object. Kumārila’s self is of the nature of potency of knowledge: But knowledge does not constitute its essence. This is an

\textsuperscript{319} PP., pp. 137-40.
\textsuperscript{319} Arthasastra-grha, pp. 1-2; Sākṣara Mīmāṁsā.
unsatisfactory conception of the self. It is wrong to hold with Kumārila that the self is an object of mental perception. The knower can never be a known object. Kumārila sometimes rightly describes the self as self-luminous.

Kumārila and Prabhākara's antitheistic arguments are similar to those of the Sāṅkhya, the Jaina, and the Buddhist. The Naiyāyikas, Vācaśpati Miśra, Udayana, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Gaṅgeśa have refuted them elaborately. The gist of their theistic argument is that unconscious matter without the direction and guidance of a conscious agent cannot produce the world governed by laws and full of unity, order and harmony. This argument is unassailable. To ascribe these to sheer chance is irrational, and to conceive nature as rational is to deify it.

The Mīmāṃsā adopts an empirical, naturalistic and pluralistic attitude towards the world. It regards the world as self-existent, which is neither created nor destroyed, though its parts are produced and destroyed by their natural causes. The Mīmāṃsā believes in the dualism of matter and soul, neither of which is reducible to the other. It does not advocate materialism or spiritualism. It does not consider matter as the sole reality, and the soul as material, or external objects as mere ideas of the finite souls. It advocates pluralism, and believes in the variety of physical objects and the plurality of the finite souls. It assumes that physical causation is regulated by moral causation or the Law of Karma. It does not explain the relation of the finite souls to the physical world, and how the Law of Karma regulates physical causation. It believes in the atoms of earth, water, fire and air, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which are the minutest perceptible particles, like the triads of the latter. The atoms are modified, according to Kumārila, into gross objects of different magnitudes, which are related to their causes by identity-in-difference. Prabhākara recognizes the relation of inherence, and adopts the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of Asatkāryavāda. He mentions inherent cause and non-inherent cause. Kumārila admits four kinds of negation, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, while Prabhākara rejects negation.

\[\text{PP.}, \ p. \ 52.\]
The Mīmāṁsā does not relate the finite souls to one another and to the world, assumes the impersonal Law of Karma to relate them to it, and rejects the notion of God as the creator of the world and regulator of the Law of Karma. Its belief in the Law of Karma, future life in heaven and hell, Apūrva, and eternity and authority of the Vedas are the supernatural elements in its metaphysics. Kumārila wrote Slokavārtika with the avowed object of making Mīmāṁsā orthodox, which was mostly regarded as materialistic. Later Mīmāṁsā adopted theism to comply with the demand of the people. The Mīmāṁsā metaphysics is a curious mixture of realism, naturalism, pluralism, supernaturalism, dualism and atheism.

The Mīmāṁsā morality and religion are ritualism and ceremonialism. Kumārila’s ethics is partly egoistic hedonism, partly supernatural legalism, and partly eudæmonism. His external and legalistic view of morality can never satisfy the human spirit. Prabhākara’s rationalism, formalism, and conception of duty for duty’s sake are equally unsatisfactory, though his conception of Apūrva as Ought or the eternal Moral Order is a great contribution to ethical thought. His analysis of volition, moral obligation, and moral imperatives shows keen psychological insight. The Mīmāṁsā conception of release as the transcendental condition of the self devoid of consciousness is unsatisfactory. But its doctrine of combination of action and knowledge of the self (jñānakarmaśamuccaya) with emphasis on control of passions, tranquillity of mind and sex restraint as the means of release strikes a right note.

Prāyenātva hi mīmāṁsā lokā lokāyatikṛtā.
Tām āstikapathe kartum ayaṁ yatnāḥ kṛto mayā. SV., i. 10.
CHAPTER XII

The Sābdika Philosophy.

Bhartṛhari (600-650 A.D.) propounds a philosophy akin to Saṅkara’s Advaitavāda, and posits Sabdabrahma (Logos) as the ultimate reality. There is one eternal principle of Sound which is the supreme Brahman (Para Brahman). It is manifested as knowing souls, known objects and experience. It is modified into the world of objects with the aid of time. Identity in Sabdabrahman is real, and plurality in it is imaginary. It creates the root sound Aum, which is modified into the manifold world. There are no cognitions devoid of words, and there are no words devoid of cognitions. Words are non-different from the objects denoted by them. Natural sounds, modified sounds or words, cognitions and objects are modifications of one eternal Logos (Sabdabrahma) or Sphoṭa, which is self-luminous. Distinctions of subjects and objects, cognitions, names and objects, are attributed to Sabdabrahma which is differentiated by avidyā. The Logos (Sabdatattva) is the Infinite Self devoid of avidyā. It appears as a finite self (jiva) subject to avidyā. The union (sāyujya) of the finite self with the infinite self is release. It is also said to be identity with Logos. It can be attained through Grammar or comprehension of the meanings of words purged of impurities. There is one letter-form (varṇasphoṭa) in the parts of a letter. There is one word-form (padasphoṭa) in the constituent letters of a word. There is one sentence-form (vākyasphoṭa) in the words of a sentence. There is one, eternal, self-luminous Sphoṭa or Sabdabrahma (Logos) underlying the empirical world of a plurality of finite selves and diverse objects. Bhartṛhari and his followers are called Sābdikas who propound a unique type of idealistic and linguistic monism, which can be traced to the Upaniṣads which declare the root sound Aum as Brahman.

1. The Sābdika Philosophy.

There is one eternal principle of Sound (Logos) without origin and end, which is modified into objects. The world is
a modification of Śabdabrahma. One undifferentiated Śabdabrahma is manifested as different objects with the aid of various powers of creating diverse objects. They are different from one another, but they are non-distinct from Śabdabrahma. The causal powers of Śabdabrahma are aided by the power of time (kālaśakti), and produce diverse objects with their six states of production, existence, modification, increase, decrease, and destruction. One eternal Logos devoid of sequence produces manifold effects with the aid of various creative powers which mature in course of time and produce diverse effects in succession. Difference of time is attributed to one non-temporal Śabdabrahma by its power of time. One Logos, the root of all beings, is manifested as knowing selves, known objects and experience. The Mahābhārata distinguishes between the supreme (Para) Brahman and Śabdabrahman, and declares that the former can be known through the latter. But Bhārtṛhari identifies them with each other, and maintains that Śabdabrahman creates Aum, then the Vedas, and then the world. All empirical objects are modifications of the root sound Aum. The world is a modification of the Vedas, which are created by Śabdabrahma. All objects are rooted in sounds and identical with them.

There are no ideas which are devoid of words. All ideas are known as accompanied by words. They appear to be interpenetrated by words. If cognitions were not attended with words, they would not be manifested. Words manifest cognitions. Cognitions are in the nature of words, which are manifested as cognitions in consciousness. Words are non-different from objects, which are their modifications. They are the

1 Anādinidhanah brahma śabdātattvam yad akṣaram. Vivartate'rtabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ. VPD., i. 1; BPR.
2 Ekam eva yad āmātāṁ bhinnaṁ śaktīyappāśrayat. Aṇṭhakṣeviś śaktībhyāṁ prthaktvam varītaṁ. Ibid., i. 2.
3 Ibid., i. 3.
4 Ibid., i. 2-3.
5 Adhyātiśatkālaṁ yasya kālaśaktim upāśritāḥ. Ibid., i. 3.
6 Tasmād arthaśīlah sarvāḥ śabdāmātṛasā niśritāḥ. Ibid., i. 4.
7 Āmśakṣaṁ saṁvājīvaṁ yasya ceyam anekadhiḥ. Bhoṅkrbhoṅkavārūṣena bhogarūpaṁ ca sthitih. Ibid., i. 4.
8 Tasmād arthaśīlah sarvāḥ śabdāmātṛasā niśritāḥ. Ibid., i. 119-120.
9 Nā so'asti pratyayo loke yah śabdārangamad rte. Aṃvihīdham īva iśānaiṁ sarvāṁ śabdāṁ bhāṣate. Ibid., i. 123.
10 Vāgrūpataḥ cennikrāmed avabodhāya śīśvati. Na prakāśaḥ prakāṣeta sa hi pratyavamarśini. Ibid., i. 124.
stuff of cognitions and objects denoted by them. There are no indeterminate cognitions devoid of names, and no objects undefinable by words. Their essential nature is constituted by words. All objects are distinguished from one another by their names. They are the media of acquiring knowledge in different sciences and acquiring skill in different arts. Different objects are known and used with the help of words. They are the media of communication of knowledge of them. Consciousness is never devoid of comprehension of words in all creatures. Their experience of external and internal objects is accompanied by inarticulate or articulate words. All persons impel others to react on objects by means of words. They react on different objects with the aid of cognitions and names of them, without which they become ignorant of them and incapable of reaction on them. They must recognize and classify different objects with the aid of their names. Then only they can react on different objects. In the waking condition an agent acts on different objects with the help of words. In dream also he acts on them with the impressions of words. In waking and dream states both Sabdabrahma (Logos) is modified into the experiencing subject (bhokta), the experienced objects (bhogya), and experience (bhoga). Words produce cognitions of objects, which are existent and non-existent. They attribute objects to cognitions. They are modified into cognitions and objects. Illusory cognitions of non-existent objects are created with the help of words. So the empirical objects are modifications of words. The empirical world is a modification of the eternal Sound (Sabdabrahma). The Logos is the Infinite Self devoid of avidyā. It is the finite self subject to avidyā. Release is the union (sāyuiya) of the finite self with the Infinite Self or Logos.

The use of empirical objects depends upon their names. The meanings of words can be understood through Grammar, which is the ground of all branches of knowledge. All classes of objects are known through the classes of words, which are

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16 Ibid, i. 124, 119, 120. 17 Ibid, i. 125.
19 Saśā sañcāriṇā sañcā sañjā śahirantaśca vartate.
20 Tanmātrām anatikrantam caitanyāṁ sarvajantaśu. Ibid, i. 126.
21 Ibid, i. 127. 22 Ibid, i. 128.
23 Toṣaḥ hyartha viṣdhiyate. Ibid, i. 129.
24 Ibid, i. 130. 25 Ibid, i. 131.
known through Grammar. So it is the foundation of all sciences and arts, and the royal road to release. Release is the intuition of the Self or Logos. So Grammar is the means to the attainment of release.

The pure light of Sabdabrahma devoid of all distinctions is hidden in the darkness of manifest sounds. Sabdabrahma is one, undifferentiated, self-luminous consciousness devoid of the impurity of Mayā or cosmic nescience. It remains hidden by the veil of manifest sounds. Sounds are of two kinds, natural (prakṛta) and modified (vaikṛta). Natural sounds manifest Spōṭa, which is not apprehended as distinct from sounds (dhvani). So Spōṭa is regarded as the root of sounds. Modified sounds spring from natural sounds, and do not manifest a Spōṭa. They produce a series of cognitions of sounds after Sadā is manifested by natural sounds. Spōṭa is manifestation. It is different from natural sounds and modified sounds, and known after they are transcended. Modified sounds are like darkness, since they do not manifest Spōṭa, while natural sounds are like light, since they manifest it. Spōṭa is Sabdabrahma which is devoid of distinctions. But distinctions are attributed to it by natural sounds, which are manifested by words. They appear to be reflected as images in Spōṭa or Sabdabrahma, after their proper meanings are comprehended, as red colour of a japa flower is reflected in a crystal.

There are three kinds of words: (1) Paśyanti Vāk; (2) Madhyamā Vāk; and (3) Vaikhari Vāk. Articulate words produced by the functions of the vital forces and composed of letters with a particular sequence are vaikhari vāk. The cognitions of articulate words conforming to their temporal order, which are not produced by the functions of the vital forces, are madhyamā vāk. The one, undivided, non-temporal, subtle, self-luminous, imperishable word is paśyanti vāk. It transcends external articulate words and internal cognitions or intermediate words. It is the supreme word (parā vāk) or Para Brahman.

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15 Ibid., i. 13, 15, 16. Yathārthajātavyah sarvāḥ sabdākrutinibandhanāḥ.
16 Tathāiva loke vidyānam eṣā vidyā parāyam. Ibid., i. 15.
17 VPD., i. 17, BPR.
18 Pratyastamitarudhāy yad vācā cāpati uttamaṁ
tathāvanīvatamāma iyotī śuddhāṁ vivartate. VPD., i. 18.
19 Vyaśtyālokatamaḥ prakāśāḥ yam upāśate. Ibid., i. 19.
20 Ibid., i. 29, 21.
The threefold word can be known through Grammar. An articulate word manifests a Sphoṭa. It consists of a number of sounds in succession. A Sphoṭa is devoid of succession. It is manifested by an audible articulate word. There are two kinds of words, a word-form (sphoṭa) which is manifested, and an articulate word (vaikhari vāk) which manifests it. A person utters a word in order to manifest a word-form to denote an object. An articulate word cannot directly denote it.

The relations between words and objects are natural. Some who follow the Purāṇas and recognize difference between a cause and an effect, admit difference between an articulate word (dhvani) and a word-form (sphoṭa). Others who recognize non-difference of an effect from a cause, hold that one word appears as a word-form (sphoṭa) apprehended by the internal organ, and as an articulate word (dhvani) perceived by the auditory organ, though they are essentially one. They do not admit intrinsic difference between them. An unmanifested non-temporal word-form (sphoṭa) is the cause of manifesting the meaning of a word uttered through the vocal organs, which denotes an object, even as fire within a piece of wood is the cause of manifesting light. An eternal, non-successive, pantless word-form (sphoṭa) existing in consciousness is manifested by an articulate word (dhvani) composed of successive letters. There is a relation of signifier (vācaka) and signified (vācyā) between an apprehended word and an apprehended object owing to non-difference between them because of convention (saṅketa) which is in the nature of superimposition of a meaning on a word. A perceived word has the power of denoting an object owing to this superimposition. A word-form (sphoṭa) existing in buddhi is devoid of temporal order or sequence. The articulate word (nāda) which manifests it is produced in succession. So a word-form manifested by an articulate word appears to have a temporal order. Though a word-form is one and eternal, it appears to be manifold and temporal owing to

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23 Vaikharyāḥ madhyamāyāca paśyantyāścaitad adbhutam. Ibid, i. 143; BPR.
24 Dvārupādānāśabdeṣu śabdau śabdavido viduḥ. Eko nimittam śabdānām aparārtthe praruyate. Ibid, i. 44.
25 Nityān abhāvahasmambhadhās intrāmnātā mahārbhiphiḥ. Ibid, i. 25.
26 Ibid, i. 45.
27 Ibid, i. 46; BPR.
28 Ibid, i. 47; BPR.
the superimposition of difference on it by an articulate word consisting of many letters produced in succession. A non-temporal word-form appears to be temporal, because the attribute of succession of an articulate word which manifests it, is superimposed on it, even as the image of the moon reflected in water appears to be moving owing to the attribution of motion of water to it. The sequence of an articulate word is attributed to a word-form (padasphoṭa) existing in buddhi, which is manifested by it. A word-form manifests itself and an object, even as a cognition manifests itself and an object. There are two kinds of sounds, non-temporal and temporal. A non-serial sound or word-form is in the mind, which is expressed in a serial articulate word in order to denote an object. So the former is the cause of the latter. Again, the serial articulate word is heard by a person, and comprehended by him as a mental non-serial sound. So an articulate serial word is the cause of a mental non-serial sound. Or, just as the form of a person consisting of parts is first known by parts and then known as a single whole, and the single partless and formless cognition is expressed in a picture of him consisting of parts, so a serial articulate word is comprehended as a non-serial idea, which is again expressed as a serial articulate word to denote an object. Just as a speaker fixes his mind on a word before speaking in order to denote an object, so a listener fixes his mind on a word in order to comprehend its meaning and know the object denoted by it. A word-form (sphoṭa) is necessary for communication of the meaning of a word, and for comprehension of its meaning. A word-form is expressed in an articulate word which denotes an object. An articulate word is comprehended through a word-form manifested by it. A word manifests itself and an object, even as light manifests itself and an object. A word does not manifest an object without being apprehended by the auditory organ. So it is an object of perception. It does not manifest an object by its mere being.

Nādasya kramajānmatvāt na pūrvo nāparaś ca saḥ. 49
Akrāmab kramarūpena bhedavān iva jāyate. Ibid, i. 48.
Pratibimbam yathā nyatra sthitam tovakriyāvaśāt.
Tatpravṛttim uvāceta sa dharma śphoṭanādavyoḥ. Ibid, i. 49.
Atmārūpam yathā jñāne jñeyarūpam ca drāyate.
Arthārūpam tathā sabde svārūpam ca prakāśate. Ibid, i. 50.
Ibid, i. 50; BPR. 41
Ibid, i. 52; BPR. 42
Ibid, i. 53; BPR. 43
Ibid, i. 55; BPR.
without being perceived.\footnote{Viśayatvam anāpanaṁ śabdāṁ nārthāṁ prakāśyate. Na sattayaṁ te'rthānāṁ agrītāḥ prakāśakāḥ. Ibid., i, 56.} If the intrinsic nature of a word, which is not perceived, produced the knowledge of its object, then a word uttered by a speaker but not heard by a listener would produce his knowledge of its object, and the listener would never ask the speaker about what he said. The sense-organs manifest their objects by their very existence, and not as perceived by the self. But a word manifests its object, when it is known. In this respect, there is a difference between words and sense-organs.\footnote{Ibid., i, 57; BPR.} Two powers of a word are perceived; they are the power of manifesting (grāhaka) and the power of being manifested (grāhya). There is non-difference between a power and an entity having the power. But difference is attributed to what are really non-different by the intellect. A word (saṁjñā) and an object (saṁjñin) signified by it are non-different from each other, though the former is a manifester (grāhaka) and the latter is manifested (grāhya). An object is a modification of Logos. A word also is its modification. Non-difference between them is essential, while their difference is accidental due to adjuncts (upādhi). There is no contradiction between their ontological non-difference and phenomenal difference.\footnote{Bhedenaśvagṛhitau dvan śabdadharmāvapoddhiyantau. Ibid., i, 58; BPR.} There are two kinds of words, viz., a word which denotes an object (pratyāyaka) and a word-object which is denoted by a spoken word (pratyāyya). A word which is uttered by a person denotes an object, but it does not fulfill any practical need. But a word-object which is denoted by a spoken word serves a practical purpose.\footnote{Yo ya uccāryate śabdo niyataṁ na sa kāryabhūk. Anyapratyāyane ūkṣṭaṁ na tasya prabhadhyate. Ibid., i, 61; BPR.} The uttered word 'fire' does not burn; but a fire which is denoted by it is perceived by the visual organ, and possessed of the power of burning. A spoken word is a qualification (gūpa) of the object-word denoted by it, and is not capable of executing any function, because it is a qualification.\footnote{Uccānaṁ paratantranvāt gūpaṁ kāryaṁ na vajīyate. Tasmāt indarthāṁ kāryaṁ sambandhaṁ parikalpyate. Ibid., i, 62.} Sometimes a speaker intends to convey identity of a word (saṁjñā) with the object...
(saṁjñin) denoted by it. 'This is Devadatta'. Sometimes a speaker does not intend to convey identity of a word with the object denoted by it, 'Devadatta is the name of this person'. The difference of an object from its name is known from the object itself.41 Some maintain that an individual word (agniśabda) is a name (saṁjñā), and that the genus of a word (agniśabdatva) is denoted (saṁjñin) by it. An individual word has priority and posteriority, and is capable of actions. A genus of a word related to an individual word is comprehended.42 Others maintain that the genus of a word (agniśabdatva) is a name, and that an individual word (agniśabda) is denoted by it.43 Some reject the hypothesis of the genus of a word (gośabdatva), and affirm the reality of an individual word (gośabda). According to them, where there are nine cows, each cow is indicated by the individual word 'cow' such as 'this is that'. Others affirm the reality of the genus of a word (gośabdatva), and maintain that the knowledge 'this is that' is due to the genus of the word 'cow' (gośabdatva), where there are many words 'cow'. They regard the genus of a word as a name (saṁjñā), and individual words as denoted (saṁjñin) by it.44 Some who maintain that sounds are effects and non-eternal, regard plurality of sounds as real, and identity of sound as metaphorical. Others who maintain that sound is eternal, regard oneness of sound as real, and plurality of sounds as phenomenal.45

Bhartṛhari admits the reality of a word-form (padasphoṭa) and a sentence-form (vākyasphoṭa). The same letter (a) occurs in different words (arka, aśva, artha, etc.). So oneness of a letter cannot be denied. The same word occurs in different sentences. So oneness of a word cannot be denied.46 A sentence-form (vākyasphoṭa) is a single whole devoid of parts, and expresses a single meaning. Words and letters, which are its parts, are unreal.47 This is Bhartṛhari's view.

41 Ibid, i. 67.
42 Svān rūpam iti kaś cit tu vyaktib saṁjñopadiśyate.
43 Vyakteḥ kāryāni samarṣṭā jātis tu pratipadyate. Ibid, i. 68.
44 Ibid, i. 69.
45 Ibid, i. 69; BPR.
46 Ibid, i. 70.
47 Padabhedēpi varpānām ekatvam na nivartate. Vākyasam padam ekam ca bhinnesāvyupalabhyate. Ibid, i. 71.
48 SV., Sphoṭavāda. VPD., i. 72; BPR.
The Mīmāṃsāka holds that a word is not different from its component letters, and that a sentence is not different from its component words. According to him letters constitute a word, and words constitute a sentence. Bhārtṛhari criticizes this view. There are no apprehended parts in letters or sounds represented by them. There are no apprehended letters in words. Words have no separate existence from that of a sentence. A sentence is real, while its constituent words and letters are unreal. The Sābdika regards a word or a sentence as a single indivisible whole which is not composed of many parts. A letter is a single indivisible whole distinct from its component parts. A word is a single whole distinct from its component letters. A sentence is a single whole distinct from its component words. Bhārtṛhari admits the reality of a letter-form (varṇasphoṭa), a word-form (padasphoṭa), and a sentence-form (vākyasphoṭa). There are two opposite schools of thought. Some regard letters as real, and a word as unreal; they regard words as real, and a sentence as unreal. Others (Sābdikas) regard a word as real, and the component letters as unreal; they regard a sentence as real, and the component words as unreal.

A sphoṭa is eternal and devoid of temporal order. But an articulate sound (dhvani) has sequence. A sphoṭa, which is manifested by an articulate sound, appears to follow its temporal order, though it is really non-temporal. The temporal order of an articulate sound is attributed to an eternal sphoṭa, without which it cannot be manifested. A sphoṭa is apprehended through an articulate sound (prākṛta dhvani) which is the cause of its manifestation. It does not appear to differ from articulate sounds which manifest it. Though a sphoṭa is eternal, it is not always apprehended, because its manifesting agents in the form of articulate sounds are absent, and not because it itself is absent.

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44 Pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣvavayavaḥ na ca. Vākyali padānām atyañtaraḥ praviveko na kaścana. Ibid, i. 73.
45 Nānekuvavayaḥ vākyan padān vā sphoṭaviśdīnām. Sphoṭasiddhi.
46 VPD, i. 73; BPR.
47 Ibid, i. 74.
48 Sphoṭasābhinakālasya dhvanikālānapātinaḥ. Grāmopānābhibhedaṁ vritibhedāṁ pracakṣate. Ibid, i. 75.
49 Ibid, i. 76.
50 Sphoṭatmā tair na bhidyante. Ibid, i. 77.
51 Saunseva sādhanābhāvācchabdo naivopalabhyate. SV.
There are three views as to why articulate sounds (dhvani) manifest a sphaṭa. Some maintain that the auditory organ is refined by articulate sounds (dhvani) in order to apprehend a sound-essence (śabda). Just as the eyes are refined by collyrium and the like in order to perceive visible objects, so the ears are refined by articulate sounds in order to perceive a sound-essence.68 Some maintain that a sound-essence itself is refined by articulate sounds, and apprehended by the auditory organ. Just as the smell of earth is intensified by water and perceived by the olfactory organ, so a sound-essence is refined by articulate sounds and perceived by the auditory organ.67 Others maintain that the auditory organ and a sound-essence both are refined by articulate sounds. Just as the visual organ and an object both are refined by light in the visual perception of an object,—the light of the eyes going out to the object, so both the auditory organ and a sound-essence are refined by articulate sounds in the auditory perception of a sound-essence.68 These are the three views mentioned by Bhartṛhari.68

He mentions three views as to the apprehension of articulate sounds (dhvani). Some maintain that an articulate sound (dhvani) and a sound-essence or sphaṭa are apprehended together, though they are different from each other,—a sphaṭa being eternal and an articulate sound being non-eternal and produced by the vocal organs, even as light and a post are apprehended together, though they differ from each other,—light being produced by the sun and a post being made of wood. They are not apprehended as different from each other.69 Some maintain that an articulate sound (dhvani) is not apprehended, but that a sound-essence (sphaṭa) is apprehended by the auditory organ. An articulate sound is conjunction and disjunction of air. Neither air nor air qualified by its conjunction and disjunction is perceived by the auditory organ. Though an articulate sound (dhvani) is not perceived, it is known from the apprehension of a sound-essence (sphaṭa). Its existence is assumed from the apprehension of a sound-essence.

68 Indriyasyaiva saṁskāraḥ saṁādhānājanādibhibh. Ibid, i. 79.
67 Viṣṇuṣvaya tu saṁskāraś tadgamadhapatipattaye. Ibid, i. 79.
66 Viṣṇuṣvayorīṣṭaḥ saṁskāraḥ sa kramo dhvanen. Ibid, i. 80.
69 Ibid, i. 78.
80 Sphaṭarūpāvibhāgema dhvaner grahaṇam īṣyate. Ibid, i. 81.
even as the existence of a sense-organ is assumed from the perception of an object. The existence of a manifester is known from the apprehension of a sound-essence, which is manifested by it. Others hold that a pure articulate sound (dhvani) unmingled with a sound-essence (sphoṭa) is apprehended by the auditory organ. The Śābdikas maintain that an articulate sound (dhvani) is neither air nor its conjunction and disjunction as the Mīmāṃsakas hold, but that it is a particular kind of sound (śabdavīṣeṣa); that both a sound-essence (sphoṭa) and an articulate sound (dhvani), the manifested sound and the manifesting sound, are perceptible through the auditory organ.

But how can articulate sounds (dhvani) manifest a sound-essence (sphoṭa)? The first articulate sound cannot manifest it, since then the second articulate sound will be useless. The aggregate of articulate sounds also cannot manifest it, since they are produced and destroyed and cannot exist simultaneously to form an aggregate. There is no aggregate of articulate sounds. But the last articulate sound aided by the cognitions of the preceding articulate sounds through their impressions (saṁskāra) distinctly manifest a sound-essence (sphoṭa). The preceding letters indistinctly manifest a sphoṭa. The succeeding letters make the manifestation more and more distinct. The last letter manifests a sphoṭa most distinctly. The sphoṭa is a single indivisible whole devoid of parts. Hence parts of a sphoṭa cannot be manifested by a series of letters in a word; each letter manifests it; the different letters of a word manifest a sphoṭa with different degrees of distinctness. A knower imagines sounds intervening between the production of an articulate sound (dhvani) and the apprehension of a distinct sound, through which he cannot apprehend the single indivisible sphoṭa; but he imagines that he apprehends it through them. He imagines parts of a letter in a letter, letters in a word, and words in a sentence. Just as a tree appears to be an elephant from a distance, and is perceived to be a tree when it is

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41 Kāścid dhvanir asaṁvedyaḥ. Ibid. i. 81.
42 Naiva vā grahaṇe teṣāṁ śabde buddhiṁ tu tādvaśāt. SV.
43 Svatastro'nyāb prakalpitaḥ. VPD., i. 81.
44 Vaiyākaraṇasya dvayaṁ dhvanīḥ sphoṭaśca, śrutaṁ vyanāgyam vṛṇjākam ca śrotarātyam. BPR., VPD., i. 81.
45 Nādaṁ āhitabājaṁ antyena dhvaninā sāha. Avṛttaparipākāyāṁ buddhau śabdo'vadhisṛyate. VPD., i. 84. Ibid. i. 83.
approached, so the false cognitions of letters and words are the conditions of the right apprehension of a sūkṣma.

Though a sūkṣma is one and partless, it appears to be different owing to the adjuncts (upādhi) of many articulate sounds (dhvani) which manifest it, even as consciousness, which is one and partless, appears to be cognitions of a jar, a cloth, etc., owing to its connection with the adjuncts of a jar, a cloth, etc. There is no real difference in a sūkṣma, but only an imaginary difference, just as there is no real difference in consciousness, but only an imaginary difference due to adjuncts. A single indivisible sūkṣma is apprehended by the cognitions of a letter-form (varṇasūkṣma), a word-form (pada-sūkṣma), and a sentence-form (vākyasūkṣma) manifested by parts of letters, letters, and words respectively appearing in succession. Just as a hundred is perceived through the discriminative intellect (apekṣā-buddhi) by comprehending one hundred units, though it is different from them, so a sentence-form is apprehended through many successive letters and words, though it is different from them. The articulate sounds (dhvani) which manifest a letter-form, a word-form, and a sentence-form are different. But they do not appear to be different owing to similarity. Parts of letters appear to be manifested in a letter. Letters appear to be manifested in a word. Words appear to be manifested in a sentence. But parts of letters do not exist in a letter, letters do not exist in a word, and words do not exist in a sentence. The cognitions of parts of letters in a single partless letter are illusory. The cognitions of many letters in a single partless word are illusory. The cognitions of many words in a single partless sentence are illusory. A sentence-form appears to be manifested as a series of letters and words at first when the series of articulate sounds (dhvani) are apprehended. But when the last articulate sound is apprehended, the sentence-form (vākyasūkṣma) is apprehended. In dim light a rope is perceived as a

44 Asatuṣṭaṇṭaraśle yaśchadbāṁ astiḥ manyate.
   Pratipatitum nākṣṭhāṁ sa grahanopāya eva saṁj.
   Ibid. i. 85.
47 Bhedānukāraṁ jñānaṁ vācaścācappalavo dhūrvaḥ.
   Kramopārthārūpā vāg jñānam jñeyavayaṁpaśrayam.
   Ibid. i. 86.
41 Ibid. i. 87.
43 Pratyekevaṁ vyaṇjakaṁ bhinnāṁ varṇavākyapadeṣu yaṁ.
   Teṣāṁ utyaṁtabhede pāśantikṛpā iva śaktayaḥ.
   Ibid. i. 88.
serpent. But in bright light it is perceived as a rope. The perception of a rope is valid, while that of a serpent is illusory. Similarly, the perception of a sentence-form is valid, while that of a series of articulate sounds is illusory. 70 Maṇḍanamiśra says, “Similar articulate sounds are the causes of the illusion”. 71 Just as there is a definite temporal order in the production of condensed milk from milk, and of a tree from a seed, so there is a definite temporal order in the articulate sounds manifesting a sphoṭa in the apprehension of it. 72 The Mimāṃsakas regard letter-sounds (varṇa) as all-pervading, eternal and devoid of sequence. But they maintain that articulate sounds (dhvani) appear in succession and manifest eternal letter-sounds. They regard a word as a collection of articulate sounds, and a sentence as a collection of words, and consider their meanings to be apprehended through a series of articulate sounds. They believe in a divisible sphoṭa (sakhaṇḍasphoṭa), which is manifested by a series of articulate sounds (dhvani). 73 But the Śābdikas believe in an indivisible sphoṭa, which is apprehended through a series of articulate sounds and words. 74 The Śābdika view is rational, because it does not violate the parsimony of hypotheses. The Śābdikas admit the reality of one indivisible sphoṭa or Sabdabrahma (Logos), which is manifested by intermediate articulate sounds which are not ontologically real, whereas the Mimāṃsakas admit the reality of many letter-sounds (varṇa) which are manifested by many articulate sounds (dhvani), and violate the parsimony of hypotheses. 75

Some maintain that the genus of a word, which is manifested by many individual letter-sounds, which are its non-eternal substrates and manifesting agents is a sphoṭa. It is the means of comprehending the object denoted by a word. 76 The genus of a word (śabdātva) has the power of denoting an object, even as the genus of an object (gotva) is denoted by a

70 Vyajyamāne tathā vākye vākyābhivyaktibhūthiḥ. Bhāgavagraharūpena pūrvam buddhīh pravartate. Ibid, i. 90. Ibid, i. 89.
71 Dhvanayāb sadṛśātmāṇa viparyāsaya hetavāḥ. Sphoṭāśiṣṭāḥ. VPD., i. 91.
72 Bhāgavatsvapi teṣveva rupabhedo dhvaneḥ kramāt. Ibid, i. 92.
73 Nirbhāgavābhyupāyō va bhāgabhedaprahalpanam. Ibid, i. 92.
74 BPR., i. 92.
75 Anekavakyabhbhyāgyā jātiḥ sphoṭa iti sūrya. Kaiścid vyaktaya evāya dhvanitvena prakalpitāḥ. Thūl, i. 93.
word. Though the genus of a word is eternal, it does not always denote an object, because non-eternal individual letter-sounds, which are its manifesting agents, are absent. Some regard individual sounds as a sūpa, and deny the reality of the genus of a sound (śabdatva). They regard an individual sound (a) as one and eternal. This view is wrong. If there is an individual sound (a) only, there can be no recognition of the same sound (a) in different words. The recognition 'this is that sound a' is due to the reality of the genus of the sound a (atva). Further, individual sounds cannot be eternal. The Śabdikas admit the reality of one eternal sound-essence (śabdatattva), and deny the reality of genera of words (śabdatva). Articulate sounds (dhvani) produced by the impact of the air impelled by efforts of the vocal organs are the causes of the apprehension of one, eternal, immutable sound-essence tinged with their characters, even as light is the cause of the perception of a jar related to and manifested by it, though it does not subsist in it.

But it is objected that manifestedness is pervaded by non-eternity; that jars and the like are manifested by light and non-eternal; and that sounds are manifested, and, consequently, non-eternal. If they are unmanifestable, then they are produced, because they are sometimes known. They are produced, and therefore non-eternal. Whatever are produced are non-eternal. Hence it is wrong to maintain that one eternal sound is manifested by articulate sounds.

Bhartṛhari refutes this objection. Manifestedness is not pervaded by non-eternity. There is no invariable concomitance between them, because eternal universals are manifested by the individuals which are their substrates. Hence manifestability which is not pervaded by non-eternity cannot prove non-eternity.

But it is objected that articulate sounds (dhvani) produced in the ear by the action of the vocal organs cannot manifest the

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18 Arthagatujāteḥ śākyatvam iva śabdāgatajāteḥ śāktatvam iti bhāvah. BPR., i. 93.
17 BPR., i. 93.
16 Avikārasya śabdasya nimittāir vikṛto dhvaniḥ. Upalabdhaḥ nimittatvam upaẏati prakāśavat. VPD., i. 94.
15 Na cātiṁyevaḥvāksīr niyamena vyavasthitā. Aśrayair api nityānāṁ jātināṁ vyaktiṁ īṣyante. VPD., i. 95.
internal sound-essence (śabda, sphoṭa) in the heart, the seat of the mind (antaḥkaraṇa), because the manifestener and the manifested are found to exist in the same place. The light of a lamp existing in a room manifests a jar existing in the same room but not some other room. Bharatṛhari refutes this objection. In this world corporeal objects of limited magnitudes are related to different places. But sound-essence is incorporeal and all-pervading, and so cannot be said to be related to different places and manifested by articulate sounds existing in them. But it may be argued, sound-essence (śabda) exists in ether enclosed in the heart, and an articulate sound (dhvani) exists in ether enclosed in the ear. This argument is not valid, because ether being one their difference of places is due to their adjuncts (upādhi) giving rise to illusory knowledge of difference. Further, the articulate sound (dhvani) goes to the heart through the ear, and sound-essence (śabda, sphoṭa) exists in the heart; they exist in the same place. Hence the objection is baseless.**

But it is objected that a manifesting agent (vyañjaka) and a manifested object (vyañgya) are not found to be uniformly related to each other, though a cause and an effect are found to be uniformly related to each other. The light of a lamp manifests a jar, a cloth, or any other object. If an articulate sound (dhvani) and a sound-essence (śabda, sphoṭa) were uniformly related to each other as a manifestener and a manifested object, then the sound a would not always be produced by the throat, and the sound ca would not always be produced by the palate. But they are uniformly produced by different vocal organs. So an articulate sound is not the manifestener of a sound-essence, but its generating cause. There is the cause-effect relation between them. Bharatṛhari refutes this objection. There is a uniform relation between an articulate sound (dhvani) and a sound-essence (sphoṭa) as a manifestener and a manifested object, even as there is a uniform relation between a sense-organ (grahaṇa), e.g., the visual organ and a perceptible object (grāhya), e.g., a colour. The sound-essence a is uniformly manifested by an articulate sound produced by the exercise of the throat. Hence there is a

** Deśādhibhiṣaśa sambandho drṣṭah kāyavatām iha, Deśabhchedavikalpe'pi na bheda dhvanisabdāyoh. Ibid., i. 96.
uniform relation between an articulate sound (dhvani, nāda) and a sound-essence (śabda, sphoṭa). 43

Another objection is raised by the opponent. There is no uniform relation between an apprehending sense-organ and a perceptible object. The visual organ composed of light perceives the colour of homogeneous light and those of heterogeneous earth and the like. The gustatory organ composed of water perceives the taste of homogeneous water and that of heterogeneous earth. The tactual organ composed of air perceives the touch of homogeneous air and those of heterogeneous earth and the like. Thus colour, taste and touch are perceived by heterogeneous sense-organs. But the olfactory organ made of earth perceives the smell of homogeneous earth, and the auditory organ composed of ether perceives the sound of homogeneous ether. There is no uniform rule as to the perception of an object by a homogeneous sense-organ. So there should be no uniform rule as to the manifestation of a sound-essence by an articulate sound produced in the auditory organ. Hence sound is not manifested but produced and so non-eternal. Bhartṛhari criticizes this objection. The smell of earth is always perceived by the homogeneous olfactory organ made of earth. There is a uniform rule as to the manifestation of a specific object (e.g., the smell of kuśkum) by a specific manifesting agent (e.g., ghee of cow milk). Hence a sound-essence is manifested by an articulate sound. 44

Another objection is raised by the opponent. Though the manifesting agent is increased or decreased, the manifested object is not increased or decreased. A jar is manifested by the light of a lamp. If it is manifested by a thousand lamps, it does not become many. But a manifested sound-essence (sphoṭa) is increased or decreased by the increase or decrease of a natural sound which manifests it. One sphoṭa is cognized as a jar, a cloth, and the like. It becomes many when the manifesting sounds are many. So a sphoṭa is produced and non-eternal, because it is devoid of the characters of a manifested object. Bhartṛhari criticizes this objection. A mani-

44 Saḍṛṣaghraṇānām ca gandhādhnām prakāśakam. Nimittau niyatām loke pratidravyam avasthitam. Ibid, i., 98; BPR.
fested object acquires plurality, increase, decrease and other attributed characters of its manifesting agents. One sun becomes many suns when it is reflected in many mirrors or pots of water. So one sūkṣma appears to be many sounds owing to the plurality of the manifesting sounds. The image of a long sword appears to be long, and that of a crown appears to be short. So a sūkṣma appears to increase or decrease owing to the increase or decrease of the manifesting sounds. It does not affect the manifestation of a sūkṣma by natural sounds.**

Bhartṛhari regards a letter-form (varṇa-sūkṣma), a word-form (padasūkṣma), and a sentence-form (vākyasūkṣma) as devoid of temporal characters, but he considers them to be apprehended as endowed with the temporal characters of the natural sounds (prākṛta dhvani) manifesting them, which are attributed to them. The temporal characters of natural sounds do not affect the non-temporal nature of the sound-essences (sūkṣma). But their manifesting sounds exist for shorter or longer duration. The letter-forms (vargasūkṣma) are eternal, and cannot exist for a short or long duration.** A manifested object appears to acquire the characters of its manifesting agent, which are attributed to it. The temporal characters of modified sounds (vaikṛta dhvani) produced by natural sounds (prākṛta dhvani) are not attributed to letter-forms (varṇa-sūkṣma). But they are the causes of the temporal ordering of external sounds, and so the causes of the apprehension of sound-essences (sūkṣma).**

Some maintain that sūkṣmas are effects which are non-eternal. They regard the sound that is first produced by the vocal organs through conjunction and disjunction of air as a sūkṣma. They regard the other sounds which are produced by a sūkṣma as dhvanis. What is called a natural sound (prākṛta dhvani) by the Grammarians is called a significant sound (vācaka śabda) by the Naiyāyikas. What is called a modified sound (vaikṛta dhvani) by the former is called a dhvani by

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**Prakāśakānāṁ bhāvānāṁ prakāśyovṛtho nuvartate.
Tisodakādibhede tat pratyakṣaṁ pratibimbake. VPD., i. 99; BPR.
Tasmad abhinakaleṣu varṇavākyavadādīṣu.
Vrittikālaṁ svakālāscā nādahēdād vibhāvyate. VPD., i. 101; BPR.
**Ibid., i. 101; BPR.
**Yāh saṁyogavibhāgābhāsyāṁ karuṇāṁ upajanyate.
Sa sūkṣma śabdajāṅ śabdā dhvanyo'nyair udāhṛtaḥ. VPD., i. 102.
the latter. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that a sound is produced in a region of ether by conjunction (e.g., conjunction of a stick with a drum) or disjunction (e.g., disjunction of a bamboo into two parts), which produces another sound as its non-inherent cause, and so on, till the last sound reaches the ear, and is perceived. The sound of the drum appears to be heard, but really another sound indirectly connected with it causally is actually perceived. The advocates of the view that a sound produced by conjunction or disjunction of air is a sphoṭa, and that sounds produced by a sphoṭa are dhvanis, regard the former as devoid of shortness or length of duration, and the latter as possessed of these temporal marks. A sphoṭa is an incorporeal sound devoid of small and large dimensions. But a series of sounds produced by it increase and decrease in dimension. The first sound which manifests a sphoṭa is called a natural sound (prākṛta dhvani). The second sound produced by a natural sound is called a modified sound (vaikṛta dhvani). Causal sounds have different powers of producing a series of sounds. Striking an iron vessel produces a series of sounds which are confined to a proximate place. But striking a drum with a stick produces a series of sounds which spread to a distant place.

Some thinkers who regard sounds as non-eternal maintain that a sphoṭa is produced with a sound (dhvani) as a lamp is produced with its light, and that a dhvani is perceived from a distance without its sphoṭa, even as the light of a lamp is perceived from a distance without the lamp, but that in the sounds of bells the difference between a sphoṭa and nāda or dhvani is distinctly perceived. Some Naiyāyikas maintain that sounds are produced successively as waves; that the conjunction of a stick with a drum produces a small sound wave, which produces a bigger sound wave, and so on, till the last sound wave reaches the ear, and is heard. This doctrine is called vicitarāṅganyāya. Other Naiyāyikas maintain that sounds are produced simultaneously in all directions by a sound, which again produce other sounds simultaneously in all directions, till the last series of sound reach the ear and are heard. This doctrine is called kadambakorakanyāya. The advocates of

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47 VPD., i. 102; BPR. 48 VPD., i. 104; BPR. 49 Ibid., i. 103; BPR. 50 VPD., i. 104; BPR.
non-eternity of sounds maintain that the conjunction of airs with
the throat and other vocal organs produces vibrations in the
air, which produce a series of other vibrations, and that when
the vibrations cease, modified sounds (nāda) are produced,
which are the causes of the functions of shortness and length
of their durations. They maintain that temporal marks are
the real attributes of sounds, which are not attributed to them,
while the advocates of eternity of sounds maintain that these
temporal marks are attributed to them, which really characterize
produced sounds (dhvani). Others maintain that even when
vibrations of air continue to exist, other modified sounds
(vaiṅkṛta dhvani) are produced by a sphiṭa, even as a flame is
produced by another flame. There is a difference between the
two views mentioned here. According to the first view modified
sounds are produced when vibrations produced by the first
sound cease, whereas according to the second view they are
produced when vibrations continue to exist.

Bhartrihari mentions three other views as to the nature and
production of sounds. Some regard them as modifications of
the air. Some consider them to be modifications of atoms.
Others regard them as modifications of cognitions.

The author of Paṅiniśikṣā maintains that vital airs impelled
by the efforts of a speaker strike his vocal organs, and are
modified into articulate sounds. He says, "The mind strikes
the bodily fire, which impels the vital air, which moves upward
from the navel, is struck by the brain, moves downward to the
mouth, and is modified into an articulate sound." Vyāsa says,"The auditory organ perceives a modification of modified
sound (dhvani) only." Vācaspatri Miśra says, "An articulate
sound (dhvani) is a modification of the vital air (udāna) struck
by the vocal organs; or, it is a modification of ether limited
by the impact of such vital air." Nāgojiḥaṭṭa also regards
articulate sounds as modifications of airs. Airs being impelled
by the volition of a speaker and struck by blowing a conch-
shell or a flute are collected together and modified into arti-

"VPD., i. 105; BPR." "Ibid., i. 105; BPR.
"Ibid., i. 106." "Ibid., i. 106; BPR.
"Vāyor anūnām jñānasya śabdavaiḥpattir āyate." "Ibid., i. 107.
"Ibid., i. 106." "BPR., i. 106, 115.
"Bhāgya, YS., iii. 17." "Tattsvaṭṭāvārādhi, YS., iii. 17."
culate sounds. The vital air produces velocity and loose conjunction, and through them generates conjunction and disjunction of the throat, the palate and other vocal organs, and is modified into articulate sounds.

The Jainas maintain that the same kinds of atoms, which are capable of producing all effects by conjunction and disjunction are modified into light and shade, darkness and sound. The same kinds of atoms are modified into different kinds of effects (e.g., light and shade) owing to their different conflicting powers. But though the atoms are eternal, they are not always modified into sounds. They are impelled by the volition of a speaker in order to communicate his ideas to another person, are integrated like clouds, and modified into articulate sounds. They are called sound-atoms because they produce articulate sounds by integration. Sounds are modifications of the atoms of matter.

Patañjali, the author of Mahābhāṣya, regards sounds as modifications of cognitions (jñāna). The Sābdikas regard the internal organ or mind with its modes existing in the heart in the form of a subtle, unmanifest sound as the finite self (jīva). It is modified into manifest, articulate sounds in order to reveal its inner nature to another person. A speaker can communicate his ideas to others through articulate sounds, which are mere modifications of ideas. This is the view of the Grammarians.

Cognitions are modified into articulate sounds in the following order. The internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) is turned into the mind (manas) with a view to exerting its will, is heated by the fire in the stomach, and enters into the vital air, and strikes it. Then the vital air is impelled by the mind with its mode of volition to move upward. Then the vital air being impelled by the mind with its volition is modified into an articulate sound with the fire of the stomach. The vital air being impelled by the mind with its volition manifests its knots in the form of letter-sounds (varṇa) through

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106 Ibid, i. 106.
109 Ibid, i. 100.
108 Svasaktau vyajamānāyām prayatnena samūrthā. Abhrātiva prācyante sābdakhyāḥ paramānāvah. 
110 Ibid, i. 111; BPR.
111 Athāyam antaro jñātā sūkṣmavīgātmāna śhitāḥ. Vyaktaye svasya rūpasya śabdātvena vivartate. 
112 Ibid, i. 112; BPR.
113 Ibid, i. 113.
114 Ibid, i. 114.
different kinds of audible sounds (dhvani), and is reabsorbed in them (varṇa). The modification of the vital air conjoined with the mind with its volition into an articulate sound amounts to the modification of a cognition (jñāna) into a sound.\textsuperscript{106} Or, the subtle sound, which exists as a subjective volition, and is not perceived owing to its subtlety, is modified into an articulate sound when it reaches the auditory organ owing to the effort of a speaker, even as the atoms of air which exist everywhere but are not perceived until they are gathered together by the motion of a fan. So an internal subtle sound or volition is modified into an external manifest sound.\textsuperscript{107}

Bhartṛhari describes his view thus. The power of an internal volition or subtle sound, which exists in the mind with its volition to be modified into external audible sounds, is modified into external audible sounds with the aid of the activity of the vocal organs.\textsuperscript{108} Thus a cognition (jñāna) is modified into an audible sound.

The Sāmkhya regards sounds as modifications of sattva, rajas and tamas. The Vaiśeṣika regards them as attributes of ether. The Laukika regards them as nādas which are different from letters (varṇa). The Buddhist thinks that words denote negations of contraries (apoha). The author of Pāṇiniśikṣā regards sounds as modifications of airs. The Grammarian (Sābdika) regards sounds as letter-forms, word-forms, and sentence-forms, or sound-essences (sphoṭa). The Jaina regards them as modifications of the atoms of matter. Kumārila mentions these views in Ślokaśārtika.

2. The Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Criticism of the Sābdika doctrine.

Sāntarakṣita describes the Sābdika doctrine thus: Sahadabrahma without origin and end is Para Brahma, which is modified into all objects.\textsuperscript{109} It is the source of all thoughts, words and objects. All thoughts are accompanied by words, and are the means of knowing the nature of objects. Therefore objects,

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., i. 115.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., i. 116.
\textsuperscript{108} Taśya prāṇe ca yā śaktir yā ca buddhau vyavasthitā. Vivartamānā sthāneṣu saśā bhedāḥ prapadyate. Ibid., i. 117; BPR.
\textsuperscript{109} TS., 128.
cognitions and words are modifications of Śabdabrahma (Logos). 110

Sāantarākṣita criticizes the Śābdika view. Śabdabrahma either abandons its intrinsic nature or sound-form to be modified into objects or does not do so. If it abandons its nature, it ceases to be imperishable because its pristine nature is destroyed. If it does not abandon its intrinsic nature, then even a deaf person will hear sounds while he perceives 'blue' and other objects, since the cognition of sound will be non-different from that of 'blue'. If it is not so, then sound-form (Śabdabrahma) is not the essence of 'blue', etc. The Śābdika admits that all objects are primarily sound-form. Then unless Śabdabrahma abandons its sound-form, it cannot be modified into objects since modification implies change of form. If 'blue' and other objects are primarily of the sound-form, then when they are perceived, their sound-form should be perceived. If their sound-form is not perceived, 'blue' and other objects should not be perceived since they are identical with each other. If they have different properties, then they are absolutely different from each other. Difference of numerous things is indicated by their possessing incompatible properties. Otherwise no difference can be assumed among diverse objects. If Śabdabrahma is imperceptible because it is extremely subtle and imperceptible, then 'blue' and other objects also will be imperceptible because they are essentially of the sound-form. If one sound-essence be said to differ in different objects, then all objects will occupy the same point of space, and be perceived by the same cognition, since they are manifestations of the same sound-essence, and they will also occupy the same time, and have the same modification, activity and causation. If the sound-essence does not differ in different objects when it is modified into them, then also all objects will occupy the same point of space. If the sound-essence differs in different objects, then Śabdabrahma becomes many, since it has diverse nature in different objects. If all objects are of the nature of eternal Śabdabrahma, then they also are eternal. If they are produced simultaneously, there will be no modification of Śabdabrahma into diverse objects. Simultaneous production

110 TSP., 128.
and successive modification are incompatible with each other. Modification implies change of form. A cause abandons one form and assumes another form in being modified into an effect. What is devoid of succession cannot be modified. Eternal Šabdabrahma cannot be modified into diverse objects. If the world were an effect of Šabdabrahma then eternal and immutable Šabdabrahma would produce all objects simultaneously, and there would be no sequence in the production of objects. If the causal efficiency of a cause were not obstructed by counteracting conditions, it would produce its effects all at once. It produces its effect successively owing to auxiliary conditions. But Šabdabrahma does not require the assistance of auxiliary conditions. If Šabdabrahma has one essential nature, it cannot be modified into diverse objects. In order to be modified into them, it must enter into their nature. But Šabdabrahma of essentially one form cannot enter into diverse objects and be modified into them. A jar, a pitcher, and other earthen vessels are permeated by the common character of clay and distinguished from other things which are of the nature of non-clay. Here the common nature of clay is perceived in them. But 'blue', 'yellow' and other objects cannot be said to be permeated by sound-form (śabdabrahma), because their common sound-character is not perceived, and they are not distinguished from objects which are not of the nature of sound. So Šabdabrahma is not the common form of different objects.  

The Sābdika may argue that one indivisible and immutable Šabdabrahma is the ontological reality, which is not really modified into diverse objects but appears to be manifold owing to avidyā. Śantaraksita criticizes this view. If Šabdabrahma is really one and undifferentiated but appears to be differentiated into manifold empirical objects owing to avidyā, there is no means of knowing one uniform Šabdabrahma in manifold objects. Blue, yellow and other objects with their specific natures are perceived, which are the basis of actions to attain good and avoid evil. But their common sound-essence (śabdabrahma), which is different from their diverse specific natures, is not perceived. So even persons, who are free from avidyā,
cannot perceive one Sadabrahma in diverse objects. Their knowledge cannot be illogical. One undifferentiated Sadabrahma is not perceived. Nor can it be inferred from its effects or characters. Since it is eternal, it cannot produce effects successively. Since it is immutable, it cannot be modified into effects. Since it is not proved to be a substrate (dharmin), it cannot be inferred from its characters (dharma). There is no other probans from which its existence may be inferred.\textsuperscript{114} Sadabrahma is said to be light, consciousness and sound. But such Sadabrahma is never perceived. When we look at 'blue' and other objects with an inattentive mind, we have indeterminate perception of them devoid of names. One undifferentiated Sadabrahma is not known by indeterminate perception. It cannot be inferred from its effects or characters. Diverse objects are said to be accompanied by sound-forms. But such association has not been proved, and is false. So it cannot prove the existence of Brahman being of the essence of sound. Nor can the existence of Sadabrahma be proved by the scripture, since it is not valid.\textsuperscript{114}

A series of cognitions as effects following the order of objects is inferred from them as their causes. Otherwise all cognitions would appear simultaneously as effects of objects. One non-serial pure cognition (jñānamātra) cannot be proved, since it is incapable of producing effects. Even the Yogins cannot perceive one eternal cognition (sadbabrahma), since they have no cognition which acts on Sadabrahma and apprehends it. If they perceive Sadabrahma as their own self in the form of self-luminous light of consciousness, then it being always the light of consciousness they cannot have a non-mystic state, and all will be liberated without any effort. But one Sadabrahma is said to appear to be diverse owing to avidyā. This argument is wrong. Sadabrahma is the only reality. There are no other 'chains' (santāna) to whom it may appear to be diverse. But Sadabrahma may be said to appear, by itself, to be diverse. In that case, there can be no liberation. If Sadabrahma is always of the nature of self-luminous light of consciousness, it cannot appear to be manifold owing to avidyā. If avidyā exists in eternal Sadabrahman, it can never be

annulled and lead to release. If avidyā is distinct from Śabdabrahma, it cannot produce any peculiarity in it, and make it appear to be manifold. So owing to the absence of any relation of avidyā to Śabdabrahma, there can be no saṁsāra. Avidyā cannot be said to be neither existent nor non-existent, but different from both, since things must be either existent or non-existent. The argument that avidyā being a non-entity makes Śabdabrahma appear to be manifold is not valid, since a non-entity is incapable of producing any effect. Śabdabrahma being one and eternal, it cannot have two states, avidyā and release. Further, it being one, the release of one would lead to the release of all, and the bondage of one would mean the bondage of all. Furthermore, in the non-mystic state there is nothing to prove that Śabdabrahma is of the nature of the light of self. If it is not so in the non-mystic state, it cannot acquire this state in the mystic state. Hence the Śābdika doctrine of Śabdabrahma is unwarranted and irrational, and the world is not a modification of it.118

The Nyāya criticism of the Śābdika denial of indeterminate perception has already been given.118 Jayanta describes Bhaṭṭarṭhari’s Śabdādvaitavādā thus. There is one eternal Śabdabrahma that appears to be many different objects owing to the adjunct of avidyā. When avidyā is annulled, one Logos manifests itself in its real nature.117 All cognitions are associated with names. All objects are modifications of names or sounds, which assume their forms. All cognitions and objects are modifications of Śabdabrahma.118 Jayanta criticizes this doctrine. First, indeterminate perception apprehends an object unqualified by its name or a pure object (śuddhavastu), which is denied by the Śābdika. Determinate perception presupposes indeterminate perception of its object devoid of a name. It depends upon the recollection of a name, which depends upon previous perception of it. It presupposes indeterminate perception of a pure object and its association with a name pointed out by an elderly person. Second, even determinate perception does not apprehend an object as identical with its name.

116 TS., 149-52; TSP., 150-51.
117 Ante, p. 474.
118 Śabdabrahmedam ekam evidyopādhidarśitavicitrabhedam avidyoparame vsthāvasthitarupabh prakāśate. NM., p. 532.
118 Śabdādvivarta evāyaum arthaḥ. Śabdoumeśaprabhāvapraptapraκāśa-svabhāvatvāt sarvapratyāyānām. NM., p. 532.
It apprehends the same object as is perceived by indeterminate perception. Only it apprehends it along with its name. It does not apprehend the object as qualified by its name, because the former is apprehended by the visual organ and the latter is apprehended by the auditory organ, and the object as qualified by its name is not apprehended by the manas. Third, a name is a means (upāya) of manifesting or expressing an object (upeya). The means can never be identical with its end.\textsuperscript{119} Colour is manifested by a lamp or an eye. But neither of them is identical with colour manifested by it. So a name, which manifests an object, is never identical with it. It is different from the object denoted by it. Fourth, an object, a name, and a cognition are different from one another. A cow has a dewlap and other parts. The name ‘cow’ consists of its constituent sounds. The cognition of a cow is formless and partless. So they are different from one another. An object is external to, and independent of, its apprehending cognition. A name is a sound produced by the vocal organs. A cognition is a quality of the self. An object is apprehended by a cognition, and expressed by a name. A cognition is expressed in a name. They are different from one another in their nature.\textsuperscript{120} Fifth, a name is perceived through the auditory organ here. But an object denoted by it is perceived at a distance through the visual organ. They are perceived in different places through the different sense-organs, and, consequently, cannot be identical with each other. Sixth, a name cannot be held to appear as an object, even as a shell appears as silver, because of their possessing similarity of form (ākārasārūpya). A shell and silver have similarity of form. But a name and an object have no similarity of form. They are absolutely different from each other. Therefore the form of one cannot be attributed to the other; nor can there be mutual superimposition on each other. The illusion of silver in a shell is contradicted by the perception of the shell. But the illusion of an object in a name is not contradicted by the perception of the name. Both a name and an object are apprehended by valid perceptions, and have real existence.\textsuperscript{121} Seventh, Sadabrahma cannot create the

\textsuperscript{119} Na kuryāvād abhinnavāh tadupēyasya yujyate. NM., p. 533.

\textsuperscript{120} Vastutas tu vivikta evaiti śabdajñānārthāh. NM., p. 533.

\textsuperscript{121} NM., p. 535
world, because sound is unconscious. But God can create it, because he is conscious. Sound is not the cause of the world like atoms, because it is an effect since it consists of parts arranged in a particular order. If Šabdabrahma is all-pervading and conscious, then it is not different from God. Eighth, the Mahābhārata says, "There are two Brahmans, Šabdabrahma and Para Brahma. One who knows Šabdabrahma thoroughly, can know Para Brahma." This contradicts monism. Para Brahma is adequate to explain the world, and the assumption of Šabdabrahma is needless. The former is real, whereas the latter is imaginary. This conception saves monism. Last, sound (śabda) cannot be regarded as the only reality, and plurality of objects as mere phenomenal appearances, which are mere constructions of avidyā. Monism, in any form, cannot adequately account for the world. Objects are different from one another, and have different intrinsic natures. They are real existents that are denoted by names, which are modifications of sounds. Thus the doctrine of monism of Sound (śabdāvaitavāda) is not rational. 132

Sridhara gives the arguments put forward by the Šabdikas for the reality of word-forms (padasphoṭa) and sentence-forms (vākyasphoṭa). They maintain that a word-form manifests the meaning of a word, while its constituent letters do not manifest it. If there were no word-form distinct from a mere aggregate of letters, a mere word would not be able to convey any meaning. The individual letters of a word do not manifest its meaning or denote its object, because in that case the later letters will be useless, the first letter being able to manifest its meaning. Nor can the collection of letters manifest its meaning, because there is no collection of the component letters. When the last letter is apprehended, the preceding letters have vanished. It may be argued that a collection of letters is possible, because they are eternal. This argument is wrong. Even if the letters are eternal, the cognitions of them are not eternal. If the letters can collectively manifest a meaning, even if they are not apprehended, then they will always be able to manifest a meaning, and there will be no difference between the letters which are never apprehended and those

132 NM., pp. 532-36.
which are apprehended and then not apprehended. It may be argued that the letters apprehended before are remembered, and that the collection of letters remembered and perceived manifests a meaning. This argument is wrong, because recollections of the preceding letters also are successive, and so there can be no collection of letters perceived and remembered. When the third letter is perceived, the recollection of the first letter has ceased. Recollections of the preceding letters cannot be simultaneous, because simultaneity of cognitions is not possible owing to the atomic nature of manas. It may be argued that the cognition of the first letter leaves an impression (saṃskāra) which modifies the cognition of the second letter, and so on, so that the cognition of the last letter is modified by the impressions of the preceding letters, and the cumulative impression of all letters produces one recollection of all letters simultaneously. This argument is wrong, because the letters are all-pervading and eternal according to the Mīmāṃsāka, and, consequently, cannot have succession due to time and place. It may be argued that their succession is due to succession of their cognitions, and that the succession of letters is known by one recollection, which conveys their meaning as if they were simultaneous. In that case, the words rasa and sra, vana and nava, nadi and dīna would convey the same meaning, because they contain the same letters, and their order of succession does not play any part in the comprehension of the meanings of the words. But, in fact, the words containing the same letters but having a different order of succession have different meanings. So the individual letters of a word in succession or as an aggregate do not convey any meaning, but it is the word-form that conveys a meaning. Similarly, it is the sentence-form (vākyasphoṭa) that conveys the meaning of a sentence, but not its constituent words in succession or as a collection.122 It may be argued that even a word-form (padasphoṭa) does not convey a meaning without being manifested, because then it will always convey its meaning. It cannot be manifested by the component letters of a word either individually or collectively for the reasons mentioned above. So even a word-form cannot convey the meaning of a word.

122 NK., pp. 288-60.
This argument is wrong. The Śābdikas maintain that successive vocal sounds (dhvani) produced by human efforts, which are manifesters of the corresponding letters (varṣa), manifest the word-form indistinctly, and being modified by the impressions of the cognitions of the preceding letters manifest it distinctly at the last moment, when one, indivisible, distinct meaning devoid of any reference to succession of the component letters of a word is comprehended.\textsuperscript{124} If a word were mere letters, then it would not be apprehended by a single cognition, and the single cognition of a word would be without an object. But there is, in fact, a single cognition of a word, which comprehends its meaning. Hence there is a word-form (padasphoṭa) distinct from the letters of a word, which is the object of a single cognition.\textsuperscript{128}

Śrīdhara criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of sphoṭa. When the words are uttered in succession in a sentence, the component letters occurring in succession are perceived, and there is no perception of an object called word-form (padasphoṭa) distinct from the letters. If it is argued that first there are cognitions of letters, and at last there is the perception of the word-form, then the cognitions of the letters are illusory like the cognition of silver in a shell, which should be contradicted by the perception of the word-form, even as the illusory cognition of silver is contradicted by the valid cognition of a shell. But the cognitions of letters are not contradicted by any valid cognition. The one cognition which comprehends the meaning of a word does not cognize anything distinct from the component letters. It cognizes the mere collection of letters and leads to action. The so-called word-form is not cognized by perception. Nor is it cognized by any other means of valid knowledge. The reality of a word-form, it may be argued, must be assumed without which the comprehension of the meaning of a word cannot be accounted for. Then Śrīdhara asks whether a word-form leads to the comprehension of the meaning of a word, when it is perceived or when it is not perceived. In the second alternative, the unperceived word-form will always lead to the comprehension of the meaning

\textsuperscript{124} Ante pratyastamānīkhilavarnavibhāgolekkhakramam anavayavam ekai vispaśtaṁ arthatattvam anubhyate. NK., p. 269.

\textsuperscript{128} NK., p. 269.
of a word. The hypothesis of unperceived word-form is useless, because the comprehension of the meaning of a word depends upon the cognitions of its component letters. When they are present, the meaning of a word is comprehended; and when they are absent, it is not comprehended. They lead to its comprehension in accordance with convention. It is wrong to argue that if the cognitions of letters are the cause of the comprehension of the meaning of a word, then they will generate it even when they are uttered by different persons, in different places, at different times, and with different orders of succession. For they can produce the comprehension of the meaning of a word, only when they are uttered by one person, in the same place, at a particular time, in quick succession, with a particular order. The same letters uttered by one person at a particular time, in a particular place, in quick succession, with a different order produce the comprehension of a different meaning. The Mimāṃsā argument that letters are eternal and all-pervading, and cannot have any succession in time, and that the words nadi and dīna will have the same meaning, because their different meanings depend upon the different orders of succession of the component letters is wrong. For the letters are not all-pervading and eternal, but they are produced in different places at different times to which they are confined. They are non-pervasive and non-eternal, and so can have succession. The argument that the component letters of a word can neither individually nor collectively bring about the comprehension of the meaning of a word is wrong, because though the successive letters cease to exist, their successive impressions (saṁskāra) accumulate in the self, and their cumulative impression brings about the comprehension of the meaning of a word. Or, the last letter or its cognition aided by the impressions or recollections of the preceding letters generates it. The argument that the comprehension of the meaning of a word cannot be produced by the impressions of the letters, because the impression of the cognition of an object can produce the recollection of it only, and

182a Yadvapi varṇā anavasthāyinaḥ tathāpi tadviṣayāḥ kramabhaśvinaḥ saṁskāraḥ saṁbhāya padārthadhiṣayaṃ ātavate. Yad vā pṛrvavartinaḥ saṁskārasyamaraṇayor anyatarasāpakaṣo'nty vo vartāḥ pratyāyakāḥ. NK., p. 270.
not of any other object is wrong. For though the impression of an object produces the recollection of it, yet its power of producing some other effect cannot be denied. The impressions of the letters produced by their cognitions in the self are the auxiliary conditions of the comprehension of the meaning of a word. When they are present, the meaning of a word is comprehended; and when they are absent, it is not comprehended. So they have the power of producing the comprehension of the meaning of a word. The Śābdikas who believe in sphoṭa must assume also its power (śakti) to convey the meaning of a word. So they make two hypotheses, and thus violate the law of parsimony. But they and the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika believe in the power of impressions. So the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika hypothesis of the impressions of letters generating the comprehension of the meaning of a word is better, because it does not violate the parsimony of hypotheses. Hence the assumption of a word-form is useless. Similarly, the assumptions of letter-forms and sentence-forms are needless. Kumārila criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa elaborately in Slokavārttika. The Yoga doctrine of Sphoṭa is discussed in the second volume. The doctrine of Sphoṭa is criticized in the Vedānta also. The discussion of the doctrine in Vākyapadīya and the mention of divergent views clearly shew that the philosophy of language was sufficiently developed before Bhartṛhari. Here only his view is discussed.
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