Some Aspects of Muslim Administration

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PREFACE

The study of Indian history has begun to attract the attention of a wider class of scholars than before. No longer satisfied with merely military and spectacular affairs, these scholars are trying to study the institutions, the system of government, the economic conditions, military organisation, and such other topics of deeper interest. A considerable amount of work has been done in the Mughal period of Indian history by scholars like the late Mr. Irwine, Mr. W. H. Moreland and Mr. J. N. Sarkar. But the pre-Mughal period of Muslim history has not yet received the attention it deserves.

In the present thesis an attempt has been made to trace the vicissitudes of two important institutions—the Sultanat, or sovereignty, and the Vizarat. The survey covers a long period. It begins with the Ghaznavides and comes down to the end of the reign of Akbar. The reason for selecting Akbar as the other limit of the inquiry is that in him were combined the old and the new. He stands almost in the central place of the Muslim history of India and looks both backwards and forwards. It was in the time of Akbar that some of the old movements and institutions reached their culmination or were transformed into something new.

Sir Thomas Arnold has just touched a few points connected with the history of sovereignty as an institution, simply because it came incidentally within the purview of his bigger subject—the Khilafat. No other writer seems to have discussed in a systematic way either the institution of Sultanat or of Vizarat in India.

The study in the pre-Mughal history of Muslim India is beset with numerous difficulties. For the Mughal period the material is larger and more dependable. Works like the 'Ain Akbari,' and numerous 'Dasturulamals' and 'farmanas' enable a student to start with some positive details brought together in them. Moreover, the European travellers have left accounts that throw a flood of light on the working of some of the institutions. Such facilities are not
available to a student of the pre-Mughal period. He has to work his way through the whole mass of the available material and patiently collect the relevant information scattered all over them. A sentence here and a clause there, a hint here and a word there, are picked up with inquisitiveness. That this exercise requires much labour and patience is evident.

Then comes the question of interpretation. For, the terminology and language used by the chroniclers is often vague and loose, and things that seemed to them quite obvious in the context of actual facts before them, have now become obscure. It is therefore in the light of known facts, the trend of affairs, the principles of Muslim law and time-honoured Indian customs that the statements of the chroniclers can be interpreted. Where they proved inadequate imagination has been exercised with as much caution as possible.

In the use of the material sufficient care has been taken. It is rarely that any secondhand authority has been given preference over the contemporary or early writers. Only in exceptional cases and for good reasons have the statements of contemporary chroniclers been rejected. As far as possible all the known original authorities have been carefully examined. Only in the case of Arabic words like Mawardi, Ibn Batuta or Kitābul Kharrāj the best translations have been resorted to. Among the works that have been used systematically for the first time might be mentioned:

1. Tārikhi Fakhruddin Mubārakshā; the Athārulawuzarā;
2. the Dasturulawuzarā, Sulūk ul Mulūk; (3) Tārikhi Muhammadi;
4. Afṣānai Shāhānī Hind; (5) Daulati Sher Shāhī; (6) Bāyazid’s Memoira; (7) Khāki Shirāzi; (8) ‘Arif Muhammad Qandhārī.

Besides these works, those portions of well-known works which have not been translated into any language have also been examined. Among such works are Baihaqi, Tajul Maāthir, Tārikhi Mahmuḍ Shāhī, Tārikhi Mubārak Shāhī, Tārikhi Haqqi, Akbarnāma of Fāzī Sarhindī besides other minor works. Some manuscripts have been carefully collated with a view to arrive at a more reliable reading. Tājulmaāthir, Waqīṭi Mushtāqi, Ziauddin Barani, and portions of Aini Akbari have been specially collated. Doubtful or highly important passages of the printed texts of Baihaqi and Tabqātī Nasiri have been also verified from some manuscript or the other in the
British Museum and the Royal Asiatic Society. Where differences of serious nature have been found, they have been mentioned either in the text or the footnotes.

As far as possible no preconceived notions or time-honoured opinions have been allowed to interfere with the interpretation of facts. Where any serious disagreement was found between the opinions of other scholars and mine I have tried to indicate briefly either in an appendix or in a footnote my grounds for arriving at a particular conclusion. The nature of the evidence at times has made differences inevitable but full consideration and weight has been given to the opinions of other scholars before forming my own.

The subjects discussed in the thesis have been treated from a fresh point of view. The bulk of the material bearing on the period was known to many a writer and has been utilised in various ways, particularly for constructing history. But in this thesis the entire range of the available authorities has been searched to construct institutions. Every endeavour has been made to make the best of them. I believe that it is possible to throw a flood of light on many an institution, though not all, of the Muslim period of Indian history by a sustained and intensive study of the material even as it is. At present I have discussed only the sovereignty and the Vizarat in some details to show the possibilities of the kind of research. But I have collected a good deal of material and hope later on to do the same kind of work for the Army and Religious policy of the Muslim Government.

It is hoped that this study will locate properly the place of the early Sultans and later Emperors in the history of India. The work is designed to fix the historical place of rulers like Sher Shah or Akbar. The writers of separate monographs, for example the late Mr. V. A. Smith, Von Noer and others, have not been able to bring Akbar in proper historical perspective with the result that they have ignored the heritage of the past and the forces that were responsible for his actions. As Akbar received high praise for his originality and constructive abilities a reaction gradually came in and some writers laboured to prove that most of the credit that has gone to Akbar should have been given to Sher Shah in the field of administrative reforms. This controversy is apparently due to the
limitations of research circumscribed within too short a period. Not in the administrative reforms but also in the case of such large questions as the ideas about kingship and religion similar controversy has been going on and very divergent opinions have been expressed by scholars. These controversies have created some confusion and made a proper historical estimate somewhat difficult. This thesis is intended to remove much of the haze that hangs over such questions.

By throwing fresh light on old questions, by submitting the historical material to an intensive and scientific examination, by the combined application of the telescopic and microscopic methods of study and research in the original sources of information, a new synthesis of the Muslim history of India, more dependable and probably useful, is possible. Synthesis without critical analysis has no root and analysis without synthesis bears no fruit. It is hoped that this thesis will be an honest contribution towards those objects and illustrate the application of those principles within a comparatively limited sphere.

It is my pleasant duty to express my very sincere and deep gratitude to Prof. Harold Laski, Prof. Sir Denison Ross and Prof. H. Dodwell of London University for the encouragement, guidance and help which I have received from them at every stage in the preparation of this thesis. I am also grateful to Mr. W. H. Moreland, C.S.I., who has helped me, by personal discussions and long correspondence to understand some disputed, and difficult points connected with my research. But for their ungrudging and constant help I am afraid it would have been almost impossible for me to undertake this work.

My sincere thanks are due to B. N. Jha, I.C.S., who went through the manuscript of the thesis before it was typed, and to S. C. Deb, Reader in the English Department of our university, and Mr. A. K. Vatal for very kindly going through the proof sheets. They have saved me from errors of language. I am very much obliged to my friend and colleague Dr. B. P. Saxena, who has kindly prepared the index. Lastly, I have to thank Mr. H. K. Ghosh, proprietor of the Indian Press, Allahabad, for having rescued the thesis from oblivion, in which it has been lying since 1926, and undertaking its publication in spite of numerous difficulties.
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CHAPTER I

THE MUSLIM THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY

The first Muslim invaders of India were the Arabs. Their activities were practically confined to the lower Indus regions—the Sindh—and the outer fringe of the Indian political life and civilization. Their occupation of Sindh was only an episode in Indian history, full of interest in its own way, but not destined to influence seriously the political and economic structure of Hindu India.

But the movements of the Ghaznavides and the Ghorides had a far reaching effect, and eventually completely changed the political map of the post-Harsha period. These invaders gradually wormed themselves into the heart of India, and finally assumed the rôle of the earlier Hindu Empire-builders like Chandra Gupta, Samudra Gupta and even Harsha. The sovereign power passed into the hands of the Muslim Sultan who exercised it according to his light and the circumstances of the time.

The Muslim Sultan, however, differed from the earlier Hindu Sovereigns in two respects. He did not belong to the country over which he came to rule, and naturally enough took time to adapt himself to his new environments. Secondly, he believed in a religion whose outlook on social and political questions was very different from that of the Hindus. He did not come like the Scythians and the Huns simply for conquest. With him he had brought a well-defined religion, a highly developed civilization, and a set
of institutions to which he clung with all his faith. Indeed, it was an avowed principle with him to maintain their purity and to establish them in lands under his sway.

The Muslim state was a theocracy. All the institutions that the Muslim either evolved or adopted were intended to subserve the law, the existence of which was prior to them. Next to the law, but first in the Muslim political theory was the conception of sovereignty. The Muslim idea of sovereignty is one of the most powerful and determining factors of Muslim political institutions.

According to the Sunni theory sovereignty lay in the Muslim brotherhood that might confer sovereign power on any bona fide Muslim. The majority of the Sunnis would confine their selection to the tribe of Quraish to which the Prophet belonged.

The practical difficulty of election in which every Muslim could directly participate must have been felt even at the early stages of the expansion of Islam. Since the time of the Ommayid Caliphs a general tendency of the Khalifa nominating his successor in his own lifetime had come into being. It was by no means necessary that such nominations should remain confined in the direct line.¹ In spite of the fact of nomination the theory of election was not abandoned. The gulf between the two principles was bridged by the theory that a formal acceptance of a man's sovereignty by the leading officials and men amounted to his election. The device was simple and practical in

¹ Cambridge Mediaeval History, IV, p. 282.
the circumstances, but it was eventually calculated to destroy the advantages that were implied in actual election. Indeed it was nothing more than acquiescencence which could obviously be gained by means other than the active will to confer sovereign power.

Such acquiescencence, however, did not wholly dispense with the formal ceremony of election. The formality had to be maintained; it was a semi-religious necessity. The circle of active electors was therefore narrowed to the leading men of the capital town; then to eleven men, or five, or two or to even one.2 This tendency of narrowing the number of electors finally led to the conclusion that the sovereign might appoint his own successor.3 This conclusion of Mawardi seems to have been influenced by the force of facts and a desire to reconcile the theory with them. This device drove the last nail in the principle of election, and tacitly recognised inheritance of sovereign power; for, human nature, as it is, could not but prejudice a sovereign in favour of his own descendants, preferably a son.4 Nevertheless the elective theory had not lost its importance entirely. It offered a loophole for avoiding or getting rid of an undesirable sovereign and kept alive the idea of the ultimate sovereignty of the Muslim people. For practical purposes, however, it had neither the advantages of election nor of hereditary succession. On the other hand it had possibly the disadvantages of both.

3 Dr. Arnold: The Caliphate, p. 71.
4 Among the Ommayids out of 14 Caliphs only 4 were succeeded by a son, and out of 36 Abbasids, 16.
Most of the jurists and historians of the Sunni school of thought consider the office of Imām or the Khalifa absolutely essential in the interest of the law and human society. If there were no Imām the law would be lost in bewildering conflicts of opinions, strong men would exercise tyranny over the weak, order would give place to utter chaos and the purpose of creation would remain unfulfilled. This doctrine is essentially utilitarian with a background of theocracy. The theory of election must to some extent go hand in hand with utilitarianism. In the Shi'a theory both these elements are wanting, but in the history of Muslim Imām Sunnism was the most predominating factor.

The duties of the Imām were, therefore, to defend religion and administer the State. The Jurist had vested in him both civil and military powers. The Imām possessed the power to make peace or war, appoint or dismiss civil and military officers, raise the taxes, settle disputes and adopt necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the people and maintain the integrity and purity of Islam. In fact all the

5 Sulākul Mulūk, f. 14v. 19r.
Zakhiratulmulūk, f. 89r. 90r.
Nasihat Nāmā. f. 55r.
Ibni Hazm in Khudabakhsh’s ‘Essays, Indian and Islamic,’ pp. 47—49.
Ibni Khaldun in Dr. Arnold’s ‘Khilafat,’ p. 75.

6 For a detailed list of his duties or rather what he was expected to do, see Cambridge Med. Hist., IV, 231. Arnold’s Caliphate, p. 72. Khudabakhsh Orient under the Caliphs, p. 265 seq. Fakhruddin Mubārak Shah, pp. 13—15; Sulākul Mulūk, f. 19r.
powers of a strong executive head were vested in the Imām.

In spite of his wide powers the Imām was not without limitations. He could not, for example, claim exemption from the operations of the Shāriʿat law. Before the law, at least in theory, his position was no better than that of his lowliest subject. The most insignificant man could sue him before the Court of the Qazi or magistrate. He could not alter the Quranic law, and had to conform to the interpretation of it by the great founders of the school to which he might profess to belong. Though he could lay down rules and regulations consistent with the Shāriʿat he could not transgress it.

Another and more practical check on the power of the Imām was the Muslim doctrine of obedience to the sovereign. He enjoyed prestige and power not by any inherent right of his own, but by the will of the Muslim people. The source of his political power was in the Muslim subjects. Although it is true that the Muslim law enjoins upon the Muslims the duty of obeying the Imām almost implicitly, yet that obedience is not entirely unqualified. If the Imām disregarded the law or failed to discharge his responsibility, he ran the risk of forfeiting all claims to obedience. It is only in extremely awkward situations when the people were threatened with possible anarchy and utter confusion that some jurists have advised unconditional obedience.7

7 Macdonald’s Muslim Theology and Jurisprudence, p. 92. Nasihat Namâ, f. 110r, 111v, 112, 114.
The Sunni doctrine, therefore, recognised the moral basis of obedience as distinguished from merely legal or mechanical. The right conferred by this doctrine was not absolutely a dead letter; for more than once in the history of Muslim India rebellion against an unlawful sovereign had been declared perfectly lawful. Such a doctrine, hanging like the sword of Damocles over the head of the sovereign, was calculated to make him somewhat cautious in contravening the law.

Another important feature in the Muslim conception of sovereignty was its indivisibility. Within his powers the Imām was supreme. No power on earth could even share with him his sovereign rights. He was the final living political authority. The Muslim law recognised only one Imām. There could not be two Imāms at one and the same time. Provision has no doubt been made for two Imāms, but only when a wide sea separates two continents. Apparently it was an afterthought suggested by historical facts. The idea was that of one sovereign for the whole of the Muslim world. The unity of Islam and of a supreme leader have been the essentials of Muslim political theory.
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL HERITAGE OF THE DELHI SULTANS

When Alptigīn, the founder of the Ghazna kingdom, died his son succeeded him only to be driven out. The Sāmānī overlords, however, threw their weight on his side and backed him up once more to the throne of Ghazna. But a year had hardly passed when he died. The followers of Alptigīn then raised one of their chiefs to the throne. He died after a rule of ten years. Subukτigīn, a slave of Alptigīn, was then elected. He founded the Ghaznavide dynasty which played a great part in the history of Persia, Central Asia, and India.

Although a scarlet canopy was held over him Subukτigīn could hardly be considered an independent sovereign, for he was a subordinate of Malik Nūh Sāmānī, whose name was inscribed on the currency. Subukτigīn, Ismā‘il and even Mahmud in his earlier years described themselves on their coins as local governors. The authority over Khurasan, Turkistan,

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1 T. Nāsiri, p. 7; Raverty, 72; Coins of the Ghazni Kings, by Thomas, pp. 37-38. Jawām‘ul Hikāyat. Some writers put one Piri before Subukτigīn. Piri was, however, deposed and Subukτigīn elected in his place.

2 T. Yamini (m), f. 14v.

3 Raverty, I, 73. 74.

4 Coins of the Ghazni Kings, p. 2. See also Yamini, f. 75r.
Mavaraunnahr, Sindh, Hind and Jurjan had been conferred on Ismā'il Sāmāni by the Khalifa of Baghdad early in the tenth century. 'Utbi has rather loosely used the word 'Pādshāh' about Subuktigin. As he was only a nominal official of Mansur and practically independent it is permissible to take him into account.

After the death of Subuktigin it could not be possible to settle the question of succession by unanimous election. Ismā'il the younger brother of Mahmud being nearer home managed to get himself recognised as the successor of his father to the kingdom of Ghazna. Later historians say that Subuktigin had made Ismā'il his successor by will. Mahmud, however, challenged the right of Ismā'il, not on the score of seniority, but on the ground of his fitness to discharge well the responsibility of the State, an argument likely to carry more weight with the people because his abilities were very well known to them. As Ismā'il refused to make any compromise an appeal to the sword became inevitable. The principle of election was thrown into the background. It was the sword that brought Saifuddaulā to the throne.

3 Narshakhi, History of Bokhara, Schefer, p. 90, R. A. Socy. per MSS. 160, p. 100v has Faras, Jurjan, Talaristan, Khurasan, Mawaraunnahr, Turkistan, Sindh and Hind. This was in the year 282 A.H.


7 Yamānī (T), pp. 187-88. Add MS. f. 106r.

8 Saifuddaula, a title of Mahmud given by Nūh Sāmāni (Yamānī Tehran), pp. 135-36.
The expansion of the State of Ghazna under his energetic rule and the collapse of the Sāmānīdes, raised Mahmud's prestige. He was now free from the vassalage of the Sāmānīdes, and by 389 A.H. (999 A.D.) assumed independence with the title of Amīr, and removed the name of the Sāmānīdes from the coins. He felt himself strong enough to assume the high title of 'Sultān' as well. A powerful and wealthy ruler Mahmud yet thought it worth his while to get his title as an independent Sultān confirmed by the Khalīfa of Baghdad. In the eyes of the Muslim people such a recognition was considered necessary to cast a halo of legality over his head.

With this enormous prestige at his back and the gratitude of the Muslim people Mahmud could at least hope to nominate his successors. He was displeased with the riotous conduct of his eldest son, Mas'ūd, and had made up his mind to make his second

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10 There is a great divergence of opinion on this point. Guzida, (p. 396) says that Khalīf. b. Ahmad of Sistan, being defeated by Mahmud addressed him as 'Sultān.' Mahmud liked the title and adopted it. See also Coins of Ghazni Kings, p. 5. Baizawi, Br. M., 48v, 49r. on the other hand says that in honour of Mahmud's victory over 'Abdulmalik, the Khalīfa of Baghdad confirmed him in the government of Khurasan and Sijistan, sent him a robe of honour and conferred on him the title of 'Sultān.' There is a strong tradition that Mahmud was the first ruler to assume the title of Sultān (vide Tab Nāsiri, p. 9. Siyasat Nama i. 44. Sadiq Shahid, f. 128v) but this is not strictly true.

11 Mahmud had received the title of Yaminuddaula, and Aminul millat, but was anxious to get additional title from the Khalīfa but the latter declined to give him one. Kitābī Siyasat, f. 92v.
son, Muhammad, his successor at least to the throne of Ghazna, if not to the whole empire. He was afraid that Mas'ūd would not put up with the authority of Muhammad, hence he contemplated a division of the Empire between the brothers. However, following the practice of some of the Ommayid and Abbāside Caliphs he got his officials and nobles to swear allegiance to Muhammad, and had his name inserted in the Khutba.

After the death of Mahmud the local maliks and grandees renewed their allegiance to Muhammad. But Mas'ūd refused to recognise him and put forward his claim to succession on three grounds. First, that when he was a boy he was declared as the Wali 'Ahd of his father. Secondly, that he had been granted the Manshūr and Karāmat by the Khalifa of Baghdad entitling him to succeed his father; and this in his opinion was the strongest ground. Thirdly, that he had also got the support of the nobles, commoners and religious men.

The importance of the recognition of his title to succession by the Khalifa occurred to Mas'ūd quite early. He sent an envoy to Qādir billāh, and promising

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13 Baidawi, E. D. ii. 256.
15 Baihaqi, pp. 101, 127.
16 Baihaqi, 351—53 seq., 361, 458 seq. and passim. Manshūr means investiture, diploma, or Letters Patent; Karāmat signifies robe of honour and such other gifts.
17 Baihaqi, p. 5.
to send him every year a sum of 200,000 dinars, 10,000 pieces of cloth, besides other presents requested him to recognise his claim.\(^{18}\) The Khalifa was pleased to send him a formal investiture and conferred on him the titles and territories of Mahmud, with a new title of Zahīr Khilāfat ullaḥ Amīrulmuminīn.\(^{19}\) Masʿūd considered this his great victory, and boasted of it on every possible occasion. Indeed, on the strength of the Manshūr he put forward his claim to take over the charge of any country that had no proper person to govern it.\(^{20}\) No one questioned the grant of the Khalifa except the Seljūqs, at a later stage of his career. They told him plainly that they did not care whether the Khalifa had invested him with authority or Mahmud had declared him as his successor, for they knew no better authority than that of the sword.\(^{21}\) After the death of Qādir billāh Masʿūd got his ‘Aḥdnāma (investiture?) renewed by Amr ullaḥ.\(^{22}\)

The civil war between Masʿūd and Muhammad set people thinking. They wondered why a shrewd, experienced and powerful man like Mahmud should have failed to make a satisfactory arrangement for succession after his death.\(^{23}\) They, however, failed to find any satisfactory answer, for they could not

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\(^{18}\) Baihaqi, pp. 16-17; 49 seq.

\(^{19}\) Baihaqi, p. 50.

\(^{20}\) Baihaqi, p. 533. Baihaqi (B), f. 240r.

\(^{21}\) Baihaqi, p. 805.

\(^{22}\) Baihaqi, 352-53 seq., 361, 458 seq.

\(^{23}\) Baihaqi, p. 55.
realise that the fault lay not with Mahmud, who did what he could, but with the indeterminate law or convention of succession and the unreliable character of the nobles.

Although Mas'ūd held the throne by his descent, the sanction of the Khalifa, and the allegiance of officials and religious men, yet within a short time he had to realise that it was impossible to hold sovereignty without the ability to command and rule. Neither his descent, nor the Khalifa's sanction could save him from being dethroned and eventually executed.

After Mas'ūd's death the succession was more confused than ever. Five of his sons ruled one after the other with one important break. The appeal to the sword became a normal process of capturing the sovereignty. But there was no question of the acceptance of a ruler outside the family of Mahmud. The most remarkable fact was the succession of Mas'ūd, an infant son of Mawdūd, but he was set aside after a short reign of one month. People preferred even a weakling of the house of Mahmud to a strong ruler of another house. This is illustrated by the case of Tughral, the vanquisher of Alp Arsalān, and the most powerful commander in the Ghazna Army. When Tughral was asked how he came to entertain the ambition to reign, he calmly replied: "At the time that 'Abdurrashīd was sending me forth to do battle against Alp Arsalān and Dāūd, and was giving me my instructions, and had placed his hand in mine, terror had overcome him to that degree, that I could hear his very bones rattling from the state of
trembling he was in. I knew this pusillanimous man was incapable of sovereignty, and the ambition of reigning entered my heart. 24 Even his usurpation under such conditions was not tolerated by the people. They rose in revolt, and within forty days restored a descendant of Mahmud to the throne. 25 Tughral had put to death almost all the descendants of Mahmud, and there was a good chance for any able man to capture the throne, but none ventured to do so. A diligent search was made if any person of the house of Mahmud had survived. Two or three princes were found alive. One of them, Farrukhzâd, was immediately raised to the throne. 26

Two facts clearly emerge out from the history of the Ghaznavides. Originally, unfitness to rule was a positive disqualification and neither descent nor any other title could override that consideration. Since the time of Subuktigin, but particularly after Mahmud, descent formed the chief consideration and fitness was given a second place. Fitness to rule or the power of the sword could not destroy the right to sovereignty of the descendants of Mahmud. Mahmud's prestige eventually succeeded in establishing the right of

24 Raverty, p. 100.
25 Guzida, p. 403. T. Nasiri, p. 16, says that Mas'ud and Ali exercised joint sovereignty, but this arrangement is unlikely as Raverty rightly points out, p. 97, n4.
26 Some authorities like Nikbi do not mention the name of Farrukhzâd between Abdurrahid and Ibrahim, but Khandmir does that. The Persian authorities differ in their lists of the rulers of Ghazna. The safest course is therefore to rely on numismatic evidence. For Farrukhzâd, see Coins of the Ghazni Kings, number 97, p. 80, and Lane-Poole's Cat. of Or. Coins in the Br. M., IX, p. 234.
his house to rule. Might seemed to have yielded to right not of any particular member of the family but of the house. It was not, however, settled as to who among the sons or brothers of a ruler had the best title to succeed. Anyone of them who could command the largest following had the best chance. Such a support a minor could of course hardly expect. It is not surprising, therefore, that excepting one dubious case of a minor ruling for a few days, no minor was ever acclaimed as a ruler of Ghazna.

It was Mahmud who had suggested the idea of granting the governorship of Khurasan to his brother should the latter resign sovereignty in his favour. But the idea was not seriously taken up and died out. The idea of dividing the empire or sovereignty found no favour with the Ghaznavides. The Ghorides, on the other hand, gave it a fair trial. The famous Ghorí brothers, Ghayāsuddín and Mu‘ızuddín, managed to live most cordially and rule together over a vast empire. On the coins were inscribed the names of both the brothers. Practically independent at Ghazna, Mu‘ızuddín recognised his elder brother as the sovereign, and remained loyal to him to the last, in spite of his large following and glorious military career. As relations between the brothers were largely of a personal nature, their permanent significance could be realised only after the death of one of them.

27 T. Nāsiri (c), p. 10 says 2 months; Guzida, p. 40 says 2 years; Raverty, p. 97, n. 4; T. Akbari, p. 31; Badaoni corrects T. A., p. 33.

28 Rodgers, p. 6.
The practical question was whether Fīroz Koh and Ghazna could continue to work together. Muʿizuddin himself does not seem to have got a clear idea, as his actions show. After the death of his brother he did not bring under his rule the kingdom of Fīroz Koh, but chose to place on the throne Malik 'Alāuddin Muhammad (bin Shujāʿuddin Abi Ali). He was a son-in-law of the late Sultān, and had distinguished himself in the battle with Prithvi Rāj. How far was Muʿizuddin justified in taking this step and disregarding the sons of Ghayāsuddin, is difficult to say. There is no doubt that his prestige and power enabled him to interfere in the affairs of his late brother’s kingdom.

If his action had been confined to nominating a ruler of Fīroz Koh his policy would have been easy to understand. But he went much further when he parcelled out the kingdom of Fīroz Koh into three principalities—Fīroz Koh and Garamsir; Bust, Farāt and Isfarain; and Herat. Did he expect that under his general control smaller divisions of the kingdom would contribute to better and efficient administration, and would be better organised to meet the Turkish enemies who were pressing on the north and west? Or, did he want to accommodate more than one prince whose services were valuable but whose ambition for power required a safety valve? Or whether, after all, he desired to weaken the kingdom of Fīroz Koh and finally declare himself as its ruler? Why did

29 T. Muhammadi, f. 281r, v, 297r. Tabaqat Akb (De’s Tr), p. 40.

30 T. Muhammadi, f. 297r, v, Tabaqat Akb De loc. cit.
he not declare himself as the successor of his brother? Why did he satisfy himself with only nominating his candidate? Probably he was not prepared to destroy the individuality of the kingdom of Firoz Koh. Equally anxious was he to maintain separate existence of the kingdom of Ghazna. It was even believed that he intended to make Yildoz, one of his slaves his successor!31

The arrangements made by Mu‘izuddin for Firoz Koh were not calculated to introduce any healthy principle in the matter of succession. As he died suddenly without leaving a son, members of both the houses, Ghor and Bämiyanan, put forward their claims to the kingdom of Ghazna. ‘Aläuddin, of the house of Bämiyan, got the upper hand. But he lost the confidence of the Turkish nobility of Ghazna when he divided the State treasury between himself and his brother. Such a division was neither sanctioned by the Islamic law, nor supported by any convention of Ghazna. It involved the principle that the state was, as if it were, the private property of the ruler, and in every way was contrary to the interest of Ghazna. The prime minister, ‘Abdulla Sanjari, got the support of the officials and people when he refused to continue his allegiance to ‘Alauddin. An invitation was sent to Yildoz, the Governor of Karman, and the most favourite slave of Mu‘izuddin, to come and take the throne of Ghazna.

There was, however, one technical difficulty in declaring Yildoz Sultán. According to the Islamic

law a sovereign ruler ought to be a free man; but Yildoz was a slave. Ghaznin, however, was on his side. The relative strength of _de facto_ and _de jure_ kingship would have been put to the test if the nephew of Mu'izuddin, Sultan Ghayasuddin, the then ruler of Firoz Koh, had refused to grant Yildoz a letter of manumission. Ghayasuddin not only freed him but conferred on him the kingdom of Ghazna. This was by no means an act of willing generosity. Ghayasuddin made the best of a bad job. For, the rivalry of the house of Bamiyan, the growing pressure of the Khwârizm State on the frontier demanded rather a policy of conciliation than hostility of a popular and capable man like Yildoz.

The right of the descendants of the patron Sultan to rule, which Mahmud had built up and Ghazna had respected for over a century broke down under the Ghorides there, though not in Firoz Koh. This was due to several causes. The people of Ghazna could not but look upon the Ghorides as usurpers. Mu'izuddin had died childless and his Turkish slaves, who were his ablest followers, were bound by personal regard for him. But they could hardly be expected to have any reverence for the Tajiks to which the Ghori family belonged. Last but not least was the inability of the ruler of Firoz Koh to impose his sovereignty on the powerful Turkish commanders. The Ghorides thus destroyed the element of right and restored indirectly the principles of might and election in Ghazna. The principle of nomination did not

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T. Nāsiri (m), f. 166r, 168r; Raverty, 398, 500, 601n., 502, 525; T. Muhammadi, 283v. 302v.; Ferishta, p. 64.

F. 2
commend itself to Ghazna either in the Ghaznavide or the Ghoride period.

In those days it appears that the people did not want the rule of a plebeian. The Ghaznavides and the Ghorides both, therefore, tried to connect themselves with the ancient families that had ruled prior to the conquest of Iran and Turan by the Arabs. Subuktigin traced his origin directly from Yazdjar23 and 'Alauddin Jahānsoz, the founder of the kingdom of Firoz Koh, connected himself with Ḍuhāk.24 It is more likely that these genealogies were fictitious, but fiction has always counted for something in politics.

Like the Ghaznavides the Ghorides were also alive to the importance of getting the confirmation of sovereignty from the Khalifa of Baghdad. Ghayāsuddin received his investiture from Mustazi billah and Annāšir.25 Still more important was it for Yildoz to get the sanction of the Khalifa for his authority. It would have made his position stronger and, if necessary, given him a status absolutely independent of Firoz Koh and satisfied the conscience of Ghazna. He, therefore, made a request and got the Letters Patent from the Khalifa.26

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24 For full details see Kitab Rawdat al jannāt fi. Awsaf madinat ul Hirāt, B. M., 22880 f. 100v seq. See also Nuskhai Jahanārā, B. M., Or., 141, f. 116r. Ferishta, p. 54.

25 Raverty, 382-83: T. Muhammad, f. 278v.

26 T. Alfi, B. M., 1697, f. 73r, Tajulmaāsir and Fakhruddin do not mention it for obvious reasons. Nor is the silence of T. Nāsiri surprising.
Even at this period the Sultān was looked upon with awe and was believed to occupy the highest position among men. Nizāmī-al-‘Arūdi of Samarqand maintains that Kingship 'is not less than a Divine gift,' and 'no burden after the Prophet's Office is weightier than sovereignty.' Fakhruddin Mubārak Shah calls him ‘Zillillāh’ and ‘Sāyai Khudā’ and explains it as a resort and shelter of the oppressed from the tyranny of the oppressor.

The death of Mu‘izuddin Ghori and the election of Yildoz naturally raised the question of the relationship between the new ruler of Ghazna and the old officers whom the former had left in India. Mu‘izuddin had not made it clear if he wished to separate his Indian territories from Ghazna. His death was unexpected and sudden, and the question had not seriously arisen in his life. Although his Indian Empire had in a way extended as far as Bengal and its proper administration from a distant place like Ghazna had obvious difficulties, yet it is improbable that he could have contemplated the separation of India from Ghazna. If the Ghazna Empire extended in the East it extended in the West also. Indeed, the western frontier was as important to the life of Ghazna as the eastern conquests to its prosperity. Ghazna was, therefore, better suited to be the capital of the Ghoride Empire. Moreover, Mu‘izuddin would have

37 Chahārmaqāla, E. G. Brown, p. 3.

38 Fakhruddin, p. 13. It might be pointed out that the author is a past master in providing curious derivations. For example, see his explanation of the town ‘Kohram,’ op. cit., p. 22. It is childish and funny.
hardly failed to see that the power and prosperity of Ghazna depended almost wholly on the resources drawn from India, and that she could give shelter to the ruler of Ghazna in times of distress and misfortune. Lahore, according to a contemporary historian, was an object of special consideration to Mu‘izzuddin who considered it as the second capital of the Empire. The establishment of a monarchy in northern India, independent of Ghazna, could not have commended itself to Mu‘izzuddin.

Did Mu‘izzuddin appoint Qutbuddin Aibak as the Governor General of his Indian dominions? Fakhruddin’s history, which was dedicated to Qutbuddin, says that the Sultan had nominated him his ‘heir-apparent,’ to Hindustan just after his victory over the Khokhars in 602 A.H. Hasan Nizami, another contemporary and creditable historian, does not mention this important fact though he says that Mu‘izzuddin had presented a Karamat and Tashrif to Qutbuddin. This by no means implies that he thereby became the governor of the whole of the Indian Empire.

Qutbuddin was a governor of Hansi with Delhi as his personal appanage. The possession of Delhi in those days did not mean much, for it was neither the capital of India nor the most important Muslim


40 Fakhruddin, pp. 28-29. ‘Ajab Nama (Cambridge), Ferishta, p. 61, says that Mu‘izzuddin had made him Sipahsalar of Hindustan.

41 Tajul maathir (r), f. 73v, op. cit.; (v) 178r; op. cit.; (c) f. 128v. Tashrif signifies a robe of honour.
town. Qutbuddin was one of the ablest commanders of Mu‘izzuddin, and by his family connections and generosity had acquired great prestige. Himself the son-in-law of Yildoz, the most influential man under Mu‘izzuddin, he could count Ilutmish and Qubacha as his son-in-law. These facts alone would not have necessarily enabled him to exercise sovereignty in India after the death of his master.

Being the most powerful of the Muslim officers in India Qutbuddin availed himself of the opportunity caused by Mu‘izzuddin's death and had the Khutbah read in his name at Lahore which was then "the centre of Islam in Hind." The recognition of his sovereignty at Lahore was likely to carry a good deal of weight with other Muslim towns. Lahore readily welcomed him for it was then exposed to the attack of the Khokhars and the Hindus, who were beaten but not crushed by Mu‘izzuddin, and there was no man on the spot more influential and capable than Qutbuddin.

42 T. Maāthir (r), f. 81v; op. cit., (v), f. 134v; op. cit., (c), f. 186v. Fakhruddin and 'Ajah Nama, p. 401. T. Nāsiri is a bit confused as it gives two different dates for it—602 A.H. Raverty notices the discrepancy but did not quite explain it. There might be some truth in the statement of T. N., 89-90, that at first Qutbuddin got Khutbah read in the name of Mahmud of Firuz Koh. But Fakhruddin is decisive on this question. Tabq Nāsiri f. 168r gives a partial account, its sequence is also not so clear.

43 Fakhruddin, p. Tabq N., f. 168 (r) says that Mahmud had sent Qutbuddin Chahar and conferred on him the title of Sultān. It does not give the date but places the event before Qutbuddin’s accession at Lahore. The sequence appears doubtful.

44 Fakhruddin, p. 31.
Qutbuddin refused to recognise the authority of Yiljoz. He charged him with exercising undue influence on Mahmud of Firoz Koh, marched against him, and breaking the opposition occupied Ghazna. From Ghazna Qutbuddin sent Nizamuddin to Firoz Koh to discuss the situation with the Ghoride Sultan. The result of these negotiations was that Qutbuddin also got a letter of manumission together with the paraphernalia of royalty—Chatr and Durbash, and an authority to rule over Ghazna and Hindustan (605 A. H.). This formality was not enough to strengthen his position in Ghazna where he was unpopular owing to his being a hopeless drunkard, and a rival of its favourite, Yiljoz. Forty days had hardly rolled by when at the invitation of the people of Ghazna Yiljoz returned. Qutbuddin found his position so untenable that he had to save himself by slipping out through a back gate and fleeing precipitately to India.

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45 Muhammadi, f. 283v, 332r, Alf, f. 72r is not so clear but see Raverty, 501, n.5. Ferishta, p. 63, mentions the facts but not its antecedents; its sequence of events is also not correct. Mubarak Shah, (v), f. 338r also mentions Chatr and Durbash.
CHAPTER III

EXPERIMENTS OF THE ALBARI TURKS

The adventure of Qutbuddin in Ghazna did not prove quite unfruitful. He came back to Lahore with a letter of manumission and a sort of authority to rule over Hindustan. Now he could feel himself stronger inasmuch as he was free from the disqualification imposed by the Muslim law on slaves, and could expect ungrudging support of the religious men as well. To make his position clear he got himself proclaimed formally as an independent Sultan (605 A.H.).

It is, however, not quite correct to regard Qutbuddin as the sovereign ruler of Muslim India, or Delhi, as yet, the Capital of the Indian Empire.¹

Although the historians say that Qutbuddin struck coins in his name, no specimen of them has so far been discovered. Nor do we know anything about the Khutbā. Supposing that he claimed to be the sovereign of all the territories conquered by the Muslim invaders in India, could that claim alone entitle him to be so regarded? True it is that some officers were friendly to him, but it is yet to be proved that they recognised his suzerainty. Not far from Delhi, at Biyāna, the commander of the Muslim forces,

¹ Prof. Ishwari Prasad says Qutbuddin "became the ruler of Hindustan and founded a dynasty of Kings, which is called after his name." (Medieval India, p. 125.) There is but faint justification for the first part [of his statement], and absolutely none for the second.
Bahāuddin, was unwilling to recognise him as his overlord. It is more likely that other commanders also showed similar disregard or at least an attitude of significant indifference. Thus it is no wonder that his coins are non-existent, that Ibni Baṭuṭa does not consider him as the first independent sovereign of Delhi, and that his name is not included in the list of the Sultans whose names Firoz Tughluq had ordered to be inserted in the Friday Khutba.

His work was, however, not insignificant. He had helped considerably in the expansion of the Muslim power in India. But his greatest service was to cut India off from the supremacy of Ghazna which had existed for about two centuries. By doing so he paved the way for an independent Sultanate in India free from any outside interference.

The history of Muslim sovereignty in India begins properly speaking with Iltutmish. The attempt of the supporters of Ārām Shah, son of Qutbuddin, failed miserably. By supporting his cause Lahore lost the pre-eminent position that it enjoyed. Delhi, which was geographically better situated, snatched this honour from Lahore. Although an appanage of Qutbuddin it practically gave no support to Ārām Shah. The highest dignitaries, the commander and the Amirdād,

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2 T. Nāsiri, 145; Raverty, 546-47.
3 Baṭuṭa, III, p. 164.
4 'Aṣḥ, 106-7. Vide also Futūḥatī Firoz Shahī.
5 It is not clear whether Ārām Shah was the real or adopted son of Qutbuddin. See Raverty, 529, n. 4; T. Nāsiri (m), f. 168r; T. Haqqi, f. 6, v 7r; Wassūf, f. 254r, says Qutbuddin had no son.
sent a united invitation to Iltutmish, who was a free Muslim and held the government of Badaon.

Iltutmish was a great military leader. He had won his spurs in the momentous battle with the Khokhars which brought him freedom, elicited the praise of Mu‘izuddin, and attracted the attention of other high officials. He was more sober and religious than Qutbuddin. The choice of Delhi was in the best interests of the infant empire. They wisely chose a strong, energetic, and moderate man instead of proping up some weakling even though he was the son of Qutbuddin. Iltutmish was not a usurper for the simple reason that there was nothing to be usurped. There was no sovereign in India. He was the candidate of the Delhi officials and it was for the future to show if their confidence was placed in the right man.

The election of Iltutmish was opposed by the commander of the guards (Jāndār) of Qutbuddin, but his opposition had no serious backing and quickly collapsed. Then came the jurists headed by Qazi Wajihuddin Kāshāni whose objection was based not on any personal ill-will but on their doubt regarding the free status of Iltutmish. They were effectively silenced and disarmed when Iltutmish showed them the letter of manumission.

The energy and the successes attending all his enterprises, the popularity gained by his moderation,

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*For the other view see Dr. Arnold’s The Caliphate, p. 86.

7 T. Mašir, (A), f. 91r; T. M. (B) 141r; T. Nāsirī, 170.

8 Ibnī Baṭūṭa, III, 164.
and open-handed charity, enabled Iltutmish to extend his sway from Multan to Gaur. By his diplomacy he kept himself aloof from the Mughal entanglements and prevented the possibility of a combined action against him by Yildoz and Qubächa.

Yildoz was flattered when Iltutmish chose to receive from him the insignia of royalty. Yildoz interpreted it as a sort of recognition of his supremacy by Iltutmish. But his further proposals regarding territorial jurisdiction were summarily rejected. Iltutmish was not prepared to go further; indeed he never intended to submit to any other power.

To buttress his position as an independent Sultan, to win a status in the Muslim world, and to satisfy the formalities of the Muslim law, Iltutmish procured a robe of honour from the Khalifa of Baghdad. Whether he had made any special request for it, or the Khalifa himself in his anxiety to enlist the support of a powerful Muslim ruler, against the growing Mongol menace voluntarily sent the robe, is not quite clear. Be that whatever it may, the fact fastened the fiction of Khilafat on the Sultanate of Delhi, and involved legally the recognition of the final sovereignty of the Khalifa, an authority outside the geographical limits of India, but inside that vague yet none the less real brotherhood of Islam (1229). It

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9 These were Chatr (canopy) and Durbash. Shāhidi Ṣādiq, f. 109r, defines Durbash as a mace which was placed where the Sultan desired; no one could cross and go near the Sultan.

10 The nature of the proposals is not specifically given, yet from the accounts it can be inferred. See Rauers, p. 607 and n.6; see also T. Muhammadi, f. 344r. Tabq Akb (D), pp. 64-65.
was no fault of Iltutmish. The Muslim law, political
convention and the heritage from the Ghaznavides
and Ghorides were largely responsible for it. On
coins certainly and possibly in the Khutbat also the
first real sovereign of Muslim India claimed no other
higher honour than that of being the lieutenant of
the Khalifa.  

Iltutmish fully realised that his main strength
lay in his power to enforce obedience, as is apparent
from his action against Ghayasuddin of Bengal.
Like Iltutmish Ghayasuddin had also procured a
patent from the Khalifa of Baghdad, and had assumed
the high-sounding title of Shâhânî Shâh.  
Iltutmish was not to be bluffed, and was not willing to share the
sovereign power in Muslim India. He carried war
into Gaur and compelled Ghayasuddin to recognise
him as Sultân-i-Ázam.  

Iltutmish made Delhi the capital of the empire
and was the first sovereign ruler of Muslim India.  
From this time Delhi rises and Lahore begins to sink
gradually. The sovereign power of Iltutmish was
based on three things. First, he was elected by the
officials; second, he had the right of conquest, and
power to enforce obedience; third he had been formally
recognised by the Khalifa of Baghdad. In spite of
his power he professed his shyness to sit on the throne

11 T. Nâsiri, 174; Raverty, 616, n.4; Wright, p. 20; n. 32
seq. His titles were Nâsir Amîrulmuminin and Nâsrud-
duniyâ waddin.
12 Raverty, p. 774, n.
13 Raverty, p. 610.
14 Bâtuâ on the authority of Qâdî'l Qudât Kamâluddin,
III, p. 164.
or to lord it over the great Turkish commanders who, he said, were his equals. It was not sheer hypocrisy, for in fact the position of the sovereign ruler at that time was not more than that of an exalted peer.

Iltutmish was, however, anxious to perpetuate Kingship in his family. Like Mahmud of Ghazna, he declared his successor in his own lifetime and made his officials offer a formal allegiance. Indeed, in one respect, he outdid the Ghaznavides and the Ghorides. Ignoring his sons completely he chose his daughter, Raziya, to be his successor.\textsuperscript{15} The high officials hesitated to fall in with the proposal, but were silenced when Iltutmish told them that his sons were worthless and that she was the fittest of his descendants to rule. Fitness to rule was the most decisive qualification not only in the eyes of Iltutmish but of the Turkish commanders as well.

After the death of Iltutmish the Turks did not immediately raise Raziya\textsuperscript{16} to the throne. It was a daring innovation. They could not easily reconcile themselves with the idea of a woman ruling over them. It had no parallel either in the history of the Ghaznavides or of Ghorides, and was opposed to the

\textsuperscript{15} T. Nāsiri, p. 185; Raverty, 636, 638-39, 641 and n. 8; T. Muhammadi, f. 349v; Tabq Akb De, p. 75. Ferishta says that in the lifetime of Iltutmish himself Raziya exercised administrative functions, I, 68.

\textsuperscript{16} Though Raziya was for the time being ignored she was considered a rival of Ruknuddin. When Ruknuddin’s mother, Shāh Turkan, wanted to kill Raziya the people of the city made an assault on the palace and captured Shāh Turkan. These events indicate the prestige of Raziya with the people.
conception of sovereignty as laid down by the authors of Muslim political theory. The prestige of Iltutmish and his superior judgment stood vindicated when the Turkish nobles themselves placed Raziya on the throne in the teeth of the opposition of the prime minister, Muhammad Junaidī, and his Tajik supporters.

Considering the times and the general outlook of the Muslim people, chiefly of the military and religious classes, the selection of Raziya was unique and most daring. Although her reign lasted for three years and a half, yet its significance cannot be measured by time. At least, it indicates the freshness and robustness of the Turkish mind in the thirteenth century, which then seemed to be capable of taking such a bold step and trying such an experiment. It was left to only one solitary jurist to observe, some three centuries afterwards that the selection of Raziya was most curious, and to express his surprise at the action of contemporary jurists and Shaikhs who confirmed it. He explains it away by suggesting that it must have been due to the united support and power of the Malikis.

Another significant fact in the history of the so-called slaves was the unanimous recognition by the nobles of the right of the descendants of Iltutmish to reign. There is no novelty in the idea itself; for in the Muslim world there were countless examples to support it, and the law of the Turks recognised it. But in the history of Muslim kingship in India, it

17 Haqqi, f. 9v.

Parker, pp. 103, 213, 217, 234, 239. Brete Schneider Researches, etc., I, p. 158; II, 324, 346.
was the first instance of the sort. The Ministers rose and fell, the great military leaders were greeted or sent to exile, but the descendants of Iltutmish alone were to reign as if by some inherent right of their own. If the nobles brushed aside one and raised another it was on grounds other than the right to reign.

It cannot be said that the Turkish rulers had become supine. What they really wanted was a vigorous man who could rule with strength and yet be amenable to the general wishes of the peers. After the death of Raziya they offered their allegiance to Bahrām Shāh on the specific condition that the deputyship of the Sultan (niyābat) should be entrusted to Ikhtiyāruddin Ai-tigin.\(^{10}\) This conditional homage is also not without significance. True it is that according to Islamic conception of sovereignty, which is based on bilateral compact,\(^{20}\) every act of homage is in a way conditional. Yet, to fasten upon the sovereign a particular man with a view to keep vigilance and control over his use of power was an important fact at least in the history of Muslim India. The desire of the nobles obviously was that while Bahrām Shāh should continue to reign the real power should be exercised by other officials.

The scheme worked for some time though not quite smoothly. A body of three high officials—the Prime Minister, the Auditor General (Mustawfi) and the Royal Deputy (Nāyab)—constituted itself into a sort of governing board. It is interesting to note that

\(^{10}\) T. Nāsiri. 191, 253; Raverty, 751.

\(^{20}\) Von Kreimer (Eng. tr), pp. 266–68.
none of these three officials seems to have held any high military rank. The official triumvirate acted in fair harmony and offered a united front. But Bahrām Shāh like most of the monarchs could not brook this sort of control which reduced him virtually to the position of a figurehead. He began to intrigue; and his plot was so successful that the Deputy was assassinated in the audience hall and the Prime Minister narrowly escaped with his life.

The coup d’etat did not, however, succeed. For shortly after, the Auditor General and the Grand Master of Ceremonies (Amīr-i-Hājib) called a meeting of the leading men of the metropolis, among whom the Chief Qazi was also included. After a full discussion of the whole situation they decided to depose Bahrām Shāh, and invited the ex-Prime Minister to help them. If the Prime Minister had played the game, and not been moved by personal considerations the resolution would have materialised in a most constitutional manner. But he acted treacherously, with the result that the officials who had taken part in the proceedings were dismissed, exiled or executed. After breaking the party the Prime Minister undermined the influence of Bahrām Shāh and played so successfully on the fears of the nobles that the Sultan was thrown into prison and then executed.

The fall of three sovereigns within six years on the score of either anti-aristocratic policy or incompetence was a clear proof of the worthlessness of the

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sons of Iltutmish. One of them had even fled to the Court of Mangu Khan, the Mughal ruler, and brought a Mughal force to help him to the throne of Delhi (651 A.H., 1253-54 A.D.). The Mughals penetrated into the heart of the Punjab, and the fair town of Lahore fell into their merciless grip. It was precisely the time when a really strong man could usurp the sovereign power and expect the support of the people. One of the most powerful and ablest military leaders, Malik ‘Izzuddin Kashi Khān, probably counting on such a probability and relying on his power and influence, proclaimed his intention of assuming sovereignty. The announcement caused much excitement, and the Amirs assembling in a general meeting at the tomb of Iltutmish, repudiated the proclamation and resolved to place a son of Iltutmish on the throne. ‘Izzuddin had to yield and agree to place ‘Ala‘uddin Mas‘ūd Shāh on the throne.

The chief constitutional interest in the history of the family of Iltutmish lies in the struggle between the crown and the peers for the possession of real power. For the time being the nobles apparently gained the point when Nasiruddin for all practical purposes ceased to interfere in state affairs and allowed the younger Balban to exercise full powers in his name. The unenviable fate of his predecessors, the

22 Wassāf, f. 254r. Badāuni Ranking, p. 92.
23 T. Nāsiri, 269. Raverty, p. 780. Ferishta, p. 70, has the word Munādī which is used in Tabq Nāsiri.
24 Raverty, 661. T. Nāsiri, p. 269. T.N. (m). f. 208v; T. Muhammadi, f, 353v; Tabq Akb De, p. 81; Ferishta I. p. 70.
loss of real power, and the gloom cast by the Mughal menace accentuated his religiosity, and he found solace in copying the Quran and such other pious acts. For about two decades he played the King in a most dignified and becoming manner, and died a natural death leaving happy memories and a good name.

Nāširuddin died without leaving a son. His prime minister, the younger Balban, who belonged to the same tribe, was the son-in-law of Iltutmish and father-in-law of Nāširuddin. Old and experienced, Balban had consolidated his power and influence as a minister so well that he found no difficulty in ascending the throne. He seems to have realised that the Turkish nobility being vain and self-conceited could not be kept together without efficient leadership. Moreover it could not be otherwise possible to stem the tide of the aggressive Mughals who were threatening to break through the boundary of the Delhi Sultanat. A dictator with full civil and military powers was the need of the hour.

(The task of Balban was not easy. The prestige of the Delhi Sultanat had suffered considerably while the Turkish nobility had become accustomed to enjoy virtually independent power. Unlike 'Izzuddin he had the initial advantage of getting the kingship with the acquiescence of the nobles and officials.)

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26 Raverty, 706 and n. T. Haqqi, 12r. f. 12v. says that Nāširuddin had made him his Wali Ahd.
27 Zia (a), p. 51.
loc cit and 29; Mubarakshahi (a) f. 13v; T. f. 359.
Balban set himself to the task of placing kingship upon a more dignified and impressive footing. Accordingly, he changed his mode of living and sedulously cultivated a dignified reserve. Those drinking orgies, dances and music that once formed the most conspicuous function in his social gatherings were no longer permitted. Except the Prime Minister none could venture to address him in the Court. Even in his private life he would not permit anyone to talk with him besides a selected few. Claiming his descent from the ancient Khāqān Afrāsiyāb he posed as belonging to a high family. This fact or fiction he propped up by extending his patronage to men of noble extraction only. All important posts he would give only to men of high family. In this policy he went to ludicrous length when he dismissed at least thirty officials who were found to have been of obscure or humble origin. As the prime minister, Nizāmulkululk, had supported one of his nominees of an obscure origin, on the ground of his experience, ability and efficiency, he was castigated and an inquiry into his own descent was ordered. As it was found that the prime minister had descended from a weaver he fell from the royal estimation.

The autocratic policy fitted well with his plan of destroying powerful nobles. Unmoved by any scruples Balban adopted all means fair or foul to get


31 Zia, pp. 32, 39.
rid of such men as were likely to come in the way of his cold calculated despotism.

(Balban’s main object was to raise the prestige of the throne of Delhi which he occupied. He was fully conscious of the ‘dignified parts’ of kingship. Accordingly, he modelled his court after the style of the old Persian monarchs and introduced Persian etiquette, ceremonial and festivities. It was he who in spite of the harangue of Maulana Nuruddin at the court of Iltutmish, instituted the Persian custom of ‘pābōs.’ The credit of introducing the famous Persian festival ‘Naoroz’ also goes to Balban. Under his inspiration Delhi witnessed the magnificence of the Court of Ghazna. People travelled even four hundred miles to have a sight of the Imperial Court.

32 Zia, p. 25. Even the names that Balban gave to his grandson, etc., were Persian. For example, Kaikāūs, Kaikhusru, Kaiqubād, Kaimurs.

33 The author of the “Table Talk of a Mesopotamian Judge” (tenth century A.D.) says that in India it was a custom among the people to signify their assent by prostrating themselves before the King (Trans., Margolioth, pp. 62-63). For references to Pābōs or Zaminbaas see Bhaiqī, pp. 27, 38, 58 and passim. Zia, pp. 38, 100, 142. It seems to have continued even in Khilji times. See Zia, p. 295; also Amir Khusru Tarikhi ‘Alai, E.D. iii, 85. In the time of the Tughlaqs references are in ‘Affif, p. 73 and passim. Similar practice was followed by the Khalifas. (Vide Camb. Med. Hist. IV., 275.) It prevailed in the time of the Seljuk Sultans, also (vide History of the Seljūks. Royal Asiatic Society, Persian MS. No. 9 f., 355v and passim. It existed among Samanis also. (Narshakhi, 91r.)

34 Alberuni refers to celebration of Naoroz by the Khwarizmians (vide Chronology). In Mas’ud’s time see Bhaiqī, 666, 708. Zia also refers to Naoroz (vide p. 113). Amir Khusru has several odes on it. This festival seems to have had to the time of Firuz Tughlaq (vide Affif, 360). pp. 46, 31.
The theory that the sovereign is the vicar of God was also pressed forward to cast a halo of superiority round Balban’s conception of monarchy. The title ‘Zillillâh’ was originally the prerogative of the Khalifa, but since the time of the Seljûqs had come to be applied to others as well. Though they used it for Qutbuddin and Iltutmish, Balban was probably the first monarch of Delhi who took it seriously and made much of it.38 The rivals of Delhi, the Mughal Khâqâns, boasted of supernatural origins. There was no reason why Balban should have failed to utilise the doctrine of the superman known to the Muslims and believed by the Hindus.

(The destruction of the Khilâfat of Baghdad was the heaviest blow that the Mughals had dealt on the Muslim power. All the old and respected Muslim ruling families had been reduced to nothingness in Central and Western Asia. On the Asiatic continent no Muslim power except the ruler of Delhi could keep itself erect. Delhi had become the asylum of many a Muslim crown, and a refuge of the exiled princes. Balban naturally felt that the honour of keeping the banner of Islam floating in the East had fallen to him. He, therefore, did everything he thought likely to maintain the prestige and power of that hope of the Muslim Asia. Although the Khalifa of Baghdad was no more yet his memory was treasured by Balban

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38 Zia, pp. 70, 75. Khusru in Qirânu S’adain calls Mu‘izzuddin Kâiqubâd Zilli Ilâhi. Add. 21104, f. 555v. The author of Tabaqâti Nâsiri uses the epithet in connection with the name of Iltutmish (Everty, I, 597) and of course that of Balban (Tabq., 230).
who inscribed the coins and read the Khutbā in the name of the deceased Khalīfa. It was a sort of challenge to the Mughal Khāqān: for it amounted to: "The Khalīfa is dead, long live the Khalīfa!"

Balban's conception of sovereignty was based on prestige, power and justice. His aim was to dominate over the military and official oligarchy. He was not satisfied like Iltutmish with the supreme leadership of the peers. He was anxious to give a distinct and separate individuality to the crown, make it a magnificent institution that might derive its power, not from the nobility, but its own inherent vitality, and shine out head and shoulders above the military aristocracy. Yet he was not prepared to use his power recklessly without a sense of responsibility. He was influenced by the Islamic view of the sovereign's duties and was never tired of repeating the commonplace wisdom of the ancients. He recognised the religious and conventional limitations, attached much importance to the advice of his Councillors, and tried to respect and act up to them.

Balban had built high hope on his son, Prince Muhammed, who was brave, generous, cultured and popular. If he had succeeded him the work that Balban had begun might have been carried on further. But unluckily Muhammed was killed in a battle.

37 Arnold, Khilāfat, pp. 87, 207, n. 10. All the catalogues of Indian Coins, Balban seems to have known that the line of the Abbasid Khalīfas had not come to an end. He advised his son to procure confirmation of sovereignty by an Abbasid Khalīfa (vide Zia, p. 103).
38 Zia, pp. 34-35 and passim.
39 For the idea of Iltutmish, see Zia, p. 137. 101.
with the Mughals. His death at the hands of the Mughals was a blow from which old Balban never recovered. Balban next wanted to nominate his second son, Bughra Khan, although he held a poor opinion of him. But Bughra Khan being unaware of the fast decay of his father insisted on going back to Bengal. Three days before his death Balban called the prime minister, Khwaja Hasan Basari, the Amirul 'Umarah and several other nobles and told them that he had chosen Kai Khusro, the son of the late Prince Muhammed, as his successor to the throne, and made them offer their homage to him.\[41\]

Balban had hoped in vain that the Turks had changed. After his death his deputy supported by the Amirul 'Umarah decided in favour of Kairaibad, son of Bughra Khan. The prime minister and the chief secretary ('Ala dabir) who opposed the proposal, were unceremoniously turned out.\[42\] Poor Kai Khusro was frightened out of his wits by a forged paper bearing the signatures of the nobles, and fled away from the capital.\[43\] The metropolis, under the influence of the Amirul 'Umarah offered its allegiance to Kairaibad. Kai Khusro tried to bring in the aid of the Mughals but returned disappointed, only to be entrapped and put to death.\[44\]

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\[41\] Zia, pp. 121-22; Mubarak Shahi, f. 17r; T. Muhammadi, 361v, says that after Muhammed's death Balban had transferred the insignia granted to him to Kai Khusro and made him his heir-apparent. Tabq. Akb. supports Zia. Ferishta reconciles both, p. 83.

\[42\] Mubarak Shahi, f. 17v.

\[43\] Baṭūta, III, 176.

\[44\] Ferishta, I, 84, quoting Haji Mohammad Qan'ad. 'Asāmi's Futūh, Salatin.
The election of Kaiqubād introduced a new principle. The fact that he was raised to the throne while his father was yet alive was yet another innovation of the Turkish nobles. It proved that although the Turks had come to show regard to the family of a successful ruler in the matter of succession yet they were free to choose anyone they liked heedless of any nomination.

The father of Kaiqubād, Bughrā Khān, was not oblivious of his claim to the throne. In spite of the lectures that Balban had read to him on the duty of obedience of the ruler of Bengal to the sovereign of Delhi, he repudiated the title of his son and declared himself independent of Delhi. Assuming the title of Nāširuddin he had the Khutbā read and coins struck in his name. This led to some correspondence which was followed by the mobilisation of the armies of Bengal and Delhi. A conflict seemed to be imminent but wiser counsels prevailed. Bughrā Khān

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42 Zia, pp. 142, 148, 156; Baṭuṭa, III, p. 177; Qirānus S’adain in Add. 21104 f. 565r, v, 597r. Mubārakshahi, f. 18r, v; T. Muḥammadī, f. 366r. Ferishta I, p. 85. Tabq. Akb. has followed Zia whose account is too melodramatic to be taken at its face value. The account of Baṭuṭa as it stands requires some corrections. He has probably misled Pt. Ishwari Prasad to say that Nāširuddin went to Delhi to inculcate his son. Mediaeval India, p. 176.

Khusru made Bughrā Khān say - "کام میں ہے یہ فراغ اور بیٹھے ہے - "کاہل کا سب کاہل ہے - " etc., etc. Add 21104, f. 565v. The message sent by Bughrā to Kaiqubād is given at f. 597r.

خود کے انسکے خالقی مرا اسے - "پر خالی سردشتہ خالصہ etc., etc. To this reply of Kaiqubād was very strong and amounted to magnatum (f. 398 add). He claimed his right on the (1) title of Vali 'Ahdi given by Balban; (2) his gift; (3) gift of God.
decided to submit to the sovereign of Delhi at least in form, though not without a protest and warning that the family of Balban was doomed. The prophecy proved only too true.

The Albari tribe⁶⁶ that boasted of its pure Turkish blood had ruled for about eight decades in India. During this period the Turks not only laid the foundation of Muslim kingship but also evolved all the paraphernalia that was later on associated with the Sultanat of Delhi. They also tried to adjust the principle of election with the right of a house to rule, but partly owing to their limited political experience, and partly to the uncertain political conditions of the time and their presumptuousness, and partly to some inherent incompatibility between the principles of election and of hereditary or family succession, they failed to arrive at any definite solution. They, however, impressed upon the minds of the people the idea that the Turk was a born ruler of men and sovereignty was his monopoly.

The fiction or superstition that the Turkish blood alone was entitled to sovereign power must have been resented by the quasi-Turkish and the non-Turkish nobility that comprised of the foreigners as

⁶⁶ That Ilutmish and Balban both belonged to the Albari tribe of the Farakhhalai Turks is mentioned by Minhaji Saraj, (vide Tabq N. MS. 176r, 212v. and Ferishta). The word is a compound of Alb and Ar [vide Kashghari (5th Century. A.H.), p. 144]. The Albaris traced their origin to Afrāsiyab. The claim might be as false as that of Sultan Seljuk ibn Yaknk (Cam. Med. Hist., IV, 300), but it does not vitiate my argument. Zia, 175-76 and Zubdat T, f. 22r. T Muhammadi, 317v. T. Haqqi, 18v consider that with fall of the Albaris sovereignty passed out of the Turks.
also the converted Hindus. It was, however, destroyed by the Khilji revolution which overthrew the Albari oligarchy. One of the most significant consequences of the Khilji revolution was that it gave a heavy blow to the growing sentiment of loyalty that was gathering round the throne of Delhi and was likely to bear good results. If the Khiljis had not nipped in the bud the traditions of dignity and loyalty, and had allowed them to grow up and reach full stature, the element of militarism would have been minimised, and new traditions of rights and duties, of command and obedience, would have probably crystallised as in some other countries of the world. Unfortunately the Khilji revolution threw into shade the civil side of the government, and accentuating the military aspect established a dangerous precedent that continued to sap the vitality of the Delhi Sultanat.
CHAPTER IV
THE ZENITH OF DESPOTISM

The instrument of the Khilji revolution was the muster-master of the army, Jalâluddin, the then leader of the Khiljís. The Khiljís must have been nursing high ambitions owing to their brilliant achievements in the frontier wars against the Mughal invaders. They could have hardly liked the Albarí oligarchy that had blighted their prospects of independent power both on the frontiers and in Bengal.

The severe illness of Kâiqubâd provided an opportunity. Realising that his recovery was beyond all hope the nobles sat in a council to discuss the situation. The supporters of the Albarí party were naturally suspicious about Jalâluddin but they could by no means ignore him. In the Council Jalâluddin was present. They decided to place Kaikâús,¹ son of Kâiqubâd, a child of only three years, on the throne. There was some hesitation about the appointment of a regent. Jalâluddin proposed that the Nayâbat (Deputyship of the Sultan) should be entrusted to Malik Chajjû, a nephew of Balban and uncle of Kaikâús. For himself he asked for the supreme command of the western frontiers and the government of the Iqtâ’s of Multan, Tabarhind and Dipâlpur. This demand was over and above the governorship of Samâna that he already held. True it is that the

¹ Zia, Amir Khusro, Mubarakshâhi and Badakhshân Kaikâús. But Fehishta calls him Kaimur; even Mr. Thomas.
demand was suspiciously great and calculated to arouse the fears of the nobility, but there was no talk of capturing the throne immediately. The proposal was not accepted by Malik Chajjû who suggested that the Deputyship might be entrusted to Jalâluddin and he might be allowed the governorship of Kara. Fakhruddin, the Amir-ul-‘umara and the Kotwal of the Metropolis, supported Chajjû. Accordingly, Jalâluddin was made the Deputy with the title of Siyâsat Khan. Though something can be said in favour of the arrangement yet on the whole it was not very happy or far-sighted.

The respect for the house of Balban was no doubt alive, but what could be the significance of installing on the throne a child by the Turks who hardly brooked an incompetent ruler? The fact was that it was absolutely a new situation. Never before in their history were the Turks in India face to face with a similar contingency. The right of the ruling house was put to the severest test. The supporters of the Albari house wanted to keep power, even by taking shelter behind a child. The Khiljis could hardly fail to see their weakness and embarrassment. It was clear that Jalâluddin and Malik Chajjû were the most important persons in the inevitable conflict.

\(^2\)Zin’s account is less substantial and obviously partial. The more probable version is given by Mubarakshâhi (A) f. 20r, v, op. cit. (v) f. 363v, 364r. Later writers for reasons known to them chose to follow Zin. I have ventured to offer the above interpretation after examining the above two works and T. Muhannadi, Tabq Akh., Badaoni, Ferishta, Mubarak Or., 5318, f. 18v; Muhannadi, f. 370r, Tabqat-i-Mubarak Shahi give Jalâluddin’s title as Zin, p. 170, gives Siyâsat Khan.
The respect for and prestige of the house of Balban combined with the hesitation of Jalāluddin postponed the crisis for three months. For three months Jalāluddin exercised sovereign powers in the name of Kaikāūs. But the Balbanites and the Khiljīs were suspicious of each other and were biding their time. The train was already laid, but the match was set to it by a renegade whose open confession of an active conspiracy to get rid of Jalāluddin gave a long-sought-for opportunity to the young Khiljīs to take the offensive. A selected body of cavaliers under the leadership of the son of Jalāluddin made straight to the royal apartments and carried Kaikāūs out of Delhi. Although the Chroniclers suggest that the Balbanites were organised for action, but the ease with which they were surprised and disposed of shows that the Khiljīs were better organised and that their move was deliberate. Be that as it may, Jalāluddin’s party emerged out successfully.

Himself a man of shaky resolution and restrained ambition, Jalāluddin had at his back the serried ranks of the young Khiljīs who were mightily ambitious and ready to dare. They had now so much compromised their position that they could not turn back safely. Naturally, therefore, they were anxious to push their advantage further and carry the matter to its logical conclusion. The conflict of the parties brought to an end the Albari dynasty.

The Khiljī revolution brought to light for the first time that there was among the Muslims of

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3 Mubarak Shahi (A), f. 20r.
Delhi something like a public opinion that had been unconsciously growing up. Although Jalāluddin had hurled back the Mughal invaders in numerous engagements, and was on the whole a man with a religious bent of mind he could not inspire confidence in the people or enthusiasm for himself. In spite of his admitted generalship and bravery, and the powerful military support at his back he could not muster up courage to enter the capital for about twelve months. Delhi seethed with indignation, but was held in check only by the fear of the revolutionary army. Jalāluddin had to stay at Kilughari, and make it the seat of his government.

The old nobility in the eastern provinces, the Rājas and Zemindārs, joined the banners of Malik Chajjū, the nephew of Balban, when he asserted his right and took up arms in its defence. The news was received at Delhi with joy and the metropolis prepared to welcome him. The movement, however, failed owing to the energetic action of Jalāluddin and his superior generalship.

The affair of Sidi Maula was also connected with the revolutionary activities of the anti-Khilji party. As Malik Chajjū had miserably failed and his ambition lost its edge they decided to marry a daughter of Sultan Nāsiruddin to Sidi Maula, who was then

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4 Zia, pp. 173, 175-76. T. Muhammadi, f. 371v., 373v. Tabq. De, p. 132. The people of Delhi had been mustered at the Badon gate to fight Jalāluddin but were brought round by the Kotwal who knew that resistance would be futile.

at the height of popularity, and raise him to the throne. Unfortunately, little is known of the princess but she could not have been less than thirty years of age. The plan to marry the Sidi with the princess was obviously enough intended to give him a sort of title to the throne and thus use the loyalty to the Albari house against the Khiljis. This plan also failed.

Jalaluddin was extremely anxious to reconcile the hostile elements, and win them over by means of generosity. Whatever might have been his real feelings he exhibited a studied modesty. He would excuse his conduct on the ground of self-defence and throw the entire blame on the party that drove him to desperation. He even refused to sit on the old throne before which, he said, he had stood as a servant. These gestures were partly due to his character, and partly to the hostile attitude of the people of the capital, and were not entirely theatrical. None the less, they indicate the atmosphere in which he lived, and even if they lacked sincerity they show which way the wind was blowing.

Jalaluddin could not willingly adapt himself to the ambitions of his more vigorous and restless followers. Although raised to the throne by the military party he was yet inclined to be peaceful, merciful and humane, not because he lacked personal courage and valour, but because his ideal was to rule with the minimum of bloodshed and oppression. For

7 Note his gesture regarding the title of "Throne of God." Zia, Tabq. Akb.
his generosity, mercy, and professions of humility people had begun to like him. But these very qualities that were expected to disarm opposition, made him unpopular with the young Khilji aristocracy. They began to doubt his political wisdom, charged him with senility, crankiness, and finally pronounced him unfit to rule. The respect which he enjoyed as a great military leader also received a rude shock when he failed to capture Ranthambhore and decided to retreat even against the disapproval of his officials. Obsessed with theoretical wisdom Jalāluddin failed to grasp the situation.

Those who had flocked round Malik Chajjā and were the well-wishers of the house of Balban found in 'Alī, later known as 'Alāuddin Khilji, a nephew of Jalāluddin, an ambitious man who could be persuaded to strike for the throne of Delhi. It appears that the intention of these disgruntled men was to spur on 'Alāuddin to fight for the throne and to bring him into conflict with prince Arkali Khan, the brave and relentless son of Jalāluddin. If their plan had succeeded, a serious civil war among the Khiljis would have followed, and thereby a fresh chance to the Balbanites would have come. But owing to some unexpected developments as also to the shrewdness and

8 Zia, 184, 185, 187, 189-90, 206, 210.

9 Zia and Tabq. Akb. explain it away as due to Sultan's unwillingness to permit the bloodshed of Muslims. Muhammadi, though a follower of Zia, does not conceal the truth (f. 376v).

MS., 101v; Tabq. Akb., f. 116r; Muhammadi, f.
determination of 'Alāuddin, their expectations failed.\textsuperscript{11} 'Alāuddin had a temperament and outlook very different from that of his uncle. He was just the man who could appeal to the sentiments of the young Khilji party. He was decidedly superior to Arkali in tact and judgment. As soon as he established himself firmly he once more began with the traditions left behind by Balban. It is said of him that he inspired so much awe that even his immediate courtiers would not venture to ask for any favours.\textsuperscript{12} Endowed with strong common sense and native wisdom 'Alāuddin once more revived the prestige and power, if not the dignity of the Court of Balban.

The assassination of Jalāluddin ended the policy of vacillation between militarism and the Muslim idea of a benevolent monarch. 'Alāuddin, young and warlike, reverted to the principles followed by _IL_Tutmish and Balban of military efficiency and victorious career. 'Alāuddin was no more imperialist or militarist than his distinguished Albari predecessors. His regime has been styled as militaristic because he could afford to hold the Mughals in check and yet extend the boundaries of his empire. But this was

\textsuperscript{11} The blunder was made by Arkali Khan. The Chronicles do not seem to have taken into account, while criticising the action of Malikai Jahan the danger of leaving the throne of Delhi vacant. She seems to have acted wisely, but discouraged by the impoverished treasury and due to his own shortsightedness Arkali Khan refused to respond to the call of Malikai Jahan. It might also be pointed out that there is no reason to think that Ruknuddin was a mis

\textsuperscript{12} Zia, 338.
precisely the ideal of Balban. The difference is not in essence but of degree. 'Alāūddin carried the old policy to its logical conclusion.

'Alāūddin was shrewd enough to see the state more clearly than any of his predecessors. He had moreover the courage to declare for the first time that the state should look after its own interest and not act under the direction of the orthodox church.13 His policy has been misunderstood and exaggerated. Although in his cups, it is said, he often talked of establishing a new religion he could hardly have meant anything serious. Excepting dominating the clerical lawyers which by no means implied the negation of the Church, 'Alāūddin did nothing that could be considered either contrary to the general principles of Muslim law or the practices of some of the other Muslim rulers. Indeed he was known outside India as a great defender of Islam.14 In India the opinion was divided. While the clerical historian emphasises his disregard of religion15 Amīr Khusrū, a cultured and shrewd observer, held him as a supporter of Islam.16

Although 'Alāūddin was a powerful monarch and could hold his own against any Asiatic ruler he did not assume any title higher than 'Sikandar' and continued to style himself 'Yamīn-ul-Khilāfat Naṣiri

13 Barani, 296, 338. Ferishta, I, III.
14 Wassāf (f. 433r) calls him 'Mujtahid dindār.'
15 Barani (298-99) and his followers.
16 Nyanwār, B. M., f. 13r. has "Kard Qavi Shar'a hād." Also Khāzāyānul Futuh, Br. M., f. 10r.
Amīr-ul-Muminin.” He replied to the proposal of the Mughal monarch, Aljaitu Sultan, of a friendly alliance by throwing into prison the Mughal ambassador who had brought the proposals and getting trampled under the feet of elephants other members of the embassy. He had practically subdued all the independent chiefs and princes of India. That a monarch enjoying so much power and prestige should choose to call himself a lieutenant of the disgraced and powerless Khilāfat is a fact of considerable significance. It was apparently not so much the Khalifa but the idea of Khilāfat that continued to receive the homage of Balban and 'Alāuddin.

It was just after the conquest of Chitor that 'Alāuddin had declared his eldest son, Khiḍr Khān, his heir-apparent, and conferred on him the insignia of royalty. About the end of his reign either under the influence of his minister and favourite general, Malik Kāfūr, or because of his displeasure with the ease-loving, negligent habits and disregard of his orders he disinherited Khiḍr Khān in favour of Shahābuddin, his infant son of five or six years, from the daughter of Ramdeo. The nomination of a minor

17 Wright, p. 38. Rodgers, p. 46. Elliot and Dowson, III, 543. 'Yamin-ul-Khilāfat' signifies 'right hand (or strength) of Khilāfat.' Nasiri Amīr-ul Muminin signifies Assistant (defender) of the leader of the faithful (viz., Khalifa). Amīr Khusro, however, uses phrases like Khalifai 'Ahd, Imāmi 'Ahd, Khalifai Zamān. Khaṣāyānul Futūḥ, f. 56r, 57r, 81v.
18 Wassāf, f. 434v, gives the date 710 A.H.
19 Mubarak Shahi, (r), 27r. f. Ibn-i-BAṣṭuṭa, III.
20 Muḥammad, f. 389v. Feriahtā gives b.
to the exclusion of his three grown-up sons was not desirable in the interest of the Khiljis or the Muslims at large.

But nomination was a recognised principle and with the support of Malik Kāfūr, the all-powerful Minister of 'Alāuddin, it was apparently accepted. Malik Kāfūr, a converted Hindu, could hardly see anything objectionable in accepting the infant as successor to the throne of Delhi. But the Muslim nobility though not questioning the right of nomination could hardly appreciate the significance of the measure. Their attitude is reflected in the events that followed the assassination of Malik Kāfūr within thirty-six days after the death of 'Alāuddin. Mubārak Shah was not immediately recognised as Sultan. After his release from the prison he was only made the Nayab of Shahābuddin. During the sixty-four days of the regency he consolidated his influence and enlisted the support of the nobles so well that he found no difficulty in throwing off the mask and assuming

21 Zia, Mubārak Shahi, Muhammadi, Tabaqat-i-Akbari and Ferishta do not consider the will of 'Alāuddin a forgery. Mubarak Shahi does not contradict it. Baṭuta, III, however, says that 'Alāuddin asked Kāfūr to call up Khiḍr Khān so that he might declare him his Wali 'Ahd but Kāfūr procrastinated till 'Alāuddin died. I do not see any reason to doubt the Indian authorities because (1) no opposition to the recognition of Shahābuddin was offered; (2) Shahābuddin was a legitimate son of 'Alāuddin; (3) his right to rule was for some time recognised even by Mubārak Shah.


23 Mīr Siyāhi says several months. Ferishta's dates would Amir Khusro and Mubārak Shahi's calculations our days. Baṭuta is indefinite (III, 191).
sovereignty. This was then the second important occasion when a minor was thrown out.

Several attempts had been made to shake off the Khilji domination. The old disinherited Albarites, the newly admitted Mughal converts, and many Hindu converts were hostile to the Khiljis. The Albarites were anxious to recover their lost power, and therefore could not get the support of the other two communities who had joined the Khiljis to destroy a favoured oligarchy, but could not view with equanimity the perpetuation of the Khilji domination. The last effort of the Albarites was the revolution engineered by Haji Maula who had tried to raise a descendant of Iltutmish popularly called Shāhān-i-Shah or Shahzada.\(^{24}\) It was now the turn of the converted Muslim, Khusro Khan, to make an attempt of subverting the Khiljis. He assassinated the fatuous Mubārak Shah and himself usurped the throne.

The short reign of about four years of Mubārak Shah witnessed an important event. What the mighty 'Alāuddin had failed to do was done by his son. He was the first ruler who had ventured to shake off the fiction of the Khilāfat and thereby proclaim the sovereign power of the Sultanat of Delhi free from any outside connections. He made the Sultanat of Delhi independent of the Khilāfat, and refused to recognise the legal superiority of any power outside his empire. He went even further when he declared himself the Great Imām the representative of God (al Imām ul

\(^{24}\) T. Muhammadi, f. 386r. Ferishta, I, 107. \(R\)anking, 260. Zia, 280. T. Muhammadi says that the date to the throne was called Nabasa Shāh.
'Āzam khalīfai Rabbul 'Alimīn or Khalīfat ullah or Amīr-ul-Muminīn). 20

'Alāuddin had an ambition to conquer Khurasan and to lead his victorious army like Alexander. He was the first Muslim ruler who had extra territorial ambitions. His mantle had fallen on Mubārak Shah who besides actually styling himself the Khalīfa of God, was desirous of levying Bāj and Khirāj from Khurasan and Iraq. 20

(The Khiljīs did not claim sovereignty on the strength of either racial superiority or election or the sanction of the Khalīfa. They based the kingship on military power and force. Their outlook was different from that of the Albarī kings, and forms an important stage in the evolution of Muslim Kingship in India.

The Khiljīs had made two contributions to Kingship. They showed that Kingship was not a monopoly of any privileged class, but that it was within the reach of those who had the power and ability to hold it. The final blow to the idea of a privileged class was, however, given by the Tughlaqs. For the Khiljīs after all belonged to a tribe that had its individual existence and claimed considerable following while the Tughlaqs had no considerable clan or tribe of their own. The second contribution made by the Khiljīs

20 Thomas, pp. 179–81; Lane-Poole, pp. 44–48; Rodgers, p. 51. Wright, 8, 43 seq. With the assumption of the title of Khalīfa Delī came to be called dar ul Khalīfāt. See inscriptions on coins, and also see Amīr Khuaro's Nāhī, Sipahr, f. 673v, 675r, v, 677v, 701v.
1 Sipahr, Br. M. 673v.
was that Kingship could exist without any special religious support and that the outlook of a king was very different from that of the clergy. This was the greatest contribution of 'Alāuddin).

Zia Barani has written with great indignation against Khusro Khan but it need not be taken to mean a corresponding regard of the people for the Khiljís as such. The Khiljís were not so popular as the Albarí Sultans. Shaikh Bashír was near the truth in saying that “the empire of 'Alāuddin had no foundation.” Consequently when the Khiljís were overthrown there was no great sympathy for them. Zia himself recognises that there was only a small minority that had any genuine grievance against Khusro. That he was supported by a number of influential Muslim commanders can hardly be doubted. There is also reason to think that he had the moral support of Shaikh Nizámuddin who exercised considerable influence over the people. If in the very orthodox circles Khusro was unpopular it was not because of the love for the Khiljís but for fear that the revolution was strengthening the forces of heathenism. The cause of the fall of Khusro should be sought somewhere else than in the popularity of the Khiljís.

27 Zia, p. 378.
28 Zia, MS., f. 204v. Ibn-Batútá says that the nobles of Delhi gave homage to Khusro Khan, whose farmans and Khil'at were accepted by all provincial officials except Tughluq Shah. Tughluq Shah threw the Khil'at on the ground and sat on it. (Batútá, III, pp. 198, 208.) There appears some confusion in Ba'tútá's account, for Tughluq Shah could hardly have gone to that extent so long as his sor...
CHAPTER V

DESPOTISM ON TRIAL

It was Fakhruddin, later on Muhammad Shah Tughlaq, who after a first-hand knowledge of two months realised the weak leadership of the revolutionary party and danger to the old nobility, and conceived the idea of a counter revolution that was likely to bring the Tughlaqs to power. In the later days of 'Alāuddin there were three powerful commanders who could reasonably hope to capture the sovereign power. They were Malik Kāfūr, the conqueror of the Deccan, Ghāziuddin Tughlaq, the terror of the Mughals and the keeper of the gates of India, and Alagh Khan, the able commander and the governor of Gujrat. Alagh Khan was struck down by Malik Kāfūr who in his turn was disposed of by the partisans of Mubārak Shah. If Mubārak Shah had not come between Malik Kāfūr and Ghāziuddin Tughlaq, a struggle for power would most likely have taken place between the last two. The murder of Mubārak Shah once more opened the question. If Ghāziuddin and Fakhruddin had been really so loyal some action might have followed the murder of Mubārak Shah, and the latter would not have so readily accepted the office of the Master of the horse.

But Fakhruddin was an intelligent and acute. After having taken a full account of the wrote to his father to hold himself in
readiness, and urged upon him the advisability of defying the new regime, and slipped out of Delhi. The chances were good. Ghāzi Malik held the important sief of Depālpur, while Fakhruddin was the Master of the Horse. With almost similar opportunities Jalāluddin had captured the throne of Delhi; why should not the Tughlaqs try their luck?

The slogan of revenge for religion, so common yet so effective in the history of the Muslims, was now started. The governors of Sivistān, Multan, Samāna and the able 'Ainulmulk were invited to join the holy cause. It is significant that the invitation was extended only to the officers of the western frontier while all others were excluded from participation in the righteous undertaking! But no one could see eye to eye with Ghāziuddin. 'Ainulmulk declared his neutrality while the other three simply refused to join. Failing in that attempt the Tughlaqs worked upon the lesser officials and encouraged them to defy their superiors. This plan was highly successful. Insurrections broke out in Sivistān, Multan and finally in Samāna also. The party of counter revolutionists became so powerful that Ghāziuddin decided to march upon Delhi. Delhi made a stand against them; and it was not before two well contested battles had been


2 The Amīr Akhurs played very important part in the Delhi Sultanat. Qutubuddin was Amīr Akhur of Muʿizuddin Ghori; Balban's brother was also Amīr Akhur, so were 'Alāuddin Khilji, Muhammad Tughlaq. Prince Muhammad, son of Firoz Tughlaq, was also raised to the throne of Akhur and son of 'Ārīz.'
fought that fortune fitfully declared itself in favour of Ghāziuddin.³

In spite of the unpopularity of the Khiljīs the opinion that the sons of a ruler had the best title to succeed him seems to have survived. The Khiljīs were no doubt less popular than the Albaris, but there was no reason why sovereignty should pass on to a third party. The idea of hereditary succession had taken root, and any aberration from the normal course was an exception to the rule. This is borne out by the history of the Tughlaqs.

When Ghāzi Malik had destroyed his rival he is said to have instituted an inquiry if any son of 'Alā-uddin or Mubārak Shah was alive. His son, who had been at Delhi during the period of change, ought to have known that. It is not, however, clear how far Ghāzi Malik was in earnest or the inquiry was honest. But after some inquiries he came to the conclusion that Khusru Khan had done to death all the sons of Mubārak Shah.⁴ That settled, the way was now open to the throne. Ghāzi Malik was accepted as the ruler. The irony, however, lies in the fact that the Tughlaq who had championed the cause of religion⁵

³ Zia’s is verbose yet less substantial than the terse and straight account of Mubarak Shahi (A), 30v, 31r. Ghāzi Malik had practically lost the battle but his cool attack with only three hundred men on his opponents who had dispersed for plundering, turned his defeat into a victory. Ferishta is confused. See also Bātūta, III, 325.


⁵ Ghayāsuddin was the first Sultan of Delhi to style himself “Al Sultān ul Ghāzi.” (Wright, p. 47.) After a son added to it “Al Sultan ul Sa’īd al Shahīd (Wright, p. 50.)
and had the honour of wreaking vengeance on the ungrateful enemy of the Khilji masters, was not welcomed nor regarded as such by the Shaikh-ul-Islam Nizāmuddin Awliya in spite of the efforts of Muhammad Tughlaq to win him over; and that no tears were shed at his unusual death. The world knows of the way in which Jalāluddin Khilji had lost his life but the death of Ghāziuddin is still involved in suspicion and mystery.

The Tughlaqs had come to power as the champions of the faith. They could hardly afford to neglect the religious aspect of the Muslim polity. Accordingly Ghayāsuddin made his court more austere than it ever had been except probably in the time of Balban. In the presence of the King singing boys or girls or men of questionable character could no longer be seen. Unlike Balban and even 'Alāuddin the Tughlaq was extremely social with the nobles and officials. If Ghayāsuddin had been followed by Firoz Tughlaq the secular note that had been struck by the Khiljīs would have faded away, but it was partly saved by Muhammad Shah. Ghayāsuddin held his court both evening and morning and tried to maintain the prestige of the Delhi Sultanat. Trained in the school of 'Alāuddin he pursued the same policy of military domination. It appears unhistorical to say that the rise of the Tughlaqs represented a reaction against the Khilji imperialism. Ghayāsuddin was a greater annexationist than 'Alāuddin as is clear

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7 Feraish, p. 130.
from his policy in Bengal and the Deccan. It was not till the failure of Muhammad Shah Tughlaq became visible that a reaction began against the policy the origin of which goes back to the time of Iltutmish.

The first Tughlaqs were anxious to show themselves off as the loyal servants of the Khilji masters. They tried to show that they had simply stepped into the shoes of Qutbuddin Mubarak Shah, as if the revolution were only a continuation of the Khilji sovereignty in the Tughlaqs. Even the son of Ghayasuddin, Muhammad Tughlaq, kept up the fiction in full force, rather, in his characteristic manner he carried it to extreme limits. He doubled the endowments (waqfs) that had been assigned to the tomb of Mubarak Shah. Four hundred and sixty men received daily food, over a hundred recited the Quran, and eighty students got stipends in the name of Mubarak Shah. Muhammad Tughlaq made pilgrimages to his tomb and kissed his slippers! So much fuss for an unworthy prince obviously lacks sincerity, and seems to have been intended not for his soul but for the advertisement of the Tughlaqs. Was it that the people did not like violent changes and expected a justification for giving their moral support? In spite of it there was no love lost between Ghayasuddin Tughlaq and Shaikh Nizamuddin and the same ill-feeling continued between Muhammad Tughlaq and Shaikh Nasiruddin, the Lamp of Delhi.

Ghayasuddin had styled himself as Nisiri Amir-ul-Muminin, but Muhammad Tughlaq dropped all
reference to the Khilāfat though he did not himself assume the title of Khalifa or Amīr-ul-Muminīn. Robust in his outlook, and inclining towards rationalism Muhammad Tughlaq began his momentous reign. The gigantic task of the pacification and consolidation of the vast empire that ‘Alāuddin and Ghayāsuddin had created was likely to tax his energies and demand his best powers. He had great confidence in his abilities and perseverance. As much for his personal conviction as for political expediency Muhammad like Balhan believed that the Sultan was the Shadow of God. After the performance of Qutbuddin Mubārak Khilji he could see little trouble in inscribing on the coins “Al Sultān Zilli Allāh” (Sultan, the Shadow of God). With a grand notion of his office Muhammad threw himself whole-heartedly into the task.

In his early reign affairs seemed to get on well. But it was not long when difficulties began to crop up. The first obstacle was that the nobility could not let the Sultan exercise absolute sway, and did not like his dictatorial tone and constant interference with their normal course of conduct. The second trouble was the lack of moral support from the leaders of religious thought of Delhi who were suspected to be unfriendly. The third and probably the most serious difficulty was his own character which would not brook opposition and was most reluctant to make compromises.

Daring and original as Muhammad Shah was he tried several methods to strengthen his sev power. Inspired by the Khilji example h
canon law and based his political conduct on reason. He did not intend to defy the law and took care to sound the opinion of the jurists, but he adopted what appeared to him the best course. To get rid of the high-browed nobility which was old and incorrigible he began to gradually raise a new class of officials from among the lower and non-privileged classes. This was a natural outcome of the revolt of the Khiljis against the theory of a ruling caste. The Khiljis had given emphasis to a principle which had a tendency to filter downwards.

Another method resorted to by Muhammad was to preach to the people directly the importance of the sovereign power and their duty towards the Sultan. This was done by means of coins of copper and bullion. No ruler before Muhammad seems to have realised the use of coins to educate the people so well. His coins bear the most significant inscriptions. On some he inscribed that “sovereignty is not conferred upon every man but is placed on the elect.” On others he says, “he who obeys the Sultan truly obeys God.” Some coins reminded the people that “the Sultan is the Shadow of God” and “God is the supporter of the Sultan.”

In spite of his efforts and exhibition of force Muhammad was made to realize that his affairs were

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9 Zia, 459, 464-65. Shaikh Nizamuddin, Shaikhul Islam and Shaikh Nasiruddin did not get on well with the first two Tughlaqs.
10 Zia, 505; Ferishta, 140.
11 Wright, and Thomas.
12 Thaier, p. 59. Lane-Poole, 63. Thomas.
58. Lane-Poole, p. 63.
drifting contrary to his wishes. Neither his open-handed generosity, nor his personal abilities, nor his strict and impartial sense of justice could save him from getting more and more unpopular. Then followed a remarkable reaction. Swinging to the other extreme he thought that his disregard of the Khalifā might be responsible for the disaffection of the people and a series of natural calamities. In his characteristic manner he craved the favour of the Khalifā in Egypt to confirm him in the Sultanat of Delhi. He ordered (741 A.H.) his name to be removed from the Khutbā and the coins and instead inserted that of the Khalifā. All orders were issued and homage received by Muhammad Shah in the name of the Khalifā. This was a revival of the legal superiority of the Khalifā with a vengeance, and practically amounted to making the Sultanat of Delhi a dependency of a foreign and imbecile power. This remedy also failed and Muhammad Shah began to see failure staring at him in all its grimness.

Worried and confused at the development of unpleasant events Muhammad asked the historian Ziāuddin if he could suggest from his colossal knowledge of history any way to get out of the muddle. Naively enough Ziāuddin told him that one of the methods adopted by some rulers under such circumstances was to abdicate the throne in favour of some acceptable and fit man, and retire into seclusion.

14 Zia, 491-92 seq. For coin of 741 A. H. Lane-Poole, 742 and onwards; see Wright, pp. 52, 58, 10, passim.
15 Zia, loc. cit. Ferishta, 139.
The Sultan observed that he would willingly leave the government in the hands of three high officials provided tranquillity were restored; but so long as they continued to defy his authority he would not change his policy, much less surrender. This was the first occasion in the Muslim history of India that a reference was made to voluntary abdication. It is evident that monarchy had reached a critical stage. If Muhammad Tughlaq had carried out the plan or rather if the anti-monarchical party had been organised and able enough to negotiate on that basis and take advantage of the circumstances it is probable that a change might have taken place fraught with great possibilities.
CHAPTER VI

REACTION AND COLLAPSE

It was at a very critical stage of monarchy and of the Sultanat of Delhi that Muhammad Shah Tughlaq died a broken man. If he had died in Delhi, and not in the far off Sindh, in the military camp which was under the danger of being destroyed by open enemies and treacherous friends, something very different from what actually happened might have come to light. Under the circumstances the officials and the influential persons in the Sindh Camp were called upon to immediately declare someone as their leader, an Imām, who would be capable of saving them from that unfortunate plight and lead them back to safety.

As Muhammad Shah Tughlaq was kind and affectionate towards Fīroz, all eyes naturally turned to him. The Khans, Malikṣ, Qazis, Ulemās and Shaikhs elected Fīroz formally as the Sultan. The lead was taken by Shaikh Nāṣiruddin Awdhi, the Lamp of Delhi, who declared for Fīroz. This was followed by the confirmation of Ghayāsuddin Makhdūm Zāda, a descendant of Abbasid Caliph Almustansir billah who was held in great respect by the late Sultan and lived with him.1 The support of these two highly influential men was likely to carry great weight with the council of electors which after a good deal of discussion2 finally elected Fīroz. The electors did not

2 Aṣf, p. 44.
stand simply on their free choice but supported their decision with the assertion that Muhammad Tughlaq by his last will had made Firoz his heir-apparent.  

Against that decision the first protest was made by the sister of the late Sultan who sent a message to the Maliks that her own son had a better claim to the throne as he was more closely related to Muhammad Shah and Ghayasuddin than Firoz. It is important to note that the claim of her son was not denied in theory. It was met by a reply formally communicated to her by the nobles, through their formal representative that her son was incompetent, and that any course other than the one they had adopted was bound to bring ruin on them in a foreign land.

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3 Zia, 547, 532. Matl'ass'dain f. 86r. Tabq. Akb., f. 92r. Firishta, 144. Sir Wolseley Haig doubts the will. Whether the will was true or false it was used by the contemporaries as an argument.

4 Aff, 46. Pt. Ishwari Prasad (Medieval India, 2nd Ed., p. 257) argues that Muhammad Tughlaq could not have left a son for it was least likely that the sister of the Sultan should have not known that. He says that if she had known of the existence of any son of Muhammad Shah she would not have conspired. This inference overlooks several points: (i) Long before the conspiracy alluded to, she had made a formal protest against the election of Firoz on behalf of her son; (ii) the son of Muhammad Shah even if legitimate was a minor and had few chances; (iii) while she with her son was in the camp, (iv) and he had a better chance for she knew that the nobles and religious men wanted to elect some one immediately; (v) the conspiracy which she hatched later on, came after the son of Muhammad Shah had been thoroughly discredited and declared a pretender whether rightly or wrongly is another question; (vi) but the legitimacy of her son was beyond doubt; (vii) moreover, it is by no means certain if the Muhammad Shah was alive at the time of conspiracy; (viii) personal interest was enough to disregard the claim in favour of her own son or husband.
Firoz had hardly come out of Sindh when he got the news that the Khwaja-i-Jahân, the Deputy of the late Sultan at Delhi, had declared a boy as the son and successor of Muhammad Shah and placed him on the throne. Although ‘Afif says on the authority of Kishlu Khan that the Khwaja-i-Jahân had done so on hearing that the camp in Sindh had been plundered and Firoz was missing, and that he did not know of the election of Firoz the story appears to be an afterthought to justify the loyalty of Khwaja-i-Jahân. The whole trend of his action apparently suggests that he had taken that step quite consciously and deliberately.

This move of Khwaja-i-Jahân created great anxiety to Firoz. The matter was referred to nobles and the religious men. The former were to consider the question of the succession of the boy Sultan as a matter of state policy, while the latter were to declare the Islamic law and the duty of Firoz under the circumstances. The matter became complicated for the Khwaja-i-Jahân had sent a deputation of a number of Ulema to inform Firoz that the Sultanat was in the family of the late Sultan and it would be conducive

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The greatest argument against the illegitimacy of the son of Muhammad is the statement of Mubarak Shahi. Every other consideration favours legitimacy. There is no reason to doubt the honesty of Khwaja-i-Jahân. There appears to be some truth in the statement of Badaoni (Ranking, p. 322) that Firoz “got the Sultan’s son out of his way by some crafty means.” I am inclined to think that the boy raised to the throne by Khwaja-i-Jahân was the son of Muhammad Tughlaq, though I do not agree with the way Ferishta has drawn the inference (I. 145). Besides the known authorities Matl’ass’dain, f. 87r also illegitimate.
to the stability of the realm if Firoz himself were to accept the high office of Nāyab or Regent.6

The theory of the legitimists, namely, the right of the son to succeed was not challenged by anybody. The nobles simply denied the existence of any son of Muhammad Shah Tughlaq. The Muslim Jurists, on the other hand, were not concerned with the genuineness of the boy King, for, from the point of view of the Muslim law that question was irrelevant to the problem. The Muslim law did not regard sovereignty a matter of inherited right. For the Jurists the question was whether the election of Firoz could become null and void in view of the actions of Khwāja-i-Jahān. None of the conditions laid down by the Muslim law necessitating the abrogation of Imāmat at all existed. While the candidate of Khwāja-i-Jahān was a minor, and therefore legally disqualified, the election of Firoz had been perfectly lawful. No wonder that the Jurists declared that Firoz should continue to carry on the duties entrusted to him.7

The Jurists were consulted either to satisfy the conscience of Firoz or probably to strengthen his case, for their decision was a foregone conclusion and could hardly be doubted. Be that as it may, it is important to remember that the nobles denied the existence of any son of Muhammad Shah, and that was the greatest argument, as far as they were concerned to justify their action. Whatever might have been the Muslim law the right of the son to

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6 Ferishta, 145.
7 Ferishta, I, 145. Tabq. Akb. f. 93r.
succeed his father had come to be widely recognized as normal. If they hesitated in accepting a minor it was for fear of a regency with its intrigues as its corollary.

The question of Fīroz's succession is as important as it is interesting. The decision in his favour asserted once more with great force the right of election that had been gradually receding in the background without, however, denying the right of the son to rule. It also emphasized fitness against merely close relationship to the Sovereign. If they had not set aside the son of Muhammad Shah's sister, a new and probably more troublesome precedent might have been established. The slow and imperceptible tendency of applying the ordinary law of private succession to sovereignty would have gained much emphasis.

The circumstances under which he had been elected, the support he had received from the religious classes, his association with them, and his own outlook combined to make him feel that he was a trustee of the Sultanat that his predecessors had built up. His election was the nearest approach in India to the requirements of the Muslim constitutional theory which involved the principle of trusteeship. The later traditions left by Muhammad Tughlaq also suggested the same idea. For, was it not that he held the Delhi Empire in the name of the Khalīfā?

But Fīroz took a more historical and reasonable view than Muhammad who tried to efface himself and his predecessors by removing all names from the Khutbā and reading it in the name of the Khalīfā.
Firoz restored the names of many Sultans, including his own, in the Khutbā. The most significant and surprising fact, however, was that among the names selected for insertion that of Qutbuddin Mubarak Shah was also included. A Sultan who had dropped the name of the Khalifā, and had assumed that title for himself, had little justification to find a place in the list of Firoz. But the Tughlaqs, as has been pointed out, were anxious to maintain the fiction that they were the loyal and legal successors of the Khalijis. Firoz also reverted to the common practice of inscribing the name of the Sultan on the coins.

Firoz had a great regard for the Khalifā and in his own memoirs has described the recognition of his Sultanat by him as the greatest honour that he ever had in his life. There is no doubt about the sincerity of his profession. It was he who for the first time in Muslim India introduced the fashion of styling the Sultan as the Nayab or Khalifā (deputy) of the Khalifā. The titles held by the previous Sultans of India were indefinite, dubious or pompous. Between the old fashion and the later practice of Muhammad, Firoz struck a compromise. His titles

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8 Futuhat, f. 305v.
were expressive of the relative position of the Sultan of Delhi to the Khalifā. Firoz gained some advantage from this measure. Not only that he got a better status in the eyes of the Muslims but he could even use it to cover his own weakness. This he did at least in one case when he waived all his claims over the Deccan in favour of the Bahmani Sultans of the Deccan on the ground that the Khalifā had recommended it.\(^\text{10}\)

The election of Fīroz Shah with the united support of all classes is important from another point of view. Although Shahābuddin Khilji was the first Sultan of Delhi who was born of a Hindu mother, and a mixture of blood was suspected in the veins of Ghayāsuddin Tughlaq yet no case was so clear and definite as that of Fīroz. It established beyond doubt that maternal connections at least did not deter the Muslims of his time from accepting his Imāmat.

The case of Fīroz also showed that it was not absolutely essential that the Sovereign should himself be a successful and distinguished warrior or a military despot. Since the days of Balban, excepting the case of Kaiqubād there had grown up a general tendency of the sovereignty passing into the hands of a great military leader. It was not at all surprising; for the Muslim State in India did require at the helm of affairs a vigorous leader with great military talents. Fīroz Shah, however, was neither a distinguished soldier nor a successful general. In fact his regime was

\(^\text{10}\) Ferishta, 146.
an utter failure from the military point of view. He was not a man of remarkable talents, but he was on the whole a good-natured and well-meaning mediocrity.

Yet he continued to rule, and ruled longer than any other Sultan before him. Considering the age in which he lived this phenomenon requires explanation. The secret of his long and comparatively peaceful reign is to be found outside his military power. The first pillar of his strength was the united Muslim opinion which had brought him to the throne and had never forsaken him. The first inkling of the public opinion at Delhi was seen when it protested vehemently against the Khilji usurpation. By the time of Firoz it had gained strength both in depth and breadth, and could be found in places other than Delhi. There can hardly be any doubt that there was a feeling of loyalty for Firoz.

There were other factors also. The policy of Firoz was calculated to enlist and sustain the gratitude and friendship of the Sunni religious classes. The warlike and military classes were on the other hand allowed to enjoy much latitude and were at least not molested. "Let sleeping dogs lie" was the principle in which Firoz found a solution of the problem that had overwhelmed Muhammad Shah.

Finally, the general prosperity of the people, even of the Hindu Khots and Muqaddams" stood in a remarkable contrast with the desolating famines and constant wars of his predecessor. The masses judge

T. Haqqi, f. 33v.
a ruler by the material prosperity that they can see and feel, and rightly or wrongly they attribute it to the goodness of the ruler just as they lay all calamities at his door.

The irony of history reflects itself in the unfortunate fact that the very qualities that had contributed to the popularity of Firoz were also largely responsible for the weakness of the Sultanat of Delhi. In his old days Firoz had to see the power vanishing almost completely out of his hands, although he did not lose the goodwill of his people. Muhammad Tughlaq with all the unpopularity and storm beating upon him had only talked of abdication. Firoz was however destined to be the first Sultan of Delhi who had almost to abdicate the throne in favour of his restless son.

The policy of Firoz Tughlaq of minimum interference with the ordinary administration of the state, of placing confidence and wide powers in the hands of the ministers, of consulting the jurists and the ministers on all important matters would, in more favourable circumstances, have led to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy deriving its main support from the sentiment of loyalty. Never before, not even in the days of Nasiruddin did the Muslim Kingship in India reach the very verge of constitutional monarchy but for the lack of appreciation and other causes its further growth on that line was stopped. What an irony of fate that it was just on the very eve of such a promising development that both monarchy and public opinion sustained a blow from which they did not recover for quite a long time!
closes an important chapter in the evolution of Muslim Kingship in India.

About the year 1359 (760) Fīroz had declared his eldest son, Fath Khan, as his heir-apparent but the prince died (776 A.H.).12 His choice next fell on his second son, Zafar Khan, who also died.13 Instead of nominating his third son, Muhammad Khan, as his successor he decided in favour of his grandson, Tughlaq Shah, son of Fath Khan.14 The choice led to serious troubles. Although there was the precedent of Kaiqubād, the circumstances leading to his nomination were different. By nominating his second son after the death of the eldest son Fīroz naturally raised the hopes of Muhammad Khan, who must have been sorely disappointed when his claims were overlooked. The intrigue began in which Muhammad Khan worked for his own cause while the Prime Minister stood by Fīroz. It soon took a violent form which led to the murder of the Prime Minister and the virtual abdication of Fīroz.

The transfer of the sovereign power and prerogative was not abrupt. Fīroz’s name was still in the Khutbā and on the coins side by side with that of Prince Muhammad Khan. The name of the Crown Prince was read in the Khutbā amongst the Ghaznavides also but its inscription on coins was an

12 Perishta, I, 146, 147, 148.
13 Thomas; Lane-Poole, p. x.
14 Mubārak Shāhi, f. 408. Muhammad, f. 414r. The story of events given by Muhammad, an almost contemporary writer, is more probable than that of later writers. Compare Muhammad to Mubārak Shāhi.
innovation of Firoz. Although the transfer of power was complete and even formal yet Muhammad Shah was regarded as nothing more than merely an all-powerful Vazir of the Sultan (Wazir mutlaquil‘inān). 15

Prince Muhammad Shah enjoyed all the symbols and powers of royalty—full powers of the crown, title, Khutbā, name on coins, charge of elephants and horse stables. No Crown Prince since the days of the Ghaznavides ever enjoyed the unique position of Muhammad Shah. Yet he did not, rather could not do away with the name of Firoz Shah much less lay hands on his person. He failed, in spite of his solicitude to win the sympathy of the religious and popular leaders. Within a short period the loyalists organized a counter revolution and Muhammad found himself pitted against Tughlaq Shah. He fought a battle and was on the verge of victory when the personal appearance of Firoz Shah brought about a debacle. Losing all moral support Muhammad fled away for his life. It was not the triumph of Tughlaq Shah or of the slaves of the Sultan but of the personal influence that the old and respected Sovereign exercised over the minds of the people. Public opinion was on his side, and if Tughlaq Shah had shown even a fraction of the energy of Muhammad Shah it is doubtful if the latter could have ever returned to Delhi. Muhammad Shah had invited so much obloquy on his head that even after the assassination of Tughlaq Shah not one at the capital or among the leading military or religious leaders thought...

15 Badaoni, Ranking, p. 337.
inviting him. His chief supporters among the Muslims were the Amir Sada whose love for the Tughlaq family was never above suspicion. It was not till Abu Bakr’s supporters were divided that Muhammad Shah got his chance to rule.

The Tughlaq period established another important precedent. After the death of Sikandar Shah Tughlaq the nobles could not easily make up their mind as to whom they should elect as their Sultan. For the first time in the history of the Delhi Sultanat the throne remained vacant for fifteen days. At last a son of Muhammad Shah, Sultan Mahmūd, a lad of ten years was raised to the throne to the great astonishment of the Muslim people. A contemporary poet wrote:

"What a wonder! a lad of ten got a kingdom!"

This was the first definite and clear case when the right of minors to rule was more widely recognised than ever. The principle had been working itself gradually and was acquiring more and more strength. If in his anxiety to be free from the influence of Iqbal Khan he had not fled away to the other party it is probable that his authority had been still more widely accepted.

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16 Firishta, I, 145. Other chroniclers do not say it plainly but the dates given by Badaoni and Tabaqat Akbari lead to the same conclusion. Abdul Haqq and his literal follower his son do not support the statement, probably the former did not bother himself to investigate the truth.

17 T. Haqqi, f. 36 r.

18 Mubarak Shahi, f. 427 r. Tarikh M., f. 434 v calls simply Mullud Khan.
The personal character of Fīroz Tughlaq had enlisted the sympathies of the people, and even in the days of adversity the later Tughlaqs were considered with respect. At least Delhi was with them and loyally supported them as long as it could be possible. This is borne out by the events that followed after the invasion of Timūr. As soon as Timūr turned his back on India the nobles rallied once more round Mahmūd Tughlaq. Although Khizr Khan was the favourite of the Mughals and held the important western frontier he did not put forward his claim to the throne. He had a good opportunity to enter Delhi after his victory over Iqbāl Khan, but he did not take courage, probably because he knew that Delhi was still in favour of the Tughlaqs. So indeed it was; for, Sultan Mahmūd who was in the Hindustan was invited by the people of Delhi and was heartily welcomed.19 Though worthless and weak he continued to reign for seven years and died a natural death. After the death of Mahmūd Shah there was no one even as capable as to take the throne. Sovereignty at least passed out of the hands of the Tughlaqs but for several years to come the new rulers Daulat Khan 20

19 Mabārak Shāhī, (h), f. 427v.

20 Some writers think that this Daulat Khan was a Lodi. Neither Mubārak Shāhī, Tabaqāt Akh, nor Badaoni style him as Lodi, though they have mentioned other Lodi names. T. Haqī (f. 38v) and Zubdat ut tawarikh (f. 55r) call him one of the Firozi princes (Shahrāzdāhī Firozi). On what authority Ferishta I, 166 calls him Lodi, I do not know. I am afraid he has confused this man with his namesake who was a contemporary of Babar. Pt. Ishwari Prasad (Medieval India, p. 317) also calls him Lodi, probably on the authority of Ferishta.
and Khiḍr Khan, without assuming the title of Sultan, continued to issue coins in the name of the Tughlaqs probably to bridge the gulf that separated their usurpation from the regard of the people for the Tughlaq house.
CHAPTER VII

HEGEMONY OR MONARCHY?

The gap between the early Turks and the later Turks, namely the Mughals, was filled by the Afghans. Before the Afghans emerged into prominence the sovereignty of Delhi passed through a period of confusion. The first Khilji ruler and the first two Tughlaq rulers had also adopted legal fiction, but never before was it used so seriously as in the time of the Saiyad rulers of Delhi. After the disappearance of the Tughlaqs both Daulat Khan and Saiyad Khidr Khan "preferred rather to trade upon the traditional credit of their predecessors than to make any demands upon the peoples' trust in their personal solvency."

Khidr Khan found himself in a very awkward situation; for while he was a creature of the Mughals and could hardly afford to disregard them, he had also to face the Muslims in India who had no love lost for them. In his embarrassment he adopted a strange and novel policy that had no parallel in the Muslim history of India, at least up to his time. While the coins were issued in the name of the Tughlaqs, the Khutba was recited in the name of the Mughals though

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1 Lane-Pole, Coins of the Sultans of Delhi, xvii.

2 Ferishta, I, 162, and Pt. Ishwari Prasad, Medieval India, p. 414 (new edition) say that Khidr Khan issued coins in his name. No such coin has been so far known to exist.
the name of Khiḍr Khān was tagged at the end. For himself he coined a new and unheard of title of "Rāyāti 'Āla." The recognition of the suzerainty of the Mughal resulted in the disappearance of the name of the Khalifa from the Khutba and the coins.

This duplicity and fiction could not last long. The son of Khiḍr Khān, who was raised to the throne by the Amirs and Maliks, according to the will of his father, refused to prolong the confusion. He ceased to show deference to the Timurides and even dropped the names of the Tughlaqs from his coins. Assuming the title of Shah Sultan, he began to strike coins in his own name. He also brought back the title of Nāyab-i-Amīr-ul-Muminīn. The consequence of this assertion of sovereign power, independent of the Timurides, was that the Mughals threw their support against the Saiyads on the side of the Khokars, and the Mughals from Kabul renewed their attacks on India. This was not all, rebellions broke out even in those parts where the supremacy of Delhi was recognized. Thus neither in India nor outside was the sovereignty of the Saiyads recognized. Delhi was also unwilling to remain quiet. A conspiracy

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3 Tabq. Akb., f. 106 v. Aini Akb., Jarret, II, 307. Khaki Shirāzi, f. 471 v., 472r. Khizr Khan acknowledged the Suzerainty of Shāhrūkh Mirza. Quatremere Notices et extrait (814—1411), xiv, 196. Also Berthold in Mip p. nja Ma I, 362—3 quotes Häfiz Abru, f. 5. I have not found the reference in Häfiz Abru, Br. M., Or., 2774, f. 5 b. See also Memoirs of Bābār, Bev, 481. Ferishta, I. 162 says that Khiḍr issued coins also in Timur’s name. No such coin has been found though his statement is supported by Tabq. Akb. Forikhi Mahmūd Shahi (Or. 1819), f. 61 v., and other
in which Hindus and Muslims both took part was hatched and Mubarak was murdered while saying Friday prayers in his own mosque. His son was kept on the throne as a puppet. An attempt was made to call in the Khilji ruler of Malwa but the Afghans who were biding their time frustrated it and ultimately obliged the Saiyad ruler to abdicate the throne.

The Saiyads made no positive contribution to kingship. They only emphasized the existence of Delhi factions and public opinion, and gave one more instance of the abdication of the sovereign power. In fact, they were never seriously considered as Sovereign rulers, but were looked upon as creatures of the Mughals, unworthy of confidence, respect or even fear. It however witnessed the last of the fictions by which the succeeding rulers linked themselves with their predecessors. They had ruled at first with the support of the Mughals and then of the Afghans. As soon as the two props were taken away they collapsed.

With the rise of the Afghans the history of Delhi sovereignty entered a new phase. The sturdy Afghans with their love of tribal independence were hardly prepared to recognize easily the idea of an indivisible absolute sovereignty in which all political relations could be summed up in two words: King and Subject.

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5 T. Haqq, 40 r., Tabaq. Akb., 116 r., Badâoni, Rang- ing, 398.

6 For some time coins had the name of ‘Alâuddin but after 854 A.H. his name disappeared from Deli.
The Afghans could not expect any support either from the Turks or the Mughals or the Indian Muslims. They had therefore to rely largely on the support of their own compatriots. It would have been as unnatural as impolitic for the Lodi Sultan to disregard the prejudices of the Afghans and force on them the institutions of the Turks and Tajiks or of the Hindus.

The history of the Afghans is largely based on tradition. It says that the father of Bahlul Lodi, Malik Kala, had vanquished Jasratha Khokar and had become an independent ruler. On assuming the sovereign power he ordered the construction of a throne spacious enough to seat all his brethren. As a throne of that dimension was an obvious impossibility he satisfied himself with a throne on which he could sit with thirty to forty leading Afghans.7

Islam Khan, an uncle of Bahlul Lodi, was in the service of the Saiyads. He had a large following and was one of the leading nobles of the kingdom of Delhi. He appears to have been shrewd enough to see the advantages of combining under a great leadership the Lodi Afghans, at least of the Punjab. His choice fell on his nephew Bahlul whom he declared his successor in preference to his own son Quṭb Khan. Although Quṭb Khan was an able, intelligent, thoughtful and brave young man, he was superseded on the ground that he was born of a Hindu girl and would therefore be unacceptable as a leader to the Afghans.
In spite of the nomination the opinion of the Afghans was not unanimous. There were three parties. One supported the candidature of Firoz, brother of Bahlul, another supported the claims of Qutb Khan, and the third was for Bahlul. After some bitterness and intrigues all parties including Qutb Khan joined the colours of the masterful Bahlul Lodi. These events show that the Afghans had an open mind in selecting their leaders, though there was some hesitation in their accepting the son of a Hindu girl. Their attitude in this respect was in contrast with that of the Tughlaqs. It was however only a temporary phase.

When Bahlul snatched the sceptre of Delhi he found himself pitted against the Sharqi kings who besides being wealthy and powerful were supported by the anti-Lodi Amirs. In his anxiety he sent an appeal to all the Afghan tribes inhabiting the Roh, inviting them to share with him the privilege of defending the honour of the Afghans, and the benefits of the new empire. The appeal found a ready response and crowds of Afghans flocked round him entertaining all kinds of hopes.

8 Firishta, I, 173.
9 Afsâna, f. 14 v.
10 Tabaq. Akb., f. 119 v.; Firishta, I, 175.
11 Roh, according to the definition of T. Khan-i-Jahâni, is the hilly country that extends from Sawâd and Bajawar to Kaswi in the Division of Bhakkar, and from Hasan Abdal to Kabul and Qandhar, f. 57 v., 58 r.
12 T. Sher Shabi, Or., 164 f., 3 v.
Bahlūl Lodi, in keeping with the sentiments of the Afghans and the traditions of his father, claimed to be nothing more than one among the peers. He was quite satisfied with the title of Sultan and the leadership of the Afghans. In his days the Afghan empire was a sort of confederation of tribes presided over by the Lodi kings. This idea of kingship had little affinity with that of his Turkish predecessors. It was a complete negation of the conception of Balban and ‘Alāuddin, and was different from that of even Iltutmish. Bahlūl would not sit on the throne even on the occasion of public audience, and would not issue orders savouring of command. He addressed the tribal leaders as “Masnad-i-‘Āli” (Exalted Lordship). Indeed so much regard did he evince for them that if anyone of the great leaders felt displeased he would go to his house, ungirt his sword, and sometimes even put off the sash of his turban.

(The Lodi idea was a compromise between nomination, and implied election. Bahlūl Lodi was not elected by the Afghan tribes but was nominated by his uncle to the leadership of the Afghans. He did not however use his powers in an autocratic manner, and was anxious to make the Afghan leaders believe that he drew his power and authority from their goodwill.)

The plan of Bahlūl of establishing a sort of confederation had more disadvantages than advantages. While it minimised the possibility of intrigues by ambitious nobles for the throne by providing a safety
valve for their ambition, it was also calculated to make them more conscious of their influence and power. Bahlūl raised the power and prestige of the nobles at the expense of the Sultan. He lowered the dignity of the Crown, and reduced kingship to a sort of exalted peerage. Instead of the rule of one autocrat he permitted numerous autocrats. Whatever satisfaction his idea might have given to the Afghans it could hardly inspire the non-Afghan communities in India. The non-Afghans, whether Hindus or Muslims were excluded from his polity and had no voice in the matter of government. Bahlūl was at best the chief leader of the Afghan tribes and not a king of all the people of his kingdom. While the foundation of his kingship was deeper than that of the Albari rulers, his conception was far narrower than that of either Balban, the Khiljis or the Tughlaqs.

In spite of its defects the experiment of Bahlūl Lodi is interesting. Its immediate usefulness was proved by the spirit of loyalty that it awakened among the Afghan tribal leaders who in fighting for him felt to be virtually fighting for their own cause. By toning down the autocratic conception of kingship, Bahlūl Lodi had taken a substantial step towards making it amenable to the wishes of the peers. Responsibility to peers and nobles has been an important link between autocracy and constitutional kingship. Here again was a chance for Muslim monarchy to change for the better and take a constitutional form. But the lack of appreciation, factions, jealousies, selfishness of the nobility, indifference and ignorance of the people let the opportunity...
The successor of Bahlul Lodi, Sikandar, was nominated by his father—in preference to 'Azam the son of his eldest son. It appears that experience had taught Bahlul Lodi to be cautious in his dealings with the Afghans. He had warned Sikandar not to give high position to the Surs and the Niyazi Afghans, for the former were believed to be too ambitious and the latter utterly faithless. This shows that the homogeneity of the Afghans was not likely to last long.

Sikandar had to move cautiously. He had six brothers and a struggle for succession was bound to follow. Bahlul Lodi himself had parcelled out the kingdom among Afghan leaders and had placed his son Barmak Shah on the Sharqi throne at Jaunpur. The Afghans could see no reason why the Empire should be ruled by one man only and not by two or even more. Finally, Sikandar Lodi was born of a woman of the goldsmith caste and was not considered an Afghan of pure blood. The Afghans who could set aside Qutb Khan, the cousin of Bahlul on the ground of his lineage could turn against him also.

But Sikandar was aware of the dangers of a divided authority and allegiance, and was not prepared to share the empire with anybody. Not only that, it was against the Muslim conception and the traditional wisdom of the Persians, the division would

14 Tabaq. Akb., 123 r., v.; Daoodi (A), 14 r., 22 r.
15 Mushtaqi (A), 46 v.; Daoodi (A), 14 r.
16 Isma'il Jalwani bluntly expressed his feeling. Afsana, 22 v., 40 v.
Abdat-ul-Tawarikh is very explicit. 71 r.
have been fatal as much to the empire as to the Afghan power. After making two experiments to let Bārbak Shah rule at Jaunpūr he changed his mind and annexed it. After his victory over Bārbak Shah his chief supporter Mayara (Mubārak?) Khan was taken prisoner. Instead of pushing him, Sikandar deceived him with respect and placing his sword before him said that if he was not qualified to rule he might gird the sword on the waist of anyone he thought best. This was surely a theatrical pose on Sikandar’s part, but he probably realized its psychological effect on the unsophisticated Afghan soldiers. After a good deal of fighting Sikandar vindicated his right, and although the nobles later on conspired to place Fath Khan on the throne their attempt failed. Sikandar won, and the unity of the Empire was maintained.

Although Sikandar took care to respect the susceptibilities of the Afghans and refrain from any radical change in the policy of his father he was convinced that the institutions and the ideas of the Afghans would not fit in with the conditions of India. He was therefore gradually introducing a change in their conception of kingship. He gave up the attitude of humility and assumed a high tone. Unlike his father he sat on the throne in the open Darbar and issued orders in the form of commands. Some of the Court etiquette of the early Turkish rulers was also revived and the nobles were taught to show formal respect to the Sovereign. Even while he

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18 Afsāna, 24 v.
was absent his orders were treated with great deference and received with much formality. An Amir had to go six miles to receive his farmân which he placed on his head. It was read in a public meeting and all had to listen to it standing. It is obvious that Sikandar was taking inspiration not from his Afghan predecessors but from the Turkish rulers of Delhi. As he was energetic, strong-minded and strict the Afghans had to respect his wishes. But the Afghans were hard-headed, and liberty-loving people and could not easily adapt themselves to the new idea of kingship.

The mantle of Sikandar fell on his son Ibrāhim. There was no doubt as to his ability, courage and bravery. He was unanimously raised to the throne. Simultaneously with his accession the proposal of dividing the empire between himself and his brother Jalāl Khān was broached up. If the principle had been established further divisions would have been inevitable, for Ibrāhim had five brothers. For the time being only Jalāl Khān who was born of the same mother, was in the list but others would also have come up in the course of time.

The proposal was temporarily agreed to, though Ibrāhim could have hardly relished it. Fortunately the Afghans on this occasion were sharply divided in

10 Daūdi, 24 r.; Tabaq. Akb., 133 r. v.
20 Daūdi, 50 r.; Khān-i-Jahān, 94; Tabaq. Akb., 133 r.; Ferashtus, I. 188.
22 T. Haqqi, 44 r.
their opinion. Whether the policy of Sikandar on the political experience of some leaders had taught them the wisdom of undivided authority, there is no doubt that there was a strong party opposed to the division. Fath Khan and Khān-i-Jahān, two most influential officers were vehement in their protest and loudly declared that the idea of the division of the empire and authority was utterly mistaken and against all reason.23

Ibrāhīm Lodi naturally welcomed such a move on the part of high officials. (Relying upon their support he issued a farmān to all the officials serving under Jalāluddin commanding them not to recognize his authority,24 but Jalāluddin by his generosity, gifts and conciliatory policy had become popular in his kingdom. He simply ignored the farmān and ordered the coins and Khutba in his name. He also began to prepare himself for an armed resistance in case Ibrāhīm used force.)

But Ibrāhīm had made up his mind. (He attacked Jalāluddin and in the course of time reduced him to utter helplessness.) Indeed he was so relentless that he refused to listen even to the modest proposal of Malik Ādam to give the jagir of Kalpi to Jalāluddin who showed great willingness to forego even the shadow of royalty. Jalāluddin fled for his life, but was captured and handed over to Ibrāhīm who got him executed.25

23 Fuller details in Khān-i-Jahān, 95 r., v.; see also Daūdi, 51r.; Tabaqat. Akb., 133 r.; Ranking, p. 430.
24 Daūdi, 51 v.; Khān-i-Jahān, 96 v.
After disposing of his rival, Ibrāhīm turned his attention against the Afghan leaders who enjoyed great freedom and power in the previous regimes and were likely to offer an obstacle in carrying his policy to its logical conclusion. He openly confessed that kings have no relations nor clans, and that all men and clans were his servants. What he probably meant was that no one could claim any special privilege or right on the ground of being a relation or belonging to a tribe or clan of the sovereign. All the privileges and rights emanated from the Sovereign. This was an undisguised declaration of his idea of kingship. Not only did it have some affinity with the kingship as understood by Balban, 'Alāuddin and Muhammad Tughlaq but it showed some advance, inasmuch as it completely swept the tribal claims aside. It was a complete negation of the idea of Bahlūl Lodi. Although unpalatable to many an Afghan leader it was a more sound principle.

As a proof of his seriousness and in keeping with the traditions of his father, Ibrāhīm now sat on a gorgeous throne studded with jewels, and ordered that no one whosoever should sit while the Sultan was in the Darbar. The proud Afghan nobles who claimed equality with Bahlūl Lodi had to stand before the imperial throne with their hands folded. The whole atmosphere had changed. The Balbanite etiquette now ruled and the nobles were made to feel that the king was not one of the peers but much above them.

26 Ferishta, I. 188.
27 Tabaq. Akb., 133.
The proud Afghan leaders began to grumble but Ibrāhīm paid no heed. On the other hand he felt that unless he ousted the old nobility his object could not be realized. Accordingly he began to cut down the tall poppies and at times did not hesitate from adopting questionable and ruthless measures. Those Niyāzīs whom Bahlūl had hesitated to admit in offices of influence were now used as a set-off against the Furmulis.\(^{28}\) He had not gone far in his persecutions when the old Afghans got alarmed and to defend their vested interests took up arms and shook off his allegiance.\(^{29}\) Ibrāhīm was not cowed down by such defiance. He was prepared to deal with the rebels. He crushed the three most formidable rebels, S‘āïd Khan Lodi, Islām Khan and Fath Khan. Husain and M‘ārūf Furmulis were also hard-pressed. What Ibrāhīm wanted was that the nobles, however high they might be, should submit to his orders.) This is shown by his attitude towards Malik Miān Husain whom he wrote to forgive, and promised to give him a large jagir should he come back to his allegiance.\(^{30}\)

\(^{28}\) Note the observation of Mushtāqi (A), 46 r.

\(^{29}\) Mushtāqi (A), 41r.

\(^{30}\) Daūdi (A), 57 r., v.
time of his predecessors. Ibn Ibrahim’s attempt to crush the dangerous oligarchy created by Bahlul and Sikandar had the tacit approval not only of the other clans but also of those Lodis and Furmulus who did not belong to the privileged house.

In the struggle the cause of Ibrahim Lodi was gaining decisively. The disaffected nobles now began to realize that they had little chance against him. The Nuhannis in Bihar were in suspense and terror, while the Lodi in the Punjab sought for the help of the old enemies of the Afghans—the Mughals. An attempt to raise an uncle of Ibrahim to the throne was also crushed down. Blinded by selfishness and mad after revenge the discontented Afghans could not see their real interest and adopted a policy that eventually led to the ruin of the Afghan power. Without attempting to justify their foolishness and short-sightedness it might be said that they were not the only Muslims who took recourse to such mean measures. The first to do that was Jalaluddin, son of Iltutmish, and the second was Muhammed Shah, son of Firuz. The seekers of the Mughal help did not realise that they would be the first to suffer and that Babar’s idea of kingship was not much different from that of Ibrahim.

Ibrahim Lodi paid for his haste and rashness with his life. With his fall came to an end the power and prestige of the Lodis, the Furmulus and Nuhannis. True it is that they continued to struggle on for some

31 Numerous instances can be gleaned from Chronicles. For example see Zubdatut., T., f., 73 r.
32 Wasi, f. 264 r., supra.
33 T. Muhammadi, f. 422 v., 423 r.
time, but their attempts were the echoes of the past thunder, the last flickering of a worn-out candle. Later on, when the curtain rose, instead of the Lodis, Furmulis and Nūhānīs, the Surs and Niyāzis appeared on the political stage.

The principle for which Ibrāhīm lost his throne and life did not die with him. On the other hand the arrival of the Mughals gave it further strength. When the Surs came to power the Afghans once more found themselves face to face with it. Indeed it was difficult to avoid a conflict of two definite and opposite principles. The Afghan ideal of tribal and clannish independence was set against the Indian idea of supreme monarchy buttressed by the Turkish theory and practice and favoured by the situation of the time. Two of the best Afghan rulers, Sikandar Lodi\textsuperscript{34} and Sher Shah\textsuperscript{35} had unequivocally declared that India was not Roh and sovereignty was not a group affair. The idea of a confederation was not properly understood by the rulers of the time. It was possible to some extent in Rajputana where most of the states were of old standing and settled relations had come to exist between the rulers and the ruled. But the Rajput confederacy also was no more than a fighting machine, and that too of not a high order. If the Delhi Sultan had permitted the break-up of the empire he could not have averted a conflict between different clans for supremacy, or the risk of a final collapse under Rajput or Mughal pressure. The principle for which

\textsuperscript{34} Afsāna, 24 v.
\textsuperscript{35} Abbās Kh., Or., 164 f., 19 r.
Ibrāhim Lodi had fought was sound, but the occasion and the methods he chose were highly mistaken.

The Lodis did not assume any title higher than that of Shāh Sultān. They were the last of the pre-Mughal rulers of Delhi to call themselves Nāyab or Khalīfa of the Amīrulumuminin. This was probably because they inherited it from the Saiyads. There is no evidence to show that they had any connection with the Egyptian Court. The formal name of the Khalīfa was dying out in India and provincial Indian rulers had begun to drop it from the coins. The rulers of Kashmir are not known to have coined in the name of Khalīfa. In Malwa, Hoshang Shah and Muhammad Shah did not strike coins bearing any reference to the Khalīfa; and although revived for some time, it was given up for good. In Gujrat, excepting Ahmad Shah II and Mahmūd Shah no Sultan cared to make any mention of the Khilāfat on coins. The same tendency was visible even in the south.
CHAPTER VIII

REVIVAL OF MONARCHY

(The founder of the short-lived Sur dynasty, Sher Shah, came to the throne as the leader of the Afghan national movement against the Mughals. In some respects his accession to the throne of Delhi was different from that of any other ruler. It was neither by the right of inheritance, nor through his family connections, nor as a revolutionary leader of the army that he got the throne. He stood for the assertion of the Afghan power, co-ordinated all the broken pieces, and fought for the recovery of the sovereignty that once belonged to the Afghans.) With every victory that he scored either in Bihar or Bengal, or the eastern part of the United Provinces his power and prestige rose higher.) The Lodis in spite of the support of the young Furmulis had been thoroughly discredited and no longer the sentiments expressed by S'aif Khan to the Rana of Chitor—that the Afghan sovereignty belonged either to the Shāhu Khail or the Yusaf Khail could inspire the Afghans. Both the Lodi houses—Shāhu Khail and Yusaf Khail—had proved incompetent and treacherous. Sher Shah therefore had no rival from the ruling Afghan family to contest his title seriously. (Even before Sher Shah actually dealt his final blow on Humāyun he was recognized by the Afghans

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1 Daoodi, 57 r.
as their national leader. The proposal of formally conferring sovereignty on him was broached at a most psychological moment.\(^2\) The Afghans were elated with their success under his masterly leadership, and had just begun to feel that the final victory was quite within their reach provided Sher Shah led them to the field. Faith in his leadership and the prospects of a mighty victory were fully exploited. Concealing his deep ambition and real intentions Sher Shah gave a typical Afghan pose when he observed that it did not behove him to sit on the throne and address formal farmāns to such noble and distinguished comrades as the Amirs of the great Lodi Sultans, or to make them stand before the throne.\(^3\) The shrewd 'Isā Khan quickly and rightly gauged the real feelings of Sher Shah and observed that the indulgence of Bahlūl and Sikandar to the Afghan sentiments was contrary to the laws of kings, and urged him to vindicate them. (Moreover, he said that sovereignty suited the fittest, and that as he (Sher Shah) possessed all the qualifications he need not hesitate to assume it.\(^3\) Other Afghans naturally endorsed his remarks. This was precisely what Sher Shah wanted. He wanted to make it clear that it would not be possible under the changed conditions to go back to the policy of Bahlūl. Immediately he ordered festivities to celebrate the occasion. Like the early Turks he ascended the throne and the royal umbrella was spread over his head.) Was it not a vindication of the principle of

\(^2\) Abbās Khan, Or., 164, 47 r., 48 r.

\(^3\) Abbās Khan, Or., 164 f., 47 r., 48 r.
Ibrāhīm Lodi? (But Sher Shah was the idol of the Afghans, he was their Shah long before he marched on Delhi. No other Muslim ruler had gone to Delhi or Agra with so strong a title to rule.)

(The rise of the obscure Afghan clan of the Surs destroyed in the eyes of the Afghans the superstition of the right of any one particular clan to rule. While widening the outlook of the Afghan tribes, it set up a dangerous precedent to the ambitious leaders of other powerful clans such as the Niyāzis. For the time being, however, the name and fame of Sher Shah held the Afghans spellbound.

Sher Shah fully realized that the conditions in India were very different from those of Afghanistan and that the Lodi regime had collapsed. But could he quickly revert to the Turkish conception of sovereignty, which was an institution head and shoulders above the aristocracy of the bluest blood? He had before him the experience of Ibrāhīm Lodi, and the wounds caused by his policy had not yet healed up.) There were still old-fashioned Afghans like Shaikh Bāyazīd Sharvānī who, even after Sher Shah's conquest of Northern India, were not willing to appear before him on the ground that he had changed the manners of the Court and did not show due respect to the Afghans. (Sher Shah was too wise and cautious to act precipitately and throw off the mask prematurely.

To begin with, Sher Shah started with a compromise between the early Turkish principle of ab-

4 Abbās Kh., Or., 164 f., 55 v.
solute monarchy and tribal leadership of Bahlūl. Quite early in his reign two facts were clear. He was not at all prepared to share the sovereign power with anybody. Nor was he prepared to exhibit the super-sensitivity of Bahlūl. His outlook was wider. He was a lover of the history of the great rulers of the past. He had seen two Mughal rulers. His reforms were modelled on those of ‘Alāuddin. For the time being he had made a moderate start, but it is improbable that he could have remained fixed at that point if his reign had lasted longer. Equally improbable was it that the great Afghan leaders would have remained satisfied with the arrangement after the joy of victory had been forgotten, the Mughal menace had passed away, and normal conditions had been restored. The conflict of principles is insidious and at best only dormant.)

Sher Shah demanded full obedience to his commands and did not hesitate to take swift and drastic measure against those who disregarded his wishes. He also realized the value of the spectacular side of kingship as is evident from the show that he had given to Mullū Khan of Malwa. The chroniclers have not described, but his coins have survived to tell the tale of his unrealized ambitions. In the whole of the

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5 Note his remarks in reply to the suggestion for the partition of his father’s jagir made by Mohammed Khan; also the conditions on which he had accepted the administration of the jagir from his father. (Abbās Khan; Dacodi, 67 v., 69 r.)

6 Cases of Mullū Khan and Muhammad Khan Sur and the reprimand to Shujaat Khan are in point.

7 Dacodi, 87 v., 88 v.

F. 7
pre-Afghan history of Delhi, no ruler except Quṭbud-din Mubārak Shah had assumed the title of Imām or Khalīfa. It has been pointed out above that there was a tendency to drop all references to the Khalīfa, and that the Lodis were the last to respect it. It was left to Sher Shah and the Surs to revive the memory of Mubārak Shah and to assume the Khilāfat for themselves. Besides styling himself AsSultān ul ‘Adil, Al-Amīr ul Ghāzi, Sher Shah calls himself Khalīfatuzzamān and AsSultan ul ‘Adil, Sher Shah Khuld Allah Khilāfathu. The former two titles remind one of the early Turks and Timur and the latter speaks for itself. That such a sober, cool and calculating man as Sher Shah should choose to style himself as Khalīfa on silver and copper coins, is far more significant than the action of Mubārak Shah Khilji. As in some other respects, Sher Shah is entitled in this matter also to be considered as a precursor of Akbar. At least he forged an important link in the chain of ideas that found their full expression in Akbar.

(The reign of Sher Shah was unfortunately short. The time for a crucial test of his ideas did not come within his lifetime. It would have come with the inevitable conflict between the crown and the Afghan nobility, that would have followed sooner or later. He was suspicious of the Niyāzis and was thinking as to how he could pull their fangs out. In the case

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8 Wright, p. 109, Nos. 772 to 779. Also Lane-Poole, p. 117.
9 Abūs Kh. T., Sher Shahi., Or., Br. M., Or., 164 f. 79 r., v.; 1782 f., 100 v., 101 a.
of conflict the principles of Sher Shah would have definitely come to light. Divine right, hereditary succession, election or nomination, which of them Sher Shah would have finally chosen cannot be for the present ascertained with any measure of certainty.

The sudden and unexpected death of Sher Shah at Kalinjar immediately raised the question of succession. It is said that he had made the son of his eldest son his heir-apparent, but it is not certain. He had left behind him two grown-up sons, but none of them was present on the spot. The elder son 'Adil Khan was at Ranthambhore and the younger Jalal Khan at Rewa. The army had just gained a remarkable victory and it was not improbable that the question of the division of spoil might put a severe strain on its cohesion in the absence of a ruler.

The leading Afghan nobles in the camp sat in council to deliberate as to whom they should declare their ruler. 'Isa Khan opened the discussion and concluded his brief and pointed speech by saying: "I recollect Sher Shah remarking occasionally, that neither of his two sons was fit for the throne; Adil Khan being so addicted to play, gaming, luxury, and amusements as entirely to neglect his own concerns and estates, which was utterly incompatible with a concern of such paramount importance as the Sultanat; and Jalal Khan's disposition being too rancorous and feeble. These qualities, it is true, are in entire repugnance to the administration of an empire; but he is still brave

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10 Badaoni, Bib. Ind., p. 363; Br. M., MS. 6581f, 75 v. Tabaquati Akbari does not mention it.
and the favourite of fortune." In the discussion that followed there was perfect unanimity on the point that the choice should be strictly confined to the house of Sher Shah. But there was a sharp difference of opinion on the right of the elder son to succeed in preference to the younger. Those who were in favour of Jalāl Khan urged that any son of the deceased monarch could be placed on the throne, and in support of it they cited the cases of Muʿizuddīn Kaiqubād and Sikandar Lodi.

As the discussions tended to be long and opinions were sharply divided the proposal of Shaikh Muhammad to send letters to both the princes simultaneously urging them to come immediately, and to elect whoever happened to arrive first, was accepted by both the parties. This was not quite fair for it was obvious that Jalāl Khan who was nearer was likely to reach first.

As was expected, Jalāl Khan arrived first and was accordingly declared King. This simple and childish procedure of election was hardly expected to carry conviction especially with those high officials and great commanders who were in charge of large provinces as the Punjab, Malwa and Eastern Rajputāna. Even Jalāl Khan doubted the seriousness of the officials and hesitated to assume sovereignty.

11 Dorn, p. 142 et seq. following the MS. of the R.A.S. The British Museum, MS. (Egerton, f., 139 r., v.) is an expurgated copy of the fuller work and does not give the speech. It simply says that Isā Khan Ḥājib's exertions crowned Islam Shah. The speech put in his mouth might not be exactly 'Isā Khan's but it indicates the points that were considered in the council.
With obvious theatrical gesture and insincerity he observed that "he would never perform such an act of baseness, as to accept that power while his elder brother was alive." His supporters were, however, in dead earnest and unhesitatingly declared that "Sovereignty was nothing but a magnificent present bestowed by the grandees of the empire on any individual they chose, which turn had now fallen to his lot."  

In principle the Afghan supporters of Jalāl Khan were right; but the practical question was whether all the grandees of the empire had been consulted. As that was not the case further complications were inevitable. In the struggle that followed the opponents of Islām Shah sustained a crushing defeat. Besides other causes one important reason for the collapse of the opposition was that it was not unanimous in its choice regarding its candidate. While Khawās Khan stoutly and to his last maintained the right of the eldest son of Sher Shah, the notorious Niyāzīs scoffed at him and held that sovereignty was not a heritage that ran from father to son but was the privilege of the mightiest. For holding such dangerous opinions the Niyāzīs were ruined, and with them died for good.

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12 Dorn, 145. Badaoni (Ranking, 486) says that he wrote an apologetic letter to his elder brother, offered him the throne and requested for deputyship. See also Tabaq Akb., 175r.
13 Dorn, 145.
14 Daūdi, 107r.; Dorn, 165. Tabaq. Ak., 176v Mush-tāqi (A), 76r.
15 Daūdi, loc. cit.; Khānjahāni, 143v.; Afsāna; 144v. Ranking, 492. The Niyāzīs were sanguine of their success and hoped to wrest sovereignty from the Surs.
the theory that they upheld. The principle of right triumphed and even the Afghans had to admit it.

Like Ibrāhīm Lodi Islām Shah also tried to curb the Afghans who, in spite of the misfortunes of the Lodis had not changed their general outlook. He subdued them thoroughly and inspired terror even in the heart of the Afghans. In his hour of triumph he seems to have clearly exceeded the reasonable limits when he "heaped the dust of infamy and oppression on the head" of the Afghans. What Balban, the two great Khiljīs and the Tughlaqs did not do Islām Shah actually did. The early Turks were satisfied with Zāmīnbos and Pābos, but Islām Shah made his nobles show respect to his slippers! "Every Friday," says Badaoni on his personal knowledge, "the Amīrs used to pitch a lofty tent. . . . and bring the shoes of Salīm Shah together with a quiver which he had given to Sardar, in front of the throne; and first of all the commander of the troops, and after him the Munsīf followed by the others in due precedence with bowed heads and every expression of respect would take their appointed places. . . ."\(^{16}\) Is it not a paradox of history that this was done by a king of the Afghans who were famous for their presumptuousness, love of equality and freedom? In Islām Shah Ibrāhīm Lodi stood more than vindicated.

\(^{16}\) Badaoni. Ranking, 497. Afṣāna, 148v, says that Ibrāhīm insisted on the nobles standing before him and since his time it prevailed as an etiquette of the Court. This statement is not correct for the Sultanat of Delhi but has some force regarding the Afghan period. In fairness to Islām Shah it might be pointed out that on social occasions he was free from all formalities and quite homely. (See op. cit., 156v; Khanijahāni, Egerton, f. 150v.)
Islam Shah was as ambitious as his father. Sher Shah had a mind to extend his sway in the Deccan and to smash the Persian Kingdom. Islam Shah also had vastly increased his military power with a view to make extensive conquests. He retained for himself the title of Khalifatul 'Adil that his father had brought into vogue. His word was law and no one dared defy it. If he had utilized his opportunities with restraint and lived longer he might have given his principle more durability. But he died young and after his death the Afghans again relapsed in their old follies.

Islam Shah's son was a minor. Neither the early Turks nor the Afghans were willing to accept a minor as their ruler unless under very exceptional circumstances. A scramble for power was, therefore, a foregone conclusion. It was, indeed, a very unlucky thing for the infant Sur Empire that Sher Shah and Islam Shah had very short reigns and the latter was succeeded by a minor. No one considered it a crime when 'Adil Shah, son of Sher Shah's brother Nizam snatched the throne from the boy Sultan. But the Afghan opinion was prejudiced against him when he murdered the boy in tragic circumstances.

Without the strength of Islam Shah or even of Ibrāhim Lodi, the musician King 'Adil Shah tried to carry on Islam Shah's policy of crushing the powerful and turbulent Afghan leaders. The history

17 T. Haqqi, 47r.
18 Wright, p. 123.; Lane-Poole, 124.
of Ibrāhīm Lodi and 'Ādil Shah is very similar regarding their attitude towards the high pretensions of the Afghan tribal leaders. Both fought for the same principle.

Nor had the Afghans forgotten the idea of dividing up the kingdom. For while 'Ādil Shah was fighting in the east Ibrāhīm Shah Sur\(^{20}\) and Sikandar Shah Sur assumed independence in the west. To avert a conflict between the two the proposal of dividing the empire was put forward and found considerable support from the Afghans.\(^{21}\) Ibrāhīm, however, rejected it and faced the consequences.

The history of the first and the second Afghan empire was that of a conflict between the principle of Kingship and the ideal of Afghan tribal leadership. In a duel between the king and the nobles the former had no doubt gained some points, but the issues were not well fought out when in both cases the Chaghtai invasion cut short the fight, and eventually the Afghan power was lost. But the principles were carried over to the Mughals who were called upon to settle it.

\(^{20}\) It is amusing to read that during his short stay at the capital he ordered the Khutba to be read according to Šar‘a. Consequently on a Friday the Khutba was read in the name of the Khalîfa of Baghdad! Mūshtuqî (A), f. 77r.

\(^{21}\) Badaoni, Ranking, 543-44.
CHAPTER IX

TURKO-MONGOL THEORY OF KINGSHIP

The Chaghtai conqueror Bābar came to India with ideas that were not quite similar to those of either the early Turkish rulers of Delhi or the Afghans. Claiming the blood of Changīz Khan and Timūr in his veins Bābar could also claim a system of ideas which reflected the Mughal, the Turkish and the Islamic cultures. By geographical situation, family alliances and political relations the house of Bābar could not but imbibe consciously or unconsciously the traditions and beliefs of all those people.

The Turks, the Iranians and the Mongols all considered the position of a sovereign as something higher than simply a leader. The story of the birth of the ancestor of Changīz Khan clearly indicates the element of supernatural origin of his personality. He was according to the legend the Son of Light. Such a belief was quite in keeping with the star worship that had continued to prevail among the Mughals down to the fourteenth century, if not later. The semi-divine origin of the family of Changīz coupled with the enormous prestige of his success and career had made his house an object of inspiration and awe, and had preserved sovereignty in his family up to the sixteenth century. Sovereignty was regarded as their birth-right not on the strength of some vague traditions as was the case with Balban's house, but on actual
facts of centuries of history. Such was the spell of the house of Changīz Khan that even Timūr could not venture to break it, and thought it advisable to exercise full power in the name of a descendant of Changīz and feel contented with the humble title of Amīr or Beg.

The Mughal Khan—the Great Khan—was different from the Khalīfa of the Islamic theory. The Great Khan was purely a political and military and not a religious leader. It was no part of his duty to enforce a well-defined and immutable code of divine or quasi-divine system of law as was the case with the Khalīfa. While the Islamic conception of the sovereign hedged the Khalīfa round by the Shari‘at Law the Mughal Sovereign had no such limitations. He was a political sovereign pure and simple.

True it is that there was a sort of election even among the Mughals in determining the Great Khan but the choice was very narrow and had nothing to do with any spiritual or religious connotations.

Another important feature of the Mughal polity was that of dividing the empire among the princes not on the territorial but tribal basis. The tribes were assigned to them and they were established in the territory inhabited by them. These princes exercised almost full powers of government within their jurisdiction and were practically independent. Theoretically, however, they recognized the suzerainty of the Great Khan who ruled in Mughūlistān—the homeland of the Mughals. The theory had gained reality from the traditions and conventions prevailing among the Mughals.
These were some of the leading ideas that were mixed up with the Islamic theories and practices in the course of time. Although the authenticity and antiquity of the Malfuzâti Timuri is not beyond question they might reasonably be taken to embody the ideas which were believed to be prevailing in the time of Timûr. They unmistakably show the fusion of the Mughal and Islamic ideas that must have taken place by the time of Timûr.

The central point in Timûr's conception of sovereignty was his belief that the various offices in an earthly empire are symbols of those in the empire of God.¹ This idea was imparted to him by, or at least had the sanction of Quţbul aqţâb Zainuddin Abu Bakr, his spiritual guide. Timûr believed that "since God is one and hath no partner, therefore, the vice-regent (King) over the land of the Lord must be one."² Accordingly he lays down that the King must make the people feel that he is not under the influence of anybody.³ It does not however mean that he inculcated the unrestrained use of power. He himself showed considerable regard for his nobles and officials and has emphasized the importance of consulting the wise just as Balban and others had done. But the final decision lay with the sovereign who might or might not follow such counsels.⁴

¹ Malfuzâti. Davy. For similar ideas see Hâfiz Abru, Or. 2774, f. 3v.
² Malfuzâti, 86—88, 228.
³ Malfuzâti, 220-21.
⁴ Malfuzâti, 9, 11, 15.
Timūr was not satisfied with being a purely military and political leader. He was brought up in Islamic traditions, hence he had a religious view of kingly office. With suppressed exultation but obvious satisfaction he gives a full copy of the letter (Maktūb) of the great scholar Mīr Syyad Sharīf conferring on him the title of the promoter and renovator (Murawwaj wa muajaddid) of the religion of Muhammed. He was the eighth of the line of such promoters. In each century there was one. The previous seven in the order of time were Umar Abdul Aziz, Māmun, Muqtadir billah, Azaduddaula, Sultan Sanjar, Ghāzān Khan and Aljaitu Khan. It is significant that the last two Mughal sovereigns and Timūr have been linked in the same chain at one end of which appear the names of the Ommayyids and Abbasid Khalīfās. It is also said that both Timūr and Shāhrukh Mirza read the Khutba in their own names in the mosque like some previous Khalīfās.

Under the Timurides the old Mongol custom of dividing tribes among the princes was transformed into a territorial division of the empire. Timūr himself divided his empire among his sons and his practice later on was followed by his successors. Nevertheless the occupant to the throne of Samarkand had some glamour which others lacked but there does not appear to be any reality in it.

In one respect the grandfather of Bābar, Abu S'aid Mirza introduced a great change in the policy

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5 Malfuzāt, 178—196.
6 Badaoni, 268; Tabaq. Akb.
of Timūr. Although in practice the Timurides enjoyed full powers and were sovereign in their own jurisdiction, yet in theory they had left the fiction of the ultimate sovereignty of the Great Mughal Khan undisturbed. Abu S'aīd, however, gave a rude shock when he said to the Mughal sovereign Yunis Khan "the old order of things has been changed, you must now lay aside all your pretensions, that is to say, the mandates will be issued in the name of the dynasty" (of Timūr) because, "I am Pādshāh in my own right." This step was resented by the Mughals and aggravated the hostility that they bore to the Timurides. It might be for that reason that Abu S'aīd did not inscribe on the coin any new and high title. In fact he remained contented with the titles of Sultan and Mirza.

As to the women, they exercised enormous powers in the state and there are cases when during a period of interregnum or of the minority or absence of the sovereign they exercised the powers of regency. In this respect they offer a strong contrast with the women of the time of the early Turkish rulers of Delhi. Among the latter normally the harem exercised little influence, and paradoxical as it might appear they had to their credit Raziyah who was sovereign in fact and theory. The Mughals while permitting great influence normally to women did not recognize her title to hold sovereignty. This point has been clearly

7 T. Rashidi Elias and Ross, p. 172.
9 For Abu S'aīd's coins see Br. M. Cat., Vol. X.
brought out in the letter that Shah Begum of Badakhshān wrote to Bābar. She said, "though I, being a woman, cannot myself attain the sovereignty, yet my grandson Mirza Khan can hold it." This claim was recognized by Bābar fully.

Like the Safavīs the Timurīdes did not consider minority a disqualification for attaining sovereignty. Bābar was himself a minor, though the eldest son of his father, when he got the throne. The Mughals of Farghana supported even the claim of Jahangir Mirza who was younger than Bābar. They did not show any reluctance to recognize a minor as their sovereign like the early Turks and the Afghans in India.

In the time of Bābar the nobility was very powerful. The nobility and the religious classes both exercised great power in Central Asia. As the early days of Bābar were full of troubles and anxiety it was natural that he should show respect for them. Indeed at times he had to humiliate himself before them and follow their advice to their satisfaction.

By 1507, Bābar felt it advisable to assume formally the title of Pādshāh. He had established himself securely in Kabul, had got an upper hand of the Arghūns and was the best of the surviving descendants of Abu S̱aʿīd Mirza. The political link between him and the Mongol Khan was cut off and the latter had been thrown into the shade by Shaibānī Khan. By the death of Sultan Husain Baiqara he

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10 Rushidī, p. 208.

11 An Empire Builder of the Sixteenth Century by L. F. Rushbrook Williams, p. 95.
was left the best representative of the house of Timūr.\footnote{12} Besides all these things the necessity for asserting himself had also arisen. The growth of the Ottoman pretensions in the east, the rise of the Safavis in Persia and of the Shaibānides in Maawaraunnahr (Central Asia) were calculated to throw into oblivion the descendants of Timūr who once exercised sway over all of them. The Ottoman Sultan held the title of Qaṣar, the Safavi of Shah and the Shaibānides of Sultan. Taking a hint, probably, from the intentions of Abu S‘aīd Mirza Bābar also assumed the high and distinctive title of Pādshāh.

Bābar's own outlook was more practical and political than religious. Although he had unbounded faith in the will of God and had versified the Islamic law for the guidance of his second son, his memoirs do not show any superstitious and morbid regard either for the schoolmen or the details of the law. The ease with which he could adjust his actions to the wishes of Shah Ismail Safavi is a good example of his general outlook.

As one proud of his ancestry and believing in the inherent right of the Timurides to rule. Bābar was a believer in the hereditary right to sovereignty. In his letter to Sultan S‘aīd regarding the succession to the authority in Badakhshān he laid emphasis on the “hereditary rights” of the heir.\footnote{13} He could not understand and expressed surprise at the custom of Bengal where any person who could kill the ruler, and usurp

\footnote{12} A. S. Beveridge, Memoirs of Bābar, I. 344 r.
\footnote{13} Memoirs, I, 274; Elias and Ross, T. Rashīdī 389; A. N., i. 115-16.
the throne received the homage of the officials and the people. He was astonished at the theory of the Bengalis: "We are faithful to the throne; we loyally obey whoever occupies it." 14

Unlike some of the great Turkish Sultans of Delhi, Bābar was social and mixed rather freely with his officials. He would even accept social invitations from his officials and would participate in dining, drinking and drugging. He relied on his personal charm and influence rather than on a highly artificial social etiquette. Sometimes he gave audience to foreign envoys in a most informal manner, and he himself says how on one occasion he shouted from the house-top where he was drinking with his private friends, asking an envoy to come up! 15

In his letter to Humāyūn written in 1529, almost at the end of his career, he summed up his final opinions regarding sovereignty: "No bondage equals that of sovereignty; retirement matches not with rule." 16 He advised him to "take counsel and settle every word and act in agreement with the well-wishers." Bābar himself acted accordingly. These ideas were not very different from those of his predecessors in India, but in that letter there was one statement that had a strong flavour of Central Asia. Referring to the probable dispute between Humāyūn and Kāmrān he says that "the rule had always been adhered to that when thou hadst six parts Kāmrān had five." 17

14 Memoirs, 482-83.
15 Memoirs, 402. The envoy was Darvish Muhammad.
16 Memoirs, 625, 626, 627.
17 Memoirs, loc. cit.
Personally, however, so far as the sovereign power (Pādshāhi) was concerned, Bābar did not like the idea of the division of authority. On one occasion during the Kabul period he had remarked that "partnership in rule is a thing unheard of." In spite of his political experience Bābar seems to have failed to see that territorial divisions between princes and the maintenance of sovereign authority over the whole do not match well and keep the State in perpetual tension. The early Turkish rulers and the Afghan rulers of Delhi, excepting Bahlūl, fully realized the dangers inherent in the policy. It did not always work well even in Central Asia and there were no better chances for it in India.

The Timurides were free from any belief in the legal superiority of the Khalīfa dead or living. The position of the first four Khalīfas was however different. They had come to enjoy an extraordinary place in Muslim thought. They had acquired a semi-religious and sanctified position never attained by any Khalīfa of any dynasty. Their name on the coins indicated nothing more than a respect to their memory and an act of piety. Moreover by the time Bābar conquered India even the nominal Khalīfa of Egypt had disappeared. That the Timurides could ever accept any position of inferiority to the Ottoman Sultan was entirely out of the question. Indeed they considered themselves superior to the Ottomans.

The succession of Humāyun had in its background an interesting episode. Nizāmuddin Khalīfa, the Vazir

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18 Memoirs, 293.
F. 8
of Bābar, was suspected of some grievance against Humāyun and therefore is said to have intrigued to raise to the throne Mahdi Khwāja, a brother-in-law of Bābar. Mahdi Khwāja was reported to have uttered in a monologue words signifying his intention to kill Khalīfa on coming to the throne. On hearing his remarks Khalīfa changed his mind, ordered Mahdi to be interned, and calling Humāyun from Samhāl raised him to the throne.19 Bābar called in the high officials and made them offer their homage to Humāyun.20 If Humāyun had been really superseded a very dangerous precedent would have been created quite in the infancy of the Mughal empire and would have proved a source of endless troubles. The recognition of Humāyun, the eldest son of Bābar, was a happy beginning and might have led to healthy traditions if the course of events that followed had not weakened its force.

The Mughal principle of the division of the empire was put to a test soon after the death of Bābar. There was no great difficulty felt at the beginning regarding the theoretical position of the sovereign. Humāyun was unanimously recognized by the Mughals as the successor of Bābar to the sovereignty of Delhi; and the Khutba was read and coins were struck in his name. The practical question, however, was the way in which the empire was to be divided between the brothers. Should the same proportion of six to five hinted at by Bābar be maintained?

19 See Appendix.
20 Ak. N., I, 117.
For the first time the experiment of division was seriously tried in India. It must at once be recognized that the conditions under which the experiment was made were very unfavourable. The Mughal empire had not yet gained a firm and strong footing in India, and its enemies were yet very powerful and threatened to destroy it. But the traditions of the Mughals and even the wishes of Bābab were there. There was practically no escape out of it. The division was made. Askari and Hindāl Mirza were comparatively moderate in their ambitions but Kāmrān insisted on the lion’s share and got it. No other Sultan of Delhi would have tolerated such an arrangement, and the perplexity exhibited by Humāyun indicates that he too was nervous.

In the early stages nothing untoward happened. Apparently things appeared to be getting on well. The Khutba was read in the name of Humāyun in Delhi, Kabul and Ghazni. The plan was not very likely to succeed. If it had succeeded, then a possible solution might have been found out of the evil that took a violent form in the later days of Shāhjahān and after the death of Aurangzeb. The wars of succession would not have been then so bitter as to paralyse the Mughal Empire.

As the difficulties of Humāyun increased in volume the hollowness of the arrangement became more and more visible. After his final defeat at the hands of Sher Shah, Humāyun thought of falling back upon Badakhshān. But Kāmrān refused to permit him to pass through Kabul on the ground that it had been given by Bābab to his (Kāmrān’s) mother. Humāyun
was thunderstruck at this reply and urged that Bābar had specifically declared his intention not to give Kabul to anybody for all his sons were born there. It was then that Humāyun must have realized that the division of the empire meant something more than simply an administrative arrangement. The final blow was given when Hindāl was also obliged by Kām-rān after a siege of four months to drop the name of Humāyun and insert his name in the Khutba at Qandhar also, in spite of the attempts of Bābar's respected sister. Thus the first and the last experiment of the Mughals to introduce the principle of division of authority broke down in India.

Humāyun had a mystic bent of mind, and as such probably believed that the phenomenal world was only a Shadow of the Reality that human eye cannot ordinarily see. He had also faith in astrology like many a Timurid. As a Muslim he also believed that the king was the Shadow of God on earth and therefore was expected to do within his sphere what God did in relation to his creation.

The cumulative effect of all those ideas resulted in a theory that was reflected in the institutions evolved out by him. He believed that just as the Sun was the Centre of the Material world, similarly the King whose destiny was closely associated with that great luminary, was the centre of the human world. Accordingly he constituted the servants of the State in

22 Gulbadan, 147.
22 Gulbadan, 161-62.
23 Khwand Mir. H. Nama.
twelve orders, of which he himself was the Centre. A tent with twelve divisions corresponding to the signs of the Zodiac was constructed to symbolise the lattices through which the light of Empire shone. In all this he might have drawn inspiration from the institutions of the Mughals and Timūr, or even from the ideas of the Shias.

The most glaring manifestation of his ideas was during his stay at Gaur where he introduced a new form of Court etiquette. In Bengal he used to cast a veil over his crown, and when he removed it the people used to say, "Light has shone forth!" He also washed his sword in the river and said, "Upon whom shall I gird the sword." This manifestation led some people to believe that Humāyun claimed divinity, and when he was in Persia he was taunted for his pretensions.

The early Turks believed in the theory that the king was the Shadow of God on earth. But no one seems to have given so much emphasis to it as Humāyun. His first official historian, Khwandmir, calls him a personification of the spiritual and temporal sovereignty (Jām'ī Sultanati Haqīqi va Majāzi) and His Majesty the King, the Shadow of God (Hazarati Pādshāh Zill-i-İlahi). He was believed to

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24 Khwand Mir. H. Nama.
25 A. N., Beveridge, 361.
26 Badaoni. Ranking, p. 573.
28 Kh. Mir Humāyun Nama, Or., 1762 f. 128 r.
29 Kh. Mir Humāyun Nama, f. 133 r.
receive institutions and inspiration from God. (Ilhāmātī. Rubbānī va Vāridātī Subhānī). His rival Sher Shah also appears to have believed that his mind received special suggestions and directions from God. The latter had better justification to think so than the former! With all this there is little wonder that Abul Fazl in his exuberance uses the word Insānī Kāmil, or the Perfect Man, for him.

In the whole range of the Muslim history of India, there is hardly anything more amusing and significant than the transfer of sovereign power for a few hours, to the water-carrier who saved the life of Humāyūn. Gulbadan who was then old enough to understand things, and was present at Agra, says that Humāyūn made the water-carrier actually sit on the throne, and "ordered all the Amirs to make obeisance to him. The servant gave everyone what he wished and made appointments (Manṣab)." This strange expression of gratitude involved a principle that had no justification in the Islamic law or precedent among the Timurids or rulers of Delhi. It implied that Sovereignty was a personal property of the Pādshāh who could bestow it upon anybody or do with it as he

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30 Kh. Mir Humāyūn Nama, f. 123v. Also see Ak. Nama, I, 120.
31 This can be clearly inferred from the anecdotes given in Dacodi.
32 A. N., I. 115.
33 Gulbadan, 140, says two days. Jauhar, B.M., 16711, f. 25v. Stewart 19, says two hours (Sāʿt). Whatever be the duration the fact of transfer is there. The sovereign according to Muslim theory cannot transfer his sovereign right to any man or assembly. Macdonald, Muslim Theory and Jurisprudence.
pleased. It was not approved by Kāmrān, and Hindāl did not attend the Court of the water-carrier, the former being ill and the latter had gone to Alwar. What 'Askari did we do not know. Probably he attended it like other Timurid nobles. The event itself though of no practical importance is significant enough of the attitude of Humāyun towards the Sovereign power. Indirectly it brought to light the nature of the interpretation that Humāyun put upon the idea of hereditary right.

In spite of the grand notions of Humāyun regarding the position of the Padshah and his expectations of receiving absolute obedience from the nobles, the latter on more than one occasion forced their will on him. The first occasion was in Bengal when Humāyun found himself stranded there owing to the activities of Sher Shah in his rear. Supported by 'Askari the officers obliged Humāyun to augment their regiments, increase their stipend, and advance a large sum of money in hard cash.34 Even when Humāyun’s days of adversity were over and Kāmrān was a prisoner in his custody the nobles offered him a bold front. As Humāyun seemed to be unwilling to inflict drastic punishment on Kāmrān, they told him plainly that they had suffered long enough for him and were no more prepared to see their wives and children in captivity or under torture.35 "The matter had passed beyond

34 Jauhar, 14-15.
35 Gulbadan, 201. See also Tabaq. Akb., 165 r. Jauhar; though not so explicit refers to the matter, Br. M. MS., f. 121 v. Stewart (104).
bounds, it could no longer be coped with." In spite of Humāyun’s evasions the officers remained “firm in their request.” Humāyun then asked them to put down their demands in writing. They asked for the execution of Kāmrān, and supported their demand with legal opinions. Humāyun did not go to that extent but had at least to order Kāmrān to be blinded.

After Humāyun had disposed of his brothers he commended to his men the ideal which the followers of Shah Ism‘aīl Safavi had placed before them. They were so loyal that they “flung themselves from a sky-high mountain to seize his (Shah’s) handkerchief.” Humāyun did not realize that Shah Ism‘aīl had enjoyed a religious status and a national position that no Timurid could claim from his subjects. Not long after he was made to realize the difference when his officers objected to go with him to Kashmir on military and political grounds. When they found Humāyun determined they deserted him so completely that he was compelled to abandon his intention and return to Kabul.

Like his father and the Surs, Humāyun was not willing to recognize any power politically superior to him. He, however, did not assume the title of Khalīfa. Although in Mecca and Medina the Khutba was read in the name of the Ottoman Sultan, he, like his father did not attach any importance to it. Humāyun had not forgotten the humility to which Bāyazīd Ildiram

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36 Ak. N., Beveridge, I, 603.
37 A. N. Beveridge, I, 557.
was reduced by Timūr. In fact he had cited the incident in one of his bombastic letters to Bahādur Shah of Gujrat. In his last days when the Turkish Admiral Sidi Ali Rais praised before him the power and dignity of the Ottoman Sultan, Humāyun expressed his utter indifference and complete surprise. Though he did not object to Sidi Rais praying for his sovereign in a Friday prayer, the incident was so insignificant that no one except the loyal Admiral took notice of it!

39 Travels of Sidi 'Ali by Vambery, pp. 51—53. Sidi 'Ali makes Humāyun say (what he hardly would have said) that the ruler of Turkey was the only man worthy to bear the title of Pādshā... he alone and no one else in the world."
In her introduction to Gulbadan Begam's Humāyun Nama⁴ and in an appendix to it⁵ and also to her scholarly translation of the memoirs of Bābar³ that learned lady, Mrs. A. S. Beveridge has discussed at length the episode connected with Humāyun’s succession. She says that the version of Tabaqātī Akbarī “taken as it stands, it is incredible.” She does not wholly reject it but offers three suggestions: (1) the plan of Khalīfa was with the concurrence of Bābar, (2) it concerned Hindustan only and was considered in connection with Bābar’s intended return to Kabul; (3) there might be some “case of truth” if the name of Muhammad Zamān (son-in-law of Bābar) were substituted for it. In support of her suggestions she has argued: (a) Kabul and not Delhi was the chosen centre of Bābar’s Empire; (b) division of Empire was common among the Timūrids; (c) for several years Bābar was thinking of returning to Kabul; (d) Muhammad Zamān Mirzā, son-in-law of Bābar and a Timūrid had to be provided for; (e) Bābar’s feeling is indicated by the fact that early in 1529 he had given him the insignia of royalty; (f) it was within the competence of Bābar to choose his successor. She closes the discussion by saying that the idea was abandoned after Humāyun’s illness.

⁴ Humāyun Nāma, pp. 24—27.
³ Memoirs, 702—8.
⁴ Memoirs, 704-5.
With due deference to her great scholarship and high authority, I venture to differ from her for the following reasons: (1) Both Nizāmuddin and Abul Fazl were in possession of the best sources of information, and both put the episode during the last illness of Bābar. Nizāmuddin’s father had intimate knowledge of the whole affair as it was he who frustrated the chances of Mahdi Khwāja. In the circumstances there seems hardly any justification for antedating the incident. (2) Nizāmuddin could hardly have confused Muhammad Zamān Mirzā with Mahdi Khwāja for hardly a page below he gives an account of the origin and activities of the former. (3) If Muhammad Zamān who already held the jagir of Jaunpur was to be provided for there is no reason why Mahdi Khwāja should not have been provided for in spite of his jagir, as he was the husband of Bābar’s dear and respected sister. (4) The original jagir of Badakhshān held by Humāyun was finally given away by Bābar to Sulaiman Mirzā and Hindāl also was recalled. The more important question for Bābar was to provide for his two sons first and ‘Askari also before thinking of Mahdi Khwāja or Muhammad Zamān Mirzā.’ (5) The question could hardly have been confined to the governorship of Hindustan alone because both Nizāmuddin and Abul Fazl use the words ‘Sultanat.’ (6) Whatever the idea of Bābar might have been regarding Kabul, ever since the conquest of Agra it was the seat of the imperial govern-
ment, and the most important officials were in India. The first question after Bābar's death would have been to take over the charge of the government and keep the nobles and officials under control. This was actually done when Humāyun ascended the throne and the Khutba was read in his name by order of his brothers.

The version of Nizāmuddin appears to be quite consistent and connected with the succession to the throne. There is no reason to think that Bābar had any knowledge of the intrigue. Nizāmuddin had not hopelessly compromised himself and could therefore find no difficulty in changing his mind. A plain reading of the matter would partly explain the complete disappearance of the Khalīfa from history.
CHAPTER X

NEW SYNTHESIS

The death of Humāyun immediately raised the question of succession. The Mughals had not yet established their position in India on a secure foundation. The Afghans and the local Hindu rulers were still independent and powerful. Though they had no leaders like Sher Shah and Bahādur Shah, yet Hemu was there. Fortunately for the Mughals Mirzā Hakīm, Akbar’s younger brother was not in India; and there was no one to dispute the right of Akbar. A serious conflict among the nobles for power was averted because, firstly, the Mughals and the Persians recognized the right of minors to succeed to the throne; secondly, they were not only jealous of one another, but both were afraid of the hostile powers in India.

Akbar was the first minor sovereign of Delhi whose right to the throne was not questioned. Although the precedent of Mahmūd Shah Tughlaq had prepared the ground, the credit of firmly establishing the right of minor in Muslim India is due to the Mughals. It was a useful addition to the widely recognized hereditary right, and gave more strength to the monarchy. Humāyun was the eldest son of his father, and Akbar was his eldest son. The lead given by the first two Mughal rulers was in the right line, and it was for time to show if these precedents could finally establish the right of the eldest son to succeed to the throne. Later history showed that the principle could not win
general recognition. It is not relevant to the present enquiry to enter into the causes, but one of the chief reasons is to be found among the traditions of the Timurid and Mughals themselves inherited by the descendants of Bābar. If, however, that principle had gained ground both the monarchy and the Mughal Empire would have gained immensely.

Nevertheless the definite recognition of the right of minors was a move in the right direction. It strengthened monarchy in the same proportion as it weakened the dangerous doctrine that the fittest had the best right to the throne. The theory of fitness had no doubt an appearance of soundness but in the state of the civilization of medieval ages of India and the Muslim world, it was fraught with serious evils. If the right of the eldest son had been firmly established the militarist doctrine of fitness would have been set at rest. Under the Mughals it did not die out but survived in the narrower sphere of the sons of the Monarch.

The recognition of Akbar was not surprising for the sixteenth century had witnessed in Central Asia and Persia the romances associated with the names of Bābar, Shah Ismā‘il Safavi, Shah Tahmāsp, and to some extent of Shaibāni Khan. The first three were minors at the time of their accession to the throne, while the last had begun his stormy career as a minor. The practical question was the relation between the sovereign and the regent. Mahmūd Shah Tughlaq had fled away from his regent, and could not return to Delhi till the death of the latter. Akbar's contemporary Ahmad Shah of Gujrat who also had got
the throne in his boyhood found himself in the merciless grips of Etmād Khan who eventually assassinated him¹ (1562). Unlike those princes Akbar was more intelligent, resourceful, and possessed foresight, firmness, self-control and decision. Yet he too could not assume full sovereign powers and control of government without considerable fight and bloodshed. Akbar’s was the only case in which the monarch gained a decisive victory over the Regent.

The fall of Bairam Khan, the regent, was just the beginning of a series of political and military activities which occupied the attention and absorbed the energy of Akbar for about seven years (1561—67). During this period full of romance and statecraft, Akbar subdued the nobility that had given great trouble to his father and grandfather. It was in this struggle that he acquired the experience that enabled him to re-organise Kingship in a methodical manner.

The relations between the Mughals and the Afghans were largely responsible for the aggressive policy adopted by Akbar towards the Muhammadan states as such, and of Northern India in particular. Before a quarter of a century had elapsed since he took the government in his own hands all the Moslem states of Northern India—the Afghan and the semi-Afghan states—had been wiped out. This was just in keeping with the glorious traditions of the Delhi Sultanat and the ideals of Balban and the Khiljis. One of the results of this policy of wholesale annexation was that no Sultanat remained in Northern India

¹ Miraati Ahmadi, Bird, 282-83; Farishta II, 229.
to represent the ideals of the Afghans which were so very different from those of their predecessors and successors. It thus cleared the way for a re-orientation and growth of the Delhi Sultanat ideals modified by new conditions and new traditions brought into India by the Mughals.

But Akbar was different in his treatment of the Hindu states. 'Alāuddin in his days had returned Chitor to a descendant of its ruling house, and had recognized the practical independence of the kingdom of Deogiri. He had, however, annexed the kingdom of Gujrat probably because the case of Gujrat was in many respects different owing to its commercial and strategical importance. Though the policy of the later Sultans of Delhi even including Sher Shah was not so clear yet it appears that the Afghan rulers—Sikandar Lodi, Sher Shah and Islām Shah—followed in the main the principle of 'Alāuddin. Moreover, according to the traditions of Delhi (or Agra) the provinces once belonged to it but had assumed independence as its government grew weak. Now as Agra was once more strong and able to vindicate its power the provinces were claimed and taken over by its government. Lastly the step could be justified not on the ground of power but also of the Muslim theory of Sovereignty that favoured the idea of one ruler for the Moslem people as such. Not one of the numerous Hindu states, not even Gadhā Katangā was wholly and permanently annexed. An attempt to totally annex Gadhā Katangā in the early days of Akbar had brought to light some disadvantages and his government had to modify its policy even in that case. None of the old Hindu states
was utterly destroyed; on the other hand some like Jaipur and Bikanir were strengthened probably with a view to keep a balance in Rajputana. The result of his policy towards the Hindu States was that Akbar gained the confidence of most of the important Hindu rulers and thereby brought a new class of devoted supporters of his power and the Mughal monarchy. The admission of the independent Hindu States as integral parts of the empire and the disappearance of the Muslim States were important factors in strengthening the position of the Delhi monarchy. Although not entirely new no ruler had such a clear vision or followed it so intelligently as Akbar. He carried to its logical conclusion the policy of some of the best rulers of Delhi and brought a new outlook on it.

Akbar was quite conscious of what he was doing. His attitude towards the Hindus was a very important plank in his general policy. It was impossible to solve the political problems without a full and generous recognition of the importance of the Hindus. Sooner or later the force of circumstances would have compelled the Muslim sovereign to realize that it was a hopeless attempt to bring stability to the Muslim rule without reckoning the Hindus. The Hindus had been recovering fast since the days of the later Tughlaqs and were getting more and more conscious of their power. Indeed, on two occasions it appeared that they would overwhelm the Muslim power. On both the occasions the Mughals rescued it. With a fresher

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2 I have in mind the rise of Rana Sangram Singh of Chitor, and of Hemu.
and more robust outlook they could hardly have failed to see the futility of repeating the experiences of their predecessors. The time had come for a bold and new experiment, and Akbar had the clearheadedness to visualize and carry it out. Akbar had the eye to see that the interests of the Timurides, of the Delhi Sultanat, and of the Muslim power at large were for the time being one and the same.

Having brought the Moslem nobility and the Hindu princes under his control, Akbar took up the question of the relation between the Sovereign and the religious aristocracy. So far the Muslim had been accustomed to regard the Delhi monarch as the representative of the Sunni Sovereignty and all that it implied. With the revival of Hinduism, the growth of Hindu power, and the influx of the Persians, it was impossible to revert to the older system. It was far wiser and practical to work out boldly the principle of the ultimate authority of the Sovereign in the State.

It has been pointed out before that the idea of Khilafat did not recognize any authority higher than that of the Sovereign in the State. In theory the will of the Muslim brotherhood under certain conditions was superior to that of the Khalifa, but in practice it had lost its force. In practice the will of the Khalifa was supreme. Akbar appears to have attempted to avail himself of the theory and assert the right of the Khalifa. He did not fully take into account the fact that an attempt of that kind could only be successful if his Sunni subjects showed their willingness to give their moral support. Such a support was not likely to come. The Sunni popula-
tion doubted the credentials of Akbar and was afraid lest the influence of the Shi‘as and the Hindus should lead to the weakening of the orthodox creed and the power of the Muslims. Another practical difficulty was that the Ulema had come to occupy the position of the interpreters of the law, and exercised enormous power over the masses. This learned aristocracy could hardly be persuaded to surrender willingly the power and prestige it had gained. Besides religious considerations the political circles could not also like the idea as it involved the resumption of a power that had fallen into disuse. It would have strengthened the position of the monarch more than they could like.

Inspired by the ideal of Khilāfat, the traditions of Changīz and Timūr, encouraged by his military and political achievements, and supported by a band of very able Muslim scholars, the strong-minded Akbar began the experiment seriously. That Mubārak Shah had assumed Khilāfat and Sher Shah and Islām Shah had followed him has been already mentioned. It is, however, not at all clear what their real intentions were. In the case of Mubārak Shah nothing except the satisfaction of assuming the highest title of the Muslims can be found. Sher Shah, a thoughtful man, might have got some ideas of his own but there are no means to discover them. Akbar, however, made his intentions quite clear in the famous declaration

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3 In one of his coins Akbar styles himself as Al Khāqān, Br. M., Cabinet No. 23, pl. 2.
(Mahzar) that he issued to proclaim himself as Imāmi ‘Ādil, and Amīrulmuminin.

Whatever might have been the hidden feelings of Akbar, he had so far done nothing that could provide a basis for bringing a definite charge of anti-Islamism against him. The Declaration had definitely laid down that Akbar did not intend to set at naught the well-established and highest sources of the Muslim law (nas). The scope of the Mahdar (Mahdar) was very limited. It only emphasised the right of the Emperor to select from among the divergent views of the legists what seemed to him to serve the best interests of the State and the people; and issue ordinances not incompatible with the nas and the good of the people. As far as the Mahdar (Mahzar) goes Akbar does not seem to have aimed at any radical change.

4 A. N., see Appendix B. It might be pointed out that Shaibani Khan also styled himself on his coins as "The Imām of the Age, the Khalifa of the Merciful." (Barthold in Dr. Arnold's Khilāfat.) On some of his coins Akbar inscribed his title as the exalted Khalifa. Lane-Poole in "Coins of the Mughal Empire," Ixiii and Ain., I.

5 Naş means the clear testimony of Qurān and Hadith.

6 Badaoni, II. 271. Tubaq. Akb., f. 252 r. is slightly wrong.

7 That the Sovereign could exercise the power of selection and discretion is evident from the writings of Abu Yusuf. After expounding the different theories and practices of Kharraj he says: "J'ai fini mon exposé (O. Prince): Choisis l'opinion que tu préferas et pratique ce que tu jugeras le meilleur pour les Musulmans, les plus utile pour toutes les classes de la population, le plus avantageux pour ta foi!" Kitābul Kharraj. Fagnan I, 90. At page 82 he makes his position still more definite when he says: "Adoptes eu a ton gre celle deux opinions que tu jugeras la meilleure pour le peuple et la plus profitable pour le tresor."
These measures synchronized with the revenue and military reforms. The changes in jagirs, the re-adjustment of accounts, the new assessment of land revenue and the conditions imposed on military officers had caused inconveniences and disappointments to many, and disaffection was brooding in some quarter. To make matters worse the usual cry of 'Religion is in danger' was also raised and fatwas against Akbar were issued which gave a sort of religious sanction and moral support to the mutiny that had broken out in the Bengal army for reasons only very remotely, if at all, connected with any religious sentiment. If Akbar could assert the rights and privileges of the Khilâfat, the eastern rebels also could resort to the right of the Moslems to depose the Khalifa! Hardly ten months after the publicity of the Mahdâr Akbar was declared deposed and Khutba was read for the second time in the east in the name of his brother Hakim.

Far from being frightened or depressed, Akbar took up the challenge and faced the movement calmly and boldly. In this struggle the Persians and the Hindus stood almost solidly in support of Akbar, and the bulk of even the Sunni population threw its weight on his side. The details of the struggle have no direct bearing on the point under consideration; but one episode has some significance. On the arrival of the Imperial Army on the Afghan frontier the question arose as to whether Afghanistan should be invaded or the apologies of Hakim Mirzâ accepted. Most of the officials were against an invasion of Afghanistan. Akbar, therefore, asked twenty leading
nobles to sit in a Council and discuss the whole question freely among themselves. Abul Fazl the Secretary of the Emperor was instructed to take down the proceedings and report them to him. The discussion was heated, and although Abul Fazl placed the point of view of the Emperor before the nobles they unanimously declared against an invasion. The situation was almost parallel to the one that Humāyun had to face when he had proposed an invasion of Kashmir. But Akbar's prestige was decidedly greater at this time than that of his father. He was annoyed at the decision of the nobles and summarily told them to return back or remain behind, but so far as he was concerned he had made up his mind and would invade Afghanistan with his personal troops. Without taking any noble to task for expressing his opposition, or losing any time he ordered the troops to move forward and issued necessary instructions to advance. The vigour and firmness shown by Akbar produced the desired effect and the nobles and officials willingly followed him.\(^8\) No desertions are recorded by chroniclers and it appears that Akbar had his way. The nobles had been made to realize that the days of Humāyun were over and even as a class they could not get the better of the Crown.

From this conflict Akbar emerged with complete triumph. The support that he received from the bulk of the Sunnis, the Persians and the Hindus must have given him greater confidence in his policy and the righteousness of the cause. But the confla-

\(^8\) A. N., Beveridge, III, pp. 522–30.
igration must also have taught him a lesson and made him realize that it would not be wise to march towards his goal through the orthodox way.

He must strike a new path and cease to show himself off as an orthodox Imām. A man of wider outlook and capable of adapting himself to changing circumstances, Akbar proceeded with new experiments. Although he himself was not to proclaim from the pulpits his imāmat, yet he did not abandon the idea underlying the Khilāfat and the ambitions he had inherited from Changīz Khan and Timūr. Instead of simply calling himself an Imām of the Sunnis he now preferred to stand up as the supreme leader of all irrespective of race, religion or creed, and to revive and augment the glory of the Sultanat of Delhi and the house of Timūr.

In March 1582 he held a grand darbar to celebrate his triumph on an unprecedented scale that staggered the imagination of the chroniclers. The celebration was organized according to the best traditions of the old Delhi monarchy and the Persian Court. The Persian festival of 'naoroz' was elaborated together with the old court etiquette of Zaminbos (or Sijdah) on the ground that "it was necessary to add something... for royalty is an emblem of the power of God, and a light shedding ray from the Sun of the Absolute." This time, however, he took care to

9 For darbar see A. N. and Badaoni.
10 For Naoroz see note under Balban.
12 Ain, Blochmann, 158-59.
exempt the Syyads from the performance of Zaminbos and sometime later prohibited it even in the open Court. The fact is, however, significant as it revealed the mentality of Akbar.

The idea that the Sovereign is the shadow and vicar of God was already well-known to the Muslims of India. Humāyun believed, in addition, that he was the centre of the human world, just as the sun was the centre of the universe. Both these ideas were knit together into a theory that might appear novel in form but is not so in substance. The theory of monarchy as propounded by Abul Fazl and approved of by Akbar takes the above two principles and joins them with the mythical origin of the Mongols. "The same Light that entered Alanquwa after passing through many saints and sovereigns displayed itself gloriously in the external world. That day (i.e., of Alanquwa's conception) was the beginning of the manifestation of his Majesty."13 This process was conceived in the spirit of philosophical mysticism—a trait both of Humāyun and Akbar. In the background of these ideas it is quite easy to understand that "royalty is a light emanating from God, a ray from the sun, the illuminator of the universe, the argument of the book of perfection, the receptacle of all virtues."14 Such an interpretation of kingship would not have astonished at all the Mughals and the Rajputs who traced their descent to the sun and the moon. The Indian Sunni Moslems who were not

13 A. N., Beveridge, I, 65. For similar tradition of descent from Light see Bretschneider's Researches, I, 247, 255.
14 Ain, Blochmann, iii.
used to the Mughal conception saw something novel in the interpretation and entertained baseless apprehensions.

Akbar, though a descendant of great conquerors and himself a successful warrior, did not wish to base his sovereignty on the sword. It may be that like many a sovereign he tried to conceal his iron hand under a velvet glove but it is more probable that a man of his nature believed in all seriousness in the moral mission of sovereignty. The chief argument for monarchy according to Abul Fazl was in the depraved and selfish nature of men. The world is full of greedy and lightheaded men in whom justice and true friendship is rare. Human nature is vicious and corrupt, and the panacea against their ruinous activity “is attainable only in the majesty of just monarchs.” If it is not possible to administer a house or a quarter without “the sanctions of hope and fear of a sagacious governor, how can the tumult of this world-nest of hornets be silenced save by the authority of a vice-regent of Almighty power.”15 “If royalty did not exist, the storm of strife would never subside, nor selfish ambition disappear.”16 “A king is therefore the origin of stability and possession.”17

“Kingship is a gift of God, and is not bestowed till many thousand grand requisites have been gathered in an individual. Race and wealth and the

15 Ain, Jarrett, p. 51.
16 Ain, Blochmann, ii. See also Ain, I, 178, and Blochmann, 237.
17 Ain, Blochmann, ii.
assembling of a mob are not enough for this great position.” Though kings possess treasury, army, servants, subjects and such other things, yet wise men distinguish a true king from a selfish ruler. The foundation of power of a bad king is laid on sand and the real purpose of sovereignty is not realized. The true king fears God, is just and solicitous of the happiness of the people, understands the spirit of the age, is benevolent, vigilant and forbearing, and does not allow sectarian differences to create strife. If the king does not “inaugurate universal peace and if he does not regard all classes of men and all sects of religion with the single eye of favour... he will not become fit for the exalted office.”

Between the theory of kingship of Abul Fazl and of the Muslims Khilafat there are points of agreement as well as of difference. In place of the religious law of the Muslims Abul Fazl puts the divine will which manifests itself in the intuition of Kings. The one believes in the law as laid down by the Qurān, Hadis and other sources, the other puts its faith in the law of God as a true sovereign understands it. Both feel as if the sovereign has got some higher mission, some religious and moral responsibility, the realization of which is the measure of success. Both the theories indulge in abstract qualities that a

18 Ak. N. Beveridge, II, 421.
19 Aín, Bl., iii.
20 Aín, iii—vi.
21 A. N. II, 285. I have made just one change in the translation of H. Beveridge, II, 421 by substituting “Classes of men” for “Condition of humanity.”
sovereign ought to possess, and of which justice, benevolence, fear of God and good of the people are most prominent. Both are the outcome of religious consciousness and moral psychology.

Yet the differences are fundamental. The theory of Khilafat is essentially democratic but the theory of Abul Fazl is essentially autocratic. The Khalifa exists by virtue of the will of the Muslim people but the King enjoys his position by the Divine will and his intrinsic right and greatness. The object of the Khalifa was to spread the religion of Muhammad, but the King of Abul Fazl aims at keeping good will, concord and peace between different religions and creeds. There is, however, no question of religious neutrality in either case. The Khalifa keeps the eternal difference between the Muslims and the non-Muslims but the King puts them on the same footing as far as the political rights and the State are concerned. The Khalifa is the leader of an active and conscious missionary society but the King is the head of a political society with a slight dash of mysticism and a tendency to become missionary.

It is apparent from the theory of Abul Fazl that the sovereign's conscience is guided by God Himself. As a corollary he does not necessarily stand in need of guidance by the letter of any particular religious law or of any particular group of jurists. This is not a mere inference; Abul Fazl makes the position absolutely clear. According to the views he represented one of the root causes of trouble was dual authority. "So long as the spiritual supremacy over the recluse which is called 'Holiness' and the sway over laymen which
is called 'sovereignty' were distinct, there was strife and confusion among the Children of Noah." In plain language it means that the difference between the secular and religious leaderships is the cause of strife. The obvious remedy was to combine these two authorities and go back to the principle of undivided sovereign power vested in one and the same person. This kind of unity was contemplated in the theory of Khilâfat but the premises and the methods leading almost to the same conclusion are different. The substance is the same but the angles of adjustment and outlook are different. The theory of Abul Fazl is a new interpretation of the old idea. The true sovereign sees things in right perspective while "the superficial consider secular world as opposed to and exclusive of the spiritual." The State was no longer to be a weapon in the hands of any religion, creed or class but a law unto itself or more precisely the enlightened will of the unfettered sovereign. This was the doctrine of enlightened despotism. The sovereign of Abul Fazl

"By a single thought, he has placed under foot,
The royal diwan and the darvish's carpet,
The nine heavens revolve for his purpose,
The seven stars travel for his work."

The ideal of the Muslims has been of one brotherhood, one scripture (Qurâân) and one sovereign. It was

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22 A. N., Beveridge, p. 35; also see A. N., Beveridge, III. 72.

23 A. N., Beveridge, III, 72; see also A. N., Beveridge, II, 197, 207.

24 A. N., II, Beveridge, 22-23.
a doctrine of universal empire, a world-sovereignty. Changiz Khan and Timur had also conceived the ambition of a world empire in their own way. The Hindu Puranic idea of the Chakravartin vaguely suggested a universal monarchy and had greater affinity with that of Changiz Khan than with the Muslim Khilafat for it did not include the unity of one religious brotherhood or scripture. Universal sovereignty was a feature common to all. Quite in keeping with his theory of sovereignty and according to the best traditions of his race and the ideas of the people over whom he ruled, Akbar also dreamed of a world empire and universal sovereignty. Unlike the doctrine of the Muslims Akbar's idea did not include either the scripture or any given religious brotherhood. The principle of religious freedom might have come to Akbar partly from the views of Changiz Khan and partly through his own political and metaphysical outlook.

'Alauddin and Muhammad Tughlaq had conceived of the conquest of Khorasan and Iraq and Tibet, Sher Shah had a desire to smash Persia after finishing the conquest of the Deccan. To his last Babar entertained the fond hope of reconquering Maawaraunnahr. Akbar's ambition was higher than that of his predecessors. As soon as he could settle the affairs of the Deccan he had a mind to conquer Persia, Central Asia, Anatolia and even Arabia. He was quite serious about it. He wanted to rival

25 Abul Fazl hints at it at several places. For example, see A. N., II, Beveridge, 441.
26 For Muhammad Tughlaq's ambition, see Zia, 476.
the exploits of Timur and carry his principles to lands outside India. In one of his letters to Abdulla Khan Uzbek, his great rival, he wrote that he intended to go to Khurasan, Iraq and get the Khutba read in his name at Mashhad. From there he would march to Samarqand, Khata and Khotan. After finishing his work in Middle Asia he proposed to conquer Room and Sham but restore it back to the Ottoman ruler. Then circumambulating the holy Kaaba and Medina he intended to travel through Arabia and return to India on board the ship. 27

It was with reference to that ambition that Akbar expressed his desire to Rodolfus to enter into an alliance with the King of Portugal against the Ottoman Turks and showed his willingness to finance the project. 28 Equally desirous was he to open communication with the Pope and the King of Spain. 29 He had asked Abdulla Khan Uzbek to enter into an alliance with him against the Turks as early as 1586, 30 and had promised Persia to help her against the Turks. 31 It is obvious that Akbar considered the Ottoman Sultan as his greatest rival and viewed with jealousy that the Khutba was read in Mecca and Medina in the name of the latter. 32 It appears that Akbar was anxious to

28 Monserrate, p. 172.
29 Monserrate, pp. 159, 163, 172.
30 A. N., Beveridge, III. 758.
31 Muntakhibati, Abul Fazl, p. 18. A. N., Beveridge, III. 758.
32 The reading of Khutba in the name of the Ottoman Sultan at Mecca and Medina was considered an impor-
get himself recognized as the greatest ruler of the Muslim world. It is not within the topic under consideration to discuss how far the plans of Akbar were practicable. From the historical point of view the claims of Akbar were probably higher and certainly not inferior to those of the Ottoman Sultan. There is no doubt that the idea of Akbar signifies an important stage in the development of sovereignty in Muslim India.

Akbar's idea was not so much national as of universal kingship. The historical antecedents, as also the theory of sovereignty that Akbar had inherited and developed, pointed clearly towards universal kingship and the universal empire. Babar had thought of making Kabul the capital of his empire. If he had conquered Maawaraunnahr he might have pushed the capital from Kabul to Samargand. What Akbar would have done if he had succeeded in his ambitious plans is purely a matter of speculation. Though there is some slight reason to think that he desired to keep his headquarter in India yet the probability was in favour of a change.

In spite of his high ambitions, remarkable success and great powers Akbar was genial, accessible and sociable. He made himself quite at home with men of different faiths and classes. During his tours the common folk collected round him to receive his blessings

tant event even by the writers of the sixteenth century. For example, see History of Shah Ism‘ail, Br. M., Or. 3248 f., 275 r. Prof. Buckler in J.R.A.S., 1924, p. 598 n.
and represent their troubles. Like his grandfather Bābar he accepted the private invitations of nobles to grace social functions. He felt much delight in giving interviews and paying visits to saints and pious men. He took a practical interest in both indoor and outdoor games. In the annual exhibitions and fancy fairs he would go from shop to shop, examine things, make purchases and settle prices with merchants and vendors. Under his regime the days of feasts and public rejoicings were increased. Never before except probably in the case of Fīroz Tughlaq were the personal charm and social functions so effectively used as by Akbar to raise the monarchy in the estimation of the people, and to insinuate it into their affection. The wits of the fictitious Mulla do piyāza and the bon mots of Birbal have been associated with the social gatherings of Akbar. And yet Akbar was feared and his manners were very dignified. Badāoni, a man of strong character, trembled when he saw him angry on one occasion and his moustache

34 'Arif, Q., p. 219, seq.; A. N., II, 513, 528-29; III 322, 328, 547, 557.
35 Ain, Blochmann, p. 277.
36 A. N., Beveridge, II, 24.
37 I have not been able to trace or identify this name in any contemporary work. References to Mulla do piyāza are found in Shāhīdī Sādiq, a work written in the time of Jahangir. His funny sayings regarding some officials are given (f. 93 v, 98 v). There is a small manuscript in the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal that is attributed to Mulla do piyāza, but it does not appear to be an old MS. and I have serious doubt about its authenticity.
38 Monserrate, 197.
bristling up like that of a lion. Except probably on one or two occasions in his long reign of half a century he never allowed his anger to get the better of him. By his personality and character, his broad sympathy and liberal-mindedness, Akbar raised the prestige of monarchy in the eyes of all powers whether Indian or foreign. He had not only created an empire and re-organized the governmental machinery but had assimilated the best traditions of the Delhi and Mughal monarchy, given a fresh interpretation to the Moslem idea of sovereignty and cast a glorious halo round the throne of Agra. Akbar's conception of sovereignty was the outcome of three streams of thought—the Muslim, the Mughal and the Hindu—which were active during the three preceding centuries of Muslim rule and had a tendency to unite.

39 Badäoni, III, 82.
F. 10
CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION

During the four centuries of the Delhi Sultanat the idea of kingship passed through several stages. In spite of breaks and confusion some definite opinions regarding kingship gradually settled down.

The foundation of kingship either on racial superiority, tribal leadership or clannish brotherhood was found weak and unreliable. So also the attempts to buttress the Sultanat with religious support and draw strength from religious classes of the Muslim did not prove very successful. The basis of race was shaken when the Khiljis rose to power and utterly broke down after the Tughlaq revolution. The Khilji experiment of recruiting vitality from the converted Muslim brought ruin on them. The Tughaqs with their triple support of converted Muslims, a large army of slaves, and the goodwill of the Muslim religious classes did not succeed either; and one of their most respected rulers lived long enough to see the tragedy with his own eyes. The Syyads brought a large army of the Afghans to support their throne but were ousted by the Lodis. The Afghans began with the tribal polity which was destroyed by the force of circumstances in a short time. The clan dies as the State develops. The last experiment was made by Akbar who dropped all tribal, racial or communal consideration, and dissociating himself from particular classes or groups brought the Persians
and the Hindus to join with the Mughals and Indian Musalmans in supporting the throne of Agra.

The principle that sovereignty was mainly based on force as illustrated in the conduct of Balban, 'Ala'uddin and Muhammad Tughlaq miserably failed. It was indeed absurd to rely on force. The Muslims themselves were so divided and their leaders so ambitious that a permanent sense of loyalty even to the best was out of the question. A great military leader in the early stages of his career made phenomenal progress, but as soon as he grew old or his career of conquest closed, the forces of disintegration became visible. The doctrine of force could not survive even two generations in any case. There was yet another reason. The bulk of the Indian people, particularly the fighting Hindu communities, could not be kept under control for a long time. They had little sympathy with the conquerors, they were restless and prepared to utilize every opportunity to confound them.

The principle of election laid down by the Muslim legislators had proved unworkable even at Damascus and Baghdad. Yet it was brought to India where it continued to linger on in some form or other up to the time of the Afghans. But it had to meet serious difficulties from the very beginning. The Turko-Iranian ideas of kingship and the Hindu conception of sovereignty undermined its vitality. The final blow to the principle of election was however dealt by the Mughals when even in theory it was abandoned.

The principle of nomination of one of the sons or scions of the ruling house by the preceding Sultan continued to survive. But nomination of women or
minors or clearly unfit persons did not carry much weight after the death of the nominating Sultan. Fitness was believed to consist either in the ability of the sovereign to enforce his commands or in his tact in keeping the leading officials and the religious leaders in good humour. Nevertheless, on the whole, nomination carried considerable weight with the people ever since the days of Iltutmish, and gave initial advantage to a candidate. The chief argument in favour of nomination was that it made the question of succession comparatively easy. With the arrival of the Mughals the nomination in the first three cases was of the eldest son. Humāyun, Akbar and Jahangir were the eldest sons of their fathers. The tendency right through since the days of Khiljīs was to favour the eldest son but the principle did not take firm root. Since the days of the Khiljīs the right of the minors to succeed to the throne had begun to gain strength. The Tughlaq period witnessed a minor as Sultan, but it was not till the arrival of the Mughals that the principle could gain adequate support.

Although the Albari Turks had accepted a woman as their sovereign yet ordinarily the fair sex was not expected to meddle with politics. During the Turkish and Afghan periods woman exercised little influence in politics. In that respect the Mughals were different. Although the Mughals did not recognize the right of women to sovereign power they were willing to allow them to wield considerable influence in political matters. In the pre-Mughal period the harem played little part in public affairs but after the arrival of the Mughals it became a power in the State.
As to whether the King should simply reign and leave the ministers to rule, the opinion was distinctly against it. Public opinion was strongly in favour of the rule by the King. The individual officials, the local autocrats, and the entire official class were believed to be unscrupulous, grasping and dangerous. Against their cupidity and tyranny the people looked to the sovereign. It was only when the monarch failed to rise to the occasion that the people sought protection under their local leaders, and if they found him worthy supported him against any outside encroachment and sometimes backed him up to the gates of Delhi.

But the desire to see the sovereign in full enjoyment of his prestige and power did not imply undiluted despotism. Even according to the views of the Muslims any attempt on the part of the monarch to interfere with the institutions recognized by Muslim law or to change arbitrarily well-established customs or dismiss men of recognized ability and loyalty, was wrong. Such actions were as much resented as their due maintenance was appreciated. As there was no machinery for organizing public opinion in such a way as to bring pressure on the ruler, the only alternative was to wait for an opportunity till hostility and resentment gathered sufficient strength to deprive a tyrant of his sovereignty. Nevertheless the religious leaders, the nobility, that is to say, the high officials, did exercise some, though not adequate control on the despotism of the monarch. The reverence of the Muslim public for the law (which was comprehensive enough to include constitutional, civil and
private laws) was so great that it was not possible even for an 'Alāuddin or Akbar to disregard it.

The Muslim idea that sovereignty is indivisible persisted in India. Neither the rulers themselves nor the public ever considered it advisable to divide the authority or the empire. The Afghan theory of partition on a tribal basis failed utterly to commend itself in India. The idea of a universal sovereignty found some expression in the ambitions of 'Alāuddin, the views of 'Alāuddin, Muhammad Shah Tughlaq and the first two Surs. But the Mughals infused a new life into it and gave it a fresh interpretation. Akbar in his own way developed it into a theory which it was his life ambition to carry out. Circumstances however proved too strong for him and the ideal was never realized.

The theory that the monarch was the shadow of God was brought to India by the Muslims themselves. The Hindus also believed him to be a representative of divine powers. There was, therefore, a general unanimity on that point. In the early days of the Turkish rule there was some opposition to the idea in very orthodox circles of Muslim thinkers; but it did not last long. With the arrival of the Mughals it gathered a new force and reached its high water mark under Humāyun and Akbar.

The relation between the rulers of Delhi and the exotic Khilāfat continued in theory and to a considerable extent in practice right through the Turkish and the Lodi period, only with two short breaks. It did not much matter whether the Khalīfa was dead or
alive. The Khilafat was taken for granted and the Delhi Sultans considered themselves lieutenants of that higher power. The fiction of the foreign Khilafat received a final blow when Babar came to India. But the idea of the Khilafat did not die out. The practice of inscribing the name of the first four Khalifas begun in India probably by Muhammad Tughlaq, was fully established by the Mughals. It continued the memory of the idea of the Khilafat. Sher Shah and Islam Shah probably wanted to establish the centre of Khilafat in India. Akbar took up the idea and was anxious to make the Khilafat a living institution in his own person. But general disapproval led him to merge it in the Mughal and Indo-Iranian conception.

From the very beginning the conception of sovereignty of the Muslim legislators had to fight the Iranian, the Turkish, the Mongol and the Hindu conceptions. Gradually bit by bit the Muslim theory began to lose the ground till it lost itself almost completely leaving only an echo in the new theory that found its full expression in the time of Akbar.

A study of the Muslim kingship in India shows that on more than one occasion it showed promising signs of assuming a constitutional form. The Moslem theory was constitutional and democratic in its character, a fact which ought to have given a powerful lever to the rise of constitutional monarchy. Yet kingship in India could not rise above benevolent despotism and a sort of paternal rule. True it is that even in Western Europe monarchy was no better in the sixteenth century, still the evolution of Muslim king-
ship in India in spite of the democratic Muslim theory requires explanation.

The first reason why the Muslim kingship became autocratic was that from the very beginning of their history the Sultans had to face serious military problems. The hostility of the Hindu States and Hindu fighting communities within the empire and the pressure of the Mughal invaders from outside was bound to make the Muslim sovereign a sort of military despot. The circumstances of the time required a strong centralized government, and the executive head assumed gradually almost despotic powers.

Secondly, the Muslim in India had no hereditary Muslim aristocracy jealous to guard its rights and relying on the help of traditional supporters. The advantages of an aristocracy of talents and capacity are well-known, but the monarch in those days had good reasons to be suspicious of great military leaders and naturally took the earliest opportunity of destroying them. The greatest defect of a created aristocracy lies in its tendency to foster an atmosphere of intrigue, slavishness, favouritism, jobbery and snobbery. An aristocracy depending on the will of the monarch instead of clipping his powers added strength to his pretensions for some time, and then fanning the flames of furious jealousy and selfishness corrupted the entire system of government.

The absence of a feudal type of organization among the Muslims in India was not an unmixed good. In spite of its many defects the feudal type had one great virtue. Based as it was on the principles of rights and duties, privileges and obligations, it kept
those two elements in the front and acted as a heavy
drag to the assumption of absolute powers by the
Crown. The ideas of privileges and obligations fostered
by feudalism were bound to filter down sooner or
later and arouse an active consciousness of their
rights among the people at large.

The necessity for finding money was an important
factor that led the European monarchs to make pro-
gressive concessions to the people. The Western
monarch had not the power to tax the land or the
people as he pleased. The income from the Royal
demesne was not enough to enable him to carry on the
wars on a large scale. He had to ask for money and
his necessities were the opportunities of the people to
demand concessions. In India the sovereign had the
power to raise the land revenue and other taxes. The
country being rich and vast they could command
plenty of resources. Moreover the State got substan-
tial benefits from the wars against the Hindu States
because they usually resulted in rich plunder. The
Muslim sovereign therefore never stood in need of
funds to carry out his plans.

Moreover, the Muslim King of India did not re-
quire the assistance of the civil population to carry on
his wars. He relied almost entirely on the mercenary
armies which he recruited from all parts of India and
from countries outside. The prospects of pay and
plunder were quite enough to swell the army. This
mercenary army was the source of his strength so long
as he could pay them and lead them from victory to
victory. It proved dangerous as soon as those
conditions disappeared.
The rights of the people in other countries have been asserted by assemblies that were deemed qualified to give consent to laws, grant or refuse taxation. Such assemblies were not purely the creations of the monarchs, but were believed to some extent to consist of the representatives of the people who derived their power not from the King but from those whom they represented. In Muslim India there were no such assemblies. The Councils of the Moslem sovereign were chosen by him and consulted when he pleased. The Moslem theory of *ijmā* or general consensus consisted more in acquiescence than in the active expression of will of the Muslims.

The conflict between the State and the Church that accelerated the speed of progress in the West did not exist in India. Down almost to the time of the Suri Kings the Muslim State had only one creed the Sunni. The Ulema and the Sultan generally speaking agreed on most of the questions and worked together for the glorification of each other and the orthodox creed. As regards the Hindus they had no voice in the Muslim State. It was just before the Mughal invasion that the supremacy of the orthodox Church was questioned both by the Muslims and the Hindus. The conflict of ideas and arms liberalized the monarchy and as it sided with the spirit of the time it received considerable strength from the gratitude of the non-Hanafite people.

In India both the Hindus and Moslems were brought up in monarchical theories that had gained almost the sanction of religion. The Imam and the Rāja were the pivots on which Muslim and Hindu
political thoughts revolved. It was unthinkable for men of those days to conceive of a plan of government in which the monarch played a subordinate part. There was no other important theory in the field, hence the monarchical ideas enjoyed unchallenged sway.

The Muslim and also to an extent the Hindu theories recognized like the Romans the supremacy of the law over the monarch. But the Roman Empire had bequeathed some well-defined institutions and a body of traditions that proved very helpful to the Western people. The Muslims and the Hindu ideas were too wide to be of specific importance and there were no institutions to safeguard them in India. The place given to reason in the creation and justification of laws by the Romans was a feature far more pronounced than that given to it by the Hindu and Muslim legists.

Finally the country over which the Muslim sovereign ruled was vast. The lack of means of communication, differences of language and customs, the absence of any common and organized educative method, stood in the way of the growth of a strong public opinion that could tell upon the monarch with any reasonable chance of success. A welding of the people was necessary before monarchy could be forged into a constitutional form.
APPENDIX B

In his suggestive paper (J.R.A.S., October 1924, page 591 seq.) Prof. F. W. Buckler has offered a new interpretation of the 'Mahzar.' One of his statements has a close bearing on the question of Sovereignty. On pages 591-92 he says that the declaration "was intended to fix the position of Akbar in the Muslim world by eliminating the religious and political control of Persia, but without committing him to the allegiance of the Ottoman Khalîfa. It aimed, indeed, at pronouncing Akbar to be the Khalîfa of his time, and as such as a protest against the Ottoman pretensions." I agree with Prof. Buckler that the declaration aimed at pronouncing Akbar to be the Khalîfa of his time. But I do not find it possible to accept his suggestion that it involved the elimination of the religious and political control of Persia, because there is no evidence to show that Persia exercised any religious or political control over the Mughal emperors of India. True it is that Bâbar had offered allegiance to Shah Ism‘ā’l for holding Samarqand and the territories of Maawàra-unnahr, but there is no proof to show that his allegiance continued after the battle of Ghazdawan. The letter of ‘Ubaidulla Khan referred to by the Professor (Munsh, Faridun Bay I. 350) clearly refers to the past affairs. If reference to past affairs were taken as an argument then ‘Ubaidulla himself was a vassal of Ism‘ā’l just before the Shah accepted the proposals of Bâbar (Khwandmir, Br. M., Or. 2939 f., 67 v, 68 r; 156

The letter of 'Ubaidulla Khan proves nothing. The Khutba was read and the coins were struck both at Kabul and in India in the name of Bābar and later on of Humāyun. It might also be pointed out that on the coins the Mughal emperors kept the names of the first four Khalīfās and their own, a practice which was essentially Sunni and incompatible with Shi'aism. During his exile in Persia Humāyun had no doubt to give a broad consent to the Shi'a creed which in all likelihood was dropped as soon as Humāyun entered Qandhar. The help that Tahmāsp had given to Humāyun was on the understanding that he would make Qandhar over to the Shah. But Humāyun did not deliver Qandhar and drove the Persians out. At Qandhar and Kabul and of course at Delhi Khutba was read in the name of Humāyun. Neither in the history of Persia written in 983 A.H. (Br. M., Or. 2776) nor in 'Ālam Ārāi Abbāsi is there any reference to the vassalage of Humāyun. The Afzal-uttawārikh (Br. M., Or. 4678) reproduces a letter written by Tahmāsp in reply to that of Humāyun. In the letter all the titles that have been used go to show the absolute independence of Humāyun (p. 163). In a short note added by the Shah with his own pen he calls him "My brother the tribunal of majesty Humāyun Pādshāh" (loc. cit.). Except for a short period during the regency of Bairam all the Ulema who exercised influence in the Mughal government were Sunnis. The coins of Humāyun and Akbar continued
to bear the names of the first four Caliphs. In the Mahzar itself there is no hint clear or implied to any Persian control, religious or political. The word ‘Mujtahidin’ does not lend the slightest colour to the view of the Professor.

As to the Khilafat of the Ottoman Sultan neither the Mughals nor the Surs ever recognized it: Dr. Arnold has shown that the Ottoman Sultan at that time was not regarded as Khalifa in the technical sense of the term. Sher Shah and Islam Shah had begun to use the title for themselves at least on the coins, and Humayun had higher pretensions. Yet the fact that Khutba was read at Mecca and Medina in the name of the Ottoman Sultan gave him some precedence over other Sunni rulers. Akbar never recognized his superiority; on the other hand he was jealous of him and wished to have Khutba in his own name. At least in India on all the pulpits of the Empire Akbar was styled as ‘Amirul Muminin.’ This is clear from Ayif Qandhari (p. 394) who in his account of 986 says, ‘‘ham darin sal ismi sami va namf namf ashrafi aqdas bandgani hazrat Khqan Akbar ra Amirulmuminin Khutba bar manafir mumalik mahrusa Khwandand.’’ In the Mahzar also (Badoni, p. 271) Akbar has been styled as ‘‘hazrat Sultn-ul-Islm Kahafalanam Amirulmuminin zilli allah . . .’’
PART II
CHAPTER I

THE VAZIR UNDER THE GHAZNAVIDES

Among the non-Arabian institutions that have been incorporated in the Islamic constitution few are as interesting as the Vizarat. The Ommyyads, who followed the old Arabian practice and relied, when necessary, on the advice of the chiefs of their own race, did not adopt the Persian institution of Vizarat. But the Abbāsids owing to their close association with the Persians and their thought, favoured the Vizarat. Autocratic as the Abbāsids were they created a large body of officials whom they placed under the control of a Vazir. Under their patronage the Vazir became the most powerful official in the state and at times threw the Khalifa himself into the shade.

The Muslim legislists call the Vazir an alter-ego, a deputy or Nāyab, of the Imām. According to Mawardi, Vizarat had two grades. The first class Vazir was one to whom the Imām delegated all his authority. He was technically called the Vaziri Tafwid. As a delegate of the Imām he could exercise all his powers on his own initiative. It was not necessary for him to wait for the sanction of the Imām for the measures he thought fit to adopt. He was expected just to inform the Imām what he did. As he exercised unlimited powers he was expected to possess all the qualifications that had been laid down in the case of the Khalifa. Although he had the power to appoint
officials he could not dismiss those appointed by the Khalifa.

The second class Vazir was called Vaziri Tanfiz. His powers were limited. It was not within his competence to initiate a policy or to do anything on his own responsibility. He was supposed to simply carry out the orders of the Khalifa. Although his hands were not so tied in revenue matters, he was not competent to make peace or declare war, appoint or dismiss high officials, or order expenditure from the public treasury.

The Muslim Jurists held that more than one Vazir of the first class could not be appointed. The reasons are obvious. Two Vazirs of the first class would have been as impossible as two Khalifas. The case of the second class Vazirs was different. More than one second class Vazir could be appointed, provided that their respective jurisdictions were clearly defined, and that the probability of their collective action as one administrative entity was definite.1 Nizāmulmulk, the famous Vazir of Malik Shah, holds that it is always desirable to have more than one Vazir of the second class, for concentration of power in one man leads to inefficiency and laxity.2 Another important point regarding the second class Vizarat is the eligibility of even non-Muslims to hold it.3

The Islamic theory of Vizarat appears to be a statement of the types of Vizarat that existed at one

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1 V. Kremer (Eng. tr.), p. 225.
2 Kitābi Siyāsat, Ch. 44, pp. 98v, 99r. Sulākulmulūk, f. 18r.
3 Sulākulmulūk, f. 18r. Amir 'Ali, History of Saracens, p. 413 and note.
time or the other under the Abbāsids. It does not appear to have been based on any sound and independent political theory. Strangely enough, it does not even reflect the experiences which these types of Vizarat should have taught. The first class Vazir, it is obvious, could not have been of any great help in a system in which the sovereign exercised almost autocratic power and was bent on using it. A strong, energetic and active sovereign was bound to neutralize the value of a first class Vazir and virtually reduce him to the second class. In such circumstances the only possible use of the Vazir was to act as a buffer between the Khalifa and the public in case of a conflict. If, on the other hand, the sovereign was weak, the first class Vazir was likely to become irresponsible. Without any responsibility to any strong public body, the extensive powers vested in him were calculated to fan his ambition and even prove dangerous. At any rate it introduced an imperium in imperio, established two monarchs, and was likely to invite conflicts, and impair the efficient and smooth working of the government. True, the Imām had the power to dismiss the Vazir, but that was not likely to improve the matter. For, if the Imām happened to be strong he would rarely think of appointing a Vazir of the first class. If theoretically he happened to confer first class powers on a Vazir, the latter for fear of being dismissed would hardly think of using them and of acting on his own responsibility. If the Imām were

4 This was partly apprehended by Nizāmulmulk, vide Kitābi Siyāsat, f. 14v.
weak he would look to others to release him from the domination of a first class Vazir and would readily become a centre of intrigue against him. This situation would be worse, for not only would it impair the government and political morality it was most likely to end either in the destruction of the Imām or of the Vazir.

The second class of the Vizarat was also not free from drawbacks. It made the minister merely a departmental head without any power of initiative. By depriving him of initiative it impaired his sense of responsibility, made his task dull, his outlook slavish, and considerably destroyed his usefulness. In spite of such drawbacks the second class Vazir was more suited to the political constitutions of the medieval period than the other.

Both the theory of Vizarat and the actual institution were widely recognized when the Kingdom of Ghazna came into existence. When Ghazna became independent of the Sāmāni domination, Mahmūd created an official machinery suitable to his position of an independent and powerful Sultan. The first known Vazir of Mahmūd was Abul 'Abbās Fazl bin Ahmad. He was a man of wide experience, and had served both under Faiq and Subuktīgin. He was believed to be an expert in the art of government. Mahmūd, therefore, did not hesitate to entrust to his charge "the affairs of the realm and the administration of the army." Thus he appears to have exercised within his competence both the civil and military powers. As

5 Athārulwuzarā, f. 21r. Dastārulwuzarā, f. 70r.
Mahmūd was himself a very energetic and powerful ruler and usually himself commanded the army, it might be reasonably supposed that the Vazir did not enjoy very extensive military jurisdiction. For ten years he held the post with credit. His fall was due not to his incompetence but to the jealousy of the nobles, and his refusal to surrender to the Sultan one of his favourite slaves and possibly also to some alleged misappropriation of the State revenue. The last charge was, however, not satisfactorily established, though the tyranny of the revenue officials under his direction was not doubted. During the absence of Mahmūd on an Indian expedition he was cruelly treated by the officials and died under merciless torture.

The next Vazir Abul Qāsim Ahmad bin Hasan al Maimandi was a school-fellow and foster brother of Sultan Mahmūd. He was a man of culture, dignified manners, and an able administrator. Besides personal experience of several offices it is probable that he acquired administrative training from his father who served in the diwan department of Subuktīgīn. He was liked not only by the Sultan but also by the nobles, and thus had a very favourable start in his new career. For full eighteen years he enjoyed the confidence of his sovereign. During this long period he established his reputation for honesty, efficiency, shrewdness, discipline and wisdom so well that his name passed on from generation to generation as one of the greatest of the ministers in the Islamic world. So much reliance did Mahmūd place on him that he could devote his whole attention to long military expeditions and constant wars that necessitated his absence from the capital.
Long enjoyment of power and the confidence of the Sultan made Ahmad somewhat vain. Well established in the Sultan’s favour he did not care to humour the nobles and often disregarded their pleasure. This led to excite jealousy and hatred among the nobles who were lucky enough to enlist the support of the sister of the Sultan. They intrigued successfully and brought a charge of extortion and oppression against the Vazir. The result was that Ahmad was dismissed and sent a prisoner to one of the forts in India.⁶

It appears that an important qualification of the Vizarat in those days was the ability of the Vazir to keep the nobles in good humour. It was by no means an easy task to serve the State and the sovereign honestly and at the same time please the nobles and officials. But he had to do it, for it was not possible even for the Sultan to show persistent and callous disregard to the wishes of his high officials and nobles. His own safety and the success of the government and his policy depended to a large extent on the goodwill and co-operation of the officials and nobles. He had therefore to take into account their feelings even though the Vazir might happen to be honest and efficient.

Twice the opposition of the nobles had led Mahmūd to throw out his minister. The Sultan, therefore, asked them to propose the name of a man, worthy of the post of Vazir. After full consideration the nobles submitted four names out of whom the Sultan

⁶Jam’ulhikayat, I, xii, 9; Bāhiṣqi, p. 211.
might select one. Mahmūd considered the qualifications of each of them and told them that the services of Abul Qāsim in the military department were too valuable to be spared, while Abul Hasan lacked polished manners. With regard to the third candidate, Ahmad, the Sultan observed that he was a man of undoubted ability and for that very reason was indispensable in Khwārizm which was a very troublesome province. Regarding Hasanak the fourth candidate Mahmūd said that he possessed a high lineage and remarkable administrative ability and talent but unfortunately he was too young for the exalted office.

The nobles could not probably suggest any better man. They were shrewd enough to see that the Sultan was clearly inclined to give preference to Hasanak. If they did not strengthen his chance, all the four candidates they had fixed upon might be rejected. Consequently they unanimously declared for Hasanak, who was accepted as Vazir by the Sultan. He held the post of Vazir till the death of Mahmūd.

On coming to the throne Mas'ūd charged Hasanak with treason, because he was believed to have turned the mind of his father against him. The Vazir being the right hand of the Sultan was expected to give his opinion on matters referred to him. But in questions like succession his position was very delicate. If he supported one prince he invited the hostility of the other. The Vazirs therefore usually contented themselves with enumerating the qualities of the various princes without committing themselves definitely to

7 Baihaqi, 453–54.
any positive statement. How far was Hasanak responsible for Mahmūd’s favour to his second son it is difficult to say. But it appears that the charge was too vague to carry conviction with the people who liked Hasanak.

Nor was Mas‘ūd successful in convincing the high officials of the necessity of executing Hasanak. Ahmad bin Hasan al Maimandi who had been released from prison and once more made the prime minister frankly opposed the idea of execution. Failing to get any serious political charge substantiated against Hasanak, Mas‘ūd revived an old charge of his belonging to the heretic sect of Qarāmatians. The details of the allegation are not available but prima facie Hasanak could not have professed that creed. For, Sultan Mahmūd, who did not tolerate heretics, could not have allowed him to hold the Vizarat if he had belonged to the Qarāmatian creed. Mas‘ūd was, however, relentless. When this charge failed to arouse any indignation of the people he adopted a different method. He referred the heresy of Hasanak to the Khalifa and requested him to authorize his execution. This move succeeded, and he procured an order for executing him. The sanction of the Khalifa was a weighty argument by itself. Armed with the decree Mas‘ūd ordered him to be humiliated and stoned to death. But so popular was Hasanak

8 Yamini—Tehran, p. 429. The basis of the charge was probably the fact that Hasanak long ago had accepted a Khil’at from the Fātimid Caliph al-Zāhir. But that episode had closed in the lifetime of Mahmūd who had satisfied the ‘Abbāsid Caliph by sending him the Khil’at to be burnt.
that none but a drunkard ruffian could be found to stone him to death!⁹ The circumstances attending his execution suggest that it was not so easy for even the Sultan to put to death his Vazir. His guilt had to be established, and as it could not be done the Sultan shelved the responsibility on the shoulder of a higher power—the Khalifa.

The reason why Mas‘ūd’s choice fell on Ahmad bin Hasan al Maimandi has been frankly stated by the Sultan. He wanted an able, experienced and devoted man who could command respect and weight with the officials and relieve him of the burden of government.¹⁰ More than once he publicly declared that the Khwāja was the Khalifa (deputy) and his orders should be implicitly obeyed.¹¹

The ministers under the early Ghaznavides exercised enormous power. The Vazir was the highest and most respected official in the State. His appointment was very formal, and he was given a turquoise ring on which was inscribed the name of the Sultan. This was probably the royal signet which the Vazir affixed on important papers for there is no mention among the Ghaznavide officials of any keeper of the royal seal. It might as well be the symbol of the Vizarat.

Regarding the appointment of Vazir Mas‘ūd kept up the policy of his father. After the death of Ahmad he called a council of some high officials such

⁹ Baihaqi, 207 et seq. 218.
as the Commander of the Army, the Chief Master of the Ceremonies, 12 Āriz and others. Before them he expressed his sincere grief at the demise of the able Vazir, praised his devotion to duty, and his dignity, loyalty and efficiency; and then invited the name of one who could be worthy to be his successor. Several names were suggested and discussed. One was rejected on the ground of his inability to write well, another for want of smartness, a third for his boorish manners and others for their being too young. After a prolonged discussion the choice fell upon Abu Naṣr Ahmad bin Abdussamad, who was then the governor of Khwārizm. A formal invitation was sent to him to come and take charge of the Vizarat. 13

Masʿūd was also in the habit of consulting his ministers on all important matters and hear their opinions patiently. To their great credit they were men of courage and responsibility and no mere flatterers. On matters of moment they definitely disagreed with him and unequivocally opposed his proposals. 14 In most cases the Sultan overruled them and had his own way which ultimately brought him to a sad end. But no minister is known to have been driven out of office or penalized or even fallen from the Sultan’s estimation for having opposed his proposals.

The Vazir of Masʿūd exercised full revenue and financial powers in central government, and controlled the administration of the provinces as well. He exer-

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12 For details of ceremonies see Baihaqi, 177-79, 462 seq.
14 Baihaqi, 266, 347-49, 312-13, 319-21; Aḥārulwu-zārā, f. 31r, seq.
cised control over the accountants, writers, auditors, treasurers; supervised the wardrobe, elephant and horse stables, slaves; in fact everything that was required for the dignity of the Crown. He sat in his office and heard complaints. Khwāja Ahmad was easy of access and any man who wanted to see him could go to him without any sort of hindrance by the porters and chamberlains. In the appointment of high officials his advice was usually sought for and given full weight by the Sultan.

The Vizarat under the early rulers of Ghazna was remarkable in more than one way. The first and foremost was the election by the officials of a panel from which the Sultan selected one. The reasons for rejecting other names were also briefly given. The grounds for the appointment of a man were also indicated. In the constitution where there was no organised public body this method of selection was probably the best one. At any rate it was far better than an arbitrary appointment by the Sultan. The method of the Vazir’s appointment adopted by Mahmūd and his successor has not been fully appreciated or rather has been ignored. It is most important to remember that no other Muslim ruler of northern India at least, not even the Mughal rulers of Delhi ever took such a wise course of action.

Another noteworthy feature was the importance attached to the office by the Vazirs. Khwāja Ahmad would not accept office under Mas‘ūd until he had

15 Baihaqi, 181. The passage, however, refers to nithār only.
persuaded the Sultan to define his powers in black and white. At first the Sultan evaded but the Khwāja was so insistent that he had to give way. The discussion on the question was carried on not verbally but in writing, and fragments of correspondence have been preserved by the author of Athārulwuzarā. If that practice had been followed by others the institution of the Vizarat would have gained much strength and vitality. The Khwāja was also very jealous of safeguarding the prestige and dignity of his office. Once an influential chamberlain of the Sultan, Abu Bakr Hasiri spoke lightly of him to one of his servants. The latter reported the matter to the Khwāja who was so upset as to send his resignation to the Sultan and stay back at home. The absence of the Vazir from the office created considerable sensation. The Sultan refused to accept his resignation and sent the offender to him to punish him as he liked. Abu Bakr was humiliated and had to submit to a heavy fine which was later on excused.

The Vazirs of the early Ghaznavides do not appear to have been either men of great wealth or considerable military following. Khwāja Ahmad certainly required a start in life when Mas'ūd reinstated him in the Vizarat. To maintain his dignity he gave the Khwāja a present of ten thousand dinars, ten slaves and five horses. The early Ghaznavides expected of the Vazir administrative ability and not great military powers of leadership. Later on the civil quali-

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17 Athārulwuzarā, 45r. et seq.
18 Baihaqi, 187–91, 197.
fication gradually yielded to the military ones which created serious problems in the State.

With all the prestige and power the position of the Vazir was delicate. Abul 'Abbās died under torture, Khwāja Ahmad had to spend some years in prison, Hasanak was stoned to death, and Abu Nasr bin Ahmad bin Abdussamad was thrown into prison where he died. The successor of Abu Naṣr, Abu Tāhir, was driven out of his office after two or three years. He was succeeded by Abdurrazzāq, son of the famous Khwāja Ahmad Maimandi. In the days of the early Ghaznavides the Vazirs held office for as many as seven, or ten or even eighteen years but later on long enjoyment of power was rare.

Whether Hasanak had seriously interfered with the succession to the throne or not, it is certain that Abdurrazzāq had. He had been sent to Sistān but on his way he set the expedition in abeyance, brought out from the prison a prince, made the army swear allegiance to him, and raised him to the throne. From this time onwards the character of the Vizarat changed. The Vazir was already an object of jealousy and suspicion and when he began to show active interference with the question of succession he made his position still more awkward and difficult. Personal ambition was an important factor in the change of the attitude of the Vazir but it must also be recognised that the tragic fate of the early and some of the very best Vazirs compelled him to choose between self-effacement and complete domination.

10 It was Mas'ūd's son, Mandud, who imprisoned him.
Little is known about the Vazirs of the later Ghaznavides. It might be presumed that there was no remarkable Vazir who could stamp his name on the pages of history. Placed between the jealousy of the nobles and officials and the suspicion of the Sultan, the Vazir seems to have lost gradually his prestige and power.

But the office of the Vazir continued even after the Ghaznavides. It was as usual regarded as the highest office in the government. Mu'izzuddin Ghori had Vazirs, and the names of at least three of them have survived. Nothing definite is known either of the method of their appointment, the powers vested in them and the extent to which they enjoyed the confidence of the Sultan. But the later history of the Vizarat lends colour to the surmise that he was yet supposed to wield civil and partly military powers.
CHAPTER II

FROM THE SLAVES TO THE TUGHLAQS

With the establishment of independent Sultanates in India the office of the Vazir also came into existence. Yildoz, Qubacha and Qutbuddin all had their Vazirs. From the time of Iltutmish, the Vazir came into better light. His first known Vazir was styled as Nizamulmulk. That he took active part in actual military campaigns is clear. From the accounts of the early Ghaznavide rulers it appears that their control of the military side of the government was largely confined to administrative and financial control and not so much to the actual command of the armies in the field. But the Vazir of Iltutmish, the real founder of the independent Delhi Sultanat, conducted military campaigns also. This is no surprise, for it must have been a difficult task for the early Muslim rulers to make a clear distinction between the civil and military duties of the officials. It required every ounce of the available fighting strength for the handful of Muslim conquerors to maintain themselves against the warlike military castes and fighting communities of India. Moreover,

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20 Raverty, 534.
22 Tajulmaâthir, Br. M., 7623 f. 119r says that the Vazir commanded an army against Yildoz. Vide also Tabqati Nasiri, p. 173, and preface to Jami`ul Hikâyât, also Elliot, ii, 291. For Junaidi Or. 163 f. 231 reads Khojandi.
it must have been equally difficult to find able men with requisite experience and tact to hold the important office of Vazir. The other Vazir of Iltutmish was Fakhrulmulk ‘Isāmi,22 an old man who had served in high offices for thirty years at the Court of Baghdad. His choice shows clearly that Iltutmish was willing to give much weight to experience and did not necessarily insist on military ability and physical energy. The character of Vizarat was thus not clearly established in the time of Iltutmish. It was not settled whether the Vazir should be definitely a civil officer or should combine in him both civil and military powers and qualifications.

During the regime of the weak successors of Iltutmish the power of the Vazir began to grow inevitably. When the Sultan is weak the Vazir must necessarily be strong, otherwise the State is doomed. If the Vazir was strong and powerful and able to dominate the sovereign he was compelled to increase his military power as much in his own interest as in that of the State. When and how the old Fakhrulmulk vanished it is difficult to say. But in Ruknuddin’s time Muhammad Junaidi Nizāmulmulk again came to power.23

The regime of Ruknuddin did not last long. The warlike Vazir was strongly opposed to the election of Raziya and as a consequence was driven out of his

22 Raverty, 617n, Tabq. Akb. De 71. The Vazirs in those days were given such titles of Nizāmulmulk, Fakhrulmulk and ‘Ainulmulk, etc., Shāhidi Šādiq, f. 128r.
23 Raverty; Mohammadi, 349r, 350v. Ferishta, i, 68.
office. His deputy, Khwāja Muḥazzab Ghaznavi\textsuperscript{25} was raised to the Vizarat with the title of Nizāmulmulk.\textsuperscript{26} The Vazir continued to exercise great influence during the reign of her two successors. It was probably owing to his great influence and power that he came to be disliked not only by Sultan Bahram Shah but also by some nobles, religious leaders and leading men of the capital. It is interesting to find that Muḥazzabuddin kept himself in power by his tact and dominating personality without any large military following. Failing to find any direct means to curb the power of the Vazir (his opponents) seem to have decided upon creating a set-off against his power. It was probably with that end in view that they compelled Bahram Shah to give the office of Nāyab (Deputy of the Sultan) to Ikhtiyāruddin.\textsuperscript{27} But the Vazir won him over to his side, and with his co-operation and that of the Mustaufi (Auditor) he continued to exercise power. The Sultan naturally desired to free himself from their grip and fomented a plot which ended in the murder of Ikhtiyāruddin. But the lucky Vazir escaped with a few wounds. The Vazir did not like either to share the power with anyone\textsuperscript{28} or to continue his support of Bahram Shah. So ably did he play his cards that the powerful clique at the Court was broken and the Sultan lost his throne.

\textsuperscript{25} Raverty, p. 641. Ferishta, loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{26} Muḥammadi, 350v.
\textsuperscript{27} Raverty, 649.
\textsuperscript{28} Muḥammadi, 353v; Raverty, p. 662. Tabq. Akb. De 82, Ferishta, 70.
F. 12
In this subtle struggle for real power between the Sultan and the Vazir public opinion inclined in favour of the former. Neither political theorists nor public opinion could appreciate that the King should be left to reign while the Vazir be allowed to rule. And how could they like a Vazir in whose appointment the people had no voice, who could not be removed either by them or the King, and who probably might cast greedy eyes on the crown itself. The last master stroke of Muhazzabuddin was when he tripped up Malik 'Izzuddin, the elder Balban, and once more bringing to the throne his own candidate became the powerful Vazir. This was, however, his last. The measure of his unpopularity with the nobles was full and they combined to put him to death. The weakest point of the Vazir was his lack of actual military power adequate enough to overawe the opposition. For his success he had to depend on one military leader or the other until all lost their confidence in him.

The fall of the Vazir amounted to the domination of the military leaders. The successor of Muhazzabuddin, Najmuddin Abu Bakr remained under the shadow of Balban, and continued to play the second fiddle. The real power was held by Balban whose regime was characterised by wars and campaigns. After about eight years Nasiruddin tried to shake off Balban and transfer the Vizarat to 'Ainulmulk Muhammad Nizamulmulk Junaidi. But this man could not manage to keep his position for more than

20 Raverty, pp. 662, 787 (640 A.H.); 753, 757.
30 Raverty, 664.
a year and once more Abu Bakr was made a nominal Vazir.

The tendency of relying more and more on the support of military leaders and the weakening of the power of the Sultan virtually made the Vizarat synonymous with strongest military leadership. Balban and his brother were the virtual rulers and the Sultan and Vazir were eclipsed. Balban utilized his opportunities so well that he got the throne itself. The Vazirs before Balban had simply aspired to power, but Balban carried matters much further.

During his romantic career and his nizābat Balban had seen that the Vizarat was a very tempting and powerful office, and probably realised that it should not be placed in the hands of either a very ambitious and clever man or a powerful military leader or a man of low origin. With some such notions in his mind and a desire to bring all the strings of administration in his own hand he chose for his Vazir Khwāja Hasan. Hasan must have remained a titular Vazir. His powers must have been limited, firstly, by his ignorance of financial affairs and, secondly, by the fact that the Muster Master (Rāvati 'Arz) was made absolutely independent in his department. Moreover, the vigilant eye of Balban on the whole administration was calculated to narrow the scope of the activities of the Vazir.

31 Raverty, 698.
32 Zia, pp. 24, 114.
During the latter part of the Slave rule the Vazir was not much heard of, and the influence and power that ought to have been in his hands were enjoyed by others. The period of Balban and his successor was therefore very unfavourable for the Vizarat.

There seemed to be some chance for the revival of the Vizarat under Jalāluddin Khilji. Although himself a distinguished soldier and commander his outlook was broader than that of an average military leader. He entrusted the Vizarat to Khwāja Khaṭīr who was a man of experience and wisdom and had served as a deputy Vazir in the time of Balban. He was a non-military man and was believed to be an expert in his own line. His abilities were vindicated when 'Alāuddin confirmed him in his office after the revolution.

The policy of 'Alāuddin changed when he allowed Malik Kāfür to become the Nayab. The Vazir was forgotten and in fact Malik Tā julmulk Kāfüri came to be regarded as the Vazir of the Sultan. What were his financial and administrative abilities history does not record, but he was undoubtedly a favourite of the Sultan and an able military leader. It was probably his military success that raised him to the Vizarat and it would appear that military achievement came to be regarded as a decisive qualification for it.

34 Zia, 117, Muhammadi, 373r.
35 Zia, 24.
36 Zia, 247.
37 Futuhati Firoz Shahi, Or, 2039 f. 304; T. Haqqi, f. 25v.
As in 'Alāuddin's time so also in that of his successor the Vizarat remained in the hands of a military leader. Compared with the abilities and qualifications of Malik Kāfūr, Khusro Khan was a much smaller man. His appointment to the Vizarat was a scandal and only showed how that office was degraded. He was considered as one of the most unworthy men who ever held that post. But Khusro Khan himself showed much discretion when during his short reign he conferred the Vizarat on Malik Wahīduddin Quraishi, who was regarded as a man of eminent qualifications and had held the important post of the Vazir of Gujrat with credit. The selection was wise and marks a healthy change from the Khilji policy.

When Ghayāsuddin Tughlaq came to the throne of Delhi he introduced a new experiment. He invited three of the ex-Vazirs—Khwāja Khaṭir, Khwāja Muhazzab and Junaidi—honoured them by permitting them to sit in his presence, and not only consulted them in all important matters but gave full weight to their opinions. Junaidi held the high title of Malikulwuzara. For the ordinary routine work the office of Vizarat was given to Malik Shādi the son-in-law (?) of the Sultan. The chroniclers do not say how the experiment worked and how long it lasted.

38 Zia, 381.
40 Zia, p. 397.
Whatever experience the system of Ghayāsuddin might have brought, his son, Muhammad Tughlaq, reverted back to the old policy of individual responsibility. He conferred the Vizarat on Khwāja Jahān, an elderly man who had held the post of the superintendent (Minister) of public works under Ghayāsuddin. The selection of this dignified and experienced man and the confidence that the Sultan placed in him infused new life into the office. His competence was beyond all doubt, for in spite of the rigid temperament of the Sultan and the enormous political and financial troubles of the time he continued to hold the office right up to the death of Muhammad. He had no military or high political ambitions and took pleasure in his work which he did efficiently and honestly. His loyalty and devotion to duty were so well established that Firoz Tughlaq and some of the grandees of the State refused to believe that he could have acted disloyally.

The successor of Khwāja Jahān to the Vizarat was his deputy, Maqbul. A converted Telang Hindu, he was a man of experience and tact. He had enjoyed the confidence of Muhammad Tughlaq and Firoz, when he came to the throne, did not hesitate to invest him with full powers. Firoz had so much trust in

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44 J.A.S.B., 1871, p. 225.
45 'Aaff, 54, 71-72.
46 Zia, 454.
47 Zia, 527, 578; 'Aaff, 396.
him that he could leave the entire government in his hands and afford to absent himself from the capital for long periods. During the first seven years of his reign the Sultan spent only thirteen days in the capital. On one occasion when all sorts of misapprehensions were entertained at Delhi owing to the absence of any news for several months from the royal camp, the Vazir’s tact and dignified behaviour maintained peace and order.

Although the Vazir maintained a gorgeous retinue and, both for personal and political reasons, was fond of spectacular processions, he was essentially a civilian. The source of his strength did not lie in warlike battalions but in the support and confidence of the Sultan and his own dignity and tact. True and loyal, tactful and dignified, he inspired awe and respect. His honesty in money matters was not beyond doubt but he did not deliberately sacrifice the interests of the exchequer. Like Clive he enriched himself and also replenished the treasury of his master. Firoz was so satisfied and pleased with his work that he frequently used to say that Khāni Jahān was virtually the King (Padshah) of Delhi.

After the death of Maqbūl his son was given the Vizarat. He maintained all the dignity and traditions of his father. In one respect he was superior

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48 'Aṣif, 399.
49 Zia, 542. For the opinion of Ahmad Ayaz, vide 'Aṣif, 68.
50 Op. cit., 400. For Khāni Jahān’s enormous powers see Mubarak Shāhī (B.M. 1673), f. 401v., 402r, 406r, 408v.
to him. While his father was fond of women and his integrity in money matters was doubted, his son was strictly honest and upright.

The Tughlaq period was thus the heyday of the Vizarat in Muslim India. The Vazir in the time of Firoz Tughlaq could, in theory, appoint or dismiss any official of his department including such a high official as the Ashrāf Mumālik (Auditor General). In practice, however, such extraordinary powers were not used. Maqbul used to sit on an embroidered carpet and receive accounts from the revenue collectors (Āmils). Every night he used to give a report to the Sultan of financial and political matters. In the darbars (public audience) only the Vazir had the privilege of directly addressing the Sultan. Moreover, he was offered a special seat near the royal throne but his conservative instinct prevented him from availing himself of the honour. During the absence of the Sultan from the capital the whole administrative machinery was run by him.

As might be expected the other officials and grandees were jealous of Maqbul, insinuated against him, and represented to the Sultan the inadvisability of placing so much confidence in, and leaving so much power to, him. Finding that the Sultan

52 'Aṣif, 426.
53 'Aṣif, 413.
was unwilling to change his policy some nobles hatched a conspiracy against him. The Vazir came to know that Prince Muhammad Khan in his youth and restless ambition had allowed himself to become a tool in the hands of the conspirators. He therefore brought the matter to the notice of the Sultan and procured an order for the arrest of the ringleaders. There might be some truth also in the statement of the chroniclers that the Vazir wanted to get the prince out of his way and usurp the throne. The enjoyment of supreme power might have spurred his ambition further and aroused a desire to capture the throne. The statements of the chroniclers, however, are not supported by any fact. The character of the Vazir, his hereditary loyalty, and his general behaviour were not sullied by any intrigue or rebellious action. Nor did he command like Balban or even Khusro Khan any military power that was essential not only to keep him on the throne but also to back up his pretensions. The charge appears to be based on no better ground than the malice and envy of his opponents and detractors.

The arrest of the son of the governor of Gujrat who was the most active conspirator frightened the supporters of the prince. The prince thought it advisable to strike first before the hand of the Vazir could reach him. Supported by some military officers he surprised the Vazir, and surrounded and plundered his house. The Vazir fled wounded,
only to be surrendered after some time to the mercy of the prince who had him executed. With the fall of the Vazir ended the power of Firoz Tughlaq who virtually abdicated the throne in favour of the prince. The Vazir, who was the mainstay of Firoz, might or might not have thought of usurpation but the idea was accomplished by the prince.

57 Mubarak Shahi, Br. M. (1673), f. 409r, v. 410r.
CHAPTER III

THE PERIOD OF DECLINE

As the later Tughlaqs were weak and ease loving the power of the Vazir began to grow and virtually he became the head of the civil and military affairs. Khwâja Jahân Sarvarulmulk, the Vazir of Muhammad Shah, seems to have commanded great power and influence. What Malik Kâfûr had only partly succeeded in doing, Sarvarulmulk could do successfully. It was he who for the first time succeeded in establishing firmly Mahmud Shah, a boy of ten years, on the throne. Himself having no powerful following he was tactful enough to win to his side a brave and resourceful military leader, Muqarrab Khan, whom he honoured with the high title of Vakîl-i-Sultanat. He was playing, as it were, the part played by some of the Vazirs of the descendants of Ilutumish. He had probably realised that the Sultanat of Delhi was tottering to its fall, and that the rivalry and conflicts of military leaders at the capital had left little scope for him. Therefore, he was pleased to leave the whole burden of government on the shoulders of Muqarrab Khan, the Vakil, and to depart towards the eastern provinces which were in a state of fermentation. There he carved out for himself a kingdom that played for some time an important part in the political and cultural history of northern India. As he probably expected, the Tughlaq dynasty came to an end.
The first Sayyad ruler, Khıdır Khan, employed his Vazir Tājulmulk largely on military duties. As Khıdır Khan himself pretended to be a viceroy on behalf of the Timurides he did not put much emphasis on the paraphernalia of royalty. Consequently the Vizarat also did not receive as much attention as it otherwise would have done. Like Maqbul, the first Vazir of Firoz Shah Tughlaq, Tājulmulk was lucky enough to have the office of the Vazir conferred on his eldest son, Sikandar. Sikandar was also employed on military duties, and only two years after was posted as military governor at Lahore. The Vizarat was then given to Malik Daūd and he too was immediately after despatched to fight the recalcitrant Zamindars of Etawah and Kather.59

The civilian in the Vazir was now almost entirely smothered. Under the Sayyads he was primarily a military leader and was employed in the most difficult military campaigns. But his constant military duties were not supposed to interfere with the financial responsibilities. He was simultaneously an actual commander, a finance minister and the auditor general. In fact he was all in all. There is no doubt that the state treasury and finance must have suffered considerably owing to this concentration of powers in his hand. Mubārak Shāh therefore had very good reasons to appoint an auditor general (Ashrāf) and ask the Vazir to manage the finance department jointly with

59 For all this see Mubārak Shāhi (b) 432v. seq. 437r, 441v.
him. The Vazir resented this interference with his absolute control, and as the Sultan was not prepared to agree with him he fomented an intrigue which ended in the assassination of the Sultan. The Vazir now placed his own candidate, Muhammad Shah, on the throne and assuming the title of Khāni Jahān continued to wield absolute power over the treasury, the stables, the armoury and other departments.

It was indeed a vicious circle in which politics moved in those days. The principles of the Muslim or the Hindu theory of sovereignty did not either suit the times or the ruling race. They did not know any type of constitution other than the monarchical government. There must be someone in the State to sit on the throne. If they allowed the doctrine of the right of the strongest to rule, the throne could not acquire stability. If they bowed to the principle of hereditary succession, a weak ruler caused enormous anxiety and led to intrigues. If again the Vazir wielded full powers and actually ruled on behalf of the sovereign who simply reigned, he became an object of envy and created enemies on all sides. If the Vazir happened to be weak the whole administration was thrown into confusion and the military leaders became uncontrollable. With these impersonal factors the personal element united to make matters worse confounded. On the whole the people tolerated

60 Mubārak Shāhi (B) f. 459r, 461v. Mahmūd Shāhi, f. 76v. Ferishta, i. 169.
an absolute ruler than an absolute Vazir, and the latter was a loser in the long run.

Sarvarulmulk like others met a tragic fate. The Sultan was as jealous of him as were the nobles. Kamalulmulk, the rival of the Vazir, waited for an opportunity to encompass his ruin. There was nothing more easy for the ambitious leaders than to pretend to espouse the cause of some injured monarch. Just as the cause of Mubârak Shâh Khilji was espoused by Ghâzi Malik, that of the late Mubârak Shâh Sayyad was taken up by Kamalulmulk. Having enlisted the support of some of the Afghans and other officers he besieged Delhi. The Vazir's position became delicate as the Sultan was also intriguing against him. After a stand of some months he was killed by the order of the Sultan in the royal pavilion.

The murder of the Vazir instead of improving matters made them worse. Kamalulmulk, who was made Vazir, was, like his titular master Muhammad Shah, a tool in the hands of the Afghans. After some time he too was driven out of his office to please Bahlûl Lodi. But Bahlûl had deeper designs than simply a change in the Vizarat. He did not even approve of the new Vazir, Hamid Khan, who happened to be on the whole a strong

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61 Mubârak Shâhî, (B), f. 461v. Ferishta, i. 170.

62 The chroniclers suggest that driven to desperation he and his supporters went to the royal pavilion with drawn swords to kill the Sultan. The Sultan was already on his guard and had placed secretly his own men inside. At his signal they attacked the Vazir who, while attempting to run away, was killed. Mubârak Shâh uses the word ghadr.
man. The Sultan must now have realised his helplessness and folly as is apparent from the licence and debauchery into which he plunged himself. The Sayyad Sultanat crumbled fast. The Afghans grew more and more aggressive. The Vazir, Hamid Khan, did whatever could be possible to save the Sultanat but his resources were soon dried up and the Lodi usurped the throne in the time of 'Alauddin, the worthless son of a worthless father.

Since the days of the later Tughlaqs the Vazir had been growing in power and pretensions and was identifying himself more and more with the political and military affairs of the State. The office of the Vazir had come to be considered as the highest ambition for a man and the struggle was not so much to capture the throne as to become Vazir. The extraordinary extension of the powers and importance of the Vazir was soon followed by a reaction.

The successors of the Sayyads were the Lodi Afghans who were brought up in democratic and tribal traditions and had little love for the paraphernalia of the Turkish monarchy. In this respect they were somewhat like the Arabs. The government that the Lodis established had some affinity with that of the Ommayad Khalifas who ruled without a Vazir but with the aid of the chiefs of the various tribes.

Bahlūl Lodi had no well organized central government. He had divided the Empire among the tribal leaders who had very indefinite, if at all, financial connection with the central government. Each of the leaders was practically independent and supreme in his jurisdiction. It is believed that Bahlūl Lodi was
averse to amass treasure and preferred to divide the State income among his followers. This policy was quite in keeping with the promise that he had made in his circular inviting the co-operation and help of the tribal leaders in maintaining the Afghan power.

In the authorities dealing with Bahlūl there is no reference to the Vazir; probably he had no Vazir. But the ideas of Bahlūl Lodi were as unsuitable to the conditions in India as his machinery of administration was inadequate for governing an empire. His son took a view different in some respects but not radically from that of his father. When a prince, he had a Vazir as well as a treasury. Shaikh S’aīd Farmuli was Divān and later on Mian Malik Bhuva also probably enjoyed the powers of the Vazir. The latter was believed to be a very pious and upright minister and seems to have enjoyed the confidence of the Sultan. He was not a very active and efficient man, nor had he any ambition to dominate his master. The Sultan was anxious to introduce efficiency in the Vizarat department and receive a report of its work daily.

In the early days of Ibrahim Lodi Mian Bhuva was the Vazir. As an old Vazir he considered himself, as if it were, a custodian of the State treasury and felt a bit jealous in permitting expenditure he did not

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63 Daoodi (a), f. 8v; Op. cit. (b), f. 8r.
64 T. Haqqi, f. 42r.
65 Daoodi (a), 19v.
66 Afsanai Shahani Hind, f. 45r.
67 Khān Jahānī, f. 86r. Mushtaqi (a), f. 17r.
68 Badaoni, f. 67r. Ranking, 432. Afsana, f. 46r.
think justifiable. This is apparent from his reply to Ibrahim when the latter ordered him to pay a few lacs of rupees to the son of Raja Man. He frankly observed that "the monarch accumulates treasure as a matter of policy and spends it on proper objects. It is not desirable that money should be spent without good reason." The youthful Sultan was put out by the reply, and as his general attitude had already aroused his suspicion he ordered the arrest of the Vazir immediately. Though otherwise creditable, the Vazir had no legal right to override the orders of the Sultan. The office of Vizarat was then transferred to the son of Mian Bhuvā. This is one of the few cases in which the Vizarat passed from father to son.

The Vazir continued to remain in obscurity even in the second Afghan Empire. In the chronicles concerned with the history of the first Surs there is little mention of the Vazir. Sher Shah was not actuated by the motives of Bahlūl but acted on different principles. The history of the Vizarat particularly of the later Tughlaq period, showed the evils of the institution under particular circumstances. The Lodi Afghans had not attached much importance to that office. Moreover the experience of Sher Shah of the high officials at the court of the Mughal Emperors was not very happy. On one occasion he frankly said that one of the reasons of his success lay in the corruption of the high officials at the Mughal Court. This

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69 Afsana, f. 45v.
70 Khān Jahānī Egerton, f. 100r. The text has dārul 'adālat which I suppose means the imperial office.
71 Abbas Khān, L.O. f. 104r. Abbas Khān refers specifically to the Vakil and the Vazir.

F. 13
remark was probably based on his own experience of Hindu Beg, the Vazir of Humayun. For all these reasons Sher Shah decided to supervise the Central Government directly instead of leaving it in the hands of the Vazir. It is doubtful if he or his son Islam Shah ever appointed a Vazir. In the time of Islam Shah his Hajib seems to have exercised considerable influence but he is not to be identified with the Vazir.

The only reference to the Vizarat in the time of the Surs is found when 'Ādil Shah appointed Shamshír Khan to that post.\(^2\) The appointment of Shamshír Khan appears to be due mainly to political reasons. Khvāš Khan, a favourite general of Sher Shah, was very popular owing to his distinguished military career, loyalty to the throne, generosity and piety. He was executed under very tragic circumstances, and his followers and admirers must have felt strong resentment against Islām Shah. When 'Ādil Shah killed the son of Islām Shah and usurped the throne he gave the Vizarat to Shamshír Khan, brother of Khvāš Khan, for obvious reasons.

Shamshír Khan could not have enjoyed his powers for long. Quite early in his reign 'Ādil Shah came into conflict with the Afghan nobility. In this struggle he found Hemu to be the ablest and most serviceable of his followers, and allowed him to exercise supreme influence. According to some authorities he was made the Vazir.\(^3\) Hemu possessed so much in-

\(^2\) Khan Jahān Egerton, f. 152r. v. Badaoni, i. 416 says that Shamshír Khan was made Vazir and Daulat Khan, a neo-Muslim, vakil.

\(^3\) Badaoni, 427. Tabq. Akb. f. 180r.
fluence and power that even the personality of the Sultan seems to have gone into the shade. He was like Malik Kafur the chief Military Commander also, hence in him were united both the civil and military powers. Hemu was the first Hindu who without changing his religion rose to the position of Vazir and justified his selection. He commanded the entire confidence of the Sultan and worked ceaselessly in his master's interests. As a general his abilities were realised by the Mughals who counted in their ranks such able commanders as 'Ali Quli Khan Shaibani, Bahadur Khan, Bairam Khan and Shamsuddin. They were not afraid of any Afghan general or ruler but regarded Hemu as the most formidable of their opponents and the greatest obstacle to their success.

The Afghan period was very unpropitious for Vazirship. Strictly speaking it did not quite disappear but it was weak and inefficient and appeared to be insignificant. The practical elimination of the Vazir had both advantages and disadvantages. The chief advantage was that the crown once more recovered its original splendour and power. The political ambitions of the Vazirs had damaged the power and prestige of the Sultans from the times of the later Tughlaqs. Intrigues, frauds, embezzlements and pretensions had undermined the vitality of the government. The policy of the Afghan rulers from that point of view was not an unmixed evil. The disadvantages of it were that it stiffened the autocratic character of the Sultanat. Over the Vazir there was the Sultan, but over the latter there was no one to exercise a direct check. Besides acting as a sort of
brake on the autocratic tendency of the Sultan, the Vazir also acted as a buffer between the people and the Crown. By reducing the Vazir to a nonentity the Crown weakened its own defence. By undertaking direct control of the revenues, finance and military affairs the crown brought all blame for bad government on its own head. Any revolution in the government was now bound to involve the Sultan or the people in ruin. In the days of the Slaves and the Tughlaqs, as a general rule, the Vazirs rose and fell without necessarily destroying the ruler. Exceptions to the rule were few and far between but during the weakness of the Vizarat the Sultan was the object of revenge. The evils were not so serious so long as there were strong and able rulers like 'Aläuddin and Sher Shah and Isläm Shah, but the principle of the Afghans was defective. It was as necessary in the interest of the crown as of the government that the Vazir should not be reduced to a negligible quantity. The real problem for the Crown was how to restrict the power and ambition of the Vazir in a way as to make him a source of strength rather than of weakness.
CHAPTER IV

RE-ORGANISATION ON A NEW PLAN

With the arrival of the Mughals in India the power of the Vazir once more revived. Babar’s Vazir Nizamuddin Khalifa was a man of tact and devoted to the sovereign. Babar had great confidence in him which was never betrayed. Babar has eulogized his services and styled him the "pillar of the imperial fortune." He showed considerable regard to the requests of the Khalifa. In connection with his attitude towards the Mughal rebels he remarked that "to please him (Khalifa) I gave them their lives but I ordered them to be kept in custody."

Nizamuddin Khalifa was the political and financial head of the government. His position was almost exactly like that of some of the Vazirs of the early Turks. He took a leading part in the military campaigns and commanded troops at Bijapur, Panipat and Khanwa. At Khanwa he even supervised the digging of a ditch and appointed spadesmen and overseers. He accompanied Babar in his Bihar and Chanderi expeditions. He seems to have enjoyed enormous influence in the government as is evident from the important part he played in connection with Humayun’s succession.

76 Memoirs, 564.
75 Memoirs, 354.

The Khalifa as his title indicates was the Vakil and Vazir of Babar.
Humayun continued the policy of Babar. Less energetic but more ceremonious than Babar as Humayun was he left the Vazir in full possession of his powers. In his early reign Amir Wais Muhammad exercised full control over all the departments of the government civil or military. Later on Hindu Beg enjoyed the full confidence of Humayun as is evident from the action that was taken on his report regarding the movements of Sher Shah. In the language of Abul Fazl "the shutting and opening, the binding and loosening of the great affairs of the officers and Vazirs, and of all the government clerks, and those entrusted with civil affairs, and the fixing of the pay of the soldiers and the appointment of the household servants rested with him."

After his defeat and exile Humayun's attitude seems to have changed probably because he could not find any man worthy of his entire confidence and endowed with the qualifications necessary for the office. Moreover he seems to have become more cautious and acquired a better sense of proportion. This view is suggested by the attitude that Humayun took in the quarrel between Qaracha Beg, the Vazir, and the treasurer.

The circumstances in which Babar and Humayun found themselves were not favourable for a separation of the civil and military duties of the Vazir. Babar was personally too deeply interested in military affairs,

76 Badaoni.
77 Khwand Mir.
78 A.N. Beveridge; i. 645.
79 Jauhar, MS. 96v. 97r.
hence it might be presumed that the Vazir in his time played a secondary role in military matters. But Humayun had placed the military department also under the charge of Wais Muhammad while Hindu Beg and Qarācha Beg were pre-eminently military officers. There appears to be a good deal of truth in the words which Abbas Khan puts in the mouth of Sher Shah that the Mughal rulers left too much power in the hands of the ministers.\(^{80}\) In the absence of more positive details it might be said that during the period of the first two Mughals the Vazir enjoyed wide and undefined powers and was considered to be the most important official.

When Akbar came to the throne he was a minor. Hence the office of Vakil grew in importance. There is no exact parallel to the Vakil of the early days of Akbar in the history of the Sultans of Delhi. In name it bears some affinity with the earlier Vakil\(^{81}\) but in reality it resembles more the nayābat. Except in name Bairam Khan exercised all powers of the sovereign. Except probably Balban and Sarvarul-mulk, Vazir of Mubārak Shah, no official of the Delhi Empire ever exercised more powers than Bairam. He virtually enjoyed for a few years all the dignity and power allowed by the Muslim law to the Vazir of the first class.\(^{81a}\) On his own initiative he adopted all

\(^{80}\) Abbas Or 164, f. 21v. T. Khān Jahāni, f. iii v.

\(^{81}\) According to Siyāsāt Nāma the Vakil was to look after the kitchen, Sharāb Khana, horses, royal court, etc., Chap. 16, f. 58r. According to Tabqati Akbari there were two officials called Khāni Khana and Khan Jahan respectively. It is not, however, stated what their powers were. Vide Tabq. Akb. MS., 122v. 123v.

\(^{81a}\) See above, p. 161.
measures, military or political, to the extent of appointing, dismissing and even imprisoning and executing any official however important and influential he might be.

The same forces that had ruined many a Vazir overwhelmed Bairam Khan also. The problem of the Vizarat up to this time was far from being solved. After the fall of Bairam Khan for some time the Vikalat was a bait that was offered to powerful and ambitious leaders to enlist their support for the Imperial cause. The appointments of Shahābuddin, Bahādur Khan, and Muna'īm Khān also were evidently for that reason. As these appointments were purely for political reasons, change of hands was comparatively quick, and no other qualification except military power and influence was seriously counted.

While the Vizarat in the form of Vikalat was thus in a state of flux, Akbar was consolidating the power of the crown and was laying the foundations of a policy that was likely to offer some solution of the problem of Vizarat. The first and the most important measure adopted by him was to gradually organize the finance department more or less on an independent basis. He began with the appointment of an officer Etmad Khan to whom he gave the entire management of the crown lands.

After the murder of Shamsuddin Atka and the execution of Adham Khan the prestige of Muna'īm Khān suffered a heavy blow. His flight and arrest belittled him in the eyes of the people. Soon after, he was badly defeated at Jalalabad and had to beat a
retreat in a miserable condition. On all these occasions Akbar treated him with the utmost generosity. But these facts strengthened the prestige of the Crown and undermined that of Muna'īm Khān. Although the latter continued to hold the office of Vakil he could never seriously recover his old prestige and influence. The real direction of the government and political affairs had gone into the hands of Akbar.

While the Vakil was thus losing his political powers financial matters were taken out of his control and entrusted to Muzaffar Khan who was made the Divān of the Empire, and was authorized to look after the financial affairs with Todar Mal as his assistant (1564-65). Muzaffar Khan was an able financier with considerable experience. He was the Divān of Bairam Khan. After the fall of the latter he was made ‘Āmil of Parsur and then rose to the important position of the Divāni Bayutāt.82 His varied experience had made him eminently fit for the Divānship of the Empire. From his time the office of Divān began to grow into importance almost independent of the Vakil. In 1573 he was made Vazir.83

Just as he kept the strings of political power in his own hands Akbar was desirous of directing the financial affairs of the Empire also. Muzaffar Khan probably did not quite realize this. Conscious of his ability and the wide powers entrusted to him he had the audacity to oppose the proposals of the Emperor regarding the civil and military reforms. For that

82 A.N., ii. 198. Blochmann. Maasirul Umara, iii, 221.
83 Khaki Shirazi, f. 546r.
attitude he was removed from his office which was transferred to Todar Mal, his chief rival. Coming from a business-like community, Todar Mal had seen the regimes of Sher Shah and Islām Shah. In Sher Shah’s time he was believed to be a man of parts and was therefore entrusted with the difficult task of the fortification of Rohtas. Although in Akbar’s early days he was more distinguished as a military engineer and an able military officer his financial ability did not escape the attention of the Emperor. This dual character of a commander and financier Todar Mal retained up to the end of his life. But it is important to remember that he was not a military man in the sense of the tribal leaders of the early Turks.

Even in the life-time of Muna’im Khan the Vakil had been practically deprived of financial powers. After his death the process was completed. Although in 1577 Muzaffar Khan was given the powers of Vikalat and Vizarat as a reward for his brilliant military services in Bihar yet his Vikalat was more of a financial than a political character. No doubt Akbar had raised his position in the eyes of the officials and the people when he allowed him a special privilege to ride on a Kotal horse while he himself and other nobles walked on foot on the occasion of one of his pilgrimages to Ajmere. The chronicler says that no Vakil had ever received such an honour from any ruler before. But it was more a spectacular honour than real. Muzaffar Khan was in fact a Vazir in the sense

84 'Arif, f. 370. 'Arif knew Muzaffar Khan very intimately and gives interesting information, vide f. 388. 370, 372-73.
of Divān and was only nominally a Vakil. And even as a Vazir he was only a titular head for the real financial control was exercised by Todar Mal and his colleague, Khwaja Shāh Mansūr.\(^5\) Besides, the Vīkalat of Muzaffar Khan was a short one and before two years of his office were over he was again sent as Governor to Bengal\(^6\) (1579). These details by themselves are dull and dreary but they suggest how the Vīkalat was disintegrated by the policy of Akbar.

But the final blow was given to the old type of Vīkalat when for about ten years (1579—89) no Vakil was appointed by Akbar because no man was found fit for the post.\(^7\) This was the period of greatest depression for the old type of Vīkalat. But it was the happiest period for the Vīzarat of financial character. It was during this time that Todar Mal enjoyed the high office of Mushrif Diwan, a post higher than that of Diwan but lower than that of Vakil.\(^8\) In the words of Abul Fazl he enjoyed "virtually the position of a Vakil."\(^9\) In Todar Mal the old fashioned Vīkalat was metamorphosed to the High Divānship.\(^10\) The financial character dominated

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\(^5\) A.N. Beveridge, iii, 300, 303. 'Ārif, f. 386.

\(^6\) A.N. Beveridge, iii, 386.

\(^7\) A.N.

\(^8\) Ain Akb.


\(^10\) Prof. J. N. Sarkar in his "Mughal Administration" (Calc. 1924), p. 23, says that "We read of no Hindu diwan being given the high title of Vazir." If insistence on the word he laid even then see—Iqbal Nama, p. 355 where Todar Mal in 1581 was given "Alī manṣab Vazārat Kul min Haid ulistaqlāl. . . . "
the military one. The Divān Ashrāf overshadowed the Vakil!

The high importance given to the head of the financial department was never lost. The Vazir was now the financial head topping over the governmental machinery, though in theory the office of Vakil was a sort of sinecure and the highest title in the official hierarchy. It was not the intention of Akbar to abolish the high title of the Vikalat. He realised its honorific value and held it out as the highest spectacular reward that could be given to the ablest and most favoured official. After Todar Mal’s death Abdurrahim was made Vakil, and in 1596 the office was given to ‘Aziz Koka. But these two officers were primarily military heads. "Although the financial offices are not under his (Vakil’s) immediate superintendence," yet as a formal matter he "receives the returns from the heads of all financial offices and wisely keeps abstracts of their returns."\(^{91}\)

Thus Akbar in practice took the sting out of the Vakilship and made it almost harmless. In financial matters the Vazir or Diwan was supreme controller. As Abul Fazl puts it "he is the lieutenant of the Emperor in financial matters."\(^{92}\) The position of the Vazir under Akbar was not identical with that of the Vazir of the Tughlaqs. The Vazirs of Firoz, the two Khwājajahāns, exercised full financial and political powers. They had no rival in power for no title was higher than that of Vazir. But Akbar’s Vazir (Divān) was the highest financial officer and had little

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\(^{91}\) Ain Blochmann, vi.

\(^{92}\) Ain, loc. cit.
to do with purely political affairs. On the other hand his Vakil had only a nominal connection with financial matters. He was the head of the officials of the court, the camp and concerned himself with military and political matters. The Vazir was thus supreme in one sphere while the Vakil in another. This practical division of powers and functions was a useful contribution that Akbar made towards the solution of a long-standing problem.

For twenty years the Vizarat (Divānship) changed hands between Muzaffar Khan, Todar Mal, and Shah Mansur. Shah Mansur was essentially a financier. He is not known to have played any conspicuous part in any military campaign. The qualifications for Vazirship did not necessarily include military experience or fame. He had earned a good reputation as the Mushrif of the perfumery department. He had served as Divān of ‘Ali Qulī Khan-i-Zaman and also held for some time the offices of Bakhshi and Diwan under Muna‘im Khān. Thus his experience was wide. In those situations he had acquired practical knowledge of the whole country from Qanauj to Gaur. He was a man of courage and character and was notorious as a hard task master and a rigorous administrator. As to his expert knowledge of revenue and finance there was no doubt; and, if not superior, he was in no way less able than Todar

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93 In 1670—72 Mansur was Bakhshi of Muna‘im Khān. (Bayazid, f. 138v. 144v). At the time of Muna‘im Mansur was his Diwan (Khaki Shirazi, f. 577r). In 1675 he was made Diwan (Bayazid) and in 1678 Divānikul (Badaoni Love 248 and Khaki Shirazi, loc. cit.) See also Maasirul Umara, i, 653 seq. and Blochmann.
Mal. His greatest drawback was that he could not fully appreciate the military point of view, and considered every question from the financial point irrespective of its political consequences. This drawback was exploited by his rivals Muzaffar Khan and Todar Mal. That he exercised enormous powers just before the outbreak of the Bengal mutiny is clear from the fact that he had cut down the scales of allowance sanctioned by the Emperor for the armies serving in Bihar and Bengal, and when complaints were made against this the Emperor paid no heed. No doubt on the strong representation of Todar Mal he was suspended for some time but shortly after he was reinstated in his office. Failing in their efforts his opponents hatched a cowardly conspiracy that resulted in his execution.\textsuperscript{94}

Akbar was wise to leave wide and full powers to his Vazirs. The work of assessment, restoration of the finances, and regulating military expenditure was bound to bring in its train much unpopularity. Muzaffar Khan's appointment has a chronogram in "Cruel" (Zālim).\textsuperscript{95} He and Todar Mal were highly unpopular as is clear from a couplet preserved by Badaoni:

The dog of the Raja is better than Muzaffar Khan
Though the dog is a hundred times better than the Raja.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{94} A.N. Beveridge, and n. Faizi Sar hindi, f. 164, 166.
\textsuperscript{95} Badaoni Lowe, p. 64.
Similarly Shah Mansur was unpopular and Nurulhaq has left the following:  

Shah Mansur that Persian  
His business is to perpetually tease the people.  
Owing to his actions I almost see,  
His head on the gibbet like that of Mansur.  

This came out true and his execution was hailed with supreme satisfaction by all, though later on Akbar himself was very sorry for it. By entrusting the responsibility of financial affairs to the Vazir Akbar gained two advantages. The first was that the sense of responsibility made the Vazirs put their very best in the task to the ultimate benefit of the State. Secondly, all the blame and obloquy that might have fallen on Akbar was shelved on the shoulders of the Vazir.

It appears that Akbar maintained his policy up to his death. For, the later Vazirs, Qulij Khan, Khwaja Shamsuddin Khwafi, Rai Patr Das, Araf Khan and Muhammad Muqim, all continued to enjoy the same position in financial matters. The last one was given the title of Vazir Khan but it is not clear what was its precise significance. The period for which that office was held by one man was not more than four or five years. But it should not be supposed that that was the period for which a Vazir was appointed as a general rule. There was no hard and

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97 Zubdat, f. 211v.  
99 A.N.  
100 Zubdat, T. f. 247r.
fast rule in the matter. Patr Dās\textsuperscript{101} for example did not hold his office for more than a few months. Indeed he was removed before he could be confirmed in his office. Similarly Qulij Khan also did not enjoy his Vizarat for more than a year. The policy of appointment for short periods adopted by Akbar was also wise. In the days of the early Turks the Vazir stuck to his post sometimes throughout the reign of the appointing sovereign, or until he incurred his displeasure, or sometimes until he was removed from his office by violent means. The dangers inherent in the old plan did not exist to that extent in that of Akbar. The Vizarat was no longer a monopoly of any person, nor was a Vazir a fixture in the State.

On a general survey of the history of Vazirship it appears that it passed through several stages. At first the Vazir was an alter-ego of the Sultan and exercised indefinite and wide powers both civil and military. In the time of Balban the independence and power given to 'Āriz marks the first stage of change. The Vazir struggled to recover his original powers which were sanctioned in a way by the Muslim law. By the time of the Tughlaqs the Vazir recovered high prestige and enjoyed indefinite and too extensive financial and political powers, though his military powers were very weak. This is followed by another struggle for complete possession of all powers. Then came a reaction under the Afghans when the Vazir was almost a nonentity till the time of Adil Shah. On the arrival of the Mughals the

\textsuperscript{101} A.N. 'Maasirul Umara, ii, 140.
Vizarat was revived but its character was as indefinite and powers as wide as in the days of the early Turks. Akbar took an important step and separated the financial from the political and military powers. His Vazir was more dignified and powerful than the second class Vazir of the Muslim jurists,\footnote{See above, p. 101.} and instead of being a danger to the State and a source of intrigues he brought efficiency and responsibility to bear on his task.
CHAPTER V

GROWTH OF THE VIZARAT DEPARTMENT (UNDER THE DELHI SULTANS)

The Abbasid Khalifas and the Sāmāni rulers had a fairly organized system of Central Government more or less of a similar nature. The institutions of the Abbasid Khalifas are too well known to require any description. The chief departmental heads in the days of the Sāmānis were Mustaafi, Mushrif, Sāhibi Shurt, Sāhibi Hajib, Diwani Mumlikati Khās, Diwan Auqāf, Diwan Muhtasab, Diwani Qaḍa.\(^{102}\) There was of course the Vazir, and we might also presume the existence of the Diwani Rasāil and Divān-i-'Araz.

The Ghaznavides therefore had before them the constitutions of Baghdad and Bokhara to serve as models. The Vazir was the head of the governmental machine. It is not within the scope of the present inquiry to discuss any offices and officials other than those connected with the financial side of the government which was the special sphere of the Vizarat. The chief officials of the central government controlling the income and expenditure were apparently the Mustaafi, the Mushrif, and the Diwani Mumlikati Khas. The Diwan Muhtasib and Diwani Auqāf might be considered as belonging to the religious activities of the State while the sphere of Diwan-i-'Araz was obviously military.

\(^{102}\) Narshakhi, f. 28v.

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The constitution of the Ghaznavides had all those officials. There was an Ashrafi Mumlakat who was assisted by a number of Mushrifs and was the head of the department. There were also Mustaufs, though it is not quite clear if they had over them a Mustaufi Mumalak though there is mention made of a Mustaufi Diwan. The Mushrif Mumalik appears to have enjoyed a high status for his seat was on the left side of and next to the Vazir.¹⁰³ There is no clear and specific description of the functions of the Mushrif in the contemporary Ghazna Chronicles. From the Siyasatnama of Nizamulmulk, who had drawn considerable inspiration from the practices of the Ghazna rulers, it appears that the duty of the Mushrif was to keep an account of everything whether large or small that was brought to the Government.¹⁰⁴ The Mustaufi on the other hand had to deal with the collection (hasil) and balances (bāqi).¹⁰⁵ It might be that the Mushrif looked after the State property and stores while the Mustaufi supervised the cash accounts.

The functions of the Diwani Mumlakati Khās are also not described. The name however suggests that

¹⁰³ Baihaqi, p. 183. While going through the proofs I happened to look into "The Life and Times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna" by Dr. Muhammad. At page 144 he says that Mushrifs were officers of the Intelligence Department and Diwani Ashrafi Mumlakat was the "Department of Secret Intelligence. He has, however, adduced no arguments and I have no reason to accept his interpretation in preference to mine.

¹⁰⁴ Kitabi Siyāsat, IX, f. 41r.

¹⁰⁵ Baihaqi, p. 145.
he was in the charge of the Royal Domain and was a counterpart of the Diwani Khalisa in the time of the Mughal rulers of India.

Besides these officials there was a Khāzan or Treasurer. The position of the Khāzan does not appear to have been high for he is rarely taken notice of by the Chroniclers and is not mentioned among the high dignitaries of the State.

As the Kingdom of Ghazna was yet in the making the constitution was neither so elaborate nor detailed as that of the Khalifas of Baghdad. Nor were the relations between the heads of the various departments clearly defined. Indeed, some of the officials, such as Diwani Rasālat Khwāja Bu Naṣr and the Dabir Tahir had shown bitterness towards each other. Each of them regarded himself more important than and superior to the other. Similarly Khwāja Bu Sahl Hamdui considered his position as high as that of the Vazir. Nevertheless the Vazir was generally regarded as the highest official. Each departmental head had direct access to the Sultan in the time of Masʿūd. Sometimes the Sultan referred administrative matters directly to the officer concerned. For example the Army affairs were discussed with the Diwani ʿAraz just as some other affairs were discussed with Abu Sahl. On the whole this was not a bad practice for it prevented the Vazir from becoming too presumptuous and made the departmental heads feel their individual responsibility to the Sultan.

106 Baihaqi, 67-68.
The officials described above were of the Central Government at Ghazna. In the days of the early Ghaznavvides India was regarded only as a province. Its importance was not as high as that of Khurasan, not because it was a poor province but because it was less consolidated and was inhabited by non-Muslim subjects. While there was a Sāhibi Divān of Khurasan as early as the time of Mahmūd there was no Sāhibi Divān in India. The administration of India was run practically by two officials—the Sipahsālār and the Qāzi. The Sipahsālār at Lahore was Abdulla Qaratigin in the time of Mahmud. He was a mild man and allowed the Qāzi to dominate over him. But when he was succeeded by Aryāraq, the Qāzi Shirāz Abdul Hasan Ali who knew him to be a strong man persuaded the Government of Ghazna to appoint an 'Āmil and a Mushrif. In spite of these officials Aryāraq had his own way. The Qāzi then intrigued against him and Mas'ūd who was trying to get rid of the old and proud nobles and officials of his father's time brought ruin upon Aryāraq.107

At the time of his appointment as Asp Sālār of India Niyaltigin was instructed by the Vazir of Mas'ūd not to meddle with financial affairs but to leave them to Qāzi Shirāz. Thus the Sālār had nothing to do except force the Thakurs to pay tribute, carry holy wars and look after the military affairs. The entire financial administration was left in the

107 Baihaqi, 327-28.
hands of Qāzi Shīrāz. The idea apparently was to separate the civil from the military administration. The Qāzi was assisted by an Āmil and a Mushrif. The conflicts between the Asp Sālār and Qāzi Shīrāz and the rebellion of the former led Masʿūd to introduce more changes. He now appointed one of his sons Majdud as Amir (Viceroy) and sent with him a Dabir and a Mustaufi. The duties of the Mustaufi were as expected to control the income and expenditure.

Thus in the time of Masʿūd the following officers were appointed at Lahore—a Viceroy who was a prince of the blood, a Mustaufi, a Mushrif and a Dabir. We might presume that there was a treasurer also. This was then the nucleus round which the Vizarat department grew. The original intention of keeping the military department severely separate from the civil must have been considerably modified by the appointment of an Amir who being the son of the Sultan, probably represented him, and was in a way the head of the Government. Further changes might have taken place when under the pressure of their Western foes the later Ghaznavides transferred the capital from Ghazna to Lahore.

The Ghorides on their arrival in India must have found the Governmental structure as described above. There is no evidence to show that Muʿizuddin ever contemplated a division between military and civil duties.

109 Baihaqi, pp. 497, 328. At Parahur also there was an Amir and a Kadkhunda. Op. cit., 666-67 which shows the division of functions.

110 Op. cit., 622. Besides the two officials there was a third to look after the affairs of Sarhang (Soldiers).
There is no reference to any appointment of two separate officers for looking after the financial and military affairs respectively. Wherever Mu'izuddin went he appointed an Amir who in all probability exercised both the powers and was responsible to the Sultan. He was left to regulate the Government entrusted to his care as he thought best, for it does not appear that the Sultan appointed Mustaufis or Mushrifis, though the appointment of a Qāzi as an important official has been described. The Amir, for his assistance and to keep the administration going, might have appointed on his own initiative his Mushrif and Mustaui, 113 but that was a very different thing. The policy adopted by the Ghori Sultan might have been in keeping with the conditions of the time but was less enlightened than that of the early Ghaznavides.

When the so-called Slaves established an independent kingdom in India they had to reorganize the administrative machinery and make it worthy of their new position. It was then that there sprang up a Central Government in which the Vazir was the highest official. As early as the days of Iltutmish a regular hierarchy of officials came into existence. Besides the Vazir, the Nayab Vazir, the Mustaifi, the Mushrifî Mumâlik, the Khâzinadar, the Bhalladar are mentioned.

113 There is a vague reference to Mustaui in Tajumaasir. The word has been used in a rhetorical description in which income and expenditure have also been associated with it. Br. M., 7623, f. 96r, 24951 f. 145r.
The most interesting, however, was the Nāyabi Vazir. There was no officer bearing the title of Nāyabi Vazir in the time of the Ghaznavides. It might be that a counterpart of his had existed under some other name or title, but the Nāyabi Vazir was no title in those days. It is apparent that Iltutmish realized that the work of the Vizarat department was too heavy for one man, particularly because he had to do too many things, while the rapid growth of the Empire was bound to increase the volume of work more and more.

Another step was taken by Balban who gave almost complete authority to Rāvati ‘Arz and practically made him independent in his own department.\(^{31}\) This measure had a double advantage. It lightened the pressure of work of the financial department, and also separated the military from the general accounts. It would be too much to suppose that Balban contemplated to dispense with the power of general supervision and control of the Vazir. Theoretically the Vazir was supposed to exercise control over the whole governmental machinery, but in practice he was relieved of his excessive burden. This measure was, moreover, quite in keeping with the general policy of Balban of not allowing the Vazir to grow very powerful.

Under the Slaves the general structure of the Central Government was built up. If Balban had been followed by a ruler of constructive abilities the

\(^{31}\) Zia, p. 116.
department might have developed further and the respective duties of the officials been better defined. But his grandson was a reckless youth and unintentionally allowed the government to grow weaker. His father, Bughra Khan, over and again advised him to have four Vazirs\(^{112}\) as was the custom of the best rulers but he does not appear to have followed his advice.

Early in the days of Jalāluddin Khilji a new office was created in the Vizarat department. It was called Divan-i-Vaqoof. Jalāluddin was anxious to give one of his relations some important post in the Vizarat department. On enquiry he found that there was no reasonable demand for a new officer there. As the Sultan was unwilling to dismiss any of the officials of the department, he created a new one called the Vaqoof.\(^{113}\) In his time two officials worked under the Mushrafi Mumālik.\(^{114}\) The one was the Nāzir whose duty was to deal with the acquisitions, and the other was the Vaqoof who was required to deal with the papers of expenditure.

Whatever might have been the motive of Jalāluddin the appointment of a Vaqoof had some distinct advantages. It was calculated to increase supervision on the expenditure side and introduce more efficiency. Another advantage was that it separated the income from the expenditure side of the finance department. Proper control of the expendi-

\(^{112}\) Zia.

\(^{113}\) 'Aff, 420.

\(^{114}\) Of course there was an officer called Mustaufi Mumālik. In the time of Nizamuddin Auliya that office was held by Khwāja Shamsulmulk. Favāid ul Favād, f. 37r.
ture was the most pressing need of the time. The recklessness of Kaiqubad and the necessity of keeping a strong army were the two most important reasons for it. The value of the Vaqoof appears to have been soon realised for he was given a deputy or nayab to assist him in his work, and was provided with a staff. The Vaqoof might be styled as the Controller of Expenditure.

One of the greatest difficulties under which the Central Government laboured in those days was, that while regarded as extortionate and tyrannical, it had in reality to forgo large balances of unrealized revenue. The intermediaries between the Central Government and the cultivator manipulated the revenue in such a way that while the cultivator had to pay probably more than the specified revenue, the Central Government did not get its proper share. The necessity of proper collection was as clear as that of the close supervision of expenditure.

Driven by the heavy expenditure over his vast army, military fortifications, and the grandeur of the Court, 'Alāuddin was anxious to tap every possible source of income. The most obvious problem was to recover the balances and discourage the vicious habit of allowing them to run on. With his native wit 'Alāuddin created a new department called the Divan Mustakhraj. The duties of the Mustakhraj were to inquiere into the arrears lying in the name of collectors or agents, and realize them.\textsuperscript{115} He was vested with penal powers and appears to have exercised

\textsuperscript{115} Zia, 288-89, 292. Ibni Batuta, iii, 295.
them freely. For he had soon become notorious for frequent employment of physical coercion.\footnote{Zia, pp. 498-99.}

Muhammad Tughlaq also created a new divan to look after the agricultural experiments and colonization introduced by the Sultan. This department was called 'Divān-i-Amiri Kohi.' It was a useful department, but seems to have fallen into neglect, and it disappeared after the death of the Sultan. Like the Divani Mustakhraj of 'Alā'uddin the Divāni Kohi of Muhammad Tughlaq dwindled into obscurity and oblivion.

The extension to the Ashraf department, made by the appointment of a Vaqoof, was bound to bring the Mushrif and the Mustaufī into conflict. It is surprising why a final definition of their respective spheres was long postponed. In the time of Firoz Tughlaq the question was seriously raised. The practice before his time was that the provincial and divisional officials had to send three copies of the details of expenditure and income, one to each of the three high officials, the Vazir, the Mushrif, and the Mustaufī. The powers of the Vazir were clear. But each of the other two officials thought that he was authorized to scrutinize both the income and expenditure. Not only did that attitude unnecessarily duplicate the work but it also created confusion and bitterness. The Vazir Khani Jahan pointed out that the duties of the Mushrif were primarily to scrutinize the income (Jama'). The function of the Mustaufī on the other hand was to supervise the expenditure.
This view was doubted by both the officials until it was finally upheld by Firoz himself. It was ordained that in future the Mushrif was to receive full details of the income and a summary of expenditure, while the Mustaufi was to receive full details of the expenditure and a summary of income.\textsuperscript{117}

The Tughlaq period witnessed another important change. Ever since the days of the Ghaznavides there was a growing tendency to increase the number of slaves. In the history of the early Ghaznavides references are found to Hájib Sálár Ghulámáñ and Mushrifí Ghulámánsaráí. The number of slaves in the time of Mas‘úd was six thousand. The love of Muizuddin Ghori for slaves is well known and it is possible that he might have got special officials to look after them, though no reference is found. It might reasonably be presumed that the number of slaves had been constantly increasing during the Slave and the Khilji periods. ‘Aláuddin Khilji had fifty thousand slaves;\textsuperscript{118} but in the time of the Tughlaqs their increase was very rapid. Firoz had one hundred and eighty thousand slaves. The reason why the Sultans were anxious to favour slaves was that the latter depended for their existence on none else except the Sultans. They were a kind of set-off against the tribal and clannish brotherhoods, and could be relied upon by

\textsuperscript{117} Aśf, 409.

\textsuperscript{118} Baihaqi, pp. 86, 335, 598 and passim. For number of slaves, op. cit., 701.

\textsuperscript{119} ‘Aśf, p. 272; for the number of Firoz's slaves, op. cit., 270. Shahid Sadiq, f. 121r gives 70,000.
the Sultans in time of serious necessity. Moreover, the growth of the Empire and the grandeur of the Court had increased the number of State factories or Karkhanas in which the slaves were employed.

Firoz realised that the management of slaves had enormously increased the work of the Vizarat department. To relieve it he created a separate department to look after them. In this department there was a divān, an Āriz, a treasurer and a Majmu’dar. The duties of the Majmu’dar were to look after the mahāsabāt (accounts) of the Karkhanas. This department was not a law unto itself but was only a branch of the Vizarat department and was under the control of the Divani Vizarat.

Another important step taken by Firoz was the appointment of separate officials to deal with the imlaki Khas (crown lands). These officials kept the imlak accounts separate from that of the general revenue. The distinction between general revenue and income from the crown lands was enlightened and wise. In this office lay the seeds of the Khalsa departments which found enormous development in

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120 For similar reasons the Abbas Khalifas had slaves. Vide Cambridge Medieval Hist., Vol. IV.

121 'Asif, 271, 339. The Bib. Ind. edition of 'Asif, pp. 91-92 mentions Malik Shadi as "Ahli 'Uzām Majmu’adar a’yānī Mumalik va Vizarat" which Elliot, iii, 287, translates as "Accountant General." But the Br. Mus MS. of 'Asif. Or. 162 reads simply "Ahli Majmu’yān-i-Mumalik va Vizarat." One Malik Shadi was made Vaqoof by Ghayas-uddin Tughlaq. In Muhammad bin Tughlaq’s time he might have continued to hold the post.

122 'Asif, 409.

123 'Asif, 130.
the days of the Mughals. It does not appear that the Mughals adopted the principle of Firoz Tughlaq of distinguishing between the public and the private incomes.

Whatever powers the Vazir might have exercised in the Government it appears that his power of expenditure was very little in the time of Muhammad Tughlaq. Ibn Batuta has personal experience of the difficulties and formalities that had to be satisfied before money was delivered from the treasury. When the Sultan ordered payment his orders were first signed by the hājib or bearer of the note. It was then signed by the Khāni Azam, the Kharitadar, and the bearer of the royal inkstand respectively. Then the paper was sent to the Vazir who wrote an order on its strength to the treasurer to make the payment. The treasurer then submitted the order of the Vazir before the Sultan with the daily parwanas. If the Sultan ordered immediate payment it was forthwith made. If, however, he said that delay did not matter the actual payment was usually late. Batuta himself received payment six months after the orders had been issued. It is apparent, therefore, that in the matter of expenditure the treasurer received orders through the Vazir but made payment after the order had been confirmed by the Sultan himself. It is not so clear if that procedure was followed even in the case of recurring expenditure.

The relative position of the high officials of the Vizarat might be imagined from their seats in the

194 Batuta, iii, 406–08.
Court. On the right side of the Vazir sat the Mustaufi. Although by the convention of the Court the position of Mustaufi was next to that of Mushrif, yet, as a special case Mustaufi Muhammad was allowed to sit next to the Vazir. The reason was that Muhammad was the son of the daughter of the late Sultan Muhammad bin Tughlaq. On the left side of the Vazir sat the Nāyabi Vazir; next to him came the Mushrifī Mumālik. Behind the Vazir stood the Nāzir and Vāqīf and other officials.¹²⁵

The department of Vizarat was fully developed by the time of Firoz Tughlaq. The machinery of the Central Government was complete, but its efficiency is highly doubtful. The reason is to be found in the meekness or rather weakness of the Sultan who connived at embezzlements and allowed great latitude to the nobles.¹²⁶ In spite of the good supervising machinery the high officials seem to have appropriated for their private use the money that was due to the state.¹²⁷ For, how else could ‘Imadulmulk hoard a property of thirteen crores though he had only the iqṭā’ of Rāpri. The Chronicler admits that the fear of ‘Imadulmulk had led the Divān Vizarat to connive at his misappropriations. Abu Raja who had been appointed by the Sultan to remove the corruption prevailing in the Divani Vizarat¹²⁸ made confusion

¹²⁵ ‘Aṣif, 419-20.
¹²⁶ Op. cit., 341-42; Besides, Firoz had made the offices hereditary. Futubat, f. 305r.
worse confounded. The himself began to take bribes and his excesses brought his fall. The younger Khani Jahan was scrupulous and honest, but the elder one must have been corrupt, for how else could he have maintained two thousand slave girls selected from even such distant countries as China and Anatolia, and dress each of them in gold embroidered clothes. The history of the Vizarat department of Firoz Shah proves, if any proof were necessary, that the machinery of departmental organization however carefully devised does not necessarily and by itself improve the tone of administration. The character of the Government depends on the sense of responsibility, public spirit, and morality exhibited by the servants of the State, and to some extent also on the vigilance of the Sovereign. Balban and 'Ala'uddin with smaller machinery probably could do better than Firoz with his more developed organization.

CHAPTER VI

GROWTH OF THE VIZARAT DEPARTMENT
(UNDER THE EARLY MUGHAL PADSHAHAT)

With the decline of the Tughlaq Empire the Government fell deeper and deeper into confusion. The Vizirat department was disorganized and important posts were probably left vacant. Power tended to pass in the hands of the Vazir who combined in him the functions of several officials and resented any scrutiny in financial matters. Nevertheless, some officials like the deputy Vazir, Divani Ashraf, Mutsarraf Mumalik and the Muster Master and probably others continued to appear in the lists of officials. In the time of the Sayyads the Vazir exercised all powers. This is illustrated by the resentment of Sarwarulmulk when Kamalulmulk was appointed the Divan Ashraf. The deterioration of the Vizirat department was almost complete in the time of the Sayyad rulers of Delhi.

The policy followed by Bahlul Lodi did not require any elaborate organization of the financial department. As has been pointed out he did not believe in amassing treasure, and preferred to divide the benefits of the State between his Afghan supporters and followers. What was left as the share of the Central Government could well be managed by a simple and crude department. But Sikandar Lodi
took more interest in financial matters. He appears to have organized the Vizarat department better than his father. There is meagre evidence on the point, but the case of Mian Malih throws some light on its working. Sikandar had ordered that the Wazaifs (grants) and Imlak lands should be separated from the Jagirs. This order was not well carried out and one Mian Malih, a Turk Jagirdar, had encroached upon an Imlak land of a Sayyad. The Sayyad travelled all the way from Araul\textsuperscript{122} and lodged a complaint. Sikandar referred his case to the finance office, (Vizarat) which did not promptly attend to it. After some time the Sayyad repeated his complaint at which the Sultan demanded an explanation for the delay from the office. This caused a flutter and the finance officials sat over-night to settle the matter.\textsuperscript{133} That the financial cases were dealt with by the Vizarat department is evident from this anecdote. It throws further light on the fact that the Central Government entertained complaints against the Jagirdars of places distant from Agra.

The Lodis did not, however, do much for the Vizarat department. Nor did the Surs show much favour. Sher Shah himself undertook to do the work of the Vizarat department. His early training in the work of local administration had no doubt qualified him to handle revenue matters with confidence. He

\textsuperscript{122} Daoodi says Araul is sixty miles from Panna on Agra side, f. 27.

\textsuperscript{133} Mushtaqi, 11633 f. 14v. Daoodi (197), f. 27 r, v.
himself took account from the ‘Āmils and examined all remittances to the treasury from every part of his Kingdom. He listened carefully to the accounts of the Karkhanas. Thus he did the work which in the days of the early Turks had been entrusted to the Mushrif and Vaqooof and Mustaufi. True, that he must have been assisted by numerous clerks, but their position and prestige could not have been so high or responsibilities so definite as those of the financial officers of the pre-Afghan period. Sher Shah deserves credit for his devotion to duty, minute supervision and driving power. But there can hardly be any doubt that the work was too much for one man even of his capacity and energy, and consequently in spite of his desire to enliven the administration with his own efficiency it is most probable that a lot of work remained in arrears. Moreover the best part of his time was spent in planning expeditions and conquests, the most important of which he personally led. He could therefore hardly afford to give as much time and attention as a number of whole time and qualified financial officials could do. The eulogy of Abbas Khan and others must be taken with much qualification, and it is only fair to recognize that the administrative machinery of the Surs was inadequate for the task. The successors of Sher Shah might have slightly changed it, but there is no record of any

138 For all this see Mushtaqi, f. 48v, 50r. Daoodi Or (197), f. 79r, v. Abbas Khan, I.O. 105v, also mentions this but does not use the word ‘Āmil which has been used by Daoodi.
serious endeavour on their part to re-organize the machinery of government properly.\footnote{Islam Shah kept up the institutions and regulation of his father, vide Mushtaqi, f. 74r.}

It was not till the time of the Mughal conquerors that the Vizarat department received careful attention. According to the traditions preserved in the Malfuzati Timuri Timur contemplated seven Vazirs working under a prime minister called Divanbegi. Of those the Vaziri Mumlakat, the Vaziri Sayar, the Vaziri Sipah and the Vazir Karkhana appear to have had some connection with financial affairs. The duties of the Vaziri Mumlakat were to bring to the notice of the Amir the condition of the ryat, collections and balances of Vilayats, income and expenditure, and the population and prosperity of the Kingdom. The Vaziri Sipah was to deal with the stipends and salaries of soldiers and present their affairs to the Amir. Matters connected with such miscellaneous affairs and sources of revenue as the baj, zakat, property of the deceased, cattle, pastures, water and fodder, and the arrivals and departures of men, and the absentees, were placed in the charge of the Vaziri Sayar. Lastly came the Vaziri Karkhana who was to supervise the Karkhanas, their income and expenditure, and also general expenditure on the cattle.\footnote{For all these ministers see the Institutes, p. 300 et seq.}

The distribution of functions indicated in the organization of Timur does not entirely correspond with the arrangements adopted by the early Turks or
the Mughals. Yet, one can more or less trace in the Vazirs mentioned above counterparts of the ‘Ariz, the divan, and the Mushrif. What is really important is the division of functions among a number of Vazirs contemplated by Timur.

From the Humayun Nama of Khwandmir, which has largely been followed by Abul Fazl, it appears that Humayun had also some idea of the division of power. He had three large departments. They were called the Daulat, S‘ādat, and Murād departments. Each of these three departments was under the charge of one Chief. The S‘ādat department can be easily identified with the Sadr department of the time of Akbar. How far it corresponded with the Sadararat of the time of the early Turks is difficult to say, for the information on this point is very meagre. It is, however, clear that the head of the S‘ādat department, Sharafulmulk Maulana Muhiuddin, had full powers in his department.¹³⁷ Similarly the affairs of the Sarkar Daulat were in the hands of Hindu Beg; and of Sarkar Murād in that of Amir Uvais. The work of these departments was coordinated by an officer who was appointed later on.

The theory underlying the arrangements of Humayun continued in the time of Akbar.¹³⁸ There was one serious defect in Humayun’s organization which was to a large extent rectified by Akbar. Under the Daulat department Humayun had placed the affairs of Divan, government services, and the salaries

¹³⁷ Humayun Nama, f. 132r.
¹³⁸ Abul Fazl’s Introduction to the ‘Ain.
and stipends of soldiers. But the affairs of Bayūtāt of the Emperor had been completely entrusted to the Murād department. Akbar struck a compromise and extended the supervision of the Vazir to Bayutāt also,139 in fact to all matters of income or expenditure.

In the time of Akbar the organization of the Vīzarat departments received careful attention.

By the last decade of the sixteenth century the Vīzarat department was fully organized and was worked by a large staff. The head of the department was of course the Vazir also called the Divān. Next to him in importance was probably the Mustaufi. The various branches of the office were entrusted to different officials.140 Thus there was the Divāni Khālsa who was in charge of the Khālsa land. At first this officer seems to have enjoyed great importance but later on he is not much heard of, probably because the Vazir threw him into the shade. For dealing with the affairs of Jagirs there was a Divāni Jagir. It is not quite clear if he was the same officer as the Divani tan. In Akbar’s time the use of the word tan is extremely rare, and it is probable that the Divani Jagir later on came to be called by the title of Divani tan. There is no mention in Akbar’s time of any official holding the title of Divani tan. Be it as it may, it is clear that there were two

139 Vide Ain. Loc. cit. and Blochmann, p. 262.

140 The theory in Jahangir’s time was that there should be a division of functions, that is to say, one man for one duty. The author of Shahidi Sadiq lays stress on the point on the ground of efficiency and dignity. Vide f. 89v. 90r. This was in keeping with the principle laid down in Kitab Siyasat, Chap. 44, f. 98v. 99r.
different officials, one to deal with the accounts of the Crown lands and the other with those of the Jagir lands.

The military accounts were separated from other accounts. The military account was technically called the taujīh. The head of this department was styled as Sāhibī taujīh. He was not an independent official but was a part and parcel of the general financial department, and consequently, under the supervision of the Vazir and the Mustaufi. This was a good arrangement inasmuch as the financial minister had his say in questions of military expenditure and exercised control over it.

Then came the Karkhanas or factories. Each of the important Karkhanas had its own Mushrif or accountant. But the expenditure of Karkhanas was examined and supervised by the divani bayūtāt. This officer was different from the Nāzir. While the divani bayūtāt was the chief supervisor of the accounts of Karkhanas the Nāzir appears to have been a general superintendent of workshops. The functions of the Nāzir are, however, not quite clear. There was also a Mir-i-Sāmān. The title apparently suggests that he was in charge of the stores and such other State property. Thus there were three general supervisors: one for accounts, another for workshops, and the third for the stores. This arrangement was different from that of Firoz Shah Tughlaq. The duties of the divani bayūtāt more or less correspond with those of the Majmu’dar. The duties of Akbar’s Nāzir are not clearly known but he does not appear to have been a counterpart of the Nāzir of Firoz who had to watch
the income from the revenue and not the affairs of bayūtāt. Nor do we know of the existence of any officer under Firoz corresponding to Mir-i-Sāmān.

There was an essential difference between the attitude of Firoz Tughlaq and that of Akbar. Firoz treated a Karkhāna like an iqṭā', and the procedure adopted by his finance office was similar to that adopted in the case of an iqṭā'. The accounts were annual, the Mutassarafs or Muharrirs were called and questioned like muqta. Akbar took a saner view and considered his Karkhanas simply as stores and workshops working from day to day. He himself was particularly interested in the factories and sometimes paid surprise visits to see how the workmen did their work. His finance department kept an eye on the daily work and expenditure, though the budgets were made every six months. Akbar's machinery of supervision was more organized than that of Firoz.

The treasury was similarly provided with a supervising officer known as Mushrif Khazana. Akbar had separate treasuries for cash, precious stones, gold, and jewellery. The general treasury of cash had nine departments, each under the charge of a treasurer to deal with specified matters. Such small treasuries were for peshkash (tributes), escheats, and nazar (presents, vows, etc.), charity, and so on. These

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141 'Afīf.
142 'Afīf, 339.
143 'Afīf, 341.
145 'Ain., Bloch., p. 262.
treasuries were different from those of the Karkhanas which were believed to be about one hundred. It is doubtful if the treasury had received so much attention, and the division of work had been so clearly made, by any other Muslim ruler before Akbar. The treasury was under the supervision of the Mustauff General and the Vazir.

The Ain mentions an 'Āmil-i-Khālsa.\textsuperscript{147} This is rather an unusual title and appears more to indicate the nature of the work rather than the actual technical title. Apparently he seems to have been responsible for the land revenue of the Khālsa. This title might have been applied to the Divani Khālsa who has been referred to in Akbar Nama on more than one occasion.

Last but not least was the Divani Sādat which dealt with gifts, endowments, annuities granted to religious men, poets, scholars, astronomers, widows, poor men, orphans, judicial officers and the like.\textsuperscript{148} This department was considered with some pious regard for obvious reasons. The head of it was called Sadr and was selected not on the ground of his administrative abilities or expert handling of accounts, but particularly for his scholarship and theological attainments. Though in the days of the early Turks this department was not very powerful, after the Tughlaqs and particularly in the days of the Afghans it became almost independent. Its growth and history is full of interest but is not relevant to the present inquiry. The policy of Akbar was to keep it under

\textsuperscript{147} Ain., B., iii. Blochmann translates it as "'Āmil of the Domains."

\textsuperscript{148} 'Ain., Bloch., vii. 262, 263.
the general control of the Vizarat department. Like other branches it was placed under the general financial control and supervision of the Mustaũfi and the Divani Kul or Vazir.

The Vizarat department in the time of Akbar had six important branches. They were the Divānī Khālsa (divan or Crown lands), the Divani Jāgir (divan of Jāgir lands), the Divānī Taujāh (divan of military accounts); the Divani Bayūtāt (divan of factories, workshops, etc.), the Treasury, and Şadr. Each of these branches was provided with necessary staff such as clerks and accountants.

One more feature of Akbar's experiments in the Vizarat deserves attention. Early in his reign Akbar seems to have realized that the work of the Vizarat department was heavy. The introduction of reforms had increased the volume of work further. The efficiency of the department depended on its legitimate expansion which was gradually proceeding.

The first experiment was the introduction of a kind of board for administering the affairs of the Vizarat. He might have got some hint from the practice of joint responsibility that prevailed in Gujrat for some time.¹⁴⁹ It was after his return from Gujrat in 1573 that he created a board. It consisted of five high officials three of whom were Muslims and two Hindus.¹⁵⁰ It is probable that one of them Āṣaf Khan might have presided over it. These officials probably worked under the general direction of the

¹⁵⁰ A. N. Bev., iii, 166.
Vakil. This board seems to have become defunct when in 1575 Todar Mal was made the Mushrīf Divan. The title of Mushrīf Divan carried with it a higher dignity than that of the divan. As a reward for his military achievements in Bihar and Bengal Todar Mal was entrusted with "financial and territorial matters."

The second board was tried in 1577 when Todar Mal and Shah Mansur were ordered to co-operate and work with the consultation of Muzaffar Khan who was then the Vakil. This board came to an end on account of the Bengal mutiny which compelled Todar Mal to go to the east and led to the dismissal of Khwaja Shah Mansur. For a short time in 1580 Patr Das and Mir Adhan were asked to perform the divānī duties jointly (ba Shirkat ba divānī). This arrangement, like the one following immediately after (1581) when Qulij Khan and Pākdas acted as Vazir and Divan, was only a stop gap one, and was dropped when Todar Mal was free to resume the work.

In 1583 a board of four men was established to look after the affairs of the Khālsa lands. In this board two men were Hindus and two Muslims. As Todar Mal was then the Vazir the board might have worked under his expert advice. After the death of

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151 A. N. Bev., p. 223; Khākī Shirāzi, f. 572v.
152 Ain., p. 5. AKN., iii, 381. The Mushrīf Divan was practically the Vakil, though only a shade less in dignity.
153 A. N. Bev., iii, 300, 303.
155 A. N. Bev., iii, 598-99.
Todar Mal the Vizarat was unsettled. In two years three Vazirs were tried.

In 1592 a new experiment was made. Once again the whole of the Khālsa land was placed in the charge of a board of four men—two Hindus and two Muslims. These members of the board might have had joint responsibility in theory, but in practice each was in charge of one of the four large circles into which the Khālsa land was divided.\[156\] After an experience of about three years this arrangement was dropped in favour of a new one. In the reform of 1595 the principle of one Vazir for one province was adopted. Although as far back as 1580 Akbar had divided the empire into twelve sūbas and it is stated, had appointed divāns, but it seems that either the divāns were not actually appointed to all provinces or else full responsibility for the provincial financial affairs was not given to them. In 1595 the "old wish was translated into action,"\[157\] when each province was given a divān of the status of Vazir.\[158\]

Only three months before his death Akbar took a very significant step. He placed the Finance Department (Vizarat) under the control of the Crown Prince, Salīm.\[159\] Akbar's Government and his conception of Sovereignty were closely allied to the strengthening

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\[156\] A.N., iii, 605. Shamsuddin according to Khāki Shirāzi had the divani of Punjab, Kabul, Kashmir, Bhakkar, Multan and Qandhar, f. 270r.

\[157\] A. N., iii, 670.

\[158\] According to Khāki Shirazi, f. 577r. Shamsuddin and Rai Patr Das performed the duties of Vizarat jointly in 1598 (1006 A.H.).

\[159\] A. N., iii, 839.
of the foundation of the rule of his house. His policy obviously was to combine efficiency in administration with strong control by himself, and to evolve out a bureaucracy to be directed and managed by him. The transfer of the control of the Vizārat to the Crown Prince at once relieved him to some extent of the pressure of work and also strengthened the control of the royal family over the administrative machinery, a control that was expected to be more dependable than that exercised through a Vazir belonging to other than the reigning house.

The experiments made by Akbar show clearly that he was not satisfied with any time-honoured arrangement and did not hesitate to try new methods. Indeed he did more for the full expansion and efficiency of the Vizārat department than probably all the rulers combined before him, not excluding even the Surs. Jalāluddin Khilji had an informal board of Vazirs but it was irregular and did not form part of the established administrative machine. It was probably more an advisory than an executive body. Firoz Tughlaq had also a sort of board but it did nothing except fomenting quarrels. Akbar had apparently the clearest notion about the value of boards and the division of functions in the Vizārat department. Similarly, the idea of separating the Khalsa revenue from the general revenue could be traced in a crude form even earlier, but it was clearly thought out and systematically worked by Akbar.

Akbar had trust in his ministers and had created a good machinery of finance. He could, therefore, conveniently afford to leave a good deal of work
entirely to the officials. Although on important papers his signature was necessary but a considerable amount of routine work he left entirely to the officials concerned. It was no longer necessary for the Emperor to sign the salary bills (parwānchas) of the officials and servants of the household department, of the Ahdīs and Chelās, or the stipend bills of princes and princesses or of the Jāgirdars. Other papers like the schedules of prices, statements of sums forwarded by collectors, agreements made between the r' yat and the ‘Āmils and audit bills, were also not signed by the Emperor.  

Akbar assimilated fully the ideas and traditions of the early Delhi Sultanat. examined them thoroughly and improved them so well that they appear to have been transformed. His own contribution to the administrative art and machinery was substantial and it reflects much credit on him that the organization he gave lasted with only a few modifications here and there till the eighteenth century. True, that his organization suffered from much reduplication of work but that was due to the fact that the civil and military services were combined and not separate.

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CHAPTER VII
REVENUE SYSTEM (UNDER THE SLAVES)

The material for reconstructing a history of the revenue policy prior to the Mughals is meagre. The Chroniclers paid more attention to political history and only incidentally made a few desultory remarks regarding other matters. An account of the working and revenue policy of the pre-Mughal governments is bound to be sketchy and confined to the general principles and tendencies that guided the Sultans of Delhi.

The experience of the founders of the Delhi Sultanat in financial matters was practically nothing. They were primarily soldiers and were more interested in wars and conquests than in the details of government. They, however, had for general guidance the Muslim theory of finance and the policy followed by the Ghaznavides whom they had supplanted. The Muslim fiscal theory has been briefly described in an appendix.

The Ghaznavide rulers, as has been pointed out, had a central financial department presided over by the Vazir. By the Central government or rather by the Sultan himself were appointed local officials such as Sahibi divan or provincial financial minister, the ‘Amil or Collector, and the Rais who probably was
the local revenue supervisor of a district or town. The central financial department kept a record of accounts and revenue (Māli-Kharāj) which was expected from different places. It was not clearly known on what principles the revenue of districts and provinces was assessed, but it might be surmised that the Ghazna government, following the practice of other Muslim rulers, relied upon the records left by the rulers or officials whom they had supplanted. In the Ghaznavide period no reference to actual measurement of land is available. Narshakhi's account of the history of Bokhara suggests more a summary assessment than any careful calculation.

The assessments were recorded in the Central finance department. It was on that basis that the Vazir demanded revenue from provincial and district officials. The demands were not confined to cash. The Māli-Kharāj included even pearls, amber, cloth, utensils, and such other things.161

The Vazir was very particular in realising the amount recorded in his office. A Governor was expected not only to pay the Kharāj due from his province but also to send presents to the Amirs and high officials of the Court.162 The loyalty and ability of a provincial official was measured by the amount of Kharāj and presents that he sent to the Court. So long as he could prevent any outbreak of serious rebellion and send adequate presents he was regarded as an efficient and loyal official no matter what the

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161 For example see Baihaqi, pp. 292-93.
162 Baihaqi, Loc. cit.
people thought of him. On one occasion a provincial governor sent rich presents to Mas'ud who waxed eloquent in his praise. One of the shrewd men said to himself that the character of the administration of that governor should better be asked from the subjects of the province whose homes he had despoiled to win the goodwill of the Sultan.  

Those unfortunate governors who failed to pay the amount recorded in the Vizarat office had a bad time. It might reasonably be presumed that most of the defaulters were either really inefficient or dishonest, but sometimes even a good governor ran the risk of being ground down for no faults of his own. There is a case recorded of Abul Qasim Hasîrî, the governor of Khurasan, who failed to satisfy the Vazir Khwaja Ahmad bin Hasan Maimandi in the time of Mas'ud. The Vazir forthwith decided to adopt rigorous measures. The governor was insultingly addressed and humiliated and a public executioner was called to flog and torture him. Such treatment of a high official was resented by other ministers, and one of them, Abu Naṣr, protested to Mas'ud against it and requested his intervention. The Sultan declined to do anything directly and asked him to go to the Vazir on some pretext and try to soothe him. Abu Naṣr did what a tactful man like him could do but the Vazir frankly told him that the only way out of the unpleasant situation lay in the full payment of the revenue. At last Abul Qasim agreed to do

163 Baihaqi.
164 Baihaqi, pp. 447—49.
that; and resigning his office immediately vowed never to accept a governorship.\textsuperscript{165}

Although great rigour was exercised in the realisation of the revenue, neither the Vazir nor the Sultan was unwilling to show leniency when there was good reason for it. It is said that the people of Lamghān would unhesitatingly undertake long journeys to the capital to protest against any unreasonable demand, even of a paltry sum, by the local officials. As their part of the country had been plundered they went to Ghaznin and represented their case before Khwaja Ahmad bin Hasan Maimandi, with the result that twice successively remissions were made.\textsuperscript{165} There is another case when a hundred thousand dirhams were remitted from the revenue of Tirmiz in honour of the subjugation of Makran.\textsuperscript{167}

In the time of famines the State did try to help the people. In 401 A.H, a terrible famine had occurred in Khurāsan. Mahmud sent orders to all provinces and districts to send corn. Large quantities of foodstuffs were sent to relieve the poor.\textsuperscript{163}

Frequent references are found to Kharāj in the Chronicles of the time, from which it appears that it was the most important source of revenue. Jizya was also levied from the non-Muslims. The revenue office (Abvāb-ul-māl) kept a record of Jizya also.\textsuperscript{169} Of

\textsuperscript{165} Baihaqi, pp. 447–49.
\textsuperscript{166} Chahar Maqala, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{167} Baihaqi, 289.
\textsuperscript{168} T. Yamini, Tehran, 331; Br. Mus. MS., f. 199r.
\textsuperscript{169} T. Yamini, Br. Mus. MS., f. 195r.
zakāt there is hardly any mention, but it might be presumed that it must have been levied in some form or another.

The provincial officials usually sent the revenue to the headquarters. In case of delay an agent (Rasul)\textsuperscript{170} was sent by the Central government to expedite remittance. If there was any serious confusion the Vazir himself sometimes went to the province to set the affairs in order. As the organisation of the Central government grew weak the provinces fell into more disorder. In the days of 'Abdul Rashid, for example, one Khwaja Abu Tāhir Husain was sent to Hindustan to collect the revenue. On his arrival there he found that the local officials were tyrannising over the people and that grave confusion prevailed.\textsuperscript{171} His impressions he reported to the Secretary of State which office was then held by Abul Fazl Baihaqi. On his representation the Sultan threatened the official concerned with strong measures. But the official worked upon the Sultan in such a way that Baihaqi was imprisoned and his house was plundered. From this anecdote it is possible to infer that at least in the days of the later Ghaznavides an influential local official could retaliate even on a high official of the Central government should the latter venture to expose him.

All the payments were made to the treasury. The treasurer examined the demands (Nuskhai hujjat) and

\textsuperscript{170} For example, Baihaqi, 292.

\textsuperscript{171} For similar confusion in Peshawar see Jām'ulhikāyāt, E.D. ii.
on receiving the payment gave a receipt (Khat) for it.\textsuperscript{172}

The system prevailing in the time of the Ghaznavides was probably followed by the Ghorides who stepped into their shoes. After the conquest of India Mu‘izuddin Ghori appointed governors at different places who probably exercised both civil and military powers. With the establishment of independent sovereign princes in India that state of affairs naturally changed. A regular machine and a system began to grow after the model of the Ghaznavides, influenced by the local conditions and customs as well as by the Muslim theory.

Just as Mu‘izuddin had entrusted the charge of different territories to his officials, the so-called Slave Sultans distributed tracts of land among their own followers and officials. Such tracts of land were called iqtā‘s, and the man entrusted with the charge of an iqtā‘ was called a muqta‘. According to the Muslim law a muqta‘ was not considered the owner of the iqtā‘ but was simply allowed, within defined limits, the ownership of the usufruct. Usually an iqtā‘ was given to military men (Ahli Jaish) for a number of years or even for the lifetime of the grantee. It could not legally be hereditary for a grant making an iqtā‘ hereditary became automatically null and void.

Another important feature of iqtā‘ according to Muslim Jurists, is that the tithe land could not be given to anyone as iqtā‘ except on the grounds of

\textsuperscript{172}Baihaqi, p. 314.
poverty. Moreover, in a tithe land if a landowner declined to pay the tithe, no action could be brought against him by a muqta'. This being the law there is no surprise that one does not find any reference to military officers holding tithe lands as iqṭā'. Frequent references on the other hand are found of the transfer of muqta's and even dismissals; which suggest that iqṭā' grants were revoked by the Sultan when he thought necessary.

It was therefore from the Kharāj lands that iqṭā's were given to military officers. The Muslim law draws a distinction between jizya and non-jizya revenues of an iqṭā'. While other sources of revenue could be assigned to a muqta' for a number of years, those of Jizya could only be granted annually. Ordinarily therefore the iqṭā' was given on the strength of its revenue other than Jizya.

An iqṭā'-holder was expected to collect the revenue and deduct from it the amount granted to him. The balance he was to remit to the Central Government. According to the law, if the realization from an iqṭā' fell short of the amount granted to the muqta' he could not demand the deficit from the Central Government. For, if he did so, his right of collecting the revenue was ipso facto suspended at least as long as the question was not settled. The Central Government in those days was far more dilatory than now, and no iqṭā'-holder would have willingly liked to involve himself in trouble. This view of the law gives the reason why a muqta' tried to square up the revenue with his grant, and attempted to get some surplus, if he could, to fight a lean
year. Over and above this there was the natural desire on the part of an iqṭā'-holder to make the best of his opportunities or in plain language to satisfy his cupidity.

An iqṭā'-holder naturally tried to conceal from the Central Government the real income from his iqṭā'. As a corollary there was a perpetual tug between the Central Government and the muqta'. The Central Government was anxious to get the surplus after a muqta' had deducted the amount granted to him. The Muqta' on the other hand tried to show that no surplus or only a nominal surplus was left. This situation created an atmosphere of suspicion and dishonesty which on the whole was undesirable in the general interests of the State.

Besides the iqṭā' there was another class of land known as Khālsa. The Khālsa land was also termed 'mumlakat.' It belonged to no individual as such but was the property of the public treasury. It was under the direct supervision and control of the government and was probably managed through the agency of 'Āmils. For this class of land the scales of revenue were determined by the Central Government.

Another class of land was that which was left in the hands of its original holders on condition of paying tribute. The Rajas or Zemindars who had come to terms with the Muslim conquerors continued to enjoy autonomy within their jurisdiction as long as

173 The administration of an iqṭā' was largely left to the muqta' who probably followed the old custom in the collection of land revenue; some might have been more greedy than others.
they did not break the terms of agreement or the ambition of the Sultan did not lead to the annexation of their lands. This class of land was not affected by any reform or regulations introduced by the Central Government, and the local individual owners did not know of any authority except their own Raja or Zemindar. The arrangement was entirely between the Raja and the Central government. The tribute which these Rajas paid does not appear to have been rigidly fixed, or always realized with regularity. The very fact that they had submitted was sometimes taken as enough. This tribute or Kharāj was of the nature of Jizya.

From the earliest days of Muslim rule in India the chief sources of revenue of the Central Government were Kharāj from the Hindu chiefs and landlords, land revenue derived from the Khālsa and other classes of land, Khams or one-fifth of the war booty, and miscellaneous revenue derived from Zakat and Abvāb.

The earliest reference to revenue policy is found in Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah who says that Qutbuddin ordered the abolition of all taxes except the Sharʿī ones which in some cases were one-tenth and in others half a tenth.174 Although the writer does not throw any further light on his statement it is apparent that the operation of this rule related to the tithe land. The sources of revenue to which this statement relates come under the Sadaqāh.175 Two

174 Ajab Nama. Sir E.D. Ross, p. 403.
175 The use of the word Sharʿī justifies the hypothesis. If that word had not been there it could be argued that
inferences can be reasonably drawn from the statement. Firstly, that in some parts of the land tithe was applied. As it was purely a religious tax its advantages were confined to the Muslims. Secondly, that this tax was not on the land as such but on the actual produce of the soil.

Fakhruddin says that Qutbuddin abolished all taxes except the Shar‘i. Whether this was actually carried out is highly doubtful. The Muslim period has witnessed many similar resolutions but they could never be successfully enforced. Nevertheless it clearly indicates the policy of Qutbuddin and whoever might have derived advantages from the unauthorised taxes, so far as the Central Government was concerned they did not count as a source of revenue. The policy of the government was no doubt generous inasmuch as it was anxious to stick to a well defined code of law. It is not possible to say which of the numerous scales of taxes proposed by the Muslim law was generally adopted. But it might be that the scale nearest to the system prevailing in the country had been adopted. As there was no uniform system prevailing throughout the land the scales applied to different localities might have naturally differed. One more inference might be permitted. All the historians say that ‘Alāuddin’s scale was the highest. Now ‘Alāuddin took one-half of the produce, which was the highest rate sanctioned by the Muslim law.

Qutbuddin simply followed the custom of Turan where a tenth of the produce was exacted as is mentioned in the ‘Ain. (Jarrett, II, 55). I do not think that such an argument would be weighty under the circumstances.
It might reasonably be presumed that the rate of Qutbuddin was lower than that of the great Khilji monarch.

In the time of Iltutmish no changes are recorded. In all probability he did not interfere with the system or rather systems obtaining in the country. He was not so hard pressed for money, for his conquests and the extension of the empire replenished his treasury.

By the time of Balban the Mongol pressure on India had increased considerably. They were in the heart of the Punjab and threatened to break through the boundary of the Delhi Sultanat. Balban was therefore forced to strengthen his army as much as he could, and suspend the policy of expansion and conquest in India. In his time most of the country was held by muqt's. Balban did not like the arrangement, but circumstances prevented him from changing it. On account of the confusion that prevailed after the death of Iltutmish a large number of iqṭā's, at least in the Doab and probably in other parts of the Empire too, had become hereditary by his time. The original holders of iqṭā's were dead, but their sons and in some cases their slaves or widows had contrived to hold them. This was clearly against the Muslim law and definitely disadvantageous to the State. Balban ordered an inquiry into such holdings and tried to bring under the Khalsa those iqṭā's, the holders of which were either dead or disabled for active military service. He did not intend to remove those descendants of the original holders of iqṭā's

¹⁷⁶ Zia, 61—63. For iqṭā', Tabq. Akb. uses Jagir (Nawal Kishore, p. 41) see also De, pp. 101-02.
who were fit for military service. To the orphans and widows of the muqta's he was willing to grant allowances sufficient for their maintenance. This reform was opposed on the ground that the present holders thought that their predecessors held the iqtā's as in'am (gifts) and any attempt to deprive them of their holdings would ruin them. The arguments were legally of no value, but Balban had to yield because the opposition was supported in influential quarters.\footnote{Zia, 61—63.} Nevertheless, the attitude of the Sultan acted as a warning to other muqta's and might have prevented for the time other iqtā's from becoming hereditary.

Thus Balban could effect no change in the iqtā' system. He himself, however, did not create hereditary iqtā's and frequent changes of muqta's are mentioned in his time. A muqta' was, however, not free to do as he pleased. There were several checks upon him. Failing in his attempt at reform, Balban decided to tighten the administration and keep a rigorous watch on the sources and amount of income. He removed those officials in whom he had no confidence and appointed more reliable men in their places.\footnote{Tajul maathir.} Following the precedent of Iltutmish\footnote{Zia, 37—39.} he placed the most important divisions in the hands of his sons. Multan, Samana, Oudh and Bengal were held at one time or other by the sons of the Sultan. The eldest son of Balban used to come to the Court every year with Khazāna (treasure) and Māli
Khidamati\(^{160}\) (presents?), a practice which the Sultan appreciated and others might have adopted.

Another and the most important measure was the appointment of a 'Khwāja' to important iqṭā's.\(^{181}\) No precise definition of the functions of the Khwāja is found in early writers,\(^{182}\) but the fact that he was selected from clever 'mutasarrafs' shows that he was a civil official and had to deal with accounts and records. The appointment of such an officer by the Sultan on the recommendation of the Vazir suggests the desire on the part of the Central Government to keep an eye on the divisional revenue and to put a sort of check on the activities of the muqt's.

The possibility of collusion between muqt's and Khwāja was minimized by two factors. One was the appointment of informers by the Sultan. These informers loitered about picking up information and communicating it either to the finance department or to the Sultan himself. The other factor was that an iqṭā was coveted by more than one man. The rivals of a muqt would have hardly failed to report if not exaggerate his faults. Under these limitations a muqt could not have persisted long in evil ways.

Besides iqṭā's, lands were also given as ṁilk and ʿnām. They were treated quite separately from other classes of holdings. They were given as rewards or gifts, and unlike the iqṭā's, could be made hereditary.

\(^{160}\) Zia, 69.
\(^{181}\) For ex. see. Zia, pp. 36, 38.
\(^{182}\) Raj Rup writing in the days of later Mughals, however, says it meant "Navisinda" (writer). Elliot & Beames, Races of N. W. P., II, 377. But in the early days that office seems to have been more dignified.
Although the Sultan could theoretically revoke such grants, yet in practice that was not usually done, at least with regard to grants made by him.

The Muqta's were entrusted with adequate power to enforce payments. Jalaluddin Khilji who was a muqt of Kaithal showed rigour. He was also required to subdue the recalcitrant people and quell disturbances. He could even adopt extreme measures such as plundering villages in case of defiance.

Among the officials of Khīṭāt and Qasbāt are mentioned Mutsarrafs, and Kārkuns, who apparently were officials connected with revenue and office work. These officials do not seem to have dealt with the peasants as such but with the landlords, the Chaudharis and the Muqaddams. Both these terms—Chaudhari and Muqaddam—have been loosely used by the Persian writers and no one has given any precise description of their position. According to Ibnī Batuta, who, it must be remembered, wrote about half a century later, the territories depending on the capital were grouped into large units of hundreds(?) Over each of these units was a Chaudhari who was a Hindu. The muqaddam was generally speaking a village headman or in certain cases even a chief of considerable military power and importance.

Besides the muqta's, frequent references are also found to 'Āmils. The 'Āmil was not probably an

183 Zia, 194.
184 Zia, 106. According to Batuta, III, 388, "Mutassaraf an administrateur charge d'un percevoir les impôts." Evidently he was a revenue officer.
185 Batuta, III, 388.
official subordinate to the muqta’, for he gave accounts, like the muqta’s, directly to the officials at the Central Government. What was the position of an ‘Āmil? Technically he was the collector of zakat taxes. The original significance had, however, undergone a change even before the time of the Slaves and the term had come to be applied more and more in the sense of a “collector” of taxes. Among the important officials that were considered to be necessary for the regular government of an aqlīm, were a Wali, Amirs, ‘Āmils and Kārkuns. The fact that twelve thousand horsemen were deemed necessary to hold an aqlīm clearly shows that it was quite a big division more or less like a province. Delhi was styled as an aqlīm. An aqlīm therefore was believed to have more than one ‘Āmil.

In spite of his sometimes unscrupulous method, Balban had respect for the Muslim law. The Muslim writers do not mention any increase of taxation in the time of Balban, but the probability is that the increase of expenditure on the Court and the Army, and the suspension of the programme of conquest and expansion, would surely have forced the hands of Balban to get as much as could reasonably be got, and make the best of the available sources of revenue. The Central Government might not have claimed any extra Shari‘at taxes, but there could hardly be any doubt that the local officials would not have failed to

186 For ex., Zia, 52.
187 Aghindes, p. 316.
188 Zia, 51-52.
avail themselves of the time honoured cesses that existed in India prior to the Muslim conquest. Where adequate facilities did not exist the official might have created new cesses in imitation of the practice followed in other places.\textsuperscript{199}

After the death of Balban the machinery of the Central Government became slack. The demoralisation of the last days of the Slave kings was followed by a revolution. Jalāluddin Khilji was naturally anxious to command the confidence and gain the support of the officials. He did not, therefore, deprive any of his iqtā'holders of their grants nor would he apply severe measures against the officials such as imprisonments or corporal punishments.\textsuperscript{199} Nor did he interfere with the imlāk and waqf lands, or the moveable or immovable property of the deceased. In this respect he followed the policy of Balban though he did not adopt his rigorous methods. Except in his application of leniency he maintained the arrangement that he found on coming to the throne.

\textsuperscript{199} For a list of taxes prior to Muslim Conquests see Monahan’s History of Bengal, pp. 81—83, Barnett’s Antiquities of India (1913), p. 100. For South India see S. K. Ayangar’s Ancient India, p. 190, R. K. Mukerji’s Local Government in Ancient India, (2nd ed.), pp. 250—53, 257-58.

\textsuperscript{199} Zia, 193-94, 205.
CHAPTER VIII

REVENUE SYSTEM (UNDER THE KHILJIS)

'Alāuddin was a man of sterner stuff than his old uncle. He wished to screw up the machinery of administration and introduce vigour and efficiency. The internal rebellions and foreign pressure forced his attention to the whole system of government and led him to introduce reforms both in the military and revenue departments.

His revenue policy was comprehensive enough to affect all classes of land tenures. It has been already stated that a very large portion of the revenues in the territories annexed by the Muslim government was alienated as milk (proprietary rights given by the State) in'ām (gifts), idrārāt (pensions), waqfs (endowments)\textsuperscript{191} and mafrāz (?). These grants were almost exclusively held by the Muslims. Although with regard to the resumption of the iqtā' lands the legal difficulty was not serious yet any attempt to interfere with them was resented, as in the time of Balban. Far more difficult was it to lay hands on the above-mentioned holdings. But 'Alāuddin after long discussions with his high officials, and hard thinking had made up his mind to bring them under state control and make them a source of profit to the exchequer. Undeterred by communal considerations and unlike Balban he revoked most of these grants.

\textsuperscript{191} Zia, 283-84.
Some chroniclers say that he revoked all grants, but it is not likely. More probably he asserted the right of the State to deal with all classes of lands, cancelled all such grants of which he did not approve and bestowed others on his own terms. The Muslims must have felt the change keenly and in the inflated language of Zia were reduced to poverty.

Then 'Alâuddin turned to the question of reducing those Hindu landholders who held lands from the state on condition of paying a stipulated amount of revenue. These landholders should be distinguished from semi-independent or independent Rajas who did not hold land directly from the State but were allowed to rule over their territories on condition of paying a lump sum to the Delhi Sultanate as tribute. The reforms under consideration were directed against the Hindu landlords who acted as a sort of middlemen between the Government and the cultivators either as revenue farmers or collectors. They have been indifferently styled as Muqaddams (head-men), Khoṭs\(^{193}\) (farmers of revenue), Chaudharis (revenue collectors). These middlemen collected the

\(^{192}\) References to grants of the time of 'Alâuddin are found in Zia. For example vide pp. 438-39.

\(^{193}\) Khoṭ: A Marathi word used also in Konkan. It means 'a farmer of land revenue or custom.' In Konkan and some parts of the Maratha provinces he exercised the hereditary privilege of collecting the Government revenue. (Wilson, pp. 286, 585.) I have tentatively accepted this meaning because it fits in well with the text. There is no wonder that the extension of the Muslim conquests beyond the Vindhyas brought some technical terms to the North from the South. Besides Zia and Mubarak Shahi' no other chronicler I know of gives any meaning of the word.
revenue on behalf of the State for which they were given special concessions. Besides getting their dues for the work of collection they were allowed liberal concessions in holding land and pastures for themselves. The Muqaddams and Khoṭs and perhaps also the Chaudharis were probably hereditary officials, 194 for there is hardly any mention of appointments to those jobs by the Government.

The Muslim Government was not well organised even under Balban, and whatever little he could have done was undone by the weak governments that followed after his death. Taking advantage of their intimate knowledge of the lands and tenants under their jurisdiction, their local influence and power, and the weakness of the central government and the Vizarat department, the Khoṭs, Muqaddams, and Chaudharis appropriated to themselves as much of the state revenue as their opportunities permitted. Not only did they evade payments but seem also to have ignored the Government. Allowing considerable margin for the style of Ziauddin there appears to be a good deal of truth in the complaint of 'Alāuddin that 'the Khoṭs and Muqaddams ride on good horses, dress themselves daintily, use Persian bows, busy themselves in hunting or fight among themselves. They do not pay either Kharāj or Jizyah, house or grazing taxes, and (besides) they charge their dues of collecting revenue. They hold drinking and convivial parties. Whether called or uncalled they

194 Such was also the case in Hindu India, see Barnett's *Antiq*, p. 105.

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do not come to the Divān (revenue office) and completely disregard the revenue officials.\textsuperscript{196}

When ‘Alāuddin had not spared the Muslims or hesitated to deprive them of peculiar privileges, there was no reason why he should have shown any favour to the Hindu officials. Besides the loss of revenue to the State their mutual quarrels were responsible for some political disorders also. Both for political and financial reasons they were to be dealt with. ‘Alāuddin therefore, withdrew all the peculiar time-honoured concessions that they had hitherto enjoyed, and taxed them like other landholders. He abolished all distinctions between different classes of landholders and tried to introduce uniformity. Between the Muqaddam (headman) and the Balāhar (the village watchman?)\textsuperscript{196} he would make no distinction.\textsuperscript{197} It was a levelling stroke against the Hindu privileged classes. Neither the Muslims nor the Hindus were allowed to enjoy any special privileges in the matter of Kharāj. The measure of their respective losses was according to the measure of privileges they had hitherto enjoyed.


\textsuperscript{196} I have tentatively and reluctantly accepted Wilson’s definitions, as in the case of Khoṭ. Zia is the only Muslim writer so far as I know who uses this term, and he does not explain it.

\textsuperscript{197} The word ‘vafā i bisvah’ occurs in Zia printed text (287, 299) and in Br. Mus. MS. (f. 143r) and India Office, No. 211, f. 187r. v. The Tabq. Akb. (India Office Text No. 225, f. 70v, 71r) drops this word. Ferishta has almost entirely followed Tabq. The meaning of the phrase is not clear to me. Vide appendix.
'Ala'ud-din had abolished neither the iqṭā' nor the Khoṭi system. There was no machinery to replace them even if he had liked to do so. His sole object was to abolish privileges that were enjoyed at the expense of the government and contributed to disorders and difficulties in revenue collection. The Khots continued to live and get their dues (Khoṭi) for their services, but nothing more. They had to pay like others the land, house, and grazing taxes.\[198\]

In pursuance of his anti-liquor policy 'Ala'ud-din had renounced the income derived from taxes on drugs and tāri (Bagini).\[199\] He had also tried to stop gambling and forego the gambling tax. What amount of the revenue the State lost in these reforms it is not possible to know correctly. But the amount must have been quite large as Ziauddin uses the word "Kharāj hāi bi Andāza."\[200\] Thus, while the exchequer lost considerable revenue it was overburdened with the military expenditure which had been steadily rising ever since the beginning of the Muslim conquest and had assumed huge figures in the time of 'Ala'ud-din. The extension of the empire in the west and south and the constant Mughal menace were largely responsible for the enormous army maintained by 'Ala'ud-din.

To meet the growing demands of the exchequer 'Ala'ud-din raised the scale of taxation to the highest point allowed by the Muslim law. He charged fifty

\[198\] Zia, 287.
\[199\] Bagini is a Karnatic word for "a species of palm from which Tari is extracted." Wilson, p. 46.
\[200\] Zia, 284. The phrase means Kharāj beyond calculation.
per cent of the gross produce of the land. It is not possible with the evidence available at present to compare the taxation of 'Alāuddin with those of his predecessors. But it is very probable that the land tax had a tendency to increase ever since the time of Iltutmish and Balban. However, it seems clear that the land was not so heavily taxed by the Muslim Sultans before 'Alāuddin. Its justification, if it were possible, lay in the need of the hour and the remarkable efficiency of the army.

'Alāuddin realised that the tax was heavy and was bound to tell seriously on all classes particularly the cultivators. He had no sympathy for the well-to-do classes, and did not worry about them. But he was anxious to see that the local revenue farmers and landholders who had been deprived of their privileges did not shelve their burden on the shoulders of the poor, as they usually did. At the same time he was no more prepared to allow the exchequer to be defrauded or suffer from the venality of the revenue officials. In his attempt to find out a solution he was led further in his reforms.

The first important step that he took was to insist on the actual measurement of land. It was on the basis of the actual cultivation that he realized taxes. The Muslim law ever since the time of Omar recognized measurement of land as an important basis for assessment. Nor was it unknown to the

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201 Zia, 287.
202 Zia, Loc. cit.
Hindus. How far and in what parts of Northern India it was followed it is difficult to say with certainty. But in Southern India it had prevailed in the Chola Kingdom and was known to the Hindu rulers. However, 'Alaüddin appears to be the first Muslim ruler of India who laid emphasis on the system of measurement. By adopting the system of measurement on a large scale the government could

364 In Northern India also some sort of measurement probably prevailed as would appear from the duties of Gopa described in Arthashastra; see "Early History of Bengal" (1925) by F. J. Monahan, I.C.S., p. 80. See also Bühler's remarks on "Asoka's Rajukas oder Lajukas," Z. D. M. G., 1893, p. 469, 70 where he calls him a "Feldmesser." This has been further elucidated by "Dr. Richard Fick in Die Soziale Gliederung im Nordostlichen Indien" (1897), p. 97, styling him "Landmesser." The word occurs in Girnar inscription, Third Rock Edict, and is given in E. Hultsch, "Corpus Inscription I" (1925), p. 4. He gives a note (p. 5, n. 2) and A. C. Woolner in Asoka Glossary, p. 127, also notices it. The word Cora-rajjuka of Arthashastra does not necessarily contradict the significance given by Bühler on the authority of Jatakas. Dr. D. R. Bhundarkar accepts Bühler, Asoka, p. 55. He was a companion of Pradestr who according to Dr. Thomas was "charged with executive duties of revenue collection and police." (J.R.A.S., 1914, p. 385.) The Rajjuka looks like the Muslim Amir. However the whole question is not finally settled. Jolly in Z.D.M.G., 1916, p. 228, considers Rajjuas the right reading and having exactly the same significance as Rajjuschorrajju. Hultsch is not as definite as Jolly. V. Smith, however, would connect Rajjua with Raja (Asoka, p. 203, ed. 1920)—or Governor. Dr. Thomas in the Cambridge History of India, Vol. I, 1922, p. 487, says that the designation Rajjuka points "No doubt to functions connected with survey, land settlement and irrigation." He accepts Bühler, p. 508, n. 2. Professor Bevan in the same volume (p. 417) confirms the existence of "irrigation and land measurement" from the account of Megasthenes.

365 "Some Contributions of South India" by A. Ayangar (1923), p. 409; "Ancient India" (1911), pp. 148, 150, 175—76.
keep a close eye on the landholders, the cultivators, and the revenue collectors.

One of the standing evils in the revenue collection consisted in defective realization which usually left large balances to be accounted for. As the revenue system was yet in the making and the machinery for assessment and collection was yet undeveloped, unrealised balances were probably inevitable. There was another trouble also. The Central Government was already overworked, while bribery among revenue officials, particularly of the lower grades, was rampant. To deal with the balances 'AlAuUddin had created the "Mustakhraj" office as has been described before. But for curbing the venality of the lower officials he adopted two measures. With the common-sense that he possessed, 'Alauddin realized that low salaries of revenue officials exposed them to temptation. He, therefore, raised their salaries so as to enable them to live in respectability and comfort without resorting to corruption. But that was not enough to improve their moral tone. 'Alauuddin therefore inflicted drastic punishment whenever a man was charged with bribery or embezzlement. On one charge or the other about ten thousand men—'Amils and clerks—were extremely humiliated and severely punished. These measures considerably checked corruption and bribery, and also enriched the exchequer.
Another important measure of 'Alāuddin was the examination of the papers (Bahi) of Patvāris with a view to know the exact figures entered in the name of revenue collectors. The scope of the measure was obviously limited, and the possibilities of those records were not probably fully realized. Nevertheless, it was a step in the right direction. 'Alāuddin was apparently the first Muslim ruler whose hands reached as far as the records of Patvāris, which were the best source of information on all matters pertaining to the land and its revenue.

As to the system of payment, 'Alāuddin was not very particular about payments in cash. On the other hand he preferred payments in kind as he was anxious to see that his regulations of prices were well carried out. It is said that while enforcing his market laws he had issued an order that in the Khālsa (Crown lands) of the Doab and Shahri Nau the share of the government be taken in kind and the grain be stored up in state granaries. Measurement of land, examination of the papers of the Patvāris, division of crops, payment in kind and in cash, all were known to the government of 'Alāuddin.

(Besides the land tax the government of 'Alāuddin realized house tax and grazing fees.) Zia does not mention the exceptions in the application of the grazing tax. It has been pointed above that the Muslim law on the subject had made some exemptions.

210 Zia, 305-06, Ferishta, 1, 112.
211 Zia, 287.
A people already heavily taxed would have been driven to desperation if unqualified rigour had been applied in other matters also. 'Alâuddin exempted two pairs of oxen, two buffaloes, two cows and ten goats from taxation. Any cattle above those figures if sent for pasture had to pay grazing fee provided they were milk-producing. As the tax was on grazing, the cattle that were fed at home would have been exempted from it.

The grazing tax probably was responsible for the increase in the price of meat. Instead of removing the grazing tax, 'Alâuddin abolished the cattle tax or Zakat. The abolition of Zakat on cattle was an important measure and must have been welcomed by those Muslims who kept a large number of cattle for trade, and relieved them to some extent of the burden of grazing tax. It has not been mentioned why 'Alâuddin preferred to lose the cattle tax rather than the grazing fee. Probably his object was to prevent the cultivable land from being enclosed for pastures. This was what the Khošs and Muqaddams most likely did, and this 'Alâuddin was anxious to stop for numerous reasons.

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212 Ferishta, I, 109. The passage is doubtful. As it stands it appears to mean that he prohibited the Muqaddams and Ryots to keep more than the specified number of cattle. A comparison with Zia suggests that the passage of Ferishta is an interpretation of that of Zia. Zia neither mentions limitations nor exemption. Where Ferishta got his information from he does not tell us. But the view that I take fits with the Muslim law, and appears more reasonable and probable. The question is, however, open.

213 Batuta, III, 184.
From Ziauddin it appears that the reforms of 'Alāuddin were not forced throughout his vast empire. There was no lack of energy on the part of the Nayab Wazir (Deputy to Wazir) in enforcing the reforms. In the divisions of Lahore, Dipālpur, Samāna, Sannām, Delhi, Biyāna, Afghanpoor, Amroha, Katehar, Jhāin, Rewari and Nagore the reforms were introduced. The entire lower Doab in the United Provinces, Oudh, Gorakhpur, Bihar, Bengal, Malwa, Western Panjab, Gujrat and Sindh were left out. Bengal was practically independent, Gujrat and Malwa had not been yet fully subdued. Gorakhpur and the Tarai were yet terra-incognita. But it is difficult to say why Oudh and the eastern and central parts of the modern United Provinces were not included.

'Alāuddin has been bitterly criticised by Ziauddin. That the taxation under his regime was heavy is evident. The cultivators, the landlords, the merchants and traders, all had to shoulder the burden. The empire had to pay heavily for the defence of the country from foreign invasions and internal disorders. It is unfair to say that 'Alāuddin specially aimed at crippling the Hindus as such. The extravagant language used by Ziauddin is indicative of the

214 Zia, 288.
215 I might point out that some names given by Zia (p. 288) have not been satisfactorily identified. The readings given in Bib. Ind. Edition differ from the Br. Mus. MSS., 2039. For example, Kadah and Dabhai of Bib. Ind. read respectively as Khar and Dahmsbai. I do not propose to offer guesses until some more data have been collected and examined.
216 Zia, pp. 324, 340, 386.
superficial nature of his observations. All classes felt the burden but the Hindus felt it more keenly. Firstly, because they were mostly cultivators and landholders, and secondly because the Khoṭs and Muqaddams who were also mostly Hindus and were considered as well-to-do men were reduced to poverty. In the first case, it was a mere accident, and in the second it was quite legitimate, for, strictly speaking, the Khoṭs and Muqaddams had no right to anything else beyond their share or commission on collections. ‘Alāūddin might have escaped the unpleasant situation if he or men of his time had a better knowledge of taxation and had not pinned their supreme faith in land tax. Besides, in a country like India where land tax was the main source of revenue any increase in taxation was bound to affect the landed classes and the cultivators. Personally, ‘Alāūddin was neither unusually extravagant nor reckless, nor has been believed to possess any morbid love for treasure. But he was anxious to strengthen the fighting power and the treasury of the empire, and did it as best as his empirical knowledge and opportunities permitted.

From the Hindu States of Southern India and also probably from the States of Rajputana, Jizyah was taken. There is no definite evidence to show that

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217 The opinion of Abdul Haq, a sixteenth century writer, seems to be the sanest. Very briefly, he says that the oppressive taxation fell on all, but particularly on the Hindus. (B. M., f. 24 v.) His statement is supported by Zia also, if his exaggerations are not allowed to conceal the facts.

218 Ziauddin says that the poet Khusro who would have received Walayat and Iqtā’s from other rulers, got no more than a salary of one thousand rupees, p. 366.
Jizyah was levied from the Hindu subjects living directly under the government of Delhi. From the trend of conversation between 'Alāuddin and Qazi Mughisuddin it appears that the Sultan was well satisfied with the maximum tax he had imposed upon the people and was not inclined to press for Jizyah. Ziauddin would surely have not failed to mention it if it had been levied at all.

The Muqt'āi system was even less favoured by 'Alāuddin. Although the most substantial part of the income from the Crown-land (Khālsa) was absorbed in the salaries (wajha) of the Army (hashm) but the revenue had to be brought to the State Treasury before any disbursement was permitted. The hopes of Balban to an appreciable measure were realized in the government of 'Alāuddin. It does not, however, appear that the practice of giving Iqtā’a’s was totally abolished. In some parts of the empire at least it continued. Its retention was probably considered necessary in the territories which had either been recently conquered or had not been fully subdued.

219 The difference between the "Madbūt" and "Ghair Madbūt" appears to have been made by 'Alāuddin. See Zia, 323. The word is the objective form of 'Zabt'. What it precisely meant Zia does not tell us. But the distinction which he draws in connection with the States and territories in Rajputana and Mulwa is pretty suggestive.


221 Zia, 328, 389.
CHAPTER IX

REVENUE SYSTEM (UNDER THE TUGHLAQS)

After the death of 'Alauddin his arrangements broke down. Besides the incompetence and short-sightedness of Mubarak Shah, which was no doubt an important factor, there were other reasons for the reaction. The policy of 'Alauddin was too rigid and unpopular with almost all classes of men. Moreover, it does not appear that any satisfactory machinery of administration had been created by him to carry on his work efficiently after his death. The administration continued to deteriorate for the next five years.

It was not till Ghayasuddin, the founder of the Tughlaq dynasty, came to the throne that any attention seems to have been given to revenue matters. Both as a matter of policy and necessity he did not deem it advisable to change quickly the policy of Mubarak Shah in whose shoes he professed to have entered. His main source of power was the support of his military followers. He had received no support from the Shaikhul Islam and his followers. It was therefore inevitable that he should keep the military officers and nobles in good humour. This he did by conferring iqta's on them and showing them indulgence in matters of revenue realizations, and by an exhibition of military energy. Moreover,

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Zia, 428.
Zia, 431.
Ghayāsuddin was a soldier and not a financier. On the whole he liked moderation and had not the rigidness of ‘Alāuddin.

In pursuance of his general policy and the necessity of enlisting popular sympathy on his side, he made some important changes in the system of ‘Alāuddin. The greatest defect in ‘Alāuddin’s revenue policy lay in his insistence on collecting the standard revenue irrespective of any consideration. Ghayāsuddin saw the inequity of the system and ordered that due allowance should be made in realizing the revenue, for any accidents or natural calamities (to crops).\(^{224}\) Balban had on one occasion struck off the old balances of revenue; but Ghayāsuddin by adopting a more reasonable policy minimized the possibility of large unrealised balances and at the same time earned a good reputation. The policy of ‘Alāuddin as amended by Ghayāsuddin carried the revenue policy of the Sultanat to a point which was not exceeded even in the times of the Surs or the Mughals. If Ghayāsuddin had stuck to measurement and had not favoured the grant of iqṭā’s or laxity towards Muqta’s and revenue officials, his system would have been the best. Nevertheless by recognizing the principle of allowance for damages to land or crops he took a very substantial step towards the growth of the Imperial revenue policy.

Ghayāsuddin was not oblivious of the necessity of enhancing the revenue, but unlike ‘Alāuddin he favoured gradual increase.\(^{225}\) It is incredible that he

\(^{224}\) Zia, 429.
\(^{225}\) Zia, 430.
charged only one-tenth or one-eleventh of the gross produce, for neither the most lenient view of the Hindu nor the Muslim law would recommend such indulgence. Surely a Sultan who of necessity was bound to maintain a large army and keep the military leaders satisfied could hardly afford to allow the revenue to fall so low. Ghayāsuddin did not usher a millenium: no one could.

The passage in Ziauddin dealing with the instructions to the Divān is obscure. Its obscurity has led to misunderstanding. But it becomes fairly clear if it is understood in the light of the revenue organization of the period. The Central Government did not deal with every individual farmer but probably had assessed the revenue on territories known as iqtā', walāyat, etc. These territories were given to Muqtā's or Walis on the conditions which have been described in connection with Balban's policy. The Wāli and Muqtā', therefore, were immediately responsible to the Central Government for the collection of revenue within their jurisdiction. It was the interest of the Wāli or Muqt'a to prevent any increase in the assessment. The reasons are quite obvious. With the growth of the Empire and the expansion of the government the Central Government was inclined to increase

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226 Mr. Iahwari Prasad (Mediaeval India, p. 231) says, "the State demand was fixed at one-tenth, or one-eleventh of the gross produce."

227 Zia, 429; Ferishta has interpreted the passage and added to it something that is not found in Zia. For example Ferishta, I, 131, says that Ghayāsuddin remitted one thousand from one lac, and ten from a hundred of the arrears, and did not permit the 'Āmils to treat the subjects rigorously.
the assessment. There was a pull between the Central Government and the Muqta'. As Ghyāsuddin stood for moderation and was anxious to keep them in good humour he instructed the Divān not to make an increment over one-tenth or one-eleventh on (the assessment of) the iqtāʿat or Walāyāt\footnote{227a} by surmises or on the statements of collectors (sāʿiyān) or of-those interested in the enhancement of the revenue.\footnote{228}

Another equally important step both from the point of view of the finance department and of the iqtāʿ holders was taken by Ghayāsuddin when he ordered that the basis of the demand by the Central Government should be hāsil\footnote{229} (actual turnover). The tendency of the Central Government was probably to demand the government share from the Muqta's according to the figures of assessment received in the office. These figures were either based on traditional assessments, or on guesses, and not on any systematic survey.\footnote{230} As time rolled on and prices and produce fluctuated these figures became out of date and unreliably, and caused much annoyance and evil. The

\footnote{227a I find in Mr. Moreland's "The Agrarian System of Muslim India" which was published, three years after the submission of this thesis that he is inclined to take this passage with reference to the surplus revenue remitted to the central treasury by the Muqta's, Walis, etc. But he does not adduce any argument which may necessitate any change in the view I have presented.}

\footnote{228 Zia, 429-30, 431. For an example of one-tenth as Bāj taken by Sultan, see Afsanai Shahani Hind, f. 151 v.}

\footnote{229 Zia, 429.}

\footnote{230 It is possible that the assessment of 'Alā'uddin which was based on measurement was adopted by the Central Government as standard.}
policy of Ghayāsuddin to rely on hāsil was indeed wise and equitable. It was calculated to rationalize the accounts of the Central Government, save the Muqt' from worries and indirectly minimize exactions from the people.

Towards the revenue officials—Muqt', Mutasarrafs, Kārkuns—Ghayāsuddin was indulgent. The rigid system of 'Alāuddin was calculated no doubt to minimize corruption, but was hard on the honest collectors who were obliged to adopt fair or foul means to push up the realization of revenue to the fixed standard. Ghayāsuddin relaxed the rigour and ordered that in the case of the Kārkuns and Mutasarrafs (the subordinate officers) a difference of half or one per cent may be overlooked. This, however, did not mean that he permitted them to embezzle the assessed jam', or deduct any larger amount as their own share. In such cases of course he declared them as robbers, deceivers, and permitted physical coercion.321 Similarly the Amīrs and Maliks were not molested if from the revenue they appropriated four and a half or five per cent.322

321 Zia, 431. Auckland Colvin in J.A.S.B., 1871, p. 230, translates the passage differently. He says "a fifth thousand or tenth thousand": while I understand it, five or ten in a thousand.

322 The passage of Zia, 431, is very obscure. The words "Yakdah Pānzdah" in the Bib. Ind. edition are not found either in the Br. M. MS. 2039 f. 214v or in I.O. MS. Moreover it is doubtful if they were allowed to levy the dues (baq) of iqtā'-dāri or vilāyat-dāri over and above the percentage allowed. Mr. Moreland thinks that "nimdah yazdah" and "yakdah panzdah" in Zia are technical terms.
Nor was Ghayāsuddin harsh upon the Khoṭs and Muqaddams like 'Alāuddin. He was willing to let them enjoy exemptions from taxes on grazing and their own crops, provided they did not demand anything else from the r’yat except the tax sanctioned by the Sultan. His reason for this consideration was that they had great responsibilities and deserved some remuneration for their trouble. If he treated them like common r’yat, they would feel no interest in the work imposed on them. Towards the Hindus in general he was lenient enough to see that the taxation did not fall so heavily on them as to reduce them to utter poverty or force them to abandon cultivation. It is not clear what measures, except prohibiting the Khoṭs, Muqaddams and revenue officials to take anything more from the r’yat than the revenue sanctioned by the Sultan, were adopted. No historian definitely says that any reduction in the scale of taxation was made. The probability is that he left intact the scales fixed by the government of 'Alāuddin.

The successor of Ghayāsuddin, Muhammad Tughlaq began his reign well. The efforts of 'Alāuddin and Ghayāsuddin to introduce discipline and method in administrative machinery had not been altogether in vain. Muhammad Tughlaq himself was an able ruler and seems to have evinced great interest in the working of the government. Anxious to lay down definite regulations, he issued numerous

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333 The Bib. Ind. has 'zara’at' (p. 430, line 18). But the Br. M. MS. has instead of it 'barāy' (f. 214r).
334 Zia, 430. The passage is somewhat obscure, especially lines 3 to 5 from below.
F. 18
Ordinances (tauqī'). In the early part of his reign the work of the revenue department was smooth and efficient. From even the distant parts of the Deccan, Bengal, and Gujarat regular summaries of income and expenditure (mujmilāt i jam‘va Kharch) were received by the Central Government which enabled them to exercise vigilance and control. Zia says that the work was so smooth and regular as if the long distances were practically annihilated. After examining the records the Central Government realized strictly from Naibs, Wālis and Mutassarraf's the revenues and arrears without foregoing even a farthing (lit. dāng va diram).

During the later Khilji and the Tughlaq period a policy of annexation in the Deccan was adopted by the Delhi Sultans. As these provinces were far distant a Naib and a Vazir were appointed there. In other respects the same policy that was followed in other parts of the empire was extended to the Deccan.

Muhammad Tughlaq was at first quite satisfied with the organization and working of the finance department. He was encouraged by it to extend his military operations beyond the limits of India, and to spend large amounts of money for furthering his objects. He could also think it advisable to enhance the taxation.

The best place for an experiment to increase taxation was the Doab. It was well-watered and was very near the headquarters of the government. As

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235 Zia, 470.
the land tax was already heavy it was not deemed proper to increase the land revenue. The idea was to raise the revenue somehow by five to ten per cent. For this purpose some cesses were either revived or created. If Ziauddin had given a list of such cesses, it would have been possible to correctly estimate the policy of the Sultan. But the author of Mubārak Shahi, referring to the same matter mentions only the house tax and the grazing tax, and adds that the cattle were branded and the houses of the r‘yāyat were numbered. To these taxes and the systematic method adopted for their realization Mubārak Shahi attributes the whole trouble. If extraordinary and brand new taxes had been created by the Sultan someone might have surely noticed them. The list of Abvābs given by Firoz Tughlaq in his memoirs is of a vague and general nature, and on its strength it is not possible to say to what extent Muhammad Tughlaq was responsible for them. If Mubārak Shahi were taken as more reliable, because more definite than the vague and extravagant Ziauddin, it will be clear that Muhammad Tughlaq tried to go back to the policy of ‘Alāuddin Khilji and apply it to a smaller area.

237 Zia, 473, Mubārak Shahi, f. 34 v. 38v. Tabq. Akb. 83v has only one-tenth. Ferishta, I, 134, is utterly misleading. While Zia only says “Yaki ba deh va yaki ba bist,” Ferishta says “dah siva dah Chihl gardanid.” Ferishta has absolutely no good authority to support his fantastic statement. Far more staggering is the statement of Mr. Qanungo (Sher Shah, pp. 371-72) that Mohammad Tughlaq “increased the revenue tenfold”! Ishwari Prasad (Medieval India, p. 239 note) rightly rejects this preposterous statement.

238 Mubārak Shahi, f. 34 v.
It might pertinently be asked why Muhammad Tughlaq's measures were so much opposed. It has even been suggested that an increase of 5 or 10 per cent was not so serious as to have created all the trouble. Ever since the time of 'Alāuddin Khilji the scale of taxation was high. In his days also the house and the grazing taxes were unpopular. As his power and prestige were high and the Mughal menace was hanging heavily on the people they submitted to it. Moreover between one part and the other 'Alāuddin had made no invidious distinction. Muhammad Tughlaq on the other hand chose the Doab particularly for taxation at a time when there was no danger of any foreign invasion. His attempt to revive the unpopular taxes again in spite of the fact that the country had not recovered from the burden imposed on the land since the Khilji period, was bound to raise a storm of indignation. An increase of five to ten per cent was not an insignificant one with the impoverished people. To make matters worse, famine due to the failure of monsoons soon followed. The people therefore offered resistance in the Doab which caused unnecessary panic in other parts of the kingdom and aroused the indignation of the Sultan.

It is highly improbable that Muhammad Tughlaq could have been able to get anything from the extra taxes. He had thought of enhancement of revenue but actually he was called upon to face prolonged and serious famines which taxed his resources to their

239 Ishwari Prasad, Mediaeval India, 239.
240 Zia, 473. Mubarak Shahi (a), 38 v.
utmost limit. Obstinate and strong-willed though the Sultan was, yet he could have hardly escaped the logic of facts.

Financial distress, military failures, defiance to his orders brought about an enormous change in his outlook, and he devised all kinds of methods to fight the misfortune. The first thing that he did as early as A.H. 741 (1340-41 A.D.) was to abolish all the non-sharī'ī taxes which were taken either in the form of Mahsūl or Daud. He also abolished duties on foreign goods coming to India overland.241 This step amounted to a surrender, because far from reviving the policy of 'Alāūddin, he was forced to proclaim his intention of confining himself to the lawful taxes only.

It was a misfortune of Muhammad Tughlaq that he found himself face to face with one of the most serious crises in the history of Muslim India. For the first time the Muslim administration was seriously called upon to deal with famines which periodically recur in India and injure the revenue administration of the country. It put the Muslim rulers to test and almost overwhelmed Muhammad Tughlaq.

The methods adopted to mitigate the hardship, and the results achieved, are as interesting as instructive. The first measure was to give loans242 to the impoverished peasantry to provide them with the elementary means of production. But what could the loans do when the chief trouble was the scarcity of water? The Sultan therefore issued a farman for

241 Batuta, III, 288.
242 Zia, 482.
the sinking of wells.\textsuperscript{243} He also permitted men to migrate to Hindustan with their families for the period of distress. To enable the people to settle down and to give them relief Muhammad Tughlaq spent about two crores\textsuperscript{244} (\textdagger). This expenditure must have thrown a heavy burden on the exchequer at the time of a very unfavourable financial situation. The large stores of corn that had been collected ever since the time of 'Alāuddin must have been also exhausted.\textsuperscript{245}

Muhammad Tughlaq was far above the average ruler of his day in intellectual gifts. The experience of the famine in the premier province of the empire brought home to his mind its dependence for foodstuffs on other provinces such as Oudh and Karah (or Kādah). In case of unrest in the latter provinces, Delhi was bound to suffer from famine. The Sultan, therefore, decided to make an experiment unique in the history of Muslim India. He created a new branch in the revenue department and christened it as Divāni Kohi. The function of this department was to supervise his attempt of bringing the un-cultivated land under the plough by means of direct State management and financial support. For the experiment a large tract of land sixty miles square

\textsuperscript{243} Zin, 483. It might be that the wells were sunk only in the country near the Capital. The statement is not very clear.

\textsuperscript{244} Afīf, 92.

\textsuperscript{245} For farming in Hindustan and Sindh and the distribution of grain in fixed measure, see Ibn Batuta, III, 280; also 372-74. Batuta says he saw rice and millet of Balban's time in the granaries of Delhi, Ed. III, 590.
was chosen and an attempt was made to break it completely and produce different crops in rotation. During the course of two years over seventy lacs of tankas were spent on the scheme. The land was given to the poor and those who were anxious to have some. A large staff of a hundred Shiqdārs and a thousand Savārs was appointed to look after it.\footnote{Zia, 498-99. Tabq. Akb. f. 88r; Ferishta, I, 140. The passage in Zia is obscure. I have collated the Bib. Ind. edition with Br. M. MS. 2039 f. 246 v. There are some differences. In some places I have preferred the reading of the MS. The word 'Akhal' in Zia is probably "Ukhal" a Hindi word meaning "land recently brought into cultivation" (Wilson’s Glossary, p. 530).}

The experiment was interesting but not destined to succeed. There were several reasons for its failure. It was a new measure without any precedent, and numerous difficulties in its practical working were bound to arise. If the Sultan had not been compelled to leave Delhi never to return again, he might have been able to extend to it the advantage of his personal presence and guidance. Besides, the tract chosen for the experiment was not so good as to bring quick success. Also the period of three years was rather short for getting the best possible results. The money advanced by the Sultan was not properly spent, partly due to the dishonesty of the officials and partly to the temptation of the suffering people to use it for other purposes. Some of these drawbacks could have been remedied if the Sultan had been able to give personal attention, for he was hardly deterred by difficulties from pursuing his pet schemes.
The machinery of administration and the methods of collections in the time of Muhammad Tughlaq remained much the same as in the days of 'Alāuddin. The iqṭā's were granted as before.²⁴⁷ The distinction between Civil and Military officers continued. In important provinces there was a Nayab who as his title suggests was a representative of the Crown, and the Vazir who looked after financial affairs. In other divisions there was a Wāli or Hākim, and an Amīr or Commander. Ibn Batuta mentions the Wāli of Amroha who had fifteen hundred villages under his control.²⁴⁸ A province was divided into smaller divisions which were either placed in the charge of Muqta' or of 'Āmils.²⁴⁹ Over still smaller units there were Shiqdārs. The jurisdiction of a Shiqdār does not seem to have extended over more than a few miles.²⁵⁰ The military police was under the control of Faujdārs. In case of defiance of the

²⁴⁷ Holders of several iqṭā's or jagirs appointed their own muqta's. For example note the case of Nayab Barbak, Afīf, 432.

²⁴⁸ Ibn Batuta, III, 438–40. Of the total revenue of the division, 1/20th was given to the Wāli. Fawāidul Fawāid mentions Wālis of Ajodhan, f. 78 r, Uchh and Multan f. 112 r. 113 v.

²⁴⁹ Zia, pp. 500-01; 481, 450. Mubārak Shahi (a), f. 32v.

²⁵⁰ Zia, 498, says that about a hundred Shiqdārs were appointed to manage the area of 3600 sq. miles. The case under consideration might have required a larger number of Shiqdārs, but it fairly suggests that his jurisdiction could not have been over large territories. These smaller Shiqs should be distinguished from larger Shiqs mentioned in connection with the government of the Deccan. In the Deccan a Shiq was larger than a district. It was more like modern divisions in British India. The four Shiqs of the Deccan were believed to yield approximately seven crores.
Khoṭs, Muqaddams, or the peasants the Shiqdār was supported by the faujdārs in the enforcement of the law or the orders of the Sultan. 251

Muhammad Tughlaq sometimes farmed out the entire revenue of a province. To one, Nizam, he had farmed the iqṭā’ or kara for several lacs of Tankas. This ‘man did his best to recover from the iqṭā’ the promised revenue but could not realize even a tenth of it. 252 Nusrat Khan who had farmed all the iqṭā’s of Bidar for three years for one crore could not realize even one-fourth the amount in spite of his tact and ability. 253 The entire province of Daulatabad was farmed out to a Hindu banker for thirteen crores, but he too failed and was flayed alive. 254

Like ‘Alāuddin, Muhammad Tughlaq also liked the system of measurement. It was not liked by the people either in the time of the Khiljis or Tughlaqs. The Sultan was at one time quite in earnest and had forced measurement on the people255 at least in the Doab. It is not clear whether he persisted in it after all the calamities that fell on him and his subjects.

At the time of the death of Muhammad Tughlaq the financial and revenue affairs of the Empire were as unsatisfactory as the political. The first task before his successor, Firoz, was to inspire confidence

251 For example, see Zia, 479.
252 Zia, 487.
254 Ibni Batuta, III, 268.
255 Mubārak Shahi (a), 34 v.
in the officials and the people, and to help them to settle down to their normal life. The people had suffered terribly from over-taxation, rigorous administration and natural calamities. The policy of Muhammad Tughlaq had failed so palpably that an attempt to follow it would have been sheer folly. Driven by the force of circumstances and helped by his mild, and, on the whole, generous temperament, Firoz Tughlaq had to adopt a course different from his predecessor.

On coming to the throne, Firoz wrote off all the loans that had been advanced by way of ‘savadhari’ to the people. This was, indeed, a generous expression of the best intentions of his government and was bound to win the sympathy of the people. It was by no means an easy task to forego an amount of two Krors at a time when famines and the late Minister’s extravagances had seriously denuded the treasury. The sum amounted to the entire annual revenue of Gujrat at that time. It is true that Firoz would have found it almost impossible to recover the loans from the impoverished people, and therefore made a virtue of necessity, yet it is also a fact that he willingly cancelled them and never thought of recovering them at all at any time during his long reign.

The grant of general amnesty to the people became far more effective when the Sultan refrained from recovering the gifts that the late Vazir had

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made to the people and officials to win their support for the son of Muhammad Tughlaq. 'Alāuddin and Ghayāsuddin had compelled the people in their days to disgorge all that they had received for political reasons. It was possible for Firoz to have adopted the same course, for a complete account of all gifts was in the office of the Majmuʿadār, but for the same reasons as in the case of loans, he let the matter drop.\(^{257}\)

Two other measures Firoz adopted to gain the good-will and confidence of the official classes. He increased their salaries and allowances.\(^{258}\) Moreover he prohibited the use of physical coercion and humiliation of officials on the occasion of taking accounts (Mahāsaba va Matālaba).\(^{259}\) The spies and informers appointed to watch their activities were also withdrawn.

Firoz had received great support from the religious classes in getting the throne. Since the days of 'Alāuddin the State had been showing indifference towards them, with the result that they also were unfriendly towards the Sultanat. As they exercised great influence over the people their antipathy was a serious factor to be reckoned with. Firoz, however, did his best to reconcile them by removing their grievances. All those grants that had been cancelled by his predecessors were restored either to the original grantee or their descendants. The lands that had been brought under the Khalsa were given back. Firoz

\(^{257}\) Afīf, 93.
\(^{258}\) Zia, 555; Afīf, 94-95.
\(^{259}\) Zia, 556–574; Afīf. 472.
was very generous and liberal and distributed grants or increased them lavishly. It is said that no other Sultan of Delhi had been so kind and liberal towards the religious classes of all shades of opinion.

Although these measures were politically advantageous for the time being, they were disastrous from the point of view of the impoverished exchequer. They made Firoz popular and rallied to his support different classes of men, but in the general interests of the State, as it then was, their utility was questionable. For the moment the problem was to purchase peace at any cost and Firoz could afford to pay the price irrespective of other considerations, or, in other words, he offered a willing submission to the relentless logic of facts and the force of circumstances.

The policy of Firoz was directly and intimately bound up with the finances of the State. After making the large concessions he turned his attention to revenue matters. The first thing was to know precisely what was the prospective income of the Central Government. The old jam‘ was absolutely out of date for many reasons. A new jam‘ adjusted to his policy was essential. The venerable Khwaja Husāmuddin was deputed to the task of fixing the Mahsul of the empire. After a labour of six years he fixed it at six crores and seventy-five lacs of tankas. This jam‘ remained unchanged till the end of the reign of Firoz. Though there is no definite record

260 Zia, 558—61.

261 'Aṣif, 94. 'Aṣif, Br. M. Or. 162, f. 944v. “Bar hukmi Mushāhida” appears in contrast with “bar hukmi Masahat” of Zia in 'Alā‘uddin’s time.
but it is reasonable to think that the jam' of the time of 'Alāuddin and Muhammad Tughlaq also were based to a considerable extent on actual measurement. But Firoz who was anxious to placate the people would not have insisted on it. This general hypothesis finds some support from the use of the word " mushāhida." It might, therefore, be fairly concluded that the jam' of Firoz was based on speculation and guess arrived at in the light of local information and possibly of the previous experience of the Vizarat department. The fixing of a new jam' was indeed a valuable work done by Firoz. It is a pity that no further details about it are available.

Another important feature of the jam' of Firoz was that it did not take into account the miscellaneous cesses, (Abvāb). The list of abvābs given by Firoz himself mentions twenty-four items and refers to others of similar nature. Whether those abvābs were actually abolished or not, the attitude of the government about them was clear. It is not possible with the present material to say which of these abvābs actually had been good sources of income to the exchequer. But the house and the grazing taxes must have been a fruitful source of revenue because they had attracted so much attention of the earlier rulers.

In the collection of revenue Firoz reverted back to the policy of Ghayāsuddin. Muhammad Tughlaq had preferred the policy of 'Alāuddin while Firoz preferred that of Ghayāsuddin. He ordered that

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Futuhati Firoz Shahi, Br. M. f. 300v. See also 'Aṣīf, 375 seq. The total loss of revenue was estimated at thirty lacs of tankas. Op. cit., 379.
Kharāj and Jizya should be levied according to the hāsil (bar hukmi hāsil) and that no excess demands be made. Moreover, no account should be taken of the qismāt and nābūd (accidents and losses in crops). 363

The most important and abiding contribution of Firoz Shah, however, was the policy of opening canals and irrigating those parts of the eastern Punjab where cultivation was not possible for want of water. The practical advantages of canals and the religious virtues associated with digging of wells and canals were known very well to the Muslims. Among the Sultans of Delhi Ghayāsuddin Tughlaq was probably the first who thought of opening canals 364 and probably did some minor work on a very small scale. But no Sultan was so serious in the matter as Firoz. He took great delight and keen personal interest in canals and made it an important part of his policy. A tract of land covering at least one hundred and sixty miles was benefited by his two canals, Rajivā and Alaghkhānī. 365

The advantages of such a wise policy were soon visible. New agricultural colonies sprang up along the canals. Not less than fifty-two colonies were established in the Doab alone excluding those in other

363 Zia, p. 574.
364 Zia, p. 442. It is well known that in Hindu India wells, tanks, and canals were dug by the princes on a large scale.
365 'Aṣif, 127. For details about the canals of Firoz Shah see Zia, pp. 567-71. 'Aṣif, p. 127. Mubārak Shahi (α), f. 43r, 45r. Ferishta, I, 146-47. Thomas' Chronicles, pp. 294-95; and several articles in J.A.S.B. for years 1833, 1840, 1846.
iqṭā's and shiqs. Agriculture flourished from the hills of Sakrudah and Kharìa down to Kol: there is much truth in the statement of 'Afif that neither one village remained desolate nor one cubit of land uncultivated. Firoz was anxious to make the best of the advantages brought by the canals. He encouraged the cultivation of superior crops such as wheat, sugar-cane, lentils, etc., and of superior quality of fruit trees and flower plants.

Muhammad Tughlaq was anxious to raise by five or ten per cent the revenue of the Doab by means of extra cesses which were universally resented. Firoz on the other hand abolished all unpopular cesses, and instead of increasing the burden on the old cultivated areas found a permanent source of income in a method that was at once popular and beneficial to the government. This increased revenue came from three sources. First, from the improved quality of cultivation and superior crops. Second, he charged "haqi shirb" or water tax over and above the normal land tax from those lands that were irrigated by the canals and water subways. The scale of 'haqi shirb' was one-tenth. The legality of 'haqi shirb' was carefully considered and the jurists unanimously gave a verdict in its favour. The third source of income was the gardens. Whatever income the State might have got from the private gardens, Firoz Shah owned twelve hundred gardens in the vicinity of

296 'Afif, 295.
297 Zia, 569-70.
Delhi alone which brought a net income of one lac and eighty thousand tankas.\textsuperscript{260} The total income from all these sources would have increased the revenue from the Doab substantially.\textsuperscript{270}

Besides financial gain the irrigation policy of Firoz had other advantages as well. Firoz made the province of Delhi richer and capable enough to meet its food requirements better in times of distress. The dependence of the province in times of scarcity on the provinces of Hindustan was one of its weak points as was proved by the events in the reign of Muhammad Tughlaq.

The idea of opening canals was a most important contribution to the methods of fighting famines. The reigns of 'Alāuddin Khilji and the first three Tughlaqs witness the growth of all the essentials of a sound famine policy. 'Alāuddin had adopted two measures: control of market prices and profiteering, and storing up huge quantities of corn in the State granaries with a view to relieve the distress. Muhammad Tughlaq took a further step when he made liberal advances to the people to supply them with the means of cultivation and ordered the sinking of wells and distribution of foodstuffs. By opening canals and extending the area of cultivation Firoz carried the methods still further. Thus were evolved by the Khilji and Tughlaq rulers all the modern

\textsuperscript{260} 'Afif, 295-96.

\textsuperscript{270} The revenue from the new lands irrigated by the canals were so considerable that a new staff of officials was appointed to look after these "imlākī Khās." ('Afif, p. 130.) The revenue from imlāk yielded about two Kror tankas. (Loc. cit.)
methods of fighting famines. If the Delhi Sultanat had remained in health and vigour after Firoz a permanent famine policy could have been definitely established.

The revenue policy of Firoz, however, suffered from two defects. The first was the further extension of the farming system. That the farming system prevailed before the time of his predecessors is beyond doubt, but Firoz was more lavish in that respect than any other Sultan. The worst feature of his farming system was that he farmed the revenue of even provinces to the government officials themselves. In the time of Muhammad Tughlaq the farmers had not been successful in their enterprise because they had not sufficient power and resources at their command to force realisation of revenue, as they seem to be private individuals or bankers. But Firoz placed at the disposal of the farmers the entire local machinery of government. As a case in point, there was a keen bidding between Abu Raja Ziaulmulk and Shamsi Damghāni for the Niyābat of Gujrat. The latter offered to pay forty lacs of tankas over and above the average revenue of Gujrat, besides a hundred elephants, two hundred Arab horses and four hundred Hindu and Abyssinian slaves. As Abu Raja refused to accept this additional contribution, the Niyābat was given to Damghāni. This man made frantic efforts

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271 Easy and swift means of communication like railways and steamers and the import of corn from countries outside India were not possible in those days at all.

272 Mubarak Shahi (b), f. 406rv. Ferishta, p. 148. The average revenue of Gujrat was estimated at two crores in the time of Firoz. 'Aff, pp. 500-01.
to raise the revenue which made him highly unpopular and led to his assassination.

Firoz was equally lavish in paying his officials in the shape of jâgirs. For example the Vazir personally was given a territory yielding thirteen lacs of tankas; others had lands yielding six or four lacs, and so on. Some of the assignees sold their assignments to the bankers who made a clear profit of about seventeen per cent. The evils of the system are obvious and while the assignee was relieved of botheration and the bankers derived considerable profits, the State was a loser. Firoz Shah was not ignorant of the enormous wealth that the bankers and officials acquired from his policy but he took no steps to modify it.

Another defect in his policy was the extension of the operation of the Jizya. Although it is true that Jizya had not been abolished and was probably realised to some extent, it was gradually falling into disuse. The ablest of the Delhi Sultans were taking

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\(^{273}\) 'Aff, 296.

\(^{274}\) 'Aff, 296-97. E.D., III, 346-47.

\(^{275}\) Futuhat, B.M. f. 305.

\(^{276}\) In fairness to Firoz it might be said that in other respects the Hindus must have gained like other classes. Tarikhi Haqqi, f. 33v, says that on account of the Sultan's leniency "no room was left in the houses of Khoâs and Muqaddams to keep the large number of cattle and huge quantities of grain and other goods," so at least the Khoâs and Muqaddams seem to have flourished. Besides, Firoz prohibited the practice of confiscating cattle and then property for failure of paying revenue. Firoz, however, permitted them to take two Jitals on every Tanka of the revenue. This too was very beneficial to the cultivators, khoâs and muqaddams as such who were mostly Hindus. (Vide 'Aff, 98-99.)
more and more interest in the secular revenue and were inclined to ignore Jizya. The difficulties of assessment and the numerous qualifications and exemptions were some of the practical objections, besides its unfairness and its unpopularity with the Hindus. Firoz Shah who was religious-minded thought of it seriously and tried to enforce it.
CHAPTER X

THE AFGHAN EXPERIMENTS

After the death of Firoz Shah Tughlaq the Sultanat of Delhi was thrown into confusion. The rise of Hindu Chiefs in Hindustan and Rajputana, and of the Khokhars in the Punjab, the invasion of Timur and the establishment of independent Muslim Kingdoms, destroyed almost completely the power and prestige of the Delhi Sultanat. Under such circumstances the Government of Delhi could not preserve intact the principles and policy that had been developed by the early Turkish Sultans, much less could they improve upon them. The administrative machinery became slack with the weakening of the Central Government. But the institutions and traditions are as slow to die out as they are to grow, hence it is likely that the local officials carried them on as best as the circumstances permitted.

It was not till the establishment of the Lodi dynasty that the Delhi Sultanat once more began to recover from the paralysing shocks it had received. But the Afghans had neither the keen interest nor the administrative abilities of the Turks. Their ideas and institutions were different in several respects from those of the preceding Sultans. Moreover, most of their energy and attention was diverted to military affairs which at that time were of paramount importance.
The practice of dividing the country into iqṭā's followed by the predecessors of Bahrol, the promise of dividing the benefits of the empire, which he had made, among the tribal and clannish leaders, and the necessity of keeping law and order which could be then possible only through the local commander were some of the main causes why Bahrol did not, or rather could not, think of tightening the control of the Central Government over local affairs. The local commanders so long as they could collect the revenues through the time-honoured local agency did not think it worth their while to give their attention to the details of revenue administration. They had neither the inclination nor the time nor the ability to worry themselves with affairs in which they did not feel any interest.

By the time of Sikandar Lodi the situation was much improved. The rival Kingdom of Jaunpur was completely destroyed and annexed, the Hindu Chiefs were made to realise the might of the Lodi Sultans, the danger in the Central Punjab from the Khokars and the Mughals had also passed away. Sikandar's ideas were not so uncompromisingly Afghan as those of his father, and he began to show some interest in other than the military activities of the State.

The important contribution made by Sikandar Lodi was the abolition of Zakāt on grain. As a serious famine had broken out in some parts of his kingdom and he was anxious to get a better supply of grain at less price he took that measure. 'Alā-uddin had removed Zakāt on cattle, though it is not known if it was ever revived. In the case of the
Zakat on grain it is mentioned by the writers of Akbar's time that since its abolition by Sikandar Lodi throughout his whole empire it was not revived.\textsuperscript{277}

Another useful measure of Sikandar was the adoption of one uniform yard of forty-one digits as a standard unit of measurement. His yard continued to prevail up to the time of Humayun who increased it by one digit. It was the standard yard of Sikandar Lodi which was used by Sher Shah and his son, and also by Akbar till the thirty-first year (1586-87) of his reign.\textsuperscript{278}

Sikandar's successor, Ibrahim, was not destined to rule long. He was a strong minded, energetic and ambitious prince and it is probable that he might have been able to do something to improve the tone of administration. However, he made a remarkable experiment. He ordered that the revenue should be taken from the cultivators in kind.\textsuperscript{279} Although the authorities say that the rule was applied to every-thing that was cultivated on the land, yet for obvious reasons things like perishable greens and vegetables could hardly have come within its operation.

It can not be said with certainty whether Ibrahim's policy was aimed at introducing a kind of uniformity in the method of collection, or was due to shortage of silver. That revenue was taken in kind

\textsuperscript{277} Badaoni, i, 317; Zubdat T., f. 71v; Tabq. Akb., f. 126r.

\textsuperscript{278} 'Ain, Jarrett, ii, 61. A.F. says according to some a yard of that length had existed even before Sikandar's time.

\textsuperscript{279} Daoodi (a), f. 63v. Haqqi, 44r, v. Zubdat T., f. 80r, v. Badaoni, i, 317.
even in the days of the early Turks is known. It might be that a tendency towards cash demand had been steadily growing and Ibrahim wanted to go back to the collection in kind. This hypothesis is the more likely because the chronicles have described especially in some details the effect of his policy. If there had been no novelty at all, it would hardly have attracted so much attention. They say that the result of his policy was that grain became very cheap. For the officials who collected in kind required cash for their normal expenses, and therefore vied with one another in disposing of their stores as early as they could. Their need for money, and the competition in converting grain into cash, lowered the prices very much. It is obvious that this system could have worked only so long as no demand was made from the cultivators in cash, and barter was the normal means of transaction. The writers say that money had become scarce. In villages and small towns the system might have worked to some extent but it could hardly continue long in cities. Moreover, the officials and nobles who were put to much inconvenience would not have tolerated it for a long time. Those who had cash in their possession could derive the fullest advantage from the policy and the cultivating too would have got plenty to eat. In other respects the system was neither advantageous to the government nor conducive to trade and commerce. If Ibrahim had lived longer he would have either been forced to devise an adjustment of prices or to abandon it. With all its defects it was an interesting experiment and for the time being made living cheap.
The defeat of Ibrahim must have disturbed his revenue policy immediately. Bābar had no rigid principles of his own to enforce. Both in Farghana and in Afghanistan he was used to collections in kind. From the memoirs of Timur also it is clear that Timur recognised both the collection in cash and in kind. So also the system of measurement of land was suggested as a method of assessment should the cultivator want it. It can, therefore, be reasonably presumed that Babar had no fads of his own and would have let the local customs prevail. He just took the government over from the Afghans without necessarily intending to change the revenue system. The cut and dried nature of the revenue list given in Babar's memoirs suggests that he laid his lands on the papers of the late government and made it the basis of his demands.

Without prejudice against realisation in kind, Bābar must yet have felt the need of cash. He had already squandered the treasury of Delhi in the first flush of victory and must have felt the necessity of replenishing it. In all likelihood, therefore, he might have showed indifference to the policy of Ibrāhim Lodi.

Like the Sultans of Delhi, Babar also divided the revenue of the empire among the officers, reserving a fairly good portion as Khālsa. For example Muhammad Zamān was given the Bihar revenue but one cror and twenty five lacs were reserved for

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280 Memoirs, pp. 56, 221, 228.
281 Institutes Davy, p. 360 seq.
282 Memoirs, 521.
283 Tabq, Akb, f. 143v.
Khālsa. Other high officials were also given large jagirs. Thus Firoz Khan got a jagir of one crore and odd in Jaunpur, Bāyazid was given one crore in Oudh and ninety lacs in Jaunpur, and so on.

It is quite probable that while giving provinces to a commander, Bābar appointed a divān himself. The case of Murshid is in point. Muhammad Zamān was the Commander or rather viceroy of Bihar but Murshid Iraqi was appointed Divan. This plan was quite in keeping with the policy of the Turkish Sultans of Delhi.

The invasion of Bābar did not usher any radical change in the system of government followed by the early Turkish Sultans. There were still in his days the Khālsa, Jagir, and Sayurghāl lands, and lands under the direct management of rais and Rajas. The territorial divisions were also much the same. The administrative units were the same. The methods of revenue collection were probably the same. He had simply taken over the government. It seems the only change he made was regarding the abolition of tamghā for all the Musalmans. This declaration too had its counter-part in the policy of Muhammad Shah Tughlaq. Gulbadan Begum says that besides "bāj va Tamghā" Bābar also abolished Zakāt on grain.

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284 Memoirs of Babar, 663.
285 A. N., i, 253; Memoirs, 676.
286 Memoirs, 521.
287 Memoirs, 553 & n. 2.
288 Humayun Nama of Gulbadan, text, 13 r. This was abolished by Sikandar and was never revived. Babar, therefore, wisely passes over it.
Humayun was too busy with his political and military difficulties, hence he does not seem to have interfered with the methods or machinery of revenue collection. It was not till the time of Sher Shah that those matters attracted the attention of the Central government. Though Sher Shah was busy like Humayun, yet he was more vigilant and energetic and had some personal knowledge of and interest in revenue affairs. As the manager of his father's jagirs he had actually seen the working of the local revenue machinery and had grappled with the problems of the peasants and revenue. Later on when he became the Sultan of Delhi, he attempted the administration of the empire in the same old spirit.

When Sher Shah was appointed Shiqdār of his father's jāgir he found there a system more or less the same as existed in the days of the early Turks. The Shiqdār was then the most important revenue official and had under his charge one or more parganas. He was assisted by the navisinda (writer) and the muqaddam who had their own separate crude papers (Kāghaz Khām). In these papers the actual and true account of revenue collection was kept. It was on this basis that a fair register was prepared. It appears that the Shiqdārs and his assistants sometimes colluded to manipulate the accounts of the rough papers (Kāghaz Khām) according to their wishes and even prevented the r'yat from representing their grievances to higher authorities.

200 Abbas Kh. Or 164 f. 3r, v. 13 r. v. Or. 1782 f. 6r. 9 r. v.
Besides those officials there were others to measure the land and collect the revenue. In his jagir both the systems of measurement and division of crops were prevalent. The cultivator had the option to choose whichever method he liked and give his acceptance in writing. For measuring the land and collecting the revenue these officials got remuneration technically known as Jaribāna and muhassalāna. These were also probably charged from the cultivators. There were two crops and after each harvest the revenue was realized.

On coming to the throne of Delhi, Sher Shah tried to infuse new life and efficiency into the administration. His most important contribution seems to have been the introduction of ray' or schedulo of the crop-rates of assessment. The good, the middling and the poor produce, from a bigha, of all the leading crops of each of the two seasons were taken into consideration. By adding the good, middling and poor produce of a bigha and dividing the total by three, an average of the produce of a bigha was arrived at. One third of this average was fixed as the rate of assessment by the government. Similar rates were fixed by the same method for all the chief crops.

According to Wassaf, Ghazan Khan of Persia (1295—1304 A.D.) had adopted a ray' in his days.

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200 Abbas Khan use the words 'zari Kharif' and 'Zari rabi.' Does it mean that for each crop separate revenue was taken? In the case of division of crop that was natural, but in cash collection the case might have been different.
21 Ain, ii, 286—89.
22 Wassaf, Br. M., 23517 f. 356v, 360r.
but in India no Sultan is known to have framed a schedule of rates so systematically. It is doubtful if they had any idea of it at all. The absence of any previous reference to it might suggest that it was Sher Shah who introduced it in India.

It is not known whether one ray' held good for the whole empire or there were different ray's for different localities. In the former case the difficulties in revenue collection would have been serious owing to variations of local produce and prices. If the revenue had been collected in kind the difficulty might not have been very serious. That in some parts of the country it was collected in kind is well known but it is highly improbable that Sher Shah could have thought of reverting to the system of Ibrāhīm Lodi which was unpopular with the Afghan Officials. 293

Sher Shah discouraged the system of division of crops and it is said that he and Islām Shah practically freed Hindustan from it. 294 From his experience of Jagirs in his early days he came to the conclusion that measurement was by far the better system than division. In this respect his ideas were similar to those of 'Alāuddin Khilji and Muhammad Shah

293 It has been suggested that the empire of Delhi ever since the days of the later Tughlaqs must have begun to feel the shortage of silver, for both Gujrat and Bengal were cut off from it, and the supply via Multan was small. This might have been responsible for the policy of Ibrāhīm Lodi. But the improvement in the currency system and silver coins in the time of Sher Shah suggests that his empire did not suffer much, although silver in proportion to gold was a bit dearer than in the time of Akbar (Thomas, Chronicles, 404-05). Besides, Abus Khan uses the words 'tahsil zar,' Br. 1782, f. 86v, Abus Khan, Or. 164, f. 69r, says "According to Jarib Zar should be taken."

294 Ain, ii, 296.
Tughlaq. He therefore tried to enforce measurement as extensively as he possibly could without being too rigid and uncompromising. The concession that he allowed to the Langas in Multan 295 might have been dictated partly by political reasons and partly by their strong wishes. But the rigour with which measurement was enforced in Sambhal, 296 Qanauj 297 and Nagarkot 298 shows that he was not willing to extend such concessions freely. In such parts as Malwa, Rajputana, and Western Punjab which were not then properly pacified Sher Shah could hardly have succeeded in enforcing his wishes.

The local officials of course were instructed to realise the revenue by measurement, as was done in the time of 'Alâuddin Khilji and Muhammad Tughlaq. Besides local measurement Sher Shah ordered a general survey of the land for the use of the Central government. Ahmad Khan was entrusted with the task of measuring the cultivated and uncultivated (Mazru‘a va ghair mazru‘a) lands. This he did with the help of the Brahmans (Hindus). On the basis of this survey a register was prepared in which were entered the rights of owners and the measurement of all cultivated pieces of land and their different classes 299. It is not known whether any similar register was kept in the days of the early Turks, but the elaborate organisation of the Vizarat

295 Abbas Khan, Or. 164, f. 61r.
297 loc. cit.
298 Abbas Kh., Or. 164—70r.
299 Daulati Sher Shahi farman No. 10.
department in their time suggests that the Central
government might have possessed such records.
Although it is true that the system of measurement
was not the creation of Sher Shah he was certainly as
keen as 'Alāuddin to extend it, and he succeeded
considerably. His general survey gave him a good
basis for fixing a new jam which probably was not
done by the Syyads and Lodis. By itself it was a
necessary and useful work and Sher Shah did it
better than Firoz Tughlaq. It might be reasonably
supposed that the survey could not have been very
satisfactory for Sher Shah’s reign was very short for
the purpose. Even Akbar who had at his back the
experience of the Sur government and was served by
highly skilled officials like Shah Mansur, Muzaffar
Khan and Todar Mal took ten years to get a fairly
satisfactory, though not absolutely reliable survey.
Nevertheless Sher Shah’s move was in the right
direction and he deserves due credit for it.

Besides taking one third of the average produce
of a bigha, Sher Shah also collected ten astārs of
grain from each bigha. It was a sort of contingency
tax—a cess. The weight of an astār was equal to
twenty Bahlolis. This tax was certainly realised
in kind. The grain was stored up in local granaries
and was released in times of famine to relieve
distress. It was not freely distributed but was sold
at a cheap price. ‘Alāuddin had also such stores but
he had filled them by collecting the revenue in kind

300 A bahloli was equal to 1 tola 8 mashas and 7 rattis.
301 Afsanai Shahani Hind, 135v.
and not by any extra cess as was the case with Sher Shah. This tax of Sher Shah was apparently the forerunner of the dah seri tax which Akbar levied in kind. Akbar, however, used it for other purposes also.\footnote{\textsuperscript{302}}

In the administrative machinery Sher Shah did not introduce any change. The practice of bestowing Jagirs continued even during the Sur period. It is possible that Sher Shah might have tried to remove some of the worst features of the Jagir system but there is no definite evidence to show it. He had given jagirs to men in Sarhind,\footnote{\textsuperscript{303}} Malwa,\footnote{\textsuperscript{304}} Rohtas\footnote{\textsuperscript{305}} and Bengal\footnote{\textsuperscript{306}} and probably in other places also.\footnote{\textsuperscript{307}} Some of the jagir holders managed their jagirs through their own servants,\footnote{\textsuperscript{308}} and it is probable that it was the general practice as he found it when he was Shiqdār of his father's Jagir.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{302} 'Ain. Bloch., 275.
  \item \textsuperscript{303} Abbas Kh., Or. 164, f. 70r.
  \item \textsuperscript{304} Op. cit., 75r; Daūdī, Or, 197, f. 89v, 91r; Or. 1701, f. 132v.
  \item \textsuperscript{305} Badaoni, Ranking, 474.
  \item \textsuperscript{306} Daūdī, Or. 197, f. 92r; (Or. 1701, f. 133v.). Mushtaqi, however, says that Sher Shah paid the 'hasham' from the treasury but not in jagirs. This remark might apply to 'hasham' only, otherwise its truth is doubtful. Irvine distinguishes 'hasham' from Manṣābdars (vide Army of the Great Mughals, p. 160) but his distinction does not wholly apply in the case of Islam Shah. I am inclined to suppose that the word 'hasham' in Sur times was the personal army of the Sultan himself.
  \item \textsuperscript{307} This can be clearly inferred from Abbas Kh., Or. 164, f. 67v. Also I.O., 103r. E.D. IV. 410-11.
  \item \textsuperscript{308} Abbas Khan (a), or 64 79r, and I.O., f. 107r. v.
\end{itemize}
Like the early Turks and the Lodis Sher Shah had no definite ideas about provincial organisation. While on the one side there were large provinces as Malwa and the Punjab, on the other there were small divisions into which the whole country from Delhi to Bihar was divided. The case of Bengal stands alone. As the governor of that province had married a girl of the late ruler of Bengal without Sher Shah’s permission the latter feared lest the alliance should foster an ambition of establishing an independent Sultanat in Bengal. He therefore punished the governor and parcellled the province into numerous small divisions.\footnote{Daoodi (Or. 197), f. 92r, says that Sher Shah gave Bengal to a number of men as jagirs. But Elliot MS. (133v.) adds further that he “made it mulk ut tawaf.”} This was an exceptional case, and does not afford adequate ground to say that it represented his well-considered judgment or ideal of government.

As before, a pargana consisting of several villages remained the effective unit of administration. The same dual arrangement of government that existed in the days of the early Turks prevailed under Sher Shah. The faujdars and shiqdars administered the police and revenue affairs respectively. It is incorrect to say that the idea of making the pargana a unit, and of keeping revenue or civil affairs separate from the police and military, was that of Sher Shah.\footnote{This statement has been discussed in some details in the appendix.} It had come as a legacy from the early Turks to the Afghans. The Lodi Sultan Bahlol had appointed in Kampil, Patiali, Sakit and Kol and
Jalālī, one Shiqdār in each pargana. Babar had also appointed a Shiqdār at Delhi. The ‘Āmil of Sher Shah had a still older antiquity and existed ever since the advent of the Muslim conquerors into India.

Sher Shah was a reformer and not an innovator. His sole aim was to infuse vitality and efficiency in administration. The behaviour of the ‘Āmils and Shiqdār, however, suggests that Sher Shah could not succeed in removing corruption. His policy of changing local officers after a year or two was not aimed at stopping corruption, but, as he candidly confessed, to give opportunity to a larger number of men to share the benefits and profits of ‘Āmildāri. In this respect Balban and ‘Alāuddin were very rigorous, and though they might not have fully succeeded it could not be said of them that they knowingly tolerated corruption.

Like Firoz Tughlaq Sher Shah was solicitous of the welfare of his subjects more than other Sultans. In one of his farmans he says, "If the insufficiency of rain destroys the crops of the year, it is necessary that the poor should be helped with money from the

311 Tabq. Ak., Br. M., f. 122v. Mr. Qanungo is not right in saying that Shiqdars were introduced by Sikandar Lodi (Sher Shah, p. 354). The Shiqdars existed in the time of the Tughlaqs, if not before, vide Zia, 479; and ‘Aṣif, 272.
312 Memoirs, 476.
313 Abbas Khan, I.O., f. 106v.; Or. 164, f. 69v. 1782, f. 41r, v. 86v. Tarikhi Khan Jahani gives the case of the sons of Sher Khan, a jagirdar against whom a charge of tyranny was brought. Sher Shah refused to entertain the complaint for Sher Khan was a most devoted servant. Egerton, 696 f. 173r. This, however, does not show that he forgave all offenders.

F. 20
treasury so that as far as the resources of the State permit they might be saved from the whirlpool of destruction." This probably refers to something like loans and doles that were given by the early Sultans. It was the glory of the Tughlaqs alone to have attached much importance to canals and artificial means of irrigation. Sher Shah and even Akbar did nothing in that direction. Although Sher Shah could spare plenty of time and money for fortifications, founding of cities, castles, mosques and serais, no writer says that he had any idea of canals or artificial irrigation.

The son and successor of Sher Shah, Islām Shah kept in tact the policy of his father in most respects. He, however, appears to have been more anxious to bring the land under the direct administration of the exchequer. Although some writers say that Islām Shah abolished Jagir system \(^{314}\) and made all Vilayat Khalsa, but it is an exaggeration. Waq'āt Mushtaqi which is the best authority for the period clearly says that he gave Jagirs to his soldiers. \(^{315}\) It is, therefore, reasonable to hold that his ideal was to extend the Khalsa land and he tried to do so.

Like Muhammad Tughlaq Islām Shah was anxious to lay down systematic and detailed regulation in administrative matters. It is said that his regulations were comprehensive enough to satisfy all practical requirements and obviate the necessity of

\(^{314}\) Daoodi, Or. 197, f. 103r, Or. 1701, f. 150r; Badaoni, Ranking, p. 496.

\(^{315}\) Mushtaqi, 11633 f. 57r. It might be that in his later days he discouraged the jagir system.
frequent references. 316 Unfortunately these regulations have not been preserved or described by any writer. It is, however, probable that they were known to the government of Akbar and were assimilated in the Ain with modifications.

No change was made in the machinery of administration. For, when Humayun recovered Lahore, he appointed a Faujdār, an Āmin and a treasurer. We might also presume that there was a Shiqdār or an Āmil as the case might have been. Lahore was an important and large division and the above mentioned officers were supposed to be quite enough for administering it.

In the time of Islam Shah there were, no doubt, Shiqdārs also. There is a case of a Shiqdār who protested why a Shiqdār should be compelled to make good the loss within his territory caused by theft or robbery. Islām Shah coolly replied that because the people paid bāj for it. 317 The little anecdote shows that the Shiqdār’s duties included prevention of theft and robbery also. In the time of Sher Shah the Muqaddam was held responsible for it. Islam Shah placed the responsibility more on the Shiqdār. This was an improvement inasmuch as unlike the Muqaddam the Shiqdar was a regular government official. His responsibility meant that of the government.

316 Ranking, 496. Zubdat 123v, 124r.
CHAPTER XI

RECONSTRUCTION AND REFORM

The Sur Afghans were succeeded by the Mughal ruler Akbar whose long reign was to witness an entire overhauling of the administration. The improvements and modifications introduced by Akbar were not done quickly but after many experiments, experiences, and even failures. If Sher Shah and Islām had lived longer they would have cleared much the way for the full expression of the administrative abilities and constructive statesmanship of Akbar. But their short reign was followed by confusions and disorders, and the little good they had been able to do was practicallv undone. Nevertheless the old machinery of the government, and the time-honoured customs and procedures that had survived so many changes of dynasties and shocks of revolution must have passed on as legacy of their predecessors to Akbar.

Although it will be a repetition but a brief recapitulation will be on the whole useful. There were even before Akbar three kinds of lands or three kinds of relations between the central government and the holders of land. The Khalsa was the crown land directly under the management of the government and paying revenue to it. There was Jāgir land under the direct management of the Jāgirdars and not of the government. There was also the Sayūrghāl land
which was given on free tenure and paid no revenue to the government, a feature that distinguished it from the two other classes. The tendency of the Surs was to discourage Jagirs and extend the Khalsa class of land. Of the administrative divisions the largest was a province usually known by the name of the country or the capital. Next to it were the Sarkars, which probably corresponded with the earlier terms Shiq, Khita and even iqta'. The word Sarkar is believed to have been introduced by the Surs though there is no direct evidence for it except that it probably does not occur in the earlier works prior to the time of the Surs. Smaller than the Sarkar were the parganas which again were subdivided into villages.

In the early part of Akbar's reign no efforts were made to improve the system prevailing in the country. The Mughal, following the general practice of the conquerors in those days, parcellled out the country among the Khans, Sultans and Jagirdars. The central government of course had the power to change the Jagir holders or officials, and increase or diminish the Jagir; otherwise it exercised minimum pressure in administration. The result of this arrangement was that the policy of extending the Khalsa land continued to remain in abeyance. Matters grew worse after the fall of Bairam Khan. For in their anxiety to enlist the support of the officials and soldiers the government made grants on a liberal scale. As the empire was small and the numbers of expectants was large the revenue records were fabricated and revenue figures inflated. The position of the government was deplorable for the country was given away in Jagirs and
the records of the Central Government were unreal, rather false.\textsuperscript{318}

Although a youth, Akbar could not have remained satisfied with this state of affairs. But his attention was drawn by a funny incident. Once he wanted a paltry sum of sixteen rupees for some urgent matter. Khwajai Jahan asked the Khwajai Sarā, who had taken the message of the Emperor, whose Jagir money was to be taken from. The matter reached Maham Anga who ordered her men to make the payment immediately.\textsuperscript{319} Akbar could have hardly failed to notice the incident. At any rate he made up his mind to look into the financial affairs.

In 1563 Akbar appointed Etmād Khan, who had served under Islām Shah and bore a character for integrity, to organize the Khalsa lands.\textsuperscript{320} The work of reorganization thus began with the Khalsa land. Etmad Khan instituted an inquiry and extricated the Khalsa from other kinds of land,\textsuperscript{321} that is to say, separated those lands which were worthy of being brought under the exchequer. It is not known what were the principles on which he proceeded.

The reform of Khalsa would have remained at this time confined roughly to the provinces of Delhi

\textsuperscript{318} A. N., ii; "Ain. Although the precise meaning of Jam' Raqami Qalami is not known but the general description of Abul Fazl is clear.

\textsuperscript{319} Bayazid, f. 102r. Misappropriations mentioned in Maasir Um, i, 88.


\textsuperscript{321} A. N. II
and Agra or partly even to Lahore. Other parts of the empire were either mainly held by jagirdars or not yet properly subdued. The Khalsa lands were divided into small divisions each yielding one Kror of dams (about two lacs and fifty thousand rupees). The idea of making equal divisions on the basis of revenue seems to be a new one. The officer entrusted with the collection of a Kror of revenue is apparently the Karori. With this official were appointed one 'bitikchi' or writer and a 'ganjür' or treasurer.\(^{322}\)

Thus as early as the time of Etmad Khan the Karoris seem to have come into existence. The Karori, however, could not be the highest official of a Sarkar of the Ain. For, of the thirteen Sarkars of Agra only four yielded a revenue less than a Kror of dams; while others gave a revenue from two to nineteen Krores. Again, in the province of Delhi there was not a single Sarkar that yielded a revenue of less than two Krores. Nor could the Karori be a pargana official, for ordinarily a pargana of the Ain was too small a unit to yield as much as one Kror of dams. It is probable that the Karoris were appointed over revenue units handed down by the Surs. In that case the pargana of Sher Shah would be a larger unit, and the Sarkar a smaller unit, than those of the Ain. But it is improbable that at such an early period of his reign Akbar could have introduced such serious

\(^{322}\) Ain., i, 10. The general trend of the Ain's account indicates that the Karoris were appointed at this stage. But A. N. and other writers do not mention their appointments in connection with the reforms of Etmad Khan. All authorities however mention that in 1574 A.D. 182 Karoris were appointed.
changes in administrative units existing in the time of the Surs.

In the method of collection of revenue the old system prevailed. The ray' of Sher Shah was adopted without any change.\textsuperscript{323} For the facility of those who wanted to pay in cash, the rates of ray' which were in grain were commuted in money\textsuperscript{324} probably according to the prices obtaining in the local market. It appears that Akbar was anxious to realize the revenue in cash as much as possible, for that method was convenient to the government and liked by the officials. The local customs do not seem to have been disturbed at all. Division of crops, however, was least favoured ever since the days of the Surs, and there is no reason to think that the Mughals favoured it either. As to the measurement, it might be that the local officials measured the cultivated land to assess the revenue and on their record the Collector (Karori) collected it. No attempt was made at this time by the central government to have a general survey of the land as such.

In 1564 Muzaffar Khan was appointed as Diwani Kul with Raja Todar Mal as his assistant. These two men unfortunately did not pull on well and consequently revenue matters were not well thrashed out. Nevertheless, these shrewd men did not fail to realize that the old figures of the record prepared by Abdul-Majid Asaf Khan and technically known as 'Jamai Raqami,' were absolutely unreliable and

\textsuperscript{323} Ain, 297. Also R.H.S. Mus.
\textsuperscript{324} Ain., loc. cit.
grossly fictitious. In 1566 Muzaffar, set about collecting the approximately correct figures from the local qanungos and those who had knowledge of them. As in the time of Firoz Tughlaq, reliance was placed on surmises and guesses which were based on the Khasra papers of the local qanungos. It is not clear if the papers of village patwāris were also examined. But it is apparent that no actual measurement was resorted to in preparing the 'hālihāṣil.' Even in using surmises and guesses the qanungos did not exercise either strict honesty or enough vigilance. On account of their anxiety to show figures not in a violent contrast with the old recorded ones, and due to corruption, they brought figures which were far from being reliable. However, these figures were better than the old ones. On their basis a rent roll was prepared by the central government. It was technically called 'Hālihāṣil,' (1566).

Just as in the days of Firoz some cesses were not included in assessment, the government of Akbar also excluded some definite cesses. Such cesses as rāḥdāri (road tax, or tax for watching roads), salāmāna (salute offering), peshkash (presents), sarana (?) bāj, Tamgha, and all such miscellaneous items, were cancelled as

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325 A. N. Op. cit. I.O. (235), f. 352 r. v. Ain., p. 288. has 'dah Qanungo,' and Jarrett, ii, p. 88, has translated it 'ten qanungos.' But the R.A.S. MS. has no word signifying the number of Qanungos. Both in the Bib. Ind. edition and the MSS 'Qanungo' is used in singular and not plural but Jarrett has translated it as plural. I have followed mainly the R.A.S. MS.

early as the first year of Akbar's accession. The Government of Akbar also refused to levy taxes from liquor shops (Sharab Khana), poor houses (Yuza Khana), brothels (baitullataf) and gambling houses, although it was believed that they brought a large revenue. But the orders or wishes of the government were obviously not properly carried out by the local people and officials. So far as the central government was concerned they were not counted as sources of revenue. In the ninth year of Akbar's reign (1564) it was also made clear that the Jizya and the pilgrim tax, known as Kar, were not to be resorted to. This was the first formal declaration in the Muslim history of India when the government renounced its claim to levy Jizya. Akbar went a step further than Firoz, for the latter, while he had abolished many cesses claimed the Jizya. The announcement of the policy as early as 1564 required enormous moral courage and marks a new era in the history of Muslim taxation in India. It is likely that the State did not suffer much material loss; for,

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328 Arif Qandhari, 56-57. The passage in my text is corrupt but its significance is clear. My text has got "baitullataf" 'Arif gives no date for the order abolishing these taxes. It is likely that the various taxes were abolished at different times.

329 A. N., ii, 230.

330 A. N. Bev., ii, 296. The note of Mr. Beveridge on Kar is due to wrong reading.

331 Abul Fazl no doubt says that it involved great "revenue." A. N. Bev., ii, 316. But to me it appears to be a prospective affair than revenue actually realized.
Jizya seems to have fallen into disuse ever since the days of the later Tughlaqs, owing to the general dislike of it by the Hindus and the revival of their power. A tax so unpopular and so difficult to assess and collect was undependable as a sound source of income. Although no government before Akbar had announced its abolition only a few could have succeeded in realizing any substantial benefit from it. The political advantages of Akbar's policy were obviously greater than the doubtful financial advantage derived from that tax.

The practice of fixing the revenue after collecting the returns of produce and prices current in the market had some defects. The system was dilatory and expensive without guaranteeing accuracy. The returns were suspicious and were not probably received in time. These considerations led Shahabuddin Ahmad (1568) to abandon the method of Muzaffar Khan and adopt 'nasaq.'

It was not till 1573-4 that the revenue question was again seriously taken up. During the last six or seven years great changes had taken place. The position and power of the Emperor had gained enormous strength and extensive conquests had brought a remarkable extension of the empire. The cardinal points in the contemplated reforms were the extension of the Khalsa land and reorganization of the resources of the empire.

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338 A. N. Bib. Ind. II 333; I.O. MS. f. 377 r. As 'Nasaq' is a difficult term to explain and its precise significance is doubtful, I have thought it proper to discuss it in an appendix.
The first important step was to bring the territory between Kanauj and Bihar under Khalisa. This was just the beginning of a policy which contemplated the extension of Khalsas as much as possible. Gradually one province after the other felt the pressure of this policy; and the Jagir system began to contract in proportion to the extension of the Khalsa lands. This was a revival of the policy of some of the ablest Sultans of Delhi like 'Alauddin and the first of two Surs. It did not mean the abolition of the Jagir system which was never abolished. But Akbar, like other great Sultans, gave preference to the Khalsa and brought within it most of the best tracts of land.

The reorganization of revenue administration required a systematic measurement of the land and an enquiry into its condition. The yard of Sikandar Lodi was taken again as the unit of measurement; but it was decided to use a new kind of jarīb. The old țanāb was made of hemp fibres which expanded when wet but contracted when dry. The new one introduced by Akbar was made of bamboo poles linked together with iron rings. This change in the apparatus of measurement was important, for it made considerable difference in actual calculation.

333 Mun'īm Khan was persuaded to exchange his jagir of thirty Krors to the West of Garhi, for that of the country to the other side of it which was estimated at thirty-five Krors. Bayazid, f. 144 v. Similarly in 1573 (980 A.H.) Muzaffar Khan was given a jagir of 250 laces of tankus in Malwa—Khaki Shirazi, f. 538 r.

334 If measured by fibre țanāb, one bigha was shorter by 2 biswas and 12 biswansah, which resulted in a difference of ten bighas in a hundred—Ain., ii, Jarrett, 62.
A bigha, as before, was sixty yards by sixty yards. A number of high officials were appointed to supervise the work of measurement. The supervising board consisted of four officials, two of them were Hindus and two Muslims. In spite of some opposition by some high officials the work of survey was pushed on, and Punjab proper, the country between Lahore and Bihar, Malwa, Eastern and Southern Gujrat were surveyed between 1574—78. Bihar, Bengal, Surashtra, and Multan were, for the time, not included in the survey, while Thatha, Ghazni, Qandhar, Kabul, Kashmir, Orissa, Ahmadnagar and Khandesh were not till then conquered.

The Survey work required the appointment of a large number of officials. In 1574 as many as 182 Karoris were appointed. In other words the machinery which was provided for the Khalsa land as early as 1564 was extended to territories newly brought under the exchequer. Karori was a popular term used for 'Amil. As before they were given a foṭadār or treasurer and a Karkun or Clerk. The work of the Karori was not simply to collect revenue. He had to fix the boundaries (Chak), measure the areas of villages, separate the revenue-paying lands

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335 A. N. Bev., iii, 166; Badaoni, Lowe, 1760, 192-93.
336 A. N., iii, 117; I.O. MS., f. 455 r. Iqbal Nama, 287. The office of Karori continued to about the end of the Mughal empire. See Elliot and Beams, Races N.W.P., ii, 197—200.
337 Arif, 317-18; Badaoni, ii, 189.
338 'Chak.' For its various meanings, see Wilson's Glossary p. 97, and Elliot's "The Races of N.W.P.", ii, 79.
from free holdings, ascertain the revenue for each of the two seasons, keep a record of various kinds of tenures, and encourage cultivation in a manner as to bring all the arable land under cultivation in the course of three years. These officers were as usual helped by others such as the Amīn, measures of land, Qanungos, Muqaddams and Patwari. The Karoris were appointed by the Central government for the Khalsa land. The jagirdars were also commanded to appoint Karoris for their Jagirs. The Karoris were not allowed to make deductions from the revenue but were paid from the public Treasury. This practice was also probably followed by the Surs and 'Alāu-uddīn, for it is said of them that they paid their officials in cash and not by assignments. This is, however, not certain.

In 1579, another declaration was made abolishing the Jizya and Tamghā "which brought in several crores of dams." It might be that the former orders of 1564 were not literally carried out. Even if they were carried out an announcement was necessary in view of the extension of the Empire, for in some parts of it, such as Gujrāt, the Jizya yet lingered and the Jagirdars also might have tried to levy it.

The data collected and the experience acquired encouraged the government to proceed further with

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341 Tabq. Ak., I.O. f. 308 r, puts it under 26 yen (1581) but says only of Tamgha and Zakat, which yielded a revenue equal to the revenue of Iran.
the reforms. It has already been described that prior to Akbar three types of division had existed. They were the province, the district or division, and the pargana. With regard to the provinces the policy of the early Turks as also of the Afghans was not very clear. Some provinces such as Gujrat, Malwa, Bihar, Bengal, Delhi, Lahore and Multan were practically ready-made and only some modifications were required, but other provinces were not so clearly definable and in their organization the government of Akbar must have felt more difficulties. It is not within the present topic to discuss the growth of Subas; but a close examination of facts suggests that the Subas had been also in the making. Akbar, however, had a clearer idea than his predecessors and realized the importance of provincial governments. It was highly unsatisfactory to supervise the working of the local administration from the Capital of the Empire by the Central government, even when there were rulers like Balban, 'Alāuddin or Sher Shah. For an efficient administration some arrangement, some machinery between the Central government and the district or division was an obvious necessity.

Akbar therefore decided to organize the provinces on a systematic basis. In 1580 the whole empire was divided into 12 Subas—Multan, Lahore, Delhi, Agra, Allahabad, Oudh, Bihar, Bengal, Malwa, Ajmere, Gujrat, and Khandesh. Some of the Subas were yet too big as compared with others, but the importance of a Suba depended not necessarily on its size but on other considerations as well. For example, the Suba of Ajmere and Khandesh, for obvious political reasons
had other problems besides revenue and civil administration to be looked after. Moreover the historical facts were not seriously disturbed. It was on the whole a cautious step that Akbar took.

The idea was to appoint in each province a Sipah Sālār (subadar) a Divān, a Bakhshi; a Mir ‘Adl, a Ṣadr, a Kotwāl, a Mir Bahr and a Vaq‘anavīs. This was probably the ideal plan. All these officials probably were not immediately appointed in every province. For example the Mir ‘Adl and Mir Bahr are rarely heard of among provincial officials. The position of the divān also was not well defined in all provinces. The Sipah Sālār, Divan and Bakhshi and probably the Kotwal also were appointed in several provinces. Besides the divan there is a mention of the Amīn among high provincial officials in Gujrat in 1583. Again in Kabul the offices of Amīn and Ṣadr were combined in one person in 1586. Such instances are however very few and exceptional.

Below the provincial division were the Sarkars. In the Suba of Lahore a Sarkar was called Sawād. In some places below a Sarkar were dastūrs which consisted of several parganas but this was not universal. In Bengal between a Sarkar and a pargana was a division called ‘Jawār.’ For example in the Sarkar of Jannatabad (Lakhnauti) the Jawar of Darsarak had sixteen Mahals, and the Jawar of

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342 A. N., iii, 282; Maas U., i, 654.
343 A. N., iii, 596-97.
344 A. N., iii, Bev., 718; so also in Bengal, Fain Sarhindi, f. 152 v.
345 Ain., 377.
346 As in Orissa for example.
Akra fourteen parganas. This too was, however, not the case with every Sarkar of Bengal.

Another important change that Akbar made in 1580 was the introduction of the dah-sāla rate. This measure was an attempt to remedy the inconvenience caused by the practice of calling periodically returns of produce and prices for fixing dastur ul ‘Amal.\(^{347}\) Whether Akbar introduced the practice of commuting in cash the grain rates of Sher Shah’s ray‘ or whether it already was the practice even earlier there may be some doubt. But there is no doubt that the dah-sāla arrangement was the work of Akbar. It was another experiment to remedy the same evils which the Nasaq system of Shahabuddin had tried to avoid.

The dah-sāla arrangement was intended to supersede the ray‘ of Sher Shah which must have become out of date owing to changes in produce and prices. The produce and prices of the last ten years were collected partly from the government records and partly from other sources, and one-tenth of the total was taken to be the ‘māl’ or revenue of a year. It should not be supposed that henceforward no record of produce or prices was kept. The value of the Dah-sāla arrangement was that it obviated the necessity of collecting such annual returns before settling the annual revenue. With the Dah-sāla rate the government, the Collectors and the people also knew what would be the revenue for a particular year, and

\(^{347}\) Aini, Dahsāla; Jerrett, ii, 38. The translation of Jerrett has been corrected and the text rightly interpreted by Mr. Moreland, vide J.R.A.S., 1918, p. 19. See also A.N., iii, 282; Bev., iii, 413.
consequently the work of collection was expedited and considerably facilitated.

While Akbar was keen to extend the operation of measurement, and realize revenue in cash, he was not uncompromising and over-strict. Like Sher Shah he would respect strong local prejudices and customs. In Sindh ghallabaksh was allowed to continue, in Bengal, Berar and Khandesh the old system was not disturbed. But in the whole country from Bihar almost to Nilâb, Akbar pressed his reforms.

While these reforms were being carried out under the guidance of Shah Mansûr and Todar Mal, mutiny broke out in the Bihar and Bengal armies and soon spread to the eastern part of the United Provinces. Simultaneously with the internal troubles, Mirza Hakîm, ruler of Kabul invaded India. Leaving the internal affairs in the hands of his trusted Officials, Akbar led an army against the Mirza, drove him back and marched right up to Kabul. During his absence from India, Shahbâz Khan undid a considerable part of Akbar’s work in the provinces of Delhi, Agra, Allahabad, Oudh and Bihar. The first two being better organized might not have felt serious changes but the latter three, which were yet growing and not well settled must have been seriously affected. As the mutiny was largely confined to those three provinces Shahbâz Khan for political reasons parcelled them out into jagirs for Officials and Soldiers. Thus a considerable portion of the Khalsa land was again changed into Jagir land. On his

348 The work was largely done by Shah Mansur because Todar Mal was sent to the Eastern provinces. A. N., iii, 282.
return when Akbar questioned him, he replied that it was done to avert mutiny and to inspire confidence.\textsuperscript{340} The Emperor kept silence and let the matter drop for the time. The lesson of the mutiny and the fate of Shah Masur were a warning to the officials who now showed less eagerness to interfere with jagir lands.

Akbar, however, could not let the matter rest there. He found out a remedy to minimize the evils of the jagir system. In 1581-82 he issued an order that the regulations followed in the Khalsa lands should also hold good in the jagir lands.\textsuperscript{350} The dastur ul 'Amal was made binding on the jagirdars. This measure was of great importance for while it allowed the jagir system to continue it prevented the jagirdars from administering their jagirs as they liked. This compromise was a very valuable contribution of Akbar to the solution of a serious problem of long standing. As the jagirdars, before this order, had been commanded to employ Karoris in their jagirs the machinery was there ready to adopt and carry on the methods of Khalsa. By this means Akbar endeavoured to introduce a sort of uniformity in local revenue administration as far as could be practicable.

It seems that the jagirdars immediately objected to the extension of reforms in jagirs and pointed out that unless they were entrusted with extraordinary

\textsuperscript{340} Badaoni, ii, 296; Lowe, pp. 304-06. A.K.N. passes over this matter without notice. Shahbaz was shortly after put in prison.

\textsuperscript{350} A. N., iii, 381; A. N. Bev., iii, 561.
powers the refractory people at least of the hilly tracts would defy them and not pay the revenue. There was some point in their contention. Akbar met them by assuring them that should a situation of that kind arise the State would undertake to force the people to pay the revenue, and would compensate the jagirdars for the damage done to their jagir by the military operations of the faujdārs. 351

As the administration in the Khalsa land was to serve as a model of method, Akbar gave more attention to it. In 1582, Akbar issued another order to survey the land capable of cultivation in the Khalsa. The object probably was to prevent the decline of, and, if possible, extend further cultivation, and also to raise the idle land and the land not sown before gradually to the level of polaj land. For these classes of land the Collectors were instructed to begin with a low assessment and then raise it year by year according to the capacity of the ra'yat, 352 and a scale was laid down for their guidance. Moreover the Collectors were permitted to grant loans to poor peasants on

351 I have followed the reading of the Roy. As. Soc. MS of the Ain, which has 'ba' instead of 'ya' between the words 'barzgar' and 'Amalguzar of the Bib. Ind. text (15, p. 283). Jarrett, p. 40, has followed the Bib. Ind. I think the reading of R.A.S. MS. gives a better and reasonable meaning. For compensation to Jagirdars, see A. N. iii, 382. The passage of A. N. like other passages is somewhat obscure. Mr. Beveridge has translated it better (iii, 564) than Mr. Dowson (E.D., vi, 64) The latter is sometimes misleading.

352 A. N., iii, 381-82. The precise significance of the passages is not clear. I have ventured to interpret them as best I could. Some more changes in these reforms were made between 1582-95 and they can be seen by comparing the passages of A. N. and Ain, ii, Jarrett, 67. They, however, do not introduce any new principle.
taking two securities. These advances were not confined to times of serious famines, but were given at any time to enable them to cultivate the land.

The Collectors were ordered to make tours in their district to see personally the condition of cultivation. They were also instructed to accept even old coins according to their weight. In case of land suffering from inundations a deduction of 12.5 per cent per bigha was made and in case of sandy tracts and jungles that of 15 per cent was allowed. 553

A new scale of remuneration different from the previous one was fixed for the Staff employed for measurement of the land. These measurers went about measuring the fields when the crops were standing and noted down not only the area but also the kind and quality of cultivation.

The Central government kept itself in touch with the local work through the Siahai Zābita (Record of measurement etc.,) which was dispatched to it weekly. Besides this a monthly journal of daily collection was sent by the 'Amalguzār (Collector). Damage sustained by the land was also duly communicated to the Central government.

The Khalsa work was entirely separated from other kinds of work, such as Sayurghāl and Jagirs. This step was likely to facilitate the work of the Khalsa department and introduce more efficiency in its working.

In 1584, Akbar introduced the Solar era for official calculations. It was called the Ilāhi era and

553 A. N. Bev., iii, 598-99.
came to be known as fasli era.\textsuperscript{354} Its introduction was advantageous to the cultivators in the long run, and simplified the record of the government. The multiplicity of numerous provincial eras must have caused much inconvenience in keeping uniform records. The lunar era that was officially recognized before Akbar was not satisfactory in so far as it was unfair to the peasant. Every lunar year, roughly speaking, is less by ten or eleven days than the solar one; and consequently thirty solar years were equal to thirty-one lunar years.\textsuperscript{355} It is obvious that the agriculturalist sows his seed and reaps his harvest under the influence of the sun and not by lunar movements. This fact was realized by Muslim rulers like Khalifa Muatazid, Malik Shah, and Ghazan Khan, and they had turned to solar calculation. In the days of the early Turkish rulers the solar era was followed in some parts of the Empire. For example in Malwa it continued up to the middle of the fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{356} The Ilahi era was therefore a blessing to the revenue payer.

During the next two years (1583-84) numerous defects and grievances were brought to the notice of Akbar. The grievances came from all sides—the Central revenue department, the local officials, and the people. In 1585, therefore, the Emperor appointed a Commission of two men—Fathullah Shirazi and

\textsuperscript{354} Dastur ul Amal, Patna, Or. Lib. f. 45. R.A. Soc. f. 29 v. 30. r.

\textsuperscript{355} Ain., Jarrett, 29.

\textsuperscript{356} Ferishta, Briggs, iv, 230.
Todar Mal—to investigate the whole matter and submit their recommendations. Both these men were of high ability and unquestionable integrity and did the work honestly.

The inquiries of the Commission led to startling revelations. It was found that the reforms were not carried out in a proper spirit either by the officials of the Central or the local government, and consequently the advantages that were expected to follow them did not become visible. The Officials, trained and brought up in the old atmosphere probably had not been able to enter into the spirit of the reforms. The Officials of the Central government took.a mere mechanical view of them, while the local officials were reluctant to abandon their corruption and highhandedness. In fairness to the local officials (‘Amalguzār) the Commission frankly recognized that their grievances were just; yet they did not fail to find out that they had shown lack of zeal and neglect of supervision. Their failures to exercise due supervision and control had made the Gumāshtas (Agents of Collectors) too high-handed and reckless.397

The Commissioners categorically pointed out the grievances of the Cultivators and Officials. The Cultivators had two chief grievances. Firstly the Āmārah Navis398 (Accountant) had based his figures on mere conjectures and approximations without investigating properly into the matter as was required by the new regulations. They had taken the figures

397 A. N., iii, 45—47.
398 R.A.S. MS. No. 118 has ‘Ayāra navis’; Bev., iii, 687, translates it as ‘Accountants.’
of arrears shown by the officers appointed to bring the land under the Exchequer\textsuperscript{359} as gospel truth, without realising that those figures were highly inflated and inaccurate.\textsuperscript{360} Those figures they dangled before the much embarrassed ra‘yat to serve their own purpose. The second defect was that those who collected revenue (Māl sitānandgān) gave no receipts (yāfta) for the payments received by them, nor did they keep a proper table (sīhrist) of the receipts. The obvious reason, as the Commissioners pointed out, was to defraud the government and misappropriate the revenue.\textsuperscript{361} Absence of receipts was also responsible for the misunderstandings and errors of the accounts department.

The grievances of the ‘Āmils were also pointed out. First, they were required to collect the revenue according to the figures of the standard year or Karorbandi\textsuperscript{362} which were admittedly unreliable. Second, their reports regarding damages to the crops went unheeded. And when they failed to realize the amount shown in the Karorbandi they were treated harshly and thrown into prison. They were thus compelled to rack-rent the people or show figures which were far removed from reality. Third: It was a practice that one-fourth of the salary of ‘Āmils was withheld by the Mustausi pending the payment of the

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{359}] It might be referring to 1575.
\item[\textsuperscript{360}] The implication of the phrase “panjum va Shashum bakhsh faisal dadand” (A. K., iii, 457) is not quite clear to me.
\item[\textsuperscript{361}] A. N., iii, 457.
\item[\textsuperscript{362}] The text has “bar sāl i Kāmil . . . . ya ba nuskhai Karorbandi.”
\end{itemize}
final instalment of the revenue. That was unjust if the default were due to causes beyond their control. Fourth: If the pressure of work required the services of an additional staff for a period longer than that for which the Central authorities permitted their appointment, the Collectors had to pay them from their own pocket. Very often the salaries of the auxiliaries were made payable from the arrears that could not be realized. The Collectors were thus driven to realize the arrears by fair means or foul, and failing that they had to pay the auxiliaries themselves. Fifth: the salary of a Collector was suspended from the very day the order for his transfer or recall to the Court was issued. No pay was given for the period intervening between the relinquishment of one charge and taking over of the other. Nor was he given any pay for the period of the collection of arrears or travelling to the Court. Lastly, the reports of the Collector were often pigeon-holed or misplaced and they were punished for not sending them.

After considering these grievances and defects, the Commissioners made some definite recommendations which were accepted by Akbar and put into force. The Collectors were instructed not to accept as immutable the figures shown by previous Collectors but to examine them and come to their own conclusion. They were required to give receipts for every payment made by the Cultivator to the Treasury. The patwaris\textsuperscript{363} were also required to file the receipts and

\textsuperscript{363} In the Suba of Berar, the term for Chaudhari was 'deshmukh'; for Qanungo 'deshpande'; for Muqaddam, 'patel'; and for patwari 'Kulkarni.' Ain., 476.
vouchers (Kāghazi Khām) with the Qarari Vāqʿa, and the Collectors were to examine them. If it were found that the subordinate staff had shown less than the actual realisation they should be called to account and compelled to pay the deficit. If on the other hand any excess in realisation were discovered it should either go towards the payment of the arrears or be debited in favour of the raʿyat for the next year.\textsuperscript{364}

To remove the grievances of the collectors it was decided to place under them additional footmen to enable them to realise the revenue properly. In cases of clear necessity they were to be allowed additional expenditure. If the arrears were not due to their neglect no part of their salary was to be withheld. If, however, in case of their negligence any part of their salary were withheld it should be shown in the registers as balance of pay "baqāyatānjih." The collectors should also receive their salary for the period of either the collection of arrears or travelling to the Court. During their stay at the Court they should receive the salary from the Kashak (guards) establishment. Regarding their reports it was ordered that the higher officials should not arrest any collector if he informed them that reports had been sent to the Emperor, but no order had been received. The work of receiving reports and issuing orders on them was transferred to the department of Vaqʿanavis.

\textsuperscript{364} A. N., iii, 458. is obscure. I have tentatively adopted the rendering of Mr. Beveridge, iii, 620; but I must confess that I do not yet feel quite satisfied. The word 'vajh' is obscure there.
These reforms were calculated to improve the methods of revenue collection, increase supervision and remove some patent grievances of the cultivators. So long as the central government had to do the whole work of direct supervision the results could not be very satisfactory, for it is obvious that proper supervision from the Capital by an overworked department could not be practicable. The death of Raja Todar Mal forced the attention of Akbar to that question. In 1592 the whole of the Khalsa land was divided into four circles each of which was placed under the charge of one man.\textsuperscript{365} The Punjab, Multan, Kabul, Kashmir formed one circle; Ajmer, Gujrat, Malva, another; Agra, Allahabad, Bengal and Bihar the third; and Delhi province was a circle by itself. The heads of these circles probably worked under the general direction of the Vazir. The scheme was not quite satisfactory, hence in 1595 it was superseded by another arrangement based on the principle of one Vazir for one province.\textsuperscript{366} This was the extension of the idea of 1580. These new provincial Vazirs (12 in number) worked under the general direction of the great Vazir Shamsuddin, but were directly responsible to the Emperor also. This reform was of far reaching consequence and conducive to efficiency.

Like the Sultans of Delhi Akbar relied mostly on the land tax. Other kinds of taxes such as jizya, Khams, Zakāt sanctioned by the Muslim law appear to be gradually disappearing owing to many circum-

\textsuperscript{365} A. N., iii, 605-06.
\textsuperscript{366} A. N., iii, 670.
stances. As the secular element of the State predominated over the religious, taxation also became more and more free from religious connexion. Besides other considerations the difficulties of realizing religious taxes, owing to their complexities and exceptions, contributed to their gradual abandonment by the State. In the early days of the Muslim Sultanat the religious taxes received some favour and they continued to linger on in some form or the other up to the days of Firoz. After him they began to lose ground till by the time of Akbar they practically disappeared.

The abolition of Jizya\(^\text{367}\) has already been mentioned. Next came the turn of Zakāt. It has been pointed out that Alāuddin had abolished Zakāt on cattle and Sikandar Lodi on grain. Akbar carried the matter further. He abolished Zakāt\(^\text{368}\) on all articles that he considered as necessaries of common life. Such articles were grain, sugar, sugar-candy, salt, oils, perfumes, woollen goods, cotton, leather goods, wood, grass, reeds, utensils, etc. Taxes on horses, elephants, camels, goats, sheep, arms, and silk, continued as before.\(^\text{369}\) The Mohammadan law itself draws distinction between necessaries of life and other things in the matter of taxation but Akbar

\(^{367}\) Jizya was also abolished for Christians. Father Hosten. J.A.S.B. 1910, p. 452.

\(^{368}\) For tricks played to evade Zakat even by such pious men as Abdulla Sultanpuri, see Badaoni, Lowe, 203.

\(^{369}\) Muntakhibati Abul Fazl, pp. 87—89. Faizi Sarhindi, f. 150r, gives 987 A.H. (1579-80).

See also 'Ain, p. 284; Jarrett, ii, 42. Blochman, 215. Also Ain., 301; Jarrett, ii, 66.
went much further than that by including in the list of exemptions several things which were taxed by the law. Another feature in regard to Zakāt is that probably it gradually lost its religious significance and became an ordinary tax not confined to Muslims only. The evidence is not quite decisive but that seems to have been the general tendency. It need not be supposed that Zakāt had disappeared completely from all parts of the empire. The Ain mentions the levying of Zakāt in some parts of Bengal e.g., in the Sarkars of Tajpur, Ghoraghat, Sonargaon, Fathabad, Chittagong, Cuttak; and at Jhālawar in Gujrat and from rock salts in the Suba of Lahore. It might be that foreign trade and some exceptional cases were responsible for the continuance of Zakat in some parts of the empire.

Like Firoz Tughlaq Akbar also tried to abolish numerous Abwāhs or cesses commonly included in Sāir Jihāt. The list of such cesses has been given in the Ain. It is probable that Akbar might have gained more success than Firoz because the provincial administrative machinery in his time was better organized. But the cases of bāj and Tamgha

370 Sher Shah also levied Zakat only on the frontiers and the place of sale. Abbas Kh. Or. 164, f. 73r. 1782 f. 91v.
371 For the list of such miscellaneous imposts see Ain., 301; Jarrett, 66-67.
372 The precise definition of bāj is not given by the historians. The editor of Rahatussadar thinks it is a tribute taken by the rulers from the protected Muluks (princes) (Gibb Mem, p. 502n).
373 Tamgha is also an obscure word but see Jarrett, ii, 57 and n. 367, Elliot and Beams, ii, 9, 6 seq. A. F. says "In every kingdom government taxes the property of the
clearly suggest that he could not have succeeded as much as he liked, and some of the cesses at least continued to linger on.

While it is true that the orders of the emperor abolishing such taxes were not literally carried out, it cannot be argued that Akbar satisfied himself by a simple expression of pious wishes. The Kotwal was instructed to see that those taxes that had been declared illegal were not realised.\(^{374}\) His solicitude is also clear from the fact that he repeatedly issued proclamations abolishing Bāj and Tamgha,\(^{375}\) and twice he appointed commissioners to inquire into the matter, punish the offenders and stop the evil.\(^{376}\) It is quite likely that these measures minimised the corruption, considerably.

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The study of the tendencies of the policy of the Vizārat during the Muslim rule is beset with difficulties. The use of technical terms of which the precise significance is yet to be discovered is not the only difficulty. The terms have been used loosely and the passages are usually obscure. The texts of the

subject over and above the land revenue and this they call ‘tamgha,’ see also Memoirs of Bahar, Bev., 553.

\(^{374}\) Ain., Jarrett, 42.

\(^{375}\) A. N., Bev., ii, 33. 'Arif Q. Zubdat T. f. 201v. has Zakāt va-tamgha A. N., iii, 437, see also A. N. Bev., iii, 438 and n.

\(^{376}\) A. N., iii, 670, 801.
Persian histories are corrupt, doubtful and occasionally so different that an implicit reliance on one or two manuscripts is not possible.

Nevertheless it is possible to follow, even though in a faltering way, the general trend of policy and to visualise some of its main tendencies. In the early days of the Muslim rule the central government did not take much direct interest in the revenue procedure. Since the days of Balban it began to extend its control and supervision, and that process continued throughout the Khilji and the early Tughlaq periods. It was during that time that almost all the essentials of a revenue policy were evolved. After a period of unsettled condition the thread was again taken up by the Afghans, particularly the Surs. The heritage left by the past was well utilised by Akbar and in his time the control of the central government extended to the minutest details of the Khalsa and Sayurghāl lands. Even the Jāgir lands felt the pressure of the imperial policy of extending control of the central government.

Another important tendency was the change of outlook. At first the Muslim rulers attached considerable importance to the Sharī point of view. But the difficulties of following the Sharī came to be realised definitely by the time of Jalāluddin Khilji. It was ʿAlāʾuddin who clearly conceived the idea of separating secular from religious considerations. From his time, in spite of the wishes of some of the most religious-minded Sultanas, the secular tendency

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377 I propose to treat of the growth of Sayurghāl policy in a subsequent study.
continued to grow and the religious viewpoint began to wear out. The State considerations gradually became the decisive factor in revenue policy and finance. During the Sur period little stress was laid on religious factors. The process found its culmination in Akbar. It was but natural that the religious background, occasional religious impulses, and echoes of the past should continue to influence to some extent the growth of the imperial policy but they were no longer allowed to dictate and dominate it.

Neither the Afghans nor the Mughals seem to have introduced any new method of revenue collection. Nevertheless in their time some important changes took place. The farming of the revenue system as prevailed in the days of the Tughlaqs was never heard of again either in the time of the Afghans or of Akbar. The system of the division of crops seems to have received more favour in the days of the early Sultanat. Ever since the time of 'Ala'uddin Khilji the State showed a desire to levy the revenue in cash or kind on the basis of actual measurement of land. Their desire was not so well realised till the time of Sher Shah who is credited with having abolished the system of the division of crops in Hindustan and laying more emphasis on measurement. It was Sher Shah who carried the policy of 'Ala'uddin and Muhammad Tughlaq further and although the previous systems did not die out yet the division of crops came to be regarded as an exception rather than a rule.

Up to the days of the Surs revenue assessment was in terms of grain, as the ray' of Sher Shah, which
was followed even in the first half of Akbar's reign, suggests. Akbar however introduced the dahsāla arrangement and made the realization of revenue in cash a general rule. Although even in his time the old systems lingered on here and there but it was his well considered policy to rely on measurement and collect revenue in cash.

In the machinery of the local administration no serious changes seem to have taken place. The Surs no doubt tried to introduce efficiency but in the absence of any good supervising machinery their success seems to be doubtful. Unlike the Afghans—Lodis or Surs—the early Turkish Sultans, and Akbar, gave more thought and attention to the organisation of the machinery of the central government. Akbar did the greatest service in that direction. He made the machinery of the central government more workable and efficient than it had ever been before. But his greatest contribution was the creation of systematic provincial governments of a new type more efficient and rational than those of the early Turks. In this respect Akbar stands higher than any ruler of Delhi before him including 'Alauddin and Sher Shah. While it is true that Akbar owed much to the work done by the Muslim rulers before him yet his own contribution to the policy, machinery and efficiency of the Vizarat department was far greater than that of any of his predecessors.

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APPENDIX A

Muslim Theory of Taxation

Like the theory of sovereignty the theory of taxation and finance was developed by the jurists of Islam with great ingenuity and minuteness. From the very beginning of its history the Islamic Law of taxation was based on reason and on actual facts. The Byzantine and Persian practices and the prevailing customs were taken as the bases and then the principles of Muslim theory were applied to them to bring them as far as practicable in line with the ideas of Islam. This process began consciously with the second Caliph Omar, and continued down to the days of the Abbasid Khalifas. By the second and third century of Hijra enormous literature sprang up on different aspects of Muslim Law including finance and taxation, and it began to show a tendency towards rigidity. Although the sources of inspiration of the Muslim jurists were more or less the same yet there was a great divergence of opinion between them on some important matters. The Hanbali and Mālikī laws are substantially different from the Shāfī'ī and Hanafī. The latter, however, agree on very many points and have been largely followed by the Muslims of Central and Eastern Asia.

In India the Hanafī School predominated right through the Muslim period, and, without any break, was the State religion. It is therefore necessary for a full appreciation of the theory and practices of the Sultans of Delhi to grasp the broad principles of taxation as propounded by the Hanafītes.
Broadly speaking the Muslim jurists divide the sources of revenue under two heads—Fa’y and Zakāt. Fa’y might be styled as the secular source and Zakāt as the religious one. Fa’y is divided into three big sub-heads: Khams, Jizya and Khirāj. Zakāt might also be divided into taxes on flocks and herds, commercial capital, gold and silver, and agricultural produce. Under these six sub-heads were included practically all things which were subject to Shar‘i taxation. Fa’y is comparatively more simple and clear than the Zakāt.

Khams literally means one-fifth. Under the sanction of Khams the State was entitled to one-fifth of the booty acquired by the Muslim soldiers, or of any mine or treasure trove discovered by a man or body of men. If, however, booty came or treasure was discovered without anybody’s efforts the law of one-fifth did not apply and the whole benefit went to the Muslims at large.

The Jizya was levied from the non-Muslims1 “in return for which they received protection of life and property and exemption from military service.”2 This was the original idea. Later on when for numerous causes a wave of fanaticism overtook the Muslims further reasons for imposing Jizya were also

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1 A concise but lucid account of Jizya is in Sulukulmulk, f. 165 seq.
2 Cambridge Medieval Hist., IV, p. 287. Aghnides, pp. 399, 528. It partly served the purpose of what “host tax” was in France, “Common penny” in Germany, and the “Victual money” or “Scutage” in England. It, however, fell on non-Muslims only and not on the people as such.
adduced. One of them was the punishment of the infidels for their unbelief. This was indeed an expression of opinion rather than principle and need not be taken seriously. Nevertheless this additional argument in favour of Jizya gave the tax a bad odour and led to misunderstanding. Both Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf\(^3\) permit imposition of Jizya on the non-Muslims even if they be idolators. It is only the most bigotted and fanatically inclined later jurists who hold that the idolators do not come within the operation of Jizya,\(^4\) and the only alternatives for them are either conversion or death. As far as India was concerned this extreme view was not adopted by any Muslim ruler. It was relegated to oblivion and had no more than academical interest. Among those who allow Jizya there is a difference of opinion regarding the way in which it should be levied. For example Abu Hanifa would like the dhimmi to come and personally pay it in a formal manner to the collector. His two disciples Abu Yusuf\(^5\) and Muhammad\(^6\) would not insist on personal payment, but would allow payment by proxy. Again Abu Yusuf and Imam Ghizali would not recommend the use of corporal punishment and violence in collecting Jizya. Imam Nuri openly declared that degradation and humiliation is wrong and is the invention of the faqih of

\(^3\) Fagnan, pp. 101, 198.

\(^4\) For example Baizavi and Sha' rani, see Fagnan, loc. cit. n. According to Hedaya Shaf'i also excludes the idolators from the concession. Hamilton, ii, 211.

\(^5\) Prof. Becker in Ency. of Islam, p.

\(^6\) Agnides.
Khurasan. Ghizali also held that the use of oppression and violence makes Jizya unlawful (harām). The Jizya was thus a sort of "Scutage" and the original intention of Islam was not stretched further.

Jizya was not imposed recklessly on all non-Muslims. It was not levied on women, children, illiterates, decrepits, lunatics, slaves and men without property. Abu Yusuf even exempted the monks and priests, though Abu Hanīfa would tax them provided they were capable of doing work. Abu Yusuf would also exempt the old and men without any employment.

Those who came within the operation of the Jizya tax were classed under three heads: the rich, the middle class and the poor. There is naturally a difference among jurists in defining each of these classes. Some suggest that the rich are those who possess ten thousand dirhams or more, the poor are those who have less than two hundred dirhams, and in between these two are the middle class men. Abu Yusuf, however, gives an interesting definition of the poor. According to him the poor are "labourer on exerçant un métier manuel." From the rich classes 48 dirhams were taken, from the middle 24 and from the poor 12 annually.

The levying of Jizya has been regarded by most of the Sunni Jurists as an important duty as it was

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7 Sulukulmuluk, f. 167r. Though the author of Sulukulmuluk takes a slightly different view.
8 See also Mawardi in Aghnides, 398.
9 Fagnan.
10 Al Tahavi in Aghnides, 403.
11 Fagnan, i, 187.
believed to be one of the most lawful taxes. But Abu Yusuf is not so uncompromising and holds that should an expediency arise Jizya might be taken not as Jizya but under a different name, as was the case with Bani Taghib in the time of Omar. According to him ‘aqd-i-dhimmat is not compulsory (Wājib) but is lawful (Jāiz) for the Imam.12

Last, but not the least, came the Kharāj or the land tax. The Muslim jurists built their theories on the precedents set up by Omar. Recent investigations go to prove that the taxes that the conquered original inhabitants paid to the Arabs “were much the same as they had been accustomed to pay to the former governments.”13 However, in the time of Omar two systems of assessment were well known. The assessment was made either in proportion to the produce of the land, or according to the area cultivated. For fixing the area there was the system of measurement by Jarib. But in settling the quality of the land the jurists have suggested three ways: the kind of crop with reference to its price; the method of irrigation followed;14 and where payments in cash were made the distance of cultivated tract from cities and markets was also taken into consideration.

Where the division of crop was adopted the scale of tax ranged between one-half to one-fifth. It was

12 Sulukulmulk, f. 165v. If the dhimmi refuses to pay Jizya he does not lose his rights as a dhimmi according to some jurists. But Shāf‘i says he does forfeit his rights. See Aghnides, 359.
specifically laid down by jurists that in no case should the Kharāj exceed one-half although Muḥammad Ibn ul Hasan permitted increment should the land be capable of bearing the burden. Should it be necessary the jurists permit reduction of the tax to less than one-fifth. In the case of the total failure of crops owing to natural calamities the Kharāj automatically lapses, but no exemption is urged for partial failures. The Kharāj Muqāsama (division of crop) is due whenever the crop is ready. It might be more than once a year. But in the system of cash payment the tax is levied only once a year. The scales of cash payment varied from one to five dirhams according to the class of produce. Shāfʿī raised it to two to eight dirhams. Others, however, strike a mean between the two.

Originally the Muslims were exempted from the payment of land tax. Owing to large conversion the system broke down and even the early Muslims were forced to levy land tax from the Muslims as well. By the time of the classical jurists Kharāj was considered due from both the Muslims and non-Muslims. They made no distinction in the matter of Kharāj either of religion, sex, age or freedom. Whosoever owned the Kharāj land was liable to pay the tax whether he cultivated it or not. Mawardi, however, suggests that if the land were not cultivated the lowest assessment should be demanded.

The Muslim law did not favour ejectments from holdings. Not that it completely rejected or declared it unlawful, but it was very reluctant in adopting it. It could be adopted when every other method had
been tried and failed. If the landholder was unable to pay the revenue for want of means to cultivate his land, the state was to advance him loans to provide himself with necessary implements and means of cultivation. As an alternative to this the land might be let out to someone else for the time the original holder was unable to pay. The State might also cultivate it from public funds. When the original holder was in a position or was willing to pay the revenue his land was to be restored back to him. If, however, it were found inevitable to sell the land to somebody else then the State was to deduct from the sale price its lawful dues and make over the balance to the owner.

The Muslim jurists were well aware of the farming system. Abu Yusuf gives full and convincing reasons why he disapproved of farming as such.\(^{15}\) With great reluctance would he allow it even when the demand was made by the tax payers of the locality concerned and the Imam was satisfied that it would be conducive to the welfare of those people.

The other general source of revenue was Sadaqa or Zakāt. Mawardi and Shāf‘i make no difference between Sadaqa or Zakāt. But according to other writers every Zakāt is Sadaqa and not vice versa. Only that Sadaqa which is obligatory (farz) is Zakāt in the strict sense of the term.\(^{16}\) It is clear that it is primarily a religious tax. Strictly speaking Zakāt cannot be collected by force for it is an obligation

\(^{15}\) Fagnan, i, 159—62.

\(^{16}\) Abu Hanifa.
between God and the individual. Its validity lies in the voluntary free will of the individual while compulsion vitiates its character. It is one of the five chief obligations of the Muslim faith. Another important point is that Zakāt is not subject to audit.

As Zakāt was a religious tax minute regulations have been laid down for it. The first important condition is that Zakāt cannot be valid unless the payee is in a position to understand its significance or possess free property. This qualification automatically exempted infants, slaves, lunatics, debtors, insolvents and the non-Muslims. Although the Shafites would not forego the Sadaqa after the death of the owner, the Hanifites regard it to have lapsed.

Another important qualification is that the property on which Zakāt is levied should not be below the nisāb or taxable minimum. The jurists have fixed nisāb for different kinds of property. No Zakāt was charged on the primary necessaries of life. The jurists have indicated the primary necessaries by mentioning such things as dwelling houses, clothes, utensils, slaves employed as servants, riding and draught animals or those used for ploughing, foodstuffs required for the consumption of the family, books, tools and implements, and decorative articles provided they were not made of gold and silver. In fixing the nisāb the Muslim jurists have shown much liberality and good sense.

In collecting the Sadaqa tax a difference was made between the apparent and non-apparent pro-

17 Aghnides, p. 297.
On non-apparent property the owner was left to pay whatever he thought he should without being questioned. But the property which was exposed to public view and therefore apparent had to pay the prescribed rate.

All animals were not taxed. The tax was imposed on camels, bulls, cows and buffaloes, sheep and goats. Opinion is divided on the tax on horses. Abu Hanifa makes it voluntary but Abu Yusuf and Shafi'i exempt them completely. Mules and donkeys pay taxes only when intended for sale. For camels the nisab was fixed at five, for bulls, cows and buffaloes at thirty heads and sheep and goat at forty. The tax is indicated in kind but Hanifa would allow even cash payments. For gold the nisab was twenty misqaels and for silver two hundred dirhams. The articles of trade were not normally taxed if their value was less than forty dirhams and in some cases less than two hundred dirhams.

From the time of Caliph Usman.

Apparent property included animals and agricultural produce; while the non-apparent implied gold, silver and articles of trade.

Hedaya, i, p. 10.


Hanifa would tax the merchandise of the dhimmis as imposts at double the Zakat fixed for Muslims, provided the nisab was of the value of fifty dirhams; Hedaya, i, 33-34.
Tithe was also an important sub-head of the Sadaqa tax. Opinions are divided as to whether tithe was levied on the actual produce of the land or the actual productivity of the soil. Hanifa was personally in favour of the latter though other thinkers of his school do not wholly agree with him. Tithe is distinguished from Kharaj in two respects. First, Kharaj is definitely fixed on the potential productivity of the soil while the tithe was a tax on the actual produce and was levied only from the Muslims, being a religious ‘farz.’ Secondly, tithe required the condition of nisab or taxable minimum which was not necessary in the case of Kharaj. Moreover, tithe was realised and expended by the State according to the rules of Sadaqa tax which were different from those of the Kharaj. The special feature of tithe is that it does not exempt minors, lunatics, and waqfs from payments.

The articles on which tithe is levied are specifically mentioned by the jurists. They are wheat, barley, rice, millet, lentils, maize, beans, peas and the species of their genus. Some jurists included olive saffron and honey. The Mālikites add sesame and such other oil-producing stuffs. With regard to vegetables Hanifa proposes tax irrespective of nisāb but Abu Yusuf and Muhammad insist on it. Among the exemptions from this tax might be mentioned habitations, cemeteries, salt, silkworms, and

26 In the case of vegetables and fruits that cannot be preserved for one year Abu Hanifa advises tax without the condition of nisāb, vide Hedaya, i, 47.
27 Aghnides, 290.
according to Shāfʿi, silk also. Such articles as firewood and herbage that grow spontaneously were also exempted.

The general rule governing the tithe rate is that lands irrigated by rain or running water, and wild fruits pay one-tenth, while crops watered by artificial means of irrigation pay half of that rate. In either case the tax is on gross produce. Unlike Abu Hanīfa, Abu Yusuf exempts from tax such quantity as is necessary for the use of the producer and his family.

According to Hanīfa tithe is levied only from the produce of tithe-lands and not from that of Kharāj land. Both taxes cannot be levied together. But Shāfʿi does not accept this view and holds that both taxes might be levied simultaneously on the same land.

It will be irrelevant to mention in this connection that later jurists describe another class of land different from either the Kharāj or tithe lands. This class of land they call Mumlakat or Amīriyah. Under it came those territories which were conquered by force or treaty, but were not left in the possession of their original proprietors, and were made the property of the public treasury. The owners of such lands were then regarded as mere tenants and paid tithe on the produce. These tenants ipso facto forfeited their tenancy right if they failed to cultivate their land for three years, though they were not permanently disqualified to hold it again. They could bequeath their holdings to their descendants but could not sell or make gifts or waqfs or transfer tenancy rights without the permission of the Sultan.

Aghnides, 375-76.
APPENDIX B

A Disputed Passage from Barani

The passages in Ziauddin Barani dealing with land revenue and reforms are at places very obscure. His style and use of peculiar terminology are sometimes difficult to understand. For example words like Khot and Balāhar and Vafā are as difficult to comprehend as phrases like 'bar na rawand' (p. 429) 'Nimdah Yāzdah' etc. These are just a few specimens of the difficulties.

The most perplexing word, however, is 'Vafā.' At pages 287 and 299 it occurs in a phrase 'Ba hukmi Masāhat va Vafā i bisva.' The I.O. MS. of Zia's Firozshahi has two dots under (بیسوا). The word therefore might be read either as bisva or basiva (f 187r. v.) but the word Vafā is clear. Mr. Moreland who has been kind enough to discuss the phrase with me is inclined to consider "Vafai bisva" as merely a reduplication of hukmi Masāhat. He is supported by the distinguished linguist Mr. Dewhurst of Oxford. Ferishta (i. 347) and Tabaqāt Akbari have tried to paraphrase Zia. They dropped the word Vafā entirely which, according to Mr. Moreland, shows that they considered the word Vafā redundant, and thought that Hukmi Masāhat was sufficient. Mr. Moreland has other general considerations to support the view that 'Vafā i bisva' does not introduce another idea.

The failure of Ferishta to take notice of the phrase 'Vafā i bisva' might have been due to his inability to understand its precise significance. The
author of Mubārak Shāhi uses the word in a different context "Kisht ha mi paimudand va vafāhā farmāni bustand" (Br. M. 5318 f. 34r.). In this passage the phrase "Vafāhā farmāni bustand" appears to me to convey something different from the phrase "Kisht ha mi paimudand." I cannot say with absolute certainty what it really connotes but I just suspect that it has something to do with the "productivity" or "ability" of the soil. This suggestion came to my mind from the following passage in Suluk ul muluk: "Gāhi ki zamīn tāqat ān vazīfa nadāshtā bāshad baānki ribh ū Kam bāshad pas naqṣ bāyad kard tā bidān ki tāqati zamīn bidān vafā kunad." (f. 98r.). In this connection I might also point out that Muslim law does show consideration to the productivity or ability of the land to sustain the burden of assessment in cash.

I must confess that the significance of "vafā" in Zia and Mubārak Shāhi is yet far from settled. The use of this word by Shams Sirāj 'afīf (Bib. Ind., p. 180) is in a general sense and does not appear to me to possess any technical significance. However, Mr. Moreland and myself are in complete agreement that Dowson's (E.D., iii. 182, 188) rendering of the passage is not to be relied upon. For the present I leave the question without discussing other general considerations favouring or contradicting my suggestion.
APPENDIX C

Sher Shah’s Administration

According to the Elliot text\(^1\) of the Vāqʿāti Mushtāqi which has been translated partly in Elliot & Dowson’s monumental work Sher Shah is said to have appointed in each pargana, one Shiqdār, one munisif, one Khazānadār, one munisifi khazāna, one Persian and one Hindi scribe. But according to the other and probably older text\(^2\) he appointed only one Shiqdār, one Munsif and one Kārkun in every pargana. There is no mention of the Khazānadār, munisifi khazāna, or two scribes. Daūdi substantially supports the reading of the Elliot text but one of the manuscripts\(^3\) reads Mushrif instead of Munsif. Abbas Khan does not mention the existence of munisif in each pargana.\(^4\) But he adds another official called Qānugo in every pargana who informed the government of the past, present and future condition of it.\(^5\)

Similar confusion is found regarding the number of parganas. Abbas Khan says that there were 113000 parganas\(^6\) and his statement is supported

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\(^1\) Br. M., 1929, p. 98.

\(^2\) Br. M., 11633 f. 49r.

\(^3\) Br. M. Or. 197, f. 79v. Elliot and Dowson have translated from other MS. 1701, f. 115r. None of them, however, mentions munisifi khazāna.

\(^4\) Br. M. Or. 164, f. 69r. I.O. Ethe 218, f. 106v. Instead of Munsif Abbas has Amin. In another context he says that the Amins were sent to assess the damage done to crops during the march of the Army and give the cultivators compensation. MS. (a), f. 73v.

\(^5\) Op. cit., f. 69r, v; 1782 f. 41r 86r.

\(^6\) Op. cit., 164 f. 74v. 75r; 1782 f. 94r.
by the Elliot manuscript of Daūdi.\textsuperscript{7} The Vāqʿāti Mushtāqi also supports the figure given above.\textsuperscript{8} But from both the other manuscripts of Daūdi\textsuperscript{9} it appears that this figure was neither of the villages nor of the parganas but of the sawārs in all the parganas of the Khalsa land! A modern writer on the other hand holds that the figure given (of the parganas) should be considered that of the villages (dih).\textsuperscript{10}

There are other difficulties also, but what has been shown here is sufficient to prove the confusion and uncertainty that surrounds the problem. This much, however, appears clear that whatever be the size of a pargana almost all the authorities agree in mentioning the appointment of officials for its administration. It would be absurd to identify parganas with villages for in that case in each pargana there would be as many as five officials appointed. Their total number would reach to 565,000. Then again these officials were over and above the two permanent semi-officials of the village—, the Muqaddam and the Patwari. If they are also included each pargana would have seven administrative hands, and their total strength in all the parganas would be about 800,000! The supposition that the pargana of the Persian writers was equal to a village will create a preposterous army of officials which only credulity could complacently admit. More probable, but by no means positive, would be the

\textsuperscript{7} Daūdi, 1701, f. 115r.
\textsuperscript{8} Br. M. 11633, f. 49r; 1929, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{9} Br. M. 197, f. 79v.
\textsuperscript{10} Qanungo's Sher Shah, p. 352.
supposition that the so-called figures of the parganas were better applied to the number of troops maintained in the Khalsa as the manuscripts of Daüdi suggest.\textsuperscript{11}

According to Abbas Khan a number of parganas were grouped into a Sarkar\textsuperscript{12} over which were appointed one chief Shiqdar and one chief Munsif.\textsuperscript{13} This statement is again supported by the Elliot MS. of Väq'äti Mushtäqi, but the other MS. of that work has no reference to such officials at all. In the time of Islam Shah among the Sarkar officials a later writer\textsuperscript{14} mentions one Shiqdar, one Mushrif and one Kärkun. After Humayun recovered Lahore he appointed for that division only three officials, Faujdär, Amin and Treasurer.\textsuperscript{15} It might be reasonably presumed that these three officials were considered quite sufficient to meet the requirements even of an important division like Lahore.

Abbas Khan apparently relied much on hearsay. He himself had not seen the regime of Sher Shah. This is true of all the writers except Rizqullah.

\textsuperscript{11} This supposition finds some colour from the account of Islam Shah's military reforms given by Mushtäqi (MS. A. f. 74. v). In connection with each mansab-holder he appointed a munsif, a Persian and a Hindu writer. On this point any positive statement is not possible. It is very significant that Mushtäqi (A. MS.) mentions Shiqdar, Munsif and Kärkun in connection with the branding (of Horses?) and equipment of the servants (soldiers). See also Daüdi (a), f. 103r.

\textsuperscript{12} All MSS. in the Br. M. read har Kär for Sarkar. Although all these MSS. are corrupt yet the point is to be noted.

\textsuperscript{13} Abbas, 164 f. 69v; 1782 f. 41r, 86r. v.

\textsuperscript{14} Nurul Haq, Zubdat. Br. M., 10580 f. 123v, 124r.

\textsuperscript{15} Badaæni; Ranking, 496.

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Their statements are therefore more credible than those of others but so long as the text is not definitely settled the element of certainty would be wanting even in the most cautious conjectures.

With these limitations the system obtaining in the time of Sher Shah might be described. In every village there was a Muqaddam and a patwāri. The former collected the revenues from the people living within his jurisdiction, and handed it over to the State officials. For this service he got a given percentage of the revenue allowed to him by the government. The patwāri kept a record of the cultivators and their holdings. Over a number of villages there was a Shiqdār,16 who was a circle officer to collect revenue from his division (Pargana). As he had to handle considerable revenue he was assisted by a clerk (Kārkun). The money realized was placed in the charge of Khazānadar or Fōtādar (treasurer). There were other officials also known as Amin17 and Qānunngō. The former was appointed by the government to measure the boundaries of the village, the area under cultivation and to settle by measurement any disputes regarding the actual area or size of holdings. The Qānunngō was probably not appointed by the government. He appears like the Muqaddam to be a hereditary semi-official who kept a record of the

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16 The word Shiqdār is used by Chronicles of Sher Shah in more than one meaning. So also the words Munsif, Amil. Its use of the words ‘Amil and ‘Amaldari are also obscure. These words should therefore be understood strictly with reference to the context in which they are used.

17 Sikandar Lodi employed Amins to measure the land to settle disputes. Mushtāqi (a), f. 26r. v.
past and present condition of agriculture and the cultivators.

Realising the revenue from the Muqaddams, the Shiqdârs sent it to the higher officials of the Sarkar who presented it to the Sultan and explained to him the accounts personally. The position of the ‘Āmil as usual was of considerable importance. His was a very lucrative post and was considered a sinecure. Sher Shah himself observed that there was no job so profitable as of ‘Amaldâri, and therefore it was his policy to change ‘Āmils every year or two years so that the profits might go to a larger number of the officials.

It can be readily seen that the machinery of revenue administration in the time of Sher Shah was not much different from that of the early Turks. The Shiqdârs and Faujdârs existed at least as far back as the time of the Tughlaqs. In the time of the early Lodis every pargana had a Shiqdâr. Bahlol Lodi had appointed in Kampil Patiali, Sakit and Kol and Jalali one Shiqdâr for every pargana. Similarly the Amins were employed to settle disputes by measurement certainly in the time of Sikandar Lodi. The ‘Āmil had a still older antiquity and existed ever

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18 In the Jagir of Hasan Every ‘dih’ (village) probably had a muqaddam, and probably elsewhere also. Khanjahani, f. 107r.
19 Abbas Or. 164 f. 69v.; 1782, 41r. v. 86v.
21 Tábq. Akb. Br. M. 6543 f. 122v. Parganas in Sikandar Lodi’s time are mentioned in Oudh, Bihar, Qanauj, Shamsabad, Jhajhar, etc. Mushtâqi (a), f. 67v. 68r.
22 Mushtâqi (A), f. 26 r. v.
since the advent of Muslim conquerors in India. It is unhistorical to say that Sher Shah created any new pargana machinery of the government unknown to the early Sultans. What he is credited with having done he had already found in operation when he took the charge of his father's Jagir. Sher Shah was not an innovator. His sole aim was to revitalise the government and introduce efficiency. But the behaviour of the 'Āmils and of Shiqdārs suggests that in spite of his best wishes he had not succeeded in removing corruption. He knew it and like other rulers before and after him had to put up with and make the best of it.
APPENDIX D

Nasaq and Zabt

The Persian historians have often used the same word to express different ideas just as they have employed different words to connote the same idea. The context where such words occur is the best guide to their significance. Yet, at times, some words remain obscure in spite of the context. Of such words in the writings of Abul Fazl 'Nasaq' is one.

In his article on Akbar's Land Revenue arrangement in Bengal, Mr. Moreland has defined nasaq as "summary assessment of the village." (J.R.A.S. 1926, p. 43). This view is substantially the same which he and Mr. A. Yusuf Ali expressed in the same journal in 1918. There are two main arguments in support of this view. First, that in the Akbar Nama (A. N. iii. 381) Shahābuddin, the divani Khalsa, is said to have discontinued the zabti harsāla and established a 'Nasaq.' In this context 'nasaq' appears to be a specific system, a particular method of fixing the jam'. The second argument is that in the introductions to statistical tables in the "Account of the twelve subas" such expressions as 'hama zabti,' or 'naqdi' occur in some subas, while in some others "partly zabti and partly naqdi" are found. From these statements it is concluded that 'Nasaqi' is on the same footing as 'zabti' or 'naqdi,' and denotes a particular system of assessment.

The word 'Nasaqi' in Alc N. ii. 270 is clearly an alternative of the Zabti harsāla. But what is
the significance of zabti harsāla in that context? It has been argued that Zabti involved the measurement of land, and consequently Nasaq did not involve measurement but was a summary assessment.

In considering the question it is important to remember that the passage (referred to above) connected with the policy of Shahābuddin, describes *the procedure of the Central government*, and has no reference to local methods and practices. The Central government, according to it, dropped the system of zabti harsāla and adopted a ‘nasaq’ for *fixing the jam*.

Now what was the Zabti harsāla of Muzaffar Khan that was dropped? Did it involve a systematic and regular measurement of the cultivated land every year on the part of the Central government? Personally I am inclined to think that it did not. For there is no reference whatsoever prior to Shahābuddin’s time of any sort of measurement being carried on by the *Central government* of Akbar. There are, besides, other considerations. Firstly there can hardly be any doubt that in the days of Bairam Khan the Central government relied on what the author of Iqbal Nama calls ‘Takhmīn’ (conjecture) and ‘Qiyās’ (guess) and not on measurement. That system which continued almost to 1566 was superseded by that of Muzaffar Khan who according to the Iqbal Nama called to the Court the Qānungsos and Chaudhariis of parganas, and from the qarār vāq‘ found out the material on the basis of which he fixed the hāli hāsil (Iqbal N. p. 213). It is obvious therefore that the Central government did not go further
than examining the qarār vāq' which was in the possession of the Qānungos and Chaudharis. The zabti harsāla would therefore involve the examination of qarār vāq'. It might be that the qarār vāq' was based on the actual measurement done by these officials, but as far as the Central government was concerned there is hardly any definite evidence to show that it went beyond the papers of the Chaudharis and Qānungos. The use of the word zu'm in Akbar, Nama and the general trend of the account given there (Ak. N. ii., 270, 272. I.O. MS. f. 352v.) suggests to my mind that the 'hāli bāsil' was based on those papers and other general considerations, and not on actual measurement conducted by the Central government.

If my reasoning is correct I do not think that the word 'Nasaq' in the text (A. N. loc. cit.) is clear, and that it necessarily and positively implies an alternative of measurement, though certainly it is an alternative of Zabti harsāla.

The second argument that 'Nasaq' should be placed on the same footing as 'zabti' and 'naqdi' in the introduction to the account of the various subas in the Ain, is also not decisive. The first and the foremost difficulty is that they are not exclusive terms. One does not exclude the other. For example 'Naqdi' could be possible both in the 'Zabti' or the 'Nasaqi,' if that word meant Cash. It might be that 'zabti' was an alternative of 'nasaqi' but this supposition too does not settle the question finally.

The main difficulty in settling definitely the significance of these terms consists in the loose use of
the words zabt and Nasaq both in the Akbar Nama and the Ain; and the two chief arguments mentioned above can only be tentatively granted. I must frankly confess that I am not yet satisfied with the translation of the word 'nasaq' as "summary assessment." I expect to take up the question in detail later. For the present I suppose that the 'Zabti harsāla' was something similar to what is said in connection with Sher Shah that "before his (Sher Shah's) time. . . . there was a Qānūngo in every pargana, from whom was ascertained the past, present, and probably future, state of the pargana." (E.D. iv. 414.) At any rate 'nasaqi' does not appear to me as yet "a summary assessment on village," though I cannot at present say what it really was.
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Haji, 15 Cen. A.D.

Afzalut-tawarih

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1594.

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(2) The India Office MSS.

Ain-i-Akbari, Abul Fazl,
1594.

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