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
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Indian Psychology



INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY

A CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
SPECULATIONS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

512.7

by
Raghunath Safaya



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Transliteration Chart

Vowels a ā i ī u ū ṛ ṝ e ai o au

Anusvara ṁ

Visarga ḥ

Consonants

Gutterals k kh g gh ṅ

Palatals c ch j jh ñ

Cerebrals ṭ ṭh ḍ ḍh ṇ

Dentals t th d dh n

Labials p ph b bh m

Semi-vowels y r l v

Sibilants s as in 'sun'

ś palatal sibilant pronounced like soft of
'machine'

ṣ cerebral sibilant as in 'shun'

Aprirate h

Abbreviations

<i>AA</i>	Aparokṣanubhūti of Śankara
<i>AB</i>	Ātmabodha of Śankara
<i>AG</i>	Avadhūta Gītā
<i>AR</i>	Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa
<i>AS</i>	Arthasangraha of Laugākṣi Bhāskara
<i>AS</i>	Ātma-siddhi of Yāmunacārya
<i>AU</i>	Atareya Upaniṣad
<i>AV</i>	Aṣṭavakra Gītā
<i>BC</i>	Bhatta-cintāmaṇi of Gāga Bhatta
<i>BG</i>	Bhagvadgītā
<i>B. Purana</i>	Bhāgvat Purāṇa
<i>BP. and SM</i>	Bhāṣā-paricheda and Siddhānta-muktāvali of Viśvanātha
<i>BS</i>	Brahma-sūtra of Bāḍrayana
<i>BU</i>	Bṛhadārnyaka Upaniṣad
<i>BV</i>	Bhoja Vṛtti
<i>Bṛhati</i>	Bṛhati of Prabhākara
<i>CU</i>	Chāṇḍogya Upaniṣad
<i>DDV</i>	Dṛk-dṛṣya-vivēka
<i>DPS</i>	Daśapadārtha-śāstra of Candra
<i>G. Bh</i>	Gandapāda Bhāṣya of Sāṃkhya Kārikā
<i>HS</i>	Haristotra of Śankara
<i>IU</i>	Īsopaniṣad
<i>JG</i>	Jīvanmukta Gītā
<i>JV</i>	Jīvanmukti-vivēka of Vidyāranya
<i>KKK</i>	Khaṇḍana-khanda-Khāḍya of Śrī Harṣa
<i>KU</i>	Kaṇṣitakī Upaniṣad
<i>Katha U</i>	Katha Upaniṣad
<i>Kena U</i>	Kena Upaniṣad
<i>MS</i>	Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini
<i>MU</i>	Maitri Upaniṣad
<i>Māndūkya U</i>	Māndūkya Upaniṣad
<i>Mundaka U</i>	Mundaka Upaniṣad
<i>NB</i>	Nyāya Bhāṣya of Vātsāyana

<i>NK</i>	Nyāya Kusumāñjali of Udayāna
<i>N.Ka</i>	Nyāya-Kandali of Sridhara
<i>NM</i>	Nyāya Mañjari of Jayanta
<i>NR</i>	Nyāya-ratnākara of Pārthasārathi Miśra
<i>NS</i>	Nyāya-sūtra of Gāutama
<i>NV</i>	Nyāya-vārttikā of Udyotkara
<i>NVTT</i>	Tātparyyatikā of Vācaspati Miśra
<i>P. Bh.</i>	Padārtha-dharma-sangraha of Praśastapāda
<i>PD</i>	Pañca-daśī of Vidyāraṇya
<i>PM</i>	Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini
<i>PPP</i>	Pañcapādikā of Padmapāda
<i>PPS</i>	Prakaraṇa-pañcikā of Śālikanātha
<i>PU</i>	Praśna Upaniṣad
<i>Paingala U</i>	Paingala Upaniṣad
<i>RM</i>	Rāja-Mārtanda of Bhoja
<i>SAS</i>	Sarvārtha Siddhi of Vedānta Deśika
<i>SB</i>	Śankara Bhāṣya, Brahma-sūtra with Śankara's Commentary
<i>SD</i>	Śastra-dīpikā of Pārthasārathi Miśra
<i>SK</i>	Śāṃkhya kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa
<i>SM</i>	Seśvara Mīmāṃsā of Vedānta Deśika
<i>SN</i>	Svātma-nirūpaṇa of Śankara
<i>SP</i>	Sopā-padārthī of Sivāditya
<i>SP. Bh.</i>	Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya of Vijñāna-bhikṣu
<i>SPS</i>	Sāṃkhya-pravacana Sūtra of Kapila
<i>SS</i>	Śata-śloki of Śankara
<i>SV</i>	Śloka Vārttikā of Kumārilla Bhatta
<i>SSV</i>	Sāṃkhya-sūtra-Vṛtti of Aniruddha
<i>STK</i>	Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra
<i>SU</i>	Śvatasvetara Upaniṣad
<i>SV</i>	Ślokavārttikā of Kumārilla Bhatta
<i>Sri B</i>	Śrī Bhāṣya of Rāmānujācārya
<i>TB</i>	Tarka Bhāṣā of Keśava Miśra
<i>TC</i>	Tattva-cintāmaṇi of Gāṅgeśa
<i>TC</i>	Tātparyya-candrikā of Vedānta Deśika
<i>TK</i>	Tarka-kaumudī of Laugakṣi Bhāskara
<i>TS</i>	Tarka Saṅgraha of Annam Bhatta
<i>TU</i>	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
<i>TV</i>	Tantra-vārttikā of Kumārilla Bhatta

US	Upadeśa-sahasrī of Śankara
VA	Vijñānāmṛta of Vijñāna-bhikṣu
VC	Vivēka-cūdamapi of Śankara
<i>V Purāṇa</i>	Viṣṇu Purāṇa
VP	Vedānta-paribhāṣa of Dharma-rāja
VS	Vaiśeṣika Sūtra of Kaṇāda
VSR	Vedānta-sangraha of Ramanujācārya
VSS	Vedānta-sāra of Sadānanda
VSU	Upaskara Commentary of Vaiśeṣika Sūtra by Śankara Miśra
Y-B	Yoga-bhāṣya of Vyāsa
YM-D	Yatindra-matadipīkā of Śrinivāsācārya
Y-S	Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali
Y-S	Yoga Vasiṣṭha
<i>Y. Vārttika</i>	Yoga Vārttika of Vijñāna-bhikṣu

Preface

THE title of the present investigation might arouse some curiosity among the minds of the readers. The very first question that arises in this respect is whether India produced any psychology in the real sense of the term, or in the sense of the term has been used in the West. We have been talking of Indian philosophy, Indian religion, Indian culture etc., but not of Indian psychology. It is a fact that 'Mind' has never been considered as an independent entity in India, but an annexe of the 'Self', as an instrument of action. 'The science of Mind' is an outcome of the science and philosophy of the self, and hence all psychological principles are outcome of the philosophical doctrines. Very little attention has been paid so far to the gathering of purely psychological data from the philosophical literature, so much so, whenever we read any work on psychology in the Universities in India, we read purely Western psychology.

The present investigator undertook, long ago, the laborious task of gathering psychological data from the philosophical treatises. Instead of collecting the material from the secondary sources, he framed the policy of tackling the primary or the original sources in Sanskrit in each of the philosophical systems beginning from Upaniṣads. It was verily a laborious task, especially when each system has constantly developed through a mass of literature produced in each age in the form of Sūtras, Karikas, Bhāṣyas, Vṛttis etc. The investigator has the satisfaction that he has made the best of the published material in Sanskrit, following the policy of Mallinātha, of writing nothing without a base in the original works (*namūlaṁ likhyate kiñcit*).

During the course of the investigation, the author found that Buddhist psychology is an independent field, and so is Jaina psychology, and that Mrs. Rhys Davids and Dr. Mohan Lal Mehta have covered these fields respectively. After reading their publications, the author felt that he could not add much to what had already been written by the two eminent scholars.

Nor would the space in the volume of this research permit to give so much weightage to these two systems among a dozen systems, so as to complete with the independent treatises prepared by the two authors. Again Buddhist psychology, may be called more than Indian Psychology, in so far as its sources are contributions from scholars of a number of Asian countries besides those of India. The investigator therefore decided to confine his fullest attention to the Āstika granthas i. e. the Upaniṣads and the six systems of Indian philosophy, collecting the necessary data from these, and adding a chapter on Buddhist and Jaina psychology in outline form, so as to give the reader a comprehensive view of the whole of Indian psychology.

As the scope of the present investigation was only the philosophical literature, the author did not go into other realms of Sanskrit literature, such as Kāvya, Kāvyaśāstra, Āyurveda, Kāmaśāstra, Tantraśāstra, Saṅgītaśāstra, Dharmasāstra, Arthaśāstra, etc. This is an independent field for research for a subsequent attempt.

In the exposition of the present subject, the author has tried to be objective and impartial. At some places, he has also given his opinion on the basis of personal experience, but only after thoughtful concentration, lest a mind already influenced by Western culture, gets an opportunity of dismissing the facts, alleging a bias for Indianism on the part of the author. Throughout the writing of the investigation, the author has been conscious of the fact that he is writing it not only for an Indian reader but also for a western reader, who may appreciate the ancient Indian contributions in the realm of psychology.

Indian psychology should be given as much importance in Indian universities as is given to Indian philosophy in comparison with Western psychology, and Western philosophy respectively. The principles of pedagogy taught in teacher-training institutions should be based more on Indian psychology and Indian philosophy, than on Western psychology and Western philosophy. Even the Westerners will profit by the study of Indian psychology. They will appreciate our contribution, know the limitations of Western psychology and attempt at fruitful synthesis.

Here the author feels duty-bound to acknowledge his ex-

treme indebtendness to Dr. D. N. Shukla, M. A., Ph. D., D.Litt, professor and head of the department of Sanskrit, Panjab University, under whose expert guidance, the author worked and completed the project, and but for whose guidance he would not have been taken up this subject for special investigation; and who carefully went through the whole, giving valuable guidance, unwearied help and steady encouragement.

The author is also indebted to all the eminent scholars whose works he consulted during the course of the investigation. The list of works consulted is fairly long, and hence only the works quoted have been mentioned in the bibliography. Of-course, the works consulted are confined to those published in Sanskrit, English or Hindi, the languages that the author knows. The author's emphasis, has, however, been on primary source i.e. the original Sanskrit works on philosophy, from where he had to collect the material, and therefore modern works in other Indian or European languages are fairly dispensable for purposes of research in the present topic.

To conclude, the author hopes that his humble work will pave way for further research in this virgin-field, and thus he has at least set the ball rolling.

The author is especially indebted to Messers Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., for having undertaken the publication of the book.

RAGHUNATH SAFAYA

Chandigarh

9th November, 1975.



**INDIAN
PSYCHOLOGY**



Introduction

A. PSYCHOLOGY—INDIAN APPROACH

1. Philosophical Basis of Indian Psychology

INDIAN Psychology is embedded in Indian Philosophy, and therefore it stands on the strong foundations of deep and everlasting fundamental truths regarding the nature of reality, the ultimate goal of human endeavour and such problems that have been baffling human mind. No aspect of human life and the universe has been left unexamined by Indian Philosophers, and this leads to a totality of vision in both philosophical and psychological fields. Philosophy in India has been named 'Darśana', which means, 'vision', 'insight', 'intuition' and thus the word itself signifies that Indian philosophers pursued the quest of having a total vision of life and universe, based on personal experience, and not only on a limited plane of modern methodology. The insight of Indian philosophers from the time of Upaniṣads reigns still supreme and marvellous. No wonder if it had a deep and abiding influence on a number of Western philosophers like Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860).

With a faculty of intuition (over and above reason), the Indian philosophers looked at the cosmos as a whole, and arrived at a number of generalisations such as the following:

1. The existence of supreme consciousness as the source of all that constitutes the universe, designated by the word Brahman or Īvara or Puruṣottama.

2. The existence of soul, Ātman (or Puruṣa of Sāṃkhya philosophy) as the essence of human personality.

3. The direct relation between the individual soul Ātman and the cosmic soul (Brahman) as that of identity (as propounded by Advaita Vedānta) or that of subject and predicate (viśeṣa-viśeṣaṇa as in the case of Viśiṣṭādvaita).

4. The evolution of the universe from Brahman (Supreme Consciousness), and the nature of universe as a combination

of matter on the one hand and various degrees of consciousness on the other, resulting in conglomeration of matter and spirit, with its diverse forms of life.

5. The embodiment of soul (with different explanations given by different philosophical systems).

6. The Law of Karma and transmigration of soul.

7. The ethical basis of human life.

8. The doctrine of release or Mokṣa as the ultimate goal of human life.

Although there have been a good number of divergent philosophical systems or thought-currents (six Āstika systems, Buddhist and Jaina), but there is a common current of idealism and spiritualism running through all of these. Regarding the above eight principles, there are only minor differences, which are more a matter of detail than of conflict. Of course, we leave the Cārvāka system (Indian materialism) which does not survive, and of which only references are traceable.

2. Fundamental Assumptions of Indian Psychology

Indian Psychology directly follows the above generalisations as fundamental postulates, assimilates these, and develops on the following fundamental assumptions:

1. The essence of human personality is Ātman the Self, which is different from body or mind, and which governs these.

2. Ātman or Self is of the nature of Pure Consciousness, and it enlightens both mind and body, and gives life to these.

3. The essence of the entire universe is cosmic consciousness, and Ātma the individual consciousness is directly related to it.

4. The whole universe is an off-shoot of the Pure Consciousness (Brahman), and is produced, sustained, governed by it and dissolved in it. According to Viśiṣṭadvaita. Universe is the body of Brahman. Human body and mind follows the same principle. Both are governed by soul.

5. Corresponding to individual body, individual mind and the individual self, there is the cosmic body or the physical universe (called Virāṭ), cosmic mind (called hiranyagarbha) and cosmic consciousness.

6. The individual body is directly related to the cosmic body, and so is individual mind to cosmic mind, and individual self to cosmic self.

7. Consciousness pervades the entire universe, and it animates all organic and inorganic matter. The difference in degrees of life in lower organism and higher organism is merely due to the degrees in the quantum of consciousness and its threefold nature or *guṇa* (*sāttvika*, *rājasika* or *tāmasika*). This has been explained by Sāṅkhya.¹ The scope of Indian psychology, therefore, is the entire life pervading the physical atom, the amoeba, the vegetable kingdom, and the animal kingdom. From the point of view of Indian philosophy, even an atom possesses consciousness, but it is characterised by inertia (*tamas*). We may make a deeper study of consciousness in man, because we are concerned about it, but we cannot shut our eyes towards the eternal truth that consciousness governs the entire universe. There have been different shades of opinion regarding the relation of consciousness and the world of matter. Upaniṣads declare that, all this world is Brahman (*sarvaṁ idaṁ khalu Brahman*). Sāṅkhya declares independent existence of matter, but accepts the non-consciousness of the same, and proclaims that all life is the product of Consciousness (*Puruṣa*) and matter. Matter is insentient without *Puruṣa*. Vedānta (leaving aside Advaita) believes that the relation between matter and consciousness is that of adjective and substantive, or body and soul, owned and owner, heat and fire, colour and object etc. Advaita denies the existence of matter apart from consciousness. Barring Advaita and Mahāyāna Buddhism, all schools of Indian philosophy affirm the existence of the universe. Nevertheless, it has been declared unequivocally that consciousness reigns supreme. The subject of Indian psychology is, therefore, consciousness proper, that is the be-all and end-all of all life and thought.

8. Indian psychology assumes that individual consciousness is directly related to the universal consciousness. Different Darśanas explain the relation in diverse ways. Sāṅkhya believes in plurality of *puruṣas* (or plurality of individual conscious-

¹See Ch. IV, Section A on Three *Guṇas*.

nesses) but concedes to the unity in diversity. Upaniṣads declare identity of the two, and so does Advaita, illustrating the relation between ripple and sea, pot-ether and cosmic-ether or reflection of sun in water and the sun. The philosophical discussion about the minute details regarding the mutual relation of individual consciousness and cosmic consciousness, whether it is of slight difference, or of non-difference, is not so important from the psychological point of view. The relation exists, and it is a psychological truth for us. It is on this assumption that Indian psychology ventures to enter into the so-called mystical realms of superconscious,—a topic beyond the scope of Western psychology.

9. Another epistemological assumption is the nature of knowledge and its valid sources. Indian psychology, in the wake of Indian philosophy, classifies knowledge into three types: the direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*parokṣa*) and intuition (*aparokṣa*). Nyaya psychology deals with these in detail. Intuition or *yogi-pratyakṣa* has been discussed primarily by Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta and Jaina, and exhaustively by Yoga. These are discussed in the relevant chapters below. It is a fact that individual mind can transcend the realms of limited cognition, and enter super-cognition or intuitional state. Swami Vivekananda explains this in simple words: "There is continuity of mind, as the Yogis call it. The mind is universal. Your mind, my mind, all these little minds, are fragments of that universal mind, little waves in the ocean; and on account of this continuity, we can convey our thoughts directly to one another." Hence Indian psychology does not regard that there is any mystery in intuition, telepathy or extra-sensory perception (ESP).

The above facts regarding the philosophical basis of Indian psychology have been mentioned to clarify the point that Indian psychology has altogether a different foundation from that of Western psychology. While Western psychology is an off-shoot of Western philosophy and science, Indian psychology emerges from Indian philosophy; the antithesis between East and West (and their philosophies) explains the mutual dissimilitude between Indian psychology and Western psy-

chology. Here some readers may have sincere doubt regarding even the existence of anything like Indian psychology, because whenever we read anything about psychology, it is the Western psychology. But the facts mentioned in the following pages vouchsafe the fact that Indian psychology not only exists, but surpasses Western psychology in scope, methodology and validity of conclusions. It solves a number of problems concerning psychology, which remain unsolved in the West. After a full understanding of Indian psychology, the Western mind if not accepting the total superiority of Indian psychology, shall have to make this much concession of accepting that Indian psychology is complementary (not supplementary) to Western psychology and that synthesis of both is at once necessary. He will agree with Edgar Sheffield Brightman in saying, "The West cannot afford to neglect the gifts which wisemen from the East may bring,"¹ or with Gordon W. Allport of Harvard University, who mentioning some questions of curiosity regarding meditation and mental discipline of Indians declares, "Ignorance of Eastern thought leads us to give callow and mischievous answers to such questions as these."²

It would, therefore, not be out of place to make a resume of Western psychology—to begin with, spotlighting the unsolved problems of Western psychology and its limitations, and to make a brief statement of facts explaining how Indian psychology solves these problems.

B. THE WESTERN APPROACH—A BRIEF HISTORICAL RESUME

The subject matter of psychology was studied, in East as well as in West, by philosophers only. It is only in the recent times that it has attained a separate independent entity. In the West, not only has psychology attained freedom from the yoke of philosophical speculation, but also its very concept has undergone a radical change. Originally meaning the Science of the Soul (derived from the Greek word *Psycho-logos*), it changed into 'the Science of the Mind', as in the mediaeval ages the

¹Swami, Akhilananda, *Hindu Psychology*, p. xiii.

²*Ibid.*, p. ix.

very existence of soul was questioned. But the problem of relation between mind and body, and between mental and physical phenomena remained an unsolved riddle. Though the problem was humorously avoided by a philosopher who said, "What is mind?—No matter; What is matter?—Never mind", a better attempt was made by Descartes (1596-1650) while he defined it as a science of consciousness. The definition lost its significance when the Psychoanalysts like Freud and Adler explored the unconscious fields. The Behaviourists therefore defined it as study of behaviour, thus combining the conscious and the unconscious behaviour. Watson's Behaviourism, upon which this definition is based, has long been refuted by the contemporary psychologists. If we put it humorously, first psychology in the West lost its soul, then its mind, then its consciousness and lastly all its behaviour. It is not an exaggeration to state that there is no unanimity amongst the contemporary psychologists regarding the very subject-matter. A number of theories are rampant, and a number of schools have originated. But all the same, some of the very fundamental problems regarding our conscious or unconscious behaviour remain unsolved.

It will not be out of place to give a brief resume of the contributions of the Western philosophers down from Plato upto the present times.

1. Greek Psychology

Plato recognised mind or soul as an active principal working to control the body. But his 'soul' was different from the 'soul' of Indian philosophers. The soul according to him had two stages of development—the irrational stage (seated in the heart and lower body) and the rational stage seated in the head. Human behaviour according to him flowed from three main sources: desire, emotion and knowledge. Aristotle regarded soul as the entire vital principle of organism—plant, animal or human. A part of its power in human organism is passive and dies with the body. But the active part survives. Here he leads us to inexplicable mystery. The Epicureans reduced soul to matter—very fine and mobile matter. Thus Hippocrates, the physician, considered all mental

action as material. Following this approach, Galen made a rudimentary attempt to study the nervous system and explained the four temperaments, (Sanguine, Phlegmatic, Melancholic and Choleric).

2. Mediaeval Psychology

Christianity revived the doctrine of soul. St Augustine (354-450 AD) attributed all human actions to soul—God's creation. The three faculties—memory, imagination and will—are parts of the unitary soul. Thomas Aquinas (1225) believed in the survival of soul after death. He, however, made a beginning of faculty approach. He found emotions and will subordinate to intellect.

The Renaissance period brought the revival of Greek learning in Europe. It is during this period that Descartes (1596) presented very powerfully his theory of the existence of Self. To him all the world, and everybody is a machine; but outside the world is God, and within the body is the spiritual soul—the Self. What is the proof of the existence of the Self? To this he replied, "*Cogito ergo Sum*" (I think, therefore, I exist). Even if you doubt, the doubt proves the existence of the doubter ("*Dubito ergo Sum*"). Here started the problem of body-self relationship, to which his solution was 'the theory of interactionism'. Here Descartes stopped but Spinoza (1632) went a step further. As a religious minded person, he held that body and mind are two different aspects of the same single substance—God. He reaches nearer our Indian point of view when he propounds 'man is a part of the universal whole, and his life, in thought and action, is but a fragment of the divine substance.' According to him 'God is the true reality and presents himself in these two fundamentally distinct ways.'¹ He firmly proclaimed, 'God is immanent, and not the extraneous, cause of all things, I say, All is God; all lives and moves in God.'² He comes nearer our Indian doctrine when he says, "the will of God is the sum of all causes and all laws,

¹W. B. Phillips, *History of Psychology*, p. 64.

²Will Durant, *Story of Philosophy*, p. 172.

and the intellect of God is the sum of all mind."¹ To him the mind of God is a mentality scattered over space and time. It is the diffused consciousness that animates the whole world. According to Spinoza, the mental process is one (not two) that seen inwardly as mind and outwardly as matter. Neither is mind material, nor is matter mental. He thus tries to resolve the distinction between the two. But for want of details, his explanation remained a mystery and was readily dismissed by the English Psychologists of the seventeenth century. Unfortunately his philosophy did not survive the materialistic philosophy of the later times, and no further investigations were made regarding the valuable doctrines that he presented. His theory that individual is a part of the cosmos, accords with our own. "He tried to merge his own desires with the universal order of things, to become an almost indistinguishable part of nature."² "The greatest good is the knowledge of the union which the mind has with the whole nature." Here was a clue to the understanding of deeper realms of Psychology e.g. parapsychology, extra-sensory-perception and depth-psychology. But the reactions against his philosophy by the Associationists like Hobbes (1588-1679) and Locke (1632-1714) gave a set-back to his theories. Locke (even though he was a christian) dissociated mental behaviour from God, and asserted that all knowledge comes from the senses. In his famous publication *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, he asserted that "there is nothing in the mind except what was first in the senses." Thus mind is at birth a clean sheet, a *tabula rasa*. But indirectly he proved that matter does not exist except as a form of mind. Here he approaches Vedāntic monism. Berkeley followed and went a step further that all matter is a mental condition. We perceive matter only through mind. But both Locke and Berkeley were soon refuted by David Hume (1711-1776). He held that mind is simply an abstract name for the series of ideas. We perceive ideas concerning matter. He thus very strongly banished mind and soul from Psychology. He

¹Will Durant, *Story of Philosophy*, p. 175.

²*Ibid*, p. 187.

killed mind as Berkeley killed matter. The reader can imagine the unfortunate plight of Western psychology at this juncture. Mere confusion prevailed. While Bishop George Berkeley denied the existence of the external world, David Hume in his famous *Treatise on Human Nature* questioned the existence of mind, soul and God. Before Berkeley and Hume, Leibniz (1646-1716) had tried to harmonise mind and matter through his doctrines of 'Psycho-physical parallelism' and 'Pre-established Harmony'. According to him body and mind worked together like two perfect clocks, keeping the same time without a common control. But such an explanation did not satisfy the later thinkers.

3. Eighteenth Century Psychology

The famous German Philosopher Kant (1724-1804) attempted to unite the ideas of Berkeley and Hume. He pleaded for the banishment of the mind or soul as an immediate object of study. Though this only avoided the problem and did not solve it, this, however, helped later the empirical study of mental processes and human actions rather than speculations about soul, regarding which only useless attempts have been made in the West. But when he explains his monistic idealism that space is subjective and an innate property of mind, he makes a positive contribution. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* he puts the right check on the so-called infallibility of reason. Even our sensations are innate and selective. Thus reasoning is an imperfect road to knowledge and truth. Perceptions remaining the same, our judgments can differ. That is the reason for individual differences in men. This was a positive contribution. But when he declared measurement as necessary only for science and not for psychology, he delayed the experimental aspect of psychology.

Schopenhauer (1788-1860) made a stronger attack on materialism than Kant did. How can we explain mind as matter, when we knew matter only through mind? Hence he pleaded for his idealism "The World is my idea". He discovered a power within—Will—that moulds every form, in plants, animals and men. But his extreme pessimism and his unduly exaggerated criticism against life, objects of

pleasures, women, sex, beauty and art leads dangerously to unbalanced views about human psychology. In his later years, being influenced by the profound Upaniṣadic philosophy, he tried to reconcile his pessimism and frustration with Vairagya of Vedānta, and proclaimed Nirvāṇa as the ultimate wisdom, but he missed many essential features of Indian philosophy. Indian philosophy bears a well-marked contrast to the pessimism of Schopenhauer.

Schopenhauer discussed threefold division of mental processes viz. intellect, feeling and will. Hamilton went a step further in discovering six separate faculties and thus founded the faculty psychology. But Herbert (1776-1841) disproved the faculty theory by explaining all mental processes through apperception and interaction.

4. Nineteenth Century Psychology

Nineteenth Century saw the foundations of the experimental psychology—a landmark in the history of Western psychology. The earlier thinkers only paved way for a detailed study of sense-perception and nervous system. The concern of psychology became more that of anatomists than that of armchair philosophers. Johannes Miller conducted experiments on sensory-motor action. Weber's law on sensations was a new discovery in the field of perception. In this connection Fechner (1801-1887) was the first to give psychology a definite experimental foundation. His psycho-physical methods revealed new facts about perception. Detailed experiments were made by Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) in his experimental laboratory (the first of its kind in Europe). Since then the experimental studies in Europe and America about perception and learning have met remarkable success. This resulted in a well-marked shift of study from introspectional to experimental.

Another shift affected was from physiological study to biological study. Thus Herbert Spencer in his *Principles of Biology* defined life as 'the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations'. He saw before him a magnificent drama of the cycle of evolution taking place. Side by side with the evolution of life he saw the evolution of mind taking place, and this he explained in his two volumes on

The Principles of Psychology. His 'evolution of mind' bears resemblance with our Sāṃkhya theory of evolution. But his ideas were circumscribed by Lamarck's theory of transmissibility of acquired characteristics. Thus he traced the present mental mechanism of human beings to the nerve-processes evolved mechanically not only from the primitive life but also remotely from primeval nebula. Nevertheless, he is not able to explain the origin of mind and consciousness. To him, mind is subjective accompaniment of nerve processes. But wherefrom this subjective accompaniment? Had he been an Indian, believing in the existence of Ātman that illuminates the body and mind, the problem was solved. But here he falters, and the problem lay as it was. But biological studies bore one fruit. A study of hereditary characteristics, influence of environment, instincts and emotions were made more deeply. The studies were based both on the theory of Lamarck and of Darwin. Darwin's theory of evolution, 'Descent of Man' and 'The survival of the fittest' gave some clue to tracing the mental capacities of man from more rudimentary proto-types of animals. Francis Galton (Darwin's cousin) studied the genius, the various human traits and the primary abilities. He paved way for Spearman, Thorndike and Thurstone for analysing the structure of human abilities. The twentieth century saw the development of the measurement side of abilities and personality traits at the hands of Catell, Binet, Simon, Terman, Merrill, Weschler, Alexander, Murray, Morgan and many others.

A historian will discover clearly Western psychology oscillating and changing hands from materialists to naturalists, from naturalists to idealists and back, again from idealists to materialists. The real sense of this instability is the absence of certain fundamental principles governing life and the Universe, explored long ago in India by the Upaniṣadic seers, out of which only some glimpses were caught here and there by the European master-minds. Rationalism and materialism prevailed in the last century in Europe. But soon there was a revolt against it. Bergson (1859-1941) declared consciousness as distinct from the organism which it animates. In his

words "in Principle, coextensive with life."¹ He comes very near our Indian *stand-point* and clearly distinguishes between consciousness and the nervous system. He gives rational proof for it, and that supports our Indian doctrine.

"The lower we go in animal series, the more nervous centres are simplified and separate from one another, and at last they disappear altogether, merged in the general mass of an organism with hardly any differentiation. If, then, at the top of scale of living beings, consciousness is attached to very complicated nervous centres, must we not suppose that it accompanies the nervous system down its whole descent, and that when at last the nerve stuff is merged in the yet undifferentiated living matter, consciousness is still there, diffused, confused, but not reduced to nothing?"² He believed in evolution but he gave a more comprehensive view by declaring that "there is something more in evolution than a helpless mechanism of material parts. Life is more than its machinery; it is power that can grow, that can restore itself, that can mould to its own will some measure of environing circumstance."³ He was the first evolutionist to discover a vital urge—*Elan Vital*—the source of all the evolutionary process and the basis of creation, activity and struggle.

The impulse and desire acting as an active force in evolution, explained by Bergson, may be compared to *Kama* of the Upaniṣadic seers.

Greater still against the materialistic mechanism was the criticism and attack by Bergson's contemporary Professor James Ward of Cambridge University (1848-1925). In his *Principles of Psychology* first published in 1919, he refuted the Associationists and Behaviourists and all others who did not include a definite 'mind'. Like the Indian seers, he caught the glimpse of the 'Ego' (*Aham*) or 'Self', which gave unity to all the mental behaviour.

He believed that consciousness was not a mere succession

¹Bergson, *Mind-Energy*, p. 11.

²*Ibid.*

³Will Durant, *Story of Philosophy*, p. 449.

of mental states, but was the expression of a controlling central Ego, which gave unity to the whole.'

Experience of each moment may be trivial. But whence the continuance of experience? It is the Ego that brings this continuance of dominates all the changes in the consciousness. His centemporary American philosopher William James (1842-1910) expressed a similar idea regarding the continuance of experience by using a metaphor 'Stream of Consciousness.' He too declared that all the mental processes are but 'phases of unitary continuous whole of the experience that runs without sharp break from birth to death.'¹ But believing in pluralistic theism, a number of Gods rather than one, a multiverse rather than a universe, and a number of diverse cross-currents rather than a harmonious system of cosmos, he missed the fundamental unity of Reality.

Psychology in the 19th century was thus studied from different angles. It was influenced by new discoveries in Physics. Further achievements in chemistry led to the idea of a 'mental chemistry', whence sprang up Associationism. Biology influenced it, and a number of psychological doctrines were based on the theory of evolution as presented by Lamarck, Darwin, Galton and Spencer. In the field of methods, the method of introspection gave way to the method of experimentation.

5. Contemporary Schools of Psychology and their contribution

The 20th century saw the development of definite diverse systems of psychology, in some cases contradicting each other and in certain areas supplementing each other. Watson's Behaviourism tries to explain each and every mental phenomena through stimulus and response. According to this school, man is practically a machine, all the mental activities are performed mechanically, and there is nothing like consciousness. They study human behaviour because man's mental activity is known to us by his behaviour alone. Behaviourism cannot explain the diversity of behaviour of individuals in a common situation. Nor can it go deep into the inner working

¹W.B. Philsbury, *History of Psychology*, p. 240.

of the mind. It has at the most covered the field of sense-perception. The higher faculties of mind like will, imagination, reasoning, judgment and the like are beyond the purview of Behaviourism.

The very fundamental principle of Behaviourism was questioned by McDougall, the propounder of 'Purposive Psychology' or 'Hormic Psychology'. He distinguishes a human activity (or even an activity of an animal) from a mechanical activity, as the former is characterised most pronouncedly by 'free-will'. Life of every living being has a purpose behind it; it is *teleological*. A machinery does not conserve the experience-engrams, while an animal does. Whence this conservation of experience, and whence the hormone—the life urge, the will to live? Materialistic mechanism thus stands clearly refuted at the hands of McDougall. The analytical type of psychology which emphasises the analysis of each type of mental activity has been corrected by the Gestalt Psychology which levied emphasis on the synthetic whole, as opposed to the parts. It is the total personality that thinks, feels and acts. Thus the conscious self is a unity and not sum-total or aggregate of diverse instincts, emotions, habits and tendencies. But further explanation of the totality of the mind, and the various states like conscious and unconscious, are wanting in this school of thought also.

All the three schools have been concerned with the conscious mind only. But what about the wealth of mental behaviour stored in the unconscious? We owe a lot to Sigmund Freud (1856-1940) for his discovery of the unconscious, and later to Alfred Adler (1870-1937) and C.G. Jung for further exploration in this direction and for enlivening and enriching the school of Psycho-analysis. Freud's discoveries constitute a landmark in the history of Western psychology. Basing his conclusions on abnormal neurotics, and combining experimentation and observation with introspection, he explored new fields in the realm of unconscious (so far unknown to the Western thinkers, but already explained in India in thread-bare outline). But both Freud and Adler miss the fundamental source of unconscious behaviour, while they exaggerate the instincts of sex and self-asser-

tion respectively. Jung traces the behaviour to the racial past and opens fresh vista for racial psychology. He makes an approach nearer to Indian psychology, but misses the central focus, while he as a 20th century German flouts at the Eastern idea of 'Soul' animating human behaviour. In his *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, he distinguishes between the Traditional 'Soul' and the 'Psyche', the conscious principal governing mental activities. He accepts intuition, but a little more intuition could have brought him close to the comprehensive Indian view.

This is the story of Western psychology, an interesting story of human struggle for the achievement and discovery of knowledge of the very instrument of knowledge—mind. A vast body of literature has been produced through the untiring efforts of Western scholars during the last two milleniums and a half. But if we compare what has been achieved, with what remains unexplored, the achievement is very humble. Even the most fundamental problems of psychology remain unsolved. Groping in the dark, Western psychologists have faltered at every step, making a little headway through the feeble light of a ray of reality perceived here and there, but stopping again and fumbling off and on. That is the reason for the instability of psychological doctrines, and oscilation from the extreme nodes of theism to atheism, materialism to idealism, monism to pluralism, intuitionism to objectivism, and so on. No wonder, if in a state of indefiniteness, even the most fundamental problems given below remain unsolved. Some of the problems are:

1. The problem of continuity of experience;
2. The problem of the nature and origin of mind;
3. The problem of physiological basis of mind;
4. The problem of mind-body relationship;
5. The problem of survival and immortality of mind;
6. The problem of extra-sensory perception;
7. The problem of dream-phenomena;
8. The problem of heredity versus environment;
9. The problem: concerning mental hygiene and abnormal psychology;
10. The problem of positive status versus normative status of psychology; and

11. The problem of method of studying psychology.

C. UNSOLVED PROBLEMS OF WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY

1. The Problem of continuity of experience

A reference was made above regarding the bundle concept of David Hume and stream-concept of James. A question can be asked, what causes the continuity of experience? How do I know that the experiences of today and yesterday belong to the same person? A pure stream, or a mere bundle of experience cannot explain the phenomena. A continuous learning and memory must pre-suppose a learner or subject of memory. Memory vests in whom? Experience is accumulated in whom? Continuity of experience is brought by whom? These may be complex riddles in Western psychology, but have been explained long ago in India by the Upaniṣadic seers.

In this connection James Ward had rightly pointed out the ridiculously unconvincing explanation given by Western psychologists regarding the continuity of experience. He comes very near our Indian point of view, when he discusses his theory of 'continuum'. Upaniṣadic seers declared three thousand years ago that Self is the substratum of all experience. 'Know thy Self'. Taittirīya Upaniṣad distinguishes between body, mind and Self. Self is beyond, body and mind. All the Indian philosophies give detailed account of Self as the seer, knower and the doer and experiencer. The Self is the bed of what William James calls 'stream of consciousness'. The Self is the permanent reality behind all the experiences, a background of all the states of consciousness viz. wakeful, dream, sleep, etc. He is the "subject" as described by James Ward. The simplest argument regarding the existent of the Self as the substratum of experience is given in Upaniṣadas and Vedānta. In the wakeful state I am aware of myself. In the dream I experience something and on waking I am aware that it was I who met the dream, for I remember all that. But when I am in deep-sleep state, I do not experience anything. But when I wake up, I do state, 'I slept well'. Was there any break in the experience? If we admit that, then the person before sleep must be different from the person after sleep. Hence there is continuity of

experience even during the sleep state. Naturally, even though the body and the mind are not working in that state, a permanent 'subject', besides mind, is there to vouchsafe the continuity of experience. This permanent subject is the Self. Śankara explains this point in detail.¹

2. *The problem of the nature and origin of mind*

Down from Plato upto the present day, various explanations have been given about the nature and origin of mind. The Greek Idealists or Spiritualists explained in terms of a 'Spirit', but the very essence of the 'spirit' was unknown and the idea vanished because of the vagueness. Even Kant, Schopenhauer and Bergson became unintelligible for the imperfect idealistic doctrines that they presented. This was explained above.

Behaviourists like Watson,² Bechterev (Russian), Pavlov (Russian)³, Max Meyer⁴, Franz, Lushley and others got rid of mind altogether. They talked of behaviour only. But is it not a fact that we ourselves experience our mind perceiving, thinking, feeling, willing, imagining, reasoning, discriminating and remembering? Our higher faculties of mind work at a deeper level than the perceptual level of stimulus and response. Whence the memory? Watson calls it 'old habitual path'. Is it not an oversimplification? From this point of view Watson's book 'Behaviourism' is just a bundle of responses corresponding to some stimuli. Even that stimuli is undefined. In that case, W. Kohler's 'Gestalt Psychology' is as real a bundle of responses as that of 'Behaviourism'. Both are real and true, but reasoning fails here, as both are antagonistic.

Psychoanalysts like Freud, Adler and Jung do not possess any unanimity among themselves as regards the source of human mental behaviour. Therefore something is wrong with all of them.

Materialist Biologists assert that at various stages of material complexity, new properties emerge, and consciousness may be one of these. Following the laws of Physics, we can under-

¹See Ch. VIII, Advaita Psychology, Section on Sleep,

²Watson, *Behaviourism*.

³I. P. Pavlov, *Conditioned Reflexes*.

⁴M. Meyer, *The Fundamental Laws of Human Behaviour*.

stand that hydrogen and oxygen when put up together produce water which bears entirely new properties. But life and consciousness are not a property of matter. How does material aggregates produce distinct entity like life bearing quite strange properties like assimilation, growth, respiration, reproduction etc. ? Again, at what stage of the evolution of matter, should we postulate the emergence of consciousness ? Once we postulate a definite stage, the very premises fall, as it is against the very theory of evolution to postulate a line of demarcation before which there was no life and after which life suddenly appeared. The sudden appearance of life will remain a mystery unaccountable for. The emergence theory that life emerges out of matter at a particular stage can safely be discarded. The same thing is true about the Dialectic Materialistic Theory of Karl Marx that mind is nothing but a higher form of organic behaviour.

The inadequency of the Biological theory regarding the origin of consciousness has been well explained by J.W.N. Sullivan in his *The Limitations of Science*.

"We see that the question of Evolution of Intelligence bristles with unsolved problems. We are not yet clear as to whether certain types of behaviour are to be classified as intelligent, nor can we draw any clear line of demarcation between the conscious and the non-conscious. The connection between physical structure and mental characteristics is still very largely hypothetical. And we do not know whether consciousness arises only at a certain stage of complexity or whether it must be postulated of all living matter—or even of all matter. Thus the theory of evolution, although it can tell us a great deal about the development of our bodies, can tell us very little about the development of our minds. It may be that the structure of our minds is completely conditioned by the structure of our nervous system, but researches on the nervous system, at present practically throw no light on our mental processes. For the understanding of these we have to appeal to different methods."¹

¹J.W.N. Sullivan, *The Limitations of Science*, p. 107.

What these different methods will be, is not explained by the famous Scientist. Indian Psychology shall come to rescue here.

According to Indian philosophers, the whole universe with its diversity of name and form (nāma-rūpa), life and intelligence all round, has emerged from the Absolute, the Ultimate Reality, which is of the nature of 'Existence', 'Consciousness' and 'Bliss'. It is Pure Consciousness, according to Advaita, or Īśvara with Consciousness as its essential attribute according to Viśiṣṭadvaita. Consciousness pervades the entire universe, and it permeates each and every element and object in the universe, differing in quantum or degree. Consciousness is the highest in Yogis, high in men, less in animals, still less in worms, still less in plants and in the least in matter (which we wrongly call 'dead'). There is consciousness in each atom, which makes its inner motion resemble that of a solar system. There is consciousness in particles of sugar forming in the shape of crystal. Dr. J.C. Bose proved that there is consciousness in plants. Hence, consciousness does not emerge at any particular stage of evolution. The three 'guṇas' (Sattva, Rajas and Tamas) determine the degree of consciousness. In man, it is neither the nervous system, nor the brain that is responsible for intelligent behaviour. Brain and nervous system are the physical agents of the Self, and consciousness is an attribute of the self and not the body, brain or nervous system. As the mind is only an agent of the Self, its structure depends upon the needs of the Self, and so does the structure of nervous system and brain.

3. The problem of physiological basis of mind

Very recently, a good many neurologists, doctors, physicians, psychiatrists and psychologists made a deep analysis of the nervous system. They connected each and every mental task to one or other area of the cerebral cortex in the brain. They studied the intricate net-work of nervous tissues in the brain, and mapped the whole field. They cured thousands of mental patients through operations upon certain localities in the brain. They discovered the modifications in the nervous cells corresponding to each mental experience e.g. linguistic development, habit formation, acquirement of skill, etc.

All this scientific discovery could pave way for concluding that mind is the same as nervous system, or that there is nothing like mind apart from the nervous system and brain. But such conclusions are far from the truth.

(a) Firstly, all the phenomena of cortical function and behaviour have not been explored. Wenger and Jones state:

"Many of the important problems concerning sensation already have been solved, but at least two major areas of unknown remain ;

(i) the problem of differential irritability of receptor cells.

(ii) the problem of quality in sensation."¹

As in the field of sensation and perception, so in the field of emotions, the entire organisation of nervous system cannot explain the nature of pleasantness and unpleasantness, pleasure and pain. The same stimulus can be pleasure for one and pain for the other. Wenger and Jones frankly confess:

"We do not understand completely the important sensation which we call pain, nor are we certain about the portion of the cortex which is responsible for it. We know that it determines much of our behaviour, but we do not understand how."²

Had the nervous system been the be-all and end-all of our mental functioning, and had pleasure and pain no distinction, our world would have been a different one. No Buddha or Christ would have been born to relieve humanity of human suffering, because there would have been no human suffering. We may ask in vain the physiologists to discover in the cerebral cortex the seat of human suffering, and once discovered, ask him again to have a major operation and thus simplify once for all the whole jigsaw puzzle of human suffering.

The physiologists again, do not know what changes in the nervous system underlie learning and what regions of the cerebral cortex are concerned with memory. Reasoning and imagination are not located in the cortex. The relation between higher mental functions and cortex, are unknown. Nothing can be predicted from the study of brain and nervous system about the unconscious behaviour of an individual. Even the

¹M.A., Wenger, F.N. Jones and M.A. Jones, *Physiological Psychology*, p. 426.

²*Ibid.*

phenomena of sleep and dream are not well-explained. Regarding the degrees of consciousness from the unconscious behaviour to complete alertness, Wenger and Jones confess again:

"What kinds of processes are involved? At the moment no one knows. We do not even know the exact condition, which after a walking state to a sleep state or vice-versa.¹

The same is true about abnormal behaviour. A few mental disorders may be ascribed to physiological defects, but not all. The scope of physiological operations for mental therapy is extremely limited. The most widely used treatment is electro-therapy. But it succeeds in certain cases only in the initial stages of abnormality. Doctors agree that the electric shock does nothing more than stimulating the nervous system. It is, therefore, useful only in certain cases where the individual suffers from Psychosis or Schizophrenia (*Dementia Precox*) or other maladjustments evincing lathargic reactions to stimuli.

It is true that doctors have discovered certain psychological disorders due to physiological disorders. But this leads to no conclusion, because the reverse also is true. Doctors have discovered a number of physical defects originating from nothing but psychological disorders. The effect of emotions on bile and ductless glands is universally known. The effect of anxiety through the Vagus nerve (10th Cranial nerve) upon the functioning of lungs, heart and abdomen is similarly clear. Anger and digestion are correlated such diseases as cancer have in certain cases been ascribed to psychological factors. Conversely the healing power of mind has been discovered by the Western doctors. And as such the nervous system cannot explain the psychological disorders and mental diseases. Charles Sherrington, Professor of Physiology, Oxford University, after his life-long experiences regarding the functioning of the brain verdicts:

"The physical basis of mind encroaches more and more upon the study of mind, but there remain mental events which seem to be beyond any physiology of the brain."²

¹*Ibid*, p. 430.

²Basil Blackwell, *The Physical Basis of Mind*, p. 3.

(b) The physiological basis of mind is refuted from another point of view.¹

Is nervous system an instrument of mind or the mind itself? If it is an instrument of mind, then no problem arises. Then we can postulate that with gradual increase in the complexity of animal behaviour, the gradual complexity in the nervous mechanism correspondingly followed. The instrument had to become finer and more adequate to cope up with the needs of the mind. But if the reverse view is held that complexity of behaviour followed from the gradual complexity of nervous mechanism, a number of puzzles remain unsolved:

(a) The size of the brain must have some relation with the maturity of mind. 'But', says W.E. Le Gros Clark, "it is an instructive fact that the size of our brain today shows an astonishing range of individual variation, and yet it has not been possible within wide limits to relate these differences in intellectual capacity."² Should not then a genius have a brain of larger size? But no correlation has been found between size and capacity of the brain.

"Lenin's brain was examined microscopically in great detail and showed no certain difference from the brain of ordinary men."³ Should we presume, on the principle of physiological basis of mind, that the primitive brain being less experienced and uncivilized was smaller? In this connection, Clark informs as :

"The fossil evidence indicates that the human brain has not appreciably changed in its size for about 200,000 years."³

(b) Separate functions of the mind have been ascribed to separate areas of the cortex, and separate nerve-fibres in the nervous system. Neurologists have discovered in the brain the most complicated patterns prepared out of twelve-thousand million nerves. What forms these patterns? Nobody knows. Russel Brain, Physician to the London Hospital makes a guess:

¹*Ibid*, p. 23.

²*Ibid*, p. 43, quoted from Eliot Slater's talk on consciousness.

³*Ibid*, p. 23.

"My guess is that in the nervous system we are looking at the threads, while with the mind we perceive the patterns, and that one day we shall discover the patterns are made out of threads."¹ Hence the necessity of mind to weave a pattern out of the threads. Wilder Penfield, the famous neurologist of Canada, distinguishes clearly between the mind and nervous mechanism when he guesses...

"That something else finds its dwelling place between the sensory complex and the motor mechanism, that there is a switchboard operator as well as the switchboard."²

In reality the relation between mind and brain is that of the operator and the instrument, the stream and the river-bed, the electricity and the wire.

Viscount Samuel clearly distinguishes between the two and states that the body influences the mind only in the sense that 'the painter or sculptor is conditioned and influenced by his materials; the composer by the musical instruments that exist in his time; the architect by the available building materials; the craftsman by his tools, the captain and crew by their ship.'³ Here he reaches the Upaniṣadic doctrine "Ātmānam rathinam viddhi etc." (*Maitri Upaniṣad*, II, 3-4).

It is futile therefore to expect any discoveries regarding higher mental functioning from cerebral cortex which is purely a physical instrument of mind and not the mind itself. S. Zuckerman, Professor of Anatomy, Birmingham University, gives his final verdict...

"The physical sciences do not seem to have advanced far enough to define the actual physical changes which underlie the process of learning. Even the most powerful instrument of research cannot help us at all here."⁴

Zuckerman is right in declaring that any instrument of research cannot help here, for the meeting place of mind and matter is not the brain. It is here that Indian psychology per-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 54-55.

² *Ibid.*, quoted from Wilder Penfield's talk, *Cerebral cortex and the Mind of Man*.

³ *Ibid.*, quoted from Viscount Samuel's talk.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28, quoted from S. Zuckerman's talk on 'The Mechanism of Thought'.

forms its duty proclaiming the truth and solving the problem. The problem of physiological basis of mind, the nature and origin of mind, and the mind-body relationship has been solved by Indian psychology in the most convincing terms.

The first point to start is the metaphysical assumption that the substratum of all experience is neither the body, nor the mind, but the Self, which is of the nature of pure consciousness, and which partakes its essential attribute (as light, life and consciousness) from the cosmic consciousness. So the 'Self' or *Atmā* is the source of all human mental behaviour. Negatively the Self is neither the body, nor the nervous system, nor the brain, nor the stimulus-response mechanism, nor the behaviour, nor any complex chemical or biological product and nor the mind. Positively it has been described as Consciousness, the seer, (*dr̥ṣṭā*), the doer (*kartā*) and the experiencer (*bhoktā*).

Mind in Western psychology, is a limited concept. We substitute it in Indian psychology by Consciousness, which is a wider term and connotes not only thought, but the entire life and light that pervades each and every organism.

What we call mind in Western psychology is a limited concept, and is designated by such technical terms as *Antah-karāṇa* (in *Sāṅkhya* and *Vedānta*), *Manas* in *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika*, *Mīmāṃsa* and *Viśiṣṭadvaita*, *Citta* in *Yoga* and *Ālaya* in *Buddhism*. It is no longer of the nature of consciousness but is in the form of energy. It is lighted or reflected by consciousness or the Self, of whom it works as an instrument (*Karāṇa*). Mind is material (*annamayam manas*), declared *Upaniṣads*, and this fact has always been affirmed by Indian philosophers. It is simply the higher form of matter, the subtlest form, converted into energy. This concept does not go against the latest scientific discovery that matter is convertible to energy. The subtlest part of our food is transformed into mental energy. So both mind and body, working as a physical instrument of self belong to the same class, with only different shades of quality.¹ Apart from consciousness

¹See the Description of Mind in Ch. III, *Psychology in Upaniṣads*.

derived from the Self, reflected in it, mind has no power. Hence it is dissoluble after death or after liberation.

So what the Westerners mean by mind is really consciousness which belongs to the self. The mind, apart from the consciousness of the self reflected in it, is not mystical or spiritual, but simply material. Hence the true mind is responsible for intelligent behaviour is nothing but consciousness and is spiritual in character, but the mind as organ or agent is purely material. Indian philosophers have made a very clear distinction between the two. Confusion arises because of absence of the right terminology in Western psychology. Sometimes 'psyche' was used, sometimes 'spirit', and sometimes 'mind' for the source of this intelligent behaviour. Once we accept the trinity of soul (of the nature of consciousness), mind and body, governed by soul, the whole riddle is solved.

4. *The Problem of mind-body relationship*

All the Western psychologists have failed to give any satisfactory explanation of the mind-body relationship. Various theories have been postulated, the major theories amongst which are: Materialistic Monism, Parallelism, Epiphenomenalism and Dualistic Interactionism. But all the theories miss the fundamental truth which Indian philosophers have explained unequivocally.

(a) *Materialistic Monism*

Many a Western philosophers, unable to perceive a spirit governing the physical universe reduced the whole cosmos to one ultimate reality-matter. As at the cosmic level, so at the individual level, there was nothing more than a physical body. "Body am I entirely and nothing more; and soul is the name of something in the body"—thus said the German Philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Another German Philosopher Feuerbach (1804-1872) declared, 'A man is what he eats'. Accordingly, in words of Vogt, "thought is the secretion of the brain". Such thinkers declared that the relation between thought and brain was roughly of the same order as that between bile and liver, or urine and the bladder. In words of Ostwald) a German Chemist of the present century), "all the

mental processes are a form of physical energy." It is deducible from this sort of 'mental physics' that a person's dreams and thoughts can be correlated with certain specific movements of brain molecules. James and Lange in their 'James-Lange Theory' declared that emotions are functional disturbances of the body. John Dewey also believed that "mental processes are qualities or attributes of physical organism". And so did Watson and his followers of the Behaviourist School.¹

Such a 'Mental Physics' or 'Mental Chemistry' may solve the problem for the materialists, but it raises one hundred more. Movements of brain molecules are not thoughts. Anger is not the same thing as angry behaviour. The difference is radical as in sound and light, operator and the switchboard, river and the river-bed or electricity and the wire. The liver-bile metaphor is nothing but absurd because both are tangible and concrete, while-as thoughts are abstract. The physical and the physiological basis of mind is absurd, as has been shown above, while discussing the first two problems. Man is not a complex machine, as the dialectic materialists declare. McDougall refuted it long ago. Though the materialistic idea persists upto the present day, its absurdity has been proved beyond doubt.

(b) *Parallelism*

Among those who believe in dualism i.e. body and mind are two separate entities, there is no unanimity of views as regards the relation between body and mind. One strong view in this connection has been that both work in a parallel order. Physical and mental states work independently without any casual relationship between them. How did this happen? Leibnitz postulated that 'pre-established harmony' existed between the two. In his own words "the body and mind are two clocks which agree perfectly and accurately." The reason for such an agreement can be questioned. Occasionalists said that God intervenes. Spinoza (1632-1677) explained that body and mind are two different aspects of the same thing...God.

¹J.B. Watson, *Behaviourism*, and C.L. Hull, *Principles of Behaviour*,

"God is the true reality and presents himself in these two fundamentally distinct ways."¹ From the point of view of Indian philosophy, the first part of the sentence is alright, but it remains to be explained how he presents himself in fundamentally two distinct ways. Fetchner (1801-1887) tried to cover this absurdity by a mathematical metaphor by saying, that the two are 'convex and concave form of the same curve.' A better metaphor from the commercial field is presented by Lasswiz as 'loan of money and asset at the same time.' But metaphors cannot solve the problem. Body and mind are not two sides of the same coin, when we find that there is a causal relationship between the two, each affecting the other. Even the universal parallelism held by some is absurd, until the source of the coincidence of parallel functioning is explained. Two wheels of a cart run parallel only when there is a third force acting on both. But what is the third neutral force here? Parallelism is therefore illogical and unscientific.

(c) *Epiphenomenalism*

T. H. Huxley (1825-1895), Santayana (1863-) and others believe that mental events are by-products of bodily events; hence the word 'epiphenomenon' (by-product). They believe that mental events are not physiological processes but are the results of these. This is just another kind of materialism, which has been found absurd. Is all the mental advancement the result of matter? Paul Edwards objects, "Was history created by matter?"²

(d) *Interactionism*

Is another remedy suggested. Some philosophers believed in mutual interaction between mind and matter. Des cartes (1596-1650) was the first propounder of dualistic interactionism. To him mind is the thinking substance and body its extended substance, but mind itself is manufactured by the body. This is again unintelligible to us. This forms a vicious circle, and the cause of the mutual interaction

¹W.B., Philsbury, *History of Psychology*, p. 64.

²Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap ed., *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*.

is not known. According to our Indian psychologists mind itself is material...a very subtle matter. Mind and body, both being material can act and react only in the presence of Ātman which illuminates both. In the absence of Ātman, the mutual interaction of mind and matter is not intelligible. The mutual interaction was really objected to by later philosophers. 'How can something which cannot move in space, have no extension in space, move a brain molecule?'¹ Once we accept Ātman, the problem is solved, but Descartes and others could not distinguish between mind and the subject of experience which they called, 'the spiritual substance'. Descartes' interactionism has a better meaning than the sort of interactionism suggested by David Hume, William James and Bertrand Russel.

According to David Hume (1711-1776) mind is like a theatre with successive scenes of experience and "they are nothing but a *bundle* or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement."² His bundle concept fails when we ask the question, "who bring these in rapid succession?" A partial idea of self is presented by Bertrand Russel, "The mental continuity of a person is a continuity of habit and memory; there was yesterday one person, whose feelings I can remember; and that person I regard as myself of yesterday."³ A full idea of the 'self' at the back of all the mental experience is not revealed to Russel, and hence the circumlocution or beating about the bush with illogical arguments. James talks of the 'Stream of Consciousness', but knows not the source of unity forming the drops of consciousness into stream. Unable to explain such objections to interactionism, there are some Western thinkers who agnostically confess that the interaction exists but the 'how' is not known. They discover that mind and brain do meet, but the meeting place is not known. Professor W.E. Le Gros Clark, Oxford anatomist confesses, "Physiology and anatomy are unable even to suggest how the physico-chemical phenomena associated with

¹Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap ed., *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*.

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*

the passage of nervous impulses from one part of the brain to another can be translated into mental experience."¹

Another contemporary philosopher C.D. Broad believing in interactionism discovers that mental phenomena survive even after the dissolution of the physical body.² If mind survives, then it means that it does not depend upon interaction of the body. How that occurs is not known.

Thus the traditional problem of body and mind remains as it is. And it will remain so, unless Indian philosophy intervenes. By accepting the trinity of soul, mind and body the problem is solved.

5. *Survival and Immortality of Mind*

Materialists and Agnostics may not believe in the existence of spirit. Western idealists also do not believe in the survival of mind and the immortality of soul. William James laughed at the idea.³ Bertrand Russell is a prominent atheist,⁴ Christianity too does not believe in transmigration of soul, and hence the Christian idea of immortality is partial. Though the Western mind in general is against the idea of immortality, but recent investigations in the field have brought to light this truth, and a number of psychologists and philosophers are prone to accept it.

Gardner Murphy discusses this idea in his *An outline of Survival Evidence*. Earlier to him McDougall approached the idea. John Haynes Holmes in a lecture delivered in 1925 gives ten reasons for believing in immortality.⁵ C. D. Broad collects evidences from the current psychical researches regarding the same.⁶

Myers has produced two volumes on the subject. His volume, I, is about 'the actions and perceptions of spirits still in flesh'. His volume II deals with "the actions of spirits no

¹Ibid.

²Ibid, Ch. III, C.D. Broad, *Mind and its place in nature*.

³William James, *Human Immortality*.

⁴Bertrand Russell, *Why I am not a Christian and other essays*.

⁵Gardner Murphy, *Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, Ch. XIX.

⁶C.D. Broad, *Human Personality and the possibility of its survival*.

longer in flesh'.¹

The Society for Psychical Research America has thrown a flood of light on this subject. J. B. Rhine's experiments are notable in this respect. His latest works on the subject give ample proof for the survival of the spirit.² A better explanation of the Phenomena is given by Indian philosophers, through the theory of transmigration of soul and Law of Karma.

6. *The Problem of Extra-Sensory-Perception*

All the phenomena of Extra-sensory-Perception (ESP) such as telepathy, clairvoyance, clairaudience, precognition, mysmerism, dream-visions, apparitions, ghosts, mediumship, psychometry, psychokinesis, telekinesis, levitation, apports, etc. are not recognised in the normal psychology of the West, and constitute a separate branch of study called 'Parapsychology'. For a long time researchers in this field were held in contempt, so much so that the contemplated Professorship in Parapsychology was nicknamed as 'Chair in ghosts'. Objective researches and long observations of innumerable cases have brought to light a number of new psychological facts, which are in no case 'superstition' but are scientific facts. There may appear a novelty in all these experiments, and in the results obtained, but for an Indian mind there is nothing novel in these.

A detailed description of the powers of the mind have been presented by Patañjali in his *Yoga-sutras*. The powers of the mind are so immense that Extra-sensory-Perception is insignificant. Even this Extra-sensory-Perception has a novelty for the western mind. This will be discussed in the relevant chapter.

7. *The Problems concerning Dream Phenomena*

The dream phenomena is still a riddle in Western psychology. Freud, Adler, Jung and others discovered subconscious thoughts playing their part in the dreams. They have dealt with the pathological (morbid) dreams, and the dreams caused

¹Rosalind Heywood, *The Sixth Sense*.

²J.B. Rhine, (i) *The Reach of the Mind*, (ii) *New World of Mind*.

by organic disturbance. But what about a wealth of other types of dreams which do not come in the sphere of the above two? What about the prophetic dreams, dream-within dreams, telepathic dreams, clairvoyance dreams and many other miraculous type of dreams? These are unaccountable for in Western psychology. Even the explanations given to morbid dreams by Freud, Adler and Jung are imperfect, and in many cases far-fetched and wrong. Besides the scope of dreams, problems regarding the very nature of dream-phenomena are unsolved. A few problems are given below:

- (i) Are dream-perceptions produced by external organs of senses or not?
- (ii) What are the physiological organs that function while dreaming?
- (iii) Are the dream-perceptions real or illusory?
- (iv) What is the relation between deep-sleep state and dream state?
- (v) What is the relation between the wakeful state and dream state?
- (vi) Are dreams anyway connected with individual's past birth and future life?
- (vii) How can dreams predict future events?
- (viii) How does ESP function in dreams?

These and a number of such queries await reply in Western psychology. But detailed discussion, we find, about all these queries in the philosophical literature of India produced even before Christ. Charaka the physician, for instance, has conducted experiments on dreams, and he lived not later than Christ.

The very fundamental question about the dreams is the subject of the dream. Who dreams? Who experiences the dream-perceptions, and enjoys or suffers sometimes in dreams? Who is it that works out problems (unsolved during the day) and feels inspired in dreams? The subject and object of dreams are fully explained by Indian philosophers.

As regards the relation of dream and wakefulness, Indian thinkers have gone even further. They have explained at

length the four states viz. wakefulness (jāgrat), dream (svapna), deep-sleep (suṣupti) and blissful state (turīya). All this will be explained in the relevant chapters below.

8. *The Problem of Heredity versus Environment*

A detailed study of Biology in the West revealed a number of new facts regarding the influence of heredity and environment upon the living organism. Experiments were conducted on the possibilities of transference of acquired characteristics from the past generations to the future generations. The effects of the type of seed and the type of soil were clearly demarcated, proving the equal importance of heredity and environment. The same generalisations were verified in relation to the human beings. Thus heredity means the particular combination of genes of the chromosomes got from both the parents. The genes contain the most prominent physical and mental characteristics. In order to compare the relative importance of heredity and environment, we can take four different types of cases:

- (i) Two persons of the same heredity reared in the same environment.
- (ii) Two persons of the same heredity reared in different environment.
- (iii) Two persons of different heredity reared in the same environment.
- (iv) Two persons of different heredity reared in the different environment.

If we apply simply the generalisations of Biology, we might come to strange results.

In the first case, siblings brought in same environment must attain equal success in life. But observation fails here. Brothers of genius or fools were not always genius or fools. Nor had great man great fathers or great sons. It has been observed that one brother died a millionaire, and the other a pauper. Even identical twins born in the same family attained different status in life.

In the other cases also observation and genetic generalisation have been different.

Where do the generalisations fail in certain cases, if not in

all? Psychologists attribute the failure to other variables like will and X factor (as Alexander calls it). It is a safe postulate to attribute variations in life-achievements to variations in 'will' under conditions where all the factors of heredity and environment are constant. But here lies the fundamental problem. Wherefrom the 'will'? Besides 'will', a layman believes in destiny playing a great part in the life of a person. Western psychologist feels shy of believing in destiny, for to him it is unscientific to believe in the supernatural. Destiny and 'will' play no less an important role in moulding ones life and determining the heredity as well as the environment.

This is explained in Indian philosophy fully well. Here two fundamental doctrines viz. the Transmigration of Soul, and the Law of Karma explain the whole situation.

It is the Sanskāras of the past lives that determine firstly, the heredity of a man, and secondly, partly his environment where he is reared. For the success and the failure of an individual's life, credit goes to or fault lies in the Sanskāras, rather than the heredity and the environment. Indian psychology throws light on the immense possibilities of moulding and modifying to the extreme degree the past Sanskāras, through the agency of effort and will. Without accepting these fundamental doctrines, psychology is incomplete and can go no step further.

9. The Problems concerning mental hygiene and Abnormal Psychology.

The present century saw the birth and development of the school of psychoanalysis. The discovery of the subconscious mind was a land-mark in the history of Western psychology. Freud made attempts to explain the overt behaviour of persons in terms of repressed wishes stored up in the unconscious. To Indians who know the importance of Sanskāras, and the accompaniment of the mind stuff (citta) with the transmigrating soul, there is nothing new in the theory of the 'unconscious.' But as soon as Freud, Adler and Jung make further analysis of the subconscious mind they vary in their views, and in fact all of them falter. Hence a number of problems still

remain. The greatest drawback of psychoanalysis is that it "does not plumb the unconscious deeply enough to reveal the self and get it fully distinguished from the ego."¹

(i) Freud gives too much prominence to sex. He traces all the sub-conscious behaviour to sex-urge, which is far from being acceptable.

(ii) Freud speaks of Death Urge besides Life Urge. Why should a person have a Death Urge? This is unaccountable for.

(iii) He interprets all dreams in terms of sex. His interpretation is far-fetched. Professor McDougall after getting his dreams analysed by Freud states that Freud's formulae for the interpretation of dreams may be true for some dreams but not for all.

(iv) The same is true of Adler. Every action cannot be traced to master-instinct.

(v) Even if the diagnosis of abnormal behaviour made by Western psychiatrists be accurate, the treatment they suggest fails.

Freud believes in full expression of the sex-urge. This has aggravated the problem and not solved it. Due to the recent trend in giving undue importance to sex in art, drama, theatre, literature and society sexual immorality is increasing. Freud might have been right to some extent in his generalisation from a sample of cases taken from the materialist European society, where sex-appeal, exhibitionism, sex-immorality and craving for sexual satisfaction was high. But the generalisation is not universal. Over-emphasis on sex, and undaunted liberty in sexuality, is a menace to the society. Freud has been responsible for a school of his thought, and has given rise to peculiarities like Freudian literature. Freudian pathology fails here, for liberal expression of sex, rather than self-control is dangerous and deteriorating.

(vi) The treatment of 'sublimation' and 'redirection', sounds nice, but it is yet to be seen how everybody's urges can be sublimated or redirected. The process of sublimation or redirection needs another urge, inside the individual. What is that urge or power?

¹A. W. Watts, *The Supreme Identity*, pp. 89-90.

(vii) Psychoanalysts may discover the causes of mental conflicts, but they seem to have failed in practical therapy of integrating the personality of the patients. There are mental asylums, but the treatments are very slow. Recently some therapists have introduced religious therapy. This is a step in the right direction. But the major task is ahead. Indian psychology propounds 'self-control', 'self-analysis', 'concentration of mind', 'development of will', and 'integration of the self.' It reveals the highest powers of the mind. While Freud leads us to self-indulgence, Patanjali leads to self-control and self-realization, which are truest goals of life.

Indian psychology gives full account of not only the sub-conscious, but of four continuous and gradual states viz. Sub-conscious, Conscious, Dream-conscious and Superconscious.

(viii) Very few laws of mental hygiene are available in Western psychology. A better account of attaining balanced personality, mental equipoise, tranquillity amidst torrents of misfortune and unfoldment to the highest degree of all the latent potentialities is given by Indian seers. They teach optimism to the frustrated pessimist. They promise glory, light and divinity after a period of dark misfortune. The neurotic in the West can get no consolation anywhere except in the teachings of Indian seers. Schopenhauer with all his neurosis and frustration, in his later years got consolation only from Upaniṣads. He declared 'Upaniṣads have been the solace of my life, these will be the solace after my death.'

Western materialism leads to suicides, exploitation, deceit, aggression, massacres, battles, wars and mass destruction. It paves way to frustration, neurosis and disintegration of personality. Western psychology cannot provide remedy to all this. Indian psychology is the soothing balm for the ignorant and suffering humanity. The principles of mental hygiene according to Indian psychology are dealt in the chapters below, especially in Chapter X, Yoga Psychology.

10. *The Problem of Positive Status versus Normative Status of Psychology*

Western psychology has virtually acted as a positive science

attempting to describe in detail the essentials of human behaviour, as those exist. Recently its canons have been applied in the field of education, industry and sociology. All the same it simply attempts to give an insight into the nature of mental functioning, and only suggests a better way of mental functioning. Beyond this it does not go. It is a normative science only in a very limited sense.

Indian psychology is a perfectly normative science in so far as it instructs a detailed procedure of mental progress e.g. Yoga practices. It instructs at every step and suggests a regular course of effort in the direction of highest unfoldment of mental and physical powers. It promises extra-sensory powers e.g. the eight Siddhis and other miraculous powers of the Psyche.

11. The Problem of the methods of studying Psychology

The chief methods employed by Western psychologists are : Introspection, Observation, Experimental and Analysis. Introspection has been the oldest method of studying psychology. Essentially it is a method of philosophy, and hence when psychology did not assume an independent status apart from being a branch of philosophy, this was the only method employed. But later on it was criticised by scientists on the grounds that it is purely a subjective method, personal and private, amenable to subjectivity and individual variations. The personal equation of the investigator can interfere with the objective analysis of the matter of fact. This method therefore gave way to the method of observation, which was employed invariably by the Behaviourist school. The data collected by observation was repeated several times under controlled conditions for verification. Most modern equipment like electric devices were used for recording of behaviour-changes.

The method employed in the physical sciences, namely the experimental method, is now more popular as it has received the approval of the intellect of the scientific age. Prof. Wundt opened the first psychological laboratory, and since then the method has become very popular. Experiments under controlled conditions on heredity, perception (Psycho-physical

methods), learning, memory, motivation, emotions, measurement of abilities, assessment of personality, growth and development have been made, and complex experimental designs prepared. The method of psycho-analysis has been employed for the exploration of the Unconscious, because the other methods could be employed only with regard to the conscious behaviour. The word—association Tests, free-association test, dream-interpretation, Thematic Apperception test, Rorschach Inkblot Technique, and many other projective techniques have been employed to fathom the unconscious and to psychoanalyse the subconscious behaviour.

The method of observation and experimentation have a limited field, hence the necessity of psychoanalysis and introspection. These two methods were not new to Indian thinkers, and were actually used by them where necessary. For instance Charaka conducted experiments on the influence of physical stimulus on dreams. It has been recognised by Indian thinkers that psychological behaviour being purely subjective cannot be studied in the same way as Physics and Chemistry. Psychoanalysis is a better approach to its study, but it is somewhat difficult to apply. The most suitable method of psychology is introspection. Western psychology cannot approach the depths of mind through the objective methods employed in physical sciences. Our psychical apparatus is too fine and subtle to be mapped by gross physical instruments. Experiments at the perceptual level may succeed, but for understanding the functioning of the higher faculties of mind like reasoning, judgment, imagination, talent, sentiment, will, devotion, tranquillity and equipoise, nothing but introspection will suit. Observation and experimentation are confined to lower types of conscious behaviour. The introspection is applicable to all the four stages viz. Unconscious, Conscious, Dream-state and Superconscious. Every individual can introspectively study his own mind, analyse his mental tendencies, understand his weaknesses, control these, develop higher power and integrate the whole personality. This is the subject-matter of Yoga.

Western psychology has therefore to borrow anew the method of introspection from the Indian philosophers and dive

deep into the psychic ocean, rather than count the ripples on its surface.

D. LIMITATIONS OF WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY

The foregoing discussion about the historical development of Western psychology, and the puzzling problems that remain still unsolved, will enable us to generalise briefly the most prominent lacunas and limitations of Western psychology.

1. *Limited methods of study*

Western psychology has unfortunately abandoned the Introspection method. Introspection needs to be developed more deeply and applied more extensively.

2. *Limited scope of study*

Western psychology studies some aspects of the wakeful state or conscious level of mind. It makes just an attempt into the Unconscious. The Superconscious is as yet outside its purview. It does not accept the doctrine of past births of individuals, the past Sanskāras or engrams accumulated into the mind-stuff, the reality of the dreams and the reality of the extrasensory perceptions. It does not take into account the pre-natal past of individual and the survival and immortality of the psyche.

3. *Circumscribed view of life*

Western psychology does not study man as a whole. It views human mental activity detached from his total life. It studies mind as a single separate phenomenon, while as mind has no independent existence apart from the Self. It is therefore, that Western psychology, disregarding the Self, the Spirit, the Ātman, and studying mental behaviour in a detached way, is not able to discover the true relationship between mind and body, mind and nervous mechanism, and cannot arrive at definite conclusions regarding the origin and nature of mind. It studies the peripheries of mind without knowing the essence of mind. Infact, Western psychologists study a subject whose bonafides are unknown to them. The body-mind problem can

never be solved except in relation with the experiencing self, illuminating both. In words of Dr. G. Ryle :

"The trouble generally with Western thinkers is that not only do they view mind and matter as disjunctly capable of mutual exclusion, but they imagine that these alternations alone exhaust the field. Until this attitude is modified and the recognition of Self over and above mind and matter is made, there can be no satisfactory solution for body-mind problem."

Western psychologists assume mind as an independent entity the subject of all mental actions and all the experiences *while as* mind is no more than an instrument of action (as the body is) in the hands of the self. It is therefore called *Antah-karāṇa*, the inner instrument of action.

Western psychologists likewise, do not discover the source of continuity of all experience. Here also Self is unavoidable. Of course a discussion on the nature of the Self leads us to metaphysics which is beyond the frontiers of psychology. But true psychology cannot be studied without postulating the necessary fundamental metaphysical doctrines governing life and universe as a whole. If we miss the Self, we miss the focal point and the nucleons of all psychology.

Western psychology studies the mental functioning of men as individuals, as if there is no meeting plane of the individual minds.

It cannot conceive any universal or cosmic mind to which all the *individual minds* are related. It is therefore that it cannot account for the higher powers of mind or the ESP, like telepathy and clairvoyance.

Without any spiritual foundation. Western psychology cannot direct us to the highest fulfilment, unfolding and development of human personality. It can reveal neither the source nor the goal of human personality. In words of Sir Radhakrishnan :

"Unless human being is able to abstract from the world and get the divine presence, you cannot be said to reach at truth. It is therefore essential that if you are to develop any kind of spiritual values, you must subject yourself to considerable *Self-scrutiny*. That is the meaning of meditation. Mere intellectual learning or mere pedantry does not take you to God."

Psychology must help us in self-scrutiny and lead us to the path of spiritual bliss. Western psychology fails here.

E. LIMITATIONS OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

The dominant current running throughout the major philosophies of the West is materialism. The scientific age has created a skeptic attitude towards all the idealistic doctrines hitherto accepted by prominent thinkers from Plato to Kant. Even the theism of Christianity was challenged by astronomers who mapped the heavens with a telescope but found no God, by biologists who analysed life to its minutest form and discovered only a protoplasm, by physicists who analysed matter and discovered only electrons and protons, by historians who generalised that every new discovery brought a change in the philosophical outlook of a society, and by philosophers themselves who declared idealistic doctrines mere superstitions. A few reasons for this attitude are:

(i) The West could not accept infallibility of reason beyond certain point. It could not rely on intuition where reasoning failed, whereas intuition is one of the major instruments of valid knowledge, as recognised by Indian thinkers.

(ii) The West could not go beyond the perception of senses, and hence could not arrive at the essence of Reality which transcends the bonds of physical perceptions.

"The West refuses to accept the postulate that the world of mind and matter is but an appearance of a deeper reality which lies beyond the perception of our senses, regardless of how magnified these may be by powerful instruments of precision."¹

(iii) West believes that no man has ever attained supreme knowledge. "In the Orient, it has been accepted that man can know metaphysical truths by direct experience. He need not depend upon speculation, inference or faith. The literature is replete with the writing of men who are said to know the

¹Theos Bernard, *Hindu Philosophy*, p. 14.

whole truth of Nature and human existence, and the teachings of these men have been set forth in the philosophical systems of ancient India."¹

Because of the limitations of Western philosophy, Western psychology could not be built on strong foundations.

In this connection Gordon W. Allport doubts the universality of Western psychology:

"Does the excited psychology of action and behaviour so characteristic of America treat adequately all the capacities of human mind? Are the powers of meditation revealed through *Yoga* illusory and slightly absurd? ...Ignorance of Eastern thought leads us to give callow and mischievous answers to such questions as these."²

Western psychology is a product of Western philosophy, as it is based on the Western materialistic philosophy. Unless there is a radical change in the materialistic philosophy of life, true nature of Reality cannot be known, and as a corollary, all the instruments of materialistic philosophy will be inadequate to reach at the truth of mental functioning. This is the reason why most of the fundamental problems of psychology remain unsolved. A number of such problems were discussed above.

Colossal destruction caused by the two world wars in the present century have shaken the faith of many a Western thinkers in materialism and science divorced from spirit. A tendency is growing to accept the spiritual essence of the universe. Says Professor Eddington in a discussion of science and mysticism:

"We have seen that the cyclic scheme of physics presupposes a background outside the scope of its investigations. In this background we must find first, our own personality, and then perhaps a greater personality. The idea of a Universal Mind or Logos would be, I think, a fairly plausible inference from the present state of scientific theory, at least it is in harmony with it."³

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

² Swami Akhilananda, *Hindu Psychology*, Introduction by Allport, p. X.

³ *Ibid.*

Similarly G.N.M. Tyrrell approaches the Indian idea of *Divine Union* :

"In the present crisis of world History, one thing however stands out clearly. It matters profoundly what view is taken of the value of human individual. Only if we are intellectually convinced that it extends beyond the limits of atomic consciousness, and reaches out potentially to that for which the ordinary name is God, can the purpose of human society be secured...

From the nature of the personality of man, springs up the possibility of the mystical *divine union*, the promise of a limitless inheritance and the hope that in literal truth this mortal shall put on immortality."¹

Unless Western psychology takes into cognizance the ultimate goal of human being as the mystical divine union, it remains to be narrow and circumscribed. Alain Danielou, in his book '*Yoga the Method of Re-Integration*' refers to the same Divine Union as the be-end of all Psychology and Philosophy:²

"When the agitation of the mind is stilted, supra-mental perceptions appear, and with them comes the perceptions of the fundamental Union of all that exists ; consequently, all things are perceived to be in their natural aspects of this unity. If following any river we go down to the ocean in which all rivers unite, we can then go up any river we choose; similarly if we dive down, with ourselves to that point where all beings are one, we can thereafter enter into the most secret heart of all beings or things of the differentiated world."

A comparison of the Western and Indian approach to the same subject was presented above. The express purpose of the present investigation is to bring to lime-light the deep and everlasting wisdom of Indian seers on this subject of most utmost significance for the highest benefit of humanity.

Psychology in India has developed parallel to Indian philosophy, and as such a study of the development of Indian psychology at different periods is highly useful. Upanishads form the basis of Indian philosophy, and a number of philosophical systems developed in course of time. In the chapters that follow, psychology as developed in each philosophical system will be discussed.

¹ G.N.M. Tyrrell, *Personality of Man*, p. 284.

² Alain Danielou, *Yoga the Method of Re-Integration*, p. 76.

Psychology in Pre-Upaniṣadic Literature

A. PERIODS OF INDIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL THOUGHT

AS psychology has been a hand-maid of philosophy in India, a natural off-shoot, or an essential branch of it, its periods in its evolutionary process should be the same as those of philosophy. We may briefly outline the various periods:

Period I. *Pre-Upaniṣadic Period.*

Period II. *Upaniṣadic period* (1000 BC to 600 BC). This was the age of settlement of Āryans in Āryavarta. Further, it was the age of speculation, a period of transition from wonder to intuition, polytheism and monotheism (of Vedic period) to pure monism from rituals to meditation, from sacrificial acts to knowledge, and from theology to real philosophy.

Period III. *The Sūtra Period and the Epic.* The Epic period (c. 600 BC to 200 AD) corresponds to the period when the two Epics—Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata were composed, Vedāṅgas were elaborated, Upaniṣadic thoughts were further synthesised as in Bhagvadgīta, and rudiments of Buddhism, Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism also began to evolve.

The Sūtra Period (c. AD 200 to 600 AD) is characterised by the summarisation in Sūtra form of different philosophical systems. The schools in order are Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsa, Vedānta, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya, but as there are cross references throughout, we cannot present a sure chronology of the systems. Buddhist and Jain schools also developed during this period.

Period IV. *The Scholastic Period* (c. AD 200—). Even during the Sūtra period, commentaries on the sūtras and further commentaries began. Haribhadra (6th century AD) tried to synthesise the six system in his *Saddarśanasamuccaya*. Later

Kumarila, Śamkara, Śridhara, Rāmānuja, Mādhva, Vācaspati, Udayana, Jayanta, Bhāskara, Nimbārka, Vijñānabhikṣu, Raghunātha, Vidyānanda, Merutunga, Madhusūdana and others coming down even to the present century followed the suit. During the last century and the present century, also a host of scholars saints and philosophers like Dayananda, Ramakrishna, Vivekananda, Rama Tirtha, Ramana Maharshi, Aurobindo Ghosh, S.N. Das Gupta, Radhakrishnan, Arthur Avalon, Abhedananda, Akhilananda and others made voluminous and outstanding contributions while expounding the Indian philosophical and psychological principles. Redefining and re-interpreting the Indian philosophical doctrines in the light of the modern scientific discoveries and philosophical discussions in the West, as done by these modern scholars of India was essential, lest these outstanding doctrines die for want of modernity.

Our attempt here will be to present in a systematic order the evolution of psychological system from the Vedic times onwards, and systematising the same in the form of a treatise.

B. PSYCHOLOGY IN THE PRE-UPANISADIC LITERATURE

The earliest document not only of the Indian mind but also of the mind of the entire human race is the Vedas. Vedic literature consists of four different classes of collections viz. (1) Samhita, (2) Brahmana, (3) Āraṇyaka, and (4) Upaniṣad, which dealt with (i) hymns of prayer, benedictions, (ii) Theological explanations of the Samhita texts. (iii) secret doctrines of forest hermits and (iv) philosophical speculations, respectively. These four classes of texts roughly corresponded to the four stages (Āśramas) of life viz. Brahmacharya, Gṛhastha, Vānaprastha and Saṇnyāsa. Philosophical ideas systematised in the Upaniṣads, were thus the product of the last stage of life, characterised by the culmination of human experience and by maturity of thought. The subject matter of pre-Upaniṣadic works has thus been pure theology, liturgy, religious rites, sacrifices and incantations. We should therefore not expect anything philosophical or psychological from this early literature of Indians.

A few philosophical speculations are found here and there. The pluralism and henotheism in the shape of obeisance to and a belief in a number of gods gradually gave way to monotheism according to which the universe emanated from one great being Puruṣa or Prajāpati or Hiranyagarbha or Viśvakarman and that there is a chief deity superior to all the gods, who is one but named in various ways. The most important hymn in this connection is the hymn of creation (*Rgveda*, X, 121) and the Puruṣa sūkta (*Rgveda*, X, 90). In X, 72 the world is said to have emerged from non-existent. The cosmic forces arise from the infinite. In X, 121 the universe is said to have arisen out of pre-existent matter, 'the golden egg' (Hiranyagarbha). In X, 90 (Puruṣa Sūkta) the material out of which the universe was made is spoken of as Puruṣa, the body of primeval agent with 1000 heads and 1000 feet. The puruṣa hymn is the oldest pantheistic literature in India. It is this 'puruṣa' that becomes the soul of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. Thus Vedic cosmology is in a nebulous form, and there is lack of clearness and consistency. There is confusion of the combination of the theory of evolution with that of creation.

Some eschatological references also are there. Yama prepares resting place for the departed (*Rgveda*, X, 14, 1). The soul departs and takes to a path different from that of gods, (X, 6, and IX, 41, 2). Reward of meritorious deeds is given in heaven. An agnostic spirit also is evident in the later Vedic period, when doubt was expressed about the fundamentals of creation (*Rgveda*, X, 121 and I, 24 ; I, 185 ; X, 86).

But this cosmology, ontology, and eschatology leads us nowhere. It does not help us to discover any psychological principles in the Vedic literature. Hence there are only catchy references about mind, knowledge, intuition and the organs of senses.

1. *Desire as the creative energy*

We read of mind as the cosmic principle of which desire is said to be the creative energy. This desire (Kāma) can be compared to the élan vital of Bergson, but not to the sex of Freud. It suggests that an intelligent entity is the source of creation. This later on leads to the idea of Mahat or Buddhi in Sāṅkhya.

2. *Manas as Mind*

The word *Manas* is used everywhere for mind. 'Let us know each other's mind.'¹ Let our mind be the same.² The word *Citta* is used at some places almost synonymous for mind.³ "Arise you friends with one mind".⁴ The moon is said to have sprung up from the mind of *Purusa*.⁵ The five senses have been mentioned freely. The types of *Prana* also have been mentioned at certain places (*Atharva*, XI, 5, 124).

The concord hymn in *Atharva Veda* (III, 30) uses a number of psychological phrases e.g. *shaṛdayam*, *samanasyam*. The word *medhā* is used for intellect or intelligence.

3. *Characteristics of mind*

The concept of mind is dealt with in some details in the *Vājasaneyya Sāmhita*. There are six verses beginning from 'yajjagrato' to 'tanme manah śiva saṁkalpamastu'. These verses are freely used as prayer. The concept of mind in these verses is given as 'mind as a whole'. Roughly it corresponds to *antahkarana* including sense-organs and excluding soul. Some of the characteristics of mind mentioned in these verses are:

(i) Mind goes out far (*dūraṅgamam*) and is the swiftest (*jawiṣṭam*), as it is unhampered by the limitations of time and space. The faculty of imagination is referred here.

(ii) Mind is intelligence (*prajñānam*), feeling (*cetas*) and resolution (*dhṛtiḥ*). It roughly corresponds to the cognition, affection and will—the tripartite divisions of mental life.

(iii) Mind holds the past, present and the future all together and is thus the unifying principle of knowledge. Mind holds the entire consciousness.

(iv) Mind has a volitional phase, which leads each individual to action, as a charioteer leads the horses.

(v) The Vedic devotee prays for mental peace and pure thoughts (*śiva saṁkalpam*).

¹ *Rgveda*, X, 191, 2.

² *Ibid*, X, 191, 4.

³ *Ibid*, X, 191, 3.

⁴ *Ibid*, X, 101, 1.

⁵ *Ibid*, X, 90, 13.

4. The Significance of human mind

The significance of human mind is further elucidated in *Altareya Āraṇyaka* chapter II. A comparison is made between the mind of men and that of animals.

"He says what he has known. He knows the future. He knows both the world and the non-world. He desires the immortal by means of the mortal. He is thus gifted. The experience of the other animals is confined to the object of hunger and thirst. Whatever they know, they can't speak. Nor can they see what they know. They do not know the future. They do not know the world and the non-world."

According to *Altareya Āraṇyaka*, all reality exists in so far as it is known. The cognition is divided into the (a) knower (Prajña), (b) the intellect (Prajñā) and the cognition (Prajñāna).

There are references in *Śatapatha Brahmana* (XI, 2, 3, 1) about the perception and cognition of things, and the relation of name and form with mind. This Brahmana again discusses at another place (X, 6, 3) the self, which possesses intelligence and will. It is here that a new concept of the identity of the individual self and the universal self emerges. But the doctrine lacks psychological analysis.

5. The Self and Mind

The doctrine of self emerges in *Śatapatha Brahmana*. It is further elucidated in *Altareya Brahmana* (II, 6). It is the Self that is the object of our meditation. It is that by which one sees, hears, smells, tastes and feels. The characteristics of mind are enumerated through a number of concepts viz. awareness (Sanjña), comprehension (Ajñānam), understanding (Vijñānam), knowledge (Prajñānam), retentiveness (medhā), insight (dr̥ṣṭi), resolution (Dhṛtiḥ), opinion (mati), memory (smṛti) reflection (manīṣā), impulse (jūti), will (Sankalpa), purpose (kratuḥ), life (asuh), desire (Kām), control (vāsa). All these are names of mind or knowledge (Prajñānam).

Altareya Brahmana suggests that all reality is knowledge. The reality depends upon our mind. It does not, however, mean that reality has no objective existence. But it suggests that it is the self that appears as the object of knowledge in the form of the universe as well as the subject of knowledge. A

sort of idealistic pantheism was propounded at this stage, which was further elaborated in the Upaniṣads.

Thus in the pre-Upaniṣadic period, mind generally denotes consciousness and is used for certain powers which form ideas and decisions. Certain mental faculties have been listed, but these have no coherence or system. A vague connection of mind is sought with the Self. The five senses have been mentioned, and the function of mind to control these has been referred to.

C. TRANSITION TO UPANIṢADS

In the later Brahmanas and Āraṇyakas, speculative thinking and crude generalisation developed side by side with liturgy and ritualistic worship. The reflective thinking gave rise to a mass of literature called Upaniṣads. Upaniṣads are thus the concluding portion of the Vedic literature which embody the first philosophical thought in India. These bear a contrast to the previous literature in so far as these give preference to knowledge over religious rites. These are work of thought and reason, in contrast to Samhitas which are works of faith, emotion and imagination. As says Ranade, "In a word, we may say, that we pass from the Vedas to the Upaniṣads, we pass from the prayer to philosophy, from hymnology to reflection, from henotheistic polytheism to monotheistic mysticism."¹

The transition from Brahmanas to Upaniṣads is characterised by the transference of values from rites and sacrifices to knowledge and meditation, from karmayoga to jñānayoga, from faith to reason, from extroversion to introversion, from objectivity to subjectivity, observation to institution, and from liturgy to philosophy. The Upaniṣads which were compiled circa 600-200 BC are included in the Vedic literature. A number of Upaniṣads were compiled far later, and these will not be discussed here. 13 Upaniṣads are studied here, and are presented below in chronological order.

(a) *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Chāndogya*.

(b) *Iśa* and *Kena*.

¹Ranade, *Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, p. 3.

- (c) *Aitareya*, *Taitīreya* and *Kauṣītaka*,
- (d) *Kaṭha*, *Mundaka*, *Śvetāśvatara*,
- (e) *Praśna*, *Maitri* and *Māndūkya*.

The usual branches of philosophy are (i) metaphysics and ontology, (ii) epistemology, (iii) logic, (iv) ethics, and (v) aesthetics. But in Upaniṣads, only metaphysics and ethics are discussed in detail. About the other branches, there are insignificant references here and there.

The topics dealt with in the Upaniṣads are (i) the nature of reality, (ii) doctrine of Brahman, (iii) doctrine of self, (iv) relation between self and Brahman, and (v) creation. The topics about ethics dealt with are (i) transmigration and Karma, (ii) the goal of life as salvation and (iii) evil and suffering.

Psychology in the Upanisads

INTRODUCTION

MIND has never been considered as an independent entity in India, but an annexe to the 'Self' as an instrument of action. 'The Science of Mind' is an outcome of the science and philosophy of the 'Self', and hence all psychological principles are outcome of the philosophical doctrines. The psychological speculations in the Principal Upanisads cannot be explained apart from the deep philosophical doctrines which form their inseparable background. It will be imperative, therefore, to begin with a summary of the various philosophical doctrines in Upanisads. On the ontological side, the doctrines are:

1. Brahman as the Ultimate reality.
2. Self as the essence of all individuality.
3. Identification of Brahman with Ātman (Self).
4. Cosmology.

On the ethical side, the doctrines are:

1. The law of Karma, and Transmigration of Soul.
2. Salvation as the goal of life.

A. PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINES IN UPANIŠADS

1. *Brahman as Ultimate Reality*

Upanisads preach absolute monism and declare that the ultimate reality is Brahman. He is the unchangeable and everlasting reality underlying the exterior transient world. The whole world of plurality, with dualistic aspects of matter and spirit can be reduced without residuum into Brahman. Like a spider, weaving its own web, furnishing himself both its matter and design, Brahman is the material and efficient cause of the Universe.¹ This universe is Brahman. From Him do all things

¹MU, 1, 1, 7.

originate, into Him do they dissolve and by him are they sustained.¹ All these creatures merge in Brahman and lose their identity as honey collected by a bee from a particular flower loses its identity in the total honey,² or as the rivers rising from the ocean, merge in the ocean and become ocean itself.³ Brahman pervades the whole universe, though it may not be perceived by sight or touch, like salt pervading the salt-waters. If Brahman is known, everything else is known, just as if clay is known, all the objects made of clay are known.⁴ He is thus the reality of the real (*satyasya satyam*) and the source of all existing things.⁵ He is truth (*satyam*), consciousness (*jñānam*) and infinity (*anantam*).⁶ He is pure delight, and all language and mental speculations fail to reach it.⁷ He is the one Lord, pervading all the creatures, the inner essence of them all, and the witnessing consciousness.⁸ Through his shining do all these celestial bodies shine.⁹ He is without parts, without activity, tranquil and irreproachable.¹⁰ He is 'the single thread binding the whole plurality into a single unit'. Both consciousness (*cetana*) and non-consciousness (*acetana*) are aspects of that single reality.

This profound doctrine solves a number of riddles of philosophy. In the materialistic philosophy, matter alone is the substance constituting the objective world. But the objective world cannot have empirical existence apart from a subject that perceives or knows it. Hence materialistic theory which denies the existence of spirit or mind is one-sided and imperfect. In words of Goethe, 'matter cannot exist and be operative without spirit, or spirit without matter'. Upaniṣadic monism combines the two and declares Brahman governing both. "The universal substance appears as possessing these two attributes of subject and object,

¹CU, III, 14-1. TU, III, 6.

²CU, VI, 9, 1-2.

³Ibid, VI, 10, 1-2. MU, II, 1, 9.

⁴CU, VI, 1-6.

⁵BU, II, 1.

⁶Ibid, II, 1.

⁷Ibid, II, 4.

⁸SU, VI, 11.

⁹Ibid, VI, 14. MU, II, 2-10. KU, II, 2, 15.

¹⁰SU, VI, 19.

of spirit and matter. They are like the two modes of one eternal substance, which is unknown and unknowable existence."¹ The westerners may call it by different names like 'the unknowable' (Herbert Spenser), 'Ding-an-sich' (Kant), 'The God' (Plato), 'Over Soul' (Emerson) and the like.

The subject-object relationship of this phenomenal world merges in Brahman. Without the assumption of this Ultimate Principle, the subject-object relationship cannot be explained. This has been clearly explained in *Kaushitaki Upaniṣad* (III, 8) :

"Matter or object is related to spirit or subject, and the spirit or subject is equally related to the object or matter. If there were no object, there would be no subject ; and if there were no subject, there would be no object. From either side alone nothing could be achieved."

"From that infinite substance or Brahman, the Absolute Being, have evolved life-force, mind, the mental activities, the sense-powers, which are included in the meaning of the term spirit or subject on the one hand, and, on the other hand, space (either), all gaseous, liquid and solid objects which are understood by matter."² Upaniṣads thus declare matter and spirit, both subservient to Brahman.

"This Universe is like a gigantic magnet, one pole of which is matter, and the other is spirit, while the neutral point is the absolute substance."³

We may summarise in words of S. Radhakrishnan:

"The Upaniṣads affirm that Brahman on which all else depends, to which all existences aspire, Brahman which is sufficient to itself, aspiring to no other, without any need, is the source of all other beings, the intellectual principle, the perceiving mind, life and body. It is the principle which unifies the world of physicist, the biologist, the logician, the moralist and the artist."⁴

¹Abhedananda, Swami, *Self-Knowledge*, p. 10-11.

²*MU*, II, 1. 3.

³*Self Knowledge*, p. 13.

⁴Radhakrishnan, S., *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 59.

2. *Ātman as the Essence of Individuality*

The Upaniṣads declare Ātman the innermost essence of the individual self. Just as in relation to the universe, Brahman is the ultimate reality, so is the individual ego the expression of Ātman. Ātman is the true self, the eternal self, the one eternal being in the midst of all forms and names, all individuals.¹ He is the subject, the knower, the perceiver. He is the light of lights in the individual, the foundational reality underlying all the activities and the conscious powers of the individual. Ātman is not to be identified with the physical personality of the individual, nor with the mental personality. He is even beyond that, remaining constant in all the states of the individual *viz.* wakeful, dream, deep-sleep, swoon, death and rebirth. He is free from all the attributes of the person, free from all the sins, sufferings, griefs and desires. "The knowing self the Ātman is never born, nor does he die at an time. He sprang from nothing and nothing sprang from him. He is unborn, eternal, abiding and primeval. He is not slain when the body is slain."² He neither slays, nor is he slain.³ He is smaller than the small, greater than the great, set in the heart of every creature."⁴

3. *Identification of Ātman with Brahman*

One of the greatest discovery made by Upaniṣadic seers intuitively is the identification of Ātman with Brahman. Brahman is not only the Universal Spirit, but also the essence of the self of individual. Brahman is known through Ātman. The two are the same. Says *Chândogya Upaniṣad*, "This whole world is Brahman. This soul of mine within the heart is Brahman."⁵ Though Brahman is beyond this universe and individual, He enters into man and lives in him and becomes the essence of his existence."⁶ The sumum bonum of the individual is therefore to realize the Self—Ātman. Ātman is to be seen, heard and reflected upon. One should realize,

¹KU, II, 2, 23. SU, VI, 13.

²KU, I, 2, 18.

³*Ibid*, I, 2-19.

⁴*Ibid*, I, 2, 20.

⁵CU, II, 14, 1.

⁶*Ibid*, IV, 15.

that Ātman is Puruṣa or Brahman,¹ because Self is the absolute (ayaṁ Ātmā Brahma).² All this universe is Brahman. "You are that" (tat tvam asi).³ "I am Brahman" (aham Brahmasmi).⁴

"He who knows Brahman as the real, as knowledge and as the infinite (satyaṁ jñānam, anantaṁ) placed in the sacred place of the heart and in the highest heavens realises all desires alongwith Brahman the intelligent."⁵ It is in this connection that Yājñavalkya gives detailed percepts to Maitreyi:

"Verily by seeing of, by hearing of, by thinking of, by understanding of the Self, all this is known."⁶

The essence of the Upaniṣadic teaching is the formula "That thou art" in the teaching of Aruni to Śvetaketu.⁷ After explaining to Nārada that Bhūma is the essence of the whole universe, Sanat Kumāra abruptly proceeds from third person to first person:

"That infinite alone is below. That is above. That is behind. That is front. That is to the south. That is to the North. That alone is all this. So next is the teaching with regard to the self-sense. I alone am below. I am above. I am behind. I am in front. I alone am all this."⁸

A further description is given in *Chāndogya*:

"He who is permeating the mind, who has Prana for his body, whose nature is consciousness.....this my Ātman, residing in the lotus of the heart is smaller than a grain of paddy.....This my Ātman residing in the heart is greater than earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all the worlds."⁹

"This Ātman has pervaded all, effulgent, incorporeal, scatheless, untouched by brain or nerve-centres, sinless, pure, wise,

¹BU, IV, 4, 12.

²Ibid, 1, 4, 10.

³CU, VI, 8, 7.

⁴BU, 1, 4, 10.

⁵TU, II, 1.

⁶BU, II, 4, 5.

⁷CU, VI, 8, 7.

⁸Ibid, VII. 25. 1.

⁹Ibid, III, 14. 2-3.

omnipresent, self-existent, who has ordered all things aright for eternity."¹ "He who realises all beings in the Self and the Self in all animate and inanimate objects of the universe, he does not feel any revulsion."²

"The eternal greatness of the knower of Brahman is not increased by work nor diminished. One should know the nature of that alone. Having found that one is not tainted by evil action. Therefore he who knows it as such, having become calm, self-controlled, withdrawn, patient and collected sees the Self in his own Self, sees all in the Self.....free from evil, free from taint, free from doubt, he becomes a knower of Brahman."³

Upaniṣadas propound the identity of Brahman with Ātman—the Universal Soul with Individual soul. Brahman is the Universal soul, and He is the same person residing in the individual. So says *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*:

"As fire which is one, entering this world becomes varied in shape according to the object it burns, so also the one Self within all beings becomes varied according to whatever (it enters) and also exists outside (them all)."⁴

The forms that the Supreme assumes are not its modifications but are the manifestations of its possibilities. The Supreme Self is unaffected by the pain of the individual (*na lipyate lokaduḥkhena bāhyah*).⁵

"It is the one controller of all the inner self all things that makes his form manifold."⁶

A person who realises the identification of Brahman with Ātman, realises his Self truly. He is the liberated soul. Such a liberated soul feels like *Trīṣaṅku*:

"I am the mover of the tree (of Universe), my fame is like a mountain peak. The exalted one making me pure, as the sun, I am the immortal one. I am a shining treasure, wise, immor-

¹ *IU*, 8.

² *Ibid*, 7.

³ *BU*, IV, 4, 23.

⁴ *KU*, II, 2, 9.

⁵ *Ibid*, II, 2, 11.

⁶ *Ibid*, II, 2, 12.

tal, indestructable."¹ This is the revelation of the inspired sage like Trīṣaṅku.

S. Radhakrishnan summarises this phenomena:

"We have now the Universe of thought constructed by thought, answering to thought and sustained by thought, in which subject and object are absorbed as moments..... God is the inner ground, the basis of identity; the world is the outer manifestation, the externalisation of self-consciousness."² The light of Brahman that shines above and in everything is the light within the body of man.³ and the light within is the light everywhere.

Upaniṣads declare that the individual is the universe in miniature and the universe is the individual writ large. "As large indeed as is this Ākāśā (space), so large is that Ākāśā in the heart. Within it indeed are contained both heaven and earth, both fire and air, both the sun and the moon, lightning and the stars. Whatever there is of him in this world and whatever is not, all that is contained within it."⁴ Thus *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* propounds a very significant philosophical doctrine that there is macrocosm in microcosm. Perhaps the specialists in atomic science will vouchsafe that an atom is a universe itself.

4. The Individual Personality

The Universe is an expression of Brahman, so is the individual personality an expression of Ātman. The gross physical body and the psychical apparatus are attached for its fulfilment, for all its actions. Though the pure Self, Ātman is beyond any attribute, but the individual reflected by Atman is bound by the rules of the phenomenal world. This individual called *jīva* is the person who enjoys or suffers, and is bound by the law of *Karma*. The characteristics of the individual soul, *jīva* are mentioned in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*,⁵

(i) He has the three qualities—*gunas viz.* equilibrium and

¹TU, I, 10. 1.

²Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, I, p. 38.

³CU, III, 12. 9.

⁴*Ibid*, VIII, 1. 3.

⁵SU, V, 7-12.

- enlightenment (sattva), energy and passion (rajas) and inertia (tamas).
- (ii) He is the doer of the deeds that are to bear fruit. He is the enjoyer of the fruits of action. He takes different births in accordance with the actions.
- (iii) He is very subtle. His existence may be the size of the thumb. He is as subtle as a part of the 100th part of the point of a hair divided a hundred fold.
- (iv) He is neither male, nor female, nor neuter. Whatever body it takes to itself, by that it is held.

5. Transmigration and Karma

The individual soul (jīva) transmigrates and takes a number of births. It leaves the first body, and takes another one, by being born in another place. "As a caterpillar when it comes to the end of a blade of grass, after having made another approach (to another blade) draws itself towards it, so does this jīva, after having thrown away the body, approaches to another body, for making the transition."¹ In each successive birth, it improves upon the older apparatus (physical and mental), "as a goldsmith taking a piece of gold turns it into another, newer and more beautiful."²

All the same the cycle of birth, life and death is repeated, on account of the desires persisting in Jīva. "He who entertains desires, thinking of them, is born again here and there on account of his desires."³

The nature of the next birth is determined by the *Karma* of the individual. "Some souls enter into a womb for embodiment; others enter stationary objects according to their deeds and according to their thoughts."⁴

Death according to Upaniṣads is nothing but a change of the gross physical body. The individual jīva retains with him the subtle body, consisting of the life principle (Prāṇa), the mind, the past impressions, the past karma and the self-sense

¹ *ARI*, IV, 4. 3.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 4-4.

³ *WU*, III, 2, 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*

(*ahaṅkāra*). The phenomena of death is explained in detail in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*:

"The point of his heart becomes lighted up and by that light the self departs either through the eye or through the head or through other apertures of the body. And when he thus departs, life departs after him. And when life thus departs, all the vital breaths depart after it. He becomes one with intelligence. What is intelligence, departs with him. His knowledge and his work take hold of him as also his past experience (*Vidyā Karmāṇi purvaprajñāca*)."¹ "The dying man's breathing becomes difficult."² All the breaths and senses gather round the self at the end, when he is breathing with difficulty, just as policemen, magistrates, Chariot-drivers, leaders of village gather round a King who is departing.³

The Upaniṣads make a clear distinction between the Supreme Soul, and the individual soul, *jīva*.

"There are two selves that drink the fruit of Karma in the world of good deeds. Both are lodged in the secret place of the heart, the chief seat of the supreme. The knowers of Brahman speak of them as shade and light as also (the householders) who maintain the five sacrificial fires and those too who perform the triple *Nāciketas* fire."⁴ This is how the relation between the individual soul (*jeevātma*) and the Supreme soul is explained. A parable of two birds on the same tree has been frequently mentioned and that explain this point further.

"Two birds, companions (who are) always united, cling to the self-same tree. Of these two, the one eats the sweet fruit, and the other looks on without eating."⁵

It explains that the eternal in itself and the eternal in the empirical flux are companions. The individual self becomes subject to pleasure and pain, and all the experiences of the

¹*BU*, IV, 4, 2.

²*Ibid*, 3, 35.

³*Ibid*, 3, 38.

⁴*KU*, 1, 3, 1.

⁵*Mundaka U*, III. 1. 1. *KU*, III, *SU*, IV, 6.

phenomenal world. But the transcendental Self is above all these experiences. He is only the witness.

6. *The Seat of the Soul*

A number of speculations have been made regarding the seat of the Soul. The Upaniṣadic seers discussed the nature of the part or parts of the body with which the soul is closely associated. Some of them give the same view as Aristotle by proclaiming that the seat of the soul is the heart:

"This space that is within the heart—therein is the Person subsisting of mind, immortal and resplendent."¹

A further reference is given at the same place, extending the seat from heart to the brain. It roughly corresponds to the later yoga which mentions the Suṣumnā Nādi going from the region of the heart to the skull.

"That which hangs down between the palates like a nipple, that is the birthplace of Indra; where is the edge of the hair splitting up the skull of the head."²

Deussen and Max Müller identify this nipple as uvula. But it seems to have no relation with the later yoga. Perhaps the reference is to pituitary gland. S. Radhakrishnan directly connects it to the Suṣumnā Nādi of the yoga, "which passes upward from the heart, through the mid region of the throat up to the skull where the roots of the hair lie apart."³

Ranade guesses that the reference is to the soul in the heart, travelling along the course of the sympathetic nerves to the pituitary body. From the pituitary it moves to the lateral ventricle.

It has also been speculated that the soul has spatial extension. According to *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*:

"This person who consists of mind is of the nature of light, is within the heart like a grain of rice or of barley...And yet he is the ruler of all, the lord of all, governing at this end and whatsoever also exists."⁴

¹TU, I, 6, 1.

²Ibid.

³Radhakrishnan, S., *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 534.

⁴BU, V, 6, 1.

Again, *Kāthopaniṣad* mentions it of the size of a thumb.¹

Chāndogya mentions it as of the measure of a span.²

Pradesa is the span of the thumb and the forefinger. *Maitri Upaniṣad* synthesises the different propositions by presenting different alternatives for the same point:

'A man reaches the supreme state by meditating on the soul, who is smaller than an atom, or of the size of the thumb, or of a span, or of the whole body.'³ The controversy regarding the spatial extension is perfectly resolved in *Kātha Upaniṣad*: "The soul of the living being is subtler than the subtle, and yet greater than the great and is placed in the cavity of the heart."⁴

The same viewpoint is corroborated by *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*:

"My soul in the heart is smaller than a grain of rice or barley, or a mustard or a canary seed, and yet my soul which is pent up in the heart, is greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than the heaven, greater than all these worlds."⁵ We may generalise that according to the Upaniṣads, the soul transcends all the spatial limitations. In the body it is, however, associated with the heart.

7. Liberation

Rebirth takes place only with regard to the category of persons whose attachment with this world has not died. He who desires, continues subject to re-birth. But re-birth does not take place with regard to him:

- "(i) Who does not desire (akāmaḥ) ;
- (ii) Who is without desire (niṣkāmaḥ) ;
- (iii) Who is freed from desire or whose desires are satisfied (āptakāmaḥ) ;
- (iv) Whose desire is the self (ātmakāmaḥ).

His breaths do not depart. Being Brahman, he goes to Brahman."⁶

¹KU, II, 2, 12.

²CU, V, 18, 1.

³MU, VI, 38.

⁴KU, I, 2, 20.

⁵CU, III, 14, 3.

⁶BU, IV, 4, 6.

Such a person is the liberated soul.

"Such liberated souls, such wisemen, free from desires, worship the Person and pass beyond the seed of re-birth."¹ Again, says sage Yājñavalkya:

"When all the desires that dwell in the heart are cast away, then does the mortal become immortal, then he attains Brahman (in this very body). Just as the slough of a snake lies on an apt-hill, dead, cast off, even so lies this body. But this disembodied immortal life is Brahman only, is light indeed."² Through the knowledge of Brahman, the wise man attains the blissful immortality. In that state, "the Knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are dispelled and his deeds terminate."³ "The sun shines not there, nor the moon and stars, these lightnings shine not, where could this fire be? Everything shines only after that shining light. The shining of the liberated illuminates all these worlds."⁴ The liberated soul, free from passion, tranquil, having attained the omnipresent self on all sides, enter into the All itself.⁵ The identity of liberated soul with Brahman is beautifully explained by a number of metaphors.

"Just as flowing rivers disappear in the ocean casting off name and shape, even so the knower, freed from name and shape, attains to the divine person, higher than the high."⁶ The liberated soul says: "I am the food, I am the food eater. I am the combining agent. I am the first born of the world order, earlier than the gods, in the centre of immortality. I have overcome the whole universe. I am brilliant like the sun."⁷

Renunciation is preached as the path for liberation:

"Verily he is the great unborn Self who is this person consisting of knowledge among the senses. In the space within the heart lies the controller of all, the lord of all, the ruler of all. He does not become greater by good works nor smaller by evil works. He is the bridge that serves as the

¹ *MU*, III, 2, 1.

² *BU*, IV, 4, 7.

³ *MU*, II, 2, 8.

⁴ *Ibid*, 2, 10. *KU*, II, 2, 15. *SU*, VI, 14.

⁵ *Ibid*, V, III, 2, 5.

⁶ *Ibid*, V, III, 28.

⁷ *TU*, III, 10, 5.

boundary to keep the different worlds apart. Him the Brahmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, by gifts, by penance, by fasting. On knowing Him, in truth, one becomes an ascetic. Desiring Him only as their worlds, monks wander forth. Verily because they know this, the ancient sages did not wish for offspring. What shall we do with offspring (they said), we who have attained this Self, this world? They having risen above the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, the desire for worlds, led the life of a mendicant. For the desire for sons is the desire for wealth, and the desire for wealth is the desire for worlds; both these are indeed, desires only. This Self is (that which has been described as) not this, not this. He is incomprehensible for He is never comprehended. He is indestructible for He cannot be destroyed. He is unattached for He does not attach himself. He is unfettered. He does not suffer, He is not injured. Him (who knows this) these two (thoughts) do not overcome, for some reason he has done evil, for some reason he has done good. He overcomes both. What he has done or what he has not done does not burn him."¹

8. *Ontology*

Upaniṣads explain a parallelism between the psycho-physical apparatus of the individual and that of the Universe. An understanding of the whole cosmology as given in the Upaniṣads is therefore essential for understanding the psychological principles.

In the beginning, declare the Upaniṣads, all this was being (sat) alone. That is Brahman, truth (satya), knowledge (jñāna), bliss (ānanda), ever-full (pūrṇa), ancient (sanātana) and one without a second.

The pure Brahman became the witnessing consciousness, the eternal subject faced by the principle of all objectivity. The pure spirit developed into subject-object relationship. On the objective side it is called matter (mūla-prakṛti), and on the subjective side it is the consciousness (caitanya). When this root principle of matter is reflected in Brahman it becomes the witness self (Sākṣi).²

When that mūla-prakṛti undergoes change, due to the preponderance of the Sattva quality, it becomes known as the unmanifested (avyakta) and has the power of veiling (the nature of) the Supreme Self. What is reflected in it becomes the Īśvara consciousness. That Īśvara has māyā under his control, he is all knowing, the first cause of creation, sustenance

¹ BU, IV, 4, 22.

² PU, I, 3.

and dissolution of the world, he takes the form of sprout of the world. That causes the entire world resting on it and becomes manifest.¹

From the power of veiling dwelling in *Īśvara* there comes into being the power of projection known as the *mahat* due to the preponderance of *rajas*. What is reflected in it becomes the *Hiraṇyagarbha* consciousness. That consciousness conceiving the *mahat* *tatva* as its own has its form manifested both distinctively and indistinctively.²

From the power of projection dwelling in *Hiraṇyagarbha* there comes into being the power of making gross bodies, known as the self-sense (*ahaṅkāra*). What is reflected in it becomes the *virāṭ* consciousness. That *virāṭ* conceiving the self-sense as its own with its form manifested distinctively becomes the sustainer of all gross creation. From that *Virat* self originate ether, from ether air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth. Out of these gross elements he created these macrocosms and globular gross bodies.

In brief, the order of evolution is from Brahman to *Īśvara*, *Īśvara* to *Hiraṇyagarbha*, and *Hiraṇyagarbha* to *Virāṭ*. The distinction between these four modifications (called *catuṣpād* of Brahman) is well explained by S. Radhakrishnan:³

"The absolute conceived as it is in itself, independent of any creation is called Brahman. When it is thought of having manifested itself as the universe, it is called *virāṭ*; when it is thought of as the spirit moving everywhere, in the universe, it is called *Hiraṇyagarbha*; when it is thought of as a personal God, creating, protecting and destroying the universe, it is called *Īśvara*. *Īśvara* becomes *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu* and *Śiva* when his three functions are taken separately. The real is not the sum of these."⁴ Thus we have four sides of the same Ultimate Reality:

1. Brahman—the Universal Being, anterior to all concrete reality.
2. *Īśvara*—the causal principle of all differentiation.
3. *Hiraṇyagarbha* (golden egg)—the innermost essence of the universe.

¹ *Ibid.* 1, 4.

² *Ibid.* 1, 5.

³ *PU*, I, 6-7.

⁴ Radhakrishna, S., *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 66.

4. Virāt—the manifest world.

"All these are co-existent and not alternating poises where we have either a quiescent Brahman or a creative Lord. These are simultaneous sides of one Reality."¹

We may also explain these four principles as Ultimate Reality (Brahman), universal consciousness (Īśvara), universal mind (Hiraṇyagarbha) (Logos of Plotinus) and lastly the gross physical universe (Virāt). Brahman is the Supreme Self, beyond cause and effect. It becomes self-conscious, with the objective non-ego (mūlaprakṛti) opposed to it, and assumes the name Īśvara. The same is manifested in subtle matter of the universe (or universal mind) and is called Hiraṇyagarbha or Sūtrātman. The same manifested in the gross physical world is Virāt. This is the order of evolution at the cosmic level. But there is a similar evolution at the individual level also.

"The omniscient Lord possessed of a particle of māyā on entering the several bodies attained the state of individual soul (jīva). By identification with the three bodies, gross, subtle and causal, he attained the state of doer and the enjoyer, ever performing the functions of waking, dreaming, sleeping and dying, he twirls round and round like a potter's wheel."²

Corresponding to the four states of Brahman, we have four states of Ātman viz.

1. Ātman, the pure self;
2. Prajñyā, the Self in deep sleep (suṣupti), with its causal body (Kāraṇa śarīra);
3. Taijasa, the Self in dream state, with its subtle body (linga śarīra);
4. Viśva, the Self in wakeful state, with its gross physical body.

In the State of involution, the whole gross world recedes into the primordial matter, the world spirit Hiraṇyagarbha. The latter is absorbed in Īśvara. Īśvara has all three powers, the creation, the sustenance and the dissolution. Using the power of dissolution, the Hiraṇyagarbha merges in Īśvara. Īśvara, in its turn himself merges in Brahman, the Eternal Being.

¹ *Ibid*, p. 72.

² *PU*, I, 12.

The same is diagrammatically shown below :

Diagram 1

EVOLUTION

Cosmic Level Objective Side	Individual Level Subjective Side	Form	State
1. Brahman The Absolute	Ātman Pure Self		Turiya Blissful
2. Īśvara Universal Consciousness The Creative Spirit	Prajñā Intellectual Self	Kāraṇa Śarīra, Causal Body	Suṣupti Deep sleep
3. Hiraṇyagarbha Universal Mind World Spirit	Taijasa Mental Self	Linga Śarīra, Subtle Body	Svapna Dream
4. Virāṭ Cosmos	Viśva Bodily Self	Sthūla Śarīra, Gross Physical Body	Jāgrat Wakeful

INVOLUTION

Cosmic Level	Individual Level
Virāṭ	Viśva
Hiraṇyagarbha	Taijasa
Īśvara	Prājñā
Brahman	Ātman

The same order is true for the individual jīva. The gross body perishes, then goes the subtle body, then remains the causal body. That also merges in the Ātman. What remains is Ātman the Pure Self, who is identical with Brahman.

A complete outline of the order of involution is given in *Paingala Upaniṣad* (III. 3). The same is diagrammatically shown below. The order in the diagram is from left to right.

Diagram 2

ORDER OF INVOLUTION

Virāṭ	Hiraṇyagarbha	Īśvara	Brahman
Ahaṅkāra Self Sense	Mahat The Great Principle	Avyakta Unmani- fested	Brahman
Viśva	Taijasa	Prājña	Ātman
Sthūla Śarīra	Linga Śarīra	Kāraṇa Śarīra	Ātman
Solid Liquid	Fire-Gas	Ether	

The order of involution as given in Upaniṣads is well-explained by S. Radhakrishnan:

"The working and the dream states answer to the exteriorised existence and interiorised life of the world spirit. When the world spirit externalises its attention, we have the manifestation of the cosmos. When it turns its attention inwards, the cosmos retreats into latency. When the world spirit withdraws altogether into undisturbed stillness, the object, though present, becomes a mere abstraction. When even that ceases, Īśvara is Brahman.

The riddle of mind-matter relationship, which still forms a subject of controversial discussion in the western philosophy, was solved long ago by the Upaniṣadic seers. "The interaction of the universal subject and object develop the rest of the universe. Hiraṇyagarbha is the Sūtrātman and plays with ideas,

¹Radhakrishnan, S., *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 703.

mental states, as Taijasa does in the dream world."¹ Matter and Mind, Object and Subject are the two sides of the same coin. Both these merge in Brahman. The two are interdependent, and both are dependent upon the Absolute. The psychophysical parallelism exists only to the limit that both matter and spirit are manifested and are in actual operation by the will of the Absolute.

B. THE STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

It was mentioned above that according to Upaniṣadic sages, consciousness (caitanya) vests not in the body or the mind but in the 'Self'. Mind, in the Upaniṣads, is simply a subtle organ of action, and it is material (ānamayaṁ manas);² differing from the gross body only in the degree of grossness. It is not consciousness, but a material force enveloping consciousness. Pure consciousness is not an attribute of Mind. It is beyond Mind, being independent of it. Consciousness is an attribute of the Pure Self, or the Ultimate Reality. The Supreme is Being (sat), Consciousness (cit) and Bliss (ānanda). It is the power of consciousness (caitanya sakti) that illuminates the whole gross physical and mental body at the individual level, and the Virāṭ and Hiranyagarbha at the cosmic level. This consciousness pervades the entire cosmos, and is differentiated in the universe only in degrees, influenced by the three guṇas—sattva, rajas and tamas. It pervades the individual self, and assumes four forms.

Usually we talk of our experiences in the wakeful state of mind. Western psychology gives more premium to this state, and talks of dreams and sleep only in relation to abnormal behaviour. But Upaniṣadic seers discovered three distinct states of mind, and gave due emphasis upon each. They discovered a number of facts regarding these. The three states discovered are : wakeful state, dream state and deep sleep state (jāgrat; svapna and suṣupti). The only reference about a fourth state is given in *Māndūkya Upaniṣad*. But actually speaking it is not a state of mind. It is the final state wherein

¹Radhakrishnan, S., *The Principal Upaniṣads*.

²CU, VI, 5, 4; VI, 6, 5; VI, 7, 6.

mind withdraws and is not functioning at all. In this state mind has no locus standi. It is named as 'turīya' by later philosophers. There is a difference between this state and the third state of dreamless sleep. In the dreamless sleep, the mind has an existence in subtle potential form. That is why, we say after a deep sleep, 'I had a deep sleep and I enjoyed it.' The experience of enjoyment is there. But about this fourth state, the explanation is not graphic and detailed, as given by later philosophers.

1. The Four States of Consciousness in *Māndūkya*

Māndūkya Upaniṣad explains four states of the soul, viz. (i) Viśva, the waking state, (ii) taijasa, the dream state, (iii) prājña, the state of dreamless sleep, and the (iv) state of spiritual consciousness (called turīya by later philosophers). This corresponds to the four poise of reality, the Absolute, Brahman viz. (i) Virāt, the external Universe, (ii) Hiraṇyagarbha, the World-Spirit, (iii) Īśvara, the Creative Spirit and (iv) Brahman, the Absolute. These are the four feet of reality, as mentioned in puruṣa-sūkta of *Rgveda* (X,90).

According to *Māndūkya Upaniṣad* the soul has four conditions¹

"The first quarter is Vaiśvānara, whose sphere of activity is the waking state, who cognises external objects, who has seven limbs and nineteen mouths and who enjoys gross objects."²

"The second quarter is Taijasa, whose sphere of activity is the dream state, who cognises, internal objects, who have seven limbs and nineteen mouths and who enjoys the subtle objects."³ The nineteen mouths explained by later commentators are : five organs of senses, five organs of action, five prāṇas, manas, buddhi and ahaṅkāra and citta.

"Where one, being fast asleep, does not desire any desire whatsoever and does not see any dream whatsoever, that is deep asleep. The third quarter is prājña whose sphere of activity is the state of deep sleep (suṣupti), who has become one, who is verily, a mass of cognition, who is full of bliss and

¹MU, 1, 2.

²Ibid, 1, 3.

³Ibid, 1, 4.

who enjoys bliss and whose face is thought."¹

In this third state, consciousness enjoys peace and has no perception of either external or internal objects. This is different from the wakeful state in which consciousness moves outward, or from dream state in which consciousness moves inwards and produces subtle dream-objects.

S. Radhakrishnan comments upon the paragraphs as under:

"In the waking state we are bound by the fetters of sense-perception and desire; in the dream state we have a greater freedom as the self makes a world of its own, out of the materials of the waking world. Though in a dream state, we take the dream images of delight and oppression as real, we produce them out of ourselves. In dreamless sleep the self is liberated from the empirical world, indeed from the person as a contained unit.² The fourth state is described as under:

"The (Turiya) is not that which cognises the internal object not that which cognises the external objects, not what cognises both of them, not a mass of cognition, not cognitive, not non-cognitive. It is unseen, incapable of being spoken of, ungraspable, without any distinctive marks, unthinkable, unnamable, the essence of the knowledge of the one self, that into which the world is resolved, the peaceful, the benign, the non-dual, such, they think, is the fourth quarter, He is the Self; He is to be known."³

This fourth state is the state of 'oneness with Brahman.' It has been named by later philosophers as *turiya*. It is the super-conscious state, in words of Swami Vivekananda. Prof. Ranade calls it self-conscious state.

The relation corresponding between the states of individual and that of the universal Self are explained by S. Radhakrishnan.

"When analogically we transfer this idea from the microcosm to the macrocosm, from the individual to the world, since there is a co-relation between intelligibility and being, we have—

- (i) answering to the waking state, Virāṭ ;
- (ii) to the dream state, Hiraṇyagarbha ; and,
- (iii) to the dreamless sleep state, Īśvara.

All these are on the plane of duality. Īśvara has facing him *mūla-prakṛti*, though in an unmanifested (avyakta) condition, as the self has the object in an unmanifested condition in the

¹MU, 1, 5.

²Radhakrishnan, S., *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 697.

³MU, 1, 7.

state of dreamless sleep."¹

The revered scholar again applies the four states of individual consciousness to the universal consciousness.

"The waking and the dream states answer to the exteriorised existence and interiorised life of the world-spirit. When the world-spirit externalises its attention, we have the manifestation of the cosmos. When the world-spirit withdraws altogether into undisturbed stillness, the object though present becomes a mere abstraction. When even that ceases, *Īśvara* is Brahman."²

The Western psychologists take into account only the wakeful state. But from the Upaniṣads, we learn that for arriving at Truth we must take into account all the four states of consciousness. From the point of the Self, the experiencer, the dream state and the deep-sleep state are real. The Self actually experiences in all the states. The importance of all the four states is well explained by S. Radhakrishnan:

"Indian thought takes into account the modes of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep. If we look upon the waking consciousness as the whole then we get realistic, dualistic and pluralistic conceptions of metaphysics. Dream consciousness when exclusively studied leads us to subjectivist doctrines. The state of dreamless sleep inclines us to abstract and mystical theories. The whole truth must take all the modes of consciousness into account."³

The three states in Bṛhadāraṇyaka

The three states are also explained in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (IV-3-10) :

"Verily there are just two states of this person (The state of being in this world and the state of being in the other world.) There is an intermediate third state, that of being in sleep (dream). By standing in this intermediate state one sees both these states, of being in this world and of being in the other world. Now whatever the way is to the state of being in the other world, having obtained that way one sees both the evils (of this world) and the joys (of the other world). When he goes to sleep he takes along the material of this all-embracing world, himself tears it apart, himself builds it up ; he sleeps (dreams) by his own brightness, by his own light. In that state the person becomes self-illuminated."

¹Radhakrishnan, S., *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 702-3.

²*Ibid*, p. 703.

³Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, vol. I.

The self moves from one state to another like a large fish moving along both banks of a river. (*Br. U. IV-3*). The Self is by nature, eternal, free, enlightened and pure. In the state of deep sleep it is perfectly serene and unattached. But in dream state it enjoys and suffers, and creates a world of its own.

The pendulum of mental states is thus well-explained by Yājñavalkya through the illustration of a fish in the river. It is illustrated here in illustration 1, below.




Illustration 1 : The Pendulum of Mental States

Nature of Sleep

As far as the nature of sleep is concerned a number of theories have been presented.

(a) The fatigue theory has been explained in *Chāndogya* and *Bṛhddāraṇyaka*:

"Just as a bird tied to a string, after flying in various directions and finding no resting place elsewhere, takes refuge at the very place whereto it is tied, even so, dear boy, that mind after flying in various directions and finding no resting place elsewhere, takes refuge in Prāṇa, for the mind, dear boy, is tied to Prāṇa."¹

The same example is given in *Bṛhddāraṇyaka*.²

¹CU, VI, 8,2.

²BU, IV, 3-19.

(b) Another theory presented is that during sleep all the senses are absorbed in the mind.

"As all the rays of the setting sun become one in this circle of light and as they spread forth when he rises again and again, even so does at this become one in the supreme god, the mind. Therefore in that state, the person hears not, sees not, smells not, tastes not, touches not, takes not, rejoices not, emits not, moves not. Then they say, he sleeps."¹

Nature of Dream

The Upaniṣadic seers maintained that in dreams we have reproduction of the working experiences, we see the same chariots, fields, roads, houses, wealth, etc., that we see in our wakeful life.

The seers have gone beyond this phenomenon also. They have admitted that sometimes in dreams we have new experiences. The creative side of the dream consciousness is mentioned at various places.

Praśna Upaniṣad mentions that we meet in the dreams "what has been seen and not been seen, what has been heard and what has not been heard, what has been experienced and not been experienced, what is existent and what is not evident..."²

About the nature of dream, Yājñavalkya says that "there are no chariots there. nor animals to be yoked to them, no roads but he creates (projects from himself) chariots, animals and roads."³ There are no joys but he creates. He sometimes has pleasant or painful experiences. In the dream state the person is self-illuminated. He projects his own thoughts and creates his dream world.

Again Yājñavalkya states:

"When he moves about in dream, these are his world. Then he becomes as it were a great kind, a great Brahmana, as it were. He enters, as it were, states, high and low. Even as a great king, taking his people, moves about in his country as he pleases, so also here, this one taking his breaths, (senses), moves about in his own body as he pleases."⁴

It has also been explained in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* that dreaming self is subject to pleasure and pain. "He is not slain (when the body) is slain.

¹PU, IV, 2.

²Ibid, IV, 5.

³BU, IV, 3-10.

⁴Ibid, II, 1-18.

He is not one-eyed (when the body) is one-eyed, yet it is as if they kill it, as if they unclothe him. He comes to experience as it were what is unpleasant, he even weeps as it were....."¹

The reverse also is true. If the body has got any defect, the dreaming self may experience as if there is no defect. The dreaming self does not suffer from the defects of the body.

"Even though this self is not blind (when the body) is blind, is not lame (when the body) is lame, though he does not suffer defects from the defects (of the body)."²

Nature of Deep Sleep

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad also explains that the Self rests in peace in its own self during deep sleep (*Suṣupti*).

"Ajātaśatru said, 'When this being fall asleep thus, then the person who consists of intelligence, having by his intelligence taken to himself the intelligence of these breaths (sense-organs) rests in the space within the heart. When the person takes in these (senses), he is said to be asleep. When the breath is restrained, the eye is restrained, the ear is restrained, the mind is restrained.'"³

There is still a more detailed description of deep sleep state:

"Again, when one falls sound asleep, when he knows nothing whatsoever, having come through the seventy-two thousand channels called *hita*, which extend from the heart to the pericardium. Verily, as a youth or a great king or a great Brahmana might rest when he has reached the summit of bliss, so does he then rest."⁴

Here it is described that round the heart there are 72000 arteries. In deep sleep the soul glides into the arteries and through them it becomes one with the heart. *Chāndogya* describes only 101 arteries,⁵ out of which one artery leads to the sun. Thus it suggests that Brahman enters the body as a spirit or leaves the body at death through this one artery by breaking through the suture, the *brahma-randhra*. This is

¹CU, VIII, 10-2.

²*Ibid*, 10-1.

³BU, II, 1, 17.

⁴BU, II, 1, 19.

⁵CU, VIII, 6, 1.

again explained in *Aitareya Upaniṣad*.¹ The two versions of 72,000 and 101 arteries were mixed up in later accounts.

The word 'puritat' has been explained by interpreters differently. Deussen translates it 'pericardium'. Max Müller translates it 'surrounding body'. Śāṅkara explains it as 'that which envelope the heart' (*Hṛdaya pariveṣṭanam*). Prof. Ranade suggests that it is perhaps the pineal gland of Descartes, or it is the membranous sac round the heart. A similar account has been given at various places.

Thus says *Chāndogya*² and *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*:³

"A hundred and one are the arteries of the heart, one of them leads up to the crown of the head. Passing upward through that, one attains immortality, while the other arteries serve for departing in various other directions—yea, serve for departing." The reference is to the artery known as *suṣumna*, as is explained further clearly in *Maitrī Upaniṣad*.⁴ The channel called *Suṣumna* leading upward, serving as the passage for the breath, is divided within the palate. Through it, when it is joined by the breath, the syllable 'aum' and by the mind let him proceed upwards. By causing the tip of the tongue to turn back on the palate, by binding together the senses, let greatness perceive greatness."

A further description is given in *Taittirīya*:

"This space that is within the heart—therein is the person consisting of mind, immortal and resplendent. That which hangs down between the palate like a nipple, that is the birth place of Indra, where is the edge of the hair splitting up the skull of the head."⁵

It has been generally believed, as is frequently mentioned in various Upaniṣads, that there are hundred and one arteries in the heart. "To each one of these belong a hundred smaller arteries. To each of these belong seventy-two thousand branching arteries within them moves the diffused breath."⁶

All this suggests that the *Kundalinī Yoga*, which was developed further in the post-Upaniṣadic period was already practised and the rudiments were explained as above.

¹*AU*, I, 3, 12.

²*CU*, VIII, 6, 6.

³*KU*, II, 3, 16.

⁴*Ma U*, VI, 21.

⁵*TU*, I, 6, 1.

⁶*PU*, III, 6.

The Self in Deep Sleep

A detailed account of the Self in deep sleep is given in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. In this state the Self desires no desires and sees no dream. Like a falcon, weary after flying, clinging to his nest, the Self hastens to this state and takes rest.¹ This is really the state of divine union. The Self is united with its own Self and enjoys bliss and pure delight, like a married couple united in love-embrace.² The Self in that state loses all worldly attributes and empirical distinctions. For here in this state, a thief is not a thief, a king is not a king.³ He is not affected by good or evil. Though his senses do not work, yet he perceives through the light of his Self. He becomes transparent like water, one, the seer without duality.

Again in *Praśna Upaniṣad* it is explained metaphorically that in deep sleep the soul is at one with Brahman; only we do not know it. "The mind, indeed is the sacrificer. The fruit of sacrifice is the upbreath. It leads the sacrificer every day to Brahman."⁴

In this state the soul is overpowered by the light of Brahman. "When he is overcome with light, then in this state, the soul sees no dreams. Then here in this body arises this happiness."⁵ The characteristics of a person in deep dream-sleep is also given in *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad*. Ajātaśatru led Bālāki to a person asleep. Ajātaśatru called him by name, but the person did not wake up. When he pushed him with a stick, he woke up. He asked Bālāki the reason of this phenomenon: 'where did he remain?' Bālāki could not answer. To him, then, Ajātaśatru said: 'Where he lay is the channel of a person called *hita* extending from heart to the surrounding body (pericardium). As minute as a hair divided a thousand-fold, they consist of a thin essence white, black, yellow and red. In these one remains, while asleep he sees no dream whatsoever.'⁶

¹BU, IV, 3, 19.

²Ibid, IV, 3, 21.

³BU, IV, 3, 23.

⁴PU, IV, 4.

⁵Ibid, IV, 6.

⁶KoU, IV, 19

Further details about the various states of consciousness are given in one of the later Upaniṣads viz. the *Paṅgala Upaniṣad*.¹

(i) In the wakeful state all the knowledge is acquired by the jīva through the five organs of perception viz. the eyes, the ears, the tongue, the nose and the skin.

(ii) The jīva pervades throughout the body and has its special seat between the eye-brows. He goes to different worlds and enjoys fruits of action.

(iii) The physical form (Viśva) of the Jīva, attains the mental state (taijasa) and moves through the middle of the arteries (nādi). It manifests its own power in the form of impressions.

(iv) In the deep sleep state, only thoughts function. The jīva enters the state of ignorance (ajñāna) it looks as if tired of the world affairs, like the bird tired of flying about turns towards nest, and restrains its wings. It enjoys its own bliss.

Commenting on this point, S. Radhakrishnan says, "He retires from his outward and inward activities and enters into his own nature. The principle of ignorance, of objectivity is present in the state of sleep though it is not manifest."²

(v) The state of fainting is fusing together of several organs of perception. It resembles the state of death but is not death.

GENERALISATIONS ABOUT THE STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

1. There are three states of mind : (i) the wakeful, (ii) the dream, and (iii) the deep sleep.

2. The Self moves from one state to another and returns back e.g. wakeful to dream, dream to deep sleep, deep sleep to dream again, and dream to wakeful state. This is one complete cycle. Such cycles go on.

3. There are various theories presented regarding the nature of sleep:

(a) The fatigue theory explains that when a person is fatigued in the wakeful state, he takes rest in sleep, like the falcon who takes rest in the nest after long travel.

¹PU, II, 8-12.

²Radhakrishnan, S, *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 912.

(b) Again sleep is said to be absorption of the senses in the mind.

(c) In sleep the self lodges himself in the arteries of the heart.

(d) In sleep the mind merges in Prāṇa.

(e) In sleep the soul enters the heart.

(f) In sleep the soul becomes Brahman.

4. About the phenomenon of dream, the following facts have been explained through suitable illustrations:

(a) In dreams we have the reproduction of the wakeful experiences.

(b) The objects and events seen in the dream have no real existence. These are only the projection of the mind.

(c) Dreams are creative also. Sometimes we experience in dreams, what has not been experienced before.

(d) The dreaming self is subject to pleasure and pain, which is not real.

(e) The bodily defects do not occur in the dreams. A lame person will walk, a deaf will hear, and a one-eyed person will seem to have both eyes in a dream. The reverse also is true. A healthy person may find himself ill in dream.

5. About Suṣupti or deep sleep, a number of facts have been discovered:

(a) In deep sleep, the self withdraws from the body and rests in the space within the heart. It restrains all the senses and the mind.

(b) The Self glides into the arteries and becomes one with the heart.

(c) The Self is in a state of peace free from desires.

(d) The senses do not work, but the Self perceives through its own light.

(e) In this state the Self sees no dreams.

(f) The Self is in a state of bliss. The Self is united with its own Self and enjoys pure delight.

C. FACTORS OF PERSONALITY

Before we try to explain what is commonly understood by 'mind' in Western philosophy and psychology, it seems necessary here to outline the whole personality of which mind forms a part.

Western materialists, denying the existence of soul, consider human personality an off-shoot of matter—an aggregate of atoms. Vitalists go a step further, and declare personality as a living unity with the power of self-adaptation, self-preservation and self-reproduction. Sensationalists call it a bundle of sense-impressions with a purpose and will. Rationalists add a thinking principle to these sensations. According to them personality is the subject of experience. But wherefrom does this thinking principle arise?

According to Upaniṣads, the essence of human personality is Ātman, which is the same as Brahman. Ātman, in conjunction with gross and subtle bodies becomes subject to experience of pleasure and pain. Its true nature becomes as if veiled. The nature of 'veiling' is differently explained by post-Upaniṣadic philosophers. It becomes engrossed in five types of 'sheaths' (Koṣa) and the total personality is called jīva.

The five Sheaths of the Individual

The five sheaths of the soul have been described in *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*.¹ The person consists of the essence of food. The gross physical body is the product of food. This is the first sheath. Different from and within it is the self that consists of life (Prāṇa). The breath (Prāṇa) is the life of all beings. Different from and within it is the self consisting of mind. Different from and within it is the self consisting of intellect (Vijñāna) which directs all deeds. Different from and within that which consists of intellect is the self consisting of bliss (Ananda). The true Self is beyond the five sheaths (Pancakoṣas) material, vital, mental, intellectual and spiritual. The same reference in a different context is given in Bhṛgu Valli of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. The five principles that are identified with Brahman are matter (anna), life (prāṇa), mind (manas), intellect (vijñāna) and bliss (ānanda). This is the hierarchy of the factors of individual personality.

The self is manifested as the ego or the Jīvātman in these five koṣas or sheaths. These five principles of matter (Anna), Life (Prāṇa), instinctive and perceptual consciousness (manas), intellect (Vijñāna) and bliss (Ānanda) are found in the world of

¹TU, II, 2-5.

non-ego. The first two form the physical self, the next two the mental self (or the *linga śarīra*), and the last is the spiritual or blissful self. This is diagrammatically represented in Illustration 2, below.




Illustration 2 : The Five Sheaths (Koṣas)

The Relation of the various factors of personality

The relation between the body and the soul has been well-described in *Maitri Upaniṣad*. The body is compared to a cart, and the soul to its driver.¹ The organs of perception are the five reins. The five organs of action are its horses.² The parable of the chariot is again presented in *Kaṭhōpaniṣad*.³

"Know the self as the Lord of the chariot, and the body as, verily, the chariot, know the intellect as the charioteer and the mind as, verily, the reins. The senses, they say, are the horses ; the objects of sense the paths (they range over) ; (the

¹MU, II, 3-4.

²Ibid. II, 6.

³KU, I, 3, 3.

Self) associated with the body, the senses and the mind—wise men declare—is the enjoyer.”

The hierarchy of the principles or beings is again mentioned: “Beyond the senses are the objects and beyond the objects the mind; beyond the mind is the intellect, and beyond that the great self. Beyond the self is the unmanifest, and beyond that is the Absolute.”¹

A series of metaphors is presented in *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad*:

“As a razor is placed in the razor case, or fire in the fire-hearth, similarly does this conscious self pervade the body up to the very hairs and nails. These senses depend upon the soul as the relatives upon the rich man. As the richman feeds with his kinsmen, and the kinsmen feed on the rich man, even so does this conscious self feed with the senses and the senses feed on the self.² Thus it is explained that the self is immanent in the whole body.

The Five Prāṇas

A description of the five Prāṇas is given in *Maitrī Upaniṣad* also:

“He divided himself five-fold and is called Prāṇa, Apāna, Samāna, Udāna, Vyāna. The breath which rises upward that, assuredly, is the Prāṇa. Now that which moves downward, that assuredly, is the Apāna. Now that, verily, by which these two are supported, that, assuredly, is the Vyāna. Now that which carries into the Apāna breath gross elements of food and distributes the subtle (elements) in each limb, that, assuredly, is called Samāna. It is a higher form of the Vyāna breath and between them is the production of the Udāna. That which brings up or carries down what has been drunk and eaten is the Udāna breath.”³

Prāṇa sustains and supports this body. All the activities of the body and mind depend on it. “As all the bees go up when the king bee goes up and as they settle down when the king bee

¹KU, 3-10-11.

²KU, IV, 20.

³MU, II, 6.

settles down, even so, speech, mind, sight and hearing."¹

A further description of the types of vital airs is given in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. In the earlier part, it mentions only three Prāṇas viz. Prāṇa, Apāna and Vyāna.² That which one breathes out is Prāṇa, and that which one breathes in is Apāna. The functions of Prāṇa and Apāna is Vyāna.³ In some other places of the text, Apana means the vital air that moves downward for the purpose of excretion.⁴ the meaning of Vyāna also undergoes change in Sāṅkhya and Yoga according to which it is the air pervading the entire body.

In the later part of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*,⁴ the number goes to five viz. Prāṇa, Vyāna, Apāna, Samāna and Udāna.⁵

Again, a reference of these five types is given in the same Upaniṣad (IV-19). A fuller description is given in *Praśna Upaniṣad* (IV, 3, 5-8). According to it, Prāṇa is in the mouth and nose, eye and ear. Samāna is the equalising breath, which equalises whatever is offered as food. Apāna is the outer breath, in the organs of excretion and generation. Udāna rises upwards through one of the arteries of the heart, and leads the individual either to the good world or to evil world. The Vyāna moves in the 72000 branching arteries. The above description suggests perhaps a rudimentary idea of the respiratory system (Prāṇa), the circulatory system (Samāna), the nervous system (Vyāna), the thinking system (Udāna) and lastly the excretory and reproductive system (Apāna).

The importance of life energy (Prāṇa) is explained in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.⁶ A dispute arose among the senses, and they approached Prajāpati, each claiming his superiority. Prajāpati verdicted a criteria of supremacy, 'He amongst you is the best on whose departure the body would appear its worst, as it were'. Speech departed, eye departed, ear departed, mind departed, but the body continued its existence. 'But as the Prāṇa was about to depart, it uprooted the other senses, as a

¹PU, II, 5, 3.

²CU, I, 3, 3.

³Ibid, III, 13, 3. Br U, III, 9.26. Pr U, III, 3.

⁴CU, III, 13, 1-5.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid, V, 1, 13.

horse of mettle would uproot the pegs to which it is tethered."¹

Manas

A description of Manas has been given in the Upaniṣads. Manas is the perceiving mind which governs the five organs of perception and the five organs of action. It is the coordinating factor of mind, and is only a part of it. It corresponds to the mental sheath (manomaya Koṣa). Through manas the Jīva perceives the objective world. It is therefore called the divine eye of Ātman (mano asya daivam cakṣu).²

The Physical Basis of Mind

The Upaniṣads hold that mind is material (annamayam hi saumya manah).³ Mind is matter, made up of food in the same way as our body made up of food is matter. Only that, it is subtle, while as body is gross. Mental energy bears resemblance with physical energy. There can be no energy without matter, in fact it is the subtle result of matter. Mind is still more subtle than the physical energy.

Again says *Chāndogya*:

"Food when eaten becomes divided into three parts. What is the grossest ingredient, that is faeces; what is the middling ingredient, that is flesh, and what is subtlest ingredient, that is the mind."⁴ "The subtlest part of curd when churned becomes ghee. So of the food that is eaten, that which is the subtlest part rises upwards and that becomes the mind."⁵ The testimony is further given by the incident that Śvetaketu did not eat for fifteen days. He had no mental energy left. He could not recall the Vedas learnt. But when on the sixteenth day he ate, he could recall his knowledge. The *Chāndogya* further explains:

"Just as when a single of ember of the size of firefly left over from a large burning fire, is made to blaze up by adding straw and it burns much more than before, even so, dear boy, of your sixteen parts, only one part remained, and that being nourished by food, has been made to blaze up;

¹CU, V, 1, 12.

²Ibid, VIII, 12, 5.

³Ibid, VI, 5, 4; VI, 6, 5; VI, 7, 6.

⁴CU, VI, 5, 1.

⁵Ibid, 6, 4.

and by that you perceive the Vedas now. Hence, dear boy, the mind is made up of food....."¹

The Subtle Body

There are references about the subtle body, the sūkṣma śarīra or the līṅga śarīra. It excludes the gross physical body, and includes in it the five prāṇas, the manas (mental body), the intellect (buddhi) and the self-sense (ahaṅkara). It corresponds to the prāṇamaya koṣa, manomaya koṣa and the vijñānamaya koṣa.

Both during sleep and at the time of death the physical body remains detached with the self. The individual soul (jīva), however, retains the subtle body (līṅga śarīra)—the psyche. It is the subtle body that experiences the dream phenomena, and accompanies the soul to the next birth. Says *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*:

"The object to which the mind is attached, the subtle self goes together with the deed, being attached to it alone. Exhausting the results of whatever works he did in this world, he comes again from that world to this world for (fresh) work."²

D. ESCHATOLOGY

The functions of the various bodies in the state of dying are given in detail:

"When this man is about to depart, dear boy, his speech merges in the mind, mind in Prāṇa, Prāṇa in fire, and fire in the Supreme deity."³

It means that at the time of death speech stops, but the mind continues to work for some time. Then the mind also merges in Prāṇa, as in deep sleep. Even then the body appears to be warm, pulse beating. Then Prāṇa merges into heat, and after some time the body is cold. The mind and other accessories merge in Brahman. The living self reflected in mind also remains as Brahman. The Upaniṣads also give a description of the departing soul, leaving this gross physical world and taking

¹CU, 7, 5-6.

²BU, IV, 4, 6.

³CU, VI, 8, 6.

either of the two paths in the spiritual worlds viz. the path of gods (Devayāna) and the path of forefathers (Pitṛyāna).

Devayāna path for those who know the five sacrificial fires is described in *Chāndogya*:

"Now as for such person, whether the cremation rites are performed or not, they go to light, from light to the day, from the day to the bright fortnight, from the bright fortnight to those six months during which the sun rises towards north; from the months to the year; from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, from the moon to the lightning. (From the region of Brahman) a person who is other than human, causes them existing there, to realise Brahman. This is the path of the gods and the path to Brahman. Those who go by this path do not return to this human whirlpool—yea they do not return."¹

The same description is repeated in the story of Śvetaketu,² in *Bṛhdāraṇyaka*.³

The path of forefathers is described in *Chāndogya*:

But those who living in the villages practice sacrifice and works of public utility and gift go to smoke, from smoke to night, from night to the dark fortnight, from the dark fortnight to those months during which the sun travels southward. From there do not reach the year. From the months they go to the region of the fathers, from the region of the fathers to Akāśa, and from there to moon."⁴

"Residing in that region of the moon till they have exhausted (the results of action) they then return again the same way as the came."⁵

Mediumship

There are references of mediumship, which was recognised and experienced. In *Bṛhdāraṇyaka*, there is an episode of Bhujyu Lahyayāni. She says to sage Yājñavalkya, "We were travelling around as wanderers among the Madra tribe and came to the house of Patancala Kapya. He had a daughter who was possessed by a gandharva....."⁶ Here Patancala's daughter was possessed by a gandharva, a spirit, and so serves as a medium.

¹CU, IV, 15, 5.

²CU, V, 10-1-2.

³BU, VI, 2, 1-16.

⁴CU, V, 10, 4.

⁵*Ibid*, 10, 6.

⁶BU, III, 3, 1.

A few more details are given in *Paingala Upaniṣad*:¹

(i) Death is giving up of the gross body. In that state the *jīva* draws together all the senses. As he is still wrapped in ignorance, with desires and attachment, he attains another body. He does not attain any rest due to the actions and their fruits, and is like a worm in a whirlpool. It is at the end of many births that he has the desire of liberation.

(ii) The *jīva* remains in bondage as long as there is no desire in him for release. Bondage is lack of investigation, and liberation follows investigation.

(iii) With the denial of the phenomenal world, the inner-most self non-differentiated from Brahman alone remains.

E. MENTAL FUNCTION

As Upaniṣads discuss human personality as a whole, there is no separate account of mental functioning. Whatever references there are regarding particular aspect of mental functioning, those are incidentally mentioned with respect to any particular philosophical or theological view-point. Again, it is rather difficult to present an equivalence of Mind (used in Western philosophy) with any of the terms used in Upaniṣads. The following words occur in Upaniṣads which are associated with the concept of Mind: (i) *Manas*; (ii) *Prajñā*, (iii) *Vijñāna*, (iv) *Samkalpa*, and (v) *Citta*.

The above terminology has not been used in a uniform manner. Each single word has been used denoting different connotations and shades of meaning.

The word '*manas*', has for instance, been used in the following senses:

(i) The whole mental field, as we understand in Western psychology.²

(ii) The perceiving organ that coordinates the five organs of perception (*Jñānendriya*) and the five organs of action (*Karmendriya*).

Sometimes the word *Prajñā* has been used in place of *manas*, both in the narrower sense of intellect,³ and in the wider sense

¹PU, II, 11-12.

²SU, II, 8; TU, II, 9.

³KU, III, 7.

of total consciousness.¹

The word Citta appears, sometimes for 'thought'² and sometimes for the whole 'mind'.³ The same term becomes of special importance later in the yoga system.

The word Vijñāna is usually used for the organ of knowing.⁴ But at some places it is used for the higher faculty of intellect and discrimination.⁵ It corresponds to the intellectual sheath in which the jīva rests in deep sleep. The word buddhi also is used sometimes in the same sense.⁶

The word Saṁkalpa has been used for Will, or what we call 'libido'.⁷ At a number of places there are references of supremacy of one of the above over others. Sometimes intellect has a claim of primacy,⁸ and sometimes will.⁹

On the whole, the hierarchy of mental functions is summarised below, on the basis of the major trends expressed here and there:

1. The five sensory organs (Jñānendriya) and the five motor organs (Karmendriya).
2. Manas or perceiving mind, the coordinating organs of perception.
3. Buddhi or Vijñāna, intellect, the higher organ of thought, discrimination, reasoning and intelligence.
4. Ahaṁkāra, the self-sense, the organ of personal ego.
5. Citta, the subconscious mind, the storehouse of past impressions.

The above classification of mental functioning has been followed in one of the later Upaniṣads viz. *Paingala Upaniṣad*. It is later on accepted in Vedānta, wherein further details are worked out. According to this Upaniṣad, the five organs of

¹AU, III, 3.

²CU, VII, 5.

³Ibid, III, 6, 8.

⁴Ibid, 13, 1; 15, 4; 25, 2; BU, III, 4, 2.

⁵TU, II, 6.

⁶SU, V, 8.

⁷BU, II, 4, 11; CU, VII, 4.

⁸CU, VII, 5, 1.

⁹Ibid, 4, 2.

perception are srotra (ear), tvak (skin), cakṣu (eye), jihvā (tongue) and ghrāṇa (nose). Mind or manas governs their action and coordinates these. It also possesses the power of determination (saṁkalpa). The function of intellect (buddhi) is conviction (niścaya), while the functions of citta and ahamkāra are memory (smaraṇa) and ego (abhimāna) respectively. According to this Upaniṣad, each of the above four factors of antahkaraṇa (the inner organ *i.e.* Mind) has a particular seat in the body *viz.* chest for manas, forehead for buddhi, lower trunk for citta and heart for ahamkāra. This Upaniṣad again gives an accurate correspondence of these four factors of Mind with the sheaths of personality as mentioned in *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*.¹

The first factor of personality is the gross physical body (sthūla śarīrah), and it corresponds to the annamaya koṣa. The second major factor is the subtle body (linga śarīra). It constitutes of:

(i) the five vital airs, (prāṇa), (ii) the five organs of perception, (iii) the five organs of action, (iv) the fourfold antahkaraṇa *i.e.* manas, buddhi, ahamkāra and citta. (v) desire (kāma), (vi) action (karma) and (vii) ignorance (tamasa). If we add the five gross elements as another category to the above seven categories, the eight categories thus formed are called the eight citadels of personality (aṣṭa purāṇ). The subtle body (linga śarīra) corresponds to three sheaths *viz.* prāṇamaya, manomaya and vijñānamaya. The third major factor of personality is the causal body (kāraṇa śarīra) which corresponds to the ānandamaya koṣa. Its function is the realization of the reality (svarūpa jñāna) or the self-realization. These three major factors *viz.* gross body, subtle body and causal body correspond to the three states of consciousness *viz.* wakeful, dream and deep sleep respectively.

Mental functions as in Aitareya Upaniṣad

This Upaniṣad discusses that the whole universe is guided by

¹*Paingala U*, II, 5, 6.

an intelligent force. The flora and fauna, the animate and the inanimate—all are guided by intelligence (Prajñā) and established in intelligence.¹ This intelligence works in human beings: the mind (or the heart) and assumes the following forms:

(i) Consciousness (Sanjñānam), (ii) judgment (ajñānam), (iii) ideation (vijñānam), (iv) wisdom (medha), (v) insight (dṛṣṭir), (vi) steadfastness (dhṛtir), (vii) opinion (matir), (viii) thoughtfulness (manīṣa), (ix) impulse (jātih), (x) memory (smṛtiḥ), (xi) volition (saṃkalpaḥ), (xii) purpose (kratur), (xiii) will to live (asuh), (xiv) desire (Kāmo), (xv) self-control (vāsa).

It will be clear that all these functions come under three broad categories viz. cognition, affection and will. Under cognition we have nos. (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vii), (viii) and (xi). Under affection we have (ix), (xii) and (xiv). Under will, we have the rest of the functions mentioned. Though order in which these functions are stated does not suggest this type of categorisation, but it suggests that an attempt at some sort of categorisation of all the mental functions was actually made during this period.

Mental Functions in Bṛhadaranyaka Upaniṣad²

Another list of mental functions is presented here. "Desire (kāmaḥ), determination (saṃkalpaḥ), doubt (vicikitsā), faith (śraddhā), lack of faith (aśraddhā), steadfastness (dhṛtir), lack of steadfastness (adḥṛtir), shame (hīr), intellect (dhīr), fear (bhīr) all this is truly mind."

Dependence of Perception upon Mind

Unless the mind works, there can be no perception inspite of the existence of the objects of perception. "They say my mind was elsewhere, I did not see it, my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear. It is with the mind, truly, that one sees. It is with the mind, that one hears."³ Again it is mentioned, "whatever is to be known is a form of mind for mind is to be known."⁴

¹AU, III, 3.

²BU, I, 5, 3.

³Ibid,

⁴Ibid, I, 5, 9.

A few more ideas regarding the Psychological principles are given in rudimentary form.

For instance, some attempt has been made to define attention. Actions involving voluntary effort require suspension of breath, so that we neither inhale nor exhale.¹ One utters speech, while one neither breaths out nor breaths in.²

There are almost no references about emotions. The word *sukha* and *duḥkha* are used for pleasure and pain. There are, however, a rudimentary reference about the emotion of fear.

Fear

The real cause of fear is duality. One who find Him as the support, he is fearless. "When, however, this soul makes in this One the smallest interval, then, for him, there is fear."³ Thus it is only when a feeling of otherness lodges in us, there is occasion for fear. Faith in God causes fearlessness. Lack of faith breeds feeling of insecurity. One who lacks faith in God, feels he is alone. "He was afraid. Therefore one who is alone is afraid."⁴ One who finds his lord as his companion, from whom should he fear.

A few more emotions are mentioned in one of the passages in *Maitri Upaniṣad*:⁵

"He sees by the mind alone, he hears by the mind, and all that we call desire, will, doubt, belief, disbelief, resolution, irresolution, shame, thought and fear—all this is but mind itself."

F. HIGHER MENTAL POWERS AND YOGA

Self-realization being the ultimate goal of life, frequent references are made in Upaniṣads regarding controlling of mind as a means of self-realization. The word *Yoga*, which appears in Vedic texts viz. *Taitirīya Saṃhitā*,⁶ *Vājasaneyī*

¹CU, I, 3, 5.

²CU, I, 3, 3. KU, II, 5.

³TU, II, 7, 1.

⁴BU, I, 4, 2.

⁵MU, VI, 30.

⁶Taitirīya Saṃhitā, IV, 1, 1. 1-5.

Saṁhita,¹ *Śatpatha Brahman*,² is again reproduced in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*³ and is used in the sense of controlling of mind.

The rudiments of Yoga are referred to in the *Maitri Upaniṣad*.⁴ "This is the rule for achieving this Oneness, control of breath, withdrawal of the senses, meditation, concentration, contemplative enquiry and absorption (*prāṇāyāma*, *pratyāhāra*, *dhyāna*, *dhāraṇā*, *tarkaḥ*, *saṁādhiḥ*). This is said to be the sixfold yoga."

Further details have been furnished which form the basis of the Yoga Darsana of later times:⁵

"The aspirant restrains his mind from the external, his breath has put to rest objects of senses, and he remains devoid of conceptions.....

He merges his thoughts in the Supreme."

He can also press the tip of the tongue down the palate, restrain voice, mind and breath, and thus see Brahman through contemplative thought. He attains the serenity of thought, by which he destroys deeds, good and evil, and enjoys eternal happiness, with the serene self abiding in the self.⁶

Mention has also been made about the channel called *Suṣumnā* leading upward, serving as the passage for the breath and which is divided within the palate. The aspirant can turn the tip of the tongue back on the palate, bind together the senses, and thus perceive greatness.

The significance of meditation is emphasised over and over again as an instrument of attaining bliss. "Meditation is directed to the highest being within and to the outer objects. When the mind is dissolved, bliss results."⁷

A more complete definition of Yoga is given in *Maitri Upaniṣad*:⁸

¹ *Taittiriya Saṁhita*, X, 1, 5.

² V. 3, 1, 12-17.

³ *SU*, II, 2.

⁴ *MU*, VI, 18.

⁵ *MU*, VI, 19-20.

⁶ *Ibid*, 20.

⁷ *Ibid*, 21.

⁸ *Ibid*, 24.

"The oneness of the breath, the mind and likewise of the senses and the abandonment of all conditions of existence, this is designated as Yoga." Hence Yoga emphasises abandonment of all conditions (or thoughts) of existence, and abandonment of attachment to the family etc.¹ It is guaranteed that if a man practices Yoga for six months, he may be freed from the world and the mysterious Yoga is accomplished.² By the practice of Yoga, one gains contentment, endurance of dualities (of pleasure and pain) and tranquillity.³

The practice of Yoga has again been explained in Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.⁴ According to this scripture — The wise man crosses by the boat of Brahman the fearful dangerous stream (of life) by:

- (i) holding the body steady with the three upper parts (chest, neck and head) erect.
- (ii) causing the senses and the mind to enter into the heart.
- (iii) repressing his breath, breathing through the nostrils with diminished breath.
- (iv) controlling all the movements of the body.⁵

It is instructed that the practice should be made in a congenial environment, on a comfortable seat, where all sorts of distraction is avoided.⁶ Reference is also made about mysteries of Yogic practice. "The devotee sees imaginatively a number of forms like mist, smoke, wind, fire, lightning, crystal, moon etc."⁷ These visions are not illusory but real. It may be recalled that great spiritual leaders had such visions. Mohammad, Moses, Christ, Saint Hildegard and many other prophets and saints had visions.

Further effects of Yoga have been described at the same place:

- (i) There is no longer sickness, old age or death.⁸

¹MU, VI, 25.

²Ibid, 26-27.

³Ibid, 28.

⁴SU, II, 8-16.

⁵Ibid, 8-9.

⁶Ibid, 10.

⁷Ibid, 11.

⁸SU, II, 12.

(ii) Lightness, healthiness, steadiness, clearness of complexion, pleasantness of voice, sweetness of odour and slight excretion are its results.

(iii) The embodied one sees clearly the real nature of the Self, as in a clean mirror, and thus he is released from all fetters.

Control of Thought

Yoga is a system of controlling thoughts. *Maitri Upaniṣad* lays great stress on controlling thoughts as a means of attaining liberation.¹ Thoughts by the cessation of activity become extinct in their own source, like fire without fuel. Even then, after the thoughts have been quieted down, there arise some false ideas due to past impressions (*Vāsanā*). Man becomes what he thinks, hence one should clean his thoughts by effort. Past deeds and their fruit can be destroyed by making ones thoughts serene. Desires make the mind unclean, and hence desires must be curbed. The mind must be made restful, serene and motionless by over-powering all perturbation. The happiness attained through controlling of mind and concentration cannot be explained in words.

The final verdict is given in strong terms:

"Mind in truth, is the cause of bondage and liberation for mankind; for bondage if it is bound to objects; freedom from objects, that is called liberation."² Even enlightened persons may be afflicted with passion and darkness if he is attached to son, wife, and family. For such a person, there is no liberation at all, unless he controls his mind.³ Method of introversion has been suggested as a further step in the controlling of mind.

"The Self though hidden in all beings does not shine forth but can be seen by those subtle seers, through their sharp and subtle intelligence."⁴ The Self is not to be sought through the senses. "Wisemen seeking life eternal with their eyes turned inward saw the Self." They close their eyes to the

¹*MU*, VI, 34.

²*Ibid*,

³*Ibid*, VI, 28.

⁴*KU*, I, 3, 12.

phenomenal variety and turn them inward to the noumenal reality. In that state of introversion the five senses cease, the intellect does not stir, one becomes undisturbed, and that is the state of Yoga.¹ The spiritual powers attained through meditation, have been described at a number of places. 'He who meditates on Brahman becomes endowed with splendour.'² He gets unlimited freedom.³ Auspicious sounds will hasten to him and delight him.⁴ His rivals perish.⁵ Even if blind⁶ he ceases to be blind.⁷ To him there is no darkness, there is neither day nor night.⁸ He is neither male nor female.⁹ He has no desire for maintaining this body.¹⁰ He verily, becomes fearless. The mystic realizes the self and in absolute bliss sings the chant, 'Oh wonderful, Oh wonderful, Oh wonderful.'¹¹

In words of Ranade, "We thus see, on the whole, that the immediate effects of God-realization upon the mystic are the entire abatement of infinite power, the enjoyment of ultimate joy, the destruction of all fear, and the fulfilment of any end that may be contemplated by the mystic."¹² This doctrine paves way for further elucidation of Yoga philosophy, as made by sage Patanjali in his *Yoga-sūtra*. Anyway, the Upaniṣads suggest that beyond the present conscious state, there is a higher state, a superconscious state, in which the devotee transcends the limitations of his earthly, etheric, mental intellectual and beatific sheaths, in which he has the vision of the entire universe, and in which he discovers through his divine eye of the unity of the universe. In utter ecstasy he sings the song of divinity, which he finds within himself.

G. A RESUME

The importance of psychological doctrines embodied in

¹KU, 3, 10-11.

²CU, IV, 5, 3.

³Ibid, VII, 11, 2.

⁴Ibid, III, 19, 4. III, 13, 8.

⁵TU, III, 10, 4.

⁶CU, VIII, 4, 2.

⁷SU, IV, 18.

⁸SU, V, 10.

⁹BU, IV, 4, 12.

¹⁰TU, III, 10, 5.

¹¹Ranade, *Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, p. 350.

Upaniṣads is viewed from the angle that these form the very basis of psychological principles developed in later Indian philosophies. A broad outline is presented fairly and accurately, and upon this foundation a detailed superstructure is constructed, with notable differentiations, in matters of detail. The seeds of all the later philosophies were sown during the Upaniṣadic period, and hence the principles, though very few in number and pithy and terse in detail, form the backbone of Indian psychology. On account of its direct emergence from Upaniṣadic philosophy, it offers a great departure, both in matter and method, from the Western psychology. Upaniṣadic sages proclaimed all that with confidence through intuition and introspection rather than reasoning alone. Their method of introspection was observation at the super-conscious level. They 'saw' and declared, and hence their doctrines were called 'darśana'—the vision. The range of their observation was not limited in time and space to the present behaviour in the present wakeful state, but extended to the past and future of the human individual, to all the states of mental consciousness, and to the universe as a whole, as an extension of the Self. Hence the deep relationship of the psychological principles with metaphysics and ethics. Human behaviour and conduct cannot be studied apart from the ultimate goal of human life. Psychology thus becomes both a positive as well as normative science, deeply founded on Darśana.

The foundational philosophical doctrines namely the doctrine of Brahman, of Ātman, of Transmigration of Soul, of Law of Karma and of Salvation were discussed above in brief. Upaniṣadic psychology starts with four states of consciousness, the wakeful, the dream, the sleep and the superconscious, corresponding to the four such states of cosmic consciousness namely the Virāt, the Hiranyagarbha, the Īśvara and Brahman. It affirms the importance of all the four in realising truth. Neither is dream state an unreality (to the extent we deem it), nor is sleep state nothingness and nor is superconsciousness a myth. Again consciousness is not an attribute of mind, but of the Self, which illuminates both mind and body. Ātman and Brahman being identical, consciousness (cit) being one of the attributes of the ultimate reality, it pervades the entire universe,

in the animate and the inanimate beings, differing only in degree. The same consciousness acts at the individual level and at the cosmic level and is responsible for four marked states of cosmos and of individuality. The superconscious state forms the common ground where the individual consciousness unites with the cosmic consciousness without any differentiation of personal ego which is created by veil of ignorance. Hence the extra-sensory powers, visions, supernatural revelations and blissful ecstasy are empirically vouchsafed and declared by Upaniṣadic seers. This refers to the Yogic powers and that way the mystery of Yoga becomes intelligible.

The enumeration of the five factors of personality (the five sheaths) with Ātman as the innermost essence and the independent monarch of the physical and mental realm, sets 'mind' at its due place as a mere internal organ of thought and action (*antahkaraṇa*), without any independent status but being illuminated and governed by the soul. The composition of mind as through the subtle ingredients of matter (the food) is another notable discovery. The chariot parable beautifully illustrates the exact place and functioning of mind in relation to body and soul. The scope of its functioning has been well-demarcated through hierarchy of *manas*, *buddhi* and *aṅkāra*, and *citta* also as the organ of perception, intellectual discrimination (or reflection) and ego (and memory also). Some details have been given regarding the lower functioning of the mind...sensory or motor. Reference has also been made of the storing in the subconscious mind past impressions, desires (*vāsanā*) and abilities, governing the birth of a *jīva* in a particular environment for purposes of reaping the fruits of action. It has been declared that mind does not perish at the time of death, but accompanies the *jīva* in a subtle form, as a part of the subtle body (*linga śarīra*) along with *prāṇas* (vital airs), retaining in it all the past impressions (*saṅskāras*) to be transferred to the next birth. The method of introversion; controlling of thought, deep concentration and meditation has been suggested for attaining higher powers of mind as a step towards self-realization and liberation. Mind as an agency of both bondage and liberation has been emphasised again and

again. It must be admitted that Upaniṣads being philosophical treatises, we cannot make an attempt to define broad features of human behaviour in the modern psychological make up. A few catchy references about perception, attention, reflection, emotion of fear, will, memory, desire, pleasure, pain, faith and determination do not make any headway in explaining the characteristics of day-to-day conduct and behaviour. The number of the organs of perception differs from scripture to scripture (sometimes five, sometimes eight). This suggests that psychology of perception was still vaguely understood. No account of the nervous system is given apart from mentioning some nadis in a mysterious way. A rudimentary idea about heredity has been given, suggesting that heredity is more concerned with impressions of past life than with parental genes. References about ignorance (*māyā*) veiling the individual mind are still clothed in mysterious language. A note of optimism, however, prevails everywhere, guaranteeing supreme bliss to every one who makes efforts in realising the self.

This is what Upaniṣads teach us. Thus these explain to us the first lessons in Indian psychology in clear-cut terms and with well-marked outlines. The details will follow when we study the principles as elaborated in the later philosophical literature.

Psychology in the Sāṃkhya

OUT of the six systems of orthodox Hindu Philosophy, Sāṃkhya appears to be the oldest. Its first principles appear in some Upaniṣads like *Śvetāśvatara*,¹ *Kaṭha*,² *Praśna*³ and *Maitrayāni*.⁴ The system itself underwent modifications from time to time. We have three strata of the system. The first is the theistic, a legitimate development of the teaching of Upaniṣads. The *Sāṃkhya Pravacanasūtra* of Kapila (7th century BC) represent this system. The second is an atheistic as represented by Caraka and Pañcāśikha. The third strata is again an atheistic modification, represented by *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and the commentators on it. *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* is the earliest available text on this philosophy, and it appears to be a work of the third century AD.⁵ The later commentators have mainly depended upon this work. They have even tried to prove that Kapila was an atheist by re-interpreting his sūtras.⁶ But it is definite that the earliest form of Sāṃkhya was 'a sort of realistic theism, approaching the Viśiṣṭadvaita view of the Upaniṣads.'⁷ Perhaps the later atheism was due to the influence of Buddhism.

In dealing with the psychological principles found in the Sāṃkhya, we shall mainly depend upon the *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* and the commentaries on it, and quote further references from Kapila and his commentators. It is obvious that an account of purely psychological speculations in Sāṃkhya it should be

¹SU, VI, 13.

²KU, III, 10-11.

³PU, IV.

⁴*Maitrayāni U*, III, 2 V, 5 ; V, 2.

⁵Radhakrishnan, S., *Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, p. 425.

⁶SPS, I, 92. Even the present commentators differ. S. Radhakrishnan interprets the Sūtra in the direction of atheism, but A. K. Majumdar in his 'Sāṃkhya Concept of Personality' refutes the atheistic interpretation.

⁷Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 253.

preceded by a brief metaphysical and ontological account which forms the very basis of Sāṃkhya psychology. This system accepts the common postulates of Upaniṣads namely the principle of soul, law of karma, transmigration, devotion and salvation. It uses the word *Puruṣa* for *Ātman* of the Upaniṣads. The *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* expounds dualistic doctrine of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* as the ultimate cause of the Universe in action. It gives a clear account of the cosmology and ethics and later on makes new discoveries in the field of psychology which were not mentioned in Upaniṣads.

A. COSMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY

Sāṃkhya enumerates 25 tattvas (or true principles) and its chief object is to effect the final emancipation of *Puruṣa* (the 25th tattva) from the bonds of worldly existence by conveying a correct knowledge of the 24 other tattvas, and by properly discriminating the soul from them. Soul (*Puruṣa*) and nature (*Prakṛti*) are the two ultimate entities, neither of which can be derived from the other. The dynamic universe owes its existence to the interaction of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. The evolution of unconscious *prakṛti* can take place only through the presence of conscious *puruṣa*.

Nothing but *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is eternal.¹

1. *Puruṣa*

Puruṣa is distinct from the material universe.² It is the pure intelligent conscious spirit, free from the three *guṇas*.³ Acting as the superintendent of the objective world, which works only for the pleasure of *Puruṣa*.⁴ The existence of *Puruṣa* is beyond doubt, because there must be someone to control, to experience and to enjoy the matter for whom it exists.⁵ It is not *Puruṣa* that is bound or liberated, for it is pure and free. It is the *Prakṛti* that is bound and liberated, and migrates.⁶ It excites the activity of *Prakṛti*, upsetting the equilibrium of the *guṇas*,

¹SPS, V, 72.

²SPS, I, 139.

³SPS, I, 142.

⁴*Ibid*, I, 140.

⁵SK, 17.

⁶*Ibid*, I, 62.

and thus passively starts the evolutionary process. Its relation with Prakṛti is metaphorically illustrated by the story of lame and blind. The lame Puruṣa cannot operate without the blind Prakṛti.¹ At the cosmic level, there takes place the interaction of the cosmic Puruṣa with Prakṛti. At the individual level, the empirical self (jīva) is composite of the free spirit Puruṣa and the individual counterpart of Prakṛti. Each jīva possesses within the gross material body which suffers dissolution at death, a subtle body formed of psychical apparatus. As these subtle bodies vary from person to person, there is multiplicity of Jīvas, and likewise the multiplicity of Puruṣas, though the genus of the Puruṣas is one. The plurality of souls is evidenced by the diversity of birth,² the diversity of experiences,³ the diversity of personality (physical and mental)⁴ and the distributive nature of the incidence of birth and death.⁵ The self-sense in Puruṣa appears due to its association with Prakṛti.⁶ *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* gives Puruṣa another name as Jñā, as it is the knower and the seer.

2. Prakṛti

Prakṛti is the primordial matter, the cosmic substance, or the first cause of the material Universe. Sāṃkhya postulates it to be an uncaused cause, otherwise a contrary proposition will lead to *regressus infinitum*.⁷ The manifestation of the phenomenal world is only an evolution of the Cosmic Substance, and the dissolution is only an involution. Sāṃkhya propounds a unique principle of causality. Effect exists in the cause in a latent form.⁸ The cause is the implicit effect and effect is the explicit cause. The purpose of all this creation is two-fold—(i) the experience of Prakṛti and its evolutes by Puruṣa, and (ii) the release of Puruṣa from the bondage

¹SK, 21.

²SPS, I, 149.

³*Ibid*, I, 152; VI, 45.

⁴*Ibid*, V, 61; SK, 18.

⁵SK, 18.

⁶*Ibid*, 20.

⁷SPS, I, 68.

⁸SPS, I, 121; SK, 9. The Principal is called Satkāryavāda.

consequent upon such experience.¹ *Puruṣa* acts for enjoyment of *Prakṛti*, and the latter for its release, and this act is as spontaneous as the flowing of milk from calf.² When *Puruṣa* has experienced or enjoyed all the manifestations of *Prakṛti* to his satiety, *Prakṛti* ceases to act, does not manifest any more to him, like the dancer on the stage who ceases to act after the performance to the satisfaction of the spectator;³ or like the servant who retires after his full service.⁴ Once having been seen by Him, it does not appear any more.⁵

Prakṛti is also designated by the words *Pradhāna* and *Avyakta* (as it is in the unmanifested state). It is an evolvent, but not an evolute.

Interaction

The existence of the dynamic Universe owes to the interaction of spirit and matter, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. Their mutual association is necessary, as spirit without matter is inactive and matter without spirit is blind. They are like the lame and the blind friends.⁶ They appear as consciousness and unconsciousness, subject and object, knower and known. Their relation can be metaphorically explained by fire and iron,⁷ or crystal and⁸ object. Matter is reflected in the spirit, or it becomes charged with the power of spirit, as iron is charged with fire. This also explains that both Matter and Mind are inter-dependent. Neither is Mind derived from Matter, nor Matter from Mind.

3. *Guṇas*

Prakṛti consists of three constituents, called *Guṇas*—(i) *Sattva* or the potential consciousness or light (*prakāśa*), (ii) *Rajas*, the activity and dynamism and, (iii) *Tamas*, the dullness, massiveness,⁹ inertia and darkness.

The *Guṇas* bind the *Prakṛti*, bind each individual as a bird

¹*SPS*, II, I; *SK*, 21.

²*SPS*, III, 58-59; *SK*, 57-58.

³*SK*, 59.

⁴*SPS*, VI, 43.

⁵*SK*, 61.

⁶*SK*, 21.

⁷*SPS*, 99.

⁸*Ibid*, 96.

⁹*Ibid*, I, 128.

is bound on account of its sweet voice, or a man by rope.¹

The Sattva attribute is held to be illuminating, the rajas exciting and mobile; and the tamas sluggish and enveloping.² These three Guṇas are in a state of balance, equipoise or equilibrium. But this condition is disturbed and the phenomenal world begins to make its appearance. These support one another, intermingle with one another and are intimately connected like electron and proton. These Guṇas are infinite in number, but in accordance with their three main characteristics, they have been arranged in 3 types. When one Guṇa becomes predominant, the others remain latent. In a body at rest, Tamas is patent, Rajas is latent and Sattva is sublatent. So whenever there is disturbance of equilibrium of Guṇas, manifestations occur. A return in quiescent state of these is *pralaya* of Prakṛti. In the individual also, when the movement of Guṇas ceases, liberation proceeds. All evolution depends upon the permutation and combination of the Guṇas. By the interaction of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, activated by the Guṇas, a new evolute is born viz. Mahat, and then start a series of categories of evolutes. It has been asserted by Sāṃkhya that production is no new creation but a change in form. The evolution is but a modification, and it has a purpose. It is cyclic and periodical.

4. Mahat

Mahattatva (or Mahat), the 'Great Principle' is the first motion that arises after the interaction of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. It stands for the cosmic intelligence that governs the well-defined line of evolution of the universe.³ It is used in the cosmic sense as well as in the psychological sense, as it is the subtle substance of all mental processes. In the individual jīva, its functions are ascertainment and decision (*adhyavasāya*).⁴ From its sāttvika form, emanate virtue, wisdom, non-attachment and possession of lordly powers.⁵ Mahat is thus the third principle, after Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Here begins

¹*Ibid*, IV, 26.

²*SK*, 13.

³*SPS*, I, 71.

⁴*Ibid*, II, 13.

⁵*SK*, 23.

the integration of spirit and matter, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. We may compare it with *Logos of Plotinus*, or with *Hiranyagarbha* of *Upaniṣad*, or with *Māyā Śakti* of the *Vedāntins*. It is the *Kārya Brahman* of the *Vedāntins*, while *Puruṣa* corresponds to *Kāraṇa Brahman*. "It comprehends within it all the buddhis of individuals, and potentially all the matter of which gross world is formed."¹

5. *Ahaṁkāra*

It is the evolute of *Mahat*.² It is the fourth principle, the Individuating Principle, responsible for limitations, separation and variety in the universe. It designates the state of active consciousness of ego. *Mahat* stands to *Ahaṁkāra* as consciousness to selfconsciousness, for it is here that the subject-object differentiation in the living beings takes place. The development of the sense of objective world as perceived by the subject arises only through *Ahaṁkāra*. It arises through the preponderance of *sattva* in *Mahat*.

6. *Manas*

It is the fifth principle arising out of *Ahaṁkāra* under the influence of *sattva*.³ It is the cosmic Mind, the principle of cognition. Its functions are to get a clearly defined picture of the objective universe (beyond the level of *Ahaṁkāra* which is concerned only with 'I' ness), and it works as the internal organ of perception. It synthesises the sense-data into percepts, and works as the cognitive, affective and conative organ of an individual. It controls the five sense organs, and the five organs of action, which are called the ten outer organs (*Bāhyakaraṇa*). Including the ten organs, we have thus covered fifteen principles.

7. *Tanmātrās*

These are the next five principles arising out of *Ahaṁkāra* under the influence of *tamas* *guṇa*. *Sāṁkhya* postulates an

¹Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 249.

²SPS, I, 72.

³SK, 25.

intermediatory stage between Ahaṃkāra and Tanmātrās. Under the influence of *tamas*, first arises from Ahaṃkāra, Bhūtādi, the physical principle of the universe. It is the objective world as compared to the subjective world of Ahaṃkāra. It represents the physical mass of the world, in the preliminary form, devoid of physical or chemical characters. Under the influence of *rajas*, it gives rise to potential energy, subtle matter, radiant and vibratory, called Tanmātrās. These possess the potentials of energy represented by sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. These are thus "the five-fold extension of the formless manifestation or energy, the first conceivable division of matter, the subtlest form of actual matter, without magnitude, super-sensible, and perceived mediately only through particular objects."¹ The five Tanmātrās correspond to the five cognitive senses. Even their classification is not based upon "any chemical analysis, but from the point of view of the five senses through which knowledge of them could be brought home to us."² It is therefore we call these 'potentials' or 'infra-atomic units' that evolve under the influence of *tamas* from Mahat through the intermediatory stage of Ahaṃkāra (or from Ahaṃkāra).³ Till now we have covered twenty principles.

8. Mahābhūta

Tanmātrās give rise to the five elements *viz.* ether (ākāśa), air (vāyu), fire (tejas), water (āpas) and earth (kṣiti). The sound potential (śabda tanmātrā) corresponding to the auditory sense, under the influence of *tamas*, partaking of the Bhūtādi. (or more specifically the non-atomic *i.e.* Kāraṇa Ākāśa) generates the Ākāśa atom. The touch potential, corresponding to the tactual sense, under the influence of *tamas*, partaking of touch potential generates air or vāyu-atom. Vāyu atom has two characteristics of touch and sound. Similarly the light-and-heat potentials, partaking of the previous two tanmātrās, produce fire, which has all the three characteristics—sound, touch and sight. In a similar manner, the taste-potentials combining with the previous three, produce water, āp-atom, which

¹Theos Bernard, *Hindu Philosophy*, p. 99.

²Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 252; *SPS*, I, 62.

³*SPS*, I, 73; II, 18; *SK*, 24.

possesses the qualities of sound, touch, sight and taste. The smell potential in the same way, produce earth-atom. This may be illustrated by the following diagram. With the manifestation of the Mahābhūta there is a stop to the process of Cosmic evolution. The number of principles including the five Mahābhūtas totals twenty-five.

Diagram 3

TANMĀTRĀS AND MAHĀBHŪTAS

Sense Organ	Cognitive Sense	Tanmātrā	Influenced by	Combined with	Mahābhūta	Characteristics.
1. Ear Śrotra	Hearing	Sound-Potential Śabda- Ākāśa	Tamas	Kāraṇa Ākāśa	Ēther Ākāśa (Kārya- ākāśa)	Sound
2. Skin Tvak	Touch sparśa	Touch-Potential Sparśa- Vāyu	Tamas	Sound Potential	Air Vāyu	Sound & Touch
3. Eye Netra Cakṣu	Sight Rūpa	Light and heat Pot- ential Rūpa- tejas	Tamas	Sound & Touch Potentials	Fire Tejas	Sound and Touch & Form
4. Tongue Jihvā Rasaṇā	Taste Rasa	Taste Potential Rasa-Āp	Tamas	Sound, Touch & Sight Potential	Water Āpas	Sound and Touch & Form and Taste
5. Nāśā Nāsikā Ghrāṇa	Smell Gandha	Smell Potential Gandha- Kṣiti	Tamas	Sound, Touch, Sight & Taste Potentials	Earth	Sound & Touch & Form & Taste & Smell

Total Categories in Sāṃkhya

The total number of principles is twenty-five. These are broadly categorised into four major classes:

- (i) Evolvent but not evolute—Prakṛti.
- (ii) Both Evolvent and evolute—Mahat etc.
- (iii) Evolute but not evolvent—Senses and elements.
- (iv) Neither evolute nor evolvent—Puruṣa.¹

¹SPS, 1, 61 ; SK, 3, 22.

The same is illustrated by means of the following diagram:


Diagram 4

TWENTY-FIVE CATEGORIES OF SĀMĀKHYA

Classes	Principles Tattvas	Number
I. Neither Evolute Nor Evolvent	Puruṣa Spirit	1
II. Not Evolute but Evolvent (Prakṛti)	Prakṛti Matter (Pradhāna, Avyakta)	1
III. Both Evolute and Evolvent (Prakṛti-Vikṛti)	(i) Mahat (ii) Ahaṃkāra (iii) —(vii) Tanmātrās	7
IV. Evolute but not Evolvent (Vikṛti)	(i) Manas (ii) —(xi) Ten senses (xii) —(xvi) Five elements	16
		<hr/> 25 <hr/>

Diagram 5

EVOLUTION OF THE CATEGORIES (IN SĀMĀKHYA)



B. ETHICS

According to Sāṃkhya there is three-fold misery in this world¹ viz. (1) Ādhyātmika, proceeding from the intrinsic causes, such as mental conflicts and bodily disorders; (2) Adhibhautika, proceeding from extrinsic causes like animals and inanimate objects; (3) Adhidaivika, proceeding from the supernatural causes, like atmosphere, earthquake, comets etc. The ordinary means to avoid misery are temporary. The only final means is discrimination—viveka. In reality, the soul does not suffer.² The misery, which we usually attribute to soul, is caused by the intimate association of the body and the soul. If the true nature of the soul is understood by means of viveka, bondage and misery will end.³ The fruit of action does not actually belong to the soul but to the body.⁴ Hence by the true knowledge of things, by proper differentiation between spirit and matter and by the proper understanding of the twenty-five categories there will be an end to all bondage and misery.

From the union of matter and spirit, the matter which is insentient, appears as if sentient. The activity that really belongs to the matter appears to belong to spirit.⁵ Liberation proceeds the knowledge of this fact.⁶ For the liberated soul, the prakṛti ceases to act.⁷ As he become unattached to Prakṛti, Prakṛti also becomes unattached to it.⁸ Prakṛti herself retires before him, like the dancer after having completed the performance, or like a bride hesitating to appear before the man who knows her shortcomings.⁹ Even after liberation, Puruṣa may have minimum of impulse for sometime and thus live,¹⁰ but this impulse also ceases and he is liberated fully from

¹SPS, I, 1; SK, 1.

²SPS, I, 19.

³SPS, I, 55.

⁴Ibid, 106.

⁵SK, 20.

⁶SPS, III, 23.

⁷Ibid, 63.

⁸Ibid, 65.

⁹Ibid, 70.

¹⁰Ibid, 83.

the bondage. This type of knowledge is the sole purpose of Sāṃkhya philosophy. This knowledge can be acquired through effort such as dhyāna (meditation) by which the faults of mind are removed.¹ *Kārika* further says, "No Puruṣa is bound or liberated ; nor does any migrate. It is Prakṛti in its manifold form that is bound, is liberated and migrated."² It is the linga-śarīra of a person that migrates till liberation, and dissolves at the time of liberation. The puruṣa remains alone then, attains aloofness (kaivalyam).

C. PSYCHOLOGY

After presenting a brief resume of the cosmological and ethical principles of Sāṃkhya, we now trace the strictly psychological principles embodied in this system.

1. *Personality*

Human personality, according to Sāṃkhya is the product of conjunction and interaction of a pure Spirit (Puruṣa) and Matter (Prakṛti). The empirical self (jīva) is the composite of Spirit and Matter, the former is sentient and the latter insentient. The two are interdependent like the lame and the blind. The physical and the mental organism attached to Puruṣa is a manifestation of Prakṛti, and without it the Puruṣa is inactive, as is the organism lifeless without Puruṣa. Puruṣa is neither evolute nor evolvent. It is pure, eternal and unchangeable. So on the whole the personality has two mutually interdependent constituents : (i) Spirit, Puruṣa and (2) the psycho-physical apparatus—the mind-body.

The psycho-physical apparatus is also called Karaṇa (the agent). Karaṇa is both organ and functions. The Karaṇa has thirteen constituents (Trayodaśa Karaṇa).³

(a) The three internal agents (antaḥkaraṇa) namely:

- (i) Buddhi or the Mahat at the individual level.
- (ii) Ahaṃkāra, ego.
- (iii) Manas, the mind, or the perceptive-conative organ.

¹ *Ibid*, 56.

² *SK*, 62.

³ *SK*, 32.

(b) The ten external agents (bāhyakaraṇa) namely :

(i) the five senses of perception (jñāna indriya);

(ii) the five senses of action (karma indriya);

These thus include the Nos. 3 to 15 in Diagram No. 5 on page 105.

The external agents concern only the present time, but the first agent concern all times.¹ Out of the external agents, the motor organs have the function of seizing (hāryam), the sense-organs illuminate the objects (prakāśyam) and the internal organs have their purpose to sustain (dhāryam).²

The external agents have two types of functions viz. specific and non-specific. The five sensory organs are concerned with objects specific as well as non-specific. The specific objects are those which have gross-form, and the non-specific have subtle form. The former can be perceived by human beings, but the non-specific subtle, can be perceived by gods and sages only.³ Out of the motor organs, speech is concerned with sound, while the rest are concerned with all the five objects i.e., objects dealt with by the five sensory organs, which are made up of the five primary elements of sound, colour, touch, taste and odour.

The relation between the external agents and the internal agents is further elucidated. The internal agents are warders (dvāri) while the external are the gates.⁴

Thus the five sensory organs are the gateways of knowledge, and so do the five motor organs help in reacting and ascertaining. The knowledge obtained through these ten gates is checked by the first warder, manas. Ahaṁkāra acts as the second warder, and finally Buddhi as the third and the final warder. Buddhi thus occupies the supreme position, and its decision is final. The relation between these is metaphorically explained by Vācaspati. Manas according to him acts like a village-chief (gramādhyakṣa); Ahaṁkāra commands the village-chief and acts as a minister, but Buddhi acts as the chief minister, while the soul (Puruṣa) is the monarch.

¹SK, 33.

²Ibid, 32.

³Ibid, 34, Also see STK.

⁴SK, 35.

Buddhi as a Karaṇa

Sāṃkhya gives great prominence to Buddhi in the personality of a human being. A similar hierarchy has been presented by *Kāthopniṣad*, where the soul is considered to be the charioteer, buddhi the driver, manas the reins and body the chariot.¹ *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* again holds that these external organs together with the manas and ahaṃkāra, characteristically different from one another and being different modifications of the attributes, resemble a lamp in action; and as such having first illumined or manifested the whole purpose of the soul, present it to the buddhi.²

All the organs proceed to intellect and present to it all that is secured and obtained. All the experiences of the Puruṣa are accomplished by intellect alone. It is again the intellect that differentiates between the subtle difference between Puruṣa and Prakṛti.³

Personality consists of not only the thirteen agents (Karaṇa) but also the gross physical body. The physical body is composed of the five elements (mahābhūta). The five elements are derived from the five tanmātrās (potentials), as explained above. The tanmātrās, again arise from Mahat under the influence of tamas, *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* holds that the subjective-objective distinction of the personality starts at the Ahaṃkāra stage. Under the influence of sattva, we have the subjective side of personality i.e. the 13 organs (internal and external); and under the influence of tamas, we have the objective side, the gross physical body, arising out of tanmātrās. The tanmātrās are subtle and non-specific, but the physical body comprising of gross physical elements are specific and are either calm or terrifying or stupifying.⁴

Thus we may summarise the composition of human personality according to Sāṃkhya. Besides puruṣa, there are two bodies—the gross physical body (sthūla śarīra) and the subtle body (linga śarīra). The gross physical body is composed of

¹KU, I, 3.3.

²SK, 36.

³Ibid, 37.

⁴SK, 38; SPS, III, 17.

the five elements, and the subtle body includes Buddhi, Ahaṁkāra, Manas and the ten external organs. Among these, the physical body perishes at the time of death, but the subtle body accompanies the soul even after death and lasts till liberation.¹ The subtle body (Mind in the Western sense) including the 13 organs right from the external organs to Mahat (or Buddhi) differs from person to person. It is unable to experience without the gross physical body. It migrates from one body to another, one life to another.² "It is the structural design of a concrete person or Puruṣa as aware of a world including his own body."³ The physical body is thus necessary for the mind to function. As a painting stands not without a substrate (canvas ground), nor a shadow without a past or the like, nor fire without heat, nor ether without space, so too the mental apparatus (linga) does not subsist supportless, without specific physical body.⁴ The notion of subtle body, the mental apparatus, has been explained in the Upaniṣads also. Here some more details have been presented. This idea has remained unobjected and unthwarted. Colebrook says, "Although, therefore, less clearly expressed than by Hindu writers, the early Greek philosophers entertained similar notions of the nature of the subtle body, which was inseparable from soul until the period of its final exemption from transmigration."⁵

Subtle Body

Some further details regarding the subtle-body are given by Kapila. The individual constitutes of Puruṣa, subtle body (linga) and the gross physical body. The gross physical body is inherited from the parents, but not the subtle body.⁶ It is the subtle body that migrates, and enters the gross physical body. As it arose first, experience belongs to it,⁷ and not to the physical body, which perishes at death. This *linga-sarīra* is

¹SK, 39.

²*Ibid.*, 40.

³Mukerji, J.N., *Sāṁkhya or Theory of Reality*, p. 43.

⁴SK, 41; G. Bh, 41.

⁵Colebrook, ..., *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, (commented by Wilson), p. 115.

⁶SPS, III, 7.

⁷*Ibid.*, 8.

itself material, but is composed of extremely subtle matter. Its material composition has been vouchsafed by Upaniṣads also. It is so subtle that it is atomic in size,¹ and yet it contains a world of past impressions (saṃskāras)—a macrocosm in microcosm. In all, it has eighteen adjuncts, which are integrated and function as a whole. The eighteen adjuncts are—Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, Manas, ten indriyas, and five tanmātrās. If we subtract from it the five tanmātrās, it verily corresponds to the Mind in Western terminology. It is both conscious and sub-conscious. In its conscious stage, it functions in the form of our daily activities. But it has a deep sub-conscious, a repository of innumerable impressions of not only the present life, but of innumerable past lives. It stores vāsanās and saṃskāras. Vāsanās are innate tendencies acquired during past lives. Saṃskāras being constantly generated by experience. The Puruṣas are of the same kind in all the subtle bodies. It is the subtle bodies which are diverse and thus differentiate them. The subtle body in itself being a product of Prakṛti is non-conscious, but because of the association of Puruṣa it becomes conscious. Consciousness does not pass into it, but is reflected into it. Likewise the sufferings of the subtle body are reflected in Puruṣa, though it actually remains untainted like the reflection of red flower in a pure crystal. There is no real contact, and hence no traces are left behind.

Sāṃkhya Kārikā gives further details about the subtle body.² Firstly, it is primevally formed (Pūrvotpannam). It is the first evolute of Prakṛti. Secondly, it is unconfined (asakta), in animals or men or gods. It is not specifically determined. It is undetermined even in respect of sex. Thirdly, it persists through the changes and specifications (niyatam). It is not dissolved until liberation or perfect wisdom dawns. Fourthly, it is incapable of experience without the gross physical body (nirupabhogam). Fifthly, it is invested with dispositions (bhavaiḥ adbhivāsitaḥ), such as virtue and vice, wisdom and ignorance, passion and dispassion, power and weakness. Sixthly, it migrates from one life to another, through a succession of

¹*Ibid.*, 14.

²*SK*, 40,

births. Seventhly, it is the support of the cognitive apparatus.¹ Eighthly, it acts for the sake of *Puruṣa*² like a dramatic actor, on account of the connection of causes and effects, and by union with the all-embracing power of *Prakṛti*.

The purpose of the subtle body is further explained in *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* :

"For the sake of soul's wish, the subtle body exhibits before it, like a dramatic actor, on account of connection of causes and effects and by union with the all-embracing power of *Prakṛti*."³ Just as an actor plays diverse roles, so does the subtle body play different roles. The purpose of this role-play is further explained. By virtue one ascends to the higher regions, and by vice he descends to the lowest regions. Knowledge and wisdom result in deliverance (*apavarga*), and the reverse result in bondage.⁴

2. Sources of Knowledge

Experience, according to *Sāṃkhya* belongs to the *Puruṣa*.⁵ The agency by which the *Puruṣa* experiences is the *Antah-karṇa*, which constitutes of the *Buddhi*, *Ahaṃkāra* and *manas*, which are again helped by the *Bāhyakarṇa*, the ten senses, whose function is to present the sense-perceptions to *Manas*. *Manas* arranges these sense-perceptions into a percept, presents it to the *Ahaṃkāra*, which again presents it to *Buddhi* to form the concept, as is clear from the table below:

Indriyas Sense- Perceptions	Manas Percept	Ahaṃkāra Modified percept	Buddhi Concept
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Modification of *Buddhi* takes place in the form of the cognition of the object. We use the word *modification*, because *Buddhi* already possesses past impressions in the form of *Vāsanā* and

¹SK, 41.

²Ibid, 42.

³Ibid, 42.

⁴Ibid, 44.

⁵SPS, I, 143.

Sanskāras, and these impressions are modified by the new impressions. Puruṣa receives the knowledge through Buddhi, but it is the Buddhi that is modified and not Puruṣa who is not liable to transformation. This modification is manifested by means of reflection of Buddhi in consciousness.¹ Hence two events take place. Firstly there is the modification of Buddhi because of the new impressions. Secondly the modification is reflected in Puruṣa, so that he experiences the same. The two events, according to Sāṃkhya take place not successively, but simultaneously and knowledge is the result of the two events.

The relation between Buddhi and Puruṣa is like of a rose reflected in a crystal. There is no actual transference of the colour of the rose in the crystal, but the reflection exists.² So there is no actual transference of the modifications of Buddhi in Puruṣa.

Sāṃkhya admits three sources of valid knowledge, namely (1) perception (pratyakṣa), (2) inference (anumāna) and (3) authority (śabda).³ As said above, the reflected modification of Buddhi is the knowledge. This is called Pramā. The knower Puruṣa is Pramātṛ. The source of knowledge is called Pramāṇa. Perception, as the source of knowledge is the first Pramāṇa. Most of our experience in the empirical world is based on this source. Anumāna is passage from the known to the unknown, and it means the inference of the presence of a thing from the absence of another, or its absence from the presence of the latter, or their presence or absence at the same time from the observation that they have been so related in the past. Whatever cannot be perceived directly through Pratyakṣa can be inferred logically. Wherever there is fire there is smoke. This is a common observation. So if we find smoke rising on a distant hill, although the glow of the fire is not seen, we can infer from the smoke that fire exists.

Authority (śabda or Āptavacana), or trustworthy assertion is the third source of knowledge.⁴ The reference is chiefly to

¹SPS, I, 99.

²SPBh, VI, 28.

³SPS, I, 88; SK, 4.

⁴Ibid, 101; SK, 4-5.

Vedas, which are said to be inspired and not composed by any person.¹ The reason for this assertion is given as this. The unreleased persons have limited knowledge and are thus incompetent for such an outstanding work. The released are released and as such should have no concern with Vedas.² Hence Vedas, on account of its non-personal authorship is free from doubts. Aniruddha and Vācaspati in their commentaries suggest that Vedic assertions also must be based on logic.³

Kapila asserts that there are only three sources of knowledge (Pramāṇa). Since if these are established anything can be ascertained, and no more proof is needed.

3. Concept of Manas

Manas is the third internal organ, and its importance is third-rate in comparison to Buddhi and Ahaṁkāra. It has a number of properties, as discussed in *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*.

(i) Manas governs the ten Indriyas. As one of the class of organs, manas is both sensory and motor. Among the sensory organs it is a sensory one, and among the motor organs it is an organ of action also. It has double characteristics (ubhayāt-makam).⁴

(ii) Manas ponders or purposes, that is, it helps in understanding that by a certain action a desired consequence is affected.⁵ Manas carefully considers a substance perceived by a sensory organ, and determines or discriminates between the specific and the non-specific.⁶

The word 'saṁkalpa' which is used here to determine the function of manas has a broad connotation. Perception through the sense-organs is simple and non-specific. The recognition is broad and general, for instance when we see a child, a man or a tree. But when, after this, the thing as distinguished by its properties, by its genus, is recognised by the understanding, and the object perceived becomes specific, there comes the function of manas. In a way, saṁkalpa is the

¹*Ibid*, V, 46.

²*Ibid*, V, 47.

³STK, 5; SSV, I, 26.

⁴SK, 27.

⁵See commentary by Kalluka Bhatta.

⁶As commented by Vācaspati.

process of reflection, the consideration of the object of simple perception, so as to form a definite idea, which manas transmits through Ahaṃkāra and Buddhi to the soul. Sense organs are concerned with pure sensation, manas turns the sensations into determinate perceptions, and presents further to ego and intellect, and still further to Puruṣa.

(iii) Manas has the common property (sādharmya) of sensory and motor.¹ It has multifarious activities and diverse external forms, due to the particular modifications of the attributes.² The various senses are numerous by specific modifications of qualities, and so are the external forms. The several objects of the organs, all proceed from specific modifications. Just as the same individual assumes different characters according to the influence of his associations, becoming a lover with a mistress or a sage with sages, so mind from its connections with the different Indriyas, becomes identified with each of these, and consequently is diversified according to the function of each Indriya with which it is associated.³

4. Perception

Perception depends upon not only the senses but also manas. The eyes are useless unless the manas attends. The ears cannot hear until manas attends. This fact was explained in Upaniṣads also : 'My mind was elsewhere, so I did not hear.' Hence manas must cooperate with the organ of sense, even after the sensation and sense-perception, as the organ would otherwise be incapable of performing its function.

Perception further depends upon Buddhi. Manas presents the idea to Buddhi. Buddhi itself becomes modified and assumes the form of the object. Hiriyanna summarises this phenomena:

"The image is not transferred to the Buddhi and found in it as may be supposed, but the Buddhi itself assumes the form of the object, when a suitable stimulus is received from outside. The modification of the evolvent Buddhi, viz. Vṛtti is a characteristic not only of perception but also of all forms of

¹SK, 27.

²Ibid.

³SK, 27, also SPBh.

consciousness, and when it is inspired by spirit, experience results. The psychic apparatus as a whole mediates between the Puruṣa and the outside world thereby securing former the experiences of life or final freedom."¹

The sense-organs have a limited function to perform. They have got their limitations in cognising and perceiving objects. Sāṃkhya holds the theory that the senses go to reach a particular object. The sense of sight travels outward to reach various objects, and then does the perception take place.

When the senses are not able to reach a particular object, perception fails. It is not possible for the senses to reach everything. Had it been possible, then man could perceive everything in this universe.² In vague terms Sāṃkhya explains that there is a maximum and minimum threshold for all sorts of perception. There is a limit beyond which our visual perception, auditory perception, tactual perception, olfactory perception and flavourous perception cannot proceed.

An objection can be raised against this view : 'If sight goes as far as the object, then it must have the nature of light, because it possesses excessive velocity'. To this Sāṃkhya replies that the objection does not stand : 'Not because light glides away, has sight the nature of light, since this is to be explained by the function'.³ Sāṃkhya refutes the opinion of Nyāya that sight has the nature of light. The proceeding of sight is to be explained by a connection mediated through the function of sight. Aniruddha gives further explanation:

"The functions of sight proceed according to their nature and reveal this object with which they come into connection, to him who opens his eyes, and at that place where they energeise because of the cooperation of the invisible power of merit."⁴

The Order of Perception

There are two types of functions—simultaneous and gradual. Generally the perception is simultaneous or instantaneous. All

¹Hiriyanna, M., *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 285.

²SPS, V, 104.

³*Ibid*, I, 105.

⁴SSV, I, 105.

the four agents viz. Buddhi, Ahaṁkāra, Manas and any one of the Indriyas, work instantaneously like a flash of lightning, a post is visible. The eyes see, send the message to the Manas, that further transmits to Buddhi through Ahaṁkāra. But this long task, though having particular order, takes place instantaneously.¹

But in certain cases, the perception's is graded. The Indriya perceives first, but this perception is indeliberate (*nirvikalpa*), and it is only the Manas that makes it specific through its power of *saṁkalpa*. When the same reaches Buddhi, it becomes definite through its power of *niscaya*.

But in respect of an unseen one, the functions of the higher three (Manas, Ahaṁkāra and Buddhi) are preceded by the fourth—Indriya.² Deliberation, which is a function of Buddhi cannot take place unless there are previous impressions of sensations and perceptions. Buddhi is thus the chief instrument.³ It is indispensable for soul's experience,⁴ and is the receptacle of all the impressions and experiences.⁵ This fact can also be inferred from the unique power of memory that it possesses.⁶ It stores in it a vast treasure of impressions of past and present. Hence it is the king of all the senses.⁷

Non-perception

Sāṃkhya Kārikā discusses a number of causes of non-perception.⁸ (1) The first is extreme distance. We can see, hear and smell not beyond a particular limit of distance. Beyond a particular threshold, we cannot perceive. (2) Curiously enough too much proximity also is a cause of non-perception. We cannot see the collyrium in our own eyes. (3) Any injury to organ of perception may render it partially or wholly unserviceable as is the case with blind or deaf. (4) Non-steadiness of the mind is another cause. Attention and concentration

¹SK, 30.

²*Ibid.*

³SPS, II, 40.

⁴*Ibid.*, II, 41.

⁵*Ibid.*, II, 42.

⁶*Ibid.*, II, 43.

⁷IP, II, 47.

⁸SK, 7.

is the pre-requisite condition for perception. (5) If the object of perception is too subtle, our organs may fail to perceive. A faint sound, a minute object, a faint smell, a slight change in temperature, or a slight change in taste may not be perceived at all. (6) If there is any obstruction (vyavadhāna) between the object of perception and the organ of perception, (e.g. a curtain obstructing sight), perception is not possible. (7) A stronger perception can suppress a weaker perception. We cannot see the stars during the day because of stronger light of the sun. A faint voice cannot be heard under the condition of drum-beating. A strong smell causes suppression (abhibhāva) to the faint smell. (8) The last condition of non-perception is blending. It may not be possible to differentiate between two perceptions when blended together. Two similar colours, sounds, flavours, temperatures or smells when blended may appear to be one, difficult to be differentiated.

We could very well imagine that non-perception is always due to non-existence of an objection, and hence the above eight conditions can be dispensed with. But such a hypothesis is wrong. Our senses sometimes do not perceive, but the higher organs such as Buddhi prove the existence through inference etc.¹ There may be no glow of fire seen, but the existence of smoke is enough for our inference that fire exists there. Hence the above eight conditions of non-perception need not be doubted.

5. *States of Consciousness*

Sāṃkhya repeats the same account of various states of consciousness as given in Upaniṣads. The states are waking, dreaming, deep sleep and death. In the waking state, the external organs i.e. the senses receive sense impressions, carry these through Manas and Ahaṃkāra to Buddhi, and thus modify Buddhi. In the dream-state also modifications of Buddhi take place, but not due to the impressions through the senses, but through the impressions of previous experiences stored in Buddhi. The senses do not work here. In the deep-sleep state, there is withdrawal (partial or complete) of the impressions. No modification of Buddhi takes place. It,

¹SK, 8.

however, experiences a sort of pleasure or dullness. When one wakes up, he has the memory of this kind of sleep.

Dream

A few references of dream phenomena are given by Kapila. Dreams are illusory, as opposed to the waking state which is real.¹ But the unreality of apprehension in dreams is not absolute like that of a flower in the sky, nor is such apprehension absolutely unreal even in the respective Self, into which the visions of internal organs are reflected.² Had the dreams been absolutely unreal, the notion of there having been a dream would not exist. Nor does a dream consist of absolutely unseen things, but of such objects which have been seen beforehand in the waking state. Dreams are the creation of the mind. The previous impressions again present themselves, of-course in a different form and in a different context.

Human mind has the capacity of reproducing previously seen objects in the dream state. Yogis have a still greater capacity, as they can produce a new phenomena even in the real world.³

6. Meditation and Yoga

There are references about the super-conscious state beyond the conscious state of the empirical self. In the super-conscious state, a Yogi has super-natural powers. He can even produce new objects by means of his will.⁴ Everything falls to the purified Yogis in consequence of intensity of contemplation.⁵ He obtains eight types of supernatural powers (siddhis).⁶ An ordinary person perceives what is before him at present, and recalls through memory and imagination what he has perceived in the past. But a Yogi can perceive what is going to happen in future also. He can even see beyond what is before him.⁷ Thus he possesses the power of extra-sensory perception (ESP). He can perceive through his mind even without the help of the

¹ SPS, III, 26.

² *Ibid*, 27.

³ *Ibid*, 28.

⁴ *Ibid*, 28.

⁵ *Ibid*, 29.

⁶ *Ibid*, III, 44.

⁷ *Ibid*, I, 90.

Indriyas (sense-organs.)¹

Kapila finds no reason to disbelieve the supernatural powers. Even the ordinary herbs possess abnormal powers in the treatment of diseases. Yogis obtain higher powers through concentration and effort. Hence these are not to be denied.² Meditation is a great boon. It is the internal sense without any object.³ And by concentration, following a regular course of yoga, liberation is attained. The regular course of Yoga is well-explained by Patanjali in his Yoga-Sutras, but Kapila gives all the rudiments and first principles.⁴ The emphasis in Sāṃkhya, however, is towards knowledge of the reality (tattva) rather than to Yogic efforts (sādhana). This is one of the differences between Sāṃkhya and Yoga.

D. RESUME

1. *Comparison with Upaniṣads*

Sāṃkhya has strong foundations in Upaniṣads,⁵ but also makes bold departure from the Upaniṣadic philosophy.

(1) Puruṣa and Prakṛti are the two major principles mentioned in Upaniṣads also. But, beyond the two, Upaniṣads maintain, there is one Brahman, who governs the two. If Sāṃkhya simply believed in a twenty-sixth principle as Īśvara or Brahman, it could be identified with Upaniṣadic monism. Perhaps the original Sāṃkhya held monistic theism, but later on under the influence of Buddhism, made a modification to this effect. The subject-object, spirit-matter, Puruṣa-Prakṛti relationship is not so convincing in Sāṃkhya. The association is there, but who brings this association?

(2) The principles of Ātman-Puruṣa (Ātman in Upaniṣads and Puruṣa in Sāṃkhya), transmigration of soul, law of Karma and the principle of liberation are common to Upaniṣads and Sāṃkhya.

(3) There is a parallel theory, of cosmic evolution, which can be identified in both Upaniṣads and Sāṃkhya. In Upaniṣads, the

¹ *Ibid*, I, 90.

² *SPSV*, 128.

³ *Ibid*, VI, 25.

⁴ *Ibid*, III, 28-45.

⁵ *SUV*, 7-10; VI, 10; VI, 13; *KU*, I, 11.

order of evolution is Brahman, Īśvara, Hiranyagarbha and Virāṭ. Eschewing the original creative principle Brahman, the above order corresponds to Avyakta, Mahat and Ahaṃkāra of Sāṃkhya.

(4) A parallelism of evolution at the cosmic level and individual level is postulated in both.

(5) Both assert that consciousness rests not in the body but in the spirit (Ātman-Puruṣa). Sāṃkhya, however, develops the theory of reflection, which is an innovation.

(6) Both explain the theory of three Guṇas. Sāṃkhya, however, makes greater contribution about the nature of Guṇas, so much so that this principle is accepted even in later system of philosophy without discussion.

(7) An account of states of consciousness (waking state etc.) is common to both.

(8) As far the factors of personality, both present common material. Personality according to both has three main factors: Soul, Subtle body and Gross Physical body. Better details are given in Sāṃkhya about the subtle body which is composed of thirteen organs. The relations between the various parts of the personality are explained in a similar manner.¹ Hierarchy is the same. The concept of manas in Sāṃkhya, is based on the description in Upaniṣads. It is material and atomic in size.

(9) The eschatology is common to both.

(10) Higher mental powers and yogic powers have been accepted by both.

2. *Special Contribution of Sāṃkhya to Psychology*

(1) Sāṃkhya explains in detail the intelligent principle (Mahat) acting in the Universe. It explains the interaction between matter and spirit. Thus we have a Psycho-physical phenomena at the cosmic level and at the individual level. It attempts to solve the riddle of mind-body relationship, which has given rise to a number of theories in the West. The theory of interaction (sanghāta) is a profound discovery. The theory of mutual reflection of Puruṣa and Buddhi is a further contribution in this field. The metaphor of lame and blind in explain-

¹ KU, I, 3, 3-4; SK, 35.

ing the mutual inter-dependence of matter and spirit is striking.

(2) The theory of plurality of souls, is a bold adventure in the Indian philosophical realm. A Western realist will appreciate the logical conclusions arrived at by Kapila and his followers. For the time being, it seems to be a satisfactory reply to the problem of individual differences in men. Whatever be the philosophical worth of this dogma, it has a great psychological significance. The chapter on heredity and environment in psychology, gets a strong foundation if explained from the point of view of Sāṃkhya. The accumulation of impressions by the subtle body, in the past lives explains heredity, and that in the present life explains environment.

(3) Sāṃkhya makes one stride forward from the Upaniṣadic thought, in the explanation of three types of sources of knowledge. Greater details, have been presented in later philosophical systems, such as Nyāya.

(4) Perception, as a chief source of knowledge, has been explained in Sāṃkhya. The role of Manas, and the ten sense-organs is a chief feature in this system. The functions of Manas as a coordinating organ, over and above the senses, make explicit a number of queries on this issue. A number of conditions of non-perception have been explained in Kārikā.

(5) Rudiments of Dream-phenomena and extra-sensory perception, super-conscious state of mind and yogic powers have been referred to. These have been further elaborated in Yoga Philosophy.

(6) The Sāṃkhya philosophy has been taken for granted in toto by the Yoga System, but Yoga proceeds further to discuss elaborately the yogic methods for achieving liberation. In a way Sāṃkhya and Yoga are complementary, Sāṃkhya is the first part and Yoga the second part.

Chronologically, it would have been appropriate to deal with Yoga psychology, soon after dealing with psychology in Sāṃkhya, but as Yoga psychology is the culmination of Indian psychology, incorporating most of the psychological truths in other systems, its discussion is postponed towards the end, after the discussion of Vedānta system. So Nyāya, which is the next important system is discussed in the succeeding chapter.

Psychology in Nyāya

WE have already discussed the psychological speculations in Sāṃkhya. Nyāya is another system which developed side-by-side with Sāṃkhya and which accumulated a wealth of philosophical material under the impact of other growing philosophies. As the nomenclature suggests, Nyāya is the 'science of reasoning', 'Science of logical proof', 'Science of Truth'. It deals more with epistemology than with metaphysics or ethics. (As Indian psychology is ever embedded in philosophy, Nyāya psychology also is coloured by its philosophy metaphysics). Hence before dealing with the strictly psychological theories, a background of its metaphysics needs to be presented.

A. METAPHYSICS

Nyāya deals more with epistemology than with metaphysics. It accepts the metaphysical doctrines propounded by Vaiśeṣika, and does not bother to give its own explanation. All the same Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics have some unique characteristics, which distinguish it from other schools.

Nyāya asserts positively that the external world exists apart from our knowledge of it, and our ideas correspond to things outside us. The world of nature is a composite of eternal, unchangeable, causeless atoms, existing independently of our thoughts. Here Nyāya preaches realism, but it does not preach materialism or atheism, because at the same time, it asserts, that God is the cause of the Universe.¹ The existence of God is, however, established through inference and not through revelation.²

¹NS, IV, 1, 19-21.

²Udayana treats this subject extensively in one whole treatise—*Kusumāñjali*. He applies all the canons of Nyāya in proving the existence of God.

Nyāya divides the multifarious things of experience into certain classes of substance (dravya). The dravyas are nine in number—(1) earth, (2) water, (3) fire, (4) air, (5) ether, (6) time, (7) space, (8) self, and (9) manas.

The dravyas form only one of the categories which the universe is composed of. The other categories (arthas) are—(1) Quality (Guṇa), (2) Karma, (3) Universal (Sāmānya), (4) Individuality (Viśeṣa), (5) Inherence (Samavāya) and (6) Non-existence (Abhāva). The last category Negation (abhāva) is added by Vaiśeṣika. This is strictly the ontological method. All these arthas are one of the objects of knowledge (prameya). There are eleven more objects of knowledge. All these form one class of categories (padārthas). But Nyāya adheres to the epistemological method here also, and presents sixteen padārthas. All the twelve arthas are included in but one of them—the knowable (prameya). There are 15 other categories. The sixteen categories in order are—Means of right knowledge (pramāṇa), knowable (prameya), doubt (saṁśaya), purpose (prayojana), example (dṛṣṭānta), established tenet (siddhānta), syllogism (avayava), confutation (tarka), ascertainment (nirṇaya), discussion (vāda), controversy (jalpa), cavil (vitanda), fallacy (hetvābhāsa), equivocation (challa), futility (jāti) and disagreement (nigrahasthāna). The first nine of these deal more strictly with logic, and the remaining seven deal with error.

B. CONCEPT OF PERSONALITY

According to Nyāya, personality is composed of Ātman (individual soul), Manas (mind) and body. Consciousness is an attribute of Ātman. Earlier Nyāya is silent about the distinction of individual soul and supreme soul. But in the later period, the distinction has been made clear.¹ The supreme soul is devoid of pleasure and pain. The individual soul, separate in each body, is subject to pleasure and pain. It pervades the whole body. Manas corresponds to Antaḥkaraṇa of Sāṃkhya (and not Manas of Sāṃkhya, which is only a part of Antaḥkaraṇa), and it may roughly convey the sense of 'Mind' in Western psychology. The physical body is composed of the

¹ See *Tarka Sangraha* : Ātma na dvividhah, jivātma, parmātma ceti.

five elements. All psychic process is done by Manas with the help of the body, and for Ātman, for all the marks (linga) like desire, aversion, pleasure, pain and cognition subsist in Ātman. In order to understand the complete psychic process, a discussion about the Self, Mind and body is necessary.

1. *The Self (Ātman)*

The self is a unique substance, to which all cognitions, feelings and conations belong as its qualities or attributes. Desire (iccha), aversion (dveṣa), effort (prayatna), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), and cognition (jñāna) are the indicatives of the soul.¹ These qualities are psychic, and therefore cannot belong to the body. Hence the self exists. The self is eternal (nitya) and indestructible. It is all-pervading (vibhu), unlimited in its activities by time and place. So far Nyāya agrees with the Upaniṣadic definition. But it gives some further details which do not agree with other systems. Self is not intelligence as such (as says Śāṅkara), but owning intelligence as its quality.² It is the knower, the ego, and not mere knowledge. It is the seat (āśraya) of Ahamkāra. *Nyāya vārttika* goes still further and calls Self neutral (neither intelligent nor non-intelligent). It is intelligent only in relation to the body. All cognitions are transitory, but soul is eternal.³ The existence of Self is proved beyond doubt.⁴ The body is merely its vehicle of actions.⁵ Ātman is not the mind and senses, but what controls them and synthesises their functions.⁶ The unity of all types of cognitions and actions is brought about by the soul.

Apprehension cannot subsist in the sense-organ, or in the object, since it continues to exist also when these two have been destroyed.⁷ Nor can apprehension be the quality of the mind, because the simultaneous cognition of things actually appearing in Yogis would be inexplicable if it belonged to mind and not to soul.⁸ It is proved beyond doubt that all appre-

¹NSI, 1, 10.

²Ibid, 5.

³NVTT, I, 1, 10.

⁴NB, I, 1, 10.

⁵NSI, I, 11.

⁶NB, III, 1, 1.

⁷NS, III, 2, 18.

⁸Ibid, 1, 19.

hension belongs to the soul. Soul is the subject, and all other organs of the soul, together with the object of senses are the object.¹

The soul is different in different bodies.² The same soul subsists in all the different births of a particular individual. There is a single agent cognising all things and subsisting in all the bodies with which a person is endowed during his numerous lives on earth, who recalls, numerous cognitions and remembrances.³ At the present moment there are different souls in different bodies. Had it not been so, all should experience the same thing.

Soul is Eternal

Having proved that soul exists, Gautama asserts that soul is external. It exists even after the perishing of the body. The Upaniṣads have given testimony of the fact. But Gautama presents convincing reasons, and proofs based on psychological grounds.

Because the new born infant experiences joy, fear and sorrow—which could follow only from the continuity of remembrance of what has been repeatedly gone through before, it can be inferred that soul exists eternally.⁴ Whence this continuity of remembrance, whence these *sanskāras*? Even the new-born baby has a desire for milk from the mother's breast. Whence did he get this instinct, unless from the past births?⁵ The natural instincts in the newly born child do not have physical basis (like the attraction of iron by magnet) but have mental basis.⁶ It is the attachment during a long course of births and rebirths that is responsible for the present instincts. But persons who kill this attachment are never born again. Their instincts die. They have no reminiscences.⁷

"What particular kind of longings will appeal to a new-born soul will depend upon the peculiarities of the particular kind of

¹NV, III, 2, 19.

²NVTT, I, 1, 10; NB, III, 1, 14.

³NB, III, 1, 14.

⁴NS, III, , 18.

⁵Ibid, III, 1, 21.

⁶Ibid, 1, 23.

⁷Ibid, 1, 24.

body into which it is born ; what determines the special kind of body in which the soul is born is his past Karma ; and the personality comes to be known by the particular name by reason of the peculiar body with which it is equipped at that time.”¹

2. *Relation of Ātman with mind and body*

Self is the ground of all thought and experience. In it reside all the innate faculties of the mind, the reflexes, the instincts, desires and dispositions (sanskāras) of past life. Hence it is the guiding principle (adhiṣṭhātā) of mind, body and senses. It is the self that cognises and perceives through the medium of the senses and the mind. The process of perception is like this. The external senses come into contact with the object, mind with the external sense and self comes into contact with the mind. In the case of internal perception, the external senses are unnecessary, and hence the object is perceived by the mind, which is connected with the self.

It is through the self's connection with the mind and body that consciousness results. Consciousness is not an essential property of the soul, according to Nyāya. Here Nyāya differs substantially from other systems of Indian philosophy.

This view of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is open to serious criticism. Even the older school of Western realism, which agrees on many points with Nyāya, differs here. Consciousness has all along been considered as an essential attribute of the soul. Without consciousness, the soul cannot be distinguished from matter. But Nyāya asserts that the stream of consciousness is separate from the self, only embedded on it. The self is the witness, but not involved in the stream.

3. *The Nature of Consciousness*

Nyāya offers unique views as regards consciousness.

(a) *Consciousness is not a quality of the body.*

Gautama categorically remarks that consciousness is not a quality of the body. A body, whether living or dead possesses certain characteristics such as colour. But consciousness is absent in the dead-body. If during its life, consciousness exists, it is not because consciousness is an attribute of the body, but

¹ *Ibid*, 1, 26.

because of something else, just as water appears to be warm not because warmth is its intrinsic quality, but because of fire associated with it.¹

(b) *Consciousness is not a quality of the Manas.*

Desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition are the indicative of the soul. All the material substance, the sense organs and Manas are under the control of something else, i.e., soul. Therefore consciousness also belongs to soul and not to Manas or body. If it is proposed that consciousness belongs to mind, then why should the soul be considered responsible for all its acts? It would mean that the actions are done by Manas, and the fruits (good or bad) accrue to soul.² It would mean that what is experienced by the soul on rebirth is the results of acts done by others (Manas).³ Hence consciousness is a quality of the soul only. The phenomenon of re-birth and deliverance will be possible only if there is a persisting entity in the shape of the soul, that acts consciously.⁴ It is the conscious person that cognises and not the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) (as asserted by Sāṃkhya). Though Mind also is occupied, but it does not justify the view that apprehending is done by it and not by the soul.⁵

(c) *Consciousness and Soul.*

Although consciousness cannot exist apart from the soul, the soul itself is not necessarily conscious. Consciousness is a quality of the soul produced in the waking state by the association of the soul with manas. The stream of consciousness is embedded with soul, but is different from the soul. The series of cognitions are transitory, which vanish after sometime. But soul is eternal. Here Nyāya differs from Vedānta and other schools of philosophy. Existence, consciousness and bliss (sat, cit and ānanda) are, according to Vedānta, the foremost attributes of soul.

¹NB, III, 2, 47.

²NS, III, 2, 38.

³NB, III, 2, 38.

⁴Ibid, III, 2, 39.

⁵Ibid, 2, 8.

4. *Buddhi*

Nyāya deals more with epistemology than with metaphysics and ontology. It propounds logical realism and pluralism as against monism of Vedānta, or dualism of Sāṃkhya. It postulates three eternal entities, *viz.*, Ātman (soul), universe and Īśvara (God). The souls are many, and each soul acts through its agent *Buddhi*. *Buddhi*, is not only the agent but also the product, that is to say the whole sphere of knowledge. It is different from the *Buddhi* of Sāṃkhya, as it is not cosmic (mahat of Sāṃkhya). It encompasses the apprehension (*upalabdhī*), knowledge and cognisance.¹ It is the manifestation of objects (*arthaprakāśa*).² Hence *Buddhi*, according to Nyāya, is identical with knowledge. Sāṃkhya and yoga treated knowledge as modification (*vr̥tti*) of *Buddhi*, but Nyāya treats it as belonging to *Buddhi* itself. In that way it is not a substance but an attribute, an attribute of the Self. Nyāya refutes the reflection theory of Sāṃkhya also.³ It asserts that no reflection is possible, and actually it is a quality of the soul.⁴ Knowledge or *Buddhi* is not an activity, as the Bauddha and Mīmāṃsā systems explain. It is a *guṇa*, an attribute, and not a substance (*padārtha*). Knowledge is a reality, corresponding to the objective universe. It is not a subjective affair, inadequate of the objective world. The external world exists apart from our knowledge of it.

Scope and Types

Buddhi, according to Nyāya, has two factors : experience (*anubhava*) and memory (*smṛti*).⁵ The former is the knowledge presented, and the latter is the old knowledge reproduced. *Anubhava* may be valid (*pramā*) or non-valid (*apramā*). The former is again of four types, *viz.* perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*) and testimony (*śabda*). The latter is also of three types, *viz.* doubt (*saṃśaya*), error (*viparyaya*) and hypothetical (*tarka*). Memory may be true (*yathārtha*) or false (*ayathārtha*). While dealing with the

¹NS, I, 1, 15.

²TK, p. 6.

³NS, III, 2, 5.

⁴Ibid, 2, 18-41.

⁵TB, (Buddhinirūpanam).

psychology in Nyāya, we are mostly concerned with perception and memory, we may however study in brief the Nyāya theory of error.

5. *Concept of Mind*

Mind in Nyāya is designated by the term *manas*. Nyāya calls *manas* the sixth sense, over and above the five senses; in the same way as Sāṃkhya calls it the eleventh sense. Nyāya does not include the five motor organs (Karmendriyas) in the category of senses. Hence *manas* is the sixth and not the eleventh. Like Sāṃkhya, it calls *manas* an internal organ, an internal sense located in the heart (vide *Tarkabhāṣā*). It is not a product of Ahaṃkāra, as Sāṃkhya says, but an eternal substance, which is non-physical (abhautika). It is atomic in size and exists in contact with the soul.

The existence of mind as a separate sense is justified by the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions.¹ At one time only one sense-organ (out of the five) operates, which suggests that there is some other cause or sense-organ by whose proximity cognition appears, and on account of whose non-proximity cognition does not appear. This coordinating factor is mind.² In the absence of such a cause, all types of perceptions must function simultaneously. The apparent simultaneous perception, is in reality, successive. When it is in contact with one sense organ, it is not so with another.³

Mind in Nyāya is given the status of an instrument of perception. It is not the cogniser, but only the means of cognition. It is the soul that is the cogniser. An instrument of cognition, such as mind is, belongs to the cogniser, the soul.⁴ So *Manas* mediates between the Soul and the senses. Soul cognises through *Manas*. Its cognitions are not self-luminous. Each soul has its own *Manas*. There are not many *Manas* in one self, lest there be many types of volitions simultaneously in one soul.⁵

Manas is said to be atomic in dimension.⁶ It is not all

¹NS, I, 1, 16.

²NB, I, 1, 16.

³NS, III, 2, 6-7.

⁴NB, III, I, 15-16.

⁵NV, III, 2, 56.

⁶NS, III, 2, 59.

pervading (vibhu). Had it been all pervading, it could have simultaneous contact with all the senses, and through those all the objects.

The functions of Manas have been enumerated as follows :¹

- (1) remembrance, (2) inference, (3) verbal cognition, (4) doubt, (5) intuition, (6) dream, (7) imagination (ūhā), (8) the perception of pleasure and pain, (9) desire, and (10) rest.

6. *Manas and Senses*

Manas can well be distinguished from the other five senses, as it is the inner sense by which a person can cognise the inner states of thoughts, feelings and desires. The five senses are composed of material substances like earth, water, fire, air and ether. These act as organs only. But Manas is not composed of the material substances, and can act as an organ unlimited by specific functions, as the senses are.² The senses are outer organs, but the Manas is an internal organ. We know the outer organs through our inner organ Manas. But how do we know Manas, the internal organ? Not through Manas. The mind as a sense cannot be perceived. It is known by inference.

The outer organs deal with outer perception, but Manas deals with internal perception like pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and the like. It rises above the outer perception and enters the field of memory, doubt, dream and inference etc.³ Mīmāṃsā also says that memory, inference etc. are not cases of perception, although they depend upon the function of mind as a sense.⁴

7. *Attention*

Mind attends to one thing at a time. To us it may appear that mind attends to many objects, simultaneously, but actually the attention is non-simultaneous.⁵ "This teacher reads, walks, holds the water-pot, looks at the path, hears the sound proceed-

¹NB, I, 1, 16.

²NB, I, 1, 4.

³Op. cit.

⁴NB, I, 1, 16.

⁵Śaṣṭradīpikā, p. 36.

⁶NS. I, 1, 16 ; III, 2, 56.

ing from the forest, becomes frightened, keeps on the look out for signs of serpents or tigers, remembers the place of destination."¹ In the above example, it may appear that there is no-sequence in these varied cognitions, and are simultaneous. But actually, all these cognitions take place so rapidly, in quick succession, that these appear to be simultaneous. An analogy of the fire-circle can be given. In the case of whirling fire-brand, even though there is sequence among the several perceptions of the fire, yet it is not perceived so by reason of the extreme-rapidity of motion.² Another example is the cognition of language. When several squabbles composing a sentence are pronounced, the mind perceives each squabble in succession; recognises the word, recalls its meaning, recognises all the words in the sentences and integrates the meaning of each word. 'Even though there are so many cognitions involved in the process of our comprehension of the meaning of a sentence, yet by reason of the quickness by which they appear, their sequence-fails to be perceived.'³

8. *Subtle Body*

Enough has been said in Upaniṣads and in Sāṃkhya about subtle body (*linga śarīra*). But Nyāya does not believe in any subtle body. It was explained in Sāṃkhya that *linga-śarīra* accompanies the soul after death, and enters the new body. It stores in seed form all the impressions of the previous births. Nyāya substitutes *Manas* for *linga-śarīra*. The soul passes from one body to another through the aid of *Manas*, which is atomic and imperceptible. *Manas* is super-sensuous and all pervading. After death, the body perishes, but *Manas* proceeds to the new abode of the fruition of Karma.

9. *Samskāras*

Though Nyāya disregards a subtle body, it recognises the existence of mental disposition (in the subconscious mind) called *Samskāras*. These are of three kinds :

(i) Velocity (*vega*) which keeps the person in motion, prompts him to desire and work.

¹NB, III, 2, 57.

²NB, III, 2, 58.

³Op. cit.

(ii) Bhāvanā, which enables a person to remember things and to recognise these.

(iii) Elasticity (sthitisthāpaka) which tends towards mental equilibrium when a person is mentally disturbed.¹ Viśvanātha says that elasticity is a property of earth and perhaps in all the other substance. Pull a branch, it will try to retain its own position. We can compare this with Newton's "Laws of Motion."

10. The Body

As said earlier, human personality according to Nyāya is composed of (1) the self (Ātman), (2) the mind (Manas) and (3) the body. The body is the vehicle of action for the self.² The mind, along with the sense organs, is found to operate only within the body, never outside the body.³ Of the cognising person also, all experiences of objects, consisting of apprehension etc., is found to occur only in the body. So also his acquiring of the desired and abandoning of the undesired thing—and all other operations carried by the person.

Nyāya takes for granted the doctrine of Karma and transmigration of soul. As a direct postulate of the same, the formation of the body is considered to be due to the persistence of the effects of previous acts.⁴ In addition to the parents, it is Karma that is responsible for the birth of the body. Without Karma, there is no reason to believe that the material substance in the mother's womb will develop in a particular order viz. cell, mass, foetus; embryo, arteries, head and feet, absorb the food through the umbilical cord, and grow into a full developed infant that is born.⁵ Again every connection of the parents does not bring about conception, and the only explanation of this is that when the influence of Karma is not there, conception does not take place.⁶ Just as Karma is the cause of the formation of the body, so is it also of the connection of

¹BP & SM, Verse, 158.

²NSI, 1. 11.

³Ibid, III, 2, 26.

⁴NB, III, 2, 60.

⁵NB, III, 2, 64.

⁶Ibid, 2, 65.

the body with the soul.¹ It is only when the Kārmic residuum exhausts, that the soul is freed from the bondage of the body.² The body is not everlasting, as it becomes inert at death, when the soul leaves it. In as much as death would not be possible, the body should be regarded as everlasting.³ But it is an admitted fact, a matter of daily experience, that death, sometimes, overcomes the body. All accruing of pleasure and pain in the body is due to destiny (Karma).⁴ Law of Karma rules over the body in all its functions.

Exact Nature of the Body

Earlier schools of philosophy regarded human body as composed of the five elements. Nyāya reiterates the same, with a little modifications. It asserts that the body is made up of earth, water, air, fire and ether because we find in it odour (of earth), humidity (of water), heat (of fire), breathing (of air) and cavities (of ether). But the more important constituent is the earth. We find in the body predominantly the distinctive qualities of earth.⁵

The inheritance of body is not merely a physiological act. It is a mystic and psychic basis also. As says Uddyotkara in his *Vārttikā* : "The Karma of the parents who have to enjoy the experiences resulting from the birth of the child, as well as the Karma of the personality which has to undergo experiences in the world, both these conjointly bring about the birth of the body in the mother's womb."⁶ It is strictly in accordance with the Law of Karma. The conjunction of seeds (male and female, śukra-raj) is not the primary cause of the birth of the body. It is the secondary cause, as every such conjunction does not give rise to the birth of a child.

Body is subject to birth and death. The connection of the soul with the body is birth, and its separation from it death.⁷ The body forms one of the wheels of Saṃsara for the soul.

¹NS, III, 2, 66.

²NB, III, 2, 66.

³NS, III, 2, 70.

⁴NB, III, 2, 72.

⁵NS, III, 1, 27 ; NB, III, 1, 29.

⁶NV, III, 2, 63.

⁷NS, IV, 1, 10.

As long as the Karmic residuum do not vanish, the bondage through body, continues. Release is the final emancipation and cessation of body. It is the absolute freedom from pain.¹

C. THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF LIFE

1. Release (*mokṣa*)

Nyāya takes for granted not only the Law of Karma, and transmigration of soul, but also the doctrine of emancipation. But in its explanation, it departs from the Upaniṣadic view. Mokṣa is negatively explained as freedom from pain.² It is the destruction of bondage. Upaniṣads define it positively as attainment of everlasting pleasure. But Nyāya objects to this view on the grounds that such an experience is not possible without the bodily mechanism.³ Vātsyāyana also says: "This condition of immortality, free from fear, imperishable, consisting in the attainment of bliss, is called Brahman."⁴ The 'fear' meant here is the fear of being born into the world.⁵ The body is considered to be an obstruction in Vedānta. But Nyāya holds that is no obstruction for the attainment of release. "The only purpose for which the body exists is to bring about experience, so that it is not possible that it should hinder the experiencing of pleasure, especially as there is nothing to prove that there is any sort of experience for the soul deprived of the body and the rest."⁶ Vatsyāyana makes another modification when he says 'until there is renunciation of the desire for eternal pleasure, there can be no attainment of final release, for the simple reason that all attachment is a bondage.'⁷ "Being free from all desire, when the man betakes himself actively towards the attainment of release, he does not care whether the eternal pleasure comes to him or not. In the absence of all desires, final release is certain."⁸ The condition of release is

¹NSI, 1, 22.

²Ibid.

³NVI, 1, 22.

⁴NBI, 1, 22.

⁵NVTT, I, 1, 22.

⁶NB, I, 1, 22.

⁷op. cit.

⁸NVTT, I, 1, 22.

akin to deep-sleep.¹ The negative explanation of release as offered by Nyāya is subject to severe criticism. The soul of Nyāya is unconscious. The release is simply cessation of pain—a state like that of being enjoyed by an inert stone. The status of consciousness is not well-explained in Nyāya. This makes the system nearer to materialism.

Final emancipation takes some time. It follows strictly the Doctrine of Karma. Until the fruits of past actions do not exhaust, no release is possible. Some actions bear immediate fruit e.g. the work of a carpenter. But the fruit of some actions matures after a long time depending upon a number of circumstances. The circumstances are explained in *Nyāya Vārttikā* as four-fold :

1. Some peculiar circumstances in the environment may prevent the fructification of Karmic residuum.

2. The Karmic residuum of other lives waiting for the fructification, may delay the task. These other lives may have direct connection with the life of the person under question.

3. There may be some other persons sharing the Karma with the individual, and the Karma of all has to wait for the simultaneous fruition.

4. Some auxilliary causes as dharma and adharma may not be present at the time, and hence the delay.²

Anyway, the final release does take place, when all the actions have exhausted their fruition. Devotion does help in the precipitating matters.

2. True Knowledge

Release is possible only through the true knowledge of the four defects : (i) Pain (*duḥkha*), (ii) Births (*janma*), (iii) Activity (*pravṛtti*), (iv) Defect (*doṣa*), (v) Wrong notion or ignorance.³ When the true knowledge of these comes about, it sets the notion of 'I' in regard to them, and there is a cessation of each member of the above series. It is through the true knowledge of the cause of the above defects that the false egoism is

¹NB, IV, 1, 63.

²NV, III, 2, 60.

³NS, I, 1, 2.

destroyed.¹ For that purpose one should refine the thoughts, and unless the mind is purified the exterior form and other objects of pleasure will continue to bother the person and perpetuate the defects.² People usually fall prey to wrong conceptions, which in turn lead to the defects. For instance in connection with sexual love for the male, the conceiving of the female as such, becomes a source of bondage. He looks only at the agreeable aspect of the female, and not to the disagreeable aspect. If he ponders over the disagreeable aspect of the thing, his desire and attachment for it will cease.³ The agreeable aspect should be ignored. Just as in the case of the poisoned food, while the food aspect is agreeable, the poisoned aspect is not. But on account of pondering over the poisoned aspect, one should discard it.

True knowledge is brought about by practice of particular form of meditation, besides by purification of thoughts.⁴ The mind should be withdrawn from the sense-organs, kept steady by an effort tending to concentration. Such meditation leads to true knowledge.⁵ For this purpose, it is not necessary to escape from the world. The body is not a hinderance but an aid, provided that it is used discriminately. True knowledge also does not accrue from wide study of books. Study without righteousness has no value. Hence scriptural study must be accompanied by philosophic thought and meditation.⁶ By constant practice, one can succeed in meditation. Meditation is brought about by the force of the fruit of what has been previously accomplished.⁷

3. Yoga

Nyāya recommends the path of yoga for the embellishment of the soul.⁸ Release requires refinement of soul (ātmaśans-

¹NS, IV, 2,1.

²NS, IV, 2,2.

³NB, IV, 2,3.

⁴NS, IV, 2,38.

⁵NB, IV, 2,38.

⁶NV, I, 1, 2.

⁷NS, IV, 2,41.

⁸NS, IV, 2,46.

kāra). This requires restraints (yama) and observances (niyama) as laid down in yoga. True knowledge proceeds from the practice of particular form of meditation.¹ When the mind having been withdrawn from the senses, is kept steady by an effort tending to concentration, the contact between mind and soul results in meditation.² Certain obstacles do confront the devotee while he is practising meditation. He may cognise thundering voice, or something against his desire. All this is due to external obstacles like hunger, thirst, heat, cold, disease, noise *etc.* In order to avoid these, it is advised that Yoga should be practised in forests, caves and on river-banks.³ As long as one is not released, there is connection between soul and senses, and disturbances do appear. But for the released soul, the physical connection with soul is voluntary, and hence no cognitions are thrust upon the soul.

D. PSYCHOLOGY OF PERCEPTION

According to Nyāya there are as many as four means of acquiring valid knowledge, namely, Perception (pratyakṣa), Inference (anumāna), Comparison (upamāna) and Testimony (śabda). These are mentioned in the actual order of preference. Perception is the most primary and fundamental of these means of valid knowledge, although it is not the only source of knowledge.⁴ Even inference must be preceded by perception.⁵ Comparison also needs perception of the similarity between two objects. Testimony also needs it in the form of listening to or reading the scripture. So perceptual knowledge is the foremost of all the means.⁶ Whatever is known through the other means must be verifiable by perception. Suppose a man seeks the knowledge of a certain thing. If he is told by a trustworthy person, he will still have the desire to ratify the information by means of inference. Even after the inferential

¹*Ibid*, 2, 38.

²*NB*, IV, 2, 38.

³*NS*, IV, 2, 42.

⁴*NVTT*, I, 1, 3.

⁵*NS*, I, 1, 5.

⁶*NB*, I, 1, 6-7.

knowledge, he will still desire to see the thing for himself. Once he perceives himself, his curiosity is at rest.¹

1. Definition of Perception

Nyāya Sūtras mention sense-perception as that cognition (a) which is produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ—(b) which is not expressible by words—(c) which is not erroneous and (d) which is well-defined.

The first important factor is the sense-object contact, which has been universally agreed upon by the Western psychologists, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsa—all alike. The different factors involved in sense-object contact are : (1) the sense (indriyas), (2) the objects (artha), (3) the immediate contact of the senses with the objects (sannikarṣa), and lastly (4) the cognition produced by this contact.²

2. Senses and Function in Perception

Nyāya postulates the earlier Upaniṣadic principle that the perceptual senses are five in number *viz.* visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual.³ Their sites are the eye-ball, the ear-hole, the nose, the tongue and the skin. Again, Nyāya takes for granted the Sāṃkhya view that the senses are associated with the five elements as follows :

Eyes with colour and light ; ear with sound and ether ; nose with smell and earth ; tongue with taste and water ; and skin with touch and air.⁴

Nyāya refutes the view that all the senses can be represented by one sense *i.e.* touch. Things can be cognised by means of instruments of right cognition. Ears cannot see colour, nor can eyes hear sound.⁵ The blind cannot see, and the deaf cannot hear. This suggests the exact division of labour and specialisation.⁶ Again several things are not perceived simultaneously.⁷ The cutaneous organ can only work when there

¹NB, I, 1, 3.

²NS, I, 1, 4.

³NB, II, 1, 54 ; NS, I, 1, 12-14.

⁴NS, III, 1, 62-63.

⁵NB, III, I, 51-52.

⁶NS, III, I, 53.

⁷*Ibid.*, 54.

is actual touch with the object which must be near at hand. But sight and sound perceive objects which are even far off.¹ Hence the distinctive character of each of the five sense-organs. There may be several kinds of odours, but the universal odour is one. Hence the sense of odour is one and not many.² We should group all kinds of odours under one head, all kinds of touch under one head.

Nyāya gives further reasons for the variety of sense-organs. We cannot group all the senses under one universal because of the five reasons—(a) sign indicatives, (b) location, (c) process, (d) shape, and (e) constituents.³ The indicatives of the sense-organs in the shape of perceptions are as many as five. Each sense-organ has its own location. The tactual organ has its own location. The tactual organ has its location throughout the body, the visual organ is located in the pupil of the eye, and so on. Each organ has its own process. The visual organ encased in the pupil issues outside and then gets at the objects possessed of colour.⁴ Each sense has a particular shape (ākṛti) or limit or extent of magnitude. The ear has as its scope only the sound and nothing more. Each sense-organ is associated with a particular element, and hence has a particular constituent. The constituent of sound is ether and so on. There are five elements and hence five types of perception.⁵ It is true that some elements are associated with many types of perception, but there is one predominant perception out of those. Earth has smell, touch, taste and sight, four perceptions, but smell is predominant.⁶ The restriction as to one organ being composed of earth and so forth is due to preponderance.⁷

Another question is raised, whether the senses can apprehend their own qualities. Can the eye see itself? Gautama replies that the sense-organs do not apprehend their own qualities because it is only as endowed with qualities that the sense-organs

¹NB, III, 1, 55.

²Ibid., 1, 58.

³NS, III, 1, 60.

⁴NB, III, 1, 60.

⁵NS, III, 1, 61.

⁶NB, III, 1, 66.

⁷NS, III, 1, 69.

are what they are. The olfactory organ apprehends outside odour, only when it is itself accompanied by odour which serves the same purpose as the organ itself. The eyes can see only the outside objects. There is, however, one exception. The ear can hear the internal sound also, because Ākāśa, its parent element is found everywhere, inside and outside the body.¹

Thus Nyāya gives a number of fresh details regarding the functioning of the senses.

3. Comparison with Modern Psychology

The description of the senses as given by Nyāya is not perfect, if we compare the same with modern psychology. According to modern psychology, 'the organ of smell is a mucous membrane lining the roof and part of the walls of the extreme upper portion of the nasal cavities' (vide Titchner, *A Text book of Psychology*). But Nyāya describes the sense of smell with its seat in the fore-part of nasal cavity (nāsagravartī) (vide *Tarka-bhāṣa*). According to Titchner, the taste bulbes occur in the back part of the tongue, but Nyāya mentions the tip of the tongue. Probably it took into consideration only the sweet taste. Modern psychology treats retina as the organ of vision, and recognises that sight depends upon light and colour. Nyaya recognises light and colour (tejas) but substitutes pupil of the eye for retina. Actually, the pupil serves only as the lense reflecting the image on the retina. With regard to cutaneous sense, Nyāya comes close to modern psychology. But it does not give differentiations regarding the various types of this sense viz. pressure, warmth, cold, pain. The details are wanting, whereas experimental psychology has gone far ahead. The description of Auditory sense by Nyāya is also imperfect. It makes it identical with a portion of ether (ākāśa), present in the ear-hole.² Sound belongs to ether. This is vague according to modern psychology.

Nyāya again talks of mind (manas) as the sixth sense, which is not accepted by modern psychology. Modern psychology does not restrict the number to five only. There is the kina-

¹NB, III, 1, 70-73.

²*Bhaṣāparicheda* does mention about sound waves sent by the object and received into ear passage, vide verse 166.

esthetic sense, which helps in maintaining balance. The pain sense is definitely a distinct one. It cannot be included in touch. Then there is the sensation of movement, resistance, weight, digestion, respiration, blood circulation, heart-beating, urinary sensation and genital sensation. But Indian philosophers will call all these sensations, mere sensations, not coming to the position of perception. None of them can be treated as a sense-datum like touch, taste, sight or sound. These may be called organs of action, rather than senses. In fact Nyāya accepts five organs of action, like other philosophies. But it does not include these in perceptual senses. These are purely motor organs.

4. *Mind and Soul in Perception*

What is the contribution of mind and soul in perception? Nyāya takes it for granted that perception is possible only when soul and mind are there. But the distinctive and the primary source of perception is the sense-object contact, without which no perception is possible, howsoever the mind functions. It is the senses that present the image to the mind, and the mind in its turn presents it to the soul.¹ The sense-object contact is the principal cause, and the mind-soul contact is the secondary cause.²

Although the primary source of perception is sense-object contact, the contribution of Mind and Soul cannot be denied. Cognition is characteristic feature of the Soul, because it is its quality. Again, when the cognition is brought about by sense-object contact, the latter is dependent upon and helped by the contact of Mind. Hence perception depends upon Mind and Soul also,³ although the primary source is sense-object contact. Even in the case of a person whose mind is asleep or pre-occupied, it is the sense-object contact that awakens the mind or stimulates it. A loud noise may awaken a sleeping person, which shows that it is the sense-object contact that creates a new situation giving rise to perception.⁴

¹NB, II, I, 21-27.

²Ibid, I, 30.

³NB, II, I, 24-25.

⁴NB, II, I, 27.

5. Characteristics of Perception

(a) Perception not verbal

"At the time of apprehension of a particular thing, the name is not necessarily present and operative. It becomes operative and useful only at the time of its being spoken of, or communicated to other persons. The upshot of all this is that the apprehension of things produced by the contact of the sense-organs with them, is not verbal—*i.e.* it is entirely free from all verbal representations."¹

(b) Perception should not be erroneous

In order to guard against illusions being included in perception, Gautama delimits perceptions only to those which are not erroneous. Vatsyāyana explains this point, "During the summer it often happens that the sun's rays become mixed up with the heat-rays radiated from the earth's surface; and the two together, flickering at a distance come into contact with the eye of the observer, who apprehends them as water."² Such a perception of mirage is erroneous and cannot be included in right perception.

(c) Perception should be well-defined

This qualification is added so as to exclude all doubtful cognition—*e.g.* this is smoke or this is dust, this is silver or this is oyster shell, this is snake or this is rope. Doubtful perception cannot be included in our category.

6. The Process of Perception

In normal perception five entities function :

- (i) The object of perception (*viśaya*).
- (ii) The external medium such as light in the case of visual perception.
- (iii) The sense-organ (*indriya*).
- (iv) The *Manas*, which helps the sense-organs to function.
- (v) The self or soul (*ātman*).

In case any of these do not operate, the perception will be erroneous.

¹*Ibid.*, 1. 4.

²*Op. cit.*

7. *Later Modifications in the concept of Perception*

Modern school of Nyāya (Navya Nyāya) deviates from the Gautama's explanation of perception. Gangeśa in his *Tattvacintamani* calls perception immediate cognition (sākṣāt-kāritvarṇ). Perception is immediate apprehension, a new experience not brought about by any antecedent knowledge. He questions the nature of sense-organ. Sense-organ is known only from sense-perception. Then how can we define perception through sense-organ? He therefore excludes the various types of cognitions such as cognition through inference, similarity or testimony, and comes to perception which has none of the other three types of cognition. Keśavamīśra in his *Tarkabhāṣa* unites the two views by saying that perception is immediate knowledge, and immediate knowledge is brought about by sense-object contact. But there still remain some doubts. The sense-object contact is true about the ordinary perception and not about abnormal perception like illusion; hallucination, dream, delirium or extra-sensory perception. Hence Udayana and Vardhamāna limit the scope of Gautama's definition to the ordinary (laukika) perception. The real perception has a wider scope, and is something more than sense-object contact. It must include ideation also, though the basis be sense-object contact. In this way Udayana comes nearer Vedānta and Jaina theory of perception.

8. *Types of Sense Object Contact*

Sense-object contact is of six kinds (as explained in *Tarkabhāṣa*, Chapter II).

(i) *Conjunction (saṁyoga)*. This is the direct contact between sense and object. Our eyes come in direct contact with a jar and perceive it.

(ii) *Inherence-cum-conjunction (Saṁyukta-samavāya)*. This is indirect perception through the medium of a third that has association with the actual object through inherence. Colour has inherence in jar. We see colour through the jar, and not without the medium of jar.

(iii) *Inherence in something which is related to two objects mutually inherent (Saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya)*. Colour and jar are mutually related. Colourness is inherent in colour and jar. The perception of colourness is of this type.

- (iv) Inherence (Samavāya). Sound inheres in ether. So perception of sound is indirect and due to inherence.
- (v) Relation of inherence in that inheres (Samaveta-Samavāya). In the above case soundness inheres in sound. So perception of soundness is of this type.
- (vi) Qualification (Viśeṣanātā). Here the object might be qualification of another term connected with sense. How is perception of non-existence of a quality produced? How do we perceive that there is no 'odour in sound? Our sense comes into contact with the non-existence (abhāva) of odour as a qualification of sound which inheres in the auditory organ. (Further details are given in *Sidhantamuktavali* and *Bhāṣāpariccheda* of Viśvanātha).

9. Types of Perception

Nyāya has given a detailed classification of the type of perception. There are broadly speaking two types of perception:

- (A) Ordinary (laukika); and
- (B) Extra-ordinary (alaukika).

The Ordinary Perception is again of two types viz. (i) External (bāhya) and (ii) Internal (mānasa). The External Perception is of five types, depending upon the five organs of senses. Hence it is either visual, auditory, tactual, olfactory and gustatory. The Internal Perception is the mental perception i.e. the perception of inner feelings, desires, volitions, images etc. The External Perception from the point of view of perception of being and non-being is again of two kinds viz. Bhāva Perception and Abhāva Perception. Bhāva means the positive side of reality i.e. the existence. Abhāva means the non-existence. The Bhāva Perception is again of six kinds, on the basis of six beings (arthas) viz. substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), action (karma), universal (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa) and inherence (samavāya). Internal Perception is of three kinds depending upon inherence and conjunction. Another classification of the kinds of Ordinary Perception has been made on the basis of the character of perceptual knowledge which arises from the sense-object contact. This classification is :

- (i) Indeterminate Perception (nirvikalpa),
- (ii) Determinate Perception (savikalpa) and
- (iii) Recognitional Perception (pratyabhijñā).

The Extra-ordinary Perception have been classified into three types, viz.

- (i) Perception with Universal Property (sāmānya lakṣaṇa);
- (ii) Acquired Perception (jñānalakṣaṇā).
- (iii) Extra-sensory or Intuitive Perception (yogajñā).

A diagram illustrating the various types of Perception from different points of view is given on the opposite page.

Explanation of the Various Types

1. Ordinary Perception depends on the sense-object contact. But in Extra-ordinary Perception, the object is conveyed to the mind not through the five senses, but through an unusual medium. E.S.P. intuition of Yogis and deep perception come in this category.

2. The division into internal and external is based on the fact that the five senses come into direct contact with the objects, but Manas has no external organ, and therefore it perceives internally and experience, pleasure, pain, desire etc.


3. The distinction into Being and Non-being is unique in Nyāya. There are two types of reality. The substances stand for the positive reality, but non-existence of a substance also is a reality. We perceived a jar on the table. If it is removed, we perceive its non-existence (abhāva).

4. The reality has again been divided into six categories, of which substance (dravya) is the first and the foremost.

5. Perception of substance : There are nine kinds of substances viz. earth, water, light, air, ākāśa, time, space, soul and Manas. Out of these ether, time and space are imperceptible, as these are eternal, infinite and without manifest quality. Soul is perceived internally. The others are perceived directly through the various senses. Air, of course is perceived only through touch. All the things perceived by the external senses have a limited dimension (mahattva). The perception takes place, as a whole. We do not perceive a thing through its parts.¹

¹NB, II, 1, 31.

Diagram 6
TYPES OF PERCEPTION



6. Perception of Quality. Quality is that which subsists in a substance, which owns it. It is passive (niṣkriya) and it has no quality. There cannot be a quality of a quality. Nyāya enlists 24 kinds of Qualities viz. colour (rupa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), touch (sparśa), sound (śabda), number (saṅkhyā), magnitude (parimāṇa), difference (pṛthakatva), conjunction (saṁyoga), dissociation (vibhāga), remoteness (paratva), proximity (aparatva), fluidity (dravatva), viscosity (sneha), knowledge (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa), effort (prayatna), gravity (gurutva), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma) and dispositions (saṁskāra).¹ Some of these like Saṁskāra, merit, demerit, activity, gravity cannot be perceived, and therefore should be excluded from the list. Pleasure, pain etc. are attributes of the soul, and are therefore objects of internal perception.

The explanation regarding the perception of sound as presented by Keśava Miśra in his *Tarkabhāṣa*, bears remarkable resemblance with the explanation given by modern scientists. He says that sound is an attribute of ether and is perceived only by the auditory sense. The sound when produced at a distance, produces other sounds ; which move in all the directions like the ripples in water (caused by throwing a stone). 'By the parable of the expanding ripples in water (vīcitarāṅga-nyāyena), we can explain the travelling of the sound in expanding ripples, moving in all the directions and then reaching the auditory organ of the listener. The sound produces one series of sound waves, which give rise to other series, until the last series reach the ear. "It is incorrect to say 'I heard the sound of bugle at a distance.'"² Sound also originate in the manner of Kadamba Buds.³ From the first sound, ten other sounds are produced in ten directions, by them, ten other sounds are produced, until they go on expanding like the Kukumba buds.⁴

As regards visual perception, also, Nyāya believes that the

¹BP, 3-5.

²For pictorial illustrations, see *Tarkabhāṣa* translated by Viśveśvera Sidhantaśiromaṇi, (1953), p. 206.

³op. cit.

⁴BP, & SM, Verse 166.

eye does not come into direct contact with the object at a distance, just like the ear. It can perceive objects without direct contact (*prāpyakāri*). The visual organ is of the nature of light (*tejas*). The pupil is only its location. Light goes out of the pupil to the object and comes into contact with it, just as the light of a torch goes out and envelopes the object. That is how a small pupil can see the big mountain. The pupil being small could not be compatible to perceive such a big object, but for its rays going out divergently and covering a large ground. This explanation, of course, is faulty from the point of view of modern psychology.

7. Perception of activity (*Karma*) also is a subtle one. Activity also subsists in a substance. It is of five kinds *viz.* (i) throwing up (*utkṣepana*), (ii) throwing down (*apakṣepana*), (iii) contraction (*kuncana*), (iv) expansion (*prasāraṇa*) and (v) locomotion (*gamaṇa*). These activities can be perceived by sight and touch. As we perceive activity through the substance, it is the sense-object contact of second type *viz.* *saṃyukta-samavāya*.

8. Perception of Universal. Universal is a new concept in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is defined as an eternal entity common to many of the same class. All cows have the property of 'cowness', which is its universal (*sāmānya*). But a particular colour, shape, form or quality of a particular cow which distinguishes it from other cows is *viśeṣa*. Here also the universal subsists in the substance, and is perceived only through that substance. The sense-object contact is of the second type. But the universal of a quality (*e.g.* brightness) is perceived through the quality which inhere in a substance. This is, therefore, the third type of sense-object contact *viz.* *saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*. Perception of particularity (*viśeṣa*) can be explained in the similar way. But it may be noted that *viśeṣa* is the opposite of *sāmānya*.

9. Perception of Inherence (*samavāya*). Inherence is the inseparable relation between two facts, like the yarn and cloth, earth and jar, which cannot be separated (*ayutasiddha*). It is different from conjunction (*saṃyoga*) where the two (*e.g.* cup and plate) can be separated. *Samavāya* relation holds between whole and part (branch and tree) attribute and substance (*guṇa*

and *guṇin*, e.g. colour and jar), action and substance, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*.

This relation is perceived by sight and touch. We perceive that the cloth inheres in the yarn, the colour inheres in the jar, whiteness inheres in snow, burning inheres in fire, cold inheres in ice *etc.*

Details about types of perception of *Abhāva* are not presented here, as these have little psychological significance.

10. Internal Perception. The objects of internal perception are feeling of pleasure (*sukham*), pain (*duḥkham*), desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), cognition (*matiḥ*) and volition (*kṛtiḥ*). All these are attributes of the self. So the mind perceives these internally when it comes into contact with these through their inherence in the self which is joined with the mind. So the type of contact is *Samyukta-samaveta-samavāya*. Cognition (*matiḥ*) also can be known by *manas* through introspection. Western Psychologists come very near this approach of *Nyāya*.

10. *Determinate and Indeterminate Perception*

Nyāya divides ordinary perception into two types : indeterminate and determinate. The former is that which is pure sensation, the first stage in the process of apprehension, wherein there is no association of name or quality. It is the immediate cognition of the object without a knowledge of its attributes, universals or particulars. While as the determinate perception is the next stage after indeterminate perception, wherein the object is revealed as endowed with its attributes and characteristics.

The above distinction has not been strictly adhered to by the philosophers of the *Nyāya* schools. We come across divergent definitions and explanations.

- (i) *Vācaspati* and *Śrīdhara* increases the scope of I. P. (Indeterminate Perception) by saying that at this stage the perception of an orange gives as its colour, form and its *sāmānya*. It only lacks the subject-predicate relationship (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣa bhāva*) that 'this is an orange'. It is perception without a name associated, like the perception by an infant and a dumb. At the second stage, when the necessary relationship and

the verbal image is there, we have D.P. (Determinate Perception).

- (ii) Prabhākara of Mīmāṃsā school decreases the scope of I. P. by saying that herein we perceive just the form (svarūpamātra) of the object. The sāmānya and viśeṣa, though perceived vaguely are not discriminated at this stage. Bhāvasarvajña follows Prabhākara and defines it likewise.
- (iii) Gāṅgeśa and the later Nyāya writers make another modification. I. P. is the first stage of perception, without any connection with universality or any such relation (jātyādiyojanārahitaṃ), uncharacterised (niṣprakāraṃ), presenting no specification or predication (Vaiśiṣṭyanavagatri).¹ For example, the jar is perceived, but it is not related to jariness, or the class it belongs to.
- (iv) Viśvanātha finds I.P. only logically necessary. Actually we cannot have the perception of a jar without the knowledge of the content and the predicative quality.²
- (v) A better systematic and psychological explanation has been given by Keśava-Miśra. To begin with he explains the process of I.P., like this : The self is in contact with Manas, Manas with the sense, and the sense with the object, by the principle that the sense has the property of revealing the nature of associated objects. By the sense-object contact arises I.P. that 'this is something.' This I.P. is without the relationship of name, generic and specific features. It is the revelation of just the thing (vastumātram). The agent of this I.P. is the sense, as axe is the agent of cutting the wood. The sense-object-contact is the process (avāntara vyāpāra). I.P. is the result. Here we should note three entities : agent, process and the result. Sense is the agent, sense-object-contact is the process, and I.P. is the result. This is the first stage

¹ T C.

² BP & SM, 167-180.

of perception. At the next stage, the sense-object-contact becomes the agent, I.P. the process, and a higher type of perception, called D.P. the result. This is the stage when name, generic and specific qualities are revealed such as 'this is the Brahmana,' 'this is black.' The substantive-adjective relation exists here. There is a third stage of perception, when I.P. serves as the agent, D.P. the process, and the still higher type of perception is the thought or concept (buddhiḥ). For thought presentation, there is thus threefold process in succession. Sense-object-contact was the first-process, I.P. was the second process, and D.P. was the third process that resulted in conceptual thinking. Perhaps in the terminology of Western psychology we could equate I.P. with sensation, D.P. with perception and buddhi with concept.

Perception of Nyāya has a very large scope, and it includes all types of direct knowledge, hence it is called pratyakṣa.

A diagrammatic representation of the ladder of perception as explained by Keśava Miśra is given below:

Diagram 7

THE LADDER OF PERCEPTION IN *TARKA BHASA*

		Agent Karaṇa	Process Vyāpāra	Result Phala
	Agent Karaṇa	Process Vyāpāra	Result Phala	
Agent Karaṇa	Process Vyāpāra	Result Phala		
Sense	Contact with Object	I. P.	D. P.	Thought Buddhi

(When sense is agent, contact with object serves as process, I.P. is the result.

When sense-object-contact is the agent, I.P. is process, D.P. is the result.

When I.P. is the agent, D.P. is the process, thought is the result).

11. Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*)

Vātsyāyana defines recognition as follows :

"When one applies to, or connects with, the same objects, two cognitions, which appear at different times (one appearing after the other),—there is what is called 'Recognition'; this recognition appears in the form 'I see now what I had seen before', 'this is the same object.'"¹

"Recognition is the name of that recollective cognition which is involved in the conception that we have in regard to one and the same thing, in the form, 'I now see the same thing that I had seen before'."²

Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjari*, defines recognition as a kind of qualified perception. It gives us knowledge of the present object as qualified by the past.³ When we recognise Devadatta, we think that this is the same Devadatta, whom we saw before. Hence the agent (Karaṇa) of recognition are two—(i) the past experience, and (ii) the present sense-object-contact (sanskāra-sahitam indriyam). We include recognition under perception, because it requires sense-object-contact.

12. Extraordinary Perception (*Alaukika Pratyakṣa*)

Here the objects are revealed through an extraordinary medium. It is of three kinds viz. (i) Perception with Universal Property, (2) Acquired Perception and Intuitional Perception.⁴

The first-type is the perception of a class of objects through its universal perceived in one object of the class. We perceive jariness in a jar, and by implication the whole class of pots.

¹NB, III, 1, 7.

²op. cit., III, 2, 2.

³NM, p. 448.

⁴BP & SM, Verse 63.

Acquired perception is the perception which we do not get exactly through the sense, but through previous experience. The sight of sandalwood gives me an idea of its fragrance also, although fragrance cannot be perceived by sight. It is the previous experience that sandalwood is fragrant, that helps me in its perception. Both these types do not have much psychological value. But the third type, the Intuitive Perception is very significant. Details about it are given in Yoga philosophy. This type of perception has been generally accepted by all. Our ordinary perception is circumscribed by organic limitations. But in the absence of the distraction and organic limitations, the span of consciousness is expanded to include the perception beyond time and space.

The Yogajñ perception is again of two types according to the divisions of yogis into those who have attained concentration and those who are striving for it.¹ A yogi who has attained concentration has knowledge of everything while the other type is aided by meditations.²

13. Doubtful Perception

Gautama defines doubtful perception as follows :

Doubt (*saṁśaya*) is that wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting, and which arises either from :

- (i) Recognition of common properties ;
- (ii) Recognition of uncommon properties ;
- (iii) Conflicting testimony ;
- (iv) Irregularity of perception ;
- (v) Irregularity of non-perception.³

(i) In the first place, doubt is the wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific character of one object is wanting, and which arises from the cognition of characters common to the objects concerned.⁴ If we perceive a post and begin to doubt whether it is post or man (*sthānurvā*

¹*op. cit.*, Verse, 65.

²*Ibid*, 66.

³*NS*, I, 1, 23.

⁴*NB*, I, 1, 23.

puruṣovā), the source of doubt is the want of the perception of the distinction between the two, and the perception of the common properties (length, breadth and form in this case) only.

(ii) Secondly, it may arise from the cognition of uncommon properties. For example the presence of smell distinguishes the earth from water, as also from qualities and actions. Earth and water are substances, but qualities and actions are not substances but heterogeneous to earth. Unless there is awareness of the specific uncommon properties, doubt will remain.

(iii) Thirdly, doubt arises from the presence of contradictory opinions or conflicting testimony. One Śāstra may assert that soul exists, but the other may refute it.¹

(iv) Fourthly, doubt arises from irregularity and uncertainty of perceptions. An example of mirage illustrates this point. There arises the doubt whether the water perceived is really water.²

(v) Fifthly, it arises from irregularity of non-perception. We do not perceive water in the roots and branches of trees, hence the doubt whether water exists inside the tree.³

14. Illusory Perception

There are three types of illusory perception:

(i) There may be defect (doṣa) in the sense-organ, such as defective vision, a jaundiced eye.

(ii) A part may be perceived instead of whole, and the perfect perception is wanting (saṃprayoga).

(iii) Previous disposition (saṃskāra) that might prejudice or influence the perception. The previous saṃskāras, on account of a certain habit formation, can modify the present perception, and distort it. A burnt child dreads fire. One who experiences once milk as hot, always mistakes at sight, cold milk for hot. The recollection of a snake creates the illusion of seeing snake in a rope.⁴ A comparison of Nyāya theory of illusion with Vedāntic theory of illusion is presented in Chapter VIII below.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *op. cit.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Nyāyabinduṭṭika*, p. 12.

STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Nyāya postulates the Upaniṣadic doctrine regarding the various states of consciousness. The States as accepted generally by the Indian philosophers are :

- (1) The Wakeful State ;
- (2) The Dream State ;
- (3) The Deep Sleep State.

Nyāya presents its own explanation with regard to the nature of these three states, and the explanation differs from that of Sāṃkhya. As regards the wakeful state of mind, nothing more has been said than the phenomenon of perception. The nature and process of perception has been explained above. There are some references about the nature of memory. This is explained below, followed by an explanation of dream phenomena and deep sleep.

1. Memory

Annambhatta in his *Tarkasaṃgraha* defines memory as representative cognition of past experiences due solely to the impressions produced by them. The impressions of the past remain latent and are retained in the soul. When the mind is in touch with a disposition (Bhāvanā), it remembers the corresponding experiences gained in the past. In this way remembrance is a quality of the soul, otherwise there would be no continuity in experience. The past impressions (saṃskāras) are accumulated and stored, in each life-time, serving a basis for future action. Memory thus acts not in one life-time, but in all the janmas. Even the new-born infant experiences joy, fear, and sorrow, due to his saṃskāras of earlier life.¹ The soul is endowed with the character of the cogniser, and memory must belong to it.²

Memory is different from recognition (pratyabhijñā). The latter is caused by the perception of the present object, and its identity with another object. But the immediate cause of memory is impressions (saṃskāra).

¹NS, III, 1, 18.

²Ibid, 2, 40.

How far is memory a means of valid knowledge ? Nyāya explains that its validity depends upon the validity of the previous experience which is reproduced. Again recollections are not simultaneous, because the factors of recollection such as attention, perception *etc.* are not present at one and the same time.¹

Specific Causes of Memory

Memory works through the agency of certain specific causes mentioned in Nyāya Sūtras. These causes are 23 in number.² The list of the specific causes is given below:

- (i) Attention (*pranidhāna*), the fixing of the mind, with a desire to recollect something.
- (ii) Association (*nibandha*) or connection of different experiences that suggest of one another. It also may include the fixing of things in the plexus of the body through yoga.³
- (iii) Repetition (*abhyāsa*), securing persistence for the previous impressions.
- (iv) Sign (*liṅga*) which leads the mind to the thing signified, *e. g.* recollecting fire after seeing sun.
- (v) Characteristic mark (*lakṣaṇa*) that recalls the class to which the object belongs.
- (vi) Similarity (*sādṛśya*) that associates the ideas of similar objects. Likeness of a picture of a lady may remind us of a particular lady.
- (vii) Possession (*parigraha*), suggesting the owner of the thing owned. The servant reminds us of the master.
- (viii) The relationship between refuge and refugee (*āśrayā-āśritasambandha*). The pupil reminds us of the teacher and *vice-versa*.
- (ix) Immediate sequence or contiguity (*anantaryya*). The preceding act reminds us of the succeeding.
- (x) Separation (*viyoga*), which reminds us of which is separated.
- (xi) Identity of function or co-profession (*ekākaryya*). One teacher reminds us of another teacher.

¹*Ibid*, 2, 33.

²*Ibid*, 2, 44.

³*NB*, III, 2, 44. The explanation of the terms is based on Vātsyāyana.

- (xii) Enmity (virodha) of two rivals, one reminds us of another. Rāvaṇa reminds us of Rāma.
- (xiii) Excess (atiśaya), which reminds us of that which has produced the excess or superiority.
- (xiv) Acquisition (prāpti), which frequently reminds us of its source.
- (xv) Intervention (vyavadhāna) or cover. The sheath recalls the sword.
- (xvi) Pleasure and pain (sukhaduḥkha).
- (xvii) Desire and Aversion (icchādveṣa).
- (xviii) Fear (bhaya).
- (xix) Need (arthitva), reminding one of what a person needs in terms of food and clothing.
- (xx) Action (kriyā) which suggests the agent. The chariot-maker is recalled by the chariot.
- (xxi) Affection (rāga). One frequently remembers the person one loves.
- (xxii) Merit (Dharma). It reminds one of the merit attained in the previous birth, and it enables one to retain what one reads and hears.
- (xxiii) Demerit (adharma). It reminds a person the causes of suffering in the past.

The recollections are not possible simultaneously. All these several causes are not cognised at the same time. The list of causes is not exhaustive. Later thinkers add more causes. For instance insanity may be one of the causes that reminds old complexes.¹

2. Dream

Dreams have a basis in the waking state. We see in dreams those objects which we have already apprehended in our daily life. In this way it has some similarity with remembrance and reflection (saṁkalpa). Like remembrance and desire, the cognition of objects in dreams also has for its objects something that has been previously apprehended.² But, unlike memory and reflection, dream cognition is unreal, and this fact is understood when we finish the dream and enter wakeful state. On

¹See *Tātparyāṅkā*.

²NS, IV, 2, 34 ; NB, IV, 2, 34.

waking there is destruction of the conception of things during a dream,¹ because the objects seen in the dream have no real existence, apart from the previous impressions of such things gathered in the wakeful state.

Dreams, again, illustrate false memory. The dream cognitions are memory cognitions but untrue in character. The cognition of the thing appears to be real in a dream, but it represents the not-present as the present. This fact explained in *Tarkabhāṣa* has already been explained in the Upaniṣads.²

Sources of Dreams

There are three sources of dreams:

(1) Remembrance of objects experienced in the past (anubhūta-padārtha-smaraṇa). Whatever we meet in the dream, is already experienced by us in the wakeful state. An objection can be raised that sometimes we may fly in air, or find our head out. This we have never experienced in our wakeful state. Nyāya replies that we do see birds flying in air, and animals whose head has been cut. The same phenomena may be superimposed in us in a dream. Such an association is possible in dream, when everything is produced by our mind, and has no real basis.

(2) Influence of an unseen moral law regarding our past desires and actions (adṛṣṭa). Our pleasurable or painful experiences in our dreams arise from the good or bad actions of our waking life.

(3) Organic disorders (dhātudoṣa). The fact that we meet disturbing dreams when we have stomach-ache or any other organic physical defect or disease, has been explained extensively by Caraka and reiterated by Nyāya.

(4) Prophetic dreams are due to the influence of spirits. Udayāna also admits the true prophesy of some dreams.

On the whole Nyāya, calls dream perceptions as false. Dreams, thus cannot be a basis of valid knowledge. A dream appears to be real, as long as one dreams, but the dream-objects are contradicted by the wakeful state. This fact explained

¹NB, IV, 2, 35.

²BU, IV, 3, 10.

by Nyāya has been exploited by many Eastern and Western thinkers, when they infer that our present experience might be unreal, contradicted by a higher spiritual experience, just as the dream experience appearing to be real for the time being, is contradicted by the wakeful experience.¹

In the dream state, it is only the *manas* that works, and the senses are at rest. Hence *manas* creates new appearances, which are like hallucinations and illusions.

3. Deep Sleep (*Suṣupti*)

When a man is in deep sleep and dreams no dream, there is an end (for the time being) of all connections with attachment, as also of all connections with pleasure and pain. The same thing happens with regard to the released soul. Vātsyāyana compares released soul with a person in deep sleep.² The only difference is that in deep sleep, the past impressions exist, but for the released soul, all the impressions have perished.³

F. CONCLUSION REGARDING NYĀYA PSYCHOLOGY

Out of all the different philosophies, it is Nyāya that gives a common-sense view of the reality, and avoids as much of metaphysics as possible. It preaches pluralistic realism, and presents a compendium of epistemology rather than ontology. It is here that while explaining epistemology, physiological principles come in. As it is concerned with the sources of valid knowledge, it takes great pains in explaining perception as a source of knowledge. Credit may be given to Nyāya in giving the foremost rank to Perception as a source of valid knowledge, and in making all other sources dependent upon it. Its approach is realistic objectivism as opposed to the idealistic subjectivism of Vedānta and of many other philosophies. Nyāya, therefore, accepts the world as a reality, as it is actually perceived by us through our senses.

No wonder then, that Nyāya enters into minute details of perception. It starts with the process of perception, and explains

¹See Bertrand Russell, *Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 34-35.

²NB, IV, 1, 63.

³*Tātparyatīka*.

at length various types of perception. It is here we find a description of sensation, perception and ideation. The account given, about various types of perceptions compares favourably with the explanation of the modern experimental psychology (*e.g.* Wave-theory regarding perception of sound, psychology of doubt and illusion, recognition *etc.*). Curiously enough, it gives the successive order of mental functioning—Cognition, Affection and Conation (*jñāti, icchati, yatate*). It describes the phenomena of attention and memory.

Limitations

Apart from perception, there is meagre material on other psychological aspects. Even regarding perceptions it lacks the physiological account. "The Nyāya theory of perception does not solve the central problem of physiological psychology, as to how the stimulus of an external object in the sense-organ which is resolved into a form of mechanical contact becomes Transformed into a psychical state. Even today the problem remains a mystery, inspite of the great advance in scientific knowledge."¹

¹Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, II, p. 52.

Psychology in Vaiśeṣika

THE Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya agree in their essential principles. Both agree with regard to the atomic theory of the universe, the nature of the self and the ultimate goal of life. There are just minor differences, so much so that later philosophers synthesised the two as one. Vaiśeṣika, however, has the distinction of propounding the famous atomic theory, while Nyāya specialises in epistemology. In a way, they supplement each other by dealing with some topics in greater details, with common metaphysical and epistemological fundamentals. The psychological principles, emanating from the common portion of the two, remain the same in both the systems. Hence, we find not much of any fresh psychological material in Vaiśeṣika when once we study Nyāya. Only here and there, do we find some new points, which are not mentioned in Nyāya. Before we discuss those additional points, we may make a brief survey of the distinctive features of this philosophy. We may deal with certain metaphysical principles embodied in it, which have bearing on its psychology.

A. METAPHYSICS

Like Sāṃkhya and Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika also considers that supreme good consists in the permanent cessation of pain, which leads to salvation. That which leads to salvation and prosperity is virtue+dharmā. Knowledge of the principles is the principal virtue, as it is means of the supreme good.¹ The supreme good results from the knowledge of the essences (tattvajñāna) of the six predicables (padārthas) viz. substance, attribute, action, genus, species and inherence.² A later philosopher Candrakīrti adds four more categories viz. potentiality, non-

¹ VS, I, 1, 2.

² Ibid, I, 1, 4.

potentiality, commonness and non-existence (vide *Daśapadārthi* I.1). A brief explanation of the six predicables has been presented in the previous chapter. Vaiśeṣika, however, lays greater emphasis on Vedic precepts, and is here akin to Mīmāṃsā philosophy. It again emphasises the work of an 'unseen force' (adṛṣṭa) that moves the universe in an orderly manner. The movement of needles towards magnet,¹ the motion of fire and air,² the circulation of water in plants,³ the cohesion and integration of atoms,⁴ are all due to this universal force 'adṛṣṭa'. The working of the mind, the fructification of karma and the movement of the soul after death are also dependent upon this force. Kaṇāda does not make any mention of God, but his followers proceed from adṛṣṭa to God that imposes this principle. So Vaiśeṣika view of God as the efficient cause of the universe (atoms being the material cause) is practically the same as that of Nyāya.

Vaiśeṣika has the distinction of propounding atomic theory. According to this philosophy all the things in the universe are products, consisting of parts. The minutest part beyond which no division is possible is an atom, which is eternal, while the products composed of innumerable atoms are non-eternal.⁵ Atom (anu) is eternal. It is without parts; it cannot be destroyed; it has no magnitude and it does not occupy any space. Two atoms associate themselves in such a manner as to combine along a common axis, and form a binary (dvyaṇuka), while three integrate forming a ternary (tryaṇuka) with three dimensions, length, breadth and thickness. The integration of the five types of atoms (earth, water, fire, air and ether) in this manner is responsible for all the objects in the phenomenal world. Thus Kaṇāda, like a modern physicist, explains the material evolution of the universe. "By the process of reason it organises this chaotic mass into coherent and intelligible whole, and exhibits a system that sets forth the cosmic plan which shows the interrelation of all its parts into a synthetic whole,

¹VS, V, 1, 15.

²Ibid, V, 2, 13 and IV, 2, 7.

³Ibid, V, 2, 7.

⁴Ibid, IV, 2, 7.

⁵Ibid, IV, 1, 1-2.

operating with such perfection that its very conception is spiritually exhilarating."¹

Another distinction of this philosophy is its theory of causation, called 'asatkāryavāda'. It claims that non-existence of effect follows from the non-existence of cause,² but non-existence of cause does not follow from the non-existence of the effect.³ An effect has only a temporary existence. Before its production, and after its destruction it is non-existent. Hence the world, which is an effect, is not an appearance (vivarta) of the cause, nor an evolution (pariṇāma), but is produced by the aggregation of the cause—the ultimate atom.

With the aid of this scientific analysis Kaṇāda adopts a six-fold classification of the predicables (padārtha) of the universe, into substance (dravya), attribute (guṇa), activity (karma), genus (sāmānya), species (viśeṣa), and inherence (samavāya). Later followers of this system add the seventh predicable non-existence (abhāva). The substances are nine in number⁴ (as enumerated in the last chapter on Nyāya Psychology). Reference is here made to mind and soul, as two separate substances. This helps us to understand the Vaiśeṣika view of human personality. The attributes are seventeen in number viz. colour, taste, smell, touch, number, measures, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, understandings, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition.⁵ The actions are throwing upward, throwing downward, contraction, expansion, and motion.⁶

This type of Vaiśeṣika metaphysics has bearing on the psychological principles inherent in this philosophy. Psychological principles are a logical outcome of this 'atomic pluralism' of Vaiśeṣika.

B. THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The perplexing question whether consciousness vests in matter, in mind or in soul, has been best analysed by Kaṇāda

¹Theos Bernard, *Hindu Philosophy*, p. 61.

²VS, I, 2, 1.

³*Ibid*, I, 2, 2.

⁴VS, I, 1, 5.

⁵VS, I, 1.6.

⁶*Ibid*, I, 1, 7.

and his followers. Kaṇāda concludes after rational discussion that consciousness is the property of the soul. This refutes the modern Western dogma.

What is consciousness? It is 'an awareness', found in all animate beings. Hence it has no independent existence of its own. It inheres in something else. In what does it inhere? Does it inhere in any of the five elements and their atoms? Inanimate atoms have no such property. A jar has no consciousness.¹ The five types of atoms have their own attributes. Ether has sound. Air has sound and touch. Fire has sound and touch and form, and so on. But none of these possess consciousness as an additional quality. There is no manifestation of consciousness in the operations of space (dik) or time (kāla). It may be asserted that consciousness resides in the body of animate beings, when the basic elements combine to form a new integrated product. But Kaṇāda refutes this view. Consciousness does not inhere in any parts of the body separated from the body. The body always goes on changing. Its constituents, formed of the food we eat, always change and are replaced in the process of metabolism and catabolism. If consciousness resided in the food constituents of yesterday, then it must perish while the food constituents perish. In that case the recollection of what is experienced in infancy, will be impossible in youth.² Again, the body may exist in the state of swoon or death, but it may have no consciousness. This shows that consciousness inheres in something other than the body. When we analyse into the phenomena of the recollection of the experiences of the present life, we find that the experiencer is the sane, who can recall all the past events. The continuity of experience therefore leads us to the proposition that consciousness does not inhere in the non-eternal body. The stream of consciousness must have a permanent bed. Not to speak of the experiences of this life, there is reminiscence of the experiences of the past lives as well. Whence the sucking of the breasts of the new-born infant? There should have been no activity at sucking the breasts on the part of an infant just

¹VSU, III, 1, 4.

²VSU, III, 1, 7.

born, because of the impossibility at that stage of the understanding that this is the means of attaining the desirable which is the cause of activity.¹

Another reason is presented to refute the proposition that body possesses consciousness. The body is a created thing, and must be made for the purpose of something other than itself, in the same way as a cart is made for the driver. The intelligent principle using the body for its purpose must be something other than the body. Intelligence or consciousness therefore resides in that other being.

Consciousness again necessitates two things—subject and object. It must reside in the subject, the perceiver and not in the object. Since the body is the object, the perceived, and not the perceiver, it cannot be the seat of consciousness, which is, in reality, associated with the subject.

Does consciousness inhere in the senses, there are, in some measure, perceivers? Vaiśeṣika argues that the senses are not independent perceivers. They depend upon something else—say the mind, and the soul. Again the senses are capable of perceiving only a single class of objects.² The eyes can only see, and the ears can only hear. Consciousness is the mother of all types of perception. We can simultaneously be aware of the apple, see it, smell it and taste it. This manifold perception cannot be the act of any of the senses.

Should consciousness then inhere in the mind? The mind also is in the same position. Its ideas are not consciousness itself, but objects of consciousness. These ideas can be directed according to the will of the thinker. The thinker is therefore, somebody other than the mind. Mind is simply an instrument in his hands. That other person is the soul—Ātman. Hence consciousness inheres in the soul.

Consciousness inheres in soul, as sound inheres in Ākāśa. That is to say, consciousness is not essential to soul, just as sound is not essential to ether. Ether can exist without sound, but sound cannot exist without ether. Similarly, consciousness cannot exist without Ātman, but Ātman can exist without the manifestation of consciousness. Vaiśeṣika thus agrees with

¹VSU, III, 1, 7.

²*op. cit.*

Nyāya in postulating that consciousness appears only when Ātman is in special relationship with something. Here it differs from Sāṃkhya and Vedānta. The Sāṃkhya view has been explained in Chapter 4 above; the Vedāntic view will be discussed in the relevant Chapter below.

As for the states of consciousness is concerned, the description given in Upaniṣads is accepted in toto. Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya emphasise the experiences of the wakeful state, as this world is a reality apart from our subjective experience of it.

Our experience in the wakeful state depends upon the particular conjunction between the soul and the mind. Cognition in dreaming also depends upon such a conjunction, with the difference that in the dream-state the senses cease to function.¹

Dream Phenomena

Śaṅkara Miśra gives detailed account of dreams, their nature and how they are produced.² Dreams according to him are of four kinds:

1. Some dreams arise from acuteness of the impression or facility of reproductiveness ; just as in a man who, in love or in anger, thinks intently on some subject, when he goes to sleep. In that state cognition resembling perception in the form, 'this is the battle between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna' is produced through the influence of the previous impressions produced by previous study of *Mahābhārata*. This is the reminiscent theory.

2. Some dreams arise from derangement of the humours or affections of the body. Due to the disorder of the humour, wind (vāta), one may dream of moving about in the sky. By the excess of bile, he may dream of fire, golden mountains, flashing lightening etc. Through the predominance of phlegm, he may dream of swimming upon the sea, sprinkling with showers of rain etc. These are the physiological dreams.

3. Thirdly, dreams appear under the influence of the 'unseen force', adṛṣṭam. These are cognitions produced in one whose internal senses have been lulled to sleep or overpowered with sleep, in respect of the experiences of the present or previous

¹VS, IX, 2, 7.

²VSU, IX, 2, 7.

births. The previous virtue (dharma) accumulated, produces beneficent and pleasurable dreams like riding upon elephants, ascending on mountains, acquisition of royal umbrella, feasting, meeting kings and the like. The accumulated evil (adharma) produces unpleasant dreams like falling into blind wells, immersion in mire and the like.¹ This is the mystical explanation, of dream phenomena.

4. Fourthly, we have dream-within-dreams (Svapnāntikam).² According to Praśastapāda, dream-cognition is a sort of internal perception through the mind when all the functions of the external sense-organs stop, and the mind has retired into the trans-organic region.³ When the mind retires, the senses do not operate, and dream cognitions arise through the central sensory. This takes place in sleep-state, which is a particular conjunction of the self with the mind. Herein sub-conscious impressions of past experiences emerge and present before the mind.⁴ Śrīdhara in his *Nyāya Kandali* reiterates the same. The dream-cognitions arising from sleep and sub-conscious impressions are direct and immediate presentations of objects which have no real existence at that time and place.⁵ According to Śivāditya, dreams are produced by the Mind (and not senses) in the perverted condition, due to sleep.⁶ Bhāsarvajña calls these a kind of false recollection, and so does Jayanta Bhatta.⁷

C. FACTORS OF PERSONALITY

Like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika also postulates three major factors of personality viz. soul, mind and body.

1. Soul

The existence of soul is proved beyond doubt. Nyāya proves it through inference (anumāna) that it is the

¹VSU, IX, 2, 7.

²VS, IX, 2, 8.

³PBh, IX, 2, 7.

⁴op. cit.

⁵NKa, p. 184.

⁶SP, p. 68.

⁷NM, pp. 182-3.

seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain etc. Vaiṣeṣika depends upon the direct perception (pratyakṣa), and considers the above inference as an additional proof. We directly perceive the self in our feeling as 'I' (aham). The intuition of 'I' is enough to prove the existence of the self. The authority of Veda, and the inference of its existence from its activity and feeling are simply additional minor proofs.¹ Compare this dictum with Descartes' 'cogito ergo sum'. An ordinary man may fail to understand this 'I'ness properly, but a yogi has the direct perception of the self. Through concentration of mind, that is, through a particular conjunction of the soul and the mind, he can have perceptual cognition of the self (ātmapratyakṣam).²

In the same manner, we can say that everybody feels his ego, and his soul exists. This proves the plurality of soul. Each soul has his own ego, and from each ego we infer a separate soul. Activity and inactivity which are observed in one's own soul are marks of existence of other souls.³ The status at birth, the individual differences in men, also proves plurality.⁴ The same principle is reiterated by the scriptures also.⁵

Kaṇāda refutes all sorts of objections to the existence of soul.⁶ He again proves that soul is a substance and is eternal.⁷ The soul, however, is not an object of perception.⁸

Kaṇāda, again makes a distinction between the individual soul (jīva) and the supreme soul (Īśvara). The two are similar but not identical.⁹ Chandrakānta, however, in his Bhāṣya, interprets the sutras III. 2. 19-21 in the monistic sense, namely that there exists only one Ātman variously differentiated on the phenomenal plane, as supported by scripture. Prof. Dasgupta accepts this interpretation, but S. Radhakrishnan disagrees.¹⁰

¹VS, III, 2, 10-18.

²VS, IX, 1, 11.

³VS, III, 1, 19.

⁴Ibid, III, 2, 20.

⁵Ibid, III, 2, 21.

⁶VS, III, 2, 6-8.

⁷Ibid, III, 2, 5.

⁸Ibid, VIII, 1, 2.

⁹VSU, III, 2, 19, Vivṛti on the same.

¹⁰Indian Philosophy, II, p. 190, n8.

as the general tendency of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy has been pluralistic rather than monistic. Hence all souls are different, and the differences are due to the connection with mind and body.

2. *Mind (Manas)*

Manas in Vaiśeṣika is used in the widest sense, for it is applied to all the mental powers *viz.* sensation, perception, understanding, feeling, willing, and higher intellectual powers. It refers to the whole of the internal organ (*antaḥ karaṇa* of Sāṃkhya), the faculty or instrument through which thoughts enter or by which objects affect the soul. The appearance and non-appearance of knowledge, on contact of the soul with the senses and the objects are the marks of the existence of the Mind.¹ The object may be there, the senses may be in contact with the object, the Ātman may be there, but unless an another instrument, Mind works, no perception will result. Knowledge appears when Mind attends. In the absence of attention by the Mind, there is no perception. If there were no Mind, we should have been able to perceive through the senses many things simultaneously, by the direct contact of Ātman with the senses. But, in reality, all the perceptions are in succession, and hence the supposition of an intermediate instrument—the Mind. So, between senses and Ātman, Mind functions as a coordinator, or a mediator. Candrarāja defines Mind as—‘That of which the recognition of a non-inherent cause for the production of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, impression, merit, demerit and impression is the mark of its existence is Mind.’² Its functions thus include cognition, affection, conation and storing of impressions in the sub-conscious. Mind cannot function as an independent perceiver, as the Western psychologists say. The real perceiver is the Ātman, and Mind cannot take its place. Nor can Ātman take the place of Mind, as it needs an instrument of action, which is Mind.

The existence of Mind as different from Ātman has been proved through logical reasoning by Vaiśeṣika. Each sense

¹VS, III, 2, 1.

²DPS, I, 2.

organ is capable of perceiving only one class of objects. There must be a sense-organ different from the five sense-organs that can perceive all classes of objects of the external world. Again, ideas, thoughts and feelings belong to the internal world, not directly depending upon sense-organs. An organ, separate from sense-organs is needed for the internal perception, cognition, affection and volition. The phenomenon of forgetting or remembering is yet another proof. The instrument that retains past ideas, brings these forth to Ātman, or holds these back.

A number of characteristics of Mind have been discussed. Mind is a substance, and is eternal.¹ Because of non-simultaneous perception by Mind, it is clear that Mind is not all-pervading, and it cannot be of infinite magnitude. Hence it is a substance. The same fact that perceptions are not simultaneous but successive, leads to the view that each body has its own mind.² The object may be one and the same, but each individual will think of the same object in diverse ways.

Mind has no magnitude, it is atomic.³ Hence it is eternal like an atom. It is unproduced, indestructible and without parts. It is the subjective side of the individual, while the body and the objects of perception constitute the objective world. Like soul and ether, Mind is not an object of perception.⁴ It is the perceiver, the organ of perception, helping the soul to perceive. The action of mind needs volition on the part of the soul, in the same manner as raising the hand needs volition.⁵

Although mind, the special sense-organ, is not directly subject to volition, still it should be observed that action is produced in mind by volition which can be reached by the nervous process by which mind travels.⁶ Pleasure and pain results from contact of soul, mind, sense and object.⁷ Another quality characterises Mind. It is fickle and restless. This fickleness restricts the intuitive power of the soul. That way, there should

¹VS, III, 2, 2.

²Ibid, III, 2, 3.

³VS, VII, 1, 23.

⁴USU, 2, 14.

⁵Ibid, V, 2, 14.

⁶VSU, 2, 14.

⁷VS, V, 2, 15.

be no hope for the control of mind, and subsequently the cessation of the mind, and the deliverance of the soul. But as said earlier, volition is a power in the hands of the soul that makes the mind function, and controls it also. The soul can inhibit and restrain through volition the actions of the internal organ, Manas. 'When the mind of an indifferent person who has come to believe in the vanity of all objects of enjoyment, comes to stay only in the soul, at that stage, owing to the absence of volition corresponding to its action, action is not produced in the mind which then becomes comparatively steady. It is this state which is called yoga, since the marks of yoga are the restraint of the internal organ, citta¹.'

Mind accompanies soul after the death of the individual. Here it is bound by the force of *adṛṣṭa*. The going out of life and mind from the body (*apasarpaṇam*), and the entrance of life and mind into another body (*upasarpaṇam*) depend on *adṛṣṭa*.²

The word *Sanskāra* (impression) refers to the sub-conscious mind. Impression is said to be of two kinds : (1) cause of reminiscence and (2) cause of actions.³ The cause of reminiscence is that which is inherent in self, and it is a particular mental impression produced by the impressions of the preceptive and the inferential knowledge of one substance. The cause of actions is impetus, which is produced by actions arising from impulsion.⁴ Thus our instinctive behaviour and our innate tendencies depend upon the impression that is latent in us.

3. Body

Body is the third factor of personality. The body of the individual is a form of earth which is a kind of substance. Though it is made up of all the four elements, earth, water, fire and air, yet the earth-element predominates in it.⁵ Smell which is the distinctive attribute of earth, is observed in the human

¹*VSU*, V, 2, 16.

²*VSV*, 2, 17.

³*DPS*, I, 3.

⁴*op. cit.*

⁵*VS*, IV, 2, 1-3.

body as not departing from it till its dissolution, whereas digestive heat, etc., are not observed in the decayed body. These attributes therefore, are accidental.¹ Our common experience is that all bodies are sex-born, produced by the conjunction of male and female germ. But according to Kaṇāda, some bodies may be produced independent of the sexual conjunction (ayoni-jam). In support of his dogma, he presents a number of argument, which are not convincing to us. Śāṅkara Miśra goes a step further and states that the vegetable kingdom also possesses consciousness, and the trees also can be considered as bodies in so far as these too possess experience, life, death, sleep, waking, procreation, attraction to agreeable and repulsion to disagreeable.² He anticipated, what Dr. J.C. Bose discovered in the present century. But Śāṅkara Miśra goes a step further in proclaiming that trees also are subject to the law of Karma. That is why some trees are fortunate to be grown on the banks of Narbada river, and some in a cemetery to be haunted by vultures.³ The concept of physical body in Vaiśeṣika is thus very wide, as it includes animate as well as inanimate bodies, flora as well as fauna. Its classification as sex-born and asexual is rather primitive. The sexual bodies also are classified into womb-born and egg-born. The classification is not significant for the present readers, but the idea that living organism with physical bodies possess consciousness is worth considering. All living bodies thus possess a tripartite personality with soul, mind and body. The distinction between vegetable kingdom, animals and human beings lie in the degree of consciousness. We should not deny a plant having sensation, feeling, and instinctive behaviour of attraction and repulsion to agreeable and disagreeable things respectively. The physical body is composed of the ultimate atoms, but these ultimate atoms themselves are devoid of consciousness. The aggregates of binaries and ternaries form inorganic matter. These do not have the property of producing a living organism.

¹VSU, IV, 2, 4.

²Ibid, IV, 2, 5.

³op. cit.

D. THEORY OF PERCEPTION

The theory of perception in Vaiśeṣika is almost identical with that of Nyāya. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika establish the existence of five sense-organs. Manas is regarded as an internal sense through which we perceive pleasure and pain. The sense-organs come in direct contact with the objects, and are prāpyakāri. The sense-object contact is essential for perception. The perception may be indeterminate, if it is simply a presentative cognition of an object, without discrimination and reflection. It may be determinate, if it involves association, assimilation and discrimination of ideas and objects reproduced in memory. Perception may be external or internal, external through the senses and internal through Manas. The external perception takes place in respect of an object possessing magnitude, by the possession of that which is composed of more substances than one, and by means of its colour.¹ There is no external perception of the ultimate atom, as it does not possess magnitude. Air is a substance but it has no colour, and hence it is not perceived.² Nor is gravity perceptible.³ Numbers, magnitudes, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority and action become subjects of visual perception, through their combination with substances possessing colour.⁴ Certain objects like colour, sound, odour, taste and touch are perceived through one sense-organ. But number, magnitude etc. are perceived through visual organ and tactual organ. Existence and quality are perceived through all the senses.⁵ Perception of colour depends on two conditions. The first condition is co-inherence of many substances (aneka dravya samavāya), and the second condition is particularity of colour (rūpa viśeṣa).⁶ An atom is not composed of many substances, and hence invisible. Again its colour is not perceivable. A binary also cannot be perceived, as it is formed only of two atoms. Taste cannot be seen, as it has no colour. The conditions of other sense-perception are similar.

¹VS, IV, 1, 6.

²Ibid, IV, 1, 7.

³Ibid, IV, 1, 10.

⁴Ibid, IV, 1, 11.

⁵VS, IV, 1, 11-13.

⁶Ibid, IV, 1, 8.

The sense-object contact, according to Vaiṣeṣika is of the same six types as explained in Nyāya, viz. Saṁyoga, Saṁyukta, Samavāya etc.

Doubtful perception arises from three conditions. The first is perception of the general properties only. The second is the non-perception of the differentia, and the third is recollection of the alternatives.¹ Śankara Miśra adds that a doubtful cognition, is the knowledge of many contrary qualities in one and the same object. Annaṁa Bhatta supports this view.²

Reference has also been made to supernormal perception or yogī-pratyakṣa. The yogis can perceive all objects, past, present and future, near and far, subtle and gross, and hidden and present. Jayanta Bhatta explains that a yogi can perceive all objects of the world simultaneously by a single intuition. Praśastapāda refers to ārṣa-jñāna or the yogic intuition. He also describes the occult-perception, through some occult powers obtained by some practices and medicines. Occultists can perceive through the senses, some subtle and hidden objects, but they work at the sensuous plane, and not at spiritual plane. The sages possess higher intuition (pratibhā-jñāna), but occultists possess base occult powers.

How is cognition produced? Kaṇāda states, 'the mode of production of cognition is said in connection with the differentiation of a particular cognition.'³ Śankara Miśra further comments : A cognition should be marked off or distinguished from other cognitions, in respect of the mode of its production, in respect of its subject-matter, and in respect of its property.⁴

One cognition can depend upon another cognition. This can be proved by induction from agreement and difference.⁵

Candra classifies perception into 4 types : (1) doubtful perception ; (2) decisive perception ; (3) imperfect perception ; (4) perfect perception.⁶ If we take improperly the specific property of one of the many alternatives for that of the other,

¹VS, IV, II, 2, 17.

²TS, p. 56.

³VS, VIII, 1, 3.

⁴VSU, VIII, 1, 3.

⁵Ibid, 2.2.

⁶DPS, II, 5, 10.

and if we miss the right property of the object, we have imperfect perception. Illusions will come under this category. Perfect perception is knowledge without error.

Perception, according to Candra is produced in three ways: (1) by contact of four factors, (2) by contact of three factors and (3) by contact of two factors.¹ The first type is the sensory representation in which self, mind, senses and the objects, all the four, play their part. But for the perception of sound and its attributes, the object is unnecessary, and so only three factors, self, mind and senses, work. For internal perception, that is for the cognition of pleasure, pain etc. self and mind (only two factors) are needed.²

Memory

According to Vaiśeṣika, there are four kinds of valid knowledge : (1) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) inference (*laingika*), remembrance (*smṛti*) and intuition (*ārṣa jñāna*). Here it differs a little from Nyāya. The comparison (*upamāna*), tradition (*aitihya*) and verbal authority (*śabda*), as explained by Nyāya, are all brought under inference. Remembrance (*smṛti*) is thus a new source of valid knowledge, not included in Nyāya. It is given an independent place.

How is memory produced? It results from a particular conjunction between the self and the mind and also from impression or latency (*saṅskāra*).³ Later philosophers explain the following conditions:

1. The efficient cause of memory is *saṅskāra*, the past impressions about objects, seen, heard and otherwise experienced. This forms the real content of memory.

2. The helping cause is the observation of a suggestive mark, or voluntary attempt at recollection.

3. The non-combinative cause is the contact (*saṁyoga*) or contiguity such as reflection or meditation or re-interpretation. The *saṁyoga* takes place between the soul and the mind.

4. The self works as the combinative cause.⁴ Reminiscence

¹DPS, II, 5, 16.

²*op. cit.*

³VS, IX, 2, 6.

⁴VSU, IX, 2, 6.

does not take place at all times, or continually, because it depends upon the revival of the mental impressions. It takes place only where there is a suitable condition for the revival of the latent impressions.

Pleasure and Pain

Kaṇāda devotes one full section to a discussion about the nature of pleasure and pain. Pleasure is a state of agreeableness, which gives rise to attraction towards the agreeable object. Pain, on the other hand, is uneasiness which produces repulsion towards the object causing it. Both are diametrically opposite to each other. They stand in the relation of objects different from each other, because of the difference of their causes in the form of agreeable and disagreeable, and on account of their mutual opposition (*virodha*).¹ Thus one distinction between pleasure and pain, is the heterogeneity of effect—agreeable and disagreeable. The other is the heterogeneity of the cause. The cause of pleasure is a desirable (*iṣṭam*) object, and that of pain is undesirable (*aniṣṭam*). Examples of the former are, garland, sandal-paste, women *etc.*, and of the latter are snakes, thorns *etc.*² Another principle of distinction is mutual juxtaposition (*virodha*). Both cannot dwell together simultaneously in the same person, 'for pleasure and pain are not experienced in one and the same soul at one and the same time'.³

Kaṇāda also states that pleasure and pain are not forms of cognition, as these cannot be included either in 'doubt' or in 'certainty'.⁴ The species of cognition are only two, either certainty, or doubt. The two cannot be doubt, as the two alternatives which must be present in doubt do not exist. Nor can it be the certainty, as the single alternative does not exist. The perception of pleasure and pain is not cognitive but mental, *i.e.* by the inner sense, in the form, 'I feel pleasure', 'I feel pain', and in the form 'I know', 'I am certain', or 'I am doubtful'.⁵

¹ VS, X, 1, 1.

² VSU, X, 1, 1.

³*op. cit.*

⁴ VSX, 1, 2.

⁵ VSU, X, 1, 2.

While doubt and certainty is produced by *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, neither pleasure nor pain awaits these two.¹ Incidentally, Śāṅkara Miśra refers to four types of feeling of pleasure, viz. (1) objective, (2) subjective, (3) imaginative or sympathetic, and (4) habitual.² Again he mentions the uncommon and specific causes of pleasure as—*dharma*, attraction for pleasure, desire for the cause of pleasure and cognition of the object of pleasure. The cause of pain are likewise *adharma* and cognition of objects of pain.

Although *Vaiśeṣika* tries to explain the complex psychological phenomenon of pleasure and pain, but the explanation does not seem to be satisfactory one.

E. RESUME

The psychology of *Vaiśeṣika* is invariably the same as that of *Nyāya*. A few details here and there do not lend any special character to the psychological principles already explained by *Nyāya*. It is therefore more accurate to present a combined *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view, rather than two separate views.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has the unique distinction of propounding pluralistic realism. It thus puts more premium upon the objective world whose existence is independent of our subjective perception of the universe. The universe of form and matter is a reality, and this reality is to be perceived with accuracy and perfection. Hence the need for right perception and right understanding of the world around. *Vaiśeṣika*, therefore, enters into the minute details about the physical and chemical composition of the universe, and *Nyāya* enters the realm of epistemology for understanding the truth in the right manner. This leads to the categorisation of the predicables in the universe. In this categorisation specific places are assigned to the factors of human personality, soul, mind and body. Although this categorisation does not satisfy the other schools of philosophy, but it marks a definite trend of scientific analysis and a rational approach. Nothing in the universe escapes the notice of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophers. And everything is explained in

¹*Ibid*, X, 1, 3.

²*Ibid*, X, 1, 3.

a rational manner, with the common-sense approach, avoiding as far as possible the mysticism that features in Upaniṣads, Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsa and Vedānta. Hence, the contribution of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika towards the psychology of perception is unique and distinct. The relation between the senses, mind and soul has been explained thread-bare. The theory of consciousness, as explained in Vaiśeṣika is as significant as is its atomic theory. This theory solves a number of riddles regarding the nature of consciousness as remain unsolved in the Western psychology. Of the states of consciousness, proper weightage is given to the wakeful and the dream state, and the phenomenon of dream is well explained even from the modern point of view. Vaiśeṣika no more states this phenomenon in mystical language as do Upaniṣads. Even the description of the super-conscious state of the Yogis is presented in common-sense terminology. An attempt has been made to explain the factors responsible for memory, and the feeling of pleasure and pain. It makes a distinction between the cognitive function and the affective function of mind. The distinction, in reality, is artificial, as there can be no cognition without some amount of affection, and no affection without some sort of cognition. Nyāya devotes a lot of attention to reasoning (tarka) and syllogism, but the approach is epistemological rather than psychological. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is however, one step forward in the survey of psychological principles.

Psychology in Mimāṃsā

A. INTRODUCTION

MIMAMSA (also called Pūrvamīmāṃsā, to distinguish it from Uttaramīmāṃsā or Vedānta) deals mainly with the principles of interpretation of the Vedic texts in connection with rituals and sacrifices. Dealing with Karmakāṇḍa of the Vedas (as in contrast with Jñānakāṇḍa of Vedānta) its main objective is the consideration of Dharma, and hence it is also designated as Dharmamīmāṃsā. It is thus more of the character of a religious scripture and a theological treatise than a philosophy proper. In comparison to other systems, very little of philosophy can be gleaned out of it, and concomitantly, psychological speculations herein can be found only few and far between, just in the form of some incidental references. On a number of matters it maintains the same stand as that of Nyāya and Sāṃkhya. An outline of its metaphysics and epistemology is given below:

1. Mīmāṃsā accepts the existence of the Universe as real, but does not admit of any absolute annihilation, apart from partial or cyclic dissolutions. "The doctrine of creation and dissolution which is recognised by all other Hindu systems, could not be acknowledged by the Mīmāṃsā as it would have endangered the eternity of Vedas."

2. Jaimini, the composer of Mīmāṃsā aphorisms, does not believe in the existence of God, but the latter exponents of the system had to bring in God in order to make the system more acceptable.

3. As regards the creation of universe, it follows Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, and propounds Ārambhavāda. But it believes that there is no creator of the universe; it is eternal.

4. It categorises the universe in the manner of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It accepts seven categories as substance, quality, action, genus, specy, samavāya (inherence) and Abhāva

(negation). Vaiśeṣika presents nine type of substances, but Mīmāṃsā adds darkness and eternal sound as two more.

5. Mīmāṃsā accepts the existence of soul, which is entirely distinct from the body. The soul is the experiencer of pleasure and pain. It undergoes numerous births. Deliverance (*mukti*) is the state of the soul when it is devoid of pleasure and pain, and devoid of Dharma and Adharma, for these two are the respective cause of pleasure and pain. But there is no such thing as enjoyment of bliss.

6. In the wake of Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā believes in the plurality of souls, and in knowledge as a separate entity. Knowledge is the property of the soul. It is self-illuminating. It illuminates the self as well as the object.

7. The human personality consists of body, senses and mind, enlightened by the inner essence—the soul. The body is made up of the five elementary substances. The sense-organs also are the modifications of these elements. The mind also is a modification of these.

8. The duty of the human being is performing actions instructed by Vedas, and thus accumulating Dharma. An unseen force (*apūrva* or *adrṣṭa*) governs the fruit of actions. It is of two kinds—one bringing prosperity either in this world or in the next, and another leading to *mukti*.

9. For the due performance of Vedic injunctions, true knowledge is necessary. The valid means of knowledge are six viz. (i) sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*), (ii) inference (*anumāna*), (iii) analogy (*upamāna*), (iv) Verbal testimony (*śabda*), (v) Apparent inconsistency or implication (*arthāpatti*) and (vi) negation (*anupalabdhī*). Of these, verbal testimony is the highest. In order to confirm this tenet, it propounds the doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (*svataḥ prāmānya*).

10. Two major schools of thought have emerged after Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara, who have given divergent interpretations of a number of aphorisms. They differ as regards theory of knowledge.

11. An important contribution of Mīmāṃsā is its Realism. Kumārila, attacked the Nirālambanavāda and the Śūnyavāda of the Buddhists with vehemence. This realism paved way for accepting our perception and cognition as real as we are.

B. FACTORS OF PERSONALITY

1. *The Soul*

Mīmāṃsā accepts the existence of soul as the essence of human personality. The soul is entirely distinct from the body, the senses and the buddhi.¹ It differs from individual to individual. It is the experiencer of all the fruits of actions, the pleasure and pain. It is the doer of all actions.² It survives the destruction of the body and gets rebirth.

Kumārila gives justification of the existence of soul, not on the same lines as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does. He makes religious approach to the problem. He argues that if soul did not exist, the relation between means and consequences of Dharma could not be established.³ After the perishing of the body nothing would exist and none to enjoy the fruit.⁴ There is need for an experiencer, and a permanent cogniser. The Buddhist theory that 'Idea' is the essence, is not tenable, for ideas are perishable and have no persistence.⁵ The counter argument that the soul undergoing experiences of pleasure and pain is also non-eternal, is refuted by Kumārila. According to him the soul while passing through the different conditions of pleasure, pain, etc. never relinquishes his fundamental character of an intelligent substantial entity.⁶ Hence soul is eternal and does exist. Intelligence and consciousness continues throughout in the soul. There is a partial change in the form of change in the state of pleasure and pain. This partial change does not disturb the permanent characteristics of soul.⁷

Moreover the recognition of one's own self as being the same today as it was yesterday, cannot be explained except by postulating an eternal soul.⁸ The soul is the substratum of consciousness. Apart from soul, there is no other substratum.

¹SV, Ātmavāda 7.

²Ibid, 84.

³Ibid, 3.

⁴SV, Ātmavāda, 5.

⁵Ibid, 111-121.

⁶Ibid, 26.

⁷Ibid, 28.

⁸Ibid, 108-110.

Consciousness cannot reside in the body or in the senses, as even at the death of the body and cessation of senses, the permanent entity persists and takes another birth. This permanent entity is the soul, bearing the potentialities of Ideas, capable of migrating to another body.¹

The soul is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*). It is manifest by itself.² The soul pervades the entire body *i.e.* it is *vibhu*. It is also able to connect itself with one body after another. Its energy causes movement in the body, and directs it.

The plurality of the souls is vouchsafed by the fact that there are individual differences amongst men as regards experience, activity, fruit of action and difference of dharma and adharma. The soul is different in different persons for otherwise their individual experiences of objects and of pleasure and pain could not be explained.

In the liberated state the soul continues to exist as a mere *sat*. It serves as the basis of collective cognition of all things taken together. But it is devoid of affection (feeling) as the feeling of pleasure and pain require a body.

The soul is not perceptible in itself, but it is known as the doer (*kartā*) and not the object (*karmā*). It cannot be the object of consciousness. Prabhākara elaborates this point and explains that soul is neither a substance, nor a quality, nor an action, but mere consciousness.

2. *Manas*

The second factor is the *Manas*, the mind alongwith the five cognitive senses. The *Manas* of Mīmāṃsā envelopes the entire field of *Antahkaraṇa* of Sāṃkhya, but Mīmāṃsā deals very little with the higher mental faculties. It deals mostly with perception.

3. *The Physical Body*

Mīmāṃsā gives no different explanation of the human body. It, however, emphasises the body as a real entity, not to be made an object of contempt as Vedāntins do. The movement of the body is due to the soul.

¹ *Ibid*, 73.

² *Ibid*, 142.

As for the states of consciousness, it accepts the common view point viz. the three states—wakeful, dream and deep sleep.

C. THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL SYSTEM

Prabhākara gives an indication of the psycho-physical system in three types of bodies (of the living organism) viz. (i) womb-born (ii) egg-born and (iii) sweat-born. Mind and tactile organ are present in all the three types of bodies. Vegetable body, according to him, has no such system. The womb-born, including the human body has six sense-organs (manas and five senses). Mind (manas in his terminology) is a substance, otherwise there could be no contact between mind and soul or mind and objects. Mind is atomic, and hence eternal. It is extremely mobile. No cognition is possible without it.¹

Kumārila also mentions six sense-organs including Mind. Pārthasārathi Miśra while commenting on *Ślokavārttikā* in his *Nyāyaratnākara* gives detail of the five sense-organ, but these are identical with those given in Nyāya. He also explains Kumārila's view of Mind in his *Śāstradīpikā*, commenting on Sūtra 1.1.4. Here he distinguishes between internal and the external organs. The five sense-organs are external, while Mind is internal. Mind is an instrument of direct perception, and can perceive pleasure and pain. But while perceiving the external objects, it cannot operate apart from the body, and without the five sense-organs.²

D. COGNITION

We have mentioned above that Nyāya puts to test the validity of knowledge, and puts forth the criteria of pratyakṣa, anumāna, śabda and upamāna. All true cognition depends upon these four pramānas, out of which pratyakṣa is the most important. Vaiśeṣika also follows the same, but over-rides śabda and upamāna. Sāṃkhya and Yoga accept three instruments (by cancelling śabda). Mīmāṃsā adds two more instruments but minimises the importance of all the six. It propounds a queer theory called 'the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge

¹PPS, p. 52.

²SD, pp. 21-22.

(Svataḥ-prāmāṇya)'. Mīmāṃsā asserts that all cognition (apart from memory) is valid in itself. If any knowledge is illusory or wrong, it will be sublated afterwards. But to begin with, we must accept the validity of our cognition. It is just in tune with the judicial principle that a criminal is perfectly innocent till he is proved a criminal. We should start with the null-hypothesis that our cognition is not invalid, and test the same later on. At the time of rise of knowledge, we accept it as valid, without any indecision about the same. We see water and it is water. No need to tax our mind whether it is water or not. None does that. If we did, then all our daily business will become complicated by indecision at every step, about every cognition. So we proceed with our cognition. We reject the cognition only when a contradictory experience (bādhakajñāna) takes place.

All cognition is located in the soul. It is the soul that is the cogniser, and this soul has the power of remembering and also of recognising the facts of past experience.¹ The soul is the experiencer, the body is the abode of experience and the senses are the instruments.

Cognition is also independent of verbal expression. An object cannot be said to be not cognised simply because it has not been specified by words. Even he who does not know the word, can recognise the class 'cow'.² Even a deaf and dumb, unconnected with the world of language, has full cognition of things around. An infant, not taught a single word, does possess cognition of a number of things.

Kumārila again holds that "cognitions have real substrate in the external world."³ 'Even in dream cognition the external substratum is not altogether absent.'⁴ "As a matter of fact too, what is comprehended by dream cognition is (some real external object that has been perceived) either during the present life, or in some past life, or at any other time, and which comes to be cognised in dreams, either in connection with the same time and place, or under different

¹SV, IV, 122.

²SV, IV, 176.

³SV, Nirālambanavāda, 79.

⁴Ibid

circumstances."¹

Similarly, even the illusory cognitions have a real substratum.² The cognition that has a negation for its object also has a real substratum. Kumārila, with all the force at his command, proclaims that everything in this world, as well as beyond this world—"all these would be groundless (unreasonable), if ideas (or cognitions) were devoid of (corresponding) objects (in the external world)."³ His realism is a strong rejoinder to the Idealism of Śāṅkara, and Nihilism of Buddhists.

Mīmāṃsā holds that the process of cognition has three basis—the knower, the known object and the knowledge. This is the *Tripuṭi* of cognition. Out of these three, it is knowledge (*saṁvid*) that reveals by its very appearance the knower and the object. Prabhākara explains his doctrine of *tripuṭi-pratyakṣa* that in one manifestation of knowledge, the knower, the known and the knowledge are simultaneously illumined.

Recognition

Recollection is the essential basis of recognition. But prior to that, says Kumārila, perceptual cognition is necessary. In the absence of sense-perception, no cognition is possible, and subsequently no recognition. Sense-perception takes place, both prior to recollection, and it continues even after recollection. "There is no command that it is only such cognition as is prior to remembrance that is called sense-perception."⁴ "Nor is the function of sense-organs, after recollection, precluded by any valid reason."⁵ Hence recognition is based on recollection, but is fundamentally perceptual in character. The perception may take place both before and after recollection.

Verbal Cognition

Mīmāṃsā starts a new chapter of psychological interest viz. verbal cognition.

¹*Ibid.*, 109.

²*Ibid.*, 109-113.

³*Ibid.*, 117-119.

⁴*SV*, IV, 234.

⁵*Ibid.*, 235.

Śalikanātha defines verbal cognition as the cognition of something not before the eyes, brought about by the knowledge of words.¹ A word is a composite of letters, but it is taken as a whole. The word as a whole brings about the idea of meaning. The perception of each letter of the word vanishes as soon as it appears, and so the perception of each word composing a sentence.² The relation between word and its meaning is eternal, and so also is the relation between the sentence and its meaning.³ The steps in the physiological process of speech are—1. The speaker makes an effort. 2. This brings the speaker's soul into contact with the air in the lungs. 3. The air in lungs is expelled outwards. 4. It comes into contact with vocal chords. 5. These contacts modify the character of the air. 6. The air issues forth from the mouth of the speaker, forming speech. 7. It then passes onward and reaches the auditory organs of the listener. 8. There in his ears, the air-waves produce a change, making the speech audible.

The need for discussing verbal cognition at length was felt in order to prove that Vedas are eternal, Mīmāṃsā holds the word to be eternal.

Kumārila explains the mental reaction, when a word is uttered. On listening to the word, do we comprehend the universal denoted by the word, or the individual? Kumārila says—"When the word 'cow' is uttered, before we have an idea of any individual cow, it is the universal that we have an idea of. Individual cows may be of many colours and forms. but we do not think of a particular colour and form. We find the word giving rise to a single uniform conception of the common universal cow."⁴

Mīmāṃsā refutes the celebrated theory 'sphota' regarding the word and denotation of its meaning, but the arguments against the theory are not so convincing, especially from the point of view of modern linguistics. Hence no details are

¹PPS, p. 87.

²*Brhatī*, pp. 160-161.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 135.

⁴TV, on I,1,33, translation, pp. 363-365. Also SV, Sambandha-kṣepa, 29-35.

presented here. Mīmāṃsā, however, stimulated later thinkers on this obscure topic.

Wrong Cognition

Śābara in his Bhāṣya on Mīmāṃsā Sūtras (Sūtra 1.1.4) explains that a cognition is wrong—

- (a) when the mind is affected by some sort of derangement.
- (b) when the sense-organs concerned is beset by disabilities.
- (c) when the object itself suffers from such disabilities as being too small for perfection and so forth.

If all the three means, Mind, Senses and Objects are right, cognition is right, and there is no question of sublation of the cognition.

E. PERCEPTION

On the whole, Mīmāṃsā follows the theory of perception as propounded by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Sense Organs

As explained in Nyāya, the external sense-organs are five and the internal is one, namely *manas*. The *manas* is the internal organ. It is atomic in nature. It is independent of the sense-organs, but acts in co-operation with the external objects. The *manas* may be identified with *antaḥkarana* of Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Vedānta. All the senses apprehend the objects on coming in contact with them, and hence these are *pratyakāri*.

1. Physical Basis of Perception

According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, five contacts are necessary for perception.

1. The contact of the senses with the objects.
2. The contact of the *manas* with the senses.
3. The contact of *manas* with the objects.
4. The contact of soul with *manas*.
5. All these contacts collectively.

The sense-organs are many, not one. Had these been one, then the functioning of one organ could be done by the common organ. Then either everything or nothing could be

perceived. A deaf would also hear, and so on.¹

The Auditory sense

Mīmāṃsā follows the principle of *prāpyakāritā* of Nyāya. It makes an exception in the case of auditory sense only. Kumārila holds that sound travels through the ear. It reaches the ear-hole and modifies it. The sound moves in order of sequence. The nearer sounds enter the threshold of auditory acuity, but not the distant sounds. The visual organ is *prāpyakārī*. But the ear does not go out to the sound. It is the sound that is propagated to the ear-drum. Such a theory explains two phenomena about the auditory perception. Firstly, it explains the reason for the degrees of intensity of sounds, the high pitch sound (*tivra*) and the low pitch sound (*manda*). Secondly, it explains the difference in the perception due to spatial proximity and remoteness. The auditory acuity changes in inverse proportion to distance. Nearer the distance, greater the acuity, as the sound gets greater facility to reach the ear-drum. Thus the upper and lower thresholds are governed by distance.²

Sounds are again qualified by the directions from which they come. We perceive sound, not as mere sound but as sound coming from a particular direction. Hence the object of perception are sound plus direction plus distance, a complex whole. Alongwith sound, direction also is perceived, from which the sound comes. The distance also is perceived, whether it is near or far, because sound is feeble or intense in accordance with long or short distance respectively.

2. Types of Sense-object Contact

We have discovered in Nyāya, as many as six types of sense-object contact. These were:

1. Conjunction (*Samyoga*), e.g. the object seen directly by the contact of organ and object.
2. Inherence-cum-conjunction (*Samyukta-samavāya*) e.g. the perception of colour which inheres in the substance.

¹SV, IV, 163-166.

²SD, pp. 400.

3. United-inherent-inherence (Saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya) e.g. the perception of brightness which is inherent in bright colour, which itself inheres in substance (say, a jar).

Mīmāṃsā accepts the above three types of sense-object contact. Gāga Bhaṭṭa in his *Bhaṭṭacintāmaṇi* refutes the other three types mentioned by Nyāya, and accepts only the above three. He says, contact with substance is through saṁyukta; contact with attribute, action and class (guṇa, karma, jāti) of the substance is through saṁyukta-samavāya; and the universals of attribute, action and class are apprehended through the third type.¹ According to him sound is a substance, and here the contact is of the type of saṁyoga.² So no need of samavāya. Soundness inheres in sound, and so its perception is through saṁyukta-samavāya and not through any new type samaveta-samavāya.

3. Doctrine of Tripartite Perception

According to Prabhākara, perception is direct apprehension (Sākṣāt pratītiḥ). He presents the doctrine of Tripartite Perception called "Tripuṭi-pratyakṣa-vāda". The doctrine enlists three constituent factors of perception. viz. (i) the cogniser; (ii) the cognised, and (iii) the cognition. Who is the cogniser? In this respect Prabhākara explains that cognition has material and immaterial cause, like every ephemeral object in the world. The Soul is the material or constituent cause. Mind is the immaterial cause, as it fulfils all the conditions necessary from immaterial cause. It is atomic and eternal. It pervades the entire body. Since itself, it is devoid of qualities of colour and the rest, it stands in need of sense-organs for the presentation of external objects. But for internal perception of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort and so forth, it needs no sense-organ. What is cognised? Prabhākara enlists here 3 objects—substances, universal and qualities. About the act of cognition itself he divides it into two classes—indeterminate and determinate.³

4. Indeterminate and Determinate Perception

We are familiar in Western psychology about sensation and

¹BC, aphorism 4.

²Sābdasya ca dravyatvattatrāpi saṁyoga eva sambandah 4.

³PPS, p. 52.

perception. Some such gradation of cognition was explained in Nyāya. In Nyāya it was explained that the first stage is I.P. (indeterminate perception), the pure sensation, wherein there is no association of name or quality. It is the immediate cognition of an object without a knowledge of its attributes, universals or particulars. It is the revelation of just the thing (*vastumātram*). D.P. (determinate perception) is the next stage, wherein the object is revealed with its attributes, and characteristics. Keśava Miśra has explained three stages *viz.* I.P., D.P., and thought (or *buddhi*). When sense is agent, contact with object serves as process, I.P. is the result. When sense-object contact is the agent, I.P. is the process, D.P. is the result. When I.P. is the agent, D.P. is the process, thought is the result.

A rather different view is presented by two schools of Mīmāṃsā—the Kumārila Bhaṭṭa school and the Prabhākara School. According to Kumārila, I.P. is a simple apprehension of the object. "First of all", says Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, "there is a cognition in the shape of mere observation in the abstract, which is undefined similar to the cognition of the infant or the dumb, arising purely out of the object by itself (without any qualifications.)"¹ "And at that time neither any specification nor a generalisation is recognised; what is recognised is only the object, the substratum of these generalisation and specification."² Kumārila illustrates the point by referring to the perception of music. "Just as one who has been well instructed in music is able to discriminate between its different notes, both ordinary and Vedic, such as *śadaja*, *ṛṣabha* etc., and those who have not been so instructed know all notes merely as music, but the non-recognition of these latter cannot lead to the conclusion that the recognition of discriminating person is false."³ It means that the former knew distinctly while the latter knew indistinctly. There may exist both *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* (generic and specific characteristic) in the object, but these are not apprehended as such.

¹SV, IV, 112.

²SV, IV, 113.

³SV, IV, 239-41.

Prabhākara makes a modification in this view. He holds that I.P. apprehends the object as well as its generic and specific characters without apprehending their distinction. It is devoid of assimilation and discrimination, recollection or recognition. So when we perceive a cow, we apprehend the animal belonging to the kine race, and its individuality. But the sensation is so undefined that we do not distinguish between its 'cowness' in general, and its specific existence as a particular cow. It is only when we recall in our mind the memory of many such cows seen, and we associate that with the present, we call it D.P. Śalikanātha endorses this view. He says that I.P. does not apprehend the difference between the *sāmānya* (generic or universality) and *viśeṣa* (specific or individuality).¹ Pārthasārathi-Miśra says I.P. does not differentiate between the genus, substance, quality, action and name; while the D.P. does I.P. is simple apprehension, 'this is cow'. D.P. is the apprehension, 'this is a white cow', 'the cow gives us milk' etc.² Gāga Bhaṭṭa goes a step further and classifies D.P. into five kinds in accordance with the qualification of the object such as genus, substance, attribute, action and name. On the basis of the six organs of senses, it is of six kinds. It has specific qualities (*saviśeṣakam*), distinct types (*saprakāraṇam*).³

To sum up, Kumārila school holds that I.P. is mere sensation and non-determined observation (*ālōcanā*), just like the observation of an infant, where the object is perceived without any generic or specific features. Prabhākara school goes one step further and holds that in I.P. both the generic and specific features are perceived, both these are not differentiated. This view comes nearer to the Western psychology. Woodworth says, "O must observe, yes ; but how is it possible for O to observe anything except stimuli and their combinations.....? He goes beyond the stimuli and observes objective facts ; things and events with their qualities and relations."⁴ We do have a simple perception of material objects (*dravya*). But Besides, we have perception of attributes (*guṇa*) also, although the

¹ PPS, pp. 54-55.

² SD, p. 140.

³ BC, p. 17.

⁴ Woodworth, *Psychology*, Ch. XIII.

attribute inheres in the material object. Woodworth explains many facts about the perception of attribute. "We see it is wet today. Wetness is something to be felt rather than seen." But we perceive the motives and intentions of other people, their sincerity, intelligence and many other traits. We see them angry, bored, amused, full of energy."¹ "Even beauty and humour can be observed through the senses." We observe objects moving, and thus we perceive motion (karma). So the Mīmāṃsā view of perception of matter, attribute and action is quite plausible.

5. Perception of Universal and Individual

Mīmāṃsā also takes up the question of perception of universal and individual, the whole (avayavī) and its part (avayava). As said above Mīmāṃsā holds 'the theory of self-evidence' (svataḥprāmāṇyavāda); that the proof of the existence of an object rests on our consciousness. As a corollary of the same, anything that is perceived exists. As the object is perceived as gross whole, its wholeness is proved, although it may be composed of many parts. Prabhākara is the exponent of the above view. Kumārila makes the point rather more clear. In *Ślokaṣvartikā*, Vanavāda, he discusses at length the relation of whole and part. A forest (Vana) is the whole and a tree is the part. Should we consider forest as one whole, or a combination of parts? Kumārila synthesises the two viewpoints by saying that it is due to the point of view from which we look at a thing as a whole or a combination of parts. Truly speaking, both the perspectives are identical. Sometimes we may lay stress on the notion of parts, and the objects appears as such. In that case the forest is a conglomeration of trees. Otherwise we may look at as one whole, and thing appears as one of which there are parts. In short it is the question of proceeding either (i) from whole to part or (ii) part to whole. Both are identical, as the result is the same.

The same principle is extended by Kumārila to the perception of class (jāti) and individual. When we look at jāti as identical with the individual, it is the individual that becomes prominent in our consciousness and the notion of jāti becomes

¹Woodworth, *Psychology*, Ch. XIII.

latent. We can also look at it from the reverse point of view, the individual as identical with *jāti*, it is the *jāti* that becomes prominent, whileas the aspect as individual becomes latent. The perception of class-individual is thus only a matter of the angle of vision from which we look—class to individual or individual to class.

Kumārila extends this idea to *Samavāya* also. According to him "Samavāya may be only a particular form of the qualification and the qualified (*dharmādharminoḥ*, class and individual)"¹. Instead of talking about class and individual as identical, we can say likewise that the subject and the predicate, the substantive and the attribute, the qualification and the qualified (*dharma* and *dharmin*) are identical. The relation between the class and individual, qualification and the qualified is one of identity in difference. "The class (action and property) are not totally different from the individual (object of perception)."²

"A class devoid of individuals does not exist and vice-versa."³ As is the *Jāti* relation, so is the *samavāya* relation." "There is a distinct effect of the idea of a single commonality, and it is a natural property of the individuals. As such it may be named either *Sāmānya*, or *Ākṛti* or *Jāti* or *Śakti*."⁴ Thus universal or class or *jāti* is the same as shape or *Ākṛti*. "It is the class itself that has been called *ākṛti*—which signifies that by which the individual is specified (or characterised). It is that which is common to all the individual objects and the means of a collective idea of all the individual as forming one complete whole."⁵

This theory has been further seconded by Kumārila's disciple Pārthasārathi Miśra. In the perception 'this is cow,' there are two aspects—(i) thisness (*iyambuddhi*) and (ii) cowness (*gobuddhi*). The former emphasises individual, and the latter the class. Both inhere in the same object. Hence identity in difference, without any contradiction between the two.

¹SV, IV, 149.

²*Ibid*, 141.

³SV, *Ākṛtivāda*, 10.

⁴*Ibid*, 18.

⁵*Ibid*, 3.

"The Bhaṭṭa realism closely resembles the realism of Aristotle and Hegel, according to whom, the universal cannot exist apart from the individuals, and the individuals cannot exist apart from the universal. The universal is the inner essence of the individuals, and the individuals are the outer expression of the universal; the universal and the individual are abstractions apart from each other; the universal is neither wholly identical with the individual, nor wholly different from them, in fact, they together constitute the concrete reality."¹

Prabhākara agrees with Kumārila in saying that universals exist and they are objects of perception. Here both of them repudiate the Buddhist view that individual alone is real. "The act of perception involves both assimilation and discrimination. Perception is inclusive and (anuvṛtta) as well as exclusive (vyāvṛtta). Inclusion depends upon the reality of the universal."² But Prabhākara does not agree with Kumārila in the latter's theory of 'identity in difference.' He says, the universal and the individual are not identical, since the universal is common to many and is eternal, whereas the individual is not common but specific and is non-eternal.

Extending the point to the question of whole and part. Prabhākara maintains somewhat the modern gestalt view that the whole is an object of perception. Objects exist as wholes. A material object may constitute of minute atoms (as says Vaiśeṣika), where the atoms are the physical cause, and the conjunction the non-physical cause. The conjunction gives the whole its uniqueness, so that we no longer perceive the individual parts or atoms. Besides the 'whole' stand-point, the 'part' stand-point (as put forth by Kumārila) is unnecessary.

6. *The Perception of the Self*

We have seen above the speculations of Upaniṣads etc. with regard to this point. According to Upaniṣads, the self is existence, consciousness and bliss. It is to be 'heard', reflected and contemplated upon. It is an object of higher intuition. It is one

¹SD, p. 284.

²Sinha, Jadunath, *Indian Philosophy*, p.p. 195-196.

*Radhakrishnan, S, *Indian Philosophy*, I, p. 383.

with Brahman. Sāṃkhya talks of the reflection of puruṣa in buddhi and vice-versa. The self can be inferred as an original from its reflection in buddhi. Nyāya maintains that Self is a category of objects, endowed with the qualities of cognition and affection and conation. Self can be inferred from these qualities. Vaiśeṣika admits self as an object of yogic intuition. The latter Nyāya hold that self is an object of internal perception (mānasapratyakṣa).

The two schools of Mīmāṃsā give two different explanations. Kumārila quotes Vedas : "It is self-luminous meaning that the Soul is manifested by Itself."¹ His disciple Pārthasārathi in his *Śaṣṭradīpikā* makes a little departure, but at the same time clarifies the point, so that his view is considered to represent Bhaṭṭa school. He says that the self is an object of mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa). This is what latter Nyāya says. Self is an object of Self-consciousness in the form of mental perception.²

So there is no necessity to bring in inference for the perception of self. The Nyāya view is untenable.

But Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka is refuted by Prabhākara. According to Prabhākara, Self is the subject of consciousness, how can it be, at the same time, the object of consciousness. The self is always the Knower. So says Kant, the self is the subject and not the object. This point is further repudiated by Pārthasārathi, by explaining that over and above subject-consciousness and object-consciousness, there is also a higher degree of conscious life, viz. self-consciousness (mānasahampratyaya).³ He just makes an approach to the Vedāntic view that self-consciousness is higher type but falls short in maintaining (as Vaiśeṣika says) that self can be realized by intuition and yoga.

7. Illusory Perception

Mīmāṃsakas assert that all knowledge (sarva vijñānam) is true (yathārtham). A cognition may be less than true, but it can never be untrue. Hence, even in illusory perception there is true substratum.

1. Kumārila gives a number of illustrations of illusions.

¹ SV, Ātmavāda, 142.

² SD, p. 479.

³ Ibid., pp. 479-482.

When a fire-brand is whirled with extreme rapidity, a circle is perceived. Imaginary cities are perceived in the particular shape of clouds. Water is perceived on sand heated by and reflecting the rays of the sun.¹ The illusory perception in such cases is not altogether false. In the illusion of silver and shell, both silver and shell are real. Delusion lies in apprehending shell as silver, which it is not. The delusion takes place on account of mal-observation. We do not note the peculiar traits of the shell as distinguished from the silver, and at the same time by the glow of the shell, the silver which we have seen elsewhere is remembered. The non-distinction between the two causes delusion so that we take shell as something else (anyathā). This explanation is termed Anyathā-khyāti.

2. Prabhākara gives a different explanation. According to him there is no error, and hence his explanation is termed non-error, akhyāti. Prabhākara explains that cognitions are two-fold—apprehension and remembrance. There is no delusive cognition as a third. In silver-shell illusion, the features common to the shell and silver are noticed, and not the differences. Here lies mistake in apprehension. Secondly lies mistake in remembrance. Due to the defect of memory the true features of silver are not recollected, and hence non-distinction between the shell and silver, the thing perceived and the thing remembered.

In short Mīmāṃsakas explain that illusion is not due to any positive wrong knowledge but due to a mere negative factor of non-apprehension due to certain weakness of mind. Prabhākara's theory is, as such, called Viveka-khyāti (non-discrimination error).

8. Super-normal Perception

Kumārila refutes the possibility of any super-normal perception, or anything like yogic perception. "But, such yogic perception is not found to belong to any person in this life; and as for those who have reached the Yogic State, we know not what happens to them."² Is yogic perception sensuous or non-sensuous? If it is sensuous, then how can a person have per-

¹SVV, Nirālambanavāda, 109-113.

²Ib id, 93.

ception of past and future, as is claimed by yogis? A non-sensuous perception is in the form of internal perception, pleasure and pain. It is not possible to suppose a very high degree of development of the senses. There is a limit to the development. Perception of the past is a case of memory, without which it is invalid. Vedas can, however, give us the knowledge of past and future, near and distant object.¹

9. *Dream Consciousness*

Mīmāṃsaka recognises the representative character of dreams. All dreams have an objective basis in our wakeful life.² These are reproduction of past waking experience. In spite of the fact that the dream presents strange objects and impressions sometimes, these have basis in the sub-conscious mind. You may object that the phenomenon may never have been experienced by the dreamer, such as cutting off one's own head. But cutting off another's head is seen, and that forms the basis. Some objects may be dreamt, which were never seen in present life. But these might have been dream is a pure misconception, "which, while comprehending an object for us, comprehends it in a way other than in which it exists; and it can never be said to exercise any independent function by itself."⁴ Pārthasārthi-Miśra repeats that the dream cognitions are of the nature of recollection.⁵ The recollection is disturbed by the perversion of the mind by sleep, and hence their uniqueness.⁶ Prabhākara elaborates this point further by bringing in the idea of 'lapse of memory' (smṛtipramoṣa). We have waking illusions due to lapse of memory. Similarly when we sleep, we forget the real situations met in our life, and the same are presented as dreams.⁷ Udayana is not convinced by this explanation. He emphasises the presentative character of the dreams, for we have a vivid impression of what is before us, and not what we have seen in the past. Śāṅkarite calls dream an illusory reality.

¹SD, p. 52.

²SV, Nīlāmbanavāda, 107-10.

³SV, Śūnyavāda, 206.

⁴Ibid, 206.

⁵NR, p. 243.

⁶SD, p. 211.

⁷PPS, p. 35.

But Prabhākara replies that there is neither actual presentation nor illusory presentation, because *sense-organs* do not function in dreams at all.

In brief Mīmāṃsā strongly reiterates the representative character of dreams. It connects dreams with the sub-conscious mind, a fact that has been lately discovered by the Analytical School of Western psychology (Freud, Adler, Jung *etc.*). It hints at the reproduction of the past desires fulfilled in dreams, and does not indulge in any mystical explanation as some other philosophies do.

10. *Vāsanā*

Mīmāṃsā does not believe in the permanent character of cognition. Ideas are momentary, and are destroyed and do not leave any trace behind. This leads to the corollary that there is nothing like *Vāsanā* or 'Impression' that continues and accumulate from birth to birth.¹ *Vāsanās* never bring effect in serial order.² The *vāsanā* theory was declared by the Buddha with the sole object of alienating the affections of men (from worldly objects). Mīmāṃsā does not believe in any subtle body also.³

11. *Deep Sleep*

Prabhākara holds that in deep dreamless sleep, the contact of the self ceases with the Mind. Kumārila has a different explanation. According to him in sleep, self resides in its pure consciousness, where dreams are not produced.

12. *Volition*

Mīmāṃsā has its own theory of cognition and perception. Concerned chiefly with Dharma, and Vedic rituals. It does not deal with the affective side of Mind. But Dharma (duty) is connected with the conative side of Mind, and hence some references are there. Prabhākara lays stress on duty. In order to perform duty voluntary action is needed, which consists of the following six steps :

1. The knowledge of something to be done (*kāryatājñāna*).

¹*SVV*, 181-182.

²*Ibid*, 192-193.

³*Ibid*, *Ātmavāda*, 62-65.

2. The desire to perform the act(cikīṣā).
3. The consciousness that the act can be performed (Kṛti-sādhya-tājñāna)
4. The volitional tendency (pravṛtti).
5. The motor reaction (ceṣṭā).
6. The action (kriyā).

The basic assumption of voluntary action is freedom. Without assuming human freedom, man cannot be held responsible for his good or bad deeds. Man is the maker of his own destiny.

F. RESUME

As explained above Mīmāṃsā is concerned more with the vedic ritualism than with epistemology or metaphysics as such. Even the concept of ethics is limited to ritualism. But some corollaries have psychological worth. The special contribution of Mīmāṃsā is upholding strongly the realistic character of the universe, and in refuting the Buddhist, Nihilism and Idealism, and even Advaita idealism. In the field of metaphysics and epistemology, it generally follows Nyāya and makes some modifications, here and there. It does not present anything special as regards the psycho-physical system. Its special contribution as regards cognition is the doctrines of:

- (1) Self-validity of knowledge, (2) Tripartite Perception.

In explaining indeterminate and determinate perception, it makes a departure from Nyāya view-point. It presents its own theory of the perception of the universal. The two schools of Mīmāṃsā (Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara) represent, however, two different view-points. Both give divergent explanations, of the problem of illusory perception. On the whole, they take up the common-sense view-point rather than the deep and mystical or highly metaphysical view-point. It is, therefore, that Mīmāṃsā does not believe in any subtle-body, and super-sensuousness, and yogic intuition, any 'vāsanā,' any illusion, any 'sphota' in verbal cognition, and even any creator. Presumably, the idea of God was imported very late in Mīmāṃsā in order to satisfy the popular belief. Mīmāṃsā psychology is, therefore, characterised by perceptualism and realism as against mysticism and idealism. Here lies its meagre contribution.

Psychology In Advaita Vedānta

AFTER discussing psychology in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā (Prior Investigation), we proceed to discuss psychology in Uttara-Mīmāṃsā (Subsequent Investigation), also called "Vedānta" (the last of the Vedas). While the Prior Investigation deals with the ritualistic portion of the Vedas, the 'Karmakāṇḍa,' the nature of Dharma leading to Heaven, the Subsequent Investigation deals with the spiritualistic portion of the Vedas (i.e. Upaniṣads), the 'Jñānakāṇḍa' and the nature of knowledge leading to Mokṣa. The former deals with the proximate goal and the latter the ultimate goal of human life. Vedānta or Brahma-Mīmāṃsā, (Investigation of Brahman) or Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā is incorporated into *Brahma Sūtras* of Bāḍrāyana, and it revives the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and also sums up all the previous philosophies. It refutes Buddhism on all its fronts and revives Upaniṣadic Idealism, proclaiming identity of Ātman and Brahman. Essentially, its philosophy is the same as the philosophy of Upaniṣads, and consequently the psychological speculations in Vedānta have the foundations of Upaniṣadic psychology. But a huge mass of details accumulated during centuries characterises Vedāntic psychology as more or less complete, and as a representative of Indian psychology, in the same manner as Vedānta is representative of Indian philosophy, as a whole. Taking Upaniṣadic psychology as the core, and Vedānta psychology as a huge peripheral structure based on the core, we discover two types of superstructure built on the foundational principles of Upaniṣadic psychology. Firstly, each psychological concept of Upaniṣads has been worked out in broader details, and explained threadbare, incorporating and synthesising the psychological concepts in other Āstika philosophies (rejecting the incompatible ones, of course). Secondly, due to the divergent interpretations of *Brahma Sūtras* by four Vedāntic Schools namely the : (1) Advaita (Pure Idealistic Monism) School of Śaṅkara and his followers; (2) Viśiṣṭadvaita (Qualified Non-dualism) of Rāmānuja and

his followers; (3) Dvaita (Dualism) of Mādhva and (4) Dvaita-dvaita of Bhāskara and Nimbārka, their respective epistemology and metaphysics has modified the very nature of psychological principles. The divergent interpretations of Sūtras are mostly limited in scope to the problem of relation between Brahman, Ātman and the Universe. To facilitate arrangement of presentation of all the divergent psychological principles, Advaita psychology, incorporating the common portion of Vedāntic psychology, and the special contribution of Śankara and his followers is presented in the present chapter, followed by psychology in Viśiṣṭadvaita and in the other two Schools in the next chapter. The next chapter will, therefore, be confined to the points of contrast only, and the common principles of Vedantic Psychology, explained in the first chapter will not be repeated.

B. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO ADVAITA PHILOSOPHY

This philosophy is a powerful affirmation of the absolute entity as sole existence, to be realised by personal experience as a direct and total merging in the Absolute. It teaches absolute monism, as it declares Brahman the only essence of existence. It speaks of one Ātman or Brahman or Self who exists in the past, present and future, who has no beginning, middle or end, who is the support for everything, and who is Existence, Consciousness and Bliss.

It proclaims that the individual self is identical with the Supreme Self or the Absolute, in the sense that a wave is of identically the same water as the sea, or that the reflection of the sun in a water-pot is not different from the sun, or that the ether in the pot is identical with the ether outside.

It explains that the mundane universe is merely an appearance (vivarta) and not a transformation (pariṇāma) or evolution (ārambha). Its existence owes to the thought-wave of the universal. Mind pictures this universe through divine creative power and thus veils His Real Being from the beings enclosed in that Universe. 'The matter is a whirling vortex of thought powers moulded into ever-changing shapes by the breezes of imagination.' The appearance of the world of name and form is the product of the cosmic illusion, Māyā, or Nescience, which is inexplicable (anirvacanīya) and cannot be explained by

words. All the same, the veil of *Māyā* exists, and it bewilders the individual soul, who superimposes the non-self, the outer objects with all their characteristics upon the real self.

Impelled by ignorance (*avidyā*) the individual lives in a mind-born world, forgets his real nature (his identity with the Absolute), plunges into false egoism (as a separate individual enjoying the dream-objects of worldly life), seeks the false pleasure of the worldly life and entraps himself in the wheel of *samsāra* (*sansāra-cakra*).

The gross and subtle body enveloping the Self, is born of nescience or ignorance (*avidyā*). It no longer exists in the sleep state, when the Self enjoys a reflection of the pure bliss. The gross body perishes at death, but the subtle body continues to envelop the Self in different incarnations, as long as the Self is not awake through realisation of its identity with the Absolute. The separate self is the 'pathetic fallacy, and it is only the false assumption of its non-identity that the illusory desparate universe is architected. The Self can be free by ceasing to identify himself with the bodies he has so long falsely imagined his own, and realising himself to be really the cosmic Self that uses all existent bodies, and so to be immortal and universal. In the state of freedom he attains the eternally blissful experience of identity free from ego, desire, and experience (pleasant and unpleasant), and living wholly without relationship to objects and events in this shadow-world, being merged wholly in the absolute, Brahman.

The method of attaining the above State is the direct and ecstatic intuitive experience of the self as the Universal Self or God, and then living wholly thus merged in the Divine. This involves the loss of all ego-sense, the cessation of Planning and desiring sense-objects. Divine grace and precepts of the Guru are further aids in this direction. Righteous actions, control of mind, discrimination between right and wrong, detachment from the worldly life and desire for freedom are the pre-requisites of attaining Self-realisation.

Advaita preaches selfless action, action without personal motive, eradication of worldly desires, detachment from pleasures of life, discrimination of the real from the unreal, beholding one self in all and rising above the narrow personal life. It

emphasises contemplation on the 'Self' as the highest devotion (sādhana).

Advaita makes a special contribution to the following problems, which have bearing on psychology:

(1) The Nature of Reality; (2) The Creation of the Universe; (3) The Doctrine of Māyā; (4) Ethics and Mokṣa. Before taking up Psychology proper, a brief summary of these theories are presented below.

C. ADVAITA METAPHYSICS

1. Nature of Reality

We saw that Sāṃkhya traced all the manifold mundane phenomena to Pradhāna activated by Puruṣa, arriving at an irreconcilable dualism as between Pradhāna and Puruṣa, and a plurality of the Puruṣas. It was a departure from the synthetic approach of the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads declared in a synthetic and monistic approach that the ultimate reality is Brahman which is identical with the individual Self (Ātman). There is macrocosm in the microcosm. The sun in the sky is the sun in the Puruṣa.¹ Uddalaka tells Svetaketu "You art that." Ātman-cum-Brahman alone is real. It is Sat, and the universe sprang from the same. The ultimate reality is Existence (Sat), Consciousness (Cit) and Bliss (Ānanda). Advaita Vedānta concentrates on the same Upaniṣadic doctrine and elaborates it further in order to reply to counter arguments of the other schools of philosophy.

Reality is Existence (Sat). Of the real there is no non-existence, and of the unreal no existence.² Existence implies constancy, and as the world lacks constancy, it is unreal. The beings are unmanifest in the beginning, manifest in the middle and unmanifest again at the end.³ Whatever exists throughout is the substrate Brahman, while the objects of the world are unreal or lacking persistent reality.⁴ The Sat has no other thing which is similar or dissimilar to it, and it has no internal differentiations, 'Sat' alone existed in the begin-

¹TU, II, 8, 1; III, 10, 4.

²BG, II, 16.

³BG, II, 28.

⁴VPS, p. 200; MU, Vi, 12-13.

ning,¹ said Upaniṣadic seers. Hence the world of name and form, were non-existent prior to creation, and cannot be reality. Nor is the world a part of Brahman. The real is devoid of parts, and has no modifications.² Plurality also cannot be admitted in the concept of Sat. So There is none akin to the Sat. Real existence is one without a second, having no properties and no genus. It is not related to anything else.³ Hence the objective world has Brahman as its substrate, and Brahman alone is real. Even from the subjective point of view, the wakeful state, the dream, the sleep state are not real, as each one of the states is sublated by the successive Self, pure consciousness alone persists and exists.

Upaniṣads again declared, 'Brahman is intelligence (prajñāna),⁴ Ātman is 'Self-luminous (svayaṁ jyotiḥ)';⁵ 'Self alone is its light';⁶ 'who can cognise that by which everything is cognised' etc. Advaita elaborates the same. Reality is self-luminous, illuminating all other things without depending on any external aid.⁷ It knows all but is not apprehended by any means of knowledge.⁸ Caitanya is not an attribute of Brahman, but is Brahman itself. In fact Brahman is above all attributes.

Reality is also Bliss. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* had declared that in emphatic terms (Ānandam Brahmano vidvān).⁹ All the universal objects sprang from Bliss, subsist on it and merge in it subsequently.¹⁰ Advaita propounds the same, 'That which is the nature of the impartite essence is Ānanda; of that all other beings enjoy but a fraction.' The pleasure derived from the worldly objects is but a fraction of the divine bliss,¹¹ just a reflection of that. The divine bliss is reflected in the pure psychosis—the noble fluctuations of mind (śānta vṛtti), which

¹PD, II, 20-21.

²PD, II, 22-23.

³Ibid, 24.

⁴Ibid, 25.

⁵AU, III, 3.

⁶BU, IV, B, 9 & 14.

⁷Ibid, 3, 6.

⁸DDV, 5.

⁹PD, III, 18.

¹⁰T. Up., Brahmānandavallī, Anuvāka, 4, 9.

¹¹Ibid, 6.

¹²PD, XV, 1.

are characterised by the *sattva* quality. The reflection is dull and disturbed in virile and dull psychoses (*ghora* and *mūḍha vṛtti*),¹ in which bliss is veiled and only consciousness is reflected.² In inert objects only the *Sat* is reflected; in impure psychosis only the *Sat* and *Cit* are reflected, but in pure psychosis, all the three *Sat*, *Cit* and *Ānand* are reflected.³ The blissful nature of Reality is also inferred by Scripture from the nature of deep sleep. In deep sleep, the wounded becomes one who is not wounded *etc.*⁴ The non-existence of all misery and suffering, and the manifestation of happiness in sleep is due to the fact that *Jīva* in sleep experiences its identity with *Brahman* which is of the nature of bliss. The *Jīva* loses its *Jīva*-hood, and *Brahman* alone remains. And when it wakes from sleep, he says, 'I had a sweet sleep'.

Therefore reality is *Brahman* and nothing else. All this universe is *Brahman*.⁵ Not even a speech is otherwise than God.⁶ The universe is ignorantly seen as manifold, otherwise it is *Brahman*.⁷ *Brahman* alone is the reality. It is Pure Existence, Pure Consciousness and Pure Bliss.⁸ Omniscience, supreme rulership, absolute freedom are His attributes. He is causality of all, creator of all and inner and outer controller (*sūtradhāra*). Creation, preservation, destruction, veiling the reality (*tirodhāna*) and blessing (*anugraha*) are His five actions (*pañca-kriā*). He is without the three limitations of time, place and substance. His nature is ineffable (*anirūpya*) and beyond mind and speech. In Him there is no variety.⁹ The Supreme Oneness is real. Nothing is beyond Him.¹⁰ By Him is all space pervaded, while He is pervaded by nothing.¹¹ Having seen Him nothing else is to be seen.¹²

¹*Ibid*, 3, 4 & 5.

²*PD*, XIII, 73-79.

³*PD*, XV, 20-21.

⁴*CU*, VIII, 4, 2.

⁵*Yogaśikhopaniṣad*, IV, 3-4.

⁶*VC*, 230.

⁷*Ibid*, 227.

⁸*YY*, 29, 18.

⁹*VC*, 469.

¹⁰*Ibid*, 226.

¹¹*AG*, II, 14.

¹²*AB*, 55.

2. Need for an Intelligent Principle as the Creator of the World

Vedānta refutes the materialistic view that dead matter is the origin of the universe. The Sāṃkhya propounded a materialistic doctrine that Pradhāna (which is un sentient) is the cause of the world. It puts forth the following arguments:

(1) As vessels made of clay have clay alone as their cause, even so the external and internal world of effects have for its cause which possesses these characteristics. (2) The activity in the Pradhāna is due to the disturbance of the balance of guṇas. (3) The activity is spontaneous like the flow of milk from the calf.¹

Śankara refutes all these arguments boldly, and the arguments can be put forward against the materialistic doctrines of the Western philosophy also. A non-conscious like stone cannot serve any purpose unless it is guided by an intelligent being. 'How can this world with its wonderful variety and arrangement be created by an unconscious principle?' Vessels are made out of clay only if a potter is there.²

Again the original disturbances of the three guṇas from the condition of equipoise which is essential for creative manifestation is not possible due to the unintelligent Pradhāna. Clay does not change into pots without the help of a potter.³ There is a difference between an animate object and an inanimate object. An inanimate object cannot act and think. It is wrong to postulate that intelligence is a mere attribute of the body. Intelligence exists only in a living body, and not in a dead corps. It is the pure consciousness alone that can move a body. The spontaneous activity of flowing of milk from a cow is not an activity without consciousness. Its very basis is the intelligent cow loving her calf, that makes the milk flow and the flow is aided by the sucking of the calf.⁴ No dead cow can give milk. What stimulates Pradhāna to turn into activity? If the works of souls instigate Pradhāna, then these works, are the cause of the world and not Pradhāna.⁵ The theory of the conjunction

¹SK, 15.

²SB, II, 2, 1.

³BS, 2, 2.

⁴Ibid, 2-3.

⁵Śrinivasa on BS, II, 2, 4.

of Puruṣa and Pradhāna is not logical and convincing. The metaphors used by Sāṃkhya, like 'the lame and blind', 'the iron and magnet' are also vague and meaningless. In the case of lame and blind, both are sentient beings, and therefore they guide each other. This metaphor can be applicable only when we talk of the two sentient beings. But Pradhāna is not sentient. The proximity of iron and magnet also depends upon some sentient being who brings these together.¹

The binary principle of Puruṣa and Pradhāna does not explain the working of the universe. *If Sāṃkhya postulated one more principle, i.e. Brahman, over and above the two, most of the objections to the system would vanish.* One universal consciousness would be the source of the non-conscious Prakṛiti and sentient Puruṣa. The object and subject would coincide in Brahman. Hence we arrive at the theory that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. Vedānta cosmology is therefore cosmology of Sāṃkhya plus Brahman.

Brahman according to Vedānta is both the material cause (upādāna kāraṇa) and the efficient cause (nimitta kāraṇa) of the universe. A number of metaphors and parables are employed to explain this phenomenon. The spider spins his web from his own material.² The universe emanates from him like the sparks from a blazing fire.³ The universe remains rolled up in Him like screen.⁴ Nyāya follows Ārambhavāda and declares Lord is only the efficient cause, because the effect is different from the cause. The effect does not exist in the cause before origination. Sāṃkhya holds that that effect exists in the cause, and so the universe is 'pariṇāma' of Pradhāna. Vedānta agrees with Sāṃkhya that effect exists in the cause, but disagrees in holding Pradhāna responsible for the creation of the universe, as it is insentient. It is only the intelligent Brahman that is the material and efficient cause.⁵ Advaita Vedānta goes one step further in declaring that in fact the universe is only an appearance, a phenomenon

¹SB, II, 2-7.

²MUI, 1, 7.

³Ibid, VI, 1-2.

⁴YV, 14, 1-2.

⁵VS, 55.

and is not real.¹ It is the 'Vivarta', a phenomenal change only. According to Advaita Vivartavāda, Brahman is true and the universe is false (Brahma satyam jaganmithyā).

3. Cosmic Evolution

So far as the order of Cosmic evolution is concerned, Advaita accepts the order as outlined in Sāṃkhya, but also makes fundamental modification in the nature of evolution. Firstly, it propounds an additional category Brahman that is the essence of all, over and above Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Brahman is the efficient and the material cause, Secondly, it mentions two conditions of Brahman in His transcendental aspect. Its passive condition is 'non-being' (asat) wherein the universe of name-form-causality is submerged in it. In its active condition called 'being' (sat), it exists as Pure Consciousness supporting the Universe of name-form-causality. Thirdly, in the 'Being' form, there are two grades viz. (1) the Ultimate Transcendental, Pure Spirit, without attributes called Nirguṇa Brahman, and (2) the lower grade called Saguṇa Brahman or Īśvara, the creator and governor of the universe, with attributes of omniscience and omnipotence. Fourthly, it brings in Māyā, as the special power of Īśvara as the auxilliary cause (Sahakāri kāraṇa) for the creation of the universe. The cause that changes into the world is Māyā, while that which is the basis of the world is Īśvara, the pure consciousness limited by Māyā. Hence the universe is Īśvara plus Māyā.

From the Advaitic point of view, therefore, the universe has no real existence, but an off-shoot of Māyā. It is Māyā that is the finalising principle, that creates forms in the formless, projects the unreal and conceals the real.² Hence Prakṛti (of Sāṃkhya) is nothing but Māyā (of Advaita),³ a mere appearance of fleeting forms, an illusory appearance, which appears to be real only as long as the veil of ignorance (avidyā) is not lifted. The visible universe does not really exist;⁴ it is an appearance only,⁵ an enduring dream,⁶ or a projection of the wakeful

¹PD, VI, 186.

²VSS, 51.

³SB, II, 1, 14.

⁴YV, 37, 69.75.

⁵YV, 17-29.

⁶Ibid, 6, 207.

mind like in a dream.¹ It has empirical existence (vyāvahārika sattā) but not ultimate existence (pārmārthika sattā), as it is sublated by true knowledge.² The whole phenomenon of plurality, the subject-object relation exist till Avidyā (the counter-part of Māyā in the individual soul) lasts. It follows that from the Advaitic point of view the psychology or the science of mind itself has only a relative importance, as mind itself has a relative existence (at the vyāvahārika level only). Cognition, perception etc. are nothing but aspects of Adhyāsa. All these vanish when true knowledge dawns.

The order of cosmic evolution according to Advaita, therefore, is Brahman, Īśvara, Māyā, Universe. It is explained in *Paingala Upaniṣad*:

"Like water in desert, silver in nacre, a man in past, and rays of light in a crystal, so in God there came to be the Root of Nature, with three Guṇas. What was reflected in them was the witness Consciousness (Sākṣī Caitanya), then it underwent a further change, became veiling power called Unmanifested (avyakta). What was reflected in that was Īśvara Caitanya who had Māyā under control. He is the creator, maintainer, and absorber. He next became the world seedling."³

Next proceeded Hiraṇyagarbha (the cosmic mind), and lastly Virāṭ (the physical universe).

D. ADHYĀSA AND AVIDYĀ

1. *Adhyāsa*

Adhyāsa (super-imposition) is a psychological phenomenon. It is defined as the appearance of a thing where it is not (atasmimstadbuddhiḥ),⁴ such as nacre appearing as silver, rope appearing as a snake, non-self appearing as self and object appearing as subject. It is this Adhyāsa that is responsible for the confusion between the empirical existence of the universe and the transcendental reality. It is beginningless, endless, natural and possessed of the form of wrong knowledge.⁵

2. *Avidyā*

Padmapāda the first disciple of Śāṅkara defines Avidyā thus: "That which is variously described in Śruti, Smṛti, Itihāsa and Purāṇa

¹VC, 170-171.

²SB, III, 2, 4.

³Paingala Up, 3-4.

⁴SB, Introduction.

⁵Ibid.

in different contexts as name and form (nāmarūpa) undifferentiated (avyākṛta), māyā, prakṛti, agrahāna, unmanifested (avyakta), tamas, kāraṇa, laya, laya, śakti, mahāṣuṭi, nidrā, ākṣara ākāśa; that which having prevented pure consciousness (caitanya) from manifesting itself as of the nature of Brahman which is its essential characteristic, brings about its individuation (jivatva); that which serves as the wall on which are picture-illusions, action and residual impressions of past cognitions; that which exists in deep slumber enveloping (āvarana) the light (of ātman) and remaining only as mental trace of the world-projection (vikṣepa)—that is the beginningless Avidyā (anādiravidyā).¹

The psychological principle of Avidyā, is at the root of all psychic functioning. It is responsible for the differentiation of name and form in the universe, recognition of the existence of the universe (which in fact does not exist), superimposition of object on subject (though at the transcendental level there is no subject-object differentiation) super-imposition of the non-self on the Self, the mistaken notion of the Self as the enjoyer, the experiencer and the doer (kartā ca bhoktā) (although the Pure Self is devoid of any such attribute), the mistaken notion of the physical body and mind as the constituents of the Self (whileas these are only limiting adjuncts and do not constitute the essence at all). While Māyā works at the cosmic level, its counterpart Avidyā works at the individual level.

Regarding the mistaking of the Self for the non-Self Vedāntins use a number of metaphors. A post is taken for a thief. A mirage is taken for water. A whirling fire-brand appears to be a circle. A passenger in boat sees the objects on the bank moving. The moon seems to be flying past when really the clouds are streaming by. One misses glass for water, and water for glass. One takes nacre for shell. All these are illustrations of illusions that we fall victim to, not less often.² In the same manner, the non-self is taken for the self and the universe is taken for the Ultimate Reality. Avidyā is at the root of all this illusion.

Avidyā has a positive character also. It is definitely a defect in the consciousness, for it causes superimposition (adhyāsa), error (khyāti) and works as a limiting adjunct (upādhi) of the Self. But itself it exists, and exists eternally and naturally.

¹PPP, XXVI, 95, translated into English by D. Venkataramiah, p. 66.

²Aparokṣasanubhūti by Śankara, 82, 87-8.

And inspite of the defect in the consciousness, it forms the material cause, the lower stage for the cognition of Brahman. It leads to Vidyā, when the curtain of Avidyā is torn asunder. It is like dirt on crystal, scum on water, coloured painting on the canvas (hiding the actual substratum canvas).¹ Avidyā partitions Superconsciousness from the Conscious and the subconscious state. From the Advaitic point of view, Superconscious State is the Real State, the normal state, whileas the empirical Conscious State is the sub-normal state. Freud supposed Censor between the subconscious and the conscious mind. Advaita supposes Avidyā as the Censor between the Conscious State and Superconscious State, as it suppresses true knowledge.

E. HUMAN PERSONALITY

1. *Self as the Essence*

Advaita refutes (1) the materialistic view that body is personality, (2) the vitalism that living unity (Prāṇa) is the personality, (3) sensationalism that personality is the cluster of sense-impressions (Manas), (4) the rationalism that intellect (which is higher than matter, life and sense-perception) is the personality, and asserts that none of these constitute the personality. The essence of personality is something beyond body, life, mind and intellect. It is the Self. The attributes of the Self are (1) Consciousness, (2) Continuity in consciousness; and (3) association with all the activities as the knower and the enjoyer. The Self exists before, in and after the various states of consciousness, wakeful, dream and sleep. We are aware of ourselves as the subject of experience. Denial of consciousness means denial of everything else. Hence Mind and Self are not identical. The Self is the knower (kṣetrajña), the seer (dṛṣṭā), the witness (sākṣī), the immutable (kūṭastha) and pure consciousness (cit). It is related with the body and mind, the non-self or the acit. The composite whole of cit and acit, kṣetrajña and kṣetra, the doer (kartā) and its instrument (kāraṇa) is the total personality called Jīva—the embodied self.

The constituents of Jīva are (1) the Self, Kūṭastha, Sākṣī, Ātman, (2) Avidyā, enveloping the Self, (3) Cidābhāsa, the

reflection of Kūṭastha in the Ego, (4) Kāraṇa-śarīra (the causal body), (5) Linga Śarīra constituting of vital airs, Manas, Ego and Intellect, (6) gross physical body.

2. Jīva Defined

"And that Jīva—of the nature of 'not this', conditioned as ego in the waking and dream state, and conditioned in sleep by avidyā which has within it trace of the impressions (that the inner sense has left behind), which is the opposition of Jñāna and which obstructs the light (of Ātma)—keeps going forwards and backwards and as such is termed in Śruti, Smṛti in common parlance as Saṁsārī (the worldly person), Jīva, vijñāna-gaṇa, vijñānātmā, prajñā, śarīrī, śarīrah, ātmā, saṁprasādhah, puruṣa, pratyagātmā, kartā, bhoktā, and Kṣetrajñā."¹

On account of being conscious that it is an agent and enjoyer and that it is happy or miserable etc. is called the phenomenal Jīva (the individual self) subject to transmigration and the other worlds.² It is the Kūṭastha reflected in Buddhi.³ It works as the experiences by the identification of the bodies (physical, mental and causal) with consciousness.⁴ It is thus a composite of Kūṭastha, Linga-śarīra and Cidābhāsa.⁵ Jīva is dressed in the garb of prakṛti and when the ignorance is removed, its true nature is revealed. Jīva is the embodied soul, and is subject to transmigration due to the nescience. At the cessation of nescience it realises its true nature and becomes Self Absolute. The difference between Jīva and Ātman is not real, as it continues so long as true knowledge does not arise.⁶ In the condition of ignorance, Ātman or Brahman which is object of enquiry or search is different from the Jīva. The Jīva is a creature and not the creator. Ātman is something higher than the Jīva on account of this difference.⁷

3. The Witness Self (Sākṣī)

Advaitin holds, after Upaniṣads, that the self is non-different from taintless Brahman which is of the nature of Existence,

¹PP, XXXIV 135, p. 100-101.

²BS, II, 3, 10-20, 30-50; III, 2-5-10; VS, 73.

³PD, VII, 5.

⁴PD, XIV, 6.

⁵PD, IV, 11; VI, 23.

⁶BS, II, 3-30.

⁷BS, II, 1, 22 (adhikam tu Bhedanirdeśāt); BU, II, 4, 5; IV, 3, 35; V, 8, 1; CU, VIII, 7, 1.

Consciousness and Bliss. This inner self is self-luminous. It partakes of the consciousness of Brahman. In fact it is pure Consciousness, which illuminates the whole human personality—body and mind.¹ In the waking state the senses and mind works. In the dream state, mind alone is active. In the sleep-state even the mind dissolves. What remains is the 'Self', the witness-consciousness. It is this witness-self, that reports to us at the end of the sleep and we say 'I had a sound sleep'. Even in the absence of the working of the mind the pure consciousness, the witness-self did persist. Its relation with Brahman is explained in a number of ways. According to the theory of reflection (*ābhāsavāda*),² this witness self is a reflection of cosmic consciousness—Brahman. As the sun is reflected in innumerable water-pots and shines there separately, so the cosmic consciousness shines as an individual reflection in each personality. According to another theory (*avachchedavāda*), as the ether in a pot is the same as the cosmic ether, only bound by the limitations of the pot, so the individual consciousness is the same as the cosmic consciousness, and is simply bound by the individual personality.³ The Witness-Self is also named as *Kuṭastha* in Advaita literature.

Vidyāraṇya defines it the immutable, unchanging, eternal and flawless consciousness. It is the substrate of the gross and the subtle body.⁴ It is called witness-consciousness (*Sākṣī caitanya*) because it directly superintends the two bodies. It is free from any attachment, any mutation.⁵ It illumines both the ego (the agent of knowing) and the object of knowing.⁶ It may be compared to the lamp set on a dramatic stage. A lamp lights the stage, the actors, and even the manager. So does the *Kuṭastha* illumine the body, the senses and the ego (*ahamkāra*). The analogy is like this. *Ahamkāra* is the stage-manager, the objects are the audience, *buddhi* is the dancer, senses are the musical instruments and *Kuṭastha* is the lamp illumining all.⁷

¹US, II, 16, 5; II, 15, 26.

²PD, VIII, 22-26 ; US, II, 14-33, US, II, 18-109.

³SB, II, 3, 17.

⁴PD, VI, 22.

⁵PD, VIII, 70-71.

⁶Ibid, X, 9.

⁷Ibid, 14.

Just as the lamp on the stage illumines without moving and without being affected by the movements of the actors and the audience, even so the witness which is permanent and unchanging manifests all things both within and without.¹ It is immutable like anvil.² It is the true nature of the individual. It is not directly responsible for cognition. It illumines buddhi which cognises. Citsukha distinguishes between the seer (draṣṭṛ) from the Cogniser (pramāṭṛ). Kūṭastha is the seer, and buddhi is the cogniser.³

It is the ego that is the agent of all the worldly activities. The pure Self is the witness of the same, and distinct from the ego (the agent), the mind (instrument) and the object.⁴

The Pure Self is neither the agent, nor the doer. It does not change. The modifications belong to the ego and mind. It is only because these modifications are superimposed upon the Self, that it appears to be changing. All impurities and changes in the Self are appearances due to its connection with the modifications of the ego. Consciousness differs according to different modifications of the mind superimposed on it like the jewel which differs in colour owing to the proximity of coloured things.⁵

The wrong knowledge that one is happy or unhappy due to one's identification with the body *etc.*, like the pleasure or sorrow due to the possession or loss of an earning, is surely negated by the right knowledge that one is Pure Consciousness.⁶

The Self is beyond the five sheaths, beyond the three states of consciousness, the substrate of everything else.⁷ It pervades everything, and is beyond change, birth or death.⁸ It is beyond cause and effect, beyond thought and logical proof.⁹ It illumines all objects, and is not illumined by anything.¹⁰ It is all bliss.¹¹

¹*Ibid*, 16.

²*Ibid*, VI, 22.

³*Tattva-Prādīpika*, p. 373.

⁴*US*, II, 18, 120.

⁵*Ibid*, 18, 122.

⁶*US*, II, 18, 161-162.

⁷*VC*, 127, 149-151.

⁸*Ibid*, 128-138.

⁹*Ibid*, 410.

¹⁰*US*, II, 7, 4.

¹¹*VC*, 105, 142.

Śankara discusses at length the reasons why body and mind must be distinguished from the Self, why the apparent mental functioning must be distinguished from Pure Consciousness that is the basis of all. He says, if consciousness were a quality of the body, it could not cognise the body. It is contradictory. Fire does not burn itself. Consciousness must be attribute of a cognising Self that cognises the body. The cognition is expressed like 'I saw this', 'Who is this I?' Hence the cogniser is the self apart from the body. Body is sometimes used by it as a necessary auxiliary.¹ Similarly Self is different from the mind. The soul is the agent and not the mind.²

"Just as light assumes, the form of objects revealed by it but is really different from, though apparently mixed up with them, so the Self is different from the mental modifications whose forms it assumes through its reflection while revealing them."³

The Self seems to be moving when the intellect moves and it seems to be at rest when it is at rest on account of its identification (through ignorance with the intellect, like trees appearing to move in the eyes of those who are in a moving boat. Similar is the misconception about transmigratory existence.⁴

Therefore Self of which the whole of the object portion is the qualification is different from it. Bereft of all qualifications it has an independent existence like that of a man possessing a variegated cow.⁵

Though the Self is intelligent, mind is needed for its experience. Had mind been not necessary, then there would result either constant perception or constant non-perception, or else the limitations of power of either of the two (of the soul or the senses).⁶

Ātman is non-different from Brahman. The individual soul is the same as the Supreme Soul, as if a part of that.⁷ Actually there is no difference. The difference is due to Avidyā only.

¹SB, II, 3, 53-54.

²BS, II, 3, 33-39.

³US, II, 16, 5.

⁴US, II, 5, 2.

⁵Ibid, VI, 5.

⁶BS, II, 3, 32.

⁷SB, II, 3, 43. (Śankara adds the phrase 'as if' to make the interpretation of sūtra consistent with the doctrine of pure non-difference.)

Hence the agency and intelligence of Ātman is the same as that of Brahman.¹

4. Cidābhāsa

According to Ābhāsavāda of Advaita, the Self, Kūṭastha, which has its adjuncts the intellect and the vital forces is reflected in the modifications of the intellect and in the senses, like the sun reflected in water. But the Self is free and pure by nature.² The reflection may change with the movement of water. But the sun does not. Pure Self is immutable.

The intellect itself is non-conscious, but it appears to be conscious like the black iron that appears to be red when charged with fire.³ It is illumined by the reflection of the Self, without which it has no power of revealing things. As the torch and other things appear to be possessed of the power of burning, so the modifications of the intellect illumined by the reflection of the Self, appear to be endowed with the power of perception.⁴

The reflection of the Self in the intellect and ego is called Cidābhāsa. Cidābhāsa is different from the Self as the reflection of a face in the mirror is different from the face. The reflection may not be clear due to dirty water, but that does not affect the face. So whatever be the purity of Cidābhāsa, the Self is pure. In vain do we look upon the Cidābhāsa as the Self, just we erroneously look upon our body placed in the sun as having the property of light in it.⁵

People mistake the combination of the subtle and the gross bodies for the Self. The mistake is due to identification caused by its reflection. Pure Consciousness is reflected in the body (physical and mental), which appears to be conscious, though it is not conscious by nature. The non-conscious body must be discriminated from the Pure Consciousness—the Self. The mental and physical modifications belong to the body and not the pure Self, which is only the witness. The Self is free from

¹BS, II, 3, 41.

²US, II, 14, 33.

³Ibid, 18, 86.

⁴US, II, 18, 71.

⁵Ibid, 12, 1.

the modification like 'I am happy', 'I am miserable'. It is not the doer or agent, nor the sufferer or enjoyer.

The conditions of the mind and intellect produced by actions are illumined by Pure Consciousness like jars and other things by sun. (U.S.II.XV.26).

5. *Adjuncts of the Self*

One way of describing the human personality is in terms of the Self (the essence, the core, the real) and its adjuncts. In Sāṃkhya-yoga, Puruṣa (the Self) has two adjuncts viz. the subtle body (Linga-śarīra) and the physical body (Sthūla-śarīra). Vedānta adds one more viz. Kāraṇa Śarīra. Hence the order of the element is—the Self (Kūṭastha or Sākṣī), the Kāraṇa Śarīra, the Linga Śarīra and the Sthūla Śarīra. Kāraṇa Śarīra corresponds to the Ānandamaya Kośa, and Suṣupti (the deep sleep state of consciousness). It is the causal body, the radical adjunct of the Self (Sākṣin plus Avidyā). It is the individuality due to the union of Sākṣin with Avidyā, but not with Antaḥkaraṇa. The Linga Śarīra corresponds to the Vijñānamaya, Manomaya and Prāṇamaya Kośa and dream-consciousness. Its major factor is Antaḥkaraṇa or Mind. The Sthūla Śarīra corresponds to the Annamaya Kośa and the wakeful state of consciousness.

Associated with the three states of consciousness viz. the wakeful, the dream and the sleep, the Self is designated as Viśva (in the wakeful), Taijasa (in the dream) and Prājña (in the sleep state). Viśva is the Self engrossed in the mundane affairs in the wakeful state, over-powered by Avidyā. Manifested (in the abode of the mind in dream and witnessing the impressions produced by actions due to ignorance, the Self is called Taijasa. It is then the self-effulgent witness.¹

In deep sleep when neither objects nor their impressions are produced in the intellect by actions, the Self, cognizant neither of objects nor of their impressions is known to be Prājña.²

At the cosmic level the various expressions of reality are Virāṭ, Hiraṇyagarbha and Īśvara. Virāṭ is the sum-total of all the physical bodies. Hiraṇyagarbha is the aggregate of the

¹US, II, XV, 26; VSS, 91-96.

²Ibid, 25; VS, 91-96.

subtle-bodies, corresponding to the individual consciousness-Taijasa. Īśvara corresponds to Prājña.¹

6. Relation between the Individual and the Cosmos

Advaita explains the relation between the individual and the total (vyaṣṭi and samaṣṭi). Virāṭ is the sum-total (samaṣṭi) of all the individual gross bodies. Similarly the sum total of all the subtle bodies, when looked upon as one like a forest or a reservoir, is called samaṣṭi or aggregate, and is named as Hiraṇyagarbha. The individual subtle body is the vyaṣṭi.² In this way our individual minds are part of the universal mind. We are basically connected with one another. Just as our individualised souls are in a way, part of the cosmic soul, so are our minds. Swami Vivekananda explains this point:

"There is a continuity of mind, as the yogis call it. The mind is universal. Your mind, my mind, and all these little minds, are fragments of that universal mind, little waves in the ocean, and on account of this continuity, we can convey our thoughts directly to one another."³

7. Five Sheaths

Another way of describing the human personality is through the five sheaths (Panca Koṣas). The fivefold sheath of the Self were explained in *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. Advaita discusses the same in detail.⁴ The five sheaths are : (1) physical (annamaya); (2) vital (Prāṇamaya); (3) mental (manomaya); (4) intellectual (vijñānamaya), and (5) blissful (ānandamaya).

8. The Causal Body

Causal body is the unmanifested (Avyakta) which subsists after the gross physical body and the subtle body are disassociated from the Kūṭastha. and when all the psychosis of Mind are dissolved. But Avidyā still persists, and its state of consciousness is deep sleep.⁵ All empirical knowledge it dissolves, and the experiencer experiences absence of knowledge.⁶

¹VSS, III, 115.

²VSS, 90.

³Vivekanand, Swami, *Complete Works*, Vol. II, 13.

⁴VC, 156-213; VS, 50, 67, PD, I. 33, III. 1-11.

⁵VC, 122.

⁶VC, 123.

9. *The Subtle Body*

The description of Linga-śarīra is the same as given in Sāṃkhya, except that it includes five Prāṇas also. Its composition therefore is Cidābhās (the reflection of the Self in Ahaṃkāra), Citta, the Buddhi, the Manas, the ten senses and the five Prāṇas (in all nineteen).¹ The Prāṇas correspond to the Prāṇamaya Koṣa, the senses and Manas to the Manomaya Koṣa, the Buddhi and Citta to the Vijñānamaya Koṣa, and Ahaṃkāra to the Ānandamaya Koṣa.

The subtle body arises from the unquintuplicated elements, and this makes possible its going to another world, and subsist till release.² It exists in the sleeping person also in the form of residual impressions (saṃskāras), but for the dead it exists in the other world.³ Eight more components are added in *Viveka-Cūdāmaṇi*, and these are five elements, ignorance, desire and action.

The Linga Śarīra is of two kinds—the individual and the cosmic, called 'aparaṃ' and 'paraṃ' respectively. The cosmic Linga is the sum total of all the individual Lingas, and is the same thing as Hiranyagarbha, or Mahat Tattva.⁴

10. *Vedāntic View of Mind*

By the mind, Vedānta means Antaḥkaraṇa composed of buddhi, ahaṃkāra, citta and manas, whose respective functions are decision (niścaya), conceit (garva) ; recollection (smaraṇa) and perception. Antaḥkaraṇa is inert (jaḍa) in itself, but it manifests pure intelligence (caitanya) and is therefore intelligent in a secondary sense) jñānatvopacāra). It becomes intelligent by the Self's relation to or reflection in it. Ātman is neither mind nor matter, but the ground of both mental and material phenomena. Mind and matter are not two opposed substances, but

¹VP, VIII, 30; PDI, 23; VS, 61 (only seventeen counted because Citta and Ego are included in Manas and Buddhi respectively).

²VP, VIII, 33.

³VP, VIII, 41.

⁴Ibid, 32.

Diagram 8

VEDĀNTIC VIEW OF PERSONALITY

INDIVIDUAL LEVEL VYAṢṬI					COSMIC LEVEL SAMAṢṬI
Factors of Personality	Koṣa	Type of Śarīra	State of Conscious- ness	Designa- tion of the SELF	
Pure Se Kūṣastha Sākṣi	Ānanda- maya Koṣa	Kāraṇa- Śarīra	Sleep State	Prājña	Īśvara
Buddhi } Citta }	Vijñāna- Maya Koṣa	Linga Śarīra	Dream State	Taijasa	Hiraṇya- garbha Sūtrātmā
Ahaṁkāra }	Mano- maya Koṣa				
Manas }					
The Five Organs of Senses }					
The Five Organs of Action }					
The Five Prāṇas }					
Gross Physical Body	Anna- maya Koṣa	Sthūla- Śarīra	Wakeful State	Viśva	Virāṭ

different grades of the same material substratum. Mind is the subtler form of matter. Its consciousness is due to the Ātman only.

Sāṁkhya-yoga counted only three aspects of Mind viz. Manas (along with the ten senses), Ahaṁkāra and Buddhi. Sāṁkhya named it Antaḥkāraṇa, Yoga named it Citta and Nyāya named it Manas (Buddhi etc. including in the same). Vedānta-

calls it *Antaḥkaraṇa*, but enumerates distinctly the four aspects viz. *Buddhi*, *Manas*, *Citta* and *Ahaṁkāra*.

Buddhi is that modification (*vṛtti*) of the *Antaḥkaraṇa* which determines.¹

The Mind considers the pros and cons of a subject (*Saṅkalpa* and *Vikalpa*).²

Citta remembers and *Ahaṁkāra* is characterised by self-consciousness.³

Advaita uses the word 'modification' (*vṛtti*) with a special purpose. When an organ perceives an object the mind transforms itself into the object. When a pot is seen, the mind projects through the eye and takes the form of a pot. When the *Antaḥkaraṇa* cannot determine whether it is pot, but only perceives something, it is known as *Manas*. When it becomes sure about it, it is *Buddhi*. When it remembers as object, it is *Citta*. When it establishes relationship of 'I' and 'mine', it is known as *Ahaṁkāra*.

11. *Manas* Defined

The *Manas* is that modification of the internal instrument which considers the pros and cons of a subject (*sankalpa* and *vikalpa*).⁴ Along with the organs of perception, it constitutes the mental sheath (*manomaya Koṣa*).⁵ It co-ordinates the function of other senses. By nature it is fickle, and it is difficult to control the same.⁶ It has two-fold psychosis—(1) having external direction (*bahirmukhī*), and (2) internal direction (*antarmukhī*).⁷ By the former it perceives the external objects through the five senses, by the latter, it realizes the Self. It is composed of subtle matter and is atomic. It pervades the entire body. All other characteristics are given in the *Sāṃkhya*.

¹VSS. 65, US, II. 16, 4.

²Ibid. 66; VC, 169-190.

³Ibid. 68-67.

⁴VSS, 66.

⁵Ibid, 74.

⁶PD, VII, 120-121; BG, VI, 34.

⁷PD, X, 7.

12. *Buddhi Defined*

Buddhi, the intellectual aspect of Antaḥkaraṇa is enlightened by pure Consciousness.² By that light it reveals the objects, by assuming the form of the object. It determines thought and action. In the waking state it reveals the external objects. In the dream state it becomes the instrument, the object, the agent, actions and their results.³ This Buddhi together with the organs of perception constitutes the intelligent sheath (vijñāna-maya koṣa).⁴

13. *Citta Defined*

Citta is that modification of the inner organ that remembers.⁵ It is the store-house of all the past impressions, tendencies, instincts, hereditary traits and Saṁskāras. It is the sub-conscious mind (in Western psychology). It embodies Vāsanā of a number of past births. The Vāsanā is of three kinds viz. (1) desire for fame, name, respect, pursuit of the customs of society (Loka-vāsanā), (2) excessive care of body, its beauty and adornment (Deha-vāsanā), and (3) passion for book-learning, spiritual gluttony (śāstra-vāsanā).⁶ All the Vāsanās and Saṁskāras are products of Avidyā, hence on the emerging of right knowledge all these are dissolved,⁷ and are destroyed in the fire of knowledge.⁸

14. *Ahaṁkāra Defined*

Padmapāda explains Ahaṁkāra in the following words:
 "Ahaṁkāra is a particular transformation of Avidyā, resulting from its having Parameśvara as substratum. It is the substratum of thought-energy (jñānaśakti) and kinetic energy (kriyāśakti). It is the sole basis of agency and enjoyment. It is the light generated by its association with the unchanging consciousness. It is self-luminous and it is immediate cognition (and not inferred, as says Nyāya). Due to the intimate relation with Ahaṁkāra, the Kuṭastha (unchanging consciousness) has acquired

²VSS, II, 12, 1.

³US, II, 14, 8.

⁴VSS, 72.

⁵VSS, 68.

⁶PD, IX, 104; AC, 271.

⁷VP, IX, 47.

⁸PD, XIV, 15.

erroneously indeed the role of enjoyer, though it is of the nature of the 'not this' and is the Ātman-entity. Whence could the 'I' notion arise in sleep where all the evolutes of avidyā has been rooted out."¹

Padmapāda refutes the Sāṃkhya view that Ahaṃkāra is an evolute of Pradhāna. If the inert Pradhāna independently of consciousness is admitted as evolving Ahaṃkāra then the appropriate expression would be 'this is enjoyer', and not 'I am enjoyer'. The latter is possible only on the basis of the relatedness of Ahaṃkāra with the witness—Sākṣī Caitanya or Puruṣa.

The Self is eternally free from any experience of pleasure or pain, doership or agency. But it is the Ahaṃkāra that is superimposed on the Self, undeservingly as the distress experienced by the son is superimposed by the father on himself.² If the ego were to feel 'I am liberated', freedom from pleasure and pain would result.³ The Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā ascribe pleasure and pain to Ātman, but Advaita shifts the same to ego.

Pancadaśī mentions Ahaṃkāra possessing the second reflection of the self, viz. Cidābhāsa. It leads to the ego that 'I am the doer', 'I am the experiencer'. Pleasure and pain are its two qualifications.

15. Prāṇas

Advaita describes the Prāṇas in the manner of Upaniṣads. These are five in number viz. Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Samāna and Udāna.⁴ Prāṇa is that vital force which goes upwards and has its seat at the tip of the nose.⁵ Though Prāṇa is in the heart,⁶ but its presence is felt at the tip of the nose. It corresponds to the respiratory system. Apāna goes downward and has its seat in the organs of excretion. So it may correspond to the excretory system. Vyāna pervades the whole body, and may correspond to the nervous system. Samāna helps digestion and

¹PP, XXVI, 96.

²US, II, 18, 20.

³US, II, 18, 162.

⁴VC, 105-107.

⁵VSS, 77; VC, 97.

⁶VSS, 78; VP, VIII, 28.

⁷Taittirīya Brahmana, 3, 10, 8, 5.

assimilation of food in the body. So it may correspond to the digestive system. Udāna is the ascending vital force which helps the passing out from the body and has its seat in the throat.¹ The above functions of Prāṇa are the major one.² Inhaling and exhaling are the chief functions. These maintain life in the living organism. The other minor functions are yawning, sneezing, trembling, thirst and hunger.³ For the minor functions five more minor types of Prāṇa are mentioned viz. Nāga, Kūrma, Krikala, Devadatta and Dhanañjaya.⁴

Further description of Prāṇa is given in *Brahma Sūtra*. Prāṇa is considered as different from air and the sense-functions.⁵ But like the sense-organs it is subordinate to the soul,⁶ works as its instrument,⁷ and is also minute and subtle.⁸ Prāṇa cannot be identified with the senses. Had it been so, it would not function in deep sleep, when the senses are active.⁹ Śāṅkara argues further: 'The organs do not function in deep sleep while the vital breath does. The organs get tired but not the Prāṇa. Loss of organs does not affect life but the passing out of vital breath ends in the death of the body.'¹⁰

The concept of Prāṇa is a novice for the Western psychologists, but it is so deep-rooted in Indian philosophy that it has been taken for granted in the manner described in the Upaniṣads. Its effect on the working of the physical body is understandable, as it controls a number of metabolic systems. Yoga goes a step further in explaining its direct effect on mental concentration. That will be explained in a subsequent chapter.

16. Composition of Gross Physical Body

Vedānta accepts the theory of five elements as explained in the Upaniṣads. The composition of the cosmos by five princi-

¹VSS, 79-83; SB, II, 4, 12.

²VSS, 88.

³VC, 104.

⁴VSS, 84.

⁵BS, II, 4, 9.

⁶Ibid, II, 4, 9.

⁷BS, II, 4, 10.

⁸Ibid, 4, 11.

⁹Ibid, 4, 12-13.

¹⁰Ibid, 4, 18.

ple elements is taken for granted. *Chāndogya* (VI.3.3) explains the triple combination of elements (Trivrit karaṇa). Bādrāyana modifies the same and explains the process of quintuplication, according to which each of the gross element contains the other four elements in some proportion. Fire, for instance, contains the other four elements also, but it is called fire because of the preponderance of fire element in it.¹

Each gross physical body contains all the five elements, and each element itself contains all the five elements in a particular proportion. This is illustrated by the following Table. The symbols are—E for ether, A for air, F for fire, W for water and S for solid matter or earth.

Diagram 9

COMPOSITION OF ELEMENTS

	E	A	F	W	S
E =	$\frac{2}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$
A =	$\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{2}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$
F =	$\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{2}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$
W =	$\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{2}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$
S =	$\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{8}{8}$	$+\frac{2}{8}$

$$E+A+F+W+S = E+A+F+W+S$$

(by adding left-hand side and right-hand side).²

F. THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL APPARATUS

Composition

The complex organisation of the Psychic apparatus was well explained by Sāṃkhya, and taken for granted by yoga. Advaita accepts the same with some minor modifications. The Puruṣa of Sāṃkhya is the Sākṣin of Advaita, and is characterised by pure consciousness. The Antaḥkaraṇa consists of manas, buddhi

¹VSS, 102-103.

²Ibid, 99; VP, VIII, 30; BS. II, 4, 22.

and ahaṁkāra (as in Sāṁkhya), and has another adjunct citta (the subconscious mind) the repository of all the previous impressions and memory images going back to the previous births). The antaḥkaraṇa is material and is constituted of all the five elements, with tejas predominating.

As explained in Sāṁkhya-yoga, the mind is active and, its fluctuations are called Vṛtti. The same has been accepted in Advaita. Sāṁkhya-yoga does not mention the five vital airs—Prāṇas, which have been so well explained in Upaniṣads. Advaita makes for the omission, and sets these in the proper hierarchy of factors of personality viz. body, vital airs, mind, intellect, and Sākṣin.

The number of sense-organs, including Manas is eleven.¹ Manas rules over the five organs of cognition and the five organs of action. Its function is selective, and it coordinates the working of all the sense-organs. The sense-organs are minute, subtle and are not seen.² They originate from the elements (and not from Ahaṁkāra as the Sāṁkhya holds). Here Advaita agrees with Nyāya, but it further maintains that it gets its light from the Self.³

G. THE STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

1. Enumeration of the States

Advaita follows the Upaniṣads in enumerating four states of consciousness viz. the wakeful (jagrat), the dream (svapna), the sleep (suṣupti) and the superconscious (turiya). If we combine dream and sleep into one and identify the same with the subconscious state, there remain three distinct states viz. subconscious, conscious (waking) and superconscious. Superconscious state is the highest state, the state of self-realization, identification of self and Brahman, the state of Absolute Consciousness. According to Advaita, it is characterised by absence of nescience (avidyā) or Māyā, when the phenomenality of the world disappear, when there is no subject-object relations. The subject and object, the Ahaṁkāra (ego) on the one hand and the objective world on the other disappear and merge in the Absolute. There being no limiting adjunct (upādhis), no

¹BS, II, 4, 5-6.

²BS, II, 4, 7.

³Ibid, 4, 1-2.

limitations of time or place, the individual consciousness becomes one with the Absolute Cosmic Consciousness. The Self, Ātman, Sākṣī, Kūṭastha shines pure. This is the state of Samādhi of Yogis, the Mukti or Kaivalyam.

The other three states are the products of Māyā or Avidyā. The curtain of Avidyā separates the Pure Self from the mundane personality (Jīva), completing indefinitely the cycle of the three states—wakeful, dream and sleep. In sleep, the Ahaṁkāra, intelligent because of the reflection of the Self, also called Cidābhāsa, also works and remains enveloped by Avidyā. What endures then, is the Self or Sākṣī plus Avidyā which is known as the Kāraṇa Śarīra (radical adjunct) as distinguished from the Subtle Body (Linga Śarīra). The concept of Kāraṇa Śarīra is absent in Sāṃkyha. But in Advaita; its presence is vouchsafed by the fact that we recollect 'we had a sound sleep', when we wake up. The experience is here, and hence the presence of some experiencer. The Antaḥkāraṇa does not operate in this state. As the individuality persists, it is due to the union of Sākṣin with Avidyā. In the dream state Mind (disconnected with senses) operates. But in the wakeful state the senses also function. This is explained by the following diagram.

Diagram 10

INDIVIDUALITY IN DIFFERENT STATES OF
CONSCIOUSNESS

Individu- ality	Pure Self Ātman Brahman Sākṣī Kūṭastha Pure Con- sciousness	Māyā Avidyā	Ego Cidābhāsa Ahaṁkāra	Intellect Buddhi	Mind and Body
State of Conscious- ness	Kaivalyam Mukti (IV)	Māyā Avidyā	Suṣupti Sleep (III)	Svapna Dream (II)	Jāgrat Wakeful (I)

From the diagram it is clear that the first three states are responsible for the transmigratory existence of the Jīva. Advaita

holds that no one of these three states has a real existence because each goes out of existence when another remains in it.¹ They do not exist in the Self or anywhere else, just as a snake does not exist in the rope when the rope is perceived as such. The Self continues in all the three states.² When the Self is realized, the mundane appearance of the world tumbles down.

Advaita mentions two more states of consciousness though these are not so important *viz.* swoon and death.

2. *The Wakeful State*

The wakeful state (jāgrat) is defined as the state of sense-generated cognition which is a psychosis (Vṛtti) of the Antaḥ-karaṇa.³ It corresponds to the empirical reality (vyāvahārika sattā), and is a little higher state than that of dream state. But its reality does not stand very high in comparison to the dream state, as they get mutually sublated, and both get sublated in the superconscious state when the super-imposition (adhyāropa) of the empirical world in the Pure Self ceases. Both waking and dream states are products of Avidyā, and the transmigratory existence of the Jīva and the empirical world is an offshoot of Māyā. So Advaita holds that the subconscious and the conscious state do not have a real existence because each goes out of existence when another remains in it.⁴ Modern psychology may ridicule this theory, but it has inadequate means to disprove it, when it is confined only to sub-conscious and conscious state, and has not entered the realm of super-conscious state. Only after fathoming Superconscious state, can it discuss the Advaita theory.

From the Advaitic Point of view the individual soul (Jīva) is called awake as long as it is connected with the various **external** objects by means of the psychosis of mind—which thus constitute limiting adjuncts (Upādhi) of the soul.

3. *The Dream Theory*

Advaita accepts the dream theory as explained in Upaniṣads.

¹US. II, 16, 18.

²ABU, 11.

³VP, VIII, 70.

⁴US, II, 16, 18.

As stated in Upaniṣads, the distinction between dreams and waking is that the senses co-operated in the waking state but not in dreams. The body exists but does not function in the dream world. The objects in the dream world are illusory. No chariots are there, though met in a dream. Advaita adds that the dream world is not absolutely unreal. It presents reality of the third order—the *prātibhāsika sattā* (the apparent reality). It is sublated by the waking state which presents the empirical reality—the *vyāvahārika sattā*. From the point of view of the highest reality, the *paramārthika sattā*, both the dream and waking states are almost at par in so far as both these are illusory and unreal.

The experiences of dream are contradicted by wakeful. What remains non-contradicted by any experience is pure consciousness (*saṁvit*). Even in waking state the objects of experience may vary, but the *saṁvit* which cognises them is single and same throughout.¹ *Saṁvit* remains as the witness of both waking and dream state,² and also in the sleep state.³ It is ever existent eternal light, neither rising, nor setting.⁴ It exists when each body vanishes. The gross body vanishes in dream, the subtle body functioning in dream vanishes in sleep. The causal body, functioning in sleep vanishes in *saṁādhi* or superconscious state. What persists in *saṁādhi* is the pure consciousness.

Another explanation of the distinction between wakeful and dream state is presented in *Vedānta Paribhāṣa*. It says that *Jāgrat* is the state of sense-generated cognition which is psychosis of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Two things are necessary here viz. (1) the contact of the senses with the objects, and (2) the psychosis of the inner instrument (*antaḥkaraṇa*). In dream state, the former aspect is absent, and so it is a state of immediate psychosis of mind as has for its sphere not-sense-generated content.⁵

¹PD, I, 3.

²*Ibid*, I, 4.

³*Ibid*, 5-6.

⁴*Ibid*, I, 7.

⁵VP, VIII, 70-79.

Representative Theory of Dreams according to Śāṅkara

Śāṅkara explains that the dream world does not agree with the waking world in respect of (1) time, (2) place, (3) cause, and (4) non-contradiction, and so it is not real like the waking world. In dream we feel it is the day but actually it is the night. We dream long space wherein move the chariots etc. But can these move in the limited confines of the body? We dream of material objects, but their cause is non-existent. There is non-contradiction also. A chariot becomes a man, and man a tree.¹ So what we see in a dream is only an appearance (Māyāmayaṁ svapnadarśanaṁ).

All the dreams are not reproduction of the impressions in the wakeful state. Some dreams are prophetic also. Śruti also declares that some dreams are indicative of the future.²

The dream world is sublated by the wakeful world. But the empirical world also is not absolutely real. It is also sublated by the metaphysical experience.³ That way both are partially real and partially unreal.

Presentative Theory of Dreams

The author of *Vedānta Paribhāṣa* does not follow Śāṅkara, and holds the Presentative theory. He says that the dream objects are not the recollections of the previous waking perceptions (as Prabhākara says). If the chariot *etc.* met in dream be admitted recollection alone, there is contingency of conflict with experience like, 'I see the chariot' and 'I saw the chariot in the dream'. Actually, these dream objects are illusory, like nacre-shell, and persist so long as they appear. Śruti also confirms the same (BU, IV. 3.10).⁴ The substance of the dream objects is the self-luminous consciousness; the consciousness manifest as reality. The particular locality of the dream-object is superimposed on consciousness and is phenomenal. No senses work at that time, and hence sense-cognisedness (*i.e.* thisness of the chariot *etc.*) is phenomenal.⁵ These need not persist in the

¹SB, III, 2, 3.

²BS, III, 2, 4.

³*Ibid.*

⁴VP, I, 103.

⁵VP, I, 105.

waking state, as these are sublated when the sleep ends.¹

4. *The Deep Sleep*

Suṣṭi is defined as a state of Avidyā—psychosis, having Avidyā for its sphere. The wakeful and dream states are psychosis of Mind directly and of Avidyā indirectly. Although in this state, the empirical world is absent, all the products are dissolved, the past impressions (sanskāras) and good and bad deeds do remain in causal form (kāraṇvasthā). Hence for him who has awakened from sleep there is no unintelligibility of pleasure *etc.*, nor is there any unintelligibility of recollection. Again, the prāṇa and the body function properly.² The State does contribute to pleasure, as is evidenced by the fact that a person on waking recollects 'I had sound sleep, I did not know anything in sleep. There was nothing but ignorance'.³ Anyway, this state is the state of pleasure. The Self enjoys bliss.⁴ The after-effects of the pleasure in sleep are experienced by the person when he wakes up.⁵

Śankara states that the Self in the dreamless sleep resides in the arteries (nāḍi), pericardium (puritat) and in Brahman. Heart being the seat of Brahman, and as the soul rests in the artery seated in the heart, it rests in Brahman.⁶ Then the soul returns from Brahman on account of work, remembrance *etc.*⁷ There is continuity of work *i.e.* the unfinished works are then carried by the soul on waking.

5. *Super Conscious State*

This is the highest state called Turīya (the fourth), the state of direct perception of the Absolute (sakṣātkāra), perfect intuition (saṁyag-jñāna),⁸ intuitional consciousness or experience absolute (anubhava).¹⁰ This is the goal of all experience

¹ *Ibid*, 10, 9.

² *VP*, VIII, 80.

³ *VP*, 39-40; *PD*, XI, 58.

⁴ *PD*, XI, 58.

⁵ *VC*, 207-210.

⁶ *PD*, XI, 74.

⁷ *SB*, III, 2, 7.

⁸ *BS*, III, 2, 2.

⁹ *SB*, I, 2, 8.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 2, 8; III, 3, 32.

(anubhavāvasānam).¹ It is of the nature of perception, as the Self witnesses itself directly.² It is the state of self-realization. It corresponds to the Samādhi of Yoga. Herein the individual Mind mingles with the Universal Mind, the individual Consciousness in the Cosmic Consciousness, Jīva in Īśvara, Ātma in Brahman, and vyaṣṭi in samaṣṭi.

6. *The Nature of Swoon*

In the swooning person, there is half attainment, this being the remaining hypothesis. He is half-asleep.³ The person in swoon is not conscious of objects as a waking person. We cannot say that on account of concentration on one object he is unaware of other objects. For the swooning person is not conscious of anything. He is not dreaming also. He is not dead, for he continues to breath, and he rises again to conscious life. He is not in deep sleep, when one is peaceful, breathing at regular intervals. The man in swoon breathes irregularly. His body trembles, his face has a frightful expression. His eyes are staring wide open. A sleeping person can be roused by a gentle touch, but the fainting person may not rise even by a blow. It is half-way to death.⁴

7. *Death State*

A number of eschatological references in *Brahma Sūtra* and its commentary by Śaṅkara are not of less psychological significance. At the time of death, says Bādrāyaṇa, the soul goes out of the body enveloped by subtle material element with a view to obtaining different body.⁵ The subtle material element has also preponderance of water.⁶ What clings the soul is the residual karma. When the soul gets the new embodiment, this residual karma determines the nature of new birth.⁷ It is from the time of entering the womb that the soul enters a new body fit for experiencing the results of the past residual karma.⁸ The

¹ BGS, II, 21; SB, II, 1, 6.

² Ibid, SB, I, 4, 14.

³ BS, III, 2, 10.

⁴ SB, III, 2, 11.

⁵ BS, III, 1, 1; CUV, 3, 3.

⁶ BS, III, 1, 2.

⁷ Ibid, 1, 8.

⁸ SB, III, 1, 27.

residual karma is burnt by the fire of true knowledge. So the moment one acquires knowledge, one's works decay and there is no rebirth.¹ For the self-realised person there is nothing to be traversed, neither *devaloka*, nor *Pitṛloka*. He frees himself from bondage.² The journey to the path of the gods is true only to the worshippers of *Saguṇa Brahman*. It has no meaning for the devotees of *Nirguṇa Brahman*, whose ignorance is destroyed by knowledge.³ According to Śrīkanṭha, the cessation of Karma takes place in two instalments at death, and at a later stage on the crossing of the river *Viraja*. Before one actually attains Brahman, the intellect is in a state of contraction which is the characteristics of the souls in the world. The world does not exist in the absence of Karma. Till the river *Viraja* is crossed, we must admit residual karma. Beyond the river is the abode of final release.⁴

8. Types of Consciousness

Consciousness is of three kinds viz:

(i) Content Consciousness (*viśaya caitanya*), i.e. the consciousness defined by the object such as the pot.

(ii) Cognitive Consciousness (*pramāṇa caitanya*), i.e. the consciousness defined by psychosis of the internal organ (*antaḥ-karāṇa-vṛttiyavacchinna*).

(iii) Cogniser Consciousness (*pramātṛ caitanya*) i.e. the consciousness defined by internal organ.⁵

Consciousness is, again, twofold viz. *Jīva-Sākṣin* and *Īśvara-sākṣin*. The former is the consciousness defined by the *Antaḥ-karāṇa*. 'It is individual and determinate, being defined by reference to the particular internal organ with which for the time being it seems associated.'⁶ It is different for every individual. Higher than this is the Absolute Consciousness, the Cosmic Consciousness, ground for the whole Universe. It is called *Īśvara-sākṣin*, *svarūpa-jñāna* or pure Consciousness.⁷

¹ *Ibid*, 3, 28.

² *BS*, III, 3, 27.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ *BS*, IV, 3, 30; Śrīkanṭha's commentary.

⁵ *VP*, I, 17.

⁶ Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 360.

⁷ *VP*, I, 66-70.

H. FUNCTIONS OF MIND

1. *The Concept of Psychosis (Vṛtti)*

Psychosis is the fluctuation of the mind, its working, the thought-waves, or the ripples in the stream of consciousness. Yoga discusses at length the means of controlling the same. Sāṃkhya-Yoga take it of real character, arising out of the interaction of Puruṣa and Buddhi. Advaita considers it to be an off-spring of the Consciousness (caitanya). The consciousness emanates from the self, functions through the Antaḥkaraṇa and the senses, and is modified according to the nature of the object of consciousness, like the water of a big tank modified by the small channels, through which it runs to irrigate the field.¹

This psychosis is of four kinds, viz. doubt, certitude, pride and recollection. The internal organ though one is called Manas, Buddhi, Ahaṁkāra and Citta according to the above four types of psychosis.²

2. *Cognition*

Cognition according to Western psychology is a passive affair. External stimuli play the active role, and the mind receive the impressions of the outside world. But advaita reverses the position. It is the mind that:

- (i) reaches out to the external objects through the nervous system and the sense-organs;
- (ii) draws its sensations and impressions through them;
- (iii) unifies the experience into integrated whole;
- (iv) stores these impressions for future use, and
- (v) ascertains through the ego that 'I know this'.

In this way the whole Antaḥkaraṇa is actually at work. Manas alongwith the senses draws the sensations, Buddhi analyses these and integrates these into coherent whole, Ahaṁkāra connects with the self-concept, and Citta stores the impressions. Antaḥkaraṇa gets its power by association with the Ātman. Beyond Mind, the Self is active here.

Sensations are only a fragment of the mind-functioning. Pleasure, pain, emotions, volition *etc.* are such functions which

¹ VP, I, 18..

²VP, I, 58

exist even without the sensation. This leads to the separate existence of Mind apart from the sensations.

Means of Cognition

Advaita also discusses the instruments of cognition. Direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference and authority (śabda) have been explained at length by Nyāya also. But Vedānta, like Mīmāṃsā adds three more viz. comparison (upamāna), postulation (arthāpatti) and non-cognition (anupalabdhī). We do not enter their details, as these are connected more with epistemology than with psychology. Cognition through instruments other than direct perception is called indirect cognition (parokṣa jñāna). But a higher type of cognition is cognition without any mediate, purely direct cognition or intuitive cognition (aparokṣa jñāna). Vidyāranya discusses it in detail.¹ Everybody does not experience this non-mediate cognition, because of three obstacles viz. (1) obstacles in the form of past habituated modes of thinking, (2) present prejudices and mental defects, and (3) the fruit of action to be borne in future, and accumulated in the form of 'prārabdha'.² These obstacles are to be removed through persistent effort, practice in right thinking and mental concentration.³

Degrees of Cognition

Advaita states that the objective world presents different appearances. Illusions take place, but are sublated afterwards. Dreams present objects, but the moment we wake up, the dream world vanishes. The cognition in the wakeful state seems to be real. Therein also, a person with jaundiced eye will see everything yellow. His perception will be coloured so long as jaundice continues. A home appears to be desert or heaven, depending upon our predispositions. The reality appears to be in different forms according to our own state of mind. When we live on a particular plane, the previous appearance is sublated, and appears to be unreal. From this point of view, Advaita explains three planes of reality viz.

1. *Prātibhāsika or apparent*: The reality of illusory cognition, hallucination and dreams is of this type. But this is sublated

¹PD, IX, 30-38.

²Ibid, 39-45.

³Ibid, 32.

as soon as we proceed to the next higher state vyāvahārika (empirical).

2. *Vyāvahārika or spiritual* : The reality of cognition in the wakeful state is of this type. But this also is sublated at the superconscious level.

3. *Pārmāthika or the higher empirical*. This is the highest plane, where the experiences in the wakeful state are sublated and cognised as unreal, as unreal as dreams remembered in the wakeful state.

The cognition of the objective world in the wakeful state has its existence at the empirical plane, but not at the superconscious plane or Samādhi state, or the state of Self-realization. True cognition is the cognition at the spiritual level—cognition of the first order. The cognition of the empirical world is only of the second order, and it ceases at the spiritual level. The objective universe, and its complex business (prapañca) has got existence so long as the true cognition at the spiritual stage does not arise. The dreams are illusions and are cognition of the third order, and these are sublated by empirical cognition. The universe exists from the empirical point of view only. From the absolute point of view it is nescience.¹ The stimulus and response, sensation, perception, concepts, reasoning, imagination, emotions, pleasure, pain, ego, sub-conscious thoughts—all these exist only from the empirical point of view; and as these are products of Avidyā, these vanish when the absolute truth is realized. This type of phenomenalism is the special contribution of Śankara and his followers.

3. Perception according to Advaita Vedānta

(a) The nature of Perception

Advaita Vedānta takes a completely reverse view of the Western psychologists. According to Western psychologists, we have first the sensation. The object produces certain sensation, a modification in the sense organ and the nervous system, and these give rise to mental image. In Vedānta, the order is reversed. The mind goes out through the senses and reaches the object, and becomes so modified as to assume the form of

¹VP, VIII, 1.

the object itself. The mind is changed in the form of the object, and there is no need to propose a mental image corresponding to physical stimuli.

It is the mind that assumes the form of the objects, and appears to be exactly like the objects of perception, just as molten copper assumes the form of a mould when poured into it.¹ Just as light, the revealer assumes the forms of the objects revealed by it, so the mind looks like things in-as-much as it reveals them.² It is because of the actual modifications of the intellect in the form of the objects, that the objects are perceived in the dream also.³ The Self simply acts as witness (Sākṣī) of the modifications and pervades throughout.⁴ In short the existence of the external objects also depends upon the intellect, otherwise these could be present in sleep also.

Briefly speaking, Advaita states the following process of perception. An organ of sense is brought into contact with an object. The manas, like a lamp, goes out towards it and assumes the form of that object. The mental vṛtti coincides with the object, and gives rise to perceptual knowledge.

Three conditions need be satisfied for perception. Firstly, the object must be such as can be known directly (yogya). Secondly, it must exist in time. A past event cannot be perceived. There must be relationship between the subject and the object of perception. The vṛtti joins the subject and the object. It flows out like water from a tank, assuming the shape of the field to be irrigated.

Perception is also defined as the identity between the ultimate consciousness particularised by an object which exists in the present time and is fit to be perceived by the senses and the ultimate consciousness particularised by the psychosis which has taken the form of the object.⁵

Advaita adds to pratyakṣa the word aparokṣa (non-mediate), because some objects of perception may not be perceived by

¹US, II, 14. 3.

²Ibid, 14. 4.

³Ibid, 14. 5.

⁴Ibid, 14. 6.

⁵VP, I, 18.

the eyes and other senses (so as to be called *pratyakṣa* which means 'through the eyes' or 'through the senses'), such as pleasure and pain, the empirical self and the inner experiences. These are known directly (hence non-mediate) and therefore called *aparokṣa*, as opposed to those objects which require mediacy of another instrument, which would be called *parokṣa* (mediate).¹

(b) *The Senses and their Function in Perception*

As per other systems, in Vedānta also, the number of cognitive senses is five, and they are of the nature of smell, taste, sight, hearing and touch. And all these senses have general perceptual cognition only as in contact with their respective contents.²

The senses of smell, taste and touch generate the perception only as abiding in their own location. But sight and hearing, go forth themselves to the locality contents and apprehend their respective contents.³ Thus the light proceeding from the eye reaches the object and envelopes it. The sense of sight is *prāpyakāri*.

Vedānta holds that sense of hearing also is *prāpyakāri*. It goes to the locality of the sound.⁴ This view is against the Nyāya view that the sound waves travel from distance and reach the cavity of the ear. The argument given by Dharmarājadvarīndra that the innumeral sound-waves would cause delusiveness in the ear is unconvincing. It also goes against the modern experimental psychology, according to which the ear receives the distant sound, rather than goes to London to listen to the B.B.C. Programme.

(c) *Types of Perception*

(i) *Internal and External Perception*: The perception through the sense-organs, further coordinated by *Manas* is the external perception or *Indriya-janyaṁ* (produced through senses). The other, *i.e.* not produced through the contact of senses (*ajanyaṁ*) is the internal perception.⁵

¹VPS, I, 1.

²PD, VI, 16-30.

³VP, I, 123.

⁴VP, I, 124.

⁵VP, I, 120.

(ii) *Indeterminate and Determinate Perception* : Perception is twofold. The determinate Perception is cognition apprehending relatedness, e.g. the cognition, 'I cognise the pot', whileas the Indeterminate Perception is a cognition not apprehending relations.¹ Indeterminate perception is apprehension of mere 'existence' or 'being' (Sanmātra), and nothing else. It means the 'being' and not the object itself, or its qualities, or the relation between the object and the quality. It is thus a mere sensation.

(d) *Illusory Perception*

The problem of illusory perception and its psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indian philosophy. Different explanations have been given to the nature and cause of illusory perception. The most popular example is of illusion of silver for nacre (śukti-rajat). There are five theories of error (khyāti), viz. (1) Asat Khyāti, (2) Ātma Khyāti, (3) Anyathā Khyāti, (3) Akhyāti, and (5) Anirvacanīya Khyāti.

(i) According to the Nihilist school of Buddhism, everything is unreal, both the silver and nacre are unreal (asat). Nullity first appears as nacre and then is apprehended by silver. Advaita refutes this theory on the ground that nullity can have no apprehension. So Asat Khyāti is unconvincible. (2) The Sautrantika Bauddha says, the external objects have a real existence. The delusion that nacre appears as silver is that the internal notion of silver becomes external, i.e. we possess the notion of silver in our mind, and it presents itself. So it is Ātma Khyāti. According to Idealistic Buddhists, there is no reality of the existence of the external objects. They are only forms of knowledge. An object is the same as its cognition. The silver is a wrong perception, but is real not as existing outside in space, but as mode of our mind. When cognitions are mistaken to be fact in the external world, an error results. Śankara refutes Ātma Khyāti. He says there is contradiction in saying that silver is not external, but when it appears in delusion, it is apprehended as external. There cannot be cognition of externality in what is non-external. (3) According to Mīmāṃsā (Bhaṭṭa School) and Nyāya, the non-distinction

¹Ibid, 59.

between nacre and silver causes delusion, so that we take nacre as something else (anyathā). We do not observe well the peculiar traits of the nacre as distinguished from silver whose glow we remembered in the past. Śāṅkara refutes this Anyathā Khyāti on the ground that the properties of one are not transposed to the other. The nacre does not become silver, the rope does not become snake and the mirage does not become watery. Hence the superimposed object (silver) is not an absolute reality here. (4) The akhyāti of Sāṃkhya and Prabhākara School of Mīmāṃsā claims that there is no error, in reality. There is no invalid cognition (yathārtham sarvavijñānam). A cognition may be less than true, but it is not untrue. In nacre-silver illusion, there is a defect in our memory because of which we do not recollect and recognise the true properties of silver. The non-distinction between the thing perceived and the thing remembered causes the error. Śāṅkara refutes this theory. How can there be non-distinction between a thing which is clearly perceived and a thing which is remembered? The non-apprehension of non-relation (asansargaḥ) cannot be between apprehension (grahana) and memory (smṛti). (5) So Śāṅkara presents his own explanation, designated as 'Anirvacanīya Khyāti'. According to it the nature of illusion is inexplicable. The nacre-silver cannot be real, because the silver is sublated afterwards. Silver is not apprehended by all, by those who have no defective observation. Again the nacre-silver cannot be unreal, since it is cognised. If it were unreal like human horn, there would be no cognition at all thereof, and as such no illusion. The third alternative would be nacre-silver is both real and unreal. But this is self-contradictory. Hence it must be stated that nacre-silver is inexplicable, indeterminable either as real or as unreal.

The process of illusion is described by Śāṅkara as follows:

It is Avidyā associated with the Cit that disturbs the real perception. This Avidyā in co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver revived by the common qualities (of silver and nacre) is transformed into illusory silver and its perception. This explanation resembles Nyāya explanation, if we eliminate Avidyā. This type of illusion has its existence, and it continues until it is sublated. Hence it is called apparent existence

(prātibhāsika sattā) as compared to empirical existence (vyāvahārika sattā).¹ The silver-nacre phenomenon is a transformation (pariṇāma) in relation to Avidyā, but trans-figuration (vivarta) in relation to consciousness.²

Regarding the phenomenon of illusion, Advaita offers a number of illustrations. A post is taken for a thief. A mirage is taken for water. A whirling fire-brand appears to be a circle. A passenger in boat sees the objects on the bank moving. The moon seems to be flying past when really the clouds are streaming by. One misses grass for water, and water for grass.³ Śankara stretches this phenomenon farther when he says, we mistake the Self for the Non-self, when we say our body is the Self. We superimpose the attributes of Non-self upon the Self, and this is Avidyā.

(e) *Advaita Perception Criticised*

The most essential fact regarding the theory of perception of Advaita is the extreme subjectivism. It says that the object has no existence apart from the perceiver, i.e. the substratum which maintains the object is not different from the subject. The object is itself an appearance, a vivarta of consciousness. This extreme subjectivism, nullification of the real existence of the object of perception, may appear rather crude on the scientific side. But one lesson is to be learnt from it, that perception depends upon consciousness, and is not merely a material change.

(f) *Psychology of Pleasure and Love*

The scope of pleasure according to Advaita is vast. Our concept of pleasure confined to the internal feeling when our senses come in contact with the objects of pleasure is very limited indeed. Sensual pleasure is fragmentary (āṁśika), temporary and perishable. It is surpassable (sātiśayam). But the pleasure of divine ecstasy, pleasure in superconscious state is blissful and unsurpassable (niratiśayam). The former is just a fragment of bliss, affected by grades of the psychosis of Antaḥkaraṇa due to the contact with objects. The other is supreme bliss

¹SB, Introduction.

²VP, I, 85.

³Aparokṣasanubhūti by Śankara, 82, 87-88.

(ānanda), or bliss Absolute.¹

As a corollary of the above, the objects of pleasure are of two types *viz.* (1) the dearest (priyatama) such as the Self, whose realization is the source of supreme bliss; (2) the dear (priya) such as the pleasurable objects of the world.² The two types govern the 'likes' of man. The opposite are the 'dislikes', which are again of two types *viz.* (1) Those which deserve to be ignored (Upekṣyaṁ) such as the minor obstacles in our path, and (2) those that are to be hated (dveṣyaṁ) such as the enemy, the trouble, the misfortune etc.³

The same object can sometimes enter the domain of our 'dislike' and shift to 'like'. An aggressive lion is an object of hate and displeasure, a lion in the cage can be ignored, but the pet lion receives our affection and is an object of our 'like'.⁴ But the Self is always the dearest. We love wealth, better still do we love our kith and kin, better still our own body, better still our life, and the Self we love the best. This is the hierarchy of love.⁵

The love of Self is the supreme love. The love of objects of pleasure is contemptible, because of their ugly consequences in the form of physical and mental maladies. There is no end to the satiation of pleasure. So the transmigratory cycle continues, with the physical maladies (like ill-health), maladies of conscious mind (like anger, hate, anxiety) and the maladies of sub-conscious mind (deep-rooted worries, vāsanā etc.)⁶

¹VP, IX, 3-5.

²PD, XII, 50.

³Ibid, 51-52.

⁴Ibid, 53.

⁵Ibid, 60.

⁶PD, XIV, 9.

Psychology in Viśiṣṭādvaitā

A. INTRODUCTION TO RAMANUJA'S PHILOSOPHY

To Śāṅkara, the ultimate reality is Brahman, who is devoid of all attributes (nirguṇa). The finite universe, with the intelligent principle that governs is below the level of Brahman, and hence Śāṅkara postulates a God of lower level than Brahman, who is the creator, sustainer, destroyer and ruler of the universe. This God, possesses attributes and is called Īśvara or Aparā Brahman, as distinguished from the higher Lord, Paraṁ Brahman. Rāmānuja accepts Īśvara, the Saṁguṇa Brahman as the Ultimate Reality (in place of Nirguṇa Brahman) and refutes the idea of Nirguṇa Brahman, because such a Brahman cannot be known by any means, perception, inference or scripture.¹

Hence Īśvara is the Ultimate Reality, is the Real of the Real (satyaśya Satyaṁ), Light of Lights (jyotiṣāṁ jyotiḥ), the Truth (satyaṁ), the Consciousness (jñānaṁ) and the Infinite (anantaṁ). He is the supporter (prakāri), the controller (niyaṁtṛ) and the totality (śeṣin) of the universe. In relation to the individual souls, he is the redeemer (rakṣaka) and the merciful. He uplifts those who surrender (prapanna) to him. He is all beautiful (bhuvvana sundara). He is the twenty-sixth principle after the twenty-five principles categorised by Sāṁkhya, and is therefore Puruṣottama, higher than Prakṛti and Puruṣa.

According to Śāṅkara, Brahman is Pure Consciousness. Consciousness and Brahman are identical. But Rāmānuja states that Consciousness is an attribute of Īśvara. To Śāṅkara, consciousness is His essential nature (svarūpa), but to Rāmānuja, consciousness is his quality (dharmabhūta jñāna).

According to Śāṅkara, the universe is an illusion, it is unreal. Brahman alone is real. But Rāmānuja follows a realist and objective approach by calling the universe real. He talks of the world as the body of Īśvara, or as His attribute. There

¹Sri BI, 1, 2.

are three realities viz. (1) Īśvara; (2) Individual Soul (cit) and (3) Material World (acit). Cit and Acit constitute the body of Īśvara, they are His attributes (viśeṣaṇa).¹ Thus the Ultimate Reality has two major parts viz. (1) the essential part, the substantive part (viśeṣa) which is the substratum (ādhāra) and does not undergo any change, and (2) secondly the body, the attribute, the viśeṣaṇa, i.e. the cit and acit, which undergoes all change. The universe is thus the body of Īśvara, and is real. It is a sport (lila) of the Lord, a divine comedy. This repudiates Mayāvāda of Śāṅkara. The individual also is real, as real as Īśvara. The relation between Īśvara and Universe, and also between Īśvara and the Jīva is that of substantive and the attribute, the owner of body and the body. There is no difference in heat and fire. Similarly, there is no difference between Īśvara on the one hand and the world of matter and spirit on the other. Hence the non-dualism of Īśvara and matter-spirit. But their mutual relationship is that of substantive and attribute, and hence the non-dualism is qualified non-dualism (viśiṣṭādvaitā). It differs altogether from the non-dualism of Śāṅkara. This concept has full bearing on psychological principles, and therefore there is a fundamental difference between Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita as regards psychology is concerned.

The doctrine of triune unity i.e. the unity of the individual soul (bhoktā), the matter (bhogyam) and the Lord (prerita),² elaborated by Rāmānuja affords intelligibility to Vedāntic psychology. Psychology deals with the relation between subject and object, mind and matter, and if both are considered illusory (as per Advaita), it loses its significance and existence. Vaiṣṇava Vedānta therefore draws a significant corrective to Advaita psychology.

There are a number of points, in addition to those stated above, where Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita differ, and because of which the whole psychology is described anew.

To Śāṅkara Jīva is unreal, but to Rāmānuja, Jīva is as real as Īśvara. To Śāṅkara Jīva's nature is ignorance, all his body and mind is unreal, superimposed upon his Self by Avidyā, and so the whole psychology has some worth only at the

¹Sri BI, 1, 2.

²Śyetaśvatara Up. with Śāṅkara's commentary, I. 7.

empirical level, but vanishes at the higher spiritual level (pārmārthika). But to Rāmānuja, Jīva's nature is knowledge, although that knowledge is limited and contracted due to karma. To Śāṅkara, Prakṛti is illusory, and is to be discarded. But to Rāmānuja, Prakṛti is real, and it stands for the experience of Jīva in accordance with his karma. Liberation according to Śāṅkara means lifting of the veil of Avidyā. But according to Rāmānuja, liberation means expansion of the constituent knowledge (dharmabhūta-jñāna) of Jīva to infinite strength so as to make him capable of understanding all things at the same time. Through moral and spiritual discipline, he is to rise step by step till freedom from Karma and embodiment is got. Jīva is infinitesimal like a spark, but its intelligence is all pervasive, and can know everything when freed from Karma.

Viśiṣṭādvaita possesses a number of more special features, because of which it has received utmost popularity.

It incorporates in it the Sāṃkhya psychology, the Yogi Sādhana and its ethical discipline, the epistemology of Nyāya, the importance of Dharma of Mīmāṃsā, and Monism of Advaita. In words of Śrīnivāsācārya:

"Viśiṣṭādvaita is the meeting ground of the extremes in philosophy like monism and pluralism, and has the intrinsic value of containing what is true, good and beautiful in other systems, though it rejects what contradicts its essentials." The same is true about psychology in Viśiṣṭādvaita, as will be explained below:

Viśiṣṭādvaita lays emphasis on devotion (bhakti) by means of Karma-yoga and Jñāna-yoga, on selfless action (niṣkāma karma), on moral and spiritual effort (sādhana) on self-surrender to Lord and on divine grace. All these, have entered the very fabric of Hindu society.

According to Rāmānuja, the goal of life is to attain liberation and enjoy the bliss of Brahman, the eternal glory (nitya vibhūti). The means of liberation is devotion. Action and knowledge are essential but only associate to devotion. When knowledge deepens, it attains the form of devotion.

¹Śrīnivāsācāri, *The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita*, p. x. vii.

Rāmānuja emphasises specially the ethical and aesthetic side of human life. The Jīva has moral freedom but he should dedicate himself to the service of his Master. Thereby he partakes the absolute beauty of Brahman, and enjoys the pure bliss.

As for the theory of causation, Śankara's Vivartavāda that the universe is an illusory appearance, is corrected by Rāmānuja's Satkāryavāda that the world is real, and its evolution is only a change of state. This gives practical bias to Vedānta philosophy and Vedānta psychology. As every effect implies a pre-existent material cause, causation is only an alteration of the State. The universe exists, whatever form it may take and whatever change it may undergo. Consciousness depends upon both the subject and the objective universe. It is not exclusive.

As described in the last chapter on Advaita Psychology, a good amount of psychological material could be gathered from Vedāntic literature, and the same was presented there in an organised form. But Advaita of Śankara represents only one school of Vedānta, and a number of views are true for Advaita alone and not for the other schools. The Māyāvāda of ankara has given a strong twist to Vedāntic psychology, whereby it differs radically from the other schools which oppose Māyāvāda. The three theistic schools namely Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja, Dvaita of Mādhava and his followers, and Bhedābheda of Nimbārka and his followers differ mutually with regard to the relation of Jīva, Jagat and Brahman, but have a common character of theism and realism. Their psychological speculations vary in a number of spheres from Advaita. Viśiṣṭādvaita, represents the Theistic Vedānta or Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, and hence the points of difference from Advaita psychology explained in it are explained below. The other points common to all the schools, have already been discussed in Advaita psychology.

The chief method of Vedāntic speculation is introspection. Vedānta psychology is therefore more based on introspection and intuition than on observation. In words of Śrīnivāsāchāri, "Vedantic psychology is not an empirical science that follows the method of mere perceptual and conceptual knowledge, but is

founded on metaphysical and metapsychical analysis which relies more on introspective than on genetic method to find out the essential nature of self-hood."¹

B. NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

1. *Previous theories*

We saw in the foregoing chapters that divergent speculations arose regarding the nature and location of consciousness, among the philosophical schools. According to Upaniṣads, Brahman is Consciousness Absolute (Cit). Sāṅkhya calls it an independent entity which arises out of the interaction of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. But the nature of interaction remains a riddle. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it is an attribute of God and soul. As an attribute of soul, it is separable, but not as an attribute of God. Mīmāṃsā talks about two parts of the soul, the essential part which is conscious, and the other part which is unconscious, like an iceberg, whose one part is above the sea-level, and the other is beneath. According to Advaita, everything but Pure Consciousness is illusory and unreal. Brahman is equal to Pure Consciousness. Vijñānavāda Buddhism talks of everything as illusory, except consciousness. Some Western idealists call consciousness as a reality and not abstraction, as light of the Self.

Rāmānuja holds the most commonsense point of view. He considers consciousness as an attribute of the Conscious, a reality and not an abstraction.

2. *Rāmānuja's theory of Consciousness*

Rāmānuja gives a detailed explanation of the subject, which satisfies the modern thought.

(1) Firstly, he says that consciousness is not a substance, created by the contact between the subject and the object, as Nyāya says. If it were so, where does it go before and after the contact? Consciousness is continuous and eternal. It is present in the present perception, reasoning and memory. It is inseparable from the subject in all his cognitive activities (internal and external). It is therefore independent of sense-object contact, and is not a created substance.

¹Srinivāsacāri, *The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita*, p. 274.

(2) Secondly, he says, Consciousness is neither the subject, nor his agent, but the act of cognising the object by the subject to whom it is related. Advaita call it the subject, which is unreasonable, because consciousness is a function and not the subject. Hence it is neither the Absolute Brahman, nor the individual soul.

(3) Thirdly, he says, Consciousness is a function of the subject, whether soul or Īśvara. It is not the witness, as Advaita says. Nor is it any object. It is not a stream or an expense, nor is it discrete momentary experiences. Though it is absent in sleep, it is continuous. Only under certain conditions like sleep, non-existence of consciousness is possible. If it were the subject, how is it that it is absent in sleep? Actually, it is not the subject but the function of the subject.

(4) Fourthly, Rāmānuja says that Consciousness is an attribute (viśeṣaṇa) of the Self or Īśvara. As light is the attribute of fire, and fire is the substratum of light, so it is an attribute of Personality, an inseparable quality (apṛthaksiddhadharma). It is inherent in the self as its trait (dharma bhūtājñāna).

In words of Śrīnivāsācari, "Viśiṣṭādvaita absolutism checks the extremes of realism and idealism and points out the defects of the pure object philosophy and the pure subject philosophy by insisting on the reality of Kṣetrajña or the knowing subject and the Kṣetra or the knowable object, the correlativity of the subject-object relation and the immanence of the super-subject or Ātman in Cit and Acit."⁶

3. States of Consciousness

According to Advaita the dream state, the wakeful state and the sleep state, all are unreal and illusory. But according to Rāmānuja there is a real character in all the states. Even the dreams are not unreal.

During the waking state, the Self is awake, and it contacts the external world through the mind and senses. In the dream state, the Self breaks away from the external world by shutting the senses. Its Mind works, and it experiences a successive memory images without any coherence and co-ordination. As the Mind actually works in this state, we cannot call it unreal.

¹Ibid. p. 44.

According to Śankara, each state of consciousness is sublated by the successive higher stage. But Rāmānuja takes a realistic stand. According to him the three states are continuous like the growth of a man, and his stages of life childhood, youth, and old age. Continuity persists in all the states, and there is no sublation or contradiction. There is a particular cyclic order in which the states function viz. waking to dream to sleep to waking again, and so on, as explained in the Upaniṣads. The concept of sublation is Śankara's own, and it has no validity. If waking is sublated by dream, dream by sleep, and sleep by kaivalya, then following the same logic, kaivalya must also be sublated by some other state, say nothingness (śūnya). Then the consequences would be nothingness, which is unacceptable.

Consciousness is continuous, though it has degrees of perfection. In the subconscious and the dream state, consciousness is dim and confused. In the waking state, it is distinct and clear. In the mukta stage, it is divine and perfect. In the former two states it is limited, finite and contracted. But in the final, turīya or mukta state, it is all pervasive. The goal of all life is to break the walls of finiteness and make finite consciousness infinite.

Finally, we may quote Rāmānuja accepting the following definition of Yamunācārya regarding the nature of Consciousness:

"The essential nature of Consciousness consists that in that it shines forth or manifests itself through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment or that it is instrumental in proving its own object to its substrate."¹

4. Dream Theory

Bādrāyaṇa in *Brahma Sūtra* states that dream is an intermediate state between sleep and waking or waking and sleep, and it is called 'Sandhyā'.²

Again it is a state of creation, wherein objects are created and experiences of joy and sorrow take place.³ But these

¹Quoted from Vardacāri, *Rāmānuja's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 21.

²IV, 2.1.

³III, 2, 2.

creations are not real but illusory.¹ There are no chariots, and no actual objects.² These dreams are representative in character.

Now the question arises, "who creates these dreams?" Rāmānuja states that all power of creation belongs to Īśvara, and not to the individual. He creates dreams through his Devamāyā. To support this fact, he presents the following arguments:

(1) The individual does not possess the capability of creating objects which are not there. His powers are limited. The dream experiences cannot be created by him, as these are far beyond his powers. So it is Īśvara who makes him experience the dream through the individual's own psychic apparatus.

(2) Some dreams are prophetic (sūcaka).³ The Jīva of limiting powers cannot bring about the fruition of events in future which are experienced in dream. Even his intense volition cannot bring fulfilment of dreams.⁴

(3) The individual experiences sometimes bad dreams. He would not entertain any desire to meet unpleasant dreams. So he himself is not responsible for the creation of dreams.⁵ It is the Īśvara, who residing in the heart of the individual (antar-yāmi), creates the dreams for the enjoyment or suffering of the individual, in accordance with his merit or demerit.⁶

Ethical aspect of Dreams

The cause of dreams is the karma of the individual. Meritorious Karma result in pleasant dreams. Evil actions beget unpleasant dreams, as a punishment for the sins. Thus some dreams are retributive in character. They evoke joy or sorrow. Good actions beget pleasant dreams creating mental comfort and joy. Sins beget unpleasant dreams disturbing actually the mental peace and causing physical exhaustion.

Thus the dreams have a moral cause and these produce physical and psychical effects in the receptive state. The ethical

¹III, 2.3.

²BU, IV, 3, 1.

³BS, II, 24; CUV, 2, 8.

⁴Sri B, III, 2-4.

⁵Ibid, 2, 6.

⁶Ibid, 2, 5.

and the mystical (prophetic) aspect of dreams is a special contribution of Rāmānuja. The ethical and the prophetic aspects are inter-connected according to Rāmānuja. The more the individual becomes Sāttvic with self-control and piousness, the more does he experience the prophetic dreams, wherein the individual has the higher communication with the Divine.

5. *Deep Sleep*

Śankara says that the Self exists in deep sleep as witness (Sākṣin) of Avidyā, and ego is totally dissolved. After waking he says 'I slept well. I was pure consciousness, free from all egoity, and was witness of Avidyā'. Rāmānuja modifies the whole explanation. He says there is no witness, and no consciousness persists in this State. The person on waking from sleep, says only this much, 'I slept well'. Though he is conscious of nothing, it means that the subject 'I' persisted, and the object of knowledge was absent.¹ The soul in that case remains in the state of self consciousness, and the cognition is not functioning at all at that time. To Śankara Self is pure consciousness. But to Rāmānuja, Self is not consciousness, but pure ego, who possesses consciousness as an attribute. What persists in deep sleep is the Self, the subject, and not the consciousness. If the Self did not persist in deep sleep, he could not remember on waking that he slept well, and again he would have a permanent self-memory, as there would always be a gap between one wakeful state and another. If we identify Self with Consciousness (as Śankara does), then the phenomenon of void in sleep could not be explained. So sleep is not a breach of the continuity of the self, as it is evident from the continuity of work and from memory.²

6. *Turiya and Yogipratyakṣa*

Upaniṣads talk of Turiya as the fourth state of Consciousness. Rāmānuja adds Yogi-pratyakṣa as another state. In the Turiya state, the individual crosses the finiteness of his body and gets unfettered consciousness (nirupādhika jñāna). It is the state of realisation of the limitless expanse of consciousness. It

¹*Sri BI*, 1, 1 ; II, 3, 31.

²*Sri B*, III, 2, 7.

has no contradiction which obscure the realization of the Ultimate Reality. It is divested of all the limitations of body and mind.

Rāmānuja differentiates between Turiya and Yogic intuition. The later is a higher type of consciousness, a divine consciousness. Through this the individual perceives the entrei reality, as Arjuna perceived when divine eye was granted to him by Kṛṣṇa. It is supersensory in character, and is the highest consciousness accompanying liberation. According to Rāmānuja, it is got by divine grace (Bhagvatprasāda). "Whom he chooses by him He is perceived."¹

C. FACTORS OF PERSONALITY

(a) *Concept*

Human personality is a prototype of the Cosmic personality, it is a microcosm in the macrocosm. The Jīva is monad and it contains in him both matter and spirit. It is a prakāra of Brahman. The empirical self is the knower (jñātā), experiencer (bhokta) and doer (karta). Thus he is endowed with all the three psychological aspects, cognition, affection and conation. Consciousness is his inherent attribute. To Vaiśeṣika, Jīva is non-intelligent, and intelligence is its adventitious quality. But to Rāmānuja, Jīva is intelligent like Īśvara (though its intelligence is circumscribed by karama) and the intelligence is his essential trait. According to Sāṃkhya, Puruṣa is indifferent and passive, and it is Prakṛti that dances before him and involves him in the world-drama. But to Rāmānuja, man is active by nature, and his knowledge is all active. To Śāṅkara, Jīva is the reflection of Ātman, but Rāmānuja calls him the finite form of the Absolute. It is real and not reflection. Jīvas are many, according to their physical and mental characteristics depending upon Karma.

Rāmānuja falls in line with the modern psychologists as regards the concept and nature of human personality. Realist as he was, he well explains the nature of personality, the relation between man and man, between man and God, and between man and nature. "The whole Universe," according to

¹Katha UP, 2, 23 ; BG, IX, 53-54.

Rāmānuja, "is rooted in Brahman and pulsates with his life."¹ Every living organism borrows its life from Him, and grows and blossoms forth. Every plant has a seed, it takes roots in earth, sprouts up and grows to its fulfilment. There is growth, continuity and fulfilment. Human personally follows the same principle. "Personality implies inner growth and the unfolding of the infinite consciousness that belongs to the Jiva. Causality thus implies continuity, immanent unity and free causality."² An example of causal relationship in human personality is childhood to youth (and not clay to pot). Every personality grows, continuously according to its endowments.

(b) *Factors*

As far the factors of personality, Rāmānuja enumerates three major factors viz. (i) body and Manas, (ii) the Self, and (3) Antaryāmin Īśvara.³ The Manas of Rāmānuja is a wide term, identical with Antaḥkaraṇa of Sāṃkhya and Advaita, and incorporating in it ego, citta and buddhi. The psycho-physical system is also the same as given in Sāṃkhya. Ātman is the essence of personality, Manas and Śarīra are its mental and physical bodies respectively. Ātman is the knowing subject (jñātā).⁴ Thus each personality is a trinity in unity, just as Īśvara is.

(c) *The Ātman*

What is the essence of individuality? Ātman, the Self is the essence. Rāmānuja examines the other views on this subject and repudiates those:

(i) The Cārvāka views that the assemblage of atoms is the essence is erroneous because matter does not think.

(ii) The Vitalists view that Prāṇa is the essence is also wrong because Prāṇa is not an intelligent entity. Its task is maintenance and reproduction.

(iii) The Sensationalistic view of the Buddhists that the cluster of five skandas is the essence is wrong because it does not explain the reason for unity and continuity.

¹Srinivāsāchari, *The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita*, p. 260.

²*Ibid*, p. 260.

³*Sri BI*, 1, 13.

⁴*Ibid*, II, 3, 18.

(iv) Those who think Mind is everything, are wrong as Mind is a mode of Prakṛti and is not spiritual.

(v) The Advaita Theory that Jīva is an illusory reflection of Brahman in Avidyā is a mere phantasy.

The essence of personality according to Rāmānuja is the Ātman, who is self-luminous and morally free.¹ He is the 25th category, beyond the 24 categories as enumerated by Sāṃkhya. Ātman is self-manifest and is its own proof. He is monadic and infinitesimal.² He possesses light and jñāna or self-consciousness as his integral quality. Jñāna is the attribute (dharma) of the Self (the dharmin), hence it is called dharma-bhūta-jñāna. The consciousness and Ātman are distinguishable (as attribute and substantive) but not separable. Its relation to Brahman is that of spark and fire, śarīra and śarīrin. Brahman or Īśvara is the source, sustainer and the controller of the individual personality. Every person comes from God and goes back to Him, as He is the home of all perfection. Man is bound by Karma. What some call Avidyā is really Karma, and it is Karma that is the cause of imperfections in life. Pure Karma leads to the union with the Lord, and vicious Karma is the cause of degeneration. But every man has the moral freedom to have the Sāttvika traits and follow the practice of selfless duty (niṣkāma-karma). Ātman falls in bondage, because of bad action, because of false identification with the body made of Prakṛti and Guṇas, and because of the desire (Kāma) for the pleasures of the body. The process has been explained in Gīta. First rises the attachment, then desires, then frustration, then infatuation and then mental confusion and finally moral death.³

According to Rāmānuja, the individual soul no doubt is an effect of Brahman but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and a mode (prakāra) of Brahman. Hence its eternity. The material elements also subsist in Brahman, but they are said to originate when they pass into gross condition at the time of creation. But the soul possess

¹*Ibid*, 3, 19, 33.

²*Ibid*, 3, 26.

³*BG*, II, 62-63.

at all times the same essential qualities.¹ The soul is continuous and eternal. It retains its individuality even after attaining liberation.

Thus Rāmānuja states a number of unique facts about the self. He talks of plurality of souls as is evident from the distribution of pleasure and pain.² Each soul reincarnates and maintains its identity throughout the births. Each soul is an *aṁśa* of *Īśvara*, in the sense of a mode (and not a fragment) like spark from fire.³ Essentially it possesses the same characteristics as Brahman (hence non-dualism), and what differs is the intelligence which expands and contracts. The theory of plurality of *Puruṣa* is obviously due to influence of *Sāṁkhya*.

(d) *Manas*

Manas of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* corresponds to *Antaḥkaraṇa* of *Sāṁkhya* and *Advaita*, and *Mind* of the Western psychology. *Manas* reveals to the soul the inner states of pleasure and pain and with the aid of ten senses, conveys a knowledge of the outer states. The functions of *Manas* are threefold : decision (*adyavasāya*), self-love (*abhimāna*) and reflection (*cintā*), corresponding to its three aspects *Buddhi*, *Ahaṁkāra* and *Citta*. It corresponds to the subtle body which serves as the substrate of life. It remains as long as the state of bondage lasts.⁴

D. FUNCTIONS OF THE MIND

1. *Cognition*

Rāmānuja's theory of cognition is realistic one, rejecting on the one hand the extreme materialism, and the extreme mentalism on the other hand. From the materialistic point of view, ideas are nothing but sensations stimulated by matter. There is nothing like independent mind or knowledge. According to Śāṅkara, the object is a psychosis (*vṛtti*) of the mind objectified by *Avidyā*. The objects have no real existence apart from the *vṛtti*. To Rāmānuja, both exist, the objects as well as the idea. The perceiving self is real, and so is the external

¹*Sri B*, II, 3, 17.

²*Sri B*, II, 1, 15.

³*Ibid.*, 3, 45.

⁴*Sri B*, IV, 2, 9 ; III, 3, 30.

world. No object in the universe is unreal and no cognition is unreal. All knowledge produced has a real character (sarvam vijñānaṁ jātaṁ yathārthaṁ).¹ Ideas are counterpart of the objects. There is reality of the perceiving self, of the external world and of the cognition thereof. A cognition depends upon both the object as well as the subject. An object is illumined by cognition and it is not a shadow of the idea, nor a mental construction (as Advaita says).

Again Knowledge has the power of illumining and therefore it is neither a copy of the object nor its duplication. It is something more than that. Although Jīva is finite and infinitesimal (aṇu), it has the cognitive capacity of mirroring the whole universe, because consciousness, which is its inherent attribute, is all-pervasive (vibhu) and infinite.

Cognition is two-fold, observation (anubhava) and remembrance (smṛti). Remembrance is as valid as perception, and deserves to be given a separate place. All remembered knowledge may assume a sort of perception, but that does not make it perception, because the objects of perception are not present at that time and place.

Observation is two-fold: perception and inference. Inference is based on indirect proof or tarka and the use of both positive and negative instances. The non-essentials are eliminated and a general principle is established.²

The Process

Cognition has three basis : (1) the subject, (2) the object and (3) the subject-object relation. From the point of object, the external world is important for cognition. As for the subject, Rāmānuja presents gradation. The immediate subject is Manas and senses, but it is directed by Ātman, who is itself an attribute or śarīra of Īśvara. So the immediate subject may be Mind or Ātman, but the remote subject is Īśvara. Consciousness is an attribute of Īśvara and the Ātman. Hence there are four factors on the subject side: Īśvara, Ātman, Manas and the senses. The fifth factor on the object side is the object of perception or cognition. The subject-object relation means

¹*Sri BI*, 1, 1.

²*SAS*, IV, 47.

the coordination of the five factors. The result of coordination is the cognition, which works as the attributive intelligence of the Self. The cognition, whether it is present experience (anubhava) or memory, reveals both itself and the object of cognition.

Levels of Cognition

Rāmānuja describes three levels of cognition viz. (1) Perception (pratyakṣa); (2) Inference (anumāna); and (3) Intuition (divya-pratyakṣa). This corresponds to Perception, parokṣa and aparokṣa of Advaita. Śankara's views regarding the authority of scriptures have not been accepted by Rāmānuja. Intuition, according to Rāmānuja is the highest level of cognition. The first two levels have limitations due to the Karma and Vāsanā of the individual. Consciousness is the same in all the three levels of cognition, and in each of these three levels some aspects of the real are exhibited. But total reality is exhibited in the third level. The other lower levels of cognition are illusory cognition and dream cognition. Rāmānuja holds that even these cognitions are real. The false object has some advantage of familiarity. This compares favourably with modern theories of illusion.¹ Even the dream experiences are real, being result of our past karma.

Thus according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, all knowledge is real, but it has levels of truth. Illusion is partial truth. A mirage is an error, not because the element of water is not present, but because the water in it cannot serve our purpose. It is not real (yathārtha) because it is not practically useful (vyavahārānuṣṅga). The second level is the empirical level. But this also is not perfect until it takes in the whole of reality. That is possible only when we are divested of all imperfections through Karma and devotion, and we attain divine perception, which is the highest level of cognition, the desired goal.

2. Perception

According to Śankara, perception is mere 'existence' (asti), and actually speaking, the objects of perception (pot, cloth etc.) are unreal. These things do not persist and are mere

¹Compare Woodworth, *Psychology*, Ch, XIII, Observation Section on illusions.

phenomenon. But Rāmānuja accepts all perception as real. Perception, according to him is not mere 'is' (asti) but also the existence of the object. If the object exists even for a short duration, it exists and hence real. Reality and unreality do not depend upon duration. There is no question of sublation of the present perception.

The process of sense-perception follows the process of cognition. Perception is Prāpyakārī. It starts from Ātman, and with Mind and senses comes into contact with the object, assumes its form and reveals the same. All perception is real. Even the so-called illusory perception has reality. Take for instance the silver-nacre example. In the nacre there is an element or aspect of real silver which accounts for the mistake. It is this fraction of real silver that is taken for silver. Nacre and silver have some common properties. Our perception of nacre as silver is not unreal in so far as we have actually perceived the common properties. The physical stimulus from nacre is there, which is responsible for the mistake. Here we must take into account physics, physiology as well as psychology. For perception, one basis is the light vibrations, the sound vibrations *etc.* from the objects of perception. The physiological basis is the sensations and the stimuli. The psychological basis is the consciousness. Rāmānuja's theory of perception accounts for the reality of all the basis, and synthesises these.

3. Indeterminate and Determinate Perception

According to Śankara, the first stage of perception is I.P., which is perception of mere existence 'isness.' The second stage is D.P., the perception of form and attribute (jāti-guṇa). I.P. is real, but D.P. is illusory.

Rāmānuja holds that at no stage is our perception devoid of attributes. There is no such perception as 'asti'. Hence even I.P., the perception in the first instance presents not bare existence but configuration or physical structure of the object with its differentiating features.

Indeterminate Perception is not devoid of any character. There can be no perception which is absolutely negative with regard to manifestation of qualities. When a thing is perceived for the first time, and we say 'It is so.' The perception may

be purely elementary, but some specific characters are discerned. At the first glimpse of an elephant, we try to run away, because we take it as an elephant and not a cow. Hence some specific character, by which we designate an object as that object and not something different is existent even in the I.P.

I.P. is, indeed, known to be the perception of that which is devoid of particular attribute or the other, but not the perception of that which is devoid of all attributes; because the perception of such a thing is not seen to occur at any time, and because also it is impossible. Surely, all cognition is produced in association with some defining attribute, or other, so as to denote that a particular thing is of a particular nature.¹

I.P. is outline perception—the first outline in relation to things which are of the same kind. The second and the following perceptions possess the character of being definite. Thus perception can never have for its object the thing which is devoid of attributes.²

“Even if I.P. last for one moment, yet during that very moment, the generic properties which (for example) belong to the ox and other such objects, which are the same as distinctions,—they are (all) apprehended.” I.P. of pure existence is a myth, because in that case there would result the contradiction of such definite cognitions as are realised in the instances, ‘A jar exists,’ and ‘a cloth exists.’

If differentiation, which is a thing other than pure existence, and consists of generic properties and such other attributes as go to make up the configuration of things, be not apprehended by perception, why does one who is in quest of a horse turn away at the sight of a buffalo? Hence there is no such thing as perception of pure existence.³ Rāmānuja substantiates this point by his further presumption that individuals alone are real and there is no class-essence in them, although there is resemblance (*sādṛśya*) in the individuals in the shape of configuration (*saṁsthāna*) among the individuals.

¹*Sri BI*, 1, 1.

²*Ibid*, 1, 1.

³*Ibid*, 1, 1.

4. *Intuitive Perception*

This is the highest type of perception. It is the fundamental type of cognition capable of apprehending the Reality. Hence it is designated as insight into reality. Herein, the individual is not influenced by Karma, Vāsanā or any defect of the body or senses. He is free from ignorance and the limitations of the body which is a product of Karma. This perception does not need the physical senses, and hence it is called divine perception (divya-pratyakṣa). It is representative in character. From point of view of distinctness and immediacy, it is in no way inferior to ordinary perception.¹

The means of attaining divine perception are divine grace which is invoked by acts of daily worship and meditation bearing the character of devotion.²

5. *Conation*

Rāmānuja lays due emphasis on the conative aspect of human personality. He grants to the individual soul freedom to act according to his own will. Here he is a prototype of God. But he is responsible for all his acts, good or bad, for which Law of Karma is there, as an administrative principle of God to control sins. Man can misuse his will, and there lies the evil fruit of his misuse, to check the same. Hence Will must be guided by ethical principles. The sublimation of will is dedication to the service of the Lord who is the Master. The individual will must be surrendered to the divine will.

6. *Affection*

Rāmānuja lays greatest emphasis on the affective side of personality. Cognition and conation are subservient to it. It is this aspect that leads to the highest spiritual fulfilment. The best means of training the affective side is devotion (Bhakti). 'It is a surging emotion which thrills the whole frame, chokes speech and leads to trance.' It is the highest form of love—sublimated love. All good emotions culminate in love. The devotee redirects the love of worldly things to Īśvara. He gets highest happiness in the presence of his beloved Lord. He is

¹*Sri, BI, III, 4, 26.*

²*Ibid, 2, 23.*

prepared to undergo any suffering for the sake of Divine Love. That way Bhakti is not mere emotionalism, but includes the training of will as well as the intellect. The state of devotion includes a number of emotions and cognitive and volitional acts. On the emotional side, it includes longing for Īśvara and for nothing else (*vimoka*), wishing good to others (*kalyāna*), compassion (*dayā*), non-violence (*ahimsā*) and cheerfulness (*anavasāda*). On the cognitive side it includes discrimination (*viveka*) and integrity (*ārjavam*). On the conative side it includes action (*kriyā*), practice (*abhyāsa*), and charity (*dāna*). Rāmānuja's Bhakti Yoga lays emphasis on complete resignation to Lord (*prapatti*) which invokes divine grace. Devotion according to all the Vaiṣṇava philosophers is the best means of not only training and sublimating the emotions but also uplifting the human personality. It leads to the emotional experience of highest love, exquisite joy and pure delight. It cuts at the roots of the lower *tāmasika* emotions of anger, hatred, jealousy and passion, and develops the *sattvika bhāvas* of love, cheerfulness (*prasāda*), sympathy (*karuṇā*), and kindness (*dayā*).

E. RESUME

Vedānta presents a vast philosophical super-structure on the foundations of Upaniṣads. The Psychology in Upaniṣads is therefore repeated in Vedānta, with greater details about each topic. While Advaita Vedānta twists the Upaniṣads psychology in the direction of Māyāvāda (which is against the spirit of Upaniṣads), Vaiṣṇava Vedānta faithfully carries the Upaniṣad philosophy and psychology further and Brahma Sūtra in the spirit of Upaniṣads. Thibaut rightly points out that Rāmānuja was more faithful to Bādrāyaṇa in his interpretation of Brahma Sūtra than Śankara was, who revived Upaniṣads on Buddhist lines. S.N. Dasgupta also points out that Śankara's philosophy is largely a compound of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda with the Upaniṣadic notion of permanence of Self superadded. No wonder of the celebrated philosopher Vijñānabhikṣu called Śankara a hidden Buddhist. But Rāmānuja retains the realism of the other Āstika philosophies and synthesises the various currents of vedic ritualism, Bhāgavata devotion, south Indian

philosophy of Alvars, and the Monism of Vedānta.

Rāmānuja's special contribution is, therefore, in the following directions. He divested Vedāntic philosophy from Buddhist influence, and while calling the universe a real appearance, made psychology a subject of real character. He synthesised Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, taking the best from each.

He recalled the ethical and aesthetic side of life and emphasised the volitional and aesthetic aspect of human behaviour, pointing towards the higher goal of human will. He laid the greatest stress on the affective side of personality (in contrast to the mere intellectualism of Śāṅkara) and pointed towards devotion as the highest means of sublimation of emotions. He gave an intelligible explanation of consciousness which he calls as attribute of the Self (and not identical with Self). He presents a realistic explanation of perception and divests Advaita perception from its pure metaphysics. He discusses superconscious state (yogi-pratyakṣa) and thus presents a complete picture of Consciousness, with all its levels and degrees. Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita represents all the three schools (viśiṣṭādvaita, dvaita and bhedābheda) of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta as far as psychological principles are concerned, and hence there is no need to refer to Mādhva, Nimbārka or Bhāskara and their followers.

Yoga-Psychology

A. INTRODUCTION

After having discussed the psychological speculations in the Upaniṣads and five systems of Āstika philosophy, we now proceed to Yoga Psychology, which is, infact, the Psychology proper. The other schools deal with psychological topics only incidentally. But the subject-matter of Yoga is Psychology proper. Chronologically, it should figure after Sāṃkhya, but here it is discussed last of all, as it is the culmination of Indian Psychology.

B. COMPARISON WITH SĀMĀKHYA

Yoga takes for granted most of the ontological, epistemological and psychological doctrines as propounded in Sāṃkhya. In fact it starts from the Sāṃkhya principles and proceeds further to expound a number of subjects not dealt with in Sāṃkhya. It is thus a complementary compendium of Sāṃkhya, and it begins where Sāṃkhya ends, without finding any need to discuss any further the Sāṃkhya doctrines. Thus it begins with the postulates viz. the twenty-five categories of universe, the three Guṇas, the three proofs of valid cognition, the interaction between Prakṛti and Puruṣa, and the nature of Mokṣa (as the cessation of Prakṛti from Puruṣa).

Garbe has listed fourteen principles of Sāṃkhya system which are taken for granted in Yoga. These are reproduced below, in an order that helps us to understand Yoga Psychology:

(1) The twenty-five principles (tattvas); (2) Independence and eternity of matter; (3) Evolution of the world from primeval matter; (4) Denial of Brahman; (5) Plurality of souls; (6) The theory of Guṇas; (7) The theory of release through dissolution of spirit from matter; (8) Absolute separateness of the spiritual and the non-spiritual principles; (9) The five element-potentials (tanmātras); (10) The evolution of psychical organs evolving from the interaction of Puruṣa and Prakṛti;

(11) The Antaḥkaraṇa, and its composition of Manas, Ahaṁkāra and Buddhi ; (12) The concept of subtle-body (Linga Śarīra) ; (13) the effect of soul consciousness on matter and the birth of psychical process ; (14) The theory of Saṁskāras (mental dispositions).

Out of the above fourteen postulates in Yoga, the last five are directly connected with Psychology. We may not discuss these topics again in Yoga, but proceed further with its special topics like superconscious state, mental health, psycho-analysis, para-psychology etc. Yoga, however, presents some minor differences from Sāṁkhya regarding a few topics. Sāṁkhya emphasises knowledge as the means of release. The realisation of Puruṣa that it is different from Prakṛti, releases him from its bondage. But for Yoga, this theoretical realisation is not enough. Actual practice in meditation leads to release. No release is possible until the whole mind is brought under control. Yoga talks of Īśvara, over and above Puruṣa. While as the Sāṁkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa denies the existence of God. A number of references of God are there in Yoga (this is explained below). In Sāṁkhya, the round of rebirths, with its perpetual misery is that which is to be escaped from, and the means are the right knowledge. But Yoga emphasises meditation as the means. The highest form of matter is Citta, and Yoga wants to annihilate Citta by Sādhana.

Sāṁkhya designates mind by the word Antaḥkaraṇa, while Yoga calls it Citta. Citta is something more than the Antaḥkaraṇa, in so far it replaces the Linga Śarīra. Yoga does not postulates any linga Śarīra apart from Citta.¹

According to Yoga, Īśvara is a particular Puruṣa who is untouched by afflictions of life, actions and the results thereof.² He is thus over and above each Puruṣa. In him there is pre-eminence that is neither equalled nor excelled by any one.³ In him becomes perfect the seed of all consciousness.⁴ He is the object of devotion. He who surrenders himself to Īśvara

¹TV, IV, 10.

²YS, I, 24.

³YB, I, 24.

⁴Op. cit.

attains concentration.¹

In him is the highest limit of omniscience.² Being unconditioned by time, He is teacher even of the ancients.³ His designation is Om.⁴ By constant meditation on Om, obstacles are controlled and the consciousness turned inward.⁵ Meditation on God is means to higher type of Samādhi *i.e.* Nirbīja Samādhi. In words of Vijñānabhikṣu, "of all kinds of conscious meditation, the meditation of Īśvara is the highest."⁶

C. YOGA AND ITS TYPES

The word Yoga has been used in a variety of ways, though the principal one is Yoga of Patañjali, named as Rāja-yoga, to distinguish it from the other paths *viz.* Jñāna-yoga of Śankara, Haṭha-yoga, Laya-yoga, Mantra-yoga, Karma-yoga, Bhakti-yoga, Kuṇḍalinī-yoga etc. Śankara emphasises intellectual enlightenment and self-realisation as the supreme goal. So he advises to meditate on the 'Self,' and take recourse to good action and devotion as preliminary steps. Hatha-yogis go to the extreme of controlling the bodily organs, the bodily function, through Prāṇāyām and Āsana.⁷ Laya-yoga leads to awakening of the 'Serpent Power' (Kuṇḍalinī Śakti) from its source along the path of Suṣumnā Nāḍi *via* six plexus (cakras) upto the cerebral cortex, resulting in divine consciousness. Mantra-yoga teaches meditating on a mystical Mantra (with its meaning and thought), by repeating the same and gaining concentration of mind. The Mantra has a mystical power, and it is suggested by the Guru.⁸

Karma-yoga is the path of action, dedication to the people, through selfless devotion, renunciation and love. Love of man is love of God. Bhakti-yoga teaches devotion to personal god through prayer, devotion or ritual. Swami Vivekananda has

¹YS, I, 23.

²*Ibid*, 25.

³*Ibid*, 26.

⁴*Ibid*, 27.

⁵*Ibid*, 29.

⁶YSS, I.

⁷*e.g.* Gheranda Saṁhitā and Haṭha-yoga Pradīpikā.

⁸*e.g.* Aum, So-ham, Ain-kleem-soh, kleem kṛṣṇāya Govindāya.

presented the most lucid explanation of the various yogic paths.¹

D. THE PHILOSOPHY OF KLEŚAS

Yoga postulates five-fold misery in the world. Pleasure, there exists, of course, but it is transient, and it results in displeasure, at least in the sense that it causes attachment to pleasure and anxiety to avoid pain. But the worldly pleasures cannot be retained for long. Hence all pleasures are pain-giving (pariṇāma-duḥkha). The resultant of the worldly life is misery in five forms viz. (1) ignorance (avidyā); (2) egoism (asmitā); (3) attachment (rāga); (4) aversion (dveṣa) and (5) clinging to life (abhiniveśa).²

The root-cause of the latter four types of miseries is ignorance, whether these types of misery are dormant or alternating or expanded. In the dormant condition the misery is there but in the latent form. In the alternating condition two opposite tendencies overpower each other alternately. In the expanded condition, the misery is fully operative.³ In all these states of misery, the root-cause is Avidyā. Avidyā is taking the non-eternal non-Ātman to be the eternal Ātman. The same concept we find in Vedānta also. The second type of misery is egoism, arising out of Avidyā. The third type of misery arising out of Avidyā is attachment. It is that which accompanies pleasure.⁴ Man is so much involved in the emotions of the moment that he is incapable of seeing the true bearing of any given situation. The fourth misery is repulsion or aversion from pain (dveṣa).⁵

Man is tossed between the two opposites (dvanda), Rāga and Dveṣa. "Life swings like a pendulum backward and forward between pain and ennui," says Schopenhauer. Both Patañjali and Schopenhauer agree that life is beset with misery. Schopenhauer asks, "For whence did Dante take the material

¹vide *Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda*, or separate booklets on Raja-yoga etc.

²YS, II, 3.

³YS, II, 14.

⁴*Ibid*, 7.

⁵*Ibid*, 8.

of his hell but from our actual world?" To a hedonist he advises to go and see hospitals, prisons, battlefields, mental asylums, slums, and starving beggar colonies and be convinced of the horrors of life.

The fifth misery is 'attachment to life.' Everyman has a deep resistance to life as life. It is, therefore, that he has the incapacity to accept the flow of things and adapt to it freely. Too much attachment to life creates unnecessarily mental conflicts born of fear—fear of insecurity, fear of illness, fear of accident and fear of death. A warrior fights when he has rid his mind off the fear of death. A patriot is prepared to sacrifice his life. Look at the Rajput women who performed fearlessly the vow of Jauhar! So Yoga teaches us to accept life as it comes. Coster says: "It is sitting loose to life, accepting it as it comes rather than demanding from it what you expect, that both analyst and Yogi regard as constituting the free 'psyche.' 'Liberation' which in the eyes of both (Yogis and analysts) is the pearl of great price worth any sacrifice to attain."¹ This fear of death, and strong desire for life demonstrates even the wise.²

The true goal of human life is the destruction of this five-fold misery, because it is the kleśas that are responsible for the continuous generation of karmas. The reservoir of karmas (karmāśaya) which are rooted in kleśas bring all experiences in present and future lives.³ As long as the root is there, it must ripen and result in lives of different class (jāti), longevity (āyu) and experiences (bhoga).⁴ This is illustrated in Illustration 3, below. They have joy or sorrow for their fruit according as their cause is virtue or vice.⁵ To the person who has developed discrimination, all is misery on account of the pains resulting from change, anxiety and tendencies.⁶ Hence misery is to be destroyed. It is to be suppressed by meditation.⁷ The misery

¹Geraldine Coster, *Yoga and Western Psychology*, pp. 180-81.

²YS, II, 9.

³*Ibid*, 12.

⁴*Ibid*, 13.

⁵*Ibid*, 14.

⁶*Ibid*, 15.

⁷*Ibid*, 11.




Illustration 3

that is past, is exhausted and hence not to be cared for. But the misery which is not yet come can and is to be avoided by meditation.¹

E. GOAL OF YOGA

The philosophy of Kleśa leads us to the goal of Yoga. Patañjali says that misery is to be destroyed, and Yoga is the means or the remedy. But whence started this misery? If we know the inherent cause, we can take hold of that and select the right remedy. Here Patañjali follows the Sāṃkhya metaphysics. The business of the universe started from the interaction of two principles—the seer and the seen, the Puruṣa and Prakṛti, the Self and the non-Self or the subject and the object. The seer, *i.e.* Puruṣa is pure consciousness, but though pure, appears to see through the mind.² The 'seen' is the Prakṛti, consisting of the elements and the sense-organs, which is of the nature of cognition, activity and stability. Its purpose is providing Puruṣa with experience and finally liberation.³ It exists for the sake of Puruṣa only.⁴ When it becomes non-existent for that Puruṣa whose purpose has been fulfilled, it continues to exist for the other Puruṣas.⁵ By this interaction Puruṣa becomes aware of

¹YS, II, 16.

²*Ibid*, 20.

³*Ibid*, 18.

⁴*Ibid*, 21.

⁵*Ibid*, 22.

his true nature and unfolds his inherent powers, and the powers in Prakṛti.¹ But this union or interaction is caused by Avidyā, and unless Avidyā is destroyed, Puruṣa cannot be liberated from Prakṛti.² So long as Avidyā continues, the union continues and the five-fold misery continue. Avidyā is thus to be removed, and the method is the uninterrupted practice of the awareness of the Reality.³ Once Avidyā is destroyed, enlightenment follows, and brings in its wake cessation of misery, cessation of entanglement of Puruṣa by Prakṛti. This is the state of liberation—Kaivalyam. This highest stage of enlightenment (prajñā) is reached by a number of stages called Aṣṭāṅga-yoga. Here lies the need for Yoga and its ultimate purpose. Ultimately Yoga brings supreme enlightenment, but in the preliminary stages it develops the powers of the mind by divesting it of distractions and impurities. A concise definition of Yoga is therefore given by Patañjali as "Yoga is the control of the modifications of the mind."⁴ In this state the Puruṣa (the Seer) is established in his own essential nature.⁵ Ordinarily, when the Yoga state is far away, the Puruṣa take the same form as the fluctuations of the Citta.⁶ But in Yoga state, enlightenment follows.

Purity of Consciousness

The object of Yoga is to divest mind of all its impurities, so that the stream of consciousness is clear as crystal capable of reflecting whole reality. The muddled water of mental modifications is to be left alone (calm and steady), so that all the impurities sink to the bottom and the pure stream shines forth. Edward Carpenter says, "If the brain consciousness can be rendered calm and free from ripples as a motionless pool of water, then and then only can creative and complete ideas be reflected in its depths without distortion."⁷

¹YS, II, 23.

²Ibid, 25.

³Ibid, 26.

⁴YS, I, 2.

⁵Ibid, 3.

⁶Ibid, 4.

⁷Quoted by Coster, *Ibid*, p. 241.

Aurobindo explains Yoga in more clear terms:

"Yoga means union with the Divine—a union either transcendental (above the Universe) or Cosmic (universal) or individual or, in our Yoga, all three together. Or it means getting into a consciousness in which one is no longer limited by the small ego, personal vital and body but is in union with the supreme self or with the Universal consciousness or with some deeper Consciousness in which one is aware of ones soul, one's own inner being, and of the real truth of existence..."¹

Extremes of Emotional Life

The duality of emotional life, the extremes of pleasure and pain, likes and dislikes, attraction and aversion is a common experience of ours. Man is tossed from one extreme to another. But no psychologist tells us how to harmonise the two. Yoga tells us that when we reach the summit of pleasure at one moment, we are destined to descend to the depths and rise to the summit of pain. The pain not only neutralises the extreme pleasure, but also creates a lasting impression upon our mind, as moments of pain are far more forceful and enduring than are moments of pleasure. The best way therefore is to escape both the extremes, and remain at the neutral point (the bottom of the two summits of pleasure and pain). This is possible by dissociating the mind from the objects of pleasure and pain, attraction and repulsion, like and dislike *etc.*

Geraldine Coster explains the goal of Yoga to the western mind in the following words:

"The basic idea of yoga is that the soul is immersed in the objective world, the eternal deeply entangled in the transient, the real in the unreal, and man's task is to disentangle himself in such a way that the soul becomes spectator of the drama of his own experience. This disentanglement does not necessarily involve a withdrawal from objective participation in life. It may take this form, but equally it may result in a state of recollection to use the Christian term, in which the individual participates in life but is not immersed in it."²

Yogic psychology therefore teaches detached and dispassioned working of the mind.

¹Aurobindo Ghosh, *Lights on Yoga*, p. 16.

²Geraldine Coster, *Yoga and Western Psychology*, Ch. VI.

Yoga-Therapy

Geraldine Coster recognises the importance of psycho-therapy as the only remedy of a number of physical ailments, hysterical and such organic defects which are more of psychological than of physiological origin. But he finds that the Western psycho-therapy is not on a firm ground, as it may kill or cure. "It is still at the almost entirely empirical stage of its development, and has contributed little of real value to our theoretical knowledge of the make-up of human consciousness—failing as it has done to answer any of the great fundamental questions concerning the existence and inter-relation of body, soul and spirit."¹

Coster also compares Yoga with therapy:

"Preliminary Yoga has for its object the breaking up of the automatic and unaware habits of thought and feeling, which make up the confused picture of life, and for this reason I have ventured to argue that preliminary Yoga is an eastern equivalent to analytical therapy."²

Yoga and Psycho-analysis

Geraldine Coster finds Yoga a better method of psycho-analysis:

"What I hope to show by the comparison of Yoga with analytical therapy is that these two have much in common, and that although yoga is perhaps an essentially Eastern method, it nevertheless contains the clue needed by the West if the analytical method and theory is to reach its fullest scope as a regenerating and recreating factor in modern life."³

As regards method also, Yoga is far superior to psycho-analysis. In psycho-analysis, the person approaches the analyst as a patient. But a student of yoga approaches the question from the active and not the passive stand-point. He is a student, and not a patient. He himself chalks out the programme of self-analysis and proceeds with yogic exercises, for clearing and cleansing of the mento-emotional nature. The patient of psycho-analysis is a frustrated person, who has no goal to be looked for guidance, for help against trouble and insecurity. But the student of Yoga has a goal—liberation. He looks to Īśvara as the supreme guide, and faith in Him creates all the conditions of security and optimism. Yoga does

¹Coster, *Yoga and Western Psychology*, p. 25.

²*Ibid*, p. 199.

³*Ibid*, p. 11.

not emphasise religious practices, but devotion as a means of psychic progress. That way it is similar to Analytical Psychology, 'which provides a method of internal approach and interior experience for all—agnostic as well as the religious type of man.' Both Yoga and Analytical psychology emphasise self knowledge and self-analysis.

Coster recommends the Yogic practices not only for the patient but also for the psycho-analyst himself, in order that he may have balanced mind poise and calmness:

"But it would seem that the analyst of the future should also be one who knows experimentally something of the process of meditation, or the obtaining of mastery of the mind, so that even if no definite deductions are asked for or given, the analysed may feel for the analyst something of that profound confidence, that sense of his capacity for interim poise and spiritual insight, which the aspirant to yoga is trained to recognise in his Guru."¹

F. STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Yoga follows the same order of the states of consciousness as mentioned in the Upaniṣads and the Sāṃkhya. The wakeful, the dream and the sleep state are the first three states normal for every human being. But the fourth or the super-conscious state or Samādhi state is the privilege of the Yogi only. Yoga specialises in the description of this fourth state, and it deals with not only a detailed description of this stage, but also the means of attaining this state, and the result thereof. It deals with all the different types of supernatural powers (Siddhis) that accompany the devotee during the preliminary stages of his concentration and meditation. The supernatural or super-human powers are discussed in detail in the third book of Yoga-Sūtra. A separate section of this Chapter is devoted to this topic viz. Super-conscious state.

G. FACTORS OF PERSONALITY

Yoga accepts in toto the Sāṃkhya account of human personality, and the factors thereof. Human personality is a conjunction of spirit and matter, Puruṣa and Prakṛti, the seer and the seen or the self and the non-self. The interaction

¹Coster, *Yoga and Western Psychology*, p. 208.


between Puruṣa and Prakṛti brings forth Mahat, from which springs Ahaṁkāra. According to Sāṁkhya, Ego is bifurcated into the eleven senses on one hand, and five Tanmatras and five gross elements on the other. According to Yoga, the Tanmatras and elements spring forth directly from Mahat. This is shown in Diagram 11 below. Sāṁkhya calls the entire intergal organ (separated from the gross physical body) as Antaḥkaraṇa, which includes the ten senses, Manas, Ego and Buddhi. Yoga designates the same by Citta. This Citta is of two types—Kāraṇa Citta and Kārya Citta. Hence the personality comprises of Puruṣa (the seer, the spirit, the soul), the Citta and the gross physical body. Citta stores up latent Vāsanās and Saṁskāras. A brief description of Citta is given below.

Citta in Yoga

Citta in Yoga is the Mahat of Sāṁkhya, the first product of the interaction of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, and it includes Buddhi,

Diagram 11

EVOLUTION OF CATEGORIES (IN YOGA)



Ahaṁkāra and Manas. That way it is identical with Antaḥkaraṇa of Vedānta or Sāṁkhya.¹ Citta is unconscious, and it

¹YS, 1. Commentary by Vācaspati.

becomes conscious only by the reflection of *Puruṣa*.¹ It connects *Puruṣa* with the external objects of the world, and in that process it undergoes modification itself. The real experiencer is *Puruṣa*, but his consciousness reflected in it gives the erroneous impression that *Citta* is the experiencer.

Citta has a number of characteristics. It differs from *Puruṣa* to *Puruṣa*. It is all pervading. The Consciousness (*caitanya*) of the *Puruṣa* is reflected in *Citta*, and only then is knowledge produced. *Citta* is not self-illuminative for it is perceptible by another *i.e.* the *Puruṣa*.² It cannot be both the perceiver and the perceived at the same time.³ The perceiver is, in fact, *Puruṣa* and not another *Citta*—a Super *Citta*, because in that case cognition of one mind by another mind would have to be postulated and confusion of memories also.⁴ Impressions on *Citta* leave certain residue in the form of *Saṁskāra* and *Vāsanā*, which continue from birth to birth. These *Saṁskāras* further cause *Citta* to act in a particular direction resulting in further impressions, and thus the wheel of the world (*samsāra-cakram*) goes on. And so *Citta* becomes subject to five-fold misery. Deliverance consists in the cessation of the connection between *Citta* and *Puruṣa*.

Citta has another characteristic feature. It expands and contracts in the various kinds of abodes, say animal body or human body. The *Citta* that is always connected with *Puruṣa*, and remains constant is called *Kāraṇa-citta*, while its modified form which expands and contracts and assumes different forms from birth to birth is called *Kārya-citta*. "After death the *Kāraṇa Citta* which is always connected with the *Puruṣa* manifests itself in the new body which is formed by the *Āpūra* (filling in of *Prakṛti* on account of merit or demerit). The formation of the body as well as the contraction or expansion of *Kāraṇa-Citta* as the corresponding *Kārya-citta* to suit it is due to this *Āpūra*."⁵ We may roughly identify *Kāraṇa-Citta* with the *Citta* of *Vedānta* (the subconscious

¹YS, IV, 17-19.

²YS, IV, 19.

³*Ibid*, 20.

⁴*Ibid*, 21.

⁵YB, I, 5.

mind, the store-house of latent impressions and karmic residue), and Kārya-Citta with the Antaḥkaraṇa of Sāṃkhya-Vedānta. In the process of evolution of mental activity Puruṣa acts as the experiencer. It is connected with Prakṛti and the result is Mahat. From Mahat follows Kāraṇa-Citta, and from that Kārya-Citta. This process is responsible for all the human behaviour. But in the opposite process (the involution) the Kārya-citta dissolves in Kāraṇa-Citta, the latter in Mahat, and that also in Puruṣa. This process of involution is the process of Yoga by which all mental modifications or psychoses are controlled, and dissolved.

Five Types of Cittas

Cittas have various degrees of perfection. Vyāsa mentions five kinds viz. (1) wandering (kṣipta) ; (2) forgetful (mūḍha), (3) occasionally steady (vikṣipta) ; (4) one-pointed (ekāgra) and (5) restrained (niruddha). The wandering type moves from one passion to another and lacks concentration. The forgetful type is overpowered by Tamas and loses its wits. The occasionally steady or distracted type is unstable. He pursues the pleasant and avoids the unpleasant. All these three types represent the ordinary people, whose Cittas are imperfect. The fourth type is one-pointed, and has a favourable condition for attaining Samādhi. The final type is the best of all, whose mind is restrained, and who attains liberation or Kaivalyam.

Saṃskāra

The doctrine of Saṃskāra is a direct corollary of the Law of Karma. The subconscious impressions can be traced to the residual Karma of the past lives which accompanies Jīva from birth to birth in two forms—(1) the individual tendencies, propensities, interests and urges called vāsanā, and (2) the merit and de-merit of past actions. These accompany the soul after death, remain in seed form and bear fruit in the coming life in accordance with the Law of Karma. The Vāsanā propels him to act in a particular direction, and merit and demerit (dharmā-dharma) fructifies at proper occasions causing pleasant or unpleasant incidents of life. The seat of the

¹Dasgupta, S.N., *The Study of Patañjali*, p. 95.

Saṅskāras according to Yoga is Karmāśaya. It is also named as Ālaya-vijñāna in Buddhist philosophy, kāraṇa-śarīra in Vedānta, apūrva in Mīmāṃsā, and Adṛṣṭa in Nyāya-vaiśeṣika.

Saṅskāras inhere in the Ātman and not in Manas. These end by time, disease, and last recollection (carama-smaraṇa). Both Saṅskāra and Vṛtti are the business of Antahkarana, but Saṅskāra denotes the tendency, and Vṛtti the actual action. That way subconscious Vṛtti is Saṅskāra. All mental life is an integration of Vṛtti and Saṅskāra, action and tendency. There is a cyclic causation between the two. Saṅskāra causes Vṛtti, which in its turn leaves some impressions, to be accumulated in the previous Saṅskāras. Both Vṛtti and Saṅskāra cease to exist on the occasion of final release (mukti) or at dissolution (pralaya). In the former case these are destroyed through knowledge and yoga. The goal of Yoga is not only modification of Vṛtti but even the destruction of Saṅskāras and the Vṛtti. The destruction of Vṛtti alone is not sufficient. "The Saṅskāras are like the roots stuck deep in the soil which grow with the growth of the plant above, but even when the plant above the soil is destroyed the roots remain undisturbed and may again shoot forth as plants whenever they may get a favourable season."¹

Karmāśaya

The existence of Citta depends upon Karmas. It is the reservoir of Karmas (karmāśaya) which are rooted in Kleśas brings all kinds of experiences. And a person takes the next birth in accordance with his Karma. The community in which he is born, the period for which he is to live, and the types of experiences (enjoyments etc.) he is to gain are all determined by his past Karma.² Karmas are of three types; good, bad and mixed (white, black and mixed).³ From these only those tendencies are manifested for which the conditions are favourable.⁴ Hence a limited number of Vāsanās, whether in the form of desire or Vṛtti, can find expression in a particular

¹Dasgupta, S.N., *The Study of Patañjali*, p. 99.

²YS, II, 13.

³YS, IV, 7.

⁴*Ibid*, 8.

incarnation. The span of life is limited, and the favourable conditions for all the *Vāsanās* cannot be found in one incarnation. Only a portion of the accumulated Karma (*Sancita Karma*) is ready to be precipitated in one incarnation and is known as (*prārabdha karma*). The Karma that fructifies in future is *Āgāmī Karma*. A particular karma therefore awaits the opportunity for its fructification, when the conditions are favourable. It may wait for a number of incarnations. Conversely, a particular incident in ones life, may be the fruit of an action committed a number of incarnations ago. So the present *Karmāśaya* is a repository of different types of actions in the seed form, belonging to a number of past births. The class, locality and time may vary from birth to birth, but the *Karmāśaya* with its *Saṅskāras* and *Karmic* residua remains constant, and hence the actions are related to their fruit by the relation of cause and effect.¹ Some actions that bear fruit are exhausted. But new actions accumulate. And hence there is no end to Karma. *Karmāśaya* continues as long as the *Vāsanās* are there. *Vāsanā* leads to Karma, and Karma to new *Vāsanā*, and the vicious circle never ends. There is no beginning to the *Saṅskāras*, as the desire to live is eternal.² The *Saṅskāras* disappear only when *Avidyā* disappears.

The Nervous System

According to Tantric works, the seat of consciousness is the brain and the cerebro-spinal system. "The soul has its special seat within the *Brahmarandhra* above the foreman of Monroe and the middle commissure, but traverses the whole cerebro-spinal axis, up and down, along the *Suṣumnā* (the central passage of spinal cord). The *Brahmarandhra* contains the *Suṣumnā*, the *Brahma-nādi* and the *Manovāhi-nādi*. The cerebro-spinal axis with the connected sympathetic system contains a number of ganglionic centres and plexus (*chakras* and *padmas*) from which nerves (*Nadīs*, *Śīrās* and *Dhamnīs*) radiate over the head, trunk and limbs."³

A description of nervous system has also been made in detail,

¹YS, IV, 9.

²YS, IV, 10.

³Seal, *Positive Sciences of Ancient Hindus*, pp. 218-19.

in the Medicinal literature of Caraka and Suśruta. According to them the seat of consciousness is the heart.¹ Dhamnis (nerves) proceed from here in ascending and descending direction. Those ascend from the heart number thirty and are of three kinds. Ten nerves are for conveying vital air (vāta), phlegm (kapha), organic matter (pitta), blood and lymph (rasa). Two nerves are for each. Eight nerves are sensory nerves for carrying sensory impulses from the sense organs (two each for optic, auditory, olfactory and gustatory). Twelve nerves are for six more functions (two each) viz. speech, larynx, sleep, waking, weeping and breast flow or seminal flow in males. Now on the descending direction, there are four major nerves subdivided each into hundreds and thousands, and hence innumerable. Some are connected with the skin and reach the hair-roots. These are responsible for conveying of lymph. These nerves carry to heart cutaneous sensations, internal and external. The sensations of pleasure and pain from the skin are carried by them. Five pairs of nerves are conductors of blood, chyle, vital current, metabolic fluid and lymph, and twenty nerves are spinal nerves. "These comprise the brachial and lumbar plexus, and divide and subdivide hundred fold, thousand fold, till they ramify into fibrellae. They carry to the heart cutaneous sensations, external as well as internal. A fibril is said to be as minute as the one hundredth part of a hair."²

H. FUNCTIONS OF THE MIND

1. *The fivefold mental activities*

Patañjali states that the activities of mind are fivefold viz. correct understanding (pramāṇa), misconception (viparyaya), fancy (vikalpa), sleep (nidrā) and memory (smṛti).³ These activities are constantly at work in the mind of the ordinary man, but he has no real mastery over them. He cannot ensure himself correct apprehension, nor can he always recall a given set of facts at will; he is often deceived by his own fanciful delusions, and when he falls asleep he may be the unwilling

¹Suśruta Carita, Ch. IV; Caraka, Ch. VIII.

²Seal, *Positive Sciences of Ancient Hindus*, pp. 217-18.

³YS, I, 6-11.

victim of night mare.

"Now the analyst assures us that the greater part of our mistakes about facts, our false reasoning, our independable memories, our nagging and unwelcome anxiety states, and above all our sleeping and waking night mares are due to mento-emotional conflict, conflict between actual fact and our own desires and fears. If, says the analyst, we can resolve these conflicts and disentangle the fact itself from our emotion about the fact, we shall be free and masters of ourselves.¹

Here Patañjali comes to our rescue. He states that the activity of the thinking principle can be controlled by steady practice and by non-attachment or dispassion and he explains non-attachment as being 'that effect which comes to these who have given up their thrust after object.'² He advocates loosening of the tensions of the psyche, and in particular non-identification of ones self with experience. In the Vairāgya state, there is cessation of the least desire for the Guṇas. Abhyāsa, on the other hand, is the effort for being firmly established in that state.³ It is firmly grounded on being continued for a long time without interruption, and with devotion.⁴

"While the analyst rarely counsels actual meditation, many schools of analysis advocate the practice of inducing a patient to steady his nerves and combat his depression by taking up some absorbing occupation such as painting or a craft, which resembles in effect what Patañjali calls, 'intense application to one thing.'⁵

2. Modification of the Thinking Principle

Yoga teaches three methods of modification of the thinking principle, viz. mortification (Tapas), study (Svādhyāya) and resignation to God (Īśvara pranidāna).⁶

'Mortification' here means overcoming the demands of the body, inducing a sort of relaxation of the grip of bodily design

¹Coster, *Yoga and Western Psychology*, Ch. VIII.

²YS, I, 15.

³YS, I, 13,

⁴*Ibid*, 14.

⁵Coster, *Yoga and Western Psychology*, p. 148.

⁶YS, II, 1.

so that our mind is no longer over-powered by them. But this does not mean reducing the body to skeleton, or causing to make it unhealthy. Yoga needs perfect physical health. Self-castigation should be performed only so long as it does not bring on a disorder of the humours (from the Āyurvedic point of view).¹

'Study' means collecting information, acquiring knowledge from books and other authorities. There is need for a preparatory period of self-training in which one gradually assimilates the Yogic philosophy and its technique. This will bring about earnestness in the practice of Yoga, and clear away many misconceptions and exaggerated notions about Yoga.

'Resignation to God' helps in loosening the tensions, in physical and mental relaxation, in attaining relief in insecurity and finally in getting peace of mind.² This point has been repeatedly emphasised in Gita.³

The preliminary self-discipline corresponds to the triple nature of man—Tapas is related to will, svādhyāya to intellect, and resignation to God to the emotions. All the three methods modify the Saṅskāras and bring about gradual change.

✓ 3. Auto-suggestion

Patañjali has devised a novel method of controlling the disturbed mind. He says when the mind is disturbed by improper thoughts constant pondering over the opposites is the remedy.⁴ This is a sort of auto-suggestion, and the suggestion is of the nature of presenting negative for positive and positive for negative. All evil tendencies are rooted in wrong habits of thought and attitudes. So the best means of removing them is to attack the trouble at its source, and alter the thoughts by replacing these by exactly the opposite kind (pratipakṣa-bhāvanam). If there is strong sexual desire, this can be removed by suggesting to the mind that sex is an animal urge, a weakness in man, an urge leading to sin and corruption and nothing but non-sense. Let one read Schopenhauer, who despises

¹TV, II, 1.

²YS, II, 45.

³BG, II, 47.

⁴YS, II, 33.

women with 'soft slippery skin,' as parasites of man, who calls sex as denominator of intellect, who calls beauty as deluding both the holder and the beholder, etc. Let one read Swami Dayananda's lectures on Brahmacharya, and slowly, silently but steadily will one root out the sex-desire by the opposite suggestion. This process is exactly opposite of rationalisation, where we instead of rejection of corruption and misdeeds, defend these. Aurobindo calls this method the only sure method of controlling even the strongest of human urges, like the sex-urge, which springs remote from the biological life, and is deep-rooted in all the living organism.

Patañjali justifies this method because there is utmost need for it. As the improper thoughts, emotions and actions such as those of violence *etc.*, whether they are indulged in, caused to be done or abetted, whether caused by greed, anger or delusion, whether present in mild or intense degree, result in endless pain and ignorance, so there is necessity of pondering over the opposites.¹

Evil thoughts and actions may be both direct and indirect. Indirect evil actions are as bad as direct actions. Meat-eating is as bad a *Himsā* as butchering, though the non-vegetarian may rationalise that he himself does not kill the animal. Similarly inaction in a deed of mercy is a deadly sin (as Buddha proclaimed). The causes of all sinful actions are traced by Patañjali to three sources *viz.* greed, anger and delusion. These bring a clouding of intellect. Bhagvadgītā also explains that when a man resorts of attachment, desire is produced, from desire proceeds anger, and from anger delusion.²

All these evil thoughts, actions and attitudes may be of varying degree—mild, medium or intense. Even the milder tendencies are to be curbed as the result of all these is pain, in some form or the other. These produce an endless series of causes and effects which keep the soul in a state of bondage and consequently in perpetual misery. Hence the gordian Knot is to be cut asunder by going to the very root of evil thoughts and counteracting these by an equal and opposite force of

¹YS, II, 34.

²BG, II, 61.

suggestion in the opposite.

4. Mental Distractions

Patañjali describes a number of conditions which cause the mind to be distracted. The nine distractions are—disease, langour, doubt, carelessness, laziness, world-mindedness, delusion, non-achievement of a stage and instability.¹ When the mind is thus distracted there arise such states of mind as mental pain, despair, nervousness and hard breathing. Hence, no progress can be achieved unless these distractions are removed.

How to build Mental Health

For removing these obstacles and distractions, there should be constant practice of one truth or principle.² Another method of steadying the mind is cultivating attitudes of friendliness, compassion, gladness, and finally indifference towards happiness, misery, virtue and vice.³ The same principle has been taught in Bhagvadgītā. "Have common attitude to pleasure and pain, gain and loss, or victory and defeat."⁴ This is the panacea for all mental evils. One of the greatest sources of disturbance of mind is our uncontrolled reactions to our human environment and to the pleasant or unpleasant conditions in which we get involved. We should, therefore, not react at all to the pleasant or unpleasant circumstances. Not reacting will lead to balance of mind, calm, gentle and sober nature. We are usually tossed between pleasures and pains. We can retain our mental equilibrium by changing our attitude towards these, by being indifferent. "Verily, he is poor whose greed is unbounded. To the contented mind there is neither poverty nor riches."⁵ Hence one should be steady at the neutral point. Yoga directs towards the neutrality and indifference to pleasure and pain, the only steady and sure method of gaining mental equilibrium. Bhagvadgītā, in line with the yogic discipline, prescribes similar practices and principles for building steadiness of mind. "His

¹YS, I, 30.

²Ibid, I, 32.

³Ibid, 33.

⁴BG, II, 38; XII, 13.

⁵Bhartṛhari. *Vairāgyaśataka*.

intellect will be steadfast, who abandons all desires, and is satiated in his own mind, who is unperturbed in misery, unattached to pleasures, and who has abandoned attachment, fear and anger." Equilibrium is Yoga (*samatvam yoga ucyate*).¹

Another method of establishing steadiness of mind is coming into activity of higher senses, *i.e.* concentrating on higher principles.² This is possible in so-called *laya-yoga*, where the devotee concentrates on a *Nāda* or superphysical sounds. Through *Japa* or *Mantra*, serene or luminous states are experienced within.³ One can also meditate on such souls who are spiritual leaders of the community and are free from attachment,⁴ a master, a spiritual teacher or a Divine Incarnation. *Prāṇāyāma* also is helpful in steadying the mind.⁵

Any type of meditation increases the powers of the mind, removes gradually the distraction, cuts at the root of mental conflicts and thereby steadies the mind. One should do meditation according to one's temperament or liking.⁶ It does not matter, what the target of meditation be. Whatever be the object of meditation, the mind is helped to acquire the habit of one-pointedness by the natural attraction for the object of pursuit. This builds mental health and develops the inherent powers of mind.

Patañjali states that the powers of the mind are infinite. When the individual mind is united with the cosmic mind, it draws and utilises all the powers of the cosmic mind. By meditation, the devotee (*sādhaka*) brings about the union of individual consciousness with the supreme consciousness governing the whole universe, and thereby he attains supernatural powers. "His mastery extends from the finest atoms to the greatest infinity."⁷ Once his mind is cleansed of all the impurities born of the worldly activities, once his *Vṛttis* are

¹*BG*, II, 55-56; II, 48.

²*YS*, I, 35.

³*Ibid*, 36.

⁴*Ibid*, 37.

⁵*Ibid*, 34.

⁶*YS*, I, 39.

⁷*Ibid*, 40.

annihilated, his Citta shines like a transparent jewel. In that state, what pervades is the infinite consciousness, and there is entire absorption in one another of the cogniser, cognition and cognised.¹ Meditation thus helps in the focussing of mind and in cleansing of mind. Focussing results in the development of potential powers, and cleansing results in transference of consciousness (including clairvoyance and all such superconscious powers).

5. *Redirection and Sublimation*

Students of western psychology are familiar with the principle of redirection and sublimation of instincts and emotions. But this principle works only at the superficial level. Patañjali goes deeper still and wants that the deep-rooted sentiments and tendencies themselves must be changed. We may sublimate the sex urge into appreciation of art. But it will be a temporary affair, as it is just an incidental factor that redirects the urge to another side. But the urge does not subside. The urge is deep-rooted. The social taboo is an obstacle. Appreciation removes the obstacle and redirects the urge. It is presumed that the urge has to flow in some direction. Patañjali states that the incidental factor does not change the natural tendency (which is deep-rooted), but it merely removes the obstacle, just as a farmer irrigating a field does not stop the flow of water but lets it flow in one direction or the other after removing petty obstacles in the channels.² The best thing is to destroy completely certain deep-rooted tendencies, and not merely suppress or redirect. It is no use merely removing the exciting causes. The predisposing causes must be removed. "The ultimate aim of Yoga is to bring about complete transmutation of the substance of our nature."

The modern tendency is to deal only with the superficial causes and to tide over the difficulty temporarily. This leads us nowhere as the old troubles relapse in different forms from time to time. Yoga does not recommend temporary measures like removing temporary incidental cause (nimittam). It pre-

¹YS, I, 41.

²YS, IV, 3.

scribes total eradication of the mental evils, conflicts, unpleasant urges and tendencies, through will and practice, aided by Yogic methods. It claims complete cure of the hardest of neurotics, mental patients, insane lunatics and abandoned mental cases. Patients in mental asylum who have no future, otherwise, but if guided in Yogic practices, have a bright future. May be, the extreme schizophrenic patient, or the aggressive insane is a hard nut to crack. We may not be able to talk to him, not to speak of prescribing Yogic practices. Yoga has a cure here also. One Yogi can, by his yogic powers, modify the intellect of the patient, hypnotise him so to say, and slowly and steadily bring him to normalcy. A hypnotist has very limited powers. But a yogi is a divine hypnotist, who can cleanse the muddled and extremely dirty waters in the subconscious of the mental patient. Yoga succeeds where western analysts fail.

I. THE PATH OF YOGA

The need, scope and goal of Yoga has been discussed above. Yoga philosophy proclaims that the mental fluctuations or psychosis can be controlled and inhibited. For this it prescribed eight-fold method (*aṣṭāṅga-yoga*) consisting of (1) abstention (*yama*), (2) observance (*niyama*), (3) posture (*āsana*), (4) regulation of breath (*prāṇāyāma*), (5) withdrawal of the senses (*pratyāhāra*), (6) contemplation (*dhāraṇā*), (7) fixed attention (*dhyāna*) and (8) deep meditation (*samādhi*).¹ The eight steps are gradual and are classified into two. The first five are the indirect or external (*bahiranga*) means or aids, while the last three are the direct or internal (*antaranga*) aids. Illustration 4 below gives a visual picture of the eight fold path. Out of the first five steps, the first two (*yama* and *niyama*) are the ethical preparation for the strong steps to be taken later. The next two (*āsana* and *prāṇāyāma*) are the physical preparation and the fifth step (*pratyāhāra*) is the mental preparation. The first real step after the five preparatory steps is contemplation (*dhāraṇā*).

¹YS, II, 29.




Illustration 4

The Eight Steps of Yoga

I. Yama is the first step. It includes five abstentions namely (1) none-violence (ahimsa), (2) truthfulness, (3) honesty, (4) sexual continence or brahmacaryya, (5) non-acquisitiveness. This sort of ethical preparation is fundamental for a student of Yoga. Purification of mind and heart is not possible without the above abstentions. Great men excelled the masses only because of the greatness of the mind. Lincoln followed the principle, 'malice towards none and charity for all'. Christ prayed for the welfare of even his enemies. Gandhi was great for he followed all the above abstentions. These yamas have universal validity, and are not related to any caste, creed, colour, age, country or nation.¹

¹YS, II, 46.

II. The same is the case of five *niyamas* or observances namely, (1) purity (*śauca*), (2) contentment (*santoṣa*), (3) austerity (*tapā*), (4) self-study (*svādhyāya*) and (5) resignation to God. The *yama* practices are, in a general way, moral and prohibitive, while the *niyamas* are disciplinary and constructive. The former deal with ethical principles, and the latter with organisation of life preparatory to strenuous Yogic discipline. The ethical and disciplinary principles have a great psychological effect on the minds of the student of Yoga. These result in purity of mind and development of higher mental faculties.

III. *Āsana* is considered as a physical aid to concentration. Hatha Yoga deals with innumerable postures of the body, aiming at perfecting the physical mechanism of the body, bringing about longevity and resistance to disease. Not all these postures are needed in Yoga. One right posture is enough, and that is the posture which is steady and comfortable.¹

Postures help in the perfection of body, and the definition of a perfect body is that which has beauty, fine complexion or grace, and adamantive strength (like that of a thunderbolt).² Yoga believes in the dictum 'sound mind in a sound body'. Some postures are recommended for bodily health, and *Padmāsana* or *Siddhāsana* for meditation.

IV. *Prāṇāyāma* is cessation of inspiration and expiration. To a westerner, it will seem to be an odd physical practice, which should obviously have nothing to do with psychic. The present author can vouchsafe the fact, on the basis of his personal experience, that it has direct control over our mind. Let it be a topic for research for the experimental psychologists. Control of breath proceeds control of our nervous system. It produces inexplicable new vigour and vitality to our nerves, controls their unwanted function such as vomiting due to psychological reasons, controls the function of vagus nerve (the tenth cranial nerve), aids in concentration and steadies the mind. Some adept Yogis, stop the functioning of the autonomic nervous system, the pulsebeats etc. There is nothing mystical about it. Our physical life is governed by the five

¹YS, II, 46.

²YS, III, 47.

vital airs (mentioned in Upaniṣads). Control of these vital airs means control of the functioning of the different systems in the body (corresponding to each vital air).

V. *Pratyāhāra* is the imitation by the senses of the mind by withdrawing from their objects.¹ This stage is an important milestone, as it signifies the direction of the mind from outward to inward. Mind is usually engrossed in the worldly affairs, and the senses follow it or imitate it. But let the mind be withdrawn from the outward objects, senses also will be withdrawn, and there will be no conjunction of the senses with the object. "Just as when the king-bee flies up, the bees fly up after him."²

The withdrawal of the senses is a common affair with every one, when he is deeply engrossed in his study or task at hand. The mind is absorbed in one task and its doors are shut for other outside stimulus. Attention to one thing is inattention to another. This is a general law. But can attention be always voluntary? It depends upon the will-power of the person. Yoga teaches that withdrawal of senses from all other objects will mean attention to one object. The devotee can withdraw his mind from outward stimuli and it is only then that he can concentrate on one object. Contraction of senses (as a tortoise contracts his limbs) is a step to steadfast intellect.³

VI. *Contemplation (dhāraṇā)* is the confining of the mind within a limited mental area i.e. object of concentration.⁴ It is the controlled movement of the mind, focussing it to one point, so that the mental images become sharper and power of attention increases. Distractions will exist, but the mind when it tries to slip away from the object of concentration, is to be brought back. The object of concentration may be heart-lotus, navel, tip of the nose, etc.⁵ It can also be a symbolic figure like that of Prajāpati etc.⁶

VII. *Dhyāna* is the uninterrupted flow of Citta towards the object of contemplation.⁷ In the previous stage, mind could

¹YS, II, 54.

²YB, II, 54.

³BG, II, 58.

⁴YS, III, 1.

⁵YB, III, 1.

⁶TV, III, 1.

⁷TS, III, 2.

slip away and then come back, and this could happen frequently. But here the distraction is rather nil, and the mind is focussed on one point continuously and uninterruptedly for some period.

VIII. *Samādhi* is still a higher stage, when the consciousness is continuous, uninterrupted and focussed on the object, but without the awareness of the Self, as it were emptied of itself.¹ In the previous state self-awareness was there. The devotee is conscious of the object of concentration as well as himself. But gradually, the self-awareness also disappears and what remains is pure consciousness (without the distinction of knower, known and knowledge). The distinction between the three stages is illustrated in illustration 5 given on opposite page—In Circle I in the illustration dotted circles represent the object of concentration, and the concentrated circles distractions. In Circle II, the distractions disappear, but self-awareness is there represented by dotted circle encircled. In Circle III even this self-awareness disappears. The three taken together constitute *Samyama* (constraint). *Samyama* thus result in a state of super-consciousness, or *Turiyā* (of Vedānta).

The three stages *Dhāraṇā*, *Dhyāna* and *Samādhi* present a wealth of psychological material, unknown to the Western psychologists. At the very first stage *Dhāraṇā*, some mental changes take place, and the present author mentions the same on the basis of his own personal experience. Firstly, mental distractions, unpleasant memories, unwanted thoughts, persecutions and obsessions fade away and subsequently die out. Many of the mental conflicts are resolved or become faint and feeble. Secondly, a sort of calmness, quietitude and sobriety of mind gains ground. This is the royal road for equilibriums of mind. After the morning contemplation the strenuous mental tasks of varied nature to be performed during the day appear to be easy, smooth and non-taxing. Thirdly, the mind becomes more adept in the act of concentration on one task at hand. Greater attention and stronger concentration enables the mind to finish exacting mental tasks very quickly and with high degree of precision and accuracy. Fourthly, the mind gains more power, so as to work during the day for greater duration,

¹Briugher 2.




Illustration 5 : The three stages of Concentration

with less of fatigue and boredom. No coffee or tea is needed to stimulate the brain. Morning contemplation provides enough of vitality to be spent throughout the day.

If psychology is to be studied as a normative science, then the above facts regarding the utility of contemplation should form a distinct chapter for the study of students of psychology. The basis of the findings is introspection and personal observation

J. THE SUPERCONSCIOUS STATE (SAMĀDHI)

The superconscious state is the fourth higher stage of consciousness after wakeful, dream and sleep state. Herein, what pervades is pure consciousness. Dhāraṇā and Dhyāna are two stages that lead to it. But this stage also is characterised by a number of steps. Its two major divisions are Nirbīja (seedless) and Sabīja (with seed). "The seed is latent deposit (āśaya) of Karma which corresponds with the obstacles—birth, longevity and enjoyment."¹ The Samādhi with this basis is Sabīja, and that which is exempt from it is Nirbīja, the highest type. The culmination of Nirbīja is Dharma-megha Samādhi which corresponds to liberation (kaivalyaṁ). The Sabīja Samādhi also has a number of steps. It begins with Samprajñāta Samādhi, wherein the mind remains conscious of the object. This also is of two types—with deliberation (savitarka) and without deliberation. This is followed by Asamprajñāta Samādhi, wherein there is no consciousness of the object. This state does not stay for long, for it glides into another Samprajñāta, characterised by reflection (vicāra), both savicāra and then nirvicāra. The second cycle is complete when it glides into Asamprajñāta. In the third cycle there is Samprajñāta Sānanda (joyful) followed by Asamprajñāta. In the fourth cycle, there is Samprajñāta Sasmitā (egoism). The four cycles of Vitarka, Vicāra, Ānanda and Sasmitā constitute Sabīja Samādhi. Each cycle has two phases—Samprajñāta and Asamprajñāta. In fact Asamprajñāta is the neutral point which helps the consciousness to leave one focal point and then proceed to another.² This is presented in Illustration 6, given on page 293.

In the state of Samādhi, the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is lost, the individual consciousness conjoins with the cosmic consciousness, and the seer abides in himself,³ the fluctuations of mind have been destroyed, the Citta is desolate, and there is infinite joy. This state is a mystical state, and words fail to explain it. "Through Yoga must Yoga be known, Yoga increaseth Yoga's store, he who for Yoga care hath shone, in Yoga rests for evermore."⁴

¹TV, I, 2.²YS, 41-51.³YS, I, 3.⁴YB, II, 6, translated by Woods.




Illustration 6

Faith, energy, memory and high intelligence are necessary pre-requisites of Samādhi.¹ It is nearest to those whose desire for Samādhi is intensely strong.² Only those who have been Yogis in the previous birth begin it straightaway without much effort. Thus there are individual differences because of which some may take recourse to mild means, others medium and still others intense means and efforts.³ To some God's grace may descend. Anyway, one can take the path according to his potentiality. The rate of Yogi's progress depends upon his previous background and present effort.

H. SUPERNORMAL POWERS

The ultimate goal of Yoga is Kaivalyam, Liberation, Godliness, Realization or Mukti. But during the practice of Yoga, some special powers (called Siddhis) are acquired, which are something beyond the capacity of normal human beings. These are super-human powers, but are entirely distinguishable from black-magic and incantation. Some powers are purely psychic powers, which are of psychological interest. The others, which are superhuman powers need not be discussed, Pātañjali states that by meditating upon certain objects, these special powers are acquired. The following table enlists a few psychic powers by way of illustration. The Yoga Sūtras are mentioned on the left-hand column.

The knowledge possessed by the individual is finite, limited by the senses, the mind and intellect. It cannot be unlimited because of the impurities and obscurations. But the mind of a Yogi is divested of all the impurities, and it is directly connected with cosmic mind, and hence its knowledge is infinite.⁴ The state of a Yogi is supreme consciousness. Here the Puruṣa is established in his Real nature which is nothing but pure consciousness.⁵

In such a state there is no wonder, if the Yogi is omniscient and he possesses supernatural powers. ESP (extra-sensory per-

¹YS, I, 20.

²YS, I, 21.

³Ibid, 22.

⁴Ibid, 34.

⁵YS, IV, 31.

Diagram 12
PSYCHIC POWERS

Sūtra	Object of Meditation	Psychic power
II. 40	Cleanliness of body & mind.	Complete purity of mind, power of concentration, and control over senses.
41	—do—	Cheerfulness & fitness for realization.
42	Contentment.	Pure mental delight.
43	Austerity.	Perfection of the sense-organs and body.
52-53	Prāṇāyāma.	Removal of screens hiding the light and ability to concentrate.
54	Pratyāhāra.	Full control over senses.
III. 5	Saṁyama.	Intuition.
16	Meditation on three types of transformation.	Clairvoyance, pre-vision and psychometry.
III. 19	Saṁyama on mental image.	Telepathy, knowledge of the mind of others.
25	Inner light.	Knowledge of the subtle concealed and distant objects.
30	Navel plexus.	X-ray like vision of the body, its anatomy and physiology.
33	Light in the head.	Seeing master spirits.
34	Intuition.	Omniscience.
35	Heart.	Telepathy, awareness of the nature of the mind.
49	Senses.	Instantaneous cognition.

ception) is an ordinary thing for him. Yogic psychology is therefore higher psychology dealing with super-mental states, or as it is called, Parapsychology. It starts where the known Psychology ends. Interest in ESP and Parapsychology has been increasing during the recent years. Dr. J.B. Rhine started working in this field in the West, and in India an Institute of Parapsychology was opened at Jaipur. The recent evidences collected on the subject has influenced the views of a number of psychologists. A new outlook on Psychology, with new dimensions, is being created. Prof. B.L. Atreya points towards this fact:

"The orthodox scientific psychology is certainly not yet the science of Soul, Self, or Mind. It is still a chapter of materialistic and mechanistic biology. Its principal aim is to understand everything mental in terms of the psychology of the brain and nervous system and the primary biological urges.....The concepts of the present-day psychology are based upon the reactions and responses of the normal, sub-and abnormal types of human beings. These scientists naturally fail to comprehend facts which can be rightly called supernormal. They have occurred and are recorded in all ages."¹

Alain Danielou explains the phenomena in simplest possible terms:

"When the agitation of the mind is stilled, supramental perceptions appear, and with them comes the perception of fundamental unity of all that exists; consequently, all things are perceived to be, in their nature, aspects of this unity. If following any river, we go down to the ocean in which all rivers unite, we can then go up any river we choose; similarly if we dive down, into ourselves to that point where all beings are one, we can therefore enter into the most secret heart of all beings or things of the differentiated world."²

Kuṇḍalinī Śakti

The Yogic power has also been designated as Kuṇḍalinī Śakti (Serpent Power) in the Tantric literature. Tantric literature mentions that this power is coiled up like a serpent in two and a half coils and rests asleep in lowermost end of the Spinal Cord. Through Yogic meditation it is awakened, and it rises through six plexus to the cerebral cortex. Aurobindo explains:

"In the mind it manifests as a divine mind-force or a universal mind force, and it can do everything that the personal mind cannot do; it is then the Yogic mind force. When it manifests and acts in the vital or the physical in the same, it is there apparent as a yogic life-force or a yogic body force. It can awake in all these forms, bursting outwards and upwards, extending itself into wideness from below, or it can descend and become there a definite power for things; it can pour downwards into the body, working establishing its reign, extending into wideness from above, link the lowest in us with the highest above us, release the individual into a cosmic universality or into absoluteness and transcendence."

Thus this power combines the individual human mind with the cosmic mind and individual limited consciousness with cosmic consciousness. No wonder then, if the individual through

¹Atreya, B.L., Address before the Science Congress, 1943.

²Danielou, Alain, *Yoga*, p. 76.

the awakening of this power, possesses the mystical divine powers, E.S.P. and clairvoyance, because his mental transmitter receives vibrations from the entire universe.

Aurobindo elucidates the mystery of Kuṇḍalinī Śakti. He says it is the individual consciousness which is a part of the universal consciousness, but a part feeling itself as a separate, is being separated through a wall of ignorance. "Once the wall breaks down, the individual becomes aware of the Cosmic self, of the consciousness of the Cosmic Nature, of the forces playing in it etc. He becomes one with the Cosmic Self." The individual possesses the lower consciousness, the lower nature (Aparā Prakṛti), and it is governed by the higher or Divine Prakṛti. Through the spiritual evolution of Yoga, the individual can become aware of the higher Nature. This is the mystery of Serpent Power.

Six plexus or cakras have been described in this connection. These are: (1) Mulādhāra, the lowermost, which governs the physical down to the subconscious, (2) the abdominal centre, Svādīṣṭhāna, which governs the lower vital, (3) the navel centre, (Manipura or Nābhipadma), (4) the heart centre, anāhata which governs the emotional being, (5) the throat centre, Viśuddha, which governs the expressive mind and (6) the Ājñā Cakra, the centre between the eye-brows, which governs the dynamic mind, will, vision and mental formation.

All these plexus are stationed in the astral body and not in the physical body. Dr. Rale has tried in vain to discover anatomically the nerve-centres corresponding to these centres. Aurobindo vouchsafes the fact that these are stationed in Linga-Śarīra, but these are felt as if in the physical body. Above all these six cakras is the thousand-petalled lotus sahasra-dal. "It houses the still higher illumined mind and at the highest opens the intuition through which or else by an overflowing directness the overmind can have with the rest communication or an immediate contact."¹

A detailed description of the Kuṇḍalinī Śakti is given in Arthor Avalon's book: *The Serpent Power*.

RESUME

The Supernormal powers of mind or Yogic powers are not a

¹Aurobindo, Sri, *Lights on Yoga*.

myth. These can be verified empirically by those who practice Yoga. Attempts have been made in the West also to conduct research in Psychical phenomena. The Psychical Research Society began this work in England in 1882, with the help of such scientists as Sir William Crooke, Oliver Lodge, William Barrett and Mr. Garnay. Dr. Rhine Tyrrel, McDougall and James have come to believe many supernormal faculties of human mind, such as telepathy, clairvoyance, clairsaudience, psycho-kinesis, visions, multilocation and spirit manifestation. There is nothing superstitious about these powers.

"These supernormal powers are not considered by the Yoga philosophy to be miraculous interferences with the laws of nature. The world open to the senses is not the whole world of nature. What happens to be a contravention of the principles of the physical world is only a supplementing of it by the principles of another part of the cosmic order. The world beyond the physical has its own science and laws."¹

The reputed scholar beckoning towards Yoga says:

"The normal limits of the human vision are not the limits of the universe. There are other worlds than that which our senses reveal to us, other senses than these which we share with the lower animals, other forces than those of material nature. If we have faith in the soul, then the supernatural is also a part of the natural.....It is good to know that the ancient thinkers required us to realise the possibilities of the soul in solitude and silence and transform the flashing and fading moments of vision into a steady light which could illuminate the long years of life."²

Western psychologists should not look at Yoga as something superstitious, supernatural, occult, mysterious and magical. It is no longer a process of self-hypnotisation. It is a natural system of the purification of body, mind and soul, a gateway to the realms of higher mental powers, and a spiritual ladder for the fulfilment of the divine potentialities inherent in man. Even the lower stage of Yoga is a psychic training to enable the person to withstand the stormy events of life, to make the maximum use of the mental powers, and to build perfect mental health, a balanced mind and a sober temperament. It is the healing balm for the wounded and afflicted in the dreadful battlefield of this dire phenomenal existence. It is the divine collyrium which removes the cataract of ignorance and gives a new inner eye of intuition. It inspires, renovates, vivifies and energises. It gives

¹Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, I, p. 367.

²*op. cit.*

everlasting solace and peace that the soul is hankering after. Pātañjali's Yoga is the eternal guide for the entire humanity. It is an antidote to materialism of the West, and the royal road to international peace and harmony. Yoga psychology gives the complete picture of the working of the human mind, and its highest promises. It deals with all the states of consciousness—subconscious, conscious and superconscious. It is both a positive science describing the matter of fact, and a normative science guiding for the future development of mental and spiritual potentialities.

Psychology in Buddhism and Jainism

(1) PSYCHOLOGY IN BUDDHISM

Another great philosophical system that originated in India four hundred years before Christ, and developed into a mighty religion-cum-philosophy, is the Buddhist System. It transcended the boundary of its land of origin and spread in a number of Asian countries like Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Tibet, Indo-China, Japan, China and Mongolia. Though one in the beginning it bifurcated into Mahāyāna and Hinayāna systems, and later into four major schools. Buddhist psychology, therefore, feeds on the contributions of not only Indian scholars, but of scholars of a number of countries. From that point of view Buddhist psychology is Greater-Indian psychology rather than Indian psychology proper. A brief outline of the Buddhist psychology is presented below. A comprehensive description is beyond the scope of the present investigation, as Buddhist psychology itself is a full-fledged subject for investigation, on account of the magnitude of the subject, and the scope of the field of contribution (both Indian and non-Indian) that it covers.

A. VARIED CONTRIBUTIONS OF FOUR SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM

The two vehicles of Buddhistic philosophy, developed into four schools. Hinayāna developed into Vaibhaṣika and Sautrāntika. Mahāyāna developed into Vijñānavāda (and Yogācāra) and Śūnyavāda. Though all the four schools developed from the common stem, but in course of time they differed amongst themselves on a number of issues. The metaphysical and ethical divergence is responsible for some differences in psychological speculations.

1. *The Vaibhāṣikas*

The Vaibhāṣikas believed in the reality of the world, in the reality of the perception and reality of experience. They maintained the independent existence of nature and mind. The objects have an existence independent of mind. They are of two types, external and internal. The elements and the objects belonging to the elements (bhūta and bhautika) are external. Intelligence (Citta) and those belonging to intelligence (Caitta) are internal. The material objects are composed of minute atoms—smallest particle of rūpa.

We have two instruments of knowledge—perception and conception. The former is free from imagination and gives us indefinite presentation. The latter is imaginary, and does not give us definite knowledge. Citta is the substratum of consciousness, and it is permanent. Vijñāna is the perceiver (uplabdhr).

2. *The Sautrāntikas*

They also believed in the existence of the external world. According to them, the varieties of forms of consciousness leads to the conclusion that the external objects exist. There can be no perceptual knowledge of objects without external objects. Here it agrees with Vaibhāṣikas. But it further maintains that the external objects are momentary. We get momentary perception of an object in rapid succession so as to give us the impression that the perception is not momentary, just as fire-band appeals as a circle.¹

The process of cognition is explained in the following manner. Four conditions are needed for cognition ; (1) data (ālam-bana), (2) suggestion (samānāntara), (3) medium (sahakāri) and (4) dominant organ (ādhipatirūpa). *Sarvadarśana-sangraha* explains this process as follows:

“From blue data, we understand the form of blue, and this leads to cognition. From suggestion there is a revival of old knowledge. The restriction to the apprehension of this or that object arises from the medium, light, as one condition and the dominant organ as the other.”² The Sautrāntika view is

¹*Sarvasiddhāntasārasangraha*, III. 3. 16.

²Quoted by S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, I, p. 622.

represented by Dharmakīrti, in his *Nyāyabindu*. He holds that all perception is indeterminate, and free from all mental impositions (kalpanā). He also maintains that we can have self-consciousness. A lamp can illuminate both the space and the lamp.

3. The Yogācāras

Yogācāras are Vijñānavādins, subjective idealists emphasising yogic practices. Idealists as they are, they deny the existence of external objects apart from the subjective knowledge. The outer world is a fiction. If you say that cause is necessary for the ideas, that cause need not necessarily be the external object. 'So the apparent phenomena around us are produced by mental operations within'. We can produce the impressions of external objects in wakeful state, as we produce those in dream. So all the things (dharma) and their qualities are nothing but constituents of consciousness. This theory is called Nirālambanavāda.

The sum total of our conscious states is called Ālayavijñāna. Our personal consciousness knows just a small fraction of Ālayavijñāna. We can compare Ālayavijñāna with Ātman of Advaita, in so far as it is consciousness. But it differs from it in so far as it is a changing stream of consciousness, while Ātman is unchangeable. Ālaya receives impressions, stores impressions of karma and is developing continuously.

A significant contribution of yogācāra is the discovery of subconscious. It states that we are not fully aware of the larger portion of our consciousness. Our personal consciousness or awareness is just a fraction of total consciousness.

Another new idea is the distinction between the Absolute Self, Ālayavijñāna, and the phenomenal Self. Ālaya is common to all the individuals, and is not conditioned by time and space. But the phenomenal Self differs from person to person, and is called Skandha-vijñāna.

The greatest contribution of Yogācāra is its emphasis on superconsciousness and Yoga. Through Yogic exercises mind becomes clear of all illusion and impurities, and so it reflects the truth, and Nirvāṇa is attained.

The concept of Ālayavijñāna, all-conserving mind is also new. It is the store-house of Saṁskāras and is enveloped in

Avidyā. It reminds us of Karmāśaya of Yoga, or kāraṇaśarīra of Vedānta. The ultimate goal is breaking down of Ālaya through good deeds and pure wisdom.

The theory of perception of yogācāra follows its epistemology. The objective world is not real. Our sense-experience is produced in the Ālayavijñāna on account of four reasons—(1) The visible phenomena are of nothing external but of our own mind. But we do not realise that. (2) We have a traditional tendency to believe a phenomenal world of appearance. (3) There is the nature of knowledge, which differentiates between cogniser and cognised. (4) There is also the instinct in the mind to experience diverse forms.

4. *The Mādhyamikas or Śūnyavādins*

They considered both the subject and the object, internal as well as external, knower and known, as void (śūnya). Thus they go one step forward further from yogācāras. Nāgārjuna the founder of this school denied altogether the existence of the external objects and the internal ideas. The whole world is a mere appearance, a net work of relations. Knowledge cannot be explained. Perception and perceived objects, though unreal, have mutual relation. It is the mutual relation of part and whole, cause and effect that make up the world. Otherwise, the Absolute is mere void, Śūnya. We can compare this Śūnya with Brahman of Advaita, and the unreality of the phenomenal world with Māyāvāda of Advaita. But Brahman is a positive entity and śūnya is a negative one. So Mādhyamika psychology is nearer Advaita psychology. Both consider sensations, perception, cognition and all the mental functioning real only at the empirical level (samvṛti of Mādhyamikas and vyavahāra of Advaita) and not at the absolute (pārmārtha) level:

We may summarise the tenets of both Yogācāra and Śūnyavāda which comprise the larger wheel (Mahāyāna).

The basis of Mahāyāna psychology is its unique metaphysics, which resembles Advaita. According to Mahāyāna, the universe has two aspect:

(1) the unchanged, the absolute which persists throughout space and time, called Bhūtataṭhāta, (which we may compare with Brahman of Vedānta);

(2) the changeable aspect, the world of our experience, the phenomenal world which is like a dream, neither real nor unreal, but illusory, produced by Avidyā. All consciousness arise in Avidyā, and next arises the distinction of subject and object. So cosmic process is the product of Avidyā.

The sensible world is void of all reality. Hence its reactions upon our senses are equally void. Our ideas which are based upon the data gathered by the senses are void of truth. Our will, which follows the ideas, is also without foundation. All this is a pure mirage. There is no such thing as consciousness. The mind itself is an illusion. It reminds us, Schopenhauer saying, 'the world is my idea.'

B. FACTORS OF PERSONALITY

Buddha said that there was no Atman. On the other hand, the personality (Pudgala) is a congregation of five Skandhas (literally trunks), reacting intimately one upon the other. The five Skandhas (khandhas in Pāli language) are aggregates of physical and mental states. There is no Ātman apart from these. If you say, I perceive the Self, it only means that you are conscious of one or more of these Skandhas. The five Skandhas are as follows:

1. Rūpa Skandha, the material element *i.e.* the body, the senses and sense-data.
2. Vedanā Skandha, Sensation, feeling (Pleasurable, painful and indifferent).
3. Samjñā (Sanna in Pāli) Skandha, conceptional knowledge.
4. Sanskāra Skandha (Sankhara), the coordination of the mental states, *i.e.* synthetic functioning of concepts and feelings.
5. Vijñāna Skandha, consciousness.¹

These five Skandhas are transferred from one birth to the next and these constitute a temporary human identity. These are dispersed when the force that binds them together is finally extinguished in Nirvāna.

The doctrine that soul exists only as complexes and not a self-contained entity is called Nirātmyavāda (doctrine of non-self). An explanation of this doctrine is given in the conversation between King Menander and

¹*Samyutta Nikaya*, III, 86.


Nāgasena. Nāgasena explains that what we call chariot, is neither the pole, nor the wheel, nor any of its parts. Chariot is a mere symbol for all the parts assembled. The same is true about human personality. The word self is only a label for the aggregate of some physical and mental factors, i.e. of five Skandhas.

Non-existence of Self

Buddhist idealists (Yogācāras) do not believe in the existence of Self. What exists is a series of momentary cognitions, in succession. Apart from this series of cognitions, neither any Self exist, nor any object. As cognitions are self-luminous, they apprehend themselves, as their own objects. There is no question of recognising any subject or object.

C. LEVELS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Aniruddha gives a detailed account of the levels illustrated by the following diagram:



The sub-liminal consciousness is the sub-consciousness below the threshold (manodvāra) of consciousness, while the Supra-liminal is above it. Kāma-Citta is the consciousness confined to the mundane world (in which desires to kāma prevail). It is the normal consciousness. The supernormal consciousness, higher than this level has three phases. Rūpa-Citta is the consciousness concerned with visible objects, Arūpa with

invisible, and Lokottara is the transcendental, over and above both. Rūpa Citta roughly corresponds to Dhyāna, and Lokottara to Samādhi of Yoga.

D. FUNCTIONING OF THE MIND

Buddhism has no concept of Manas apart from Buddhi, Citta and Vijñāna. Leaving aside the first Skandha (*i.e.* the Rūpa-Skandha), the other four Skandhas constitute the mental side of personality. What we call Mind, arises out of 'being' (bhavanga), which is mind in sound sleep (veethimutta-citta). Manodvāra (threshold of mind) is the boundary between 'being' and thought, and is called Bhavangupaccheda. The mental properties (cetāsika) are of two types—universal and specific, which again are either good or bad.

1. The Universal mental properties are (i) contact (phassa), (ii) feeling (vedanā), (iii) perception (sañjñā), (iv) volition (cetanā), (v) oneness of object (ekaggata), (vi) psychic life (jeevitendriya), and (vii) attention (manasikāra). The contact between the object and mind is just the awareness of the object, as colour, smell, form *etc.*

2. The specific good mental properties are six in number:

(i) the process of directing concomitant properties towards the object (vitakka), (ii) the process of continually exercising the mind on the object (vicāra), (iii) the process of choosing to attend (adhimokkha), (iv) energy at the back of conation (vīrya), (v) interest (piti), and (vi) intention to act (chanda).

There are four universal and two specific properties which are bad. The universal bad properties are (i) infatuation (moha), (ii) shamelessness (ahirika), (iii) remorselessness (anottappa), and (iv) distractions (uddhacca).

The two specific bad properties are:

(i) greed (lobha) and, (ii) error (ditthi).

1. Nature of Cognition

The process of cognition is called Viñhi. It includes the following:

(i) imagination, (ii) images (uggaha), (iii) fancy (patilakkhana), (iv) after-images (patibhaga), (v) appreciation, (vi) concentration (jhana), (vii) dreams, and (viii) perception.

The order of cognition is as follows:

(i) Firstly, an object enters the field of presentation. It produces a vibration in the pure being (bhavanga, corresponding to the self of Vedānta). (ii) Secondly, the faculty of reflection arises and the vibration is caught. (iii) Thirdly, apperception (javana) follows and then the thought loses in 'Being', (iv) Fourthly, the investigating faculty begins to work and there is a momentary examination of the object. (v) Next comes the determining process (vottapana), after which comes the apperceptive process. In this way the object cognised remains identified for just two moments. All cognition is transitory and momentary.

2. The Buddhist Theory of Perception

Dharmakīrti defines perception as cognition free from the mental concepts such as name, class and the like. He uses the word 'kalpana' for the concepts like name, class *etc.* Again perception must be non-erroneous, so as to preclude illusions from it. It is direct perception (sakṣātkarijñānam) so that both sense-object contact and mental perception are included in it. It is 'indeterminate and name, class *etc.* do not qualify it.'

Perception has been defined and explained by many other Buddhist thinkers. Vasubandhu explains perception as a cognition which is directly produced by the object, of which it is the cognition¹ (kalpanā podhamabhrantam). Fire exists, and therefore it produces cognition of fire. The perception of fire is therefore valid. But silver does not exist in an oyster shell (śukti), and so the cognition of silver is no perception. Even the perception of any object, say a jar, is actually the perception of the outward qualities of the jar, such as its form, colour and surface. It is the qualities associated with the objects mixed with their images that produce the complex cognition.

Dignāga, stresses the outer realism of the objects, and defines perception as determined by the object, and not modified by ideas or concepts.² Words do not actually represent the object perceived, because of their subjective character. Pure sensation is so objective that it cannot be described in words. Thus he

¹Nyāyabindu.I.

²Pramāṇasamuccaya, Ch. I.

reduces perception to a mere sensation free from all conceptual determination.

This type of explanation has been criticised by Nyāya. How can an object which according to Buddhists is momentary (*kṣanika*) have perception? The object must cease to exist after it is perceived. Then again it is wrong to exclude the complex cognition of jar (*sanivṛtijñāna*) from the total range of perception, and to spotlight only the outer characteristics. A sensation cannot be dissociated from the ideation. Ideation is there, and so is verbal representation of the idea. Without that perception has no significance.

3. *Momentary nature of Perception*

According to Buddhists all perceptions are momentary, and they can apprehend only the present which has no length of duration, but is just a short single moment. There is no continuous or uniform perception, but only a series of momentary impressions in succession. The pictures on the movie screen appear to be continuous, but actually these are discrete, but as these move in rapid succession, an illusory appearance of continuity is caused. Similarly, the so-called continuous sensations are a series of discrete sensations which are purely temporary (*kṣanabhaṅgura*) but appear to be continuous (*dhārāvāhika*). Because of the temporary and momentary character of perception, there can be no continuous, nor simultaneous perception. Even in the so called simultaneous presentation of knower, known and knowledge, there is infact a succession of the perception of 'I', then of the object, and then of the knowledge.

4. *Types of Perception*

According to Dharmakīrti there are four kinds of perception *viz.*

(1) Sense-perception or sensation (*indriya-jñāna*); (2) mental perception (*mano-vijñāna*), (3) self-consciousness (*svasamvedanā*) and (4) superconscious perception of Yogis (*yogipratyakṣa*).

1. The first is sense-perception, which is based and derived from the functioning of the senses. It is mere sensation, and gives rise to mental perception subsequently.

2. Mental perception does not depend upon sense-organs, but follows upon the sensation caused by the functioning of sense-organs. The sense-perception is one of the stimulus (pratyaya) of mental perception. Besides, there are three more stimulus namely; the external stimulus (ālambana-pratyaya), the auxiliary (sahakāri) stimulus, and the immediately preceding cognition (samānāntara pratyaya).

3. Self-perception is the perception of the mind and its various states like pleasure and pain. It is self-awareness (vedamatmanah) ; indeterminate and free from error (abhrāntam).

4. Yogic perception is the result of meditation on the four doctrines of Buddhism viz. (i) all is transitory, (ii) all is void, (iii) all is pain ; and (iv) everything is like itself. The Yogi contemplates constantly and perceives the object of contemplation most distinctly, and attains the state of intuition. It has three phases, Rūpa-citta, Arūpa-citta and Lokottara-citta. The devotee or Bhikṣu transcends from Rupa-loka to Arupa and then to Lokottara. Rhys Davids' gives a detailed description regarding the factors in each of these stages—Rūpa, Arūpa and Lokottara.

5. *Determinate and Indeterminate Perception*

Nyāya holds that before determinate perception, there is a stage when the perception is indeterminate *i.e.* when the object is perceived without its name, quality, action, generality and substantiality. The Buddhist agrees with the latter proposition that indeterminate perception is devoid of attributes, but denies the existence of any determinate perception. All perception is I. P., but it is not as elementary as Śāṅkara holds, *i.e.* mere 'isness'. It is something more than that. As there is no determinate perception, there is no perception of universal or attribute or name *etc.*

6. *Dream Perception*

There are four theories of dream phenomena:

(1) The physiological theory, recognises organic and muscular disturbances as the source of such dreams as falling from a mountain, flying into sky *etc.*

(2) The Psychological theory, recognises central stimulation born of automatic activities of the mind as the source of common dreams which are echoes of past waking experiences and which are related to wish-fulfilment.

(3) The Superstitious theory recognises spirits as the source of dreams. These may also be called telepathic dreams.

(4) The Clairvoyant theory, recognises merit and demerit as the source of prophetic dreams.¹

7. Illusory Perception

Buddhists give divergent explanation of the illusory perception. According to Śūnyavādins, everything is void, and therefore both silver and nacre are unreal. The error consists in the cognition of unreal nacre as real silver, though the silver also is unreal. Nullity first appears as nacre, and nacre is apprehended as silver. So there is superimposition of nacre on silver and also an assumption in nacre of an opposite attribute. Virtually, the illusion is unreal. This theory is called *Asatkhyāti*.

According to Sautrāntika Bauddha, the external objects have a real existence. Nacre is really existent. The illusion that it appears as silver is that internal knowledge of silver becomes external. We possess the notion of silver in our mind. Here that notion of our mind (*Ātman*) has as if come out and presented itself.

According to Vijñānavādi Bauddha, there is no reality of the existence of external objects. They are only forms of knowledge. Reality consists in a series of momentary cognitions, particular perishing psychical representation. There is no difference between object and its cognition. Momentary cognitions are object. The flow of knowledge sometimes generates right cognition and sometimes illusory cognition.

Both the above theories are called *Ātmakhyāti*.

8. Nature of Sense-organs

Sense organs are six in number, the usual five and the purely mental. Leaving aside mind, each of the sense-organs is made up of a kind of translucent subtle matter. The six organs have

¹ Sinha, Jadunath, *Indian Psychology*, pp. 322-323.

got six bases (*āśraya*), and six objects (*viṣaya*). The same is illustrated in the following diagram:

Diagram : 14
NATURE OF SENSE-ORGANS

Sense	Golaka (<i>organ</i>)	Āśraya	Viṣaya	Nature
1. Visual	eye	vision	colour	Aprāpyakārī
2. Auditory	ear	audition	sound	Aprāpyakārī
3. Olfactory	nose	smelling	smell	Prāpyakārī
4. Gustatory	tongue	tasting	taste	Prāpyakārī
5. Tactile	skin	touch	tangible- ness	Prāpyakārī
6. Mental	Mind	Knowledge	Idea	Aprāpyakārī

The sense-organs are the sockets (*golaka*) in the body, such as eye, ear *etc.*

Although Nyāya holds that all the sense-organs are *prāpyakārī*, but the Buddhist holds that the eye and the ear are not *prāpyakārī*, because these can apprehend the object from a distance without coming into contact with it. That is why the eye can see a mountain, an object bigger than the eye, and can see the branches of a tree and the moon at the same time, though the moon is at a great distance, and can also see objects hidden behind glass. The eye cannot go out to its objects to perceive it. It perceives without getting at it.

Similarly the sound need not come from its place of origin into the ear-drum in order to be perceived. The auditory organ is *aprāpyakārī*, and it can perceive without the direct contact with the object which may be far away.

9. Recognition

The Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta holds that all recognition is a single mental act or psychosis (*vṛtti*). But the Buddhist refutes it. The Buddhist holds that recognition is not a single psychosis but a complex of two—presentative and representative. Jayanta presents the arguments of the Buddhist, in his *Nyāya Mañjarī*. If we take simply the present perception, it can-

not help in recognition, because in recognition the past condition of the object is involved, whileas in perception only the present condition is involved. Similarly we cannot take the subconscious impressions as the cause of recognition, because these deal with the past only, and not with the present. Nor can both the sense-organs and the past impressions produce one effect like recognition, because of their divergent nature. The former produce direct perception of the present, and the latter produce memory of the past. How can they cooperate to produce one effect? So no single process (either of senses or of impressions) can produce recognition. Hence recognition is a mechanical composition of presentative and representative processes. Senses represent the present, and impressions represent the past. Hence recognition is both presentative and representative.

II

PSYCHOLOGY IN JAINISM

Like other systems of Indian Philosophy, Jaina Philosophy also has contributed to the field of Indian Psychology. Its psychology is based on detailed foundations of the Doctrine of Karma. An exhaustive investigation in Karma Theory of Jaina, and its psychological analysis has been recently made by Mohan Lal Mehta.¹ Since Mr. Mehta's investigations are exhaustive, there is no need to repeat the findings here, but in order to help the reader to compare the contribution of various systems (including Jaina philosophy), a brief outline is reproduced below.

A. PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF JAINA PSYCHOLOGY

Jaina philosophy follows the philosophy of Upaniṣads regarding a number of philosophical issues. It affirms the doctrine of soul, doctrine of transmigration, doctrine of karma and the doctrine of liberation. The essence of human personality is the soul. Life is not the product or property of the body. The embodied soul, Jiva, possess infinite power which is covered by a thin veil of Karma matter accumulated in the past. The Jivas are of many kinds viz. (1) plants; (2) worms; (3) ants etc.

¹Vide his publication *Jaina Psychology*.

(4) bees *etc.* and (5) vertebrates. Plants possess the sense of touch. The worms have touch and taste. The ants have touch, taste and smell. Bees have touch, taste, smell and vision. Animals have all the five senses. Men and gods possess in addition the inner sense-organ *Manas*. Every *Jīva* transmigrates after death. On account of the merit or demerit it is born as god, man, animal or denizen of hell. His Karma determines (i) the length of life ; (ii) the peculiar body ; (iii) the caste and family; and (iv) energy of the soul preventing the doing of an action where there is desire for it (*antarya*). The Karma matter accumulates in each birth, and when it fructifies on an appropriate occasion, it is purged from off the soul. If no new Karma is done, and the old is exhausted, the soul becomes free. *Mokṣa* is the state of the soul in pure happiness and knowledge. Karma can throw away suffering and help in reaching this state. From the point of view of Karma, its origin, accumulation and destruction, the soul undergoes five states as under:

A. The essential state, *Pāriṇāmika Bhāva*, unaffected by Karma.

B. The state with manifestation of Karma, *Audāyika Bhāva*.

C. The state with suppression of Karma, *Aupaśamika Bhāva*.

D. The state with total annihilation of Karma, *Kṣāyika Bhāva*.

E. The state of mixture of B, C & D above, *Kṣāyopaśamika Bhāva*. Herein some Karmas are destroyed, some are suppressed and some begin to manifest and then be exhausted so as to bring about realization.¹

Theory of Karma in Jaina Psychology

Karma has direct psychological bearing. 'Karma is nothing but a series of acts and effects'. These acts accumulate and bear fruition after a particular period. Each Karma is characterised by a special nature, duration, intensity and quantity. The fruit corresponds to the same. The nature and quantity of Karmic matter depend on the activities of body, mind and speech. Karma explains the diversity of all beings, and individual

¹Mehta, Mohan Lal, *Jaina Psychology*, pp. 63-64.

differences in men. It explains the phenomenon of heredity. The Karmic particles of Jaina correspond to the Sanskāras and Vāsanās of Vedānta. These envelop the soul and obscure its vision and powers, "The soul possess the faculty of infinite apprehension, infinite comprehension, infinite bliss and infinite energy." All these powers are limited by Karma, which are in three forms : cognition, affection and conation. The highest goal is to understand the nature of all the three types of Karma, control the same and to remove the karmic matter. Hence the need for understanding the cognitive, affections and conative faculties of mind. An outline of the same as held by Jaina is given below.

B. NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

According to the Jaina, Consciousness is the essential characteristic of the Self. It is the very essence of the Self and not an adventitious quality. The substratum of consciousness is neither the brain, nor the body. Its substratum is only the Self.

1. Cognition

Cognition is a particular modification of consciousness. It is of two types viz. (i) darśana which corresponds to indeterminate perception and (2) jñāna or comprehension which corresponds to determinate perception. Regarding the distinction between the two, there are three different views:

(a) One view is that both mean cognition with specific and generic qualities, but I.P. is introspective in character, and D.P. is observational.

(b) The second view is that I.P. is the knowledge of generic characters and D.P. is the knowledge of the specific characters.

(c) The third view is that I.P. is the first stage of cognition characterised by bare apprehension of the existence of the object, without any specific determination, whileas D.P. is the next stage with specific determination.

In normal beings both I.P. and D.P. occur successively and not simultaneously. For the omniscient, or those who possess the faculty of intuition, I.P. and D.P. are identical.

D.P. is of two kinds (i) sensory and mental and (ii) super-

sensory or E.S.P. (extra-sensory perception). The former depends upon the senses and the latter is directly derived from the soul.

Perception is the direct and immediate knowledge of objects (*viśadajñānasvabhāvaṃ*).¹ The primary (*mukhya*) form of perception is independent of the mind and the senses, as in the cases of yogis. The secondary or the practical (*samvyavahārika*) form of perception is conditioned by the senses and the mind, and its essence lies in direct cognition (not intuition).

2. *Sense-organs*

The Jaina follows the other philosophies as regards the number of sense-organs. The number is five *viz.* visual, auditory *etc.* Each of the senses is of two varieties: physical and psychical. The physical sense-organ is in definite shape having two parts—the organ itself and the protecting environment. The psychical sense is of two kinds: attainment and activity. But the number of motor organs is not restricted to five. The throat swallows, and many other parts of the body do some such action. But these cannot be called sense-organs. All these are included in one sense-organic touch. Mind is the internal sense-organ, and it is composed of group of atoms. Its function is I.P. and D.P. For purpose of perception, the senses remain in the same state, and it is the mind which cognises the object without having any conjunction with them.

3. *Non-verbal comprehension*

Comprehension is of two kinds: verbal (*śruta*) and non-verbal (*mati*). Non-verbal comprehension has seven categories: sensation (*avagraha*), speculation (*iha*), perceptual judgment (*avaya*) and *Dhāraṇā* (retention, recollection, recognition and reasoning). Sensation is vague cognition, the first result of sense-object contact. Speculation knows it more clearly. The third stage is ascertainment of right and wrong. Retention is the absence of forgetting. Recollection is based on latent mental impressions. Recognition combines perception and recollection. Reasoning helps in drawing conclusion.

4. *Verbal Comprehension*

It is the cognition based on words, read or heard from

¹*Prameyakamalamārttaṇḍo*, pp. 37-38.

trustworthy persons. It is preceded by non-verbal comprehension. Language is its cardinal factor. It performs two functions: revealing the contents to the knower himself and to others as well. There are eight qualities necessary to give rise to it: desire for hearing and reading, questioning, attention, grasping, enquiry, conviction, retention, and right action.

5. *Extra-sensory Perception*

Jainas admit three types of ESP : (1) clairvoyance (avadhi), (2) telepathy (manah-paryaya) and (3) omniscience (sarvajñatva). Clairvoyance is confined to material objects only. Telepathy is the cognition of the states of the minds of others. It is of two kinds: *tjumatī*, which is rather feeble, and *vipulamati*, which is everlasting and strong. Omniscience is the perfect manifestation of consciousness, after all the Karmic veils have been destroyed. It is the highest type of cognition.

6. *Affection (Emotions)*

"An emotion is a mental excitement usually coloured with pleasure and pain."¹ Both pleasure and pain are produced on account of the rise of feeling-producing karma. These do not depend upon the object because the same object can be source of pleasure for one and of pain for the other. There is no neutral feeling, or a mixed feeling. There can be succession of pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain are the bases of emotions, which can be categorised into classes: passions (or strong emotions, and quasi-passions or mild emotions). The former are sixteen in number, and the later nine. The four major passions are: anger, pride, deceit and greed. Each of these are of four varieties in accordance with the intensity of its nature and function. Out of the mild emotions, there are six non-sexual emotions *viz.* laughter, sorrow, liking, disliking, disgust and fear, and three sexual emotions *viz.* male-sexuality, female-sexuality and the mixed sexuality.

7. *Conation*

Mental Activity

There are four types of mental activity: true, untrue, true

¹Mehta, Mohan Lal, *Jaina Psychology*, p. 201.

and untrue, and neither true nor untrue. True activity corresponds and the object, and untrue activity does not. Some activities are partly true and some activities like desires, purpose are neither true, nor untrue.

Control of Mental Activity

Jaina holds that if the mental activity is controlled, the inflow of new Karmic matter can be checked, and the old annihilated: This will result in emancipation. Here he agrees with Patañjali and Buddhist. The means of control of mental activities are: Self-regulation, moral virtue, contemplation, conquest of affliction, auspicious conduct, and austerity. Austerity is of two kinds: physical and mental. Physical austerity results in non-attachment, lightness of body, conquest of senses, self-discipline and cessation of karmic particles. The mental austerity is meditation, which includes pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi (as per yoga). Haribhadra Jain presents eightfold path of self-discipline which reminds us of aṣṭāṅga-yoga.

C. RESUME

The special contribution of Jaina psychology lies in expounding the Law of Karma, the theory of emotions, Extra-sensory Perception, mental control through austerity and meditation. The Law of Karma of Jaina explains a number of psychological phenomena e.g. the nature of personality, the factors of personality, the changes in personality from time to time, the individual differences in men, the significance of heredity (as against environment), the Psychology of attitudes and motives. A number of emotions have been described with such details which are wanting in other systems. As regards E.S.P. and Yogic faculty, it is in line with Yoga-psychology, and affirms the same. It shares many topics common with Yoga, such as mental control, mental health, therapy and meditation.

It starts another topic of psychological interest viz. verbal comprehension and outlines psychology of language learning. Jaina psychology, like Yoga, has a practical approach, and it is devoid of higher metaphysics and epistemology which would make it theoretical. Certain practical topics like 'action' and 'control of action' reach their climax in this system.

Conclusion and Recapitulation

WE may summarise below in outline form the chief contributions of Indian philosophers to Psychology. It is not intended here to repeat what has been mentioned above. But a brief outline of the psychological topics in vertical classification may serve a useful purpose, at least in presenting an index of psychological topics as discussed by Indian philosophers.

A. METHODS OF INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY

Indian psychology is an off-shoot of Indian philosophy. The very subject-matter of Indian philosophy viz. Consciousness, leads to metaphysics and cannot be divorced from it. The problems regarding nature of consciousness, the scope of consciousness in the universe, the functioning of consciousness, the agencies of consciousness (mind and body) and the results of consciousness are metaphysical and epistemological problems. Hence these problems are solved by philosophers. The method of philosophy is experience and reason supplemented by intuition. Indian philosophers have accepted (1) experience and observation (*pratyakṣa*); (2) reasoning (*anumāna*, *upamāna*, *tarka*) and (3) intuition or testimony (*śabda*). Upaniṣads mention these methods, and Sāṃkhya endorses the same. These are three *pramāṇas* used by *pramātṛ* (the knower) leading to *pramā* (knowledge). Nyāya declares the supremacy of *pratyakṣa* over other means of valid knowledge. Whatever is known through other methods must be verifiable by other means (vide Chapter V, Section D above). Mīmāṃsā refuses to accept the validity of intuition. But the other philosophical systems (Vedānta, Yoga, Buddhism and Jaina) give all supremacy to intuition. Advaita talks of *pārmārthika sattā* as the highest reality, which is related to intuition and superconsciousness, and he makes observation subservient to intuition, as it has only *vyāvahārika sattā* (empirical reality). The empirical experience based on experience is sublated by superconscious experience. Yoga states the practi-

cal methods of attaining superconscious experience, and thus obtaining the true nature of reality. Buddhism emphasises the importance of enlightenment (bodhi). Intuitive insight (prajñā) represents the highest activity of the human mind. Jains talk of omniscience (sarvajñatva) attainable when the karmic veil is removed. On the whole, except Cārvāka system (which is virtually non-existent) and Mīmāṃsā, all the schools of Indian psychology admit intuition. Bauddha, Jaina, Yoga and Vedāntā give intuition the highest place. "Hindu thinkers as a class hold with great conviction that we possess a power more interior than intellect by which we become aware of the real in its ultimate individuality, and not merely in its superficial or discernible aspects."¹ It does not mean that intellect is denied. Intuition presents truth of first order, and reason and experience presents truth of the second order. There is no antithesis between the two. Reason is to be supplemented by intuition. Hence the hierarchy of philosophical method is intuition (aparokṣa), reason (parokṣa) and observation (pratyakṣa). Some Western philosophers (e.g. Bergson, Croce) also admit this hierarchy.

The intuitional or the introspectional method is the most suitable method for psychology, for it helps the study of the total mind instead of its different functions separately. One who experiences Samādhi knows the total mind, and obtains the non-mediate (aparokṣa) knowledge. He listens to the voice from within and realizes his self. He sees the development of his own mind and thereby understands the working of the mind of other people. The purely experimental method cannot be adequately applied to the study of mind. Mind is something higher than nervous system. Objective method can work only at the superficial level. Intuitional method will dive deep into the waters.

Fortunately spiritual insight has been abundant in India, right from the Upaniṣadic age. It is therefore that all the philosophical systems arose out of insight (darśana) and are designated as such. Intuitive knowledge is beyond all proof (prāmāṇyam nirapekṣam). No wonder then that the chief method of Indian

¹Radhakrishnan, S., *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 127.

philosophy, and consequently of Indian psychology is insight and introspection. In fact psychology is itself a subject of introspection. Vyāsa's verdict is irrefutable: "Through Yoga must Yoga be known."

The second major method of Psychology is observational and experimental. Intuition is the right method where metaphysical problems of psychology are to be solved. But where problems regarding the lower functions of consciousness such as perception, cognition, affection, volition *etc.* are concerned, observation is the suitable method. It is, therefore, that Nyāya that deals extensively with 'perception' makes use of observational method and assigns last place to intuition (see Chapter V, Section D above). The minute details regarding perception are based on observation. The wave-theory (of Keśava Miśra) could not be discovered by the philosopher, without taking recourse to detailed observation. There are evidences that Caraka conducted actual experimentation for finding the effect of external physical stimuli on dreams. He had discovered the rate of change of respiration during the three states *viz.* wakeful, dream and deep sleep. By observing the rate of respiration he could state whether the sleeping person is in dream state or deep-sleep state. Further, he would subject the sleeping person to a definite physical stimuli, just at the moment when the sleeping person entered dream state. The stimuli of fire-pot near the feet would cause such dreams as 'burning in fire'. The stimuli of raising the cot and then lowering it down would cause such dreams as 'flying in air and falling from precipice.' A stimuli like a medicine disturbing digestion would cause unpleasant dreams. Thus there is no dearth of experimentation under controlled conditions.

The generalisation regarding perception, cognition, memory, dream, deep-sleep, emotion, volition *etc.* have been arrived at by Indian philosophers after collecting a huge mass of evidences. What is the basis of declaring the prophetic nature of some dreams? Evidences were collected from persons whose dreams came about to be true. There are books in India dealing with prophetic dreams, mentioning concomitant results of various events or phenomena met in dreams. The generalisations (like that of palmistry and astrology) are based on analysis of data

of evidences.

In short we conclude that the chief method of Indian psychology is 'introspection', supplemented by observation and experimentation.

B. NATURE OF INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY

Psychology is the science of consciousness, and its scope is the study of consciousness which pervades the entire universe from the invisible atom to the man, the highest of the living organisms. The Ultimate Reality according to majority of the Indian philosophical systems is Pure Consciousness. Individual Consciousness is directly related to it like spark and fire, wave and ocean etc.

Indian psychology is embedded in Indian philosophy. The fundamental doctrines of Indian philosophy which have bearing on psychology, and the psychological deductions therefrom have been mentioned in Chapter I above. A few principles such as ethical principle of life, Law of Karma and liberation are repeated below for clarification.

1. *The Ethical Principle of Life*

Upaniṣads emphasise the purity of character as the basis of higher life and self-realization. Sāṃkhya mentions threefold misery in the world and that the final means of deliverance from it is unattachment and discrimination. Yoga mentions pañcākleśas, the fivefold misery and emphasises yama and niyama as the first preliminary steps for spiritual progress. Śāṅkara talks of fourfold qualities necessary for a spiritual aspirant e.g. Virāga, Viveka, sādhanā-sampat and mumukṣatva. The third quality sādhanā-sampat includes the ethical principles emphasised by Patañjali or Buddha or Mahāvīra. Ethics of all the Indian Philosophers have been almost identical. Pure ethical life is the foundation of spiritual progress.

2. *Law of Karma*

Upaniṣads declare it as an eternal law. Sāṃkhya affirms it. Nyāya reiterates the same with a little modifications. It mentions that the birth of a child depends upon the Karma of the parents and of the soul. The conjunction of the seeds is only a secondary cause. Karmic residuum continue from birth to birth. Man

is free only at the cessation of Karma. The three-fold division into *prārabdha*, *sañcita* and *āgāmi* have been explained by Vedānta. The concept of *karmāśaya* and *ālayavijñāna* is the contribution of Yoga and Buddha respectively. Details about the process and fructification of Karma have been given by Yoga and Jaina system.

3. *Sanskāras*

The theory of Sanskaras is a corollary of the Law of Karma. The nature of the next birth is determined by the karma of the individual. The soul retains with him the subtle body consisting of *Prāṇa*, *Manas*, the past Karma and *Ahaṁkāra*. The Karmas contain the past impressions of experience in the previous birth. These past impressions (*sanskāras*) determine the direction of the *Jīva* in the present life. This is explained in Upaniṣads. Nyāya talks of 3 kinds of *Sanskāras* viz. velocity (*vega*), *bhāvanā* and elasticity (B.P. and S.M. 158). Yoga describes two types of *Samskāras*—the individual tendencies (*Vāsanā*) and good or bad actions (*dharmādharmā*). The seat of *Samskāras* is *karmāśaya* and it results in *Karma-vipāka* or the fruit of action which determines the nature of the next birth, especially the family in which one is destined to be born, the longevity, and the pleasures of life (*jāti*, *āyu* and *bhoga*). The goal of yoga is the destruction of the *Karmāśaya*.

4. *Liberation*

The ultimate goal of life according to all the Indian philosophies is liberation, self-realization, *Mokṣa* or *Kaivalyam*. It is the state of destruction of bondage, cessation of transmigration, annihilation of karma, destruction of the subtle body, lifting of the veil of ignorance (according to Advaita), release from three-fold misery (according to *Sāṁkhya*) or fivefold *kleśa* (according to yoga), understanding the true nature of the Self and attaining the state of Superconsciousness. Knowledge of psychology must lead to the understanding of the true nature of the Self, and hence the principle of liberation is a part of the subject-matter of Indian psychology.

The circumstances when final release takes place have been mentioned by Nyāya (N.V, III. 2.60). Release is possible

through true knowledge of the defects like pain, births, activity and ignorance (N.S.I, 1.2). Sāṃkhya states that release takes place automatically when the dance of Prakṛti ceases before the Puruṣa, and Puruṣa detaches himself from Prakṛti. There is an urge for eternal happiness and eternal existence in the human mind. Indian philosophy leads to that goal.

5. Means of Liberation

The means of liberation have been mentioned in all the philosophies. Upaniṣads emphasise knowledge of the true nature of the self. Sāṃkhya emphasises the discrimination (viveka) and knowledge of the true nature of Prakṛti. Nyāya emphasises true knowledge through purification of the self, withdrawal from the senses and concentration and meditation. Advaita emphasises Jñānayoga, or the path of knowledge. Rāmānuja emphasises Bhakti-yoga. Patañjali emphasises Rāja-yoga. Buddhism emphasises high ethical life. Jainism emphasises ethics and meditation (like that of Yoga). Each philosophical system has given details about the divergent means for liberation. This topic has been beautifully summarised by Swami Vivekananda, "Each soul is potentially divine. The goal is to manifest the divinity within by controlling nature, external and internal. Do this either by work, or worship, or psychic control, philosophy, by one, or more, or all of these—and be free."

C. FACTORS OF PERSONALITY

The essence of human personality is Ātman which is of the nature of pure consciousness. According to Śaṅkara, Ātman is consciousness itself. Rāmānuja believes that consciousness is its attribute. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believes that consciousness is an adventitious (aupādhika) quality of the soul. Sāṃkhya calls it an essential attribute of Puruṣa which is reflected in Mahat. Bauddha does not believe in the existence of a permanent self, but a stream of consciousness. Jaina endorses Rāmānuja's view. Anyway consciousness, or soul characterised by consciousness is the essence of human personality.

The soul possesses body and mind as its agents. The triune of soul, body and mind is accepted by all the schools (except

by Bauddha). A detailed description of psycho-physical system and the gross body is given by Sāṃkhya. The thirteen elements of mind and five elements of body constitute the total body (physico-mental) of Puruṣa. Upaniṣads have explained the five sheaths, and its details are given by Vedānta. Since Bauddha does not believe in soul, its concept of personality is a Pudgala which is a congregation of five Skandhas namely the Rupa, Vedanā, Samjñā, Sanskāra and Vijñāna. These roughly correspond to the five kośas of Vedānta—Rūpa with Annamaya, Vedanā with Manomaya, Samjñā, and sanskāra with Vijñānamaya and Vijñāna with Ānandamaya.

1. The Self

The Self as the essence of personality and the substratum of all consciousness has been declared by all the schools of philosophy (except by Bauddha). Upaniṣads present the fullest details about the Self, and its identity with Brahman. Sāṃkhya calls it Puruṣa, and talks of plurality of puruṣas, with one genus (as a common factor). Nyāya makes a little departure from Upaniṣads and Sāṃkhya, by mentioning that Self is intelligent only in relation to body and that consciousness is its adventitious quality. Nyāya, however, affirms the eternality of the Self. The souls are many and each soul acts through its agent Buddhi. Advaita calls it the witnessing Self (Sākṣī), the immutable (kūṭastha), and explains the relation between Self and Brahman through two theories viz. Abhāsavāda and Avachēda-vāda. The reflection of the Self in ego is called Cidābhāsa. The relation of kūṭastha with Cidābhāsa is explained as that of between original face and reflection in mirror. The theory of Māyā and Avidyā, according to which the Self is enveloped by ignorance and thus it identifies non-self, with self, has a great psychological significance. Details about this theory were explained above (Chapter VIII). The relation between the individual and Self and the Cosmos, primarily explained by Upaniṣads, have been explained in detail by Advaita (see Chapter VIII and diagram :8 above).

2. The Subtle Body

Upaniṣads mention the Linga-śarīra or the Sūkṣama Śarīra

which includes the five vital airs, the Manas, the Buddhi and the Ahaṁkāra. In sleep and death, the physical body remains detached with the self, but the subtle body accompanies the Self. It transmigrates along with the soul, at the time of death. It contains the seed of the Karma. The subtle-body, according to Sāṁkhya is atomic in size, and it contains eighteen adjuncts. It stores Vāsanas and Samskāras. It is undetermined as regards sex. It is not dissolved till liberation.

3. *Buddhi*

Upaniṣads declare the supremacy of Buddhi in the illustration where the soul is mentioned as charioteer, Buddhi the driver, Manas the reins, senses the horses, and body the chariot (K.U., I. 3.3). All the organs proceed to intellect, and all the experiences are accomplished by it. Advaita mentions further the characteristics of Buddhi. It reveals the objects in waking state, and becomes both object and perception in the dream state. According to Advaita its characteristics are change (pariṇāma), activity (ceṣṭa), suppression (nirodha), ideation in action (śakti), life (jivana) and characterisation (dharma). Again, Mind has six powers viz. (1) power of cognition and perception through the senses (vedanā-śakti), (2) power of judgment (Maniṣa-śakti), (3) volition (ichhā-śakti), (4) imagination (bhāvanā), (5) retention (dhāraṇā), (6) memory (smaraṇa). Judgment also is of two types—ascertainment (nirṇaya) and reasoning (tarka). Reasoning is either in the form of inference (anumāna) or discussion (parāmārśa).

4. *Ahaṁkāra*

The 'I' notion reveals the existence of ego or Ahaṁkāra as an aspect of the Self. It is not exactly the Self, but a reflection of the Self. Sāṁkhya calls it an evolute of cosmic intelligence Mahat—an individualised consciousness through the interaction of Puruṣa and Pradhāna. But Advaita explains it differently. Ahaṁkāra is a transformation of Avidyā, whereby the Self erroneously calls itself the experiencer and the enjoyer. So Ahaṁkāra is superimposed on Self. Between ego and soul, there is the veil of Mayā or Avidyā. Once the veil is lifted, Ahaṁkāra is dissolved and the true nature of the Self is revealed.

Ahaṁkāra of a child is faint, but it develops day by day by the accumulation of desires, fears, Vāsanās *etc.* Ahaṁkāra can be burnt by the fire of knowledge (says Advaita), by devotion and self-surrender (says Rāmānuja) and by deep meditation (says yoga). Ahaṁkāra is the root of all Vṛttis. Destroy it and all the mental modes of psychosis will die automatically.

5. Citta

It is another important aspect of Mind. It is that modification of Antaḥkaraṇa that remembers, stores past impressions, tendencies, hereditary traits and Sanskāras. It corresponds to the subconscious mind of Western psychology. Sāṁkhya does not mention Citta, but Advaita describes it in detail, and explains its importance as the store-house of vāsanās and sanskāras (of this life and past lives). Citta is dissolved at the rise of right knowledge and cessation of ignorance (Avidyā). The Yogic method of meditation purifies the Sanskāras in it to the extent that the whole Mind (called Citta in Yoga) becomes transparent capable of reflecting divine consciousness.

The Citta is the store-house of past karma and impressions gathered in the past lives. These determine the present ability, present aptitude and the present status of the person. But it does not mean that man is a mere creature of the past. He can build new Sanskāras in his Citta, change the very fabric of the mental habits, exhaust the past Karmas, resolve the unpleasant impressions, revive the past pleasant sanskāras, develop the latent powers and make full cleansing of the Citta.

6. Manas

Upaniṣads describe Manas as the coordinating organ that synthesises the function of senses. It is material in character and derives its power from Self. The subtlest part of food is turned into the energy of Manas. Sāṁkhya calls Manas as the fifth Principal arising out of Ahaṁkāra under the influence of Sattva. It works as the internal organ of perception to experience pleasure, pain *etc.* It controls the ten sense organs and works as the cognitive, affective and conative organ. Its function is to ponder (saṁkalpa) and to propose (vikalpa). It discriminates between the specific and non-specific. It has the

common property of sensory and motor. It identifies itself with each of the senses. Nyāya justifies the existence of Manas as a separate sense on the basis of non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions. According to Mīmāṃsā, Manas is an instrument of direct cognition, capable of perceiving pleasure and pain. But while perceiving the external objects it needs the five sense-organs. But Śāṅkara goes a step further in proclaiming that Manas can perceive even without the sense-organs. Even the blind have some amount of visual perception. A snake has no ears, but can perceive sound. Some lower animals do not have all the senses, but the perception is not altogether absent in the case of the sense that is lacking. Manas is fickle, it wanders from object to object. It is very difficult to steady it. Manas is related to time and distance. Time and distance are but modes of the mind. Short time and distance sometimes appears to be very long.

7. *Gross Physical Body*

The gross physical body is composed of five elements. Each of the elements contains in it the other four in small proportion (vide chapter VIII, Section E.16 above). Sāṃkhya mentions in detail the five Tanmātrās, the element potentials, which are connected with the five elements on the one hand and the five respective senses on the other (vide Chapter IV, Section A, and Diagram 3 above). Kaṇāda explains in detail the minute atoms, their conjunction and character, which constitute the gross physical body. References about five vital airs have been made in Upaniṣads, and details worked out in Vedānta. These roughly correspond to the various systems responsible for the functioning of the body.

8. *The Five Cognitive Senses*

Upaniṣads mention the five cognitive senses and their function. The details about these have been explained in Sāṃkhya, which have been further accepted by other systems. Bauddha explains the nature of five senses, the five 'golakas' (sense-organs), their substratum, object and nature (see diagram 14, Chapter XI).

9. The Five Conative Senses

Although Bauddha, Jaina, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika do not recognise the five motor organs as senses, their details have been given in Upaniṣads, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita, and these have generally been included among the senses.

Details about nervous system are given in *Caraka Saṃhita* and in Tāntric literature. Yoga also mentions some nerves connected with the yoga practices.

D. THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL APPARATUS

Although various schools have given their own description of the organs of Mind, the best classification is given by Śāṅkara:

(1) Sāṃkhya names Mind as Antaḥkaraṇa accompanied by the senses called Bāhyakaraṇa. Antaḥkaraṇa is composed of Manas (that coordinates the activities of senses), Ahaṃkāra (ego) and Buddhi (that reflects). The senses are ten in number, five cognitive and five conative (or receptors and affectors, sensory and motor).

(2) Śāṅkara adds Citta (the subconscious mind, the store of Vāsanā, Karmic residues, and memory images) to the above list, and thus makes the list complete.

(3) Rāmānuja calls the whole of Antaḥkaraṇa as Manas. So according to him Mind comprises of 10 senses and Manas.

(4) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Bauddha and Jaina go a step further and exclude five motor organs, and thus according to them Mind comprises of five cognitive senses and Manas. Jains include all the motor organs in one sense-organ viz. tactual sense. All this is represented briefly in the diagram on page no. 329.

The psycho-physical phenomena at the cosmic level and at the individual level has been explained by Sāṃkhya. The theory of mutual reflection of Puruṣa and Buddhi is a novel contribution. The metaphor of lame and blind in explaining the mutual inter-dependence of matter and spirit is striking. A modified description, we do find in Upaniṣads and in Advaita, where in the relation between samaṣṭi and vyaṣṭi has been explained.

Diagram 15
COMPOSITION OF MIND

	External		Internal
	Sensory Organs	Motor Organs	
1. Bauddha	Five Sensory Organs Jñānanedriyas	—	Manas
2. Jaina	—do—	—	Manas
3. Mīmāṃsā	—do—	—	—do—
4. Nyāya	—do—	—	—do—
5. Vaiśeṣika	—do—	—	—do—
6. Viśiṣṭadvaita (of Rāmānuja)	—do—	Five Motor Organs	—do—
7. Yoga	—do—	Karmendriya Organs	Citta
8. Sāṃkhya	—do—	—do—	Manas, Ahaṃkāra and Buddhi
9. Advaita	—do—	—do—	Manas, Ahaṃkāra, Buddhi and Citta

E. THE STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Upaniṣads have mentioned four states of consciousness *viz.* wakeful, dream, sleep and superconscious. Sāṃkhya follows the same. Yoga gives elaborate details about the superconscious state, and mentions various steps for reaching the same, and various grades of this state itself (*e.g.* Saṃprajñāta, Asaṃprajñāta, Sabija, Nirbija and Dharmamegha Samādhi). Nyāya divides wakeful state into two—experience and memory. Advaita gives minute details about the nature of Jīva in each state (see Ch. VIII and also diagrams 8 and 9). It presents the unique theory that wakeful state is illusory in relation to the superconscious state just as dream state is illusory in relation to wakeful state.

Śankara presents the representative theory of dreams, and mentions the nature of two more minor states *viz.* the swoon and the death. Rāmānuja draws distinction between Turiya (fourth) state and Yogipratyakṣa. Yoga and Jaina present elaborate details about super-normal perception, parapsychology, ESP and superconsciousness. Some generalisations about the states of consciousness were mentioned in Upaniṣads (vide Chapter III, Section B above).

Bauddha explains various levels of consciousness. Subliminal consciousness is the subconscious, Kāma-Citta is the normal Consciousness, and Mahaggata Citta is the superconscious state (see diagram 13 in Chapter XI).

1. *Dream Theory*

A number of problems concerning the exact nature of dreams were mentioned above (Ch. I,). Western psychology does not present satisfactory reply to these. Indian philosophers beginning from Yajñavalkya of the Upaniṣadic period have given detailed explanations, and we find that here also Indian psychology is far ahead of Western psychology.

PROBLEM I

Are dream perceptions produced by external organs (senses) or not ?

1. Reply No. One : Absolutely not.

(i) Kaṇāda defines a dream cognition as the consciousness produced by a particular conjunction of the self with the central sensory Manas in co-operation with the subconscious impressions of past experience like recollections.¹

(ii) Praśastapāda defines a dream cognition as an internal perception through Manas, when all the functions of the senses have ceased, and the mind has retired within a trans-organic region of the organism.²

(iii) Śankara Miśra says that though all the dream cognitions are produced by the mind when it has retired, and the external sense-organs have ceased to operate, it is apprehended as if it were produced by the external sense organs (indriyadvāre-

¹VS, IX, 2, 6-7.

²P-bh, p. 183.

naiva).¹

(iv) Śrīdhara holds that they are produced through the retired Manas when the functions of the peripheral organs have ceased.²

(v) Śivāditya defines a dream as a cognition produced by the Manas perverted by sleep.³

Thus all the above philosophers recognised the central origin of dream, and not the origin from external sense organs. But some thinkers gave a divergent reply that sometimes dreams are produced by sense-organs and sometimes not.

2. Reply No. Two : Sometimes yes, sometimes not.

(i) Udayana admits that in the dream state the peripheral organs (at least the tactual organs which pervades the organism) do not altogether cease to operate. External stimuli, if not sufficiently intense to awaken the person, may act upon the peripheral organs and produce dream cognitions.⁴ Thus there are two types of dreams—centrally excited and peripherally excited. We do perceive external sounds in dreams, when they are not sufficiently loud to rouse up from sleep, and the faint external sounds perceived through the ears during light sleep easily incorporate themselves into dreams. We do perceive heat and cold when we are dreaming.⁵

Recent researches in experimental psychology have proved that external stimuli very often create dream phenomenon.

PROBLEM 2

Are dreams produced or stimulated by disorders of the internal bodily orders?

Reply : Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara, Śankara Miśra and Śivāditya do not recognise the sensory origin of dreams, but they still hold that certain dreams are produced by organic disorders within the body. Caraka the famous physician was the first to declare that some dreams are stimulated by pathological disorders, within the organism. Praśastapāda explains it in

¹VSU, IX, 2,7.

²NK, p. 184.

³SP, p. 68.

⁴NK, III, p. 9.

⁵NK, III, p. 9.

detail in the following way. Those who suffer disorders of flatuency (vāta), dream that they are flying in the sky, wandering about on earth, fleeing with fear from tigers *etc.* And those who are of bilious (pitta) temperament, dream that they are entering fire *etc.* And those who are of phlegmatic temperament, dream that they are crossing the sea, bathing in rivers *etc.*¹

PROBLEM 3

What are the physiological organs that function at the time of dream perception ?

Reply :

1. The external sense organs do function in dreams, but not in the same manner as in wakeful state. Udayana explains that external senses do function, but dream perceptions are not due to those, because the objects we perceive may not be existing at all.

2. The internal organs also function, and these may affect the dream perception. The bad health, temperature, pain, indigestion also may stimulate dreams.

3. The principal organ of the dream is Manas, that has retired at that time from wakeful experiences.

4. Caraka says that Manovāha Nādi, a channel along which centrally initiated presentations come to the sixth lobe of Mānasacakra.² According to Yoga-tantra it is the channel of communication of Jiva with the Mānasacakra (sensorium) at the base of the brain. When sensations are centrally initiated as in a dream, a special Nādi called Svapnavāha Nādi which appears to be a branch of Manovāha Nādi serves as the channel of communication from Jiva to Mānasacakra.³

PROBLEM 4

Are dream perceptions real or illusory ?

Reply : Indian philosophers right from Yajñavalkya have declared that dream perceptions are not real. No chariots are there, and no horses, but we seem to perceive these. The dreamer

¹VSU, IX, 2,7.

²Caraka Saṁhitā, Indriyasthāna, Ch. V.

³Seal, *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, p. 223.

becomes as it were a king, while he is not.¹

Dream perceptions are therefore illusory, but not exactly in the same way as the illusions in wakeful state are. Udayana explains that dreams and illusions resemble in so far as both apprehend objects which do not exist at that time and place, but illusions are products of sense-object contact, while dreams are not produced by senses. Śrīdhara states that dreams take place only when we are asleep, and hence different from illusions. Jayasīma Sūri endorses this view. This view is universal.

PROBLEM 5

Are dream perceptions definite or indefinite perceptions?

Reply : Udayana holds that dream perceptions (d. p.) are definite and determinate in character, in which mind does not oscillate between alternate possibilities.

PROBLEM 6

Are dreams presentative or representative?

Reply : Vaiśeṣika holds the presentative theory. But Śāṅkara and many others hold the opposite view which is the majority view. They hold that dream perceptions are produced by recollections of already perceived objects. The detailed arguments have been given above in the Chapters on Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta.

PROBLEM 7

What is the relation between wakeful state and dream state; and sleep and dream state?

Reply : Upaniṣads have explained in detail the four states of consciousness, and their mutual relations. *Cāndogya* explains the pendulum of mental states (see illustration I.) Advaita presents further details (vide Chapter VIII).

PROBLEM 8

Are the dreams anyway connected with individual's past and future life and past karma?

Reply : Rāmānuja explains that the cause of the dreams is the karma of the individual. Some dreams are retributive in

¹BU, II, 1, 18 ; IV, 3, 10; CU, VIII, 10, 2; CU, VIII, 10; 1.

character. Some dreams are prophetic. He gives details about the relation of dreams with dharma (merit), karma and sãttvika traits (vide Chapter IX above). Kumãrila also talks of dreams representing experiences in previous birth (vide Chapter VII above). There are numerous references of prophetic dreams as well as dreams wherein departed souls are met.

Classification of Dreams

Different schools have presented different classification. Caraka talks of six types. Vaišeṣika talks of four types viz. (1) those born of physiological disturbances (2) due to sub-conscious impressions, (3) due to Dharma and Adharma or Adīṣṭa and (4) dream within dream. Buddhists add prophetic dreams. In all there are six types of dreams whose details are found in the various philosophies:

(a) Some dreams are due to peripheric stimulation—intra organic or extra organic.

(b) Some dreams are due to subconscious impressions, and these include dream hallucinations. Some of these dreams relate to a recent experience; some bring about fulfilment of repressed desires and some are constructive imagination. This explanation is empirically evidenced by all.

(c) Some dreams are prophetic in nature, and are associated with the fruit of past Karma.

(d) Some are telepathic dreams, in which the mind has communication with persons separated by long distance. Numerous incidents of such nature have been reported in all the ages, and in all the countries.

(e) There are cases of dream-within-dream (svapnāntika jñāna).

(f) Lastly there are pathological or morbid dreams, as is commonly known to psycho-analysts.

Theories of Dreams

Buddhist philosophy admits four theories of dreams viz. the physiological theory, the psychological theory, the superstitious theory and the clairvoyant theory.

2. Sleep Theory

Upaniṣads explained that the self rests in peace in its own

self during deep sleep (suṣupti).¹ It is mentioned that the soul in sleep glides into the arteries of heart and becomes one with it.² Here the self desires no desires, sees no dream but enjoys pure delight 'like a married couple in love embrace'. The self is at one with Brahman. The Jīva retires from the outward and inward activities and enters into its own nature. All this has been reiterated by Advaita. In this state, there functions neither the physical body, nor the subtle body, but the causal body (kāraṇa-śarīra). There is complete cessation of empirical consciousness. Only the self continues to exist though it is bereft of all experiences. The mind is absorbed into the cause. The senses are at rest. All the vṛttis remain in subtle state. The empirical consciousness ceases (prapancopāśamaṁ). The phenomena of duality caused by the action of mind are present in the waking and dreaming state only but absent in deep sleep state.

3. Superconsciousness

Self-realisation being the ultimate goal of life, frequent references are made in Upaniṣads regarding controlling of mind as a means of self realization, and the methods for that. Hence Āsana, Prāṇāyāma, Chanting Aum, Concentration (dhyāna) and Samādhi have been recommended. Rudimentaries of Yogic methods are already described in *Maitrī Upaniṣad*. The practice of Yoga and superconscious experience has also been described in *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad*. The method of introversion, controlling of thoughts, deep concentration and meditation has been suggested for attaining higher powers of mind, and superconscious experience. Other philosophical systems also (except Mīmāṃsā) acknowledge superconscious state, supernatural powers, and para-psychology. Yoga deals with it in a detailed manner and explains the eight-fold ladder of attaining superconsciousness. It mentions the types of supernormal powers attained by a yogi during the preliminary stages of his practice, and forbids the use of these as that hampers future progress. It mentions the various stages even in the Samādhi (see Illustration 4-6). Though Yoga does not mention Kuṇḍalinī Śakti or

¹BU, II, 1, 17.

²Ibid, II, 1, 19.

'Serpent Power', the later Tāntric literature gives detailed description of the latent power and its fulfilment by the passage through six plexuses (ṣaṭcakras). There is no dearth of Yogis even now in India, and many Yogis have given account of Yogic practices and its fruits. Swami Ramakrishna, Vivekananda, Rama Tirtha, Maḥarṣi Raman, Aurobindo, Mehar Baba, Abhedananda, Rama Charaka, Yogananda, Shivananda, Shankaracaraya of Haridvar, Mahesh Yogi and others have enlivened this subject in the present century through their teachings based on personal experience in Yoga.

Superconscious state is differentiated from deep sleep (suṣupti). In deep sleep a person does not remember what is dreamt of, or he falls into absolute unconsciousness. But in Samādhi, a person enters into absolute silence, immortality and peace. There is perfect 'awareness'. It is not sleep. Even a few minutes of Samādhi give refreshment and vigour, more than that given by hours of sleep.

F. MENTAL FUNCTIONS

Some rudimentary functions have been mentioned by Upaṇiṣads, e.g. judgment, ideation, wisdom, insight *etc.* (vide UA., III. 3). Some more functions have been added in *Bṛhadaranyaka*. Some attempts have been made to define attention. Sukha and Duḥkha have been mentioned as the basic emotions. Some emotions like fear and desire have been discussed. The word Vṛtti has been used in later systems to stand for fluctuations of mind, or psychosis. According to Advaita, Vṛtti is the offspring of Caitanya (consciousness), and it functions through Antaḥkaraṇa and the senses, and is modified by the nature of the object (V.P., I.18). Vṛtti includes doubt, certitude, pride and recollection. The scope of Vṛtti according to Yoga is vast indeed. It includes all types of mental functioning. The subject-matter of Yoga is the types of Vṛtti, the nature of Vṛtti and the method of controlling the Vṛtti of mind. Yoga explains Vṛtti in detail. It mentions fivefold mental functioning viz. correct understanding, misconception, fancy, sleep and memory (Y.S.I., 6-11). It also explains the three methods of modification of the thinking principle, viz. mortification, study and resignation to God (Y.S., II. 1). Some functions of the mind

are given by Bauddha also. The seven functions according to Bauddha are contact, feeling, perception, volition, concentration, psychic life and attention.

1. Cognition

According to Sāṃkhya the cognition belongs to Puruṣa (the soul) who cognises through the agency of Antaḥkarana which constitutes of Buddhi, Ahaṁkāra and Manas. Manas is again helped by the ten senses. Manas arranges these sense-perceptions into percepts, presents it to Ahaṁkāra, which again presents it to Buddhi to form concept. Besides direct perception the means of cognition are inference and testimony of authority. Mīmāṃsā accepts that all cognition is true (svataḥ-prāmānya). It is false only when proved by any evidence. This philosophy again declares that cognition is independent of verbal expression. Kumārila holds that cognitions have real substrate in the external world. Even the illusory cognition have a real substratum. There can be, however, wrong cognition when the mind is affected by some sort of derangement, when the sense organs do not function properly, or when the object itself presents some difficulty (*Śābara Bhāṣya*, I,1.4). According to Western psychology, it is the object that presents stimuli to the senses, and through the senses to the mind. But Advaita talks of the reverse process of cognition. It is the mind that reaches out to external objects through the senses. Hence the objects do not exist apart from what we perceive. But Rāmānuja believes in the real existence of objects independent of our perception. Cognition according to him is two-fold—experience (anubhava) and remembrance (smṛti). He gives further details about the process and levels of cognition (vide Chapter 9 above). Bauddha includes the following items in cognition: imagination, images, fancy, after-image, appreciation, concentration, dreams and perception. The criteria of true cognition is the subjectmatter of Nyāya philosophy.

2. Perception

The detailed analysis of perception, its nature, process, types, functioning etc. is given by Nyāya (Chapter 5 above). Nyāya defines perception as apprehension through sense-object

contact. It describes in detail the function of the senses, mind, soul and the body in the act of perception. It mentions three characteristics of perception (N.B.I., 1.4), and its six kinds. It gives details about numerous types of perception and distinguishes between I.P. and D.P. The theory of 'prāpyakāritā,' has been well explained by Nyāya. Mimāṃsā follows the same except in the case of auditory sense. Prabhākara has contributed his doctrine of 'Tripartite Perception' (vide Chapter 7 Mīmāṃsā gives further details about the perception of individual, perception of class (Jāti), perception of the Self, illusory perception and supernormal perception. According to Advaita, the mind assumes the form of the object and appears to be exactly like the object of perception. The process of perception has been explained in a different manner (V.P., I. 18). Bauddha defines perception as cognition free from the mental concepts such as name, class and the like. He talks of direct perception in which both sense-object contact and mental perception are included. Perception according to him is only momentary. There is no continuous or uniform perception, but only a series of momentary impressions in succession, Sāṃkhya mentions a number of causes of non-perception (S.K., 7.).

Advaita mentions six stages of mental functioning. Perception through the cognitive senses is the first stage. Mind goes out through the senses, envelops the object and assumes its shape. The psychosis (vṛtti) removes the veil (āvaraṇa) that conceals the object. Consciousness is associated with the Vṛtti, and it illuminates the object, in the same way as lamp illuminates the object. The second stage is discrimination by Manas. Mind enquires whether it is an object or not, if it is an object, what object it is. The third stage is determining the object (niścaya) by Buddhi. The fourth stage is retention of the thought in Citta. Citta enquires and associates with previous experience. Fifthly, Ahamkāra asserts and commands. Sixthly, the conative sense-organs receive the command and execute the same, through the mediation of Buddhi and Manas.

Doubtful Perception

Details about doubtful perception have been presented by Nyāya (N.S.I. 1.23), and Vaiśeṣika (V.S., II. 217.).

Illusory Perception

An interesting discussion has taken place among the various schools of Indian philosophy regarding illusory perception. There are five theories (panca khyāti) of erroneous perception, (*viz.* Akhyāti, Asat-khyāti, Vipareeta-khyāti, Ātma-khyāti and Anirvacanīya-khyāti). Rāmānuja's theory approaches the explanation of modern psychology. Śāṅkara calls it inexplicable (Ch. 8, Section H.3 above).

Extra-sensory Perception

Nyāya calls it Alaukika Pratyakṣa and defines it as perception through extraordinary medium. It includes intuitive perception or yogi-pratyakṣa. Yoga explains the various types of E.S.P. and the objects of concentration (saṁyama) which bring about each type.

3. Indeterminate and Determinate Perception

There have been lot of speculation with regard to what we call in Western psychology sensation, perception and conception. Indian psychologists have thought in terms of Nirvikalpa and Savikalpa, as two stages of perception. The first is the preliminary stage, the first result of the contact between the sense and the object, and is called Nirvikalpa (I.P.) *i.e.* Indeterminate Perception. But there have been differences amongst the various schools as regards the nature of I.P. Advaita and Jaina, identify I.P. with mere sensation, the apprehension of mere being (sattā), without any further recognition of its name, class *etc.* At that stage even the object does not exist. Bauddha also calls it thing in itself, devoid of all qualifications. Sāṁkhya goes a little further and accepts the apprehension of an object, but devoid of any qualifications. Kumārila also follows the same when he calls I.P. as perception of a baby or a dumb person. Gāṅgeśa of neo-Nyāya calls I.P. apprehension without qualifications of name, class *etc.* These views of Sāṁkhya, Kumārila and Gāṅgeśa, identify I.P. roughly with 'percept' or 'knowledge of acquaintance' of Western psychology. According to them D.P. is the 'knowledge about', wherein apprehension of name, class and qualifications exists. But other philosophers go a step further. Prasastapāda of Vaiśeṣika school calls I.P. apprehension

with specific and generic qualities, without any distinction between these. Prabhākara (of Mīmāṃsā School) also follows the same Vātsyāyana (of Nyāya School) calls I.P. as perception without verbal image. Rāmānuja believes that I.P. is apprehension with definite qualities. Thus the D.P. of Sāṃkhya is his I.P. This may be represented roughly by the following diagram.

Diagram 16
LEVELS OF PERCEPTION

	Pure Sensation	Knowledge of Acquaint- ed Percept	Knowledge About Concept
Advaita, Jaina and Bauddha	I.P.	D.P.	D.P.
Sāṃkhya)		I.P.	D.P.
Kumārila)			
Neo Nyāya)			
Vaiśeṣika)			
Prabhākara)			I.P.
Nyāya)			
Rāmānuja)			

4. Recognition (*Pratyabhijñā*)

Nyāya thinkers give details about the nature of recognition. It is knowledge of the present object as qualified by the past. Recognition is distinguished from recollection which may be purely imaginary (not depending upon the object present). According to Kumārila recognition is based on recollection but is fundamentally perceptual in character.

5. Memory

Memory is a very important subject in Indian psychology. Its

scope is not only the present life but also the past lives. Annambhatta defines memory as representative cognition of past experiences due solely to the impressions produced by them. Its distinction from recognition and *Saṃskāras* is explained in *Nyāya* (N.S., III. 1.18; III. 2-40). As many as 23 causes of memory have been mentioned in *Nyāya* (N.S., III. 2.44). Kanāda extols memory by giving it a place in the list of *Pramāṇas* (sources of valid knowledge). It refers to a particular conjunction of Self and the mind to result in memory (V.S.U., IX. 2.6), and explains the necessary conditions for memory (V.S., IX. 2.6).

According to *Sāṃkhya*, memory is the function of *Buddhi*. According to *Vedānta*, it is the function of *Citta*. Four characteristics of memory have been explained viz. (i) easy reproduction (*sugamatā*), (ii) reproducing accurately without increase or decrease like chanting of mantra (*avaikalya*), (iii) retention for a long time (*dhāraṇā*) and (iv) recalling at once when needed (*apaharaṇā*). Memory is assisted by two factors. Association of ideas is the first factor. A flower-gift from a friend reminds us of the friend. Similarity is the second factor. A tall tree may remind us of a tall friend.

6. Attention

Nyāya says that mind attends to one thing at a time. Attention is non simultaneous and successive, though it appears that mind attends to many things at a time. Hence attention to one thing is in-attention to another. The rapid state of successive attention is illustrated by the analogy of fire-circle. (N.B., III. 2.58). The same process takes place in reading. Mind can send only one kind of sensation at one time like a gate-keeper.

7. Reasoning

Various methods of reasoning have been explained in detail by *Nyāya*. In fact the subject-matter of *Nyāya* is logic, which includes the whole process of sound reasoning, the fallacies and the false reasoning. The method of *Pramāṇas* as explained by *Nyāya* has been accepted by all the schools. The only modifications that some other schools make is adding some more to the four *Pramāṇas* of *Nyāya*.

Some special mental modes

Attachment and repulsion are two mental modes or Psycho-ses (Vṛttis). Their fundamental bases is ignorance and ego. It is this ego that under the influence of ignorance presents like and dislike and further attachment and repulsion, pleasure and pain, and these in turn beget Karma. In order to destroy Karma, one should destroy Rāga and Dveṣa. Both these are inter-dependent and mutually exclusive.

Similarly 'I'ness and 'Mineness' are two modes. These bind the soul in bondage of life and world. So these should be destroyed.

Fear is another Vṛtti, in the form of fear of disease, or death, or losing property or public criticism etc. Its effect is unhappiness and formation of complexes. Hence it is to be curbed either through opposite suggestion, (pratipakṣa-bhāvanā) or by developing courage, or by disattachment to the objects of pleasure. Introversion (antarmukhī) and extroversion (bahirmukhī) are two more modes. The former is the indrawing of the energy of mind by means of abstraction (pratyāhāra) and renunciation (vairāgya). The wandering mind is made to rest at one place. The latter mode is the outgoing tendency of the mind due to Rajas, Samskāra or habit. In this case the vision is turned outward. This can be controlled by renunciation and devotion. The first step is not to be directed towards the body, its dress, embellishment, food and physical tastes. The second step is to control mental luxuries. The third is to enter intellectual delights. Thus the mind can withdraw from the outer desires and go inwards.

Renunciation is another mode, which is opposite to attachment (rāga). It means dissatisfaction with worldly pleasures. It is of two types ; (1) karuṇa vairāgya which is developed due to unpleasant experiences of life and (2) Viveka-pūrṇa Vairāgya which is developed through discrimination and proper understanding. The latter is the best form of renunciation.

Repulsion and jealousy (dveṣa) also can be controlled by three means. Let a person think that he will not gain by being jealous of another. Secondly, let him entertain the idea of universal brotherhood. Thirdly, let him resign to God.

Hope and attainment are two more modes. A person hopes

for good fruit (*pratyāśa*) and also accepts the good fruit (*parigraha*). Both these make a person beggar of beggars. With the former he continues hoping, and that never ends. With the latter, he entertains more hopes due to want of satiation. The cycle never ends. Both these modes need to be checked. One should not hope beyond hope. All the modes can be controlled by concentration.

8. Affection

Kaṇāda devotes one full section to a discussion about the nature of pleasure and pain (V.S., X). Pleasure is agreeableness, and pain is repulsion. Both cannot dwell together simultaneously. Śaṅkara Miśra refers to four types of the feeling of pleasure (V.S.U., X. 1.3) and refers to dependence of affection on some amount of cognition also. Pleasure and pain are the two basic emotions. Some more details about pleasure and love have been presented by Vidyāraṇya (P.D., XII). Psychology of devotion, love and pure emotions have been detailed out by Rāmānuja. According to him Bhakti is the best means of sublimating our emotions, and love supersedes not only the other emotions but also intellect and will. His Bhakti-Yoga became extremely popular in the mediaeval period.

Conation

The word 'Saṁkalpa' (will) appears frequently in Upaniṣads. The world is a result of divine will. All human action depends upon will or desire (*kāma*). Man possesses freedom to act. Mīmāṃsā declares that without assuming human freedom man cannot be held responsible for his good or bad deeds. Six steps of voluntary action are mentioned in detail (Chapter VII above). The best method of strengthening our will power has been explained by Yoga. Yoga teaches training of emotions and training of will, where the tendencies are unwholesome, the method of auto-suggestion (*pratipakṣa bhāvanā*) has been prescribed. The extreme of emotional life can be avoided by willing to remain at the neutral point (*samatva*), and by conducting all the normal working of life with detachment and dispassion. Hypersensitivity is the cause of mental breakdown. We may have to swallow many a bitter pill, and retain our hilarity in order to establish firmly mental equilibrium.

9. *Therapy and Mental Health*

The principles of Yoga lead us to the most reliable therapeutic measures and a sound system of building mental health. The stresses and strains of life in the present century are too heavy to enable even the man of strong will to make full adjustment with his family environment, occupational environment and social environment. Shocks, prolonged disease, accidents, sudden onslaught of poverty, loss of occupation, sudden insecurity, sudden death of near and dear one, destruction of life and property in war and such calamities, besides the eternal miseries of old-age, disease and death, present a dire challenge to the delicate and sensitive human mind. Patañjali provides us the recipe to meet the challenge, and to destroy the miseries of the world. Firstly, the nine types of mental distractions are to be checked. Secondly, constant practice of truth or principle is to be had. Thirdly, an attitude of friendliness, compassion, gladness and indifference towards happiness and misery is to be cultivated. Fourthly, regular practice in concentration on higher principles should be done. This strengthens will-power and mental capacities. Meditation steadies the mind, develops inherent powers and builds strength to endure the shocks of life. The cause of majority of the cases of heart failures, neurosis, psychosis, schizophrenia and insanity is lack of mental resistance of shocks to life. Meditation builds that resistance. Yoga claims complete cure of the hardest of the neurotics and insane lunatics. If the insane person cannot practice Yoga himself, another yogi can take pity over him and by means of yogic powers bring him to normalcy. Spiritual power can be transmitted by a yogi to another (śaktisāncāra).

10. *Self-analysis and Control of Mental Activity*

Yoga teaches self-analysis, as the sure method of modification of mind. Self-realisation is the fundamental goal of life according to Advaita, Self-analysis is different from psychoanalysis. In the latter it is the psychologist who plays the active part, but here the person concerned himself takes the initiative. The subject-matter of Yoga is modification and control of the fluctuations of Mind. Through the eight-fold ladder of Yoga, the mind is controlled, the karmic matter is resolved, and

emancipation is achieved. Bauddha and Jaina prescribe similar path of penance. The physical and mental austerity of Jaina corresponds to the ladder of Yoga. Indian psychology is thus not only a positive science, but also a normative science, leading to the understanding as well as control of Mind.

This is the story of Indian psychology—a play of eleven Acts, having a common theme, a common purpose, but different characters. The whole of Indian psychology is redolent with spiritualism. Its subject of study is 'Consciousness' itself and it teaches how to know Consciousness through consciousness (learning Yoga through Yoga). It gives an insight into the depths of human mind and spirit, and does not wander only at the outskirts and peripheries. We have been late in presenting it before the West as well as the East. The present investigation might work as the first step in this direction. We are reminded of a quotation from *Manusmṛti*, which might form the epilogue of this work :

"Let men all over the world learn their ideals from the intellectuals born in this land."

"Etaddeśa parsūtasyā sakaśādagra-janmanahḥ svaṁ svaṁ carittam śikṣeran prithivyām sarva-mānavāḥ."



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
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