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ON THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, THEIR RELIGION & INSTITUTIONS

BY
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VOLUME THIRD.

THE VEDAS: OPINIONS OF THEIR AUTHORS AND OF LATER INDIAN WRITERS
ON THEIR ORIGIN, INSPIRATION, AND AUTHORITY.

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PREFACE

The object which I have had in view in the series of treatises which this volume forms a part, has been to investigate critically the most important points in the civil and religious history of the Hindus. Having shown in the First Volume that the mythical and legendary accounts given in the Purānas, etc., regarding the origin of the caste system which has long prevailed in India, are mutually contradictory and insufficient to establish the early existence of the popular belief regarding the distinct creation of four separate tribes, as an original and essential article of the Brahmanical creed; and having endeavoured to prove, in the Second Volume, by a variety of arguments, drawn chiefly from comparative philology and from the contents of the Rigveda, that the Hindus are descended from a branch of the Indo-European stock which dwelt originally along with the other cognate races in Central Asia, and subsequently migrated into Northern Hindustan, where the Brahmanical religion and institutions were developed and matured;—I now come, in this Third Volume, to consider more particularly the history of the Vedas, regarded as the sacred Scriptures of the Hindus, and the inspired source from which their religious and philosophical systems (though,
to a great extent, founded also on reasoning and speculation) profess to be mainly derived; or with which, at least, they all claim to be in harmony.

When I speak, however, of the history of the Veda, I am reminded that I am employing a term which will suggest to the philosophical reader the idea of a minute and systematic account of the various opinions which the Indians have held in regard to their sacred books from the commencement, through all the successive stages of their theological development, down to the present time. To do anything like this, however, would be a task demanding an extent of research far exceeding any to which I can pretend. At some future time, indeed, we may hope that a history of the theological and speculative ideas of the Indians, which shall treat this branch also of the subject, may be written by some competent scholar. My own design is much more modest. I only attempt to show what are the opinions on the subject of the Veda, which have been entertained by certain distinct sets of writers whom I may broadly divide into three classes—(1) the mythological, (2) the scholastic, and (3) the Vedic.

The first, or mythological class, embraces the writers of the different Purāṇas and Itihāsas, and partially those of the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads, who, like the compilers of the Purāṇas, frequently combine the mythological with the theosophic element.

The second, or scholastic class, includes the authors of the different philosophical schools, or Darśanas, with their scholiasts and expositors, and the commentators
on the Vedas. The whole of these writers belong to the class of systematic or philosophical theologians; but as their speculative principles differ, it is the object of each particular school to explain and establish the origin and authority of the Vedas on grounds conformable to its own fundamental dogmas, as well as to expound the doctrines of the sacred books in such a way as to harmonize with its own special tenets.

The third class of writers, whose opinions in regard to the Vedas I have attempted to exhibit, is composed (1) of the rishis themselves, the authors of the Vedic hymns, and (2) of the authors of the Upanishads, which, though works of a much more recent date, and for the most part of a different character from the hymns, are yet regarded by later Indian writers as forming, equally with the latter, a part of the Veda. As the authors of the hymns, the earliest of them at least, lived in an age of simple conceptions and of spontaneous and childlike devotion, we shall find that, though some of them appear, in conformity with the spirit of their times, to have regarded their compositions as in a certain degree the result of divine inspiration, their primitive and elementary ideas on this subject form a strong contrast to the artificial and systematic definitions of the later scholastic writers. And even the authors of the Upanishads, though they, in a more distinct manner, claim a superhuman authority for their own productions, are very far from recognizing the rigid classification which, at a subsequent period, divided the Vedic writings from all other religious works, by a broad line of demarcation.
It may conduce to the convenience of the reader, if I furnish here a brief survey of the opinions of the three classes of writers above described, in regard to the Vedas, as these opinions are shown in the passages which are collected in the present volume.

The first chapter (pp. 1–217) contains texts exhibiting the opinions on the origin, division, inspiration, and authority of the Vedas, which have been held by Indian authors shortly before, or subsequent to, the collection of the Vedic hymns, and consequently embraces the views of the first two of the classes of writers above specified, viz. (1) the mythological and (2) the scholastic. In the first Section (pp. 3–10), I adduce texts from the Purusha Sūkta, the Atharva-veda, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, the Chhāndogya Upanishad, the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, and the Institutes of Manu, which variously represent the Vedas (a) as springing from the mystical sacrifice of Purusha; (b) as resting on (or inhering in) Skambha; (c) as cut or scraped off from him, as being his hair, and his mouth; (d) as springing from Indra; (e) as produced from time; (f) as produced from Agni, Vāyu, and Śūrya; (g) as springing from Prajāpati, and the waters; (h) as being the breathing of the Great Being; (i) as being dug by the gods out of the mind-ocean; (j) as being the hair of Prajāpati’s beard, and (k) as being the offspring of Vāch.

In page 287 of the Appendix a further verse of the Atharva-veda is cited, in which the Vedas are declared to have sprung from the leavings of the sacrifice (uch- chhishta).
In the second Section (pp. 10–14) are quoted passages from the Vishnu, Bhāgavata, and Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇas, which represent the four Vedas as having issued from the mouth of Brahmā at the creation; several from the Harivaṁśa, which speak of the Vedas as created by Brahmā, or as produced from the Gāyatrī; another from the Mahābhārata, which describes them as created by Vishnu, or as having Sarasvatī for their mother; with one from Manu, which declares the Vedas, along with certain other objects, to be the second manifestation of the Sattva-guna, or pure principle, while Brahmā is one of its first manifestations.

The third Section (pp. 14–18) contains passages from the Brāhmaṇas, the Vishnu Purāṇa, and the Mahābhārata, in which the Vedas are celebrated as comprehending all beings, as being the soul of metres, hymns, breaths, and gods, as imperishable, as the source of form, motion, and heat, of the names, forms, and functions of all creatures, as infinite in extent, as infinite in their essence (brahma), though limited in their forms as Rich, Yajush, and Sāman verses, as eternal, and as forming the essence of Vishnu.

The fourth Section (pp. 18–36) contains passages from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa and Manu, in which the great benefits resulting from the study of the Vedas, and the dignity, power, authority, and efficacy of these works are celebrated; together with two other texts from the latter author and the Vishnu Purāṇa, in which a certain impurity is predicated of the Sāma-veda (compare the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, as quoted in p. 12, where the four
Vedas are described as respectively partaking differently of the character of the three Guṇas, or Qualities); and some others from the Vāyu, Padma, Matsya, and Brahma-vāivartta Purāṇas, and the Mahābhārata, and Rāmāyana, which derogate greatly from the consideration of the Vedas, by claiming for the Purāṇas and Itihāsas an equality with, if not a superiority to, the older scriptures. A passage is next quoted from the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, in which the Vedas and their appendages are designated as the "inferior science," in contrast to the "superior science," the knowledge of Scul; and is followed by others from the Bhagavad Gītā, the Chhāndogya Upanishad and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, in which the ceremonial and polytheistic portions of the Veda are depreciated in comparison with the knowledge of the supreme Spirit.

The fifth Section (pp. 36–49) describes the division of the Vedas in the third or Dvāpara age, by Vedavyāsa and his four pupils, according to texts of the Vishnu, Vāyu, and Bhāgavata Purāṇas; and then adduces a different account, asserting their division in the second or Tretā age, by the King Purūravas, according to another passage of the same Bhāgavata Purāṇa, and a text of the Mahābhārata (though the latter is silent regarding Purūravas).

Section vi. (pp. 49–57) contains passages from the Vishnu and Vāyu Purāṇas and the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, regarding the schism between the adherents of the Yajurveda, as represented by the different schools of Vaiśam-pāyana and Yājnavalkya, and quotes certain remarks of
Prof. Weber on the same subject, and on the relation of the Rig and Sāma Vedas to each other, together with some other texts, adduced and illustrated by that scholar, on the hostility of the Ātharvaṇas towards the other Vedas, and of the Chandogas towards the Rig-veda.

Section vii. (pp. 57–70) contains extracts from the works of Sāyana and Mādhava, the commentators on the Rig and Taithtirīya Yajur Vedas, in which they both define the characteristics of the Veda, and state certain arguments in support of its authority. Sāyana (pp. 58–66), after noticing the objections urged against his views by persons of a different school, and defining the Veda as a work consisting of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa, asserts that it is not derived from any personal, or at least not from any human, author (compare the further extract from him in p. 105); and rests its authority on its own declarations, on its self-proving power, on the Smṛiti (i.e. non-vedic writings of eminent saints), and on common notoriety. He then encounters some other objections raised against the Veda on the score of its containing passages which are unintelligible, dubious, absurd, contradictory, or superfluous. Mādhava (pp. 66–70) defines the Veda as the work which alone reveals the supernatural means of attaining future felicity; explains that males only, belonging to the three superior castes, are competent to study its contents; and asserts that, inasmuch as it is eternal, it is a primary and infallible authority. This eternity of the Veda, however, he appears to interpret as not being absolute, but as dating from the first creation, when it was produced from Brahmā,
though, as he is free from defects, the Veda, as his work, is self-proved.

Section viii. (pp. 70–108) contains the views of Jaimini and Bādarāyana, the (alleged) authors of the Mīmāṃsā and Brahma (or Veda) Sūtras on the eternity of the Veda. Jaimini asserts that sound, or words, are eternal, that the connection between words and the objects they represent also, is not arbitrary or conventional, but eternal, and that consequently the Vedas convey unerring information in regard to unseen objects. This view he defends against the Naiyāyikas, answering their other objections, and insisting that the names, derived from those of certain sages, by which particular parts of the Vedas are designated, do not prove those sages to have been their authors, but merely the teachers who studied and handed them down; while none of the names occurring in the Veda are those of temporal beings, but all denote some objects which have existed eternally. Two quotations in support of the supernatural origin of the Veda are next introduced from the Nyāya-mālū-vistara (a condensed account of the Mīmāṃsā system) and from the Vedārtha-prakāśa (the commentary on the Taittirīya Yajur-veda). The arguments in both passages (pp. 86–89) are to the same effect, and contain nothing that has not been already in substance anticipated in preceding summaries of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine. In reference to their argument that no author of the Veda is remembered, I have noticed here that the supposition which an objector might urge, that the rishis, the acknowledged utterers of the hymns,
might also have been their authors, is guarded against by the tenet, elsewhere maintained by Indian writers, that the rishis were merely seers of the pre-existing sacred texts. Some of the opinions quoted from the Sūtras of Jaimini are further enforced in a passage from the summary of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine, which I have quoted from the Sarva-darśana-sangraha. The writer first notices the Naiyāyika objections to the Mīmāṃsaka tenet that the Veda had no personal author, viz. (1) that any tradition to this effect must have been interrupted at the past dissolution of the universe; (2) that it would be impossible to prove that no one had ever recollected any such author; (3) that the sentences of the Veda have the same character as all other sentences; (4) that the inference,—drawn from the present mode of transmitting the Vedas from teacher to pupil,—that the same mode of transmission must have gone on from eternity, breaks down by being equally applicable to any other book; (5) that the Veda is in fact ascribed to a personal author in a passage of the book itself; (6) that sound is not eternal, and that when we recognize letters as the same we have heard before, this does not prove their identity or eternity, but is merely a recognition of them as belonging to the same species as other letters we have heard before; (7) that though Peśamēśvara (God) is naturally incorporeal, he may have assumed a body in order to reveal the Veda, etc. The writer then states the Mīmāṃsaka answers to these arguments thus: What does this alleged ‘production by a personal author’ (pauruśeyatva) mean? The Veda, if supposed to be so pro-
duced, cannot derive its authority (a) from inference (or reasoning), as fallible books employ the same process. Nor will it suffice to say (b) that it derives its authority from its truth: for the Veda is defined to be a book which proves that which can be proved in no other way. And even if Paramēśvara (God) were to assume a body, he would not, in that state of limitation, have any access to supernatural knowledge. Further, the fact that different sākhās or recensions of the Vedas are called after the names of particular sages, proves no more than that these recensions were studied by those sages, and affords no ground for questioning the eternity of the Vedas,—an eternity which is proved by the fact of our recognizing letters when we meet with them. These letters are the very identical letters we had heard before, for there is no evidence to show either that letters of the same sort (G’s, for instance,) are numerically different from each other, or that they are generic terms, denoting a species. The apparent differences which are observable in the same letter, result merely from the particular characteristics of the persons who utter it, and do not affect its identity. This is followed by further reasoning in support of the same general view; and the writer then arrives at the conclusion, which he seems to himself to have triumphantly established, that the Veda is underrived and authoritative.

The question of the effect produced on the Vedas by the dissolutions of the world is noticed in some extracts from Patanjali’s Mahābhāṣya and its commentators, which have been adduced by Prof. Goldstücker
in the Preface to his Mānava-kalpa Sūtra, and which I have partly reprinted in pp. 95 ff. It is admitted by Patanjali, that, though the sense of the Vedas is permanent, the order of their letters has not always remained the same, and that this difference is exhibited in the different recensions of the Kāṭhakas and other schools. Patanjali himself does not say what is the cause of this alteration in the order of the letters; but his commentator, Kaiyyāta, states that the order was disturbed during the great mundane dissolutions, etc., and had to be restored (though with variations) by the eminent science of the rishis. Kullūka, the commentator on Manu (see p. 6), maintains that the Veda was preserved in the memory of Brahmā during the period of dissolution; and promulgated again at the beginning of the Kalpa, but whether in an altered form, or not, he does not tell us. The latter point is also left unsolved in Sankara’s commentary on Brahma Sūtra i. 3, 30, which I quote in the Appendix, pp. 300 ff. Pages 93 ff. contain some remarks (by way of parenthesis) on the question whether or not the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā admits the existence of a Deity.

In the extract given in pp. 98–105 from his commentary on the Brahma Sūtras,1 Sankara, who follows the author of those Sūtras, and Jaimini, in basing the authority of the Vedas on the eternity of sound, finds it necessary to meet an objection that, as the gods mentioned in the Veda had confessedly an origin in time, the

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1 My attention was originally drawn to this passage by a treatise, then unpublished, by the Rev. Prof. Banerjea, formerly of Bishop’s College, Calcutta.
words which designate those gods cannot be eternal, but must have originated co-evally with the created objects which they denote, since eternal words could not have an eternal connection with non-eternal objects. This difficulty he tries to overcome (ignoring the ground taken by Jaimini, that the Veda contains no references to non-eternal objects) by asserting that the eternal connection of words is not with individual objects, but with the species to which these objects belong, and that Indra and the other gods are proved by the Veda to belong to species. Sankara then goes on to assert, on the authority of Bralima Sūtra, i. 3, 28, fortified by various texts from the Vedas and the Smṛitis, that the gods and the world generally are produced (though not in the sense of evolution out of a material cause) from the word of the Vedas (see pp. 6 and 16) in the form of sphota. This last term will be explained below. This subject above referred to, of the eternal connection of the words of the Veda with the objects they represent, is further pursued in a passage which I have quoted in the Appendix, p. 300, where an answer is given to the objection that the objects denoted by the words of the Veda cannot be eternal, as a total destruction of everything takes place (not, indeed, at the intermediate, but) at the great mundane dissolutions. The solution given is that, by the favour of the supreme Lord, the inferior lords Brahmā, etc., retain a recollection of the previous mundane conditions; and that in each successive creation everything is produced exactly the same as it had previously been. I then proceed in p. 105 to adduce a passage from Sāyāna, the
commentator on the Rig-veda, who refers to another of the Brahma Sūtras, i.e. 1, 3 (quoted in p. 106), declaring that Brahma was the source of the Veda, which Sankara interprets as containing a proof of the omniscience of Brahma. Sāyana understands this text as establishing the superhuman origin of the Veda, though not its eternity in the proper sense, it being only meant, according to him (as well as to Mādhava; see p. xi.), that the Veda is eternal in the same sense as the æther is eternal, i.e. during the period between each creation and dissolution of the universe.

In opposition to the tenets of the Mīmāṃsakas, who hold the eternity (or the eternal self-existence) of the Veda, and to the dogmas of the Vedānta, as just expounded, Gotama, the author of the Nyāya aphorisms, denies (Section ix. pp. 108–118) the eternity of sound; and after vindicating the Veda from the charges of falsehood, self-contradiction, and tautology, deduces its authority from the authority of the wise, or competent, person or persons who were its authors, as proved by the efficacy of such of the Vedic prescriptions as relate to mundane matters, and can be tested by experience. It does not distinctly result from Gotama’s aphorism that God is the competent person whom he regards as the maker of the Veda. If he did not refer to God, he must have regarded the rishis as its authors. The authors of the Vaiśeṣhika Sūtras, and of the Tarka Sangraha, as well as the writer of the Kusumānjali, however, clearly refer the Veda to Īśvara (God) as its framer (pp. 118–133). Udayana, the author of the latter
work (pp. 128–133), controverts the opinion that the existence of the Veda from eternity can be proved by a continuous tradition, as such a tradition must, he says, have been interrupted at the dissolution of the world, which preceded the existing creation. He, therefore (as explained by his commentator), infers an eternal (and omniscient author of the Veda; asserting that the Veda is paurusheya, or derived from a personal author; that many of its own texts establish this; and that the appellations given to its particular sākkhas or recensions, are derived from the names of those sages whose persons were assumed by Īśvara, when he uttered them at the creation. In pp. 125 ff. I have quoted one of the Vaiśeshika Śūtras, with some passages from the commentator, to show the conceptions the writers entertained of the nature of the supernatural knowledge, or intuition, of the rishis.

Kapila, the author of the Sānkhya Aphorisms (pp. 133–138), agrees with the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika aphorists in denying the eternity of the Veda, but, in conformity with his own principles, differs from Gotama and Kanāda in denying its derivation from a personal (i.e. here, a divine) author, because there was no person (i.e. as his commentator explains, no God) to make it. Vishṇu, the chief of the liberated beings, though omniscient, could not, he argues, have made the Veda, owing to his impassiveness, and no other person could have done so from want of omniscience. And even if the Veda have been uttered by the primeval Purusha, it cannot be called his work, as it was breathed forth by him unconsciously. Kapila agrees
with Jaimini in ascribing a self-demonstrating power to the Veda, and differs from the Vaiśeshikas in not deriving its authority from correct knowledge possessed by a conscious utterer. He proceeds to controvert the existence of such a thing as śphoṭa (a modification of sound which is assumed by the Mīmāṃsakas, and described as single, indivisible, distinct from individual letters, existing in the form of words, and constituting a whole), and to deny the eternity of sound.

In the tenth Section (pp. 138-179) I shew (a) by quotations from the aphorisms of the Vedānta and their commentator (pp. 140-145), that the author and expounder of the Uttara Mīmāṃsā (the Vedānta) frequently differ from Jaimini the author of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in the interpretation of the same texts of the Upanishads. A similar diversity is next (b) proved at greater length (pp. 145-173), by quotations from the aphorisms and commentaries of the Vedānta and the Sānkhya, to characterize the expositions proposed by the adherents of those two systems respectively. One quotation is given in pp. 175 ff. to shew (c) that the same is true in regard to the followers of the Vaiśeshika philosophy, who distinctly reject the Vedāntic explanations; and last of all (d) I have made some extracts (pp. 177 ff.) from the Bhakti Sūtras of Sāndilya to exhibit the wide divergence of that writer from the orthodox views of the Vedānta regarding the sense of the Vedas. In pp. 173-175 I quote some remarks of Dr. E. Roer, and Prof. Max Müller, regarding the doctrines of the Upanishads, and their relations to the different philosophical schools.
In the facts brought forward in this section we find another illustration (1) of the tendency common to all dogmatic theologians to interpret in strict conformity with their own opinions the unsystematic and not always consistent texts of an earlier age which have been handed down by tradition as sacred and infallible, and to represent them as containing, or as necessarily implying, fixed and consistent systems of doctrine; as well as (2) of the diversity of view which so generally prevails in regard to the sense of such texts among writers of different schools, who adduce them with equal positiveness of assertion as establishing tenets and principles which are mutually contradictory or inconsistent.

In the eleventh Section (pp. 179–207) some passages are adduced from the Nyāya-mālā-vistara, and from Kullūka’s commentary on Manu, to show that a distinct line of demarcation is drawn by the scholastic writers between the Vedas on the one hand, and all other classes of Indian scriptures, embraced under the designation of Smṛiti (including the Darśanas, the Institutes of Manu, the Purāṇas, and Itihāsas, etc.), on the other, the first being regarded as independent and infallible guides, while the others are (in theory) held to be authoritative only in so far as they are founded on, and coincide with, the Veda. The practical effect of this distinction is, however, much lessened by the fact that the ancient sages, the authors of the Smṛitis, such of them, I mean, as, like Manu, are recognized as orthodox, are looked upon by Mādhava and Sankara as having had access to Vedic texts now no longer extant, as having held communion with the gods,
and as having enjoyed a clearness of intuition into divine mysteries which is denied to latermortals (pp. 181–185). Sankara, however (as shewn in pp. 184–192), does not regard all the ancients as having possessed this infallible insight into truth, but exerts all his ingenuity to explain away the claims (though clearly sanctioned by an Upanishad) of Kapila, who was not orthodox according to his Vedantic standard, to rank as an authority. In his depreciation of Kapila, however, Sankara is opposed to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (p. 192). I then proceed to observe (pp. 194–196) that although in ancient times the authors of the different philosophical systems (Darśanas) no doubt put forward their respective opinions as true, in opposition to all the antagonistic systems, yet in modern times the superior orthodoxy of the Vedānta appears to be generally recognized; while the authors of the other systems are regarded, e.g. by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, as, amid all their diversities, having in view, as their ultimate scope, the support of the Vedantic theory. The same view, in substance, is taken by Vijnāna Bhikshu, the commentator on the Sānkhya Sūtras, who (pp. 196–203) maintains that Kapila’s system, though atheistic, is not irreconcilable with the Vedānta and other theistic schools, as its denial of anĪśvara (God) is only practical, or regulative, and merely enforced in order to withdraw men from the too earnest contemplation of an eternal and perfect Deity, which would impede their study of the distinction between matter and spirit. To teach men this discrimination, as the great means of attaining final liberation, is one of the two main objects, and strong
points, of the Sāṇkhya philosophy, and here it is authori-
tative; while its atheism is admitted to be its weak
side, and on this subject it has no authority. Vijnāna
Bhikshu goes on to say that it is even supposable that
theistic systems, in order to prevent sinners from attain-
ing knowledge, may lay down doctrines partially opposed
to the Vedas; and that though in these portions they are
erroneous, they will still possess authority in the portions
conformable to the Śruti and Smṛiti. He then quotes a
passage from the Padma Purāṇa, in which the god Śiva
tells his consort Pārvatī that the Vaiśeshika, the Nyāya,
the Sāṇkhya, the Purva-mīmāṃsā Darśanas, and the Ve-
dāntic theory of illusion, are all systems infected by the
dark (or tāmasa) principle, and consequently more or less
unauthoritative. All orthodox (āstika) theories, however,
are, as Vijnāna Bhikshu considers, authoritative, and free
from error on their own special subject. And as respects
the discrepancy between the Sāṇkhya and the Vedānta,
regarding the unity of Soul, he concludes that the former
is not devoid of authority, as the apparent diversity of
souls is acknowledged by the Vedānta, and the discrimi-
native knowledge which the Sāṇkhya teaches is an
instrument of liberation to the embodied soul; and thus
the two varying doctrines, if regarded as, the one prac-
tical (or regulative), and the other real (or transcendent-
al), will not be contradictory. At the close of Section
eleventh (pp. 204–207) it is shewn that the distinction
drawn by the Indian commentators between the super-
human Veda and its human appendages, the Kalpa
Sūtras, etc., as well as the Smṛitís, is not borne out by
certain texts which I had previously cited. The Brihad Āranyaka and Mundaka Upanishads (pp. 8, 31) seem to place all the different sorts of Śāstras or scriptures (including the four Vedas) in one and the same class, the former speaking of them all promiscuously as being the breathing of Brahma, while the latter describes them all (except the Upanishads) as being parts of the "inferior science," in opposition to the "superior science," or knowledge of Brahma. In the same spirit as the Mundaka, the Chhāndogya Upanishad also (quoted in p. 32 f.) includes the four Vedas in the same list with a variety of miscellaneous Śāstras (which Nārada has studied without getting beyond the confines of exoteric knowledge), and never intimates (unless it be by placing them at the head of the list) that the former can claim any superiority over the other works with which they are associated. As, however, Sankara could not, in consistency with the current scholastic theory regarding the wide difference between the Vedas and all other Śāstras, admit that the latter could have had a common origin with the former, he endeavours in his comment on the passage of the Brihad Āranyaka Upanishad to which I have adverted, to shew that the other works, which are there said to have been breathed out by the great Being along with the Vedas, were in reality portions of the Brāhmaṇas. This explanation can scarcely apply to all the works enumerated, and its force is weakened by the tenor of the other passages from the Mundaka and Chhāndogya Upanishads, while any such distinction is repudiated in the statements of the Itihāsas and Purāṇas quoted in pp. 27–30 and 105.
In the twelfth Section (pp. 207–217) the arguments in support of the Veda, adduced in the philosophical systems, and by the various commentators, as above summarised, are recapitulated, and some remarks are made on these reasonings. My observations are intended to shew that the arguments in question are inconclusive, or assume the points to be established; that the rishis are proved by the contents of the hymns to have been their real authors; and that numerous events which have occurred in time, are undoubtedly mentioned in the Vedas. This as we have seen (above, p. xvi.) is admitted by Sankara.

The Second Chapter (pp. 217–286) exhibits the opinions of the rishis in regard to the origin of the Vedic hymns. Its object is to shew in detail that, though some at least of the rishis appear to have imagined themselves to be inspired by the gods in the expression of their religious emotions and ideas, they at the same time regarded the hymns as their own compositions, or as (presumably) the compositions of their forefathers, distinguishing between them as new and old, and describing their own authorship in terms which could only have been dictated by a consciousness of its reality. The first, second, and third Sections (pp. 218–244) contain a collection of passages from the Rig-veda in which a distinction is drawn (1) between the rishis as ancient and modern, and (2) between the hymns as older and more recent; and in which (3) the rishis describe themselves as the makers, fabricators, or generators of the hymns; with some additional texts in which such authorship appears
to be implied, though it is not expressed. Section fourth (pp. 245–283) contains a variety of passages from the same Veda, in which (1) a superhuman character or supernatural faculties are ascribed to the earlier rishis; and (2) the idea is expressed that the praises and ceremonies of the rishis were suggested and directed by the gods in general, or, in particular, by the goddess of speech, or by some other or others of the different deities of the Vedie pantheon. To illustrate, and render more intelligible and probable, the opinions which I have ascribed to the old Indian rishis regarding their own inspiration, I have quoted in the same Section (pp. 267-273) a number of passages from Hesiod and Homer to shew that the early Greek bards entertained a similar belief. I then advert (pp. 273-274) to the remarkable divergence between the later religious histories of Greece and of India. I next enquire briefly (in pp. 274-275) in what way we can reconcile the apparently conflicting ideas of the rishis on the subject of the hymns, considered, on the one hand, as their own productions, and, on the other, as inspired by the gods. Then follow (pp. 275-279) some further texts from the Rig-veda, in which a mystical, magical, or supernatural efficacy is ascribed to the hymns. These are succeeded (pp. 279-283) by a few quotations from the same Veda, in which the authors complain of their own ignorance; and by a reference to the contrast between these humble confessions and the proud pretensions set up by later theologians in behalf of the Veda, and its capability of imparting universal knowledge. The ideas of the rishis regarding their own inspiration differ widely from the conceptions
of later theorists; for while the former looked upon the
gods, who were confessedly mere created beings, as the
sources of supernal illumination, the latter either regard
the Veda as eternal, or refer it to the eternal Brahma, or
Īśvara, as its author. The fifth and last Section (pp.
283-286) adduces some texts from the Svetāsvatara,
Mundaka and Chhāndogya Upanishads, which show the
opinions of the writers regarding the inspiration, of their
predecessors; and refers to the similar claims set up on
their own behalf by the writers of the Itihāsas and Purāṇas,
as shewn in the passages quoted in pp. 27-30.

With all its imperfections this volume may perhaps
possess a certain interest, not only for the student of
Indian history, but also for the divine and the philoso-
pher, as furnishing a few documents to illustrate the
course of theological opinion in a sphere far removed
from the ordinary observation of the European student,
—a course which, quite independently of the merits of
the different tenets involved in the enquiry, will, I
think, be found to present a remarkable parallel in
various respects to that which is traceable in the his-
tory of those religious systems with which we are most
familiar. In both cases we find that a primitive age of
ardent emotion, of simple faith, and of unarticulated
beliefs, was succeeded by a period of criticism and spe-
culation, when the floating materials handed down by
preceding generations were compared, classified, recon-
ciled, developed into their consequences, and elaborated
into a variety of scholastic systems.

In the Preface to the first edition I stated as follows:
"In regard to the texts quoted from the Rig-veda, I
have derived the same sort of assistance from the French version of M. Langlois, which has been acknowledged in the Preface to the Second Volume, p. vi. I am also indebted for some of the Vedic texts to Boehlingk and Roth’s Lexicon."

A comparison of the former edition with the present will shew that considerable alterations and additions have been made in the latter. The texts which formerly stood in the Appendix have now been transferred to their proper places in the body of the work; and various other passages have been transposed. The principal additions will be found in the first four sections, in the ninth (pp. 115-127), tenth (which is altogether new), eleventh (pp. 185 ff.), and in the Appendix.

I am indebted to various learned friends for assistance in different parts of the work, which I have acknowledged in the notes. My thanks are especially due to Professors Goldstücker and Cowell for various important corrections which they have suggested in my translations of passages of a scholastic and philosophical character, quoted either in the body of the volume or in the Appendix,—corrections which are incorporated in the text,—as well as for some further remarks and suggestions which will be found in the notes or Appendix. I am also under obligations to Professor Aufrecht for some emendations of my renderings in the early part of the work, as well as for his explanations of many of the texts of the Rigveda cited in the Second Chapter.

Edinburgh,

November, 1868.

J. Muir.
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ERRATA ET CORRIGENDA.

Page 24, line 11. For Brahmā read Brahmkā.

,, 45, ,, 15. For Yāyush read Yāyushkā.

,, 53, ,, 8. For theologicans read theologians.

,, 62, ,, 2 from foot: For its author read their authors.

,, 85, ,, 4 ,, Before Prapāṭipāt insert xi. 243.

,, 95, ,, 2 ,, For dhvanitam read dhvanitam.

,, 96, ,, 16. The same correction.

,, 101, ,, 22. For Vanap. read S’āntip.

,, 149, ,, 6. For ābādāikshiter read ābādā ākshiter.

,, 159, ,, 16. For chāindri- read cā āndri-.

,, 159, ,, 31. For paracent- read paracento-.

,, 160, ,, 18. For punar-uptattīr read punar-anuptattīr.

,, 213, ,, 16. For p. 120 read p. 118.

,, 221, ,, 24. For vi. 21, 1 read vi. 21,

,, 224, ,, 7 from foot. Omit dhishanā.

,, 261, ,, 12. For vi. 62, 3 read vi. 26,
ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXTS.

VOLUME THIRD.

CHAPTER I.


In the preceding volumes of this work I have furnished a general account of the ancient Indian writings, which are comprehended under the designation of Veda or Sruti. These works, which, as we have seen, constitute the earliest literature of the Hindus, are broadly divisible into two classes: (1) The Mantras or hymns, in which the praises of the gods are celebrated and their blessing is invoked; (2) the Brāhmaṇas, which embrace (a) the liturgical institutes in which the ceremonial application of these hymns is declared, the various rites of sacrifice are prescribed, and the origin and hidden import of the different forms are explained, and (b) the Āranyakas, and Upanishads (called also Vedāntas, i.e. concluding portions of the Vedas), which in part possess the same character as some of the earlier portions of the Brāhmaṇas, and are in part theological treatises in which the spiritual aspirations which

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1 See Vol. I. pp. 2 ff. and Vol. II. pp. 169 ff. See also Professor Max Müller’s History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature.

2 For more precise information see Müller’s Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 313 ff. from which it will be perceived that only some of the Āranyakas form part of the Brāhmaṇas, and that two of the Upanishads are included in a Sanhitā.
were gradually developed in the minds of the more devout of the Indian sages are preserved. It is, therefore, clear that the hymns constitute the original and, in some respects, the most essential portion of the Veda; that the Brāhmaṇas arose out of the hymns, and are subservient to their employment for the purposes of worship; while the Upanishads give expression to ideas of a speculative and mystical character which, though to some extent discoverable in the hymns and in the older portion of the Brāhmaṇas, are much further matured, and assume a more exclusive importance, in these later treatises.

I content myself here with referring the reader who desires to obtain a fuller idea of the nature of the hymns, and of the mythology which they embody, to the late Professor H. H. Wilson’s translation of the earlier portion of the Rig-veda, to his prefaces to the several volumes, to Professor Max Müller’s History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, and to two papers of my own in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, entitled Contributions to a knowledge of the Cosmogony and Mythology of the Rig-veda. In the fourth volume of this work I return to the latter branch of the subject, and compare the conceptions which the rishis entertained of the different objects of their worship, with those representations of the deities who bore the same names, which occur in Indian writings of a later date, whether mythological or theological.

The task to which I propose in the meantime to devote myself, is to supply some account of the opinions entertained by Hindu writers, ancient and modern, in regard to the origin and authority of the Vedas. With this view I have collected from some of the later hymns, from the Indian writings of the middle and later Vedic era (the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads) as well as from the books, whether popular or scientific, of the post-vedic period (the Purāṇas, the Itihāsas, the Institutes of Manu, the aphorisms of the Darśanas, or systems of philosophy, and their commentators, and the commentaries on the Vedas) such passages as I have discovered which have reference to these subjects, and propose to compare the opinions there set forth with the ideas entertained on some of these points by the writers of the more ancient hymns, as deducible from numerous passages in their own compositions.

The mythical accounts which are given of the origin of the Vedas
are mutually conflicting. In some passages they are said to have been created by Prajapati from fire, air; and the sun, or by some other process. In other texts they are said to have been produced by Brahmanda from his different mouths, or by the intervention of the Gāyatrī, or to have sprung from the goddess Sarasvatī, or to have otherwise arisen. I proceed to adduce these several passages.

Sect. I.—Origin of the Vedas according to the Purusha-sūkta, the Atharva-veda, the Brāhmaṇas, Upanishads, and Institutes of Manu.

Purusha-sūkta.—In the ninth verse of this hymn (Rig-veda, x. 90, already quoted in Vol. I. pp. 8 and 9) the three Vedas are said to have been produced from the mystical victim Purusha: Tasmād yajnāt sarvā-hutaḥ rīchaḥ sāmāni jajnire | ehāndāmāsi jajnire tasmād yajus tasmād ajāyata | “From that universal sacrifice sprang the rich and sāman verses: the metres sprang from it: from it the yajush arose.”

This is the only passage in the hymns of the Rig-veda in which the creation of the Vedas is described.

In the Atharva-veda the following texts refer to that subject:

x. 7, 14. Yattra rishayaḥ prothamajah rīchaḥ sāma yajur maḥī | ekarshir yasminn ārpiṭah Skambhaḥ tam brūhi katamah śvīd eva saḥ |

... 20. Yasmād rīho apātakshan yajur yasmād apākashan | sāmāni yasya lomāni athavāṅgirase. mukham | Skambhand tam brūhi katamah śvīd eva saḥ |

“Declare who that Skambha (supporting-principle) is in whom the primeval rishi, the rich, sāman, and yajush, the earth, and the one rishi, are sustained. ... 20. Declare who is that Skambha from whom they cut off the rich verses, from whom they scraped off the yajush, of whom the sāman verses are the hairs, and the verses of Atharvan and Angiras the mouth.”

3 The word vedas, in whatever sense we are to understand it, occurs in R.V. viii. 19, 5: Yaḥ samāhāḥ yah āhuti yo vedena dadāsya martyo āgnaye | yo namsi svadhva- raḥ | 6. Tasya id avanto rāinhayante āśavas tasya dymunitamām yasāḥ | na tam aṁho déva-krītaḥ kutaḥ chana na marṣya-krītaḥ naśat | “The horses of that mortal, who, devoted to sacrifice, does homage to Agni with fuel, with an oblation, with ritual knowledge (ś), with reverence,—(9) speed forward im emphatically; and his renown is most glorious. No calamity, caused either by god or by man, can assail him from any quarter.”
xiii. 4, 38. Sa vai rīgbhya ajāyata tasmād rīcho ajāyanta

"He (apparently Indra, see verse 44) sprang from the rich verses: the rich verses sprang from him."

xix. 54, 3. Kālād rīchaḥ samabhavan yaujḥ kālād ajāyata

"From Time the rich verses sprang: the yajush sprang from Time." 

The following texts from the same Veda may also be introduced here:

iv. 35, 6. Yasnāt pakvād anṛitaṁ sambabhūva yo gāyatrīyaḥ adhi-patir bābhūva | yasmin vedāḥ nihitāḥ visvarūpās tenaudanena tārāmī mṛityum |

"I overpass death by means of that oblation (odana), from which, when cooked, ambrosia (amṛita) was produced, which became the lord of the Gāyatrī, and in which the omniform Vedas are comprehended."

vii. 54, 1. Rīchaṁ sāma yajāmahe yāḥhyāṁ karmāṇi kurvate | ete sadasi rūjato yaujśāṁ devēsau yachhataḥ | 2. Rīchaṁ sāma yad aprāksham haviṁ ojo yauj balam | esa mā tasmād mā hiṁsid vedāḥ prishṭāḥ sāchāpate |

"We worship the Rich and the Sāman, wherewith men celebrate religious rites, which shine in the assembly, and convey sacrifices to the gods. 2. Inasmuch as I have asked the Rich and the Sāman for butter and for vigour, and the Yajush for strength,—let not the Veda, so asked, destroy me, o lord of strength (Indra)."

The next passage is from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 5, 8, 1 ff.:

Prajāpati vai idam agre ātad ekaḥ evo | so kāmayata sīyām prañāyayo iti | So śrūmyat sa tapo tapyata | tasmāt chrāntāt tepānāt trayo lokāḥ asriyanta prithivy antarikshaṁ dyauḥ | sa imāṁ trīn lokān abhitātpa | tebhyaś taplobhyas trīni jyotiṁśeṣy ajāyanta aṅgir yo`yam pavate suṛyaḥ | sa imāṁ trīni jyotiṁśeṣy abhitātpa | tebhyaś taplobhyas trayo vedāḥ ajāyanta aṅgir rīgvedo vāyov yajurvedaṁ suṛyaṁ sāmadevaḥ | sa imāṁ trīn vēdan abhitātpa | tebhyaś taplobhyas trīni sukrāṇyajāyanta bhrī ṣūrīyād dhvām aṅgir yajurvedaṁ svar iṁ sāmadevaḥ | Tad rīgvedenaiva hotram akurvata yajurvedena adhārvavāṁ sāmadevaṁ udgītham | yad evo trayyai vidyāyai sukrāṁ tena brahmātvam uchakraṁ.

"Prajāpati was formerly this universe [i.e. the sole existence], one only. He desired, 'may I become, may I be propagated.' He toiled

4 See my translation of the entire hymn in the Journal of the Roy. As. Soc. for 1865, p. 381. The Vīṣṇu Purāṇa, i. 2, 13, says: Tad evo sarvam evatmak syaktā-cyakta-svarūpam | tathā purusha-rūpam kāla-rūpam cha aśhitam | "This (Brahma) is all this universe, existing both as the perceptible and the imperceptible; existing also in the forms of Purusha and of Kāla (Time)."
in devotion, he performed austerity. From him, when he had so toiled, and performed austerity, three worlds were created,—earth, air, and sky. He infused warmth into these three worlds. From them, thus heated, three lights were produced,—Agni (fire), this which purifies (i.e. Pavana, or Vāyu, the wind),6 and Sūrya (the sun). He infused heat into these three lights. From them so heated the three Vedas were produced,—the Rig-veda from Agni (fire), the Yajur-veda from Vāyu (wind), and the Sāma-veda from Sūrya (the sun). He infused warmth into these three Vedas. From them so heated three luminous essences were produced,—bhūḥ from the Rig-veda, bhuvah from the Yajur-veda, and svar from the Sāma-veda. Hence, with the Rig-veda they performed the function of the hotrī; with the Yajur-veda, the office of the adhvaryu; with the Sāma-veda, the duty of the udgātrī; while the function of the brähman arose through the luminous essence of the triple science [i.e. the three Vedas combined]."

Chhāndogya Upanishad.—A similar passage (already quoted in Volume Second, p. 200) occurs in the Chhāndogya Upanishad (p. 288 of Dr. Röer's ed.)

Prajāpatir lokān abhyatapat | teshām tapyamānāṇām rasān prābrihad agnim prithivyāḥ vāyum antarikṣād ādityam divāḥ | sa etām tiro devatāḥ abhyatapat | tāsām tapyamānāṇām rasān prābrihad agner riho vāyor yajūmśhi sāma ādityāt | sa etām trayām vidyām abhyatapat | tasyās tapyamānāyāḥ rasān prābrihad dhur iti rigbhya bhuvah iti yajurβhyaḥ svar iti sāmabhyaḥ |

"Prajāpati infused warmth into the worlds, and from them so heated he drew forth their essences, viz. Agni (fire) from the earth, Vāyu (wind) from the air, and Sūrya (the sun) from the sky. He infused warmth into these three deities, and from them so heated he drew forth their essences,—from Agni the rich verses, from Vāyu the yajush verses, and from Sūrya the sāman verses. He then infused heat into this triple science, and from it so heated he drew forth its essences,—from rich verses the syllable bhūḥ, from yajush verses bhuvah, and from sāman verses svar."

5 See S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, vi. 1, 2, 19: . . ayam eva sa Vāyur yo 'yan pavaṣa . . . "This is that Vāyu, he who purifies."
6 Passages to the same effect occur also in the Aitareya (v. 32-34) and Kaushītaki Brāhmaṇas. That in the former will be found in Dr. Haug's translation of
Manu.—The same origin is assigned to the three Vedas in the following verses from the account of the creation in Manu, i. 21–23, where the idea is no doubt borrowed from the Brāhmaṇas:

_Sare sakeṣaṁ tu aś nāmāṁ karmāṇī cha prthak prthak | Veda-śabdebhya evādou prthak saṁsthāḥ cha nirmame | Karmāṭmanāṁ cha devānāṁ so 'srijat praṇiñāṁ prabhuh | sādhyānāṁ cha gaṇāṁ sūkṣmaṁ yajnaṁ chaiva sanātanaṁ | Agni-vāyu-raviḥḥyas tu tryaṁ brahma sanātanaṁ | dudoha yajna-siddhyartham-'rig-yajuh-sāma-lakṣaṇam_

"He [Brahmā] in the beginning fashioned from the words of the Veda the several names, functions, and separate conditions of all [creatures]. That Lord also created the subtle host of active and living deities, and of Śādhyas, and eternal sacrifice. And in order to the performance of sacrifice, he drew forth from Agni, from Vāyu, and from Sūrya, the triple eternal Veda, distinguished as Rich, Yajush, and Sāman."

Kullūka Bhaṭṭa, the commentator, annotates thus on this passage:

_Sanātanaṁ nityam | vedāpaauruḥeyateva-paksha Manor abhimataḥ | pūrṇa-kalpe ye vedas te eva Paramātma-mārttter Brahmaṇaḥ sāvajnasya smṛty-ārūḍhāḥ | tān eva kalpādāv agni-vāyu-raviḥḥyas ācakarsha | śrautaḥ cha ayam artho na śaṅkānyāḥ | tathācha śrutih | "agner rīgvedo vāyor yajurvedaḥ ādityāṭ sāmavedaḥ" __iti_

"The word sanātana means 'eternally pre-existing.' The doctrine of the superhuman origin of the Vedas is maintained by Manu. The same Vedas which [existed] in the previous mundane era (Kalpa) were preserved in the memory of the omniscient Brahmar, who was one with the supreme Spirit. It was those same Vedas that, in the beginning of the [present] Kalpa, he drew forth from Agni, Vāyu, and Sūrya: and this dogma, which is founded upon the Veda, is not to be questioned, for the Veda says, 'the Rig-veda comes from Agni, the Yajur-veda from Vāyu, and the Sāma-veda from Sūrya.'"

Another commentator on Manu, Medhātithi, explains this passage in a more rationalistic fashion, "by remarking that the Rig-veda opens with a hymn to fire, and the Yajur-veda with one in which air is mentioned."—Colebr. Misc. Ess. i. p. 11, note.

Brāhmaṇa; and the one in the latter is rendered into German by Weber in his Ind. Stud. ii. 303 ff.

Kullūka explains this to mean, "Having understood them from the words of the Veda" (Veda-śabdebhyaḥ eva avagamyā).
OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS.

To the verses from Manu (i. 21–23) just cited, the following from the second book may be added, partly for the purpose of completing the parallel with the passages previously adduced from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa and the Chhāndogya Upanishad:


76. "Prajāpati also milked out of the three Vedas the letters a, u, and m, together with the words bhūḥ, bhuvah, and svr. 77. The same supreme Prajāpati also milked from each of the three Vedas one of the [three] portions of the text called sāvitrī [or gāyatrī], beginning with the word tat.8 . . . . 81. The three great imperishable particles (bhūḥ, bhuvah, svr) preceded by om, and the gāyatrī of three lines, are to be regarded as the mouth of Brahman." The next passage, from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, vi. 1, 1, 8, first speaks generally of Prajāpati creating the three Vedas, and then afterwards, with some inconsistency, describes their production from the waters:9

So'vam purushaḥ Prajāpatir akāmayata "bhūyaṁ syām prajāyeyā" iti | so’srāmyat sa tapo tapyata | sa śrāntas tepāno brahma eva prathamam asrijata trayayī. eva vidyām | sā eva asmai pratishtāḥ 'bhavat | tasmād āhur "brahma asya sarvasya pratishtāḥ" iti | tasmād anūchya pratitishṭhaiḥ | pratishtāḥ hy esā yaḥ brahma | tasyām pratishtāyaṃ pratishtitho tapyata | 9. So’po’srijata vāchaḥ eva lokāḥ | vāg eva asya sā’srijyata | sā idaṁ sarvam āpnot yad idaṁ kincha | yad āpnot tasmād āpaḥ | yad avṛinot tasmād vāḥ | 10. So’kāmayata “abhya’dhyo’dhi vṛajāyeyā” Yē | so’naya’trayyā vidyāyā saha apaḥ praviṣat | tataḥ ānāṁ samavarttata | tad abhyamṛiṣat | “aśto” ity “astu bhūya’stro” ity eva tad abhavita | tato brahma eva prathamām asrijyata trayy eva vidyā | tasmād āhur “brahma asya sarvaya prathamajam” iti | api hi tasmāt purushād brahma eva pūram asrijyata tad asya tad mukham eva asrijyata | tasmād anūchānām āhur “agni-kalpaḥ” iti | mukhaṁ hy etad agner yad brahma |

8 This text, Rig-veda, iii. 62, 10, will be quoted in the sequel.
9 This passage with the preceding context is given in the Fourth Volume of this work, pp. 18 ff.
"This Male, Prajāpati, desired, ‘May I multiply, may I be propagated.’ He toiled in devotion; he practised austere-fervour. Having done so he first of all created sacred knowledge, the triple Vedic science. This became a basis for him. Wherefore men say, ‘sacred knowledge is the basis of this universe.’ Hence after studying the Veda a man has a standing ground; for sacred knowledge is his foundation. Resting on this basis he (Prajāpati) practised austere-ferouvoir. 9. He created the waters from Vāch (speech), as their world. Vāch was his: she was created. She pervaded all this whatever exists. As she pervaded (āpnot), waters were called ‘āpaḥ.’ As she covered (aśrīgot) all, water was called ‘vār.’ 10. He desired, ‘May I be propagated from these waters.’ Along with this triple Vedic science he entered the waters, Thence sprang an egg...He gave it an impulse; and said, ‘Let there be, let there be, let there be again.’ Thence was first created sacred knowledge, the triple Vedic science. Wherefore men say, ‘Sacred knowledge is the first-born thing in this universe. Moreover, it was sacred knowledge which was created from that Male in front, wherefore it was created as his mouth. Hence they say of a man learned in the Veda, ‘He is like Agni; for sacred knowledge is Agni’s mouth.’"

The next passage from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, ii. 3, 10, 1, briefly states that the Vedas were created after Soma:

Prajāpatiḥ Somaṁ rājānam aśṛijata | tāṁ trayo vedāṁ anv aśṛijyanta |

"Prajāpati created king Soma. After him the three Vedas were created."

The same Brāhmaṇa in other places, as iii. 3, 2, 1, speaks of the Veda as derived from Prajāpati (Prajāpatya vedāḥ).

Satapatha Brāhmaṇa.—According to the following passage of the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, xiv. 5, 4, 10 (= Brīhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad, p. 455 of Röer’s ed. and p. 179 of trans.) the Vedas, as well as other Śāstras, are the breath of Brahma:

Sa yathā ārdrekaṁ āṣravīhārāṁ abhyāhitat prithag dhūmāṁ viṇīṣcharanti evaṁ vai are 'svya mahato bhūtasya nīvasitam etad yad pīrvedyayurvedaṁ sāvavedo thārvarīgirasāṁ itihāsaṁ purāṇaṁ vidyā vaiṣṇavāṁ slokāṁ saṁrāgy amuṣyākhyānāṁ vyākhyānāṁ asyaiva evāṁ sarvāṁ nīva-sitāṁ |

"As from a fire made of moist wood various modifications of smoke proceed, so is the breathing of this great Being the Rig-veda, the
Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Atharvāṅgirases, the Itihāsas, Purāṇas, science, the Upanishads, verses (ślokas), aphorisms, comments of different kinds—all these are his breathings."

It is curious that in this passage the Vedas appear to be classed in the same category with various other works, such as the Sūtras, from some at least of which (as we shall see further on), they are broadly distinguished by later writers, who regard the former (including the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads) as of superhuman origin, and infallible correctness, while this character is expressly denied to the latter, which are represented as pauruṣehya, or merely human compositions, possessed of no independent authority.

In the Brāhmatva Upanishad (pp. 50–53 of Dr. Röer’s ed.) Prajāpati [identified with Death, or the Devourer] is said to have produced Vāch (speech), and through her, together with soul, to have created all things, to the Vedas:

Sa tayā vāchā tenā ātmānaḥ idam sarvam asrijata yadh idam kinccha riho yajūnāhī sāmāni cchandāṁsi yajnān prajāḥ paśūn |

"By that speech and that soul he created all things whatsoever, rich, yajush, and sāman texts, metres, sacrifices, creatures, and animals."

And in Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, xiv. 4, 3, 12 (p. 290 of the same Brähmatva Upanishad) it is sād:

Tryo vedāḥ ete eva | vāg eva ṛg-vedo mano yajur-vedāḥ prāṇāḥ sāma-vedāḥ |

"The three Vedas are [identifiable with] these three things [speech, mind, and breath]. Speech is the Rig-veda, mind the Yajur-veda, and breath the Sāma-veda."

The following text, from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, vii. 5, 2, 52, gives a singular account of the production of the Vedas:

"Samudrāḥ tvā sadāne sādayāmī" iti | Mano vai samudraḥ | manaso vai samudrāḥ vāchā ’bhryaḥ devās trayīnvidyāṁ nirakahanān | tad esha śloko ’bhuyuktaḥ "ye (yat?) samudrāḥ nirakahanān devās tikshnābhir abhirbhiḥ | sudeva adya tad vidyād yatra nirvapanaṁ dadhar" iti | manah samudro vāk tikshnā ’hris trayī vidyāṁ nirvapanaṃ | etad esha śloko ’bhuyuktaḥ | manasi tāṁ sādayati |

"I settle thee in the ocean as thy seat."10 Mind is the ocean.

10 I am indebted to Professor Aufrecht for the following explanation of this formula, which is taken from the Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xiii. 53. The words are addressed to a
From the mind-ocean with speech for a shovel the gods dug out the triple Vedic science. Hence this verse has been uttered: ‘May the brilliant deity to-day know where they placed that offering which the gods dug out with sharp shovels.’ Mind is the ocean; speech is the sharp shovel; the triple Vedic science is the offering. In reference to this the verse has been uttered. He settles it in Mind.”

The next passage from the Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 39, 1, speaks of the Veda as being “the hair of Prajāpati’s beard” (Prajāpatier vai etāni āmaśrāṇi yad vedah). The process of its germination is left to the imagination of the reader.

In another text of the same Brāhmaṇa, Vāch (speech) is called the mother of the Vedas:

ii. 8, 2, 5. Vāg akṣharam prathamajā rītasya vedānāṁ mātā amṛitasya nābhīḥ | sā no juñjāṇa upa yajnām āgađ advantī devī suhavā me astu | yām rishayo mantra-krito maniśīnāh anvaichhan devās tapasā śramaṇa | “Vāch (speech) is an imperishable thing, and the first-born of the ceremonial, the mother of the Vedas, and the centre-point of immortality. Delighting in us, she came to the sacrifice. May the protecting goddess be ready to listen to my invocation,—she whom the wise wishis, the composers of hymns, the gods, sought by austere-favour, and by laborious devotion.”

Sect. II.—Origin of the Vedas according to the Vishnū, Bhāgavata, and Markandeya Purāṇas, the Harivaṁśa, the Mahābhārata; eternity of the Veda; miscellaneous statements regarding it.

In the Vishnū and Bhāgavata Purāṇas we find a quite different tradition regarding the origin of the Vedas, which in these works are said to have been created by the four-faced Brahmā from his several mouths. Thus the Vishnū Purāṇa says, i. 5, 48 ff.:

Gāyatraṁ cha richeś chaiva trīrīt-sāma-rathantaram | Aghanṭomāṁ cha yajnānāṁ nirmame prathamād mukhāt | yajüṇāli traiśṭubhaṁ chhandah stomaṁ panchadāsaṁ tathā | Vṛihat sāma tathokthyaṁ cha dakṣinād asṛjād mukhāt | sāmāṁ jagati-chhandah stomaṁ saptadāsaṁ

brick at the time when the hearth (chityā) for the reception of the sacred fires is being constructed. As the bricks are severally called apasyā (properly ‘effulgent,’ but erroneously derived from ap) they are, addressed as if placed in various parts of water
tathā vairūpam atirātraṁ cha paśchimād asrijad mukhāt ekaviṃśam atharvāṇam āptoryāmāṇam eva cha Anushṭubhāṁ sa vairūjām uttarād asrijad mukhāt |

"From his eastern mouth Brahmā formed the gāyatra, the rich verses, the trivṛt, the sāma-rathantara, and of sacrifices, the agnishṭoma. From his southern mouth he created the yajush verses, the trisṭubh metre, the panchadasa-stoma, the vyihat-sāman, and the ukthya. From his western mouth he formed the sāman verses, the jagati metre, the saptadasa-stoma, the vairūpa, and the atirātra. From his northern mouth he framed the ekavinsa, the atharvan, the āptoryāman, with the anushṭubh and virāj metres." 11

In like manner it is said but with variations, in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, .iii. 12, 34, and 37 ff.:

Kadāciḥ dhīyātāḥ srasṭṭur vedāḥ āsāṁ chaturmukhāt kathaṁ srakṣhyāmy ahaṁ lokān samavetān yathā purā | ... Rīg-yajuḥ-sāma-tharavākhyān vedān pārādībhir mukhaiḥ | āstānam ījjāṁ stuti-stomam prāyaśchittam vyadhāt kramāt |

"Once the Vedas sprang from the four-faced creator, as he was meditating ‘how shall I create the aggregate worlds as before?’ ... He formed from his eastern and other mouths the Vedas called rich, yajush, sāman, and atharvan, together with praise, sacrifice, hymns, and expiration."

And in verse 45 it is stated that the uṣṇih metre issued from his hairs, the gāyatṛi from his skin, the trisṛṣṭubh from his flesh, the anuṣṭubh from his tendons, the jagati from his bones (Tasyosñig āśiḷ lomebhyo gāyatṛi cha tvacho vibhoḥ | trisṛṣṭup māṁsāt snuto nusṛṣṭup jagaty asthṇah Prajāpateḥ).

The Mārkaṇḍeyā Purāṇa says on the same subject, 102, 1:


11 See Wilson's Transl. vol. i. p. 84.
kaṭibhūtaṁ vadanat tasya vedhasaḥ | sukha-sattva-tamaḥ-prāyaṁ saumya-saumya-svarūpaṁ |
7. Richo rajo-guṇaḥ sattvaṁ yajushāṁ cha guṇo mune | tamo-guṇāṁ sāmāni tamaḥ-sattvam atharvasu |
1. “From the eastern mouth of Brahmā, who sprang by an imperceptible birth from that divided egg (Manu, i. 9, 12), there suddenly issued first of all the rich verses, (2) resembling China roses, brilliant in appearance, internally united, though separated from each other, and characterized by the quality of passion (rajas). 3. From his southern mouth came, unrestrained, the yajush verses of the colour of gold, and disunited. 4. From the western mouth of the supreme Brahmā appeared the sāman verses and the metres. 5 and 6. From the northern mouth of Vedhas (Brahmā) was manifested the entire Ātharvasu of the colour of black bees and collyrium, having a character at once terrible and not terrible, capable of neutralizing the arts of enchanters, pleasant, characterized by the qualities both of purity and darkness, and both beautiful and the contrary. 7. The verses of the rich are distinguished by the quality of passion (rajas), those of the yajush by purity (sattva), those of the sāman by darkness (tamas), and those of the atharvan by both darkness and purity.”

Harivaṁśa.—In the first section of the Harivaṁśa, verse 47, the creation of the Vedas by Brahmā is thus briefly alluded to:

Richo yajuṁshi sāmāni nirnāme yajna-siddhayaye | sādhyas tair auyajan devān ity evam anuṣūruma |

“In order to the accomplishment of sacrifice, he formed the rich, yajush, and sāman verses: with these the Śādhyas worshipped the gods, as we have heard.”

The following is the account of the same event given in another part of the same work; Harivaṁśa, verse 11,516:

Tato ’ṣrijat vai tripadām gāyatriṁ veda-mātaram | Akaroch chaiva cha-
turo vedān gāyatri-sambhavān |

After framing the world, Brahmā “next created the gāyatri of three lines, mother of the Vedas, and also the four Vedas which sprang from the gāyatri.”

12 Ghorāghora is the correct MS. reading, as I learn from Dr. Hall, and not gāveddāhara, as given in Professor Banerjea’s printed text.

13 The same words gāyatriṁ veda-mātaram also occur in the M.Bh. Vanaparvan, verse 13,432; and the same title is applied to Vāch in the Taitt. Br. as quoted above, p 10.
A little further on we find this expanded into the following piece of mysticism, verse 11,665 ff.:

Samāhita-manā Bhramā moksha-prāptena hetunā | chandra-maṇḍala-


samāsthānāj jyotis-tejo mahat tada | Pravīṣya hraidayaṁ kṣiṇapāṁ gāyatryāḥ


nayanāntara | Garbhahasamābhavatāś ca chaturdhā purusātmakāḥ | Brahma-tejomayo vyaśataṁ bāśvato 'tha ēhruvo 'vyayaḥ | na chendriya-


gunair yukto yuktas tejo-gūṇena cha | chandrāṁśu-vimala-prakhyo bhram-


jishnur varṇa-samsthitāḥ | Netrubhyāṁ janayad devaḥ rig-vedaṁ yajushā
daha | sāmavedaṁ cha jihvāgruḍ atharvāṇāṁ cha mūrdhātāḥ | Jīta-mātrās
tu te vedāḥ kṣetram vindanti tattvataḥ | Tenā vedatvam āpannā yasmād


vindanti tat padam | Te śrijanti tāda vedaḥ brahma pūrvaṁ saṅatanam | Purusāh maṁ divya-rūpābhaṁ svaṁ svair bhāvar nano-bhāvaṁ |


“For the emancipation of the world, Brahmā, sunk in contemplation, issuing in a luminous form from the region of the moon, penetrated into the heart of Gāyatrī, entering between her eyes. From her there was then produced a quadruple being in the form of a Male, lustrous as Brahmā, undefined, eternal, undecaying, devoid of bodily senses or qualities, distinguished by the attribute of brilliancy, pure as the rays of the moon, radiant, and embodied in letters. The god fashioned the Rig-veda, with the Yajush from his eyes, the Sāma-veda from the tip of his tongue, and the Atharva from his head. These Vedas, as soon as they are born, find a body (kṣetra). Hence they obtain their character of Vedas, because they find (vindanti) that abode. These Vedas then create the pre-existent eternal brahma (sacred science), a Male of celestial form, with their own mind-born qualities.”

I extract another passage on the same subject from a later section of the same work, verses 12,425 ff. When the Supreme Being was intent on creating the universe, Hiranyagarbha, or Prajāpati, issued from his mouth, and was desired to divide himself,—a process which he was in great doubt how he should effect. The text then proceeds:

Iti chintayatas tasya “om” ity evotthitaḥ svaraḥ | sa bhūmāv antarikṣhe cha nāke cha kṛitavān svanam | Taṁ chaivābhyyatasas tasya manāḥ-sāra-


mayam punah | hridayād deva-devasya vashṭkāraḥ samutthitaḥ | bhūmy-


antarikṣha-nākānāṁ bhūyāḥ svārātmakāḥ parāḥ | mahāmṛtimayāḥ


punāḥ mahāyāhritayo bhavan | chhandasām pravarā deva chaturvisā-


kharā 'bhavat | Tat-padaṁ saṁsmaran divyam sāvitrīm akarot prabhūḥ |
rik-sāmātharva-yajushās chaturv bhavān prabhuḥ | chakāra nikhilān vedaṇ brahma-yuktena karmāṇā |

“While he was thus reflecting, the sound “om” issued from him, and resounded through the earth, air, and sky. While the god of gods was again and again repeating this, the essence of mind, the vashaṭkāra proceeded from his heart. Next, the sacred and transcendent vyāhṛitis, (bhūḥ, bhuvan, svar), formed of the great smṛiti, in the form of sound, were produced from earth, air, and sky. Then appeared the goddess, the most excellent of metres, with twenty-four syllables [the gāyatṛī]. Reflecting on the divine text [beginning with] “tat,” the Lord formed the sāvitrī. He then produced all the Vedas, the Rīch, Sāman, Atharvan, and Yajush, with their prayers and rites.” (See also the passage from the Bhāg. Pur. xii. 6, 37 ff., which will be quoted in a following section.)

Mahābhārata.—The Mahābhārata in one passage speaks of Sarasvatī and the Vedas as being both created by Achyuta (Viṣṇu) from his mind (Bhīṣhma-parvan, verse 3019: Sarasvatīṁ cha vedāṁ cha manasaḥ sacraje 'chyutaḥ). In another place, Śānti-parvan, verse 12,920, Sarasvatī is said, in conformity with the texts quoted above, pp. 10 and 12, from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, the Vāna-parvan, and the Harivaṁśa, to be the mother of the Vedas:

Vedānām mātaraḥ pāṣya mat-sthām devīṁ Sarasvatim |
“Behold Sarasvatī, mother of the Vedas, abiding in me.”

Manu.—According to the verses in Manu, xii. 49, 50, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 41, the Vedas, with the other beings and objects named along with them, constitute the second manifestation of the sattva guṇa, or pure principle; while Brahmā is placed in a higher rank, as one of the first manifestations of the same principle. The word Veda in this passage is explained by Kullūka of those “embodied deities, celebrated in the Iśāsas, who preside over the Vedas” (Vedā- bhimānīnyāś cha devatāḥ vigrahavatyāḥ itiḥāsa-prasiddāḥ).

Sect. III.—Passages of the Brāhmaṇas and other works in which the Vedas are spoken of as being the sources of all things, and as infinite and eternal.

The first text of this sort which I shall cite is from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, x. 4, 2, 21:
Atharva eva vidya eva sarvani bhutany apasyet | atra hi sarveshnam chhandasam atmam sarvesham stoma-

nami sarvesham prapanam sarvesham devanam | etad vai asti | etad hy amritam | yad hy amritam tad hy asti | etad u tad yad martyam | 22. Sa aikshata Prajapatiha "trayayam vaa vaiva vidya eva sarvani bhutani | hanta trayam eva vidyam atmam abhisamskaravai" iti | 23. Sa riche vyau-
hate | devada sa brihat-sahasrany etavatyo ha riche yaḥ Prajapati-srishtas
tas triṁśattame vyuhe panktisva atishthanta | tath yat triṁśattame vyuhe
tishthanta tasmad masya rātryaḥ | atha yat panktisva tasmāt paṁktah Prajapatiḥ | tath ashtaśatam satani panktayo 'bhavan |

21. "Then he looked around upon all beings. He beheld all beings in this triple Vedic science. For in it is the soul of all metres, of all hymns of praise, of all breaths, of all the gods. This, indeed, exists. It is an undying thing. For that which is undying (really) exists. This is that which is mortal. Prajapati reflected, 'All beings are comprehended in the triple Vedic science: come let me dispose myself in the shape of the triple Vedic science. He arranged the verses of the Rigveda. Twelve thousand Brihatis, and as many Rich-verses which were created by Prajapati, stood in rows in the thirtieth class. Since they stood in the thirtieth class there are thirty nights in the month. Since they stood in rows (pankti) Prajapati is called Pāṅkta. They formed eighteen hundreds of rows."

The next text, from the Taïtiriya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 12, 9, 1, speaks of the three Vedas as being respectively the sources of form, motion, and heat, or brilliance:

Rigbhyojatam sarvaḥ mūrtīm ahuḥ sarvā gatir yajushī haiva saśvat | sarvaṁ tejaḥ sāma-rūpyaṁ ha saśvat |

"They say that form universally proceeds from rich verses; that motion is always connected with the yajush, and that all heat has the nature of the sāman."

We have already seen, p. 6, that Manu (i. 21) speaks of the names,

14 "Always exists" (sarvadā vidyate).—Comm.
15 On this the commentator remarks: Yach cha martyam marana-dharmakam ma-
nushyādi tad apy etat trayī-bhūtam eva | ato martyānṛśāttakāṁ sarvāṁ jagat
attrānterbhūtam | "And that which is mortal, subject to death, the human race, etc., is also one with the triple Vedic science. Hence the latter includes all the world both mortal and immortal."
functions, and conditions of all things as fashioned from the words of the Veda. It is similarly said in the Vishnu Purana, i. 5, 58:

Nāma rūpaḥ cha bhūtanāṁ kṛityānāṁ cha pravrattanāṁ | Veda-sabdebyā eva da dovādinām chakāra saḥ | rishīnām nāmadheyāni yathā veda-śrutāni saḥ | yathā- niyoga-yogyāni sarveshām api sa’karoḥ |

"In the beginning he created from the words of the Veda the names, forms, and functions of the gods and other beings. He also assigned the names of all the rishis as indicated in the Vedas, and as appropriate to their respective offices."

The same idea is repeated in the Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, 8533:

Rishayas tapasā vedaṁ ādhyāshanta divāniśam | An-ādi-nidhanā vidyā vāg utriśiṣṭā Svayambhūvā | ādau vedamāyī divyā yataḥ sarvaḥ pravrityayaḥ | rishīnām nāmadheyāni yās cha vedeshu śrīśītyajāh | nānārūpaḥ cha bhūtanām karmanām cha pravrattaya (pravrattanam?) | veda-sabdebyā eva dau nirmimite sa śvargaḥ |

"Through austere-servour (tapas) the rishis studied the Vedas, both day and night. In the beginning knowledge (vidyā) without beginning or end, divine speech, formed of the Vedas, was sent forth by Svayambhū (= Brahma, the self-existent): from her all activities are derived. It is from the words of the Veda that the lord in the beginning frames the names of the rishis, the creations which (exist) in the Vedas, the various forms of beings, and the activity manifested in works."

The Mangalācharaṇa, or prayer prefixed to their commentaries on the Rik Sanhitā and Taittiriya Sanhitā, by both Śāyaṇa and Mādhava, is as follows:

Yasya nīśvasitaṁ vedāḥ yo vedebhya 'khalam jagat | nirmano tam ahaṁ vande vidyā-tirtham maheśvaram |

"I reverence Maheśvara the hallowed abode of sacred knowledge, of whom the Vedas are the breathings, and who from the Vedas formed the whole universe."

The following passage from the Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 10, 11, 3, asserts that the Vedas are infinite in extent:

Bharadvaḥo ha trībhir āyurbhir brahmacharyyaṁ avāsa | taṁ ha jīryaṁ

17 In quoting this line in a passage of his Vedārtha-prakāśa, or commentary on the Taittiriya Sanhitā, which I shall adduce further on, Mādhava Āchāryya gives the reading niyā, ‘eternal,’ instead of vidyā, ‘knowledge.’ It is possible that the line may be taken from some other book.
"Bharadvāja lived through three lives" in the state of a religious student (brahmacharyya). Indra approached him when he was lying old and decrepit, and said to him: ‘Bharadvāja, if I give thee a fourth life, how wilt thou employ it?’ ‘I will lead the life of a religious student,’ he replied. 4. He (Indra) showed him three mountain-like objects, as it were unknown. From each of them he took a handful: and, calling to him, ‘Bharadvāja,’ said, ‘These are the Vedas. The Vedas are infinite. This is what thou hast studied during these three lives. Now there is another thing which thou hast not studied, come and learn it. This is the universal science.’ 5. He declared to him this Agni Śāvitra. Having known it he (Bharadvāja) became immortal, and ascended to the heavenly world, to union with the sun. He who knows this ascends to heaven, to union with the sun. This is the triple Vedic science. He who knows this conquers a world as great as he would gain by the triple Vedic science.”

Another text from the Taittiriya Sanhitā, vii. 3, 1, 4, puts the matter somewhat differently:

Atha brahma (brahma-vadino?) vadanti parimitāḥ vai rihaḥ parimitāṇi sāmāṇi parimitāṇi yajānshi atha tasya eva anto nāsti yad brahma |

“The expounders of sacred science say, ‘Rich verses are limited, sāman verses are limited, yajush verses are limited; but there is no end of sacred knowledge.’

Vishnū Purāṇa.—At the end of Section 6 of the third book of the.

18 This does not appear to mean, three lives in three different births, but a life of thrice the usual length, or already twice renewed.
Vishnu Purana we have the following assertion of the eternity of the Veda:

"Ii śakkhaḥ prasankhyataḥ śakkha-bhedas tathaiva cha | karttāraś chaiva śakkhanām bheda-hetus tathoditah | sarva-manvantarēsva eva śakkha-bhedah samah smritāḥ | Prājāpatyā śrutir nityā tad-vikalpās tv ima devaḥ |

"Thus the Śakhas, their divisions, their authors, and the cause of the division have been declared. In all the manvantaras the divisions of the Śakhas are recorded to be the same. The śruti (Veda) derived from Prajāpati (Brahma) is eternal: these; o Brähman, are only its modifications."

In another passage of the same book, Vishnu is identified with the Vedas: Vishnu Purana, iii. 3, 19 ff.:

Sa viṇa-mayaḥ sa sāmamayaḥ sa chātmā sa yajurmayah | rig-yajus- sāma-sūrātmā sa evātmā sārīrānām | sa bhidyate vedamayaḥ sa vedaṁ karoti bhedair balubhiḥ saśākham | śakkha-pranetā sa samasta-śakhaṁ jñāna-svarūpo bhagavān anantaḥ |

"He is composed of the Rich, of the Sāman, of the Yajush; he is the soul. Consisting of the essence of the Rich, Yajush, and Sāman, he is the soul of embodied spirits. Formed of the Veda, he is divided; he forms the Veda and its branches (śakhas) into many divisions. Tramer of the Śakhas, he is also their entirety, the infinite lord, whose essence is knowledge."

SECT. IV.—Passages from the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa and Manu, eulogistic of the Veda, with some statements of a different tenor from Manu and other writers.

The following panegyric on Vedic study is taken from the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 5, 6, 1:

Pancha eva mahāyajnaḥ | tany eva mahāsattrāṇi bhūta-yajno manushya-yajnaḥ pitri-yajno deva-yajno brahma-yajnaḥ iti | 2. Ahar ahar bhūtebhyo baliṁ hare | tathā etam bhūta-yajnam samānpnoti | ahar ahar dadyād ā uda-pātrāt tathā etam manushya-yajnam samānpnoti | ahar ahaṁ svādhākuryād ā uda-pātrāt tathā etam pitri-yajnam samānpnoti | ahar ahaṁ svādhākuryād ā kāśṭhāt tathā etam deva-yajnam samānpnoti | 3. Āthā brahma-yajnaḥ | svādhākuryo vai brahma-yajnaḥ | tasya vai etasya brahma-
eva sa nakhāregbhyaśa tapyate yaḥ evam vidvān svādhyāyam adhīte | tasmāt svādhyāyaḥ dhetavyaḥ | 5. Madhu ha vai riche'ghritam ha sāmāny āmritam yajuśhi | yad ha vai ayaś vākavāyam adhīte kshiraudana-māṃsaudanau ha eva tau | 6. Madhunaḥ ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evam vidvān riche'har ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te evaṁ triptās tarpayanti sarvaiḥ kāmāḥ sarvaiḥ bhogaiḥ | 7. Ghrītena ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evam vidvān sāmānyah ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te evaṁ triptāh ityādi | 8. Amṛtena ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evam vidvān yajāṁshya ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te evaṁ triptāh ityādi | 9. Kshiraudana-māṃsaudanābhyaṁ ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evam vidvān vākavāyam itiḥāsa-purāṇam ity ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te evaṁ triptāh ityādi | 10. Yanti vai āpaḥ | eti adityaḥ | eti chANDramāḥ | yanti nakshatrāṇi | yathā ha vai nāyur na kuryur evam ha eva tadbhavā bhavati yad ahaḥ svādhyāyam na adhīte | tasmāt svādhyāyaḥ dhetavyaḥ | tasmād āpy riche'ūnā vyajur vā sūna vā gāthām vā kumāryaṁ vā ahhivyāhured vratasya avyavachchhedaya|

"There are only five great sacrifices, which are the great ceremonies, viz., the offering to living creatures, the offering to men, the offering to the fathers, the offering to the gods, and the Veda-offering (brahma-yajña). 2. Let an oblation be daily presented to living creatures. Thus the offering to them is fulfilled. Let (hospitality) be daily bestowed even down to the bowl of water. Thus is the offering to men fulfilled. Let the offering to the fathers be daily presented, down to the bowl of water with the svadha formula. Thus is the offering to the fathers fulfilled. Let the oblation to the gods be daily presented as far as the faggot of wood. Thus is the offering to the gods fulfilled. 3. Next is the Veda-offering. This means private study (of the sacred books). In this Veda-sacrifice speech is the jhū́, the soul the upabhṛ́t, the eye the dhrūvā, intelligence the sruva, truth the ablation, and paradise

19 This sacrifice, as I learn from Prof. Aufrecht, consists in scattering grain for the benefit of birds, etc. See Bühlingk and Roth’s Lexicon, s.v. bali. In regard to the other sacrifices see Colebrooke’s Misc. Essays, i. pp. 150, 153, 182 ff., 203 ff.
20 In explanation of this Professor Aufrecht refers to Kātyāyana’s S’rauta Sūtras, iv. 1, 10, and Manu, iii. 210, 214, 218.
21 Svādhyāyaḥ svavākhādhyanaṁ | “Reading of the Veda in one’s own sākhā.”—Comm.
22 These words denote sacrificial spoons or ladles of different kinds of wood. See the drawings of them in Prof. Müller’s article on the funeral rites of the Bṛhmaṇs, Journ. of the Germ. Or. Soc. vol. ix. pp. lxxviii. and lxxx.
the conclusion. He who, knowing this, daily studies the Veda, conquers an undecaying world more than thrice as great as that which he acquires who bestows this whole earth filled with riches. Wherefore the Veda should be studied. 4. Verses of the Rig-veda are milk-oblations to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with milk-oblations; and they being satisfied, satisfy him with property, with breath, with generative power, with complete bodily soundness, with all excellent blessings. Streams of butter, streams of honey flow as svadāḥ-oblations to the fathers. 5. Yajush-verses are offerings of butter to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with offerings of butter; and they, being satisfied, satisfy him, etc. (as in the preceding paragraph). 6. Śāman-verses are soma-libations to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with soma-libations; and they being satisfied, satisfy him, etc. (as above). 7. Verses of Atharvan and Angiras (atharvāngirasa)\textsuperscript{23} are oblations of fat to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with oblations of fat; and they etc. (as above). 8. Prescriptive and scientific treatises, dialogues, traditions, tales, verses, and eulogistic texts are oblations of honey to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these, satisfies the gods with oblations of honey; and they etc. (as above). 9. Of this Veda-sacrifice there are four Vashaṭkāras, when the wind blows, when it lightens, when it thunders, when it crashes; wherefore when it blows, lightens, thunders, or crashes, let the man, who knows this, read, in order that these Vashaṭkāras may not be interrupted.\textsuperscript{24} He who does so is freed from dying a second time, and attains to an union with Brahma. Even if he cannot read vigorously, let him read one text relating to the gods. Thus he is not deprived of his living creatures.\textsuperscript{31}

xi. 5, 7, 1: "Now comes an encomium upon Vedic study. Study and teaching are loved. He (who practises them) becomes composed in mind. Independent of others, he daily attains his objects, sleeps pleasantly, becomes his own best physician. Control of his senses, concentration of mind, increase of intelligence, renown, capacity to educate mankind [are the results of study]. Increasing intelligence secures for

\textsuperscript{23} The Atharva Sanhitā is so called.

\textsuperscript{24} See Büthingk and Roth's Lexicon, s.v. chhambut.
the Brähman the four attributes of saintliness, suitable conduct, renown, and capacity for educating mankind. When so educated, men guarantee to the Brähman the enjoyment of the four prerogatives which are his due, reverence, the receipt of gifts, freedom from oppression, and from leath by violence. 2. Of all the modes of exertion, which are known between heaven and earth, study of the Veda occupies the highest rank, (in the case of him) who, knowing this, studies it. Wherefore this study is to be practised. 3. On every occasion when a man studies the Vedic hymns he (in fact) performs a complete ceremonial of sacrifice, i.e. whosoever, knowing this, so studies. Wherefore this study, etc., etc. 4. And even when a man, perfumed with unguents, adorned with jewels, satiated with food, and reposing on a comfortable couch, studies the Veda he (has all the merit of one who) performs penance (felt) to the very tips of his nails: 25 (such is the case with him) who, knowing this, studies. Wherefore etc. 5. Rig-veda-verses are honey, Sāma-verses butter, yajus-verses nectar (amrita). When a man reads dialogues (vākōvākya) [and legends], these two sorts of composition are respectively oblations of cooked milk and cooked flesh. 6. He who, knowing this, daily reads Rig-veda-verses, satisfies the gods with honey; and they, when satisfied, satisfy him with all objects of desire; and with all enjoyments. 7. He who, knowing this, daily reads Sāma-verses, satisfies the gods with nectar; and they, when satisfied, etc. (as before). 8. He who, knowing this, daily reads Yajus-verses, satisfies the gods with nectar; and they, etc. (as before). 9. He who, knowing this, daily studies dialogues and the different classes of ancient stories, satisfies the gods with milk- and flesh-oblations; and they, etc. (as before). 10. The waters move. The sun moves. The moon moves. The constellations move. The Brähman who on any day does not study the Veda, is on that day like what these moving bodies would be if the ceased to move or act. Wherefore such study is to be practised. Let

25 This sentence is differently rendered by Professor Weber, Ind. Stud. x. p. 112, as follows: “He burns (with sacred fire) to the very tips of his nails.” In a later page of the same Essay we are told that according to the doctrine of a teacher called Nāka Maudgalya as stated in the Taittirīya Aranyaka, the study and teaching of the Veda are the real tapas (vādhyāya-pravachane eva tad hi tapah). In the text of the Aranyaka itself, vii. 8, it is declared that study and teaching should always accompany such spiritual or ritual acts as rītam, satyam, tapas, dama, īma, the agnikotra sacrifice, etc. See Indische Studien, ii. 214, and x. 113.
a man therefore present as his offering a verse of the Rig-veda, or the Sāman, or the Yajush, or a Gāthā, or a Kuṉavyā, in order that the course of his observances may not be interrupted."

Manu employs the following honorific expressions in reference to the Vedas (xii. 94 ff.):

\begin{verbatim}
  Pitṛi-dvā-manushyāṇāṁ vedaś chakṣuh śanātanaṁ | asakyaṁ chāpra-
  meyaṁ cha veda-śāstram iti sthitīḥ | Yā veda-vāyuḥ śrīrāya yāḥ cha
  kāścha kuḍāṅkṣṭayaḥ | 25 sarvās tā nishphalāḥ pretya tamo-nishṭāḥ hi
  tāḥ śrīrāyaḥ | Utpadante chyavante cha yāny ato 'nyāni kānichit | Tūny
  aprāk-kālīkatayaḥ 26 nishphalān anvitrān ċaḥ | Chāturvarṇaṁ tṛayo lokāḥ
  chaṭvāraś chāśrāmaḥ prithak | Bhūtām bhavaḥ bhavishyaṁ cha sarvāṁ
  vedāt prasiddhīyati | śabdaḥ sparśaḥ cha rūpaṁ cha raso gandhaḥ cha
  panchamaḥ | vedāt eva prasiddhīyante prasūti-guna-karmataḥ | Briharti 28
  sarva-bhūtāni veda-śāstrāṁ śanātanaṁ | Tusmād etat param manye yaj
  jantor asya sādhanaṁ | Saināpatyaṁ cha rūyaṁ cha daṇḍa-netrītām
  eva ca | sarva-lokādhipatyāṁ cha veda-śāstra-vid arhati | Yathā jāta-
  balo vahnir dahayā ardṛan api drumān | tathā dahati veda-jaṁ karma-
  jaṁ doṣham ātmanaḥ | veda-śāstrārtha-tattva-jno yatra tatrāsrame vasan |
  ihaiva loke tishṭhan sa brahmabhūyāya kalpate |

  "The Veda is the eternal eye of the fathers, of gods, and of men;
  it is beyond human power and comprehension; this is a certain con-
  clusion. Whatever traditions are apart from the Veda, and all heretical
  views, are fruitless in the next world, for they are declared to be
  founded on darkness. All other [books] external to the Veda, which
  arise and pass away, are worthless and false from their recentness of
  date. The system of the four castes, the three worlds, the four states
  of life, all that has been, now is, or shall be, is made manifest by the

25 Drīṣṭārthā-vākyom "chaitya-vandanāṁ svargo bhavati" ity ādīṁ gūni ča asat-
  tarka-mūlāni devatā-purūrā-nirākaratmakāni veda-viruddhāni chārvāka-darśa-
  nant | "That is, deductions from experience of the visible world; such doctrines as
  that 'heaven is attained by obedience to a chaitya,' and similar Čārvāka tenets
  founded on false reasonings, contradicting the existence of the gods, and the efficacy
  of religious rites, and contrary to the Veda."—Kullāka.

26 Īdānīṁgaṁvatāt "From their modernness."—Kullāka.

27 "Havīr agnaḥ hīyate | so'gir ādītyam upasarpati | tat sūro raśmiḥbhir var-
  shati | tenānman bhavati | aha ēka bhūdānam utpatti-sthitiḥ cheti havīr jāyate" iti
  brāhmaṇaṁ | "The oblation is cast into the fire; fire reaches the sun; the sun causes
  rain by his rays; thence food is produced; thus the oblation becomes the cause of the
  generation and maintenance of creatures on this earth;" so says a Brāhmaṇa."—
  Kullāka.
Veda. The objects of touch and taste, sound, form, and odour, as the fifth, are made known by the Veda, together with their products, qualities, and the character of their action. The eternal Veda supports all beings: hence I regard it as the principal instrument of well-being to this creature, man. Command of armies, royal authority, the administration of criminal justice, and the sovereignty of all worlds, he alone deserves who knows the Veda. As fire, when it has acquired force, burns up even green trees, so he who knows the Veda consumes the taint of his soul which has been contracted from works. He who comprehends the essential meaning of the Veda, in whatever order of life he may be, is prepared for absorption into Brahma, even while abiding in this lower world."

The following are some further miscellaneous passages of the same tenor, scattered throughout the Institutes (Manu, ii. 10 ff.):

_Shrutis tu veda vijneyo dharma-sāstraṁ tu vai smṛitiḥ | te sarvārthesvo_ 
amīmāṁsyo tāḥyāṁ dharmaḥ hi nirabhau | 11. Yo 'vamanyeta to mālo _heto-sāstraśrayād dvijaḥ | sa sādhubhir vahishkāryyo nāstiko veda-ninda-kaḥ | ... 13. Dharmaṁ jijnāsamānāṁ pramāṇam paramāṁ śrutīḥ |

"By śrutī is meant the Veda, and by smṛiti the institutes of law: the contents of these are not to be questioned by reason, since from them [a knowledge of] duty has shone forth. The Brahmān who, relying on rationalistic treatises,²⁹ shall contemn these two primary sources of knowledge, must be excommunicated by the virtuous as a sceptic and reviler of the Vedas. ... 13. To those who are seeking a knowledge of duty, the śrutī is the supreme authority."

In the following passage, the necessity of a knowledge of Brahma is asserted, though the practice of ritual observances is also inculcated (vi. 82 ff.):

_Dhyānikaṁ sarvam evaitaṁ yaṁ etad abhisabdītam | na hy anādhyātma- _vit kāṣcit kriyā-phalam upāśnate | ādhyājnam brahma japeḥ ādhyādai- _vikam eva cha | ādhyatmikāṁ cha satataṁ vedāntābhikah cha yat | Īdāṁ _saraṇam ajñānāṁ īdam eva vijñatām | īdam eva anviciohāhatāṁ svargam īdam ānantaṁ icchāhhatām |

²⁹ This, however, must be read in conjunction with the precept in xii. 106, which declares: _ārkaṁ dharma-pudeiṁ cha veda-sāstraṁvirodhinaḥ | yas tarkaṁnusandaḥ kata va _dharmaṁ veda nōparaḥ | "He, and he only is acquainted with duty, who investigates the injunctions of the rishis, and the precepts of the smṛiti, by reasonings which do not contradict the Veda."
“All this which has been now declared is dependant on devout meditation: no one who is ignorant of the supreme Spirit can reap the fruit of ceremonial acts. Let a man repeat texts relating to sacrifice, texts relating to deities, texts relating to the supreme Spirit, and whatever is declared in the concluding portions of the Veda (the Upanishads). This [Veda] is the refuge of the ignorant, as well as of the understanding; it is the refuge of those who are seeking after paradise, as well as of those who are desiring infinity.”

The following text breathes a moral spirit, by representing purity of life as essential to the reception of benefit from religious observances (ii. 97):

Vedas tyagaḥ cha yajnaḥ cha niyamaḥ cha tapāṁsi cha | na vipradushta-bhāvasya saddhiṁ gachchanti karchicit |

“The Vedas, almsgiving, sacrifices, observances, austerities, are ineffectual to a man of depraved disposition.”

The doctrine which may be drawn from the following lines does not seem so favourable to morality (xi. 261 ff.):

Hatvā lokān apimāṁs trīn āśnann api yatstataḥ | Rigvedam dhārayan vipro nainah prāpnoti kinchana | Riksamhitāṁ trīr abhyasya yajushāṁ va samāhitaḥ | sāmnāṁ vā sa-rahasyānāṁ sarva-pāpaṁ pramuchyate | yathā mahā-hradam prāpya kshiptāṁ losṭāṁ vinasyaṁ | tathā duscharitāṁ sarvaṁ vede trīvṛti majjati |

“A Brāhman who should destroy these three worlds, and eat food received from any quarter whatever, would incur no guilt if he retained in his memory the Rig-veda. Repeating thrice with intent mind the Sanhitā of the Rik, or the Yajush, or the Sāman, with the Upanishads, he is freed from all his sins. Just as a clod thrown into a great lake is dissolved when it touches the water, so does all sin sink in the triple Veda.”

Considering the sacredness ascribed in the preceding passages to all the Vedas, the characteristics assigned to three of them in the passage quoted above (p. 12) from the Maṛkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, as well as the epithet applied to the Sāma-veda in the second of the following verses are certainly remarkable; (Manu, iv. 123 ff.):

Sāma-dhavanāv rig-yajushī nādhīṣṭa kadāchana | vedasyādhītya vā pṛy antam āranyakam adhitya cha | Rigvedo deva-daivatyo yajurvedas tu mānushāḥ | Sāmavedāḥ smritaḥ pitoras tasmāt tasyaśuchir dhvaniḥ |
“Let no one read the Rich or the Yajush while the Sāman is sounding in his ears, or after he has read the conclusion of the Veda (i.e. the Upanishads) or an Āraṇyaka. The Rig-veda has the gods for its deities; the Yajur-veda has men for its objects; the Sāma-veda has the pīṭhīs for its divinities, therefore its sound is impure.”

The scholiast Kullūka, however, will not allow that the sound of the Sāma-veda can be really “impure.” “It has,” he says, “only a semblance of impurity” (tasmāt tasya aśuchir iva āhvanīḥ | na tu aśu-
chir eva). In this remark he evinces the tendency, incident to so many systematic theologians, to ignore all those features of the sacred text on which they are commenting which are at variance with their theories regarding its absolute perfection. As it was the opinion of his age that the Veda was eternal and divine, it was, he considered, impossible that impurity or any species of defect could be predicated of any of its parts; and every expression, even of the highest authorities, which contradicted this opinion, had to be explained away. I am not in a position to state how this notion of impurity came to be attached to the Sāma-veda. The passage perhaps proceeded from the adherents of some particular Vedic school adverse to the Sāma-veda; but its substance being found recorded in some earlier work, it was deemed of sufficient authority to find a place in the miscellaneous collection of precepts,—gathered no doubt from different quarters, and perhaps not always strictly consistent with each other,—which make up the Mānava-dharma-śāstra.

Vishnu Purāṇa.—The following passage from the Vishnu Purāṇa, at the close, ascribes the same character of impurity to the Sāma-veda, though on different grounds, Vish. Pur. ii. 11, 5:

Yā tu saktī pārā Vishnur ṭig-yajuh-sāma-sanjñitā | saishā trayā
tapatī aṁho jagataś cha hinaśti yat | saiva Vishnuḥ sthitāh sthityāṁ
jagataḥ pālanodyataḥ | ṭig-yajuh-sāma-bhāto 'ntah savitur dvija tisht-
thati | māsi māsi ravis yo'yaś tatra tatra hi sā pārā | trayāyai Vishnuu-
saktir avasthānāṁ karoti vai | Richas tapanti pūrvāhe madhyāhe 'tha
yajunāśky atha | vihadrathantaradīni sāmāny ahnāḥ kshaye ravau |
angam esha trayāi Vishnur ṭig-yajuh-sāma-sanjñitā | Vishnuu-saktir avas-
thānānāṃ māsādyāye karoti sā | na kevalāṁ ravau śaktir vaishnavā sā tra-
yāmāyi | Brahma 'tha Puruche Rudras trayam etat trayinayam | sar-
gādāv riṁmayo Brahma sthitau Vishnur yajurmayaḥ | Rudrāḥ sāmamayo
'ntāya tasmāt tasyāśuchir āhvanīḥ |
"The supreme energy of Vishṇu, called the Rich, Yajush, and Śāman—this triad burns up sin and all things injurious to the world. During the continuance of the world, this triad exists as Vishṇu, who is occupied in the preservation of the universe, and who in the form of the Rich, Yajush, and Śāman, abides within the sun. That supreme energy of Vishṇu, consisting of the triple Veda, dwells in the particular form of the sun, which presides over each month. The Rich verses shine in the morning sun, the Yajush verses in the meridian beams, and the Vṛihad-rathantara and other Śāma verses in his declining rays. This triple Veda is the body of Vishṇu, and this his energy abides in the monthly sun. But not only does this energy of Vishṇu, formed of the triple Veda, reside in the sun: Brahmā, Purusha (Vishṇu), and Rudra also constitute a triad formed of the triple Veda. Acting in creation, Brahmā is formed of the Rig-veda; presiding over the continuance of the universe, Vishṇu is composed of the Yajur-veda; and for the destruction of the worlds, Rudra is made up of the Śāma-veda; hence the sound of this Veda is impure."

Vāyu Purāṇa.—Other passages also may be found in works which are far from being reputed as heretical, in which the Vedas, or particular parts of them, are not spoken of with the same degree of respect as they are by Manu. Thus the Vāyu Purāṇa gives precedence to the Purāṇas over the Vedas in the order of creation (i. 56.50):

Prathamaṁ sarva-śāstrānāṁ Purāṇaṁ Brahmaṇaṁ smṛitam | anantaraṁ cha vaktrehyo vedas tasya vinissritah |

"First of all the Sastras, the Purāṇa was uttered by Brahmā. Subsequently the Vedas issued from his mouths."

Similarly the Padma Purāṇa says:

Purāṇam sarva-śāstrānāṁ prathamam Brahmaṇaṁ smṛitam | tri-varga-sādhanam puṇyaṁ śata-koṭi-pravistaram | nirdagdheshu cha lokeshu vājirūpeṇa Keśavaḥ | Brahmaṇas tu samādesūd vedān ahritavān asau | angāṇi chaturu vedān purāṇa-nyāya-vistarā[?n?] māṁsā[?n?] dharma-śāstrāṁ cha parigrihyātha śaṃpratam | matsya-rūpeṇa cha punaḥ kalpādōv udakāntare | aśeṣaham etat kathitam ityādi | 31

"The Purāṇa, which is an instrument for effecting the three objects

31 See the same Catalogue p. 12, col. i.
of life, which is pure, and extends to the length of a hundred crores of verses, was the first of all the Sāstras which Brahmā uttered. When the worlds had been burnt up, Keśava (Krishṇa), in the form of a horse, and obeying Brahmā's command, rescued the Vedas. Having taken them with their appendages, the Purāṇas, the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā, and the Institutes of Law, he now at the beginning of the Kalpa promulgated them all again in the form of a Fish from the midst of the waters."

In the Matsya Purāṇa, iii. 2 ff., not only is priority of creation claimed for the Purāṇas, but also the qualities of eternity and identity with sound, which are generally predicated of the Vedas alone:

Rūpaṁ dādāraṁ śrutiṁ vedāṁ sāṅgopāna-pada-krāmaḥ | 3. Purāṇaṁ sarva-sāstrāṇaṁ pratha-

mam Brahmanā emritam | nityam śabdamayam punyam śata-koti-pra-

vistaram | 4. Anantaṁ cha vaktrebhyo vedāṁ tasya vinispritaḥ | mī-

māṁsā nyāya-vidyā cha pramāṇāśṭaka-saṁyutā | 5. Vedābhyaśa-rata-

syāya praḻā-kāmasya mānasāḥ | manasā pūrva-srishtāḥ vai jātāḥ ye 

tena mānasāḥ |

2. "Pitāmaha (Brahmā), first of all the immortals, took shape: then the Vedas with their Angas and Upāngas (appendages and minor appendages), and the various modes of their textual arrangement, were manifested. 3. The Purāṇa, eternal, formed of sound, pure, extending to the length of a hundred crores of verses, was the first of the Sāstras which Brahmā uttered: and afterwards the Vedas, issued from his mouth; and also the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya with its eightfold system of proofs. 5. From him (Brahmā), who was devoted to the study of the Vedas, and desirous of offspring, sprang mind-born sons, so called because they were at first created by his mind."

The Vāyu Purāṇa says further on in the same section from which I have already quoted:

Yo vidyāch chaturō vedāṁ sāṅgopanishado dvijāḥ | na cēt purāṇaṁ samvidyād naiva sa syād vichakṣhitāḥ | Itihāsa-purāṇābhyaṁ vedām sanmasyāṁ dhiḥ | vibhṛty alpa-śrutad vedo māṁ ayaṁ prahariśyaḥ |

32 This quotation is made from the Taylor MS. No. 1918 of the India Office Library. The Guikowar MS. No. 3032 of the same collection, reads here tāpas cha-

chātra, "practised austerity," instead of rūpaṁ dādāraṁ, "took shape," and has besides a number of other various readings in these few lines.

33 See p. 50 of Dr. Aufrecht's Catalogue.
"He who knows the four Vedas, with their supplements and Upanishads is not really learned, unless he know also the Purânas. Let a man, therefore, complete the Vedas by adding the Itihâsas and Purânas. The Veda is afraid of a man of little learning, lest he should treat it injuriously."

The first of these verses is repeated in the Mahâbhârata, Adiparvan verse 645, with a variation in the first half of the second line na châ-khyânam idam vidyât, "unless he know also this narrative" (i.e. the Mahâbhârata). The second of the verses of the Vâyu Purâna also is to be found in the same book of the Mahâbhârata verse 260, and is followed by these lines:

261. Karshyam vedam imam vidvam sravayitva’nam aśnute ||
264. Ekataḥ chaturō vedaṁ Bhûrataṁ chaitad ekataḥ | purā kīra swaś sarvaḥ sametā tuśaḥ dhritām | chaturbhyaḥ sa-rahasye bhyo vede bhyo hy adhikāṁ yadā | tadā-prabhriti lokē smin mahâbhûratam uchyate ||

"The man who knows this Veda relating to Kṛṣṇa (the Mahâbhârata), and repeats it to others, obtains food. . . . 264. All the collected gods formerly weighed in a balance the four Vedas which they placed in the one scale, and this Bhûrata which they put into the other. When the latter was found to exceed (in weight) the four Vedas with the Upanishads, it was thenceforward called in this world the Mahâbhûrata."

Here there is a play upon the word Bhûrata, as in part identical with bhûra, "weight."

The following verses of the same Adiparvan and many others are also eulogistic of the great epic poem:

2298. Idam hi vedaṁ sammitam pavitraṁ api chottamam | śravāṇam uttamaṁ chedam purāṇam rishi-sanśrutam |

"This (Mahâbhûrata) is on an equality with the Veda, pure, most excellent, the best of all works that are to be recited, ancient, and praised by rishis."

2314. Vijnayaḥ sa cha vedānāṁ pārago Bhûratam pāthan |

The reader of the Bhûrata is to be regarded as having gone through the Vedas."

The benefits derivable from a perusal of the same poem are also set forth in the Svargārohaṇika-parvan, verses 200 ff.

In the same way the Râma-yâna, i. 1, 94, speaks of itself, as "this
pure and holy narrative, which is on an equality with the Vedas.” (idam pavitraṃ ākhyānam punyaṁ vedaṁ cha sammitam).

And in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, ii. 8, 28, it is said: Prāha bhāgavataṁ nāma purāṇam brahma-sammitam | Brahmane Bhagavat-proktam Brahmane kalpe upāgato |

“(Brahmarāta) declared the Purāṇa called the Bhāgavata, which stands on an equality with the Veda (brahma), and was declared by Bhāgavat to Brahman when the Brahman-kalpa had arrived.”

Brahma-vaivartta Purāṇa.—The Brahma-vaivartta Purāṇa asserts in a most audacious manner its own superiority to the Veda (i. 48 ff.):

Bhavagan yat tvayā prīśthaṁ jnātaṁ saraṃ abhīpeitam | sāra-bhūtam purāneshu Brahman-vaivarttam uttamam | Purāṇopapurānām vedānāṁ bhrama-bhājanaṁ |

“That about which, venerable sage, you have inquired, and which you desire, is all known to me, the essence of the Purāṇas, the pre-eminent Brahman-vaivartta, which refutes the errors of the Purāṇas and Upapurāṇas, and of the Vedas.” (Professor Aufrecht’s Cat. p. 21.)

In the following passage also, from the commencement of the Munḍaka Upanishad, the Vedic hymns (though a divine origin would no doubt be allowed to them) are, at all events, depreciated, by being classed among other works as part of the inferior science, in contrast to the Brahman-vidyā or knowledge of Brahman, the highest of all knowledge, which is expressly ascribed to Brahmā as its author:


In fact the following verses (4 and 6) occur in the second chapter of the same Mund. Up.: Agnir murdāha chaḥkṣuḥ chaḥ chandra-sūryaṁ dīshaḥ ērotre vāg viśrītāḥ cha vedāḥ | vāyuh prāgo hridayaṁ viśvam asya padbhūyām prithivē hy eho sara-bhūtanitarūtām | . . . . 6. Tasmād ṛicah sāma yajñūṣhī dikṣaḥ yajñīṣe cha sarve kratave daksīnē cha | saṃveṣāraṁ cha yajamānas ca lokāḥ sone yatra pavo yatra sūryaḥ | “Agni is his [Brahma’s] head, the sun and moon are his eyes, the four points of the compass are his ears, the uttered Vedas are his voice, the wind is his breath, the universe is his heart, the earth issued from his feet: he is the inner soul of all creatures.” . . . . 6. From him came the Rich verses, the Sūman verses, the Yajush verses, initiatory rites, all oblations, sacrifices, and gifts, the year, the sacrificer, and the worlds where the “moon and sun purify.”
vi dhivad upapannah prapachchha | kasm in nu bhagavo vijnate sarvam idam
vijnatam bhavatiti |

4. Tasmai sa hovacha | devi vidyevi veditave iti ha sma
yad brahma-vido va daanti parah chaitvaparama cha |
5. Tatrparah "rigvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedaḥ 'tāravavedaḥ śikṣhā kalpo vyākaraṇāṁ niruktaṁ
chhando jyotisham" iti | atha parah yaya tad aksharam adhigamyate |

"Brahmā was produced the first among the gods, maker of the
universe, preserver of the world. He revealed to his eldest son
Ārtharvā; the science of Brahma, the basis of all knowledge. 2. Ārtarvān
of old declared to Angis this science, which Brahmā had unfolded to
him; and Angis, in turn, explained it to Satyavāha, descendant of
Bharadvāja, who delivered this traditional lore, 'in succession, to
Angiras. 3. Mahāśāla Saunaka, approaching Angiras with the proper
formalities, inquired, 'What is that, o venerable sage, through the
knowledge of which all this [universe] becomes known?'
4. [Angiras]
answered, 'Two sciences are to be known—this is what the sages versed
in sacred knowledge declare—the superior and the inferior. 5. The
inferior [consists of] the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the
Ārtharvā-veda, accentuation, ritual, grammar, commentary, prosody, and
astronomy. The superior science is that by which the imperishable is
apprehended."

I adduce some further passages, which deprecate the ceremonial, or
exoteric parts of the Vedas, in comparison with the esoteric knowledge
of Brahma.

My attention was drawn to the following passage of the Bhāgavat
Gītā, ii. 42 ff., by its quotation in the Rev. Professor K. M. Banerjea's
Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy:

Yām imāṁ pushpitāṁ vācum pravadanty avipaśchitaḥ | vedā-vāda-rataḥ
pārthā nānyād astiti vādinaḥ | kāmātmānaḥ svarga-parāḥ janma-karma-
phala-pradām | kriyā-visēsha-bahulām bhogaisvarya-gatim prati | bhogais-
varya-pravaktānām tayā 'pahrita -chetasām | vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ
śamādhou na vi dhīyate | traigunya-vishayāḥ vedāḥ nistaigunya bhavār-

35 Compare the Mahābhārata, Ādi, verse 258, which speaks of the Āranyakas as
superior to (the other parts of) the Vedas, and amrita as the best of medicines (ārany-
akaṁ cha vedabhyas chaunādāhībhya 'mrītaṁ yathā). Similarly the S'atapatha Brāhma-
ṇa, x. 3, 5, 12 (quoted in Müller's Anc. Sans. Lit. p. 315, note), speaks of the
Upanishads as being the essence of the Yajush: Tasya vai etasya yajus rotate ova
upanishat |
juna | . . . yāvān arthaḥ udapāne sarvataḥ samplutodake | tāvān sar-
vesehu vedeshu brāhmaṇasya vijānataḥ |

“A flowery doctrine, promising the reward of works performed in this embodied state, prescribing numerous ceremonies, with a view to future gratification and glory, is preached by unlearned men, devoted to the injunctions of the Veda, asserters of its exclusive importance, lovers of enjoyment, and seekers after paradise. The restless minds of the men who, through this flowery doctrine, have become bereft of wisdom, and are ardent in the pursuit of future gratification and glory, are not applied to contemplation. The Vedas have for their objects the three qualities (sattva, rajas, tamas, or 'goodness,' ‘passion,' and ‘dark-
ness'); but be thou, Arjuna, free from these three qualities . . . As great as is the use of a well which is surrounded on every side by overflowing waters, so great [and no greater] is the use of the Vedas to a Brāhmaṇ endowed with true knowledge.”

Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii, 1, 1, p. 473 (Coblebrooke's Essays, i. 12):

“Aḍhīhi bhagavāḥ” iti ha upasasāda Sanatkumāraṁ Nāradaḥ | taṁ ha uvācha “yad vettha tena mā upasīda tatas te ārdhvaṁ vakṣhyāmi” iti | 2. Sa ha uvācha “iḥ-vedam bhagavo’dhyemi yajurvedaṁ sāmavedam ātaveṇaṁ chaturtham itihāsa- purāṇaṁ panchamaṁ vedānaṁ vedam pitṛyaṁ rūśiṁ daivāṁ niḥśiṁ vākvaṁyam ekāyanaṁ deva-vidyāṁ brahma-vidyāṁ bhūta-vidyāṁ kshatra-vidyāṁ nakshatra-vidyāṁ sarpa-deva-
janā-vidyāṁ etad bhagavo’dhyemi | 3. So’ham bhagavo mantra-viḍ evāsma, na ātma-vit | śrutāṁ hy eva me bhagavadṛśebhyas ‘tarati śokam ātma-viḍ’ iti so ’ham bhagavāḥ sochāmi tam mā bhagavān śokasya pāraṁ tārayatvā” iti | taṁ ha uvācha “yad vai kincha etad adhyagatiḥśhaḥ nāma evaitat | 4. Nāma vai rīgvedo yajurvedāḥ sāmavedāḥ ātavanesa chaturthāḥ itihāsa- purāṇaḥ panchama vedanāṁ vedāḥ pitṛyo rūśir daiva niḥśiṁ vākvaṁyam ekāyanaṁ deva-vidyā brahma-vidyā bhūta-vidyā kshatra-vidyā nakshatra-vidyā sarpa-deva-jana-vidyā nāma evaitat nāma upāsva” iti | 5. “Sa yo nāma brahma ity upāste yuvad nāmno gataṁ tatra asya yathā kāmachāro bhavati yo nāma brahma ity upāste” | “asti bhagavo nāmno bhūyāḥ” iti | “nāmno caitra bhāya ’sti” iti | “taṁ me bhagaran bhrastvā” iti | 1. “Nārada approached Sanatkumāra, saying, ‘Instruct me, venerable sage.’ He received for answer, ‘Approach me with [i.e. tell me] that which thou knowest; and I will declare to thee whatever more is to be learnt.’ 2. Nārada replied, ‘I am instructed, venerable sage, in the
Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Ātharvana, [which is] the fourth, the Ithāsas and Purāgas, [which are] the fifth Veda of the Vedas, the rites of the pitris, arithmetic, the knowledge of portents, and of great periods, the art of reasoning, ethics, the science of the gods, the knowledge of Scripture, demonology, the science of war, the knowledge of the stars, the sciences of serpents and deities; this is what I have studied. 3. I, venerable man, know only the hymns (mantras); while I am ignorant of soul. But I have heard from reverend sages like thyself that 'the man who is acquainted with soul overpasses grief.' Now I, venerable man, am afflicted; but do thou transport me over my grief.' Sanatkumāra answered, 'That which thou hast studied is nothing but name. 4. The Rig-veda is name; and so are the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Ātharvana, which is the fourth, and the Ithāsas and Purāgas, the fifth Veda of the Vedas, etc. [all the other branches of knowledge are here enumerated just as above],—all these are but name: worship name. 5. He who worships name (with the persuasion that it is) Brahma, ranges as it were at will over all which that name comprehends;—such is the prerogative of him who worships name (with the persuasion that it is) Brahma.' 'Is there anything, venerable man,' asked Nārada, 'which is more than name?' 'There is,' he replied, 'something which is more than name.' 'Tell it to me,' rejoined Nārada.' (Sankara interprets the words panchamaṁ vedāṁ vedam differently from what I have done. He separates the words vedāṁ vedam from panchamaṁ and makes them to mean "the means of knowing the Vedas," i.e. grammar. See, however, the Bhāg. Pur. i. 4, 20, below, p. 42, and iii. 12, 39, to be quoted further on.

Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, xiv. 7, 1, 22 (= Brīhadāraṇyaka Upanishad, iv. 3, 22, p. 792 ff., p. 228–9 of Dr. Röer’s English): Atra pitā apiśa bhavati mātā amūtā lokāḥ alokāḥ devāḥ adevāḥ vedāḥ adevāḥ yajñāḥ aya- jnāḥ | atra stena ’steno bhavati bhrūṇa-hā abhrūṇa-hā paulkasa’ paulkasaś chāndālo ’chāndālo śramaṇo ’śramaṇas tápaso ’tápaso nanvāgam punyena nanvāgam pāpena27 tīrṇo hi taddā sārvān sokān hṛdayasya bhavati |

26 Vākṣayam = tarka-sāstram — Sāyana. The word is elsewhere explained as meaning "dialogues" (uktī-pratyukti-rūpam prakaram—Comm. on S’ P. Br. xi. 5, 6, 8). The sense of some of the terms in this list of sciences is obscure; but exactness is not of any great importance to the general drift of the passage.

27 I give here the reading of the Br. Ār. Up. The S’ P. Br. in Professor Weber's
“In that condition of profound slumber, sushupti, a father is no father, a mother is no mother, the worlds are no worlds, the gods are no gods, and the Vedas are no Vedas, sacrifices are no sacrifices. In that condition a thief is no thief, a murderer of embryos is no murderer of embryos, a Paulkasa no Paulkasa, a Chândâla no Chândâla, a Sramaṇa no Sramaṇa, a devotee no devotee; the saint has then no relation, either of advantage or disadvantage, to merit or to sin; for he then crosses over all griefs of the heart.”

(I quote from the commentary on the Br. Ār. Up. Sankara’s explanation of the unusual words nanvâgata and ananvâgata: Nanvâgatam na anvâgatam ananvâgatam asambaddham ity etat punyena śāstra-vihitena karmāṇā tathā pāpena vihitākaraṇa-pratishṭhiddha-kriyā-lakṣaṇena |

“Nanvâgata=na (not) anvâgata, and ananvâgata=asambaddha, unconnected. This condition is unconnected either with merit, i.e. action enjoined by the śāstra, or with sin, i.e. action defined as the neglect of what is enjoined, or the doing of what is forbidden.”

To the same effect the great sage Nārada is made to speak in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, iv. 29, 42 ff.:


“BrahmA himself, the divine Giriṣa (Śiva), Manu, Daksana and the other Prajāpatis, Sanaka and other devotees, Marīchi, Atri, Angiras, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Bhrigu, Vasishtha—all these expounders of sacred knowledge, and masters of speech, including myself (Nārada) as text gives ananvāgataḥ punyena ananvāgataḥ pāpena. And yet the commentary alludes to the word ananvāgata being in the neuter.
OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS.

the last, though seeing, are yet, to this day, unable, by austerity, by science, by contemplation, to see Paramēśvara (the supreme God), who sees all things. Wandering in the vast field of the verbal brahma (the Veda), which is difficult to traverse, men do not recognise the Supreme, while they worship him as he is circumscribed by the attributes specified in the hymns (mantras). When the Divine Being regards any man with favour, that man, sunk in the contemplation of soul, abandons all thoughts which are set upon the world and the Veda. Cease, therefore, Varhishmat, through ignorance, to look upon works which merely seem to promote the chief good, as if they truly effected that object, (works) which only touch the ear, but do not touch the reality. The misty-minded men, who, ignorant of the Veda, declare that works are its object, do not know [his] own world, where the divine Jahnādana abides. Thou who, obstinate man that thou art, strewest the whole earth with sacrificial grass, with its ends turned to the cast, and art proud of thy numerous immolations,—thou knowest not what is the highest work of all. That by which Hari (Vishṇu) is pleased, is work; that by which the thoughts are fixed on him, is science."

I copy the comment on a part of this passage, viz. on verses 45 and 46:

"S'abda-brahmāṇi vede urur vistāro yasya arthatop 'pi pāraśūye tasmin vartāmānāḥ mantrāṇāṁ lingair vajra-hastattādī-guṇa-yukta-vicidha-devatā-'bhūdhāna-sāmarthyaśiḥ parichchhinnam eva Indrādi-rūpam tat-tat-karmāgraheṇa bhajantaḥ param Paramēśvaraṁ na viduḥ | Tārhy anyaḥ ko nāma. | karmāḍy-āgraḥaṁ hitvā paramēśvaraṁ eva bhajed ity ata aha "yadā yam anugrihyāti" | anugrahe hetuḥ | atmāni bhāvitaḥ san sa tada loke loka-vyavahāre vede cha karma-mārge parinishṭhitam matiṁ tyajati |"

"Men, conversant with the verbal brahma, the Veda, of which the extent is vast, and which, in fact, is boundless, worshipping Paramēśvara [the supreme God] under the form of Indra, etc., circumscribed by the marks specified in the hymns, i.e. limited to various particular energies denominated deities, who are characterised by such attributes as 'wielder of the thunderbolt,' etc.; worshipping Him, I say, thus, with an addiction to particular rites, men do not know the supreme God. What other [god], then, [is there]? He therefore, in the words, 'When he regards any one with favour,' etc., says, let a man, abandoning all addiction to works, etc., worship the supreme God alone. The reason for this favour [is supplied in the following words]:"
"Sunk in the contemplation of soul, he then relinquishes his regard directed to the business of the world and to the Veda, i.e. to the method of works."

The following passage from the Kaṭha Upanishad (ii. 23) is of a somewhat similar tendency (p. 107 of Roër's ed. and p. 106 of Eng. trans.):

Nāyam ātmā pravachanena labhyo na medhayā na bahunā śrutena |
yam evaisha vrinline tena labhyas tasyaisha ātmā vrinline tanām svām |

"This Soul is not to be attained by instruction, nor by understanding, nor by much scripture. He is attainable by him whom he chooses. The Soul chooses that man's body as his own abode."

The scholiast interprets thus the first part of this text:

Yadyapi durvijñeyo 'yam ātmā tathāpy upāyena suvijñeyo iva ity āha nāyam ātmā pravachanena aneka-veda-svākaranena labhyo jneyo nāpi medhayā granthardha-dhāranā-baktya na bahunā śrutena kevalena | kena tarhi labhyāḥ ity uchyate |

"Although this soul is difficult to know, still it may easily be known by the use of proper means. This is what [the author] proceeds to say. This soul is not to be attained, known, by instruction, by the acknowledgement of many Veda... nor by understanding, by the power of re-collecting the contents of books; nor by much scripture alone. By what, then, is it to be attained? 'This he declares."

It is not necessary to follow the scholiast into the Vedantic explanation of the rest of the passage.58

The preceding passages, emanating from two different classes of writers, both distinguished by the spirituality of their aspirations, manifest a depreciation, more or less distinct and emphatic, of the polytheism of the Vedic hymns, as obstructive rather than promotive, of divine knowledge, and express disregard, if not contempt, of the ceremonies founded on that polytheism, and performed with a view to the enjoyments of paradise.

SECT. V.—Division of the Vedas, according to the Vishnu, Vāyu, and Bhāgavata Purāṇas, and the Mahābhārata.

Some of the Purāṇas, as we have seen above, represent the four Vedas as having issued from Brahmā's different mouths. If they had

each a separate origin of this kind, it would seem that they must have had from the time of their production a distinct existence also. And yet it is elsewhere said that there was originally but one Veda, which was subsequently divided into four portions.

Thus the Vishnu Purana gives the following account of the division of the Veda, described as having been originally but one, into four parts, iii. 2, 18:

*Krite yuge parām ājñānam Kapiládi-svarūpā-dhriik | dādāti sarva-bhū-
tānām sarva-bhūta-hite rataḥ | chakravarti-svarūpāṇa tretāyam api sa
prabhuḥ | Dushṭānām migrahām kurvan paripāti jagattrayam | Vedam
ekaṁ chatur-bhedam kriyā śākhā-satair vibhūḥ | karoti bahulum bhūyo
Vedavyāsa-svarūpā-dhriik | vedānś tu dvāpāre vyasya, etc.

"In the Krita age, Vishnu, devoted to the welfare of all creatures, assumes the form of Kapila and others to confer upon them the highest knowledge. In the Treta age the Supreme Lord, in the form of a universal potentate, represses the violence of the wicked, and protects the three worlds. Assuming the form of Vedavyasa, the all-pervading Being repeatedly divides the single Veda into four parts, and multiplies it by distributing it into hundreds of sakhās. Having thus divided the Vedas in the Dvapara age," etc.\(^{29}\)

This is repeated more at length in the following section (Vish. Pur. iii. 3, 4 ff.):

Veda-drumasya Maitreya śākhā-bhedaiḥ sahasraśaḥ | na śakyā viśāra
vaktum sanskepya śrīnushva tam | Dvāpore dvāpore Vishnu Vyāsa-
rūpam maḥāmune | Vedaim ekam sa bahudhā kurute jagato hitaḥ | viryam
tejo balaṁ chālpam manushyānām avakṣya vai | hitāya sarva-bhūtānām
veda-bhedān karoti saḥ | yaya sa kurute tane vedaṁ ekaiṁ prithak prā-
bhuh | Vedavyāsābhidhānā tu sā mūrttir Madhuvindvishāḥ | . . . .

\(^{29}\) Compare on this subject portions of the passage of the Mahābhārata quoted in the First Volume of this work, pp. 144–146.
decreased. Vedavyāsa, in whose person he performs this division, is an impersonation of the enemy of Madhu (Vishṇu). . . . Eight-and-twenty times in the Dvāpara ages of this Vaivasvata Manvantara have the Vedas been divided by great sages.” These sages are then enumerated, and Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana is the twenty-eighth.

The subject is resumed at the beginning of the next section (Vish. Pur. iii. 4, 1 ff.):

durvaśāyam śiṣyām sa itihāsa-purāṇavoḥ
durvaśāyam śiṣyām sa itihāsa-purāṇavoḥ

“The original Veda, consisting of four quarters, contained a hundred thousand verses. From it arose the entire system of sacrifice, tenfold (compared with the present) and yielding all the objects of desire. Subsequently, in the twenty-eighth manvantara my son, [Parāśara is the speaker] the mighty Vyāsa, divided into four parts the Veda which was one, with four quarters. In the same way as the Vedas were divided
by the wise Vyāsa, so had they been divided by all the preceding Vyāsas, including myself. And know that the śākhā divisions [formed] by him [were the same as those] formed in all the periods of four yugas. Learn, too, that Krishṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa was the lord Nārāyaṇa; for who else on earth could have composed the Mahābhārata? Hear now correctly how the Vedas were divided by him, my great son, in this Dvāpara age. When, commanded by Brahmā, Vyāsa undertook to divide the Vedas, he took four disciples who had read through those books. The great muni took Paila as teacher of the Rich, Vaisampāyana of the Yajush, and Jaimini of the Sāman, while Sumantu, skilled in the Atharva-veda, was also his disciple. He took, too, as his pupil for the Itihāsas and Purāṇas the great and intelligent muni, Sūta, called Romaharshaṇa."

Vāyu Purāṇa.—In the same way, and partly in the same words, the Vāyu Purāṇa (section IX.) represents the Vedas to have been divided in the Dvāpara age. It first describes how this was done by Manu in the Svāyambhuva, or first manvantara, and then recounts how Vyāsa performed the same task in the existing seventh, or Vaivasvata manvantara; and, no doubt, also in the Dvāpara age, though this is not expressly stated in regard to Vyāsa.

The following is an extract from this passage (as given in Dr. Aufrecht's Catalogue of the Bodleian Sanskrit MSS. p. 54):

Dvāpara tu purāvritte Manoḥ svāyambhuve 'ntare | Brahmaca Manum uvāchadaṃ vedaṃ vyasya mahāmata | Purvavrittaḥ yogam tattva svalpa-viryāḥ dijayatāḥ | saṁvrittaḥ yuga-doshena sarvaḥ chaiva yathākramam | bhrasṭa-mānaṃ yuga-vaśād alpa-sīṣṭam hi driśyate | Daśa-sāhasra-bhāgena hy avaśīṣṭam kṛitād idam | vyayaḥ tejo balam chālam sarvaḥ chaiva prayaśyati | veda vedaḥ hi kāryāhaḥ nyur mā bhūd veda-vināśanāḥ | veda nāsam anu-prāpte yajno nāsam gamishyati | yajno nāsam deva-nāsas

42 Mahādhara on the Vājasaneyi Sanhitā (Weber's ed. p. 1) says, in regard to the division of the Vedas: Tatrādu Brahmaca-paramparayā prapatā Vedaṃ Veda-vyāsa manda-matī manavahyān vihiṃtya tat kṛitayā cha tarvāha vyasya Rig-yajūh-sūrī-tharēkhyāṁ cha tetro vedan Paila-Vaisampāyana-Jaimini-Sumantuḥhyāḥ kramād upadideśa te cha eva-sūkebhyāḥ | Eevam paramparayā sahasra-sūkho Veda jātāḥ | "Vedavyāsa, having regard to men of dull understanding, in kindness to them, divided into four parts the Veda which had been originally handed down by tradition from Brahmā, and taught the four Vedas, called Rich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvan, in order, to Paila, Vaisampāyana, Jaimini, and Sumantu; and they again to their disciples. In this way, by tradition, the Veda of a thousand sūkhas was produced."
tataḥ sarvam prañāyati | Ādyo vedaḥ chatus̄h-pādo ṣata-saḥasra-saṃni-
taḥ | Punar dāsa-guṇaḥ kṛitsno yajno vai sarva-kāma-dhuk | Evam uktas
tathety ukṛtvā Manur loka-hite rataḥ | vedam ekam chatus̄h-pādaṁ chatur-
dhā syabhajat prabhuḥ | Brahmaṁ vachanāt tāta lokānāṁ hita-kāmyaṁ |
tad aham varthāmanāna yushmākānam veda-kalpanam | manvantareṇa va-
ksyāmi vyattānāṁ prakalpanam | pratyakṣena parokṣaṁ vai tad nibo-
dhata sattamāḥ | Asmin yugo kṛito Vyāsaḥ Pārśaryaḥ parantarapah |
“Dvaipāyanah” iti khyāto Vīshnora aṁśah prakṛttitaḥ | Brahmaṇaḥ chodi-
taḥ so ’śmin vedaṁ vyastum prachakrame | Atha śishyāṁ sa jagrāha cha-
turo veda-kāraṇāt | Jaiminīṁ cha Sumantuṁ cha Vaiṣampāyanan eva
cha | Pailaṁ teṣahāṁ chaturthāṁ tu pāneḥmahāṁ Lomaharṣaṇan |

“In the former Dvāpara of the Svāyambhuva manvantara, Brahmā
said to Manu, ‘Divide the Veda, o sage. The age is changed; through
its beneficent influence the Brāhmans have become feeble, and from the same
cause the measure of everything has gradually declined, so that little is
seen remaining. A part (of the Veda) consisting of only these ten thousand
(verses) is now left to us from the Kṛita age; vigour, fire, and energy
are diminished; and everything is on the road to destruction. A plurality
of Vedas must be made out of the one Veda, lest the Veda be destroyed.
The destruction of the Veda would involve the destruction of sacrifice;
that again would occasion the annihilation of the gods, and then every-
thing would go to ruin. The primeval Veda consisted of four quarters and
extended to one hu. dred thousand verses, while sacrifice was ten-
fold, and yielded every object of desire.’ Being thus addressed, Manu,
the lord, devoted to the good of the world, replied, ‘Be it so,’ and in
conformity with the command of Brahmā, divided the one Veda, which
consisted of four quarters, into four parts. I shall, therefore, narrate
to you the division of the Veda in the existing manvantara; from which
visible division you, virtuous sages, can understand those invisible
arrangements of the same kind which were made in past manvantaras.
In this Yuga, the victorious son of Parāśara, who is called Dvaipāyaṇa,
and is celebrated as a portion of Vīṣṇu, has been made the Vyāsa. In
this Yuga, he, being commanded by Brahmā, began to divide the Vedas.
For this purpose he took four pupils, Jaimini, Sumantu, Vaiṣampāyaṇa,

43 The Mahābhārata, Sāntip. verse 13,678, says the Vedas were divided in the
Svāyambhuva manvantara by Apūntaratamas, son of Sarasvati (Tena bhūnās tadā
vedā manah svāyambhuva ’ntaro).
and Paila, and, as a fifth, Lomaharshana" [for the Purānas and Iti-hāsas, etc.]

_Bhāgavata Purāṇa._—It is in its third book, where the different manvantaras are described, that the Vishnu Purāṇa gives an account of the division of the Vedas. In the book of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa where the manvantaras are enumerated, there is no corresponding allusion to the division of the Vedas; but a passage to the same effect occurs in the fourth section of the first book, verses 14 ff.:


14. "When the Dvāpara age had arrived, during the revolution of that third age, the Yogin (Vyāsa) was born, a portion of Hari, as the son of Parāśara and Vāsavya. 15. As on one occasion he was sitting solitary at sunrise, after touching the pure waters of the Sarasvatī, (16) this rishi, who knew the past and the future, perceiving, with the eye of divine intelligence, that disorder had in each yuga been introduced into the duties proper to each, through the action of time, whose march is imperceptible, (17) that the strength of beings formed of the elements had in consequence declined, that men were destitute of faith, vigour, and intelligence, that their lives were shortened, (18) and that they
were miserable,—reflected with unerring insight on the means of benefitting the several castes and orders. 19. Discerning that the pure Vedic ceremonies ought to be performed for men by the agency of four classes of priests, he divided the one Veda into four parts, with a view to the performance of sacrifice. 20. Four Vedas, called the Rich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvan, were drawn forth from it; while the Itihāsas and Purāṇas are called the fifth Veda. 21. Of these the Rich was held by Paila, the sage Jaimini chanted the Sāman, Vaiśampāyana alone was versed in the Yajush, (22) the dreadful muni Sumantu in the verses of Atharvan and Angiras, and my father Romaharshaṇa in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas. 23. Each of these rishis arranged his own Veda in many ways; and by the successive generations of their disciples the Vedas were separated into branches (śākhās). 24. The venerable Vyāsa, kind to the wretched, acted thus in order that the Vedas might be recollected by men of enfeebled understanding. 25. And as women, Śūdras, and the inferior members of the twice-born classes were unfitted for hearing the Veda, and were infatuated in desiring the blessings arising from ceremonies, the muni, with a view to their felicity, in his kindness composed the narrative called the Mahābhārata."

But notwithstanding the magnitude of the great legendary and theological repertory which he had thus compiled, Vyāsa, we are told, was dissatisfied with his own contributions to sacred science until he had produced the Bhāgavata Purāṇa consecrated to the glory of Bhagavat (Krishṇa)." The completion of this design is thus narrated, Bhāg. Pur. i. 7, 6:


"Knowing that devotion to Adhokshaja (Krishṇa) was the evident means of putting an end to the folly of the world, which was ignorant of this, he composed the Sātvata-Sanhitā (the Bhāgavata). 7. When a man listens to this work, devotion to Krishṇa, the supreme Purusha, arises in his mind, and frees him from grief, delusion, and fear. Having

"See Wilson’s Vishnu Purāṇa, Preface, p. xiv."
completed and arranged this Sanhitā, the muni taught it to his son Sūka, who was indisposed to the pursuit of secular objects."

Towards the close of this Purāṇa also, in the sixth section of the twelfth book (verses 37 ff.), there is to be found what Professor Wilson (Vish. Pur. Pref.) calls "a rather awkwardly introduced description of the arrangement of the Vedas and Purāṇas by Vyāsa."

The passage (as given in the Bombay lithographed edition) is as follows:


"Śūta speaks: 'From the aether of the supreme Brahma's heart, when he was plunged in meditation, there issued a sound, which is
perceived [by the devout] when they close their organs of sense. By adoring this sound, devotees destroy the soul’s threefold taint, extrinsic, inherent, and superhuman, and become exempt from future birth. From this sound sprang the oṁkāra, composed of three elements, self-resplendent, of imperceptible origin, that which is the emblem of the divine Brahma, the supreme spirit. He it is who hears this sound (sphoṭa), when the ears are insensible and the vision inactive,—(this sphoṭa or oṁkāra) through which speech is revealed, and which is manifested in the ether, from the Soul. This [oṁkāra] is the sensible exponent of Brahma, the self-sustained, the supreme spirit; and it is the eternal seed of the Vedas, including all the Mantras and Upanishads. In this [oṁkāra] there were, o descendant of Bṛigu, three letters, A and the rest, by which the three conditions, the [three] qualities, the [three] names, the [three] significations, the [three] states are maintained. From these [three letters] the divine and unborn being created the traditional system of the letters of the alphabet, distinguished as inner (y, r, l, e), ushmas (ś, śh, s, ṣ), vowels, long and short, and consonants. With this [alphabet] the omnipresent Being, desiring to reveal the functions of the four classes of priests, [created] from his four mouths the four Vedas with the three sacred syllables (yākhiti) and the oṁkāra. These he taught to his sons, the brahmaśriś, skilled in sacred lore; and these teachers of duty, in turn declared them to their sons. The Vedas were thus received by each succeeding generation of devout pupils from their

45 Dravya- Kıtya-kāraka, which the scholiast interprets as answering to adhīhiṣa, adhyātma, and adhīdāiva. See the explanation of these terms in Wilson’s Sāṃkhya-kārikā, pp. 2 and 9.

46 I quote the scholiast’s explanation of this obscure verse: Ko’sau paramātmā tam aha ‘sphoṭī’ iti | śivam sphoṭam avyaktam oṁkāram | namu jīvaḥ eva taṁ sphoṭu | na ity aha | suptā-śrotre kārya-pidāhādnaṁ avyātike ‘pi śrotre satt | jīvas tu karaṇādīnaitāṇaḥ tamad śrotva | tadv-paś cabhis tu tasya paramātmā-dvārīkaḥ eva iti bhāvaḥ | īśvaras tu naivyam | yataḥ śūnya-dṛk śūne ‘pi indriya-vartge dṛk jñānaṁ yasya | tathā hi suptā yadaḥ saśādi śrūtvā prabuddhyate na tadd jīvaḥ śrotva linen- śrīyateḥ | ato yas tadad saśādi śrūtvā jīvaṁ prabodhayati satyāḥ paramātmā eva tadvat | ko śāv oṁkāras taṁ visnunāti sārdhena yena vāg bhikatv evadyate yasya cha hṛdayayuṣā śāmam oṁkārd evakti abhivyaktiḥ. The word sphoṭa will be explained below, in a future section.

47 These the scholiast explains thus: Gunaḥ sattvādahāḥ | nāmāni rig-yajña-sā- nāni | arthāḥ bhūr-bhuvah-svar-lokāḥ | evitāte yājgrād-anāyāḥ |

48 If I have translated this correctly, the oṁkāra is both the source of the alphabet, and the alphabet of the oṁkāra.
predecessors, and in each of the systems of four yugas were divided by great sages at the beginning of the Dvāpara. The Brahmashis, impelled by Achyuta, who resided in their hearts, divided the Vedas, because they perceived that men had declined in age, in power, and in understanding. In this manvantara also, the divine and omnipresent Being, the author of the universe, being supplicated by Brahmā, Īśa (Śiva), and the other guardians of the world, to maintain righteousness, became partially incarnate as the son of Parāśara and Satyavatī, and divided the Veda into four parts. Selecting aggregates of Rich, Atharvan, Yajush, and Sāman verses, and arranging them in sections (vargas), he formed four sanhitās (collections) of the hymns, as gems [of the same description are gathered together in separate heaps]. Having summoned four disciples, the wise lord gave to each of them one of these sanhitās. To Paila he declared the first sanhitā, called that of the Bahvričhas; to Vaisampāyana the assemblage of Yayush verses, called Nigada; to Jaimini the Chhandoga collection of Sāman verses; and to his pupil, Sumantu, the Atharvāṅgirasī.

The Brāhmaṇa Purāṇa, however, is not consistent in the account which it gives of the division of the Vedas. In a passage already quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 158, it speaks of that division as having been the work of the monarch Purūravas, and as having taken place in the beginning of the Tretā age. From the importance of this text I will extract it here again at greater length.

The celestial nymph Urvāṣī, the Purāṇa tells us, had been doomed, in consequence of a curse, to take up her abode upon earth. She there

49 Dvåparādu can only mean the "beginning of the Dvåpara;" but the scholiast undertakes by the following process of reasoning to show that it means the end of that yuga: Dvåparādu dvåparam ādir yasya tad-antyaśa-lakṣayanasya kālaya | tasmin dvåparōnto veda- vibhōga- prasiddheḥ S'antana-sama-kāla -V'yāsavatāra-prasiddheḥ cha | vyastā vibhaktāḥ | "Dvåparādu means the period of which the dvåpara was the beginning, i.e. the time distinguished as the concluding portion of that yuga; since it is notorious that the Vedas were divided at the end of the Dvåpara, and that the incarnation of Vyāsa was contemporaneous with S'antana. Vyastāḥ = vibhaktāḥ, divided."

50 From this it appears that hitherto the account had not referred to the present manvantara. The scholiast remarks: Evaṁ sāmānyata veda-vibhōga-kramam ukti vaivasvata-manvantare viśeskato nīrūpayitum ēha | "Having thus [in the preceding verses] generally described the manner in which the Vedas are divided, [the author] now states [as follows], with the view of determining particularly [what was done] in the Vaivasvata manvantara."
fell in love with King Purūravas, the report of whose manly beauty had touched her heart, even before she had been banished from paradise. After spending many happy days in the society of her lover, she forsook him in consequence of his having infringed one of the conditions of their cohabitation, and Purūravas was in consequence rendered very miserable. He at length, however, obtained a renewal of their intercourse, and she finally recommended him to worship the Gandharvas, who would then re-unite him with her indissolubly.

The Purāṇa then proceeds (ix. 14, 43 if.):

Tasya saṁśtuunas tushṭaṁ agnisthûlaṁ dadur nripa | Urvasīṁ manyamānas tāṁ so 'budhyata charan vane | Sthāliṁ nyasya vane gatva grihan ādhyāyato nīśi | Tretāyāṁ sampravṛttāyāṁ manasi trayy avarttata | Sthāli-sthānāṁ gato 'svatthāṁ śāṁ-garbhaṁ vilakshya saḥ | Tena deve arohi kṛitvā Urvasī-loka-kāmyaṁ | Urvasīṁ mantrato dhyāyann adharaṇaṁ uttarāṁ | Ātmānam idhayor madhye yat tat prejanaṁ saṁprabhūḥ | Tasya nirmathanāyā jāto jātavedāṁ vibhāvasuḥ | Trayyā cha vidyayā rājñā putrata kalpitā trivrit | Tenāyajata yajneśāṁ bhagavantam adhokshajam | Urvasī-lokaṁ anvichhan sarva-devamayaṁ Harīm | Ekaḥ eva purā vedaḥ pranavaḥ sarva-vāṁnayaḥ | Devo nārāyaṇo nānyaḥ eko 'gnir varnayaḥ eva cha | Purāravasā evāsīt trayyī tretā-mukho nripa | Agnīṁ prejaya rājā lokam gandharvam eyivān |

"The Gandharvas, gratified by his praises, gave him a platter containing fire. This he [at first] supposed to be Urvasī, but became aware [of his mistake], as he wandered in the wood. Having placed the platter in the forest, Purūravas went home; and as he was meditating in the night, after the Tretā age had commenced, the triple Veda appeared before his mind.51 Returning to the spot where he had placed the platter, he beheld an āsvalītha tree springing out of a śamī tree, and formed from it two pieces of wood. Longing to attain the world where Urvasī dwelt, he imagined to himself, according to the sacred text, Urvasī as the lower and himself as the upper piece of wood, and the place of generation as situated between the two.52 Agni was produced from its

51 Karma-bodhakam veda-trayaṁ prāṇurabhūt | "The three Vedas, expounders of rites, were manifested to him," as the scholiast explains.
52 Allusion is here made to a part of the ceremonial for kindling a particular sacrificial fire; one of the formulas employed at which, as given in the Vāj. Sanhitā, 5, 2, is, "thou art Urvasī" (Urvasī aśi), and another, "thou art Purūravas" (Purūravāḥ
friction, and, according to the threefold science [Veda], was under his triple form, adopted by the king as his son. With this fire, seeking to attain the heaven of Urvasī, he worshipped the divine Hari, the lord of sacrifice, Adhokshaja, formed of the substance of all the gods. There was formerly but one Veda, the sacred monosyllable om, the essence of all speech; one god, Nārāyaṇa; one Agni, and [one] caste. From Purūravas came the triple Veda in the beginning of the Tretā age. Through Agni, his son, the king attained the heaven of the Gandharvas.”

On the close of this passage the commentator remarks:


“How is it that the eternal method of works, which is pointed out by the three Vedas, and through which Brāhmans and others, by worshipping Indra and many other gods, attain to paradise, is spoken of [in the preceding verses] as if it had a beginning in time? He [the author of the Purāṇa] answers this in these two verses. Formerly, i.e. in the Kṛta age, there was only one Veda, the sacred monosyllable om, the essence of all words, i.e. that which is the seed of all words; and there was only one god, Nārāyaṇa; only one fire, that for common uses; and

asi), the former denoting the lower (adharūrṇi), and the latter the upper, piece of wood (uttarūrṇi), by the friction of which the fire was to be produced. See Weber’s Indische Studien, i. 197, and note; Roth’s Illustrations of the Nirukta, p. 154; the S’atapatha Brāhmaṇa, iii. 4, 1, 22, and Kātyāyaṇa’s S’rūta Sūtras, v. 1, 28 ff. The commentator on the Vājasaneyi Sanhitā explains the formula Ur바sī asi thus: Yathā Urvasī Purūravo-nipasiya bhogīya adhastat śete tadvat team adho ‘cāsthitā ‘si’ | “As Urvasī lies under King Purūravas for sexual connection, so thou art placed underneath.”

53 This story is also told in a prose passage in the Vish. Pur. iv. 6. It is there stated that Purūravas divided fire, which was originally one, in a threefold manner (Eko ’gnir adhiv abhavaḥ Aitlena tu atira manvantare tratitī pravartitāt). No mention, however, is there made of his having divided the Vedas, or partitioned society into castes.
only one caste, the Hansa. But the triple Veda came from Purūravas. 

. . . . The meaning is this: in the Kṛita age the quality of goodness predominated in men, who were almost all absorbed in meditation. But in the Tretā age, when passion (rajas) prevailed, the method of works was manifested by the division of the Vedas.”

This last quoted passage of the Bhāgavata gives, as I have intimated, a different account of the division of the Vedas from that contained in the other two texts previously adduced from the same work, and in the citations from the Vīṣṇu and Vāyu Purāṇas. The one set of passages speak of the Veda as having been divided by Vyāsa into four parts in the Dvāpara age; while the text last cited speaks of the triple Veda as having originated with Purūravas in the Tretā age; and evidently belonged to a different tradition from the former three. The legend which speaks of three Vedas may possibly have a somewhat more ancient source than that which speaks of four, as it was not till a later date that the Atharva asserted its right to be ranked with the three others as a fourth Veda. The former tradition, however, would appear to have had its origin partly in etymological considerations. The word Tretā, though designating the second Yuga, means a triad, and seems to have been suggested to the writer’s mind by the triple fire mentioned in the legend.

Mahābhārata.—The following passage from the Mahābhārata, Sānti-parvan (verses 13,088 ff.), agrees partially in tenor with the last passage from the Bhāgavata, but is silent regarding Purūravas:

Idāṁ kṛta-yugaṁ nāma kālaḥ kreshṭhaḥ pravartitiḥ | Ahiṁsyāḥ yajna-paśavo yuga 'smin na tad anyathā | Chatushpāt sakalo dharmo bhavishyatya atra vai surāḥ | Tatas Tretā-yugaṁ nāma trayaṁ yatra bhavishyatī | Prakṣhitāḥ yajna-paśavo badhāṁ prāpsyanti vai nākho | Yatra

84 This legend is borrowed from the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 5, 1, 1 ff. (pp. 855–858 Weber’s ed.), where the motive for its introduction is to describe the process by which fire was generated by Purūravas in obedience to the command of the Gandharvas, as the means of his admission into their paradise. See Professor Müller’s translation of this story in the Oxford Essays for 1856, pp. 62, 63, or the reprint in his Chips from a German Workshop; and the First Volume of this work, p. 226. The legend is founded on the 95th hymn of the tenth book of the Rig-veda.

85 Manu (i. 85, 86) differs from this passage of the Mahābhārata in making the Dvāpara the age of sacrifice: Anye kṛita-yuge dharmāṁ Tretāyūnām Dvāpara pari | Anye kāliyuge nṛpiṁ yuga-hrūśamurīpataḥ | Tarpā pariṁ Kṛita-yuge Tretāyūnā juśnam ukyate | Dvāpara yajnau evaḥhur dānam ekāṁ hānum yuge | “Different duties are practised by men in the Kṛita age, and different duties in the Tretā, Dvāpara, and
“This present Kṛta age is the best of all the yugas; in it it will be unlawful to slay any animals for sacrifice; in this age righteousness shall consist of all its four portions and be entire. Then shall follow the Tretā age, in which the triple Veda shall come into existence, and animals fit for sacrifice shall be slaughtered as oblations. In that age the fourth part of righteousness shall be wanting. Next shall succeed the Dvāpara, a mixed period.

The M. Bh. (Sāntip. 13,475) relates that two Asuras, who beheld Brahmā creating the Vedas, suddenly snatched them up and ran off. Brahmā laments their loss, exclaiming:

Veda me paramāṁ chakshur vedo me paramam balaṁ | . . . . Vedān rite hi kīṁ kuryāṁ lokānāṁ spriśtīṁ uttamaṁ |

“The Veda is my principal eye; the Veda is my principal strength.
. . . . What shall I do without the Vedas, the most excellent creation in the universe?” They were, however, recovered and restored to Brahmā (verses 13,506 ff.).

Vishṇu Purāṇa.—The following verse, Vish. Pur. iii. 2, 12, refers to the periodical disappearance of the Vedas:

Chaturyugante vedānāṁ jāyate kali-viplavaḥ | pravarttayanti tāṁ etya bhūvi saptarśhayo divaḥ |

“At the end of the four ages (yugas) the disappearance of the Vedas, incident to the Kali, takes place. The seven rishis come from heaven to earth, and again give them currency.” (Compare M. Bh. Sāntip. verse 7660, which will be quoted further on.)

SECT. VI.—Accounts in the Vishṇu and Vāyu Purāṇas of the schisms between the adherents of the Yajur-veda, Vaiṣampāyana and Yajnaveṣṭa; hostility of the Ātharvaṇas towards the other Vedas; and of the Chhandogas towards the Rig-veda.

The Vishṇu Purāṇa, iii. 5, 2 ff., gives the following legend regarding Kali ages, in proportion to the decline in those yugas. Devotion is said to be supreme in the Kṛta, knowledge in the Tretā, sacrifice in the Dvāpara, and liberality alone in the Kali.” See also Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, verse 8505, which agrees with Manu. See also the First Volume of this work, pp. 39 ff.
the way in which the Yajur-veda came to be divided into two schools, the black and the white:

Yājnavalkyas tu tasyāḥ brahmaratā-suto dvija | Sīshyāḥ parama-dharma-jno guru-vritti-parah sadā | Rishir yo 'hya mahāmerum samāje nāgamishyati | Tasya vai saptā-rātrāṁ tu brahma-hatyā bhavishyati |
Pūrvam eva muni-gaṇaiḥ samayo 'bhūt krito dvija | Vaiśampāyana ekas tu taṁ vyatikrāntavāṁs tadā | Svaśriyam bālakaṁ so 'tha padā sprish- 

tam aghātayat | Sīshyāṁ āha sa "bhoḥ sīshyāḥ brahma-hatya-paḥam vrat 
tam | Čaraḍhvaṁ mat-krito sāve na vichāryyam idam tathā" | Athāha Yājnavalkyas taṁ "kim ebhīr bhagavan dvijaḥ | Kesitair alpatejobhir cha-

rishye 'ham idam vratam" | Tatāḥ kruddho guruḥ prāha Yājnavalkyam 

mahāmatiḥ | "Mucyataṁ yat tvayā 'dhītaṁ matto vipra-vamanyaka | Nis-

jasya vadosy etān yas tvam brāhmaṇa-pungavān | Tenā sīshyena nārtha 'sti mamāja-bhangā-kārīṇa" | Yājnavalkyas tataḥ prāha bhaktatva tat te mayo-
ditam | Mamāyai alaṁ tvaya 'dhītaiṁ yad mayā tad idam dvija | Ity ukvā 
rudhirāktaṁ sarupāṁ yajāṁśi saḥ | Chhadāyitvā daduasm tasmai yayau 

eva svehaya muniḥ | yajāṁśhy atha visṛṣṭāni Yājnavalkyena vā dvija | 

Jagrīhus tattirīḍhuvā tattirīyāṣa tu te tataḥ | Brahma-hatyā-vratam 

chīrṇam guruṇā choditaś tu yaiḥ | Charakādvaryavas te tu charaṇaḍ 
nuṣṭattamah | Yājnavalkyo 'tha Maitreyā prāṇāyama-parāmyaḥ | tush-

ṭāva pravataṁ suryam yajāṁśhy abhilashāṁs tataḥ | . . . . Ity evam-

āśīkhis tena stūyanamaḥ stavaṁ raviḥ | vājī-rūpa-dharaḥ prāha "vriya-

taṁ" iti "vānchhitam" | Yājnavalkyas tadā prāha pranipatya diva-
karam | yajāṁśhi tāṁ ma dehi yāṁ santi na me gurau | Ėvam uktō da-
dau tasmai yajāṁśhi bhagavan raviḥ | ayīc 'ayāma-sanjnāni yāṁ vetti na 

tad-guruḥ | Yajāṁśhi yair adhīlāni tāṁ vipra-vāj jottama | vājinas te 

samākhyaṭaṁ suryo 'tvaḥ so bhavad yataḥ |

"Yājnavalkya, son of Brahmārāta, was his [Vaiśampāyana’s] dis-
ciple, eminently versed in duty, and always attentive to his teacher. An 
agreement had formerly been made by the Munis that any one of their 
number who should fail to attend at an assembly on Mount Meru on 
a certain day should incur the guilt of Brahma-nicidice during a period 
of seven nights. Vaiśampāyana was the only person who infringed 
this agreement, and he in consequence occasioned the death of his 
sister’s child by touching it with his foot. He then desired all his 
disciples to perform on his behalf an expiation which should take away 
his guilt, and forbade any hesitation. Yājnavalkya then said to him,
'Reverend sir, what is the necessity for these faint and feeble Brahmins? I will perform the expiation.' The wise teacher, incensed, replied to Yājnavalkya, 'Contemner of Brāhmans, give up all that thou hast learnt from me; I have no need of a disobedient disciple, who, like thee, stigmatizes these eminent Brāhmans as feeble.' Yājnavalkya rejoined, 'It was from devotion [to thee] that I said what I did; but I, too, have done with thee: here is all that I have learnt from thee.' Having spoken, he vomited forth the identical Yajush texts tainted with blood, and giving them to his master, he departed at his will.

[The other pupils] having then become transformed into partridges (tīṭtiri), picked up the Yajush texts, which were given up by Yājnavalkya, and were thence called Taṅtirīyas. And those who by their teacher's command had performed the expiation for Brahmanicide, were from this performance (chārāga) called Charakādhyāyas. Yājnavalkya then, who was habituated to the exercise of suppressing his breath, devoutly hymned the sun, desiring to obtain Yajush texts . . . [I pass over the hymn.] Thus celebrated with these and other praises, the sun assumed the form of a horse, and said, 'Ask whatever boon thou desirest.' Yājnavalkya then, bowing down before the lord of day, replied, 'Give me such Yajush texts as my teacher does not possess.' Thus supplicated, the sun gave him the Yajush texts called Ayātayāma, which were not known to his master. Those by whom these texts were studied were called Vājins, because the sun (when he gave them) assumed the shape of a horse (vājin).

I quote also the parallel text from the Vāyu Purāṇa, as it exhibits some slight variations from the preceding (Aufr. Cat. p. 55):

Kāryam āśīd rishināṁ cha kinchid brāhmaṇa-sattamāḥ | Meru-prishthaṁ samāsūdyā tais tadā "śtv" iti mantritam | Yo no 'tra saptārūtrena nāgachched divja-sattamaḥ | sa kuryād brahma-badhyāṁ vai samayo naḥ prakīrtitvāḥ | Tatas te sa-gaṇāḥ sarve Vaisampāyana-varjiṇī-tāḥ | Prayayuḥ saptārūtreṇa yatra sandhiḥ krito 'bhavit | Brāhmaṇānāṁ tu vachanād brahma-badhyāṁ chakara saḥ | Sishyāṁ atha samucaṁ sa Vaisampāyano 'bravīt | "Brahma-badhyāṁ charadhaṁ vai mat-krite divjaḥ-sattamaḥ | sarve yayaṁ samāgamya brūta me tad-hitāṁ vachāḥ " | Yājnavalkyaṁ uvācha | Aham eva charishyāmi tiskhāntu munayas tv ime | bālam chothūpayishyāmi tapaśa svena bhāvītaḥ | Ecam uktaḥ tataḥ kruḍdho Yājnavalkyaṁ athābravīt | uvācha "yat tvaya 'dhiṭāṁ sarvam prayā-
arpayasa me” | Evam uktaḥ saruṇaṁ yaśuṣhī pradadau guruh | ru-
dhīreṇa tathā ’ktani chhanditaṁ brahma-vittamaḥ | Tataḥ sa dhīyanam
āsthāya sūryam ārādhyad ivaiva | “sūrya brahma yad uchchhinnaṁ
khaṁ gavā pratitishthati” | Tato yāni gatānir uṛddhaṁ yaśuṣhī
dhīya-maṇḍalam | Tāni tasmai dadau tuṣṭaṁ sūrya vai Brahmaraṭaya |
Aśva-rūpaṁ cha mārttaṇdo Yājnavalkyāya dhamate | Yājnuṣhī adhayaṁte
yāni brāhmaṁaḥ yena kechichit (yani kānicchit?) | aśva-rūpaṁ (-rūpena?)
datāni tatas te Vajino ’dhavan ⁵⁶ | brahma-hatyā tu yaś chīrṇa charanāt
charakāḥ smṛīlaḥ | Vaisampāyana-sīshyās te charakāṁ samudāhritāṁ |

“The rishis having a certain occasion, met on the summit of Mount
Meru, when, after consultation, they resolved and agreed together that
any one of their number who should fail to attend there for seven
nights should become involved in the guilt of brahmanicide. They all’in
consequence resorted to the appointed place for seven nights along with
their attendants. Vaisampāyana alone was absent, and he, according to
the word of the Brāhmans, committed brahmanicide. He then as-
sembled his disciples, and desired them to perform, on his behalf, an
expiation for his offence, and to meet and tell him what was salutary
for the purpose. Yājnavalkya then said, ‘I myself will perform the
penance; let all these munis refrain: inspired by my own austere-
fervour I shall raise up the boy (whom thou hast slain).’ Incensed at
this speech of Yājnavalkya [Vaisampāyana] said to him, ‘Restore all
that thou hast learned (from me).’ Thus addressed, the sage, deeply
versed in sacred lore, vomited forth the identical Yajush texts stained
with blood, and delivered them to his teacher. Plunged in meditation,
the Brāhman (Yājnavalkya) then adored the sun, saying, ‘Sun, every
sacred text which disappears [from the earth] goes to the sky, and
there abides.’ The sun, gratified, and [appearing] in the form of a
horse, bestowed on Yājnavalkya, son of Brahmarāta, all the Yajush
texts which had ascended to the solar region. As all the Yajush texts
which these Brāhmans study were given by him in the form of a horse,
they in consequence became Vājin. And the disciples of Vaisampā-
aya, by whom the expiatory rite was accomplished, were called
Charakas, from its accomplishment (charaṇa).” ⁵⁷

⁵⁶ I am indebted to Dr. Half for communicating to me the various readings of this
verse in the India Office Library MSS., but some parts of it seem to be corrupt.
⁵⁷ In a note to p. 461 (4to. ed.) of his Translation of the Vishnū Purāṇa, Prof. Wilson
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It is sufficiently evident from the preceding legend that the adherents of the two different divisions of the Yajurveda (the Taittirīya or black, and the Vājasaneyi or white), must in ancient times have regarded each other with feelings of the greatest hostility—feelings akin to those with which the followers of the rival deities, Vishnu and Siva, look upon each other in modern days. On this subject I translate a passage from Professor Weber’s History of Indian Literature, p. 84:

"Whilst the theologicans of the Rich are called Bahvrichas, and those of the Śāman Chhandogas, the old name for the divines of the Yajush is Adhvaryu: and these ancient appellations are to be found in the Sanhistā of the Black Yajush (the Taittirīya), and in the Brāhmaṇa of the White Yajush (the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa). The latter work applies the term Adhvaryus to its own adherents, whilst their opponents are denominated Charakādhvaryus, and are the objects of censure. This hostility is also exhibited in a passage of the Sanhistā of the White Yajush, where the Charakāchārya, as one of the human sacrifices to be offered at the Purushamedha, is devoted to Dushkrīta or Sin." 58

In his Indische Studien (iii. 454) Professor Weber specifies the following passages in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa as those in which the Charakas, or Charakādhvaryus are censured, viz. iii. 8, 2, 24; iv. 1, 2, 19; iv. 2, 3, 15; iv. 2. 4, 1; vi. 2, 2, 1, 10; viii. 1, 3, 7; viii. 7, 1, 14, 24. Of these I quote one specimen (iv. 1, 2, 19):

mentions the following legend illustrative of the effects of this schism. "The Vāyu and Matsya relate, rather obscurely, a dispute between Janamejaya and Vaiśampāyana, in consequence of the former’s patronage of the Brāhmans of the Vaiṣānayi branch of the Yajur-veda, in opposition to the latter, who was the author of the Black or original Yajush. Janamejaya twice performed the Aśvamedha according to the Vaiṣānayi ritual, and established the Trisarvi, or use of certain texts by Aśmaka and others, by the Brāhmans of Anga, and by those of the middle country. He perished, however, in consequence, being cursed by Vaiśampāyana. Before their disagreement Vaiśampāyana related the Mahābhārata to Janamejaya."

58 Vaiṣānayi Sanhistā, xxx. 18 (p. 546 of Weber’s ed.): Dushkrītayā charakā- chāryayam | (charakācāryam guruva—Scholiast). Prof. Müller also says (Anc. Sūsk. Lit. p. 350), “This name Charaka is used in one of the Khilas (the passage just quoted) of the Vaiṣānayi Sanhistā as a term of reproach. In the 30th Adhyāya a list of people is given who are to be sacrificed at the Purushamedha, and among them we find the Char-kačārya as the proper victim to be offered to Dushkrīta or Sin. This passage, together with similar hostile expressions in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, were evidently dictated by a feeling of animosity against the ancient schools of the Adhvaryus, whose sacred texts we possess in the Taittirīya-veda, and from whom Yajnavalkya seceded in order to become himself the founder of the new Charanas of the Vaiṣānayins."
Tāḥ u ha Charakāḥ nānā eva mantrabhyaṁ juhvati “prāṇodānau vai asya etau | nānā-विरयau prāṇodānau kurmaḥ” iti vadantaḥ | Tad u tathā na kuryāt | mohayanti ha te yajamānasya prāṇodānau | api id vai enam tāśnīṁ juhvayāt |

“These the Charakas offer respectively with two mantras, saying thus: ‘These are his two breathings,’ and ‘we thus make these two breathings endowed with their respective powers.’ But let no one adopt this procedure, for they confound the breathings of the worshipper. Wherefore let this libation be offered in silence.”

But these sectarian jealousies were not confined to the different schools of the Yajur-veda; the adherents of the Atharva-veda seem to have evinced a similar spirit of hostility towards the followers of the other Vedas. On this subject Professor Weber remarks as follows in his Indische Studien, i. 296: “A good deal of animosity is generally displayed in most of the writings connected with the Atharvan towards the other three Vedas; but the strongest expression is given to this feeling in the first of the Atharva Pariśiśṭas (Chambers Coll. No. 112).”

He then proceeds to quote the following passage from that work:

Bahiriccho hanti vai rāśtram adhvayar nāsayet sutān | Chhandogo dhanaṁ nāsayet tasmād Ātharvanō guruḥ | Ajnānāt vā pramādād vā yasya syād bahyericchō guruḥ | deśa-rāśtra-purāmātva-nāśas tasya na saṁsayaḥ | yadi vā dhyayavaṁ rājā niyunakti purohitam | bāṣṭreṇa badhyate kshipram parikṣhāṅratha-vāhanaḥ | yathaiva pangur adhvānam apakṣē chāṇḍa-bhojanam (chāṇḍa-jo nabhaḥ?) 59 | evaṁ chhandoga-guruṇāṁ rājā vṛiddhiniṁ na gacchati | purodhī jalaḍa yasya maudo vā syāt kathan-
chana | abadād dasabhīyo māsebhīyo rāśtra-bhrāṃśaṁ sa gacchati |

“A Bahvricha (Rig-veda priest) will destroy a kingdom; an Adhvaryu (Yajur-veda priest) will destroy offspring; and a Chhandoga (Sāma-veda priest) will destroy wealth;—hence an Ātharvana priest is the [proper] spiritual adviser. (The king) who, through ignorance or mistake, takes a Bahvricha priest for his guide will, without doubt, lose his country, kingdom, cities, and ministers. Or if a king appoints an Adhvaryu priest to be his domestic chaplain, he forfeits his wealth and his chariots, and is speedily slain by the sword. As a lame man makes no progress on a road, and an egg-born creature which is without wings

59 For the ingenious conjectural emendation in brackets, I am indebted to Professor Aufrecht. I adopt it in my translation.
cannot soar into the sky, so no king prospers who has a Chhandoga for his teacher. He who has a Jalada or a Mauda for his priest, loses his kingdom after a year or ten months."

"Thus," continues Professor Weber, "the author of the Parishishta attacks the adherents of certain Sākhās of the Atharva-veda itself, for such are the Jaladas and the Mudas, and admits only a Bhārgava, a Paippalāda, or a Saunaka to be a properly qualified teacher. He further declares that the Atharva-veda is intended only for the highest order of priest, the brahman, not for the three other inferior sorts."

The following passage is then quoted:

\[ \text{Atharvā ērijate ghoram adbhutaṁ śamayet tathā} \mid \text{atharvā rakṣate} \\
\text{yajnam yajnasya patir Angirāḥ} \mid \text{Divyāntarikṣha-bhaumānāṁ utpātānāṁ} \\
\text{anekadāhā} \mid \text{śamayitā brahma-veda-jnas tasmād dakhinato Bhṛiguḥ} \\
\text{Brahmā śamayed nādhvaryur na chhondogo na bahvriḥaḥ} \mid \text{rakṣānīsī} \\
\text{rakshati brahма brahma tasmād atharva-vit} \]

"The Atharva priest creates horrors, and he also allays alarming occurrences; he protects the sacrifice, of which Angiras is the lord. He who is skilled in the Brahama-veda (the Atharva) can allay manifold portents, celestial, aërial, and terrestrial: wherefore the Bhṛiga [is to be placed] on the right hand. It is the brahman, and not the adhvaryu, the chhandoga, or the bahvricha, who can allay [portents]; the brahman wards off Rakshases, wherefore the brahman is he who knows the Atharvan."

I subjoin another extract from Professor Weber's Indische Studien, i. 63 ff., which illustrates the relation of the Sāma-veda to the Rigveda,\(^{60}\) as well as the mutual hostility of the different schools: "To understand the relation of the Sāma-veda to the Rig-veda, we have only to form to ourselves a clear and distinct idea of the manner in which these hymns in general arose, how they were then carried to a distance by those tribes which emigrated onward, and how they were by them regarded as sacred, whilst in their original home, they were either—as living in the immediate consciousness of the people—subjected to modifications corresponding to the lapse of time, or made way for new hymns by which they were pushed aside, and so became forgotten. It is a foreign country which first surrounds familiar things with a sacred charm; emigrants continue to occupy their ancient men-

\(^{60}\) See the Second Volume of this work, pp. 202 f.
tal position, preserving what is old with painful exactness, while at home life opens out for itself new paths. New emigrants follow those who had first left their home, and unite with those who are already settlers in a new country. And now the old and the new hymns and usages are fused into one mass, and are faithfully, but uncritically, learned and imbibed by travelling pupils from different masters;—several stories in the Brāhād Āraṇyaka are especially instructive on this point, see Ind. Stud. p. 83;—so that a varied intermixture arises. Others again, more learned, then strive to introduce arrangement, to bring together what is homogeneous, to separate what is distinct; and in this way theological intolerance springs up; without which the rigid formation of a text or a canon is impossible. The influence of courts on this process is not to be overlooked; as, for example, in the case of Janaka, King of Videha, who in Yaśnavalkya had found his Homer. Anything approaching to a clear insight into the reciprocal relations of the different schools will in vain be sought either from the Purāṇas or the Charaṇavyūha, and can only be attained by comparing the teachers named in the different Brāhmaṇas and Sūtras, partly with each other and partly with the text of Pāṇini and the ganapāṭha and commentary connected therewith (for the correction of which a thorough examination of Patanjali would offer the only sufficient guarantee). For the rest, the relation between the S.V. and the R.V. is in a certain degree analogous to that between the White and the Black Yajush; and, as in the Brāhmaṇa of the former (the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa), we often find those teachers who are the representatives of the latter, mentioned with contempt, it cannot surprise us, if in the Brāhmaṇa of the Śāma-veda, the Paingins and Kaushtakis are similarly treated."

It is sufficiently manifest from the preceding passages of the Purāṇas concerning the division and different Sākhās of the Vedas, that the traditions which they embody contain no information in regard to the composition of the hymns, and nothing tangible or authentic regarding the manner in which they were preserved, collected, or arranged. In fact, I have not adduced these passages for the purpose of elucidating those points, but to show the legendary character of the narratives, and their discrepancies in matters of detail. For an account of the Sākhās of the Vedas, the ancient schools of the Brāhmans, and other matters of a similar nature, I must refer to the excellent work of Professor Müller,
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SECT. VII.—Reasonings of the Commentators on the Vedas, in support of the authority of the Vedas.

I proceed now to adduce some extracts from the works of the more systematic authors who have treated of the origin and authority of the Vedas, I mean the commentators on these books themselves, and the authors and expositors of the aphorisms of several of the schools of Hindu philosophy. 61 Whatever we may think of the premises from which these writers set out, or of the conclusions at which they arrive,

61 Although the authors of the different schools of Hindu philosophy (as we shall see) expressly defend (on grounds which vary according to the principles of the several systems) the authority of the Vedas, they do not consider themselves as at all bound to assert that the different portions of those works are all of equal value: nor do they treat their sacred scriptures as the exclusive sources out of which their own theology or philosophy are to be evolved. On the relation of Indian thinkers generally to the Vedas, I quote some remarks from an article of my own in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1862, pp. 310 f.: "It is evident from some of the hymns of the Veda (see Müller's Hist. of Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 550 ff.) that theological speculation has been practised in India from a very early period. . . . As, therefore, the religious or mythological systems of India became developed, it was to be expected that they should exhibit numerous variations springing out of the particular genius of different writers; and more especially that, whenever the speculative element predominated in any author, he should give utterance to ideas on the origin of the world, and the nature and action of the Deity or deities, more or less opposed to those commonly received. In the stage here supposed, a fixed and authoritative system of belief or institutions had not yet been constructed that was only in process of construction, and therefore considerable liberty of individual thought, expression, and action would be allowed; as is, indeed, also shown by the existence of different schools of Brāhmans, not merely attached to one or other of the particular Vedas, but even restricting their allegiance to some particular recension of one of the Vedas. Even after the Brahmanical system had been more firmly established, and its details more minutely prescribed, it is clear that the same strictness was not extended to speculation, but that if a Brāhman was only an observer of the established ceremonial, and an assessor of the privileges of his own order, he might entertain and even profess almost any philosophical opinion which he pleased (Colebrooke, Misc. Ess. i. 379; Müller, Anc. Sansk. Lit. 79). In this way the tradition of free thought was preserved, and speculative principles of every character continued to be maintained and taught without hindrance or scandal. Meanwhile the authority of the Vedas had come to be generally regarded as paramount and divine, but so long as this authority was nominally acknowledged, independent thinkers were permitted to propound a variety of speculative principles, at variance with their general tenor, though perhaps not inconsistent with some isolated
we cannot fail to be struck with the contrast which their speculations exhibit to the loose and mystical ideas of the Purāṇas and Upanishads, or to admire the acuteness of their reasoning, the logical precision with which their arguments are presented, and the occasional liveliness and ingenuity of their illustrations.

I.—The first passage which I shall adduce is from Śāyaṇa’s introduction to his commentary on the Rig-veda, the Vedārthaprakāśa, pp. 3 ff. (Śāyaṇa, as we have seen in the Second Volume of this work, p. 172, lived in the 14th century, A.D.):

*Nānun Vedaḥ eva tāvad nāsti* | *kutas tad-avāntara-viśeṣaḥ riṣi vedaḥ*
*Tathā hi | ko’yaṁ vedo nāma | na hi tatra laṅkhaṇāṁ prabhāṇāṁ vā ’sti*
*nachā tad-ubhaya-vyatirekāṁ kinchid vastu prastidhyātī | Lakṣana-pra-
*māṇaḥhyāṁ hi vastu-siddhir iti nyāya-vidāṁ matam | “Pratyakṣhān-
*mūnaḥgmeshu pramāṇa-viśeṣaḥ svetaṁ Vedaḥ iti tattvānām” iti chet |
*na | Manu-ādi-smṛtiśva atieyōptēḥ | Saṃaya-balena samyak paroksha-
*nabhava-sādhanam ity etasya. āgama-laṅkhaṇāyasya tāsv aṣṭi sadbhāvāt |
*“apaṃrūṣhetyatyo satī iti viśeṣaḥvad adoshaḥ” iti chet |
*na | Vedaśāyāpi paramēvara-nirmitatvena pauruṣhetyātāt | “S’ārṣṭa-dhāri-jīva-nirmitat-
*vābhāvād apaṃrūṣhetyātvan” iti chet | [na] | “Sahasra-śrīr̥ṣa puruṣah”
*ītyādi-śrutibhir īcāsaryāpi śarīritvāt | “Karma-phala-rūpa-śātra-
*dhāri-jīva-nirmitatvābhāva-mōtreṇaapaṃrūṣhetyātvan vivaḥkṣitam” iti
dhet | [na] | Jīva-viśeṣar Āgni-Vāyo-Ādityair vedānām utpāditatvāt |
*“Rigvedaḥ eva Agner ājąyata Yajurvedo Vāyō Saṃvedaḥ Ādityaḥ” iti*
*śrutet īcāsaryā egny-ādi-prerakatvena nirmitatīyevaṃ drashtvayam |
*“mantra-brāhmaḥ śāliakaḥ śāda-rūṣir vedaḥ” iti chet | [na] | īdṛīśa*
*mantraḥ īdṛīśam brāhmaṃ ity anayor adiyāpi anīrmitatvāt | Tasmād*
nāsti kinchid vedasya laṅkaṇam | Nāpi tat-sadbhāve pramanām paśyamāḥ |
*““Rigvedaḥ bhagavo ’dhyemi Yajurvedaḥ Saṃvedaḥ Ādityaḥ*
*chaturtham’ ityādi vākyāṇaṃ pramanāṇaṁ” iti chet | [na] | tasyāpi vākyasya*
*vedantakāyitvena utmāśr̥yate-prasangāt | Na khalu nipuṇa ’pi sva-
*śarīdham āroḍhah prabhāve iti | “Vedaḥ eva dvijātmāṁ niḥśreyasa-
*karaḥ paraḥ” iti ādi smṛti-vākyāṇaṃ pramanāṇaṁ” iti chet | [na] | tasyāpy*
*ukta-śrutī-śūlayatena nirākṛitavāt | pratyakṣhādikāṁ ṣāṅkitum ayo-

portions of their contents. It was only when the authority of the sacred books was not merely tacitly set aside or undermined, but openly discarded and denied, and the institutions founded on them were abandoned and assailed by the Buddhists, that the orthodox party took the alarm.”
ḡyām | Veda-vishaya loka-prasiddhiḥ sārvajanānā ′pi "nīlāṁ nabhāḥ" ityādi-vad bhūntā | Tasmāl lakṣaṇa-pramāṇa-rahitasya vedasya sadbhāvo na aṅgikarttaṁ śakyate iti pūrva-pakṣaḥ |

Atra uchyate | mantra-brāhmaṇātmakāṁ tāvad aduṣṭaṁ lakṣaṇam | ata eva Āpāstambho yajna-parībhāṣyāṁ evaḥa "mantra-brāhmaṇayor veda-nāmaddheyam" iti | tayos tā rāpyaṁ uparīṣṭhād mānḍeshyate | apauruṣeya-vākyatvam iti idam api yādriṣam asmābhīr eva-kṣitiṁ tadārhiṁ uttaratra śpatsītbhavishyati | pramāṇāny api yathoktāṁ śrutī-smṛiti-loka-prasiddhi-rāpaṁ veda-sadbhāve draśṭavyāni | Yathā ghaṭa-patādi-drayāṇām eva-prakāśātvābhāve ′pi sūrya-chandraśālāṁ eva-prakāśātvam avirudham tathā mahuhādiṁ sva-sandhārāhāsambhav py akṣuṅhitāśaktar vedasya itara-vastu-pratipādaḥkata-vat eva-pratipādaḥkataḥpy apy aṣṭu | Atra eva sampradāya-viḍo 'kuṣṭhitāṁ saktim vedasya darsayantī "chudāṇā hi bhātām bhavishyantam sākṣhāṁ vyavahitaṁ viprakṛṣhtam ity evanijātiyam artham śaṅkoty avagamayitum" iti | Tathā satī vedā-mālāyaḥ smṛites tad-ubhaya-mālāyaḥ loka-prasiddheḥ cha prāmāṇyaṁ durvāram | Tasmāl lakṣaṇa-pramāṇa-siddha veda na kenāpī cha-vākādinā 'poḍhum śakyate iti sthitam |

Nanv aṣṭu nāma Veda-khyāya keśiḥ pādārthauḥ | tathāpi nāsau vyākhyānam arhati apramāṇyaś cetvāna anupayuktavat | Na hi Vedaḥ pramāṇam tal-lakṣaṇasya tatra duḥsampādatvāt | tathā hi "samyag anubhava-sādhanaṁ pramāṇaṁ" iti kechil lakṣaṇam āhuḥ | apara tu "anadhigārtha-gantri pramānaṁ" ity āchakshate | na cha itād udbhaya vede sambhavati | mantra-brāhmaṇātmakāṁ hi vedaḥ | tatra mantrāḥ kechid abodhakāḥ | "anyak sā te Indra rishīṁ" (R.V. i. 169, 3) ity eko mantrāḥ | "Yādriṣnin dhāyi tam apasyayā vidad" (R.V. v. 44, 8) ity anyāḥ | "Srīṇyā iva jārthārī turpharītā" (R.V. x. 106, 6) ity aparaḥ | "Āpanta-manyus tripala-prabharmā" (R.V. x. 89, 5) ity-ādayaḥ udāhāryāḥ | na hy etair mantrāḥ kaśchid apy artho 'vabudhyate | etesivo anubhavo eva yādā-nātī tadā tat-samyakvaiṁ tadiya-sādhanaṁ ca cha-dūraṇicetam | "Adhāḥ avid āsid" (R.V. x. 129, 5) iti mantrasya bodhakaive ′pi "sthāṇur vā purusho vā" ityādi-vākyā-vat sandigdhārtho bodhakataṁ nātī prāmāṇyam | "Oshadho trāyasva enam" (Taitt. Sanh. i. 2, 1, 1) iti mantra darbha-vishayaḥ | "Svadhita ma enam hiṁsir" (Taitt. Sanh. i. 2, 1, 1) iti kṣura-vishayaḥ | "Srīgota grāvaṇaḥ" iti pāśaṇa-vishayaḥ | Etesivo achatānam darbha-kṣura-pāśaṇānam chetana-vat sambodhaham śrāyate | tato "dvau chandramaśāv" iti vākyā-vad viparītartha-bodhakatvād aprāmāṇ-
"But, some will say, there is no such thing as a Veda; how, then, can there be a Rig-veda, forming a particular part of it? For what is this Veda? It has no characteristic sign or evidence; and without these two conditions, nothing can be proved to exist. For logicians hold that 'a thing is established by characteristic signs and by proof.' If you answer that 'of the three kinds of proof, perception, inference, and scripture, the Veda is the last, and that this is its sign;' then the objectors rejoin that this is not true, for this sign extends too far, and includes also Manu's and the other Smritis; since there exists in them

22 The Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xvi. 53., has, asamkhyātā sahasrōṇi ye Rudrāh adhi bhūmyām |
also this characteristic of Scripture, viz. that in virtue of common consent it is a perfect instrument for the discovery of what is invisible.' If you proceed, 'the Veda is faultless, in consequence of its characteristic that it has no person (purusha) for its author;' they again reply, 'Not so; for as the Veda likewise was formed by Paramesvara (God), it had a person (purusha) for its author.' If you rejoin, 'It had no person (purusha) for its author, for it was not made by any embodied living being;' [they refuse to admit this] on the ground that, according to such Vedic texts as 'Purusha has a thousand heads,' it is clear that Īśvara (God) also has a body. If you urge that apaurusheyatva ('the having had no personal author') means that it was not composed by a living being endowed with a body which was the result of works; —the opponent denies this also, inasmuch as the Vedas were created by particular living beings—Agni (fire), Vāyu (wind), and Aditya (the sun); for from the text 'the Rig-veda sprang from Agni, the Yajur-veda from Vāyu, and the Sāma-veda from Sūrya,' etc., it will be seen that Īśvara was the maker, by inciting Agni and the others. If you next say that the Veda is a collection of words in the form of Mantras and Brāhmaṇas, the objectors rejoin, 'Not so, for it has never yet been defined that a Mantra is so and so, and a Brāhmaṇa so and so.' There exists, therefore, no characteristic mark of a Veda. Nor do we see any proof that a Veda exists. If you say that the text, 'I peruse, reverend sir, the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, and the Atharvāṇa as the fourth,' is a proof, the antagonist answers, 'No, for as that text is part of the Veda, the latter would be open to the objection of depending upon itself; for no one, be he ever so clever, can mount upon his own shoulders.' If you again urge that such texts of the Smṛiti as this, 'It is the Veda alone which is the source of blessedness to twice-born men, and transcendent,' are proofs, the objector rejoins, 'Not so; since these too must be rejected, as being founded on the same Veda.'

63 Or, the meaning of this may be, 'If you urge that, as the Veda has no personal author, there is—in consequence of this peculiar characteristic—no flaw (in the proposed definition), etc.'

64 I have translated this, as if it there had been (which there is not) a negative particle na in the printed text, after the iti chet, as this seems to me to be necessary to the sense. I understand from Prof. Müller that the negative particle is found in some of the MSS. [I am, however, informed by Prof. Goldstücker that na is often omitted, though understood, after iti chet.]
evidence of the senses and other ordinary sources of knowledge ought not even to be doubted. And common report in reference to the Veda, though universal, is erroneous, like such phrases as 'the blue sky,' etc. Wherefore, as the Veda is destitute of characteristic sign and proof, its existence cannot be admitted. Such is the first side of the question.

To this we reply: The definition of the Veda, as a work composed of Mantra and Brähmaṇa, is unobjectionable. Hence Āpastamba says in the Yajnaparibhāṣā, 'the name of Mantra and Brähmaṇa is Veda.' The nature of these two things will be settled hereafter. The sense we attach to the expression 'consisting of sentences which had no personal author' will also be declared further on. Let the proofs which have been specified of the existence of the Veda, viz. the Veda (itself), the Smṛiti, and common notoriety, be duly weighed. Although jars, cloth, and other such [dark] objects have no inherent property of making themselves visible, it is no absurdity to speak of the sun, moon, and other luminous bodies, as shining by their own light. Just in the same way, though it is impossible for men or any other beings to mount on their own shoulders, let the Veda through the keenness of its power be held to have the power of proving itself, as it has of proving other things. Hence traditionists set forth this penetrating force of the Veda; thus, 'Scripture is able to make known the past, the future, the minute, the distant, the remote.' Such being the case, the authority of the Smṛiti, which is based on the Veda, and that of common notoriety, which is based on both, is irresistible. Wherefore it stands fast that the Veda, which is

65 The drift of this sentence does not seem to me clear. From what immediately follows it would rather appear that the evidence of the senses may be doubted. Can the passage be corrupt?

66 See the First Volume of this work, pp. 2 ff. and the Second Volume, p. 172.

67 The same thing had been said before by Śankūra Achāryya (who lived at the end of the 8th or beginning of the 9th century, A.D. See Colebrooke's Misc. Essays, i. 332), in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtras, ii. 1, 1: Vedasya hi sīrapeksham svārtha prāmāṇyaṁ rave rava viśvāstam tu mūlaṁtarāpekṣaṁ svārtha prāmāṇyaṁ evakāri-smṛiti-vyavahitam ca iti vipra-kaśāhaḥ | For the Veda has an independent authority in respect of its own sense, as the sun has of manifesting forms. The words of men on the other hand, have, as regards their own sense, an authority which is dependent upon another source [the Veda], and which is separated [from the authority of the Veda] by the fact of its author being remembered. Herein consists the distinction [between the two kinds of authority]."
established by characteristic sign, and by proof, cannot be overturned by the Chārvākas or any other opponents.

"But let it be admitted that there is a thing called a Veda. Still, the opponents say, it does not deserve explanation, being unsuited for it, since it does not constitute proof. The Veda, they urge, is no proof, as it is difficult to show that it has any sign of that character. Now, some define proof as the instrument of perfect apprehension; others say, it is that which arrives at what was not before ascertained. But neither of these definitions can be reasonably applied to the Veda. For the Veda consists of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa. Of these mantras some convey no meaning. Thus one is amṣak sā te Indra prīṣītir, etc.; another is yadṛṣṭim, etc.; a third is śrīṇyā īcā, etc. The texts āpāntu-manyuh, etc., and others may be adduced as further examples. Now no meaning whatever is to be perceived through these mantras; and when they do not even convey an idea at all, much less can they convey a perfect idea, or be instruments of apprehension. Even if the mantra ādāhats vīd āsīt upari vīd āsīt, 'was it below or above?' (R.V. x. 129, 5) convey a meaning, still, like such sayings as 'either a post or a man,' it conveys a dubious meaning, and so possesses no authority. The mantra, 'deliver him, o plant,' has for its subject grass. Another, 'do not hurt him, axe,' has for its subject an axe (kṣhura). A third, 'hear, stones,' has for its subject stones. In these cases, grass, an axe, and stones, though insensible objects, are addressed in the Veda as if they were intelligent. Hence these passages have no authority, because, like the saying, 'two moons,' their import is absurd. So also the two texts, 'there is one Rudra; no second has existed,' and 'the thousand Rudras who are over the earth,' involving, as they do, a mutual contradiction (just as if one were to say, 'I have been silent all my life'), cannot be authoritative. The mantra āpaḥ undantu expresses the wetting of the sacrificer's head with water at the time of tonsure; while the text 'śubhika,' etc. ('garland, mount on my head and decorate my face') expresses the placing of a garland formed of flowers on the heads of the bridegroom and bride, by way of blessing, at the time of marriage. Now, as these two last texts merely repeat a matter of

68 See Nirukta, v. 12, and vi. 15, and Roth's Illustrations. It is not necessary for my purpose to inquire whether the charge of intelligibility brought against these different texts is just or not.
common notoriety, they cannot be said to attain to what was not before ascertained. Wherefore the Mantra portion of the Veda is destitute of authority.

"To this we reply, the meaning of these texts, 'amyak,' and the others, has been explained by Yāska in the Nirukta. The fact that they are not understood by persons ignorant of that explanation, does not prove any defect in the mantras. It is customary to quote here the popular maxim, 'it is not the fault of the post that the blind man does not see it; the reasonable thing to say is that it is the man's fault.' The mantra 'adhaś svad,' etc. ('was it above or below?') (R.V. x. 129, 5) is not intended to convey doubt, but rather to signify the extreme profundity of the supreme Essence, the cause of the world. With this view the author intimates by this turn of expression the difficulty which persons who are not versed in the deep Scriptures have, in comprehending such subjects. The same intention is manifested in the following mantras ko addhā vedā, etc. (R.V. x. 129, 6) ('who knows?' etc.) In the texts oshadhe, etc. ('o herb,' etc.), the deities who preside over these various objects are addressed by these several names. These deities are referred to by the venerable Bādarāyaṇa in the aphorism abhimāṇi-vyapadeśaḥ. As Rudra, though only one, assumes by his power a thousand forms, there is no contradiction between the different texts which relate to him. And though the moistening, etc., of the head by water, etc., is a matter of common notoriety, yet as the goodwill of the deities who preside over these objects is not generally known, the texts in question, by having this for their subject, are declaratory of what is unknown. Hence the Mantra portion of the Veda, being shown to have a characteristic mark, is authoritative."

Sāyaṇa then, in p. 11 of his Preface, proceeds to extend his argument to the Brāhmaṇas. These are divisible into two parts, Precepts (vīdhi), and Explanatory remarks (arthavāda). Precepts again are either (a) incitements to perform, some act in which a man has not yet engaged (apravṛttta-pravarttanaṃ), such as are contained in the ceremonial sections (Karma-kāṇḍa); or (b) revelations of something previously unknown (ajñāta-jñāpanam), such as are found in the portions which treat of sacred knowledge or the supreme spirit (Brahma-kāṇḍa). Both these parts

69 See the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1866, pp. 323, 329, 334, and 337.
are objected to as unauthoritative. The former is said (1) to enjoin things afterwards declared to be improper; and (2) to prescribe in some texts things which are prohibited in others. Thus in the Aitareya, Taittirīya, and other Brāhmaṇas, many injunctions given in other places are controverted in such phrases as, “This or that must not be regarded;” “This must not be done in that way” (tat tad na ādrit-yam | tat tathā na kāryyam).80 And again prescriptions are given which are mutually contradictory. Another objection is that no result, such as the attainment of paradise, is perceived to follow the celebration of a jyotishaτoṇa or other sacrifice; whilst satisfaction never fails to be experienced immediately after eating (jyotisṭomādīśk apy anuṣṭhanānantāram eṣa svargūḍi-phalaṁ na upalabhaye | na hi bhojanāntaraṁ tiṛṭer anupalambho’sti |). The answer given to the earlier of these objections is that the discrepant injunctions and prohibitions are respectively applicable to people belonging to different Sākhās or Vedic schools; just as things forbidden to a man in one state of life (āśrama) are permitted to one who is in another. It is thus the difference of persons which gives rise to the apparent opposition between the precepts (tathā ārthādī-vidhir attra nindyamāṇo pi kvawav ṣākhāntare bhaved iti chet | bhavatu nāma | prāmāṇya aṁ api tach-ehāḥkāḥdhātyayikam prati bha-vishyati | yathā grihasthāvārame nishiddham api parānna-bhojanam āśra-māntarestoḥ prāmāṇyikam tad-vat | anena nyāyenā sarvatra paraṅṣara viroddhau vidhi-nilśedahau purusaha-bhedona vyavasthāpaniyau yathā maṇ-treshu pāṭha-bhedah |). In the same way, it is remarked, the different Sākhās adopt different readings in the mantras. As regards the objection raised to the authoritativeness of the revelations of things hitherto unknown, which are made in the Bṛahma-kāṇḍa, that they are mutually contradictory—as when the Aitareyins say, Ātmā vai idam eva agré ősīt, “This was in the beginning soul only;” whilst the Taittirīyakas on the other hand affirm, asaṁ vai idam agré ősīt, “This was in the beginning non-existent;”—the answer is given that it is determined by a particular aphorism (which is quoted)81 that in the latter passage the word asaṁ does not mean absolute vacuity or nothingness, but merely an

80 Compare the quotation given above, p. 54, from the S’atapatha Brāhmaṇa, iv. 1, 2, 19.

81 Brahma Sūtra, ii. 1, 7, appears to be intended; but the text of it as given by Sāyaṇa does not correspond with that in the Bibliotheca Indica.
undeveloped condition ( . . . iti sutra Taittiriya-gata-vakyasya asah-
chhadasya na sanya-paratvam kintu avyaktavastha-paratvam iti nirij-
tam | ).

Sāyana accordingly concludes (p. 19 of his Preface) that the
authority of the whole Veda is proved.

II.—The second passage which I shall quote is from the Vedārtha-
prakāśa of Mādhava Āchāryya on the Taittiriya Yajur-veda (p. 1 ff. in
the Bibliotheca Indica). Mādhava was the brother of Sāyana,73 and
flourished in the middle of the 14th century (Colebrooke’s Misc. Ess.
i. 301):

Nanu ko ‘yāṁ veda nāma ke vā asya vishaya-prayojana-sambandhādhi-
kāriṇaḥ kathaḥ vā tasya prāmāṇyam | na khalu etasmin sarvasmin asati
vedo vyākhyāna-yogyo bhavati | Atra uchyate | Ishṭa-prāpta-aniṣṭa-pari-
hārayor alaukikam upāyaṁ yo grantho vedayati sa vedaḥ | Alaukika-pa-
dena prayakṣahānumāne vyācartyeta | Anubhityāmaṇasya erak-चandana-
vanitād iṣṭa-prāpta-hetuvam aśhadha-sevāder anishṭa-parihāra-hetut-
vaṁ cha prayakṣa-siddham | Śvetānavahishyāmaṇasya purushāntara-
gatasya cha tathātvam anumāṇa-gamyam | “Evaṁ tarhi bhāvi-janma-gata-
sukhādikam anumāṇa-gamyam” iti chet | na | tad-viśeṣasya anavagamāt |
Na khalu jyotishtomādī. iṣṭa-prāpta-hetuḥ kalanja-bhakṣaṇa-varjanādīr
anishṭa-parihāra-hetur ity anum artham veda-vyatirekaṇa anumāṇa-sahas-
renāpi tārki-kāśvamāgīr api asya-vagantuḥ saknoti | Tasmād alaukik-
pāya-bodhako vedaḥ iti lakṣaṇasya na ativyāptaṁ | ata evātman “Prat-
yakṣhaṇaṁityā vā yas tūpaya na budhyate | Etāṁ vindanti vedaṇa
tasmād vedasya vedatā” iti | sa eva upāya vedaṣya vishayaḥ | tad-bodhāḥ
eva prayojanam | tad-bodhārthī cha adhikārī | tene saha upakāryyopakā-
raka-bhāvaḥ sambandhāḥ | nanu “evaṁ sati stri-sūdra-sahātāḥ sarve vedā-
dhikāraṁ syur ‘iṣṭam me syād anishṭam ma bhād’ iti āśishāḥ sāraṇaja-
ninatvāt” | maśivam | stri-sūdrayoh saty upāya bodhārthiva hetu-antareṇa
vedādhikāraṣya pratibaddhatvāt | upaniṣasya eva adhyayanadhikāram

72 Compare with this the passages quoted from the S’atapatha and Taittirīya Brāh-
masaśas in the First Volume of this work, pp. 19 f., 24 f., 27 f., and from the Taitt. Saṃh.
and Brāh. in pp. 52 and 53; and see also the texts referred to and commented upon in
the Journ. of the Roy. As. Soc. for 1864, p. 72, and in the No. for 1865, pp.
346–348.

73 Whether either of these two brothers, who were ministers of state, were the
actual writers of the works which bear their names, or whether the works were com-
posed by Panditas patronized by the two statesmen, and called after the names of their
patrons, is a point which I need not attempt to decide.
bruvat śāstram anupanītayoḥ strī-sūdrayor vedāḥhyayanam anīṣṭa-prāpta-śrī-ḥetur iti bodhayati | kathāṁ tarhi tayos tad-upāyācayamaḥ | puruṣā-dībhir iti brāmakaḥ | ata evoktam | "strī-sūdra-deśajabandhūnāṁ tryāt na śruti-goccharam | iti Bhāratam ākhyānam muninā kriyāḥ kriyam" (Bhāg. Pur. i. 4, 25) | iti | tasmād upanītair eva trairavyakair vedavyaḥ sam-bahdaḥ | tat-prāmāṇyaṁ tu bodhakaṭvāt svataḥ eva siddham | pauruṣeṣeṣa-vākyaiṁ tu bodhakam api sat puruṣa-gataḥ-bhrānti-mulavat-sambhāvanaiya tat-parīḥāraśā mūla-prāmāṇam apekṣate na tu vedah | tasya nityatvena vakṣṭī-ḥodaḥ-ṣaṅkānudayāt | . . . Namu vedo'pi Kālīdāsā-dī-vākyai-vat pauruṣeṣaḥ eva Brahmapāryya-śravaṇāt | "śrīcaḥ śaṁāṇi jaṅgiraḥ | cchhandāni jaṅgiraḥ tasmād yajus tasmād ajaya "; iti śruṭḥ | ata eva Bādarāyanaḥ (i. 1, 3) "śastra-yonītaḥ" iti sūtrena Brahmapaṇo veda-kaṛyāvatām avocharat | maivaṃ | śruti-smrītibhyāṁ nityatvavagamāt | "vācaḥ Viṣṇuḥ nitya-yā" (R. V. viii. 64, 6) iti śruṭḥ ""anādī-nilāṇāṁ nityā vāg uṣtriṃśaḥ svayambhubvā" iti smṛteca cha | Bādarāyaṇo'pi devatāḥnikaraṇe śūtrayāmāsa (i. 3, 29) "ata eva cha nityatvām" iti | tarhi "paraspara-viroḍhaḥ" iti chet | na | nityatvasya vyavahāri-kaṭvāt | śrishter uṛdhvaḥ saṁghārat pārvam vyavahāra-kālas tasmin upatti-vināśādarśanāt | kālākāsādānaḥ yathā, nityaḥ ecau vedo'pi vyavahāra-kāle Kālīdāsā-dī-vākyai-vat puruṣa-viṣṇitvābhavād nityaḥ | adi-śrīsibhau tu kālākāsādā-vad eva Brahmanoṣaḥ sakāśad vedotpattir āmnāyate | ato vyāhaya-bhedaḥ na paraspara-viroḍhaḥ | Brahmano nirdoshaṭvena vedavyaḥ vaktṛi-doshahbhavāt svatas-siddham prāmāṇyaṁ tad-acāram | tasmāl lakṣaṇa-pramāṇa-sadbhavād vyāhaya-prayojana-sambandhādhikāri-sadbhāvāt prāmāṇyasā sauhvatvāḥ cha vedo vyākhyātanavāḥ eva | "Now, some may ask, what is this Veda, or what are its subject-matter, its use, its connection, or the persons who are competent to study it? and how is it authoritative? For, in the absence of all these conditions, the Veda does not deserve to be expounded. I reply: the book which makes known (vedayati) the supernatural (lit. non-secular) means of obtaining desirable objects, and getting rid of undesirable objects, is the Veda. By the employment of the word "supernatural, [the ordinary means of information, viz.] perception and inference, are excluded. By perception it is established that such objects of sense, as garlands, sandal-wood, and women are causes of gratification, and that the use of medicines and so forth is the means of getting rid
of what is undesirable. And we ascertain by inference that we shall in future experience, and that other men now experience, the same results (from these same causes). If it be asked whether, then, the happiness, etc., of a future birth be not in the same way ascertainable by inference, I reply that it is not, because we cannot discover its specific character. Not even the most brilliant ornament of the logical school could, by a thousand inferences, without the help of the Vedas, discover the truths that the *jyotishtoma* and other sacrifices are the means of attaining happiness, and that abstinence from intoxicating drugs is the means of removing what is undesirable. Thus it is not too wide a definition of the Veda to say that it is that which indicates supernatural expedients. Hence, it has been said, 'men discover by the Veda those expedients which cannot be ascertained by perception or inference; and this is the characteristic feature of the Veda.' These expedients, then, form the subject of the Veda; [to teach] the knowledge of them is its use; the person who seeks that knowledge is the competent student; and the connection of the Veda with such a student is that of a benefactor with the individual who is to be benefitted.

"But, if such be the case, it may be said that all persons whatever, including women and Sūdras, must be competent students of the Veda, since the aspiration after good and the depreciation of evil are common to the whole of mankind. But it is not so. For though the expedient exists, and women and Sūdras are desirous to know it, they are debarred by another cause from being competent students of the Veda. The scripture (śāstra) which declares that those persons only who have been invested with the sacrificial cord are competent to read the Veda, intimates thereby that the same study would be a cause of unhappiness to women and Sūdras [who are not so invested]. How, then, are these two classes of persons to discover the means of future happiness? We answer, from the Purāṇas and other such works. Hence it has been said, 'since the triple Veda may not be heard by women, Sūdras, and degraded twice-born men, the Mahābhārata was, in his benevolence,

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"Kalanja-bhakshanam is mentioned in the Commentary on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, x, 33, 28. In his translation of the Kusumānjali, p. 81, note, Professor Cowell says:

"Some hold the *Kalanja* to be the flesh of a deer killed by a poisoned arrow—others hemp or bhang,—others a kind of garlic. See Ragbunandana’s *Ekādāsī tattva.*"
composed by the Muni.\textsuperscript{75} The Veda, therefore, has only a relation to men of the three superior classes who have obtained investiture.

"Then the authority of the Veda is self-evident, from the fact of its communicating knowledge. For though the words of men also communicate knowledge, still, as they must be conceived to participate in the fallibility of their authors, they require some primary authority to remedy that fallibility. But such is not the case with the Veda; for as that had no beginning, it is impossible to suspect any defect in the utterer. . . .

"A doubt may, however, be raised whether the Veda is not, like the sentences of Kālidāsa and others, derived from a personal being,\textsuperscript{76} as it proclaims itself to have been formed by Brahma, according to the text, ‘the Rich and Sāman verses, the metres, sprang from him; from him the Yajush was produced;’\textsuperscript{77} in consequence of which Bādarāyaṇa, in the aphorism\textsuperscript{78} ‘since he is the source of the śāstra,’ has pronounced that Brahma is the cause of the Veda. But this doubt is groundless; for the eternity of the Veda has been declared both by itself, in the text, ‘with an eternal voice, o Virūpa,’\textsuperscript{79} and by the Śrīrīti in the verse ‘an eternal voice, without beginning or end, was uttered by the Self-existent.’\textsuperscript{80} Bādarāyaṇa, ṭo-ṛ, in his section on the deities (Brahma Sūtras, i 3, 29) has this aphorism; ‘hence also [its] eternity [is to be maintained].’ If it be objected that these statements of his are mutually conflicting, I answer, No. For [in the passages where] the word eternity is applied to the Vedas, it is to be understood as referring to the period of action [or mundane existence]. This period is that which commences with the creation, and lasts till the destruction of the universe, since, during this interval, no worlds are seen to

\textsuperscript{75} See the quotation from the Bhūgavata Purāṇa, above, p. 42.

\textsuperscript{76} This seems to be the only way to translate praurusheya, as prusha cannot here mean a human being.

\textsuperscript{77} R.V. x. 50. 9, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 10; and p. 3, above.

\textsuperscript{78} Brahma Sūtras, i 1, 3, p. 7 of Dr. Ballantyne’s Aphorisms of the Vedānta.

\textsuperscript{79} These words are part of Rig-veda, viii 64. 6: Tasmāi nūnam abhidyave vāchā Virūpa nityayā | vyāsante chodave sushitum | “Send forth praises to this heaven-aspiring and prolific Agni, o Virūpa, with an unceasing voice [or hymn].” The word nityayā seems to mean nothing more than “continual,” though in the text I have rendered it “eternal,” as the author’s reasoning requires. Colebrooke (Misc. Es. i 306), however, translates it by “perpetual.” I shall again quote and illustrate this verse further on.

\textsuperscript{80} This line, from the M.Bh. Sāntip. 8533, has already been cited above, in p. 16.
Origin**: originate, or to be destroyed. Just as time and æther (space) are eternal, so also is the Veda eternal, because, during the period of mundane existence, it has not been composed by any person, as the works of Kālidāsa and others have been. Nevertheless, the Veda, like time and æther, is recorded in Scripture to have originated from Brahma at the first creation. There is, therefore, no discrepancy between the two different sets of passages as they refer to different points. And since Brahma is free from defect, the utterer of the Veda is consequently free from defect; and therefore a self-demonstrated authority resides in it. Seeing, therefore, that the Veda possess a characteristic mark, and is supported by proof, and that it has a subject, a use, a relation, and persons competent for its study, and, moreover, that its authority is established, it follows that it ought to be interpreted."

Sect. VIII.—Arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins in support of the eternity and authority of the Vedas.

I shall now proceed to adduce some of the reasonings by which the authors of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta, aphorisms, and their commentators, defend the doctrine which, as we have already seen, is held by some of the Indian writers, that the Vedas are eternal, as well as infallible.

I.—Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.—I quote the following texts of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā which relate to this subject from Dr. Ballantyne’s aphorisms of the Mīmāṃsā, pp. 8 ff. I do not always follow the words of Dr. Ballantyne’s translations, though I have made free use of their substance. (See also Colebrooke’s Misc. Ess. i. 306, or p. 195 of Williams and Norgate’s ed.) The commentator introduces the subject in the following way:

81 Passages affirming both the eternity of the æther, and its creation, are given in the First Volume of this work, pp. 130 and 506.
82 The same subject is touched on by Sāyaṇa, at p. 20 of the introductory portion of his commentary on the Rigveda. The passage will be quoted at the end of the next section."
83 Since the 1st edition of this Volume was published, the Sanskrit scholar has obtained easy access to a more considerable portion of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras with the commentary of S’abara Śvāmin by the appearance of the first, second, and part of third, Adhyāyas in the Bibliotheca Indica.
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Sabdarthayor utpatty-anántaram purushena kalpita-sanketātmaka-śambandhasya kalpitavāt purusha-kalpita-śambandha-jnānāpekshitvāt sabdasya yathā pratyanisha-jnānam śuktikādaus satyatvam vyabhicharati tathā purushādhinatvena sabde'pi satyatva-vyabhichāra-sambhavāt na dharmed chodanā pramanam iti pūrva-pakṣe siddhāntam āha |

"Since, subsequently to the production of words and the things signified by them, a connection of a conventional character has been established between the two by the will of man, and since language is dependent upon a knowledge of this conventional connection determined by man, [it follows that] as perception is liable to error in respect of mother-of-pearl and similar objects [by mistaking them for silver, etc.], so words also may be exposed to the risk of conveying unreal notions from [their sense] being dependent on human will; and consequently that the Vedic precepts [which are expressed in such words, possessing a merely conventional and arbitrary meaning] cannot be authoritative in matters of duty. Such is an objection which may be urged, and in reply to which the author of the aphorisms declares the established doctrine."

Then follows the fifth aphorism of the first chapter of the first book of the Mīmāṃsā: Autpattikas tu(a) śrādhasya(b) arthena, sambandhas(c) tasya(d) jñānam(e) upadeso(f) vyatirekaḥ cha(g) arthe 'nupalabdhe(h) tat(i) pramanam Bādarāyaṇasya anapekshatvāḥ [which may be paraphrased as follows: "The connection of a word with its sense is coeval with the origin of both. In consequence of this connection the words of the Veda convey a knowledge of duty, and impart unerring instruction in regard to matters imperceptible. Such Vedic injunctions constitute the proof of duty alleged by Bādarāyaṇa, author of the Vedaṃta Sūtras; for this proof is independent of perception and all other evidence."]

I subjoin most of the remarks of the scholiast as given by Dr. Ballantyne, indicating by letters the words of the aphorism to which they refer:

(a) Autpattikah | svābhāvikah | nityah iti yāvat | "Autpattika (original) means natural, eternal in short."

(b) Sābdasya | nitya-veda-ghaṭaka-padasya "agnihotraṁ jhuyat svarga-kāmaḥ" ityādeḥ | "Sābda (word) refers to terms which form part of the eternal Veda, such as, 'the man who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice.'"
(c) Sambandha (connection), “in the nature of power,” i.e. according to Dr. Ballantyne, depending on the divine will that such and such words should convey such and such meanings.

(d) Atas tasya | dharmaṣya | “‘Hence’ is to be supplied before ‘this,’ which refers to ‘duty.’”

(e) Jñānam | atra karane luyt | jñapter yathārtha-jñānasya karaṇam | “In the word jñāna (knowledge) the affix luyt has the force of ‘instrument,’ ‘an instrument of correct knowledge.’”

(f) Upadesaḥ | artha-pratipādānam | “Instruction, i.e. the establishment of a fact.”

(g) Avyatirokaḥ | avyabhichārī dṛṣṭyate ataḥ | “‘Unerring,’ i.e. that which is seen not to deviate from the fact.”

(h) Namu vahminān iti sabda-śravaṇāntaram pratyakṣaṇena vahmiṃ dṛishtvā sabde pramāṇaṃ grihṇāti iti loko prasiddheḥ pratyakṣaḥdītara-pramāṇa-sūpekṣhatvāt sabdasya sa kathāṃ dharme pramāṇam ata aha anupalabdhe iti | anupalabdha pratyakṣaḥdī-ṇṝṣaṇaṣaḥ aṣṭyaˈtṛthe | “Since it is a matter of notoriety that any one who has heard the words ‘[the mountain is] fiery’ uttered, and afterwards sees the fire with his own eyes, is [only] then [thoroughly] convinced of the authority of the words, it may be asked how words which are thus dependent [for confirmation on] perception and other proofs, can themselves constitute the proof of duty. In reference to this, the word anupalabdhe (‘in regard to matters imperceptible’) is introduced. It signifies ‘matters which cannot be known by perception and other such proofs.’”

(i) Tat | vidhi-ghaṭīla-vākyaḥ dharme pramāṇah Bādarāyaṇācāryasya sammataḥ | ayam āsayaḥ | ‘parvato vahminān’ iti doshavat-purusha-prayuktam vākyaḥ arthaḥ vyabhicharati | ataḥ prāmāṇya-nīcchaye praty-akṣhādikam apekkhate | tathā ‘gnihotram juhoti iti vākyaṃ kāla-traye ṣṭhaḥ arthaḥ na vyabhicharatī | ata itara-nirapekṣhaiḥ dharme pramāṇam | “This, i.e. a [Vedic] sentence consisting of an injunction, is regarded by Bādarāyaṇa also as proof of duty. The purport is this. The sentence, ‘the mountain is fiery,’ when uttered by a person defective [in his organ of vision], may deviate from the reality; it therefore requires the evidence of our senses, etc. to aid us in determining its sufficiency as proof. Whereas the Vedic sentence regarding the performance of the Agnihotra sacrifice can never deviate from the truth in any time, past, present, or future; and is therefore a proof of duty, independently of any other evidence.”
The commentator then proceeds to observe as follows: *Pūrva-sūtra śabdārthayos sambandho nityāk ity uktam | tach cha śabda-nityatvādānām iti tat śivādhayishur ādau śabdānityatvā-vādi-matam pūrva-pakṣam upādayati* | “In the preceding aphorism it was declared that the connection of words and their meanings [or the things signified by them] is eternal. Desiring now to prove that this [eternity of connection] is dependent on the eternity of words [or sound], he begins by setting forth the first side of the question, viz. the doctrine of those who maintain that sound is not eternal.”

This doctrine is accordingly declared in the six following aphorisms (sūtras), which I shall quote and paraphrase, without citing, in the original, the accompanying comments. These the reader will find in Dr. Ballantyne’s work.

Sūtra 6.—*Karma eke tatra ċārśanāt |* “Some, i.e. the followers of the Nyāya philosophy, say that sound is a product, because we see that it is the result of effort, which it would not be if it were eternal.”

Sūtra 7.—*Asthānāt |* “That it is not eternal, on account of its transitoriness, i.e. because after a moment it ceases to be perceived.”

Sūtra 8.—*Karotī-śabdāt |* “Because, we employ in reference to it the expression ‘making,’ i.e. we speak, ‘f making’ a sound.”

Sūtra 9.—*Sattvāntare yaugapadyāt |* “Because it is perceived by different persons at once, and is consequently in immediate contact with the organs of sense of those both far and near, which it could not be if it were one and eternal.”

Sūtra 10.—*Prakṛiti-vikṛityoś cha |* “Because sounds have both an original and a modified form; as e.g. in the case of ḍādhi atra, which is changed into ḍādhy atra, the original letter ā being altered into y by the rules of permutation. Now, no substance which undergoes a change is eternal.”

Sūtra 11.—*Priddhiḥ cha kārtṛ-bhūmnā’sya |* “Because sound is augmented by the number of those who make it. Consequently the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas, who say that sound is merely manifested, and not created, by human effort, is wrong, since even a thousand manifesters do not increase the object which they manifest, as a jar is not made larger by a thousand lamps.”

These objections against the Mīmāṃsaka theory that sound is manifested, and not created, by those who utter it, are answered in the following Sūtras:
Sūtra 12.—Samaṁ tu tatra darśanam | "But, according to both schools, viz. that which holds sound to be created, and that which regards it as merely manifested, the perception of it is alike momentary. But of these two views, the theory of manifestation is shown in the next aphorism to be the correct one."

Sūtra 13.—Sataḥ param adarśanāṁ visṛṣṭyānāgamat | "The non-perception at any particular time, of sound, which, in reality, perpetually exists, arises from the fact that the utterer of sound has not come into contact with his object, i.e. sound. Sound is eternal, because we recognise the letter k, for instance, to be the same sound which we have always heard, and because it is the simplest method of accounting for the phenomenon to suppose that it is the same. The still atmosphere which interferes with the perception of sound, is removed by the conjunctions and disjunctions of air issuing from a speaker's mouth, and thus sound (which always exists, though unperceived) becomes perceptible. This is the reply to the objection of its 'transitoriness' (Sūtra 7)."

An answer to Sūtra 8 is given in

Sūtra 14.—Prayogasya varam | "The word making' sounds, merely means employing or uttering them."

The objection made in Sūtra 9 is answered in

Sūtra 15.—Aditya-vad yaugapadyam | "One sound is simultaneously heard by different persons, just as one sun is seen by them at one and the same time. Sound, like the sun, is a vast, and not a minute object, and thus may be perceptible by different persons, though remote from one another."

An answer to Sūtra 10 is contained in

Sūtra 16.—Varṇāntaram avikāraḥ | "The letter y, which is substituted for i in the instance referred to under Sūtra 10, is not a modification of i, but a distinct letter. Consequently sound is not modified."

The 11th Sūtra is answered in

Sūtra 17.—Nāda-vṛiddhiḥ paraḥ | "It is an increase of 'noise,' not

24 "Sound is unobserved, though existent, if it reach not the object (vibrations of air emitted from the mouth of the speaker proceed and manifest sound by their impulse to air at rest in the space bounded by the hollow of the ear; for want of such impulse, sound, though existent, is unapprehended)."—Colebrooke, i. 306.

25 The text as given in the Bibliotheca Indica has nāda-vṛiddhi-para.
of sound, that is occasioned by a multitude of speakers. The word ‘noise’ refers to the ‘conjunctions and disjunctions of the air’ (mentioned under Sūtra 13) which enter simultaneously into the hearer’s ear from different quarters; and it is of these that an increase takes place.”

The next following Sūtras state the reasons which support the Mīmāṃsaka view:

Sūtra 18.—Nityas tu syād ṛāśanasya parārthatvāt | “Sound must be eternal, because its utterance is fitted to convey a meaning to other persons. If it were not eternal [or abiding], it would not continue till the hearer had learned its sense, and thus he would not learn the sense, because the cause had ceased to exist.”

Sūtra 19.—Sarvatra yaugapadyāt | “Sound is eternal, because it is in every case correctly and uniformly recognized by many persons simultaneously; and it is inconceivable that they should all at once fall into a mistake.”

When the word go (cow) has been repeated ten times, the hearers will say that the word go has been ten times pronounced, not that ten words having the sound of go have been uttered; and this fact also is adduced as a proof of the eternity of sound in

Sūtra 20.—Sankhyābhāvāt | “Because each sound is not numerically different from itself repeated.”

Sūtra 21.—Anapekṣhatvāt | “Sound is eternal, because we have no ground for anticipating its destruction.”

“But it may be urged that sound is a modification of air, since it arises from its conjunctions (see Sūtra 17), and because the Śikṣā (or Vedāṅga treating of pronunciation) says that ‘air arrives at the condition of sound;’ and as it is thus produced from air, it cannot be eternal.” A reply to this difficulty is given in

Sūtra 22.—Prakhyābhāvāḥ cha yogyasya | “Sound is not a modification of air, because, if it were, the organ of hearing would have no appropriate object which it could perceive. No modification of air (held by the Naiyāyikas to be tangible) could be perceived by the organ of hearing, which deals only with intangible sound.”

Sūtra 23.—Linga-darśanāḥ cha | “And the eternity of sound is established by the argument discoverable in the Vedic text, ‘with an eternal voice, o Viśvāpa.’ (See above, p. 69.) Now, though this sentence had another object in view, it, nevertheless, declares the eternity of language, and hence sound is eternal.”
"But though words, as well as the connection of word and sense, be eternal, it may be objected—as in the following aphorism—that a command conveyed in the form of a sentence is no proof of duty."

Sūtra 24.—Utpattau vā rachenāḥ syur arthasya a-tan-nimīttatvāt.

"Though there be a natural connection between words and their meanings, the connection between sentences and their meanings is a factitious one, established by human will, from these meanings (of the sentences) not arising out of the meanings of the words. The connection of sentences with their meanings is not (like the connection of words with their meanings) one derived from inherent power (see Sūtra 5, remark (c), above, p. 72), but one devised by men; how, then, can this connection afford sufficient authority for duty?"

An answer to this is given in

Sūtra 25.—Tad-bhātānāṁ kriyārthena saṁāmnāyo'ṛthasya tan-nimīttatvāt | "The various terms which occur in every Vedic precept are accompanied by a verb; and hence a perception (such as we had not before) of the sense of a sentence is derived from a collection of words containing a verb. A precept is not comprehended unless the individual words which make it up are understood; and the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence is nothing else than the comprehension of the exact mutual relation of the meanings arising out of each word."

Sūtra 26.—Loke sannīyamāt prayoga-sannikarśaḥ syāt : "As in secular language the application of words is known, so also in the Veda they convey an understood sense, which has been handed down by tradition."

The author now proceeds in the next following Sūtras to state and to obviate certain objections raised to his dogmas of the eternity and authority of the Vedas.

Sūtra 27.—Vedadās cha eko sannikarśhaḥ purushākhyāḥ | "Some (the followers of the Nyāya) declare the Vedas to be of recent origin, i.e. not eternal, because the names of men are applied to certain parts of them, as the Kāṭhaka and Kauthuma."

This Sūtra, with some of those which follow, is quoted in Śāyāna’s commentary on the R.V. vol. i. pp. 19 and 20. His explanation of the present Sūtra is as follows:

Yathā Raghunāṁśudayaḥ idāṁnītānāṁ tatha vedaḥ api | na tu vedaḥ anādayaḥ | atāḥ eva veda-kartṛitvena purushāḥ akhyayante | Vaiyāṣikam
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Bhārataṁ Vālmīkiyaṁ Rāmāyaṇam ity atya yatā Bhāratañi-kartṛtvena Vyāsādayyaḥ āhhyāyante tathā Kāṭhakaṁ Kauṭumhāṁ Taittīrīyakam ity evam tat-tad-veda-sākhā-kartṛtvena Kāṭhāsīṁ āhhyātatvat paurush-eyāḥ | Nanu nityānām eva vedānām upādhyāya-vat sampradāya-pravartakatvam Kāṭhakaṁ-sāmākhyā syād ity āśankya yukty-antarāṁ sūtrayati | . . . kā 'tarhi Kāṭhakādy-aḥhyāyikāyāḥ gatir ity āśankya sampradāya-pravarttanāt sā iyam upapadyate |

"Some say, that as the Raghuvanaśa, etc., are modern, so also are the Vedas, and that the Vedas are not eternal. Accordingly, certain men are named as the authors of the Vedas. Just as in the case of the Mahābhārata, which is called Vaiyāsika (composed by Vyāsa), and the Rāmāyaṇa, which is called Vālmīkiya (composed by Vālmīki), Vyāsa and Vālmīki are indicated as the authors of these poems; so, too, Kuṭha, Kauṭhuma, and Taittīriya are shown to be the authors of those particular Sākhās of the Vedas which bear their names, viz. the Kāṭhaka, Kauṭhuma, and Taittīriya; and consequently those parts of the Vedas are of human composition. After suggesting that the Vedas, though eternal, have received the name of Kāṭhaka, etc., because Kuṭha and others, as teachers, handed them down; he adduces another objection in the next Sūtra."

The explanation here indicated is accepted a little further on, in the remarks on one of the following Sūtras: "What, then, is the fact in reference to the appellations Kāṭhaka, etc.? It is proved to have arisen from the circumstance that Kuṭha, eto., handed down the Vedas." I proceed to

Sūtra 28.—Anitya-darśanāḥ cha | "It is also objected that the Vedas cannot be eternal, because we observe that persons, who are not eternal, but subject to birth and death, are mentioned in them. Thus it is said in the Veda 'Babara Prāvahāni desired,' 'Kusuruvidenceuddālaki desired.' Now, as the sentences of the Veda, in which they are mentioned, could not have existed before these persons were born, it is clear that these sentences had a beginning, and being thus non-eternal, they are proved to be of human composition" ('Babaraḥ Prāvahāniḥ akāmaya' 'Kusuruvidenceuddālaki akāmaya' ityādi (vākyānāṁ?) vedeshu darśanāḥ teshāṁ janaṁ prāg imāṁ vākyāṁ nāsann iti sādvyād anityatvam paurusheyātvaṁ cha siddham).

These objections are answered in the following aphorisms:
Sūtra 29. — Uktāṁ tu śabda-purvatvam | “But the priority—eternity—of sound has been declared, and, by consequence, the eternity of the Veda.”

Sūtra 30. — Ālyā pravachanāt | “The names, derived from those of particular men, attached to certain parts of the Vedas, were given on account of their studying these particular parts. Thus the portion read by Kaṭha was called Kaṭhakā, etc.”

Sūtra 31. — Paranā śruti-sāmānyā-mātram | “And names occurring in the Veda, which appear to be those of men, are appellations common to other beings besides men.”

“Thus the words Babara Prāvahani are not the names of a man, but have another meaning. For the particle pra denotes ‘pre-eminence,’ vahana means ‘the motion of sound,’ and the latter ā represents the agent; consequently the word prāvahani signifies that ‘which moves swiftly,’ and is applied to the wind, which is eternal. Babara again is a word imitating the sound of the wind. Thus there is not even a semblance of error in the assertion that the Veda is eternal” (Yadvapi Babaraḥ Prāvahaniḥ ity asti parantu śrutiḥ prāvahany adi-sabdaḥ sāmānyam | anuvātāhāyāpi vāchakām | tathā hi | “pra” ity asya uktavahānāyaḥ | “vahanaḥ” sabdasaya guṭhā | i-kāraḥ kartā | tathā cha uktavahānāyaḥ śrutiḥ vāyu-parah | sa cha anudīḥ | Babaraḥ iti vāyu-sabdānukaraṇam | iti na anupadati-gandho 'pi |).

Before proceeding to the 32nd Sūtra, I shall quote some further illustrations of the 31st, which are to be found in certain passages of the Introduction to Sāyuṣa’s Commentary on the Rig-veda, where he is explaining another section of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras (i. 2, 39 ff.). The passages are as follows (p. 7):

Anitya-sāmīyogād mantrānarthāhak yam | “kīm te kriyavanti Kīkātashv” iti mantraṃ Kīkāto nāma janapadāḥ āmnātāḥ | Tathā Naikvaśākhāṃ nāma nagaram Pramagandō nāma rājā ity ete’rthāḥ anityāḥ āmnātāḥ | Tathā cha sati prāk Pramagandād na ayaṃ mantra bhūta-pūrvah iti ganyate | And in p. 10: Yad apy uktam Pramagandād—anityārthaḥ—sāmīyogād mantrasya anūdītaṃ na syād iti tatrottaram śrutiḥ | “Uktās cha—nitya-sāmīyogāḥ” iti | prathama-pūḍasya antimādyikarane so’yam anitya-sāmīyogā-dōṣah uktah pariḥśritah | Tathā hi | tatra pāra-paksha Veda-nām paurushayatvam vaktum Kāṭhakaṃ Kālāpakam ity-ādi—purusaha-sambandhāḥ bhidhānam hetukṛitya “anitya-dārśanāḥ cha” iti hetu-anitaraṃ
sātītam | "Babaraḥ prāvāhaṇiḥ akāmayata" ity anityānām Babarūḍinām arthānāṁ darśanāt tataḥ pūrvaṁ asattvāt paurushyo vedāḥ iti tasya uttaraṁ sātritam "parāṁ tu śruti-sāmānyāṁ mātram" iti | tasya ayam arthaḥ | yat Kāṭhakādi-samākhyānaṁ tat pravachana-nimittam | yat tu param Babarādy-anitya-darśanāṁ tat śabda-sāmānyāṁ-mātraṁ na tu tatra Babarākhyāḥ kaścit puruṣho vivakshitaḥ | kintu "babara" iti śabdaṁ kurvan vāyur abhidhiyate | sa cha prāvāhaṇiḥ | prakarṣheṇa vahanaśīlaḥ | Evaṁ anyatāpy āhāniyam |

"It is objected that the mantras are useless, because they are connected with temporal objects. Thus in the text, 'what are thy cows doing among the Kīkäṭas?' a country called Kīkäṭa is mentioned, as well as a city named Naichasākha, and a king called Pramaganda, all of them non-eternal objects. Such being the case, it is clear that this text did not exist before Pramaganda.' The answer to this is given in p. 10: To the further objection that the mantras cannot be eternal because such temporal objects as Pramaganda, etc., are referred to in them, an answer is given in the following Sūtra: 'The connection with non-eternal objects has been already explained.' In the last section of the first chapter, this very objection of the hymns being connected with non-eternal things has been stated and obviated (see above, Sūtras 28–31). For in the statement of objections, after it has first been suggested as a proof of the human origin of the Vedas, that they bear names, Kāṭhaka, Kāḷāpaka, etc., denoting their relation to men, a further difficulty is stated in a Sūtra, viz., that 'it is noticed that non-eternal objects are mentioned in the Vedas;' as, for example, where it is said that 'Babara Prāvāhaṇi desired.' Now, as it specifies non-eternal objects of this kind, the Veda, which could not have existed before those objects, must be of human composition. The answer to this is given in the aphorism, 'any further names are to be understood as common to other things.' The meaning is this: the names Kāṭhaka, etc., are given to the Vedas because they are expounded by Kāṭha, etc.; and the further difficulty arising from the names of Babara and other objects supposed to be non-eternal, is removed by such names being common to other objects [which are eternal in their nature]. No persons called Babara, etc., are intended by those names, but the wind, which makes the sound babara, is so designated. And prāvāhaṇi refers

24 See the First Volume of this work, p. 342, and the Second Volume, p. 362.
to the same object, as it means that which carries swiftly. The same method of explanation is to be applied in other similar cases."

I proceed to the 32nd Sūtra. It is asked how the Veda can constitute proof of duty when it contains such incoherent nonsense as the following: "An old ox, in blanket and slippers, is standing at the door and singing benedictions. A Brāhmaṇa female, desirous of offspring, asks, 'Pray, O king, what is the meaning of intercourse on the day of the new moon?' or the following: 'the cows celebrated this sacrifice'"

(Nānu "Jāradgavva kambala-pādūkābhyyāṁ dvāri sthito gāyati mangalāni" | tam bhṛmāṇi prichhati puttra-kāmā rājann anāyāṁ labhanasya ko'rthah | iti | "gāvo vai etat sattram āsata" ity-ādīnāṁ asambaddha-pralāpināṁ vede sattvāt kathāṁ sa dharme pramāṇam). A reply is contained in

Sūtra 32.—Kṛite vā viniyogaḥ syāt karmāṇaḥ sambandhāt | "The passages to which objection is taken may be applicable to the duty to be performed, from the relation in which they stand to the ceremony" (as eulogistic of it).

As a different reading and interpretation of this Sūtra are given by Sāyaṇa in his commentary, p. 20, I shall quote it, and the remarks with which he introduces and follows it:

Nānu vede kuachād evaṁ śrūyatā "vanaspatayaḥ satram āsata sarpāḥ satram āsata" iti | tatra vanaspataṁ echetanatvāt sarpāṁ echetanatvāt 'pi vidyā-rahilatvād na tad-anuṣṭhānaṁ sambhavati | Ato "Jāradgavva gāyati madrakāṇi" ityādy-umattā-bāla-vākya-sādṛṣṭvāt kenacht kṛite vedeḥ ity āsāṅkya uttarāṁ sūtrayati | "Kṛite cha aviniyogāḥ syāt karmāṇaḥ sanatvāt" | Yadi jyotsīṭomādi-vākyaṁ kenacht puruṣheṇa kriyeta tādāvil kṛite tāsmin vākya svarga-sādhanatvāt jyotsīṭomāsa viniyogaḥ na syāt | sādhya-sādhana-bhāvasya puruṣheṇa jñātum āsāṅkyatvāt | śrūyate tu viniyogaḥ | "jyotsīṭomaṇaṁ svarga-kāmoṣaṁ yajeta" iti | nā cha etat umattā-vākya-sādṛṣṭāṁ laukika-viḍhī-vaikya-vaib bhāṣya-karangoṭi-kartavyata-ṛūpais trībhīṣaṁ aśitas vṛttaśāyaḥ bhāvanāyaḥ avagaman | lokha hi "brāhmaṇāṁ bhajayaḥ" iti vīdhau kiṁ kena kathāṁ ity ākāṅkṣāyāṁ

87 In his commentary on the following aphorism Sābāra Svāmin gives only a part of this quotation, consisting of the words Jāradgavva gāyati māttakaṁi, "An old ox sings senseless words;" and adds the remark: kathāṁ viṁsa jāradgavva gāyeth, "How now, can an old ox sing?" We must not therefore with the late Dr. Ballantyne take jāradgavva for a proper name.
triptim udhyāya ođanena dravyena śaka-sūpādi-pariveshaṇa-prakārena iti yathā uchyate jyotishtoma-vidhāv api svargam udhyāya somena dravyena ātikṣaṇīyaśd-angopakāra-prakārena ity ukte katham unnatta-vākya-sadṛśam bhaved iti | vanaspaty-ādi-satra-vākyam api na tat-sadriśaṁ tasya satra-karmaṇa jyotishtomādinaṇa samatvāt | yat-paro hi śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ iti nyāya-vidaḥ aḥuḥ | jyotishtomādi-vākyasya vidhāyakatvād anushṭhāne tatparyam | vanaspaty-ādi-satra-vākyasya arthavādatvād prasāṁsāyāṁ tatparyam | sa cha gviyamānenāpi karttuvū sakyate | achenād avidvāṁso 'pi satram anushṭhītavantaḥ kim punaḥ chetanāḥ vidvāmso brāhmaṇāḥ iti satra-stutiḥ |

“But it will be objected that the Veda contains such sentences as this: ‘trees and serpents sat down at a sacrifice.’ Now, since trees are insensible, and serpents, though possessing sensibility, are destitute of knowledge, it is inconceivable that either the one or the other should celebrate such a ceremony. Hence, from its resembling the silly talk of madmen and children, as where it says, ‘An old ox sings songs (fit only for the Madras?)’ (see the Second Volume of this work, pp. 481 ff.), the Veda must have been composed by some man. The answer to this doubt is contained in the following Sūtra (which I can only render by a paraphrase): ‘If prescribed by ṛṣi human authority, no rite can have any efficacy; but such ceremonies as the jyotishtoma rest on the authority of the Veda; and narrative texts such as that regarding the trees and serpents have the same intention as precepts, i.e. to recommend sacrifice.’ If the sentence enjoining the jyotishtoma sacrifice had been composed by any man then, as the sentence was so composed, the sacrifice so enjoined would not have been applicable as a means of attaining paradise; for no man could know either the end, or the means of accomplishing it. But the application in question is prescribed in the Veda by the words ‘let him, who seeks paradise, sacrifice with the jyotishtoma.’ Now this injunction does not resemble the talk of a madman, since we recognize in it, as in injunctions of a secular kind, the contemplation of the three characteristics of the action to be performed, viz. its end, means, and mode. For, as when a question is put in regard to the object for which, the instrument through which, and the manner in which the precept, ‘to feed Brahmans,’ is to be fulfilled, we are told that the object is to be their satisfaction, the instrumental substance boiled rice, and the manner, that it is to be served up with
vegetables and condiments;—in the same way, in the Vedic injunction regarding the jyotishṭoma, we are told that paradise is the object, that soma is the instrumental substance, and that the application of the introductory and other portions of the ritual is the manner. And when this is so, how can this precept be compared to the talk of a madman? Nor does the sentence regarding trees, etc., celebrating a sacrifice, admit of such a comparison, since the sacrifice in question is similar to the jyotishṭoma and other such rites. For logicians say that the meaning of a word is the sense which it is intended to intimate. The purport of the sentence regarding the jyotishṭoma, which is of a preceptive character, is to command performance. The object of the sentence regarding trees, etc., attending at a sacrifice, which is of a narrative character, is eulogy; and this can be offered even by a thing which has no real existence. The sacrifice is eulogized by saying that it was celebrated even by insensible trees and ignorant serpents: how much more, then, would it be celebrated by Brāhmans possessed both of sensation and knowledge!"

The following passage from the Nyāya-mālā-vistara, a treatise containing a summary of the doctrines of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, by Mādhava Āchāryya, the brother of Sāyaṇa Āchāryya (see above, p. 66) repeats some of the same reasonings contradicting the idea that the Veda had any personal author (i. 1, 25, 26):

Paursheyaṁ na vā veda-vākyam syat paurusheyatā | Kāthakādi- 
samākhyaṇād vākyatvāḥ chaṇya-vākya-vat | Samākhya' dhyāpakatvam vākyatvam tu parāhatam | Tatkaritr-anupalambhaṇa syāt tato paurushey- 
yatā | Kāthakaṁ Kauṭhumā Taittiriyakam ityādi samākhyaṁ tat-tad- 
veda-vishayā loke dṛṣṭā | taddhita-pratyayaṁcha tena praktam ity 
asmin arthe varttate | tathā sati Vyūṣena praktaṁ Vaiyāśikam Bhāra-t 
am ity-udāv iva paurusheyatvam praṇīyate | kincha | vimataṁ veda-vāk- 
yam paurusheyam vākyatvāḥ | Kālidāsādi-vāhya-vaad iti prāpte brūmaḥ | 
adhyāyena-sampradāya-pravṛttakatvam samākhyaṁ upapadyate | Kālidā- 
sādi-granthakshet-sargavasāne karttāraṁ upalabhyyante | tathā vedaśṛpi 
paurusheyatve tat-kartā upalabhyyeta na cha upalabhyyate | aṭo vākyatva-
hetuḥ pratikūla-tarka-parāhataḥ | tasmād aparusha-yo vedaḥ | tathā sati 
purusha-buddhi-kriṣṭasya aprāmāṇyaṁ anāśankāntiyatvād viḍhi-vākyasya 
dharma prāmāṇyaṁ susthitam | 88

88 I have extracted this passage from Prof. Goldstücker's text of the Nyāya-mālā-
"[Verses] ‘Is the word of the Veda derived from a personal author or not? It must (some urge) be so derived, since (1) it bears the names of Kāṭhaka, etc., and (2) has the characters of a sentence, like other sentences. No (we reply); for (1) the names arose from particular persons being teachers of the Vedas, and (2) the objection that the Vedic precepts have the characters of common sentences is refuted by other considerations. The Veda can have no personal author, since it has never been perceived to have had a maker.’ [Comment] It is objected (1) that the names Kāṭhaka, Kaūthuma, Taittirīyaka, etc., are applied in common usage to the different Vedas; and the taddhita affix by which these appellations are formed, denotes ‘uttered by’ [Kuṭha, Kuthumi, and Tittirī] (comp. Pāṇini, iv. 3, 101). Such being the case, it is clear that these parts of the Vedas are derived from a personal author, like the Mahābhārata, which is styled Vaiyāsika, because it was uttered by Vyāsa, etc. And further (2), the sentences of the Veda, being subject to different interpretations, must have had a personal author, because they have the properties of a sentence, like the sentences of Kālidāsa, etc. To this we reply (1) the name applied to any Veda originates in the fact that the sage whose name it bears, was an agent in transmitting the study of that Veda. But (2) in the books of Kālidāsa and others, the authors are discoverable [from the notices] at the end of each section. Now if the Veda also were the composition of a personal author, the composer of it would, in like manner, be discoverable; but such is not the case. Hence, the objection that the Veda partakes of the nature of common sentences is refuted by opposing considerations. Consequently the Veda is not the work of a personal author. And such being the case, as we cannot suspect in it any fallibility occasioned by the defects of human reason, the preceptive texts of the Veda are demonstrated to be authoritative in questions of duty.’

II.—Vedārtha-prakāśa. The verses just quoted are repeated in the Vedārtha-prakāśa of Mādhava on the Taittirīya Sanhitā (p. 26), with a various reading at the beginning of the third line, viz. “samākhyañam pravachanat” instead of “samākhya ‘āhyāpakatvena.” The comment by which the verses are explained in the same work, is as follows:

Vālmikiyaṁ Vaiyāsikīyam ityādi-samākhyañād Rāmāyaṇa-Bhāratāvistara; and I am indebted to the same eminent scholar for some assistance in my translation of it.
“It may be said (1) that as the Rāmāyaṇa, the Mahābhārata, and other such books, are regarded as the works of personal authors from the epithets Vālmikiya (composed by Vālmiki), Vaiyāsikīya (composed by Vyāsa), etc., which they bear, so too the Veda must have had a similar origin, since it is called by the appellations of Kāthaka, Kauthuma, Taittirīya, etc.; and further (2), that the sentences of the Veda must have had this origin, because they possess the properties of a common sentence, like those of Kālidāsa and others. But these objections are unfounded, for (1) the appellations of those parts of the Veda are derived from the sages who were agents in transmitting the study of them; and (2) the objection about the Vērā having the properties of a common sentence is opposed to the fact that no author was ever perceived, and so proceeds upon an erroneous generalization.

For though Vyāsa and Vālmiki, etc., when employed in the composition of their respective works, were perceived by some persons to be so en-

89 This phrase thus translated (kōltayyopadēśta) is a technical term in the Nyāya philosophy, denoting one of the hetu-abhāsas, or “mere semblances of reasons,” and is thus defined in the Nyāya-sūtras, i. 49, Kōltayyopadēśta kūlētā, which Dr. Ballantyne (Apophisms of the Nyāya, p. 42) thus explains: “That [semblance of a reason] is mis-timed, which is adduced when the time is not [that when it might have availed]. For example, suppose one argues that] fire does not contain heat, because it is fictitious, his argument is mis-timed if we have already ascertained by the superior evidence of the senses that fire does contain heat.” It does not, however, appear, how the essential validity of an argument can depend at all on the time when it is adduced, as is justly observed by Professor Goldstücker, who has favoured me with his opinion on the sense of the phrase. After consulting the commentary of Vātsyāyana in loco, he thinks the aphorism (which is not very distinctly explained by the commentators) must denote the erroneous transference of a conclusion deduced from the phenomena happening at one “time,” i.e. belonging to one class of cases, to another class which does not exhibit, or only apparently exhibits, the same phenomena; in short, a vicious generalization.
gaged, and are known by others also [in after ages] to be the authors, from the existence of an unbroken tradition to that effect;—no human author of the Veda has ever been perceived. On the contrary, we have formerly shown that the eternity of the Veda is declared both by itself and by the Smṛiti. And even if the Supreme Spirit be the maker of it, still he is not a mundane person; and consequently, as no defect exists in the maker, there is no reason to suspect fallibility in his work."

No notice has been taken by these commentators of an objection which might have been raised to the validity of this reasoning, viz. that the hymns of the Rich and other Vedas are all set down in the Anu-kramaṇās, or indices to those works, as being uttered by particular rishis; the rishis being, in fact, there defined as those whose words the hymns were—yasya vākyam sa rishiḥ.⁹⁰ (See Colebrooke’s Misc. Ess. i. 26, or p. 12 of Williams and Norgate’s ed.) Though, however, this objection has not been alluded to in any of the preceding passages, an answer has been provided to it in the well-known assertion of the orthodox Indian writers that the rishis did not compose, but only saw and afterwards repeated the hymns and other parts of the Vedas, which had in reality pre-existed from eternity.

Thus, in the Vedārtha-prakāsa c. tae Taittirīya Sanhitā, p. 11, it is said: Aśṭādhiyārtā-draśṭārāḥ rishayah | Teshām veda-draśṭārīvatvāṁ smaryate | Yugante 'rtarhitān ⁹¹ Vedān setihāsān maharshayaḥ | Lebhira tapasā pūrvarvan anujītātāḥ svayambhuvāḥ | (Mahābhārata, Saṁtiparvan, verse 7660. See above, p. 49.) "The rishis were seers of things beyond the reach of the bodily senses. The fact of their seeing the Vedas is recorded in the Smṛiti: 'The great rishis, empowered by Svayambhū, formerly obtained, through devotion, the Vedas and the Itihāsas which had disappeared at the end of the [preceding] Yuga.'"

So, too, Manu (as already quoted, Vol. I. p. 394) says, in similar, although more general language: Prajāpatiḥ idaṁ śāstraṁ tapasaiva- śrijat prabhūḥ | Tathaiva vedān rishayas tapasıḥ pratypedire | "Prajāpati created this Śāstra (the Institutes of Manu) by austere-fervour (tapas); and by the same means the rishis obtained the Vedas."

⁹⁰ Some passages from the Nirukta on this subject will be quoted in a later part of this volume.

⁹¹ The text of the Biblioth. Ind. reads tarhi tān. I have followed the M. Bh., which evidently gives the true reading.
OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORIGIN, ETC.

The following extract from the account of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā philosophy, given in the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha of Mādhava Āchārya (Bibliotheca Indica, pp. 127 ff.), contains a fuller summary of the controversy between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas respecting the grounds on which the authority of the Veda should be regarded as resting:

Syūd etāt | vedasya kathām ‘apauruṣheyatvam abhiḍhīyate | tat-pratipādaka-pramāṇābhāvāt kathām manyetāḥ ‘apauruṣheyaḥ vedāḥ | samprādāyavichhedo satye asamyayamāṇa-karttikātadvād ātma-vad iti | tad etad manḍaṁ viṣeṣhayāsiddheḥ | puṣruṣheya-veda-vaḍibhiḥ pralaya samprādāya-vichhedasya kakṣikaranat. | kincha kim idam asamyayamāṇa-karttikatvam naṁ | apratīyamāṇa-karttikatvam asamaraṇa-gochara-karttikatvam vā | na prathamaḥ kalkha Paramesvarasya karttuḥ pramiter abhyupagamat | na devityo ekaipūṣhatvāt | tatāḥ hi | kim ekena asamaraṇam abhipryate sarvair vā | na ādyah | “yo dharma-sīlo jīta-māna-roṣhaḥ” ityādīshu muṭkakoktisu vyabhichārāt | na devityah | sarvāsamarasya asarvajna-durjñānataḥ |

Pauruṣheyatve pramāṇa-sambhavāc ēva veda-vākyāṇi pauruṣhayāni | vākyateōt | Kālidāsādi-vākyavat | veda-vākyāṇi āpta-pragītāni | pramāṇate sati ākhyatvād Manvā-ādi-vā’ya-vad iti |

Nanu | “Vedasyādhyayanaṁ sarvam guru-adhyayam-pūrvakam | vedādhīyana-sāmānyad adhunā ‘dhyayanaṁ yathā” | ity anumānām prati sādhananā pragābhate iti chet | tad api na pramāṇa-koṭim praveshtum āsīt | “Bhūrātādhyayanaṁ sarvam guru-adhyayana-pūrvakam | Bhūrātādhyayanaṁ pramāṇa-samprātādhīyanāṁ yathā” iti ābhūṣa-sāmānya-yogasākṣemāt | nanu tatra Vyāsāḥ karttā iti smaryate “ka hy anyah Puṇḍarīk-kṣhād Mahābhārata-krīd bhavet” ity-ādāv iti chet | tad asāram | “richaḥ sāmāni jajnire | chhandāṁsi jajnire tasmād yajas tas-mād ajayaṁ” iti puruṣa-sūke vedaṣya sa-karttikāt-pratipādanat |

Kincha anitāyaḥ sabdaḥ sāmānyavattte sati asmad-ādi-vāhcyendriya-grāhyatvād ghata-vat | nanu idam ekaipūṣhatvān sa evāyaṁ ga-kūraḥ ity pratyabhijnā-pramāṇa-pratihatat iti chet | tad ati phalgu “lūna-punar-jāto-kṣa-dalita-kund”-ādæv ita pratyabhijnāyāḥ sāmānya-vishayatvena bādhakatvābhūvat |

Nanu asarirasya Paramesvarasya tāl-vādi-sthānābhāvena varnochchārausambhavāt kathāṁ tat-pranitatavaṁ vedasya syād iti chet | na tad bhadrāṁ svabhāvato ‘sarirasyāpi tasya bhaktanugrahārthaṁ tīlā-vigraha-
graḥana-sambhavat | tasmād vedasya apauruṣhayatva-vāche yuktir na
yuktā iti chet |

Tatra samādhanam abhīdhiyate | Kim idam pauruṣaḥyatvaṃ sīdhaḥhi-
shitam | puruṣād-dvāpanātva-mātram | yathā asmad-ādibhir ahar ahar
uucchāryaṃ mānasasya vedasya | pramāṇāntareṇa artham upalabhya tāt-
prakāśadhīya rachitaṃtvā vā | yathā asmad-ādibhir īva nibadhyakāmasya
prabandhasya | prathama na vipratipattih | charame kim anumāna-balat
tat-sādhanam āgama-balād vā | va ādyāḥ | Mālati-mādhavādi-vākyeshu
savyabhāṣāratvāt | atha pramāṇātve sati iti viśishyate iti chet | tad api
na vipāśchito manasi vaiśadyam āpadyate | pramāṇāntara-gochaḥarārtha-
pratipādaṃ kā hākāyaṃ Veda-vākyam | tat pramāṇāntara-gochaḥarārha-
pratipādam iti sādhyamāne “mama mātā bandhya” iti ca vayāghatā-
pātāḥ | kineha Paramesvarasya itī - vīgraḥa-parigrahaḥbhavyagam epy
ātindriyārtha-dārsanāṃ na sanjāghatītī deśa-bāla-svabhāva-viprakriṣ-
tārtha-grahaṇopāyabhāvāt | na cha tach-chakshu-ādikam eva ṛtaṃ-
prāti-janaṇa-kshamam iti mantavyam | dṛṣṭāntusāraṇāiva kalpaṃyāḥ
āsravāniyāvāt | tad uktam Gurubhiḥ sarvajña- nirākaraṇa-velāyām
“yatayā atisayo dṛṣṭaḥ sa svārthānapālaṇāhād | dāra-sākhānaḍi-
dreṣṭau syād na rūpe srotos-vrīttitā” iti | atāḥ eva na āgama-balāt tat-
sādhanam |

“Tena prakatam” iti Pāṇini-anuśasāṃ jāgratī api Kāṭhaka-Kālāpa-
Tattvīryām ityādi-samākkhyā adhyayana-sampradāya-pravarttaka-viśa-
yatvena upapadyate | tad-cad atrāpi sampradāya-pravarttaka-viśaya-
tvenāpy upapadyate | na cha anumāna-balāt sabdasya anityateva-siddhiḥ |
pratyabhijnā-viddhāt | . . . .

Nanv idam pratyabhijnānam gatvādi-jāti-viśayaḥ na gōdi-vyakti-
vishayaḥ tāsām prati-puruṣam bhedopalambhad | anyathā “Somājāmā
dhite” iti vibhago na syād iti chet | tad api sōbhaṇi na bīhartya gōdi-
vyakti-bhode pramāṇābhāvena gatvādi-jāti-viśaya-kalpanāyām pramāṇa-
bhavāt | Yathā gatvam ajānataḥ ekam eva ṛhuṇā-desa-parināma-sāṃ-
sthāna-vyakti-udāhāna-casād bhīna-deśam iva alpaṃ iva mahād iva
dīrgham iha vāmanam iva prathate tathā ga-vyaktim ajānataḥ ekā ‘pi
vyānjanaka-bhedaṃ tat-tat-dharmāṇubāndhikī pratiḥbāṣate | etena viṃ-
dha-dharmadhiyāsād bheda-pratibhāsaḥ iti pratyuktam | tatra kim
svabhāviko viṃdha-dharmadhiyāso bheda-sādhaṅkātreṇa abhimataḥ prā-
tikā vā | prathama asidhaḥ | aparathā svabhāviko-bhedadhyapagam
ēko ga-kaṇān udāchārayat Chaitra iti pratipattih syād na tu dāsa-
kritvo ga-śaivä iti | devitye tu na svābhāvika-bheda-siddhiḥ | na hi paropādhi-bhedena svābhāvikam aikyaṁ vihanyate | mā bhumu nabhao 'pi kumbhādy-upadhi-bhedāt svābhāviko bhedaḥ | ... tad uktam āchārya-yaiḥ | 'prayaojanaṁ tu yaj jātēs tad varṇād eva labhyate | vyakti-labhyaṁ tu nādevyaḥ iti gataśāy-dhār eriṁāḥ | iti | tathā cha 'pratyabhijñā yaṁ sabā jāgartyā niravagrahā | anityatvānumānāṇi saiva sarvāṇi bā-dhate' | ... tataḥ cha vedasya apaurusheyatayā nirasta-samasta-sāṅkā- kalankā-kuratsena svataḥ siddham āharme prāmāṇyam iti susthitam |

"Be it so. But how [the Naiyāyikas may ask] is the Veda alleged to be undivered from any personal author? How can you regard the Vedas as being thus undivered, when there is no evidence by which this character can be substantiated? The argument urged by you Mi-mānsakas is, that while there is an unbroken tradition, still no author of the Veda is remembered, in the same way as [none is remembered] in the case of the soul (or self). But this argument is very weak, because the asserted characteristics [unbrokenness of tradition, etc.] are not proved; since those who maintain the personal origin [i.e. origin from a person] of the Veda, object that the tradition [regarding the Veda] was interrupted at the dissolution of the universe (pralaya). And further: what is meant by the assertion that no author of the Veda is remembered? Is it (1) that no author is believed? or (2) that no author is the object of recollection? The first alternative cannot be accepted, since it is acknowledged [by us] that God (Paramesvarā) is proved to be the author. Nor can the second alternative be admitted, as it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma, viz. Is it meant (a) that no author of the Veda is recollected by some one person, or (b) by any person whatever? The former supposition breaks down, since it fails when tried by such detached stanzas as this, 'he who is religious, and has overcome pride and anger,' etc. And the latter supposition is inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any person whatever.

22 This objection occurs in a passage of the Kusumāṣṭa, which I shall quote further on.

23 I do not know from what work this verse is quoted, or what is its sequel. To prove anything in point, it must apparently go on to assert that such a saint as is here described remembers the author of the Veda, or at least has such superhuman faculties as would enable him to discover the author.
OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS.

"And moreover, [the Naiyāyikas proceed], the sentences of the Veda must have originated with a personal author, as proof exists that they had such an origin, since they have the character of sentences, like those of Kālidāsa and other writers. The sentences of the Veda have been composed by competent persons, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.

"But [ask the Mīmāṃsakas] may it not be assumed that, 'All study of the Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character, which was the same in former times as now;' and that this inference has force to prove [that the Veda had no author or was eternal]? Such reasoning [the Naiyāyikas answer] is of no force as proof, [for it might be urged, with an equal show of reason, that] 'All study of the Mahābhārata was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since the study of the Mahābhārata, from the mere fact of its being such, [must have had the same character in former times] as it has now;' and the advantage of such an argument is simply illusory. But the [Mīmāṃsakas will ask whether there is not a difference between these two cases of 'the Veda and the Mahābhārata, since] the Smṛiti declares that [Vishṇu incarnate as] Vyāsa was the author of the latter,—according to such texts as this, 'Who else than Puṇḍarikāksha (the lotus-eyed Vishṇu) could be the maker of the Mahābhārata?' (see above, p. 39),—[whilst nothing of this sort is recorded in any Śāstra in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is powerless, since it is proved by these words of the Purushasūkta, 'From him sprang the Rich and Śāman verses and the metres, and from him the Yajush verses,' (above, p. 3) that the Veda had a maker.

"Further [proceed the Naiyāyikas] we must suppose that sound [on the eternity of which the eternity and uncreatedness of the Veda depend] is not eternal, since, while it has the properties belonging to a

94 The purport of this verse is, that as every generation of students of the Veda must have been preceded by an earlier generation of teachers, and as there is no reason to assume any variation in this process by supposing that there ever had been any student who taught himself; we have thus a regressus ad infinitum, and must of necessity conclude that the Vedas had no author, but were eternal.
OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORIGIN, ETC.,

...genus, it can, like a jar, be perceived by the external organs of beings such as ourselves. But [rejoin the Mīmāṃsakas], is not this inference of yours refuted by the proof arising from the fact that we recognise the letter G [for example] as the same we have heard before? This argument [replies the Naiyāyika] is extremely weak, for the recognition in question having reference to a community of species,—as in the case of such words as 'hairs cut and grown again, or of full-blown jasmine,' etc.,—has no force to refute my assertion [that letters are not eternal].

"But [asks the Mīmāṃsaka] how can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Paramēśvara (God), who has no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot be conceived to have pronounced the letters [of which it is composed]? This objection [answers the Naiyāyika] is not happy, because, though Paramēśvara is by nature incorporeal, he can yet, by way of sport, assume a body, in order to shew kindness to his devoted worshippers. Consequently, the arguments in favour of the doctrine that the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive.

"I shall now [says the Mīmāṃsaka] clear up all these difficulties. What is meant by this pauśheyaśata (‘derivation from a personal author’) which it is sought to prove? Is it (1) mere procession (utgannata) from a person (purusha), like the procession of the Veda from persons such as ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2) is it the arrangement—with a view to its manifestation—of knowledge acquired by other modes of proof, in the sense in which persons like ourselves compose a treatise? If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute. If the second sense be meant, I ask whether the Veda is proved [to be authoritative] in virtue (a) of its being founded on inference, or (b) of its being founded on supernatural information (āgama-balat)? The former alternative (a) [i.e. that the Veda derives its authority from being founded on inference] cannot be correct, since this theory breaks down, if it be applied to the sentences of the Mālāti Mādhava or any other secular poem [which may contain inferences destitute of authority]. If, on the other hand, you say (b), that the contents of the Veda are distinguished from those of other books by having authority, this explanation also will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the word of the Veda is [defined to be] a word which proves things that are not...
provable by any other evidence. Now if it could be established that this Vedic word did nothing more than prove things that are provable by other evidence, we should be involved in the same sort of contradiction as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even if we conceded that Paramesvara might in sport assume a body, it would not be conceivable that [in that case] he should perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in time, and in nature. Nor is it to be thought that his eyes and other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge, since men can only attain to conceptions corresponding with what they have perceived. This is what has been said by the Guru (Prabhakara) when he refutes [this supposition of] an omniscient author: 'Whenever any object is perceived [by the organ of sight] in its most perfect exercise, such perception can only have reference to the vision of something very distant or very minute, since no organ can go beyond its own proper objects, as e.g. the ear can never become cognizant of form.' Hence the authority of the Veda does not arise in virtue of any supernatural information [acquired by the Deity in a corporeal shape].

"Without any contravention of the rule of Pāṇini (iv. 3, 101; see above, p. 83) that the grammatical affix with which the words Kāṭhaka, Kālāpa, and Taṅtiriya are formed, imparts to those derivatives the sense of 'uttered by' Kātha, Kalāpa, etc., it is established that the names first mentioned have reference [not to those parts of the Veda being composed by the sages in question, but] to the fact that these sages instituted the practice of studying those parts of the Veda. Here also these appellations ought to be understood in the same manner, as referring to the fact of those sages being the institutions of the study of the Veda; and we are not to think that the eternity of sound [or of the words of the Veda] is disproved by the force of any inference [to be drawn from those names], since this would be at variance with the recognition [of letters as the same we knew before] (see above, Mīmāṃsā Sūtras, i. 19 f., p. 75).

"But [the Naiyāyikas will ask] does not the recognition [of G and other letters as the same we knew before] refer to them as belonging to the [same] species, and not as being the [same] individual letters, since, in fact, they are perceived to be different [as uttered by] each

93 Literally "although the rule of Pāṇini be awake."
person,—for otherwise it would be impossible for us to make any distinc-
tion [between different readers, as when we say], ‘Somaśarman is reading?’ This objection, however, shines as little as its predecessors, and has been answered in this way, viz. that as there is no proof of any distinction of individuality between G’s, etc., there is no evidence that we ought to suppose any such thing as a species of G’s, etc. [i.e. of G’s and other letters each constituting a species]. Just as to the man who is ignorant that G’s constitute a species, [that letter], though one only, becomes, through distinction of place, magnitude, form, individuality, and position, variously modified as distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, or as short, in the same way, to the man who is ignorant of an individuality of G’s, [i.e. of G’s being numerically different from each other], this letter, though only one, appears, from the distinction existing between the different persons who utter it, to be connected with their respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way erroneously ascribed [to the letter G], there is a falla-
cious appearance of distinctness [between different G’s]. But does this ascription of contrary characters which is thus regarded as creating a difference [between G’s] result from (1) the nature of the thing, or (2) from mere appearance? There is no proof of the first alternative, as otherwise an inherent difference being admitted between different G’s, it would be established that Chaitra had uttered ten [different] G’s, and not [the same] G ten times. But on the second supposition, there is no proof of any inherent distinction [between G’s]; for inherent oneness (or identity) is not destroyed by a difference of extrinsic disguises [or characteristics]. We must not conceive, from the merely apparent distinctness [occasioned by the separation of its parts] by jars, etc., that there is any inherent distinctness in the atmosphere itself. . . . It has been said by the Āchāryya ‘The object which the Naiyāyikas seek, by supposing a species, is in fact gained from the letter itself; and the object at which they aim by supposing an individuality in letters, is attained from audible sounds (i.e. the separate utterances of the different letters), so that the hypothesis of species, etc., is useless.’ And he thus reaches the conclusion that, ‘since, in respect of sounds (letters), recognition has so irresistible a power, [literally, wakes, unrestrained], it alone repels all inferences against the eternity [of sound, or the Veda].’ After some further
argumentation the Mīmāṃsaka arrives at the conclusion that "as every
imputation of doubt which has germinated has been set aside by the
underived character of the Veda, its authority in matters of duty is
shewn to be self-evident."

I shall not attempt to carry further my translation of this abstruse
discussion, as the remainder of it contains much which I should find
great difficulty in comprehending. 56

[Although not directly connected with the subject in hand, the fol-
lowing passage from Śankara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtras, iii.
2, 40, 57 will throw some further light on the doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā.
In the two preceding Sūtras, as explained by Śankara, it had been
asserted, both on grounds of reason and on the authority of the Veda,
that God is the author of rewards. In the 40th Sūtra a different doc-
trine is ascribed to Jaimini:

Dharmaṁ Jaiminir. ataḥ eva | Jaiminie tv āchāryyo dharmaṁ phalasya
datāram manyate | ata eva hetoh śrutrer upapattes cha | śrāyate tāvad
ayam arthaḥ "svarga-kāma yajeta" ity evam ādīshu vākyeshu | tatra cha
vidhi-śrutrer viśhāya-dhāvopagamad yāgaḥ svargasya utpādakaḥ iti gam-
yate | anyathā hy anunushtḥāṭiko yāgaḥ āpadyeta tatra asya upadesasya
vaiyarthyaṁ syat | nanv anukshanā-vināśinaḥ karmadyah phalāṁ na upa-
padyade iti parityokto 'yam pakshaḥ | na esa doshaḥ śrutı̄-prāmāṇyaḥ | śrutis
chet pramāṇam yathā 'yam karma-phala-sambandhaḥ śrutas upa-
padyate tathā kalpasyatavyaḥ | na cha anupadāya kimapu aparvan karma
vināśyaḥ kalāntaritam phalaṁ datum śaknoti ity ataḥ karmaṇo vā sūkhma
kācid uttarāvastha phalasya vā pūrvavastha aparvan nāma asti iti tark-
yate | upapadyate cha ayam arthaḥ uktena prakāreṇa | Īśvaras tu phalaṁ
dādāti ity anupapannam avichitrasya kāraṇasya vīchitra-kāryyo anupapat-
tēḥ vaishamyā-nairghṛinya-prasangad anushṭhāna-vaiyarthāpattes cha |
tāsmād dharmad eva phalāṁ iti |

"'Jaimini says that for this reason virtue [is the giver of reward].'
The Āchāryya Jaimini regards virtue [i.e. the performance of the pre-
scribed rites and duties] as the bestower of reward. 'For this reason,'

56 In fact I have left out some pages of the translation which I had given in the
first edition, as well as the corresponding portion of the text. I am indebted to the
kindness of Professor Goldstücker for various suggestions towards the improvement of
my translation. But two of the passages on which he had favoured me with his
opinion are, to my own apprehension, so obscure, that I have omitted them.
57 It is partly quoted in Prof. Banerjea's work on Hindu Philosophy.
and because it is proved by the Veda. This is the purport of the Vedic text, ‘Let the man who seeks paradise, sacrifice,’ and others of the same kind. As from this Vedic injunction we must infer the existence of an object [to be sought after] it is concluded that sacrifice has the effect of producing heavenly bliss; for otherwise we should be involved in the absurdity of a sacrifice without a performer [since no one would care to sacrifice without an object], and thus the injunction would become fruitless. But may it not be said that it is not conceivable that any fruit should result from a ceremony which perishes every moment, so that this view must be abandoned? No, this defect does not attach to our Mimāṃsaka statement, since the Veda is authoritative. If the Veda be authority, this connection of the reward with the ceremony must be supposed to exist just as is proved by the Veda. But as a ceremony which perishes without generating any unseen virtue, cannot produce a reward at a distant time, it must be concluded that there is either a certain subtle ulterior form of the ceremony, or a certain subtle anterior form of the reward, which is called ‘unseen virtue.’ And this result is established in the manner before mentioned. But it it is not proved that God bestows rewards, because it is inconceivable that a uniform Cause [such as He is] should produce various effects, and because the performance of ceremonies would be useless, owing to the partiality and unmercifulness which would attach [to the supposed arbiter of men’s deserts]. Hence it is from virtue alone that reward results.”

How far this passage may be sufficient to prove the atheism of the Mīmāṃsā, I will not attempt to say. Before we could decide on such a question, the other Sūtras of that school which refer to this question (if there be any such) would have to be consulted.

Professor Banerjea also quotes the following text from the popular work, the Vidvan-modā-tāranga, in which the Mīmāṃsakas are distinctly charged with atheism:

Devo nā kaśchid bhuvanasya karittā bhartā na karittā ‘pi cha kaśchid āste | karmānu-pāṇī sukhāsūbhāni praṇāti sarve hi janaḥ phalāni | vedasāḥ karittā na cha kaśchid āste nityāḥ hi śabdāḥ rachaṇā hi nityā | prāmāṇyaṁ asmin svataḥ eva siddham anādi-siddheḥ parataḥ kathaṁ tat |

“There is no God, maker of the world; nor has it any sustainer or destroyer; for every man obtains a recompense in conformity with his
works. Neither is there any maker of the Veda, for its words are eternal, and their arrangement is eternal. Its authoritiveness is self-demonstrated, for since it has been established from eternity, how can it be dependent upon anything but itself?"

I learn from Professor Banerjee that the Mīmāṃsaka commentator Prabhākara and his school treat the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā as an atheistic system, while Kumārila makes it out to be theistic. In fact the latter author makes the following complaint at the commencement of his Vārttika, verse 10: Prāyaṇaiva hi Mīmāṃsā loke lokāyatikītā | tām āstika-pathe kartum ayaṁ yatnāḥ kṛito mayā | "For in practice the Mīmāṃsā has been for the most part converted into a Lokāyata (atheistic) system; but I have made this effort to bring it into a theistic path." See also the lines which are quoted from the Padma Purāṇa by Vijnāna Bhikshu, commentator on the Sāṅkhya aphorisms, in a passage which I shall adduce further on.]

It appears from a passage in Patanjali’s Mahābhāshya, that that great grammarian was of opinion that, although the sense of the Veda is eternal, the order of the words has not continued uniform; and that it is from this order having been variously fixed by Kātha, Kalāpa, and other sages, that different portions of the Indian scriptures are called by their names.

The following passages from the Mahābhāshya, and from the Commentaries of Kaṭiyāra and Nāgojībhaṭṭa thereon, are extracted from the fuller quotations given by Professor Goldstücker in pp. 147 ff. of the Preface to his Māṇava-kalpa-sūtra.

Patanjali: Nanu cha uktam “na hi chhandāṃsi kriyante nityāni chhan-
dāṃsi” iti | yadyapy artho nityāḥ | yā tv asau varṇāṇupūrva śā anityā
tad-bhedāḥ cha etad bhavati Kāṭhakaṁ Kālāpakam Maudakam Paippalā-
dakam ityādi . . . . | Kaṭiyāra: “Nityāni” iti | karttur asmaranyā teshām iti bhāvaḥ | “yā tv asū” iti | mahāpralayādīsahu varṇāṇupūrva-
vināśo punar utpadya rishayaḥ saṁskārātiśayād vedārthaṁ smṛtvā sabda-
raçhanaḥ viñādhati ity arthaḥ | “tad-bhedā” iti | anupūrva-bhedaḥ ity arthaḥ | tataḥ cha Kāṭhūdaya vedāṇupūrvaḥ karttārāḥ eva ityādi | Nāgojībhaṭṭa: Aṁśena vedasya nityatvam svākritya aṁśena anityatvam āha “yadyapy arthaḥ” iti | anena vedatvam śabdārthobhayā-śrītī-āvainitvam | nanu “dhātā yatā pūrvaḥ akalpayad” ityādi-śruti-balena

56 See Colebrooke’s Misc. Ess. i. 402 ff., or p. 259 ff. of Williams and Norgate’s ed.
In the context of the Vedic sacrifices, the act of fire-announcement is described as an important ritual element. This process involves the priest saying, "Mahapralayadise" (lit. 'let the universe be annihilated'). Following this, the priest sets fire to the offerings (ahāvā) and observes the ritual sequence. The text highlights the role of the priest in these actions, emphasizing the transformation that occurs during the act of sacrificing. The priest acts as an intermediary between the deity and the gods, ensuring the successful completion of the sacrificial ritual. The text also mentions the importance of the priest's role in maintaining the continuity of religious practices and knowledge. The act of fire-announcement is depicted as a critical component in maintaining the spiritual and religious unity of the community. The text underscores the precision and ritualistic nature of Vedic sacrificial practices, with the priest playing a pivotal role in ensuring the ritual's success.
the words, 'though the sense is eternal,' etc., that it (the Veda) is also in part not eternal. By this clause it is implied that the character of the Veda as such is constituted both by the words and by the sense.29 But is not the order also eternal, since it is a settled doctrine of the modern Mīmāṃsakas, on the strength of such Vedic texts as this, 'the creator made them as before,' etc., that the order also is the very same? No; this is incorrect, and in consequence, he (Kaiyyaṭa) says, 'in the great dissolutions,' etc. Some say the meaning of this is, that the order is not eternal, inasmuch as it is formed in particular moments. But this is wrong, because it is opposed to the conclusion of the sentence, 'though their sense is eternal,' etc., and because the objects signified also, such as the jyotishṭoma sacrifice, are not eternal. Others say that both the sense and the order of the words are eternal [or permanent], owing to the continuity of the tradition; and that, consequently, it is in different manvantaras that the order of the words is different, according to the text, 'in every manvantara this śruti (Veda) is made different.' Others again think that in the words, 'the sense is eternal,' etc., an admission is made by an objector of an eternity opposed to the idea of production, since it is only such a [qualified] eternity that is mentioned in the Veda; and that thus the word 'sense,' or 'object' (arthaḥ), here refers toĪśvara, because he is the principal object which is had in view in the whole of the Veda, according to the words of the Bhagavad-gītā (xv. 15), 'It is I whom all the Vedas seek to know.' He next states the proof of the assertion that the order of the letters is not eternal, in the words, 'through the difference of this,' etc. The difference in the order is proved by the difference in the things included under the category of non-eternity. Difference here means variety. But inĪśvara (God), there is no variety. He declares current usage to be the proof of difference, in the words 'Kāṭhaka,' etc., which mean that, though the sense is the same, we use the distinctions of Kāṭhaka, Kāḷāpaka, etc., in consequence of the difference of arrangement. Here by saying that the order is not eternal, it is implied that the words are the same. And this is what is asserted in the words [of Kaiyyaṭa], 'consequently Kaṭha and the other sages,'" etc.

29 I am indebted to Professor Goldstücker for a correction of my former rendering of this sentence, and of several others in this passage of Nāgojibhaṭṭa.
After quoting these passages at greater length than I have given them, Professor Goldstücker goes on to remark in his note: "I have quoted the full gloss of the three principal commentators, on this important Sūtra [of Pāṇini] and its Vārttikas, because it is of considerable interest in many respects. . . . We see Kaiyyaṭa and Nāgojībhāṭṭa writhing under the difficulty of reconciling the eternity of the Veda with the differences of its various versions, which, nevertheless, maintain an equal claim to infallibility. Patañjali makes rather short work of this much vexed question; and unless it be allowed here to render his expression varṇa (which means 'letter'), 'word,' it is barely possible even to understand how he can save consistently the eternity or permanence of the 'sense' of the Veda. That the modern Mīmāṃsists maintain not only the 'eternity of the sense,' but also the 'permanence of the text,' which is tantamount to the exclusive right of one single version, we learn, amongst others, from Nāgojībhāṭṭa. But as such a doctrine has its obvious dangers, it is not shared in by the old Mīmāṃsists, nor by Nāgoji, as he tells us himself. He and Kaiyyaṭa inform us therefore that, amongst other theories, there is one, according to which the order of the letters (or rather words) in the Vaidik texts got lost in the several Pralayas or destructions of the worlds; and since each manvantara had its own revelation, which differed only in the expression, not in the sense of, the Vaidik texts, the various versions known to these commentators represent these successive revelations, which were 'remembered,' through their 'excessive accomplishments,' by the Rishis, who in this manner produced, or rather reproduced, the texts current in their time, under the name of the versions of the Kaṭhas, Kaḷāpas, and so on. In this way each version had an equal claim to sanctity. There is a very interesting discussion on the same subject by Kumārila, in his Mīmāṃsa-vārttika (i. 3, 10)."

III. The Vedānta.—I proceed to adduce the reasonings by which Bādarāyaṇa, the reputed author of the Brahma, Śārīraka, or Vedānta Sūtras, as expounded by Sankara Āchāryya in his Śārīraka-mīmāṃsa-bhashya, or commentary on those Sūtras, defends the eternity and authority of the Veda. His views, as we shall see, are not by any means identical with those of Jaimini and his school. After discussing the question whether any persons but men of the three highest tribes are qualified for divine knowledge, the author of the Sūtras comes to the conclusion
that Śūdras, or persons of the fourth tribe, are incompetent, while beings superior to man, the gods, are competent¹⁰⁰ (Coblentz’s Misc. Ess. i. 348, or p. 223 of Williams and Norgate’s ed.) In Śūtra, i. 3, 26, the author determines that the gods have a desire for final emancipation, owing to the transitoriness of their glory, and a capacity for attaining it, because they possess the qualities of corporeality, etc.; and that there is no obstacle which prevents their acquiring divine knowledge. A difficulty, however, having been raised that the gods cannot be corporeal, because, if they were so, it is necessary to conceive that they would be corporeally present (as priests actually are) at the ceremonial of sacrifice, in which they are the objects of worship,—a supposition which would not consist with the usual course of such ceremonies, at which the gods are not seen to be corporeally present, and would, in fact, involve an impossibility, since Indra, for example, being but one, could not be corporeally present at numerous sacrifices at once;—this difficulty is solved (under Śūtra i. 3, 27) in two ways, either by supposing (1) that the gods assume different forms, and are present at many sacrifices at once, although invisible to mortals; or by considering (2) that, as a sacrifice is offered to (and not, by) a deity, many persons may present their oblations to that deity at once, just as one Brähman may be saluted by many different persons at the same time. It is, therefore, concluded that the corporeal nature of the gods is not inconsistent with the practice of sacrifice. Having settled these points, Sankara comes to Śūtra i. 3, 28:

“S’abde iti chet | na | atah prabhavat | pratyakshanumabhyam” |

Mā nāma vighrahavatve devādīnām abhyupagamyamāne karmanī kāśchid virodhaḥ prasānji | sabde tu virodhaḥ prasajyeta | katham | Auppattikaṁ hi sabdasya. arthena sambandham āśritya “anapekshavād” iti vedasya prāmāṇyaṁ sthāpitam | Iddānīṁ tu vighrahavati devataḥ bhūyapagamyamānā yādyāpy aśvāryya-yogad yugapād aneka-karma-sambandhīni havinshi bhunjita tathāpi vīgra-vyogad asmad-ādi-vaj janana-maṅavati sa iti nityasya sabdasya anityena arthena nitya-sambandhe prakṣayamānā yad vai dīke sabde prāmāṇyaṁ sthitam tasya virodhaḥ syād iti chet | na ayam apy asti virodhaḥ | kasmād “ataḥ prabhavat” | Ataḥ eva.

¹⁰⁰ For a discussion of the different question whether the gods can practise the ceremonies prescribed in the Vedas, see the First Volume of this work, p. 365, note.
hi vaiśikāt śabdād devadīkaṁ jagat prabhavat | Nanu “janmādi asya yataḥ” (Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 2) iti brahma-prabhavatvam jagato 'vadhāritam katham iha śabda-prabhavatvam uchyate | Apicha yadi nāma vaibdikat śabdād asya prabhava 'bhyupagataḥ katham etāvata virodhaḥ śabdo parihritaḥ | yāvatā Vasuva Rudrā Ṛđityāḥ Vīśvedāḥ Marutaḥ ity etc 'rthaḥ anityāḥ eva utpattimattvāt | Tād-anityayate cha tad-vāchakānaṁ vaiśikānaṁ Vasu-ādi-śabdānāṁ anityatvam kena vāryyate | Prasiddhaṁ hi lokā Devalaṭāṣaṁ putra utpanne Yajñādattaḥ iti tasya nāma kriyate iti | Tasmād virodhaḥ eva śabdo iti oṣṭa na | Gavādi-śabdārtha-sambandha-nityatva-darśanāt | Na hi gavādi-vyaktinām utpattimattvāc tad-ākritinām apy utpattimattvām syād daśṛy-guṇa-karanāṁ hi vyaktayaḥ eva utpadtye ra-ākritayaḥ | Ākritibhiḥ cha śabdānāṁ sambando na vyaktibhiḥ | vyaktināṁ anāntyat sambanda-śravaṇanāyupapatteḥ | Vyaktihṣu utpadya-mānāv apy ākritināṁ nityatvād na gavādi-śabdesu kaśchid virdho driśyate | Tathā devadī-vyakti-prabhavābhṛtyupagam āpī ākriti-nityatvād na kaśchid Vasu-ādi-śabdesu virdhaḥ iti drasṛṭavyam | Ākriti-viśeṣha tu devadīnāṁ mantrārthavādaṅdeḥ bhṛty vṛğhaḥattvādy-avagamā udvagantavyaḥ | Sthāna-viśeṣaṁ sambandaṁ nimitātā cha Indrādi- śabdo senāpatyaśadā śabdo-śrutī | Tataḥ ca yo yas tat tat śthānām adhitishṭhāt sa sa Indrādi- śabdaṁ abhidhiyate iti na dosha bha.āti | Na cha itāṁ śabda-prabhavatvam Brahma-prabhavatva-vad upādāna-karagatvābhuprayeṇa uchyate | kathāṁ tarkī sthiti-vāchakāttamanā nitye śabdo nityartho-sambandhini śabdo-sthāṇavāhara-yogārtha-ṣyākti-nilipattīr “ataḥ prabhavaḥ” ity uchyate | kathāṁ punar avagamya śabdo prabhavati jagad iti | “pratyakṣa-khānumānabhyaṁ” | Pratyakṣhaṁ śrutīḥ | prāmāṇyam prati anapakshātāt | anumāṇāṁ smṛtiḥ | prāmāṇyam prati sāpekṣhātāt | To hi śabdo-pūrvāṁ srīśiṁ darśayataḥ | “Ete” iti vai prajāpati devān asrijata “asrigram” iti manuṣhyaṁ “indavah” iti pitiṁś “tirah pavi-tram” iti grahaṁ “aśavaḥ” iti stotraṁ “visvāni” iti śastrāṁ “abhi saubhagā” ity anyaḥ prajāḥ iti śrutīḥ | Tathā ‘nyatra pī “sa manāsa vācāṁ mithunām samabhavat” (Satăpatha Brahmaṇa x. 6, 5, 4, and Brhadāraṇyaka Upanishad, p. 50) ityādīnaṁ tatra tatra śabda-pūrvāṁ śrīśiṁ śravate | Smṛtīr api “anādi-nidhanā nityaḥ vāg uṣṭṛiṣṭaḥ evavam-bhuvāḥ | ādau vedamāyā śḤyāḥ yataḥ sarvāḥ pravrīttayaḥ” ity utsargo ṣy āyaṁ vāchaḥ sampadāya-pravrīttanāṁmakā drasṛṭavyaḥ anādi-nidhanā-yāḥ anyādīrṣasya utsargasya asambhavat | Tathā “nāma rūpaṁ cha bhū-tānāṁ karmanāṁ cha pravrīttanāṁ | Veda-sabdeḥyā evāduv nirmanaṁ sa
maheśvaṁ” iti | “sarvasṛiṣiṁ cha sa nāmaṁ karmāṇi cha prīthakaḥ prīthakaḥ | Veda-sādabhiṇṇa evaśaḥ prīthakaḥ saṁsthāḥ cha nirmāṁ” iti cha | Apoicīa chikārṣhitam artham anutisṭhita tasya vācakāṁ sabdaṁ pūrvam śrīrīvē paścāt tam artham anutisṭhita iti sarveśaṁ naḥ prayākṣham etat | Tathā praṣāpater api sṛatśuḥ śrisṭeḥ pūrvaṁ vaidikāḥ sabdaḥ manasi prādurbhūtāḥ paścāt tad-anugatām arthān sarvajña iti gavyate | Tathā cha śrutīḥ “sa bhir iti vyāharaṁ bhāṁsa aspijata” ity-evam-ādikā bhir-aḍi-sādabhiṇṇa eva manasi pūrvaṁ subḥā BaşSabdam abhiprētya idāṁ sabda-prahavatvam uchyaṁ | sphaṭam ity aha | . . . Tasmād nityāt sabdaḥ sphaṭa-rupad abhidhyayāt kriyā-kāraka-phala-lakṣaṇaṁ jagad abhidheya-bhūtam prahavatiti | . . . Tatha cha nityebyaḥ sabdebhiṇṇo devaśa-vyaktinām prabhavaḥ ity aviruddham |

Sūtra i. 3, 29. “Ate eva cha nityatvam” | svatantrasya karttuḥ sma- ranāṅaḥ eva hi śhīte vedasya nityate devaśa-vyakti-prabavabhuyapagamena tasya virodham adānāya “ataḥ prabhavaḥ” iti parihiṃtya idānāṁ tad eva veda-nityatvaṁ sthitam draṣṭhayati “ata eva cha nityatvam” iti | atā eva cha nityaśrinter devaśa jagatato veda-sabda-prahavatvād eva veda- sabda-nityatvam api pratyetyayaṁ | Tathā cha mantra-varṇaḥ “yaṣnena vāčaḥ padavīyaṁ ayaṁ tāṁ anuvai’dann piṅkushu praśīṣṭhāṁ” iti sthi- tāṁ eva vācām anuvānīṁ darśayati | Vedavānaḥ cha eva eva mārāti (Mahābhārata, Vanap. 7660) | “yugante ’ntarhīṁ vedān sethāsāṁ ma- harshayāḥ lebhīre tapasaḥ pūrvam anuvajatāḥ svayambhūva” iti |

“Sūtra i. 3, 28: ‘But it is said that there will be a contradiction in respect of sound (or the word); but this is not so, because the gods are produced from it, as is proved by intuition and inference.’

‘Be it so, that though the corporeality of the gods, etc., be admitted, no contradiction will arise in respect of the ceremonial. Still [it will be said that] a contradiction will arise in regard to the word. How? [In this way.] By founding upon the inherent connection of a word with the thing signified, the authority of the Veda had been established by the aphorism ‘anapakahatvāt,’ etc. (Mimāṃsā Sūtras i. 2, 21; see above, p. 75.) But now, while it has been admitted that the deities are corporeal, it will follow that (though from their possession of divine power they can at one and the same time partake of the oblations

101 Compare S'atapatha Brahmaṇa, xi. 1, 6, 3.
offered at numerous sacrifices), they will still, owing to their corporeality, be subject, like ourselves, to birth and death; and hence, the eternal connection of the eternal word with an object which is non-eternal being lost, a contradiction will arise in regard to the authority proved to belong to the word of the Veda; [for thus the word, not having any eternal connection with non-eternal things, could not be authoritative]. But neither has this supposed contradiction any existence. How? 'Because they are produced from it.' Hence the world of gods, etc., is produced from the Vedic word. But according to the aphorism (Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 2) 'from him comes the production, etc., of all this,' it is established that the world has been produced from Brahma. How, then, is it said here that it is produced from the word? And, moreover, if it be allowed, that the world is produced from the Vedic word, how is the contradiction in regard to the word thereby removed, inasmuch as all the following classes of objects, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Adityas, Viśvedevas, Maruts, are non-eternal, because produced; and when they are non-eternal, what is there to bar the non-ternity of the Vedic words Vasu, etc., by which they are designated? For it is a common saying, 'It is only when a son is born to Devadatta, that that son receives the name of Yajnadatta,' i.e. no child receives a name before it exists. Hence a contradiction does arise in regard to [the eternity of] the word. To this objection we reply with a negative; for in the case of such words as cow we discover an eternal connection between the word and the thing. For although individual cows, etc., come into existence, the species to which they belong does not begin to exist, as it is individual substances, qualities, and acts, which begin to exist, and not their species. Now it is with species that words are connected, and not with individuals, for as the latter are infinite, such a connection would in their case be impossible. Thus as species are eternal (though individuals begin to exist) no contradiction is discoverable in the case of such words as cow, etc. In the same way it is to be remarked that though we allow that the individual gods, etc., have commenced to exist, there is no contradiction [to the eternity of the Vedic word] in the existence of the words Vasu, etc., [which denote those individual gods], since the species to which they belong are eternal. And the fact that the gods, etc., belong to particular species may be learned from this, that we discover their corporeality and other attributes in
the hymns and arthavādas (illustrative remarks in the Vedas), etc. The words Indra, etc., are derived from connection with some particular post, like the words ‘commander of an army’ (śeṇāpati), etc. Hence, whoever occupies any particular post, is designated by the words Indra, and so forth; [and therefore Indra and the other gods belong to the species of occupants of particular posts]. Thus there is no difficulty. And this derivation from the word is not, like production from Brahma, meant in the sense of evolution from a material cause. But how, since language is eternal and connected with eternal objects, is it declared in the phrase ‘produced from it’ that the production of individual things, corresponding to the ordinary sense of words, is effected by a thing (sound or language), the very nature of which it is to denote continuance [and not such change as is involved in the idea of production?]

102 How, again, is it known that the world is produced from the word? The answer is, [it is known] ‘from intuition and inference.’ ‘Intuition’ means the Veda, because it is independent of any (other authority). ‘Inference’ means the smriti, because it is dependent on another authority (the Veda). These two demonstrate that the creation was preceded by the word. Thus the Veda says, ‘at (or with) the word etc. (these) Prajapati created the gods; at asrīgiram (they were pourer out) he created men; at indavaḥ (drops of soma) he created the pitris; at tīrāḥ pavitram (through the filter) he created the libations; at āśavaḥ (swift) he created hymns; at viśvāni (all) he created praise; and at the words abhi saubhagā (for the sake of blessings) he created other creatures.’ 103 And in another place it is said ‘with his

102 This sentence is rather obscure.

103 According to Govinda Ananda’s Gloss this passage is derived from a Chhandoga Brahmaṇa. It contains a mystical exposition of the words from Rig-veda, ix. 62, 1 (=Sāma-veda, ii. 180) which are imbedded in it, viz. etc. asrīgiram indavaḥ tīrāḥ pavitram āśavaḥ | viśvāni abhi saubhagā | “These hurrying drops of soma have been poured through the filter, to procure all blessings.” (See Benfey’s translation.) It was by the help of Dr. Pertsch’s alphabetical list of the initial words of the verses of the Rig-veda (in Weber’s Indische Studien, vol. iii.) that I discovered the verse in question in the Rig-veda. Govinda Ananda gives us a specimen of his powers as Vedic exegete in the following remarks on this passage: Ity etan-mantra-sthānāḥ padaḥ smṛitvā Brahmā devadān asrījata | tattra “etc.” iti padaṃ sarvāṇāmatvād devavāḥ smāramakaḥ asrīg rudhirāḥ tat pradhāne deha ramante iti “asrīgriḥ” manasahāḥ | chandra-sthānām pitrīgām indu-śaḍaḥ smārakaḥ iltīdā | “Brahmā created the gods, etc., in conformity with the recollections suggested by the various words in this verse. The word etc. (these) as a pronoun suggested the gods. The beings who dispport
mind he entered into conjugal connection with Vāch (speech).  
(\textit{S. P. Br. x. 6, 5, 4, Brīh. Ār. Up. p. 50.}) By these and other such texts the Veda in various places declares that creation was preceded by the word. And when the Smṛiti says, 'In the beginning a celestial voice, eternal, without beginning or end, co-essential with the Vedas, was uttered by Svayambhū, from which all activities [proceeded]' (see above, p. 16), the expression 'utterance of a voice' is to be regarded as employed in the sense of the origination of a tradition, since it is inconceivable that a voice which was 'without beginning or end,' could be uttered in the same sense as other sounds. Again, we have this other text, 'In the beginning Maheśvara created from the words of the Veda the names and forms of creatures, and the origination of actions;' and again, 'He created in the beginning the several names, functions, and conditions of all creatures from the words of the Veda.' (See above, pp. 16 and 6.) And it is a matter of common observation to us all, that when any one is occupied with any end which he wishes to accomplish, he first calls to mind the word which expresses it, and then proceeds to effect his purpose. So, too, in the case of Prajāpati the creator, we conclude that before the creation the words of the Veda were manifested in his mind, and that afterwards he created the objects which resulted from them. Thus the Vedic text which says, 'uttering bhūk, he created the earth (bhūmi), etc.,' intimates that the different worlds, earth, and the rest, were manifested, i.e. created from the words bhūk, etc., manifested in his mind. Of what sort, now, was this word which is intended, when it is said that the world was produced from the word? It was sphota (disclosure or expression), we are told.'

I shall not quote the long discussion on which Sankara here enters, regarding this term. (See Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 305 ff.; Ballantyne's Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy, pp. 192 ff.; the same author's translation of the commencement of the Mahābhāshya, p. 10; and Professor Müller's article on the last-named work in the Journal of the German Or. Soc. vii. 170.) Sankara states his conclusion themselves in bodies of which blood (asrik) is a predominant element, were asrigraḥ, 'men.' The word indu (which means both the soma plant and the moon) suggested the fathers who dwell in the moon," etc., etc. The sense of asrigram, as given above in the text, is "were poured out." Govinda Ananda, no doubt, understood it correctly, though he considered it necessary to draw a mystical sense out of it.
to be that "from the eternal word, in the form of sϕoṭa, which expresses [all things], the object signified by it, viz. the world, under the three characters of action, causer, and the results of action, is produced," and finishes his remarks on this Sūtra (i. 3, 28) by observing: "Consequently there is no contradiction in saying that the individual gods, etc., are derived from eternal words." He then proceeds to Sūtra i. 3, 29: "‘Hence results the eternity of the Vedas.’" On this he observes, "The eternity of the Veda had been established by the fact of its being described in the Smṛiti as the work of a Self-dependent Maker. But a doubt had been suggested that this eternity is inconsistent with the admission that individual gods, etc., have commenced to exist. This doubt, however, having been set aside by the preceding aphorism, ‘Since they are produced from it,’ he now confirms the eternity of the Veda (which had been already proved) by the words of the Sūtra before us, which mean that as a result of this very fact that the world, consisting of gods and other beings belonging to fixed species, was produced from the words of the Vedas, the eternity of these Vedic words themselves also must be believed. Accordingly, the words of the hymn, ‘by sacrifice they followed the path of Vāch, and found her entered into the rishis’ (R.V. x. 71, 3 ; see the First Volume of this work p. 254, and Volume Second, p. 220) prove that Vāch already existed when she was discovered. And in the very same way Vedavyāsa records that, ‘formerly the great rishi, empowered by Svayambhū, obtained through devotion the Vedas and Itihāsas, which had disappeared at the end of the preceding yuga.’"

Śāyuṇa refers to the Sūtra just quoted (i. 3, 29), as well as to another of the Vedānta aphorisms (i. 1, 3) in p. 20 of the introduction to his Commentary on the Rig-veda in these words:

_Nanu bhagavatā Bādarāyanena Vedasya Brahma-kāryayatvam sūtritam |
"śāstra-yonitvād" iti | rigvedādi-śāstra-kāraṇatvād Brahma sarvajnam |
itī sūtrārthaḥ | bādham | na etatā paaurusheyatvam bhavati | manushya-
nimitatvābhāvat | tāriṣam apaurusheyatvam abhipṛetya evavahāra-daśā-
yām ākāśādi-vad nityatvam Bādarāyanenaiva devatādhikarāṇe sūtritam |
"ata eva cha nityatvam" iti |

"But it is objected that the venerable Bādarāyaṇa has declared in the aphorism ‘since he is the source of the śāstra (Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 3), that the Veda is derived from Brahma; the meaning of the aphorism being, that since Brahma is the cause of the Rig-veda and other Śāstras,
he is omniscient. This is true; but it furnishes no proof of the human origin of the Veda, since it was not formed by a man. Bādarāyaṇa had in view such a superhuman origin of the Veda, when in the [other] aphorism 'hence also [its] eternity is to be maintained,' (which is contained in the section on the deities), he declared it to be, like the ether, etc., eternal, during the period of mundane existence.''

The remarks of Sāṅkara on the Brahma Sūtra (i. 1, 3) above referred to, begin as follows:


"Brahma is the source of the great Śāstra, consisting of the Rig-veda, etc., augmented by numerous branches of science, which, like a lamp, illuminates all subjects, and approaches to omniscience. Now such a Śāstra, distinguished as the Rig-veda, etc., possessed of the qualities of an omniscient being, could not have originated from any other than an omniscient being. When an extensive treatise on any subject is produced by any individual, as the works on Grammar, etc., were by Pāṇini and others,—even although the treatise in question have for its subject only a single department of what is to be known,—it is a

104 See the quotation from the Vedārtha-prakāśa, at the top of p. 70, above. The aether (abhāśa) is uncreated according to the Vaiṣeshikas (Kaṇḍā's Sutras, ii. 1, 28, with Sāṅkara Miśra's commentary, and Sāṅkara Āchāryya on Vedānta Sūtra, ii. 3, 3: Na hy abhisāsa utpattih sambhavaṁ tvaṁ ēka-yā śṛiṁat-Kṣayabhagyahāpyayāśeśarūpam śivaṇṇu | "The production of the aether cannot be conceived as possible, so long as those who follow Kaṇḍā's view retain their vitality"). The Vedānta Sūtras, ii. 3, 1-7, on the other hand, assert its production by Brahma, in conformity with the text of the Taittiriyakas which affirms this: Tasmād vai etasmād itmanah abhāśaḥ sam-bhūtah | "From that Soul the aether was produced."
matter of notoriety that the author is possessed of still greater knowledge than is contained in his work. Dr. Ballantyne (Aphorisms of the Vedānta, p. 6) renders the last words thus: "that man, even in consideration of that, is inferred to be exceedingly knowing." Govinda Ananda’s note, however, confirms the rendering I have given. Part of it is as follows: Yad yach chhāstraṁ yasmūd ēptāt sambhavati sa tataḥ śastraūd adhikhār-tha-juñāḥ iti prasiddham | “It is well known that the competent author from whom any treatise proceeds has a knowledge of more than that treatise (contains).” The idea here is somewhat similar to that in the second of Bishop Butler’s Sermons “Upon the love of God”: “Effects themselves, if we knew them thoroughly, would give us but imperfect notions of wisdom and power; much less of his Being in whom they reside.” . . . “This is no more than saying that the Creator is superior to the works of his hands.”

An alternative explanation of the aphorism is given by the commentator, according to which it would mean: “The body of Scripture, consisting of the Rigveda, etc., is the source, the cause, the proof, whereby we ascertain exactly the nature of this Brahma” (āthaṁ yathākram riṣvedādi-śāstrāṁ yonih kūryaṁ pramāṇam asya Brahmaṁ yathāvat svarūpādhiyame).
whilst other texts which appear to be at variance with the Vedantic dogmas, and to favour those of the other philosophical schools, are explained as being merely figurative (*gaṇa* or *bhākta*); or other interpretations are given. See, for example, the Brahma sūtras, i. 1, 6; ii. 4, 2 f., etc., with Sankara's comments. The supposition of any real inconsistency between the different statements of the sacred volume is never for a moment entertained. As, however, the different authors of the Vedic hymns, of the Brāhmaṇas, and even of the Upanishads, gave free expression to their own vague and unsystematic ideas and speculations on the origin of all things, and the relation of the Deity to the universe, and recognized no fixed standard of orthodox doctrine to which they were bound to conform,—it was inevitable that they should propound a great variety of opinions which were mutually irreconcilable. But as, in later times, the Vedas came to be regarded as supernatural and infallible books, it was necessary that those systematic theologians who sought to deduce from their contents any consistent theory of being and of creation, should attempt to shew that the discrepancies between the different texts were only apparent.

**Sect. IX.**—Arguments of the followers of the Nyāya, Vaishēnika, and Sāṇkhya Systems in support of the authority of the Vedas, but against the eternity of sound.

I. The Nyāya.—The eternity of sound is, as we have already discovered from the allusions of the Mīmāṃsaka commentator, (above p. 73), denied by the followers of the Nyāya school. The consideration of this subject is begun in the following way in the Nyāya aphorisms of Gotama, as explained by Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭāchārya in the Nyāya-sūtras-vṛtti, ii. 81:

107 See Sankara on the Br. Sūtras, iii. 31 (p. 844 of Bibl. Indica), where he says, *yadi paṇar ekasmin Brahmaṇi bahuḥ vijnānāni vedāntāntaresu pratipādayishitāni teshām ekam abhirūtam bhūrināni itarāni ity anāvāsa-pravango vedāntesu tasmād na tāvat prativedāntam Brahma-vijnāna-bhedāḥ āsankituṁ śakyaṁ| “If, again, in the different Vedāntas (i.e. Upanishads) a variety of conceptions regarding the one Brahma be sought to be established, one of these (conceptions) will be correct, and the others erroneous, and thus the objection of being untrustworthy will attach to the Upanishads. It must not, therefore, be suspected that there is in each of the Upanishads a different conception of Brahman.”
OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS.

Vedasya prāmāṇyaṃ āpta-prāmāṇyāt siddham | na cha idām yuyyate
vedasya nityatvād ity āsankhyām varṇānām anityatvāt kathām tat-samudaya-rūpasya vedasya nityatvam ity āsāyena sābdānityatva-prakaranam ārabhate | tatra siddhānta-sūtram | “Ādimatvād aindriyakatvāt kritakatvād upachārach cha” | 81. Sābdo ’nityaḥ ityādih | ādimatvād sakaraṇaṇaṇaṁ kanṭha-tālau-ādy-abhighatāder
ayanjakatvāpy upapatter ataḥ āha aindriyakatvād iti sāmānyavattve sati vahir-indriya-janya-laukikika-pratyaksha-vishayataväd ity arthaḥ |

. . . . Aprayajakatvam āsankya āha kritaketi | kriyak ghaṭādau yathā
upachāro jnānam tathāvā ko kāryatva-prakāraka-pratyaksha-vishayataväd ity arthaḥ | tathā cha kāryatvena anāhāryya-sārvalaukikika-pratyaksha-balād anityatvam eva siddhati |

“It has been proved (in the 68th Sūtra, see below) that ‘the authority of the Veda follows from the authority of the competent person who made it.’ But it may be objected that this is not a proper ground on which to base the authority of the Veda, since it is eternal. With the view of proving, in opposition to this, that since letters are not eternal, the Veda, which is a collection of letters, cannot be so either, the author of the Sūtras commences the section on the non-eternity of sound. The Sūtra laying down the established doctrine, is as follows: ‘Sound cannot be eternal, as (1) it had an origin, as (2) it is cognizable by sense, and (3) it is spoken of as factitious.’ Sound is non-eternal, etc., because (1) it had a beginning, i.e. because it had a cause. But it may be said that it had no cause, as, agreeably to the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsakas (see above, p. 74), the action of the throat and palate in pronunciation may merely occasion a manifestation of sound [without creating it]. In reply to this it is said (2) that sound is cognizable by sense, i.e. that though it belongs to a genus, it is an object of ordinary perception through an external sense.” [A different explanation given by other interpreters is next quoted, which I omit.] . . . “Then surmising that the preceding definition may be regarded as not to the point, the author adds the words ‘since it is spoken of as factitious,’ i.e. as jars and other such objects are spoken of as—are known to be—products, so, too, sound is distinguishable by sense as being in the nature of a product. And in consequence of this incontrovertible and universal perception of its being produced, it is proved that it cannot be eternal.” [Two other explanations of this last clause of the Sūtra are then added.]
OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORIGIN, ETC.,

Leaving the reader to study the details of the discussion in Dr. Ballantyne's aphorisms of the Nyāya (Part Second, pp. 77 ff.), I will pass over most of the Śūtras, and merely quote the principal conclusions of the Nyāya aphorist. In Śūtra 86 he says in opposition to the 13th Śūtra of the Mīmānsā (above, p. 74):

86. “Prāg uchchāraṇād anupalambhāḥ āvāraṇādy-anupalabdheḥ” | Sābdo yadi nityaḥ syād uchchāraṇāt prāg aṣy upalabhyaṣa śrotra-sannikarṣa-sattvā | na cha atra pratibandhakam asti ity aha āvaraneti āvāranādyā pratibandhakasya anupalabdhyā abhāva-nirṇayat | deśāntara-gamanam tu śabdasya amārttatvād na sambhāvyate | atisāṃriyānta-pratibandhakatva-kalpanām āpokshya śabdānti-yavatva-kalpanā eva laghī-vasi iti bhāvah |

‘Sound is not eternal, because it is not perceived before it is uttered, and because we do not perceive anything which should intercept it.’ If sound were eternal, it would be perceived even before it was uttered, from its being in contact with the ear. [Sound, as Dr. Ballantyne explains, is ‘admitted to be a quality of the all-pervading æther.’] And in the next words the aphorist says that there is no obstacle to its being so heard, since the non-existence of any hindrance, such as an intercepting medium, is ascertained by our not perceiving anything of that sort. And it is not conceivable that sound should have gone to another place [and for that reason be inaudible], since it has no defined form. The supposition that sound is non-eternal, is simpler than the supposition that there are an infinity of imperceptible obstacles to its perception.”

The 89th and 90th Śūtras, with part of the comments on them, are as follows:

89. “Asparśatvāt” | śabdo nityaḥ | asparśatvād gagana-vad iti bhāvah |
90. “Na karmānti-yatva” | asparśatvaṁ na śabda-nityatva-sādhakam karmani vyabhichārāt |

89. “It may be said that sound is eternal, from its being, like the sky, intangible. 90. But this is no proof, for the intangibility of sound does not establish its eternity, since these two qualities do not always go together; for intangibility, though predictable, e.g. of action, fails to prove its eternity.”

The 100th and following Śūtras are as follows:

100. “Vināśa-kāraṇānapalabdheḥ” | 101. “Āsravāṇa-kāraṇānapalab-
dheḥ satata-śravana-prasangah” | Yady apratyakṣhād abhāva-siddhis tadā 'śravana-karaṇasya apratyakṣhatvād aśravanaṁ na syād iti satata-śravana-prasangah iti bhāvaḥ | 102. “Upalabhyamāne cha anupalabdhār asattvād anapadesaḥ” | Anumāṇādnānā upalabhyamāne vināśa-kāraṇe anupalabdhār abhāvāt tv aciyo hetur anapadesaḥ asādhakah asiddhatvāt | janya-bhāvatvena vināśa-kalpanam iti bhāvaḥ |

“It is said (100) that ‘sound must be eternal, because we perceive no cause why it should cease.’ The answer is (101), first, ‘that if the non-existence of any such cause of cessation were established by the mere fact of its not being perceived, such non-perception would occasion our hearing continually, which is an absurdity.’ And (102), secondly, ‘since such non-perception is not a fact, inasmuch as [a cause of the cessation of sound] is perceived, this argument falls to the ground.’

Since a cause for the cessation of sound is discovered by inference, etc., and thus the non-perception of any cause is seen to be untrue, this argument of yours proves nothing, because its correctness is not established. The purport is that we suppose, from sound being produced, that it must also be liable to perish.”

Sūtras 106–122 are occupied with a consideration of the question (above treated, pp. 73, 74, in Sūtras 10 and 16 of the Mīmāṃsā) whether letters can change or not. The conclusion at which Gotama arrives is, that the substance of letters cannot undergo any alteration, though they may be said to change when they are modified in quality by being lengthened, shortened, etc.

In a preceding part of the Second Book (Sūtras 57–68) Gotama treats of the Veda, and repels certain charges which are alleged against its authority. I shall quote most of these aphorisms, and cite the commentary more fully than Dr. Ballantyne has done. (See Ballantyne’s Nyāya Aphorisms, Part ii. pp. 56 ff.).

śyāva-svālāv asya āhutim abhyavaharato yaḥ samayādyushite juhoti’’
astra cha uditādi-vākyāṅm nānānunmitānīṣṭā-sādhanatā-bodhakā-vākyā-
virodhaḥ | paunarakuyād aprāmānyam | Yathā ““trīḥ prathamām anvāha | trīr uttamām anvāha”’’ | ity astra uttamatvasya prathamata-paryavasānāt trīḥ kathena cha paunarakuyam | eteshām aprāmānye tad-drishtāntena tad-eka-karttikatvena tad-eka-jātiyatvena vā sarva-vedāprāmānyamān sādhanīyaṁ iti bhāvaḥ | siddhānta-sūtram | 58. “Na karma-karttri-sādhana-
vaigunyat” | Na vedāprāmānyamān karma-karttri-sādhana-vai
gunyat phalābhāpapateṭk | karmaṇaḥ kriyāyāḥ vai
gyunyam ayathāvidhītvādi | kart-
tur vaigunyam avidvattvādi | sādhanasya havir-āder vaigunyam āprikhi-
tattvādi | Yathokta-karmayaḥ phalābhāvoh āhyāntatvam | na cha evam asti iti bhāvaḥ | vyāghatam pari
harati | 59. “Abhyupetya kāla-bhede
dosha-vadhanāt” | na vyāghatāḥ iti śesāḥ | Agny-ādhāna-kule udita-
komādiyam abhyupetya svikriyā anudita-komādi-karaṇe pārvokta-dosha-
kathanaṁ na vyāghatāḥ ity arthaḥ | paunarakuyam pari
harati | 60. “Anuvādopapattēs cha” | chaḥ puner-arthe | anuvādopapatteḥ punar na paunarakytam | nishprayojanave hi paunarakytāṁ dosaḥ | ukta-sthāte tv anuvādasya upapatteḥ prayojanasya sambhavāt | ekādasa-sāṁdhinām prathamottamasyo trir abhidhāne hi panchadāśatvaṁ sambhavati | tathā-
cha panchadāśatvaṁ sūryate | “Imam aham bhṛatīvyam panchadāśava-
reṇa vāg-vajrēṇa cha bādhe yo’smāṁ dešekti yaṁ cha vayaṁ dvishmaḥ”’’
itī | Anuvādasya sārthakatvaṁ lokā-śrāddhāṁ iti āha | 61. “Vākya-
vibhāgasya cha artha-grahaṇāt” | Vākya-vibhāgasya | anuvādatvena vibhakta-vākyasya artha-grahaṇāt prayojana-svēkārāt | śīṣṭārā iti śesāḥ | śīṣṭāḥ hi vibhayakānvādakādi-bhedena vākyaṁ vibhajaya anuv-
ādakasyāpi srayojanatvaṁ manyaṁte | Vedeṣ’py evam iti bhāvaḥ | . . .
Evam aprāmānyamān nirasya prāmānyamān sādhayaṁ | 68. “Man-
trāyurveda-vach ca tat-prāmānyam āpta-prāmānyat”’’ | Āptasya vedā-
karttuḥ prāmānyūd yathārthopadesakatvād vedasya tad-uktatvam arthāl labhām | tena hetunā vedasya prāmānyam anumeyam | tatra dṛṣṭāntaṁ aha mantrāyurveda-vad iti | mantra viśhādi-nāsakaḥ | āyurveda-bhāgaḥ cha vedā-sthāḥ eva | tatra saṃśādene prāmānya-grahat tad-dṛṣṭāntena vedatvācchhedena prāmānyam anumeyam | āptaṁ grīhitam prāmānyam āhāra sa vedaṁ tādṛśeṇa vedatvam prāmānyaṁ anumeyam iti kṣeṣit | “It had been declared (Nyāya Sūtras, i. 8) that verbal evidence is of two kinds, (1) that of which the subject-matter is seen, and (2) that of which the subject-matter is unseen. With the view, now, of testing
the authority of that verbal evidence which refers to unseen things, viz. the Veda, Gotama states the first side of the question. Sūtra 57. 'The Veda has no authority, since it has the defects of falsehood, self-contradiction, and tautology.' That verbal evidence, which is distinct from such as relates to visible objects, i.e. the Veda, has no authority. Why? Because it has the defects of falsehood, etc. Of these defects, that of 'falsehood' is established by the fact that we sometimes observe that no fruit results from performing the sacrifice for a son, or the like. 'Self-contradiction' is a discrepancy between a former and a later declaration. Thus the Veda says, 'he sacrifices when the sun is risen; he sacrifices when the sun is not yet risen; he sacrifices' [I cannot explain the next words]. 'A tawny [dog?] carries away the oblation of him who sacrifices after the sun has risen; a brindled [dog?] carries off the oblation of him who sacrifices before the sun has risen; and both of these two carry off the oblation of him who sacrifices.'

Now here there is a contradiction between the words which enjoin sacrifices, and the words which intimate by censure that those sacrifices will occasion disastrous results. Again, the Veda has no authority, owing to its 'tautology,' as where it is said, 'he repeats the first thrice, he repeats the last thrice.' For as the lastness ultimately coincides with [?] the firstness, and as there is a triple repetition of the words, this sentence is tautological. Now since these particular sentences have no authority, the entire Veda will be proved by these specimens to stand in the same predicament, since all its other parts have the same author, or are of the same character, as these portions.'

Here follows the Sūtra which conveys the established doctrine. "58. 'The Veda is not false; it is owing to some fault in the ceremonial, or the performer, or the instrument he employs, that any sacrifice is not followed by the promised results.' Faults in the ceremonial are such as its not being according to rule. Faults in the performer are such as ignorance. Faults in the instrument, i.e. in the clarified butter, etc., are such as its not being duly sprinkled, etc. For falsehood might be charged on the Veda, if no fruit resulted from a sacrifice when duly performed as prescribed; but such failure never occurs.'

Gotama next repels the charge of self-contradiction in the Vedas. "59. 'There is no self-contradiction, for the fault is only imputed in case the sacrifice should be performed at a different time from that
at first intended.' The fault imputed to these sacrifices in the text in question would [only] be imputed if, after agreeing, at the time of placing the sacrificial fire, to perform the sacrifice after sunrise, one were to change it to a sacrifice before sunrise; there is, therefore, no self-contradiction in the passage referred to."

He next rebuts the charge of tautology. "60. 'The Veda is not tautological because repetition may be proper.' The particle cha means 'again.' 'Again, since repetition may be proper, there is no tautology.' For repetition is only a fault when it is useless. But in the passage referred to, since repetition is proper, its utility is apparent. For when the first and the last of the eleven sāmidhenīs (forms of prayer used on throwing fuel into the fire) are each repeated thrice, the whole number of verses will be made up to fifteen.108 Accordingly, this number of fifteen is mentioned in these words of the Veda, 'I smite this enemy who hates us, and whom we hate, with the last of the fifteen verses, and with the thunderbolt of my words.'"

He next observes that the advantage of repetition is commonly recognised. "61. 'And the Veda is not tautological, because the utility of this division of discourse is admitted,' i.e. because the necessity for such a division of language, that is, of a description of language characterized as reiterative, is acknowledged, viz. by the learned. For by dividing language into the different classes of injunctive, reiterative, etc., learned men recognise the uses of the reiterative also. And this applies to the Veda.'"

The author of the aphorisms then proceeds to state and to define (in Śūtras 62–67) the different sorts of discourse employed in the Veda, and to defend the propriety of reiteration. "Having thus refuted the arguments which aim at showing that the Veda is of no authority, he goes on to prove its authority. 68. 'The authority of the Veda, like that of the formulas, and the Ayur-veda (treatise on medicine) follows from the authority of the competent [persons from whom they proceeded].' Since the competent maker of the Veda possesses authority, i.e. insculates truth, it results from the force of the terms that the Veda was uttered by a person of this character; and by this reasoning the au-

108 If there are in all eleven formulas, and two of these are each repeated thrice, we have (2 × 3 =) six to add to the nine (which remain of the original cloven), making (9 + 9 =) fifteen. See Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 89 and 393.
authority of the Veda is to be inferred. He illustrates this by the case of the formulas and the Āyur-veda. By formulas (mantra) are meant the sentences which neutralize poison, etc., and the section containing the Āyur-veda forms part of the Veda. Now as the authority of these two classes of writings is admitted by general consent, the authority of everything which possesses the characteristics of the Veda must be inferred from this example. Some, however, explain the aphorism thus: a Veda is that in which authority is found or recognised. From such vedicity (or possession of the character of a Veda) the authority of any work is to be inferred."

I add the greater part of the more detailed and distinct exposition of this aphorism given by the commentator Vātsyāyana (Bibliotheca Indica, p. 91): 109

Kim punar. āyurvedasya prāmāṇyam | yad āyurvedena upadīṣyatā
idām kṛitis ihātā adhigachchhati idām varj-jayitvā ’nīṣṭām jahāti
tasya anushṭhitamānasaya tatha-bhāvaḥ satyarthataḥ vaparyayāḥ |
mantra-padanām cha viksha-bhūtāsani-pratishedhārtānām prayoge
’rthāsyā tatha-bhāvaḥ etat prāmāṇyam | kim-kriyaḥ etat | ópta-prāmāṇya-kriyām | kim punar āptānām prāmāṇyam | sākṣāt-kriya-dhar
matā bhūta-dayā yathā-bhūtārtha-chikhyāpayishā iti | óptaḥ khalu sāk
śāt-kriya-dharmānādi idām hātavyam ayam asya hāni-hetur idam asya
adhigantavayam ayam asya adhigamanā-hetur iti bhūtāny anukampante |
teshām khalu vai prāṇa-bhrītām evayam anavabduhyamānām na anyad
upadesād abavodha-kāraṇam asti | na cha anavabdhā samthā varjjanaḥ vā |
nā vā akṛtivā svastī-bhāvaḥ | nā’py asya anyah upakārake’py asti | hanta
vayam ebhavo yathā-dārśanām yathā-bhūtam upādīṣmaḥ | te ime śrutvā
pratipadyamānāḥ heyaṁ āsasyantā adhigantāvayam eva adhigamishyanti
iti | evam āptopadesāḥ etena tri-viḍhena ópta-prāmāṇyena parigrihi
‘nushṭhisthamāno ’rthāsya sādhakō bhavati | evam ótapadesāḥ pramāṇam
evam óptaḥ pramāṇam | drīñṭārthena ótapadesena āyurvedena adrisht-
ārtho veda-bhāgo ’nīmātavyah pramāṇam iti | ópta-prāmāṇyaśya heloh
samānātvedā iti | asya api cha eka-āśe “grāma-kāmo yajeta” ity evam-ādi-
drīṣṭārthas tena ānīmātavyam iti | loke cha bhūyān upadesāśrayo vyā
vahāraḥ | lakṣikasya asya upadesāḥ upadesāstaryārthā-jnānena parānyj
ghikṣayā yathā-bhūtārtha-chikhyāpayishayā cha pramāṇam | tat-pari-

109 A small portion of this comment, borrowed from Professor Banerjea’s Dialogues on Hindu philosophy, was given in the 1st edition of this vol. p. 210.
On what then does the authority of the Ayur-veda depend? The Ayur-veda instructs us that to do so and so, is the means of attaining what is desirable, and to avoid so and so is the means of escaping what is undesirable; and the fact of such action having been followed by the promised result coincides with the supposition that the book declares what is true. So, too, the authority of the formulae for neutralizing poison, repelling demons, and arresting lightning, is shewn by their application fulfilling its object. How is this result obtained? By the authoritativeness of competent persons. But what is meant by the authoritativeness of competent persons? It means their intuitive perception of duty, their benevolence to all creatures, and their desire to declare the truth of things. Competent persons are those who have an intuitive perception of duty; and they shew their benevolence to all creatures by pointing out that so and so is to be avoided, and that such and such are the means of avoiding it, and that so and so is to be attained, and that such and such are the means of attaining it. 'For these creatures,' they reflect, 'being themselves unaware of such things, have no other means of learning them except such instruction; and in the absence of information they can make no effort either to attain or avoid anything; whilst without such action their welfare is not secured; and there is no one else who can help in this case: come let us instruct them according to the intuition we possess, and in conformity with the reality; and they hearing, and comprehending, will avoid what should be avoided, and obtain what should be obtained.' Thus the instruction afforded by competent persons according to this threefold character of their authoritativeness [viz. (1) intuition, (2)
benevolence, and (3) desire to teach], being received, and acted upon, effects the object desired. And so the instruction given by competent persons is authority, and these competent persons are authorities. From the Āyur-veda, which conveys instruction given by competent persons in reference to objects perceptible by the senses, it is to be inferred that that part also of the Veda which is concerned with imperceptible objects is authoritative, since the cause, the authoritativeness of competent persons, is the same in both cases; and the same inference is to be drawn from the fact that a portion of the injunctions of the last mentioned part of the Veda also have reference to perceptible objects, as in the case of the precept, 'Let the man who desires landed property sacrifice,' etc., etc. In common life, too, men usually rely upon instruction. And the authority of an ordinary instructor depends (1) upon his knowledge of the matter to be taught, (2) upon his disposition to shew kindness to others, and (3) upon his desire to declare the truth. From its being accepted, the instruction imparted by competent persons constitutes proof. And from the fact that the seers and declarers are the same in both cases, viz. that the competent seers and declarers of the contents of the (rest of the) Veda are the very same as those of the Āyur-veda, etc., we must infer that the authoritativeness of the former is like that of the latter. But on the hypothesis that the authority of the Vedic injunctions is derived from their eternity, it will be improper to say that it arises from the authoritativeness of competent persons, since the authority of words as exponents of meanings springs from their declarative character, and not from their eternity. For on the supposition of the eternity of words, every (word) would express every (thing), which would be contrary to the fixity of their signification. If it be objected that unless words are eternal, they cannot be declarative, we deny this, as it is not witnessed in the case of secular words. If it be urged again that secular words also are eternal, we must again demur, since the discrepancy of purport arising from the injunctions of incompetent persons would be at variance with this." After some further argumentation Vātsyāyana concludes: "The eternity of the Vedas [really] consists in the unbroken continuity of their tradition, study, and application, both in the Manvantaras and

110 Compare the commentator's remarks introductory to the Nyāya aphorism ii. 57, quoted above, p. 112.
Yugas which are past, and those which are to come; whilst their authority arises from the authoritativeness of the competent persons (who uttered them). And this is common to them with secular words."

The phrase sākṣhat-krita-dharmāṇāḥ, "possessing an intuitive perception of duty," which is employed by Vātsyāyana in the preceding extract as a definition of āptāḥ, "competent persons," is one which had previously been applied by Yāska (Nirukta, i. 20) to describe the character of the rishis: Sākṣhat-krita-dharmāṇāḥ rishayo bābhuvah | te 'vare bhyyo sākṣhat-krita-dharmabhyāḥ upadesena mantrān samprāduḥ | upadesāya glāyanto 'vare bīma-grahanāya imaṁ granthaṁ samānnāśishur vedāṁ cha vedāṅgāni cha | "The rishis, who had an intuitive perception of duty, handed down the hymns by (oral) instruction to men of later ages, who had not that intuitive perception. These, declining in their power of giving instruction, compiled this work (the Nirukta), the Veda, and the Vedāṅgas, in order to facilitate the comprehension of details."

The Vaiṣeṣhika.—Among the aphorisms of this system also there are some which, in opposition to the Mīmāṃsakas, assert, 1st, that the Vedas are the product of an intelligent mind; and 2nd (if the interpretation of the commentator is to be received) that they have been uttered by God.

The second aphorism of the first section of the first book is as follows:

Yato bhuydāya-nīsbrēyasā-siddhiḥ sa dharmāḥ

"Righteousness is that through which happiness and future perfection 112 are attained."

After explaining this the commentator proceeds to introduce the next aphorism by the following remarks:

Nanu nivṛttī-lakṣaṇo dharmas tattva-jnāna-dvārā nīsbrēyasā-hetur ity

111 Of the aphorisms, which I am about to quote, the first has been translated by Dr. Ballantyne (who published a small portion of these Sūtras with an English version in 1851); and it, as well as the others, is briefly commented upon by the Rev. Prof. Banerjea, in his Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy, pp. 474 ff., and Pref. p. ix., note. See my article in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, No. xx. for 1862, entitled "Does the Vaiśeṣhika philosophy acknowledge a Deity or not?" from which the translations now given have been transferred with but little alteration and a few additions. And compare Dr. Roer's German translation of the Vaišeṣhika aphorisms in the Journal of the German Oriental Society for 1867, pp. 309 ff.

112 The Commentator explains abhuydāya as tattva-jnānam, "a knowledge of the reality," and nīsbrēyasā as utyantikī duḥkha-nivṛttih, "the complete cessation of suffering."
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attra śrutih pramāṇam | śruter eva prāmāṇya vayaṁ vipratipadyāmahe
“anrīta-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyāḥ” | . . . na cha āmnāya-pra-
tipādakam kinehid asti nityatve vipratipattau | nitya-nirdoshato am api
sandigāham | praveshaya te bhrama-pramāda-vipratipatti-karanāpā-
tāvādi-sambhāvanayā āptotatvam api sandigāham eva iti na niśreyasām
na vā tattra tattva-jñānaṁ deśaṁ na vā dharmāḥ iti sarvam etad āku-
lam | ataḥ aha “tad-vachanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam” | “tā” ity
anupakrāntam api prasiddhi-siddhatyā īśvaram parāmṛśati | yathā
“tad-aprāmānaye anrīta-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyāḥ” iti Gaṅ-
amiya-sūtre tach-chhabdena anupakrānto ’pi vedāḥ parāmṛśyate | tathā
cha tad-vachanāt tena īśvarena praṇayanād āmnāyasya vedasya prāmān-
yam | yadvā “tad” iti saṁnitiṣṭha dharmam eva parāmṛśati | tathā cha
dharmasya “vachanāt” pratipādānav āmnāyasya vedasya p.āmnā-
yam | yad hi vākyam prāmāṇikam artham pratipādayati tat prāmāṇam
eva yataḥ ity arthaḥ | īśvaras tad-āptatvām cha sādhayishyate |

“But may it not be objected here that it is the Veda which proves
that righteousness, in the form of abstinence from action, is, by means
of the knowledge of absolute truth, the cause of future perfection; but
that we dispute the authority of the Veda because it is chargeable
with the faults of falsehood, contradiction, and tautology113 . . . .
And further, there is nothing to prove the authority of the Veda, for
its eternity is disputed, its eternal faultlessness is doubted, and if it
have a personal author, the fact of this person being a competent utterer
is questioned, since there is an apprehension of error, inadvertence,
contradiction, and want of skill in composition attaching to him. Thus
there is neither any such thing as future perfection, nor is either a
knowledge of absolute truth the instrument thereof, or righteousness.
Thus everything is perplexed.”

In answer to all this the author of the aphorism says:
“The authority of the sacred record arises from its being uttered
by Him.”

“Here,” says the commentator, “the word tad (His) refers to Īśvara
(God); as, though no mention of Him has yet been introduced, He is
proved by common notoriety to be meant; just as in the aphorism of
Gautama: ‘Its want of authority is shown by the faults of falsehood,

113 Here the same illustrations are given as in the commentary on the Nyāya
aphorisms, quoted above, pp. 113 ff.
contradiction, and tautology, the Veda, though not previously introduced, is intended by the word *tad.* And so [the meaning of the aphorism is that] the authority of the sacred record, i.e. the Veda, is proved by its being spoken by Him, composed by Him, by Īśvara. Or, *tad* (its) may denote *dharma.* (duty) which immediately precedes; and then [the sense will be that] the authority of the sacred record, i.e. the Veda, arises from its declaring, i.e. establishing, duty, for the text which establishes any authoritative matter must be itself an authority. The proof of Īśvara and his competence will be hereafter stated." The commentator then goes on to answer the charges of falsehood, contradiction, and tautology alleged against the Veda.

The next aphorism which I shall quote (vi. 1, 1) is thus introduced by the commentator:

*Buddhi-pūrvā vākya-kritir vede | saṁsāra-māla-kāraṇayor dharmādharmayoh parīkṣhā shashṭha-dhyāyārthaḥ | dharmādharmau cha "svarga-kāmo yajeta" "na kalanjam bhakshayed" ityādi-vidhi-nishedha-balaikalpanīyau vidhi-nishedha-vākyayoh prāmāṇyo sati syatām | tat-prāmāṇyaḥ cha vaktṛ yathārtha-vākyārtha-jñāna-lakṣaṇa-guṇa-pūrvakavād upapadyate | svataḥ prāmāṇyaasya nishedhāt | atah prathamaṁ veda-prāmāṇya-prayoja-guṇa-ca-ñhānam uvakramate | "vākya-kritir" vākyaracanā | sa buddhi-pūrvā vaktṛ-yathārtha-vākyārtha-jñāna-pūreṇa | vākyaracanātvat | "nādī-itre pancha phalāni santi" ity asmad-ādi-vākyaracanāvat | "vede" iti vākya-samudāye ity arthaḥ | tattra samudāyināṁ vākyānāṁ kritiḥ pakṣaḥ | na cha asmad-ādi-buddhi-pūrvaka-

114 For the sake of the reader who does not know Sanskrit, it may be mentioned that *tad* being in the crude, or uninfected form, may denote any of the three genders, and may be rendered either 'his,' 'her,' or 'its.' I may observe that the alternative explanation which the commentator gives of the Aphorism, i. 1, 3, viz. that the authority of the Veda arises from its being declarative of duty, is a much less probable one than the other, that its authority is derived from its being the utterance of God; for it does not clearly appear how the subject of a book can establish its authority; and, in fact, the commentator, when he states this interpretation, is obliged, in order to give it the least appearance of plausibility, to assume the authoritative character of the precepts in the Veda, and from this assumption to infer the authority of the book which delivers them. I may also observe that Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapanchāhāna, the author of the Gloss on Sāṅkara Miśra's Commentary, takes no notice of this alternative interpretation; and that in his comment on the same aphorism when repeated at the close of the work (x. 2, 9) Sāṅkara Miśra himself does not put it forward a second time. Dr.-Roer (Journ. Germ. Or. Soc. for 1867, p. 310) argues in favour of the former of the two interpretations as the true one.
tena anyathā-siddhiḥ  "svarga-kāmo yajeta" ityādāv iśṭa-sādhanatayāḥ kārayatayāḥ vā asmad-ādī-buddhi-agocharutvāt  | tena svatantra-purusha-pūrvakatvam vede siddhyat | vedatvaṁ cha śabda-tad-upajīvi-pramāṇātiriktaḥ-pramāṇa-janya-pramīty-avishayārthakato vato sati śabda-janya-tākyārtha-jñānājanya-pramāṇa-śabdavam | "An examination of righteousness and unrighteousness, which are the original causes of the world,\(^\text{115}\) forms the subject of the 6th section. Now, righteousness and unrighteousness are to be constituted by virtue of such injunctions and prohibitions as these: 'The man who desires paradise should sacrifice,’ ‘Let no one eat garlic,’ etc., provided these injunctions and prohibitions be authoritative. And this authoritiveness depends upon the fact of the utterer [of these injunctions or prohibitions] possessing the quality of understanding the correct meaning of sentences, for the supposition of inherent authoritiveness is untenable. The author, therefore, first of all enters upon the proof of that quality which gives rise to the authoritiveness of the Veda.

"Aphorism vi. 1. 1.—'There is in the Veda a construction of sentences which is produced (giś. preceded) by intelligence.'"

"The ‘construction of sentences,’ the composition of sentences, ‘is produced by intelligence,’ i.e. by a ‘knowledge of the correct meaning of sentences on the part of the utterer [of them]; [and this is proved] by the fact of these sentences possessing an arrangement like the arrangement of such sentences as ‘There are five fruits on the river side,’ composed by such persons as ourselves. ‘In the Veda,’ i.e. in the collection of sentences (so called). Here the construction of the sentences composing the collection is the subject of the proposition which is asserted. And this construction must not be ascribed to a wrong cause by assuming that it was the work of a [limited] intelligence such as ours. [Because it was not a limited intelligence which produced these sentences]. For it is not an object of apprehension to the understandings of persons like ourselves that such injunctions as, ‘He who desires paradise should sacrifice,’ are the instruments of obtaining what we desire, or that they are obligatory in themselves. Hence in the case of the Veda the agency of a self-dependent person is

\(^{115}\) This, I suppose, means that the existence of the world in its present or developed form, is necessary in order to furnish the means of rewarding righteousness and punishing unrighteousness.
established [since these matters could be known by such a person alone.] And while the contents of the Veda are not the subjects of a knowledge produced by any proof distinct from verbal proof and the proofs dependent thereon, Vedicity, or the characteristic nature of the Veda, consists in its being composed of (authoritative) words, whose authority does not spring from a knowledge of the meaning of sentences arising from words [but depends on the undervied omniscience of its author].”

“Or, Vedicity consists in being one or other of the four collections, the Rich, Yajush, Sāman, or Atharvan.”

I will introduce the next aphorism (x. 2, 9) which I propose to cite (and which is a repetition of aphorism i. 1, 3), by adducing some remarks of the commentator on the one which immediately precedes it, viz. x. 2, 8:


116 The last words are a translation of the conclusion of Jayanārāyaṇa’s gloss.
ity uktam | kartṛi-smaraṇābhavād na evam iti chet | na | kartṛi-smaraṇaṁ pūrvac āva sadhitavat | tat-pranitavatḥ cha sva-tantra-puruṣa-pranitavat āva siddham | na to asmād-ađinaṁ sahasra-sākha-veda-pranavye svātantryaṁ sambhavati ity uktavat | kincha prāmāyaṁ guṇa-janyatvena vaiḍika-pramāyaṁ api guṇa-janyatven āvaśyakam | tattra cha guṇo vaktṛi-yathārtha-vākyārtha-jñaṇam āva vācyayāḥ | tathā cha tād-riśaḥ āva veda vaktā yaḥ svargāpūrvaṁ-vishayaka-sākṣāt-kāravān | tād-riśaḥ cha na īśvarād anyaḥ iti: suṣṭhu |

"Now all this will be so, provided the Veda is authoritative: but this condition is the very one which is difficult to attain; for you do not hold, like the Mīmāṃsakas, that the authority of the Veda arises from its eternal faultlessness; since you admit that it has a personal author, and error, inadvertence, and a desire to deceive are incident to such a person. It is with a view to this objection that the writer says in his aphorism, ‘In the absence of what is seen,’ i.e. in the absence of those personal faults which are seen in other persons like ourselves,17 such as error, inadvertence, and a desire to deceive: for the Supreme Person who is inferred from the creation of the world, or the authorship of the Veda, can only exist in a state of freedom from fault; and, consequently, neither want of meaning, nor contradiction of meaning, nor uselessness of meaning, can be predicated of his words. Incorrectnesses in words are to be apprehended as the results of error, inadvertence, or unskilfulness in composition, arising from some defect in the elements, the senses, or the mind. But none of these things is to be imagined in the word of Īśvara (the Lord). And this has been expressed in the following verse: ‘A speaker may utter falsehood, from being possessed by affection, ignorance, and the like; but these [defects] do not exist in God; how then can he speak what is otherwise [than true]?"

"But may not the fact that the Veda is composed by God be disputed? In consequence of this, the author says (in the next aphorism): x. 2, 9. ‘The authority of the Vedic record arises from its being uttered by Him.’

17 A different interpretation is given by the commentator to this phrase dṛṣṭā-ḥāve, in an earlier aphorism in which it occurs, viz. vi. 2, 1. He there understands it to mean that where there is no visible motive for a prescribed action, an invisible one must be presumed (yattra dṛṣṭām prayojanaṁ nopalabhyaśe tattra adṛṣṭām prayojanaṁ kalpanīyam).
"Thus at the end of his treatise [the writer lays it down that] the authority of the Veda is derived from its being His word, viz. from its being spoken, i.e. composed by Him, i.e. by Īśvara. As thus: The Vedas are derived from a person, because they are formed of sentences. This has been proved. And persons like ourselves cannot be conceived as the utterers of these Vedas, which are distinguished by having thousands of Sākhās (recensions), because their objects are such as lie beyond the reach of the senses; and persons like us have no intuition into anything beyond the reach of the senses. Further, the Vedas [are not only derived from a personal author, but they] have been uttered by a competent author (āpta), because they have been embraced by great men. Whatever has not been uttered by a competent person is not embraced by great men: but this (book) is embraced by great men: therefore it has been uttered by a competent person. Now, composition by a self-dependent person is utterance by a competent person; and the reception (of the Veda) by great men is the observance of its contents by persons who are adherents of all the different philosophical schools: and (the infallibility of the Veda is defended by that which) has been already said, viz. that any occasional failure in the results (of ceremonies prescribed in the Veda) is crying to some defect in the rite, or in the performer, or in the instruments employed [and not to any fallibility in the Veda].

"If it be objected to this reasoning, that no author (of the Veda) is recollected, we rejoin, that this is not true, because it has been formerly proved that the author is remembered. And that it was composed by Him is proved by the simple fact of its being composed by a self-dependent-person; and because it has been said that the self-dependence [or unassisted ability] of people like us in the composition of the Veda, consisting, as it does, of a thousand Sākhās, is inconceivable. And since authority (in a writing in general) springs from a quality [in its author], it necessarily follows that the authority of the Veda also springs from a quality. And there the quality in question must be declared to be the speaker's knowledge of the correct meaning of sentences. And thus (we have shewn that) there is such an utterer of the Veda, who possesses an intuitive knowledge of paradise, and of the yet unseen consequences of actions, etc., and such an utterer is no other than Īśvara. Thus all is satisfactory."
The ultimate proofs, then, of the binding authority of the Veda are, according to the commentator, 1st, its extent and subject-matter, and 2ndly, its unanimous reception by great men, adherents of all the different orthodox systems. Of course these arguments have no validity except for those who see something supernatural in the Veda, and on the assumption that the great men who embraced it were infallible; and therefore as against the Baudhās and other heretics who saw nothing miraculous in the Vedas; and consequently regarded all their adherents as in error, they were utterly worthless. But possibly it was not the object of the commentator (for the greater part of the argumentation is his, not that of the author of the Aphorisms) to state the ultimate reasons on which the authority of the Vedas would have to be vindicated against heretics, but merely to explain the proper grounds on which the orthodox schools who already acknowledged that authority ought to regard it as resting; i.e. not, as the Mīmāṃsakas held their eternal faultlessness, but the fact of their being uttered by an intelligent and omniscient author; whose authorship, again, was proved by the contents of the Vedas having reference to unseen and future matters of which only an omniscient Being could have any knowledge; while the fact of these revelations in regard to unseen things having actually proceeded from such a Being, and being therefore true, was guaranteed by the unanimous authority of the wisest men among the faithful.

As it is a matter of some interest to know what is the nature of inspiration, or supernatural knowledge, as conceived by the Vaiśeṣhikas, I shall quote some passages bearing on this subject from the aphorisms, or from their expounder, Sankara Miśra. In his remarks on Aphorism viii. 1, 2 (p. 357), the commentator states that opinion (jñāna) is of two kinds, true (vidyā) and false (avidyā); and that the former (vidyā) is of two descriptions, arising from perception, inference, recollection, and the infallible intuition "peculiar to rishis" (Tath cha jñānaṁ dvividhāṁ vidyā cha avidyā cha | vidyā cha tattvavidhā pratyakṣa-duṣṭikā- 

smṛity-ārtha-lakṣaṇā). Perception or intuition, again, is of different kinds or degrees (Aphorism ix. 1, 11–15, pp. 385 ff.). Aphorism ix. 1, 11 (p. 386), is as follows:

Tad evam bhāvābhāva-visayaḥkam laukika-pratyakṣaṁ nirūpya yogi- 

pratyakṣaṁ nirūpayitum prakaraṇāntaram ārabhate | ix. 1, 11. "Āt- 

many ātma-manasoḥ saṁyoga-visēśhād ātma-pratyakṣaṁ" | jñānam ut-
padyate iti beshah | dvividhis tavat yoginah samahitaantahkaranah ye
“yuktah” ity abhidhiyante asamahitaantahkaranah cha ye “viyuktah”
ity abhidhiyante | tatra yuktah sakshatkartaye vastuny adare na mano
mihaya nididhyasanavanta | tesham atmani svatmani paratmani cha
jnanaam utpadyate | “atma-pratyaksham” iti | atma sakshatkara-vishayo
yattra juna tat tathah | yadyapy asmad-adinam api kadachid atma-
jnanaam asti tathapy avidya-tiraskritatvat tad asat-kalpam ity uktam |
“atma-manasah sannikarsha-viseshah” iti yoga-ja-dharmavgrahah atma-
manasoh sannikarsha-atishah tasmad ity arthaah |

“Having thus defined ordinary perception which has for its objects
existence and non-existence, the author, with the view of determining
the character of the intuition of yogins, says: ‘From a particular con-
centration of both the soul and the mind’\(^1\) on the soul, arises the per-
ception (or intuition) of soul.’ On this the commentator remarks:
‘There are two kinds of yogins (intent, or contemplative, persons), (1)
those whose inner sense is fixed samahitaantahkaranah), who are called
(yuktah) united (i.e. with the object of contemplation), and (2) those
whose inner sense is no longer fixed, and who are called disunited (viyuk-
taah).\(^2\) Of these the first class, who are called ‘united,’ fix their minds
with reverence on the thing which is to be the object of intuition, and
contemplate it intently. In this way knowledge arises in their souls
regarding their own souls, and the souls of others. ‘Intuition of soul,’
that is, a knowledge in which soul is the perceptible object of intuition.
Now, although persons like ourselves have sometimes a knowledge of
soul, yet from this knowledge being affected by ignorance, it has been
said to be like what is unreal. ‘From a particular concentration of the
soul and the mind;' that is, from a particular conjunction of the soul
and the mind which is effected by means of the virtue derived from
yoga.’ See also Aphorism xv. p. 390.

At the conclusion of his remarks (Bibl. Ind. p. 408) on the third sort
of true knowledge (referred to in p. 357, Bibl. Ind.), viz. recollection,
the commentator remarks that the author of the aphorisms does not
make any separate mention of the fourth kind of knowledge, viz., in-
fallible intuition:

\(^1\) The “mind” (manas) is regarded by the Indian philosophers as distinct from
the soul, and as being merely an internal organ.

\(^2\) This class is the more perfect of the two, as appears from the gloss of Jayan-
rayaḥ: ayam api viśishṭa-yogarattvād viyuktah ity uchyate.
ix. 2, 6. . . . Ārshaṁ jñānam sātra-kṛtā prithaṁ na lakṣhitam |
yogi-pratyakshāntarbhāvitam | padārtha-pradesākhye tu prakaranae tad|
ustam | tad yathā | “āmnāya-vidhātṛīnām rśiṁāṁ atītānāgata-vattta-
mānesho atindriyārthaṁ artheśu dharmādīśu granthopanibaddheshu vā|
lingādy-anapekśād atma-manasoḥ saṁyogād dharmā-viśeṣāḥ cha pra-
tibhāṁ jñānāṁ yad utpadyate tad ārshaṁ iti | tach cha kaḍāχil lauki-
kānām api bhavati yathā kanyakā vadati “śvo me bhṛata gantā iti hri-
dayam me kathayati” iti |

“Rishis’ (ārsha) knowledge,” he says, “is not separately defined
by the author of the aphorisms, but is included in the intuition of
yogins.120 But the following statement has been made (in reference to
it) in the section on the categories: ‘Rishis’ (ārsha) knowledge is
that which, owing to a conjunction of the soul and the minā, inde-
pendent of inference, etc., and owing to a particular species of virtue,
immunates those rishis who have composed the record of the Vedas
(āmnāya-vidhātṛīnām), in reference to such matters, whether past,
future, or present, as are beyond the reach of the senses, or in refer-
ence to matters of duty, etc., recorded in books, etc. And this sort of
knowledge is also sometimes manifested by ordinary persons, as when a
girl says, ‘my heart tells me that my brother will go to-morrow.’”
See also Aphorism ix. 2, 13 (Bibli. Ind. pp. 414, 415).

The Tarka-sangraha, another Vaiśeṣika work, also affirms the divine
authorship of the Veda in these words: 121 Vākyāṁ deśvidhaṁ laukikāṁ
vaidikāṁ cha | vaidikāṁ Īśvaroktavat sarvam eva pramāṇam laukikāṁ tu
ūptoktam pramāṇam anvad apramāṇam | “Sentences are of two kinds,
Vedic and secular. Vedic sentences, from being uttered by Īśvara, are
all proof [or authoritative]. Of secular sentences, those only which are
uttered by competent persons (ūpta) are proof; the rest are not
proof.”

In this text, the authority of the Veda is founded on its being uttered
by Īśvara; and this characteristic is regarded as limited to the Veda.

120 It had been already noticed by Professor Max Müller in the Journal of the
German Oriental Society, vii. p. 311, that “the Vaiśeṣikas, like Kapila, include the
intuition of enlightened rishis under the head of pratyakṣa (intuition), and thus sepa-
rate it decidedly from aithhya, ‘tradition.’” He also quotes the commentator’s
remark about a similar intuition being discoverable among ordinary persons, which he
thinks is not “without a certain irony.”

121 See Dr. Ballantyne’s ed. with Hindi and English Versions, p. 40 of the Sanskrit.
On the other hand, such secular works as proceed from competent persons (āpta) are also declared to possess authority. Here, therefore, a distinction is drawn between the authority of the Veda and that of all other writings, however authoritative, inasmuch as the former was uttered by Īśvara, while the latter have only been uttered by some competent person (āpta). But in the Nyāya aphorism, ii. 68, quoted and commented upon above (p. 114), the authority of the Veda itself is made to rest on the authority of the wise, or competent persons (āpta), from whom it proceeded. In this aphorism, therefore, either the word “āpta” must mean “Īśvara,” or we must suppose a difference of view between the author of the aphorism on the one hand, and the writers of the Vaisheshika aphorisms and the Tarka-sargraha on the other. We shall see from the next extract that the Kusumānjali coincides with the latter.

I quote from the work just named (of which Udayana Āchārya is the author), and its commentary, some statements of the doctrine maintained by the author regarding the origin and authority of the Veda. Mr. Colebrooke (Misc. Ess. i. 263, or p. 166 of Williams and Norgate’s ed.) speaks of this treatise as being accompanied by a commentary of Nārāyaṇa Tirtha; but the or: “which is printed in the Calcutta edition, as well as in Professor Cowell’s, is by Haridāsa Bhaṭṭāchārya. The object of the work is to prove the existence of a personal god (Īśvara), in opposition to various other antagonistic theories.

I. Kusumānjali, 2nd Stavaka, at the commencement: Anyatha’pi paraloka-sādhana-anushṭhāna-sambhavād iti dvitiya-vipratipattitiḥ | Anyathā Īśvaraṁ vinā’pi paraloka-sādhana-yāgūdy-anushṭhānaṁ sambhavati yāggadeḥ sārva-sādhanatvasya veda-gamyatvāt | nitya-nirdoshatavāḥ cha veda-sya prāmāṇyam | mahājana-parighahāḥ cha prāmāṇyasya grahaḥ iti veda-kāraṇataya na Īśvara-siddhiḥ | yogadhi-sampādita-sārvajnya-Kapi-

122 The following words are put by the author of the Vishṇu Purāṇa (iii. ch. 18; Wilson, vol. iii. p. 212) into the mouth of the deluder who promulgated the Buddha and other heresies: Na hy āpta-vādāḥ nabhaso nipatanti mahāsūryāḥ | guktimad euchanaṁ grāhyam mayā’nyaiś cha bhavat-vādaiḥ | “Words of the competent do not, great Asuras, fall from the sky. It is only words supported by reasons that should be admitted by me and others like yourselves.”

123 This book was published at the Sanskrit Press, Calcutta, in the Saṅka year, 1769. A new edition was published by Professor Cowell in 1864, accompanied by an English translation. I have availed myself of this excellent version to correct a good many mistakes in my own.
lādi-पुरवाकःeva vā vedo 'sty itty atra āha | "pramāyaḥ paratantratvāt
sarga-pralaya-sambhavat | tad-avyasminn avivāsād na vihāntara-sambhavaḥ" | S'abdī pramaṇa vaktri-yathārtha-vakyārtha-dhi-rūpa-guna-janyā
iti guṇādhāratayā Īśvara-siddhiḥ | nanu sakartrike 'stu yathārtha-vāk-
yārtha-dhir guṇaḥ | akartrike cha vede nirdoshatvam eva prāmānya-pra-
yojakam astu mahājana-parigrahena cha prāmānayā-grahah itty ata āha |
"sarga-pralaya-sambhavād" iti | pralayottaram pūrva-veda-nāśād uttara-
vedasya katham prāmānyaṃ mahājana-parigrahaśyapi tadda abhāvāt |
śabdasya anityatvam uppanno ga-karaḥ iti prati-t-siddham | pravāhāvich-
chheda-rūpa-nityatvam api pralaya-sambhavād nāsti iti bhāvāḥ | Kapilā-
dayaḥ eva sargadau pūrva-sargābhyaṣṭa-yoga-janya -āharmānubhavat
sākshat-kriṣa-sakalārthāḥ kartāraḥ santu | itty ata āha | "tad-avyas-
minn" iti | viśva-nirmāṇa-samarthāḥ aniṣṭa-saṁpannaḥ yadi
sarvajnānād tadda lāghavat ēka eva tādṛṣṭaḥ svakriyatam | sa eva bhagavān
Īśvaraḥ | anityāsarva-viśaya-kāṇuṣvati cha viśvāsaḥ eva nāsti | iti
vaiāika-vyavahāra-viˈlopaḥ | iti na vihāntara-sambhavāḥ Īśvarānangī-
kartri-naye iti śesāḥ |

"The second objection is that [there is no proof of an Īśvara], since
the means of attaining paradise can be practised independently of any
such Being. That is to say, the celebration of sacrifices, etc., which
are the instrument of obtaining paradise, can take place otherwise, i.e.
even without an Īśvara (God). For the fact that sacrifices, etc., are the
instruments of obtaining paradise is to be learned from the Veda, while
the authority of the Veda rests upon its eternal faultlessness; and the
[immemorial] admission of that authority results from its reception by
illustrious men. Now in this way there is no proof of the existence of
a God to be derived from the idea that he is the cause of the Veda. Or
let it be supposed that the Veda was preceded [composed] by Kapila
and other sages, who by their wealth in devotion had acquired omni-
science.

"In answer to all this the author says: [verse] 'Since truth depends
on an external source, since creation and dissolution occur, and since
there is no confidence in any other than God, therefore no other manner
can be conceived [in which the Veda originated, except from God].'
[Comment] Verbal truth [or authoritativeness] is derived from the
attribute, possessed by its promulgator, of comprehending the true
sense of words [i.e. in order to constitute the Veda an authoritative
rule of duty, it must have proceeded from an intelligent being who understood the sense of what he uttered]; and since God is the substratum of this attribute [of intelligence], there is proof of his existence.

"But it may be said that if the Veda had a maker, then, indeed, such comprehension of the true sense of words as you insist upon may be a quality belonging to him; but if the Veda had no maker, let it be its faultlessness which imparts to it its authority, while the [immemorial] admission of that authority results from its reception by illustrious men.

"In answer to this the author says: 'Since creation and dissolution occur.' Since the previous Veda [the one which existed during the former mundane period] perished after the dissolution of the universe, how can the subsequent Veda [i.e. the one supposed by our opponents to have existed during the dissolution] be authoritative, since there was not then even any reception of it by illustrious men [who also had all become extinct at the dissolution]. And further, the non-eternity of sound is proved by the conviction we have that letters such as G are produced, [and not eternal]: and even that eternity (or perpetuity) of the Veda which consists in unbroken continuity of tradition, does not exist, as there is probable proof of a dissolution. But, again, it is urged that Kapila and other saints—who, from their perception of duty, springing from the practice of devotion during the former mundane period, had acquired an intuitive knowledge of every subject—may at the creation have been the authors of the Veda. This is answered in the words, 'since there is no confidence in any other but God.' If persons capable of creating the universe and possessing the faculty of minuteness be omniscient, then, for the sake of simplicity, let one such person only be admitted, namely, the divine Iśvara. And no confidence can be reposed in any person who is not eternal, and who is not possessed of a knowledge which extends to all objects. Thus the Vedic tradition disappears. And so he concludes that no other manner [of the origination of the Veda] can be conceived [except

124 The writers on the other side seem to reply to this Naiyāyika objection about the interruption of the tradition of the Veda through the dissolution of the universe, by saying that the Veda was retained in the memory of Brahmā or the Rishis during the interval while the dissolution lasted. See Kullūka on Manu, i. 23, above, p. 6; and the passage of Kāliya on the Mahābhāṣya, above, p. 96.

125 "The law of parsimony bids us assume only one such," etc.—Cowell.
from Īśvara]; that is, in the system of those who deny an Īśvara [no way is pointed out]."

II. Kusumāñjali, iii. 16.—"Na pramāṇam anāptoktir nādrīṣṭāṁ kvācid āptatā | adrīṣṭa-āprīṣṭau sarva-jna-na cha nityāgamaḥ kshamaḥ | ayaṁ hi sarva-kāraṇyābhāvāvedakaḥ śabdāḥ anāptoktaḥ echa na pramāṇam | āptoktaḥ echa etad-artha-gocchāra-jnānavatvo nitya-sarva-viṣaya-kā-jnānavatvo indriyādy-abhāvāt | āgamaṣya cha nityatvaṁ dūshitaṁ eva prāg iti veda-kāro nityaḥ sarvejñaḥ śiddhyati |

[Verse] "The word of an incompetent person is not authoritative; nor can there be any competency in regard to a thing unseen [by the speaker]. To perceive invisible things, a person must be omniscient; and an eternal scripture is impossible. [Comment] This [supposed] scriptural testimony, denying the fact of there being a creator of all things, if uttered by an incompetent person, would be no proof. If it was uttered by a competent person, then the person who possessed an acquaintance with this circumstance [that there was no creator] would be master of a knowledge which was eternal, and universal in its range, since he would not be limited by any bodily organs. And we have previously disproved the eternity of any scripture (see the first extract from the Kusumāñjali, above). Consequently an omniscient and eternal author of the Veda is established."


[Verse] "An omniscient and indestructible Being is to be proved from [the existence of] effects, from the conjunction of [atoms], from the support [of the earth in the sky], etc., from ordinary usages, from belief [in revelation], from the Veda, from sentences, and from particular numbers."

The following is so much of the comment as refers to the words pratyaya, śruti, and vākya: "From belief, i.e. from authoritativeness. The knowledge derived from the Veda is derived from the attributes of its Cause; since it is true knowledge, like the true knowledge derived from perception. From the śruti, i.e. the Veda. The Veda is [shewn
to be] derived from a person, by its having the characters of a Veda, like the Ayur-veda. It is also [shewn to be] derived from a person, by having the character of sentences, like the Mahâbhârata. The words of the Veda are [shewn to be] derived from a person, by their having the character of sentences, like the sentences of persons such as ourselves."

IV. Kusumânjali, v.16.—"Syâm" "abhûvam" "bhavishyâm" 'tyâdau sankhyâ pravaktri-gâ | samâkhyâ 'pi cha sâkhânaâm náda-pravachanâd rite | Vaidîkottama-purushena svatantrochchârayituh sankhyâ vâchyâ | "tad aikshata eko 'ham bahu syâm" ityâdi-bahusuh uttama-purusha-sruteh | sankhyâ-padârthaṁ anyam āha "samâkhyâ" ityâdi | sarvâsâm sâkhânâṁ hi Kâṭhaka-Kâlâpakâdyâḥ samâkhyâḥ sanjñâ-vîsheshâḥ śrâvantē | tē cha na adhyayana-mâtra-nibandhanâḥ | adhyetṛînâm ānântyât | ādâv anyair api tad-adhyayanât | tasmâd atîndriyârtha-darśi bhagavân eva Īsvaraḥ kârûnîkaḥ sargâdâv atîndriyârtha-kâthakâdi-kârûnîkaḥ-vîshesham adhishtâya yâṁ sâkhâm uktâvâṁ tasyâḥ sâkhâyâs tan-nâmnâ vyapadesâḥ iti Siddham Īsvara-mananam moksha-hetuḥ |

[Verse] "In the phrases 'let me be,' 'I was,' 'I shall be,' [which occur in the Veda], personal designations have reference to a speaker; and the names of the Sâkhâs could only have been derived from a primeval utterance. [Comment] The first person (I), when it occurs in the Veda, must be employed to denote a self-dependent utterer. Now there are many instances there of such a use of the first person, as in the words, 'It reflected, I am one, let me become many.' The author then specifies another signification of the term aṅkhyā in the clause, 'and the designations,' etc. For all the Sâkhâs of the Veda traditionally bear the names, the special names, of Kâṭhaka, Kâlâpaka, etc. And these names cannot be connected with the mere study [of these Sâkhâs by Kâṭha, Kalâpa, etc.] from the infinite multitude of students, since they must have been studied before by others besides the persons just mentioned. Wherefore the particular Sâkhâs which Īsvara, the beholder of objects beyond the reach of the senses, the compassionate Lord, himself uttered at the beginning of the creation, when he assumed the bodies of Kâṭha, etc., which were drawn on by the destiny (adrishtâ) of beings like ourselves—these Sâkhâs, I say, were designated by the names of the particular sages [in whose persons they were promulgated]. And so it is proved that the contemplation of Īsvara is the cause of final liberation."
I am unable to say if the ancient doctrine of the Nyāya was theistic, as that of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras (at least as interpreted by Sankara Miśra) appears to be, and as that of the Kusumānjali, the Tarka-sangraha, and the Siddhānta Muktāvali undoubtedly is (p. 6 of Dr. Ballantyne’s ed., or p. 12 of his “Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy,” and p. 13 of Dr. Röer’s Bhāshā-parichchheda, in Bibl. Ind.). The remarks of Dr. Röer on the subject, in pp. xv., xvi., of the introduction to the last named work, may be consulted. The subject is also discussed by Professor Banerjea in his work on Hindu philosophy, pp. 144–153. The solution of the question may depend much on the interpretation to be given to the aphorisms of Gotama, 19–21 of the fourth book.

III. The Sāṅkhya.—The opinions of the author of the Sāṅkhya aphorisms in regard to the authority of the Veda and the principles on which that authority depends, are contained in the 45th to the 51st aphorisms of the Fifth Book, which I extract with the comments of Vijnāna Bhikshu:


126 Jnānādikaraṇam ātmā | sa deviśha jīvātmā paramātmā cha | tatra Īśvaraḥ sarvajño paramātmā eka eva | jīvātmā prati sarvam bhīnno vibhū bhūṣṇa nityaścha |

“The substratum of knowledge is soul. It is of two kinds, the embodied soul, and the supreme soul. Of these the supreme soul is the omniscient Isvara, one only. The embodied soul is distinct in each body, all-pervading, and eternal.”

127 Compare Dr. Ballantyne’s translation of the Sāṅkhya Aphorisms, books v. and vi., published at Mīrzapore in 1856, pp. 26 ff., as well as that which subsequently appeared in the Bibliotheca Indica (in 1865), pp. 127 ff.
134 OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORIGIN, ETC.,

rira-janyam iti vyāptir loke āriśṭā tasyāḥ bādhādīr evam sati syād iti arthāḥ | nanv Ādi-purushochcharitavād Vedāḥ api paurusheyāḥ eva ity āḥa | 50. “Yasmin adrishto’pi kriya-buddhir upajāyate tat paurusheyam” | Drishto iva adrisktapo’pi yasmin vaistunī kriya-buddhir buddhi-
purvakatva’-buddhir jāyate tad eva paurusheyam iti vyavahriyate ity arthāḥ | etad uktam bhavati | na purushochcharitā-mātreyā purushe-
yavam śvāsa-prāśvāsayaḥ suh₂ṣṭi-kālinayoḥ paurusheyatva-nyavahāra-
bhavat kintu buddhi-purvakatvena | Vedās tu niḥsvāsa-vad eva adrishta-
vaśād abuddhi-purvakāḥ eva Svayambhuvaḥ sakāsāt svayaṁ bhavanti | ato
na te paurusheyah | tathā cha śrutīḥ “tasya ityāya mahato bhūtasya ni-
śvasitam etad yad riṣvedo ity ādir” iti | nanv evam yathārtha-vākyārtha-
-jnānapurvakatvāt śuka-śākyasyeva vedānām api prāmāṇyaṁ na syāt
tatārāḥ | 51. “Niśā-saktya-abhiyakteḥ svatāḥ prāmāṇyaṁ” | Vedānām
nīśa svābhāvika yā yathārtha-jñāna-janana-saktis tasyāṁ mantrāyurveda-
dāv abhiyakten upalambhād akhila-vedānāṁ eva svatāḥ eva prāmāṇyaṁ
siddhyati na vaṭkri-yathārtha-jñāna-mulakatvādāna ity arthāḥ | tathā
tathā cha Nyāya-sūtram | “mantrāyurveda-prāmāṇya-vach cha tat-prāmāṇyaṁ”
iti |

“Sūtra 45. ‘Eternity cannot be predicated of the Vedas, since various texts in these books them ives declare them to have been pro-
duced.’ The sense is this, that the Vedas are proved not to be eternal by such texts as the following: ‘He performed austerity; from him, when he had thus performed austerity, the three Vedas were produced.’

[See above, p. 4.] Those other texts which assert the eternity [or perpetuity] of the Vedas refer merely to the unbroken continuity of the stream of homogeneous succession [or tradition]. Are the Vedas, then, derived from any personal author? ‘No,’ he replies in Sūtra 46. ‘The Vedas are not derived from any personal author (paurusheyu), since there is no person to make them.’ We must supply the words, ‘since an Īśvara (God) is denied.’ The sense is easy. In answer to the supposition that there may be some other maker, he remarks, Sūtra 47, ‘No; for there could be no fit maker, either liberated or un-
liberated.’ Vishṇu, the chief of all those beings who are liberated even while they live,128 although, from the pure goodness of his nature, he is possessed of perfect omniscience, would, owing to his impassiveness, be unfit to compose the Veda consisting of a thousand śākhās (branches),

128 See Colebrooke’s Essays, i. 369, or p. 241 of Williams and Norgate’s ed.
while any unliberated person would be unfit for the task from want of omniscience. (See Sankara’s comment on Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 3; above, p. 106.) But does not, then, the eternity of the Vedas follow from their having no personal author? He replies (48), ‘Their eternity does not result from their having no personal author, as in the case of sprouts, etc.’ This is clear. But is it not to be inferred that sprouts, etc., since they are products, have, like jars, etc., some personal maker? He replies (49), ‘If such a supposition be applied to these (sprouts, etc.) it must there also be exposed to the objection that it is contrary to what we see, etc.’ Whatever is derived from a personal author is produced from a body; this is a rule which is seen to hold invariably. But if we assert that sprouts are derived from a personal author, we contradict the rule in question, [since they evidently did not spring from any embodied person].’ But are not the Vedas, too, derived from a person, seeing that they were uttered by the primeval Purusha? He answers (50), ‘That object only (even though it be an invisible one), which its maker is conscious of having made, can be said to be derived from [or made by] such a person.’ It is only those objects, be they seen or unseen, in regard to which a consciousness of design arises, that are ordinarily spoken of as made by a person. The sense is, that it is not mere utterance by a person which constitutes formation by that person (since we do not ordinarily speak of the inspirations and expirations of any person during the time of sleep, as being formed by that person), but only utterance with conscious design. But the Vedas proceed of their own accord from Svayamabhū (the self-existent), like an expiration, by the force of adrishta (destiny), without any consciousness on his part. Hence they are not formed by any person. Thus the Veda says, ‘This Rig-veda, etc., is the breath of this great Being, etc.’ [See above, p. 8.] But will not the Vedas, also, be in this way destitute of authority, like the chatter of a parrot, since they did not result from any knowledge of the correct meaning of the words of which they are made up? In reference to this, he says (51), ‘The Vedas have a self-proving authority, since they reveal their own inherent power.’ The self-evidencing authority of the entire Vedas is established by the perception of a manifestation in certain portions of them, viz. in the formulas and the Ayur-veda, etc., of that inherent power which they (the Vedas) possess of generating correct knowledge, and does not depend on
its being shown that they (the Vedas) are founded on correct knowledge in their utterer,\textsuperscript{129} or on any other ground of that sort. And to this effect is the Nyāya Sūtra, that ‘their authority is like the authority of the formulas and the Āyur-veda.’ (See above, p. 114.)

In reference to the 46th Sūtra I add here the 98th aphorism of the 1st book, with the remarks by which it is introduced and followed:

\textit{Nanu chet sādā sarvajñaḥ śvaro nāsti tarhi vedānta-mahāvākyārthasya vivekaśya upadeśe ’ndha-paramparāśankayā aprāmāṇyam prasajyeta | tattra aha | 98. Siddha-rūpa-boddhītvād vākyārthropadeśaḥ | Hiranyagarbhadīnām siddha-rupānām\textsuperscript{130} yathārthārthasya boddhītvāt tad-vak-
\textit{trikāyurvedaśi-prāmāṇyena acadhārtītāḥ cha esahāṃ vākyārthropadeśaḥ prāmāṇam iti śesah |}

“But may it not be said that if there be no eternally omniscient Īśvara, the charge of want of authority will attach to the inculcation of discriminative knowledge which is the subject of the great texts of the Upanishads, from the doubt lest these texts may have been handed down by a blind tradition. To this he replies: 86. ‘From the fact that beings perfect in their nature understood them, it results that we have an (authoritative) inculcation of the sense.’ As Hiranyagarbha (Brahmā) and other beings who were perfect in their nature understood the true sense, and are ascertained to have done so by the authoritiveness of the Āyur-veda, etc., which they uttered, their inculcation of the sense of the texts is authority;—such is the complete meaning of the aphorism.”

In the 57th and following Sūtras of the fifth book, Kapila denies that sound has the character of sphoṭa, or that letters are eternal:

57. “\textit{Pratity-apratītibhyāṁ na sphoṭātmakaḥ sabdah}’ | Pratyeka-
vargabhyaḥ tīriktāṁ kalasāḥ ityādi-rūpam akhandam eka-padam sphoṭah iti yogair abhyupaganyate | kambu-grivādy-avargabhyaḥ tīrktā ghaṭādy-
\textit{aravātaka | sa cha sabda-visēsaka padākhyo ’rtha-sphuṭikaranat sphoṭah ity uchyate | sa sabdo ’prāmāṇikāḥ | kutah | “pratity-apratītibhyām” | sa sabdah kim pratiyate na vā | ādye yena vṛṇa-samudāyena ānupurvi-

\textsuperscript{129} This directly contradicts the doctrine enunciated in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras and the Kusumānjali. See above, pp. 121, 123, and 129 f.

\textsuperscript{130} This is a various reading given by Dr. Hall in the appendix to his edition of the Sāṁkhya-pravachana-bhāṣya; and I have adopted it: in preference to \textit{siddha-rupasya} which he gives in his text, as the former seems to afford a better sense.
vīśeṣa-viśiṣṭeṇa so 'bhivyajyate tasya eva artha-pratyāyakatvam astu | kim antargaṇaḥ tena | antye te ajñāta-sphoṭasya nāṣy artha-pratyāyana-śaktir iti vārthā sphoṭa-kalpanā ity arthāḥ | Pūrvam vedānām nityatvam pratiśiddham | idantī varṇa-nityatvaṁ api pratiśhedati | 58.


"'Sound has not the character of sphoṭa, from the dilemma that the latter must be either apparent or not apparent.' A modification of sound called sphoṭa, single, indivisible, distinct from individual letters, existing in the form of words like kālaśa (jar), distinguished also from parts of words like kambu-ṛīva (striped-neck) and forming a whole like the word ghaṭa (jar), is assumed by the Yogas. And this species of sound called a word (pada) is designated sphoṭa from its manifesting a meaning. But the existence of this form of sound is destitute of proof. Why? 'From the dilemma that it must be either apparent or not apparent.' Does this form of sound appear or not? If it appears, then let the power of disclosing a meaning [which is ascribed by our opponents to sphoṭa] be regarded as belonging to that collection of letters, arranged in a particular order, by which the supposed sphoṭa is manifested. What necessity is there then for that superfluous sphoṭa? If, on the contrary, it does not appear, then that unknown sphoṭa can have no power of disclosing a meaning, and consequently it is useless to suppose that any such thing as sphoṭa exists.

"The eternity of the Vedas has been already denied. He now denies the eternity of letters also. 58. 'Sound is not eternal, since it is clear that it is a production.' The meaning is, that it is not reasonable to
infer on the strength of the recognition of the letter G as the same
that we knew before (see Mīmāṃsā Aphorisms i. 13; above, p. 74),
that letters are eternal; since it is clear that G and other letters are
produced, and therefore cannot be eternal. The recognition of these
letters has reference to their being of the same species as we have per-
ceived before; since otherwise we are landed in the absurdity that,
because we recognize a jar or any other such object to be the same, it
must therefore be eternal.

"He expresses a doubt: 59. 'What we hear may be merely the
manifestation of a previously existing thing, as a jar is manifested (not
created) by the light of a lamp.' (See Mīmāṃsa Aphorisms i. 12, 13;
above, p. 74.) Is it not the fact that it is merely the manifestation of
previously existing language by sounds, etc., which we perceive as
originating? An illustration of such manifestation is that of a jar by
means of a lamp.

"He repels this doubt: 60. 'If the axiom that an effect exists in its
cause be here intended, this is merely proving what is already admitted.'
If by manifestation is meant the relinquishment by any substance of its
past (?) condition, and the attainment of its present state, then we have
merely the recognized principle of an effect virtually existing in its
cause (see Sānkhya Kārika Aph. ix.); and as such eternity is truly
predicable of all effects whatever, it is proving a thing already proved
to assert it here. If, on the other hand, by manifestation be merely
meant the perception of a thing actually existing, then we shall be in-
volved in the absurdity of admitting that jars, etc., also are eternal, etc."

Sect. X.—On the use which the authors of the different Darśanas make
of Vedic texts, and the mode of interpretation which they adopt.

I have already (in p. 107) touched on the mode of interpretation ap-
plied by the author of the Brahma Sūtras, or his commentator Śankara
Āchāryya, to the Vedic texts, derived chiefly from the Brāhmaṇas and
Upanishads, on which the Vedāntic doctrines are based, or by which they
are defended, or with which, at least, they are asserted to be consistent.
It will, however, be interesting to enquire a little more in detail into the
extent to which the Indian scriptures are appealed to, and the manner
in which they are treated by the authors or expounders of the different
OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS.

Darśanas. The object proposed by the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā is an enquiry into duty (ādharma-fījnāsā—Aph. i.). Duty is defined as something enjoined by the Veda (ahodanā-lakṣhano 'rtho dharmaḥ—Aph. ii.); and which cannot be ascertained to be duty except through such injunction. The first six lectures of the Mīmāṁsā, according to Mr. Colebrooke, “treat of positive injunction;” the remaining six concern “indirect command.” “The authority of enjoined duty is the topic of the first lecture: its differences and varieties, its parts, . . . and the purpose of performance, are successively considered in the three next. . . . The order of performance occupies the fifth lecture; and qualification for its performance is treated in the sixth. The subject of indirect precept is opened in the seventh lecture generally, and in the eighth particularly. Inferable changes, adapting to the variation or copy what was designed for the type or model, are discussed in the ninth, and bars or exceptions in the tenth. Concurrent efficacy is considered in the eleventh lecture; and co-ordinate effect in the twelfth.” . . . “Other matters are introduced by the way, being suggested by the main topic or its exceptions” (Misc. Essays, i. 304 f.). It appears, therefore, that the general aim of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā is (1) to prove the authority of the Veda, and then to (2) deduce from it the duties, whether enjoined directly or indirectly, which are to be performed, the manner and conditions of their performance, and their results. It is also termed the Karma-mīmāṁsā, “as relating to works or religious observances to be undertaken for specific ends” (Colebrooke, i. 296, 325).

The Brahma-mīmāṁsā, or Vedānta, is, according to the same author, the complement of the Karma-mīmāṁsā, and “is termed uttara, later, contrasted with pūrva, prior, being the investigation of proof deducible from the Vedas in regard to theology, as the other is in regard to works and their merit. The two together, then, comprise the complete system of interpretation of the precepts and doctrine of the Vedas, both practical and theological. They are parts of one whole. The later Mīmāṁsā is supplementary to the prior, and is expressly affirmed to be so: but differing on many important points, though agreeing on others, they are essentially distinct in a religious as well as a philosophical view” (Misc. Ess. i. 325). In fact the Brahma-mīmāṁsā proceeds upon a depreciation of the value of the objects aimed at by the Karma-mīmāṁsā,

131 See Ballantyne’s Mīmāṁsā aphorisms, p. 7.
since the rewards which the latter holds out even in a future state are but of temporary duration; and according to Sankara it is not even necessary that the seeker after a knowledge of Brahma should first have studied the Karma-mimāṇsā before he conceives the desire to enter upon the higher enquiry (nam iha karmācabadhānāntaryayāṁ vīṣa-śrāḥ | na | dharma-jijnāsāyāh prāgg apy adhīta-vedāntasya Brahma-jijnā- sopapattiteḥ). (Sankara on Brahma Sūtra, i. 1, 1, p. 25 of Bibl. Ind.) This is distinctly expressed in the following passage, p. 28:


The author is explaining the word atha ‘now,’ or ‘next,’ with which the first Sūtra begins; and is enquiring what it is that is referred to as a preliminary to the enquiry regarding Brahma: ‘What, then, are we to say that that is after which the desire to know Brahma is enjoined?’ The answer is, ‘it is the discrimination between eternal and non-eternal substance, indifference to the enjoyment of rewards either in this world or the next, the acquisition of the means of tranquillity and self-restraint, and the desire for final liberation. For if these requisites be present, a knowledge of Brahma can be desired, and Brahma can be known, even before, as well as after, an enquiry has been instituted into duty. But the converse does not hold good (i.e. without the requisites referred to, though a man may have a knowledge of duty, i.e. of ceremonial observances, he possesses no preparation for desiring to know Brahma). Hence by the word atha it is enjoined that the desire in question should follow the possession of those requisites.’ The next word atha, ‘hence,’ denotes the reason. Because the Veda itself,—by employing such words as these, ‘Wherefore just as in this life the world which has been gained by works
perishes, so too in a future life the world gained by merit perishes’—points out that the rewards of the agnihotra sacrifice and other instruments of attaining happiness are but temporary. And by such texts as this, ‘He who knows Brahma attains the highest exaltation,’ the Veda further shews that the highest end of man is acquired by the knowledge of Brahma. Hence the desire to know Brahma is to be entertained after the acquisition of the means which have been already referred to.’

In the Mīmāṃsā Śūtras, i. 1, 5, as we have seen above (p. 71), Bādarāyaṇa, the reputed author of the Brahma Śūtras, is referred to as concurring in the doctrine there laid down. But in many parts of the Brahma Śūtras, the opinions of Jaimini are expressly controverted, both on grounds of reason and scripture, as at variance with those of Bādarāyaṇa.122

I adduce some instances of this difference of opinion between the two schools:

We have seen above, p. 99, that according to the Brahma Śūtras the gods possess the prerogative (adhiṅkāra) of acquiring divine science. This, however, is contested by Jaimini (see Brahma Śūtras, i. 3, 31), who objects (1) that in that case (as all divine sciences possess the characteristic of being science) the gods would also have the prerogative of becoming adepts in the science called Madhuvidyā, etc., which would be absurd, because the sun (Āditya), being the virtual object of worship in the ritual connected with that science, could not be worshipped by another sun, who, according to the supposition, would be one of the deities skilled in it, and one of the worshippers. Similar difficulties are furnished by other cases, as, for instance, that on the hypothesis referred to, the Vasus, Rudras, and three other classes of gods, would be at once the objects to be known and the knowers. In the next Śūtra the further objection is made (2) that the celestial luminaries, commonly called gods, are in reality destitute of sensation and desire; and on this ground also the prerogative in question is denied to the supposed deities. Bādarāyaṇa replies in the 33rd Śūtra (1) that although

122 Dr. Ballantyne refers to the Mīmāṃsakas as being the objectors alluded to by S'ankara in his remarks which introduce and follow Brahma Śūtra, i. 1, 4; but as Jaimini is not expressly mentioned there, I shall not quote this text in proof of my assertion. See Ballantyne’s Aphorisms of the Vēdānta, p. 12.
the gods cannot concern themselves with such branches of knowledge as
the Madhuvidyā, with which they themselves are mixed up, yet they do
possess the prerogative of acquiring pure divine science, as that depends
on the desire and capacity for it, and the non-existence of any obstacle
to its acquisition (tathāpy asti hi suddhāyām brahma-idyāyām sambhavo
ṛthitva-saṁarthyāpratisedhādy-apekṣhāvatād adhikārasya). An excep-
tion in regard to a particular class of cases cannot, he urges, set aside a
rule which otherwise holds good; for if it did, the circumstance that
the generality of men belonging to the three highest castes are excluded
from the performance of particular rites, such as the Rājasūya, would
have the effect of rendering them incapable of performing any sacrifice
whatever. And he goes on to cite several Vedic texts which prove
that the gods have both the capacity and the desire for divine know-
ledge. Thus: Tad yo yo devānām pratyabudhyata sa eva tad abhavat
tathā rishīnām tathā manushyānām | "Whosoever, whether of gods,
rishis, or men, perceived That, he became That." Again: To ha uchur
"hanta tam atmānam anvichhāno yam atmānam anvishyā sarvān lokān
āpnoti sarvāṁ cha kāmān" iti | Indro ha vai devānām abhi pravarāja
Virochano 'surānām iti | "They said, 'come, we shall enquire after
that Soul, after investigating which, one obtains all worlds, and all ob-
jects of desire.' Accordingly Indra among the gods, and Virochana
among the Asuras, set out" ("to go to Prajāpati the bestower of divine
knowledge," according to Govinda Ānanda). And in reply to the second
objection, Sankara maintains that the sun and other celestial luminaries
are each of them embodied deities possessed of intelligence and power;
an assertion which he proceeds to prove from texts both of the Veda and
the Smṛiti. He then replies to a remark of the Mīmāṁsakas, referred to
under Sūtra 32, that allusions in the Vedic mantras and arthavādas (illu-
strative passages) cannot prove the corporeality of the gods, as these texts
have another object in view: and his reply is that it is the evidence,
or the want of evidence, derivable from any texts which occasions us to
believe or disbelieve in the existence of anything; and not the circum-
stance that such a text was or was not primarily intended to prove that
particular point. The Mīmāṁsaka is represented as still unsatisfied: but
I need not carry my summary further than to say that Sankara concludes
by pointing out that the precepts which enjoin the offerings to certain
gods imply that these gods have a particular form which the wor-
shipper can contemplate; and that in fact such contemplation is en-
joined in the text, "Let the worshipper when about to repeat the
Vashaṭkara meditate on the deity to whom the oblation is presented."
(yasyai devatāyai havir grihītaṁ syāt tāṁ āhyāyed vashaṭkarishyai).

In Brahma Sūtras, iii. 4, 1, it is laid down as the principle of Bāda-
rāyaṇa that the knowledge of Soul, described in the Upanishads, is the
sole means of attaining the highest end of man, i.e. final liberation;
that it is not to be sought with a view to, and that its operation is
altogether independent of, ceremonial observances (ataḥ | asmāt vedānta-
vihītād atma-jñānāt svatantrāt purushārthaḥ siddhyati iti Bādarāyanaḥ
ācharyyo manyate). This he proves by various texts (ity-svaṁ-jātiyakā
śrutir vidyāyāḥ kevalāyāḥ purushārthaḥ hetutevaṁ śravayati), such as
Taratī śokam ātma-vit | sa yo ha vai tat param Brahma veda Brahma eva
bhavati | Brahma-viś āpnoti param | "He who knows soul overpasses
grief" (Chhāndogya Up. see above, p. 33); "He who knows that Bra-
hma becomes Brahma;" "He who knows Brahma obtains the highest
(exaltation);" etc. In the following Sūtra (2) Jaimini is introduced
as contesting this principle, and as affirming that the knowledge of soul
is to be acquired with a view to the performance of ceremonial works.
The Sūtra in question, as explained by chakara, means that "as the
fact that soul is an agent in works implies an ultimate regard to works,
the knowledge of soul must also be connected with works by means of
its object" (karmatarvāṇa atmanāḥ karma-bhavat tad-vijñānam api .
evahya-dvāreṇa karma-sambandhy eva iti). The same view is further
stated in the following Sūtras 3-7, where it is enforced by the example
of sages who possessed the knowledge of Brahma and yet sacrificed
(Sūtra 3), by a text which conjoins knowledge and works (Sūtra 5), by
a second which intimates that a person who knows all the contents of
the Veda has a capacity for ceremonial rites (Sūtra 6), and by others (7).
Sankara replies under Sūtra 8 to the view set forth in Sūtra 2, which he
declares to be founded on a mistake, as "the soul which is proposed in
the Upanishads as the object of knowledge is not the embodied soul,
but the supreme Spirit, of which agency in regard to rites is not pre-
dicable. That knowledge, he affirms, does not promote, but on the

123 The passage in which Sankara goes on to answer the objection that in cases
like this the Ithāsas and Purāṇas afford no independent evidence, will be quoted
below.
contrary, puts an end to all works” (na cha tad-vijñānam karmānāṃ pravarttakam bhavati prayuta tat karmaṇy uchchhinasti), and under Sūtra 16 he explains how this takes place, viz. by the fact that “knowledge annihilates the illusory conceptions of work, worker, and reward, which are caused by ignorance, and are necessary conditions of capacity for ceremonial observances” ( Api cha karmādhikāra-hetoḥ kriyā-kāraka
gahala-lakṣaṇasya samastasya prapanchasya avidyā-kritasya vidyā-sūmar-
thyāt svapopamarāṇaṃ ahamanti). To Sūtra 3 Bādarāyaṇa replies that the ceremonial practice of sages is the same whether they do or do not acquire knowledge with a view to works; to Sūtra 5, by saying that in the text in question works and knowledge are not referable to one and the same person, but works to one and knowledge to another; and to Sūtra 6, by declaring that it is merely the reading of the Veda, and not a knowledge of all its contents that is referred to in the text in question. Another reason assigned in Sūtra 17 to shew that divine knowledge is not dependent on, or subservient to works, is that ascetics who practise no Vedic ceremonies are yet recognized in the Veda as competent to acquire it (urdhāvaretassu cha āśrameshu vidyā śrūyate na cha tattra karmāṅgatvān vidyāyāḥ upapadyate karmāṅbhavat | na hy agnîttrādīni vai-
dikāmi karmāṇi teshām sam’). In the following Sūtra (18) Jaimini is introduced as questioning the validity of this argument on the ground that the Vedic texts, which are adduced in support of it, merely allude to the existence of ascetics, and do not recognize such an order as consistent with Vedic usage, or that they have another object, or are ambiguous; while another text actually reprehends the practice of asceticism. To this Bādarāyaṇa rejoins in Sūtra 19, that the texts in question prove the recognized existence of the ascetic order as much as that of any other; and that the alleged ambiguity of one of the passages is removed by the consideration that as two of the three orders referred to, viz. those of the householder and brahmachārin, are clearly indicated, the third can be no other than that of the ascetic. The subject is further pursued in the next Sūtra 20, where the author and his commentator (who adduces additional texts) arrive at the conclusion that the practice of asceticism is not only alluded to, but enjoined in the Veda, and that consequently knowledge, as being inculcated on those who practise it, is altogether independent of works (tasmat siddhā ʿurdhāvaretasaḥ āśramāḥ siddhaḥ cha ʿurdhāvaretassu viḍānād viḍyāyāḥ svatantryam).
Again in Brahma Sūtras, iv. 3, 7–14, the question is discussed whether the words sa etān Brahma gamayati, "He conducts them to Brahma," refer to the supreme Brāhma, or to the created Brāhma. Bādari (Sūtra 7) holds that the latter is meant, whilst Jaimini (in Sūtra 12) maintains that the former is intended. The conclusion to which the commentator comes at the close of his remarks on Sūtra 14 is that the view taken by Bādari is right, whilst Jaimini's opinion is merely advanced to display his own ability (tasmāt "kāryyam Bādārıś" ity esha eva pakshaḥ sthitāḥ | "param Jaiminir" iti cha pakshāntara-pratipādana-mātra-pradarśanam prajñā-vikāśanāya iti drashtiṣṭavyam).

Further, in Brahma Sūtras, iv. 4, 10, it is stated to be the doctrine of Bādari that the sage who has attained liberation no longer retains his body or bodily organs, but his mind (manas) alone, whilst in the following Sūtra (11) it is declared to be Jaimini's opinion that he retains his body and senses also. In the 12th Sūtra it is laid down as the decision of Bādarāyaṇa that either of the two supposed states may be assumed at will by the liberated spirit.

Jaimini and his opinions are also mentioned in Brahma Sūtras i. 2, 28, and 31; i. 4, 18; and iv. 4, 5.

I shall now adduce some illustrative of the claims which the founders of the other philosophical schools put forward on behalf of their own principles as being in conformity with the Vedas. I begin with a passage on this subject from Sankara's note introductory to Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 5 ff.:

sya sarvaśaktar Brahmano jagat-kāraṇatvam pratipādayanti ity avochar tāni pradhāna-kāraṇa-pakshe 'pi yojayitum śakyaṇte | sarvaśaktitvam tāvat pradhānasyāpi su-vikāra-viśhayam upapadyate | evāṁ sarvajāntvam upapadyate | kathām | yat tvain jñānam manyaṣe sa sattva-dharmāḥ “sattvāt sanjayate jñānam” iti smṛiteḥ | tena ca sattva-dharmayā jñānena kāryya-kāraṇavantaḥ purushāḥ sarvejānāḥ yogināḥ prasiddhāḥ | sattvasya hi nirātisayotkarshe sarvejāntvam prasiddham | na ca kevalasya akāryya-kāraṇasya purushasya upalabdhi-māttrasya sarva-jñatvam kinchīj-jñatvam va kalpayitum śakyam | trigunatvait tu pradhānasya sarvajñāna-kāraṇa-bhūtāṁ sattvam pradhānāvasthāyāṁ api vidyate iti pradhānasya achetanasya eva sataḥ sarvejāntvam upachārytyate vedāntā-vāyakṣuḥ | avaśyaṁ ca tvayā 'pi sarvejānaṃ Brahmo abhyupagachhatā sarva-jñānākṣātkāntaveneva eva sarvejāntvam abhyupagantavyam | na hi sarva-viśayaṁ jñānaṁ kurvaḥ eva Brahmo varttate | tathā hi jñānasya nityateve jñāna-kriyaṁ prati svatantryaṁ hitya | atha anityaṁ tad iti jñāna-kriyāyaḥ uparamo uparameta api Brahmo | tadā sarva-jñāna-śaktimattvena eva sarvejāntvam āpatati | api ca prāg utpatteh sarva-kāraka-sānyam Brahmo āhyaṁ tvayā | na ca jñāṇa-sādhanānāṁ sarvendriyādinām abhāve jñānotpattiḥ kasyachid upapanṇaḥ | api ca pradhānasya anekātmakasya pariṇāma-sambhavat kārmaṇaṁ-papattir mṛd-ūdi-vat | na asaṁhatasya ekātmakasya Brahmanoḥ | ity evam prāptā idam sūtram ārabhyate | 5. “Īkshater na | aśabdam” | na Śāṅkhyā-parikalpitam achetanam pradhānaṁ jagataḥ kāraṇaṁ śakyaṁ vedāntesvo āśrayītum | aśabdāṁ hi tat | katham aśabdam | “īkṣhiteḥ” | īkṣhitṛīca-bravanat kāraṇasya | kathām | evāṁ hi āṛṣyate “Sad eva saumya idam agre āśid ekaṁ eva adevītyam” ity upakra-myā “tad aikṣhata ‘bahu syām praṇāyaṁ’ iti tat tejo ‘śrījata’ iti | tattva-īdām-śabda-vāchyaṁ nāma-rūpa-vyākṛitaṁ jagat prāg utpatteh sad-ata manā ‘vadhāryya tasya eva prakṛtasya sachi-haddha-vāchhyaśya īkṣhaṇa-pūrakaṁ tejah-prabhṛiteḥ erashtṛīcavāṃ dārsayati | tathā cha anayatra “ātmā vai idam ekaṁ eva agre āśit | na anyat kinchana misthat | sa aikṣhata ‘lokān nu śrījata’ iti sa imān lokān asrījata’ iti īkṣhā-पūrvikāṁ eva śrishtiṁ ācāshtā | . . . ity-evam-ūdhyāni api sarvejānēvara-kāraṇa-parāṇi vākyān udāḥartavyāni | yat tu uktaṁ “sattva-dharmena jñānena sarvejānaṃ pradhānam bhavishyati” iti tad na upapadyate | na hi pradhānāvasthāyāṁ guṇa-sāmyāt sattva-dharmo jñānaṁ sambhavati | nāna uktaṁ “sarva-jñāna-śaktimattvena sarvejānaṃ bhavishyati” iti tad api na upapadyate | yādi guṇa-sāmya sati sattva-vyāpāśrayāṁ jñāna-śaktim
āśritya sarvajnam pradhānam uchyeta kāmaṁ rajas-tamo-vyapāsyāṁ api jnāna-pratibandhaka-saktim āśritya kinchijñatvam uchyeta | api cha na asākshikā sattva-vṛttir jānāti na abhīdhītyate | na cha achenāsya pradhānasya sākhitvam asti | tasmād anupannam pradhānasya sarvañātvan | yoṛināṁ tu chetanatvāt sarvakarṣha-nimittāṁ sarvañātvan upa-pannam ity anudāharanam | atha punah sākshi-nimittam īkṣhīrtiṃ pradhānasya kalpeṣṭa yathā agni-nimittam ayaḥ-piṇḍāder dagāhirvāṁ tathā sati yan-nimittāṁ īkṣhīrtiṃ pradhānasya tad eva sarvaṉam mukhyaṃ Brahma jagataḥ kāraṇam iti yuktam | yat punar utkam Brahmano 'pi na mukhyaṃ sarvañātvan upapadyate nitya-jnāna-kriyate jnāna-kriyām prati svātantrāsambhavāt ity attra uchyate | idāṁ tavād bhavān prasātaṇvāḥ "kathāṁ nitya-jnāna-kriyate sarvañātva-hānir" iti | yasya hi sarva-viṣhayāvabhasana-kshamāṁ jñānaṁ nityam asti so 'sarvañāḥ iti vipratishidhāṃ | anityate hi jñānasya kadācchij jānāti kadācchid na jānāti ity asarvañātvan api syāt | na asau jnāna-nityate dosho 'sti | jnāna-nityate jnāna-viṣhayā-svātantra-vyapadeśo na upapadyate iti chet | na | pratataushtā-prakāśe 'pi savitari dhahati prakāśayati iti svātantra-vyapadeśa-darṣanāt | nanu savitvar dāhya-prakāśya-saṁyogo sati dhahati prakāśayati iti vyapadeśaḥ syāt | na tu Brahmano prāg upatter jnāna-karma-saṁyogo 'sti iti vishano dhṛstāntāḥ | na | asaty api karmāṇi savitā prakāsate iti karttrītva-vyapadeśa-darṣanāt | evam asaty api jnāna-karmaṇi Brahmanas "tad -ākṣhata" iti karttrītva-vyapadeśopapattar na-vai-shamyam | karmāpekhayāṁ tu Brahmani īkṣhīrtiva-srutayaḥ sutaram upopannāḥ | kim punas tat karma yat prāg upatter īsvara-jnānasya viṣhayībhavati iti | tatvānyatecābhāyan anirvachanīye nāma-rūpe avyā-krīte vyācchikīrśite iti brāmaḥ | yat-prasādād hi yoṛinām apy atitānā-gata-viṣhayam pratyakṣāṃ jñānam ichhāti yoga-sāstra-vidāḥ kimu vaktvāyaṁ tasya nitya-suddhāsyāṁ tsvārayāśya śrishti-thiti-saṁhṛtī-viṣhayāṁ nitya-jnānam bhavati iti | yad apy uktam prāg upatter Brahmano satrādi-sambandham antareṇā īkṣhīrtīvam anupannam iti na tach chodayam avatarati savitī-prakāśa-vad Brahmano jnāna-svarūpa-nilāyateva jnānasādhanēpekhānupapatteḥ | . . . yad apy uktam "pradhānasya anekat-makatavād mrid-ādi-vat kāraṇatopapattir na asaṁhatasya Brahmano" iti tat pradhānasya asaṁhatāna eva pratyuktam | yathā tu tarkēṇāpi Brahmano ēva kāraṇatvam nirvādhum śakyate na pradhānaṇānāṁ tathā prapaṇchayiṣṭhāte "na vilaksheiṣṭvād asya" ity-evam-ādina (Brahma Sūtras ii. 1, 4) |
Attra āha yad uktāṁ "na achetanam pradhānāṁ jagat-kāraṇam ḫukhiṭrivā-śravaṇā" iti tād anyathā 'py upapadyate | achetane 'pi chetana-vad upachāra-darsanāt | pratyāsanna-pātanatāṁ kūlasya ālakṣhya kūlam āpi papiṭhitati ity achetane 'pi kūle chetana-vad upachāro drishtas tad-vad achetanen 'pi pradhāne pratyāsanna-sarge chetana-vad upachāro bhavishyati "tad aikshaṭa" iti | yathā loke kāschīḥ chetanaḥ snātīva bhūtvā cha "aparāhna grāmāṁ ratheṇa gamiśyāmi" iti ikṣhitvā anantaraṁ tathāvāva niyamena pravarttate tathā pradhānāṁ api mahād-ādy-ākāreṇa niyamena pravarttate | tasmāḥ chetana-vad upacharyyate | kasmāt punaḥ kāraṇād vīhaya mukhyam ikṣhitrivam aupaṭhārikaṁ kalpyate | "tatt tejaḥ aikṣhata" "tāḥ āpay aikṣhanta" iti cha achetanayor api ap-tejasōḥ chetana-vad upachāra-darsanāt | tasmāt sat-kārtirikam api ikṣhaṇam aupaṭhārikaṁ iti ganyate upachāra-prāye vachanād ity evam prāpte idamḥ sūtram āraḥhyate | 6."Gaṇapāḥ cēt | na | ātma-sabdāt" | yad uktam pradhānam achetanam ācārāḥ cēham vāčyam tasmān aupaṭhārika ikṣhitrī ap-tejasōr ēva iti tād atsat | kasmāt | ātma-sabdāt | "sad eva saumya idam āg̃ ra asā" ity upakramya "tad aikṣhata tat tejaḥ-ṣrijata" iti cha tejaḥ 'b-annāṁ nām śriṣṭhit uktvā tad eva prakṛitaṁ saḥ ikṣhitrī tāni cha tejaḥ 'b-annāṁ devata-sabdāna parāmiṣyā āha "sā iyam devata āikṣhata hanta haham īmās tīre devataḥ anena jīvenā ātmanā 'nupraviṣyā nāma-rūpe vyākaraṇāni" iti | tattra yadi pradhānam achetanam guṇa-vṛttiyā ikṣhitrī kalpyeta tad eva prakṛitateḥ sā iyam devataḥ parāmiṣyeta | na tadā devataḥ ēvam ātma-sabdāna abhādadvīyatā jīvo hi nāma chetanaḥ sarvādhyakṣaḥ prāṇāṇāṁ dhārayita prasiddhāḥ nirvācānāḥ cha | so katham achetanasya pradhānāsya ātma bhavet | ātma hi nāma svarūpaṁ | na achetanasya pradhānāsya chetano jīvaḥ svarūpaṁ bhavāt arhati | attra tu cētanaḥ Brahma mukhyam ikṣhitrī parigrihyate | tasya jīva-viṣhayaḥ ātma-sabdā-prayogaḥ upapadyate | tathā "sa yaḥ esho 'nimā etadātmyam idāṁ sarvāṁ tat satyāṁ sa ātma tāt tvam asi Svētaketo" ity attra "sa ātma" iti prakṛitaṁ sad-agimānāṁ ātmānam ātma-sabdāna upadiṣaya "tā tvam asi Svētaketo" iti chetanasya Svētaketo ātmatvena upadiṣāti | ap-tejasaḥ tu viśaya-tvād achetanatvāṁ nāma-rūpa-vyākaranaṁ cha pravyojnaṁ eva nirdēṣat | na cha ātma-sabdā-vaṁ kincīḥ mukhyate kāraṇām asti ity yuktāṁ kūla-vad gaṇaṁ svētakvam ikṣhitrivasaḥ | tayor api cha sad-adhikṣhitatvāpekṣham eva ikṣhitrivam | satas tv ātma-sabdād na gaṇaṁ ikṣhitrivam ity uktam | atha uchyate | achetane 'pi pradhāne bhavaty ātma-sabdāḥ | ātmanāṁ sarvākṣa-kāri evēt |
yathā rājñāḥ sarvārtha-kārini bhūrye bhavaty ātma-sabdā "mama ātma Bhadrasenaḥ" iti | pradhānaṁ hi purushātmano 112 bhogāpavargau kurvaḥ upākaroti rājñāḥ ieva bhūryaḥ sandhi-vigrhaḥādiṣu varttamāṇaḥ | athavā ekaḥ eva ātma-sabdāḥ chetanāchetana-vishaya bhavishyatī "bhūtātmā" "indriyātmā" iti cha prayogā-dārnāṇāḥ yathā ekaḥ eva jyotiḥ-sabdāḥ kratu-jvalana-vishayaḥ | tattra kutaḥ etad ātma-sabdādikshiter agaunātvam ity attra uṭtaram 'patati | 7. "Tan-nishthasya mokshopadesāt" | na pra- dhānam achetanam ātma-sabdālambanaṁ bhavitum arthi "sa ātma" iti prakriyāṁ sad anिमānam ađāya "tat tvam asi Svētaketo" iti chetanasya Svētaketo mokshayitasya tan-nishthāṁ upadiśya "Āchāryyavān puruśo veda tasya tāvad eva chiraṁ yāvad na vimokṣhye atha sampatsye" iti mokshopadesāt | yadi hy achetanam pradhānaṁ sacc-chhhāda-vāchyam "tad asī" iti grāhayed mumukṣuhum chetanāṁ santam "aĉetanāṁ 'si" iti tadā vipārītā-vādi śāstram puruṣhasya anārthāya ity aprāmāṇāṁ syāt | na tu nirdosham śāstram apramāṇāṁ kalpayitum yuktam | yadi cha ājñasya sato mumukṣhor aĉetanam anātmanāṁ "ātma" ity upadiśet pramāya-bhūtāṁ śāstrāṁ sa śraddadhanataya 'ndha-go-lāṅgula-nyayena tad-ātma-ūriktīṁ na parityajet tad-vyatiriktāṁ cha ātmanāṁ na pratipadyā | tathā sati puruṣārthād vihanyeta anarthaṁ cha richchel | tasmād yathā svargad-dhruvino 'gnihośrādi svatanāṁ yathā-bhūtam upadiśati tathā mumukṣhīr api "sa ātma" | tad tvam asi Svētaketo" iti yathā-bhūtam eva ātmanām upadiśati iti yuktam | evaṁ cha sati tapta-paraśu-grahaṇa-moksha-ūriktāntena satyābhīṣhanāhasya mokshopadesāḥ upapadāye | . . . . tasmād na sad-anि�myatī ātma-sabdāsya gaunāteu | bhūrye tu svāmi bhūryaḥ-bhedasya pratvayakhatvād upa- panno gaunāḥ ātma-sabdā "mama ātma Bhadrasenaḥ" iti | api cha kvachid gaunāḥ sabdo āriṣṭaḥ iti na etavyatā sabda-pramāṇako 'rthe gaunā kalpanā nyāyāya sarvāttra anāśvāsa-prasangāt | yat tu uktaḥ chetanāchetanayoḥ sādhāraṇaḥ ātma-sabdāḥ kṛatu-jvalanayor eva jyotiḥ- sabdaḥ iti | tad na | anekārthatvestya anyātryatvat | tasmāc chetana- vishayaḥ eva muκhyaḥ ātma-sabdāḥ chetanatvāopachāradh-bhūtādhiṣu prauṣyate "bhūtātmā" "indriyātmā" iti cha | sādhāraṇatve 'py ātma-sabdāsya na prakaranaṁ upapadāṁ vā kinchiṁ nischāyakam antareṇa an- yatāra-vrīttītā nirāhārayitum śakyate | na cha atra aĉetanasya nischāyakam kinchiṁ karaṇam asti prakriyāṁ tu sad śkhitrī samnihitaṁ cha chetanaḥ Svētaketoḥ | na hi chetanasya Svētaketoḥ aĉetanāṁ ātma sam-

112 The edition printed in Bengali characters reads puruṣhasya ātmanaḥ.
And it has been declared that Brahma, omniscient and omnipotent, is the cause of the creation, continuance, and destruction of the world. But the Sāňkhyas and others, holding that an ultimate (parinishṭhita) substance is discoverable by other proofs, and inferring the existence of Pradhāna or other causes, apply the texts of the Upanishads as having reference to these. For (they assert that) all the texts of the Upanishads which relate to the creation, design inferentially to indicate the cause by the effect. The Sāňkhyas think that the conjunctions of Pradhāna and Purusha (Soul) are to be inferred as eternal. From the very same texts the followers of Kaññāda (the Vaiśeshikas) deduce that Īśvara is the instrumental cause and atoms the material cause (of the world). So, too, other rationalizing objectors rise up who rely on fallacies founded on texts or reasoning. Here then our teacher (āchāryya), who understood both words and sentences and evidence, with the view of pointing out that the texts of the Upanishads have for their object the revelation of Brahma, first puts forward and then refutes the fallacies founded by those persons on texts or reasoning. The Sāňkhya regarding Pradhāna, consisting of the three qualities: guṇas, viz. sattva, rajas, and tamas, or "Goodness," "Passion," and "Darkness"), and inanimate, as the cause of the world, tell us: (a) 'Those texts in the Upanishads which, as you say, declare that an omniscient and omnipotent Brahma is the cause of the world, can be applied to support the view that Pradhāna is the cause. For omnipotence in regard to its own developments is properly predicatable of Pradhāna also; and omniscience too may be rightly ascribed to it. You will ask, how? We answer (b), What you call knowledge is a characteristic of 'Goodness' (sattva), according to the text of the Smṛiti, 'From Goodness springs knowledge.' And (c) through this knowledge, which is a characteristic of Goodness, Yogins, who are men

125 Compare Sāňkhya Sūtras, i. 69: pāramāpye 'py ekatra parinishṭhā, etc., which Dr. Ballantyne renders, "Even if there be a succession, there is a halt (parinishṭhā) at some one point," etc.

126 The phrase so translated is sannāsāyi-kārayam. The word sannāsāya is rendered by Dr. Ballantyne, in his translation of the Bhāšāparichheda (published January, 1851), p. 22, by "intimate relation" (the same phrase as Dr. Roer had previously employed in 1850); and in the translation of the Tarka-sangraha (published in September of the same year), pp. 2 and 4, by "co-inherence."
with bodily organs,\textsuperscript{127} are reputed to be omniscient; for owing to the transcendent excellence of Goodness its omniscience is matter of notoriety. Nor it is only of a person (purusha) whose essence is mere perception, and who is devoid of corporeal organs, that either omniscience or partial knowledge can be predicated: but from Pradhāna being composed of the three qualities, Goodness, which is the cause of omniscience, belongs to it too in the condition of Pradhāna. And so in the texts of the Upanishads omniscience is figuratively ascribed to it, although it is unconscious. And (d) you also, who recognize an omniscient Brahma, must of necessity acknowledge that His omniscience consists in His possessing the power of omniscience. For He does not continually exercise knowledge in regard to all objects. For (e) if His knowledge were continual. His self-dependence (or voluntary action) in reference to the act of knowledge would be lost. But if knowledge be not continual, then when the act of knowledge ceases Brahma must cease (to know). And so omniscience results from the possession of the power of omniscience. Further (f) you, too, hold that before the creation Brahma was devoid of any impulse to action. Nor can knowledge be conceived to arise in anyone who has no bodily organs or other instruments of knowledge. Moreover (g) causality can properly be ascribed to Pradhāna (as it can to earth, etc.) owing to the variety in its nature,\textsuperscript{128} and the consequent possibility of its development, but not to Brahma whose essence is simple and uniform.' These arguments having been urged, the following Sūtra is introduced: 5. 'No; for in consequence of the word 'beholding' being employed, your view is contrary to the Veda.' (a) The unconscious Pradhāna, imagined by the Sāṅkhya as the cause of the world, can find no support in the Upanishads. For it is unscriptural. How so? From its beholding, i.e. because the act of 'beholding' (or 'reflecting') is in scripture ascribed to the cause. How? Because the Veda contains a text which begins thus: 'This, o fair youth, was in the beginning.' 'Existent, one without a second' (Chh. Up. vi. 2, 1); and proceeds: 'It beheld, let

\textsuperscript{127} The epithet kārya-karṣṇavantaḥ is rendered dehendriya-yukta in the Bengali translation of S'ankara's comment, which forms part of the edition of the S'ūrūka-sūtras, with comment and gloss, published at Calcutta in 1784 of the S'ākṣaṣa era. This translation is useful for ascertaining the general sense, but it does not explain all the difficult phrases which occur in the original.

\textsuperscript{128} The meaning of this is that Pradhāna, as cause, possesses in its nature a variety corresponding to that exhibited by the different kinds of objects which constitute the visible creation; whilst Brahma is one and uniform.
me multiply, and be propagated.' 'It created light' (3). By these words the scripture, having first determined that the world, denoted by the word 'this' and now developed as Name and Form, subsisted before the creation in the form of the 'Existent,' then goes on to show that this very subject of the text, denoted by the word 'Existent,' became, after 'beholding,' the creator of light and other objects. And accordingly another text (Ait. Up. i. 1) declares in the following words that the creation was preceded by 'beholding:' 'This was in the beginning Soul, one only: there was nothing else which saw.' It beheld, Let me create worlds; it created these worlds.'"

After quoting two other texts Sankara proceeds: "These and other passages may also be adduced which show that an omniscient Isvara was the cause (of all things). And (6) the opinion which has been referred to, that Pradhāna will be omniscient in virtue of the knowledge which is an attribute of Goodness, is groundless. For since the three qualities are in a state of equilibrium as long as the state of Pradhāna lasts, knowledge as an attribute of Goodness cannot then belong to it. And the assertion (a) that Pradhāna will be omniscient from possessing the power of omniscience is equally untenable. If (6) in reliance on the power of knowledge residing in Goodness during the state of equilibrium, it be maintained that Pradhāna is then omniscient, a merely partial knowledge may with equal reason be ascribed to it on the strength of the power to obstruct knowledge which resides in Passion and Darkness (the other two qualities which constitute it). Besides, no function of Goodness can either be, or be called, knowledge, unless it be accompanied by the power of observing (or witnessing). But Pradhāna, being unconscious, possesses no such power. Consequently the omniscience of Pradhāna is untenable. And the omniscience of Yogins, (c) springing from their eminence in every attribute, becomes possible in consequence of their being conscious creatures; and therefore cannot be adduced as an illustrative argument in the case before us. If, again, you ascribe to Pradhāna a power of reflection derived from an observer (like the power of burning possessed by iron balls, etc., which is derived from fire) then it will be right to say that the source from which that power of reflection comes to Pradhāna, viz. the omniscient Brahma in the proper sense, and nothing else, is the cause of the world. Once more, (c) it is

202 This is the sense assigned in Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon to the word mishat. The commentators render it "moving" (chalat).
urged that omniscience cannot in the literal sense be properly attributed even to Brahma himself, because if the cognitive acts were continual, His self-dependence (or spontaneity), in regard to the act of cognition, would be no longer conceivable: we reply, that we must ask you how the supposition that cognitive acts are continual, interferes with the existence of omniscience. Because it is a contradiction to say that he who possesses a perpetual knowledge which can throw light upon all subjects can be otherwise than omniscient. For although on the hypothesis that knowledge is not continual, a negation of omniscience would result, as in that case the person in question would sometimes know and sometimes not know,—the same objection does not attach to the supposition of a perpetuity of knowledge. If you reply that on that supposition, self-dependence (or spontaneity), in regard to knowledge can no longer be attributed, we deny this, because we observe that spontaneity, in regard to burning and illuminating, is attributed to the sun, although he continually burns and shines. If you again object that this illustration does not hold good, because the power in question is ascribed to the sun only when his rays are in contact with the objects to be burnt or illuminated, whereas before the creation, Brahma has no contact with the object of knowledge;—we reply that the parallel is exact, because we observe that agency in shining is attributed to the sun even when there is no object [for his beams]; and in the same way agency in regard to ‘beholding,’ is justly ascribed to Brahma, even when there is no object of knowledge. But the texts which record the fact of ‘beholding’ will be applicable to Brahma with still greater propriety if that ‘beholding’ have had reference to a positive object. What then is the object which is contemplated by Brahma before the creation? We reply, the undeveloped Name and Form which were not describable either in their essence or differences, and which He wished to develop. For what need we say to prove the perpetual knowledge, relating to the creation, continuance, and destruction of the world, which belongs to Īśvara, the perpetually pure, from whose grace it is that the intuitive knowledge of things past and future, which men learned in the Yoga doctrine attribute to Yogsins, is derived? And as regards the further objection (f) that Brahma, who before the creation was without body or organs of sense, could not be conceived to ‘behold,’—that argument cannot be sustained, as from
Brahma's existence in the form of knowledge being, like the sun's lustre, perpetual, he cannot be supposed dependent upon any (bodily organs as) instruments of knowledge." ... "Then as regards the assertion (g) that Pradhāna, from its multiformity of character can (like earth, etc.,) be readily conceived as the cause (of the manifold products which we see around us), whilst such causality cannot be ascribed to the simple and uniform Brahma,—that has been answered by the remark that the existence of Pradhāna is not established by scripture. And that the causality of Brahma, but not that of Pradhāna, etc., can be established by reasoning will hereafter be shewn in the Sūtras, 'Brahma, you say, cannot be the material cause of this world, because it differs from him in its nature,' etc. (Brahma Sūtras, ii. 1, 4 ff.). Here the Śāṅkhya remark: 'As regards your objection that the unconscious Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the world, because the Veda describes that cause as 'beholding,' we observe (h) that that text, if otherwise explained, will be consistent with our view. For we find that even unconscious objects are figuratively spoken of as conscious. Thus we notice that any one who perceives that the bank of a river is on the point of falling, speaks in a figurative way of that unconscious bank as intending to fall. In the same way when Pradhāna is on the point of creating, it can be figuratively said of it, although unconscious, as of a conscious being, that it 'beheld.' Just as any conscious person, after bathing and eating, resolves that on the following day he will proceed to his village in a car, and afterwards acts according to that plan, so too Pradhāna (becoming developed) in the form of Mahat (intellect), etc., acts according to a law, and therefore is figuratively spoken of as conscious. If you ask us, why we abandon the proper sense of 'beholding,' and adopt a figurative one, we answer that we do so because we find the term figuratively applied to Water and to Light, though unconscious objects, in the Vedas texts, 'The Light beheld,' 'the Waters beheld' (Chh. Up. vi. 2, 3 f.). Hence from the fact that the expression is for the most

140 Kūleṣṭi pipatīkhati, literally, "The bank wishes to fall;" but, as is well known, a verb, or verbal noun, or adjective, in the desirative form, often indicates nothing more than that something is about to happen. Here, however, the Sāṅkhya are introduced as founding a serious argument on this equivocal form of speech.

141 See Vijñāna Bhikshu's remarks on the Sāṅkhya Sūtra, i. 96, where the same illustration is given.
part figuratively employed, we conclude that the act of beholding, performed by the ‘Existent’ also was a figurative one.” These objections having been brought forward, the following Sūtra is introduced: 6. “If you say that the act of ‘beholding’ is figuratively ascribed to Pradhāna, it is not so, because the word Soul also is applied to the cause.” (6) “The assertion that the unconscious Pradhāna is designated by the word ‘Existent,’ and that ‘beholding’ is figuratively ascribed to it, as to Water and Light, is incorrect. Why? Because the word Soul also is employed. The text which begins with the words, ‘This, o fair youth, was in the beginning Existent,’ and goes on ‘It beheld, it created light,’ after relating the creation of Light, Water, and Food, refers to that ‘Existente’ the ‘beholder,’ which is the subject of the text, and to Light, Water, and Food, under the appellation of deities, thus: ‘This deity beheld (or resolved), come let me enter into these three deities with this living Soul, and make manifest Name and Form’ (vi. 3, 2). Here if the unconscious Pradhāna were regarded as being, through the function of the quality (of Goodness), the ‘beholder,’ it would from the context be referred to in the phrase ‘that deity;’ and then the deity in question could not denote a ‘living being’ by the term ‘Soul.’ For the principle of life is both according to common usage, and interpretation, the conscious ruler of the body, and the sustainer of the vital breaths. How could such a principle of life be the Soul of the unconscious Pradhāna? For Soul means the essential nature, and a conscious principle of life cannot be the essence of the unconscious Pradhāna. But in reality the conscious Brahma is understood in this text as the ‘beholder’ in the proper sense of the term; and the word Soul, as relating to the principle of life, is rightly applied to Him. And thus in the sentence ‘This entire universe is identical with this subtile particle; it is true; it is Soul: Thou art it, o Svetaketu,’ (Chh. Up. vi. 8, 6 f.) the author by employing the words ‘it is Soul’ designates the subtile particle, the Existent, which is the subject of the text, as Soul, by the term Soul, and so in the words ‘thou art it, o Svetaketu,’ describes the conscious Svetaketu as being Soul. But Water and Fire are unconscious things, because they are objects of sense, and because it is pointed out that they were employed in the manifestation of Name and Form; and so there is no reason, as in the

142 Vishayatvāt = dṛg-vishayatvāt, “from their being objects of the sense of sight.”—Govinda Ananda.
case of Soul, to describe them as 'holders' in the proper sense: that term must be applied to them by a figure, as in the case of the 'river bank.' And their act of 'beholding' was dependent on their being governed by the 'Existing.' But, as we have said, the act of 'beholding' is not figurative in the case of the 'Existing,' because the word Soul is applied to it. But it is now urged (i), that the term Soul does apply to Pradhāna, though unconscious, because it fulfils all the objects of soul; just as it is applied by a king to his servant who accomplishes all his designs, when he says 'Bhadrasena is my soul.' For Pradhāna renders aid to a man's soul by obtaining for it both celestial enjoyment, and final liberation, as a king's servant assists him by acting in peace and war, etc. Or (j) the one word Soul may apply both to conscious and unconscious objects, as we see it employed in the phrases 'soul of the elements,' 'soul of the bodily organs;' just as the same word jyotis means both sacrifice and light. Why then, the Sānkhyas conclude, should you infer from the word 'Soul' that the term 'beholding' cannot be figuratively used?

"This is answered in the 7th Sūtra ('Soul cannot denote Pradhāna), because it is declared that the man who fixes his thoughts upon it obtains final emancipation.' Unconscious Pradhāna must not be understood to derive any support from the word 'Soul;' for after referring in the words 'it is Soul' to the 'Existing,' the 'very subtile thing,' which is the subject of the passage, and indicating in the words 'thou art it, o Svētaketu,' that the conscious Svētaketu, who was about to obtain emancipation, was intent upon it, the text above adduced declares his emancipation in the words 'the man who has an instructor knows, "this will only last until I am liberated; I shall then be perfected."' (Chh. Up. vi. 14, 6) For if the unconscious Pradhāna were denoted by the term 'Existing,' the words 'thou art it,' would cause the conscious person, who was seeking after emancipation, to understand (of himself) 'Thou art unconscious;' and in that case the Sāstra which declared what was contradictory would be unauthoritative, because injurious to the person in question. But we cannot conceive a faultless Sāstra to be unauthoritative. And if a Sāstra esteemed authoritative should inform an ignorant seeker after emancipation, that a thing which was not soul was soul, he (the ignorant seeker) would in consequence of his faith, persist in regarding it as soul, as in the case of
the blind man and the bull’s tail, and would fail of attaining to soul which was quite different from it; and would in consequence lose the object of its efforts, and suffer injury. It is therefore proper to conclu-
de that just as the Vedic precept, that he who desires paradise should perform the agnihotra sacrifice is conformable to truth, so, too, the text which says to the man seeking after emancipation, ‘this is soul, thou art that, o Svetaketu,’ declares to him soul in conformity with the reality. And so,—as in the case of the man (charged with theft) who takes into his hand the red-hot axe, and (in consequence of the truth of his protesta-
tion of innocence) is delivered (Chh. Up. vi. 16, 2),—the promise of final emancipation will hold good in the case of the man whose thoughts are
fixed on the true Brahma. . . . Consequently the application of the word
‘soul’ to the ‘existent subtle thing’ is not figurative. Whereas (i)
the use of the same word when applied to a servant (as when it is said
‘Bhadrasena is my soul’), is shown to be figurative by the manifest
distinctness of a servant from his master. And the fact that a word is
sometimes observed to be employed figuratively does not justifying
the supposition that it is so used in cases where the (proper) sense is estab-
lished by the words; because that would give rise to doubt in every
instance. Again, (f) it is incorrect to say that the word soul is common to
things conscious and unconscious, (as the term jyotis means both sacrifi-
cice and flame), because the assertion that it has a variety of signifi-

d143 The story or fable here alluded to is told at length by Ananda Giri, and more
briefly by Govinda Ananda as follows: Kaśchit kila duskhāṭam mañjarīyam niṃrge
patitam andhaṁ su-bhandhu-nagaraṁ jiganishum babhashe “kim attra āyushmatā
duskhitenā sthīyate” iti | sa cha andhaḥ sukha-ruṇīṁ akṣarṇa tam āptam nate
uvaḥca “aho mad-bhūgadheyaṁ yad attra bhavūn mūn dīnāṁ svabhīṣṭa-nagara-
prāptya-asamartham bhūṣhate” iti | sa cha vipralipsur dusṭha-go-yuvaṁ umīya ta-
dīya-tāṇgulām andhaṁ grāhayaṁśa upadiseṣa cha enam andham “ēha go-yuva
tvāṁ nagaraṁ neshyatā mū tuṣṭaṁ tāṅgulām” iti sa cha andhaḥ śradhaḥ-lutayā tad
atyajan svabhīṣṭam aprīpya anartha-paramparāṁ prāptas tena nyūyena ity arthah |
“A certain malicious person said to a blind man who was lying on the road through
a forest, and wishing to proceed to the city of his friends, ‘Why, distressed old man,
do you stay here?’ The blind man hearing the agreeable voice of the speaker, and
regarding him as trustworthy, replied: ‘O how great is my good fortune that you
have accosted me who am helpless, and unable to go to the city which I desire to
reach!’ The other, wishing to deceive him, brought a vicious young bull, and made
the blind man lay hold of his tail, and told him that the young bull would conduct
him to the city, entreating him not to let go the tail. Trusting to the speaker, the
blind kept his hold, but did not attain the object of his desire, and encountered a
series of mishaps;—such is the illustration.”

tions is unreasonable. Hence the word 'soul', which properly refers to conscious things, is applied to the elements, etc., by a figurative ascription to them of consciousness, as when we say, 'the soul of the elements,' or 'the soul of the bodily organs.' And even if it were admitted that the word soul was common to different things, it could not be ascertained whether it had reference to one thing or another unless the context or some auxiliary word determined the point. But in the case before us there is nothing to determine that it denotes anything unconscious; on the contrary, the subject of the sentence is the 'Existent, the holder,' and in immediate connection with it is the conscious Svetaketu; for as we have already said an unconscious thing cannot be conceived as the soul of the conscious Svetaketu. Thus it is settled that the word 'soul' refers to a conscious being,' etc.

In the fourth section (pāda) of the 1st Book, the author of the Sūtras returns to his controversy with the Sānkhyaśas, and Sāṅkara, after alluding to the aphorisms in which they had previously been combated, proceeds as follows (p. 334):

Idān tu idānīm avasiṣṭham aśāṅkyate | yad uktam pradhānasya aśabdatvām tad asiddham kāsushit śākṣāsu pradhāna-samarpanābhāsānaṁ śabdānāṁ śrūyamāntvāt | atāḥ pradhānasya kāraṇatvaṁ veda-prasiddham eva mahādbhiḥ paramarṣhiḥ Kapilādbhiḥ parigriḥtām iti prasajyate | tad yāvat teshāṁ śabdānāṁ anya-paratvaṁ na pratipādyate tāvat sarvejanam Brahma jagataḥ kāraṇam iti pratipāditam apy ākutbhavet | atas teshāṁ anya-paratvaṁ darśayitum paraḥ sandarbhāḥ pravartate | "ānumānikam api" (Br. Sūtra i. 4, 1). anumāna-nirūpītam api pradhānam "ekeshāṁ" śākhīnāṁ śabdavat upalabhya | Kāṭhako hi paṭhyate "mahatāḥ param avyaktam avyaktāt purushaḥ paraḥ" iti | tattva ye eva yan-nāmaṇo yat-kramakās cha mahād-avyakta-purushāḥ smṛiti-prasiddhās te eva iha pratyabhidhānaye | tattva "avyaktam" iti smṛiti-prasiddheḥ śabdācā-śiṣṭeviḥ cha na vyaktam avyaktam iti vyutpatti-sambhavat smṛiti-prasiddhām pradhānam abhidhyate. | atas tasya śabdavattvād aśabdatvam anupapannam "| tad eva cha jagataḥ kāraṇān śruti-smṛiti-prasiddhībhyaḥ iti eteh | na etad evam | na hy etat Kāṭhaka-vākyam smṛiti-prasiddhāyor mahād-avyaktayaḥ astīva-param | na hy attra yādṛśaṁ smṛiti-prasiddhāṁ svatantraṁ kāraṇam trīguṇam pradhānaṁ

134 The text given in the Bibl. Indica has anupapannam, but I follow the old edition in Bengali characters in reading anupapannam, which seems required by the sense.
tādiśam pratyabhijnāyate | sabda-mātraṁ hy attra avyaktam iti pra-
tyabhijnāyate | sa ca sabdo na vyaktam avyaktam iti yaugikatvād an-
yasmin api sūkṣho durlakṣyate cha prayunjaye na cha ayaṁ kus-
minśchid rūḍhāḥ | yā tu pradhāna-vādinām rūḍhikā sa teshām eva
pārīhāshīkā sati na vedārtha-nirūpaṁ kāraṇa-hāvam pratipadyate |
na cha krama-mātra-sāmarthyāt samānārtha-pratipattir bhavaty asati
tad-ruṇa-pratyabhijnāne | na hy aśva-sthāne gam paśyann āsvo 'yam
ity amuḍho 'dhyavasyati | prakaraṇa-nirūpaṇāyāṁ cha attra na para-
pārakalpitam pradhānam pratyayate sarīra-rūpaka-vīnyasta-grhiṁ 
| sarīram hy attra rūpaka-vīnyastam avyakta-sabdena parigrihyate |
kutaḥ | prakaraṇat pariśeshāḥ ca | tathā hy anantarūti granthaḥ
ātma-sarīradnām rathī-rathādi-rūpaka-kṛiptiṁ darsayati | (Kaṭha
Upanishad, i. 3, 3 f.) "ātmānām rathinaṁ viddhi sarīram ratham eva
cha | buddhiṁ cha sārathīṁ viddhi manaṁ pragraham eva cha | 4. Indri-
yāṇi hayān āhur vishayāṁs teshu gocharān | ātmendriya-mano-yuktam
bhoktety āhur manīshināḥ" | tais cha indriyādibhir asaṁyataḥ samsāram
adhigachchhati | sāmyataṁ tv aśvavahaḥ pāram tad Vīshṇoḥ paramam
padam āpnoti iti darsayitvā kiṁ tad aśvavahaḥ pāram Vīshṇoḥ paramam
padam ity asya ākāṃkṣhayāṁ tebhyaḥ eva prakṛitebhyaḥ indriyādibhyāḥ
pratvena paramātmānām aśvavahaḥ pāram tad Vīṣṇoḥ paramam padam
darsayati | (Kaṭha Up. i. 3, 10 f.) "indriyebhyaḥ paraḥ hy arthaḥ arthe-
bhyāḥ cha param manaḥ | manasas tu para bhuddhir buddher ātma mahān
paraḥ | 11. Mahataḥ param avyaktam avyaktā purushaḥ paraḥ | puru-
shād na paraṁ kinchit sā kāṣṭhyā sā para gatir" iti | ... "Buddher
ātma mahān paraḥ" yaḥ sa "ātmānām rathinaṁ viddhi" iti rathitvena
upakāshiptaḥ | kutaḥ | ātma-sabdaṁ bhoktuḥ cha bhogopakaraṇat paravopapa-
ṭteḥ | mahātvaṁ cha asya svāmītvād upapannam | ... yā pratha-
majasya Hiranyagarbhasya buddhiḥ sā sarvasam buddhinām paramā pra-
tiṣṭhāṁ sā iha "mahān ātmā" ity uchyate | sa cha pūrvaatra buddhi-
grahanena eva grhiṁ tattvāt hirug iha upadiśyate tasyaḥ apy asmadiyā-
bhyo buddhisbhyaḥ paravopapatteḥ | ... tad evaṁ sarīram eva ekaṁ
pariśisyate | teshu itarāṇi indriyādini prakṛitiḥ eva parama-pada-
dīdarśayiṣyaḥ samanukṛaman pariśishyāṁnaḥ iha anena avyakta-sab-
dena pariśishyāṁnam prakṛitaṁ sarīram darsayati iti gamyate | ... 
tad evam pāravāparālochanāyaṁ nātī attra para-parikalpitasya pradhā-
nasya avakāśaḥ | 2. "Sūkṣmaṁ tu tad-arhatvāt" | uktam etat prakaraṇa-

145 The earlier edition above referred to omits teshu.
OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORIGIN, ETC.,

pariśeshāḥḥyāṁ āryaṁ avyakta-sabdāṁ na pradhānam iti | idam idāniṁ āsanyakate katham avyakta-sabdārhatvam <Śrīraṣya> yāvatā śhālāvat śpāṣṭhātaram idāṁ āryaṁ avyakta-sabdārham aspāṣṭa-vachanas to avyakta-sabdaḥ iti | ataḥ uttaram uchyate | sūkṣham tu ihā karaṇatmanā śrīraṁ vivakṣhyate sūkṣhmasya avyakta-sabdārhatvāt | yady-epi śthālaṁ idāṁ āryaṁ na svayam avyakta-sabdām arhati tathāpī tasya to ārambhakam bhūta-sūkṣham avyakta-sabdām arhati | . . . 

atra āha yadi jagad idam anabhivyakta-nāma-rūpaṁ viṣṭātmaṁ prāg-avasthām avyakta-sabdārham abhyupagamyeta tad-ātmanaḥ cha śrīrāṣyāpy avyakta-sabdārhatvam pratijñāyetca sa eva tarhi pradhāna-kāraṇa-vādaḥ evam satya abādyeta asya eva jagataḥ prāg-avasthāyāḥ pradhānatvena abhyupagamād iti | attra uchyate | yadi vayaṁ svatantrāṁ kāntiḥ prāg-avasthām jagataḥ kāraṇatvena abhyupagachchhe prasmajyaṁ tada pradhāna-kāraṇa-vādam | Pameśvarādhiṇā to iyam asmahāḥ prāg-avasthā jagato 'bhyupagamyate na svatantrāḥ | sā cha avakhyam abhyupagantaryā | arthaṃvati hi sā | na hi tāyā vinā Pameśvarasya srasṛṭpitvām siddhyati sakti-rahitasya tasya pravṛttī-aryapatteḥ muktāṁ cha punar-utpattir viṇḍyayā tasyaḥ viṣa-śaktier dāhat | avidhyātmikā hi sā viṣa-śaktir avyakta-sabda-nirdeshāyā Paramesvarārāsyāyā māyāmayi mahāsushuptīr yasyāṁ svarūpa-pratibodha-rahitāḥ srate saṁsārino jīvāḥ | tad etad avyaktāṁ kvacīḥ akāśa-sabda-nirdhiṣṭam | ātmanānu khalo akshare Gārgi akāśaḥ otaḥ cha protaḥ cha" iti śrutēḥ | kvacīḥ akṣara-sabdādīṣṭam "ākṣarāt parataḥ parah" iti śrutēḥ | kvacīḥ mayā iti suchitam "māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ viṇḍyād mayināṁ tu mahēśvaram" iti mantrasvarṇāḥ | avyaktā hi sā māyā tatvamātva-nirūpanasya asakya-vat | tad idam "mahātaḥ param avyaktaṁ" ity uktam avyakta-prabhadratvād. mahātaḥ yadh Hairanyagarbhi buddhir māhān | yadda tu jiva māhāms tadda'y avyakta-hānatanva jīva-bhāvasya mahātaḥ param avyaktaṁ ity uktam | avidyā hy avyaktaṁ avidyāvatte cha jīvasya sarvaḥ saṁvyavahāraḥ samta vartate | tachcha avyakta-gatam mahātaḥ paratvam abhedopachārāḥ tad-vikāra śarīre parikalpyate |

"But now this doubt still remains. The assertion that the existence of Pradhāna is not supported by the Veda is, say the Sāṅkhyas, destitute of proof, as certain Vedic Sākhās contain passages which have the appearance of affirming Pradhāna. Consequently the causality of Pradhāna has been received by Kapila and other great rishiks on the ground that it is established by the Veda; and this is an objection to the state-
ment which you make to the contrary. Until, therefore, it be established that these passages have a different object, the doctrine that an omniscient Brahma is the cause of the world, even though it has been proved, will be again unsettled; and consequently you bring forward a great array of arguments to shew that these texts apply to something else. In the words 'it may be deduced also,' i.e. it is determined by inference,—it is shewn that in the opinion of certain schools the doctrine of Pradhāna is scriptural, for in the Kaṭha Upanishad (i. 3, 11) we read the words 'Above the Great one is Aavyakta (the Unmanifested one), and above the Unmanifested one is Purusha (Soul). Here we recognize 'the Great one,' 'the Unmanifested one,' and Purusha, with the same names and in the same order in which they are known to occur in the Śmṛiti (i.e. the system of Kapila). Here that which is called Pradhāna in the Śmṛiti is denoted by the word 'the Unmanifested one,' as we learn both from its being so called in the Śmṛiti, and from the epithet 'unmanifested' (which is derived from the words 'not' and 'manifested') being properly applicable to it in consequence of its being devoid of sound, and the other objects of sense: wherefore, from its having this Vedic authority to support it, its (i.e. Pradhāna's) unscriptural character is refuted; and it is proved both by the Veda, the Śmṛiti, and common notoriety to be the cause of the world. If the Śāṅkhyaś argue thus, we reply that the case is not so; for this text of the Kaṭha Upanishad does not refer to the existence of the 'Great one' and the 'Unmanifested one,' which are defined in the Śmṛiti (of Kapila); for here we do not recognize such a self-dependent cause, viz. Pradhāna, composed of the three qualities, as is declared in that Śmṛiti, but the mere epithet 'unmanifested.' And this word 'unmanifested,' owing to its sense as a derivative from the words 'not' and 'manifested,' is also applied to anything else which is subtile or indistinguishable, and has not properly a conventional meaning in reference to any particular thing. As for the conventional use which the assertors of Pradhāna make of it, that is a technical application peculiar to themselves, and does not afford any means for determining the sense of the Vedas. Nor does the mere identity of the order (of the three words) furnish any proof of identity of meaning unless we can recognize the essential character of the things to be the same. For no man but a fool, if he saw a cow in the place where he expected to see a horse, would falsely
ascibe to it the character of a horse. And if we determine the sense of the context, it will be found that the Pradhāna imagined by our opponents finds no place here, since it is the 'body' which is indicated in the preceding simile. For here the body as represented under the figure of a chariot, etc., is to be understood by the word 'the Unmanifested.' Why? From the context and the remainder of the sentence. For the context which immediately precedes sets forth the soul, the body, etc., under the figure of a rider, a chariot, etc., as follows: 'Know that the soul is the rider, the body the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses are called the horses, and the objects of sense the roads on which they go. The soul accompanied by the senses and the mind is the enjoyer;" so say the wise.' After pointing out (in the following verses) that with these senses, etc., if uncontrolled, the soul gains only this world, but if they are kept under control, it attains to the highest state of Vishnu, which is the end of its road; the author (in answer to the question 'What is that highest state of Vishnu which is the end of the road?') shows in the following verses that it is the supreme Spirit who transcends the senses, etc. (which form the subject of the context), who is alluded to as the goal, and the highest state of Vishnu: 'The objects of sense are higher than the senses; the mind is higher than the objects of sense; the intellect is higher than the mind; the Great soul is higher than the intellect; the Unmanifested one is higher than the Great soul; the spirit (Purusha) is greater than the Unmanifested: there is nothing higher than Spirit, that is the end, that is the highest goal.'" After observing that the various terms in these lines are the same which had been previously introduced in the simile of the chariot, charioteer, rider, horses, etc., Sāṅkara assigns the reason of the superiority attributed to each succeeding object over that which precedes it, and then goes on to say in regard to intellect and soul: '"The Great soul is higher than the intellect, that soul, namely, which is figuratively described as a rider, in the words 'Know the soul to be the rider.' But why is the Soul

142 The words of the original, both as given here and in the text of the Katha Upanishad are ātmendriya-mano-yuktam bhaktā, which are not very clear. The commentators understand ātman at the beginning of the compound as denoting body, and supply ātmānam as the subject. See Dr. Roer's translation of the Upanishads (Bibl. Ind. p. 107).
superior to the intellect? Both from the use of the word Soul and because it aids the enjoyment of the enjoyer, it is shewn to be superior. Its character as the Great soul is proved by its being the master... The intellect of Hiranyagarbha, the first-born, is the highest basis of all intellect; and it is that which is here called the 'Great soul.' It had been previously comprehended under the word 'intellect,' but is here separately specified, because it also is superior to our intellects. Thus the body alone remains of the objects referred to in the passage. After going over all the others in order, with the view of pointing out the highest state to be attained, he indicates by the one remaining word, the 'Unapparent,' the one remaining subject of the text, viz. the body—such is our conclusion... Hence after examining both the earlier and later portions of the passage, we find that there is no place for the Pradhāna imagined by our opponents... Going on to interpret the next aphorism (i. 4, 2) 'But the subtile body may also be properly called 'unmanifested,' Sankara begins:

"We have declared that, looking to the context and the only word which remained to be explained, the body, and not Pradhāna, is denoted by the word the 'Unapparent.' But here a doubt arises: 'How can the body be properly designated by the word 'unapparent,' inasmuch as from its grossness it is very distinctly perceptible, and therefore should rather be denoted by the word 'apparent,' while the word 'unapparent' signifies something that is not perceptible? We answer: In this passage the subtile body in its character of cause is intended, since what is subtile is properly designated by the term 'unapparent.' Although this gross body itself cannot properly be described by the word 'Unapparent,' still this term applies to the subtile element which is its originator"... Sankara begins his interpretation of the next aphorism (i. 4, 3) as follows: "Here the Sāṅkhyaists rejoin: 'If you admit that this world in its primordial condition, before its name and form had been manifested, and while it existed in its rudimentary form, could be properly designated by the word 'Unapparent,' and if the same term be declared applicable to body also while continuing in that state, then your explanation will exactly coincide with our doctrine of Pradhāna as the cause of all things; since you will virtually acknowledge that the original condition of this world was that of Pradhāna. To this we reply: If we admitted any self-dependent original
condition as the cause of the world, we should then lay ourselves open to the charge of admitting that Prādhāna is the cause. But we consider that this primordial state of the world is dependent upon the supreme Deity (Parameśvara) and not self-dependent. And this state to which we refer must of necessity be assumed, as it is essential. For without it the creative action of the supreme Deity could not be accomplished, since, if he were destitute of his Sakti (power), any activity on his part would be inconceivable. And so, too, those who have been emancipated from birth are not born again, because this germinative power (on the destruction,—which implies the previous existence,—of which emancipation depends) is consumed by knowledge. For that germinative power, of which the essence is ignorance, and which is denoted by the word ‘Unapparent,’ has its centre in the supreme Deity, and is a great illusive sleep, during which mundane souls repose unconscious of their own true nature. This ‘Unapparent one’ is in some places indicated by the term aether (ākāśa), as in the text (Bṛih. Ār. Up. iii. 8, 11) ‘On this undecaying Being, o Gārgī, the aether is woven as warp and woof,’ in other places by the word ‘undecaying’ (akṣhara), as in the text, ‘Beyond the Undecaying is the Highest;’ and is elsewhere designated by the term ‘illusion’ (māyā) as in the line (Śvetaśv. Up. 4, 10) ‘Know that Prakṛiti (or matter) is illusion, and the great Deity the possessor of illusion.’ For this ‘illusion’ is ‘unapparent,’ because it cannot be defined in its essence and difference. This is the ‘Unapparent’ which is described as above the ‘Great one,’ since the latter, when regarded as identical with the intellect of Hiraṇyagarbha, springs from the former. And even if the ‘Great one’ be identified with the embodied soul (jīva), the ‘Unapparent’ can be said to be above it, as the condition of the embodied soul is dependent upon the ‘Unapparent.’ For the ‘Unapparent’ is ignorance, and it is during its condition of ignorance that the entire mundane action of the embodied soul is car-

167 Govinda Ānanda explains this clause as follows: Bandha-muktī-eyavasthārtham api sā svikārayā ity āha “muktānām” iti | yan-nātad muktīḥ sā svikārayā tām vinā eva sriśām muktānām pusnam bandhāyatta ity arthāḥ | “In the words ‘Those who had been emancipated,’ etc., he tells us that this ignorance must be admitted, in order to secure the permanence of emancipation from the bondage (of birth): that is, that ignorance by the destruction of which emancipation is obtained must be admitted; as without it those who had been emancipated would at the creation be again involved in bondage,” [because to be released at all, they must be released from something].
ried on. And that superiority of the 'Unapparent' over the 'Great one' is by a figurative description of body as identical with the former attributed to body also.'

By these subtle and elaborate explanations Sankara scarcely appears to make out his point. But I cannot follow further the discussion of this question, and now go on to the eighth aphorism (i. 4, 8) where the purport of another Vedic text is investigated:

"Chamasa-vad aviśeshāt" | punar api pradhāna-vādī aśabdātavam pra-
dhānasya asiddāhāṁ ity āha | kasmāt | mantra-varṇāt | (Svetāsvatara Upanishad, iv. 5) "ajām ekāṁ lohita-sukla-krishṇām bahuḥ praśāh eśri-
jamanāṁ svarūpāh | ajo hy eko jushamāno 'nuṣete jahāty enam bhukta-
hogām ajo 'nyaḥ" iti | attra hi mantra lohita-sukla-krishṇa-sabādāṁ
rajaḥ-sattva-tamaṁsy abhidhiyante | lohitāṁ raja ranjanatmakatvāt suk-
lāṁ sattvām prakāśatmakatvāt krishṇaṁ tamaṁ āvaranatmakatvāt | teshāṁ
sāmyaśaśvāpayava-dharmāśīrapadiyate lohita-sukla-krishṇa iti | na
jayate iti cha "aja" syād "mula-prakritir avikritir" ity abhyupagamāt
| nanv ajā-sabāśa chhagayāṁ rūḍhaḥ | vādham | sā tu rādhir iha na āśra-
yitum sakyā vidyā-prakaraṇāt | sā cha bahuḥ praśaṁ traigunyanvitāh
janayati ... tasmāt śruti-mālā eva pradhānādi-kalpanā Kāpilaṇām
irty evam prāpta brāmaḥ | na anena mantreaṇa śruti-mālātām Śāṅkhyaa-
vādasya sakyam ēśrayitum | na hy ayam mantraḥ svātanthreyena kanchid
api vādaṁ samartha-yitum utsahate | sarvatrepi yaya kayachit kalpanaya
ajātavādi-sampādanopapatteḥ Śāṅkhyā-vādaḥ eva iha abhipretaḥ iti viśe-
śharmāharaṇa-karanābhāvāt | "chamasa-vat" |

"'Because, as in the case of the spoon, there is nothing distinctive.'

The assertor of Pradhāna again declares that Pradhāna is not proved to be unscriptural. Why? From the following verse (Sv. Up. iv. 5):

'One unborn male, loving the unborn female of a red, white, and black colour, who forms many creatures possessing her own character, unites himself with her: another unborn male abandons her after he has enjoyed her.' For in this verse the words 'red,' 'white,' and 'black,' denote (the three Qualities) Passion, Goodness, and Darkness;

—Passion, from its stimulating character, being designated by the term

148 The text of Dr. Rüer's ed. of the Upanishad (Bibl. Ind. vol. vii.) has two various readings in this line, viz. lohita-krishṇa-varṇām for lohita-sukla-krishṇām (which latter, however, is the reading referred to by Sankara in his commentary on that work), and sarūpām for svarūpāh.
red,' Goodness, from its illuminating character, by 'white,' and Darkness, from its enveloping character, by 'black.' The unborn female is described as red, white, and black, with reference to the characteristics of the three components which make up the state of equilibrium. She must be called 'unborn' (Ajā), because she is not produced, since it is admitted that 'original matter' (Mūla-Prakṛti = Pradhāna) is not a modification (of any other substance—Sānkhyā Kārikā, verse 3). But is not ajā the conventional name for 'she-goat'? True (reply the Sānkhyas), but that conventional sense cannot be adopted here, because knowledge is the subject of the context. And this unborn female produces many creatures characterized by the three Qualities . . . . And from this it is concluded that the theory of Kapila's followers regarding Pradhrāna, etc., is based upon the Veda. We reply: that it cannot be admitted on the strength of this verse that the theory of the Sānkhyas is founded on the Veda. For the verse in question, if regarded independently, is powerless to sustain any hypothesis whatever; and the reason is that, as this description of the state of the unborn female may be rendered applicable on any hypothesis whatever, there is no ground for determining specifically that the Sānkhya theory is here intended—'as in the case of the spoon.'" This aphorism refers to a verse quoted in the Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad, ii, 2, 3 (Bibl. Ind. p. 413 of the Sanskrit, and p. 174 of Dr. Roer's translation), and beginning 'a cup with its mouth down, and its bottom upwards,' which, as Śankara remarks, cannot, without some further indication, be applied to any one cup in particular; and in the same way, he argues, the unborn female in the passage under discussion cannot, in the absence of anything to restrict the application in any special way be understood as denoting Pradhāna (evam ihāpy aviśesho jām ekām ity asya mantrasya | na asmin mantre Pradhānam eva ajā 'bhigretā iti śakyate niyantum). The question then arises what is meant by this 'unborn female.' To this the author of the aphorisms and Śankara reply, that the word denotes the material substance of a four-fold class of elements, viz. light, heat, water, and food, all derived from the supreme Deity (Paramesvarād utpannā jyotih-pramukhā tejo 'b-anna-lakshanā chatur-vidhābhūta-grāmasya prakṛiti-bhūtā iyaṃ ajā pratipattavyā). These four elements he however seems (p. 357) to identify with three, in the words: bhūta-traya-lakshanā eva iyaṃ ajā vijnaya na guṇa-traya-lakshanā | 'This
unborn female is formed by three elements, not by the three qualities; and the ascription of the three colours in the text to these three elements is supported by a quotation from the Chhāndogya Upanishad, vi. 4, 1, which is as follows: *Yad agnoḥ rohitam rūpaṁ tejasās tad rūpam yat śublam tad apāṁ yat krishnam tad annasya* | "The red colour of fire is that of heat; its white colour is that of water; and its black colour is that of food (which here means earth, according to the commentator on the Chhāndogya Upanishad)." In this way, he adds, the words denoting the three colours are used in the proper sense, whereas if applied to the three qualities they would be figuratively employed (*rohitādānāṁ cha śabādānāṁ rūpa-viśēśaḥ mukhyatvād bhākta-tvāḥ cha guṇa-viśhayatvāya*). Sāṅkara concludes that this verse, descriptive of the unborn female, does not denote any self-deceptive material cause called Pradhāna, but is shewn from the context to signify the Divine Power in its primordial state before Name and Form were developed (*na svatantrā kāḥit prakṛtih pradhānaṁ nāma ajā-mantrena āmnāyate iti śakyate vaktum | prakaraṇāt tu sā eva daivi saktir avyakrita-nāma-rūpā nāma-rūpayaḥ prāg avasthānenaśi mantrena āmnāyate ity utihyate*).

Passing over the further questions, which are raised on this subject, I go on to the 11th Sūtra, and the comment upon it, from which we learn that the words ‘knowing him by whom the five times five men, and the aether are upheld, to be Soul,’ etc. (*yasmin pancha pancha-janāḥ ākāśas ca pratishtitaḥ | tam evānyāḥ ātmānam vidvān ityādi*), are adduced by the Sāṅkhya in support of their system, as the number of the principles (*tattva*), which it affirms (see Sāṅkhya Kārikā, verse 3, and Sāṅkhya Sūtras, i. 61), corresponds to the number twenty-five in this text; while the applicability of the passage is denied by the Vedāntins on the ground that the ‘principles’ of the Sāṅkhya are not made up of five homogeneous sets of five each (p. 362); that if the Soul and aether mentioned in the text are added, as they must be, to the twenty-five, the aggregate number will exceed that of the Sāṅkhya ‘principles,’ among which both Soul and aether are comprehended (pp. 364 f.); that the fact of the correspondence of the numbers, if admitted, would not suffice to shew that the ‘principles’ of the Sāṅkhya were referred to, as they are not elsewhere recognized in the Veda, and as the word

149 See Babu Rajendra Lāl Mittra’s translation of this Upanishad, p. 106.
men’ (*janāḥ*) is not usually applied to denote ‘principles’ (p. 365); and further that the phrase ‘the five five men,’ signifies only ‘five,’ and not ‘five times five’ (p. 366), etc. The conclusion arrived at in the twelfth aphorism is that the breath, and other vital airs, are referred to in the passage under consideration; and that although the word ‘men’ (*janāḥ*) is not generally applied to ‘breath,’ etc., any more than to ‘principles,’ the reference is determined by the context. Others, as Sāṅkara observes, explain the term ‘the five men’ (*panchajanāḥ*) of the gods, fathers, gandharvas, asuras, and rakshases, and others again of the four castes, and the Nīshādas. The Vedic teacher (Bādarāyaṇa) however, as his commentator adds, has decided that the breath, etc., are intended.

If we now turn to the Sāṅkhya aphorisms themselves, we shall find that their author constantly refers to texts of the Veda as supporting, coinciding with, or reconcileable with his dogmas. I have noticed the following instances, viz. Śūtras i. 5, 36, 51, 54, 78, 84, 148, 155; ii. 20–22; iii. 14, 15, 80; iv. 22; v. 1, 12, 15, 21; vi. 32, 34, 51, 58, 59, which may be consulted in Dr. Ballantyne’s translation. I can only refer more particularly to a few of these with the commentator’s remarks.

I begin with Śūtra i. 155, in which the author of the Aphorisms maintains that the great distinctive dogma of the Veda, the oneness of Soul, is not supported by the Veda. In Śūtra 150 he had laid it down as his own conclusion, established by the fact of the variety observable in the conditions of birth, etc., that there is a multitude of souls, and he now defends this as conformable to Scripture.

"Na advaita-śrutī-virodho jāti-paratvāt" | atmaikya-śrutināṁ virodhas tu nāsti tāsaṁ jāti-paratvāt | jātiḥ sāmāṇyaṁ eka-rūpatvāṁ tattva advaita-śrutināṁ tātparyyād na te akhaṇḍatva pravojananabhāvād ity arthaḥ |

... yathā-śruta-jāti-ścbdasya adare te "ātmā idam ekāḥ eva agre asīt" "sād eva saumya idam agre āśīd evam eva advitiyam" (Chhänd. Up. vi. 2, 1) ity-ādy-advaita-śrutī-upapādakatayā eva sūtraṁ vyākhyāyam | "jāti-paratvāt" | vijātiya-advaita-nishedha-paratvād ity arthaḥ | tattva ādya-vyākhyaṇām ayam bhāvaḥ | atmaikya-śrutī-smṛtisv ekādī-śabdās chid-

180 See the First Volume of this work, pp. 176 ff.
181 i. 164 in Dr. Hall’s edition in the Bibl. Ind.
ekarūpata-māttra-parāḥ bhedādi-sabdāḥ cha vaidharmya-lakṣaṇa-bheda-parāḥ

‘155. ‘This is not opposed to the Vedic doctrine of non-duality, since that merely refers to genus.’ Our doctrine that souls are numerous does not conflict with the Vedic texts which affirm the oneness of Soul, since these passages refer to oneness of genus. Genus means sameness, oneness of nature; and it is to this that the texts regarding non-duality relate, and not to the undividedness (or identity) of Soul; since there is no occasion for the latter view. The Sūtra must be explained with due regard to the sense of the word genus as it occurs in the Veda, so as (thereby) to bring out the proper meaning of such texts, expressing non-duality, as these, ‘This was in the beginning Soul, one only;’ ‘This was in the beginning, o fair youth, Existent, one without a second.’ The words ‘since that merely refers to genus,’ mean ‘since that is merely intended to deny a duality denoting a difference of genus.’ The first of two interpretations given of the Sūtra is as follows: In the texts of the Śruti and Smṛti relating to the oneness of Soul, the words ‘One,’ etc., denote simply that Spirit is one in its nature; whilst the words, ‘distinction,’ etc., designate a distinction defined as difference of nature.” At the close of his remarks the commentator gives a second explanation of the Sūtra.

The author returns to this subject in the 61st Sūtra of the fifth Book:

“Na advaitam ātmano lingāt tad-bhedā-pratiteḥ” | yadyapy ātmanām anyonyam bhedā-vākya-vad abhedā-vākyāny api santi tathāpi na advaitam | na atyantam abhedāḥ | ajādi-vākya-sthaiḥ prakṛiti-tyāgatyāgādi-lingair bhedasyāvāva śiddhār ity arthaḥ | na hy atyantābhede tāni lingāny upa-padyante |

‘Soul is not one; for a distinction of souls is apparent from various signs.’ Although there are texts affirming that there is no distinction, just as there are others which assert a distinction, of souls, still non-duality, i.e. an absolute absence of distinction must be denied; because a distinction is established by signs, such as the abandonment and non-abandonment of Prakṛiti, etc., mentioned in such texts as that about the ‘unborn female,’ etc. (See above, p. 165.) For these signs are inconsistent with the hypothesis of an absolute absence of distinction,” etc.

A kindred subject is introduced in the next Sūtra, the 62nd:

“Na anātmanā ’pi pratyakṣa-bādhāt” | anātmanā ’pi bhogya-praprav
chena atmano na advaitam pratyakshanapi badhat | atmanah sarva-bhog.
yabhode ghatat-patayor apy abheda syat | ghatadeb, patady-abhinatma-
bhedat | sa cha bheda-grahaka-pratyaksha-badhitaḥ |

"Further, there is not an absence of distinction (i.e. identity) be-
tween Soul and non-soul, as this is disproved by the evidence of sense.
That is: non-duality (i.e. identity) is not predicable of Soul on the
one hand, and non-soul, i.e. the perceptible objects by which our senses
are affected, on the other, because this is opposed to the evidence of
sense. For if soul were identical with all that is perceptible, there
would also be no distinction between a jar and cloth, inasmuch as jars,
etc., would not be distinct from soul which is not distinct from cloth,
etc.; and such identity (of jars, etc., with cloth, etc.) is opposed to the
evidence of sense which obliges us to perceive a distinction."

But how is this to be reconciled with such Vedic texts as 'this is
nothing but soul' (atma eva idam)? An answer is given in Sutra 64,
which seems to admit that the passages in question do at least on a
prima facie view convey the sense ascribed to them by the Vedantins:

"Anyaparastam avivekanaṁ tatta" | avivekanam aviveki-purushan
vratitatta advate 'naya-parastam upasunartha-kumadhityarthah |
loke hi sarīra-sarīrirghor bhogyabhoktrośa avivekana abheda vyanahriyate
"'ham gauro" "mama atma Bhadrasenaḥ" ityādiḥ | atas tām eva vyan
vahāram anūdyānām ārvir vidadhāti satvān
suddhy-ādy-artham iti |

"These texts have another object, with a view to those who have
no discrimination." That is: in the passages which affirm non-duality
another object is intended, viz. a reference (to vulgar ideas) with a view
to stimulate devotion. For it commonly occurs that undiscriminating
persons confound the body and the soul, the object to be experienced,
and the person who experiences it, as when they say 'I am white,'
'Bhadrasena is myself.' The Veda, therefore, referring to this mode of
speaking, inculcates on such undiscerning people the practice of devo-
tion with a view to the promotion of goodness, purity, etc."

The author returns to the subject of non-duality in Sutra vi. 51,
which is introduced by the remark:

Nanv evam pramanādy-anurodhena āvaita-sidhāv āvaita-bruteḥ kā
gatir iti |

"But if duality be thus established in accordance with proofs, etc.,
what becomes of the Vedic texts declaring non-duality?"
The answer is as follows:

"Na śrutī-virodha rāginām vairāgyaṁ tat-siddhaṁ" | advaita-śrutī-virodhas tu nāsti rāginām purushātirikte vairāgyaṁ eva śrutibhir advaita-siddhanāt |

"‘Our view is not opposed to the Veda, as the texts in question establish non-duality with a view to produce apathy in those who are actuated by desire.’ That is to say: There is in our doctrine regarding non-duality nothing contrary to the Veda, as the passages referred to affirm this principle with the view of producing in those who have desire an indifference in regard to everything except Soul.’

The 12th aphorism of the fifth Book asserts that according to the Veda, Pradhāna, and not Īśvara, is the cause of the world. The details of the reasoning on which this view is founded, as here stated by the commentator, differ in some respects from those which Sankara puts into the mouth of the Sāṅkhya:

"Śrutir api pradhāna-kāryayatvasya” | prapanche pradhāna-kāryayatvasya eva śrutir asti na chetana-kāraṇatve | yathā “ajām ekām lohitā-śukla-krishṇām bahviḥ prajāh srijamāṇām sarūpāḥ” | “tad ha idāṁ tarhy avyākritam asit tad nāma-rūpābhyaṁ vyākṛyata” ity-adir ity arthaḥ | yā cha “tad aikṣhata bahu syāṁ” ityādiś chetana-kāraṇatā-śrutih sā sargadāv uppannasya mahāt-tattvopādhi-kasya mahā-purushasya janya-jnāna-parā | kiṁ vā bahu-bhavānānurodhat pradhāne eva “kālam pipatisati” iti-vad gauṁ | anyathā “sākṣi chetāḥ kevalo nirgunaḥ cha” (Svetāsvatara Upanishad, vi. 11) ity-ādi-śrutī-uktāparināmītvasya purushe ‘nupapattār iti | ayaṁ cha īśvara-pratishedhaḥ aśvaryya vairāgyārtham īśvara-jnānāṁ vinā ‘pi mokṣa-pratipadānārtham cha praudhi-vāda-mātttram iti prāgam eva vyākhyātām |

"‘There are also Vedic texts to support the doctrine that the world has sprung from Pradhāna, as its cause.’ That is: There are Vedic texts to shew that the phenomenal world has sprung from Pradhāna, and that it has not had a conscious being for its cause. They are such as these: ‘An unborn female, red, white, and black in hue, producing many creatures like herself, etc.;’ ‘This was once undeveloped: it was developed with Name and Form.’ As regards those other texts which affirm the causality of a conscious being, such as ‘It reflected, let me become many,’ they refer to the knowledge which sprang up in the great Male who was produced at the beginning of the creation vo-
sessing the attributes of the principle of Intellect (Mahat). Or, in accordance with the idea of becoming multiplied, the expression (indicating consciousness and will) is figuratively applied to Pradhāna, as when it is said of the bank of a river that it ‘intends to fall.’ For on any other supposition the incapability of any modification which is ascribed to Purusha in such texts as ‘He who is the witness, the conscious, the sole being, free from the Qualities,’ could not properly be applied to him (since if he were the material cause of the creation he must become modified). And it has been before explained that this denial of an Īśvara is a mere display of ingenuity, introduced for the purpose of producing apathy in regard to glory, and of propounding a method of final liberation even independently of the knowledge of an Īśvara.”

The following is the 34th Sūtra of the sixth Book, with the remarks by which it is introduced and followed:


“But must we not adopt the theories of an illusory creation, etc., because the causality of Purusha (soul) is to be learned from such texts as the following ‘many creatures have been produced from Purusha’? To this difficulty he replies: ‘From his opposition to Scripture the illogical outcaste does not attain to Soul.’ The sense of this is, that all the propositions, affirming the causality of Soul, which have been devised, are contrary to the Veda; and consequently the low class of bad logicians, etc., who adopt them have no knowledge of the nature of

122 See Vijnāna Bhikshu’s remarks, introductory to the Sūtras (p. 5, at the foot), which will be quoted in the next Section, and his comment on Sūtra i. 92. He is, as we shall find, an eclectic, and not a thorough-going adherent of the Śāṅkhya.
Soul. Hence it is to be understood that those also who assert that Soul is the substance of the qualities of pleasure and pain, etc., are incompetent reasoners: they too are destitute of the true knowledge of Soul. The Vedic texts which declare its causality are intended to inculcate devotion on the ground that there is no distinction between Power (Sakti) and the possessor of Power (Saktimat); for the causality of Pradhana is established by such texts as that relating to the 'one unborn female,' etc. But if it be affirmed that Soul is the cause of the world merely in the same sense in which the ether is the cause of clouds, etc., viz. by affording them a receptacle, we do not object to that, since we only deny the transformation (of Soul into material productions)."

In regard to the question whether the principles of the Vedanta or those of the Sankhya are most in harmony with the most prevalent doctrine of the Upanishads, I shall quote some of the remarks of Dr. Röer, the translator of many of these treatises. In his introduction to the Taittiriya Upanishad he observes that we there find "the tenets peculiar to the Vedanta already in a far advanced state of development; it contains as in a germ the principal elements of this system." "There are, however," he adds, "differences" (Bibliotheca Indica, vol. XV. p. 5). The same nearly is the case with the Aitareya Upanishad (ibid. p. 27). In reference to the Svetasvatara Upanishad he remarks: "Sankara in his commentary on this Upanishad generally explains its fundamental views in the spirit of the Vedanta. He is sometimes evidently wrong in identifying the views of some of the other Upanishads with the tenets of the Vedanta, but he is perfectly right to do so in the explanation of an Upanishad which appears to have been composed for the express purpose of making the principle of the Vedanta agreeable to the followers of the Sankhya" (ibid. pp. 43 f.). Of the Katha Upanishad Dr. Röer says (ibid. p. 97): "The standing point of the Katha is on the whole that of the Vedanta. It is the absolute spirit which is the foundation of the world. . . . In the order of manifestations or emanations from the absolute spirit it deviates, however, from that adopted by the other Upanishads and by the later Vedanta, and is evidently more closely allied to the Sankhya. The order is here: The unmanifested (avyakta), the great soul (mahatma, or mahat), intellect

133 See Dr. Ballantyne's translation, which I have often followed. He does not, however, render in extenso all the passages which I have reproduced.
(buddhi), mind, the objects of the senses, and the senses,' etc. The reader who wishes to pursue the subject further may consult the same author's remarks on the other Upanishads. On the whole question of the relation of the Vedānta and the Sānkhya respectively to the Veda, Dr. Röer thus expresses himself in his introduction to the Śvetāsvatara Upanishad (p. 36): "The Vedānta, although in many important points deviating from the Vedas, and although in its own doctrine quite independent of them, was yet believed to be in perfect accordance with them, and being adopted by the majority of the Brāhmans, it was never attacked on account of its orthodoxy. The same cannot be said of the Sānkhya; for it was not only frequently in opposition to the doctrine of the Vedas, but sometimes openly declared so. Indeed, the Vedānta also maintained that the acquisition of truth is independent of caste (1) or any other distinction, and that the highest knowledge which is the chief end of man cannot be imparted by the Vedas (vide Kaṭha ii. 23); yet it insisted that a knowledge of the Vedas was necessary to prepare the mind for the highest knowledge (2). This the Sānkhya denied altogether, and although it referred to the Vedas, and especially to the Upanishads, still it did so only when they accorded with its own doctrines, and it rejected their authority (3) in a case of discrepancy."

I make a few remarks on some points in this quotation indicated by the figures (1), (2), and (3). (1) We have already learned above, p. 99, that, according to the Brahma Sūtras (see i. 3, 34 ff., and Sankara's explanation of them), at least, a Sūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge. (2) It appears from Sankara's argument against Jaimini that he does not consider a knowledge of the ceremonial part of the Veda as necessary for the acquisition of divine knowledge, but he seems to regard the Upanishads as the source from which the latter is derived. (3) I do not know on what authority this statement that the Sānkhyas ever actually rejected the authority of the Vedas is founded. Their attempts to reconcile their tenets with the letter of the Veda may often seem to be far-fetched and sophistical; but I have not observed that Sankara, while arguing elaborately against the interpretations of the Sānkhyas, anywhere charges them either with denying the authority of the Veda, or with insincerity in the appeals which they make to the sacred texts.

354 See above, p. 161.
OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS.

On the subject of the Upanishads the reader may also consult Prof. Max Müller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature.

I subjoin in a note some extracts from this work.\(^{155}\)

The Nyāya and Vaiśeshika Sūtras do not appear to contain nearly so many references to Vedic texts as the Sāṅkhya; but I have noticed the following: Nyāya iii. 32 (= iii. 1, 29 in the Bibl. Ind.); Vaiśeshika ii. 1, 17; iii. 2, 21; iv. 2, 11; v. 2, 10.

The author of the Vaiśeshika Sūtras affirms, in iii. 2, 20, the doctrine that souls are numerous; and in the 21st Sūtra, which I quote, along with the comment of Sankara Misra, and the gloss of the editor Pañḍit Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapanchāhāna, he claims Vedic authority for this tenet:

21. "Śāstra-sāmarthyāḥ cha" | (Sankara Misrā) Śāstraṁ srutiḥ |

\(^{155}\)"They (the Upanishads) contain, or are supposed to contain, the highest authority on which the various systems of philosophy in India rest. Not only the Vedānta philosopher, who, by his very name, professes his faith in the ends and objects of the Veda, but the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣhika, the Nyāya, and Yoga philosophers, all pretend to find in the Upanishads some warrant for their tenets, however antagonistic in their bearing. The same applies to the numerous sects that have existed and still exist in India. Their founders, if they have any pretensions to orthodoxy, invariably appeal to some passage in the Upanishads in order to substantiate their own reasonings. Now it is true that in the Upanishads themselves there is so much freedom and breadth of thought that it is not difficult to find in them some authority for almost any shade of philosophical opinion." (p. 316 f.) Again: "The early Hindus did not find any difficulty in reconciling the most different and sometimes contradictory opinions in their search after truth; and a most extraordinary medley of oracular sayings might be collected from the Upanishads, even from those which are genuine and comparatively ancient, all tending to elucidate the darkest points of philosophy and religion, the creation of the world, the nature of God, the relation of man to God, and similar subjects. That one statement should be contradicted by another seems never to have been felt as any serious difficulty." (p. 320 f.) Once more: "The principal interest of the older Upanishads consists in the absence of that systematic uniformity which we find in the later systems of philosophy; and it is to be regretted that nearly all the scholars who have translated portions of the Upanishads have allowed themselves to be guided by the Brahmanic commentators," etc. (p. 322). "In philosophical discussions, they (the Brāhmans) allowed the greatest possible freedom; and although at first three philosophical systems only were admitted as orthodox (the two Mīmāṁsās and the Nyāya), their number was soon raised to six, so as to include the Vaiśeṣhika, Sāṅkhya, and Yoga schools. The most conflicting views on points of vital importance were tolerated as long as their advocates succeeded, no matter by what means, in bringing their doctrines into harmony with passages of the Veda, strained and twisted in every possible sense. If it was only admitted that besides the perception of the senses and the induction of reason, revelation also, as contained in the Veda, furnished a true basis for human knowledge, all other points seemed to be of minor importance." (p. 78 f.)
tayā tpy ātmano bheda-pratipādanāt | śrūyate hi ..... (Jayanārāyaṇa) ito tpy jīvasya īśvara-bhinnatvam ity āha | śastrasya śrutē śāmartyāy jīvēsarayor bheda-bodhakatvāt | tathā hi | "dve brahmaṇi veditavye" (Maitri Up. vi. 22) | "dvā suparṇā sayujā sakāhyā samānaṁ vriksham parihastvacāte | tayor anyāḥ pippalaṁ svādu ati anāsaṁn anyo abhichakṣiti" (Rig-veda Sanhitā, i. 164, 20; Śvetāsv. Up. vi. 6; Mundaka Up. i. 3, 1) ity-ādi-śrūter jīvēsarayor bheda 'vasyam angikāryyahiḥ | na cha "tata tvam asi Śvetaketu" "Brahma-vid Brahma eva bhavati" ity-ādi-śrutinām kā gatir itī vācyam | "tata tvam asi" iti śrutē tād-abhēdēna tadāyatvā-pratipādanena abheda-bhāvana-para-tvāt | "Brahma-vid Brahma eva" iti śrutē cha nirādhiphatvādīnā īśvara-sāmyatā jīvasya abhidhatte na tu tad-abhēdam | "niranjanaḥ parām sāmyam upāti" iti śrutē gaty-antarāsaṁbha-vāt | astī hi lāukika-vākyeshu "sampād-ādhiyē purohitō 'yam vajā samvṛttāḥ" ity-ādiśgu sādriśyā-paraśre abhedopachāraḥ | na cha moksha-dāśāyam ajñāna-nivṛttiābh bheda jāyate iti vācyam bhedaśya nityātva nāśaye gād bheda-nāśāṅkāre 'pi vyakti-dvayavasthānasyāt āvasyakatvāc cha iti sankṣepaḥ | bheda-sādhakāni yuktā-antarāni śruti-antarāṇi cha grantha-gaurava-bhīyā parishaktāni |

"And this opinion is confirmed by the Sāstra." (Sāṅkara Miśra) The Śāstra means the Veda; by which also a distinction of Souls is established. For it is said," etc. [He then quotes two texts which are repeated by Jayanārāyaṇa, the author of the gloss, whose remarks are as follows :] "There is another proof of the Soul being distinct from Īśvara; viz. this, that it is confirmed by the Śāstra, the Veda, which declares the distinctness of the two; and this principle must of necessity be admitted from such texts as these: 'Two Brāhmās are to be known;"156 and 'Two birds, united, friends, attach themselves to the same tree; one of them eats the sweet fruit of the pippala tree, while the other, without eating, looks on.' Nor are we to ask what will then become of such other texts as (?) 'Thou art that, o Śvetaketu;' (2) 'He who knows Brahma becomes Erahma;' for the former of these two passages (1) tends to convey the idea of 'identity by representing as identity with That, the fact of Śvetaketu's entirely belonging to That, whilst

156 The full text is: Dove brahmaṇi veditavye śabda-brahma paraṁ cha yat—śabda-brahmaṇi nīśhātabh param brahmādhiṣgahasti | "Two Brāhmās are to be known, the verbal and the supreme. He who is initiated in the former attains the latter." Here, however, by the verbal Brāhmā, the Veda must be intended.
the second (2) affirms the equality of the Soul with Īśvara, in consequence of its freedom from pain and other weaknesses, and not its identity with Him; for it is shewn by another Vedic text, viz. 'The passionless man attains the highest state of equality,' that any other destiny would be inconceivable. In secular modes of speaking also, such as the following, 'From the abundance of his wealth the domestic priest has become the king,' we find a figurative assertion of identity. Nor can it be said that distinction disappears on the cessation of ignorance in the state of final emancipation, because distinction, from its eternity, cannot be destroyed, and because, even if its destructibility were admitted, two separate personalities must still continue to exist. Such is a summary of our argument: further proofs from reasoning, and further texts of the Veda, are omitted from a dread of making the book too bulky.'

The charge of open contempt of the Veda is brought by Sankara against Śaṅḍilya, the author of the Bhāgavata heresy, as the orthodox Vedāntin considers it. Of that doctrine Sankara thus speaks in his remarks on Brahma Sūtra ii. 2, 45:

_Veda-vipratisheṣhaḥ cha bhavati | chaturṣhu vedesu param śreya 'lab-
dhvā Śaṅḍilyāḥ idaṁ śāstram adhīgatavān ity-ādi-veda-ninda-darśanāṁ |
tasmād asangataḥ eśā kalpanaḥ iti siddham |

"And it also contradicts the Veda: for we see such an instance of contempt of the Vedas as this, that Śaṅḍilya, not finding the means of attaining the highest good in the whole four of them, devised this Śāstra. Hence it is established that these imaginations are absurd."

The points of the Bhāgavata doctrine objected to by Sankara do not however appear to be those which are principally insisted on in the Bhakti Sūtras of Śaṅḍilya, published by Dr. Ballantyne in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1861. I will notice some of these doctrines. The leading principle of the system is that it is not knowledge (jñāna) but devotion (bhakti) which is the means of attaining final liberation (Sūtra 1). Devotion is defined in the 2nd Sūtra to be a supreme love of God (sā paraśaḥ anuraktār Īśvara). Knowledge cannot, the author considers, be the means of liberation, as it may co-exist with hatred of the object known (Sūtra 4). Neither the study of the Veda nor the acqui-

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187 See Colebrooke's Misc. Essays, i. 413: "A passage quoted by Sankara Āchārya seems to intimate that its promulgator was Śaṅḍilya," etc., etc.
sition of such qualities as tranquillity of mind is a necessary preliminary to devotion. The only requisite is a desire of emancipation, according to the commentator (remarks on Śūtra 1). Ceremonial works, too, have no bearing upon devotion (Śūtra 7), which may be practised by men of all castes, and even by Chāṇḍālas, since the desire to get rid of the evils of mundane existence is common to all (Śūtra 78). The commentator explains that the authority of the Vedas as the only source of supernatural knowledge is not denied, nor the fact that only the three highest castes have the right to study them: but it is urged that women, Śūdras, etc., may attain by means of the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, etc., to knowledge founded on the Vedas, whilst Chāṇḍālas, etc., may acquire it by traditional instruction based on the Śrīti and the practice of virtuous men. Those whose devotion is not matured in the present world, will find the opportunity of perfecting it in Svetadvipa, the world of the divine Being (Śūtra 79). Even the wicked may have a penitential devotion (ārtī-bhaktāv eva aāhikāraḥ), and after they are freed from their guilt, they may attain to full devotion. The Bhagavad Gītā is much quoted by the commentator on these Śūtras; but the Veda is also sometimes adduced in proof of their doctrines; as e.g. the following words of the Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii. 25, 2, are cited to prove that devotion is the chief requisite, and knowledge, etc., subservient to it:

"Ātmā eva idāṁ sarvam iti | sa vai eva evam pāṣyann evam manvānāḥ evam vijānann ātma-ratir ātma-krīḍāḥ ātma-mithunāḥ ātmanāndadāḥ sa svarād bhavati" | ittra “ātma-rati”-rāpāyaḥ para-bhaktēḥ “pāṣyann” iti dārsanam aprītadvādi-bhrāma-nirāsa-mukhena angaṁ bhavati |

"All this is Soul. He who perceives this, thinks this, knows this, delights in Soul, sports with Soul, consorts with Soul, takes pleasure in Soul; he becomes self-replenishing.' Here the sight expressed in the words 'perceiving,' etc., is by removing all errors regarding disagreeableness, etc., an adjunct of supreme devotion in the form of 'delight in Soul.'"

In his remarks on Śūtra 31 the commentator quotes another passage of the same Upanishad, iii. 14, 4, in which a Śāṅḍilya is referred to as the author of a statement. Sankara in his commentary on the Upanishad calls him a rishi. He cannot, however, have been the same person as the author of the Śūtras; although, even if he had been so reputed,
Sankara would have had little difficulty in denying that they could have been written by a rishi, as we shall see in the next section that he contradicts the opinion that the rishi Kapila, referred to in the Svetāsvatara Upanishad, was the author of the Sāṅkhya aphorisms.

Sect. XI.—Distinction in point of authority between the Veda and the Sūtris or non-Vedic Sāstras, as stated in the Nyāya-māla-vistara, and by the Commentators on Manu, and the Vedānta, etc.; difference of opinion between Sankara and Madhusūdana regarding the orthodoxy of Kapila and Kanāda, etc.; and Vijnāna Bhikshu’s view of the Sāṅkhya.

A distinct line of demarcation is generally drawn by the more critical Indian writers between the Vedas, and all other classes of Indian Sāstras, however designated. The former, as we have seen, are considered to possess an independent authority and to be infallible, while the latter are regarded as deriving all their authority from the Veda, and (in theory at least) as infallible guides only in so far as they coincide with its dicta. This will be clear from the following passages:

I. Nyāya-māla-vistara.—The first text which I adduce has been already quoted in the Second Volume of this work, but is repeated here for facility of reference. It is from the treatise just named, i 3, 24:


"It may be said that the Kalpa Sūtras and other works designated by the names of Baudhāyana, Āpastamba, Āśvalayana, Kātyāyana, etc,"
and the Nigama, Nirukta, and six Vedāngas, together with the Śrīpātas of Manu and others, are superhuman, because they impart a knowledge of duty, as the Vedas do; and that they should not be suspected of inferiority to the Vedas on the ground that they depend upon a primary authority, since the knowledge which they impart is independent, because it is admitted to be self-evidencing. But this view is incorrect, for the inference in question proceeds upon an erroneous generalization. The books referred to are called by the names of men, as ‘the Śūtras of Baudhāyana,’ ‘the Śūtras of Āpastamba;’ and these designations cannot correctly be said to originate in the exposition of the works by those teachers whose names they bear (as is really the case in regard to the Kāṭhaka, and other parts of the Veda); for it was known to some of the contemporaries of these men, at the time when they were composing these Śūtras, Śrīpātas, etc., that they were so engaged; and this knowledge has descended by unbroken tradition. Hence these books are, like the works of Kālidāsa and others, of human origin. Nevertheless, they possess authority, as being founded on the Veda.” . . . The following additional remarks represent the opinion of the Guru (Prabhākara) on the same question: “It is not yet proved that the Kalpa Śūtras possess the character of the Veda; it would require great labour to prove it; and, in fact, it is impossible to prove it. For the human origin of these books is established by the names which they bear, and by their being observed to have had authors.”

II. Kullāka.—The same thing is admitted by Kullāka, the commentator on Manu, who (in his remarks on i. 1) thus defines the relation of his author to the Vedas:

Pauruṣeyatvē′pi Manu-vākyānām avigīta-mahajana-paricrāhāt śruty-uṣṇagāch ca veda-mulakatayā prāmānyam | Tathā cha ohhadogyā-āhmane šrūya te “Manur vai yat kinchid avadat tad bhesajyam bhesajatāyaś” iti | Viṁhaspatir apy āha “Vedārthopanibandhītevat pradhānyam hi Manoh śrīmitam | Manu-artha-viparitā tu yā śrīpītih sā na sasyate | Tāvac chhastrāṇī sōbhante tarka-vyākaranāni ca | Dharmārtha-mokshopadesaḥ Manur yāvad na drīṣyaḥ” | Mahābhārato′py utkam “Purāṇam Mānavo dharmaḥ sango vedā chikitsitam | ājnā-siddhāni chatvāri na hantavyāni hetubhīḥ” | virodhi-Baudhādhi-tarkair na hantavyāni | anukālaṣ tu mīnāsāđi-tarkaḥ pravartanīyāḥ eva | ata eva vakshyat “ār-ṣhaṁ dharmaḥpadesāṁ ca veda-sāstra-virodhāṁ | yas tarkaṇāṇusandhaṁ sa dharmaṁ veda netarāḥ” iti |
“Though the Institutes of Manu had a personal author, still, as their reception by illustrious men of unimpeached [orthodoxy], and their conformity to the Veda, prove that they are based upon the latter, they are authoritative. Accordingly it is recorded in the Chhândogya Brâhmaṇa that, ‘Whatever Manu said is a medicine for remedial purposes.’ And Viṣhṇu-puruṣottama says: ‘As Manu depends upon the contents of the Veda, he is traditionally celebrated as pre-eminent. But that Smṛiti which is contrary to the sense of Manu, is not approved. Scriptures and books on logic and grammar are all eclipsed as soon as Manu, our instructor in duty, and in the means of attaining both earthly prosperity, and final liberation, is beheld.’ And it is said in the Mahābhārata: ‘The Purāṇas, the Institutes of Manu, the Veda with its appendages, and treatises on medicine, these four, which are established by authority, are not to be assailed by rationalistic arguments;’ that is, they are not to be attacked by hostile reasonings, such as those of the Baudhāyas. But friendly arguments, such as those of the Mīmāṃsakas, are to be employed. And accordingly we shall find below (Manu xii. 106) that he says, ‘the man who investigates the injunctions of the rishis, and the rules of duty by reasoning which is agreeable to the Veda, he, and he only, is acquainted with duty.’” (See above, p. 24, note 29.)

III. Nyāya-mālā-vidyāra.—But the precepts of the Smṛiti are not considered useless or superfluous. On the contrary, an authority is attributed to them corresponding to the antiquity, elevated position, and sacred character of their supposed authors. Thus the author of the Nyāya-mālā-vidyāra says (i. 3, 3):

_Vinatā smṛitis evaṁ māla | vaidika-manu-ādi-praṇita-smṛiti-vat | upanayanādhyayanādī-smṛiti-vat | na cha vaiyarthyaṁ śāṅkaviyam | asmad-adīnām pratyaksheśu parokshēshu nānā vedēshu viprakīrṇasya anuṣṭhē-yārthasya ekatra sankshepyamāṇavat |_

“The variously understood Smṛiti is founded on the Veda, because the traditions, such as those regarding investiture, study, etc., have been compiled by Vedic men, such as Manu and others. Nor is it to be surmised that the Smṛiti is useless, since it throws together in a condensed form a variety of injunctions regarding matters to be observed, which are scattered through different Vedas, both such as are visible and such as are invisible to us.” (This last expression appears
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to refer to the supposition that some parts of the Veda which Manu and others had before them when compiling their own works have now been lost. See Müller’s Ane. Sansk. Lit. pp. 103–107.)

Accordingly the Smṛitis have an authority superior to that founded merely on the practice of learned men of modern date, who have no intuition into the past and invisible. Thus the Nyāya-mālā-vistara says (i. 3, 19):

Na hi idāntanaḥ śiśṭāḥ Manu-ādi-vad dēśa-kāla-viprakriṣṭam vedāṁ 
śivya-jnānena sākṣhātkartum sāknuvanti yena śiśṭāchāro māla-vedam anumāpayisti!

“For learned men of the present day do not possess the power, which Manu and others had, of placing before their minds, through divine knowledge, the Veda which is far removed from them both in place and time, so as to justify us in regarding the practice of these moderns as a sufficient ground for inferring the existence of a Veda as its foundation.”

But as learned men, in any particular country or at any particular time, may be able to consult some Smṛiti which authorizes their particular observances, “these observances may serve as ground for inferring the existence of some Smṛiti on which they are founded, but not for inferring a Veda (tasmāḥ chhīśṭāchārāṇga smṛitir anumātuṁ sākyate na tu śrūṭiḥ). But a Smṛiti which is thus merely inferred to exist is set aside by any visibly existing Smṛiti of contrary import (anumilā cha smṛitir viruddhayā pratyakshayā smṛityā bādhayate).”

IV. Sāṅkara.—The above passages, by assuming that Manu and other eminent sages had the power of consulting Vedic texts now no longer accessible, make them practically almost infallible. The same view is taken by Sāṅkara Āchāryya. (See, however, the passage quoted from him above, in noto 67, p. 62; but there he has the author of the Sāṅkhya in view, whose tenets he regarded as contrary to the Veda.) In answer to the remark of a Mimāṁsaka objector stated in the comment on the Brahma Sūtra i. 3, 32, that the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, being of human origin, have only a derived and secondary authority (“itiḥāsa-purāṇam api pauruṣasyatvāt pramāṇāntara-mūlatam ākāṅkṣate”), Sāṅkara argues in his explanation of the following Sūtra (i. 3, 33) that they have an independent foundation:

Itiḥāsa-purāṇam api vyāhṛtyena mārgena sambhavaḥ mantrārthadvada.
mūlatvāt prabhavati devatā-vigrahādi prapanchayitum | pratyaksha-mūlam
api sambhavati ḥāvati hi asmākam apratyaksham api chiarantanām pratyaksham | tatha cha Vyāsādayo devatābhīḥ pratyakṣham vyavaharanti iti
śmartyate | yas tu brūyād idānāntanām iva pūrveshām api nāsti deva-dibhir vyavahartvāṃ sāmrathyaṃ iti sa jagad-vaihītriyam pratisheḍet | idānāṃ iva cha na anyada ’pi sārvabhaumaḥ kshatriyo stī iti brūyāt tatas eva rūna-
saṃyādi-chodanāḥ uparunāḥyāt | idānāṃ iva cha kalāntare ’py avyāvasthita-
prāyan varṇāsrama-dharmān pratijñānita tatas cha vyavasthā-vidhāyī sās-
tram anarthakaṁ kuryāt | Tasmād dharmotkarcha-vaśāt chiarantanaḥ deva-
dibhiḥ pratyakṣham vyājayuro iti śishyate | api cha śmaranti "svādhyā-
yādiśta-devata-samprayaḥyogā" ityādi | yogyo ’py aṃiṃādya-aśvarja-prāpti-
phalakaḥ śmaramanāno na sākhyate sāhāsa-mātrenā pratyākhyaṁ | srutīḥ
cha yoga-māhātmyam prakhyāpayati | "prīthiy-av-po-tejo-’nīla-khe s’uṭh-
thite panchātmaka yogo-γυνε pravritte | na tayō rogo na juvā na mrityuḥ
prāptasya yogād 158 nīmishāṃ sartrām itī | rishnām api mantri-brāhma-
ṇa-darśinām sāmrathyaṃ na asmātyena sāmrathyena upamātum yuktam | tasmāt sa-mūlam itiḥāsa-purāṇam |

"The Itiḥāsas and Purāṇas also, having originated in the way which has been explained, have power, as being based on the hymns and arthavādas, to evoke the corporeality, etc., of the gods. It is also reasonable to suppose that they are founded upon intuition. For there were things palpable through intuition to the ancients, though they are not thus palpable to us. 159 Accordingly it is recorded in the Smṛiti that Vyāsa and others associated face to face, with the gods. 160 Any man

158 Instead of yogād nīmishām the text of the Biblioth. Indica reads yogānīmamayam.
159 See above, pp. 116, 118, and 127; and also Prof. Müller’s article on the Vaiśe-
shika Philosophy in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vol. vii. p. 311, where it is remarked that the Vaiśeshikas, like Kapila, include the intuition of rishis under the category of pratyakṣaḥ (ārṣhaṁ jñānām sūtra-kṛitiḥ prīthak na laksita-
tam yogi-pratyakṣha ’ntar-bhūvāt).
160 Compare with this R.V. i. 179, 2: Ye chaḥ hi pūrve ritastāpāḥ ānāṃ sākāṁ deve-
bhīr avadann itiśāni | te chaḥ avaisur ityādi | “The pious sages who lived of old and who conversed about sacred truths with the gods,—they led a conjugal life,” etc. See also the passages quoted from the Vana-parvan of the Mahābhārata, the S’atapatha Brāhmaṇa, and Plato in the First Volume of this work, p. 147 ; and compare Hesiod
fragment 119: ξυαλ γὰρ τότε δαίτης θεῶν, ξυαλ δὲ τῶνοι θεάνωτοι θεῶν: κατα-
θυτος τ’ανθρώποι.

"Immortal gods, not unfamiliar, then
Their feasts and converse shared with mortal men."

And Herodotus writes of the Egyptians, ii. 144: Τὸ δὲ πρότερον τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖταν.
who should maintain that the ancients, like his own contemporaries, were destitute of power thus to associate with superhuman beings like the gods, would be denying all variety in the history of the world. Such a person would in like manner affirm that as now there is no Kshatriya possessed of universal sovereignty, so neither was there ever such a prince; and would thus impugn the scriptural injunctions regarding the rājasūya sacrifice [which was only to be performed by a universal monarch]. He would also allege that in former times, as now, the duties of castes and of orders were scarcely at all in force, and would thus render fruitless the scriptures by which the rules relating to them are prescribed. By these considerations it is intimated that the ancients, in consequence of their eminent holiness, were admitted to associate immediately with the gods, etc. And the Smṛiti says that nearness to, and converse with the gods is gained by reading the Veda, etc. Again, when the Smṛiti talks of the practice of Yoga resulting in the acquisition of superhuman faculties, such as minuteness, this assertion cannot be impugned through mere audacity, [i.e. it must have had some good foundation]. The Veda, too, declares the immense power of devotion in these words: 'When the fivefold influence of Yoga, connected with the elements of earth, water, fire, air, and æther, has begun to act, and a man has attained an æthereal [or fiery] body, he is no longer affected by disease, decay, or death.' And it is unreasonable to estimate, by the analogy of our own power, the power of the rishis, the seers of the Vedic hymns and Brāhmaṇas. Wherefore the Itiḥāsas and Purāṇas have an (independent) foundation.'" 

Sankara does not, however, treat all the ancients in this way. Like many other systematizers, he finds no difficulty in rejecting or explaining away any authorities which come into conflict with his views. It is thus that he deals with Kapila, the author of the Sāṅkhya. That eminent sage is thus spoken of in the Śvetāsvatara Upanishad, v. 2:

_Yo yoniḥ yonim adhitishthaty eko viśvāni rūpāṇi yoniḥ cha sarvāḥ_

__śeṣaḥ śivai tās tē ṣrī 'āyōṣṭār ṣrīvantaś, ṣrīkṛṣṇa śivā ṣrī Śrīva ṣrīvantaś, ॥ "And [the Egyptian priests said] that before these men the gods were the rulers in Egypt, dwelling together with men."

161 It appears from the gloss of Govinda Ānanda that one of the Yoga Sūtras is here quoted. I give the sense according to his explanation: _maṇtra-japōd deva-saṃ-niṣṭhāḥ tat-sambhūśaḥ cha iti sūtrārthāḥ._
rishim prasūtam Kapilaṁ yas tam agre jñānair bibhartī jāyamānāṁ cha paśyet |

“The god who alone superintends every source of production and all forms, who formerly nourished with various knowledge his son the rishi Kapila, and beheld him at his birth, etc.”

Towards the close of his comment on Brahma Sūtras ii. 1, 1, which I shall cite at some length, Sankara makes some remarks on this passage of that Upanishad. After stating the points that had been established in the first Book (adhyāya) of the Brahma Sūtras, and alluding to the objections which had been urged against the Sāṅkhya and other hostile doctrines as contrary to the Veda, Sankara goes on to explain the object of the second book, and the purport of the aphorism with which it begins, as follows:

Idānīṁ svā-pakhe smṛiti-nyāya-virodha-parihāraḥ prāhānādi-vāda
nāṁ cha nyāyābhāsopabrihimhitavam prattedāntaṁ srishty-ādi-prakri-
yāyaḥ avigātatvam ity asya artha-jātasya pratipādanāya dvitiyo’dhyāyaḥ
ārāhyate | tatra prathamaṁ tattvāḥ smṛiti-virodham upanyāsyas pariha-
rati | yaṁ uktaṁ Brahma eva sarveṣaṁ jāgataḥ kāraṇāṁ tad ayuktam |
kutaḥ “smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasaṅgāṭ” | smṛitiś cha tantrākhyā
paramarshi-praṇitā śisṭa-parigrihitā | anyāś cha tad-anusārīṇyaḥ smṛi-
tayaḥ | evam saty anavakāśaḥ prasaṁjyeraṁ | tātu hy ahaṇanam pradhān-
āṁ svaivatraṁ jāgataho kāraṇam upanibādhyete | Mano-ādi-smṛityas
tavaḥ chodanā-lakshanena agnihotrādīna dharmo-jātena āpekšhitam
arthāṁ samarpayantyaḥ sāvakaśaḥ bhavanti asya varṇasya asmin kāle
’nena viśhānena upanayanam idrīṣaṁ cha āchāraḥ itthāṁ vedādhanam
itthāṁ samārvartanam itthāṁ saha-dharma-chārīṇi-samyogāḥ iti tathā
purushārthaṁ śatur-varnagārama-dharmāṁ nānā-viśhān viśhādhi | na
evam kāpilādi-smṛitinam anuśhṛdaye vishaya’vakāso’sti moksha-sādhanam
evā hi samyag-darśanam adhikrītya tāḥ, praṇitāḥ | yadi tattva apy ana-
vakāśaḥ syur ānarthakyaṁ eva āsāṁ prasaṁjyeta | tasmāt tad-avirodhaṁ
vedāntāḥ syākhyātavāyaḥ | katham punar “ikshityo”-ādibhyo hetubhyo
Brahmā eva sarveṣaṁ jāgataḥ kāraṇāṁ ity avadāraṁ śruti-arthāḥ |
“smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasaṅgana” punar ākshipyate | bhaved ayam
ānākshepaṁ svat-tantra-praṇāṇāṁ | para-tantra-praṇāṇāṁ tuprayena janaḥ

See S’ankara’s commentary on this passage in Bibl. Ind. vii. 351, and Dr. Röer’s translation, p. 62, with the note; also Dr. Halk’s note in p. 19 of the preface to his edition of the Sāṅkhya Sūra, in the Bibl. Ind.
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svatantryena śruti-artham avadhārayitum asaknuvantāḥ prakhyāta-pra-
netrikāśu smrītiśv avalamberan tad-balena ca śruti-artham pratipat-
seram asmat-krite cha vyākhyaṇe na viśvasyur bahu-manāt smṛītīnām
pranetaṁ | kapila-prabhṛtīnām ca ārthām jñānam apratihaṭām sma-
ṛyate ārthiḥ ca bhaviṣyate "tīrtham prasūtaṁ kapīlām yas tam agre jnānair
bibharti jñayānāṁ ca paśyead" iti | tasmād na esām matam ayathār-
thāṁ sākyaṁ sambhāveryitum | tarkavāśṭāmbhena ca te 'rtham pratis-
ḥāpayaṁ | tasmād api smṛīti-balena veḍāntāḥ vyākhyayāḥ iti punar
ākṣṇepaṁ | tasya samādhīr "na | anya-smṛīty-anavakāśa-dosha-prasan-
gāḍ" iti | yadi smṛīty-anavakāśa-dosha-prasangaṇa tīvra-kārāṇa-vādaḥ
ākṣṇipeva evam api anyaḥ īśvara-kārāṇa-vādīnyāḥ smṛītyo 'navakāśaḥ
prasaḍyeyan | tāḥ uddāharishyāmaḥ | . . . evam anekaśaḥ smṛītiśv api
ātmaḥ kārāṇatvāna upādānāvena ca prakṛṣṭyate | smṛīti-balena pratya-
vatishṭhānānasya smṛīti-balena eva uttaram pravakṣhyāmi ity ato 'yam
anya-smṛīty-anavakāśa-doshopanāsaḥ | dārśāṁ tu śrutinām īśvara-
kārāṇa-vādam prati tātāparyyam | vypratipattau ca smṛītinām avaśya-
kartavye 'nyatara-parigrahe 'nyataraśyaḥ parityyāge cha śruti-anusārin-
yaḥ smṛītayaḥ prāmaṇam anapakṣhyāḥ itāraḥ | tad uktam prāmaṇa-lak-
ṣhāṇe "vīrodhe tu anapakṣham evad asati hy anumāṇām" iti (Mīmāṁsā
Sūtras i. 3, 3) | na ca atindriyān arthān śrutim atareṇa kaśchid upa-
labhate iti sākyaṁ sambhāveryitum nimittābhāvāt | sākyaṁ kapīlādīnāṁ
siddhānām apratihaṭa-jñānatevād iti chet | na | śiddhār api sāpekṣātvāt |
dharmānusūdaṇāpekṣāḥ hi śiddhīḥ sa ca dharmas chodāṇa-lakṣhaṇaḥ |
tattaḥ ca pūrva-siddhāyāḥ chodāṇāyaḥ artho na paśchima-siddha- 
puṣṭa-vachana-vāsena atisānktūṁ sākyaṁ | suddhāya-vapiṣṭraya-kalpanāyām api
balutvāt siddhānām pradarśitena prakāreṇa smṛīti-vipratipattau satyān
na śruti-vapiṣṭrayād anyā navidāya-kārāṇaṁ asti | para-tantra-prajñā-
ṣya api na akasmāt smṛīti-viśeṣa-viṣheyaḥ pakṣhapāto yuktāḥ | kasyaḥcit
kvachit tu pakṣhapāte sati puṣṭa-vati-vaiśvarūpyena tattvāvyasthāna-
prasangāt | tasmād tasya api smṛīti-vipratipaṭty-upanyasena śruta-anu-
sāranaṣubha-vivechanena ca san-mārge prajñā sangrahāṇīyā | Yā tu
śrutiḥ Kapīlasya jñānātisayaṁ darśayaṁ pradarśītā na tayo śruti-
viruddham api Kāpīlam mātāṁ śradhāhāṁ sākyaṁ "Kapīlam" iti
"śruti-sāmānya-mātratvād"103 anyasya ca Kapīlasya Sagara-putrānām
pratāpār Vāsudeva-nāmaṁ maṁśaṁ | anyārtha-darsanasya ca prāpriti-
vañāhitya asādhakātvaṁ | Bhavati cha anya Manor māhātyam prakṛyā-

103 Mīmāṁsā-sūtra i. 1, 31. See above, pp. 78 f.
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payanti krtitir. "yad vai kincha Manur avadat tad bhesaham" 184 iti | Manunā cha (xii, 91) "sarva-bhūteshu chātmānaṁ sarva-bhūtāni chāt-
manī | samam paśyann ātma-yājī svārājyam adhigachchhati" iti sarvāt-
mata-vārṣanam praśaṁsataḥ Kāpilaṁ mataṁ nindyate iti gamyate | Ka-
pilo hi na sarvātmatva-dārśanam anumanyate ātma-bhedābhikṣupagamāṁ |

... ataś cha ātma-bheda-kalpanayā 'pi Kāpilasya tantrasya vedā-
viruddhatvaṁ vedānusāri-Manu-vachana-viruddhatvaṁ cha na kevalāṁ svā-
tantra-prakṛiti-parikalpanayā evotī siddham | vedasya hi nirapekṣaṁ 
vārthe prāmāṇyaṁ ravor āva rūpa-vishayo purusha-vachasāṁ tu mūlān-
tarapekṣaṁ svārthe prāmāṇyaṁ vaktri-smṛiti-vyavahitaṁ cha iti vipra-
karṣaḥ | tasmād veda-viruddhe vishaye smṛity-anavakāśa-prasanga na 
dohāh |

"But now the second chapter is commenced with the view of effect-
ing the following objects, viz. (a) to refute, in our own favour, the 
charge of contradicting the reasonings of the Smṛti, to shew (b) that 
the doctrines regarding Pradhāna, etc., have nothing more than an 
appearance of reason, and (c) that the manner in which the subjects of 
creation, etc., are treated in each of the Upanishads is unimpeachable. 
First of all then the author states, and removes, the objection of con-
trariety to the Smṛti. Our opponents urge that it is incorrect to say 
that the omniscient Brahma is the cause of the world. Why? Because, 
(1) as they allege, that doctrine is chargeable with the objection of setting 
aside the Smṛti as useless' (Br. Sūtra, ii. 1, 1). This term 'Smṛti' denotes 
a systematic treatise (tantra) composed by an eminent rishi, and received 
by the learned; and there are other Smṛtis in conformity with it. And 
the alleged difficulty is that (on the theory that Brahma is the cause) all 
these would be set aside as useless; since they propound an unconscious 
Pradhāna as the self-dependent cause of the world. The Smṛtis of 
Manu and others, indeed, which affirm that by means of the agnihotra 
and other enjoined ceremonies, the objects desired (by those who practise 
these rites) will be accomplished, will still retain their use, viz. of pro-
scribing the objects to be pursued, viz. the various duties of the four 
castes and orders,—that such and such a caste shall be initiated at such 
a time and by such a process, and shall follow such and such a mode of 
life, that the Veda is to be studied, that the cessation of study is to 
take place, and that union with a woman following the same rites is to 

184 See above, p. 181, and the First Volume of this work, pp. 188, and 610.
celebrated, in such and such ways. But [on the hypothesis of Brahma being the creator] no such room is left for the Smṛitis of Kapila and others, on the ground of any ceremonies to be performed [in conformity with their prescriptions]; for they have been composed as embodying perfect systems affording the means of final liberation. If in this respect also no place be left for them the difficulty will arise that they are quite useless. And hence the conclusion is reached that the Upaniṣhads should be interpreted so as to harmonize with them. But, such being the case, how, it is again objected, have you determined on the strength of the reasons furnished by the texts about 'beholding,' etc., that it is the meaning of the Veda that Brahma is the omniscient cause of the world, thus exposing yourself to the charge of leaving no place for the Smṛiti? Although we hold that this charge is harmless as regards those who think for themselves; yet men have for the most part no independent opinion, and are unable by an unassisted act of their own judgment to determine the sense of the Vedas, and will consequently lean upon the Smṛitis composed by renowned authors, and adopt the sense of the Vedas which they enforce: and from their lofty opinion of these authors they will have no confidence in our interpretations. And it is moreover urged (2) that Kapila and the others are declared by the Smṛiti to have possessed an unobstructed intuitive (ārāha) knowledge; and there is also a Vedic text to the effect 'He who of old sustains with manifold knowledge Kapila when he is produced, and beholds him when born,' etc. (Svētāṣṭra. Up. v. 2). Consequently their doctrines cannot be imagined to be untrue. And they further support their tenets by argument. On these grounds also, it is urged, the Upanishads must be interpreted by the aid of the Smṛitis. The questions thus raised are settled by the concluding words of the Sūtra, 'No; for this conclusion is vitiated by the objection that other Smṛitis would in this way be rendered useless.' (1) If the doctrine that God is the cause of the world is chargeable with the objection that it leaves no room for the Smṛiti, in the same way the difficulty will arise (on the other theory) that other texts of the Smṛiti which affirm that God is the cause will be set aside. These we shall adduce." After quoting some passages, Sankara proceeds: "In the same manner in numerous texts of the Smṛiti God is shewn to be both the instrumental and the material cause. I must answer on the

166 See above, pp. 116, 118, and 127.
strength of the Smṛiti the person who opposes me on the same ground, and so I just indicate this objection against his views as having the effect of setting aside other Smṛitis. But it has been shown that the sense of the Vedic texts is in favour of the causality of God. And since, if the Smṛitis are at variance with each other, we must of necessity accept the one set and reject the other, those of them which are conformable to the Veda will be authoritative, and the rest will deserve no attention: for it has been said in the section (of the Pūrva Mimāṃsā) on proof (i. 3, 3), that 'if it (the Smṛiti) be contrary (to the Veda) it must be disregarded; but if there be no (contrariety) it must be in¬
ferred (that the former is founded on the latter).’ And it is inconceivable that anyone should discover things beyond the reach of the senses without the aid of the Veda, since the means of doing so are wanting. If it be urged that we can conceive such discovery (of imperceptible things without the help of the Veda) as possible in the case of Kapila and other perfect persons (siddhānām), because there was nothing to obstruct their knowledge;—we reply, No; because perfection (siddhi) is dependent upon something else, viz. on the practice of duty. Now duty is defined as something which is enjoined. And the subject-matter of an injunction which was previously promulgated cannot be called into doubt on the strength of the words of a man who became perfect at a subsequent period. And even on the supposition that confidence could be placed in such ‘perfect’ persons, yet, as they are numerous, and as such a mutual contradiction as we have already pointed out exists between the Smṛitis of different ‘perfect’ persons, there is no means left of determining the truth, but reliance on the Veda. Causeless partiality to any particular Smṛiti, on the part even of a man who has no independent opinion, is improper; but if anyone ever does exhibit such partiality, the charge of depriving truth of all fixity attaches to his procedure, because the opinions of men (which he takes as the standard of his belief) assume all sorts of forms. Consequently his judgment also should be directed into the right path by indicating the mutual contradictions between the different Smṛitis, and by distinguishing those of them which are conformable to, from those which are at variance with, the Veda. And (2) the Vedic text which has been pointed out, showing the transcendent character of Kapila’s knowledge, cannot be a warrant for believing the doctrine of Kapila, though con-
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trary to the Veda, since the word Kapila ‘has, in this text, a general sense’ [applicable to others besides the author of the Sāṅkhya] (Mīm. Sūtra, i. 1, 31), and another Kapila called Vāsudeva, the consumer of Sagara’s sons, is also mentioned in the Smṛiti; and since the indication of something which has a different object in view, and is therefore irrelevant to the matter in question, can prove nothing.106 There is, besides, another text of the Veda which sets forth the eminent dignity of Manu in these terms, ‘Whatever Manu said is medicine.’107 And Manu—when he employs the words (xii. 91), ‘He who, with impartial eye, beholds himself in all beings, and all beings in himself, thus sacrificing his own personality, attains to self-refulgence;’ and, by saying this commends the tenet that everything is one with the supreme Spirit—must be understood as censuring Kapila’s doctrine. For Kapila does not assent to the identity of Brahma and the universe, since he holds a diversity of souls.” . . . (After quoting one passage from the Mahābhārata, and another from the Veda, to prove that Kapila is wrong, Sankara proceeds): “Hence it is proved that Kapila’s system is at variance with the Veda and with the words of Manu, who follows the Veda, not only in supposing an independent Prakṛti (nature), but also in supposing a diversity of souls. Now the Veda has an independent authority in regard to its own contents, as the sun has (an inherent power) of manifesting forms; whilst the words of men have, as regards their own sense, an authority which is dependent on another source (the Veda), and which is distinguished (from the authority of the Veda) by the fact of their authors being remembered. Consequently it forms no objection to a doctrine that it sets aside a Smṛiti on a point which is contrary to the Veda.”

106 The words thus translated are explained as follows in the Gloss of Govinda Ananda: Kīnca “yāḥ Kapilam iṣunāir bhārati tām iṣvaram paśyey” iti vidhiyate tathā cha anyārthasya iṣvāra-pratipatti-śekhasya Kapila-sarovatavasya dārānam anuvādas tasya mūnāntaraṃ prāpti-sūnyasya svārtha-sādhakatvāyogād na amūdāmaṭrūd sarveṣvatā-vācchāt śy āhā | And it is enjoined (in the text of the Svetāśvatara Upānishad): ‘Let him behold that Īśvara who nourishes Kapila with various knowledge;’ and so since this ‘indication’ of this reference to, the omniscience of Kapila, which has another object in view, and ends in the establishment of an Īśvara, and which on other grounds is shown to be irrelevant, cannot prove its own meaning, —this mere reference does not suffice to evince Kapila’s omniscience.—This is what Sankara means to say.”

107 See the First Volume of this work, pp. 186 and 510.
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See also Sankara’s commentary on the Taittiriya Upanishad, Bib. Ind. vii. pp. 136, 137, where he says:

Kapila-kānāḍāḥ-tarka-sāstra-virodhaḥ iti chet | na | teṣāṁ māla-
bhāve veda-virodhe cha bhrāntyopapatteḥ |

“If it be objected that this is contrary to the rationalistic doctrines of Kapila and Kaṇāḍa [and therefore wrong], I answer no, since these doctrines are proved to be erroneous, as having no foundation, and as being in opposition to the Veda.”

His remarks on a passage of the Praśna Upanishad, which are as follows, afford a curious specimen of the contemptuous manner in which this orthodox Vedāntist treats the heretical Sāṅkhya, etc. (Praśna Up. vi. 4; Bib. Ind. viii. 244):

Sāṅkhyaś tu avidyādhyāropitam eva purusā karttritvarāh kriyā-kāra-
kanā phalaṁ cha iti kalpayitvā agama-vāhyatvā punas tatas tasyantaṁ
paramārthatahaṁ eva bhoktritvam purushasya icchahanti | tattvāntaraṁ cha
pradhānam purushāt paramārthā-vastu-bhūtam eva kalpayantu ’nya-tār-
kiyā-kṛita-buddhi-vishayāḥ santo vihanyante | Tathā itare tārkākāḥ sān-
khyaṁ ity evam paraspara-viruddhārtha-kalpanātāḥ amishārthāṁ īva
prāṇino ’nyonyāṁ viruddhānāṁ artha-dārśītāṁ paramārthā-tatteḥ
tad-dārām eva apakṛishyante | atas tan-matam anādṛtya vedāntārtha-
tattvāṁ ekata-dārśānam prati ādāravantō munukṣhāṇāḥ syur iti tārkī-
kate dosha-dārśanaṁ kṣipchid uchyate ’sūmbhir na tu tārkīkā-tātparyyena |

“The followers of the Sāṅkhya imagine that the functions of action, and the enjoyment of reward which causes action, become erroneously attributed to the soul (purusha) in consequence of supervening ignorance; but as this doctrine differs from that of Scripture, they become afraid of it, and seek to ascribe to the soul enjoyment in the proper sense. And supposing another principle distinct from soul, viz. Pradhāna (or na-
ture), which they regard as substance in the proper sense, they become the objects of correction by other rationalists, and are crushed. Thus, in consequence of the contrariety between the conceptions of the Sāṅ-
khya and those of other freethinkers, the two parties quarrel with
each other like animals fighting for flesh; and thus, from their having
an (exclusive) regard to (their own) views, they are all drawn away
to a distance from the essential truth. Wherefore let men, disregarding
their tenets, seek for final liberation by paying honour to the principles
of the Vedantic doctrine, which maintains the unity of all being.”

We
have thus pointed out something of the errors of the rationalists, and
have said nothing in accordance with their views."

IV.—In thus depreciating Kapila, Sankara is in direct opposition to
the Bhagavata Purana (which, however, may be a work of later date
than his\textsuperscript{168}), in which the author of the Sankhya is spoken of with
the greatest reverence. Thus in Bhag. Pur. i. 3, 10, he is described as
the fifth incarnation of Vishnu:

\begin{quote}
Pancahama Kapilo nāma siddheśaḥ kāla-viplutam \textit{\provaraḥ}
sānkhyāṁ tattva-grāma-viśrīrayam \textit{\provaraḥ}
\end{quote}

"In his fifth manifestation, he [in the form of] Kapila, and lord of
saints, declared to Asuri the Sankhya which defines the series of prin-
ciples, and which had been lost through the lapse of time."

And again, in Bhag. Pur. ix. 8, 12, 13, Kapila is made the subject
of eulogy. A legend narrates that the sixty thousand sons of king
Sagara, conceiving Kapila to be the robber of a horse which had been
carried away from their sacrifice, advanced to slay him, when they
were burnt up by fire issuing from his body. The author of the
Purana, however, denies that this was in any degree owing to passion
on the part of the sage:

\begin{quote}
Na sādhu-vādo muni-kopa-bhājitaḥ nripendra-putraḥ iti sattva-dhā-
manī \textit{\pragra} kathāṁ tamo roshamayaṁ vibhāvyate jagat-pavitratimani khe rajo
bhūvaḥ \textit{\pragra} yasyerītā sānkhyamayi drīḍhaka naur yai mumukṣhus tarata
duratyayam \textit{\pragra} bhavārvanaṁ mṛityu-pathāṁ vipaścitaḥ parātma-bhūtasya
kathāṁ pṛithuṁmatiḥ \textit{\pragra}
\end{quote}

"It is not an assertion befitting a good man to say that the king's
sons were burnt up by the wrath of the sage; for how is it conceivable
that the darkness (tamas) of anger, should reside in the abode of good-
ness (sattva), or that the dust (or passion, rajas) of the earth should
ascend into the sky, the region of purity? How could that sage, one
with the supreme Spirit, by whom the strong ship of the Sankhya was
launched, on which the man seeking emancipation crosses the ocean
of existence, hard to be traversed, and leading to death,—how could he
entertain the idea of any distinction between himself and others [and
so treat any one as an enemy]?"

It is not necessary for me to quote any further passages in praise of
the author of the Sankhya. There is a great deal about this system.

\textsuperscript{168} See Wilson's Vish. Pur., preface, pp. xlv. and li.
in the Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, verses 11,037 ff. See Colebrooke's Essays, i. 236 (p. 149 of Williams and Norgate's ed.); Wilson's Viṣṇu Purāṇa, pref. p. xciv. and text, pp. 18 ff. with notes; Bhāgavata Purāṇa, iii. chapters 24–30; Weber's Ind. Stud. passim; Dr. Röer's Introduction to Śvetāsvatara Upanishad, Bibl. Ind. xv. 35 ff.; and Dr. Hall's preface to the Sāṃkhya-sāra in the Bibl. Ind. p. 19, note.

We have thus seen that a distinct line of demarcation is drawn by the most accurate and critical of the Indian writers, between the Sruti, which they define to be superhuman and independent, and the Smṛiti, which they regard as of human origin, and as dependent for its authority on its conformity with the Sruti. Sāṅkara, indeed, as we have also observed (above, p. 183 f.), goes very nearly, if not altogether, so far as to assign an independent foundation to the Smṛitis; but he confines this distinction to such of these works as coincide in doctrine with the Sruti or Veda, according to his own Vedāntic interpretation of its principles, while all other speculators are denounced by him as heterodox. It is, however, clear from the Śvetāsvatara Upanishad, the Mahābhārata, the Bhagavad Gītā, the Viṣṇu, and the Bhāgavata Purāṇas, etc., that the doctrines of the Sāṃkhya must have been very prevalent in ancient times, and that Sāṅkara, when he condemned them as erroneous, must have done so in the face of many powerful opponents.169

169 I quote the following passage from Dr. Röer's Introduction to the Śvetāsvatara Upanishad, pp. 36 f.: "At the time of the composition of the Śvetāsvatara, the Sāṃkhya was not a new system, which had to overcome the resistance of old received opinions, and the prejudices of men in power, whose interest might be opposed to the introduction of a doctrine by which their authority could be questioned. It had found many adherents; it was the doctrine of Manu, of some parts of the Mahābhārata, and to its founder divine honour had been assigned by general consent. It was a doctrine whose argumentative portion demanded respect, and as it was admitted by many Brāhmans (sic), distinguished for their knowledge of the Vedas, it could not be treated as a heresy. The most learned and eminent of the Brāhmans were evidently divided among themselves with reference to the truth of the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta, and this must have afforded to the opponent of the Vedaic system a most powerful weapon for attacking the Vedas themselves. If both the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta are divine revelations, both must be true; but if the doctrine of the one is true, the doctrine of the other is wrong; for they are contradictory among themselves. Further, if both are derived from the Vedas, it is evident that also the latter cannot reveal the truth, because they would teach opposite opinions about one and the same point. Such objections to the Vedas had been made already in ancient times, as is clear from the Upanishads, from several passages of Manu, from Yūṣa, etc.; and under these circumstances it cannot be wondered at, if early attempts were made to reconcile the
It is not necessary for me here to inquire with any accuracy what the relation was in which the different philosophical systems stood to each other in former ages. It may suffice to say that the more thorough-going adherents of each—of the Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya, etc.—must, according to all appearance, have maintained their respective principles with the utmost earnestness and tenacity, and could not have admitted that any of the rival systems was superior to their own in any particular. It is impossible to study the Śūtras of the several schools, and come to any other conclusion. The more popular systems of the Purāṇas, on the other hand, blended various tenets of the different systems syncretically together. In modern times the superior orthodoxy of the Vedānta seems to be generally admitted. But even some who hold this opinion refuse to follow the example of Śankara in denouncing the founders of the rival schools as heretical. On the contrary, they regard them all as inspired Munis, who, by adapting their doctrines to the capacities or tendencies of different students, have paved the way for the ultimate reception of the Vedāntic system. Such is the view taken in the Prasthāna-bhedā of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who gives the following lucid summary of the leading principles of the different schools of speculation (Weber's Indische Studien, i. 23):

Sarveśhāṃ cha sankshepeṇa trīvidhaḥ eva prascīrāṇa-bhedāḥ | tatra ārambha-vādāḥ ekāḥ | pariṇāma-vādō dvitiyaḥ | vivartta-vādās tṛitiyaḥ |

pārthivāpya-tajjasa-vāyaviyāḥ chaturbanvāḥ paramāṇava dvī-ayukādi-kramena brahmāṇa-paryantaṁ jagad ārembhante | asad eva kārṇyaṁ kāraka-vyāpārād utpadyate iti prathamaṁ tārīkāṇām mīmāṃsā-kāṇāṁ cha | satteva-rājas-tamo-guṇātmakam pradhānam eva mahad-ahankārādi-kramena jagad-ākāreṇa pariṇamate | pūrvam api sūkṣma-rūpena sad eva kārṇyaṁ kārana-vyāpārāṇa abhihīvajyate iti dvitiyaḥ pakṣaḥ Sāṅkhya-Yoga-Pātanjalī-Pāśupatānām | Brahmaṇaḥ pariṇāmo jagad iti Vaishnavānām | svā-prakāśa-paramāṇanda-duśtyayam Brahme eva-māyā-vasād mithyāva jagad-ākāreṇa kalpate iti tṛitiyaḥ pakṣho

tenets of the Vedānta and Śankhya to save the uniformity of the doctrine, and thereby the sacredness of the Vedas as the Scriptures derived from the immediate revelation of God. So, for instance, it is recorded that Vyāsa, the reputed author of the Brāhma Śūtras, wrote also a commentary to Pātanjali’s Yoga-sūtra, which is still extant under his name. In the same manner composed Gaudapāda, the eminent Vedāntist, and teacher of Śankara’s teacher, Govinda, a commentary to Īśvara Kṛṣṇa’s Sāṅkhya Kārikā; and the Bhagavad Gītā has also the same object."
Brahma-vādīnām | sarvēkhaṃ prasthānā-kartāryāṃ munināṃ vivartta-vāda-paravasāsāna eva advitīya Paramēśvare eva pratipāde tātparyam | na hi te munayo bhrāntaḥ sarvajnataḥ teshām | kintu vahir-vidvāya-pravatānām āpātātoḥ purushārtho pārveṣo na sambhavitā iti nāsti-ka-vāra-nāya taśc prakāra-bhedāḥ pradarśītaḥ | tatra teshām tātparyam abuddhā veda-viruddhe 'py arthe tātparyam utprekshāmanās tan-matam eva upādeyatvena γríaṇanto janāḥ nānā-patha-jusho bhavanti | iti sarvam anavadyam |

"The difference in principle between these various schools is, when briefly stated, three-fold. The first doctrine is that of a commencement of the world; the second is that of an evolution; the third is that of an illusion. Atoms of four descriptions—earthy, aqueous, igneous, and aerial—beginning with compounds of two atoms, and ending in the egg of Brahmā (the world), originate the universe: and effects, previously non-existent, come into being from the action of a cause. This is the first theory, that of the Logicians and Mimāṃsakas. The second theory, that of the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pāṇṭañjala, and Pāṣupata, is that Pradhāna (or Prakṛiti = nature), consisting of the three guṇas (qualities), sattva, rajas, and tamas, is evolved, through the successive stages of mahat (intellect), and ahankāra (consciousness), etc., in the form of the world; and that effects, which had previously existed in a subtle form, are [merely] manifested by the action of their cause. Another form of this theory is that of the Vaishnavas [the Rāmānujas], who hold the universe to be an evolution of Brahma. The third view, that of the Brahma-vādins (Vedāntists), is, that Brahma, the self-resplendent, the supremely happy, and the one sole essence, assumes, unreally, the form of the world through the influence of his own illusion (Māyā).

The ultimate scope of all the Munis, authors of these different systems, is to support the theory of illusion, and their only design is to establish the existence of one Supreme God, the sole essence; for these Munis could not be mistaken [as some of them must have been, if they were not all of one opinion, or, as those of them must have been who did not hold Vedāntic principles], since they were omniscient. But as they saw that men, addicted to the pursuit of external objects, could not all at once penetrate into the highest truth, they held out to them a variety of theories, in order that they might not fall into atheism. Misunderstanding the object which the Munis thus had in view, and
representing that they even designed to propound doctrines contrary to the Vedas, men have come to regard the specific doctrines of these several schools with preference, and thus become adherents of a variety of systems. Thus all has been satisfactorily stated."

I find that Vijnana Bhikshu, the commentator on the Sankhya aphorisms, takes very nearly the same view as is here quoted from Madhavasudana Sarasvati, in regard to the superiority of the Brahma Mimansa or Vedanta over the other Darshanas.

In his Sankhya-pravachana-bhashya (Bibliotheca Indica, pp. 3 ff.), he thus writes:

**Svad etat | Nyaya-vaiseshikabyam atra avirodho bhavatu | brahma-mimansa-yogabyam tu virodho 'sty eva | tabhyam nityesvara-sadhanaat | atra cha Ikvrasya pratishtidyamanaate'tat | na cha atra api vyavaharika-pramarthika-bhedena eswara-niristvara-vadaya avirodho 'stu eswara-vadasya upasana-paratvam-sambhavad iti vachya | vinigamakambhavat | iti varo hi durjneyah iti niristvaravam api loka-vyavahara-siddham aishvarya-vairagyya anuvaditum sakythe utmanah saugnatavam iva | na tu kruapi shrut-adav iśvarah sphetum pratishtidyate yena eswara-vadasyavai vyavaharika-tejam avadharyeta iti | atra uchya | atra api vyavaharika-pramarthika-bhavo bhavati | "asatyam apratishtham te jagad adhur anisvaram" ityadi-sastrair niristvara-vadasya niditvat | asminna sastra vyavaharikasyaiva pratishtedhasya aisva.yya-vairagyyadyartham anuvadatuvauchyit | yadi hi laukyayatikat-matamasaurena nitya-svayyam na pratishtidyeta tadaparipurna-nitya-nirdoshaisvarya-darsanena tatras chhutasate virodhakhyasa-pratibandhaḥ syad iti sankaḥcharyyaśnam āśayaḥ | eswara-vadasya na kruapi nindatikam asti yena upasannad-paratayā tat śastrāṁ sankhyaḥyeta | yat tu "nasti sankaḥśamaṁ jnanaṁ nasti yoga-samam balam | atra vah samaśayo mā bhūj jnanaṁ sankaḥ param smritam" ityadi vākyam tad-vivekānāmo eva sankaḥ-jnanaṁ darśanaṁ trebyaḥ utkṛṣṭah pratispādayati na tu iva-pratishtedhamśe 'pi | tatha Parāśarāy-akhilasāvadād api eswara-vadasyaiva prāmarthikatejena avadharyate | api cha "Akhāpadā-praṇīte cha Kānade śankaḥyogayoh | tāyayā śrutī-viruddho 'ṁśah śrutī-eka-saranair nri-bhiḥ | Jaiminīye cha Fāyayey viruddhāmnā na keshana | śrutīya veda.ṁāvinaṁ śrutī-paṛamaṁ gatau hi tāv" iti Parāśaropapunādibhyo 'pi brahma-mimansaśyāḥ tīvarāṁte balavatve | yatha | "nyaya-tantrāṁ anekāṁ tais tair uktāṁ vādibhiḥ | hetu-āgama-sadācāraṁ yad yuktāṁ"

"Be it so: let there be here no discrepancy with the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika. But it will be said that the Sāṅkhya is really opposed to the Brahma-mimāṃsā (the Vedānta) and the Yoga (of Patanjali); since both of these systems assert an eternal Īśvara (God), while the Sāṅkhya denies such an Īśvara. And it must not be said (the same persons urge) that here also [as in the former case of the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika], owing to the distinction between practical [or conventional, or regulative] and essential truths, there may be no [real] contrariety between the theistic and the atheistic theories, inasmuch as the theistic theory may possibly have a view to devotion [and may therefore have nothing more than a practical end in view];—you are not, it will be said, to assert this, as there is nothing to lead to this conclusion [or, distinction]. For as Īśvara is difficult to be known, the atheistic theory also, which is founded on popular opinion, may, indeed, be adverted to for the purpose of inspiring indifference to the conception of a Deity,
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(Just as it is [conventionally] asserted that soul has qualities); but neither the Veda, nor any other sāstra contains "distinct denial of an Īśvara, by which the merely practical [or conventional] character of the theistic theory could be shewn. [Consequently the theistic theory is not a mere conventional one, but true, and the contradiction between the atheistic Sānkhya and the theistic systems is real and irreconcilable].

"To this we reply: in this case also the distinction of practical and essential truths holds. For although the atheistic theory is censured by such texts as the following: 'They declare a world without an Īśvara to be false and baseless; yet it was proper that in this system (the Sānkhya), the merely practical (or conventional) denial [of Īśvara] should be inculcated for the purpose of inspiring indifference to the conception of a Deity, and so forth. Because the idea of the author of the Sānkhya was this, that if the existence of an eternal Īśvara were not denied, in conformity with the doctrine of the Laukāyatikas, men would be prevented by the contemplation of a perfect, eternal, and faultless godhead, and by fixing their hearts upon it, from studying to discriminate [between spirit and matter]. But no censure on the theistic theory is to be found in any work, whereby [the scope of] that system might be restricted, as having devotion, etc., in view as its only end. And as regards such texts as the following: 'There is no knowledge like the Sānkhya, no power like the Yoga; doubt not of this, the knowledge of the Sānkhya is considered to be the highest,' they [are to be understood as] proving the superiority of the Sānkhya doctrine over other systems, not in respect of its atheism, but only of its discrimination [between different principles]. It is, moreover, established by the concurrence of Parāśara, and all other well instructed persons, that the theistic theory is that which represents the essential truth. Further, such texts as the following of the Parāśara Upapurāṇa, and other works, shew that the strength of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā lies on the side of its theism, viz., 'In the systems of Akshapāda (Gotama) and Kaṇḍāda, and in the Sānkhya and Yoga, that part which is opposed to the Veda should be rejected by all persons who regard the Veda as the sole authority. In the systems of Jaimini and Vyāsa (the Vedānta) there is no portion contrary to the Veda, since both these sages have attained to a perfect comprehension of its true meaning. In the same way it results from this text of the Moksha-dharma (a part of the
Sānti-parvan of the Mahābhārata, viz.: ‘Many systems of reasoning have been promulgated by different authors; [in these] whatever is established on grounds of reason, of scripture and of approved custom, is to be respected;’ [from this text also, I say, it results] that the theory,—declared in the Brahma-mīmāṃsā, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeshika, etc., in consonance with the tradition of Parāśara and all other well-instructed men,—which asserts an Īśvara, is alone to be received, in consequence of its strength; and [the same thing follows] from the fact that in such passages as this of the Kaurma-purāṇa, etc., viz.—‘Take refuge with that Mahēśvara, that Brahma without beginning or end, whom the most eminent Yogins, and the Sāṅkhyaśas do not behold,’—Nārāyaṇa (Vishṇu) and others assert that the Sāṅkhyaśas are ignorant of Īśvara.

‘Moreover, Īśvara is determined to be the principal subject of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā by the introductory statement, etc., of that system. If it were open to objection on that side [i.e. on the side of its principal subject], the entire system would be without authority. For it is a rule that ‘the sense of a word is that which it is intended to denote.’ Whereas the principal subjects of the Sāṅkhya are—(1) the grand object of human pursuit, and (2) the distinction between nature (prakṛti) and spirit (purusha), which is the instrument of attaining that grand object. Thus this system does not lose its authority, even though it be erroneous in so far as it denies an Īśvara. For it is a rule that ‘the sense of a word is that which it is intended to denote.’ Hence, as the Sāṅkhya has a certain applicability of its own, it is weak only in so far as it denies an Īśvara.

‘Nor can it be alleged that it is Īśvara only, and not the eternity of his existence, that is the principal subject of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā; since, through the disproof of the objection (purva-pakṣa) that the theistic theory ‘is chargeable with the defect of rendering the Smṛiti inapplicable,’ it is ascertained that the assertion of an eternal Īśvara is the main object of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā. But as the word ‘Brahma’ is properly employed to denote the supreme Brahma, the first aphorism of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā does not run thus, ‘Now follows the enquiry regarding the supreme Brahma;’ [but thus, ‘Now follows the

170 The aphorism here referred to (Brahma Sūtras ii. 1, 1), with most of Sāṅkara’s comment on it, has been already quoted above, pp. 185 ff.
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enquiry regarding Brahma.’) Hence we are not to surmise that, as they [would otherwise] contradict the Sâṅkhya, the Brahma-mîmâṁsâ and Yoga systems must aim at establishing [not an eternal Deity] but a [secondary] Īśvara, who is merely an effect. For this is disproved (1) by the series of Brahma Sûtras (ii. 2, 1 ff.) which affirm that ‘an unintelligent cause of the world cannot be inferred, as it is not conceivable that such a cause should frame anything,’ and which would be rendered inconclusive by the assumption of the independent action of Prakriti; and (2) by the fact that the eternity of God is clearly understood from the Yoga aphorism [i. 26], viz. ‘He is also the instructor of the ancients, as he is not circumscribed by time,’ as well as from the commentary of Vyāsa thereon. Hence, as the Sâṅkhya, arguing on its own special principles, and at the same time making a great display of ingenuity and so forth, has in view a merely practical denial of an Īśvara, it does not contradict the Brahma-mîmâṁsâ or the Yoga. The method of reasoning on special principles is referred to in the Sâstra. Thus it is said in the Vishnu Purâṇa [i. 17, 54, Wilson, vol. ii. p. 44], ‘These notions, Daityas, which I have described, are the guesses of persons who look on the Deity as distinct from themselves. Accepting them as partially correct, hear from me a summary (of transcendental truth).

‘Or let it be [supposed] that even orthodox systems, with the view of preventing sinners from attaining knowledge, lay down doctrines which are partially opposed to the Veda; and that in those particular portions they are not authoritative. Still in their principal contents,

171 I quote the commentary of Bhọja-rāja on this Sûtra, as given by Dr. Ballantyne (Aphorisms of the Yoga, part first, p. 32): Püreshhām | ādyānām Brahmādvīnām api sa guru upadēshā yataḥ sa kūlana navachchhidyate anvāritā tēshām punar ādi-mattvād āsti kūlana avachchhedāḥ [ ‘Of the ancients, that is, of the earliest [beings], Brahmā and the rest, he is the guru, i.e., the instructor, because He, as having no beginning, is not circumscribed by time; while they, on the other hand, having had a beginning, are circumscribed by time.’

172 I am indebted to Professor Cowell for a satisfactory interpretation of the first of these two phrases, abhyupagama-vāda and prauḍhi-vāda, as well as for various other improvements in my translation of this passage. The phrase abhyupagama-siddhānta is rendered by Dr. Ballantyne ‘Implied dogma’ (Nyāya aphorisms, i. 31, p. 30, as corrected in MS.). Professor Goldstücker e.v. renders it by ‘implied axiom.’ In Böhtlingk and Roth’s Lexicon the phrase abhyupagama-vāda is rendered ‘a discussion in a conciliatory spirit.’ In regard to the sense of prauḍhi-vāda see above, p. 172.
which are consonant to the Sruti and the Smṛiti, they possess authority. Accordingly, in the Padma Purāṇa we find a censure passed even upon the several philosophical systems (Darśanas), with the exception of the Brahma (the Vedānta) and the Yoga. For in that work Īśvara (Mahādeva) says to Pārvati, 'Listen, goddess, while I declare to you the Tāmasa works (the works characterised by tāmas, or the quality of darkness) in order; works by the mere hearing of which even wise men become fallen. First of all, the Saiva systems, called Pāśupata, etc., were delivered by myself. Then the following were uttered by Brāhmans penetrated by my power, viz. the great Vaiśeshika system by Kaṇāda, and the Nyāya, and Sāṅkhya, by Gotama and Kapila respectively. Then the great system, the Pūrva-[mīmāṃsā], was composed by the Brāhman Jaimini on Vedic subjects, but on atheistic principles. So too the abominable Chārvāka doctrine was declared by Dhīshaq, while Vishṇu, in the form of Buddha, with a view to the destruction of the Daityas, promulgated the false system of the Baudhāṇkas, who go about naked, or wear blue garments. I myself, goddess, assuming the form of a Brāhman, uttered in the Kali age, the false doctrine of Māyā [illusion, the more modern form of the Vedānta], which is covert Buddhism, which imputes a converted and generally censured signification to the words of the Veda, and inculcates the abandonment of ceremonial works, and an inactivity consequent on such cessation. In that system I propound the identity of the supreme and the embodied soul, and show that the highest form of this Brahma is that in which he is devoid of the [three] qualities. It was I myself, goddess, by whom this great sāstra, which, composed of Vedic materials and inculcating the theory of illusion, is yet un-Vedic, was declared in the Kali age for the destruction of this entire universe. We have entered into fuller explanations on this subject in the Brahma-mīmāṃsābhaṣya. There is, therefore, no want of authority, nor any contradiction, in any orthodox system, for they are all incapable of refutation in their own especial subjects, and are not mutually discrepant. Does, then, this system (the Sāṅkhya) lay down a theory based only on its own assumptions in respect of the multitude of souls also? It does not. For in the Brahma-mīmāṃsā also it is determined by such a kind of texts

172 A name of Viśhaspati, according to Wilson’s dictionary.
173 See Wilson’s Viṣṇu Purāṇa, pp. 334 ff.
as the following (Brahma Sūtras, ii. 3, 43), viz. 'the embodied spirit is a portion' of the supreme soul, from the variety of appellations,' that there is a multitude of embodied spirits. But it is denied by the Brahmanimānsā that the spirits (purusha) asserted by the Sāṅkhya have the character of Soul; for it is determined by the Brahma Sūtra (iv. 1, 3), 'they approach Him as one with themselves,' that, on the ground of transcendental truth, the supreme Soul alone has the character of Soul. But, nevertheless, the Sāṅkhya is not unauthoritative; for as the knowledge of its own distinctness from other things, obtained by the embodied spirit in its worldly condition, is instrumental to final liberation, this system is not erroneous in the particular subject matter which it aims at propounding. In this way it results from the distinction of practical and real, that there is no contradiction between the two theories (made known by the Sruti and Smṛiti), of a multitude of souls, and the unity of all soul.

The view taken by Madhusūdana, as quoted above, and partially confirmed by Vijnāna Bhikshu, of the ultimate coincidence in principle of all the different schools of Hindu philosophy, however mutually hostile in appearance, seems, as I have remarked, to be that which is commonly entertained by modern Pandits. (See Dr. Ballantyne's Synopsis of Science, advertisement, p. iv.) This system of compromise, however, is clearly a deviation from the older doctrine; and it practically abolishes the distinction in point of authority between the Vedas and the Smṛitis, Darśanas, etc. For if the Munis, authors of the six Darśanas, were omniscient and infallible, they must stand on the same level with the Vedas, which can be nothing more.

I return, however, from this digression regarding the hostility of Sankara to the adherents of the Sāṅkhya and other rationalistic schools

175 On this, however, Sankara (in loco) remarks as follows: Jīvaḥ Īśvarasya aṁśo bhavītum arhati yathā' gner visphulingaḥ | aṁśaḥ iva aṁśaḥ | na hi niravayavasya mu-khyo 'ṁśaḥ sambhavati | kasmāt punar niravayavatenaḥ sa eva na bhavati | "nānā- vyapadeśāt | "The embodied soul must be 'a portion' of Īśvara, as a spark is of fire (and not merely dependent upon him as a servant on his master). 'A portion' means, 'as it were a portion;' for nothing can be, in the proper sense, 'a portion' of that which has no parts. Why, then, as Īśvara has no parts, is not the embodied soul the very same as he? 'From the variety of appellations,' etc., etc.'

176 The original Sūtra runs thus: Ātmā iti tu upagachchhanti grahayanti cha | "They approach Him as one with themselves, and [certain texts] cause them to receive Him as one with themselves." This refers to certain texts which Sankara adduces from one of the Upanishads, apparently.
and the opinions of later authors concerning the founders of those several systems. The distinction drawn by the Indian commentators quoted in this section between the superhuman Veda and its human appendages, the Kalpa Sūtras, etc., as well as the other Smṛitis, is not borne out by the texts which I have cited above (pp. 8, 31) from the Brhad Āraṇyaka (= Satapatha Brāhmaṇa), and Muṇḍaka Upanishads. By classing together the Vedic Sanhitās, and the other works enumerated in the same passages, the authors of both the Upanishads seem to place them all upon an equal footing; and the former of the two authorities speaks of them all as having proceeded from the breathing of the Great Being. If the one set of works are superhuman, it may fairly be argued that the others are so likewise. According to the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, neither of them (if we except only the Vedāntas or Upanishads) can be placed in the highest rank, as they equally inculcate a science which is only of secondary importance.

As, however, Sankara (who, no doubt, perceived that it would be inconsistent with modern theories to admit that any of the works usually classed under the head of Smṛiti had been really breathed forth by the Creator, and that such a directly divine origin could, on orthodox principles, be assigned only to writings coming under the designation of Śrutī), maintains in his comment on the text of the Brhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad that the whole of the works there enumerated, excepting the Sanhitās of the four Vedas, are in reality portions of the Brāhmaṇas, it will be necessary to quote his remarks, which are as follows (Bibl. Ind. ii. 855 ff.):

... Niṣvasitam iva niṣvasitam | yathā aprayatnenaiva puruṣa-niśvāso bhavaty evāṁ vā | are kim tad niṣvasitam tato jātam ity uchyate | Yād pīgavo yajurvedah sāmadev Ềtharvagrīvasah chaturvidham mantra-jātam | itihāsaḥ ity Ûrvasī-Purānavasā sarvādādīr “Urvasī ha aṣparāḥ” ityādi-bṛāhmaṇam eva | purāṇam “aṣad vā idam agre aṣad” ityādi | vidyā devajana-vidyā “vedaḥ so yam” ityādiḥ | upanishadāḥ “priyam ity etad upāṣita” ityādyāḥ | ślokaḥ “brāhmaṇa-prabhavāḥ mantras tad ete ślokaḥ” ity adayaḥ | sūtrāṇi vastu-sangraha-vākyāni vedo yathā “ātmā ity eva upāṣita” ityādīni | anuwākhyānāni mantra-vivaraṇāni | eva yākhyānāni arthāvādāḥ | ... evam asḥāvidham brāhmaṇam | evam mantra-brāhmaṇayor eva grahaṇam | niyata-rachanāvato vidyamānasayīva vedasya abhivyaktiḥ puruṣa-niśvāsa-vat | na cha puruṣa-Buddhi-prayatna-pūr-
vakāḥ | ataḥ pramāṇam nīrāpekṣaḥ eva svārthe | ... tena vedasya
aprāmāṇyam āśāṅkate | tad-āśāṅka-nīvṛitty-arthat idam uktam | puruṣa-naśvāsa-vad aprayaṇotthitatavāt pramāṇam veda na yathā 'nyo gran-
thaḥ iti |

"His breathing' means, 'as it were, his breathing,' or it denotes the
absence of effort, as in the case of a man's breathing. We are now
told what that breathing was which was produced from him. It was
the four classes of mantras (hymns), those of the Rīch, Yajush, Sāman
and Atharvāngirasas (Ātharvaṇa); Itihāsa (or narrative), such as the
dialogue between Urvāṣī and Purūravas, viz. the passage in the Brāh-
maṇa beginning 'Urvāṣī the Apsaras,' etc. [S. P. Br. p. 855]; Purāṇa,
such as, 'This was originally non-existent,' etc.; Vidyā (knowledge),
the knowledge of the gods, as, 'This is the Veda,' etc.; Upanishādās,
such as, 'Let him reverence this, as beloved,' etc.; Ślokas, such as
those here mentioned, 'The mantras are the sources of the Brāhmaṇas,
on which subject there are these ślokas,' etc.; Sūtras (aphorisms) oc-
curring in the Veda which condense the substance of doctrines, as,
'Let him adore this as Soul,' etc.; Anuvyākhyānas, or interpretations
of the mantras; Vyakhyānas, or illustrative remarks.' The commen-
tator adds alternative explanations of the two last terms, and then pro-
ceeds: "Here, therefore, eight sorts of texts occurring in the Brāhmaṇas
are referred to; and consequently the passage before us embraces merely
mantras and Brāhmaṇas. The manifestation of the Veda, which already
existed in a fixed form of composition, is compared to the breathing of
a person. The Veda was not the result of an effort of the intelligence
of any person.277 Consequently, as proof in respect of its own contents,
it is independent of everything else."

Sankara terminates his remarks on this passage by intimating, as
one supposition, that the author of the Upanishad means, in the words

277 Compare S'ankara's Comment on Brāhma Sūtra, i. 1, 3, as quoted above in
p. 106, where this same text of the Brāh. Ar. Up. is referred to. As the fact of
Brahma being the author of the Vedas is there adduced to prove the transcendent
character of his knowledge, and of his power, we must, apparently (unless we are to
charge the great commentator with laying down inconsistent doctrines in the two
passages), suppose that in the text before us he does not mean to deny that Brahma
was conscious of the procession of the Vedas, etc., from himself, and cognizant of their
sense (as the author of the Śāṅkhya aphorisms and his commentator seem to have
und ratodd, see above p. 135), but merely that his consciousness and cognizance were
not the result of any effort on his part.
on which he comments, to remove a doubt regarding the authority of the Veda, arising from some words which had preceded, and therefore affirms that "the Veda is authoritative, because it was produced without any effort of will, like a man's breathing, and not in the same manner as other books." (See Sānkhya Sūtras, v. 50; above, p. 135.)

This attempt to explain the whole of the eight classes of works enumerated in the Upanishad as nothing else than parts of the Brāhmaṇas, cannot be regarded as altogether satisfactory, since some of them, such as the Sūtras, have always been referred to a distinct class of writings, which are regarded as uninspired (see Müller's Anc. Ind. Lit. pp. 75, 86); and the Itihāsas and Purāṇas had in all probability become a distinct class of writings at the period when the Upanishad was composed. And Sankara's explanation is rendered more improbable if we compare with this passage the other from the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, i. 1, 5, already quoted above (p. 31), where it is said, "The inferior science consists of the Rich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvan Vedas, accentuation (śikṣā), ritual prescriptions (kalpa), grammar, commentary (nirukta), prosody (chhandas), and astronomy." Here various appendages of the Vedas, which later writers expressly distinguish from the Vedas themselves, and distinctly declare to have no superhuman authority, are yet mentioned in the same category with the four Sanhitās, or collections of the hymns, as constituting the inferior science (in opposition to the knowledge of the supreme Spirit). From this we may reasonably infer that the author of the Brīhad Āranyaka Upanishad also, when he specifies the Sūtras and some of the other works

178 I take the opportunity of introducing here Sāyaṇa's remarks on this passage in his Commentary on the Rig-veda, vol. i., p. 33: Ayigamabhīrasya vedasya artham avabodhayitum śīkṣādāni shaṅ-angāni pravītāni | ata eva teshām aparā-vidyā-rūpeṇa mūndakopanishady Atharvanikāh āmānanti | "dve vidyā" ityādi | . . . sādhanā-bhūta-dharma-jnāna-hetutveṣa shaṅ-anga-sahilānāṃ karma-kāṅgānāṃ aparā-vidyāteṣaḥ | parama-purushārtha-bhūta-brāhma-jnāna-hetuteṣa upakanishadāṇa para-vidyāteṣa | "The Sīkṣā and other five appendages are intended to promote the comprehension of the sense of the very deep Veda. Hence, in the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, the followers of the Atharva-veda declare that these works belong to the class of inferior sciences, thus: 'There are two sciences,' etc. [see the entire passage in p. 31.] Since the sections of the Veda which relate to ceremonies [including, of course, the hymns], as well as the six appendages, lead to a knowledge of duty, which is an instrument [of something further], they are ranked as an inferior science. On the other hand the Upanishads, which conduct to a knowledge of Brahms, the supreme object of man, constitute the highest science."
which he enumerates, intended to speak of the Vedāngas or appendages of the Vedas, and perhaps the Smṛitis also, as being the breathing of Brahma. The works which in the passage from the Muṇḍaka are called Kalpa, are also commonly designated as the Kalpa Sūtras.

This conclusion is in some degree confirmed by referring to the passage from the Mahābhārata, Śānti-parvan, 7,660, which has been cited in p. 105, where it is said that the “great rishis, empowered by Svayambhū, obtained by devotion the Vedas, and the Itihāsas, which had disappeared at the end of the preceding Yuga.” Whatever may be the sense of the word Itihāsa in a Vedic work, there can be no doubt that in the Mahābhārata, which is itself an Itihāsa, the word refers to that class of metrical histories. And in this text we see these Itihāsas placed on a footing of equality with the Vedas, and regarded as having been, like them, pre-existent and supernatural. See also the passage from the Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii. 1, 1 ff. (Bibl. Ind., vol. iii. pp. 473 ff.), quoted above (p. 33), where the Itihāsas and Purāṇas are spoken of as “the fifth Veda of the Vedas.” The same title of “fifth Veda” is applied to them in the Bhāg. Pur. iii. 12, 39: Itihāsa-purāṇanī panchamaṁ vedam Īśvarah | sarvebhyaḥ eva mukhebhyaḥ sasriye sarva-darśanaḥ | “The omniscient Īśvara (God) created from all his mouths the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, as a fifth Veda.” See also the passages quoted above in pp. 27–30, from the Purāṇas and Mahābhārata, where the Itihāsas and Purāṇas themselves are placed on an equality with, if not in a higher rank, than the Vedas. The claims put forward by these popular works on their own behalf are not, indeed, recognized as valid by more critical and scientific authors, who, as we have seen at the beginning of this section, draw a distinct line of demarcation between the Vedas and all other works; but it would appear from the passages I have quoted from the Upanishads that at one time the Vedas were, at least, not so strictly discriminated from the other Sāstras as they afterwards were.

SECT. XII.—Recapitulation of the Arguments urged in the Darśanas, and by Commentators, in support of the Authority of the Vedas, with some remarks on these reasonings.

As in the preceding sections I have entered at some length into the arguments urged by the authors of the philosophical systems and their
commentators, in proof of the eternity and infallibility of the Vedas, it may be convenient to recapitulate the most important points in these reasonings; and I shall then add such observations as the consideration of them may suggest.

The grounds on which the apologists of the Vedas rest their authority are briefly these: First, it is urged that, like the sun, they shine by their own light, and evince an inherent power both of revealing their own perfection, and of elucidating all other things, past and future, great and small, near and remote (Sāyaṇa, as quoted above, p. 62; Sankara on Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 3, above, p. 190). This is the view taken by the author of the Sānkhya Sūtras also, who, however, expressly denies that the Vedas originated from the conscious effort of any divine being (see p. 135). Second, it is asserted that the Veda could have had no (human) personal author, as no such composer is recollected (Mādhava, above, pp. 83 ff.), and cannot therefore be suspected of any such imperfection as would arise from the fallibility of such an author (pp. 69 f.; Sāyaṇa p. 106). Third, the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā adds to this that the words of which the Vedas are composed are eternal, and have an eternal connection (not an arbitrary relation depending upon the human will) with their meanings, and that therefore the Vedas are eternal, and consequently perfect and infallible179 (Mīmāṁsā Sūtras and Commentary, above, pp. 71 ff., and Sarva-dārsana-saṅgraha, above, pp. 91 ff.) Fourth, the preceding view is either explained or modified by the commentator on the Taṅtirīya Sanhitā (above, p. 69), as well as by Sāyaṇa in his Introduction to the Rig-veda (above, p. 106), who say that, like time, sēther, etc., the Veda is only eternal in a qualified sense, i.e. during the continuance of the existing mundane system; and that in reality it sprang from Brahmā at the beginning of the creation. But this origin cannot according to their view affect the perfection of the Veda, which in consequence of the faultlessness of its author possesses a self-demonstrating authority. Fifth, although the Vedānta, too, speaks of the eternity of the Veda (above, p. 105), it also in the same passage makes mention of its self-dependent author; while in another passage (p. 106) it distinctly ascribes the origin of the Indian Scripture to Brahma as its source or

179 In the Brāhad Aranyaka Upanishad (p. 688 of Dr. Röer’s ed.) it is said: Yā-chaiva samrūḍh Bhṛma jñāyate vāg vai samrūḍh paraṁpara Bhṛma | “By speech, o monarch, Brahma is known. Speech is the supreme Brahma.”
cause. Brahma here must be taken as neuter, denoting the supreme Spirit, and not masculine, designating the personal creator, as under the fourth head. Sixth, according to the Naiyāyika doctrine the authority of the Veda is established by the fact of its having emanated from competent persons who had an intuitive perception of duty, and whose competence is proved by their injunctions being attended with the desired results in all cases which come within the cognizance of our senses and experience (Nyāya Sūtras, above, pp. 116). Seventh, agreeably to the Vaiśeshika doctrine, and that of the Kusumānjali, the infallibility of the Veda results from the omniscience of its author, who is God (Vaiśeshika Sūtras, Tarka Sangraha, and Kusumānjali, pp. 119 ff., 127, and 129 ff., above).

These arguments, as the reader who has studied all their details will have noticed, are sometimes in direct opposition to each other in their leading principles; and they are not likely to seem convincing to any persons but the adherents of the schools from which they have severally emanated. The European student (unless he has some ulterior practical object in view) can only look upon these opinions as matters of historical interest, as illustrations of the course of religious thought among a highly acute and speculative people. But they may be expected to possess a greater importance in the eyes of any Indian readers into whose hands this book may fall; and as such readers may desire to learn in what light these arguments are regarded by Western scholars, I shall offer a few remarks on the subject.

In regard to the first ground in support of the infallibility of the Veda, viz. the evidence which radiates from itself, or its internal evidence, I may observe first, that this is a species of proof which can only be estimated by those who have made the Indian Scripture the object of careful study; and, second, that it must be judged by the reason and conscience of each individual student. This evidence may appear conclusive to men in a certain stage of their national and personal culture, and especially to those who have been accustomed from their infancy to regard the Vedas with a hereditary veneration; whilst to persons in a different state of mental progress, and living under different influences, it will appear perfectly futile. It is quite clear that, even in India itself, there existed in former ages multitudes of learned

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180 See note in p. 205, above.
and virtuous men who were unable to see the force of this argument, and who consequently rejected the authority of the Vedas. I allude of course to Buddha and his followers. And we have even found that some of those writers who are admitted to have been orthodox, such as the authors of the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gītā, and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, while they attach the highest value to the divine knowledge conveyed by the latest portions of the Veda, depreciate, if they do not actually despise, the hymns and the ceremonial worship connected with them.

In regard to the second argument, viz. that the Vedas must be of supernatural origin, and infallible authority, as they are not known to have had any human author, I observe as follows. The Greek historian, Herodotus, remarks (ii. 23) of a geographer of his own day who explained the annual inundations of the river Nile by supposing its stream to be derived from an imaginary ocean flowing round the earth, which no one had ever seen, that his opinion did not admit of refutation, because he carried the discussion back into the region of the unapparent (ἐὰς ἀφανὲς τὸν μύθον ἄνενεκας οὐκ ἔχει ἐξεγγεγραμμένον). The same might be said of the Indian speculators, who argue that the Veda must have had a supernatural origin, because it was never observed to have had a human author like other books;—that by thus removing the negative grounds on which they rest their case into the unknown depths of antiquity, they do their utmost to place themselves beyond the reach of direct refutation. But it is to be observed (1) that, even if it were to be admitted that no human authors of the Vedas were remembered in later ages, this would prove nothing more than their antiquity, and that it would still be incumbent on their apologists to show that this circumstance necessarily involved their supernatural character; and (2) that, in point of fact, Indian tradition does point to certain rishis or bards as the authors of the Vedic hymns. It is true, indeed, as has been already noticed (p. 85), that these rishis are said to have only “seen” the hymns, which (it is alleged) were eternally pre-existent, and that they were not their authors. But as tradition declares that the hymns were uttered by such and such rishis, how is it proved that the rishis to whom they are ascribed, or those, whoever they were, from whom they actually proceeded, were not uttering the mere productions of their own minds? The whole character of these compositions, and the circumstances under which, from internal evi-
dence, they appear to have arisen, are in harmony with the supposition that they were nothing more than the natural expression of the personal hopes and feelings of those ancient bards by whom they were first recited. In these songs the Aryan sages celebrated the praises of their ancestral gods (while at the same time they sought to conciliate their goodwill by a variety of oblations supposed to be acceptable to them), and besought of them all the blessings which men in general desire—health, wealth, long life, cattle, offspring, victory over their enemies, forgiveness of sin, and in some cases also celestial felicity.

The scope of these hymns is well summed up in the passage which I have already quoted (from Colebrooke's Misc. Essays i. 26) in the Second Volume, p. 206: Arthepsavaḥ rishayo devatās chandobhir abhja-dhāvan | "The rishis desiring [various] objects, hastened to the gods with metrical prayers." The Nirukta, vii. 1, quoted in the same place, says: Yat-kāmaḥ rishir yasyāṁ devatāyāṁ arthapatyam ichhān stutim prayukte tad-devataḥ sa mantra bhavati | "Each particular hymn has for its deity the god to whom the rishi, seeking to obtain any object of desire which he longs for, addresses his prayer." And in the sequel of the same passage from the Nirukta (vii. 3), the fact that the hymns express the different feelings or objects of the rishis is distinctly recognized:

Paroksha-kritāḥ prayaksha-kritās cha mantrāḥ bhūyishṭāḥ alpaśā alāhvātmikāḥ | athāpi stutir eva bhavati na āśīrvādāḥ "Indrasya nu vir-yāṇi pravocharam" iti yathā etasmin sūkte | athāpi āśīr eva na stutīḥ "suchakshāḥ aham akṣhibhyām bhūyāsaṁ suvarcāhāḥ mukhena suśrūt karnābhyām bhūyasam" iti | tad etad bahulam ādvaryave yājneṣu cha mantreshu | athāpi śapathābhisāpau | "adya muriya" ityādi ... athāpi. kasyachid bhāvasya āchikhyāsa | "na mṛityur āśīd" ityādi ... | athāpi paridevanā kasmāhchhiḍ bhāvāt | "sudevo adya prapate anārvid" ityādi | athāpi nindā-prāsaṁse | "kevalāgho bhavati kevalādi" ityādi | evam aksha-sūkte dyūta-nindā cha krishi-prāsaṁsa cha | evam uchchāvachair ṛbhipurāyaṁ rishiṇām mantra-drishṭayo bhavanti |

"[Of the four kinds of verses specified in the preceding section], (a) those which address a god as absent, (b) those which address him as present, and (c) those which address the worshippers as present and the god as absent, are the most numerous, while those (d) which refer to the speaker himself are rare. It happens also that a god is
praised without any blessing being invoked, as in the hymn (R.V. i. 32).
'I declare the heroic deeds of Indra,' etc. Again, blessings are in-
voked without any praise being offered, as in the words, 'May I see well
with my eyes, be resplendent in my face, and hear well with my ears.'
This frequently occurs in the Ādhyātma Yajur Veda, and in the
sacrificial formulæ. Then again we find oaths and curses, as in the
words (R.V. vii. 104, 15), 'May I die to-day, if I am a Yātudhāna,'
etc. (See Vol. I. p. 327.) Further, we observe the desire to describe
some particular state of things, as in the verse (R.V. x. 129, 2), 'Death
was not then, nor immortality,' etc. Then there is lamentation, arising
out of a certain state of things, as in the verse (R.V. x. 95, 14), 'The
beautiful god will disappear and never return,' etc. Again, we have
blame and praise, as in the words (R.V. x. 117, 6), 'The man who eats
alone, sins alone,' etc. So, too, in the hymn to bice (R.V. x. 34, 13)
there is a censure upon dice, and a commendation of agriculture. Thus
the objects for which the hymns were seen by the rishis were very
various.'

It is to be observed, however, that although in this passage the
author, Vāsaka, speaks of the various desires which the rishi expressed
in different hymns, he nevertheless adheres to the idea which was rec-
ognized in his age, and in which he doubtless participated, that the
rishis "saw" the hymns.

In the Nirukta, x. 42, the form of the metre in particular hymns
is ascribed to the peculiar genius of the rishi Paruchhepa: 182 Abhyāse

181 In Nirukta, iv. 6, allusion is made to a rishi Tītra perceiving a particular hymn
when he had been thrown into a well (Tītām kūpe vahitam etat sūktam prati
babhau).

182 A Paruchhepa is mentioned in the Taittirīya Sanhitā, ii. 5, 8, 3, as follows:
Nrmedhas cha Paruchhepa cha brahmaṇavādyam avadātam "asmin dārav ādīro gniṁ
janayōva yatara nau brahmaṇīyōn" iti | Nrmedho 'bhayavadat sa dhūmam ojanayat |
Paruchhēgo 'bhayavadat so gniṁ ojanayat | "rishe" ity abhavīd "yat samāvadvidvam
kathā travam agnim aṣṭam nāham" iti | "samidheninām eva haṁ varamān veda" ity
abravīt | "yad ghrītavat padam anūcuṣyate sa āṣāṁ varṇas 'tāṁ tvā samidhibhir An-
girah" ity aha samidhenishv eva taj jyotīr jananayit" | "Nṛmedha and Paruchhepa
had a discussion concerning sacred knowledge. They said, 'Let us kindle fire 1 in this
moist wood, in order to see which of us has most sacred knowledge.' 2 Nṛmedha pro-
nounced (a text); but produced only smoke. Paruchhepa pronounced (a text) and
generated fire. Nṛmedha said, 'Rishi, since our knowledge is equal, how is it that
thou hast generated fire, while I have not.' Paruchhepa replied, 'I know the lustre

1 "Without friction."—Comm.
2 "In regard to the Samidheśu formulæ."—Comm.
bhūyāṁsam aratham manyante yathā “aho darśaniya aho darśaniya” iti |
tat Parucohchhepasya śīlam | “Men consider that by repetition the sense is intensified, as in the words ‘o beautiful, o beautiful.’ This is Parucohhepa’s habit.”

In Nirukta, iii. 11, the rishi Kutsa is mentioned as being thus described by the interpreter Aupamanyava: Rishiḥ Kutso bhavati kartā stomānām ity Aupamanyavaḥ | “Kutsa is the name of a rishi, a maker of hymns,’ according to Aupamanyava.”

So too the same work, x. 32, says of the rishi Hiraṇyastūpa that “he declared this hymn” (Hiraṇyastūpaḥ rishir īdam sūktam provācha).

I do not, as I have already intimated, adduce these passages of the Nirukta to show that the author regarded the hymns as the ordinary productions of the rishis’ own minds, for this would be at variance with the expression “seeing,” which he applies to the mental act by which they were produced. It appears also from the terms in which he speaks of the rishis in the passage (Nirukta, i. 20) quoted above, p. 120, where they are described as having an intuitive insight into duty, that he placed them on a far higher level than the inferior men of later ages. But it is clear from the instances I have adduced that Yāska recognizes the hymns as being applicable to the particular circumstances in which the rishis were placed, and as being the bona fide expression of their individual emotions and desires. (See also the passages from the Nirukta, ii. 10 and 24, quoted in Vol. I. pp. 269 and 338, which establish the same point.) But if this be true, the supposition that these hymns, i.e. hymns specifically suited to express the various feelings and wishes of all the different rishis, were eternally pre-existent, and were perceived by them at the precise conjunctures when they were required to give utterance to their several aims, is perfectly gratuitous and unnecessary. It might be asserted with nearly the same shew of reason that the entire stock of ordinary language employed by human beings to express their ideas had existed from eternity.  

of the Śāmidheniṣ. The sentence which contains the word ghrīta (butter) forms their lustre. When any one repeats the words, “We augment thee, o Angiras (Agnī) with fuel and with butter,” he then generates that lustre in the Śāmidheniṣ.”

153 A difficulty of the same nature as that here urged, viz. that men and objects which existed in time are mentioned in the Vedas which are yet said to be eternal, was felt by Jaimini, as we have already seen (pp. 77 ff.). I recur to this subject in p. 215.
In regard to the third argument for the authority of the Vedas, viz. that they are eternal, because the words of which they are composed are eternal, and because these words have an inherent and eternal (and not a merely conventional) connection with the significations or objects, or the species of objects, which they represent, it is to be observed that it is rejected both by the Nyāya and Sāṅkhya schools. And I am unable (if I rightly comprehend this orthodox reasoning) to see how it proves the authority of the Veda more than that of any other book. If the words of the Veda are eternal, so must those of the Baudhā books be eternal, and consequently, if eternal pre-existence is a proof of perfection, the infallibility of these heretical works must be as much proved by this argument as the divine origin of the Vedas, whose pretensions they reject and oppose. Or if the meaning is that the words of the Veda alone are eternal and infallible, this is an assumption which requires proof. If their reception by great rishis be alleged as evidence, it must be remarked that the authority of these rishis is itself a point which cannot be admitted until it has been established.

In regard to the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh of the arguments above stated, as put forward by the representatives of different schools or opinions in favour of the authority of the Veda, it may suffice to say that they for the most part assume the point to be proved, viz. that the Veda did proceed from an omniscient, or at least a competent, author. The only exception to this remark is to be found in the reasoning of the Nyāya and Sāṅkhya aphorisms that the infallibility of the Vedas is shown by the fact that the employment of the formulas or prescriptions of those parts of them which deal with temporal results, such as can be tested by experience, is always found to be efficacious; a premiss from which the conclusion is drawn that those other parts of the Veda, which relate to the unseen world, must be equally authoritative, as the authors of these different parts are the same persons. This argument cannot appear convincing to any but those who admit first, the invariable efficacy of all the formulas and prescriptions.

See, however, the comment on Brahma Sūtra, i. 3, 30, regarding the perpetual recurrence of the same things in successive creations from, and to, all eternity, which will be quoted in the Appendix.

384 See Dr. Ballantyne’s remarks on this controversy, in pp. 186, 189, 191, and 192 of his “Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy.”
of the Veda which relate to such matters as can be tested by experience, and secondly, the identity of the authors of the parts of the Veda which contain these formulas and prescriptions with the authors of the other parts. It would be impossible to prove the former point, and next to impossible to prove the latter.

Against the eternity of the Vedas an objection has been raised, which Jaimini considers it necessary to notice, viz. that various historical persons are named in their pages, and that as these works could not have existed before the persons whose doings they record, they must have commenced to exist in time. This difficulty Jaimini attempts, as we have seen above (pp. 77 ff.), to meet by explaining away the names of the historical persons in question. Thus Babara Prāvahini is said to be nothing else than an appellation of the wind, which is eternal. And this method, it is said, is to be applied in all similar cases. Another of the passages mentioned by an objector (see above, p. 79) as referring to non-eternal objects is R.V. iii. 53, 14, “What are the cows doing for thee among the Kikaṭas?” etc. The author of the Mimāṃsā Sūtras would no doubt have attempted to show that by these Kikaṭas we are to understand some eternally pre-existing beings. But Yāsaka, the author of the Nirukta, who had not been instructed in any such subleties, speaks of the Kikaṭas as a non-Āryan nation. (Vol. I. p. 342, and Vol. II. p. 362.) It is difficult to suppose that Jaimini—unless he was an enthusiast, and not the cool and acute reasoner he has commonly proved himself to be—would have seriously imagined that his rule of interpretation could ever be generally received or carried out.155 The Brāhmaṇas evidently intend to represent the numerous occurrences which they narrate, as having actually taken place in time, and the actors in them as having been real historical persons. See, for instance, the legends from the Satapatha and Aitareya Brāhmaṇas, the Taittariya Sanhitā, etc., quoted in the First

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155 In Sāyaṇa’s Introduction to R.V. vol i. p. 23, it is said: Manuṣhya-vrittiṃ- pratipādakāḥ richo nārāśāmyah | “The Nārāśāmyas are verses which set forth the histories of men.” Yāsaka’s definition is the same in substance, Nir. ix. 9. If these Nārāśāmyas are, as Sāyaṇa says, verses of the hymns (rīchaḥ), and if according to his definition their object is to record events in human history, it follows that they must refer to non-eternal objects. See also the explanation of the words nārāśāmyam atomena in Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, 3, 53, given by the Commentator Mahādhara, which will be quoted further on.
Volume of this work, pp. 182, 192, 194, 328, 355, etc. And it is impossible to peruse the Vedic hymns without coming to the conclusion that they also record a multitude of events, which the writers believed to have been transacted by men on earth in former ages. (See the passages quoted from the Rig-veda in the First and Second Volumes of this work, passim; those, for example, in Vol. I. pp. 162 ff., 318 ff., 339 ff., and Vol. II. p. 208.)

We shall, no doubt, be assisted in arriving at a correct conclusion in regard to the real origin and character of the hymns of the Veda, if we enquire what opinion the rishis, by whom they were confessedly spoken, entertained of their own utterances; and this I propose to investigate in the following chapter.
CHAPTER II.

THE RISHIS, AND THEIR OPINIONS IN REGARD TO THE ORIGIN OF THE VEDIC HYMNS.

I have already shewn, in the preceding pages, as well as in the Second Volume of this work, that the hymns of the Rig-veda themselves supply us with numerous data by which we can judge of the circumstances to which they owed their origin, and of the manner in which they were created. We have seen that they were the natural product and expression of the particular state of society, of the peculiar religious conceptions, and of all those other influences, physical and moral, which prevailed at the period when they were composed, and acted upon the minds of their authors. (Vol. I. pp. 161 f., Vol. II. pp. 205 ff.; and above, pp. 211 f.) We find in them ideas, a language, a spirit, and a colouring totally different from those which characterize the religious writings of the Hindus of a later era. They frequently discover to us the simple germs from which the mythological conceptions current in subsequent ages were derived,—germs which in many cases were developed in so fanciful and extravagant a manner as to shew that the simplicity of ancient times had long since disappeared, to make way for a rank and wild luxuriance of imagination. They afford us very distinct indications of the locality in which they were composed (Vol. II. pp. 354–372); they shew us the Aryan tribes living in a state of warfare with surrounding enemies (some of them, probably, alien in race and language), and gradually, as we may infer, forcing their way onward to the east and south (Vol. II. pp. 374 ff., 384 ff., 414 ff.); they supply us with numerous specimens of the particular sorts of prayers, viz. for protection and victory, which men so circumstanced would naturally address to the gods whom they worshipped, as well as of those
more common supplications which men in general offer up for the various blessings which constitute the sum of human welfare; and they bring before us as the objects of existing veneration a class of deities (principally, if not exclusively, personifications of the elements, and of the powers either of nature, or of reason) who gradually lost their importance in the estimation of the later Indians, and made way for gods of a different description, invested with new attributes, and in many cases bearing new appellations.

These peculiarities of the hymns abundantly justify us in regarding them as the natural product and spontaneous representation of the ideas, feelings, and aspirations of the bards with whose names they are connected, or of other ancient authors, while the archaic forms of the dialect in which they are composed, and the references which are made to them, as pre-existent, in the liturgical works by which they are expounded and applied, leave no reason for doubt that they are the most ancient of all the Indian Scriptures.

We can also, as I have shewn, discover from the Vedic hymns themselves, that some of them were newer and others older, that they were the works of many successive generations of poets; that their composition probably extended over several centuries, and that in some places their authors represent them as being the productions of their own minds, while in other passages they appear to ascribe to their own words a certain divine character, or attribute their composition to some supernatural assistance. (Vol. I. p. 4, and II. pp. 206 ff., 219 ff.)

I shall now proceed to adduce further proofs from the hymns of the Rig-veda in support of these last mentioned positions; repeating, at the same time, for the sake of completeness, the texts which I have already cited in the Second Volume.

Sect. I.—Passages from the Hymns of the Veda which distinguish between the Rishis as Ancient and Modern.

The appellations or epithets applied by the authors of the hymns to themselves, and to the sages who in former times had instituted, as well as to their contemporaries who continued to conduct, the different rites of divine worship, are the following: rishi, kavi, medhāvin, vipra,
vīpaṣcit, vedaḥ, muni, etc. The rishis are defined in Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, to be persons "who, whether singly or in chorus, either on their own behalf or on behalf of others, invoked the gods in artificial language, and in song;" and the word is said to denote especially "the priestly bards who made this art their profession." The word kavi means "wise," or "a poet," and has ordinarily the latter sense in modern Sanskrit. Vipra means "wise," and, in later Sanskrit, a "Brāhmaṇa;" medhāvīn means "intelligent;" vīpaṣcit and vedaḥ, "wise" or "learned." Muni signifies in modern Sanskrit a "sage" or "devotee." It is not much used in the Rig-veda, but occurs in viii. 17, 13 (Vol. II. p. 397).

The following passages from the Rig-veda either expressly distinguish between contemporary rishis and those of a more ancient date, or, at any rate, make reference to the one or the other class. This recognition of a succession of rishis constitutes one of the historical elements in the Veda. It is an acknowledgment on the part of the rishis themselves that numerous persons had existed, and events occurred, anterior to their own age, and, consequently, in time; and it therefore refutes, by the testimony of the Veda itself, the assertion of Jainini (above, pp. 77 ff.) that none but eternally pre-existing objects are mentioned in that book.

If, under this and other heads of my inquiry, I have cited a larger number of passages than might have appeared to be necessary, it has been done with the intention of showing that abundant evidence of my various positions can be adduced from all parts of the Hymn-collection.¹

R. V. i. 1, 2. Agniḥ pūrvebhīr rishibhir idyo nātanair uta | sa devān eṣa vakshati |

"Agni, who is worthy to be celebrated by former, as well as modern rishis, will bring the gods hither."

The word pūrvebhīh is explained by Sāyaṇa thus: Purātanair Brīgu-angirāḥ-prabhritibhir rishibhiḥ | "By the ancient rishis, Brīgu, Angiras," etc.; and nātanaḥ is interpreted by idānānair asmāḥhir api, "by us of the present day also." See also Nirukta, vii. 16.

¹ I have to acknowledge the assistance kindly rendered to me by Prof. Aufricht in the revision of my translation of the passages quoted in this and the following sections. As, however, the texts are mostly quite clear in so far as regards the points which they are adduced to prove, any inaccuracies with which I may be chargeable in other respects are of comparatively little importance.

"O (god) of great power, listen to the invocation of Prasakṣaṇa, as thou didst listen to Priyamedha, Atri, Viśu, and Angiras. The Priyamedhas, skilled in singing praises, have invoked thee."

Here Prasakṣaṇa is referred to, in verse 3, as alive, whilst Priyamedha, Atri, Viśu, and Angiras belong to the past. In verse 4 the descendants of Priyamedha are however alluded to as existing. The three other names are also, no doubt, those of families. In R.V. iii. 53, 7, (see Vol. I. p. 341) the Viśus appear to be referred to; while in viii. 64, 6 (which will be quoted below), a Viśu is addressed. In v. 22, 4, the Atris are spoken of.

i. 48, 14. Ye ciiδ hi tvām rishayaḥ pūrve utaye juhure ityādi |

"The former rishis who invoked thee for succour," etc.

i. 80, 16. Yām Atharvā Manuṣṭa Ṛkṣaṇa Ṛtvajjyata ityādi |

"In the ceremony [or hymn] which Atharvan, or our father Manu, or Daḍhyaṃ performed, the prayers and praises were, as of old, congregated in that Indra," etc.

i. 118, 3 (repeated in iii. 58, 3). Āhur viprāsaḥ Āśvina pūrājaḥ |

"O Śvins, the ancient sages say," etc.

i. 131, 6. Ā me asya vedhaso naviyasas manma śruḍhi naviyasas |

"Hear the hymn of me this modern sage, of this modern [sage]."

i. 139, 9. Daḍhyaṇa ha me janusham pūrvo Angirāḥ Priyamedhāḥ Kaṇvo Atri Manuś viṣvūr ityādi |

"The ancient Daḍhyaṃ, Angiras, Priyamedha, Kaṇva, Atri, and Manu know my birth."

i. 175, 6. Yaḥaḥ pūrvebhyaḥ jaritṛbhyaḥ Indra mayaḥ i va āpo na tri-

shyate bahāthā | Tum ann tuvā nividāṃ johāvīmi ityādi |

"Indra, as thou hast been like a joy to former worshippers who praised thee, like waters to the thirsty, I invoke thee again and again with this hymn," etc.

iv. 20, 5. Vi ṣyo rarapā ṛṣiḥbhir nāvebhīr śrīkhaḥ na pakvaḥ śrīnyo

na ṣṭā | maryo na yosūm abhi manyaṁano achhā vivakmi puruḥātam Indram |

"Like a man desiring a woman, I call hither that Indra, invoked by
many, who, like a ripe tree, like a conqueror expert in arms, has been celebrated by recent rishis."

iv. 50, 1. Tam pratnāsāḥ rishayo didhyānāḥ puro viprāḥ dadhiraṃ mandra-jihvam |

"The ancient rishis, resplendent and sage, have placed in front of them [Bṛhaspati] with gladdening tongue."

v. 42, 6. . . . Na te pūrve Maghavan na aparāso na vīryaṃ nūtanaḥ kaśehana āpa |

"Neither the ancients nor later men, nor any modern man, has attained to [conceived] thy prowess, o Maghavan."

x. 54, 3. Kē u nu te mahimanaḥ samasya asmāt pūrve rishayo antam āpuḥ | yad mātaraṃ cha pitaraṃ cha sākaṃ ajanayathās tanvāḥ svāyāḥ |

"Who among the rishis who were before us have attained to the end of all thy greatness? for thou didst at once procure from thy own body both the mother and the father (earth and heaven)."

vi. 19, 4. Yathā chīt pūrve jārītāraḥ āsur anedyāḥ anavadvāḥ arishtāḥ |

"As [Indra's] former worshippers were, [may we be] blameless, irreproachable, and unharmed."

vi. 21, 5. Idā hi te vevishtataḥ pūrājāḥ pratnāsāḥ āsuḥ purukṛt sakha-yāḥ | Ye madhyamaṃ sa ta nūtanāsāḥ utāvamasya puruhūta bodhi |

"For now, o energetic god, men are thy worshippers, as the ancients born of old and the men of the middle and later ages have been thy friends. And, o much-invoked, think of the most recent of all."  

vi. 21, 1. Sa tu śrudhī Indra nūtanasya brahmānyato vīra kāruḍhāyaḥ |

"Heroic Indra, supporting the poet, listen to the modern [bard] who wishes to celebrate thee."

vi. 22, 2. Tam u naḥ pūrve pitaro navagvāḥ sapta viprāsāḥ abhi vajāyantaḥ ityādī |

"To Him (Indra) our ancient fathers, the seven Navagya sages, desiring food, (resorted) with their hymns," etc.

vi. 50, 15. Evā napato mama tasya dhībir Bharadvājāḥ abhyarchantī arkaiḥ |

"Thus do the Bharadvājas my grandsons adore thee with (my ?) hymns and praises."

2 Prof. Aufrecht thinks sprīyo na āṣeṣa may perhaps mean, "like a winner of sickles (as a prize)."

3 This verse is translated in Benfey's Glossary to the Śrāvaṇa-vedā, p. 76, col. i.
vii. 18, 1. *Tvē ha yat pitarasa chiś naḥ Indra viśvā vāma jāritāro asan-vann ityādi |
   “Since, in thee, o Indra, even our fathers, thy worshippers, obtained all riches,” etc.

vii. 29, 4. *Ulo gha te purushyaḥ id āsan yeshām pūrveśhām abhiḥor rishīnaḥ |
   adha aham tvā Maghavan johavimi tvāḥ naḥ Indra asi pramatiḥ piteva |
   “Even they were of mortal birth,—those former rishis whom thou didst hear. I invoke thee again and again, o Maghavan; thou art to us wise as a father.”

vii. 53, 1. . . . . *Te chiś hi pūrve kavayo griñantaḥ puro mahī dadhre devapurte |
   “The ancient poets, celebrating their praises, have placed in the front these two great [beings, heaven and earth] of whom the gods are the children.”

vii. 76, 4. *Te id devanām sadhamādaḥ āsan ritāvānaḥ kavayaḥ pūr-vyāsah |
   gūlham jyotiḥ pitaro anvavindan satya-mantrāḥ ajanayann uṣhasām |
   “They shared in the enjoyments of the gods, those ancient pious sages. Our fathers discovered the hidden light; with true hymns they caused the dawn to arise.”

vii. 91, 1. *Kuvid anga namasā yo vriḍhāsaḥ purā devaḥ anavadyūsah āsan |
   te Vāyave Manave bādhitāya avāsayaṁ ुṣhasāṁ sûryena |
   “Certainly those gods who were formerly magnified (or grew) by worship were altogether blameless. They lighted up the dawn and the sun to Vāyu (Āyu?) and the afflicted Manu.” (See Vol. I. p. 172.)

viii. 36, 7. *Syaśvāvasya sūvatas tathā śrīnu yathā abhiror Ațreḥ karmāṇi kriṅvataḥ |
   “Listen to Śyaśvāva pouring forth libations, in the same way as thou didst listen to Atri when he celebrated sacred rites.”

ix. 96, 11. *Tvayā hi naḥ pitaraḥ Soma pūrve karmāṇi chakruḥ pava-māna dhīrāḥ |
   “For through thee, o pure Soma, our wise forefathers of old performed their sacred rites.”

4 See Benfey’s Glossary to Śaṁa-veda, under the word vas 2.
5 Compare viii. 35, 19; and viii. 37, 7.
ix. 110, 7. *The Soma prathamāḥ vrīkta-varhisho mahe vājaya śravase
dhiyam dadhuḥ |

"The former [priests] having strewed the sacred grass, offered up a
hymn to thee, o Soma, for great strength and food."

x. 14, 15 (=A.V. xviii. 2, 2). *Idam namaḥ rishiśhyāḥ pūrvajēśhyāḥ
pathikriđāḥyāḥ |

"This reverence to the rishis, born of old, the ancients, who showed
us the road." (This verse may also be employed to prove that at
the end of the Vedic period the rishis had become objects of veneration.)

x. 66, 14. *Vasishtaśaḥ pitrivas vācham ākṛta devān ilaññah rishi-
vañ ītyādi |

"The Vasishtas, like the forefathers, like the rishis, have uttered
their voice, worshipping the gods."

x. 67, 1—will be quoted in a following section.

x. 96, 5. *Tvam aharyathāḥ upastutaḥ pūrvebhir Indra harikesa yaj-
vahīḥ |

"Indra, with golden hair, thou didst rejoice, when lauded by the
ancient priests."

x. 98, 9. *Tvam pūrve rishayo gīrbhir āyan tvām aḍhvaśrshu puruhūta
viśve |

"To thee the former rishis resorted with their hymns; to thee, thou
much invoked, all men [resorted] at the sacrifices."

Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xviii. 52. *Imau te pakṣāv ajaraun patatrimou yā-
bhyāṁ rakṣāṁi apahan śi Agnou tābhyaṁ patema sukriśam u lokam
yatra rishayo jagmuḥ prathamajāḥ purāṇāḥ |

"But these undecaying, soaring pinions, with which, o Agni, thou
slayest the Rakshases,—with them let us ascend to the world of
the righteous, whither the earliest-born ancient rishis have gone." (This
verse is quoted in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, ix. 4, 4, 4, p. 739.)

The ancient rishis, as Sāyaṇa says in his note on R.V. i. 2, were
Bṛgīnu, Angiras, and others whom he does not name. In another place
we find Atharvan, Manu, Dādhyanā, and others mentioned. I will
not here enter into any particulars regarding these ancient sages. For
some texts relating to Bṛgīnu, I may refer to the First Volume of this
work, pp. 443 ff.; and various passages relating to Manu will be found
in the same volume pp. 162 ff., and in pp. 324–332 of the Second
Volume. In regard to Atharvan, as well as Angiras, Professor Gold-
stücker's Sanskrit and English Dictionary, and in regard to the same personages and Dadhyanch, the Sanskrit and German Lexicon of Boehtlingk and Roth, may be consulted.

SECT. II.—Passages from the Veda in which a distinction is drawn between the older and the more recent hymns.

From the passages which I propose to bring forward in the present section, it will be found that the hymns which the rishis addressed to the gods are frequently spoken of as new, while others of ancient date are also sometimes mentioned. The rishis no doubt entertained the idea that the gods would be more highly gratified if their praises were celebrated in new, and perhaps more elaborate and beautiful compositions, than if older, and possibly ruder, prayers had been repeated.

The fact that a hymn is called new by its author, does not, however, by any means enable us to determine its age relatively to that of other hymns in the collection, for this epithet of new is, as we shall see, applied to numerous compositions throughout the Veda; and often when a hymn is not designated as new, it may, nevertheless, be in reality of recent date, compared with the others by which it is surrounded. When, however, any rishi characterizes his own effusion as new, we are of course necessarily led to conclude that he was acquainted with many older songs of the same kind. The relative ages of the different hymns can only be settled by means of internal evidence furnished by their dialect, style, metre, ideas, and general contents; and we may, no doubt, hope that much will by degrees be done by the researches of critical scholars towards such a chronological classification of the constituent portions of the Rig-veda.

The hymns, praises, or prayers uttered by the rishis are called by a great variety of names, such as rīch, sāman, yajush, brahmaṇ, ārka, uktha, mantra, manman, mati, manīśā, sumati, dhi, dhiti, dhishanā, stoma, stuti, sushtuti, prāsasti, saṁsa, gir, vāch, vachas, nītha, nīvīd, etc.

R.V. i. 12, 11. Sa naḥ stavānaḥ ābhara gāyatreṇa naviyasā | rayiṁ vīrvatīm iṣhaṁ |

"Glorified by our newest" hymn, do thou bring to us wealth and food with progeny." (Sāyaṇa explains naviyasa by pūrvakair apya asampaditeṇa gāyatreṇa | "A hymn not formed even by former rishis.")

* Compare Psalms, 33, 3; 40, 3; 96, 1; 98, 1; 144, 9; 149, 1; and Isaiah, 42, 10.
TO THE ORIGIN OF THE VEDIC HYMNS.

i. 27, 4. *Imam a shu tvam asmākāṁ saniṁ gāyatram naryāṁsam | 
Agni deveshu pravocahā |

"Agni, thou hast announced [or do thou announce] among the gods this our offering, our newest hymn."

i. 60, 3. *Tam navyaṁ hridāḥ ā jayamānam asmat sukṛttir madhu- 
jihvam aśyāḥ | yam ritvijō vṛjjano mānushāsaḥ prayavantaḥ āyavo jyaj-
nanta |

"May our newest laudation (springing) from (our) heart, reach him, 
the sweet-tongued, at his birth, (him) whom mortal priests the descend-
ants of Manu, offering oblations, have generated in the ceremonial."
(See iii. 39, 1, in next page, and i. 171, 2 and ii. 35, 2, which will be 
quoted further on in the next section).

i. 89, 3. *Tāṁ pūrvayā nividā hāmahe vayam Bhagam Mitra. Āditiṁ 
Daksham Asrīdham ityādi |

"We invoke with an ancient hymn Bhaga, Mitra, Aditi, Daksha, 
Asrīdh [or the friendly]," etc. *(Purvakāśinayā | nityayā | nividā | 
vedātmikayā vācā | "With an ancient—eternal, hymn—a Vedic 
text."—Sāyaṇa.)

i. 96, 2. *Sa pūrvayā nividā kavyatā Āyor ināḥ praṭjāḥ ajanayād ma-
nunām |

"Through the ancient hymn, the poetic work, of Āyu he (Agni) 
generated these children of men."*

i. 130, 10. *Sa no navyebhīr vṛiša-karmann ukthais purāṁ darttāḥ 
pāyubhiḥ pāhi saṃsthit |

"Through our new hymns, do thou, vigorous in action, destroyer of 
cities, sustain us with invigorating blessings."

i. 143, 1. *Pra tavyasāṁ navyaṁ dhiśim Āgnye vāc̣ho matiṁ sahasaḥ 
sūnave bhare |

"I bring to Agni, the son of strength, a new and energetic hymn, a 
production of thought uttered by the voice (vāc̣ha)."

ii. 17, 1. *Taḥ asmaṁ nasyam Angiras-vad archata ityādi |

"Utter to him [Indra] that new [hymn] like Angiras." ("New, 
i.e. never before seen among other people" anyeshv adrishta-pūrvam— 
Sāyaṇa.)

ii. 18, 3. *Harī nu kaṁ rathe Indrasya yojam ayai sūktena vachasā 
navena | mo shu tvām atra bahavo hi vipṛṇḥ ni viraman yajamanāsino anya | 

7 See the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, p. 143 of Prof. Haug's translation; and Vql. I. p. 18f.
"With this new and well-expressed hymn I have yoked the steeds in Indra's ear, in order that he may come hither. Let not the other wise sacrificers, who are numerous, stop thee (from coming to me)."

ii. 24, 1. Sa imām avidhī prabhritīṃ yaḥ tishe | ayā vidhema navayā mahā girā |

"Do thou who rulest receive this, our offering [of praise]: let us worship thee with this new and grand song."

iii. 1, 20. Elā te Agne janimā sanāni pra pārvyāya nūtanāni vocham | "These ancient [and these] new productions I have uttered to thee, Agni, who art ancient." (Comp. R.V. viii. 84, 5, in the next section.)

iii. 32, 13. Yaḥ stomebhir vāvridhe pārvyebhir yo madhyamebhir uta nūtanēbhīḥ |

"[Indra] who has grown through (or been magnified by) ancient, intermediate, and modern hymns."

iii. 39, 1. Indram matir hridāḥ ā vāchyanāṁ āchā āpatīṁ stomatastāḥ jīgāti | ā jāgrivir vidathe sasyamānaḥ Indra yat te jāyate viḍḍhi tasya | "1. The vigilant hymn, formed of praise, and uttered from the heart, proceeds to Indra the lord, when chanted at the sacrifice: be cognizant, Indra, of this [praise] which is produced for thee. 2. Produced even before the daylight, vigilant, chanted at the sacrifice, clothed in beautiful and radiant garments,—this is our ancient ancestral hymn."

(Pitṛyā is rendered by Sāyaṇa as pitṛi-kramāgatā, "received by succession from our fathers.")

iii. 62, 7. Iyāṁ te Pūshann āghrīne sushtutir deva nāvyasī | asmābhīṣ tubhyaṁ sasyate |

"Divine and glowing Pūshan, this new laudation is recited by us to thee."

v. 42, 13. Pra sū mahe susaraṇāya medhām girām bhare nāvyasīṁ jāyamanām |

"I present to the mighty protector a mental production, a new utterance [now] springing up."

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8 Compare the expressions vacho-yuṣṭaḥ harī, "brown horses yoked by the hymn (R.V. viii. 46, 39; viii. 87, 9); brahma-yuṣṭi, "yoked by prayer" (i. 177, 2; iii. 36, 4; viii. 1, 24; vii. 2, 27; vii. 17, 2); and mano-yuṣṭi, "yoked by the mind, or will" (i. 14, 6; i. 51, 10; iv. 48, 4; v. 75, 6; viii. 5, 2)."
v. 55, 8. *Yat pūryam Maruto yach cha nūtanaṁ yad udyate Vasavo yach cha sasyate | viśvasya tasya bhaveṣaḥ navedasaḥ |

“Be cognizant of all that is ancient, Maruts, and of all that is modern, of all that is spoken, Vasus, and of all that is recited.”

vi. 17, 13. . . . . *Suvirāṁ tvā svāyuḍham suvajram ā brahma ṇavyam avase vavrītyāt |

“May the new prayer impel thee, the heroic, well-acladted, the loud-thundering, to succour us.” (“New, i.e. never made before by others: prayer, i.e. the hymn made by us” *Nūtanam anyair akṛita-pūrvaṁ | brahma asmābhiḥ kṛitaṁ stotram—Sāvana.)

vi. 22, 7. *Tāṁ vo dhiyā ṇavyasyā Śavishṭham prātain pratna-vat pariṁśayadhyai |

“I seek, like the ancients, to stimulate thee, the ancient, with a new hymn.”

vi. 34, 1. *Saṁ cha te jagmura gīrhaḥ Indra pūrvir vi cha tvad yanīi viḥvo manīśaṁ | purā nūnaṁ cha stutayaḥ rīṣiṇām paspridhre Indre adhi ukthārkaṁ |

“Many songs, Indra, are collected in thee; numerous thoughts issue forth from thee; both before and now the praises, texts and hymns of rishis have hastened emulously to Indra.”

vi. 44, 13. *Yah pūrvaḥḥir uta nūtanaṁḥ gīrbaṁ vāpridhe griñatām rīṣiṇām |

“He (Indra) who grew through the ancient and modern hymns of lauding rishis.” (See R.V. iii. 32, 13, above p. 223.)

vi. 48, 11. Ā sakhāyaḥ subardughāṁ dhenum ajadhvam upa ṇavyasā vachaḥ 9

“Friends, drive hither the milch cow with a new hymn.”

vi. 49, 1. *Stushe janaṁ suvratāṁ ṇavyastiḥhir gīrbaṁ Mitrāvaraṇaḥ sumnayanāt |

“With new praises I celebrate the righteous race, with Mitra and Varuna, the beneficent.” (“The well-acting race, i.e. the divine race, the company of the gods,” sukarmānaṁ janaṁ dāivyam janaṁ dera-sangham—Sāvana.)

vi. 50, 6: *Abhi tyam vīraṁ girvanasam archa Indram brahmaṇa jari-
tar navena |

“Sing, o worshipper, with a new hymn, to the heroic Indra, who delights in praise.”

9 Compare the words ni ṇaṁ ṇavyasā vachaḥ tanūskaṁ tāṁsam ekaṁ, viii. 39, 2.
vi. 62, 4. Tū navyasa jaramāsya manma upa bhūshato yuyujāna-sapti ityādi | 5. Tū valgū dāsrā puruṣākalamā pratnā navyasā vachasā vivāse |

"4. Thoso (Aśvins), with yoked horses, approach the hymn of their new worshipper. . . . 5. I adore with a new hymn these brilliant, strong, most mighty, and ancient (gods)."

vii. 35, 14, will be quoted in the next section.

vii. 53, 2. Pra pūrvajo pitarā navyasibhir girbhīḥ krīṇadhvan sadane pitasya ityādi |

"In the place of sacrifice propitiate with new hymns the ancient, the parents" (i.e. Heaven and Earth), etc.

vii. 56, 23. Bhūri cakra Marutaḥ pitryāṇi ukthāni yā vah basyante purā chit |

"Ye have done great things, o Maruts, when our fathers' hymns were recited of old in your honour."

vii. 59, 4. . . . abhi vah āvartt sumatir naviyasi10 tūyaṁ yāta pipi-shavah |

"May the new hymn turn you hither; come quickly, desirous to drink."

vii. 61, 6. . . . Pra vām manmāni rīchase navāni kṛitāni brahma jujushann imāni |

"May the new hymns made to praise you, may these prayers gratify you."

vii. 93, 1. Sūchīṇ nu stomaṁ nava-jātam adya Indrāgni Vṛitra-hanā jushetham | ubhā hi vāṁ suhavā johavīṁ ityādi |

"Indra and Agni, slayers of Vṛitra, receive with favour the pure hymn newly produced to-day. For again and again do I invoke you who lend a willing ear," etc.

viii. 5, 24. Tāhīr āyātam utibhir navyasibhiḥ suṣastibhiḥ yad vām vṛishkavasā hue |

"Come with those same succours, since I invoke you, bountiful [deities], with new praises." (The epithet navyasibhiḥ in this text might possibly be construed with the word utibhibhiḥ, "aids.")

viii. 6, 11. Aham pratnena manmanā girāḥ śumbhāmi Kaṇva-vat | yena Indraḥ sushmam id dadhe |

10 The same words, sumatir naviyasi, occur in viii. 92, 9, where they may not have the same sense as here.
"I decorate my praises with an ancient hymn, after the manner of Kanva, whereby Indra put on strength."

viii. 6, 43. \textit{Imāṁ su pārskyāṁ dhiyam maṁhor ghratasya pipyushīṁ Kanvaḥ utkṣena vairṛdhuk} |
"The Kanvas with their praise have augmented this ancient hymn, replenished with sweet butter."

viii. 12, 10. \textit{Iyāṁ te pītvyāvatī dhitir sbi navāyast saparyantī ityādi} |
"This new and solemn hymn advances to honour thee," etc.

viii. 20, 19. \textit{Yānāḥ ā su navishṭhayā vṛishṇāḥ pāvakān abhi Sobhars girā | gāya ityādi} |
"Sing, o Sobhari, with a new hymn to these youthful, vigorous, and brilliant (gods).

viii. 23, 14. \textit{Srūṣṭi Agne navasya me stomasya vīra viśpate vi mā-
yinas tapuṣāḥ rakshaso dāha} |
"Heroic Agni, lord of the people, on hearing my new hymn, burn up with thy heat the deluding Rakshases."

viii. 25, 24. \textit{... Kaśāvantā viprā navishṭhayā mati | maho vājināv arvanta saccā asanam} |
"I have celebrated at the same time with a new hymn, these twain and mighty [princes], strong, swift, and carrying whips."

viii. 39, 6. \textit{Agnir vedā marttānām apīchyaṁ ... Agnir dvārā vyār-
nyte svāhuto navāyasa} |
"Agni knows the secrets of mortals ... Agni, invoked by a new [hymn], opens the doors."

viii. 40, 12. \textit{Eva Indrāgniḥkyām pitṛ-vaḍ navīyo Māṇḍhātri-vaḍ Angiras-vaḍ avāchī ityādi} |
"Thus has a new [hymn] been uttered to Indra and Agni after the manner of our fathers, and of Māṇḍhātri, and of Angiras."

viii. 41, 2. \textit{Tam ā śu samanā girā pītṛnāṁ cha maṇmabhīṁ Nābhā-
kasya praśastibhir yaḥ sindhunāṁ upa udaye sapta-vasta sa madhyamaṁ} |
"[Worship] him (Varuṇa) continually with a song, with the hymns of the fathers,\textsuperscript{11} and with the praises of Nābhāka. He who dwells at the

\textsuperscript{11} The expression here employed, \textit{pitṛnāṁ cha maṇmabhīḥ}, occurs also in R.V. x. 57, 3 (=Vāj. S. 3, 53): \textit{Mano nu a huvāmahe nārāśaṁsenā somena pītṛnāṁ cha maṇmabhīḥ} | "We summon his soul with Soma, accompanied by human praises, and with the hymns of the fathers." The Vājasaneyi Sanhitā reads \textit{stomena}, "hymn," instead of \textit{somena}. The commentator there explains \textit{nārāśaṁsenā stomena} as "a hymn
birth-place of the streams, the lord of the seven sisters, abides in the centre." (This verse is quoted in the Nirukta x. 5. Nabhaka is said by Yaska to have been a rishi (rishir Nabhako babhava). A translation of the passage is given in Roth's Illustrations of the Nir. p. 135, where reference is also made to two verses of the preceding hymn (viii. 40, 4, 5), in which Nabhaka (the ancestor of Nabhaka) is mentioned thus: (verse 4) Abhyareha Nabhaka-vad Indraghi yajasâ girâ ... (verse 5) Pra brahmânî Nabhaka-vad Indragbhyam irajyata | "Worship Indra and Agni with sacrifice and hymn, like Nabhaka ... Like Nabhaka, direct your prayers to Indra and Agni." In explanation of the seven sisters, Roth refers to Nir. v. 27 (R.V. viii. 58, 12) where the seven rivers are mentioned. See his Illustrations of Nir. pp. 70, 71.

viii. 44. 12. Agni pratnena manmanâ sumberânas tanvam svâm kavih viprena vaivridhe |" "The wise Agni, illuminating his own body at [the sound of] the sage and ancient hymn, has become augmented."

viii. 55, 11. Vayam gha te apureyâ Indra brahmâni vritrahan | purutamasaâ purushâta vajrivo bhritinâ na pra bharâmasi |

"Indra, slayer of Vrittra, thunderer, invoked of many, we [thy] numerous [worshippers] bring to thee, as thy hire, hymns which never before existed."

viii. 63, 7, 8. Tyam te navayati matir Agne jahayi asmad â mandra sujata sukroto amura dasma atithe | sâ te Agne santamâ chanishthâ bha- vatu priyâ tayâ vardhasva sushtutah |

"O Agni, joyful, well-born, strong, unerring, and wondrous guest, this new hymn has been offered to (or, made for) thee by us; may it be dear to thee, agreeable and pleasant: lauded by it, do thou increase."

viii. 65, 5, 6. ... Indram gibir haramahe | Indram pratnena manmanâ marutvantam haramahe ityâdi | 12. (=S.V. ii. 340.) Vacham ashtapadih aham nava-sraktin pita-sriyam | Indrat pari tanvam mame |" "5. We invoke Indra with songs; we invoke Indra, attended by the Maruts, with an ancient hymn. ... 12. I compose for the sake of

in which men are praised," and pitrinâ cha manmadhih, as hymns "in which the father sare reverenced" (pitaro yath stotnair manyante te manmãnas tair ityâdi). See Prof. Max Müller's translation of this hymn in the Journal of Roy. As. Soc. for 1866, pp. 449 and 458.
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Indra a hymn of eight feet and nine lines, abounding in sacred truth.” (This verse is translated and explained by Professor Benfey, Sàma-veda, p. 255.)

ix. 9, 8. 

\[ \text{N}u \text{ navyase navyase sùktāya sadhaya pathaḥ | pratna-vad rochaya ruchāḥ} \]

“Prepare (o Soma) the paths for our newest, most recent, hymn; and, as of old, cause the lights to shine.”

ix. 42, 2. 

\[ \text{E}śha \text{ pratnena manmanā devo devebhyaḥ pari | dhrārayā pavate sutaḥ} \]

“This god, poured forth to the gods, with an ancient hymn, purifies with his stream.”

ix. 91, 5. 

\[ \text{S}a \text{ pratna-vad navyase visva-vāra sùktāya pathaḥ kriṣṇuḥ prāchāḥ ityādi} \]

“O god, who possessest all good, make, as of old, forward paths for this new hymn.”

ix. 99, 4 (= S.V. ii. 983). 

\[ \text{Taṁ gāthayā purāṇyā punānam abhi anu-shata | uto kripanta dhītayo devānāṁ nāma bibhratiḥ} \]

“They praised the pure god with an ancient song; and hymns embracing the names of the gods have supplicated him.” (Benfey translates the last clause differently.)

x. 4, 6. . . . 

\[ \text{Īyam te Agne navyasi manīṣhā yuksheva rathāṁ na sucha-yadbhir angaṁ} \]

“This is for thee, Agni, a new hymn: yoke thy car as it were with shining parts.”

x. 89, 3. 

\[ \text{Samānam asmai anapāvṛid archa kshmayā dīvo asamam brahma navyay ityādi} \]

“Sing (to Indra) without ceasing a new hymn, worthy of him, and unequalled in earth or heaven.”

x. 91, 13. 

\[ \text{Imām pratnāya sushṭutiṁ navyayastīṁ vocheyam asmai uṣate śrīṇotu naḥ} \]

“I will address to this ancient [deity] my new praises, which he desires; may he listen to us.”

x. 96, 11. . . . 

\[ \text{Nayam navyam haryasi manma nu priyam ityādi} \]

“Thou delightest in ever new hymns, which are dear to thee,” etc.

x. 160, 5. 

\[ \text{Āsvayanto gavyanto vājayanto havāmahe tvā upa gantavai} u | Ṣbhūṣhantas te sumatau navāyāṁ vayam Indra tvā śuṇaṁ huvema \]

“Desiring horses, cattle, and wealth, we invoke thee to approach us.
Paying homage to thee in a new hymn, may we, o Indra, invoke thee suspiciously."

SECT. III.—Passages of the Rig-veda, in which the rishis describe themselves as the composers of the hymns.

In this section I propose to quote, first of all, those passages in which the rishis distinctly speak of themselves as the authors of the hymns, and express no consciousness whatever of deriving assistance or inspiration from any supernatural source. I shall then adduce some further texts in which, though nothing is directly stated regarding the composition of the hymns, there is at the same time nothing which would lead the reader to imagine that the rishis looked upon them as anything else than the offspring of their own minds.

I shall arrange the quotations in which the rishis distinctly claim the authorship, according to the particular verb which is employed to express this idea. These verbs are (1) kṛi, "to make," (2) takṣh (= the Greek τεκταίνωμεν), "to fabricate," and (3) jān, "to beget, generate, or produce," with others which are less explicit.

I. I adduce first the passages in which (1) the verb kṛi, "to make," is applied to the composition of the hymns. (Compare R.V. vii. 61, 6, already quoted in the last section.)

R.V. i. 20, 1. Ayām devāya 'anmane stomo viprebhīr āsayā | akāri ratna-dhātamaḥ |

"This hymn, conferring wealth, has been made to the divine race, by the sages, with their mouth [or in presence of the gods]."

i. 31, 18. Etena Agne brāhmaṇā vāsviṣāvasa śakti vā yat te chakrīma viḍā vā |

"Grow, o Agni, by this prayer which we have made to thee according to our power, or our knowledge."

i. 47, 2. . . . Kaṇvāso vām brāhma kriṅvanti adhvara teshāṁ sa śriṅutaṁ havam |

"The Kaṇvās make a prayer to you: hear well their invocation."

i. 61, 16. Evā te hariyojanā suvrīkī Indra brahmaṇi Gotamāsah akrava |

"Thus, o Indra, yoker of steeds, have the Gotamas made hymns for thee efficaciously."

12 See the note on vi. 32, 1, below.
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i. 117, 25. \( \text{Etāni vām Āsvinā viryaṇi pra pūrvaṇi āyavaḥ avochar |} \\
\text{brahma kriṣṇanto}^{13} \text{ vṛishanā yuṣabhyaṁ svirāsa vidathām ā vadema |} \\
\text{“These, your ancient exploits, o Āsvins, men have declared. Let} \\
\text{us, who are strong in bold men, making a hymn for you, o vigorous} \\
\text{gods, utter our offering of praise.”} \\
i. 184, 5. \( \text{Esha vāṁ stomo Āsvināv akāri mānebhir maghavanā suvṛkti |} \\
\text{“This hymn has efficaciously been made to you, o opulent Āsvins,} \\
\text{by the Mānas.} \text{ (Comp. i. 169, 8; 171, 5; 182, 8; 184, 3.)} \\
\text{ii. 39, 8. \( \text{Etāni vāṁ Āsvinā vardhānāni brahma stomaṁ Grītsamadāsāḥ akraṇ |} \\
\text{“These magnifying prayers, [this] hymn, o Āsvins, the Grītsamas dāsāḥ have made for you.”} \\
\text{iii. 30, 20. Svāryavo matibhiṣi tubhyāṁ viprāḥ Indrāya vahāḥ Kuśikāsāḥ akraṇ |} \\
\text{“Aspiring to heaven, the sage Kuśikas have made a hymn with} \\
\text{praises to thee, o Indra.” (The word vahāḥ is stated by Sāyana to be} \\
\text{= stotra, “a hymn.”)} \\
i. 6, 11. \( \text{Akāri brahma samidhāṅa tubhyāṁ ityādi |} \\
\text{“O kindled [Agni], a prayer has been made to thee.”} \\
i. 16, 20. \( \text{Eved Indrāya vṛishabhāya vṛiṣhṇe brahma akarma Bhṛyavo na ratham | . . . . 21. Akāri te harivo brahma navayāṁ dhiyāḥ syāma} \\
\text{rathyaḥ sadāsāḥ |} \\
\text{“Thus have we made a prayer for Indra, the productive, the vigorous,} \\
\text{as the Bhṛgus [fashioned] a car. . . . . 21. A new prayer has been} \\
\text{made for thee, o lord of steeds. May we, through our hymn (or rite),} \\
\text{become possessed of chariots and perpetual wealth.”} \\
\text{vi. 52, 2. \( \text{Ati vā yo maruto manyate no brahma vā yaḥ kriyamānaṁ} \\
\text{nīnīṣāt | tapūṃshi tasmai vṛiṣiṇi santu brahma-āvisham abhi taṁ} \\
\text{sohetu āyauḥ |} \\
\text{“Whoever, o Maruts, regards himself as superior to us, or reviles} \\
\text{the prayer which is being made, may burning injuries be his lot; may} \\
\text{the sky scorch the enemy of prayer.”}^{14} \\

^{13} \text{The reader will find Prof. Haug’s opinion of the sense of this phrase in p. 11 f.} \\
\text{of his German dissertation “on the original signification of the word brahma,” of} \\
\text{which the author has been kind enough to send me a copy, which has reached me as} \\
\text{this sheet is passing through the press. Prof. Haug mentions R.V. i. 88, 4; vii.} \\
\text{103, 8, as passages (additional to those I have given) in which the expression occurs.} \\
^{14} \text{Translated by Prof. Haug in the Dissertation above referred to, p. 6.}
vii. 35, 14. Ādityāḥ Rudrāḥ Vasava juṣṭantaḥ (the Atharva-veda has juṣṭantām) idam brahma kriyamāṇāṁ navīyaḥ | śṛṅvantu no diyāḥ pār-
thīvacā gojātaḥ ityādi |

"The Ādityas, Rudras, and Vasus receive with pleasure this new prayer which is being made. May the gods of the air, the earth, and the sky hear us."

vii. 37, 4. Vayaṁ nu te dāśvāḥṣaḥ syāma brahma kriyavantāḥ ityādi |

"Let us offer oblations to thee, making prayers," etc.

vii. 97, 9. Iyāṁ vāṁ Brahmaṇaśpate svuṣrītīr brahma Indrāya vaṃśe akūri |

"Brahmaṇaśpate, this efficacious hymn, [this] prayer has been made for thee, and for Indra, the thunderer."

viii 51, 4. Āyāḥi kriyāvama te Indra brahmāṇi varādhana ityādi |

"Come, Indra, let us make prayers, which magnify thee," etc.

viii. 79, 3. Brahma te Indra gīrvaṇāḥ kriyante anatīdbhutā | imā juṣhava haryaśva yojanā yā te amannah |

"Unequalled prayers are made for thee Indra, who loveth hymns. Receive favourably, lord of the brown steeds, those which we have thought out for thee, to yoke thy horses."

x. 54, 6. . . . Adha priyam śuṣhama Indrāya manma brahmakṛito¹³ Vṛihadukthāḥ avāchī |

". . . An acceptable and powerful hymn has been uttered to Indra by Vṛihadvactha, maker of prayers."¹⁴

x. 101, 2. Mandrā kriṣṇudvāma dhiyaḥ ā tanudvāma nāvam aritra-
pāraṇīṁ kriṣṇudvāma |

"Make pleasant (hymns), prepare prayers, make a ship propelled by oars."

It is possible that in many of these passages the verb kṛi may have merely the signification which the word make has in English when we speak of "making supplications," etc., in which case it of course means to offer up, rather than to compose. But this cannot be the case in such passages as R.V. iv. 16, 20 (p. 233), where the rishi speaks of making

¹³ Compare rishayā mantrakṛito manvāśīyāḥ in Taîttrīya Brāhmaṇa, ii. 8, 8, 5; and R.V. ix. 114, 2: Rśke mantra-kriyāh stomaṁ Kaśyapovardhayaṁ gīrāh | somaṁ namasya rīvaiṁ so jayī virudhām patiḥ | "Rishi Kaśyapa, augmenting thy words with the praises of the makers of hymns, reverence King Soma, who was born the lord of plants."

¹⁴ Prof. Haug thinks the word brahma-kṛit here refers to hymns, and mentions other passages in which it occurs: see p. 12 of the Dissertation above referred to.
the hymn as the Bhṛgus made a chariot. And such an interpretation would be altogether inadmissible in the case of the texts which I next proceed to cite.

II. Passages in which the word takṣaḥ, "to fashion, or fabricate," is applied to the composition of the hymns.

i. 62, 13. Sanāyate Gotamaḥ Indra navyam atakṣhad brahma hariyojānāya ityādi | "Nodhas, descendant of Gotama, fashioned this new hymn for [thee], Indra, who art of old, and who yokest thy steeds," etc.

i. 130, 6. Imāṁ te vāchaṁ vasuyantāḥ āyavo rathaṁ na dhiraḥ svapāḥ atakshishuḥ sumnāya tvām atakshishuḥ |

"Desiring wealth, men have fashioned for thee this hymn, as a skilful workman [fabricates] a car; and thus they have disposed (lit. fashioned) thee to (confer) happiness."

i. 171, 2. Esā vaḥ stomo Maruto namasvān hridā taśto manasā dhāyī devaṁ |

"This reverential hymn, o divine Maruts, fashioned by the heart, has been presented [or, made] by the mind. [According to Śāyaṇa, the last words mean, 'let it be received by you with a favourable mind']."

ii. 19, 8. Evā te śṛitamadāḥ śūra manma avasyavo na vayunāni takṣhaḥ |

"Thus, o hero, have the Śṛitamadas, desiring succour, fashioned for thee a hymn, as men make works." (Śāyaṇa explains vayuna by "road.")

ii. 35, 2. Imāṁ su asmai hridāḥ ā sutashtam mantraṁ vocema kuviḍ aṣya vedaṁ |

"Let us address to him this well-fashioned hymn proceeding from the heart; will he not be aware of it?"

v. 2, 11. Etaṁ te stomaṁ tuvi-jāta vipro rathaṁ na dhiraḥ svapāḥ atakṣham |

"I, a sage, have fabricated this hymn for thee, o powerful [deity], as a skilful workman fashions a car."

v. 29, 15. Indra brahma kriyamāṇā jusahasva yā te śaṅkṣhtham navyaṁ akarma | vastreva bhadrā sukṛitā vasūyuh rathaṁ na dhiraḥ svapāḥ atakṣham |

17 See also v. 29, 15, and x. 39, 14, which will be quoted a little further on; and in which the verbs kṛi and takṣaḥ are both employed.
"O mighty Indra, regard with favour the prayers which are made, the new [prayers] which we have made for thee. Desirous of wealth, I have fabricated them like beautiful well-fashioned garments, as a skilful workman [constructs] a car." (Compare R.V. iii. 39, 2; above, p. 226.)

v. 73, 10. Īma bṛahmāṇi vardhanā Āśvibhyāṁ santu santamā | yā takṣāma rathān āva avochāma bṛihād namaḥ |

"May these magnifying prayers which we have fashioned, like cars, be pleasing to the Āsvins: we have uttered great adoration."

vi. 32, 1 (=S.V. i. 322). Apāryā purutamāṇi asmai mahe viraya tavase tūraya | virapāṇe vajriṇeh santamāṇi vachāmśi āsāḥ18 sthaviraya takṣaṃ |

"To this great hero, vigorous, energetic, the adorable, unshaken thunderer, I have with my mouth fabricated copious and pleasing prayers, which have never before existed."

vi. 16, 47. Ā te Agne richā havir hridā tasṭham bharāmasi |

"In this verse, Agni, we bring to thee an oblation fabricated by the heart." (Comp. R.V. iii. 39, 1, in p. 226.)

vii. 7, 6. Ete dyumnebhir viścaṁ ātiṃta mantram ye vā araṁ naryāḥ atakṣaṇ |

"These manly (Vasishthas), who have skilfully fabricated the hymn, have by their energy accomplished all things (?)."

vii. 64, 4. Yo cāṁ garttam manasā takṣhad etam urddhvaṁ dhitiṁ kriṇavaṁ dhārayaḥ cha |

"May he who with his mind fashioned for you (Mitra and Varuṇa) this car, make and sustain the lofty hymn." (The same expression urddhvaḥ dhitiḥ occurs in R.V. i. 119, 2.)

viii. 6, 33. Uta bṛahmanyā vayaṁ tubhyaṁ prayṛddha vajrivo vīprāḥ atakṣaṇa jīvao |

"O mighty thunderer, we, who are sage, have fabricated prayers for thee, that we may live."

x. 39, 14. Etāṁ cāṁ stomaṁ Āśvināv akarma atakṣāma Bhṛgavo na ratham | ni amṛkṣāma yoshaṇāṁ na maryyo nityaṁ na sūnāṁ tanayāṁ dādhanāḥ |

"This hymn, Āsvins, we have made for you; we have fabricated it

18 On the sense of āsā see Prof. Müller's article in the Journal of Roy. As. Soc. for 1867, p. 232 f.; and Bohtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, s.v.
as the Bhrigus [constructed] a car; we have decorated it, as a bride for her husband, continuing the series [of our praises] like an unbroken line of descendants.” (See iv. 16, 20, above, p. 233.)

(The following is Śaṇā’s comment on this passage, for a copy of which I am indebted to Professor Müller: Ṣvīnau vām yuvayor etām yathoktaṁ stomaṁ stotram akarma. akurma | Tad etad āha | Bṛgavo na Bṛgavaḥ iva ratham atakshāma vayaṁ stotram saṁskṛitavantaḥ | karmayogād Ribhavo Bṛgavaḥ uchyaṇe | athava rathakārāḥ Bṛgavaḥ | kinccha vayaṁ nityaṁ sāśvataṁ tanayaṁ yāgūdināṁ karanāṁ tanitāram sūnuṁ na aurasaṁ putram iva stotram dadhānaḥ dhārayanto maṇṇhye nyamākṣhāma yuvaṁoḥ stutiṁ nitarāṁ saṁskṛitavantaḥ | “Aśvins, we have made this preceding hymn or praise of you. He means to say this. Like the Bṛgus, we have made a car, we have carefully constructed a hymn. The Ribhus are, in this passage, ... styled Bṛgus; or Bṛgus are chariot-makers. Moreover, maintaining praise as a constant perpetrator (like a legitimate son) of sacrifice and other rites, we have polished, i.e. carefully composed a celebration of you among men [?].” In this comment the word yoshaṇā is left unexplained. In verse 12 of this hymn the Aśvins are supplicated to come in a car fleeter than thought, constructed for them by the Ribhus—ō tena yātām manasā javiyānā rathaṁ yaṁ vām Ribhavaḥ chakrur Aśvinā |)

x. 80, 7. Agnaye brahma Ribhavas tataksrūḥ |

“The Ribhus [or the wise] fabricated a hymn for Agni.

III. I next quote some texts in which the hymns are spoken of as being generated by the rishis. (Comp. R.V. vii. 93, 1, in p. 228.)

iii. 2, 1. Vaiśvānarāya dhishaṇāṁ ritāvridhe ghrītaṁ na pātām Agnaye janamāsi |

“We generated a hymn, like pure butter, for Agni Vaiśvānara, who promotes our sacred rites.”

vii. 15, 4. Navaṁ nu stomam Agnaye dīvāh śyenāya jīsanam | vasaṁ kuvīd vanāti naḥ |

“I have generated a new hymn to Agni, the falcon of the sky; will he not bestow on us wealth in abundance?”

vii. 22, 9. Ye cha pūrve rishayo ye cha nūtnāḥ Indra brahmānī janayante viprāḥ |

“Indra, the wise rishis, both ancient and modern, have generated prayers.”
vii. 26, 1. Na somaḥ Indraṁ asuto mamāda na abrahmaṇa maghavanam sutāsaḥ | tasmoi uktāṁ janaye yaj jujosad nriavād navīyaḥ śrīnavaḥ yathā naḥ |

“The soma exhilarates not Indra unless it be poured out; nor do libations [gratify] Maghavan when offered without a prayer. To him I generate a hymn such as may please him, that, after the manner of men, he may hear our new [production].”

vii. 31, 11. . . . Suvrīktim Indrāya brahma janayanta viprāḥ |

“The sages generated an efficacious production and a prayer for Indra.”

vii. 94, 1, 2 (=S.V. ii. 266). Iyām vām asya manmanah Indrāgni pūrya-stutir abhrād vriścit ivā ajani | śrīnutaṁ jaritur havam ityādi |

“This excellent praise has been generated for you, Indra and Agni, from the soul of this [your worshipper], like rain from a cloud. Hear the invocation of your encomiast.” (Benfey thinks manman, “spirit,” is to be understood of Soma, whose hymn, i.e. the sound of his dropping, resembles the falling of rain. The scholiast of the S.V. makes manman = stotri, “worshipper”.)

viii. 43, 2. Aesmai te pratiharyate Jātavedo vicharṣaṇe Agne janāmi susūtūtim |

“Wise Agni Jātavedas, I generate a hymn for thee, who receivest it with favour.”

viii. 77, 4. Ā tvā ayam arkaḥ uṭaye vavarttati yaṁ Gotamah ajjianan |

“This hymn which the Gotamas have generated, incites thee to succour us.”

viii. 84, 4, 5. Śrūdhi havāṁ Tiraschyaḥ Indra yas tvā saparyati suvīryasya gomato rāyaḥ pūrdhī mahān asi | Indra yas te navīyaṁ giram mandrām ajjianat chikitvin-manasaṁ dhiyam pratnāṁ ritasya pipuṣhīm |

“Hear, Indra, the invocation of Tiraschi, thy worshipper; replenish him with wealth in strong men and in cattle, for thou art great. Indra (do this for him) who has generated for thee the newest exhilarating hymn, springing from an intelligent mind, an ancient mental product, full of sacred truth.”

(These verses occur also in the Sāma-veda ii. 233, 234, and are translated by Professor Benfey, at pp. 230 and 250 of his edition. The hymn referred to in this passage is apparently designated as both
new and old. How can it be both? It may have been an old hymn re-written and embellished; ancient in substance, though new in expression. Compare St. John’s Gospel, xiii. 34, and the First Epistle of St. John, ii. 7, 8, and iii. 11.)

ix. 73, 2. . . madhor dhārābhīr janayanto arkaṃ it priyām Indra-
sya tavam avēvidhan |

“Generating the hymn, they have augmented the beloved body of Indra with the honied streams.”

ix. 95, 1 (=S.V. i. 530). . . . aто matīr janayata svadāhāhiḥ |

“Wherefore generate hymns with the oblations.” (Professor Benfey makes janayata the 3rd person singular of the imperfect middle, and applies it to Soma.)

x. 7, 2. Imāḥ Agne matayas tubhyāṁ jātāḥ gobhir aśvair abhi griṇanti rādhaḥ |

“These hymns, Agni, generated for thee, celebrate thy bounty in cows and horses.”

x. 23, 5, 6, 7. Yo vācāḥ vivācho mṛīḍhravāchaḥ purā sahasrā aśivā jaghāna | Tat tad iḍ asya pauṃayaṁ griṇimasi pitā iha yas tavīṁ vi-vṛidhe śavah | 6. Stomaṁ te Indra Vimadāḥ ajījanann apūrveyam purutamaṁ sudānave | Vidma hi asya bhojanam inasya yad ā paśuṁ na gopāḥ karāmahe | 7. Mā kīr naḥ eṇā sakhyā viyaushus tava eha Indra Vimadasya eha rishaḥ | Vidma hi iśe pramatiṁ deva jamī-vaḍ asme te santu sakhyā śivāni |

“5. Who (Indra) with his voice slew many thousands of the wicked uttering confused and hostile cries. We laud his several acts of valour, who, like a father, grew in vigour and strength. 6. For thee, o Indra, who art bountiful, the Vimadas have generated a copious hymn, which never before existed (apūrveya); for we know that it is gratifying to this mighty god, when we attract him hither as a cowherd drives his cattle. 7. Indra, may that friendship of ours never be dissolved, which exists between thee and the rishi Vimada: for we know thy wisdom, o god; may thy friendship be favourable to us, like that of a kinsman.”

x. 67, 1. Imāṁ dhiyaṁ apta-śirṣānīṁ pitā naḥ ritaprajātāṁ bhihatam avīndat | turiyāṁ svij janayāḥ viśvajanyo Ayāsyah uktham Indraya śāsan |

19 As Prof. Aufrecht expresses it: “Gir is opposed to dhi, as form to substance a new utterance, but a primordial homage.”
“Our father hath discovered [or invented] this great, seven-headed hymn, born of sacred truth; Ayāśya, friend of all men, celebrating Indra, has generated the fourth song of praise.” (In his Lexicon, Roth gives Ayāśya as a proper name; but says it may also be an adjective with the sense of “unwearied.”)

x. 91, 14. Kīlāla-pe soma-prishtāya vedhase hridā matīṁ janaye cārurum Agnaye |

“With my heart I generate a beautiful hymn for Agni, the drinker of nectar, the soma-sprinkled, the wise.” (See also R.V. i. 109, 1, 2, which will be quoted below.)

IV. In the following texts the verbal root ri, “to move, send forth,” etc., used with or without a preposition, is applied to the utterance or (it may even mean) the production of hymns.

i. 116, 1. Nāsalyābhīyām bahir āva pravrinja stomān iyarmi abhriyā āva vātaḥ | yāv arhaṣāya Vimadāya jāyaṁ senājuva ni uhatuḥ ratheṇa |

“In like manner as I spread the sacrificial grass to the Nāsatyas (Aśvins), so do I send forth to them hymns, as the wind [drives] the clouds; to them (I say), who bore off to the youthful Vīmadā his bride in a chariot swift as an arrow.”

vii. 61, 2. Pra vāṁ sa Mitrā-Varunau ritāvā vīpuro manmāni dirghā-śrud iyartī | Yasya brahmāṇi sukṛata avāthaḥ ā yot kravā na saradāḥ prinaiitho |

“The devout sage, heard afar off, sends forth his hymns to you, o Mitra and Varuna. Do you, mighty gods, receive his prayers with favour, so that for (many) autumns ye may not be satiated with his fervour.” (See Böhtlingk and Roth’s Lexicon, s.v. a +. pri.)

viii. 12, 31. Imāṁ te Indra susṛutiṁ vipraṁ iyartiḥ dhiṣṭiḥiḥ | jārim padā āva pipratim pra adhvaṁ |

“In the sacrifice the sage, with praises, sends forth to thee this hymn, which is of kin to thee, and, as it were, supplies the places (of others?)

viii. 13, 26. . . . Ritād iyarmi te dhiyam manoyuṣam |

“. . . From the sacred ceremony I send forth a prayer which will attract thy heart.”

x. 116, 9. Pra Indrāgniḥyāṁ svachāsyāṁ iyarmi sindhāv āva prera-yaṁ nāvam arkaḥ |

“I send forth a [hymn] with beautiful words to Indra and Agni; with my praises I have, as it were, launched a ship on the sea.”
TO THE ORIGIN OF THE VEDIC HYMNS. 241

(Compare R.V. ii. 42, 1, spoken of Indra in the form of the bird called Kapinjala, a sort of partridge: \textit{Iyartti vācham ariteva nāvam | It sends forth a voice, as a rower propels a boat.} See also R.V. x. 101, 2, quoted above, p. 234.)

x. 4, 1. \textit{Pra te yaksī pra te iyarmi manma bhuvo yathā vandyo no havesku | dhawam niva prapā asi tvam Agne iyakshave pūrave pratnā rañjan |}

“I offer thee worship, I send forth to thee a meditation, that thou mayest be accessible to adoration in our invocations. For thou, Agni, ancient king, art like a trough of water in the desert to the man who longs for thee.”

V. In the following passages other verbs are employed to denote the composition or presentation of hymns:

i. 61, 2. \textit{Indrāya hrīḍā manasa manishā pratnāya satye dhiyo marjayanta |}

“To Indra, the ancient lord, \textit{prepared [or polished] hymns [or ceremonies] with the heart, mind, and understanding.”}

i. 61, 4. \textit{Amaī id u stomaṁ saṁhinomi rathaṁ na tashtā iva ityādi |}

“To him (Indra) I \textit{send forth a hymn, as a carpenter a car},” etc.

i. 94, 1 (= S.V. i. 66). \textit{Imaṁ stomaṁ arhate Jātavedass ratham iva sam mahema manishayā | bhadrā hi naḥ pramatir asya saṁsadi Agne sakhye mā rishāma vayaṁ tava |}

“Let us with our intellect \textit{construct (or, send forth) this hymn for the adorable Jātavedas like a car, for his wisdom is favourable to us in the assembly. Agni, in thy friendship may we never suffer.”} (The root \textit{naḥ} means to honour or worship.\textsuperscript{20} The reader may compare Benfey’s translation.)

There is to be found in the hymns a great multitude of passages in which the rishi speaks of presenting his hymn and prayers to the various deities who are the objects of his worship, without directly claiming for himself the authorship of those compositions. The natural inference to be drawn from the expressions which we shall find to be employed in most of the cases to which I refer, would, I think, be that the personality of the rishi himself was uppermost in his mind, and that he was not conscious that the praises which he was uttering to

\textsuperscript{20} See, however, the various reading suggested by Böthingk and Roth \textit{sv. naḥ + saṁ and āḥ + saṁ}. 16
the gods proceeded from any other source than his own unaided faculties. Of this description are the following texts, which represent a manner of thinking and speaking very prevalent in the hymns:

i. 60, 5. Tam tvā vayam pratim Agne rayinām prāsaṃśāmo matibhir Gotamāsah |

"We, the Gotamas, praise with hymns thee, Agni, the lord of riches."

i. 77, 5. Eva Agnir Gotamabhīr rītāvā viprebhīr astoṣṭa jātavedaḥ |

"Thus has the holy Agni Jātavedas been celebrated by the sage Gotamas."

i. 78, 5. Avochāma Rāhuṇgānas Agnaye madhumad vachaḥ | dyumnair abhi pra nonumaha |

"We, the Rāhuṇgānas, have uttered to Agni honied speech; we incessantly laud him with eulogies."

i. 91, 11. Somā gīrbhi tvā vayam vardhayāmo vacho-vidah | sumṛiliko nah aviṣa |

"Soma, we who are skilled in speech magnify thee with praises; do thou enter into us, full of kindness."

i. 102, 1. Imām te dhiyam prabhare maho mahim . . . . . .

"I present to thee joyfully this great hymn . . . . . ."

i. 183, 6. Atarīshna tamasaś pāram asya prati vām stomo Āśvināv adhāyi |

"We have crossed over this darkness; a hymn, o Āśvins, has been addressed to you."

iii. 53, 2. Pītur na putrahā sichām a rahbe te Indra svādiṣṭhayā girā sāchitaḥ |

"Powerful Indra, I lay hold of thy skirt (as a son does that of his father), with a very sweet hymn."

iv. 3, 16. Etā visvā vidusha tubhyam vedho nithāni Agne niṇyā va- 

chāmsi | nivachanā kavyāni asaṁśīsham matibhir vipraḥ utkhaḥ |

"Intelligent Agni, to thee, who knowest, [have I uttered] all these songs and mysterious words; to thee, who art a bard, have I, a sage, uttered these hymns, these poems, with meditations and praises."

iv. 32, 12. Avṛśīdhanta Gotamāḥ Indra tve stoma-vāhasah |

"The Gotamas, Indra, bringing hymns to thee, have magnified thee."

v. 11, 5. Tubhya idam Agne madhumattamaṁ vachas tubhyam manishā 

iyam astu śaṁ hride | Tvām girā sindhum iva avanir mahār ā priṇantī 

śavasā vardhayanti cha |
"Agni, may this sweetest of prayers, may this mental production be pleasant to thy heart. As great rivers fill the ocean, so do the words of praise fill thee, and augment thee with strength."

v. 22, 4. Agne chikiḍḍhi aṣya naḥ idaṁ vachaḥ sahasya | Taṁ tvā susiḥra dāmpata stomaṁ varūhanti Atrayo giriḥhī śumbhanti Atrayaḥ |

"Vigorous Agni, observe these our words; thee, with the beautiful nose, the lord of the house, the Atris magnify with praises, the Atris decorate with hymns."

v. 45, 4. Śuktebhūr vo vāchobhir deva-jushtair Indrā nu Agnī aṣayə hu-vadhya० |

"Let me invoke you for help, o Indra and Agni, with well-spoken words, such as are acceptable to the gods.

vi. 38, 3. Taṁ vo dhiyā paramayā purājām ajaram Indrove abhi anūshī arkaiḥ ityādi | |

"I adore thee, the ancient, imperishable Indra with an excellent hymn and with praises."

vii. 67, 5. Prāchām a devā Aśvinā dhiyam ma amridhrāṁ sātaye kritam vasūyum |

"O divine Aśvins, bring to fulfilment my unweared prayer which suppcilates wealth."

vii. 85, 1. Punīṣhe vām arakhasam maṇīshāṁ somam Indrāya Varunāya jukvato ṣvita-pratikām Usasam na devīṁ ityādi |

"Offering soma to Indra and Varuna, I prepare for you twain the sincere hymn, like the goddess Ushas, with glittering face."

viii. 5, 18. Asmākam adya vām ayaṁ stomo vāhishḍho antamaḥ | yuvābhyaṁ bhūtu Aśvinā |

"May this hymn of ours approach near to you, to-day, o Aśvins, and be effectual in bearing you hither."

viii. 8, 8. Kīṁ anye paryūṣate asmat stomebhīr Aśvinā | putraḥ Kanyasava vām rishir giriḥbhir Vatso avāvridhat |

"Aśvins, do others than we set round you with songs? Vatsa, the son of Kanya, has magnified you by his hymns."

viii. 27, 8. Ā praḥ yāta Maruto Vishṇu Aśvinā Pūshan mākinayā dhiyā | 11. Idā hi vaḥ upastutim idā vāвесya bhaktaye upa vo viśva-vedasam namasyur āśrīkṣhi |

21 Compare vi. 8, 1. Vaiśvānārṇīṣa namit navyaṁ śuchīṁ somaṁ ieva pavate chātur Aṇaya | "A new and bright hymn is purified, like beautiful soma, for Agni Vaiśvānara."
THE RISHIS, AND THEIR OPINIONS IN REGARD

"8. Come, O Maruts, Vishnu, Aśvins, Pūshan, at my hymn. 11. For now, possessors of all riches, now, in order to obtain wealth, have I, full of reverence, sent forth to you a hymn."


"2. Agni, receive my hymn: grow by this product of my thought: rejoice in our beautiful words. 22. And may my thoughts and words always augment thee; Agni, think of our friendship. 26. With my mental productions I adorn Agni, the young, the lord of the people, the sage, the all-devouring, the very restless."

x. 40. 1. Astā iva suprataraṁ layam asyan bhūshann iva prabhara stomaṁ asmai | vācā viprāst tarata vācham aryo niramaya jaritaḥ soma Indraṁ |

"Like an archer discharging his far-shooting arrow, with zeal present the hymn to Indra. Sages, by your song, overcome the song of the enemy; worshipper, arrest Indra at the soma."

x. 63, 17. Eva Plateḥ sūnur avivriddhad vo viśve Ādityaḥ Ādite mani- shiḥ | Ṛṣīnāso naro amartyena astaṁ jano dīvyo Gayena |

"Thus, all ye Ādityas, Aditi, and ye ruling powers, has the wise son of Plati magnified you. The celestial race has been lauded by the immortal Gaya."

x. 111, 1. Maniśīn̄ hāḥ prabharaḥvam maniśham yathā yathā mata- yaḥ santi niṇṇam | Indraṁ satyair ā īrayāma kriśbhiḥ sa hi viro giri- vaṇasyur vidānāḥ |

"Sages, present the prayer, according as are the various thoughts of men. Let us by our sincere rites stimulate Indra, for he is a hero, he is wise and loves our songs."

In the following verse, from a hymn in praise of liberality, it is said, though no doubt only figuratively, that the true rishi is the prince who is bountiful to the priesthood.

x. 107, 6. Tam eva rishiṁ tam ā brahmaṇaṁ āhur yajnayanam sāma- gāṁ ukthaśasam | sa śukraya tane veda tīrṇo yaḥ prathamo dakshīṇaṁ yā rādhaḥ |

"He it is whom they call a rishi, a priest, a pious sacrificer, a chaunter of prayers, a reciter of hymns; he is who knows the three bodies of the brilliant (Agni),—the man who is most prominent in bestowing gifts."
Sect. IV.—Passages of the Rig-veda in which a supernatural character is ascribed to the rishis or the hymns.

In the present section I propose to collect the most distinct indications which I have noticed in the Vedic hymns of any supernatural attributes attaching, in the opinion of the authors, either to the rishis themselves, or to their compositions. We shall see in the course of this enquiry (1) that a certain superhuman character was ascribed by the later rishis, who composed the hymns, to some of their predecessors; (2) that expressions are occasionally employed by the rishis which appear to ascribe their compositions to a divine influence generally; while there is a still more numerous set of texts in which the hymns are attributed in various forms of phraseology to the agency of the or more particular and specified deities; and (3) that there is a considerable number of passages in which a mysterious or magical power is ascribed to the hymns or metres.

I proceed to furnish specimens of these several classes of quotations.

I. I adduce some passages which ascribe a superhuman character or supernatural faculties to the earlier rishis. These are the following:

R.V. i. 179, 2. Ye chid hi purvo ritasapah asan sakam devebhir avadann ritani | te chid avasur ityadi |

“The pious sages who lived of old, and who conversed about sacred truths with the gods, led a conjugal life,” etc.

vii. 76, 4. Te id devanam sadhamadah asan ritavanah kavyah purvyasa | gulham jyotiha pitaro anvavandam satyamantrah ajanayann ushasam |

“They were the associates of the gods, those ancient pious sages. The fathers found out the hidden light; with true hymns they generated the dawn.”

x. 14, 15. Yamaya madhumattamaḥ rajne havyah jujotana | idam namah rishibhyah purvajebhyah purvebhyah pathikridbhyaḥ |

“Offer to king Yama a most sweet oblation. (Let) this reverence (be paid) to the rishis born of old, who were the earliest guides.”

22 Compare A.V. x. 7, 14, quoted above in p. 3.
The sixty-second hymn of the tenth Mandala contains the following passage regarding the Angirases (see above, p. 223):

1. The Angirases.—x. 62, 1, 3. Ye yajnena dakshinaya samaktah Indraya sakhyam amritatvam anasa | tebyo bhadram Angiraso vah astu prati gribhita manavah sumedhasah | 3. Ye pitena suryam arohan adi aprathayam prthivim mataram vi ityadi |

"1. Blessings be on you, Angirases, who, sanctified by sacrifice and liberality, attained the friendship of Indra and immortality. Do ye, o sages, graciously receive the man (who addresses you). 3. Ye who by sacrifice caused the sun to ascend the sky; and spread out our mother earth," etc.

This is succeeded by the following verses:

x. 62, 4. Ayam Nabha vadati valguvo grihe deva-pratrishayas tat shrutana . . . | 5. Virupasa id rishyas te id gambhira-vepasa | Angirasah sunavas te Agneh pari jajivre |

"This Nabhan addresses you, brilliant beings, within the house. Hear this, ye rishis, sons of the gods. . . . 5. The Virupas are rishis, profound in emotion; they are the sons of Angiras; they have been born from Agni."

(The fifth verse is quoted in the Nirukta, xi. 17. See Roth's illustrations of the passage.)

2. Vaisishtha.—A supernatural character is attributed to Vasishtha also in the following passage (which has been already quoted and illustrated in Vol. I. pp. 318 ff.).

vii. 33, 7 ff. Trayah krivanti bhuwanasya retas tisra prajah auryah jyotir-agrah | trayo gharmasa uhasam sanchante sarvan it tain anu vidur Vasishtha | 8. Suryasyeva vakshatho jyotir esha samudrasyeva mahimah gabhira | vatasyea prajavo na anyena stoma Vasishthah anu etave vah |

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The next verse (which, with the sequel, is quoted in my article "On the relations of the priests to the other classes of Indian society in the Vedic age," Journ. Roy. As. Soc. for 1866, p. 276) is as follows: 6. Ye Agneh pari jajivre Virupusah divas pari | Navagvo nu Dasagvo Angirantanah sacha devakeshau manyate | "The Virupas who were produced from Agni, from Dyaus,—the Navagva, the Dasagva, who is a most eminent Angiras, lavishes gifts along with the gods." Here the Virupas would seem rather to be princes than rishis: and the same is the case in the following passage also: iii. 58, 6. Ine bhajah Angiraso Virupah divas putraus aurasya virah | Vivasmiti yoga dedato magaham sakhasvades pra tivanta vyah | "These liberal Virupas of the race of Angiras, heroic sons of the divine Dyaus (the sky), bestowing gifts on Vivasmita at the ceremony with a thousand libations, have prolonged their lives." (See Vol. I. p. 341 f.)
9. Te id ninyam hridayasya praketaḥ sahasra-valṣam abhi sancharantī | 
yamena tatam paridhiṁ vayantaḥ aṣparaṇaḥ upa sedur Vasishṭhaḥ | 10. 
Vidyuto jyotiḥ parisenjihānam Mitra-Varuṇaḥ yad aphaṣyatam tvā | 
tat te 
janma uta ekaṁ Vasishṭha Agastyo yat tvā visāh ājaḥāra | 11. Utāsi 
Mitrāvaruṇa Vasishṭha Urvaśīyāḥ brahmaṁ manaso 'dhi jātaḥ | 
drapṣam 
skanman brahmaṇā daivyena viśve devaṁpushkara tvā odaṁta[1]. 12. Sa 
praketaḥ ubhayasya pravidvān sahasra-dānāḥ uta vā sadānāḥ | 
yamena 
tatam paridhiṁ vayishyan aṣparaṇaḥ pari jāne Vasishṭhaḥ | 13. Satre ha 
jātaṁ iṣhitaḥ namobhiḥ kumbho retaḥ sīsichituḥ samānām | 
tato ha Mānaḥ 
udiyāya madhyāt tato jātaṁ rishim āhur Vasishṭham[1] |  

“7. Three [gods] create the fecundating principle in (all) existences; 
[there exist] three excellent productions of which light is the first: 
three fires attend upon the dawn: all these the Vasishṭhas know. 8. 
The splendour of these [sages] is like the full glory of the sun; their 
grandeur is profound as that of the ocean; like the swiftness of the 
wind, your hymns, o Vasishṭhas, cannot be followed by any other 
bard. 9. Through the intuitions of their hearts they seek out the 
mystery with a thousand branches. Weaving the envelopment ex-
tended by Yama [Agni ? see R.V. i. 66, 4] the Vasishṭhas sat near the 
Apsaras. 10. When Mitra and Varuṇa saw thee quitting the gleam of 
the lightning, that was thy birth, Vasisṭha, and [thou hadst] one 
[other], when Agastya brought thee to the people. 11. And, Vasis-
ṭha, thou art the son of Mitra and Varuṇa, born, o priest, from the 
mind of Urvaśi; all the gods placed thee—the drop fallen through 
divine contemplation—in the vessel. 12. He the wise, knowing both 
[worlds?], with a thousand gifts, or with gifts, Vasisṭha, being about 
to weave the envelopment extended by Yama, was produced from the 
Apsaras. 13. Born at the sacrifice, and impelled by adorations, they 
[Mitra and Varuṇa] let the same equal procreative energy fall into the 
jar; from the midst of this Māna (Agastya) issued forth; from this 
men say the rishi Vasishṭha was produced.” 

Two of these verses are quoted in the Nirukta, verse 8, in xi. 20, 
and verse 11, in v. 14. See also Prof. Roth’s Illustrations of that 
work, p. 64, where he states his opinion that the foregoing verses 
which describe the miraculous birth of Vasisṭha in the style of the 
epic mythology, are a later addition to an older hymn. See the note 
in p. 321 of the First Volume of this work.
The two following passages also have reference to knowledge supernaturally communicated, or favours divinely conferred on Vasishṭha. See Vol. I. p. 325 ff.

vii. 87, 4. Uvācha me Varuṇa medhīraya triḥ sapta nāma aghnyā bibhārti | vidvān padasya guhyā na voched yugāya vipraḥ uparāya śikṣan | “Varuṇa said to me, the intelligent, the cow has thrice seven names.’ The wise [god], though he knows them, has not declared the mysteries of the word, which he desires to reveal to a later generation.”

vii. 88, 4. Vasīśṭhōnaḥ ha Varuṇo nāvi ā adhād rishiṁ chakraṁ svapāṁ mahobhīḥ | stotāram vipraḥ sudinatve ahnāṁ yād nu dyāvas tataṁ yād uahasāḥ | “Varuṇa took Vasīśṭha into the boat; by his mighty acts, working skillfully he (Varuṇa) has made him a rishi; the wise (god) has made him to utter praises in an auspicious time, that his days and dawns may be prolonged.” (See Vol. I. p. 325 ff.; and compare R.V. x. 101, 2, and x. 116, 9, in pp. 234 and 240, above.)

3. Viśvāmitra.—In one or more of the texts which I shall next produce, a superhuman character is ascribed to Viśvāmitra, if not to the Kuśikas.

iii. 29, 15. Āmitrāyudho marutāṁ iva prayāḥ prathamajāḥ brahmaṁ viśvam idḥ viduḥ | dyumnavad brahma Kuśikāśaḥ eriṁ ekaṁ eko dāmo Agniṁ samādhire | “Combating their foes, like hosts of Maruts, (the sages) the first-born of prayer are masters of all knowledge; the Kuśikas have uttered an enthusiastic prayer; each of them has kindled Agni in his house.” (See Vol. I. p. 347.)

iii. 43, 5. Kuviṁ mā gopāṁ karase janasya kuviṁ rajānam Mahavann rishiṁ | kuviṁ mā rishiṁ papivāṁsaṁ sutasya kuviṁ me vasvaṁ amritasya śikṣāḥ | “Dost thou not make me a shepherd of the people? dost thou not make me a king, o impetuous Mahavan? dost thou not make me a rishi, a drinker of the soma? wilt thou not bestow upon me imperishable wealth?” (See Vol. I. p. 344.)

iii. 53, 9. Māhan rishi devajāḥ devajātāḥ astabhnāḥ sindhum arnavāṁ nṛichakṣāḥ | Viśvāmitro yād avahat Sudāsam aprīyāyata Kuśikebhīr Indraḥ |
"The great rishi (Viśvāmitra), leader of men, god-born, god-im- pelled, stemmed the watery current. When Viśvāmitra conducted Sudās, Indra was propitiated through the Kuśikas." (See Vol. I. pp. 342. Indra himself is called a Kuśika in R.V. i. 10, 11. See Vol. I. p. 347.)

According to ix. 87, 3, of which Uśanas is the traditional rishi, certain mysterious knowledge is said to have been possessed by that personage:

Rishir vipraḥ pura-etā janānāṁ ribhur ṛītraḥ Uśanā kāvyena | sa chiḍ viveda nihitaṁ yaḥ asām apiḥyaṁ guhyaṁ nāma gonām |

"A wise rishi, a leader of men, skilful, and prudent, is Uśanas, through his insight as a seer; he has known the hidden mysterious name applied to these cows."

Again in ix. 97, 7, it is said: Pra kāvyam Uśaneva bruvāno deve devānāṁ janimā vivaktī |

"Uttering, like Uśanas, the wisdom of a sage, the god (Soma) declares the births of the gods."

In a hymn of the tenth Maṇḍala, the rishis-are spoken of as "seeing" the objects of their contemplation in a way which seems to imply a supernatural insight (see above, pp. 116, 118, 125 ff.); in this hymn, x. 72, 1, 9, it is said:

Devānāṁ nu vayaṁ jānā pravoḥāma vipānyayā | ukthesu śasyamānesu yaḥ pasyād uttare yuge | Brahmanaśpatī etā saṁ karmāraḥ iva adhamat | devānāṁ pūrve ye ye asataḥ sad ajāyata |

"Let us, from the love of praise, celebrate in recited hymns the births of the gods,—any one of us who in this later age may see them. Brahmanaśpati has kindled these births, as a blacksmith [blows a flame]: in the earliest age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent." 24 (See Vol. I. p. 46.)

Another not less decided instance of this use of the verb to see, in the sense of supernatural insight, may be found in the verse of the Vālakhilya already quoted in Vol. II. p. 220, which will be cited below. See also x. 130, 6, which will be quoted further on.

The next two passages speak of the radiance of the rishis.

viii. 3, 3 (= S.V. i. 250, and Vāj. S. 33, 81). Imaḥ u tvā purūvavo

24 The first of these verses is translated by Prof. Benfey in his Glossary to the Śāma-veda, p. 154.
gīro sarīhantu yāḥ mama | pāvaka-varṇāḥ suchayo vipaśchitaḥ abhi stomaṁ anuśhataḥ |

“Lord of abundant wealth, may these prayers of mine magnify thee! Pure sages of radiant appearance have celebrated thee with hymns.”

viii. 6, 10. Aham id hi pituḥ pari medhām rītasya jāgrabha | aham sūryaḥ iva ajani |

“I have acquired knowledge of the ceremonial from [my] father; I have become like the sun.” (Is Indra the father here referred to?)

The following texts, which occur in the last book of the Rig-veda, speak of tapas (“fervour” or “austerity”) being practised by the rishis much in the same way as the later epic literature does. This use of the word is not known in the earlier books of the R.V. (See Boehtlingk and Roth’s Lexicon, under the word tapas.)

x. 109, 4. Devāḥ etasyām avadanta pūrve sapta rishayās tapase ye nisheduḥ |

“The following gods spoke of her, the seven rishis who sat down for austere-fervour.” (See my article “On the priests of the Vedic age” in the Journ. Roy.-As. Soc. for 1866, p. 270.)

x. 154, 2. Tapasā ye anādhriśyās tapasā ye svar yayaḥ | tapo ye chakrīre mahās tāṁs chid eva api gachhatāḥ | 5. Sahasra-nīthāḥ kavayo ye gopāyanti sūryam rishīṁs tapasya Yama tapojān api gachhatāḥ |

“Let him (the deceased) go to those who through austere-fervour are invincible, who by austere-fervour have gone to heaven, who have performed great austerity. 5. Let him go, Yama, to the sages of a thousand songs who guard the sun (see Wilson, Vish. Pur. vol. ii. pp. 284 ff.), to the devout rishis, born from fervour.” (See my article “On Yama” in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc.)

x. 190, 1. Ritaṁ cha satyam cha abhāddhāt tapaso ādhyājyata | tato rātrī ajāyata tataḥ samudraḥ arnavaḥ |

“Right and truth sprang from kindled austerity; thence sprang night, thence the watery ocean.”

In x. 167, 1, it is even said that Indra attained heaven by austerity:

Tvāṁ tapah paritapya ajayaḥ svaḥ |

“By performing austerity thou didst conquer heaven.”

In some places the gods are said to possess in the most eminent degree the qualities of rishis, or kavis. This may possibly imply, e converso, that the rishis were conscious of a certain affinity with the divine
nature, and conceived themselves to participate in some degree in the superior wisdom and knowledge of the deities.

R.V. i. 31, 1. Tvam Agne prathamo Angiråḥ rishir devo devänäm abha¬
vaḥ śivaḥ sakhå ityädi | 2. Tvam Agne prathamo Angirastamaḥ kavir
devänäm paribhūhasi vratam |

"1. Thou, Agni, the earliest rishí Angiras, a god, hast been the au-
spicious friend of the gods. . . . . 2. Thou, Agni, the earliest and most
Angiras-like sage, administerest the ceremonial of the gods."

i. 66, 2. . . . Rishir na stubhå vikshu praśastah ityädi |

"Like a rishí, who praises [the gods], he (Agni) is famous among
the people," etc.

iii. 21, 3. . . . Rishih śreshthaḥ samidhyase yajnasya pra avitå bhava |

"Thou, Agni, the most eminent rishí, art kindled; be the protector
of the sacrifice."

v. 29, 1. . . . Archanti två marutaḥ pûta-dakshås tvam esham rishir
Indrå asi dhiraḥ |

"The Maruts, endowed with pure dispositions, worship thee; thou,
Indra, art their wise rishí." (Śaśaṇa, however, here renders rishí by
drashtå, "beholder.")

vi. 14, 2. Agnir iå hi prachetåḥ Agnir vedhastamaḥ rishiḥ |

"Agni is wise; Agni is a most sage rishi."

viii. 6, 41. Rishir hi pûrvaåjå asi ekaḥ iñanaḥ ojaså | Indrå chosh-
kåyaœe vasu |

"Thou art an anciently-born rishí, who alone rulest by thy might;
Indra thou lavishest riches."

viii. 16, 7. Indro brahma Indraḥ rishir Indraḥ puru puru-håtaḥ |
mahån mahåbhii śaciihii |

"Indra is a priest, Indra is a rishí, Indra is much invoked; he is
great through his great powers."

ix. 96, 18 (= S.V. ii. 526). Rishi-
manå yåh rishi-kåit svarshåḥ salas- ranåthåḥ padavih kavinåm |

"Soma, rishi-minded, rishi-maker, bestower of good, master of a thou-
sand songs, the leader of sages," etc.

ix. 107, 7. . . . Rishir vipro vichakshyanåḥ | tvåm kavir abhavo deva-
vitamaḥ ityädi |

"A rishí, a sage, intelligent, thou (Soma) wast a poet, most agreeable
to the gods," etc.
x. 27, 22. ... Indrāya sunvad rishaye cha śikhat |
“... Let [men] present libations to Indra, and offerings to the rishi.”

x. 112. 9. Ni ahu sida ganapate ganeshu tvām āhur vipratamāṇ kavi-
nāṃ | na rite tvat kriyate kinhana āre mahām arkatam Maghavanś chitram
archa |
“Sit, lord of multitudes, among our multitudes; they call thee the
greatest of sages [or poets]; nothing is done without, or apart from,
thee; sing, Maghavan, a great and beautiful hymn.”

x. 115, 5. Agniḥ kaṇvatamāḥ kaṇva-akāhā ityādi |
“Agni is the greatest of the Kaṇvas, the friend of Kaṇva,” etc.

II. The Vedic rishis, as we have seen, expected to receive from their
gods every variety of temporal blessings, strength, long life, offspring,
ricness, cattle, rain, food, and victory, and they also looked for forgiveness
of their offences, and sometimes for exaltation to paradise, to the same
benefactors. Hence it would be nothing more than we might have an-
ticipated, if we should further find them asking their different deities to
enlighten their minds, to direct their ceremonies, to stimulate their devo-
tion, to augment their powers of poetical expression, and to inspire them
with religious fervour for the composition of their hymns. I think the
following passages will justify this expectation by showing that the rishis
(though, as we have seen, they frequently speak of the hymns as their
own work) did also sometimes entertain the idea that their prayers,
praises, and ceremonies generally, were supernaturally suggested and
directed. One of the modes (if not the most important) in which this
idea is expressed is, as we shall discover, the personification of speech
under different appellations. The following are the passages to which
I refer: they are—

First, such as refer to the gods generally:

R.V. i. 37, 4. Pra vaḥ sarāḥaya ghrishvaye tvesha-dyumnāya śushmine |
brhma devattaṁ gāyata |
“To your vigorous, overpowering, energetic, host [of Maruts] sing
the god-given prayer.”

S.V. i. 299. Tvashṭā no dāivyāṁ vachaḥ Parjanyo Brahmanaspatiḥ |
putair bhṛātriḥhir Aditiḥ nu pātu no dushtaram trāmaṇāṁ vachaḥ |
“May Tvashtri, Parjanya, and Brahmanaspati [prosper] our divine
utterance: may Aditi with her[?] sons and brothers prosper our in-
vincible and protective utterance.”
In the next passage, the hymn or prayer is spoken of as inconceivable.
R.V. i. 152, 5. Achittam brahma jujushur yuvanaḥ ityādi
“The youths received with joy the incomprehensible prayer,” etc.
In R.V. x. 20, 10, Vimada, a rishi, is connected with the immortals:
Agne Vimado manisham ārjonāpād arītebhīḥ sajoshāḥ girāḥ āvakshat
sumatir iyānaḥ ityādi
“O Agni, son of strength, Vimada, united with the immortals,
haasting, has brought to thee a product of thought, and beautiful
hymns.”

In the two following texts the gods are said to have generated the
hymn or prayer:
x. 61, 7. . . . Svādhya ajanayan brahma devāḥ Vāstoshpatiṁ vrata光明
niratakshan
“The thoughtful gods generated prayer: they fashioned Vastoshpati
the protector of sacred rites.”
x. 88, 8. Sūkta-vākam prathamam ād ād ād ād havir ajana-
yanta devāḥ | sa ezhām yajno abhavat tanūpāḥ tam dyaur veda tam pri-
thivī tam āpan
“The gods first generated the hymn, then Agni, then the oblation.
He was their sacrifice, the protector of their life. Him the Sky, the
Earth, and the Waters know.”

In the latter of the two following verses, Vāch (speech) is said to be
divine, and to have been generated by the gods. Though speech is here
spoken of generally, and nothing is said of the hymns, still these may
have already come to be connected with her in the minds of the Vedic
bards, as they were afterwards regarded as her most solemn and im-
portant expression.
R.V. viii. 89, 10. Yad vāg vādam an vīcheyo āmi śād vādam nish-
āsāda mandrā | chatsraḥ urjaṁ düduke payāmś eva svid asyāḥ paramas
jagāma | 11. Deviṁ vācham ajanayanta devāṁ täṁ vīṣvarūpāḥ paśavo
vadanti | sā no mandrā isham urjaṁ duhānā dhenur vāg asmān upa
sushfutā a etu
“When Vāch, speaking unintelligible things, queen of the gods, sat
down, melidious, she milked forth sustenance and waters towards the
four quarters: whither has her highest element departed? The gods
generated the divine Vāch; animals of all kinds utter her; may this
melodious cow Vāch, who yields us nourishment and sustenance,—ap-
proach us, when we celebrate her praises.
The last verse (as well as R.V. viii. 90, 16, which will be quoted below), derives some illustration from the following passage of the Brhad Aranyak Upanishad, p. 982 (p. 251 English transl.), in which also Vāch is designated as a cow:

Vāchaṁ dhenum upāśita | tasyāṁ chātvāraḥ stanāṁ svāhā-kāro vashat-kāro hanta-kāraḥ svadhā-kāraḥ | tasyāṁ āvau stanau devaḥ upajñavanti svāhā-kāram cha vashat-kāram cha hanta-kāram manushyāḥ svadhā-kāram pitarāḥ | tasyāḥ prāṇaḥ rishabho mano vatsaḥ |

"Let a man worship the cow Vāch. She has four udders, the formula svāhā, vashat, hanta, and svadhā. The gods live upon her two udders, svāhā and vashat; men upon hanta; and the fathers upon svadhā. Breath is her bull; the mind, her calf."

The two verses, R.V. viii. 89, 10, and 11, occur in the Nīruktā, xi. 28, 29. Roth (in his Illustrations of that work), p. 152, says the unintelligible utterance of Vāch in verse 10, means thunder. Whether this be the case, or not, the word appears to have a more general significance in the next verse, and to refer to speech in general, personified as a divine being. The speech which all the animals utter cannot of course be thunder.

In some of the preceding verses of this hymn there is a curious reference made to some sceptical doubts regarding the existence of Indra; which I quote here, though unconnected with the present subject.

R.V. viii. 89, 3, 4. Pra su stomam bharata vājayantam Indrāya satyaṁ yadi satyam asti | na Indro asti iti nemaḥ u tvah āha kaḥ im dādāśa kam abhi stavāma | Aymavasmī jariṭaḥ paśya mā iha vīvā jatiṇi abhi asmī mānaḥ | pītasyā mā praṭiśo varddhantyānti ādārīro bhuvanā dādārimi |

"Present to Indra a hymn soliciting food, a true [hymn] if he truly exists. 'Indra does not exist,' says some one: 'who has seen him? whom shall we praise?' 'I am here, worshipper,' [answers Indra]; 'behold me, I surpass all creatures in greatness; the directors of the sacrifice augment me; crushing, I destroy the worlds.'"

Second: the next set of passages which I shall bring forward either refer to Sarasvatī, Vāch, etc. (various names of the goddess of speech, or different personifications of speech, or of prayer), or at least speak of prayer as divine.

R.V. i. 3, 11, 12. Choḍayitrī sūṁśitāṁ chetanti sumatinām | yaj- naṁ dadhe Sarasvatī | . . . . dhiyo vīvā virajati |
"Sarasvati, who furthers our hymns, and who is cognizant of our prayers, has sustained our sacrifice. . . . She enlightens all intellects."

i. 22, 10. Ā gnaḥ Agne iha avase Hotrāṁ yavishṭha Bhāratim | Varūtriṁ Dhishaṇāṁ vaha |

"Bring here, youthful Agni, to our help, the wives [of the gods], Hotrā, Bhāratī, Varūṭrī, and Dhishaṇā."

(Varūṭrī, "the eligible," may be merely an epithet of Dhishaṇā which, according to Sāyaṇa, at least, is = vāg-devī, "the goddess of speech.")

i. 31, 11. Iḷāṁ akrīṇvan manushasya sāsanīṁ ityādi |

"The gods made Iḷā to be the instructress of men." (See Professor Wilson's note on this passage, p. 82 of his translation of the R.V. vol. i.)

ii. 3, 8. Sarasvati sādhayanti dhiyaṁ naḥ Iḷa devi Bhāratī visvatūrtiḥ | Tiso deviḥ svadhāyā bharhir edam achhidram pāntū saragaṁ niṣhadya |

"May Sarasvati, perfecting our hymn, may the divine Iḷā, and the all-pervading Bhāratī; may these three goddesses, seated on the place of sacrifice, preserve by their power the sacrificial grass uninjured." (See Prof. Müller's translation of part of the verse, in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc. for 1867, vol. iii. p. 224.)

iii. 18, 3. . . . Yāvdad īśe brahmaṇā vandamānah imām dhiyaṁ sata-

"Worshipping thee—with a prayer according to the best of my power, in this divine hymn, to obtain unbounded wealth."

iv. 43, 1. Ka u śravat katamo yajniyāṁ vandārū devaḥ katamo jushāte | kasya imāṁ devīm ampitēshu preshṭāṁ hridi śreshyāṁ suṣh-

"Who will hear us? which of all the objects of adoration? which of all the gods will be gratified by our praises? In the heart of whom among the immortals can we lodge this our divine and dearest hymn of praise and invocation?"

vii. 54, 1. Pra śukrā etu devī maniṣhā anamvat sutashṭo ratho na vājī |

"May prayer, brilliant and divine, proceed from us, like a well-

vii. 34, 9. Abhi vo deviṁ dhiyaṁ25 đadidhvam pra vo devatrā vāchāṁ kriṇudhvam |

25 Compare the same phrase dhiyaṁ devim in A.V. iii. 15, 3, and daivyā vāchā in A.V. viii. 1, 3.
“Receive towards you the divine hymn; proclaim the song for yourselves among the gods.”

viii. 27, 13. Devaṃ devam āhuma vājasātaye grīnantọ devyā dihyā |
“Let us invoke each of the gods to bestow riches, praising them with a divine hymn.”

viii. 90, 16. Vacho-vidaṃ vācham udirayantim viśvābhir dhiḥhir upa-
tishthāmānām | devaṃ devbhyaḥ pari eyushān gāmā ma avrīkta marītyo
dabhračchetāḥ |
“Let not any mortal of little intelligence do violence to the cow, the divine Vāch, who is skilled in praise, who utters her voice aloud, who arrives with all the hymns, and who has come from the gods.”

ix. 33, 5. Abhi brahmār anūshata yahitr ritasya mātarō marmrītyante
divaḥ śītaṃ |
“The great and sacred mothers of the sacrifice have uttered praise: they decorate the child of the sky.”

x. 71, 1. Brihaspatē prathamaṃ vacho agraṃ yat prairata nāmadhe-
yāṃ dadhānāḥ | yad esham śreṣṭhām yad aripam āśā tad esham
nihitaṃ ghūhā aviḥ | 2. Saktum iva titaunā punanto yatra dhīraḥ manasā
vācham akṛta | atra sakhāyaḥ sakhyāni jānate bhaḍrā ighām lakshmiṁ
nihita adhi vāciḥ | 3. Yajnena vācaḥ padoviyam āyaṇ tām anvavindann
rishishu praviṣṭām | tām abhritya vyadadhuh purutrā tām sapta rebhaḥ
abhi sannavante | 4. Uta teah pasyan na dadarśa vācaḥ-um uta teah śriṇvan
na śriṇoti enāṃ | udo tvasmāi tanvam visasre jayeva patye uṣati suvāsaḥ |
5. Uta teah sakhya sthirapitām āhur naināṁ hinvanty api vājinesu
adhenaḥ charati maṇaya āsha vācaḥ śusṛwan apalām apuṣpham | 6. Yat
itiyāja sachi-vidaṃ sakhyānāṃ na tasya vāciḥ api bhāgo asti | yad iva
śriṇoti alakām śriṇoti na hi praveda sukṛitasya panthām |
“1. When, o Brihaspati, men sent forth the first and earliest utter-
ance of Vāch (speech), giving a name (to things), then all which was
treasured within them, the most excellent and spotless, was disclosed
through love. 2. Wherever the wise,—cleansing, as it were, meal with
a sieve,—have uttered speech with intelligence, there friends recognize
[their] friendly acts; an auspicious fortune is impressed upon their
speech. 3. Through sacrifice they followed the track of Vāch, and
found her entered into the rishis: 32 taking, they divided her into many
portions: her the seven poets celebrate. 4. One man, seeing, sees not

32 See the use made by S’ankara of this text, above, p. 105.
Vāch; another, hearing, hears her not; to another she discloses her form, as an elegantly attired and loving wife displays her person to her husband. 5. They say that one man has a sure defence in [her] friendship; men cannot overwhelm him even in the conflicts (of discussion); but that man consorts with an unprofitable delusion who has [only] heard speech [Vāch] which is [to him] without fruit or flower. 6. He who has abandoned his discerning friend, has no portion in Vāch; whatever he hears he hears in vain; he knows not the path of virtue.”

The second, fourth, and fifth verses of this obscure hymn are quoted in the Nirukta, iv. 10; i. 19, 20; and are explained in Professor Roth’s Illustrations. Verses 2 and 4 are also quoted and interpreted in the Mahābhāṣya; see pp. 30 and 31 of Dr. Ballantyne’s edition. The verse which is of most importance for my present purpose, is, however, the third, which speaks of Vāch having “entered into the rishis.” See the First Volume of this work, pp. 254 f. The idea of Vāch being divided into many portions will be found again below in R.V. x. 125, 3.

x. 110, 8 (=Vāj. S. 29, 33). Ā no yajnam Bhārati tāynam etu Iḷā manushvad iha chetayanti | tisro devir bharhir ā idam syomaṇ Sarasvatī svapasaḥ sadantu |

“Let Bhārati come quickly here to our sacrifice, with Iḷā, who instructs us like Manush [or like a man], and with Sarasvatī: let these three goddesses, skilful in rites, sit down upon this beautiful sacrificial grass.”

x. 125, 3. Aham rāṣṭrī sangamāṁ vasūnāṁ chikitusā prathamā yajniyānām | tāṁ mā devā vyadadhūḥ purutāh bhūriṣṭhātram bhāri āvesayantim | 4. Mayā so annam atti yo vipāsyati yaḥ prāṇītī yaṁ kṛṇoti uktam | amantavo māṁ te upa kṣihyanti śrudhi śruti śraddhivasām te vädāmi | 5. Aham eva svayam idaṁ vadam iṣṭaṁ devahir ute mānushebhīḥ | yam kāmaya tam tam ugraṁ kṛnomi tam brahmāṇāṁ tam rishiṁ tam sumedhāṁ |

“3. I am the queen, the centre of riches, intelligent, the first of the objects of adoration: the gods have separated me into many portions, have assigned me many abodes, and made me widely pervading. 4. He who has insight, he who lives, he who hears [my] sayings, eats food through me. These men dwell in my vicinity, devoid of understanding. Listen, thou who art learned, I declare to thee what is worthy of belief. 5. It is even I myself who make known this which is agreeable
both to gods and men. Him whom I love I make terrible, [I make] him a priest, [I make] him a rishi, [I make] him intelligent."

x. 176, 2. Pra devaṁ devyā dhiyā bhārata Jātavedasam havyā no vakshad anushak |

"By divine prayer bring hither Jātavedas: may he present our oblations in order."

x. 177, 1. Patamag aktam asurasya māyayā hridā paśyanti manasā vipaśchitaḥ | samudre antaḥ kavayo vichakshate marichiṇām padam iehhanti vedhaśaḥ | 2. Patano vācham manasā bībhartī tām Gandharvo avadad garbhe antaḥ | tām dyotamānāṁ svaryam manishām rītasya pade kavayo nipānti |

"1. Sages behold with the heart and mind the Bird illuminated by the wisdom of the Asyra: the wise perceive him in the (aerial) ocean: the intelligent seek after the abode of his rays. 2. The Bird cherishes speech with his mind: the Gandharva hath uttered her in the womb: the bards preserve in the place of sacred rites this shining and celestial intellect." (See also x. 189, 3, vāk patangāya dhīyate.)

Third: I shall now adduce the passages in which other Vedic deities, whether singly or in concert, are spoken of as concerned in the production of the hymns:

Aditi.—In R.V. viii. 12, 14, Aditi is mentiond as fulfilling this function:

Yād uta svarāje Aditiḥ stomam Indrāya jijanat puru-praśastam utaye ityādi |

"When Aditi generated for the self-resplendent Indra a hymn abounding in praises, to supplicate succour," etc.

Agni.—R.V. i. 18, 6, 7.—Sadasaspatim abhutam priyam Indrasya kāmyam | sanim medhām ayāsiṣham | yamād rite na-siddhyati yajno vipaśchitaḥ chana | sa dhīnāṁ yogam invati |

"6. I have resorted, for wisdom, to Sadasaspati (Agni), the wonderful, the dear, the beloved of Indra, the beneficent; (7) without whom

27 This passage, which is commonly understood of Vāch, occurs also in the Atharvaveda, iv. 30, 2 ff., but with some various readings, as āveśeyantaḥ for āveśeyantum, and śraddhikyam for śraddhikvam, etc. The hymn is translated by Mr. Colebrooke, Ess. i. 32, or p. 16 of Williams and Norgate's edition. Professor Whitney, as I learn from a private communication with which he has favoured me, is of opinion that there is nothing in the language of the hymn which is specially appropriate to Vāch, so as to justify the ascription of it to her as the supposed utterer.
the sacrifice of the wise does not succeed; he promotes the course of our hymns."

iv. 5, 3. Sāma dvi-barhah mahi tigma-bhriṣṭiḥ sahavra-retāḥ vriśabhas tuvishmān | padam na gor apragulhām vividvān Agnir mahyaṁ pra id u vochad manishām | 6. Idam me Agne kiyate pāvaka aminate gurum bhāraṁ na manma | Brihad dadhātha dhriṣṭatā gabhiraṁ yahvam prīṣṭhaṁ prayaśaṁ saptadhātu |

"Agni occupying two positions, the fierce-flaming, the infinitely prolific, the vigorous, the powerful, who knows the great hymn, mysterious as the track of a [missing] cow, has declared to me the knowledge [of it]. 6. To me who am feeble, though innoxious, thou, o Agni, the luminous, best given, as a heavy load, this great, profound, and extensive Prīṣṭha hymn, of seven elements, with efficacious oblations."

iv. 6, 1. Tvām hi visvam abhi asi manma pra vedhasaṁ chit tirasi manishām |

"Thou presidest over all thoughts [or prayers]; thou augmentest the intelligence of the sage."

iv. 11, 3. Tvad Agne kāvyā tvad manishās tvad ukthā jāyante rādhyaṁ |

"From thee, Agni, are generated poetic thoughts; from thee the products of the mind; from thee effective hymns."

x. 21, 5. Agnir jāto Atharvaṇaṁ vidad visväni kāvyā |

"Agni, generated by Atharvan, is acquainted with all wisdom."

x. 91, 8. . . . Medhākaraṁ vidathasya prasādhanam Agnim ityādi |

"Agni, the giver of understanding, the accomplisher of sacrifice."

x. 4, 5. Yad vo vayam pramāno vratāni vidūṣāṁ devāḥ avidustaraṁ | Agnis taṁ visvam āprināti vidvān yebhir devāṁ ritubhiḥ kalpa-viṣayaṁ | Yat pākatā manasā dāna-dakshāṁ na yajnasya manvate martyasaṁ | Agnis taṁ hota krutvac vijānan yajīkṣtho devāṁ rituśo yajāti |

"When, o [ye] gods, we, the most unwise among the wise, transgress the ordinances of your worship, the wise Agni completes them all, at the stated seasons which he assigns to the gods. When men, devoted to sacrifice, do not, from their ignorance, rightly comprehend the mode of worship, Agni, the skilful sacrificer, and most eminent of priests, knowing the ceremonial, worships the gods at the proper seasons."

(As rites and hymns were closely united in the practice of the early Indians, the latter finding their application at the former; if Agni was
supposed to be the director of the one, viz., the oblations, he might easily come to be also regarded as aiding in the production of the other—the hymns. Verse 4 occurs also in the A.V. xix. 59, 1, 2, where, however, ṛṇātus is read instead of ṛṇātis, and in place of the words yobhīr devān, etc., at the close of the verse, we have, somaḥ cha yo brāhmaṇaṁ ā viveṣā! "and Soma, who entered into the priests."

Brahmaṇaspati.—R.V. i. 40, 5, 6. Pra nānam Brahmaṇaspatir mantram vadati ukthyaṁ | yasminn Indro Varuṇo Mitraḥ Aryaṁ devaṁ okāṁsi chakrire | Tam iñ vocema viḍatheshu śambhuvam mantram devaṁ anehasam ityādī |

"Brahmaṇaspati (abiding in the worshipper's mouth, according to the scholiast) utters the hymn accompanied with praise, in which the gods, Indra, Varuṇa, Mitra, and Aryaman, have made their abode. Let us utter, gods, at sacrifices, that spotless hymn, conferring felicity." (Roth in his Lexicon considers okas to mean "good pleasure," "satisfaction." See also his Essay on Brahma and the Brāhmaṇs, Journal of the Germ. Or. Soc. i. 74.)

Bṛihaspati.—R.V. ii. 23, 2. Usrāḥ iva sūryo jyotiṣhā maho viśveshām iñ jānita brahmaṇaṁ asi |

"As the sun by his lustre instantly generates rays, so art thou (Bṛihaspati) the generator of all prayers."

x. 36, 5. Ā Indro barhiḥ śidatu pīvatāṁ Īṣa Bṛihaspatiḥ sāmabhī rīkvo archatu |

"Let Indra sit upon the sacred grass; let Iṣa abound in her gifts; let the bard Bṛihaspati offer praise with hymns."

Gandharva.—According to Professor Roth (see under the word in his Lexicon) the Gandharva is represented in the Veda as a deity who knows and reveals the secrets of heaven, and divine truths in general; in proof of which he quotes the following texts:

R.V. x. 139, 5. Viśvāvasur abhi tad no grīṇātu divyo Gandharvo rajaso vimānaḥ | Yad vā ghā satyam uṣa yad na vidma dhiyo hinvāno dhiyāḥ iñ naḥ avyāḥ |

"May the celestial Gandharva Viśvāvasu, who is the measurer of the atmosphere, declare to us that which is true, or which we know not. May he stimulate our hymns, and may he prosper our hymns.

A.V. ii. 1, 2. Pra tad vouched amṛitasya vidvān Gandharvo dhāma paramaṁ guhā yat |
"May the Gandharva, who knows the (secret of) immortality, declare to us that supreme and mysterious abode."

_Indra._—R.V. iii. 54, 17. Mahat tad vaḥ kavyaṁ cāru nāma yad ha devaḥ bhavatha viśve Indre | sakha Ribhusiḥ puruḥata priyebhir imām dhiyam sātaye takshata naḥ |

"Great, o sage deities, is that cherished distinction of yours, that ye are all associated with Indra. Do thou, much invoked (Indra), our friend, with the beloved Ribhus, fabricate (or dispose) this hymn for our welfare." (This may merely mean that Indra was asked to give a favourable issue to the prayer of the worshipper, not to compose his hymn for him. See Roth’s Lexicon, under the word _taksh_, 3.)

vi. 62, 3. _Tvāṁ kaviṁ chodayaḥ ārkaśātāṁ ittyādi |

"Thou (Indra) didst stimulate the poet in the composition of his hymns," etc. (Śāyaṇa renders _arkaśātāu_, "for the sake of finding food.")

vi. 18, 15. _Krīṣaṁ krītno akritāṁ yat te asti ukthaṁ navyay jana- yaśaya yajnaīḥ |

"Energetic (Indra), do what thou hast never yet done; generate a new hymn with the sacrifices."

vi. 34, 1. _Saṁ cha tve jagmur giṁaḥ Indra pūrvir vi cha tvad yanti viṁhva maṁśhadāḥ |

"Many hymns are congregated in thee, o Indra, and numerous products of the mind issue from thee." (This half-verse has been already quoted in p. 227.)

vi. 47, 10. _Indra mrīla mahyaṁ jīvaṁ ācāraṁ cōchha chodāya dhiyam ayaṁ na dhārām | Yat kihca ahaṁ tvāyur idāṁ vaddāmi taj jūshāva krdhiṁ mā devavantam |

"O Indra, gladden me, decree life for me, sharpen my intellect like the edge of an iron instrument. Whatever I, longing for thee, now utter, do thou accept; give me divine protection." (Compare with the word _chodaya_ the use of the word _prachodayāt_ in the Gāyatrī, R.V. iii. 62, 10, which will be given below.)

vii. 97, 3. _Tam u namāṁ havirbhiḥ suśevam Brahmanaspatiṁ grīṁhe | Indraṁ sūho maṁ dāivyam siṁhaktu yo brahmaṇo devakritasya rājā | 5. Tam a no arkaṁ amṛtāya jūshām ime dhāsuraṁ amṛtāṇaṁ purājāḥ ittyādi |

"3. I invoke with reverence and with offerings the beneficent Brahmanaspati. Let a great and divine song celebrate Indra, who is king
of the prayer made by the gods. 5. May these ancient immortals make this our hymn acceptable to the immortal," etc.

viii. 13, 7. Pratna-vaj janaya giraḥ śrīnudhi jarītur havam |
"As of old, generate hymns; hear the invocation of thy worshipper."

viii. 52, 4. Sa pratnathā kavi-ciридhaḥ Indro vākasya vakshānīḥ |
"Indra was of old the promoter of the poet, and the augmenter of the song."

viii. 78, 6. Yaj jāyathā apūrya Mahavān Vṛitra-hatyāya | tat pri-
thivim aprathaya tad astabhnāḥ uṣa dyām | 7. Tat te yajno ajayata tad |
arkaḥ uṣa haskritīḥ | tad viśvam abhibhūr asi yaj jātāṁ yach cha jantvam |
"When, o unparalleled Mahavān, thou wast born to slay Vṛitra,
thou didst then spread out the earth (the broad one) and sustain the sky: then thy sacrifice was produced, then the hymn, and the haskriti: (since) then thou surpassest everything that has been, or shall be, born."

Her therefore the hymn is asserted to be as old as Indra; though nothing more need be meant than that hymns then began to be pro-
duced. The hymn in which this verse occurs is not necessarily meant.

x. 112, 9. Ī śru śīda gānapate gāṇeshu teśām āhur vipratamaṁ kavi-
ṇām | na rite tvat kriyate kincana āre mahāṁ arkaṁ Mahavān chitram |
archa |
"Lord of assemblies, sit amid our multitudes; they call thee the wisest of poets. Nothing is done without, or apart from thee; sing, o Mahavān, a great and beautiful hymn." (Already quoted in p. 252.)

Indra and Vishṇu.—R.V. vi. 69, 2. Vā viśvāsaṁ janitarā matinām |
Indrā-Viṣṇu kalasā soma-dhānā | Pra vām giraḥ sasyamānāḥ avantu |
prā stomaśa giyāmānāsaḥ arkaḥ |
"Indra and Vishṇu, ye who are the generators of all hymns, who are the vessels into which soma is poured, may the praises which are now recited gratify you, and the songs which are chaunted with en-
comiums."

Indra and Varuṇa.—The following passage is not, properly speaking, a portion of the Rig-veda, as it is part of one of the Vālakhilyas or apo-
cryphal additions (described in Vol. II. p. 210), which are found in-
serted between the 48th and 49th hymns of the 8th Maṇḍala. From its style, however, it appears to be as old as some parts of the R.V.

xi. 6. Indrārātrauṇa yad rishibhyo maniśāṁ vābhō matiśū śrutam |
adattam agre | yāni sthānāṇy aṣṭijanta dhiraḥ yajnaṁ tanvānāṁ tapasā |
"bhuyapāṣyam |
"Indra and Varuṇa, I have seen through austere-fervour that which ye formerly gave to the rishis, wisdom, understanding of speech, sacred lore, and all the places which the sages created, when performing sacrifice." (See Vol. II. p. 220.)

The Maruts.—R.V. viii. 78, 3. Pra vaḥ Indrāya brīhate Maruto brahma archata |

"Sing, Maruts, your hymn to the great Indra." (Compare verse 1, of the same hymn, and the words brahmakṛitā Mārutena gaṇena in iii. 32, 2.)

Pūshan.—R.V. x. 26, 4. Māṁsīmahi tvā vayam asmākaṁ deva Pūshan matināṁ cha sādhāraham viprāgaṁ cha ādhāram |

"We have called thee to mind, divine Pūshan, the accomplisher of our hymns, and the stimulator of sages." (The first clause of this, however, may merely mean that the god gives effect to the wishes expressed in the hymns. Compare vi. 56, 4: Yad adya tvā purushaṁ brāhmaṇa dasra mantumāḥ | tat su no māṁsa sādhyāḥ | "Accomplish for us the (objects of the) hymn, which we utter to thee to-day, o powerful and wise god."

Savitṛ.—R.V. iii. 62 (= S.V. ii. 812, and Vāj. S. iii. 35). Tat Savitūr vareṇyam bhargo devasya dhīmahi | dhiyo yo naḥ prachodayāt |

"We have received that excellent glory of the divine Savitṛ; may he stimulate our understandings [or hymns, or rites]."

(This is the celebrated Gāyatrī, the most sacred of all the texts in the Veda. See Colebrooke's Misco. Ess. i. pp. 29, 30, 127, and 175; or pp. 14, 15, 78, and 109 of Williams and Norgate's ed. Bonfey (S.V. p. 277) translates the Gāyatrī thus: "May we receive the glorious brightness of this, the generator, of the god who shall prosper our works." On the root from which the word dhīmade is derived, and its sense, see also Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, s.vv. dhā and dhī; and compare my article "On the Interpretation of the Veda," Journ. Roy. As. Soc. p. 372.

The Linga Purāṇa (Part II. sec. 48, 5 ff., Bombay lithographed ed.) gives the following "varieties" of the Gāyatrī, adapted to modern Saiva worship:

Gāyatrī-bhedāḥ | Tatpurushāya vidmahe vāg-viśuddhāya dhīmahi |
Tan naḥ S'ivāḥ prachodayāt | Gaṇāṃbikāyai vidmahe karma-siddhāyai cha dhīmahi | Tan no Gaurī prachodayāt | Tatpurushāya vidmahe Mahā-
devāya dhīmahi | Tan no Rudraḥ prachodayāt | Tatpurushāya vidmahe Vakratuṇḍāya dhīmahi | Tan no Dantiḥ prachodayāt | Mahāśeṇaya vidmhe vāg-viśuddhāya dhīmahi | Tan naḥ Skandah prachodayāt | T-kśma-śringāya vidmahe Vedapādāya dhīmahi | Tan no Vṛiṣaḥ prachodayād ityādi |

"1. We contemplate That Purusha, we meditate on him who is pure in speech; may That Siva stimulate us. 2. We contemplate Gaṅambikā, and we meditate Karmasiddhi (the accomplishment of works); may That Gaurī stimulate us. 3. We contemplate That Purusha, and we meditate Mahādeva; may that Rudra stimulate us. 4. We contemplate That Purusha, and we meditate Vakratuṇḍa (Ganesa); may That Danti (the elephant) stimulate us. 5. We contemplate Mahāsena (Kārtikeya, and we meditate him who is pure in speech; may That Skanda stimulate us. 6. We contemplate Tikṣṇasṛṅga (the sharp-horned), and we meditate the Veda-footed; may Vṛiṣa (the bull) stimulate us."

Soma.—R.V. vi. 47, 3. Ayam me pītah udiyartti vācham ayam maniśham uśatīm ajīgah |

"This [soma], when drunk, stimulates my speech [or hymn]; this called forth the ardent thought."

It may be said that this and the other following texts relating to Soma, should not be quoted as proofs that any idea of divine inspiration was entertained by the ancient Indian bards, as they can mean nothing more than that the rishis were sensible of a stimulating effect on their thoughts and powers of expression, produced by the exhilarating draughts of the juice of that plant in which they indulged. But the rishis had come to regard Soma as a god, and apparently to be passionately devoted to his worship. See the Second Volume of this work, pp. 470 ff., and especially pp. 474, 475; and my account of this deity in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1865, pp. 135 ff.

Compare what is said of the god Dionysus (or Bacchus) in the Bacchae of Euripides, 294:

Μάρτις ἐδ χαλκοῦ ἔδε τὸ γαρ βακχεύσιμον
Καὶ τὸ μανίδες μαντικὴν πολλὴν ἔχει.
"Ωσταν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς 'εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἐκάθε πολέσ,
Λέγειν τὸ μέλλον τοῦς μεκριότατας ποιεῖ.

38 I retain here this sense of the word, which is probably the most commonly received.
"And this deity is a prophet. For Bacchic excitement and raving have in them much prophetic power. For when this god enters in force into the body, he causes those who rave to foretell the future."

R.V. viii. 48, 3. *Apāma somam amṛitāḥ abhūma aganna jyotir avidāma devān | kim nānam asmān kṛṇavad arātīḥ kim u dhūrttir amṛita martyasya |

"We have drunk the soma, we have become immortal, we have entered into light, we have known the gods; what can an enemy now do to us? what can the malice of any mortal effect, o immortal god?"

(This passage is quoted in the commentary of Gauḍapāda on the Sāṅkhya Kārikā, verse 2, and is translated (incorrectly as regards the last clause), by Prof. Wilson, in p. 13 of his English version.)

A curious parallel to this last Vedic text is to be found in the satirical drama of Euripides, the Cyclops, 578 ff; though there, of course, the object is merely to depict the drunken elevation of the monster Polyphemus:

'O v' ēyavanās μοι συμμεμεγμένος δοκεῖ
Τῇ γῇ φέροσθαι, τοῦ Δίος τε τὸν θρόνον
Λέοντε τὸ πάν τε δαιμόνων ἄγρυν σέβας

"The sky, commingled with the earth, appears
To whirl around; I see the throne of Jove,
And all the awful glory of the gods."

R.V. ix. 25, 5. *Arusho janayan giraḥ Somaḥ pavaṭe āyushag Indraḥ gachchan kavikratuḥ |

"The ruddy Soma, generating hymns, with the powers of a poet (or with the understanding of a sage), united with men, is purified, resorting to Indra."

ix. 76, 4. . . . . *Pilā matinām asamashta-kāvyāḥ |
"[Soma] father of our hymns, of incomparable wisdom."

ix. 95, 2. *Hariḥ spijanāḥ pathyām ritasya iyartī vācham ariteva nāvam | devo devānāṁ guhyāṁ nāma avishkṛṇoti bhūrī hasta pravāche |

29 This text may be versified as follows:

We've quaffed the soma bright,
And are immortal grown;
We've entered into light,
And all the gods have known.
What foeman now can harm,
Or mortal vex us, more?
Through thee, beyond alarm,
Immortal god, we soar.
"The golden [Soma] when poured out along the path of the ceremony, sends forth his voice, as a rower propels a boat. A god, he reveals the mysterious natures of the gods to the bard upon the sacred grass." (See R.V. ii. 42, 1, and x. 116, 9, quoted in p. 240.)


"Soma is purified, he who is the generator of hymns, of Dyaus, or Pṛithvī, of Agni, of Sūrya, of Indra, and of Vishnū. 6. Soma, who is a brahman-priest among the gods (or priests), a leader among the poets, a rishi among sages, a buffalo among wild beasts, a falcon among vultures, an axe amid the forests, advances to the filter with a sound. The purified Soma, like the sea rolling its waves, has poured forth songs, hymns, and thoughts," etc. (See Benfey's translation of this passage in his Sāma-veda, pp. 238 and 253; and Nirukta-pariśiṣṭa, ii. 12, 13.)

Varuṇa.—R.V. viii. 41, 5, 6. Yo dharte bhuvanānāṃ yaḥ uṣrānam apiḥya veda nāmāni guhyā | sa kaviḥ kāryā puruḥ rūpam dyaur iva pushtyati . . . . | Yasmin visvāni kāryā chakre nāhīr ivi śrīta iṣṭyādi |

"He who is the upholder of the worlds (Varuṇa), who knows the secret and mysterious natures of the cows, he, a sage [or poet], manifests sage [or poetical] works, as the sky does many forms. . . . In him all sage works abide, as the nave within a wheel," etc. (See R.V. vii. 87, 4, in p. 248, and ix. 95, 2, above, in this page.)

Varuṇa, Mitra, and Aryaman.—R.V. vii. 66, 11. Vi ye dadhuk śaradām māsam ād āhar yajnam aktaḥ cha ād rīcham | anāpyam Varuṇo Mitraḥ Aryamanā kshatraṃ rājanaḥ āsata |

"The kings, Varuṇa, Mitra, and Aryaman, who made the autumn, the month, and then the day, the sacrifice, night, and then the Rich, possess an unrivalled power." 31

30 It appears from Prof. Benfey's note on S.V. ii. 291 (= R.V. ix. 96, 6, quoted here), that the scholiast on that passage makes devinām = ritevījam, "priests."

31 As this verse ascribes the formation of the Rich to the gods who are named in it, my remark, in p. 3 above, that the Purusha Sūkta contains "the only passage in
The following passage of the Rig-veda has (as we have seen above, p. 69, note 79, and p. 75) been quoted by Indian commentators and aphorists to prove the eternity of the Veda, on its own authority:

R.V. viii. 64, 6. *Tasmai nānam abhidyave vāchā Virūpa nityayā | vrīṣñye chodasva susūṭutim |

"Send forth praises, Virūpa, to this heaven-aspiring and prolific Agni, with perpetual voice." (See i. 45, 3, etc., quoted above, p. 220.)

There is, however, no reason whatever to suppose that the words *nityayā vāchā* mean anything more than *perpetual voice*. There is no ground for imagining that the rishi entertained any such conception as became current among the systematic theologians of later times, that his words were eternal. The word *nitya* is used in the same sense "perpetual" in R.V. ix. 12, 7 (= S.V. ii. 55, 2), where it is said of Soma: *nitya-stotro vanaspatir dhānām antar ityādi* | "The monarch of the woods, continually-praised, among the hymns," etc., as well as in the two following texts:

R.V. ix. 92, 3.—*Somaḥ punānaḥ sadaḥ eti nityam ityādi* |

"The pure Soma comes to his perpetual abode [or to his abode continually], etc.

x. 39, 14 (quoted above, p. 236). *Nityān na sūnuṁ tanayaṁ da- dhānaḥ* |

"Continuing the series like an unbroken line of descendants."

The tenor of the numerous texts adduced in this Section seems clearly to establish the fact that some at least of the ancient Indian rishis conceived themselves to be prompted and directed, in the composition of their hymns and prayers, by supernatural aid, derived from various deities of their pantheon. It may add force to the proof derived from these texts, and show that I am the less likely to have misunderstood their purport and spirit, if I adduce some evidence that a similar conception was not unknown in another region of the ancient Indo-European world, and that the expressions in which the early Grecian bards laid claim to an inspiration emanating from the Muses, or from Apollo, were not mere figures of speech, but significant, originally, of a popular belief. Most of the following passages, from Hesiod the hymns of the R.V. in which the creation of the Vedas is described," requires some qualification.
and Homer, in which this idea is enunciated, are referred to in Mr. Grote’s History of Greece, i. 478.

Hesiod, Theogony, 22:

"Αἰ νῦ ποθ' Ἡσίωδος καὶ καὶ ἑδίδακαν ἀοίδην
"Ἀρνας ποιμάκονθ’ Ἐλικώνος ὤν καθένοι.
"Τόνδε δὲ με πρώτοστα θεαλ πρὸς μίθοιν ἔεπαν,
"Μοῦσαι Ολυμπιάδες, κούραι Διὸς ἀγαλχοιο.
"Ποιμένες ἀγραυλοί, κάς' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες διον,
"Ἤμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοιοι ὅμοια,
"Ἤμεν δ’, ἢν’ ἐθέλωμεν, ἀλῆθεα μυθήσασθαι.
"Ὡς ἱράσαν κούραι μεγάλοι Δίος ἀρτιένειαι:
"Καὶ μοι σκῆπτρον ἔδων, δάφνης ἐρυθλήσιον ὅοιν,
"Δρέφασαι δηητὸν ἐνέκενεσαν δὲ μοι ἀνὴν
"Θεῖα, ἃς κλεομεῖ τά τ’ ἐσφόρον, πρὸ τ’ ἑοντα,
"Καὶ με κέλονθ’ ὄμειν μακάρων γίνοις δὲν ἑόντων,
"Χράς τ’ ἀντὰς πρῶτον τε καὶ νετερον δεῖν ἐδίσειν.

"The Muses once conferred the dower
On Hesiod, poet of poetic power,
As underneath the sacred steep
Of Helicon he fed his sheep.
And thus they spoke, ‘Inglorious race
Of rustic shepherds, gluttons base,
Full many fictions we can weave
Which by their truthlike air deceive;
But, know, we also have the skill
True tales to tell, wheno’er we will.’
They spake, and gave into my hand
A fair luxuriant laurel wand;
And breathed into me speech divine,
That two-fold science might be mine;
That future scenes I might unveil,
And of the past unfold the tale.
They bade me hymn the race on high
Of blessed gods who never die;
And evermore begin my lays,
And end them, with the Muses’ praise”

Hesiod, Theogony, 94:

"Ἐκ γὰρ Μοοῦσών καὶ ἐκήβιλου Ἀπόλλωνος
"Ἀνδρεὶς δοῦλοι ἔσυν ἐκι χθάνα καὶ κιναρισταλ,
"Ἐκ δὲ Δίος βασιλῆι.

"The bards who strike the lyre and sing,
From Phoebus and the Muses spring:
From Jove’s high race descends the king.”

The following are the words in which the author of the Iliad invokes the aid of the Muses, to qualify him for enumerating the generals of the Grecian host (Iliad, ii. 484):

"Ἐπὶ δὲ μικρὰν πόλιν συν οὐσίᾳ ἐν οἴκῳ
"οὔτεν θυσίαν ἔδω καὶ οὐδ᾿ ἔλεγχοι
"οὔτεν ἀριτμοῦντα καὶ ἀριτμοῦντα
"οὔτεν ἔμενον μὴν ἐνθαρρύνοντα
"οὐδὲν ἄλλον ἔδωσαν τοῖς ἔνθαρρυσιν ἡμῖν
"οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔδωσαν ἔλεγχοι καὶ ἄλλον ἐμενοῦντα
"οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔδωσαν ἔμενον μὴν ἐνθαρρύνοντα.”
"Tell me the truth, ye Muses, tell,
Ye who on high Olympus dwell;
For, omnipresent, ye can scan
Whatsoever on earth is done by man,
Whilst we vague rumours only learn
And nothing certain can discern."

But the Muses could also take away, as well as impart, the gift of song, as appears from Iliad, ii. 594 ff.:

"Ευθα τε Μούσαι
'Αντόμεναι Θάμυριν τον Θρήνια παύσαν δοίδης:
Στείρυ ταύροι οὐχόμενοι μυκητέροι, ἐμπερ ἄν αὐτάλ
Μούσαι δεῖδοικ, κοίται Δίδυς ἀγάλχοιον.
'Αι δὲ χελωσάμεναι πηνδρόν θέασαν, ἀντὰρ δοίδην
Θεσπεσίην ἀφέλοντο, καὶ ἐκλείπαθν κιβαρί τινιν.

"'Twas there the Muses, we are told,
Encountered Thamyris of old.
He boasted that the minstrel throng
To him must yield the prize of song;
Yes, even although, among the rest,
The Muses should the palm contest.
Aware of his presumption, they
Both took his skill in song away,
And power to wake the tuneful lyre;—
And struck him blind, in vengeful ire."

The following passages from the Odyssey refer to Demodocus, the bard who sang at the court of Alcinous, King of the Phaeacians (Odyssey, viii. 43 ff.):

Kaléssaste de teiôn aoidón,
Δημόδοκουν τῷ γάρ ἔδει τέκνα περί δώκειν aoidhyn,
Τέρπειν, ὅπερ θυμὸς ἐπιτρέψασιν δεῖδειν.

"And go, the bard divine invite:—
The god hath given him skill
By song all others to delight,
Whenever he may will."

Odyssey, viii. 62 ff.:

Κῆρος δ' ἐγγύθεν ἥλθεν έγαν έρήμων aoidón:
Τόν πέρι Μοῦσα ἐφίλησε δίδου δ' ἠγάθον τε κακόν τε,
'Οφθαλμόν μὲν ἐμέρασε δίδου δ' ἕθειαν aoidhyn.

"The herald came, and within him brought
The bard whom all with longing sought.
The Muse's darling, he had good
As well as ill from her received;
With power of dulcet song endured,
But of his eyesight too bereaved."
Here the Muse is described as the arbiter of the bard’s destiny in other points besides the gift and withdrawal of song.

Odyssey, viii. 73:

Μοῦδ’ ὅπ’ ἀδελφὸν ἀνήκειν ἀδελφὸς καλά ἀδελφὸν κ.τ.λ.

"Stir’d by the Muse the bard extoll’d
In song the deeds of warriors bold."

A little further on, Ulysses says of Demodocus (Odyssey, viii. 479ff.):

Πάσι γὰρ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχειροισίσκειν δοιδοὶ
Τιμήτ᾽ ἐμαυροὶ εἰσὶ καὶ ἄδεουσ, ὄνεκεν ἄρα σφέας
"Ομοῖος Μοῦδ’ ἐδίδαξε, φίλησε δὲ φίλον ἀδελφὸν.

“All mortal men with awe regard,
And honourably treat, the bard;
Because the Muse has taught him lays,
And dearly loves his tuneful race.”

And again he addresses him thus ( Odyssey, viii. 487):

Ἀμήδοκος’, ἔξωχα δὲ σε βροτῶν ἀνίκοροι ἀπέλυτοι.
Ἡ σὲ γε Μοῦος’ ἐδίδαξε Δίδε πάϊς, ἢ σὲ γ’ Ἀπόλλων.
Δίνω γὰρ κατὰ κόσμου Ἀχαιῶν διότων ἀδελφοῖς, κ.τ.λ.

“Demodocus, beyond the rest
Of mortals I esteem thee blest.
For thee, the Muse, Jove’s child, has taught,
Or Phoebus in thee skill has wrought;
So perfectly thou dost relate
The story of the Argives’ fate.”

Phemius, the Ithacan minstrel, thus supplicates Ulysses to spare his life (Odyssey, xxii. 345 ff.):

"Αὐτὸ τοις μετώπους ἔχεις ἔσεται, ἕκεν ἀδελφόν
Πέρινης, διὶ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἄδελφω.
"Ἀντοδίδακτος ὦ ἐμυλ, θεῖς δὲ μοι ἐν φρεσίν ὄμας
Πάντολα ἐνεφύειν.

"Thou soon wilt grieve, if thou the bard shouldst slay,
To gods as well as men who pours his lay.
Self-taught I am; and yet within my mind
A god hath gendered strains of every kind.”

"That is," says Mr. Grote, "Demodocus has either been inspired as a poet by the muse, or as a prophet by Apollo, for the Homeric Apollo is not the god of song. Kalchas, the prophet, receives his inspiration from Apollo, who confers upon him the same knowledge, both of past and future, as the Muses give to Hesiod." But does not this passage ( Odyssey viii. 488) rather show that the Homeric Apollo was the god of song, as well as the bestower of prophetic intuition; and do we not learn the same from Iliad, i. 603? In any case, it is quite clear from Theog. 94, quoted above, that Hesiod regarded Apollo in this character.
The early Greeks believed that the gift of prophecy also, as well as that of song, was imparted by the gods to mortals. This appears both from Hesiod, as already quoted, and from the following passage of Homer (Iliad, i. 69):

Κάλχης Θεσσαλός, διανοόμενος ὠξεῖ ἔριστον.
"Ὄσ ἔδη τὰ ἑκάτερα τὰ ἑρμήμενα, πρὸ τ' ἑκάτα,
Καὶ νήσος ἦγησατ' Ἀχαιῶν Ἰλιὸν ἔσω,
"Ἡν δὲ μαρτυρόντος, τὴν δὲ πᾶρε Φαῖδος Ἀπόλλων.

"Of augurs wisest, Calchas knew
Things present, past, and future too.
By force of that divining skill,
Vouchsafed to him by Phæbus' will"
The Grecian fleet he safely bore
From Aulis' bay to Ilion's shore."

It is thus argued by Mr. Grote that the early Greeks really believed in the inspiration of their bards by the Muses (History of Greece, i. 477 ff.):

"His [the early Greek's] faith is ready, literal and uninquiring, apart from all thought of discriminating fact from fiction, or of detecting hidden and symbolized meaning: it is enough that what he hears be intrinsically plausible and seductive, and that there be no special cause to provoke doubt. And if indeed there were, the poet overrules such doubts by the holy and all-sufficient authority of the Muse, whose omniscience is the warrant for his recital, as her inspiration is the cause of his success. The state of mind, and the relation of speaker to hearers, thus depicted, stand clearly marked in the terms and tenor of the ancient epic, if we only put a plain meaning upon what we read. The poet—like the prophet, whom he so much resembles—sings under heavenly guidance, inspired by the goddess to whom he has prayed for her assisting impulse. She puts the words into his mouth and the incidents into his mind; he is a privileged man, chosen as her organ, and speaking from her revelations. As the Muse grants the gift of song to whom she will, so she sometimes in her anger snatches it away, and the most consummate human genius is then left silent and helpless. It is true that these expressions, of the Muse inspiring and the poet singing a tale of past times, have passed from the ancient epic to compositions produced under very different circumstances, and have now degenerated into unmeaning forms of speech; but they gained currency originally in their genuine and literal acceptation. If poets had from
the beginning written or recited, the predicate of singing would never have been ascribed to them; nor would it ever have become customary to employ the name of the Muse as a die to be stamped on licensed fiction, unless the practice had begun when her agency was invoked and hailed in perfect good faith. Belief, the fruit of deliberate inquiry, and a rational scrutiny of evidence, is in such an age unknown; the simple faith of the time slides in unconsciously, when the imagination and feeling are exalted; and inspired authority is at once understood, easily admitted, and implicitly confided in."

If we extend our researches over the pages of Homer, we shall speedily discover numerous other instances of a belief in divine interference in human affairs, not merely (1) in the general government of the world, in the distribution of good and evil, and the allotment of the diversified gifts, intellectual, moral, and physical, which constitute the innumerable varieties of human condition, but also (2) in the way of special suggestion, guidance, encouragement, and protection, afforded to individuals.

Illustrations of the general control exercised by the gods over the fortunes of mankind may be found in the following passages of the Iliad,—xiii. 730 ff., and of the Odyssey,—i. 347 ff.; iv. 236 ff.; vi. 188 ff.; viii. 167–175; xvii. 218, 485 ff.

The following are illustrations of the special interference of the gods on behalf of their favourites: Iliad, i. 194 ff., 218; iii. 380 ff.; v. 1 ff.; vii. 272; xiii. 60 ff., 435; xvi. 788 ff.:—Odyssey, i. 319 ff.; iii. 26 ff.; xiv. 216 ff., 227; xvi. 159 ff. Of the latter class of passages, I quote two specimens.

Odyssey, i. 319 ff.:

"Ἡ μὲν ἢρ δε εἰποῦσ᾽ ἀπέβη γλαυκώπης Ἀθηνᾶ, ὁρνης ὡς ἀνοςία διέστητο τῷ ἔνθι θυμῷ Ὁμήρου μένος καὶ βάρσος, ὑπέμνησεν τὸ ἐν πατρός Μᾶλλον ἦ τῇ τῷ πάρασται καὶ δὲ φρεσὶν ἦσι νοθίσαι ἢμβησεν κατὰ θυμὸν, δίποτα γὰρ βέλει νιναί.

"As thus she spake, Athene flew
Aloft, and soared beyond his view.
His soul she filled with force and fire,
And stronger memory of his sire.
Amazed, he felt the inward force,
And deemed a god must be its source."

When Telemachus urges his youth and inexperience as a reason for diffidence in approaching Nestor, Minerva says to him (Odyssey, iii. 26):

"Επελέγα, ἠλα ὧποι ἐν φρεύ οὕτι νοήσεις,
'Αλλα δὲ καὶ δαιμόνιον ὑποθήκησας· ὦ γὰρ οὐ
'Όμι σε θεῶν ἕκατε γενέσθαι τε πραβήται τε.

"Some things thy mind itself shall reach,
And other things a god shall teach;
For born and bred thou ne'er hadst been
Unless they gods had will'd, I ween.

These passages, however, afford only one exemplification of the idea which runs through, and in fact created, the entire mythology of the Greeks, viz. that all the departments of life and of nature were animated, controlled, and governed by particular deities, by whom they were represented, and in whom they were personified.

The Indian mythology,—as is evident to every reader of the Vedas, as well as (to some extent) to the student of the Purâṇas,—is distinguished by the same tendency as the Grecian. Indra, Agni, Vāyu, Savitṛi, Śrīrya, and many other gods are nothing else than personifications of the elements, while Vāch or Sarasvatī and some other deities, represent either the divine reason by which the more gifted men were supposed to be inspired, or some mental function, or ceremonial abstraction.

In the later religious history, however, of the two races, the Hellenic and the Indian, there is in one respect a remarkable divergence. Though the priestesses of the different oracles, and perhaps some other pretenders to prophetic intuition, were popularly regarded as speaking under a divine impulse, the idea of inspiration as attaching to poems or other compositions of a religious, didactic, or philosophical character, very soon became extinct. The Greeks had no sacred Scriptures. Although a supernatural character was popularly ascribed to Pythagoras, Epimenides, and Empedocles, the Hellenic philosophers in general spoke and wrote in dependance on their own reason alone. They rarely professed to be guided by any supernatural assistance, or claimed any divine authority for their dogmas. Nor (unless such

34 See Nägelsbach's Nachomérische Theologie, pp. 173 ff., and Dr. Karl Köhler's Prophetismus der Hebräer und die Mantik der Griechen in ihrem gegenseitigen Verhältniss, (Darmstadt, 1860), pp. 39 ff.
35 I express myself cautiously here, as a learned friend profoundly versed in the study of Plato is of opinion that there are traces in the writings of that author of a
may have been the case at a very late period) was any infallibility claimed for any of them by their successors.

In India, on the other hand, the indistinct, and perhaps hesitating, belief which some of the ancient rishis seem to have entertained in their own inspiration was not suffered to die out in the minds of later generations. On the contrary this belief grew up (as we have seen above, pp. 57–138, and 207 ff.) by degrees into a fixed persuasion that all the literary productions of those early sages had not only resulted from a supernatural impulse, but were infallible, divine, and even eternal. These works have become the sacred Scriptures of India. And in the popular opinion, if not in the estimation of the learned, most Indian works of any importance, of a religious, scientific, or philosophical kind, which were produced at a later period, have come to be regarded as inspired, as soon as the lapse of ages had removed the writers beyond familiar or traditional knowledge, and invested their names with a halo of reverence.

To return from this digression to the inquiry which was being pursued regarding the opinions of the ancient Vedic rishis on the subject of their own inspiration:

How, it will be asked, are we to reconcile this impression which the rishis manifest of being prompted by supernatural aid, with the circumstance, which seems to be no less distinctly proved by the citations made in the preceding section (pp. 232 ff.), that they frequently speak of themselves as having made, fabricated, or generated the hymns, without apparently betraying any consciousness that in this process they were inspired or guided by any extraneous assistance?

In reply to this I will only suggest (1) that possibly the idea of inspiration may not have been held by the earliest rishis, but may have grown up among their successors; or (2) that it may have been entertained by some rishis, and not by others; or again (3), if both ideas claim to supernatural guidance, though by no means to infallibility. See also the mention made of the inspiration ascribed to Pythagoras, in Mr. Grote's Greece, iv. 538, 530; and the notices of Epimenides and Empedocles given by the same author, vol. iii. 112 ff., vol. vii. p. 174, and vol. viii. 466 f.; and compare on the same subjects Bp. Thirlwall's Hist. of Greece, ii. 32 ff., and 155 ff.; and Plato, Legg. i. p. 642. See also Prof. Geddes's Phædo, note P. p. 251, and the passages there referred to; and the Tract of Dr. Köhler, above cited, pp. 60 and 64.
can be traced to the same author, we may suppose that the one notion was uppermost in his mind at one moment, and the other at another; or (4) that he had no very clearly defined ideas of inspiration, and might conceive that the divine assistance of which he was conscious, or which at least he implored, did not render his hymn the less truly the production of his own mind; that, in short, the existence of a human, was not incompatible with that of a superhuman, element in its composition.

The first of these suppositions is, however, attended with this difficulty, that both conceptions, viz., that of independent unassisted composition, and that of inspiration, appear to be discoverable in all parts of the Rig-veda. As regards the second supposition, it might not be easy (in the uncertainty attaching to the Vedic tradition contained in the Anukramaṇī or Vedic index) to show that such and such hymns were written by such and such rishis, rather than by any others. It may, however, become possible by continued and careful comparison of the Vedic hymns, to arrive at some probable conclusions in regard to their authorship, so far at least as to determine that particular hymns should probably be assigned to particular eras, or families, rather than to others. I must, however, leave such investigations to be worked out, and the results applied to the present subject, by more competent scholars than myself.

III. While in many passages of the Veda, an efficacy is ascribed to the hymns, which is perhaps nothing greater than natural religion teaches all men to attribute to their devotions, in other texts a mystical, magical, or supernatural power is represented as residing in the prayers and metres. (See Weber’s Vājasaneyi-Sānhitā specimen, p. 61; and Vol. I. of this work, p. 242.) Some of the following texts are of the latter kind.

Thus in R.V. i. 67, 3, it is said:

Ajo na kṣaṃ dadhāra prithivīṃ tāstambha dyām mantrebbhiḥ satyaiḥ |
“(Agni) who like the unborn, supported the broad earth, and upheld the sky by true prayers.”

The following is part of Śāyaṇa’s annotation on this verse:

Mantrair dīvo dārāṇaḥ Taittirīye samānātātām | “devaḥ vai ādit-
yasya svarga-lokaṃya parācho ’tipātād abibhayuḥ | taṁ odbhodbhir adri-
han ākṛityā” iti | yadvā satyair mantraiḥ stāyamāno ’gnir dyām tas-
tambha iti |
THE RISHIS, AND THEIR OPINIONS IN REGARD.

"The supporting of the sky by mantras is thus recorded in the Taittirīya: 'The gods feared lest the sun should fall down from the heaven; they propped it up by metres.' Or the verse may mean that Agni, being lauded by true mantras, upheld the sky."

See also R.V. i. 96, 2, quoted above, in p. 225, and Ait. Br. ii. 33, cited in the First Volume of this work, p. 180.

i. 164, 25. Jagatā sindhun divi astabhāyad rathantara sūryam pari apatyat | gāyatrasya samidhas tīraḥ āhus tato mahnā pra viriche ma-
hitvā |

"By the Jagati metre he fixed the waters in the sky; he beheld the sun in the Rathantara (a portion of the Sāma-veda): there are said to be three divisions of the Gāyatra; hence it surpasses [all others] in power and grandeur."

iii. 53, 12. Viścāmitrasya rakshati brahma idam Bhārataṁ janam |

"The prayer of Viśvāmitra protects this tribe of the Bharatas."

(See Vol. I. pp. 242 and 342.)

v. 31, 4. Brahmāṇaḥ Indram māhayanto arkair avardhayan Ahaye hantvai u |

"The priests magnifying Indra by their praises, have fortified him for slaying Agni."

Compare the following texts already quoted, i. 32, 13, p. 226; vi. 44, 13, p. 227; viii. 6, 11, p. 228; viii. 8, 8, p. 243; viii. 44, 12, p. 230; viii. 63, 8, p. 230; x. 67, 13, p. 244; and also i. 10, 5; ii. 11, 2; ii. 12, 14; iii. 34, 1, 2; v. 31, 10; vii. 6, 1, 21, 31, 35; viii. 13, 16; viii. 14, 5, 11; viii. 82, 27; and viii. 87, 8, where a similar power of augmenting, or strengthening, the gods is attributed to the hymns.

v. 40, 6. . . . Gātham sūryaṁ tamasā apavratena turīyena brahmaṇa
avindad Ātriḥ | 8. . . . Ātriḥ sūryasya divi chakshur ādhāḥ svārbhānora
apa māyāḥ aghukhāt | 9. Yaṁ vai sūryaṁ svārbhānus tamasā avidhyad āsuraḥ | Ātryas tam anvavindan na hi anye abāknuvan |

"Ātri, by his fourth prayer, discovered the sun which had been concealed by the hostile darkness. 8. . . . Ātri placed the eye of the sun in the sky, and dispelled the illusions of Svarbhānu. 9. The Ātris discovered the sun, which Svarbhānu, of the Asura race, had pierced with darkness; no other could [effect this]." (See Vol. I. of this work, pp. 242 and 469.)
vi. 75, 19. . . . Devās taṁ sarve dhūrvantu brahma varma mamān-
taram |  
"May all the gods destroy him; the prayer is my protecting armour."  
vii. 19, 11. Nu Indra śūra stavamānāḥ uti brahma-jūtas tanvā vavri-
dhasva ityādi |  
"Heroic Indra, lauded, and impelled by our prayers, grow in body through (our) aid [or longing]," etc. (Compare viii. 13, 17, 25.)  
vii. 33, 3. . . . Even nu kaṁ dāsaraṇa Sudāsam prāvad Indro brah-
maṇaḥ vo Vasishṭhāḥ | 5. . . . Vasishṭhasya stuvataḥ Indraḥ asrod urum
Trītubhyāḥ, akṛpinod u lokam |  
"Indra has delivered Śūdas in the combat of the ten kings through your prayer, o Vasishṭha. 5. Indra heard Vasishṭha when he praised, and opened a wide place for the Trītus." (See Vol. I. pp. 242 and 319.)  
viii. 49, 9. Pāḥi naḥ Agne ekaya pāḥi uta dvitīyaya | pāḥi gīrbhis tis-
ribhir āryaṁpate pāḥi chetasribhir vaso |  
"Protect us, Agni, through the first, protect us through the second, protect us, lord of power, through three hymns, protect us through four, thou bright god."  

The following passage celebrates the numbers of the metres:  
x. 114, 8, 9. Sahāsradhā panchaśāni ukthā yāvad dyāvā-prithvi-
tavā it tat | Sahāsradhā mahimānaḥ sahasraṁ yāvad brahma vishṇhitam
ūtāti vāk | 9. Kāḥ chh. ndasāṁ yogam āveda dhīraḥ ko dhishṇyāṁ prati
vāčham papāda | kam ṛtvijāṁ asḥtamaṁ śūram ādur hari Indraiya ni
chikāya kaḥ svit |  
8. "There are a thousand times fifteen ukthās; that extends as far as heaven and earth. A thousand times a thousand are their glorious manifestations; speech is commensurate with devotion. 9. What sage knows the [whole] series [or application] of the metres? Who has attained devotional speech? Whom do they call the eighth hero among priests? Who has perceived the two steeds of Indra?"

(The word dhishṇya is said by Yāska, Nirukta, viii. 3, to be = to dhishṇya, and that again to be = to dhishṇa-ḥṭava, "springing" from dhishṇā, "speech," or "sacred speech."

I conclude the series of texts relating to the power of the mantras by quoting the whole of the 130th hymn of the 10th Maṇḍala of the Rig-veda:  
1. Yo yajno viśvatas tantubhis tataḥ ekaśataṁ deva-karmeḥbhīr āyatāḥ |

"1. The [web of] sacrifice which is stretched on every side with threads, 35 which is extended with one hundred [threads], the work of the gods,—these fathers who have arrived weave it; they sit where it is extended, [saying] 'weave forwards, weave backwards.' 2. The Man stretches it out and spins it, the Man has extended it over this sky. These rays approached the place of sacrifice; they made the Sāma verses the shuttles for the woof. 3. What was the measure [of the ceremonial], what the form, what the type, what the oblation, what the enclosing fuel, what the metre, what the prāuga, and what the uktha, when all the gods sacrificed to the god? 4. The gāyatrī was associated with Āgni; Savitri was conjoined with the ushnīhā; and Soma, gladdening (us) through hymns (ukthas), with the anushtubh; the brihati attached itself to the speech of Brihaspati. 5. The virāj adhered to Mitra and Varuṇa; the trishṭubh, a portion of the day (?), [accompanied] Indra. The jagati entered into the Viśvedevas. By this means human rishis were successful. 6. By this means our human fathers the rishis were successful, when this ancient sacrifice

35 In R.V. x. 67, 2, we find the same word tantu occurring: Yo yajnasya pratā-dhanas tantur deveshu ātatas tam āhutaṁ naśīnahi | "May we obtain him [Āgni] who is offered, who is the fuller of sacrifice, who is the thread stretched to the gods." (Comp. the versions given by Prof. Müller in the Journ. R. A. S. for 1866, pp. 449, and 457.) Prof. Roth quotes under the word tantu the following text from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, ii. 4, 2, 6: A tantum Āgner diṣyam tatīne | tvam nas tantur uṣṇa tcetur āgneyaṃ tvam paniḥ bhavanī deva-yūnah | "Āgni has stretched the divine thread. Thou, Āgni, art our thread and bridge; thou art the path leading to the gods."
was celebrated. I believe that I behold with my mind, [as] with an eye, those ancients who performed this sacrifice. 7. The seven-wise and divine rishis, with hymns, with metres, [with] ritual forms, and according to the prescribed measures, contemplating the path of the ancients, have followed it, like charioteers seizing the reins.”

I shall not attempt to explain the meaning and purport of this obscure and mystical hymn, which has been translated by Mr. Colebrooke (Essays, i. 34, 35, or p. 18 of Williams and Norgate’s ed.). My object in quoting the verses is to show how the various metres are associated with the different deities, in this primeval and mysterious rite, and how a certain sanctity is thus imparted to them. In verse 7, it will be observed, the rishis are spoken of as seven in number, and as divine. The Atharva-veda (x. 7, 48, 44) gives the second verse somewhat differently from the Rig-veda, as follows: Pumān enād vayati udgrīnatti pumān enād vi jabhāra adhi nāke | ime mayākāh upa tastabhur divām sāmāni chakrus tasarāṇi vētave | “The Man weaves and spins this: the Man has spread this over the sky. These rays have propped up the sky; they have made the Śāma-verses shuttles for the woof.”

IV. But whatever may have been the nature or the source of the supernal illumination to which the rishis laid claim, it is quite clear that some among them at least made no pretensions to anything like a perfect knowledge of all subjects, human and divine, as they occasionally confess their ignorance of matters in which they felt a deep interest and curiosity. This is shown in the following texts:

R.V. i. 164, 5. Pākaḥ prichkhāmi manasā avijānan devānām enā nihitā padāni | yatse bashkaye adhi śipta tantūn vi tatnire kavyāk otavai ṣ | 6. Achiktvān chikitasaś chid atra kavin prichkhāmi vidmane na vidvān | vi yas tastambha shaś imā rajāmsi ajasya rūpe kim api śivid skam | 37. Na vi jānāmi yad iva idam asmi nignyāh sannaddho manasaḥ charāmi | yadā mā āgaḥ prathamajāḥ ritasya ēd id vācaḥ āsnuve bhāgam asyāḥ |

“5. Ignorant, not knowing in my mind, I enquire after these hidden abodes of the gods; the sages have stretched out seven threads for a woof over the yearling calf [or over the sun, the abode of all things]. 6. Not comprehending, I ask those sages who comprehend this matter; unknowing, [I ask] that I may know; what is the one thing, in the form of the uncreated one, who has upheld these six
worlds? 37. I do not recognize if I am like this; I go on perplexed and bound in mind. When the first-born sons of sacrifice [or truth] come to me, then I enjoy a share of that word."

I do not attempt to explain the proper sense of these dark and mystical verses. It is sufficient for my purpose that they clearly express ignorance on the part of the speaker. Prof. Wilson's translation of the passages may be compared. Prof. Müller, Anc. Ind. Lit. p. 567, renders verse 37 as follows: "I know not what this is that I am like; turned inward I walk, chained in my mind. When the first-born of time comes near me, then I obtain the portion of this speech."

x. 31, 7. Kiṃ svīd vanaṁ kah u sa vrikṣhaḥ āśa yata dyāvā-prithiṇi nishtatakṣhaḥ | santasthāne ajāre itātā ahāni pūrīr uhaso jaranta |

"What was the forest, what the tree, out of which they fashioned heaven and earth, which continue to exist undecaying, whilst days, and many dawns have passed away?"

Compare x. 81, 4, where the first of these lines is repeated and is followed by the words: Manīshino manasā prīchhata iḍ u tad yad adhy- atishthad bhuvanāṁ dhārayan | "Ask in your minds, ye intelligent, what that was on which he took his stand when upholding the worlds;" and see verse 2 of the same hymn.

i. 185, 1. Katarā pūrvā katarā aparā ayoḥ kathā jāte kavayo ko vi veda |

"Which of these two (Heaven and Earth) is the first? which is the last? How were they produced? Who, o sages, knows?"

x. 88, 18. Kati agnayaḥ kati sūryasaḥ kati ushasaḥ kati u svīd āpaḥ | na upaspijañ caḥ pitaro vadāmi prīchhāmi caḥ kavayo vidmaṇaḥ kam |

"How many fires are there? how many suns? how many dawns? how many waters? I do not, fathers, say this to you in jest; I really ask you, sages, in order that I may know."

Compare x. 114, 9, above, p. 227.

x. 129, 5. Tīraścrito vitato raśmir esām adhah svīd āstī upari svīd āsit | retodhaḥ āsan mahimānaḥ āsan svadha avastat prayatīḥ parastat |

6. Kah addha veda kah iha pravoḥat kutaḥ ajītaḥ kutaḥ iyaṁ visriṣṭhiḥ | oṛvāg devaḥ asya visaranena atha ko veda yataḥ ababhūva | 7. Iyaṁ vis- riṣṭhir yataḥ ababhūva yadi vā dadho yadi vā na | yah asya adhyakshaḥ parame vyoman sa ugaḥ veda yadi vā na veda |

5. "Their ray [or cord], obliquely extended, was it below, or was it above? There were generative sources, and there were great powers,
svadha (a self-supporting principle) below, and effort above. 6. Who knows, who hath here declared, whence this creation was produced, whence [it came]? The gods were subsequent to the creation of this universe; who then knows whence it sprang? 7. Whence this creation sprang, whether any one formed it or not,—he who, in the highest heavens, is the overseer of this universe,—he indeed knows, or he does not know."

See the translation of the whole hymn by Mr. Colebrooke in his Essays, i. 33, 34, or p. 17 of Williams and Norgate's ed. See also Prof. Müller's version and comment in pp. 559-564 of his History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature; and my own rendering in the article on the "progress of the Vedic religion towards abstract conceptions of the Deity," in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1865, pp. 45 f.

We have seen (above, p. 62) that a claim is set up (by some unspecified writer quoted by Sāyaṇa) on behalf of the Veda that it can impart an understanding of all things, past and future, subtle, proximate, and remote; and that according to Sankara Āchāryya (on the Brahma-sūtras, i. 1, 3) as cited above, p. 106, the knowledge which it manifests, approaches to omniscience. All such proud pretensions are, however, plainly enough disavowed by the rishis who uttered the complaints of ignorance which I have just adduced. It is indeed urged by Sāyaṇa (see above, p. 61) in answer to the objection, that passages like R.V. x. 129, 5, 6, can possess no authority as sources of knowledge, since they express doubt,—that this is not their object, but that their intention is to intimate by a figure of speech the extreme profundity of the divine essence, and the great difficulty which any persons not well versed in the sacred writings must experience in comprehending it. There can, however, be little doubt that the authors of the passages I have cited did feel their own ignorance, and intended to give utterance to this feeling. As, however, such confessions of ignorance on the part of the rishis, if admitted, would have been incompatible with the doctrine that the Veda was an infallible source of divine knowledge, it became necessary for the later theologians who held that doctrine to explain away the plain sense of those expressions.

It should, however, be noticed that these confessions of ignorance and fallibility are by no means inconsistent with the supposition that the rishis may have conceived themselves to be animated and directed in
the composition of their hymns by a divine impulse. But although the two rivals, Vaisishtha and Visvamitra, whether in the belief of their own superhuman insight, or to enhance their own importance, and recommend themselves to their royal patrons, talk proudly about the wide range of their knowledge (see above, pp. 246 ff.), it is not necessary to imagine that, either in their idea or in that of the other ancient Indian sages, inspiration and infallibility were convertible or co-extensive terms. The rishis may have believed that the supernatural aid which they had received enabled them to perform what they must otherwise have left unattempted, but that after all it communicated only a partial illumination, and left them still liable to mistake and doubt.

I must also remark that this belief in their own inspiration which I imagine some of the rishis to have held, falls very far short of the conceptions which most of the later writers, whether Vaiseshika, Mimamsaka, or Vedantist, entertain in regard to the supernatural origin and authority of the Veda. The gods from whom the rishis supposed that they derived their illumination, at least Agni, Indra, Mitra, Varuna, Soma, Pushan, etc., would all fall under the category of productions, or divinities created in time. This is clearly shown by the comments of Sankara on the Brahma Sutras, i. 3, 28, (above, pp. 101 ff.); and is otherwise notorious (see my "Contributions to a knowledge of the Vedic Theogony and Mythology" in the Jl. R. A. S. for 1864, p. 63). But if these gods were themselves created, and even (as we are told in the Rig-veda itself, x. 129, 6, cited in p. 280) produced subsequently to some other parts of the creation, the hymns with which they inspired the rishis, could not have been eternal. The only one of the deities referred to in the Rig-veda as sources of illumination, to whom this remark would perhaps not apply, is Vach or Sarasvati, who is identified with the supreme Brahman in the passage of the Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad quoted above (p. 208, note 179); though this idea no doubt originated subsequently to the era of the hymns. But it is not to created gods, like Agni, Indra, and others of the same class, that the origin of the Veda is referred by the Vaiseshikas, Mimamsakas, or Vedantists. The Vaiseshikas represent the eternal Isvara as the author of the Veda (see the passages which I have quoted in pp. 118 ff. and 209). The Mimamsakas and Vedantists, as we have seen (pp. 70 ff., 99 ff. and 208),
either affirm that it is uncreated, or derive it from the eternal Brahma. And even those writers who may attribute the composition of the Veda to the personal and created Brahmā (see pp. 69, 105 f. and 208), with the Naiyāyikas who merely describe it as the work of a competent author (see pp. 116 f. and 209), and the Sāṅkhyaśas (see pp. 135 and 208), concur with the other schools in affirming its absolute infallibility. Their view, consequently (unless we admit an exception in reference to Vāch), differs from that of the Vedic rishis themselves, who do not seem to have had any idea, either of their hymns being uncreated, or derived from the eternal Brahma, or of their being infallible.

As regards the relation of the rishis to deities like Indra, it is also deserving of notice that later mythologists represent the former, not only as quite independent of, the latter, and as gifted with an inherent capacity of raising themselves by their own austerities to the enjoyment of various superhuman faculties, but even as possessing the power of rivalling the gods themselves, and taking possession of their thrones. See the stories of Nahusha and Viśvāmitra in the First Volume of this work, particularly pp. 310 ff. and 404. Compare also the passages from the Rig-veda, x. 154, 2, and x. 167, 1, quoted above, p. 250, where the rishis are said-to have attained to heaven, and Indra to have conquered it, by austere-effort (tapas).

Sect. V.—Texts from the Upanishads, showing the opinions of the authors regarding their own inspiration, or that of their predecessors.

I shall now adduce some passages from different Upanishads, to show what opinions their authors entertained either in regard to their own inspiration, or that of the earlier sages, from whom they assert that their doctrine was derived by tradition.

I. Svetāsvatara Up. v. 2 (already quoted above, p. 184). "yo yoniṁ yonim adhitishṭhāty eko viśvāni rūpāni yoniś cha sarvāḥ | pṛishim praśutam Kapilaṁ yas tam agre āgnāṁair bibharti jāyamānaṁ cha paśyet |

"He who alone presides over every place of production, over all forms, and all sources of birth, who formerly nourished with various knowledge that rishi Kapila, who had been born, and beheld him at his birth."
II. Svetāsvatara Up. vi. 21. Taṣaḥ-prabhūvād veda-prasādāch cha Brahma ha Svetāsvatara 'tha viḍāṇ | atyāśramibhyah paramam pavītram pravīcāha samyag rishi-sangha-juṣṭtām |

"By the power of austere-fervour, and by the grace of the Veda, the wise Svetāsvatara declared perfectly to the men in the highest of the four orders, the supreme and holy Brahma, who is sought after by the company of rishis." (Dr. Röer's translation, p. 68, follows the commentator in rendering the first words of the verse thus: "By the power of his austerity, and the grace of God." This, however, is not the proper meaning of the words veda-prasādāča cha, if the correctness of that reading, which is given both in the text and commentary (Bibl. Ind. p. 372), be maintained. Sankara interprets the words thus: "Veda-prasādāch cha" | kaivalyaṃ uddiṣṭa tad-adhikāra-siddhyas bahu-janmasu samyag ārādhita-paramēśvarasyā prasādāch cha | "By the grace of the Veda: 'by the grace of the supreme God who had been perfectly adored by him during many births in order to acquire the prerogative of (studying) it (the Veda) in reference to kaivalya (isolation from mundane existence);" and thus appears to recognize this reading.

In the 18th verse of the same section of this Upanishad the Vedas are said to have been given by the supreme God to Brahmā:

Yo Brahmānaṁ vidadhāti pūrvaṁ yo vai vedāṁ cha prahīnoti tasmai | teṁ ha devam ālma-buddhi-prakāśam munukshu vai  śroṇam aham pra- padyo |

"Seeking after final liberation, I take refuge with that God, the manifestor of the knowledge of himself, who at first created Brahmā and gave him the Vedas."

III. Mūndaka Up. i. 1 ff. (quoted above, p. 30, more at length). Brahmā devānam prathamaḥ sambabhava viśvasya karitaḥ bhuvanasya goptā | Sa brahma-vidyām sarva-vidyā-pratishthāṁ Atharvāya jyeshṭha- pravrīṇa prāha |

"Brahmā was born the first of the gods, he who is the maker of the universe and the supporter of the world. He declared the science of Brahma, the foundation of all the sciences, to Atharva, his eldest son."

IV. The Chhāndogya Up. viii. 15, 1, p. 625 ff. concludes as follows:

Tad ha etad Brahmā Prajāpataye uvāca Prajāpatir Manave Manuḥ praṇābhyah | ākhārya-kulād vedam adhitya yathā viḍhānaṁ guroh kar- mātiṣeṣeṇa abhisamanṛṣṭyā kuṭumbe śuchau đeṣe svādhyāyam adhityāno
TO THE ORIGIN OF THE VEDIC HYMNS.

This [doctrine] Brahmā declared to Prajāpati, Prajāpati declared it to Manu, and Manu to his descendants. Having received instruction in the Veda from the family of his religious teacher in the prescribed manner, and in the time which remains after performing his duty to his preceptor; and when he has ceased from this, continuing his Vedic studies at home, in his family, in a pure spot, communicating a knowledge of duty [to his pupils], withdrawing all his senses into himself, doing injury to no living creature, away from holy places,—thus passing all his days, a man attains to the world of Brahmā, and does not return again, and does not return again [i.e. is not subjected to any future births]."

I quote the commencement of Sankara's comment on this passage:

"Tad ha etad ātma-jñānam sopakaranam om ity etad aksharam ity-ādyaih saha upāsanaṁ tad-vāchakena granthena ashtādhyāya-lakṣaṇena saha Brahmā Hīranyakarbhāḥ Paramesvara vā tad-dvāreṇa Prajāpataye Kaśyapaṁ uvācha | asāv api Manuṁ sva-putrāya | Manuḥ prajaḥbhyāḥ | ity evam śruti-artha sampadāya-paramparayā āgataṁ upanishad-vijnānam adyaṁ virodhsv avagamyate |

"This knowledge of soul, with its instruments, with the sacred monosyllable Om and other formulæ of devotion, and with the book distinguished as containing eight chapters, which sets forth all these topics, [viz. the Chhāndogya Upanishad itself] was declared by Brahmā Hīranyakarbhā, or by Paramēśvara (the supreme God), through his agency, to the Prajāpati Kaśyapa. The latter in his turn declared it to his son Manu, and Manu to his descendants. In this manner the sacred knowledge contained in the Upanishads, having been received through successive transmission of the sense of the Veda from generation to generation, is to this day understood among learned men."

In an earlier passage of the same Upanishad iii. 11, 3 f. (partly quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 195), we find a similar statement in reference to a particular branch of sacred knowledge (the madhu-jñāna):

3. Na ha vai asmai udeti na nimlochati sakrīdh divā ha eva asmai bha-
pañca yāḥ etām evam brahmopanishadaṁ vedā | 4. Tat ha etad Brahma
Prajāpataye uvācha Prajāpatiḥ Manavo Manuḥ praJaḥbhyaḥ | tad etad
Uddalakāya Āruṇaye jyeshṭhāya putrāya pitā brahma uvācha | 5.
Idaṁ váva taj-jyeshṭhāya putrāya pitā brahma prabṛyāt prañāyyāya
vā antavāsina (6) na anyasmai kasmāichana | yadyāpy asmai īmām
adbhīḥ parigṛhiṇāṁ dhanasya pūrṇāṁ dādyāt etad eva tato bhūyaḥ ity
etad eva tato bhūyaḥ iti |

"3. For him who thus knows this sacred mystery, the sun neither
rises nor sets, but one day perpetually lasts. 4. This (Madhu-jnāna) was
declared by Brahma to Prajāpati, by Prajāpati to Manu, and by Manu
to his descendants. This sacred knowledge was further declared to
Uddalaka Āruṇi by his father. 5. Let a father expound it to his eldest
son, or to a capable pupil, but to no one else. 6. If any one were to
give him this entire earth, which is surrounded by water, full of
wealth, this sacred knowledge would be more than that, yes, would be
more than that."

Compare Manu, xi. 243, where that Code is said to have been created
by Prajāpati (First Volume of this work, p. 394); and Bhagavad Gītā
iv. 1, where the doctrine of that treatise is said to have been declared
by Kṛishṇa to Vivasvat (the Sun), by Vivasvat to Manu, by him to
Ikhvāku, and then handed down by tradition from one royal rishi
to another (Vol. I. p. 508).
APPENDIX.

Page 4, line 5.
I have omitted here the verse from the Atharva-veda, xi. 7, 24 (quoted by Professor Goldstücker in his Pañini, p. 70): Ṛichāḥ s-māni chhandāmsi purāṇām yajushā saha | uchchhishtāj jajnire sarve divī devāḥ diviśritāḥ | “From the leavings of the sacrifice sprang the Rich- and Śāman-verses, the metres, the Purāṇa with the Yajush, and all the gods who dwell in the sky.”

Professor Aufrecht has favoured me with the following amendments in my translations in pp. 7 and 8:

Page 7, line 13.
For “the text called sāvitrī [or gāyatrī]” he would substitute “the verse dedicated to Savitri.”

Page 7, line 16.
For “the mouth of Brahma” he proposes “the beginning of the Veda.” (Sir W. Jones translates “the mouth, or principal part of the Veda.”)

Page 8, line 8.
For “from Vāch (speech) as their world” he proposes “out of the sphere (or compass) of speech.”

Page 8, line 8
For “Vāch was his: she was created” he proposes “For in creating the Vedas, he had also created Vāch.”

Page 8, line 13.
For “He gave it an impulse” he proposes “He touched it.”
Page 8, line 16.

For "Moreover it was sacred knowledge, which was created from that Male in front" he proposes "For even from that Male (not only from the waters) Brahma was created first."

Page 9, line 16.

This passage of the Brähad Āraṇyaka Upanishad corresponds to Satapatha Brahmana x. 6, 5, 5.

Page 10, line 2.

"May the brilliant deity," etc., Professor Aufrecht would prefer to translate the second line of the verse, beginning sudvaḥ (p. 9, l. 6 from the foot), "Goodness; (the good god) only knows where they put the earth which was thrown up (nirvapana)."

Page 20, line 17.

See Āśvalāyana Gṛihya Sūtras, pp. 155, and 157 ff.

Page 22, line 13, note 25.

I quote two verses from Manu, of which the second confirms the correctness of the rendering I have given of the words ā ha eva sa nakhagrebhyas tapyate, and the first illustrates the text of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka cited in the note: Manu ii. 166. Vedaṃ eva sadā bhyaṣyat tapas tapyaṇa devījottamaḥ | vedābhyaśo hi viprasya tapasḥ param śriyate | 167. ā haiva sa nakhagrebhyah paramaṁ "tapyeta" tapasḥ | yaḥ svagvy api dvija 'dhīte vādhyāyaṁ saktito 'nvaham | "Let a good Brāhmaṇ who desires to perform tapas constantly study the Veda; for such study is a Brāhmaṇ’s highest tapas. 167. That twice-born man who daily studies the Veda to the utmost of his power, even though (luxuriously) wearing a garland of flowers (really) performs the highest tapas to the very extremities of his nails." This verse, it will be observed, quotes verbatim one of the phrases of the Brāhmaṇa, and gives definiteness to its sense by adding the words paramaṁ tapaḥ. Verses 165 ff. of the same book of Manu prescribe the abstemious mode of life which the student (brahmachārin) is to follow whilst living in his teacher’s house. The Mahābhārata, Udyoga-parvan, 1537, thus states the conditions of successful study in general; Sukhārthīnaḥ kuto viḍyā nāsti viḍyārthīnaḥ sukham |
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sukhārthā vā tyaṣaḍā vidyāṁ vidyārthī vā tyaṣaṭā sukham | “How can one who seeks ease acquire science? Ease does not belong to him who pursues science. Either let the seeker of ease abandon science, or the seeker of science abandon ease.”

Page 30, line 17.

Compare the lines quoted by the Commentator on Śāṇḍilya’s Bhaktiśūtra, 83, p. 60, from the Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, Moksha-dharma, verses 13,551 ff.: Sahapanishado vedān ye vipraḥ samyag asthitāḥ | pa-ṭhanti vidhim āsthāya ye chaṇi yati-dharmaṇāḥ | tato viśiṣṭam jānaṃi gatim ekāntāṃ nṛṣīṇam | “I regard the destination of Ekāntins (persons devoted to the One as their end) as superior to that of Brāhmans who perfectly study the Vedas, including the Upanishads, according to rule, as well as to that of those who follow the practices of ascetics (yatis).”

Page 34, line 1.

Perhaps this was scarcely a suitable passage to be quoted as deprecatory of the Veda, as in such a stage of transcendental absorption as is here described all the ordinary standards of estimation have ceased to be recognized.

Page 43, line 10.

With the expression hriḍ-akāśa, “the aether of the heart,” compare the passage quoted from the Veda in Sankara’s commentary on Brahma Sūtra iii. 2, 35 (p. 873): “Yo’yaṇ vahṛdāḥ purushād ākāśo yo’yan antaḥ-purushe ākāśo yo’yan antar-hriḍayes ākāśaḥ | “This aether which is external to a man, this aether which is within a man, and this aether which is within the heart.” See also the Brīhad Āraṇyaka Upanishad ii. 5, 10 and iii. 7, 12.

Page 44, line 1.

See the Yoga aphorisms i. 2 ff. as cited and explained by Dr. Ballantyne.1 The second aphorism defines yoga to be “a stoppage of the functions of the mind” (Yogaś chitta-vṛitti-nirodhaḥ). “The mind then abides in the state of the spectator, i.e. the Soul” (tāda drasṭuḥ svā-rūpe ‘vasthānam—Aph. 3). “At other times it takes the form of the

1 Two fasciculi only, containing two Pādas and 106 Sūtras, were published at Allahabad in 1852 and 1853; but a continuation of Dr. B.’s work has been commenced in the “Pandit” for Sept. 1863.
functions” (vrâti-sârûpyam itaratra—Aph. 4). These functions, or modifications (as Dr. Ballantyne translates) are fivefold, and either painful, or devoid of pain, viz. proof, or right notion (pramâna), mistake (viparyyaya), groundless imagination (vikalpa), sleep (niârâ), recollection (smrîti)—Aphorisms 5–11. See also Dr. Ballantyne’s Sânkhya Aphorisms, iii. 31 ff.

Page 57; note 61.

With the subject of this note compare the remarks in p. 108, and the quotations from Dr. Roer and Professor Müller in pp. 173, 175, and 193.

Page 62, note 65.

Professor Cowell does not think that the text is corrupt. He would translate it, "the other pramânas, beside sabda, (scil. perception and inference), cannot be even supposed in a case like this" (which refers to such a transcendental object as the existence of an eternal Veda). Sâyana, in his reply to the objector, recapitulates the applicable proofs as sruti, smrîti, and loka-prasiddhi,—all three only different kinds of testimony, sabda.

Page 63, lines 11 f., and note 68.


Page 84, note 89, and page 180, line 7.

I have been favoured by Professor Cowell with the following note on kâlâyâyâpadishâ:

“My Calcutta Pandit considered this fallacy to be the same as that more usually called bâdha (cf. too Bhaâshâparichchhedha, sl. 70, 77, and the Bengali translation, p. 65). Its definition is pakshe sâdhyâbhava. The Tarka-sangraha defines a hebù as bâdhita, ‘when the absence of what it seeks to prove is established for certain by another proof,’ as in the argument vâhnir anushho dravyatvat. The essence of this fallacy is that you deny the major, and therefore it does not matter whether you accept the middle term in itself or not. It is involved in the overthrow of the major term. I should translate it the ‘precluded argument,’—it might have been plausible if it had not been put out of court by something which settles
the point,—it is advanced too late (the pre in ‘procluded’ expresses the kālātita of the old name). This corresponds to the account in the Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti: Kālasya sādhana-kālasātyayo ’bhūva ’padishṭaḥ prayuktāhetur | etena sādhyābhavapramālakṣapartha āti sūchitam | sādhyābhavānirnāyaye sādhanaśambhavāt | Ayam eva bādhitasādhyako āti giyate. The Vṛtti goes on to say that you need not prove vyabhichāra (i.e. that your opponent’s hetu or middle term goes too far, as in parvato dhumavān vahneḥ where vahni is a svabhāsikā hetyeva) in order to establish the bādha. I should therefore prefer to translate the passage from the Vedārtha-prakāśa, p. 84, ‘your alleged middle-term vākyatā, the possessing the properties of a common sentence, is liable to two objections,—(1) it is opposed by the fact that no author was ever perceived, and (2) it also is precluded by weighty evidence (which proves that your proposed major term is irrelevant).’ Śāyaṇa then adds his reasons for each objection,—for the first, in the words from yathā Vyāsa down to upalabdhaḥ; for the second, in the fact that smṛiti and sruti agree in the eternity of the Veda (the pārvam I suppose refers to p. 3 of the Calcutta printed text), and that even if the Supreme Spirit be the author he is not purushaḥ in the sense in which the objector uses the term. Either way, the major term of the objector’s syllogism pawrasheya is precluded, bādhitaḥ; or, in the technical language of the Nyāya, Śāyaṇa establishes an absence from the minor term (pākṣa) of the alleged major term (sādhyā); and hence no conclusion can be drawn from the proposed syllogism. I may add that I have also looked into Vātsyāyana, but his explanation seems to me an instance of what my Pandit used so often to impress on me, that the modern logic (which such a late mediaeval writer as Śāyaṇa follows) is not always that of the Nyāyabhasya. He makes the error lie in the example, i.e. in the induction; and it is therefore, as Professor Goldstücker says, a ‘vicious generalization.’”

Page 88, note 95.

Professor Cowell disagrees with the explanation I have hazarded of the object of the sentence in the text to which this note refers. He thinks that its purport, as shewn by the word vyabhichārataḥ, is to intimate that the former of the two alternative suppositions would prove too much, as it would also apply to such detached stanzas as the one
referred to, of which the author, although unknown to some persons, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his contemporaries no doubt knew who wrote it, and his descendants, as well as others, might perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the origin, but which nevertheless was not superhuman (apaurushya). This is no doubt the correct explanation.

Page 99, line 1.

The argument in proof of the incompetence of the Sūdras for the acquisition of the highest divine knowledge is contained in Brahma Sūtras i. 3, 34–38. As the subject may possess an interest for any educated persons of this class into whose hands this book may fall in India, I extract the entire discussion of the question:

34. “Sūg asya tad-anudara-śravaṇat tad-ādṛvaṇat sādyate hi” | yathā manushyādhi-kāraṇa-niyamam apodya devādīnām api vidyāsv adhi- kāraṇa uḍśatas tathaiva devījāty-adhi-kāraṇa-niyamāṅgurādena śūdrasya api adhi-kāraṇa syād ity etam āśankāṁ nivartayatam idam adhi-karaṇam āraḥbhaye | tatra śūdrasya api adhi-kāraṇa syād iti tāvat prāptam arthita- sāmartyayoh sambhavat | tasmāḥ “chhūdrot yajne ’navakṛiptaḥ” iti- vach chhūdrot vidyāyāṁ anavakṛiptaḥ iti nishedhā śravaṇat | yach cha karmasv anudhi-kāraṇa-karaṇān śūdrasya anagamīvaṁ na tad vidyāsv adhi-karaṇa api avadākam | na hy āhavāṇīyādi-rahitena vidyā vedītuṁ na śaktat | bhavati cha lingāṁ śudrādhi-karasya upodhalaḥ | saṁvarga-vidyāyāṁ hi Jānaśrutiṁ Pautrāyangam śuśrūshuṁ śūdra-śabdāna parāmyōti “aha hāre tvā śūdra tava eva saha gobhir asto” iti | Vidura-prabhṛitayāḥ cha śūdra-yoni-prabhavāḥ api visiṣṭa-viṣṇuna-sampannāḥ | smaryantava | tasmād adhi-kriyate śudro vidyāsu | ity evam prāpte brūmāḥ | na śūdrasya adhikāro vedādhya-vanabhavat | adhita-vedoḥ vidita-vedarthaḥ adhikriyate | no cha śūdrasya vedādhya-vanam asty upanayanat-pārvakatvad vedādhya-vanasya upasanyanasya cha varga-traya-vishayatvāt | yat te arthivaṁ na tad asati sāmartya ‘dhikāra-karaṇam bhavati | sāmartyam api na laukikam kovalam adhikāra-karaṇam bhavati śāstrīya rthā śāstrīyasā sāmartyasya apekshitavat śāstrīyasā cha sāmartyasya adhīyayana-nirākaraṇena nirākṛitavat | yach cha idam śudro yajna ‘navakṛiptaḥ iti tad nyāya-pārvakatvad vidyāyāṁ api anavakṛiptatavam dyotavati nyāyasā sādhāranavat | yat punah saṁvarga-vidyāyāṁ śudra-
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36. “Saṁskāra-parāmasrāt tad-abhāvahilāpāḥ cha” | itaś cha na sūdrasya adhikāro yaḥ vidyā-pradesesu upanayanādaśaḥ saṁskāraḥ parāṁśiyante “taṁ ha upanīye” | “adhīhi bhagavah ṣ ēha ha upasana” | “brahma-parāḥ brahma-nishthaḥ param Brahma anveshamānaḥ ‘esha ha vai tat sarvaṃ vākṣyati’ iti te ha samit-pāṇaya bhagavantam Pippalādaṁ upasannāḥ” iti cha “tān ha anupaniya eva” ity api prādārśita eva upanayana-prāntir bhavati | sūdrasya cha saṁskārabhāvo
"bhilagyate "śūdraś chaturtho varnaḥ ekajātir" ity ekajātitva-smaranam-
"na śūre pātakaṁ kinchid na cha samākaram arhati" ity-ādibhiṣ cha |
37. "Tad-abhāva-nirāharāṇe cha pravṛtteḥ" | Itas cha na śūdasya
adhiṣṭhāyat yat satya-vachanena śūrata-abhāve nirāharāte Jābālaṁ C-udā-
maḥ upanetum anuśāsituṁ cha pravṛṣite "na etad abrahmāṇyo vivaktnum
arhati | samādham somaḥ åhara upa tvā neshye na satyād agaḥ". (Chh.
Up. iv. 4, 5) iti śrutī-lingat |
38. "Sravanādhyayanārtha-pratisheḍhāt smṛiteḥ cha" | Itas cha na
śūrasya adhiṣṭhāyor yat asya smṛiteḥ śravanādhyayanārtha-pratisheḍho bhav-
vati | veda-śravanā-pratisheḍho vedādhyayana-pratisheḍhas tad-artha-jñā-
nānushtānayoḥ cha pratisheḍhāḥ śūrasya smaryyate | śravanā-pratishe-
dhās tāvad attha asya "vedam upaśriyayatas trupu-jatubhyāṁ śrōtra-prati-
purāṇam" iti "padyu ha vai etat śmaśānām yat śūrasya tasmāt śūdra-
samīpe na adhyetayam" iti cha | ataḥ eva adhyayana-pratisheḍhāḥ |
yasya hi samīpe'pi na adhyetayam bhavati sa kathāṁ śrutim adhiṣṭhāta |
bhavati cha uchchhārane jihvā-chhedo dhārane śatāra-bhedāḥ iti | ataḥ eva
cha arthād artha-jñānānushtānayoḥ pratisheḍho bhavati | "na śūrāya
matiṁ dadyād" iti "dvijātīnām adhyayanaṁ iṣya dānam" iti cha |
yeshāṁ punaḥ pūrva-kṛita-saṁskāra-vasād Viśuṣrā-dharmavyādha-pra-
bhūtinām jñānottattis teshāṁ na sākyate phala-prāptih pratisheḍho
jñānasya ebhāntikā-phaḷatvāt | "śrāvayeḥ chaturgo varṇan" iti cha iti-
hāsa-purāṇādhiyam chāturvarnyādhiṣṭhāra-smaraṇāt | veda-pūrvakas tu
nāyī adhiṣṭhāraḥ śūrāṇām iti ethitam |
34. "In the word 'Śūdra' reference is made to his vexation on
hearing that disrespectful expression, and to his running up."

"This section is commenced to silence the doubt whether in the same
way as it had been denied (above) that the prerogative of acquiring
divine knowledge is restricted to men, and affirmed that it extends to
the gods, etc., also, the limitation of the same prerogative to twice-
born men may not also be questioned, and its extension to Śūdras
maintained. The grounds alleged in favour of the Śūdra having this
prerogative are that he may reasonably be supposed to have both (a)
the desire and (b) the power of acquiring knowledge, and that accord-
ingly (c) the Veda contains no text affirming his incapacity for know-
ledge, as it confessedly has texts directing his exclusion from sacrifice:
and further (d) that the fact of the Śūdra's not keeping up any sacred
fire, which is the cause of his incapacity for sacrifice, affords no reason
for denying to him the prerogative of gaining knowledge; since it cannot be maintained that it is impossible for a man who is destitute of the āhavanīya and other fires to acquire knowledge. There is also (c) in a Vedic text a sign which confirms the Śūdra’s prerogative. For in the passage which treats of the knowledge of the Saṃvarga (Chhāndogya Upanishad, chapter iv. section 1–3) a speaker designates Jānaśruti, descendant of Janaśruta in the third generation, who was desirous of performing service, by the term Śūdra: ‘Keep to thyself, o Śūdra, thy necklace and chariot with thy cattle.’ (Chh. Up. iv. 2, 2.) And further (f) Vidura and others are spoken of in the Śraut sacrifice as possessed of distinguished knowledge, although they were of Śūdra descent. Consequently the Śūdra enjoys the prerogative of acquiring various sorts of divine knowledge. To this we reply: The Śūdra has no such prerogative, because he cannot study the Veda. For it is the man that studies the Veda, and obtains a knowledge of its contents, who enjoys the prerogative of [access to] those contents. But a Śūdra does not study the Veda, for such study must be preceded by initiation, which again is confined to the three upper castes. As regards (a) the desire of knowledge,—that, in the absence of power, confers no prerogative. And (b) mere secular power does not suffice for the purpose; since scriptural power is necessary in a matter connected with Scripture; and such scriptural power is debarred by the debarring of study. And (c) the passage which declares that a ‘Śūdra is incapacitated for sacrifice,’ demonstrates his incapacity for knowledge also; since that follows

2 Such is the sense given to āra by the Commentators, who make it out to be a compound of the words āra, “necklace,” and āra, “a chariot;” but although āra might be the nominative of āra, “going,” no such word appears in the lexicons with the sense of “chariot.” Besides, the compound seems a very awkward one. Perhaps the word should be separated into ha are tvā; but then there would be no nominative to asu, and it would be difficult to construe tvā, “thee.”—Since the above was written, I have been favoured with a note on the passage by Professor Goldstücker. He conjectures that the words should be divided as follows: aha ha are tvā Śūdra tava eva saha gobhīr asu; that tvā may be the nominative singular feminine of the Vedic pronoun tvā, meaning “some one,” and then the sense might be as follows: “O, friend, some woman belongs to thee, Śūdrā! Let her be (i.e. come) along with the cows.” And Janaśruti would appear to have understood the word tvā in this sense here supposed, for we find that on hearing the reply of Raikva, he took his daughter to the latter, along with four hundred additional cows and the other gifts; and that on seeing the damsel, Raikva expressed his satisfaction and acceded to the request of her father.—The author of these puzzling words, it seems, intended a pun; and Sankara perhaps gave only one solution of it.
from the rule, which is of general application. As regards the circumstance that in the Vedic text regarding the knowledge of the Sāṃvarga, the word Sūdra occurs, which you regard as a sign in favour of your view; it is (d) no sign; because in that passage no rule is laid down. For the discovery of a sign indicates that a rule has been laid down; but in the passage in question there is no such rule. And although it were conceded that [if it were found in a precept regarding the Sāṃvarga] the word Sūdra would confer on a man of that caste a prerogative in regard to that particular knowledge alone, (from its being intended for him), although not to all sorts of knowledge, yet as the word occurs [not in precept, but] in an illustrative narrative (arthaśāstra) it cannot confer on him a prerogative in regard to any knowledge whatever. And in fact this word Sūdra can be applied to a person [of a higher caste] who possessed the prerogative.

How? I explain: Vexation (śuk) arose in the mind of Jānaśruti when he heard himself disrespectfully spoken of in these words of the swan: ‘Who is this that thou speakest of as if he were Rainka yoked to the chariot?’ (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 3). And since a Sūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring knowledge, we conclude that it is to this vexation (śuk) that the rishi Rainka referred, for the purpose of shewing his own knowledge of things imperceptible by sense, when he made use of this word Sūdra (Chh. Up. iv. 2, 2, see above). But again, how is it indicated by the word Sūdra that vexation (śuk) arose in his mind? We reply: by ‘the running to it [or him]’ (tad-ādravanāt); i.e. either ‘he ran to vexation,’ or ‘he was assailed by vexation,’ or ‘in his vexation he resorted to Rainka.’ We conclude thus because the sense afforded by the component parts of the word Sūdra is the probable one, whilst the conventional sense of the word Sūdra is here inapplicable. And this is seen to be the meaning in this story.

3 This appears to allude to the person referred to being found sitting under a chariot (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 8). See p. 67 of Babu Rājendralal Mitra’s translation. This story is alluded to by Professor Weber in his Ind. Stud. ix. 45, note, where he treats Sayugyan as a proper name, and remarks “The Vedānta Sūtras (i. 3, 34, 35), indeed, try to explain away this” (the circumstance of Jānaśruti being called a Sūdra) and of course Sāṅkara in his commentary on them does the same, as well in his explanation of the Chhāndogya-Upanishad.” I am not, however, by any means certain that the epithet “Sūdra,” applied to Jānaśruti by Rainka, is not merely meant as a term of abuse.

4 The meaning of this is that the word Sūdra is derived from such, “vexation,”
Sūtra 35. “And that Jānaśruti was a Kahattiya is afterwards indicated by what is said of Abhipratārin of the race of Chaitraratha.”

“That Jānaśruti was not a Śūdra appears also from this, that by examining the context he is afterwards found to be a Kshatriya by the sign that he is mentioned along with Abhipratārin of the family of Chaitraratha. For in the sequel of the passage regarding the knowledge of the Saṁvarga mention is made in these words of Abhipratārin Chaitrarathi, a Kshatriya: ‘Now a Brahmachārin asked alms of Saunaka of the race of Kapi, and Abhipratārin the son of Kakshasena who were being served at a meal’ (Chh. Up. iv. 3, 5). And that Abhipratārin belonged to the family of Chaitraratha is to be gathered from his connection with the Kāpeyas; for the connection of Chaitraratha with the latter has been ascertained by the text: ‘The Kāpeyas performed sacrifice for Chaitraratha.’ Priests of the same family in general officiate for worshippers belonging to the same family. From this, as well as from the text: ‘From him a lord of Kshat-

and ṛu, “to run.”’ (See the First Volume of this work, p. 97, note 192.) Even the great S’ ankara, it seems, was unable to perceive the absurdity of such etymologies. In his commentary on the Chhāndogya Upanishad the same writer tells us that various explanations had been given of the employment of the word S’ūdra in this passage: Namu rājā’ sau kshattṛi-sambandhit | “Sa ha khattāram vācha” (iv. 1, 5) ity uktam | vidyā-gra ṣaṇya ca brāhmaṇa-saṁpopagamūt | śūdrasya ca anadhis- 

kārāt | kathām idam anumūtpaṇi Raikvēṇa ucyate “śūdra” iti | tattra uḥur ucie-

ṛyāyāḥ | haśiṣa-vachana-āravanyāt śug enam āvivēṣa | tena asau suchā śrutvā Raik-

vāṣya mahāmānaṁ vā dvarati iti | rishir āmanah parokshajñatān darśayān “śūdra” ity uḥa | śūdra-vad bādhanaṇa eva enam vidyā-gra ṣaṇya upajjagam un śūrūṣhayā | na tu jātya eva śūdraḥ iti | opare punar uḥur aipaṇā dhanam uhiram iti rishā eva enam uktavān “śūdra” iti | “But is not Jānaśruti shown to have been a king, (a) from his name being connected with a charioteer in the passage ‘He said to his charioteer,’ (b) from his resorting to a Brāhmaṇa to obtain knowledge, and (c) from a S’ūdra possessing no such prerogative? How then did Raikva address to him an appellation inconsistent with this in the words ‘o S’ūdra?’ Learned teachers reply: ‘Vexation (suk) took possession of him on hearing the words of the swan: in consequence of which, or of hearing (srutavi) of the greatness of Raikva, he ran up [S’ūdra is here derived either from suchā + dvarati, or from śrutavi + dvarati]; and the rishi, to show his knowledge of things beyond the reach of the senses, called him S’ūdra. He had approached to obtain knowledge from the rishi by annoying him like a S’ūdra, and not by rendering him service; while yet he was not by birth a S’ūdra. Others again say that the rishi angrily called him a S’ūdra because he had brought him so little property.” This passage is also translated by Bābu Rājendralal (Chh. Up. p. 68, note), who renders bādhanaṇa (which I have taken to mean “annoying”) by “paying” for instruction; but I cannot find any authority for this sense of the word.
triyas named Chaitrarāthi was descended,' which proves that his family were Kshatriyas, we may gather that Abhipratārin belonged to this class. And the circumstance that Jānaśruti is mentioned in connection with the same branch of knowledge as Abhipratārin, the Kshatriya, shews that the former also was a Kshatriya. For it is in general men of the same class who are mentioned together. And from the fact of Jānaśruti sending a charioteer (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 5–7), and his other acts of sovereignty also, we learn that he was a Kshatriya. Hence (we conclude that) a Śūdra does not possess the prerogative of divine knowledge.

Śūtra 36. "From reference being made to initiation, and from a Śūdra being declared to be excluded from it."

"And that a Śūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge, may be further inferred from the fact that investiture with the sacred cord and other rites are referred to in passages where science is the subject in question: For the fact that the seekers after such knowledge obtained initiation, is shewn by such passages as the following: 'He invested him;' 'He came to him, saying, teach me, Sir' (Chh. Up. vii. 1, 1?); 'Devoted to Brahma, resting in Brahma, seeking after the highest Brahma, they approached the venerable Pippalāda with firewood in their hands, (saying) 'will declare all this' (Praśna Up. i. 1); and 'havān invested them,' etc. And that a Śūdra receives no initiation is shewn by the text of the Smṛiti which pronounces him to be but once-born, viz. 'the Śūdra is the fourth class, and once-born;' and by such other passages as this: 'There is no sin in a Śūdra, and he is not entitled to initiation.'"

Śūtra 37. "And because he acted after ascertaining that it was not a Śūdra [who had come to him]."

"That a Śūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring knowledge appears also from this that [according to the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad] Gautama proceeded to invest and instruct Jābala after ascertaining by his truth-speaking that he was not a Śūdra: 'None but a Brāhman could distinctly declare this: bring, o fair youth, a piece of fuel; I will invest thee; thou hast not departed from the truth' (Chh. Up. iv. 4, 5)."

This last verse has been already quoted in Vol. I, p. 138, note 244.

* I shall quote in full the earlier part of the passage from which these words are
Sūtra 38. "And because, according to the Smṛiti, a Śūdra is forbidden to hear, or read, or learn the sense."

"And that a Śūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge, appears from this that, according to the Smṛiti, he is forbidden to hear it, or read it, or learn its sense: i.e. it is declared in the Smṛiti that he is forbidden either to hear the Veda, or read the Veda, or to learn it contents, or to practise its injunctions. Hearing is forbidden to him in these texts: 'If he listens to the reading of the Veda, his ears are to be filled with [melted] lead and lac;' and 'The Śūdra is a walking cemetery; therefore no one must read in his vicinity.' And consequently the reading of it is prohibited to him: for

taken, both for the sake of explaining the allusion, and for the illustration which it affords of ancient Indian manners: Chh. Up. iv. 4, 1. Satyakāmo ha Jābālo Jābālam mātaram āmantryānchakre "brahmacharyam bhavati vivatsyāmi kim-gotro na aham asmī" itī | 2. Sā ha enam uchchā "na aham etad veda tāta yad-gotras tvam asī | bhv aham charanti parichāriṇī yauvane tvām abābe | sā 'ham etad na veda yad-gotras tvam asī | Jābāla tu nāma aham asmī Satyakāmo nāma tvam asī | sa Satyakāmah eva Jābālo 'bravītkāḥ' itī | "Satyakāma, the son of Jābāla, addressed his mother Jābāla, saying, 'I wish, mother, to enter on the life of a religious student. To what family (gotra: see Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 378 ff.) do I belong?' 2. She answered, 'I do not know, my son, to what family thou belongest. Much consorting [with lovers] and roving (or serving), in my youth, I got thee. I know not of what family thou art. But my name is Jābāla, and thine Satyakāma. Say, 'I am Satyakāma son of Jābāla.'" He accordingly goes to Hāridrumata of the race of Gotama, and asks to be received as a student. The teacher enquires to what family he belongs, and the youth repeats verbatim the answer he had received from his mother, and says he is Satyakāma the son of Jābāla. The teacher replies in the words quoted by S'ān'kara "No one other than a Brūhan could distinctly declare this," etc. The interpretation of paragraph 2, above given, seems to convey its correct sense: Jābāla apparently means to confess that her son was nullius filius: and that he must be content to call himself her son, as she did not know who his father was. The explanation of the words bhv aham charanti parichāriṇī yauvane tvām abābe given by the Commentators and followed by Bābu Rājendralāl Mittra, that she was so much occupied with attending to guests in her husband's house, and so modest that she never thought of enquiring about her son's gotra, and that her husband died early, is founded mainly on the word parichāriṇī, and would not account for Jābāla's ignorance of her husband's name (which she does not mention) or even of her husband's lineage. In regard to the sense of charanti see the passage from the S'atapatha Brūhmaṇa, ii. 5, 2, 20, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 138, note 242. S'ān'kara was either ignorant of the laxity of ancient morals, or wished to throw a veil over the spurious origin of a sage like Satyakāma who had attained divine knowledge and become a teacher of it (see Chh. Up. iv. 10, 1). In his preface, however, p. 30, as I observe, Bābu Rājendralāl speaks of Satyakāma as a natural son in these words: "Although a natural born son whose father was unknown, and recognized by the contemptuous sobriquet of Jābāla from the designation of his mother Jābāla," etc.
how can he, in whose neighbourhood even the Veda is forbidden to be read, read it himself? And if he utters it, his tongue is to be cut; and if he retains it in his memory, his body is to be slit. And it results from the meaning of the terms that he is prohibited from learning its contents, or practising its injunctions, according to the texts, ‘Let no one impart intelligence to a Śūdra;’ and ‘reading, sacrifice, and liberality are the duties of twice-born men.’ As regards (f) Vīdura, Dharma, Vyādha, and others in whom knowledge was produced in consequence of their recollection of acts performed in a former birth, their enjoyment of its results cannot be prevented, from the transcendent character of the effects of knowledge; and because in the text ‘Let the four castes be made to hear them,’ the Smṛiti declares that the four castes possess the prerogative of learning the Itihāsas and Purāṇas [by means of which Śūdras may attain perfection]. But it has been established that Śūdras do not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge derived [directly] from [the study of] the Veda.”

The Bhagavad Gītā affirms a different doctrine in the following verses, x. 32 f., where Krīṣṇa says:

Māṁ hi Pārtha vyapāśrītya ye 'pi ṣuḥ pāpa-yanayah | striyo vaiśyās tathā śūdras te 'pi yānti parāṁ gatim | 33. Kim punar brāhmaṇaḥ punyāḥ bhaktāḥ rājarśhayas tathā |

“Those who have faith in me, even though they be of base origin, women, Vaiśyas, and Śūdras, attain to the most transcendent state. How much more pure Brāhmans and devout royal rishis.”

Sankara could scarcely have been ignorant that his principle was not in harmony with this text; but he has thought proper to ignore this discrepancy of views, as he probably shrank from directly contradicting a work held in such high estimation.

See also the account of the views entertained on the same subject by Śāṅḍilya which I have stated above, p. 178.

Page 105, line 24.

The following quotation continues the discussion of this subject; and will also serve to illustrate pp. 6 and 16, above, as well as p. 60 of the First Volume:

Brahma Śūtra i. 3, 30. “Samāna-nāma-rūpaṇvāccha ēva ēśāv āpy
ha devam atma-buddhi-prakâšam mumukshur vai saranam aham prapadyo"
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ajaḥ | yathartāv rītu-lingāni nānā-rūpāni paryyaye | dṛisyante tāni tāny eva tathā bhavaḥ yugadishu | yathā bhāmnino 'ttās tuṣyās te sāmpratair iha | devāḥ devair aitātir hi rūpair nāmbhair eva cha’ ity evaṁ-jaṭiyakā drashtavyā |

"Brahma Sūtra, i. 3, 30. 'And though there be a recurrence of creation, yet as (the new creation) has the same name and form7 (as the old) there will be no contradiction in regard to the words of the Veda; since this is proved both by the intuition of rishis and by the Smṛiti.’ And further, let it be so that if a series of individual gods, as of animals, etc., is born and disappears in unbroken continuity, the alleged contradiction in regard to the words of the Veda (viz. that as they are connected with objects which are not eternal, they cannot themselves be eternal) will be removed by the perpetuity of connection arising from the continuity of practice regarding the designation of things, the things to be designated, and the designator. But when, as texts of the Sruti and Smṛiti inform us, the entire three worlds, losing name and form,⁸ are utterly annihilated and afterwards produced anew, how can the contradiction be avoided? [The meaning of this is: How can there be an eternal connection between the words of the Veda and objects which how long soever they may have existed, must yet have come into being at the new creation following after the total (not merely the partial) destruction of the universe? and if such a connection does not exist, how can the words of the Veda be eternal, when before this new creation they represented nothing existent? see above, p. 102.] A reply to this is given in the words, ‘Yet as (the new creation) has the same name and form as the old,’ etc. Even then the world must be admitted to have been without a beginning. This eternity of the world will be declared by our teacher in the words (of

7 Professor Goldstücker is of opinion that here, as elsewhere, these words (nāma-rūpa) should be rendered "substance and form." See the note on the subject furnished by him in M. Burnouf’s Introduction à l’histoire du Bouddhisme Indien, p. 302.

8 Govinda Ánanda remarks on the Sūtra before us, and S’ankara’s comment: Nāmaḥ-pralaye jāter apy asattvāt sabārtha-sambandhānityatvam ity āśankya āha ‘samaṇa’ iti | sūtraśā nīrāgya āśankom āha ‘athāpī’ iti | evakti-santatyā jātunām avan-tara-pralaye asattvāt sambandhās tishṭhate vyavahāravīkhedīd jñānyeta cha iti vedasya anopeksha-vedaṇa pramāṇya no kaśchid virodhaḥ syāt | nirlepa-pralaye tu sambandhā-nāśāt punāḥ śriśāstau kenaścit puṣnāḥ sāṃketaḥ kartavyāḥ iti puruṣa-buddhi-sāpe-kshatvāṇa vedasya aprimāṇya adhīpataṇaśa utarāṣṭraśa anityatvam echa prōptam ity arthāḥ | mahāvarulaye ‘pi nirlepa-layo ‘siddhaḥ sat-kārya-vādāt"
Brahma Sūtra, ii. 1, 36), 'It is agreeable to reason, and it is ascertained.' And the world being eternal, although the Veda declares that its dissolution and reproduction take place during the sleep, and at the waking (of the creator), still as the practice continues the same in the later, as in the previous, waking condition, there is no contradiction (of the sort pretended). And it is to be considered that the same must be the case in regard to the dissolutions and creations of another Kalpa (see Vol. I. p. 43 f.). Now dissolutions and creations are said in the Veda to take place during (the creator's) sleep, and at his waking. 'When the sleeper does not see any vision, and when his breath is concentrated in him, then the voice with all names enters into him, the eye with all forms enters into him, the ear with all sounds enters into him, the mind with all thoughts enters into him. When he wakes, just as sparks shoot out in all directions from blazing fire, so do all breaths according to their several seats issue from this Soul; from the breaths spring deities; and from the deities worlds' (Kaushitaki Brāhmaṇa, latter part, 3, 3). But be it so, that [in the circumstances referred to] there is no contradiction of the kind alleged, because during the

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\text{tathā ca śaṃskūrṇānaḥ saḥ śānta-tat-sambandhānaḥ satām eva punah sṛṣṭhīv ahbhivyaktar na anityatvaṃ | ahbhivyaktānuḥ pūrva-kalpiṣṭa-nāma-rūpa-samitātend | na sanketaḥ kenaḥ kāryaḥ | vishrāma-sṛṣṭhāḥ hi sanketaṃ pektahā na tulya-sṛṣṭh-āniti pariḥaratī \text{ 'tatra idam' īty-śāntaḥ | 'But since in a great dissolution even species cease to exist, will it not result that the connection of words with the objects they denote is not eternal?' In reference to this doubt the aphorist says, 'as the name and form are the same,' etc. Waving the authority of the Sūtra, the Commentator expresses a doubt in the words 'And further,' etc. It is true that the connection subsists in consequence of the continuity of individuals owing to the existence of species during the intermediate dissolutions, and this connection will be known because the previous practice continues uninterrupted. And so from the independence of the Veda, there will be no contradiction in regard to its authority. But since in a total dissolution all such connection is lost, and some intimation (of what had existed before) must be given by some person at the new creation, the Veda will be dependent on the understanding of such person, and consequently its unauthoritativeness, as well as the non-eternity of the dependent object, owing to the extinction of the instructor on whom it depended, will result. But even in a great dissolution an absolute annihilation is unproved, according to the doctrine that effects exist in their causes. And so, as words, the objects which they denote, and the connection between both, (all of which things previously existed), are manifested at the new creation as reminiscences of a previous existence, they are not non-eternal. As the objects thus manifested have the same names and forms as in the previous Kalpa, there is no necessity for any intimation (of what had existed before) being given by any person. For such an intimation would, indeed, be required in a dissimilar creation, but not in one which is similar. It is thus that the commentator removes the objection in the words 'a reply to this is given,' etc.'
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sleep (of one person) the practice of others continues uninterruptedly, and even the person who has been in a deep sleep can ascertain the action which took place in his former waking state. But this is inapplicable to a great dissolution, because then there is an absolute annihilation of all practice, and because the practice which prevailed in another Kalpa, like that of another birth, cannot be ascertained. This objection, however, does not hold; for although all practice is annihilated by a great dissolution, still it is proved that through the favour of the supreme Lord, the lords Hiraṇyagarbha (Brahmā), etc., can ascertain the practice of the preceding Kalpa. Although ordinary creatures are not observed to evince the power of discovering the practice of a former birth, the limitation which is true of them will not attach to the great lords in question. For just as in the series of beings commencing with men, and ending with posts, although all the creatures included in it without distinction possess the attribute of life, yet, as we descend the scale, the obstructions to knowledge and to power are perceived to go on gradually increasing; so too, in the series beginning with men and culminating in Hiraṇyagarbha, there is an ever greater and greater manifestation of knowledge and of power, etc.; and thus the transcendent faculties which are declared in texts of the Sruti and Smṛiti to belong to the beings who again and again come into existence at the beginning of the successive Kalpas cannot be denied to be real. And consequently it is established that the lords Hiraṇyagarbha and others who during the past Kalpa had manifested distinguished knowledge and powers of action, and who again came into existence at the beginning of the present Kalpa, and enjoyed the favour of the supreme Lord, were able, like a person who has been asleep and awakes again, to ascertain the practice of the previous Kalpa. And accordingly the Sruti says: ‘Seeking final liberation, I take refuge with that God, shining by the light of his own intellect, who in the beginning creates Brahmā and reveals to him the Vedas’ (Svetāsv. Upan. vi. 18). And Śaunaka and others record in their Smṛitis that the hymns in the ten Maṇḍalas of the Rig-veda were seen by Madhuchhandas and other rishis. In the same way the Kāṇḍarshis, etc., of each of the Vedas are specified in the Smṛitis. The Sruti, too, in the passage commencing ‘Any priest who in sacrificing for another person, or in teaching a pupil, employs a text of which he does not know the rishi, metre, deity,
and proper application, is turned into a post, or falls into a pit,' and ending, 'Wherefore let him ascertain all these points regarding every text;'—declares that a knowledge of the rishi by whom it was seen should precede the ceremonial use of every text.\(^9\) Further, righteousness is prescribed and unrighteousness is forbidden, with a view to promote the happiness and obviate the misery of living beings: and love and dislike have for their objects nothing but the happiness and misery which are perceptible by sense or are scripturally revealed. Consequently each succeeding creation which is effected, forming, as it does, the recompense of righteousness and unrighteousness, is constituted perfectly similar to each of those which preceded it. And the Smriti, too, declares: 'These creatures, as they are reproduced time after time, perform, respectively, the very same actions as they had performed in the previous creation.\(^10\) They so act under the influence of (their previous tendencies) whether noxious or innocuous, mild or cruel, righteous or unrighteous, to truth or to falsehood; and it is from this cause that they are disposed to one or another course of conduct.' Besides, even when this world is destroyed, a residuum of its force (sakti) continues, and it is reproduced only because it has this force for its basis: for any other supposition would involve the difficulty of the world having no cause. And as we cannot conceive that there are many forms of force (sakti), we must believe that, as the relations between the senses and their objects are invariable, so too, in a world which had no commencement, the successions of earths and other worlds, and of different classes of living beings distinguished as gods, animals, and men, (although separated from each other in the period of their production,) as well as the ordinations of castes, orders, duties, and recompenses are invariable. For we cannot imagine that such conditions as the re-

\(^9\) The object of these remarks of S'ankara regarding the rishis is thus explained by Govinda Ananda: *Kinccha mantra-rūpam rśihy-ūdi-jñānāvāsyakata-v-śrūyopikā śrutir mantra-āśrayam rśihy eva jñānāttayaṁ darsayati ity āha | . . . . . tathā cha jñānāsvaikoḥ kalpaṃtataiḥ vedāṁ smṛtvā vyavahārasya pravartitātvaḥ vedasya anuśīlam anupet-kahavān cha aviruddham iti bhūvah | ‘In these words S'ankara intimates that the Ārti which declares the necessity of knowing the rishis, etc., thereby manifests the transcendent knowledge of the rishis who saw the mantras. . . . And so from the fact that these rishis, distinguished by eminent knowledge, recollected the Veda which had existed in a different Kalpa, and [again] gave currency to the [ancient] practice [of its precepts], it is shewn that the eternity and independence of the Veda is not in contradiction [to any fact]—such is the purport.’

\(^{10}\) See the First Volume of this work, p. 60.
lations between the senses and their objects, etc., should vary in every creation, in such a way, for example, as that there should exist objects for a sixth sense. Hence, as all Kalpas exist under the same conditions, and as the lords (Hiranyakarpha, etc.) are able to ascertain the conditions which existed in another Kalpa, varieties (of beings) having the same name and form are produced in every creation; and in consequence of this sameness of name and form, even though a revolution of the world in the form of a great creation and a great dissolution is admitted, no contradiction arises affecting the authority of the words of the Veda, etc. Both Sruti and Smriti shew us this sameness of name and form. Here such texts of the Sruti as these may be adduced: 'The creator formed as before the sun and moon, the sky and the earth, the air and the heaven.' This means that in this Kalpa the supreme Lord fashioned the sun, the moon, and the rest of the world in the same way as they had been fashioned in the former Kalpa.' Again: Agni desired, 'May I be the food-eater of the gods.' He offered to Agni [as the deity presiding over] the Krittikas 11 (the Pleiades) a cake in eight platters.' In this passage the Sruti shews that the two Agnis, he who in the ceremony of sacrifice to the constellation offered the oblation, and he to whom it was offered, had the same name and form. And such Smritis, too, as the following should be examined: 'The Unborn Being gives to those born at the end of the night (i.e. of the dissolution 12) the names of the rishis and their intuitions into the Vedas. 13 Just as on the recurrence of each of the seasons of the year its various characteristics are perceived to be the very same (as they had been before), so too are the things produced at the beginning of the yugas; 14 and the past gods presiding over different objects resemble those who exist at present, and the present (resemble the) past in their names and forms.' 15

I shall quote a part of Sankara's remarks on the Brahma Sutra, ii. 1, 36, referred to in the earlier part of the preceding quotation, in which the eternity of the world is affirmed:

11 Krittika-nakshattrubhimini-devaya Agnaye — Govinda Ananda.
12 Sarvanyya-ante pralayante — Govinda Ananda.
13 The sense of the last words, which I translate literally, is not very clear. Govinda Ananda says that in the word vedeshu the locative case denotes the object (vedeshu iti vishaya-soptami). Compare the passages quoted above in p. 16 from the Vishnu P. and M. Bh. which partially correspond with this verse.
14 Already quoted from the Vishnu P. in the First Volume of this work, p. 60.
“Upapadyate cha upalabhaye cha” | “upapadyate cha” saṁsāraśya anādityam | ādīmateva hi saṁsāraśya akasmād udbhūter muk-tānām api punah saṁsārodbhūti-prasangaḥ | akrītābhyaśagama-prasangaḥ cha sukha-duḥkhasād vaishamyasya nirmittattatāt | na cha ēśvara vaishamyasya-hetur ētī uktam | na cha avidyā kevalā vaishamyasya kāraṇam eka-rāpatvāt | rāgādi-klesā-vāsanākṣipta-karmāpekṣāt te avidyā vaishamyakarī syāt | na cha ‘arma antareṇa sarīraṁ sambhavati na cha sarīram antareṇa karma sambhavati iti ētāta ēśārāya-dosha-prasangaḥ | anādīte tu viṣṭāṅkura-nīyayena upapattar na kāśchid dosho bhavati |

“'It is agreeable to reason, and it is ascertained.' The eternity of the world is agreeable to reason. For on the supposition that it had a beginning, as it came into existence without a cause, the difficulty would arise (1) that those who had obtained liberation from mundane existence might become again involved in it; 15 and (2) that men would enjoy or suffer the recompense of what they had never done, as the inequalities occasioned by happiness and misery, etc., would be causeless. But God is not the cause of this inequality, as we have said (see the comment on Sūtra ii. 1, 34). Nor can ignorance alone be its cause, since ignorance is uniform (whilst conditions are varied). But ignorance, when connected with works induced by the surviving memory of desire and other sources of disquiet, may be the cause of inequality. Further, corporeal existence does not originate without works, nor works without bodily existence: so that (this hypothesis of the world having had a beginning) involves the fallacy of making each of two things depend upon the other. But on the supposition that the world had no beginning, there is no difficulty, as the two things in question may be conceived to have succeeded each other like seed and sprout from all eternity.” (See Ballantyne’s Aphorisms of the Sāṅkhya, Book i. pp. 60 and 126.)

Page 111, line 2 from the foot; and Page 113, line 11

In the first edition, p. 78, I had translated the word samayādhyu-shīte “in the morning twilight.” When revising the translation for the new edition I became uncertain about the sense, and did not advert

15 i.e. as Professor Cowell suggests, if there is no cause for the production of the world, it comes into existence at hap-hazard, and by some chance the liberated may be born again as well as the unliberated.
to the fact that the term is explained in Professor Wilson’s Dictionary as denoting “a time at which neither stars nor sun are visible.” Professor Cowell has since pointed out that the word occurs in the second of the following verses of Manu, where a rule is given for the interpretation of the Veda in cases such as that referred to by the commentator on the Nyāya Sūtras: ii. 14: Šruti-dvaidham tu yattra syāt tattrā dharmāv ubhau smṛitau | ubhāv api hi tau dharmau samyag uktau maniṣhīhibhiḥ | 15. Uaite ’nu diṣṭe chaiva samayādhyuṣhite tathā | sarvathā varttate yajñaḥ itiṣyaṁ vaidikī śrutiḥ | “14. In cases where there is a twofold Vedic prescription, both the rites are declared in the Smṛiti to be binding; since they have been distinctly pronounced by sages to be of equal authority. 15. The Vedic rule is that sacrifice may be performed in all the three ways [indicated in a particular text], viz. when the sun has risen, when it has not risen, and when neither stars nor sun appear, i.e. in the morning twilight.” Kullūka says: Sūrya-nakṣatra-varjitaḥ kālaḥ samayādhyuṣhita-śabdena uchyate | “a time devoid of sun and stars is denoted by the word samayādhyuṣhita.

Page 142, lines 14 and 16.

The first of these quotations is from the Brihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad, i. 4, 10; and the second from the Chhandogya Upanishad, viii. 7, 2.

Page 149, line 6.

For śabdādikshiter read śabdād ūkṣhiter.

Page 154, note 140.

Professor Cowell observes on the close of this note that the Sankhya opponent maintains that the metaphor is in every case a real one.

Page 157, line 18.

Professor Cowell remarks that the meaning of the phrase śabda-pramāṇako ‘rthe is not correctly rendered by the translation here given, viz. “where the (proper sense) is established by the words.” The author is laying down the general rule that in cases where there is nothing in the purport of any passage in which a particular word occurs to lead the reader to suppose that it is figuratively used, and where consequently the word itself is the only index to the sense, it must be understood in its primary signification. The proper rendering, therefore, is: “Where the sense can only be determined by the word itself.”
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Page 160, line 18.

For punar-uptattir read punar-anu-pattir.

Page 181, lines 7 and 11 from the foot.

I learn from Professors Cowell and Goldstücker that vimata smṛitiḥ should be rendered not "the variously understood Smṛiti" but "the Smṛiti which is here the subject of dispute."

Page 183, note 160, line 1.

With R.V. i. 179, 2, compare R.V. vii. 76, 4, quoted in p. 245.

Page 201, line 21.

The commentator thus explains this verse of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (I am indebted to Dr. Hall for a collation of the best MSS. in the India Office Library): Ete cha dvēshopāśama-prakārāh madhyamādhi-kārīṇām eva uktāh. na tu uttamādhi-kārīṇām ity āha "ete" | "bhinnadriṣṭa" bheda-drishtyā | "bhinnadriṣṭam" iti va pāthāḥ | tattra bhinnadarsane "abhuyupagaman" anigkāraṁ kriyā dvēshopāśamopaya-bhedaḥ kathitaḥ | uktānām upāyānām paramārtha-sankshepo mama matāḥ śrīya-tām | "In the words 'these notions,' etc.' he tells us that the methods of repressing hatred which have been hitherto declared are those which are followed by the persons who have attained only to the secondary, not to the highest, stage of knowledge. Bhinnadriṣṭa is the same as bheda-drishtyā, 'with a view which distinguishes [the Deity from themselves],' or the reading is bhinnadriṣṭam, 'of persons who look [on Him] as distinct.' 'Accepting' (abhuyupagaman kriyā), i.e. admitting, this opinion regarding a distinctness, 'I (the speaker in the V.P.) have declared these methods of repressing hatred. Now hear from me a summary' of the highest truth in regard to these methods."

Page 225, line 21.

There is a verse in the Viṣṇasacyi Saṁhitā, xiii. 45, in which also Agni is connected with the creation: Yo Agnir. Agner adhi ajāyata śokāt prithivyāh uta va divas pari | yena praṣṭaḥ Viśvakarma ṣajāna tam Agne hedaḥ pari te śrīyaktu | "Agni, may thy wrath avoid that Agni who sprang from Agni, from the flame of the earth or from that of the sky, by whom Viśvakarman generated living creatures." This verse is quoted and after its fashion explained in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, vii. 5, 2, 21: Atha dakṣiṇato 'jam | "Yo Agnir Agner adhi ajāyata" ity
Agnir vai esha | Agner adhyajayata | "śokāt prithivyāḥ uta va divas pari" iti yad vai Prajāpateḥ śokād ajayata ta 'as cha prithivyai cha śokād ajayata | "Yena praṣāh Viśvakarmā jajāi" iti vāg vai ajo vācho vai praṣāh Viśvakarmā jajāna ityādi | "Then [he places] a goat (aja) on the southern side, (saying): 'That Agni who sprang from Agni:' this goat is Agni and sprang from Agni. 'From the flame of the earth or from that of the sky:' that which sprang from the flame of Prajāpate sprang from the flame of the earth and of the sky. 'By whom Viśvakarman generated living creatures:' The goat, [or the Unborn], is Vāch (Speech): Viśvakarman generated living creatures from Vāch," etc. Compare R.V. i. 67, 5, quoted above in p. 275.

Page 235, line 9.

Add after this the following texts, in which the verbs takṣāḥ and jan are applied to the composition of the hymns:

R.V. i. 67, 4. Vindanti tv atra naro dhiyām-dhūḥ hṛidā yat tashṭan mantrān aṣaṃsan | "Meditative men find him (Agni) here, when they have uttered hymns of praise fashioned by the heart."

i. 109, 1. Vi hy akhyam manasaḥ vasyaḥ ichhann Indrāgni jnāsaḥ uta vā sajātān | nāyā yuvat pramatir asti mahyaṁ sa vām dhiyāṁ vāja-yantim ataksham | 2. Āśravaṁ he bhūri-dāvattarā vām vijāmātur uta vā syālāt | atha somasya prayati yuvabhyaṁ Indrāgni etomaṁ janayāmi navam | "1. Seeking that which is desirable, I beheld [in you], o Indra and Agni, relations or kinsmen. I have no other counsellor than you,—I who have fabricated for you a hymn supplicating food. 2. For I have heard that you are more bountiful than an ineligible son-in-law (who has to purchase his bride), or than a bride's brother; so now, while presenting a libation of Soma, I generate for you a new hymn."

Page 253, line 15

Insert after this the following verse: R.V. x. 66, 5. Sarasvān dhābhīr Varuṇo dhrita-vrataḥ Pūshā Viṣṇur mahinā Vāyur Aśvinā | brahma-kṛto anūraḥ viśva-vedasāḥ karma no yaṃ san trivarūtham amāhasāḥ | "May Sarasvat with thoughts, may Varuṇa whose laws are fixed, may Pūshan, Viṣṇu the mighty, Vāyu, the Aśvins,—may these makers of prayers, immortal, possessing all resources, afford us a triple-cased protection from calamity."
Supplementary Note Kālāyayāpadishta.—See page 84, note 89, and page 290.

I am indebted to Professor Goldstücker for the following additional remarks on this expression:

The Tarkasangraha, quoted by Professor Cowell in his interesting note which you kindly communicated to me, differs materially from the Bhāshāparichchheda in its interpretation of the fallacy called by them bādha; and I might add that the Tarkasangraha-dīpikāprakāśā offers even a third explanation of the same Vaiśeshika term. But I do not think that the bādha of the Vaiśeshikas is the same as the kālātita of the Naiyāyikas. For when we find that the Bhāshāparichchheda in its enumeration at v. 70 applies to the fifth hetvābhāsa the epithet kālāyayāpadishta (probably the same as the kālāyayāpadishta of the Nyāya-sūtra i. 50) yet in its explanation of v. 77 does not call it kālātita, as the Nyāya does, but bādha, such a variation in terms seems pointed; and when we find moreover that its interpretation of bādha differs from Vātsyāyana’s interpretation of kālātita, there seems to be a still greater probability that the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika disagree on the question of the fifth hetvābhāsa.

For that there is no real difference between the Nyāyabhāshya and the Nyāyavrūtti is still my opinion. Both commentaries, I hold, agree in stating that the fallacy kālātita arises when a reason assigned exceeds its proper sphere (sādhana-kāla), and neither, I think, can have taken kāla in its literal sense of “time.” This might have been the case if, as Professor Cowell seems to suggest, “plausibility” of an argument were the subject of the Sūtra; but as, in my opinion, the hetu is always intended to be a valid and good hetu, I do not see how such a hetu can become a bad one simply by being advanced too late. It would, however, become bad by being applied to a time, i.e. to a case to which it properly does not belong.

The circumstance that the Vṛtti and Bhāshāparichchheda are probably works of the same author, does not invalidate my opinion; it would seem on the contrary to confirm it, since the object of both these works is a different one: the former being intended as an exposition of the Nyāya, and the latter as one of the Vaiśeshika.
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