A PHILOSOPHY OF DEVOTION
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[A Comparative Study of Bhakti and Prapatti in Viśiṣṭādvaita and St. Bonaventura and Gabriel Marcel]

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MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
DELHI :: VARANASI :: PATNA
DEDICATION

To

J.K. Birla

It was the custom during the Italian Renaissance to write a lengthy dedication to one’s patron, and not merely to mention his name. Though unconventional now, I should like to follow that custom; and thus, Sir, I beg your leave to express certain sentiments and concerns.

Of course, the primary dedication which does not openly appear, is to Nārāyaṇa. But then, you, Sir, are in Nārāyaṇa, and He in you, as—unworthily—I also: We are both only his unworthy instruments. In you, concretely, therefore, I make the double dedication, to God and to Man, even as your vocation as patron of Indian learning and piety, as philanthropist in the full sense, obliges you to serve both together harmoniously. For I know myself not to be the only one for whom you have made it possible to lead a relatively retired life, active though you yourself must be, in order to pursue knowledge and love in the way of research and contemplation. In the end, whether in societies or with individuals, karma, bhakti and jñāna are inseparable, regardless of the balance struck between them in various situations.

In our present world, which is so poignant but yet not quite one, there is need of encouraging cross-currents between different cultures in more than one way. The ever-increasing number of those who come to India from the West—scholars of high rank, teachers, tourists-of-leisure and the like who cannot remain for long, is one of these cross-currents. But, thanks to your generosity, I count myself fortunate for the opportunity of sailing in another, namely, that of remaining, relatively obscure, for a longer time, not only seeking impressions, but allowing oneself to become assimilated as much as possible. Culture is a matter of the soul—the soul of a people, deep-rooted in its ageless past. It does not reveal itself in spectacles, but in nuances of emotion, customs and attitudes,
that demand the experience of inward reorientation, of identification, before it can be fully appreciated. Thus, with all its limitations, the present work is the treasure, for myself, even if not for others, gathered while coursing in this stream. And yet, for that very reason, it is hoped that it will be all the more intimately valuable to others also.

The present world is not simply a time of the "one-world" challenge; it is a new age. And as in previous new ages, there is danger that the old will be lost. In the past, Indian scholars were supported by Mahārājas, princes of high cultural attainment themselves. In the present, which is becoming more and more democratic, that responsibility must pass on to others like yourself, who, having less leisure than they, must nevertheless maintain the same standard of cultural excellence, and with this additional factor, that today there is the categorical demand of transcending all provincial and sectarian barriers. For in all ages, scholars, philosophers and artists, and ascetics as well, remain, by virtue of their vocation, in need of material support, since the basic values in which they traffic, beauty and wisdom and piety, somehow remain chronically "not of this world".

Yet these are the precious few who cannot be tied to any economic or political system of obligation, for their responsibilities are to God and humankind at the universal level. Still, they must live in limited bodies dependent on their fellow-mortals for their sustenance. A democratic world must still preserve its cultural aristocracy, supported by patrons like yourself in both East and West. Taste and good judgment must not be compromised, nor standards of excellence lowered to the merely popular level. And as the princes of the past are succeeded by philanthropists like yourself, so the sādhus of the past must now give place to modern wanderers through all the world, learning as they teach, and teaching as they learn, open-mindedly, neither contemptuous of ancient or ‘foreign’ ways not yet bound to them, but seeking truth and love in ever wider dimensions.

For only thus will synthesis come about—or syntheses, for it may be too much or even false to hope that for our one world there will be only one culture or one religion. Free
communication and fresh challenge mutually given and received should bring new flowers into all the old gardens.

Sir, I fear I do not measure up to my own standard; but such has been my aim. At times, I have made bold to criticize and evaluate in a way that may not be popular, and my judgments may often have been hasty. But I hope they have not been one-sided. I have tried to write for both Indian and Western readers, feeling myself in the position of a bee who is free to gather honey from whatever flowers he encounters, unsolicitous concerning the pollen he may leave behind in them, leaving the business of cross-fertilization to chance and/or Providence. This attitude, this method, has necessitated certain compromises. Not an indologist, nor a scholar in the technical sense, I have not been able to speak with authority in many cases, because of limitations in language. I have had to put my trust in the language of the heart, and to depend on many others indeed—professors, pundits, sadhus and fellow-students—to whom I am indebted in gratitude no less than to yourself for their generosity of time and patience. In general, in presenting the western material, I have spoken as it were to my Indian friends; and vice versa, in presenting the Indian material, I have fancied myself answering the questions of my American friends. To both, I have spoken informally and out of my ignorance, hoping to provoke further thought and searching, rather than risking premature conclusions, even at the cost, perhaps, of some inconsistency. It may be that I have pleased no one; the orthodox on both sides may be shocked, but neither will the secularists or “modernists” on either side find full support. Past and present, East and West, and many other Dimensions multiply considered make many more demands than one poor mind can satisfy.

Likewise, between solitude and society, between theory and ‘practice’, between study and sādhanā, the balance has been made by compromise. As I have constantly stressed, a philosophy of devotion cannot be built on anything but devotion; but neither have I capitulated to those who insist that philosophizing and writing are of no use. Paradoxically, they both help and hinder each other. Behind the scenes are spiritual struggles and ecstasies at Annamalai University and the
wonderful temple of Chidambaram, at Melkote and Mysore, in the Himalayas and on the banks of the Ganges at Banaras. But also behind the scenes is the borrowing of books and typewriters, participation in international conferences and seminars, and conversations in crowded trains and buses.

And even in the method of writing there have been compromises. I have not *constructed* this work; I have simply "let it grow" organically. I have not "worked on it"; it has been worked in me. Hence the material is more thematically than schematically presented. Yet it is hoped that both layman and scholar will find in it something of interest and/or personal usefulness. Again, the purpose, method and theme have been all motivated more by the heart than by the mind. Would that I could claim some divine guidance or inspiration herein; but if I dared to do so, I should transgress against humility. Yet, if I denied the Grace of God that often did come as I was working, I should become unfaithful to my conviction and my Testimony. I have not tried to "prove" anything; but neither have I avoided the risk of bias in following what light has come. In short, perhaps the outcome is more of a sort of 20th century *Purāṇa* than a treatise of the sophisticated sort! The 20th century *Śūtras* remain for yet another man.

Perhaps some explanations or apologies are nevertheless in order concerning some details. In many cases, I have used quotations longer than is the usual custom, although for the most part, these are from materials not readily available to the readers I have had in mind. Some may survey only these, omitting the remarks upon them; others may skip them. In some cases, there are parenthetical remarks inserted in these quotations in a discusssional sort of way; this was done in order to avoid the multiplication of footnotes. Again, certain points or arguments, like themes in a musical composition, are repeated in several contexts; it is only hoped that such repetition will not be found irrelevant. Again, there has been the problem of spelling and italicizing Sanskrit terms. For the most part, proper names have been spelled phonetically, and certain terms have been italicized as they are introduced, but left unitalicized as they came into current usage. In these
matters, as in all, criticism is invited, in view of future revision.

Finally, there is the concern for Peace—for peace that is both personal and eternal, and international and inter-religious, for they are all inseparable, as Gandhiji so deeply realized: the Peace that comes equally from mutual understanding between men, and from a good conscience before God. Peace in politics must be rooted in peace in religion, in newness of life, in fresh and full vision honestly sought. The role of comparative philosophy, therefore, is to show the unity of these things, and to explore bases for reconstructive dealings with them with the motivation of reciprocal goodwill. Ideas are as inevitable as ideals are necessary. Yet these are deeply rooted in divergent systems and traditions which somehow must be reconciled to each other. Even as we hope to see the end—thin though our hope may sometimes be—of the age of military battles, so the age of shallow proselytism should pass, although the dialectics of inter-religious and intercultural challenge and response will and must remain, lest stagnation set in. Perhaps Ignorance is the only enemy after all, although it is not easily removed from the soul of mankind without that Enlightenment which is not of man alone. Science has given many tools, for evil and for intelligent use; and as science advances into the comparative analysis of the human psyche in its historical development, in which the Divine Factor has ever been the key to all true progress, there is yet promise of a better world, although not so cheaply bought as some would think. The present work is meagre indeed in this perspective; and yet it is hoped that it will not be found irrelevant, even to cultural anthropologists. For the anthropological sciences can have no other motivation than the promotion of peace; and it is their responsibility to counteract the menace of atomic warfare. Does it not follow that they, above all, must turn to Humility and Devotion, to Religion at its best, wherein man surmounts his native barriers and is lifted into spiritual power and plenitude, sacrificially bringing, like Prometheus, the Gifts of the Gods back down into the finite world? Peace, in short, means peace-making, reconciliation: both the human will to commonality and Divine Grace to bring technical knowledge into good fruition—both are needed.
In this spirit, Sir, I offer this work to God and to yourself and to my fellow-seekers after Wisdom. It is nothing in itself. But there is the hope that in spite of its limitations, in some small measure it may contribute to these things that are holy among men, and may stimulate efforts toward something better.

Banaras

April, 1955.

J.C.P.
(Now praise) Nārāyaṇa, the Highest Puruṣa, the Supreme Brahman, Lord of Śrī.
Incompatible in His very nature with all that is undesirable;
The focus of (all) Excellence and Beauty;
Whose form consists solely of infinite knowledge and beatitude;
the ocean of a host of innumerable qualities which are by nature superabundant and without limit: knowledge, power, lordship, fortitude, splendour . . . .
The treasure of endless qualities conformable to His profound inclination, without discordances, inconceivable, divine, admirable, eternal, irreproachable, insurpassable, such as brilliancy, beauty, gracefulness and youthfulness . . . .

Of divine form;
Apparelled with ornaments appropriate to Himself, in which
He finds His joy—diverse, varied, infinitely marvellous, eternal, irreproachable, without limits, divine . . . .
Equipped with arms conformable to His nature, innumerable, of an inconceivable power, eternal, irreproachable, excellent, divine . . . .
Having adequate form, qualities, majesty and sovereign domination dear to His heart, conforming to His own profound inclination; irreproachable, eternal . . .
Beloved of Śrī because of the multitude of His unlimited, superabundant, innumerable and excellent qualities which are his virtues . . . .
Whose pair of feet are unceasingly praised by innumerable, sages, (because they are) endowed with infinite qualities of the order of knowledge and of action, irreproachable and insurpassable, and take no repose nor delight except in the Surplus of His Being which surpasses their fullness, and which are together constant in their essential nature and diligent in the diversity of exterior actions, conforming always to His Will . . . .
Who because his own form and His nature are such that
His word and His thought cannot be circumscribed, is
endowed with an infinite glory, grand and marvellous, abounding in objects, means of enjoyment, and the locus of joyful experience (which objects and means of enjoyment are) infinite, varied, and dear to His heart...
Whose dimensions are infinite......
Imperishable.....
Irreproachable
Unalterable......
The seat of supreme space.........
Whose play consists in the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the universe which is diversified and variegated by subjects and objects of affective experience......
The supreme Brahman...
The Person supreme...
Nārāyaṇa !.....
Immutable in His own form even after creating the universe from Brahmā down to the beings without movement......
Who although inaccessible to the most concentrated effort of meditation and the adoration of men and gods—even of Brahmā—nevertheless, without losing anything of His essence which is His alone, assumes certain (accessible) forms such as are homogeneous in constitution with His divinity; and of His pure initiative (he does this) because He is a great unbounded ocean of compassion, of benevolence, of parental tenderness, of generosity......
Venerated, and propitiated by the generations of man; from age to age descending among them, enabling them to obtain their respective fruits as desired and deserved by them according to their observance of Dharma, Artha, Kāma, and Mokṣa...
Who, having made Himself visible to the sight of all people, even the least worthy such as us, in order to relieve the miseries of samsāra by way of what is called descending to lighten the burden of the earth........
Who accomplishes the great Deeds of destroying the torments of all creatures high and low......
Who satiates the earth with the ambrosia of his looks and his words—chalices full of pity, amity and affection without limit, after having killed (all the) demons......
Who by the revelation of the multitudes of his insurpassable qualities such as his benevolence and beauty and a host of other virtues converted Akrūra, Mālākāra and others into faithful devotees of the Lord Supreme, having descended among us as the Means of realizing this Deliverance characterized as the sovereign End of Man, introduced the discipline of Bhakti whose object is Himself, such as the Vedānta teaches, aided by jñāna and karma as auxiliaries ...(Thus) He encouraged the Sons of Pāṇḍu to fight the battle.
A PRAYER OF SAINT BONAVENTURA

O FAIREST Lord Jesus, transfix the affections of my inmost soul with that most sweet and healthful wound of thy love, with true, serene, most holy, apostolic charity; that my soul may ever languish and melt with entire love and longing for thee. Let me ever desire thee, and faint for thy courts, and long to be dissolved and to be with thee. Grant that my soul may hunger after thee, the Bread of Angels, the Refreshment of holy souls, our daily and supersubstantial Bread, who hast all sweetness, and every pleasurable delight. Thee, whom the Angels desire to look into, may my heart ever hunger after and feed upon: and may my soul be filled with thy sweetness. May I ever thirst for thee, the Fountain of life, the Fountain of wisdom and knowledge, the Fountain of eternal light, the Torrent of pleasure, the Richness of the House of God. Let me ever compass thee, seek thee, stretch towards thee, arrive at thee, meditate upon thee, speak of thee, and do all things in praise and glory of thy holy Name, with humility and discretion, with love and delight, with readiness and affection, with perseverance even unto the end. And be thou ever my hope and my whole confidence; my riches, my delight, my pleasure, and my joy; my rest and tranquillity; my peace; my sweetness; my food and refreshment; my refuge and help; my wisdom; my portion; my possession, and my treasure; in whom my mind and heart may firmly and unchangeably be fixed and rooted, henceforth and for evermore. Amen!
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BHAKTI AS UPĀSANĀ

It would be quite as futile, as it is really unnecessary, at the outset, to try to give a comprehensive and yet precise definition of bhakti, for it has many aspects which can only become clear by long exposition. The word itself, of course, comes from the root bhaj which means to enjoy, or to be devoted to. In this chapter we shall be dealing primarily with the aspect concerned with the discipline of meditation.

Since for countless centuries, and perhaps more intensively today than ever, the relation of bhakti, jñāna and karma (devotion, knowledge and action) has been the favourite topic of controversy and of endless discussion in India, it is a temptation at the outset to devote much space to the inter-relations of the three—a temptation, however, to which we hope not to yield. Suffice to say that in the tradition with which we are dealing, bhakti takes the lead, and the other two are regarded as ancillary, as may be seen from the following text (Yatindramatadipikā of Śrīnivāsadāsa—a 17th century work which is now, due to its epitomized form of expression, regarded as of high authority):¹

Karmayoga, jñānayoga and other yogas, which are said to be the means for liberation, are the means (to mokṣa) through the medium of bhakti alone.

What is called karmayoga is a special kind of activity which a person possessing true knowledge of the individual self and the Highest (received from the instructions of the preceptor), performs according to his capacity; it is non-prohibited action without any regard for the fruits, and is in the shape of kāmya, nitya and naimittika actions. It is divided into the worship of God, penance, pilgrimage, charity, sacrifice, etc. This, by destroying the impurities of the individual self, generates jñānayoga, and through it or directly becomes the producer of bhakti.

What is called jñānayoga is a special kind of meditation on the (real nature) of one’s own self as distinct from prakṛti and as existing for the purpose ofĪsvara, after having attained purity of mind by the (discipline of karmayoga.) This is useful for the direct realization of bhakti. Likewise the manner in which other means also are useful for generating bhakti may be understood.
What is called bhaktya is a continuous stream of remembrance (of God) uninterrupted like the flow of oil, and is characterized by the eight-fold limbs of yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi. It (bhaktiyoga) is generated by the sevenfold discipline of viveka, vimoka, abhyāsa, kriyā, kalyāna, anavasāda and anuddharṣa. Of these, what is called viveka (discrimination) is the purification of the body by food that has not become impure either on account of species or abode or adventitious case. Vimoka (mental detachment) consists in non-attachment to desires. Abhyāsa (practice, repetition) is the continuous meditation of the perfect object. Kriyā (actions) means the performance of the five great sacrifices according to one’s capacity. Kalyānas (virtues) are such as truthfulness, straight-forwardness, compassion, liberality, non-violence and non-covetousness. Anavasāda (cheerfulness) is freedom from dejection. Anuddharṣa (non-exultation) is the absence of exultation. The meaning is that over-exultation is opposed (to meditation).

Then bhakti, favoured by the sevenfold discipline, attains the likeness of a direct intuition; it has ‘final realization’ (antimāpratīyaya) as its limit. This ‘final realization’ may take place at the end of the present body or at the end of some other body. Bhakti, denoted by such terms as vedana, dhyāna, upāsanā, etc., transforms itself into successive forms of parābhakti, parajñāna, and paramabhakti; it has prapatti (self-surrender) as a limb. It is of two kinds because of the difference as sādhanabhakti (engendered by spiritual exercises) and phalabhakti (spontaneous devotion). Sādhanabhakti is generated by the aforesaid means. Phalabhakti, as found in Śrī Parānukuṣa, Nātha, etc., is engendered by the grace of Isvara....

‘Now, when the Vedānta texts have laid down “hearing and reflection” (as means to salvation) how is “meditation” (dhyāna) alone enjoined?’ If this be asked, it is said in reply: A person who has studied the Veda with its limbs finds that it contains instructions regarding activities subserving particular purposes, and in order to ascertain it he applies himself to ‘hearing’ (sravana). Since ‘hearing’ is thus established it becomes the anuvāda (i.e., reference to what is already mentioned or known). (Likewise), reflection (manana) is also an anuvāda, since it confirms what one has heard. Therefore (all the Vedānta texts) enjoin ‘meditation’ only; thus there is no contradiction.

Bhakti, denoted by the term ‘meditation’ is manifold, because
of the difference of vidyās (i.e., forms of meditation). And these vidyās are of two kinds: those that are the means for the attainment of ephemeral fruits and those that are useful for the attainment of liberation. Of these, udghāthavidyā and others are the means for the attainment of ephemeral fruits. Brahmavidyās... are the means for the attainment of liberation.

An adequate commentary on this would lead us into a complete and detailed critical study of the whole of Indian Philosophy which we cannot undertake all at once. Here we shall follow only those points which are pertinent to sādhanā bhakti, to bhakti as meditative discipline. But at the outset, since the Advaitin (the school of Śaṅkara) interpretation of the same meditative discipline—the movement of śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana and dhyāna—is all cast in terms of jñāna and not bhakti, we must briefly consider the basic arguments for the superiority of bhakti.

Following the Gitārtha Saṅgrahā of Yāmunācārya, an immediate predecessor of Rāmānuja, we may first note that the sole object of any form of meditation must be Brahma as Nārāyaṇa e.g., the Highest Reality in its intrinsic pantheistic nature and manifestation, of whom the Kṛṣṇa of the Bhagavad Gitā is the best representation: 2

Hence Śrī Kṛṣṇa is Nārāyaṇa, and it is He, who has to be meditated on and who is reached by the meditator. The term Brahma connotes the quality of being great and of making others great. As it is found in the highest degree in Nārāyaṇa, he is denoted by that term... it is meant that Nārāyaṇa is shown to be the highest goal, to be the means thereto, to be the maker, protector, and destroyer of all things, to be higher than all, to be the support, the ruler, and the Lord of all, to the Being taught by the whole of the Veda, to be free from all imperfections, to be the means of releasing others from all karmas, and to the refuge of all. By the possession of these features He is shown to be a unique Being... He is to be reached by bhakti, which is continuous, vivid and loving meditation on Brahma...

For the modern world, as for various misrepresentations of Indian tradition, this is a basic warning. The lesser goals of "psychic science", or "secret lore" which is only the modern version to a large measure of the cultivation of magic in the Italian Ranaissance (Campanella being the last philosopher to take magic seriously, although he put it in a definitely subor-
dinate place)—or the other lesser goals of scientific perfection of empirical knowledge, or, for that matter, of "selling" religious values because of their practical bearing on life—these are, volte force, to be declared inadequate; pure spiritual endeavor is just as emphatically affirmed in Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita Vedānta as in any European or Islamic system.

Anyone, moreover, who takes a thoroughly theistic position will naturally be inclined towards bhakti, since bhakti is the most personal relation between persons, and if in any sense God can be considered as personal, it is to be expected, by analogy, that love should follow knowledge or acquaintance, just as is the case at the merely human level.

And the analogy goes yet further. If one falls in love, his desire to know the object of his love increases; and he will not be content with this love and knowledge alone: he will work: he will give presents, and seek the 'service' of the beloved. So, even after bhakti has come into primary focus, jñāna and karma are not to be abandoned, for they are necessary ancillaries. Otherwise, as Kṛṣṇa Prem points out, disciplined devotion will descend into perverse sentimentality. In his commentary on the Gitā (XII: 12-15), Rāmānuja points out that the man who does not have knowledge of the akṣara (the eternal, the undecaying) will be devoted only to his own soul, although this is better than no devotion at all; and that he who does not carry out his sense of devotion in acts of selfless service and compassion will not gain a true relationship with the Lord, who is Himself all-compasionate, but will remain self-centered and thus will fail to reach the Goal. Indeed, it is better to serve one's fellow-men and to show compassion to all creatures without pure consciousness of the Lord's presence (in them or in himself) than it is to try to approach the Lord alone directly without regard for them, because He will accept the selfless service ex opere operato, whereas devotion to Him for selfish reasons, although again better than nothing, is really self-contradictory. But acts of selfless service done for the sake of the Lord—this is the niṣkāma karma—the ideal of true detachment—which is one of the basic teachings of the Gitā itself. For, according to our tradition, this 'detachment, is not just the ataxaria of the Stoics, or of the classical Sāṅkhya-Yoga school, but the positive expression of the Love of God.
As for the superiority of bhakti as such, moreover, the proof does not lie, as much popular opinion is disposed to assert, merely as an expression of temperament. It is not just the emotional man who should lean towards this path, but all men; and this position is supported by scripture and by theological and ontological argument.

Thus, it is best to follow the natural order in the interpretation of the sacred texts, the Gītā in particular, which moves from the discussion of disciplines of Yoga and its metaphysics as embodied in the Sāṅkhya system, through a description of the Godhead in its fullness of personal qualities, to the climax in the last adhyāya (chapter) in which the summit of mystical devotion is reached both by teaching and by example. In this connection, in his preface to the 7th Adhyāya, Rāmānuja says:  

In the first six chapters, the perception of the real nature of the innermost (individual) soul (pratyagātman), the attainer, has been taught as introductory to the worship of Nārāyaṇa;...who is blameless; who is the only cause of the whole world; Omniscient; who constitutes all; who is possessed of true resolves; who has a grand glory, which worship is the means of His attainment: this perception of the innermost (individual) soul being the part of the worship of Nārāyaṇa and accomplishable by performing action in accompaniment with the knowledge of the soul. Now in the middle hexade, the nature of the Supreme Puruṣa who is the Supreme Brahman and His worship are taught as to be designated by the word Bhakti....

And at the beginning of the 12th Adhyāya, he continues: The Lord, who is the ocean of virtues such as infinitely profuse compassion, generosity, agreeable disposition and others, and who possesses true resolves, has shown His Lordly power in reality to Arjuna which unrivalled Lordly power of the Lord, Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Brahman, the very goal of the devotees of Bhaktiyoga, he desired to see directly with (his own) eyes. It has also been declared that a real knowledge, perception or attainment of the Lord can be accomplished only by an exclusive (ākāntika) absolute (āyantika) Bhakti of the Lord. Next to this, the following is going to be taught: That the worship of the Lord which consists in Bhakti is superior to the worship of the soul, which is the means of the attainment of the soul, because it is quick in accomplishing its object, and because it is easy to undertake; what the means of worship of the Lord is; that the one who is not attached to the Lord, devotes himself to the imperishable (soul); and what his requirements are....
And in summary, the preface to the last Adhyāya:

In the last two chapters it has been taught, that it is precisely the Vedic acts, as sacrifice, austerity, and gifts, and not others, that form the means of worldly welfare or Emancipation; that the distinctive mark, in general, of the Vedic acts is that they are endowed (anvita) with the syllable OM; that, of these, there is a distinction between the means of Emancipation and worldly welfare, according as they are to be designated and not to be designated by the words ‘Tat’ and ‘Sat’; that the means of Emancipation is acts,...free from the desire of fruits; that their undertaking is possible by the increase of Sattva; and that the increase of Sattva is brought about by the use of Sāttvika food.

Next to this are going to be described: the identity of abandonment (tyāga) and renunciation (sanyāsa) which are spoken of as the means of Emancipation; the nature of abandonment and renunciation; the investigation of agency regarding all acts, in the Lord, the Ruler of all; the necessity of acquiring the quality of Sattva...the way how to express actions suitable to one’s own caste,...and finally, Bhaktiyoga, which is the essential teaching of the whole Gitā Śāstra.

Such passages speak for themselves. Even though formally, only one Adhyāya is devoted to bhakti, and it appears towards the center of the Gitā as a whole, the whole of the poem should be interpreted as an enlargement—at both ends—of it, and does not present a consistent picture at all unless we follow Rāmānuja’s lead. It is not a gnostic text, as the Advaitin school tries to make it; nor, for that matter, the basis for a modern social action philosophy such as Tilak—and after him, Gandhiji and his followers—have made it out to be. The concept of detachment does give good ground for this modern trend—and it is perhaps a healthy one; but it must be emphatically admitted that without the undergirding of bhakti, this detachment cannot be true.

The culmination of the whole classic in the famous charama sloka (XVIII : 66), wherein sarvanagati is so pointedly enjoined, would be strange indeed if either jñāna or karma were the basic theme—as we shall show in the following chapter in some detail.

As to the Upaniṣads, the need for vindicating the teaching of bhakti therein is met at every turn by Rāmānuja in all his works; it is a major burden for him, as we shall see in passing throughout this chapter. For the present, it should be sufficient to take note of the list of citations which he makes in his preface.
to the 7th Adhyāya. The fact that these citations have to deal directly with upāsanā need not deter us, for to him, upāsanā is bhakti, as we are just about to demonstrate at length. The list is as follows:

"A man who knows him truly, passes over death." (Śvet. 3:8)

"Knowing Him to be such, one becomes the immortal" (Nṛp. 1:6)

"Verily, the soul is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought over and meditated upon, O Maitreya!" (Bṛh. 2:4:5) "Let a man worship the soul only as his true state" (Bṛh. 1:4:15)

"when the inner sense has been purified, memory becomes firm. And when the memory (of the Highest Soul) remains firm, then all the ties (which bind us to a belief in anything but the Soul) are loosened." (Ch. 7:26:2) "The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his works (and their effects) perish, when He has been beheld who is high and low (cause and effect)." (Mund. 2:2:8)

So much (for the present, at least) for the textual basis, As to the theological basis, it is important to realize at the outset that two of the basic doctrines of Viśiṣṭādvaita undergird its emphasis on bhakti throughout, namely, the supremacy of the personal nature of the Godhead, and the concept of creation as Līlā, play. Both of these doctrines cannot be treated in full at present, but we can take note provisionally of some of Rāmānuja's remarks on Gītā XV:16-20, and of sūtras II:1:32-33 of the Śrī Bhāṣya.

For the first, emphatic distinction is made between the individual jīva as the Microcosmic Person (puruṣa), and the Macrocosmic Person that is Brahman or Nārāyaṇa, who is "the indestructible Lord who penetrates and sustains the three-fold world... (who) forms a different entity from these who are the object of His penetration and sustenance..."Thus pantheism is rejected. The complementary personal nature is equally emphasised immediately following:

"...Through this knowledge [on his (the jīva's) part, viz., that I am the Highest Puruṣa] I feel a two-fold gratification viz., the gratification that accrues to Me because I am worshipped by all possible kinds of worship; and because I am known in all possible respects."

In other words, knowability implies personality: and being known as personal leads directly to worship—to bhakti—which,
in being received, still further reinforces the personal relation to the personal nature, somewhat in the same sense that Whitehead teaches, e.g., that God is the Supreme Appreciator, the faculty of appreciation being the highest characteristic of personality, and worship being the highest form of appreciation.

Again, the doctrine of creation as the “play” of the Creator undergirds the bhakti-relation between the creature and the Creator, by putting the primary focus on the esthetic order, with its roots in love and its fruition in complete freedom. For Rāmānuja, all the rational arguments for the existence of God fail; but the concept of Līlā remains of a super-rational order, and stands, not as a ‘proof,’ but as a truth of the apophatic order. The world is an expression of the Joy of the Lord, and such expression is easy for Him. It follows that the way of return to Him on the part of the creature should be one of ease and of delight, freely expressed towards the Ground and Source of Freedom Himself.

On the score of ontology, it must be enough for the present to observe that there could be no meaning to devotion or the part of an unreal or indescribable (anirvacaniyaka) soul to a fictitious Iśvara, who is only a symbolical portrayal of Being as such, although this is essentially what the view of the Advaitin school believes. But since, by long argument, Rāmānuja and his school abolish the whole concept of illusion (māyā), and prove that individuation must be a distinct and necessary component of being itself, it follows that true devotion, as the highest relation between the modes of individuation both between themselves and between each of them and the ‘undifferentiated’ is also a necessary relation—and all the more so when, as we see in the Brahma Sūtras (III:3:13) it is necessary to think of bliss (ānanda), as the innermost attribute of Being and indeed as the common bond between the modes and the Ground, even more than the other necessary attributes (satya, jñāna, ananta—truth, knowledge, infinity) all these attributes being necessary because without them Being would be only a vacuum, a void (tūnya), Karma and Jñāna may lead to ānanda, but cannot reach it except by a transfer to another order; but bhakti leads directly into the heart of Being itself, since it is of the same order as that ‘heart’—as may be seen by the next sūtra (III:3:14): ⁵
“For this purpose (e.g., meditation as bhakti) it is necessary to form a conception of Him, who is bliss; and He is divided into priya (joy at perceiving), moda (joy on gaining) pramoda (joy in enjoying) and ananda (bliss of full identification).”

For Being itself cannot be impersonal. That view involves what Marcel calls the fallacy of abstraction. Being is Bliss: this is irreducible. All other attributes are enfolded within it, but as separable, distinct factors, constituting dependent orders of reality. But Bliss, though in a sense it remains an attribute, as descriptive, as the irreducible and all-including attribute, is of the same order as irreducible Being. There is no more important key to the understanding of the whole of the Vedānta than this; and it is to Rāmānuja’s credit that he sees its implications more fully than any of the other ācāryas—.

So much for the superiority of bhakti. We now turn to upāsanā as such. The term, in its broad sense, means simply remembrance, or recollection, in the technical sense as developed within mystical theology in the West. But in the more restricted sense it indicates the technique of meditation which makes this remembrance or recollection possible. As we have seen in the Taitātra Mata Dipikā, for Rāmānuja and all his school it is described by the metaphor of the flow of a steady stream of oil.

It is a strange tragedy indeed that in the West, the secularization of philosophy since Des Cartes has left this discipline to go its own way within the strictly religious field. Yet, within that field, it has continued to play a very important role indeed, both in Catholic and Quaker traditions. It was developed to a high art by Cistercians and the early Jesuits, as may be seen, for example, by the little classic called the Practice of the Presence of God by Brother Lawrence (a classic now popular with Protestants as well) and the long manual for novices, Christian Perfection by Rodríguez. For Quakers, this discipline remains the very basis of all spiritual life; Prof. Douglas Steere’s On Beginning from Within is an excellent attempt to restate the discipline in the modern context. Such terms in Quaker tradition as ‘living in the Light’, ‘Openness to Concern’, ‘Keeping to the Center’ are very apt indications of its reality and importance. Among Buddhists likewise, such terms as setting up mindfulness indicate the same thing—or very nearly the same thing, as may be seen, for example,
in the little treatise called *The Way of Mindfulness* by Bikkhu Soma. Among Muslims, also, the Sufis have much to say, under such metaphors as the fragrance of the Rose which hovers around the saint.

There remains the distinction, however, of the cultivation of a Presence (characteristic more of Buddhism and Advaita traditions) and the continual abiding in the Presence (of God). This latter characterizes the traditions with which we are here concerned. It is to the credit of Gabriel Marcel that he has rediscovered this distinction and the implications that it carries. In his earlier journal he seems to have been more concerned with the former, which is, after all, more general, and as such, the form in which most people first realize spirituality as distinct from 'objective' metaphysical speculation. He suggests that perhaps it is related to a telepathic function of the mind; but later this seems to have been given up. He says that at one time he attributed this experience (of spiritual presence) to a certain *ontological solidarity*; but this is also proved inadequate. *For it is not an 'idea'.* It is better called a 'spiritual ambiance': something of the order of *invocation*: I must even 'invoke' myself to be present to myself. (Otherwise, in American slang, I simply lapse into a 'brown study'—a state of deadened blankness). Even symbols and images fail to embody or express this experience; it is something anterior to them. The only metaphor which approaches description of this basic reality is that of the form of fluids, and Marcel certainly had never read Rāmānuja!

Indeed, things, at times, are not just 'given' to our experience; they 'present' themselves to us: they also express this spiritual ambiance; they cease to be pure objects, and we cease to be pure subjects; there is an ensemble of their being and a certain *mediative quality*. Such is the secret of artistic creation: there is a certain *interior transmigration* whereby we experience a real sense of communication with the object experienced or created, even without our really knowing what it is.

Or again, it is somewhat like what is called *charm*: something not necessarily indicated by action, but is irreducibly and inobjectionably a sort of personal radiation, of the order of revelation, embraced by an act of faith, whereby 'I' become a 'you' to my follow-being instead of just another lamp-post standing
there. One does not offer it any resistance; but if it is withdrawn, one becomes aware of its absence. I never talk about a ‘you’ to you; I talk to you, or with you: ‘you’ and ‘I’ become a ‘we’: we engage ourselves in each other’s presence, which, at its best, is really love. And how many great lovers there have been who were more content with silence, with communion, than with conversation."

At its best, this is the Presence that is basic to a Quaker Meeting. If the Spirit is not there, it is called a ‘dead’ meeting; but if the Presence is there, sometimes, even without having heard or spoken a word, one comes away with an entirely new perspective. One then understands God and the world; one is even able to understand, to appreciate one’s opponents, one’s enemies—actually to love them, for the Presence goes with one. Or if not this, at least disintegrating tensions have been dissolved; one is no longer distracted by solitude, one can be present to oneself and to the new-integrated and illumined world. And the same may be said of the Catholic Mass. In the light of these basic participations—for such they are; not mere ‘experiences’—Marcel raises the question whether reality itself and reciprocity can be considered as distinct: an issue which does not immediately concern us here, but which illustrates what we have already observed about the Personality of Being in reference to Rāmānuja.

But after his conversion, Marcel went into this with still more profundity. Being, as Presence, is Mystery. It is not just the recollecting of a presence, but the field of the metaproblematical. Thus he says:

"Not only am I in a position to impose silence upon the strident voices which usually fill my consciousness, but also, this silence has a positive quality. Within the silence, I can regain possession of myself... I should be tempted to say that recollection and mystery are correlatives. There is, properly speaking, no such thing as recollection in face of a problem. On the contrary, the problem puts me in some ways into a state of mental tension. Whereas recollection is rather the banishment of tension... .

The metaproblematic is a participation on which my reality (italics his) as subject is built (WE DO NOT BELONG TO OURSELVES); and reflection will show us that such a participation, if it is genuine, cannot be a solution. (italics his). If it were, it would cease to be a participation in trans-
cendent reality, and would become, instead an interpolation into transcendent reality, and would be degraded in the process...

We then discover that it is just this participation which passes beyond the order of the problematic, and beyond what can be stated as a problem. It must next be shown that in fact, as soon as there is presence, we have gone beyond the realm of problem. (italics ours) But at the same time we shall see that the motive power that activates all at the same time we shall see that thought which precedes by means of problems and solutions—that this motive power gives a provisional character to every judgment we make, so that every presence may give rise to problems. But it can do so in so far as it loses its worth as presence."

If we equate—and we do—this field of the metaproblematical with the concept of Brahman, we have a strident clue to the understanding of Vedantic philosophy. It is an Existentialism. But what the existentialists—even Marcel—have not yet done is to revive the method of approach systematically; and this has been done with unsurpassable thoroughness by Rāmānuja and his school, as also in the height of the development of the western Medieval mysticism, such as we find in St. Bonaventura. It is to this method that we now turn.

In a word, the method for Rāmānuja is affective meditation. At first glance this looks very simple. But when one realizes that one had to work this out against the strong stream of Śaṅkara’s laboured view that the method is that of gnostic assimilation, and that few of the ācāryas who followed after Rāmānuja linked bhakti with meditation at all, but left it purely as the devotional expression of emotion as such, then it becomes clear what a high synthesis he was striving for.

As a matter of fact, Śri Kaṇṭha is probably the only one of the major Ācāryas who takes the same position as Rāmānuja on this point—and it remains a matter of sharp controversy whether he did not follow or even imitate him in this and several other topics. Even Nimbārka, who is probably the closest to Rāmānuja in general, kept bhakti and upāsanā distinct from each other. Madhva and his school identified, to some extent, upāsanā with dhyāna or nididhyāsana, not with the whole of the upāsanā process, and seem to have kept more of the ritualistic emphasis from the Mīmāṃsā. Vallabha also keeps the emphasis on upāsanā
as mental function though not identical with jñāna, as is the case with Śaṅkara (whom he follows in most other respects, except the emphasis on māyā, and the inclusion of bhakti as of primary importance). Baladeva, the interpreter of Chaitanya, keeps bhakti at a high emotional pitch, untamed, so to speak, with disciplined meditation, lest spontaneity be sacrificed, although here (as indeed in many other respects) he does show some influence from the Mādhva school in making (a secondary) identification of upāsanā with nididhyāsana.

But since Rāmānuja’s work was all cast against the looming shadow of Śaṅkara, it may be worthwhile to indicate something of the latter’s position in regard to upāsanā.

Śaṅkara also takes the process of śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana and dhyāna as the structure of the method; but instead of the “aids” of viveka, vimoka, abhyāsa, kriyā, kalyāṇa, anavasāda, anuddharṣa, which we find in Rāmānuja and his school, he posits the prerequisites (Rāmānuja emphatically denies that there are any prerequisites) of viveka, vairāgya, samādhāna (with the other coordinates of uparati, titikṣa, samādhāna, and śraddhā), mumukṣutvam, or discrimination of what is eternal and non-eternal, renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit of one’s actions (not to say of carnal worldly pleasures) the acquisition of tranquility and self-restraint (along with discontinuance of religious ceremonies, patience in suffering, attention and concentration of the mind, and faith) and the desire for final release.

Prof. M. Hiriyanna has, on the basis of this, summarized the method of Advaita as follows: ¹⁰

“The method of Advaita may be briefly described as proceeding first from diversity to unity and then from appearance to reality. We start with more or less diverse universes as given in our experience and discover as their common basis a single universe. Systematizing the variety that is manifest in it we then arrive at unity. Lastly, since this world of unity-in-diversity cannot but be an appearance... we conclude from it to the spirit beyond it as the sole Reality. The ascertainment of the true nature of the self—whether cosmic or individual—is thus finally a negative or inverted process... So far reason alone is sought as the aid. The need for faith arises only at this stage when the final truth as signified by tat tavam asi (That thou art) —that the ground of the tvam or
individual self is the same as the ground of *Tat* or universal self—is to be accepted on the authority of Revelation.

"...So it becomes necessary to endeavor to transform the knowledge got from the Upaniṣads into immediate experience. The disciple should be able to say *Aham brahma asmi* (I am Brahman)...The realization is the result of a long and laborious process. The discipline is two-fold if we leave out study (śravaṇa)...which is regarded, not in any merely academic sense, but as a part of and as initiating the training which is to culminate in self-realization.

(i) *Manana:* The need for śravaṇa implies that the ultimate truth to be learnt is revealed and is to be known only from the Upaniṣads. Manana is intended to dispel such doubt (about false doctrines). It consists of long and continued reflection upon the unity of Being, drawing to its support facts from experience such for instance as how the advance of knowledge and the growth of human institutions more and more point to unity as the likely end. It is arguing within oneself, after knowing definitely what the Upaniṣads teach, with a view to convince oneself that that teaching alone is true.

(ii) *Nididhyāṣana:* Manana secures intellectual conviction. But there may still be obstacles in the way of self-realization. For, despite such conviction, there may be now and again unconscious reassertion of old habits of thought (viparīta-bhāvanā) incompatible with the truth since learnt. Nididhyāṣana is meant to overcome this kind of obstacles. It consists in long and uninterrupted meditation on the Upaniṣadic truth and has to be persisted in till intuitive knowledge (sāksāt-kāra) arises and the truth is revealed in a flash of vision...when such experienced conviction of unity arises in him, (the student) becomes a jivan-mukta and he may then be said to have left empirical life behind and entered upon what is described as the life absolute."

This attainment of the state of jīvan-mukti, of course, is the advaitic equivalent of what Rāmānuja and his school refer to under the metaphor of the continuous flow of oil—in other words, dhyāna for the advaitins is absolute perfection as an ultra-phenomenal gnostic state while still in the world, while Rāmānuja denies that such perfection is possible in the flesh, and interprets dhyāna as the perfection of bhakti—as we shall see presently in detail.

Olivier Lacombe, in his monumental classic, *L'Absolue selon le Vedānta,* has probably given the most profound and authorita-
tive interpretation of Śaṅkara’s view (here as elsewhere) in recent times. We take the liberty of quoting him at length both for this reason and in order to avoid the temptation of controversial bias or argumentation. For there is much to be said in support of Śaṅkara at this juncture, even for one who does not accept his position. It may well be that western Christianity—the Byzantine tradition being of a different type—has suffered much by the too strict condemnation of the Hellenistic gnostics, and Christian ‘advaitins’ like Scotus Erigena, Meister Eckhardt and the other German mystics, who more or less have their modern counterparts in Husserl and Heidegger, have been unjustly outcasted by the orthodox; for the adamant emphasis of the transcendental identity of Reality remains for all time the basic orientation of all profound philosophy, whether one works against or from within it, and the possibility of a gnosis which is identical with reality itself (at least ultimately) remains, for all time, like the riddle of the silent Sphinx, not just a possibility, but an unavoidable mystery—the sort of a mystery in the face of which all arguments pro or con may necessarily be of the a posteriori sort: we cannot escape the reality that we are; yet who has really said what it is? It is thus that Lacombe says:11

“It is necessary therefore to underline (the fact that) the different ways of salvation all converge towards the knowledge in respect to which they are in advance regulated, of which they follow the attraction and the law, which they are forced to imitate as much as they can in uplifting the transfiguring progressively the science of sacred things of an obscure mode—obscure, indirect, and inevident from faith, a luminous, direct, simple and evident mode of intuition....As to yoga and devotion...they correspond respectively to the double necessity of human effort and of divine succor in the quest of deliverance. Duality of aspects (such as this is) altogether provisory, it is necessary to re-state, like that of the immanence and transcendence of Brahman in the face of our transmigrant condition.

The pious meditations (upāsanās) enjoined by Scripture...are ordained according to the hierarchy of the sacred realities according to their double face, personal and impersonal, that is to say, according to the ideas—substances which ground the universe and according to the divinities...which preside over the exercise of their causality which “assume” their functions as their own;...they make (the sādhaka) take cogni-
zance of the eternal ideas which up to that point regulate and ground that without which he cannot perceive the unrolling of his empirical consciousness.

It is necessary nevertheless to dismiss the idea that the cult of the gods stops at polytheistic adoration. That is why the Upanisads always insist on envisaging each particular deity as being Brahman itself. And Saṅkarā works out his own precision on the basis of this, in order to safeguard the transcendence of the absolute: (for him) the divinities are to be adored as being Brahman, but not Brahman as being these divinities, as (though Brahman were) absorbed in them... (he insists on) distinguishing two degrees of meditation of this sort: the first, at the lowest level, the symbol is the ground floor of the religious consciousness and Brahman feebly apprehended behind it; at the second degree, the symbol, without being eliminated, has become transparent and allows (the sādhaka) to pass all the way in to the intimacy of the clear consciousness of the notion of Brahman.

But it is necessary in the end to come to the direct meditation on Brahman itself and without the aid of any symbol whatsoever—and without the retardation it involves. Here two types again are to be discerned, according to which the spirit fixes itself on Īśvara, the conditioned Brahman, or on the unconditioned Brahman. In either case, nevertheless, the orientation of thought is radically reversed. For from Brahman to him who meditates there is no distance to cover, no opposition between subject and object, but (Brahman itself) is universal and thus more ourselves than ourselves; (Brahman) is ourselves and we are Brahman. The devatās—the deities—on the contrary are, despite their being principles of unity, of the cosmological order and thus are presented necessarily in objective opposition to the subjective Spirit in ourselves, and appear as other than ourselves. It is true that, in a way, the perspective of the conditioned Brahman carries with it a certain appearance of duality, and in another way, the universal subordinate Lords are total personalities in whom we participate as being equally spiritual persons—and not only by one aspect or other of our psycho-physical organization—but at lower levels, as we participate at the supreme level in the relativity of the total personality of Īśvara, the Sovereign Lord, without doubt. But such an objection neglects that which characterises distinctly the participation of the soul in the essence of Īśvara before it has attained the state of union (Īśvara-sāyuja) with Him. It is this moreover which concerns a conscious participation and not only a participation of nature. How, then, indeed, does this consciousness of duality come to be more serviceable to the individual soul
than to Isvara himself, of whom we know that He is eternally free, and that He is at once conditioned by nature, under the perspective of pure prime essence (suddha-sattva-upadhi) and transcendent of that same nature along with the three qualities (guna) by which He is defined in relation to Mayaya, but which He knows as illusory,—how can He be both that relation and its term?

(The answer lies in the view that) the investigation of the union with the Lord does not lead to salvation except in the measure that it follows from the perspective of pure non-dualism and of the identity—the rigorous identity—of Brahman and the Self. Union must be willed (only) as preparatory to identity, and identity is not realized except as pure gnosis, far beyond all devotion, even far beyond any moral equality. Individual dispositions make it such that some take the path—the long path—of piety to arrive by successive stages at the supreme renunciation which is not only a moral renunciation of egoism but a metaphysical renunciation of individuality, a renunciation of the I which is a realization of the Thou; and it is in the enveloping sweetness of the penetrating tenderness of love of the Lord that they accomplish this ultimate sacrifice. Such a manner of liberating oneself is a “deliverance by degrees” (krama-mukti). Others take, instead of that path, the short path of gnosis, short but perilous withal, in spite of the fact that (in this path) there is no guarantee of a divine society which is preserved from pride or supported against feebleness. If physical death and the dissolution of the subtle body immediately succeed illumination such a deliverance is called videha-mukti. If the sage continues to live empirically after the illumination and just to the extent that is necessary to sustain the vital energies of his individuality, such a one is not limited withal by the habitual bounds of a single human existence, and is called a jivan-mukti.

The Absolute Paradox of Sankara’s position—the paradox of an illusory soul in an illusory world finding its way to Being through itself and its illusions which are such that they cannot even be described as illusory because they are also somehow participations in that Being, but participations of such remoteness that they are really non-being—has strictly speaking had no complete equivalent in all of western tradition. And yet, as we have intimated, there have been closer approximations than is generally known. Indeed, if one may risk comparisons on a wider perspective, one may suggest that if Marcel comes closer to Ramana in his insistence that Being is Presence,
and that Mystery can give rest in communion, Heidegger and behind him, Husserl, both in their paradoxical "reductions" from empirical investigations of pure consciousness to an identity of Nothing (which is the antithesis of dialectical non-being) with absolute being, come very close to Śaṅkara, as the following passages demonstrate: Husserl in particular shows this paradox of the provisional validity of relationality before it is transcended in a transcendence which then eliminates the relationality within being altogether, and the link of gnosis as the way of this transcendence; Heidegger in particular shows the other side of the paradoxical coin, in the necessity of vairāgya (equatable with Angst) and of the absolute indescribability of Being even though everything else is totally dependent on it.

Thus Husserl:  

We see that consciousness (as inward experience) and real Being are in no sense co-ordinate forms of Being living as friendly neighbours, and occasionally entering into "relation" or some reciprocal "connection". Only that which is essentially related to an other...can in a true sense be said to form a connection with that other or build up a whole within it. Both immanent or absolute Being and transcendent Being are indeed "being" and "object", and each has, moreover, its objective determining content; but it is evident that what then on either side goes by the name of object and objective determination bears the same name only when we speak in terms of the empty logical categories. Between the meanings of consciousness and reality yawns a veritable abyss. Here a Being which manifests itself perspectively, never giving itself absolutely, merely contingent and relative; thus a necessary and absolute Being, fundamentally incapable of being given through appearances and perspective-patterns. It is thus clear that in spite of all talk—well-grounded no doubt in the meaning intended—of a real Being of the human Ego, and its conscious experiences in the world and of all that belongs thereto in any way is perfect "psychological connections"—that in spite of all this, consciousness, considered in its "purity", must be reckoned as a self-contained system, as a system of Absolute Being, into which nothing can penetrate, and from which nothing can escape; which has no spatio-temporal exterior, and can be inside no spatio-temporal system; which cannot experience causality from anything nor exert causality upon anything, it being presupposed that causality
bears the normal sense of natural causality as a relation of dependence between realities.

On the other hand, the whole spatio-temporal world, to which man and the human Ego claim to belong as subordinate singular realities, is according to its own meaning mere intuitional Being, a Being, therefore, which has the merely secondary, relative sense of a Being for a consciousness. It is a Being which consciousness in its own experiences (Erfahrungen) posits, and is, in principle, intuitable and determinable only as the element common to the (harmoniously) motivated appearance-manifolds, but over and above this, it is just nothing at all.

Nothing at all! in terms of Advaita, the realization that Māyā is all that can be experienced, which realization is, as method, upāsanā: the phenomenalological ‘reduction’ is really upāsanā. And Dread, disgust, the feeling of absolute negation and the anxiety to get to its bottom—vairāgya—vimoka—this is not just the consequence, but the motivation that really was “always there” a negation of negation not posited logically as Hegel tried to do, but inherent in the very illusoriness itself by virtue of the inversion of participation in Being—Brahman—which makes the paradox both possible and necessary: One only “awakens” as out of a dreamless sleep in a consciousness that is undifferentiated even from its own pseudo-obliteration. Hence it is that Heidegger can say that ‘Nothing’ (pure indiffer-entiation) functions as Being, just as Śaṅkara, against the Buddhists, says that Being, (Brahman) although it cannot be described because it is as qualityless (Nirguṇa) as Nothing (Śūnya) nevertheless is also undifferentiated from (functions as) Being as relating all to itself (Saguṇa Brahman) without being submerged in the relationality. Lacombe once privately expressed his opinion to us, nevertheless, that Heidegger does not “rest in Being” as Śaṅkara does; he never gets beyond the Angst; never to the reversal of the inverted participation. Be that as it may,—and the Viśiṣṭādvaita charge against Śaṅkara is quite the same, for there can be no “rest” in a total blankness because rest must overflow in joy—the analogy between Śaṅkara and Heidegger remains apt at least thus far:

“No matter”, writes Heidegger,13 “where and however deeply science investigates what-is, it will never find Being. All it encounters, always is what-is...But being is not an existing quality of what-is, nor, unlike what-is, can Being
be conceived and established objectively. This, the purely "Other" than everything that "is", is that—which-is-not (das Nicht-seiende). Yet this "Nothing" functions as Being. It would be premature to stop thinking at this point and adopt the facile explanation that Nothing is purely Mystery equating it with the non-existent (das Wesenlose). Instead of giving way to such precipitate and empty ingenuity and abandoning Nothing in all its mysterious multiplicity of meanings, we should rather equip ourselves and make ready for one thing only: to experience in Nothing the vastness of that which gives every being the warrant to be. That is Being itself. Without Being, whose unfathomable and unmanifest essence is vouchsafed us by Nothing in essential dread, everything that "is" would remain in Beginninglessness (Sein losigkeit). But this, too, in its turn, is not a nugatory Nothing, assuming that it is of the truth of Being that Being may be without what-is, but never what is without Being."

But for Rāmānuja and his school, the case is quite different. Identity with the Absolute, which eternally remains an absolute "Other", by gnosis, is inherently impossible and otherness can be bridged only by affection—affection, moreover, which liberates one from all sense of frustration, for gnosis can give only an ingrowth of self-limitation which, intensified to the utmost, falsely seems to be a transcendence, but in reality is nothing more than a dead-end beyond which none can go, and from which none can escape once he is in it whereas affection is a reciprocation from and within the boundlessness of the Other who is not just a blank but an unlimited overplus of His own otherness, not just reducing all to Himself, but rather embracing all within himself by the re-entoldment of grace, as the free gift of his Being to what would otherwise be non-being.

Not that knowledge does not have its place; far from that. For, as is the case with inter-personal relations on the purely human level, love and knowledge go hand-in-hand. Even in cases when love is "blind", an intuitive knowledge springs upon and within the love; otherwise, it is not true love, but only sentiment. But on the other hand—and this is more important in the face of the Śaṅkarite view—there can be no true remembrance of the Beloved that is not motivated by affection. How easily we forget those whom we do not love! And, mutatis mutandis, if we are in love, how the image of the Beloved lingers
in all that we do. Most psycho-analysts insist that the completion of personality cannot be achieved without this sort of affective identification with an other; it becomes very deeply rooted in the sub-conscious mind, and gives colour to all that we do. And at the religious and philosophical level, as Martin Buber has shown in his Between Man and Man, it is the link between the love of God and the love of man. This intuitive-affective sense of identification for the followers of Rāmānuja is expressed in the term Sākṣātkāra,—a word that may be heard in almost any conversation of a serious nature among them even today: it is the most basic concept governing their life, and is the prime source of their healthy-mindedness.

Against this, there is a radical danger in advaitic sādhanā, if it is taken seriously, of leading into schizophrenia. It is a common saying that there are a lot of advaitin philosophers in India, but very few truly realized advaitins: one must either be a hypocrite, or take the risk of insanity—and not a few that do take the risk do not escape the danger. For although it is possible, as perhaps in the case of the Ramanamaharṣi of Tirunamalai, to come into the absolute plentitude of Being by this path, the likelihood of getting stuck in a complete ‘withdrawal’, in a complete blockage of all communicative ‘Presence’—even that of ‘being present’ to oneself—is very great indeed. For that matter, an examination of the Ramana’s life-story, at least from the outside, makes one wonder if even he had not been mad at one time and finally somehow came out of it.

Be that as it may, the basic necessity is the universalization of the identification; and this is obviously easier when the identification is conceived in terms of an other, and not the expansion-by-reduction of one’s own self-awareness—especially in view of the fact that the atrophying of the affections necessary in the latter case can lead to untold complications. Moreover, the universalization is more natural when it functions by an analogical and anagogical enlargement by hierarchical ascent, rather than by an ingressive intensification of point-consciousness in which all analogies are reduced to zero; for it is patent that love and religion go hand-in-hand for the simple reason that analogy is their basic logistic: just as one can see sex in everything, so one can see God in everything! Another
pertinent term in modern psychology is that of *transfer*: Affections can easily be transferred, analogically, to more universal objects, so that, as Meninger suggests in his *Love against Hate*, it may well be that the function of religion is not so much that of sublimation of sex, as the sublimation of hate by play, so that the erotic drive is spread out to cover—eventually—all of life. This is not at all unlike the Viśiṣṭādvaita scheme: from selfish infatuation (which still has some of the self-centred aggressiveness in it) one grows into maturity by the purification (by affective creativity) of motive to all-embracing *communion* with all, as inherently included in the Primordial Beloved—the anima, as distinct from the animus in Jung’s system—in the unconscious. For this inherent, inalienable Primordial Beloved is the Antaryāmin, the Holy Spirit, which is at once intimately personal and supremely, universally, unconsciously all-embracing.

The other sense in which the word *transfer* is used in modern psychology is also pertinent here, namely, the ‘transfer’ that must take place in psycho-analysis between the patient and the doctor: although at first it may be positive or negative (e.g., love or hate) the *otherness* is the important factor, and eventually it must be positive, e.g., the patient is literally encouraged to "fall in love" with the therapist. We simply suggest that when, as Karen Horney has demonstrated, the patient really cures himself, the otherness has come in by bhakti; but when there is need of the physical presence of the therapist, the otherness comes in by prapatti, as āchāryābhimāna. Moreover, it might be pointed out that both in the modern context and the classical method with which we are dealing, the ‘therapy’ really never ends. For that reason, we suggest that *sādhanā* is a much better term, being positive in semantical weight from the beginning.

So much for the psychological approach. The transition to the theological and ontological ground should be quite simple, if not necessary. For if the method can be effective does it not follow that there must be reality as meaningful being undergirding it? In the broad perspective, one might even assert that the modern techniques are really not basically new, but are only rediscovering the classical methods and calling them
by new terms. If the trend continues, we see no real objection to reusing the old terminology, especially since it may be argued that this process of transfer is not complete until it is able openly to acknowledge the ontological field—which, as presence, as personal—is more than ‘universal’, more than barren abstractness, but embraces the over-plus of relationality in which and out of which creativity is possible and follows—and only therein and therefrom—in fullness.

Thus it is that we have already intimated that the Primordial Image in the psyche, as equatable with the Antaryāmin or Holy Spirit, is not just a functional fiction, but is the “real thing”. Quite literally, “In Him we live and move, and have our Being”. Furthermore, is this not the immanent link of identity with the wholly Other, Anselm’s “Being greater than which nothing can be conceived”, whom we “see through a fogged mirror ‘now’ but ‘then’ (when and if the sādhana becomes complete) face to face”? And is He not our ‘end’ because all ‘beginning’ must be rooted there(as T. S. Eliot has reminded us in his Four Quartets): the unprovable ‘point’ without which, nevertheless, nothing else makes sense?

And just as in the Christian tradition Anselm’s ontological argument—malgré Aquinas and Kant—is the undergirding of the whole doctrine of the Trinity, and really cannot be understood except in that light (for the ‘greater than which’ is also indwelling Holy Spirit and incarnate Word), so for Rāmānuja, the Upaniṣads are not rightly understood until one has harmonized the texts that indicate complete transcendence (absolute otherness) and complete immanence. For him, as Marcel somewhere says of Bradley’s Absolute, Śaṅkara’s Nirguṇa Brahman is the result of the ‘fallacy of abstraction’. Personalistic sādhana is grounded in a Personal Absolute; and Personality entails not only attributes but an organic relation—pantheism in short—with the world and the souls in it.

At the ultimate, even the utterly transcendent form may be realized in the terrifying Beatific Vision, as Arjuna experienced in the appearance of Krishna in his Viṣvarūpa form (Gitā XII: 8) concerning which Rāmānuja enlarges thus:

I shall show you the whole world in one part of My body; but you will not be able to see Me in that form as I am
heterogeneous from everything else and infinite, with this earthly eye of yours which discerns (only) a certain (number of) things (and those, too) to a certain limit only. I give you a divine, i.e., not earthly (aprākṛta) eye as the means of seeing Me; behold My lordly Yoga, i.e., behold My extraordinary Yoga. The meaning is — Behold My mystic power (yoga) which consists in (My) infinite knowledge, etc., as well as the mystic power which consists in My endless glories.

But, as is to be found in the next śloka, this same infinite form was incarnate in the simple cowherd hero, "who is born of the maternal uncle of Arjuna and who became Arjuna's own charioteer in battle." But in the systematic frame, in his Śrī Bhāṣya (I:1:2) Rāmānuja puts his conception of Brahman thus:

The word janmādi means creation, preservation, and destruction. The attributive compound (here) denotes that (collection of things) which is characterized (as having 'creation' as its beginning.). The word asya denotes the world which is constituted in an unthinkably varied and wonderful fashion, and which is mixed up with (all) the individual souls, beginning with Brahma and ending with a clump of grass, each of which has its particularly assigned enjoyment of the fruits (of karmas) limited to particular times and places. The word yataḥ denotes that the Highest Person who is the Lord of all, who possesses a nature which is hostile to all that is evil, who wills the truth, who possesses innumerable auspicious qualities, such as knowledge, bliss, etc., who is omniscient, omnipotent, and merciful in the highest degree, and from whom proceed creation, preservation, and destruction,— (it denotes that the Highest Person) is the Brahman.

From the sub-commentaries, V. K. Ramanujachari has added this excellent footnote:

The meaning of these clauses is as follows: The second clause differentiates Him from matter, the substance of which continually changes, and from jivas, who are subject to karma and suffer misery in various ways. By the term 'enemy' it is meant that no imperfection can ever touch Him. The freed jiva has no imperfection of any kind; but before release he was subject to karma. The third clause shows that He can at His will subject the jivas to bondage, or release them, if they appeal to Him. This attribute accounts for freedom from imperfections, and is needed for creation and for being sought. The fourth attribute is needed for
the latter purpose. He is bliss in the sense that He is agreeable, that is, to be with Him is bliss. The fifth and sixth attributes are needed in creation—being all—knowing for being the operative cause, and being almighty for being the material cause. This indicates that matter and jivas form His bodies, and as clothed in them He evolves from the subtle condition to gross condition as the universe. The two attributes are also needed for releasing bound jivas; He must know what is in their way to reach Him, and must be able to remove it. The seventh is needed for both purposes. Seeing that jivas in the state of rest are unconscious and sleep like matter, He is moved by mercy and creates the universe again. It is because He is merciful that He is approached. The last attributes show that He, who releases a bound jiva, is the Being to be reached by Him; it is not one that releases and another that is reached.

This passage shows how intimately connected the concept of Brahman—God—and the method of sadhanā are for Rāmānuja. The affective aspect of the method is grounded on the Divine Mercy, and the necessity of attributes in the Divine Nature gives support for the jiva’s approaching Him as Personal Presence. Quite the same doctrine may also be found in St. Bonaventura. Affection, love in all of its gradations, reaches beyond knowledge, for the essential reason that love is of the nature of God himself; and the other attributes of divinity only follow after this. Hence his constant philosophizing on the basis of the Trinity; although he does accept Anselm’s ontology, he can never rest there, for the Being of God is intimately identical with the Love of God. Schematically speaking, one can say that Being properly appertains to the Father, Mercy to the Son, and Love to the Holy Spirit; but these are inseparably one, in the field of Mystery, of Presence. And as grace, this Presence pervades the whole of Nature as illumination, which illumination operating in the human soul brings it to release, to realization not only of mystical experience of God, as ontological ground of the soul’s own existence, but also as ‘present’ in all the world which He has created in hand of Love. Thus, for him as for Rāmānuja, devotion—bhakti—is not merely a matter of sentiment or of temperamental preference. Omniscience is indeed, along with omnipresence and omnipotence, a primary attribute of the Godhead—a necessary
one, indeed, but Love is of the Divine Nature. Hence its primacy in sādhanā. For in the soul, too, just as is the case with the ānandamaya kośa, the inmost ‘sheath’ of the soul, the affective is itself the ontological link with the divine, whereas knowledge is, as the vijñānamaya kośa, still within the individual soul, appertaining to the ‘about’ and not to the ‘with’. Thus he says:15

That by which we love God may be taken in three ways: either that by which we love (God) effectively, and thus love (caritas) as affection (amor) is appropriately posited as of the whole Trinity and of the Holy Spirit; or, that by which we love (Him) exemplariter—as partaking of the divine by emanation—, and thus love is appropriately posited as of the Holy Spirit, who is the union of the Father and of the Son and the bond (nexus) between them both and their unity, to whose imitation love binds us in that nexus, as is said by the Lord (John 17:21) ‘That they might be one even as we are one’; or, that by which we love (Him) (can be spoken of) in terms of form (formaliter), and thus we interpret the opinion of the Master (Peter Lombard) (that) affection (is inherently) of the soul...

...And this pertains (equally) to the aspects of essence, virtue and operation... (notably) to essence, because love is the goodness of the rational creature, perfecting it and distinguishing it and also ordering and disposing it to eternal life; therefore it is necessary that it be its formal perfection.

In reply to the objection that love is better than the rational soul, we reply that here there is no comparison; for where there is one because of another, there it is so much one (with it), so that the good having love is good because of the love. Or else we may say there is no comparison possible here, because the good cannot be spoken of uniformiter—as pertaining to a single form. For a rational substance is said to be ordinable to an end, and thus good; but love (can be said to be good) because (it is that which) orders (to an end).

And further, aside from the text of the Sentences of Peter Lombard (which played a role in medieval Europe remarkably like that of the Śūtras in medieval India!) in reply to the doubt that the love whereby we love God is God himself, he says:

God is love both essentially and causally: essentially, because love (amor) is in Himself causally, because he effects love (amor) in us... It is to be noted, moreover, that Augustine wishes to say that God is love (caritas) essentially, but he does not wish to say that love (caritas) is ours essentially, but causally, and exemplariter (according to the order of
emanation). For although all virtues have a cognitive exemplar in God, and they all have (that) exemplar according to a distant (longinquam) similitude, yet certain virtues do not have (the exemplar) as corresponding to themselves in all respects, as in the case of suffering (patientia) . . . But love (caritas) has affection (amor) corresponding in every way to itself in God, and affection (amor) not only essentially, but personally also; and thus it is that the authorities say that love (caritas) is the Holy Spirit, by which we love (diligo) God; and the ablative 'by which' indicates not only the habit of efficient cause but also of the formal cause, not according to perfection but according to the exemplar. These passages contain much technical material that would take much exposition to elucidate adequately. St. Bonaventura's exemplarism, for the time being, we shall simply take as closely allied to Rāmānuja's philosophy of embodiment (śarirabhāva), whereby, by proportional analogy of Being, all things are at once other than God, and yet are the embodiment of God: He is personally 'present' in them all—and in a sense doubly so in the soul—as their inner ruler, as their 'Soul of the soul' and as their 'end' in salvation. Love—bhakti—is simply this bond of intimacy made manifest. For both philosophers both in the emanational order and in the causative order God provokes love because He is bliss, love the end as well as the means of salvation. But since what we wish to emphasize here has already been excellently summarized by Etienne Gilson, perhaps it is better to follow his exposition.16

What, then, will be the end par excellence of all truly good will? One would risk no error in saying that it is God, but it is preferable to say that it is charity or love. We have said, indeed, that the object of the will is good in the measure that it conduces in its own right as an end capable of terminating its desire; but only love alone can satisfy the will totally. An end could be for the will that by which it is satisfied momentarily or forever. Yet, the only end by which our will finds its complete satisfaction is charity or love of the uncreated sort, that is, God. Just the same as created and consummated love, that is, the love, by which the human will will know its object in the beyond and forever, so is the love of God. Indeed, created love taken in its initial and incomplete form, such as it inaugurates and prepares (us) here below for eternal beatitude, is again nothing but the charity by virtue of which our will is reposed
in God in the present instant. Moreover, just the same as (our) bodies do not find rest as long as the feet which carry them along the way do not take them to their natural place, so the soul cannot repose in God, who is its natural place and its ultimate destination, unless love takes it there in making it know the good under its reason (of being) good. Moreover, that which is well considered as good at the same time belongs to the will and the object of its love; thus one is correct in considering love as meriting par excellence the name of end.
SECTION I

PREREQUISITES AND PREPARATION

But we have digressed—however necessarily—from our emphasis on method, except to emphasize that at the deeper level the method and the end are essentially the same—an emphasis that cannot be overstressed, and we shall be constantly reminding ourselves of that. Basically, of course, the method is meditation, contemplation, upāsanā; but secondarily it also concerns the ancillary disciplines (as we noted at the outset in Srinivasa’s text) of viveka, vimoka, abhyāsa, kriyā, kalyāṇa, anavasāda, and anuddharṣa. We shall consider the latter first.

The first two, of course, are the most important, and the others follow almost as a matter of course. It is passing strange indeed that such disciplines are no longer considered necessary to philosophers. Perhaps Spinoza was the last major figure to consider the contemptus mundi as essential for philosophy as such, and not just a twirk in the mystical temperament. Of course, the emphasis on the Angst of Kierkegaard in all the varieties of contemporary existentialism is a healthy reaction; but as reaction, it may be extreme, and extreme for the reason that it stops, or tends to stop, at the negative point of shock. Sartre does go a little farther in his development of disgust: he appears to be a “dirty man”. But this is by no means yet enough. Marcel has done better in his meditations on death, but there may be yet a hiatus between this and his philosophy of presence; and Jaspers, in his affirmation of the philosophia perennis, may have bridged the hiatus, but only in a vague way. For the bridge across the hiatus can be planned, and has been, as we are about to see, in well-explicated detail. Dread does force us to seek self-knowledge, as we have seen in the above passage from Heidegger. But self-knowledge should lead directly on to knowledge and love of God: dread is negative; self-knowledge is, for the most part, neutral, but God-love is only positive. And as it arises, constant discrimination and constantly increasing longing for peace and the sweetness of communion in His abiding are both necessary and natural. The following
passage from one of St. Bonaventura’s opuscula, *On the perfection of Life*, a manual of direction for the nuns under his charge, will show this rather plainly. Surely here there is a way through the problem of frustration which, like a revengeful demon, has come to plague so many of our modern ‘seekers’.17

If then you desire to know yourself better, you must secondly think again whether in you there is, or has been, a flourishing of the desire (concupiscencia) of voluptuousness, of curiosity or of uselessness (vanitas).—Certainly the desire of voluptuousness will flourish in a religious man when he seeks sweetness, whether of tasteful food, or when he seeks softness, such as delicate clothing, or when he seeks carnal pleasures, such as luxuriously pleasing things.—Certainly the desire of curiosity will flourish in the family of God, when he seeks to know occult things, when he seeks to see pretty things, when he seeks to possess rare things.—Certainly the desire of uselessness will flourish in the spouse of Christ when he seeks the favour of men, when he seeks (as though he required it) human praise, when he has strong desire for human honour. All such the handmaid of Christ ought to flee as from venom, for they are the root of all evil.

Again, if you wish to have certain awareness (notitia) of yourself, you ought to rethink three things diligently, whether there is or has been a flourishing of the ill-will (nequitia) of wrath, the ill-will of envy, the ill-will of rancor (accidia).—Certainly there will be a flourishing of wrath whenever in spirit (animus) or heart or affection, or sign, or face, or word, or clamour of any sort whatsoever of indignation... shown to one’s fellow (or, neighbour).—And envy will reign in a man when he gloats over the adversity of his neighbour and is sad at the prosperity of his neighbour, when he rejoices over the evils that happen to his neighbour, and is silent about the good things (that come to him). Then there will be a flourishing of rancor (accidia) in the Religious when he becomes tepid, sleepy, spiteful (odiosus) tardy, negligent, remiss, dissolute, undevoted, sad and full of tedium. These all a spouse of Christ ought to detest and flee as death-bearing venom, for in these consists the perdition of both body and soul.

If, therefore, O lovable family of God, you would come to the perfect knowledge of yourself, you must ‘return to yourself, enter into your own heart, learn to discern your own spirit.’ Discern what you are, what you are doing, what you ought to be what you can be: what you are through nature, to what extent you are involved in blame (culpa), what you ought to be through industry, what you can be through
grace. And hear, moreover, the prophet David, what an example he sets for you: For he says, 'I have meditated in my heart by night; I have aroused and examined my spirit.' (Psalm 76:7) He meditates in his heart; so you also must do. He examined his spirit; so you too. Work this field diligently; attend to yourself. Without doubt, if you insistently engage in such exertion, you shall find abundant hidden treasure. Far from this exertion there is increase of gold, multiplication of knowledge, increase of wisdom; from this exertion of the heart the eye is humbled, the character is improved, the intelligence is enlarged. For he by no means rightly makes a proper estimate who is ignorant of himself or does not think of the condition of his dignity. Truly indeed, he knows nothing, nothing whatsoever of angelic spirits, much less may he feel anything of the divine, who has not first taken cognizance of his own spirit. If up to now you have not returned into what is properly your own, how do you expect to pry into what is above you; if you are not yet worthy of entering the first tabernacle, how can you have the presumption to go on into the second tabernacle?

But if you would wish to be elevated to the second and third heaven, you must first have passed through the first, that is, your own heart; and the way you may do this I have already taught you enough just now; yet blessed Bernard informs you in the best manner when he says, 'O curious explorer of your integrity, with assiduous discussion examine and think over your life diligently, to what extent you have progressed and regressed, what sort of person you are in affections, how similar to God, and yet how dissimilar, how close to Him, and yet how far from Him you are'. What a terribly perilous thing it is in a religious man to wish to know so much, and yet to know nothing of himself? How near to perdition and to eternal burial is that Religious who is eager and curious to have so much knowledge of things, who is solicitous of judging the consciences of other people, and yet is ignorant of himself and (does not wish to know anything of himself)! O my God, whence such blindness in a Religious? Yet see and hear, the reason is close at hand; for the mind of man who is distracted by solicitudes does not enter into himself through intelligence; for seduced by illicit desires, it never can be turned back to the desire of internal sweetness and spiritual happiness; thus totally throwing itself into these sensibilities, it can never enter itself as the image of God, and is thus totally miserable in its ignorance of itself. Therefore in all things howsoever they are proposed to you, have a firm memory and recollec-
tion of yourself. Thus Bernard used to pray, saying, ‘May God give me to know nothing else, than to have true cognizance of myself.’

At first glance, of course, this passage seems no more than an expression of sentimental piety unworthy of a modern man. But reflection and closer examination will bring two things to light: The first beginnings of any variety of the philosophia perennis are always found in self-examination. Socrates emphatically insisted upon it: an unexamined life cannot possibly be a philosophical life. The Buddha also taught that the way out of sorrow necessarily begins with right reflection on oneself; Confucius built his whole ethical system on self-evaluation; and so on through the whole catalogue of the great seers and sages of the world. It is basically so simple that it is all-too-easily passed on by; and yet the whole trend of modern education, the whole increase of emphasis on empiricism in the whole of the ‘scientific’ world-view tends to discredit it as ‘subjective’ and unreliable, and ‘introversion’ is actually regarded as abnormal in many psychological circles. But introspection and introspection are not to be confused; as a matter of fact, in most cases, the abnormal forms of the first are curable only by the healthy exercise of the latter.

But here, we have something more than the universal mode of the discipline. Self-knowledge is not just an evaluative appraisal, but a way to the realization of one’s need of God. Indeed, it may well be said that self-examination is unhealthy unless it includes this ultimate point of orientation. Angst, religiously grounded, is not just frustration and anxiety, but the realization both of how unworthy we are, and also of hope: both how far, and yet how near we are to Him. Anyone who is really honest with himself will find a radical incompleteness in himself, even when he is at his best. As T.S. Eliot says, quoting an ancient axiom in the Four Quartets, “Humility is endless”.

But this radical incompleteness cannot possibly be taken in itself alone. The world just can’t be made that way: incompleteness invariably implies at least potential completeness ‘somewhere’. Thus the negative must lead to the positive; self-knowledge cannot but lead on to the search for God, humility only opens the way to grace. It is in this spirit that St. Bonaventura goes on in the next section of this same little
manual, although we cannot follow it here in detail. Humility leads to the spirit of poverty, to quietude, silence and taciturnity, and this to the application to the discipline of prayer as such, for which, quite as in the Vedânta (of all sorts), the closing off of the senses is necessary, and the spirit of gratitude—not the spirit only, moreover, but the actual giving of thanks, and finally, the conversion of the mind by humble and pious affection, which leads to abandoned admiration, to exaltation, and to inebriation in supermundane affection, to celestial joy.

But taking seriously the counsel already given, let us go back and examine more closely the initial process, the āṅgas of bhakti, the prerequisites of upāsanā. The first of these, it will be remembered, in the Vedântic list, are viveka and vimoka, the first being negative, and equatable with the reference to curiosity in St. Bonaventura's writings, and the second being positive, and equatable to the elevation of the affections; the first, to the consideration of how far we are from God, and the second, of how near we are to Him; the first, the disgust with ourselves and with the external world, the second, to the desire for spiritual bliss.

St. Bernard has often been condemned for his castigations of Abelard, and St. Bonaventura has been totally castigated and deliberately ignored because of his strictures on Roger Bacon by people like Bertrand Russel. Their charge was simply that curiosity had got a hold of their all-too-extrovert contemporaries; and it may well be that they were misguided in action. But this should not lead on to a total disregard for the importance of the warnings about curiosity; for there is involved an all-important matter of attitude of perspective. The misapplication comes from the condemnation of subject-matter; but the warnings about the attitude were never more pertinent than in our own time. For do we not now need to make spiritual use of all the scientific material gathered since the Renaissance? St. Bonaventura, in his In Hexoemerôn (the last of his works, in which there is a remarkably successful effort at interweaving the dogmatic system of medieval Christianity with the Mystical tradition) delineates this attitude under the allegorical consideration of the deliverance of the Israelites
out of Egypt (which signifies the merely secular or scientific 'captivity' of knowledge for the sake of knowledge only). This deliverance is like a deliverance from darkness (the fascination with 'bare facts') into the promised land of divine wisdom, where the life-giving truth lies. This darkness is characterized by curiosity, by 'vanity' (emptiness, meaninglessness), transitoriness, and commutability, changeableness.

But the deliverance, which brings us on into a taste for the beauty (pulcritudo) of divine wisdom, is assisted by the ministry of the angels (which we may compare to the auspicious devatās, or even the vibhūtis of Vaiṣṇavism), whose chief virtue is their humility, and which are opposed by the demons (the asuras, as in the Rāmāyaṇa), Lucifer being the chief, whose chief characteristic is their pseudo-knowledge, that is, knowledge which is not used for the end of the attainment of sanctity. Such, he notes, quoting Seneca and Hugo of St. Victor, is the nature of the world: so much knowledge, and so little wisdom! (And thence our modern anxiety, especially since the disillusionment of the last two World Wars: How can we properly use our technology?)

The manner of proper study—that which will lead us on to sanity and sanctity—must be according to proper order, assiduity, complacency, and commensurability. Orderly study means not only proper arrangement of materials, but getting at the root of the matter, and so disposing of it that the materials flow on like music, with internal necessity and consonance. But such harmony cannot be infused without the operation of divine grace, by God's own conversion of the matter into spiritual intelligence or understanding, the symbol for which is Christ's changing the water into wine.

Assiduity means the opposite of the sophisticated 'casual' vagabond, dilletantish attitude toward learning, the "Oh, I know that already", the fondness for display of bibliography, the legerdemain self-congratulation about 'progress' and 'modernity'. A studied familiarity is to be cultivated, much in the same spirit that Rāmānuja recommends in his Gitā Bhāṣya (VIII : 8):

Meditating on the Supreme Puruṣa, the Resplendent, i.e., on Me whose nature is going to be described, with the mind
not wandering away to anything else because of its being endowed with daily practice and Yoga at the time of death, one comes to Me alone, i.e., one acquires the same nature as I have, inasmuch as one gets possessed of lordship, just as Adhibhārata acquired the nature of a deer. Practice (abhāṣa) means a frequent communion (saṅśīlana) with the Lord by worshipping Him with the mind at all times not colliding with the obligatory and casual (acts); while Yoga means worship of the described nature which is done daily at the time of Yoga.

As to complacency, Bonaventura decrées the “turbulent waters” of the dialectics of the ‘philosophers’. Those are wise, who, like the ruminant animals (which were the ones not prohibited as food according to the old Jewish code) do not hastily gulp down their food, their spiritual fare (how we suffer, now, in our universities, from intellectual—not to say spiritual—indigestion!) but rather, having eaten, seek a quiet place, and gently regurgitating, reflectively chew the sweet cud of contemplation.

Then, commensurability, this is simply the discipline of moderation. Take in no more knowledge than you need at the time, and according to the measure and status of your (spiritual as well as intellectual) advancement. It is better not to fly too high. And the body, likewise (though there is little danger of this in our time) is not to be over-taxed by too severe penance (the danger being now over-exertion from too much going-and-coming, too little sleep and the usual Pell-mell of running after machines: “I must catch the 10:32 train” even when there is another at 10:45). But when we come to the positive side, we are on still more serious ground. Bonaventura’s discernment in regard to vimoke is worth following verbatim:

Now we take up the study of sanctity. This consists in the comparison of morals and acts, wherein we often commit moral and spiritual sin. And unless in these disciplines we are cautious, composed, and circumspect, in vain shall we labour in conquering the sense and meaning of scripture... And who should be the disciple of Christ and the one (properly) to hear the Sacred Scripture? Certainly (he who discerns more than) the composition of it. And there is no other preparation for this than the fear of the Lord, who is himself) the consummation of the divine Wisdom. For he is to be feared before the work. in the work, after
the work. Tobias taught his son the fear of the Lord from his infancy. (Tobias 1:10)

Secondly, he who would embark on the study of the Scripture should have an unpolluted life. This cleanliness consists in that by which the evangelical disciple should be capable of that affection which is love, in which admittedly there lies much difficulty. For all love is suspect which is outside the divine love. But that love is the most noble and no less the most delicious by which the apostles of Christ were taking constant delight by its abiding presence so that not even for an hour would they be separated from it, yet even they were hindered by the least transitory thing to the extent that any love of any kind took them away from spiritual love and disposition toward total conversion to the good. (And this is much more than Aristotle taught in his Ethics). For only that heart is free which is held by no other love than the love of God. Yet the Scripture should have the disciple completely free in this way.

Thirdly, the study of sanctity requires the disciple to be religious, which consists in this, that to the greatest possible extent the friend of the Scripture is he who, completely renouncing all, subjects himself to the bridle of the discipline of obedience, and as a friend of the Scripture, follows in study and in profession the status of his magistrate Christ, whom the Scripture shows to him. And even among those others who are not in a religious state (e.g., who are not monks or friars) and yet apply themselves to the study of Scripture, those will profit most who most conform themselves to the greater status of Christ and the Apostles. For there is nothing else in the Scripture that we may know or scrutinize except this, that we may be made good.

Fourthly, it is required in this study that the life of the disciple should in all things concern himself with what is edifying, both those things close at hand and those things which are remote, that he may please all through all...

Following this comes the study of wisdom, which follows after the pursuit of knowledge and the study of sanctity. This study, like the others, requires four conditions. The first is the recognition of his defects, both interior and exterior, without which no one can arrive at the pursuit of wisdom. For just to the extent that the wise man progresses, to that extent does he consider himself regressive and deficient. Let such a man take heed lest in appreciating himself more than he deserves, for the more a man devalues himself, the more is he worth; so he ought always to appreciate others and to vilify himself. For this is the criterion of wisdom.
For as (in I Kings 15:17) Samuel said to Saul, 'When you are humble in your own eyes, then will you be made the head of the tribes of Israel'.

The second condition of the study of wisdom is in castigation of the passions. For there are seven affections of the soul to be castigated, namely, fear, sorrow, hope, joy, love, hate and desire... For in all of these it is very easy to go to excess... Whence Boethius, in his On Consolation, quotes the following verse. Great Cynaras, ignoring his daughter Myrrham who loved her father very much, knowingly begat Adonidas... the verse is this:

Gaudia pelle
Pelle timorem
Spemque fugato
Mec dolor adsit;
Nubila mens est
Vinctaque frenis,
Haec ubi regnant.

... The third requirement for wisdom is the ordering of the thoughts. For 'stupid is he who peeps through the window' (Ecclesiastes 21:26) at his neighbour. For 'the holy spirit of instruction will flee from deceit, and will rise and leave at unwise reasoning, and be put to confusion at the approach of wrong' (Wisdom of Solomon 1:5). And yet the moderation of the thoughts is especially difficult. Thus all the more we must have definite material to which the mind may turn, lest it get dissolved and begin to wander.

The fourth requirement for the study of wisdom is the lifting up (sursumactio) of the desires. This makes us rightly evaluate other studies, so that we may forget former things and proceed on to the better (anterior). For the 'wisdom of the eye is in the Head' (Eccles. 2:14)—that is, Christ. For this is the act of wisdom, that there our desire should be held, in Him who is totally desirable. These four are indeed difficult; but they will be easy, if we have diligently applied ourselves to the previous disciplines (of knowledge and sanctity). For Wisdom, which is the fruit of the other two, is described by AlGazeli thus: 'Wisdom, above all other possessions, is the most generous, for it gathers sparsely, yet brings in great returns, and publicly declares the increment. This is the light by which the mind in darkness goes on as if in day, the hidden heart, the delight of the paradise of the soul. This is the heavenly country, immortal good-chance, which converts a man to God by the imitation of its deifying authority.'

Again, we submit that here we are concerned with more
than a matter of jejune piety. Philosophy is a \textit{vocation}, a \textit{discipline} requiring self-sacrifice, and not a mere technical profession; and any so-called philosophy that tries to remain within the merely ‘objective’ world, any self-limiting naturalism which neglects the interior pursuit of the Ultimate within, the elevation of the Self to the ground of wisdom through the desire for sanctity—and that desire is, as Gilson intimates at the outset of his chapter on Bonaventura’s critique of natural philosophy, that desire is infinite, and tends toward an Other—any such philosophy is self-condemned by its own abortive self-limitation. If thinkers like Reichenbach insist, as he does in his \textit{Rise of Scientific Philosophy}, that their particular school is misunderstood because others do not have the patience to learn their particular techniques, those who belong to the tradition of the \textit{philosophia perennis} can aptly counter with a corresponding challenge: the moral—not to speak of the mystical—disciplines also have their own inalienable prerequisites and methods; and few there be indeed who have arrived at any peace who have not applied themselves to them. Wisdom forever remains more than knowledge about the world; and indeed, there can be no reason for acquiring that knowledge except for the sake of its application in the right conduct of life. The man who tries to claim that our world is not in a mess is indeed stupid; and the man who has no longing to find the meaning of its imperfections and to seek correspondingly the eradication of his own roots of malaise, can scarcely be called a philosopher. Perfection: who does not desire it? And this desire is \textit{vimoka}.

So much for viveka and vimoka. We have given them a broad interpretation, both because of their importance, and because of their particular relevance to our modern situation; but we believe we have not gone beyond their basic intentions. Actually, for example, Rāmānuja stresses the importance of proper food in reference to viveka; but this is only the most elementary aspect of the discernment of physical and spiritual values; all bodily practices must be subordinated to spiritual ends. And likewise the mental disciplines which dispose the soul towards freedom for contemplation. The other ancillary disciplines, abhyāsa, kriyā, kalyāṇa, anavasāda, and anuddhāraṣa, follow on closely and naturally. It is to be noted in passing
that this series is stressed by Rāmānuja and the other Vaiśṇava āchāryas more than the other (e.g., yama, niyama, āsana, prānāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi), although Śaṅkara takes the latter as more important. The significance of this lies in the fact that, stemming from the Tantric or Agamic tradition, less extremes of asceticism are therein demanded; whereas the second set, coming from the tradition of Patañjali Yoga, can be employed by the select few only, and only under special conditions, and lead more to jñāna than to bhakti.

Abhyāsa we have inadvertently mentioned in passing. Rāmānuja’s interpretation stresses the constancy of remembrance. But the underlying and secondary meanings should not be neglected. First, in popular usage, japa, the constant repetition of the mantra, of the Holy Names of God, may be noticed, as the simplest technique of maintaining this constancy. In a sense it belongs to karma rather than bhakti according to the older tradition. But for modern bhaktas in India, it has become a primary focus for bhakti. It is strange indeed that this practice has been so little known in the west, although it has always been the central practice of Russian monasticism. But fortunately, it is becoming more common in our own time, under the term rhythmic prayer. It is especially important for persons who are much engaged in outward activities; for although it seldom elevates the soul to the highest states, it does keep the subconscious current rightly focussed on the divine. Automatic, it does not take the place of conscious prayer; but it is a great help in preserving the fruits of more intensive communion in times of distraction. And there is no one, illiterate or highly educated, farmer or political executive, who may not use it to great advantage. Most of us idly whistle silly tunes most of the time, or allow our minds to get stuck on some meaningless joke or something of the sort, and thereby waste much subconscious energy. But if, instead of this, some Name of God, or some simple couplet, such as “Holy God, I thee adore; make me love thee more and more” or “Holy God, Holy and Mighty, Holy and Immortal, have mercy upon us”, or “Śaṅkara, Śaṅkara, Sambhu, Śiva; Śaṅkara, Sankara Śiva OM” or simply OM NAMO NĀRĀYANĀYA—if some rhythmic and affectively
meaningful phrase like these becomes the basic rhythm of our life, all other melodies will only blend into it and thereby become harmonious: Even the rhythm of machines will only seem to reinforce the rhythm of this prayer, along with the rhythm of our walking and all the other autonomic things we do: all things thereby become enfolded in the prayerful attitude. Such is _japa_. But the second secondary meaning is also very important. That is the injunction, as we see in the first _Sūtra_ of the last _Adhyāya_ of the Brahma _Sūtras_, that _upāsanā_, or _vedanā_, should be done more than once. This is characteristic of the meditative approach to reality as against the analytical. Once some point is thoroughly analyzed, it is done once and for all. But not so with contemplation. One must dwell on the object of contemplation first consciously over and over again, until it becomes settled into the mind as a part of its own structure. This is why symbols, and not so much ideas as such are important for contemplation: without them, the mind remains chaotic, unstructured, incapable of “listening”, unenriched by the overtones and undertones of the meaning of _situations_. For _upāsanā_ is not an act; not something that one ‘performs’; it is a mode of _becoming_ for the psyche itself. And as in all manner of growth, here also, a _steady diet_ is best. Rāmānuja’s ideal of constancy—the constant uninterrupted stream of oil—for most of us becomes possible only by the deliberate practice of these aspects of _abhyāsa_, the one (_japa_) auditory, the other (the selection and deliberate focus on a symbol, or an object of natural beauty) being visual, for all the faculties must be enlisted.

_Kriyā_ concerns the social and moral obligations. Rāmānuja cites two _Upaniṣadic_ texts in support of maintaining these: ‘The performer of virtuous actions is the best among the knowers of Brahman’ (Mund. III : 1 : 4) and ‘The Brāhmaṇas seek to know Him through the recitation of the _Veda_, sacrifices, charity, penance, and fasting’ (Br. A., IV : 4 : 22) _Śaṅkara_ tends to the counsel that renunciation, _sanyāsa_, carries with it the neglect of these duties; but Rāmānuja is very emphatic on their continuance—and we should say wisely, on two accounts: for the sake of humility (for no one may presume to escape his human duties as long as he is in a human body—Bonaventura in many places stresses this) and also for the sake of stability of the social
order itself, which also must be viewed as important to God. There is a typical story of a Carmelite monk who asked to be excused from manual work so that he could the more pursue his meditations, but who, when he was given the permission to do so on the proviso that he would not eat, left off his high ambition: his selfish motives were thereby exposed. Evelyn Underhill has studied the problem in the history of Christian mysticism thoroughly, and has come to the same conclusion. It may be true that the mystic at the highest stages no longer needs the sacraments and rites as means of grace; but as Rāmānuja and St. Bonaventura both emphatically teach, continued participation in them is best, not just for the sake of good example for the masses (a reason too commonly given now by the Rāmākrishna swamis, and stressed by Thomas Aquinas as well) but also with a higher motive, namely that of kaiñkarya, of loving service, of thanksgiving for grace already received, of purely humble, selfless devotion as Holy Obedience to what God has enjoined for all men.

As kriyā concerns the outward man, so kalyāṇa concerns the inward. The virtues subsumed under this head (truthfulness, straightforwardness, compassion, liberality, non-violence, non-covetousness) are interestingly parallel to the virtues corresponding to the seven capital sins of western scholastic tradition (gluttony, lust, sloth, ill-will, avarice, anger and pride). Rāmānuja gives as his authority two upaniṣadic citations, e.g., 'He is to be attained by truth, real knowledge, and continence' (Mund. II:1:5) and 'Verily, Brahmāloka is for those who are endowed with penance and continence and in whom truth is established. To them belongs the pure world of Brahman in whom there is established neither deceit, untruth or guile.' (Pras., I:15: and 16). A very pertinent observation to be made here is that too many people think they can be good in the abstract, without employing any scheme of virtues as a 'Rule' against which to measure themselves. Even for Benjāmin Fraņklin, it will be remembered, such a Rule was extremely helpful; and yet among our great philosophers, perhaps Descartes was the last to use this technique, and even his little work on the subject is usually disregarded.

Anavasāda, freedom from dejection, is certainly worthy of
note, at least from the standpoint of modern psychology. The greatest guides in religion have always been the best psychologists. St. Benedict expressly condemns moroseness and mental depression in his Holy Rule; and Bonaventura, of course, with the joyous St. Francis as his model, can see no room for it in the Christian system at all. But more than that: it is basically a moral matter, not a result of natural causation to which the psyche becomes a victim unwillingly. Hope, its opposite, is a virtue which can be deliberately practiced. The theist who allows himself to be plunged into an orgy of despair is giving an affront to God; it is an abrogation of faith. One also thinks of St. Bernard's three principles of a good monastic community: humilitas, humanitas, hilaritas—the last being not the superficial excitement which the word has now come (symptomatically?) to mean; not boisterousness, but the spirit of joyous willingness which naturally follows the spirit of devotional dedication of all activity to God, in the way of Victory. A good figure for this is the angel who rolled the stone away from the tomb of the Lord, "and sat upon it" as an antiphon in the Breviary Office for Easter says. Or, as Rāma and Krishna were never weaklings, but always victorious over all demons (dejection is a demon!) so the spiritual man partakes of their victories. Rāmānuja cites the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad again here (III:2:4) 'The Atman cannot be attained by one devoid of strength'.

And the other extreme, anudharsa, emotional elation, is likewise to be avoided. Contemplation should lead to deep-seated quietude, as Rāmānuja points out by quoting the Bṛhad-Āranyaka Upaniṣad (IV:4:23): 'He who knows Him becomes calm, subdued, etc.' The Southern tradition has for this reason always looked with some suspicion on Chaitanya and his followers; religious ecstasy should be more than a matter of the emotions. The focus should be on the will, not on the superficial enjoyment of one's 'feelings', and this again will follow of its own course if the "Godward" focus is kept. Again St. Bernard, in his commentary on the ladder of humility in the Benedictine Rule, is quite explicit: inepta laetitia is a selfish condition, and soon leads to a 'fall'. Our only true, abiding joy is in the constant Peace of God, which passes understanding. For truly religious joy is always reinvested in praise; it never descends to
mere sentiment.

Historically, it is interesting to observe that both in India and in Europe, there has been a degeneration of emotional refinement and discipline since the tenth century. Just as one may trace, through Nimbārka and Vallabha to Chaitanya, this descent from the primordial to the sentimental, so, the current from St. Bernard to St. Theresa of Lisieux, and the Methodist ‘revivalism’ seems to exhaust itself in trivial. Most of the modern contempt for religion is based on a right reaction against this emotionalism and sentimentality. But it should not be an excuse for rebellion against all religion whatsoever; it is time, is it not, rather, for a return to the classical restraint, to this discipline of reinvestment of both joy and sorrow in the depths of Praise, a return to the Primordial? This, it seems, is the profoundest note of Rainer Maria Rilke’s poetry, as when he writes in his tenth Elegy:19

Some day, emerging at last from this terrifying vision, may I burst into jubilant praise to assenting Angels! May not one of the clear-struck keys of the heart fail to respond through alighting on slack or doubtful or rending strings! May a new-found splendour appear in my streaming face! May inconspicuous Weeping flower! How dear will you be to me then, you Nights of Affliction! Oh, why did I not, inconsolable sisters, more bending kneel to receive you, more loosely surrender myself to your loosened hair? We wasters of sorrows! How we stare away into sad endurance beyond them, trying to foresee their end! Whereas they are nothing else than our winter foliage, our sombre evergreen, one of the seasons of our interior year,—not only season—they’re also place, settlement, camp, soil, dwelling.

For all of life, in its profoundest harmony, partakes of this Divine Melody, this Praise. Religion can never be divorced from it, nor can any specialization of life be abstracted out of this, short of metaphysical falsehood. Bhakti is life itself; bhakti is wholeness—nay, fullness, the reuniting of Science and Sanctity in the Love of Wisdom, the return to the Infinite, the regenerating Soil of the Soul. Let us open the Depths again!
SECTION II

THE METHOD : INTRODUCTION

We have made, as it were, a long preparation. Though not without reason; for in our hurried world, the business of preparation, which is so all-important, is too often neglected. But coming to the central theme of upāsanā as such, we must begin by examining a long and basic text. We follow here VK Rāmānujāchāri, who combines a famous passage in the first sūtra of the Śrī Bhāṣya with the material equally pertinent in the second sūtra of the fourth Adhyāya. The first sūtra of this last Adhyāya notes that vedana (a word deriving from the same root as Veda) is synonymous with upāsanā, and reiterates the importance of abhyāsa:

The following texts teach vedana: ‘one that meditates (vid) on Brahman reaches the highest’ (Anandavalli of Taitt.,1:1) ‘Meditating (vidivā) of Him alone, one attains immortality (Śvet. 3:8). ‘If one meditates (veda) on Brahman, he becomes Brahman indeed (Mund. III:2:9); ‘When the seer sees the Being with a bright figure’ (ibid., III:1:3). The text contains the term vidvān. These texts prescribe vedana as the means to reach Brahman. The question for consideration is whether it should be done but once, and whether the injunction is fully complied with thereby, or whether it should be repeated many times? First view (pūrvapakṣa): The vedana should be done but once. For, the injunctions mention only vedana; and there is no authority for its repetition. The case cannot be likened to the husking of paddy (rice that is unhusked)....There the effect is actually seen; and till the husk is removed, the operation should be repeated. But vedana does not produce an effect that can be seen; and it need not be repeated. Further, Karmas like jyotiṣṭoma, and the vedana prescribed in the Vedānta form the worship of the highest Ātman; and thus worshipped, He bestows on the worshipper the four kinds of fruits...

Final decision (Siddhānta) (As) stated in the sūtra, Repetition more than once; because it is so taught. Because the word vedana is used as synonymous with the terms dhyāna and upāsanā, to denote the same thing. The Chāndogya (III:18) begins with the words ‘meditate (upāṣita) on the mind as Brahman’ (verse 1), and closes with the sentence ‘He that meditates
(veda) shines through his frame as a giver; warms through his repute as a powerful person, and shines through the luster born of vedic learning' (verse 3). Here the teaching begins with the term upāsanā and ends with the term Vedana. In the next example this is reversed. In the same upaniṣad the first section of chapter IV describes Raikva’s learning thus ‘What he knows (veda), that alone any other knows (veda): such a person is stated by me (verse 4). Further on, there is the sentence ‘Teach me, revered sir, the Being on whom you meditate (upāsse) (IV:2:4). Other texts similarly connect vedana and dhyāna. The teaching conveyed by the text ‘One that meditates (vid) on Brahman reaches the highest’ is given by other texts thus: ‘The Ātman, dear, should be seen, should be heard about, should be thought on and should be meditated on’ (nīdīdhyāsitaṇya) (Br. A.IV:4:5); and ‘Then meditating (dhyāyamāna) on Him without parts, he sees Him’ Muṇḍ. III:1:8. Now dhyāna is thinking continuously, and is not merely a single act of recalling something to the mind. Upāsanā too has the same meaning; for the term is used to denote the fixing of the mind on one thing to the exclusion of everything else. It may, therefore, be concluded that the term vedana means the continuous dwelling of the mind, the subject of meditation being revolved many times. (then the second sūtra):

This is learnt from the smṛtis also.

This text is:

A continuous stream of thought without interruption by any other thought is dhyāna; and it is brought about by the first six helps (e.g., those we have just been discussing). (Viṣṇu Purāṇa, VI:7:91)

(then the section from the first sūtra of the first Adhyāya): The means to release (mokṣa) is thus shown to be meditation. It should be continuous without a break, like a stream of oil poured from a cup. This is stated:

If food be pure, the mind will be pure; if the mind be pure, unbroken (dhruva) meditation will come; when unbroken meditation is attained, all knots are cut [e.g., knots of ignorance (avidyā), desire and the like]. (Chānd. VIII:26:2)

Next it becomes vivid like sense perception. This appears from the following text:

The knots in the heart are cut; all doubts are solved; his karmas are destroyed, when He is seen, as compared with whom all superior beings appear as inferior beings. (Muṇḍ. II:2:9);
This being, in the text, 'The Ātman, dear, should be seen, etc.,' the term draṣṭavya shows that meditation denoted by nididhyāsaṇa should be vivid like sense perception. [And here our translator-interpreter adds a pertinent footnote: In the text, 'Ātman, dear, should be seen, should be heard about, should be thought on, should be meditated on', the hearing about is not an injunction; for one, that has learnt the veda, will perceive that it points out the means to desirable ends; and in order to find out all about them, he will himself go to a teacher to receive instruction. This need not be enjoined. Nor should manana (thinking on) be enjoined, as its purpose is to impress the teaching on the mind. Hence, what is enjoined is only dhyāna (meditation proper), and this should be as vivid as sense perception is]. A thought recalled and revolved in the mind becomes vivid like sense perception.

And this is explained by the author of the vākya. 'Vedana is upāsanā; as it is used to denote the subject of upāsanā.' He considers the following as the first view (pūrvapakṣa): 'Think but once; for the intention of the injunction is thus carried out; like the prayāja offerings, which are made but once for all the principal offerings. He then states the final decision (śiddhānta) thus: 'It is decided (that the thought should be repeated); for the term upāsanā should be unbroken meditation; for it is seen, and is stated in the vedic text.'

It has been stated that the means to release (mokṣa) is continuous, vivid meditation. It should be loving meditation also. This is stated:

This Ātman cannot be reached by mere thinking, by mere meditation, or by mere hearing many times; He is reached by him, whom alone He chooses. To him this Ātman shows Himself (Munḍ. III:2:3—the famous 'election' vakya, which later we shall see applies even more to prapatti than to bhakti). He chooses him only, who is dearest to Himself. He is dearest to Him who loves Him beyond all measure. Bhagavān Himself makes efforts in such a manner, that one who is dearest to Him may reach Him. This is stated by Himself: 'To those, that wishing ever to be with Me, meditate on Me, I give with love that buddhi, with which they will reach me (Bh. Gitā, X10): 'I am immeasurably dear to him; he is immeasurably dear to Me' (ibid., VII:17). This means that the continuous vivid meditation must become immeasurably dear, as the object meditated on is immeasurably dear. It is then that the highest Ātman will choose the meditator, and can be reached by him. This continuous, vivid, loving meditation and this alone is denoted by the
term bhakti, for it is synonymous with the term upāsanā. Hence, the Veda and the smṛti state:

By meditating on Him alone, one overcomes death (Śvet. III:8). One that thus meditates on Him here becomes immortal; no other path to the goal exists; I cannot be seen in this form, as you have seen Me, either by reciting the Veda, by tapas (diminution of sense enjoyment), by making gifts, or by yajñas (sacrifices). But by love, not looking forward to any other fruit, it is possible for one to know Me to see Me as I am, and to enter into Me’. (Gītā, XI:53-54); That highest Puruṣa can be reached with love, that spends itself wholly upon Him. (ibid., VIII:22).

Criticism. Śaṅkara holds the view that the destruction of avidyā alone is mokṣa, and that it comes about by knowing Brahman. This we accept. Let us now consider what this knowing is, which the Upaniṣads intend to enjoin as the means of destroying avidyā. Is it mere knowledge conveyed by vedic texts, or is it meditation following on that knowledge?

Śaṅkara: It is the former.

Reply: The knowledge conveyed by vedic texts need not be enjoined; it will come to one that hears the texts. Nor is it perceived that by this alone avidyā is destroyed.

Śaṅkara: Such knowledge as will destroy avidyā does come on hearing the texts; but the perception of differences, which is the effect of vāsanā (unfavourable tendency, in the subconscious, sometimes even inherited from previous lives) does not appear at once; it continues for some time, like the perception of the moon as double by one with cataract in the eye, even though he learns that there is but one moon. Though it continues, as its root has been out, it does not bind.

Reply: We cannot admit that perception of differences can continue; for its cause also, viz., vāsanā, being unreal (according to Śaṅkara’s system) has been destroyed by knowledge. The case of the perception of the double moon is not analogous; for the cause of such perception is a real cataract in the eye; and it cannot be removed by knowledge. Hence the perception continues; but as it is known to be misperception on good authority, it will lead to no undesirable result. If you say that the vāsanā continues, even after knowledge comes, as there is no other means of destroying it, it can never disappear.

Śaṅkara: There is a vāsanā engendered and developed by perception of differences; and until this is removed, vedic texts will not produce such knowledge as will destroy avidyā.

Reply: Sentences must convey their meaning, when the neces-
sary conditions exist; it is not correct to state that they will not. We also see that even though an unfavourable tendency exists, such knowledge, as will remove misconception, comes from the statements of reliable persons from inference. Further, as you consider that knowledge should come through the destruction of the vāsanā, this result can never happen; the vāsanā has been developed during long ages; and is immeasurably strong; while the meditation, that should destroy it, being practised only for a short time, is weak; and it cannot destroy the vāsanā.

Hence, the means to the destruction of avidyā, which the upaniṣads intend to teach, is something other than the knowledge conveyed by the texts. It is what is denoted by words like dhyāna and upāsanā. Here is the authority:

Knowing (vijñāya) do meditation (prajñā) (Br. A. VI: 4:21); Knowing (anuvidyā), one meditates (Ch. VIII:12: 16); Meditate on the Ātman thus. I am for thee only (Munḍ. II:2:6); Meditating on Him, one is released from the jaws of death (Kaṭha. III:15); Meditate only on the Ātman, the fruit (Br. A. III:4:15). Ātman, dear, should be seen, should be heard about, should be thought on, should be meditated on (ibid., VI:6:6); He should be sought; He should be meditated on (Ch. VIII:7:1).

As the knowledge to be gathered from vedic texts serves meditation, in the first two texts reference is made to this knowledge by the participle, knowing, and then meditation is enjoined by the other words in the texts.

But in case there is still doubt as to the predominance of the affective element in the meditation itself, we may turn to Rāmānuja’s comments on the Brahma Sūtras in I:2:23, where the aksara (the super-transcendent, unmanifest aspect of Brahman) is the topic:

(i) At the very commencement reference is made to Brahma-vidyā, knowledge of Brahman, as the basis of all knowledge, for by knowing Brahman everything is known. Śaunaka applied to Aṅgiras for instruction on Brahma-vidyā, and asked the question, ‘By knowing what is all this known?’ This question means that he desired information regarding Brahman.

(ii) The teacher replied, ‘Two vidyās should be obtained—the lower and the higher’. The Upaniṣad goes on to state that the lower is knowing Brahman from the veda and its adjuncts, and that the latter is loving meditation (bhaktirūpaṇa) on Him. (italics ours) (and Rāmānujāchārī adds a pertinent footnote here: The latter is the means of reaching
Brahman; that it is loving meditation is stated in the text (cited above: the election vākya of Mūnd., III:2:3). The means to this again is the knowledge obtained from the Veda, helped by the Viveka and the six others (discussed above). . . . (x) In the remaining three sections of the upaniṣad He is stated to have come down from the highest heaven to dwell in the hearts of men; the mode of meditation on Him is explained; and the fruit of such meditation is shown to be released from karma and the enjoyment of Brahman in full (italics ours).

But before we begin to discuss these matters at length, it may be more than worthwhile to observe the comments made by Prof. Lacombe on these passages, which he admires very much. He writes as follows:20

This beautiful text, so sober in its synthetic plenitude, calls for a brief commentary. The 'participation of love' (as he translates bhaktirupanam) is indeed a form of knowledge; it proceeds from that essential attribute of the spiritual soul which Rāmānuja calls jñāna, and concerning which we know that he includes it in the common embrace of knowledge and in the pure interiority of its unity; (he includes also) the voluntary and effective order no less than the intellectual order in its strict sense. Supreme degree of knowledge, bhakti leaves far behind all the other degrees—not only the profane ones, but also the sacred. And even though it springs out from the same source, out of the same radical principle, (bhakti) is incommensurable with them. That goes without saying (of course) in regard to profane knowledge, regardless of the aspect of it that one may consider. (But) let us specify that it is the same in respect to all forms of revealed knowledge, which are only indirect; (it is the same) in regard to all knowledge of Brahman which has it for a non-manifest object—non-manifest and inevident—in respect to all knowledge engendered by faith by vedic testimony. For bhakti attains its object directly and in (open) evidence. (Bhakti) does not depend solely on Revelation given in common to all men, in a created language, nor on the intellectual effort deployed by the faithful (sādhaka) in order to penetrate the sense, howsoever purified might be that intelligence by an ascetic and virtuous life. (Bhakti) depends, moreover, on the side of the subject, on a discipline much more unified and much more profound—a discipline which moves the soul in its entirety and which is centered in the love of God for itself, without measure, and far beyond all created good and created value, and, on the side of the object, (that is, God himself thus loved) on the grace of election by which
he gives Himself immediately to the soul as the lover gives himself to the beloved, but in a transparency that is intelligible and in an identity of will of which no other amity could furnish the image.

This supreme gift which is the gift of God himself under the title of object—object perfectly interior because it is the Self itself of the soul—presupposes a grace of illumination, the effect of election. And this election corresponds to the preference which the soul has for God, which love requires in its turn anterior graces and preliminary initiatives of the soul. It involves all the problems of human liberty and divine grace. (But) what we must note here is the more and more personal character which takes a hold of grace in the measure in which the soul addresses itself the more directly to the personality of God Himself, and not only to universal and impersonal causality. And that progress is achieved in an act of election which carries to the highest degree the shield of personality, even to the extent of consummating the unity of the two persons in a perfect amity...To speak the technical Indian language, the discipline of yoga may conduct the soul to the intuition of Brahman, but without permitting it to pass on to the knowledge of Recollection and to gain access to a knowledge of God which is veritably (and eternally, we interject) new. It would seem that of such sort is the case of the one delivered by ‘isolation’ for whom salvation consists on the one hand of being separated definitively from his material nature and thus freed from transmigration, and on the other hand by the knowledge of himself as pure spirit and (by knowledge) of Brahman as his own Self. Yet this presence of Brahman to the soul is a presence eternally and metaphysically immutable, of the order of the essential necessities and known necessarily in the knowledge itself of the soul ridded of all obstacles and extrinsic obscurations. But is not the knowledge of the self an intuitive knowledge or a knowledge of Recollection (memory) in togetherness, or (a knowledge) which would allow entrance into the circle of its own necessary content, is not such a knowledge given from all eternity; does it not have no absolute commencement whatsoever?...Be that hypothesis what it may (and in a sense it is common to both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja), it remains that for the soul already incarnated the teaching of Rāmānuja is formal: supranormal intuition (such as the yogin attains) is only a form of memory, and not an original knowledge....

But let us be on guard not to give the wrong sense or value to the kind of knowledge (which Rāmānuja intends by bhakti) or to wrongly limit the amplitude of its meaning. Memory
to him, as opposed to Śaṅkara) is not less than...the possession—the spiritual possession—of the soul by itself in its pure essence. And in relation to the spirit in the flesh, (memory) is not only the function of conservation but also of total synthesis and of integration...

In the west, this business of memory has had a rather pied history. Beginning with Plato’s anamnēsis—which is strangely neglected by Aristotle, neglected at least in reference to the important position it has in Plato—it is deepened by St. Augustine to include not only the Eternal Ideas, but also the integral relation between the human soul as a ‘lesser trinity’ and the Triune nature of the Godhead wherein the soul has its ontological ground and total orientation in the irreducible relatedness of that Godhead. This is carried on through the middle ages until the revival of Aristotelianism, in the face of which Bonaventura still further—as we shall presently see—deepened and enlarged the theory. In the Renaissance, there was an effort to return to the purely Platonic theory, although one senses that the original ‘pagan’ orientation was never completely understood. At least in Ficino, there is more imitation of the thought of Plato and Plotinus than real understanding: the real metaphysical interest is lost, and the zeal for new discovery—always a more superficial matter—takes its place, especially in Telesio and Campanella. But Descartes’ cogito constitutes no proof, but is really a phenomenal reduction, exposing the sum, which is already presupposed. Kantianism, nevertheless, returns to the fascination with proof, the ground-motive being the construction of a metaphysics upon which empirical science can soundly be built; even the a priori is kept in an ‘objective’ perspective, and self-knowledge becomes a matter of subjectivity, the subject-matter of psychology as another science of investigation.

In Bergson, however, memory recovers its metaphysical importance. Memory for him is not a deliberate act (do I ‘remember’ what so-and-so said?), but a re-entrance into the subconscious continuum that is life itself; it is the primal intuition, the immediate rapport with the durē purē, the return of consciousness from specialization, the immediate realization of freedom. “Very rare” he says, “are these moments when we re-know ourselves at this point; they don’t happen except in our truly
free actions."\textsuperscript{21} And it is only by this introspective ‘rapproche-
ment’ with the soul that we know not only its immortality,
but also the Elan Vital which is also the progressive life of the
Universe of which the soul is the focal participant. But this
supramechanistic vitality which undergirds all ‘extended’ reality
is really God Himself—for God is Love. Memory, therefore,
is the very quintessence of mysticism, the unmerited voyage into
originality, which transcends all objectivity, the entrance into
the unknown land of obedience, where ‘problems’ all appear
to have been false problems. And this Obedience carries with
it the presupposition—nay, it is the immediate realization of its
truth—that God, in Love, has created us because, quite as
Rāmānuja teaches, He has need of objects of the out-pouring
of His creative energy. All of this, nevertheless, Bergson says
is really present in Plato; all of the two thousand years of argu-
mentation have not been able to refute or even basically to
revise what he was trying to express; for it is a matter of expe-
rience—metaphysical experience, to which only meditation
holds the key. Dialectically, one can only approach such Experi-
ence by negations; but memory, Recollection, recueillement, gives
the Openness, the possibility of a progress without end which is
necessary to all philosophy, and which is more than a logically
posited a priori, but an accommodation to participation in the
divine essence, by the side of which all materialization and ideas
as well appear only provisory and as yet unperfected. For, as
with Rāmānuja, it is of the affective order; it is like Music—
music in which the individual notes mean nothing separately,
but which, in their flow, express emotion in harmony: the har-
mony of Being.\textsuperscript{22}

Nevertheless, Gabriel Marcel suggests, in his earlier Journal
Metaphysique, dedicated though it is to Bergson and Wm. E.
Hocking, that Bergson did not penetrate yet as deeply as he
might have done. Distinguishing memory as repertoire from me-

mory as communication, he suggests that Bergson was too much
concerned with the former. In his entry for the 6th March,
1919, he writes :\textsuperscript{23}

"to remember oneself, is this not to take oneself as a reper-
toire? I note off-hand that a repertoire only makes responses
prepared for an other, destined for an other, such as he
might be, even myself as an other. To know—this is (to be
taken) in the sense that it is to be in a state of execution of
some operation or other...To say, I don't know, has this signif-
ication: this does not figure in my repertoire. I wonder if
the pure rememberings in Bergson do not tend to constitute
a repertoire....

"To apprehend, this is always to refer oneself to an ulterior.
In this sense, to apprehend is not to live in the present, or
rather it is to make an abstraction of the present as (already)
lived. It is because of this that there is a profound difference
between apprehending and enjoying...Let us say that ex-
perience incorporates itself in our being, in such a way that
it is thus transformed in consequence, and in this sense,
continues to live in us. Yes, it is an accretion vivante...Is it not
necessary then to say that it even enriches our apperceptive
mass, that is to say, that with which we appreciate, that
with which we evaluate the universe? I am persuaded that
it is. But how is it capable, as the bosom of this apperceptive
mass, to liberate itself for itself, to return to itself for itself?
......Memory in this sense is certainly a mode of being; I
am that which I remember in the measure that I relive it...
A memory never grows old; it has only an age that is properly
its own...."

And later on, in his entry for the 13th March, he elaborates
on memory as communication. True it is that we cannot com-
municate with another except by signs; but even these signs
convey nothing unless there is a common esprit between the
persons concerned: a veritable psychical symbiosis which is very
precarious, but of such a nature that one can say that "he is us"
in this state of communication. But alone with ourselves—alone
with myself—this nature of communication becomes even more
vivid. As an 'othered' object, I remember myself (in a par-
cular past situation, for example); but what is this memory
itself? It is no longer a communication, strictly speaking, but a
sort of incomplete possession (in which it is myself as conserved in
both past and present that is the possessed).

So far, Marcel affirms no more than could be accepted by an
advaitin also. But in the later Journal, as we have already seen,
he sees Being—and surely this being which is unavoidable in
memory is the same Being—he comes to realize Being as My-
stery. But Mystery is not the unknowable, as radically, Saṅkara's
Brahman is. It is capable of recognition; it involves engagement,
whereas the unknowable is merely the "limiting case of the prob-
lematic, which cannot be actualized without contradiction"—the very sort of contradiction in which, according to Rāmānuja, Śaṅkara gets himself entangled, But "the recognition of mystery... is an essentially positive act of the mind, the supremely positive act in virtue of which all positivity may perhaps be strictly defined. In this sphere everything seems to go on as if I found myself acting on an intuition which I possess without immediately knowing myself to possess it.... The essential metaphysical step would then consist in a reflection upon this reflection (in a reflection 'squared')....

The 'problem of being', then, will only be the translation into inadequate language of a mystery which cannot be given except to a creature capable of recollection—a creature whose central characteristic is perhaps that he is not simply identical with his own life.²⁶

But not only that. This non-identity with ourselves does not imply a super-Self, an Absolute, but the Thou, which drops out of 'Being' over into 'Having' as soon as it is treated otherwise. And this Thou is realized by love, which transcends the polarity of the same and the other, and plants us in Being.²⁶ For all knowing, like all desire, is a having—even the knowing of ultimacies:²⁷

The notion of the self, and of one's-self, should really be firmly seized upon. We should then realize that, contrary to the belief of many idealists (and here, we interpose, advaitins are idealists par-excellence), particularly the philosophers of consciousness, the self is always a thickening, a sclerosis, and perhaps—who knows?—a sort of apparently spiritualized expression (an expression of an expression) of the body, not taken in the objective sense, but in the sense of my body in as far as it is mine, in as far as my body is something I have.... But we know that it is possible to transcend the level of the self and the other; it is transcended both in love and in charity. Love moves on a ground which is neither of the self, nor that of the other qua other; I call it the Thou.... Love, in so far as distinct from desire or as opposed to desire, love treated as the subordination of the self to a superior reality, a reality, a reality at my deepest level more truly me than I am myself—love as the breaking of the tension between the self and the other, appears to me to be what one might call the essential ontological datum. I think...that the science of ontology will not get out of the scholastic rut
(and, again, we submit, Advaita is in the same scholastic rut) until it takes full cognizance of the fact that love comes first.

Thus we see how that, even in our present day, upāsanā, vedana, cannot be taken as gnosis only. It is participation in love, in a word, bhakti. Why, then, even in India—present day India—is bhakti relegated to religion only (as though that were really possible !) and not considered as philosophically relevant? No one can philosophize without it—nay, in it; and indeed, as Marcel has elsewhere emphasized, both in *Être et Avoir*, and in *Man against Mass Society*, without it, thought ceases to be creative, gets ‘abstracted’ into dogma, and fanaticism ensues. Without it, idealists withdraw from the world in an attitude of proud superiority and realists (such as the Marxists) cease to be human and technologize the masses, to treat persons as if they were only cogs in a society that has become a machine. One thinks again of Jesus weeping over Jerusalem: the dogmatic Pharisees and Sadducees had rigorized religion into a loveless, dead observance of uncreative tradition; to be ‘religious’, one must be a hypocrite, contemptuous of all ‘worldly’ matters. And the Roman (it might as well have been the British or American) political machine was equally corrupt for the opposite reason; it was contemptuous of all religion as such, and sought—if it became uneasy of nihilistic scepticism at all—‘philosophical’ rationalization in a completely impersonal stoicism which denied reality to ‘feelings’ altogether. Is it not so again today, with even more demoniac intensity? Only bhakti can bring us to creative wholeness, and that for metaphysically profound reasons: Being, for the best of Vaiṣṇava as well as the best of Christian teaching, is light, Life, Love—the God of love, whose redeeming nature cannot be forgotten or ignored without extrapolation into suicidal darkness of non-being. We remember Him because that is the very reason for our existence.
SECTION II
B
THE METHOD: VEDĀNTIC

Thus far, what we have covered as reflection is covered in the Vedāntic terminology under the words vedāna and anuvāda, which are the general indications of the state of consciousness characterized when bhakti is generally activated. Now we must turn to the technique of intensification under the heads of śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsanā, and dhyāna. The terms all overlap to some extent, since in the process one stage leads intimately into the next. The movement is from a diffused focus of the mind and affections, through concentration on scriptural texts and symbols, to rapt enjoyment and ecstatic mystical union, resulting in a permanency of establishment that amounts to complete self-obligation or antima-pratityaya, in which—usually not realized until just before death—beatification is attained.

In short, this is the Vedāntic formula for mental prayer, or meditation as such. In our own day, writers like Bede Frost, Gerald Heard and Alan Watts are making laudable efforts to revive interest in these methods, at least for a few intellectuals. We only suggest in passing that they are not for dilettants any more than for philosophers; and we also hope to show that the earlier medieval methods are more profound and more ‘philosophically’ worked out than those that have engaged the primary attention thus far (e.g., the Carmelites and the 17th and 18th century French ‘directors of souls’). It is true that none of these methods are for everybody; Rāmānuja is as explicit on that point as he is that prapatti is for everybody. But neither are they reserved only for those who become monks and “specialists” in religion—not for those who would descend into piety, but rather for those who would enlarge their field of contemplation and deepen and intensify their cultivation of Presence—for reasons already made sufficiently clear in our citations of Gabriel Marcel’s views, and St. Bonaventura’s challenges.

For without these deliberate intensifications, there will be no effect on the subconscious, there will be no good vāsanās set in operation, and hence no fruition. For besides the ultimate fruition in beatification, after each act of meditation there is the
fruit of a fresh awakening to one’s own identity in the Presence, which Rāmānuja describes in an allegory of a prince who was lost in the forest, forgot his royal heritage, and was only reminded of it by the servants of his father who identified him, or like the finding of buried treasure in one’s own house. Likewise, from the standpoint of mental hygiene, as may be intimated from the clinical experience of Karl Jung, such deliberate practice softens the shock of the religious consciousness by giving it structure and controlled focus. This is already suggested in the Brahma Sūtras (IV: 4 & 5), where there is a warning against allowing the meditation to evaporate into meditation on Brahman in the abstract: the ‘Name’ is to be kept in focus even though Brahman stands in relation to it as a servant to a king. This is not even avoided by Śaṅkara, even though he regards the ‘Name’—the attributes—as unreal superimpositions, whereas Rāmānuja, of course, takes the attributes as equally real with the Being of which they are attributes.

First, then to śravaṇa

It is necessary to select a text, whether heard or read, from some charismatic writing. Ordinary poetry or literature is only second-rate, only second-best, because it does not carry the weight of tradition behind it—the weight of tradition which is not to be disregarded even by ‘revolutionaries’ because, as cultural anthropologists and Whitehead with them have shown, this is the inalienable factor that moulds our consciousness, and even gives the inspiration for revolt from the tradition itself. We cannot dilate here on the nature of charismatic literature; but we do throw out the suggestion that the chief criterion for its discernment is already contained in the method of its use: it is that text which will hold more of interpolation than it will yield in interpretation; it is that which elicits engagement, not merely that which is to be understood. For here we are not concerned with analytical thought, not with inductive or deductive reason, but with the enlargement and intensification of the field of consciousness—and here we intend the term field in its full technical force as used by the school of psychology which subscribes to the field theory of consciousness. And it is difficult for this enlargement to come by a leap; it must be of the order of modulatory shift from an original and definitive, but provocative, focus. It is also
better to take a text as basic and use a symbol or symbols (in the manana 'shift') as illustration or 'incarnation' of it, for the simple reason that the potential scope of enlargement is greater in the text, and the sensuous aspect less limiting. Indeed, most of the modern misunderstanding of the Vedânta comes from this confusion of consciousness (with which meditation deals) with learning and thought. The latter is what is done; it belongs to the karma level. But the former concerns the psyche itself, as is clearly intimated in Sûtras III:12-16. Here Râmânuja says 29, "The term 'learning the veda' means only learning the text. The injunction to learn the veda is fully carried out when the text has been learnt; it does not require him to know its meaning also. When the text has been learnt, as it teaches karmas as means to fruits, one of his own motion takes up an inquiry to determine what it exactly teaches. Then, if he desires worldly fruit, he seeks to know karma; if he desires release, he essays to find out about Brahman...one's knowledge of the nature of the highest Ātman and of the mode of meditation on Him is different from the meditation itself, which alone leads to the attainment of the highest goal." (italics ours) He then goes on to elaborate the way in which meditation delivers the soul from its bondage (and we must remember that this bondage is of both 'good' and 'bad' karmas—which includes the learning of the meanings) to karma (Sûtra 14), and quotes the Muñḍaka Upaniṣad (II:2:9), "'His karmas are destroyed, when the Being is seen, compared with whom all superior beings appear as inferior.' Such destruction would be inappropriate on the theory that meditation subserves karma; for a subordinate part cannot destroy the principal karma."

That it is the self itself and not thought with which we are concerned becomes even more clear when we come to the shift to the manana stage. Here, the technique is not that of question and answer—not dialectical discourse—but, at the first level, that of free association, of opening to spontaneous suggestibility, and at the second level, to focusing and 'dwelling' on a symbol or particular aspect or attribute that has thereby come into focus. It is at this stage that the use of prânâyâma, or conscious regulation of the breathing—first by slowly breathing in through one nostril and out the other, then by alternate holding
and sustained exhalation of the breath, and then by long suspension in the neutral condition—is useful, if not necessary. Then, at the third level, the elimination of all factors other than that focussed upon. This can be examined in its technical language in Sūtra I:3:6 & 7, where the directive text is from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VII:24:1): “That is bhūma (large), which being experienced, one does not see anything else, does not hear about anything else, does not meditate on anything else. That is the small thing (alpa), which being experienced, one sees another thing, hears about another thing, meditates on another thing.” What is intended here is the intensification of the prophetic approach to Being, preparatory to the shift to the apophatic, which may be identified with the nididhyāsana stage, or, in Marcel’s terminology, with instrumental mediation, which must be followed up with sympathetic mediation, which in turn yields to total supra-problematic Presence.

For, as in śravaṇa, the text is used to elicit the engagement, or involvement, wherein the ‘spectator attitude’ (or the activity of the manas and buddhi as ahaṅkāra) is submerged into the ontological rapport with the object of meditation, in manana the current of the rapport is reversed, and the Being of the Self (Ātman, not ahaṅkāra) as the subject of the meditation is elicited. That the arousing of the affections is important here almost goes without saying, for it is only they that make the engagement possible: affection is the ontological link between the subject and object of the meditative process; hence it is that Rāmānuja, against Śaṅkara, insists that it is of the nature of the Divine. And within the engagement, analogies and allegories will unfold themselves with a resulting sense of clarification and of inward discovery: negative attitudes melt into the attitude of ‘of course’, and the argumentative ‘is this true or not?’ disappears before the realization, ‘it is!’ . Being is simply allowed to manifest itself, and that in its non-propositional foundation. One by-product of this manifestation is deliverance from the identification with one’s body: yes, the body ‘is’, but qua instrument; yes, I ‘am’, but qua being en rapport (with it and with other bodies, and thoughts which dwell in it and them).30 But when, without really being aware of it, one enters this on rapport itself—for it is the Presence of God, the Mystery, the Secret—when one ‘centers down’ (the
Quaker phrase): this is *nididhyāsana*: sympathetic mediation in which the telepathic ‘field’ of *communion* in the Numinous as such, and even the sense of ‘I am’ ceases in total identification of affection and of will with the Presence itself. We deliberately say telepathic field both to indicate that it is that in the full technical sense, and to indicate that it is more than telepathic *communication* in the particularized sense. Rāmānuja’s own words—poorly as they may be indicated in translation—are these: “That *nididhyāsana* has the same characteristic as direct perception. Moreover, memory has the character of direct perception, because it is (simply) the intensification of the process of mental conception.” But what he means by *intensification* is the plunge from the subconscious which has been brought to the surface in manana into the unconscious, which is undifferentiated—the ‘point’ awareness—for both him and Śaṅkara, but which is still affective for him—pure affection indeed: the Being which has been allowed to manifest itself is realized as the Thou; no longer the realization ‘His love is like this’ or the sense that ‘He loves me’, but *I love Thee*; the *engagement* is intensified to the point of literally falling into Love; one no longer observes oneself or the symbols or analogies with which one is ‘engaged’, but one realizes that God in the symbolic process has been the ‘observer’ all the time, and at the same instant one embraces Him for that reason, with a sense of cathartic joy and freedom or Renewal. It is extremely difficult to *describe* this verbally, because it is the point where time and space and verbalization are all transcended, as in the story about John Wesley who replied when asked how long one should pray, “until one does not know how long he has prayed:” One really does lose oneself in God: this is the liberation.

Then comes *dhyāna* in the strict sense (for the word also is used to cover the continuation in the Presence after the meditation), the *settling* into the Presence, the harmonious immobility, the peaceful dwelling in oneness, in which love flows like the steady uninterrupted stream of oil (to use Rāmānuja’s favourite metaphor), in which there is a re-inclusion of all of nature and life—all that has been left behind in the ‘plunge’, the symphonic expansion of the Presence into wholeness. Most interpreters stress the aspect of *intuitive knowledge* here; and it cannot be
denied that Rāmānuja does mean that also. But to us it appears that his primary stress remains on the affective aspect—indeed not aspect, strictly speaking, for to him meditative vidyā is affectional by nature, and not just ‘intuitive’. Thus, under Śūtra III.4.26, he explicitly says, “Meditation must become vivid like sense perception; it must be marked with a high degree of love; it must grow every day; and it should be done throughout life. It is denoted by dhyāna, upāsanā, and other terms; and it is more than mere knowledge of texts.” (italics ours). This will become more clear when we come to examine various passages in his Gitā Bhāṣya; but it is enough for the present to observe that also in the Śrī Bhāṣya it is emphasized, and for two reasons: bhakti is of the essential nature of reaching out beyond jñāna because the reaching out beyond is the response to election, which is the love of God reaching towards the soul; and because Brahman is realized as ānanda, bliss, more fundamentally than as jñāna, as can readily be seen in more passages than we can examine here, for of all passages in Upaniṣadic literature, he is most fond of the Ānanda-valli of the Taittirīya, which he most characteristically links with the Antaryāmin section of the Brhad Āranyaka.

But there is another still more basic reason than these. If we may distinguish between meditation and contemplation, dhyāna should be taken in the sense of contemplation, meditation being the act, and contemplation being the state reached thereby, both in its intensive aspect as the crown of meditation, and as the continuation throughout daily life of that state. And for Rāmānuja, contemplation is still of an Object, even though there may be a unitive (as affective) relation—the Presence—with that (Absolute and absolutely transcendent) Object. These higher states, of course, in all schools, blur; and in the advaitin school, if we may use a strong expression, the blurring is taken as the basic principle: unitive relation there is none: only realization of the blur, total non-differentiation, the complete erasure of both relation and related. Thus in the strict sense, for the Advaitin, there can be no contemplation; there is only meditation and samādhi, or transcendence of personality and all that goes with it: a sort of ‘evaporation’ into non-describability—which Rāmānuja and his followers ridicule as either meaningless or
impossible. This is perhaps best seen in the “Hundred Points” of Venkatanatha which Das Gupta has reported in considerable detail, of which we may look to the 57th as a crucial example:32

It is said that Brahman is of the nature of pure bliss (ānanda); but it may well be said that in whatever sense the word ānanda may be used it will not be possible to affirm that Brahman is of the nature of pure bliss (e.g., according to Advaita). For if ānanda means an entity the awareness of which induces an agreeable experience, then Brahman will be knowable. If it means merely an agreeable experience, then Brahman would not be pure indeterminate consciousness. If it means a mere agreeable attitude, then duality will be implied. If it means negation of pain, then Brahman would not be positive and it is well admitted on all sides that Brahman is neutral. Moreover, according to the Śaṅkarites themselves the state of intuition of Brahman is regarded as a positive state like the state of dreamless sleep. Thus, in whichever way one may look as the problem the assertion that the indeterminate Brahman is of the nature of pure bliss becomes wholly unwarrantable.

But, as we see in the Śrī Bhāṣya (I:1:20), if Ānanda is positive, and not only an attribute of Brahman, but of the very essence of His nature, then bhakti, as the participation in this bliss—and we must remember that the ānandamaya kṣaṇa as the innermost core of the soul is not the jīva itself, but Brahman as Antaryāmin—can be seen in its metaphysical importance. Thus, quoting the Taittiriya Upaniṣad (II:7:1) (He is Bliss; for on reaching this bliss one becomes blissful), Rāmānuja goes on to say,

That, by the enjoyment of whom one becomes blissful, cannot be that one. Hence Ānandamaya is other than the jīva. This last sūtra removes the doubt that may arise that the freed jīva might create, without a body, as he has merely to will; and it is stated in vedic texts that he attains this power on reaching Brahman in the highest heaven.

Ānandamaya being thus decided to be Brahman, the reference to ānanda in the texts, ‘If this limitless ānanda did not exist (a continuation of the above text Vijñānam ānandam Brahma—Br. Ar. V:9:28) is to ānandamaya alone, as by the terms vijñāna reference is made to vijñānamaya. For the same reason the following statements are made:

One who knows the ānanda of Brahman (Taitt. II:9:1) He reaches the Ātman, who is ānandamaya (ibid. II:8:1)…Hence in the expression ‘He learnt that ānanda was Brahman, reference is made to ānandamaya alone’. For the same reason
the conclusion in that place is thus stated—‘Reaching the Ātman who is ānandamaya’.

Our translator-interpreter has added a helpful footnote that clarifies this:

The objection may be raised that one becomes blissful on reaching ānanda; but not by reaching ānandamaya. To refute this objection, the text states that the two words are synonymous. The reasons for this statement are the same as for vijnāna and vijnānamaya...As Brahman is extremely agreeable, He is ānanda; and even though the word denotes the attribute bliss, it cannot stop there, but must denote also one who possesses it. i.e., Brahman. Where it is intended to refer to the attribute alone, the word ānanda and Brahman will not be in apposition; the word Brahman will have the termination of the possessive case, as in the expression quoted in the text.

Moreover, as we shall see even more vividly in dealing with prapatti, this bhakti, as the living link of love with the Lord, carries both the implication that the means and the end are the same: contemplation is the response to Grace; and also the implication that compassion—and therefore a genuinely democratic spirit—is a necessary expression not just of an illusory virtue by an illusory individual, but of the Lord’s own love operating in one for the sake of all that are His own. The exercise of the virtues, therefore, is not limited to karma, but is reinfolded into the continuation of dhyāna as an expression of it. P.N. Śrīnīvāsa-chārya has interpreted this quite aptly, as may be seen in the following:

Every karma by thought, word, and deed is transfigured into kāṅkārya or worship of Bhagavān, as He is Himself the ultimate doer and the deed. Service to the ṣeṣi is entirely different from dāśya in the ordinary sense. To attribute it to the slave mentality of the creature awe-struck by the dictatorial fiat of the capricious Lord is the result of deep-rooted prejudice and misunderstanding of the function of the will... The rewards and rebuffs of life arise from self-alienation from the ṣeṣi, and the paramaikāntin or absolute and perfect devotee knows that the real evil is not suffering but the sin of self-estrangement from the ṣarīrin. Thus the philosophic knowledge of Brahman as ādhāra and the jīva as ādhēya has its fruition in the religious relation of ṣeṣi or svāmin and dāsa. Such dāsatva or service is not a task implying a must or ought but is a spiritual experience which is sui generis, and it con-
notes pāratantrya or dependence on the Lord and pārathyā or existence of the Lord. It is not even induced by the goodness of God but is the true relation of the self to God who is necessarily good, not guṇāirāśya but svarūpa dāśya. The self enters the service of the Lord not owing to the attraction of His qualities but owing to its own real nature... It is the self that primarily experiences ānanda or bliss,...and all the delights of life belong not to the jīva but to the jīva-śarīrin or the Supreme Self who lives within the self...the paramai-kāntin thus lives and has his being in bhakti, and not only has aśvarya or kaivalya no charms for him, but even mukti has no value, if it were emptied of bhakti.

Of course, it may be said in defence of the advaitin that the jīvan-mukta will behave in virtually the same way. But this is not strictly true; he may or he may not, since there is no reason why he should, and indeed, since his business is simply to exhaust his prārabdha karma, he really has no motivation for kaiṅkarya, and may become completely apathetic, in complete retirement, or, if he does stay in the world, he is in an a-moral state which contributes nothing to society or to Īśvara whom he thinks he has transcended as a merely symbolic upādhi of the Brahman whom—or which—he has become. Where, then, can Humility, the sense of dāsa-tva, or any loving relation of any kind, find its foundation? And since humility is the heart of all virtues, what place has any virtue?

But since all the distinctions we have thus far discussed in reference to Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja are most vividly brought out by a comparison of their commentaries on Gītā XVIII:54 & 55, we offer them as summary. Thus on śloka 54 Śaṅkara:

He who has reached Brahman and attained self-serenity does not grieve regarding his failure to accomplish an object or regarding his wants. It is not possible to suppose that he who knows Brahman can have a longing for any object unattained;

...Such a devotee to wisdom attains highest devotion to Me, the Supreme Lord—the fourth or the highest of the four kinds of devotion—viz., the Devotion of Knowledge...

But Rāmānuja on the same śloka,

Becoming Brahman (brahmabhūtah), i.e., becoming the soul which is identical (with Me) in nature inasmuch as infinite knowledge has arisen in it, as also whose only nature consists in forming a part of Me...

Of serene self, i.e., one whose nature is not tainted by the (five) kleshas, action and the rest, he neither grieves for any
particular being except Myself nor desires any body; but on
the contrary, treating all beings except myself alike with reference
to their being to be disregarded (by him). . . he attains supre-
me devotion (bhakti) to Me, which consists in feeling (Me)
to be extremely dear (to himself), I being the Lord of all; one
whose play consists in the evolution, sustenance and dissolu-
tion of the whole universe; one free from all traces of every-
thing that is avoidable; focus of the hosts of infinite, profuse,
innumerable, noble qualities; Ocean of the nectar of beauty;
one possessed of Śrī; one having eyes like a lotus; and his
own Master.

And on śloka 55 Śaṅkara:

By Bhakti, by the Devotion of Knowledge, he knows Me as
I am in the diverse manifestations caused by upādhis. He knows
who I am, he knows that I am devoid of all the differences
caused by the upādhis, that I am the Supreme Puruṣa, that I
am like unto ākāśa; he knows Me to be non-dual, the one
Consciousness (chaitanya), pure and simple, unborn, undecay-
ing, undying, fearless, deathless. Thus knowing Me in truth,
he enters into Myself immediately after attaining knowledge.
It is not meant here that the act of knowing and the act of entering
are two distinct acts.—‘what then is the act of entering?—It is
the knowledge itself; for, there is nothing to be effected by knowl-
edge other than itself, as the Lord has taught, ‘Do thou also
know Me as the Kṣetrajña’. (xiii: 2) . . . the word ‘devotion’
(niṣṭhā) means that the knowledge aided by all the favourable
conditions of its rise and development and freed from obstac-
les culminates in a firm conviction of one’s own experience.
When the knowledge of the unity of the individual Self (kṣetrajña)
and the Supreme Self (Paramātman) . . . culminates in a firm
conviction by one’s own experience, then the knowledge is
said to have attained supreme consummation. This jñāna-
niṣṭhā (Devotion of knowledge) is referred to as the Supreme
or fourth kind of Devotion, Bhakti,—supreme as compared
with the remaining three kinds of Devotion—. . . . by this
supreme devotion the aspirant knows the Lord as He is, and
immediately afterwards all consciousness of difference between
the Iṣvara and the Kṣetrajña disappears altogether . . .

. . . . And the Devotion of Knowledge (jñāna-niṣṭhā) con-
sists in an intent effort to establish a continuous current of the
idea of the Inner Self (Pratyagātman); there would be a con-
FLICT if that devotion were to be conjoined with karma, which
is like going towards the western sea. It is the firm conviction
of philosophers that the difference between the two is as
wide as that between a mountain and a mustard seed. Hence
the conclusion that the Devotion of Knowledge (jñāna-
niṣṭhā) should be practised by renouncing all action.
But Rāmānuja:

By Bhakti of this nature he knows Me in truth, who I am by nature and character, and how great I am by (My) qualities and glory; Knowing Me in truth forthwith, i.e., after knowing Me in truth, he enters, thereby, i.e., by Bhakti, into Me. The meaning is: he attains Me by the infinite and profound Bhakti which is (bound) to arise after perceiving, in truth, (My) nature, character, qualities and glory. Here it, viz., Bhakti is, indeed, spoken of as forming the means of attaining (the Lord), that is referred to by the word ‘thereby’ (tataḥ); for, the same has been declared to be the means of entering into (the Lord), in truth, in the following text:—‘But by exclusive devotion can (I of this form) be (known and seen in reality, and entered into...) (XI:54, which he has explained in terms of the election vākya, Kaṭh. I:2:23).

Thus has been declared the outcome of the obligatory and casual acts suitable to the (several) castes and orders of life, with their fruits etc. abandoned, and performed as constituting the propitiation of the Supreme Puruṣa.

The italicized portions will bring out the contrast, so that no further commentary is necessary. To anyone familiar with the text of the Gitā itself, it should be obvious how Śaṅkara twists things around to make them mean their opposite; above all, the ideal of niṣkāma karma is in fact rejected for complete ascetic, non-active, renunciation, even though this is the very heart, according to all interpretations since Tilak’s, of the Gitā’s teaching. And it only naturally follows that bhakti can have no meaning (and hence must be twisted into a form of gnosis), for it is the key to the sacramentalization of action—action done with a higher motive than that of attaining one’s own desired end.

But now, as a precaution against going to the other extreme, it will be profitable to make a few observations as to the difference between Rāmānuja’s views and those of Madhva. We neglect the other ācāryas, howsoever important they are, both to avoid prolixity—the full comparative study of Indian Philosophy remaining, nevertheless still inadequately explored—and because Madhva offers the most and original—original to the point of being ‘far-fetched’ as Ghate often puts it—system of transcendent theism (hardly even a pantheism, which is a more or less common basis, with shades of interpretation, of all
the other non-advaitic schools) in all of Indian Philosophy. Indeed, if one may risk an epithet, he could be called the Calvin of Indian Philosophy: fanatical in zeal, arduous and uncompromising in logic, unsparing of opponents, he not only denies all mystical tendencies, but even affirms predestination, so rigid is his view of the total dependence of the world and the soul upon the transcendent Deity.

This, of course, even affects his interpretation of bhakti and prapatti. The Love of God for him is reduced to the submissive acknowledgement of this total dependence; and even his interpretation of the Antaryāmin is conditioned by it. Thus, where Rāmānuja, commenting on the Gītā (VI:20-33) says, Himself abiding in all beings, and all beings abiding in Himself, he (really sees)... because his own self and the other beings, in their true nature apart from Prakṛti are equal, inasmuch as they have only one form which constitutes intelligence (jñāna). When one (single) soul is seen, the entity of the soul as a whole (e.g., the Soul of all souls) is thereby seen, because the entity of the soul as a whole (the Soul of all souls) is equal to that....

(30) He who having arrived at a still more mature state than the last, and having attained equality with me, sees Me everywhere, i.e., in the entity of (all) souls, seeing the equality of the entity of (all) souls, which have shaken off (their) good and evil, and which stand in their own form, with Me, which equality has been spoken of in ‘He reaches the highest oneness, free from all taint (of Passions)—Munḍ. III:1:3) ...who understands by seeing one of the two, that (31) Who, intent on his oneness (with Me) because of the uniformity of the infinite knowledge during his state of yoga, worships Me abiding in all beings... that Yogin dwells in Me, i.e., sees Me alone, while seeing himself and all others whatever his state of life..... he always sees oneness alone of himself as well as of all beings with Me.

wherein his mysticism of unitive relation (in the Vision of Love) becomes clear, Madhva interprets in terms of dependence on the Protector; and the immanent indwelling is reduced to contact.  

(VI:28)... free from Rāga, Dveṣa, and other passions... manifested or realized on account of being in direct contact with Brahman....

(VI:30) In Me : dependent on Me... I always remain His Protector... nor does he cease to be my votary, i.e., he always remains my bhakta....
And instead of specifying the abiding in all beings, he (Madhva) simply says, seeing Me everywhere—implicitly, as remaining transcendent completely, even though omnipresent.

Again, in their commentaries on Gitā VIII:20-21, concerning the Akṣara, the Unmanifest, Rāmānuja dilates somewhat, saying that the meaning is only that which is manifested by no means of proof (pramāṇa), not subject to production and dissolution; that which does not persist when the elements perish, even though It abides in them...as their highest seat of ruling. But Madhva takes the Akṣara as the absolutely independent Being.

And even more emphatically, their interpretations of Brahma Śūtra I:1:31 (32 in Rāmānuja’s numbering) Rāmānuja, in the apt epitomizing of Ghate, enjoins “meditation on Brahman in its own nature as the cause of the entire world, as having for its body the entirety of enjoying souls, and on Brahman as having for its body the objects and means of enjoyment” enjoining the general rule of interpreting all Upaniṣadic texts that “whenever an attribute found only in Brahman is applied to a jīva, or to a material product Brahman is to be meditated on (as) appearing as that jīva or as that product”. But Madhva specifies, quoting the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa “Viṣṇu who has produced the Pañcarātra expounding the supremacy of Viṣṇu has himself appeared (in the world) under the name of Mahidāsa, pleased with the meritorious austerity practiced by ‘Itara’”; and the Brahma Purāṇa, “By some Hari is to be contemplated as abiding everywhere: by some others as abiding in their heart; and by some others again (as an object) without themselves under the forms of Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, etc.” (italics ours). This abiding in the heart at first may appear contradictory to our point; but we shall presently see what Madhva means by that. But our point of distinction—whether one takes the view of Rāmānuja or not—is borne out by Nāga Rāja Sharmā, as may be seen from some of his remarks.

There is the other well known passage NIRĀṆJANAḤ PARAMAMŚĀMYAMUPAĪTI in the interpretation of which Madhva joins issue with the Viśiṣṭādvaitins. The passage speaks of the evolved soul attaining parama-sāmya, i.e., exalted type of maximum resemblance. Even in the sāmśāric state the finite does possess some resemblance with the Supreme Being as the latter has created the former in his
own image. But by consistent and devoted adherence to a course of spiritual discipline, the finite soul manages to gain exalted type of resemblance with the Supreme Being. Never can it attain identity with the Supreme Being.

And in terms of a gap: \(^{39}\)

\[
\ldots \text{While a very adroit and robust mentality is necessary to reconcile oneself to the position that the gap between the human and the Divine, the Finite and the Infinite can easily be bridged and the Finite can (italics his) realize its own Identity, with the Infinite, it is so easy and natural that weak Humanity always considers it to be an unpardonable sacrilege even to dream of an Identity with the Absolute and the Infinite, which must forever remain out of its grasp and reach. (italics ours).}
\]

And specifically, \(^{40}\)

Dvaita (Madhva) and Viśiṣṭādvaita differ in the views they hold about the nature of the Ultimate State of Realization and the qualitative intensity of the ecstatic spiritual joy and blessedness experienced.\ldots

\[
\ldots \text{A full and complete surrender of the entire Finite Personality to the Infinite, surrender of everything held near and dear with all its defects and imperfections...cannot but appear to be an exceedingly fascinating doctrine. Such a surrender constitutes the purest act of sacrifice. The individual effectively realizes his helplessness and impotence even in the comparatively minor concerns of life and existence. More acute and poignant is the sense of his helplessness in spiritual matters. He feels he must lean on some firm support... The relationship between the Infinite and the Finite with love, grace, and sympathy on the part of the former, and realization of helplessness and complete surrender and obedience to divine will on the part of the latter is termed Bhakti.}
\]

Actually, of course, this at first sight appears to confuse bhakti and prapatti. We shall see in the next chapter that Rāmānuja, and especially his Tengalāi followers, also stress this sense of helplessness and of obedient and loving surrender; but with this difference, that for them, he who does this does enter into the mystical unitive relation which Madhva and his followers deny.

It follows from this that for Madhva upāsanā retains, primarily the meaning it has for the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, e.g., worship in the sense of ritual as spiritual discipline, or at best, in the sense of invocation, rather than affective meditation. Thereby one comes “face to face” with God: the ‘Divine Encounter’ of the
neo-Calvinists or of Martin Buber more than the engagement of the Existentialists.\footnote{41} Not that he considers bhakti as unimportant; far from that. But he follows the more usual tradition of identifying upāsanā with dhyāna, as a sort of self-effort which is followed by bhakti. Thus, B. A. Krishnaswamy Rao, in his little Outlines of the Philosophy of Madhva, says: \footnote{42}

The course of discipline is directed towards obtaining His Grace. It is contended that knowledge of Brahman alone is the direct cause of removal of avidyā and that His Grace is not called for. If it were so, argues Madhva, immediate release or mokṣa should be obtained by those who have acquired such knowledge. Such is however not the case since there is an interval (vilamba) between the realization of knowledge and obtaining of mokṣa, (and using a favourite śrūti of Madhva's 'Nārāyaṇa the Great, should be contemplated by those desiring Mokṣa, by whose Grace alone release from this world of misery can result'...Such Grace (prasāda) can be obtained through a course of discipline consisting of renunciation (vairāgya), bhakti or devotion, upāsanā or contemplation and aparokṣa or perception of God...The mind becomes detached and prepared to get absorbed in God, being unfettered by worldly desires. True devotion to God cannot arise in a mind attached to earthly things. The devotion to God becomes steadfast and deep when the knowledge of His nature dawns on the souls. The contemplation of the Glories of God, the knowledge of His Avatārs and constant meditation deepen the devotion or bhakti. The knowledge of God as the creator of our bodies would generate love towards Him as towards a father and the knowledge of God as all Creator would generate veneration towards Him; the knowledge of God as full of infinite qualities would produce a feeling of contempt for other things and a knowledge or dependence would tend to deepen our devotion towards Him...Such deep devotion or bhakti is conducive for upāsanā or contemplation. Contemplation practised for a long time produces Aparokṣa or perception of God.

It is true that the distinction we want to draw can be overstressed; but subtle though it may be it is important. The italics in this citation will perhaps help, nevertheless, to make it clear. For although in a secondary sense, bhakti follows jñāna for Rāmānuja also, in the primary sense they are not so separable as Madhva would have them; for him the interval does not occur, since bhakti has motivated the knowledge and permeates it as the dominant factor throughout; likewise with the course of discipline: it is not
ascetic discipline undertaken for an end, but the natural response of Grace which is freely given in Election from the first: the identity of means and end again, which Madhva does not affirm; and the continued dhyāna is likewise basically affective in its own nature—affection giving not just aparokṣa, but participation in God's very Being; thus the sense of dependence is counterbalanced for Rāmānuja by an intimacy of Love which we do not find in Madhva.

These distinctions may become still a little more clear as we examine closely Das Gupta's delineations of Madhva's doctrine. Bondage is due to attachment to worldly objects, and liberation is produced through the direct realization of God (aparokṣa-jñānam Visnoḥ). This is produced in various ways, viz. Experience of the sorrows of worldly existence, association with good men, renunciation of all desires of enjoyment of pleasures, whether in this world or in some heavenly world, self-control and self-discipline, study, association with a good teacher, and study of the scriptures according to his instructions, realization of the truth of those scriptures, discussions on the proper meaning for strengthening one's convictions, proper respectful attachment to the teacher, respectful attachment to God (paramātma-bhakti), kindness to one's inferiors, love for one's equals, respectful attachment to superiors, cessation from works that are likely to bring pleasure or pain, cessation from doing prohibited actions, complete resignation to God (thus far things common in varying emphases to all types of Vaisnavas, but the next unique for Madhva:) realization of the five differences (between God and soul, soul and soul, soul and the world, God and the world and between one object of the world and another), realization of the difference between prakṛti and puruṣa, appreciation of the different stages of advancement among the various kinds of men and other higher and lower living beings, and proper worship (upāsanā)...As regards worship (upāsanā) it is said that worship is of two kinds: worship as religious and philosophical study, and worship as meditation (dhyāna) (Rāmānuja does not distinguish these, for upāsanā and dhyāna are identical with bhakti, as we have seen at length); for there are some who cannot by proper study of the scriptures attain a true and direct realization of the Lord, (for these, as we shall see in the next chapter, Rāmānuja leaves prāpatti as the excellent way) and there are others who attain it by meditation. Meditation or dhyāna means continual thinking (not the metaphysical remembrance we have discussed?) leaving all other things aside, (Das Gupta puts a footnote here, that for
Madhva dhyāna is the same as a nididhyāsana—significantly, for if there is no participation involved, the ‘entrance’ into that must be ignored and such a meditation of God as the spirit, as the existent, and as the possessor of pure consciousness and bliss is only possible when a thorough conviction has been generated by scriptural studies and rational thinking (more important for him than for Rāmānuja) and discussions, so that all false ideas have been removed and all doubts dispelled.

God is alone the cause of all bondage as well as of all liberation. (This Rāmānuja explicitly denies). When one directly realizes the nature of God, there arises devotion (bhakti) to the Lord; for without personal, direct and immediate knowledge of Him there cannot be any devotion. Devotion (bhakti) consists of a continual flow of love for the Lord, which cannot be impaired or affected by thousands of obstacles, which is many times greater than love for one’s own self or love for what is generally regarded as one’s own, and which is preceded by a knowledge of the Lord as the possessor of an infinite number of good and benign qualities. And when such bhakti arises, the Lord is highly pleased (atyarthā-prasāda) and it is when God is so pleased with us that we can attain salvation. (Rāmānuja tends to put more stress on prevenient grace, to which bhakti is the response rather than the means of attainment).

But it seems to us that the distinction between Rāmānuja and Madhva—and, for that matter, it is a very revelatory key for getting at differences in system in all the Vedāntic Ācāryas—becomes most clear in their interpretations of the Antaryāmin. For Rāmānuja, it is the basis for his sarīra-bhāva, the doctrine of immanence as embodiment, quite literally taken—the core of his pantheism, or even ānopsychism; and his whole philosophy of devotion is radically oriented here, as the basis, for example, of his doctrine of the identity of means and end, of his doctrine of Grace, and of his viśiṣṭādvaitic (in the literal sense: qualified identity, or ontologically what we have termed ‘unitive relation’) concept of mokṣa, and of bhakti as the effective expression of that relation. But Madhva refuses—like Śaṅkara, but for the opposite reason—to take the sarīra-idea literally, but rather only as an extension—it seems to us at the cost of systematic coherence—of the independence (and still in the sense of transcendence) of God even in His all-pervasiveness. In this light, it will be profitable to examine rather closely certain aspects of his Commentary on the Brhad Āranyaka Upaniṣad. First, it may be noted that
in the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa, he interprets the Antaryāmin in such a way that he avoids taking the śarīra-bhāva literally.\textsuperscript{44}

The upaniṣad mentions the all-governorship of the Lord in this Brāhmaṇaṁ, (He who has been mentioned as the refuge of all the Muktas in the world of Brahman is no other than the Supreme Viśnu; and not Prakṛti or the Devas in Prakṛti)... As a person is said to be the knower of a country, if he knows the ruler of that country, similarly one is said to know all, if he knows Hari to be the Supreme Lord. (Man can never be Sarvavit or ‘all-knowing’ in its literal sense, for God alone is Sarvavit or ‘all-knowing’. A man is ‘all-knowing’ figuratively only, namely, when he knows the God)... Pṛthivī etc., are said to be the ‘Body’ of the Lord, not literally, \textit{but metaphorically only}. For the real body of the Lord consists of cit or intelligence only. Pṛthivī, etc., are said to be the body of the Lord, because they are controlled (italics his) by the Lord, in the same way as a man controls his body. Since they are under the control of the Lord, they are said to be the body of that Great Soul, Lord Viśnu... As the soul of a man dwells in the body of the man, the Lord Hari dwells in the spirit of these Devatās, and so the Devatās are called the body of Hari....

The Lord is said to be ‘Antara’ in the text, because He is controller of all, by his own power, He is \textit{self-sufficient}, and so He is called Antara. He who delights in Himself, without depending upon anything external to him, is called Antara (inner delighter). Hari is also called the Antara, because He is the highest (Anta) object of dearness (ra) to all... The very self-love of the Jīvas is so ordained by Viśnu... The love of man for himself is ordained by Viśnu and by no other Deva. The Lord is most dear to the Jīvas, and because the Lord has so ordained it, therefore, the jīvas love their own self.

The word Antaryāmin means \textit{governor independent of all}. Antar means independent, and Yāmin means governor. He is called Yāmī or Governor, because he \textit{created} both the nature and the essential form (svarūpa) of all the Devatās. Essence and attributes of all the Devatās are always \textit{under the control} of the Lord, therefore the Lord Vasudeva is called Yāmi. He is Antaryāmin or Absolute Ruler, since He gives the very Svabhāva or nature or attribute, and the sattā or existence to all these, so he is the real Yāmin. Thus it is in Brahma Tarka....

...When it has been said that the Lord governs the gods and sentient beings, it is useless to say that He also governs the inanimate world; for, it is a very simple thing to understand
this; because the Lord is the knower of all, and because He is higher than all those that are higher, therefore no other god there is who is said to be independent knower of all jīvas (though they are intelligent beings) but they are subject to misery. All the jīvas are not independent or svatantra; had they been independent they would never have been subject to any sort of misery. It is, therefore, the Lord Viṣṇu who allots misery to the miserable beings and Mukti to the Mukta beings. The great Lord Viṣṇu is always superior to all and He is independent and the only sovereign. Thus in the Mahāmīmāṁsā.

Thus we see how he avoids altogether the aspect of immanence, and always stresses ‘independence’ instead, evidently considering them incompatible. Rāmānuja does not see this incompatibility—or rather, he denies it. For him, the internal relatedness of the world-and-souls and God is reciprocal: not only is there nothing outside of God, (they are internal to Him); but He, in order to make this possible, is inherent to them (He is internal to them). Thus it is that bhakti means not only elevation but inwardness, as we shall see, is also the case with Bonaventura. Thus, in the Śrī Bhāṣya (1:1:13, already alluded to above), he brings the sarīra-bhāva into his interpretation of the Tat Tvam Asi vākyā (which, of course, Madhva notoriously twists around to mean the opposite of any possibly intended meaning):

As even the jīva in the material vehicle is the body of Brahman, and is the aspect in which He appears, words ‘I’ and ‘thou’ and the like, though intended to denote jīvas, denote Brahman alone. This being so, the upaniṣad after stating ‘All this has sat for its ātman’ closes with the words ‘That thou art’. It does not, however, follow that the attributes of the jīva touch Brahman; for the jīva is connected with Brahman as His body. The properties of his body like childhood and youth do not touch the jīva; similarly here. The word ‘thou’ shows the same Being as the ātman of the jīva and of the body. Thus both the words are used in their primary meanings. By understanding the words in this manner, we avoid conflict with the context, and with all the upaniṣads. We are saved from the need to attribute avidyā to Brahman, free from imperfections and the seat of all good qualities. The very statement that Brahman and the jīva are one as thus understood, shows Him to be different from the jīva, who is his aspect.

Not only the relevance of this, but its importance also, may be seen in the footnote added by our translator-interpreter.
In a sense, upāsanā can be defined as essentially the process of clarification of an entrance into this right-relatedness of mutual reciprocity between the indwelt and the indweller who is also the Absolute Other: He is his very Being, both internally and externally:

*That thou art.* This means that the Sat denoted by the word 'that' and Brahman, the ātman of Śvetaketu, denoted by the word 'thou' are one. Here no affirmation is made; for this was already made in the preceding sentence 'all this, etc.' and the result is stated here by the words in apposition, the object being that the student should meditate on Brahman as possessing the attributes stated in the context and as being his ātman.

This becomes even more emphatically vivid in Śūtras III:3:19-24, where the Śāndilya Vyāhṛti and Puruṣa Vidyās are discussed. Here Madhva again completely evades the aspect of immanence, and construes everything in terms only of attributes of the Lord, specifying that "only the qualities that do not form part of the world’s nature are to be contemplated", and that "the qualities of being the ‘nourisher’ the ‘all-pervader’ etc., are only meant to be contemplated by the gods..." But Rāmānuja stresses both transcendence and immanence:

(Sūtra 19) : The same set of qualities is stated in both—perceivable with a pure mind, and having a brilliant body... In one, 'He controls all; He is the Lord of all; and He supports all this, whatever exists'. In the other, "with an unfrustrated will". *These additions do not differ... (Sūtra. 21)... though it is the highest Ātman in both the vidyās, He is to be meditated on in one as being in the orb of the sun; and in the other as abiding in the right eye of man. In the śāndilya vidyās the place of meditation does not differ; for in both it is the heart.

(Sūtra 23)...How is it possible to meditate on Him as being in the heart and at the same time as being larger than earth or ether? The large size is not intended to form part of (this particular) meditation. The fact that in Himself He is without limitation is stated—(to which Rāmānujāchārī adds the explanation):

As the highest Ātman is by nature all-pervading, this aspect may be thought on by one at the same time, as he thinks that out of infinite mercy He is present in his heart to help him. There is no incongruity in this; one aspect pertaining to nature and the other due to a limiting place. If the meditation were as
stated by the text under consideration, there would be two limitations—one by the size of the heart, and the other by the size of the earth or ether; and the resulting sizes would conflict.

Indeed, it may well be said that the whole purpose of meditative contemplation is just this arrival at the realization of this *coincidentia oppositorum* in which, so to speak, we are the fulcrum: We participate in God both as the infinitely small and the infinitely great. His own Relatedness—that of Being itself—is so internally structured that, whether we like it or not, our own very being is essentially caught up into it; and upāsanā is the reduction out of metaphysical falsehood—avidyā, kāma, krodha, ‘beginning-less’ karma—back into, and at the same time forward into, our own primordiality in Him. Hence, again, it should be clear that it is not a matter of *ideas* or *ideation*, but a matter of bhakti, which reaches both beyond and beneath ideas and all form of duality by re-linking the differences which nevertheless cannot be disregarded as non-existent. Hence again, our term, *unitive relation*, for relatedness is simply the ontology of affection.

But the distinction between Madhva and Rāmānuja in these matters is nowhere better shown than in their views of mokṣa. The full development of the latter must be reserved to a subsequent chapter; but the following resume of Das Gupta’s report of Parakāla Yati’s refutations of the Mādhva position is unavoidable here. 45

Madhva was so intent on seeing *difference* everywhere that he also extended it into the realm of the relation of emancipated souls in their relation to God: he says that different souls enjoy different degrees of bliss, even *after* attainment of their spiritual end. But Parakāla Yati refutes this by referring to the text itself of the fourth book of the Brahma Sūtras; here it is said that ‘by entering into the nature of the Supreme Lord emancipated beings *participate* in the blissful experiences by their mere desire (*saṅkalpa*). Even to the Madhvas if there are differences in their manner of enjoying this bliss, it is due to the muktas’ capacity, not to the will of the Lord. But even this is not accepted by the Rāmānujas; for to them, emancipation entails being not only under the supreme *control* of the Lord (in *spite* of their differences) but also—or rather—it entails *participation in all His joys*: “The emancipated person” translates Das Gupta, “is like a good wife
who has no separate will from her husband and enjoys with her husband all that he does or feels. Thus the emancipated souls, being completely associated with God, enjoy and participate in all His joys: and there cannot be any degrees of enjoyment among the different emancipated persons.” (italics ours). Again, even though there may be different modes of approaching God, the end is always the same; it would be contrary to Rāmānuja’s conception of the Divine Mercy to think otherwise. The quality of the devotion (bhakti) may be different, but since God’s bliss is homogeneous and ubiquitous, the realization is the same. Again, Madhava’s argument that God’s bliss is so exalted that it cannot be enjoyed by anyone but Himself falls, because it includes the divine favour, which re-enfolds those whom He loves. And to re-emphasize what we have just said anent the unitive relation, Parākāla Yati says that “The emancipated person realized the identity (better, ‘unitive relation’?) of Brahman in himself (as Antaryāmin?), and this realization of the nature of Brahman in himself is bliss in the superlative degree. It does not imply any decrease of qualities of Brahman, but it means that in realizing the qualities in oneself one may find supreme bliss.”

For it is both within and towards God as indwelling, as Antaryāmin, that bhakti is both aroused and realized in its culmination, the other realizations (that of exaltedness, of Power, of transcendence, as well as of mediation in and through the Avatāras) being as it were a necessary parabola through which the devotion must pass, but not without leaving the relatedness behind, but rather by bringing them back into the re-enfoldment of the interior focus. Thus the sense of egocentricity is dissolved, the focus of the heart and mind is at once turned more deeply inward and more vastly outward, and as the sense of awe merges into the participation in existential harmony one realizes that there is a seat of agency within oneself that has been at work all the time, but unconsciously: the Spirit groaning within our spirit, working toward the consummation of the creatures (to use St. Paul’s language); the spiritual within the psychical, the God within, working to restore the ‘image’ of the perfect Godhead—the image (somehow) befouled by the fall (avidyā being the Hindu way of expressing this ‘fall’)—to its own pristine purity and splendour. When this is accomplished, ‘sonship’ replaces
slavishood' (or, as we have seen above, the soul becomes the perfect wife). Individuation is not broken down or dissolved, but the ultimate level of individuation, with its primary subordinate nodes is brought into full focus: one realizes that he is only an individual echo (ādhēya) of the Ultimate Individual (ādhāra) in which and out of which all individuals derive their dimensions, means and end, potency and activity, consequent and ground in qualified identity. But the qualification of the identity is not only attributive; it is substantial also. We may even risk the inference that it is the Antaryāmin itself, as the Relatedness of Love which inhere in the Absolute rendering it Personal and rendering ourselves capable of enjoying Itself without stint.

Such an ultimate profundity, such a balanced harmony of dynamism and identity, is realized only by Rāmānuja. All of the other Ācāryas stop short somewhere or wrap its subtlety (and its profundity lies in its subtlety) by over-emphasis on one extreme or other. Thus Śaṅkara, in the Brahma Sūtras (I.2:18-19) in Rāmānuja's numbering), falls short of the dynamism, in ascribing it to the ruled rather than the Ruler:—

The objection that the highest Self is destitute of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is without force, because organs of action may be ascribed to Him owing to the organs of action of those whom he rules.

Whereas Madhva, at the other extreme, falls short of the identity. Quoting the Aitareya Āraṇyaka, he says, under the same Sūtra,

From such texts as "He whom prthivi does not know, who is different from Prthivi" containing attributes characteristic of Brahman, declared in passages treating of the presiding deities, etc., (He is the incomprehensible, unknown) and the indweller declared in the texts, "O Viṣṇu, no one who was, is or will be, can fully comprehend Thy glory" "He who is present everywhere, but not heard of, reached, thought out, guided, seen, perceived or commanded, who is the Person present within all beings."

But Rāmānuja:

The Sūtra refers to the peculiar attributes of the Highest Ātman. One of these is the entry by one only into all worlds, all beings, all devas, all vedas and all yajñas, and controlling them in every way. Another is having every object as His body, and being its ātman.
Here V. K. Rāmānujāchārī adds a supremely important footnote:

This is stated in the following texts: 'He has entered into men and controls them; He is the Ātmā of all' 'Having created it He entered into the very same; having entered into it, He became sat and tyād (Ānandavalli of Taīt. ) Subala Upaniṣad begins with these words: 'Here there was a nothing whatever before. These beings are born without a root and without support. Nārāyaṇa is a dweller in the highest heaven, has a shining body and is one i.e., has no equal or superior. The eye and what is to be seen are Nārāyaṇa.' It then goes on thus: 'He remains within (man's) body in the heart; He is unborn; one, i.e., without an equal or superior, eternal. He whose body the earth is, who moves about in the earth, whom the earth does not know; whose body water is;... whose body mṛtyu (subtle matter) is...He the inner ruler of all beings, is free from karma; dwells in the highest heaven; has a shining body; had no equal or superior; He is Nārāyaṇa.

Continuing Rāmānuja's own text:

These are not possible in one other than Brahmā, who is omnipresent and who has an unfailing will. A third attribute is being immortal; and this is a part of His nature. When a doubt arises whether an attribute mentioned is natural or accidental, and there is no limit to its application, it should be presumed to be natural.

Finally, we must realize that all this is but a formalization of what Rāmānuja had inherited from the Alwaras. It is fitting, therefore, that we close this section with a citation—and a conclusive one—from Nammalwar:

I understood the nature of God unto my ideal, and when I had reached that I found that Thou wert incomprehensible and beyond all knowledge. Thy inherent nature cannot be known completely by anyone, and no one can say that it is either this or that. Though He is known He cannot be seen. By my ascending step by step in succession, by stripping off all the entities, by my exceeding the good and the bad, I attained the Unique Good. Even then He went beyond my understanding.

To this Govindāchārya has given the following commentary:

This verse is a description of the soul, which with reference to God, is somewhat analogous to the description of whiteness which belongs to a white wall or white cloth. The idea that is intended to be conveyed is that the soul is as it were an appendage to the Lord, a dependent (or hypostatic) co-existence with the Lord, an attribute to Him....
The soul is a unique Verity distinct from the body, the external senses, the sensory (manas) and the reason (buddhi). While these are perishable, the soul alone remains apart as the Imperishable.

St. Nammalwar never throughout his Tiruvoimoli Hymnal up to this, bestowed any appreciable attention to the nature of the soul, for the reason that his mind and heart were absorbed in the contemplation of the Lord and His Blessed Attributes, Glory, etc., before which soul-nature is like the fire-fly before the...Sun. The saint had no time to give to gnosis, or rational meditation to realize soul-nature, to the detriment of amor or emotional devotion to realize God. For ...not caring to waste a thought over the painful memories surrounding the embodied state—since abandoned—the saint who is transported with the revels of his enjoyment with his Lord the Spouse, never considers it worth while to waste his time over a search after the inferior kind of soul-knowledge.

Thus, may we, along with Rāmānuja himself, join Nammalwar (II. 2.4 & 7) in singing:

Thou becamest one with my soul. For this good I offered my soul to Thee. Surely there is no retraction. Thou swallowed up my soul, the seven worlds and all. Thou art my Lord. Thou art the cause of my very being. Thou hast thyself taken me into Thee. What is there to be offered? Who is there to offer?...Thou art as sweet as the high-pitched note of the Viṇā. Thou art the Holy Person. The angels always enjoy Thy presence. Thou art the Purest. Thou art the sugarcane juice. Thou art ambrosia itself. Thou art the Lovely dark cloud. Thou art my dear doer of all. I without Thee am nothing. Have thy mercy on me always.
SECTION II
C
THE METHOD: ST. BONAVENTURA

We turn now to St. Bonaventura, to follow in detail his teaching on what Rāmānuja calls upāsanā.

First, we must take note of the fact that, no less than Rāmānuja, he was a reformer in the matter. This has been pointed out by no less an authority than P. Ephrem Longpre, himself a modern Franciscan, in his excellent little work on the Mystical Theology of St. Bonaventura. Again and again he stresses the importance of the affections as against the intellect; it was St. Bonaventura who set the tradition of voluntarism which has been characteristic of Franciscan tradition ever since. The affections, not the intellect, set the will. But since voluntarism in the modern world means something slightly different, since there is a tendency to identify the affections more with aesthetics and the will with ethics, as the intellect with epistemology, it is good to keep in mind that for Bonaventura the will is not just a moral matter. It is also the seat of mystical devotion pure and simple, which includes also the aesthetic, and re-includes the intellect in the process: it is the will that effects mystical union. For, as with Rāmānuja, it is in affective devotion that the soul is freely under the inspiration of Grace; and there is scarcely any philosopher in the history of all of western philosophy who lays more importance on Grace. But grace in turn is primarily operative through meditation and contemplation; again, like Rāmānuja, he is a bhakta par excellence, and not a karmi yogin nor a jñānī, as were Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhardt and the Dominicans in general.

Thus, in his manual of instruction for novices, concerning prayer (oratio), he gives special emphasis to perseverance and constancy in recollection, in the technical sense which we have already discussed, quoting St. Luke (18: 1), that it is necessary "always to pray and not to faint"; prayer should be such that "whether in prayer as such, or in reading, or in good meditation, or in service", one should hold himself always in profound devotedness of heart and humility, for, as St. Gregory taught, only in such profundity lies serenity of exalted love
(caritas). Such constant prayer must be secret, and according to truth and justice, full of tears, and of such a nature that the mind will be making its constant ascent to God, for this prayer is of the heart, and not of the lips.

Again, in a little allegorical work written entitled “The Six wings of the Seraphim” for those who were a little more advanced, and were charged with the care of other souls, he suggests the discipline of meditation is three-fold: First there is the constant memory of God which is like a yoke, as in the verses from the Psalms (15:8; 24:15), ‘I shall always hold God before my eyes’; ‘My eyes shall ever be looking unto the Lord.’ One should imitate the Angels, who never depart from contemplation, regardless of their mission. Quoting St. Bernard, he counsels that as one does not think of God, one is in danger of perdition. For although one cannot ordinarily be in a constant state of actual meditation, yet one can so direct the (subconscious) intuition of the heart by memory that whenever the opportunity arises the heart will surge up into actual prayer, just as a sculptor who, having always an image constantly in his imagination, will go to work on its embodiment in stone as soon as the opportunity arises.

Secondly, in all actions and conversations, one’s continuous ‘study’ (e.g., focus of attention) should be toward pleasing God, as though one were actually in His physical presence as a judge in a tribunal, who sees all that is going on. Thirdly, he counsels what is now called ejaculatory prayer: In everything one does, a quick affective leap of the mind in prayer should fortify the soul in such a way that the actions themselves will become expressions of prayer (as is the case also with Kaiṅkārya for Śrī Vaiṣṇavas), the emphasis being on thanksgiving and praise. For this quick and secret prayer is more important than the actual work at hand. Indeed, without it, we really do not know what we ought to be doing; we are like a pilot of a ship, who must always be checking his compass, lest he get lost. Here the verse of the psalm used in the daily prayers of monks and friars comes to mind (122:2) ‘Unto Thee do we lift up our eyes...As the eyes of a servant look to the hands of the Master, and the eyes of a handmaid to the hands of her mistress, even so our eyes wait upon the Lord our God, until He have mercy
on us.' Thus we see that prayer (upāsanā) for the Franciscan
as for the Vaiṣṇava, is twofold: the constant and constantly
guarded attitude, which is constant, and the specific acts, which
arise out of it and reinforce it in return.

But for the parallel to the sravaṇa, manana, nīdīhyāsana,
dhyāna method, we again turn to Bonaventura's last major
work, the Collationes in Haexameron. Here we find both the
importance of meditation for ontological 'research' (in the
French sense of the word: pursuit, engagement, investigative
attention) and the importance of devotion in the meditative
technique. For as with Rāmānuja, to him bhakti is more primary
than gnosis. Here he writes:

The third conversion of the mind (anima: otherwise, soul)
is threefold. (the other two having been the contemplation
of natural powers, and of angels as pure created intelligences,
this one being towards the 'eternal Reasons', which corre-
respond in his system to the Platonic Ideas). It is by ratiocina-
tion, by intelligizing, and by experiencing. By the way of
reason, the soul comes to the knowledge of the Eternal Laws
by considering the conditions of the first uncreated being in
respect to the consideration of the first created being. For it
is called a law (ratio: Idea) because the first being or the
first cause is being per se, but the caused is produced or
created; the first cause (being) simplex, caused and com-
posite; the first cause (being) pure, (but) mixed with the
causcd; the first cause is fixed, (but) caused variably; the
first cause is absolute, (but) 'diminished' by the caused. And
since what is in prospect the soul finds only with (great)
labour...it makes transit from the posterior to the first, that
is, by ratiocination: if the produced being is concerned, it
is necessary to posit a first producing; and if the composite
(is concerned) it is necessary (to posit) a first being in
every way simplex and so on.

But when it is said in the sixth condition, that if the dimini-
shed (is concerned) it is necessary to posit the perfect,
(Aristotle) argues...that if there is anything perfect, there can
be nothing prior to it, and infers that the circular motion is
perfect, and therefore nothing may be prior to it....

Secondly, the soul is directed (convertitur) toward the eter-
nal laws by experience. Every soul experiences whatever-is a
posteriori from the a priori Being. For the tendencies (habitus:
characteristic pattern of being in activity) are known
through their privations, and thus the perfect is not known
experientially except through the imperfect, nor the straight
except through the oblique...if you understand this, you will understand that which irradiates it. Whence (we argue that) this way—the way of experiencing—is in a way innate. Thirdly, the soul is directed towards (convertitur) towards the First by the way of simple intelligence, or by a pure intuition and insight (aspectu), as can inhere in being except being, and similarly, that 'that is perfect being which is such that nothing can be understood to be greater'; for then in God nothing can be conceived (intelligitur) which is greater, nor can it be thought of as not being (cogitare non esse) as Anselm proves.

These things the soul intuits by being turned familiarly to God, and becoming quiet. Having in itself something of the Prime Substance, Power (virtus) and Operation, it understands (intelligit) what is the unity, truth, and goodness, according to these six conditions, and in that is prime and simplex memory, intelligence and will: again, it understands that therein is life, wisdom, joyfulness according to the six. Again, it understands the blessed (beatum) through that by which others are beatified, because that is sought above all. This understood, the soul attains quietude, in which (state) it understands (cognoscit) what is in itself as a mirror, what is in the angels as lights, (and) what is in the divine and perfect intuition in the divine quietude, and thus attains the adept intellect, which is a certain finishing the course, or a certain adaptation to first principles—a certain attainment of ultimacy by the way of conclusion, as it were.

This passage, difficult for anyone unfamiliar with scholastic terminology, contains, to our view, when reduced to the root concepts, an ontology very much like that of Viśiṣṭādvaita. First, reason is only ancillary: by it we cannot 'prove' being, but by it we can distinguish grades of being, which, because of this, are not to be considered as unreal. Being—Brahman—is essentially undifferentiated, but in such a way that it is structured by its capacity to produce relatedness. The first relatedness—corresponding to Rāmānuja's sūdha sattva, which is so intimately involuted in Brahman that it is difficult to say whether it is yet the 'body' of God; sūdha sattva is still in the avyakta state (Śrī Bhāṣya II: 2: 18)—is simply that which prevents us, like Heidegger or Eckhardt, or Śūnyavāda, from confusing Being with Nothing. The succeeding grades come in emanational order toward materialization in such a way that reason can follow back, by an a posteriori 'reduction', their inherent reality to the Prime
Source, even though reason alone cannot embrace That. It is true that the suggestion that Being is ‘diminished’ as it ‘descends’ might be more aptly compared to a system like that of Kaśmīr Śaivism: but even this remains more or less a viśiṣṭādvaita, the subtleties of which need not divert our attention, for in both Kaśmīr Śaivism and Rāmānuja the diminishing is not sufficient to erase the inherence of the seeds of perfection which provoke the soul towards re-entering the ‘circle of perfection’ which reason cannot square, but which can be realized by the reflective way of contemplation. This ‘circularity’ of Being suggests the Vedantic doctrine that Being is always self-proved (svatantra); hence the second point about experience: all experience (Bonaventura is an existentialist, not an idealist, as Rāmānuja also) partakes of Being, because the experimenter has an innate seed of Being in himself which is ineradicable. The externality of experience is indirect, and its completion can be realized only internally; for the self-proveness lies in the soul as well as in God. This is what is carried in Rāmānuja under his term dharma-bkūta-jñāna: externally, individuated being (jīvātman) takes the aspect of modification of the ground; but internally, the ground itself is also a mode of individuation, although in such a way that its perfection is not thereby sullied, and thus innately retains the capacity of identification with the Perfect in spite of the ‘oblique’ hindrances of the external: Being and contemplative knowing are the same, and bhakti can be taken as the process by which the soul is weaned from infatuation with the external and ‘reduced’ (though the reduction is really an exaltation) to its internal relatedness to-and-within Being in its purity. Furthermore, it must be noted that Anselm’s (and Bonaventura’s) ontologism cannot be taken in an advaitic sense; like Rāmānuja, they put the stress on the truth that nothing can be taken as equal or higher than God; and not that God can have no attributes, for they are essential to his nature: the triads of Unity, Truth and the Good of ‘prime and simplex’ memory, understanding and will, of life, wisdom, joyfulness are too closely parallel to the Vedantic sat, cit, ānanda, which Rāmānuja refuses to put at a secondary level, but says that they are the irreducible characteristics of Being itself. Again, the figure of the mirror may be more close to Kaśmīr Śaivism, and the
quietude also; but the way in which Bonaventura uses the metaphor does not tally with the Kaśmir version, and is more in accord with Rāmānuja's objection that the soul's light is its own and not a reflected light (Śrī Bhāṣya I:1:1), for the innate ideas are the soul's own light even though their reflection in the external sphere—unlike the angels, who are not involved in the external at all—is sullied; there is no hint at anything illusory about the nature of the soul, as there is in the pratibim-bavāda to which Rāmānuja objects. Again, the quietude is not to be taken in the sense of pure undifferentiation, as it is even in the Kaśmir system; it is rather the Peace of Presence, the quietude of perfect Joy, in which, as we have already stated, problems are rather dissolved than solved. But what we are trying to make clear has perhaps been better expressed by Etienne Gilson:53

St. Bonaventura tried in vain to discover a sensible expression which would permit one to imagine (the rapport of God to things through the Eternal Ideas). The one with which he would be in the most accord would be that of a light which would be at the same time its own illumination and its own irradiation (precisely the ādvarūpātajñāna); if the exterior irradiation of this luminous point would be confused with it, it would be simultaneously one of its rays, even though they are notwithstanding perpendicular to each other. Thus the divine truth is a light, and its expressions of things are nevertheless like luminous irradiations oriented towards that which they express; but the comparison remains clumsy, because each light is not its own irradiation and (because) we cannot imagine what would be an intrinsic irradiation (italics his). That is why we are warned that the intuition of such a truth cannot be prepared by discursive knowledge, but that (discursive knowledge) remains finally unable to give us (that intuition). (italics ours)

From this one easily conceives to what point the multiplication of ideas can go. Although their plurality is not real and has no other foundation than that of things, the ideas of things necessarily exist nonetheless. (italics ours) That which gives foundation to the diversity of ideas resides in the diversity of that which they connote; but the expression which, in so far as the divine truth is one, nevertheless connotes an infinity of things under which the finite number of created things particularly returns...Although God could create an infinity of things, he only created a finite number,
and since it could not be otherwise than that he should know them, we have the right to say that there is in God an infinity of ideas. (italics ours) Infinity, nevertheless, which entails no confusion whatsoever; for confusion would perhaps result in an infinity of ideas really different whose actualization would be incomparable with distinction and order...St. Bonaventura pushed the sense of this real unity of ideas in God so far that, in the same way in which he refused to allow the distinction which separates beings from that which they connote to fall back into the ideas, he also refused to attribute to them the order or the hierarchy of perfection which is introduced between (the ideas) and the things of which they are models.

In short, the relation of things and ideas to Being is that of qualified identity; Unlike the advaitins, Bonaventura does not admit that gnosis in God is completely undifferentiated, but also, unlike the Aristotelians and the Mādhvas, he does not insist that there is no unitive relation which binds the world, ideas and souls to and within God. Thus we argue that his position is very close to that of Rāmānuja, as far as ontology and ideation go.

Ontology and ideation; this is the crux of the matter, in understanding both of our philosophers, and difficult for any post-Kantian who has not rediscovered the philosophy of Presence. Yet the Being of God, and the function of ideas in that Being remains a more basic problem that Kant ever saw, since he was not really concerned so much with this as with the understanding of things as such. But really to understand things, to embrace their totality, it remains necessary, as Gilson elsewhere says, to find an ontological equality with them; and in order to find this equality, it is necessary, by contemplation, to arrive in the Ideas of God. “...to apprehend a thing by the mode of knowledge, it suffices that the verity of that thing become manifest to us, that its presence become attested to us with (full) evidence, to such an extent that (its presence) perhaps exceeds the limits of our understanding.” And the same thing is even more intensively true of the soul’s understanding of itself. Things do have a certain externality somehow foreign to their presence; but the soul and God are of the very nature of Presence itself, and in this respect they are of the same order of intelligibility: the in-nateness of the idea of God in the soul is thus explicable in a way that the presence of the soul to itself is included in His presence
to Himself: "The soul is present to itself and knows itself immediately; But God is immanently present to the soul, and, in the same way the soul is intelligible by itself to itself, God is intelligible by Himself to Himself. He is thus an intelligible present to an intelligible; and the fact that that supreme intelligible is superior, even disproportionate, to that in which It resides, is what proves that there can be absolutely nothing contrary to the possibility of such a knowledge... The soul... is naturally apt at knowing everything, because it can assimilate (literally: make itself similar) to everything; and we must add that it is especially apt at knowing God by this mode of 'assimilation' because it is made in His image and resemblance. It is thus in a profound accord between these two intelligibles, of which one is the cause and the archetype of the other, that our knowledge takes its innate root from the existence of God." And all other orders of intelligibility follow only after and as reincluded within this, so that, as in the text above, all 'oblique' a posteriori knowing indirectly points toward the knowledge—contemplative 'knowledge'—of God:56 "...our experience of the existence of God is the very condition of the inference by which we pretend to establish (even the sensible order of knowing)". Thus there is a necessary qualified identity of Presence in which is found the Fundamental Unity of All things that is the end of any metaphysical enquiry.57 "If our intellect were an intelligence as pure as that of the angels, it could, without arriving at total comprehension of God, still see Him directly, to know the identity of His essence and His existence; but even so, it can at least by virtue of that which remains intelligible to it, know the identity of the idea of His essence with the idea of His existence. And if it is enough that the idea of God be in us in order to enable us to posit the existence of its object, it is here that the ontological argument is quite something else than that to which Kant objected. St. Bonaventura does not pass from idea to being; idea to his eyes is only the mode of presence of being in its thought; there is thus no real transition between an idea of God whose existence is necessary and that same God necessarily existent." Finally,58

...the existence of God could (nevertheless) never be a thing known by itself (as is the case with Śaṅkara); but the idea
of God which He himself accords to us is of quite a different nature. Instead of being a construction—even an analogical construction (such as we find in Nyāya, for example) of our intellect, it is innate, we do not fabricate its content, we find it; and if it is not our industry which is its origin, it is necessary that we know whence it comes, that we explicate it...by a cause. That is why St. Bonaventura dared to affirm that the simplest explication of our idea of God is God Himself. An idea which comes neither from things nor from ourselves could only come from God alone; it is in us like a tag left by God on His own work; it is thus eminently qualified to attest the irrefutable manner of the existence of its object; the presence of the idea of God in the human soul would be unintelligible if it did not manifest the presence, by the mode of verity, of a God veritably existent.

...by reason of its mystical orientation, each kind of proof (for the existence of God) corresponds to a definite type of return of the soul to God by ecstasy, and their order of succession depends on the degree of penetration of the human soul by grace...The proofs of the existence of God by Truth, and the proof of St. Anselm by the Idea, of God, (pre) suppose still more: a purification of the soul by the acquisition of virtues, an entrainment of the intellect and the will to which the Bonaventuran mysticism initiates us. They do not take on their true sense except for a soul already arrived at the summits of the interior life and already on the way of touching God by love.

To bring out further the likeness of this to Rāmānuja’s views it is enough to note that, aside from the dharmabhūtajñāna already mentioned, for Rāmānuja the formal proofs for the existence of God fail, but, with Revelation as the only ‘proof,’ the crux of our knowledge of God lies (as we see with Bonaventura) in the mystical ontology of experience—difficult for the modern man because experience is generally considered to belong to the empirical realm, whereas ontology belongs to the realm of Grace; yet grace is ‘understandable’ only after it is experienced, and hence must be considered as a matter of mysticism and not of epistemology in the usual sense. It is only in this perspective that Rāmānuja’s doctrine of the soul as the embodiment of God may be understood. Bonaventura’s innateness of the idea of God in us is of the same nature as this embodiment, which is technically termed aprthak-siddha, e.g., 59 “that which may as a whole be held fast and prevented from falling by the volitional efforts
acting on the soul as Grace: that by which knowledge of God is both inter-subjective and objective. Both the soul and God are self-luminous, the former derivatively by participation and the latter intrinsically but generously, as Lacombe says. Thus, at the same time, knowledge is an attribute of both soul and God—and not their only nature, as Śaṅkara teaches—and also of their essential nature. This is what makes bhakti both possible and necessary: possible, in that there is the objective distance to be bridged; necessary, as the ontologically affective ‘reduction’ to the common nature. As P. N. Śrīnivāsāchārī has put it:  

It the infinite is infinite and the finite is (only) finite, knowledge would become impossible. But the theory of dharma-bhūtajñāna sacrifices neither the finite nor the infinite, as it mediates between the two and traces spiritual consciousness to its headquarters in Brahman.

Dharma-bhūtajñāna not only illuminates itself and the objects of nature but is also substance-attribute (dravya-guṇa). It has... been explained analogically by comparison with light. Light or prabhā...illuminates objects and is a quality inhering in a substance. At the same time, as the substratum of colour and the shades of colouration, it is a substance...Jñāna is thus both changing and changeless and is both substance and quality. It is thus the peculiar spiritual quality of the ātman and is contrasted with the qualities of objects as their secondary sensations...Jñāna is one though it realizes itself in various mental modifications starting with animal instincts and ending with the divine impulse of bhakti. Jñāna functions as conation and feeling and therefore every state of consciousness is cognitive, conative and affective.

We only submit that it is, nevertheless, the affective that reaches deepest and highest, and, moreover, permeates the rest. With Rāmānuja, this will not become so vivid until the next chapter, where, in dealing with Prapatti, it will be shown how that sooner or later, for all, it becomes even the only effective means and end of our relation to and with God, and pari passu, in Him with all. But with St. Bonaventura, it is so, both devotionally and systematically, from the first. It is because of this indeed that contemplation to him is not just the privilege of the few, but the right and duty for all, as Longpre emphasizes, quoting a passage from the Commentary on the Sentences: "The desire for contemplation is not just a licit tendency of the supernatural will, but it is even a duty which is imposed even on souls
which are not yet elevated to passive orison.... Mystical knowledge is that where the affection is marvellously enflamed..... This mode of knowledge....every just man, even if he has not come to heaven, is obliged to seek.” Again, “thus the proper act of the gift of Wisdom is in part intellectual, but it is in feeling that it achieves and finds its perfection, and as such that it is an interior appetite (gout), a taste, and an experiential knowledge of the goodness and sweetness of the divine. All is thus by no means obscurity and darkness in that affective act, but the intellectual perception which accompanies it is only a subsidiary element: praevius, disponens; the act of the gift of Wisdom, the principle of mystical union, in no wise depends in its essence on that concomitant light, nor on any other exercise of the understanding....The primacy rests always with Love, with the appetite for affective experience, that mode of knowing God to which no other can be compared.”

In the passage upon which we have been expostulating, one can already see something closely akin to the movement of śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana and dhyāna, or at least, the last three, in the ratiocination, the intelligizing, and the experiencing. But there is much more to be noted about them, especially the śravaṇa, to which we now turn.

Behind the use of Scriptures, of course, is always the doctrine of Revelation, which is much suspect in our own time, not only because of the greater importance of what is considered as Reason, but also because of the Meeting of all Traditions in such a way that we are tempted to say that since there have been so many ‘revelations’ all of which claim absolute authority, we cannot accept their rival claims, and therefore reject them all as obsolete and of little use. But such a judgment is surely short-sighted: would it not be better to accept all, and set about at systematic reinterpretations, at the rebuilding of a comprehensive theology on a comprehensive basis? The time for mere ‘comparative’ studies is past; we must go on to synthesis, integrally built: a job wherein, once again, philosophers must join in to keep the theologians awake, as Hegel suggests in his philosophy of religion, and the awakened theologians once again must turn to the philosophers for depth and breadth of vision and precision of method. As we have already suggested, it may be
necessary to evolve a New Canon, or at least, to order secondary canons as bases for the work; but it is difficult to think of any religious tradition without any canon at all. It is patent, for example, that the Buddhists, in spite of their rejection of the Vedas, found it necessary to evolve their own canon, and it appears that today it remains a major problem among their different sects, to find what may be valid for all: there has been too much blurring of canonical and semi-canonical material.

Indeed, it seems that the scientific investigation of the dynamics of charismā, instituted by Weber and Scheler in regard to persons and institutions, is badly needed now in regard to the matter of śruti and smṛti. For, even from empirical investigation, it does appear that there have been ages in which, somehow, mankind did come into Openings of Timeless Truth which may be valid for all time. It was these Openings, these Revelations, that set the Questions upon which all metaphysical enquiry has been based ever since: for Revelation is Opening; and the tendency among some thinkers to regard the basic Questions of this Opening as ‘meaningless’ is really simply an admission that they are meta-empirical, that the method for dealing with them must be of a different order than that of experimental science. That bhakti, as faith seeking understanding as affective contemplation, is such a method, should by now begin to become clear.

But even for bhakti, a canon is absolutely necessary, as the guard against degeneracy. And mutatis mutandis, a canon used without bhakti: this is the stagnation of dogmatism and fanaticism into which most modern religion has fallen. Nietzsche’s prophetic cries “MORE AIR! FRESH AIR! MORE LIGHT!” etc., are emphatically the cry for the method which is our burden. For revelation—and Nietzsche does give a sort of New Revelation—is of the order of Infinity; it is not concerned with the duality of faith as credulity and reason as exposition, but with Grace as Opening and of Contemplation as the plunge into Infinity, a matter of Orientation, of Attitude in all its meta-empirical valuational implications, of trans-valuation, of the Observed entering the observer, of intra-assimilative appropriation of the soul in its affective foundation, of prophetic Return to the Primal Source, to use Jaspers’ phrase: not the examination of
experience, but the communication of Experience, which is of the Self, and not merely of the mind, which after all gives only second-thoughts or arrangements of the radical Insights and Outlooks which determine all of life.

For in the beginning was the beginningless Word, the Veda...full of Grace and Truth: in the beginning was Meaning creative, liberating, unanalyzable—meaningless indeed to those who will not receive it in love; but to those who approach it is reverence, its testimony is like that "of a friend returning from a distance" "who has a love for us more than a thousand parents" as Rāmānuja says.65

Thus philosophy without Revelation, without śrutī, without śravaṇa, is inevitably the descent into secularization, the empty abstraction into nihilism. But with it as the foundation for Prayer, for Contemplation, as Jaspers says66, prayer "stands at the frontier of philosophy, and it becomes philosophy in the moment when it is divested of any pragmatic relation to the godhead or desire to influence the godhead for practical ends...at first it expresses only devotion and gratitude, but later it becomes progressively internalized and man finds in it a firm ground on which to stand. The aim of contemplation is no longer to achieve practical mundane results, but inward transfiguration. Where such speculative spiritualization developed into genuine contemplation, it was like one continuous prayer".

Precisely the Vedāntic formula! devotion and gratitude: śravaṇa; progressive internalization: manana; inward transfiguration: nididhyāśana; continuous contemplative prayer: dhyāna! But again, without bhakti,67

....revelation that is communicated as such, must have a mundane form. Once it is stated, it deteriorates into finiteness, and even into trivial rationality. In speech, its meaning is perverted. The word of man is not the word of God. That part of revelation that concerns man as man, becomes the content of philosophy and as such is valid without revelation. Have we to do with attenuation of religion, a loss of its substance—then we call the process secularization.

But with bhakti, are we not dealing with a purification, a deeping, a distillation or even realization of its primal source? Thus, in philosophical effort, thus rooted in the Eternal Word,68 something takes place that is not seen by all those who reject
it: in it man rediscover his primal source. In this sense, philosophy is absolute and without aim. It can neither be justified through something else, nor on the basis of utility for any purpose. It is not a girder to support us or a straw to grasp at. No one can use it as a means....

Our enduring task in philosophical endeavour is to become authentic men by becoming aware of being; or, and this is the same thing: to become ourselves by achieving certainty of God. (italics ours)

Nevertheless, with Dorothy Emmett, we do not believe that acceptance of the revelational basis of philosophizing or of theologizing entails the complete abrogation of reason, or abandonment of Nature altogether as the Barthians are preaching. Ultimately, this is really what Śaṅkara also demands, although against the Barthians, and with the Thomists, he insists that as long as one is still in the realm of the Natural (viśyāhārika), it is to be taken as real and good. But, once Revelation (as the paramārthika) is accepted, or realized in its full sense (as we early saw in the exegesis of Hiriyanna) reason and Nature are to be abandoned. For Śaṅkara, like Thomas, the supernatural completes the natural, but in such a way that, once the completion is realized, the lower is dropped, as it were, as a ladder that is no longer needed: the 'world' is simply left behind, not necessarily as wholly evil (though the Barthians do say this), but as a useless hindrance.

But for Rāmānuja and Bonaventura, this is by no means the case. For both of them, as for Jaspers, reason remains a boundless will to communication, transformed, indeed, by the illumination of Grace, rooted in Revelation, but uncompromisingly valid as showing forth the Divine Order and Harmony; and Nature along with the Scriptures—both psychological and cosmological Nature—remains an open book, written within and without (intus et foris), revealing the marvellous and innumerable Glories of the Lord.

Thus, in Sūtra III: 2: 36 (37 in Śaṅkara's numbering), Śaṅkara takes the doctrine of an all-pervasiveness as extreme monism, relegating the texts that indicate the revelatory character of Nature to a secondary, allegorical interpretation; but Rāmānuja takes the sūtra at face value, quoting the following texts which are to be taken literally:
By that Puruṣa all this is filled (Śvet. III:9). Whatever in this world is seen or heard about, Nārāyaṇa pervades all that inside and outside (Mahānārāyaṇa XI) Who is eternal, omnipresent, and all-pervading, because of His highly subtle nature and the wise perceive Him to be the material cause of all that exists. (italics ours)

In the same spirit, Bonaventura says that this Open Book of Nature is like a window, and one can look at it, or through it: Developing Plato's doctrine of the Footsteps—the vestigia—he says:69

...the whole world, because it is a shade (umbra), a way, a footstep (vestigium) is a book written within and without (intus et foris); for in any creature whatsoever there is a certain refulgence of the divine exemplar, but mixed (commixta) with (a certain) darkness. Again, it is a way, like a window, for in this creature it is like this, in another, like that; the eternal ray shows itself in these ways as through a coloured glass: thus from the many colours of the glass the ray is variously (multipliciter) coloured, thus the divine ray giving the properties. Again, it is a vestige, or simulacrum of the Wisdom of God, a sculptured image as it were. In all these is the book written, as it were, without. For whenever the soul sees this, it seems to itself that it ought to go (transpire) from the darkness to the light, from the way towards the end, from the vestige to the truth, from the book to the true knowledge. Thus to read the book is for the highest contemplatives, not for the natural philosophers, because (the later) the nature of things (only) in themselves, and not that they are vestiges.

...For all substance—all spiritual substance—is light...whence the interior man is a true light illumining the exterior man. The same is the case with this mirror for it receives all and represents (in strict literal sense: represents) all; and it has the nature of light, so that it may indeed make judgments about things. For the whole world is described in the soul as an image, and this is the book written within. Whence, into the intimacy of the soul, simplex as it is, no one may enter. For this intimacy of the soul, according to Augustine, is its summit: to the extent that it is more intimate, to that extent it is the more sublime.

Again, admittedly, the metaphors are more like what can be found in Kāśmir Śaivism; but that does not concern us here. What does concern us, however, is the relation of the revelationist attitude to contemplation: treated as a matter for contemplation, anything can be a Revelation; and—a very important key to the understanding of almost all that will follow—the
vertical hierarchy is to be identified with the hierarchy of interiorization, as we have already sought to show is the case with Râmânuja: Revelation, as process, is interiorization.

It is in this perspective that he goes on to show how the Two Books complement each other. If the Book of Nature contains the germs of the living truth, the Scriptures, in the same sacramental way, are the living voice:

Every Scripture is the mouth of God, the tongue of God, and the pen of God: par excellence it is the Book written intus et foris. The Mouth is the Father...the tongue is the Son...and the pen is the Holy Spirit. For the Father speaks through the Word (e.g., the Son), who moreover completes (the speech) and commits it to memory, (and is) the pen of the Holy Spirit... (the allegory is supported by the Scripture itself, in Isaiah, 30: 1-2) 'Woe to you, rebellious children.....who carry out a purpose that comes not from Me, and who form an alliance that is not according to My mind, adding sin to sin, who set out on the way to Egypt, without asking My advice, to take refuge in the protection of Pharaoh and to take shelter in the shadow of Egypt—taking My advice means consulting the Scriptures: both here and again, (Joshua 9: 14) 'The men partook of their provisions without asking the advice of the Lord'. For whoever would engage himself in the secular sciences, must (first and foremost) consult the sacred scriptures. Again, as to the Tongue, 'Honey and milk are under Thy tongue' (Song of Solomon, 4: 11) and 'How sweet are Thy promises to my palate, sweeter than honey to my mouth' (Psalm 119: 103; 118 in Vulgate numbering) or this Tongue, that is the Scriptures, has savouriness; whence it is compared to bread that is both taste and also nourishing.—Again, the Scripture is the pen of God, and this is the Holy Spirit. Just as one who writes can write the past and future in the present time, so is this Book, written intus et foris through the ministries of the Scriptures, for outside it supplies (only) pretty stories, but inwardly a multitude of mysteries and meanings.

To the modern man of the West, of course, some of this allegorizing is a bit far-fetched; but at least this much lies emphatically patent: the degeneration into rootless secularism against which Jaspers warns us is always a danger if we do not trace the empirical sciences back to the Questions, which remain as Openings in all the sacred literatures of the world, which originally provoked them: they are Eternal Questions, timeless received in present time, but as challenging before they were recorded
as after they are received. And *sweetness* : what great poet has ever re-enfolded the results of scientific investigation without contemplation—contemplation, again, linking ‘facts’ with primordial Meanings, weaving arabesques out of Traditions, discovering new allegories, opening up new depths of hiddenness, establishing new dimensions which were always inherent in the familiar, but simply *unrevealed* before the Light of Contemplation was focused on them? It is not without significance, for example, that Rilke was always profoundly moved by the Old Testament and the Koran; in one of his Letters he exclaims how they were full of ‘pointers’—pointing directly, as it were, to God, without the entanglement of dogmas and doctrines, linking the immediacy of the world with the immediacy of the Presence in the soul. Without this sort of orientation, he could scarcely have written, as he did in Eighth Elegy.

With all its eyes the creature-world beholds the open. But our eyes, as though reversed, encircle it on every side, like traps set round its unobstructed path to freedom. What *is* outside, we know from the brute’s face alone; for while a child’s quite small we take it and turn it round and force it to look backwards at confrontation, not that openness so deep within the brute’s face. Free from death. We alone see that; the free animal has its decrease perpetually behind it and God in front, and when it moves, it moves into eternity, like running springs. We’ve never, no, not for a single day, pure space before us, such as that which flowers endlessly open into: always world, and never nowhere without no: that pure, unsuperintended element one breathes, endlessly knows, and never craves . . . .

Not that we would try to get the old hard dogma of Inspiration of Scripture out of this: far from that! But that is not what Bonaventura teaches either. That dogma is already the *degeneracy of literalism*, which results when contemplation is neglected and the Sensitivity to Mystery is thereby lost. Here is no matter of argument by ‘Authority’ for the sake of ‘proving’ anything, but the *moving into eternity*, into inexhaustibility of Life—life itself which is both outward and inward, but Meaningful and Sweet
only when the outward reveals the inward. And the same thing must be said of the dogmas or doctrines that are said to come by revelation: Bonaventura’s allegorizing in terms of the Trinity, both here and throughout his writings, scarcely raised the question of proof or disproof, but nevertheless gives a ‘revelational’ basis of contemplating such that all dimensions therein converge and re-emerge arrayed with the glory of the Divine—and this re-emergence is what Hegel missed, much as his triadal dialectic resembles Bonaventura’s allegorizing, because the latter realized that what he was doing, whereas Hegel tried to limit the trinitarian principle to a logical process only, so that the apophatic always escaped him, because he was doggedly bent on objectification. As Berdayev says, 70

..... The critique of revelation which has been going on in recent centuries, has in essence been the final triumph of naturalism and the denial of God, Spirit and religion..... God is not an object. God is not a thing. God is Spirit. One cannot enter into communion with the mystery of the Spirit in any sort of objectivization. The mystery never reveals itself in the object. In the object only symbolism (and we interpose that allegory and symbolism are inseparable, just as outwardness and inwardness are meaningful only by an allegorical transition or semantical shift from the impersonal objective to the personal as mystery) of the Spirit is possible, not its reality.

Revelation is the fact of the Spirit in me, in subject: it is spiritual experience, spiritual life. The intellectualist interpretation of revelation which finds its expression in dogmatics is precisely its objectivization, its adjustment to the average level of normal thought. But the events of the Spirit described in Holy Scripture...were not of an intellectual character; the entire spiritual nature of man came into operation in them..... But God is life; life, not being, if by this term the rational concept of being is understood. In this respect Indian religious philosophy attains greater heights and goes deeper than Western ontological philosophy which is too much subject to the categories of Aristotle.

Had Bonaventura known Rāmānuja’s works, we dare to suggest that he would have said the same thing, in the same way that he approved of Al Gazali against Averroes and Plato against Aristotle. Indeed, the ‘natural philosophers’ referred to in the above citation are not so much the Greeks in general
as the Aristotelians—probably including Thomas Aquinas himself.

For it is the Holy Spirit, the Antaryāmin, that holds the key to the relation of the study of the world to the ‘study’ (as contemplation, not exposition) of the śrutiś and smṛtīś. The Spirit contains, and by the analogia entis, is the living Mystery which gives us this key which we must use if we would, as true philosophers, and not as mere sophists, seek to comprehend—or rather apprehend, for comprehension, we must in humility admit is too high for most of us—the creative, living Meanings of the two Books. And he who is not a bhakta, he who is not alive in the Love that is that Spirit, will neither make this right beginning, nor would he continue profitably if he could make any other beginning. Scientific analyses of all the canons of the world are indeed badly needed to clear away the distortions and dogmatic accretions of time. But, as Santayanna vividly points out in his Idea of Christ in the Gospels, that alone will not give us Wisdom. The analytical is not only useful but necessary; but it must go on to the allegorical and anagogical, as Bonaventura always insists. Otherwise the inspiration (literally: the life-giving Spirit coming into the dead letter) will be missed. As the key, the Scripture must be used as such; polishing it must not become an end in itself. Explicitly, as Bonaventura continues in the next section of the same work,⁷¹

The significance of the third vision of the work of God lies in what God has said, ‘The earth germinated living herbs’ (Genesis 1:11). For He constituted spiritual beings with senses and understandings, sacramental things with figures, multiform things with theories (theories: not the modern sense of hypothetical postulations, but the classical sense of contemplative beholding in wonder) discretely elicited for right understanding. To these three all understandings of Scripture are reduced. The first of these, that is, the spiritual understandings (italics his), are given to be understood by the gathering of the waters; the second, the sacramental figures, are to be understood as the putting forth of the dry land, as is noted, ‘God saw that it was good and said, let the earth be fruitful’. And the third, that is, the multiplicity of theories, (are to be understood) as the seed, as noted, ‘whose seed shall fructify’. For as from plants new seeds ever take their origin, so, from the Scriptures ever and ever new meanings are elicited (italics ours), as though one star were taken out of all stars.
Thus, then, is Scripture to be used by bhaktas: ever and anon, *freshness* of terms of meaning, fertility of suggestiveness that comes only in reverent reverberations, while the basic essence of the inspiration—which remains inexhaustible—remains the same. Indeed, here, as we already once intimated, we almost have a criterion for establishing canonicity: a statement that means *only* what it says can scarcely be a mahāvākya. Spiritual truth is ever *open*, and "speaks to our condition" (to use the apt Quaker phrase) at every turn. *Mutatis mutandis*, ‘Spiritual truths are to be spiritually discerned’ as the New Testament says. Mythologies, as Cassirer and others have demonstrated, are not lightly to be overthrown; on the contrary, they have their own logistic, deeply rooted in the unconscious; and thus it is necessary to sink into their hidden meanings by affective meditation. They can neither be hemmed in by ritual prescriptions nor be taken simply as scientific ‘data’. Otherwise the fruit of liberating joy will not be forthcoming. As Rāmānuja says in the First Sūtra in refutation of the Mīmāṃsikas,

The Vedānta gives many injunctions to meditate on Brahman, and they refer to a particular kind of kārya as understood by you. The fruit to be yielded by the kārya is stated in other texts, viz., to reach Brahman. It is necessary to know, as serving the kārya, the *nature* of Brahman, His *attributes*, the *universe which He controls*, and what *obstructs the attainment of the fruit*, so that it may be avoided. Hence it must be admitted that *the whole of the Vedānta does convey its meaning*. This conclusion follows the precedents set by the pūrva mīmāṃsā itself in three cases, in all of which the sentences contain no injunction, and there is *merely a statement of facts*; and yet as the injunctions given in separate texts require some information or service, the sentences are connected with the injunctions, and it is held that they convey their meanings. (italics ours)

It other words (for the passage out of context may be a bit obscure), the Vedic texts are meaningful not so much as giving directions for ritual or as stating mere facts, but as revelatory of the fullness and richness of the nature of Brahman the Divine Reality in such a way that only affective meditation can be their intended use: an important hint against much modern misinterpretation of the Vedānta Sūtras themselves: the *cosmology* is to be included as part of the *vidyās*, not
vice versa; the first two Adhyāyas are only preparatory for the
last two; 'science' is subordinated to sādhana.

But to return to Bonaventura's text. Enlarging on what
he has already pointed out about the theories, he says, 72
(This topic) consists of the consideration of succeeding
times in the divine governorship, and these are to be
understood through the seeds. Secondly, in the considera-
tion of the salutary circumscensions (in the literal sense:
looking around, viz., viewing from many angles at the object
of contemplation) in which the soul is nourished are thus
signified by the fruits. For the fruits were beautiful (deco-
rus) and tasty. For 'the woman saw the tree' (e.g., the
tree of temptation in the Genesis story). Moreover, by then
(the fruits), the intellect was illumined (illustratur) and
the affection was satisfied (reficitur). But this satisfaction
(refectio) is ordered toward an other (italics ours). It is, more-
over, said in what way the understanding was illumined by
the 'theories' as it is induced to proceed ultimately to the
tasting of the fruits. For the harder anyone works at this only to
understand what he ought to speak, the more will he be excluded from
internal devotion (italics ours) and thus he becomes 'like a
sounding brass or a tinkling symbol'.

Therefore, the intellect is illumined as though from within
in four trilogies. It begins from within because this touches
faith. For without this illumination there are no others,
since these illuminations are from God and lead (back)
to God. For when it is said, 'in the beginning He created
heaven and earth', and 'the Spirit of God was moving above
the waters', the mystery of the Trinity is understood—the
mystery of the Incarnation (also) and redemption and glorifi-
cation, through which is confirmed the objects of specu-
lation in (particular) articles through the whole of the
Scripture. Later through the other two antitheses (e.g.,
'forward' and 'backward'), the intellect is illumined in re-
spect to itself. Finally, the other four illuminations are
through the presiding over and directing through civil af-
fairs, which are the hierarchical spirits, through the battles
of armies from the oblique, as was the case with Job, from
a distance through the signs of figures, and from nearby
through the gifts of grace. Order, moreover, is in these,
because the affection rectifies the intellect. (italics ours) Still others
enter the ultimate illumination to which the celestial forms,
the elemental form, etc., concur.

Moreover, to eat of the tree of life is illustrated by these
illuminations in such a way that the one who contemplates
seeks nothing for salvation except through the understand-
ing (intelectum) of truth and the affection of piety, the
delight of sweetness, the solace of contemplation; for when
he becomes oblivious of these and takes delight in scruti-
nies only for curiosity’s sake, that is to know so much that
from it is born (a certain) superciliousness of vanity (or,
emptiness) and he (comes to) despite others; and from this
is born an inquietude of contention: he thinks of himself
as insulted when anyone replies to him, and he is always
ready for contentions; from him the true and quiet life is
taken away, just as Adam and Eve, discovering shame
(literally, blame, culpa) between themselves prepared cloth-
ing for themselves, since they (no longer) had what they
had received from God. Thus always contentious people
defend themselves, and say whatever they can, whether it
be true or false. Therefore these illuminations should not remain
in the intellect alone, but should make a transit to affection, so
that the speculative intellect may be made practical.
(italics ours)

In this passage we may see, if we examine it closely, much in
common with the Vedântic view of the deep-rooted need for
contemplation, and how that the root of Affection is the deep-
est of the roots. The process of evolution is a ‘fall’, a descent
from the primordial undifferentiated affective state, but it is
compensated by the tendency to involution, by the Return;
and in this compensative pattern, the intellect is, though not
deprived of the capacity to distinguish good and evil, not cap-
able of enjoying the Primordial Good; it lies at a level once
removed, whereas it is the affections that bridge the differen-
tiated and the undifferentiated in both the downward and the
‘return’ process: their wrong use, in curiosity, in infatuation,
only leads to false shame and the attempt to cover up that
shame with still more false argument; but their right use—
bhakti—establishes the right orientation for the whole of human
affairs. The Ānandamaya kośa lies deeper than the vijnâna-
maya, and that in turn deeper than the manomaya. Hence the
śravaṇa aspect of upāsanā must already be focused in bhakti,
which alone can be both means and end; it cannot be jñāna
alone; for even the illumined intellect—jñāna as intuitive, not
as engaged in tarka—gets its illumination only through grace,
which in turn comes only through the pious opening up of the
soul to its reception. Such bhakti, moreover, is not just a wor-
ship of the Lord, but a communion with Him, right from the
beginning. Even in the hearing of the sacred ‘Word’, there is not a simple physiological listening, but the ontological link of affection, as we have so often reiterated, between what is inalienably divine in the soul and the all-divine which is at once both within and without, echoing throughout all space and time; not just an art of interpretation—not just drumming up a sermon—but a reawakening within primordial life—for, as Bonaventura realizes, it is the affections, not the intellect, that give order, and the order, moreover, between the primordial and the ordered—in which there is no within or without, above or below. As Heracleitus first announced in the west—and the accoustical reinforcements of his voice increase in Bernard and Bonaventura—the upward and the downward are the same; and one has not entered the logos until he hears it thus.

Thus, if one approaches the Scriptures, if one comes to ‘revealed’ truth, in the right spirit—in the Spirit—the rest of the process of contemplation will follow as a matter of course. Nevertheless, there is much to be pointed out about the details of the rest of the process; and here St. Bonaventura, according to Gilson, is perhaps the best master in the whole history of western tradition. Both philosopher and mystic, he incorporates all the best in not only Augustine and Gregory and Bernard of Clairvaux and the Victorines, but also the best of the material brought by the Arabs. He does not completely reject Aristotle, but rather takes the field of metaphysics as the search for first principles into stride as an element in the ascent of the soul to the Person of God, in whom the principles are embodied as living ideas, quite as Rāmānuja uses the contributions of the Nyāya school as a means of systematizing what is found in the Alwars. But in both cases, we cannot be too emphatic in reiterating that the synthesis is so complete that there is no question, as there may be in Śaṅkara and Thomas, of separation of method and principle.

For the whole business of contemplation involves the transformation of the mind, not its mere function. He compares this transformation to the cycle of the seasons: 73

Therefore the souls which are not thus elevated, are as it were, the winter season, but those who are elevated to the
mediocre are as it were in the spring; but those which are suspended in mental excesses may be taken as like the summer; and those who gather in the fruit are like autumn. Moreover, the perfect explanation of perpetual summer in heaven, as also those inflammations and arduous which the Sun emits in those souls which experience the mental excesses—no one can explicate these. For if their groaning is unutterable (cf. Romans 8:26), what will be their excesses? What will be their arduous? ...

May we not read into this comparison the very process of Śravaṇa (winter), manana (spring), nībidhyāsana (summer), dhyāna (autumn)?

Then he goes on to compare the process also to the reflections of the sun in golden shields, so that the mountains are illuminated with the reflection, the simile being suggested by a text in First Machabes (6:39) : 74

The shields are the eternal laws (rationes) of the eternal predestinations, which hold the law (ratio) of guarding (armatura) and the law of incorruptible refugence. For the Sun is eternal, that is, it is Eternal Wisdom, refulgent in the shields, when the mind of contemplatives is lifted up (sublicmat) to the perception of the refugence of eternal truth; and the mountains become resplendent (with the reflected light) because the Sun itself through those eternal laws illuminates the mountains, as it were, through the shields, that is, the spirits established (firmatos) in the sublimity of eternity. These receive the rays of the morning as by a primary irradiation, and the rays of the evening as by a secondary (postrema) retention; these burn from the sun and (its) splendour as by lamps of fire, which is the permaximate inflammation, and in this consists the law (ratio) of contemplation itself. For never does any pure and refugent ray come into the mind of the contemplator except by such inflammation and ascension. Thus, concerning this matter it is said in the Canticles that through a mode of love (amoris) and through a mode of singing (does the soul so become inflamed and ascends) because these fulgurations are not without love and a certain jubilation. (italics ours)

Again, we see essentially our upāsanā scheme: the simple reflection, the illumination of the surrounding area, and the light so reflected, so glorifying the mountains far more than ordinary light naturally received and not by reflection—are these not the passive reception (manana) the glorification (nididhyāsana) and the glory (dhyāna) itself that concerns us? For the Presence is Glory; it is self-luminous (svayamprakāśaḥ), as Rāmānuja also
teaches; it is its own law, and not a matter to be proved. And yet, it is not a pure identity: it is not the sun itself, but a refugence, a unitive relation with the Sun, but in such a way that its light is reinforced on earth, or at least, on the mountainous—the contemplative—souls in a manifold manner. The whole of the In Haexaemerou is so full of these rich upāsanās that one gets a sense of vertigo in trying to select the most appropriate ones. And characteristically they all contain the full movement, the full ascent. Nevertheless, we turn to the following one, based on the text, ‘the Spirit of the Lord filled him with wisdom and understanding’ (Ecclus. 15:5—Vulgate numbering; other versions differ), in which is shown how the unaided jīva cannot so meditate, for it is the Spirit that must provoke and guide it; and the relation of jñāna to bhakti becomes clear: 

For the plenitude of the Spirit irradiating the soul makes it deiform and changes it into a strong house of God, sorrowless and full of delight, and illuminates the understanding and inflames the affection and strengthens the effect. For this house of God is the evangelical soul, founded on the firm Rock, against which the rushing impetus of floods and winds could not prevail. For the spirit of wisdom for the sake of both ornamentation and strength set it up with seven pillars, which are enumerated in St. James (3:17): ‘The wisdom that is from above is first of all pure, then peaceable, considerate, willing to yield, full of compassion and good deeds, whole-hearted, straightforward’....

.....Thus the desire for wisdom is seen to imply discipline, delight, rectitude, custody of the law, sanctification, incorruption, deformation. (italics ours) Through deformation, moreover, wisdom takes its first impressions because by desiring deiformity we can come to wisdom. It is fitting therefore that the lover (amator) have the spirit of wisdom and be a man of great desires, having discipline not of the scholarly sort, but of moral qualities, for not just by hearing only was he made wise, but by observing the discipline (italics ours); and thus he was a true disciple of the spirit of wisdom: ‘Teach me goodness and discipline and wisdom (all three) (psalm 119: 66-118, Vulgate version). Such a disciple by observing the percepts of wisdom and by being filled with the highest desires, arrived at the finished state where ‘I laboured a little and found for myself much rest’. (Ecclus. 51:30).

Finally, consider how this lover of wisdom, thus disposed to wisdom, delight, etc., ought to be prompt in observing the mandates of wisdom. Thus if wisdom requires poverty and the
other acts of the virtues, it is fitting that he fulfill them all from filial love—indeed, by a servile fear—which best disposes toward their observance. Thus if poverty is for the sake of discipline, then it is fitting that he love poverty. For love (amor) as delight is the custody of the law. For if you would delight in the good, observe the law; for ‘the end of instruction is love (caritas) from a pure heart, from a good conscience and from faith unfeigned’ (Timothy 1:15).

Then, when anyone has thus observed the law, he is sanctified and made full of the Spirit of God, and is wrenched away from every corruptible and defiled love, e.g., from anything which could corrupt the soul. For such incorruption assimilates (in literal sense: makes it like) the soul to the Creator by deformity, crying out with the Seraphim, ‘Holy, Holy Holy’, which is the clamour of assimilation, for ‘Holy’ resounds with the resonance of purity, according to Dionysius......Note that the Wise Man (‘Solomon’ in the Book of Wisdom) says that by involving and by hoping, one may have wisdom. Therefore since through her (wisdom) one may have the sumnum bonum, which he may not have without the desire for her, she is above all to be desired and universally to be sought after (appetenda: combining the modern sense of seeking and of appetite). Whence Solomon made no petition except for a docile heart (I Kings, 3:4); and St. James (1:5-6): ‘If anyone needs wisdom, let him pray for it in faith, in no wise hesitant.’

For concupiscence is the gate of wisdom, extinguishing all other pulcritudes and lifting up man from below, from the world. Whence Solomon says, ‘Her I loved’ (Wisdom 8:2). For if we would look directly into the face of wisdom, it will appear fourfold... now uniform, now multiform, now nulliform. And I suggest that it appears uniform as manifesting itself in the rules of divine laws, multiform in the mysteries of the divine scriptures, omniform in the vestigia of good works, nulliform in the suspensions of divine excesses.

An adequate commentary on this passage would involve a whole book, and a very large one at that; to say the least, it contains much that we cannot consider in detail until subsequent chapters. The allusions to Biblical figures which are no longer currently popular, the mergeance of the upāsanā and the erotic aspects of bhakti, the culmination of both in prapatti, and the transvaluation into beatitude, into deformation—all of these need separate treatment, even though to separate them is a helplessly arbitrary thing to do. In general, nevertheless, one almost feels that Bonaventura has passed the boundary beyond
which Socrates could not pass: philosophy is no longer the love of wisdom, but the actual entrance into Wisdom; and it is contemplation, in the Plenitude of Spirit—a phrase which is used by Lacombe in describing Rāmānuja’s life-view also—that makes the Entrance possible. And is not contemplation as Entrance nididhyāsana?—though for this, as we see, much preparation is necessary, and dhyāna, the becoming established on the Rock, must follow. The discipline of preparation is not unlike Rāmānuja’s treatment of karma yoga in his Gītā Bhāṣya, and his subordination of jñāna yoga to the status of preparation for the rise of bhakti therein also. For true bhakti has not been realized until therein is found the commingling, the colloidalization, of discipline (as karma raised by observance of the aṅgas of viveka, vimoka, abhyāsa, etc., to nīkāma karma in the spirit of humility) of delight [of the rasas pursued through their hierarchical continuum from kāma (concupiscientia) to sneha (amor) to prema (dilectio) to rati (caritas) which is virtually identical with bhakti itself], of rectitude and custody of the law (as jñāna in reference to the study of the Vedas, for such custody is really of the heart, the knowing soul, as may be found in another verse of the Psalms which Bonaventura also frequently uses: ‘Thy Law is in my heart, my goings shall not slide’, and such also is the sense in which Rāmānuja takes jñāna). Indeed, without going further into the sanctification, incorruption and deification, we can already see that is the plenitude of spirit, of the Holy Spirit, that is at work; it is Grace, and not the ‘natural’ effort of the soul alone, as Rāmānuja puts it (Gītā Bhāṣya X: 15. 17, 18):

O Supreme Puruṣa! You yourself know Yourself (ātmānām) through your self (ātmanā), i.e., through Your own knowledge. O Source of all beings, i.e., O Producer of all beings. O Lord of all beings, i.e., O Ruler of all beings...

How shall I, the yogin, i.e., one devoted to Bhaktiyoga, ever meditating on You with bhakti, i.e., engaging in meditation (on You with Bhakti), know You, the object of meditation, possessed of a multitude of noble qualities such as abundant Lordly power and so on? In what several things which have not (yet) been declared, besides those mentioned before, viz., intelligence (buddhi) wisdom (jñāna) and others, are You to be thought of by me as the Ruler?

Tell me further in detail of Your Yoga... consisting in Your
being the creator (of all) and the like, as well as glory... there is no satiety for me in hearing of your grandeur... as if I were drinking of ambrosia. 'Verily', i.e., my insatiety is well-known....

But again, may we not compare the counsel that a man of wisdom must be a man of great desires who 'labours a little and finds much rest' (and not a scholar only, not a tarkavādin satisfied only with arguments and syllogisms)—is this not manana? We remember how in a previously quoted passage Bonaventura would have us to be like the ruminating animals; and the cultivation of the law to him is certainly not ritualistic formality, but rather allowing the counsels of the scriptures and of the saints to sink into the heart, so that love and a good conscience may freely dwell therein.

Moreover, there could be no better definition of nididhyāsana than just his clamour of assimilation: in the technique of meditation, if one has ruminated sufficiently in the Spirit, one will be moved from within, and so moved that it seems to be the Voice of the Spirit crying out within oneself, and ejaculations of invocation will carry the soul along with the Voice: HOLY HOLY HOLY, or OM NAMO NĀRĀYANĀYA or some other Mantra, resounds, or seems to resound in all around, as though one were joining with the angels and one forgets oneself, one loses oneself completely in the utterance, as Dante wrote (Paradise, I: 7; XXIII: 40, 41):

Because approaching to its own Desire,
Our understanding plungeth in so deep,
That memory cannot from so far return
As fire, imprisoned in a cloud, bursts forth
In self expansion, and demands more space,
And counter to its nature falls to earth,
Even so my soul 'mid this delightsome feast,
Expanding in its range passed beyond self
And what befell it can no more recall.

or Nammalwar (IV: 10:10 & V: i:3):

He is the Holiest: He is the Truest: He is all the gods: He is all the worlds! He is all the other things! while these are all as they are He shines with a spotless form. He is in Holy Kuruka surrounded by fields of red paddy and sugarcane. He is the Holy Brahmachāri, the Dwarf. He danced with the vessels arranged in a lofty pile placed over his head. To serve him is true glory.
I had a few thoughts in my mind, but I did not give them out truly and I assumed a love, which I did not feel. But Thou art the embodiment of generosity. Thou art the Self-Shining Divine Gem. By associating with Thee I got rid of the deceptive and dishonest nature of my mind, and saw Thee clearly, and came to Life. Thou hast the flowing waters laving Thee for Thy bed. What else have I to take hold of?

In a definite sense, this sanctification, this sursum corda, this clamour assimilationis is also prapatti, or ātmanikṣepa. The difference is really a technical one: it is prapatti whether experienced as a part of meditation or not; but as a part of meditation, it is also in a sense prapatti as the consummation of bhakti, and the bhakti of establishment (dhyāna) that follows is bhakti after prapatti. But these matters will be discussed at length in the next chapter, where the argument between the Tengalai and Vadagalai (the former holding the former view, and the latter the latter, or rather a sort of a combination of both).

But as we come to the formula describing the face of Wisdom, the uniform, multiform, omniform, and nulliform, we have many options of interpretation. It could be taken as describing the stages of prapatti (if one allows that there may be stages in prapatti); or as parallel to the jñāna, bhakti, parābhakti, paramājñāna, and paramabhakti with which we shall be dealing in a later chapter; or again either as another form of the basic scheme of upāsanā itself, or the refinements of dhyāna. At any rate, it does contain the basic structure of any mystical ascent. Perhaps we are arbitrary, but we take it here as elaborating the subtilities of dhyāna. For dhyāna really recapitulates the other stage of the upāsanā, except ‘face to face’: it is the constant stream of remembrance, as it is focused on different aspects of reality as a whole, reflection at the second level, as Marcel uses that term, or perfect, as distinct from imperfect, contemplation, if we accept Fr. Bonnefoi’s interpretation of Bonaventura.76

Thus, in elaboration of the scheme, he says of the first, the uniform, that it is thus that we know the modes by which a thing is its necessary being, and that this existential nature of things has so linked with the highest good as to promote intrinsically, veneration and love. This existentialist orientation brings him to a typical criticism of Aristotle: things do not have their ratio essendi ‘ad exterius’. Everything as bearing within itself its own
god-infused law of intrinsic existence has its own singularity (hence the ‘uniform’ face of Wisdom reflects this) of form which is really more than it needs for itself alone (It has ‘presence’, as Marcel would put it) but whose certitude and necessity overflow back, as it were, into the Divine Mind. Thus—and we suggest the same is the case with Rāmānuja—every individuated existent, as an individuation of the Divine Light, is worthy, as revealing the fullness of the Lord’s glorious qualities, of being the object of contemplation; and reciprocally, things are so seen—and here might lie a profound criticism of almost all western philosophy since Campanella, from whom DesCartes took everything else—things are so seen only in a state of contemplation, of dhyāna, which itself is an intensification of that same Light and Love.

The second, the multiform, is best exemplified in the maniness of the modes of reparation: there is not just one sacrament, not just one Mystery, but many.—a statement, and Bonaventura is emphatic in making it, which is much more akin to Jaspers’ opinions about exclusiveness than to the dogmatism of modern scholasticism,—akin again to the spirit of toleration in Rāmānuja, who in the Gītā Bhāṣya notes, following the text closely, that anyone who comes in sincere devotion to deity in any form—for God himself is not limited by any particularity of form—will be received as though the devotion were consciously to the highest Form. For, says St. Bonaventura, Wisdom “is veiled to the proud and vain, but revealed to little ones”. The only requirement is the exercise of the ‘theological’ virtues of Faith, Hope and Love: Faith, which opens the way to the (hidden) allegorical meanings; Hope, which opens up the analogical way to the fullness of Grace; and Love (caritas) which takes the soul the certitude and secrets of mystical union, as typified in the cry of the lover in the Song of Solomon, ‘How beautiful are Thy cheeks, O my Love!’: Thus truth, when its mystery is unveiled, is found to be identical with beauty (and only then!); and hence the coy hiding behind the veil makes the multiplicity of the forms of wisdom meaningful: there are as many forms of wisdom as there are forms of truth, and only those who are pure and simple enough to see its beauty are allowed to peep behind them. Dhyāna, then, is no less than a taking part in this lilā, this game, of love: “Thy cheeks are lovely!” (1)
In dilating on the third 'face of wisdom', the omniform, he again warns us against curiosity, and urges that one should be always (meditatively, in a state of communion) looking deeper and deeper into the essential Reality, in which lies the Wisdom of God.—looking into the measure, the number, and the inclinations of Creation, into the modes by which reality has constancy, the appearances by which it is discerned, and the order in which it is congruously arranged; for all of these are the vestigia, the foot-prints of the Divine Wisdom, which are not to be taken only metaphorically, as Plato thought of them but as the existent essences or Divine Ideas in them which confer reality on them, in a way that only the contemplative man, who has entered into the Mind of God can apprehend. Thus, moreover, is surmounted the whole hierarchical dialectic of substance and accident, potentiality and actuality, and one comes directly to the 'representation' of the Trinity wherein the Father is the Origin, the Son is the Image, and the Holy Spirit is the binding of the Two together, that is, making the contemplative Return possible. Or again,77

The third is the way by which Wisdom is poured out over the creatures (for, as with the Greek Tradition, Bonaventura makes a tacit identification of the Holy Spirit with Divine Wisdom) for every creature is (of such a nature that it) 'represents' (itself in knowledge) not only through the mode of the vestigium, but also by the mode of image, whether natural or by grace. For the reason (ratio) of the image is in the memory, imagination and will. Understanding (intelligensia) takes its origin from memory, and will from both. According to their impression (e.g., of the image), the angel or the soul receives (its nature) according to immortality, wisdom, joy, according to which eternity is held in memory, truth is made refulgent in the intellect, and goodness gives delight in the will. This is maximally true in reformed substances.

Thus every creature narrates the wisdom of the Creator. For the whole world is like a mirror full of lights, just as a blazing coal emitting light.

To this last we may only compare a remark of Rāmānuja under Sūtra I:1:4:

Brahman gives limitless bliss by His substance, by His figure, by His attributes, and by the persons and objects whom He controls and by His doings; all freed jivas share this fully
with Him; and the bound jivas have their full share in it when they render themselves fit for it.

By this, though out of context it may seem comparatively trivial, he basically means the same thing: every creature, who has made the reduction of the conversion of the mind according to mystical discipline, not only shares in the bliss of the Supreme, but also, as having come to the complete coincidence of means and ends, of method and principle, and therein, as having come to the illuminative vision of the dynamic open, fertile unity also of Being in transcendence with being in act—of realizing essence as existent, and not merely a matter of speculative abstraction—comes to experience himself and all fellow-creatures as part and parcel of that open Unity, which, moreover, is open and fertile for the simple but profound reason that it is itself of the affective and not of the gnostic order. Hence also the impossibility of separating mysticism and logic, ‘philosophy’ and religion, wisdom and theology. In both philosophers, however, this cannot become completely clear until we have come all the way through to the business of Fruition as such and to the final fruit of Perfection, of Beatitude. It is this that Bonaventura goes into under the nulliform, the via negativa, the neti neti, and therefore we reserve it for its proper place in the subsequent chapter. It is enough for the present, however, to note that, contrary to what might be expected, he does not, as for example, Eckhardt does, take this entrance into the Divine Obscurity, the Cloud of Unknowing, as an identity of being and knowing above or transcending love, but as the field of excess of the zeal of love; “To this experience one may not come except through maximal love; for neither the cognitive nor the intellective touches onto (attīgit) this, but through a permaximal condescension from above.”

But without going on in-and-up to this ‘condescension’ we have reached the point where our chief burden for the present becomes very heavy indeed. For the modern man the doubt always lurks that such mystical certainty, such seeing all creatures, all essences as participations in and as expressions of the internal Harmony of the nature of God Himself, is after all only a subjective feeling, a mere consolation, religiously nice, but insignificant for the practical or scientific ordering of human affairs or even for systematic metaphysics as such. This we emphatically
deny. It may have been enough, at the time when H. O. Taylor wrote his *Medieval Mind*, to remain a sedate and comfortable humanist, observing these delightful sentiments—or the atmosphere creating them—from the outside, as a *guest*, as it were, in the monastery, and politely excuse oneself from the challenging clan, to approve, as it were, of the delight of Lovers in their love, but not to allow oneself to become an infatuated Lover, lest one’s ‘respectability’ be thereby compromised. But now, after the two Wars, now when there is no more ‘respectability’ or comfortableness, now when the genteel tradition that made it easy for Santayanna to talk of the same sort of “essences” in a debonair esthetic sort of way, has been blasted root and branch—now is not the alternative completely loveless nihilism, technologized totalitarianism? Machines now can solve our logical problems better than our minds; and *perhaps* some day there will be a machine that is capable of loving as well as of being loved, though that is doubtful. For as Marcel writes,78

…it would seem absurd, not to say crazy, to suppose that there exists some technique, that is, some combination of methods which can be defined in abstract terms, by means of which we could reawaken love in souls that appear dead. Quite summarily, we have to say that such a reawakening can only be the work of grace, that is, something at the opposite pole of any sort of technique...as soon as I think of graces, that thought itself tends to be transmuted into a freedom at the service of grace....Yet to serve means to expend oneself on behalf of something; the soul of service is generosity...Here I can only point to the path on which that type of reflection which aims at reconstruction ought to set out; without this type of reflection there is no philosophy worthy of the name. But let us not be misled. We are *not* simply preaching a cheap gospel of *return to religion*; for religion itself has also dried up, become closed to this very openness of *Life* that is Grace and the gift of creative gratitude, degenerated on the one hand to dogmatism and to shallow emotionalism on the other.

But *bhakti* as *upäsanä*, as contemplation, as return to the Primal Source, as the re-enquiry into Brahman, as the quest for the eternal Truth that is also creative love and reintegration not only in the psychotherapeutic sense, but in the sense of reduction to the very root-source of our existence—as reflection at the second level, sympathetic mediation—this is our burden.
But again, it is not the *desperate* matter that it seemed to be with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, wherein frustration and anxiety remain. It is warmth, profundity, Harmony, the interior Song of the Beloved, the Spirit of the Lord moving on the Waters, giving the ‘measure’ the ‘number’ and the ‘inclination’: balance of the interior and the exterior, the ‘above and the below’, the freedom to make the modulational shift within the Trinity of the *soi*, the *toi*, and the *moi*, the immanent responsibility (literally: the re-entrance into and the return from spontaneity) for the inexhaustible transcendence of Mystery which joyously throws out categories and schema without every allowing itself to be limited by them, bridging all Difference in its Fullness, but ever remaining elusive and never allowing unqualified Identity, never permitting comprehension but ever illuminating apprehension so that where analytic fails, Faith leads on to Hope and good judgment, to the analogical connexity of process and phenomenon, and that in turn to the analogical Redemption in-and-by the glorious and blissful Love of God. Sat, Cit, Ānanda: one only, without a second; there is no other, for all otherness is already in It: *tat tvam asi*; thou art (*also*) that!

This is, then, by no means a matter of ‘meaningless’, private sentiment, nor Lewis Carol’s jabberwally’s convincing himself that “what I say three times is true”. It is rather the equation—the adequation—of subjective and objective (and all equation, all linkage, is the same thing as affection, emotion being only one type of such linkage) in inter-subjective Presence, which is essence existentially encountered, resusitative recouperative engagement with the Meaning, the Logos, of things and friends and religious functions. Bhakti is mediation; and it is by meditation, *upāsanā*, that we *become* Mediators, that we become *at one* with (that we experience contuion with) the Mediator, that we make the equations, the integrations without which existence remains merely *jada*, a cadaver.

And this is what Bonaventura means when he says that we not only then experience the vestigia, but also the image. For the image is the inward, the immanent, as the vestigium, in itself, without the Equation, is the outward, the cadaver; but when the mediation is realized, then one has certainty that it is a result of *Presence*, and one is led back to (one makes the
re-direction) the Presence Itself: *mediation* then as *completed*, sinks deeper into the *triadal* harmony of the Father, the Avyakta, the Akṣara, Parabrahman, and the Son, the Avatār, the Hiraṇya- garbha, the Vibhūti, and the Holy Spirit, the Antaryāmin. And triadal harmony: immortality (sat), wisdom (cit), joy (ānanda): infinite fertility: Mystery, or, as Giordano Bruno later put it, *infinity of infinities*, though experienced as triads: this is God.

It remains to see what typical forms this upāsanā, this contemplation, may take. Gilson lists five for Bonaventura—five, that is, which come under the term *reduction*, which is a favourite term for him. Gilson gives this definition of the term: "the assignment of the genus of substance under which a being happens to be arranged—a being which is not itself a substance." In scholastic terminology, this is clear enough, but to those unacquainted with such terminology, perhaps what is meant will nevertheless be clear from seeing the five examples:

1. the reduction of the principles of the substance to the substance (itself), such as essential principles such as matter and form, or integral principles which are parts of the substance, and which, without being substances, appertain nevertheless to the substance;
2. the reduction of the complements of the substance to the substance, such as the first act or the second, life and being, for example, which are neither substance nor intelligible aside from a substance;
3. the reduction of the operations to (their) substances which produce them, as generation is reduced to the substance engendered—and it is in this sense that the faculties are attached to their substance;
4. the reduction of the images to the substance which is their origin, such as spaces irradiated by objects, and which are not things, but of the genus of things;
5. the reduction, finally, of privations to the habits in relation to which they are defined.

But lest one come too quickly to the interpretation that this is after all only the old Aristotelian process of abstraction,—or, for that matter, the idealist dialect of abstraction such as is found in Bradley—Gilson rightly subjoins that these reductions are rather "ways (italics his), that is to say, *organs of transition*" (italics ours). In other words, it is not a matter, as it is with Thomas, of substance and accident (which is a purely intellectual postulation), but a manner of getting back to ground of
the reflexive nexus of spiritual reality and that which ‘reflects’ it—or to transfer over to the terminology of Rāmānuja and Marcel, that which ‘embodies’ in indisposably. The importance of this cannot be exaggerated because it is thus—and only thus—that creative self-knowledge, self-love and recollection is guaranteed, and only thus that the final reduction between microcosm and macrocosm, from the human jīvātman to the divine paramātman—or, for that matter, between substance and essence be existentially realized. Still more: it is this logistic that affords rapport between the material and the spiritual in such a way that both the extremes of crude empiricism and gnostic evaporation into undifferentiation are avoided, without nevertheless eliminating the pragmatic value of sensed reality or the transcendent ultimacy of mystical ecstasy. Thus also is included in the same movement not only the operation of the intellect and the will, but the faculty of engendering, as Gilson further notes, quoting a passage from the Commentary on the Sentences, which in turn gives the opening for the Valid Return whereby compassion (Bhagavān kāṅkṣa and bhāga-vata kāṅkṣa identified) and other and other spiritual fruition in the world (niṣkāma karma) are possible. Hence the ‘illuminations’, the action of Grace which sacramentalizes everything from the ordinary object of everyday use to the intellect and—ultimately, in beatitude—the soul itself.

Again, the identity, as with Rāmānuja, of means and end: for reduction is also resolution, as Gilson also points out:80 ‘...No human certitude is possible without the immediate collaboration of God (in and) with the act by which we know.... It is this which is expressed in the Bonaventuran doctrine under the terms reduction or resolution. To reduce or resolve the truth of any judgment is to retrace (ramener) from conditions to conditions all the way to the eternal reasons (or 'laws', as we prefer to translate) which give them foundation; and each time the reduction or resolution is pursued to the bottom, it conduces the intellect to the constation that its own necessity requires the immediate collaboration of God for the enunciation of the first principles of which it holds the necessity.”

This immediate collaboration of God is best expressed in Bonaventura’s own term contuitus, as distinct from intuitus—a
distinction which by the way would clear up much misinterpretation of Rāmānuja also. For in both philosophers, bhakti is not the intuitive apprehension of God, but the intuitive comprehension within God (as Love Himself) and yet distinct from Him, not only of Him alone, but of all things in equality or, equalized (among themselves, and yet still ‘outside’ of Him) in Him. We hesitate to contravene Gilson’s retraction of his former insistence on the importance of the distinction,81 but all philological arguments (which we cannot judge) aside, it does seem to throw light on the very heart-structure of Bonaventura’s philosophy of devotion. Fr. Longpré82 supports Gilson’s former view, quoting a passage from the Itinerarium which corresponds to the citation from the “In Hexaemeron” we have used in regard to the omniform face of wisdom. It seems to us that the term carries not only the distinction between singular union with God without regard to the illuminations of the world in Wisdom, but also the weight of the affective nature of the gift of wisdom itself, wherein as Fr. Bonnefoi points out83 the relation with God is more of the order of taste or touch—is primarily, as we have again and again reiterated, affective and not merely intellectual. More than that, Gilson’s original point that it also carries the weight of the spontaneous overflow of abundance, of the fontalis lux fontali sprincipium, fontalis plenitudo, objectum fontanum, fontalis radius, fons superessentialis deitas Pater84 and of the Bonum est diffusum sui as well as of the confluence of inaccessibility and of the intimacy—this seems radically true of the heart-spirit of St. Bonaventura’s experience and teaching, malgré all philological arguments to the contrary. Without making a particularized study of the matter, we have nevertheless noted that he often not only in the mystical works as such but even in the Sentences, as well as in the Breviloquium—uses both words in the same passage with this difference of connotation. Finally, and conclusively, the term contuitus seems to us, with Fr. Bonnefoi,85 to carry the connotation of repose, of the established abiding which is the same as Rāmānuja’s fullness of connotation of the term dhyāna, wherein there is not merely recollection of the Lord as such, but also a peaceful, communing accord with the Lord because of His glorious and infinite qualities, which qualities are thereby, in their enjoyment, reflected participatively in the jīva also: Plenitude in tranquillity:
intuition cannot possibly express this, nor the \textit{mutuality of possession}. “My Beloved is mine and I am His”: this is intuition, dhyāna, bhakti in every nuance of profundity and intimacy for both philosophers.

Indeed, it might well be said of both that the ‘reduction’ is not complete until both aspects of the Christmas anthem are existentialized in their organic integrity: “Glory to God in the highest, and on earth, peace to men of goodwill!” They are inseparable. Glory—not absorption—to God—not an impersonal Absolute; Peace; not ascetic truncation of life, but plenitude, \textit{expression of reconciling Love}. Glory on high; but the earth makes full reply.
SECTION II

D

THE SUBJECTS (VIDYĀS) TO BE USED BY THIS METHOD (VEDĀNTIC)

For Rāmānuja and his school, this may best be seen in the treatment of the principal vidyās—or, as we may now call them, reductions—to be taken as themes for the upāsanās. P.N. Śrīnivāsāchārī notes that in all there are thirty-two, and lists the following as the most important: Bhūma Vidyā, Dahara Vidyā Maitreyī Vidyā, Antarāditya Vidyā, Ānandamaya Vidyā, Madhu Vidyā, Dahara Vidyā, Maitreyī Vidyā. Nyāsa Vidyā, and Paryaṅka Vidyā. The next to the last is usually regarded as the most important, being synonymous with prapatti, and the others being more or less preparations for it, although, as he rightly notes, each one, if rightly done, will implicitly take in all the others; contemplation, contuition, is reduction in the sense of reaching the heart-life, the nexus, of reality, not the abstraction out of it, the energizing of the aprthaksiddha vīśeṣaṇa, the organic inseparability of content and container, of attribute and ground. It is the last in which this becomes most clear, for it expresses the relation of symbol and reality symbolized: the symbol is not something to be transcended (as it is for Advaita), for it is not just the means of making the reduction, but also the recipient of the illumination—which at once makes the reduction possible and becomes more brilliant—more glorious—as the reduction becomes more complete. Thus it is that all ‘external’ reality is basically symbolical, or more radically, sacramental: the Viśiṣṭādvaīta philosophy in this regard closely resembles that of the Victorines, whom Bonaventura follows very closely. As it is by the Word that all things are so constituted, so it is by incarnation of the Word that all things are redeemed; and upāsanā, reduction, is the extenuation of incarnation, embodiment by illumination. Peace is Glory in the Earth. For embodiment is not just that crudely considered. It
entails for Rāmānuja also the relation of ādhārā-ādheya, Support/supported, of niyantā-niyanti, ruler/ruled, rakṣaka-rakṣaki, Redeemer redeemed, of Śesa-Śeśin, one who exists for a Purpose/Purpose for Whom he exists. Thus, under Śūtra II:1:5, he says:

Every material thing is under the control of an intelligent being known as devatā; and the words ‘earth’, and ‘water’ refer to the beings that control them... (Upon the basis of upaniṣadic texts we say). Hence by the use of the epithet and by the statement on entry of beings into what they control, it should be decided that reference is made to these beings in the texts quoted.

and Śūtra IV:3:4:

Who are these—light, day, and the rest up to the Prajāpati mentioned in connection with the path—are they landmarks on the path, or places of enjoyment, or carriers deputed by the highest Ātman?..... There is a mark of their being carriers in the text, ‘That person, not human, leads them to Brahman’ (Chh. IV:15:5-6) this is found at the end of the context; and as there is no difference in this respect between lightening and those mentioned before, it is concluded that this description applies to all of them. The terms light, day, and the rest denote certain devatās, who control what is ordinarily denoted by them.

and Śūtra IV:3:14:

The view that those that meditate on the four-faced one (the god Brahma) are carried along the path is not sound; nor is the limitation to only those that meditate on the highest Ātman correct. Those that are not carried are those that meditate on prātikas, i.e., on things other than Brahman. Under this description come all those that meditate on any product of evolution either in itself or as being the highest Ātman, like one that meditates on devadatta as a lion. Only two classes of meditators are carried along the path—those that meditate on the highest Ātman as stated by Jaimini (e.g., according to the restrictions of the karma-kānda), and also these that meditate on themselves as divested of all material vehicles and as forming a body of the highest Ātman, their inner ruler.....

Hence, meditation on the jīva as divested of all material vehicles and as forming a body of the highest Ātman must be recognized. As to those that meditate on names and other products of evolution, they are without either of the meditations mentioned in the Chāndogya text (V:10:1); they cannot proceed on the path or reach Brahman. Their meditation is on
something blended with matter, and the principle referred to applies. (italics ours)

and continuing the next Sūtra:

The text is ‘As far as names go, so far is he able to wander at pleasure’ (Chh. VII: 1:5). There are similar statements in the same chapter of the upaniṣad regarding those that meditate on other pratikas (e.g., thing aside from its sacramental significance) up to prāṇa. All of them reap fruits of a limited nature...The conclusion is: the carriers do not carry those that meditate on an unintelligent object or on a jīva connected with it, either as Brahman or in itself; they carry those that meditate (e.g., who is symbolized by them, so that the inclusive locus is not reached until the reduction has achieved its final ground), and those who meditate on themselves as divested of material vehicles and as forming a body of Brahman.

In the Gitā Bhāṣya, of course, there are too many passages to mention that bring out this sacramental nature of the peace that crowns true bhakti. We may only cite VIII:31:

Soon (he becomes righteous, having his qualities of rajas and tamas destroyed at the root by the very virtue of being one whose evils are shaken off through My disinterested worship which brings about My affection (for him), i.e., all at once (he) becomes one whose mind is solely intent on My worship together with its accessories free from (all) its adversaries. For it is through a worship of this nature alone that one attains eternal peace,.....He attains peace which is eternal (sāsvati), i.e., such from which there is no return again, as also from a conduct which is hostile to My attainment. O son of Kunti! do you yourself proclaim this fact that nobody having begun with My devotion (ever) perishes, even if he is associated with a conduct hostile (to My attainment); but on the contrary (he) soon becomes possessed of perfect bhakti, after achieving eternal freedom from all impediments by destroying all kinds of obstacles by the merit of My bhakti.

This is followed two ślokas later by a long exegesis on sacrifice as šeṣavṛtti, which is interpreted by the gloss to indicate kaiṇkarya and as prapatti outright, after which we find that even the distinction of secular and sacred action is ameliorated by this spirit:

Now, in this way doing actions secular such as those intended for bodily maintenance, as well as Vedic, viz., obligatory and casual, (determining) that you, who are the same in
essence as Myself, because you are a part of Me, are caused by Myself to do (these actions) for My (own) pleasure;...... investigating that the whole universe is ruled over by Me and that it is in its essence the same as Myself, because it is a part of Me; determining the multitude of My most pleasant virtues; and taking to this worship the nature of which has been (just) described by Me, everyday, you shall reach Myself.

Thus, both in the sādhanā stage and after reaching the state of peace ‘from which there is no return’—which is what we mean by the ‘Valid Return’—we see that the whole world, including daily food, the devatās and one’s own very self, take on the sāksātkāra, the contemplative, the sacramentalized, aspect and function. The ‘that by which everything else is known’ (the paryāṅka vidyā strictly speaking) does not eliminate the things so known (as it must with the advaitins); nor do they remain (as they must with the Thomist and the Nāyakas and Madhvas) merely ‘things in themselves’. They are illuminated, as Bonaventura puts it, so that one ‘sees’ them not only as vestigia, but also as image. Moreover, for both philosophers, such illumination is a result of grace—we must never forget that—or Wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit, the Antaryāmin (the Antaryāmin Vidyā being a most focal one for both, if not the ultimate or most all-inclusive). Thus Lacome writes: 86

As substance, Brahman exists and acts in His creatures and by them, without being exhausted by them. As intentional efficient cause, the Supreme Person makes them be and makes them act according to the order and in view of the ends ratified and persued by His providence. The personalist perspective in which we are now placed, in putting the accent more than ever on the transcendence of God, nevertheless does not in the least abolish the aspect of immanence: the divine knowledge and power (and we might interpose, the divine love also) are omnipresent no less than the substance of Brahman. Also just as Brahman is the soul, the ātman, of his cosmic body, so the Lord is their immanent moderator, the Antaryāmin. It is as such that He resides in the heart of man, according to the scriptural affirmation, under the title of friend (or, beloved) and companion.

The list of vidyās given above by P. N. Śrīnīvāsāchārī is slightly different from that given in the Yatindra Mata Dipikā (Avatāra VII:27). 87 Having discussed the burden of these
vidyās in general, following the latter list—for it appears that
the order in which they are given is significant in demonstrat-
ing our point that taken in toto they express contuition rather
than intuition, and taken in the order given they suggest both
the askesis and the movement of re-inclusion which we have termed
the 'Valid Return'—we now may examine them in slightly more
detail.

First, the Antarkṣvidyā which Swami Ādidevānanda iden-
tifies with the aksisthasatyabrahmavidyā (Br. A. V:5). This is dis-
cussed in Sūtra III:3:20-21, where according to Rāmānuja the
controversial point is whether the Person in the Sun is the same
as the Person in the (right) eye of the meditator. The answer
is significantly in the affirmative, thus, at the outset, estab-
lishing the reductive link between the cosmological and the psychol-
ogical: something that is very difficult except by the method
of contemplation. But the reduction does not stop there. In
another sense, they are separate meditations, and are not reconc-
ciled—not resolved into one until they are both taken in under
the sāndilya, or the daharā vidyā, which comes next in the
Dīpikā’s list. In other words, the shift must be from the exte-
rrior cosmological order (Bonaventura’s uniform) through the
perceptive, sense order (the multiform) to the interior focus where
they are realized in their reductive nexus as omniform quite
the same as we have already seen in St. Bonaventura. Thus, in
discussing the daharā vidyā (the texts for which are Chh. VIII:
1:1 & Br. A. VI:4:22) (Sūtra III:3:38), Rāmānuja not only
stresses the aspect of interiority, but also emphasizes that this
interiority (the dwelling in the heart) is the aspect of the reduc-
tion in which the attribute of satyakāma, the quality which
marks the identification of being and love, comes into focus. It is
closely followed moreover, by the attribute of satyasamkalpa, of
having an unfrustrated will. This vividly illustrates what we
noted above that in dhyāna the attributes of Brahman are re-
flexively—contuitively—realized in the sādhaka. But more than
that: the dwelling in the heart is in the formless form (nulli-
form) of ākāśa, ether, wherein it becomes plain that it is not an
anthropological 'symbol' that is at the bottom of the reduction,
but only the highest Ātman, which is generally characterized
by the 'neti neti' formula—the via negative. But still more:
as with St. Bonaventura, this via negative does not lead to the advaitic ‘evaporation’ of attributes, but rather to the identification of the Paramātman with the Antaryāmin, by virtue of which the aprthākviśesāna relation (explicated in the above quotation from Lacombe) between attribute and ground is guaranteed:

The texts denying difference and affirming oneness show that all things are products of Brahman; and that they are therefore identical with Him. It is therefore enjoined that they should be seen as one in this respect ... This therefore differentiates Him, the inner ruler of all, from the world ... (and yet) to be the seat of the qualities mentioned.

The movement thus far has really covered only the śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana grades of the upāsanā, as may be seen when we examine—or re-examine—Rāmānuja’s treatment of the Bhūma vīdyā, which is the next in our list. This gives the establishment in dhyāna which we have explicitly noted, and also, with it, the aspect of spread, which we have only implied uptill now, for, under Sūtra I:3:7 we find:

Satya (truth, being) having been shown to be the highest Ātman, it has to be connected with bhūma, the large Ātman. The teacher (e.g., in the Chāndogya text, VII:2ff) thought that one that realized satya would praise it above everything else; that realization depended upon meditation; that the latter should be preceded by hearing and thinking (śravaṇa and manana); that this implied eagerness to know; that eagerness comes with the conviction that satya alone should be known; that this conviction should be coupled with the turning away of the mind from all other things (nididhyāsana); and that both would happen, if satya was to be (realized as) bliss. He accordingly led the student through each of these stages, and at the end stated ‘what is bhūma, that is bliss.’ Hence satya and bhūma are identical. (here, dhyāna).

The text under consideration gives a definition of bhūma, the large Ātman: ‘That is bhūma, which being experienced, one does not see anything else, does not hear anything else, does not meditate on anything else.’

This does not mean, as the school of Śaṅkara thinks, that all other things do not exist, and that Brahman alone is real. The correct meaning is that all other things form a part of Brahman, including His attributes and the perishable and imperishable worlds which He controls. And he who ex-
periences Brahman as thus described, will find Him to be infinite bliss.

To this our translator interpreter adds the footnote:

Two other interpretations of the text are possible. In that given above bhāma is the highest Ātman considered by Himself; for He is stated to be the ātman of all; and the highest Ātman together with matter and jīva elements cannot be the highest Ātman of those elements. In this case, as those elements exist, it is not correct to say that one does not see anything else. The difficulty is got over by remembering that those elements are inseparable from Him, and that one who experiences Him necessarily experiences them also (e.g., contemplation!). Two other interpretations are therefore given. One does not see anything i.e., anything similar to Him; for the term anya (other) in the original refers to someone similar to what has been described. The other interpretation is that one who experiences Him finds him so full of bliss, that he does not see anything equal to it in this respect.

For it is in the ‘spread’ that the bhakti aspect of dhyāna becomes profoundly evident and significant: Bliss cannot but be plenitude, overflow. And this is the stage at which we come to the ‘Valid Return’, the ‘illumination’.

The first ‘illumination’ is upon the problem of causation. This is the import of the sadvidyā, as we find under Sūtras III: 3: 37 and I: 1:5. Based upon the knotty mahāvāksya, ‘In the beginning, dear, Being was this, one only, without a second’. (Ch.VI: 2: 1)—all too comparable to the Biblical ‘in the beginning’ of Genesis and the fourth Gospel—it is here that Rāmānuja, not unlike Bonaventura, admitting the weakness of strictly logical method in regard to cosmogony, nevertheless insists that Revelation, existentially considered, does give the certainty that the human soul cries for: it is only by coming to Being as Presence that we ‘contuit’ the omnipotence and omniscience, and hence Great Worship of God. For the important thing is not the question about the origin of the world after all, but rather the realization that creatorship is a primary attribute of Being itself.

The next vidyā, the madhu vidyā (madhu means honey, nectar, ambrosia) carries the ‘spread’, the overflow, the ‘Valid Return’ into the aesthetic mode of Being, as may be seen from an examination of Sūtra I: 3: 30, where we may be surprised to see the
mention of the devatās in prominent focus. This may at first surprise us; or, for that matter it may discount the value of the vidyā altogether, as belonging to medieval superstition only, and therefore to be neglected. But deeper reflection will reveal a basis for reinterpretation of something which may not be clear without an appreciation of something like Rilke's use of 'angels' as the focus for his deepest aesthetic experience: Beauty, Sweetness, always extends beyond us; its hierarchy must be rooted in the heavenly order; it is only the supernal spirits, whatever they may be, for they cannot be a matter of dogmatic postulation, but are nevertheless necessary aesthetically as constituting the higher mediation between our own imperfect enjoyment—imperfect because of our lack of purity and innocence—and the Source-and-Object of our enjoyment of Beauty. Rāmānuja significantly takes the vidyā in a very rich allegorical context:

The sun (the highest of the devatās, or, as some writers transpose, the angels) is to be meditated on as honey; it is made from the karmas enjoined in the four Vedas and the secret doctrines; it is carried by the sun's rays and is lodged in cells on the four sides and on the top of the orb; the honeycomb is the intermediate world hanging from the cross-beam of heaven. The group of devas known as vasus live on the honey on the east, and the four other groups live on honey on the other four sides and on the top. By this vidyā a person gets into one of these groups, enjoys its honey and has the supremacy in the group, and his will is never frustrated. Here, in addition to meditation on the sun and on the five-fold honey, one has to meditate also on the vasus enjoying the honey; for he has to become a vasu himself, and the rule is—what one meditates on, that he becomes. (italics ours)

In other words, in this vidyā, angelic innocence and purity is realized, and one no longer simply 'perceives' beauty, but so radiates it, in its inwardness as well as its sublimity and brilliance, that he experiences himself, as it were, as one of the cells of the cosmic honeycomb, exuding divine sweetness: true beauty is never experienced except as participation in the divine plenitude which permeates all in such a way that one never sings alone, one never feels isolated in the rapture of a sunrise or sunset: one is rather drawn up into it; for such is the bhakti that contemplation is. One is reminded of Blake's Songs of Innocence,
or even more poignantly, of St. Francis’ Canticle of the Sun, wherein, having addressed ‘Brother’ Sun and ‘Sister’ Moon and ‘Sister’ Water and ‘Mother’ Earth, his fellow-mortals who have known the grace of forgivingness in peace and love, and ‘Sister’ death, concludes in symphonic unison,

Most High, omnipotent good Lord
To thee be ceaseless praise outpoured,
And blessing without measure
Let creatures all give thanks to thee
And serve in great humility.

For it was in the same spirit that once, having gained no human congregation, he ecstatically started preaching to the birds—‘preaching’ : we wonder! the sweetness and innocence of their music is the nearest thing to angelic beauty we know; surely they, like the devas, as Rāmānuja says under the subsequent Śūtra, “Meditate only on the highest Ātman”. For in the madhu vidyā, not only the creaturehood of the world is realized, but the whole of the world of worlds glorifying the Lord. Then one not only sings Holy, Holy, Holy, but ALLELU-YAH, HOSANNA IN THE HIGHEST! Dante’s Music of the Spheres, which was not really understood until (Paradiso XXVIII : 94)²⁸

I heard Hosannas ring from choir to choir,
Praising the One Point which their ‘ubi’ sets
And will forever hold them as of old.

For these Hosannas express (Paradiso XXIX : 136-144) as they reflect

The primal Light, which shines upon all these,
By them in modes as many is received,
As are the splendours, wherein It unites;
And thence, just as upon the conceptive act
Affection follows, so in modes diverse,
Fervid or cooler, doth Love’s sweetness glow.

But we may not always remain in this supernal sweetness; all the best mystics were against trying to hold ourselves in it too long, for it holds dangers of perversion. The Return continues : the upakṣaśalavidyā brings the focus again back to the heart. But there is a distinctive difference between this heart-focus and that of the first two vidyās: there, in the ascending order, the Presence is considered primarily as Being; here, in the order, of the Return, it is realized as Personal, with the fullness of the attri-
butes of which amṛtam is the first—the nectar of the angelic order is brought into the heart. (Ch. Up., IV, 15:1 & Br. Sūt. I:2:13) This is still continued in the Śāndilya vidyā, wherein, as distinct from the vidyās of the ascending order, where the microcosm is seen in the perspective of the macrocosm (though already as Antaryāmin), the macrocosm is seen as inherent in the microcosm, and intimacy is added to immediacy in reference to the Antaryāmin, (Ch. Up. III: 14: 1 & Br. Sūt. II: 3: 1-4 & III: 3: 19).

Concerning the next, the Paramapurūṣavidyā, there seems to be some unclarity of interpretation, but we gather that the emphasis here must be that, since the question raised therein is the role of Brahma, the ‘creator’ god who exists as extending out from the ‘lotus’ (the nerve-plexus, or chakra of tántric yoga) of the navel, the Return is here extended from the heart down to the navel, with the result that the Antaryāmin being realized as Personally abiding here also, creativity in the world is realized—not that one any longer marvels at creation as wonderful, but that one himself becomes the centre or instrument of the creativity of the Antaryāmin itself. One no longer enjoys (this being the object of the advice against dwelling in the heart-sweetness too long) only, but participates aggregatively in the creative Fruition of the Holy Spirit—the sacramentalization, actively, of the external world of which we have spoken. This is reinforced by the intonation of the praṇava OM in such a way that the vibrations are felt in the navel, as well as in the head. For it is extremely important in yoga practice, as a guard against insanity, not only to get the kuṇḍalini up, but to bring it down again, although it will be realized in practice that this downward-going (which Nietzsche exalted in words, but evidently did not achieve in practice) is not just a return to the former condition, but is a sort of Promethean bringing down of the secrets of the gods to the world, or the Zarthustran prophetic awakening of the world to the Creative Light. (Śrī Bhāṣya I:3:12) First it manifests itself—the sacramentalization—in the external things of the world, and in the world of men, in the Vaiśvānara Vidyā (Śrī Bhāṣya I: 2: 25), wherein one realizes the Antaryāmin as dwelling in all jivas—or, to transpose into the Christian terminology, the koinonia, community, sobornost—is established. The connection also with fire
(Agni) is not insignificant for comparative studies, since the association of the Holy Spirit with fire in the New Testament is well-known, as well as the association with prāṇa, pneuma, breath. Thus is eros transsubstantiated, so to speak, into agape.

But the cenobitic life, though it is the common ground for all in sacramentalized intentional community, is not the final end. For some, at least—and for these only for the further spiritualization of what is left behind—there remains the hermit’s retreat in order to achieve the final consummation in the pañcāgnividya. St. Bonaventura and all true Franciscans constantly reiterate the condition of St. Francis in his last days: he was literally consumed in the fire of the Seraphim which administered the stigmata to him, and he scarcely was among men any longer, but sought solitude more and more. We are reminded, again, of the Russian Startsi, the hermits of the monasteries who, having achieved the highest grades of contemplation, were excused from the duties of community life and retired into strict solitude, even though pilgrims would often travel thousands of miles on foot only to get their ‘darsan’ as they prostrated, and return with the blessing which as often as not was given in complete silence. In both Indian and Christian tradition, the via negativa has always remained the crown of the via affirmativa; that is the pañcāgnividya, the path of light, in which all other paths, as we see in Sūtra IV: 3: 1, are consummated; and it is the only final path: light, day, half month, half year, devaloka, the sun, and lightning: transfiguration, in a word, or Beatitude. All karmas have been left behind, burned up in the fire of solitude. Deification—and we must not forget that Bonaventura uses the word quite as openly as Origen—sets in.

And the deification is consummated in Nyāsa vidyā, prapatti, self-surrender, which will be our concern in the next chapter.

THE VIDYĀS—BONAVENTURA

All of these stages are explicated in detail in Bonaventura’s In Hexaemeron as vividly as in the Sūtras we have been considering—and in their sociological implications as well, although we cannot be diverted into this topic at present. We may only note in passing that, in the fourth pāda of the third adhyāya—
perhaps the most neglected by indologists, oddly enough—
these sociological implications are thoroughly worked out, and
with a result remarkably resembling western medieval socio-
logy: the earthly and the heavenly hierarchy are seen as in a
metaphysical continuum so that each stage of the spiritual pil-
grimage analogically undergirds the structure of the society itself. But
not only that: though the different stages are set, they are not
limiting; the hierarchic is only normative, and is always counter-
balanced with the democratic: any varña or āśrama may
afford full opportunity for realization of the highest spiritual
state; and the guarantee of this is bhakti. We may only cite
Sūtra III:4:46, where Rāmānuja says,

(A) Brāhmaṇa is one that does brahma vidyā; he should
obtain pāṇḍītya, i.e., he should know the nature of Brahma,
to be meditated upon, fully and without doubt or mis-
conception; that is he should obtain a clear and full grasp
(vedana) of the subject, that cannot be attained by hear-
ing (śravaṇa) and thinking (manana) alone. This must
come from the predominance of the quality sattva, which again
must come from love of Brahman (Bhagavad bhakti) (italics
ours).... his mind must dwell on the nature of Brahma as it
is, in order that he may attain brahma vidyā (nīdidhyāsana)
...(becoming brāhmaṇa) means attains vidyā fully grown
(dhyāna); and this is to be attained with such helps only....the
conclusion is that for all stages of life pāṇḍītya (correspond-
ing to Vaisvānara vidyā ?), bālya (corresponding to paṇcāgni
vidyā ?) and mauna (corresponding to nyāsa vidyā ?)
are prescribed like the duties of those stages.

This whole movement we have discerned in the vidyās, e.g., the
ascent, the descent, and the regressus in Deum is traced very close
to the end of the In Hexaemeron, and constitutes perhaps the
last thing St. Bonaventura wrote. It is fitting, therefore that we
conclude with it. It is necessary, he says, that the hierarchiza-
tion of the human soul follows the structure of the celestial
hierarchy, the vegetative (the tāmasic) corresponding to the
angelic order, the animal (the rājasic) to the cherubic, and the
intellective (the sāttvic) to the seraphic. The first (the ascent)
is covered first by nature, secondly by industry, third by grace
in accordance with the grades of angels. In more detail, the
first by nuntio, dictatio, ductio; the second by ordinatio, roboratio,
imperatio; the third by susceptio, revelatio, unio.
Then the descent is according to the virtues which are suspected, custodied; and distributed copiously, studiously, and liberally. The copious suspeting must be with a vivicity of desire, a perspicacity of scrutiny, and a tranquility of judgment; the studious custody must be with an authority of ruling, a virility of proposing, and a nobility of triumphing; and the liberal distributing with a clarity (praeclaritas) of exemplifying, the truth of eloquence, and the humility of accommodation (obsequendi), for the sake of the praise of God, the utility of final reward, and the necessity of our neighbours. Thus, as the ascent terminates in love (caritas—agape), so the descent terminates in humility.

But the regressus in Deum, as the culmination of what we have been considering all through this chapter, as well as by way of preparation for the next, we cannot but record verbatim:

The third mode of hierarchization is the final (penes) regressus in Deum. It also takes the shape of triplex gradation, according to Gregory’s Super Ezelielem: for everything that comes into contemplation is either within us, or outside (extra) us or above us; for man contemplates God either in the things which are above, within, or without, according to (Aristotle’s scheme of) the three noble operations (of the soul) that is the animal, the intellectual, and the divine. Thus as to the exterior powers, the soul has three, which are discrete vividness (praelustratio) in respect to the cognitive, discrete selectiveness (praelictio) in respect to the amative, and discrete prosecution as to the motive. Thus according to the first the soul should consider the world through particular senses, through the sensus communis (antahkarana), and through the imagination (buddhi), in such a way that nothing be admitted thereby which would be useless or dangerous or suspect, as Eve did in introducing the beguiling eloquence of the serpent. This is the angelic custody; and it corresponds to the order of the Angels. The second, the discrete selectiveness, implies both order and grades of goods; and this corresponds to the Archangels. The third follows, the discrete prosecution among the things discretely selected; and this corresponds to the Principalities. Grace operates in (all) three: in the first a little bit (inimic); in the second, more or less (medie); in the third, supremely.

The second hierarchization is in respect to the interior powers of the soul, among which the first is the discrete cleansing (castigatio) of the passions by overting the contrary powers, such as giving consent to suggestions. For he (the
Tempter) comes as prince of this world, and has and discovers much in us which these passions govern so that always the more they are pruned, the more they sprout forth; for there is therein a triple root, viz., the libido of possessing of becoming proud, and of luxuriating. These therefore must be pruned everyday by humility, by chastity, and by poverty, because they are always sprouting like the buds of a shrub; and thus the devil will find nothing. This corresponds to the Powers.

The second is discrete strengthening (comfortatio). For the soul is inclined to a threefold infirmity, that is the infirmity of negligence, of impatience, and of diffidence. For whoever are thus far neglectful will sell themselves out cheap, perilously, in omission and boastfully in commission. There is need then, for the soul to be re-formed by vigilance of the mind, by tolerance of the mind, and by confidence of the mind. And it is helped in this by the order of Virtues. The third is the discreet convocation of the forces (virium) of the soul. Whenever the soul is perturbed by noxious forces, such as irrational fury, or rational forces such as demented desire, or by desire-forces such as wanton phantasy, by irascible forces such as the three furies are wont to impress on the soul, even when abjures these forces in their works, then it has power over itself and is never expelled from its proper house and kingdom. Such a soul God inhabits, but not in a soul abounding in furies.

This district corresponds to the Dominions. Thus lies the pattern of the middle hierarchization: the major difficulty being found here, in the proceeding according to discretion.

The third hierarchization of the mind is according to what is above. For when the soul does all it can, then grace easily lifts it above itself and God accomplishes (operatur) whatever pertains to Himself. But to this sort of elevation first is required a worthy superadmission: ‘Arise in the night and pour out your heart like water’ ‘Lord, all my desires are before Thee’. This corresponds to the Thrones. Secondly, circumspection is required; for then no soul ought to be hateful after inspection, but it must also use attentive circumspection and speculate with much intuition (not, here, intuition). ‘Arise, shine, Jerusalem, for thy light is come’.

‘Arise, stand in the highest and see the joy which has come to thee from thy Lord thy God’ etc.; ‘then thy heart will marvel and dilate when he shall have turned to thee’ (Isaiah 60: 1: 52: 2; Baruch 4: 36; 5: 5; Isaiah 60: 5). This circumspection (literally, looking around) corresponds to the Cherubim. Thirdly, here is required a worthy induction (literally: a being led in). For now the soul is ravished (rapitur: really, raped!) by its Delight, saying, ‘Let his
left hand be under my head, and his right hand embrace me' 'My Beloved is mine, and I am his' (Canticles 2:6; 6:3). Then indeed it senses unction, and 'whoever is united with the Lord is one spirit with Him (I Cor. 6:17). These things are done to the soul in the supreme, and make it to be in the heavens. And this induction corresponds to the Seraphim.

Thus in the second consideration the little lights of the Church militant (on earth) appear as the moon under the feet of the contemplating soul, and it is crowned 'with the crown of twelve stars' (Apoc. 12:1) through the contuption (here; not intuition) of God Himself: it has been hierarchized in deiformity. For it has the 'crown of twelve stars' because it is full of lights and can never divert its eye from the Light; and since in this life it cannot consist in one light, it has twelve, around which it moves in the same way the sun moves through the twelve signs in the heavens. For these stars of its own crown are twelve like the considerations or speculations as follows: The first is the consideration of natural bodies, the second, spiritual substances, the third, intellectual knowledges, the fourth influences of the virtues, the fifth, the institution of the laws of divinity, the sixth, the infusion of divine graces, the seventh the irreprehensible judgments, the eighth, the incomprehensible mercies, the ninth, remunerable merits, the tenth remunerated rewards, the eleventh, discernment (decursuum) of the times, the twelfth the eternal laws (rationum).

Moreover the sun of the mind, that is, the serenity of the contemplating soul, must tarry (morari) a bit for the sake of its own mode, and take caution against eclipse, which comes from the intersection of the two. For in the heavens, that is, in the fastening of the contemplating mind, there are two intersections: one in the tail of the Dragon, the other in the head of the Dragon. For with the motion of the moon the mathematicians assign a double circle, equal as it were, which is concentric with the earth and is in the superficial eclipse, and the different circle which is eccentric (and so on, in detail according to medieval astronomy...) For the moon has more influence on us when it is in the ecliptical line of the head of the Dragon: and thus it is said to be the head of the Dragon for this reason; in the remaining point it is said to be the tail. Therefore the head is above us, and the Tail by us.

These things can be adapted to the motion of contemplation, in whose motion an eclipse is especially perilous: for most lazily may the contemplative fall. And moreover he falls doubly: either through presumption, through seeing that he
is illuminated, or through blinding, or the error of estimation which arises from presumption and from 'vanity', as when he believes he has everything through revelation. In taking caution against these errors he ought always to have the rule of the Scriptures at hand, just as Christ appeared to the Apostles on the mount of transfiguration between Moses and Elias—that is, the Evangel between the law and the Prophets. Without these no man ought to believe any revelation whatsoever that does not say 'Thus says the Lord'!

For the contemplative man must be humble, lest he be endangered in the Head of the Dragon; he ought to be circumspect, lest he be endangered in the tail.

Therefore this woman, viz., the hierarchized soul, having the sun and the moon and the crown of twelve stars, sees in her contemplation two visions; the arc and the city (e.g., the arc of contemplative Rest signified by that of Noah, and the city of the heavenly Jerusalem, the patria, the Fatherland, which the earthly society, as in the philosophy of history as founded in Augustine's Civitas Dei, reflects or adumbrates: thus the celestial and the terrestrial, the homo viator and the beatified saint are contuited in one harmony of the Love of God.)

Thus

This contemplative Wisdom is the reclination of gold, which no one may have unless he has also the columns of silver and the ascent of purple (for so the Vulgate translates the Canticles 3:9: King Solomon made himself a palanquin, from the cedars of Lebanon. He made its columns of silver, its seat of gold, and its body of purple, its interior inlaid with ebony). For these columns are the stabilizing virtues of the soul. Moreover this ascent is love (caritas—bhakti), which makes the soul now ascend to God, now descend to its neighbour, now to the interior, now to proceed for the sake of utility to one's neighbour to the exterior. Whence whether we surge up (excedamus) in mind to God, or whether we descend to our neighbour, it is the Love of God that urges us on (II Cor. 5:13-14), and at length (tandem) we arrive (perveniemus) at the place of peace, of solace, of quiet, which may He deign to establish (praestare) in us, who with the Father and the Holy Spirit reigns and lives, Christ, the Son of the Father, to ages of ages. Amen.
BHAKTI AS UPĀSANĀ

1. *Tatindramatadipikā* by Śrīnivāsadāsa, English Translation and notes by Swāmī Adidevānanda, Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa Maṭh, Mylapore, Madras, 1949. There is another edition, a translation by Govindāchārya, published by the Meykandin Press, Madras, 1912, which is very valuable, although long since out of print.

2. *Gitārtha Saṅgrahā* of Yāmuna, with explanations from Vedānta Deśikā, Translated (and edited in his very useful way) by V. K. Rāmānuja-chāri, Kumbakonam, 1913, pp. 1-3. There is another study of this classic in the Journal of the Śrī Veṅkaṭēsvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati, Vol. XII No. 1 (1951) by Tattāchārya.


4. *Rāmānuja’s Commentary on the Bhagavad Gitā*, translated by Īśvaradatta (with introduction and notes) Chandrakanth Press, Hyderabad, Decan, 1930. The more popular translation is that by Govindāchārya, published at Madras in 1818. We have never had the good fortune, however, of having access to both of these translations at the same time. All quotations henceforth, unless otherwise noted, are from Īśvaradatta’s translation.

4.a *Gitā Bhāṣya*, XV : 19.

5. *Śrī Bhāṣya*, translated into English by V. K. Rāmānujāchāri. Published by the author, Kumbakonam, 1930. This edition is not a translation in the strict sense, but has been done with expert intelligence and in excellent format. All quotations from the Śrī Bhāṣya are from this edition unless otherwise noted.


8. ibid., p. 292 ff.

9. *Being and Having* by Gabriel Marcel, translated by K. Farrer Dacre, 1949. Unfortunately, we have not had access to the French original of this.


15. I Sent. XVII, I:1:1 Vol. I, p. 238) Translation, as all below, ours. The text we have used throughout is the *Editio Minor*, Published (as also the opuscula) by the Franciscan Fathers at Quaracchi (Italy) 1934 and subsequently. The reply to the Doubt is found under Dubium V (Vol. I, p. 247).

16. *La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventura*, par Etienne Gilson, troisième Edition (Paris, Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin. 1953, p. 332-3) Unfortunately, we have not had access to the English translation. The translation here, as all below, is our own.


18. *Editio Minor*, p. 219 ff. The whole section under discussion is Visio III, Coll. VII.


20. op. cit. pp. 365-6 (italics ours).


23. op. cit., p. 175 ff.

24. ibid., p. 197 f.

25. Gabriel Marcel! *Being and Having* Dacre (Westminster) 1949, p. 117 (italics ours). We have not had access to the French Original of this work.


27. ibid., p. 167 (italics ours)


29. See also III: 4: 12, where it is made clear that the mere knowledge of the texts is not equivalent to meditation (dhyāna).

30. *Journal Metaphysique*, pp. 238-240

31. Śrī Bhāṣya, I: 1: 11, Translation of Raṅgāchārya and Āiyengār Published by The *Brahmavadin Press*, Madras, 1899.


34. The translation (here, as below) is that of A. Mahādeva Śastri, published by the GTA Press, Mysore, 1901.

35. The translation (here, as below) is that of S. Subhā Rau, *Printed at the Minerva Press*, Madras, 1906.

37. *The Vedānta Sūtras with the commentary of Śrī Madhvacārya* translated into English by S. Subhā Rau (second edition), printed at the Śrī Vyāsa Press, Tirupati, 1936. All citations below from Madhva’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya are also from this edition.


39. ibid., p. 7.

40. ibid., pp. 9, 10.

41. ibid., p. 260, 261.


43. op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 313, ff (italics ours).


45. op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 98 ff.

46. Thibaut’s translation (Sacred Books of the East, Vol XXXIV).

47. *A Free Translation of the TIRUVOIMOLI of Sathakopa* by N. Kuruttatvalar Āiyengār, printed at the Vakulabharanam Press, Madras, 1929. All subsequent quotations from this classic are from this edition.

48. Ibid.


52. ed. cit. p. 88 seqq. (Viso I Coll. II, 3).

53. op. cit. p. 129-130.

54. ibid., p. 102 (italics ours, as below).

55. ibid., p. 105

56. ibid., p. 108.

57. ibid., p. 110

58. ibid., p. 118.


60. Śrīnivāsāchārī, op. cit. pp. 247-8.

61. op. cit., p. 96.

62. op. cit., p. 33.


64. ibid., pp. 72-3.

65. Śrī Bhāṣya I: 1: 3.


68. ibid., p. 158.

69. *In Hexaemeron*, ed. cit. p. 144 f. (italics ours)
73. ibid., p. 226.
74. ibid., p. 227 see also Bonnefoi, op. cit. p. 195.
75. ibid., pp. 19-20.
78. *Man against Mass Society* by Gabriel Marcel, translated by G. S. Frazer (Regnery, 1952) pp. 142-3. We have not had access to the French Original of this work.
79. Gilson, op. cit. p. 278.
80. ibid., pp. 318, 319.
81. ibid., pp. 322 ff and 412.
82. Longpré, op. cit. p. 63.
83. ibid., p. 191.
84. ibid., p. 57.
85. ibid., p. 195.
86. Lacombe, op. cit., p. 314.
87. P. N. Śrīnivāsāchāri, op. cit., p. 365.
88. The translation (as all below) is that of E. C. Lowe (Js. Parker and Co., London, 1904).
89. ed. cit. p. 258.
90. ibid., p. 260.
91. ibid., p. 273.
PRAPATTI

Introduction

Every age has had, and no doubt will continue to have, its sinners and saints as well as its sages and fools. True it is that there have been fluctuations or rather undulations of religious fervour and tides of zeal and negligence. But as the Scriptures say, “God is not mocked”; He remains. Therefore Religion remains—perhaps not the religion that most men know, but religion as the availability of God to those who become his sons by adoption and grace, to those who come to Him submissively, repentently, whether as returning or as experiencing conversion. Prapatti, surrender, therefore remains the heart of all religion, as Whitehead has aptly put it in the already famous paragraph in his *Science and the Modern World*:1

The vision claims nothing but worship; and worship is a surrender to the claim for assimilation, urged with the motive force of mutual love. The vision never overrules. It is always there, and it has the power of love presenting the one purpose whose fulfilment is eternal harmony. Such order as we find in nature is never force—it presents itself as the one harmonious adjustment of complex detail. Evil is the brute motive force of fragmentary purpose, disregarding the eternal vision. Evil is overruling, retarding, hurting. The power of God is the worship He inspires. That religion is strong which in its ritual and its modes of thought evokes an apprehension of the commanding vision. The worship of God is not a rule of safety—it is an adventure of the spirit, a flight after the unattainable. The death of religion comes with the repression of the high hope of adventure.

Nevertheless, Whitehead remained among the class of “polite” philosophers; he never underwent any major crisis of faith or conversion in his personal life. But since the revival of interest in Kierkegaard and in the problems of negation among the existentialists and others, the issue of surrender and commitment and of the necessity of grace has again taken the foreground. Marcel, for example, underwent the experience of conversion; and a study of his development and of his consciousness of the implica-
tions of this sort of approach to reality—of the necessity for example, of grace for the realization of true freedom—would be in order, would it not demand too much attention in proportion to our basic study? For him human freedom, even human life lived adequately, demands an ontological mutation which grace alone can effect; and grace does not come so easily as the things which concern man only as man; without it, man inevitably is plunged into ugliness or the frustrations of nihilism. Even dialectic is all in vain except as a reductive process leading to that Something which is beyond despair. And that Something can be nothing but Love—the Love of God. This is such a basic theme for him that it is hard to extract an adequate citation but perhaps the following few words at the close of his critique of Sartre's *Etre et le Neant* will indicate something of the stringency of the issue:

The only authentic transcendence, it not the act by which we become disengaged from those givens and those conditions, and substitute for them renewed givens and conditions? Again it is necessary to recognize, according to all appearance, that that act cannot be accomplished with the resources of our own being abandoned to itself, but that it requires the assistance or an influx which is nothing other than that grace.

Grace, in short, requires humility; not the pathological humility which psychologists rightly condemn, which comes from self-humiliation, but

One could even go so far as to say that (humility, true humility) does not consist in the act of humbling oneself but above all in the recognition of one's proper negation (neant). At the root of humility there is an affirmation more or less inarticulate: "I am nothing by myself and I can do nothing by myself, but solely in so far as I am not only assisted but moved forward (promn) into being by Him who is all and who can do all."

This last expression is perhaps the best 'definition' of prapatti that one could find anywhere. This chapter is really nothing more than an exploration of the implications of this attitude, which is also an act. We shall confine ourselves almost solely to its importance and development in Bonaventura and Rāmānuja, with some particular attention to the interpretation of the Vadagelai sect, among whom it is the true beginning and end of all philosophy and religion.
Turning again to the Yatindra-mata-dipika, we find, although the author belongs to the Tengelai sect, a clever reconciling of the two school’s interpretation by including the essential doctrine under different heads. In VII 24, he states what is really the Vadagalai interpretation, that prapatti is a limb (aṇga) of bhakti, coming as the culmination of the higher forms of bhakti. Indeed, if one follows out his interpretation of phala-bhakti, it can even be argued (and here we are supported by Paṇḍita Jagu Veṅkaṭāchārya of Melkote) that prapatti comes as the final fruit of bhakti, that is to say, if one follows through with adequate techniques of devotion, one will be led to the point of abandon, of an ecstatic leap, into that relation with God wherein the conscious will is no longer active, but is overcome, as it were, by the operation of God’s own will itself replacing the human will, this coming as at once the reward of one’s effort, and as the cessation of all effort in the full operation of Grace. But in paragraph 28 he states precisely what is really the Tengelai interpretation, including the other synonyms:

“Nyāsavidyā is self-surrender. What is called prapatti is ‘to conceive what is in conformity (with the will ofĪśvara) to reject what is disagreeable (toĪśvara), to have firm faith as “He will save me”, to seek Him alone as the protector, and to surrender one’s self to Him in all meekness’. Thus it has five constituents. Nyāsa denoted by saraṇāgati and other terms, is that particular state of consciousness which grants liberation at the finis of this body and which is to be performed but once. This (doctrine of) prapatti has to be known from the mouth of the preceptor and esoteric works in the traditional manner…”

And again, in VIII : 21 & 22, he epitomizes practically all of what we shall come to see in detail:

A Prapanna is he who, being characterized by the attributes of ‘being helpless and devoid of other refuge’ resorts to Bhagavān. He is also of two kinds, as one who is intent on the three ends of life and the one who is intent on the release (the fourth end). The devotee of the three ends is he who appeals to Bhagavān alone for dharma, artha and kāma. The devotee of release, possessing the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal by means of holy company, becomes dispassionate on account of his disgust for the transmigratory existence; (consequently) the desire for release arises in his (mind), and to attain that goal he takes
recourse to a spiritual preceptor who is distinguished by the characteristics of an (ideal) teacher such as (stated in the text) 'the teacher is he who is well versed in the Veda' etc.; (and) through the instrumentality of that (teacher) he resorts to (the Divine Mother) Śrī, who is the mediator (between him and the Lord); (then) being unable to follow other paths such as bhakti etc., and therefore feeling helpless and refugeless, he takes shelter at the feet of Śrīman Nārāyaṇa as the only means. He (who is of this description) is called prapanna. Everyone (irrespective of caste or profession) is qualified for self-surrender.

"The prapanna is of two kinds, as the ekāntin (the one-pointed) and the parama-ekāntin (the extremely one-pointed). He is ekāntin who seeks from Bhagavān alone liberation along with other (worldly) fruits. The meaning is that to him other gods are simply non-existent. He is parama-ekāntin who does not desire other fruits even from Bhagavān himself except devotion and knowledge. He is (again) of two kinds, because of the difference as being dṛpta (patient aspirant) and ārta (impatient aspirant). Dṛpta is he who experiences the fruits of his previous deeds (as expressed in the saying) 'necessarily it must be experienced'; and waits (patiently) for the casting off of this body (for the attainment of release). The ārta is he who conceives the longing for release immediately after the (act of) self-surrender, since he feels the state of transmigratory existence as extremely unbearable like one who is enveloped by blazing flames."

In the next paragraph, he goes on to trace what would now be thought the mythological path of the released soul through the various worlds—a path not at all unlike that described by Dante in the Divine Comedy. Only two things may be noted in passing, namely, that this is the same pattern as that described in the Brahma Sūtras in the section in which Rāmānuja considers phala-bhakti, although Śrīnivāsa says it is the one who has performed prapatti who goes along this ascent; and that the final stage before launching out into the spiritual cosmic space (the Empyrean) is the full establishment of the Antaryāmin (which we equate, along with Govindāchārya, without reserve, with the Holy Spirit of the Christian Trinity) in unreserved operation in the core of the heart.
SECTION I

A

PRAPATTI IN THE UPANIŚADS

But the rest we take simply as the introduction, without commentary, to the present chapter, since all that we may add will actually be an elaboration of Śrīnivāsa’s text. First, let us take a glance into the Upaniṣads.

Although it must be frankly admitted that prapatti as a doctrine is discussed very little in Upaniṣadic texts as such, and that the Southern Vaiṣṇavas of both sects actually derive most of their express tradition in this regard from the Saṃhitās, the Itihāsas, and the Tamil Prabandams, nothing is more obvious than the fact that by example, the tradition of obedience to the guru is one of the foundation stones, if not the very corner-stone, of all Vedāntic life and practice. Now, since, as we have already seen, śaraṇāgati means nothing more (or less) than prapatti, and, as we shall see, ācāryābhimāna is in turn if not completely synonymous with śaraṇāgati, the most intense form of it, we need not even assert our point: even though most interpreters of the Upaniṣads have stressed the jñāna element, and the supposed “isolationism” of concentration on the Self of one’s self in solitude, it remains patent that it is hard indeed to find a passage in the whole literature where this is enjoined without the help of a guru, a teacher, an ācārya. Moreover, not only implicit active (or passive ?) obedience as such is in evidence, but actual worship. The passages are too numerous to list, and too easy to find, even for the most ignorant beginner. We therefore pass them by as already well-known.

But lest it be thought that the doctrine is not explicitly stated at all, we must point to three passages which Śrī-vaiṣṇava us as authoritative. The first is Muṇḍaka, II:i:i:4, where, within the text itself, the esoteric interpretation of the praṇava, OM, is laid down:
"The mystic syllable OM (praṇava) is the how. The arrow is the soul (ātman). Brahma is said to be the mark (lakṣya). By the undistracted man is It to be penetrated. One should come to be in It, as the arrow (in the mark)."

In Pillai Lokāchārya’s Mumukṣupadī and many other favourite texts, this esoteric interpretation is further elaborated thus: The letter A represents Paramātm, as Nārāyaṇa, as the source of all things, ideas and worlds etc.; the letter U represents Śrī (Lakṣmī) as the Mediatrix (who makes prapattī possible by making Viṣṇu easily accessible); and the letter M represents the soul as the ādheya, or the one supported and benefitted by prapattī. We shall see more of this later.

Then, in the Brahmananda Vallī of the Taittirīya, a still further foundation for the same esoteric interpretation:

"OM! He who knows Brahma, attains the highest!
As to that this (verse) has been declared:
He who knows Brahma as the real (satya) as knowledge (jñāna) as infinite (ananta),
Set down in the secret place (of the heart) and in the highest heaven (parame vyoman)
He obtains all desires
Together with the intelligent (vipascit) Brahma."

Here the first point is obvious enough: the three primary attributes of Brahma which Rāmānuja makes of the utmost importance, indicate the End for which and to Whom prapattī is made. The second point indicates Śrī as the highest of the Vibhūtis, as “Queen of Heaven” and also indicates the role of Antaryāmin. And the third point indicates the fruit of prapattī: not only Brahmavidyā, but all goods as well, for both the drpta and ārta types of prapannas get all this, the former getting complete salvation along with the gifts for which he makes his surrender, and the latter getting all and more than he could desire, both because Bhagavān’s Grace includes all benefits along with the gift of Himself, and because He is everything:

In the Śvetāśvatara (VI:18) there is the most explicit reference, where the roots of both terms, Šarāṇagati and prapattī are used:

mumukṣur vai Šarāṇam ēkam prapadye
(To him who of old creates Brahma,
And who, verily, delivers to him the Vedas—
To that God, who is lighted by his own intellect,
Do I, being desirous of liberation, resort as a shelter—

Indeed, as P.N. Śrīnīvāsāchārya points out, this is the basic
text upon which Rāmānuja based his Śaṅkara Gadya, with
which we shall deal later; and it is paralleled by Nammalvar
thus:

"Lakṣmi, residing always on the lotus flower and who is
ever youthful, made Thy breast her seat. Thou hast unequalled
fame. Thou lordest the three worlds. Thou art my Lord.
Thy place is Tirupati. All the crowds of munis and all the
angels with great desire come and take their abode there. I
have no place to bend my head except Thy feet. Such a ser-
vant of Thy feet came and took refuge under them and (will)
never be separated."

And by Yāmunācarya, in his Stotratatna thus:

"Obeisance again and again to Thee, who art beyond the
reach of speech and mind; obeisance again and again to
Thee, who art the sole object of speech and mind; obeisance
again and again to Thee, of infinite powers; again and again
to Thee, the one ocean of infinite mercy."

Then, according to A.V. Gopālachariar, the whole of the
Īśāvāsyopaniṣad is a treatise on prapatti. According to him,
the world tyāga in the first vākya is to be equated with nyāsa;
and bhūjīthā is to be interpreted in the light of the last śloka of
the Gītā, since saving oneself cannot be done except by absolute
self-surrender to God with unquestioning trust; indeed, he goes
so far as to assert that the whole Gītā, is an interpretation of
this Upaniṣad; and the nama ukti motif with which it ends is an
outright expression of prapatti:

"The opening of this Upaniṣad with Īśa and the closing of
it with grateful and prayerful thanksgiving implying the
idea of outright self-surrender to the Īśa, appears to be made
purposely. Īśa and Jīva are described by a Śruti as constit-
tuting a pair of birds in one tree, Īśa and Anīśa. As He is
all power, Jīva is all impotence. His utter impotence is ex-
perienced at every step and every moment. . . . The way out
of Moha and Śoka is to resign himself completely unto Īśa
and lose his self in Him. By doing so, he acquires the spirit-
ual strength of Īśa by His grace. . . ."

In particular, mantras 15 to 18 may be noted. First, we give
the translation of the late Prof. Hiriyanna:
“Truth’s face is covered with a golden lid; remove that, O Pūṣan, that I, Truth’s devotee, may see it”.

Here it is easy to see that prapatti is involved, because the finishing of the upāsanā demands a complete revelation, and the prayer for it (“remove that, O Pūṣan”) has the mood of complete piety—and even desperate demand—which conforms explicitly to our definition of nyāsa-vidyā. Śaṅkara interprets drṣṭaye as “one that practices true piety” or, “for reaching you whose essence is Truth.” This, of course, is as far as an advaitin can go; but the implication is obvious: such ‘reaching’ is not possible without the ‘leap’ of complete surrender.

On Pūṣan, sole traveller, Yama, Sun, child of Prajāpati, recall thy rays; withdraw thy light that I may behold thee of loveliest form. Whosoever that Person is, that also am I. Here, even the advaitin has to admit both the necessity of Grace and the Personal nature of the Deity approached thereby:

“Paśyāmi—i.e., I may see by your grace. Further I am not entreating you as a servant, because whoever is the Person in the Solar disc, composed of nyāḥtis the same am I. He is known as puruṣa (person) because He is of the form of a person, or because this world is full of Him, in His modes of activity and thought or, again, because He lies in the citadel of the body.”

This interpretation, of course, lends itself to emphasis on the antaryāmin, which is always focal in prapatti, and which, from the viśiṣṭādvaita point of view, is an insurmountable difficulty for the advaitin, because non-differentiation would not allow, much less demand, the distinction between parabrahman or the individuated nature of the things indwelt by Him as the śarīrin. It is interesting to note in passing that according to the Gauḍyā (Chaitanya) interpretation, this mantra is an instance of the prapanna dominating the Lord, as it were. This is a mood scarcely allowed in the Southern tradition, however, since it risks the transgression of humility. But the necessity of the operation of grace is common: without the Lord’s prasāda, our efforts are of no effect; indeed, there will truly be no need of effort:

“(May) this life (merge in) the immortal breath! And (may) this body end in ashes! OM! mind, remember, remember the deeds! (17) O God Agni, lead us on to prosperity by a good path, judging all our deeds. Take away ugly sin from us. We shall say many prayers unto Thee.”
Saṅkara notes in particular that bhūyistham indicates repeated obeisance—and it is well known that such obeisance is always taken as an act of śaraṇagati: One does not simply perform upāsanā thereby; one openly, and by a definite coup de grâce, acknowledges one’s entrance into the Lord’s subservience.

Madhva, on the other hand, true to his habitual tendencies, puts the stress on karma throughout, and of course, goes out of his way to emphasize his doctrine of difference between the jīva and Īśvara as Hari. But it must be remembered that for him, prapaṭṭi and karma are even less incompatible than for the Viṣiṣṭādvaita school. Thus, under the second mantra “doing verily works in this world one should wish to live a hundred years...Action cleaves not to a man”, he cites the story of Svāyambhuva Manu in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (VIII: 1:7-18). Svāyambhuva was one of those early princes who renounced his status along with its accompanying luxuries and retired with his wife to the forest to do tapas (penance). Having meditated on the attributes of the Lord, he reaches the peak of his karma performances in śaraṇagati thus:12

“The person who in the first instance engages himself to action at length attains capability in renouncing them. The Omnipotent Lord engages Himself in acts, but does not allow them to attract Him. So those persons who follow in His wake have not to despond, but compass consummation by the attainment of self-control. I (Svāyambhuva Manu) do take refuge under the Lord, who staying in the paths respectively adopted by Him in course of His various incarnations performs acts befitting the time, place and object of those incarnations; yet who is devoid of pride, who is without desire, and who is Absolute Lord, who is not urged by others, who teaches all beings, and who is the stay of all religions.” (Sanyal’s translation)

Under mantras 6 & 7, Madhva stresses the Antaryāmin, although of course his interpretation of it is somewhat different than Rāmānuja’s, as is evident from his analysis of mantra 16, where he seizes on the word ‘Supreme’ as indicating that although Hari “dwells in all and is the ‘measure’ of their existence”, this indwelling is not by way of ‘ensouling’ as with Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, where there is a certain inseparability as of body and soul, but ‘ensouling’ in the sense of dwelling in them as separate, hypostasized Lord who controls them in a relation of dependence ab
extra, not essentialiter at introque as Bonaventura would put it.

Likewise, under mantra 17, Madhva takes the reference to Vāyu as indicating saraṅgagati, since Vāyu as a god of lower rank, himself takes refuge in Viṣṇu. For Madhva, to whom the transcendent nature of God is everything, cannot allow that Viṣṇu is only the ‘highest’ deity, but the only deity.

Aurobindo’s famous commentary,13 true to his gnostic tendency, is closer to that of the advaitin, and misses the real import of the saraṅgagati with all its moral implications implicit throughout. For him, it is the “perception of Unity” in “cosmic consciousness”, and has difficulty in avoiding the advaitic corollary of māyā in regard to the Many; for asserting that the One is identity, he still tries to assert that the three basic schools (advaita, viśiṣṭādvaita and dvaita) can be simultaneously valid—which is absurd, because it cannot in the same breath—not to mention the strictly logical difficulties—be asserted that attainment is purely of a gnostic order and yet also of the nature of will and affection! He misses the necessity of the “leap” between self-renunciation as the negative condition of realization and the realization itself. His emphasis on the personal nature of Brahman is in right accordance with the text; but this is difficult to reconcile with his acceding to the advaita version of the nāma-rūpa doctrine, which is not supported by the text. Again, when he says that “life has to be transcended in order that it may be freely accepted”, he does not really explain the act of this transcendence, but involves himself in the māyāvādin’s (and he is supposed to have refuted that!) assertion that the bondage the soul is in is only apparent; the soul is “really free and only plays (!) at being bound”: overlooking prapatti, he must perforce explain away the reason for it, and not explain it; prapatti is no mere game! Thus he undermines the seriousness of the “complete submission of the individual to the divine Will” and the submission to the Lord as the universal and transcendent in the fully self-conscious action” which he asserts is (one of the) “keys of the divine gates—the gates of immortality”.

It would be extreme, of course, to assert that Veṇkaṭanātha’s commentary14 is the only truly correct one, but even a perfunctory perusal of it leads one readily to acknowledge that it is at
least the most careful one. A true scholar, he discreetly weighs the two recensions (Kāṇva and Mādhyandina), and as discreetly takes in all the commentaries previous to his own.

He also differs from Śaṅkara in regard to the first and second mantra. The injunction to do karma is not a concession to the ajñāni, but as indicating that the ajñāni, as a seeker, a upāsaka should take up karma yoga as leading to prapatti. And Gopalachariar is quite right in extending the meaning of renunciation in this context as having not only the negative aspect of self-denial in regard to sensual pleasures, but also the positive aspect of enjoyment of spiritual love. “the way to save the soul” he says, “is to enjoy it. By enjoying it, you protect it. Not to enjoy it is to kill it. It claims your first love. Not getting it, it languishes broken-hearted...” Veṅkaṭanātha himself simply and emphatically says, “giving up undue attachment for the world, love and enjoy God.” In this light, karma also takes on the aspect of kainkarya, service of humanity not so much as a means or approach to prapatti, as an expression of it, as niṣkāma karma. In this light, Gopalachariar is quite right in further supporting Veṅkaṭanātha’s interpretation with copious citations of the Gitā.

The second section (3 to 8) is treated in the light of the Brahma Sūtras (III : iv, passim), in which, according to Rāmānuja, the triad of tattva, hita, puruṣārtha, or the principle, the means and the end of sādhana, is taught, with the emphasis on the sarīra-sarīrin relation, which, as we shall later see, is the metaphysics behind prapatti. In a word, God as Antaryāmin is both means and end; and prapatti is simply “allowing” him to take back what is really his and his only; the bondage to self-hood is really stealing the soul from its Lord. As Gopalachariar puts it, “Without losing oneself in Īśa by unreservedly and wholly entering or slipping into Him leaving no trace of selfishness or personal narrowness, it will not be possible to realise any sense of unity with the rest of creation.” For as Antaryāmin, the Lord dwells not only in the individual jīvātmān, but in all bhūtas, all creatures, enveloping them while dwelling in them.

Coming to the 9th mantra, Veṅkaṭanātha interprets the ātma-vidyā motif not as the advaitin doctrine of gnostic ‘realization’ of the identity of jīva-ātman-Brahman, but as the recognition on the part of the seeker that he is himself the “property of the Lord,
not an independent agent”. This is a cardinal point with Rāmānuja himself, as we shall see in dealing with his Gītā Bhāṣya, and is integrally associated with prapatti; indeed, it is prapatti: for it is not only an idea, but a change in orientation of the will and affections. The word upśāte is also significantly rendered as indicating one-pointedness of mind; this is more closely associated with bhakti, but the secondary emphasis on prapatti is also present, since bhakti includes the stages leading to this single pointedness, but prapatti is the expression of it. But lest this one pointedness be still taken as indicating jñāna, Veṅkaṭanātha, following the text more closely than Śaṅkara, says, “Those who are attached to knowledge alone, by neglecting the duties according to their fitness, enter into darkness deeper than the darkness obtained by those doing works alone with one-pointedness of mind.” The mantra itself reads thus:

“Into blinding darkness enter those who are attached to works; into still greater blindness verily those who are attached to knowledge alone.”

Gopalachariar, here, as elsewhere, sees a real sense of humour on the part of the seer who is the author of these mantras. Perhaps this is a bit exaggerated; it is quite a sober and profound truth that is being posited; but he is right in pointing out the parallel in the Gītā: Arjuna is there advised to prefer niṣkāma karma to jñāna—in spite of Śaṅkara.

Likewise the tenth mantra is definitely anti-gnostic, and worthy of receiving particular attention from critics of Upaniṣadic “other worldliness” like Albert Schweitzer:

“They say (the means of attainment) (is) quite different from knowledge: (and) they say that...(the means is) different from works. This (statement) have we heard from those seers who explained that clearly to us.”

Here the role of āraṇaṅgati, in the form of ācāryābhimāna, comes to the fore; and as Gopalachariar suggests, when the “apostolic succession” of these gurus gets somehow interrupted, then Bhagavān Himself becomes again incarnate to renew it—a cardinal point in Hindu philosophy of history, malgre those who say that Hinduism has no philosophy of history! Here, Veṅkaṭanātha’s commentary may be worth following in some detail:

*aḥaḥ*: ye: who, the previous teachers
nah: to us who have approached (them by prostrating ourselves) and others (here there is a reference to Gitā IV: 34, where, in Rāmānuja’s Commentary, karma and āchāryābhimāna go hand in hand).

tat: that, (that is) the means to liberation (which, of course in our tradition is primarily bhakti and prapatti the means and end being identical, namely, God Himself).

tesam dhāraṇam: of those seers who are attached to meditation on the Supreme Self (meditation, that is, as we have seen in the previous chapter, as upāsana, which leads to loving surrender and constant remembrance, like the uninterrupted stream of oil).

yah: (He) who has received the true instruction.

sahā vada: together knows. Because of the necessity for both the main and the subsidiary duties being practised equally... but not because that which has to be followed and that which ought to be rejected are to be equally known. If it be said that because at first (karma) has been censured (as Śaṅkara interprets)...it follows that there is here mention of this group of two rejectables since knowledge has been censured (which is absurd).

amṛtam ainuta: attain immortality (and reference is made to Chāndogya (Upaniṣad (IV: 15: 1)... crossing over death means crossing over the obstacles of the means (of realization—upāya-virodhi); and ‘He attains freedom from death’ declares the achievement of the disappearance of all obstacles to attainment (prapatti-virodhi-nivṛtti lābhokteḥ) (Then in full accordance with tradition, e.g., that these two terms refer to prapatti, he quotes the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (VI: 6: 12): ‘He (Keśidhvaṇa) taking refuge in knowledge (arising from study of the scriptures) seeking knowledge of Brahman as fruit for the sake of crossing over death, then performed many sacrifices, (according to karma), and cites Rāmānuja’s interpretation of avidyā in the Śrī Bhāṣya as that which is ‘next to’ vidyā, and not the determinate negation of it, as with the māyāvādins).

Likewise, as we come to the last mantras (15-18), where a prayer of śaraṇagati par excellence is given, we may note, with Gopalachariar, the similarity of Arjuna’s prayer in the Gitā for the viśva-rūpa, and then the corresponding prayer to remove that, because it is too great for him, and to assume his usual, though still supremely beautiful, form. Under 15, Veṅkaṭaṇātha points out that the appeal to Pūṣan is nothing but śaraṇagati: “O Nourisher! who have the nature of nourishing those who have taken refuge (in thee).”
And under 16, the following explanations:

“ekārṣe: One seer; the sun without a second, or that which is beyond the range of the senses.” Gapalachariar suggests here the need of Grace is indicated, as the only means of getting beyond this ‘range of the senses’.

Yama : all-indwelling controller” Again, Gopalachariar is helpful, here suggesting the motif of death-bed surrender (Yama, of course, being the god of death), and gives the story of Śiśupāla in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa as example (X:74:30 seqq.) This is very apt, since Śiśupāla represents an extreme example not only of prapatti at death—or in death, as it happens to be—but also of how the extreme of hatred causes such enfatuation that bhakti and prapatti follow. Others had been giving Kṛṣṇa all sorts of adoration; but Śiśupāla violently objected, saying that Kṛṣṇa was after all only a cow-herd boy, an upstart who knew nothing of ascetic practices, who had been even excommunicated from all the orthodox systems of religion, and who, no rightful ruler, was only a ‘forest pirate’. Kṛṣṇa killed him instantaneously (in order to save him from further sin of calumny); but from his body came forth an ‘effulgence’ which “entered into the body of Kṛṣṇa, before the very eyes of lookers-on, like a meteor dropping on the earth from the heavens”, thus indicating that in death he had abandoned all selfhood and attained union with the Lord whom he had previously (like Nietzsche?) hated.

The rest of the mantra is a pure expression of this mystical union, which is based on the tat tvam asi mahāvākya, and Vaṅkatanātha gives an excellent summary of the viśiṣṭādvaitic exposition of it, though that cannot capture our attention now, except to note that he accuses the advaitin of taking the tvam (thou) in the sense of “as if”: this would undermine, just as we saw Aurobindo does, the reality of prapatti. Gopalachariar suggests that here is a recurrence of the motif of the first mantra, with tyakteṇa as the keynote, and asserts that this is synonymous with nyāsa. This is in full accord with Vaṅkatanātha, and gives the right sense in which he takes all the references to Ātma-Vidyā, which is in turn synonymous with Ātma-Samarpaṇam, the gift of oneself in self-surrender. He also suggests that God’s Beauty is only thus enjoyed. Under mantra 16, Veṅkaṭa-
nātha notes the word krato, sacrifice, as pointing to Gītā IX:16, where Kṛṣṇa says that he is himself the whole sacrifice, as well as the act of offering it—another reference to the doctrine of identity of means and end.

The word smara, remember, is to be taken in the sense indicated in the Varāha Purāṇa: “O Kesava, the fact that you remember us with your mind which is full of love”... “Afterwards when he is dying and is like wood and stone, I remember that devotee of mine and lead him to the highest culmination”—another highest truth provoking both bhakti and prapatti; we pray that we may be “remembered” at death, only thereby acknowledging that God in his Love never forgets.

Krtaṁ smara : remember that which was done. Reminiscent of Rāmānuja’s Śaṅkara-gati Gadya, Veṅkaṭanātha says:

“Here also the same meaning is intended. ‘What little good thing had been done by me, being grateful do you protect me.’ this is the idea. Or else, ‘remembering all the favours that you have granted me so far, please complete the remainder also yourself’.

Here the undercurrent of his remarks seems to be both the consciousness of sins of commission, which tradition always associates with prapatti as repentance, and the helplessness of the individual to do any good except by the favours and grace granted by the Lord, such favours never occurring except in association with Ātma samarpanam.

The last mantra, as we have already intimated, is packed with prapatti. First, the reference to Agni. In accordance with Brahma Sūtras (I:2:29), we may point out that Agni is not just the primitive god of fire, but is that which leads upwards. The subcommentary on this in the Śrī Bhāṣya further indicates that is as the inner ruler of the psychic heat in the stomach that is really indicated—that is not the power of digestion, but the solar plexus, which is activated by yoga with the result of spiritual ecstasy and katharsis. Gopalachariar further suggests that Agni is the15 “spiritual fire into whom we throw ourselves as an offering with the Mantra of Namaḥ”—e.g., self-immolation in self-oblation.

The word rāya is to be taken not as referring to worldly wealth, (although prapatti may be done even for this) but
only either such “worldly wealth as is necessary to make worship possible, or non-worldly.”

asmān : us : “who have no other attitude of mind and who have no other means (than You)”

Naya vayunām jñānam : “May You, who know as they are all means of realizing the (puruṣārtha) according to the fitness of each individual, be pleased to lead us, who do not know them.”

Gopalachariar appropriately cites a sentiment in Yāmuna-cārya’s Stotra Ratna: “How can I say I give myself to you as my Lord, who own me and whatever is reputed as mine?” It is as much our ignorance—and hence our helplessness—that leads to prapatti as it is our faith that success lies on the other side, so to speak; gnostic self-realization is, by contrast, only a dead-end; one cannot get out of ignorance by knowledge which one simply does not have!

The word jūhurāṇam brings out again the note of resortlessness: “that which bothers us because of its being a bond, or else because of its wickedness of an unimaginable sort.”

enāḥ brings to the foreground the undercurrent of repentance: the sins of omission and of commission, “and which obstructs the experiencing of You.”

Tuyodhī : “remove, destroy, is the meaning” : we can’t get rid of our own sins; only the Lord can banish them.

And the grand climax : Bhūyistham te namauktim vidhema: “We sincerely and repeatedly utter the word namaḥ. Or else, one prays to the Divine to help one to continue repeating the word namaḥ. Verily those who are liberated are mentioned in the Mokṣa Dharma as ‘those who always utter namaḥ.’

“The intention of the word ukti is that though the namas is not mental and physical, by the mere utterance of the word namaḥ, He will be pleased to grant me this Grace.”

If this is not prapatti intense and pure, we do not know what it is! Gopalachariar rightly points out that the Gitā itself closes with the same note, in the cārama śloka where Kṛṣṇa promises deliverance from all sins; and in the 73rd śloka, where Arjuna makes his reply, in gratitude. “by your Grace ...(I am delivered)” We only say AMEN! So be it!

Turning again to the Kaṭhopaniṣad (I: ii: 9 to 11) we find marked, if indirect, reference to, or description of, prapatti. Here
again, the Gauḍya interpretation stresses a certain sense of domi-
ination of Paramātman by the prapanna, which is made possible only by grace. Rāmānuja’s interpretation is not so extreme, but no less relevant. We may note the following points:

“These knowledge cannot be obtained through reasoning. Only when it is taught by another, O my dearest! it is capable of being well known. The same knowledge you have attained to! You are of firm resolution. O Nāciketas! I pray that enquirers of us may be like you. (9).

“tarkeṇa prāpaṇīyā na: It is not attainable through reasoning. Therefore it is not possible to know it by himself, even by one who is well versed in reasoning: this is the meaning.

“preśthā: Dearest: Only the knowledge imparted by a Guru different from one’s own self brings about that knowledge that leads to liberation....

satiyadṛṣṭam asi: You are one whose resolution is firm....”

Here we note the importance of ācāryābhimāna, the usual and practical form of prapatti; the guru is normally indispensable. And we also cannot avoid the inference that anyone whose “resolution is firm” must be a prapanna. The human will is incapable of such determination without the Lord’s grace, and without being focussed in surrender to its destined End. The attainment as well as the expression of such focus is clearly prapatti.

“I know that wealth is transitory. Verily that eternal is not attained through things that are transitory. The fire (altar) Nāciketas was constructed by me with transitory things. I have therefore attained the eternal.(10).

“Preśṭvān asmi: I have attained; this is the meaning....”

“Having perceived the attainment of desires by the world which is the result of action and the far short of fearlessness, endless, full of great qualities, famous and eternal, O Nāci-
ketas! you, the intelligent, rejected the desirables with firm-
ness.”

Here we have an exemplary description of the fruits of prapatti, both positive and negative: mokṣa above all, and the attributes that go with it, as the commentator brings out but:

“Now he speaks of the nature of Liberation (Mokṣa).

anantyaṁ-avaināśītvam: Non-destructability.

abhayaśya pāram-atyantāṁabhāyatvam: absolute freedom from fear.
Stotram mahat: The group of great qualities such as freedom from sin, unfailing desires, etc.

urugåyam-urukirtim: fame and stability.

Perceiving all these also as belonging to liberation, you have rejected the worldly desirables due to your keen discrimination. This is the meaning. Or else all these (adjectives) may be construed as belonging to the Supreme Self. Seeing all desires in the nature of the Supreme Self itself which is the form of liberation (moksa) and that it is the support of all the worlds and that it is itself of the form of infinite results of sacrifice you have rejected the worldly desirables.

Then, in the famous 'election' vâkya of the Kenopanishad (I. ii: 23), in Rañgarâmânuja's commentary we find a classical expression of the idea that prapatti is not just a one-way gift (as may also be found in the above citation from Nammalwar), but is the gift of God himself to man as man surrenders to Him:

"tena labhyä: But the person sought by Him, is attainable. The state of being sought after by Him (the Lord) can only be in respect of a person who is His Beloved. To be His Beloved can happen only to one who loves him (alone). Therefore the Love of God on the part of the practiser creates love of him on the part of God and thus it becomes the cause of the attainment of Him...."

Vijnute: The meaning is (He) gives Himself. The same is the meaning when the reading is Vijnute."

The fact that the same vâkya is to be found also in the Mundaka Upanishad makes it all the more important. But it is not to be interpreted to indicate a doctrine of complete predestination, as in the dvaita school. Viśiṣṭadvaita tradition always puts more stress on the attainment of freedom for the jiva than on the unalterable absolute will of the Lord, and, perhaps of all the classical Vedantic systems, it leaves the least room for fatalism of any kind. Election, therefore, is to be thought of as an expression of special favour—in the same sense that John was called the 'beloved' disciple of Jesus; and in this sense it becomes the ground for the complete response to the gift of grace, freely made, of prapatti.

In the later Upanishad also there are several passages which may be taken as a basis for prapatti, although many of them are general enough to be taken as referring to bhakti as well. Thus, in the Tripadvibhûtimahânârayanopanishad, we find
references to the requirements for and the results of, a life of abandoned devotion:

“As a result of the consummation of the fruits of highly meritorious deeds... there is brought about association with the righteous. Therefrom is generated the power of discrimination... Thence is generated the proclivity to righteous conduct. Through righteous conduct is brought about the destruction of all sin. Thence the inner and the outer senses attain transparent purity.”

“Thereafter is generated firmer faith in and devotion to the Lord Viṣṇu. Thence springs up detachment. From detachment spring discrimination and knowledge of (the real nature of) the world. Through constant practice, that knowledge develops into ripe wisdom.”

Or again, after an exposition of nirālamba yoga (which, being a variety of ‘supportless’ one-pointedness, may be taken itself as an equivalent of prapatti), the question is put as to who is eligible for it. The answer is (corresponding to the Vadagalai interpretation?) that he who is supremely engaged in bhakti is eligible:19

“(That is), for all persons, whether possessed of the requisite qualifications or not possessed of such, Bhakti-yoga is eminently fit to be practised. Bhakti-yoga does not involve any hardships. From Bhakti-yoga is attained liberation... Without true devotion to Viṣṇu, there is not even the remotest possibility of attaining liberation for any... Without true devotion the realization of Brahmān can never be achieved; hence, do thou resort to devotion...”

And again, in the Nārāyanopaniṣad (Khaṇḍa III)20 we have another elaboration of the esoteric interpretation of the praṇava, coupled with a similar exposition of the word Nārāyaṇa (Khaṇḍa IV). This is a favourite text for Vaiṣṇavas of the South, and gives still further basis for such writings as Lokācārya’s Mumukṣupadi, which (as we have already intimated) will be considered later. It is sufficient here simply to note that the sincere practice of the Mantra Oṃ NAMO NĀRĀYANĀYA is itself considered as an act of prapatti par excellence. Thus, in the text, we have:

“The practitioner of this Mantra will attain the abode of Viṣṇu, Vaikunṭha. This (abode of Viṣṇu) is the white lotus of the heart, the palpable sentience, which shines as a flash of lightning alone. (The Parameśvara abiding in it) is the Brahmaṇya... born of Devaki... the vanquisher of the demon Madhu, (Viṣṇu) alone is Brahmaṇya. (The sentience known
as) Nārāyaṇa, that is established in all beings, is after all one alone. . . . What is looked upon as the prime cause . . . is in reality, the Parabrahman, that has no cause of its own. . . . This is the sum and substance of the crest of the Atharva-Veda.”

This mantra, in popular usage, is called the mūla (root) mantra. In an excellent article A. N. Krishna Aiyanagar of the Adyar Library has given the following comments on it:

NAMO (1) “I am not my own master” (2) “Nor is the carrying out of my desire independent of other control. The kernel of the doctrine that underlies this aspect is the Bhāgavata-Śesatva. It also aims at pointing out the main upāya of Śaranagati to the Lord. It further prays for extrication from those sins that act as impediments to the attainment of salvation. In this manner the word nāmaḥ itself explains the tattva, hita, and puruṣārtha, true knowledge, the upāya, and the object of attainment so much longed for.

NĀRĀYANA: We, the jīvas, should at all times, without any separation whatsoever be with the Lord permanently, serve him, and so serve him that the prospect of coming back to mundane existence is totally absent.”

He also points out that Nārāyana is the name indicating the attributes stressed by all the followers of Rāmānuja, namely, vātsalya (affection), svāmīta (lordship), sausīlya (excellence), and saulabhya (easy accessibility).

This mūla mantra is further expanded into the dvaya mantra, which is the form used in initiation. As such, it is of the highest importance, and is usually kept and used secretly. The first part remains the same as the mūla mantra, and indicates the nature of the Lord to whom the surrender is made. The second part deals with the pṛāpti, wherein, according to P. N. Srinivasachari, “the prapanna realizes that his self-feeling is swept away by the downpour of mercy and he leads a dedicated life, eats, drinks, and lives by religion.” We give here Aiyangar’s comments on the most important words in it:

Prapadye: sums up the rest of the action of the cetana, who being absolutely helpless, holds the feet of Īśvara as the upāya or method, gets the necessary knowledge for performance of the act of self-surrender, and surrenders himself to the Īśvara.

Srimate Nārāyanāya (The word as used in the first part indicates) the prakāra who leads the cetana to its object (of
surrender); here (in the second part) it indicates the object attained after mokṣa, or the Master of all who is resplendent with all that is best and unequalled bliss.

And summarizing the significance of the whole mantra, Aiyangar says:

“"To attain the everlasting and tireless service of the Lord and for ever-increasing opportunities of such service, I prostrate and surrender myself at the feet of the Lord who is Śrīmān Śrīrāja.""

The full mantra, then, is Oṃ Namo Nārāyaṇāya Śrīman Nārāyaṇa caraṇau Śaraṇam Aham Pra-padye Śrīmate Nārāyaṇāya. In Alwār literature it is paralleled by Tondarapodi Alwary in his Tirumalai thus:23

O Lord who resides in Śrīraṅgam girt by waters (of the Kāveri)! It appears Thou appreciatest those who after giving up the materialistic view of things know rightly the truth (of the soul), learn that service to Thee is the end to be sought, (and) controlling firmly their five senses, cutting themselves away from every other means and abolishing the wrong ways in themselves stand at Thy gateway (seeking refuge).
SECTION I

B

PRAPATTI IN THE BHĀGAVATA PURĀṆA

To give an exposition of prapatti in the Purāṇas would constitute a veritable encyclopedia in itself,—almost as much so as a survey of bhakti from the same literature. We cannot, therefore, allow such an extensive digression. However, before going on into the work of Rāmānuja himself and of those who followed him, we might do well to cite some examples of prapatti from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. It is true that Rāmānuja never refers to this Purāṇa, for whatever reasons (probably chronological ?) ; but since later Śrī Vaiṣṇavas have used it almost as freely as any other sampradāya, we do not believe that reference to it is out of order.

The selection of the most choice verses expressing prapatti has long since been made by the author of the famous Bhakti-ratnāvali, Viṣṇu Puri. We give these in his own order, divorced from the stories in which they are found, in order to avoid prolixity as well as to preserve the intensity of the feeling contained in them:

1. He who, O King, has with a whole heart taken refuge in the Lord Mukunda, casts aside all ideas of difference, is not under obligation to serve the Devas, Rṣis, demons, the manes, and living ones who are our elders. He owes no debt to them. (XI: 5: 31—Karabhajana)

2. Nothing is unattainable to those noble-hearted persons who have taken refuge in the feet of the Lord—the holy shrine that drives away all troubles (from its proximity). (III: 32: 41—Maitreya)

3. O Vidura, how can the troubles of the body and of the mind, the evils that befall on man from the skies, those that have their origin in the elements of matter—how can all these oppress the man who has taken refuge in the Lord? (III: 22: 35—Maitreya)
4. The mighty Yama who perpetrates havoc on the world cannot boast of his conquest of him who takes refuge in the lotus feet of the Lord. (IV: 24: 56—Rudra)

5. He is a fool who takes shelter in anyone else than the Lord, who is not astonished (by his own greatness) who is fully satisfied with all he has, who is unconditional, who is void of passions and (therefore) tranquil. The man who resorts to anyone else for refuge wishes to cross the sea by taking hold of the tail of a dog. (VI: 9: 22—Devas)

6. O Narasimha, parents cannot always afford protection to their children (being either helpless themselves or neglectful). Medicines do not always cure the sick. The ship does not always succour a drowning man in the sea. Such means as are resorted to for the relief of the distressed are not invariably unfailling and not benefit those who have not secured thy care. (VII: 9: 19—Prahlâda)

7. He is no wise man who seeks protection of anyone other than thee—Thou who art grateful, friendly, truthful and affectionate towards thy devotees—thou who fulfillst the desires of all who serve thee—thou who offerest thy own self to them—and thou who art ever the same, suffering no increase or decrease. (X: 48: 26—Akrûra)

8. O fortunate was the demoness Pûtanâ who, in her desire to kill him, made him suck her poisoned breast and got her reward worthy of a foster-nurse. Who else is there more merciful whose shelter we should seek? (III: 2: 23—Uddhava)

9. I do not see in the course of my passage through the world any other shelter than the shade of your lotus feet—thou who rainest nectars. (XI: 19: 9—Uddhava)

10. O Lord! save me who am thus afflicted. I have been long oppressed by my remorses. My tyrants, six in number (e.g., the senses) have not yet been satisfied with their infliction of cruelties on me and I have not found peace anywhere. O Supreme One! I approach thy lotus feet which confers security from fear and immunity from sorrow. (X: 51: 57—Muchunda)

More in detail we may note the story of Dhrótarâstra. (XIII: 16). His prapatti is two-fold: first to Vidura, and then, accord-
ing to the latter’s counsel, to God directly. The story is well summarized in V. K. Rāmānujačāri’s edition thus:

“Seeing that his brother Dhṛtarāṣṭra’s life was coming to a close, he (Vidura) addressed him as follows: ‘Get out quickly... Bhagavān Kāla (time) cannot be evaded by any means at any time... How wonderful is the desire of people to live! You set fire to the residence of the Pāṇḍavas; you administered poison to them; their wife was insulted in your presence and you deprived them of their kingdom and wealth. What so you gain by the life which they have suffered you to live? ...He is a wise man, who having attained a body, the means for teaching the true goal, abandons all desires and attachments and throws up his body without his relations knowing where he went and what became of him. He is the best of men who is disgusted with the world either of his own motion or under instruction from another, who fixes his mind on Bhagavān and departs from home. Go to the north without your relations knowing it...’ This speech of Vidura had the desired effect. Dhṛtarāṣṭra cut asunder his strong attachments and proceeded with his brother in the direction pointed out by him, followed by his faithful wife Gandhāri.”

The note of needed repentance is to be remarked here, as well as the fact that his prapatti was of the type that comes at the end of life. But Prahāda represents the other extreme. It is said of him that he was a prapanna even in his mother’s womb. As such, perhaps he could be compared to Samuel in the Old Testament. But unlike Samuel, he had a father who persecuted him to the extreme, and as such he presents an arch-type extremely interesting from the stand-point of modern psychology. Indeed, if one goes at the story in terms of Jung’s dream symbolism, the full list of levels of consciousness is represented: He overcomes wrong instruction by excess of piety rather than revolt; he overcomes attempts to emasculate him and thereby bring about his death; elephants, serpents, ghosts, thunderbolts, suffocation, poison, being thrown from a high citadel, attempts at drowning—all these in turn not only fail, but rather only furnish further occasions of more intense prapatti. Finally, he brings about the salvation of his agnostic father through the appearance of the Lion-Man Avatāra, who tears him (the father) to shreds in order to bring him to the point of death-struggle conversion. The story is also given in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa; but it is interesting to note how much more
it is elaborated in the Bhāgavatam. That, however, cannot detain us here. We must be content, for the present, with a description of his character as a prapanna, again from Rāmānuja-cāri’s abridged version:

“He was without desire of any kind; for he saw that the fruits sought by men in this world and in the next are not worth striving for; when any unwelcome things came, he felt no pain; his mind, the senses and prāṇa were ever under control; his conduct was exemplary. Though he was an asura by birth, he was without the nature found in other asuras. Even as a boy, he found no pleasure in his toys. Though he had a high birth, a fine person, wealth of every kind and great learning, he was without conceit. He regarded all things as himself, and wished their welfare. He bowed before the feet of worthy people like a servant; he loved helpless men like their parents; he was attached to men of equal age as if they were his brothers; he regarded his gurus as if they were Bhagavān Himself; he was considerate to brāhmaṇas and he ever kept his word. He found pleasure in Bhagavān by nature, His mind being ever fixed on Him, he appeared to the world like a fool; he did not know what was going on around him. Whatever he did, he ever thought of Bhagavān, whether he sat, went about, took his food or quenched his thirst, lay down, or spoke. He was not aware of these actions. Thinking of Bhagavān, he would sometimes weep; sometimes he would laugh; he would sing aloud; he would dance without being ashamed; he would imitate Bhagavān’s deeds; sometimes he would remain silent with his hair standing on end, and with eyes closed and tears falling down therefrom. Poets do not sing the praises of anyone, as they sing the praises of Prahlāda even now. Even enemies sing his praises, and he is held up as an example to all men.”

The reference to the divine madness is noteworthy. The Gauḍyā tradition makes the most of it, since of course, Chaitanya was an extreme of this type. But the Southern tradition also recognizes it as exemplified also in the Alvars, even if they do not encourage it so much. Likewise it is interesting to note that the early Franciscans had many members who exemplified the same characteristics. Not only St. Francis himself, but Jacapone da Todi may be cited as examples, along with many others. Indeed, the whole troupe of the immediate followers of the Saint called themselves “fools of God.”
We cannot pass on without another citation, this time, Prahlāda's own words to his preceptors who were supposed to bring him up as a worldly prince, since this in itself is a description *par excellence* of prapatti: 28

"Like as a human being is hard to attain; yet it is a means by which one may attain the highest goal...A wise man should therefore, even while he is young, adopt the means, by which Bhagavān may be reached; and youth is the proper time to do so, as he will then have a strong body and capable limbs. Bhagavān alone is worthy of being attained; for he is the *ātmā* of all and their controller, and he wishes their well-being...If one desires (even worldly) enjoyment, let him seek refuge in Bhagavān; for though he enables him to reach the highest goal, yet he will give inferior enjoyments also, should one desire them, and they will be of a superior kind. Hence a wise man, that is plunged in *sāṃsāra*, should make efforts towards his own good, before his human body comes to grief."

Notable here is what we read at the outset in the Yatindra-Mata-dipikā, namely that prapatti may be either forfinite ends, or for ultimate salvation, but that the former conduce to the latter: total dependence on Providence, such as was also exemplified by the Franciscans in their devotion to "Lady Poverty", is an essential virtue for any prapanna; and indeed, if the doctrine were not so clearly expressed (though we shall later see that it is) by Bonaventura, the *example* would be more than sufficient.

Likewise, just as many scholars are prone to interpret the Franciscan spirit as the precursor of modern democracy 29, so in the Vaiṣṇava tradition, bhakti and prapatti do have far-reaching social implications. This is nowhere better expressed than in Prahlāda's reply to his father: 30

"My strength is Bhagavān. He is not only my strength, but yours and the strength of all other persons. All beings from Brahma downwards,...have come under his control. He is the ruler of all; He it is that gives one strength of body, strength of mind and strength of senses; He is the whole world; He creates, sustains and destroys the whole universe...He controls the three guṇas, satva, rajas and tamas and He has no equal. Give up this *asura* nature of yours. Regard all beings alike; there are no enemies except one's own mind uncontrolled and running after unworthy objects; the con-
control of the mind is the highest worship of Bhagavān... The notion that one is an enemy arises from delusion. How can this notion come to a good person, who controls his mind, who knows Bhagavān and looks upon all alike?"

Finally (though we must pass by many other choice examples) we come to Prabuddha’s reply to King Nimi, this time using J. M. Sānyāl’s (unabridged) translation:

"And know this also, as lords paramount show their vanity with the equal, cherish jealousy to the superiors and are afraid of their destruction, so do the people vaunt themselves before the equal, and are jealous of their superiors and they are always afraid of their destruction. One, accosting for his best well-being, should understand fully the word Brahma, sink deep into the Great, Brāhmaṇa, and should seek refuge of a preceptor of quiescent soul, considering the preceptor as the Atman, and the Deity. One should, with unfeigned servitude, learn from him, those tenets of the Lord’s religion with which Śrī Hari, who even gives away his own self, is delighted. First of all, he should learn to withdraw his mind from all objects, to associate with the pious, due commi-
ration for all creatures, friendships, humility, purity, observ-
vance of his own duties, forgiveness, the avoidance of useless words, asceticism, simplicity, Brahmacarya, not to injure others, to consider equally happiness and misery, to consider all things as his own, to see God, to live in a solitary place, to forsake attachments to home and other things...to revere
the sacred lores of the Lord, not to vilify other sacred books...to chant and meditate upon the birth and actions of Him...He should learn to make friends with those whose soul
and Lord is Śrī Kṛṣṇa, to adore mobile and immobile objects, mankind and especially the pious and amongst them those
who are votaries of the Lord... to be satisfied (with) all that
remove (s) the miseries of the soul."

"Recollecting and making each other meditate upon Hari,
the destroyer of the heap of sins, he would have his body
thrilling with joy begotten of love and devotion dependent
upon service unto him. Having his mind consigned to Śrī
Hari, he will sometimes weep, laugh, dance, sing and express
his joy. He will again give vent to super-human words or
represent Hari. Being thus delighted with the attainment
of the Great he will remain silent. In this way, having been
initiated with the tenets of the Divine religion, and being
attached to Nārāyaṇa on account of the devotion originating
therefrom, he shall by force tide over the unsurmountable
Māyā."
Such a passage needs no comment. It so closely parallels the expositions of Vedānta Deśika and Pillai Lokācārya that we merely refer the reader to them. For that matter, there are materials in the Gītā itself, (of which this seems to be a virtual summary) which carry the same burden. We therefore turn to that "New Testament" of Hinduism, keeping Rāmānuja's commentary close at hand.
SECTION II

PRAPATTI IN THE BHĀGAVAD GĪTĀ

It may well be remarked that if, as Thibaut and others think, Śaṅkara is closer to the Upaniṣads, Rāmānuja is the better interpreter, not only of Bādarāyaṇa, but even more, of the “Lord’s Song”. Indeed, one often feels that he is only dutifully faithful to the text of the Sūtras in the Śrī Bhāṣya, but that in his Gītā Bhāṣya he finds more freedom to express his own thought and feeling. This is especially important in consideration of the fact that Prapatti finds little if any place, strictly speaking, in the Śrī Bhāṣya, but that in the Gītā Bhāṣya Prapatti as well as bhakti is extolled and enjoined. The typical attitude towards this discrepancy—if it be that—was expressed by Pundit Buberhampillai of Annamalai University thus: “What does it matter if the Sūtras, which are only a Sage’s wisdom, say nothing of Prapatti? The Gītā is the Lord’s own words, and therefore of much greater authority. If the Lord himself teaches prapatti, what more can you ask for?” Apropos to this attitude, as well as by way of introducing our topic, we can do no better than cite a topic from Govindaḥchārya’s excellent little hagiographical work, The Divine Wisdom of the Dravida Saints.52

“The best means to salvation is God Himself. Even this is two-fold. One is by bhakti or loving Him with all the energy of one’s own will; the other by prapatti or loving Him with all the force derived from God Himself when the aspirant has resigned his own will, and placed all his hope and confidence in the sweet will and dispensations of Providence. In the former case, incessant training and turning of the will to devotional meditation on God—demanding much individual effort—and which has to be performed strictly in accordance with prescribed modes—and modes demanding qualification such as birth in holy families, rigid preliminaries, and careful watching against the slightest omissions in observance etc.—are required; whereas in the latter case neither individual effort nor conditions of birth etc. are requisites where a soul in whole-hearted devotion unreservedly throws itself into the loving and caring hands of God. The
former (bhakti) is attended with danger inasmuch as when lacking any of the conditions imposed upon one, who would thus rise by the strength of his own will, he renders himself liable not to be accepted by God, whereas in the latter case (prapatti) the aspirant so unconditionally surrenders himself to God, and so confidently seeks shelter under His protecting wings, that even God, after giving him such protection, cannot cast him away. In the former case (bhakti) God does not bind Himself to save, whereas in the latter case (prapatti), He binds Himself to save. Conditions for the former (bhakti) are untiring devotion and unceasing worship etc., on the part of the creature—the use of self-will; whereas the conditions for the latter (prapatti) are implicit trust and effacement of self-will and proneness to the complete operation of God’s will alone. The former (bhakti) is a slender stream of love proceeding from puny efforts a creature is capable of producing in his heart; but the latter (prapatti) is the mighty flood of grace pouring down from God the Creator, nothing withstanding the rush of the torrent. Bhakti requires pumping up with exertion; whereas prapatti brings down His Grace in natural downpour."

He then goes on to report a (traditional) view that before Rāmānuja wrote the Śrī Bhāṣya, he implicitly followed his Guru Yāmunācārya in teaching only prapatti; but that after that, he emphasized bhakti more, because he said “that the Doctrine of Grace was too holy to be exposed to the profane gaze of all mankind without reference to their preparedness to receive the same... (and that) without the change of heart leading it to entirely sacrifice itself for God, prapatti would but land the soul in moral turpitude and spiritual bewilderment.” But that his own views, his own personal doctrine, remained weighted toward prapatti, is shown clearly by his Śaraṇagati-Gadaya.

But as authority for our view that the Gītā itself includes prapatti along with karma, jñāna, and bhakti, we can do no better than appeal to Prof. M. Rangāchārya, whose unsurpassable Lectures on the Gītā we shall now be following at length. In his introduction to the 7th Adhyāya, he discourses on the interrelations of the four, not omitting, in his broad-mindedness, that according to some interpretations prapatti is included as a variety of bhakti, he points out that both are available even to those who cannot, for whatever reason, follow the techniques
(usually included under the term rājayoga) leading to samādhi:

“It is easy to see that the immortality of the soul gives to mokṣa its requisite foundation upon truth; and when we know that work, which is inevitably essential to all beings, does not of itself cling to man and produce the bondage of karma, and that it is the attachment to the fruits of work which gives rise to this bondage, we cannot fail to see that karma-yoga, as a means for the attainment of mokṣa, rests fully upon truth. We may, with even greater certainty, say that the discipline of jñāna-yoga also, rests upon truth, because it is founded upon the self-realization achieved by the yogin in the state of samādhi and upon this consequent conviction that all beings are in him and that he is himself in all beings. The discipline of bhakti-yoga also is equally well consistent with truth and founded upon truth..... It seems to be meant in the Gitā, that it is a progressive advancement.....to pass on from the discipline of karma to that of jñāna, and from this again to the discipline of bhakti and prapatti, because he, who uses this last discipline to regulate and control his life, is guided by a still wider and more comprehensive vision of truth than that which is commanded ordinarily by the jñāna-yogin.”

And, citing the first mantra of the Īṣa Upaniṣad (see above), he goes on to argue that bhakti, and prapatti par excellence are the best means of overcoming selfishness; and further, in accordance with the best tradition, he points out that prapatti (if not bhakti also) not only gains release from karma, but also implies the attainment of God by the emancipated soul—of God, who is its natal home and destined goal”. His arguments, along this line, throughout his lectures, are well in accord with what we have already examined in the previous chapter, namely, that even if the empirical evidence of a universal attitude toward Reality were not enough to demonstrate a Deity within-and-above that Reality, then, as a pre-supposition more primordial than the experience of self-knowledge, the “hypothesis of God” is unavoidably necessary to give intelligibility to all other reality—an intelligibility, moreover, which has the character of “opening out” into infinite possibility and richness of Meaning: the jñānin is seldom, if ever a poet! God-knowledge includes self-knowledge, not vice versa, for the latter leads to an absurdity.
It is in this spirit that, commenting on the last śloka of the 11th Adhyāya, he points out that the concept of Duty is to be understood as "becoming fellow-workers with God"; that our relation with the universe has a certain inevitability about it, and that therefore our freedom consists in the open recognition of this relatedness; rebellion from it only leads to ruin. Such recognition is really nothing more or less than prapatti:  

“To the followers of prapatti, all work becomes service unto God and all knowledge becomes related to self-realization and God-attainment. The loving fervour with which they seek God is bhakti. God alone being the Supreme unto whose will they have resigned themselves, they will think that all is for God and nothing is for themselves. Very naturally they will strive to see that everything appertaining to the individual soul operates in the direction in which God has ordained that it should operate, so as to harmonize with the plan and purpose of the divine government of the universe...not merely bhakti, but prapatti as well, (is) be implied by the śloka which we have been studying so far.”

Now, to take up the text more in detail, the first thing which cannot escape our notice is the fact that at the very outset, Arjuna has already made his śaraṇāgati to Kṛṣṇa, in inviting him to become his charioteer. This is both literally and allegorically rich in meaning: Rāmānuja points out that Kṛṣṇa acceded through His divine clemency, “on account of His being constrained through love for those who come to Him for refuge.” This first, and close on it, Arjuna’s appeal, in his “failure of nerve” to Kṛṣṇa to “tell me conclusively that which is wholesome for me, who am come to you for refuge as your pupil”. Rāmānuja notes his feeling of helplessness, as well as his submission to the “lotus feet” of the Lord. In this he only follows Yāmunācārya, who states in the Gitārtha Saṅgraha, that “This means an enquiry that is made to show that a proposed work is needed. For Arjuna—the author wished to teach the śāstra, as it had been practically lost to the world...and He needed only an excuse in the prapatti made by Arjuna...” Prof. Rangācārya enlarges at length on this foundation, pointing out that the surrender was not a matter of choice of evils, but a conflict of duties—a point which Whitehead is fond of making, namely, that choice—and especially the choice of recourse to religion—is free because it is always
made in the positive realm, and not in the realm of necessity. We shall later note that this is of the same spirit as that of St. Bonaventura in contrast with St. Thomas, who rather stresses the doctrine of choice of evils as constituting the good. In prapatti there can be no element of compulsion whatsoever.

In ślokas 10 & 11 of the fourth Adhyāya, we find a reference to śaraṇāgati in relation to karma-yoga. The different translations seem to conform to the interpretation of the particular school of the commentator. Thus, in the bhāṣya of Śaṅkara, although the words "taking refuge" are used in 10, in 11, we find only the word "approach". Of course, Śaṅkara always interprets, as here, any form of prapatti as meaning the attainment of identity, or complete devotion to jñāna, and even seems in 11 to suggest that any form of devotion as exercise of affection is equitable almost to delusion; jñāna is the only way. Mādhva, on the other hand, in a spirit different from the modern all-embracing toleration of modern Hinduism such as Prof. Rangācārya (though not as indiscretely as Rādhākrṣṇan) reads into these texts, puts the stress on supreme devotion to Viṣṇu alone as the Supreme Lord, all other forms of devotion being rewarded according to their respective merits; prapatti can be made rightly only to Viṣṇu, and the (Mīmāṁsikas?) followers of other deities receive proportionately less reward for their devotion. Rāmānuja, however, does show a more tolerant spirit:

"Not only by incarnating Myself" he says, "in the forms of gods (thereby indicating that he holds that all forms of deity are nitya sūris?) men, and so on, do I protect the seekers after My refuge, but...in whatever way, the seekers after My refuge approach me, i.e., resort to Me...do I manifest Myself (out of His condescension, not out of their deserving) : there is no need dilating upon it, all men who simply desire to follow Me, follow My path, i.e., My nature all over, although it is beyond the reach of speech and thought of the Yogins, experiencing it in all ways, i.e., in all manners which are desirable to them, through their own organs, viz. the eyes and so on."

It seems, indeed, that he is not just expressing toleration, but rather the profound truth—the same which St. Bonaventura stresses—that all men have an inherent desire for God if not, indeed, an innate idea of His existence, and that there-
fore, even ritualistic devotion is acceptable if offered in a pure
spirit. Prapatti can sanctify everything.

Following on this, śloka 36 of the same Adhyāya expresses a
sentiment which is especially dear to the Tengelais, and which,
as one can see from Rāmānuja’s Śaraṇāgati Gadya, he felt very
keenly himself, even if his comments here are very brief: No
sinner, no matter how corrupt his past life may have been, is
beyond redemption; the Lord takes a special delight in granting
pardon to those who have sinned the most. Prapatti as conversion
is illustrated in hagiography of every religion very vividly indeed: the
worst sinners make the best saints; not only St. Paul, but
St. Augustine, St. Francis himself, and St. Teresa of Avila have
their counterparts in many of the Alvars and Nayanmars, as well
as the greatest of the Buddhist Bodhisattvas and saints of Islām.
Prof. Rangāchārya rightly points out in this connection that it is
selfishness that is at the root of all sin; and that “when all
selfish desires take their final departure from the heart of man,
he immediately becomes an emancipated being worthy to enjoy
all the high and heavenly privileges of a blessed and everlasting
life in God.” Of course it is the “wisdom” of God-realization
that is the guarantee of this deliverance, and not bhakti as such:
but it is also clear that such “wisdom” itself comes only by
Grace as the bond of surrender.

In V: 19 we have an extension of the meaning of sainthood,
as the attainment of “equality”, or, as Rāmānuja himself puts
it, “if they rest on the equality of the soul, they rest, verily, in
Brahman. And resting in Brahman itself is, verily, the conquest
over saṁsāra.” Such attainment of “rest” is also a focal point
for Bonaventura; it is the stage beyond ecstasy, and is the chief
characteristic of beatitude, mokṣa, to use the Sanskrit equivalent
which we find in Rāmānuja’s remarks, and for both, such beatitute
comes only through (and in) nyāsavidyā, total abnegation of
self in mystical union. Prof. Rangāchārya takes the occasion
here to point out the different ontological interpretations of this
the self-abnegation and “union”, but rightly stresses the fact
that the moral implications remain the same, regardless of the
metaphysical doctrine involved.

In VI: 9 we have the basis for the doctrine of Kāṅkārya
which we shall see figures so prominently in Pillai Lokāchārya’s
interpretation of prapatti: The true yogin not only attains stoical steadiness of mind;.....having achieved true selflessness in his śaraṇāgati, he perforce at once seeks selfless service of his fellow-prapannas (if not of foes also) and expresses the Love of the Lord operating in him toward all men. To those not acquainted with this development of tradition, Rāmānuja may seem to be reading “Christian” ethics into the ideal of detachment—niṣkāma karma—of the Gītā. But it is difficult to claim this positive note of love and exclusive to the Christian Gospel, although there might be some point of argument, as to relative emphasis, since in Hinduism at large one admittedly finds less altruism in practice than in Christianity. Rāmānuja simply says “as regards aptitude for the practice of Yoga, he is esteemed who is capable of the same mind to the good-hearted, friends, and so on, because his sole concern is with the soul and because with them he has no concern nor hostility against them.” But Rāmānuja goes on expressly saying “...even this entire absence of selfishness is evidently looked upon as a mere negative virtue, so that, if, as a yogin, he is desirous of becoming specially excellent, he has to supplement this absence of selfishness with an equal and comprehensive manifestation of true love and sympathy towards all persons, who may come into relation with him in any manner whatsoever.” In any case, the interpretation to be stressed is not that of Vivekānanda, that since all are the same “Self” service to any is service of that same Self as much as the exercise of rāja-yoga, but that since all jīvas are embodiments of the Lord, one can best serve Him in and through those in whom He abides: Prapatti cannot possibly be twisted away from radical altruism.

Rāmānuja takes VII : 13 & 14 as an occasion for discussing the symbols associated with Viṣṇu, as well as his own interpretation of māyā. The latter we leave aside here, since it does not immediately concern us in this context. But since tradition has associated these symbols with prapatti, we cannot pass them and Rāmānuja expressly interprets the slokas as enjoining prapatti. Here Rāmānuja only again follows Yāmunācārya, who says 39

“In the Seventh chapter the following matters are dealt with: His (the highest Ātman’s) nature as it is! its being hidden by matter (prakṛti); prapatti (appealing to Him for help); classes of those that love Him; and the superiority
of those that love Him for Himself."

Regardless of one's interpretation of the term māyā, the remedy for bondage to it is exclusive devotion to God in pure freedom. Thus, Śaṅkara interprets the counsel as enjoining the abandonment of formal religion, and although he will not enjoin prapattī outright, he does say that exclusive devotion, or "seeking", is necessary. Mādhva is quite explicit: "...the emphatic particle 'alone' is meant to indicate how the Lord is to be resorted to. The source is thus: one should give up all other things and perform the worship of preceptors, etc., as the votaries of the Lord and thus absolutely resign oneself to Him as the sole refuge." Rāmānuja puts the emphasis on the nature of the Lord thus to be resorted to: "Whoever secure refuge in Me alone—who am possessed of true resolves; most compassionate; affording refuge to all people regardless of (their) particulars,—they cross over this Māyā of mine which is made up of the qualities. The meaning is:—they worship Me alone, leaving aside this Māyā." He has already pointed out that the cakra indicates the Lord's power of protection, citing a passage from the Mahābhārata where it (the cakra) was used to destroy the Māyā of Śambhara.

Rāgācārya enlarges on the traditional interpretation of the symbols thus:40 Commenting on VI : 13 & 14, he pictures Viṣṇu in the lying-down posture (a very popular form in South Indian temples) as symbolizing "the One Lord of all the Worlds and as the God of Gods, who has the universe for his body and is infinite and immaterial like the sky." The anthropomorphism involved, with the emphasis on the expression of love and peace in the "lotus eyes", the dark hue (dear to dusky Dravidians, Śiva being fair and all-too-Āryan); the figure of Lakṣmī; the cosmic serpent as forming the bed on which He lies—these are not just primitive "idols", but highly philosophical embodiments of primordial Truth: Anthropomorphism is not a human weakness, but is theologically grounded in the Incarnation doctrine; Lakṣmī, not just the crude fertility goddess, but the sakti, the recessive principle that elicits reality out of the primordial ground, and thus the Divine Mediatrix, who like the Virgin Mary, intercedes for sinners; the serpent-bed, not only the sex symbol that modern anthropologists make much about,
but the image that "symbolizes in the language of myths the mastery of God over time and eternity; and the lotus from the navel (aside from its depicting a physiological fact known to experts in yoga) indicates that He is the centre and ultimate source of universal creation. The serpent forming the bed of Viśṇu is called ananta, the endless one, and seṣa, the ever-remain ing one; it is sometimes called ādi-seṣa also, which means that it is a certain something the beginning of which always remains to be found out."

Again, interpreting the Viśvarūpa vision of Arjuna in the 11th Adhyāya,41 he points out that the four-armed form (the most common in Vaiṣṇava iconography) emphasizes the superhuman aspect of the Avatār, yet within easy comprehension of the finite mind. But the Viśvarūpa (the best example in all religious lore of what Rudolph Otto terms the "mysterium tremendum", to which the response can be nothing but complete surrender) "stuns our minds more than it enables us to conceive of our God. How can we meditate on the viśva-rūpa with its thousands of heads and arms in front, behind and everywhere? Yet (it) is perhaps the least inadequate symbol for the infinite power of God." Then, returning to the four-armed form, he points out that the mace represents Kingship; it is the "staff by which the evil-doers are punished and the law of righteousness upheld." The cakra, on the other hand, "is a weapon not so much intended to punish the wicked as to protect the good... however distant they may be." He could very well have also mentioned that the other two arms symbolize the positive aspects of grace and mercy, the one holding a lotus, and the other with the hand in a gesture giving reassurance and confidence. But he does mention the crown, as symbolizing that He is "Lord of all, the sovereign ruler of the universe."

The essential observation to be made at this point is simply that although each and all of these can—and should—be used as objects of meditation (and thus are concerned as well with bhakti) they emphatically portray attributes that provoke pra- patti.

Following on the symbols (and we have only touched the topic; many large volumes could be written—and have been already!) we cannot resist the temptation to digress on the Names of Krṣṇa. Actually, they are so many that scarcely anyone
knows them all; so we shall take only a very few of the most significant ones, as also indicating the attributes of the Lord who provokes prapatti, as well as bhakti. (For in most cases, both are thus provoked.)

The two names most famous in the Gītā itself (as well as in popular devotion) of course, are Vāsudeva and Acyuta. Raṅgācārya is again very helpful in interpreting these. Nothing that the name Vāsudeva, on the human side, only indicates Krṣṇa's family (his father is also called Vāsudeva), Raṅgācārya, nevertheless, stresses the divine sense which it embodies, noting that it is used in one of the most popular mantras among Vaiṣṇavas, OM NAMO BHAGAVATE VĀSUDEVĀYA, and pointing out that the (esoteric) meaning is that He is the abode of all beings in the universe:  

"Accordingly Vāsudeva is interpretable as the deva or divine being who is notable by the name Vāsu, this name itself derived from the root VAS meaning to dwell or to inhabit. That God dwells in the universe is a doctrine of great importance...Therefore, in our endeavour to understand God as the enlivening and omnipresent in-dweller of the universe, who is at the same time the supporting home of love and security to all the beings in the universe, the purely divine interpretation of the same Vāsudeva is sure to be of considerable help to us. As a matter of fact... (it) tends to confirm the conviction that Krṣṇa, the son of Vasudeva, is Himself the omnipresent and all-sustaining God, who has become incarnate in human form...It cannot be hard to see that in persons (who use this name in this sense), their complete God-love must necessarily kill all their self-love. The wisdom which enables one to realize God so truly and so well and also develops his devotion to God so completely as to make him absolutely unselfish—such wisdom is naturally very rare..."  

—But nevertheless, it is attainable by all through prapatti, and perhaps only by that way! (At least, such is the traditional doctrine) Indeed, he goes on to discuss the necessity of exclusive devotion to God in this spirit (as the inevitable consequence of this conception of Deity); polytheists (and all are polytheists who insist that their religion—e.g., their God—is the only 'true' God) are still in the immature stage of desiring "answer to prayer" and such like; they, having experienced no true conversion, have no concept of pure contemplation or adoration.
Without prapattī, no true monotheism! Such is the meaning of Vāsudeva.

The name Acyuta brings out the other side of Prapatti. Not only is God the One-and-only who is immanent in all, but by virtue of this, He—and He only—is the One able to give Protection to His suppliants.

The word itself, says Raṅgācārya,42

"is what may be called the negative particle of a root which means ‘to slide or slip or fall’. Roughly, it may be rendered as not fallen, firm, imperishable (or rather, we suggest, He who keeps one from falling, for such is the tradition). The significance of the name is usually explained in two ways. Firstly, we may understand the word to mean that God is transcendent, in spite of being immanent in the universe. Secondly, it may convey the suggestion that God is a refuge (sic!) whence there can be no fall for those who seek Him.”

These interpretations are well substantiated in the Purānic literature. For example, there is the story of Paundraka (Viṣṇu Purāṇa, V : 34, Bhāgavatam X : 46) who had set himself up as a rival ‘Vāsudeva’ Krṣṇa, in the irony of Divine Wrath, addresses his discus thus: 43

“Go, messenger, back to Paundraka, and say to him, from me: ‘I will dispatch to thee my emblem the discus, without fail. Thou wilt rightly apprehend my meaning...for I shall come to thy city, bringing the discus with me, and shall, undoubtedly, consign it to thee. (Paundraka had demanded it as token of his claim of rival supremacy.) If thou wilt command me to come, I will immediately obey...And having sought thy asylum (sic!) I will so provide, O King, that I shall never more have anything to dread from thee’.”

And that was the end of this man who tried to make a prapanna out of the Lord, instead of becoming a prapanna himself!

It is in the same manner that most of the other names found in the Gitā are to be taken. If one sees in them too much reference to “protection” by virtue of being the slayer of so many foes, one should also see the other side: there is nothing sentimental involved in prapatti. On the other hand, as we see in some of the prayers in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa the warmth and intimacy of devotion which constitutes, as it were, their halo, do not allow us to dismiss them as ‘primitive’ in any sense.

Thus, at the occasion of Krṣṇa’s Incarnation, Brahmā and
the Devas give their śaraṇāgati, addressing Him as Bhagavān (usually translated in the Gītā as "the Blessed One"); and as Mādhava (usually explained as derived from madhu—honey); and as Hari (Lord) : 

"Hari Ruler of all! I regard the burden under which the earth is groaning as already removed by your birth. We shall see the earth marked by Your auspicious footprints as the highest heaven is; for You are full of mercy towards us... You are the ātmā and the help by which we shake off the fear of saṁsāra...You come down in avatāra...You protect us and the three worlds, as You will do now. Take down the burden of the earth. Prostration to You".

And in another place Brahmā also uses the names Acyuta, Ajita (unconquered being) Adhokṣaja (Being beyond sense perception) etc., including expressions such as : 

"Kṛṣṇa! So long as the thieves in the form of desire and the rest remain, as long will one's home be a prison to him; so long as You do not regard a person as belonging to Yourself, as long will his misconception remain and bind his feet like fetters. You are without body made of matter with the three guṇas, and without the actions to which such a body leads; yet You imitate persons possessed of such a body and doing such actions; Your object in doing so is to make known to the world the stream of happiness, in which those that do prapatti to You are submerged."

But perhaps the best available treatment of these names of Kṛṣṇa is that of Nammalwar (Tiruvoimoli II : 7, passim), who without resort to philological analysis seems to have a high awareness of the significance of the mythological import of each of the names he uses. It is difficult indeed to get a synoptic hold on all the aspects of Kṛṣṇa, necessary though that is in order really to understand the universal appeal he makes to all-and-sundry; but it seems to us that Nammalwar has come closer to this than almost any other man ancient or modern. The lines must be closely read if significant details are not to be missed, but certainly this much is patent, that he finds prapatti indicated as the only basis for all the names, whether the particular reference is to his beauty, his mysteriousness, his simplicity as a rustic, or his power as a destroyer of evil. Thus he sings—and the poetic expression is the only adequate one :

Nārāyaṇa is the Lord of all the seven worlds. He is the form
of the Vedas. He is the Cause. He is the first cause of action and the result of it. He is worshipped by Śrī, by the angels and many other beings. He deserves it. He broke the tusks of the Kuvalayāpiḍa. He is my Lord Mādhava......

......Govinda is He. He is the pot-dancer. He is the cow-herd. I dance chanting these words and am singing about Him and His qualities. He rectifies me. He receives me. He drives off my sin with one reproof. He made my people seven heads above me and seven heads below me become His servants by nature. He is clever. He is my Lord Viṣṇu......

......I have none but Madhu-sūdana. Madhu-sūdana is my all. I have nothing to do to gain any purpose. My only object is to dance before Him singing numbers full of His praise. He for many eons in many births took me forcibly into His presence. He has been doing me good in a great many ways. I am doomed to be so. I do not know how I can stand before Trivikrama......

......O! Śrīdhara. O! my beautiful lotus-eyed one! All day and night I murmur Thy names. I am always in search of Thee. From my eyes tears flow down like mountain torrents unceasingly. My sighs are long drawn and frequent. To destroy all agonizing wicked sin and to increase happiness for all time, Thou remainest in me. O Hṛṣīkeśa!

Hṛṣīkeśa is my benefactor. He killed the stubborn Rāvaṇa of Laṅkā, the king of giants. By this He did a very great good to the world. He is the Lord of my love, devotion and reverence and veneration. He is the ruler of the eternal angels. O my mind! if you are clever, serve Him firmly. Know Him thoroughly. When you know Him once, even though your mind becomes duce, do not leave Him...... Padmanābha has none higher than He. He has the great and ever increasing power and strength. He is deeply attached to me. He made me fit to be his servant. He received me. He gave Himself to me. He is all giving Divine True Being. He is like delicious nectar. He possesses the hill Veṅkaṭa resembling dark clouds. He is the Lord of the heavenly Being. He is my Lord, the Dāmodara.

For as in the Christian context, Jesus embodies not only the qualities that are specifically his own but also those of all the 'prototypes' (Moses, Melchizadek, David and many others), so Kṛṣṇa incorporates all the aspects of all the avatāras that had preceded him. The 'not to destroy but to fulfil' seems to apply also to him.

Again, we shall have to be satisfied with this mere sample, which, nevertheless, would be sufficient to show that almost every name can be taken in reference to prapatti, whether because of
the Lord’s Might, or His Mercy. But, lest it be thought that these sentiments go beyond the spirit of Rāmānuja himself (remembering, as we always must, that he evidently did not have the Bhāgavatam, even though he was so fond of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, in which the eulogies are not quite so elaborate) we may close this digression by citing his comment on (Gītā) IX : 34. In the first paragraph, he seems to support interpretation as bhakti, using his favourite metaphor of the steady stream of oil. But in the second paragraph, he also gives prapatti as the key:

“The meaning is:—Be one whose mind is fixed on Me being endowed with extreme love for me... (Sacrifice) is tantamount to saying:—Be one whose mind is fixed on me in such a way that you may engage in My sacrifice wrought by an infinitely abundant love proceeding from a thorough experience (of Me)... Bow down to Me, i.e., try to be absolutely humble towards Me, the Inner Soul, not ceasing with the most complete service which is most pleasant and which is worked by experience Me, who am infinite and most delightful. With Me as your Supreme Goal: i.e., as one whose Supreme Goal is I alone. The meaning is one who takes refuge in Me (italics ours) because his sustenance is impossible without Me...

“Now, in this way doing actions secular such as those intended for bodily maintenance, as well as Vedic, viz., obligatory and casual, (determining that you, who are the same in essence as Myself, because you are a part of Me, are caused by Myself to do (these actions) for My (own) pleasure; engaging constantly in the uttering (of My name), in My sacrifice, in bowing down (to Me) and so on, with love; investigating, that the whole universe is ruled over by Me and that it is in its essence the same as Myself, because it is a part of Me; determining the multitude of My most pleasant virtues; and taking to this worship the nature of which has (just) been described by Me, everyday, you shall reach Myself.”

The relation of faith to prapatti is itself a large topic, and thus we cannot overlook it, although we shall have to treat it inadequately here. We shall later see the importance attached to it by Bonaventura; and although the three ‘theological’ virtues of faith, hope and love never constituted the trilogy in Vedāntic tradition as they did (and do) in Christian scholasticism, it can readily be seen that they are all equally present, and just as inseparably. It should be noted in passing, moreover, that, as
different from the modern distinction between faith and reason (which probably stems from Thomas Aquinas), for both Franciscan and Śrī-Vaiṣṇava tradition, the emphasis is on the moral (or rather analogical) rather than the intellectual aspect: It does not so much involve the willingness to "believe", as the entrance into religious discipline, founded as Rāmagārāya says, on "the religious reliance upon God as the one and only independent agent of all work that is in any manner done by any being in the universe, so that people may thereby manage to overcome successfully all their strong internal promptings in favour of bondage-compelling selfishness and sensuality." As such—as a pointed entering into personal relation with the Supreme—it is already an añga, a part, of prapatti. The yogin, as a prapanna, must feel that in all that he thinks and feels and does, he has to serve merely as the instrument of God and carry out His will. Even his own realizations he attributes to the love of God, and makes the grace of God responsible for whatever good there may be in that life of universal equality which he so very naturally lives. Thus the absolute moral selflessness of this best of yogins may be seen to be the result of his complete self-surrender to God."

This inseparability of faith, hope and love could no better be illustrated than in the following comment of Rāmānuja himself (on VI : 47):

"Who, full of faith, i.e., expeditious in his effort to attain Me on account of his being unable to bear separation (from Me) even for a moment because of his intensive love for Me, attends Me, i.e., serves Me, that is worships Me, who am (full of all auspicious attributes) with his inner self (antarātman), i.e., mind (mānas) abiding in Me, because of his nature not common to others owing to his excessive love for Me: the inner self (antarātman) means the mind which forms the basis of all specific activities external and internal: with his mind abiding in Me because of his failure in composing himself without Me owing to his intense love for Me."

It may also be noted that in the Śrī Bhāṣya (III : i : 1-6) Rāmānuja likewise defines faith as "eagerness", and, beneath the rich allegory of the offering of water as a means of attaining the subtle state for the jīva, he stresses what we have termed the analogical interpretation of faith. It is, in short, that which removes the gross hindrances, and is related to the affections and
will in quite the same manner that Bonaventura teaches. For the latter, we turn first to the In Hexameron 48

"As thus the soul feels its way towards God in a threefold way, it finds a threefold influx from that highest light: There is the influx as virtue, as zeal, as ardour. As virtue, the soul is made of such virtue that nothing is difficult for it because of God, because it is stabilized by faith. As zeal, the soul throws aside vehemently, and hates and becomes indignant at everything which is contrary to faith, in favour of everything which is affixed to faith and is moved toward it...as ardour, the soul always feels in opprobrium and vituperations a certain sweetness and joyfulness. For this is the highest thing about faith, that when the soul is stabilized in it, although externally it is continually afflicted by misfortunes, it nevertheless always experiences a certain interior sweetness of confidence, and the mind even offers itself to toleration of even greater transitory evils. Hence faith is a certain shield of the soul against all difficulties."

And then, in systematic form, in the commentary on the Sentences (italics ours) he makes the following judgment: 49

"But there remains a third view, that faith is neither altogether in the cognitive power nor in the affective altogether either, but partly in one and partly in the other. And this is what Hugo of St. Victor says, in the book De Sacramentis: ‘Faith consists in two aspects, namely cognition and affection. In the affections faith finds its substance, and in true cognition, its matter.’ The reason for this is that an act of will is essential to faith itself...Whence Augustine says that ‘Virtue is nothing but love in proper relation (amor ordinatus)’...Again, since the cognition of essential faith itself is an illumination through which the intellect is directed into the highest Truth and is subjected to it, faith involves essentially an act of reason. And it is for this reason that some say that faith is as much a matter of will as of reason, since it involves both essentially. For indeed an act of reason in respect to an act of the will is material, since reason is inclined by the will, and hence they say that in reason faith finds its matter, but in affection, its substance...."

And as to the inseparability of faith from hope and love, in a later passage, he says: 50

"(it is best) to speak of faith and the other virtues in a two-fold manner, e.g., according to propensity (habitus) and according to act. If according to propensity, it is here we find sameness (simultas); if according to act, it is here we find a natural order by which the act of faith precedes the
act of hope and love. For no one hopes for anything or loves it unless he knows it and in some manner or other has faith (credat) in it.

"And to the objection that love is the mother (of all virtues) it may be replied that that is to be understood according to the reason of meriting. Indeed, love is said to be the mother of virtues, not because it gives birth to them, but because it takes care of them and nourishes them, so that they may go on to arrive at the state of perfection.

"And to the objection... (from the Psalms, 36:1) that hope is the entrance into faith, it may be replied that faith is not taken here as the virtue of faith the act of faith so much as in the sense that faith comes afterwards as in the beatific vision itself."

These passages really need no comment; it is obvious that here faith is seen as both the most necessary pre-condition of prapatti, and, as inseparable from the other virtues that lead to mystical ecstasy, is really already the beginning—if indeed, we can speak of a beginning and end of such a subtle movement of the will—of prapatti itself. We could have digressed here into the relations with grace; but with holding that topic till shortly after, we only note in passing that Bonaventura expresses the opinion (quite comparable to what Rāmānuja writes under Gītā VII: 21 & 22) that the work of grace is to bring undeveloped faith into fructifying fullness, just as rain is needed to make the germinating seed sprout and grow, or just as light is necessary to make colours, otherwise hidden in darkness, visible. This brings out the important truth that without faith, there can be no worship of any sort; but that with even the lowest modicum of primitive faith, one can worship even unknowingly that Highest which he really does not know; but at the advent of grace, prapatti opens up the religious relation so that worship is activated consciously, "in spirit and in truth."

Having thus entered the Way through Faith, it would seem that all will follow it in the same manner, and thus, to classify prapannas into types would not be possible. But this is done; and the classification given by the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas constitutes a valuable contribution to mystical theology. Yāmunācārya, in his Gītārtha Saṅgraha, sets the pace, distinguishing four classes. Having stated that the reason why all men do not become prapannas is because of karma—a point not held so rigidly by
Pillai Lokācārya, as we shall later see—he lists the classes as follows:

"Some wish to gain material enjoyment after having lost it; some wish to attain it newly. Both these form but one class in reality. Some wish to get out of samsāra with the incidence of old age and death, and to enjoy the bliss of self-realization. The last class wishes to go to the highest Ātman and to enjoy him alone. The Gītā refers to them by the term jñāṇī (thereby, we interpose, he reverses Śaṅkara's interpretation) and states that they are the best. For they wish to be ever with the highest Ātman; their love is not divided between an end and its means, but is fixed wholly on Him; and He is immeasurably dear to them..."

The basis of this comment, of course is VII: 16-19. Rāmānuja enlarges on this somewhat, giving, among others, the following points: He cites Prahlāda as the best example of the last class. He stresses the reciprocity of the 'dearness' between the prapanna and the Lord; "but the jñāṇī I deem as My very self, i.e., I deem that I cannot sustain Myself without him. Why is it so? For he resorts to Me alone as the unsurpassed goal regarding that his sustenance is impossible without Me. Therefore without him, My sustenance is impossible too..." This is an important point indeed for the field of comparative studies; Christians especially are generally too prone to claim this doctrine of love for God for the world as their exclusive heritage, condemning Hinduism as only gnostic. The famous text in the fourth Gospel, "For God so loved the world..." needs reinterpretation in this light, giving it a much wider space than most of tradition has heretofore allowed. On the other hand, to neglect, by too much latitude, its full development in Christian tradition would also be foolishness. Bonaventura devotes a large section to the doctrine in his systematic work, and, frequently quoting Bernard of Clairvaux and Gregory, is constantly reminding his readers that here is the precious foundation of all spiritual progress; to neglect it is the worst possible sin: ingratitude. As most appropriate to the present point of typology, or classification of prapannas, or those who do make the adequate response, we turn to his discussion of whether the Lord loved John more than Peter. Having surveyed the authorities, he finds them, in spite of variant opinions otherwise, agreed in the following manner:
"For John loved more sweetly; and Peter more fervently, because John especially received the grace of loving God in Himself through the sweetness of contemplation (the jñāni, according to Śrī Vaiṣṇava tradition); but Peter indeed (the grace of) loving God in his neighbour through the labour of action, (the karma type, par excellence!) and thus it is that Peter was loved by Christ more strongly as concerns the effect of interior grace; but John with greater familiarity as concerns the signs of exterior conversation (e.g., constancy in recollection).—These signs of familiarity the Lord exhibited to John not only because of their signification (e.g., their outward manifestation), but also because of the quality of the person (italics ours). For the Lord loved John, as Chrysostom says, more familiarly because of his inborn constancy (inborn because of prārabdha karma, the Hindu may add) and because of his virginal purity and because of his youth, which, other things aside, makes a man to be loved more strongly."

Then, adding a healthy word of caution that it is scarcely ours to judge about these mysteries, he goes on:

"But which of these was finally the dearer, this we shall know better in glory, and hence it is better to wait (devoutly) than to have the temerity to define. This is enough to say, that he is higher in heaven who finally has the greater love on the earth."

Perhaps it is in the same spirit that Yāmunācārīya and Rāmānuja, in their comments on VII : 30 (And Prof. Raṅgācārīya's enlargement on the same is also worth noting in the modern context), where, concerning deathbed conversion (as really belonging to the third class) they say that this class equally attains the same Goal. We shall later see how Pillai Lokācārya enlarges on this, as the ultimate demonstration of God's Mercy and the freedom of his Grace.

Apropos to this point of Mercy and Grace (and we should have added the quality of sulabhya, or easy accessibility; as the fourth Gospel puts it, "We love Him because He first loved us"). Rāmānuja, commenting on VII : 24 and IX : 13 (here following again the lead of Yāmunācārīya) lays great stress on this aspect of Prapattī. It is a response, not a self-initiated action, and presupposes the fullness of God's gift to us of himself, especially in His incarnation(s). Not all recognize this, but, as again the fourth Gospel says, "to as many as received him, to them the power to become the sons of God...full of
grace and truth”. Correspondingly, under the first heading, Rāmānuja says:

“The foolish regard Me to have been manifest heretofore... and now... according to the law of action (karma), knowing not My higher, immutable unsurpassed Nature in the following manner, viz., that I am the Lord... who am incarnated as the son of Vasudeva out of my extreme compassion and affection for those who come to (Me) for refuge, so that I may be accessible to all people, not departing at all from my own nature. Therefore they do neither resort to me...”

The Christian doctrine is so well known that it may seem superfluous to enlarge upon it, but Bonaventura’s own words on the matter are so like these of Rāmānuja that we cannot easily pass them by.53

“It is without doubt congruous that God should become incarnate, and this because of his power, his wisdom, and because of his eminent manifestation of goodness... For here is the consummation of perfection, as appears in the figure of a circle, which is the most perfect figure, (as having neither beginning nor end, and whose relation with the point that is its centre is such that the point cannot be known without the circle—an argument enlarged by Giordano Bruno later on). It is also fitting because of the superabundant paying the price for the liberation of captive humanity, because only a divine person (given as hostage, as it were) could be enough to (gain redemption for) all humanity. Lastly, it is fitting because of the supereffluent glorification of man that not only should man find a pasture within, but also a pasture without.”

(The reference is to John 10: 9, interpreted to mean that by the incarnation, man is no longer kept confined to the sheepfold, but is led out, freely to graze, under the wise guidance of the ‘Good Shepherd’ so that in this metaphor, we have the ‘accessibility’ mentioned above).

If we keep in mind that on the part of the Vaiṣṇavas, this is a controversial issue against the Śaivites, who will never admit the theology of incarnation because according to them embodiment in the world can come only as a result of the operation of the law of karma [their interpretation of the incarnation doctrine in the Gītā text being based on a myth that Viṣṇu had been cursed (by Bhīṣma?) by one of Śiva’s chief deva devotees, so that he was compelled to undergo the
appearance of limitation by incarnation] this accessibility doctrine becomes all the more significant. The stress is on the point that instead of undergoing limitation by coming into the world, God rather proves his superlative nature—his ability to add, as it were, to his perfection by voluntarily and freely taking on finite form over and above (while still included within) his infinite nature. Continuing from the above passage, Bonaventura expresses this aspect of the doctrine as follows:

"And thus it lies that the work of incarnation is indeed quite (multum) congruous with every mode (of God's nature), both according to His infinity, His perfection, according to piety, and according to liberality.—according to His infinity in himself, according to his perfection in operation (operando) according to piety in the liberation (of humanity) and according to liberality in rewarding (the good)..."

And in answering the objection that God suffers injury by taking on an appearance (effigy—and here we are surprisingly reminded of the further extension of the incarnational principle into the arcavatara doctrine of Vaishnavism), he says:

"Moreover, Incarnation does not make Him have an appearance (effigiem) in himself, (but it is to be understood so that) He is united with him (e.g., Man, made "in the image of God") who has the appearance safe by virtue of the spirituality and nobility of God. Whoever thus interprets the incarnation of God, far from detracting from His nobility and perfection, and far from adding the more to the exaltation and dignity of the human species, rather does not only derogate God, but rather the more commends His goodness..."

Following close on this accessibility is the attribute of saumya, approachability by all-and-sundry, without respect to status or station. This is a trait of the Lord distinctly appropriate to prapatti, since even bhakti, as a variety of Brahma Vidya, is not easily available to all. The social implications of this are obvious, though we cannot dilate on that here. It is enough for the present to point out that the Tengelai emphasis on this aspect of prapatti has the full support of Ramanuja himself, under Gita IX: 29. Although in the Sri Bhasha he is compelled to defer to tradition as to the qualification of the Sudras, here he openly and explicitly (whereas both Saunkara and
Madhva—who interprets in terms of Bhakti, instead of prapatti—pass the point on by) says:

“One is not hateful to Me as regards resorting to Me because one is inferior by caste or form or knowledge or the like, i.e., one does not happen to be discarded as being contemptible as regards resorting to Me nor is anyone dear to Me...because he is much superior by caste, etc., except for his taking resort to Me. But on the contrary, who so worship Me...owing to their extreme love to Me, they rest verily in Me with pleasure; whether superior or inferior by their caste, etc., like one possessing the same qualities as I; and I rest in them as if they were superior to Me.”

One is reminded of several incidents in the life of Peter, who refused to let the Lord wash his feet, and thus became “inferior” to him, and who later had such difficulty in overcoming his orthodox scruples about admitting “gentiles” into the young “Christian” community. For true Vaiṣṇavas, as for true Christians, God is indeed “no respector of persons”. Prapatti entails democracy, and that is all that can be said, for there cannot be any exclusiveness about it!

One of the most valuable and philosophically significant contributions of religious consciousness to human life is the elevation of the mind above the mere animal level of appetite, or, in the language of the Gitā, the achievement of non-attachment. Indeed, although many philosophers who insist that it is only through the senses that scientific knowledge can be gained do not openly acknowledge the discipline of the senses by reason, it always remains a moot question—the basic one, for that matter, put by Kant himself—whether empiricism, if it be strictly a matter of sense-perception, can yield any systematic body of meaningful “facts” without a non-empirical perspective; or, if empiricism includes more than that, whether it can itself supply the proper mode of discipline whereby the crude sense-impressions become ordered and related as “facts”. In either case, it remains patent that, at least as a discipline in the background, something approaching the religious mode of knowing is a necessary component even of science. Whitehead, Cassirer and many others have fully vindicated this view, and Eric Frank, in his Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth, has more recently (1945) presented it with great profundity and lucidity. Real knowledge, in order to attain the level
of truth must always be supplemented by imagination; and this imagination is never really liberated without a discipline that puts the senses in their proper place as instruments, or without a positive entrance into that "Presence by whom our entire existence is determined." This, in modern expression, is the kernel of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the famous simile of the Aśvāttha tree of the 15th Adhyāya of the Gītā. A certain stoical Ataxaria can be achieved by sheer will, or by yogic discipline; but it can never become quite the "real thing" without the positive element implied in prāpatti. To express it as on addage, detachment from the "world"—from enslavement to the senses—is next to impossible without attachment to God.

Thus, in interpreting the 4th śloka, following the lead of the Gītartha Sāṅgrahā, Rāmānuja insists that it is only by saraṇāgati to the Primeval Puruṣa that such attachment to the purely material world—which attachment "proceeds since a time without beginning"—can be overcome. But more than that: This saraṇāgati leads to more than mere detachment; it is the secret, also, of our immortality. As Prof. Raṅgācārya says, "Freedom from attachment to the things of the world very naturally leads on to the transfer of attention to the welfare of our souls...... Intellectual as well as moral wisdom comes to one who has attained these qualities, which open the way to immortality. Rich in the wisdom of the spirit, and free from ignorance of all kinds, such as one enjoys perfect bliss and attains unto God." "To attain this consummation, we must surrender ourselves to God. Seeking the abode of immortality is to seek refuge at the feet of God....With the utmost trust and confidence in His grace and with a felt realization of our own numerous imperfections and weaknesses, we must throw ourselves entirely at His mercy, leaving it to Him to dispose of us as He pleases."

This is not the place to get diverted into the problems of immortality; that is reserved to a later chapter. But it is essential in passing, even if one cannot affirm it in the manner of the "grand piety" of the Victorian era—and we must confess that Raṅgācārya is not free from it—nevertheless, with philosophers like Frank, we do insist that there is a field which, while furnishing deeper roots for all human knowledge, and
involving roots of being such as are symbolized by those of the Aśvattha tree as being in the air, the branches and leaves extending downward, which empirical science can scarcely take into its finite embrace; and, with existentialists like Jaspers and Marcel we must further insist that these roots reach beyond all “systematic” formulation. Prapatti is not concerned with analyzing ‘limiting concepts’, it is the existential engagement which, by a paradoxical inversion of value, transvaluates all of life, so that the category of limitation itself loses its binding hold.

Coming now to the last adhyāya, we note that Rāmānuja, and tradition both before and after him, consider it as the quintessence of the whole Gītā. Thus, interpreting śloka 57 in terms of III: 30 and 13-17 according to the Brahma Sūtras (II. 3.33 and 40-41) he enjoins prapatti as the means of achieving that state of consciousness wherein, like St. Paul’s “now no longer I, but Christ in me” the limitations of all egocentricity—a central problem in all psycho-therapy—are transcended. However, his teaching is not at all to be reduced merely to the level of the Psychology of altruism; it reaches into the metaphysical nature of the self: the ‘unconscious’—to use the modern term—always underlies the conscious, and is of a supra-personal order; but more than that; the doctrine of Antaryāmin is to be taken more at face value. The Unconscious is the Holy Spirit, the Witness within ourselves not only that we are only mad if we think we are “sufficient unto ourselves”, but also that it is itself that within us that is the node of individuation of the Final Transcendent which holds the keys of all Creation and cosmic energy. Prapatti therefore involves more than introspection or therapy; it is, quite literally, in the power of the Holy Spirit, the final realization that “God is all in all”, the attainment of real sainthood, wherein by his immediate Obedience, the human person can be used by God in history who only is Actual Agent, all other agency being only by perverse rebellion into non-being and madness or by participation in His Being.

But lest one be drawn to the conclusion that such a view leads only to quietism—whereas it is patent that the extreme forms of advaita are always on the verge of it—Rāmānuja
everything; and that action is also, it is said, done by the
Lord, (being under the guidance of the Lord)....in the
Mokṣadharma, the following is said: ‘This agentship is
true of the soul, when it is understood to be under the
control of the Lord’.

It is interesting to note that Bonaventura solves this difficulty
by distinguishing between inducing the will (which, of course,
remains free) and changing it, and forcing it, and says that the
first is proper to a created agent, the second to an uncreated
agent (God—and the ‘changing’ is to be taken in quite the
same sense that Rāmānuja proposes), but the third cannot be
done by any (agent) whatsoever. Moreover, to the objection
that perfect obedience implies a weakening of the will, he
replies that this would be regarding the will like a wheel or a
play-ball set in motion by violence—which is impossible, both
because such violence is not proper to God, because the will is
of quite a different nature from such things, since it has the
choice of responding or not to the force influencing it.

Raṅgāchārya has explicated this in the following manner:

“The method of philosophical analysis is not fully conclu-
sive. Reason has been pressed as easily into the service of
atheism as into that of theism. That is why the Gitā tells
us that Nature may act either as a veil, screening God from
our vision, or as a luminous guide, revealing the God with-
in. (We remember Bonaventura’s “two books”, Nature and
the Scriptures, discussed in the previous chapter.) But the
reality of the existence of God is realized directly in
personal experience by those, who are privileged to progress
beyond the experience of self-realization and attain the
summit of God-realization. And what do these proofs tell
us about God? They show Him as the source of all being
and as pervading the entire universe in such a manner that
every action in the universe is motivated by His power
and energy. There is nothing we can call our own in all the
wide universe, because everything is from Him. The differ-
ent beings in the universe accomplish what they do achieve
not through any independent power of their own but
through the grace of God...”

We shall later see in detail the relation of Grace to prapatti. It
is sufficient for the present to observe that Rāmānuja himself
does insist that they are integrally linked, and that thus the
later Tengelais are not stretching out away from his own teach-
ing in the matter. Under sloka 62 he says: (and we may not
that here, as elsewhere, he has full support of the text itself, whereas it is Śaṅkara’s tendency to slide by mention of prapatti (or even bhakti, for that matter), and to take the slightest pretext to expand his own doctrines:—and that the same holds true, though to a lesser extent, for Mādhva).

"Such being the case, you yourself should seek shelter with, i.e., follow, Me wholeheartedly, i.e., with all your spirit, who am the instructor of all, having undertaken the office of your charioteer out of (My) affection for those who come to (Me for refuge) and who am instructing (you)... The meaning is... Thus acting, you will obtain, by My grace supreme peace, i.e., cessation of all bounds of all actions, and the eternal seat."

In his enlargement on this, Raṅgāchārya sees the overcoming of temptation, and avoids the interpretation that grace is "irresistible". It is to be doubted that the concept of temptation, in its full Christian context, is to be found in the Gitā, for it involves, strictly speaking, the concept of the Devil, the arch-Fiel, the Tempor. However, this much seems common, that the concept of the freedom of the individual soul does carry the implication that man can turn away from grace, and that this is the worst sin, or obstacle to salvation. Even Pillai Lokāchārya, as we shall see, cannot avoid this, although he, like the extreme Augustinians, does affirm something like a doctrine of irresistible grace. Raṅgāchārya seems to express an irreducible middle position.56

"Here is an opportunity for Arjuna to progress on the path of final deliverance and bliss. If he gives it up, he would be strengthening the obstacles to his salvation. By seeking refuge with the Lord, he would become the recipient of divine grace, attain the peace which passeth understanding and enter into the world of indestructible immortality. The Lord is only too ready to help, but it is left to us to decide whether we accept it or not."
is rather transported into a state of devotional wonder at the ways of the Almighty who is also Merciful. This is illustrated by a story related by Govindāchārya.67 A disciple of Nanjiyar had proposed our problem of Grace and free will as a difficulty, involving the alternatives of quietism and of God's submission or subordination to our own will. The teacher was moved to the quick; he had revealed this mystery (of prapatti) to one who was devoid of devotional understanding. He smote his forehead and retired in agony to his secret chamber. The burden of the story is simply this: If the disciple had been received into the mystery, he would not have asked the question. The Prapanna starts praising, instead of problematizing!

Then quoting a passage from St. Francois de Sales, in which the latter uses the metaphor of the need of a bird to spread his wings (our will) in order to soar on the free breeze (the given grace) Govindāchārya summarizes: "If the attitude of the heart be not one of opposition to God, or even be not one of indifference, it ought to be one of loving, yielding to the operations of Grace. This attitude is itself a gift of His Grace."

And in another place, citing the Rāmāyaṇa (VI:8:6) in illustration, he shows the same attitude. Rāma, addressing Sugrīva, who tried to refuse to let Vibhiṣaṇa (the arch-example of a true prapanna, according to tradition) in to see him, says:

"And can I Vānar King! forget
The great, the universal debt,
Ever to aid and welcome those
Who pray for shelter, friends or foes?
Hast thou not heard the deathless praise
Won by the dove in olden days,
Who conquering his fear and hate
Welcomed the slayer of his mate,
And gave a banquet—to refresh
The weary fowler,—of his flesh?"

And Govindāchārya gives Nampillai's exegesis of this as follows:

"That once we have in faith confided our self-will unto the keeping of God (as Vibhiṣaṇa did to Lord Rāma), this act has spiritual power sufficient to carry us on to the very acme of spiritual eminence. Nothing needs be done on our side. For God, our Refuge, takes up the work of our salvation after our surrender, for such is his Perfection, Glory, and Grace, on which we have put implicitly to reply."
This leads us directly to the climax and culmination of all the Gitā, in the famous “charma śloka” (XVIII: 66), which is taken by all as the quintessence of the whole Gitā. Śaṅkara takes it as the spring-board from which to expound at length his theory of avidyā-maya, and the emphasis which is inherent in this, that all “action”—all ritual, all “works”, all dharma, literally taken—is useless, and that only pure Self-knowledge is the means to salvation. We cannot go into his interpretation here; we only note the strangeness, from the Vaiṣṇava point of view—and it has indeed become our own—of his interpreting the words “seek Me as the sole Refuge” (mām ekaṁ śaraṇaṁ vraja) as meaning “I am myself that Ḵṣara”, e.g., as indicating his doctrine of strict identity of jīva and Brahmaṇ; and the even stronger interpretation of mokṣa as kevala. The act of śaraṇāgati is thus really altogether by-passed; the completely obvious theism is disregarded deliberately; and the aspect of affection in the state of mokṣa is unnecessarily relegated to the level of “popular devotion”, as another kind of “activity” for the unenlightened. Here, even Madhusūdana Sarasvatī leaves Śaṅkara and suggests Rāmānuja’s position.

Mādhva, on the other hand, gives the healthy corrective that if complete non-action were the meaning, all the rest of the passages about karma—niṣkāma karma included—would be negated and nullified; and that Kṛṣṇa would not then urge Arjuna to “fight”. But on the other hand, he seems to deny any form of mystical union, and in doing so, he virtually reduces the śaraṇāgati to bhakti, as a “constant remembrance” rather than as prapatti, as a supreme act of self-abnegation in the enjoyment of ecstatic love. Thus he says that ‘taking shelter under the feet of the Lord’ means only

“The clear perception of the supremacy of the Lord, to set the mind on Him, to love him above all other things, to offer everything to Him; such worship from natural delight in Him; the faith that He protects; the constant remembrance ‘I belong to Him’;—this is called Śaraṇāgati....”

Rāmānuja also stresses the niṣkāma-karma interpretation; and beyond this he seems to give room for both Tengelai (who say that here only prapatti is taught) and Vadagelai (who say that here prapatti is taught as the highest aspect of bhakti only) interpretation. But in either case, he does stress the following points:
(a) All three, karma, jñāna, and bhakti, are involved. Here, he is supremely faithful to the text itself—more so than the others.
(b) Mokṣa does entail more than kevalya, on the one hand, or simply cognizance of the Supremacy—or transcendence—of Viṣṇu on the other; it carries “extreme delight” as its quintessence. (c) The reconciliation of immanence and transcendence is effected in the (mystical) realization of God as both Means and End. These points are all contained in the first section of his interpretation. But he adds a supplementary interpretation, which, being less textual seems to represent more freely his own viewpoint. Here he expressly does distinguish between bhakti and prapatti, although it still may be argued whether his meaning is that the latter renders the former unnecessary (Tengelai), or whether, on the other hand, the latter only renders the former possible (Vadagelai). At any rate, he is quite clear that prapatti is easier than bhakti, and that it is available to all. In this connection we note with regret that Prof. Lacombe has somehow overlooked this passage, and has stressed instead the introduction to the 7th Adhyāya, where the subject-matter is definitely bhakti, and therefore emphasis on prapatti would not be in order. Avoiding controversy as far as possible, we do concur that there is little support for the view that prapatti to Rāmānuja himself constitutes an exclusive way but we do not find that it58 “does not appear to constitute in his eyes but one of the exalted aspects of bhakti, and not as a complete way...of deliverance.” He seems to have followed Rādhākrṣṇana too closely, who also has not adequately surveyed the varying material on the point,—nor, for that matter, has he analyzed the Yatindra Mata Dipikā carefully enough. There, as we have already shown, Śrīnivāsa gives one view in the chapter on dharmabhūta-jñāna karma and the other (which we follow) in the chapter on jīva.

Nevertheless, Lacombe does excell in his exposition of the distinction between deliverance as the kevalya state and as enjoyable bliss and of the theological implications of the latter.59 He points out that it is not merely a matter of ‘enjoyment’ but, more than that, access to the Personality (of Brahmān) and protection from the sin of pride. But before going further, perhaps it is best to report Rāmānuja’s own words more fully.
In the first part Rāmānuja says:

"While performing, doubtless, all duties (dharma) consisting in Karmayoga, Jñānayoga, and Bhaktiyoga, which form the means of Supreme Bliss, as constituting My propitiation, with extreme delight—according to your qualification (adhikāra)—forsake them in the manner described, viz., by way of forsaking attachment to their fruits, agency and the rest; and then investigate that I am the only agent, the object of propitiation and the means (of attaining the object) . . ."

And in the second part,

"Dispelling the grief of Arjuna, who grieved on considering his inability to undertake bhaktiyoga, because Bhaktiyoga can (only) be accomplished by such a man as is freed from all evils and to whom the Lord is extremely dear; because the evils hostile to undertaking it (Bhaktiyoga) are endless; and because these evils cannot be crossed over by duties (dharma) expiatory of these (evils even if they are) performed for an infinite period of time—the blessed Lord said: forsaking all duties (dharma) come to me as (your) sole refuge, i.e., forsaking all (rites) expiatory duties...which (duties) are multifarious and endless, corresponding to the multifarious and endless evils hostile to the undertaking of Bhaktiyoga, and accumulated in (course of) time without a beginning, which (duties) can hardly be accomplished by you, who are to live (but) a limited time,—come to Me as (your) sole refuge, so that you may be able to undertake bhaktiyoga, I being most compassionate, affording shelter to all people, regardless of their particulars, and the ocean of affection for those, who come to me (for shelter). I shall release you from all evils whose nature has been described (above), viz., which are hostile to the undertaking of Bhakti; be not grieved."

Professor Raṅgāchārya's exposition of this sloka, 60 gives a wealth of information as to the variant interpretations within the Vaiṣṇava tradition. Especially in regard to the wide range of meanings given to the term dharma, he points out the following: First, it carries the connotation simply of duty. From this orientation, one can read most of Kant's ethics into the sloka: Duty is not simply duty for duty's sake, but rather the following of conscience, as the "voice of God" which even "forces us against our wills to tread the straight and narrow path". Or again, in reference to bhakti, dharma is that which elevates the affections to the unselfish level, lifting love to devotion. But
this elevation does not stop there; it ends in a sense of dependence, dependence arising either out of danger, or out of situations when the all-too-finite limits of human life are encountered, as in the case of a doctor confronted with a patient whom he cannot cure. Then comes the prayer within the heart—(and we interpose, with Marcel, that it happens even to those who have no conscious belief in God)—“Thy will be done”. This is prapatti.

“When we reflect on the contrast between our manifold imperfections and weaknesses and the greatness and glory the Lord, must we not deem it a privilege to be allowed even to love Him? As for His response to our love, dare we expect it? Judged from the standpoint of our fitness to be loved by God and to be granted the enduring emancipation of mokṣa, how can any of us pass the test? Were it not for the grace of God, who tempers His strict justice with overflowing mercy, we must abandon all hope and sink into abysmal despair. It is the height of foolishness to demand salvation from God as a right earned and sought for. Our only hope is to appeal to the gracious mercy of the Lord and to pray that He might overlook our faults and weaknesses in the abundance of His love. Indeed (and here he expresses a sentiment very dear to both Vaiṣṇavas and Śāivites of the South) our very weaknesses may induce Him to bestow on us His protecting love.”

Then, after quoting the famous lines from Tennyson,

“Our wills are ours, we know not how,
Our wills are ours to make them Thine.

he goes on to discuss the variants between Vadagelai and Tengelai traditions, nothing that (even for the former?) the prapanna divests himself of the sense of responsibility, “for the sense of responsibility dies with the death of a separate will”, emphasizing that nevertheless there is no room in consequence for indifference to the moral law, because the prapanna is “swayed by God.” Being thus in conformity with the will of God, according to this view, the prapanna “earns” the grace of the Lord, and it is in this sense that all “duties” cease—and all sorrows also.

Then giving the other view that dharma stands for the means of salvation (that of Rāmānuja’s first paragraph, we may note), he explains:

“according to this view what is enjoined is that we must
give up the paths of karma, bhakti and jñāna, and look upon the Lord as both upāya and upeya the end and the means of salvation. Two important ideas underlie this view (the mystical element, as we have pointed out). Firstly, it is the grace of God alone that confers on us the great gift of salvation... (and quoting the Rg Veda, X: 124 and the ‘election’ vākyya of the Kathopaniṣad, he continues) When conscious efforts at attaining perfection may not bear fruit, at odd corners and in strange ways, men of light and leading rise up. And it is certainly impertinent to investigate the guiding motives of God in bestowing His grace. Not till our wisdom is greater than that of God may we hope to do so with any promise of success. Is it not therefore abundantly clear that our wisest course is humbly to seek refuge at the lotus feet of the Lord, leaving our fate to be decided by his mercy and wisdom?"

Following this, he gives his explication of the upeya-upāya doctrine, stressing the traditional emphasis on the purgation of any manner of form of self-effort, and pointing out that for some, even prapatti itself is not to be taken as a ‘means’, citing the story of Hanumān and the brahmāstra weapon in the Rāmāyana. But in limiting himself to the ethical implications of the doctrine only, he does not go far enough. As we pointed out in the last chapter in connection with bhakti, so here, the burden of the doctrine is the realization of the “mystery” of the Lord as the indwelling Antaryāmin who provokes the surrender, as one with the Lord appearing (symbolically or as Avatār) and transcendent. In this we are supported by P.N. Śrīnivāsāchārya, who also, supports our contention that prapatti cannot be reduced to a mere variety of bhakti. He expressly states: 61

“The misconception that prapatti yoga is an alien graft on Vedanta and not an inner growth is removed by an appeal to āstra and āstraic experience ... The Gitā, as the essence of Upaniṣadic experience, summons the whole world of jīvas that are heavily laden with sin to renounce their duties and take refuge at the feet of the universal saviour and offers mukti, to all of them .... Although bhakti is a desirable means to mukti, it is not easily practised in this Kali Yuga owing to its arduousness. But prapatti preserves the essentials of bhakti, dispenses with its predisposing causes or conditions, which are only contingent and omits the non-essentials like the need for ceaseless practice. It is thus a direct and independent (advaraka) means to mokṣa”
In short, in the words of the hackneyed, but profoundly true hymn,

"Without Thy grace we go astray
Like flowers that wither and decay"

In the first (73) it is as though Arjuna is speaking—and this, esoterically, we might suggest, is why bhakti is stressed, prapatti being almost always expressed on the side of Kṛṣṇa himself!

"Destroyed is my delusion which consisted in a perverted knowledge, through Your grace. And I have gained, again through Your grace, recognition (smṛti) which consists in knowing a thing in reality. All (my) delusion is destroyed, viz., the (false) notion of the soul as consisting in non-soul, i.e., prakṛti; the false notion that all things, intelligent and non-intelligent, do not consist of the Supreme Puruṣa which (as a matter of fact) do consist of Him, because they constitute His body, and the conception that action, obligatory or casual, leads to bondage, which (as a matter of fact) forms the means of attaining (You) because it constitutes the propitiation of the Supreme Puruṣa. And (I) have gained knowledge, viz., that the soul is distinct in nature, from prakṛti, and is devoid of the characters of prakṛti, because it is different, in nature, from prakṛti; that the unique character of the soul consists in its being a knower (of prakṛti); that it forms a part of the Supreme Puruṣa; that its nature consists in its being only governed by (and not in governing) Him; what the real nature of the Lord, the Supreme Puruṣa is, whose play consists in the evolution of the whole universe, who is of noble nature only (and not ignoble nature), opposed to all blemishes, who is an ocean of the hosts of all noble qualities such as inherent, infinite and profuse knowledge, strength, lordship, valour, power, splendour, etc. and who is called by the word Supreme Brahman; what the distinction between the real natures of the Superior soul and the inferior soul of this description is; and that You viz., Vāsudeva, are the Supreme Person, who is to be known through (all) the Upaniṣads, and who is to be obtained through worship which has assumed the form of bhakti, which is to be accomplished by (performing) the obligatory and casual duties which result but in love for the Supreme Puruṣa, which (love) accumulates day by day as these (duties) are performed, and (which bhakti is to be accomplished) by the avoidance of the prohibited (acts), and by one’s qualities such as pacification (of the external senses), self-restraint, etc...

(But in the last, Rāmānuja speaks out in his own words, there being no pretext or need of doing otherwise):
“Wherever is Kṛṣṇa, the son of Vāsudeva, the Lord of Yoga, i.e., the Lord of all those inborn Yogas which anything at all, intelligent or unintelligent, presenting itself as superior or inferior, possesses, that is, one on whose will depends the maintenance, of their individual characters and their different activities with regard to all things except himself, and wherever is Arjuna, the archer, the son of His (Kṛṣṇa’s) father’s sister, resorting solely to His (Kṛṣṇa’s) pair of feet—(italics ours), there, fortune, victory, prosperity and polity are established...”

If, nevertheless, any doubt remains that Rāmānuja, apart from his commentaries, taught prapatti—for in them, it does seem clear that he is limited in this matter by the text to which he must remain loyal—one has only to turn to his little jewel of a work bearing the title of the Gadya-traya. The first section has been throughout the history of Vaiṣṇavism in the South, and continues to be even today, a text for private devotion as well as for innumerable commentaries. That the whole burden of this section is nothing but prapatti, with all its aspects, and with all its intensity (wherein all the “aspects” are swallowed or compressed into one flood of feeling, into one rapturous act of complete self-abnegation and glorious self-forgetfulness, cannot be denied; it could not bear any other title than saranāgati. It seems to be the epitome of all that can be found in Yāmunāchāry’s Stotaratna and all the Alwars who came before him. Notable in particular are the emphasis on sinfulness and a sense of unworthiness; the devotion to Śrī, or Lakṣmi, as Mediatrix; the description of the Lord in all of His exalted perfections, as well as in his compassionateness, and as Nārāyaṇa, the Holy Name that embodies all His characteristics; the inclusion of the dvaya mantra (see above); the complete renunciation of the “world”; the list of the classical relations of the Divine Love (e.g., father-son, friend-to-friend, Lover and Beloved; the prayer for jñāna, but followed by the prayer to have no other object of love than the lord (supreme devotion, supreme knowledge, supremest love (Parābhakti, Parājñāna, Paramabhakti); the summary emphasis on grace; and the final achievement, in supreme happiness, of (active) subservience—of Instrumentality—of the Lord: the positive transfer of the locus of agency from selfhood (ahaṅkāra) to sainthood as pure embodiment of the Will of God and that alone. It is also noteworthy that some of the very
ślokas of the Gitā which we have treated figure prominently as the basis of his faith; thereby we can find the secret of his whole doctrine, and reassurance of the feeling that in his Gitā Bhāṣya he is not forcing any interpretation. The opening paragraphs will illustrate our point:

I who have taken refuge, take refuge in Her who possesses a multitude of unlimited, surpassingly great and innumerable, auspicious qualities, such as the nature, form, glory, divine supremacy, virtue etc. all worthy of and approved by, the adorable God, Nārāyaṇa—in whose dwelling is the forest of lotuses, who is the adorable goddess Śrī, ever unharmed and faultless, and who is the Divine Consort of the God of gods, the Mother of the whole universe, our Mother, and the Refuge of all those who have not found their refuge.

May I obtain the really appropriate and everlasting refuge in the lotus-feet of the Lord, for the sake of the attainment of the eternal divine service which is of the nature of taking a sole delight in all things subservient to His purposes, and which is suited to all His conditions, and which is the result of the unbounded and excessive love born out of the realization of the Lord—a realization which is caused by the sincere, unswerving, ever-active high devotion, supreme knowledge, and the supremest love (parābhakti, parājñāna, and paramābhakti) directed to the lotus-feet of the Lord; and which is full, incessent, most vivid, eternal, and an end in itself, and is infinitely and exceedingly pleasing.....

O Thou whose entire nature is the opposite of all that is evil, and is the seat of (all) auspicious qualities, and consists of infinite knowledge and bliss essentially different from all entities other than Thyself—O Thou whose divine form is the treasure-house of infinite qualities worthy of and approved by Thee—such qualities as brilliancy, beauty, fragrance, delicacy, grace, youthfulness, etc., which are unchangeable, unthinkable, divinely divine, wonderful, everlasting, faultless and unsurpassed; O Thou that art, of Thine own nature, possessed of unbounded and inestimable knowledge, strength, dominion, valour, power and glory; O Thou that art the great ocean worthy to receive the streams of multitudinous innumerable auspicious qualities such as affability, affection, tenderness, uprightness, benevolence, impartiality, mercy, sweetness, majesty, generosity, cleverness, firmness, courage, valour, heroism, the quality of desiring the truth, the quality of willing the truth, the quality of fulfilling the desires of worshippers, and the quality of bestowing recognition of any little good that may be found in the worshippers, etc., etc.;—O Thou that art adorned
with unlimited divine ornaments of various kinds worthy of Thee, variegated, infinitely wonderful, eternally free from imperfections, and possessing surpassing fragrance, surpassing agreeableness to touch, and surpassing brilliancy—ornaments such as the crown, the diadem, the crest-jewel, the Śrīvatsya Mark, the kaustabha gem (etc.),... O Thou that wieldest countless, eternal, faultless, inestimable, auspicious divine weapons worthy of Thee and possessing unthinkable virtues—weapons such as the conch, the discus, (etc.) O Thou, Lord of the goddess Śrī,... O Thou the Lord of the goddesses Bhūmi (Earth) and Nila, O Thou whose pair of feet is served by many kinds of innumerable male and female attendants like Seṣa,... Garuḍa, etc., who possess qualities... characterized by the sole delight in entire subservience to Thy purposes, to which are due the various kinds of the nature, the existence and activity of all things according well with Thy absolutely free will; O Thou, the Lord of Śrī Vaikuṇṭha, the nature and characteristics of which cannot be defined by the speech of the mind of the greatest yogins... which is full of endless wonders, and endless transcendent glory, and which is of infinite extent, and is eternal, perfect and matchless:—O Thou, to whom the creation, sustenance and the destruction of the whole universe is mere sport—the universe which consists of various wonderful, endless things worthy to be enjoyed,... O Thou who art the Pārabrahman, the highest Puruṣa, the glory of whose dominions is great; O Thou, NĀRĀYĀNA... who, without taking into consideration their peculiarities, forrest the refuge of all persons, who art the remover of sorrows of those that prostrate themselves before thee to worship thee, and who art the one ocean of affection to those that are devoted to Thee.... O Lord of the whole world, O OUR Lord..... O Friend in adversity..... the Refuge of the refugeless, I having no other refuge, take refuge in the pair of Thy lotus-feet.

How he exhausts the superlatives, even of the Sanskrit language! Prapatti demands no less. Both with and without symbol, it takes in all philosophizing in its elevating sweep, and gives that dignity to man which can come only when he is full of divine love and adoration which surpass his capacity of expression.

In the second section—the Śrī Raṅgam gadya—however, we find room for doubt as to whether Saranāgati does take complete priority over bhakti or not. For, after the usual paean of the Lord’s perfections and glories, he emphasizes the constant meditation on these—perhaps as upāsanā, as bhakti?—which leads
to a fresh rush of adoration, of prostration (which might be interpreted as controverting the Tengelai doctrine that prapatti can have no preparation, not even that of bhakti); and following this he brings in his favourite metaphor (about bhakti) as the uninterrupted stream of oil (thus leaving open the possible interpretation that bhakti even comes after prapatti, which for some, as Prof. Rangāchārya has pointed out, is the end in itself!). However, the last words do indicate adoration and prostration to Kṛṣṇa under the Name of Ranga (the favourite name with Nammalvar, we may note) in a mood of liberation for free service (kaiṅkarya) which he seems to feel is more than, and follows after, the uninterrupted recollection, in the same spirit as the last note of the preceding Gadya.

Thus, here too, we do not find sufficient reason for insisting that prapatti, according to Rāmānuja himself, is to be subordinated as a part of bhakti, or that the reverse—e.g., that prapatti is not only distinct from, but eliminates, prapatti altogether. It would seem, therefore, that the most considered judgment should be simply that they are inseparably related, though distinguishable; and that neither can be subordinated unto the other. This conclusion, parenthetically, should furnish some basis for a reconciliation—dear to the best leaders of the present day—of the two sects which still continue the age-long controversy.

The last section—the Vaikunṭha Gadya—is an elaborate description of heaven, such as one finds in medieval literature of all the world, whether Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, or what not. But it is of extreme importance to note that Rāmānuja emphasizes that this is a function of the devotional imagination, an exercise in the art of contemplation. Anyone, therefore, who turns away from the such as mere "pie in the sky" has not understood; and on the other hand, those who dogmatize on the nature of this only imaginable realm, taking the symbols and lights as literally true, are also far from realizing the essential import of this aesthetic aspect of religion.... We shall have much more to say in a subsequent chapter on this, so here we leave it.

However, at the very close of this flight of devotional imagination, there comes a clue to something which we have already touched on: the tradition that the initiation into prapatti
remained with him a secret doctrine, not to be divulged to all-and-sundry. Whether the words—which are very explicit—are Rāmānuja’s own or not is hard to tell from the text; but even if not, their explicitness does emphasize the tradition. This should not be surprising, even to those who emphasize his democratic spirit: though prapatti is open to all, regardless of social station or sex, nevertheless, it is, of its intrinsic nature, not a doctrine; it is a practice and as such, can be transmuted only by personal contact—by āchāryabhimanā, not by written documents and as such, it escapes all controversial treatment... Such, we may remind ourselves, is the spirit in which we too should accept it.

We have openly admitted that in the Śrī Bhāṣya itself, there is no explicit mention of prapatti as such, and have offered the traditional explanation. However, that there should be some implicit indications is almost unavoidable. It is in this spirit that Prof. Seshadri of Trivandrum, in his Substance of the Śrī Bhāṣya, has offered a very interesting key of interpretation. He suggests that on the whole, the fourth Adhyāya is to be accepted as teaching bhakti, but that the whole of the third Adhyāya really gives us Rāmānuja’s views on prapatti. To substantiate this, he points in particular to III: II: 34 & 37, and lays emphasis on the doctrine of identity of end and means. The latter half of the argument, as we have seen, is somewhat weak, since the upāya-upeya nexus does apply to bhakti as well as prapatti. Nevertheless, it can be said in his support that the application to bhakti is certainly not so appropriate as to prapatti, since the emphasis in the case of bhakti is definitely on means; and if we admit—as we have, that the doctrine of election and of prevenient grace gives the key orientation to prapatti, then we must admit, at least in part, that his thesis is correct. For under sūtra 34, Rāmānuja does quote the election vākya (from the Kathopaniṣad), with the express comment that Brahman can be reached by no other means; and in the introduction to sūtra 37, he is equally explicit in stating that “such fruits (i.e., aparvarga, the reaching Him) as are attainable here (e.g., the dṛpta prapanna as the Yatindra Mata Dipikā depicts him) or in the heaven-world (e.g., the ārta) by adopting the means declared in the Veda come only from Him”
(italics ours). Moreover, under sūtra 40, he says,

"The upaniṣads teach the existence of Puruṣottama, who is beyond the capacity of every other source of knowledge...; they show that yagas, making gifts, and homas, are His worship, as also to praise, to fall down before Him, to recite his names, to place flowers at his feet and to meditate on Him; and that worshipped by these means, He gives either enjoyment here or release from bondage to karma...."

The italics will show that although meditation is included, in the light of the above Gītā texts śaraṇāgati may be taken as the keynote.

Seśādri also emphasizes the point that since the first movement of the Adhyāya demonstrates the miserable and helpless plight of the jīva in bondage (this being followed by the above-mentioned sūtras as a sort of climax), prapatti is indicated; Ātma-nikṣepah, supreme trustfulness and self-surrender, is the only possible way out, and Rāmānuja’s purpose is simply to show that there is upaniṣadic support for this...inferring that even true bhakti is not possible until after prapatti, since it is also a gift of the Lord, as the Gītā teaches. In regard to the connection of the two sūtras he cites, Seśādri, says:69

"When we take the two sūtras together...the meaning that emerges from them is that the Lord is not only the means for the attainment of the Summum Bonum but is also Himself the giver of the greatest gifts. Now this implies that Vyāsa has revealed prapatti as the mokṣa sādhanā par excellence. Both bhakti and prapatti are treated as mukhyasādhanā or the chief instruments for the realization of the fruit of mokṣa...Hence bhakti is regarded as the upāya, while the Lord is viewed as He who bestows the gift of mokṣa and devotion. The attitude of prapatti differs from this, in that being rooted in the full awareness of the significance of body and soul, the prapanna declines to look up at anything other than the Paramātmā or mokṣa. His personal conviction is reinforced by his personal experience of the manner in which his own body lies totally entrusted to the control and direction of the finite jīvātmān within. The body does not take any initiative or make any attempts of its own to realize its end. Even so, the jīvātmān, being the śarīra of the paramātmā, ought to do nothing by way of choice of means but to look up to the Lord Himself as the best means. It is in such a state of self-surrender that here is described as prapatti, and it considers the Lord as the upāya as well as the phalaprađa."
Be this as it may—and it does remain a matter of interpretation—there is nevertheless one sūtra under which Rāmānuja, according to the Śrūta Prakāśikā of Sudarśana Sūrī (the first and most authoritative commentary on the Śrī Bhāṣya) definitely intended prapatti, as nyāsa vidyā, to be understood. In the text itself, the indication is only approximate, if not a bit remote: “the terms Veda and upāsita, enjoining meditation, do denote continuity of thought, and this thought is of the highest Ātman (here we may remember the point in the Gītā Bhāṣya that this is arduous and difficult for many people); yet the mind has to dwell on Him as possessing this or that attribute (saulabhyā for example?) stated in the context. In the one case it is being the sole cause of the evolution of the world; in another, it is possessing freedom from karma and the other seven qualities...also, the fruit in the form of reaching the highest Ātman being stated in a particular context, the need of the injunction is satisfied, and the vidyā becomes complete.” But V. K. Rāmānujaśāri has fortunately, in a footnote, added the pertinent material from the Śrūta Prakāśikā (the sub-commentary) as follows:

“In the text the difference among Brahma vidyās was based on difference of form and difference in fruit. It may also be caused by difference in other respects. The nyāsa vidyā is taught in taittiriya-nārāyaṇa thus: ‘Unite yourself, pronouncing the (praṇava)’. The term used here is yunjita, while the terms used in regard to other vidyās are veda, upāsita, etc. The names are different; it is nyāsa vidyā here, and others have their own names. The form of this vidyā is the highest Ātman standing in the place of other vidyās, and giving the person, that throws himself at His feet, the fruit of those vidyās without any further effort on his part. This is not the form of the other vidyās; for the meditator has to think of Him as possessing this or that attribute prescribed for them. In regard to the fruit also there is a difference in that one, that does the nyāsa vidyā, may reach the highest Ātman whenever he wishes it, while the other has to wait till the pṛarabdha karma has been expended, i.e., karma that has begun to yield fruit. Lastly, the qualification also differs; for the nyāsa vidyā is for one that does not have the requisite knowledge, or capacity, or cannot brook delay in the attainment of the fruit. Hence nyāsa vidyā differs from all others.”

Perhaps now we are in a position quickly to surmise the position.
of prapatti in Rāmānuja’s philosophy. It is a very difficult, as well as a very delicate question. Bharatan Kumarappa comes to the conclusion that there is an open ambiguity in the matter, and that the subsequent controversy (which, as we have already noted, still rages) between the Vadagelais and the Tengelais is only the natural outgrowth of this ambiguity, although the general trend favours the former. P.N. Śrīnivāsaśārī does not openly commit himself. Prof. C.D. Sharma, on the other hand, at the risk of further confusion, seems to try to stay on a middle ground, keeping the emphasis on the general philosophical importance of the doctrine.

First, we must remember that, as with all Vedāntic philosophers, the basic problem for Rāmānuja is that of release from the “merry-go-round” of samsāra: spiritual bondage, by virtue of limitations of the senses and of the results of karma, or the accumulated results of all past sins—this is the essential and basic given, just as in all the western (or at least Christian) Scholastics, original sin is the basic orientation for all philosophy as well as theology. In a word, the problem is that of salvation. Again, with all the others, Rāmānuja must, if he follows the scriptures at all, assent to the central teaching that Brahma vidyā, the vision of the Absolute Reality, is the solution of the problem. But the interpretation of the nature of this ‘vision’, as well as of the means to reach it, is where he parts company with all his predecessors (except, of course, his guru Yamunācārya, and behind him the Alwars). This Brahman for him is not only supremely the personal deity, “full of inexhaustible glorious qualities”, but positively goes out of His way, so to speak, to take the initiative in this business of salvation: hence the importance of the doctrine of grace. But on the side of the recipient of this grace, it would be strange indeed if mere knowledge, of however high an order, would be enough. Like all Augustinians in the West, he insists at every turn that the philosophical man is—must be—a lover of God. But as in the case of all types of love—and all types of love come direct from His essential nature—there are two essential aspects: the infatuated constant remembrance (bhakti) and the once-and-for-all falling in love (prapatti). Further—and perhaps even more emphatically—under III: 3: 24, which treats of the difference
between the *purusa vidya* of the Chandogya Upanishad and the Brahma vidya of the Taittiriya (the latter taking the more important position), Ramanuja notes that the Brahma vidya implies a self-offering in the use of the pranava mantra: “In the Taittiriya in the preceding section one is asked to offer himself to Brahman, saying ‘Offer yourself with the pranava mantra saying, ‘For you, the great Brahman’. This Brahma vidya; and its fruit is next stated ‘He reaches the greatness of Brahman’. . . . It means that the person who does the meditation should also meditate on himself as yajna . . . .”

V.K. Ramanujacarya’s footnote here also—even if the text itself is not sufficiently clear—emphatically equates this Brahma vidya with nyasa vidya:

“Why is this sub-section added? The only thing common to the two vidyas is the name, while the difference in form is patent. Reply. The intention is to show that the *nyasa vidya* in the taittiriya is the principal, and that the *purusa vidya*, which follows, is subsidiary to it.

“One more question: If the meditator in the *purusa vidya* is to meditate on his belongings as parts of yajna, why are certain things . . . . which are not parts of yajna, mentioned in the upanishad? Reply. The intention is merely to praise one that does the *nyasa vidya*. In this view there is no vidya in the taittiriya; and the oneness contended for the first view falls.”

In both aspects, but especially in the latter, the lover always considers himself unworthy of the Beloved; and this is supremely true when the beloved is the “higher than that which can be known”, on the one hand, and the very core and source of his being on the other hand. Thus, as Srinivasaacarya points out,66 prapatti is not only a matter of surrender to an inevitable absolute, but “the religious conclusion of the philosophy of the sarira-sariri relation and it affirms that the saririn is Himself the upeya and the upaya.” In other words, the Beloved, as the very love by which He is loved, is the very life-and-all of the lover. And the very realization of this cannot be either a matter of will only (karma) or of knowledge even (jñana); but, supremely, an affective restoration of harmonious relation. Krsna’s becoming Arjuna’s charioteer is only a symbolization of this harmonization, and Arjuna would have been insane to have refused to acknowledge it.
From this perspective, we can see that Prof. C.D. Sharmā’s at least implicit attempt to interpret both bhakti and prapatti in terms of jñāna is a definitely strained, if not biased, effort; and to link prapatti with upāsanā is, unfortunately, an outright error. Prapatti is open to all; but even for those who are inclined to woo the Divine (bhakti) before the real falling in love—and this is a rather aristocratic art!—the “final leap” still remains as the climax; for them, the constant remembrance must be deliberate (upāsanā) until they “open up” to the full surrender; but afterwards—how can they forget? Moreover, Sharmā is going directly against tradition in claiming that the Alwars did not distinguish between the two. It is true that Rāmānuja, out of deference to upaniṣadic tradition, did try to interpret the distinction according to the śāstras; but to say that he modified (the Tamil or the Pañcarātra) tradition in doing so,—this is equally difficult to prove. His life, if nothing else, demonstrates that his intentions were to preserve that tradition, and merely to interpret it so as to make it acceptable to those who, as he thought, had been led astray by the errors of Śaṅkara and Bhāskara; Dramida, Tanka, Gouhadeva, Karārdin, Bharouchi and the Pañcarātra tradition,\(^{67}\) (as may be seen in his Śrī Bhāṣya under I: iii: 44 & II: ii: 40) he thought represented the true vedānta; while the Alwars, as is universally conceded, belonged to this same tradition. Nevertheless, Sharmā is correct in pointing out that Rāmānuja did distinguish between the two, and that they are both essential ways to salvation by grace; and this is the chief burden, philosophically, for Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy, if not, indeed, the key to the whole of it.

On the other hand, the identification of prapatti with “lower” bhakti is at least problematical, if not mistaken, even if the distinction between lower and higher is correct, as it probably is. Sharmā’s statement in this regard is in part as follows:\(^{68}\)

“It is very important to note that constant meditation itself is not the highest bhakti (which is the same thing as real jñāna), but only a means to realize it. Enjoined actions (karma) and ordinary knowledge (jñāna) are means to realize ordinary bhakti which may be identified with prapatti or flinging oneself on the absolute mercy of God and with constant remembrance and contemplation of God called smṛti, upāsanā, or nīḍhyāsana. This ordinary bhakti which means prapatti
and upāsanā is itself a means to realize the highest bhakti which is pure jñāna or the immediate intuitive knowledge of God which is the direct cause of liberation and which dawns only by the grace (prasāda) of God."
The italics indicate that which we doubt. However, the problem is a deep-seated one, or the split between the two schools would not have happened. If one takes prapatti as the culmination of bhakti (e.g. as nyāsa vidyā), then it cannot be identified with the lower bhakti; but if one takes it as completely independent of bhakti or as swallowing it up in complete subordination as the Tengelais do, then it really can’t be identified with either; moreover, if with most Vadagelai interpretation one is disqualified for prapatti by having the qualifications for bhakti, then the stress after prapatti is really not so much on bhakti—higher or lower—but on kaiṅkarya, in spite of the reference to being enabled to undertake bhakti by means of prapatti in Rāmānuja’s second paragraph on the carama śloka.

It should be quite clear that bhakti, for Rāmānuja, cannot be identified with jñāna, however so "intuitive", from our treatment in the previous chapter; but that prapatti can be so identified is equally impossible should by now also be clear. But if not from the passages as we have already dealt with them, then our examination of the preface to the eighth Adhyāya, where he summarizes his interpretation of the seventh, and the comments on VII:17, where he points to Prahlāda as the arch-example of a prapanna, should be convincing. It may be true, that in a movement quite the reverse of Śaṅkara, who always takes prapatti as jñāna, Rāmānuja tends to take jñāna as prapatti; but this does by no means indicate a reciprocal identity: quite the reverse, for otherwise he would have followed Śaṅkara’s interpretations of prapatti on the one hand, and on the other, his tendency constantly to take jñāna as a basis upon which a further affective element is founded would not be so emphatic, as in VII:18 & 19. Indeed, the sense in which he takes jñāna as prapatti seems to be this, that if one has attained the final realization of the nature of God—who to him is not only pure jñāna, but also (as pure ānanda) pure love and compassion—then one cannot help going on to the act of surrender to Him; for prapatti is an act, and not a state, as jñāna is. At least this seems the clear intention of 18:
"...but the wise man (jñānī), I deem, is My very Self (interpreted, of course, in the light of the śarīra-śarīrī doctrine, not as identity, as may be seen from the context), that I cannot sustain myself without him. Why is that so? For he resorts to Me alone as the unsurpassed goal regarding that his sustenance is impossible without Me..."

In this light, it may be seen, moreover, that Pillai Lokācārya's placing the kevala-jñāna as definitely inferior to the prapanna is not a later development, but a faithful interpretation of Rāmānuja's own doctrine.

Further, if nyāsa vidyā is the source of Sharmā's contention, then it should be enough to see from the Śruta Prakāśikā's interpretation, that the same argument applies: it is an act, involving affection, not simply a 'realization'.
SECTION III

THE VEDAGALAI-TENGALAI CONTROVERSY

But by now we have made so many allusions to the controversial issues that we must go on to discuss the differences between the two schools both of whom equally claim Rāmānuja as their authority,

Almost everyone in India knows at least the basic metaphors upon which the principal difference is founded: The Tengalais say that the relation of the individual soul to God in grace is like that of a baby kitten to its mother, while the Vadagelais say that it is like that of the baby monkey to its mother, the one being taken in its helplessness in the mouth and carried without any effort on its part, the other needing to cling by its own effort. Many other differences follow upon this but the metaphors do quite vividly portray the difference, even as it exists today. Dās Guptā’s report of Kastūrī Raṅgācārya’s exposition of the differences is easily available, and is quite reliable, although Pandit Buberhampillai insists that all the details there reported are not essential or of great importance. Goviṅdācārya, on the other hand, has given a longer list of points of essential difference. It is to be noted that the essential points all have no deal with prapattī, directly or indirectly. Goviṅdācārya was himself a leading Tengalai of our own era; but this should not deter us, both because it is this branch that has taken the exceptions to—or revisions of, if one prefers to look at it that way—the formulations of Veṅkatanātha, and because it is among them that the doctrines become more vivid. Taking these points as outline, we shall survey in some detail the later developments, especially as they are expressed in the works of Pillai Lokācārya, the founder of the schism.

I. Concerning Grace (prasāda)

Vadagalai (henceforth N. for Northern) emphasize “cooperative” grace, or grace obtained only because of merit. Goviṅdā-
cārya puts it rather strongly: Grace can be "bought", though this may be a rather strong expression, for even here it is recognized that the jiva is absolutely dependent on the Lord's freely giving it; but the emphasis is on the point that it comes as reward of the effort of the salvation-seeker. The Tengalai (henceforth S. for Southern) doctrine, on the other hand, stresses the sovereignty of grace as such, and formulate the classical "extreme" of irresistible grace—irresistible primarily in the sense that on it hangs the doctrine of election, as well as in the sense that it comes unmerited.

We may first turn back to Rāmānuja himself, and pick up a few points thus far somewhat neglected. In the Śrī Bhāṣya (III: 4: 27), there is an intimation that grace can be obtained by right performance of karma—so long, of course, as it is done as loving worship. V. K. Rāmānujačārī has put an interesting footnote (from the Śruta Prakāśikā ?) to this, in the form of an analogy: if one knows he has wronged or offended a great man on whom he is dependent, he will do all within his power to restore good relations with him; how much more will one try to make restitution, to come (again) into grace, in the case of one's relations with God! Again, under III: 2: 40, in which is explicated the doctrine that only the Paramātman is the dispenser of (spiritual) fruition—and there, characteristically, Rāmānuja says that it is as Antaryāmin that the Lord so acts—in the sub-commentary the objection is raised that if the Lord grants grace, "which cannot for a moment remain fruitless" in reward for karma, if the sādhaka (later) makes an error, the Lord could be charged with ignorance; the reply is in effect that the devatās, the intermediary deities, or—almost—angels, being full of grace, intercede, so that the worshipper still gets the full measure of grace.

And in the Gitā Bhāṣya, there is much more to be noted. Under XV: 5, the śloka that follows the reference to the Āsvattha tree, he puts emphasis on the idea that only by Grace will those who have taken refuge "easily" accomplish the several virtuous things that constitute perfection. There is no intimation in the text whether the grace comes before or after the śaraṇāgati; indeed it appears that it is here a matter of simultaneous reciprocity: "Having thus taken refuge in Me those who are free
from pride and delusion.....those who are constantly engaged in meditation on the soul...and who are free from the pairs of opposites...attain to that imperishable goal....The meaning is: On the part of those who have taken refuge in Me, all these attempts are rendered easy to accomplish and they result in success, by My grace alone.”

Under XVI: 15, on the other hand, there does seem to be support for the Tengalai trend: (Only) those who are “deluded by ignorance, believe, that sacrificing, making gifts and the like, can be done (all) by oneself, independent of the grace of the Lord.” And likewise, under XVIII: 8, in which he takes occasion to object to (Śaṅkara’s) teaching that jñānabhāṣya alone—the inquiry after Brahman without reference to the karma injunctions of the Vedas—is sufficient; he posits the teaching that it is through grace, and not through the visible character of the rituals, that joy comes to the worshipper. The parenthesis added here by our translator seems misplaced; “which one wins thereby” misinterprets the whole attitude toward the karma-kaṇḍa which Rāmānuja takes in the first Sūtras of the Śri Bhāṣya: One does not observe the rituals is the spirit of the Mīmāṁsakas, as a means of gaining merit, nor does one, with Śaṅkara, dismiss them altogether as worthless; one rather observes them as a free act of (almost optional) obedience, as an expression of gratitude returned to God for grace enjoyed beyond their necessity.

Likewise, the weight in the commentary on XVIII: 73 seems to be on the Tengalai side. It is (only) by Grace that all delusion is destroyed, and the positive recollection (smṛti) and true worship of the Lord, with all his glorious attributes, is given, as well as obedience to His Will, all doubts having been dispelled.

Nevertheless, on the previous ślokas (61-62), there is again some ambiguity. Here the emphasis is again on the Antaryāmin; but it is unclear, as far as we can see, whether the words “thus acting, you will obtain, by my Grace, supreme peace...” and the eternal seat” are to be construed as indicating that grace is given as a result of the obedience, or whether as making the obedience possible. The latter meaning can easily be read into it, however, if one lays emphasis on the first sentence of the commentary: “Such being the case” (e.g., the Lord being supreme Controller
seated in the heart as Antaryāmin) "you yourself should seek shelter with, i.e., follow Me wholeheartedly ... who am the instructor of all, having taken the office of your charioteer out of (My) affection for those who come to (Me for refuge), and who am instructing you"—These words can be so read, that is, unless one interprets the Lord's affection in coming to be the charioteer as response to the īśaraṅgati; but as we have seen in the beginning, Kṛṣṇa did take the initiative in making the offer. Indeed, in the Mahābhārata, before the battle began, although Yudhiṣṭhira had made the first approach to Kṛṣṇa, the latter did all he could to effect a reconciliation before advising that battle was the only recourse left; and it is then that Kṛṣṇa makes the proposal that he should become the charioteer of Arjuna. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that Kṛṣṇa's choice to fight on the side of the Pāṇḍavas was determined by the fact that their's was the more righteous cause ... and so the argument can be extenuated almost interminably; for, certainly on the other side, those who had outraged Draupadi did not deserve Kṛṣṇa's visit, except for punishment, whereas he pleaded with them to come to their senses first.

Turning now to Pillai Lokācārya's Śrī Vacana Bhūṣāna, we find the full elaboration of the Tengalai doctrine on Grace. Unfortunately, Dāsa Gupta's summary of this gem of a work, which is still the basic living text for this sampradāya, is rather inadequate, especially in regard to this key-point concerning grace. For although it is true that the prapanna has the freedom to reject the Lord, and therefore does have the responsibility of removing the hindrances, it is not without prevenient grace itself that even this can be done. The prapanna—and this is the cardinal orientation of the whole formulation—cannot make any effort, positive or negative; whatever appears as effort is only response. Grace comes first, and all else follows. P.N. Śrīnivasācāri's summary, although much more brief, is much more in the proper spirit, especially on this orientation: "Bhakti and prapatti follow necessarily from the grace of the rakṣaka and are not essential antecedents of such grace. The endeavour of the jiva to attain the Lord is svāgata svikāra (for acceptance resulting from one's endeavour) and is utterly futile, but the idea of the rakṣaka seeking the jiva is parāgata svikāra or acceptable arising from the Lord's will
and is natural and efficacious... grace ceases to be grace, if it is election by works. The only upāya to be followed by the mumukṣu is to renounce the upāya mentality, receive the grace of God in a passive way and respond to the divine call of krpa when it comes..."

Venkataswāmī Naidu, the present Minister for Religious Endowments of Madras, has, at the instigation of his guru, done a still more excellent summary of the Śrī Vacana Bhūṣana in tract form. His chief emphasis is on the Ācāryābhimāna, the teaching that the guru takes the outward role of God himself in receiving the āraṇāgati, so that direct surrender to God without intermediaries is not to be countenanced. Modern Tengalais are accused by their opponents of having carried this to a ridiculous extreme, and that may be true; but it is, in the proper spirit, not beyond the original teaching, for here again, this right spirit depends on grace. As in the whole of Hindu tradition (and notably in the Bhāgavatam Purāṇa), so here, it is only by the Grace of God that one finds one's proper guru, and in proper season; here again, self-seeking is vain, and self-choosing is perverse.

In the text itself

"Does not the urchin in the street,
Its loving mother's back in anger beat?
So may not God's darlings blame their Sire
If having power He heals not their ills dire?"

This is in the negative context, and is based on Nammalwar's verse, Tiruvoimoli, VII: 1: 1:

"O my Mysterious Being, Thy greatness is immeasurable. Why dost Thou still keep me suffering by withholding Thy lotus-feet from me, troubling, tantalizing, and tormenting me with the bodily five senses? Thou art praised by the angels. Thou art the Lord Paramount. Thou art the owner of the three worlds. Thou art the Father. Thou art the Ambrosia. Thou art my Master."

—negative context, because of the expression of "complaint" against the Lord; but in the attitude of helplessness, it does
poignantly show that self-effort is vain; if grace is not given, there is no hope. In explanation, another verse is added:

“If we for Lord have one, whom e’en
In His wrath, we, seizing
By the feet, may freely crave for Grace,
We may use such speaking.”

But on the positive score—wherein the gratitude as the other side of the total dependence on grace comes to the fore—Lokācārya cites other verses from Nammalwar, e.g., V:7:3:

“Thou hast the symbol of Garuda on Thy flag. Thou hast the disc for Thy arms. Thou hast Heaven for Thy abode. Oh! my dark-coloured God! Thou madest me who was a non-entity into an entity and took me into Thy service. Thou favourest Srivaramangalnagar where reside those several men who with clear intellects are well-versed in the four Vedas, and made it Thy residence. I have nothing good in me to give Thee in return.”

and X: 6: 8:

“The fragrance from the Tulasi wreath resting on His body is greater in its sweetness the nearer it is to the Holy Head. The disc that can go to any place He likes rests in His hand. The colour of His body is blue like the water of the sea. His holy form is like a mountain of sapphire. He resides in Vattar. What god have I done to Him? Yet He dwells and shines in my mind.”

and X:8:9:

“I was nothing before. Now He put Himself in me and made me something. Why did He suffer me to go astray before? Oh! Holy dweller of Tirupperai where the mansions are like mountains, I beseech Thee to enlighten my mind on this.”

But the text is almost as poetical, if less penetrating, than the verses that support it:

“While, in the trice-great Sphere God sees all’s full, His blest heart, drooping as if wholly starved, To stray souls flies... Grieves for sinners’ being so far from Him, Grants them organs and frames, communion-fit, and powers to use all these communion-means; Himself’s unseen, lest they should say, ‘be gone’; Yet, not able to part indwells and hugs By penetrating their soul-essence’ self... For He His children knows, though they not Him. Through each frame they reach (in bliss and woe) He bears them company and their fortune shares; E’en when on wrongs they’re bent, sits—impotent, Indifferent, and consenting e’en as if He were — But truly watching opportunity For Grace to act... To sinners (He)
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ascrives virtues in terms like these: ‘Pronounced My Name, nay, e’en that of My dwelling-place; My servants did serve; them shelter gave, and drink’ .... (and grants free grace to fools who have only) mere floating faith’.

This necessarily anticipates some cardinal points yet to come—necessarily, because the whole system is splendid in its integrality. The doctrine of *prev enent* grace entails that of *undeserved* grace; and that in turn entails the *spirit of indulgence* in the heart of God, and the spirit of helplessness on the one hand and of gratitude on the other on the part of the soul which is then seen to be completely pervaded by its Lord.

It is characteristic that the authorities cited are not the Sanskrit Vedas or the Brahma Sūtras, but the Ahirbudhya Samhitā, and Nammalwar, of course, at every turn. It will be remembered that the Tamil Prabandams, with Nammalwar at the head, are considered as equal authority with the Vedas by both Sampradāyas. Thus, nothing exceptional should be found in Lokācārya’s appeal to them, unless one takes the attitude that he should equally seek support in the āryan sources. Since the former has been treated in full by such authors as Dās Guptā and Kumarappa, we may bypass it; but Lokācārya’s comment on chapter XIV reminds us of Jesus’ turning to Peter on the night of the Trial, without rebuke, but with such understanding compassion that Peter’s repentence became excruciatingly sincere, that we cannot neglect it:

“As thieves about to steal, abstain If owner takes the bag he left, And honest men’s indifference wear; So, good and bad works, their soul-stealing cease The moment God’s soul-owning glance, meets souls Who, then, salvation-wisdom seek, weaned from all else, Study, with zest, God’s Word Revealed; true teacher join; Find life; grow wise; truth’s essence grasp and keep, resting On God—full blest e’en here, and raised in time to Heaven!”

And further:

“If therefore we meditate on God as the Friend that strove to save us even in the days when we turned our backs upon Him; We feel we have nothing to do but ever rest content—banishing all fear”.

This, of course, is only an echo of Nammalwar (II :7: 6):
"I have none but Madhusūdana. Madhusūdana is my all. I have nothing to do to gain any purpose. My only object is to dance before Him singing numbers full of His praise. He for many eons in many births took me forcibly into His presence. He has been doing me good in a great many ways. I am doomed to be so. I do not know how I can stand before Trivikrama."

Excellent in its sensitivity though these sentiments are, they are not unparalleled. In one of St. Bonaventura's jewelled minor works, the *Soliloquy*, we find a whole section devoted to the necessity for gratitude in the face of undeserved redemption. It is written in the form of a dialogue between "man" and the Soul. "Man" urges the Soul to consider how it was "formed by nature, deformed by fault, and reformed by grace."

"Consider therefore" he says, "and in the serenity of pure affection...how profound is the clemency of God, how high His wisdom, how marvellous His power, that you should be thus reformed by grace" for 'the Son of Man came to seek those that were lost', taking the form of our infirmity, not only for the sake of becoming visible, but even to appear despicable:

"Awaken now, O my soul, 'Look into the face of thy Christ; look, I say, how luminous it is with splendour veiled because of thee contrary to its clarity; how beautiful in comeliness, swollen (in agony) contrary to its comeliness; gracious in sweetness, spat upon contrary to its graciousness, how desirable for love, yet abominable (from suffering) contrary to its desirability'. See and consider, 'what the Lord has done upon the earth'. God is ridiculed, that you may be honoured; "flogged, that you may be consoled; crucified, that you may be liberated—Look into this, O soul, and consider how Christ your Lord and Friend was afflicted with every punishment, in every part of the senses, by every sort and station of men...""

And he goes on, in this classical Christian style, which, of course, may become repulsive, if the basic doctrine is forgotten in the intensity of sentiment. The essential thing is that in Bonaventura's treatment, the doctrine of undeserved redemption—undeserved, with only the qualification that *ingratitude* can be the only bar—is inherently ingrained in the Gospel itself. Concerning this ingratitude, he quotes St. Bernard: "ingratitude is like a burning wind, drying up the rivers of divine mercy, the fount of clemency, and the streams of grace (itself)."
But to those who do not get perverted into this one and only pitfall, and do answer the call in grace to return to God the Lord, who “so fatherly recalls thee by hidden inspiration from actual sin, and so amicably recalls by interior allocutions from the miseries effected by sin”, there is great benignity of justification.

“Consider diligently” says Man, “what inestimable grace has been made for thee by thy (divine) Spouse. For He (freely) bestowed grace on thee, that thou might be His companion of the table, His consort in ruling, and his beloved of the bridal chamber. ‘In eternity will I sing the loving-kindness of the Lord’ (Psalm 88 : 2) because I find seven mercies which He has made in me... First, He has preserved me from many sins. Secondly, He has not immediately condemned me, sinner though I be, but Himself has prolonged (my) piety, who was prolonging iniquity. Thirdly, he has completely changed my heart, that it might be sweet to him, though it was formerly so bitter. Fourthly, He has mercifully received my repentence. Fifthly, He has established virtue in me, by contending with me and emending (my faults). Sixthly, He has given me grace far beyond my deserving. Seventhly, He has given me the tribute of hope of obtaining (Himself)”.

And then in almost the same phrases as those used by Nammalwar, the Soul replies:

“Alas, My Lord God, that such a wretched and miserable one as I should love my God, who created me when I was not; redeemed me when I was perishing, delivered me from so many perils and when I was going astray, led me back (to the right path); though I was ignorant, He taught me; when I was sinning, He wrested me from it; when I was in despondence, He consoled me; when I (completely) despaired, He strengthened me; when I stumbled, He held me up; when I was blind, He led me; when I went forth, He guided me; wherever I went, He supported me...When thus I see Him wholly occupied with taking care of me, (I marvel); (for) it is as though He wished to be oblivious of all else; and to devote His whole attention to me.”

The next inquiry follows closely, “How then, can I love Him, who with such love has done (all this)? And the reply, like Rāmānuja’s constant reiteration of the primacy of the Antar-yāmin, is cogently put; the cause of the Love of God is God Himself; and the only mode of love is in loving. And such love must express itself prudently, boldly, wisely, and sweetly, as befits the Beloved, rejoicing in the truth.
Such Love, in Indian language, is nothing but prapatti: it attains the imperishable goal. And how could it come from ourselves alone?

II. Grades of bliss in Mokṣa

N. no grades; say some variation, according to the duties assigned to different muktas (i.e., freed, liberated, or “saved”). This point need not detain us at present, since the whole topic of mokṣa is reserved for the chapter on beatification. In the comparative field, we need only note the rough similarity to the protestant-catholic controversy over purgatory. Here the Vadagalais are the “protestants” and the Tengalais are the “catholics”. Bonaventura,76 of course, gives us the traditional doctrine made famous by Dante, namely, that those who deserve punishment because of mortal sin go to the lowest place for punishment by fire; those who have only original sin go to limbo; and those who have only venial sin go to purgatory. This conception of multiple heavens and hells, of course, is quite simple compared to those developed by medieval Buddhists, especially in Tibet; but the revolution of Copernicus has made it extremely difficult for any modern man to accept the idea except in some very diffused symbolic form, since in all these medieval beliefs, it cannot be denied that actual places in the physical universe were intended. In the face of this, it is amazing indeed how many “fundamentalists” still cling to the out-moded conceptions. Pandit Venkatacārya of Melkote, for example, is as adamant as any dogmatic catholic: mokṣa is not a “state” but a “place” to both. And literalistic protestants fare no better: “pie in the sky bye and bye” is all too actually what they anticipate. There is, nevertheless no doubt something of profound psychological significance symbolized in all these distinctions, and it is not beyond the development of open orthodoxy to shift the emphasis here. Even Bonaventura suggests that punishment depends on place, but glorification does not: the purely spiritual order is essentially the transcendence of the limitations of time and space; and that there should be degrees of that transcendence should not be surprising.

Even so, it is a little surprising that the Tengalais, whose attitude toward prapatti is so intense—prapatti should bring the soul completely and immediately to the goal—should take
the graduated view. The implicit reply seems to be that it all depends on the “arbitrariness” of Grace, except in the case of the baddhas, the bound souls, who have deliberately rejected grace. Pillai Lokācārya posits five classes, in his Artha Pañcaka: (1) the nitya surīs, those who have never known saṁsāra, worldly existence, at all; they correspond remarkably to the Angelic Hierarchy of Medieval Christianity, even assisting God in the work of creation and involution of the universe, and accompanying Him in His Avatāras. (2) the muktas, or freed, who have attained the “place” (condition) of “no return”, enjoying the fullness of the fruits of grace and the bliss of the Lord, and in this bliss (like St. Bernard in Dante) are drowned in rapture, overflowing with joy and love and praise eternal. (3) the baddhas, or bound souls, who as we mentioned, have rejected grace, and hence are still mixed up in the delusions of the senses and passions. (4) the kevalas, the super-jñānis, or “philosophers”, who, completely engrossed in their own soul instead of concern with God, are past redemption—though here, as we shall soon see, the Vadagalais disagree on this point also. It is an important distinction notwithstanding: even the baddhas have a “second chance”, but these do not, because they can be content with their pseudo-salvation, whereas the others, including the fifth, the mumukṣus, will be spurred on to God by their dissatisfaction with their sufferings. (5) these mumukṣus, who have taken only the bhakti way, depending on their own effort; and the prapannas strictly speaking, who leave all to God.

Of course, our comparison of the Vadagalais to the protestant view is quite inadequate, since they are still concerned with all the passages through the different spheres mentioned in the last adhyāya of the Brahma Sūtras, whereas the protestant conception is that the soul goes immediately to heaven or to hell, never to return from either “place”. It may be a moot question whether Lokācārya intends in this picture to circumvent this Āryan system with his vivid picture of Vaikunṭha or not. This dual view of the after-life in all Hinduism (the cycle of birth-and-death compensated with absorption into Godhead on the one hand, and the “heaven” concept on the other) remains a source of confusion, troubling to those from the outside, and curiously overlooked or byepassed by almost all sampradāyas.
If the Tengalais have simply made a choice, that is all to their credit; perhaps choice is better than the attempt to reconcile the rather incompatible views.

III. Karma and Jñāna

N., ancillary to bhakti, which is the direct means—e.g., without prapatti; S. since prapatti as a “change of heart” is focal, karma and jñāna (if done in the spirit of prapatti) can be means.

IV. Nature of Śri (or Lakṣmī)

This remains one of the bugbears of contention today—N. She has more of the śakti aspect and function, i.e., she has svāra-pa-nāyāpti, or pervasion by essence. It is interesting to note that here, roughly, we have the analogue of the Virgin Mary as interpreted in Eastern Orthodox Christianity, where she is regarded as the incarnation of Sophia, the cosmic feminine principle which is also identified with the Holy Spirit, the theotokos, the God-bearer, who is thereby even more than Mediatrix, and is celebrated in the oft-repeated hymn,

“More precious than the cherubim,
And more glorious beyond all measure than the seraphim
That without corruption gavest birth to God the Word
And art truly Theotokos,
We magnify Thee”

This doctrine has received focal treatment in the philosophies of both Vladimir Soloviev and of Father Sergius Bulgakov. For the former, she is a “relatively passive principle (in the words of N.O. Lossky) devoted to God and receiving from Him its form”, or, in Soloviev’s own words,77

For God, His other (i.e., the universe) has from all eternity the image of perfect femininity, but He wants this image to be not only for Him, but to be realized and embodied for each particular being capable of uniting with Him. The eternal Feminine itself which is not a mere inactive image in God’s mind, but a living spiritual being, possessing all the fullness of forces and activities, strives for the same realization and embodiment. The entire cosmic and historical process is a process of its realization and embodiment in the great variety of forms and degrees.

This embodiment is not only by way of incarnation in the
Holy Virgin as Mother, but also as the Church as the Bride of the Logos. For Bulgakov, however, a distinction is to be made between the divine Sophia and the created—a distinction that would necessarily follow also for Vadagelais as to the relation of Śrī with her earthly avatāras such as Sītā, for the distinction is based on that between nature and personality. The divine concerns the former, which, being undifferentiated, comprises within itself the pantos pan of Plotinus, the “all-qualitative All-in-unity” which is God in His self-revelation” or as the “panorganism of Ideas is the eternal humanity in God, as the Divine archetype and basis of man’s being” or again, “the image of God in God Himself the realized divine idea, the idea of all ideas realized as beauty...She is a live and living entity, though not a personal one.”

But the created Sophia, while having the metaphysical function of bringing forth the world in such a way that the ex nihilo dogma is to be reinterpreted as her operation as becoming, as God mirroring Himself through Her in non-being, is personalized in the human personality, so that just as the Logos is incarnated in Christ as the “second Adam”, the created Sophia is, in the Holy Virgin, the “second Eve”, containing in her nature all personalities, and is “the manifestation in a human hypostasis of the Holy Spirit”.

Of course, in some ways, this lies closer to the Śaivite conception of Śiva and Śakti than to any Vaiṣṇava theology; but when one understands Venkatanātha’s expositions on the subject, one begins to see that the Vadagelai concept is rather like that too. According to P.N. Śrīnivāsācāri, Śriyāpati and Śrī also constitute a “dual self” in “cooperative identity”, such that Śrī is of the same order of infinity as Her Lord.

Nevertheless the Tengelai conception is more comparable to the Western Christian—and even Protestant—doctrine concerning Mary the Virgin. Here, she is believed to have Vigrāyāipti, corporeal pervasion—e.g. has no divinity by nature, but has a divine function by attributive gift, or the privilege among the jivas—for she is only the highest of these, and not inseparable (e.g. in the order of infinity) from the Godhead. According to Pillai Lokācārya, her function is not so much the sakti of the Lord, as the Mediatrīx for men, softening the
Lord's wrath, and appealing for mercy to sinners, being of the same nature as they, "yet without sin" (this, and not the sakti emphasis, being the basis, in Protestant tradition, of denial that she should be worshipped outright, although meditation on her as "full of grace" in uniqueness is not to be abandoned). Thus, the next point is almost ipso facto contained in this:

V. Śrī's powers

N., she has power to grant mokṣa, a power shared equally with Nārāyaṇa; Ś. Nārāyaṇa alone has that power; she is only the "chief of intercessors."

It is thus that even Dante (who, we must constantly remind ourselves, was a tertiary of the Franciscans, and followed Bonaventura in some respects more closely even than Thomas does not go so far as our Eastern philosophers, and yet does sing, when he beholds the Face of Mary:

"Look now upon the face that most resembles Christ, for its brightness alone can make thee fit to see Christ. Pouring down upon that face I saw such joy, borne by the holy minds that are created to fly through altitudes like these, that whatever I might have seen before kept not back my wonder, nor showed me so much of the face of God. And that Love who first descended to the Earth singing ‘Hail Mary, full of grace, spread out his wings before Her, and on all sides the blessed court responded to the song divine, so that every face was made more clear and bright."

The background of this, of course, is in the prose-hymn familiar to Catholics, and used daily by most of them:

Mary, we hail thee, Mother and Queen compassionate; Mary, our comfort, life, and hope, we hail thee. To thee we exiles, children of Eve, lift our crying. To thee we are sighing, as mournful and weeping, we pass through this vale of sorrow. Turn thou, therefore, O our intercessor, those thine eyes of pity and loving-kindness upon us sinners. Hereafter when our earthly exile shall be ended, show us Jesus, the blessed fruit of thy womb. O gentle, O tender, O gracious Virgin Mary.

Pillai Lokācārya has devoted a large section of the Śrī Vacana Bhūṣaṇa to the development of this Mediatrix doctrine, which would be difficult for those to follow who are not acquainted with the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa, since
much of it is based on explication of the character of Draupadi and of Sītā, who are Lakṣmi's avatāras. It may be noted in passing that in South India, the cult of Rādhā and Rukmīni, with the extremes of eroticism that go with it, are hardly known at all. Perhaps some of the lyric element, so prominent in Bengal Vaiṣṇavism (where Rādhā and the Gopīs are the focus for all) is missed; but the primordial aspect preserved in the South, along with a certain classical restraint, are certainly more commendable to the western mind. We cannot do justice to all the fine details and nuances of Lokācārya's treatment, but the following considerations must not escape our notices:

(a) Sītā is mythologically conceived as having been found in a furrow, and not as having had to undergo any human birth: a very strong version of the immaculate conception idea, significant from the point of view of comparative religion. Her "virginity" is thus guaranteed primordially.

(b) She pleads for mercy even for the asura women, the women of the enemy camp, who are therefore considered as demonic.

(c) She tempers the wrath of her Lord, with motherly sentiment, so that the soul, burdened with karma and full of fear of punishment, may appeal to her instead of the Lord, who otherwise would give the punishment.

(d) She voluntarily suffers banishment with her Lord (Rāma) in the forest—a rough analogue to the story of Mary's flight with the Holy Child to Egypt, which is much used in Medieval allegory.

(e) She pleases the Lord not only by her devotion to Him, but also by her beauty. This very much stressed, and deeply significant, reminding us to the fact that to Dante, Beatrice is the ideal of earthly beauty.

(f) Whereas Mary is the ideal of Heavenly Beauty: the esthetic approach to God in both cases is paramount. This beauty applies to both Sītā and Draupadi.

(g) In Draupadi, we see Śrī as not only intercessor, but as chief of all prapannas. Having been disgraced, she appeals not only for mercy, but also for justice, though tempered with that mercy. Arjuna did not come to
rescue, but she forgives him, and when Kṛṣṇa does come, she then pleads for justice not so much for herself, but for the others who have been wronged.

But aside from the controversy, perhaps it is best to see the devotional pattern as embodied in verse, for in both schools, Śrī does play the major role in prapatti. Śrīnivāsa Rāghavan of Pudukkotai has collected and translated some of the more popular stotras, from which we select the following:81

(a) from the Śrī Stava of Vatsāṅka Miśra, an immediate disciple of Rāmānuja himself:

“Mean and wicked-natured, undevoted and indifferent, and ignorant though I am, I am neither afraid nor ashamed to taste (the nectar of) your glory. For that (attempt of mine) your glory will not be sullied (but I will be benefited). It is indeed a well-known fact that the Ganges is not made impure by the licking of a dog and that the dog is neither ashamed nor afraid (to drink of it). But its thirst is certainly quenched.

“It is no matter of surprise to us that all the wealth, great or small found in all places with different persons is the result of your (favourable) glances, O Lakṣmī. For even Nārāyaṇa; the Saviour of the Universe, considers himself blessed and all-powerful only because of your glances.

“Goddess Lakṣmī, the extent of your greatness is not comprehended either by yourself or by Nārāyaṇa. Though it is like this, still the omniscience of you both does not suffer in the least...

“We seek refuge in Śrī who is the Divine Consort of the Lord of all the Gods, whose attendant is Sarasvatī....

“We resort to Śrī.....by whose mere will to throw her sweet glances the whole world came into existence immediately with all its things sprouting forth, non-existent as it was before because of their absence.”

(b) from the Guṇaratnakoṣa, by Parāśara Bhaṭṭār, the son of Vatsāṅka Miśra:

“If a person should only raise the burden of his joined hands (in prayer in your presence), you (are pleased with him beyond measure and shower on him wealth, kāivalya, and parama pada (mokṣa, theistically viewed). (After giving all this) you still feel that he has not been given his deserts, and therefore feel ashamed. What magnanimity is this? Tell me, O Mother!
"By hundreds of insincere words (of humility) like these, I imitate (parrot-like) the truthful sages. I have no other strength by which I can reach your lotus-like feet. So by your own spontaneous mercy, Mother, You must be my saviour and also the means for my goal.

"With our loving friends may we enjoy for a hundred years the infinite bliss (of serving you) at Śrīraṅga, free from all worries and sorrows and in great comfort. May we become like the pollen in the heart of your lotus-like feet. Be a Mother, Father, everyone and all for us. Take up your spontaneous compassion and save us."

(c) finally, from Vedānta Deśika (Veṅkaṭaśāṅkara), the founder of the Vadagalais, the Śrī Stuti: (the śakti motif here will be noted in prominence, though it is not lacking in the above also):

"Goddess! Viṣṇu and yourself form a pair united together by an unhindered love and ever inseparable. Both of you are endowed with endless qualities and are cognizable, one by the other, by your mutually defining nature. The Śeṣa (the cosmic serpent supporting them), the spotless minds of yogis and the Upaniṣads serve as excellent resorts (couches) for you in the course of your sports.

"You have taken Mukunda as your resort and you are the Sovereign of the world. Your names like Lākṣmī, Padmā, the Daughter of the Milky Ocean, Viṣṇupati, and Indra, are like the capital amount of the Vedas. Those who repeat them (in prayer) never again whirl in the wheel of birth and death by the winds of sins.

"Some hold you to be the Ruler of the Universe and others your Beloved. Of what use are those people, torn by mutually conflicting opinions? For they get drowned in the ocean of ignorance though they raise their heads but little. But our Supreme Deities are you two forming the Couple. The Vedas that speak about Hari, and about his sports as means to your pleasure, have for their final goal and purport only both of you, Goddess.

"Viṣṇu is under a vow to remove the distress of suffering humanity and they say that you are his beloved companion endowed with a unanimity of opinion. As the waves of the Milky Ocean are inseparable from their sweetness and so follow it wherever it goes even to distant places far receding from the shore, Viṣṇu in all his incarnations goes after your suitable forms in an agreeable manner.

"The floods of affluence vie with one another in rushing to that quarter where your eyes play with their glances—your
eyes which have taken the vow of saving the destitute, which are cool like the blue clouds showering nectar, and which much resemble the lotuses opening with the rise of the early dawn.

"Mother! The blessed who wish to do single-minded devotion to both of you, treat as trash all the wealth of the world sprung from Māyā. And for the pleasure of you and Viṣṇu they observe the laws laid down by the Vedas which acts end in avoiding the transgression of the limits of the Dhārmic code of the Vedas.

"Your lovely glances pregnant with cordial affection, express your unceasing mercy and partake of the nature of nectarous waves. By your pure and loving glances drench me, even if it be for a moment, as I am scorched by the threefold miseries (relating to the body, the world, and to fate) and withered by helplessness.

"By your grace all thoughts rise in my mind overflowing with devotion towards the Lord Hari and they are like suns in dispelling the dark fears of mundane existence. Further with your highly amiable and munificent nature, you are showering on me again and again heaps of good fortunes. So what more can I beg of you now?"

We shall let these texts speak for themselves. The chief characteristic, of course, that differentiates them from western Christianity is the inclusion of the consort idea with the Mother idea. The Christian scriptures would make this very difficult, even though in practice it has, as we have seen, come into Russian tradition. Actually, it has many advantages. Beauty, for example, as embodied best in the "eternally feminine" is just as enhanced by its inherent erotic (e.g. the Virgin) foundation as it is ennobled by the fertility—the creative, as subordinate to the Primal—aspect that is symbolized by motherhood. The sociological implications, much as they are stressed by modern apologists, are relatively insignificant, even though relevant indeed, by comparison. It is because of this that we have devoted so much space to the topic. As for prapatti, philosophically considered, it is, indeed indispensable. One never surrenders one's all-too-masculine pride except in face of the recessive aspect of reality; and if one does not so surrender, one remains—only a sterile bachelor, deluded by self-infatuation! This is not to be taken too literally, of course: celibacy is by no means the same as bachelorhood. The Yin and the Yang, to bring in the Chinese
terminology, are always found in all finite reality. The celebate finds his creativity in sublimation—by which is meant, radically, the surrender to the "feminine" in himself—and this applies equally to women as well as men. This much certainly comes forth as corollary: puritanism is condemned, volte-face! It is well that Freud has delivered us from it, although there is more to be reinstated than he discovered.

VI. Vātsalya (God's parental affection for His creatures)

N. Love simply overlooks the jivas' faults; S. goes further, and asserts that the Lord even evinces a certain relish in their weaknesses (so that He may have more pretext for showing mercy and forgiveness—a doctrine not unknown to St. Paul).

VII. Dayā (Compassion)

N. The Lord only begets wish to relieve the pain of the pained. S. goes further, and like Rāma Kṛṣṇa and Chaitanya before him, the observer of pain himself feels the same pain by participative appropriation. At the human level, this is significant enough, but as a theological doctrine, it runs the risk of allowing suffering in God's life—an extreme, if it be such, which has caused much controversy in Christianity also. Here, however, the west has been more Vadagelai, whereas in Dostoyevsky, for example, we find more of the Tengelai spirit; but in the west, the Franciscan tradition has made the most of the latter; Bonaventura after the example of St. Francis himself, whose devotion to the sufferings of Christ was so intense that he received the "stigmata", stresses it very much in his mystical works as we have already seen although in his systematic work he seems to soften the paradox, asserting that Christ suffered in his humanity, not in his Divinity. But his heart was in the former, whereas the latter was primarily for teaching traditional doctrine: we therefore emphasize the former. For example, in the opusculum called the Mystical Vine we find such sentiments as the following:

"Then you must approach that heart which is the most humble of all, the heart of Jesus the highest, through the door, as it were, of his pierced side. There, beyond the realm of any doubt, lies the treasury of ineffable and most
desirable love (caritas); there (true) devotion is found, whence the grace of tears is drawn out; there long-suffering and patience in adversities is found, with compassion in afflictions, and above all a contrite and humble heart. Such and so much embracing you he desired you that...he inclined his head (in death) to you,—his head flowering in crucifixion with thorns, that he might invite you to the kiss of peace, as he said, Behold, how I am disfigured, how I am disgraced, how wounded, that I might take you on my shoulders, who had gone astray, my (lost) sheep, and lead you back to the pastures of paradise...I made you in the form of the image of God—my God—when I created you, and now I have become conformed to the image of your humanity, that I might reform you...Moreover, I have been made a visible man, that I might be loved as visible by you, who in my Deity am unseen and invisible in a way wherein I might not be loved. Give, therefore, the reward of my incarnation and passion, for which I have been both incarnated and put to suffering. I have given you myself; give yourself to me."

Then comes the response, wherein prapatti is done in purity:

"O good Jesu, most sweet! The Father of lights, from whom is given all the best and every good and perfect gift, mercifully look on us who humbly place our confidence in thee, and who truly know thee, because without thee we can do nothing; Thou, who hast given thyself as the price of our salvation, give, as befits such a price for us who are worth so little, give, of thy grace, give us (only) the gift of leading us back, completely, wholly and perfectly, so that we may be conformed to thy passion, and be reformed in that image, which we by sinning have shunned, the image of thy Divinity, our Lord, our Lord surpassing all!"

Strictly speaking, of course, there is nothing in either tradition that asserts actual suffering on the part of God in his own nature—suffering, that is, as pain from evil and as evil; but in both cases, suffering as compassion, as bearing the pain of others in order to relieve them of its evil nature—this is undeniable, evident, and in quite the same motif.

This dayā, or compassion, of course, is almost synonymous with saulabhya or accessibility and vātsalya which has already come to our attention in Rāmānuja’s Gitā Bhāṣya. From this, we recall the importance of the Avatāra(s). But not only the Avatāra concept is involved; and in earlier as well as later tradition, the five vyūhas, of which the human avatāra is only one, figure with equal importance—equal, that is, in theory,
although in practice, the last, the arcāvatāra, the temple image, is the actual focus of prapatti and of all devotion. The cult of "idols" is probably the most misunderstood aspect of all the manifold complex of Hinduism; yet anyone with an open mind, who knows anything about the cult of icons in the Orthodox (Eastern) Churches, or for that matter, the extremes of the cult of miracle working images in medieval Europe, should have no difficulty with the Hindu usage, which is by no means more extreme, and is very systematically worked out, as no more (and no less) than an extension of what even the most "modern" of Christians call the "sacramental principle", especially among the Tengalais. Just as in Russian and Greek Christianity, the icon is treated not only as a representation of the saint—or of Christ of the Blessed Theotokos—but even as the means of granting the Presence and Influence of the saint or of God Himself, so with the Vaiṣṇava, as Prof. Yamunācārya of Mysore has explained, following Pillai Lokācārya:84

"The deity becomes dependent on his worshipper (arcaka parādhīna), endures all (sarvasahisyuh) and stays in the image lovingly worshipped by the devotee (arcā pujāpratimayoh). It is the self-limitation of the Absolute. The Being that transcends time and space becomes bound to them. The infinite transforms itself into the finite....

"The arcā initiates in the simple and the unlearned person a taste for God...God can effortlessly be resorted to by the whole world despite differences of rank and learning...Owing to the intimate presence of the deity and ceaseless loving contemplation of his beauteous form, the spirit of man is lifted to pure thoughts. The deity becomes an object of sheer enjoyment (anubhavyatva) to the soul filled with devotion and love for the infinite. The arcā is an excellent means of concentrating on God."

Thus, just as in the Mass, the wafer is made a vehicle of God’s own Self, so in the image, intimacy and ultimacy coalesce: It is no wonder that the artists of South India worked with such inspiration; anyone who has not seen these living wonders in stone and brass might still remain doubtful, but once one has come into their presence, one cannot express his devotion save in words such as the Alvars sang, like this (alas, a translation!) one of Tirumalisai:85

"Lord, thou standest in a holy shrine,
Sittest in another, and recline in a third.
Thou hast been here on earth ere I was born.
When I saw Thee here, then (thou) has entered into the
and I have become thy living temple.......

In the Śrī Vacana Bhūṣāṇa, Lokācārya says that even the
scriptures cannot provoke prapatti so well as the arcāvatāras: it
is only their beauty that can melt the heart.

But there is another important point which might be mis-
understood. The arcāvatāras do not receive the śaraṇāgati; they
only provoke it. It is rather the āchārya, the guru, who receives it.
Thus, not only the temples are important, but the church, as
the body of the faithful, as well. Indeed, although there is no
doctrine of the church, the Tengalais have developed a very
strong sense of spiritual community on the basis of this, and are
just as proud of their “apostolic succession” of gurus as any
Catholic is of the continuity of the papal succession: extending
back through Rāmānuja to the Alvars, and in them lost in obli-
vion of pre-history, who can gainsay it?

Prof. Varadācārī of Tirupati has allowed a little of
Aurobindo’s “philosophy of the cosmic superlative” (as it
might well be doubted) to sneak into his interpretation of the
vyūhas, but some of his remarks are not only appropriate, but
illuminating, especially on the Antaryāmin. Actually, these five
hypostases, corresponding (as it seems to us) roughly to the
Christian Trinity (Antaryāmin and arcāvatāra being equated
with the Holy Spirit; the personal or the historical avatāras
and the vibhāva forms, with the Son, and the para form, of course,
with the Father) are the metaphysic behind the pattern of
sādhanā: the process is from transcendence (Whitehead’s
‘primordial nature of God’) through the mediating forms to
interiorization (Whitehead’s ‘consequent nature of God’). It
is strange that ‘modernist’ Christians, as well as all too many
modern Hindus, have lost sight of this truth, which really
forms a sort of a posteriori proof for the existence of God: the
very fact that sādhanā has become possible for man according
to this pattern presupposes that there must be a God who has
made it possible, and who indeed is thus both means and end,
as the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas (and Bonaventura) are constantly reiterat-
ing.
As to the general philosophical principle involved, Varadācārī states this pantheistic view in a nutshell:

"The question is not whether the extra-mundane God puts into the world something, but whether it is Himself who descends into it in such a manner as to be one with it and appear as if it is that 'pattern truly' of the world Order itself. This is what is meant by the conception of creation as an expression of Divine Grace. This is what is called Līlā."

"God as puruṣārtha—God to be achieved—and also the Original Inner, or rather Behind, Impeller, as thoroughly identifying Himself with the creatures He had brought into existence as to appear as their own inner vitality; inner conscience and inner reason, which are thirsting for the higher reaches..."

"The importance to Religion of this descent into the inter-cosmic is a descent of which the Religious consciousness is aware as Revelation, Realization and Resurrection... the cave of the heart, the ivory tower or white lotus of Puisance. The descent as Antaryāmin is a revelation like any other in space and time and history of man...(not quite accurate; here is the Aurobindo we noted: Antaryāmin is not strictly 'descent', which is rather proper to the mediative aspect binding the transcendent and immanent; Antaryāmin is the eternally immanent, the primordial basis of individuation...) The inner Lord must be known and entered into, or rather, He must be invoked through surrender, total and entire, to enter into oneself, completely as antaryāmin."

Here, of course, is where Vaiṣṇava and Christian theology—especially of the Russian variety—complement each other. Just as the Mediative Hypostasis provokes prapatti, the Immanent receives it, as response to Grace from the Transcendent; and the Church, not so much as the "body of the faithful", or even the "Body of Christ" as the Sobornost, the "Shrine of the Holy Spirit", the Immanent in History is community as communion, as Love binding all souls in the Spiritual One, the ever-present Unseen—ayyakta—which is nevertheless the Sole Agent, the Good, existentially realized as angst in crisis and as the Collective Unconscious in "normal" times. In this light, Compassion, as the expression of this Love, becomes operative not only towards the soul, but through it to all the world.
VIII. Prapatti as such

N. claims prapatti only as another “yoga” equal to bhakti, initiated by the jīva, jealously guarding the doctrine of free will, avoiding the possible implication that Iśvara is capricious in conferring undeserved grace, and the danger of moral irresponsibility on the part of the prapanna; S. guards prapatti not only as an easier way for those disqualified for bhakti, but as the way—almost the only way—and that to the extent of excluding all others. It is a way of no way, to adopt a Taoist (and Zen Buddhist) phrase, stressing total dependence on grace alone, which renders human effort useless and even a matter of pride (ahāṅkāra). It is called a “way” only for convenience. For this reason, here the prapanna is more or less exempt from all normal obligations.

In the Prapannapārijāta of Vatsyavaradācārya we have perhaps the most systematic (if less fervent than Lokācārya) treatment of prapatti as a whole. In the second chapter of this, practically all that we have dealt with up to now at random is summarized. One aspect that we have not observed comes to the fore, however: the problem whether prapatti is, as we have asserted, an act than mental state. To the Vadāgalai, perhaps the stress would be on the former; but to the Ten-galai, who expands this “way of no way” to include all aspects of the process of salvation, it cannot be only that: leaving next to nothing remaining even to bhakti, he must include everything else in that which is strictly speaking not inclusive at all. Not that this is contradictory; but it is paradoxical—the kind of paradox that delighted Chesterton and still forms the logistic of almost all of Japanese Buddhism, as well as classical Taoism. Vatsyavaradācārya says, “The mental state consisting of determination which results in prayer, of a person who has a desire to attain, but no means, is the nature of prapatti”. God alone is the means. Synonyms (as we noted in treating the Iśa Upaniṣad) are Ātma-nikṣepa, Nyāsa vidyā, tyāga. Kindness to all creatures follows on conviction of Antaryāmin; and all pride is relinquished. Though God is merciful, prayer is necessary; unsolicited, He will not protect (for He will not violate free-will) (But this prayer itself is) the eschewing of all self-exertion; the Lord is svamīyāyatta, Himself both upāya and phala. The types
are the same as we find in the Yatindramatadipikā, the drpta and ārta, the resigned and the impatient. And—extremely significant—sādhya bhakti is equated with prapatti. (He would, therefore, give support to Śeṣādri’s interpretation of the Śrī Bhāṣya.)

In the fifth chapter, we have two surprising things: Although one would not expect to find a list of differentiated virtues, since the “state of mind” of prapatti, as mystical enjoyment of the divine Love should reduce all such differentiations to a vanishing point, we do have two definitive lists of virtues, traditionally called eight flowers of bhakti and the “flowers of Viṣṇu”. And the eight kinds of bhakti traditional from the Nārada Sūtras and from Śaṅḍilya, are included as manifestations of prapatti—significant in the light of Rāmānuja’s alternative interpretations of the Carama Śloka, which we have already discussed. The reason for this inclusion is that “Even a mleccha (outcaste, untouchable, harijan), if this bhakti exists, is to be taken as the holiest of Brāhmans; he is the greatest of sages: he is a pandit; he is a yati; to him ought to be given gifts...even as the Lord, so is he worthy of worship”.

The lists are as follows:\textsuperscript{88}

The intellectual virtues:

1. grahaṇa—quick grasp of Vedāntic truth
2. dhāraṇa—recollection; retentiveness
3. smaraṇa—quickening of memory
4. pratipādana—lucidity of exposition to others
5. uha—inferring unknown from the known
6. apoха—competency for analogizing
7. vijñāna—keenness for distinctions
8. tattvajñāna—knowledge of first principles

The moral virtues:

1. ahiṃsa—non-violence, charity
2. indriya nighraha—control of the senses
3. sarvabhūta dayā—benevolence to all beings
4. kṣamā—forgiveness
5. jñāna—knowledge, “realization”
6. tapas—austerity, “simplicity”
7. *dhyāna*—sense of communion
8. *satya*—truthfulness

*The kinds of bhakti*:

1. affection for devotees
2. rejoicing in their devotion
3. worship by oneself
4. avoidance of pomp
5. delight in hearing the deeds of the Lord
6. agitation of voice, eyes, limbs
7. constant remembrance
8. consciousness of non-dependence for worldly advantages; complete focus on ‘heavenly’ enjoyment.

The essential thing here, of course, is that all these things come, quite as in the philosophy of St. Bonaventura, as *illuminations*, as *fruits of Grace*, not as self-initiated “virtues” in the secular sense, nor as simple functions of the Judgment as Kant thought; for without this Illumination, the human mind only entangles itself in nihilistic dialectical negations, and everything seems to cancel out everything else, and the conscience descends to frustration and paralyzing inhibitions, being cut off from the integrating *synedresis* wherein the Holy Spirit is operative. Nor does Hegel’s negation of negation supply the remedy; as the later Mādhva logicians have shown, such gymnastics only wind up where they begin: with nothing! and although Kierkegaard does see this difficulty, his “leap” is really still that of desperation, of faith rather than Love, in which there is the full openness to Grace and joy.

But this will concern us primarily in the subsequent chapter on bhakti as *rasa*, since this Illumination is more properly of the aesthetic order.

Returning to Lokācārya’s Śrī Vacana Bhūṣaṇa, we may note the following points in this context (70-78; 95-198):

The means of salvation is, as it were, God’s contemplation of Himself in ourselves; this is the background of our merely letting him work salvation in us. In this context, he quotes Nammalwar (II:7:1):

“By Him who supports all and by Him who is supported by all, by Him who has beautiful curls, by Him who is the cause
of Brahma and Rudra and by him who destroyed Kesí, my people seven generations in the ascending order and seven generations in the descending order attained the highest superiority and their life is ennobled and enlightened by this attainment, He is the supreme Lord. He is the lovely sapphire. He has large eyes with reddish tint. He is my dearest object. He is my lotus-eyed. He is the Lord of Lords. He is my dearest Lord Narāyaṇa."

This "allowing" the Lord to act consists in the giving up of power, shame and effort, and in replacing them with love, self-sacrifice and inability to exist without Him. Love for the Goal is the source of all virtue, as illustrated by Nammalwar (IV: 9:10):

"The immeasurable worldly pleasure enjoyable by the five senses...is transitory. Lakṣmi with beautiful bracelets and Thyself have established a firm beatitude which I understand and see and attain Thy Holy Feet, rejecting the worldly enjoyment and kaivalya."

The beginning of this weaning from the earthly focus lies in Beauty, which induces ignorance of all else; grace which induces disgust at ungodly sights; and holy Example (as well as bad example, which causes fear of evil consequences) which induces zeal.

God-relish comes not so much because He is good, as from the fact that it is of the soul's essence that it should relish Him, as Nammalwar sings (V:3:5) in his allegory of the soul as helplessly in love, appealing to her maid of honour to put things right with her mother and the townspeople, in spite of her shameless condition (V:3, passim):

"He is spotless splendour...He is the First Person. I search after Him. I am reduced. My bloom is fast fading. My senses lose their powers. I do not know how long I can live like this. What do I care even for the heart-piercing blame of the townspeople; O my dear maid of Honour!"

"...My red-Lotus-Eyed One robbed me of my perfection. Before this how charming was my very youthful bloom! Now it is gone......

"My Kṛṣṇa the All-seeing God has a form as refreshing as a rain cloud. He fertilizes the vast field of my mind with the blame of the townspeople. He watered it with the words of my mother. He sowed it with the paddy (seed-rice) of beauty; it sprang up. He grew the crop of love as extensive as the ocean itself. Oh my maid of honour, is He hard-hearted?"
"He is cruel, He is the highest God, supreme Lord...His form is incomprehensible. He is the ruler of matter. With all this my cruelly tortured heart has none but Him for its support. It is a great wonder. Oh my maid of beautiful hips, what will poor mother do?"

[The italicised line is Lokācārya's particular reference; but lest its force be lost, we have given the context in full. Scarcely in all of St. Bernard's (or St. John of the Cross either, for that matter!) delicate allegories, which Bonaventura follows with such relish, do we find the equal of this. Best to let it speak for itself!]

The only sense in which effort is justified is (as we have reiterated many times, and many more parallels from Bonaventura than we can include could be cited) the response from overflowing Love and from the realization of the soul's kinship with God, which is not accidental, but coeval with the soul's existence; the soul would be deprived of its very existence without the enjoyment of this Love.

Other means are given up not because of want of power—the soul could undertake the other, more devious paths—but because they are not appropriate to the soul's essence. Indeed, as Gopālcāriar reminded us in regard to the Iśa Upaniṣad, the refusal to make prapatti is simply robbing God of what is His already. Again to turn to Nammalwar (IX:1:7 and context), we find:

"There is no fruition unless you mediate on the truth. In short, I have nothing else to say but that there is no other way. Unless we get salvation through singing the holy praises of Him who was born in the ancient country of North Madura.

"To any creature under the sun there is nothing else but this. We said it in short. Do not be troubled much. Mere thought of Him will do. Though you do not get your object at once, it will not do you any harm. So you can study the faultless qualities of our Cowherd, who took birth in North Madura, and he saved throughout eternity and Behold this as the greatest object of all.

"To live like this and help those who praise the feet of Him of the wonderful deeds is the object of life...Only His Holy Zealous Praise will be our help. There is nothing higher than this.

"Consider that there is nothing higher than this. If you think only of self attainment, you lose even what you have already;
it is the same as tearing the ear by attempting to enlarge it. There is no shelter except Kṛṣṇa on whose shoulders the tulasī wreath shines..."

Self-sought good is like clothes worn in public which are a hindrance to the intimate embrace of love. (Perhaps Lokācārya had in mind the Bhāgavata allegory of Kṛṣṇa’s stealing the Gopis’ clothes, and even forbidding them to cover their nakedness with their hands, but rather demanded abandon of all shame and adoration of Himself with hands together in the gesture of worship, above their heads—an allegory badly misunderstood by most people, even in India! In non-allegorical form, or in the shape of other allegories, Jesus demanded the same sort of ‘shameless’ devotion from his disciples, especially Mary, John and Peter.) Or again, as Pillan had been accustomed to say, self-sought good is like milk bought in the market; but God-brought good is like mother’s milk. Rather than any summary, it is more appropriate that we simply therefore pray with Nammalwar (II: 2, seqq):

"O my worthy Lord! This is what I require of thee always... Give me thy hand of wisdom so that I may get thy Lotus-Feet so hard of attainment. O my sweetest object of Love! Do not delay a moment.

"It is ordained by Him that I should always serve Him only. He came and resided in my mind without the least interruption. He should take me for His service only. This is the only end I have in view.

"...If Thou keepest Thyself in me always in whatever state I am I can never have enough of Thee.

"Thou art my eternal Lord. If thou keepest Thyself in my mind I shall never require anything else.....

"I did not know myself. I thought I was only myself; now I know that I am Thou, and all mine is Thou Thyself. Thou art praised by the Heavenly Beings. Thou art my Lord of Heavenly Beings.

".....Thou art the greatest Light. Do not be too sure of my constancy. Delay is dangerous. Take me under Thy Holy Feet. Do not let me go astray at any time!"

In the west, of course, the closest parallel, from the broad perspective, is the controversy between the Calvinists (Tenge-lais) and the Lutherans (Vedagelais). Both were opposed—and still are—to Catholic “ritualism”—salvation by “works” (karma),
but also to the intellectualist trend of later scholasticism, both demanding a more intimate pattern of devotion.

However, this, being such a vast field in itself, and entirely out of our frame of reference, cannot detain us. But it is pertinent to observe that the Franciscans themselves, at the time of St. Bonaventura, were split in a very similar way, and that one of his greatest works was to reconcile them and hold all the Order founded by St. Francis together—almost all; for some of the extremists of the camp of the "Spirituals", who might be compared to the Tengelais, in that they insisted on clinging to the primitive pattern set by St. Francis himself, in owning absolutely no property whatsoever, and thereby declaring their absolute dependence on Providence and divine Grace—even to the extent of neglecting all learning—some of these remained separate, and are, according to some historians, the precursors of a line of mystical sects which includes even the Quakers and the Anabaptists and perhaps, indirectly, even the Methodists. And as has been the case with the Tengelais, their social tendencies were quite radical: because of this complete dependence on the "Spirit", they tended to neglect the orthodox respect for church and ritual; but more than that—something that has never happened in Hinduism (except, perhaps with Aurobindo?) they developed a radical philosophy of history, of which Hegel's and August Comte's are a sort of later secularized version. The ages appropriate to the Father (the Old Testament) and to the Son (from the Life of Jesus till the time of St. Francis) having finished their course, the age of the Holy Spirit, and therefore of the complete spiritual liberation of man in the fullness of Grace, had fully come. This doctrine was first formulated by a Benedictine abbot, Joachim of Fiori, but these "Spiritual" Franciscans became its protagonists and popularizers.

Again, however, we cannot be led too far afield. It is enough to note that Bonaventura, even though as administrator he had to condemn these "extremists", was considerably at one with them in spirit, and most of his mystical writings lean in this direction. Indeed, even in his systematic works, something of the "Tengelai" trend can be traced, as for example when he states the opinion that the free will of man cannot be
literally coerced by God, but that it can nevertheless be overcome by the persuasion of Love—a point revived in our own time by Whitehead—which liberates the soul from bondage to lesser infatuations. God does not coerce us, but leads us to better judgment, so that our will is changed. Thus,

"The will is changed, when although it wills one thing, by the powerful virtue of affection it is led away from that, and toward the contrary; thus it is that God, from the love of temporal things makes these very temporal things contemptible; and hence it may be said that the will is separated from that thing to which it was strongly yoked by the glue-like force of love."

So much at the merely psychological level. But in respect to the relation of the free will to grace, he is even more emphatic. One suspects, by the way, that he is here arguing against St. Thomas Aquinas, who leaves much larger room—like the Vadageleis—for the natural will in its own sphere, judging that all that is "natural" naturally tends towards the good. But even this Bonaventura emphatically denies; there is always the possibility of lapsing if grace is not there to aid. Even the good willed for pleasing God is impossible without the "illumination" afforded by grace, which "directs, excites, and (alone) causes us to will anything at all that might be pleasing to God. Indeed, even cooperative grace is impossible without some previous movement to excite the will to use it, "for without some first movement nothing moving can move...for every action is from God" (e.g., as "prime mover")—whereby he argues with the Aristotelians on their own grounds). Thus, if natural good is extremely difficult without this fortification of grace, how much more is it impossible to come to the field of glory (e.g., mokṣa) without it! For natural good does not dispose us even toward grace, much less does it lead us to sainthood. (And we remark in passing that it is strange indeed that Kant never takes sainthood seriously; his ethics has no dynamic, for his categorical imperative levels down all men, howsoever much they need "faith", to a common level, a level of a barren place. This trend has been remedied only recently by the work of men like Max Weber and Max Scheler.) For even the natural judgment needs grace to liberate it from the drives of exterior instinct:

"But even if this judgment of right reason could be made without the fortification of grace, it could not direct us to
the obtaining of our end, which is God, nor to the reward of eternal beatitude, which cannot be known unless God reveals it. And because of this the Saints say that we cannot think or will or do any good whatsoever without the help of divine grace, for they say that the good is only that which is ordered towards the quest for beatitude.”

Then, citing the Pelagian heresy as the result of pride, and therefore to be avoided at all costs, he closes with a quotation from St. Bernard:

“Let us take heed, therefore, lest when we feel aroused toward any good proposed invisibly within ourselves or by ourselves, we attribute it either to our own will, which is infirm, or to the necessity of God, which is impossible (for God never acts out of necessity, but only in Freedom), but (let us attribute it) solely to grace, by which we are filled. For this it is which excites our free will when it shows our thoughts; heals it by transforming our affection; strengthens it by leading it on to action; preserves lest it feel defect...For not partly by grace and partly by free will (do we come to perfection), but (although) the single deeds are done altogether by the individual working, (yet)...all is done from grace.”

But with even greater zeal, in discussing the operation of God’s love within us, he posits the love of God as the supreme limit of self-knowledge: we cannot know ourselves as loving; rather, we are so lost in that love that we forget ourselves entirely. The operation of grace in love therefore is actually to blind us to anything concerning our own merits however great they may be, and to turn us entirely to the divine goodness:

“The fourth reason is the dispensation of the divine judgments. For God closes the eyes of his servants as to what they see of their own dignity and to whatever they might do (of their own effort). Whence grace is quite contrary to pride. For pride opens the eyes to the seeing of prerogatives and closes them to the seeing of needfulness and defects according to the Apocalypse (3:17, addressed to the Laodicean Church following the famous phrase, ‘would that you were either cold or hot!’) “Because you say, ‘I am rich, I have become wealthy, I need nothing’ and you do not know that it is you that are wretched, pitiable, poor, blind and naked…” But on the contrary, a holy man says that he is nothing, because God closes his eyes to the good, and opens them to the sight of evil. And this is the reason why man does not (really) know love: (love) is never sufficient to itself, but is (always) with other (goods).”
He then goes on, in answering the question, "how is love increased?" with equal zeal, to say that love does not increase in proportion to our ascetic restraint, but quite the reverse: Like Rāmānuja himself, and Lokācārya even more, he believes that asceticism is unnecessary for the prapanna; if true religious fervour is present, concupiscence simply vanishes because that which is better and higher has taken its place: "Thus, just as when a greater light is added to a lesser, the lesser is increased by the greater, so love, superadded, increases the lesser. And this position posits love as not increased by its own virtue, but by the divine. For the principle of increase and of generation is the same. Hence, just as (love) has its origin from God, so also (only from Him does it have) its increase."

Finally, in discussing the sacrament of Confession (wherein, of course, the acāryā bhimāna comes into focus in Catholic practice, the abbot or superior, or spiritual director, while not receiving worship, yet, like the Tengelai guru, does act not in his own right but in a 'representative' capacity—a level scarcely available to the secular psychiatrist, who, instead of rising to this 'suprapersonal' plane, tries to reduce everything to 'scientific' impersonal formulae, thus making the "transfer" so necessary extremely difficult, as Jaspers points out in his critique of Freud, insisting, after Weber and Scheler, that there is a radical difference between 'natural' science and 'soul' science). Bonaventura is quite explicit:

"Therefore, since man has sinned and merits nothing before the infusion of grace, God, by just judgment, does not take away every possible effect of the fault, but nevertheless relinquishes the punishment... But because he is merciful, He gives in addition even more ample good because, man needs it all the more; therefore He not only restores innocence, but more than that, gives grace... (so that even natural debility is rehabilitated towards the good)."

And in answering the (Vadagelai) objections that the fault must be expelled before grace may enter and that freedom of the will is nullified by such emphasis on grace, he explicitly denies the former (for reasons we have already seen), and, like Lokācārya, answers to the latter by saying that the will only gives consent, but that it is induced even to this consent by being led and lifted up to that which is quite impossible even to
touch much less to attain by its own effort.\textsuperscript{94}

We shall later see how in his mystical works he goes even further; and it is there that we shall find the "way of no way".

But to return to the eighteen points—we can readily see how that the rest is really already contained in this, and therefore needs very little further discussion.

\textit{IX. Who should resort to Prapatti?}

N. only those incapable (especially because of caste) of the other ways. S. it is of all—As Pandit Buberhampillai once said, since it is the \textit{easiest} way it is the \textit{best} way, and that is all one need to acknowledge; why should anyone be kept from it? But more than that, as we have seen already, since it is the \textit{only} way (\textit{fully}) to come to God and into the free operation of His grace, it is \textit{obligatory}—even \textit{necessary}—for all.

\textit{X. Conditions of this resignation}

(Here Govindācārya cites the carama śloka) N. only those incapable of the other ways. S. here, Govindācārya only states what we have already found in St. Bonaventura, e.g., in effect, "If you can be successful by other means, there is nothing to prohibit you, but it is not only dangerous to tread that path without a guide—especially since both the path and the end of it are divine—but it is even irrational and foolish, even though it may seem to you that it involves the surrender of reason, for it is the shortest and easiest way...Sooner or later you will have to reach self-abasement anyway; that is the goal; so why not do it at the beginning?"

The \textit{Prapanna-pārijāta} lists six hindrances to the other ways:

1. evil influences of the time
2. unsteady nature of the mind
3. attachment of senses to (material) objects
4. indulgence in forbidden acts
5. not doing what is ordained
6. adverse nature of the age

Both this list of hindrances to the other ways, and the positive assertion that šaranāgati is the \textit{only} means, of course, are only echoes of Rāmānuja’s Gītā Bhāṣya, the carama śloka (and
many other passages) on the negative score, and XIV: 27 on the positive score, where he explicitly says, "Whereas it has been declared...that resorting to the Lord is the only means of crossing beyond the qualities, as well as of attaining the imperishable (soul), lordly power, and the Lord...therefore the means of crossing beyond the qualities is this: an exclusive resort of the Lord, and this...leads to becoming Brahman."

The little work of Lokâcârya called the Prapanna-paritrâna is devoted exclusively to this theme, and it is here that the old refrain of resortlessness (ananya-gatitva) and waylessness (akiñcanyatva) becomes a fully developed melody. It is, like all of his works, hardly more than a commentary on Nammalwar, e.g., (V: 8: 8):

"Whether Thou dispellest my sorrow or whether Thou dispellest it not I have none but Thee for my saviour. Thou bearest the circular sharp-edged disc as thy weapon in battle. Thou liest down in Tirukkadandai. Thou art the Great Ruler of Matter. When my sorrowful soul leaves the body and goes away let it hold thy feet firmly. Ordain it thus."

It is not only a matter of other varieties of yoga that is intended; it is also the lesser heroes and deities who constitute the inadequate objects and means of refuge being only particularizations of limited attributes of God. Only Nârâyaṇa will do, who is "in and over all, the Life of life, the Soul of soul, abiding in the core of all things. Only He can be the Resort and none else."

But as to the waylessness—the other mârgas being no (real) ways at all—even the Vedic formulae are to be given up, for they do not succinctly recognize even the nature of Nârâyaṇa (We remember that this concept stems rather out of the Pâñcarâtra tradition); and the same applies to karma, jñâna, and bhakti, which do not necessarily depend on the one-and-only God alone, who is both upeya and upâya, and who, even at the time of death, comes "as the most willing Servitor of his refuge, escorts him along the Path of Light only, and in the Spiritual Regions known as paramapada unites him with the blessed bands of nityas and muktas, thus ordained in Divine Service for ever and ever."

To the best of our knowledge, this is the highest development of pantheistic monotheism ever found in India—except,
perhaps the later mystics like Kabir, Nānak, and others who were influenced by Islām; but it is highly probable that even they were indirectly influenced by the Rāmānuja tradition, through Rāmānanda. But not only that: both epistemologically and ethically, it has profoundly challenging implications. **Humanism as such is not enough**, as philosophers like Charles Hartshorne and the existentialists are now realizing once again. Even in classical Greece, there is the old refrain that the gods are jealous of man when he tries to exceed his human limitations; Homer and Hesiod are full of prapatti; and the great dramas, as well as Thucydides, have the sole “gospel” that sooner or later man must face his extremities, and bow to nemesis. The book of Job is full of a like spirit: Only by submission, only by God Himself do we attain our end; and our ‘end’ lies far beyond ourselves: “Behold, I am insignificant; what can I answer thee...I know that thou canst do all things; and no plan is too difficult for Thee”. And likewise in Chinese tradition, the constant refrain in all schools is that of Confucius himself: “Heaven help me! Heaven help me!”; for without the blessing of Heaven, there can be no good upon earth; this is the secret of Tao. And as to Islām—the word itself means surrender: surrender to Allāh, who is the only God. Indeed it is significant that in Muslim art at its best some deliberate imperfection will be found, lest Allāh, who alone can be perfect, be offended!

For here, in a sense, it is really more than a matter even of grace; for grace, strictly speaking, is something from God, a mediating force, as it were. Nammalwar’s cry is to the Lord himself, for the Lord himself. And this is also familiar strain in Franciscan tradition—the secret, even, of Franciscan mysticism which distinguishes it from other varieties: Francis himself is looked upon, not just as one enjoying fullness of the Lord’s blessing, but as one whose union with Jesus was so complete that he suffered the same signs of sacrifice; Jesus lived again in him! Even Gilson misses this in his interpretations. It is true that Bonaventura never tires of reiterating our total dependence on grace; but in his most intense moments, the word disappears, and it is Francis and the Lord Himself who come into rapturous view, and the Love is all that
can approximate proper expression—for Love is God, literally and fully. Thus, in the anonymous work bearing the little *A Meditation of a Poor Man in Solitude* which is a superb condensation of Bonaventura's mysticism, we find a tell-tale passage dealing with the hierarchy of virtues, in which there is a vehement denial that any virtue can be acquired by man in his own right and by his own effort (this much, of course, Gilson does support, and emphatically). But not only that; there is really only one virtue, and that is the (living) Christ himself.

The passage begins with a confession that all that he has been speaking of (and he has been speaking in terms of grace) "becomes liquidated" when we come to consider how St. Francis, when he received the stigmata, became one who cut asunder the grades of virtue. It would be better if he were completely silent; for this is something that is really neither seen nor heard. "I neither know nor do I not know" he says, "I (can) only believe". These grades of virtue he does distinguish as the *political*, the *purgative*, the *soul-purgative*, and the *assimilative*; but he quickly adds that they are not grades of distinguishably separate virtues, but of one, namely the ascent itself: "It is not to be understood that they went from one virtue to another...but from one grade of the same virtues to another, by ascending and perfecting according to the prescribed grades. For it is said of those who, living in this vale of tears, that, helped by the Divine Aid placed in their hearts that they were disposed to the ascent...until the God of Gods in Zion is seen, that is, until you come to God himself and the Lord of (all) virtues in clear vision." Then after condemning the Aristotelians (who think that worldly virtues have their own place, apart from the Wisdom of God), he quotes Rabanus Maurus: "These four principal virtues he posits, which no one has unless God, the fount of all virtues bears them to him, and that, regardless of the times, the places, the laws, the nation; for Christ alone the virtue and wisdom of the Father (shows him the way)".

Finally, in pointing to St. Francis, he says: "for this kind of similitude, although it would make a man perfect in beatitude, cannot be had (by ordinary men) in this life; yet it can be had by consorting with saints existing in glory, absorbed in the light of glory......eternally consummated by participation
in divinity—but because of this Christ in the infirmity of (our) flesh accomplished the acts and virtues of perfection...And it is thus that our blessed father Francis, not only in his soul, but even in his fleshy members—his hands and feet and side, was signed with the stigmata of the wounds of Christ, (because he was) perfectly conformed to the Crucified Himself”.

But this possible criticism (and we admit it may be a rather fine distinction) aside, it cannot be denied that St. Bonaventura himself exhibits quite the same spirit as that of Nammalwar and Lokācārya. We can give only one example, again from the *Soliloquy*97

(the Soul says) “What disposition should I have, in affection and in intellect, that as by a leap, I might be able to taste something of that inebriation of the mind and contemplate the celestial sweetness? For, for a long time past, I have exercised my mind in speculation, and up to now I fear I have sensed nothing—not even a drop—of that heavenly sweetness. For I have read much of the lives of the Saints and their conversion; much about nature, about the operations and orders of the angels, and not a little, even of the unity of the ineffable Deity, of the Trinity of the incomprehensible Divinity, and quite a bit of the inestimable felicity of the Blessed; but even though I occupy my whole mind with these, alas, I have remained a novice—a tender fondling; and with blessed Augustine, I have cried, ‘Make me, merciful Father, to taste through affection what I only sense through the intellect’; and even then, I get nowhere. And often, fatigued after long study and irritated with myself, I have cried with the Prophet? ‘How long, O Lord, wilt Thou forget me; how long wilt Thou hide thine eyes from me?’ because, even if I judge myself unworthy to eat the bread of the children, yet I expect to nibble at the crumbs, little as they are, with great desire; but alas, as often as I open my mouth I realize that even in my breathing, I have laboured in vain!

(and ‘Man’ replies) “O Soul, these things which have lamentably conquered you have happened because of a double cause: Either indeed from the pious and saving dispensation of the divine goodness, as Gregory says in his ‘Morality’: ‘The father, most pious though He be, allows the voices of our petitions to be deferred for a time, in order that our-desires might increase and so that we might even more desperately dare to merit his favour than we have dared to perform our vows’. And again in his Homilies, ‘Holy desires increase by delay; and if they fail because of
the delay, they were not true desires. For God, although through His pity is most merciful, yet sometimes withholds, and protracts that which HE most Liberally gives, so that you may learn all the more and the more ardently to desire (Him) and become more solicitous and adept at persevering with thanksgiving.—Or else He protracts His benefits from his postulants because of an inordinate disposition, as Bernard suggests: 'He errs altogether who thinks he can mix that heavenly sweetness with this ash, or that divine balsam with this venial joy, the gifts of the Holy Spirit with the illicit things of this world.'

XI. Do qualifications of the other ways also qualify prapatti?

N. yes, S. no, emphatically. As a matter of fact, in some respects, the Tanelai prapanna is like the jivan-mukta of the advaitins; even though in his popular teachings, if nowhere else, Rāmānuja says that the prapanna must observe śāstric ways, the point is that he will not need this advice, for the operation of grace will be sufficient.

XII. Meaning of works to be resigned

N. karma is still necessary, and by its performance, God’s pleasure is still to be sought. Here, in a sense, we must admit there is good ground in the Śrī Bhāṣya; Rāmānuja will never allow the karma kāṇḍa to be put aside altogether. S. stresses the point that it is not for the prapanna to judge whether any action is pleasing to God or not, and that karma is to be observed only for the sake of good example for the weak.

So much reference has been made in passing to karma that it is perhaps not out of place to give here a summary of what is meant, and the distinctions of what is and what is not acceptable to the Śrī Vaiṣṇava—aside, that is, from the usual treatment (as given, for example, by P. N. Śrīnivāsācāri and Prof. Raṅgācārya) where the tendency is only to stress the development in the Gitā itself as culminating in the achievement of unselfishness in niṣkāma karma, interpreted largely in terms of Kant’s duty for duty’s sake (this itself being debatable, since the Gitā ideal, as we have seen, involves more than that, namely, the inclusion of the sense of duty in an “opening up” to the sense of the creative numinous as realized in the affections, beyond the frustrating objectivity of puritan conformity).
Such a summary (which we further summarize) is found in the *Prapanna-pārijāta* (chh. 8 & 9). First, the karmas not to be done with detachment—not as strict obligation, but as free expression of normative living:

1. the ordinary study of scripture (*śruti*, *smṛti*)
2. those found in the Pañcarātra, e.g., the use of garlands of flowers, incense, etc.—where the aesthetic component is foremost
3. those done for some specific definitive purpose (*apāyopāya*), expressing dependence on God for particular needs
4. expiatory—those done, as scholastics would say, as penance for venial sin—which have no definite end, but which if neglected, open the way to the entrance of evil
5. observance of morning and evening prayer, of the seasonal festivals, etc., which remedy or ward off future ills
6. in times of calamity, when there is an ‘overflow’ of evil, special *prāyaścitta* to Lakṣmī—special prayer for ‘protection.’

The author pointedly adds, moreover, that whatever may have been the sin, *āraṇāgati*—especially to Lakṣmī—will remedy it; that only detrimental rites (such as those practised by the “Tantra of the Left”, such as sexual orgies, the use of a skull for drinking bowl, goat sacrifices, etc.—and hereby the sexual looseness found in Bengal Vaiṣṇavism is condemned by the Southern tradition with a sense of shock!) are to be avoided, for they are unforgivable; that pride in being a prapanna (that being inherently contradictory!) is no excuse for excess of sin; and that such violators are not to be spared. In all, we see a very healthy balance—weight of commonsense against what otherwise might degenerate (as it has in Bengal and Orissa) to sentimentiality.

The list of karmas definitely to be renounced shows this Dravidian spirit of good sense even more vividly; and indeed, it shows much more: it shows how the reformation instituted by Rāmānuja—for he was a reformer as well as a synthesizer—was a stable one, and it deserves special attention on the part of the peoples of the West who are confused by the variegated
nature of Hinduism as a whole, largely because they—like far too many Hindus themselves—do not appreciate its historical developments. Some cardinal points are:

1. Shun whatever is incongruent with the time, place, and status (of the devotee as well as with those with whom he associates)—a dynamic factor which is not so easy to observe by the superficial tourist.

2. No singing except the praises of Bhagavān—a pertinent principle for our own times, when cheap movie-music threatens to engulf everything, even the Rāma-Līlā, especially in North India, whereas finally in South India there is now a tendency to return to the higher classical standard. One is reminded of the use of public address system in Kumbakonam for making the Alwar hymns heard far and wide; and V. Rāmāliṅgam Pillai, the present Poet Laureate of Tamil Nadu insisted, in our private meeting with him, that there can be no real poetry that is not religious.

3. Nevertheless, heretics and hypocrites are mentioned in the same breath; as with St. Francis himself, it is not revolution that is needed, but revitalization: and is this not always true?

4. Avoidance of public display; the repentant prapanna must do his prāyaścitta in private, as is the case in Catholic confessional. Perversions such as the MRA "House Party" exhibitionism are thereby averted.

5. The simple remembrance of God is the highest atonement.

6. One meditation is enough for a sincere devotee, where even ten or twelve years of ardent "practice" will not be enough for a "foolish unbeliever". This reminds us of Bonaventura’s advice to the Franciscan nuns that prayer should be ardent, but brief.

7. A sādhu should not seek anything from a fool, for every prapanna should rather seek the company of fellow-devotees. One is again reminded of St. Francis’ hope and prayer that his little band of followers (he never dreamt that it would become so numerous) should always roam joyously together; once, finding a copy of the
gospels, he gave each companion one page each, to emphasize their corporateness! This sense of community, as we have constantly reiterated, is not encouraged by Śaṅkaraites even though their monastic order is well organized; it cannot be, for the advaitin sādhanā is bent on ‘isolation’ rather than on love. This is the chief factor that led P. N. Śrīnivāsa Ācārī back to Rāmānuja in spite of long identification with the other camp, as he told us privately; “There is no fellow-feeling among them” he said. And one cannot avoid this cardinal difference as one travels throughout India; the stamp in both camps is indelible. No matter is to be taken without instruction from a guru. The reason has already been indicated: not only the practical value of preserving tradition is involved, but the guarding against presumption, and even still more, the fact that spiritual life cannot be transmitted except through personal contact. This is why ācāryā bhimāna is so focal in śaraṇāgati; “apostolic succession” is a sacrament of love—of the Love of God awakening human love and drawing it to its Source—and—End through those in whom it has found real life. Like all highest things, of course, it is in danger of the lowest perversion; but when one reads, as in the Śrī Vacana Bhūṣaṇa, the requirements of a guru—or for that matter, Bonaventura’s allegory of the Six Wings of the Seraphim (e.g., the seraph which gave Francis the stigmata) one marvels; not even Confucius was more solicitous in the matter of self-examination and good example. Not only must the disciple take nothing without first offering it to the Teacher; not only is implicit obedience required, even to the point of martyrdom; but reciprocally, if the guru recognizes superior virtue in the sīṣya, or if he errs, he must make double homage to him, and be more solicitous of his welfare than of his own life even. Rāmānuja, like Francis, welcomed all-and-sundry into his fold, but not without the proper initiation; not without sealing the relation in a bond of loving vows, as solemn at least as those of the marriage bond. How they both rejoiced when he saw true
devotion even in the illiterate; how grieved they were if their charges suffered any true misfortune! Important though "transfer" may be to psycho-analysis, it would be difficult indeed to find a psychiatrist who could measure up to such standards, even though Theodore Reich says that Freud himself had something of it. But how ridiculous is to tell, on the first meeting, all about your private sexual life, your experiences of beauty—which are suspect—your secret spiritual ambitions, your day-dreams and nocturnal fantasies, however poetic, and everything, to a man or woman who is interested only in golf and your money!!! One rejoices indeed that Rilke rejected such a relation; his friendships with Renan and other artists of his day were more than enough!

(8) In the same spirit, family relations are to be sanctioned. Vatsyavaraḍācārya explicitly says that the father should not make servants out of his sons, for example; all of life must manifest the glory of Viṣṇu.

(9) No false oaths are allowed. Nor—surprising enough in view of the fact that astrology remains, even today, an important branch of Sanskrit learning among the orthodox, and is all-too-popular in our modern metropolises—should one resort to astrologers or indulge in any other superstitions.

(10) Matted hair, use of ashes, and other extremes of asceticism are to be avoided. This we have already observed in Rāmānuja’s Gitā Bhāṣya. It is simply made unnecessary because, as in the motif of Jesus and St. Francis, love casts out all demons; and it is unworthy of the enjoyer of Viṣṇu’s protection and grace to deprecate the beauty of the world which is His. Unreserved relation with God makes moderation in the world quite the natural course—but not ascetic moderation; rather, such moderation as is conducive to spiritual joy.

(11) In the same spirit, right livelihood is enjoined, occupations compatible with ahimsā and the other virtues to be expected of a prapanna. One is reminded, for example, that St. Francis required even his tertiaries to-
renounce the profession of arms—something that has been forgotten by Franciscans themselves, and Vaiṣṇavas also! Tolstoi and Gandhiji are vibrant reminders of these things in our own time, not only in regard to ahimsā, but satya also: political graft and corruption will never cease until honest men stand up, as Confucius, Aśoka, St. Louis of France (who was a Franciscan tertiary) have done, and refuse to bow to the “system.” Legalities are never enough; personal virtue, even in public life is absolutely essential.

(12) Over-anxiety about life and death is to be avoided; one should simply “abide his time”.

(13) Never pray for anything but bhakti and jñāna. The pietistic manner of “testimonials to ‘answers to prayer’” is condemned as a vice.

(14) Finally, all rites involving animal sacrifice are to be abjured. Aside from the historical question as to whether this indicates some influence of Jainism—the emphasis on satya (which is not strictly enjoined in the Arthaśāstra) and ahimsā (likewise weak in that classic) could also be considered here—it still remains a challenge to the violences of the Kāli cult, which is still an all-too-flagrant reality, even in sophisticated Calcutta. On the other hand, those who think that Gandhiji’s vehemence in this matter was due to Christian influence, are quite in the wrong; it was as a Vaiṣṇava that he condemned it.

For such are the ethical implications of true prapatti, regardless of nation and time the age of the reforms of Confucius and Motze; the age of Aśoka’s mission of peace; the conversion of a Constantine, the age of St. Louis and the Crusades; the age of George Fox William Penn and Cromwell and king Charles; the age of Tolstoi and Tsars and Bolsheviks; time of British Raj and Mahatma Gandhi—they all roll into one when the answer to Grace is made. And perhaps no better example of the social and political importance of prapatti could be found than the role of one Wang An Shih in era of the northern Sung of China (1069-1074), who, taking Shen Tsung (1068 to 1085) as Guru in spite of orthodox opposition not only introduced state bank-
ing and price control but also reduced the national budget by 40% while increasing salaries of ordinary officials so that they could be honest, and helped poor farmers by 2% loans, but reduced the army by half. No man is too great to surrender to almighty God. Ram Raj, the kingdom of heaven, the Buddha’s peace, they still are possible, for prapatti is always possible.

XIII. The aṅgas of Prapatti (e.g., those from the Lakṣmī Tantra)

N. they are preparations, or preliminaries. S. only analysis of the act itself and description of the type of behaviour that perforce follows. Here, it may be that both have not followed Rāmānuja, who would seem in his Gītā Bhāṣya (VII: 1-6 & 16-19 and preface to VII) only to regard these aṅgas as types. Prof. Raṅgācārya treats them under the carama śloka, but that does not seem so apt. It is true that the types listed do not tally item-for-item; but that is because the text will not allow. But the essential characteristics are the same; and it is worth remembering that Rāmānuja says that in one sense all are equally dear, and will reach the Goal, but that in another sense the jñānī (as the one concerned with ātmankṣepa) is the most preferable, because his qualities really include the others also. This, of course, is a novel notion; we only throw it out as a possible point of reconciliation.

Be that as it may, all writers take these as of focal importance, so it is well not to pass them by without some discussion. As we have seen, Radhakrishnan bases his whole discussion of prapatti on them, without adequate consideration of later developments. Dās Guptā has done better, placing them only in their historical position, although neglecting their later interpretation. Prof. Raṅgācārya takes them into stride under the carama śloka, thereby acknowledging their importance. P. N. Śrīnivāsācārya devotes considerable space to them, although he changes the order (as does Radhakrishnan) switching the 5th and 6th, following perhaps the list as given in the Yatindramatadipikā. They are given in a Sanskrit verse as follows as found in the Lakṣmī Tantra itself:

1. Āṅkūlyasya saṃkalpaḥ
2. Prātkūlyasya varjanam
3. Rāksisyati tī viṣvāso
4. goptṛtva-varāṇam tathā
(5) ātma-nikṣepa
(6) kārpanye śaḍvidhā......

Actually, of course, these constitute a classical formulation of any mystical askesis. In the minor works of St. Bonaventura, and in particular, the De Triplica Via such a similar formulation is found that we shall take them up one by one, pointing to the parallels as we go.

(1) Ānuśūlyasya samkalpaḥ or seeking conformity to the Will of God. (2) Avoidance of anything contrary to His Will. We may take these two together, as constituting the positive and negative sides of the same thing, namely, what Bonaventura calls the stimulation of the conscience; and the means thereto is meditation, which takes in the three levels of the purgative, the illuminative, and the (unitive, or) perfective ways. Corresponding to sat, cit, ānanda, it is interesting to note in passing that St. John of the Cross—and to a very great extent, Evelyn Underhill after him—takes these three as constituting the whole of the mystical process; but Bonaventura finds yet two others, with their own subdivisions, lying further on.

The first of these, the purgative, whereby one comes from sense-limitation (māyā) to realization of being (Brahman) involves exasperation at the record of our sins, the sharpening of sensitivity or circumspection of oneself, and rectification by consideration of the good, which is "terminated towards affection for spiritual happiness, sharpened by grief, and consummated in love". Each of these has further refinements, the first, the sins of negligence, of desire (concupiscence) and of perversity (nequitia); the second, the consideration of death, of the blood of the Cross, and of the face of the Divine Judge; the third, strenuousness or vigilance, severity, or rigour of the mind and benignancy of soul.

One may see here (as for that matter, in this whole series of āṅgas) also the beginning of a parallel to the series of prerequisites for the ‘inquiry into Brahman’ with which the commentaries Brahma Sūtras begin, e.g., viveka, vimoka, abhyāsa, kriyā, kalyāṇa, anavasāda, anuddhāra, which we have treated in the previous chapter. We offer this here, however, because it seems to conform to the basic distinction between the two Sanskrit schemata, namely, that this one from
the Lakṣmī Tantra has constant focus on Bhagavān, whereas the one treated in the Brahma Sūtras is more in focus in regard to the jivātman—the former therefore concerned more with prapatti, and the latter with bhakti. In this light, we continue.

The second stage is the illuminative (wherein one approaches the divine as pure intellect). Bonaventura speaks of this in terms of ‘rays’ (radii) of intelligence, in reference, of course, to his whole theory of illumination. There are three: protection against sins already committed, dilation of benefits already received, and reflection of promises of future good. The first of these includes the sins that the Lord has ‘permitted’ and yet, though we have made such poor use of our freedom, yet has not allowed us to reach the bottom of our possible perversity. For this, great gratitude indeed is in order, for without this gratitude, no illumination at all is possible; it is the only remedy for our infirmity and perversity of will. The second concerns the completion of nature by grace conferred first through the administration of the Church, but reaching into the superabundance (e.g. of grace) with which the Father has filled the whole universe, the ‘superabundance’ with which the Son as incarnate has given to man, and the ‘superabundance’ with which the Holy Spirit has made the soul (as Christian) friend, lover, and spouse of the divine Beloved. The third concerns the things which cannot be thought, but must be reached by faith and love, namely, the removing of all evils, the association of all saints, (the establishment of spiritual community) and the fulfilment of all desires in God himself, “who is the fount and finish of all goods, who is so good that He exceeds every petition, every desire, and every estimation, and reoutes us as worthy of such good, if only we desire and seek Him above all and because of himself”.

The perfective way brings us to the spark of wisdom, (or ānanda, since wisdom for Bonaventura, as well as Rāmānuja, is basically affective, not gnostic, however ‘intuitive’ the gnosis might be) by which spark we are first gathered (literally, congregated—e.g., into the fire) “by the reduction of the affection(s) from every love of creature(s) from which affection ought to be recalled, for the love of creature(s) does not profit, or if it does, it does not satisfy”; then inflamed, e.g.,
by the conversion of the affections into the love of the Spouse (of the divine)—which is to be analogized to the hierarchy, in the secular sphere, of self-love, love for superiors, and matrimonial love, the latter alone giving true abundance of good, for the beatified enjoy such a relation to God, being always enfolded into His presence, which is the most desirable thing possible; then finally lifted up (sub-levandus—e.g., in the heat of the fire) above everything sensible, imaginable, or intelligible, for He whom we love is supersensible, yet wholly desirable, beyond all terms, figures, numbers, circumlocutions and commutations, yet again wholly desirable, beyond all demonstration, definition, opinion, estimation, investigation—and yet still is wholly desirable.

(2) Proceeding on, we again may take the next two together, as constituting positive and negative aspects of the same movement, namely, rakṣikēyati 'ti viśvāsa and gopātyavaraṇam tathā, or supreme trustfulness in the Lord and supplatory temper. These correspond to what Bonaventura takes in under prayer (oratio), which follows after meditation. Again the division is three-fold the deploitation of misery, the imploring of mercy, and the exhibition of pious devotion (latria). After an acknowledgment of the need of grace these in turn are triplicated as follows:

We must deplore our miserable condition because of the faults we have perpetrated, the wanderings (amissio) from grace, and the delay of glory. Appropriate to these are the qualities of grief, shame, and fear: grief from memory of sins of omission; shame from sins of commission, which we realize when we suddenly understand our present situation, how far, as a wandering sheep, we have strayed from the summit, or how much we have defouled the beautiful image (of God) that we are, or how that we are only slave-maids, not free servants; fear from the consideration of the future, including the inevitability of Judgment and the danger of eternal death.

We must implore Mercy (of God) for whatever grace we invoke, and this with an affluence of desire—desire arising from the (Antaryāmin) Holy Spirit 'who groans unspeakably within us, travelling for us' (Romans 8: 16)—with confidence of faith which we have from Christ, and with diligence of imploring aid,
which we seek from the Holy Spirit and all the Saints and angels.

But the focus is on the exhibition of pious devotion or divine service, for it is herein that God cultivates his grace in us. Here, we must first become inclined to reverence: to marvel at the Divine Immensity and at our own smallness; to enlarge ourselves in the face of the Divine benignity and our indigence; to be elevated to complacency (in the literal meaning: becoming well-pleasing to God) in an excess of the mind by the contrast between (warmth of) the Divine Love and our tepidity. This trilogy is in turn enlarged: reverence is due to God as Father, as Lord, and as Judge, and is expressed by bowing (inclinatio), by genuflection, and by prostration; in benevolence, (concerning the benignity of God) the heart is enlarged, is opened, and is poured out ‘like water’; in ‘complacency’ one first experiences the fulfilment of desire, for only God can please the soul; this comes by His gratuitous love; the world is crucified for man; secondly, one experiences becoming pleasing only to God; this comes by love that is owed to Him; man is crucified to the world; and thirdly, one experiences becoming pleasing to God by the ability to communicate this divine pleasure to others; this comes by the realization of mutual love—the creation of spiritual community; man becomes crucified for the world. This last is the stage of perfect love, and one must not rest till he has reached it—a vibrant warning against the gnostic kevala jñānīs, who are contemptuous of the last, saying that nothing can be higher than their own ‘self-realization’: a true Tengalai position; kaiṅkarya is not a ‘descent’ as the advaitins say but is yet beyond sādhana-mokṣa, it is an expression of God’s ānanda in and through man, even to the point of self-sacrifice in death. Nevertheless, the other extreme (mere humanistic altruism) is not enough either: “to this perfection of the love of one’s neighbour one does not arrive unless (and until) one has arrived at the perfection of the love of God, because of whom we love our neighbour, who is not lovable except because of God”. (And how true this is! How utterly unlovable we are in our own right! “Love is blind” in a double sense: it both obscures our unworthiness to be lovers as well as the faults of the beloved!)

The last two, ātma-nikṣepa and kārpanye saññoidhā śaranāgati, we
do not take together, for the very important reason that it makes a great difference which comes first. It may be that Śrīnivāsaśāri and the others have followed the Vadagalai tradition in putting the kārpanye lower down in the list; certainly placing it last is very significant in the Tengalai view-point, and Bonaventura concurs emphatically; for ecstatic experience is not the end: peace follows, and the realization of truth as love with it. Thus:

(3) Self-oblation can be described in six stages (gradūs), namely, sweetness, avidity, saturation (saturitas), inebriation, security, and tranquillity. Everyone of these could be found distinctly in Nāmmalwar, but we shall refrain from citing the passages in deference to continuity.

(a) Sweetness. This is realized by rendering the soul empty, and "sabbatizing" it, e.g., bringing it to a festive condition, by meditation on the love of God.

(b) Avidity. This comes by cooperating with the sweetness until such thirst is aroused that nothing will satisfy until perfect possession is attained, and continued ecstasy evokes the cry of Job and the psalmist, 'My soul has chosen suspense, and my bones (have chosen) death', for, 'As the hart desires the water-brooks, even so longeth my soul after Thee, O God.'

(c) Saturation. Herein, all that has been left behind is turned into nausea; only the heavenly food will satisfy.

(d) Inebriation. Here we come to the condition wherein not only consolation, but solace in torments, delight in (unjust) punishment and the like take the place of the "natural" reactions, thus turning all evil into good. For he who comes into this has been denuded of all shame, and (like the Christ on the night of the trial) can bear the scourge without grief.

(e) Security. Herein the soul, knowing itself capable of bearing any opprobrium for the sake of God's love, has put away all fear, and feels that nothing could ever separate it from God, as St. Paul wrote of his own experience (Romans 8:35-39).

(f) Tranquillity. Herein is experienced a sort of silence and sleep, like as if (one were gathered) into the arc of Noah, where nothing could be perturbed. Such as one is as ideal Solomon, who establishes peace in his time. But such tranquillity can never be reached except through love. Yet he who does achieve it can easily do everything which pertains to perfection, whether
acting or suffering, whether living or dying.

(4) With all that has gone before, it is impossible to think of self-help; only complete reliance, in contemplation, on God in humility and in quiet confident helplessness is possible. St. Bonaventura goes on and on, further and further into these Mysteries, delineating stages—seven each—of the "sleep (sopor) of peace, the splendour of truth, the sweetness (dulcor) of love," at the apex of which the devoted soul continually cries in its heart to the Lord, "Thee I seek, in thee I hope, thee I desire, into thee I surge, in thee I exult, and to thee finally I cling."

In conclusion, we find the via negation is placed above the via affirmationis, the latter by 'positing' the former by 'ablation'; the latter bringing us to the ontological level, with the distinctions of the hypostases of the Trinity, wherein, in peace, the problem of the one and the many is solved by a logistic of what is now called surrelativism with the corresponding 'values' of unity, truth and goodness (the latter including beauty); but the former bringing us "to the perfection of illumination, and thus to the negation of affirmation. For this mode of ascent is so much the more vigorous, the more intimate is the ascending force (vis); so much the more fruitful, the more close (proximior) is the affection."

And this ascent takes us soaring into the celestial hierarchy of angels, archangels, 'powers', 'dominions', 'thrones', cherubim and seraphim, wherein is not only Being, but the Fount of life.

Just such is true śaraṇāgati: Total Dependence, complete helplessness, and this alone, leads beyond all abstractions, to the Supremely Personal Who is uniquely the inexhaustible Source of Revitalization. One cannot go further, nor need one; one cannot begin elsewhere, for there is no other beginning; one does not "prepare" for it, for the preparation and the process are the same, for, as Dante sang,

"In presence of this Light a man becomes
Such, that to turn from It to other light,
It is impossible he should consent:
Because the Good, Sole Object of the will
Is there stored up; and outside It all is
Defective, which in It is perfected."

(Canto xxxiii, 100-106, Paradiso)
XIV. Whether prapatti can be done more than once

N. says yes; as many times as the prapanna sins; prapatti is: always the climax of atonement for sins, and sins must always be atoned. S. says it need not be done more than once: "Once saved, always saved": one need not atone for sins as approach to God; rather, one goes to God, and grace does the rest. Here, of course, generally, N. is more like traditional catholicism, and S. like the protestants, especially those of the Anabaptist tradition—which some historians, as we have noted elsewhere, trace ultimately to the Franciscan movement. We have already seen how St. Bonaventura deals with the question of grace in this regard, in reference to the sacrament of confession; he is equally explicit in regard to baptism—equatable here to the initial submission. If it be remembered that even the most extreme Tengalai will not deny that sin is possible after prapatti, then here too we may take Bonaventura as closer to that school. He denies emphatically that God will not allow the elect to fall—the classical Calvinist position—but he does say that those who have come into the ‘larger’ portion can more easily, in the Divine Largesse, make restitution and that if the original repentance was done with sufficient fervour, the pristine purity (e.g., such as Adam had before the ‘fall’) is completely restored, and restitution will not have to be repeated. Again, although those who lapse do not remain ‘alive’ in the ‘mystical body’ because they lose their joy, yet they remain in the ‘memory’ of God (with special favour) and the memory of God never really departs from them. Their contrition therefore will be doubly keen, for they have already been recipients of such great good; and likewise the joy (both of God and the peccant) will be double when he ‘arises’ from his error: no longer a ‘dead member’ in the Mystical Body, he will remain alive in it. But this ‘becoming alive again’ is an action of grace in principle; it is manifested only to be a matter of virtue. Of course, both Vaiśnava schools deny, with vehemence equal to that of Bonaventura the doctrine of eternal damnation, for that would mean the closing of the boundless Mercy that is ever overflowing.

XV. The question of karma again: does prapatti “but” grace, and
does the residue of karma (the *apūruṇa*) remain after prapatti?

The answers are obvious, and we have already inadvertently dealt with them.

**XVI. The relation of caste and the prapanna**

Again, we have inadvertently treated this already, except to note that the Vadagalai tends to retain caste distinctions even after the śaraṇāgati is made. In this respect it is noteworthy to note the excellent work among hill-tribes which the Tengalais—long before there was any possible influence or challenge on the part of Christian missionaries—have to their credit.

**XVII. The nature of God's pervasion (e.g. of the soul)**

N. since the soul is atomic, or subtle (anu), it cannot be pervaded, even by God. S. puts no limitations on God's power, which is entirely beyond our comprehension. The argument is supported by the dialectics of genera and species, universal and particular, etc., reminding us vividly of similar controversies in Western Scholasticism. Off-hand, Rāmānuja's emphasis on the Antaryāmin would seem to give support to the latter view, but digression on this point would lead us too far astray, even though it does involve the important question of the distinction of God's *essence* and his *grace*, as well as the comparative problem of the Christian doctrine that the Holy Spirit is a *gift* (e.g., as the source and bearer of grace) as well as the inherent "indweller" of all, whereas the Hindu tradition specifies only the latter aspect, although interpreted in a great variety of ways. In the West, it involved the refutation of the Averroist doctrine of the identity of the "higher" (or 'active') intellect with the Mind of God; and in both Indian and Europe, many subtleties important to the distinction between pantheism and panentheism.

**XVIII. The position of the kaivalyin**

Both agree that it is *not* the highest state, as the Jainas, and to a great extent, the advaitins, claim; but N. says that it is a stage on the way, so to speak, while S. says that it is a "dead end"—if we may interpolate—like Dante's *limbo*—a place for "philosophers" who never suffer, but who never experience:
This is very important for comparative studies, for it involves the distinction which Rudolph Otto has made famous, between "soul mysticism" and "God Mysticism". In his book on Śaṅkara and Eckhardt, he virtually lumps all of Hinduism into the former category, and even in his *India's Religion of Grace*, in spite of his visit to Melkote, he still clings to the same emphasis. It may be true that with VadagaIais, the burden of the Sanskrit tradition has been too strong to allow a full development of a purely theistic doctrine of salvation, and that the ātma-siddhi emphasis prevails; but if we take Bonaventure as the standard instead of Luther, Otto's (all-too-semetic) Idea of the Holy" becomes of less importance than the concept of beatification (which will concern us at length in a later chapter); and the Tengalais seem to have come on a way strikingly parallel to that of their contemporaries in Europe.

For the "Idea of the Holy", with its extreme emphasis on otherness, and with its corollary emphasis on holiness as something apart, something arduous and severe—and the further corollary that the secular and sacred can have no effective relation, not even the transforming relation consequent on the influence of grace, so that philosophy and religion, church and state, and all the other unhappy dualisms that characterize the "crisis of the modern world"—woefully neglects the Holy Spirit, the Antaryāmin, and the possibility of perfection. Christ himself did not say "be ye holy" but rather "be ye perfect"; redemption is of the whole man, not just the 'holy' man. Holiness is of the order of virtue; perfection of grace. In this perspective, it seems that Otto has grossly underrated the Tengalai transformation of the concept of mokṣa, with its extreme emphasis on total dependence on the grace of God—a God, admittedly, not totally transcendent; but this is not the Christian concept either, by any means; for otherwise the Trinity, wherein Love as the Holy Spirit is always working its Mysteries, is abrogated, just as the pañca ṛṣya doctrine would be abrogated if total transcendence were affirmed.

For, the concept of the holy—like the māṁsika ritualistic insistence on "purity"—is of the order of fear, but the concept of perfection (or mokṣa) is, with both Tengalais and St. Bonaven-
tura, of the order of love, as the latter states in contrasting the
Old and New Testaments.  

"If indeed we compare the (two) 'laws' together, in respect
to their typical traits (habito respectu ad statum com-
munem), (we must see it) thus, that the Mosaic Law per-
tained to the status of imperfection... (according to
Hebrews 7:19) but the Gospel to the status of perfection
(Matthew 5:48) 'Be ye perfect as your Father is perfect’;
and the imperfect [must be led by the spirit of fear, but the
perfect by the spirit of love (amoris)]"

And further down,

"Another way to put it is that in the New Law there is not
only a great commination of punishment, but also an abun-
dant collation of grace, which gives birth to love and confi-
dence. For in the Old Law there was a commination of
punishment, but not such a collation of grace; thus the
spirit of fear urged them on (agitabat) not just because of
supplication and a defect of aid, which consisted in a desire
of the good and the grace of the Holy Spirit"

In other words, although the immanent aspect of Deity
(Antaryāmin) was not inoperative, yet it could not be con-
sciously operative, and thus the full freedom of life in grace
could not be realized except as it were in anticipation. 'Hol-
iness' is indeed a 'preparation' for grace, but not the full
realization of it; and once it is given by the Avatāra, 'prepara-
tion' is no longer necessary, but rather the full response in
proceeding onward to perfection, which is the true end.

Of course, it must be admitted that Otto was working
largely within the framework of natural theology; and it may
be true that his terminology covers only what is inalienable in
any religious consciousness. But this should not be enough,
even from his Lutheran orientation. For any philosophy that
deals with religious reality, and not just religious consciousness,
of other "phenomena" of religion, the realm of grace is even
more necessary than that of nature—and we deliberately use
the. term grace, in preference to the term 'supernatural', in
consonance with Bonaventura and the Śrīvaiṣṇavas, rather than
the Thomistic tradition, for it carries the connotation that it is
more correct—more profound—to say that grace enfolds nature
(in the sense of the vākya, so dear to Rāmānuja, of the
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 'Having created, He entered...'),
then it is to say that the supernatural ‘completes’ the natural.

In this perspective, his term, now so popular, the “Wholly Other”, corresponding to Buber’s *I and Thou* is likewise an inadequate Christian criterion. The greatness of the Christian system at its best lies in the dynamically balanced triad of relationality of the *I-i*, the *i-Thou*, the *that-I*, and the *That-thou,* and all the other inter-connectings in the secondary order: God as Trinity is the Wholly Other, but *equally* the Wholly *I,* and the Wholly *That.* And Rāmānuja’s reformation—for it is nothing less than that—comes very near, if not entirely into this Vision, this ‘illumination’: truly a work of *Grace itself!* Prapatti takes its orientation in the *i-Thou,* but it directly comes into this Fullness; *mokṣa* does not obliterate personal identity (as we find in the picturings of Vaikuṇṭha); but neither does it disallow the hierarchy of inwardness (as we have seen in the passages involving the problem of Ultimate Agency); nor does it cancel out plain objectivity (the world is *māyā* in the sense of being the Lord’s play, ‘dead’ in itself, but alive and very real as the Lord’s *śarīra*); not in the advaitic illusionist sense: it *is* describable; and correspondingly, God’s attributes can be quite objectively spoken of, even though they should lead to praise—just as every node of the triadic relationality should lead to the others.

Nammalwar and Yāmunācārya both sing the motif, “I marvel, for it is really Thou that singest Thyself through me”—a motif not too far from what we find in St. Bonaventura when, reminding us that the upward ascent is also the *inward,* he begins to lead the soul soaring through the celestial hierarchy: *the joy* there is not his own, but theirs—the angels, archangels, cherubim and seraphim, and theirs is that of the Lord of Life Himself, who has brought him there.

Indeed, the only criticism—and basically it may be that of the Vadagalais—that can be levelled against the Tengalais is that, like Otto, they over-emphasize the *I-Thou,* just as the pietist tradition out of which Otto was working has done—a descent from the classical balance of the Medieval synthesis. We have thus far neglected, for the sake of vividness in the comparative reference, the aspects of Bonaventura’s comprehen-
siveness that bring this out; but it is there, as Gilson has lucidly shown in the last chapter of his work.

In regard to Otto's concept of the Numinous, as the mysterium tremendum et fascinans, the same critique may be applied. It does not adequately take in the inwardness, the i-I relation, the antaryāmin, the Holy Spirit. This, of course, is generally true of Western Christianity, according to Berdyaev; nevertheless, we take the liberty to assert that it is less true of Bonaventura than of most others; the Śrīvaśnava tradition here is much closer to the Basilian than to the Augustinian type.

It is true that the mysterium fascinans does approach this Inwardness, but it does not enter It—or rather, its entrance follows. Jesus, like the Kṛṣṇa of Brindāban, is alluring, being full of love, although still retaining, as in the Transfiguration and the Viśva-rūpa, much of the mysterium tremendens. But as the fourth gospel puts into his own mouth 'not until I have gone away will He (It) come'; and the motif may be found in Arjuna's last words in the Gītā (XVIII:73) as well as at the climax of Kṛṣṇa's last discourse of instruction to Uddhava99

(Uddhava has said:) "We are the worshippers of the dusts of thy feet. What want have we? Thou dost reveal thyself to all corporal beings, both in their inner soul as the presiding god in it, and outside their hearts as their preceptor. . . ."

(Kṛṣṇa says): "Again, becoming free from all impurities, my personality, that is like unto the essence of the Supreme Spirit, and is full like the sky, should be observed to be present in all creatures, as well as in one's own self.

"... that man is admired to be a learned one, who... beholds all creatures to be like unto my own personality, and serves them as such (and therefore overlooks all caste distinctions, etc.)

"Understanding that I reside in all bodies the person who meditates upon me is surely delivered from the evil habits of malice, haughtiness, (etc.)."

In his Christianity and the Indian Religion of Grace, Otto makes the remark that nothing like the "Our Father" can be found in the Gītā, the whole intuitive setting being different. True enough, it is wrong to overlook historical soils and cultural backgrounds; the semetic and Āryan/Dravidian types are there. But on the other hand, these factors being admitted, in point of doctrine
and of piety as well, is not the Nārāyaṇa mantra as it is traditionally interpreted, filled with the same meaning-content as the Our Father? Perhaps one may best remain in his own milieu in practice, but is it not better in comparative studies, to err on the side of generosity rather than to risk bigotry in asserting the superiority of one’s own tradition?

In an excellent article, Prof. Yāmunācārya of Mysore has also brought this into focus. It is true, as he shows, that Otto has done well in treating both aspects of the ‘numinous’ in his discussions of Rāmānuja’s tradition; Brahman is acintya and adbhuta, inconceivable and mysterious; but Brahman also becomes easily accessible (sulabhya) and available (saññīya). But in the transition from this to the sāksātkāra or aparokṣānubhava (the non-sensuous and non-conceptual), in reference to which Prof. Yāmunācārya aptly quotes Rāmānuja [“From the worship to the Vibhava-aspect one attains to the Vyūha, and from the Vyūha one attains to the ‘subtle’ (e.g., Antaryāmin) called Vāsudeva, i.e., the ‘highest Brahman’…”], it appears to us that we enter a phase which Otto’s terminology does not cover. Likewise we concur with Prof. Yāmunācārya in denying Otto’s assertion that “India has not hitherto had the periods of purifying enlightenment and critical sifting which we of the West have had.” The materials we have already surveyed should be more than sufficient evidence. Indeed, we counter-propose the thesis that these so-called “waves of enlightenment” of western Europe have rather uprooted us from the all-essential primordial component of devotion; whereas the reform movements in India, such as that of Rāmānuja and Pillai Lokācārya, although struggling against a great weight of primitive material and rigid customs, have refined it in subtilty and elevated it to lyric and moral excellence, without sacrificing the primordial—as is evidenced, for example, in the symbolism of Viṣṇu on Śeṣanāga, with Lakṣmī on his breast and the democratization of membership without inducing complete schism thus constituting a real reform instead of a revolution such has convulsed western Europe in the past and is in danger of happening in our own time. In both India and the West, therefore, this distinction between the primitive and the primordial needs continued emphasis. In India as a basis for still needed refine-
ment and purgation of superstition, and in the West as a guard against neglect of symbolic reality.

For that matter, all reform movements aside, the whole question of the relation of the soul to God in Vedántic Hinduism being perhaps the most misunderstood in the field of comparative studies, deserves much closer attention. Among all the ācāryas who have dealt with the Brahma Sūtras, there is not one who denies the distinction between the soul (jīva) and God (Brahman), as can be readily seen by the treatment of sūtra I: ii :12. It is only the Jainas, the Theravāda Buddhists, and the Sāṅkhya who affirm in full force the isolation concept of salvation; and even the advaitins so interpret their concept of jñāna, as the transcendence of māyā (wherein all limitation, all ‘isolation’ resides) in such a way that a plenitude of resting in Being (to use a phrase of Prof. Lacombe’s) is reached. Admittedly, in their method, there is a strong strain of the ‘ātma-siddhi’ which Otto deals with; and their emphasis is rather on the sākṣi (the undifferentiated point of consciousness that enfolds, like the ‘higher intellect’ of the Averroists, both empirical activity and self-knowledge and the psychological or paranormal—and therefore superpersonal—field) than on the antaryāmin. But even with them, the metaphor, found in both Plato and the Upaniṣads, of the charioteer and the driver of the chariot is by no means set aside. But that is only one of the many—very many—possible interpretations. Under this sūtra, Rāmānuja lists the most important of those posited up to his time—and there are many more since then.101

"Philosophers indeed, hold many widely differing opinions as to what constitutes Release. Some hold that the Self is constituted by consciousness only, and that Release consists in the total destruction of this essential nature of the Self. Others, while holding the same opinion as to the nature of the Self, define Release as the passing away of nescience, ‘avidyā’. Others hold that the Self itself is non-sentient, like a stone, but possesses, in the state of bondage, certain distinctive qualities, such as knowledge, and so on. Release then consists in the total removal of all these qualities, the Self remaining in a pure state of isolation (kaivalya). Others again, who acknowledge a highest Self free from all imperfection, maintain that through connection with limiting adjuncts that Self enters on the condition of an individual
soul; Release then means the pure existence of the highest Self, consequent on the passing away of the limiting adjuncts."

He then goes on to give his own interpretation, which, though it does here hinge negatively on the 'destruction of ignorance' and positively (wherein lies his quarrel with the advaitins) with the 'intuition of the highest Self', has to be interpreted in the light of the context and of his whole system (including the passages we have surveyed in his Gîtâ Bhâṣya and his Gadyatrāya). For example, further down (1:ii :19) he gives a description of this 'highest Self' which, while preserving the other aspects which Otto neglects, does not in the least compromise the 'otherness' on which Otto insists.

"The śūtra refers to the peculiar attributes of the highest Ātmā. One of these is the entry by one only into all worlds, all beings, all devas, all vedas and all yajñas, and controlling them in every way. Another is having every object as his body, and being its Ātmā. These are not possible in one other than Brahman, who is omnipresent and who has an unfailing will. A third attribute is being immortal; and this is as a part of His nature." (italics ours, as below)

This is supported by a passage from the Subala Upaniṣad:

"...whose body (mrtyu—subtle matter) is, who moves about in mrtyu whom mrtyu does not know, He, the inner ruler (antaryāmin) of all beings, is free from karma; dwells in the highest heaven; has a shining body; has no equal or superior; He is Nārāyana."

This passage is all the more significant when one realizes that it is given in refutation of the view that the antaryāmin and the jīva are the same.

Where, then, is there room for the 'ātma-siddhi'? It is ruled out in principle, even before the question of method arises:

For that matter, as to method, Rāmānuja, in the preface to the 13th Adhyāya of the Gîtâ Bhâṣya says that even for kaivalya, bhakti is better. And it is not out of keeping to add that he does not mention prapatti there, precisely because that is the (only) way to get beyond kaivalya—or to bye-pass it! Thus, according to Dās Guptā, even Venkatanātha teaches

"further differentiates this Vaiṣṇava emancipation, as the thinking of the Īvara as the most supreme, and thereby deriving infinite joy, from the other type of kaivalya, in which Man thinks of himself the Brahman and attains
kaivalya. There also the association with avidyā and the world is destroyed, and the man is reduced to oneness; but this is hardly a desirable state, since there is not here the infinite joy which the Vaishnava emancipation can bring."

And in his Tatvo-śekhara (again according to Dās Gupṭā—the work not being available to us first-hand), Lokācārya says,¹⁰³

"the ultimate summum bonum (puruṣārtha) consists in the servitude (kāṅkṣaya) to God aroused by love of Him (prīti-kārita), due to the knowledge of one’s own nature and the nature of God in all His divine beauty, majesty, power and supreme excellence... In the ordinary idea of emancipation, a man emphasises his own self and his own end. This is therefore inferior to the summum bonum in which he forgets his own self and regards the servitude of God as his ultimate end. He also refutes the conception of the summum bonum as the realization of one’s own nature with a sense of supreme subordination (para-tantraṇeva svānubhāva-mātram na puruṣārthāḥ). This is technically called kaivalya in the Śrīvaishnava system... Positive bliss is our final aim. It is held that in the emancipation (of the Tengalai type) the individual realizes himself in close association with God and enjoys supreme bliss thereby; but he can never be equal to Him... Prapatti, or self-surrender to God, is regarded as a (the?) means to the cessation of bondage."

In fine, we have here the all-important distinction between the strictly spiritual and the purely psychical which is like that between the magical and the mystical, a distinction of profound significance not only for comparative studies and for theology (for there it is already contained in St. Paul as well as in Vaiṣṇava tradition) but for science and philosophy as well. It is highly doubtful that psychology as a (natural) science—including parapsychology—can get beyond the kaivalya state, which can be investigated, to the investigation of the antaryāmin, for that comes within—or goes beyond—the field of the limiting concept: Man’s extremity remains, literally, God’s opportunity. Yet without the leap of grace, the secret of human happiness—much less the further field of glory—can never be found: It remains a Mystery. And yet, only from that finality, only beyond all human reach, can be attained the orientation from which all epistemology, ethics and aesthetics, and the psyche itself can be seen in integrated perspective. Indeed, only in this ‘beyond’ is integration achieved at all—even if integra-
tion were the goal. *For it is not. 'Integration' is precisely the modern equivalent of kaivalya.* Bliss, perfection, beatitude: this is the End of man; and this challenge of the medieval world, whether European or Indian, remains still vibrant in our own time, as Gilson has vividly intimated in his chapter on the Critique of Natural Philosophy. St. Bonaventura’s term is *expedire:* to "take off" in the expression of American slang; one cannot reach the goal on foot; one must *soar up* into the unknown—the unknown, which, malgre Francis Bacon and all his progeny, will never be reached merely by ‘investigation’, and yet, for that very reason, remains enticingly the Eternal Challenge. Much as it is ridiculed, the medieval concept of Limbo symbolizes much: knowledge dialectic as well as statistical ‘check-up’, even self-knowledge, and para-normal e.s.p.—are not enough. As Śrīnivāsācārī says, problems are never really solved; they can only be dissolved. Grace and Wisdom, the highest of the gifts of the Holy Spirit alone will bring that Illumination of Love which will open our world to right application of technology and the full enjoyment of its hidden secret beauty—to the redemption not only of man, but of the whole of nature itself. For redemption is an Opening, the opening of essential Possibility, of the infinite overflow of Being, unlimitable revitalisation.

And it is always and everywhere possible, even though only a few—and this is part of the mystery, and part of the mystery too is the cataclysmic question, "Lord is it I'”—a few do reach out into it. But it is these precious few, like John Woolman and Mahatma Gandhi (or, for that matter, Albert Einstein?) who do *change history,* though that is not their purpose, for their purpose, their beginning their means their methods and their end is simply—obedient surrender and being conformed in and transformed by God.
NOTES

5. ibid., p. 114f.
6. especially Mānd. I: 1; 3 and I: 2: 12; Prajña I: 2 & VI: 8; also Chh. IV: 4 ff.
8. (Hume’s translation—as all Upaniṣadic passages below unless otherwise noted except those in the context of the Śrī Bhāṣya).
14. Journal of the Śrī Veṅkaṭeśvara Oriental Institute (Tirupatti) Appendix Vol. III. (Also separately published) This is a combined translation and study by Tātācārya and Varadācāri.
19. ibid., p. 104.
20. ibid., p. 211 ff.
22. op. cit. p. 386.
32. (Published at the G.N. Press, Madras, 1902), p. 266 f.
33. See Lacombe, op. cit., p. 370.
39. ibid., p. 49.
42. ibid., Vol. II, p. 77 ff.
47. ibid., Vol. I, p. 749.
49. III Sent XXIII : 1 : 2 (italics ours)
51. ed. cit., p. 156.
52. III Sent. XXXII, Passim.
53. III Sent. I : ii : 1 (italics ours)
54. See Lacombe, op. cit., p. 139.
55. II Sent. XXV : ii : 5.
58. op. cit., p. 371 n.1. (cf. also p. 360 f.)
59. ibid. p. 372.
60. op. cit., Vol. III, p. 411, passim.
61. op. cit., p. 583.
62. The first of the three Gadyas (Sections), the Saranāgati Gadya, which we shall have frequent occasion to make reference henceforward, has been translated in the *Brahmanavādin* (Journal, Madras) Vol. I, (1896), p. 228 ff. We are indebted to Prof. C. D. Sharma for help with the other two Gadyas.
63. K. Śeṣādri, *The Substance of the Śrī Bhāṣya*, Journal of Indian History
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(Trivandrum—not to be confused with another Journal with almost identical title) Vols. XXV-XXVII. The present quotation will be found in the last volume, p. 62.


66. Śrīnīvāsācārī, op. cit., p. 374.

67. See Lacombe, op. cit., p. 27; Kumarappā, op. cit, pp. 12 & 137; also Dās Guptā, op. cit., Vol. III; p. 378.

68. op. cit., p. 506.


74. op. cit. p. 401 (*italics ours*).

75. Śrī *Vacana-Bhūṣṇa* (poetically) translated (with unfortunate interpolations, however) by Parasaraṅthi Ayengar, Madras, 1893 (Lawrence Asylum Press, Mount Road). All citations are from this edition.

76. III Sent. xiv : 2 : 3.


78. ibid., p. 208-9.


81. Śrī *Śūkta and other Stotras*, translated by A. Śrīnīvāsa Rāghavan (Pudukottai, 1937) (by compliments of the author).

82. II Sent. XV, Dubium 4, and XVI : 1.


85. Quoted by Prof. Yāmūnācārya in the same article.

86. New Indian Antiquary, Vol. VI, p. 112.

87. Translated anonymously in the Brahmanādīn, (Madras) Vol. II.

88. Given also by Śrīnīvāsācārī, op. cit., p. 385.

89. See Gilson, op. cit., p. 399 ff.

90. II Sent. XXV : 2 : 5.

91. II Sent, XXVIII : 2 : 3 See also II Sent. XXVIII : 1 : 3.

92. I Sent. XVII : 1 : 3.

93. IV Sent. XVII : 1 : 1.

94. IV Sent. XVII : 1 & 2.

96. Published at Quaracchi (Italy) in 1929, p. 119 seqq. The translations are our own.
98. III Sent. XL: 1, passim.
101. Thibaut's translation (italics ours).
103. ibid., p. 136.
CHAPTER III
AESTHETICS OF BHAKTI
SECTION I
BHAKTI AS RASA

Nammalwar says:

I will not give my sweet composition to anyone but God. If I say this it creates hatred. It does not matter to me as I have my Divine father who is mine and who is my father and who is my Lord and whose I am. He resides on the Holy Hill Veṅkaṭa, where bees and bumbles hum with measured notes.

Of what good is it to compose verses upon man who is non-entity? Thinking himself to be an entity, He thinks his riches to be great. Leaving my Heavenly Father my supreme Lord the real entity residing at Tirukurungudi, surrounded by ponds and fields with flourishing plenty, why should I compose verses on man?

.....O my dear poets! Of what good are the riches got by singing about men? How long would they last? If you sing of the father of the angels, with the crown radiating Divine Splendour on all sides, He will take you into His service. He will make you as Himself and put an end to your births.

You praise me in the exuberance of your verbosity in a flowing and flowery style. A man’s riches are equal to raked up rubbish. There is nothing worth obtaining from them. Come now, my dear poets! Sing about the shining gem my Lord. His riches are inexhaustible. He will not hesitate to give you all that you want. He is never in want of anything.

.....His generosity and his praise are befitting each other and have no bounds. He has a thousand names. He is God. I will not even speak about earthly beings. You wrongly compare their hands to the generous clouds and their shoulders to the mountains.

He is loved much by Nila of smooth and round arms like the tender shoots of bamboos. He is always opposed to everything that results in evil. He is the God bearing the disc. I sing about him. I will contain as heretofore. I leave my body and join the holy feet. This is my greatest desire. I cannot be troubled to say anything about men of transitory existence.

I am not the poet who came to praise men. Such a trivial
object is to praise only Him who perpetually wages war against all sin. He is the never ceasing flow of Holy Goodness. He bears the disc. He is God. He is mine only. He allowed me to serve Him here in this world; and He takes me there to Heaven of angels and gives me charge of it by degrees.

(Tiruvoimoly, III: 9, passim)

There is much more in this passage than is apparent on first sight. First of all, for example, there is evidence here that from a very early date—a point little appreciated by most western connoisseurs of Indian art and literature, and even denied by some modern Indian apologists—there was secular, as distinct from, and even opposed to, religious art; and there was much controversy as the theoretical as well as the applied level: Nammalwar only states his position in the controversial stream. But more than that, there is much theory itself packed into what he says. And the theory thus condensed is the theme which we must develop in considerable detail in this section.

What is the relation—both existentially and ideally—between religion, and mystical religion in particular, and art; and, reciprocally, has art not reached its fullest realization until it takes religious Reality as its source and end of expression and inspiration? In other words, can bhakti be admitted as a rasa; and has it reached its true plenitude until and unless it is expressed in communicative artistic form?

But to give, in a breath, an adequate definition of rasa as such would be no more possible than to explain in one sentence such terms as Brahma, Atman, Dharma, or such other terms basic to the whole of Indian culture. Nevertheless, as a broad philosophical gesture, we posit the proposition that rasa is the ontological underlink between feeling-tone and its object/expression or embodiment. Thus what Nammalwar says in effect is that praise is the art of arts, and that the reduction of praise is not complete until it has reached its highest end, which is God himself, who is the Source-and-incorporation of all Beauty, (The Bhavana Sundara) unsading and unfailing in his inexhaustibility, and ‘having a thousand names’, the locus of all possible comparisons, metaphors and analogies; and who, mutatis mutandis, can be approached and expressed only in terms of such praise.

Yet in the history of Indian Aesthetics, this has always been a controversial issue. For although the concept of rasa can be
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traced back as far as the Veda, the basic meanings being taste, juice, enjoyment, feeling, emotion, etc., and although almost all of the Purānic literature, as well as the great Epics, the 'Iti-
ḥāsas' (the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata) are full of scenes which provoke or move the reader or hearer to a feeling of devo-
tion and piety, among the majority of technical treatises on
the theory of art there has always been a serious doubt
whether this feeling of devotion (bhakti) can be portrayed in art,
and especially in the drama, even though all the other human
emotions, such as bibhatsa (disgust), bhayānaka (fear), vīra (courage,
heroism), abhuta(wonder), raudra(anger), hāsyā (humour),
karūṇa(pathos), śṛṅgāra(romantic love)—and the number of such
basic emotions artistically expressible is again a matter of long
controversy—may be. And even more controversial is the issue
as to which of the rasas, the emotions, is the chief. Thus, for
example, those who admit sānta, peace, as the ninth to be added
to the list, almost invariably insist that it is the queen of them
all; but those who, like Nammalwar, admit bhakti also, (although
they are a minority) tend to argue that it is the only true rasa,
and that the others are only supports (sthāyin) or approaches or
adjuncts to it (vyabhicāra) or embellishments (alaṅkāras) of it,
or suggestively communicative (dhvani) of it.

Thus it may readily be seen that we cannot possibly trace
the development of the controversies. Nor for that matter is it
our purpose to argue controversially for our minority position.
Rather, having adopted it (even if arbitrarily), we hope to find
in it a source of revitalization of both art and religion (both in
India and the West) as well as an appropriate concomitant of
our visiṣṭādvaitic metaphysics of devotion; and we shall explore
the implications involved. And, as ever, we shall also trace out
parallel developments in St. Bonaventura and Marcel and
others in our contemporary world.

Nevertheless, even though the tradition which we are follow-
ing may be in the minority as far as technical aesthetics is concerned, it must be pointed out immediately that it is philosophically rooted very deep in the best of upaniṣadic tradition, and probably brings into fuller explication than any other tradition the all-prevalent aesthetic component of Hindu religious expression in general. Thus, if this tradition has not developed to the full
a theory of art as such, it has nevertheless been so preoccupied with the beauty of God and with artistic expression of His praise that it has not had the leisure, as it were, to indulge in theorizing about it. For just as it is a truism that the greatest artists, with few exceptions, have not been the best exponents of aesthetic theories, so it is with the Alwars and the Śrī Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas: masters in the art of Love of God and in its rich portrayal, they have not considered anything else necessary; their theory is in their work.

Immediately we may note the following texts in the Upaniṣads—texts rather disregarded by many of the authorities (like Abhinava Gupta, Lollaṭa and the other Kāśmir Śaiva writers) until the time of Viśvanātha (14th century) and Jagannātha (1590-1665):

Taitt. II : 5

Verily, other than and within that one that consists of understanding is a self that consists of bliss (ānanda-maya). By that this is filled. That one, verily, has the form of a person. According to that one's personal form is this one with the form of a person. Pleasure (priya) is its head; delight (moda), the right side; great delight (pra-modā), the left side; bliss (ānanda), the body (ātman); Brahma, the lower part, the foundation.

Taitt. II : 7

Verily, what that well-done is—that, verily, is the essence (rasa) (of existence). For truly, on getting the essence, one becomes blissful. For who indeed would breathe, who would live, if there were not this bliss in space! For truly, this (essence—rasa) causes bliss. For truly, when one finds fearlessness as foundation in that which is invisible, bodiless, undefined, non-based, then he has reached fearlessness. When, however, one makes a cavity, an interval therein, then he comes to have fear. But that indeed is the fear of one who thinks of himself as a knower (but who really is not a knower).

Maitrī, V : 2 (ibid.)

Verily, in the beginning this world was darkness (tamas) alone. That, of course, would be in the Supreme. When impelled by the Supreme, that goes on to differentiation. That form, verily, is Passion (rajas). That Passion, in turn, when impelled, goes on to differentiation. That, verily, is the form of Purity (sattva). That Purity, when impelled, flowed
forth as Essence (rasa). That part is what the intelligence—mass here in every person—is—the spirit which has the marks of conception, determination, and self-conceit, Prajāpati (Lord of Creation) under the name individuality......

Chh. I : 1 : 3

The essence (rasa) of things here is the earth.
The essence of the earth is water.
The essence of water is plants.
The essence of plants is a person (puruṣa),
The essence of a person is speech.
The essence of speech is the Rg. ('hymn').
The essence of the Rg. is the Sāman ('chant').
The essence of the Sāman is the Udgitha ('loud singing').
This is the quintessence of the essences, the highest, the supreme, the eighth—namely the Udgitha.

Kāth. IV : 3 :
The Self-existent (savyambhu) pierced the openings (of the senses) outward;
Therefore one looks outward, not within himself (antar-ātman).
A certain wise man, while seeking immortality,
Introspectively beheld the Soul (Ātman) face to face.
The childish go after outward pleasures;
They walk into the net of widespread death.
But the wise, knowing immortality,
Seek not the stable among things which are unstable here.
That by which (one discerns) form, taste, smell,
Sound, and mutual touches—
It is with That indeed that one discerns.
What is there left over here!
This, verily, is that!

This intimate linking of the rasa concept with the ānanda of Brahman, and with the sattva of the cosmological order only too plainly demonstrates how deep the aesthetic root goes into the Hindu soil, and makes all superficial definitions (e.g. of art and its enjoyment) at once useless and ridiculous. As P.N. Śrīnivāsācārī, in his little Philosophy of the Beautiful says, "(Rasa) is not the feeling tone of a sensation or sentiment, but is an inner spiritual enjoyment...Being self-creative, its joy is ever expensive
and fecund. Owing to its suggestiveness, delicacy, and sweetness, it has an abiding influence on aesthetic religion, and in its transmuted state, it contributes to the riches of all-inclusive harmony"¹ And there is a dictum of Śukrācārya² to the effect that the artist should attain the images of God by means of spiritual contemplation only. The spiritual vision is the best and truest standard for him. He should depend on it, and not at all upon the visible objects perceived by external senses. It is always commendable for the artist to draw the image of the Gods which gives the obverse side of the picture; for if rasa as enjoyment is traced to the Ānanda of Brahman, then only that art which embodies that bliss is worthy of the artist’s effort; the sincere artist is the yogī of yogīs, to whom the means and the end, the enjoyment and the enjoyed and the depiction of them both, are one. And is this not bhakti, pure and simple? Thus as Rāmaswāmī Śāstrī says, the supreme rasa of bhakti comes in whether orthodox aesthetics will recognize it or not. For rasa as such is not so much created as it is manifested, just as bhakti is the response to Grace rather than the result of labour; and just as manifestation, rasa is beauty as communicative, so it is art in religion the rasa of religion, that makes devotion contagious:

It is in this motif that, following the above appeal to the poets, Nammalwar goes on in the next section to sing of this contagion of the bliss of the Lord, which removes all misery:

He is the sole Lord of the whole universe; nothing can stand against Him. He is a solid mass of sweetness itself to the whole three worlds. He is honey. He is nectar. He is milk. He is sugarcane. His crown is decorated with garlands of Tulsi full of honey blooming with beauty. I worship Him. I am in communion with Him. After all this my grief is dispelled...

His divine body shines with a changeless splendour. His heavenly form does not undergo any change. He came down to the world of men who wallow in misery and sorrow. He made himself visible to men. He put wrong-doers to shame, established his divine nature and power in the world and after this He redeemed the sinners. No sin stands before Him. In Him all the good qualities attain their perfection. He is Śri Kṛṣṇa. His ways are wonderful. I am joyful to praise Him. I am freed from remorse...
His happiness knows no shadow. It is immeasurable. His radiat glory is all-expansive. He is steadfast in the enjoyment of Lakṣmī. He is the Lord of all. He has boundless knowledge and wisdom. He performs His stupendous works. He is a wonderful Being. He is immutable and infinite. He is Śrī Kṛṣṇa. I have a firm grasp of his feet. I have no sorrow.

Such, in rough epitome, is our position. It involves at one sweep not only the reduction of all emotional experience through the sensuous, imitative and appropriative to the existential, but also the reduction of all art and artistic expression whether emotional inferential or judgmental, technical or naive, to the creative ground wherein appreciation catharsis and productivity coalesce in perpetual freshness, and the analogical reduction of all these together to the function of the human imagination as participation in the free Play (līlā) of God as cosmic and transcendent love in full self-enjoyment. All beauty, natural or human, is reflection of His Glory; and all loving devotion within the range of finite experience is but the embellished overflow of his own bliss. The term rasa ultimately covers all of this. It is, as Rāmaswāmi Śāstrī elsewhere says, "a complex aesthetic phenomenon. It is a subjective aesthetic mood kindled in the reader or the hearer or the seer by his sharing in the depicted feelings because of the universal elements present in such delineation. Such unselfish absorption in an aesthetic mood enables the innate bliss of the soul to shine forth. There is then a breaking forth of the prison-bars of innate delight (āvaranabhātva)", or quoting Viśvanātha: "Rasa—which, arising from the exaltation of the sattvaguna, is infinite and full of self-luminous bliss and consciousness, which is free from the taint of any other intruding mental act, which is akin to the experience of Diviné Bliss, whose soul is transcendent charm—is enjoyed by some happy and fortunate experiencers and enjoyers as unity of enjoyer and enjoyed and enjoyment." Or again, as Jagannātha puts it, "Rasa is that blissful emotion of rati or love etc. (including all the others mentioned above) which is of the nature of antenatal Vāsanās or emotional tendencies and which is realized through the sheaths of such Vāsanās along with the inalienable and internal and self-luminous bliss of the soul and which results from the transcendence of limited cognition and ratiocination by the liberation of the Ānanda or bliss-element.
of the Soul by the aesthetic energizing which is different in nature from the mere energy of worldliness. Correspondingly, according to S. K. De, Viśvanātha has defined rasa as follows:

The rasa, arising from an exaltation of the quality of sattva or goodness, invisible, self-manifested, made up of joy and thought in this identity, free from the contact of aught else perceived, akin to the realization of Brahman, and having for its essence super-normal wonder (camatkāratva) is enjoyed by those competent in its inseparableness (as an object of knowledge) from the knowledge of itself.

And he (Viśvanātha) treats this (camatkāratva) as expansion of the mind, synonymous with vismaya or adbhuta: a certain intense marvellousness which is essential to all rasas.

We are reminded of a verse by Claudel quoted by Marcel in his essay on Peter Wust:

Wretched? How can I say without impiety
That the truth of the things His highest hand has fashioned
Is a wretched truth? Can I say without absurdity
That a world which wears His likeness and works to His glory
Is less than myself, and my most imagination
Overtops it, and finds in it nothing to lean on?
Let us then first turn to the reduction of the emotions as such.

Fortunately, by now, largely as a result of the development of the phenomenological school, we are not so limited by the merely psychological view of emotion as our parents were. In the era of William James and the foolishness of Watson’s sensory-motor arc, emotion was considered as subjective in the worst sense. Man, along with any other organism, simply was considered as a channel of responses to sensations from his environment which stimulated certain endocrine secretion leading to activity—activity which was primarily considered as satisfaction of biological appetite; no ‘meaning’ could thereby be attached to affective experience at all. It is to the credit of writers like Bhagavān Dās that even at that time the superficiality of such a naive theory was thoroughly exposed. In the Science of the Emotions he has anticipated much that Scheler, Sartre, and Marcel have since proposed in the West; but on the other hand, it is unfortunate that many contemporary Indian writers like Dr. Rakesagupta continue to criticize what is al-
ready discarded, and, thereby to run the risk of being limited by it. Thus, when the latter, taking the word *sentiment* as the best English equivalent for the term *rasa*, remains content to discuss the problem of emotion, even in its manifestation in art, in terms of attachment to an idea as subjective response to an objective phenomenon, or the conjunction of mental affection and organic disturbance, it is small wonder that he comes in the end to a woeful undervaluation of *Indian* tradition in concluding with Ribot (whose work harks back as far as 1911), that any 'objective', treatment of the emotions is at least arbitrary if not impossible... As a matter of fact, much as is being contributed by psychological research in the field, philosophers (as well as artists) should always be free to speculate beyond the range of science, not allowing themselves to become its slaves. Thus the ancient classical theories like that of Empedocles of Greece to whom love and hate, far from being merely subjective experiences of the human being, are cosmic principles, not unlike the dualities of the classical Sāńkhya of India, or of the Taoists of China, as Bhagavan Das reiterates. The pleasure and pain; feeling and desire, affection, reverence, benevolence; the anger, fear and scorn, the tenderness and compassion, the admiration, wonder, curiosity, the tragic and the sublime, and all of their unlimited permutations and combinations—nay, even love-madness at the crown of the mixture—that mankind experiences and reproduces, are no less a part of the drama of metaphysics than space, time, motion, gravitation—or, as he now adds in conversation, reflecting deeply and penetratively behind his mellow rishi-like countenance—atomic fission and radioactivity. For that matter, who knows what the future of scientific investigation may reveal—or rather, further explicate? For if consciousness—if the Self—is of the nature of an order of reality (as present research in cybernetics suggests) that is in continuum with radionics, and is, as we have philosophically demonstrated, affective at the foundation, may we not speculate—even for the direction of future investigations of the scientists themselves—that emotion, art, love devotion, *rasa* in its full Vedāntic implications, is at the core of the dynamics of *all* Reality? Why do we mistrust our introspective, not to say, our rational, analyses
as ‘subjective’ and irrelevant, when they may still hold the key to what we may later on find out to be the living core of our world whose ‘objectivity’ may be only a hypothetical abstraction.

But aside from these cosmological speculations, which need not concern us here, it is supremely important to see how that bhakti, devotion, is at once both the root-emotion out of which all others can be derived, and the most all-inclusively complex. As Bhagavan Das warns, its apparent simplicity may fool us: a new-born baby seems to have a true devotion to its mother; indeed, it scarcely experiences anything else. But then, the mother in turn has equal—or more than equal—devotion to her child. For, as the sursum corda of all other feelings, it is the point of sacrifice, and hence its simplicity; but the sacrifice is not an eliminative one, but consummative. It takes in the pain of separation, the joy of satisfaction; the tenderness of the superior and the helplessness of the inferior; the benevolence of the fortunate and the dependence of the needy; the hatred of evil and the love of the good, as well as the whole of the movement of rebellion, penitence and forgiveness. There is even a laughter of devotion, as poignant as the ecstatic weeping such as one may experience at the climax of—say, an opera-like Parsival. Thus Bhagavan Das penetrates quite deeply when he concludes 8:

Defined in terms of desire, Devotion is the desire for equalization with the Ideal, who is the object of that devotion, not by direct receipt of gift through prayer, ... but by means of obedience to the behests and guidance received from that Ideal...

And this desire—or, as we might further say, this tendency or will—to equalization penetrates through the whole erotic continuum as developed in the Nārada Śūtras, the Śaṅḍilya Śāstra and the long tradition of erotic mysticism (which we shall consider at length presently) and is the clue to the famous passage in the Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad wherein Maitreyī dialectically seeks the locus of all endearment:

Then said Maitreyī: ‘What should I do with that through which I may not be immortal? What you know; sir—that, indeed, tell me
Then said Yājñavalkya: 'Ah (bata)! Lo, (as) dear (priya)
as you are to us, dear is what you say! Come sit down. I
will explain to you. But while I am expounding, do you seek
to ponder thereon.'

Then said he: 'Lo verily, not for love (kāmāya) of the
husband is a husband dear, (priya) but for love of the
Soul (ātman) a husband is dear...

[and so on, through the list of wife, sons, wealth, Brahm-
manhood, kṣatriyahood, worlds, gods, beings (bhūta) and
all]...

It is—as when a drum is being beaten, one would not be
able to grasp the external sounds, but by grasping the drum
or the beater of the drum the sound is grasped. It is—as
when a conch-shell is being blown, one would not be able
to grasp the external sounds, but by grasping the conch-
shell or the blower of the conch-shell the sound is grasped.
It is—as, when a lute is being played, one would not be
able to grasp the external sounds, but by grasping the lute or
player of the lute the sound is grasped...

It is—as of all waters the uniting-point is the sea, so of all
tastes (rasas) the uniting-point is the tongue, so of all
smells the uniting-point is the nostrils, so of all forms the
uniting-point is the eye, so of all sounds the uniting-point is
the ear, so of all intentions (sañkalpa) the uniting-point is
the mind (manas) so of all knowledges the uniting-point is
the heart, so of all acts (karma) the uniting-point is the
hands, so of all pleasures (ānanda) the uniting-point is the
generative organ...so of all the Vedas the uniting-point is
speech.

Thus it is that for an innumerable list of lesser ends religious
devotion comes into play, and every possible human feeling as
well: in all Scriptures of the world, as well as in all cults, we
find traces of righteous wrath, the jealousy of the Lord, sexual
allegories, ironical diatribes against the 'infidels', and the full
gamut. But in the end, pure devotion is at the root and base;
and ultimately, if the soul is sincere, if the emotion is exhausted
in its superficial aspects, the 'love of the Soul for the sake of the
soul' comes out in the open; and artistically as well as reli-
giously, there is the rallying of unadulterated realisation of the
identity of means and end. Eros—kāma—takes in everything,
reproduces everything, and brings everything back to itself as
it is translated into prīti and ānanda. The couplet which
Bhagavan Das quotes from the Viṣṇu Purāṇa in this connection is more than apt:

Knowing Hari to be all things, the wise should extend bhakti to all beings undeviatingly (1: 19: 9).

And all things are beautiful—or may be so considered—for the same reason. It is the universality of beauty and devotion—the kaleidoscopic refractiveness of their all-pervasiveness—that make them problematic, and not their supposed 'subjectivity'; their mysterious elusiveness, their charming playfulness that seduce the enjoyer in their fragile forms without the necessity of his knowing immediately their secret essence, that frustrate all efforts at trapping them into static definitions. There is a Blake-like verse which illustrates this thus:

I found a Lily trebly fair
For which I'd searched most everywhere
I buried it in my golden hair.

Soon upon my stalwart head
I felt a weight as though of lead
I felt the Lily—it was dead.

Searching why this came to be,
I recalled it was said to me,
"When the Lily dies, you will be free".

Now I shave my golden locks
And build a tomb of wooden blocks
The Lily dead my freedom mocks!

And another, which gives the other horn of the provocative dilemma:

I climbed a hill
In search of the will
of God

I found a well
As deep as hell
O God

I feel in it
I dissolved in it
Like a clod.

For in both art and religion, emotion, dearness, love—along with their expressions whether open or indirect—always lead beyond themselves. Hence the impossibility of dealing with them scientifically. According to Sanskrit tradition, says
Bhagavan Das, "the Beautiful may be the pleasant, the agreeable, the attractive, the charming, the fascinating (even the fascinatingly fearful, we may add), the lovely, the lovable... There is no other standard mark of Beauty; for it varies, so far as its outer embodiment goes, with varying tastes in different men, and different races, and different times; but it never varies so far as its inner characteristic of pleasantness (but we must note in what sense he uses this word) is concerned. That is most beautiful to anyone individual which is best calculated to supplement, to duplicate, to doubly enhance his self, his life. "The instinctive, and not the definite, perception of the possibilities of such enhancement makes the mystery of emotion." In short, a metaphysics of emotion is not only possible, but necessary; and it implies a metaphysics of the Self along with it.

But this sort of metaphysics cannot be that merely of schemes of first principles. It must be existential; it must be that of engagement, of fulfilment, of self-representation, of deformalization, as Ānandavardhana (850 A.D.) says in ironic protest as poignant as any made against the over-formalisation of Classical French Drama by any German Romantic:  

We have grown quite weary of looking incessantly into the cosmic truth with the help of that ever-fresh vision of the poets which operates to render Rasas realizable and under the guidance of that of the learned philosophers which is infallible in enlightening us on the problems that require a solution; but still, Oh Lord, we have not obtained such a pleasure as can stand a comparison to the blissful devotion to Thee.

And mutatis mutandis, emotion, because of its non-abstractive nature, can never find complete expression in simple action. Its expression must include cognitive and aesthetic as well as voluntary components: it must have embodiment in order to become communicative or in order to afford abiding, leisurely enjoyment. It is when this fullness of expression is adequate that we may have what is called rasa. If the mode of the expression is by embellishment, ornamentation, figurative enhancement, it is called alamkāra; if by indirect or imaginative suggestion, dhvani. But in any case—and in the history of Indian Aesthetics rasa receives many definitions according to the varying emphasis on these aspects—it can never be shown in naked essence.
Hence if in any sense bhakti is emotional, it must, of its own inner necessity (which is its freedom also), find artistic forms with which to dress, and address, itself. Hence it must be admitted as a rasa, whether or not from the standpoint of the rules of art as such it can be distinguished from the other rasas which it takes into its own embrace.

Indeed, without it, as Bhagavan Das intimates—without the realization that the purpose and ground of all rasa-experience is the enhancement of the life of the Self in its metaphysical dimensions, all emotional life becomes stilted, artificial, mask-wearing, hypocritical: the dilatant (as Gustav Mueller notes in his *The World as Spectacle*) will never allow his brilliance however brittle, to be broken, and for that very reason, he never can himself become a true artist. He only enjoys "aesthetically"—what degeneration has come about in the meaning of the word itself!—and not according to bhakti, even though—as, for example, in the opera Tosca—bhakti is the basic rasa throughout. For just as love gives the unity of all souls to each other and all in their severality as well as in their corporate unity to and within God, so bhakti functions in the arts: the arts really function in it, whether they will or no: whether it be, technically speaking, a rasa itself or no, it remains the sakti of all the others, their divine mother and spouse also.

For just as Beauty is never an appearance only—never an 'illusion', except in an extremely elliptical sense, so it is never a matter only of *sensation*. All the elaborate treatises on the 'perception' of beauty and the beautiful seem to end up just where they start: focusing the problem only on the exterior, they never penetrate beyond it. Beauty is a matter of *enjoyment*, of *ensoultment*, of transcendence yet without compromising the transcending or the transcended, but transcendence of a višiṣṭ-ādvaitic sort (as in the term samādhikaraṇa) in which its embodiment is not just admitted as a regrettable limitation or superimposition (as is necessarily the case in a strict advaita) nor yet as containing its own ground. The Lord *needs* the world in order to manifest his Glory, and the artist needs his medium of expression; and in appreciation, it is not just the emotion as such that is realized, but the Self as the ground of the emotion within-and-through it. A certain *vairāgya*, as Bhagavan Das cons-
tantly reiterates, is always needed in order to realize this 'second level': a certain preliminary discrimination between the initial passion which is merely impulsive and blind, and the awakening of self-awareness which allows the enjoyer not only to 'assent' to the experience externally, but to proclaim, from the bottom of his being, "YES! YES! This is Real!" Some have insisted that disinterestedness is the clue to this experience; but this is not quite accurate. It is true that the locus of the enjoyment is not the ahaṅkāra, but neither is it the strictly impersonal; it is rather the realization of the personal in its own self-transcendence into-and-within the super- (not supra-) personal.

Such a psychology of emotion—if we may call it that—seems well-founded even in text of the Bhagavad Gītā itself, as P.K. Gode has shown in a brief article11 on the subject. Gode makes a list of points as follows:

1. It (Bhakti) must be directed to one object.
2. It is a means of the identification of the individual with the Brahman or Absolute.
3. The knowledge of the object of Bhakti is a factor which is essential for its deepening and perfection.
4. Complete or full knowledge of the object of Bhakti is not, however, possible without Bhakti itself.
5. The constancy or steadfastness of bhakti is facilitated by purity of action.
6. The acme of Bhakti lies in the identification of the individual with the Brahman.
7. Reciprocity in Bhakti between the individual and the object of Bhakti is also necessary for the development of Bhakti.
8. Perfection in Bhakti leads to immortality.

The example, at the outset, Arjuna experiences fear, but self-centred fear that is really therefore only cowardice and depression (kaśmala), but later on, this tāmasika fear is purged by the higher fear which is awe, fear joined or underguided with bhakti, when he experiences the Viśvarūpa vision of the Lord. Again, in the case of anger (krodha) : it is one of the chief limitations in any spiritual—or artistic—endeavour. The dilatant will be enraged merely when his private opinion is opposed;
but the true artist, as the yogī, joining vairāgya with his anger, will effect its 'reduction' either to a righteous indignation—like the wrath of Śiva bursting out of his middle eye—at sensuous infatuation which blocks self-transcendence, or to true valiance which gives the victory in the battle of bhakti, and enables the artist with a strength that is more than his own—with inspiration in a word, even the frenzied inspiration that wills, like Beethoven tearing up his first scores, nothing short of perfection. And even more pointedly with affection: Kāma, like krodha, when 'unreduced' by bhakti, is a major hindrance. If the artist is so seduced by his model that he forgets his painting, his art is "finished". But neither can he be a strict ascetic, doing away with the model altogether, lest he fall into the opposite temptation of depicting something without charm altogether. Kāma must be refined, not eliminated. There is a liṅga śarīra as well as a sūkṣma śarīra to emotions as well as the human spirit, and just as the realization of mokṣa is in a sense the dawn of the contuition that our souls are also bodies of the Lord, so with pleasure and pain, as Rāmānuja intimates under Gitā XIII: 22

This Puruṣa, seated in this body, happens to be the spectator and the approver of the body, by way of entertaining thoughts and purposes (saṅkalpa) suitable to the functions of the body, as also he happens to be the supporter of the body. Similarly he happens to be the enjoyer of pleasure and pain arising from the functions of the body. Thus (he) happens to be the great lord towards the body, the senses and the mind by virtue of his controlling the body, and being the chief principle of the body...

(He is) the Puruṣa superior (in this body) i.e., this Puruṣa referred to in 'Beginningless, having Me as the superior' (Gitā XIII : 12) possessed of infinite knowledge and power, is reduced to the status of the great lord of this body only as also (to that of) the supreme soul with regard to (this) body only, on account of his attachment to the (three) gunas arising from (his) connection with Prakṛti... (which connection has no beginning) ....

Or again, XI : 41-44, where the influence of the Viṣvarūpa vision transforms Arjuna's foolish familiarity (in which there can be no art, but only serial matter-of-fact relationality, without self-transcendence) into a paean of penitence and praise. Here we may well cite the comments of Chhaganlal G. Kaji,12 based on the bhāsyas of Rāmānuja and Vallabha:
The Lord so high and mighty and (Arjuna) so low and weak. What must be the feelings surging up in his mind at the very thought and in view of the unbounded love which one so high showed for one so inferior like himself can better be imagined than described? . . . He took the Lord to be his equal, and like a thoughtless fool called him Krṣṇa, Yādava, friend...

With the realization of the Supreme such feelings rise in the mind of the Mumukṣu (as, we add, in the mind of the artist) who had prided on his power and intelligence and had thought it was himself that had accomplished all, quite ignoring the grace and love that had been extended to him in all he undertook and achieved. The realization only proves his insignificance and discloses his delusion...

For bhakti, in art as well as in epistemic and ethical matters, is always the opening to the infinite. It does not abrogate canons and rules, but renders them transparent, elevating science to art, technique to inspiration, passion to structured expression, peace to plentitude. It is the emotion of emotions which gives the camatkāra the spontaneous, almost involuntary, certainly unreserved, sense not only of approval, but of self-commitment to the other emotions, the quality of contagious participation of soul with soul and of the—shall we say, in the sense the word was used in Greek drama, the liturgical—incorporation, the togetherness, of audience and actor, of appreciator and producer, in the work of art which expresses it. As such, it is almost synonymous with rasa as such: it is the ananda of Brahman in full vitalization, energizing all the latent potencies of artistic and religious experience in their dynamic consummative harmony. Like chaste Sītā herself, bhakti sits

Atop the terrace of the Virgin Bower
Upon the balcony o'erlooking swans
At play with mates (in lotus-teeming pool),
They saw a dazzling form—and stood entranced—
Effulgence sheer of gold, the fragrance sweet
Of blossoms, taste delicious nectar gives,
The pleasure perfect poesy yields.

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of technical aesthetics, it remains a problem whether bhakti can be listed as a separate rasa, no matter how it may influence all the others. The reason for this is not that it is not a legitimate emotion, but that it is
hard to depict on the stage; it is *alaukika*, formless, and can be expressed, if at all, only indirectly. Because of this, many writers who nevertheless were great bhaktas and some who even took bhakti as the basic theme of their composition, used śānta as the basic rasa, subordinating bhakti to it. Śānta itself, of course, is not admitted by a large number of technical writers, and for the same arguments (viz. chiefly that it is difficult to communicate to all-and-sundry). But in the tradition which we are studying, it did hold the supreme place. Thus, Venkatanātha begins his allegorical ‘morality’ play, *Saṅkalpa Śūryodaya* after the introductory invocation, which sets forth the efficacy of bhakti and prapattī, by the following speech by the stage-manager (*Śūtradhāra*):\(^{14}\)

Esteemed Gentry! I am bid by this august assembly composed of saintly men like yourselves, who, in order to witness festivals, have trod, far and wide over several holy places . . . where the Blessed Lord is installed—the lord before whose lotus-feet the gem-set diadems of myriads of Devas and Asuras form, as it were, so many waving lights—the Lord whose vow always is to protect all who seek refuge in him, whose duties are right-well done, with lotus-born Lakṣmī cooperate,—who, like the rain-cloud, quencheth the wild-fire of mundane misery...(Bid by ye...) that I should entertain this august gathering with a troupe of actors who enact the parts of diverse human attributes, such as Wisdom, (viveka) etc., which removeth the lust of men for weltering in samsāra, by enacting a Drama in which the superb ninth rasa, Śānta, findeth a prominent place like the other rasas such as heroism, etc., which captivate the minds of men bent on Dharma, Artha and Kāma...

and further down: another character speaking—

what my Lord sayeth is right, but how to account for the embodiment of the Śānta rasa in this Drama when the masters of Histrionic Art maintain that there is no such thing as that rasa?

to which the Śūtradhāra replies contemptuously:

Lady, Them, then I do not consider as connoisseurs of the Histrionic Art. Methinks that they hold the opinion that the Śānta rasa could not be enacted, perhaps because of the difficulty to find in this world an audience to appreciate that rasa.

Further—

The Erotic rasa *pampers* the ways of the wicked; the rasa of
Valour breeds mutual contempt; the rasa of Wonder borders on the grotesque; the other rasas are paltry enough. But Peace (śānta) alone then by elimination is the rasa that allays the agony of the mind.

And he goes on to give Sanaka, Sanandana and others as his authorities, although he has behind him the best of Tamil as well as Sanskrit tradition, the former having perhaps a longer history than the latter, beginning, as it does at least as early as the first century A.D., and the latter having no major exponents in the fields of poetics until the time of Bharata (cir. 500 A.D.), whose Nāṭya Śāstra set the pace.

But we must not be misled by this primacy of śānta rasa; it is only a formality. For the whole theme of this very drama is really the triumph of virtue through bhakti and prapatti; śānta is only the fruit of this triumph, as a result of grace received. At almost every turn in all the ten acts there is some reference to bhakti, whether as threatened by temptations or as eventually leading to rapturous traces in which the Ānanda of Brahman is realized. Thus, as A. V. Gopālācāriar has shown in a little tract, not only in this drama, but in his other poetic works as well, Venkatanātha demonstrates how bhakti can and does enable and deepen any and all other poetic sentiments, so that, for example, even the lyric sensualism of some of Kālidāsa's works can be elevated by introducing some comparison to a god or goddess. Perhaps the theory behind this comes out most clearly in a stanza from his Satadūṣani (vāda 44):

Whose Holy Name, even if casually and unwittingly uttered, enables the crossing of the ocean of Saṃsāra as easily as a gośpada, whom the śrutis describe as beyond description being of boundless power and glory; Him the light revealed by the Vedānta and the ultimate thing connoted by all words (italics ours) do we adore.

Thus, all technicalities aside, we may conclude that even if śānta is posited as the basic rasa, it is difficult of achievement without bhakti at least as a means (for all theories follow the basic philosophical tradition that art, like all the rest of human affairs, should follow the basic puruṣārthas of artha, dharma, kāma, and mokṣa; and even if śānta is equated with the realization of the last of these, it must be admitted, as we have seen in the previous chapters, that bhakti is a basically important, if
not the primary and easiest means of attaining mokṣa); or, that bhakti is almost synonymous with if not superior to, śānta (as Jagannātha and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī argued, on the grounds that śānta, as the realization of Brahmānanda, is more akin to jñāna, whereas bhakti is, as it were, the activation of the enjoyment of that ānanda); and that whereas all the other rasas need some external or dramatic source to excite them, bhakti, as completely spontaneous, cannot be compelled by artistic activity, yet, as the final or foundational emotion and therefore the most inclusive, it may employ all the others in its expression, for the very reason that it is the impact of the presence of the Lord Himself, whose ways of bringing the soul to himself, and whose ways of expressing himself to the soul whom He brings to Himself, are unlimitable, yet inherent in all things both internal and external: As all things express Him, so all things as enjoyed must be enjoyed in and through Him as enjoyment of His enjoyments, as Nammalwar puts it; and is this not bhakti?

For, as Jagannātha teaches in his critique of Abhinavagupta’s theories, rasa is abhīvyakti, ‘revelation’—or illumination in the sense used by St. Bonaventura. For Abhinava, abhīvyakti15 is “a process consisting in the removal of obstacles, the awakening of dormant impressions and the resulting enjoyment or realization by the sahṛdaya (the competent appreciator) of these impressions”. But Jagannātha ‘reduced’ the focus further: the obstacles are removed not only from the enjoyer’s inherent capacity, but from the blissful consciousness of Ātman itself in its true nature “What his practice of deep and abstract concentration (nīdīdhyaśāna) affords the yogin or perfect sleep (suṣupti) affords everyone of us, that, the poet’s skill, the stage devices and other such phenomena to which he reacts in the way of meditation on the matter presented by the work of art result in affording the sahṛdaya.” Or again, “As soon as the sahṛdaya’s imagination is kindled by the things set before him by a work of art...he gets a peculiar mental vision in the form of the blissful aspect of the Ātman delimited by the factors called the sīhāyībhāvas” (the potential conditions of the mind which when appealed to at the theatre or in the study of other art become rasas). But the way of rasavāda has the advantage over
the yogi’s austere path that it is inclusive and full—it takes in all the attributive aspect of Ātman—and not exclusive, frustrating and by isolation. Thus, even pathos, horror, or any other otherwise painful experiences, when ‘illumined’ in art, become purgative and ultimately pleasurable as revealing the Lord’s ways of bringing the soul to sacrificial devotion to Himself. In this perspective Jagannātha goes on to reject the theory that mere universalization is enough: Śakuntalā is not just the abstract representation of ideal womanhood, nor Dusyanta just the abstract or ideal hero; rasa brings in the factor of imaginative identification with the person depicted, so not only the actor but also the spectator actually experiences the emotion embodied in the art, but in a ‘sublimated’ sort of way, so that the crude experiences of ordinary life are at once elevated to their true meaningfulness (e.g. in their relatedness to and within Brahman) and relieved of their crudeness. For all experience of identification—is it not the identifying sakti of Brahman at work? For just as the Divine is the locus of all identity, howsoever qualified, so all process of identification—even the participative process of identifications between things or persons which are, in themselves, less than the Divine—must be the activated participation in that Supreme Identity itself. And—again—is this not bhakti? If this participative identification is consciously and directly towards the Lord, then bhakti is realized as a separate rasa; if it is unconscious and indirect, if it is, as in the case of the love between Dusyanta and Śakuntalā, within an emotion of less finality, we submit that bhakti is still at work: it is the Lord’s play, (līlā), his māyā, that is the enlivenment of all plays, just as it is His own pleasure that we enjoy in all!

Because of this, we note with deep approval the tendency of Ananda Coomaraswamy, like Jagannātha, to interpret Indian art more in terms of the primordial mythology as found in the Vedas themselves and the Brāhmaṇas and Āryanakas, rather than according to the scholasticism of the writers on Aesthetics as such. Ultimately, indeed (though these scholastics have always tried to bring this into their various theories) the ‘meaning’ of all emotion, as of all art that embodies or cultivates its expression, is the meaning of the Word, the Veda, the Logos, itself which is the Voice of the Eternal. It may well be that his ten-
dency is more toward the gnostic than the devotional emphasis as such, but in passages like the following it seems to us that he has committed himself to something very close to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic metaphysics:

The raison d'être of the Voice is to incarnate in a communicable form the concept of Truth; the formal beauty of the precise expression is that of the *splendour veritatis*. The player and the instrument are both essential here. We, in our semantic individuality, are the instrument, of which the 'strings' of 'senses' are to be regulated; so as to be neither slack nor overstrained; we are the organ, the inorganic God within us is the organist. We are the organism, He its energy. It is not for us to play our own tunes, but to sing His songs, who is both the 'Person in the Sun' (e.g. of the Madhu Vidyā) and our own Person (as distinguished from our 'personality'). When "those who sing here to the harp sing HIM," (Chh. Up., I:6:7) then all desires are attainable, here and hereafter.

For in any system less than that of a qualified monism,—and here there may be a reason for the concomitance of the secularization of art with the radical dualism of most of the Protestant Reformation—the voice must be only that of Man, singing to the unapproachable Eternal, and not the Voice of the Eternal singing in and through Man; and per contra, in anything 'more' than viśiṣṭādvaita, e.g. in a strict advaita, the Voice cannot be interpreted except as an upādhi—something *superimposed* and absolutely *illusory*—something that somehow has become disengaged from the colourless, voiceless, relationless, unenjoying and unenjoyable Absolute, so that all emotions must be treated, (analogically !) quite as the psychologists of the late 19th and early 20th century did treat them, as unrelated to the Self at all, but simply as belonging to the phenomenal world of cause-and-response, a hindrance to, rather than a means of, realizing spiritual reality. But as Lacombe has observed of Rāmānuja, just as knowledge is always of the subject-object relation, yet without subverting spiritual knowledge as contained therein, so with the passions: the subjective conditioning of the soul in its suffering and pleasure can be no more illusory than the objective conditions of its relation with the world and with God. In both cases, admittedly, there is a provisional servitude; but that servitude is the positive as well as the
negative condition of success in sādhanā. Pain, suffering, (dukha) is always 'reducible' to the pleasure (sukha) of which it is the spurring negation; and that pleasure in turn is the further spurring towards Spirit in its essentiality, yet without the necessity of further negation, for this spurring, this inclination, “is only accidentally an aspiration and a movement towards a term not yet possessed; its essence is possession of an increase, of a surplus at the same time gratuitous and necessary”,—gratuitous because it is no longer a matter of desire, but rather an expression of plenitude of joy and necessary, because this very plenitude is rooted in our essential nature: we could not exist consciously very long without it. In a word “Affectivity, being no less than a mode (the primary mode, indeed!) of consciousness, surpassingly transcends all ontological destruction,” even though it is, in a sense, more exposed, more open to subjective adventitiousness. Yet this subjectivity is doubly open: open not only to delusions of sin, but also to the more-than-compensating spontaneity of spiritual enjoyment—responsive not only to the passions as functions of the psycho-physical organism, but also to the rasas which in expressing (or evoking) them lead beyond them as expressions of the Self that experiences them in a sort of Self-enlargement by embodying them in the communicative art object. Perhaps this is best symbolized in the relation of Rāma with all the other characters that surround him. He is for them all the very soul of their soul; and yet he is quite incomplete without them, so that they in turn are often addressed by him as dearer to himself than his own soul, as Kamban makes him say when Laksmana was waylaid by Ajomukhi:18

'S still he is not come back, the dearest part
Of my life. Alas, has he sunk 'neath the load
Of my great grief? Eyes have none but him
To lead me on in this dark wood. How then
Can I with bleeding heart the jungle scan
And find out if he lives? O Laksmana!
My only staff in life! hast thou the heart
To hide thy face from me? Hear'st thou, my child?
Hard verily is thy heart!
'S it just to make me roam in search of thee
As well, my fearless lion, who left thy all
And followed me?
or again

The tears that flowed from Rāma’s lotus eyes
When he his brother’s form descried, were they
The liquid stream of love? or were they tears
Induced by painful memories of the past?
Or were they tears of joy? Or were they but
The tokens of His Mercy Infinite?

As we turn to the modern West, there are several precautions which we must bear in mind. First of all, the common complaints against the degeneration of emotion such as Coomaraswami makes, profoundly true as they are, can he levelled almost equally against modern India; and it is good to see such pleas as Ramaswami Sastri has made in the little work to which we have made frequent reference already for the revival of Indian art by return to the classical criteria. Secondly, we must remember that much of modern Indian thought, though admittedly less in aesthetics than in other theoretical fields and almost all of modern artistic production—even in some of the most popular temples—has been affected by the gaudy degeneracy of the Anglo-Saxon Victorian era, with its imitative pseudo-realism, its over-burdening of ornamentation, and its conformity to an extremely artificial prudery which has inhibited any sort of primordial erotic creativity. Thirdly it must nevertheless be pointed out that there have been worthy exceptions in both territories. The return to the eternal fertility of the Indian village folk-tradition effected by Tagore and his followers is well-known the world over; and in the west, even if we (rightly?) disregard the treatises of DesCartes and Spinoza on the passions, we still have such figures as Pascal Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Rilke, Scheler, Sorokin and our contemporary Existentialists who have refused to capitulate either to the sentimentality of exhausted romanticism or to the psychologism of the academic philosophers and protagonists of the ‘gospel’ of (positivistic) science. Indeed, great thought may have been the achievements of many in India in the last century, there is scarcely anyone to compare, say, to Rodin, whose feeling for emergence of form or of the immediate latency of pure material bears witness to a profound sense of reverence towards Being in its own inherent emotional richness which we
should not hesitate to call bhakti, even though it may not have any obvious relation with traditional religion or dogmatic theology, just as the poetry of Rilke (the Sonnets to Orpheus in particular) though not ‘religious’ in the traditional ‘Christian’ sense, nevertheless cannot but be called *spiritual* in the most complete sense of the word. And the same might be said of the music of Hindemith or Sibelius. This leads to another initial precaution: the term *secularization* in the West tends to incorporate two streams of meanings viz., the turning away (as in the development of Boroque style) from Biblical sources towards what was often regarded as ‘pagan’ as stemming from Greek culture (which does not, in spite of all, necessarily eliminate the emotion of reverence); and the simple descent to shallowness or the (compensating) ascendancy of externality and disintegration which has infected both art and religion itself. The first has its parallel in the Indian climate also when one considers Moghul art and the poetry—say—of Kabir or Nanak as a reformation of traditional Hinduism, then one excludes them—as is the increasing tendency in India today in neo-orthodox as well as orthodox circles—from the realm of ‘Indian’ art. Even though they may not exclude bhakti, they may already be called a secularization in so far as Hindu symbolism is almost eliminated, and there is more portrayal of non-mythological themes (court scenes and military battles, for example) and, as is the case, perhaps even of the Taj Mahal, the cultivation of pure form as such rather than the deliberate embodiment of the Divine. In the second sense, the parallel in India is patent; even in the Rajput paintings, but still more violently in the murtis (images of the deities) and temples of the 19th and 20th centuries, and flagrantly in the contemporary ‘mythological’ films, emotional experience does seem to be ‘secularized’ into sensuousness on the one hand, and an almost complete absence of harmonic or organic arrangement on the other.

In these matters, of course, we are in no position to speak with authority, and we may be risking generalizations without adequate technical knowledge. The study of the influence of Islam on Hindu art during this period is indeed a very involved matter, as is also the problem of Islamic art in general, which
perforce in a sense was necessarily always ‘secular’ because of the iconoclastic trend in Muslim belief. Nevertheless, it does appear to us, from our observations in travelling, that the Islamic art of India itself also underwent a certain secularist degeneration in the same period, so that, for example, one no longer finds the spiritual delicacy in the arabesques of the mosques of the 18th and 19th centuries that one observes in those of the age of Akbar and Shahjahan—a degeneration that is of the same character that one may observe in the Hindu temples of the same period.

Thus we are led to a final precaution: Is not the present trend towards fascination with the “secret lore of ‘Holy’ India” not rather like Byron’s romantic illusion about the “glory that was Greece”, or like the pathetic attempts of Faust to go back into the Gothic past, and, failing that, to embrace Helen of Troy, only to find that it is Mephistocles that is perpetrating his adventure? Are we—most of us—only adding another chapter to Faust?

The answer is probably yes. Nevertheless, it may be that there is a certain dialectical necessity to the addition. For just as the Renaissance in Europe did produce something great, even though it was anything but a true revival of the ‘pagan’ classical emotions, so perhaps an attempt at ‘returning’ to the greatness of Indian classical and medieval heritage will, equally in India and the West, bring forth something new and real. But it must be revival, revitalization, not mere imitation. It must be, to bring in the Confucian terminology, according to jen: genuineness, sincerity, conformity to the intrinsic nature of things.

This seems to be the challenge of existentialism now to all the world: and the time is ripe, is it not, for a re-examination of the possibilities of art and emotion in India (as well as in the West) according to this perspective? A brief review of the contributions of Sartre and Marcel in this field should bring out what we mean.

In his short but incisive essay on The Emotions, Sartre attacks the psychologism of the ‘classical’ theories of emotion with even keener perspicacity than Bhagavan Das. For example, in the Introduction, his critique of the fascination with ‘facts’, which, by the very nature of the case, can be only accumulative,
external factors of any distinctly human situation: "To expect the fact is, by definition, to expect the isolated, to prefer, because of positivism, the accidental to the essential, the contingent to the necessary, disorder to order; it is, on principle, to cast what is essential to the future... In short, psychologists do not realize that it is just as impossible to get to essence by accumulating accidents as to reach 1 by adding figures to the right of 0.99." But emotion does give essence, and uniquely: therein lies all novelty of experience, the irreducibility and irreversibility of man in situation, in his unpredictability of choosing and his capacity to appropriate reality and assign value to it as belonging to him, so that he can say, "I am real". Emotion is, in short, a basic transcendent that "puts its accidents in parentheses", in Husserl's famous phrase; it is integral to consciousness itself. "Thus the human reality which is I assumes its own being by understanding it. This understanding is mine..." So much so, indeed, that it is quite impossible to say without emotion that one is conscious of experiencing emotion! We know what the thing signifies is from its origin: the emotion signifies, in its own way, (italics his) the whole of consciousness, or, if we put ourselves on the existential level, of human reality. It is not an accident because human reality is not an accumulation of facts. It expresses from a definite point of view the human synthetic totality in its entirety... It is the human reality itself in the form of "emotion".

In further developing his theory, he lays the primary stress on anxiety (angst); and here, he may be incomplete, for it does seem to us that, from what we have found in our Indian resources, the same sort of 'reduction' may be made with all the rasas, of which anxiety is only one. Indeed, what we have seen to be true of Rāmānuja and his school, viz., that the 'negative' emotions are reducible to their positive ground in spiritual enjoyment, and this enjoyment in turn is reducible to the trans-personal absolute reference in Brahman as Ānanda—this he (Sartre) does not adequately treat, although we shall see presently that Marcel does come closer to the finish of the 'reduction'. Nevertheless what Sartre does have to say is quite axiomatic. For example: "In short, the affected subject and the affective object are bound in an indissoluble synthesis. Emotion is a certain way of
apprehending the world". He illustrates this (significantly, for it supports quite vividly what we mean by the term rasa itself) by an analysis of the art of writing: Emotion first is experienced completely without reflection, then disappears, as it were, when reflection about it sets in; but when action based upon the initial emotion as reflected upon, as in writing, the reflection is submerged again in the immediacy of the (emotively) creative consciousness. 24 "In reality, the art of writing is not at all conscious. It is a present structure of my consciousness." Nor does the I figure in this activation of consciousness: the words, so to speak, pull themselves along, so that an existential coincidence of emotion and object-situation (or umwelt, to use the German term) and agent arises from its own potential exigency. It is this experience of being transcended in the transcendence itself that justifies his—and our—saying (again, axiomatically) that emotion is the basic way of apprehending the world; yet in apprehending it, emotion also transforms it, in seizing on its latent novelty of connexity and exigency. It is because of this (as we may remark by way of a parenthesis) that existentialist art, like the best of Indian art, ridicules the 'imitation' theory: art transforms, rather than imitates, nature in expressing its own possibilities of dynamic and changeable relationality. Still, the transformation is not effective; art is not mere technology. As emotive behaviour, 25 "It seeks by itself to confer on the object, and without modifying it in its actual structure, another quality, a lesser existence, or a lesser presence (or a greater existence, etc.). In short, in emotion it is the body which, directed by consciousness, changes its realization with the world in order that the world may change its qualities. (Even) if emotion is a joke, it is a joke we believe in." Art, as emotive, as rasa, involves what he calls the scope of our hodological space; it is always intentional, not descriptive. As refusal, as refuge, it gives the 'consolation' of a certain reduction to indeterminacy in regard to our precarious situation in the world; but as joy, as affirmation, it antecedes possession 26: "...the object, which one could really possess only by prudent and, in spite of everything, difficult behaviour, is possessed in one swoop—symbolically."

Sartre then goes on to distinguish false and true emotion, the former being imitative, 'acted', voluntary, parasitic, tributary,
an attempt of approval rather than a movement of an appropriation, which is only fascination rather than engagement; but the latter, the true emotion, involves belief, so that it cannot be imitated; it is a _synthetic_ form, quite unschematic, even magical—although we should prefer to say _mythic_, or _promythic_.

"Consciousness does not limit itself to projecting affective signification upon the world around it. It _lives_ the new world which it has just established. It lives it directly: it is interested in it; it endures the qualities which behaviour has set up." "Consciousness, by its very nature, transcends itself; it is therefore impossible for it to withdraw into itself...It _knows_ itself on the world." This is true because emotion, as _essential_ to consciousness and not mere _embellishment_ of it, in its _thetic_ positing of the _qualities_ of reality itself, involves a passage to infinity; and this infinity is the _infinity of existential immediacy_, so that...

"...there is a reciprocal action: this world sometimes reveals itself to consciousness as magical instead of determined, as was expected of it. Indeed, we need not believe that the magical is an ephemeral quality which we impose upon the world as our moods dictate. Here is an existential structure of the world which is magical".

But he does not really go beyond this 'magic', which he further defines as "governing the interpsychic relations of man in society" and, following Alain, "the mind dragging among things', that is an irrational synthesis of spontaneity and passivity". For the magical, it seems to us, is still further reducible to the mythical, and the mythical in turn to the primordially religious, each re-embodying the previous in a sort of _samānādhikarana_ transcendence-by-inclusion. Jaspers has done much better here; although we cannot at present digress into his expositions. And yet, Sartre's reserve (if we may call it that, for it is rather dogged) may not be unjustified. For the important thing is not the affirmation, as Schelling meant it in his extreme idealist speculations, that mythology is necessary to art, but the induced realization that man's aesthetic relation to the world cannot be merely literalistic or analytical or perceptive, but that rather the world itself is mythically transparent, infinite and immediate, and that it is the function of emotion, both in art, and—through art to religion, to make the transcendence
whereby its transparency is entered and enjoyed. If we reaffirm mythologies, it is only in order to facilitate—to mediate—this entrance; but whether this is necessary—and whether it is possible by treating the world itself directly, existentially, as its own *mythos* and thereby, as it were, somewhat as Plato did, to envoke a New Mythology—this perhaps remains problematically moot, a matter of reverent, conative sensitivity for both artists and philosophers. And the theologians, if they also want to “enter into life eternal”, might also take the same hint; for their dogmas, as the world and the God they are supposed to reveal are, in our sense, emotive, and not connotative, at the root, and therefore not only subject to revision, but dissolvable in the primordial ‘juice’ (*rasa*) in which they float!

For bhakti, as the basic *rasa*, entails reverence for *all* reality in its own self-transcending power, and not merely an isolated, carefully protected pious sentiment. He who would enjoy God without being moved by his own inevitable but meaningful *situation in the world* is pretending, attempting a false emotion, as Sartre delineates it. But reciprocally, he who drinks deeply enough of the emotionality—whether in anxiety or in joy—of this *situation*, should eventually come through to the absolute intoxication, transcending the situation’s own latent transcendence in the Self of the Self, beyond fascination, in complete submission to-and-within the Absolute who is not merely the inter-psychic among men, but the Antaryāmin, the ‘Vitalization of world-and-man in ever-overflowing completeness and harmony.

But such an existentialist reduction-in-reciprocation in situation is not foreign to Indian tradition either, as may readily be seen from the definition of *rasa* which Coomaraswami gives in his essay, *The Theory of Art in Asia*\(^29\), taken from the *Sāhitya Darpaṇa*, III, 2-3:

Flavour (*rasa*) is tasted (*āsvādyate*) by men having an innate knowledge of absolute values (*kaiscit-pramāṭrybhīḥ*) in exaltation of the pure consciousness (*sattvodrekat*), as self-luminous (*svaprakāśāḥ*), in the mode at once of ecstasy and intellect (*anānda-cint-mayāḥ*), void of contact with things knowable (*vedyantarasparsa-ūnyāḥ*), twin brother to the tasting of Brahman (*brahmāsvāda-sahodaraḥ*), whereof the life is a super-worldly lightning-flash (*lokottara-camat-*)
kāraprāṇaḥ), as intrinsic aspect (svākāravat...svarūpavat), in indivisibility (abhinnatva)... (otherwise translated). Pure aesthetic experience is theirs in whom the knowledge of ideal beauty is innate; it is known intuitively, in intellectual ecstasy without accompaniment of ideation, at the highest level of conscious being; born of one mother with the vision of God, its life is as it were a flash of blinding light of transmundane origin, impossible to analyze, and yet in the image of our very being.

But if Sartre has not penetrated deeply enough (although it seems that there is in his thought virtually everything found in the above definition except the "Vision of God"), Marcel, though perhaps with a provocative incompleteness of exposition, has. In his Journal Metaphysique, under the date of 23 July, 1918, he writes:

Perhaps emotion is only action returned to itself, action 'which does not 'go out'...In other terms, is there not an intermediary possible between the (Bergsonian) idea of a universe which is a pure improvisation and that of a world which deploys an eternal content in time? (such as is represented, for example, in dramatic 'situations' : the play 'goes on')...

Another difficulty resides in the fact that what I call the situation is not at all reduced in certainty to the consciousness which one of the "actors" has of it, or (even) in the sum of the consciousness: we are here, on the contrary, in an order where there is no "summation" or "integration" possible. The unity of this situation appears to those who are "implicated" as essentially given, but at the same time as permitting and even compelling their active intervention...I am for myself a situation which depasses me and which sustains my activity. And the being inconscient is only the symbol of this transcendence of the situation in reference to the one who is so situated. Could one say that this situation in spite of all becomes the object of reflective consciousness? But it appears to a deepened reflection as not susceptible to being integrally objectivized: if it were entirely objective for me, it would cease to be mine; it is not mine except in so far as it is that in which my context rests..."adherent". Could one say that for God these adherences are broken? But it is easy to see that God thus defined is none (of these adherences) for me, and that I am none of them for Him—Nothing, that is, is He is only a 'he' who could never become a thou. God, understood as an impersonal verity, is without doubt the poorest, the most dead, of (all) fictions, he is the un-
duly realized limit of the process in which I am engaged in taking my context for an object... a sense of prayer—Science does not talk of the real except in the third person.

In other words, for him, as with Sartre, the scientist, the psychologist, cannot get to the bottom of emotion, because emotion is always 'situational'; it involves an engagement of the person, and not merely the response of the mind to stimulation. But, unlike Sartre, for Marcel, the person, as an I, is inwardly moved, not to escape the situation, to 'go out', but to find the absolute context of his situation in a transcendence which is not just objectively latent in the context itself, but which, in being effected, is subjectively enlarged at a second level by a transfer to a Thou whose situation includes, sympathetically, his own; every emotion seeks an identification which is not just an identification with the enlarged ego, but with a Thou, a Person, who can share the identifying emotion. Indeed, is it not the Thou that enlarges the ego by pulling it into Itself? Thus every emotion is either frustrated by a false 'going out' or else finds satisfaction in a sense of prayer—of bhakti—which does not compromise its inwardness and yet allows intersubjective communication and consummation. How often we get angry at an object, curse it (usually in the name of God) become frustrated because it does not reciprocate our feeling, and only get relief when in our desperation, almost involuntarily, we exclaim, "Oh God, get me out of this mess!" Then we see that the "mess"—the situation—is a passage of eternity playfully engaging us in our transparent finitude. And the same may happen with any emotion, love, sorrow, fear or any other. Our very oaths ("My God! He's fiddling like a demon!") often are the very lightning-flash of ecstasy that is the rasa itself, the transcendence into the Thou "without accompaniment of (objective) ideation".

This becomes more clear in what Marcel writes later, under the date of 26-27 February, 1919, where he examines the experience of inconscience in emotion, whereby one inadvertently, unconsciously, reveals himself when emotionally moved:

Comparison, commiseration. This is manifested by the impossibility of judging or predicting, (yet in this very impossibility of making judgment, the person who experiences such emotions reveals himself to himself. Nothing in principle
takes us more by surprise than our own emotions; it is the nature, and I am almost willing to say, the right of a sentiment to ignore itself, to be ignorant to a certain degree of itself. This is unknown of a being which reveals itself in emotion and (therein) makes its (own) value could not in any fashion be treated as an it. It is incontestably he who is accessible to invocation... This proves only that we must look beyond (mere) words ....

The important thing, as a matter of fact, is the passage from the he to the us, that is to say, to the experience of community. But this passage (even more) does not allow a mechanical explication. Emotion makes me re-enter the scene, it forces a "going out" of the "I returned", which, as much as it may concern a classification or revision of classification, will still remain "behind the curtain".

This "going out", we may suggest in his defence, is a different one than the initial "going out" mentioned in the previous passage. Emotion cannot "go out" except in this context of interpersonal relationality: it has to be shared: it cannot otherwise be expressed: an essential aspect of the rasa concept, for rasa is more than passion, which is emotion locked up in the ego; it is rather emotion communicated, emotion as infectuous, and therefore almost necessarily—and certainly inherently—producing forms of art and religion as embodiments of the infectuousness. But the infectuousness is not circumstantial, but the ontological value of the emotional situation in actualization, as he goes on to say:

In what sense now can one speak of a value of emotion properly ontological? It is beyond doubt that which we vulgarly call imaginary can be more efficacious than the real...

There is no emotion except there where there is a rupture of adaptation... But why does this rupture coincide with the "going out" of the I of which I was speaking above ?... (As in the case of a man devoted to his wife) in attachment, the I is in sum lost in its object, or more exactly, in the activities which bear upon it. I understand by this that attachment excludes all real redoubling... (but when the attachment is broken, then the real emotional self-realization ensues): Emotion here takes on the function of recall: "it is with me that he is concerned, I was not taking notice of it!" (and here a footnote): In sum, the idea of the moi, the Me is ambiguous: the me is I as much as thou—in this case in particular—or as much as he)... The "Oh dear!" which is at the
root of the emotion brings out a retrospective clarity about that which it interrupts or which it transforms.

Of course, this does not give the function of emotion in art; but the important thing is that it does give the provocation to reflection in any situation, and from that, some self-transformation. In ordinary situations, this reflection comes through the rupture; in art—and, it goes almost without saying, in religious art par excellence—the rupture comes through the projection-identification process. Perhaps we cannot quite call the former rasa, except in a derived sense—although this derived sense seems to be the burden of the Taittiriya Upaniṣad passage cited above—but at any rate, it remains important to emphasize that the self-realization or self-transformation, as well as the communicative aspect of the emotional situation is of the ontological order, so that we can find support here for our original definition of rasa as ‘ontological underlink’ of emotion and thing/person involved in the emotional situation. In Marcel’s terms, it pertains to being, and not to having: we do not ‘have’ an emotion, an aesthetic experience; in rasa, we become what we experience; we come into a coenesthetic state, as he records under the date 7 March, 1923:

In sum, it seems that one is plunged into a complete reversal of the spontaneous conceptions concerning the relations (rapports) of the apparent and the real. If there is here an invariant real by virtue of whose function interpretations could be considered as incorrect, that invariant could not appear susceptible of being regarded as representable, it is much more of the order of a sentiment which can only be transposed (more or less faithfully) in images. Here is (another) place to search if this is not of the nature of a clarification of the rapports between the ‘he’ (or the ‘it’) and the ‘thou’. The question of knowing if this invariant could be considered as an occurrence is certainly secondary. In other terms, realism could not be justified except by sentiments: this alone could be treated as a massive reality, transcendent in relation to the interpretations—the relative interpretations—which it supports.

It is necessary to admit that one finds himself because of this put in presence of a singularly embarrassing question: how can a sentiment be confronted with an idea of that sentiment? Uniquely, it seems to me, on the condition
that that idea, working on the power of suggestion (dhvani, as we shall see below) makes us feel (éprouver) at least the shadow of the sentiment which it pretends to designate. One can take some very simple examples to illustrate what is meant: Someone asks me, "Are you hungry?" I reply, "No". My cenesthetic state rejects the qualification hungry, but uniquely because that word hungry arouses in me, however obscurely, another state which coincides with that which I actually feel (éprouver). It would be infinitely more difficult (perhaps even justly impossible) to reply to the question: Do you love him? because the word is much farther from evoking a simple state, clearly knowable, with which one could confront the state initially felt. There, without doubt, is the reason why one can make mistakes about what one feels: the error consists in sum in improperly qualifying; and that error of qualification holds to the extent that one makes oneself (limited to) a certain schematic idea of a sentiment. The more complex are the sentiments, the more possible are the errors of qualification.

Altogether, is this only a question of words, of names? Take an example: I believe I have a disinterested aversion for X; but in reality, I envy him. I am mistaken about the true character of the sentiment. What must be understood from that? From the moment that I interpret, when I qualify a manner of feeling, I adopt in relation to it a dialectical attitude, I cease to feel directly and simply, I substitute for the sentiment a certain idea of the sentiment—a certain scheme; but we find the same question: how can one idea of a sentiment be more exact than another? It all happens as if we were referring ourselves to a certain catalogue, to a sort of affective keyboard.

This metaphor of the keyboard may serve us as a reminder that Marcel is himself an accomplished musician, and references in the entries of the following two days to Romeo and Juliet likewise remind us that he is no less successful as a dramatist. Therefore, although it may appear that what he has recorded thus far may have nothing to do with art, this is not the reality toward which he is pointing. As a matter of fact, in so far as sentiment is communicated, art is at work, consciously or unconsciously—and, as he insists, consciousness of the communication of the affective experience—(of the keyboard itself, and not of the music) and of the technique does tend to side-tract us from the ontological weight of the communicated ex-
perience, which we do not ‘have’, but in which we participate. Hence, also, when we are really ‘in it’, we are in a state of clear uniqueness, pure novelty—the ‘pause of innocence’ to use Gustav Mueller’s apt phrase. The work of art, therefore, is only an extended ‘pause’, and not a separable matter, any more than deliberate religious observances are separable from continued practice of the Presence. And the attempt at ideation—at ‘definition’—of this affective ontological level of life only involves us in dialectical complications, even to the extent that the word ‘experience’ is also weak: no less than the word ‘idea’, it attempts an objectification, an exteriorization which takes us out of the communicability, out of the being-together of the emotive situation. For this reason, Marcel warns us that

“A discourse on the sentiments” is only possible if one postulates an at least relative independence of the sentiments from the subjects which feel them, if one admits that a sentiment conserves its nature even if it is degraded in the individual context...

(But) one must guard against a certain ambiguity of this word independence. Independence can be defined either in reference to the subject himself, or in reference to his individual characteristics: it seems that the second alternative must be retained here.

On the other hand, one must not confuse independence with transcendence. Can one go still further, perhaps, and say that a sentiment has just so much reality to the extent that it can the least be converted into its proper idea, or disjoined from its context?

And this is where he gives the love of Romeo for Juliet as an example. And the continuation on the following day includes Proust as another example of the inseparability of self and sentiment. But the way out of the ‘subjectivity’ to which so many have objected in this sort of situation is not by reflective disjunction, by refuge to exteriority, but by this very transcendence in the self itself. He does not say so, but we raise the question (in accord with Scheler, whom we shall follow later on) whether this transcendence is achieved in Proust, even though there the intimacy, the non-separability, is ascendent. At any rate, it is this possibility of transcendence which dis-
tnguishes sentiment from a sensation. We do have a sensation, but we participate in—we 'are'—a sentiment, a rasa:

As long as I distinguish myself from my sentiments, as long as I think of myself as someone who has these sentiments, (by that very distinguishing) I render them destitute of all ontological character: they are no more than "rapports"—relationalities, referents—to the objects, as perceptions can be. In sum, this ontological character would not appertain except to an indivisible experience which reflection fractures and mutilates.

Thus it is that we find him, as existentialist, making, as it were, a reduction of reflection—of 'philosophy' (in the sense indicated by St. Bonaventura in the previous chapters) to 'art', and of art to ontology (or 'theology' in Bonaventura's sense, or Brahmananda in the Vedantic terminology). This trend is further deepened and spiritualized in his later development, as we shall see further down. But first we must follow through another parallel 'reduction'—that which historically prepared the way for our Bonaventura, who gives it perhaps the fullest expression in the western medieval context. It remains for historians and cultural anthropologists to work out in greater exactitude the inter-relations of these historical developments in various parts of the world but we throw out the tentative hypothesis that there was a parallel etherialization of emotion—an etherialization which was also a deepening towards-and-into the transcendance of which Marcel speaks—in medieval India and medieval Europe; and that, beneath the seeming external disintegration of the modern West, there is (as we find in Marcel) a comparable internal rising openness to metaphysical intimacy and spiritualization which challenges the present situation in India as well.

First of all, it must be remembered that Christianity was a product of the Hellenistic period: Philo of Alexandria was a contemporary of Jesus; the external corruption was only the cover for the upsurge of a new and more all-embracing purity, a pralaya out of which came a New Creation. It was no accident that the simple Person of Jesus took on the halo of Neoplatonic metaphysics; the Dharma and the Avatara always come together; it was not a matter of synthesis only—Philo was a Hellenized Jew and Jesus, though he said he came "to
fulfil and not to destroy the Law and the Prophets’, was always more closely associated with (or at least more sympathetic towards) the Proselytes, the Judaized Greeks and Romans, than with the orthodox Pharisees and Sadducees—but a New Emergent quite literally, “a new Heaven and a new Earth”: the allegorization of the Old Testament (and the Psalms in particular, Egypt and Jerusalem becoming symbols of the Spiritual exile and Heavenly Home) was not just a sublimation, but an *opening of history to transcendent*, a transcendent which Plato had thought possible only ideally, and not existentially. Correspondingly—for emotion really follows history, and not vice versa—there was not a mere *sublimation* of Eros and Eris, but an *inward transcendent*: the Christ, as the Bridegroom, the Lamb of the Final Sacrifice, took the Church as his Bride—a Bride, who like Sītā, was ready for Sātī, but found it unnecessary—with himself as it were, in ascending into the New Heaven, and the *pneumatic* dharma, the Law of Perfect Liberty, the Way of reconciling Peace “that passes understanding”, the rule of inward certainty, succeeded the somatic legalism of the Old Law of the Jews as well as the psychic idealism of the Greeks, and reconciled, in the stride, the dualism of the Zoroastrian (or Mithraic) Light and Shade: the Holy Spirit, Antaryāmin, as Inward Light, illumined with its fire the nether regions even as it carried, as Wind, the seeds of the Eternal Word throughout the fertile Earth. Grace, as the fullness of this freedom, illuminated (Plato’s) *right opinion* (orthodoxa), transforming it into faith, fulfilled the promise of the old Jewish Covenant, transforming it into hope, and in uniting them, crowned Eros with Agape. It was all too true that “many were called, but few were chosen”. It was an Opening, nevertheless, even though not many went through it; and that remains the important thing. If the opening was only a narrow one in the midst of the chaos of the downfall of the Roman Empire—and it did seem to get narrower as the Church became externally broader, so that the monastic life became the necessary door through it—the Heavenly Jerusalem, the Unseen Glory beyond the door, remained the goal, the Promised Land beyond the Desert: *per angusta ad augusta* remains the basic motif of the monastic Rules of all Communities since Augustine. As with Veṅkaṭanātha’s
Saṅkalpa-sūryodaya bhakti, rasa had to be purified by vairāgya before the basic Śānta rasa could come into its own, as we see in the famous letter of St. Jerome, who, scholar though he was, suffered the torments of the flesh, yet without defeat, as much as any ascetic East or West, ancient or modern:  

Do not mind the entreaties of those dependent on you, come to the desert and fight for Christ’s name. If they believe in Christ, they will encourage you; if they do not—let the dead bury their dead. A monk cannot be perfect in his own land; not to wish to be perfect is a sin; leave all and come to the desert. The desert loves the naked. O desert, blooming with the flowers of Christ: O solitude, whence are brought the stones of the city of the Great King...How long the dungeon of the city’s smoke? Believe me, I see more light! Do you fear poverty? Christ called the poor ‘blessed’...Do you dread the naked ground for limbs consumed with fasts? The Lord lies with you. Does the infinite vastness of the desert fright you? In the mind walk abroad in Paradise...And in a word, here the Apostle (Paul) answering: the sufferings of this present time are not to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us!

But the solitariness of the desert soon opened (historically) to the saṅgha, to the Blessed Community, the Sacred Company on earth: The New Heaven found a reflection even in the troubled waters. And it was in this reflection that new ripples of emotion began to appear, spreading out beyond the reflection itself into the secular world as well; and if the Chaste Love of Christ was the Holy Bond of concord behind the cloister’s walls, the romantic Love of heroic Knights and piously chaste Ladies within the kingly courts was considered no less gracious, and was an existential allegory in the world of the celestial romance of Christ and his Church. And so, not only with love, but with the other emotions as well: one was taught to hate sin, but to pity the sinner, to fear heresy, but to be bold with the heretic. As Taylor says:

So the two opposites of love and wrath laid aside some of their grossness, and gained new height and compass in the Christian soul. A like change came over other emotions. As life lifted itself to further heights of holiness, and hitherto unseen depths of evil yawned, there came a new power of pity and novel revulsions and aversion. The pagan pity for life’s mortality, which filled Virgil’s heart, could not but take on
change. There was no more mortality, but eternal joy and pain. Souls which had so unavailing stretched forth their hands to fate, had now been given wings of faith. Yet death gained blacker terror from the Christian Hell, the newly assured alternative to the Christian Heaven. The great Christian pity did not touch the mortal ebbing of the breath; that should be a triumphant birth. But an enormous and terror-stricken pity was evoked by sin and the thought of the immortal soul hanging over an eternal hell... So the Christian’s compassion would deepen, his sympathy become more intense, although no longer stirred by everything that had moved his pagan self. With him fear was raised to a new intensity by other terrors for a joy hitherto unrealized came from his new love of God and the God-man, from the assurance of salvation, and the thought of loved human relationships never to end. So Christian joy might have an absoluteness which it never had under the pause-giving mortal limitations of paganism.

And this new patterning of emotions extended into the artistic realm also! as the German writers on aesthetics well point out, the Greek love of finite beauty gave way to the Gothic ascent to infinity. Instead of Homer and Virgil, the Legends of the Holy Grail; instead of the seen ‘perfection’ of Hellenic and the sensuous curve of Hellenistic sculpture, the austere but heavenward gaze of the saints and the heaven-sundering figure of the Christ on the judgment Throne; instead of the flat-roofed Roman basilica, the pointed arch of the great Cathedrals; instead of the flute of Plato’s Symposium, the great organ; and the Gregorian chant of the Pilgrim instead of the wild bacchanalia of the pagan ‘mysteries’. As Taylor points out, if Plato had said, “Love is of the beautiful”, Augustine says, “Do we love anything else?” The pantheon gave way to the Balanced Symmetry of the Holy Trinity. Symbolism was elevated out of the Alexandrine cults of magic, and made the means of sacramental Grace. In all, the same sort of synthesis that produced the great Summas was fully paralleled in the aesthetic field also: it was Bhakti that made the difference; instead of the Delphic moden agan, ‘nothing in excess’, no limit was set, so long as it could lead to God through Christ: “Love God and do as you please”: the pace set by St. Augustine was well followed even to the time of Dante, whose Virgil says to him in the presence of the Angel of Purity:
O my son,
Here may be torture, but it is not death
Remember, O remember; and if I
Led thee in safety e’en on Geryon’s back,
What shall I now do, nearer unto God?
Be well assured, if in the very heart
Of this flame thou shouldst stand a thousand years,
Thou shouldst not be the balder by a hair.
And if perchance thou think I play thee false,
Draw near, and test it, for full certainty,
With thine own hands upon thy mantle’s hem.
Then cast away, away I say, all fear;
Turn hitherward, and fearlessly advance.

(Purgatory, xxvii, 20ff)

Then, after passing through the fire of this Angel of Purity, Virgil takes his leave. For henceforth Beatrice is to be his guide—Beatrice who symbolizes the transcendence of earthly beauty, as Virgil embodies the best of the old classical tradition whose love of beauty was limited because of its lack of ‘faith’, of bhakti as love in transcendence, which alone, beyond the Stoic strength and ataxaria (detachment) gives self-mastery, while also transforming in the transcendence the Epicurean calculus of pleasures. Virgil, who incorporates both of these, but without the transcendence, without the etherealization, could go no further, and sends Dante on with these words:

The temporal and the eternal fire
Thou’st seen, my son, and to a place art come,
Where of myself nought further I discern.
I’ve brought thee here by knowledge and with skill;
Henceforth thy pleasure for thy leader take:
Steep paths and narrow thou hast left behind.
Behold the sun, which shines upon thy brow,
See the fine grass, the flowers and all the shrubs,
Which of itself alone this land brings forth.
Until in gladness those fair eyes arrive,
Which by their tears drew me at first to thee,
Here canst thou sit, and ’midst it all canst walk.
No further word nor sign from me expect;
Free and upright and sound is now thy will,
And sin ’twould be its bidding not to do;
Bishop and King of self I hail thee now.

(ibid., 127ff)
The fair eyes of Beatrice—did arrive, and actually rebuked him for that Virgil was no longer with him, for Virgil had not that “bounty of celestial grace” which transforms earthly craft into heavenly art, and had not followed Beatrice in her later days, when (in her own words)

From flesh to spirit I mounted up,
Beauty and virtue Waxing more in me,
To him was I less dear, and pleased him less...

At first, she was veiled. But after taking him across the River of Purification—Lethe—she removes the veil, and the etherealization is complete; her “second beauty” is revealed, and Dante thus describes the vision:

O Splendour of Eternal, Living Light
Who is there that beneath Parnassus’ shade
Hath pallid grown, or of its waters drunk,
That would not find his mind obscured in cloud,
Striving to show thee, as thou dost appear,
Where Heaven around thee weaves its harmonies,
As in clear air thou didst thyself reveal?

Some, of course, will still insist that a like etherealization was not achieved in India, and will still assert that the Hinduism both of medieval and modern India remains all too like the paganism of Greece and Rome. It remains a difficult thing to make the final judgment—if that is possible for man—but to us, whatever partial truth might remain in the assertion, this does seem extreme. For just as we have already seen, there was a development of the doctrine of Grace which cannot be gainsaid, so in emotion and art, and in the theory supporting the development, it does seem that the “clear air” and the “Heaven around thee weaving its harmonies” was pretty well approximated as we see in Nammalwar: (VI: 9: 9-10):

I do not know how long thou wilt tempt me with the transitory pleasures of the five senses! I am allured by them. Thou showest me many attractive things that trouble me. Wilt Thou shorten the time and take me under Thy sheltering feet which measured the world.

The absolute bliss of the solitary soul can neither be shortened, nor lengthened, nor contracted nor can it be measured or destroyed, though it is attained, its continuation depends on the exertion of the self. If one becomes a little careless it is lost for ever. When it is well examined it is found to be
not equal to the relative bliss enjoyed, even for a short time, with God, the Lord of mother matter.

Or, in another place (VIII : 3 : 6 and 8):

I have found my sanctuary, my very life, the Father and Mother of the gods. I found him whose nature is unknowable...

I have no words sufficient to praise Him who dwells in my mind with Heavenly Splendour, and whom the earth-gods, the Śrīvaiṣṇavas, well versed in the four Vedas, worship with folded hands...

For here too, we are beyond the sublime (as the highest beauty, but unattainable, that the older world knew) and are within the (enjoyable) Splendour of the emotion that has not only been sublimated, but has been etherealized, transformed into "eternal, living light", no longer veiled.

So far, we have dealt primarily with emotion. But it has been hard to separate it from the function of the imagination as well. For the heart must always bring the head into its service, especially in the business of expression, of embodiment. It is, basically, the emotion that must be communicated; at first experienced in purity, in the process of transcendence it must find its symbol, it must generate its own logos, as proceeding out of it, yet inseparable from it, before it can become flesh and dwell among us: Brahmā, the 'Creator', whose female aspect is Sarasvatī, the patron of the arts, brings forth the differentiated world more by trying to descend back into the navel of Viṣṇu than by deliberate act; his ascetic tapas (the transcendence) is the secret of his fertility, but it is his Voice that brings forth the creation, the composition. In a sense, therefore, there can be no comparable reduction of the imagination as there can be a reduction of the emotions, for it is in the imagination that the latter is made, and the imagination is already the logos at work, the effective Self in its coincidence of understanding and expression: it may create logics, but it is its own logistic; it may generate symbols, but it has no symbol of its own; beauty comes forth from it, but still remains its virgin Bride.

It is because of this that in Indian aesthetics it seems to be a commonly accepted axiom that just as there can be no creativity without transcendence, so there can be no merely passive—
much less analytic—appreciation; the perception of rasa, as Coomaraswami notes "is thought of simply as the manifestation of an inherent and already existing intuitive condition of the spirit, in the same sense that Enlightenment is virtually ever-present though not always realized. The pratiti (perception) of rasa, breaks through the enclosing walls (varana, o̱varaṇa) by which the soul though predisposed by ideal sympathy (sādhāranya) and sensibility (vāsanā) is still immured and restricted from shining forth in its true character as the taster of rasa in an aesthetic experience which is...the very twin brother of the experience of the unity of Brahman." This inherent manifestation, in short, is always a spiritual meaning, suggestively, imaginatively realized in the work of art, and especially in poetry; and is covered by the almost untranslatable term dhvani, which takes into its stride the whole field of metaphor, allegory, the gestalt quality of words taken in their togetherness, or of sounds (as in music) in their patterned sequence, or of the visual arts in the kinesthetic movement that is "caught" in the seemingly static medium. It is a 'third power' of creative expression appreciation (vyangyārtha) beyond—and yet re-including—both denotation and connotation; therein the imagination, as it were, allows itself so to be caught that it captivates its captor, like Vāmana Avatāra, the Cosmic Dwarf who in three strides takes the whole universe into his possession without breaking his part of the bargain with the demon Bali whose pride in his self-sufficiency is broken in the act so that he also finds his salvation in this play (līlā) of the Lord—another favourite theme with Nammalwar. In this perspective, we may note by way of parenthesis, the attempts of Kant and others to ascribe artistic inspiration merely to 'genius' rather fall short of the mark; Plato's theia mania, divine madness, comes much closer to the Indian conception, although even then, its medieval refinements are closer still. For in the medieval orientation this 'love madness' is transformed into the ecstasy of mystical union with God, both in India and the West. Nevertheless, the exact relation of rasa to dhvani has always been a controversial topic, which we cannot possibly treat with adequacy here, although it has been given rather full exposition, at least from the Śaiva point of view, by K. C. Pandey. It is
enough for the present merely to point out that, according to Abhinavagupta, dhvani is sub-divided into four ‘powers’: (a) the embellishable (vastu dhvani); (b) the embellishment (alankāra dhvani); (c) the transient emotion (bhāva dhvani); (d) the aesthetic configuration (rasa dhvani). This last alone need concern us. Pandey describes it thus:33

Rasadhvani is that suggestive power which floods the mind (the imagination, strictly speaking) with a host of ideas, not always clearly definable, which are necessary for such completion of the aesthetic image as is necessary for suggesting the basic mental state at a high pitch and bringing about the complete self-forgetfulness in the hearer, in which the aesthetic experience consists. An important point of distinction between this suggestive power of word and the rest is that while the ideas suggested by the other two somehow admit of expression in conceptional language, those aroused by this can never be so expressed.

We only add the comment that in essence, is not this self-forgetfulness bhakti? In theory, of course, Abhinava Gupta will not admit this; but seems unavoidably latent in all theory that just as all emotions are ultimately reducible to bhakti as inward transcendence, so all imaginative functions are really bhakti in operation, the mental state at high pitch in which there is not only self-forgetfulness as such, but energizing of the self in the ‘divine madness’ in which imaginative creativity and openness to the suggestive power is always a hidden, spiritual meaning [as Pandey elsewhere intimates (p.143)] by which the original inspiration is recaptured by—or better, captures—the appreciator at the point when the aesthetic experience reaches its climax. The emotional situation can overlay the things involved in it only because the imagination belongs not so much to the self as individual, as to the analogical function of Being itself which gives the ‘over-bridge’ of meaning itself as well as the ‘underlink’ of enjoyability of the meaning, the former being dhvani and the latter, rasa.

Thus, in a second sense, the imagination is also ‘reducible’: without bhakti, it remains only latent, uncreatively twiddling with day-dreaming fantasies of things and feelings without realizing their transparency; but when bhakti arises, it is ‘reduced to energetic realization of rasadhvani, in which both emotion and thing embodying the emotion or its ‘value’ are caught into a
transcending coincidence of divine meaningfulness. It is then that, as we have already anticipated in discussing Jagannātha’s theory, art becomes revelation; sign becomes etherealized into symbol, and “the gods rain down flowers”, as Tulsi Das and others are fond of saying; art ‘reveals’ nature in its own self-revelation of the divine, and in so doing becomes only an extenuation of nature-in-transformation. The divine game is complete—but then infinitely complete—only in this spiralling of meaning and enjoyment; as it is really the same Antaryāmin that enjoys our enjoyment, so it is also the same Holy Spirit that breathes imaginative significance—the ‘meaning of meaning’—into it and redoubles the enjoyment thereby; the spiralling goes on, far beyond our ‘present’ world into mystical realms of creation-and-destruction which the image of Śiva Naṭārāja reveals to us. The logistic of beauty defies all the canons of logic in other realms: its secret lies in an infinite regress into itself which coincides with its inexhaustible expressibility—a paradox which can be supported only by a visisṭādvaitic metaphysics such as that to which we are committed. Nothing is strictly ineffable for the simple reason that imaginative expression always goes infinitely beyond itself. The very word Nārāyaṇa, (as we have indicated previously in reference to prapatti, where the moral context was perhaps more in focus) is an excellent example of this: The immanent ‘contains’ the transcendent in such a way that the ‘container’ is taken into the transcendent in the very ‘act’ of containing it. As a matter of fact, we might even risk the suggestion that in the imaginative field it is not so much bhakti that is at work as it is prapatti: beauty makes us surrender to itself. As P. N. Śrīnivāsācārī suggests in reference to Nāmmalwar, “Cosmic aesthetic pleasure results from the experience of the incongruities of life (which are transcended only in imagination, myths being the best representation) and is opposed to (both) serious-mindedness and light-heartedness... In the blending of the joy of the eternal realm and the tragic tension of the realm of saṁsāra, there results the aesthetic feeling that the cosmos has a comic touch.” The unity of tragedy and comedy with which Plato crowns his Symposium is realized only at the point of complete inebriation, in which the imagination is completely uninhibited, and we are “ready to do
anything"! All pride and propriety drowned—or "stolen" by the cosmic trick of Vāmana—we abandon ourselves to the aesthetic moment which uses our very souls as its own imaginative expression.

For the imagination in us is really more than ourselves it; is a sort of mirror of God in us, where in all beauty really resides in a reflected state. As Ananda Coomaraswami points out, not only for Indian, but also for Western medieval art, the art is really never in the thing, but in the artist: and the appreciator's satisfaction or delight is only a reflex awakening to the same reflection in his own 'mirror': Beauty is always 'exemplary' in the technical sense of the term; it always resides in God as the Exemplar, and is projected in the individual soul of both artist and patron in quite the same way that it is embodied in the exemplary object as His own creation. This second identification, this awakening of the same 'image' in the spectator, as well as the first in the artist, are "proper to God as the divine Artificer and Spectator, but not in Him as successive acts of being, He being (himself) at the same time both artist and patron.... From the possession of an art, in other words, the operation of the artist naturally follows. This is a self-expression, given the act of identification as postulated by Dante and others, is a self-expression, i.e., an expression of that which can be regarded either as the exemplary form of the thing to be made, or as the form assumed by the artist's intellect: not, of course, a self-expression in the sense of an exhibit of the artist's personality "as Coomaraswami says, reminding us of the passage in the Brhad-Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad cited at the first of this chapter. We cannot deal adequately in this work in detail, as Gilson and Coomaraswami have done with this doctrine of exemplarism as Universal Analogy in St. Bonaventura in detail, but we shall try now to indicate some thing of the reduction of the imagination as an approach to it.

First, let us remember the importance of allegorical interpretation of the scriptures—perhaps the first of all the arts, as it was practised both in India and Europe in the medieval period. The purpose was not just occupying the mind with idle fancy, but the penetration of the dvānam aspect, the seizure of the 'spiritual' meaning. Thus, in the opening section of his Breviloquium, Bonaventura writes:
Inasmuch as the Scriptures have a special mode of proceeding, so one must understand and exposit it in its own special mode. For since one 'letter' touches a multitude of meanings, the expositor ought to proceed from the darkness into the light, and manifest that (elicited meaning) by other more patent scriptures...But this (multitude of meanings) he cannot know either by significant diction nor by the right law of constructions; for so those who spurn the letter of the sacred Scriptures never arise to its spiritual understandings.

The reason for this, of course, is that the meaning is not only in the mind, but in the letter also. And, moreover, not all passages are to be taken allegorically, for some parts, even of the Bible, are merely historical. Nevertheless, where hidden meanings are to be (imaginatively) found, following St. Augustine, he gives a three-fold rule:

The first is this. Wherever... there is a signification of the words that indicate things of creation, or single acts of conversion of man, first the things actually signified are to be taken (literally), and then the mystery of our reparation; for where the first signification expresses faith or love, there no allegory is to be sought.

The second rule is this. There the words of the text signify the things of creation such as the conversion of the people of Israel, there we must seek from another text...and elicit its significance through a nude signification the truth of faith, or the 'honesty' (or, genuineness) of good conduct. Thus, if it says, "The sheep gave birth to twins", it (means to) show that the sheep signify men, and the twin young (signify) the double love (e.g., that man must have for his fellow-men and for God.)

The third rule is this. Whenever any text has both a literal and spiritual meaning,...(we ought to reconcile them so that both meanings stand)...but if they are not compatible, then the spiritual meaning alone is to be taken ... For all things are to be referred to the spiritual signification...

And in all of this, in order that anyone might safely enter the forest of the Scriptures both in cutting into and in giving exposition (to their dense meanings) it behoves him first to know the truth of the sacred texts through the explicated words, so that he may understand how they describe the beginning, the progression and the consummation of the double body, as though they were opposed to him, marvellously good as they are opposed to him who, thus,
humiliating himself, will be eternally exalted in the future, and be deprived of the evils which now exalt him. In this way he will deal with the whole universe...under the form of an intelligible cross, in which he may find a description and in a certain manner see the whole machinery of the universe with the light of the mind; for which intelligibility it is necessary to know the beginning of things, God, the creation, lapsing, and redemption of things through the blood of Jesus Christ, the reformation through grace, the curing power of the sacraments, and finally the retribution through punishment and eternal glory.

In our own time, we may object to the way everything is made there to fit into a particular dogmatic formula; but this is not the most essential thing at work here. The important thing to be learned from medieval man is that, through his liberated imagination, he was able to find meanings which had spiritual significance in everything. His manner of treating the Scriptures only set the pace, and his interpretation of nature and art—we remember Bonaventura’s “two books” the Bible and Nature—followed in the same pattern. And the ‘Spiritual’ meaning, though it might take on external coherence through the known theological formulas (which, nevertheless, were also treated in the same transparent manner, and not taken so literally as many are now disposed to think) always meant self-searching, and humility: the meaning was ultimately in himself; thus humbled to receive it, but its ultimate purpose was to bring him to glory; “through the light of the mind”, through the illuminated, ‘reduced’ imagination, he saw everything in a harmonious, beautiful pattern that was no less than the imprint of the Divine, which was also its source-and-end, upon it. As a matter of fact, not only the Bible, but the Greek and Latin classics, were reverenced and treated in the same spirit. Perhaps Virgil could not take Dante beyond the midst of Purgatory, but that is rather far, after all; and Virgil is by no means the only figure of Antiquity in the Divine Comedy. For Bonaventura in particular (who was fond of Ovid perhaps more than Virgil) just as all knowing, even the knowing of simple things, is sooner or later reducible to God’s contemplation of them, or, at least, to our participation in this contemplation, so all art is but a participation in the creative and illuminative movement within the Blessed Trinity; and it is through the imagination that it both
comes into material form and is enjoyed in its spiritual meaning.

Thus, he considered the artist as a creator in a sense analogous to the way in which God creates—analagous in every sense except that whereas God creates—imaginatively—'ex nihilo', but according to the exemplary ideas in His own unlimited mind, the artist creates according to the reflections of those exemplary ideas which God has caused to be mirrored in his limited mind. But in both cases, the creation takes on a trinitarian movement of matter, form, and composition; of distinction, inclination, and proportion; and of substance, virtue and operation; by which the creation "remains constant, remains congruent, and is discerned"—not in the thing created, but ultimately in the soul itself. These trinities, of course, are ontological analogies of the Father, Word and Holy Spirit themselves in their dialectical unity, as is the human soul also as the image of the same godhead, in which beauty, as well as truth and virtue, is reflected, imaged or 'imagined'; and this 'imagination' is 'conformed' according to memory, understanding and will, or according to mind, conception (notitia), and love, the first of these referring to transcendence into God—transcendence through the translucent analogy—the second to immanence in itself, and the third to the exterior objects with which the soul deals. Again, we are reminded of the Bhad-Aranyaka text: for the love of the soul the things are dear—for the love of the soul the Self is dear... etc.

For all artistic production is an activity of love, which goes out in desire to the object loved, infuses—or 'informs'—it with meaning and vitality, and thereby, while eternally binding it in this spiritualization (which is what the imparting of meaning truly is!) to itself, also leaves it transformed in such a way that it also communicates the love to others who love it in turn. It is in this sense that God is Artist in creating the world: the Holy Spirit is that Love, pure and simple: the Eros that brings forth the world, as word, as well as the communicative, 'imaginative' enjoyment of it on the part of the Father. "Love can be said to be pleasure (complacentiam—rasas, indeed!) and thus it is common (it gives communion) or it can be said to be connexion (it is the communion itself—dhvani, indeed!) or a
gift; and thus it has the nature (rationem) of a person.” Indeed, is not imagination almost identical with personality? We cannot, strictly speaking, as we have seen in Marcel, speak of it as a faculty, as something we have; it is really what we are—but what we are as a gift, as love-in-transcendence, as the ‘personality’ of Godhead working in us, the Selfhood of the soul, the Antaryāmin.

Technically, of course, this is taking a short-cut through Bonaventura’s systematic formulations, just as we have taken almost unwarranted short-cuts through the technicalities of the Indian material. Nevertheless, it is not far from his spirit, as we can see from this statement:39 “The Holy Spirit is simplex in Himself, and thus in himself is indivisible; but in effects (e.g., either in the created universe directly, or in the creation of the artist ‘imaginatively’) it is multiplex, and thus divided according to the effect, because it is not given to the single things (the effects) in entirety (ad omnia). And hence it is—for it was given to Moses more than to others—that it is said ‘I shall take (auferam) of thy Spirit’; and hence it is that it is not given in entirety (ad omnia) to us, therefore blessed John says, ‘Of his own Spirit he gave us’”. And as to Moses and ‘us’, so to the artist: ‘inspiration’ (as ‘in-imaging’) is literally that, and no less: the gift of the Holy Spirit, the infusion of God’s own image, as Love and Beauty in our reflective being!

The artist, therefore, is inevitably a mystic. He must abandon all sense of agency, as well as all intellectual abstraction, as Geddes McGregor has cogently demonstrated in his Aesthetic Experience in Religion. Love, humility, effective obedience to the Spirit which is given him must not only govern his work, but must infuse it, without his own individuality coming in the way. All great art, in this sense, must be imaginative; it must be ‘unconscious’ concealing its excellence in its purity. No matter what terminology we may use—whether the synderosis, the antahkarana, the ‘higher intellect’, interior light or simply the ‘apex mentis’ the ‘fine point’, the ‘spark’ in the soul (Coomaraswami is fond of them all) the faculty through which the ‘inspiration’ comes is inessential. But what is essential (and here Coomaraswamy seems misled in his gnostic tendency) is
that it is bhakti that makes the link of the divine and its human tool possible and effective. As McGregor puts it:

The doctrine of the ‘fine point’, it will be readily observed, easily lends itself to the suggestion that there is something belonging to the mind which is God himself... even the most orthodox mystics are inclined to speak after this fashion when they want to stress the peculiar vantage point.

A more guarded doctrine makes the aliquid animae a created effect (the scintilla, the ‘spark’) supported or inworked by God with a particular immediacy or purity, so that, by identifying our whole will with it, we become wholly the children of God and the shrines of deity and are free to experience his inworking by an empathy (‘contuition’ in Bonaventura’s terminology or the sāksātkāra of the Vedānta) he stimulates if he sees fit (italics his).

The important point for our purpose seems to be that to identify ourselves with the ‘fine point’ is not to take any particular aesthetic ground; that is to say, we do not thereby claim knowledge, but identify ourselves with the spring of right will, which is caritas (love, bhakti—italics ours).

Now, we can hardly speak of a tendency to know God. The tendency is to love him... Whatever the mysterious point may be, it evidently must have its root in aesthetic experience... The virtue of this cell in us lies not at its root but in its flower... Nevertheless, without the root, the flower, with its virtue, could not exist.

In this, McGregor is primarily following Acquinas, although what he says is even more poignantly emphasized by Bonaventura (whom, nevertheless, he does not ignore), as we may see in his (Bonaventura’s) treatment of the synderesis and its relation to conscience and to God where the context may apply equally to artist and ‘patron’.

... Whenever the intellect has any sort of light (lumen) whatsoever from anything of the soul’s own creation,—light which is natural to itself in making judgments, directing the intellect itself in knowing—there the affections have a certain weight, directing it in desiring. But the things desired are of two kinds... legitimate (honesti) and commodious (commodi); as also the things known are of two kinds: contemplative (speculatibilium) and moral... (the conscience making the judgments, and the synderesis provoking the potential state of the affection into actuality—a point which would, perhaps, clarify many of Kant’s difficulties?)...

Therefore I say that the synderesis is that which stimulates toward the good (and we must remember that for the scho-
lastics, as for the Greeks, the concept of the 'good'—bonum; kallos k'agathos—includes the beautiful as the desiderative aspect of the same thing); and therefore pertains to the affections...

To the objection that the synderesis is a rational spirit which postulates and interrupts, I reply that we do not so much speak of God by cogitations and exterior words as by affections and desires; and because of this, since the synderesis makes us desire the good by continually stimulating us, it is said to spur us (interpellare) on to God by inutterable groanings... (italics ours).

To the objection that the synderesis is the spark of conscience, I reply that it is called a spark inasmuch as the conscience in itself cannot move or prICK or (otherwise) stimulate without the mediation of the synderesis, which is a sort of stimulus or spark of kindling fire. Thus, just as the reason cannot move (us) without the mediation of the will, so the conscience cannot ('act') without the mediation of the synderesis; and for this it follows that although it has a cognitive aspect, the affective aspect is more potent or prominent.

But it is when we turn away from the earlier dogmatic work to his later works that the specifically aesthetic implications of this 'reduction of the imagination' come to the foreground. (And we must remark with emphasis in passing, that there is scarcely a philosopher between Bernard of Clairvaux and Santayanna in the West, whose whole philosophy as such is more 'aesthetic', his manner of writing revealing even more than his theory—or rather, being more than a proof-in-application of his theory.) For example, in the In Haexameron we find innumerable passages like the following, in which, it seems to us, both the dhvani concept, and the revelatory (abhi-nyaktiv) character of art (in this case, sacred literature) come to the fore, inseparably, perforce:

The third key is the understanding (intellectus) of the inspired Word, through which all things are revealed. (Daniel 10:1): 'Daniel understood the meaning (sermonem—dhvani) for understanding is the work in vision' (or, in the modern translation, 'He paid heed to the word, and gave attention to the vision.') For he understood the vision by the meaning (of the Word). For only if the Word of God sound in the ear of the heart, and the splendour eternal irradiate
the eye of the mind and the vapour (or fragrance) of the omnipotent God enter the olfactory faculty and the sweetness (of God) enter the taste—if these eternally do not enter the soul, you will not be apt at understanding visions; 'for the fragrance (vapour) is of the ever-eternal God and a sort of pure emanation of his almighty glory' (Wisdom of Solomon, 7:25); and (Daniel 1:17) 'God gave them knowledge and skill in all branches of literature and learning, while he gave Daniel accomplishment in understanding all kinds of dreams and visions', because he had the inspired word. For he had a soul especially pure, inflated (aflatam) with divine inspirations, so that he could be elevated into visions of the omnipotent, to which nothing befouled can attain, (as it is indicated in the Wisdom of Solomon, 7:25-26): (we quote the full context from the modern translation)

For Wisdom is more mobile than any motion,
And she penetrates and permeates everything, because she is pure
For she is the breath (or, fragrance) of the power of God,
And a pure emanation of his almighty glory;
Therefore nothing defiled can enter her.
For she is a reflection of the everlasting light
And a spotless mirror of the activity of God,
And a likeness of his goodness.

Moreover, the vision is threefold, that is, corporal, imaginary, and 'intellectual' . . . And the intellectual vision has six modes . . . infused (indita) by nature, lifted up (sublevata) by faith, made radiant (crudita) by the Scriptures, suspended by contemplation, illuminated by the prophets, absorbed in God through a rapture of the mind.

And from innumerable passages in our previous discussions, we know how well he emphasizes that this rapture of the mind is not a gnostic matter, but a matter of bhakti-prapatti! And this applies both in the field of ascent to the (vision) and descent with the vision into production; not only is 'theology', as (contemplative, sublative) enjoyment of the vision, of the illumination, necessary to art, but art—'music' in the scholastic sense of the term—is necessary to theology! a certain "quantity continuous in both universal and particular", as symbolized by the arc of Noah and the temple of Ezekiel is necessary, as also
perspective, which gives, like the rainbow, the proper comprehensibility of the infused form, so that good judgment is possible between the superficial and the essential. Moreover although the same descent belongs to 'science'—techne, as the Greek synonym—it is only the finite complement to 'wisdom', which, again, as we have already seen, is basically affective for him. "For the artificer makes use of great rules in his work . . . according to musical proportion" . . . so that, like the geometr, he may bring the potential into proper effect, to make the vision 'practical', for otherwise the act of contemplation, of devotion, will not be complete, and therefore not good. For the good, according to most scholastic tradition, can never remain in a merely idealistic potential state it must be completed, incarnated; the Vision must become communicative, existentially, so that there is no implication possible of illusoriness in art. The exterior object thus, in fulfilling its own potentiality—for it can have no other reason of its existence—also brings the interior power (the sensus communis, the antakaraṇa) out of their latent state, and 'converts' the intellectual (or contemplative) powers (which are otherwise only abstract universals) into spiritual substances, so that the "divine solace may be experienced, which is done by unitive force". As in the spiritual life as such, so art, in its metaphysical function, is not concerned with essence, but with existence: the concept of the spiritual is almost by definition the unification in situation of ideal and actual, of 'imaginary' and 'real'; the transcendence is compensated always by identification, and that comes unsolicited, like grace, from above. One is reminded of the two interlocking triangles that comprise the "star of David", one with the point upward, the other pointing downward: the same as the basic symbol in the Tantra, wherein is represented the union of Śiva and Śakti. Without Śiva, without the transcendence, the artist remains "safe and sane, but uninspired" but without Śakti, without the embodying matter—if the artist does not produce, or rather procreate, he destroys himself in pathological neurosis: abortion is out of the question, being fatal both to the offspring and the parent, but natural birth, painful though it be, brings new life, crying and singing meaningfully. Where, then, is the gnosis? Can it give the unitive solace, the living grace and peace? Śakti,
Lakṣmī, Sarasvati—these are patrons of prapannas, not of jñānis. Gnosis gives only Silence; bhakti gives the Word, the song. Gnosis gives the symbol, bhakti the sacrament. Gnosis is of lightning and thunder; bhakti of the fertilizing rain.

Or, as Bonaventura puts it, if the eternal art is to be mirrored in the finite, it is necessary to polish the mirror:

Thus, therefore, there is a triplex potency and six operations. And thus is the soul a spiritual mirror of extreme beauty, reflecting what is above it, in which man sees whatever there is of wisdom, beauty and radiance (fulgoris) just so in a polished and rubbed body appears the image. And for the appearance three things are required: the first is the natural opaque material, as a mirror of bronze, or the material of art, as in glass or lead, and through this opacity the appearance (species), is splendidly retained. The second requirement is a certain polish, so that the appearance (the species) can be received. The third requirement is the splendour, so that it (the species) may appear...[and the three levels of virtue (e.g. natural, political and contemplative) are artfully analogized to these...]

Actually, of course, this in some respects resembles Abhinavagupta’s ābhāsavāda than the system of Rāmānuja and his school. Nevertheless, as Coomaraswami has shown the ābhāsa concept is quite a prominent one in all Indian thought. As he says, quoting numerous texts from the Upaniṣads and Brāhmaṇas, the true Self “counter-sees itself reflected in the possibilities of being”. Be that as it may, these “possibilities of being”, according to our interpretation, are quite a real—they inhere in real matter—for Bonaventura as for any Viśiṣṭādvaitin. As a matter of fact, the ‘possibilities’ are in a way dialectically reciprocal: the matter remains meaningless without the ‘species’, the ideal meaning; the latter must be embodied in it—whether by ‘reflection’ or otherwise seems not so important—or it remains also only potential, unspiritualized, without the living Breath in it. It is in this sense that God is the Supreme Artist, for Bonaventura as for almost all Indian theists.

“For the creature proceeds (egriditur) out of the Creator not through nature, but through art, which is not its own exemplar, as indeed Plato taught. But this art is an active one, active and willing (to do) whatever is proposed; therefore it is necessary that it may have both expressed and expressive forms. For if it gives any-
thing a form by which it may be distinguished from other things, it has the form in itself—the ideal form; but these ideal forms are supremely experienceable and expressed (or, experienced)... Thus it has (in its own hands, so to speak) very direct norms; and since the norm and the form are not the same, the mode by which the creature emanates from the Creator is quite different from that norm which remains in the eternal mind." (italics ours) Again, it is a matter of will, not of passive gnosis; and will is always affective: it is the Love of God that brings meaning into the eternal forms, by bringing them down to earth! Analogically, just as man's imagination is to be 'reduced' to the Divine Love within him, so God's imagination—his imagining himself in the purely eternal, the ideal, is reducible to the same Divine Love, which is the affective hypostasis of His own nature, the Holy Spirit.

At various levels, we find the same philosophy interwoven throughout Dante's great Divine Comedy—perhaps the most 'imaginative' piece of art in all of Western literature. For him, as for his philosophical masters, imagination is almost synonymous with love, which in its hierarchical quest for divine satisfaction, will not allow the poet—or any soul—to remain content with the merely gross. Thus, at the beginning of the Paradiso (canto I, 124ff.) Bentrice says, at once disclosing Dante's own theory and the metaphysics to which it accords:

    And thither now, as our appointed bourne,
    The virtue of the string bears us, which guides
    Unto a goal of bliss that it propels
    True is't, that as the form of times doth not
    Accord with the intention of the art,
    Because material to respond is deaf,
    E'en so from this direction may depart
    Sometimes the creatures, that hath power to swerve.
    Impelled it may be in another way,
    (So may be seen downfalling from a cloud
    The flash of fire) if the first impetus
    Be wrested earthward by a false delight.
    Nor shouldst thou wonder more, if well I judge,
    At thine ascent, than at the rivulet
    From a high hill descending to the plain.
    Wonder 'twould be at thee, if now released
    From hindrance, thou had'st settled down below:
    As though a living flame could rest on earth.
Imagination soars, but it takes us along with it. It gives the spiritual release from hindrance, even the hindrance of inadequate material for our art, for it is hindrance only if we are blinded by its opaqueness, which is the same as becoming infatuated with it in its own nature, and not in its potentiality of becoming the embodiment of a higher goodness and beauty in the hands of the artist, who thereby only realizes his true End as harmonizing with the way of God as Divine Artificer:

And thus the heaven, which stars so many grace,  
The Image grasps of the Deep Mind, which first  
Its motion gave, and thereof forms a seal.  
And as the soul, encased in your dust,  
Through different members, all with aptitude  
For diverse faculties is self-diffused,  
So that Intelligence likewise unfolds  
Its Goodness, multiplied through all the stars  
Revolving aye on its own Unity.

By the glad Nature, whence it is derived,  
The mingled virtue through the body shines,  
As gladness beameth through the living eye.  
From this proceeds what between light and light  
May different seem, and not from dense and rare:  
This is the formal principle that makes  
To its own goodness dark and light conform.

(Paradiso, II, 130ff)

For the imagination, as we have so often reiterated, deals not with mere human fancy: day-dreaming is no art at all—and least of all is it true contemplation, the highest of the arts. It is rather, is it not, the divine eye of the soul, which, in its function of seeing, not only perceives beauty in its upward-beckoning, but also "beams outward with the living light of gladness", not only reflecting, but communicating the Love that inheres in both seer and seen. Love and Light and Life: this is always the basic trinitarian mystery in which the beautiful is realized as perfection. And nothing in creation, as the product of the Art Divine, is unworthy of receiving indeed, of incarnating—this perfection, as he sings in another place (Paradiso, XIII:73ff):

If to perfection were the wax prepared,  
And heaven's full virtue in supremacy,  
The signet's light would in full glory shine:
But aye nature presents this in defect,
Working as doth the artist, who in art
Is fully trained, but paints with trembling hand:
So if the warmth of Love, and Vision clear
Of Primal Virtue do dispose and seal,
The fulness of perfection then is gained
E’en so the dust of earth was worthy deemed
Of full perfection in the living man:
E’en so the Virgin in her womb conceived.

For, as Rāmānuja teaches, following his favourite Upaniṣadic texts, God ‘re-enters’ what He makes, making the world his own body, and that on different levels: the undifferentiated cosmos first; the gross world in second course, the Jivas at the end of the normal course; the Avatāra, not only to lighten the burden of the world, but to illuminate it with his splendour, so that men may receive inspiration—light and life and love and perfection; and last, but not least, at the hands of men thus inspired, the Arcāvatāra, the artistic embodiment in stone or metal, the product of Imagination which makes Him easily accessible to those who would begin their re-entrance back into Him in full but therefore (!) imaginative—enjoyment. And in both reciprocal (or rather, reciprocating) movements, just as God is both remotely and immediately both giver and enjoyer of our enjoyment, so, both directly and indirectly, he himself remains the meaning of all meaning: He is Himself also the enjoyed! Things-in-themselves, ‘solid and sound’ though they seem to be to those who correspondingly remain unopened to their existential implicativeness, are really nothing—or at best, abstractions, disassociations hypostasized out of situational reality; and whereas on the other hand things are not merely imaginary in the idealist’s sense, they are always things-as-enjoyed, the fullness of whose situational context, both internal and environmental [in their ‘umwelt’ their (sākyāthāratva)] cannot be “made practical” without reciprocative imagination—reciprocative because it is bhakti which incites the search for their meaningfulness, reinvests, creatively—incarnatively—what it finds, and induces enjoyment of the whole never-ending spiral into non-limitation, into aesthetic freedom, which is Being in its ever-reduplicative, analogical fulness: and that is what we mean by God.
It is because of this that Rāmānuja constantly, as in Śrī Bhāṣya IV:4:1, reiterates his doctrine, against the advaitins, that mokṣa is a positively enjoyable state, and not merely the removal of pleasure and pain. Otherwise, the Taittirīya text upon which this whole section (of the Brahma Sūtras) would be meaningless [Taittirīya Up. II: 73. It is one unit of the bliss of Brahman; and one that knew the Veda was not affected by desires, i.e., of a freed Jīva; attaining rasa (Brahman) this jīva becomes blissful). And the converse is quite as true for almost the whole range of Vaiṣṇava traditions also: one who creatively enters into the līlās of the Lord—one who experiences in the life of art the analogical illuminations of imaginative meaningfulness thereby enters the art of life—eternal life, in which love has found its own secret in making everything translucent and playfully, divinely, enjoyable. Or, in Marcel's terms, the world becomes a reservoir of presences, realized in their own exigence of transcendence, and the 'transliminal' range of imagination affords an omnicomprehensive inclusion of my self and my life in an appositive (and perforce creative) participation in plenitude which, in the realization of vocation, dissolves the opposition of contingency and necessity in existential unicity or immediacy which is at bottom the intersubjective spirit of prayer.

We cannot possibly trace out here the full development of these terms, although in his later works there is indication that his experience is constantly deepening, and his illustrations from French literature—and not least the illustrations from his own dramas—make quite clear what he is pointing towards, e.g. that experience as such can never be verbalized or abstracted into philosophical formulae, and yet can be intersubjectively co-enjoyed (communication as such is really less than this, and is never art) participatively in the work of art, or in the art of love, or in reflexive (which is more than reflective) contemplation which grows out of these. Perhaps it is best simply to note some of his observations concerning the poetry of Rainer Marie Rilke, as recorded in the last two chapters of his Homo Viator.

Insisting that Rilke is a spiritual poet, in spite of his objections to the formal Christianity of his day, Marcel first observes what he calls a creative attestation by which all his images be-
come not mere *echos* of sentiment, but a testimony of *participation* in and *confirmation* of spiritual reality in all of nature and experience in such a way that only in their illuminative togetherness poetic vision comes into it own, as illustrated by the opening lines of the 12th Sonnet to Orpheus:

Heil dem Geist der uns verbinden mag;
Denn wir leben wahrhaft in Figuren.
Und mit kleinen Schritten gehen die Uhren
Neben unserem eigentlichen Tag.

(Hail the Spirit which can bind us;
For then we truly live in the Figure.
And with tiny feet the hours go on
Closer to our authentic day.)

Here, as everywhere, Rilke is not content with description, not ‘romantic’ enough to be interested merely in his own feelings, or even his own interior visions, nor ‘classic’ enough to have any patience with conventions. It is the Spirit itself—and the Authentic Spirit itself which resists any adjectives: not the ‘spirit of this or that’—which binds our most intimate little experiences—the hours—with particularized, illuminated objects so that not only our vision of them gives their own inwardness, but Vision itself transforms us and them in the same immediacy. Indeed, so fast is this bond, so authentic in integrating, in the transformation of the whole of the ‘day’ that to break down any of his poetry into discursive analysis misses the transforming illumination; in other words the *dhvani* must be enjoyed, tasted, it must engage the reader, or there is no poem at all: the *poem* is not the *work produced*, but the binding of the Spirit itself. It is this binding of the Spirit that Marcel equates with his *exigence of transcendence*. It permits no promiscuity, demands a love of solitude, bridges all finite space and time in joining poet and reader into the same intimate experience of *weltraum*, cosmic space, of God in His own vastness—a vastness such that He eternally refuses to be defined, as He eternally transforms himself: a vastness which Rilke experienced in his early years when he was in Russia, according to his own testimony. (One wonders what change would have come of him if he could also have experienced the Himalayas!) But such experience can be recorded only poetically; simple piety is not enough. For the poet (as much as the fashioner of an *arcāvatāra*) is as much a
creator of God as God is the creator of the poet; no one can approach God in true reverence, in proper sensitivity, except creatively for He is too Great, too Lofty, to allow any cheap familiarity, while at the same time, all the world in its poetic possibilities, in illuminative Vision, 'points' to Him as Unseen, and yet as the Revealer, as the One who mysteriously, as in Love, leads all experiencers beyond themselves. For, to Rilke, as to Marcel, "A great love is a creation; like a poem or a statue, a great love is a creative participation... in the life divine."

And as with love, so with death. Rilke seems to have penetrated its mystery more deeply than any European since the Middle Ages: above all, it is the primary passage to infinity, defying all attempts at measurement. Again, as Marcel says, in Rilke's work "one finds wedded in a rare harmonious plentitude the sense of God and the sense of death... the sense of being and the sense of becoming (therein) are intimately founded (together)... (in a) revelation... (Therein) it is the eternal which is liberated for him to the view of the pacified visage, transfigured by death; but at the same time it is an announcement, it is the anticipated testimony of that which will some day be, of that which some day will be revealed."

Thus, in Rilke's own phrase "God is a direction of the heart...That which exists, it is love, nothing else." The business of theological 'belief' in this perspective is as ridiculous as it is superfluous. "It is above all necessary to discover God somehow, to prove—rather to experience—Him at an infinite point, so immensely, so formidable present—it matters not at all whether one is seized by fear or astonishment, or whether in the final count one is rather invaded by love—but belief, that constraint (put upon) God, has no place there where one has begun that discovery of God which allows no stoppage, whatever may have been the point of departure."; for it knows the dimensionless breath of God, as long as it remains—flexible. From this, it is not a far step to the doctrine, or at least its corollary, which so many are prone to relegate to the middle ages, that God is the Divine Artist, and the Only Artist, ultimately, who only uses the human as instrument—at least, the human heart that
retains sufficient intimacy and flexibility. In this connection, Marcel goes on to say,

It seems to me, once again, that it is of the essence of the Rilkan vision, or even of the power of the vibration which is at the heart of this work, not to isolate the artist from creation in general. Perhaps the poet in a certain sense is for Rilke the heart of creation, but this turns us back to say, symmetrically, that the rest of that creation participates in its own order and according to its own rhythm with the experience—the cosmic experience—which is that of the poet."

In short, for Rilke, as for the Alvars and the philosophers who followed them—or as for St. Francis (whom Rilke admired equally, and celebrated in identification with, Orpheus) and Bonaventura, the intimacy of the relation between Creator and creature is so close in the mystery of love (and perforce in its expression, which for that very reason must be artistic and not dogmatic) that the Greater seemingly plays the role of the lesser, or at least, they become so fused that it is the harmony itself between them that brings forth the Song without any thought of ‘composition’: the Voice of the Spirit is itself enough, authentic, its own sursum corda, wherein there is no question of renunciation or of affirmation, but an infinite adhesion to existing. (Zustiming zum Da-Sein). In love, at death, or in the face of death, or in the fever of artistic creativity, we are no longer merely ourselves. "Who knows" writes Rilke in a letter to ‘L.H.’, in 1915—at the height of what so many call the materialism (!) of the modern West:

"Who knows, I ask myself, whether we do not always emerge as it were at the back of the gods, separated from the sublime radiance of their faces by nothing save their own selves, quite close to the expression for which we yearn but standing exactly behind it? Yet what else does this mean except that our face and the face of the gods look out in the same direction and are at one; how should we approach the gods from the front? Does it confuse you that I say God and the gods and juggle with these propositions...for the sake of comprehensiveness, thinking that some image must form in your mind too? ...this also was a part of us, only we did not know how to cope with this side of our experience; it was too massive, too dangerous, too multitudinous, it piled up over our heads into a superabundance of meaning
...But since these factors were an overflow, were Power, were indeed too powerful, the violent, the inconceivable, tremendous life-forces—how could they fail, concentrated in one spot, to exert and influence and have ascendancy over us?"

Or again, in the famous letter to Ilse Jahr, dated 22 Feb., 1923:

"Now you would hardly ever hear me name him (God), there is an indescribable discretion between us, and where closeness and penetration once were, new distances stretch out as in the atom which the new science also conceives as a universe in little. The tangible slips away, changes; instead of possession one learns the relativity of things, and there arises a namelessness that must begin again with God if it is to become perfect and without deceit. Sensuous experience retires behind an infinite longing for the perceptible world; God, now becomes unutterable, is stripped of all attributes, and these fall back into creation, into love and death...This ascent of God from the breathing heart, covering the whole heavens and descending as rain."

Commentary on such expression could only reduce it to pitiable prattle. Rilke here has written in epitome all that we are trying to exposit at length: Bhakti, the given, freely granted grace of inspiration rising spontaneously, intimately within the heart of man, takes man into the God within him who in the same motion of love infinitely increases the sense of distance also, and of infinite longing, which must burst out in sensuous expression, in rasa, with all of its subordinate and coordinate factors, so that not just the experience of bhakti, but the whole cosmos, as attributable to the same Divine Within, must subserve the bhakta—as he thereby becomes subservient with them—in sympathetic accord with his 'breathing'—and breaking but procreating—heart. Dualism is out of the question; gnosis and total identity (advaita) fade into perspective as only a momentary phase of the contuitive, re-creative co-inherence of the Inherer in the inhered and inhered in the Inherer. Viśiṣṭādvaitic pantheism—if any term at all can indicate this existential, situational, exigence which resists systematization—alone can account in the same breath for transcendence of the Spirit in art and the dynamic inevitability of great art when Spirit translimitates our allusive, but by no means illusory, world; Fraternity and Obscurity, paradox in gnosis, become living mystery, seductively giving participative transformation of all in All and All in all, when in
patience and humility there arises the joy of creative absorption
in the Presence wherein the artist works in self-oblivious
redoubling of his material into a thing of radiant, upsurging
beauty. Such is Rodin’s hand (of which Rilke said, “In six days
God did nothing but make a hand!”) in form, nothing but a
human hand, merging, rising out of unformed marble, but in
meaning, reaching out of the Divine Void through the scarcely-
graspable world into the Divine Infinity which re-enfolds the
Void and the world in Desire and the embrace of Adoration.

It is in this perspective that Marcel goes on to discuss the
‘Angel’ of Rilke’s Duino Elegies. Again, it is by no means the
traditional theological concept that Rilke is ‘believing in’ or
dealing with; but on the other hand, the Angel is by far more
than a ‘de-mythologized’ figure of speech, but rather a true
spiritual reality, an existential “image which liberates, somehow,
the inexhaustible creative forces” of the cosmos, something akin
to Plato’s ‘Ideas’—or better, we should interject, Bonaventura’s
Exemplars—or, “the presuppositions and at the same time the
ultimate content of vital accomplishment”, “irradiations of the
Logos, by whom It creates and rules all that is finite.” And
above all Rilke’s Angel gives the supremely important factor
of Revelation which we have seen to be the major function of
great art in Indian aesthetics, with jagannatha Pandita in par-
cular. It is the Angel who makes Rilke’s Elegies free from any-
thing of triviality; as Marcel puts it, “Here there is nothing of
demonstration or even of exposition; all is question, invocation,
evocation also, an interior dispute of a soul who recognizes him-
self in a way in charge of the universe and responsible for making
it grow or even to make it to be born again (de le reensfanter)”. Thus in the second Elegy, Rilke writes:

Every Angel is terrible. Still, though, alas!
I invoke you, almost deadly birds of the soul,
Knowing what you are...

...Let the archangel perilous now, no longer appalling
step but a step down hitherwards: high up-bearing,
our heart would out-beat us. Who are you?

Early successes, favourites of fond Creation,
ranges, summits, dawn-red ridges
of all beginning—pollen of blossoming godhead,
hinges of light, corridors, stairways, thrones, spaces of being, shields of felicity, tumults of stormily-rapturous feeling, and suddenly, separate, mirrors, drawing up their own outstreamed beauty into their faces again.

In Indian terminology, Rilke is par excellence a svabhāvokti poet, one who uses objects of Nature in their own strength, in their own self-illumination, in their own self-revelation, as intensely real, and yet irradiatively translucent, so that ornament (alaṅkāra) is quite unnecessary—or rather, so that the things of Nature furnish their own alaṅkāra, embody their own rasa, enabling the enjoyer to transcend himself in them as “mirrors, drawing their own outstreamed beauty into their faces again.” When V. Raghavan writes48 “When a poet describes a thing as it is he must not present us with the well-known and commonplace aspect of things, a description of which does not make the picture before our eyes...One must be a poet of imagination and inspiration to write real Svabhāvokti with power to live before our mind’s eye”, he could not find a better example than Rilke, who relied solely, as it were, on the divine ‘third eye’ of the poet as yogi, so that he49 “sees a special aspect of the thing, not with reference to its common nature but details whose presentation reveals a wondrous picture of it.” The “striking and special aspect of the thing, its Viṣiṣṭa Svabhāva, which the poet’s eye alone sees and his imagination alone embodies inwards of poetry” (which is the object of Svabhāvokti Alaṅkāra) is precisely what gives the key to Rilke’s art; indeed, his Angel is essentially nothing but this ‘third eye’ which reveals in things the same spiritual “spaces of being” (Raume aus Wesen) which the rapturous heart feels within itself; jñāna only embodies bhakti so that bhakti can become rasa, and that, not just in the negation of negation, the kevala state of absolute self-sufficiency but quite on the contrary, in the openness of-and-in infinity, the infinity of the creative power of God. As Marcel points out, this Openness is especially poignant in the opening lines of the 8th Elegy:

With all its eyes the creature-world beholds the Open. But our eyes, as though reversed, encircle it on every side, like traps set around its unobstructed path to freedom.
and he (Marcel) goes on to say:

The Open, it is that which surrounds the creature—but not in the way that empty space or a fluid bathes things; it is the fact that the creature is finite, that it has a limit, or more exactly, it is the other aspect, the aspect correlative to that. It is not a matter of the relative limit of a being, that is of that which is only adjacent, but its absolute limit, the Other pure and simple, the Other as Other, that is to say, (the limit which is) God, the creative power of God...(this is clarified in two aspects, the psychological which has an object, and that which has no object, but reaches directly into the profundity of being). In the first instance, it is the mystery of interiority, in the other, transcendence, absolute space. In both instances, man leaves himself behind himself as a particular being who observes, judges, covets, etc., and thus accomplishes his being as pure creature. Being distends itself, commences to flourish, and thus becomes itself. The Open, that is direction in which this is accomplished.

Moreover, the transcendence is not only into the Other, but it is anything but a liberation in oblivion, such as might be exalted by an advaitin or a neo-platonist. Much as Rilke deals with the inexpressible, he never romantically allows himself to be lost in it; tragic though our limitations are—especially in love and in death—"The silent earth, does it not find, in order to express itself, this artifice of constraining lovers to ravish and to transmute all things in their proper sentiment? The praise which must mount from the depths of ourselves to the angelic presence: it is that which exalts the most simple experienceable things.... All the things for which life is only perpetual declination understand what we celebrate; perishable themselves, they (nevertheless) accord us the power to save them—to us who moreover are more perishable than they. They will that we would make them pass into our invisible heart, regardless of what may be our being and our ultimate destiny."—so Marcel; and Rilke himself, later in the 9th Elegy:

Earth, is it not just this that you want: to arise invisibly in us? Is not your dream to be one day invisible? Earth! invisible! What is your urgent command, if not transformation? Earth, earth beloved, I will! Oh, believe me, you need no more of your spring-times to win me: a single one, ah, one, is already more than my blood can endure. Beyond all names I am yours, and have been for ages.
You were always right, and your holiest inspiration is Death, that friendly Death.
Look I am living. On what? Neither childhood nor future are growing less... Supernumerous existence wells up in my heart.

Here, of course, there is no mention of a mystical love of God as such: Rilke has discarded traditional language, even the language of erotic mysticism, in his intensity and constraint. But the content is not far from what is often expressed in the Alwars—if not also, for example, in St. Francis's Canticle of the Sun, wherein all creation, sun, moon, earth, and death as well, are bid to join the angelic praise of the love that moves within them—for whom all of Nature seems in accord with the supernumerous existence (Überzahliges Dasin), the bhakti which is at once infinite longing for and also passionate embrace of the Unattainable which embraces ourselves and 'Earth' in the same belovedness which binds us to it. Thus Andal, in her Morning Hymn bids all nature to awake and help her awake her fellow-devotees so that all may go to greet the Lord, who after all dwells as much in them as they in Him; and Nammalwar (at the opening of the 2nd Hundred) enquires of the young heron if she is not also love-sick for Sripathi; bids peace to the sleepless ocean; sympathizes with the cool breeze that wanders among the hills, ocean and sky in fruitless efforts at finding the Invisible; wishes better luck to the rain-cloud who weeps tears of love that nourish the creatures of this world; chides the waning moon for wasting away in the same love and neglecting to remove the darkness of the night; thanks the darkness itself for trying to dampen out the unbearable passion; and even asks the burning lamp if it is not the same flame of the divine that burns in his own heart, totally consuming it while it lingers through eternity, embraced by, but never quite embracing that deathless being that keeps him in unceasing death-like love.

The essential thing, whether the expression is traditional or 'original', is that such poetic experience and its embodiment must take a mythical form, which is intranscribable. In this connection, Marcel criticizes Heidegger, who would try to reduce such irreducible quintessence into strictly philosophicla
formations. Heidegger is also concerned with angst, the immancy of death and negation—or rather the constancy of the threat of dying as negation; but that is all: he balks at mystery, at the “other face” whereby the mythical expression reflects the looming vision of the Unknown...and it is precisely this realm of metamorphosis, wherein negation is Entrance and not Finality, that is the very essence of Man. True enough, despair, angst, cannot be lightly assuaged; but neither can it be purged by violence and flagrancy, as we find in both Nietzsche and Heidegger or, for that matter, eliminated by dialectic, as with Kierkegaard. “A supreme patience” Marcel says, “a supreme humility in the face of the eternal flourishes herein (true) knowledge of self...(a humility which is synonymous with) a receptivity which is another name for creation itself.” For the secret of metamorphosis is grace, the unhoped-for hope, the restoration of innocence that renders praise free and triumphant, as we find in the following lines from the Sonnets to Orpheus:

Be—and yet know that you were before your creation, sensing the infinite source of your spirit’s pulsation so that it may be perfected as never before

To the depleted alike to the dumbly encumbered storerooms of Nature, the sun that is nameless, unnumbered —add yourself to them exultant and reckon no more

and:

Praise is the thing! Like one destined for singing
he broke like a bell from the tongueless ores
O transient press of his heart, from whose wringing
the wine of mankind inexhaustibly pours
For he like a heavenly messenger stays
and holds far into the doors of the dead
vessels heaped high with the full fruits of praise.

Thus, in the end, bhakti, as Openness in triumph as well as at the bottom-source, bhakti as despair, as longing—the longing of transcending love that lingers through death—proves to be the permeating rasa of all great poetry, of all great art, even in the modern world. But just because of this, it cannot be ‘preached’ from any pulpit; it must be autogenous, and contagious in its own right, overflowing in its own camatkāra, in its own “supermundane, artistic delight brought about by the contemplation of beauty”, as Raghavan reports Jagannātha’s
definition. For just as the longings of love are perverse without reaching through to the divine beauty in them, and the exaltations of ‘superman’ are only erratic reduplications of frustration without the further transformation of devotion in humility, so ‘pious’ puritanical, unrefreshing drones of ‘worship’, as well as great ‘programmes’ of professional choirs who have known neither spiritual suffering nor elevating surrender to upsurging inspiration, are empty and meaningless: as bhakti is the quintessence of rasa, so rasa is the procreative life of bhakti. Only in the Authentic, in the Divine in total saturation of all beneath it, does myth become Revelation and mystery become vibrant Presence, but therein the beautiful ceases to be attributive, and the ‘transient press of the heart’ ceases to reckon, forgets the bargaining for the sheer lustiness of the harvest—the harvest which is not only plenty for now, but continuing seed of the unending future: Beauty is Fertility, Devotion is eternal Life! Who can separate them?

For such is the gateway of the Imagination: no less than total metamorphosis; not only penetration of, but triumphant (even if sometimes tragic) Entry into, the Unknown, the Land of Refracting Dimensions, and rejuvenating communion with all that we bring along in the procession. We must be reduced by it, we must bow down low, begging mercy before we pass through; for there is a ‘terrible’ Angel that guards it; but once the Angel has blessed us with his flaming sword, as by divine command, the gateway is opened wide, and the novice beholds himself and all in another realm, noumenous more than luminous, and even the Angel, now resplendent, has lost his ominous character. His, not ours, was the business of the reduction of the imagination; his not ours was the power of second sight. Yet he gives it to those who are Worthy, to those who are purged of both the crassness alike of dogmatism and of incredulity and the foolishness of fairyland phantasy.—And not only second sight, but tongues of flame and hearts of fire and voices that set the whole of the body in reverberation, so that no longer we sing in the night to the dawn, but in the glorious light, we have become the Anthem. The mantra intones itself, welcoming a world that came forth from it in the beginning primordial.
AESTHETICS OF BHAKTI

BHAKTI AS RASA

1. p. 103 (Published in Madras—obtained from the author).
4. ibid., p. 197.
7. Published by the Theosophical Press, Adyar (Madras), 1908. Recently revised, although the revision was not yet available at the time of writing.
8. p. 98.
13. From VVS Aiyer's *Kamba Ramayana* (being a study with ample sections beautifully translated) published by the Delhi Tamil Sangham, 1950.
15. As reported by P. Pancapagesa Sastri in his *Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure* (Annamalai University Press, 1940), pp. 241ff.
16. *Figures of Speech and Figures of Thought* (Luzac, 1946), p. 32.
17. L’Absolue selon le Vedanta, p. 198ff.
18. The translation is that of VVS Aiyer, op.cit., p. 64.
19. ibid., p. 55.
22. ibid., p. 17.
23. ibid., p. 52.
24. ibid., p. 54.
25. ibid., p. 60-61.
26. ibid., pp. 69-70.
27. ibid., pp. 75, 78.
28. ibid., p. 83.
34. Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, p. 211. The reference is to Tiruvoimoli VI: iii, passim. The passage is too long to quote in full.
35. Figures of Speech and Figures of Thought, pp. 72 & 83.
36. I Sent. III. Dubium 3.
37. I Sent. III:1:2
38. I Sent. III:iii:3.
41. II Sent. XXXIX:ii:1 & Dubia.
42. ed. cit., p. 43.
43. ibid., p. 80
44. ibid., p. 86.
45. Transformation of Nature in Art, chapter VI.
46. In Hexameron, ed. cit., p. 141.
47. This, and all subsequent citations from his letters, is from the translation of RFC Hull (Selected Letters of R.M. Rilke, Macmillan, 1947).
49. ibid., p. 115.
SECTION II

THE EROTIC CONTINUUM

But in this new country, there are many things yet to be learned, and all the things of our 'former' life have to be relearned accordingly, in their transcended manner. For in this Land of Many Dimensions, each single instrument has become an orchestra, with its full range of undertones and overtones, and has to be played in a multidimensional way. From now on, all the rasas have a secondary, tertiary (etc.) reference although they also retain their old secular roots, and new rasas are realized which had not hitherto come into our experience.

The Caitanya tradition has developed this 'other level' of rasas probably to a more advanced point than, perhaps, any tradition in the world. It would lead us on too much of a detour to follow it through in detail; but since it does rather set the standard for all that preceded, we shall not disregard it altogether, and use it as a basis for our further comparative development, first in some other of the Indian classics on Bhakti, then, as much as possible, the parallels in the Alwar tradition; and then we shall proceed to trace out the comparable strains in St. Bonaventura and Marcel and other modern writers.

But be it noted from the outset that all the new rasas are rooted in, or else branches of love. For it is only after the Imagination has been 'reduced' to its upward latency do we come really to learn even what was the relation of desire and love might be, and only after we pass into true metaphysical Openness—largely, as we shall see, the Openness of ontological Analogy—did we learn that every earthly pattern of affection has its heavenly counterpart.

Thus, in tracing out the Caitanya traditions interpretation of rasa, Dr. Abhayakumar Guha¹ has given the usual list of
rasas, but goes on to show how they have been used not only in literary work, but also within the Krishna cult itself, as forms of bhakti—a hint, perhaps, for parallel development in the religion of the modern world. For, as we have reiterated over and over again, the relation between art and religion—and mystical religion most of all—must be mutually reciprocal, mutually open to transcendence in a certain over-inclusiveness of each other. It will never do to preach the return of art to ‘religion’, unless the religionists—and not in a cheap adaptive, advertising sort of way, but in honest and profound humility—become able to recognize the truly spiritual in the best of secular developments, and incorporate them into their own structure of devotion.

First Guha lists the five principal rasas, according to this tradition, as śānta, dāsya, sakhyā, vātsalya and madhura. It will be noted immediately that the order is significant, indicating a progression form what other traditions had considered the highest.

But even śānta rasa here has a different orientation. It is frankly theologized, although in such an appropriate poetical way that shall we say, the theology involved has had to undergo the same transcendence which the rasa now comes to enjoy. Peace becomes those who have first made their resignation to God: the peace of conflict left behind, and of hope and confident dependence taking its place. These are content to remain without any refinement of their relationship; quiet contemplation is sufficient. The Buddha (who is more emphatically included in the list of Avatāras in the Bengal cult than, perhaps, in all other varieties of Vaiṣṇavism) is given as the archetype of this rasa.

But there is not only the way of reflection; there is the way of ecstacy. Ecstasy may and must return to peace, reflection, but reflection must not remain unenergized. Like the well designed fountain, the upspray may be the same water that settles, after its delicate flight, back into the reflecting pool; but there is no real beauty unless the fountain is functioning: the mere reflection gives only the dead fountain, and not the grace and allusive charm of the living water for which it is made.

The first rising of the water (if we may, at Dr. Guha’s
expense, continue our metaphor) is dāsyā rasa, as bhakti. This is the positive activated attitude of surrender as slave or servant to the Lord. The bhakta who enjoys this rasa is not content at having “made his peace” with his God, but wants to serve him, to do His biddings, and to seek for opportunity to do things for Him that will please Him spontaneously. Hanumān is a typical example, in his relation to Rāma: in his zeal, he even sometimes does rather grotesque things, but Rāma is all the more pleased, for the little touch of the bizarre only adds to the tenderness of the rasa. And yet it is not essentially a tender rasa; for Hanumān does some mighty feats, comparable, perhaps, only to some of those told of the Knights of the Holy Grail. The relation, perhaps, is more that of liege and Lord than that of page and master. Needless to say, it involves adventure.

But this dāsyā relation gives place to sakhyā: the liege becomes the friend of the Lord. The sense of superiority vanishes before familiarity—a familiarity, moreover, which allows many liberties. The devotee learns to play with God. His imagination has begun to flower; the water of devotion is touched by the first sportive breeze, just as the gopas, Sudāmās and Sarala the cowherd companions of Kṛṣṇa in his boyhood—a theme even more favoured by the followers of Vallabha than of Caitanya—were incited to merriment, and even to mischief by his lightsome presence. They were even oblivious of his divinity: he was only their “ringleader”, but this was enough to make them centre all their affections on him. They would not only respond to His mischievous suggestions and join in the game, but would freely take the liberty of quarrelling with him, taking him on their shoulders, and climbing on his in turn. But without him, their work of tending the cows would become drearysome, because “it wasn’t any fun” without him; their sadness was even greater than that of David and Jonathan in separation, for they were ‘one soul’ with him. Even in their dreams he was their “favourite buddy”, and they would repeat his name in their sleep. We mention David and Jonathan as parallels in Biblical tradition, but perhaps even the relation of “John the beloved disciple”, who leaned on the breast of Jesus at the Last Supper could be included; and Dr. Guha hastens to point out that even Mohammed considered God as his
Friend, and that Hafis of Persia cultivated this sentiment to a very high degree.

But in this turn sakhyā gives way to vātsalya, the relation of Mother and child. The Virgin Mary with the “babe in the manger”, celebrated in so many of our carols has her full counterpart in Yaśodā, the (foster-) mother of Kṛṣṇa, who even has the privilege of punishing him—although almost every time, his winsomeness would break down her sternness, and she would give way, as so many mothers do, to adoring ecstasy of affection for her “little darling”. One thinks, somehow, of the “spoiled baby” and the big-bosomed negro Mammy of the plantations of the American South: “Honey chile, yo is jes too cute to spank! Lawsey Daisey! Ah knows yo gits into mischief, but when yo smiles at me like dat, Ah wants to hug yo...Ah could jes’ eat yo, suggah plum, yo is so sweet!”—Or, in more dignified manner, as Dr. Guha points out, after Dean Inge, Suso the German mystic—and we could add many more to the list, such as Gertrude and the Mechchildes—cultivated this rasa to an amazingly effective degree. But the highest—although according to reports other than Guha’s there are yet others in between, such as that of the finance and of the paramour—is that of bridal mysticism, the beloved betrothed in fresh wedlock, madhura rasa. As Guha writes, “In this stage the sole aim of the devotee is to have the closest embrace of his Beloved. He lives in and for his Beloved and gives all he has to his Beloved. His love enwraps him, maddens him. He drinks deep in his Beauty, but his thirst quenches not. He stands ‘eye to eye crossed’ and pressed Him to his bosom; but his craving diminishes not; it is ever fresh and vigorous. If the devotee is a man, he changes sexes, as it were—and probably less figuratively than may appear on the surface, if we approach the experience from the deeper levels of psychoanalysis, for latent bi-sexuality in all individuals is a fact universally attested in all mythology as well as in a large bulk of case histories. Guha notes that even Cardinal Newman recommended the cultivation of this approach to God. We shall be dealing with it more extensively further down, but it is enough for the present to note that it is consummative as well as culminative; it includes all the other sentiments even as it transcends them...
our metaphor, vātsalya represents the tender spray of the Fountain that mischievously drifts away in the breeze, delightfully wetting the bystander, madhura represents the spray in condensed drops that cause the reflecting pool to dance; “How lovely is the Return of the Water! How thrilled is the Pool to receive it! What rapture in being reunited! See how the ripples reach up in the dance! See how they entrance the drops as they seize them!” Thus in the Rāsa-līlā, Kṛṣṇa dances, not only with Rādhā, but with all the Gopīs simultaneously, each thinking that he is theirs alone.

The rest of the rasas, the secondary ones, follow in course: hāsya, (the ludicrous), adbhuta (the sublime), vīra (the heroic), karuṇa (the pathetic), raudra (the furious), bibhatsa (the abominable) and bhayaṁkara (the terrible) all come into play in the relation of the bhakta to his Lord in their proper course, either as preparation for the erotic motifs, or as concomitants. They need not concern us beyond this observation; but it is very important to take note of the fact that within the erotic field as applied in the bhakti context, there is an inversion of order from what is found in the sensuous order: rati, passionate love, in the not-yet-transcended focus is not even properly a rasa, but only a passion, no more, although the rasas may be considered as more or less arising out of it in the process of refinement. But in the devotional focus, it is at the apex: the highest relation between the soul and God is complete passionate all-consuming infatuation or absorption, the embrace of consummate ecstasy in which individuality is forgotten. Sneha, prema, and the other love-relations follow in proper course: Eros, in the strictly ethical context, is ‘sublimated’ into agape; but in the mystical context, agape is re-converted into the higher eros, not by sublimation so much as by way of re-inclusion intransformation, and the camatkārita becomes not only a matter of human enjoyment as such, with only remote participation in the divine, but the completed participation, the full entrance into the Lilās of Kṛṣṇa in complete identification with him; the bhakta is no longer enjoying the Lord, but the Lord is using the bhakta as His mask in the existential drama of energizing the world. The art of living ceases to be conscious and deliberate, for all selfhood is gone, and the Lord, so to speak, becomes the bhakta and the bhakta becomes the Lord.
The pattern of aesthetic and erotic reality, in other words, follows the same metaphysics as in other fields. As there is both liṅga śārīra and sūkṣma śārīra, and both gross matter and sūdha tattva, so here the labdhina-pradhāna, or labhini sakti furnishes the etherealized correlate to the gross emotions. But more than that: bhakti without these higher emotional manifestations is incomplete, truncated in a way that may even prove mentally and physically disastrous. The spontaneity must not be checked, even if that is possible, for these emotional outbursts, like the figure of Moses causing the “living” water to gush out of the dry rock in the Wilderness, are no less than fountains of Grace itself.

But the inversion of order is not limited to the erotic alone. For here, there are tears of joy, sweetness in separation, laughing not at the conquered inferior, but at oneself being overpowered and liberated from shame, and so on, as we find, for example, in the description of Prahlāda in the Bhāgavatam.²

B. N. Roy, also largely from the point of view of the Caitanya tradition, in an article in the (Indian) Philosophical Quarterly (October, 1929) has also delineated the śānta, dāṣya, sakhya, vātsalya and madhura forms of love as bhakti, and concludes, rightly or wrongly, that in Indian tradition, only Vaiṣṇavas have sought to purge love of its sensuality and turn it to its noblest use, namely the realization of God. He also points out—though this is anticipating what we shall be dealing with fully in our final section—that parabhakti, as a culmination of the erotic continuum, is arrived at only by the four stages of dharma (the observance of caste and ritual obligations), karma, prapatti, and Jñāna; but that sūdha bhakti, as synonymous with parabhakti, follows yet after this. Although his treatment is rather ordinary, here he has touched upon an extremely important point which is all-too-inadequately understood even in India. If we parallel this in modern terms, it means that bhakti as the ordinary sort of religion, or as the ‘normal’ outlet for the erotic drive, does, after a ‘conversion’ experience (prapatti) lead on to philosophy, as Hegel teaches; but this is not the end: there is a yet higher stage, in which even philosophy is superseded by devotional love of the purest sort. The fact that so few philosophers either in the West or in India
have reached this higher stage is certainly no reason for discrediting it, much less, as is more often the case, confusing it with the lower forms, in which admittedly anthropomorphism and all the other popular objections to theism do prevail. But love is not such a naive matter. It not only produces its own symbolic forms, but provides internally the means also of transcending these forms, and leading the lover into its own purity, which is nothing less than God Himself as the Ultimate Paradox in which the form of the formless is in coincidence with the creation of forms, and the relationless in full conjunction with the surrelational capacity for the creation of relationalities.

Such, in brief, is the Caitanya tradition. But although perhaps more exaggerated and refined to a greater degree of subtility than the other Vaiṣṇava traditions, it essentially contains nothing different than they. And as a matter of fact, the Southern Śaivite tradition is no “second fiddle” this matter either, although we must neglect it altogether as beyond our scope. But common to all traditions is the classic which bears the name of Nārada, the Bhakti Śūtras, which we cannot disregard, even though we give it only passing notice. Fortunately the Gitā Press at Gorakhpur has made it available in English (as well as the Indian vernaculars), with an excellent modern commentary by Hanumanprasad Poddar.

In the second sūtra bhakti is characterized as having the form of supreme Love (parapremarūpa). The third sūtra adds the characteristic of amṛtasvarūpa, the essential form of nectar—the nectar of the gods, the ānanda of Brahman. The 6th sūtra recognizes the theia mania, the divine madness in which the inversion of content of emotional meanings just discussed is manifested, the ecstatic intoxication with the divine in which love becomes rasa in full force—the rasa of such extreme identification that lover and Beloved exchange places. The 7th sūtra emphasizes that nirodha is a primary aspect; this love is without desire in the lower sense, howsoever keen the passion may be in the unitive state. The 9th and 10th sūtras bring out its exclusiveness: not only is the Lord a ‘jealous’ lover, but his love so totally saturates that all other loves are burnt up automatically, so to speak. The 22nd and 23rd sūtras take up
the theme of the erotic continuum, with stress on the participation in the glories of the Lord as the differentia between the devotion of the gopīs (the full participation) and the devotion of the paramour (wherein there is a certain illegitimacy, because there is a touch of desire instead of complete submissiveness—a note of difference from the Caitanya tradition). The rest of the sūtras deal with details of practice and the description of the fruits of such practice and the superiority of bhakti over other forms of yoga and sādhanā. We may only note the 66th, which describes the unitive state in detail, as the dissolution of the triple consciousness of worshipper, object of worship and act of worship, such as is the relation of the perfect wife and husband; and the 82nd, which gives a typology similar to but more complete than that reported above, e.g.

(1) attachment to virtue and glory—Nārada, Vedavyāsa, Śukadeva, Yājñavalkya, Kākabhusṇḍi, Śeṣa, Sūta, Saunaka, Śāṇḍilya, Bhīṣma, Arjuna, Parīkṣit, Pṛthu, Janamejaya and others.
(2) attachment to Form—Mithilā, Janaka, the women of Vraja.
(3) attachment to Adoration—Śri Lakṣmī, Pṛthu, Ambariṣa, Śri Bharata, etc.
(4) attachment to Remembrance (Recollection)—Prahlāda, Dhruva, Sanaka, etc.
(5) attachment to as servant—Hanumān, Akrūra, Vidura, etc.
(6) attachment to friends—Arjuna, Uddhava, Saṅjaya, Śrīdāmā, Sudāmā, etc.
(7) attachment to wife—the principal queen-wives of Kṛṣṇa, Rukmīni etc.
(8) attachment to parents—Kaśyapa-Aditi, Sutapa-Pṛśni, Manu-Śatarūpā, Daśaratha-Kauśalyā, Nanda-Yaśodā, Vasudeva-Devakī, etc.
(9) prapatti, self-surrender—Hanumān, Ambariṣa, Bāli, Vibhīṣaṇa, Śibi, etc.
(10) absorption in meditation—Yājñavalkya, Śuka, Sanaka, Kaundinya, Sūtikṣṇa.
(11) supreme anguish of separation—Uddhava, Arjuna, gopīs and gopas of Vraja.
Of course, most of the examples given are obscure figures to
the uninitiated Western reader, but that need not detain us here.
It is only enough to note in passing that although apparently
(for it is very important to realize that they are erotic at the
core) non-erotic types are given, the highest type—higher
than the purely contemplative—is that of the anguish of
separation. Different traditions vary as to the weight of the
other forms, but to the best of our knowledge, all Indian
bhakti traditions agree on this point, which we shall now
examine in reference to the Alwar, to whom we now turn.

The first thing that is important to know about them is
that their poetry is anything but ‘original’ (not that we
commit ourselves to the foolish superficial modern cult of
‘originality’—far from it!), but was instead, like the hymns
and allegories of the European Middle Ages, the culmination
of a long historical development. This is fortunately being traced
by Varadācāri Iyer in his Tamil-English edition of the
Tolkappiam the oldest extant Tamil classic on grammar and
prosody (Porul—a term which covers a very wide ground, the
centre of which is the conventions, both of circumstances and
of metaphor, meter, stanza pattern, etc., which governed the
composition of poetry, and especially of erotic poetry). It is
difficult to discern exactly when the allegorizing began which
we find in full force among the Alwars and the Nayanmars;
but it is a patent characteristic even of present-day Tamil
literature that the erotic continuum is just that: there is really
no break between the ‘secular’ and the divine, as most strongly
exemplified, perhaps, in the Tirukural, the classic that has an
aphorism for almost every aspect of human life which is still
the standard governing ‘scripture in almost the whole of Tamil
Nad, from the illiterate villager to the sophisticated vakils of
Madras. Inviting though the Tolkappiam Porulatikaram is to
examine in considerable detail, we here only follow the sketch-
outline given by Govindācārya, with only brief notations from
Iyer’s work.

The whole work is subdivided into two basic topical sec-
tions, the Agaporul and the Purapporul, the former dealing with
the ‘subjective’ and the latter dealing with the ‘objective’
aspects of life as depicted poetically according to the conven-
tions; that is to say, the former deals with Agama, that which is experienced by the ‘mind’ (for it includes not only the specifically mental functions, but the subjective emotions as well), while the latter deals with Puram, the circumstantial, situational factors such as war and peace, education, culture, social life, etc. which contribute to the love-making (for all classical Tamil poetry seems to have been love poetry!) and its progress. And, as with the Sanskrit tradition of poetics, the cannon is highly conventionalized.

Thus love is characterized as mutual, one-sided (kaikilai) or ill-assorted (perumtinai); and proceeds according to the pattern—which we shall see is adopted in full by the Alwars in their depiction of their love of God—of union (punartal), separation (pirital), patience in separation (iruttal), wailing (irangal), and sulking (udal). These are made to correspond with particular physiographical divisions: highland (kurinji), desert (palai), pasture-land (mullai), sea-board (neital) and cultivated fields (marutam). There are also six standardized divisions of the seasons which are also more or less made to correspond with these love-types, e.g., cloudy (kar), cold (kunzhir), early dew (mun-pani), spring (ila-venil) and summer (muzhu-venil). These in turn are made to correspond to the six divisions of the day, e.g., the first hours of the night (malai), midnight (yaman), the small hours of the night (kalai), morning (vaikaram), noon (nanpakal), and evening (erpadu). Beyond this, there is a list of 14 attending persons and things appropriate to the different kinds or stages of love, e.g., deities, nobles, common people (ilindor), birds, beasts, town (pur), water, flowers, trees, food, drum, lyre, tune and occupation.

To the superficial reader, all this may seem trivial, for it is only in the elaborate application of these schemes that their excellence is revealed, and it is indeed unfortunate that we cannot go into the details. But this much is of the utmost importance: quite in the same perspective in which Max Scheler examines love in its sociological import—its unweltsstruktur—here we see how that there is nothing that escapes erotic involvement, so that even the most crude empiricist should have to acknowledge, “truly love is the God, if the word God may mean anything at all!” And these lists,
moreover, all belong only to akam, the ‘subjective’ aspects; the further unweltstruktur of the ‘objective’ aspects we pass over as being less intensively relevant, although it must never be forgotten that they are there.

But the further division of love into wedded (karpu) and furtive (kalavu); and the correspondence of the trysting-places to the proper physiographical locations, and their further correspondence to the elements cannot be neglected. Here we follow Iyer’s explanations.

First, as to the karpu, or wedded love, it must be remembered that polygamy was the common rule, and that most marriages were not according to the present-day Indian custom of matchmaking by the parents with the dowry as the (all-too-often) most important factor, but came about after elaborate romance which often as not ended in elopement which was only later dignified by ceremony and recognition by family and friends. The allegorical possibilities in such a pattern should be readily evident: the Divine love, depending on grace rather than on arrangement or self-effort, begins in secrecy, is consummated romantically, and only later recognized publicly; and the institution of polygamy, as with Krsna, shows how the Lord may and does have many ‘wives’—some of them more faithful than others. Moreover, one interesting detail is that it is at the hero’s (or, the Lord’s) house that the wedding takes place, usually without the knowledge of the bride’s (the soul’s) family. The bride’s mother symbolizing the untranscended previous life is often very much grieved at the loss of her daughter, as we find in the following example given by Iyer

Oh ladies! The girl is the only child of my family. She has eloped with the hero with the sharp spear and immense fighting skill, crossing hills and dales and impenetrable desert tracts. Your people ask me to put up patiently with this grief. I just ask you how it is possible to do it. You must realize my forlorn condition. When I casually see the blue Nochi flowers which my young darling used to play with and the pial on which she played and ran about like the apple of the eye trying to learn walking, my heart burns. Hence I find it very difficult to put up with this grief of mine.
This, of course, could be paralleled with innumerable examples from the Alwars, Nammalwar in particular, whose Tiruvoimoli contains a whole section on this theme. It will be noted, too, how the natural scenery is brought into play. The hills and dales are supposed to correspond with Ākāśa, the fifth Element, ether or space: the formlessness (the via negativa?) of the Divine romance; the desert, which is supposed to correspond with the period of separation, represents the element fire, which symbolizes trial and purgation; and, of course, always flowers, each type of flower representing a different kind of passion or enjoyment.

But after the match is made, all is not "love and roses" in the Browning style. There are jealousies, the pain of separation while the Lord is absent in quest of wealth or military conquest, and love-quarrels are not infrequent, although they are in the end enhancements of the wedded love. These themes occupy a very large section of the Tolkappiam, and one easily gets lost in the maze of illustrations. The pattern, incidentally, seems to be much more elaborate than that found in the famous Gītā Govinda of Jayadeva, although the similarities in many instances are very striking, as for example, in the following example, where the bride refuses to doubt the virtue of her Lord:

My dear maid! Our hero is one who will never swerve from the path of virtue, ever sweet and agreeable. He never remains separated from me. His love and attachment are as dignified as the honey formed on the Sandal wood tree with the pollen obtained from the lotus as well as the sandal wood. Being so, do you think he would get non-plussed on seeing the change in colour perceptible in my forehead, when, he who knows that he is as indispensable to me as water to the world, tries to part from me to earn wealth?

The love-quarrel, first in the words of the Lord:

My dear heart! You get worried or annoyed and have lost all brightness and charm, as the heads, rendered empty by the absence of the golden-lotus flowers, as a result of the demise of the munificent Ėuvvi the Tamil chieftain. I am at a loss to know in what exact relation does she stand so far as I am concerned.

But the lady is not yet appeased:

I showed my resentment and he tried to appease me. He, in
his turn, picked up a love-feud and when I tried to pacify him, he refused to be appeased and persisted in his resentment towards me. Thus the entire night passed without embracing the cool and agreeable chest of the Valūti with the flower-wreath dripping drops of honey and with sandal-paste smeared over his body.

Then, as with Jayadeva, it is the maid who patches up the quarrel (Is the maid not Lakṣmī, the Mediatrix?)

Oh Lord of the boisterous sea-side! You are very cruel. Even when you see your sweet-heart visibly moved on recollecting or recalling to her mind your first union with her, when she was very young, you have not shown any consideration for her. Even when you actually see her weep and her frame considerably reduced—the very frame which was once very bright and beautiful and which looked very fine in the leaf-garment presented by you in the early days of your intimacy with her, you forsake her...

It is some time, in the usual course, before they are reconciled; but when they are, it is on the basis of full and complete existence, governed by the four Puruṣārthas, Kāma, Artha, Dharma, and Mokṣa; and all their retinue harmoniously lend full support. Iyer notes, following Sūtra 193 that this retinue (which we miss in Jayadeva) is twelve-fold, e.g., the maid of the lady-love, the mother, the Brahman or sage, the Brahman friend or associate, the bard, the woman bard or Patni, the youngster who served the hero, the guests, the dancers, the eulogists, the sages and those who witness their final renunciation as vānaprasthas or sannyāsīs after their married life is finished and they are ready to retire in preparation for a blessed death. Perhaps it might be noted that all these roles are to be found in the Rāmāyaṇa and the life of Kṛṣṇa as depicted in the Bhāgavatam and that even in the former, although polygamy is not a factor between Rāma and Sītā, the equivalents of all the rest of the pattern are certainly there. In any case, Love embraces all!

So much for the karpu—inadequately though we must treat it. The kalavu pattern of love is not much different, except, perhaps, in intensity—and for that reason, it seems to have been the more popular model for the Alwars, ending as it usually does in the madal which we shall discuss presently, the flagrant demonstration of desperation in which the lover rides naked
through the streets on a palm-leaf with the image of his Beloved before him.

This Kalavu is likewise the subject for a large section of the Tolkappiam, and we must be content with only random examples of its development. Iyer notes at the outset that such love was not only recognized as legitimate, but that true love was considered as necessary for effectively "discharging the duties of a typical householder and in due course (to) attain salvation or eternal bliss...Though it is styled clandestine, from the ultimate result, namely, the eternal bliss to which the union leads, it is considered sacred. This Kalavu is otherwise known as Kamappuvarcei as it is the result of the passion characterized by ardent love on both sides; Iyarkaippunarcei as the union that takes place in accordance with the rules framed by poets and in perfect unison with the kind of union generally prevalent among the Gandharvas who are the celestial musicians; Deywapunarcei inasmuch as it was effortless and providential; and Mumurupunarcei as both of them had a foretaste of each other's love even before actual sexual contact".

Destiny plays the most important role. It is always a matter of providence that the lovers meet, and the grace of the Deity that gives them the deep love that binds them. Even though in the present life the affair does not turn out to be successful, destiny will reunite them in future births.

If the match is equal, the lady is supposed to have particular characteristics that reveal her passion, e.g., a certain mental relaxation in response to the realization that the love-glance of the male lover was genuine; little beads of perspiration on her forehead, "due to fear or sense of reserve that is generated in her mind as she is being stared at by the hero"; the half-concealed smile on her lips; skilful concealment of her passion from others; etc. And, of course, there are comparable traits suitable to the hero. Together, however, there are typical vicissitudes of mind resulting from the love-passion, such as wondering whether the love will be permanent and constant; weakening of the body because of the troubled state of mind; misconstruing glances of the eyes between the couple; forgetting all pleasures and pastimes; remonstrating with birds
and beasts, and the determination to die if the outcome is not successful.

Then, of course, all sorts of oddities of love-madness follow, such as we see in the following example (translated from one Ilampuranar):

Mistaking the well-formed slender branch of a tree for his lady's frame, the hero will try to embrace it, he will try to reach the Kandal and Karuvilam flowers, taking them for the hands and eyes of the lady. He will touch the tender shoots of the mango tree taking them for the soft and tender frame of his dear love; he will accompany the strutting peacock... because of the delicate and tender grace of the lady perceptible in it, will touch the bright bamboo branch because it looked like the lady's arms; and will not scruple to dive into the water when he sees the dark sand below, because he mistakes it for the (blue-black) hair of his sweetheart.

Then a place is arranged for the secret meeting-tryst, either unaided between themselves, or through a trusted friend—trusted indeed, because there is danger that he too will become infatuated by her charms. ‘The hero may describe her to his friend in such poetry as this:

Oh what to say of her eyes, they are fully blossomed Nilam flowers that shine in the small hill-pool in the Kolli hills owned by the... Cera King...

Oh her teeth, which are as pearls cast aside by the waves of the sea in the sea-port of Korkai which belongs to the Pandyya King...

Oh the colour of her frame, which resembles the tender shoots of the mango tree...

—and so, according to the canons already indicated, in which the proper region, the noble monarchs, flowers, etc. must all figure.

But then comes the separation, and the state of the lady-love becomes so pitiable that she is found out by her mother and friends, and expresses her plight in such language as this:

The hero caught hold of my tresses and after winding round it a flower-wreath smelled it. Nay he did even more. He lifted my hand with fingers soft as the Naravan or the saffron-flower and pressing it in his eyes, breathed hard as
the bellows of a blacksmith’s furnace. He then touched gently my tender breasts ornamented with scented saffron-paste, and with the same hand touched my whole frame like a passionate and loving elephant that tries to please its mate ...

And she describes the lack of understanding of the Mother thus (a favourite pattern for Nammalwar in particular):

The mother is quite unaware of the fact that my anxiety will vanish immediately on my embracing the hero of my choice and seeing the bangles on my wrist become loose, is much worried. She has conferred with the elderly women, consulted augurs by spreading rice and other grains and has been convinced that my present affliction is due to Murugan, the hill deity. With this conviction she has offered prayers to God to the accompaniment of sweet music. Pandāl is duly erected and flowers and festoons are hung ... If, however, as a result of this function I do not get back my former beauty and grace this is sure to produce calumny and reproach; On the other hand, if Murugan accepts the offering and restores to me my former beauty and grace, the hero will think that my love was directed in some other channel and was not genuine, and I shall be forced to give up my life...

Such is her plight that she neglects her ordinary duties, and her parents put a check on her movements. She is sleepless; begins to call the Lover cruel; and makes appeal to various birds, and even the crabs on the seashore, who so easily hide in the sand: and so on: there are 36 standard themes for her.

But when the Lover finally does come, there are still hindrances, such as the presence of the Mother who objects, failure to find her in the proper place in the night, etc. Then, as before in the karpu sequence, the maid comes on the scene and helps the escape as in the following example:

My dear maid, what if we break through the mother’s guard over us, cross our house-limit, proceed to the public place and in the knowledge of all, openly brawl out entreat ing the public to let me know where my hero is staying in order to tell him plainly that he has absolutely no claim to be styled as a righteous person or hero...

And later she goes to the Lover with such appeals as this (which is remarkably like what we find in Jayadeva’s poem):
You have been approaching me for the past few days requesting me to relieve you of your acute mental distress caused by my mistress, feeling however ashamed to address the mistress boldly yourself; but I must tell you that I have no control over her and that she is far from easily accessible to me. She is to me a deity whom I can see in flesh and blood...

And the difficulties continue to mount, but at long last, the maid is successful in reuniting them, and even assists in the elopement, and addresses the hero thus:

Oh Lord of the beautiful hills where the maraiya with its slow pace has its abode near the tall bamboo bush. For your part, you should value even the little halp my mistress is able to render you...and try to protect her as she has no other guardian but yourself.

You must love her ardently now, as she by her lovely tenderness and perfection of womanhood is able to satisfy you in all respects...You must try to keep the same regard for her even when she gets old...You must grow old together with the utmost love and consideration for each other...

Still, there is the obstacle of getting the match recognized by the parents—another favourite theme of the Tamil poets, although we must pass it by without examples, for want of space. Suffice to note that usually the end is happy, and all are reconciled, and all doubts about the virtues of all are settled, and the lovers are accepted as blameless, and there is a splendid public wedding.

Perhaps the Alwar who uses this erotic element most overtly, is Parakalan, or Tirumangai Alwar. He uses to the full the ancient Dravidian tradition of the Madal. This practice, curious as it may seem to others, was evidently quite acceptable in early times in South India, and continued for a long period of history—unique to Dravidian tradition both in practice and in reference in literature, it became almost stock-and-trade in love poetry, and was utilized to the full allegorically not only by Parakalan, but by almost all of the Alwars. A vivid dramatization of the lover’s plight, Varadacārī Iyer has described it thus:

This was another wild practice that seems to have been in vogue in ancient times in the Tamil land. The disappointed
lover, completely failing in his persuasions to bring around the lady-love to marry him, used to mount the madal. A small chariot is improvised with the help of palm-leaves. The disappointed lover smears ashes all over his body, wears the red-silk-cotton and other flowers, draws out the likeness of the girl dear to his heart, places it before him, and passes through the main streets of the city in complete nudity.

For many centuries, it was the privilege only of men to divulge their desperation in this manner, but later, in exceptional cases (after the 8th or 9th century, according to Iyer) women seemed to have followed suit, although seldom unless it was Kṛṣṇa or some other deity who was the unresponsive lover. This is particularly of interest to us, because the Alwars, no less than the followers of Caitanya, dramatically thought of themselves as female in their relations to God, although whether they existentialized their role to the extent that some still do at Brindavan, dressing and behaving as women altogether, even in public—this is a matter of guesswork, as far as we can determine. At least, they were all jealous of Andal for having been born as a woman in the first place. Be that as it may, it is evidently true that bhaktas did overtly declare their śaraṇāgati in this dramatic fashion, and Parakalan’s two great poetic works, as their titles indicate, are literary expressions of his madal. First he condemns as Lokāyatās, crass materialists, all who do not have the sensitivity to fall victim to the Divine Passion: Lokāyatās are those who

......have not melted (or fallen to pieces) at the melody of the flute of the Cowherd (Kṛṣṇa)...have not broken into ecstasy on hearing the bells of the fascinated bulls (returning home in answer to the call of Kṛṣṇa’s flute)...on hearing the tender call issuing from the throat of the bird on the palm tree do not fall into a fit thinking of their own Beloved—whose bodies do not get burned up in the fire of the moon’s clear rays in the sky...do not walk lovesick in the beautiful streets (riding the madal) when the powerful Cupid discharges his flower-arrows from his bow.

This in the Periya-Tirumadal, the larger poem. And in the Sīriya-Tirumandal, the lesser one, in the mouth of the sorceress, who (as we have seen) according to the ancient tradition was consulted to discern what was the trouble with the pitiable lady-love in her pining state, Kṛṣṇa is described:
... who is my very Lord, the lord of a thousand names; O mad damsels! He it is who has caused this unceasing pain to your daughter....

For the Bhakta, as the infatuated lady-love, is always in the role of the daughter, so that the mother, in this case, retorts:

O sisters, whose eyes are flashing rudy with fright! Do you think that if He be the Lord of all, He would not give beautiful tulasī? Is this noth is slave? He must be other (than a gracious Saviour...).

Then in his ('her') own voice, the bhakta describes his (her) own condition:

On mere seeing his blue form, losing control, shivering, I am wandering. Further, the cool breeze, breaking through my frame, causing me passion (or, delusion), I am unable to know in what manner...

... I who am a great sinner, have become the laughing-stock (of all). To me there is no other messenger. My soul is melting like wax near the fire. Even though townsmen are sleeping, my eyes will not close. I am uttering the names of the Supreme Lord.

If the madal was the most desperate form of manifesting the condition of the bhakta, the other forms were scarcely less marked, even if more common. In present-day USA one thinks of rolling on the floor, loud shouting, and dancing deliriously common though it is in the 'revivalist' sects, as something only for the uncultivated masses—simply crude and uncouth, in short. But not so with the Alwars, any more than with Caitanya and his followers. As a matter of fact, it was the most dignified of all the Alwars, king Kulaśekhara—the only one who wrote in both Tamil and Sanskrit—in whose works we find such conduct most extolled. In his Perumal Tirumoli, we find him, long since having resigned his life of officialdom,10—

Moving with devotees, having a mind possessing uncooling love, with unabated emotion of the mind, thinking of Him with tear-drops of ecstasy falling like rain, melting—throughout the day praising Him...dancing with madness, rolling on the floor....

For the sake of Him who is the ocean wherein through His contact the waves are blowing, who is wearing the garland of black tulasī full of bees, who has a mountain-like chest, for Him who has red-lotus eyes, the devotees, through being
overpowered by emotion dancing from place to place sing
and move about, have become and with devotion to my
Lord Śri Raṅganātha....

Further down, he glories in his madness to the extent of saying
that it is really those who (still) cling to the worldly ‘normal’
pleasures that are really mad. And then he goes on through the
relations of patient-surgeon, subject-sovereign, wife-husband,
babe-mother. Still, true to Tamil tradition, and perhaps in
contrast with the Nārada Sūtras, with even greater abandon
than is found in the Gaudyā tradition, he puts the relation of
the illicit lover at the climax. For here, all is completely
spontaneous; here there can be no question of revulsion;
herein, in the clandestine affair, secrecy—the all-important
Secrecy of mystical love—must be preserved. This love is not
just ordinary bhakti, but the ‘extremely one-pointed’ type of
prapatti, and gives the most excited expectation of the fulfilment
of promises; and the secrecy demands solitude for the meeting
and full enjoyment of the rapturous embrace:
The place of enjoyment, should it not be in solitude? The
tryst, should it not be on the sandy dunes? Yet You have
not come...

Desiring the beloved Lover, these hymns sung at midnight
out of extreme absorption in Him...

Prof. Varadacārī has noted well that the factor of grace figures
in all of this erotic transformation (he inadequately calls it merely
sublimation—a term with all-too-naturalistic associations).
This emphasis is probably stronger in our Southern Vaiṣṇava
tradition even than in the Caitanya, and perhaps than the Val-
labha traditions, although it is certainly shared by the Southern Śaivites. He also makes the observation that the arcāvatāra is
always in focus, rather than the merely ‘imaginary’ deity—a
factor which very well adds much (and that at a very profound
level) to the aesthetic implications of the Cult, as well as avoid-
ing the possibilities of perversion, such as is found in the “Tan-
tra of the Left”, in which human devotees themselves indulge
in all sorts of degenerating excesses in their erotic identifications
—it remaining still a moot question whether the degeneration
that did happen in the Gauḍyā tradition came about through
influence “from the Left” or through inherent lack of safeguards
such as this emphasis on the arcāvatāra affords. Varadacārī
also interprets Kulaśekhara’s poem in such a way that although,
as we may, the relation of the paramour comes at the climax, following the first mention of the other relations, it is not taken as the completion of the cycle, for in the passages subsequent to this, there is a second sequence in which a sort of "return at the second level", ending in the dāsa (the servant) relation, so that, as Varadacārī puts it, the sexual aspect of the sublimation is totally purged, and the greatness of the Lord as śeśin—the realization, in short, of the Antaryāmin as "that for whom all else is dear"—alone remains in mind, thus reconciling the erotic transition with the systematic philosophy.

One thing is to be noted, however, and that is that in all the love-relations, Kulaśekhara is not limited by a mere person-to-person context, but finds identification with important figures of mythology, such as Devaki, Kauśalyā, Daśaratha, Kaikēyē and others. We submit that this is extremely significant, both in achieving the fullness of the religious—the bhakti—weight in the experience, and also in preserving mental health. The complications in the modern secular world in which there is no mythology of love are immense; but perhaps the correct inference is rather that there must be a return to mythology, in the spirit advocated by Schelling, for example, or in the sort of reference-context with which Rilke used Orpheus, than an elimination of the practice of mystical devotion altogether, for it is not only the most profound experience available to man, but once one is caught in it, there is simply no 'escape'. And as with all arts, one must observe the canons if one is to become a master, whereas on the negative score, here there can be no question of mediocrity: either one "comes through", or one is totally ruined! One must learn—to play.

This method of identification—wherein upāsanā is not a matter of sādhanā in itself, but is rather the natural (as well as the safe) development-in-re-enfoldment of the inevitable rising passion—is especially stressed by Tirumangai Alwar in his Tirukkarun-Tandaka, wherein he takes primarily the dāsyā, the servant, focus:11

I who am his slave cannot leave Him, who is the treasure, one likened to a pillar of coral, who is the gradually attainable good of all those who remember Him, who ended the life of Karṇa, who is the ruler of the universe, who remem-
bers his devotees, who loving me came and entered my mind so that it could humble itself and praise Him.

He is the Self of all and is to be meditated upon as such. Meditate on him with all his auspicious attributes...

I seek one thing alone: When I experienced in dream the lord of dark colour of the kāya flower, who in his Boar-form carried the earth, coming to me and consuming my mind, speech, acts, and faith, exceedingly I became one who had lost all attractions to other things.

I have begun to live anew by placing my love in Him who is the Lord of all, assuming absolute servitude to Him out of love which even like the waters which merge on the red-hot iron furiously devours them; To me who am enjoying the coming rain-cloud in my mind like the sugar-cane juice, would it be sweet...

Seeking refuge in Him who has the colour of the rain-cloud, who, being in love, is enjoyable like the honey that flows from the hives in the mountain, the All-Supreme—there is no such thing as non-living...

Just as the cloud attains the unsupported sky, so also hast Thou supported me, who has no other way...My mind is steady in nothing. My mind languishes like the termite upon the burning fire, which eats away the wood without noise.

Therefore, O Omniscient Lord of all gods, who assumes sovereignty of the universe (as Vāmana), lustrous Person in all three states, am I without any companion.

My sinful soul's mind refuses to be concentrated. What shall I do O Lord, grant me devotion to Thee! cool-like pearl, luminous supremely like the green stone....I know naught else but the feet of my Master...

Such passion speaks for itself, and elicits only the comment that perhaps true humility comes only in such desperation, for it is not a 'cultivable' virtue such as Fenelon and Francois de Sales and others would have us believe: it comes only after the emotions, imagination, and the very self itself have been 'reduced' to the point of prostration; only the truth—and the truth is passionate devotional love—remains. As a matter of fact, the notion that we can 'enjoy' any virtue, any more than the notion that we can produce any beauty in our own right, is perhaps perverse; for it is only the Lord whom we can
truly enjoy—and that to the extent that we even relish expressing our impatience to him!

Nevertheless, all is not desperation and impatience. Eros in religion, in its consummation, or even at its climax, affords intimacies and even liberties of sentiment with God within, or even beyond, the tenderness of treating Him as one’s own child. Thus Viṣṇucitta, called Periyalwar, (the foster-father of Andal) goes so far as to wish immortality and all other of the most desirable things to the Lord, as we see in the following extracts. We may be reminded, meanwhile, that just as, so to speak, Kulaśekhara was the most aristocratic of the Alvars, yet he found emotional ‘excesses’ quite appropriate, so the learning—for he was one of the most learned men, according to tradition, of his time—of Periyalwar did not prevent him from tender and ‘extravagant’ sentiment. Devoted (like Vallabha) in particular to the Boy Kṛṣṇa, he addresses Him thus in his Tiruppallandu: \(^{12}\)

Let thyself, along with ourselves, thine inestimable servants, live for everlasting years!
Let Her (Mother Śrī) adoring thee as the ornament residing on thy right chest, live for everlasting years!
Let the luminous blazing sharp disc in thy right hand which is capable of annihilating foes, be preserved for everlasting years!
Let thy conch Pāṇicajanya whose sound pierces the clanging din of weapons in battle be for everlasting years be preserved!
O ye who are fit to do service and who are ready, come and carry the meal (food?) and fragrance for God’s worship...

Before being lost in the world of sorrow, O you who have a mind to join our company. Come, giving up desire for anything else, join us. Come with a mind to chant ‘Namo Nārāyaṇāya’ so that the countryside and town may know. Sing ye eternal life to God!...long life eternal do we sing to Thee who art the master who ordered that disc to cut asunder the thousand shoulders of Sana, the master of an army capable of wondrous warfare...

...Performing assiduously the tasks set for us in whichever direction, we shall sing eternal years to Thee who art lying on the luminous serpent during the periods of Tiruvonam (Pralayam)...

To Thee do I sing eternal years, who wast born on an
auspicious day in Mathurā, and who broke the bow and danced on the head of the fire-hooded serpent fierce...

....Uttering thus correctly ‘surrender to Nārāyaṇa’ and pronouncing Thy Names, O Thou who are pure in many (all?) respects, I shall sing to Thee “eternal years”.

For such is the sort of rasa allowed to the true bhakta: līlā-rasa knows no limitations! And, as again and again we cannot reiterate often enough, it is only in this way that liberation from the curse of dogmatism can come; there is no use cursing dogma about God when he allows us playfully and poetically to transcend it, “rendering the Law of none effect”, to use St. Paul’s words in a context which alas he did not himself realize as possible so much as his Lord Jesus who considered severity in religion completely unnecessary because the ‘kingdom of heaven’ is more to be likened to a wedding-feast, or to the playful innocence of little children, or the most erotic of flowers, the lily, or the carefree birds whose life is completely esthetic rather than practical. As a matter of fact, does not the very concept of the praise of God, of ‘giving’ glory to the already-glorious Almighty involve no less a paradox than this which Periyalwar expresses? Yet, just as “God is not bound” neither are our relations to him: We can give Him only what is already His at any rate; but the essential thing is that the ‘giving’ is basically an aesthetic act expressing love and nothing more like the gifts of children to their parents even when it is the parents’ money that the children have used to buy the present with: Freely let us give!—and what better gift than immortality! Or, the same thing, immortal glory: As the Old English translates the Psalm, “O come let us magnify the Lord together.”

—Together! Here is another note especially prominent among the Alvars, which, to say the least, blankly refutes the foolish notion of many critics of Hinduism that it is completely individualistic. But admittedly there is no false duty about the satsaṅga, the chanting ‘Namo Nārāyaṇāya’ so that all the city may hear; and the reason is important: there is no real togetherness at all, unless it is the erotically aesthetic togetherness of the Camatkāra, the contagious enjoyability in free, spontaneous association, of a common rasa, an unlimitable entering into the līlās of the Lord, wherein there is complete
innocence, and no question of high and low, awe and Awed, so that with Bhaktisāra Yoga (Tirumalisai Alwar) we can even make the lovely sportive jest, delighting in the paradox, "Who is my equal? Not even God is my equal, for I have a Saviour, while He has none!"

Or again, those critics of the 'outside world' who jeer at the forms of pūjā (worship) in which the image of the deity—the arcāvatāra—is awakened, 'fed', bathed and clothed and even put to bed, only reveal their own lack of unenergized imagination: they have not learned to play with God, and only pooh-pooh such 'nonsense' as 'playing with Dolls'. But what a delightful thing it can be, and how productive of lyric expressions of delicate devotion, such as we find in the jewel-like Tiruppavai of Andal in which, in the early dawn, she goes singing, not like Browning's Pipā, that "All's right with the world" because God's (far off) in his Heaven, but singing to all to awake and join her in awakening Kṛṣṇa, the idyllic Ideal, so that He may bless them and give them bliss and joy appropriate to the splendid morning. The best of Christian Easter carols in which the people are bid to awake and salute the glorious Resurrection Morning scarcely rival her song (her Tiruppavai) in which (alas, we cannot give the whole of it, for space forbids us here!) she chides her Cowherd Lord for sleeping so late:13

O maid, with eyes like bee-embedded lotus blooms,'
'Tis dawn, and lo! Bright Venus chaseth Mars to gloom.
His Holy Names acclaiming who did ancient tear
The crane-fiends's masked jaws, and root-and-branch did slay
Great Rāvaṇa—the tryst to keep the maids have gone.
The small birds twitter, list; this day is holy, yet
Still slumbererest Thou, and guileless hasten not to plunging bath in bristling cold and thus: The bliss we pray make ours!

Or again, on the same theme, a stanza from Bhaktāṅghrirenū (Thondaradippodi's) Tirupallai-azuichi:14

How many deities, gods that thronging wait
Thy doors! Didst hear through night the sweet dawn notes
Of stirring melody, from drums and lyres
And cymbals, violin and reedy pipes?
These blending with the liquid-throated muse
Of Gamuds, Kinnaras, and Yakṣas bright
What symphonies they make? Divan then grant
And Joy Divine. Rise, Raṅgam’s Gracious Lord!

There is another note, very often struck by the Alwars which in India is shared only by their Śaiva Siddhānta counterparts, the Nayanmars, and that is penitence: “What a sinner I am (or was!)?” In every case, where the theme of tapas comes in, it is in this context: asceticism for them was not a matter of self-effort after particular boons from the deities, but if not simply an expression of their conversion-zeal, it was more: a dramatized complaint to the Lord that he had so long kept them in bondage to the ‘old’ life instead of to Himself, or a wail of lament that they had been so irreponsive to His invitations, that closely approaches becoming a rasa in addition to the others more universally employed. It becomes a rasa for the simple reason that it is so closely linked with love: love that was unrequited by the devotee at the beginning, and later seemingly unrequited by the Lord. Thus, in Tondaradippodi’s Tirumalai which is autobiographical, he not only records that it was the Beauty of Śrīraṅgam—beauty greater than that of the prostitute who had had him enmeshed in her clutches—that caused his conversion, but going on to say how he had lost his brahminhood and all other designations of caste and station because of his abandonment to the servitude of the maddening Divine Love. It is sometimes said by controversiasts that this note of repentence, nevertheless, is not to be compared with that in other religions, because it presupposes a different concept of evil, in which the Semetic idea of ‘sin’ has no parallel. That need not concern us directly here: but in the following excerpts it seems to us that at least we have something at least comparable—say—to some of the best hymns of the Wesleys:  

I have no place or plot of ground, nor relatives, no friends:
On earth I have not attained, thy lotus-feet
O supreme Godhead, O luminous cloud-head Form,
Kanna! I implore Thee Lord resident at Śrīraṅgam!
Who else have I except Thee to protect me?

In my mind there is no purity,
In my mouth no words of affection have I
In anger I utter words of piercing insult.
O Lord wearing the fragrant garland of tulasi residing
in Śrīraṅgam surrounded by the river Ponni (Cauvery)
O Master, who have me as thy slave! Hereafter tell me as
to what is open to me.
Nor do I belong to the society of *tapasvin*
Nor to the wealthy class; nor am I anything to my relatives,
like brackish water;
Having become enslaved by the crimson lips of ladies I have
become a knave;
O Lord of Śrīraṅgam Thou hast in vain given me this
birth!
O Kanna, having a body like grouping clouds Thou who
residest in the beautiful
Śrīraṅgam surrounded by groves where the bees are humming
tunes!
Knowing not any means to attain Thee, I have become a
knave among men and
stubborn. Stubborn am I! Stubborn am I!
Having let go all that is true and having got fully caught
in the snares of
women, I have become shameless, O Master, Lord
of Śrīraṅgam!
Out of desire for thy grace Have I come and stood before
Thee. Alas, false am I! False am I!
My Lord who once for all assumed the rulership of the
worlds by covering it (with thy feet—e.g. as
Vāmana)! None other than Thee. O red-lotus-eyed
God, will I serve.
(My) Breath! (My) Nectar! O my Master in dwelling
within me as self! Sinner that I am, I shall not think
at all of any other but Thee.

For as even Nietzsche said, it is *Beauty alone that will make us penitent*. The great Russian philosopher-theologian Bulgakov
(whose ideas of the Divine Motherhood we have already taken
note of) dwells at considerable length in one of his major
works (*The Unfading Light*) on how it was the beauty of the
Caucasian Mountains that brought about his conversion. But
more than that: the whole cathartic experience of conversion,
penitence, reconciliation, adoration, love of all in-and-as God,
is this not itself perhaps the most beautiful existential Drama
known to man? It is indeed really odd that the conversion
experience has almost been limited in treatment to the moral
sphere, when its dianoetic and aesthetic factors are at least as important as its ethical value; and it seems to us that in its wholeness the experience has more of beauty—of existential rasa, so that others, as well as the convert, rejoice at it—than of anything else. For as Bulgakov, along with our Indian aestheticians, says, Beauty is a matter of Revelation—often enough revelation to those who formerly were unworthy—and revelation is a purifying experience. Significantly enough, it was not only natural beauty, but also the Sixtine Madonna in Dresden that furthered this revelation-conversion of Bulgakov, not unlike that of our Alwar:16

Thou that Thyself touched my heart and it fluttered at Thy call. There the eyes of the Heavenly Queen, walking in the clouds with the pre-natal Child, looked into my soul. There was in them an immense power of purity and prophetic self-sacrifice (italics his)....I could not restrain myself; my head was dizzy, my eyes shed joyful and yet bitter tears, and with them the ice melted in my heart, and some vital knot was being united. It was not (just) an 'aesthetic' emotion, nay, it was an encounter, a new knowledge, a miracle...I (then a Marxist !) involuntarily called that contemplation—prayer.

Thus it is that we arrive again at the Beauty of God as identical with his (personal) Love, which has all forms of desire, sentiment, emotion, imagination and play as its root and fruit. For with the Alwars, and the Ācāryas who followed them, as with the Scholastics (and, as we shall see, St. Bonaventura in particular) this is the 'whole picture', the telos of the beautiful and the erotic, and not the field of (abstract) 'Ideas' as Plato taught. It is the activating Presence of the Supremely Personal Godhead, (supremely personal by reason of his being Love itself, love that re-enfolds all that it produces) and not a field of abstraction, which could give the ground neither for passion nor for penitence, that makes beauty as well as its enjoyability possible and makes not only works of art communicative of their value, but life itself—human life in all its problems and perplexities—into living beauty, creatively infecting all its touches while dancing on into unlimited Openness that has no end. Thus Nammalwar, not only through the long and intricate development of his great Tiruwoimoli, but perhaps in
better epitome in his *Tiruvasariyam* and *Tiruviruttam* and *Periya Tiruvaradadi* has expressed the *Bhavanā Sundara* (as it is technically termed in our tradition) in much (for he himself marvels at its inexhaustibility) of its many-rooted plenitude, as we see, for example in the verses which follow.

First, the Lilā of transcendence, without which it is all nonsense—or rather, which is nonsense, the ‘foolishness’ of God, (as it is called in the New Testament) which can yet be entered into this life, or, more accurately, as a function of grace, into which God takes us seductively: God the Paramour, the Prostitute (!) whose saints are his pimps, in bondage to their Lover, but not only for his own or their own sake, but for the sake of fulfilling the Desire of the Nations:17

Knowing that the experience of the Divine Lord is quite different if you go to that world wherein the eternals reside, it is not a difficult thing. Even if you desire it you can enjoy that (world eternal, the empyrean) even here on earth. O Mind, who are devoted to the Lord, renouncing these (untranscending) enjoyments, devote yourself to the praise of Kṛṣṇa’s feet alone.

It should be obvious by now that such experience can by no means be that of knowledge alone, which cannot give the ‘dancing into the Openness’ (as we now call it) that bhakti is; for knowledge belongs to having, while bhakti melts the very being into Being in a delight that is more than its own:18

The soul, through its intense desire to wear it on its head, abandoning a puerile end, melting itself in devotion and love, in that enjoyability—delight of transcendent nectar-flood struggles to attain the feet resounding with the bangles of my Lord the world-creator-devourer.

Let it. If lordship, established place and imperishable strength over the three worlds be got without liberation, will knowers aim at that?

Moreover, the Openness is not just a vacuum, but a flood:19

Has the sky embraced the ocean, or
Has the Ocean gone over and embraced the sky?
Is it the time when the Lord’s earth was carried away by the sky and deluging ocean, or
Is it the rainy season?
O Beautiful one! from thy deep ocean-eyes streams of water are flowing!
And a flood of rasa-love, moreover, as we find in the tenth ten of the ninth hundred of the Tiruvoimoli:

People at large must become filled with Holy love to God. *He is love itself...* Kṛṣṇa the consort of Nila Whose eyes are as beautiful as to cause shame to the eyes of a deer is to be worshipped by all. He is full of spiritual qualities. He is as tasteful as honey itself....He is love itself to those who love him in truth.

But not among the only the Alwars is this erotic continuum developed. It is already in the Rāmāyaṇa as may have been surmised from the various examples—Hanumāna, Lakṣmaṇa, Sītā and others—noted in passing. It is difficult, however, to find the paramour relation in the Rāmāyaṇa in a legitimate context; Sītā remains faithful to Rāma, in spite of all the allurements and magical wiles of Rāvaṇa, and, of course, Rāma, even to the extent of leading the great battle in order to rescue her, and although he does demand a proof—and a very extreme proof at that, namely a trial by fire—of her chastity, never thinks of dallying, or even of being tempted by any other than his beautiful Sītā. The story remains, at the purely narrative level, exciting enough to blind some to its allegorical or even its esoteric significance, in which the metaphysics of erotics is fully expounded. Rāma himself signifies embodied God-Beauty-Love as Avatāra, and the others the human soul in its various aspects as his lovers. Govindācārya, in his *Metaphysique of Mysticism* (Section XI) suggests one may find in Rāma’s relation to his devotees not only the type of scheme which we have outlined, but the following six-fold gradation of the Soul’s (erotic) progress into God (the *Akara-sakta*, as it is called, having full authority in the southern tradition of Rāmāyaṇa interpretation) each of the grades, it may be noted, representing or corresponding to a definitive rasa; as also aspects of bhakti:

1. *Ananya-arha-śesatva*: by Him appropriated, e.g., the servant relation, or even stronger, the relation of organic indisposability, like the light from the sun to the sun itself or, as in Marcel’s thinking, the indisposability relation of the body to the Self. Govindācārya suggests Sītā at the outset as illustrating this, but we submit that it really characterizes all the faithful characters in the epic, wherein the soul is basically
conceived of a feminine (Sītā) but secondarily masculine
(Bharat, Lakṣmaṇa, Hanumāna, etc.).

(2) Ananya-sarāṇatva : to Him entrustable, e.g., the soul
committed to God’s care, as exemplified by Sītā in Rāvaṇa’s
clutches, in which state she declares even to Rāvaṇa himself that
nothing of evil can happen as long as she relies on Rāma’s
protection. This, obviously, corresponds to the child-parent
relation, although without the reversal of the relation which
comes in the Lilā state—for all these relations are ‘reversible’
in this sense : at first, in the ordinary upāsanā context, the soul
always identifies itself with the subordinate character, passively;
in the Lilā phase, however, (which corresponds, in a way, to
the Viśva-rūpa vision of Arjuna, for it is ‘fearsome’) the Lord
becomes the passive ‘Actor’ while the soul ‘dominates’ Him;
and—although this is not so much emphasized in the Gauḍyā
tradition, and only appears occasionally (as in this present
schema) the Southern tradition—finally there is a return to the
first condition again, and the Lord appears again in the ‘nor-
mal’ state, causing the higher longing-in-separation.

(3) Ananya-dhṛtītva : with God, consolate, e.g., correspond-
ing to the Lilā, in which there is a certain equality, or
samśīṣa with the Lord, illustrated, according to Govindācārya,
by Sītā’s insistence to accompany Rāma to the forest—for, be
it noted, in this stage, God takes on the most unworthy or even
uncouth form, as Tulasi Dāsa describes at great length and with
considerable emotion.

(4) Vyātireka-adhṛtītva, e.g. without God, disconsolate : the
Lilā past, the sweet separation as, perhaps, the delight which
Sītā takes in undergoing her trial-by-fire; or, according to
Govindācārya the threatened separation, as with Lakṣmaṇa,
who also could not brook separation from Rāma, when he
leaves for the forest, or at any other time.

(5) Tad-eka bhogatva, e.g., the soul enjoyed by God, as the
only reason for Sītā’s preserving her life was so that she could
be enjoyed by Rāma. Or, again, if we are correct in delineating
the ‘reversal’ God enjoyed by the soul, as when Sītā is re-united
with Rāma when he returns to rule in full glory, even though
further trials and separation yet are in store before the final
stage.
(6) Tad-eka-nirvāhyatva, e.g., the final fulfilment, in which “God is all-in-all”, as exemplified, according to Govinda-cārya, in Sītā’s confidence that Rāma will be victorious. For, perhaps, it has at least a double aspect (or two levels) if not a triple: the fulfilment in expectation (as Govinda-cārya thinks) in ecstasy, as at Rāma’s victory over Rāvana, and in the fulfilment of death-in-beatification, following the final fruitful separation, as when Sītā returns supernaturally to the Earth from which she sprang in birth, after her exile during which her twin sons were born. For God, both in the amorous approach, and during the enjoyment, and in the period of separation-in-trial, remains both avyakta and apparent in aesthetic form; but in the final consummation, the final fulfilment, the immolation, avyakta only, but bringing the soul also into that ‘formless form’.

Thus the aesthetic movement, as Prof. Varadacāri has discovered, consists in ascent, descent, and the final atmā-nikṣepa, the “regress into God”, quite according to the same pattern we have explicated in the Upāsanā chapter. The aesthetic component, then, does not constitute a distinctive movement in itself, but rather gives its enhancement, the enhancement of freedom as growing out of the root of love, just as the upāsanā aspect gives the essence of necessity as growing out of the root of knowledge (jñāna, gnosis), and the prapatti aspect gives the substance of obligation as growing out of the root of the moral bond (karma). But it is bhakti (and prapatti, in another dimensions) that is the common sap that gives the Life to all. This, of course, is only a suggestive schema, and must not be pressed too far, attractive though it be, for we must never forget that all schemata are only abstractions out of the infinite dimensionality of the spiritual life—which, after all, is Life, and not system; it belongs to this dimension of aesthetic (but ontological) analogy, and not to the analytic or the analogical: Hence it is that it is proposed here, where it becomes clear, and not previously.

It is only by way of a small appendix to this topic of the erotic continuum in the Indian field that we add two notes before beginning to examine the theme in the works of St. Bonaventura. The first is the answer to the almost inevitable question as to what extent Rāmānuja Himself continued in the
strain represented by the Alwars. The answer is difficult, if we take only his Śrī Bhāṣya as evidence, and not much easier even if we include his Gītā Bhāṣya. He was himself not so much of a poet, admittedly, as either his precursors or most of his successors. And yet, within the limitations even here the same spirit certainly prevails. But as we have already seen in the excerpts from his Šaṅkāgati-Gadya, and certainly as we could discern from his other minor works were we at liberty to examine them, and most of all, from his biography, there is more than plentiful evidence that what the Alwars achieved in their literary productions, Rāmānuja transmitted in his very life: not only in his relation to his Divine Lord, but also in his dealings with the souls who entrusted themselves to him, (for they were the primary material he dealt with—the artist of the soul more than of the pen) everything was there.

As for the Gītā Bhāṣya, a re-examination of the analysis we have already given in reference to prapatti should be more than sufficient to demonstrate that the erotic continuum is nevertheless not absent, and well supported by the text itself. As a reminder we may make only two allusions as representative, e.g., in his introduction to the VII Adhyāya, he offers as one of several definitions of Bhakti, that it is “Meditation accompanied by love (sneha)”; and on ślokas 54 and 55 of XVIII, he links the attainment of such love with the Līlā concept and that in turn with the intrinsic Beauty of the Lord Himself, which is entered:

...he attains supreme bhakti to Me, i.e., bhakti...which consists in feeling Me to be extremely dear to himself, I being the Lord of all; one whose play (Līlā) consists in the evolution, sustenance, and dissolution of the whole universe; ...Ocean of the nectar of Beauty; one possessed by Śrī; one having eyes like a lotus; and his own Master... The meaning is: he attains Me by the infinite and profound Bhakti which is bound to arise after perceiving, in truth (aesthetically, as Revelation?) My nature, character, qualities and glory... Bhakti is, indeed, spoken of as the means of...entering into the Lord in truth...

It seems that no comment is needed here, for if one thinks about it at all, within the limitations of a commentary, Rāmānuja here has in mind almost all (and perhaps much
more!) that we have surveyed in the Nārada Sūtras and the Alwars. Indeed, it should be quite clear that his true intention cannot be made clear without this background! The other note which we add is Vallabha’s view (or, at least, that of his followers) as reported by Das Gupta\textsuperscript{20} that Rāmānūja’s view of bhakti was too much linked with jñāna, or at least with smṛti (recollection), rather than with intense enjoyment uncomplicated with other factors, the erotic continuum being, evidently, only that in its core, and without its unwelt. We only submit, by way of a tentative rebuttal or defence of Rāmānūja, first that Vallabha also regarded jñāna as an aṅga (‘limb’) of bhakti; and that the criticism cannot stand in the light of the Tamil ‘literary’ tradition which was as much part and parcel of Rāmānūja’s own devotional life as of his predecessors and successors, in which (although we have not so explicitly delineated the same stages according to all of the same terms) the full seven-stage continuum of love as listed by the Vallabhas (bhāva, prema, praṇaya, sneha, rāga, anurāga, and vyasana) can easily be found, and in full intensity—even to the extent that for them as well as for Vallabha, “The passion of vyasana for God, which is the deepest manifestation of affection, is the inability to remain without God (tadvinā sthātum aṣaktīḥ); it is not possible for a man with such attachment to stay at home and carry on his ordinary duties.”

But if the ordinary duties become difficult, the ‘extraordinary’ Lilās are all the more compelling, and much more fruitful: they are what make history; they are the field in which the Drama of Life itself becomes full of bhakti rasa, and institutional charisma—at least until it becomes corrupted or degenerate by mixture with the times—becomes a thing of beauty, of love and of holy freedom, such as is related by Govindācārya in his Divine Wisdom of the Dravida Saints.\textsuperscript{21} Rāmānūja was so fond of Nammalwar’s verse (Tiruvoimoli ix:5:1)

Hark, Koil-bird! distress thou not my soul,  
By thy and thy consort’s coolings of love.  
For ye bid not my soul’s Lord, Kṛṣṇa, come;  
Thou bustlest so to rape my soul for Him?

(and the rest of the decad, in which all of the different birds-of-love and even beetles are addressed in traditional style as
reminding the devotee of different aspects of Kṛṣṇa’s beauty and the love it provokes)
that although through a misunderstanding between him and the minstrel-in-chief at Śrīraṅgam Temple he was staying away, when it was announced that that decade was to be celebrated on a certain day, Rāmānuja forgot the estrangement and joined the ceremonial singing and peace was restored. Such was the deep-seatedness of the aesthetic nature of his devotion! And on another occasion, he carried the day by a little lilā of his own. Some boys playfully had drawn a plan of the Temple in the sand, and were imitating the ceremonies of the priests within, even to the extent of (sacredly so!) making offerings to their mock-deities. Quite to the surprise of the ‘pious’ bystanders, Rāmānuja joined in the play, prostrated before the ‘mock’ deities with great delight (in spite of all his ‘dignity’) and even accepted as his alms for the day the sand which the boys were offering as ‘play-food’ to the images.

For such is the way of those who would make either religion or art a living thing; such it is, and not severity and austerity, that makes the true saint; bhakti as the common essence of art and religion not only transmutes, but etherializes both into the art of spontaneous living!

Moreover, it is only out of such spontaneity, such etherialization of that peace and goodwill will be established between the nations in our time. Aesthetics and politics are not so far apart as some would think; for as Scheler has shown, they are both rooted in eros. After all, are not Nations also subject to the same conditions and open to the same possibilities as individuals? Is not Peace the most beautiful thing on earth, the most glorious rasa of God?

Such etherialization may not have been demonstrated in the life of St. Bonaventura as much as in the life of his Master St. Francis. But it is to his credit that he did work it out philosophically with thoroughness scarcely equalled in the history of western philosophy.

We have already had some foretaste of this in previous citations, especially those from the Minor ‘Mystical’ works, which are indeed all prose-poems of great beauty. As a reminder of this strain in his thought-life, we may only turn again to the
section of the *De Triplica Via*, which bears the sub-title of *Incendium Amoris*, the Kindling of (the fire of) Love, in which he gives seven grades of the etherealization about which we are concerned at present. First it is to be noted that it is to the *sweetness* of love that the etherealization is directed, and that by the lifting (susceptionem) by the Holy Spirit, the Antaryāmin. The first step or grade is *vigilance* and *promptitude of response* to the wishes and promptings of the Divine Spouse, so that the soul can say, in the verse of the psalm “O God, Thou art my God; early will I seek thee” and of the Canticle, “Even while I slept, my Heart kept vigilance”, and of the prophet, “My soul desired Thee in the night but even in my spirit and in the fore-chamber of my heart I kept morning vigil for Thee”. The second step or grade is that of *confidence in the certitude* of the Divine Spouse, so that the soul (in another verse of the psalms) may say, “In Thee, O Lord will I trust; I shall never be confounded in eternity” and (in the words of Job) “Even if He slay me, yet in Him will I trust.” The third step or grade is that of the *inflaming of desire* (concupiscencia—a term ordinarily connoting lust: *prema* or rather, *rati*), whereby the soul may use this verse of the psalms, “As the heart desires the water-brooks, even so longs my soul for Thee, O God.” or of the Canticle: “My desire (dilectio) is as strong as death”; or “For I languish from love (amore)”.

Fourthly, a certain excellence, or *elevation* (excedentia), because of the celestial nature of the Spouse, concerning which he uses the psalm-verse so beautifully celebrated in the Brahmas Requiem; “How lovely is Thy Dwelling-place, O Lord of Hosts!” or the cry to the Spouse “Take me after Thee”, and the words, again, of Job are pertinent: “My soul chose to be suspended”.

In the fifth grade, there is gratification (complacency) which gives quiet to the soul. And this comes because of the beauty (*pulcritudo*) of the Spouse, and then the words (of the Canticles) “My beloved is mine and I am his” and “My Beloved is fair and ruddy, the choice among thousands”.

But that is not the end, as might be supposed. From quiescence, the Lover must go on to *plenitude* (perhaps the ‘descent’ which we have previously discerned, along with Varadacārī—
although whether this is so elaborate as with Aurobindo who has influenced him remains moot), which delights the soul with happiness (laetitia), which is expressed in the psalm-verse: “In the multitude of the sorrows that I had in my heart, thy comforts have refreshed my soul.” and in the words of St. Paul, “I am filled with consolation, with superabundant joy”.

And finally, a certain clinging or even glueing to the Spouse by virtue of a certain boldness (fortitudo) of love: “It is good for me to cling steadfastly to God” and, “Who shall separate us from the love (caritas) of Christ?” And as a concluding note, he adds a warning about (a higher) vigilance, so that the delectability may be preserved, no longer as desire, but as fidelity, in which alone the sustained excellence (excedentia) of union (copula) and kisses and embracing become the common rule.

This, of course, is already within the mystical re-enfoldment, within the Lilā of the relation of lover and Beloved. But he also has, as most Christian mystics have had, a great devotion to the Infant Jesus, and devotes a whole little tract to the topic divided into five parts according to the traditional festivals of the Annunciation, the Nativity, the Holy Name, the Epiphany (the worship of the Magi), and the Presentation in the temple, or the Circumcision. It is unnecessary to examine these at length; we only note that the keynote of his treatment, as we find it in the prologue, is far from the usual sermonizing, and is rather, in his own words, a matter of the devotion of the ‘mind’ (e.g. in the sense of contemplation in its full aesthetic richness) that is “sweeter than honey by far, and gives delight more deep than the perfume of the richest fragrance, more sweetly (dulcius) inebriating and more perfectly consoling and comforting (than anything else known to men)”; and that, as he develops the theme of the relation of Mary to the Divine Infant [in which, of course, he come almost imperceptibly—(and so much the better for that, for these things can never be forced as a ‘technique’!)—to identify himself with Her], he again considers the sweetness and delicacy of Her delight—as ours—in nourishing Him (with her milk, as we with meditations) in washing Him (as we with the pure fountation of our tears of devotion), in clothing Him in the veil-like infant-
garments to protect him in secrecy from undue exposure (as we with chaste desires), and in carrying Him with great affection (dilectio) at her bosom (as we in our heart-of-hearts according to the interior fondlings of the imagination) and kissing him with great tenderness.

From these examples, we could easily pass on to others illustrating the other relationships of slave or servant, friend, etc. etc., which are too numerous to mention, the former being so frequent in the New Testament itself that it has always been standard in Christian tradition, even in these days of democracy; and for the latter we need only be reminded of the discussion in a previous chapter as to whether Jesus loved John more than Peter. Thus, we can conclude that these matters are of a rather universal order, extremely intensively, intimately personal though they remain. But there remains one aspect of the ordo amoris, of the erotic continuum, in Western Tradition—for it has basically permeated the whole of the culture, as we may see even in Goethe and Rilke, for example, who were not necessarily ‘Christian’—and that is the relation of Love and Death. Aside from its historical roots (for it is probably a synthesis of the Greek sense of tragedy and the Germanic Liebe tod as much as it is specifically Christian) it is nowhere better symbolized than in the Crucifix, with which the Rose became associated (whether this was taken from the Sufi tradition or not) as intimately as the Lotus has been associated with the Indian concept of peace and blessing and plenitude. Both flowers, be it noted, have a profound erotic aroma about them; but they have a different relation with death which constitutes somewhat of a problem for comparative studies. The sacrificial aspect of blessedness of a suffering death might tempt Christians to assert a certain superiority. But on the other hand, it must emphatically be remembered that because of the doctrine of transmigration, the dominant Indian attitude towards death could never be the same as that of the European. If the Rose gives both pain and fragrance, the Lotus gives both intoxicating quietude and reflective repose, as we find in the following sonnet:

Which, then, would you have of me, the Lotus
Or the Rose? For you must choose, O you
Who seek my peace; and I must take of the two
The one unchosen. (Why does life divide us?)
The rose, with subtle fragrance drowned in dew,
Its crying ecstasy of bloom held hushed
By dawn's still breath, unfolds a peace full-flushed
With blood-red rapture (what hides the thorn from view?)
Within a pool of sighs, the Lotus, hushed
In silent slumber, sinks into the gloom
Of fundamental Nothingness: the bloom
Of lethal lassitude, un lulled, unrestful,
Unbuds to breathe a depth unknown. Which, then,
Do you choose, the three of death, or the thorn?

For to the Buddhist or the Hindu, it is as much a problem to
understand how the Christ died a violent death, as it is difficult
for the Westerner to understand how there is no cult of
martyrdom (which to the cultured Hindu is nothing less than
masochistic barbarism) associated with the traditional Avatāras
and leading saints of the Orient. Thus, perhaps the difference—
which is not to be overlooked, if right understanding is to be
gained—is more of kind than of excellence.

Be that as it may, it would be unfair to St. Bonaventura
to omit his treatment of the "Rose of the Love" as we find it in
his elaborately allegorical work On the Mystical Vine. We give
the paragraph in full, along with the one following it, on the
"Rose of the Passion"28

We must carefully weigh the ardour of the rose of love (amor)
and very diligently see who, why and of what sort and how
much our Lover loved us, merciful and marvellous as He
was, that lover of ours, than whom nothing is greater, nothing
more divine, nothing stronger (can be thought of), in
whom every spirit puts his trust, for "Thou art my God".
In this word is truly comprehended who our Lover is, for
He is God; and why He loved us, may be elicited from the
following word, for He loved us not that He should take
anything from us, for "He had no need of any good", but
by His gratuitous love (caritas). For if there be anything of
good in us that He might seek for, it is not of ourselves but
from Him we have it. Of what sort He loved us is exposed
by Himself when it is said, "Although up to now we were
enemies, yet we are (now, by Him) reconciled to God. For
the just for the unjust, the beautiful (Lamb) for the goats
He alone the good and the pious greatly loved (adamavit)
us, though we were sinners and impious. O such dignity!
Now truly we see how much He loved us. Who could
sufficiently speak of it?
See, how that in the exposition of this word we necessarily have the Rose of the Passion conjoined with the Rose of Love, so that the Rose of Love might grow full-red (rubescat) in the Passion, and the Rose of the Passion might be set on fire (ardescat) by the fire of love. For such was the love of our Lover, that, the ardour of love compelling (cogente) Him, the redness of the passion might burn (incinderet) and surrender His soul to death, even the death of the Cross, nor briefly undergoing it, but from the beginning of his arising even to the finish of his dying enduring with greatest difficulty (durissime perdurantis). Therefore all that (our) good Jesus suffered in the days of his flesh, even to the redness of the Rose of the Passion, with what often-repeated effusions of his most sacred blood He made it roseate-redded! But all that He suffered, we cannot enumerate: nor how it afflicted Him to go through with the life-giving (salutiferas) effusions of His blood, that the things to be yoked to his commemoration might be the more sharply imprinted in our memory.

It is interesting to note, with Fr. Bonfoi, that true to such expression—for he felt it in the very core of his being—St. Bonaventura sometimes spoke of himself as *Ego, servus Crucis*: the servant of the Cross; and that, historically, this cult of the Passion, which influenced European art for many centuries after him, was primarily a Franciscan development, replacing the old Anselmian interpretation of the Atonement with its harsh legalistic slant. Following M. Emile Male, Bonnefoi says that it constituted “a new form of piety, a renewal of sensibility”, whose emphasis was on the *humanity* of the Saviour, and on an affective approach to it. Bhakti and Rasa, in short, found the proper coalescence in this Franciscan movement, which perhaps is the key secret to the power and popularity with which this movement swept Europe like a conflagration of new life (if we may mix our metaphors), uniting simple peasants and proud nobility (who lost their false pride in the process in a pattern which, pray God, may be paralleled in our own time!)

However, this coalescence of bhakti and rasa—all the rasas at that—was not limited to the cult of the Passion. Toward the end of the *In Hexaemeron*, St. Bonaventura gives an allegorical treatment of the twelve sons of Jacob who according to the Old Testament itself were the founders of the twelve tribes of Israel, which seems to unite the different relationalities of
bhakti which we have been discussing with the different rasas in a way which could be realized only when devotion has become an art. We shall not follow his own treatment of the theme, nevertheless, but rather that of the somewhat later anonymous little work bearing the title, Meditation of a Poor Man in Solitude, where it is elaborated with even more richness than Bonaventura himself found in it. In both treatments, these twelve are divided into four groups which are supposed to represent the four sides of the Heavenly Jerusalem—and all the rest of the allegory associated with that—as portrayed in the Apocalypse. But even without this level of the allegory (which we shall neglect somewhat along with many other details as being too involved for our present purpose for it involves so many other things associated with the number twelve) there still remains more than sufficient illustration of how not only bhakti and rasa may be unified, but how the erotic continuum is manifested in its dynamic of transcendence and etherealization in the unification.

First, then, Judah (Latin, Judas): He is the “first spiritual son in the same way that faith is the first illumination of the mind in knowing God.” Faith, of course, is the substance of things hoped for, but as yet unseen, the first necessity if any transcendence is to take place—or, in the allegory, that by which Judah was conceived, for his mother had been sterile, as all love must be if it remains at the merely sensuous-empirical level. Faith is the “bracelet of love” symbolizing espousal to the Divine, or that which renders the two eyes of the betrothed (e.g. intelligence and affection) “more beautiful than wine”—wine which only strong and mature adults may drink, but which gives them the inebriation of spiritual joy and gladness. Or again, it is represented by the jasper stone of the Apocalypse, which is green, signifying the “unstainable faith of the living” which prevails against the phantasms of life at the naive level.

Then Ruben. He is the “son of Vision”, as his name is supposed to indicate, commemorating his mother’s rejoicing, who had exclaimed, “The Lord has regarded my humility”. As such he represents the “humble veneration of the supernal majesty”, the holy fear that responds to the mysterium tremendum without which the mysterium fascinans may not be realized, for such fear
and love are inseparable, as is exemplified in his objection to the other brothers’ selling Joseph into bondage. The “pet” son of Jacob, perhaps the most tender-hearted of the twelve, he was timid (the Latin word timor means fear in this sense), and yet his father spoke of him as “the strength and the foundation of my house”. It is noteworthy that such timidity never knows sorrow, while at the same time it fortifies against concupiscence; looks for mercy from God, and carries the greatest solicitude for others. Thus the level in the transcendence he represents is that of sensitivity, wherein quality becomes more important than quantity. The stone that is his is the sapphire, “having the similitude of the serene heaven”, which represents hope—the hope of the saints, “whose conversation is in heaven”—and is supposed to have the power of repelling demons, breaking the chains of slavery, and of effecting reconciliation among enemies.

Next comes Goad, representing “the virile custody of interior sanctity”, the purity of heart which enables one to see God the rigour of abstinence from superfluous delights (which for the artist as well as the religionist, and all the more as the two becomes the same, is the first major hurdle to get across before productivity can come unhindered). And yet Goad is represented as ‘happily clad’: allegorically, clothed with his loins bound up by truth—truth which gives strength, the noble strength of a lion in repose. His stone is the chalcedon, the stone of victory.

With Aser we come to the second group, which takes the transcendence beyond the basic moral essentials into the more purely aesthetically mystical levels. For here “It is not sufficient, this cult of God, unless there is an indissoluble bond, for love (caritas) makes us cultivate and love (amare) God......And for this perfect bond (nexus)...three things are necessary, sc., that the soul desires the supreme, contemns the inferior, and takes delight in the moderate (or, middle: medio) (as Bonaventura himself puts it) ‘This is the special appetite of ever-eternal beatitude, the dilated affection of fraternal love (dilectionis), the perfect contempt of mundane prosperity’.”

The key to this appetite for beatitude is given by the words of Aser’s mother, to the effect that his birth would for ever make all women call her blessed. “For blessed indeed is he who trans-
fers his highest love into beatitude." But another very telling adjective is given to characterize this beatitude: pinguis, which is almost a synonym for rasa! It carries the connotation of fatness, juicyness, or the richness of good wine, or the ooziness of a good honeycomb. A verse from Jeremiah (31:14) is brought in for illustration: "I shall inebriate the soul of my priests with fatness (pinguedine) and my people shall be filled with my good things." As also the verse (Gen. 49:20) in which Jacob himself had characterized Aser as "his tasty (pingis) bread and he shall offer delicious things to kings"—which tasty bread is the most relishable (sapidissimus) bread of the Angels, "having in itself everything delectable and sweet to every taste (omnis saporis suavitatis)", and in the words of Isaiah (30:23), "the copious and savoury (pinguis) bread." This is the bread of life on which are feasted the denizens of the kingdom of Heaven, as is mentioned in Luke’s Gospel, (14:15) "Blessed is he who shall eat this bread in the Kingdom of Heaven"—the Sacred Supper to which is always analogized the manna in the Wilderness which descended from the heavens to the wandering Israelites, which is also described as pinguis, although it was a hidden (absconditus) bread, unavailable to the uninitiated (as we may see in the Apocalypse, 2:17), but giving sweetness (dulcedo) of the heart (more than sweetness of the flesh) to the worthy...And so our unknown author goes on, weaving an intricately delicate but harmoniously unified arabesque on the theme, artistically using citations from all parts of the Bible, ending with the observation that Aser would continue in the same constancy of relishable blessedness in his old age—and even in his posterity—as he had in his youth. For such beatitude affords "delightful happiness in a multitude of offspring, perfect charity in pleasing his brothers, joyful affection—joyful and yet not vain, but firm and established, and perpetual and immutable life. Indeed (he adds) "this is a thing to be desired with the whole heart!" Aser's stone is the smaragdus (beryl), whose virtue is supposed to be the marvellous restraint of all lascivious and libidinous motions, which it replaces with a soothing countenance and remarkable eyes.

Nepthali comes next. He signifies dilated affection of the fraternal sort, at whose arising Rachel had said, "God has
compared me to my sister, and has valued me with her”. Rachel, of the two sisters (the other being Leah), like Mary and Martha of the Gospels, is the contemplative rather than the active soul, contemplation here bearing the approbation of having the greater portion of love (caritas). Jacob had given Nephthali his blessing as “a deer that had escaped, giving the eloquence of beauty (pulcritudinis)”. Then follows another arabesque on the deer theme: the hart (deer) that fled to the water-brooks in its thirst for God, who like St. Paul, would “desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ”. The deer is swift and avid in running (as we might say) the race of transcendence, assiduously fleeing to understandings of the spiritual or invisible refuges. Then the ‘eloquence of beauty’ is elaborated as sanctified purity, illustrated with many scriptural tid-bits and the famous dictum of St. Augustine: “‘As love (amor) increases in you, so does beauty’” Nephthali also receives the promise of fertility, so that his ‘seed’ shall possess not only great lands, but also the sea; but here the ‘seed’ (as in the New Testament itself) is allegorized into the seed of the Word of God, as the land and the sea into particular virtues which further the refinement of the spirit. His stone is the sardonyx, which is “tricolour, black in the depths, white in the middle, red in the summit” signifying true love (caritas) which orders man (according to one of Bonaventura’s favourite schemes in his relations with what is his inferior, his superior, and his interior, or, otherwise, the blackness in the depths may be taken as the characteristic of the spouse in the Canticles, “I am black but comely...but my swarthiness you should not consider, for I am discoloured by the sun”—for she should be white and pure in the interior, and ruddy with the fervid love (amore) of God in the superior—ruddy with the zeal of martyrdom (red always signifying, liturgically, the blood of the martyrs as well as the fire of the Holy Spirit which is Love). Thus Nephthali brings us again to the mystery of Love-and-Death, to the transformation of love in martyrdom towards which the transcendence has been leading, and without which it is incomplete.

But after the transformation—for it is not yet the end of the process of etheralization—comes the negative preparation for the Lilä-life, as represented by Manasses, who signifies the
perfect contempt for worldly prosperity and private good. In the erotic context his condition is typified by the verse of the Psalms (44:11), “Harken O daughter and consider; forget also thine own people and thy father’s house, and the King shall rejoice in thy beauty” (a text, by the way, still popular in monastic Rules of life and tracts of guidance for mystics). Augustine is again quoted (the still-famous line from the Confessions) “He loves Thee less O Lord, who loves anything except what he loves for thy sake.” For following the crucifixion that the soul undergoes for the world comes the crucifixion of the world for the soul, as we have already seen in another context. Manasses’ name is thus interpreted as meaning ‘forgetting’ or ‘obliviousness’; and his stone is the sardius, “which has the colour of blood, or of the red earth, reminding us of our fragility by virtue of being ‘sons of Ādam’, Ādam “who was made of the red earth on the sixth day”, and us who must be sustained by the earth (of which we are supposed to be made).

With Simeon we come to the third group, for whom love must have become fervid zeal such as repels all evil, but the zeal that is followed by patience, for without this qualification, it may become damning fury. But with it, it becomes mercifulness, as exemplified by the (other) Simeon who took the infant Jesus in his arms when He was presented in the Temple—the Jesus who out of mercifulness had descended from Heaven, to be born not only in Bethlehem, but in our hearts—hearts such as are spoken of in the Canticles, (8:6) “Place me as a sign above your heart and as a little sign (signaculum) between your arms.” so that the erotic connotation is redoubled, as it were, the relationality with the infant being coupled with that of interior intimacy. And if our exegesis is correct, thus the Lilās begin: the imagination being brought into full play, fruition begins. For it not until this stage that the ‘works of mercy’ (the instruction of the ignorant, the correction of the delinquent, the remission of sins, the consoling of the afflicted, etc.) are mentioned. For they cannot be ‘virtues’ in the non-aesthetically moralistic sense; they are fruits of love, and joy as its overflow, as its rasa-camatkāra, is shared by both the commiserator and the commiserated. The stone of this Simeon is the chrysolinth, the gold-like stone; for what is more precious than the gold of
mercifulness? "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall receive mercy". Its virtue is supposed to be that of repelling serpents and demons (and we need not point out the symbolism of the serpent in all mythologies, such as Kṛṣṇa's dancing on the head of the serpent who had made it impossible for the Gopīs to swim in the pool).

Levi follows. His was the sacerdotal vocation, in which judiciousness is added to the Lilā values, wherein love achieves relationality of equality whereby one treats others as he would be treated. (Again, how few see the beauty in such equilatitarian living; it cannot be a merely 'moral' matter!) Such judiciousness cannot be according to the 'Law' which gives only severity but according to the pattern of the Christ, who leaves no room for hate and violence among men, but rather gives peace and the sweetness of propitiating reconciliation. The beryl is his store, which is supposed to "burn even the hand that holds it" signifying how the prelate, "having the zeal of God in himself, does not spare himself, his own, or others" and yet with tenderness so that the bearer of the beryl is supposed to become worthy of being "Exalted and magnified", so the priestly office may retain its dignity and grace.

Issachar is next. He is taken as representing "the victorious endurance of bitter and mundane sufferings"—but not in the stoical sense of simple endurance by will, but in the sense of the victory of the Resurrection (the Lilā life again, in our notation) so that our author cites the text from the Fourth Gospel in which Jesus rebukes Mary for seeking Him among the dead (John 18:4) assuming, as it may be supposed, that we are reminded not only of her sorrow in seeking Him and her joy in finding Him—although he did not allow her to touch Him—but of the fact that he still bore the wounds of the Cross in this transformed state. Thus Issachar's rasa is the subtle nuance of profitable patience, his mother having said at his birth, "The Lord has rewarded me (Dedit Dominus mercedem mihi)" (Gen. 30:18) and he is remembered as "the man of profit (or reward)", which is interpreted in terms of the Beatitudes, "Blessed are you when men persecute you...for your reward shall be great in heaven" Picturesque likewise is the characterization given him by Jacob: "Issachar is my strong ass who
only takes his rest at the end of the journey"—his burden, according to the allegory, being the Cross, which he bears with tranquil stability of mind, for the ass, though stubborn and vile, yet is patient and strong and capable of bearing a lot of abuse! His stone is the topaz, which "has two colours, very full of the clear light of gold and of the ether when the splendour of the sun touches it, singularly provoking the one who beholds it, dearer to kings than any other riches"—the gold reminding us of the need of purgation by fire, and the ether reminding us of the pure clarity of patience; or again, according to the Lapidarium, it is supposed to give victory over enemies—the enemies in this case being taken as wrath and noxious fervours of the body and molestations and disturbances of the mind, for, in the words of the Proverb (16:32) "Greater and stronger is the man of patience than the man who conquers great cities in battle" (a saying, by the way, that may perhaps be traced, like many others in the Book of Proverbs, to Buddhist sources!)

With the beginning of the fourth group we come into the realm of erotic mysticism in full sway, and indeed into a realm which we did not observe in the Indian context but which is emphatically there, especially in the Bhāgavatam tradition, the turiya state, which passes over into indescribability, associated in the Bhakti context not so much with the state beyond waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep (suṣupti) as with the consummation of the Lilās (which, parenthetically, may also be considered as siddhis or paranormal powers used for spiritual ends) in complete interiority such that there is no longer any manifestation to others, but complete absorption in the Lord Himself—still in the Lilā spirit, but only with and within Viṣṇu rather than 'Vaikuṇṭha'; or, as Nammalwar puts it, (Tiruvoimoli X:7 passim)—

The One whose ways are unfathomable, The Great Being of Mysterious deeds... entered into me in the form of poetry without my knowing it, nor did those around me know it........He swallowed up my mind and my soul, and He filled me with himself. Oh! poets of excellent poetical theme (skill ?) save your souls by serving Him......He completely absorbed me in Himself. He is all. He fills all, He is all the worlds. He is all the souls. He is He who is called I. He praised Himself. He is to me honey, milk, cheese and nectar......(italics ours).
In the Bonaventuran language, this stage is designated as requiring “sapidus sensus, ubi caritas ad amplexum sponsi perducens requiescere facit”: a sense of relish wherein love leads into the quiet rest of the full embrace of the Spouse, for which a sort of death must be undergone, for “no man may see God and live”, the death being the ‘divine dark’ about which Evelyn Underhill has written quite well, especially in her introduction to the famous “Cloud of Unknowing”, which is typified by the cloud and thunder on Sinai which Moses encountered before he got the revelation of the Law. For this sense of relish three things (taken of course, from Dionysius) are necessary, viz., “a peaceful state of the sublime mansion, a perspicacious prospectus of sagacious discretion, and an ecstatic excess of sweet consolation or of tasting (almost Nammalwar’s “swallowing!”)

These three are typified by Zabulon, Joseph and Benjamin. The first had evoked from his mother at his birth, the expressions “My Husband has been with me” (Gen. 30:20) and “God has enriched me with a good gift” (Gen. 30:19): and these are interpreted in terms of the Canticles, “I have found Him whom my soul loved (diliget); I shall hold Him and not send Him away. “O such a gift” (our author adds), “such a Grace, such a dignity! to have and to hold for ever what one has for ever lusted for (concupivit), nor ever to dismiss It nor to allow It to go away”......“Whence Zabulon is interpreted as the little habitation of strength or of Beauty, and signifies that Spouse who is ‘totally beautiful and decorous, and wholly desirable, for whom there is no transmutation nor shadow of vicissitude’ (Cant. 1:15:5:16) Such are ‘men of virtue who have beauty for their study, peaceful in their homes’ (Wisdom 44:6)......” This state is that of unification (unitio, not unio, as the gnostic advaitin, as opposed to the bhakta, would have it) “elevated beyond all sensible things, beyond all imaginary things and beyond all intelligible things”. For this unification is made through love (amor) which is higher than all other ways, as described by Hugo of St. Victor:

Love (dilectio) is more eminent than knowledge and greater than intelligence. For one loves what one knows,
and love enters and appropriates where knowledge stands outside; nor is it to be marvelled at that love always presumes more and makes ingress without any compunction, because it has a cutting quality or a liquidity which penetrates all and follows the impulse of the ardent desirer, not allowing dissimulation until it has fully arrived at the object of love. (italics ours)

Thus it is that beatitude (or mokṣa) is a matter of rasa in its plenitude of erotic continuity, root and flower, and not a matter of gnosis at all: not bhakti only as a 'rival' of jñāna, but bhakti with all its aesthetic components re-enfolded in embellishment (alāṅkāra) so that the dhvani, the mystical meanings of life itself, come into full play—and these not just in a contrapuntal pattern but all in full symphonic harmonization of the same theme, the theme of Love, which is the Holy Spirit itself, binding all in One.

Zebulon is thus quite a favourite in the text we are following, and elicits many other quotations concerning this grade of Love from the Scriptures and the various Scholastic authorities, which is epitomised with the adjectives unitious, sequestative, and sursum activus: unitive in the sense already described; secretly hidden away in the sense of the call to solitude (at least solitude of spirit, of psychic focus, if not sequestered from society-at-large), in such a way that the Lilās are with the Lord alone; 'sleepy' in the sense not of idle tāmasic slumber but in the sense of attaining cat-like quiet, such as one experiences sometimes in listening, 'half-awake' to music with deeper appreciation than when one is on the keen-edge of attention; and lifted up to higher activity in the sense that a continuous transmutation after the pattern of the via negativa, the neti neti of the Upaniṣads, becomes the rule: the union of love is in such an open infinity that the lover can never say what he has 'gained', not only because it is he who is the one who is 'gained' (hence the emphasis on femininity), but also because the Divine thus realized can never be a that: it is a nothing, at best a Presence, as Marcel employs the term, which can never be localized, can never be reduced to having, can never be subjected to naturalistic analysis or 'observation', but can only be spoken of metaphorically in the context of the sound-heat-light continuum, wherein the soul, like water, is
"rarefied, made subtle, vapourized" into the "stability of quiet eternity".

So it is that the chrysopras is selected as the stone for Zabulon: it is described as "most beautiful and especially youthful, whose colour is a mixture of green and of gold, yet with a touch of purple", signifying "the soul youthful with the beauty of peace, replete with delicious celestial wisdom, established in the vigour of the spirit." Nevertheless, this sequestered state is still not the highest. When we come to Joseph, one of the most famous characters in all sacred literature, we find our allegory outdoing itself, not only in terms of scriptural passages, but also in terms of all the sciences known to western medievalman; Joseph crowned with the wisdom and beatitude of eros in transmutation, ferreting the best out of every bad or even impossible situation, sifted the good out of the secularists (the Aristotelians in the context of the Bonaventuran synthesis, who are represented by virtue of his spiritualized wisdom he came to rule) and making it multiply so that not only the secular realm was benefited, but so that there was even a holy surplus with which he was able to resuscitate the arid 'holy' ones who had got rid of him out of jealousy. The basic allegory indeed suggests itself, furnishing a model perhaps for the present-day problem of the relation of 'sacred' and secular art somewhat along the lines of what we have intimated in discussing Rilke. Fauré, the French Canadian musician, might also be pointed to as an example—perhaps a better one than Rilke, for in a definite sense, is not Joseph the perpetual type (or prototype) of the neo-orthodox devotee (or artist) who "knows what he is doing", having been judged as 'too sophisticated' for the merely traditionally pious (who for that reason have come into sterility) has been exiled from the dried-up tradition to an also-avid non-pious realm and yet never forgets his indebtedness to his native source. He replenishes both sacred and secular when the opportunity comes, but with authority as well as with benevolence—an authority, moreover, with a doubly guarded humility, so that he neither becomes completely lost or assimilated in his 'secular' exile, nor yet duped by the shallow and rough sentimentality of those who still claim him. In the Indian context, this would mean, perhaps, that there is a need of 'exile' by way of espousal of art for art's sake and the acquisition
of improved techniques from abroad, but in such a way that in the end the religious themes at home would receive new life while at the same time the whole world would be enriched by the very ‘secularization’ or exteriorization of the old strictly religious tradition, such as Udaya Śaṅkara has been doing with Bharata Nātyama, the classical dance that formerly was done only in the temples as an act of devotion, but which now, in order to survive at all must be transferred to the secular stage. Yet nothing must be compromised. This is a matter of going yet further on in the refinement and strengthening of eros, and not a ‘fall’ from a high ideal, not so much a deliberate descent, a planned programme, but the attainment of such excellence of soul that the enlargement of the charismatic umwelt comes as a matter of fruitful sacrifice. For Joseph was a favourite of his Father; it was his brothers who were jealous. According to our text, they were the ones who were concerned only with disputations, having no "beauty of face or decorousness of countenance" such as he had; and his famous coat of many colours was given him because of his beauty—because, in short, already having bhakti more than jñāna, the grace of rasa was added to his merit. This Joseph was a "spouse, a lover of virginity not a violator, for discretion is the custodian, not the corruptor of internal purity" who is compared to the sixth angel of Philadelphia in the Apocalypse, who had the ‘authority of opening the closing’ the gates of hell against the age of temptation that was to come over the whole earth (3:8-10). But more than that: he is taken as the archetype not so much of the simple saint as of the ‘Doctors’: with him, we have passed beyond the Lilās, in a sense, and have come into the erotic transmutation of the realm of ideas as such—the rapport with the divine has become sufficiently intimate and strong that the mystic now thinks the thoughts of God within God, and that is the secret of his ability to abound in the midst of scarcity: Joseph therefore knew not only how to make the increasing to increase, but also from the defect of his brothers to bring profit (profectum) and from the detriment of others to acquire the wealth of prudence. Hence his name, (which means) ‘increase’, and he was rightly called the "son of accretion...whose increment in the end should have no end."
The hyacinth is chosen as his stone, "whose colour changes with the air: perspicacious in serenity, obscure in the cloud, and signifies the most learned (dissertissimos) doctors, in all their qualities, customs, ages and understandings rendering themselves temperate."

Finally, with Benjamin, we come to the purely sātvic type, who represents the state "from which there is no return", with whom there is no longer question of ascent and descent or fruition or reenfoldment or reinvestment—no complication at all, but the purely pure contemplative, "who never leaves his Father’s house, lest he die": the consummation of perfection, who has come to the top of the ladder of Jacob. For in the allegory, here we find all the sons of Jacob likened to the rungs of the ladder of his vision, on which the angels were ascending and descending; for such a son to be born, first an angel of God must prepare the way. There will not be any longer the struggling with or against the angel (Kierkegaard’s favourite figure), but a following in the angel’s light, until the contemplator comes to see God “face to face”, beyond the Jordan of purgation in Bethel, where he must perform take a new name, a Name of the Future and of Destiny, Israel. Therefore Benjamin is born long after all the others, for, according to the reading of Richard of St. Victor (whose works bearing the title of Benjamin Major and Menjanin Minor were perhaps the greatest gems of mystical or symbolical theology produced in the whole of the Middle Ages), "Benjamin was born long after Joseph because the soul (anima) which is not long exercised and practised (eruditus) in knowledge of itself will not be sustained for knowledge of God; in vain will he lift up the eye of the heart to the seeing of God who is not well accustomed to seeing himself. First man must learn to understand the invisible things within himself before he may presume to apprehend the invisible things of God." Further in the allegory, this Bethel is found to be the same as Bethlehem, the place of the birth of Jesus and the place where the shepherds heard the angelic chorus which combines Glory to God and Peace to Men; for Benjamin, as the prototype of the Christ, represents that perfect love "which casts out fear", as is testified also by the words of the midwife who helped Benjamin
into the world: “Have no fear, for now you shall have a son”; and his mother Rachael’s name is interpreted as ‘Seeing God’, that is, contemplation, for Benjamin was her vision come to life “the sweetness of which vision”, continues Richard (as quoted at length by our author) who would not seek? What could be more salubrious? What could be felt to be more suave? What soul could experience more joyfully? Yet Rachael knew this, although there could be no reason latent in it, for by comparison all other sweetness is bitter. It is such that one should never cease from an impatient desire for it which must daily increase. “Yet to such a grace no mind can attain by its own unaided effort. This is the gift of God, and not the merit of man, although without doubt so great and such a grace no one receives without ‘ingenious study’ (e.g., persevering attentiveness) and ardent desire. Therefore, in such daily anxiety trying hard, and in such immensity of grief was Benjamin born and Rachael died, for when the mind of man is taken in rapture above itself, the narrow ways of human reason are superseded. For to that which is above it elevated and rapt in ecstasy of the light of the vision of the divine, all human reason succumbs.”

Benjamin, moreover, as the smallest brother (frater minus), is taken as the model of the Friars Minor (the Franciscans), who, in spite of the fact that most historians stress their activities, were prone to regard themselves, after the model of their Founder, as the highest (as erotically ecstatic) contemplatives. Thus as embellishment of the point that Benjamin could not leave the bosom of his father, the verse from the Canticles is cited: “I have been despoiled of my tunic; whereby shall I clothe myself? I have washed my feet; wherefore should I befoul them?”—a text vividly reminding us of Kṛṣṇa’s robbing the Gopīs of their clothes when they were bathing in the pool! For such absolute purity of metaphysical—nay, mystical—sensitivity can admit of no secondary focus; reached either from the starting-point of art or of religion, it not only is sacrificially oblivious of the accusation (which occurs at the Joseph stage) “Oh, he’s been ruined by mysticism! What good is he to mankind now?” but he actually escapes such involvement as would allow the accusations; he
retains such innocence as reserves him for God (the 'father' Israel) alone, and no one questions his self-evident and radiant authenticity, as no one need praise him either. Or, in the words of Richard, whose text our author resumes, "Why should Benjamin descend to Egypt? If he did, he would have to be recalled from the contemplation of eternal things to the beginning of the mind, and from the light of eternity vertically coming from heaven he would become involved in the darkness of mutable intelligence, and in midst of alternating affairs he would have to be bothered with weighing and penetrating through a certain confusion of the divine judgments." In a word, the artist or the lover, if he reaches the end of the erotic continuum, if he allows the finish of the 'reduction' not only of the emotions and the imagination but of love itself, will come to the point where the Love of God is not only identity of ends and means, but is all-in-all, and the need of 'productivity' or any other 'work' or manifestation is at an end, and like Benjamin, he becomes "the most beloved of God, dwelling confidently in Him, as one who lingers all the day in the marriage-bed, reposing in His arms." (Deut. 33:12)—to which Richard gives the comment, "How marvellous therefore are the forms of such singular beauty! No deception, no foolish prerogatives, nothing to interrupt! Such is Benjamin the beloved (dilecta), whose intimate position could in no wise be despised, and from whose embraces he could not be withdrawn even for an hour" For (in the words of Psalm 67: 28) "Benjamin was a little adolescent in his ecstasy of mind."... who always remained in the 'third heaven' of which St. Paul speaks, wherein lies the total consummation of Christian perfection, to whom alone, as alone worthy, are revealed the 'hidden wisdom and prudence' of our holy and glorious God. Hence the amethyst is reserved for Benjamin, whose colour "is royal purple mixed with violet and rose effusing little flames of fire"—the violet signifying the profound humility required for (and yet brought by) such Love, which is signified by the rose (which as we have seen before, is associated with the Passion and with the desire for martyrdom—in this case, not the outward martyrdom so much as the purely inward martyrdom of ahaṅkāra); and the royal purple, as the colour of
blood, the forgiving prayer for enemies and persecutors (nor necessarily persecutors of himself, but rather for all who are thus bound in avidyā); and the little flames of fire signify the effective zeal, as intercessory prayer as the highest camatkāra within the sustained Embrace, for the salvation of all men.

Those acquainted with the tāntric yoga will recognize in the sequence of colours here virtually the same pattern of progress in yoga. The yantras, the geometrical figures, appear to the yogi in different colours as he progresses. Nammalvar also frequently gives tacit reference to this, and it would constitute a fascinating study, were we free to make it. But we must pass on.

In our "modern" world, what remains? What may we take from these medieval treatments of love in its mystical elevation, in its 'sacrifice' of art to religion and in its tenous allegorizations of sensuous love into what to so many now would assert to be an unattainable, and perhaps even illusorily sublimated substitute for 'normal' sexuality? Is there really a Deity who can be approached in such an erotic fashion? And if so, is it the same God as the god of the 'theologians'? Or is all this only pathological perversion of libido, sanctioned by the mores of particular periods of human history in the name of religion? Or, is religion itself the perversion, being throughout nothing but a manifestation of unsatisfactory sex-life?

Such questions we have tried to answer in passing, but it may be well to attempt a somewhat summarized conclusion, howsoever tentative. For they are questions which plague many souls of our times whose basic faith is in the proposition that "Science has made a difference"—as indeed it has, and will increasingly continue to make, in every possible aspect of human life. Yet many attitudes are possible. Some still hold that this is a field which science can never touch; others, like Max Scheler and Karl Jaspers, insist that although something like a scientific approach can be made, the basic canons of science will have to be adjusted to fit the field—much more radically than the former adjustments made in the development of biology and psychology and sociology, the time being long past when these can function on the same basis as physics and chemistry; and yet there are the still-
vociferous humanists and dialectical materialists who at best look to the future with hope that some day we shall ‘really’ know what these things ‘really’ are—who looking to the opening of fields like biophysics and semiotics will remain in a state of long-term suspended judgment until the full continuum of molecular and radionic phenomena is worked out, life and love and consciousness and what men have heretofore called ‘God’ being only more intricate functions of energized matter analogous to the ionization of atoms in the sun.

In a work such as we are attempting, it would be presumptuous, not to say impossible, to satisfy all parties. And yet the philosopher’s job remains a generalized one: as Marcel insists in his most recent writings, he cannot allow himself to become merely another specialist. He must risk a certain confusion of categories, even, in his employment of the *docta ignorantia*, the Socratic ignorance, in his attempt at arriving at some sort of overall view-point. Thus, he will object, as does Maurice Nedoncelle, to the relegation of the study of love to the science of psychology alone—let alone those who would “reduce” aesthetics to a mere psychology of art. Nor will he be satisfied with treatises like that of Nygren, which would reserve the treatment of love for the theologians alone. And above all, he will not be duped by those who doggedly cling to what they call “experience”—by which they usually mean, in a sceptical or even cynical frame of reference, their own experience, which more than likely is very limited indeed. Mere theoretical speculation in terms of categorical abstractions, on the other hand, is equally fruitless. But at least, is it not the philosopher’s task—and pre-eminently in this field of the interpenetration of religion and art and love—to cultivate a sensitive openness to possible experience, and thereby humbly remind not only himself but others also not only of what he does not know (of what he has not ‘experienced’) or even, of what he has not attained to in his own self-being, but also, in a challenging anagogical thrust, to issue the seductive *vade mecum* towards further exploration of (if not, indeed, to Faith and Hope in) what may yet lie far beyond? Nay, even more: there is always the unanswerable; the question, “what is love” may rest within that Unanswerable.

Indeed, if there is any conclusion that may be drawn from
our study thus far, should it not be that love is that very Un-answerable, which notwithstanding enables man to experience more than he ‘knows’; it is perforce not reducible to anything else, and therefore is worthy of equation with, if not simply another word for, God—but God in his viśiṣṭādvaitic levels in a continuum of ultimacies out of which nothing can be completely separated, which nevertheless, if traced into its continuously deepening Centre, leads only to further penetrating of Itself. If therefore, ‘modern’ man has lost this Art of Ultimacy, so much the more he should be humble—although the achievement of such humility is itself one of the primary facets of the same continuum! Hence, to be ‘modern’ may simply mean to be—nowhere! For that matter, is it too much, even for the dialectical humanist, to place one’s faith in the insistent possibility that the erotic continuum which we are concerned with may be the undergirding of all reality itself? Perhaps on a sort of harmonic scale what the erotically focused mystics report as introspectively experienced in their regression from the gross to the etherial—for is not man made of everything else found in the universe, ‘seen’ and ‘unseen’?—is of the same pattern as the structure of the universe—of Reality—itself? Love, consciousness (with its ‘alpha waves’ registering in the brain); life; sub-electronic Energy; radionic ‘vibration’; atoms in their tenta-tious instability; ‘matter’ in its polarity; and Rest or ‘waste’ in the end—are these really not the same things as the artistically presented Secrecy of God, the self-knowing of God in the activity of that Secrecy, its Embodiment, the Music of the Spheres, the light-colour-sound continuum in which externalized art is manifested, the imagination-emotion-passion phase, and the inert ‘nothingness of the dead body?

And is he not dead from whom Love has departed? Is not life only love activating itself? And in turn is not love-in-activation—is this not Devotion? And is not this Devotion that which is capable of being interior to itself in explosive self-regeneration? Whence then Art if not from this chain-reaction of explosiveness? and what greater art than the participative play with and within the self-regeneration from whence Art comes? Beauty is this Awful Overflow; Being the Infinite Fertility at the core; God, gloriously all of this—and we know not
what more! Yet, "THAT THOU ART" as the Upaniṣad says, with the implication that that truth remains patent whether latent in pralaya, in the end of the evolving cycle, or whether "in the way" of descent or of ascent, or whether as with little Benjamin or with Andal the Alwar, at the intimate height of the cycle of involution—and both cycles are perpetual—Thou and That remain tenderly enwrapped in non-dimensional Eternity.

Anthropomorphism? Rather, pan-logism, reciprocating harmony of microcosm and macrocosm. Auto-eroticism? The charge may appear more serious; but self-love, like any other love, the love of an idea, or even the love of love, may be not for the sake of love, but for the sake of the Self—of one's-Self—instead. We need not go into the psychology of bi-sexuality, though certainly this may be radically involved in mystical practice: it is the female element, Śrī, the Śakti, in each individual that must unite with the male, Nārāyaṇa, the Śiva. But such is all polarity, even the polarity of the atom-at-rest and the atom-in-explosion. Where, then, is the 'perversion'? Mysticism is much more by far than spiritual masturbation, just as art is much more than the mere Narcissistic self-infatuation of the artist. In both cases there is an inescapable trinitarian structure-and-movement; there is the undifferentiable tertium quid which, behind the scenes, so to speak, effects the union (whether of self with Self or of artist with his Work; two forms of the same Event) as well as the things—or personae—united. And if one argues that there is really a quarternity in consideration of the by-products of the Union, one is easily countered with the consideration that this Fourth is really a nothing, a non-being in itself, a pure exteriority, an extracted value without life, without Presence, without Meaning, a mere empty scheme. As the work of Art cannot be 'felt' or entered into except as a communication of the artist's 'soul', so the soul itself as the bifurcation of anima and animus can never be made fruitful or enjoyable (for such is the art of inter-subjective intercourse among men as well as in Prayer and contemplation) without the wistful Spirit which in the same movement harmoniously brings the soul to its own bottomless interiority and opens it to the marvellous splendour of the Reality in which it "lives and moves and has its being".

Thus as Marcel and Scheler—and the phenomenological
school in general—insist, there is no metaphysics, really, except the metaphysic of the Self—the Self, moreover, in Communion as theandrique, to use Nedoncelles’s suggestive term,24 as founded in penetrative sympathy which renders life capable of Revelation—the revelation of creative discovery as well as self-revelation in reflective repose.

In other words, any metaphysic of love must be a metaphysic of the Self which in turn must perforce be a Personalism, a personalism, moreover, in which the *amour propre*, the love of the Self predominates over the *amour de soi* (the simple self-love or self-infatuation) to the same extent that the ‘thou’ of our relations with other individual persons is merged-in-elevation to the Thou, the Absolute Thou, of Prayer. God is not only the wholly other but equally the Wholly Myself (which I am not; I can never be wholly myself at any time, as Marcel has succinctly made clear—my present frame of mind, my present relation with my body, my present state of concentration being all selective and partial at all times), whether these ‘selves’ and ‘others’ be the focus of the simple devotee or the *raison d’être* of the artist’s production (for the work of art is never *sui generis*; it is always, howsoever unconsciously, addressed either to an ‘other’ or to the self-in-reflection). But in either case, God is equally the Love by which all else, as well as Himself, is loved, or produced from and within the loving or integrative, communion-giving bond.

This much seems to have been recovered, and that with an excellent freshness springing up from inner necessity. But the consummation of the betrothal to inwardness seems yet to be realized to the same degree of excellence as was the rule in the middle ages of India, Persia, and Europe, although it is in this consummation, and there alone, that affective meditation itself becomes an art—and the highest art at that. Perhaps the reason is that most philosophers are still too insistent that all shall be reduced to principle, even to the extent that the result is too often more of an apologetic, a “making things presentable”—even the things that are most effectual in their own hearts—rather than the boldness which comes only from the loss of false shame when all pretension is removed in the face of the “heart’s own reasons” after the manner of Pascal and Kierkegaard. (And one
wonders if even Pascal and Kierkegaard got beyond the elimination of the falsities; for where in them is the free beauty of the divine pastime of affective contemplation, the positive abandon, the radiance of deliberate dallying in the deliciousness of the bosom of the Love that is “more precious by far than gold, more sweet than the honeycomb”? The love of art and the art of love are always inseparable; but at the mystical level they become completely merged—and only at the mystical level. But more than that: at that level, within that mergence—for it is a transmergence—philosophical ‘principles’ are also transmuted or energized by this alternating current of art and love, and the light of Holy Wisdom begins to glow—that light which had been so carefully and delicately constructed out of transparent material and filaments (nay, out of incandescent gases!) of high conductivity, but which remains useless until it is “turned on”, until it is made to shine with the Glory of the Divine energy.

Yet, be this as it may, our complaint is not a solitary one; it is shared poignantly by Max Scheler and all that have been influenced by him, and if he himself did not achieve the same flowering of that which he felt had been lost, at least he opened the way for ourselves and those who are yet to come. In his posthumously published writings there is an essay with the title Ordo Amoris which leaves little to be desired,25 from which we give (in rough translation, for his German is indeed as difficult as it is beautiful!) the following excerpts:

[After clearing the ground of the empirical field in which he shows the importance of love in the societal as well as the personal orientations of human destiny, fate, knowing and willing, freedom and creativity and capacity for triumph, he comes, by way of some observations on Pascal, to the distinction of the amour propre (eigen Liebe) from amour de soi (selbst-Liebe) to which we have already alluded:]

The individual destination is therefore a matter of insight while the fate is only something we may state—a matter of fact which is blind to value. It is again a certain kind of love which has to precede the individual destination: it is the so-called eigen-liebe, or love for one’s own salvation basically different from all so-called selbst-liebe. In the latter we see everything including ourselves only in intention
through one's own eye and relate at the same time all given things—and therefore ourselves also—to our sensual emotional sensations (gefühlzustande) so that this relation as relation does not come to our separate and clear consciousness. Hanging in such a situation we can even make our highest potencies, talents, forces—yea, even the supreme subject of our life-purpose itself—we can make even these a slave of our body and its circumstances... Covered with a tissue of varicoloured phantoms of deceptions woven out of dullness, wants ambitions and pride, we perceive everything—even ourselves—in this selbst-liebe. But it is quite otherwise with the eigen-liebe. Here our spiritual eye and its ray of intention is turned into a supra-mundane spiritual centre (überweltliches Geisteszentrum). We see ourselves "as through God's eye" itself—and that means first of all, quite objectively, quite as a member of the whole universe. Though we love ourselves, still (we love) always as much as we would be (as seen by) an all-viewing eye... Everything else in us we hate the more strongly as our spirit penetrates into this our divine image the more splendidly it grows in front of us, or the more strongly it differs from this picture that we find outside of the divine eternal within us. The self-forming sculpturing hammers of self-correction, of self-education, of repentance, of aesthetics, hit all parts of us extending beyond the figure which is conveyed to us by the picture of ourselves in front of and in God... (Such eigen-liebe is the root of Socratic self-knowledge and of genius such as we find in Goethe, whose secret lay in the removal of false tendencies in the face of this 'divine eye'... but more than that...) The eternal wisdom which thus is speaking and directing within us is not a loud and commanding one, but only quite a still and only warning wisdom which sounds the more loudly the more we work against it. Just as in the so-called method of negative theology, the self-knowledge of our individual destinies is at work—Negative theology, i understood rightly, i.e., in such a way that the negations do not determine the what of the searched-for object or exhaust it in significance but rather render it visible by successive subtractions (or layers) fully and in its completeness...

Then he lays his apologetic. And it should contain a sufficient answer to the charge that mysticism—and erotic mysticism in particular—is 'only' auto-eroticism. When we remember that the 'negative theology' of which he speaks is the same as the Augustinian and Dionysian method by which God is realized (and loved) as more inward to ourselves than our-
selves—a truth also reaffirmed with emphasis by Marcel and Nedoncelle—which is so much in accord with Upaniṣadic as well as Dravidian tradition, we wonder indeed if anything in the material we have been examining is to be discarded as ‘out of date’! But more than that. Scheler himself is not content with mere apologetic; and if he does not burst out in poetic allegory in medieval fashion, at least he does go on to insist on the radical importance of the same sursum cordis as we find in Bonaventura and the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas:

Every love is as yet incomplete, often falling asleep... as it were, on its way to resting in the love of God... The deeper love of spiritual objects—whether thing or persons—...gives a ray of the movement of love which looks ahead beyond the given. This movement displays the person (or thing loved) in the direction of ideality or perfection—towards the unlimited... In enjoyment as in the highest personal love the same process of limitlessness (wesensunendliche Prozess) appearing here and there prohibits... the character of finitude... (from interfering with) the personal centre in its following up the duties of perfection (wherein lies the beauty of the love) as (this process of limitlessness) challenges (the lover directly and positively) to the growing and deepening realization of the perfect ideal awakened in the love. And if on the one side this infinity makes itself felt as growing disquietude, restlessness, haste and pain at these (finite) conditions, that is to say a mode of aiming by which new repellings become a source of ever-new fainting and backward-looking attraction), then on the other side there is a growing beatific movement from value to value in the subject—a movement of growing quietude, fullness, accompanied and followed according to that positive form of aiming... Thus there is a positive and a negative infinity of love, which is expressed as potency... which builds itself on the act of love... Loving in such an infinite (wesensunendlich) way, however broken, bound and particularized by the species-organization of the bearer, wants for its satisfaction an infinite good. Thus the object of any love as the idea of God (as formed of the two predicates of the good and of the infinite form of Being) lies at the basis of any sort of an ordo amoris, and is essential for the realization of the full character of all love... God and only God can be at the top point of this scale—a pyramid-like construction of the will as love-in-value-formation (liebens würdigkeit) is at the same time the source and goal of the whole.
It is in such a context that although in one place Nedoncelle criticizes Scheler for being too much of a voluntarist, Scheler himself says that it has been a great error to call man homo sapiens, and that it would still be wrong to dub him homo volens; Man is rather homo amans—for that takes in everything else!—everything including self-knowledge, philosophy, literature and the arts, social customs, man’s own inner struggles with his secret self (or selves), and above all, his involvement in the infinity of the non-empirical—indeed, the mystical—realm of idealization and perfection. Love is both root and centre and end of man; nothing is more ultimate.

The implications of this orientation for aesthetics are especially forceful for Scheler. Not just any ‘taste’, not just any whimsical judgment of the work of art will do. Only love gives the metaphysical objectivity and the participative “culture of the heart” by which great art can be valued, not to say the sense of symbolism so vital to the middle ages, which gave meaning to the “changing constellations” of life which is otherwise seen as a blind chaos of happenings. Only Love gives the answer to the question that may arise when one is confronted with a beautiful object, or when one folds one’s hand or kneels in prayer—only love gives the answer to the question, “what is happening in my consciousness”. For these things concern not the things that logic and science deal with, but the Self—the Self, the Super Ego, which alone makes judgments, exercises imagination, observes its own pleasures and pains, engages itself in contemplation of unrealized possibilities, prays, loves, consciously creates works of art or enters into aesthetic enjoyment. And the core of this Self in turn is the inwardly perceived (or, ultimately, cultivated) divine:

In the experiences of the psycho-physical ‘life-unity’ of man we find then the ideal of a Spirit which itself does not contain anything of the limitations of human organization and in the factual things or goods, we find value-rank relations which are valid, independent of the peculiarity (or particularity) of these (things or goods) the matter (or matrix?) out of which they are made, and the causal laws according to which they become and pass away.

For although this spiritual core of the heart is the source- and-end of all human living and valuing, it is not without its
own order. Scheler does not capitulate to an advaitic "undifferentiated continuum" nor to any theory of illusion that must perforce be its counterpart. Love has its own ladder of ranks, just as it gives the orientation for all evaluation of all exteriorized 'natural' laws and phenomena:

An object can be loved with the right kind of love, but in such a way that the fullness of its love-values does not completely reveal itself to the spiritual eye from zero to the highest completeness. Then the love is not adequate to the object; and yet these steps of adequation can increase from blind love to fully adequate or clearly evident and clear-sighted love.

Otherwise, there would be confusion between the genuinely affective and the merely passionate; the advaitin ends in the same predicament as the unsensitive empiricist! But on the other hand, if one admits anything of a hierarchy—such as is all-too-evident in our studies—one cannot possibly avoid its terminus in the mystical. But the hierarchy, as we have already observed, is that of a pyramid more than that of a ladder: the ordo amoris, the erotic continuum, has many faces, but all of them lead to no less than—infinity.

And yet, the question is unavoidable: TO WHAT INFINITY? Merely to the abstract, the mathematical, the Vast Unseen, the vacant void? Certainly not! And yet, what man in our own time, what poet, what philosopher, what monk, what mystic, even—if there be the such genuinely among us what lover any more dares to seek his life's end dancing among the stars? One wishes, at least for another Nietzsche, crying

Nein! Komm zurück!
Mit allen deinen Martern!
Zum Letzten aller Einsamen
O komm zurück!
All meine Tranen-Bache laufen
Zu dir den Lauf!
Und meine letzte Herzens—Flamme—
Dir glühnt sie auf!
O komm zurück,
Mein unbekannter Gott! Mein Smertz! Mein letztes—Glück
(Zarathustra, der Zauberer)

For if we have lost the lyric delights of the delicacies of the etherial art of dalliance with the divine, if we no more truly
know either painful secrecy of the Mystery of the Rose or the depths of the Lotus’ lulling peace, at least let us be desperate. Let us aspire! Or let us make our Complaint of unrequited love, let us sing of our Bereavement, as in the refrain of a poem such as this:

I have heard the Flute
......but cannot find the Player

Many times, in many places,
The Music comes...... But He
Does not appear.

O Kṛṣṇa, dancing—dancing
in Arcadia? Where? And whence
this strange alluring, when
there’s none to heed it now?

I have heard Thy Flute
......but cannot find Thee, Player
player in my game of emptiness
making merry, making melody
in my determined void......

O Kṛṣṇa of the flute long-lost
what has killed my love and joy?
O Flute of Kṛṣṇa, what time has tossed
Thy notes aside from Him, the Boy
Who now is lost from view?

I have heard thee, flute unfound
......Nor can I find the Player!

So, perhaps, will bhakti find its rasa once again; so, perhaps, again will the penetrating echoes of the Intimate Voices, as in Sibelius’ Quartet, or in Hindemith’s compositions for the Viola, quicken, quieten, enrich us at the core, until we are able once again to sing in prayerful spontaneity what heretofore we have only chanted in a drone. And so, perhaps, not only in our monasteries, but even in our metropolitan bedrooms we may take our rest in the bosom of our Holy Beloved, quietly bidding the psychiatrist and the broker reverently to depart, for then, perhaps, we shall be the recipients of the Mystery: “Blessed art thou among women!”......Alleluia! Be it...so be it......according to Thy Word!
AESTHETICS OF BHAKTI
THE EROTIC CONTINUUM

1. The article is found in the Sir Ausotosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Series, Calcutta, 1927.
5. op. cit. p. 57.
6. ibid., p. 282.
7. ibid., p. 381.
8. ibid., p. 385. The subsequent citations follow soon after this.
12. ibid.
13. the translation is Govindacharya's (obtained through the kind courtesy of Prof. Yamunacharya of Mysore University).
15. translation of K.C. Varadachari (reprint, obtained from the author).
18. Tiruvasotiyam, ibid.
19. Tiruwirattam, ibid.
21. op. cit., pp. 189 and 68.
25. Schriften aus nem Nachlass, Band I (Der Neue Geist Verlag, Berlin, 1933), pp. 227-263.
SECTION III

THE CONCEPT OF GLORY

As a sort of recapitulation in a higher key of all that has come to our attention in the aesthetic sphere, we now turn to an examination of the concept of Glory. It seems passing strange (and a sad commentary on our age) that this topic has been so badly neglected since the medieval period, although the process of transcendence through which we have been passing is not by any means complete without it. Even Gabriel Marcel, with all if his reflections on grace and mystery and aesthetics in transcendence seems to have neglected it explicitly although as we shall see, essentially it is implied in much that he has to say in reference to the Eternal. Although Schelling dealt at length with contemplation as the highest art, and has demonstrated that art is incomplete without contemplation (e.g., in his Philosophy of Mythology) in such a way that he comes very close to it, he never treats Glory openly and distinctly; at best, he only gets entangled in etymological complications about the word *makarios*, the Greek term for blessedness.

It is only as *glorious* that God may be considered as the Supremely Beautiful and the Supreme Artist, these being in necessary coincidence in Him, whereas with the human artist—or even in nature, with birds as musicians and nest-builders for example, there is no necessary connection with the artist and his own personal beauty, if any; for as with some song-birds, the artist may be an ugly person, and yet a great artist. But not so with God; his creation is his own glorification: it is not *ab extra* or *per contra*, but is the communicative expression—or *exemplification*, in the Bonaventuran language—of His own internal plenitude, the richness, the overflow of His own inherent Beauty. We ‘ascribe’ glory to Him in the act of praise, but the glory is really already His; in the act of praise we are rather caught up in the glory which He only allows us, as parts of His own glorification, participatively to give it back to Him.

Thus, we may distinguish a hierarchy: (a) Beauty as such, which is always commingled with the sensuous, and is essentially the *enjoyable*, so that we may strictly speak of the *beauty* of God
only as Avatāra, as God—appearing. (b) the Sublime, which seeks to transcend the sensuous and yet is immanent in the world, and can be realized only in contemplation, so that perhaps we should attribute this to the Antaryāmin, the Holy Spirit, God as hidden within. (c) the splendidours, which is of a purely spiritual order, yet attributable to God not ‘in the highest’ so much as in the Celestial Order (as traditionally represented by the Angels and the Cherubim and Seraphim, or in the Vaiṣṇava tradition, to the Vyūha forms. (d) the Glorious, which is completely transcendent, and, beyond both enjoyment and contemplation and even beyond the ecstatic which is ‘governed’ by the Celestial, is linked purely with praise and adoration, which properly befits God in his Para form, the Father Transcendent. The first may be considered primarily as beauty according to Nature, the second beauty according to Grace, the third beauty according to Rapture, the fourth beauty according to Perfection, in which both nature and grace find their potential realized in exaltation and plenitude and the ecstatic rapture established in permanence. Or, again, these may be analogized to the ‘theological’ virtues of faith, hope and love or to the three guṇas, tamas, rajas and sattva, of which Glory is the Consummation, the turiya, the ‘fourth’ or unitive state.

Thus it is that commonly we speak of the beauty of a garden or temple which we can enjoy immediately and objectively if only faith opens our senses; or of the sublimity of a mountain, which may have external distance but provokes inward reflection and a sense of subjective communion with its ‘allsomeness’ if only grace leads us into the proper quietude of mind; or of the resplendence of the rainbow, which mythologically has always symbolized the Promise, the Celestial Reward, the pure spiritual immediacy of exaltation. But we speak of the glory of a sunset or sunrise, which takes us out of ourselves and beyond itself into a sense of lingering wonder: we do not remain in a state either subjective or objective, but are caught up into inter-subjective mystery; we experience not givenness, but givingness, self-oblation, the sense of belonging to a Beyond that is absolute; we are not only exalted reflectively, but reflexively we exult: “Glory, Glory, Glory........to God.” The spectacle
fades, the splendour passes, but the Peace has transfused our innermost being eternally; we never forget it.

Such at least is the spirit of St. Bonaventura, whose treatment of the relation of grace to glory will concern us now. He writes (II Sent. XXVII:1:3):

Both grace (in particular *gratia gratum faciens*) and glory are names as divine influence, through which the soul has God and God inhabits the soul. But this can be twofold: either perfectly, and thus man has God by reason of becoming quiet; or partially (semplene) and thus man has God by reason of intention (tendentia). The first, the quiet, accords to the status of the *patria*, the Homeland, the second to the status of being *in the way*; and thus the first is proper to glory, the second, to grace. And since the first is of the nature of reward, and the second of merit, grace is attributed to the act of meriting, but glory rather to the act of reigning. And since for us to have God is nothing else than that God should inhabit ourselves, therefore grace and glory are not only distinguished according to the mode of having God, but also according to the reason of God’s inhabiting ourselves. Moreover, when I speak of God inhabiting man, I mean this in a twofold sense: the divine honour (dignatio) by which He accepts man and confederates him with Himself, and by consequence, the human exaltation from which man excellently participates in the things that are God’s. And this influence, through which God dwells among us is said to be grace……according to which God condescends to man. But glory is said to be that by which man is taken up (subluminatur) by virtue of that inhabitation (of God in man) and condescends to the Great.

And further, in answer to objections,

For Faith, which speaks of aenigmatic vision, can stand together with grace according to the status of imperfection; but it cannot so stand according to the status of plenitude, which excludes ‘all that is in part’ (I Cor. 13:10).……Glory is superadded to grace in the same sense that the perfect is added to the imperfect, although the latter leads to the former by way of completion (complementative)…….The immutability of glory comes down from above, but the corruptibility of grace comes from below……

This distinction according to status can be made only in such a way that it cannot be seen at first; just as someone who does not know his affection when it first arises, when it is not intense; but when it become intensified, then with facility is it discovered (deprehenditur) and (re-) cognized. Likewise, colour is not visible in darkness, but in light it is
visible, yet the colour itself does not differ essentially; thus the diversity of the mode of knowing according to grace and glory does not hold them essentially diversifed.........

And yet, we may add, to emphasize his sense, although the essential nature remains undiversified, the value that infuses it makes all the difference between darkness and light, between affection and infatuation, between contemplation and rapture.

From this it might appear that glory was only a moral or an eschatological matter in the strict sense: the glory of Heaven that is to come, the Paradise of the Korân that comes only as reward for virtuous life, howsoever influenced by grace. The glory of heaven we cannot deny. But the eschatological orientation is by no means only moral. Quite the contrary, it is primarily aesthetic, as may be seen in the passages we are about to examine. Glory is not only the perfection of the moral life which lies beyond the valle lacrimarum samsâra but is also the locus of perfect wisdom, and the consummation of the hierarchy of the beautiful. Nicholas Berdyaev has suggested this in his essay on beauty in The Divine and the Human, but has not developed it, although he well could do so, for certainly the whole history of Russian art is meaningless without the eschatological reference, in which it excels perhaps more than any other art in the world. Pari passu it may well be that the neglect of the eschatological aspect of aesthetics since the Renaissance when the physical heavens (which popular language still speaks of as glorious) and the spiritual heaven of the Lord of Hosts became divorced, has been the cause of so much problem-perplexity in arriving at definitions of beauty. Perfect beauty is never here-and-now. This is common with the medieval and modern worlds; but between Galileo and Einstein, without any adequate basis of reinterpretation of the concept of the Empyrean, European man was left with a truncated hierarchy, and the search for the beautiful became increasingly a matter of subjective and idealistic essence, rather than of existential value. But atomic man now may perhaps prove himself more at one in the end with medieval man: the static structure of the dualistic Newtonian world having been displaced by the evidently unlimited dynamic range of energization, of etherialization of matter, he (atomic man) is confronted afresh with the problem of hierarchy. An atomic explosion is existentially
glorious: like the advent of Kalki Avatāra of New Jerusalem, it splits the heavens asunder. Frightening though it be to the man without faith and grace, it is of the order of mystery-in-actualization, the revelation of another dimension of reality whose value is remarkably parallel to that put on the Empy- rean by medieval man. Science for both is ugly and demonic, but with the illumination of grace not only is the gap between science and aesthetics bridged; illumination renders both science and aesthetics capable of glory by referring them to their common locus in the Divine. For may we not speak of a sort of ‘ionization’ of value?—value moreover which is not of the mind alone, but of existence itself, existence of the world and of the souls that inhabit it and participate in its governance and become instruments of its transformation. For are not values—esthetic as well as dianoetic and ethical—like matter itself, which never truly “evaporates”, but is only energized into dynamic invisibility? Perhaps, indeed, they are distinctly an extension of the continuum of this ‘invisibilization’, of ‘transexistentialization’ into glory! The beatified soul does not just perceive more essences—much less does it simply become an ‘essence’; its existence, its incorporative capacity (in terms, at least, of value) is extenuated into the perfection of plenitude: the beatified saint achieves the good as the beatified artist achieves the beautiful and the beatified scientist achieves the wholeness of truth; they are all equally capable of entering into glory. They all can existentialize (to use some characteristic phrases from Bonaventura’s preface to the fourth book of the Sentences) the pigmentorum suavitatis and the unctionum sanitatis the sweetness of the heavenly pigments and the saving purity of the celestial anointings, the redolence of the sacrifice of praise to God, the sweet-smelling savour of perfect oblation, the kindling of the Lord, the unction of the Holy Spirit, the immanent attainment of the Life of Eternal Abundance, which has always been, like the proton from which the electrons split off (and which—who knows?—may also be capable of inexhaustible fissionability) the core of man’s being. And yet, these things only eschatologically. Death is the Mediator, death linked with Life, dissolution (laya) with creation (sthiti). And only thus are things eternally New. Glory is absolute sufficiency in embellishment.
The whole concept of Glory has been developed by St. Bonaventura in a way that should be of interest to all concerned with comparative studies, even if they cannot find much in it that may be relevant to the modern world. And yet, as it become more relevant for the comparative field, it takes on fuller value of a universal order, as we shall see at length. For with Rāmānuja also, the glory idea is the fulcrum of the communicability of the Divine plentitude, both in the eschatological and the cosmogenic frames of reference. Although of course the formalities of the doctrine of involution so prominent in all of Indian tradition are foreign to western scholasticism, there is a tacit emphasis on the double function of the Empyrean and its gloriousness: all things proceed out of it, as material substances out of spiritual substance, and all things also return into it when their ‘exile’ is finished, their destiny accomplished; and moreover, although human souls and angels—spiritual creatures—are more in the focus of attention, material things, the world itself, are also caught up in the grand sweep of the dramatic glorification of the Almighty. Thus in commentary on the Sentences\(^1\) we find the following arguments under the question (the age-old one for aesthetics) of the relation of human utility to divine glory in itself—a question, by the way, which in the modern truncated pattern of thought which limits beauty to the sphere of nature and man alone cannot be so easily resolved; for the dichotomy of usefulness viz. beauty-for-beauty’s sake must remain just that, if their common ground is not found in the divine. Bonaventura states the question thus:

Although all creatures have been founded (conditae) because of the divine glory and (also) because of their own respective utility.....For God made us and loves us not because of our utility to Him, but because of his own bountiful goodness and our own utility (to ourselves); it must be enquired which is the more principal end of the Founder of things, the divine glory of our utility.

Of course, he argues for glory as the higher, because: (a) It is more ultimate (whereas, we may interject, mere beauty may not be, as unessential to survival). (b) It is more perfect. (c) It is more essential to the divine nature itself (in spite of the fact that as a Franciscan he put more value on utility as conversant with fruition than other schoolmen—as for that
matter Rāmānuja also does more than the other Ācāryas) especially in the case of rational creatures (e.g., an object of art may be both useful and beautiful, and even in a perverted sense, a prostitute: the mind or the thought of a philosopher or a prostitute...well, these are arts that are not for sale!—even, as in Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, the prostitute may become a philosopher, for the glory of her rationality, though sullied, is inalienable, whereas her utility is limited). (d) Because glory is more universal than utility; all of nature follows after (assequitur) the quest of it, whether good or evil, natural or human or angelic, whereas the same can hardly be said of utility....Indeed one thinks here of the problem of cosmic waste: What is the use of all the seeds that do not sprout, of the sperm that finds no egg, of flowers that bear no fruit, of the waste lands and the oceans, of all the stars that burn themselves out...yet is not the whole a pattern of glorious exhuberance, a magnificent extravaganza? Bounteouisness that can easily afford vastflourishes of playful largesse......Cosmology and eschatology alike are meaningless without this aesthetic foundation of the Glory of God!

Then he continues, after the objections, with a quotation from the Book of Proverbs (16:4):

“The Lord has made everything (e.g., the universe) for its own end”, but not for its own utility or indigence, for (Psalm 15:22) “I said to the Lord, Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my goods”: therefore because of His Glory, not, I say, for the sake of increasing his glory, but for the sake of manifesting his glory and because of communicating his glory, in whose manifestation and participation the highest utility of the creature is realized (attenditur), viz., its glorification of beatification.

Beatification, of course, is the glorification of souls, whereas the term glorification, refers to things as well. In reply to the objections he continues:

To the objection that love seeks the good of another, we reply that it is the same with God as with ourselves. For with us our own proper good differs from the common good; except that with God, His own proper good is also the common good, for He is Himself the good of all good... Wherefore, since the utility of the creature is realized (attenditur) in (being) ordained to the good which God is, the love (caritas) of God makes all things according to the
highest rightness and converts them to Himself, whereas this is not true of ourselves.

To the objection that that end is the more principal which most follows its nature (an argument more characteristic of Thomism) the reply may be twofold: Either as to nature as deficient, or as perfect. I say therefore that nature in its inherent deficiency is recurved (back into glory); and thus it desires its own proper good and hence its own reward (commodum). But perfect nature is lifted up by the love of charity (amore caritatis), and all the more improbably desires the glory of God than its own utility......

To the objection that (without the aspect of utility ad extra God would have no reason for creating the world, for he could not have created it for the increase of his glory, which cannot be increased—e.g., He is not more glorious after creating than before) ...the preferred reply is that things are made for the sake of the glory of God, not I say, for the sake of acquiring or amplifying, but for the sake of communicating. And although the glory of God might (still) be without made things, nevertheless it would not be communicated or manifested except through things that are produced.

To the objection that fruition tends to greater perfection, we reply that praise may be taken in two ways, sc., perfect and imperfect. Imperfect praise perfects the soul less than fruition; but not so with perfect praise, for the soul is made happy (laetatur) more in glory and will rejoice (gaudebit) more in the glory and honour of God than in its own glorification, and will become more jocund in praising than in considering its own good.

That glory is not just a subjective, idealistic notion but a substantial condition of existence is brought out by its relation to the Empyrean—a concept which it is passing strange that historians of philosophy have neglected so much, for it is at least as secund a concept as that of the apeiron of the Greeks, and indeed may be said to have replaced the latter in such a way as to explain why the Greeks had no concept of Glory or of existential infinity; for the apeiron, as the infinite, the ‘void’ in which the finite was precariously poised, could have no positive relation to the material here-and-now: it was only the ‘limit’ that dialectically made the world ‘limited’. But the Empyrean was anything but a void or a limit; its infinity was that of God’s—an infinity of plenitude out of which the world proceeds as body and as embodiment. The glory of the Empy-
ean alone gives the rationale of the ‘infinity’ of Gothic (as contrasted so famously by the Germans to the finitude of Greek) art and thought. Therefore, the *apeiron* could not influence the *peiron*, as communicating nothing to it; but the Empyrean, as infinite ‘fourth-dimensional’ (spiritual) body—we may be reminded of Einstein’s concept of the universe as of an order of infinity not incompatible with matter-in-concretion—has the mediating role between God as unmoved mover and as source of emanation and the world that is brought into being and governed by him. Thus Bonaventura writes:

For wherein we find a body, it is necessary that its influence be corporeal...God founded the three orders ordered among themselves by grade and dignity, not only of nature, but of influence...(the lower orders for other functions) but the empyrean for the sustenance (susceptio) of the rational.

And to some it seems that this rational (viz., the capacity of the empyrean—the fourth dimensional, so to speak—to sustain the rational order of creation) is such not only by reason of the order of influence, but also of conformity of nature. For the empyrean is the locus of spiritual substances, and even of glorified bodies. And since it is convenient to allocate either the manifest of the hidden (the occult) there, it seems that the influence of this heaven (the empyrean) must be consonant to both our bodies and our souls joined to them, not by reason of itself but by reason of their bodies which they (the souls) perfect and ‘inform’.

This essentially is the Thomistic position, which puts a quasi-separability between the body concept as material cause, and the soul as formal cause in conjunction—perhaps closer to a sort of *Nyāya* position than to Rāmānuja or any of the Vaiṣṇava ācāryas except, perhaps, Mādhva. But over against this Bonaventura puts the extremist Augustinian position, which is very nearly advaitic:

But another opinion which says that the empyrean has no influence whatever on the lower orders, because bodies have no influence except according to the order of the Founder, with respect to their end. According to this view the empyrean is founded only for the perfection of the universe, so that it might be the place of the Blessed, and therefore this region and its light is (completely) remote from us and occult, just as glory itself, which we hope for (expectamus) and love through grace, and which we believe in, but do
not see. And they say that the empyrean is not for the support (obsequium) of men in the present, but only for eternal support; it does not ameliorate their condition, but remains uniformly subsistent in its own dignity. And thus the reasons adduced to show the influence on these lower orders according to them are not valid. For the ordination of this body (the empyrean) toward the other office of (showing forth) the Founder’s rule and royalty (dictamen et imperium) does not admit of that lower influence......

But he takes a middle position:

For who can know whether God gave their occult influence over us by reason of nobility or according to the reason of conformity?......Therefore I decline to the neutral position...that since the empyrean is the first created among bodies, it is the greatest in subtlety (mole) and virtue—the greatest by subtlety for all bodies have their locus therein through ambit and through being contained; the greatest by virtue, as nourishing (vegetat) and conserving through its influence. Therefore the influence which it is said to have on human bodies is to be omitted, but that it has some effect on and some influence over inferior bodies is to be sustained, insofar as it is the first created (as out of it the rest of creation follows).

Thus he takes a sort of viṣistādvaitic position: The empyrean, like the Lilā Vibhūti of Rāmānuja which we shall later examine, does not by virtue of the corporeality which is common to it and them completely govern the lower orders, which nevertheless have their existence within it in an etherialized state when glorification is realized, and retain therefore their focus therein even in the state of concretion, because this would allow too much weight to corporeality in reference to its Divine Source; but neither is it (the empyrean) completely disassociated from them (the lower orders) as a sort of adhyāsa, for this would compromise their dignity and ‘conformity’ as being capable of glorification, which is theirs (and not God’s alone) by right, not only in the ‘future’ completely, but also in the present participatively. As the locus of glory, the empyrean furnishes also the focus of all order (and therefore of beauty, as participative and anticipative of glory—for order and harmony, as we have seen, are the key-notes of beauty for Bonaventura), so that there is a sort of samānādhiṣṭhān relation between it on the one hand and finite creation on the other, the human
situation being partially excepted because it also has an unmediated relation to Godhead.

But perhaps of even more significance aesthetically is the consideration that the empyrean, the state of glory—and it alone—is the realm of *perfect praise*, although this perfect praise is considered to be of a different nature with the angels than with beatified. In the *Doubts* following the above passages, St. Bonaventura opines, following St. Gregory, that the praise of the angels is of the nature of ‘mental’ ‘admiration of contemplation’ made ‘though ‘imaginary’’ vision, rather than corporeal vision or voice, whereas the praise of beatified men is ‘vocal’ although of an etherealized sort, so that no inspiration or expiration is necessary, but a sort of *beating of the air* like the hum of bees, as befits the rarefied nature of spiritual substance which composes the empyrean—the ‘air’ itself not being gross but ‘glorified’. To the modern, of course, this is a strange curiosity if taken literally. But it does indicate, does it not, the *stretch* of which the imagination is capable, and actually corresponds to the Yoga Practice of whispering the *Mantra*: *We can imagine* perfection, even if we cannot experience it in any other way. *Imaginative contemplation* in its purest form remains, as Schelling affirms, the highest art—even higher than the highest form of expressed praise; and art loses its glory when the imagination ceases to picture beings of a more perfectly spiritual nature than the merely human: Angels and Art! Again we remember Rilke, and wish that more would follow in his steps.

For although angels, according to Bonaventura, like the Vyūhas of Vaiṣṇava tradition, may assume bodies for our instruction and solace, in the face of God, in their own nature, they are completely bodiless, unencumbered pure spirits, remaining always (as indeed we should like to do!) in the Glory which they embody and communicate. And likewise with the whole of our pictures of Heaven: Browning fades in the light of Dante; and Kant is like a desert when put beside Bonaventura’s flood of imaginative aesthetic sense when he writes about the Blessed Virgin and the Holy Trinity.4

The word ‘heaven’ is a name imposed on a body according to its primal imposition; and that body which is the highest is called heaven, because it is of a containing nature, secret
and quiet. And since this threefold quality is referred to the exaltedness (celsitudine) of divinity, therefore it is called heaven (caelum): for it is full of the immensity of virtue, secret with the profundity of cognition, quiet with the tranquillity of dilectation...It is the highest not as to situation (situ), but as to dignity; and greater than every other heaven, not by extension, but by its immensity, through which it is beyond all not exclusive of all (extra omnium, non exclusus). In this heaven are the three persons, Father Son and Holy Spirit, who alone are in all respects perfectly equal. But all that is created, whether corporeal or spiritual, is within the Empyrean.

Thus we find clearly the same distinction which Vaiṣṇavism makes between the Nitya Vibhūti and the Lāla Vibhūti. The highest glory, the perfect plenitude of triune equality, is within the Divine Nature itself; but it does not remain locked up there alone: it irradiates communicatively the nature of the created order in all its grades the most subtle empyrean having a perfection scarcely less than that of the Divine Nature, except that it is not its own, thanks to the role of the mediative role of the duplex nature of the Word—of the Christ—who on the one hand, as Bonaventura goes on to explain, in his divine nature shares the complete equality of the internally divine, but on the other hand, by virtue of his human nature “sits on the right hand of the Father” within the Empyrean, excelling all others whether angels or men. The Blessed Virgin just next to him in rank and dignity (sc., in excellence of glory), and after her, the others.

But please, let it be noted that this is not a matter of dogma, but of art, of imagination and still more of spiritual desire:

Whence one must imagine that there the Blessed are as if in a solarium; nor is it to be understood that one is directly on top of the other......Thus none can imagine, who is really quite ignorant of the head (of these things) the disposition of the Blessed and of Christ in the empyrean. Yet scarcely can one totally imagine to what one will arrive who reaches that disposition of thinking through which (one thinks of these things as they really) are; and therefore they are more to be desired than described in imagination.

To discard these things as ‘only’ imaginary simply means that the desire for perfection has been lost, that bhakti has petrified. Art without a heaven can only be as crude—and as cruel—as any attempt at a perfect society without any ideal,
without any planning, without any desiderative goal, without a vision or method. As Marcel frequently remarks in his *Man against Mass Society* and elsewhere, utopias always defeat their own (unwittingly) affirmed eschatology because in denying the possibility of perfection-in-transcendence they cut themselves off from the creativity of faith and hope and love which alone make even their 'concrete' ("this-worldly") programmes possible.

Our ideals—the things we love—must be affirmed in a reference of immortalization, of immunity to being sullied. Not that they "jump off" thereby into a realm of 'absolute idea' devoid of any existential value; quite the contrary: we are always engaged by them, they challenge us, instead of furnishing us with a means of 'escape' into them. The "Kingdom of heaven" is within us, whereas utopias always remain a fiction at best, and often, as Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-four* has depicted, and as so many ex-communists testify (we need not mention Nazi Germany) they turn out to be the worst, the most demonic of nightmares.

Art without glory as the seed of its inspiration and the aura within which it reflectively aspires, can scarcely escape the same perversions of madness, the same disintegration of meaninglessness, the same prostitution to mundane servitude, whether political or otherwise utilitarian or propagandistic. It is not just that art must be rooted in mythology, as Schelling thought; it must also be infused with the desire of heaven. Mere idle dilettantish infatuation with the themes of ancient mythologies will not save us, but the living lure of consummation in that exaltedness, in the immensity, in that profundity, in that tranquility of delectation (no terms could be more apt than Bonaventura's own) which the vision of heaven, of the realm of glory, alone affords. And that lure—is it not inalienable within us? Even if we do not 'believe in heaven', even if we no longer so valiantly proclaim that "a thing of beauty is a joy forever" as our grand-parents, we still find ourselves secretly wishing, "if only it could be that way."

But perhaps the secret wish is nearer to true faith than the old Victorian valiente buoyancy. For true faith can never be divorced from hope, slender and precarious and tender—
but therefore all the more precious—though it must perforce remain: "Well, perhaps it could be so, who knows?" It is the sense of expectance, the suggestion of other possibilities, the reflection of a beyond, the adumbration of a Future, the lingering on, and the leaning over, the Threshold that characterizes all great art... The threshold of what? We do not know what that 'what' is, yet we are, as long as we do not take suicide as a way out, inevitably bound to it, surrendered to it, involved in it, heart and soul. To give it a name, to call it mystery, to call it glory, solves no problems, in no way relieves our ignorance; but perhaps the name, like the name of one with whom we have fallen in love, can fan the flame of our affirmation and our desire, and give it the constancy, the invariability, the supreme innocence and impassibility (to use other words of Bonaventura's) the characteristic of being that to which there can be no addition, the perfect state of the plenitude of all good, the perfect tenacity to the clear vision of God.

Yet there is another deception that must be cleared away. There is much writing today about the salvation of art, without reference to the beatification of the artist, whereas the former is impossible without the latter. For the artist's art is like God's glory: It is of himself and for himself and another although in another. Proportionately, if the artist in his own soul does not come into the transluency of God's overflowing otherness so that he experiences Living Being in it, his art will be only work; it cannot show forth any illuminative vision which he has not himself come into. For he does not, cannot 'have' a vision of glory, he must be infused with it; he must incarnate it; like the Blessed Virgin, in all her purity, in her immaculateness which has come by grace, he must become a bearer of the Eternal Word, an ad-simulation not only of the vestigium but of the image of the Divine. Or, in Bonaventura's own words, (as we find in the Reductio Artium ad Theologiam—the famous work on which this whole chapter on Rasa is scarcely more than an extended commentary)

For any artist who would do any work, either must work so that through that he must redound in praises, or else through that something is worked or is made as light in himself, or else in that there is delectation... Because of these three God made the soul rational, that it may praise Him, that it may
serve Him, that it may delight in Him and become quiet; and this through love, "in which whoever remains, remains in God, and God in him (1 Jn. 4:16) in such a way that there is a marvellous union, and from the union, a marvellous delectation....

Therefore as he knows nothing perfectly through teaching (sermonem) only, unless there is the mediation of virtue, of light, and of the face (specie) of the soul in (mystical) union; so to that which makes the soul ruddy (rerudiatur) and ready for the cognition of God through His own internal locutions, it is necessary that he be joined in union with Him "who is the splendour of glory and the figure of His substance, bearing all things with the word of his power" (Heb. 1:3).

(But) the nature of the corporeal soul cannot come into this union except by the mediation of moisture, of spirit and of heat, which three dispose the flesh toward the sustenance of life from the soul.... God cannot be present to the life of the soul except it be united to Him, except it be moist with the groans of compunction and piety,....spirited through the contempt of all that is terrestrial, and heated through the desire of the celestial Fatherland and of its delight.

It is important to realize that he is speaking of (and out of) experience of reality, and not imaginary "studio mysticism", of experience not self-engendered or arrived at through a Proustian infatuation with one's own introvertedness, sincere though it may be (Andre Gide, for example)—much less the sophisticated culture of the esoteric that we find in so many theosophists and even among some followers of Jung. Rather, as Bonaventura says elsewhere it is a matter of the gift of vision: technically so, gift in the same sense that the Holy Spirit, as the fullness of Grace, as the bearer of all spiritual gifts and powers, is 'given', and vision, in the sense not only of metaphysical 'insight', but of the transforming illuminating of the Buddha or the Prophets and Rsis who have "seen God face to face". But even more than this is required: a perfect "holding on" (tentio), a security, a security moreover, which is of a permanent abiding (permansione) And—

To the objection that it is sufficient to know God, it must be said that this is false, for even more it is necessary to 'hold on' (tenere) perfectly. And what is subjoined, that an open and clear vision of God is the reward (e.g., of glorification, of beatification) it may be said that this is true through concomitance. For scarcely is there any open vision of God, unless there is certitude of future permanence.
Further refining on the nature of this perfection he further shows that it does have existential, and not fictitious reference.

The perfect may be said to be the completed or the completion in which there is *status*. Status moreover is posited in anything doubly: either singly or in general. If simply, it is a third member; if in the general nature of the creatures, and this (in turn) doubly: either insofar as it comes forth from God, and thus it has the nature (ratio) of a *vestigium*, and perfection in this case has reference to every creature insofar as it is led through to the mode, species and order competent to itself; or in the other manner insofar as the creature returns into God, and thus is the perfection of glory (italics ours); and this the Master (Peter Lombard the author of the ‘Sentences’ as Bādarāyaṇa of the ‘Sūtras’) calls the perfection according to nature. Therefore it is to be posited that there is (both perfection according to essence and according to participation): and this doubly, either according to egress or according to regress.

The last point gives us, on the face of it, a more-than-excellent point of transition to the Indian context. For although there may be formal distinctions, it can hardly be said that there is any radical difference in orientation or basic structure: In both contexts, perfection—glory—lies at the level mediating God in Himself and the exterior cosmos. In both it is a realm of existence and not of essence, although existence of the nature of spiritual substance. In both, all things and all spiritual beings find both origin and end therein,—end in the double sense of consummation and of finishing the course; and in both it remains more a matter of aesthetic imagination and desire than of (pseudo-scientific) dogma of ‘fact’. It may be that Bonaventura, as we have seen elsewhere, formally denies that this, as all the world, is the ‘body’ of God, as Rāmānuja affirms; but he does speak of it as a ‘body’ and in very nearly the same sense—e.g. as having the same purpose—as Rāmānuja: it communicates, as a sort of effervescence of His nature, the attributes of God to his world. In short, for both, the “means of grace and the hope of glory” are inseparable and the beauty of the world is but an anticipative reflection of the Glory of Heaven. Again, it may be true that the western scholastics did not countenance the cyclic nature of the egress and ingress, which is rather basic to all Indian thought; but even here Rāmānuja’s own feeling in respect to his own tradition seems
to put the emphasis on the Final Hope that beyond the cycles, there will be—or is, in a supra-temporal dimension—the consummation of all in this Glory; beyond the līlās of the ingress and egress, beyond the enjoyments by participation mixed with anticipation, there lies the perfect intuition "face to face", wherein, as with Bonaventura's angels, praise and enjoyment and contemplation have ceased to be separable, and senses-in-the-gross, with sight as the highest, are replaced, by spiritual senses in which the order of excellence is reversed, touch being the more immediate and sight the most remorse. Likewise in both we find the distinction of the beauty (saundārya) of God as referring to the sacraments, images and incarnated form (or forms); the splendour and sublimity (tejas) of God as reflected in and transmitted by the angelic order (the Vīyūhas); and the glory (vibhūti) of God as referring to the Para, the exalted transcendent form although that form itself does not remain so exalted as to be completely unattainable by those who reach the highest beatitude—not unattainable, and yet at the same time distinct even as the enjoyer and Enjoyed remain distinct and yet separable, joined in unsullied and eternal love transformed into bliss. And although each level invalid in its own value, the process of transcendence is not eliminative, but rather inclusive: all attribution, all possible description of God is subsumed under the caption of Glory, the lesser or lower individuated attributes being not so much descriptive in the strict sense, but actively glorifications, ascriptions attributed to Him, whereas glory itself is of the purity of His essential Being: It is that by which He governs the world—not by force at all, and not by power so much as by persuasion and by the aesthetic (!) adoration which He inspires.

Glory, then, is for both Bonaventura and Rāmānuja, both the root and flower of the awareness of the artist, as Francis Hasserot has put it in his Logic of Being.

The Awareness of an Artist, is, hence, not fastened to perceptual immediacy nor imprisoned in the narrow bounds of the actual. It transcends by imaginative grasp the common world of matter-of-fact. It is filled with suggestions, glimpses, insights, intuitions and visions. These are not forced up in response to routine repetition nor administrative command. They obey the law of the causal and the intentional. They
require leisure for their generation and defy regularity. They respect neither time nor circumstance but originate as nature and the coincidence of events bring them forth. They arise out of the correlation of external syntheses of facts with internal syntheses of suggestion and come at random out of wonder and contemplation as synoptic insights. They are held by the discovering imagination as objects for a sustained fixation of vision which permits the artist to gaze on them, apprehend them, and incorporate them into actual things.

This sustained fixation of vision is very close to our concept of bhakti as linked to glory, as we see in Rāmānuja’s remarks on Gitā X:7:-

Glory (vibhūti) i.e., Lordly power (aśvarya). He who knows, in truth, this Lordly power of Mine consisting in the fact that the production sustenance and activity of all depend on Me, and the mystic power (yoga) consisting in (My) noble qualities opposed to (all) that should be avoided, is endowed with unshaken, i.e., unflinching, Bhaktiyoga; there is no doubt about it. The sense is: You will see yourself, that the knowledge of My Lordly Power as well as of (My) noble qualities, promotes Bhaktiyoga.

And for that matter, the whole of the 10th Adhyāya may be taken as an exposition of the glory (and the glories) of the Lord, especially as expressed in Arjuna’s paean of praise in 12-18, in which we find such words as supremely Great (Parabrahman) supernatural light (Param dhamma which is equated with param jyotiḥ ?) Parama Pavitram, or Supremely Holy, or Supreme Purifier; Bhūtesa, governor of all creatures, Bhūta-bhāvana, Progenitor of all creatures, Devadeva, God of Gods, Jagatpati, Master of the universe—a list all too like that found in the Te Deum or the Nicene Creed, all of which, nevertheless, seem summarized in the term Vibhūti, which, revealingly, some translators have preferred to render in such words as “supernal manifestation” (Edgerton), for as with Bonaventura, the Gitā concept itself carries with it the dupex orientation of exaltedness in reference to the creation, and communicative manifestation in reference to Godhead as the emanative source of creation. Above all, as we see in the 16th, 18th and 40th ślokas, this term vibhūti carries with it the connotation of inexhaustibility such that there can be no satiety of praise or contemplation about it, for, as Rāmānuja himself
remarks, although the Lord himself alone can describe himself, He does so by displaying himself by His governing, pervading and indwelling the world and the very souls who are inspired with that praise, reminding us again of Nammalwar’s remark that “Thou praisest Thyself through me.”

And yet in ślokas 40 and 41 we are reminded of the other refrain of Nammalwar, that one cannot begin adequately to praise, at least while still in the body. For the manifestation, the display, the Tejas, the splendour, is only fragmentary, a spark, of the Overplus which provokes our exhaustive efforts at reaching perfection: His inexhaustibility exhausts us, brings us helplessly into that perfection—by prapatti rather than by bhakti—which is His alone. Our perfection lies in the transcorporation (to use Bonaventura’s term) from the gross (sthūla) to the subtle (sūkṣma, liṅga) state, but even this attainable participative perfection available to us is still only a “thousandth part of a ten-thousandth part—a single fraction—(ekāṁśa)—of the transcendental Perfection that is the Lord’s alone.”

Such is the basis of the development in later tradition of the distinction between the līlā vibhūti and the nītya vibhūti. It is further intimated in Rāmānuja’s commentary thus: (Preface to XV, and XV : 11)

(The Preface):

......then after having described at length, the way how the qualities attach themselves to (Puruṣa), it has been taught, that the attainment of the real nature of the soul, accompanied by a freedom from attachment of the qualities, originates in the Bhakti of the Lord. Now (Kṛṣṇa) is going to teach the glory of the Lord to be worshipped, which (glory) is endowed with the (soul) bound as well as liberated consisting (respectively) in Kṣara and Aksara. As also, that (the Lord) is the best Puruṣa, who is of a different kind from the twofold Puruṣa, viz., Kṣara and Aksara constituting the glory of Him on account of His extremely superior nature by virtue of His being the focus of all noble (qualities), opposed to those that should be avoided. Of this (twofold glory), the Blessed Lord first speaks of (the glory) which constitutes a particular effect of the unintelligent (Prakṛti) and which extends itself in the shape of the bond (of Aksara), which bond constitutes the object to be cut off (by Him), comparing it figuratively with an Asvattha tree, by way of introduction to teaching the glory
called Akṣara, whose bond has been cut off with the weapon consisting in non-attachment.

(XIV : 11):

......Thus it has been taught in the following texts, that the soul, in the state of liberation, as well as in the state of a Jīva, constitutes the glory of the Lord; thus soul, which consists of knowledge, forming a light which lightens even the luminous bodies, viz., sun, moon, and fire, which give light (only) inasmuch as they serve to remove the darkness which obstructs the connection of the sense-organs with (their respective objects)....

Now (the Lord) declares that the light of the luminous bodies such as the sun, which (light) is a particular effect of the unintelligent (Prakṛti), too constitutes the glory of the Lord.

The fully developed distinction may be found in the Yaśindramāta dipikā, the Ṭilā vibhūti coming under the heading of Time (kāla)9 whereas the nitya vibhūti takes up a whole section.10 The Ṭilā vibhūti is, in brief, the glory of the Lord as it operates within time, within the great ‘play’ of cyclic involution and evolution of the material universe composed of the three guṇas, tamas, rajas and sattva but revealed as such only to bhaktas and prapannas.

But as for the nitya vibhūti, we may best turn to the text itself, insofar as it is relevant (1, 2, 3a, 6, 7, 8, 11):

Now the nitya vibhūti is explained, Immateriality (ajadatva) is a general characteristic of suddhasattva, dharmabhūta-jāna, individual self and Īśvara. What is called immateriality is self-luminosity. Of these, the common characteristic ......is thus: They possess the utility of immateriality while existing for another. They appear to (or are recognized by) others alone and are self-luminous.

2. What is called suddhasattva is a kind of (spiritual substance) being different from the matter affected by the three guṇas and possessing sattva; it is distinct from that which is different from the region where nescience is entirely got rid of. This ‘manifestation’ is infinite in the higher regions and finite in the lower regions; and this is non-conscious and self-luminous. It is designated as ‘bliss’ since it conveys bliss. It is the embodiment of Pañcopaniṣad as explained by the hymns of Pañcopaniṣad. It is proclaimed to be of the nature of five powers, since it is made up of five immutable powers.
3. This ‘manifestation’ by the will of Iśvara assumes the form of objects, means and abodes of enjoyment for Iśvara, the eternals and the released selves. The objects of enjoyment are the body of Iśvara, etc...

6. The embodiment of the released individual selves is only for the service of the Lord, like the disguise worn on the occasions of the spring festival.

7. The usage of the expression ‘six attributeness in connection with Iśvara’s body’ is due to the manifestation by it of those six attributes. The eternal faultless, and unsurpassable attributes of the Divine Auspicious figure are splendour, beauty, fragrance, tenderness, loveliness, youthfulness, softness, etc......

8. The passage, which states that the released individual selves have no embodiment, means that the body determined by karma is absent. There the senses are eternal; therefore there is not the relation of cause and effect; hence (the non-material senses) are not designated as separate categories like the material ones.

11. The (eternal) manifestation is of four kinds as amoda, pramoda, sammoda and Vaikuṇṭha; and again it is infinite. It is denoted by such terms as tripadvibhūti, paramapada, paramavvoma, vaikuṇṭha, etc. The city of Vaikuṇṭha is situated in the realm of eternal manifestation with twelve enclosures, and surrounded by many gates and ramparts. In this is the divine abode known as ānanda; within that is the hall known as mahāmahimamanaḍapa, constructed with thousands of pillars made of jewels. In it is Ananta, lit up by the lustre of the gems of his thousand hoods. On him is the divine throne made of dharma, etc. Over it is the eight-petalled lotus, attended by Vimala and with the chowries in their hands. On it is Śeṣa, the abode of supreme knowledge. Over Śeṣa is the transcendental (being) who is beyond speech. Thus nitya vibhūti has been explained.

Rāmānuja’s aesthetic sense nowhere better expresses itself than in his descriptions of this realm, not only in the Vaikuṇṭha Gadya, but also in the Vedārtha Saṅgraha. However, although his language—almost untranslatable—takes flights of passionate imaginative elaboration, the substance is the same as the Dīpikā’s more cryptic statement. But for the philosophical import of the teaching therein, we may turn to Lacombe, who has, unlike some other writers, taken the whole matter as profoundly significant for metaphysics, and not merely a matter of pious mythology. Thus he writes11
The knowledge which the Lord has of himself is no more than his being, purely relative to his creation; it has an absolute content, the *spiritual life of the absolute personality*. But at the same time, since *Īśvara* has a body, his knowledge also has a relative content, that is to say, the relation of the divine spirit to the divine body, relations (which are) ontological, by which he is "soul"—dynamic relations which make a full return (resortissment) into his creative power as illumined and embraced by his loving and willing knowledge. The knowledge which the Lord has of his generous fecundity is interior to his personal knowledge, but in the manner of an *intimate response*, and, without constituting a personality distinct from his own, it concretizes itself as the immanent term of an *eternal dialogue in which God engages himself with himself on the subject of creation in which he wishes to diffuse (rependre) his glory*. This polarization of the divine life by his *sakti*, his creative capacity (the Vaiśṇavas call it Śrī—beauty—or Lakṣmi—joyous abundance—and conceive it symbolically as a feminine principle immanent in the Supreme Deity whose will appears correspondingly as the masculine principle.)

......One sees thus with what ease the notion of a personal body of *Īśvara*, who is spirit (a notion whose prescience is best understood as commanded by traditional motives), how easily that imaginative theme takes its place in the system: not only does the cosmic body prepare us to conceive the personal body, but the prime essence, the most noble quality of the nature thanks to which this (prime essence) receives (it, the body) as a *reflection of spirituality*; but also, to take things on the ascending scale, (as a sort of) prelude to the spirituality, this prime essence which is intermediary in a platonic fashion, a *metaxu*, constitutes a prototype (footnote: in the order of invention but *ectype* in the order of constituted doctrine) completely adequate to the new intermediary reality an expression of the Divine (which is) *infra-spiritual but supra-material, infra-personal but supra-cosmic*, a marvellous and supernatural projection of His nature. This substance of glory is, in effect, immaterial (*ajāda*), that is, luminous and manifest (*svayamprakāśa*) but does not exist *for itself*; it is *for* the supreme Person. It is not luminous *for itself*; it is inconscient. One recognizes here certain properties of knowledge which itself, we must not for get, is a substance (footnote: also the nitya vibhūti, the eternal glory is said to *participate* in the essence of knowledge, *Jñānātmika*). Only, whereas knowledge is an attribute *constitutive* of the Person, the ‘pure essence’ (*suddha sattva*) is constitutive only of the body of the Person. And that
suffices to make us understand that, malgré the similitudes of their definitions, there is between these two substance-attributes a difference of ontological nexus, the second appertaining only to the order of spirit. (But) is no less than this (also) by itself the object of the blissful experience (ānanda). The substance of glory is irradiated indeed in a variety of qualities ultra sensible and delightful, sonorous and coloured, perfumed, tasteful and tactile, perceptible to the divine knowing by the means of 'ultra-sense' with which the body of glory of Īśvara is endowed. This ānanda (is the chief characteristic which) puts (the prime essence) well beyond nature (as such, which is) incapable by itself of determining affective values. And every objective principle of ignorance or error (avidyā) is eliminated.

This substance of glory constitute not only the personal body of Īśvara. Plastic in the hands of his all-powerfulness, it furnishes him with an infinite abundance over-and-above the material of that object of blissful experience which is the body itself—abundance of that experience, such as arms, ornaments (etc., including the celestial city of Vaikuṇṭha itself with all that appertains to it). It is of (this) pure essence that the glorious bodies of the spirits which live for eternity......are made (and) it is of (this) pure essence that the glorious bodies of delivered souls consist. Finally, it is this that constitutes the medium of the divine manifestations in the diverse sorts of theophanies (or avatāras).

Here, of course, Lacombe is only explicating the text we have cited, and for the evident reason that there is very little reference to the topic in the Brahma Sūtras upon which he could comment, and that for the reason that the source of the tradition in these matters is rather the Pañcarātra than the Upaniṣads. Nevertheless close reading will reveal that the ontology of the concept of glory has been quite well worked out by Rāmānuja, as we may find, for example, in Sūtras I:1:24 and III:19-25. These sections are important as support of our contention—which is clearly that of Lacombe's also—that the concept of glory is not a mere mythological matter (though even the all-too-common phrase 'merely mythological' is itself revelatory of the modern shortcomings in regard to the metaphysics of aesthetics), but is a necessary and even a focal and integral part of his systematic philosophy, and
that in a way which remains a challenge to any present-day consideration of value, relation and Being.

Thus, under 1:1:25, where the basic Upaniṣadic text is Chh. III: 13: 7 ["Now that fire (or light, resplendence—jyotis) which shines beyond this heaven above this universe, in worlds without superior world, He is the fire within man"][47]. Rāmānuja takes up the familiar upaniṣadic metaphor of the "Being connected with Heaven, whose one foot is all beings" as a basis of his identification of the concept of Brahma with that of Nārāyaṇa, which comprehends the lilā vibhūti and the nitya vibhūti in their interrelated togetherness thus:

It only remains to explain why this fire is said to be the fire in the stomach. The object is that the latter should be meditated on as being controlled by this fire beyond heaven, in order that certain fruits may be attained. That Brahma is the Ātman of the fire in the stomach is stated in Bhagavat Gītā XV: 14.

The text under consideration does contain an indication that reference is made to the highest Ātman—viz., the shining of the fire in "in worlds without a superior world"; for this expression applies to the highest heaven beyond the world of matter; and the fire which dwells therein cannot be any other.

Moreover, as the term jyotis conveys this light-motif of glory in the nitya context, so the term tejas, which is always distinct as one of the six primary attributes of Viṣṇu, carries it into the lilā realm. It is the term which carries the greatest weight in Rāmānuja’s interpretation of the concept of the self-luminosity as communicable in his refutations of Śaṅkara in the first Sūtra of his Śrī Bhāṣya, as may be seen from the following passages [which we render on the basis of Lacombe’s (French) translation]:

Tejas, which is one, exists under the double form of light (prabhā) and of that which is endowed with light (prabhāvat); even though light may be a quality of the substance pervaded by light, nevertheless it is the substance tejas itself and not a quality of the type of whiteness; for it is not only present in its substrate but also (radiating) beyond itself (and even beyond its own limits) and it is pervaded with colour, by which it differs specifically from ordinary qualitative attributes, whiteness and others. Whence it results that it is precisely from the illuminative power with which it is
endowed that it is the substance tejas and not another thing. That it is endowed with the power of illumining is proved from the fact that it illumines itself in its own form and that it (also) illumines other things. But it also receives the relative description of qualitative attribute because it is in necessary relation to the substance tejas as to a substrate and to a principle. In has been argued (by the advaitin) that the reason of its immaterial naturethe Self is pure knowledge. In reply to this, we posit the following question: What is meant by immateriality? If one replies that it is the luminous character (of that which is immaterial) insofar as it proceeds from its own character, we rejoin that in that case the definition is equivocal, because it could be applied also to the sources of physical light; it is more in contradiction with that other thes is ofthe same adversary that knowledge is not in the least subject to demonstration because its capacity of manifestation could not be held for an attribute distinct from itself.

Here Lacombe subjoins an appropriate footnote:

Knowledge is immediately self-proved, by a (certain) intimate transparence. One cannot demonstrate its existence mediately, for all mediate proof precedes from distinct signs and that which they signify.—On the contrary, in the definition of instrumentality which is here proposed, the luminous character is an attribute distinct from the immaterial thing.

The significance of this for us lies in the key position of the light-concept in its communicativeness, its radiation of glory which, as we have seen in Bonaventura, proceeds from the immaterial into the material without being diminished thereby. It is noteworthy that the term tejas also carries the connotation of power and might along with that of fire and light and splendour. 'Heaven' and earth are not so far apart as many would have us think! Moreover, this concept of the supernal light is ineradicable in all great poetry and mythology, integrally linked with the 'inner' light (a matter, by the way, which is not a monopoly of Quakerism, but has been emphasized by Marcel: It should be taken seriously, as the necessary link between interiority and transcendence) is not the whole of what is meant by glory, but it is one of the primary aspects of it, and is one of the most available keys to its comprehension. Let alone poetry and mythology, what would the philosophers of all the world have done without the figure of 'enlightenment'
or ‘illuminating’? But even as a metaphor, the experience expressed therein carries with it something of mystery—something from beyond the merely mundane, something of participation in grace, some spark of the divine, some reflection of an Ultimate which is complete and perfect and yet overflowing, effervescing, into the incomplete and imperfect: Perfection never becomes a possession; we belong to it, not it to us. To enlighten is to glorify, or to be glorified, to be brought into the fullness of relation with reality in its inexhaustibility, to experience that Primordial Novelty which is also infra-hypothetical finality, fulfilment. But more than that: is it a mere metaphor? As we have already intimated the question is now more vital than ever before as to whether there is not a continuum of consciousness—and therefore of existential being itself—with the sound-heart-light continuum. May it not be literally true that that which we really experience—nay what we are in the experience!—in art as well as in morality and epistemology, is but a refraction, a condition of ‘being for another’, a prismatication, of a sort of ‘Light of lights’—of the condition of glory—which in turn is a sort of diffusion, as through a lens, of the Primal-Existent (the ‘suddha-sattva’, the spiritual substance—mind this: not essence, as all advaïtins and idealists would have us believe) which is that which ‘embodies’ God? Or, as Râmânuja himself puts it under Śūtra III:2:27, “A shining substance and its light are one in essence, but differ; for the substance remains in the place, while the light (prabhā) spreads all around. Similarly, Brahman and matter are one and yet different from one another (jātisambandha)”; and correspondingly, in our context, as he intimates in III:2:24-25, along with the light and knowledge and endless other attributes and the material ‘clothing’ which Brahman assumes (e.g., in his lilā vibhūti, for the purpose of ‘displaying’ Himself) there is also ānanda, bliss, blessedness. In short, all of this ontological attribution is glorification: God’s glory is the voluntary bursting of His Being; Beauty is but the ebullience from that Eternal Explosion!

This much, then, remains howsoever our pictoriographical concept of ‘heaven’ may change with the changing age. Indeed, the ‘explosion’ of the limited medieval view of the physical
universe, and of the all-too finite place of the Empyrean within it is itself a part of the very eschatological orientation that provokes our dialectical struggle with and for and within perfection. If modern man quails at the immensity, and quivers within the insecurity of his atomizing universe, the more dazzling—the more stupefying, the more eschatological—must be his imaginative grasp at the grandeur, at the glory of it all. His fearful flight into ugliness—not the first in the history of the world's art—is but a demonic escape, or attempt to escape, from the "Chaos when the Old is turned into the New". But actually, this night of Brahman, this period of ours which is a sort of minor pralaya in which the end of an age is joined together with the beginning of another, is also like the Viśva-Rūpa of the Gitā, a sort of horror at the visit of the Lord's own nature when all of his illusory forms have been dissolved, a vision of his naked glory. The passing of the supersonic barrier, the incalculable possible control over life and death, the invention of mechanical 'mind' and all the other things that have come with our entrance into the atomic era—and they are bound to have their spiritual and psychological concomitants—far from undermining all possible imaginative grasp of what may yet lie beyond us, stimulates us to the point of vertigo; we are frenzied by the meteor-shower of 'illuminations' that have descended upon us. The "God of interstellar space, the Conqueror of Time" is as much Antaryāmin and the God of the Great Machine and the little "goofy gadget"—for He must have a tremendous sense of humour in His exalted playfulness—as the secret Spirit within us, bringing forth within us in turbulent juvenescence, in a new step in His Cosmic Dance, the will afresh to get a picture, a reason, a ratio, a darśana of the whole. Man's present experience has passed the bound of his art; and his prayer that he may have courage to carry on in the Mighty Battle, is to see the Glory reduced again to simple beauty—for paradoxically the beauty of the Avatāra embodies not the lilā vibhūti but the nitya vibhūti, though in a 'covered' form. He begs the Lord's pardon for his former undue familiarity—his idyllic theologies and sentimental platitudes, his "taking things for granted", as well as for his Nietzschean aspirations to behold what now he fears. Either he must return with detachment to the battle, con-
tent with the finite "four-armed form" suggestive of mystery but limited in external form, or else he must himself become a new creature; he must himself become glorified, he must enter, as Marcel puts it, a realm of trans-history, he must again become engaged with eternity and therein find the grander contemplative plenitude of peace from which alone can radiate the power not his own, and yet given to him as grace, with which he can still be in the world participatively, expectantly, creatively—a perspective from which he can realize all that is happening as another Lilā of the Lord...Thus Marcel writes in his Gifford Lectures 12

In what measure and under what reservations is it possible to be lifted above this "being in the world" which is our specific fashion of existing? In what measure do we have the right to lift up our sight (regard) towards a sphere superior to this present one? What are, beyond this, the given that is revealed, the fluctuating, scintillating lights, (which are) not fixed but which can to a certain extent clarify the very bottom (trefonds) of our being? ...I should say that a society is itself judged by the place which in it and beyond, it is still capable of that truth which is not thing, but a spirit.

But how does this perspective affect the artist? Perhaps Marcel does not go so far as Bonaventura or even our Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, but in the chapter on Obedience and Fidelity in the Homo Viator, he does have the following to say: 13

Let us note in passing that if, in the act of creation itself the artist tends to conform (only) to himself, to identify himself temporarily with his work, he is nonetheless held to detach himself from it in a certain fashion until it is realized—between it and himself there is always a carnal bond, a bond which is tender and dolorous; He does not remain nevertheless himself exempt on the condition that he liberates himself from it to a certain degree. It thus appears ...that to rest faithful to myself (e.g., as artist) is to respond to a certain interior appeal which enjoins me not to be hypnotized by what I have done, but on the contrary, to disengage myself from it (what I have done), that is to say, to continue to live and by consequence to renovate myself.....The artist himself alone can know whether he has responded to that interior appeal...It is by a confrontation always imperfect between the realized work and the indistinct awareness of the work to be accomplished that he can decide if he has been faithful or not.
This gap of imperfection is the attestation of our inevitable reference to eternity, to glory, if we transpose his meaning into our context. Even our ‘remaining faithful to ourselves’ has an eschatological orientation, albeit one which is not divorced from our role in the here-and-now:  

It is the parcel of creation which is in me, the gift which has been accorded from all eternity to participate in the universal drama, to work...toward the humanization of the Earth.

It is in the same perspective that he philosophizes on hope: I cannot hope for something, except insofar as I put my trust in someone—ultimately, in the Absolute Thou: “‘I put my trust in Thee’ that is to say, in a communion of which I proclaim our indestructibility.”—a supra-logical link with pure novelty, which allows no thought of return to a status quo, but demands a transfiguration.

It is because of this necessity of transfiguration that elsewhere he reflects that the idea of Heaven cannot be lightly put aside:  

The relation which ought to be established between the philosopher and the religious is scarcely that which has been conceived, for example, by Spinoza, for even he almost certainly underestimates the value of the imagination as (a) power of stimulation (which is) concrete and positive. Is not the philosopher held to recognize that we cannot really deliver ourselves of certain fixed images, as for example that of a heaven as a dwelling-place of the blessed, but not without showing that these images are linked with some conditions of existence which are those of an itinerant creature, and that they cannot by consequence be erected as absolute. I should say, for example, in this sense that heaven cannot in the least appear otherwise to us who are of the earth; but for the reason that the link which binds us to the earth is relaxed or changes its nature, it begins to present itself to us in an entirely different light. For we are vowed to undergo a metamorphosis whose nature can only be very imperfectly realised in a presentiment, and it is certainly on the idea of this metamorphosis that we are many these days who have an imperious need of it. It follows moreover from that that salvation can no longer be conceived by us so much as a state as a way, a road, and one can rejoin to that certain profound views of the Greek Fathers, notably Gregory of Nyssa.

For eschatology, even in art, is no matter of wishful thinking, but involves the dialectical relation between our situation in the
world and our eternal moorings, between our involvement in imperfection and our aspirations toward glorification. Thus he writes in his latest work:

It will be said to me, "We have no time, disaster threatens us." I quite agree, disaster may be immanent. But no general scheme of action will enable us to conjure it away. Whether it must or must not happen, we should look further, beyond the possible deluge, and in this case, as in Noah’s, it is only the rainbow of reconciliation that can bring salvation to us—though it may, of course, be salvation elsewhere: salvation beyond our earthly limits, far beyond the unavoidable yet only apparent bankruptcy of our earthly deaths: in eternity: as in an eternity whose call upon us becomes irresistible as soon as we have laid bare the mischief practised on us by the object, the number and by value......

I have an awareness of not being reducible to this captive self; the self of love and prayer proclaims itself as something distinct, even though between the self of love and prayer and this captive self there is something more than a mere co-habitation. And it is only this self of love and prayer that can become an eschatologic consciousness.

At first, one may be repelled by this "back to Noah" note. But on the other hand, in spite of all the challenges that the machine age presents to the mythological consciousness which is essential to the survival of the concept of glory, it is always apt to sneak in again, so to speak, by the back door, and usually in some eschatological reference, as for example, in the popular Tarzan and the Apes, Buck Rogers, Alley Oop, and other comic strips. But aside from the possibility of a sort of "New Mythology" emerging out of these—and they may be relatively superficial—it is certainly worth observing seriously (though not many do it) that even in "practical" America, the Mythological Consciousness has deep roots indeed, and continues to express itself openly even in the most modern literature, notably in the Negro Tradition as represented by James Weldon Johnson and the famous play Green Pastures, but also in poets like Edna St. Vincent Millay (The Blue Flag in the Bog, Renaissance, and her famous sonnet, Euclid Alone has looked on Beauty Bare), Vachel Lindsay, and Stephen Vincent Benet—poets, be it noted, who, more like Tagore than Aurobindo, are close to
the Earth—“Mother” Earth, Bhū Devi—For those, and perhaps only those, who are close to the Earth (the lilā vibhūti) are close to heaven (the nitya vibhūti)—or is it the other way ‘round’?—and here is a Mystery indeed, or a reciprocation of the two basic Primordial Mysteries. Hence Marcel, following Gustav Thibon, and Long with Eric Gill and his following in both England and America and others like Lewis Mumford, put much stress on Decentralism and the Return to the Soil: the cultivation of the Blessed Community (the title by the way of a truly charasmatic little essay by the Quaker Thomas Kelly) can be only that: there is no ‘proletariat’ in heaven, no propaganda, But Creativity instead. For that matter, even in the most radical extremist of poets, EE Cummings, it is by no means absent, this mythological consciousness with its polarization of Mystery, as may be seen in the following selection:

All ignorance tobaggans into know
and trudges up to ignorance again:
but winter’s not forever, even show
melts and if spring should spoil the game,
what then?

all history’s a winter sport or three
but were it five, I’d still insist that all
history is too small for even me;
for me and you, exceedingly too small

Swoop (shril collective myth) into the grave
merely to toil the scales to shrillerness
per every madge and mabel dick and dave
—tomorrow is our permanent address

And then they’ll scarcely find us (if they do),
we’ll move away still further: into now

For the concept of Glory, with its double face of aspiration for a Beyond and the necessity of a Future (“history is too small for me” and “tomorrow is our permanent address”) can never be left there: “into now”, the return, the “bringing in the Kingdom” of the Gospel Hymns which still sway many more masses than the Communist “Solidarity Forever”, the Vaikuntha in the heart of the Vaiśṇava, is always the counterpart of the heaven of the “Sweet Bye-and-Bye”; Noah’s rainbow therefore remains an extremely important symbol. For that matter, the apocalyptic note in all Russian tradition i s n o
doubt the most vital root upon which modern Marxism, which is eschatological to the most perverse degree, has been grafted; the Russians were more in deadly earnest about it than the carefree Americans whose Puritanism has fortunately been leavened by the joviality of the Negro, so that even the worldly businessman of today is still very fond of jokes about "getting through the Pearly Gates" and the role of St. Peter in admitting and rejecting candidates to an "up to date" heaven where things are conducted efficiently and according to good organization. In the Green Pastures, Gabriel always begins his conferences with "De Lawd" by "Well, Boss—" And for that matter the strangely incurable optimism of American Business—"someday things will be different"—was a note never completely lost even in the blackest days of the Depression of the thirties—is no doubt rooted in the popular belief in the Second Coming of Christ. Oddly enough, this is paralleled in India by a little recognized sense of humour about the pantheon: one may be extremely devout and yet not take the gods too seriously. After all, it is the imagination that gives life to both humour and glory; why then should they be incompatible?

What then is to be inferred? Perhaps this: These things are of the heart, which knows no absolute death. Bhakti gives the Regeneration, where gnosis, jñāna, although perhaps capable of more sophistication, is at best only a preparation for hope, but at best gives no life, no glory, and always runs the risk of degenerating into dogma. And this is as true in India as elsewhere. At a certain Pūjā time, especially in South India, machines are festooned, worshipped, for what they stand for: the conquest of time and space, the Promise of the coming of Kalki, who will 'someday' restore Earth to its inalienable radiance and usher the faithful into beatitude. Perhaps the White Horse on which he is supposed to ride must be displaced now by a jet-propelled plane, and his arms with Peace Bombs such as H.G. Wells has imagined. But the spirit today, except among those who are falsely imitating only the external trappings of what they think to be the modern west (without the Faith and Hope and sacrificial devotedness that have produced them) remains essentially the same as we find in Nammalwar (Tiruvoimoli V: 2 passim):
We see the servants of God the cloud-coloured one going about filling the whole earth singing and dancing. Even Kāli will be destroyed. You will surely witness it. Death then will have nothing to do here. Hell too is beginning to fail. The curse of the soul is gone. May all become Holy! May all become Holy! May all become Holy! ...

(3) All the creation of my Lord... chant hymns to his glory with right accents. So the deceitful Kāli will sink off. Gods, the celestial beings will descend to the earth Kритayuga will set in. The flow of supreme knowledge (and) Heavenly Happiness will increase.

(6) The servants of God the Disc Bearer have come to weed out and destroy the diseases of killing and eating, hatred and hunger, and all other wicked effects from this world. You the true servants of His, with a steady mind must offer them their due adoration, going to them and entering into Life. They are all over the earth. They skip, and jump, and dance, and sing, with correct accents and sweet music. You go and worship them and enter into life.

(9) The number of his humble servants and devotees is growing in the worlds. They take shelter under Him and worship Him in perfect devotion with flowers, incense, lamps, fragrant paint for the body, and with water. You raise your voices to chant the Holy Riks which are free from the praise of other gods, not bringing reproach on the way of wisdom take shelter under Him and worship Him who is infallible and gain Life. Wherever I look I see in all the worlds, the Holy Forms of the All-seeing God abound. Śiva, Brahmā and Indra and all the hosts of other gods join together and move in their various ways under his refuge. Oh my holy devotees! If you join with them and worship Him, there is no Kaliyuga!

If we can only once again catch this spirit, this Entering into Life, this joyous Fearlessness, this devotional abandon that conquers all, this contagious infatuation with the glory of the Future, the terrors of technocracy—the fear of Frankenstein—can be quieted; and perhaps only in this spirit can we work, as Einstein and Compton are doing, towards Human Brotherhood and Peace on Earth. For the Entering into Life is entering the Eternal; and the Eternal is never obsolete! And as long as our hearts are still aspiring for that Eternal, our mythologies, our all-too-human imaginative embodiments of Glory, will make their own revisions, as the following poem roughly intimates:
The Glorious Myth of the Great Machine

The secret of our surging bliss
Remains in myth concealed, revealed.
What myth obtains remains, like this:

In the beginning, a Witch (or fool—
For she was very rough and crude)
Managed somehow with a magic tool
To cut off Śiva’s phallic root
And hiding in the Christus’ tomb
To bring it forth as Kṛṣṇa’s Flute
(Jai Govinda, Jai Bhagavāna!)

This Orpheus used in his Great Escapade
While Wotan was still in his Northern Forest;
Then Bach thundered forth from the Gothic shade.
(Gloria In Excelsis Deo!)

But who will solve the next world’s riddle:
Who, having known the Buddha’s peace,
Can still invent the adequate fiddle
(Glory be to Frankenstein!)

To play the music for the atomic scene—
‘Civilization’s’ liturgy—
To worship the God of the Great Machine?

Libido squirms in many twirls
And leaves us urging, surging still:
The upward swirls of the nebulas’ curls
Lure us on to cosmic arcadias.
Confucius still speaks of the Yin and the Yang
While Marxists persist to sing of the radius
Of the proletariat’s dialectical power
To surmount the Mercy and Wisdom of Allah
And bring us to peace at the proper hour.
(Arise, ye prisoners of the peace!)

Love electronic, sound supersonic
Crowns our sacrificial rite:
*Which* god is dead, which tonic

Will cure us of this ancient disease,
What mathematical formulae
Will build our altars in the Pleiades?
(Praise we still the God Unknown!)

Ezekiel’s vision of the wheels
Needs only slight revision now:
The seraphic neutron surely feels
Some strangeness when its splitting wings
Fly off and leave it nude and spinning;
The wheels have begun to turn, the strings
That held the Glory in are burst;
But the eyes Within are many more,
And the Coals have made us mad, athirst
For waters beyond the Milky Way,
Sealed our tongues to prophesy
Doom to Mars and Mercury.

Or perhaps another wheel’s been added
To the Vision of the Great Machine;
Perhaps the Seraphs’ wings are padded

Against the shock of the last recension?
Tao and Brahman set the limit,
Secure beyond the Fourth Dimension.

And so the Blessed Virgin sits enthroned,
Retains her interstellar crown:
Wisdom, intercessor for our owned

And unowned nothingness, unashamed
Of the god-machines that dance
Among the cheribim untamed,

Giving body, giving birth
To our mechanistic frame,
Lifting us from limited Earth.
(Ave atque Salve!)

Psychosomatic: that’s our plight;
The Flesh yields more than thrust of flesh,
The Sun’s fire more than daily light.

And thus with the God of the Future Machine:
More than the cogs within the wheels.
And more than the mind in between.
(OM NAMO NĀRĀYĀNA VĀSUDEVĀ!)
AESTHETICS OF BHAKTI

THE CONCEPT OF GLORY

2. See Gilson, op. cit., p. 211 ff.
4. II Sent. ii : 3 Dubium 2 (italics ours) and II sent iv : 1 : 1.
6. II Sent. iv Dubium 1 (italics ours)
7. II Sent. iv Dubium 3.
10. Avatāra VI.
13. op. cit., p. 179.
14. ibid., p. 182.
16. Man against Mass Society, p. 170,
MOKṢA

SECTION I

BEATITUDE AND TRANSVALUATION
ACCORDING TO MARCEL

In all the preceding developments we have necessarily anticipated much that now must receive our undivided attention. We have considered the disciplines of meditation (Upāsanā), the importance of grace and the response to it in Prapatti, and the aesthetic implications of our Philosophy of Devotion; and all have led up to, and almost entered, the Final State. But it remains to examine “where it all leads to”—to enquire, not merely into the ‘problem of immortality’ in the grand old style, not merely the telos of the disciplines, not merely the result, the goal, of mystical attainment, within the technical field of mystical theology, nor again merely the sociological typology of charisma, although all of these are relevant. The problem of Freedom and the Predicament of Imperfection that characterizes human life on earth are also involved, and that critically, as also the enquiry into the ontology of value. Rather, what concerns us is the inclusive perspective: the projection of ourselves into the ‘God’s eye view’ of our condition ‘here’ and ‘hereafter’ in their togetherness, in our existential engagement with eternity with all that that involves; the religious aspirations and metaphysical precognitions of the Ultimate Possibilities, both as latent and insurgent in the human soul, and above all, the inexorability of affirmation that characterizes the Man of Witness, the Prophet, the Seer, whose realization of godliness puts him in a position to proclaim with authenticity the Promethean Gift, the bridging the gulf between God and Man, the restoration of the Primordial Bond of Felicity that all mythologies describe as somehow broken, and the reclamation of the Right of Inheritance of Rectitude that is nevertheless inalienably his. Man in the world is somehow commonly man without God; and all that he does, all that he thinks, all that he feels, all that he searches for, all that he makes, all that he is and is
not, makes sense only within the exigency of his relation with Deity, within his capacity to project himself into the Infinitely Ideal, and to propel himself into it—or to allow himself, the hindrances having been removed, to answer the Appeal. For perpetually comes the Voice: "Come up hither. I will grant the Victory".

And yet, since Picodella Mirandola—and Tagore may mark a belated parallel point in Indian history—the question is no longer put in terms of what is God, but what is Man? And we begin to see that it was really the basic question for all time after all. For before this question, all theologies fail, as they rise in tentative answer. But not all theologies only; systems of science (and from the antiquities of Egypt and the remotest records of all civilizations there is adequate evidence that man has never been without them) and conventions of art, have also surged on the same ebb-and-flow of the tide of history (the ocean remaining the Boundless, the Vast Unknown of the Timeless). But ever and always, whether in science or in art or in religion, the question seems unanswerable without its counterpart, which is now perhaps better but not in the traditional "what is God?", but what is man’s end, what is man’s final relation with that which here he worships, which gives him his being and his becoming that to which (or to Whom) he deeply, indelibly, knows he intimately belongs, that which he is like, and would like to become.

For as the need of salvation—salvation from the world as limitation, as blindness, as ignorance—is the first and foremost thing that has provoked man to transcend nature and to construct civilizations, so the inward quest of wisdom, and the search for the secrets of sanctity have arisen out of the imperfections that plague him even in his civilized state, that threaten to destroy not his works so much as himself in the midst of them; and so out of this, the aspiration after wholeness—omniscience, omnipotence, all-embracingness, the Perfection of Plenitude—the affirmative lunge, into Largeness, the outgoing and upsurging swerve into the Answer and onto the basis of blessedness—this yet as ever, nay increasingly as civilization in its externals increases, lures him beyond the cosmic spaces, beyond himself and all the worlds that he has found and made, beyond even
wonder at them all, into the Radiance of Recognition, the re-grafting again onto the Root of Reason, of Harmony and Peace, from which *somehow* some primal separation came about when the first atom took shape and form...The MYSTERY: it is not merely the ‘Unknown’; Man is capable of it. Nay he *is it!*...God?...Man becomes divine!

To put it otherwise would mean that we have learned nothing from Nietzsche or Rilke, or from the Upaniṣads; or else that our study of medieval love and devotion, and our own experience in contemplation, our own practice of yoga, that our strength thence derived to traverse the mountains and canyons of the heart and mind is all meaningless and in vain. The *necessity of affirmation,* paradoxical though it may be, only breeds further paradoxes—which only breed further *problems* in turn—if it is gainsaid. For one thing, affirmation is prior even to experiment; and more basically, is simply necessitated by the nature of being itself. As Marcel says, “My *being* is more than *my* being.”

The sense of this is perhaps better explicated in Max Scheler’s work than in Marcel’s reading of it. In Scheler’s *Situation of Man in the World* he has very well set the pace for the race we are now beginning—a race indeed, as St. Paul said of it, in which not all receive the prize. Martin Farber’s review of this work of Scheler’s in a recent periodical, for example, simply reveals not Scheler’s ‘unscientific treatment’ of his topic but Farber’s own metaphysical inadequacy. *No one will ever invent a mokṣa machine,* nor is it hoped that anyone will ever be able to put God into a test-tube. Nevertheless, any scientific study of man cannot possibly ignore his capacity for inwardness, his *internal necessity* of self-knowledge in the face of and separated out of nature, so that nature becomes an ‘object’ for him and within and above this self-knowledge, the *idea of a being superior to the world infinite and absolute,* to whom he can address the question, not only ‘what am I’—this he can ask himself—but, “Where am I myself? What, perforce, is my place?” And the answer that comes, that it is possible to ‘deny’ that world—to *transcend* it—provokes the further question, “Why is there any world at all?” Farber considers this a meaningless question; but Scheler’s own insistence that it is the issue
that provokes all the rest of man’s enquiries seems to carry with it the argument that if it is a meaningless question, then all the world itself is meaningless, and we are exactly back at the concept of renunciation and of salvation to which the “scientific” mind objects; and moreover, we are, with or without this objection, in a position remarkably close to that of Bonaventure and Rāmānuja. Scheler writes:

...God is not conceived as a ‘holy’ Being which is apart from Himself, and which could naturally admit of the most varied contents. But that sphere of an absolute Being in general, whether or not accessible to experience as lived or to consciousness, is just as constitutive of the essence of man as the knowledge which he has of himself and of the world......

......The knowledge of the world, the knowledge of himself and the knowledge of God form a structural unity (which is) indisassociable, just as the transcendence of the object and the knowledge of self surge up in the heart of the same act: the ‘reflection at the third level’. (italics his)

Scheler then goes on to develop the dialectic between the contingency of the world and the attitude of wonder and the development of metaphysics that are correlative to it, and with the pressure of the irresistible desire for salvation and the development of personality out of that in turn, which follow upon the wonder—a dialectic which culminates in the concept of worship and servanthood as the highest expressions of the intimacy which man has with God’s own essence. He rejects the traditional dogmatic thesis of God merely as “personal and spiritual and omnipotent in His spirituality” for the all-important reason that it neglects the (existential) “resolute engagement of our being with the ideal exigence of deity” which is linked with the countering exigence which man finds in himself of co-engendering...in the form of an increasing penetration of the impulsion of the spirit” the God which Scheler conceives of as developing himself within man. The heart of man is the unique place for the formation of the same God who makes us accessible to Himself. Being for itself cannot be separated from the concept of the Logos, wherein the becoming of God and the becoming of man reciprocally depend on each other. Man becomes, with all the energy that he is, the fellow-fighter (so to speak) with God in the cosmic struggle against non-being; the “need to
find refuge and to make appeal to omnipotency exterior to himself and to the world—omnipotency identified with goodness and wisdom—this need (is so great that it) "breaks all the dykes of (man's) good sense and reflection" and leads him on beyond contemplation and adoration to personal engagement and complete living identification with God, which alone holds the key to the mystery of value that man's history comprises, to man's openness to possibility—possibility not only of doing, but also of "knowing" the being of Being itself". This note on the exigence, on the urgency of this intimacy with the Ultimate sets a sharp rebuke not only to the 'exact' scientific modern thinker, but perhaps even more to the blind and falsely grandiose 'idealism' of the Victorian era (which was after all only a cover for an uncertain polite agnosticism, and which oddly enough still survives in a greater measure in India than elsewhere) which treated the philosophy of salvation as a matter of "evidences" from mystical experience (of other souls!) or rested pompously content with pious platitudes about the "Absolute" and man's "superior" nature. But Mokṣa is not a matter to be philosophized about. It is the inexorable concern that involves every man, including philosophers (!). It would be far better, as Marcel forcefully puts it in his critique of Bataille and Blanchot and Paul Camus (in the Homo Viator) to face this exigency with a violence of negation, of suicidal vicious absurdity, than to continue to bubble on in the agnostic vacuity of the last generation.³ "One would not exaggerate at all in saying that (the nihilism of today) in a sort has come to an apologetic in reverse, an apologetic for the absurd for which the denying of value comes to be the superior value."

"But......it appears to me difficult not to see in this a reflux of life" which sets the centre and- circumference in the right place again. For the solipsistic idealism of the past three centuries was too centrepetal. Ontology can never be considered in terms of the problems of extension, or of 'constructive' thought. "Ontology has always maintained that the self cannot affect a semblance of consistency or of content except in the measure to which is image, that is, resemblance of a plenitude which exceeds all possible representation." Or again,⁴ "Put in purely intellectual terms, the problem in insolvable...It is for
living beings that the problem arises—for beings engaged in a singular destiny which they must confront (in order to) understand. Perhaps one is well grounded in presuming that it is taking cognizance of the destruction of chaos which all ontological nihilism inevitably engenders, that the human being can awaken himself, or better, can arouse himself, to the awareness of Being evoked in its plenitude."

Marcel's critique of Bataille and Blanchot deserves much more attention than we can give to it, for their fire has been kindled by sparks not only from Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, but also from St. John of the Cross, whose desperation and desolation even within the highest secrets of the mystical love was no less than that of Nammalwar or Caitanya. Paul Camus, on the other hand, rests at the strange level not of desperation, but of absurdity: a worldly absurdity of the world! But what has happened, especially with Bataille, is a secularization of mysticism, and of the whole business of salvation, which constitutes a basic problem for us also, or at least a constant risk. For on the one hand, it will not do to treat these matters of the subtleties of spiritual progress in the merely traditional way of the piety of consolation, any more than in the smugly sceptical manner of the 'polite' professors of philosophy in most of the universities. At the least, self-confidence and all trace of pride and false comfort, must be completely purged out, before one has really made a beginning. It remains true that a certain secularization may spur on this purgation, by way of forcing a reduction of traditional accretions to basic essentials. But on the other hand, it is difficult to see how anything more than the sensational surface—and there is plenty of that with all mysticism, especially of the erotic type—can remain or be penetrated unless there is, coming out of the secularization as a dialectical phase, as a sort of dark night of the soul, a re-entrance into that higher, more authentic, more autologous piety that is really not concerned with piety as such at all, but with a complete oblivion of the self and with a transcendence of the 'world'—indeed with nothing short of the attainment of the co-engendering with God' of which Scheler speaks. Without this, a 'secularized' mysticism becomes a sort of exhibitionism, as Marcel notes, or a sort of fad: "To be ultra-modern,
one must be a neo-mystic” (all the other neoisms having been exhausted!); and such is the danger not only with these Frenchmen, but with all too many followers of Aldous Huxley, Arthur Koestler Gurdjieff, Rolland and the like. Infatuation must give way to commitment. True mysticism can allow nothing of the dilettantism 'literary' or otherwise superficial basis of life. True mysticism can never become a neoism!

Marcel’s attitude may be too much a carping one, in spite of his appreciation of the resurgence of life of which this “mysticism in reverse” is a symptom. He may be too much obsessed with criticism and not sufficiently engaged in penetrating yet further the interiority which he so solidly affirms. Nevertheless, what he has to say is trenchantly true, and he gives us an orientation from which we can proceed further—without which, rather, we cannot proceed; for deliverance, salvation, must perforce precede sanctification and beatification.5

The aspiration after salvation presents a character so different that it is not in its principle and cannot be (merely) a will, and (so different) that it indeed escapes the world of the ‘project’ which the author (Bataille) so vehemently excommunicates. Salvation can only be a deliverance, but deliverance from what, if not this prison of the egotistical I where avarice arises? It remains to show how this deliverance is possible, and if it is really effected in ecstasy—but why not just as well by opium or hashish, or by erotic practices expertly elaborated?...But the faithful declare that (these practices) can furnish nothing which resembles the deliverance to which he aspires and that an unfathomable abyss separates it from these things (which belong more to magic than to mysticism). The faithful. What plenitude in that word! For it is not just the fidelity to the chief of the Church, to Christ that he evokes, but in all simplicity the fidelity to one’s neighbour which, for such a thought, is swallowed down in negation.

The emphasis here on the neighbour—on community—is another factor not to be lost sight of, although it need not concern us at present. Along with Jainism, Advaita always runs the risk of neglecting it. Even the jivanmukta, as we shall see, in spite of the modern apologetic which attempts to reinterpret the concept, cannot really be concerned with the good of his fellow-creatures—or even with his fellow jivanmuktas, for that matter, for the whole category of the other is illusory to him.
However what does concern us more at present is that, coupled with this appreciation of the deliverance aspect of the business of salvation, Marcel, consistent with his philosophy of grace—“Being is not the ‘given’ but the Gift” as he puts it in the Gifford Lectures and various places in his Journals—sees perspicaciously that “...the problem of being is the problem of salvation...To say that the universe leaves us unsatisfied...is to give accord (to the view that) there is in me an appetite for being...I have said that to discover being that is to be lifted up to a world of experience or of life over which critical experience ceases to have any hold.” This is not to say that the world is ‘unreal’, but that it is existential, viz., a participation in being which inherently elicits transcendence; and transcendence is more, as we have seen, than a matter of ‘mere’ emotion and subjective orientation, but the inter-subjective affirmation of the road of salvation. In the conclusion of his Gifford Lectures he says:

“To be sure, I should say that it is the saint who is right; but if I were plainly assured of that, without doubt, I should engage myself forthwith on the road to sanctity. Here we recover the fundamental idea of an existential basis of affirmation. But this is unintelligible if one holds to a monadist conception ...I can believe in the faith of another without however (coming to the position where) that faith becomes absolutely mine; if I myself install myself in that situation, it runs the risk of becoming a dream. But if on the contrary, I make that attempt to enter into it, even if I do not completely arrive, it reveals itself apt to put me well on the way of salvation.”

It is in this perspective that he also treats the problem of human liberty. If we may risk an epithet, we may well say that for him, the problem is not that of human liberty so much as that of human liberation. The question of free will is avoided as another of the pseudo-problems of ‘classical’ metaphysics, because it is always put in the context of the ‘given’. Nothing is ‘given’. Human existence, in its anxieties and joys, its loves and its appetite for the eternal is not like that. The exigence of being can be grappled with only in terms of Grace, the Gift; and freedom and the entering on the road of salvation is not a matter of choice, not a matter of something to be ‘done’, but the engagement with the open, in which one’s interior plurality,
as well as one’s relations in community and one’s capacity to pray become merged in the revelatory synergetic expansiveness of the Absolute Presence of God.

In short, for him salvation, and freedom as being set on way of salvation, are not a matter of human acquisition, but as we shall see is also the case with Rāmānuja and Bonaventura, the experience of the Divine Generosity which comes as the gift of spiritual light and joy and exaltation.

But if liberty comes not only as a matter of increase of self-knowledge but more than that, as being delivered from egocentricity, which always is the source of the state of distraction that characterises the inner life of most of us (the ‘I am not really myself today’’) or the realization of Presence in such a way that in one and the same transcendence one “becomes one’s self again” and finds love for others and the sense of community, the secret of sanctity goes beyond even this love to the inclusion of myself and my ‘other’ together in the field of the Absolute Thou: ‘I’ pray for ‘us’ to ‘Thee’. Thus, in the Journal Metaphysique, he records, under the date of 2 December 1919:

There is no love except where there is an absolute renewal and even a rebirth. Love—it is the life which is decentralized, which changes its centre... One commonly reasons as follows: ‘The being whom you love is different from the veritable being, so that love (which you bear towards the loved one) has nothing to do with the being itself (and) there is nothing ontological concerned in it’. But all that one has the right to say is that as concerns love properly speaking, which is not assimilated to a judgment, an intellectual construction comes to be built which is entirely false. This does not say anything but to sharpen the difficulty: Does one give accord (to the fact that) the transvaluation which is at the base of love corresponds to a real transformation of the lover, but this has necessarily, as a correlative, a modification of the ‘object’ loved? I remark immediately that in a triadic system (e.g., in which everything is stated in the ‘objective’ third person, ‘scientifically’), the question is probably void of sense......I put myself (in a position such that I become exterior to the lover and the loved; I consider this relation from the outside; but this does not hold that I cannot truly think of the lover if I do not participate in it? ......Metaphysically, the problem decomposes itself in the
following manner: (1) Does not love have to do with being, and not simply with the idea of being? Could it have anything to do with being without affecting it? (The first is indubitable; the second somewhat doubtful, provided one considers love as divorced from faith.) One may say, in sum, that I cannot pose the question without rendering it destitute of its meaning. To look at it more closely, one sees that, if my love can exercise any action on the loved being, it is only insofar as love is not a desire......Perhaps therefore only absolutely disinterested love is susceptible to affect the ‘thou’. And this remark project some light on the practical function of sanctity.

In the entries for the succeeding days he goes on, on the basis of this, to develop his philosophy of prayer:

Prayer for myself seems to me only able to be considered in regard to what is susceptible of being regarded as a divine gift, or more exactly, I can pray to be at advantage, but not to have advantage...It is not legitimate to pray for a ‘thou’, and by virtue of that, a new triadic rapport arises which conceals in reality a diad: at bottom, I pray God for us.

The implication which he draws from these observations are profound and far-reaching, chief among them being the truth that neither God nor immortality can be treated as ‘hypotheses’ and that immortality cannot be considered apart from love.

But this consideration of God as the Absolute Thou is quite different from the ‘Wholly Other’ of Buber and Otto. Such a view misses the fullness of relationality that characterizes personality, and runs the risk of depersonalizing both the aspirant and the End of his aspiration, by putting too much distance between them. Love so binds the ‘I’ and the ‘thou’ and the ‘Thou’ that it even seeks a sort of (spiritual) death of the ‘I’, as Marcel observes in the chapter on *Moi et Autrui* in his Homo Viator;? but a death which so nourishes the bond of personality, of engagement, of community, of reality itself that a sort of rebirth takes place, in which the focus is the sense of instrumentality of the same order as we examined in Rāmānuja’s treatment of Prapatti. Indeed, the whole ensemble of self, other and God is so seen that his whole philosophy of existence can be viewed precisely as that of the Nārāyaṇā concept: ‘Existence’ is Nārāyaṇa; and salvation and sanctification are simply a
matter of the realization of the inexpressible plenitude of existence in which transcendence and incarnation—transcendence—are the reciprocating movements.

One can never, either before or in the process, or even in the attainment itself, truly say, "I am" without the aspiration and the will to identification with the Absolute Thou, the Absolute Person, in whom one's own personality is 'grafted, rooted, built in love'.

The exigence of Universality cannot be prescribed; it must come in humility, as sacrifice, as a condition of being fully lived, as an approfondissement indefini, an unlimited deepening, such that we must ourselves turn from describing salvation and sanctity, and cautiously join with Gustav Thibon, whom Marcel admires without reserve, and confess,

You feel yourself in a tight position. You dream of evasion. But take care against mirage. In order to evade yourself, do not go out, do not flee: Above all, increase that right place which is given to you: you will there find God and all. God does not flash on your horizon, he sleeps in your peacefulness. Vanity departs, love increases. If you flee beyond yourself, your prison will run along with you and narrow you down in the wind of your course: if you plunge yourself into yourself, it will become a wide opening into paradise.

It is important to note that although Marcel's primary emphasis seems to be on the toi the Absolute Presence, this does not exclude or otherwise eliminate the moi, the self; rather, simply, the self is purged, purified, integrated, enabled to become its "real self" again, or put into proper relation—creative relation—with all of life. Indeed, it is unfortunate that he is unacquainted with Vedântic terminology, for the concepts of ahañkâra and the Âtman—and the distinction between them—are basic to his whole mind and spirit, and implicit in his thought at every turn. For example, even at the early date of 23 August 1918, he records:

In the judgment on 'I' it is the immediacy (the absence of a subject—non-rapport with a subject—'unrelatedness') of the state which serves the function of a subject; to make this precise, 'I am fatigued'...there is a feeling pure and simple, that is, an absolute, or something which imitates an absolute...And I become for myself a sort of mediator for myself of the 'other' for whom I am such. In principle, and rigorously (considered) I am absolutely nothing of the
sort for myself; 'I' am even the negation of the such... But this 'I' seems indeed always to pose in the face of a thou to whom I myself am a thou....

Such, at least, is the 'natural' condition. But what he calls reflection at the second level (reflection at the first level being of the sort that analytically discusses these distinctions, divisions and discrepancies) a re-integration, a harmonization comes about, whereby 'my' whole life "becomes present" to me, whereby I return to myself, which cannot be spoken of as an objective reduplication of the self, but "an act of creation or of interior transmutation... (which) also by a paradox, whose source becomes clear only little by little, presents essentially the character of a return..." One "recognizes himself" in the same act of transition from egocentricity to the Absolute Thou; one realizes one's vocation. God (Brahman), in other words, is equally that Presence in which, in sanctity alone (the saint being one who has realized his vocation completely) 'I' (ahaṅkāra) become wholly myself (ātman), as well as the Thou (Paramapurūsa) who makes all the lesser 'thou's' open to me in love: the tat tvam asi and the aham Brahmāsmi are thus balanced in a way very much resembling the manner in which Rāmānuja balances them. However, this complete balance is never fully realized this side of death. Rāmānuja, after the Alwars, would agree with Marcel when he writes, describing a character in one of his plays.

But little by little a light is made in her which is indeed that of reflection at the second level... And in this light of interior revelation her relation with her husband is renovated. She recognizes herself as at bottom culpable but justly there is a communion of sinners just as there is a communion of saints, and no doubt the one cannot be separated from the other.

But this condition of the 'communion of sinners', this sense of being fellow-exiles from the Eternal of being viatores, when it is sufficiently interiorized, plumbed to its depths, this...experience of the profound (which is also a luminous expansion) would then be linked to the feeling of a promise of which the realization can only be a fore-glimpse. But what is remarkable here, I should add, is that this distant perceived from afar is not experienced as an elsewhere. On the contrary, every spacial and pragmatic distinction is transcended. This distant is offered to us as interior, as a domain of which is necessary to say that it is nostalgically
ours—exactly as it is for one exiled from his lost native land.

But beyond this there is also the sense of arrival which is deeper than the nostalgia. It is an intuitive plunge into what seems also like a Return—the eternal Return of which Nietzsche wrote, where an absolute Here which is the heart and soul of the mystery of existence that is our heritage in faith and hope and love; and face to face with its immediacy, the usual naive views of ‘survival’, which are always tinged with the notion of duration are seen to be as superficial as those of the empiricist agnostic who will not ‘believe’ because he cannot be ‘shown’ just what it is that ‘survives’. The attainment of the Eternal—beatitude, mokṣa—is a matter to be lived; and as it transcends all theory, so it challenges all who cannot yet say, with Nietzsche,¹⁰

We keep our Feast of Feasts, sure of our bourne,
Our aims self-same:
The Great of Greats, Zarathustra, came!
The world now laughs, the grisly veil was torn,
And Light and Dark were one that wedding-morn!

Coming at the matter from different and relatively novel approach, Marcel links up love and truth with the ‘universal communion’ that God as Absolute Thou affords, and actually is.¹¹ The attainment of immortality, the realization of one’s immortal destiny, is more than a fair risk, but a course which refusing to run will lead to peril and perdiction. For value, even as such, is not just a ‘tag’ put on the outside of reality as a whole, but the root of interior metaphysical inquietude, the link of shared experience, the ‘spirit’ of truth itself, which¹²

...becomes incarnated essentially in the act by which there is put to an end the game which in all circumstances it is possible to play with myself—the spirit of truth is presented as transcendent and nevertheless its proper function seems indeed to be to restore myself to myself

or again,

Value is the very substance of exaltation, or more exactly, (it is) that reality which we are bound to evoke when we seek to comprehend how exaltation can change itself into a creative force... (This exaltation) is not an affective paroxysm, but a surrevelation of being itself which may be
translated as an absolute possession of oneself, a calm of a supernatural sort.

In history, this can be attested by such things as martyrdom and patriotism—the willingness to die, not just for an ‘Idea, for an idea’ does not need any sacrificial service, it is sufficient to itself; but for values which are incarnated, living, in people, in brotherhood, in love. Thus, value is also the spirit of fidelity, the surging up of invocation, the recourse to the Absolute Thou, in a way that death is explicitly negated. He quotes the words of a character in one of his dramas: “To love you, that is to say that you will not die!”

Such a realization of value cannot come as something done, something acquired, but as revelation, as an opening of the consciousness to immortal destiny. The questions like ‘what survives after death’ may be answered in this wise:

There is no human love worthy of the name which does not constitute to the one who thinks of it at the same time a gage and a seedfulness of immortality. But on the other hand, it is not possible to think of this love without discovering that it cannot be a closed system, that it surpasses itself in every sense, that it carries an exigency at the bottom, in order to be plainly itself, a universal communion... which cannot be suspended except to an Absolute Thou.

Value, then, is not just a case of something, being “a thing of beauty and a joy forever”, but over and above this, the coming into the quality of translucidity:

What can be understood by that is not that value is the mirror in which it is given to us to read always imperfectly...the authentic visage of our destiny, that ‘more truly true than ourselves’ into which it will not be given us to be expanded except in a world which the character of our terrestrial experience in itself seems to consist of opening to us, of setting the door ajar, and perhaps in a few extreme cases of even leading to excess.

Thus Marcel opens the way again for us, as aspirants towards something of the Perennial beyond the ‘ultra-modern’ and yet not limited by the doggedness of sheer tradition, to reaffirm what we shall now seek to discover in the Indian and European Medieval contexts. If his orientation in value and his keen reserve against undue speculation about concepts of which there seems to be no intimation in our experiential ‘situation’ in the ‘present’ world prevent him from affirming anything like
the *liṅga śarīra*, the subtle body, and perhaps weaken his reaching beyond salvation and sanctification into beatitude properly distinguished, at least he sets the trap, so to speak, rather inescapably. We cannot *escape our eternal destiny* any more than we can refuse to experience death in some form or other; and although it may well be that *complete* realization of the Eternal, of value as transparently inseparable from Existence itself,—although this may not be possible for us while we are still embodied beings, it remains urgently, vibrantly true that this very embodiment is the incarnation of Something which is not a mere ‘X’, and which is the very raison d’être of our very life; and we are engaged in It and by It by the very force of every dissatisfaction that we experience, of every longing that comes to us, and by every Vision that becomes a pathological obsession if we do not prudently but persistently follow it, even to the point of self-annihilating sacrifice.

But more than that in faith and in hope and primarily in the purity of love, we *touch* It, we *taste* It, we *recognize ourselves as “belonging there”*, although this ‘there’ is not a sort of ‘other world’, but the Supreme Presence, the Thou to whom we owe all, and from whom we are inseparable in a bond of inter-subjective *involvement* at bottom, and at the ultimate, a Glorious Privilege of Communion, of Mystery having been *penetrated*. Immortality, and blessedness, are by no means altogether remote; Life—immortal life—goes on, Openly forever!
MOKṢA

BEATITUDE AND TRANSVALUATION

4. ibid., pp. 292-3.
5. ibid., p. 272. (italics ours)
7. p. 28, *passim*.
9. ibid., p. 184. The subsequent quotation is from p. 208.
11. e.g., in the chapter on *Value and Immortality* in the *Homo Viator*.
12. Homo Viator, p. 196. (italics ours, as below)
MOKṢA

SECTION II
THE MEDIEVAL CONCEPTS
A
INTRODUCTION I : DEFINITION AND EXIGENCE

Now we turn to our medieval fields; and we shall try to deal with them together, since here as ever we find sufficient basic similarity to interweave them as we go.

Perhaps no better preface—for it is an epitome of all that is to follow—could be found than this concluding passage from the Prapanna Pārijāta.¹

(If in a harmony of humours the prapanna)...thinks of Me who am the ocean of Lordship, excellence of disposition, affection and other good qualities kindled by Lakṣmī, and who am NĀRĀYANA, the Omnipresent, the unborn and the possessor of body at will—Me if he ever once thinks, saying ‘O NĀRĀYANA, than whom there is no other resort, I have taken refuge at thy feet’—of my own accord I then think of him who is free from obstruction by other means, who remains steady in that state, and who when death approaches, is like a block of wood or stone... has consciousness only when awakened by others but afterwards has an impaired mind, who himself is devoid of the thought of his own good and like his own self by others also—I the Soul of support of my followers, am that Puruṣa, who like his dependents are asleep, remaining steady and bringing into existence all the objects of their desire, is awake for the fulfilment of them. And by way of making known the flow of my grace, without the path of light (the arcirādūmārga) I shall take this person who is worthy of enjoying my enjoyments, to the highest region, mounting him without any hindrance as much as desired on the shoulders of Garutman.

And as systematic foundation, we turn again to the Dīpikā² (Jiva Avatāra, 23):

The liberated is one who: after accepting (prapatti) as the means, performs all nitya (regular) and naimitta (incidental) religious duties as ends in themselves, since he regards them as consecrated service enjoined by Bhagavāna; who refrains from committing offences against Bhagavāna
and the votaries of Bhagavāna; who, at the moment of giving up the body, commits his merits and demerits to his friends and foes (respectively); who then, after reposing in the Paramātman abiding in the heart as described in the text, 'The wise should merge the speech in the mind, etc.' (Katha Up. III, 13), enters the artery called suṣumnā, and issues (out of the body) from the aperture in the crown of the head, called Brahmarandhra; who then together with the Antaryāmin abiding in his heart reaches the world of Agni through the rays of the sun; who then is hospitably received on the way by the presiding deities of the day, the first half of the lunar month, the summer solstice and the year and also Vāyu; who then pierces the orb of the sun, and through the opening of the ether reaches the world of the sun; who thereafter, being conducted with great marks of hospitality by the ativāhika guides such as the moon, lightning, Varuṇa, Indra, Prajāpati, etc., passes through their respective worlds; who then having crossed the river Virāja, defining the boundary line between prakṛti and Vaikuṇṭha, shakes off the subtle body; who then, by the touch of the Amānava (a non-human person), assumes a non-material, refine figure with four arms and is adorned with Brahmanic decorations; who then, with the permission of the city gate-keepers named Indra and Prajāpati enters the divine city known as Śrī Vaikuṇṭha... who when questioned, 'who art thou?' replies, 'I am a mode of Brahman'; who then is blessed by the glances of Bhagavāna; who, by virtue of that excellent bliss engendered by the communion with Brahman, solely becomes devoted to the diverse service of Bhagavāna suited to all places, all times and all states; in whom (then) the eight-fold qualities become manifest; and who becomes established in the communion with Brahman which is devoid of any subsequent limit: such a person is said to be called the liberated.

To the modern man unversed in the tradition, much of the material in these texts is mere chaff and meaninglessness; and for this reason, most indologists—Ghate, for example—who have treated the last portion of the Brahma Sūtras at all, of which this text is essentially a pithy summary, have misunderstood very much which they have taken in, and have omitted much more as 'merely' mythological, whereas it is of supreme importance. Of course, everyone who deals with any Indian philosophy must treat of mokṣa, recording meticulously the differences of opinion among the various schools and philosophical bearing on the rest of each school's system. But also, there
are all too few, even in India (at least in the universities) who have taken the trouble to "de-mythologize" it either in terms of psychophysical experience, or of the systematic concepts that are couched in the mythological language. It seems that nowhere in the world, alas, could the refrain of the Negro Spiritual be a more apt reprimand:

"Ever' body talkin' about Hebben
Ain't a-gwiin' there...Hebben ! Hebben..."

And yet, lest we ourselves be condemned by the same judgment, it is with great trepidation that we begin this exposition. For there are sign-spots here not just of "experience beyond our ken", but of a challengingly existential nature; It is by no means just our ignorance that is at stake; it is our lack of anxiety to reach the goal on the one hand, and our fear on the other hand that we may lose the way—for it is none other than the Path of Perfection. Once we have entered it, there is no turning back; and, like Dante's "Abandon all hope", the primary admonition to all who would enter this path is that just as the Reward, if reached, is infinite, so the loss, if one falls by the wayside, is likely to be total destruction.

For the first and foremost of the things not apparent here to the casual scholar is that yoga practice is presupposed—and, according to our analysis, not only the Patañjali Yoga, but the Tantra, at least the Tantra "of the Right", which by no means can be treated as an academic—much less a philological—matter. The various 'chakras' (the psychic centres, the ganglia and syndromes of neurons in the various parts of the human organism) are in need of being correlated as microcosm and macrocosm with the various deities and 'lokas' (the 'worlds' the 'orbs') which are mentioned in the text. For these psychic centres are extremely sensitive—or become so, increasingly, as one proceeds along the 'paths'—to the solar and lunar cycles, probably due to electronic (or sub-electronic?) forces at work. For that matter, this definitely observable phenomenon may in the future extend to a scientific re-evaluation of astrology: it may well be that the planets as well as the sun and moon do influence our neurophysiological mechanism. But more of this later. Our situation all too well resembles that predicament of the scholarly old Nicodemus who came to Jesus secretly in the night,
hoping no doubt for ‘initiation’ into the ‘mysteries’, but was balked by the phrase—for it is certainly much more than a group of words or ceremony that is involved—‘Your must be born again’. Or, to use the other analogy (and it is also no mere metaphor!) to be found in the Vedānta itself, such fruition of sādhanā and/or of grace is like undergoing a second adolescence: no child can possibly comprehend what ordeals as well as joys that are ahead of him in the process of reaching adulthood, nor what life in that state can be like until he has reached puberty. Not just an emotional ‘adjustment’, but a radical psychophysical transformation is involved, even while the body remains. And, upon the basis of this change, the condition after the body is “left behind” (for such is the common idiom, and is no doubt literally true of the greatest saints: they don’t die in the usual way, but voluntarily pass out of their physical selves) should be considered not as a matter of “wish fulfilment” but of the exigence of interiorly realized vocation and destiny, and of constitutive analogue probing.

Moreover, this analogical probing—the philosophizing on the basis of homologies, to use a term now becoming current in France—although remaining problematical, and subject to colouring according to one’s metaphysical predelections, is nevertheless certainly in accord with the most elementary of theories of consciousness now seriously considered. The Field theory, for example, only points towards ever-expanding ranges of consciousness, until, ultimately, in the condition of beautification, much that is attributable to Godhead is, or becomes, available to man. We hesitate to capitulate to the term “cosmic consciousness” popularized by Aurobindo and less worthy esoterics of our time, for strictly theological reasons, the ‘cosmos’ in its own nature being scarcely ‘conscious’, and the term still risking a certain compromise with naturalism; but nevertheless the question is now more moot than for many centuries as to whether actually conscious beings do not expand their range of operation, given certain conditions made possible by disciplines, rather than ceasing to function, after they have gained sufficient control over material processes to leave the material plane or field at will. Much, no doubt, of what one hears of the greatest ‘mahātmās’ of India and elsewhere is exaggerated; but
the exaggerations are surely based on fact—on facts that deserve less incredulity than 19th century science was willing to accord. Nevertheless, once again it is not enough simply to "gather data" in order to prove or disprove these matters; one must look within—endlessly within—and not only look, but go; for the fields of wider range—and this is the basic 'homology' which is not just a logical paradox—are entered only with increasingly introspective—or better, intro-operative—disciplines. Nevertheless, 'cosmic' or personal, natural or theological, "consciousness"—for want of a better word to indicate a total state of the soul—the matter of sanctification remains of primary importance; and not only the distinguishing of its nature but also the delineation of its various grades and functions is a topic concerning which there has been untold unclarity in all circles. For, of course, even for those who have been "taken in" very far, it is difficult not only to describe to others what they experience, but not easy to remember, even in one's solitude, when one has descended again to the lower levels (the level of verbal communication being relatively quite low), what one has experienced—or rather, what one was—in these more intense moments. Often the saint can impart his blessing, or even confer his powers on a disciple; but to 'describe' what saintliness is like—this is asking too much!

Such is the condition of his renunciation also, as Lacombe has pointed out in a passage that indicates something of his own personal engagement with the Vedāntic life.3

The human condition.... for India, is only a provisional vestment imposed on the spirit from without. Much as the humanist may search for spirituality in the culture of his humanity, the Vedāntin holds it for certain that it is not possible to discover or even to rediscover the Spirit except by renunciation of humanity, in debarring himself from it by an ascetic effort, negative insofar as it aims at dissolving the human individuality, but positive in that it tends to transcend the human order, to restore the spirit of man to its superhuman dignity. And whereas, in spite of the effort of a Spinoza to whom he does not establish himself in the world as an empire in an empire, the man born of the Cartesian revolution is engaged in the finding of himself by a dialectic of opposition, and is set in opposition to himself in opposing nature and often God as well by the negation of all divine transcen-
dence, the Hindu is in a symbolic relation with the cosmic life, whether he professes the unicity of a universal substance, or whether spirituality for him consists under one of its aspects in a certain participation of a ‘non-violent’ mode in creative fecundity: on the other hand, he expends all this spiritual effort on a principle and on sacred norms and considers his journey to liberation as a progress in sanctity no less than in wisdom. The vedântic ‘hero’ is (equally) an ascetic, a sage, and a saint.

It is remarkable indeed to find that Gilson makes essentially the same complaint against the predicament of post-Cartesian man, with the background not of the Vedânta, but of western Medieval philosophy, that of St. Bonaventura in particular. Thus, in the chapter on Nature Grace and Beatitude, he writes:

The form of which the human soul is composed, is indeed destined to enjoy divine beatitude; made in the image of God, it bears the express resemblance to Him, and by consequence, it could not know what it is to be condemned to perish... United to a form whose dignity is such that the soul in its entirety finds itself gratified by its resemblance to the divine, matter is drawn towards it and conjoined to it by an appetite for its perfection that its desire of form is therein totally satisfied and reassured. A spiritual matter has nothing to do with form, since that which perfects it bears the express image of God. And since God does not wish to dissolve that of which the union is so perfect, he considers the soul in being by the same act of love which has conferred it (being) upon it (the soul).

Possible, even inevitable by reason of the structure of the soul, its immortality is necessary, of a necessity all the more metaphysical by reason of its end. The most evident human experience is the desire of well-being which we all are laboured with; no one would dream of denying it and it would be necessary to have lost one’s reason for one to contest that we all wish to be happy. Now St. Bonaventura, who situates the desire of beatitude at the basis of all his mysticism, and by consequence of all his philosophy, cannot represent to himself well-being except as a definitive possession (and which knows itself as definitive) of the most perfect possible good. And that means that there is no happiness except in the possession of a good which one knows that he can never lose, or at least simply which one has certainty of conserving. The human soul thus cannot be considered as veritably capable of being happy, if we do
not suppose it capable of attaining a definitive state where the
good towards which it aspires appertains to it under condi-
tions such that it can never be separated (from them). Now
that stability holds an evident exigence of immortality of
the soul; a *metaphysical exigence* drawn up from the most pro-
found end from that time on, and the most absolute of all,
for it is the end which imposes its necessity on its ends; we
should not know how to contest it without shattering the
very principle which rules the order of the universe and confers
on human life its intelligibility......The soul of St. Bonaven-
tura holds substantially to the body which it ‘informs’, but
it does not depend on it sufficiently to become bound to it
in its destiny, nor on the other hand that it should separate
it from God. In reality the union of the soul and body is
made by a *movement from the high to the low which answers to
that of grace descending from God into the soul in order to vivify it*;
in both cases, it is a created form which has taken posses-
sion of an inferior substance in order to reform it *from within*
and conduct it to its perfection; and in both cases also,
the operations accomplished by that form in the substance
of which it has taken possession and which it is its essence
indeed to take possession—these operations *in no wise alter
its transcendence or degrade its superiority*.

In this passage Gilson has not only indicated something of
St. Bonaventura’s philosophy about immortality, but also has
summarized much that we have already dealt with, especially
in connection with Prapatti. Above all, his overt use of the term
*exigence* puts the emphasis on the aspect which most concerns
us now. The human soul in concerned with salvation and
beatitude—with perfection—by ontological necessity. Not by
a mere entelechy of the *ought*, but by its inalienable structural
relation with the divine, its perfection is from above; and its
movement into that perfection by grace—by the “absolute
factor” which ordinary humanism cannot take into its scope
—is of a *necessity of harmony of means and ends* such that, if any-
thing, the problem is how that harmony can ever have been
interrupted, rather than how it can be achieved. The redemption
from the ‘world’ is not an escape from *bondage*, although it is
also called that in both India and medieval Europe, so much
as the completion of a circular movement of transcendence
into immanence and reinclusion of the immanence in the trans-
cendence—quite as we see in many of Rāmānuja’s interpreta-
tions of Upaniṣadic texts.
Above all, from this the inference is vivid enough that the matter of mokṣa cannot be treated merely as a part of epistemology. Yet this seems to be what most contemporary treatments of the topic—such as that given even by Das Gupta—have done at every turn. In all of Das Gupta’s detailed digests of Viśiṣṭādvaita, there is only one brief passage on mokṣa or liberation as such, and that only in its bearing on jñāna. We object to this for the reason that even in reference to bhakti, mokṣa is the important thing, malgre the poetic sentiments of many Vaiṣṇavas themselves in which the sense is really a shift from the negative connotation of deliverance from ajñāna, ignorance, to the positive realization of the bliss of being in perfect harmony with God’s attributes-in-actualization. It is true that there are great controversies to be reported concerning the nature of mokṣa; but the importance should not be put on the controversial matter so much as on that urgency of its attainment which provokes the controversies. It is only when one links together the warmth of feeling, the intense longing, the deep seated passion for eternity and paeans of praise of the Lord’s perfections which burst forth not only in Rāmānuja’s minor works, but even in his Śrī Bhāṣya along with its astute dialectic—only thus can one have caught his spirit. Mere reporting of these things will not do; one must be infected with the same exigence with which paeans came forth, if one is to represent it adequately.

In this respect, C. D. Sharma has done better. At least, he has pointedly given witness to the ‘religious’ spirit of Rāmānuja, the religious spirit that is bhakti as the urgent movement of the soul towards its vouchsafed destiny. We may not agree with him that Rāmānuja failed in his attempt at5 “reconciling the demands of philosophical thinking with this religious feeling”; but it is appropriate that having seen that spirit in Rāmānuja, he looks afresh at the devotional aspect of Śaṅkara, and of the impact of the experience of the vision of the advaitic state which underguids and provokes all his philosophizing.

But P. N. Śrīnivāsācārya has given a more “existential” representation, as we may see from the following passage:6

The nature of mukti is so rich and varied in content that
it cannot be exhausted by philosophic labels and formulas. Brahman is the sat without a second, but Brahmānubhava differs with different muktas and this truth brings out the uniqueness of each experience and its universality...The methods and the starting points may vary with the psychological variations of mumukṣutvas but the vedāntic goal is the same, namely, the intuition of Brahman, which is of the nature of supreme unsurpassable Bliss...The man of creative temperament dedicates himself to selfless service to the Lord and his devotion and prefers kaiṣikarya rasa to Brahmānubhava. The mystic is drawn by prema and thrilled by the touches of the alluring beauty of Brahman, which ravishes even the ascetic and dialectician, and changes the jñāṇī or rṣis of Daṇḍaka into gopīs of Brindavana. The mumukṣu meditates on some simple quality of Brahman according to his inclination and even the eternal seers enjoy only one aspect of the divine nature. The bliss of Brahman is, however, irresistible and every Vedāntin seeks Ānanda as the supreme end and aim of life.
MOKṢA

SECTION II

A

INTRODUCTION II : MOKṢA IN THE VARIOUS INDIAN SCHOOLS

Differ though they may in their descriptions and definitions, all the great Ācāryas, Vaiṣṇava and Śaivite, put mokṣa at the pivot of their philosophizing, and it is only after emphasizing this that we are free to observe some points of difference among them, or at least to observe the points in which they vary from the Śrī Vaiṣṇava position.

In general, it may first be observed that almost all of the commentators on the Brahma Sūtras are agreed in their criticisms of the concepts of the beatified state in Buddhism, Jainism and in most of the so-called six systems (the Śāṅkhyā in particular) to the effect that mokṣa is a positive condition and not a mere cessation of ignorance and sorrow. Upon the basis of this, most present apologists for Indian philosophy are rightly critical of the impression somehow widespread in the West that salvation in India is totally a negative matter. A recommendable discussion on this point may be found in an article by C. D. Deshmukh in the (Indian) Philosophical Quarterly for July, 1937, in which he gives full support to the argument that there is as much justification in the Vedānta for the words of Christ, “ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you Free” as in Christianity for the other major religions of the world. And Haridas Bhattacharya, in his typical whimsical but consummately scholarly manner, has also emphasized this point in his article in the same journal for April, 1927. As he says, the whole Indian perspective is such that “the soul is too valuable to be allowed extinction”. He further observes in some detail what we have noted at many points, that all through Indian tradition there is an interwoven duplicity of views as to the concepts of salvation, viz., as an
entering into a heaven and as attainment of Brahmanhood without reference to any ‘place’ or ‘time’. He notes that even in popular Jainism and Buddhism, the idea of Heaven became indispensable. Nevertheless, in the six systems, it must be admitted that

......of the three theistic systems (if they may be called such for these never gave to God any very great prominence), the Yoga taught kaivalya as freedom from pain, the Vaisheshikas looked on moksha as isolation and freedom from pain ending in a kind of insensibility; while the Nyaya regarded apavarga (deliverance) as attainment of happiness that could not be exceeded (nihshreyas). The Mimamsakas also admitted the complete cessation of the qualities of the soul as a sine qua non of salvation, but they admitted the existence of Heaven as a pleasurable abode of the departed pious.

However, his concluding view raises an important issue of valuational interpretation. The historical development of the concept of salvation is clear enough, viz., that in the pre-Christian era Indian thinkers primarily sought eternal peace in their own hearts; but later in the medieval period, with increasing theistic and devotional emphasis, the other idea of Vaikuntha or its Saivite equivalents assumed a more vivified position in all minds. But whether this development was a lapse, as Bhatat-charya thinks, this remains a disputable question. For as we have already seen, even from the humanist standpoint, the imaginative play on the desirability of perfection such as the idea of heaven affords always brings its reflected virtues and glories back to earth, and instead of making earthly man more ‘other-worldly’, actually gives him a Hope that makes life on earth not only more full of consolation, but stabilises him in a sense of continuity with the unseen so that Love may flourish more abundantly even in his present existence. Be this as it may, we cannot be concerned so much about the six systems as such (for such is not our field of scope) as about the medieval systems which developed out of them and in some measure in rebuttal of them. But for all these systems, it must be admitted that Saikara set the pace; as C.D. Sharma once said in the classroom, “You can philosophize for or against Saikara, but you cannot philosophize without him”. For all the non-advaitic schools are concerned more about their refutations of advaita than their disagreements among themselves.
And yet it must not be forgotten that after Śaṅkara, many sub-schools of advaita developed, the divisions ranging primarily around the interpretations of avidyā and māyā, the removal of which nevertheless constitutes mokṣa for them all. It may also be noted that there is some variance as to the role of Īśvara in the liberation of souls (or rather the soul, for there is really only one soul for them) and of the world, some maintaining that Īśvara himself as within māyā, is ‘saved’ when (the) jīva truly reaches the advaitic condition, or rather that he plays a mere mediating role, helping the jīva, Himself being in a privileged position as the conqueror of māyā—a sort of ‘super-jīva’—while others again maintain that when (and/or if) all muktas become Īśvara, then Īśvara is reabsorbed in nirguṇa Brahman, as it were.

But for Śaṅkara himself, these fine distinctions seem unimportant. Perhaps had he lived longer he would have anticipated most of them; but his basic position is simply that brahma-vidyā, gnosis, is everything, and he probably would not have stressed its implications so much as those who followed him. It seems of little importance to him whether the ‘dawn of knowledge’ is ‘positive’ or ‘negative’; the removal of ignorance and the realization of the advaitic experience is ever one and the same, being Brahman itself. As Sharma puts it,

**Knowledge leaves no option to us for its being this or that or for its existence or non-existence. It is not in our hands to make, unmake, or change knowledge. Our thinking cannot make a pillar a man. Knowledge of Brahman, therefore, depends on itself. It is always the same nature because it depends on the existent thing.... Knowledge is not mental activity, because it depends not upon mind but on the existent fact. There is also no succession in knowledge. Once it dawns it dawns forever and at once removes all ignorance and consequently all bondage. Liberation, therefore, means the removal of ignorance by knowledge.**

It is because of this undifferentiated unicity that jīvanmukti plays such an important role in Śaṅkara’s system, although we shall deal with this in connection with Rāmānuja’s refutations of the concept. Yet out of this doctrine of total undifferentiation many problems, it must be admitted by all, must arise: If one soul is liberated, are all souls also liberated by the same realization? For if the avidyā be removed is cosmic, if it is in
the strictest sense *anirvacaniya*, neither real nor unreal, its removal—so the argument must turn for the Maṇḍana Miśra school—cannot be individual. For that matter, even the expression of 'removal' is void of sense, for there is really nothing to be 'removed', the Reality to be realized being eternally self-realized, and the individuality of the jivas themselves being an aspect of the avidyā, the 'non-reality', to which they belong. Realisation of this must come by some sort of negation of negation; the bondage of illusion must dialectically eliminate itself!

But the Vācaspati Miśra school puts the focus on the jivas themselves, the avidyā being more of a psychological than a cosmological nature. The falseness of 'appearance' is falseness only to the jivas themselves; and it must follow that it is they themselves who must experience the saving realization of the Reality behind them, to which they inherently belong. Mokṣa, in other words, is not so much the sublation of individuation as the penetration of illusory 'appearance'. Then, for Sureśvara and his following, the root cause of samsāra is neither individuation nor 'appearance' but error (*bhrānti*). Nothing whatsoever exists 'outside of' Brahman; the business of liberation comes more from the immaterialization of the inherently irrefutable nature of Truth as Pure Self than from the penetration of illusory appearance of the sublation of individuation.

Padmapada, on the other hand, puts the emphasis on the *adhyāsa* (superimposition, epiphenomenon) aspect of avidyā. The jiva is in a *state of mixture*, being 'somehow' both Ātman-Brahman and something 'reflected' outside of Brahman—the *pratibimba* theory, to which the key to mokṣa lies in the transcendence of egoity, the assertiveness of which causes confusion between the 'reflection' and the 'Reflected'.

So the distinctions multiply—and there are many more! They are so subtle that even to state them in such a few words is to misrepresent them badly. We only take cognizance of their development because the issue remains a vital one for further studies to determine whether they arose of their own accord within the school itself, as seems to be generally assumed, or whether rather they came dialectically as defences against the other schools. For if that be the case, it only shows a certain unadmitted weakness in the system—or the method, perhaps
itself, as was also the case with Thomism by the time of the Renaissance: it simply exhausted itself by introducing distinctions, instead of discovering new and more basic truths. Alas, however, India has not yet produced a Kant or even a Descartes who with authentic originality "scraped the whole works" and began from a fresh start! And what is more, with this increase of dialectical skill, there seemed to be a tendency for even the place that Śaṅkara puts bhakti in to be lessened. Madhusudana Sarasvati is perhaps the great exception to this although he is better regarded as an eclectic of a high type than as a strict adherent to advaita as such.

And yet with the increase of dialectical subtilties there also grew the sense of their relative irrelevance and vanity. As Sharma writes of Śrīharṣa and Citsukha (who were dialecticians such as have appeared seldom anywhere in the whole history of mankind) 8

...Their main aim...is to show that intellect is essentially discursive or relational and that therefore it is beset with inherent contradictions...When one constantly ponders over the Mahāvākyas declaring that the essential unity of the individual and universal consciousness, then fortunately the finite intellect casts off the garb of discursive relativity put on it by avidyā, and gets transformed into pure Reason which is the self-luminous consciousness shining forth in its pristine purity, and thus embracing the Absolute and becoming one with it, it even enjoys its eternal bliss. Avidyā is bondage, and its destruction, which is calm non-dual knowledge, is liberation.

Turning now to the non-advaitic systems, we may first observe a few points in regard to the Śaiva systems and then turn to the other Vaiśṇava schools.

The Śaiva Siddhānta offers some interesting variants both from Advaita and from Rāmānuja, although it is generally called a viśiṣṭadvaitic system. In an article on the Śaiva systems in general9 S. S. Suryanarayan Sastri has perhaps taken it as too representative of all Śaiva systems, for the difference even between it and Kāśmīra Śaivism—aside from the question of the latter's influence on the Siddhānta—is rather basic, in spite of a certain similarity of terminology, the Kāśmīra system being more of a dynamic character and probably influenced somewhat by Buddhistic idealism of a radically
subjectivistic and dynamic type, whereas the Siddhānta is definitely realistic and structural, like the Śrī Vaiṣṇava; and also like it, this Śaiva Siddhānta puts more emphasis by far on grace than the Kāśmirī tradition. Nevertheless, Sastri does acknowledge this importance of grace in the Siddhānta when he writes:

(Mokṣa comes) at the onset of divine grace, quick or slow relative to the capacities of physical or mental worship or meditation that the soul betakes itself to. When grace fully sets in, the Lord reveals Himself and instructs the soul.

Sastri then goes on to discuss the varieties of muktas, e.g., the vijnānakalas, those whose realization is focused on the inner light; the pralayahkalas, those whose liberation-focus is on the divine supernatural form of Śiva; and the Sakalas, those who [primarily through dīkṣā (initiation) given by the guru in a manner closely resembling the ācārya Bhimana of the Tangalai sect] perceive themselves in complete identification with Śiva. But, as with Rāmānuja, for Śrī Kaṇṭha (the chief exponent of the Śaiva Siddhānta) there is no complete identity of existence, but a certain identity of essence between even the highest mukta and Śiva, so souls, in a condition of blessed spiritual servitude to the Lord. Sastri then goes on to report the Śaiva Siddhānta’s primary criticism of the Rāmānuja school:

But it (the Śaiva Siddhānta) claims greater dignity for itself than the Viṣṇu viṣiṣṭādvaita; if the analogies of being secondary to God, being the body of God, and so on are pressed, it would follow that in release God experiences through the soul, as formerly the soul used to experience through its possession of the body and the senses. But the Śaiva Siddhānta will have none of this; he makes the soul the essential figure in the picture. In bondage, the soul experienced through pāśa; now it experiences through pāti (the Lord).

The answer to this is obvious: God does ‘experience’ through all of his ‘bodies’, at least tangentially; it is through them that He lives in His world; it is through them that He has knowledge of His own operations, as well as His manifestations of glory and His self-fulfilment in provoking their praise of Him. And this does not compromise His absolute nature, but rather constitutes its ‘overflow’, as we have constantly reiterated. But
perhaps more cogent in our present context is the counter-
charge from the Rāmānuja school that the Śaiva Siddhānta
does accept the doctrine of jīvanmukti, although in a qualified
form,—a qualification typical of its tendency to accept advaitic
terminology but to assign different meanings to the terms. For
although according to the Śiva jñana Siddhyār (a basic text of the
tradition) the jīvanmukta discards all the traditional marks,
practices and characteristics of a sādhaka and even disregards
caste distinctions, is free from all egoity and other limitations, he
nevertheless, according to Bālāsūbrahmanya Mudāliar10 “should
keep his acquisition permanent by constant worship of God and
constant association with his fellow-jīvanmuktas. Otherwise
there is a large danger of (bad tendencies) getting the better
of the soul”. Herein is a marked difference with the advaitin
to whom the jīvanmukta is completely free to do as he likes
and his conformity to the world, being optional, is quite volun-
tary; he has no dangers whatsoever. Actually, it should be better
not to use the term at all, for this qualification, that there is
danger of losing his jīvanmuktahood, compromises the doc-
trine completely. Moreover, it is even further compromised by
the additional qualification that it is only after leaving the body
that he attains sāyujya (oneness of nature) with God, whereas
it is only those who have lesser attainments that come to sālokya
(sameness of abode), sāmitya (proximity, fellowship) and
sārūpya (similarity of form), sāyujya being reserved for the few,
while the Rāmānuja school teaches that these attributes are
realized by all muktas alike. Nevertheless, the Śaiva Siddhāntin
mukta remains a bhakta through and through; he is not a
jñāni except in a very secondary sense; and in this the simi-
larly with the Vaiṣṇava view is very close.

The Kāśmīra Śaivite, on the other hand, is a jñāni out-and-
out, his realization being of a “cosmic consciousness” type for
exceeding even the claims of Śrī Aurobindo. Mokṣa to him is
as much re-absorption into Śiva that there ceases to be any
distinction whatever between the universe, Śiva and himself,
his āhaṅkāra not being eliminated but rather expanded into
the infinite Ego, the basic difference from Advaita here being only
that the jīva’s previous alienation in samsāra is thought to be
an emanational process, a sort of dynamic mode of Śiva’s self-
exteriorization; there is no doctrine of realization being eternal, sāṃśāra being only adhīṣṭa. Thus in the Paramārthaśāra we find kārikā 73 stating: "There is naught distinct from himself to which he should offer praise or oblation: will he rejoice in praise and the like who is said to have passed beyond worship and hallelujah?" and kārikās 64-66: "But if one should behold the Self as being of the substance of Śiva, undefiled Vision exalted in the highest, having the substance of percipient and agent, omnipresent, framed of radiance that never rises nor sets, realizing its will devoid of conception of space and time.... sole agent in the contemplation of the dissolution and rise of multitudinous Power, cunning Creator of the laws of creation and other conditions,—how should he be in the cycle of rebirth? Since he is all-extensive, where should he have to wander, and whither?" And Abhinavagupta's enlargement on these themes even further exaggerates the tendency toward subjective idealism, which would be extremely repulsive to Rāmānuja, as also would be the manner in which the Kāśmīra jīvanmukta seems to be totally exempt from all moral restrictions.

The Vīra Śiva, or Liṅgāyat tradition, as it is called, important though it is numerically in the Deccan, and distinctive though it is sociologically because of its complete abolition of caste distinctions, at least within the sampradāya, offers little variance from the Śaiva Siddhānta as far as mokṣa is concerned, and thus we need only mention it without discussion. More specifically a ‘practical’ religious tradition than a philosophical school, it seems not to have developed so many fine points of dialectical argument, simply emphasizes its characteristic of "dynamic fullness" as the goal of its achievement, rather than any finality. Sīhala seems to be the key term, the burden of whose meaning is the movement from naïve simplicity through subdivision back to the higher integral simplicity of wholeness as symbolized by the Liṅgam as the union of Śiva and Śakti.

In the Tāntric or Śākta tradition as such, there seems to be less interest in mokṣa as such as in the proficiency in attaining samādhi and the exercise of siddhis. Thus in the writings of Sir John Woodroffe there is relatively little description of the expected states that follow after physical death, apparently for the reason that the one who perfects himself in Tāntric tech-
nique has complete control over the forces of life and death, and can leave the body at will. Mokṣa and samādhi thus become almost synonymous.

But there is another profound philosophical reason for this. The emphasis on Śakti—in some cases so great that Śakti is considered as the only principle, of which Śiva is only the unactivated aspect, is symptomatic: It is a chthonic tradition, a *philosophy of descent*, rather than a way of getting, by *ascent*, into some heaven or the attainment of beatification in the sense of exalted rarification. *The Primordiality of the Earth* is more important than the principation of Heaven, as Pandit Gopināth Kavirāj once concurred in a conversation with a friend of ours.

Nevertheless, whatever the method, the end is not much different. Kavirāj, writing on the *Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy* in the Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute in 1929, has quoted one Helarāja as saying, "As soon as this celestial light dawns on the soul, the heart begins to taste ineffable joy that is not born of senses and knows no fading; and consciousness of the Divine Majesty wells up from within in ever newer forms. It is the state of Beatitude in which the soul is wrapped in the veil of the Supreme Glory of the Highest."

Moreover, as Kavirāj has written in his article in the *History of Philosophy East and West*, although there are variations in theory from dualism to monism, for most part, the *kaivalya* state is the goal, although this is interpreted in terms of total identification with Śiva rather than the pure ‘isolation’ of the Self, as for example is the case with Jainism. Moreover, this state is attained by being caught up—or *brought down*, as one might better say—in the transforming Energy of Śakti. Grace does figure in the tradition, but bhakti not so much as with the Śaiva Siddhānta. In most cases Parama Śiva with Parā Śakti, remains transcendent, and is not attained by the human *Pāśu* or soul, although its identity with them remains non-reciprocally perfect.

Perhaps the key term in the tradition is *pratibhijña*, revelation, rather than mokṣa, for although in one sense it is the means to mokṣa, in another sense it is of sufficient weight to be virtually identical with mokṣa, for it confers omniscience and all the accompanying supernatural powers, and the transference of all into the super-Ego, e.g. the selfhood which is Śiva.
In concluding his article, Kavirāj describes the attainment of the final state (and that significantly without reference to a 'hereafter' and without mention of death of the body) as follows:

There is an order of progression in spiritual experience......

...On the rise of pure knowledge the knowables become one with the senses in consequence of which the knowables begin to disappear...The next position is that of Īśvara when the motor organs in which the movable objects are similarly absorbed and become one with the cosmic body with which the subject as agent is identified. The yogī in this stage is associated not only with an individual body but with the entire universe. In the state of Sadā Śiva which follows, the senses in which the knowables have been absorbed become one with the Self. In the Śakti stage the universe, body and the omniscient Self become unified. This is a condition of undisturbed equilibrium between spirit and matter (cit and acit).

It must be noted that it is the equilibrium of matter and spirit that is the final condition, and not the elimination of component, as is the case with most of the Vedāntic systems. It is curious indeed that until recently this tradition has been so neglected in histories of Indian Philosophy, for its influence is very widespread indeed, although it is essentially non-academic in character, and carefully guarded by secrecy, due to the rigorousness and esoteric nature of its techniques, scientifically thorough though they are. But the practice, whatever be the theory or the mythological symbolizations of the states attained, remains absolutely essential, except the overtly sexual techniques (and even these are said to have been included in the initial sādhanā of no less than Śaṅkara !), for the understanding (as we have already intimated) of the theory of my variety of Indian tradition. For essentially, it takes up where the Pātañjala Yoga leaves off, and it is difficult to say how far it may go. Even if one has made only a beginning, incredulity about some of the claims made is dissolved in utter amazement at what one does experience.

As we turn to the Vaiṣṇava systems, we may first observe that all of them put the primary emphasis on bhakti and grace. Mādhava, for example, no less than Rāmānuja, teaches that mokṣa is the reward of the God of the bhakta, although just as there is a qualitative difference in the nature of different bhaktas
for him, the sense of difference being the keynote to his whole system, so in mokṣa the radical difference between the soul (the mumukṣu as well as the mukta) and its Lord is preserved, and that not only as the sense of difference in general, but the specific five differences (e.g., between soul and soul, God and world, God and soul, one object of the world and another), which he brings into play at every possible turn. The stages of all past merit and demerit except the ārāmdha karma (though without the assertion that this constitutes jīvanmukti), the gaining and the passing off of the subtle body and the dissolution of ārāmdha karma itself, are all preserved according to the accepted common tradition; and the status of the liberated soul is characterised by sālokya, sāmipyā, sārūpya and sāyujya, with sārṣṭi as a species of sāyujya. But these states are not posited as applying to all equally, as with Rāmānuja, but as constituting a sort of typology of differentiation rather than a description of commonality. Das Gupta has summarized Mādhava's teaching on this as follows:

Sāyujya means the entrance of individual souls into the body of God and this identification of themselves with the enjoyment of God in his own body; sārṣṭi-mokṣa, which is a species of sāyujya-mokṣa, means the enjoyment of the same powers as God possesses, which can only be done by entering into the body of God and by identifying oneself with the particular powers of God. Only deities or Gods deserve to have this kind of liberation......; sālokya-mokṣa of course means residence in heaven and being there with God to experience satisfaction and enjoyment of the continued sight of Him. Sāmipyā-mokṣa means continuous residence near God such as is enjoyed by the sages. Sārūpya-mokṣa is enjoyed by God's attendants who have outward forms similar to that which God possesses.

Here, as with the Śaiva Siddhānta, the terms remain the same, but the interpretation different. But in the case of Mādhava's doctrine of eternal damnation, there is something not only different entirely from all other Hindu systems, but perhaps original with him. We cannot enter into the controversy as to his sources on this point, for it is very involved indeed; but in spite of many rather good authorities, we scarcely can give any credence at all to the suggestion that he was influenced here by Christianity, for the simple reason that the
type of Christianity in that region at that time did not stress eternal damnation as such; and we suggest that it is more likely that it was from Muslim influence, the Muslims present at that time being of a different sort (less intolerant, and more interested in trade than in conquest, having come by sea) than those that had their centre of power in Delhi. Or else,—and this may be more likely—the influence may have come from the Digambara Jains who were flourishing indeed around Udipi at that time, a remnant still continuing today at Karikal nearby. Be all this as it may, the essential point is that the interest in hell, which is stronger with him than with any other Hindu philosopher, does accord with his general philosophy of difference; he will never mix his values, or even run the risk of doing so, as many other traditions (the Yoga Vāśiṣṭha perhaps being the most extreme) tend to do. Influence or no influence, he is the least syncretistic of all Hindus, and in spite of some apparently ‘radical’ doctrines, his community remains today one of the most rigidly ‘orthodox’ in all of India.

The essential thing, of course, is that the sense of difference never stops just there: it leads on to a genius for classification, which, if it could only be ‘modernised’, would furnish a wonderful basis for grafting scientific method on to Hindu tradition; but this only remains a challenge which so far seems not to have been answered. The classification does extend not only to those who are liberated, but to those who are damned as well; but the latter need not concern us. According to Nāgarāja Sharma, the classification of the former runs somewhat as follows:

1. Dukha apristha, Lakṣmi being the chief, being eternally untinted with pain, the other classes being of all other cetanas or sentient beings, who do at some time or other and in varying degrees undergo suffering and sorrow.

2. Mukti-yogas and muktya-yogas, Under the latter term come those who are not eligible for mokṣa at all, or the ‘eternally damned’.

3. Simple muktas, those who have already attained liberation and also those who are only entitled to it, the former being divided into five classes, e.g.,

(1) devas (gods).

(2) ṛṣis, those who have gained their reward by great penance.
(3) pīṭras, ancestors who guide the destiny of their posterity.

(4) Pāś, chakravartīs, rulers whose merit of virtue has earned their reward.

(5) Naras, eminent men and women who have cast off the common bond of samsāra, and

(6) Mukti-yogas, subdivided into two classes, e.g., tamo-yogas and nityasamsāris, the former being demons of various sorts (also classified !)

the latter being those ordinary souls who are destined for (but who have not yet entered) eternal damnation.

It is important to realize that this emphasis on difference extends even to the assertion that God himself experiences difference, and therefore even the muktas of all sorts can experience nothing more,—or rather, that the value put on difference is itself quite different from that put on it by other Vedāntic philosophers: Difference is the highest category, not the lowest! It functions not just as qualification but in its own power, uncounterbalanced by any principle of identity. Thus he takes specific issue with Viśiṣṭādvaita in rejecting even the latter’s doctrine that the realized soul attains paramasāmya (an exalted type of maximum resemblance) with God. But again, the value put on the difference between the Lord and his beautified devotee is different: On the one hand, the community, the fraternity, that they compose would be meaningless if their absolute individualities were compromised; and on the other hand, as ‘Servants in Heaven’ their difference from the Lord they serve only enhances their enjoyment of Him! And likewise their gratitude for the grace bestowed on them is also increased by their sense of unworthiness, which is itself a sense of difference both of nature and of merit. This enjoyment, in turn, is not common, but individuated. As Nāgarāja Sharma puts it, “Post-final-release Democracy is a laughable idea...There is no mystical swooning into the Absolute after release.”

Above all, any assertion of equality or even of sameness would compromise the all-important attributes of the Supreme Being as svātantrya (independence unalloyed and unqualified) and Pūrṇa (full, the attribute of being the Immanent Whole—a different interpretation than Rāmānuja’s pantheism).
They, the Blessed, are indeed perfectly attuned to the Will of the Lord as being completely under His control; but to assert that their only limitation is that of inability to partake in the functions of creation and destruction of the cosmos—this is to him nothing short of blasphemy. All the other functions—and here he must twist certain Upaniṣadic texts to suit his system—they have only as a matter of obedience, and not because of their likeness (attained or inherent) to Him. His omnipotence is everything, and must not be compromised in its uniqueness at any cost. Thus, the activities—for Mādhava even more that Rāmānuja will allow no hint of quietism, even in Heaven!—are His business, not theirs, done by virtue of His power, not theirs.

Nimbārka, and his school, on the other hand, recognizes both identity and difference as equally basic on all hands, and seems not so much interested in reconciling them as in existentially recognizing that they both play an equal role on all reality, including that of the emancipated state. Das Gupta’s report here is rather unsatisfactory, being mostly taken up with the dialectical refutations of advaita, which are after all very much like those of any other Vaiṣṇava. But in her article in the Cultural Heritage of India, Roma Choudhry has perspicaciously summarized the more positive aspect of the Nimbārka philosophy of salvation. It seems that the most basic Mahāvākya for this school is Chhāndogya Upaniṣad viii : 1 : (4-5):

If they should say to him, “If within this city of Brahman is contained everything here, all beings as well as all desires, when old age overtakes it or perishes, what is left over therefrom?” he should say, “that does not grow old with one’s old age; it is not slain with one’s own murder. That is the city of Brahman. In it desires are contained. That is the Soul (ātman) free from will, ageless, deathless, sorrowless, hungerless, thirstless, whose desire is the Real, whose conception is the Real.

For just as here on earth human beings follow along in subjection to command; of whatever object they are desirous, whether a realm or a part of a field, upon that they live dependent... (Hume’s Transl.)

Das Gupta has simply stated that emancipation, mokṣa, for this school is “participation in God’s nature (tad-bhava-pati)” but Roma Choudhry has pointed out not only that it is “realization of essential similarity with the Lord. When the soul in
bondage attains a vision on the Lord, it attains his nature and most of his attributes, and this is freedom from the cycle of births and deaths"; but also that in this realization of the nature of the Lord, the attainment of the soul's own true nature (ātma-svarūpa lābha) also occurs. The Upaniṣadic text cited is interpreted as indicating both of these aspects, as well as the retention of both difference (as the character of atomicity and of being under the control of the Lord, as well as inability to create or destroy the world) and similarity, or identity-in-difference in the emancipated state. Thus—as for Rāmānuja, from whom Nimbārka differs perhaps least of all other ācāryas..."

According to Nimbārka, salvation is a positive state of supreme self-development—of infinite knowledge and bliss; and not a mere negative state of unconsciousness (as with Nyāya), nor absence of pain without the presence of bliss (as with Sāṁkhya). Likewise, with Rāmānuja, Nimbārka rejects the jīvanmukti theory, for the earthly body is inevitably a limitation.

For the rest, although he deserves much more attention, in even such a brief sketch, we shall have to pass on, for to consider exactly where he differs from Rāmānuja would involve us in a mass of distinctions which would detain us too long.19 Vallabha, on the other hand, presents (as we have noted previously) a fascinating attempt at perhaps the most purely pantheistic monism of all Indian traditions, although by no means of the gnostic type (and herein lies his uniqueness, for although he is also existentially interested not in systematic reconciliation of texts as in cultivating the coincidentia oppositorum not as paradox, as with Nicolas of Cusa, but simply as the way that God operates, for He is unlimited by logical distinctions because of His affective nature) but rather purely on a basis of bhakti and grace—even to the extent of accusing Rāmānuja of clinging too much to the Vedic ritualistic tradition (the maryādā path as opposed to puṣṭi mārga). For him we must note the following points, distinctive to him because of this monism:

1. Since the concept of identity, purged even of the dualism (or quasi dualism, which is not admitted, of course!) of māyāvāda in which world and Brahman are in a radical sense discrepant if not in opposition, is always in the foreground, the sense of hierarchy is not so sharp as with Rāmānuja; and
as a consequence there seems to be a greater emphasis of the naturally free condition of the jīva, which although in one sense is only a part of the puruṣa, in another sense is quite identical with it, and that in turn—and directly—identical with Brahma. Otherwise, according to Vallabha, mokṣa would be impossible, as in the case of the adhyāsa concept, which allows an unbridgeable gulf between individuation and identity.

2. The preference for the sādhanā stage of bhakti—as of bhakti in general—over all other stages, including mokṣa and including jivanmukti in particular, is very sharp, reminding us of the constantly reiterated theme in the Alwars that it is better to remain a simple bhakta than to experience the highest liberation by any means. But in Vallabha, it is not just one theme among others; it is the basic commitment. For this reason, the grhaṭha (householder) āśrama is given openly a decided preference over saṁnyāsa, as is the case in practice (in spite of Rāmacūḍa’s own position of blessing both almost equally) among the Tengalai community although the Vadagalais disagree with them here.

3. Three grades of emancipation are distinguished within the bhakti path (notably within it, for it need not lead beyond itself!) all distinguished by the term sevā, service (which, of course, answers to the kaiṅkarya of the Śri Vaiṣṇavas), a-laukikā-martya, sāyujya and bhajanopayogī, the first putting stress on inspiration, the second on a certain merging into the nature of Kṛṣṇa in the heat of devotional fervour, the third (evidently) the creative expression of this fervour. Herein, there seems to be an elastic blending of the fruit of a bhakti and bhakti itself.

Govinlal Hargovind Bhatt has summarized Vallabha’s philosophy of salvation as follows in his article in the History of Philosophy East and West.20

Persons who live an objectionable life have to suffer and to serve in the cycle of the world. Those who perform sacrifices (the maryādā mārga) for the fulfilment of desires or get rewards accordingly go to heaven, if desired, by the path of the manes, and have to return to the world of mortals when their merit is exhausted. When a person performs Vedic sacrifices without any desire, he enjoys spiritual happiness (ātma-sukha) and later on... assumes a new body. In this new birth he gets the knowledge of God, and ultimately qualifies himself for union with Him by passing through the
different stages of the path of the Gods. The liberation in the maryādā mārga is gradual, and one is required to move spiritually by the path of the gods. Immediate liberation is possible only through the grace of God.

In other words (according to Bhatt’s further explanation) Vallabha, like Rāmānuja, does not restrict himself to the scheme of salvation as formulated in the Brahma Sūtras; but even more than Rāmānuja, perhaps, because of his even more extreme stress on grace, he puts the preference on the non-vedic way, the purely Vaiṣṇava way of bhakti-prapatti, which is more immediate. But evidently, like Rāmānuja, he does not leave this completely unreconciled with the Upaniṣadic formulations (even though he effects the reconciliation in a different spirit, of course, less “rationally” and more paradoxically) asserting in effect that the true bhakta simply bypasses the pittyāna, the path of the manes, and passes more quickly through the devayāna, the path of the Gods, into the Akṣara Brahman, which is identified with the Puruṣottama, and that in turn identified with Kṛṣṇa in such a way that those especially devoted to Kṛṣṇa have the greatest advantage; for grace, as linked with election, comes that way. Further devotion to Kṛṣṇa as participation in the Rāsalilā is the highest, as the most spontaneous and most vividly evidencing this special favour of election. Indeed, these (the puṣṭi bhaktas) may even bypass the devayāna and go directly into the Puruṣottama.

The distinction between identity and identification with the Lord, we surmise, is really not so important for Vallabha, the identity being already there in a strong sense, although perhaps constituting a systematic defect as not adequately explaining why all souls do not come into the same salvation. For merely to say, as he does, that this too is the playful will of the Lord admittedly must compromise his theodicy. But the key word, interpretatively, perhaps would be absorption, or a complete merging, rather than identification. He is so keen on his intense devotion to Kṛṣṇa that nothing else matters: he is content to leave inconsistencies to be accounted for in the nature of the liberating Object of his devotion, rather than to hope that merely human faculties can “iron them out”. And perhaps that is the best that anyone can do. Unfortunately, from present sources
in English, it remains somewhat unclear what Vallabha’s position is in regard to jīvanmukti. Prof. Jadunath Sinha,\textsuperscript{21} for example, has allowed a discrepancy, stating in one place that he takes it as impossible, but in another place, that souls are classified as either muktas or jīvanmuktas.

For the school of Chaitanya and his followers the key term might also be complete merging into the nature of Kṛṣṇa, just as Chaitanya himself is reported to have passed bodily—like some of the Alvars—into the image of a deity, Jaganath at Puri, instead of dying a normal death. As we have already seen, the emotional pitch to which bhakti rises in this school is higher, perhaps, than any other cult in civilized society. But there are still systematic considerations of a very high order growing out of this cultivation of emotion, which, though more psychological than philosophical, are very expertly explicated indeed.

Philosophically, however, the systematic matter, though closely influenced by a certain heritage from Mādhava, more closely resembles the position of Nimbārka. Mokṣa for them is outright the positive realization of God; and the cessation of sorrow comes as a consequence rather than as a condition or requirement for that realization. The realization of one’s own true nature also comes as a concomitant, as we find also in Nimbārka and Rāmānuja. But there is a strong syncretistic tendency in this school, so that, for example, the term māyā is interpreted as having two levels, associated with Kālī and Durgā, who symbolize respectively the limiting delusions of the senses and of the self. Jīvanmukti is accepted in their terminology, although cast not in terms of advaitic gnosticism but in terms of such self-immolation in total identification with Rādhā and the gopīs that one actually lives in the spiritual Vṛndāvana—spiritual, not merely imaginative—while still the body remains. Kaivalya is another term not rejected, as in Viśiṣṭādvaita, but reinterpreted in terms of the purity of the joy of mystical intimacy with God. Again, perhaps from Tāntric influence, there is considerable emphasis on the concept of sakti, which is twofold, māyā-sakti on the one hand, whereby the divine functions are enabled to operate unseen, and on the other, a sort of counterbalance whereby the soul expresses itself, liberation being
the removal of the hindrances to this expression, or the attainment of the swarūpa sakti or acintya sakti of Brahman.

But nowhere in the history of Indian traditions is the more emphasis on the enjoyability of God. Brahman as bliss, ānanda, is not 'attained' as is asserted by other schools, but is simply enjoyed as object: no one wishes to become joy or bliss in the sense of having one's own nature dissolved in it, for one's individual personality must be preserved in order to make the enjoyment possible: the jīva experiences ānanda rather than becoming lost in it. Likewise, in regard to the attributes of sālokya, sārṣṭi, sārūpya, sāmītya, and sāyujya, it is taught that the true bhakta rejects these, preferring to remain content with his devotion, even though, as we have noted elsewhere, there is considerable emphasis on a certain kind of subjugation of the Lord to the devotee in the highest state.

In the end, there is relatively little interest in mokṣa as dimensionless attainment of Brahman; rather all is focused on Brajavṛndābana, the imaginatively spiritual, timeless, placeless, but very real realm of the Lilās of the Lord, which are eternal. Even the Vaikuṇṭha of the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas is considered as not so important, for the concern with future heaven and hell is completely forgotten by the bhakta as he approaches mokṣa; it is enough to be transported into the realm of spiritual delight, and there to be occupied in parābhakti and paramabhakti, unblemished infatuation with Kṛṣṇa, unsullied vision of Him, and/or the exquisite spiritual suffering of separation from Him and becoming concerned with his welfare instead of one's own. In practice, the Bhāgavatam Purāṇa is of more importance by far than the Brahma Sūtras, Baladev having written his Bhāṣya rather in haste in order to receive recognition of his school, rather than as a deliberate project of his own initiative. And if the Rāsalilā is no less important than for Vallabha, the higher longing in separation from Kṛṣṇa is even more important. This is expressed in the Bhāgavatam itself²² the gopīs lamenting that

When he—whose prosperity is ever-constant like that of the primal Puruṣa, and whose glory is extolled by his followers, wanders at the roots of mountains like the ranger of the forest, and calls the cows by sounding his flute, then the forest creepers and the trees, rich in floral beauty and in
the wealth of fruits, having their branches touch the ground under the heavy load of fruits, and with their frames thrilling with affection, exudates honey, as if to indicate the presence of Viṣṇu inside their hearts. When Mukunda (Krṣṇa) bearing beautiful tilakas, and cheerfully accepting the pleasing hum of bees intoxicated with the honey of the fragrant tulasi contained in his garland of wild flowers—blows his flute, then the Sarasas, the swans, and other birds of the lake, with their eyes closed and mind concentrated and speech restrained, they adore the almighty Hari.

Perhaps the chief lesson to be drawn from this survey of mokṣa in the various Indian schools is that against careless generalization, especially on the part of those writing within the broad field of comparative mysticism. For example, without further knowledge, one might come to the impression from reading Marquette’s work, that samādhi and mokṣa are synonymous, which they definitely are not, although certain strains of Advaita tend to treat the attainment of the highest samādhi as leading to, or as evidence of, the attainment of the jivanmukti state. Again, sālokya, sāmīpya, sārūpya, sāyujya and sārṣṭi are not varieties of mokṣa, as he writes, and do not constitute a progressive series of ‘states of union’, except in an extremely limited sense in some schools; rather they are the attributes acquired by the soul in the state of mokṣa (in most cases, videha=mukti at that, after the death of the physical body), the experience of union being a different thing, granted in the sādhana stage either by self-effort or as grace. And above all, what Marquette notes as true of Yogavāśiṣṭha, that the preservation of personality in mokṣa is a basic doctrine—this is not true of all Indian traditions, much less the keynote of them all, for it is held as only the most extreme view, and that only by a limited, if vital, sector of Indian heritage as a whole.

Roughly speaking, it is better to distinguish between the theistic and the acosmic trends. But even here we have subdivisions; and although there is the undeniable basic structure of the Upaniṣads within which all work, just as in other parts of the world there is a basic dogmatic system based on certain scriptures, nevertheless, accurate and comprehensive understanding can come only from a closer study of the differences in spirit in which this framework is treated. But even a more
elementary factor has misled many in interpreting Indian tradition(s): the Āgamas and Purāṇas, with their greater stress on Śakti and grace, have actually played a more vital role in moulding living tradition than the Upaniṣads with which most writers in the field have been most familiar.

Indeed, if we must schematize, it would seem that there is as much support for Bergson’s ‘Two Sources’ in Indian traditions as in any other field. Religions as well as philosophies growing out of them seem to function in a dialectical interplay of the dogmatic or institutional and ritualistic with the mystical and immediate or personal. Yet even here, one must be cautious, for the advaitin jīvanmukta is exempt completely from institutional obligations, although his state of existence is the most ‘depersonalized’ of all. Nor does the doctrine of election, disagreement about which has always been a thorn of controversy in Christian mystical teaching as well as Hindu, necessarily fit into Bergson’s scheme.

It is best, perhaps, to pursue a multidimensional perspective: and above all, in making comparisons it is best to match correlative factors within each geographical unit rather than to seek for characteristic generalities for each country. Again and again it must be reiterated that there is no such thing as Indian Philosophy; there are rather Indian philosophies, and their range is as wide as the different philosophies of any other land.

Thus, if the pantheistic (or better, acosmic) trend in some Indian traditions attracts some writers, they may well remember that the same trend is by no means absent in some strains of Christian mystical tradition, as Rufus Jones has shown at length. And in both Hindu and Christian systems of this variety the concept of salvation as ‘going to heaven’ becomes less important than the experience of samādhi or mystical union; jīvanmukti, perfection while still on earth is considered possible, and jñāna, gnosis, tends to predominate over bhakti, and effort tends to be considered as more effective or efficacious than election and grace. On the other hand, mysticism in all lands need not necessarily be of this acosmic, gnostic type; and thus in both India and Europe we have theistic systems, with their definite concepts of Heaven and Hell, which are still definitely mystical.
Again, if *salvation is primarily* a matter of ritual, operation of sacraments (Baptism, the Eucharist, sacred thread ceremony, Vedic sacrifice, *dīkṣā* at the feet of the guru, etc.), *sanctification* and *beatification* normally (but not necessarily) lie beyond these, and commonly some form of monastic or celibate ‘renunciation’ of the world is necessary for these higher states. Still again,—one generalization which we shall risk—whether acosmic or theistic in his orientations, although the saint will cease to be limited by the ritualistic obligations, he will seldom discard them altogether, either for reasons of *stability* (St. Benedict, for example) or out of *free choice*, as a normative means of expressing his otherwise inexpressible devotion (as with Rāmānuja), or out of consideration for the masses (Thomas Aquinas and Vivekananda). Heaven as reward becomes less remote and God (or the state of permanent union with Him) becomes all-in-all, whether completely and without hindrance, or with moments of *viṣleṣa*, the higher longing when there is the “sweet pain” of separation whereby Love becomes more intensified. In any case, a certain sort of boldening concerning the Divine becomes prominent: whether interpreted as identity, equality or sameness or difference,—and the same variants are found universally—the beatified soul “does not return”; he achieves a *God-like* condition; he becomes *more effectively* immortal than the ordinary person.

Here again, Marquette does not do so well in comparing the Carmalites to Buddhist or Māyāvāda Vedānta, for these are not bhaktas as the Carmalites supremely are. They might better be compared to the Vallabhas or the Chaitanyas, the latter in particular because of the common interest in infine discernment of psychological conditions and the ‘border-line’ intensity of devotion that does not flinch at pathology. Again, the jīvanmukti idea is hardly that of St. Augustine, as Marquette intimates, for of all the saints in the world, St. Augustine least of all lost his *sense of imperfection* right to the end; while on the other hand there were some extremist sects all through the history of medieval and reformation Europe that far outdid any cult in India in their assertions of exemption from all obligations. Rufus Jones, of course, treats them as precursors of Quakerism, which even today, to the horror of the more ‘tradi-
tionalistic’ denominations, holds to the doctrine of perfection in a very bold form, although most Quakers in practice strike a happy balance between the jīvanmukti’s state of exemption and the niṣkāma karma ideal—a combination all too rare in practice in India, extolled in speeches though it may be. And here again, Marquette is not quite accurate. However, the variants in western tradition need not concern us, except as we see them operative in the development of St. Bonaventura’s thought, and we have already taken sufficient note of the extremists among the Franciscans (the Joachimites) with whom he had to make reconciliation. We are now rather ready to treat of the ‘structural’ aspect of the business of beatification in Rāmānuja and Bonaventura, and shall leave the ‘mystical’ (e.g., in the sense of the word which is opposable to formality) to the last section.
MOKṢA

SECTION II

B

MOKṢA AS RESTORATION

First then, we turn to the counterpart of what has been reiterated, as we have seen, by Marcel in our own day: The concept of man as homo viator. To Bonaventura one of the favourite ways of distinguishing almost everything involved in the problem of perfection and imperfection—or of grace and glory—is the characteristic distinction of being in the way, in via, from being in pīṭras, in the Fatherland; by which, of course, he means Heaven; and in India generally the whole concept of samsāra is quite closely parallel to this: the valle laorimarum of European heritage carries the same semantic weight, not only in designating the nature of the world as such, but as indicating that the way out of it is a way of return, as is evidenced, for example, in the story in the fourth Sūtra of the Śrī Bhāṣya of the prodigal prince who does not know his true identity until he is recognized by others. The attainment of Brahman, or the entrance into Vaikuṇṭha, is of the nature of a rencontre, a reunion, a regaining of what had been lost by the ‘fall’ into avidyā and māya. Karma and avidyā are somehow ‘beginningless’, but they never completely mar the inherent nature of the soul, whose cyclic journey through the world(s) has no other purpose—at least for the Vaiṣṇava—than to quicken the eventual return and restoration of this inherent nature.

Indeed, the myth of Pradyumna, as found in the Bhāgavatam Purāṇa, more vividly perhaps than any single Biblical story, symbolizes this conception of life as exile, and of salvation as the restoration to the rightful inheritance. That the concept of māya is also involved in this story is indeed significant, for it gives a good basis of its interpretation not in the adhyāsa sense as Advaita teaches, but as a sort of alienation from plenitude which comes about as a līlā of the Lord, quite comparable to the western medieval view of the world (Parzival, for example, the “brave man slowly wise”, as H.O. Taylor epithetizes the legend) as ‘vanity’ meaningless in itself
and unprofitable except as the proving-ground of merit and the dialectical digression whereby the soul learns of higher things through its erring. The symbolism in the Pradyumna story, for the rest, speaks for itself.

Pradyumna is the son of Kṛṣṇa by Rukmini, and is considered as incarnation of Kāmadeva, the god of love (and Pradyumna is also one of the four Vyuhas, by the way) who is always bent on getting the better hand in contest with Śiva, for it is Love that assists in creating, whereas Śiva in his ascetic aspect is the deity of destruction. But Pradyumna is kidnapped in infancy by a demon, thrown into the ocean, where a fish swallows him. This fish is caught and delivered to the kitchen of Māyāvatī, who is bewailing the absence of her husband, who Pradyumna later turns out to be, Nārada in his typical role revealing Pradyumna’s identity to her at the appropriate time. She not only rears him with care as her child, but as he reaches adulthood, she challenges him to battle with a demon, an asura, Śamvara, whom he beats after a fierce struggle in which magic and psychical forces play greater role than physical prowess. But after the battle, after the victory, she considers him no longer as merely her son, but as her rightful husband; and together they go to the court of Kṛṣṇa—the return to the Fatherland!—where he is recognized by his striking likeness to Kṛṣṇa; and they are welcomed not only by his mother Rukmini but by the whole seraglio and court, with great eclat.

Correspondingly, as we may see from the following citation from Gilson, the whole philosophy of Bonaventura will be misread if this doctrine of the Return is not kept at the centre:

...The whole of the philosophy is entirely at bottom nothing but the unlimitedly ramified development of a single problem: What is the sense of Human life? Whence do we come, where do we go, and by what ways? And all the responses of philosophy to this central problem are only variations on a single response: “Lord, I come from Thee, and it is by Thee that I return to Thee.”

This return, moreover, is hierarchical; and although grace may speed the re-ascent from the ‘Fall’, still it can scarcely be done all at once. But the re-ascent is also a veritable recreation—a term which Gilson remarks is familiar to Bonaventura
from Hugo of St. Victor, and indicates a strong sense, an almost literal meaning e.g., such a re-creation that we may well read into it the counterpart of the involution/evolution doctrine of the Vedānta. This hierarchical re-ascent in grace is taken basically in three degrees: purification, illumination, perfection; by which \( \text{the end of restoration of human souls by grace is to cause to reappear in them the image of God effaced by sin... to render the soul } deiform... \text{to find again the steps that lead to God.} \) These steps in turn, of course, are analogized to the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love.

But as with Pradyumna, the return to the Fatherland coincides with the restoration of the soul's own true nature. For as we have already seen, self-knowledge and knowledge of God (as also self-love and love of God !) are inseparable. As Gilson further explains,

We must proceed by extirpating vices and replacing them with virtues; but the vices which it is our business to uproot appertain... to the order of thought and are all bound up to the same fundamental infinity, the loss of mastery of self. It seems that a sort of dispersion and as if a scattering of our thought makes for our desires, our imaginations, and our intellectual occupations continually escaping us. The immediate result of this re-lapsing is that our thought is not the mistress of itself, but finds itself perpetually expelled from its own proper home...

But once restored to the mastery of our thought, we are indeed restored to ourselves, in the strict sense of the expression. Just there we come to remain at our own door, and it is there for the first time that we come to face it; it is there for the first time that we come to have the power to recover the image of God (which has been) tarnished by sin.

To this we may immediately compare what P.N. Śrīnīvāsa-cārya says of Rāmānuja: 28

Self-realization is not the attainment or emergence of something new, but the self-manifestation due to the avidyā-karma and the sāṁsāric process resulting therefrom. In mukti the ātman is free from sin, old age, death, greed, hunger and thirst, and his desires are at once realized... Though ātman is avikāra or changeless and nītya or eternal, the limitations and obstructions of its attributive intelligence affect its integrity indirectly, and it is only in the state of self-realization that the self shines in its own effulgence like the cloudless sun.
The essential thing, as with Marcel, in our medieval systems is not arguments for "survival", but the inalienable and unavoidable consideration that man cannot but think of himself as capable of beatitude, and that this ideal is only partially realized in this present world, life in which, it follows, must be only a preparation for the ultimate goal. Thus in discussing immortality, St. Bonaventura argues as follows: 29

In the first place it must be argued (supponendum) as true and certain that the rational soul is made for participation in the highest beatitude. And this is certain from the clamour of every natural appetite so that no one would doubt this unless his reason were completely undermined. For it is most certain that we all wish to be blessed. If therefore to be blessed is not possible for anyone who would dismiss the good which he already has (for even having it he still fears and ever grieves and exists miserably) it is necessary that as the soul is made capable of beatitude, it is by nature immortal.

Such is the consideration as concerns the final cause, and from the standpoint of the formal cause, he continues thus:

Insofar as the soul is capable of participation in beatitude, which consists in the highest good alone, it is made capable of God, and thus in His image and similitude. And if the image of God, expressly it must be assimilated to Him; but this could not be if death terminally closed everything.

But both by nature and by grace,—not by nature alone—is this beatitude possible: 30

Insofar as what is beatifiable is so by aptitude, so it is in man by nature; for man has by nature—by his very nature—an aptitude for beatitude. But according to...sufficient disposition, through which whoever comes through to beatitude by a sufficient order according to act, this is in a manner not by nature but through grace, through which he is sufficiently disposed toward glory; nor without this should nature itself be sufficient. Thus just as in the proposition that man may be said to be immortal according to the state of innocence (e.g. before the 'Fall') by nature, so also he is immortal by grace, for from nature he has the aptitude, but from grace he has the completion (e.g., the fulfilment) of that aptitude.

These schemes of salvation, and the basic dogmas and symbols that indicate our condition of being on the way towards
beatitude, are all so familiar to us that we seldom see their significance. We are really a part of these symbols, rather than the other way around, as Jung has been forced to conclude from his researches; they are not our own subjective invention, nor do we have the real choice or rejecting or affirming them. They constitute the very bones of our psychic make-up; and it is only at the very abyss of self-knowledge that we can adequately become aware of them, although comparative studies may provoke a fresh approach to their external dimensions and their universality. The tree, the serpent, the combat with demons, as well as many geometrical designs, the Cross in its various forms chief among them, are all not only universal in all mythologies and dreams, but hardly make sense if not interpreted as relevant to some dialectic of immortality and digression from it. The doctrine of the Fall, the obscuring of the Image, the involvement in the “negative mystery” of disobedience, ignorance and guilt and delusion by the senses and appetites—the loss, in short, of the knowledge of divine origin—these remain indelibly in us, both individually and collectively. Somehow mankind has got into this condition, and we cannot know how until we get out of it. And yet the release, the salvation, the restoration, is not a ‘somehow’. The clarion call of the Buddha, that there is a way to end suffering has its counterpart in every religion, and is the tap-root of every serious philosophy proposed by man: Even the dead-end frustration of a Kafka or a Sartre reaches some termination, and still seeks for a solution; nihilism may not end in glory, but it cannot go on forever—this is the all-important difference between it and despair which always leaves room for that last hope. For the paradox involved goes much deeper than sheer nihilism will allow: as nihilism considers man as coming from nothing, so the restoration to his original state of nothingness becomes the desired end—and the desire for it makes it more than a nothing after all!

The inevitable conclusion is that man is not fully man, is not truly himself, without some form of Hope: as Marcel has shown in several contexts, even suicide is based on hope!—Hope for salvation of some sort or other, for the ‘End’. And it certainly seems to follow from this that even if not more necessary, it is at
least more fitting, that, rightness, fittingness being an integral component of Existence itself, as we saw in Scheler's thinking, the End should be considered as positive, as a full redemption, a complete restoration, a return to what is radically nothing new, but primordially that from which man has somehow deviated, somehow been alienated.

Again, we are not concerned with this 'somehow', important though it is. The positivism of the Buddha ("Don't argue about the source, nature, etc., of the arrow that caused the wound, but take it out!") , the Biblical "Today is the day of Salvation", the exigence of the Vaiśṇava philosophy of grace, whereby even the 'inevitability' of karma's inexorable law can be superseded by Divine intervention: These we must affirm not so much by rational choice as by a deep movement of the soul, a primordial Need in the Unconscious, a complete spiritual response that is a judgment of Existence even more than a will to live: "I believe" is more equivalent to the Great Yea-saying of Nietzsche than the recitation of a credal formula.....The profundity of Affirmation, the Great Amen.....who can question it?

In this perspective, and not in the haggard theological critics about uniqueness and/or universality of the Redemption of Christ and the Līlās of Kṛṣṇa and the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha and not in entanglement with the after all superficial concern with the mixture of fact and fancy, must we consider the business of salvation. It may or may not be true that Christ can be classified as an Avatāra; and it may or may not be true that the mediating role of the Vaiśṇava avatāras is as stringent as His. But the effect, the Way, as far as Hope is concerned, and the Foundation for that Hope, are these not so urgent, so cogently universal, that even the most perverse bigot, whether dogmatic "believer" or fanatic or determined agnostic, must sooner come to grips with them in their functioning forms, and in the same affirmation, shed off all his sectarianism? Thus, when in brief compass Bonaventura contrasts the 'fallen' condition of 'natural' man with his Restoration by the grace of the Incarnate Word,31 we find him depicting what is certainly philosophically no less true of the Vaiśṇava Vedānta:

Because man, falling into guilt (colpam; also blame, fault, default) turns himself and recedes from his extremely latent
(potissimus) wise and benevolent beginning (principio: also literally, principle), he runs headlong into infirmity, ignorance and malignity, and through this from the spiritual he is made carnal, animal and sensual: and thus he (becomes) inept at imitating divine virtue, and at cognizing spiritual light, at loving the good. Therefore, in order that from this state to that he might be repaired (reparature: renewed, retrieved), it was extremely congruous that the first Beginning (principium) should condescend to him, rendering Himself knowable, lovable, and imitable. ....

Finally, since man could not perfectly come to this reparation unless he recovered (recuperate) his innocence of mind, his friendship with God, and his own excellence, which is less only than that of God’s alone, and since this could not be done except through God in the form of a servant, therefore it was congruous that God should become incarnate... For to recover his excellence man could not, unless the reparator were God himself...Likewise, his friendship with God he could not recover except through the fittingness of a mediator who could join the hands of both, being in part conformed (or in like form with) both and a Friend of both, and thus as similar to God through his Divinity and similar to man through his humanity.—And innocence of the mind also, he could not recover unless the guilt which to dismiss could not suit the divine justice except through an adequately worthy satisfaction: and because the satisfaction could not be made unless he were God, for the whole human race, nor ought, unless he were also man, who had sinned: therefore it was most fitting that the human race should be redeemed through a God-man born of the race of Adam.

In the Sentences (III : xix: I : 4 & II : 2) more systematically we find detailed discussion of the question of redemption from the guilt—karma—and the other results of the ‘fall’ by the reconciliation of Christ. Thus, for example, he says, “Through Christ man is reconciled to God that he might be blessed, and so that from mortal he might be made immortal, form a sinner, just, from a miserable creature, blessed”.

These are the characteristics that are recovered—and that is the important thing for us now, rather than the Anselmian ‘arguments’ for the Incarnation:—Man’s own primordial excellence, innocence, and friendship with God, his immortality and blessedness. At least these are the most basic, although in other contexts we shall find many more, such as a certain omnipotence
of the will, and rulership of the heavens;\textsuperscript{32} the explication of the \textit{mystery} of immortality as such;\textsuperscript{33} and of course the seven Gifts of the Holy spirit (e.g. holy fear, understanding, good counsel, fortitude, knowledge—scientia, \textit{jñāna}—and piety—bhakti).

At any rate, whatever the schematic enumeration, the essential characteristics are quite in accord with the \textit{sālokya}, \textit{sāmipya}, \textit{sārūpya} and \textit{sāyujya} of Indian tradition. And for the present at least, it is important to realize that these are descriptive of a restoration to the primordial condition. This list is not strictly Upaniṣadic, being found rather in the \textit{Viṣṇu Purāṇa} (V: vii: 30); but in substance, and with even greater emphasis on the restoration aspect, we find them discussed in the \textit{Śrī Bhāṣya} (IV:4:1-4 and I: 3: 18) as an interpretation of Chhāndogya Upaniṣad VII: 7: 1-3, which runs as follows:

The Ātman, which is free from karma, free from old age, death, grief, hunger, and thirst, who has unchangeable objects of desire, should be searched out, and meditated upon. He who knows this and meditates on it attains all the worlds and all objects of desire.

And Rāmānuja’s dilution thus : (1:3:18)

He next observed that the highest Light to be reached is the best of \textit{puruṣas}; that the \textit{jīva}, the obscuration of whose nature has come to an end, and who has reached the highest Light, has such enjoyment as he desires in the world of Brahma and that he no longer thinks of the karma-made body that was inseparable from pleasure and pain and such undesirable things; that as a horse is yoked in the state of bondage to a karma-made body; that the eye and other senses are his instruments of perception; forms and the like are the objects perceived; and the \textit{jīva} is a perceiver; that he is therefore other than the body and the senses; and that when he shakes off the body and senses brought about by karma, he has every enjoyment with the help of \textit{jñāna}, his natural attribute. He closed with the remark that the wise men know the \textit{jīva} to be of this nature; and that one, who meditates on the Ātma of this nature, attains all worlds and all enjoyments—i.e., enjoyment of Brahma. Hence he, who was stated to be known as possessing eight qualities (enumerated in the Upaniṣad) beginning with freedom from karma, is a \textit{jīva} alone.
The second portion of the sūtra replies to this objection. These attributes in the condition of bondage are prevented by karma from appearing; when this bondage of karma is broken, and the body is cast aside and the highest Light is reached, they emerge. Here, however, reference is made to a Being, in whom they never at any time ceased to appear. Further, there are other attributes of the ‘small ether’ which a jīva can never possess, even when his nature emerges. These are (1) protecting the worlds like a bund, and (2) the controlling of jīvas and matter.

And in the other place, this is further illustrated by a quotation from Śaunika:

As by washing a precious stone from dirt, its lustre is not made, so the jñāna of the Ātman is not made by the abandonment of karma. By digging a pond, water is not made; only what existed is made to appear; how can a thing appear, that does not exist? Similarly, by the destruction of undesirable elements, jñāna and other qualities appear, but are not made: for they are permanent qualities of the Ātman.

The fact that the role of the Avatāra, of the Mediator, does not figure in this sequence need not disturb us, for aside from the whole matter as taught in the Gītā itself, even in Sūtras I : i : 22 and IV : iv : 20 & 22, Rāmānuja almost goes out of his way to inter it, at least stressing what we shall subsequently examine in detail, that although salvation comes as restoration, it comes not by merit or automatic process, but as a gift from God—even an undeserved gift, according to Pillai Lokācārya. The essential thing here is rather that the likeness to God is primordial and ineradicable; and that nevertheless, because somehow this likeness, this ‘image’ has got blemished and obscured, and even forgotten in the meshes of concupiscence and ignorance, salvation must come as the restoration of this primordial condition. Śrīnivāsācārya puts it this way:

Mukti is the return from the becoming of saṃsāra to the being of Brahman, and is thus a reversal of the empirical process due to the complex of avidyā, kāma, and karma and the infinite regress into causality. The self that belongs to Brahman somehow confounds itself, has an empirical dress and claims to be a mode of acīt, and is thus spatialized by avidyā or ignorance. The confusion of avidyā generates kāma or the desire for sense objects and their
transient pleasures. Avidyā creates kāma and kāma creates avidyā and avidyā-kāma binds the empirical self with the chains of samsāra, and subjects it to the counterclaims of karma and retribution. The free and eternal self is thus confused by Avidyā, tempted by kāma and confined by karma and is caught up in the wheel of time. One part of man is the earth and the other is heaven, and mukti is liberation from worldly and other-worldly limitations and entry into the infinite. Mukti thus implies self-transcendence in the subjective aspect of mastery over karma and in the objective aspect of going beyond the limits of space-time. The mind-body of the empirical self is composed of the twenty-four tattvas or principles of prakṛti including psychic, material and cosmic stuff and freedom from embodiment connotes the withdrawal of the jīva from the psycho-physical sphere of avidyā-kāma-karma and the cosmic sphere of space-time.
MOKṢA
SECTION II
C
CRITIQUE OF THE JIVANMUKTI DOCTRINE

The jīvanmukti concept in its unqualified form is possible only on the basis of māyāvāda: perfection while the body remains being only the removal of māyā, of which all ‘physical’ reality (there really is no truly physical reality for strict advaita) is constituted, it literally “makes no difference” (a phrase all too current in popular parlance even in present-day India) whether the gross body—which is only an “appearance” after all—remains or not. Technically, of course, many subtleties are involved; but it seems to us that the crux of the matter lies in the interpretation of prārabdha karma. In our schematic interpretation, this may be taken as the dividing-line between the obliteration of original sin, which is a matter of salvation in the more limited sense, and the forgiveness of actual sin in sanctification, beatification being the state of videha-mukti purely, wherein there is only pure blessedness in the Heavenly Realm where no gross corporeality remains, and where not only sins of all sorts are not countenanced, but where even faults are unheard of.

The key to the advaitic theory of prārabdha karma lies in a certain ambivalence of the nature of Brahma-vidyā. For although it is taught that this may be gradual or sudden it is really an either/or matter: if gnosis has become a reality, nothing else can remain; and yet, something else does remain—even though the whole of physical reality and all the category of individuation that characterizes it appears to have been eliminated not only from consciousness but from reality itself, for to the advaitin, reality is consciousness as such and nothing more. Māyā and Brahma cannot co-exist, as the advaitins themselves insist, even though in the next breath they will become long-winded enough in their description of the non-existence of māyā, as though a non-existent could be the object of discourse, the characterization of ‘neither existent nor non-existent’ being
simply an a priori impossibility! In any case, he who has Brahma-vidyā, he whose perennial Karma (or original sin) has been removed, is supposed to have attained the end of his sādhanā already, and perfection in full is his forever. Prārabdha karma, therefore, belongs only to a non-entity that somehow remains, and has to do with deeds that somehow never were and never will be real acts; for māyā is removed, not sublated, as SS Suryanarayana Sastri puts it in a certain article. Curiously, to the advaitin, prārabdha karma does not constitute imperfection: venial sin is no sin at all; the results of past action that have to be expended by virtue of their own momentum, evidence obvious enough of remnants of imperfection, are simply not considered as such; and acts of superrogation and detached service become meaningless and of no use; for there can be no evil at all except the unindividuated primal illusion/ignorance which perforce must be removed for one-and-all if removed for one at all, and hence there is no ‘individual’ to whom the good or evil can be done! The advaitin takes certain Upaniṣadic texts all too literally (e.g., Chh. IV:14:3, in which occurs the metaphor of the drop of water which does not cling to the lotus leaf; and Muṇḍ. II:2:9. “His karmas are destroyed, when He is seen as compared with whom all superior beings appear as inferior beings”; and Br. Ar. VI:4:23, “The Ātman that knows the nature of Brahman is not polluted with evil deed”); and his own metaphor of the potter’s wheel (which continues to turn by sheer momentum even after the potter has ceased to turn it) becomes a bit inconsistent, for there “never really was” any potter or wheel or movement of the wheel anyway!

Such in substance is Rāmānuja’s criticism. More in detail, in Śūtra IV:1:13, He points out that with this kind of text one has to reconcile other texts which insist on the inexorability of karma, which is such that “even after the lapse of a thousand million of kalpas”. Such inexorability can be intervened only on a theistic ground. Under IV:1:15, he makes the reconciliation in this manner:

Here a limit is fixed (viz. in Chh. IV:14:2, “There is delay only as long as he is not released from the body; then he is united to sat”) beyond which the reaching of the goal will not be delayed; and this limit is the continuance of the
body, which is brought about by the karma which has begun to yield fruit; and this fruit must be experienced.

The opponent's (e.g., the advaitin) analogy of the potter's wheel does not hold; for nothing prolongs the life of the body other than the pleasure or displeasure of the highest Ātman, brought about by good or evil deeds; and there is no authority for believing that anything else exists that will prolong its life.

This theistic ground, this continuance of the body only at the pleasure of God, cannot be overemphasized, even though from a casual reading it might not appear so significant. Not only is there the background here, which does not appear on the surface, of the parābhakti state in which, although innocence is restored, there are still periods of painful separation from the Lord (vīśleṣa is the term; we shall dilate on this later); but in the context of his whole thought and feeling systematically considered, it is on this theistic ground that all the aspects of dependence on the will of God that a thoroughgoing doctrine of grace is integrally built. God is not a "deus ex machina" brought in to save the system from inconsistency, much less a sort of appurtenance, as Īśvara is in Advaita. God is experienced as grace operating, as cannot be the case for the advaitin, for whom there is simply no explanation of how the endlessness of karma and avidyā can be interpreted, any more than he can explain how there can be two eternities, one true and the other 'false'. Salvation must come from an Other who is above the sādhanā of 'self'-realization: Brahman realizing Himself in the advaitin sense is absurd; but Brahman as "re-entering", in the sense that is taught in the Bṛhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad, the world that he has made for the purpose of playing the loving lilā of "Hide and seek": this is not only more aesthetically appropriate, but more rational after all. For as original sin—saṅcita karma—is wiped out by bhakti and prāpatti in the operation of grace, and the capacity for innocence is restored, so with it comes the balance of justice and mercy, and moral and spiritual responsibility, not only for self but for community—responsibility that is also vocation realized—becomes seriously real. One not only ceases to be a "naughty brat", but, positively, one becomes a custodian, and if one has pretensions to philosophy, then it is that the Socratic "midwifery" becomes
possible: one becomes a god-father. Prārabdha karma entails therefore for Rāmānuja (as he shows in IV:1:16) the consciously responsible performance of the Vedic ceremonies, the free enjoyment of sacraments, as the works of reparation and superrogation, whereby (as we see under IV : 1 : 19) his good merit (pūnya) may be effectively transferred to his fellows in love, and the capacity for correctional wrath [the transfer of the fruits of his past evil (pāpa) to others who deserve no more]—these become the natural course of his saintly state, which is not an evaporation into quiescent irresponsibility, but the tarrying in the real world of the real Deity in order to do His work therein, as long as He wills. The body indeed then becomes a burden, a hindrance if not a veritable prison, so that he becomes full of a certain holy impatience, for he realistically is all the more aware the imperfection still surrounds him on every side. He may deal with it dutifully nevertheless, and with humble detachment—for true detachment is not really possible without this type of impatience—and prayerfulness; and he, as others simply cannot, can work effectively within those limitations which vex him even more than those who do not realize that they are limitations. In this aspect, Mādhava is in good accord with Rāmānuja, and under Sūtra IV:1:17-18 aptly quotes the Mahābhārata: “Even a small act of righteousness performed by the wise becomes great, whereas even a great act of righteousness performed by the ignorant is productive of no good.” Moreover, the significance of this may be missed if it is not at all times remembered that it is bhakti, the full-fledged love of God, that in all situations is both end and means, and that hence very often indeed the deep-seated sentiment arises that mokṣa, technically considered, is not so important as continuance and growth—for there always can be such growth, until the state of glory is reached in permanence—in the state of grace. Because of this, as even Das Gupta reports, although the ordinary rites are to be always observed, the rites of special expiation, or prāyaścitta, may fully be ignored by the true Vaiṣṇava. Indeed, under IV:1:13, Rāmānuja is emphatic enough:

The opponent’s view that meditation (e.g. as bhakti) is not enough is correct. It is enjoined merely to destroy karma;
and when it is destroyed, and the obstruction is removed, the attribute jñāna expands of itself and other fruits come to the meditator in the same way... The meditation is His worship, and removes His displeasure when it has accrued, and obstructs its accrual when it is not.

Thus, with all due regard for the attempt of Hiriyanā and others at exalting the practical value of the advaitin jīvanmukti ideal, we defer to the Viśistādvaita position, in which all that is claimed for the jīvanmukta on the score of spiritual effectiveness, etc. is still preserved, without the theoretical embarrassments. The man who, through grace, has entered the path of sanctification beyond the mere experience of salvation still awaits his beatification, but nevertheless becomes in the full sense, a "servant of the servant of the servants of the Lord" as Nammalwar and Yamunācārya are fond of singing. Saintliness and Perfection remain as distinct as sinfulness and salvation, but there remains no basis for perversion of the high ideal, for the true saint may not literally "do what he pleases" with impunity, as is generally asserted by advaitins. It does "make a difference" what he does, and there are all-too-obvious limitations on what he can do or know while he remains in his finite frame. The opening of the capacity for perfection is not to be confused with perfection itself, for the man who is truly in a state of grace is above all characterized by his profound feeling that he has "only made a Beginning": his participation in the overflowing plenitude of the Lord's Work of Redemption only makes him all the more keenly aware of his utter unworthiness and incapacity. As Marcel puts it—and Rāmānuja would be much pleased by the epigram—there is a community of sinners as well as the Communion of Saints; and they are organically bound to each other. To assert, for instance, that Bonaventura or Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja knew all about atomic fission or could have converted the whole world to their doctrine "if only they had really wanted to" (and yet one still hears such cheap rationalization about certain present-day saints in India!) is as ridiculous as to assert that there are real jīvanmuktas in the Himalayas and/or other inaccessible places who are a thousand years old (and one still hears this sort of thing also!), or to claim, as certain early perfectionist Christian sects did, that Christ never really
suffered crucifixion, but only allowed himself to "appear" to do so, for the sake of the world. Not even avatāras—not so say saints!—transcend history; and whether one affirms a kenosis theology or not, one cannot ignore the fact that for from merely condescending to the world processes, they are the ones above all that make history—and that not in their own right, but in obedience to their Vocation, in dutiful and often enough painful answering to Divine Destiny. Far from neglecting the world in its reality, they are the ones who make it real, bringing order out of chaos, hope out of meaninglessness, dispelling darkness and false idealism by the spotlight brilliance of their inspiration, their bringing of glory down to the limited earth to which they also belong.

In these matters as in others, if an orientation in Christian scholasticism is helpful in approaching the Vedānta, so the Vedānta gives us some fresh clues for re-approaching the metaphysics of Christianity. Behind the necessity of the Incarnation and Passion of Christ lies the distinction of natural immortality and the immortality of the beatified, or the immortality of innocence and the immortality of glory which, on a rough scale, we may compare to the state of grace according to Vaiśnivism while still in the cycle of rebirth, and the full attainment of mokṣa. The one, as Bonaventura puts it, is by aptitude, the other by disposition:

Whence, as man in a certain manner can be said to be beatificable through nature, and in another manner through grace, (we reconcile the two thus)... For man from his nature has an aptitude for beatitude. But according to what amounts to a sufficient disposition, which... is in man not through nature but through grace, through which he is sufficiently disposed towards glory; nor without this can that nature possibly suffice...

Moreover, in the state of innocence, Adam's body was supposed to have been capable of a certain immortality, although it had all too much in common with that of the beasts, and thus was also capable of falling into corruption, of falling into the aptitude of death, and it is only by grace that this negative aptitude is counterbalanced so that the soul can rule and govern it and keep it in subjection. In short, this
constitutes the basis for the difference between the natural immortality of innocence and the state of glory:

Whence as in the state of innocence man could either sin or not sin, so the soul could restrain the body or not, and man could die or not die. But since in the state of glory it is impossible for the body (viz., the body as then glorified and become itself spiritualized) to put any limitation on the soul.

Unfortunately, of course, Adam took the lower course, and Christian redemption, in spite of all the theoretical claims, has always had its actual problems. For man, even men in supposed fullness, through formal baptism, of this redemption, continues in imperfection. Prārabdha Karma remains, and death still follows. In explaining this, Bonaventura is in a much more forward position than Acquinas, who by virtue of his Aristotelian psychology has to make the body more of a participant in the immortality of the soul than the Augustinians. Bonaventura is quite clear, and perhaps on better ground: the flesh still remains a limitation, and the grace of baptism affects the person, but not the flesh.

The reason for this is very forceful, as I believe; and it is that since the corruption, which is the cause of propagation of original sin, in the corruption of nature as consisting primarily in the generative force (vim), which has its root in the flesh. Whence original sin, insofar as it is a vice of nature, it is so in respect to the generative power (virtutem) and the flesh. But the grace of the sacrament is so properly in respect to the person: and indeed it has no ordination to the corruption of nature directly. And hence it is that, when baptismal grace is infused, it deletes original guilt insofar as it was sin of the soul itself; but there nevertheless remains a certain languor in the flesh, which is the original cause in progeny.

In other words, it would have to be asserted that the Christian jivanmukta would have to share his spiritual perfection with a perfection of the flesh also; and this just does not happen. The flesh remains, for Bonaventura as for Rāmānuja, a hindrance, a root of imperfection; and as long as it remains, perfection in the true sense is not obtainable. The redemption of Christ does away with past karma, but that is a purely spiritual matter, conferring grace to the soul alone, which still must use
that grace to deal responsibly with his prārabdha karma, his still-lingering languor of the flesh. Justification is not yet sanctification, much less beatitude, and the purgation of the flesh must precede the fullness of contemplation and the rapturous return into God. There is nothing automatic or necessary about the sacraments; they are rather given in the mercy of God, “according to congruity not out of inevitability”; they are only preparatory helps to grace, like the wings of a bird, not a burden such as a horse must bear.39

The essential thing is that just as bhakti without the sacramental forms may descend into chaotic sentimentality, so the sacraments without bhakti are meaningless. As a duty, they are nothing to anyone; but as a privilege, they remain, even for the most advanced along the Heavenly course, channels of glory as well as of grace. Bonaventura’s full attitude is perhaps better shown in a small tract on Preparation for Mass, from which we may excerpt the following :40

If you wish to be kindled and inflamed to love, consider this sweetest feast (cibationem) and see, ‘how good and sweet is His spirit within us’ (Wisdom 12 : 2) how congruously and usefully our Heavenly Father has provided us with life-giving aliments.—For since the rational creature was made for this that he should be capable and a partaker of the goodness of God, from which participation he ought to live and to come on through to blessed being, (and) without which (participation) he tends toward nothingness and eternal (sempternam) death, unless from participation in divine virtue and grace he grow (vegetetur) as though he were yoked by this vivifying food—which participation I therefore call a feast (comestionem) because just as the animal body is made vigorous by food and is made ruddy, is heated and vivified by it, so the rational soul, through the spirit of Christ, by whom he ought to become fruitful, is nourished by full affection and intellect, and is made vigorous and inflamed and vivified.—And just as the Angels in the Fatherland drink a full draught from the perennial and living fountain of light, till they are satiated by the ‘plenteousness of the House of God’ (Psalm 35 : 9) ; so Eternal Wisdom has provided that the rational souls of men which he has so dearly redeemed and through grace magnified and made similar to the Angels, may feast on that bread by which the Angels are nourished...and that through a certain mode convenient to us little ones; for it
is impossible for us in this mortal body to taste that bread of life in its solid proper form—sc. the form of Divinity....

We may well read into this instruction his 'moderate' attitude toward the extremists of his own day who affirmed the jivanmukti theory: He does not compromise the doctrine of participation in its full possibility; man is made like the Angels. But still the limitations of the mortal body render finite forms necessary. Elsewhere he objects to the extreme in these words:

Because in many things we ignorantly become delinquent, even when we believe we are doing well: as also because of our adherence, because love of temporal things frequently clings to us very much.

Which reminds us of a saying of Nammalwar, who wonders if even in heaven he will be delivered from the five senses.

For although in the radical Augustinian tradition throughout its history the proposition that "once in grace always in grace" has held—e.g. that justification is never lost—nevertheless, to Bonaventura there still remains the deep need of constant renovation. Thus, in discussing the sacrament of Confession, he makes the following judgment:

For actual sin is a deordination or obliquatio (a lapse from the proper order, or a tangential tendency) of certain acts of the soul; and through these the soul is separate from God; and from this occurs a duplex evil; sc., a certain difficulty towards the good...and a proneness to evil; whence all sin is to be termed....as even death, or a certain growing old or infirmity—but in opposition to this, the soul at the advent of grace is vivified, (and this may be general and instantaneous) but it is made healthy more ultimately by the grace of the sacraments and renovated by good exercise and made always more habilitated to good by them. Whence the Apostle says (II Cor. 4:16) that he was renewed everyday—day by day.

Whence it is to be noted that sin in one mode is said to be infirmity or a growing old; and in another mode to be a clinging tendency (sequela). Of the first healing and renovation may be instantaneous; but the second mode, successively, nor will one be completed, arrive at perfect health and newness except in glory, for the reason that in the 'way' there always remains this proneness and difficulty.

And he further adds, in a spirit reminding us of Rāmānuja’s judgment about the ordinary sacrificial rites and the prāyaścitta ceremony:
Thus I say that contrition, insofar as it is an act of the virtuous, is of justification; but that (contrition) which is sacramental, is (more of the order of) cultivation.—For properly the sacraments heal and the virtues rectify.—But as to grace, it is that that vivifies us. And as to all of these, they are renewings.

But at the end of much bulk of material patiently argued according to the tradition of his times (which nevertheless is no more involved than that of Rāmānuja’s dealings with the Mīmāṁsā) at the end he seems to “throw up the book” and come out with his own personal convictions about the business of proceeding towards perfection while still in the flesh. The face and fervent spirit of St. Francis seem to break through the dogmatic formularies, in the same way that sometimes one senses Nammalwar’s inspiration behind Rāmānuja’s formal arguments (Both of them were impatient with mere “logic”, even though they could handle it expertly), when he begins to write as follows:

Whence it is to be believed that in no way whatever by thinking of his sins, but rather in recollecting the passion of Christ in the Eucharist, thinking again, I say, fervently that venial sins, whether all together or in particular, will then be forgiven him through grace thus coming to his aid. And all these, whether sacraments or sacramentals, as the Eucharist…or aspersion with only water, or Episcopal blessing, or even contrition (as such) or the exhibition of mercy or the devout exercise of Sunday prayers, make toward the deletion of venial sins, not through their own nature; but by virtue of grace itself (e.g., gratia gratum faciens) they only help one and make him vigorous in these acts.

If you ask, “In what way do they act?” I reply that in such for the greater part it is humility and devotion, which is an act infused with grace, repugnant itself to venial sin, which diminishes the fervour and devotion of love (caritas) in himself….

…..For no one perfectly makes satisfaction for his fault unless in the interior of his heart he bewails himself even more than he punishes himself externally.

…..For whoever remains steadfast in grace according to his essence, even in venial sin, nevertheless his love excited to fervour consumes his fault, just as a blazing oven is easily put out by just a little water.
In other words, after all is said and done, and all theology with its involved technicalities is exhausted, the only thing that is of importance in the business of salvation and all that follows after as well, is bhakti. Mokṣa can never be the end in itself, and certainly its attainment can never be automatic, much less reduced to a sure technique. Grace, dependence on God in ardent devotion; this is the whole story, short or long, after all. Bhakti never comes to an end.

And here the Vaiṣṇavas and the Franciscans alike have a lot to teach those of us who are too much tied up with our technological civilization, in which, not content with frustrating us by exterioriation and alienation from our warmest and inmost movements of passion and reflection and sincere enjoyment, our social scientists have given us too much "brain washing" (not only in China by the way, but in a more unobservable form in other countries as well!); too much technologizing of the psyche itself, too many "techniques" in all human relations, too much "psychology of adjustment"—as though the all-too-immortal soul of man could also be put right by a simple twist of the screw-driver! Fortunately, a few leaders in the psychoanalytic field have begun to realize this since the end of the last World War: Gardner Murphy, for example, seems to be enlarging his sensitivity to these spiritual values; but there is still much to be desired. It may well be that psychic phenomena—all the sensational tricks, siddhis, can more easily be brought under laboratory investigation and even advanced in proficiency by scientific method; but these can become all the more dangerous if they come into the wrong hands.

But the Spirit is not bound, as the Scripture says. True enough, like the wind, it has its own dynamic, its own norms, but it still cannot easily be obstructed. It still blows quite invisibly, sometimes destructively, sometimes not at all, or for a short season. And much as we marvel at the powerful man-made stratocurisers, we still envy the graceful eagle and the peaceful dove, whose natural element is the free air, and "whose wings are no burden". They still remain our symbols of salvation, of soaring with ease not only high in the open expanse, but deftly through the crags and canyons, and descending safely to the nest of security and love.
Not that science itself is to be decried; rather, as Marcel makes quite clear, along with many others—Jaspers and Berdyaev, for example—it is technology that is the demon. For technology still confuses the primitive with the primordial. Science can rightly deliver us from the former; but man simply cannot exist in his full dimensionality without the latter. And for that matter, there is nothing essentially primordial or primitive about the machine as such. There may be a primitive or an advanced machine. No matter how complicated, it still remains only a tool to answer our temporary needs; it can scarcely meet our primordial exigencies. The pilot of the jet plane may pass the sonic barrier, but he still has the same problems—he is still subject to the same spiritual urgencies—in his inmost heart as the medieval pilgrim on the footpath: both look forward, with fear and/or hope toward the End of the “last trip”. Both are viaatores, both munukṣus: aspirants more or less progressing not only towards the conquest of space and time, but towards deliverance from all the other bondages of the flesh, and their primitive or (relatively) perfect machines make little difference in their spiritual perfection. Imperfection: our primordial condition: perfection, on all sides our primordial goal. Both imperfectly wonder and strive: “How long, O Lord, how long?” They both must cry, for both must die.

And yet perhaps the medieval pilgrim, Indian or European, had some advantage after all. Being less in haste about the conquest of time, he had more time for contemplation and for deep-souled singing, for keeping the balance between his interior and his exterior worlds.

Eternity: science can push the parabola a little further towards it, perhaps: but technology jumps to the conclusion that science can push the parabola into the Other Order, whereas the finite must perforce remain at best symbolical. Infinity, after all, is a matter of intuition, of affection, of perseverance within accepted limitation. Life—human life—alone is the Bridge; and no one may refuse to cross it.
MOKṢA
THE MEDIEVAL CONCEPTS

1. Prapannapārijāta of Vatsyavararasaarya, Brahmavadin (Journal, Madras), Vol. II.
3. L'Absolute selon le Vedanta, p. 330 (italics ours)
7. op. cit., pp. 405-6. The subsequent treatment of the post-Śaṅkara advaita is largely derived from pp. 414 seqq.
15. ibid., pp. 227-8.
16. ibid., p. 517 (italics his)
19. Roma Choudhry has already made the comparison in the suffix to her translation of Nimbārka's Bhāṣya on the Brahma Śūtra (Royal Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1943).
22. X : 25 : 7 ff. (Sanyal's translation)
24. ibid., pp. 151, 155.
25. ibid., p. 144.
27. ibid., p. 358.
28. op. cit., p. 479.
29. II Sent. XIX : i : 1.
30. II Sent. XIX : iii : 1.
32. Preface to II Sent.
33. Preface to III Sent.
34. op. cit., pp. 461-2.
36. op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 204.
37. Bonaventura discusses this in II Sent. XIX, iii : 1 & 2 and the following.
38. II Sent. XXXII : i : 2 (italics ours)
40. ed. cit., p. 239.
41. IV Sent. xvi Dubium 3.
42. IV Sent. xvii, ii, Dubium 4.
43. Ibid.
44. IV Sent. XXI : i : 2.
MOKṢA
SECTION III
THE GIFT OF HEAVEN
A. CRITIQUE OF THE KRAMA-MUKTI THEORY

Full of foibles and pitfalls though our Pilgrimage must be while the flesh remains, it is as we pass bond the visible world that the most vexing questions confront us. What then? Heaven? Purgatory? Hell?...in what sense?

The answers, of course, begin to multiply confusingly, even within the traditional frames, without the complications of modern doubts. But as ever, it is impossible to begin to answer these ‘modern’ doubts without surveying the controversies of the past. Most of them are well-known, as also the older possible attitudes and doubts that provoked them. But modern or ancient, doubts and affirmations alike must be speculative, and/or based on analogies and constructions derived from other systematic considerations, unless one can still accept the doctrine of Revelation quite literally, and even then the revelations being discrepant, one has to exercise philosophical judgment upon them.

And here, in our comparative study, the differences admittedly begin to take the foreground. If in discussing the matter of perfection within the fleshy condition we may have stretched the likeness of the saṅcita karma to the doctrine of original sin, and the prārabdha to the remaining proclivity toward venial sin (kriyamāṇa karma remaining the particularization of both), we may have ignored too much the points that the karma concept in general covers both merit and demerit, punya and pāpa, whereas the Christian concept, at least on the surface, does not emphasize the merit aspect so much. However, even here it must be remembered that the ‘natural’ immortality—the ‘immortality of innocence’ as Bonaventura terms it—is equally inherited from the Unconscious Past along with the ‘guilt of Adam’; and even more, we may remind ourselves that the doctrine of merit in the corporate nature of the soul’s inheritance of the Redemption of Christ and of the merit of the Saints is such
that fruition is not limited to individual lives, but is ‘inherited’ by the body of the faithful both severally and individually. The problem, therefore, remains that of individuation; what is patently common is that there is a radically primordial relation between Past and Present in the full range of the valuational scale: Historical continuity is only a surface of a spiritual—nay, of mystical—continuum. Just as Hinduism has its doctrine of metempsychosis and its corollary of the kārmic influence of past lives, so Christianity has never quite escaped the Jewish concept that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children for many generations. Shakespeare’s “A plague on both your houses” remains meaningful for both.

More in detail, as we look at the mythological and poetical pictures of the journey of the soul after death, we find still further parallels which must indicate something profoundly universal in the human psyche. For example, if the Brahma-loka is a sort of middle-house between the finite world of us saṁsāris and the final Vaikuṇṭha in the Nitya Vībhūti, Brahmā himself being, in the Hindu Trinity, the Mediator or Demiurge, the Word, the Šabda Principle symbolized by his creating by uttering ascetic sounds, so it is that in Christian tradition not only does the Christ as the Word have the role of demiurge in creating, but has also the role of harbouring those who “sleep in Christ”, those who “rest in the Bosom of Abraham” while they await the Final judgment only after which they are supposed to enter into the Empyrean with their resurrection bodies. The Doctrine of Purgatory—nay the very map of it, with its fires, its rivers, its tree of Life—is duplicated with considerable detail in the Hindu doctrine of the Path of the Fathers and the Path of the Gods, the arcīrādi mārga. Dante’s meeting first with his ancestors and subsequently coming to the Angelic Realm of Light only needs a few verbal replacements in order to make him appear as a veritable Hindu!

But more than that: In the controversy about the Krama-mukti theory, we have somewhat of a parallel with the Catholic-Protestant controversy about the importance of Purgatory. For roughly, the advaitin is more ‘Catholic’; only the jivanmuktas have no period of ‘waiting’, and all others come to the Final consummation only as incorporated in Brahmā as Ṣīvara;
whereas the Vaiśṇavas tend to discount this graduation of emancipation.

Of course, there is a terminological difficulty at the outset, which nevertheless must not detain us. For example, for Bhāskara, the terms Sadyomukti and jīvanmukti are almost synonymous, whereas for others videha-mukti and karma-mukti are almost interchangeable. But what is essential is that in Viśiṣṭādvaita videha mukti incurs the possibility of prapannas passing directly (e.g., coming to sadyomukti) on to the arcirādi path, without the delay of krama-mukti. For that matter, it must not be forgotten that there is ambiguity enough about the term mukti itself: Some seem to take it as the ultimate state, with its varieties distinguishing the various stages, while others—viśiṣṭādvaita in particular—consider it as only the deliverance, literally, from worldly concerns: salvation, in short, with parābhakti, parajñāna, and paramabhakti still following after, as we shall later see at length.

The advaitin view, against Rāmānuja, is, of course, based on the "two Brahman" theory, and that in an intolerably paradoxical frame: the jīvanmukta, while still in the manifest here-and-now body of flesh and bone, attains to Nirguṇa Brahman; that which has name-and-form attains the nameless-and-formless, whereas the videha-mukta, he who hopes for his eternity after being delivered from his physical frame, attains only Saguṇa Brahman, or Hiranyagarbha, the Mediator, in whose identity he must remain until the last timeless time when He (Brahmā, Iśvara) will also be absorbed into the total non-differentiation! That Śaṅkara has to strain the text of the Sūtras (e.g. IV: 3: 4-15) beyond the breaking-point almost and resort to all sorts of sophisms [arguing, for example, that Brahмā (masculine) and Brahman (neuter) are really the same] need not concern us; nor is this the place to review all the misled dialectics between Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and the Vaiśṇava predecessors of Rāmānuja concerning the Saguṇa-Nirguṇa problem. We simply may take note at this juncture that Rāmānuja is far more loyal to the text of the Sūtras; that Śaṅkara relegates all bhaktas to the Saguṇa achievement only, whereas Rāmānuja takes mokṣaprasāda (grace leading to mokṣa) and bhakti all the way through Brahma's swarga and right into
Vaikuṇṭha (which is considered by all Vaiṣṇavas not only as distinct form, but as higher than swarga), where even the lesser deities are engaged in bhakti eternally; and moreover that here as ever Śaṅkara keeps the sākṣin in central focus, whereas Rāmānuja never forgets the Antaryāmin (Sūtra IV: 2:16, for example); and that Śaṅkara unknowingly is involved in difficulties concerning the liṅga sarīra consequent upon his relegating all embodiment to māyā, not to mention other attributes discussed in IV: 2:12-14, such as its retention of the prāṇas.

Essentially, in other words, Śaṅkara holds the promise of no true immortality, but only a sort of reinculcre into undifferentiated Being, whereas Rāmānuja to a promise of eternal ‘Life’, and that directly and individually according to merit and ardency of devotion to God, the necessary purgation from grossness alone mediating (and that as an action of grace), whereas Śaṅkara, aside from the strange situation of his jīvan-mukta, would keep the being of the erst-wise individual bound for long delay within the primal cosmological hypostasis which Iśvara is to him: Advaita really turns out to be more naturalistic after all, for it can think of no spiritual existent; it posits only Being and Essence, Existence as such being only epiphenomenon, although that epiphenomenon includes even Iśvara and the ‘awaiting’ souls who have achieved identity only with him: everything both ‘spiritual’ and ‘material’ therefore may be considered as natural, the essential—and there is only One Essence for him—rather than the spiritual as such being the antinode to this all-engulfing māyā of nature. Contemporary terminology seems to fit better than the older characterization of realism and idealism: Rāmānuja is not so much a ‘realist’ as a thoroughgoing existentialist, whereas Śaṅkara is an essentialist in the most extreme sense, but with this difference, that his ambivalence at every turn allows one to regard everything either from the ‘lower’ (naturalistic) standpoint or the ‘higher’ (Essential) orientation that cannot be subjected to discourse, much less individuation, in any sense, simply because the Essential does not ‘exist’, it is only an Absolute Vacuum that is paradoxically also the only Value!—and that, in spite of the fact that both Nature (māyā) and Brahman are characterized as anirvacanīya, neither existent nor non-existent!
Thus, the question of krama-mukti is a matter not only of *theodicy*, but of *ontology*, and that emphatically. For the justified who have finished their course faithfully, and who can scarcely expect to remain bound in any sense whatsoever by the limitations of the flesh, their surrender to the Highest being complete, there is no reason to argue that they should be swallowed up by any demiurge in a quasi-infinite existence which is altogether like the *limbo* of the western medieval mind. Rāmānuja may be quite right in teaching that it is there that all who cultivate kaivalya, as the advaitins do, find their end, and no further; but for Śaṅkara himself, it is rather the bhaktas that end in limbo! But it is even more difficult to conceive of the ultra-material as Being only in the sense of being purely *abstraction out of abstraction*, instead of Existence capable of valid individuation and relationality more capable, indeed, than the gross matter with which it may or may not be linked. *Existence is elastic*, capable of transformation and trans-sublimation; the soul, as light, as love, as life, takes on existential forms appropriate to its condition of nearness or distance from God the Pure Existent, the Inexhaustible Giver who confers Being in due measure proportionately to Himself and to the Creation which is His Embodiment in varying degrees of gross sense and glory. *Analogy and hierarchy can never be separated*: there must be a *universal continuity of existence* of which immortality is only an instance, a functional particularization—continuity in a consistent continuum moreover, and not ending in a final somersault of hierarchy into some vacuous Vastness which is not only a negation of negation but also of existence and its capacity of positive merging of experience and experienced.

Theologically, in Christian tradition, the controversy harps back to the Anathasian-Arian combat: the orthodox conclusion remains sound: He who is saved by the Son is saved *equally* by the Father and the Holy Spirit as well; salvation is not of the Father alone. And in the Indian context, there are many more details—as many at least as those emerging out of Christian history—which cannot concern us, such as the corollary of the sarvamukti doctrine (that if one is saved all are saved) which Radhakrishnan has curiously attempted to link with the modern ‘social gospel’. These points have been discussed in a
symposium of the Indian Philosophical Congress at Mysore in 1932. We can only register our agreement with Śrīnivāsiengar in that discussion,¹ that there is little basis indeed in Śaṅkara himself for Radhakrishnan’s arguments, and that there is a very confusing duplicity inherent in all advaita, whereby it seems difficult to conceive what mokṣa must really be, and not simply what it appears (as everything else only ‘appears’) to be, for the bound soul cannot imagine it, and the jīvanmukta cannot describe it, and hence there is no way of knowing whether the mukta’s identity is really with Ḫśvara or with Nirguṇa Brahman (they are also ‘absolutely’ identical, it must be remembered !)—and if the former, whether this implies that Ḫśvara is also bound by the mukta’s prārabdha karma. This duplicity, as Śrīnivāsiengar also points out, carries with it a confusion of ends and means, so that there is no guarantee that it cannot be understood how saguṇa upāsanā could ever lead to nirguṇa mokṣa, even with the karma-mukti stage mediating; for saṁsāra, with which Ḫśvara is somehow but inevitably linked, is also somehow ananta, unending in the higher sense, for all orthodox advaitins. Śrīnivāsiengar also points out a discrepancy between Śaṅkara and Appaya Dikṣita (the latter often being appealed to as an interpreter of Śaṅkara), who, in order to avoid the difficulty about the relation of the jīvanmukta to Nirguṇa Brahman (e.g., that the still-embodied has attained the Essential condition of the somersault out of ‘existence’), teaches that the jīvanmukta as well as the videha-mukta (who is the krama-mukta here) achieves identity only with Ḫśvara. (A discrepancy which has confounded many interpreters ever since, who, in their advaitic blindness, cannot distinguish the difference between Śaṅkara himself and anyone who claims to be his follower !) Again, discrepancy only breeds further discrepancies: For example, Radhakrishnan claims, contrary to some of the best authorities, that Śaṅkara was not an ekajīva-vādin (one who believes that there is only one soul for all persons and deities, the souls and Being as the Essential being identical); and on the basis of this confusion (Radhakrishnan not being the first to be confused by its complexity) few have clearly seen the discrepancy between the ekajīva theory and the pratibimba theory in relation to karma-mukti: Are the
soul (s ? !) also ‘reflections’ after they all-and-one (or all-or-one !) have achieved mukti or not ? If so, then is Iśvara also a ‘reflection’ ......etc., ad nauseam !

Those familiar with the texts of the various Bhāsyas on the Sūtras may object that we have been (and will continue to do so) reading too much or too little into them. To them, we must simply make it clear that the matter therein is too technically worded for our other readers: and that at any rate, it is our purpose rather to interpret the spirit of the tradition(s) out of which they developed and which has continued to develop out of them, but which still is in great need of reinterpretation in order to be made intelligible to many who are not pandits. For example:

There is the inference from empirical evidence (in Rāmānuja’s treatment of IV : 2 : 11) that it is the warmth of the body that is the life-principle involved in the ‘departure of the prāṇas’ from the gross body at death that “goes out” with the subtle body, for this heat is gathered into one point at the crown of the head or else is centred into the heart at the moment of the “departure”. In rare cases, if one is familiar with hagiography at all, one must not refuse to give credence to the accounts of this heat taking even the form of luminescence. This ethereal luminescent form is the subtle body itself, according to the Vedānta; it is that which takes the breath and the elan vital with it; it is the purely spiritual existent, the Primal Energy capable of retaining individuation, according to Rāmānuja; for although it does become invisible (IV : 2 : 8-10) there is nevertheless no reason to believe that it should be abstracted or abducted out of existence—Existence simply does not cease to exist!—but (he argues), being of the nature of pure existential consciousness and bliss (the saint triumphs over the suffering that is the true death, “departure” and “death” being hence distinguishable) it must continue in its identity in a subtle condition, to do its work in the “Other Dominion”, having come to peace (IV : 2 : 14) and harmony with God, who remains at once its immanent Antaryāmin and its Ultimate goal, its Sustainer as well as its transcendent Governor. The whole picture of the process of the saintly death is thoroughly consistent, both within itself, and as giving a
rational analogical extension of the deepest levels of introspection, of yoga, which already reaches in the same direction (the experience of dhyāna takes one almost literally “out of oneself”) and into the vividness of the fullness of Perfection which one only touches at points of high spiritual excitement. This Perfection being so approachable while still in the flesh, why should there be any further delay-at-a-distance in the belly, so to speak, of a god who is therefore less than real, as being less than Perfect, in the same sense that the soul was bound to limitation in the flesh, who nevertheless ‘somehow’ and ‘some- day’ will digest himself and all that he contains back into the Void from which he ‘somehow’ is supposed to have been educed? It is not just dogma that points to individual immortality but the innermost, the most intense, spiritual experience itself. And if one argues that all of this is more a matter of the imagination than anything else, he may only be reminded of our lengthy discourse in which we have already sought to demonstrate that the imagination also points to Existence, not to Essence-existence in which consciousness and value can never be superseded by any sort of nullity but are balanced and counterbalanced with the other forces and factors that make the universe a vibrantly meaningful matter, and not a mere phantom or phantasy.

It must not be forgotten also that much that Rāmānuja would like to say cannot come out in the language of the Sūtras. Here as always, his sources in the Tamil Prabandhas are not easily acknowledged by those for whom he was writing his Śrī Bhāṣya. We shall be dealing with this material later; at present it is enough to note that even under IV : 3 : 14 he insists that both those whose psychic focus by virtue of their bhakti is on the transcendent form of Deity and also those whose meditation has been focused on the Ātman alone are fitted for the Arcirādi path, but that nevertheless even the latter must remember that as Self they are bodies of the Lord, who is their Inner Ruler. He cannot anywhere or by any means be satisfied with the merely psychic, with the Self as Ātman with “cosmic consciousness”; liberation from materiality is not in itself enough; intense love as the positive attraction to the intensely and intimately Personal God of the Alwars is
always in the end the only true means-and-end of salvation, as of further progress after that.

As we turn to the Christian heritage, we must acknowledge that the greater weight is nevertheless toward something more akin to the krama-mukti theory. Even in Protestant theology, the Last Judgment figures very prominently, perhaps at the cost of some ambiguity about the “place of waiting” for those who are affected thereby. Bonaventura, of course, follows the medieval tradition which still remains, with little alteration, that of western Catholicism. Thus, in answering the now embarrassing question—and one may see that it was hardly less difficult to answer in his own time—whether those in Limbo were immediately released and immediately passed into the Empyrean at the death and descent of Christ into Hades, he gives an emphatic no;² whereas with the Saints it was different: the souls of the Saints were not immediately led into heaven according to place; nevertheless immediately....they saw the eternal light and were beatified and heaven was opened to them as conscious reward.

This typical scholastic distinction between ‘place’ and immediacy will hardly satisfy us now: but it is enough to show that in the medieval period there were comparable controversies even about these things in Europe and India, and that the ‘solutions’ to the problems were arrived at in a remarkably similar manner: It was not a matter of delay or no delay in this case, but the manner of the delay, and the reason for it: none could enter into the Nirguna realm until Christ in whom they had come to mukti, had ‘gone on before them’. Nevertheless, as regards purgatory, he teaches that there is not the same delay for all. Some, according to their merit and measure of grace, are said to finish their course before others and enter the Highest Reward, according to a Right Balance between God’s love and mercy and His justice,³ punishment aiding grace, and not being opposed to it, and glory in the end crowning grace more according to intensity than according to the duration of the purgation.

But, of course, as to the Last Judgment and the Final Resurrection, there is an anomaly inherent in all Christian (and Muslim ?) theology as such which is not found in Hindu
tradition. The souls go on at death, but the bodies, though decomposing in the grave, are supposed to await the Final Event when Christ will appear again and bring all the bodies, then and then only glorified—then and then only transformed into the liṅga śarīra, rather than the liṅga śarīra coming immediately out of the sūkṣma śarīra at the moment of death—and brought out of their graves and then and there the complete and completely renewed persons, body and soul, will begin to adorn the heavenly realm—unless they are to be permanently damned, of course.

Nevertheless, even in handling this dogma, Bonaventura does not lose hold of his philosophy of grace and love. Noting that certain Greek ‘heretics’ did hold the view that the souls along with their bodies would suffer the ‘delay’, he says that they were stupid (stulti), for the delay is only “according to the garment (stola) of the body, not according to grace or place.” And to the objection that St. Paul used to speak of “awaiting the consummation of the creature”, he gives the same opinion: “that the Apostle meant this in regard to the time of grace, which is continued (conservative) up to our own time, in order that we, having been made partakers of grace in abundance, might also be made partakers of glory.” And further replying to an objection in regard to the Final Judgment, he answers:

For just as man is glorified according to the past, thus he is justified in particular, and will bear the judgment accordingly when the soul goes out of the body; but the universal judgment and sentences will be when he is to be glorified totally, and then it will all be consummated in the celestial court... Because of our need to be bourne up immediately, when the soul is ready (apta) for it is taken up (sublimatur), for in vain would it await any longer when it could merit no more. Because of the divine magnificence it is shown that the general and universal resurrection of body is reserved till the end of time. And thus in no wise is our convenience thereby prejudiced, as long as the soul is taken up (assumatur) into glory: nor in any way is the divine glory thereby compromised, as long as in the end...in the resumption of their bodies (there is no delay in regard to the attainment of glory on the part of the souls). Thus there is a sort of krama-mukti for him; but not any means in the advaitic sense, for in another place he puts the
emphasis on the unity of the Mystical body of Christ by which all participants in the General Resurrection come to glory with their bodies as participating in the resurrection of Christ himself, but explicitly contends that this does not entail the inference that all members of that Mystical Body have one soul. The souls remain distinct within this incorporation into the ‘body of bodies’; otherwise all justice as well as mercy would be abrogated, the just and the unjust coming to the same condition within it.

After all, Bonaventura, against his dogmatic background, remains proportionately the same sort of viśiṣṭādvaitic bhakta that Rāmānuja is in the face of his formal heritage. That in his ‘mystical’ writings he, again like Rāmānuja, comes out with more abandon, we shall see later on. But even within this framework, the idea of separation from God in the spiritual sense is intolerable for both. Krama-mukti in its full force is no mukti at all.

However, in the case of Rāmānuja, it must not be thought at all that there is any need of straining the mahāvākyas in order to substantiate his position. For example in the dialogue between Maitreyī and Yājñavalkya in the Brhadāraṇyaka, in Sveta III : 8, and in Chhāndogya VII : 3 : 4 and Mundaka III : 2 : 8, he finds quite adequate support for his view, which concludes as follows (at the end of the sequence of Sūtras I : 4 : 19-22) : “The jīva knows all this, being given jñāna by the highest Ātman…”
MOKṢA

SECTION III

B. THE GIFT AS SUCH

It is not only here that Rāmānuja stresses this aspect of mokṣa. It is one of his basic and most cardinal teachings. Thus, at the close of the 1st Sūtra, in discussing the apūrva or adṛṣṭa concept, he elaborates considerably. Here the opponent is not the advaitin, but the Mīmāṁsikā; and the argument is cast in terms of the Mīmāṁsikā’s technical view that ritual observance operating ex opere operato, so that accumulated (and hence unseen, a-pūrva) merit automatically brings one to his heavenly reward. But Rāmānuja explicitly says, after exhausting many technicalities, “Brahman as the Inner Ruler of Agni and other devotees gives the reward. That yajñas are His worship, and that, pleased with the worship, He gives the fruits….”

Our italics would perhaps seem out of place, were it not that the whole of the last section (IV: 41 to end) of the Śrī Bhāṣya will be completely misunderstood if this emphasis is not kept in primary focus. To him, mokṣa in all its aspects is a gift, and not a matter of merit. Pillai Lokācārya, in his Śrī Vacana Bhūṣana, even goes to the extent of denying all consideration of merit altogether, and goes to the extent of saying that God loves the sinner even more than saint—that he therefore loves us all more because of our lack of merit and because of our weaknesses and faults than because of our virtues and good qualities:

Vaikuṇṭhanātha feels strangely dissatisfied although he is surrounded by nityas and muktas. Just as a father does not feel completely happy in the midst of many sons who are always with him but longs for the return of the one who is in exile, so also the Divine Father longs passionately for the return of sinning baddhas. We may deny Him; we may spurn Him away from us; we may cause Him untold pains; yet He preserves us with infinite love. He is not to be turned
away by the most heinous sins we commit. He is jealously guarding over us and if in the midst of our wicked life we perchance do some kind of deed pleasing to Him, He gives us full credit for it. His love does not demand any return. And soon after this he explicitly applies the same teaching to the matter of salvation:

Just as the soul's passivity does not make the soul the cause of its own salvation, so also God's passivity does not make God the cause of the soul's loss of salvation. Both of these passivities are in keeping with the respective nature: God's absolute independence in framing His own laws for the universe; and the soul's absolute dependence on God and allegiance to God's laws.

For authority, he cites Nammalwar's Tiruvoimoli X:8:3; although perhaps X:8:5 is even more patent:

It was His will to give me Heaven, He promised it to me, He entered into this my body of flesh and today He himself annihilated all the hindering vice and virtue....

Still further down Lokācārya writes:

Conclude we therefore that God takes unknown virtues alone as His appeasing offering, and showers grace unknown: even those (unknown virtues, quite as such as the known) the souls reach by frames and organs He gives first....souls pondering this, feel they have naught to do themselves, that they may have salvation true.

But Rāmānuja himself, although perhaps less given to such flights of exaggeration, demonstrates the same spirit whenever he has the opportunity. We have already seen the horror that he (and both the Tengalais and the Vadagalais with him) have of kevala jñāna; and perforce, kevala mokṣa comes under the same criticism: Over and over again, the positive aspect of mokṣa is stressed by him perhaps more than any other Ācārya. But this would be meaningless unless this positive aspect were not of the nature of the Gift, and not merely reward. In Sūtra IV:4:1, this is quite openly affirmed. What mumukṣu would have the capacity, he argues, of getting into Vaikuṇṭha unaided, with all his burden of past karma and corrupted nature? Even the restoration of his own form, as we have already seen, is a gift: it does not come of its own accord. The same argument applies
also in his refutation of the analogy so fondly used by advaitins, that mokṣa is like suṣūpti, deep dreamless sleep (IV: 2:3 & 15). The mukta is released in the sense of a Great Awakening: nothing of the stoical ‘eternal slumber of peace’ for him; for spiritual peace is a supremely overflowingly conscious state. It is a matter of empathy, not apathy.

Likewise, in the attainment of perfect freedom of will (IV: 4:9), the reservation that this perfection of freedom is subject only to the Highest almost necessarily carries with it the corollary that this restoration is also given: the perfection consists of the removal by the Lord of frustrations (virodhī parikāra), rather than the super-vehemence of Nietzschean Will to Power, or even the high inflation of Aurobindo’s aspirations: here there is nothing of ‘ascent’ or ‘descent’, but simply the virtue of humility (naicya) restored to its proper position by the in-flowing of grace. The freedom to serve: that is the simplest and the highest also; kaiṅkaryā, as all Śri Vaiṣṇavas constantly reiterate, is not only the cardinal virtue (ātma guṇa) in heaven as well as on earth, but is the ultimate privilege which is completely realized only in mokṣa. Indeed, in the subcommentary on IV: 4:19, we find a key term, pariśyāntabhāvānubhāvabhāga: the mukta’s plenitude of enjoyment of the Lord and the sharing of His qualities to such an extent of fullness that what were formerly limitations (pratibandha) become rather congenial helps (anukūla). The līlā vibhūti is experienced from the perspective of the nitya vibhūti: the mukta enters—or rather, is ushered—into the Divine Fullness that is perfect Openness. This in turn is based on the all-important doctrine that God has a hunger for souls which reciprocates—or even over-compensates—the souls’ thirst for God. This is the interpretation given by Viśiṣṭādvaita to the term sāyujya, as P.N. Śrīnivāsa Śācārya, for example, has delineated it on the basis of Vedānta Desikā’s Rāṣya-traya Sāra. This entails a definitive metaphysics of value much like that of Gabriel Marcel. Not only is value inseparable from existence—existence in its external order of diversification, but inseparable from spiritual existence. They are not the given, but they are rather the Gift, the Gift from the Highest to those whom He makes His own by virtue of the giving. As Śrīnivāsa Śācārya puts it⁹:
It is only when the soul reaches perfection in mukti that perfect satisfaction arises. The universe as the lilā vibhūti exists not for pleasure but for the moulding of the soul in to a mukta. Čit and acit are eternally real and do not admit of degrees of reality. But values admit of levels or degrees. Values have meaning only in relation to the self and the satisfaction of its desires. In the phenomenal world the values of the evolving self are transient and perishing. The values of spiritual life are more stable and permanent than those of the sensuous life; but it only in mukta that the jīva is perfected and brahmanized. The mukta is no longer affected by the flux of prakṛti or tainted by evil, error or ugliness. The values of truth beauty and goodness then attain their highest degree of perfection. Mukti is not merely freedom from ignorance, but is also the regaining of Paramapada which is the realm of eternal values. It is not true to say that values alone survive in the absolute and not persons. The freed self is not a vanishing illusion, nor does it merge like the dew drop slipping into the shining sea. Its content is no doubt transmuted; but it is not true to say that it contributes to the whole. The only offering that the freed self makes to Brahman is self-gift without selfishness. Every value is trans-valued and perfected. The self gains itself by renouncing its empirical and exclusive nature, acquires the colour, flavour and fragrance of Brahman (Brahmarūpa, Brahmarasa and Brahmagandha) and is immersed in its everlasting and ever fecundative bliss. Freed from shackles of prakṛti and the limitations of time, it lives in spaceless space and timeless time, and it is supra-personal but not impersonal.....Infinite becoming is self-contradictory and purposeless, and becoming really presupposes being and a beginning and an end. In Paramapada the jīva attains its infinite consciousness and regains the eternal values. Eternity is not the prolongation of the present life, nor is it personal survival, but is a state of self-transcendence, in which the self renounces the phenomenal shows that come and go and realizes its noumenal state.

Conclusively, at the very end of the Śrī Bhāṣya, Rāmānuja becomes quite pointed and explicit in his emphasis, and the sub-commentary¹⁰ is not sparing in its punctuation of the emphasis. Quoting the Gītā as support (XIV: 26-7), under which we see in his Gītā Bhāṣya quite clearly that bhakti is to be construed as prapatti—e.g., in terms of Gītā XII : 14—and as identity of means and ends (another doctrine, incidentally, integrally consonant with this doctrine of the Gītī), he writes:
The veda shows that the highest Ātman exists, who is an enemy to all imperfections, and the one seat of all good qualities, who is the cause of the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the world, who stands apart from all, who is all-knowing, who has an unfailing will, who is full of love for those who come to Him, who is full of mercy, who is without an equal or superior, and who is known as the highest Brahman. The same authority states also that He is pleased with the worship of Himself in the form of meditation; that He removes the meditator's avidyā in the form of karmas done in the beginningless past, endless and incapable of being got rid of; that He gives him bliss without limit in the form of enjoyment of Himself; and that He will not make him return. The text is: "Thus passing all his life, he attains the Brahmā-world, and does not return." (Chh. VIII : 15 : 1).

Thibaut's translation here is weak, as also in the previous sūtra, where he passes over the giving, using the word "allow" instead. One wonders if he had consulted the subcommentary, without which much of the Śrī Bhāṣya is unintelligible, Rāmānuja having personally instructed the instructor of its author.

As for the Gītā Bhāṣya on the sūtras which he cites immediately after the above śloka from the Upaniṣad, he writes:

Gītā Bhāṣya (XIV : 26):

A crossing beyond the qualities cannot be achieved merely by investigating the discrimination between Prakṛti and the soul which has been taught in (Gītā XIV : 19) because that can be annulled by the contrary vāsanā which proceeds since a time without beginning. He who serves Me...with unfailing Bhaktiyoga, i.e. (with the Bhaktiyoga) which is endowed with exclusive (Bhakti), he crossing beyond these qualities...is fitted for becoming Brahman (brahmabhāvya), i.e., for being Brahman (brahmabhāvya)......

(and XIV : 27):

......Whereas it has been declared before in the section beginning with "Verily this Divine Māyā of Mine, made up of the qualities, is hard to surmount. Whoever seeks me alone" (Gītā VII : 14), that resorting to the Lord is the only means of crossing beyond the qualities, as well as of attaining the imperishable (soul), lordly power, and the Lord, accompanied by it.......Therefore the means of crossing beyond the qualities is that an exclusive resort to
the Lord, and this (crossing beyond the qualities) leads to becoming Brahman.

This doctrine of the Gift as Bonaventura treats it has been elaborated at considerable length and with consummate scholarship by Fr. Bonnefoi, who points out that the basic question here is not so much whether salvation and all that follows—whether grace and glory—come as a gift or not, but whether in the technical language of his time, they come as created or uncreated good, temporal or intemporal gift; whether, in other words, they proceed only from the operation of the Holy Spirit, which is Itself the Integral Gift that includes all other lesser gifts, God giving Himself to His creatures—or whether the operation of grace at least, if not of glory also, is not in some measure (and in what measure) distinguishable in its more finite particulars from that of the Holy Spirit Itself which is their 'principle'. In its full technicality it is a vexing problem, and one which does not occur so overtly in the Indian systems, although it is certainly there for one who discerns more closely, especially in Vallabha, for example, who resolves it by pluralizing the Antaryāmin itself: God is not self-gift, but self-gifts .......... How can the Infinite Godhead, even in His immanence, become particularized in His operation in the finite world? How being eternally self-given to His creation, can He give Himself also in time, in order to perfect the work of redemption?

For Rāmānuja this is not so much a technical problem as it is simply a matter of experience, to be marvelled at, a cause for adoration, rather than of problem-solving. For him also, the Antaryāmin is both Gift and Given, the possessing Possessor. He is the Self-given in all his four forms or Vyūhas, but more expressly so as Antaryāmin. It may thus readily be seen that at least by implication, his systematic position here as elsewhere is remarkably close to Bonaventura's, who resolves the difficulty by the distinction of the phrase ab aeterno from ex tempore: the 'procession' of the Holy Spirit, the beginning of the emanational process, the "first Entering" of the world that comes forth from Him without differentiation and as 'principle' primordially, is eternal; while the 'donation', the "second Entering" in time is by way of particularization as operative grace, in order that the Divine Decrees, the ordering
and governing of its process (so that, in effect, he becomes, as Holy Spirit, both ‘inprincipation’ and dynamization) so that the full cycle of coming-forth and return to glory in the uncreated Source might be perfected. It must also be borne in mind that with both this panentheistic metaphysic is the rationale behind the doctrine of plentitude-generosity-fecundity-spontaneity to which we have made such frequent reference. Fr. Bonnefoi has stressed this no less than we; as he puts it, it is thus that God makes Himself more than a presence to us: He becomes our possession. This possession carries with it (it need not be added) the possession of every other good, and not the possession only, but also the enjoyment of it, them, which amounts to a new perfection.¹¹

In Bonaventura’s own words,¹²

Faith and Scripture both determine that without the gift of grace it is impossible to please God; they determine also that without the uncreated gift, which is the Holy Spirit, man cannot be made acceptable to God nor assimilated to Him in the adoption of the sons of God.... It is of grace to recreate, to reform, to vivify, to illumine, to assimilate, to unite, to stabilize, to render acceptable, to lift up above.... And since God alone suffices for the perfecting of these acts or effects in the rational creature, and since they are fitting to God alone by virtue of His dignity, and are possible to God alone because of their difficulty, therefore (certain authorities say that) to posit a created gift for the perfecting of these effects is superfluous and improper and impossible.

This spiritual influence is rightly called grace, especially since it is given out of pure liberality, no necessity of nature compiling it: it does not arise from the subject nor does it come forth from God of necessity, but of His pure benignity: and also because it makes us ingratiated (gratum facit): for it conforms man and assimilates him to God, and renders him a friend of God and makes God pleasing and acceptable to him; then also because it makes man freely (gratis) to do whatever he does. For the affection (affectus) of man is crooked (recurvus) and mercenary, insofar as he is left to himself; whence if he does anything, he does it with the intention of his own convenience; but when divine grace supervenes, then and there it makes man totally ingratiated so that whether for the utility of his neighbour or for the honour of God he wishes to devote himself totally
and freely (gratis). (And in reply to) that which Didymus says, that the substance of the gifts of God is the Holy Spirit...it is to be understood through the cause and appropriation, for the Holy Spirit is the Gift in which all other gifts are given, and which is the fountain of all gifts; this moreover does not exclude any created gift. For just as if anyone takes a horse by the reigns, this does not exclude taking the horse itself (for by taking a hold of the reigns one takes hold of the horse itself), so when the Holy Spirit is said to be the substance of gifts, it does not exclude the created gift, but rather includes it. For because of no other reason is the Holy Spirit said to be given to us except from God in such a way that he may be held by us...

Here, as in so many other places, it should be evident that we have something very close indeed to Rāmānuja's apryathaksiddhatva, that wherein the adjectival and the substantive have nodes of coalescing conjunction in such a way that a qualified identity of Possessor and possessed operates in a reciprocating manner. And just as there the whole matter of the liberality etc. of God whereby salvation comes “because we are dear to Him” as well as “because He is dear to us”, cannot be understood without the metaphysical structure by which it is rationalized, —so here, it is no matter of sentiment alone: salvation and all that it carries with it is a supremely personal—this, we think, being what Śrīnivāsācārī really means in the above citation by supra-personal matter; for such an order of reciprocating relations—relations of mutual self-giving, whereby sāyujya and the other mutually enjoyed attributes become the binding link—is possible only of Persons, as we have elsewhere repeatedly argued. As Fr. Bonnemoi points out, the cardinal axiom of such a metaphysic is Bonum est diffusivum sui which means both that the diffusion of self is good, and that the good is the diffusion of itself. God as the Super-Person, as the Paramapuruṣa, the Person of Persons, gives salvation not as an external gift, but—there is the secret of the operation of grace—as a Self-giving (in the double sense, of giving Himself, and within that, of giving selfhood to the soul, increasingly and organically), so ingratiating the receiver that the latter is bound to Him not by mere indebtedness, but by an eternal ontological bond of constitutive love, of such love that the bond actually is a communication of a second life (the Sanskrit term dvijatva here being
the equivalent to the Christian doctrine of the "second birth"), as Fr. Bonnesoi puts it, or an 'expression' of the 'habitude' of supernatural existence.

But if this is true of salvation and of grace, how much more of beatitude and of glory! So excellent is Bonaventura's treatment of this topic in many contexts (one of which we have already used in the section on the Concept of Glory) that it is difficult to choose between these; and it is quite arbitrarily that we submit the following, where he is dealing with the natural state of man and original sin.  

Similarly, because of the condition of retribution it is impossible for the free will to merit anything without the help of gratia gratum faciens through which that reward which we thereby merit is eternal beatitude. For eternal beatitude consists in having Him (Christ, whom we have by the operation of the Holy Spirit), who is all and the highest good, and who is exalted above all nature and 'inhabits inaccessible light' (1 Tim. 6:11); and therefore it is impossible that by merit alone many should ascend and arrive at the highest good, unless through some aid which is above nature... And to the objection that 'the works of God are perfect', we reply that there is a perfection according to primary being and also a perfection according to secondary being. But there is another perfection according to secondary being, which is not caused by the perfection according to primary being, but rather is above that, just as there is a perfection in gratuitous or glorified being, which, although it is in us, is not of us, but of God... For God has not made everyone beatified or glorified, but only those 'whom He has predestined to become conformed to the image of His Son' (Rom. 8:29).

For, as with Rāmānuja, (and as necessarily it must be in any system with such emphasis on the unmerited gift) the doctrine of election is a corollary to the doctrine of grace.—and not the other way around! As might be expected, grace and the gift of glory are not dualistically, but rather hierarchically treated by Bonaventura. His scheme of hierarchy here as ever is as artistic as it is systematic, being arranged in three series of seven each: The seven virtues (the four cardinal and the three 'theological' virtues), the latter, faith, hope and love consuming the greatest part of his life-long attention; the same gifts of the Holy Spirit (holy fear, 'piety', knowledge, strength, good
counsel, intelligence and wisdom): and the seven beatitudes as found in the Gospels. That there is a certain overlapping does not concern him; he takes them as they are found in the Scriptures and weaves them into an arabesque in which each seven completes and perfects the previous one; and all are preserved, (or rather, lifted into) complete realization in the state of glory. None at all are possible without grace, except the cardinal virtues, which nevertheless are lifted into a second order of significance by grace; but none, even with grace, are completely realized 'in the way'. That it is an arabesque, and not a simple structure in which one thing simply sits on top of the other, is shown by the way in which he analogizes the three levels to different aspects of faith, hope and love: the first opens the way to perfection, the second mediates as understanding and the third enters as open vision of God. Again, the first seven lead one rightly, the second, expeditely, and the third bears the fruit of bringing one to the ability to suffer patiently, nay, perfectly, and "are rightly called beatitudes, because they are such habitudes as to make one a neighbour (proximum) of God and conformed to His own highest glory and beatitude in which lies the discovery of the highest perfection."

Fr. Bonnefoi has followed this series in much more detail than we can do, noting in particular where our Franciscan philosopher differs from the Dominican Thomas Aquinas, and also pointing out that the correlation between the beatitudes and the gifts is very close—so close that there is a risk of confusion, which continues throughout Scholastic philosophy although in the Breviloquium Bonaventura himself explicitly gives the opinion that the virtues dispose the soul actively, the gifts lead to the opening of the soul to contemplation, and the beatitudes lead to the perfection of both; and he adds that the fruits of the Spirit (love, joy, peace, long-suffering, etc.,—Gal. 5:22) are the delights that follow upon each perfection, the spiritual senses being the mental perceptions that come in contemplating the truth.

And yet, in spite of this near confusion in matters of detail, Bonaventura never loses hold of his central orientation, which
is this: \(^{17}\)

Because of the diversity between the efficient principle and the receiving (suscipiens) subject, (we have to keep in mind) the diverse mode of ordering, because the producing principle is the Holy Spirit Itself, in which is the highest perfection; whereas the receiving subject is the free will (of men) in which is imperfection.

Also in clarifying the relation between being in the way and in the state of glory in respect of these gifts, he is quite explicit: As with the virtues and all other things that participate 'here' in perfection, 'there' the fullness of perfection will be realized.\(^{18}\)

And if you ask, what is the necessity of these habitues, when for perfect beatitude it suffices to see God and love Him and hold Him perfectly, it must be held that the perfection of glory is much more abundant than the perfection of grace. For the perfection of grace by reason of its dignity and eminence attributes to man the performance of all habitues for the integrity of justice (e.g. justification, salvation only) according to the variance of comparison between acts and objects and between status and opportunities which are experienced in the state of the way. Therefore all the more strongly does glory, which renders the soul in every respect deform and abounding in all goods and in no way deficient, bring about the experiencing of perfected habitues in the soul according to every comparison with itself. And because of this virtues and gifts and beatitudes, as concerns all habitues which are in the status of the way and do not hold what is essentially repugnant to the perfection of glory, in glory itself are perfected and consummated.

Finally, in dealing with the Beatitudes as such,\(^{19}\) he resolves the question whether beatitude is a created good by the distinction that, just as the 'possession' of the Holy Spirit, in one sense is, insofar as it satisfies our own primordial desire, satisfaction of such an order that it renders the soul deform and thus effects a sort of inversion of subject and object of desire, so with grace and the gifts that come with it: As 'created', as objects, they give satisfaction; but as 'informing', as infusing with a new nature, they are uncreated, transforming the desirer himself into an uncreated order of existence, terminating all appetites by the superior satiety of fullness, not by extermination of the desire. And even more with perfection: there we see that the appetite for beatitude, which undergirds and permeates all other appetites, is of God and not of ourselves; there we find
the completion of all potentiality, such that what is concerned is not perfection simply considered, but perfection as a glorification, wherein *participation* is replaced by *redundance* (in the sense of *supersaturation*, not of reiteration), especially the redundance of joy—a redundance which is adumbrated in the ‘here-and-now’ by the body’s comparticipation in the soul’s thirst for God and thrilling at the least satisfaction of that thirst, which is completely satisfied in beatitude, for in that state the glorified body, the *liaṃga śārīra*, will have no limiting qualities, nor offer any obstruction to the soul, but rather completely share in the redundant overflow.

Or, in his own words:

The opinion of most authorities is that, just as with grace so with glory: as grace and virtue differ, so beatitude and gift. And as grace has to do with the substance of the soul, and thus is one, but virtue with the potentiality (of the soul) and therefore is plural, so with glory, which has to do with the substance of the soul, and therefore is one; but the gifts with the potentialities and therefore plural. And as natural example is given by the manner in which the human soul perfects the body, which insofar as it vivifies it, has to do with the complex, which is one in the whole body; (but) insofar as it is in the motor-force it has to do with the diverse organs.—But I believe that this is more by appropriation than by intrinsic property and truth. For the body is not in the least disposed to life, regardless of what sort of complex (with the soul) it may have, unless it also has organization; whence neither the influence of life nor the motor-force is from the soul into the body unless naturally there pre-exists the disposition of organization. Similarly I believe that in grace and in glory, the soul is not capable of grace and glory except through the mind. When I believe that glory as much as grace first is in the potentiality.—But to be anything in potentiality is twofold: either according to its disposition and habitude towards the respective actuality, so that thus it is distinguished from potentiality—and thus in the potentiality it is multiplied and in the potentiality according to the law (ratio) of the potentiality. Otherwise, either it is in the potentiality according to its conformity to some other one thing and union with it; and since thus the potentiality is not multiplied into (other) potentialities, but rather is said to be in potentiality according to that which has the same-law (ratio) or substance; and thus with grace and glory, both of
which are a deiformity and a conformity to God. And since by one and the same thing the soul itself is conformed and reformed, therefore grace and glory are one in many potentialities, just as the soul is one in many organs and one health in many members.

....And to the objection that God is the intimus animae (that which is more interior to the soul than itself), we reply that this influence proceeds from the intimate within, but does not proceed as the intimate conserving in the being of nature, but as object consummating in the being of glory; and thus in respect to this life it is more intimate and immediate to potentiality than to essence. Whence it does not follow even through the divine essence is intimate (in this way) that it has any influence (over) the natural condition except as residual potentiality.

The topic, as we intimated in taking it up, is virtually inexhaustible. But perhaps Gilson has epitomised the central point of it as well as we might—the central point that glory as well as grace, and as consummation and perfection of grace, is a Gift, and moreover, as such is the final operation of the Holy Spirit, the Gift that includes all gifts, and leads on into a perfection which is that of the Holy Spirit itself—and thereby becomes our own not only by 'inheritance' but also by 'right', and by virtue of the inalienable entelechy that constitutes our primordial being and becoming. In one sense, the perfection that is thus given is inexpressible; but in another sense, by the same grace which leads us to it acting as Revelation, we can discern it discretely, and therefore explicate it only anticipatively: above discursive thought, it is nevertheless not beyond experience (and this is what Bonaventura refers to in saying that it is of the mind: not buddhi nor manas, but citta, which is the apex affectionis as well as the crowning point of the intellectual function in the modern sense of the word. Glory is the gift of unencumbered bhakti—bhakti not only unhindered, but aroused, intensified in positive supersaturation. Gilson writes thus:

As with all those which have preceded, and much more completely moreover, this ultimate passage is worked in us by grace. Nature can do nothing; method cannot accomplish such a great thing, except to separate us from that which is not God; but positive union with God, it is God alone who can determine this, and everything comes
to pass as if the soul gets itself detached from the body under the powerful impact of the Holy Spirit. More than that, the immediate effect of that impact is to take it far beyond the extreme limit of its intellectual operation. Captivated by its elan, the soul, having successively transcended the exterior world and the sense-faculties which apprehend it, and the interior world and reason which explores that, she (the soul) has arrived at the apex of her thought in fixing herself above the two supreme ideas which she could formulate; the impact of grace detaches her (even) from these ultimate ideas, and, like a vessel which is launched into the open sea, the soul is denuded of the last links by which it was bound, (thenceforth) to float freely on an ocean of substance. But since she cannot go beyond her highest ideas except by renouncing thereby all knowledge, the soul penetrates in the same instant into the night.

By comparison, Rāmānuja could cite either many Upaniṣadic passages (such as Maitri 6 : 24) or Nammalwar’s Tiruvoimoli (X : 10 : 5). The former runs thus:

Now it has been elsewhere said: ‘the body is a bow. The arrow is OM. The mind is its point. Darkness is the mark. Having pierced through the darkness, one goes to what is not enveloped in darkness. Then, having pierced through what is thus enveloped, one sees Him who sparkles like a wheel of fire, of the colour of the sun, mightful, the Brahman that is beyond darkness, that shines in yonder sun, also in the moon, in fire, in lightning. Now assuredly, when one has seen Him, one goes to immortality...

...But when the mind has been dissolved,
And there is the joy whose only witness is the self—
That is the Brahma, the immortal, the pure!
That is the way! That indeed is the world!
(Hume's translation)

The latter, thus:

Thou art to me ambrosia which never cloys. Thou didst drink up my soul, satisfying Thy thirst as a piece of white-hot iron does with water when poured upon it. If Thou rejectest me again and lettest me go astray, whom shall I hold? What shall I do? Alas! Then, what is it that is mine, and what is it that is I?...

For, of course, it must not be supposed that the darkness that Gilson speaks of is only that. It is also expansion, enlargement of consciousness, sweetness and joy in superabundance.
Gilson goes on to develop the all-important difference between *ecstasy* and *rapture* and final *beatitude*, of which these are only foretastes. But the *ocean of substance*—a phrase, by the way, not uncharacteristic of Rāmānuja's mode of expression, viz., in the Preface to the Gītā Bhāṣya—and the completely free-floating thereon are well-chosen figures, well supported by what Bonaventura himself has written in his *Breviloquium*:

\[
\ldots \text{For it is called } gratia gratum faciens \text{ because it makes us who have it grateful (gratum) to God, since not only is it given freely (gratis) from God, but also according to God, and because of God, since through it the work coming from (manana) God is returned into God, in whom the manner of an intelligible circle is constituted the full completion (complementum) of all rational spirits.}
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\[
\ldots \text{For this is itself as a root of meriting antecedes all merit; because of which it is said (By Augustine) that "it goes before the will that it might be enabled to will; and follows after also, lest it will in vain." Whence none can merit it by the merit of co-worthiness; but "this itself causes the increase of merit by God in the way, that the increase might be merited and perfected" in the fatherland glory eternal from God Himself, whose is the grace of infusing, increasing, and perfecting according to the cooperation of our will and according to the predisposition or good pleasure of His eternal predestination.}
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MOKṢA

SECTION III

C. THE LIṆGA ŚARĪRA

We now pass on to the doctrine of the liṅga śarīra (or sūkṣma śarīra), the glorified body which is supposed to be the proper vesture for the soul in its glorified state. Perhaps the chief of all points at which the modern sceptic, and to a great extent, the modern devout man as well, part company with their medieval brothers, this doctrine at first seems an impossible concept, and at best something crude and unnecessary: “If the soul is spiritual in its essential nature, and if in ‘heaven’ it is liberated from all material bonds, why project this ‘body’ idea into a realm where it is not needed anywhere?” he asks. And admittedly, it is a question not easy to answer, not the least because the concept has too often, as with the theosophists and pseudo-scientific cults of ‘psychic research’, got perverted from systematic metaphysical considerations into the field of the grossly esoteric, as so often is the case when metaphysical matters are treated as a cult: instead of being put into a ‘scientific’ framework, they fall into quite the opposite!

And yet, from a purely metaphysical perspective, is not speculation in terms of the ‘purely spiritual’ more gross, more crude, more primitive, after all, than the concept of embodiment carried through systematically to the end? If we are to affirm immortality in any form or sense whatsoever, why are we bound to throw it into a dualistic frame of reference from which immortality, if anything, should give deliverance? In our previous speculations, in regard to the continuum of sound, heat, light, love and life, we have already hit upon sufficient intimations derived from yogic discipline and true aesthetic experience along with other considerations, to project the concept of embodiment into the field of immortality as well. The spiritual is the existential, not the essential, the ultra-concrete, not the superabstract, always capable of extensional,
even elastic, concretion; it is not an 'absolute' disparate from
embodiment at any level of substantialization or of etherial-
ization: This has become axiomatic with us; and we suspect
that even those who speak of the 'purely spiritual' still have
some difficulty in conceiving of it without self-betraying
negations or metaphors. The 'purely spiritual' as Rāmānuja has
so convincingly argued in such detail, can only be *nothing*; and,
short of a paradox more violent than that of the spiritual always
having a 'body' of some sort or other, no one can ever think
of a true 'nothing'.

But we shall not entangle ourselves in these argumentations
from the first. Let us rather give a hearing to our Ācāryas,
first to Gilson's summary of Bonaventura's teaching on this issue,
then Rāmānuja himself, and then Bonaventura. Gilson writes:

The body, inseparable companion of the soul, will be
naturally associated with its glory, but transfigured in order
to be adapted to its new condition. We say, in effect, that
though there exists in the soul a natural desire for the body
even from the moment it is separated from it. But that
desire is not a desire to fall back into it, but that to exalt it
to itself. Never could the soul desire to be reunited to its
body even if glorified, if the body should detract it from
divine contemplation. United already to an intellect clari-
fied by the divine light, it will find itself transmuted by the
clarity of that divine light; in order to adapt itself to a
soul rendered totally spiritual by the love of God, it will
(also) be spiritualized and made subtle; because the beatifi-
ced will have become impossible (e.g., capable of penetrat-
ing and being penetrated) in the definitive possession of its
good, the body will no longer subject him to any action of
either the exterior or even of the interior, and just as, in
the end, the beatified thought will tend towards God with a
movement infinitely prompt, the body which will serve it
will become conformed to its soul in the same way that the
soul itself will become conformed to God.

In a similar way, Lacombe has summarized the doctrine
as found in Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, although (and rightly)
with perhaps a little more emphasis on its integral relation to
the whole of the psycho-physical framework—significantly so,
because in a definite sense the subtle body is more intimately
linked with the other aspects of life than is the glorified
body of the Christian doctrine, the former being the vehicle,
so to speak, of metempsychosis and continuing within the gross
body, whereas the latter is considered as something that is acquired once and for all, but only after the heavenly state is reached, the one considering the subtle as being extricated from the gross, the other considering the subtle as being acquired by means of transformation. Lacombe writes as follows:

The vital order is generally conceived in India—and Râmânuja does not break with the tradition—as a synergy of psychophysical function, psychophysiological and physiological, coordinated and hierarchized. Function supported and served by organs whose totality constitutes the body, or more correctly, of which our individuality is composed: the gross body—the sthūla śārīra—which death will dissolve and which is born of our parents, and the subtle body—the sūkṣma śārīra—immanent in the other in this terrestrial life, but which at death will leave it not to be dissolved itself till the home of definitive salvation (is reached), and which throughout eternity accompanies the soul in its transmigration. Its functions (vyāttī) are the actions and specialized knots of the currents of energy—the prāṇas—which circulate throughout the organism and vivify it. And the same term prāṇa is equally taken in a restrained sense, that of purely biological energy, and equally extends to the sensory-motor and mental dynamics: by virtue of this it should clearly appear that for India there is a marked difference of nature between the physiological and the psychic, not a difference of order.

But if we take the notice of soul in a non-Cartesian signification, that is to say, as being situated at the ontological point of insertion in life to inform it, we must prove that this functional unity, which is an individualized living organism has no quasi need of a soul in order to subsist in existence: in a strictly ontological sense, and if the psychobiological universe had no moral signification, one could almost say that this is a possibility according to the Vedānta, a possibility purely abstract and thus unrealized in fact because without a raison d'être and without ultimate finality,—the possibility of a vital development which could never come to inform any spirit at all...

Here he subjoins a very apt footnote:

As clearly as with Descartes, thought is opposed to the extended; Brahmical philosophy distinguishes cit or ajāda (consciousness) from acit or jāda (non-consciousness, or dead matter). But the highest region of jāda, that is, the zone of sattva, is capable of combining with spirit, and of
reflecting it in a more or less pure manner. And it is this reflection of the spirit in the mirror of sattva which constitutes the psychological domain whose own proper seat is the subtle body.

...And even at that, from the moral angle, all the world of bodies, is only for the retribution of the merit and demerit acquired by and responsible to the spiritual order; and as long as transmigration endures for them, they never cease to be linked each to a subtle body and by this to an infinite series a parte ante of gross bodies. But this bond, of the moral order in its principle, furnishes the finite spirit with the occasion of an ontological and substantial presence in this body which seems nevertheless to have everything necessary to suffice for itself. And it is thus that spirit—cit—is (both) Ātman (the self) of the body and jīva (the soul of the living person).

Then after giving Śaṅkara's position by way of contrast, he continues, noting that Rāmānuja really expands Śaṅkara's view while at the same time refuting it:

...Finite persons are spirits, spiritual substances, dependent without doubt on the Supreme Person, and emanated from His substance, but eternal by reason of their high metaphysical dignity. As long as transmigration endures, they are called jīvas, 'living ones', and one is bound to translate the term as 'soul' in spite of the fact that nevertheless one ordinarily intends by soul a spirit which would be principle of life and of substantiality in a body, for the body is given to a jīva which only is, as it were, substantial and immediately capable of life. But, by the uniting of the moral bond which links it with this body, the spirit becomes immanent in it, with an immanence which makes it both ātman and jīva...In brief, the Ātman appears in the body as a principle of abundance and of everpassingness (the Sanskrit term here being prācurya). This mode of presence to the body, even though it is not produced effectively in the order of transmigration except as a function of moral convenience for such a body and such a spirit, remains nevertheless metaphysical and is not wounded thereby in any of its dignity. We shall see that freed spirits can, in their turn, assume non-dhārmic bodies which, far from enslaving them, are only docile instruments of their action or nature. But that sort of presence is also the condition requisite to a second mode of insertion of the spirit in the body, of an intrinsically moral nature: as jīva, the transmigrating spiritual person is at the same time active and passive: by
reason of his karmas, he therein enters the two substances integral but ontologically independent which compose his provisional individuality—a real relation, which is defined as a "point of view of union of the soul with the body"... He is active, is determined by new acts of merit and demerit, but with the body as instrument, an instrument which imposes on his condition proper to the vision of things and by consequence proper to action upon them: circle of action and passion which enriches spiritual liberty without being able to alienate it altogether.

There is really nothing that we could add to this superb exposition, even though it is given not strictly in our present context, but as explication of a famous passage in the first sūtra of the Śrī Bhāṣya in which Rāmānuja is expounding a certain text from the Viṣṇu Purāṇa. Nevertheless, in the third pāda of the fourth Adhyāya of the Sūtras, Rāmānuja deals in the same fashion with the parting of the ways between those who return to samsāra and those who go on to Vaikuṇṭha, all of what Lacombe has explained being presupposed. There are two points, however, which perhaps need more stress than Lacombe has given, viz., (a) that in all of the eschatological field, and in this matter of the liṅga śarīra no less than the rest, Rāmānuja never loses hold of his fundamental orientation in the Antaryāmin, Who is equally operative in conducting the liṅga śarīra through its course of existence and in disposing the sūkṣma śarīra to the operation of grace in the finite world; (b) and that the aprakṛta śarīra which the soul takes on at the will of the Lord after discarding even the liṅga śarīra is perhaps more important in weight than Lacombe has intimated. For the first, we may see in IV : 3 : 6 the emphasis clearly enough:

This sūtra states one view. This being, the four-faced one abides in a limited place, and to reach him, going along a path is appropriate enough. But the highest Ātman, the final cause, the all-knowing, the inner ruler of all, is omnipresent; and the meditator need not go anywhere to reach Him. For He is ever present with him. (italics ours). What meditation has to do is merely to remove the avidyā or ignorance in regard to the highest Ātman. Hence the carriers carry the meditators only to the four-faced one.

In other words, Brahma-loka is not the end of the journey: Heaven is beyond purgatory, or even the paradise of purgatory,
not to say Limbo, although it is there that the angelic guides take the soul with its linga sarira; but the same Lord who dwells in the akṛtam (uncreated) Vaikuṇṭha that is beyond Brahma-loka also is Antaryāmin by whose operation bhakti is more important than the attainment of mokṣa, not to say more important than the concern with all this esoteric business of subtle and gross and immaterial bodies. “One need not go anywhere to reach Him” for He is accessible to Devotion in every stage of the way as well as at its end. This is further enlarged in IV : 3 : 13, where Rāmānuja, in giving exposition of Chhāndogya VIII : 13 : 1 and 14 : 1, writes:

This shows that the meditator thinks that he would be released from all avidyā, and that he would be identified with the inner ruler of all.... this shows that the world to be reached has not been made. This is the literal meaning of the word akṛtam....; and release from all bondage is expressly stated....

And continuing in the next Sūtra, he comes to the conclusion of the matter by pointing to his philosophy of embodiment as the explanation of the whole series of different bodies in the different states or ‘paths’:

What is stated in this text (Chhānd. V : 10 : 1) is justified on the principle that “as one meditates, so he becomes”. Those that do the five-fires vidyā are said to go on the path; and those who go on the path reach the highest Ātman and never return. Hence, meditation on the jiva as divested of all material vehicles and as forming a body of the highest Ātman (italics ours) must be recognised. As to those who meditate on names and other products of evolution, they are without either of the meditations mentioned in the Chhāndogya text; they cannot proceed on the path or reach Brahman. Their meditation is on something blended with matter, and the principle referred to applies.

For it must be remembered that even sūksma sarira is conceived of as composed of a certain sort of matter, although in subtle form. But in the tradition, this is not so much talked about as the aprākṛta body, which is not blended with matter of any sort but is still nevertheless a body, being composed of pure substance, suddha sattva, the same sort of ‘stuff’ that constitutes Bonaventura’s Empyrean—and, as more a distinctive ‘gift’ of the Lord, as well as being the vehicle of the
soul in its glorified, and not its purgatorial, state, is much more accurately comparable to the 'resurrection body' of the Christian doctrine. Rāmānuja further enlarges on this in IV : 4 : 12-16, of which we submit the first three:

The freed jīva is without a body, and with a body also. (italics ours). On this view both of the texts will be reconciled (e.g., as the Advaitins do not, for they simply deny this heavenly, or empyrean, body altogether): for the reason that he has an unfrustrated will. . . .

In this case, i.e., when he has no body and senses made by himself, it is possible for him to obtain enjoyment with things made by the highest Ātman, though omnipotent, he does not make them. As the bound jīva enjoys pleasure or pain in the dream state with things made for him by the highest Ātman, so the freed jīva utilizes what things are made by Him and obtains enjoyment. . . . Sometimes he makes bodies, senses and other means of enjoyment for himself. In this case he obtains enjoyment with them as the bound jīva in the waking condition does. The highest Ātman makes for Himself fathers like Daśaratha and Vasudeva, acts like a mortal and obtains amusement. Similarly and for the same purpose, He sometimes makes fathers for the freed jīvas. Sometimes they themselves, being omnipotent, make fathers for themselves: who continue to be part of the instruments of amusement of the highest Ātman.

In other words Rāmānuja gives not only moral reasons, as Lacombé has pointed out, for the concept of the ultra-mundane 'bodies', but, in perhaps even greater weight of value, he also gives an argument—and a very strong one—from aesthetics: How can a disembodied being—even if the such were conceivable—enjoy his heavenly state, his freedom and redundant relation with God in His omnipotence and other attributes, if he has no means, no organs, no vehicle of that enjoyment? And the corollary to this is clear enough—indeed, this is rather the corollary to that: embodiment as such is not the evil; but rather the relative grossness of the embodiment corresponds to the grossness of the moral and aesthetic range of experience that the soul has achieved. When the soul, then, can enjoy the Lord only, and nothing else will please it, it is at long last rewarded with a body like the Lord's own: it becomes capable of
incarnation, even, out of pure aesthetic freedom, and not in bondage to Necessity.

Thus, admittedly, if we take the problem purely in its theological context, we become involved in technicalities enough; yet Bonaventura’s aesthetic sense, it might be argued, should carry him to the same conclusions as those of Rāmānuja:

The appearance of Saints in visions should be taken as just such a līlā of incarnational embodiment simply because they wish to enjoy God’s pleasure in helping those who are still struggling in the ‘valle lacrimarum’; and he might see also, were the two to meet, that there is some inconsistency in the doctrine that the soul in its transition between death and final glorification is in a bodiless condition, as well as in the notion that it is their former bodies, transformed though they be, that they take up again for their heavenly existence, rather than the Vaiṣṇava notion that such bodies are optionally assumed as an expression of their perfect freedom. Or, on the other hand, Rāmānuja might rather come to some modification of his view (were they to meet) that the body which the soul had for the sake of enjoyment of bhakti in the lower world—which is after all also the body of the Antaryāmin—is indeed quite worthy of being taken up into the transformed condition. But at any rate, reduced to a purely philosophical perspective, their positions are quite the same: Embodiment is an essential aspect of existence regardless of the form of that existence, gross or ethereal, both for moral reasons, and for the sake of enjoyment, and out of considerations of the metaphysical nature of existence, as rooted in the existential nature of God Himself, who does not despise incarnation, and who as Holy Spirit, infuses all being with the Over-plus of His Self-donation to His world and to spiritual beings in particular.

And it seems to us that it is only in this perspective, and not merely within the framework of the dogmatic system, that Bonaventura’s use of the metaphor of being incorporated (it is not a mere metaphor after all!) into the Resurrection-body of Christ must be taken: the ‘Head’, Christ, has ‘gone before’, but in such a way that the ‘members’, the Faithful, cannot be left behind for not only are they members of Him, but
He is, as it were, incomplete without them. It is true, nevertheless, that the Franciscan tradition put more cultic emphasis on the Passion than the Resurrection, at least by comparison with the Byzantine tradition: but when it comes to the beatified, the systematic considerations point more to the Resurrection. Thus, in IV Sent. XLIII:1:1, he gives a definitely philosophical rationale:

......Divine Justice...... is the consummation of glory, which completes every appetite of the soul or quiets it; and thereby the perfection of nature, which consists in the whole composite not in any single part or other of it.

And to the objection that that which is only an instrument does not merit glorification, his reply is that, as in the case of the angels, instrumentality is not itself an unworthy thing, but only the body as substance of corruption and malice, which, of course, the resurrection state completely rectifies, making it instead the instrumental substance of plenitude of virtue and of perfect permanency.

Likewise, his rationale of the doctrine of the soul’s having, as it were, no body between the time of departure from the earthly life and the ‘time’ of the ‘general resurrection’ is primarily moral. The resurrection of the soul, he says, is according to grace and since the moral responsibility has been that of the soul and not of the body, the soul must be purged according to its individual degree of guilt, before it is ready for the Great Event when the solemnity and majesty the Glory of the Giver (God) will be conferred upon it in the form of regaining its (now glorified) body as its reward. The thought of yet another type of body, of course, never occurred to him or any other Christian philosopher, as something simply unknown. But curiously enough, he also suggests that the unity of the mystical body (which might be equated to Rāmānuja’s sense of those who are the Lord’s Favourites being in a special sense also His Body) makes it more fitting that all should regain their heavenly embodiment together, and that in this unity of the mystical body there is necessarily a unity of souls which nevertheless remain organically individuated in spite of their common incorporation into the Christ.
Bonaventura’s characterization of the glorified body is amazingly specific—perhaps even more so than Rāmānuja’s, although the latter in his minor works does make full use of the elasticity of the Sanskrit language in describing the aprākṛta body with full devotional emotion, for it is not only what he personally hoped to achieve, but, along with Nammalwar, he seems to have had a good measure of the foretaste of the heavenly condition that Gilson mentions. Bonaventura posits the following qualities: ‘Impassibility’, (e.g. incorruptibility); indissolubility; of unmixed nature; indivisibility, and having vital heat (prāṇa ?) of a celestial nature such that food and fatigue do not affect it—the ‘fifth essence’, the quintessence, in short; ‘clarity’, e.g., of the nature of light, and yet having colouration such that individuation and recognizability are preserved, being more of the nature of a coal of fire than of the nature of the sun or a candle flame, and yet being able to penetrate non-glorified bodies without itself being penetrated by them; subtility, e.g., non-porousness, so that, as Gilson points out, it can go obediently wherever the mind may go, being more of the nature of a ‘mathematical’ point or line than the line or point drawn on the slate or paper; being able to touch and handle without being touched and handled; agility, whereby, again, it may be the perfect instrument of the mind, being capable of ‘movement’ in the sense that the mind ‘moves’ from one thought to another; being the instrument of liberty, not of change or mutation of form, whereby it may come to the aid of inferior bodies, “for the glorified body takes the whole of the law (ratio) of its existence and mobility and stability from the soul, and its ‘inclination’ (or, bent, tendency) is toward the soul, and toward nothing outside”. For, finally, “this body is stabilized in every place through the soul, and the soul through God, and thus it needs no other inclination”.

All of these attributes, moreover, are given as gifts, gifts of God, not just as participation, remotely, in His attributes but gifts of the various aspects of His own Glory, for it is these same qualities that compose His glory. For as in the Vedānta, the soul in glory here is thought to share so much with God that even its glorious body must also partake of the same glory by which he communicates His Being to His creation.
In conclusion, we must admit that there is here much that remains difficult to understand, much less to "bring up to date". Nevertheless, there is much in the Hindu Psycho-physiology of death that should not lightly be passed by. We have in various places intimated in passing that the experiences possible in yoga (and it must not be forgotten that medieval Europe also had its form of yoga, as should have become evident long ago from Bonaventura’s expositions of the process of meditation, contemplation, rapture, etc. which he personally experienced) point very definitely toward something very much like, and certainly of the same order, as this after-all organic (or, to coin a term, psycho-organic) condition of existence after death. For that matter, the doctrine of the Foretaste to which Gilson alludes is hardly a "doctrine", but really a matter of experience—experience not limited to the Saints only, but available to all who have become at all sensitized to spiritual matters in some degree or other, usually in the form of the desire for, and the will to Perfection, but in those who are more advanced, increasingly vivid, and linked with the experience of dying to self and the nididhyāsana ‘entrance’ into another Order of existence, from which, nevertheless, unless they do leave the body in the throes of that rapture, they must return to ferial living again. Videha mokṣa, or the beatified death, is a sort of permanent nididhyāsana, "from which there is no return". Gilson is quite right in intimating that the whole philosophy of Bonaventura—Saint Bonaventura—will be quite wrongly construed unless this orientation is kept at centre. The love of death which is one of the end-achievements in successful psycho-therapy is perhaps the nearest modern counterpart, although that does not yet penetrate far enough, for it is not just the love of death as such, but the going far beyond overcoming the fear of death in the positive experience of the precognition of the state of existence in the Unconscious—or whatever term one wishes to use—which probably both precedes birth and continues after consciousness has permanently left the biological organism.

But it seems to us that there is very much indeed to be recovered from the medieval worlds in perfecting the Method—for it is that in the full technical sense of the word: a Way,
and not merely a ‘technique’—of approaching this ultramundane field of consciousness-existence. And since this probably has been brought to a greater precision on the physiological score (though hardly, we believe, on the other scores) in Indian Yoga, which the Vedānta always presupposes as the primary basis of philosophizing, we must make some tentative observations as follows.

First, the nature of the prāṇas. Lacombe has scarcely hinted at what is involved here, although he seems to have a deeper penetration than most Indologists who have been limited only to philology. For the term will continue to puzzle philologists until they become yogis also. Some have suggested, for example, that it is a general term like Bergson’s elan vital, and that is perhaps the nearest European equivalent. But it is still far from being what is actually experienced in yoga practice. And that itself, definitive and effective in all aspects of life though it is, is difficult to describe. The practice begins with the simple conscious control of the breathing operation, but it by no means stops there, for this is only a means—which latter becomes automatic—to the complete conscious control of the circulation of the blood and the heartbeat itself; and this in turn becoming automatic, there is gained the complete control of the consciousness in all its distribution not only in the brain, but throughout the psychoneural system—psychoneural, for something else than mere neuro-physiology comes into play, namely the kunḍalini, which at first seems to be only the sexual energy in conscious process of sublimation, but later is perceived as the root-source of all vital and psychic activity which has an extra-personal and inter-personal range of influence and operation, making possible not only telepathic communication, but miracles, siddhis, as they technically called. As the kunḍalini is brought to higher chakras—psychic centres, which are probably the major ganglia, the heartbeat is not only perceived in them, but seems to get a certain re-enforcement where psychic energy is amplified manifold. The details of the practice would involve many such volumes as Sir John Woodroffe has produced, and we cannot possibly do more than point to the most elemental aspects of it. For it involves, for example, not only control of the breath the prāṇas (for there
are many of them, circulating in different ways through the system) but the use of sounds, such as OM, certain exercises, and the gazing at yantras, or geometrical designs, etc. so that the continuum of sound-heat-light-vital and psychic energy is brought into proficient control. At certain stages, intense heat is experienced which is like fever, and yet distinctly different, and the geometrical figures, or visions of deities which can be reduced to these geometrical patterns are felt and actually seen, culminating in a literal bath of supernal light in which all body-consciousness is transcended. At this stage, the gross body becomes, to all appearances, quite dead, only an intensification of the vital-psychic heat remaining at the crown of the head. When the yogi has become proficient at reaching this stage, he actually gains such control of the whole of the life-process that he has the free choice of leaving the body behind and going into that Other Realm—whatever it may be, and on the basis of this, we have every right to accept the accounts of the Saints as to what it is like, do we not?—or of returning down again into the body, bringing the Gifts of Heaven back with him, for the good of other souls. To say the least, immortality may be defined as the attainment of this free choice over death and 'life'.

The Vedantic interpretation of this experience is that the susūmna, the primary channel through which the prāṇa circulates, does not stop with the individual organism, but goes on to the sun; and that this prāṇa does not strictly belong to the gross body, the sthūla śarīra, but to the liṅga śarīra, the subtle body, which is always latent in the gross, and which the psyche 'inhabits'; and that this is the explanation of the cessation of breath at the time of death: the subtle body takes the prāṇas with it, and goes to Hiranyagarbha, Brahmā, along the 'path of light', the arcirādi mārga.—That is, if he has become a mukta; otherwise, if he is an ordinary 'normal' mortal, he goes along the 'path of the Fathers', e.g., the psycho-sexual 'energy' that composes his personal existence, returns into the Unconscious Residuum, to continue his future births according to the pattern of Mendelian inheritance and gross biological functions by which that Residuum manifests itself... Such, at least, is the way we would 'de-mythologize' the teaching, which thus
turns out to be as 'scientific' as present data will allow, although it certainly presents the challenge to further intensive research!

The term nāḍī is likewise a stickler for philologists. Some translate it as nerve, while others render it as blood-vessel, revealing ignorance both of yoga and of physiology. And the matter will never be settled, perhaps, until some yogis of high proficiency—and alas, they are increasingly rare!—can be put under scientific observation and be checked by electronic devices. Our own tentative notion is that the nāḍīs are neither blood-vessels or nerves or the ordinary sort, but a separate system like the sexual system which remains latent until the utkṛṣṭī stage is reached, the stage, that is, when the kuṇḍalinī reaches the sahasrāra chakra at the crown of the head and the liṅga sarīra becomes activated, even to the extent, if the yogī returns to the gross body, of beginning the transformation of the latter in a way amazingly close to what Bonaventura describes as the Resurrection Body. The Vedānta, it will be remembered, teaches that the attainment of mokṣa is like a second adolescence: it is no metaphor, but something that actually happens to some few who are on the way, past salvation and sanctification, to beatification. It is through this, and only through this explanation, it seems to us, that phenomena like the stigmata of St. Francis and the transfiguration of Christ can be 'scientifically' explained—not to mention other things like the halo, the classification of a certain order of saints in the Byzantine tradition as 'light-carriers', the actual Assumption of the Blessed Virgin, the mode of Elijah's death, and the transmergence of Chaitanya and Andal and other Indian saints into the Mūrtis (images) to which they were devoted. On the lower and more common levels of the same Order, one may point to

(a) the Presence radiating from a great artist or saint;

(b) the light—it is this psychic light from the subtle body—in the eyes of such a person, or even of a lower if he or she is spiritually pure;

(c) the fact that telepathic activity becomes more intense as it gets into the higher 'fields' of consciousness (the tests with cards being done by Rhine and others thus being quite inadequate, for these activities of the subtle body
should not be prostituted to such trivial matters anyway!)

(d) the phenomena of 'consecration' (e.g., of images, the Mass, Ordination of heretic persons);
and many other things that have heretofore been completely discredited without investigation of the right sort. The prāṇas travel along the nāḍīs activating the kundalini, bringing the liṅga śarīra into domination over the sthūla śarīra, making these ultra-mundane things not only possible, but more common than the materialist will admit. Such, at least, is the theory in modern dress. The scholar may "dig it out" of the Sūtras (IV: 2:12-16), finding many details which we have omitted; but the material in them is extremely condensed, and a much larger background is necessary for their understanding, much less for their 'modernization'!

Another datum which interests us in these sūtras is the mention of lightning and the discussion about the relation of these psycho-spiritual Events to the solar and lunar cycles. This is also a challenge to scientific re-investigation. For one can definitely observe the sensitivity of all these functions to static electricity; and it is patent that the major festivals of all religions correspond very closely indeed to the course of the sun and moon. There are also many other practices in Hindu custom which seem to point to a correlation of electronic and sub-electronic (or ultra-electronic?) activity to these matters whose terminus lies in theories of immortality which involve some sort of 'body' that continues after death. One should not lie (perhaps this applies only to the northern hemisphere) with one's feet to the south, for psychic disorders will increase if one does. One should observe the time of rising and setting of the sun, and noon-time for meditation—not as a matter only of 'regularity' in a moral or 'psychological' sense, or even for aesthetic reasons, but simply because at these times, one's psychic sensitivity is at its highest. And so on; there are many others, such as choosing the 'auspicious' time for death (e.g., day-time, when the sun and moon are both on the increase). These are not matters of superstition! Although crouched in mythological setting for most people, a few—all too few! are
beginning to check them scientifically, with amazing success. The whole universe must be psycho-organic; and any theory of immortality or any theory that tries to reject immortality must take this into account. Again, we cannot possibly go into detail; we only issue the challenge, to both the traditionally religious, and to the dogmatically ‘scientific’, to further investigation, experiment of both introspective and ‘objective’ nature, and to re-consideration of the whole range of human affairs that involve the Primordial.

The chief problem that remains, however, is the relation of this psycho-organic realm of reality to the strictly theological: No consideration of the Vedānta, or of any other great metaphysical Tradition is complete without this: and it yet remains doubtful if scientific method of any sort will be able to handle it. The finish of the course is not Hiranyagarbha, who symbolizes the psycho-organic; but with the Paramapuruṣa. The concept of Deity as both immanently related to this and as ‘outside’ it, and the concept of the soul of man as also capable of attaining the same condition of existence: these remain purely spiritual, above the psychic; the akṛtam condition in sūdha sattva has left even the subtle functions behind, although retaining the freedom to deal with them freely and at will. The only difference between man and God here is the power to create and destroy both gross and subtle. Logically (or analogically or homologically) the whole picture is not complete without this Apex; but it can never be a matter of proof in the ordinary sense. But in Faith, as Hope, and by Love, by Bhakti in all of its ramifications, one can, even in the bewildering complexities of modern human existence, arrive at the Foretaste, the Vision, and the Longing, for this Ultimate. All reality, no doubt, involves, to some degree or other, the bodily, the psychical, and the spiritual; but man is not fully Man until he is perfectly prepared for transcendence of the former two. From the first, he must be delivered; he must be saved from bondage to it. As for the second, he must learn to subject it to the third which is higher; he must become sanctified. And only in the third does he come to glory, the ‘turiya’ to beatification, to final and full and unconditioned immortality, the specifically spiritual “condition of no return”.

One of our basic criticisms of Advaita, as it should be quite clear by now, is that there is the risk; at least, of confusion in regard to these last two levels—reciprocal confusion, the theological being degraded down into the psychical, and the highest condition, in the effort to exalt it out of all categorization and/or characterization, falling in its non-differentiation too easily back into the psychical. This however is by no means true of Rāmānuja, and if we have been sparcce in citing the texts in which he makes this correction of Śaṅkara, it is simply because the language is far too cryptic for easy quotation. But in the case of Bonaventura, the passage which we submit now seems to make these levels clear enough, and as well to bring into proper perspective the summary implications of them in their epistemic, aesthetic and ontological, as well as the moral implications. We find in it, moreover, very little indeed to which Rāmānuja would object; and it seems to summarize most of what we have thus far surveyed. In particular, the relation of ‘experience’ in the ordinary acceptance to the Foretaste both as experience in the spiritual sense, and as pointing anticipatively to the trans-experiential aspect of beatification, seems vivid enough.²⁶

It is to be noted that the glorious acts are referable to God not only as to an object, but also as to the created good; for man therein both rejoices and loves his neighbour. But since the substantial reward (praemium) of beatitude is established (consistant) in God, therefore the principal acts of glory are according to these (acts) according to which the soul is turned to God. And according to these acts the gifts are assigned, because according to these the soul is united to God as spouse to husband; and in these she (the soul) is enriched and replenished, and not just invigorated. And therefore they are called gifts as being the riches of the espoused soul.

And these acts some call three, because three are required for the soul’s perfect rejoicing in God, sc. perfect vision (parājanāna, which will concern us in detail later), perfect delight (parābhakti) and perfect fruition (paramabhakti). And fruition they say is not according to any other potency than the rational and desiderative (concupiscible). For the irascible here has no act referable to God, but rather has a different act, sc., to be glorified through the virtues, which remain in her; for both love and fortitude so remain. But
this position doubly seems incompetent: first because there the third gift does not differ from the first and second except according to its law (ratio); and this is stupid to say the least. But the other way seems inconvenient, sc. that the irascible does not have in glory a tendency into God, when in the way, it holds to hope, through which act it does tend toward God.

Therefore the solution must be otherwise, because all forces which have through grace an act which tends toward God, will have perfected acts in glory, all imperfect things being evacuated. Whence, the rational, whose mode is to believe through faith, then will see openly; the concupiscible, whose mode is to love (amare), then will love (diliget) perfectly; the irascible, whose mode is to arouse and to make a beginning through hope, thus will hold fast continually and certainly. Whence according to all three of these acts the gifts are distinguished, sc., vision, delight, and comprehension, whether by intention (tentio) or by fruition or by a propriation: for fruition embraces all these.

And to the objection (which would be that of the advaitin?) that vision is the total reward, and the such-like, the reply must be that these three acts are in every way interconnected and inter-conjoined; whence, he who sees perfectly, perfectly loves and holds fast; and thus is the word of the Saints through connotation, because to be united is attributed to all; but (perhaps) even more it is to be attributed to vision because of this, that in vision is distinguished the status of the fatherland from the status of the way; whereas this is not so of delight and love (dilectio), because they are in both, whereas in the fatherland there is vision, and not in the way, but rather credulity concerning what is not seen....

And to the objection (that praise characteristic of the beatified state cannot be a gift) the reply is that this may be true of vocal praise, and as it is not a principal act it cannot be a gift; but not of mental praise, in which is comprehended the three acts of interior potencies, so that it is therefore not to be distinguished from the others, but is rather to be said to be the total reward (merces).

All things, in other words, lead to the purely spiritual, to glory, and glory is crowned with interiorized praise; jñāna, siddhis, 'cosmic consciousness' and all the psycho organic realm are not enough, though jñāna has its place, as does also karma, the irascible level; but bhakti, arising out of love and interioriz-
ed by the counterbalance of the other disciplines, is the "total
reward": bhakti remains the spiritual way par excellence. Self-
effort, including all scientific effort at reduction to precision,
is not enough: the 'acts' reach beyond themselves, and beyond
ourselves, to the 'fatherland', the realm that cannot be 'investi-
gated' without going there and not returning. But one will not
want to return, for this, even more than the grace to undertake
the Experiment which puts an end to experimenting (!) comes
as the all-satisfying Gift, the Spiritual Gift of Heaven.

It only remains to get a glimpse at the teaching as to the
relation of the soul to God in this heavenly condition. We shall
later give more details of Râmañjuja's delineation of this, which
is one of the most-argued points in present-day as well as
previous Indian philosophies; but for the present, we may only
note that P.N. Śrīnivāsācārī says that:

Brahman is cit without a second, but Brahmānubhava differs
with different muktas...The mukta is free to realize the
infinite in infinite ways, and this freedom is determined by
his own will...The methods and the starting points may
vary with the psychological varieties of mumukṣatva, but the
Vedāntic goal is the same, namely the intuition (better
contuition) of Brahman which is of the nature of unsurpass-
able bliss.

In these matters as elsewhere, it appears that the spirit of
St. Francis is what dominates Bonaventura—the spirit of
spontaneity, the spirit of joyful surrender, the spirit of free
enjoyment leading to unhindered revelling in the inter-subjective
liberality of the Love of God: of Love which is God as Holy
Spirit in all its levels of natural desire, in interiorizing contem-
plation, and of fructifying outburst of "praise and unending
glory", and of rapturous manifestation of the activities of the
unbounded and unbinding Holy Spirit. These things are quali-
fied only by the cautions of prudence and wisdom against the
extremes of erratic and unstable Joachimism. But this free
spirit is not without its philosophical grounding, in which
Bonaventura, as Fr. Bonnefoi points out, comes closer, perhaps,
than any other of the Scholastics (Scotus Erigena being except-
ed, and Bonaventura was, as we have already observed,
considerably influenced by him) to the Byzantine tradition in
his emphasis on the Holy Spirit and all that such emphasis
carries with it. This is significant to us, as bringing him closer
also to the theistic Vedânta. But as a matter of fact, since the
principle of immanence which is symbolized by the Holy
Spirit does not necessarily carry with it the emphasis on
bhakti—and indeed in the Byzantine tradition itself, there is
a strong strain of gnostic tendencies—in this respect Bonaven-
tura is probably closer to the theistic Vedânta than even his
Eastern co-Christians. That he integrates the two, as also Râmâ-
uja does, is a great credit to his genius, as may be seen, for
example in the following citation. In short, it is the realization
of the nature of the Third Person of the Trinity as Love, not
as a sentimental feeling, but as the most basic metaphysical
principle, that affords him this orientation. Thus he writes 28:

It is necessary that another Person in the divine should
proceed through the mode of liberality, and this we call
the Holy Spirit. Moreover, it is necessary that this proceed
through the mode of love; because, if there is posited in the
divine an emanation through the mode of will, it is neces-
sary that among all it be the first and most noble. Moreover
that must be through the mode of love of this sort, as is
evident, if we re-examine the matter, in the soul. For the
affection of love is the first among all affections, and the
root of all others, as Augustine shows in many places....
And this affection is most noble among all, because it most
holds the principle (ratio) of liberality. Whence this is the
Gift, in which all other gifts are given, and in which consists
all the delights (deliciae) of the intellectual substance.
Whence nothing in creation is considered so delightful
(deliciosum) as mutual love; and without love there is
simply no delight at all. Because of this the Philosopher
(Aristotle) says that friendship is either beautiful or not
without beatitude. If therefore emanation is through the
mode of liberality in the divine, it is necessary that it be
first and highest: and thus it is necessary that it be through
the mode of love.

.... And to the objection (that love is only one among the
other affections and habits) the reply should be clear
enough. For love (amor) is the most intimate affection and
the first and most noble, for it is the origin of all others, and
therefore embraces within itself the whole nobility of
emanation through the mode of liberality.
Just as the liberality of Love is the *ratio* of the primordial beginning in emanation, so it is the final consummation of satisfaction—of gratification—in involution. Some may be surprised at our assertion that this also may be found in Bonaventura, since the formality of the doctrine of involution is quite foreign to his tradition. Admittedly, it would be hard to find the full development of it as it is found in the Vedānta; nevertheless, given his background, it is rather remarkable to find him giving the following opinion, even of the angels, that29 “the sending of Wisdom or the Son is for the illumination (illustrandum) of the creature, so the sending of the Holy Spirit is for the sanctification of the creature” as promoting their return into their uncreated Source. And it is this doctrine that gives the key to the final relation of the beatified soul to God. Their union with Him is *in* Him, but in Him as this Principle of Liberality, which renders so apt the term *contuition* which we have previously studied at length. For as this Principle the Holy Spirit is both gift and Giver, Union and Unifier, the secret Source of all beginning, the Principle by which the Word was made flesh, the Reservoir of Grace, and as the bestower of Glory, the Fire of Ardency that gives the rapture of mystical union, and finally the deifying (Bonaventura distinguishes deifying and divinizing) Love that maintains the beatified soul in its perfect restoration of immanence within the Godhead which restoration answers to His immanence in them while they were still only in the state of grace. This restoration carries with it perfect innocence, freedom, and sharing in the Eternal Glory of the Father in Heaven. It is in the Holy Spirit that, as lovers, the saints achieve the unclouded vision and the unending Embrace of their Beloved; in Him they have unblemished Fullness of the Liberality which makes them inseparable from the God who is All in all.

It is indeed unfortunate that Bonaventura did not have access to the text of St. Basil which bears the title, *On the Holy Spirit*. For therein we find definitively and fully his own teaching explicated. From this, in conclusion, we submit the following extract30

Now the relation existing between the Spirit and ourselves is not one of local proximity, for how can the bodily-wise
draw near to the incorporeal?... Hence it is only by being purified from shame, the stain incurred through wickedness, and by returning to our natural beauty, and as it were by cleansing and restoring the King's image, that we can approach the Paraclete. And He, like the Sun, when thy sight is purged, will show Himself the image of the invisible. And in the blessed vision of the image thou shalt see the ineffable beauty of the archetype. Through Him hearts are lifted up, the weak are taken by the hand, those advancing are perfected. He shedding His bright beams upon those who are cleansed from every stain, makes them spiritual by their communion with Himself. And as clear, transparent bodies, if a ray of light fall upon them, become radiant themselves and diffuse their splendour on all around, so souls illumined by the indwelling Spirit are rendered spiritual themselves, and impart their grace to others. Thence come the knowledge of the future, the understanding of mysteries, the comprehension of secrets, the distribution of gifts, the heavenly life, companionship with angels, unending joy, abounding in God, likeness to God, and the utmost of our hearts' desire—the being God.

The similarity here to Rāmānuja's manner of expression, not to say fundamental teaching, is so obvious that it needs no comment. His key term in expressing the relation of the mukta to Brahman is avibhāga. In explaining this term, the Jiyar of the Yatindra Maṭha at Melkote was unreserved in putting the stress on the Antaryāmin—the Holy Spirit—even as we have done above in interpreting Bonaventura. Strictly speaking, the soul never attains union with the Para form of Deity (the 'Father' of the Christian Trinity); but on the other hand, the function of the Antaryāmin is a certain theosis, a qualified deification of the soul, the qualification being supported metaphysically by the incorporation of the principle of multiplicity—the principle of Liberality, rather, for the expression fits Rāmānuja's system quite as aptly as Bonaventura's—within the Godhead. In Vaikuṇṭha the muktas are thought of as quite literally God-like: having all the characteristics of God except His power of original creation, preservation, and destruction of the universe, they are virtually equals with Him, although not identical with Him as Śaṅkara teaches. This God-likeness is both in and through Him, their personal identity being retained, their completion of identification being regained. Chiefly, their ego-centricity is at
long last completely eradicated (and only there, in Vaikuntha), although egohood may be said (though not in the extreme sense that is asserted in Kāśmīra Śaivism by any means) to be expanded to comparcipative perfection of self-freedom and unmolested will, so that kainkarya, the love of one’s neighbour, as Bonaventura also teaches, is brought into perfect concord with the service of Bhagavāna. All external restraints removed, all potentiality—all sense of unfilled “I ought” is completely actualized, not by a negation of negation, but by expansion into the perfection of plenitude (satya kāmatva sankalpatva); and all anticipation fulfilled not by a mere escape from samsāra, but by the generosity of Fruition by and within the Divine Fecundity, so that the reciprocation of God’s Self-giving and of the soul’s gift of itself comes into complete coalescence (abhināsādayata). Śrīnivāsācāri has explained the term avibhāga as follows:31

The ātman has Brahman as its inner self and prakārin and the non-dualistic consciousness of the mukta is revealed in the experience, “I am Brahman” without any division or vibhāga. This means not svārūpa aikya or absolute identity, but viśisṭa aikya in which the self is realized as the aprthak-siddha- viśesana or inseparable mode and not as an adjective housed in the Absolute. The jīva abides forever as an entity and is different from Brahman, but though there is difference in denotation, there is identity in connotation, as every concept connoting the prakāra also connotes the prakārin. This avinābhāva or inseparability abolishes the sense of exclusiveness and externality that belongs to the bodily self of ahaṅkāra or egoism, but it does not annul the ahaṅ or ego consciousness of the ātman. Rapt in love, the mukta enjoys the bliss. Equality is attained when the brahmanized mukta sheds his body, shakes off punyapāpa and acquires the purity of Brahman...... Avibhāga or non-division thus connotes existential difference between Brahman and the mukta and experienced unity due to the joy of sāyujya or intimate communion, and it is not the same as the loss of personality. In the mystic sense, the self-feeling is swallowed in the supra-personal experience of the bliss of Brahman. This brings out the nature of Brahmārasa more than co-existence (sālokya), similarity (sārūpya) and intimacy (sāṁśaya).

The Śrī Bhāṣya text upon which these comments are made is brief enough—far more brief than the material we have used
from Bonaventura's writings—but its weight is certainly no less. It is as follows:

Owing to the destruction of avidyā, the free jīva sees his natural form, in which the Highest Ātman is his inner ruler, and he himself is His body and an inseparable attribute. The freed jīva enjoys Him without separating himself thus— I am Brahman. The texts referred to by the opponent state that while remaining an inseparable attribute of the highest Ātman, the freed jīva's nature is similar to His nature; and that abandoning material vehicles, whether deva or human, he becomes as pure as He is. The text about being together refers to his enjoying Him whose attribute he is, and His qualities. There is therefore no conflict.

That Śaṅkara interprets the same term (avibhāga) as complete identity need not concern us here. As usual, it is only by relegating many important texts to metaphorical unimportance and by overstressing others that he is able to do so; and textual technicalities aside, by this time it is surely unnecessary to review the arguments by which he defends his system, and equally unnecessary to show again how he must neglect the Antaryāmin in his shift of focus to the sākṣi instead, so that bhakti is thereby subordinated to jñāna. On first grasp of it, his system does give a great thrill, and even a plunge into a world unknown to ordinary men. But second reflection always begins to multiply difficulties which are really insurmountable. Basically, one cannot take the highest imaginable concept as the exclusive criterion of reality as a whole. Metaphysical vertigo is not enough: it must be counterbalanced by mature considerations of reason, love and experience at all levels.

And it seems to us that this spirit of maturity is what characterizes Rāmānuja throughout. The essence of what Śaṅkara emphasizes to the point of hyperexaggeration (his is a 'One-point' philosophy) is not compromised by Rāmānuja, although it is put into a more comprehensive perspective. The soul is, in its state of Restoration, divine in a profound sense indeed; all nirodhi (limitation) being removed, its godhead-within becomes unobstructed, and the inwardness no longer has an outward (false or true) with which it may be contrasted; the anubhūti, the Presence of the Highest, is no longer a distant presence, but completely permeates (vyāpti) the whole of its being. But this per-
mation does not necessarily carry with it the complication of loss of personal identity, by which the *mutual sharing* and enjoyment of divine nature on the part of both God and soul would be lost. The love, the bhakti, which is the expression of this sharing, goes on forever. *Abhivyakti*, the fullest possible manifestation of the nature of Brahman, necessarily carries with it an objective individuality to which the manifestation is given, even though it is given by *permeation*, as we say, and not as a simple object is given, nor yet by total absorption. The logic of the prakāra-prakārin relation is as inexorable as it is fertile in its openness to incorporation of all that is inherently, metaphysically dear to the spirit of man.
THE GIFT OF HEAVEN

3. IV Sent. xxi : II : 2 : 3.
5. IV Sent. XLIII : 1 : 4.
6. Paragraph 381-2. The translation, as the selections in the Prapatti section, is that of Pārthasārathi Ayengar, Madras, 1893.
7. ibid., paragraph 398.
10. We have had access to this through the kind assistance of Prof. Yamunācārya of Mysore.
11. op. cit., p. 50.
15. op. cit., pp. 80-81.
18. III Sent. XXIV : 1 : 2 : 3.
20. op. cit., p. 369.
22. op. cit., p. 377 f.
24. IV Sent. XLIII : 1 : 3.
25. IV Sent. XLIX : 2 : 2, passim.
27. op. cit., pp. 499-500.
MOKṢA

SECTION IV

PARĀBHAKTI, PARAJÑĀNA AND

PARAMĀBHAKTI

In our dealings with mokṣa thus far, we have tried to keep the focus primarily on the strictly systematic aspects, and thus have kept to the text of the Brahma Sūtras (viz., the Śrī Bhāṣya) and the commentary on the Sentences. It remains to be seen how this systematic framework is related to bhakti in its higher forms and therein takes on flesh and blossoms forth in full vigour in the minor works of our Ācāryas, e.g., the Gitā Bhāṣya and Gadyatraya of Rāmānuja, the Tiruvoli-moli of Nammalwar and other Alwar literature, and the Itinerarium Mentis in Deum and the In Hexaemeron and other ‘mystical’ works of Bonaventura.

Here, and oddly enough, here alone, do we find, in the Vaiṣṇava tradition, the key terms parābhakti, parajñāna, and paramābhakti; and in the Franciscan context, without, of course, finding the exact equivalents (that would be asking too much!), we shall find parallels enough. As a common key of reference, we shall have more frequent occasion for our own scheme of the levels of salvation, sanctification, and beatification, which roughly, though not perfectly, parallel the Sanskrit terms.

Although there seems to be a considerable divergence of opinion among those with whom we have discussed the matter, the Upaniṣadic pattern of discussing mokṣa does not afford much close accord with this scheme, which has its source rather in the Vaiṣṇava Āgamas and the Tamil Prabandams. For that matter, the Gitā text itself does not afford Rāmānuja as much free play here as it would seem he desires, although as we shall now see, he brings into his bhāṣya as much as the text will possibly allow. Parābhakti fits into several contexts aptly enough, but parajñāna never explicitly and paramābhakti not at all, unless one stretches some interpretation. Whether there-
fore, this sequence is considered as following upon the attainment of mokṣa in the strict acceptance, or whether it is simply parallel with the Upaniṣadic pattern, constitutes a problem for much more technical work than can engage us at present, although first-hand judgment leads us to prefer the former opinion, for the Upaniṣads are basically more concerned with sādhanā and the achievement of its end than with the freedom and fullness of further growth after the end is achieved, whereas our ‘parā’ trilogy seems to be a favourite theme among the Alwars, and (as we have already been able to observe in dealing with the concept of glory) with Rāmānuja himself personally. Of course, there is also the possibility of a chronological explanation. The development historically roughly parallels that of the development of western tradition, where in the Hellenistic—the patristic—period the emphasis seems to be more on the problems of means and ends, than with salvation itself; whereas in the medieval period there seems to be a shift of interest to the themes of what Heaven is like, the fine distinctions of the various degrees of the higher mystical states and speculation about the soul’s unending growth in God—the doctrine or ‘counsel’ of Perseverance being lifted out of its initial orientation in the threat of persecution to the achievement of Vocation and other aspects of these higher reaches into life in God.

Turning first at Rāmānuja’s Gitā Bhāṣya, let us examine in what contexts he is free to refer to parābhakti. Thereby we shall come to get some notion of the basic meaning of the term. We must nevertheless pass over many references to mokṣa as such which contribute nothing essentially new, because for the most part we find little if any divergence between the Upaniṣads and the Gitā here, except, perhaps the usual greater personalistic emphasis, as for example, in VII : 28-30, where Rāmānuja punctuates the emphasis by ordering all three levels of ends (aīsvārya arthi, kaivalya arthi and mokṣa arthi) as hierarchically legitimate reasons for worshipping the emphatically Personal Deity. (Govindācārya translates these terms as “great fortune, enfranchisement from dotage and death, and Myself as their Goal”).

The first possible allusion to parābhakti, although only
implicit, may be found in XI: 53-55, where it is pointed out that, beyond Vedic restoration and penance, exclusive bhakti remains the only true way (albeit the easiest!) to the perfect Vision (parājñāna?) of God in personal form: exclusive in the sense that such a devotee is, according to Rāmānuja, “He to whom I am the Sole Object of aspiration or his only Hope; he who, out of his plenitude of love for Me, praising Me, meditating on Me, worshipping Me, prostrating to Me, etc.,” and the “coming unto Me” means “resting in the blessed enjoyment of the Divine that is devoid of the faintest traces of anything like the defects of nescience (avidyā) etc.”

This, of course, raises the question as to the relation of the ekāntin and the para-ekāntin to parābhakti. At first sight, it would appear that he who has achieved that focus of exclusive devotion to the one and only Supreme Lord (for such must now be the liberal interpretation, as most present-day Vaiṣṇavas will confirm, of the old sectarian interpretation of exclusive devotion to Viṣṇu) has already achieved parābhakti. But the Jiyar of the Yatindra Maṭha of Melkote has pointedly assured that the contrary is true; for even these degrees of single-heartedness are still within the range of sādhanā bhakti, whereas parābhakti comes into play only after sādhanā has finished its course and the stage of no return has been reached and continuous spontaneity and effortlessness has become the norm. Then and then only, as the beginning of sādhyā bhakti does parābhakti become distinguishable. This also gives, parenthetically, the relation of prāpatti to parābhakti, for the pra-praṇīna as well as the bhakta (as the Yatindramatadipikā teaches) may or must be a para-ekāntin, whereas parābhakti follows after that. In fact, without explicitly saying so, Rāmānuja has given a good definition of parābhakti in the above words, “resting in the blessed enjoyment of the Divine (etc.)”. The motif of being unable to live without praising, prostrating, etc., suggests paramā bhakti; but it is not necessarily that, for paramā bhakti adds the further note of positive anxiety lest the opportunity of such all-embracing devotion be broken or interrupted even for an instant although the constancy is not lost (as we shall later see in detail), whereas para bhakti does have its “lapses”, its poignant viśleśa cycles alternating with its raptures and
consolations, although they are lapses of fervour only, and not lapses of sin.

However, in the comments on XII:11 we have an explicit mention of parābhakti. Here, clarifying the point that its chief characteristic is that bhakti as sādhanā has finished its course Rāmānuja says,

It is only to one, who is entirely cleansed of all his sins, that I become the object of love. It is only such a person who would converge all the strength of his intellect (buddhi) to Me (the fullness of love as His sole Aim). Thus, by performing (niṣkāma karma) ....
Soul-contemplation ensues
From soul-contemplation results the obliteration of all beclouding impediments, such as ignorance (avidyā).
From this follows Soul-vision (pratyag-ātma-sākṣātkāra) or the experiencing of soul-nature as essentially related to Me
When this experience is had, Parābhakti for Me becomes a natural product.
Īśvara Datta translates the last lines of this perhaps even more aptly:

...after all the veils of nescience, etc., have been removed through action done free from attachment to fruit as forming my propitiation, then Supreme Bhakti (parābhakti) towards Me arises automatically.

Govindācārya has inserted a parenthesis of his own to the effect that parābhakti is God-love plus God-vision. This is a bit confusing, however, since ordinarily the higher vision is associated with parajñāna which follows after parābhakti; and he himself, in his Metaphysique of Mysticism has pointed out the parallel of our trilogy to the neo-platonic purgative, illuminative and unitive 'ways' in which the vision is also in the middle position; and he quotes in this context the verse (from Rāmānuja’s Śaraṇāgati Gadya ?)

Darśanam parabhaktis syāt
parajñānam tu saŋgamam
punar viśleṣa-bhirutvam
paramābhaktir uchyate

where the sequence is clear enough.

Be this as it may, in XVIII:54-55 (which we have already considered in detail in dealing with prapattī) we have the
fullest exposition. In the context of such terms as Brahma-bhāta (which Rāmānuja interprets as indicating servanthood or liegeship) prasannātma (clearness of one’s nature, absence of turbidity due to deeds of pain, etc.), and absence of grief except as related to God) Rāmānuja equates parābhakti to the “attitude of indifference toward every creature, save Myself, and thus not caring a straw for anything”, and continues:

Parābhakti or supreme loving devotion is of the form of exquisite of rapturous bliss occasioned by the soul’s enjoyment of Me—Me the Lord of all, the Author of the drama of cosmic evolution, procession and dissolution—the antithesis of all trace of evil—the sole Depository of the boundless and superb multitude of Illustrious Attributes—the Nectar Ocean of Beauty—the Śrī-united, the Lotus-eyed; and the soul’s own Sovereign.

Tataḥ—“By it” means thereby (not there); or by bhakti, this constituting verily the Means by which the said ‘entry into Me’ is in reality effected; this is testified to by what has been learned above (in XI : 54)

From this we clearly gain the two most characteristic aspects of parābhakti, viz., the entry, the fruitional result of bhakti as sādhanā, and the uninterrupted rapture, which is linked in fullest intimacy with the fullness of the Personal Nature of God. Darśana in this context, therefore, we take in this connotation, and not in the usual sense of revelational ‘vision’. That it must also be linked with the achievement of immortality, as the beginning of mokṣa, follows from what we have just seen, viz., that the purgation from sins and the passing of barrier of Return (return, that is, to the dualities of ‘normal’ worldly existence, such as pleasure/pain, love/hate, etc.), as is indicated in Veṅkaṭādeśiṅka’s Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya, where we find Viveka saying:

A person, deserved by good deeds done during diverse births and who hath refrained from sinning against the godly, dame Vidyā, leading to mokṣa, approacheth anon with love abundant. Parābhakti—the ship, as it were, to cross the ocean of Sāṁsāra, well-fastened by the ropes of sāttvika-traya (dedication of the fruit of action to God, as distinct from aggressive asceticism) so helpful to Niyoṭṭidharma, saileth clear and acquireth momentum day by day.

But much more than that: The achievement of immortality—of mokṣa as such—is swallowed up in the zest of higher
devotion to God. This is the end of man’s whole life, and not simply immortality: the glorifying of God in all His wondrousness—not man’s own glorification, or even his own perfection, which lies below this, as only the prerequisite of the fruitful flowering of unblemishable adoration.

Enlarging on these points, Prof. Rangācārya, whose lectures on the Gītā have already engaged us in dealing with prapatti, reserves the treatment of parābhakti to the XVIII Adhyāya, ślokas 54-5. Pointing out that the term dharma-bhūta here must be taken in the sense of becoming like unto Brahmā, and not in the sense of mukta-avasthā (or jīvanmukti as Śaṅkara interprets it), he goes on to distinguish self-realization as such (pratyakṣajñāna of the ātman) from the higher stage of direct experience of God (pratyakṣajñāna of Paramapuruṣa), arguing that it is on the latter that samatva, the looking on everything with equal eyes, depends. Then, in introducing parābhakti, he first discusses the distinction between sādhanā bhakti and sādhya bhakti, the former being the means to the end, the latter the end in itself; the Naiṣkarmya siddhi of śloka 46, he says, belongs to the former, mokṣa being the end. But, equating parābhakti with sādhya bhakti, he writes:

There are those who believe that bhakti persists even in the state of ultimate salvation. After achieving the supreme experience of God-realization, in the blissful freedom of the state of mokṣa, what is to be the end and aim of one’s existence? It is suggested sometimes that the enfranchised souls look upon this supreme and disinterested devotion to God as their only end and aim... Many a bhakta, while believing in the good of merging one’s own identity in God as the highest purpose of all philosophy and all spiritual effort, has nevertheless been sufficiently intoxicated with the madness of bhakti to declare, “I will not strive to reach the goal. For when I do reach there, I cease to be distinguished from Him, whom it is bliss to serve”.... It is immaterial however to which view we subscribe, for even those who may be looked upon as being one step behind the goal, are content with this state as perfect in itself, and do not want to proceed further.

Then, under the next śloka, he relates parābhakti to kaiṅkarya and the philosophy of agency whose development we have previously followed. He who is still engaged in sādhanā
bhakti has the reservation of an 'as though' in his service of his fellow-men 'as though' he were serving God, the 'as though' being a bhāvanā: "But if one has attained the state in which one is fit for the practice of parābhakti, then no bhāvanā is necessary. Life itself becomes service rendered unto God... Parābhakti, therefore, gives us the direct personal experience, whereby we realize that everything we may do in life is nothing other than the service to God." "When the agency of our deeds belongs to God, we cannot have any feelings of egoistic self-importance or any sense of property. The man, who through the practice of parābhakti is able to realize as a matter of direct personal experience that the true agent of all his deeds is God, who is in him as well as in other beings, recognizes that he is a mere instrument in the hands of God." Then, Rangācārya might well add, one no longer gives thanks to God that one has been able to do thus and so, but rather, one praises Him that He has done it through him!

To the possible question whether parābhakti therefore continues after death, and if it can be practised before death, whether it can be considered as coming after mokṣa, these points of Rangācārya's suggest that parābhakti can be taken as the Vaiṣṇava alternative to jīvanmukti—or even as a sort of jīvanmukti, according to one's predilections—and thus practised before physical death; but that even it is not attained before videha mukti, it should be expected to be the normal state of the soul in its heavenly course. In either case, it is to be emphatically reiterated that not mokṣa as the 'liberation from bondage' (which of course means bondage to the lusts and infatuations of the flesh and 'worldly' affairs, the inheritance of past Karma being involved in these things and no more, at least on the negative score) is the higher value, but the transfer over to the positive completion of all-consuming engagement with God. Physical death itself, by consequence, becomes of no consequence; and the philosophy of the Gītā comes herein to be almost identical with that of the New Testament.

It is in his Śaraṇāgati Gadya, nevertheless, that Rāmānuja makes the most explicit reference to parābhakti, along with parajñāna and paramābhakti, although he cites the same Gītā passages which we have used in reference to parābhakti. Signi-
Significantly enough, the context is really a long prayer, not mere third-person exposition, which is entirely inadequate; for these things, as Marcel in our own day clearly realizes, concern one's direct relation with God in a way that really cannot be discussed, but must rather be experienced and expressed intersubjectively. 7

Bless me (he prays) with that supreme devotion which is described in three places (in the Gitā, where it is said) "That supreme Pūrṇa, O Pārtha, can be attained by the singular devotion which is not directed to any other object." "I can be known only by that love which is not directed to any other object." (and) "He obtains that supreme love for me".

Make me to acquire the nature of parābhakti, parajñāna, and paramābhakti. May I who then by these have obtained the realization of the Lord, which is fully incessant, eternal, most vivid, and is an end in itself and is infinitely and exceedingly pleasing—may I become His eternal servant characterized by the sole delight in all things subservient to His purpose, and united to all His conditions and produced by the unbounded and excessive love born (in me) out of that kind of realization of the Lord!

In this vein he goes on, reiterating the trilogy in many variations, considering the obstacles of sin and the ādhyātmika (caused by ourselves), ādhibhautika (caused by demoniac beings) and ādhidaivika (caused by the gods) hindrances resulting from various vāsanās and the pleasure/pain duality of saṁsāra. He shows considerable feeling concerning the possibility of these hindrances being overcome only by grace, especially grace as coming through the Nārāyaṇa mantra; and finally comes, in the form of an answer to his prayer, certain slokas from the Rāmāyaṇa and the Charama Śloka of the Gitā.

This passage in the Gadya might easily be passed by without realizing its full significance if one were not acquainted with the same themes in the Alwar literature, and also in the lives of the Alwars. In general Govindācārya has summarized their experience in reference to mokṣa and parābhakti as follows 8

As regards the nature of the realization of God by the Alwars, while their souls abode in the material habitations, it has been settled that all spiritual realization of God is revealed only to the interior or spiritual vision; and even then they were only temporary rush-lights. They experi-
enced the interior vision so vividly that it was almost akin to a materialized or objectified vision, so much so that they believed that their senses could realize the same in the exterior world. But when they opened their eyes, and wished to see and talk and otherwise completely serve God outside them and out of love embrace Him and kiss Him and otherwise fondle and play with Him in a thousand ways, they found it impalpable. This drove them mad again and they suffered acute pangs of separation from God. When their agony became insupportable, they were again blessed with a spiritual vision, and so on until final beatification was attained. Or these alternate moods caused by union with and separation from God-bliss, lasted until the gross body, in which the spirit remained bound, and which they felt as a load set on their eternal freedom, was completely stifled off, and they found themselves clothed in a spiritual or celestial body, which helped more than obstructed their unrestricted enjoyment of Divine Blessedness for ever afterwards.

All this is beautifully exemplified, needless to say, in Nammalwar's Tiruvoimoli; and we shall soon follow it out. But first perhaps it will not be amiss to shift our attention again for a while to St. Bonaventura. In doing so, we must first take exception to Govindācārya's comparison of our present trilogy to the purgative, illuminative and perfective 'ways'. For the former twotat least belong still to the via affirmativa, in which the focus is not yet the selfless regard for God which Prof. Rangācārya thinks so important as characterizing even parābhakti. It will be remembered that in the work bearing the title de Triplica Via, Bonaventura leaves the seven-grade ascent of love to the very last, followed only by a sort of appended paragraph dealing with the two modes of pure contemplation of divine things (e.g., according to Augustine and according to Dionysius, or according to the 'positive' way and according to 'ablation') and it is only in this last that the attention is entirely turned away from the self and completely focused on God, this being the sense in which he, in full accord with established tradition, takes the 'via negativa'. Perhaps the 'via perfective' (as equatable with sadhya bhakti) therefore, with its own sub-divisions, would constitute our parā field; but hardly the other two (which are yet sadhanā bhakti). Moreover he describes the viśleṣa of parābhakti within the via posi-
tiva, but the 'last anxiety' of paramābhakti to the via negativa, in which is experienced the abnegation of everything, in which the "groans and prayers" are not like those of angels rather than of men, to be followed only by the "study and readings" after the pattern of the archangels, and the "annunciating through example and precept" after the pattern of the 'Thrones'. Or again, following the fuller pattern of the Celestial Hierarchy extending on to the Cherubim and Seraphim, entrance, intimate association, and excesses of contemplation and embracing with kisses and hugging to God, come only within the reaches of the 'oblative' way, which crowns the via negativa. Likewise in the Soliloquy, it is only in the fourth part of his scheme that Bonaventura comes to the consideration of those things "which are above" where the prerequisite of having completed the purgation of sin(s) is taken as having been accomplished already then only is the transition made to celestial joy. No sooner does the soul cease to be a mumukṣu in the valle lacrimarum; but then, though still pilgrim, she has become a parābhakta, for she has taken the scriptural counsel to "forget also thine own people and thy father's house, and the King shall have pleasure in thy beauty", the 'father's house' being interpreted as the world, the devil and one's own self.

It is interesting to note also in this Soliloquy that just as with Nammalwar, there is a sort of recapitulation at a different level of previous themes. The scheme Bonaventura uses is of course not exactly parallel to our parā scheme, but remarkably close enough: the consideration of "things below" tallying with parābhakti, the "things around" with parajñāna, and the "things within and above" with paramābhakti. For the first contains the anticipation of victories over the impediment of evil forces, the reflection on deliverance from the burden of defect and sin, and the erasing of all the soul's past in the Divine Clemency; the second includes the luminous vision of the Heavenly City in which the only light is the Lamp of God, self-luminous and irradiating, with the Mediatrix in the key position surrounded by the company of the Blessed and the Angelic Host; and the third moves on to the soul's own condition in completed beatitude, with its glorified subtle body with
its spiritual senses, its perfect spiritual obedience. Of course the parallel breaks down if one takes separately Bonaventura’s fourth field, the consideration of the “things above”, although there is no reason for this, since paramābhakti includes this together with the description of the beatific state, and Bonaventura himself often enough identifies the within with the above, for the highest reach of beatitude is purely and intensively a protracted attention on the Glorious Godhead accompanied not with the longing of actual separation but with the anxiousness lest such exaltation be lost or experienced only in part.

But perhaps we have already anticipated too much. For each of these levels within the parā range deserves much more detailed examination; and for this reason we turn now to the Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, which some authorities still consider to be the most priceless and flawless jewel in the whole history of western mysticism. In this work, Bonaventura first treats with the field of meditation and contemplation on the wonders of the world as ‘vestiges’ in the hierarchical order according to what amounts the śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana, dhyāna method, according to their “potentiality, presence and essence”, in which not only is grace the keynote of the theme, but the whole composition runs the full gamut of the senses and imagination aesthetically employed and art as such prominently given the crescendo. The operation of the intellective faculties also takes its place in the sweep of sādhana bhakti, although they even in their highest philosophical reaches remain subordinate to the supernatural experiences of rapture, for “all these sciences have their certain and infallible rules as though they were lights descending from the Eternal Love into our mind”, so that only an insipid fool would consider any of the faculties and their respective sciences as adequate in themselves. Having covered this ground thoroughly, he then comes to the consideration (speculation) of God’s own image in us as reformed by grace: and the treatment is such that it immediately becomes clear that scheme or no scheme, Bonaventura certainly knew the experiences of parābhakti personally well enough.
The first detail we observe in the matter of the action of grace—and it must be made clear that here he is dealing not with grace as the help or support or instigation of śādhanā, but as having already done its (literally) reforming work so that śādhanā can be said to have come to an end—is that, as with Nambalwar (whether in the Sūtras or not) the Mediator (Christ here, of course) is the key opening this "realm of no return"; for as the "way, the truth and the life", the Christ gives the pattern for faith, hope and love and causes our spiritual senses to recover so that the beauty of the Divine Harmony may be enjoyed without reservation, and by means of them the soul may pass on from mere ordinary devotion to excess of admiration and exultation. Thus the soul, in the figure of the Canticles, as the Bride, is made fit for the Beloved "through the abundance of her devotion as a 'twig of smoke from the aromatic myrrh and frankincense' through the excellence of her adoration..."as the dawn, the moon, and the sun" according to the procession of the suspended illuminations...; through the superabundance of her exultation...affluent by the delicacies of her exceedingly sweet delectation, guileless and blameless altogether in the face of the Beloved".

Then as he proceeds he does make some passing reference to the purgative, illuminative and perfective 'ways', but in the context of the process of the operation of grace, by the completion of which alone the soul has come to enter the Heavenly Jerusalem. And it seems to us that even here he subordinates these 'ways' as correlated with his own favourite scheme of nature, industry and grace, to the mode of dwelling in this Heavenly Jerusalem, which follows after them, for they are still 'ways' and not terminus. He teaches that this entering is accomplished by entering into oneself in "charity, truth, equity, majesty, principle (or, beginning) safety (in the sense of salvation accomplished once and for all—the 'no return'), 'virtue' (in the classical sense of strength), light, and piety. These attributes, which are also those which God manifests of Himself (e.g., to the parābhakta) through the agency of the angelic beings quite in the same way that Viṣṇu manifests himself through the agency of his Vyūhas, are given in the descending order, because the concern is no longer with the progress of the pil-
grim, but the manner of their contemplation of God after their ascent is complete—God who is "all in all", whom they contemplate "in their own minds, in which He dwells through the gifts of His most excellent charity."

Then, after a close examination of faith, hope and love "and especially of love"—which are here correlated tropologically, analogically and anagogically to the Law, the Prophets and the New Testament,—he says that, having passed through these stages, we then come to contemplate "God within us as clearly as we might view the images of creatures in mirrors", and that "as though in the fashion of birds with wings spread for flight"... And finally closely paralleling Nammalwar's exaltation of the Nārāyaṇa concept and of the Antaryāmin, Bonaventura writes:

Our mind being then filled with all these intellectual lights, comes to be inhabited by the divine Wisdom as a house of God, (for the mind has become) the daughter, the spouse and friend of God; she (the mind, the soul) has become the member, the sister, and the coheir of Christ the Head; and above all she has become the temple of the Holy Spirit, founded through faith, elevated through hope and dedicated to God through sanctity of the mind and body. All of this is done by the most sincere love of Christ, "which is diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit which is given to us" (Romans V : 5), without which spirit it is impossible for us to know the secrets of God. For just as "no one may know what is of man except the spirit of man which is in him, so no one may know what is of God, except the Spirit of God (I. Cor. 2 : 11).—Therefore in love we may be rooted and founded, that we may comprehend with all the Saints what is the length of eternity, the breadth of liberality, the sublimity of majesty and the depth of the judging wisdom of God.

We must not, however, be misled by the use of this term wisdom: It is not jñāna, or even parajñāna, either here or in any other context where he uses the term (sapientia). In the In Hexaemeron, for example, he distinguishes it from scientia and sanctitas hierarchically in such a way that we should judge that it is closer to paramābhakti than parajñāna, although the schemes overlap, and we cannot insist on the correlation here anymore rigorously than in any other context. Nevertheless, we may remind ourselves again, from a passage in an early section of
the *In Hexaemeron*, of what we have stressed all along, that for Bonaventura as for Rāmānuja, although bhakti is never to be divorced from jñāna (nor from karma either, for that matter!) it still predominates: the affective is more primordial than the gnostic, and correspondingly extends higher; and the same thing applies equally at the sādhyā levels that we have seen to be true in the sādhanā stages. Thus he writes:

Therefore it is necessary for him to relinquish everything, who would mount upward (sursum agi) according to this wisdom. For the speculative force (virtus) whose is the act (e.g., of mounting upwards), transcends the intellect. Whence not altogether is beatitude in the intellective (faculties) for beatitude is through union, which is such through grace, although industry (karma?) does help. Nevertheless, grace lies in this, that man be carried by his total affection (affectus), be carried (feretur) into God and live thus by God (ablative case) in order that from everything else he separate himself by means of God, and even from himself as far as he is able; and this is the highest love of God (Eph. 3:17-18)...  

The force (vis) of this union is immediately unitive with God above all things in such a way that one both sleeps and keeps vigil there as it were. For it alienates (the soul) from every sense and places it in ecstasy, and then it hears "words which it is not lawful to hear" (II Cor. 12 : 4); for such it is in affection; nor can man explicate what is there revealed, because only by affection is he there carried on (agitur). "I slept, but my heart kept vigil" (Canticles 5 : 6) and "I heard what my Lord God spoke within me". (Psalm 84 : 9)......

Moreover, to this experience one does not arrive except through the maximum love (amor); for neither the cognitive nor the intellective (faculties) attains to this through itself, but (only) through the permaximal condescension from above. "For the Artifex of all things showed me Wisdom" (Wisdom 7 : 21-22); and St. Paul says about the same thing. For there is in Wisdom the Holy Spirit, one, multiplex and subtle (Wisdom 7 : 22) and it shows wisdom as uniform, multiform, omniform, nulliform......

This love is sequestering, for it separates from every (other) affection for the sake of the singular affection of the Spouse; soporative, for it quiets all the potencies of the soul and imposes silence on them; and upwards-taking (sursum
activus) for finally and appropriately (in the literal sense of making its own by assimilation) leads into God. For it is stronger than death, this love (dilectio (Cant. 8:16), for it must be that one must die through this love (amor) in order to be taken up......

Such is the same ‘Wisdom’ by which we shall later find Nammalwar exclaiming (X: 10:9), “I was nothing before. Now He put Himself in me and made me nothing. Why did He suffer me to go astray before?”

The chief question raised in these passages is that of the nature of ecstasy, or samādhi at these levels as distinguished from the experience of union in the preparatory levels and in the permanent condition of beatitude in Heaven; and many problems could be discerned which only a Madhusūdana Sarasvatī or a John of the Cross could handle. Roughly, however, it seems to us, following Gilson’s pointing out the distinction between ecstasy as such and rapture, that right up to the paramābhakti stage, all varieties of mystical union continue only as anticipation of what is yet to be in permanence after the gross body is left to dust or ashes. There must be a kind of samādhi which is higher than dhyāna, which is still associated with method, which (samādhi) as Bonaventura says, comes as a sort of temporary transition between grace and glory, “transcondescending down from above” and thus of an order which is even more than ‘merely ontological’, and yet not quite the final lingering as though the body had already become non-existent. This is the type that is characteristic of parābhakti; for the “insofar as possible” still remains, and yet there is not just the influence of grace, but the anticipation of glory. This is an important matter, because there is all too often, especially among advaitins, an undiscerning confusion between samādhi and mokṣa, and perhaps out of this confusion comes the failure to recognize that even for the jīvanmukta there are yet stages on the higher way—for which reason, of course, he really is not a jīvanmukta in the strict sense, for he is supposed to have passed all stages altogether.

Again we have to refuse the temptation of getting involved in details; what is essential at present is merely the recognition that this sort of samādhi—one might argue both ways whether it is yet completely nirvikalpa or savikalpa, largely depending on
whether one admits with Madhusūdana Sarasvatī that there are still degrees of both—this anticipative Foretaste of complete glorification which is characteristic of parābhakti does afford this finality of Wisdom which is not only about God Who is “All in all”, but comparticipative Wisdom in God within His own nature as Trinity or as Nārāyaṇa: in short, it is the Wisdom of God in man in such a way that man is also in God—a condition of intersubjectivity which only love can bring about. But this intersubjectivity is not just a simple matter. It involves the metaphysical ground of all possible relationalities or dimensionalities, as we shall now see in a passage that anticipates almost everything that Giordano Bruno later developed in a more strictly mathematical way but whose metaphysics has scarcely been understood since his time, even Leibnitz giving only a watered-down version of the cosmic swirl of the flood of Insight in which one must be submerged before one can comprehend its richness. The passage is a section of the In Hexameron in which Bonaventura is treating of the Celestial Realm according to a scheme which, reduced to geometrical diagrams, would be amazingly suggestive of the Tāntric yantras as well as of Bruno, for it involves the pattern of the evolution of infinite triangles out of the basic triad which is characteristic of both Unity and Diversity. The diagram we submit as follows, and the reader may himself allocate on it (and on its further extension, if he likes) the characters and relations and dimensions—for it should really be conceived in the perspective of solid rather than plane geometry—indicated in the table further below.

The characteristic term he uses is circumincensic: a sort of trisectioning which goes on both in and around—in a sort of coincidence of opposites such that the ingressio is really also egression. Each ‘Person’ of the Trinity is ‘seen’ to be as He is both in Himself and in the other Members of the Trinity: He affirms the full dynamic, in short, as well as the structure of the pantheistic arch-principle, which gives the ratio whereby in the same ‘movement’ God originates (or ‘Principates’), governs, and glorifies all things transcendentally or unitively, mediatively or moderately and innately or immanently, “for without these there is not full reason (ratio) for the illumination (illustratio) of
the emanations”, in which converge method, principle and system; art, morals and logic, means, end and aspirant. It is too bad that he did not have the Vaiṣṇava symbol of Trivikrama, who in his three strides—the Cosmic Dwarf that he is—rescues the world from demonic Non-being; for it is a Cosmic Dance of the Trilogies which makes even Hegel’s swaggering ‘system’ stagger in the inebriation of the Love which provokes and promotes the dance. For this is not a ‘system’; it is not man’s construction, but that infusion of Living Wisdom which can come only from the influence of a near-avatāra like a St. Francis or a Namāmalwar. Hegel is an inflated dogmatist; Bonaventura a philosopher-saint!
Blue represents the Father, Black represents the Son, the Mediating Word; and Red of course the Holy Spirit. The chief defect, of course, is that each individual small triangle, as symbolizing the human soul, should have all three colours also. Nevertheless, the movement out of and within and around the three basic concentric triangles does embody, as well as any finite figure could, what Bonaventura has in mind: the seven ascending and/or descending levels (the angelic orders), the interlocking of the three hypostases (the hexagons), and the reciprocation of the emanational and the ingressional movements (the upward-pointed and downward-pointed triangles), as well as relation of finite multiplicity (the small triangles) to the divine plurality which is made actual by the motherhood of the Blessed Virgin (the diamonds). In a word, the full pantheistic harmony of transcendence, immanence and mediation, and of microcosm and macrocosm is what is intended. One has not come to the fullness of the Divine Unity until one can also see the intricacy of its interior dynamic.

In reducing the things he gives to a table, we are necessarily compromising many of the interlockings which are quite clear in his own exposition. But if the reader is a parahakta, he will immediately see them anyway; if not, let him drink deeply of what is here suggested and not what is tabulated, and perhaps he will become a parahakta!

We divide the table roughly into those things which characterize God and those which characterize man, but it must be remembered that, true to Augustine, Bonaventura does not so sharply make the division, for in every human soul there is a small trinity which is the image of the Trinity of God such that, as we just pointed out, God is in man in such a way that man is in God—this itself composing a triadic relation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOD</th>
<th>FATHER</th>
<th>SON</th>
<th>HOLY SPIRIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>(potentia)</td>
<td>Wisdom</td>
<td>Will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(as Reason)</td>
<td>deducens</td>
<td>(sapientia)</td>
<td>(voluntas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(as Judgment)</td>
<td>sublimitas</td>
<td>erudiens</td>
<td>custodiens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(as Law)</td>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>stabilitas</td>
<td>familiaritas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grace</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beatitude</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
being-potential knowledge will
susceptio (lifting up) unio
speculatio

aeternitas formositas jucunditas
aeternitas vision fruition
temptation actus affectus
effectus order perfection
distinction flugens (light-
giving) calens (heat-
giving)

SOUL IRASCIBLE RATIONAL CONCUPIS-CIBLE
memory understanding will
honour instruction sanctification
piety truth sanctity

There are many others besides these, although these should be enough to set the mind to swimming in the same stream. Whether these triologies could be further analogized (or homologized, more strictly speaking) to the three guṇas (sattva, rajas and tamas) remains a matter of one’s predilection; but that cannot concern us at present. At any rate, the chief feature, we must again reiterate, is the inter-linking; the interweaving of nature, man and God into and within the Divine Nature is God, “to whom it is proper to be supremely potent in His exaltedness (pollens in celsitudine), presiding in fortitude, pasturing in sweetness”... And even these, appropriate to the persons of the Trinity severally, get interwoven into the trinitarian Unity, each in the other, and all in each:

And from this it follows that as supremely potent in exaltedness that (He, our Monarch) must be supremely stable in discerning just things, supremely wise in discerning true things, supremely holy in loving good things. The first befits the Father in Himself, the second as He is in the Son, the third as He is in the Holy Spirit.
Secondly, it befits Him to be supremely authentic, supremely prevalent (in the root sense: efficaciously powerful above all others) and supremely inconquerable: authentic in establishing the laws, prevalent in ministering to (or, also, mustering) his men, invincible in overcoming enemies, for
we must not expect the dignity of such a Monarch to have enemies. Thus authority is fitting to the Son as He is in the Father, virility as He is in Himself, and invincibility as He is in the Holy Spirit.

Thirdly... as supremely sweetly pasturing, it is fitting that He be supremely 'strenuous' in leading forth, in going before, and in taking by the hand; supremely sagacious in imparting experience (erudiendo); and supremely sedulous in keeping custody; that strenuously he should 'precede' (in the double sense of being the preceptor and of going before), sagaciously teach, solicitously keep custody; strenuously give the documents, solicitously minister remedies (suffragia) and aid. And thus our perfect Monarch is as it were a Sun, to which all celestial and subcelestial spirits look up.

This from an extended metaphor—or rather from another of those marvellous arabesques of his in which vine and trellis are intertwined in an endless the whole flowering of the divine and embrace seems even to exhume a heavenly fragrance and one cannot find a real beginning or end to his thought. But in the more strict ontological framework, he takes in the dialectics involved—the dialectics of Being as personally divine—in the *Itinerarium* thus.11

First giving the caveat that we cannot contemplate the realm of pure Being except by entering it, by penetrating through its antechambers into its sanctuary and even into its Holy of Holies, in its own pure light, which is formed in us by its own operation, he considers the impossibility of the non-existence of God either in potentiality or actuality; and immediately from this comes the subsequent point that such Being must be divine—the argument is really not unlike that of Scheler which we have previously examined—because it cannot be typified as either particular or 'curved' (arctatum) or merely analogical. But even more than Scheler, Bonaventura lifts the argument into the parabhakti perspective: he marvels that most men's minds—that the human mind in its 'normal' condition—is so blind as to be insensitive to this mystery, being accustomed to the darkness—the tamas—of sensible phantasms of things only, "since when they look into (intuitur) this light of highest Being, it seems to them that they see nothing, not understanding that this very highest blindness is the illumina-
tion of our mind, as when the eye sees a pure light, it seems to see nothing”.

In this he shows himself an existentialist indeed—much more so than Acquinas, malgre all of Maritain’s apologetics; for he is painfully impressed (as Thomas—and with him Kant, Hegel and most of the great structuralist philosophers—is not) by the truth that these things cannot be taken at second report. Eternity is not a mere surd point to be considered merely as a proposition or a something to be accepted because the Church authoritatively teaches it; it is not supra-relational but super-relational, and as such it can and must be experientially examined and explained by oneself as inextricably engaged with it, and not because of its ‘subjectivity’ but rather because it is Being “pure, simple, absolute, primary, eternal, most single possible, most actual possible, most perfect possible, and supremely one” : one cannot experience such unity through the mediation of an other, although it is a Unity of such a viśiṣṭādvaitic superabundance that once one has come into it, and it into him, one realizes then that it includes all ‘ones’ as well as all ‘others’, and that one is, within it, both a one and an other oneself, this convergence of relationality being the essence of Personality.

Another aspect of parābhakti that comes out in this treatment of the Personality of Being is that of wonder : wonder not just in the sense that Aristotle or Kant knew,—not the wonder on the part of the ego at the marvellousness of things, but the wonder that follows upon the plunge into that superlative marvellousness and the loss of one’s egocentricity in it. For this Being is the First and the last (novissimum); eternal and most intensely present, the most single and the most maximum, the most actual and the most immutable; the most perfect and the most immense; the supremely one and yet comprising all modes, modes “of most sincere truth, of most sincere goodness, of all qualities of virtue (virtuositas), of all exemplarity and all communicability; and through them (the modes) ‘from Him and through Him and in Him are all things’ (Romans 11 : 36) and thus because He is omnipotent, omnipresent, and in every way good (omni modi bonum)—which to see is to be blessed
(e.g. to become beatified), as it was said of Moses, 'I shall show thee every good thing'. (Exod. 33:19)

For these paradoxes, which also figure superbly in the Tiruvoimoli, are a matter of this existential marvelling, and not a matter of logic as Hegel, Ouspensky and many others, including some modern apologists for Advaita, have tried to think. As a matter of fact, when one re-examines them in Heracleitus and the Pythagoreans (whence they originate in Western tradition), one is impressed by the same thing: they had experienced this mystical union of opposites in their own mystical union. One even suspects that they might have been yogis trained by gurus from places farther East; for there is a stage in yoga practice when the prāṇa and āpāṇa, the upward and the downward 'breath', the upward movement of the kuṇḍalinī and the downward movement of śakti, become simultaneous—and curiously enough, this is most likely to happen when the moon and the sun are in equilibrious positions! Microcosm and macrocosm are certainly related—to say the least—in a way that science does not yet know! And our claim is that one simply does not 'understand' these things in the usual sense that ordinary 'professors' of philosophy would have us 'understand' them; for with this experience, and only with it, does one have the anubhava, the understanding that is the identity of knowledge and being. Moreover, the fact that the whole matter is so intimately associated with the higher reaches of sexuality all the more supports our thesis that the root of it all is not in jñāna, which is the fruition—and only one of the fruitions at that!—of this experience, but in bhakti, whereby this metaphysical level of sexuality is opened, aroused and allowed to bring one's entire (personal!) being into this super-relationality by the process of psycho-organic translimitation.

And St. Bonaventura, like Saint Rāmānuja, was a bhakta in this full sense, at all levels fully aware of the implications of his devotion, so that ontology and piety are never in separation, as may be seen in the following prayer to Jesus as the Fountain of Life, which one may well compare to certain portions of Rāmānuja's Gadyatraya, some of the figures actually being identical! It is taken from a work of consummate allegorical art in which under the scriptural figure of Christ as the
Vine, he is able to interweave almost all of the basic metaphysical matters with the simplest symbols of common Christian piety.\textsuperscript{12}

O inaccessible comeliness (decor) of God in the Highest, and purest clarity of eternal Light, illuminating all light and conserving in perpetual splendour the thousand thousands of lights fulgurating before the throne of Thy Divinity from the primaeval dawn: O eternal and inaccessible, clear and sweet first-stream of the fountain hidden from the eyes of mortals, whose depth is without bottom, whose height is without limit, whose spaciousness is beyond measure, whose purity imperturbable; from Whom proceeds the stream of the oil of gladness, who makes joyful the City of God, and torrent of the fire of vigour—torrent, I say, of the divine voluptuousness, whence drinking with joy in abounding drunkeness the celestials are jubilant with an increasing unceasing convivial hymn:

Anoint us with this sacred oil—anoint the throats of our burning hearts which so thirst for the (so) desirable drops of the torrent, so that in a 'voice of exclamation and confession' (Psalm 41 : 5) we may chant to Thee a canticle of praise proving by attesting experience, that 'with Thee is the Fountain of Life, and in Thy Light we shall see light' (Psalm 35 : 10).

Towards the end of this, the Latin becomes obscure. One feels that he simply went into samādhi, into the inexpressible, as he was writing: Hoc nos oleo perunge huiusque torrentis desiderabilibus guttis sitibundas refolias sauces arentium cordum; which might better be rendered: "...and fan (as with a bellows) the throats of our hearts which thirst for the desirable drops of such a torrent", thereby bringing out the lovely paradox that the fire of the torrent both quenches and further inflames our spiritual thirst—a basic characteristic of paraśhakti, in which the višleṣa and the consolations come in such rapid succession, or even in mixture (one suffers sublimely in such rapture!) that they are inseparable. Again, if one interprets these things in terms of yoga experience, one knows that the things he is trying to express are not mere literary figures: the kuṇḍalini is first experienced as the seminal fluid rising through the nādis, then as psychic heat—the fire of the Holy Spirit—and then in the experience of light, first in the form of geometrical designs in which both Cross and Triangle
figure, and then at the point of samādhi, as a veritable bath of light, after which one is simply burst in a sacrifice of New Praise, the Praise of Glory and not of grace. These things indeed are mysteries; but mysteries may also be experienced, if we may use the word ‘experience’ for such ‘anointings’ in which there is no longer any sense of experiencer and experience but only consummation in the double sense of being consumed and of coming into the End, in which “all things are gathered into One”. But yet again they are ‘mysteries’: How dangerous it is to write about them like this! For those who are only curious, as most ‘moderns’ are, those who are only interested in experiment as the only ‘experience’, will not desire such Anointings whose price is a complete loss of ‘life’ as they value it (life, that is, as ‘enjoying oneself’, ‘working hard’, ‘observing everything’, ‘analyzing oneself, being ‘normal’ etc., etc.) in order to gain their all-too-immortal soul! How profound the Basilian Liturgy, in which even at the very apex of adoration comes the poignant litany—mantra that it is—Kyrie eleison, Hospodi pomiloi! (Lord, have mercy!) ......Praise and confession! How humbling all this is! Confession, not profession: Even Socrates had a good measure of this; he seldom if ever confessed that he knew something of the immortal Truth; he doggedly refused to talk of his Vision, his samādhi, in which he came into his Vocation and became not so much a rogue like the Sceptics who made such a scene, themselves degenerate in a degenerate world, but a helpless irresponsible Man, lost in this Wonder of which we foolishly dare to speak, trying sincerely, desperately, and not cleverly, to find the Meaning of it, marvelling at the blindness of the ‘multitude’ and the arrogance of the Sophists who thought they knew all about ‘thinking’. But as Keirkegaard knew all too well, even Socrates lacked this, that he did not remain a bhakta but confused the Fruit of his Divine Ignorance with the Source of it; only politely would he offer his invocations; he had the Confession, but not the Praise; he remained, for want of Glory, a gnostic in spite of himself, so that his death provoked only admiration instead of leading others to sacrificial living. Whereas Bonaventura, though not suffering the martyrdom which he affirmed, died relatively young, following his blessed Father Francis, his whole being
consumed by his seraphic fire of devotion. Rāmānuja, on the other hand, although living to a remarkable age, did have the honour of suffering exile for his faith, and once or more then once fainted in grief at the news of the persecution of his disciples...True...Who will live, and love, and die for it, in it, above it?

As we turn now to Nammalwar's Tiruvoimoli, we must necessarily ignore the fact that all are not agreed as to which sections deal with parābhakti, and which with parajñāna and paramābhakti. It seems fairly clear that only the last ten of the last hundred stanzas deal with paramābhakti, and the ten just preceding that with parajñāna; but whether parābhakti may be found only in the rest of the last hundred as most of the authoritative commentaries—so we have been told by one authority—indicate seems highly controversial. Some, for example, go so far as to say that the whole work is an expression of parābhakti and not simple bhakti. Suffice to say that our own inclination is toward the opinion in other commentaries that both the 9th and 10th hundred are written in the spirit of parābhakti, and we shall proceed according to this opinion.

We also must not be tempted by the debatable point as to whether or to what extent Nammalwar has paralleled the treatment of mokṣa in the Brahma Sūtras, or whether he has merely taken them for granted as the background, so to speak, and gone on into the higher reaches beyond mokṣa. In short, there is evidently considerable ambiguity even here about the relation of mokṣa to parābhakti and its stages. We are scarcely in a position to pass judgment on the controversy, much less to clarify the ambiguity; and our primary purpose is not so much to follow tradition as to derive something from it. Our own opinion should be clear enough by now, that parābhakti does follow upon mokṣa simply taken, because of the distinction between sādhya and sādhanā bhakti; nevertheless, we cannot deny that there is some evidence, if one examines the last hundred afresh, that Nammalwar himself did take mokṣa as explained in the Sūtras in the broader sense as having stages parallel to those of parābhakti, the stages roughly being as follows:

In the first ten, there is the mention of the Asuras and Devas, and the overcoming of the impediments. In the second, the
ending of the pāpa/puṇya burden of karma and the consequent deliverance from future births—the beginning of the path of the Gods, in short, which is the beginning of mokṣa. In the fourth, we find the relative belittling of the world of Brahma and the transition from Śrī (Lakṣmī) to Parabrahman and Paramapuruṣa and the reference to lightning as a part of the path of light which leads into Vaikuṇṭha. In the sixth, there is the victorious defiance of hell and other indications of something of a qualified jīvanmukti condition—the attainment of ‘one’s own form’ in short. In the seventh, there is reference to the passage through and out of the tanmātras and the ahamkāra and the attainment of the One—parallel, in other words, with the Śūtras’ consideration of the beatified soul’s relation with Brahman. In the eighth, the attainment of Brahman as sat-cit-ānanda. And only in the ninth, as the apocalyptic Vision (parajñāna) of Vai- kuṇṭha, and the tenth, as the expression of the soul’s paramābhakti in its eternal life in Vaikuṇṭha, is there clearly material that is not contained in the Śūtras...But this is not the opinion of tradition, which exalts Nammalwar unlimitedly, and credits him with revelation which surpassed that contained in the Śūtras. P.N. Śrīnivāsācārī’s paragraph on this matter of the relation of parābhakti to mokṣa, authority though he is, shows the ambiguity of which we speak. On pp. 376-7 he writes as follows:

The jñāna meditates on Brahman as his self and cultivates exclusive devotion to Him or ekabhakti and is the true bhakta, as his devotion is controlled by the single idea of attaining mukti. When Bhakti Yoga thus becomes a means to mokṣa, it is called parābhakti. This bhakti is awakened only by śāstric knowledge purified and sanctified by jñāna, and when it develops into a thirst for the direct intuition of Bhagavāna it is called parajñāna. Then the view of God becomes a vision of God, but it still is not perfect; love leads to a continuous and deep longing for God and unquenchable spiritual thirst; and then parābhakti becomes paramābhakti. The bhakta at this stage is not satisfied by mere visions, voices and auditions which are only intimations of immortality, but eagerly and restlessly seeks the stability of eternal bliss. The bhakta longs to see the beauteous form of Bhagavāna with the eye of the soul and hear the music of love with the spiritual ear. While the philosopher in him cogitates on
Brahman as the ultimate unity of all existing things, the bhakta hungers for union and communion with the Self who has established His home in the interior of his heart. He does not desire the gifts of God like aśvārya and kaivalya but seeks the Giver Himself. By renouncing his egoism, he seeks to attain Brahman, who is all in all. When the bhakta seeks God, God also seeks for him and the lover and the beloved are finally united in the realm of mukti.

What he means here by parābhakti being a means to mokṣa is especially unclear, especially as compared with Rangācārya’s view to the contrary which we have previously examined in connection with the Gītā; for all bhakti is to be taken as both upeya and upāya although in another perspective sādhanā bhakti—bhakti in the ordinary sense—does not quite achieve the coalescence of means and end, whereas sādhya bhakti—parābhakti, whether it be taken as the bhakti that comes after mokṣa or as the degrees or stages of mokṣa as in process of being achieved—obviously does. To say the least, it is quite clear that parābhakti comes after the ‘no return’ stage—the cessation to bondage to the dualities of life, whether this be the indication of mokṣa or not; and certainly, mokṣa or no mokṣa, after this stage has become reality, there is no more question of anything being a means, for the end has been achieved, and the stages that follow are only those of fruition, of kaiṅkarya and niṣkāma karma linked with contemplation and rapture.

Moreover, parajñāna cannot be the “thirst for the direct intuition” although it certainly is the “view of God becoming the vision of God...” But according to other authorities with whom we have discussed the question, it is the perfect vision of God, even if it be impermanent. And that impermanence is a very short one, too, for immediately after the vision, there is the transition to paramābhakti, which moreover, is not simply the unquenchable thirst, but the paradoxical unlimited satisfying of the unlimited thirst, and the earnest supplication that the constant stream or double current never cease to flow: a stream of bliss so full of precious love that the bhakta can scarcely believe, as it were, that it can go on forever—and this is the curious reverse of the samādhi rapture of parābhakti, wherein the bhakta confusedly thinks that the ecstasy, being a glimpse into or a foretaste of eternity, thinks that it will not end!
But enough of controversy and criticism! Much more of importance by far the movements of the spirit and its expressions than the definitions and delineations of the stages of the movements. And certainly as we plunge into this part of the Tiruvoimoli we shall quickly be carried far away from all sorts of controversial moorings. Such is its infectiousness that one is tempted to repeat the whole text, every stanza being a magic carpet that will carry one to realms ordinarily unknown. Here tradition is not far from wrong: if one gets the full juice out of any ten in the whole thousand, one will soon find himself drowned in the ocean of heavenly nectar!

According to strict traditional interpretation—which here seems quite in good keeping—the first ten of the ninth centum gives the key theme of the whole. Briefly, this is the final and extremely zealous thrust of renunciation of the world, the last determined closing the door with a slam as it were—zealous because it has come to the point of internal inevitability. For the emphasis is not on renunciation as such, but on the consuming ardency of the urgent desire—desire such as we have felt with Bonaventura—to finish the course and to be permanently and completely with the Lord. Wife, family, children, wealth and prosperity, self-complacency which is inevitably linked with carnal desire—all the 'normal' things of life fade into their inherent meaninglessness when compared to Krṣṇa, who is the only Way-and-End, the only Refuge. For Krṣṇa's incarnation, no less than that of the Christ, was for the sole purpose of establishing this truth of the exigency of prapatti and its subsequent bursting forth into parābhakti: How can there be anything higher than His Praise? And, "Even though you doubt His goodness, He will never leave you". (stanza 2). The second ten introduces Śrī, the Mediatrix; and, making the plea that his worthiness is based largely on the faithfulness of his ancestors (a tacit allusion to the pitṛyāna?) he calls to Nārāyaṇa, here addressed in the form of the Arcāvatāra in the lying posture at Tiruppulingudi, to rise up and grant a sight of Himself "even for one day so that those ignorant people may see thee....Come-Thee before our eyes, so that all the people of the world may worship Thy feet and raise themselves to obey thee, everyone of them, showing all their utmost love to praise thee with all
the strength of their language”. Here parenthetically we may note a sort of ‘missionary’ note which in Indian tradition as a whole is rather rare, although it is here by no means the spirit of proselyteism, but simply the exuberance of his parābhakti which is more like that of some of the Psalms than that of most modern Christian missionary ‘enterprise’. Alas if the missionaries of today, Vaiṣṇava and Christian and Vaiṣṇava alike, had more of this parābhakti, in which zeal grows out of love and not vice versa, India would indeed be the spiritual country which some Hindus vainly boast it to be, and most Christians are loathe to admit that it can be without total ‘conversion’.

The ninth and tenth stanzas give an appeal to the beauty of the Lord and His Consort Laksñi; beauty coupled with His death-dealing to asuras; beauty which provokes Nammalwar to a humility of intense intimacy: “Grant me” he sings in a spirit all-too-like the Franciscan exaltation of unworthiness, “Grant me, the worst of sinners, to hold thy feet (even) for one day. Call me, Come to me...” This reciprocal notion of the Call and the Coming is very significant: In parābhakti they cannot be separated, whereas in sādhanā bhakti, one gives only the invocation (We may remember Marcel’s emphasis on this, nevertheless, for it is not to be despised); but in parābhakti both are equally prominent: therein we invoke the Lord only in order to allow Him, as it were, to call us to Himself...or, reciprocally, one realizes that one is already ‘called’, and only prays for grace to answer the Call. For such is the Mystery of the Divine Presence: intersubjective appeal between prāpya and prāpaka; Epicentre and the Centre that is the Centre of centres come into proper relation, or rather, are harmonized and brought out of the previous chaos that was dynamized by the first arousing of bhakti, but not yet harmonized.

In the third ten, it is as though Nammalwar’s invocation has been successful, and there ensues an insurgent meditation of the boundless goodness of the Lord and His yearning Love. Beginning with the greatness of having a thousand names “everyone of which can become a thousand”, he goes through a sort of lauditory credo which includes the Creation; the Scriptures; the Heavenly world; the things like tulasi, ornaments, Laksñi in youthful form, etc., which signify the Lord’s grace and
beauty; the incarnation as Narasimha which symbolizes the concurrence of deliverance by destruction of unbelief with salvation in surrender; the destruction of karma (both punya and papa); and the capacity to enter other bodies. All this culminates in the almost unavoidable sentiment, "It is too much to say that I even attempt to worship Thee worthily with flowers, water, lamp and incense" for even Brahma and the deathless Eternals fail to praise the Lord adequately.

Then, in the fourth ten, this sense of unworthiness becomes more desperately intense: "My spirit", he cries, "is cringing like a dog trying to show its feeling with its wagging tail"! (stanza 3). And his offering of service seems to have been insufficient, for his mind remains restless (stanza 4). But his yearning is answered by the memory of former consolation: "I found Thee out. I fed my sight to its full on Thee. I rejoiced in Thy sight. I destroyed all my sins so that not the least remained...He bestows his grace on me and takes me as His servant...I attained Him and then I was liberated."

Liberation: moksa as salvation, but not yet sanctification, (which comes only with parajnana, the Vision which is also a transfiguration) much less beatification, the permanency of establishment which is also an ascension. But there is a sort of no return in this liberation: there is no more turning back to the world, even though there is still fluctuation between consolation and distress—spiritual distress, however, and spiritual consolation, for the things of the world no longer vex nor satisfy.

Thus, in the next ten (the fifth) the vihle sa returns with an intensity that is admittedly more characteristic of the Carmelites than the Franciscans. Couched in the traditional figures of appeal to the birds and beetles and clouds, it is here, as distinct from the former strains in which the same figures are used, dominated by the poignant memory of former love-union: "Krshna...ate up my life, and parted from me. I followed Him and became one with Him in Heaven...My body which He loved as His own ornament is accustomed (to Him only, and is now) ready to drop down." (9 & 10).

Out of this erotic strain comes (in the 6th ten) a higher understanding of grace as "double dealing": "He deceived my mind and entered into it, melted it, became my life itself and
devoured my soul.” (3) “His apparent double dealings are now clear to me. He with love, took delight in me and ended me. Now my soul is mere chaff.” (5) “Without any effort on my part, He came to me and assimilated my soul with Himself.”

(7) “I was eagerly thirsting after Him and I was ready to devour Him at the very moment I saw Him. But before I could do this, He took me up and drank me to the last drop... He is very quick.” (10) However, this understanding of the somersault action of grace does not relieve the poignancy of His passion, and the seventh ten resumes the višleṣa theme, with redoubled erotic fervour: “Tell Him that my breast with ornaments lost its colour... Explain to Him fully how my body is wasted away and my belt became very loose and is out of order... Tell Him that is not right for Him to neglect me!” (9, 10).

So far, the relation of the past to the present seems to have dominated his parābhakti. But as it becomes more intense the distance between bhakta and Lord becomes less; the longing is an elastic bond of love, it seems, whereby the Lover teasingly draws his love to Himself, twisting him (her—for always in this longing the female aspect of the psyche is in the ascendancy) around from past to future in a swirl of dizzy impatience—the impatience of the arthaparamaikāntina: “Is there any way for sinners like us to come near it?... And Tirunavoy is enriched with the groves in which He takes His pleasure-walks. On what day shall I, His humble servant, reach it?... I entered into Thy service and will never give it up. I do not know how many days I have (left) in this life. Oh! When will my eyes behold it and enjoy it to the full?... I affirm that I am Thy servant, and require Thy grace to continue so... Thou must also chase away my ignorance and enable me to keep Thee (constantly) in my mind...” In all, it is a sort of anticipatory plea for the parajñāna that comes in the 9th ten of the last centum.

But not before then. In the 9th and 10th tens, ‘she’ comes to the excruciating pain of loneliness, and the Flute of Kṛṣṇa takes the ear. The erotic strain stretches the psyche to the point of absolute desperation, and ‘she’ turns to thoughts of involution and evolution, which is the metaphysic of the Liebestod, the Love-death. ‘She’ has long since become irrational—the
irrationality of the great sea and the Divine Darkness which Gilson has caught in Bonaventura—and the appeal is no longer to the birds and the other things of nature, but to the human ‘maids of honour’. The agony of separation is so intense that the thought of what is charming to Śiva and Brahmā and Śri is bitter to ‘her’. The Night closes in with all its fragrance and erotic sounds, and ‘she’ even desairs of life. The sequestering, as Bonaventura terms it. But at long last, in the 10th ten, the consolation comes, and Peace—the quiescence that we have noted in Bonaventura—peace that comes with the refrain that “He is Love itself”. But peace is here, no more than with our Franciscan saint, not the end, but Praise, corporate praise. For with it, not only is the loneliness relieved, but the solitude of soul is broken by the Lord himself; and the Flute that was only heard is now replaced by the Lord of Paramapada personally appearing, as it were, out of his Highest Abode, with all His fullness of attributes of protection, friendship, etc. Desire—even the desire of spiritual love—is at an end, and there is assurance of no future distress. The art of divine love has reached its consummation, and the finite and infinite have been bridged; all sense of uncertainty has been banished by love, “For He is Love itself!”

This assurance continues quite steadfast throughout the tenth centum, although it does not prove by any means to be the end of the journey, and there are many hills and valleys yet to cross even beyond the range of death. We have already taken note of some of the points in common between the sequence here and that of the mokṣa section of the Brahma Sūtras, and even from that it may readily be seen how much territory there yet remains between earth and the Empyrean. In what sense death is involved is perhaps a little ambiguous, and it is true that Nammalwar does not make explicit allusion to it as the Sūtras do; but at least it may not be too much to risk the generalization that the ninth centum is parābhakti of the last leg of the earthly journey, like Dante’s casting a glimpse over the fields he has covered before passing on over into the heavenly ascent; whereas the tenth is the complete “about face” toward the High Realm which he finally reaches in the 9th ten in his Parajñāna. Not that earthly figures do not help him; his
devotion here is still focused on particular arca-vatāras until his being carried up into Vaikuṇṭha, but they all represent aspects of the trans-earthly journey of purification.

Thus in the first ten, there is a reiteration of the upāya-upeya doctrine which figures prominently in the early sections of the work as a whole; means-and-end at the beginning and means-and-end at the finish, for Nārāyaṇa is indeed Alpha and Omega: "We would not have anything else but Him as our means to reach Himself in any birth". (1&2) Even other deities, Brahmā and Śiva notably, are in the same condition. (3) Therefore let them be a company in the journey—a praising and confident company, and not just solitary meditators on the Ātman: "To put an end to our distress come on; brethren and fellow-servants, let us praise His feet." (4) "Oh my friends who love Him, come on. Let us circumambulate His temple and let us dance there." (5) For He has taken the initiative in being born of Daśaratha as Avatāra—a point not mentioned in the Sūtras—"Our Eternal Shelter approached us". (9) And throughout there is constant mention of His destruction of Asuras, of His overcoming demonic hindrances: the chief guarantee of success in the attainment of sanctity and beatitude beyond the granting of salvation.

In the second ten, the Assurance takes the stamp of surety of no return in a specific sense: "All our troubles will come to an end if we call on Keśava. The cruel giants of death will never approach us." (1) "If you but enter, enter into it. Sin will never come near you." (2) "All your disease and sins would be chased away." We of experience declare this to let you know. Repeat you one of His thousand names." (3) "Think always of my Father's name, worshipping Him with seats and flowers. It will cut off the results of this birth." (5) And following this the theme of Viṣṇu as the Primordial Cause in the form of the Vyūhas, Viṣvakāsena (Gaṇeśa, the Remover of obstacles) and Pradyumna the story about whom we have related previously, which embodies the metaphysics of the Assurance in the symbol of the return to Kṛṣṇa's court after his successful battle with the demon.

But lest in confidence of this Assurance the soul become careless or fall to the last temptation of pride and vainglory,
there is one last and final test of separation. This viśleśa is perhaps the finest in the whole Tiruvoimoli, and couched in a theme that is also a favourite with other Vaiṣṇava sects, the Caitanya cult in particular, namely Kṛṣṇa’s forsaking the gopīs and going off with the cows. But here there is a transfer of psychic focus from concern for himself—for themselves, for he is no longer alone, but, having through the Divine love come into deep-seated altruism (another essential aspect of mokṣa and of true parābhakti at its higher levels), he realizes that other bhaktas (gopīs) share the same plight, and thus together they are not concerned for themselves but for Kṛṣṇa: “We are Thy servants. O! Govinda! Thou dost not think of the sorrows of those whom Thou hast left. Thou lovest more the cows”. (4) “Our souls are melting and boiling like wax in the fire...Our eyes like the spotless lotus-flowers shed tears like pearls...Our arms hang lifelessly...” “Thy feet have the tint of the red lotus and they are as smooth as the flower blossoms. Thou wilt get footsore by going after the cows...While Thou tendest them, if Asuras try to fight with Thee we do not know what will happen.” (7) “O! My Lord, Go not Thou to attend the cows! Many Asuras set up by Kāmśa take alluring forms and wander about in Thy meadows and entice Thee. If they succeed many evils will come upon Thee. I implore You to listen to me.” (9) “Thou art too much alone. Thou dost not take Thy elder brother Balarāma with Thee. All these thoughts burn my soul and torture my mind. I beseech Thee! Take heed of my words!” Thus, as ever, even at this level the primordial is capped by the lyrical, the ethical by the aesthetic: it is only as one’s devotion lessens the distance from God that one’s distance from one’s fellow-devotees also begins to vanish. Again we are reminded of Marcel’s “community of sinners”—of fellow viatiores, for love in longing as well as love in ecstasy cannot remain solitary forever. It is the erotic that gives the transition from the merely personal to the interpersonal and the super-personal. Thus in the following ten, as the Presence is restored, just as in the last of the ninth centum (with the significant difference however that here Assurance gives way to firm resolution!). The theme shifts to the praise and life in Paramapadā; and not only the nitya sūris,
the Angels and Śrī, but also Nila comes prominently into the picture—Nila, who is not only the personal consort of Kṛṣṇa, the counterpart of Rādhā in the Caitanya tradition, but the ultra-primordial figure who symbolizes the “Cloud of Unknowing”, the Divine Darkness that harbours the lightning-flash of final Illumination, the lightning-flash which brings the soul from God as Brahman the Abstract Absolute to God as Paramapuruṣa. God as First Principle then is revealed by Himself as more than that, as superpersonal (not suprapersonal); and what had been assumed by the bhakta to be real knowledge is seen, from within this Mystery of the ‘Dark Illumination’ to have been only a lilā-like fraction of the living Truth. Then it is that he not only hopes for the end of the round of rebirths, but boldly exclaims, “There is no need for rebirths!” (3) and “I resolved not to let anything disturb this state.” (4) “I was certain of His not leaving my mind...So mysterious are His ways that I did not know all the time that it was He who was directing my ways.” (5) “He shines as a steady lightning will in a sapphire.” (7) “He is beyond the mighty gods. He is the One in existence at the time of evolution, and supports the whole. He tends the cattle.” This viśleṣa, as we might expect, is followed not only by consolation but by praise—praise of Nārāyaṇa, Nārāyaṇa who is not only the Highest but is also descending, all-pervading, accessible, destroying evil, bestowing mokṣa freely to his prapannas, in whose presence and by whose power of māyā (in its revealing aspect, as ‘magic’) eros flourishes as divine art: “Do not only follow Him and worship Him daily with fresh flowers, but also love Him and sing His praises through samāgama” (5) “Although He cannot be fully known even by the gods, He is accessible to His servants.”

Then he goes on to the consideration of the finalizing work of grace, with a pretty play on the (Tamil) words arul (grace), irul (darkness) and marul (ignorance), in a manner which seems to us a Vaiṣṇava analogue to the jīvanmukti concept, with only this difference, that the latter rests in the notion of perfection having been attained, whereas this, in a sort of ‘patient impatience’ is characterized by the nuance of eagerness for videhamukti coupled with submissive obedience in doing the work of vocation (in this case, the composing of the verses which we are
following): "(Nārāyaṇa) is hastening to take me into heaven. This has been the sole desire of my life, but my earthly work is not yet finished, so I still remain." (3) "O my good mind! Behold how ready our Lord is to do us any good." (4) And with great boldness (the Tamil original is explosively expressive here) "He of Vattar guides me into heaven. This is what He does. I go up into Heaven...Oh my good mind, now you can defy the agonies of hell!" (5) And the Lord's sweetness correspondingly takes on a freshness that envelopes him completely: "The fragrant Tulaśī wreath on His flower-like feet breathes perfumes circling, wafted by the breeze, plays on my body and gives out sweetness on all sides." (7) And even his former sense of unworthiness is swallowed up in gratitude: "What good have I done to Him? Yet He dwells and shines in my mind." (8) "He bade me serve Him throughout eternity. He established completely His dominion over me." (10) The distance is now permanently as well as completely bridged, and the experience of union or samādhi has given place to immortality.

What is the nature of that immortality? It is remarkable indeed how (in the 7th ten) he clothes the Upaniṣadic framework of the passing through the tanmātrās, mahat and ahamkāra (the different 'layers' of the psyche) and the aham Brahmasmi mahāvākya with the Mystery of the Lord's own inner working: "He entered into me in the form of poetry without my knowing it, nor did those around me know it. He became united with my mind and soul. He Himself became my mind and soul, and He filled me with Himself." (4) "He is He who is called I" (2) "The sages became intoxicated with joy. These sages meditate on the being who is beyond the realm of thought. He became myself and sang through me of myself with sublime thought and sweet metres." (5) "He is that one who is said to be One...He is my Lord." (9)

But if thus he treats the via negativa—for that is what it really is, the peeling off of all the exterior of the onion (the psyche) until only the sprout-core remains—see how (in the 8th ten) he brings this innermost core which is the immortal part of the psyche—see how he makes this grow afresh with a new form of life! Only bliss remains; this innermost core is the ānandamaya kośa, which is the ontological link between the human
psyche and godhead; and once it has been found, whatever remains of the outer sheathes is like the outer peeling which is soon to be cast into the garbage-heap: "Those who have attained this have already attained Heaven". (7) "I attained His feet thinking of the ease with which I got it." (4) "I am fully rewarded by Him. I am filled with ambrosia. I am happy." (6) "I was nothing before, Now He put Himself in me and made me something. Why did He suffer me to go astray before?" (9) Nevertheless, the final cap of the bliss is not the bliss itself (as the Vedānta usually teaches) but kaiñkaryā, selfless service of God and man in the same act, the spiritual work of intercession which is at once the fulfilment of vocation, (the carrying out of the commission one gets from God as distinct from the mere man-to-man relation that the 'Social Gospel' teaches) and the highest act of worship that the soul is capable of, (as distinct from the gnostic attempt at escaping all social responsibility in quietistic contemplation: "I reached Thee with a willing heart. I serve Thee. I attained Thy feet. O my Father, let this privilege be mine forever. Thou who servest only the servants of the Ruler of Tirupperai....I shall not be hindered by any troubles."

Eros has given place to agape; the service of man in God has coalesced with the service of God in man; and herein is the secret of the bliss of immortality. Need any more be said? Few there are indeed who get this far, but for that few nothing else remains. The course of parābhakti is complete, and perforce must give place to the Final Ascent of parajñāna, the rewarding Vision of Heaven, and the eternal delicately anxious "waiting on the Lord", paramābhakti.

Withal, it has not been such a short way, although the length of the journey is quickly forgotten because of the crescendo of intensity which has characterized it throughout. But the end of the journey is not a standstill; parajñāna skyrockets out of all ordinary dimensions. It is apocalyptic in every sense: Revelation. And Nammalwar's Apocalypse certainly compares very well with these in any other sacred text of the world's literature. We give it in full; and we leave the reader to his own interpretation, for these things are far beyond our reach
also:

1. Nārāyaṇa of ever-living fame is my Father. When His servants ascend to Heaven, the rolling clouds in the firmament thunder at the drums announcing the departure. The deep oceans sport throwing up their arms of waves as high as possible, saluting with joy the seven islands do obeisance and bring offerings, rejoicing at the journey.

2. The clouds of pure water in the high sky ranging themselves like golden pots full of auspicious Holy Water. All the oceans joined together roaring thunderous shouts of joy, and rejoicing in the sight of the servants of Nārāyaṇa. All the peoples in all the climes of all the worlds lifted up high triumphal arches with long lines of festoons and worshipped them.

3. Before Thee servants of His who measured the earth incense is offered. Showers of fresh flowers are rained upon them. The denizens of the higher worlds worship them. The sages welcome them, ranging themselves in two lines with profound reverence in their presence exclaiming in tones of sweetly sounding tunes. Behold this is the way to Heaven. Go on.

4. As they proceed in their way the gods of the several worlds show to them their several abodes. The suns in their courses point them the way with their hands of flaming rays. The roaring of the ocean is like the thundering of the marching drums. All this is done to the servants of Mādhava whose head is decorated with the fragrant honey-dripping tulasi.

5. As they were Mādhava's servants, the gods of the celestial worlds welcome them and pray them to enter and remain in their abodes. Upon this Kinnaras and Garuḍas sing sweet songs. Those who know how to pronounce rightly, chant vedic hymns with proper accents and utter them and offer sacrificial rites.

6. At the instant when those who know the Vedas offered them their sacrifices with the incense that scatters perfume on all sides, there are horns blown and conches sounded. The Apsarās of broad shining eyes with great
joy bless those servants of the Disc Bearer and acclaim them as their ruler of Heaven.

7. When the Apsarās bless them, Maruts and Vasus follow God’s servants hailing them. They sent forth their praises in all directions honouring the servants who have served for generations our Keśava who sleeps in the deep ocean and who dwells in Tirukkulantai, wearing the diamond crown of radiating splendour.

8. Those are the servants of Govinda. Knowing this, from generation to generation the Heavenly Beings wearing crowns welcome them in turns. In this way Mādhava of the holy Form leads the muktas into the gates of Vaikuṇṭha, where the Heavenly Hosts all come to marshall them into entrance into the place of vast tiers of walls surrounded by lofty towers with waving flags.

9. As they enter Vaikuṇṭha the angels meet them at the gates and lead them to the divine abodes. All the Heavenly Beings and the sages with great joy lift up their voices and acclaim the unspeakable bliss of these earthly beings who attain Heaven.

10. All the Heavenly Beings well versed in samāgama again lift up their voices and acclaim the Grace of God in granting them the bliss of welcoming among them those earthly beings who have attained Heaven. Upon this those learned in the Vedas washed the feet of the newcomers in order, and the Apsarās, with faces shining like the full moon, crown their heads with the sandals of God, and anoint them with perfume and wave lights placed on vessels full of holy water.

11. How all the Heavenly Beings came and welcomed Him; how he enjoyed the highest bliss in the Heavenly Court of Holy Adamant and how he was in the company of the servants of God, all this is related in this ten of the thousand stanzas of the Satakopa of Kurugur abounding with flowery groves. Those who know these ten will be able to meditate on the qualities of God in Heaven.

Tradition, of course, claims that Nammalwar actually ascended into the actual Heaven and was, as a rare exception, sent back to earth to write about it. Most moderns will take this
with a certain humanist ‘pinch of salt’; but even with this, behind the figures painted in the picture is some experience of a very high order indeed—something at least supra-normal which to analyze on our part would be presumptuous indeed! Perhaps the modern with comparable experience would express it in entirely different figures—if such a saint there be—but for the rest of us, it simply remains a reminder that there is yet something far beyond our highest experiences, and only the Grace of God will take us there. To which we can only add another AMEN! So be it!

Nammalwar, of course, was a poet-mystic, and not a philosopher in the usual meaning of that word, as Rāmānuja and Bonaventura were. But even at that, when it comes to this theme of parajñāna, Rāmānuja in a sense also ceases to be a philosopher, and his Vaikuṇṭha Gadya is more an echo of this Vision of Nammalwar’s it seems to us, than anything else. We return again now to St. Bonaventura, who as philosopher-mystic treats Dionysious’ Celestial Hierarchy in a way that indicates that he was not just following tradition, but writing not only from experience, but with broad as well as profound philosophical insight. Perhaps we are mistaken in taking this as his parajñāna, but it is certainly of the same order of revelational Vision which constitutes the quick passage through sanctity to beatification. And at any rate, any treatment of his system or of his non-systematic thought and feeling would remain incomplete without consideration of the Angelic Order.

For him the three orders of angels, cheribim and seraphim correspond to the three persons of the Blessed Trinity as primal emanations, and are interpreted as at once symbolizing and actually governing the regions, so to speak, of sacred knowledge, sacred ordering, and sacred action; or again, of power, wisdom, and goodness; or again of memory understanding and will. Each of these in turn is triplicated according to the pattern we have already examined in reference to the Trinity itself. But before going into the full exposition of this, he insists that these things come not by effort, but the revelation alone: 18

The reason of these orders is taken either from the reason of the eternal exemplarity or from the integrity of the hierarchy or from the diversity of the supercelestial aspects. And
since in that coordination is the greatest utility, it is extremely damming to neglect them. For just as to a blind man all celestial lights as they really are in themselves are forfeited, for he may not participate in them nor turn to them by seeing, so the angels offer their cooperation to whatever man (who seeks it), and so daily the aid of the angels (even) to a neglectful man comes unexpectedly, (even) if by an infinite neglect he has omitted the angelic illuminations.

The passage follows immediately after the section of the In Haxaemerone which last occupied our attention, all of which shows that he was not completely averse to the sort of things that Joachin of Flora and his followers experienced and taught. For he goes on to relate that a certain friar Aegidius did have such a revelational vision, in which the archangel Gabriel had made the enunciation, confirming this doctrine, semi-heretical though it was, of the correspondence to the order of the Celestials to the Trinity. It seems that the Masters at the University of Paris where he taught did not like such things, but he accepts the revelation without question in a way that intimates that he himself must have had some experience much like that of Aegidius.

Continuing, he further philosophizes that this correspondence, or ‘assimilation’ is again according to the three modes of ‘reduction’, ‘impression’ and ‘egression’, or according to beatification, origination or participation, and governing:

For beatitude is attributed to the first and corresponds to the supreme hierarchy because in beatitude the (divine) influence is poured out (effunditur); the reason of the participation is that because a lesser influence (comes into the viator) it is attributed to the middle hierarchy; and the reason for the governing is that it holds the least influence, as it is attributed to the lowest hierarchy.

Or again, these may be characterized according to ‘eternity’, ‘formosity’ and joyfulness (jucunditas): the eternity links the Father with the Thrones, the ‘formosity’, the giving of form, links the Son with the Cherubim, and the joyfulness corresponds to the Holy Spirit who is radiant (relucens) and resplendent in the Seraphim.

Here we have a very obvious analogue to the sat-cit-ānanda of the Vedānta. And for the rest, one may or may not see an
analogy between the *Vyūhas* of Vaiṣṇavism and these Seraphim, Cheribim, Thrones, Dominions, Principalities, Powers, Virtues, Archangels and Angels; but it seems to us that according to St. Bonaventura, they too at least serve an analogous function, namely that of *mediating* the principle of plurality in God and the principle of multiplicity in the world. At the least, they symbolize something in the realm of categories—categories not in the Kantian sense, but categories of metaphysical *functions* which have a certain finality *in* themselves but not *of* themselves. Moreover, it is enticing to speculate—in a manner at least not more fantastic than that of people like Ouspensky—that these functions are not mere abstractions, but of a ‘psycho-organic’ order: they are the psychic forces at work in the universe, which are neither God nor mere extensions of human consciousness, but quite literally as Bonaventura put it, ‘influences’ of a fourth dimensional (if not 5th, 6th etc.) type. Be this as it may, let us continue our examination of how Bonaventura enlarges on the relations of these ‘influences’. He continues by saying that God as Monarch

*Has power (pollens) by his supreme heavenliness (celsitudo), for He is supremely holy in loving the good; for which reason the order of the Seraphim corresponds to this (e.g. the Holy Spirit). He is supremely wise in discerning the truth, for which reason the order of the Seraphim corresponds to this (e.g. the Eternal Word). And He is supremely stable in making justice (justa—literally just things) firm, under which characteristic the order of Thrones corresponds to Him (e.g., as Father).*

Likewise, the Dominions are linked with the Father’s *presiding* power as establishing laws; the Son’s administrative function in regard to man and the world corresponds to the order of the Virtues, whose function is the doing of miracles; and the Powers are linked with the Holy Spirit, in repelling the inordinate and promoting the ordinate. This is interesting in view of the usual prejudice that in Christian heritage, God is not Creator, Preserver and Destroyer in the sense that the Hindu Trinity (Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva) is. We cannot force the comparison here, of course; but it must be admitted that there is at least something of the same principioation suggested here. And in the next paragraph of these ‘homologies’ the comparison is
even more forceful. For the ‘pasturing’ function of the Father is carried out by the Principalities in their responsibility of giving strength (roborare), the ‘leading forth’ by the Archangels, whose function is to reveal the profound and secret things (as Gabriel supposedly did to Friar Aegidius); and this of course is the province of the Son who becomes incarnate in order to lead men forth to the ‘better pastures’ of Heaven. And God as Holy Spirit is linked with the Angels, whose function is to be sedulous in giving constant help (suffragia) to men.

After this he continues with yet another pattern: Power, knowledge and operation are subdivided to correspond with the active, contemplative and mixed types of monastic vocation or religious life. Knowledge is threefold: lifting up (sursum activus) as ‘reducing’ to origin, speculative, as bringing illumination down, and giving sensibility or meaningfulness (sententiativa), and holding the district of judgment. These correspond respectively to the Seraphim, Cherebim and Thrones. Action is likewise threefold; perfection, which is the function of the Principalities; illumination the Archangels; and purgation the Angels.

But as we move on to the third grouping of distinctions of the supercelestial hierarchy as he gives them, we almost overlap into paramābhakti. For here he resorts to his old favourite scheme of above, around and below. And he notes that this is the way that Lucifer wished to prevent, for it concerns at once the relation of all things with God, with the self and with one’s neighbour...

The first, the above, is triplicated into the ‘reasons’ of elevation (susceptio), speculation, and union; or, as usual, with memory understanding and will. This ninefold hierarchy is then also linked with the nine orders of the heavenly host in the same way that all the rest we have examined. We may only note here that the benefits to man come in the following manner: that which is to be done (agendum) comes through the angels; that which is to be chosen (praeligendum), to archangels; and that which is to be pursued (prosequendum), the Principalities...

Then, in conclusion, following Dionysius quite closely, he writes as follows, with an ardency that reveals his own proficiency in all the characteristics which he is dealing with, which came to him from his parajñāna experience on Mount Alverno:
In the Seraphim is love continuous, intense, penetrative, intimate, suave, wise, acute; this love (amor) teaches to love (diligere) with all the heart, etc. Again the Cherubim designates the multitude of knowledges (scientiae) in the operation of virtue. The thrones are the seat of God elevated pre-eminently above all others; for they designate a certain sublimity, a certain firmness (firmatio—related to the firmament concept in the cosmic sense), or again to a certain amplitude. For the angels of this class are high, stable, extended, in whom appear the sublimity, stability, and familiarity of the Divine Judgment, for the most hidden (occultissima) counsels are opened to them.

Moreover in the middle hierarchy, first the Dominions signify a certain excellence, a certain liberty, a certain presiding (praesidentiam) and domination (dominatio), a certain power over contraries, and the dignity moreover in respect to the subject angels; nor do they have any desire of inordinate dominion, but rather power divinely ordained; for they have liberty that they may look into (aspiciat) no other than God. The Virtues have stability in enduring—sc. in not defaulting, fortitude in resisting, continuity in administering the affairs of men; for they teach the mind of the contemplator not to default nor to cease, but most attentively and firmly to be led up (sursumducit) into the divine. Just as the Dominions have presiding power, and the Virtues executive, so the Powers have defensive, repulsive, exterminative and triumphal power, conservative vigour (vim) in respect to terrific and ordinatized hosts, so that nothing whatsoever contrarious might be found in the army of celestial spirits...

In the lowest hierarchy (is found) the function of leading into the divine ordinately, powerfully, directly. For the first and principal reason of this leading and concomitance is with (apud) the Principalities. And (the function of) the Archangels is to accept and intimate this to the Angels. Moreover, to the angels are deputed principally the custody of men, whence they are called angels, which means messenger or one that is sent....And they do this either mediately or immediately. (and it is to be noted that)...in this sufficiency which is taken (sumitur) according to the nine dispositions so the Monarch, by this mode is accepted how the Monarch is refulgent in them more principally through order—sc. according to the reason of loving (diligentia), discerning and judging; again, according to the reason of speaking, of continuing, (psequentia) and judging; again, of leading (deducatio), of leading forth (erudientia) and of custody
(custodientia). (Yet) all these He does through Himself and communicates with the Angels so that they may cooperate with Him.

In more emotional, or at least in more traditionally pious, form, we also find in his Soliloquy, a vision—for it is certainly more than a mere picture—of the Celestial City, in which his ardency is certainly no less than that of Nammalwar, and seems even to have something like clairvoyance at its source. We cannot give this in full, although it is irreverent indeed to mutilate it. The figures are familiar enough, being taken mostly from the Apocalypse and other Biblical texts.

The luminosity of the Lord Himself instead of the physical sun or moon give it light; the perpetual feast of the Sacrifice of the Lamb of God is the food; the clothing of the inhabitants of the city is the ‘clarity’ of deification; its wealth is the chanting of the Divine Praises and Glories; and all things are held in common, for there perfect love of one’s neighbour is perfectly harmonious with the perfect love of God. There, in exalted station like Lakṣmi in the Vaiṣṇava Vaikuṇṭha, the Blessed Virgin Mary, with all her chorus of virgins, has her throne, being adored and adoring her Lord in turn; and the whole company of Widows, Confessors, Martyrs, Prophets and Patriarchs and Apostles take their respective places just beneath the hierarchy of angels and Archangels, each rejoicing in the merits of his superior, all equally praising God, rejoicing that they have been long since freed from sin and the bondage of the finite flesh and its tribulations. There all in humility and simplicity, fidelity, love, diligence, stability and patience, chastity and continence, exercise the virtues in perfection.

And then in his eagerness, he makes the long exclamation: O how happy for thee will be that day when thou wilt be returned to the heredity of the Father and with all of them with inestimable joy thou wilt be taken up and happily introduced to the bridal bed of the King! And thou shalt see, how truth there conquers rumour, how glory dominates all discourse; and then thou shalt begin to say with blessed Peter in a jubilant heart, ‘Lord, it is good to be here!’ (Math. 17:4) O Lord, permit us to be here and never to fall away hence!

Here we see how immediately parajñāna leaps over into paramābhakti. This last “permit us never to fall away” is
paramābhakti pure and explicit. And if we reflect a bit, we may readily see how in all his works he is apt to be lifted up into it, thus fully deserving his title of Doctor Seraphicus; for we may not forget his own scheme, viz., that the middle hierarchy gives parajāna, but the highest, of which the Seraphim is the highest, and almost identical with God Himself as Love Divine, this is the province of paramābhakti. Thus, not to fall back from the high estate to which we have been lifted by his grace, we must speedily seize upon other things he has to express concerning these Highest Mysteries. We thus turn to the last section of the Itinerarium.

The approach, of course, has been through the various levels of contemplation. But this highest level is hardly even contemplation any more, but an ontological event: the self is no longer itself, but has exchanged places with the Incarnate Word—much as in the Bhāgavatam tradition, at the climax of Rādhā’s dalliance, she and Kṛṣṇa really exchange identities. These are not just Mysteries, but Secrets, with which we are really not worthy to deal; and it is only in a spirit of hope that some reader may be taken through what our hegemon has been trying in vain to teach us, far beyond us, that we have to present it. For it is in this sense of ontological exchange that Bonaventura writes of Christ as “the ladder and vehicle such as was the covering set up over the Arc (of the Covenant of the Old Testament) of God, and a secret hidden from the world”. (an allusion to Exod. 25:30 and Ephesians 3:3).

But he who would look into this Arc (which is also the Cross) must have his whole countenance changed; he must become himself suspended thereon, “through faith, hope and love, devotion, admiration, exultation, appreciation, praise and jubilation.” For as in the world love is the creative source of life, so here, the order is reversed: life must be suspended in the light of these virtues that are really God’s own, and be sacrificially converted into existential love which is pure Being itself. But to him who is taken through this Secret Sacrifice, along with the thief who died with Jesus, it will be said by the same Christ, “today thou shalt be with me in Paradise.” St. Bonaventura then points to his no less Seraphic Father Francis as one who was the perfect example par excellence of this
degree of paramābhakti—Francis who received the stigmata on
the same mountain where St. Bonaventura wrote this work.
But he warns that it is not cheaply or easily reached. The con-
tions are severe; but the order of severity is not on par with
rigorousness of technique (scientific, artistic or otherwise) or
vehemence of ascetic discipline, but spiritual in the strictest
sense, baffling to the rationalist, devastating to the sentimentalist,
revolutionary to the traditionalist:

In the transit, if it is to be perfect, it is necessary for all
intellectual operations to be relinquished, and for the whole
of the apex affectus to be transferred and transformed into
God. This moreover is mystical and extremely secret, for
'no one knows it unless he receives it' (Apocalypse 2:17) and
no one receives it unless he desires it, nor does he desire it
unless the fire of the Holy Spirit influences (literally: flows
into) his very marrow—the same Holy Spirit which Christ
has sent into the world. And thus the Apostle (I Cor. 2:10)
says that this mystical wisdom is revealed through the Holy
Spirit... But if you ask how these things are to be done, en-
quire of grace, not doctrine, desire, not intellect, the groan-
ing of prayer, not the study of writing, the Spouse, not the
master of theology, God, not man, the Cloud, not the clear
day; not light (lux) but the fire totally inflaming and trans-
ferring into God by excessive function and extremely ardent
affection. For such a Fire is God, and His furnace is
'Jerusalem' (Isaiah 31:9), and Christ Himself was therein
kindled in the fervour of his most ardent passion, whom he
alone truly perceives who can say, 'My soul chose to be
suspended' (Job. 13:1). Which death he must choose who-
ever would see God, for indubitably it is true: 'No man
may see God and live' (Exod. 33:20).—Therefore let us
die and enter (ingredianum become an ingredient of)
into the Cloud; let us impose silence on all solicitude,
concupiscences and appearances; let us make the transfer
with Christ crucified from this world to the Father (Jn.
13:1), so that, the Father being shown to us, we may say
with Phillip, 'It suffices us.' (Jn. 14:8); let us hear with St.
Paul, 'My grace is sufficient for thee' (II Cor. 12:9); let us
exult with David, saying, 'My heart and my flesh fail me, but
God is the rock of my heart and my portion forever.' 'Blessed
be the Lord forever and ever; and let all the people say, Let
it be, let it be, Amen.' (Pss. 73:26 and 106:48).

What then is the condition after this spiritual immolation is
complete?
For this we turn back to the *Soliiloquy*, in which we find the "Soul" saying:

O man, how indeed I languish with love (amore) of seeing the Lord God my Creator. I fail in myself (deficio) with ardour of discerning Jesus my brother and redeemer. Now indeed I groan with the wounds of desire of beholding the Virgin Mother. O when shall I see my joy, which I desire? O when will my consolar come, for whom I await? O when will I become inebriate with the sweetness (ubertate) of His house, for which I sigh? (thus far a quotation from St. Anselm) Now how heavy indeed is every creature to be seen for indeed exceedingly incomparably does His beauty surpass (superemine) that of all these, from whom they all proceed.

And 'Man' replies,

O Soul, await with patience, so that your desire may increase, for it is written, 'Yet a little while and ye shall not see me, and yet a little while, and ye shall see me.' (Jn. 16:16).

But the 'Soul' still complains,

O such a long little while, such a very prolix little while, for even if that little while is merited, yet the desire is very long.

And 'Man' replies at length:

O Soul, if long and great your desire seems to you, with which you burn for contemplating the eternal openness (claritas), how much, do you think, you ought to burn with desire of loving the eternal Goodness perfectly and possessing the highest Majesty eternally? For if you do not love it in the highest way, how will you rejoice in the Vision? And if you see and love it, and yet do not possess it with a sincere mind, how will you remain blessed?

And finally, in the words again of St. Anselm,

O human heart, heart in great need, heart expert in tribulation, heart overwhelmed with hardships, how thou shalt rejoice if thou abound in all these delights of heaven! Enquire of thy most intimate parts, if they can take hold of such joy as thine over such beatitude as thine.—But if man can scarcely seize his own joy over such beatitude, how capable will he be of so many and such joys when he will be of the number of the elect, where each one will love his neighbour as himself, and will love as much as is his rejoicing!...

...Thus I pray, O my God, that I may know Thee, love Thee, that I may eternally rejoice in Thee. And if I cannot
do so to the full in this life, quickly increase even now and here the knowledge (notitia—recollection) of Thee and the love of Thee, that there may be full joy, though here it be in hope, and there in actuality (hic in spe, ibi in re). Lord Father, through Thy Son Thou givest counsel and indeed orderest us to seek, and promisest to accept our petition that our joy may be full (Jn. 16 : 24) I petition Thee, Lord, that so it be....... May my mind meditate on this, may my tongue speak of this, may my heart love this, may my mouth teach (sermocinetur) this, may my soul hunger for this, may my flesh thirst for this and may my whole substance desire it until I enter the joy of my God, who is three in one, Blessed for all ages. Amen.

To add anything to this, which, simple enough in form, is the most ultimate prayer any human being could pray, would be like singing the “Star Spangled Banner” after hearing Beethoven’s 9th Symphony. We can only hope that by now it is also the reader’s prayer, for it is not a solo, but a symphonic expression although put in the first person singular, like the chorus in a Greek drama: the final Universal I of heavenly humility. And it is the same ‘I’ that is praying in the final ten stanzas of Nammalwar:

O Great Being by whose thought creation is evolved, O four-faced One, O three-eyed One, Thou art my sapphire with fruit-like mouth and lotus eyes. O my dear mysterious One: I am alone, Thou art my very life. Thy Divine Presence overwhelms me. Hereafter I will hold fast to Thee. I pray Thee not to subject me to Thy mysterious ways (māyā).

I adjure Thee by Thyself not to subject me to Thy māyā. Śri and Thy consort who is like a wreath of flowers rests on Thy breast. Thou knowest that Thou loveth me. Thou didst take me to be one with Thy soul. Thou didst this freely once. Come Thou again before me. Call me and take me to Thyself. O my perfect sapphire! Thy navel is the origin of Brahmā, Śiva and all who resort to worship Thee. Thou hast dominion over all the heavenly Beings. I know, my soul knows no other support but Thee. Come, call me and take me. Thou art the primordial inert matter. Thou art the innate force in it. Thou art the mundane sphere. Thou art the Transcendent Splendour of it. Thou art Brahmā and Hara in it; Thou art He by whose thought the gods and others were created. Thou didst once uphold my cause. Now Thou hast left me here.

Thou art to me Ambrosia which never cloys. Thou didst drink up my soul satisfying thy thirst as a piece of white-
hot iron does with water when poured upon it. If Thou rejectest me again and lettest me go astray, whom shall I hold? What shall I do, alas? Then what is it that is mine, and what is it that is I? What is ‘mine’ and what is ‘I’?

Thy colour is of the blue lotus. Thy eyes are like lotuses. Thy mouth is like a ripe fruit of sweet fragrance. Thou lovest the flower-maid whose beautiful form is worthy of Thee, thou art my very ideal of love. Thou art my soul and my life. Thou didst eat up my soul and my life to satisfy Thyself. Swallow up the rest also.

Thou lovest me as Thou lovest Thy consort of the beautiful flower-born Śrī. Thou didst take the form of the great Boar that was like a sapphire mountain bearing crescent-like tusks. Thou didst measure the earth and took possession of it. Thou art my Lord, Thou didst churn the blue sea. I attained Thee. How can I part from Thee hereafter?

Thou art the two actions of my soul (e.g., those giving comfort in this world and in Svarga). Thou art the result of these actions. Thou art the soul of all the worlds, which are like a vast enclosure. Thou enteredst into it and hiddest thyself in it completely so that no sign of Thee appears. Thou art the primordial seed germ. Thou art mine. I attained Thee; would I lose Thee?

Thou art the primordial Seed, which is the origin of all the three worlds. Thou art the matter which is the visible universe. Thou art the First One, Thou pervadest everywhere. Thou art deep in the depth. Thou art high in the highest. Thou pervadest in the intermediate spaces. Thou art the External Souls. Thou art One and always incomparable. Thou art quite distinct from all these. When shall I go to Thee and attain Thee (forever)?

Thou art the matter that surrounds all, extends all over, deep in the depth, high in the height, indestructible and incomprehensible. Thou art the Transcendental Soul which is above matter and pervades throughout matter. Thou art the Self conscious, Glorious Bliss, more incomprehensible than matter and force and Thou pervadest them both. My thirst after Thee is greater than all this. To quench all this thirst Thou didst take me into the enjoyment of the Eternal Self-conscious Bliss. O what a miraculous and wonderful deed!

The highest longing....And nothing for man is higher. For while yet he remains in the flesh, howsoever transformed by
grace, man may have only a foretaste, even in the most advanced types of rapture or samādhi—a foretaste of what? How can we really say? Why should we read the programme notes after the concert is over? For it is not ‘only’ a foretaste, although the Desire for the Finality may even drown our gratitude. And as ‘moderns’, we are at least as capable of this Desire as our medieval brothers and/or the foretaste as well, as Marcel pewanantly feels... The Desire is the thing, not the Doctrines; bhakti, first, last and beyond the end. And he who is drowned it this Desire need not even ask what is beyond our all-too-human world, whatever his place in history, for in the Desire that Mystery lives; the Mystery of God, of Life and Joy and Peace and Plenitude, “that is greater than all of this”. We call this paramābhakti; but that word we fail to define. For not only all effort at definition has become a useless vanity, but even our petty prayers—even our most vibrant, even our own unbelievable experiences of grace—of which this whole work has been but an echo: everything fails and falls away...except that Desire...And about it, what can ‘I’ say? what can I say?

For we have no knowledge of His ways
But He has given us of His Spirit.
MOKŠA

PARĀBHAKTI, PARAJÑĀNA AND PARAMĀBHAKTI

1. Govindacārya's translation, Īśvara Datta's note significantly varying.
2. Govindacārya's translation.
4. p. 145.
6. Ibid., pp. 395 & 397.
9. In Hexaemeron, Coll. II: 30 (ed. cit., p. 30 ff.)
CONCLUSION

Imperfection

Encircling manifold the inner core
Layer on layer lays in store
Faults and foibles and inabilities
Obstructing show of new attainment.

Daily faults in the trivial round
Hinder not the inner sound
And spontaneity. But see
The chaos when the old is turned to new!

The ancient lights of sheer eternity
Are shaded still: fraternity
Is seldom born upon the mountain height:
Only the Reflection in the valley.

Until the time of Right Return
There's hindrance of expressibility.

* * *

Am I excused? Or may I blame Thee,
God of my radical old uncertainty?
Where leadest Thou me? Why
The agony, the faultering, the false rest

Before each new surmounting? Where
Art Thou, Invisibility? To dare
To dive alone into discovery
Is not within my power.

As though each faltering step were death
—And death it is, else every breath
Would bring full memory: accumulation
Of the past brings never knowledge of the soul.

"Perfection lies at that Last Point"
He said; "Even the Self is not eternity".

* * *
But so it should not be! Within, Within, deeply, deeply I find no sin; The bargain was made with Thee, Seducer in illusions’ game!

The core of me is Thine own voice; Not mine the foolish fatal choice That led me to this fear, this state Of inaccountability.

Nor mine the tense rebellion, Nor mine the bliss, the clarion Peace, the restoration, the grace To make a valid prayer...

Am I not thine?...“Not yet; For still there’s imperfection.”

Not yet! How long? How wrong This stubborn Remnant, this thong That binds my very being to the Ancient Man, This hindrance to Thine incarnation!

Thou dost not descend with me! Though first it seems that all is free, That all is learned in each rebirth, There still remains mortality.

—And disobedience: the new rules Broken, the old ones never kept, the tools Of rationality failing every plan, Misconstruction of Thy pure untempled Light.

Nārāyaṇa! Thy Name is not enough! “Look then to the clouds and sky. I dwell therein not secretly”.

*     *     *

But Nature also holds great imperfection. Art Thou not rather Antaryāmin,

Dweller within, Ruler of my great complexity, Governor of the heart, dispellor of perplexity?
CONCLUSION

Why then look without, why the need
Of integration, the foolish management of false worlds?

The way of the second-best is not Thy way,
Nor Thine the reflected refracted ray,
Nor Thine the infidelity. Nor mine
The perfect grace, mokṣa in the market-place.

It is too much! Thou dost not rule!
Nor can I bear responsibility; a fool
Can never guide himself nor judge
When every moment determines his destiny.

Holy God, Complete Thy work of life
And light and joy and peace and perfect love!

* * * * *

"The others, yes. But not yet perfect peace.
I dwell in My world symbolically.

The Spirit I, the heated heavy Breath,
The Agni of the gastric fire, the death
Of all that's gross, the Wind that
Soon will blow the flickering candle out.

I come as wrestling Angel, angel also
Of the voice of thunder—or as Kalki: whose
Hopes for fragrance must forbear
The Last Destruction, must endure

The earthquake in the heart, the whirlwind
In the mind, all fond hopes rescind.
My light is blinding light, my bliss
Is maddening sweetness, my love, consuming mystery.

Holy God, open the way; Holy God, open
The Way that leadeth into Thee!

"The way was always open, that
You know, but few have entered in.

Deluded by their stupid prayer, their piety,
Their fond diffusion, their sad satiety,
Transfixed too soon on lesser crosses:
You too have embraced me with false kisses”.

* * *

But still that imperfection! And I accuse
Not myself but Thee: What refuse
Of good judgment I’ve become,
Bartered to some demon’s harem!

Have I become Thy ‘virgin’, awful
Prostitute, like the fallen angel
Through whom Thou still dispellest
Mercy—but yet art jealous?

Not the falling, not the First Event,
But the Bondage that remains while yet the body lasts.

* * *

“But I have Work for you to do,
And suffering is the chief of it.
Purity not for you; but for My world

Some secrets sown within your mortal
Hull. You forget them; that’s your fatal
Lot and your salvation. Yours alone
The husk that must be broken.

So the sprouting plant will grow in rot—
My fertile Earth: Marvel not!
All birth is sacrificial pain,
All woe is for Humility.”

So be it; I submit. But I pray
Let not the Children also die.
Birth can also bring mortality!

* * *

“But many are the forms of death!
Be not deceived, I am also Yama.

You have seen me thus in life;
In every subtle form of strife
I grossly lurk, reversing all
That would usurp each sure dimension.”
Not this, Lord! The worn-out myths
Of Phoenix, Apollo and the piths
Of apples that contain the seed:
Not now! That Age is also dead.

Nature only holds the cyclic round.
Why bid me then afresh confound
Thy Crucifixion with Thine high Eternity?
Paradox grows old, it does not die....

Art Thou divided? Thou, as we?

* * *

Not Thou Yama; Thou not Morpheus,
One of lesser Frame! Were I Orphous
I'd still proclaim Thee still unvanquished.
Jahweh Thou—and yet Thou wouldst command

Us be as Thee, deathless, unreturning
To the round of birth, burning
All desire with seals of prophecy
Upon the tongue—

Revelations also come and go;
They also die. But no,
Not Thou, from whom they come!
—Or are they Thine, O Sheer Silence unrevealed?

Unseasonable immortality:
Can I proclaim it? For lo,
The Sun itself, they say, will some day cease.

* * *

"Death is principle, death the dead
Have never known, as the living dread
Its dawning, deeming not their doom
To day, blindness to the stars' infinity."

This I've learned, or partly learned.
I dimly see: For I've spurned
All former speculation, yet death
I know as Imperfection. And when Gaṅgā
Took my friends into her womb
And left me struggling, giving room
For only OM as her propitiation,
I learned the Question:

Many are the forms of death.
But what is Death, and what
—Or Who..art Thou, whom men call Brahma?

"The answer to that comes not in the Question.
For the Quest that engages you, life and all action,
Involve much more than the heart and the mind.

Praise is the answer. Praise and the end of all malice.
After the peace comes the practice,
After the formless the form".

Then may we praise Thee, after the end of all scorn,
After the victory, after that peace is born,
—Or before, before the New Thing is won?

"Praise is your privilege, and duty.
The new and the old do not matter, the beauty
That is classic, the timeless:
The liturgy, the litany, the mantra, the song:
These you must make, and remake; the throng
And recluse alike find them mine".

Thirsting I’ve praised Thee as distant, and long;
Bursting I’ve praised Thee, insistent and strong.
But now I cannot remember. The theme

Was not mine. Was it Thine, echoing only within me,
Partially? At that moment I thought myself free
From the Question; the solemnity

That drowned down the shame, the Desire that had no true name—

Ah there! Yes! Yes! I do praise Thee, and blame
Thee no more. And I laugh in my weeping,
Praying for pardon, upraising to glory the spark
That was kindled in misery. Let me unbark
The tree of knowledge no more.

...And Love. Hast Thou not come secretly, concealed
In the hour of my need, needing me, unpeeled
The fruit of perfection before me,—as Man?

Fellow-men, fellow-sufferer, Thou; hidden
Thy doings provokingly, working in secret unbidden.
Unbidden I serve Thee, complaining no more.
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Note: This list is, apologetically, only partial. General works on comparative philosophy and religion and on Indian Philosophy which are generally known are deliberately omitted; but due to circumstances beyond control, such as having a bibliographical notebook pick-pocketed in Madras, have necessitated omissions which are much more serious. Likewise, in the field of Western Mysticism, and recent translations of the minor works of St. Bonaventura, are omitted for the simple reason that they are not available in the libraries in which we were able to work. In some cases, even books formerly in our own possession were not returned from being borrowed—books picked up in out-of-the-way places. And for that matter, in a few cases, works known about, but unavailable to us, have been omitted for the simple reason that we have not consulted them...... Such are the conditions that dictated our working in a more 'traditionalistic' way than according to the standard methods of western scholarship; hence our remark in the Dedi-
cation, that what is presented is more of a ‘Purāṇa’ than a thesis of the usual sort. This applies also to the following list of articles in Indian Journals.

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17. April, 1937: Ram Murti Loomba, “Doctrine and Expression in Mysticism.”
22. April 1940: H.N. Bhattacharya, “The Problem of Value in Indian Philosophy.”

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27. Gopinath Kaviraj, “The Doctrine of Pratibha in Indian Philosophy” Vol. V.

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34. P. S. Sastri, “The Aesthetic Categories” Vols. XLIV and XLV.


NOTE: Articles from the Brahmavadin are not mentioned, for the reason that every volume is full of relevant material. It was primarily the organ of Govindacharya, and most of the anonymous work therein is his work. The same applies to the Journal of the Venkateswara Oriental Institute, which, of course, is the chief organ of Vaisnavism of the South today.

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INDICES

Introductory Note

One dear pundit under whom I studied during the days I was working on this book, when asked why a certain book did not have an index, said, "But why don't they read the book?" inferring that anyone who really studied something worthwhile should know it well enough to know first-hand where each topic is discussed.

By no means are these indices exhaustive; that would only implicate everyone in a maze of tedious and often useless metrical. But it is hoped that by using them in conjunction with the Table of Contents the basic matters will be easily located.

Acknowledgement is due to the following student friends and co-workers who assisted very substantially in compiling these indices: Miss Trisha McMorrow, Mr. Alan Stubbs and Mr. Randall Miller (who also designed the dust-cover).

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