THE ETHICS
OF
BUDDHISM
THE ETHICS
OF
BUDDHISM

BY
S. TACHIBANA
Professor of Pāli and Primitive Buddhism
at the Komazawa-Daigaku, Tokyo

LONDON : CURZON PRESS
NEW YORK : BARNES & NOBLE BOOKS
FOREWORD TO THE SECOND IMPRESSION

A popular, if erroneous, conception of Buddhism has been that of self-negation or even nihilism, that is to say a religion that is negative in its basic attitude. Truer it is to state that Buddhism is a creed which is essentially positive in that it provides an ethical philosophy irrespective of time and place, the counsel of true moderation as prescribed by the Noble Eightfold Path which, by avoiding the extremes of self-indulgence on the one hand and self-mortification on the other, leads along a middle way 'which produces insight and knowledge, and conduces to tranquillity, to transcendent knowledge, to complete enlightenment.'

Such qualities as are required to traverse this Middle Way are nothing if not moral, and such morality is necessarily positive in demanding the virtues of righteousness — understanding, thought, speech, action, livelihood, effort, mindfulness and concentration — an eightfold aim which provides the core of the Buddhist philosophy of life. It is these great moral attributes which Professor Tachibana expounds as being the essence of Buddhism and providing a way of life based on tolerance and benevolence.

A new impression of this standard work serves therefore to restate and confirm what was emphasized in the first instance and which abounds in the Buddhist scriptures, and one is grateful for this lucid exposition of those fundamental moral principles which are disregarded at dire peril and which therefore require further study and continued understanding.

Much has been written about Buddhism in the intervening years since this book was first published and its bibliography is of vast extent. Some useful works are nevertheless commended for further reading and are listed on the pages immediately following; they are designed to supplement those included in the bibliography at the end of the book.

LONDON, 1975
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY

SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY


T. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, Leningrad,
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY


*The dates of the latest editions, where known, are indicated*
PREFACE

This is in the main the thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, presented to, and accepted by, the University of Oxford in 1922, the original thesis being entitled 'Ethics of Pali Buddhism'. I am aware that the subject which I have taken up is rather broad, and that to make it anything like complete I should have to write a few hundred pages more, which, however, it is impossible for me to do at present; and therefore I am obliged to send it to the press as it is. This being the case, what I have specially endeavoured to bring into prominence in this dissertation is that Buddhism in its origin is a religion of a moral nature, and that the morality which Buddhism particularly emphasizes is a practical one; and I believe I have been able to make these points clear.

Nearly every work written on Buddhism, from R. Spence Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, which was published over sixty years ago, to Sir Charles Eliot's *Hinduism and Buddhism*, which appeared just before I finished my dissertation, contains something about Buddhist ethics and morality. But so far as I know, no work is specially devoted to the study of this single subject. In 1914 Dr. Paul Dahlke published *Buddhismus als Religion und Moral*; but this is a collection of writings, dealing with aspects of Buddhist religion and ethics and other similar subjects, which were previously published
in periodicals. This was followed in 1921 by Dr. Wolfgang Bohn's *Die Psychologie und Ethik des Buddhismus*. These are, so far as I know, the only works dealing, not wholly but especially, with the ethical aspects of the Buddha's teaching. This is one reason why I took the subject for my thesis.

Religion is wisdom to Brāhmanism; philosophy is wisdom to Mahāyānism or the advanced form of Buddhism; and morality is wisdom to Pāli Buddhism or its primitive form. Every one of these is at once a religion, a philosophy, and an ethical system, but each of them has its characteristic features; and Pāli Buddhism, as anybody who knows it is aware, is characteristically ethical. The ethic of Mahāyāna Buddhism is founded upon pantheistic doctrine among many other things, while that of Pāli Buddhism is established upon or deduced from the doctrine of rebirth, sympathy, Kamma, 'non-self-ism', &c. The pantheistic doctrine which is shared by both Mahāyānism and Brāhmanism is completely absent in Pāli Buddhism. Except for this point and others of negligible importance, there is not much difference between the ethical systems of the two forms of Buddhism. Any one who sets out to frame a system of Buddhist ethics, whether Mahāyānistic or Hīnayānistic, especially in its practical aspect, will mainly resort to the materials which I have used in writing this dissertation, or to works which are regarded as translations of them or as being at least in the same stage of theoretical development. I venture to say, therefore, that an interpretation of the ethics of Pāli Buddhism is an interpretation of
Buddhism in general. I have therefore changed the original title of this thesis, 'Ethics of Pāli Buddhism,' into *Ethics of Buddhism*.

The object of this dissertation being to explain the practical morality of Buddhism, I thought it would be better to go through the investigation of its cardinal virtues than merely to abstract its moral idea and philosophize it. This is, I think, the best way of elucidating the practical side of morality.

For the publication of this work I owe everything to Dr. J. Estlin Carpenter, D.Litt., D.D., ex-Principal of Manchester College, Oxford. He has put me under a great obligation by supervising my work and reading over my manuscripts, and in many other matters. It is through his kindness that it is now possible for it to be brought out in book form. I wish to express my sincerest thanks to him. Similar thanks are due to Mr. F. J. Sweatman, M.A., member of the staff of the *Oxford English Dictionary*, who helped me by reading proofs and compiling the index. Lastly I should gratefully acknowledge my obligation to the Rev. S. Ishikawa, late abbot of the Sōjiji Monastery, Tsurumi, near Tokyo, who sent me to England to prosecute the study of these and other subjects, and who, I am sorry to say, passed away in November, 1920, before my return.

S. T.

*Tokyo, 1925.*
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREFACE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## BOOK I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Introduction</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Short Account of the Buddha's Life</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Outlines of Indian Thought previous to the Rise of Buddhism</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Classification of Buddhist Morality</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Characteristics of Buddhist Morality</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## BOOK II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VI. Self-restraint</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Abstinence, Temperance</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. Contentment</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. Patience</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. Celibacy, Chastity</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI. Purity, Purification</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII. Humility</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII. Benevolence</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV. Liberality</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV. Reverence</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI. Gratitude</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII. Toleration</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII. Veracity</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIX. Righteousness</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX. Conclusion</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEX</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

(The figures following abbreviated titles, in the case of Dhammapada, Suttanipāta, Theragāthā, Therīgāthā, refer to the number of the verse, in the case of Iti-vuttaka and Udāna, the number of the discourse, and in the case of others, the volume and page, of the editions published by the Pāli Text Society. Small Roman figures (i, ii, iii, &c.) signify volumes, while capitals (I, II, III, &c.) denote numbers of Sūtras or chapters.)

A. Aṅguttara.
Āp. Āpastamba, SBE. ii.
Brethren Psalms of the Brethren.
Bṛih. Bṛihadāranyaka.
Bṛihad. Bṛihadāranyaka.
Chānd. Chāndogya.
Com. Commentary.
D. Dīghanikāya.
Dh. Dhammapada.
ERE. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
Ga. Gautama, SBE. ii.
Hume The Thirteen Principal Upanishads.
It. Iti-vuttaka.
Jāt. Jātaka.
JPTS. Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
Khu. Khuddakapāṭha.
M. Majjhimanikāya.
Mn. Manu.
Mah. Mahāvaniṣa.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Rogers  A Student's History of Philosophy.
        S.  Saṁyuttaniκāya.
SBB.  Sacred Books of the Buddhists.
SBE.  Sacred Books of the East.
Sisters  Psalms of the Sisters.
        Sn.  Suttanipāta.
        Sum.  Sumaṅgalavilāsini.
        Tha.  Theragāthā.
        Thī.  Therīgāthā.
        Ud.  Udāna.
        Vin.  Vinayapiṭaka.
        V. M.  Visuddhimagga.

ERRATA

Page 50, line 15.  For bāla read bala.
Page 96, line 15.  For Srāvakas read Śrāvakas.
Page 220, note 1.  For Gautana read Gautama.
BOOK I

I

INTRODUCTION

The Buddha's Contemporaries (1). Where the Buddha and the Brâhman each lays stress (4). The Buddha and Socrates (7). Their personalities (8).

Between the seventh and fifth centuries before Christ, the history of mankind witnessed the appearance of teachers of spiritual matters almost contemporaneously in the West and the East.¹ Pythagoras (580–500 B.C.) was born on the island of Samos, in the Archipelago. After many travels, which are said to have extended as far as India, he settled down at Crotona, in Italy, where he established an ethico-religious society, the members of which were bound together by common beliefs and rules.² The injunctions of celibacy, abstinence, asceticism, meditation, devotion, and the social virtues, together with the doctrine of the transmigration of souls and moral retribution which he is said to have taught to his disciples, remind us of his acquaintance with the teachings which were prevalent in India in those days. Socrates in the latter half of the fifth century (468–400 B.C.) taught the oneness of knowledge and virtue. One seeks for knowledge, says he, not on its own account, but that it may be put into practice. There is no break between knowing and doing; wise men are always good men. When knowledge is truly realized, it will always be carried into

¹ Hinduism and Buddhism, vol. i, p. xix.
² Rogers, Student's History of Philosophy, pp. 85–8.
practical action. Knowledge is thus identified with virtue. In Persia, Zarathustra, or Zoroaster, as he is more commonly known through his latinized name, appeared somewhere in the seventh century and taught an ethico-religious doctrine of dualistic principle, according to which there are two principal spirits, who appeared to him in vision as twins, one good and the other bad in thought, speech, and action. The wise know to choose rightly, but the foolish not so. By his right choice, the man who obeys the law helps the good spirit, Ahura Mazda (Ormuzd), in his final conquest over the bad spirit, Angra Mainyu (Ahriman), who is helped by wicked people. In China, Confucius appeared in the middle of the sixth century (551–479 B.C.), and established according to the ancient custom and tradition of the country an ethical system, which is now commonly known by the name of Confucianism, and in which benevolence, tolerance, humanity, self-control, and other virtues of a similar nature predominate. As an ethical teaching, Confucianism has ruled over the actual life of the Chinese for the past twenty-four centuries. As a senior to Confucius, there appeared another sage in the person of Laocius (born 604), the founder of Taoism, who taught the Way of Nature, which according to his idea is superior to benevolence and filial duty which Confucius taught as the loftiest human virtues. In

1 Rogers, p. 58.
2 See Article 'Zoroastrianism', ERE. xii, pp. 862–8. He was the reformer of a religion or a set of beliefs, myths, tradition, &c., handed down among the ancient Iranians. The remarkable features of his reformed religion were the systematization, purification, and moralization of these things. These features, the teachings concerning the repelling of evil thought, speech, and action, remind us of its resemblance to, or close connexion with, Pali Buddhism.
India, Mahāvīra, founder or reformer of Jainism, who is known as Nigaṁtha Nātaputta in the Pāli Piṭaka, appeared in the beginning of the sixth century. He seems to have been a little senior to the Buddha, both in age and religious career. He is the person who gave the form to that religion which it has to-day. It requires its followers to practise strict asceticism, severe abstinence even to death, poverty, self-mortification, repentance, boundless love of living beings, &c., and teaches the doctrine of Karma and the transmigration of souls. It denies the authority of the Vedas. In these and many other respects it resembles Buddhism. Lastly the Buddha appeared about the middle of the same century, nearly at the same time as Confucius and Pythagoras, a little later than Laocius, Mahāviṇa, and Zarathustra, and about a hundred years earlier than Socrates.

The Buddha’s position among Indian thinkers somewhat resembles that of Socrates among Greek thinkers. Previous to Socrates and the Sophists, his immediate predecessors, Greek philosophy was chiefly concerned with the problems of cosmology. What most interested the Greek philosophers in those days were the questions about the origin of the cosmos, the process of its construction, the components which make up the world of nature, and the conditions of phenomenal bodies. It was only the Sophists that for the first time directed their attention towards the problems of human life. As teachers of virtue, this class of scholars instructed the young Greeks in the ‘art of getting on in the world and of managing public affairs’. Their appearance in Greece

1 ‘Vardhamāna Jñātaputra, the founder of Jainism, probably lived from 599 to 529 B.C.’ Rapson, Ancient India, p. 22 (cf. p. 46).
2 H. Sidgwick, History of Ethics, p. 18.
was brought about by a new social need at that time, in which scientific learning came to be regarded as an important factor of social life. They were indeed the fore-runners of philosophers who, appearing soon after them, dealt with human affairs. It was not, however, until Socrates appeared that Greek philosophy was fully concerned with human interests, especially with ethical problems. He is the founder of the Greek moral philosophy. What ought to concern every man, says Socrates, is how to live as a citizen in a state, and knowledge thereof is of vital importance to him, because unless he knows the status of a citizen, he cannot be expected to be a perfect citizen. And if any one truly knows his true interests, he will act accordingly. What he has to do is to know the good; if he knows it, he will naturally do it. Knowledge, therefore, is virtue. The doctrine of the identification of knowledge and virtue which he taught made an epoch in the history of Greek ethics.

Previous to the appearance of the Buddha, Indian thought was chiefly engaged in religious and philosophical matters. What interested the Vedic Indians was appeasing the gods by singing hymns and offering sacrifices. The Buddha has adopted many of the Vedic gods into his system, the Buddhist mythology and cosmology, but he has humanized and moralized them. They have been clad with more human embellishments at the hand of the Buddha, though they were already anthropomorphically to some extent. They generally appear in Buddhist literature with personalities of a moral nature. They have lost their dignified positions; they are regarded as inferior beings to the Buddha and other holy and virtuous persons.

The Indians of the Brāhmaṇas considered ceremonial
rites to be the most important thing in human life. They believed that they could move or rule over gods, men, animals, or even inanimate objects by means of ceremonies. The Buddha, who utterly repudiates the divine power of gods, as is ordinarily ascribed to them, also repudiates the efficacy of ceremonies. As the word Kamma (=Skt. Karma) signifies a religious action, a ceremonial performance or rite in the Brāhmaṇas, and a moral or good or bad action (or the effect of a good or bad action) in Buddhism, so the two systems each lay stress upon a different thing. In one case gods and ceremonial rites are important, while in the other morality is important. Ceremonialism is wisdom to the Brāhmaṇas, while moralism is wisdom to Buddhism.

Buddhism disregards the caste system, which was established firstly to distinguish the Aryan from the non-Aryan race, and secondly to give the Brāhma predominance over the other castes. Buddhism teaches the equality of mankind; it requires men to lay aside distinctions which come from the difference of birth or profession; and to regard moral conduct more highly than birth or profession. ‘A man is noble or ignoble through conduct, but not through birth’¹ is the idea of Buddhism with regard to the caste system.

Religious austerity, which was a common practice among the Brāhmans as well as among the Jains, is also repudiated by the Buddha. ‘The habitual practice of asceticism or self-mortification, which is painful, unworthy, and unprofitable, ought not to be followed’—² this is the Buddha’s admonition against it. Austerity, which is for the Brāhmaṇ as important as ceremonial

¹ Sn. 136, 142.
² Dhammacakkappavattanasutta; S. v. 421, SBE. xi. 147.
rites, is thus entirely disregarded as worthless by the Buddha, who though he recommended simple life and strict self-restraint to his disciples, never went so far as to recommend them self-torture as was practised by the Brāhman or the Jain. He disregards the efficacy of austerity as he does that of ceremony. His religion is a religion of common sense, with practicability as its characteristic feature.

Though in Buddhism high importance is laid upon knowledge, the Buddha has forbidden his disciples to engage themselves in philosophical speculation or discussion. The monk Māluṇkyaputta was once sceptical as to the Buddha’s ability. He doubted if the Buddha was able to answer these questions:—Is the world eternal or not? Has the world an end or not? Is the soul (Jīva) the same as the body or not? Does the sentient being (Tathāgata) exist after death or not? Does he exist or not exist? or does he neither exist nor not exist? He thought he would lead a religious life under the guidance of the Buddha if he could give suitable answers to them; but not if he could not. The Buddha told him that giving answers to them was not a necessary condition of leading a religious life under him, that waiting for answers to them would be like the attitude of a person who being wounded by an arrow makes inquiries about the arrow and the person who discharged it, without trying to remove it. He should, says the Buddha, understand what is explained as it is explained, and what is

1 Culumāluṇkyasuttanta, M. i. 426–32; Aggivacchagottasuttanta, M. i. 488–9, also deals with almost the same subject; cf. Sallekhasutta, M. i. 40–6; S. ii. 222–3; iv. 374–80. In all these places, speculation and discussion on philosophical questions are repudiated as useless to the practical culture of monks.
not explained as not explained. These questions he has left unexplained, because they are not useful for practical purposes.¹

From the above declaration of the monk Māluṅkyaputta, we can understand how some of the Buddha’s disciples were dissatisfied with his attitude towards these and other philosophical questions. Their dissatisfaction seems quite reasonable in those days when people, as we may judge from what is set forth in the Upaniṣads, a contemporary literature, were very eager about philosophical studies and debates, which, however, the Buddha repudiated as useless. But it does not mean that he disregarded knowledge as worthless; he regarded it highly, but he did so in so far as it brought a practical result. In these respects, Buddhism differs from the Indian thought current previous to, and contemporary with, this religion.

Now returning to the question, how the Buddha’s position resembles that of Socrates, we see in the first place that both the Buddha and Socrates fixed the object of their efforts mainly upon human interests. Unlike his predecessors whose chief concern lay in the external world, Socrates engaged himself in the questions concerning human affairs. His famous admonition, ‘Know thyself’, the doctrine of the identification of knowledge and virtue, the assertion of the usefulness of knowledge for practical life, and the purpose of teaching his countrymen how to live as good citizens; all these have direct relations with a man’s actual life, especially with its moral aspect. The Buddha on his part, repudiating religious actions and ceremonial performances, taught a new doctrine of a characteristically moral nature.

¹ H. Oldenberg, Buddha, pp. 274–6.
Against the current teaching which declared the possibility of deliverance by means of philosophical views, he taught deliverance through the practice of the Eightfold Noble Path. Thus the one in purporting to make good citizens by teaching people their keenest interests, and the other in maintaining the possibility of deliverance through moral practice, both of them founded systems the main features of which are moral.

The second characteristic common to both is the pursuit of knowledge as of high importance to human life. According to Socrates' idea, the acquisition of knowledge was necessary to every man. As a citizen, as a professor, as an artisan, in public or private life, what a man primarily needs is knowledge. It is not only necessary for the attainment of the status of a citizen, a professor, &c., but also for keeping a man on the right road, for a man who really knows knows that everything worth doing is only so for the sake of goodness. Knowledge makes man good; a wise man is always a good man; and goodness ought to be the first human concern. That the Buddha largely shares this idea is clear from what we have already explained. Knowledge is included in the three trainings (Sikkhā), the compendium of the way of Buddhist culture. It ought to be borne in mind, however, that what the Buddha means is perfect knowledge, the right understanding of the fundamental truth, or perfect spiritual wisdom as well as common experience.

Lastly we should say a few words about their personality, the possession of which made both the more unique, and in consequence the more valuable as founders of moral philosophy and an ethico-religious system. Socrates, it is said, in spite of the homely features of his

1 Rogers, pp. 49–59.
appearance, attracted crowds of people around him by the charm of his personality and speech.\textsuperscript{1} The one was easily overpowered by both the others. Everybody who saw him and listened to him speaking, it is said, forgot his homely look. Men were simply charmed by his magical personality and delightful conversation. As to the Buddha, he is always depicted as a possessor of thirty-two bodily characteristics and eighty minor characteristics, both of which are altogether called 'the marks of his great person'.\textsuperscript{2} A possessor of these bodily characteristics is said to become either a Buddha or a universal monarch.\textsuperscript{3} The value of this conspicuous personal appearance, however, is not solely a Buddhist idea. According to the tradition of the ancient Brāhmans, the complete possession of these marks seems to be included in the necessary status of a Brāhman.\textsuperscript{4} An ideal Brāhman is said to be necessarily possessed of characteristic bodily marks, though they may not be exactly the same with those of the Buddhist. The Buddha's personality is usually described as being embellished with these marks; his personality and speech, it is said, were free from any fault; he was perfectly ideal in his bodily marks. From the short account of his life as given in the following pages, we shall learn how he gathered large audiences around him, among other things through his personal attractiveness.

\textsuperscript{1} Foreigners were attracted to Athens 'by the renown of Socrates', ERE. xii. 669.

\textsuperscript{2} A detailed description of these marks is found in the Lakkhaṇasuttanta or 'Discourse on Marks', D. iii. 142–79; SBB. iv, pp. 132–72; Selasutta, Sn. SBE. x, pp. 102–12.

\textsuperscript{3} D. i. 88–9; SBB. ii. 109–10; Sn. 1000–3.

\textsuperscript{4} D. i. 120; SBB. ii. 152–3; A. i. 163.
Not merely his attractive personality, but his noble action, in which self-control, temperance, and other similar virtues predominated, and which was prompted by virtuous characters such as love, sympathy, liberality, tolerance, &c., helped to impress the minds of his disciples, or perhaps even the minds of those who were hostile to him. It is said in the Dhammapada:  

'Like beautiful flowers, full of colour, but without scent, are the fine but fruitless words of him who does not act according to his words.'

'But, like beautiful flowers, full of colour and full of scent, are the fine and fruitful words of him who acts according to his words.'

He did not merely intend to explain his teaching, but to practise it himself, and to make others practise it. As practicability is a characteristic of his teaching, he expected to put every word he uttered into practice. He did not intend to lead his disciples with meaningless empty words, but to take the lead for them in the way by following which he attained the highest goal of culture. One of the Buddha's chief cares was to make his disciples understand that they could attain the same condition as the Buddha by practising as the Buddha himself practised. Thus practicability, which is one of the main features of his religion, was exemplified in the Buddha's own person, which was indeed the visible embodiment of his teaching. Consistency between speech and action was perfectly manifested in his person. When he repudiated philosophical consideration and discussion, he meant to turn the attention of his disciples or others to the practical side of his teaching. Nothing could be more useless in the Buddha's thought than this sort of consideration and

1 51, 52 = Tha. 323, 324 : Brethren, 192.
discussion. His personality, the very focus of this ethico-religious system, was the embodiment of his teaching, and at the same time it served as the pattern of the spiritual efforts of his disciples.

It was indeed his noble personality, adorned, as we have already described, with so many beautiful bodily marks, and perfectly developed through the mental culture which he went through, that played so important a part in attracting and converting people who otherwise might have remained hostile or neutral to his religion. Indeed his personality, like that of Socrates, can be said to have had an ethical value in causing people to step on the same way of purification as he himself as their leader did. And his life of eighty years displayed all valuable virtues in visible forms and served as the perfect specimen of the religious life which the Buddhists ought to pursue.¹

¹ Hinduism and Buddhism, vol. i, pp. 180–1.
II

SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE BUDDHA'S LIFE

The exact date when the Buddha\(^1\) appeared in the world is not known, but it is most generally accepted that he lived from about 563 to 483 B.C. He was born as the heir to King Suddhodana of the Sakya tribe of Kapilavatthu, a country which was situated at the foot of the Himalaya; and after spending his youth in pleasure and luxury, as was the custom with the Indian noble people in those days, and after living ten years of married life in which a child called Rahula was born, he renounced home life; he renounced the glory and riches of the heir of a king; he renounced the family bonds and every other worldly tie, in order to seek the way of salvation for himself in the homeless life of a recluse.

According to legendary history handed down among the Buddhists,\(^2\) he was moved to this action by witnessing an old man, a sick man, a dead man, and a recluse

\(^1\) Buddha or 'Enlightened One' is not a personal name, but a title, which can be applied to any person who has attained to the same spiritual enlightenment as he did; and it is only after a person has attained to this condition that he can claim this title, and therefore we should not call him 'Buddha' before his attainment of Buddhahood. It is only to avoid confusion and for convenience sake that we call him so in this account. His personal name was Siddhattha. Among the Northern Buddhists he is called the Buddha Sakyamuni (the sage of the Sakya tribe), and among the Southern Buddhists he is called Gotama (descendant of the sage Gotama), but Buddhists usually call him Bhagava (Blessed One).

\(^2\) Introduction to the Jataka, Jat. i. 58 ff.
successively. That is to say, on seeing these, he came to understand that living beings cannot escape from these sorts of suffering and pain, and that the way of salvation can only be reached by living the life of a recluse. Although it is doubtful whether such events preceded his great renunciation, as it is commonly called, it is possible that the like ideas were enshrined deep in his bosom even then. As we may see from his teaching, which is pessimistic in its starting-point, he seems to have been pessimistic by nature.

In search of salvation, he first applied himself to two teachers of Atmanism,\(^1\) in whom, however, he was disappointed, and then he practised severe austerity, which chiefly consisted in extreme fast, taking one grain of rice or a seed of flax one day, but when he found it futile in his search of salvation, he gave up the practice, and having recovered his bodily strength by taking substantial milk-rice food devoted himself to profound meditation.

How the Buddha after these strenuous efforts in meditation came to enlightenment is told in his own words in the last quoted discourse (M. i. 163). According to the declaration in the discourse, 'Himself being subject to birth, old age, sickness, death, sorrow, and impurity, and knowing his subjection to them to be evil, he sought the highest security (yogakkhema), i.e. Nibbāna, which is free from all these, and succeeded in attaining to it. The knowledge and insight came to him that his release was unmistakable, this was his last birth, and he would receive no more rebirth.' Without any external help of a teacher, or without depending upon any traditional doctrine, and being subject to birth, old age, sickness, &c.,

\(^1\) Ariyapariyesanasutta, M. i. 160–75.
as he was, the Buddha sought for Nibbāna, the highest security, entirely through his own inward light, and succeeded in attaining to it. His spiritual enlightenment was solely the fruit of his own inward efforts. Later on, just before he entered the final Nibbāna, he told his disciples with the same idea to make themselves and the doctrine (Dhamma) their lamps and refuge, but not anything else.

What he means, in plain words, is that a man can only be saved through his own power. The enlightenment of the Buddha is therefore nothing but the result of seeking truth within himself, thereby freeing himself from the pain and suffering of the world, and perfectly understanding that he is above the changes of the world. The Buddha expressed the truth in a formula commonly known as the Four Noble Truths. This fundamental doctrine has always been the nucleus of this religion from its primitive stages to the developed form of Mahāyānism through its long history of twenty-four centuries. In later Buddhism, some of the primitive doctrines have been entirely left out, or at least ignored, while some doctrines of alien origin have been added; but the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths has always remained as the centre of the religion, which amply testifies its great importance in Buddhism. It expresses very concisely the Buddhist view of human life and the way of salvation.

He has now reached perfect enlightenment; but according to the statement in the Vinaya (i. 5 ff.) and the Ariyapariyesanasutta (M. i. 167 ff.), he hesitated in revealing

1 D. ii. 100; SBE. xi. 88.
2 Anesaki, Rupakāyaśca Dharmakāyaśca Buddhasya Tathāgatasya, pp. 28–7.
the doctrine to the world, because he was afraid that through lust and sin they were unable to comprehend it. Brahmā Sahampati then appeared on the scene entreat ing the Buddha to preach the doctrine. On his entreaty the Buddha looked upon the world through the Buddha-eye, and was moved to preach the doctrine for their salvation. To whom he would first preach the doctrine was the next question. He remembered his two old teachers, but he soon came to understand that they were already dead. He then remembered a group of five ascetics who used to practise austerity together with him. He therefore made his way to Isipatana near Bārāṇasi, the modern Benares, where these ascetics were known to be dwelling. On his way there, he met one Ājīvaka ascetic called Upaka, who seeing the Buddha's calmed countenance and good control of the senses was greatly struck, and asked him who his teacher was, and what his doctrine was. The Buddha declared that he had attained to the position of all-conqueror and all-knower, who is free from all, attached to none, that he had no teacher, because there were none to rival him in the worlds of men and gods, and that he was therefore the highest teacher, the absolute Buddha. This was the first open declaration that he made about his attainment of Buddhahood. But it seems that this was not sufficient to convince the ascetic, who shook his head and went away.

By and by the Buddha came to Bārāṇasi and found the five ascetics there. On seeing him coming, they agreed among themselves to show him no respect, because the Buddha had given up the practice of austerity, and returned, they thought, to the worldly life. The Buddha's personality, however, naturally induced them to pay homage to him, who thereupon easily persuaded them to
listen to his sermon, a memorable sermon known as the Dhammacakkappavattanasutta,\(^1\) or ‘Discourse on the Turning of the Wheel of the Doctrine’, inaugurating his ministerial career, in which the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path, i.e. the middle path, are taught. Koṇḍañña and his four fellow ascetics were converted. This was soon followed by another important event, the conversion of Yasa, a son of a rich treasurer (saṇhi) of Bārāṇasi, who, living in three palaces built for the three different seasons and waited on by a number of female attendants, was tired of, or dissatisfied with, a life of pleasure and luxury, a case somewhat similar to that of the Buddha. His parents and wife became lay devotees; his old friends, fifty-four in number, also joined the monkhood following his example, thus making up sixty-one Arahans in the world, including the Buddha himself. The Buddha sent them forth with the words:\(^2\)

‘Go ye now, O monks, and wander, for the gain of the many, for the welfare of the many, out of compassion for the world, for the good, for the gain, and for the welfare of gods and men. Let not two of you go the same way. Preach, O monks, the doctrine which is glorious in the beginning, glorious in the middle, glorious at the end, in the spirit and in the letter; proclaim a consummate, perfect, and pure life of holiness.’

This was the first Buddhist mission sent forth to preach the doctrine of salvation for the good of the multitude. The Buddha was thus fully prepared to propagate the doctrine through his own efforts and those of his disciples.

After sending them forth, the Buddha made his way

---

\(^1\) S. v. 420–4; SBE. xi. 146–55.

\(^2\) Vin. i. 21; SBE. xiii. pp. 112–13.
to Uruvela, near Gayā, where he had spent much of his ascetic life, and where there were three Kassapas, brother Brāhmans, fire-worshipping ascetics with matted hair (jatila), at the head of a thousand ascetics. The object of this journey was to convert them. The eldest Kassapa was proud of his mystic power, and his conversion proved to be a task of great difficulty for the Buddha, but he succeeded in bringing down his pride, and further in converting him. He is said to have worked nineteen miracles in this single conversion. The two other brothers were easily converted.

The news of their conversion came as a surprise to all the people of Magadha, including the king, Brāhmans, and householders; because when they saw the Buddha and his new converts together, they wondered which of them was the leader. The doubt, however, was soon removed, when in an assembly of the Magadhese people, at which King Bimbisāra himself was present, the Buddha asked the eldest Kassapa what made him abandon fire-worship and take up a monkish life in the Buddha's religion. Kassapa humbly replied that he no longer took delight in sacrifices and offerings, and further announced that the Buddha was his teacher. The king entertained him to dinner the next day, and presented him with the garden Veļuvana, which became the Buddha's residence for some time. This was one instance of the help which the Buddha received from many kings and princes of his day. His success as the founder of a religion was partly due to these royal gifts. Bimbisāra, whose private life was so much connected with the life of the Buddha, was the first to give him help.1

1 About the royal gifts which the Buddha and Mahāvīra received, see E. W. Hopkins, The Religions of India, p. 282.
According to the Pabbajjāsutta or 'Discourse on adopting the ascetic life' (Sn. 405-24), the Buddha after leaving home wandered about the town of Rājagaha on his begging round, when King Bimbisāra seeing him from the top of his palace was struck by his attractive personality and excellent behaviour. He sent messengers at once to see where the Buddha would take his meals, so that he might see him personally. And when he knew that he was resting in the Paṇḍava cave, the king went there in person and asked him of his birth, with these words: 'Thou art both young and delicate, a lad in his first youth, possessed of a fine complexion, like a high-born Khattiya' (Sn. 420). What especially impressed the king on this occasion was his Khattiya-like appearance, which, whether the word Khattiya means simply a warrior or a king, was sufficient to attract the sympathy of King Bimbisāra, who as a king belonging to the Khattiya or warrior caste was ready to stand for the caste and against the Brāhman or priestly caste. The king kept this frame of mind till after the Buddha, as a person of full enlightenment, went round preaching his doctrine. On the one hand the arrogant nature and corrupted morals of the Brāhman caste sickened the king, while on the other the Buddha's birth, high personality, behaviour, the doctrine which he taught, &c., all of these seem to have attracted the king's mind. The king and his Queen Videhā (of Mithilā) were among his devoted followers; and so also were King Pasenadi of the Kosalas and his Queen Mallikā. The sovereigns and their consorts of the two greatest kingdoms of those days were thus among the Buddha's followers.

1 About his relation with Bimbisāra, see T. W. Rhys Davids, Buddhist India, pp. 3-4.
Then another conversion, perhaps of the most importance in the whole life of the Buddha, took place (Vin. i. 39–43). Sāriputta and Moggallāyana, disciples of Sañjaya, a wandering ascetic, being dissatisfied with the teaching of their teacher, determined to seek for the way to immortality (amata) from another source. They agreed between them that either of them who came to enlightenment first would reveal the secret to the other. One day Sāriputta saw Assaji, one of the Buddha’s first converts, and was struck with his peaceful countenance and the good control of his senses. He asked who his teacher was, and whose doctrine he professed. Assaji replied that the Buddha was his teacher, and that he professed his doctrine. He, however, said that being a novice in that religion he was unable to explain the doctrine in full. At Sāriputta’s request he only uttered a verse explaining that everything (dhamma) is produced from a cause, that there is a way destroying the cause, and that the Tathāgata is the revealer of this doctrine. On hearing this, Sāriputta came to the full knowledge that whatever is subject to causation is subject to cessation. Moggallāyana saw him later, and was struck with his calmed countenance and well-controlled demeanour, as his friend was on his meeting with Assaji, and as Upaka was when he met the Buddha going to Bārāṇasi. This seems to be a peculiar feature of a person of full enlightenment or perfect self-control. Sāriputta explained to Moggallāyana the gist of the doctrine, which at once led him to the same enlightenment. Both then left their old teacher Sañjaya and repaired to the Veļuvana monastery where the Buddha was dwelling. Two hundred and fifty fellow students followed their example to practise Brahmacariya under the direction of the Buddha, as is usually said. At first
sight the Buddha recognized their high attainment and prophesied that they would be his two disciples in future, which proved to be true.

With the conversion of the two chief disciples, the narratives of the events which happened successively, and which are mentioned in the Vinaya text (i. 1–44), abruptly come to an end; and we have to look to other sources for the later history. We find many episodes of the Buddha’s life in the oldest Buddhist literature, chiefly in the Vinaya texts; and historians have arranged them in order as having successively happened between the event which we have mentioned and King Ajātasattu’s dispatch of his minister to ask the Buddha’s opinion with regard to an attack which he intended to make on the neighbouring people, the Vajjians of Vesāli.

The Buddha returned home after nearly seven years’ absence to see his father, foster-mother, wife, and son Rāhula. His son and half brother Nanda were made to join the monkhood (Vin. i. 82), which example was followed by many other Sakya princes (Vin. ii. 180–4). Sudatta, a wealthy merchant of Sāvatthi, who was better known by his nickname Anāthapiṇḍika, meaning ‘One who feeds the helpless’, built the Jetavana monastery near the town, and dedicated it to the Buddha and his disciples (Vin. ii. 156–9). Jīvaka, a well-known skilful physician, who played an important part in the Buddha’s history, appears with a long history of his own of a romantic nature (Vin. i. 268–81). The Buddha, rather against his will, gave permission to his foster-mother Mahāpajāpatī and her attendants as nuns to join the order (Vin. ii. 258–8; A. iv. 276–9).

During the Buddha’s stay in Kosambi, capital of the
Vatsas or Vāṁsas,¹ a dissension arose among the monks. He tried to persuade them to agree, but in vain; thereupon he stayed away from them for one rainy season. The dissension, however, was soon brought to an end by the fact that lay people in Kosambi neither paid homage to them nor supported them with their requisites of life. Their obstinacy gave way to it (Vin. i. 337–59). The ambitious Devadatta, the Buddha’s cousin, contrived to take his place as the head of the community. He requested the Buddha to resign his position to him, only to be refused. He raised bitter enmity against the Buddha, and attempted to create a schism among the monks, which, however, thanks to the sensibleness and efforts of the two chief disciples, ended in failure (Vin. ii. 178–203; A. ii. 73).

These and other events which are not recorded in Buddhist literature, but which may be justly inferred to have taken place, are inserted between the events recorded in the Mahāvagga and those of the Mahāparinibbānasuttaṇta (D. ii. 72–166; SBE. xi. 1–136), which gives us the history of the last year of the Buddha’s life, beginning with the episode with regard to King Ajātasattu’s message to the Buddha. According to this Sutta, the king sent his minister to pay homage to him and ask him his opinion about the result of the campaign plotted against the neighbouring tribe. The Buddha’s reply was that as long as they were faithful in observing the seven things which he used to teach them, they could not be easily defeated.

The Buddha at an advanced age of seventy-nine years, and in spite of his weakened health, perhaps chiefly due

¹ T. W. Rhys Davids, Buddhist India, p. 86.
to his life of privation, made a memorable journey over all the places which he used to visit during his ministry. He seems to have been conscious of the approach of his last days, because in talking with Ānanda he said: I too, O Ānanda, am now grown old, and full of years, my journey is drawing to its close; I have reached my sum of days, I am turning eighty years of age. . . .”¹ He was once seized with a dire sickness, but soon recovered from it with the strong effort of his will. While wandering from place to place he never stopped preaching the doctrine to his disciples and to those who assembled everywhere to listen to him. In the course of the journey he was invited to dinner by Cunda, a smith, of Pāvā, and given food especially cooked for him, which seems to have directly caused his death, because he suffered from diarrhoea from that time. He made his way to Kusināra with some difficulty, however, and on the bank of the river Hiraṇḍāvatī he lay down between two Sal-trees in the grove of Upavattana, where, though he was extremely weak, he went on preaching, and when he was assured that none of his disciples had anything to ask him, he quietly passed away.

¹ D. ii. 100; SBE. xi. 87.
III

OUTLINES OF INDIAN THOUGHT PREVIOUS TO THE RISE OF BUDDHISM


Before explaining the Buddhist morality and its characteristics it will be well for us to examine what was the general Indian thought with regard to morals and similar subjects, previous to the rise of Buddhism, so that we may make clear what is the relation between Buddhist and pre-Buddhist or Brāhmaṇic and other thoughts; what is the contrast between them; on what points each of them lays great stress; how much the Buddha owes to his predecessors, i.e. the Brāhmans; what is his own invention; and so forth. These subjects we shall expound later on under separate headings, but it will be necessary for us to discuss them in a general way. Let us begin with what is said in Vedic literature.

By the term 'Vedic literature' is meant the whole

---

1 What is set forth in this chapter is mainly based upon Prof. A. A. Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature (London, 1917), A Vedic Reader (Oxford, 1917), Article 'Vedic Religion', ERE. xii. pp. 601-16; and Prof. T. Kimura's History of Indian Philosophies and Religions (Tokyo, 1914).
ancient Indian religious literature extending from the thirteenth century before Christ, that is some time after the Aryans had settled in the Panjab, down to the second. The Mantras, the Brāhmaṇas, the Upaniṣads, and the Dharmasūtras will be included in it. As to what is said in the last-mentioned literature, we shall have opportunities to deal with this later on in the course of the investigation of cardinal virtues, and therefore we shall limit the scope of the present discussion to the first three, and that mainly on their moral side. To begin with the Mantras or Vedas.

The Vedas¹ are a collection of hymns and at the same time a body of myths in which natural phenomena or powers are personified and supposed to act as human beings do in their social and private life. These deities

¹ The Vedas consist of four parts: Rīc, Sāma, Yajus, and Atharva. In the canonical literature of Buddhism we often meet with the word Vēdugu (lit. one who is versed in the Vedas) and rarely with the word Vēdantagu (lit. one who has gone to the end of the Vedas), referring to a Brāhmaṇ (S. iv. 88), the Buddha (A. ii. 340), an Arāhan (A. ii. 6; Vin. i. 8; S. i. 141, 168, 183; iv. 88, 157), or a god (S. i. 148). The words are undoubtedly taken from the Brāhmanic vocabulary, but when they are applied to a Buddhist, they are explained as meaning 'one who has gone through the four paths of sanctification'. Tevijjā is also explained in different ways in the cases of a Brāhmaṇ and of a Buddhist. Tevijjā, when applied to a Brāhmaṇ, is paraphrased as tīṇnaṁ vedaṇaṁ pāragu or 'one who has gone to the other shore of the three Vedas' (A. i. 163, 166; iii. 223; M. ii. 133 et passim), while when it is applied to a Buddhist, he is tihi vijjāhi sampanno or one 'who is endowed with threefold wisdom' (A. i. 165, 168). The three Vedas, according to the commentary on Ambaṭṭhasutta (Sum. i. 247), are Irubbeda (Rīgveda), Sāmaveda, and Yajubbeda (Yajurveda). It seems that Atharvaveda was not recognized as an authentic Veda at the Buddha's time. In Suttanipāta (927), a monk is admonished not to practise rites connected with the hymns of Āṭhabbana. It was then recognized as a sort of magic or sorcery.
resemble human beings in many respects; according to
the conception of the Vedic Indian, they are a group of
beings superior to mankind; their bodily features, their
social ranks, their family and professional relations are
very much like those of human kind. But it is note-
worthy that unlike mythologies of other ancient nations,
the Vedic mythology has no regular connexion and
unity in it with regard to these respects. There are, it
is true, among the Vedic gods such relations, parents
and children, brothers and sisters, friends, masters and
servants, and so on; but these relations in some
cases are confused. This is perhaps (1) because these
gods being representatives of different natural phenom-
ena and powers, their mutual connexions are in many
cases hard to describe; (2) because the Aryan race in
this stage of development was divided into many small
tribes, without regular connexion and unity among
them, and this state of affairs reflected itself upon the
mythology which they invented; and (3) because these
gods owe their creation to pious poetical priests who
created them out of their individual imagination, perhaps
partly based upon traditions concerning them, and in so
doing clothed and embellished them, giving each of
them the highest possible quality that they could give.
Consequently as their social ranks are confused with
one another, so their family relations are confounded
with one another.

From the moral point of view, little importance is to
be laid upon the relations, whether family or otherwise,
which the gods form among themselves, not only because
these are not in many cases permanently fixed, as we
have just mentioned, but also because we find very little
moral significance attached to them throughout the
Vedas. And it is rather in their connexions and associations with human beings that we find much morality referred to. Their connexions with mankind always remind us of the natural phenomena or powers they represent; and generally speaking, gods representing phenomena or powers which are beneficial to mankind are regarded as good gods, and those who are personifications of evil phenomena or violent forces are looked upon as wicked gods. We shall describe here a few gods who are most remarkable, from the moral point of view, in their relation with human beings.

Agni is the personification of fire, especially of sacrificial fire. He is called Grihaspati, or lord of the house, an Atithi or general guest in human dwellings, for fire, which this god represents, is one of the most necessary objects in every household. He is the lord of a kitchen and the guest of a household. He is a priest or a messenger between gods and men, bearing oblations from the latter to the former, for the oblations which are offered to gods in heaven are poured on sacred fire, which is supposed to carry them to heaven. He is called Rakshohan, or slayer of demons, because fire dispels the darkness and burns up everything impure. He is believed to benefit his worshippers as their father, brother, or son.

Indra, primarily as the god of thunder, drives away drought and darkness, and in his second nature as the god of battle gives aid to the Aryans in overcoming their enemies, black-skinned aborigines, Dasas or Dasyus, and in conquering land from them. He is described as the protector and helper of his worshippers, chiefly warriors, as may be supposed from the attributes ascribed to him. He is worshipped as a mighty warrior;
he is bountiful in bestowing the highest good on mankind; but at the same time he is sensual, unruly, and even immoral, for as soon as he was born, it is said, he murdered his own father and made his mother a widow; he annoyed the Maruts, his constant companions; he destroyed the chariot of Ușas. As the result of drinking much Soma juice he becomes vigorous and sometimes unruly, which reminds us of the warriors of those days. He is a god of a bragging nature. He takes delight in acts of capricious violence.

Bṛhaspati, lord of prayer, helps and protects the pious man, prolongs his life and removes diseases. He breaks the demons' power; he crushes the foes of man; he consumes the demons with a sharp bolt; he dispels darkness; he drives forth the 'cows'; he gives offspring and riches.¹

Ușas, as a bountiful goddess of dawn, drives away the darkness and makes light for human beings; she rouses all living things to action. She bestows wealth and children, protection and long life on her worshippers. She gives renown and glory to liberal benefactors of the poet. She is munificent and kindly; she is said to be accessible to all.

Āpas, a group of gods of water, purify beings from defilements, even from moral guilt or sins of violence, cursing, and lying. They bestow on implorers remedies, wealth, health, long life, or even immortality.

Varuṇa, originally a lunar divinity, is an upholder of natural as well as moral orders, both of which are expressed by the same word Rita. He is a lord and regulator of all the laws in nature, having established heaven and earth, and keeping them apart. He has

¹ E. W. Hopkins, The Religions of India, p. 186.
established the moral law of the mundane world, and preserves it with his strong arm and sorcery. He is the universal monarch; and as the universal monarch he regulates and governs everything in nature. We are most concerned with him here, however, as an upholder of moral laws. He has established moral ordinances in the world, and he maintains them very strictly; and if any being, whether mortal or immortal, infringes them, he will be angry and punish him as severely as he deserves. He will bring upon him misfortune, illness, or death. No secret can lie hidden from him, for he, being omniscient, knows all the truth and falsehood of men. He detects even the most secret transgression. He cherishes truth and hates a lie. He seizes the evil doer or treacherous foe with his noose. But still he is gracious to the penitent, or those who have transgressed his laws through thoughtlessness, and if implored he will forgive not only their own sins, but also those of their fathers; forgiveness is his peculiar character. He is a friend of his worshippers, and he may be seen in the next world by the righteous. He is the god of the most ethical nature of all the Vedic gods.

Mitra, corresponding with the Mithra of the Avesta, is the god of the sun, representing his graceful benevolent nature. His mighty power and wisdom are considered to compare only with those of Varuṇa, so that he is called Samrāj, or universal ruler, Rītasyagopā or Keeper of the Order, &c. But early in the period of the Rig-veda he lost his independence and was incorporated with Varuṇa, and came to be known only by the compound name Mitra-Varuna.

Pūṣan, the god representing the beneficial power of the sun as a pastoral deity, a guardian of roads and protector
of cattle. He marries his own mother and takes his sister for his mistress. He is worshipped in the marriage rite as a god of thrift.

Rūdra, who later takes the form of Śiva, is a god of a fierce destructive nature, like a wild beast. He is therefore called a bull or the ruddy boar of heaven. His terrible shafts and his wrath are very much feared and deprecated. He slays men and cattle, assails them with diseases, and injures plants. He is a malignant god. His malevolent nature, however, is not lacking in its benevolent side, for he is regarded as a healer as well as a destroyer, and he is worshipped not only for preservation from calamity, but also for the bestowal of welfare.

With the exception of Varuṇa, Agni, Mitra, who are addressed as ‘Upholders of the Order’, the numerous Vedic gods are non- or super-moral; they have scarcely anything to do with morality. As A. E. Gough says: ‘There is little of moral or spiritual significance in this propitiation of the forces of nature. A sinner is for the most part nothing else than a man that fails to pay praise, and prayer, and sacrifice. . . .’¹ If men invoke or propitiate gods with prayer, praise, or sacrifice, gods will pay them with good things which men seek for, as long life, posterity, wealth, fame, strength, property in cattle, favourable weather, conquest of enemies, freedom from sin. Religion was thus commercialized, with little or nothing of moral significance, as Gough says. And the benefits desired are almost entirely of a material, and not of a spiritual or moral kind. It is true that they are described as true and not deceitful, and as benevolent to mankind, bestowing upon them benefits,

¹ The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 11.
but this is limited to those who propitiate them with praise or sacrifice.¹ Morality, in the sense in which we now employ it, was absent or ignored in the religious thoughts of the Indians of these ages.² Gods are endowed with the greatest power and the highest glory; they are mighty and splendid, but they are by no means morally good; in other words, their power and glory are not associated with moral good. Men were not favoured by gods because they were morally good, but because they offered praise, prayer, and sacrifice to them. The relation between men and gods was, so to speak, entirely commercial, but not much or at all moral.

Buddhism may be said to have its own mythology; the Buddhist cosmic system contains many worlds of gods, whose names remind us of the corresponding Brāhmaṇ gods. In many respects the Brāhmaṇ and Buddhist gods resemble one another. The principal Vedic gods Inda (Indra), Brahmā,³ Pajāpati (Prajāpati),

¹ It is said about Indra: ‘Him who brings gifts the hero (Indra) makes his comrade: with him who pours no juice he seeks not friendship’ (Ṛg. x. 42). And Indra declares: ‘This, singer, is my determination, to aid the worshipper who pours the Soma. I slay the man who brings no milk-oblation, unrighteous, powerful, the truth’s perverter’ (Ṛg. x. 27). Again he declares: ‘I have given to the singer excellent wealth, I have made the prayer an increase for myself, I was the instigator of the one who sacrifices, (but) I conquered those who have not sacrificed in every battle’ (Ṛg. x. 49).

² ‘The weakness of Hinduism, though not of Buddhism, is that ethics have so small a place in its fundamental conceptions. Its deities are not identified with the moral law and the saint is above that law’ (Hinduism and Buddhism, vol. i, p. xvi).

³ Or Mahābrahmā. Brahma was prayer and priest in the Rigveda; and holiness in the Yajur-veda; Hopkins, The Religions of India, p. 178.
Varuṇa, Isāna (Īṣāna), Pajjunna (Parjanya), Soma, Veṣṇu (Viṣṇu), and the low class gods such as Asura, Yakkha (Yakṣa), Rakkhasa (Rākṣasa), Piśāca (Piśāca), Gandhabba (Gandharva), Acchara (Apsaras), &c., are found in the Buddhist mythology.

It is especially noteworthy that in the Buddhist literature these gods do not appear merely as characters of pure mythology, but that each of them bears some moral nature; they generally appear as agents of morality or immorality. In other words, unlike what they appear in the Vedic literature, in Buddhist literature gods are always depicted with more or less moral purposes. Whether their origins are traceable in the Vedas or elsewhere, their personalities are always surrounded with some moral atmosphere. Their appearance in Buddhist literature is necessitated by some moral need. They are generally viewed from the moral standpoint, and on rare occasions their characters are neutral, i.e., they are neither moral nor immoral.

In the second place, in Buddhism they are deprived of the exalted position which they occupied in the Vedas. They are no more objects of the worship and adoration which they enjoyed in the Vedas. No more praise is given to them; no more prayer for their favour is offered to them; no more sacrifice is lavished on them for the purpose of propitiating them. This is (1) because Buddhism is far more human and more moral than Brāhmanism, which is religious, especially ritualistic; (2) because Buddhism teaches us to depend upon ourselves for our enlightenment or everything else. Nothing external can do good to us in these matters. We ought to rely upon ourselves for our enlightenment or salvation. Therefore anything external, whether from gods or men, is discarded as
worthless. And (3) because those who have attained the position of self-perfection through their own power are highly esteemed, more highly than any gods. According to the Buddhist idea the Buddha, the Arahan, and even those who are on the paths leading to Arahatship are far superior to gods. No wonder, therefore, that no reverence is paid to these gods. They are not worthy of receiving it.¹

In the Mahāsamayasuttanta (D. ii. 253–62) the names of more than seventy gods are given. It is said that they have come to see or to pay homage to the Buddha and his disciples, to whom they are always inferior. In the Ātānātiyasuttanta (D. iii. 194–206) the names of forty-one gods are mentioned. The god Vessavaṇa of the northern quarter praises the Buddha and his predecessors in the past in charming verses, and asks the Buddha to tell his disciples, monkish or lay, to repeat this sutta in their retreat in the forests, so that gods who have no faith in the Buddha may not hurt them. Even in these two remarkable instances we find no praise given to gods, neither prayer nor sacrifice is offered or promised to them. The Ātānātiya is a hymn in which Buddhas are praised, and though the names of gods are mentioned, no prayer in the sense of entreaty, petition, request, &c., is offered to them; and its mere repetition is regarded as a charm and protection for the Buddhist against gods who approach him with evil intentions.

I think we cannot better explain the nature of the Buddhist gods than by taking Inda (Skt. Indra) and Brahmā (Brahma) as examples and considering them in Buddhist light, examining them as they are depicted in

early Buddhist literature. Inda, primarily god of thunder, and secondarily god of war in the Vedas, still retains his original nature here as the chief of Devas, who are usually engaged in fight with the troop of Asuras. Contrasted with the latter who are generally depicted as impudent and malignant, Inda and his followers, gods belonging to the realms of the four great kings and the thirty-three gods, are usually good gods (S. i. 220–4). He is said to have been even in his previous birth a possessor of seven plausible virtues, dutifulness to his parents, respect to the elders of his family, amiable speech, freedom from slandering, liberality in giving, veracity, love (S. i. 228–31). His birth as Inda is the result of his meritorious deeds. He praises faith in the doctrine and discipline which the Buddha has taught, good conduct, learning, liberality in giving, and knowledge (S. i. 231–2). He always pays respect to the Buddha, the Arahan, the Sekha or ‘one who has still more to learn’ (S. i. 235); he pays respect to seers, while the chief of the Asuras insults them (S. i. 226). The most pathetic and humane episode concerning Inda is this. Once on his way to fight with the Asuras, he saw a bird’s nest on a silk-cotton tree, and in fear of destroying it with the pole of his chariot, he told his charioteer Mataki to avoid it. He said he would rather lose in the fight than make the birds nestless (S. i. 224).

1 The Buddhist cosmic system consists of mainly three Dhatus or worlds: (1) of Kāma or sensuality, (2) of Rūpa or form, and (3) of Arūpa or formlessness. The first world contains (a) a hell, (b) realm of Petas, (c) the brute creation, (d) realm of Asuras, (e) realm of mankind, and (f) part of the heavenly world, the last of which is divided into six realms, and the first two realms, i. e. those of the four great kings and the thirty-three gods, are under the rule of Inda.
Virtuous as Inda is, he is still inferior to the Buddha and his disciples who have attained Arahatship, because it is alleged he is not yet free from lust (A. i. 143). He still takes delight in sensual pleasure. Inda, Pajāpati, Varuṇa, Isāna, none of these gods is free from lust, hatred, and ignorance, and therefore if any celestial being, who in fight with the troop of the Asuras is in fear, panic, or horriﬁcation, looks upon the banners of these gods, he may or may not be released from it, while if a monk staying in a forest, under a tree, or in an empty house is in fear and recollects the Buddha, the Dhamma, or the Saṅgha, he will surely be released from the fear, because they are free from these and other evils (S. i. 219–20). Inda is not free from birth, old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair (A. i. 144–5). Freedom from lust, hatred, and ignorance, three roots of evil, is essential to Buddhist culture, and this freedom is not Inda’s possession, which makes him inferior to Buddhist saints of human form, in spite of all his good nature.

Brahmā, originally in the Vedas (where it was spelt Brahman), had the meaning of prayer, sacred word, sacred knowledge, or a priest, and later it came to mean the ﬁrst cause of the universe, the self-existing Supreme Soul. According to the conception of the ancient Indians, prayer is a force as a manifestation of profound devotion. It combines the will of the human being with that of a god, and in so doing it is able to move the latter, or it compels the god to gratify the man in what he wishes for. And in consequence, though in the Vedas Brahmanaspati

---

1 He is depicted as worshiping householders of meritorious virtuous conduct, who maintain their wives by righteous means, (S. i. 284.)
(Brahman pati) or Bṛihaspati, 'lord of prayer', was regarded as the first cause of the universe, in later Brahmanism Brahman or prayer itself was looked upon as the first cause of the world. In other words, it was thought that prayer created the world. In the transference from prayer to the creator, the word has undergone change in its accentuation. That is to say, the accent which was originally on the first syllable of the word is removed to the second syllable when it means the Creator; and at the same time, the original neuter noun has become masculine. To be a little more accurate, when it means prayer, sacred word, or sacred knowledge, as is the case in the Vedas, it is a neuter noun with the accent on the first syllable; but when it means the Creator, it is a masculine noun with the accent on the second syllable. It was in this last-mentioned stage of both theoretical and etymological developments that the Buddha adopted this word and gave it a new idea in his peculiar cosmology and mythology.

In the Buddhist cosmology, Brahmā or Mahābrāhma is the inhabitant of the third or highest division of the first Jhāna (realm) of the Rūpadhātu or world of form, the first division (Brahmapārisajja) and the second (Brahmapurohita) being the abodes of his attendants and ministers respectively. The first realm of the world of form is thus divided into three divisions and inhabited by Brahmā's attendants, his ministers, and by himself respectively. Brahmā, the first cause, the highest self-existence, the Absolute Soul, the union with whom was regarded as the highest attainment of the Brāhman of the Buddha's days, is in Buddhism looked upon merely as the lord of a realm of the vast cosmos. In other words, the term Brahmā, which in the Vedas meant
prayer and sacred word or knowledge or a priest who offers prayer, or who knows the sacred word, or who possesses sacred knowledge, and which was regarded as pointing to the highest existence or Creator in later Brähmanism, in early Buddhism merely signifies the lord of the lowest realm of the world of form.¹ As Inda is the lord and ruler of the realms of the four great kings and the thirty-three gods, so Mahābrāhma is the lord and ruler of the realms of Brahmā-ministers and Brahmā-attendants. One belongs to the Kāmadhātu or world of sensual pleasure, while the other to the Rūpadhātu or world of form. The former is sensual as he was in the Vedic mythology, as the god of thunder or the god of the warrior; but the latter is rather spiritual, sacred and pure, as may be inferred from the original meaning of the term. If we can say that Inda represents the warrior caste, Brahmā may be said to represent the priestly caste. The Buddha always mentions the warrior caste before the priestly caste; but as a teacher who always lays more stress upon anything spiritual than anything material he cannot reverse the positions of these two deities. While Inda is the lord of the two lowest heavenly realms belonging to the world of sensuality, Brahmā is the lord of the first realm of the world of form, more spiritual than the realms which Inda governs.

How the Vedic gods are treated in the Buddhist

¹ The attributes which are ascribed to Brahmā are given in the Kevaddhasuttanta (D. i. 212–23) as the words of Brahmā himself, which run as follows: Brahmā, GreatBrahmā, the Supreme Being, the Mighty one, All-seeing one, the Ruler, the Lord of all, the Controller, the Creator, the Chief of all, appointing each his place, the Ancient of days, the Father of all that are and are to be. SBB. ii, p. 281; Buddhism in Translations, p. 310.
mythology will be clear from this short exposition. They are great and powerful to some extent, but not so much as they were in the Vedas. They are no more immortal, and are subject to all mental and physical evils, as all other sentient beings are. They are only superior to human and other beings in some respects. They are no longer paid reverence, no longer flattered with praise, no longer invoked in prayer, and no longer invited to partake in sacrifices. They have come down from the exalted position which they occupied in the Vedic religion and keep the humble position allotted to them in the new mythology and cosmology. Even their two prominent representatives, Inda and Brāhma, who are always depicted as having kindly feeling towards the Buddha and his disciples, are no more than lords of realms of the heavenly world. Thus in respect to their nature, position, and relation to mankind, there is an enormous difference between the Vedic and Buddhist religions.

When the Aryans left their first home in India, the Panjab, and removed south-eastward to the middle country and settled there, their religious psychology underwent a remarkable change. In the first place they ceased to feel the favour of gods of nature, as they did while dwelling in the Panjab, in their praise and prayer; still in this stage of advancement they were far from being able to organize any philosophical systems, as their descendants in later ages did, and therein find consolation and comfort from the calamity and tribulation to which they were exposed, on account of the change of climate and the disturbed social conditions in their new home. As a natural result of this state of things, the priests in this period were solely engaged in devising
elaborate rites and ceremonies, which were performed for the purpose of propitiating or controlling gods. The idea that prayer and sacrifice could move gods to bestow upon men any favour they asked for was carried to an extreme; and it was believed that the more elaborate the rites were, the more efficacious they were. On the other hand this was the result of the claim of social supremacy over the warrior caste, which the priestly caste demanded. The priests worked out elaborate and mystical ceremonies, and kept them secret, declaring that those who knew them alone were powerful, and that warriors, merchants, or any others, kings themselves being included, who were supported by them by means of these ceremonies, alone could be endowed with power. And the religious-stricken people easily believed them.¹

It is true that early in the period of the Rig-veda, rites were regarded as an important part of religion; but certainly not so much as in the period under discussion, when ceremonies were elaborated to such an extent that every gesture and every word of the performer of a ceremony, or every instrument used in a ceremony, was thought to have some mystical meaning. What is more, every natural phenomenon, every event in human life, according to the idea of the Indian in this period, had something to do with religious ceremony. Things animate or inanimate had some connexion with the ceremony. Their existence itself was for the sake of the ceremony. The ceremony was considered to be everything. Rites and ceremonics, thus elaborated, generated a literature, known by the name of the Brähmaṇas. These ritual treatises, together with the Yajur-veda (which though it forms a part of the Veda, was an introduction to the

¹ SBE. xii, pp. xiii–xv.
Brāhmaṇaṣas), are considered to be productions of a time between 1000 and 800 B.C.

Vividly contrasted with the ceremonialism of Brāhman-ism which is set forth in the Brāhmaṇaṣas is the moralism of Buddhism. Ceremony, as we have already stated, is the most prominent feature of the Brāhmaṇaṣas. It governs every phenomenon of nature and every condition of human as well as animal life. Things animate or inanimate are all under the magical spell of ceremony. Gods, men, living beings, lifeless things can all be equally moved through the power of prayer or sacrifice. Such was the belief which prevailed in the age in which the Brāhmaṇaṣas were composed. And rites and ceremonies were performed for the purpose of propitiating and controlling gods, asking them to bestow favour upon men and to save them from evils. There is nothing of the sort in Buddhism. It has no god to flatter with praise or sacrifice; it has no god to solicit or petition by means of prayer; it has no theology nor theosophy. Gods in the Buddhist mythology and cosmology are not directly requested to give men favour or to protect them against any injury. They give them favour or protect them against injury only in the name of the Buddha, his disciples, or other holy or virtuous persons. The Buddhist gods are partly inheritances of Brahmanism, but these gods only retain a depressed position as humble figures in its mythology and cosmology. The power of the gods is in this way done away with, and the efficacy of ceremony is entirely unknown in Buddhism. Moralism is its prominent feature.

In this connexion we should say a few words about the sacrifices prescribed in the Brāhmaṇaṣas. Sacrifice was a common practice among the ancient Indians. Even
the practice of human sacrifice can be traced in the Brāhmaṇas. A story is told in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (VII. 13) of a Brāhman lad named Śunahśepa who was about to be sacrificed in lieu of the only son of a king. But gods themselves appeared and saved him.\(^1\) In the same Brāhmaṇa (I. 8) we find the following passage:—

‘The gods killed a man for their victim. But from him thus killed the part which was fit for a sacrifice went out and entered a horse. Thence the horse became an animal fit for being sacrificed. The gods then killed the horse, but the part fit for being sacrificed went out of it and entered an ox. The gods then killed the ox, but the part fit for being sacrificed went out of it and entered a sheep. Thence it entered a goat. The sacrificial part remained for the longest time in the goat, thence it became pre-eminently fit for being sacrificed.’\(^2\)

In the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa (I. 2, 3, 6–7) we read: The gods first offered a man as the victim. The sacrificial essence, however, escaping from him entered into the horse, which therefore was offered; but the essence again escaped and entered into the ox. The essence further entered into the sheep, and the goat, and into the earth in the same way. They tried to get it, by digging the earth, and found it in the shape of rice and barley. The oblation of rice and barley therefore is as efficacious for him who knows this, as the sacrifice of the human being and animals. It is quite clear from these statements that sacrifices of animals, such as horse, ox, sheep, goat, were practised in the period of the Brāhmaṇas; and on some occasions human beings seem to have been victims, though presumably not commonly. The sacri-

\(^1\) Rapson, Ancient India, p. 54; Monier-Williams, Indian Wisdom, pp. 28–81; Hopkins, The Religions of India, pp. 197–8.

\(^2\) Indian Wisdom, p. 81.
fices of horse and ox were later discontinued, but sheep and goat have continued to be sacrificed until to-day. Such bloody sacrifices were considered to be necessary to propitiate gods.

As to Buddhism, it is perfectly clean from this sort of bloodshed. As we say repeatedly, it has no gods to appease or to control by means of sacrifice; and killing any animal, to say nothing of a human being, is interdicted as an abominable sin in Buddhism. Words such as Yañña (Yajña), Yiṭṭha (Iṣṭha), Yāga, Homa, Hutta (Hotra), Havya, Huta, Bali, Pūralāsa (Pūroḍāsa), &c., are used in the Buddhist texts; but they always have particular meanings, they simply mean 'offering', 'alms', and 'almsgiving', so far as Buddhist custom is concerned, whether they refer to something offered or the action of offering. It is only when these words refer to Brahmanic practices that they mean sacrifice or oblation. The destruction of life, whatever the living object may be, is absolutely prohibited as an un-Buddhist action, and on the other hand, love, sympathy, liberality, humanity, &c., are taught as highly commendable virtues; how can such bloody sacrifices be consistent with this?

The next thing we have to discuss is the caste system, a social organization peculiar to India. The idea of caste was entirely absent in the early period of the Rig-veda. The Aryan race in these days was divided into a great number of small tribes which had each its own chief. In this stage of advancement, everybody was at the same time a priest, a warrior, and a commoner in a wide sense. There was no division of society based upon birth and profession. In the course of time, however, society became more and more complicated; professions became more and more specialized; and the custom arose for
particular people or families to pursue particular professions. Religious ceremonies became more complex than before, and no one unless especially educated for them from childhood could conduct any of them. The privilege of mediating between gods and men therefore was hereditarily transmitted from father to son in one family. The Brāhman caste was thus established. Chiefs of small tribes were eager to absorb other tribes, and those who were successful in the absorption of other tribes became Samrājs or 'universal sovereigns'; and as it was necessary to protect their lands and peoples with standing forces, they always kept some trained soldiers under them. The caste of warrior was created in this manner. As to other people, they engaged in industrial works, and in consequence formed the caste of the Vaiśyas or commoners. These three castes, though thus distinguished from one another through the difference of profession and rank, belonged to the Aryan race. Any one belonging to one of these classes was called 'twice-born' (dvija), after initiation through the proper ceremony. The Śūdra caste, on the other hand, included all the tribes whom the Aryans conquered, and was distinguished from the three others by the specific name 'once-born', because they could not be initiated like those of the other castes; they were socially and religiously damned. They were placed under eternal damnation.

When such a social distinction was made is not certain, but as we find the famous verse, 'His (Puruṣa's) mouth was the Brāhman, his two arms were made the Warrior, his two thighs the Vaiśya; from his two feet the Śūdra was born',\(^1\) in the Puruṣasūkta or hymn of the original man in the Rig-veda (X. 90), the idea of the caste can be

\(^1\) A. A. Macdonell, *A Vedic Reader for Students*, p. 201.
traced to a very early period, probably the later period of this Veda; but the full development of this system belongs to a later date, when the Aryans left the Panjab and firmly settled themselves in the middle country, i.e. in the period of the Brāhmaṇas.

Later, when Buddhism arose, the caste system was in its full swing. A man's social position and occupation were always decided by birth. He was destined through life to be noble or ignoble, rich or poor, wise or ignorant, through his birth. He was bound up by birth, hand and foot. He was free only as far as the limits which his birth allowed him, and this freedom was very narrowly restricted. Association between persons belonging to the three upper castes and the lowest was strictly or absolutely forbidden, and the breach of such prohibitions was threatened with severe penalties. The same rules prevented the marriage and eating and drinking together of persons belonging to different castes. The caste system was thus a perpetual bar against social advancement and personal freedom.

The Buddha's care in connexion with the caste system was firstly to teach the equality and universal fraternity of all castes, and secondly to place all human relations upon a moral basis. As to the first declaration, we find the following passage in the Āguttara (iv. 202): 'As, O monks, (the waters of) great rivers such as the Gaṅga, the Yamuna, the Aciravati, the Sarabhu, and the Mahi, at the moment when they reach the great ocean, abandon their original names, and are known only by the name of the great ocean, so (people belonging to) the four castes, the Khattiya, the Brāhmaṇa, the Vessa, and the Sudda, when they leave home and take up the homeless life in the doctrine and discipline which the Tathāgata
has taught, abandon their original personal and family names, and are known only by the name of followers of the “Sakya’s son.” This idea must prevail not only over the Saṅgha or monkish community, but also over the lay followers of the Buddha. Nobody can be privileged merely through birth; everybody must be equal in the doctrine and discipline taught by the Buddha. It is not birth but conduct that causes distinction among mankind.

Conduct alone makes a man noble or ignoble, makes him a Brāhmaṇ or an outcaste. Any one whose conduct is good is a Brāhmaṇ, but on the other hand whosoever is wicked in his conduct ought to be regarded as an outcaste. Conduct is essential, but not birth. It is natural that he should say this as a teacher of moralism and universal fraternity and equality. The caste system, which was established firstly to distinguish the Aryan from the non-Aryan, endowing the former, who are conquerors, with infinite authority over the latter, the conquered, and secondly to place the Brāhmaṇ on the highest social position, was utterly ignored by the Buddha. According to the Vāseṭṭhasutta,¹ the Buddha being asked by Vāseṭṭha whether birth or conduct constitutes a true Brāhmaṇ, gives a lengthy explanation, and in conclusion he says that the nature and character of the Brāhmaṇ or non-Brāhmaṇ chiefly depends upon conduct. According to his idea, moral conduct is of the most vital importance to human beings; birth counts for very little. ‘Not by birth’, says the Buddha, ‘does one become an outcaste, not by birth does one become a Brāhmaṇ; by deeds one becomes an outcaste, by deeds one becomes a Brāhmaṇ.’²

¹ Sn. pp. 115–23. ² Sn. 136, 142.
Seemingly this was a polite challenge to the Brāhman caste, who were irremediably haughty in the Buddha's days; and the Buddha always tried to suppress them, for instance, by placing them under the caste of warriors. We may admit that this is true, but we should not forget that in doing this the Buddha had a loftier idea. In praising the ideal Brāhmans he uses the best words he can find. In this connexion we shall refer, for instance, to the Brāhmaṇavagga of the Dhammapada (verses 383-428).

We have now come to investigate the Upaniṣads, the last of the three Śrutis or revelations of ancient Brahmanism. The Upaniṣads are generally considered to be a separate independent literature; but properly speaking they are not, because they are nothing but the last part of the Brāhmaṇas, being composed a little previous to, and contemporary with, Buddhism, that is to say, between 700 and 500 B.C. They are treatises concerning the universal and individual souls (Paramātman and Jīvātman) and exhibit their unity, or the absorption of the individual soul into the universal one through the power of knowledge, as Nirvāṇa or the final end of mankind.

The Brāhmaṇas, as we have already stated, chiefly deal with the rites which were performed with a view to propitiating or controlling the gods. At that period rites were considered to be the most efficacious procedure for asking the gods to give favour and avert evils. In the course of time, however, this idea gave way to another; the change being brought about from the following reason. The wars which had been long raging among different Aryan tribes were calmed down, and as a result they had more time to spend in spiritual matters. A fact
peculiar to this age in consequence is that men belonging to the warrior caste took the lead in this new movement.\(^1\) It may not be out of place to mention in this connexion that the founders of Buddhism and Jainism, both of which arose about the end of the period of the Upaniṣads, belonged to this caste, though the field of their movement does not quite coincide with that which we are now going to discuss. In the periods previous to this, that is in the periods of the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas, when the Aryans dwelt in the Panjab and the district between the Sutlej and the Jumna, the Brāhmans had absolute authority over the whole community; but when they proceeded farther south-eastwards to the Ganges valley, 'the power of the Brāhmans was restricted, the national life became more worldly, the priests milder, and the common people more important than before.'\(^2\) In a word, the Brāhmans became less powerful, people belonging to the other castes became more important, the Kṣatriyas, who had much time as the result of the cessation of wars, devoted themselves to the study of spiritual matters, especially philosophical considerations. And the Upaniṣads are the productions of this new phase of the mental development of the Aryan race.

In the history of Indian thought knowledge has

\(^1\) Brah. 1, 4, 11; 2, 1, 1; Kauṣ. 4, 19; Chānd. 1, 8–9. 'It would seem that the characteristic central doctrine of the Upaniṣads, the doctrine of Brahman or the Ātman, was at first developed and systematized within Kṣatriya circles and at the courts of kings. This combination of royal functions with the mood of a philosopher or a poet was not unfamiliar to Oriental experience.' (Art. 'Upaniṣads', ERE. xii, p. 545.)

\(^2\) Dr. Wolfgang Bohn, *Die Religion des Jina und ihr Verhältnis zum Buddhismus*, p. 5.
always occupied an important position. This characteristic could be clearly recognized in Vedic literature. The origin of the world, its substance, the process of its construction, &c., are alluded to here and there in that literature. In the Brähmaṇas, which mainly deal with ceremonial rites, these and other philosophical questions are also discussed. Brahmā as the first cause of the universe, Ātman the individual soul, identification of Brahmā with Ātman, the doctrines of transmigration and liberation, &c., are all explained in the Brāhmaṇas in some degree; but their full detailed explanation and philosophical discussions on these subjects are only to be found in the Upaniṣads, in which the Indian for the first time began his serious investigations. We are not going to enter into any detailed explanation here of the peculiar subjects dealt with by the Upaniṣads or how they deal with them. It will suffice for us at present if we understand that knowledge was of the most vital importance for the Indian of this age.

As the rite was everything to the Indian of the Brāhmaṇas, so knowledge was everything to the Indian of the Upaniṣads. In this stage of development mere ceremonial rites did not give him the satisfaction which he expected to obtain from religion. He therefore attempted to find this satisfaction in philosophical speculation. He superseded ceremonial rites by knowledge, considering it to be the best means of obtaining his end. The attainment of unity with Ātman, the highest aim and purpose of the Brāhman according to the idea of the Indian of this age, could be accomplished only through the speculative power of knowledge. Nothing was impossible for Ya evāṁ veda or ‘one who knows thus’ to accomplish or to obtain. Nothing could
hurt him, and nobody could rival him in anything. Knowledge was the most valuable possession of the Brāhman, and one who was in the possession of it was the most worthy person.

From the moral point of view we see three remarkable conditions. In the first place knowledge has absolute value and efficacy above everything else. It is declared in the Upaniṣads that 'one who knows thus' is exempt from all his sinful deeds. As fire burns up wood, so 'one who knows thus' consumes all his evil deeds, and becomes clean and pure, free from decay and death (Bṛih. 5, 14, 8). The theft of gold, drinking liquor, dishonouring one's teacher's bed, and the murder of a Brāhman are regarded as four deadly sins, the most heinous crimes; but 'a man who knows the doctrine of five mystic fires' is not stained with the evil of these sins; he will be cleansed from it and obtain the world of the blessed (Chānd. 5, 10, 9–10). As soft fibres of the Iṣīkā reed, when thrown into fire, are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt who offers this Agnihotra with a full knowledge of its true purport (Chānd. 5, 24, 3). Knowledge was thus of supreme value for the Brāhman of the Upaniṣads, whether in speculation or in practical life. There is no evil deed for 'one who knows thus'. Knowledge will cancel all sins and crimes which he commits. Morality is thus absolutely void of its value before knowledge.

Later on, however, the idea was somewhat modified. Good conduct was declared to be as requisite as knowledge. So we find passages in the Kaṭhā (3, 6–8), 'He who has understanding and whose mind is always firmly held, his senses are under control, like good horses of

1 Hume, pp. 58 ff.
a charioteer. . . . He who has understanding, who is mindful and always pure, reaches indeed that place from whence he is not born again.’ In the same Upanishad (2, 24) we read: ‘He who has not first turned away from his wickedness, who is not tranquil, and subdued, or whose mind is not at rest, he can never obtain the Self (even) by knowledge.’

Contrasted with these two opposite ideas, however, we find another one expressed in the Upanishads in connexion with good and evil. This idea is of exemption from the region of moral distinctions as the result of the cultivation of one’s knowledge. A possessor of knowledge, or a man who knows thus, as he is usually called, soars high up in the region where there is no moral distinction between good and evil; he has overcome these distinctive ideas.

That Buddhism values knowledge highly goes without saying. It values it as highly as the Upanishads. The extinction of depravities, the attainment of enlightenment or Nibbāna, liberation from transmigration, the understanding of the Four Noble Truths, the practice of the Eightfold Noble Path, &c., all fundamentally depend upon knowledge. These high attainments of Buddhist culture can be accomplished only through the exercise of knowledge. Knowledge is therefore regarded as essential to Buddhist culture, and on the other hand ignorance is looked upon as one of the most detestable evils. ‘It is through not understanding and grasping the Four Truths, O monks, that we have had to run so long, to wander so long in this weary path of transmigration—both you and I’ (A. ii. 1; D. ii. 91–122).

‘By extinguishing the depravities the monk exists, having understood, realized, attained in this very life by himself
to the liberation of the mind attainable through knowledge, which is free from deprivities’ (A. i. 107 passim), is a frequently recurring sentence. ‘Without knowledge there is no meditation (jhāna), without meditation there is no knowledge; he who has knowledge and meditation is near unto Nibbāna’ (Dh. 372). ‘Those who know whence sin arises drive it away. They cross over this stream that is difficult to cross, and has not been crossed before, with a view to not being born again’ (Sn. 273).

Knowledge is one of the three trainings (sikkhā), the other two being morality and the concentration of the mind. Ignorance, on the other hand, is one of the three roots of evil, the other two being lust and hatred. Knowledge is one of the four forces (bāla), one of the five faculties (indriya), one of the four precious things (dhamma), or portions (āṅga) (A. ii. 79, 239; D. ii. 128); recollection (sati) and the investigation of the doctrine (dhammaviccaya), the seven constituents of enlightenment (bojjhaṅga), right view (sammādiṭṭhi) and right recollection (sammāsati) of the Eightfold Noble Path, may be included in knowledge.

A glance at the epithets given to the Buddha, the most worthy personage for the Buddhist, will help us to see how highly is knowledge esteemed in Buddhism. Buddha (enlightened one), Sambuddha (highly enlightened one), Dasabala (possessor of the ten unique forces), Satthā (teacher), Sabbaññu (omniscient one), Cakkhumā (possessor of supernatural eyesight), Samantacakkhu (seer of all directions), Sugata (well-attained one), Bhūripañña (possessor of great knowledge), Tathāgata (one who has understood things as they are), Lokavidu (Knower of the world); these are only a few
of the Buddha's epithets which most frequently recur in the Buddhist writings. It is quite clear from this short exposition that Buddhism values knowledge very highly, as highly as the Upaniṣads. This fact shows us the contemporariness of those two great systems. High esteem of knowledge was the general thought of the times.

So far the case is the same, but a difference arises here, because, as we have already stated, the Upaniṣads give knowledge the supreme position, esteeming it above morality, while the Buddha has never gone so far in this direction. He never values knowledge above morality. Knowledge is always restrained by morality, or both go together. This is why early Buddhism was not successful as a philosophical school. Buddhist knowledge is always controlled by the moral conscience. It is not allowed to soar up as freely as it pleases, as in the Upaniṣads and other Indian philosophical schools which appeared later on, the later form of Buddhism being included. We should not say, however, that in Buddhism knowledge and virtue are identified, that a possessor of knowledge is considered to be virtuous, or that a wise man is expected to be good. But we may say that they always stand side by side. 'He who possesses virtue and intelligence, who is just, speaks the truth, and does what is his own business, him the world will hold dear' (Dh. 217). 'Pleasant is virtue lasting to old age, pleasant is a faith firmly rooted; pleasant is attainment of knowledge, pleasant is avoiding of sins' (Dh. 333). 'A wise and good man who knows the meaning of this should quickly clear the way that leads to Nibbāna' (Dh. 289). On the other hand, morality stands at the head of the three trainings and leads the
way,\(^1\) which means that morality is the starting-point of Buddhist culture. The Buddhist with a view to attaining high culture must first of all be a moral man. 'Establishing himself on morality, an intelligent man cultivates concentration of the mind and knowledge; the ardent and prudent monk will extricate that entanglement' (S. i. 13, 165; V. M. i. 2). 'Action, knowledge, righteousness, morality, and the noblest life, by these are mortals purified, but not by lineage or wealth' (M. iii. 262; S. i. 34, 55; V. M. i. 3). 'One who is always in possession of morality and knowledge, who is well tranquillized, energetic, and ardent, will cross the flood of transmigration hard to cross' (S. i. 53; V. M. i. 3). Vijjācaraṇasampanna, or 'One who is endowed with knowledge and good conduct', is an epithet given to the Buddha, showing the equal importance of knowledge and virtue. The Buddha esteems knowledge very highly, but he does not place it above morality, as the Upaniṣads do; nor does he identify knowledge with morality. They always go together, and the latter leads the way. This is the general Buddhist notion of the relation between knowledge and morality.

Buddhism, however, agrees with the Upaniṣads in the last of what we have called the 'three remarkable conditions', though even here we find some, though slight, discrepancy between the two; because one of them, the Upaniṣads, gives knowledge the supreme value, while the other, Buddhism, always restrains it through morality. According to the idea set forth in the Upaniṣads, knowledge exempts the knower from both good and evil, and emancipates him altogether from the region of moral distinctions.\(^2\) *Ya evam veda*, or 'Ono

\(^1\) D. ii. 98.  
\(^2\) Hume, pp. 61–2.
who knows thus’, is freed from the idea of moral distinctions through the power of the knowledge he has. ‘He does not distress himself’, says the Taittirīya (2, 9), ‘with the thought, Why did I not do what is good? Why did I do what is bad? He who thus knows these two (good and bad), frees himself.’ ‘Him (who knows)’, says the Brhadāraṇyaka (4. 4. 22), ‘these two do not overcome, whether he says that for some reason he has done evil, or for some reason he has done good—he overcomes both, and neither what he has done, nor what he has omitted to do, burns (affects) him.’ ‘If there were no speech, neither right nor wrong would be known, neither the true nor the false, neither the good nor the bad, neither the pleasant nor the unpleasant. Speech makes us understand all this’ (Chānd. 7, 2, 1). So the omnipotent Upaniṣadic knowledge elevates the knower beyond the range of ethical, aesthetical, and logical distinctions. For ‘One who knows thus’, there is no opposite or relative idea, because he has himself risen up into the sphere where there is no such distinction. As a person of complete knowledge, he is absolutely free from distinctive ideas which belong to the sphere of partial knowledge. A man of absolute knowledge, or ‘One who knows thus’, is never restrained by any such ideas.

Buddhism as a characteristically ethical teaching cannot be bold enough to admit the total abolition of moral distinction for any persons. What we expect here is that good will decidedly be good, and evil will decidedly be evil, in the case of the wise or the ignorant, the Buddha, the Arahan, or other men. Still we find almost the same idea expressed in the scripture, especially in the Dhammapada and Suttanipāta which are generally
regarded as sources of Buddhist ethical ideas. Is this due to the influence of the thoughts of the time, which we may say in some sense the Upaniṣads represent? The Bhikkhu, the Brāhmaṇa, the Buddha (Satthā, Muni) are said to be free from such distinctions as good and evil, pleasantness and unpleasantness, purity and impurity, and so on. 'He who is above good and evil, who is chaste, who with knowledge passes through the world, he indeed is called a Bhikkhu' (Dh. 267; S. i. 182). 'Him I call indeed a Brāhmaṇa who in this world is above good and evil, above the bondage of both, free from grief, from sin, and from impurity' (Dh. 412; Sn. 636). 'As a beautiful lotus does not adhere to the water, so thou (Master) dost not cling to good and evil, to either' (Sn. 547). 'The Brāhmaṇa who does not cling... to what is good and to what is evil...' (Sn. 790). 'Under any circumstance the independent Muni does not please nor displease (any one)’ (Sn. 811). ‘... Muni does not wish for purification through another, for he is not pleased nor displeased (with anything)’ (Sn. 813). 'He is a Brāhmaṇa who has no idea of boundary, who does not cling to what he has known or seen, who takes no delight in attachment, nor is affected with freedom from attachment; there is nothing which he grasps as the highest thing in the world' (Sn. 795). ‘He who having left behind both what is agreeable and what is disagreeable... such a one will wander rightly in the world’ (Sn. 363).

Thus the Bhikkhu, the Brāhmaṇa, the Buddha in Buddhism take the place of 'One who knows thus' in the Upaniṣads; and they are described as being above good and evil things, pleasant and unpleasant, and so on. Such attainment is the result of high mental culture
prosecuted through the activity of perfect moral consciousness. When one reaches this state of culture, distinctive ideas will be absolutely abolished, just as in the case of one who knows Brahmā, or one who has seen Ātman, or one who has attained complete oneness with Brahmā or Paramātman. He is not immoral, but we may say that he is supermoral. He has reached the mental condition where there is no consciousness of moral, aesthetical, or logical distinction; the relative ideas therefore of good and evil, pleasure and pain, agreeableness and disagreeableness, right and wrong, are all annihilated for him. In his action as well as in his thought all these distinctions, not merely in idea, but in fact also, are abolished. In other words, he has gone beyond the sphere of morality into that of religion. He is not limited by distinctive ideas, though naturally his action, speech, or thought will not be morally bad. Such a person may have no moral consciousness of his conduct. Without any consciousness of his conduct, without any compulsion from within and without, he acts as he pleases, and still his conduct is free from any moral breach. In the Buddhist doctrine of moral retribution, evil actions are always thought to bring evil effects, while good actions bring good effects so far as beings are within the sphere where actions will take effect. When Buddhahood or Arahatship is reached, actions will bring no effects, because the actions of the Buddha or Arahān are of an inoperative nature, unlike those of ordinary people. Their actions being completely free from desire (rāga), hatred (dosa), and ignorance (moha) and their opposites, are not transformed into Kammās which, in the case of the ordinary man, will produce good or bad results in happy or miserable birth. The Buddha or the Arahān in
Buddhism thus takes the place of 'one who knows thus' in Brähmanism, and is represented as being not bound by relative ideas. This does not mean that he will be exonerated from any moral sins, as is declared in the Upaniṣads in the case of 'one who knows thus', but that he is above these distinctions. He is no more a man morally bound.

Dr. Hopkins rightly says,¹ 'Knowledge is wisdom to the Brähman; asceticism is wisdom to the Jain; purity and love is the first wisdom to the Buddhist.' Buddhism regards knowledge highly and approves asceticism to some extent, but certainly it does not esteem knowledge as highly as the Upaniṣads do, and it does not approve asceticism as Jainism and Brähmanism do. It esteems purity and love, that is, morality in a wide sense of the term, above anything else. It is an ethical teaching after all.

¹ The Religions of India, p. 306.
IV

CLASSIFICATION OF BUDDHIST MORALITY


In classifying Buddhist morality we feel ourselves facing a great difficulty, because Buddhism as a moral system has an infinite variety of names and ideas in morality, which sometimes, though included in the same categories, are regarded as moral from entirely different points of view, so that their classifications in many cases cross one another. What we expect to find in some classifications are missing, and some moral ideas which seem to us rather unimportant appear in several of them, sometimes in redundantly subdivided forms. It is rather a wearisome, and on many occasions an irritating task to arrange them in unified or systematical classes. What we can do with them, therefore, will be at first to mention them, as set forth in the Buddhist scriptures, with notes and comments, and then to extract from them a category of morals according as we think they are regarded in this teaching.

The simplest compendium of the Buddhist morality is
the five precepts: (1) Do not kill, (2) Do not steal, (3) Do not commit adultery, (4) Do not tell a lie, and (5) Do not take intoxicating liquors. Buddhism as a teaching closely connected with Brāhmaṇism bears a striking similarity to the latter in many respects. The moralities of these two religions naturally resemble each other, with the only difference that in Buddhism morality is far more highly regarded than in Brāhmaṇism. We find four of the five precepts, falsehood being excepted, in the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad (5, 10. 9–10), in the following words: ‘A man who steals gold, who drinks spirits, who dishonours his Guru’s bed, who kills a Brāhman, these four fall, and as a fifth he who associates with them.’ These are the four most deadly sins of the ‘twice-born’, and the heaviest legal as well as spiritual punishment is expected to follow the commission of any one of them. But if the offender knows the doctrine of the five fires, he will not only not be defiled by the sin, but will be purified and obtain the world of the blessed. These four sins are mentioned in ancient law books¹ too, according to which these, the deadliest sins as they are, can be escaped from by means of the recital of Aghamarṣana or ‘hymn of sin-effacing’. As is clear from these statements, the difference between Brāhmaṇism and Buddhism is in this connexion that the latter, unlike the former, does not teach the possibility of release from any sin by means of knowledge, hymn, or through any divine mediation. It declares that we shall be responsible for the sin we commit, we shall reap the crop of what we ourselves have sown in this life or in one of the coming lives.

¹ Ga. xxiv. 10–12; Ba. iii. 5. 2–5; Va. xxvi. 8.
The five precepts are generally given in the following forms: (1) abstinence from destruction of life, (2) abstinence from taking what is not given, (3) abstinence from fornication, (4) abstinence from speaking falsely, and (5) abstinence from drinking spirituous, strong, and maddening liquors, which is the cause of sloth.

The first two of these may be regarded as guarantees for the safeguard of life and property. As we have mentioned already, sacrifice was a common practice in the times when the Buddha appeared, and sheep, goats, horses, and oxen were killed in abundance. Such a sacrifice was a ridiculous absurdity and at the same time an unpardonable cruelty in the eye of the Buddha, who did not recognize its efficacy on the one hand, and who highly regarded the life of any living being on the other. As we shall see later on in the chapter on benevolence, according to the Buddha's idea, the humane sentiment of mankind is not to be limited merely to themselves, but ought to be extended to all sentient beings, who should share as much kindness as mankind themselves do. No living being therefore should be killed intentionally. With this humane idea, the Buddha taught never to destroy the life of any living creature, however minute it may be. The water filter, one of the monk's requisites, is used to filter water so that microbes may not be swallowed while drinking water. This is the same with the case of the Jain monk, who is moreover prohibited from drinking cold water.\(^1\) It is forbidden to throw the remains of food on green grass, because it may destroy the life of grass; and it should not be thrown into water where animals live, because it may hurt their

\(^1\) Dr. Wolfgang Bohn, *Die Religion des Jina und ihr Verhältnis zum Buddhismus*, p. 6.
life. The monk ought not to go about during the rainy season, because in trampling down the grass which grows especially in that season he may destroy its life, and because he may kill small animals which also especially grow and crawl about on the roads during that season. Thus the high regard of life is in Buddhism as well as in Jainism carried almost to an extreme.

Stealing or theft in its wide sense will include not only that of material objects in connexion with which it is ordinarily explained, but that of immaterial ones. Pickpocketing, burglary, robbery, swindling, blackmail, are not all the forms of theft. There are hundreds of other forms of it;¹ for instance, the infringement of others' rights, unasked interference with others' business, the waste of time by those who are employed by private persons or corporate bodies, the neglect of duty, evasion of responsibility, misuse of or tampering with money or property belonging to the public or other persons, &c. I am afraid in fact almost all of us commit theft in some form or other, whether positively or negatively. Sometimes we are conscious of its being a form of theft, but in many cases we are not, on account of the long habitual practice of it, or from mere ignorance. Certainly all of these cannot properly be called cases of theft, but they are not consistent with the ideal of a man who 'takes only what is given, with which he is content, and who passes his life in honesty and in purity of heart.'² And if we carry on our business exactly as we ought to, our efficiency will be increased by several times.

The third abstinence is that from adultery, which we shall fully discuss later on, in the chapter on celibacy and

¹ See The Hibbert Journal, Oct., 1904, 'The Ten Commandments'.
² D. i. 4–5; SBE. xi. p. 189.
chastity. And therefore we shall dismiss the subject with only a few remarks on it. The difficulty in dealing with it is that we are not in a position to comprehend the Buddha's idea in connexion with it, because there are not materials enough for constructing any concrete idea about it. Perhaps the following episode will be sufficient for us for the present. Piṇḍolabhāradvāja, one of the Buddha's chief disciples, in the course of a religious conversation with King Udena,\(^1\) mentions that the Buddha has told his disciples to look upon women in three different ways. That is to say, they should regard women who are as old as their mothers as mothers; those who are as old as their sisters as sisters; and those who are of the same age as their daughters as daughters. This forms a part of instruction given to his monkish disciples, but we can deduce from it the Buddha's general idea of women. They should be regarded like our own mothers, sisters, or daughters according to their respective ages. When women are regarded in this manner, and when there is no breach of faith of marriage, and therefore husband and wife can have perfect trust in each other,\(^2\) the sacredness of home will be perfectly retained and the peace thereof will be realized.

The fourth abstinence is that from telling a lie, which we shall discuss fully in the chapter on veracity. 'Let no one speak falsely to another in the hall of justice or in the hall of the assembly, let him not cause any one to speak falsely, nor approve of those that speak falsely, let him avoid all sorts of untruth' (Sn. 397). This is the Buddha's admonition against falsehood. Buddhism

---

\(^1\) S. iv. 110–11.

\(^2\) For the Buddha's instruction about mutual trust of husband and wife, see the Śīṅgālovasuttanta, D. iii. 190; SBB. iv. 181–2.
as a religion of truth has no room for falsehood. It demands absolute truth, as it demands absolute purity as a religion of purity. Truth is the final end of Buddhism as a science, and it is the final standard of Buddhist morality. We ought to be absolutely true in thought, speech, and action. And a community will be very pleasant to live in, if there is no falsehood found in any form. Truth is thus essential for social as well as individual welfare. The motive of falsehood is desire to gain something (rāgāgati), or it comes as a result of moral weakness (bhayāgati). Buddhism regards covetousness as one of the ugliest vices on the one hand, and teaches the power of truth-speaking (saccakiriyā) on the other. Truth-speaking is a power, according to the Buddhist doctrine, as love (mettā) and sympathy (karunā) are.\(^1\) Strong are those who always speak the truth and never deviate from it. When a man is free from covetousness and equipped with mental strength as a result of close attachment to truth, he will never be afraid to speak the truth.

The fifth and last of the five precepts is abstinence from intoxicating liquors.\(^2\) This is usually expressed in this form: 'Abstinence from (drinking) spirituous, strong, maddening liquors, which are roots of torpidity'. This means that taking any intoxicating liquors is the cause of torpidity or sluggishness. It causes mental sluggishness and relaxation as well as physical torpidity. Buddhism recommends us to be constantly vigilant (sadājāgariyānuyutta); it teaches us to concentrate our minds as a means of culture. Drinking liquors, which causes mental sluggishness and relaxation, can never be consistent with this doctrine.

---

1 SBB. iv. 185-6.
2 See the chapter on abstinence and temperance.
The five precepts are the compendium of Buddhist virtue. They are called 'the treasure of virtue' (Siladhana). The perfect observance of them is said to be 'success in morality' (Silasampadā). Those who observe them will live the life of a householder with self-possession (Visārada), and will never meet with the king's punishment; the reputation of those who observe them and take refuge in the three holy objects will spread all over the world; after death they will be reborn in the heavenly world. 'Fivefold, O householders,' says the Buddha, 'is the gain of the virtuous person through the practice of virtue. In the first place the virtuous person, strong in virtue, acquires great wealth through his industry; in the next place, the good reports of him are spread abroad; thirdly, whatever society he enters—whether of nobles, Brāhmans, heads of houses, or members of the Order—he enters confident and self-possessed; fourthly, he dies without anxiety; and lastly, on the dissolution of the body, after death, he is re-born into some happy state of heaven. This, O householders, is the fivefold gain of the virtuous person.'

The five precepts are incumbent upon all the Buddhist laymen, who ought to observe them through life, so long as they do not give up professing the Buddhist faith. Next to these five, there comes the set of eight precepts, Aṭṭhāngasīla, which are as follows: (1) abstinence from destruction of life; (2) abstinence from taking what is

1 A. iii. 58, iv. 5.  
2 A. ii. 66, iv. 271, 284, 288, 324.  
3 A. iii. 203, 204.  
4 A. iii. 208-11.  
5 A. i. 226; the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Saṅgha.  
6 A. iii. 35, 171, 204, 205, 275-7; S. ii. 68; in A. ii. 88 abstinence from drinking is omitted.  
7 D. ii. 86; SBE. xi. 17; SBB. iii. 91.
not given; (3) abstinence from all sexual uncleanness; (4) abstinence from speaking falsely; (5) abstinence from drinking spirituous, strong, and maddening liquors which are the cause of sloth; (6) abstinence from eating at forbidden times; (7) abstinence from dancing, singing, playing music, and seeing shows; and (8) abstinence from adorning and beautifying the person by the use of garlands, perfumes, and unguents, and from using a high or a large couch or seat.¹

According to the Mahāvagga (Vin. I. 101 ff.), there was a custom among a certain religious sect in the Buddha's time, presumably in the Magadha country, to keep three days holy, the eighth, fourteenth, and fifteenth of every half lunar month. They assembled on these days and preached the doctrine, by means of which they obtained popularity among the people. This fact came to the notice of King Bimbisāra, who therefore approached the Buddha and suggested to him to tell his disciples to do the same. The Buddha, accordingly, told his disciples to assemble together on those days and preach the doctrine. Later he ordered them to recite the Pātimokkha or 'collection of precepts prescribed for the monk' on these occasions. Still later they were told to assemble once instead of thrice, which has become a perpetual institution for monks. In the southern Buddhist countries, even to-day monks assemble on the fourteenth or fifteenth day of every half lunar month and recite the collection of precepts, as their brethren did in ancient times. This is called Uposatha.

The Buddhist laymen on their part keep all the three

¹ This set is given in A. i. 211–12, iv. 248–51; 388–90; but in A. i. 214–15 (= Com. on Thi. p. 38), Sn. 400–2, (7) is omitted and (8) is divided into two, thus completing the number eight.
days or one day of every half lunar month holy, and observe these eight precepts through day and night on each occasion. In the Dhammikasutta (Sn. 400-2) they are recommended to keep these eight vows on these days and also on the extra-fast days (Pāṭihāriyapakkha). But while the five precepts are obligatory on every Buddhist layman through life, these eight precepts are voluntary; they may be observed on these special occasions.

The observance of the Upavasatha\(^1\) or fast day was an old custom in the Aryan community, because we read in the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa (I. 1. 1. 7; II. 1. 4. 1) that the householder with his wife practised fasting one day every half lunar month while preparing sacrifice to be performed the next morning, and that gods thereby knowing it betook themselves to his house and dwelt by him (\textit{upa} + \textit{vas}). This day, therefore, was called Upavasatha.

The Vrata or abstinence of the householder on these days 'included the abstinence from some kinds of food, especially meat, and other casual pleasures; the cutting (optional, according to some) of the beard and hair, except the crest-lock; sleeping on the ground in one of the chief fire-houses; and the observance of silence during the ceremonies'.\(^2\) The observance of the Uposatha days and taking one meal, and abstinence from pleasures as is prescribed in the last three precepts, are in the main taken from the Brahmanic custom in those days.

The Buddha established this institution in the first place with a view to complying with the current religious custom. He was always careful not to oppose current thoughts or customs, so far as they were not

---

\(^1\) Upasatha is its corresponding Pali form.  
\(^2\) SBE. xii. 1 note.
against his own ideas. And he did not hesitate to adopt custom, institution, doctrine, or anything else which he thought was helpful to his religious system. And it is quite natural that the Buddha as a moral teacher, in whose system self-control, temperance, endurance, chastity, and the like virtues predominate, should adopt this custom into his system.

In the second place, this observance makes the Buddhist layman more religious, because in observing these eight precepts he is leading a more religious life than in observing the five precepts only. He is partly leading a monk’s life. He abstains from sexual uncleanness; he abstains from taking meals after noon; he refrains from wearing garlands or other bodily ornaments, from using perfumes or ointments; he refrains from dancing, singing, playing music, or seeing shows; and he refrains from using a large high bed or seat. All these precepts are included among the ten precepts which are prescribed for the Sāmañera or novice. Thus the Buddhist layman, as the Brahman householder did in the preparation of sacrifice, is to take up a novice’s life for one day and night.

From the standpoint of the ideal life, the Bhikkhu or monk with his collection of two hundred and twenty-seven precepts comes first. The Sāmañera or novice, who has to observe the ten precepts as long as he remains a novice, comes next to the monk. The Upāsaka, or layman, whose everyday precepts are only five, comes last. The layman therefore by observing the eight precepts leads a more ideal life following the religious man’s example. This seems to have been the Buddha’s idea in establishing this institution. In a discourse for the lady devotee Visākhā, the Buddha says as
follows: 'He (the layman) considers, O Visākhā, in this manner, Arahans have given up the destruction of life during their life; and refraining from destroying life, and having laid aside staffs and swords, they live feeling ashamed (of sin), and compassionate and sympathetic with all living beings. I also to-day during this day and night will give up the destruction of life; and refraining from destroying life and laying aside staff and sword, I will live feeling ashamed (of sin), and compassionate and sympathetic with all living beings. I will follow the example of Arahans in this matter, by which my Uposatha will be observed. . . .\(^1\) Arahans have given up using high and large beds; and refraining from using them they sleep in low places, i.e. on chairs or couches made of grass. I also to-day during the day and night will give up using a high and large bed; and refraining from using it, I will sleep in a low place, i.e. on a chair or couch made of grass. I will follow the example of Arahans in this matter, by which my Uposatha will be observed.'\(^2\) It is clear from this quotation that the Uposatha, in which the observance of the eight vows is regarded as the most important thing, is the imitation of the life of Arahans for one day and night. While the five precepts are moral precepts, the eight are religious vows. In observing them, therefore, and devoting the day to the exercises of religion, the layman becomes more religious, and thereby he is nearer to the ideal of the Buddhist life.

The Dasakusalakamma, or 'ten good actions', is another category of virtuous conduct, which differs from the preceding two sets, because, unlike the two others,

\(^1\) The same thing is repeated about the six intermediate precepts.
\(^2\) A. i. 211–12, iv. 248–51, 388–90.
these 'good actions' do not merely include bodily 'actions', but also those of speech and thought. They are (1) abstinence from taking life, (2) abstinence from taking what is not given, (3) abstinence from adultery, (4) abstinence from speaking falsely, (5) abstinence from slandering, (6) abstinence from abuse, (7) abstinence from foolish talking, (8) abstinence from covetousness, (9) abstinence from malice, and (10) abstinence from being sceptical. The first three of the ten belong to the body, the next four to speech, and the last three to thought; and the first four, that is abstinence from taking life, stealing, adultery, and lying, are found among the five precepts and the eight which we have already explained. The last of these four and the following three make up 'good actions' in speech. Telling a lie, slandering, abuse, and foolish talk comprise all evils belonging to the mouth.

Speech is an important faculty particularly inherent in the human being. It is chiefly through this faculty that we are able to communicate our thoughts and feelings to others. Certainly there are many other mediums of communicating our thoughts and feelings to others, such as letters, pictures, actions, gestures, countenance, &c. All these are substitutes for speech, and we may call them speech in its broader sense, so far as they can be used for expressing our thoughts and feelings. Speech is thus indispensable for human beings, and it is well so long as it is used rightly or properly. Evil comes only when it is misused or when it is abused, as the Buddha says: 'To every man that is born, an axe is born in his mouth, by which the fool cuts himself, when speaking bad language.'\(^1\) Lying, slandering, abuse, and

\(^1\) Sn. 657.
foolish talk perhaps comprise the most serious cases of evil belonging to speech; and when we abstain from them, we shall be free from the evil of speech.

Slandering, backbiting, as it is ordinarily called, or to be more accurate, 'using language which is liable to cause separation among friends,' may take the form sometimes of a false statement or report concerning the personality of another, or sometimes of a misrepresentation about his action, but always accompanied by a malicious intention to rouse friendly feeling towards oneself and hostile feeling towards another. In doing this he wishes to separate friends from one another, and to attract one or both of them to himself. In the Śrīmadāväntikaśāstra (i. 73–4) we find the following definition of this term: 'Any language by means of which one rouses friendly feeling towards oneself and hostile feeling (lit. emptiness) towards another in the heart of somebody else to whom the language is directed.' This commentary further says that not only the slanderous language itself, but the will (cetanā) which prompts one to utter or disseminate slanderous language for the purpose of causing rupture among friends and making oneself friendly to them ought also to be regarded as 'slandering'.

It is quite clear that this is a detestable vice in itself; nothing can be more detestable than slandering a person who is free from at least the charge in connexion with which he is slandered, for slandering is usually understood to refer to untruth. The motives which induce one to utter slanderous language against another may be avarice, hatred, envy,¹ cowardice, or other similar

¹ 'Contentions and disputes are joined with envy, and there is slander in the disputes arisen', Sn. 863.
malicious ones. Whatever the motives may be, they will never be consistent with the moral ideas of Buddhism, which looks upon them as abominable vices, and regards concord, love, sympathy, tolerance, as admirable virtues. It may cause first of all the separation of one friend from another; it may cause the defamation or injury of one who is made the victim of this vice; and it may cause the speaker himself to lose his honour, if he has any. No positive good can be expected to come from such vice on either side except by sheer accident.

Abuse, or using harsh language, is another evil belonging to the mouth. In defining it Buddhaghosa says as follows: 'Abuse is a language which makes the speaker and others feel harsh, and which itself being harsh is pleasant neither to the ear nor to the heart' (Sum. i. 73-4). Contumely, derision, cursing, sarcasm, scornful language, which are all harsh to the ear and the heart, will be included in this vice. People may be induced to use such language by pride, anger, envy, or any other motives of a similar nature; and whether these may bring evil or not on one who is addressed, they ought to be regarded as vice, and therefore avoided.

Peyyavajja or piyavacana or kind-wordedness, one of the four elements of friendliness, is exactly the opposite of abuse. We find this among the virtues of a woman, and the virtues which are to be shown towards friends and relatives; but we shall find the most interesting reference to this virtue in the Lakkhaṇasuttanta, where the Buddha says about one of his previous incarnations

1 A. ii. 32, 248; iv. 219, 364; D. iii. 152; Jat. v. 330.
2 A. iii. 36-7; iv. 265, 267.
3 D. iii. 190.
4 D. iii. 173.
'that when he was born as a man he gave up using harsh language, and spoke only such words as were free from blame, pleasant to the ear, lovely, reaching to the heart, urbane, pleasing the multitude, beloved by the multitude.' This is said about one of the Buddha's previous births; but it may also be regarded as a virtue for the ordinary man.

The last evil belonging to the mouth is frivolous talk, or vain conversation, which is defined as: 'Any language which is spoken frivolously with no purpose' (Sum. i. 78–4). This is nonsense or idle talk which brings no good at all on the speaker or the listener. On some occasions it may be innocent and harmless; it may be by no means offensive to the listener; it may not amount to revealing the bad character of the speaker; and therefore it may not be included under the head of evil in its strictest sense. But at the same time from the strictest moral point of view it cannot be called a virtue. Idle talk, especially indulged in at the moment when our moral consciousness is somewhat lax, is prone to lead us to criticize absent persons, and as a natural consequence insolent or even reproachful language, which we refrain from using in their presence, may be used. It has no definite purpose, and it is silly idle talk only suitable for idle people; and further there is a fear of its leading to serious criticisms of those who are not present. Such a thing can never be consistent with the rigorous moral ideal of Buddhism, which recommends us constant alertness and allows us no moment for laxity of moral sense.

The last three of the ten precepts instruct us 'not to be covetous' (abhījñā), 'not to be malicious' (vyāpāda), and 'not to harbour any wrong idea' (micchādiṭṭhi).
Covetousness, malice, and ignorance (avījjā) are the three fundamental moral evils of the Buddhist. We shall not be covetous, we shall not be angry with the world, and we shall be free from ignorance. They are regarded as depravities (kilesa), fires (aggi), bonds (saṃyojana), and the roots of all moral evil (akusalamūla). They are not only the roots of moral evil, but also, according to the idea of Buddhism, the causes of all the misery of life. As long as we harbour these three fundamental evils, that is to say, if we remain under their sinister influence, we cannot be expected to be free from the misery of life and acquire final salvation. As the Buddha says: 'Having cut off desire (rāga) and hatred (dosa) you will go to Nibbāna'\(^1\) (Dh. 369); or as a Buddha is defined simply as 'He who has renounced desire, hatred, and ignorance' (It. 68), so the simple abandonment or absolute repudiation of these three evils is essential to Buddhist culture. The Buddha, or Arahan, is a person who has completely abandoned them, and who as a natural consequence has reached enlightenment, because enlightenment is attained at the moment when all mental evils have been relinquished. In other words, if we have destroyed covetousness, and do not harbour it any longer; if we have broken down hatred, and do not cherish it against any man or creature; and if we have freed ourselves from ignorance, and acquired mental enlightenment, we shall be holy persons.

Of the three evils, however, the evil of the most obstinate nature to be destroyed is the first one or covetousness. This is the evil of all evils. The complete destruction of this single evil, therefore, amounts

\(^1\) Cf. A. i. 280; S. iv. 251.
to attaining to Nibbāna;¹ and ‘one who is free from covetousness’ is a Buddha.² It must be controlled, suppressed, forsaken, destroyed, extirpated root and branch. Buddhist culture is nothing but a continual struggle against this monstrous evil. How deeply the evil has taken root in the human heart, how hard it is to uproot it, but still how important it is to do so, may be seen from the fact that so many different terms are used to signify this single evil, and always with regard to its suppression or extirpation. I have collected the following list:—

aṅgani, impurity, lust, Sn. 517.
āttha, desire, want, need, passim.
ahaṅkāro, selfishness, egoism, A. i. 132; M. iii. 18, 32.
maṁaṅkāro, desire, A. i. 132; M. iii. 18, 32.
maṁāyitāni, selfishness, Sn. 466.
maṁattaṁ, grasping, egoism, Sn. 872, 951.
apakkha, apekkhā, desire, longing, affection, Sn. 38; Dh. 845.
icchā, wish, desire, covetousness, Dh. 74.
vicchā, avarice, Sn. 941.
icchācāro, wish, desire, covetousness, ambition (?).
ceṭṭi, desire, lust, greed, craving, Sn. 751; It. 92.
aśa, desire, longing, Sn. 684, 794, 964; Dh. 397.
pipāsa, thirst, ardent desire (?).
esta, cesana, wish, desire, thirst, Dh. 335.
gavesana, pariyesana, ēṭṭhi, gaveṭṭhi, pariyeṭṭhi, do., V. M. i. 23, 29.
aṅkhi, desire, longing, Tha. 1030.
kāmo, wish, desire, passion, lust, passim.
nikatti, will, desire, Tha. 20.
kiṅcanaṁ, attachment, Sn. 949; Dh. 200.
gantho, bond, tie, Sn. 798; Dh. 211.
adānagantho, the tied knot of attachment, Sn. 794.
giddhi, greed, desire, Sn. 328, M. i. 360, 362.
gedho, greed, desire, Sn. 65, 152.

¹ Taṅhakkhayo, or extinction of desire, is another name for Nibbāna.
² Vītataṅho, Sn. 88.
gahanaḥ, entanglement, Dh. 394.
gāho, seizing, attachment, Mahānīd. 128, 227.
pariggaha, attachment, Mahānīd. 57.
chando, wish, desire, intention, Sn. 171, 208, 235, 885; Tha. 1029.
jaṭā, the entangled branches of trees or bamboo, desire, lust, S. i. 18, 165; V. M. 1.
jalini, snare, desire, lust, Dh. 180; A. ii. 211.
jīgiṁsanatā, covetousness, desire for, Vibhaṅga 353.
nījīgiṁsanatā, covetousness, V. M. i. 23.
abhijīhā, covetousness, passim.
attā, grasping, Sn. 787, 858.
tanha, tasinā, lust, unsatisfied desire, human passion, passim.
ādānaḥ, taking, clinging, attachment, Dh. 89; Sn. 1103, 1104.
upādānaḥ, clinging, attachment, Dh. ii. 58; iii. 230 et passim.
pariyādānaḥ, samādānaḥ (?).
pañāḍhi, wish, aspiration, Sn. 801.
pihā, desire, envy, Tha. 1218.
pepaṁ, affection, love, A. iii. 249.
bandho, thong, bondage, attachment, Sn. 623; Dh. 344.
bandhanaṁ, bond, fetter, attachment, Sn. 522, 532; Dh. 345.
avaṇaṁ, nibandhaṁ, tying, fastening, attachment (?)
nibandho, binding, attachment, S. ii. 17.
vinibandhaṁ, vinibandho, bondage, desire, Sn. 16.
anubandho, bondage, affection, desire, M. iii. 170; It. 91.
upanibandho, fastening, attachment, V. M. i. 235.
paribandho, Com. on Thi. p. 242.
rāgo, human passion, evil desire, lust, passim.
sārāgo, sārajjanā, sārajjītanāṁ, affection, passion, Mahānīd. 242.
rajo, impurity, human passion, Sn. 974.
rati, lust, attachment, Dh. 27.
manoratho, desire, wish (?).
ruci, desire, inclination, Sn. 781.
abhilāso, desire, longing, wish, Com. on Petavatthu, 154.
lālasa, ardent desire (?).
alayo, longing, desire, lust, Sn. 585, 635; Dh. 411.
lobho, covetousness, desire, cupidity, Sn. 367; Dh. 248.
lobhanaṁ, greed, Tha. 348.
lubbhanā, lobhitattah, do. (?).
vananī, forest, desire, lust, Sn. 1131; Dh. 284, 344.
vanatho, forest, love, lust, Dh. 283, 284.
nivesanaṁ, resting-place, home, clinging to, attachment, Sn. 470, 801.
saṅga, fetter, bond, attachment, Sn. 473, 791; Dh. 397.
asattī, attachment, hanging on, clinging, Sn. 777; Vin. ii. 156;
S. i. 212.
visattikā, poison, desire, Sn. 333; Dh. 180.
santhavāṁ, friendship, attachment, Sn. 207, 245; Dh. 27.
uussādo, desire, Sn. 515, 783, 785.
sneho, sineho, affection, lust, desire, Sn. 209, 943; Dh. 285.
āsayo, abode, intention, inclination, V. M. i. 140.
amusayo, inclination, desire, A. i. 132; Sn. 14, 369, 545.
sibbanī, desire, Sn. 1040.

As to hatred, we can find only the following few synonyms:—

kodho, anger, wrath, Sn. 1, 245, 362, 868, 928; Dh. 221-3; It. 4, 12, 109.
kopo, anger, ill-will, ill-temper, Sn. 6.
āghato, anger, ill-will, hatred, malice, D. i. 8, 81; S. i. 179.
pataţho, wrath, hatred, Sum. 116.
doso, anger, hatred, passim.
viddeso, enmity, hatred (?).
dhūmo, anger, Sn. 460.
uppanāho, enmity, Sn. 116.
vyāpado, wish to injure, hatred, fury, Sum. 211; It. 111.
anabhīraddhi, anger, wrath, rage, D. i. 3.
veraṁ, wrath, anger, hatred, sin, Sn. 150; Dh. 3-5, 201.
virodho, opposition, enmity, Sn. 362.
virodhanāṁ, opposition, enmity (?).
roso, anger (?).
rosanaṁ, anger (?).
vyārosanaṁ, anger, Sn. 148.

And lastly, as to the synonyms of ignorance, we find still fewer:—
aññānaṁ, ignorance, It. 62.
moho, fainting, ignorance, folly, passim.
mohanaṁ, ignorance, Sn. 399, 772.
avijjā, ignorance, error, passim.
Though the number of terms to which we have referred is rather limited, still we can see that a large number of words derived from different roots is used to denote the single idea of covetousness. As to the two other roots of evil, i.e. hatred and ignorance, they are represented by a far smaller number of words. This means, I think, that they are of far less importance than covetousness. So far as Buddhist culture is concerned, covetousness is most detrimental to it, and when it is utterly exterminated, culture comes to perfection.

So far we have spoken of covetousness, hatred, and ignorance as though all these were found among the ten precepts, because our present discussion is about these precepts, but we must know that the last mentioned evil is not included in them, but that Micchādiṭṭhi, or 'viewing in a wrong way', takes its place. It is only from covetousness or in order to complete the explanation of the three roots of evil that we have placed ignorance, instead of 'viewing in a wrong way', side by side with covetousness and hatred. Micchādiṭṭhi being usually defined as 'the denial of moral retribution' forms a part of ignorance. Holding the wrong view is 'to commit a terrible sin and break off all the roots of virtue'.¹ The principle of causality is the basis of the Buddhist teaching, and therefore it is natural that its denial should be regarded as the most horrible sin of the Buddhist.

Now we come to deal with the precepts prescribed for the monkhood, mainly comprising two groups, one for the Sāmaṇera, or novice, and the other for the Bhikkhu, or full member of the community; the former consisting of 10 precepts, the latter of 227. The 10

¹ Notes de Morale Bouddhique, par L. de la Vallée Poussin, Bruxelles, 1914.
precepts of the novice are the 8 precepts which the layman observes on Uposatha days, plus (the 10th) abstinence from accepting gold and silver. The novice therefore ought to abstain from (1) killing living things, (2) stealing, (3) having carnal pleasure, (4) lying, (5) drinking intoxicating liquors, (6) eating at forbidden times, (7) dancing, singing, playing music, and seeing spectacles, (8) wearing, adorning, or ornamenting himself with garlands, scents, and unguents, (9) using large and lofty beds, and (10) accepting gold and silver.

These precepts were laid down mainly in accordance with the habits or moral ideas of those days. Stealing gold, drinking intoxicating liquors, dishonouring one's Guru's bed, and killing a Brahman were regarded as the most heinous sins of the Brahman. What are forbidden as sins in the first three and the fifth precepts for the Buddhist novice are nothing but these four heinous sins in miniature. It is possible that the Buddha in prescribing these four precepts had the laws prohibiting them in his mind. The prohibition of eating at forbidden times, or the principle of taking one meal every day, is perhaps the adoption of the institution of fasting which was practised in preparation for sacrifice.

1 As we have already explained, the 8th of the 8 precepts in reality comprises 2 precepts, p. 64; and consequently the 8 precepts comprise 9 out of the 10 of the novice. See the following enumeration.

2 For monks this last precept is given in the Nissaggiya, 18–19.

3 e.g. Chândogya, 5, 10, 9.

4 In the Kūṭāgirīsuttanta, M. i. 473, the Buddha recommends to his disciples 'to practise Vikālabhojanāveramāṇī or 'abstinence from eating at forbidden times' as bringing 'little illness and suffering, bodily vigour, strength, and comfortable living'. The Buddha therefore did not merely mean by it to accord with the religious custom of the times, but he had health in his idea. And this seems to be justified from what modern medical science proves.
remaining four precepts, except the last one, are all found in the Brahmanical law books.\textsuperscript{1} We may say, therefore, that these precepts and the Brahmanical laws forbidding worldly amusement and bodily embellishment, and denying the comfort and pleasure of life in some degree, are instituted on the same ground; or the former are borrowed from the latter. If the latter is the case, the Buddha perhaps thought that what is good for the Brahmanical student must be good for the Buddhist novice.

The sixth precept forbids the novice to take meals after noon. The seventh denies him worldly pleasure. He cannot dance, sing, or play any musical instrument himself, and look at spectacles or enjoy theatrical performances. He is forbidden to take part in any worldly pleasure. The eighth precept denies him bodily embellishment. He is not allowed to wear garlands or to use perfumes, ointments, or collyrium for the purpose of adorning or beautifying his person, or making it more distinctive or attractive. By the ninth precept he is prohibited from using, we may say, magnificent furniture and fine utensils. As to the last precept, the novice is thereby instructed to refrain from coveting valuable property in any form, to say nothing of possessing it. Such strict prohibitions are undoubtedly intended to make his life as simple as possible, because a simple life is an ideal for any religious man, through which he may be saved from being bothered by any external material object, and may devote his whole energy to his spiritual

\textsuperscript{1} Students are forbidden to see dances, Āp. I. 3. 11; to dance, Ga. II. 18; to sing and play music, Ga. II. 18; to use garlands and ornaments, Ga. II. 18; to use scents and unguents, Ga. II. 18, Āp. I. 2. 25, 27; to use high or broad beds, Āp. I. 8. 11, Ga. II. 21.
cultivation. Attachment to worldly objects will certainly distract his mind and prevent it from being tranquillized or purified. He ought therefore to be contented with the fewest requisites of life, food, clothing, dwelling, and medicine, as usually given as necessaries of life. It ought to be borne in mind that fasting, the denial of worldly pleasure, the prohibition of the acceptance or possession of gold or silver, which these precepts import, do not amount to recommending him self-mortification, as they may seem to do in the eyes of the moderns. Compared with the laws of Brāhmanism or Jainism these precepts are far more lenient. Nothing can be farther from the Buddha's idea, as is clear from the declaration in his first sermon,\(^1\) than instituting laws of self-mortification.

There is another set of precepts\(^2\) which it is not obligatory for any particular class of Buddhists to observe. Seemingly they are more monkish than laic, as many of them are found in the Pātimokkha.\(^3\) We shall simply mention them as they are given, and pass on to the next set of precepts. They are abstinences (1) from destruction of life, (2) from taking what is not given, (3) from sexual uncleanness, (4) from telling a lie, (5) from slandering, (6) from using harsh language, (7) from frivolous talk, (8) from causing injury to seeds and plants, (9) from taking meals after midday, (10) from dancing, singing, playing musical instruments, and looking at shows, (11) from wearing, adorning, or ornamenting the person with garlands, scents, and ungueants,

\(^1\) S. v. 420-4. \(^2\) D. i. 4-5; 63-4; A. ii. 208-9. 
\(^3\) Eight out of the 26 precepts can be identified in the Pātimokkha under exactly the same terms. (1) corresponds to Pāc. 61; (4) to Pāc. 1; (5) to Pāc. 3; (6) to Pāc. 2; (8) to Pāc. 11; (13) to Niss. 18; (22) to Saṅgh. 5; and (23) to Niss. 20.
(12) from using large and lofty beds, (13) from accepting gold and silver, (14) from accepting uncooked grain, (15) from accepting raw meat, (16) from accepting women and girls, (17) from accepting bondmen or bondwomen, (18) from accepting sheep or goats, (19) from accepting fowls or swine, (20) from accepting elephants, cattle, horses, and mares, (21) from accepting cultivated fields or waste, (22) from acting as a go-between or messenger, (23) from buying or selling, (24) from cheating with scales or bronzes or measures, (25) from the crooked way of bribery, cheating, and fraud, and (26) from maiming, murder, putting in bonds, highway robbery, dacoity, and violence.

For the Bhikkhu or full member of the Saṅgha or community there are, as we have stated previously, 227 precepts, which are divided into 8 groups, embodied in what is known as the Pātimokkha. They are, to mention them according to their gravity, 4 Pārājikās, 13 Saṅghādisesas, 2 Aniyatas, 30 Nissaggiya Pācittiyas, 92 Pācittiyas, 4 Pāṭidesaññiyas, 75 Sekhiyas, and 7 Adhikaraṇasamathas.

The Pārājikās are rules which involve the perpetual expulsion of the transgressor from the monkhood. The offender is said ‘to have fallen into defeat’, and he is no longer allowed to remain in the community—the heaviest punishment for the monk. The first Pārājikā is a rule against enjoying sexual intercourse, which is regarded as one of the most serious crimes for the monk and deserving to be punished by perpetual expulsion. The first 5 of Saṅghādisesas, the 2 Aniyatas, 3 Nissaggiyas (4, 5, 17), 16 Pācittiyas (6, 7, 21–30, 44, 45, 59, 67), 2 Pāṭidesaññiyas (1, 2), all these are offences in connexion with women.
The second Pārājikā is taking what is not given, the theft not of trifling objects, but of objects of some value, objects of such value, according to the text of the Pātimokkha, that the King would seize, slay, bind, or banish him for the theft. We find no other rule in the Pātimokkha in connexion with theft.

The third is a rule regarding killing a human being. Not only (a) killing a human being knowingly, but also (b) seeking out an assassin against a human being, (c) uttering the praises of death, (d) inciting another to self-destruction, and (e) according to the commentary on the Pātimokkha (Vin. iii. 78), abortion or the destruction of life in the womb, are to be regarded as crimes against this rule. Monks are forbidden by this rule not only to deprive of life a human being with their own hands, but also to cause the destruction of life of those whom they address or others, or to make it possible, by luring an assassin, praising death, or inciting people to suicide. And so far as the human being is concerned, even the abortion of an embryo which was just conceived is regarded as constituting this crime. As to the destruction of life of other creatures, we see many rules in the Pātimokkha. Deliberately depriving an animal of life is a crime against the 61st Pācittiya. In the 62nd Pācittiya drinking water with living creatures in it, and in the 20th sprinkling water of this sort on grass or on clay is prohibited. Digging the ground and destroying any vegetable are prohibited in the 10th and 11th Pācittiyas, which also have indirect connexion with the destruction of life, because in digging the ground one may kill small creatures and the vegetable is to be regarded as having life. It is prescribed in the 6th and 7th of the Saṅghādisesas that in building a hut or a large
residence monks should select a site free from danger and leave an open space around it. This is meant not to cause any harassment or inconvenience to living creatures, but to protect them. The protection of animal life and vegetable life as well is thus regarded as a virtuous action.

The fourth is a rule regarding a falsehood, one of a grave nature, as theft in the Pārājikā is one of a serious nature. It is a great falsehood when a monk falsely declares that he has acquired ‘the insight into the knowledge of the noble’, the supreme acquisition.

Killing, stealing, sexual uncleanness, and falsehood, which occur in every category of precepts, appear in the Pātimokkha in their gravest forms. As plundering gold, drinking liquors, invading the teacher’s bed, and murdering a Brāhman are capital crimes in Brāhmanism,¹ so these four are the gravest offences for the Buddhist monk. If he violates any of these he will be perpetually expelled from the community, and further he will be perpetually damned, because he is said never to be able to attain Arahatship.²

The Saṅghādisesas are rules which require a Saṅghakamma in the beginning (ādi) and at the end (sesa), or which require a formal meeting of the whole community at every stage, for the amendment of offences committed. This division contains rules of various natures. The first five concern the monk’s behaviour towards woman or uncleanness; the next two (6, 7), building a hut and a large residence; the 8th and 9th, charging another monk with a Pārājikā offence without ground or on some points of no importance; the 10th and 11th, causing a

¹ Chāndogya, 5, 10, 9. ² SBE. xxxvi, pp. 78–81.
schism among the community; the 12th, refusing to listen to what is addressed to him in accordance with the law; and the 13th, leading a life hurtful to the lay people.

The Aniyatas are rules concerning undetermined matters, undetermined because it depends upon circumstances whether they are to be treated as Pārājikās, Saṅghādisesas, or as Pācittiyas. Both are about the monk’s behaviour towards woman, or relation between them.

The Nissaggiya Pācittiyas are rules the violation of which involves forfeiture. This is why these are called Nissaggiya, or ‘those which should be given up or forfeited’. They mainly concern robes, bowls, medicines, rugs and mats, except three (18–20), which deal with accepting gold or silver, and with commercial transactions in which silver is used.

The Pācittiyas are rules requiring repentance and absolution. It is in this division that we find the offences of the most moral nature. Lying (1), using abusive language (2), slandering (3), worrying monks in assembly (12), stirring up ill-will against a monk who is deputed to an official duty (13), revealing lack of public spirit (14, 15), revealing selfishness (16–18), killing living creatures (10, 11, 20, 61, 62), showing disrespect (54), giving a blow to another monk from anger (74), using a threatening gesture (75), &c. Many of them are offences of a moral nature.

The Pāṭidesanīyas are rules regarding matters which require confession, as ‘having fallen into a blameworthy offence’. The offender ought to recognize his own offence and confess it.

The Sekhiyas are rules connected with discipline.
They are chiefly disciplines or demeanours which 'ought to be observed'.

And lastly, the Adhikaraṇasamathas are rules in connexion with legal questions.

The Pātimokkha, as we have it now, contains 227 precepts, but this seems not to be a fixed number, because, according to the tradition, the Buddha prescribed and altered them whenever he considered it necessary to do so. In the Aṅguttara (i. 230, 231), Sikkhāpada, or precepts, are said to be 150 in number, and a Chinese version\(^1\) of the Pātimokkha has 253 precepts. So we have ample reason to believe that these are not a fixed number, and that if the Buddha had lived longer the number might have been increased, or, it is not impossible, diminished; because, according to the Mahāparinibbānasuttanta and other sources,\(^2\) he is said to have declared on his death-bed that his disciples might abolish the lesser and minor precepts. 'What are the lesser and minor precepts?' was the question which puzzled the monks who assembled to collect or recite the Buddha's discourses at the first Buddhist Council immediately after his death, and it will not be easy for anybody to answer even to-day. It will be therefore better for the monk to accept and observe them as they are, as Mahākassapa persisted on that occasion. Any alteration in quantity and quality of the Pātimokkha is perhaps the work of a Buddha.

It seems impossible to enumerate all Buddhist virtues, early Buddhist literature, even what we call discourses on doctrine and discipline, being merely a long list of virtues and vices, nearly all of which are arranged in

\(^1\) Nanjio's Catalogue, No. 1108 (?), Prātimokṣa-vinaya.

\(^2\) D.ii.154; Vin.ii.288–9; SBE. xi. 112–18; xx. 377; SBB. iii. 171.
classes; they are analysed and synthesized in hundreds of ways. It will be therefore well for us to stop these wearisome enumerations and turn our attention in another direction.

What we have enumerated above are all expressed in negative forms; abstinence from killing, abstinence from stealing, abstinence from lying, and so on. This is not merely the case with the Buddhist morality; in Oriental teachings moral precepts or instructions generally take negative forms. In reply to the question of one of his disciples what benevolence is, Confucius says: 'You should not do to others as you would not wish done to you.'¹ Contrasted with this negative expression, the Chinese sage has given a positive instruction of a somewhat similar meaning. 'A benevolent man,' says he, 'in the hope of being established himself, seeks to establish others beforehand; and in the hope of succeeding himself makes others succeed beforehand.'² The two precepts do not mean exactly the same; but we may say, one explains the term 'benevolence' from the negative side and the other from the positive. In spite of this, what is generally known as Confucius's definition of benevolence, and very much quoted as such, is the former, but not the latter. We do not, however, understand that benevolence as taught by him has only a negative side, that is to say, that benevolence, according to his definition, is 'not doing to others what one would not wish done to oneself'. Everybody who knows anything of his teaching will understand that when he tells his disciples not to do to others what they themselves do not like done to them, he means that benevolence,

besides refraining from doing to others what one dislikes, is also doing to others what one likes.

The case is the same with Buddhist morality. Precepts generally, and other instructions in many cases, are expressed in negative forms, which, however, it ought to be borne in mind, always involve a positive aspect. Stealing is a vice, and therefore abstinence from it and liberality in giving are virtues; using abusive language is vicious, and therefore abstinence from it and kind-wordedness are virtuous; pride is bad, and therefore giving it up and being humble are good; and so forth. Buddhism teaches doing kusala, puñña, kalyāṇa, as well as refraining from doing akusala, pāpa, kibbisa; the former being good, right, meritorious, or virtuous, and the latter, evil, wrong, demeritorious, or vicious, and we ought to refrain from them. It will be therefore a hasty conclusion to say that Buddhism simply teaches avoidance of evil actions. It also teaches the performance of good actions. 'To be good and to do good' always go together with 'abstaining from evil actions'.

Before closing this chapter it will be well for us to mention a discourse, the Mahāmaṅgalasutta,1 as a specimen of the Buddha's ideas, to show that his instructions do not always take negative forms, that they are not always a series of classifications and analyses, or concerned exclusively with monastic morality. Here in this sutta we find family morality expressed in most elegant verses. We can imagine the happy blissful state of household life attained as a result of following these injunctions.2

1 Khu. 2–3; Sn. 258–69; SBE. x. 43–4; T. W. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, pp. 125–7.
2 We have omitted the first and last verses.
HAPPINESS OF HOUSEHOLD LIFE

'Not to associate with the stupid, but to associate with the wise; and to honour those who are worthy of honour; this is the greatest blessing;'  

To dwell in a suitable place, to have done meritorious deeds in past lives, and to have formed right resolves for oneself;  
To have learnt much, (to be skilful in) art, to be well trained in discipline, and to utter pleasant words;  
To wait upon one's parents, to cherish one's wife and children, to have a peaceful calling;  
To be generous in giving, to act in accordance with the Dhamma, to cherish one's own relatives, and conduct free from blame;  
To refrain and abstain from sin and eschew strong drink, and to be diligent in righteous things;  
To be respectful, humble, contented, and grateful, and to hear the preaching of the Dhamma from time to time;  
To be patient and mild, to see Samaññas, and to have religious conversations from time to time;  
Religious devotion, absolute chastity, penetrating the Noble Truths, and realizing Nibbāna;  
A mind unshaken in contact with the conditions of the world, free from sorrow and defilement and peaceful—this is the greatest blessing.'

In this sutta these items are each given as a source of blissfulness, but at the same time they may be regarded as admirable virtues in the Buddha's eyes.

1 This clause forms the refrain of each verse.
V

CHARACTERISTICS OF BUDDHIST MORALITY


Buddhists have many precepts which the Buddha laid down for the guidance of his immediate disciples, and many more which he delivered from time to time for the same purpose, both of which are embodied in the Piṭaka. Whoever professes faith in the Buddha, has to observe and follow them. The Buddhist thus seems to be absolutely subject to external laws, in the form of precepts and instructions, and the Buddhist morality seems to be heteronomous, but not autonomous as it is usually understood to be. This requires a little explanation.

In the first place, as Dr. Rashdall\(^1\) asserts, 'no one can think out his own moral code a priori, in entire independence of his environment', and it is absolutely impossible for any one to remain unmoved by the external moral influence which is constantly working upon him. His moral ideal in the main will be the outcome of blending together maxims, traditions, customs, and ideas prevailing in the society in which he has lived, and of moral principles which he has formed for himself.

---

through the power of reasoning more or less independent of his environment. In the second place, a community, school or sect, which is founded on common religious beliefs or moral principles, will naturally require a particular religious training or moral education; and therefore every system has its own peculiar teachings, founded on its fundamental principles. What we call Buddhist precepts or instructions are mainly intended for the training or education of the monkish and lay members of the Buddhist community. Nobody will deny the necessity of such training or education, for moulding them, so to speak, into the Buddhistic type. And these precepts or instructions, though very subtle in some respects, are nothing but a general guidance to show the direction in which the Buddhist ought to turn on his way to final salvation. This training or education, in one sense of the term, continues throughout life, as in any other religious or moral system.

But, on the other hand, Buddhists have to strive for their salvation individually through their own power, so they are more responsible for their own weal and woe both in the present life and in the future than any other religionists. They have been trained and moulded through these teachings, which may continue to influence them in the surroundings in which they find themselves, but they on their own part will have to struggle for their own moral improvement and spiritual enlightenment, the attainment of which entirely depends on their own power. No one else, human or divine, according to the Buddhist doctrine, is able to work it out for them. Their unaided toil alone will be able to effect their own deliverance. The Buddhist morality, therefore, in spite of the fact that the system has so many precepts and instructions,
is in its foundation autonomous, more autonomous than
the morality of any other religion. We say more
autonomous, because no system or person can be absolutely
autonomous. The Buddha in his last preaching to his
disciples emphatically told them to depend on themselves
and the truth for their own salvation or enlightenment.
He concluded this memorable instruction with these
words: ¹ 'And whosoever, Ānanda, either now or after
I am dead, shall be a lamp unto themselves, and a refuge
unto themselves, shall betake themselves to no external
refuge, but holding fast to the truth as their lamp, and
holding fast as their refuge to the truth, shall look not
for refuge to any one besides themselves—it is they who
shall reach the very topmost Height, but they must be
anxious to learn.' The Buddha with his lofty personality
has revealed to his followers a living example of high
mental culture. His personality is the outcome of uniting
moral and intellectual cultures, if we can consider them
separately. It is a moral as well as an intellectual
perfection. Moral improvement and spiritual enlighten-
ment are perfectly manifested in a visible form in his
personality. He has taught his disciples to follow his
example, to struggle for higher mental culture and finally
attain the goal, Nibbāna.

The doctrine of Kamma or moral retribution, which
forms a prominent feature of the Buddhist teaching, also
makes clearer the autonomous nature of the Buddhist
morality. The Buddha points out three erroneous ideas
about the happiness and misery of this life in the follow-
ing words: ² 'There are, O monks, some Sāmaṇas and

¹ D. ii. 100–1; SBB. iii. 108–9; S. v. 154.
² A. i. 173 ff.; Dr. Wolfgang Bohn, Die Psychologie und Ethik des
Buddhismus, pp. 34–5.
Brāhmaṇas who maintain and believe that all the pleasure, or pain, or indifference to pleasure and pain, that this person feels, are results of his acts in previous births. There are, O monks, some Samāṇas and Brāhmaṇas who maintain and believe that these are all results of creation by the lord of the universe. And there are, O monks, some who think that all these have neither reason nor cause.’ He continues to say that if, as the first group of Samāṇas and Brāhmaṇas assert, these are all results of actions in previous existences, e.g. as murderer, thief, adulterer, liar, &c., they will all be predestined to be such as they are by their previous actions, and in consequence they will not be directly responsible for the crimes which they have committed. They cannot but act as they are destined by their actions in their previous births. They will have simply to do as they are forced to do by their past actions. Freedom of will is thus absolutely denied to them. They will have no intention to do what ought to be done and not to do what is not to be done. No moral improvement or intellectual culture can be expected from them. If, as the second group of Samāṇas and Brāhmaṇas say, the happiness and misery of the present life of beings are the outcome of divine interference, the Supreme Ruler will be to blame for these offences. And lastly, if, as the third group of Samāṇas and Brāhmaṇas think, the present condition of living beings is produced without reason (hetu) and cause (paccaya), these crimes will also be committed without reason and cause. Everything will happen only by chance, without any causal link. We shall have to wait for chances to turn up in our favour, no efforts or strivings being needed for our betterment. Such an assertion is in Buddhism refuted by the
doctrine of causation on the one hand, and rejected by
the doctrine of Kamma on the other. According to the
latter, our present different births are the results of
the accumulated Kammass performed in our previous
existences, and our present different dispositions are
also predestined by our previous Kammass, the Buddhist
doctrine of Kamma on the one hand being a fatalism;
but at the same time we must understand that we are
moulding our own fate in the next birth through our
actions, because we are free to do or not to do as we
please, not as the first group of Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas
assert who ascribe our actions in this life solely to the
Kammass done in our previous lives. And as we have
no one to interfere with our fate, and as our destiny
continues to happen regularly as we ourselves ordain it,
without any digression through the law of causation, we
have the key of our fate in our own hands throughout
our repeated births. Improvement or degeneration,
ascend to heaven or descent to hell, happiness or misery,
are all the results of our own deeds. We ourselves are
moulders of our fate. No one else is to be blamed for
our misery, or praised for our happiness. It is quite
clear from these statements that Buddhism emphasizes
the freedom of the will, and that its morality is autono-
mous par excellence. Autonomy is a prominent character-
istic of this religion.

Another characteristic of the Buddhist morality is its
practicability. In fact in Buddhism no sharp boundary
line is drawn between ethical theory and moral practice.
Theory, if we can consider it separately, is valuable only
when it can be applied to practice; the former always
presupposes the existence of the latter; there can be no
theory which is thought of merely for its own sake. In
the case of spiritual enlightenment, personal experience is of vital importance. Like a thirsty man who finds a well, but not a rope or a bucket to draw water from it, and who in consequence is obliged to endure his suffering and ‘experience in his person’\(^1\) nothing but mere knowledge that there is water; the mere knowledge\(^2\) that the cessation of existence is Nibbāna does not amount to attaining to Nibbāna. So says the Buddha: The most important thing with spiritual enlightenment therefore is to experience it in our own person. The case is the same with the Buddhist morality. The mere knowledge of it is of no use for the Buddhist.

The practical nature of morality is conspicuous especially in Buddhism in its primitive period of development, when it was least tinged with philosophical colour, and when its disciples flocked around the prominent personality of the Buddha for the purpose of practising Brahmacariyā under his guidance. As we have already stated,\(^3\) the Buddha repudiated philosophical arguments or speculations as useless for practical purposes. The monk Māluṅkya, the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta, the monk Cunda, are all warned against their philosophical inquiries. Māgandiya’s idea that man can be made pure through philosophical views (\(dītthī\)) is also refuted as wrong.\(^4\) In the Suddhaṭṭhakasutta,\(^5\) which is somewhat unique in the poetical nature of its expression, besides

\(^1\) Kāyena phusitvā.

\(^2\) S. ii. 118.

\(^3\) See Chapter I. ‘There are four things’, says the Buddha, ‘which monks should not think of: (a) the sphere of enlightenment of Buddhas, (b) the sphere of the meditation of a meditator, (c) the result of an action (kamma), and (d) the contemplation of the universe’. (A. ii. 80.)

\(^4\) Sn. 839–40.

\(^5\) Sn. 788–95.
being antique in style, like many other suttas of that collection, the Buddha persists in the impossibility of purification except through the Noble Eightfold Path. As Sir Charles Eliot 1 rightly says: 'Argumentative as the Buddhist suttas are, their aim is strictly practical, even when their language appears scholastic, and the burden of all their ratiocination is the same and very simple'.

Kern 2 blames the Buddha as a sophist, because he regards questions concerning the existence of personality and the like as 'questions that must be set aside and remain unanswered', but on one occasion he declares that he sees a certain person born in hell after death. 3 Here in this connexion also we have to realize the practical nature of the Buddha's teaching. Philosophical discussions or speculations are of no use from the strict practical point of view, and therefore the Buddha advises his disciples to avoid them. As for the Buddha himself, however, as a knower of the universe (Lokavidu) or a seer of all the directions (Samantacakkhu), it is no wonder that he should make such a declaration as to the destination of a dead person. The Buddha on the one hand tries to divert his disciples from these questions, because philosophical discussions or speculations about them are unprofitable or rather hurtful for their practice. But he on his part declares his omniscience in connexion with somebody's fate after death. There can be no discrepancy between them, much less sophism, as Kern supposes. They are seen from entirely different standpoints.

We have so far made clear the practical nature of the Buddhist morality. Primitive Buddhism was a moral

1 Hinduism and Buddhism, vol. i, p. 183.
2 Manual of Indian Buddhism, p. 54, note 2.
3 S. ii. 282.
religion, its morality is of a remarkable practical nature, and it is this point that we particularly desire to bring out in this dissertation. We have already explained in the Chapter on 'Classifications of the Buddhist Morality' the relations of the virtues and vices presented in Buddhist literature. We feel now the necessity of changing our plan, and constructing for ourselves our own classification, according to modern method. This is firstly to make the moral ideas of the Buddha clearer, and secondly to see how far a moral system designed twenty-four centuries ago can appeal to the modern mind.

With this aim we have selected the following moral items for our review:—Self-restraint, Temperance, Contentment, Celibacy, Patience, Purity, Humility, Benevolence, Liberality, Reverence, Gratitude, Toleration, Veracity, and Righteousness. We do not mean by this that they exhaust the whole of the Buddhist moral items, but I think in reviewing them we can make clear where Buddhist morality lays the greatest stress. Roughly speaking, Buddhism in respect to duties to oneself regards as virtues Self-restraint, Temperance, Contentment, Poverty, Gentleness, Celibacy, Patience, Purity, &c., while in connexion with duties to others, it takes as virtues, Humility, Gratefulness, Obedience, Reverence, Charity, Love, Sympathy, Forgiveness, Tolerance; and lastly we may add Veracity and Justice as duties common to oneself and others. This classification is only for convenience. We cannot draw a distinct line between virtues with regard to oneself and those with regard to another, or in other words between self-regarding and social duties.

A severe charge is made by the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism against the Hīnayāna as being a school of
self-interest. It is not quite certain whether the Southern or Pāli Buddhism represents the so-called Hīnayāna school or not, but as the Southern Buddhism is understood to belong to the Theravāda branch, we may infer that it is to be included in the Hīnayāna school; because, as everybody understands, the Theravāda and Mahāsaṅghika schools are the two fundamental branches of Buddhism. The charge is that the Hīnayānists, thinking solely of their own good, never think of the good of others. In other words, they are a sect of selfish or egoistic people; they have self-regarding virtues, but are entirely destitute of other-regarding ones. Their sole object being their own culture and salvation, they do not care for other’s weal and woe.

The votary of the vehicle of the Śrāvakas or of Pratyekabuddhas, in contrast with the votary of the vehicle of Bodhisattva or of Buddha, is always treated by the Mahāyānist as a small-minded, low-disposed, selfish fellow. A contrast between the two types is vividly depicted in the Saddharma-puṇḍarīkasūtra, one of the main authorities of the Mahāyāna school. The Buddha expounds to the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, so runs a story in the sūtra,\(^1\) what sorts of associations a Bodhisattva, who appears in a dreadful period which is expected to come in future, ought to avoid. Among many other people, it is said, he ought to avoid conceited persons who have settled themselves on the Vinaya and Āgama, and monks who follow the precepts of the Arahat. This means that men of the Hīnayāna are to be classed together with outcasts, drinkers, heretics, immoral men, and the like. Then the story goes on to say, he receives

---

\(^1\) The text, edited by H. Kern and B. Nanjio, St. Petersburg, 1910–12, p. 279; SBE. xxi. 265.
all who come to hear his sermons with benevolence; he refrains from entering upon a dispute; but if he is asked a question, he answers not in the way of those who follow the vehicle of 'Śrāvakas'.

If the schools, Mahāyāna and Hinayāna, are said to represent liberal and conservative Buddhists respectively, we may agree with the assertion, but if the latter are explained as a sect of self-seeking egoistic Buddhists, in opposition to the former who solely aim at others' good rather than their own, we cannot at all agree with it. It is true that the primitive Buddhists had Arahats for the object of their final attainment; while Buddhists of later times sought for Buddhahood, in which altruistic dispositions and actions predominate. The career of a Bodhisattva, a candidate of Buddhahood, is conspicuous by his noble spirit and self-sacrificing deeds. The Bodhisattva is explained as a being who regards others' salvation as more urgent than his own. And it is also true that the Arahant is not so energetic in the salvation of other people as his friend the Bodhisattva, but it is equally untrue that the Arahant has no interest in the salvation of others. The Buddha always told monks who were Arahants or candidates for Arahats to regard others' good or salvation as highly as their own. The citation of a few passages from the Pitaka will be sufficient to prove this.

Monks, whether in meditation or in religious conversation, are told not to forget 'the good, welfare, and advantage of the multitude or the world, and the good and welfare of gods and men' (A. iii. 355). The Buddha arranges men in four classes according to their mode of

---

1 The text, p. 283; SBE. xxi, p. 269.
life in connexion with other people: the first group lives thinking neither of their own good nor others', the second solely of others' good, the third solely of their own good, and the fourth both of their own good and others'. The Buddha compares the last group of men, whom he regards as the highest and noblest class of mankind, with ghee (sappimaṇḍa) which is the last and most delicate production of milk (A. ii. 95). With regard to the five items: morality, tranquillization, knowledge, emancipation, and insight into the knowledge of emancipation, the Buddha tells us that there are four classes of men: the first class keep or cultivate them themselves, but do not advise others to do the same, and the last class of men keep or cultivate them themselves, and advise others to follow their example. In this case the Buddha utters no words of depreciation or appreciation, but it is clear that he appreciates the last class of men most (A. iii. 12-14; cf. iv. 221). 'Of two persons', says the Buddha, 'who know the gain and the doctrine, and who act in accordance with the doctrine, one who acts aiming solely at his own good but not at others' is blameworthy on that account, while one who acts aiming both at his own and others' good is praiseworthy on that account' (A. iv. 116). When the Buddha sent out his disciples to wander about preaching the doctrine and converting people, he said to them: 'Go ye now, O monks, and wander, for the good of the many, for the welfare of the many, out of compassion for the world, for the advantage, good, and welfare of gods and men' (Vin. i. 21). About the help of oneself and another, the Buddha says that in helping oneself one helps another; and in helping another one helps oneself (S. v. 169). About the mutual help of the monk and the layman, the Buddha says that the former preaches the
good doctrine to the latter, while the latter supports the former with material goods, thus helping each other.

Both those with houses and those without houses,
Being mutually dependent upon each other,
Do exalt the Good Doctrine,
Which is security unsurpassed. (It. 107.3)

The Buddha, while preaching to the headman of a village, mentions many different sorts of men according as they seek wealth, as they enjoy it themselves, and as they distribute it among others. As to the last class of them he says as follows: 'Here, however, O headman, is a certain man enjoying worldly pleasures. (a) He seeks riches through justice, but not through violence; (b) having sought riches through justice, but not through violence, he makes himself comfortable and satisfies himself; (c) he divides the riches and accumulates merits; and (d) he enjoys the riches without clinging to them, without being stupefied by them, and without falling into guilt, being conscious of the danger lurking in them and knowing the results.' This is the man in the Buddha's ideal (S. iv. 332-6).

I think we have made it clear that the primitive Buddhists were not told merely to mind their own good and welfare, they were urged to regard others' good and welfare with equal consideration. 'Let him admonish, let him teach, let him forbid what is improper' (Dh. 77); 'let each man direct himself first to what is proper, then let him teach others' (Dh. 158); 'cultivating an unbounded friendly mind' (Sn. 507); 'touching with

friendliness what is feeble or strong' (Sn. 967); in this way 'they continued their benevolent activity although it could add nothing to the reward which they had already won.'

1 *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. i, p. 214.
BOOK II

VI

SELF-RESTRAINT


SELF-RESTRAINT or self-control is, in many religions, taught as virtuous conduct. Christianity regards it as such, and so do Brāhmanism and Confucianism. Buddhism, as a religion of temperance, regards it as highly as, if not more highly than, these. Self-restraint occupies an important position among Buddhist virtues. Throughout the Pāli Piṭaka we find this virtue taught in many different forms. To mention only a few instances of them, indriyesu guṭṭadvāratā or ‘guarding the doors of the sense-organs’ (S. ii. 218, passim), rakkhitamānasāno or ‘protecting one’s own mind’ (Sn. 63), vijitindriyo or ‘a man who has conquered his senses’ (Sn. 250), danto santo niyato or ‘(one who) is controlled, calmed, and restrained’ (Dh. 142), bhāvitam cittām or ‘a mind which is trained’ (A. i. 5–6), saṁvuto pātimokkhasmiṁ or ‘a man who has restrained himself by means of Pātimokkha’ (Sn. 340), cittām me susamāhitam vimuttaṁ or ‘my mind has been perfectly tranquillized and emancipated’ (Tha. 1), cittām yassa vasībhūtam or ‘one whose mind is subdued’ (A. i. 165),
vācānurakkhi or ‘watching over one’s words’ (Dh. 281), santā vācā ca kammā ca or ‘one’s speech and acts are tranquillized’ (Dh. 96), āhāre udare yato or ‘being temperate in taking food and filling one’s stomach’ (Sn. 78), hathasaññato pādasaññato vācāya saññato saññatuttamo or ‘a man who has restrained his hands, feet, and speech, and who has restrained himself in the best possible way’ (Dh. 362). Many other words of similar derivation and significance are used to denote this virtue. This fact amply testifies to its high importance. Buddhism may be simply said to be a religion of self-restraint. If any one is perfectly trained in this virtue, he may be said to be a perfect Buddhist. Buddhist virtues, especially self-regarding ones, are all unified in this single virtue. We cannot say, as Aristotle does, simply that temperance is a virtue and that we need training for attaining it. Self-restraint as taught by Buddhism has a wider sense than simply ‘observing the mean with regard to pleasure’. It implies all the Buddhist virtues; in one sense it is the starting-point of Buddhist self-culture or purification, and at the same time it is the middle and end of it; and training in it must continue throughout a man’s whole life. To be a true Buddhist, he must not deviate from it even for a moment. If we do not deviate from it either consciously or unconsciously, our culture as Buddhists has been perfected. It is, therefore, the alpha and omega of Buddhist culture.

To begin with the six sense-organs, they are usually regarded as the ‘doors’ (dvāra) through which evils may intrude into the human mind; and therefore guarding and protecting them, conquering them, tranquillizing and pacifying them are everywhere commanded as praise-worthy conduct. To control one’s own sense-organs and to

1 Nicomachean, iii. 10, 1.
prevent them from running their natural course forms an important part of Buddhist culture. The Buddha divides the assembly of the monks into two classes, according as they are trained in controlling their sense-organs or not; the one is the assembly of those who are haughty, proud, fickle, loquacious, garrulous, forgetful, inattentive, not tranquil, of confused minds, and whose sense-organs are in their natural condition (*pākatindriya*), and the other that of those who are just the opposite, and lastly whose sense-organs are well trained (*sānvutindriya*). He calls the former the superficial assembly, and the latter the profound one.\(^1\) Those whose sense-organs are in their natural state and those whose sense-organs are well trained are thus positively distinguished from each other. This shows how great stress the Buddha lays upon the restraining of the organs of sensation. Human beings as animals are naturally endowed with strong passions or instincts, and naturally crave to satisfy them. If, therefore, they are not restrained by means of religious or moral culture, that is to say, if they are left to run their natural course without being restrained in any way, the result will be the moral degeneration of individuals and the destruction of social order. They must, therefore, be controlled and led aright through the power of reason and the effort of will, which in their turn must be properly trained. This is one of the functions which highly developed religions have to teach. So far as we are obliged to mix in society as social beings, we cannot absolutely evade coming into contact with what is not good or right. We cannot simply be taught ‘not to look at what is contrary to propriety; not to listen to what is

---

\(^1\) A. i. 70; cf. i. 266; iii. 355, 391.
contrary to propriety', as Confucius\textsuperscript{1} says. We shall have to face what is contrary to propriety, whether willingly or not. And in such cases we shall have no better means of self-defence than controlling the sense-organs. Then, however tempting things outside may be, we shall find it easy to resist them. The restraint of the organs is, therefore, of the utmost importance in moral culture. In this connexion we may quote many passages from the Pāli Piṭaka. The Buddha says as follows, in praise of a monk who is not affected by external objects which he sees or hears: 'Here, O monks, is a monk who sees (something) with the eye, but is not affected by its features and minor characteristics. If (he is affected by them) and lives without controlling his organ of vision, as a result, covetousness, dejection, and sinful evil things will befall him. But he takes steps for its control; he keeps watch on his organ of vision, and brings it into perfect control.'\textsuperscript{2} The same thing is repeated about the control of his five other organs of sense: ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. As ancient people protected their towns with strong walls and allowed both their own people and foreigners to pass through narrow passages only after strict scrutiny, so we must scrutinize things which come into contact with our senses and watch over them, to guard them from being attracted or distracted by what we perceive with our senses, especially by those things which are morally or psychologically evil, but which assume attractive appearance, and thus to train (danta), subdue (vijita), and tranquillize (samāhita) them. When they are completely controlled, Buddhist culture in one sense may be said to be perfected.

\textsuperscript{1} James Legge, \textit{Chinese Classics}, vol. i, p. 250.
\textsuperscript{2} A. ii. 16; 210; v. 351.
Next to the restraint of the six organs of sense, we have to consider that of speech and bodily conduct, two of the three modes of action, the third being that of the mind. 'It is good to restrain bodily conduct, it is good to restrain speech', are words often uttered by the Buddha.\(^1\) An interesting thing in connexion with this is that three forms of action, i.e. mental, vocal, and bodily, are regarded as 'doors', as the six organs of sensation are. The idea seems to be that our actions take these three forms of expression, or in other words, they come out through these doors. The word Saṃvara, the etymology of which is saṃ (well) + vr, 'to cover', means 'covering, concealing, closing, shutting, suppressing, restraining, restraint'. So when we say indriyasaṃvara, we mean by it 'shutting' (the doors of) the six organs of sense, so that no adventitious evil may come into the mind, which, according to the Buddha's ideal, ought to be kept unpolluted, unperturbed, or undistracted. The Buddha declares that the human mind is naturally very bright, but it is polluted by adventitious depravities.\(^2\) Evils, very numerous, it seems, are always looking for a chance of invading the mind, and that through the doors of the six sense-organs. It is therefore wise on our part to keep close watch on them, and prevent evils from intruding into the mind. We have thus on one hand to shut our 'doors' of sense-organs, or keep watch over them against the intrusion of evils, and on the other we have

\(^1\) e.g. Dh. 361; S. i. 78; Mahāvastu, iii. 428.

\(^2\) A. i. 10, 'This mind, O monks, is (naturally) very bright, but it is polluted by adventitious depravities. The unlearned, unconverted person does not know this (fact) as it really is. Therefore I declare that the unlearned unconverted person is not in possession of the cultivation of the mind.'
to shut the 'doors' of action, lest evil may come out through them. *Samvuto tihi thānehi*\(^1\) or 'one who is shut in three places' or 'one who restrains himself in three places', is one who commits no evil actions in body, speech, or mind, and he is a true Brāhmaṇa. If we allow no evils to come in through the 'doors' of the six sense-organs, and to go out through the three 'doors' of action, there will be no evils at all. This seems to be the Buddha's idea in teaching restraint, and the reason why he mostly uses the words of the same derivation, *saṁvara*, *saṁvuta*, *susamvara*, *susamvuta*, for both cases.

The main object of restraint, however, is the mind. If the mind is restrained well, the five other sense-organs and the two other forms of action will be restrained by themselves. This is why so much stress is laid upon its restraint. It must be trained (*bhāvita*), tamed (*danta*), protected (*gutta*), guarded (*rakkhita*), restrained (*saṁvuta*),\(^2\) subjugated (*vasikata*); it must be directed rightly (*sammāpanihita*),\(^3\) calmed (*santa*),\(^4\) tranquillized (*susamāhita*),\(^5\) and brought to a fixed (*thita*) or perfectly fixed (*saṁthita*) state,\(^6\) when nothing will be able to move or shake it. No evil objects which may come into contact with the mind of high culture will be able to perturb it. Such a mind is completely free from any sort of evils, and therefore it receives the name vimuttacittā or 'the mind which is emancipated', or the mind which has acquired complete liberty. 'Here is a monk', says the Buddha, 'with the mind perfectly emancipated. Numerous forms, which are to be perceived through the sense of vision, come into the view of the eye, but they do not take hold of his

---

1 Dh. 391.  
2 A. i. 5–7.  
3 A. i. 8.  
4 Dh. 96, 373; A. i. 138.  
5 Sn. 341; Tha. I.  
6 A. iv. 299.
mind, which is purged (amissikata), made steady (dhita), and immovable (aneejjappatta). He says again: 'Therefore, O monks, you ought to train yourself as follows: My inner mind will be fixed, perfectly fixed, and no sinful, evil objects which arise will take hold of it.' This is the condition which we are taught to aim at in Buddhist mental culture.

The visible effect of self-control is self-possessed demeanour of the person. Mention is also made of Buddhist monks whose perfect self-control and consequent serene appearance have impressed even heretics' minds, and of conversions which have taken place in consequence. Sariputta was struck with the good demeanour of Assaji, which led him to take the robes in the Buddha's religion. The latter's demeanour is described as follows: 'His going forwards and backwards, looking straight and sideways, drawing his arms back and stretching them out; all were decorous; he turned his eyes to the ground, and was dignified in deportment.' The same words are often used in describing a person of self-control. He never loses his consciousness in whatever situation he may be. In walking, standing, sitting, in sleep or awake, when talking, or silent, he always acts consciously. The Buddha was once praised by a Brähman of the Vaccha family, native of the town Venaga, who said: 'As a gold ornament, O Gotama, which has been wrought well by a skilful goldsmith, and manipulated well by a dexterous

¹ A. iii. 377, 404.  
² A. iv. 299.  
³ Vin. i. 39; SBE. xiii. 144. The wandering ascetic Upaka was struck by the demeanour of the Buddha, whom he praises with the same words: 'Your countenance is serene; the colour of your skin, or your complexion, is pure and bright'; Vin. i. 8; SBE. xiii. 90.  
one, shines, emits and reflects light, so, O Gotama, your
sense-organs are serene, and the colour of your skin is
clear and pure'. Such is the description of persons of
self-control. The mind is hard to restrain; but it may
be restrained, as the Bhagavadgītā says, and when it is
restrained, supreme bliss will come.

Spiritually persons of self-control enjoy great bliss, which
others fail to do. And this is the main object of this culture,
the self-possession of the person practising this virtue being
merely its natural result. Buddhism, like most oriental
teaching, is a subjective teaching, and naturally the pleasures
it recommends us to seek are chiefly subjective or reflective.
The Pañcakāmaguṇa or ‘fivefold sensual pleasure’ which
comes through the five organs of sense is generally
rejected as most abominable. Genuine pleasures, accord-
ing to its tenets, are not obtained by running after objects
which are pleasant to the eye or other organs of sensation
of the ordinary man (putthujana), because this way of
seeking pleasure will only enable us to obtain pleasure
limited in extent or on some special occasions. A mind
eager in finding these sorts of pleasure will be disappoi-
nted and depressed when it fails to obtain them or
when they cease to be pleasure any more. We are there-
fore under the necessity of controlling ourselves from
seeking these sorts of pleasure, and especially those of an
evil nature, or from finding pleasure in the contact of
subject and external objects. Turn your mind to your-
self, and try to find pleasure within yourself, and you will
always find there an infinite source of pleasure ready for
your enjoyment. This is what Buddhism as a subjective
teaching recommends.

Human beings, like animals, are naturally prone to seek

1 A. i. 180.  
2 SBE. viii, pp. 56, 64, 68 et passim.
to satisfy their instincts. Among these are appetite and procreative desire, which are essential for their own existence and for the continuation of the races to which they belong. The satisfaction of these desires in the case of human beings does not at all mean moral degeneration, provided it is performed in the proper way, and in a moderate degree. But if they are satisfied in a wrong way or in an excessive degree, they will be physically, psychologically, and none the less morally injurious. As the moth is attracted to fire by its natural impulse, but is burnt to death at once, so human beings when too eager to satisfy these instincts are unconscious of the serious results which their satisfaction may bring upon them. The lack of reason and the weakness of will which result from want of self-control often lead people to these lamentable results. What religious and moral teaching has to do, therefore, is to train us to satisfy these desires in a proper manner or in a moderate and reasonable degree, or to cultivate a power within us which enables us to resist the excitement of mere impulse.

Human beings, on the one hand, as animals always seek to satisfy their natural desires, but on the other, though it may sound rather paradoxical, they aspire to purify or ennoble them, thereby always aiming at a higher, nobler life. This is a privilege which human beings alone among all creatures can perform. The people of highly cultivated society evidently have these opposite, seemingly opposite, natures. They are, so far as their natural instincts are concerned, the same as animals or primitive men; and accidental chances may turn civilized men into mere animals or primitive men in an instant. We often hear of ‘a moment of weakness’. In this respect the high civilization of society or the high principle of the individual
is not a perfect safeguard against sins resulting from the incitement of passion. But, on the other hand, the moral, intellectual, aesthetical cultures which have been carried on from generation to generation have made them far from being mere animals or primitive men. The more cultivated society is, morally and otherwise, the more advanced it is understood to be. It is the same with the individual. The richer a society or an individual is in intellectual, moral, or aesthetical pleasure, or in spiritual pleasure, the less material it is. In other words, the more animal pleasures are purified or ennobled, the more civilized society or individuals are.

If any one does not restrain his organs of sense, his morality will not be preserved well; if his morality is not preserved well, the right concentration of the mind will not be attained; if this is not attained, knowledge and insight which see things as they really are will not be attained; if these are not attained, disgust at worldly vanity and freedom from human passion will not be attained; and if these are not attained, emancipation, knowledge, and insight will not be attained. The restraint or right direction of the sense-organs is the very way of rising to higher stages of life. This is the starting-point for ennobling human life. By proper self-discipline, as the text just quoted says, morality will be preserved unbroken, and mental concentration, knowledge, and insight, which are the prelude to the attainment of Arahatship, emancipation, and enlightenment, which are the full attainment of Arahatship, will be reached.

1 A. iii. 360.
VII

ABSTINENCE, TEMPERANCE

Self-restraint and Abstinence have the same end (111). Sensual Pleasures rejected, but Asceticism also denounced (111). Temperance in Eating, Fasting (118). Sorts of Flesh which Monks cannot eat (117). Layman’s Fasting (117). Drinking is prohibited by Brâhman Law (118). It is denied to any Buddhists (119). Evil Results of Drinking, Temporary Insanity and Physical and Mental Sluggishness (120). Total Abstinence is more advisable (123).

Abstinence or refraining from indulgence in pleasures, as a sister virtue of Self-restraint, must occupy an important position in the practical Buddhist morality, though it is less prominent in the Pâli Pitaka. While so many different expressions are used to denote Self-restraint, we find very little variety in the expression of Abstinence. This is, it seems, because Buddhism, like other Oriental teachings, always puts more stress upon subject than upon object. If therefore the subject is well controlled there will be no necessity for us to trouble ourselves about the object. If the six doors of the sense-organs, the three forms of action, and especially the mind are perfectly guarded, restrained, or tranquillized, then objects, which otherwise may attract them, will have no power. Self-restraint and Abstinence, as these two English terms refer to nearly the same thing, have the same end; but the former concerns the subject, while the latter has much to do with the object. This seems to have been the idea which the Buddha had in expounding them.

As for pleasures, Buddhism vehemently rejects those
which depend upon the senses, and teaches us to refrain from all of them, but on the other hand, it highly esteems other sorts of pleasures, those resulting from the total annihilation of vulgar passions. Passions are abominable things in the Buddha's eye, and therefore pleasures in connexion with them are everywhere rejected as 'unworthy, unprofitable, and only suitable for the worldly-minded'. But he should by no means be regarded as carrying this Stoic spirit too far, and advocating asceticism or self-mortification in any form, which was common in India as a means of salvation when the Buddha appeared. The Brāhman practised it, and so also did the Jain. As for the Buddha, he denounced asceticism or self-mortification as equally unworthy and unprofitable. As Aristotle defines Temperance as 'moderation or observance of the mean with regard to pleasures', so the Buddha advises us to avoid the two extremes and to follow the middle way. This is the only virtuous course. And as the Greek philosopher thinks that virtue always lies between the two extremes,

1 SBE. xi. 146.

2 The contrast is striking between the practice of the Buddhist and that of the two other Indian religionists, especially of the Jain, in this respect. Dr. Wolfgang Bohn seems to be right in ascribing this partly to the early home lives of the Buddha and Mahāvīra, contemporary of Buddha and reformer of Jainism, before they took up religious lives. 'The idea of each of the two persons (the Buddha and Mahāvīra)', says he, 'psychologically bears evidence of the influence of his nursery and parental house. For Gotama there were luxury and glory, sorrowful and delicate recoil before every suffering, and the assertion of life without feeling of sinfulness. For Mahāvīra, there were religious permeation of his family, feeling of sinfulness, and ardent spirit of repentance'. Die Religion des Jina und ihr Verhältnis zum Buddhismus, p. 31.

3 Nicomachean, iii. 10, 1.
too much and too little, e.g. courage between cowardice and foolhardiness, and liberality between prodigality and illiberality, so also the Buddha finds virtue in the middle way.\(^1\) Aristotle\(^2\) maintains that nobody falls short in the matter of pleasures and takes less delight than he ought to. Human beings naturally seek for the gratification of their desires. And when this seeking is carried to an extreme we call it profligacy, as Aristotle does. On the other hand, however, we meet with people who absolutely reject pleasures, whether mental or physical, and who, carrying this rejection to its extreme, take delight in suffering mental or bodily pains, commonly practised among Indian ascetics as an act of religious austerity. Aristotle was certainly ignorant of or ignored this fact, and thought only of excess in pleasure-seeking. The Buddha, on the contrary, is aware of both possible extremes, which he emphatically tells us to avoid so as to take the middle course.

It is common to speak about abstinence or temperance only in connexion with eating, drinking, and enjoying sexual intercourse. Aristotle restricts the application of the term to these three.\(^3\) He says that it is impossible to say whether one is temperate or profligate with regard to mental pleasures, such as honour, learning, &c., and that temperance therefore only exists in the pleasures of eating, drinking, and sexual enjoyment, the medium of

1 A. i. 295–7; S. iv. 330–1, v. 421; M. i. 15, iii. 230.
2 Nicomachean, iii. 11, 7.
3 Nicomachean, iii. 10, 10. The *Oxford English Dictionary* gives the following definitions of Abstinence: 1. The action or practice of abstaining or refraining; forbearance. \((b)\) *spec.* A forbearance from hostilities, an armistice or truce. 2. Forbearance of any indulgence of appetite, self-restraint, \((a)\) continence (the oldest sense), \((b)\) fasting, \((c)\) the practice of abstaining from alcoholic beverages.
which is the sense of touch. The instinct of gratifying appetite and sexual desire is natural to human beings as well as other animals, and the gratification of them is necessary for their own existence and for the continuation of their race. Everybody will admit the necessity of gratifying them. Evil only comes out of satisfying them in an excessive degree and in the wrong manner.

With regard to the satisfaction of appetite, the Buddha always advises us to eat moderately. On many occasions he mentions 'moderation in eating'\(^1\) as commendable, or he praises 'one who is moderate in taking food and filling his stomach'.\(^2\) It is noteworthy that these words are always found side by side with the words 'guarding the doors of the organs of sensation', which shows their close relation. Eating much means lack of Self-control, and is usually regarded as a vicious action. Gormandize is a contemptible habit in everybody's eye. Moderation in eating is therefore recommended by all teachers, and may be regarded as virtuous for both lay people and monks, because excessive enjoyment in anything is detestable. In the case of the latter, however, the Buddha enjoins them not only to reduce the quantity of food, but also to reduce the number of their meals, that is to say, refrain from taking food between noon and the sunrise of the following day, i.e. monks are forbidden to take anything solid, except between sunrise and noon.\(^3\) They have to dispense with at least one meal every day.

\(^1\) e.g. A. i. 94; Dh. 185. 
\(^2\) Sn. 78. 
\(^3\) 'Abstinence from eating at forbidden times' is one of the ten precepts which the novice takes an oath to keep when he joins the monkhood (Vin. i. 88); and it is to be observed as long as he remains in the monkhood. Eight sorts of drink are sanctioned by the Buddha to be taken at these forbidden hours (Vin. i. 246).
ABSTINENCE, TEMPERANCE

They are taught to be moderate in eating, and what is more, they have to fast for the greater part of a day. The reasons for such a strict limitation may be various. In the first place, in ancient days, fasting was generally regarded as a religious or virtuous practice. Though it is not named in the Vedic literature, it seems to have been very old in India. It was sometimes practised as the penance for a sinful action, but in general for the purpose of attaining religious holiness. The attenuation of the physical body as the result of fasting must have appeared as something holy to the eye of the Indian, who has always regarded the spirit much more highly than the body. Not only that, fasting needs physical as well as spiritual forbearance, and the long and frequent practice of it may be taken to indicate the spiritual greatness of the practiser. No wonder then that ancient Indians included it among religious practices. The Buddha's sanction of it therefore was partly to conform it to the tradition which had been handed down among his fellow countrymen. In the second place, this is meant to subdue passions. Passions, though natural to every one, are in a great degree nourished by food, especially when animal food is taken in abundance. For subjugating the passions, therefore, we should absolutely refrain either from taking animal food, or from taking too much food. The Buddha does not forbid his disciples, whether lay or monkish, to take meat. The latter may receive alms consisting of animal food, if this is free from three conditions; that is to say, if they do not see, hear, or suspect that the flesh which is offered to them is cooked for the special purpose of being offered to them, they

1 M. i. 473.
may receive and eat it. Taking life is absolutely prohibited for the monk (and for the layman). He cannot therefore himself kill any animal, but he is free to accept the gift of meat and eat it. This apparent contradiction often raises a question as to how Buddhism, which teaches absolute abstinence from taking life, can allow its followers to eat animal food.¹ I think the Buddha’s idea in sanctioning it is to allow his disciples to receive any food offered to them, and not to prefer one sort to another, animal or vegetable. Preference means lack of self-control on the part of the receiver, and it may hurt the liberal heart of the giver. If meat is offered, they may take it; if vegetable food is offered, they must take it; if delicate food is offered, they may take it; if coarse food is offered, they must be satisfied with it; and if they cannot obtain any food, they must go without it. So far as food is concerned, they entirely depend upon their fellow lay devotees.² They must accept any food. Preference should not be made. As to the mentality of true monks in accepting alms from lay devotees, the Buddha says in the Jivakasuttanta (M. i. 368–71) that they never entertain such ideas as this: ‘It is very well that this householder or householder’s son serves us with

¹ Meat taken by the Buddhist monk has given rise to many discussions. In the Telovādajātaka (Jāt. ii. 262–8), Niganṭha Ānāgārika Nātaputta blames the Buddha for taking food which chiefly consisted in flesh, and was specially cooked for him. The host was General Sthi, who, being originally a Jain, was newly converted to Buddhism. In the Āmagandhasutta (Sn. 289–52), Kassapa Buddha and a Brāhman discuss about animal food and other delicate food stuffs. The former convinces the latter, saying that it is evil actions that defile a man, but not the eating of flesh.

² The monk is instructed always to keep in mind: ‘My livelihood is dependent upon others’. A. v. 87, 210.
this savoury alms now; let him in future serve us with savoury alms like this"; they accept the alms without attachment, without stupefaction, without craving, but always conscious of danger lurking in it, and knowing its result. In such mental condition, monks are completely free from the idea of hurting any beings. Their hearts and minds abide in love and compassion; how can they cherish any hurtful thought within themselves? Still they may accept the offering of animal food, because they have to accept any food which is offered to them. Acceptance of any food without preference is the morality of this habit.

The Buddha as a matter of course forbids his disciples to eat the flesh of a human being, and also of an elephant, horse, dog, serpent, lion, tiger, panther, bear, or hyaena, from several different reasons. In the case of other animals, they are free to eat their flesh if they are sure that it is not purposely prepared for them, as we have already stated. Animal food being allowed, it may be feared that the food will excite passions. Monks therefore must only take meals between sunrise and noon.

The lay Buddhist may fast from one meal on the Uposatha day, which comes twice or four times every lunar month. The pious layman or laywoman observes the eight precepts on these days, and abstinence from eating at forbidden hours, which we may call ‘feast of one meal’, is one of them. This was a custom among the Indian religious people in the Buddha’s days, and the Buddha seems to have adopted it with the Uposatha days. In thus observing the eight precepts, lay people

---

1 Vin. i. 218–20.
2 Vin. i. 101–2; Āp. II. 1, 1, 4–5; Āśva. I. 10, 1, 2. We have already discussed this subject; see p. 65.
are following the practice of their clerical brethren, abstaining from worldly enjoyment for one day. For this day they are religious men.

As for drinking, if this means taking intoxicating liquors, the Buddhists are absolutely forbidden to take them, whether monkish or lay. It was a general religious custom in India in the Buddha's time to prohibit drinking intoxicating liquors. According to Āpastamba (I. 17, 21), all intoxicating drinks were forbidden to a Brāhmaṇa. He should abstain from spirituous liquors through life (Ga. II. 20, note), though Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas were to abstain only as long as they were students (op. cit., note). Drinking spirituous liquors would cause the loss of caste\(^1\) or of the life of the drinker, because in Gautama (XXIII. 1) we read: 'They shall pour hot spirituous liquor into the mouth of a Brāhmaṇa who has drunk such liquor; he will be purified after death.'\(^2\) If the punishment is not so severe, the drinker was to go through Kṛiccha, Atikṛiccha, or Tapakṛiccha penance for some period,\(^3\) at the end of which he had to be reinitiated; or he was to reduce his food for three years;\(^4\) or he was seated on grass, allowing his back to be scorched by the sun;\(^5\) or the king had to cause the mark of a headless trunk to be impressed with a heated iron on the forehead of the offender and to banish him from his realm;\(^6\) and even drinking water from a vessel or jar which was used for helping spirituous liquor or any intoxicating drink was to be atoned for by

---

\(^1\) Āp. I. 21, 7–8; Ga. XXI. 1.
\(^2\) Cf. Va. XX. 22; Ba. II. 1, 18; Āp. I. 25, 3; Man. XI. 91–2.
\(^3\) Cf. Va. XX. 19; Ga. XXIII. 2; Ba. II. 1, 19, 21; Man. XI. 147, 151.
\(^4\) Āp. I. 25, 10.
\(^5\) Āp. I. 27, 10.
\(^6\) Ba. I. 18, 18.
a penance. From these few quotations it will be quite clear that drinking liquors, whatever sorts they may be, was abhorred by ancient Brāhmans, and that the punishment for it was death or the loss of caste, which was in the eye of a Brāhman as heavy as, if not heavier than, death itself.

In the case of the Buddhists, drinking liquors is forbidden to any of them. We find it included in the five precepts which are meant for the lay devotee to observe through his life; in the eight precepts which are meant for his observance on special occasions, e.g. on the Upoṣatha days, as we have mentioned above; in the ten precepts promulgated for regulating the conduct of the novice. As for the prohibition of the use of intoxicating beverages to the monk, we read of it in the 51st item of the Pācittiyas of the Pātimokkha. So no Buddhist, just as is the case with a Brāhman, is allowed to drink an alcoholic liquor; he is required by these vows to be a total abstainer through his life. The only difference is that the Buddha has not established any particular punishment for drinking liquors, as the ancient Brāhman legislators did. It is of interest to note that the use of a kind of intoxicating liquor was one of the causes of the schism which arose in the Buddhist community exactly a hundred years after the Buddha's death. At that time monks of the Vajji clan in Vesāli taught ten points as lawful, one of which was drinking unfermented palm-wine, of the colour of the feet of a pigeon. All the ten points, however, were rejected by the orthodox monks as unlawful, and thereby the schism was put an end to. Thus intoxicating liquor, whether fermented or unfer-

1 Ba. II. 1, 22; Man. XI. 148.
2 Vin. iv. 109–10; SBE. xiii, p. 44.
3 Mah. chap. iv.
mented, is forbidden to a Buddhist monk. Liquor can be taken as medicine, but in this case it must be boiled well with oil, so that it will no more have the taste, colour, and smell of liquor.\(^1\) Besides being mentioned as one of the five, eight, or ten precepts, drinking liquor is specified as one of the four stains affecting some Samaṇas and Brāhmans. The Buddha says: ‘There are some Samaṇas and Brāhmans who drink fermented liquors (sura) and strong spirits (meraya) which leads to intoxication and sluggishness, and who do not abstain therefrom’;\(^2\) and in the Dhammikasutta (Sn. 398–9): ‘Let the householder who approves of the Dhamma not give himself to intoxicating drinks; let him not cause others to drink, nor approve of those that drink, knowing it to end in madness. For through intoxication the stupid commit sins and make other people intoxicated, let him avoid this seat of sin, this madness, this folly, delightful only to the stupid’.

Fermented or spirituous liquors are drugs, which if we take them will in normal condition cause intoxication and mental and physical sluggishness. It is an established fact that they, in however small doses they may be taken, produce deleterious effects upon both mind and body. And modern scientists unanimously agree that the best thing with regard to drinking is to absolutely abstain from it, whether from a physiological or psychological point of view. From the absence of a detailed discourse on drinking we are not in a position to infer on what ground the Buddha’s theory of total temperance is founded. But he as a mental doctor does not lay so much stress upon the physical effect of

\(^1\) Vin. i. 205; SBE. xvii. 55–6.
\(^2\) Vin. ii. 295; SBE. xx. 389; A. ii. 58.
drinking as upon its mental. Perhaps he sees the effect which drinking brings upon the mind, and the evil results which intoxication may be expected to produce upon individuals and society at large. It will relax the controlling power of the mind over the senses, speech, and action, which, as we have already said, is of such importance in Buddhist ethics; it will loosen the sense of responsibility which Buddhism as a religion of self-help must regard as highly as the power of control; and it will upset the moral principles of a drinker to such an extent that he will remain in moral chaos as long as he is under the influence of alcohol. What is worse, drinking as its probable result will excite anger, ill-will, animal passions, and in the long run cause mental and physical dullness, torpidity, &c., all of which Buddhism looks upon as abominable evils, and has ample reason for doing so.

Another reason why intoxication is abhorred in the Buddha's religion is that it causes not only mental sluggishness and bodily torpidity while a person is intoxicated, but further the temporary insanity of his mind. Intoxication, whether slight or heavy, is the state of temporary madness, in which everything is confused and upset. Such a condition of mind is evidently contrary to the principles of the Buddha, who taught men always to be sober, Sadā jāgariyam anuyutto, or 'to be constantly vigilant'. This constant vigilance was what the Buddha used to teach to his disciples with two other virtues; guarding the doors of the organs of sense or the restraint of the senses and moderation in eating. The doctrine of 'constant vigilance' requires us to be

1 Cf. Buddhism, vol. i, No. 3, 'Alcohol and the Mind', by Dr. R. Earnest.
watchful, not only while we are awake, but also in sleep. We should always be mindful and conscious of what we do or in what condition we are. As the Buddha says: 'Here, O monks, a monk purifies his mind from objects which ought to be interdicted (āvaranīyadhamma) during the daytime walking up and down and sitting down. He does the same thing in the first watch of the night. In the middle watch of the night he lies down on his right side after the manner of the lion, placing one leg on the other, being mindful and conscious, and without losing consciousness when he should get up. And in the last watch of the night he purifies his mind from objects which ought to be interdicted walking up and down and sitting down.'\(^1\) It does not matter whether we are awake or asleep, we should not deviate from watchfulness even for a moment. While we are awake we should mind our actions or condition, whether at work or at rest; and while we are asleep we should be ready to get up when it is necessary, or to awake with the perfect consciousness of ourselves. Such teaching can evidently not be consistent with intoxication. Buddhism therefore demands complete sobriety. No wonder that the Buddha has absolutely prohibited drinking, regarding the sin as grave as killing, stealing, adultery, and lying.

Moderate temperance may be advisable for some people so long as drinking does not cause such evils to arise as we have mentioned. It is true that as a sort of drug, alcohol is efficacious for some mental as well as physical diseases; it gladdens the heart of a drinker; it encourages him to brave action; it dispels or at least

\(^1\) A. i. 114; ii. 40; S. iv. 104; 175-7.
mitigates his mental trouble; it stimulates his bodily organs to perform their functions more energetically, and so on. Sobriety in drinking, as people say, may be harmless or even useful to the minds and bodies of some people and on some occasions. But it must be borne in mind that human beings only need the drug of alcohol in abnormal conditions, whether mental or physical; no man as long as he is in a normal condition mentally or physically will need it; not only that, but moderate drinking in many cases leads on to drunkenness, habitual drunkenness, the evil and harmfulness of which to individuals and society nobody will deny. It is therefore most advisable for everybody, especially for the weak-minded, to abstain absolutely from drinking, or never accustom themselves to a drinking habit; how much more so, as its harmfulness to a man of normal health is firmly proved by medical scientists of modern times.
VIII

CONTENTMENT


Contentment is the mental condition of a person who is satisfied with what he possesses or obtains, or with the position in which he finds himself. He could possess or obtain more, but he does not desire to have more than he has or gets; he may improve his position, social or professional, through some medium which lies in his power, but he declines to do so.¹ This is the general mental condition of a contented man, although quite naturally there may be a variety of degrees in contentment, and the conception of it may be different according to different individuals. As the French and English adjective 'content', from which the word 'contentment' is derived, means 'pleased', besides 'satisfied', the Pali words santūṭṭha and santusita, both of which are derived from sam+√tus, mean 'well-pleased', 'quite satisfied or contented'. Santuṭṭhi, santoṣa (contentment, satisfaction), santuṭṭhitā (state of being contented), &c., are again derived from these words. So for the ancient Buddhist Indians as well as for the French and English people, contentment was the satisfied and at the same time pleased state of mind. The scarcity

¹ D. iii. 224–5.
of what one has or gets, or the humility of the position in which one finds oneself, does not matter much for such a one. In poverty or humiliation he will find perfect satisfaction and pleasure. Satisfaction and pleasure are essential qualities of contentment; otherwise it will hardly be worthy of being regarded as an ethical virtue.

Being satisfied with anything which one has or obtains is a virtue viewed from the standpoint of common sense. Everybody, generally speaking, will be ready to commend a person of this nature. Certainly it is praiseworthy to be contented with whatever comes to one's lot, and not to covet any more. As circumstances often oblige us to be so, this is quite necessary in human life. We cannot reach the state of perfect happiness unless we bring our coveting hearts and minds under complete or proper control. So long as we seek our happiness in the satisfaction of our desires for material gains, we shall never find it. In the first place we cannot obtain everything we wish for. This is quite clear from our daily experience. What we can obtain is limited by certain conditions, which may be different according to different individuals and societies, and under different circumstances. Some of us may have more, others less, and some few may have the most; still there is a certain limit to what we can obtain; and none of us can expect to obtain everything we wish to obtain. Therefore the first thing which we ought to bear in mind will be that we cannot expect to have everything which we desire to have. In the second place we can never be satisfied with things which we secure, our covetousness constantly increases. Whenever we secure one thing which we have coveted, another thing will make its appear-
ance to be coveted; and when this one is secured, a third one will appear; because covetousness knows no end. So long as we do not do away with covetousness, which is the root of the evil in this case, we shall find no rest. The destruction of covetousness therefore is essential to the happiness of mankind. Away with covetousness, and be contented with the lot which falls to you, and happiness will be yours. In reply to Tissa Metteyya’s question, ‘Who will be satisfied in this world?’ the Buddha says: ‘One who lives a holy life in respect to sensual pleasures, and one who is free from desires and mindful. . . .’ (Sn. 1039). This will account for santutthitā always occurring together with appicchatā or ‘having but few desires’.

It is quite reasonable that Buddhism, which regards self-restraint as a high virtue and covetousness as an abominable vice, and which absolutely denies the idea of self, should recognize a high ethical value in contentment. Poverty has been regarded as an ideal of life in many religions. Poverty itself, if it is simply poverty and nothing else, cannot be said to have any value from the ethical point of view. Nothing can be more miserable than the life of a poor person, who being distressed or depressed by poverty perpetually hunger for riches which evidently are out of his reach, or who perpetually complains of his poor condition. A contented man will never do this. He is poor, but he never hunger for riches, he never grumbles over his poverty. He is satisfied with his present condition. A dissatisfied man will find dissatisfaction even in heaps of riches. No less miserable is the condition of a rich man who craves for riches after riches, which even though
he may accumulate heap upon heap, he cannot or does not wish to use for himself or others, and which give him no satisfaction.\(^1\) Whether poor or rich, therefore, everybody ought to be satisfied with his present condition, or in other words, a poor man ought to be satisfied with the little lot which falls to him, and a rich man with the much which falls to his lot; and each of them should stop grumbling about his condition. Quite naturally contentment is spoken about generally in connexion with poverty or humiliation; but the lack of it is the same in the case of a rich man or a dignitary. People should not be enslaved by the mere ideas of poverty and riches, humiliation and dignity. These are all concerns of relativity.\(^2\) As long as they are concerned with these ideas, they will never attain to perfect peace of mind. Poverty and riches are not of an absolute nature, and therefore we cannot draw an exact boundary line between them; what one man thinks to be poverty may possibly be riches for another;

\(^1\) The Buddha’s ideal in accumulating and distributing wealth will be found in the following discourse which he delivered for the headman of a village: ‘Here, however, O headman, is a certain man enjoying worldly pleasures. He seeks for riches through justice, but not through violence; having sought for riches through justice, but not through violence, he makes himself comfortable and satisfies himself; he divides riches and accumulates merits; and he enjoys the riches without clinging to them, without being stupefied by them, and without falling into guilt, being conscious of the danger lurking in them, and knowing the result’ (S. iv. 382-6; cf. A. i. 129-30).

\(^2\) The Buddha often preached about getting free from the relative ideas concerning victory and defeat (Dh. 201), merit and demerit (Su. 636, 790, 791; Dh. 267, 412), friend and enemy (Sn. 363, 811, 968), purity and impurity (Sn. 900), &c. Does Agur mean the same thing, when he says in his confession, ‘Give me neither poverty nor riches, feed me with food convenient for me’ (Prov. 80, 8)?
and in what one man considers to be an intolerably miserable condition, another may find perfect comfort. Poverty and riches are thus of a relative nature, and mentality towards them is to a great extent subjective.

Many a time the Buddha has depicted in the most laudatory terms the satisfied state of a monk. Once while discoursing on the fruits of the life of a monk for the benefit of King Ajatasattu of Magadha, he mentioned it in these words: 'And how, O King, is the monk contented? Here is, O King, a monk who is contented with so much clothing as is needed for the protection of his body, and with so much food as is required for the satisfaction of his stomach. Wherever he may go, he goes taking all with him. Just like a winged bird, O King, which, wherever it may fly, does so with only its wings, a monk, O King, is contented with so much clothing as is needed for the protection of his body, and with so much food as is required for the satisfaction of his stomach, and wherever he may go, he goes taking all with him. Thus, O King, the monk is contented.' The ideal life of a monk consists, according to the Buddha's own description, in living, strictly speaking, with the scantiest possible quantities of food and clothing, with only as much as will keep him alive and cover his nakedness. It is the same with his dwelling and other requisites of life. A monk declares about his requisites of life: 'Let (a monk) fetch clothes from dust-heaps, cemeteries, or highways; and making

1 The King on committing parricide was troubled in mind, and being disappointed in the six famous teachers of those days, he repaired to the Buddha's monastery. The Samaññaphalasutta, or 'Discourse on the Fruits of the Monkish Life' (D. i. 47–86), is the discourse made by the Buddha on the occasion.

2 S. i. 71; cf. A. ii. 209–10; M. ii. 8.
them into a double robe, let him wear a coarse dress. Let him be humble, restrained, and, guarding the doors of the senses, go on his begging round from house to house in regular succession. Let him be contented even with coarse food, and let him not desire any other abundant delicate food; the mind which is covetous of delicacies does not take delight in meditation.'

They are not allowed to possess any personal possessions except those few things which are essentially necessary for their daily life. This is intended to make them free not only from a life of luxury, but also from attachment to worldly possessions. It will not be unnatural that such a strict mode of life should be prescribed for those whose aim and end is unworldly par excellence. Again, the Buddha says about the self-controlled life of a monk:

'Being ordained thus, he will live controlling himself in deed, speech, and thought, being satisfied with only so much food and clothing as is necessary to keep him alive, and taking delight in retirement.'

Being satisfied with the little he possesses or obtains, and delighting in his restricted condition, a monk is to lead a life of perfect self-control. It may sound strange or rather absurd if he declares that he finds satisfaction and pleasure in such a condition, which is nothing but a succession of trials in the eyes of ordinary men, especially in modern civilized communities. But satisfaction and pleasure are to a great extent subjective. If any one is properly trained to this condition, he will never fail to find satisfaction and pleasure there; and if he is truly sincere in seeking for a higher nobler life, the material deficiencies of his life will not matter to him at all.

\[\text{1 Tha. 578–80.}\]
\[\text{2 D. i. 60.}\]
He is rich who can be contented with the little which he has or gets. Happiness will be his. Happiness and contentment may not be identified, but certainly they have a close relation; the former much depending on the latter. Contentment is therefore said to be 'the noblest wealth' (Dh. 204), or a condition of 'the highest happiness' (Sn. 265). 'In a contented man good things will increase, and bad things will decrease' (A. i. 12), or 'Contentment will be conducive to the good of the multitude' (A. i. 16–17), as is the case with other virtues. Being thus contented with this thing or that which he has or gets, the monk is taught to make vigorous efforts in pursuit of a noble life.

I am afraid that in modern times, where economy reigns over every sphere of social life, such a virtue as we have just described will hardly receive any appreciation from society. This is quite reasonable. The production and distribution of material wealth, desires for wealth which are considered to be the fundamental motives of the economical progress of a community, values which depend upon the desirability of things, or upon what things bring, &c., all of these apparently have no connexion with the virtue of contentment; or in other words, the things valued by contentment and economy are entirely opposite. If therefore moral good were to be explained solely in connexion with economy, contentment would have no place in it at all; but economy is not identical with morality, though no doubt there exists a close relation between them, especially in modern times; and even those whose lives are entirely under the spell of economy will not fail to find moral value in contentment at least in a moderate degree.
IX

PATIENCE

Patience, a form of self-control (131). Religious life is a series of perpetual struggles (131). Much we have to endure in our daily life (133). Patience, one of the Ten Perfections. How bravely the Bodhisatta shows it (134). The Buddha's sayings on Patience (137).

Self-control forms an important part of the Buddhist self-culture, and it is quite natural that Patience or Endurance in face of hardship, mental suffering or bodily pain, or Perseverance in pursuit of a certain aim and end, should be regarded as a highly valuable virtue. In fact patience, humility, contentment, and other virtues of a kindred nature are only different forms of self-control. When a man has completely controlled himself, he will be naturally equipped with all these virtues. Perfection in self-control means perfection in these virtues. Still each of these has its particular sense and function, and it will be too comprehensive to treat them all under one single heading. We therefore deal with them separately.

Religious life, whether in the case of Buddhists or others, is a series of perpetual struggles in abstaining from evils whether mental or physical on the one hand, and in pursuing what is considered to be good or holy on the other; and the necessity of patience, endurance, or perseverance in either case goes without saying. In other words, in the subordination of lower impulses to higher, which in one sense forms the aim and process of moral or religious culture, endurance and perseverance are of the utmost importance. Whether for his own sake or for others', the religious man will have perpetually to
make strenuous efforts. The Buddha himself did this, his disciples did this. What hard efforts the Buddha made in the pursuit of enlightenment is told in the Ariyapariyesanasutta. Patience in this case was exhibited in the abnegation of the comforts of life and the struggle against human passions, and on the other hand in the ardent pursuit of a noble object. According to the legendary accounts of the Buddha’s life, he had on several occasions to fight against Mara, the incarnation of wickedness or the personification of the evil side of human nature. His whole life was a life of constant struggle against this evil. He vehemently fought with it; and so also did his disciples, both male and female. Mara is a deadly enemy of the Buddha and his disciples, trying to do some sort of mischief to them, whenever he has a chance, or in any moment of weakness. Unlike other beings, human or inhuman, real or imaginary, he is never known to have been converted to Buddhism. He is an irreconcilable foe of Buddhism. When the disciples are ardent in meditation in forests, he appears in a terrifying figure to frighten them; or he makes a fearful noise to disturb or distract them; or he tries to tempt female disciples with sensuous desires; or he intrigues in order to cause a rupture between monks and devoted lay people; and so forth. Mara and his followers are compared to an army, perhaps in the form of a general as the chief evil, and the army as a whole to minor evils. Whatever Mara may be, whether a personification of

1 M. i. 160–75.
2 H. Kern, Manual of Indian Buddhism, pp. 17, 20, 21, 24, 32, 42.
3 Brethren, pp. 13, 30; Sisters, p. 180.
4 Brethren, pp. 51, 53, 168.
5 Sisters, pp. 82, 96.
6 Brethren, p. 167.
death,\(^1\) a mental or moral evil, or a certain fearsome natural phenomenon, vigorous fortitude is needed to resist him and thereby to keep one's mind aright and quiet, unperturbed by him. Mention is often made of the monk who has attained to the four stages of meditation. The Buddha says: He thinks to himself, 'Now I live keeping myself free from fear, and I can no more be affected by Mara'. And then he attains the four stages of meditation of fearlessness, when he is said to have destroyed Mara, deprived him of legs, and striking him on the eye, gone out of the sight of the wicked one.\(^2\) Patience was thus a strong armour and a useful instrument in the resistance of mental evils and the attainment of noble objects.

We have to persevere not only for the attainment of noble objects, as in the case which we have just mentioned, but even in our daily life we have so much to endure. Pain, physical or mental, difficulty, poverty, sickness, various sorts of obstacles, must be borne with un-faltering firmness of the mind. Furthermore, we may meet with provocation, insult, threat, or even injury, against which in the majority of cases we can do nothing better than be patient. If we return violence by violence, there will be no end of violence; enmity will give rise to enmity; revenge will rouse more revenge; resentment can never be conquered by resentment; and hatred will only beget hatred. The best thing we can do with these evils is to appease them with antidotes of love, sympathy, forgiveness, tolerance, &c., the examples of which the Buddha has given both in speech and in deed. 'The hatred of those', says he, 'will never be appeased who harbour ideas such as 'he rebuked me, he struck me, he

\(^1\) Tha. 571. \(^2\) A. iv. 434.
conquered me, or he robbed me'.

'Hatred can never be overcome with hatred here in this world; it can only be overcome with love; this is a perpetual law.'

'Verily I live in perfect comfort without hatred among the hating. I live on without hatred among those who hate'.

These words will hardly need to be commented upon or to be reasoned about.

Patience is included in the Ten Perfections of the Bodhisatta, and regarded as essential to the attainment of Buddhahood, the highest human attainment. It may not be out of place in this connexion to summarize a famous Jataka story, in which it is told how an ascetic, who is represented as a previous incarnation of the Buddha, bravely faced a severe ordeal. Bodhisatta in this case was born in a rich Brähman family, and on his parents' death, taking up the life of an ascetic, he entered into the Himalaya mountains. Later, according to the custom of the ascetic of those days, he came to the town of Benares, where through the kindly hospitality of a general, he lived in the royal garden. One day the king of the country went down to the garden in company with his harem. He being drunk fell asleep, and meanwhile his female attendants, unable to bear the tedium, roamed about the garden and came across the ascetic, who was sitting under a Sal-tree. His composed countenance and self-possessed manner attracted both their attention and respect. He preached the doctrine to them, who sat around him attentively listening to his sermon. The king awoke and

1 Dh. 3; Vin. i. 849; Jât. iii. 212.
2 Dh. 5; Vin. i. 849; Jât. iii. 212.
3 Dh. 197.
4 The exposition of the Ten Perfections is only found in the post-canonical literature; see the introduction to the Jataka, Jât. i, pp. 20-8, 44-7
missing his harem and knowing where they were, came to the scene. Naturally he was in a great rage and lavished violent and abusive language upon the ascetic. He asked what his doctrine was, to which the Brähman replied: ‘Not to be angry when living among abusive, harmful, and blaming people’. The angry king calling the executioner told him to give the ascetic good blows with a scourge of thorns on his four sides. This was done. It broke his skin and flesh, and blood came down in a stream. The king asked him again what his doctrine was, to which he gave the same answer, and he said further that his patience rested in his heart, which therefore it was impossible for the king to see. The king’s anger was increased. He ordered the persecutor to mutilate his two arms, legs, ears, and nose successively. Satisfied with this cruel deed, the king went away. The general came and did what he could for the ascetic. He asked him not to be angry with anybody else but the king who had done him such a great harm, and he said in verse: ‘Get angry, O great hero, with one who has had your arms, legs, ears, and nose cut off; but never take wrath against the country’. To which he replied in verse: ‘May the king, who has had my arms, legs, ears, and nose cut off, live long; men like me never give way to anger’. Fictitious and clad with the usual Indian exaggeration as this story is, it is still Buddhistic in its nature; and it affords us ample evidence of the moral value of patience, fortitude, and forgiveness. As we have already stated, the Buddha teaches us to be strict or rather unsparing in controlling ourselves, but at the same time we must be tolerant in forgiving injuries. Strict self-control and tolerance towards others are two

1 Jat. iii. 39–43; Jatakmala, pp. 258–68.
prominent virtues. Be strict in controlling yourself, but be benevolent, liberal, and tolerant towards others. And patience will be invariable for maintaining such equanimity. It is thus through the power of patience that we can destroy our mental evils and thereby build up noble characters; that we can endure the obstacles and hardships of life; that we can forgive the provocation, insult, or injury, which we meet with in our daily life; that we can silently resign ourselves to our lot when we are obliged to do so. In the Sanskrit version of the same story, the Bodhisatta is depicted as addressing the king before he inflicted his cruel tortures, '... kings cannot be so much adorned’, says the Bodhisatta, 'either by their dark blue ear-rings, with their reverberation of dancing shine on the cheeks, or by the several brilliant jewels of their head-dress, as they are adorned by forbearance. Thus considering, pray, do not disregard that virtue. Set aside irascibility, which is never fit to be relied upon, but maintain forbearance as carefully as your dominions. ... Death is an invariable necessity for all creatures. For this reason I am not afraid of it, nor have I anything to fear, when I recollect my own behaviour. But it was for your sake, that you should not suffer by injuring righteousness, the source of happiness, that I praised forbearance to you as the fit instrument for attaining salvation. Since it is a mine of virtues and an armour against vices, I gladly praise forbearance, for it is an excellent boon I offer you'. The king, however, disdained this precious admonition, and ordered the executioner to do as we have related. And lastly he blessed the king with the words: 'May the king live long and no evil befall him'.

1 Jatakamala, pp. 264–7.
than that of a person who blesses another who has caused his limbs to be mutilated. And this noble-mindedness can only be attained through the power of Patience.

We hear from the mouth of the Buddha:—'Patience, which is long-suffering, is the best devotion, the Buddhas declare that Nibbāna is the best (of things)' (Dh. 184; D. ii. 49). 'Whosoever without resentment bears reviling, blows, and bonds, who has made Patience his strong stay and support—him call I a Brāhman' (Dh. 399; Sn. 623). 'There is nothing surpassing Patience' (S. i. 226).¹ 'Those meditative, perseverant, and intelligent ones, who always make steadfast efforts, will realize Nibbāna, the place of the highest security' (Dh. 23; S. ii. 232). 'Energy is the way leading to deathlessness, and indolence the way of death. The energetic will not die; while those who are indolent are as though they were dead' (Dh. 21; Netti. 34). And we hear also from the mouths of his disciples:—'The rain comes down, it pours down gurglingly; and I live by myself in a fearful cave. Living in such a fearful cave I feel no fear, no consterna-
tion, and no creeping dread' (Tha. 189). 'Through per-
severance desire has grown in him, which he raises up
with effort. He strives losing no time and is well com-
posed in his mind' (Tha. 1029). 'Let one who is
equipped with energy and perseverance always be devoted
to religious practice, and let not a wise man go forth in
certainty until he puts an end to suffering' (Tha. 585).
'Look at the diligent ardent disciples, who are incessantly
making unfaltering efforts, and who are living in perfect
concord. This is (the way) of paying homage to the
Buddha' (Thi. 161).

¹ All these three are quoted in the Visuddhimagga, p. 298.
Patience is sometimes juxtaposed with tenderness (*soracca*); it is mentioned as one of the four characteristics of a monk along with rectitude, swiftness in apprehension, and tenderness. A monk who is equipped with these four is said to be worthy of worship, offerings, respectful salutation, and is a fertile fruit-bearing field of the world; and we find several discourses delivered about the blissful rewards of Patience, which however we shall pass over for the present.

1 A. i. 94. 2 A. ii. 113; cf. A. iii. 248. 3 A. iii. 254, 255.
X

CELIBACY, CHASTITY


The life of celibacy, which is usually expressed by the term Brahmacariya, was inherited by Buddhism from Brähmanism with a slight modification both in the terminology and the idea, or it may be better to say that Buddhism organized an order of Brahmacārīns of its own according to traditions which were current when it arose, and its own principles. According to the Dharmasūtras which deal with the domestic and social laws of ancient India based upon existing traditions, and date roughly from 500 to 200 B.C.,¹ boys belonging to the three upper classes, which classification was at that time well established, were to be initiated through the ceremony of Upanayana as students in the eighth year at the earliest and in the twenty-fourth at the latest from their conceptions. The students who were thus initiated were called Dvija or 'twice-born', or Brahmacārīns, 'those who live a life of celibacy', and their life is Brahmacariya or 'a life of celibacy'. They were called 'twice-born', because,

¹ A. A. Macdonell, A History of Sanskrit Literature, pp. 36, 258.
besides their natural birth, they attained their spiritual birth by means of the Upanayana or initiation. They were then placed under the charge of teachers for periods from twelve to forty-eight years, the former period being considered to be necessary for the complete study of one of the four Vedas. Their chief duties were to study the Vedas, to beg food, to observe strict celibacy, and to live a simple self-restrained life. Day after day they had to recite the Vedas, and to kindle the sacred fire or feed it with fuel, or they might be instructed in the duties of a householder. With the exception of some rules with regard to substances of food, stuffs and colours of clothing, hairdressing, demeanour in public and behaviour towards their spiritual teachers, penance for the breach of rules, and some other rules of minor importance, both Brāhman and Buddhist students have many rules in common. If we were not engaged in discussing only the subject of celibacy, we should have a great deal to say about them. It is, therefore, not too much to say that Buddhism in connexion with the life of a Brahmaçārīn owes much to Brāhmañanism, as it does in some other respects, or that both Brāhmañanism and Buddhism established rules according to the current traditions, or that indebtedness is reciprocal; all these may possibly be the case.

Now let us turn to our subject. According to ancient Indian customs, those belonging to the three upper classes had to pass through the four Āśramañās or orders of life: that of the Brahmaçārīn or Vedic student, that of the Gṛihastha or householder, that of the Vānaprastha (or Vaikhānasa) or hermit, and that of the Sanyāsin (or Bhikṣu) or ascetic. Of these four orders, the first and the fourth were compulsory, while the two middle were optional. In other words, everybody belonging to these
classes so far as he was not an outcaste for some reason had to pass a period of from twelve to forty-eight years as a student under the strict care of a spiritual teacher; and when this time came to an end, he could enter the life of one of the three other orders. (a) He might return home and perform the duties as the master of a house and the father of a family; or (b) he might become a hermit retiring into the woods, living on wild vegetables, flowers, fruits, and roots, wearing clothes made of skins or bark of trees, and practising austerities, sometimes being accompanied by his wife in the case of one who entered this life after he had finished a householder's life; or (c) he might enter into the life of an ascetic immediately after finishing the order of a student, if he considered himself sufficiently purified by his studentship; but in the majority of cases, students at the completion of their term became householders, and after living a householder's life for some years and being blessed with male children, left home to spend their remaining years in celibacy, purity, and holiness. The life of an ancient Brāhman therefore generally speaking was begun in celibacy, which with an interruption of a householder's life was resumed in the life of an ascetic. The Brāhman Brahmacārin corresponds to the Buddhist Sāmaṇera, and the Brāhman Sanyāsin or Bhikṣu to the Buddhist Bhikkhu, if a Brāhman passed at once from studentship to the ascetic life, without any intervention of the householder's life. The name Bhikṣu, corresponding to the Pāli Bhikkhu, which is used in some Dharmasūtras in the same meaning as the word Sanyāsin, reminds us of a close connexion between the two. The difference between Brāhman and Buddhist celibate lives

---

1 Ga. III. 2; Ba. 11, 12.
was that in the former it was compulsory for everybody at the beginning and at the end of his life, while in the middle part of it celibacy was optional; while in the latter celibacy is compulsory only for those who have voluntarily joined the monkhood. As to the other Buddhists or lay people, they are not obliged to observe celibacy, except when they keep the eight precepts on the Uposatha days which come two or three times every lunar month or on some other special occasions. Those who have joined the monkhood are required to observe strict celibacy through life, first as Sāmaṇeras or novices, and later as Bhikkhus or fully qualified monks.

The term Brahmacariya is used in Brāhmaṇism and in Buddhism in nearly the same sense, but not always. Buddhism gives it a peculiar meaning. Putting aside the case of Brāhmaṇism, we shall examine in what senses this term is used in Buddhism. Among several different senses given to it, the following two seem to be the most remarkable. In the first place, it means complete celibacy or total abstinence from sexual intercourse, a vow which the Buddhist monk has to observe through life, and the layman only when he observes the eight precepts on the Uposatha days or on some other special occasions. Unlike the Brāhmaṇ whose celibate life is interrupted by the life of a householder, the Buddhist monk has to be a celibate all through his life. The breach of this vow is the first of the four most serious offences (Pārājikā), the punishment for it being perpetual expulsion from the monkhood. In the Pātimokkha or code of monkish laws, we find twenty-one laws enacted concerning sexual intercourse. Brāhmaṇism and Buddhism both give the same interpretation to celibacy or single life, though its performance, as we have repeatedly said, is different. In
the second place, it means 'a life of perfect holiness or purity' led by those who have entered the Four Paths. This is religious life in its perfect sense; and it seems that this sense is peculiar to Buddhism, as the performance of this culture is peculiar to it. It begins with the practice of self-control or what we may call the preparatory practice of purification in the Four Paths: keeping watch over the senses, being moderate in eating, being vigilant, thoughtful, and conscious. This practice brings praise to the monk Nanda, half brother of the Buddha, for he is commended by the Buddha as skilled in it. The observance of the precepts cannot be overlooked. The precepts in the Pātimokkha are said to be the first part of, and in conformity with, the Brahmacariya or 'life of holiness'. If any one is firm and stable in observing them, and exercises himself in them, taking all upon himself, he will destroy the three bonds: the heresy of individuality, doubt, and erroneous religious practices and rites; and thereby he will enter the First Path. He will then destroy these three bonds and attenuate the three roots of evil, lust, hatred, and ignorance; and thereby enter the Second Path. He will next destroy the five bonds belonging to the lower parts, the heresy of individuality, doubt, erroneous religious practices and rites, lust after life in the Kāma-world, ill-will; and thereby enter the Third Path. Then lastly he will put an end to all the passions, and live, having for himself understood, realized, and attained in this very life to the emancipation of mind and of insight which is free from passion. Arahatship or Nibbāna, which is the final goal of Buddhist culture or Brahmacariya, is thus reached. Brahmacariya has as its

1 A. i. 166.
chief and Nibbāna or Arahatship (A. i. 50, 168; iv. 77; S. ii. 278–9; 284). The expression Čuṣitaṁ brahmācariyaṁ, which we meet with so often, is another name for the accomplishment of Arahatship.

Brahmacariya therefore covers the whole of the religious life of the Buddhist monk, beginning with the observance of the precepts and ending with the attainment of Nibbāna. It is sometimes shown as the complete practice of the Eightfold Noble Path. The destruction of the three roots of evil is the perfection of Brahmacariya (S. v. 7–8, 16), because when these three roots of evil are entirely uprooted, the person will be perfectly purified. This is the goal, the summum bonum of the Buddhist culture. The practiser of Brahmacariya always has this single object before him. He performs it not for the purpose of being reborn in the heavenly world, or for obtaining celestial long life, celestial appearance, celestial pleasure, celestial reputation, or celestial authority. None of these has anything to do with the fulfilment of Brahmacariya (A. i. 115). Sometimes the object is stated as the destruction of five avarices (A. iii. 272), of seven bonds (A. iv. 7), of seven inclinations (A. iv. 9), or of suffering and pain (A. ii. 26; S. ii. 24–5); the abandonment of desire (S. v. 272); or freedom from lust (S. iv. 27); or the realization of the Four Noble Truths (A. iv. 383; S. iv. 51); or simply of the Noble Truth concerning suffering (S. iv. 138, 253; v. 6–7, 272). All of these different expressions, however, refer to one and the same thing, that is, the destruction of mental evil and the attainment of mental enlightenment.

As is clear from the above quotations, Brahmacariya, so far as Pāli Buddhism is concerned, covers the whole of the religious life, from keeping the precepts to obtaining Arahatship. It is the religious life in its
truest sense, though the term is sometimes used loosely to denote the religious or rather celibate life of a Brähman,\(^1\) or the life of an ordinary monk who has not yet entered the holy Paths;\(^2\) consequently it seems to have no connexion with ordinary celibate life, as in Brähman laws. But in further researches we find that celibacy is not absolutely disregarded in Brahmacariya or life of purification. Mention is often made in the Buddhist literature about ‘Brahmacariya which is complete in all its parts and perfectly pure’,\(^3\) or of ‘Brahmacariya which is not broken, not interrupted, not variegated, free from any spot, perfect and pure’.\(^4\) No doubt Brahmacariya means the whole religious life, and not merely the celibate life of the monk. But the Buddha often referred in his discourses on Brahmacariya to the question of celibacy. Among ten sorts of obstacles, he mentions association with a woman as an obstacle to Brahmacariya (A. v. 134). Once while travelling with his disciples he saw a great fire burning. Pointing to it, he asked them which would be better for a person of loose morals, to embrace that great mass of blazing fire or to embrace a beautiful young woman. The disciples naturally answered that the latter would be the better, because the former would be hard and painful. The Buddha, however, denied it and said that the former would be better, because it might cause his death or give him as great pain as death itself, but it would not send him to hell after death, as the latter might possibly do. This sermon reminds us of Jesus preaching on sin when he said: ‘It is better for thee to enter into life halt or maimed, rather than having two hands or two feet to be cast into everlasting fire’.\(^5\) It is

---

\(^1\) A. iii. 224; iv. 35, 136–7.

\(^2\) e.g. A. iii. 90, 96.

\(^3\) A. iii. 4; iv. 861.

\(^4\) A. iv. 54.

\(^5\) Mat. xviii. 8; Mk. ix. 45.
noteworthy that in both cases the moral is the same. In another place the Buddha says: 'A Samāna or Brāhman, who declares himself to be a person of perfect Brahmacariya, may not enjoy sexual intercourse with a woman; but this is not enough to warrant such a declaration, for (a) if he allows a woman to rub his body with oil or perfume, to give him a bath and shampoo him, and enjoys and longs for it; (b) if he laughs, sports, or amuses himself with a woman; (c) if he looks into, watches with expectation, the eye of a woman who does the same in return; (d) if he listens through a wall or fence to the noise of a woman who is laughing, reciting, singing, or weeping; (e) if he remembers that he has formerly laughed, talked, and sported together with a woman; (f) if he sees a householder or a householder's son in possession of five sorts of pleasure, and being attended (by a woman); (g) or if he practises Brahmacariya desiring to join a certain class of celestial beings, saying "Through this morality, religious practice, austerity, or through Brahmacariya, I shall be a certain celestial being, I shall be one of the celestial beings"; such Brahmacariya cannot be called unbroken, uninterrupted, unvaried, unadulterated, perfect and pure Brahmacariya'.¹ So it is quite clear that though mere celibacy is not all that Brahmacariya means, it is an important element of it.

Whatever meanings the term Brahmacariya may convey, celibacy is an important part of it, and it is to be strictly observed through life by any monk or novice who has joined the Buddhist brotherhood. The punishment for its breach, as we have stated, is expulsion, the severest punishment for a monk, only comparable to excommunication in the ancient Christian Church, or to being made

¹ A. iv. 54-5.
an outcaste in the ancient Brähman community. The Buddha established such an institution, partly because, as in other cases of similar nature, he was influenced by the state of things in his days. Ancient Indians, extremely given to debauchery as they were, were on the other hand stringently austere in the matter of sexual enjoyment, and of eating and drinking as well. The Buddha condemned debauchery on the one hand, but at the same time he disapproved of the severe austerity then practised. He recommended celibacy only to those who voluntarily took up a life of homelessness and who aspired after a higher nobler life through religious practice. Celibacy is the sacrifice of the greatest sensual pleasure, and can be attained only through powerful self-restraint. The monks are said to live a celibate life 'for the sake of restraint of the five organs of sensation, abandonment of evils, freedom from human passions, and destruction (of the craving for existence)'.

Why is celibacy regarded so highly in Buddhism? What is its morality? it may be asked. In the first place pleasures which are enjoyed through the sense-organs are always regarded in Buddhism as mean and detestable, and the greatest of these perhaps is pleasure obtained from sexual relation whether physical or mental. This is the basest pleasure, so those who conquer it may be looked upon as noble respectable persons. It was certainly this psychology that produced the high esteem of persons of self-restraint. Reproductive instinct with appetite is the most powerful instinct that human beings are naturally endowed with. Great strength is needed to restrain it, and therefore those who do so are looked upon as persons of great strength. Great strength,

1 A. ii. 26; It. 35, 36.
whether physical or mental, is an indication of great personality. A man who controls sexual enjoyment is therefore a noble and strong man. Ancient religions as a general rule regarded the renunciation of sexual pleasure as one of the most praiseworthy human actions. Whether this renunciation was ascribed to the self-control of a religious man or to the power of a merciful God or gods who are supposed to act upon him as the result of his devotion, they esteemed him very highly. Reproductive instinct was symbolized or idolized in many ancient religions; but at the same time total abstinence from it was applauded in many of them; and this symbolization and absolute suppression often went on at the same time among the same religious people and in the same nation.

The ancient Indians were extremely addicted to debauchery on the one hand, but on the other they regarded its absolute suppression as the end of high religious culture; or some mystic power was expected to come out of it. The Buddha in his inaugurating sermon referred to this when he said: 'These two extremes, O monks, are not to be practised by one who has given up the world. What are the two? The one, devotion to lusts and pleasures, base, sensual, vulgar, ignoble, and useless, and the other, devotion to self-mortification, painful, ignoble, and useless. By avoiding these two extremes, O monks, the Tathāgata has gained perfect knowledge of the middle path, which produces insight and knowledge, and conduces to tranquillity, to transcendent knowledge, to complete enlightenment, to Nibbāna. What is this middle path, O monks? It is the Noble Eightfold Path.'

He was disgusted with the sensual indulgence which

1 S. v. 421.
was going on in India at that time, but on the other hand he could not approve of the severe austere life, which was taken up by some religious people, probably as a reaction from the sort of life which we have mentioned first, and which still remains even to-day in some degree. Hence his declaration of following the middle path between the two extremes, as is very well known to everybody. In spite of this, however, he could not keep from inclining—especially as the founder of a religion of strict self-control—to follow the rigorous side of his moral culture. His middle way, by which he intends to show us the mean between the two extremes, indulging exuberant pleasure and leading the severe ascetic life of self-mortification, is still tinged with the colour of asceticism,¹ though of a mild nature. The absolute suppression of the reproductive instinct throughout life is thus made one of the main conditions of the Buddhist discipline. Certainly the Buddha in establishing this institution of celibate life, and his disciples in following it, do not crave after reputation for greatness or nobility of character. 'This celibate life is not led, O monks,' says the Buddha, 'either on purpose to deceive people, or on purpose to be talked of by people, or for the profit of gain, respect, and praise, or for the sake of being gossipped about, or to secure popular recognition.'² In this connexion we may say this much: The Buddha

¹ The Pali term expressing asceticism is Tapo, which means 'burning' or 'consuming by heat'. It may therefore be understood to mean zeal, earnestness, feverish exertion, like burning fire; torture, torment, or mortification, as if it is caused by burning fire, or something which burns evils; and it is in this last sense that the Buddhist Tapo is generally interpreted. Asceticism, so far as Buddhism is concerned, is merely self-control. Paramatthajotika, II. 1, p. 145.

² A. ii. 26; It. 85, 86.
established this rule partly in conformity with the ideas which were current in his days; because this was a common practice among the Brāhmans and other religious men. To cut off the strongest human bond, or to suppress the meanest human desire, is the most significant preliminary to a course of religious life where vigorous mental struggle is needed. This will put an end to affection, passion, lust, infatuation, mental distraction or perturbation, &c., which may be expected to come out of sexual relation, and are fatally detrimental to higher mental culture. And this suppression will be a reliable testimony to its attainment.

In the second place, single life is more convenient for the accomplishment of a task which will engage any one through life. The maintenance of a family is a heavy burden, under the load of which few people are able to stand and devote themselves to their life’s work. Many shipwrecks of mankind are due to this overload. Even if the issue is not so grave, still much of human inertness is ascribable to this cause. In the field of spiritual works this burden is especially felt, and it is natural that those who have spiritual inclinations should take up a life of homelessness. Here the practice of celibacy will have double meaning, deliverance from worldliness, on the one hand, if not from the sensual indulgence of the world, and the adoption of a life of homelessness on the other.

The Buddha, who had spent his youth in luxury and indulgence in some measure, according to the general custom of noble people in his days, having seen the harmfulness of such a life to individuals and society at large, established an order of monks who would give up family life of their own accord and make efforts for personal deliverance and social enlightenment. It ought
to be borne in mind that this is compulsory for those who have joined the brotherhood of their own free will, and as for the rest, they are entitled to call themselves Buddhists if they lead a life of chastity so far as sexual relation is concerned.

Chastity is a virtue included in the five precepts which are incumbent upon all lay Buddhists to keep. The continency of the married is considered as important as the single life of the unmarried. The unchaste life of the married man is absolutely repudiated as unbecoming for a Buddhist. In describing the chaste life of the ancient Brāhmaṇa, which is vividly contrasted with that of the Brāhmaṇa of the Buddha’s days, he says as follows: ‘The Brāhmaṇs did not marry a woman belonging to another caste, nor did they buy a wife; they chose living together in mutual love after having come together. . . . They praised chastity and virtue, rectitude, mildness, penance, tenderness, compassion, and patience’.\(^1\) Or we may mention the following verse as a warning against a husband’s faithlessness: ‘Let the wise man avoid an unchaste life as a burning heap of coals; not being able to live a life of chastity,\(^2\) let him not transgress with another man’s wife.’\(^3\)

About the mutual duties of husband and wife we find good moral teaching in the Singālovādasuttanta.\(^4\) In the first place, about the duties of a husband towards his wife, the Buddha says: ‘The husband ought to minister to his wife as western direction through the five ways: by honour, by respect, by chastity, by the abandonment of supreme authority, by the gift of ornaments. And about the duties of a wife to her husband

\(^1\) Sn. 289–2.  
\(^2\) i.e., a life of celibacy or single life.  
\(^3\) Sn. 395.  
\(^4\) D. iii. 180–93.
he says: 'The wife being regarded as the western direction through these five ways, sympathizes with her husband through five ways: she arranges his business well, she treats his attendants with kindness, she is devoted to him, she protects what has been accumulated, and she is skilful and diligent in all his works or duties.' The Buddha says nothing here about love between husband and wife; perhaps taking it as natural he thinks it unnecessary to say anything about it. Perhaps he means to say that the husband must not only love his wife, but also honour and respect her, and be courteous and faithful to her, and hand over authority to her. The wife on her side must be faithful to her husband, hospitable to her own and his relatives, and help him in conducting his business. Thus in the Buddhist home the wife is the queen. While the husband works away from home, the wife rules the home, all domestic business being laid upon her shoulders. About the duties of a man as the master of a family, the Buddha says: 'Waiting on mother and father, protecting child and wife, and being engaged in a quiet calling, this is the highest blessing.' The domestic relations and blissful conditions in the Buddhist home are depicted in this simple verse. If a man is dutiful to his parents, and faithful and affectionate to his wife and child, and protects them, the family life which these people lead among themselves will be a very peaceful and happy one; there will be nothing more to be desired. And the village or the clan which these families compose will be very pleasant to live in.

The Buddha once delivered a sermon for Sujātā, Sudatta's daughter-in-law, who being proud of her

---

1 SBB. iv. 181–2.  
2 Sn. 262.  
3 A. iv. 91–4.
birth and beauty, was not obedient to her husband and parents-in-law. In the course of the sermon he mentioned seven sorts of wives: a murderer-like wife, a thief-like one, a master-like one, a mother-like one, a sister-like one, a friend-like one, and a servant-like one. He asked Sujata what sort of wife she wished to be. Being softened in her heart by his sermon, she replied that she would be a servant-like wife. This does not mean that a servant-like wife is the Buddha's ideal wife. Her wish to be a servant-like wife was only an expression of her mind, which was humbled as the result of the preaching. The Buddha again says that husband and wife, both of whom observe the five precepts or perform the ten meritorious deeds, are a god and goddess, and those who do not observe them, or do not perform them, are a couple of vile persons.

The most pathetic episodes that we find in the Buddhist literature in this connexion, however, are those of Maddi, wife of Vessantara, and of Ummadantī, especially that of the latter. Ummadantī was the beautiful daughter of a rich townsman living in the capital of the Sibi country. The king, a Bodhisatta or a previous incarnation of the Buddha, wishing to marry her, sent for some Brāhmans and told them to observe her future. Enchanted by her splendid beauty, they spoke unfavourably of her to the king. The king therefore gave up the intention of marrying her, and she married an officer in the king's service. Later, while driving through the town on a festival day, the king happened to see her, and fell into passionate love with her. This fact soon came to the notice of the husband,
who out of loyalty, because the story tells us that he thought the king would die out of disappointment if he could not get her for his wife (Jāt. v. 217), proposed to the king to offer his wife to be queen. The king, though indeed vehemently infatuated with the beauty of the woman, was still able to discriminate virtue and vice in this connexion, and owing to his strong attachment to the path of virtue, he refused to accept this unusual offer; and when he was pressed by the officer repeatedly, he reasoned with him in the following words: ‘One who by exceeding his attachment to my person does not heed even his own life is my friend, dearer to me than my kinsmen. His wife I am bound to respect as a friend’s. You do not well, therefore, enticing me to a sinful action. . . . How can happiness be expected for him who commits a wicked action, though un-witnessed? . . . I should dare throw myself on a sharp sword or into a fire with blazing flames, but I shall not be able to offend against righteousness, which I have always observed, and to which I owe my royal bliss. . . . The virtuous do not like for themselves a pleasure procured at the expense of others whom they have distressed by bringing them into disrepute and the like. . . . If I should lack the power of ruling my own self, say, into what condition would I bring this people who long for protection from my side? Thus considering and regardful of the good of my subjects, my own righteousness, and my spotless fame, I do not allow myself to submit to my passion.’

Finally the officer was dissuaded, and ceased to press the king to accept his wife, with which the dramatic story comes to an end. The

1 These quotations are all taken from the translation of the Jatakamāla, SBB. i, pp. 120-3.
respect for another's chastity and the idea of righteousness made the king, who was sick with love, rightly refuse to accept this offer.

Scanty as the materials are for proving the Buddha's attitude towards the questions which we have dealt with above, it is beyond doubt that he regards the continency of the married as important as any other teacher does. The question how the Buddha regards womanhood in general we may discuss later on. An interesting and at the same time difficult question will be: Does the Buddha approve of polygamy, which was a common practice in India and China in the Buddha's days? Brahmanism approves of it. According to the ancient Brāhman codes of laws\(^1\) the Brāhman is entitled to marry three wives, the Kṣatriya two, and the Vaiśya and the Śūdra each one. Confucianism also approves of it, allowing the feudal prince to marry nine wives including the chief one.\(^2\) We find it very hard to understand the Buddha's ideas about this, from lack of discourses dealing fully with this subject. But we infer, though not conclusively, from fragmentary sayings appearing here and there, that the Buddhā approves of monogamy, but not of polygamy. It is true that on several occasions cases of polygamy and even of polyandry are mentioned as existing in society at that time, but only as instances of wantonness and lewdness. Even the harems of kings,

\(^1\) Va. I. 24; Manu III. 13; but according to Manu III. 29, the Brāhman may marry six wives, the Kṣatriya four, the Vaiśya and the Śūdra each one; and according to the Institutes of Vishṇu, XXIV. 1–4, the Brahman four, the Kṣatriya three, the Vaiśya two, and the Śūdra one.

\(^2\) SBE. xvi. 183 ff. note. Both the Brāhman and the Chinese are under the necessity of obtaining male descendants. 'A Brāhman needs his wife in obtaining offspring'; A. iii. 226.
which were so common in ancient India, are often mentioned as seats of intrigue.\(^1\) In the Aṅguttara (i. 137) we find the wanton life of a householder with four wives depicted. He lives in a comfortable house furnished and decorated. He is attended by four women, who serve and comfort him in every possible way. The description is naturally directed towards the mental and bodily suffering and pain which the householder experiences, and the wretchedness of this sort of life is emphatically described. In two other places of the same Nikāya (iv. 210, 214) we read that the householder Ugga, a Vesāli-man, whom the Buddha praises as a person with eight wonders, had four wives around him previous to his conversion. He gave them all up at the moment of his conversion, which he declares a wonder. In the Kunāla-jātaka, princess Kaṁhā marries the five princes of King Paṇḍu. Being not satisfied with them, she sins with her hump-backed crippled attendant. The five princes, knowing the faithlessness of the princess, give her up, and go into the forest to lead a retired life there.\(^2\) The harem of a king is often mentioned. The queen, who is commonly expressed by the term aggamakṣī or ‘chief consort of a king’, seems to have been their leader. Pasenadi, the king of Kosala,\(^3\) Udāna, the king of Vaṁsas,\(^4\) &c., seem each to have had a group of this sort of woman. Among legendary kings, Sudassana\(^5\) is said to have had 84,000 wives; the harems of Prince Sīlāvā,\(^6\) King Brahmadatta,\(^7\) King Kalābu of Kāsi\(^8\) are also mentioned. We have called them harems, but

\(^1\) Jat. i. 262; ii. 125, 206; iii. 18, 168.  
\(^2\) Jat. v. 425–7.  
\(^3\) Jat. i. 381; ii. 206.  
\(^4\) Com. on Dh. i. 162 ff.  
\(^5\) Jat. i. 392; D. ii. 187.  
\(^6\) Jat. i. 262.  
\(^7\) Jat. ii. 125; iii. 168.  
\(^8\) Jat. iii. 40.
their real nature and position being rather dubious, whether in the case of an actual king or a legendary one, we cannot be too strict in moral criticism in connexion with them. In many cases it seems that a harem is simply mentioned as a necessary accompaniment of a king. We certainly cannot deny their existence, and it is true that we never hear of any king who abolished this system as a result of his conversion into Buddhism; but their co-existence with Buddhist faith will not do any discredit to it. On the other hand, we hear the Buddha preaching about the mutual duties of husband and wife to a young man Sigāla, as we have already quoted. Now a husband is told to honour and respect his wife; to be courteous and faithful to her; to hand over authority to her; and to provide her with ornaments. We can be assured of conjugal harmony existing in such a union. How can a husband who is faithful in observing these duties be other than a monogamist? The wife is said to be the best friend that one has.¹ Satisfaction with a single wife is always mentioned as a praiseworthy moral virtue.² ‘Let him not share a wife with another,’³ says the Buddha. Thus polygamy as well as polyandry is rejected as mean and vicious. In mentioning the virtuous married life of the ancient Brāhmans, the Buddha says that they did not marry a woman belonging to another caste, that they did not buy a wife, and that they chose living together in mutual love after having come together.⁴ In describing the blissful condition of family life he mentions waiting on mother and father, protecting child and wife, and a quiet calling.⁵

¹ S. i. 87. ² Sakadārena santuṭṭho. ³ Jāt. vi. 286–7. ⁴ Sn. 290. ⁵ Sn. 262.
In these descriptions we can recollect only the happy union of a single man and a single woman. Though the authorities are rather fragmentary and scanty, we believe that what the Buddha always had in his mind was strict monogamy.
XI

PURITY, PURIFICATION


Every religion has some tenets in connexion with purity and impurity, laying greater or less stress upon them in its own way. Zarathushtrianism regards purity as the greatest good for man next to his life. Brāhmanism regards it as highly as Zarathushtrianism, and so do also many other religions. But if we investigate what these religions mean by purity and impurity, we shall find that they often differ widely. Zarathushtrianism, as we have already stated, regards 'purity and holiness as the first object of man, the greatest good, next to his life'. These very words are found in several places in the Vendīdād, a part of the Zend-Avesta, the holy scripture of that religion. And in spite of J. Darmesteter's assertion that 'purity and impurity have not in the Vendidād the exclusive spiritual meaning which they
have in our languages', we may say we find in it moral and religious sentiments relating to purity and impurity, expressed in many places. 'Holiness is the best of all good. Well is it for it, well is it for that holiness which is the perfection of holiness'; and when we hear the holy Ahura Mazda tell the holy Zarathustra, 'Purity is for man, next to life; the greatest good, that purity, O Zarathustra, which is in the religion of Mazda for him who cleanses his own self with good thoughts, words, and deeds', we may say that he sees moral and religious perfection in perfect purity and holiness of heart and mind. The man who has perfectly purified his own self with good thoughts, good words, and good deeds is the perfect man from a moral point of view. And this is indeed what Pāli Buddhism strives to bring into prominence.

The case is quite different with Brāhmanism, which it seems expounds purity and impurity chiefly as physical and in rare cases psychological defilements. It lays great stress upon external purity and impurity, and the process of purification which it prescribes is generally ceremonial. According to its tenets, which are set forth in the Brāhman law books, birth and death are always regarded as impure things. Child-birth will cause the impurity of the parents or the mother of the child alone for some days; and it is forbidden for any one to take food in a house where there is a lying-in woman; and if

1 SBE. iv, p. lxxii. 2 SBE. xxiii, pp. 22, 30, 34, 39, &c.
3 SBE. iv, p. 55.
4 This and the explanations following are all founded upon the records of the Brāhman law books, which are included in the Sacred Books of the East (vols. ii, xiv, xxv, xxix, xxx); but we have omitted mentioning the source of each quotation except in special cases.
any one touches a woman in her confinement, he will have to bathe with his clothes on, in order to get rid of the defilement. Death was equally regarded as impure. The death of a person will cause impurity of the Sapinḍas for a period ranging from ten days and nights to a month, according to difference of caste, but not according to the degree of relation between the dead and mourners as we might expect. During these periods they are forbidden to have intercourse with other people lest these should be defiled by it. Impurity will be caused even by the death of a relative by marriage, a teacher, a sub-teacher, a pupil, a Śrotiṣya, a fellow-student, &c. No one shall eat in the house of a dead relative before the days of impurity have elapsed, or in a house where there is a corpse. If any one carries out a corpse, impurity will last for ten days, or if he touches, buries, cremates, or follows a corpse, he shall bathe with his clothes on. The dog seems to be regarded as a specially unclean animal, because it is recorded in the law books that if any one touches it, he shall bathe dressed in his clothes, or at least he must wash that part of the body, touch it with fire, and wash it again, as well as his feet, and sip water. Food becomes impure if it is touched by a dog, the hem of a garment, or by any impure person or thing, or if there is a hair, an insect, or any other unclean substance in it. Among human beings, besides members of the Śūdra caste, an outcaste, a Caṇḍāla, a woman in her confinement, or in her courses, one who sells the Vedas, all of these are

1 Kinsmen connected by the offering of the Piṇḍa or a ball of rice flour, &c., to the Manes, and ancestors and descendants comprising seven generations including oneself.

2 'He who, observing the law, has studied one recension of the four Vedas, is called a Śrotiṣya.' SBE. ii. 114, note 4.
considered to be unclean; and if any one touches them or even touches one who has touched them, he must go through the same penance as one who touches a dog, a corpse, a sacrificial post, a funeral pile, or other unclean thing. A rather curious case is this, if any one raises his empty hands in order to scare birds, he becomes impure and shall wash his hands.¹

So far we have enumerated cases which cause a man to become impure from a Brāhmanical point of view. And we shall now briefly deal with how he may be purified from these defilements. In the law books we find several means of purification recorded, but one which is most frequently referred to is sipping water—pure water which has been collected on the ground, and which, according to a commentator, a cow will drink ² or has drunk from. The impure person becomes pure when he of his own accord sips pure water, or when somebody else who is pure causes him to sip it. About sipping water a lengthy explanation is given in Āpastamba, I. 16, and Gautama, I. 28–45. In some cases he may merely touch water for the purpose of purifying himself; or if he fails to find pure water, he may touch moist cowdung, wet herbs, or moist earth.³ Bathing is also referred to on many occasions. Water thus forms a principal medium in the Brāhmanical practice of purification, for we find in Vāsiṣṭha, III. 60: 'The body is purified by water, the internal organ by truth, the soul (Bhūtātman) by sacred learning and austerities, and the

¹ Āp. I. 15, 7. ² Āp. I. 15, 2; Manu V. 128. ³ In A. v. 263 we find six means of purification mentioned: (a) touching earth, (b) touching moist cowdung, (c) touching green grass, (d) attending on sacred fire, (e) worshipping the sun with folded hands, and (f) entering water for bathing three times a day.
understanding (Buddhi) by knowledge. In Vāsiṣṭha, III. 58, it is said: ‘A woman is purified by her monthly discharge, a river by its current, brass by being scorched with ashes, and an earthen vessel by another burning’. The most gruesome case of purification is perhaps that of a drinker, to which we have already referred, because it is said: ‘They shall pour hot spirituous liquor into the mouth of a Brāhmaṇ who has drunk such liquor; he will be purified after death’ (Ga. XXIII. 1; Āp. 1. 25, 3).

Impurity, purity, and purification, whether in connexion with a person or a thing, have thus merely a physical external import. In some few cases acts of purity may be regarded as good or reasonable from a hygienic point of view: e.g. food which contains a hair, an insect, excrements or limbs of rats, or which is touched by a dog, the hem of a garment, or by an unclean person or substance, is looked upon as impure; if a man is bitten by a worm, he has to bathe on three successive days and drink a mixture of cow’s urine, cow dung, milk, sour milk, butter, and water boiled with Kuśa grass. These and some other cases of a similar nature may be regarded as due to hygienic reasons, though we are not sure if the mixture above mentioned is efficacious for worm-bites or not. Sipping or touching water, washing hands, bathing, obviously have no connexion with hygienics, because it is hardly conceivable that one who has touched a seller of the Vedas, a sacrificial post, a funeral pile, an outcaste, a Caṇḍāla, &c., can be cleansed from the defilement by bathing dressed in his clothes. Unless we understand it as meaning that these people are spiritually corrupted for some reason and the process

1 Manu, V. 109.
of bathing is the symbol of purifying the spiritual defilement caused through touching them, we shall find no moral in it at all.

But these are not all the Brāhmanical tenets of purity and impurity which we cannot be satisfied with. There is something more to be said about them. According to its teaching, if a man plunges into a river, any river, but especially the Ganges, the water of which is believed to be the purest, and mutters the hymn of Aghanarṣaṇa or 'sin-effacing' three times for three successive days, however hideous his sin may be, he will be cleansed from all of it. This hymn runs as follows: 'Yathāsvamedhah kraturat sarvapāpapanodanah, tathāghanarṣaṇam sūktam sarvapāpapraṇaṣānam' (as the horse-sacrifice, king of ceremonies, is a dissipator of all sins, so the hymn 'sin-effacing' is a dissipator of all sins).¹ He may murder a Brāhman, who is always regarded as a holy personage, so long as he has not committed any sin which causes him to lose his caste; he may drink spirituous liquor, which, as we have already stated, is a hideous act threatening the loss of his caste or life; he may steal gold; he may violate his spiritual teacher's bed; or he may commit the most heinous sorts of crimes; still if he resorts to this means, he is assured of being cleansed from all his sin. No one who attaches any importance to morality will consider such a doctrine as passable from a moral point of view. Brāhmanism is truly a religion of non- or super-morality. In its rites of purity and impurity we find their meanings mainly materialistic or merely ceremonial. Bodily stains, psychological weakness, legal crime, moral guilt, and religious sin, all are confused

¹ Rig-veda, X. 190; Ba. IV. 2, 15; Va. XXVI. 8; Ga. XXIV. 10–12; Manu, XI. 260–1.
together, and it is believed that spiritual sins as well as physical stains may equally be obliterated by means of bathing, washing hands, or sipping water. As Dr. J. Darmesteter says about Zarathushrianism, in Brāhmanism the terms purity and impurity 'do not refer to an inward state of the soul, but chiefly to a physical state of the body.'¹ Dr. Hopkins rightly says: 'There is very little teaching of personal purity in the Veda, and the poet who hopes for a heaven where he is to find "longing women", "desire and its fulfilment", has in mind, in all probability, purely impure delights. It is not to be assumed that the earlier morality surpassed that of the later day, when, even in the epic, the hero's really desired heaven is one of drunkenness and women ad libitum'.² As is the case with the morality of Vedic literature, so is it with that of the literatures of later days. It is true that we find some stray references here and there to purity and impurity with spiritual meanings. As we have already quoted: 'The internal organs are purified by truth, the soul by sacred learning and austerities, and so on';³ or 'In pure nourishment there is a pure nature';⁴ or

He, however, who has not understanding,
Who is unmindful and ever impure,
Reaches not the goal,
But goes on to transmigration.
He, however, who has understanding,
Who is mindful and ever pure,
Reaches the goal
From which he is born no more.⁵

¹ SBE. iv, p. lxxii.
² The Religions of India, p. 148.
³ Va. III. 60.
⁴ Chāndogya-Up. 7, 26; Hume, p. 262; SBE. i. 125.
⁵ Kaṭhā-Up. 8, 7–8; Hume, p. 352; SBE. xv. 13.
But the general tone is mainly materialistic and ceremonial, and we shall not find spiritual or moral meanings given to them until we come to early Buddhism.

The Buddhist ideas of purity and purification differ much from those of Brāhmanism. They are entirely spiritual, and naturally richer in ethical character. Purity, perfect purity, is the final end of Buddhist culture, and purification is nothing but the process necessary to reach this goal.¹ The process of Buddhist culture is a series of purifications in thought, speech, and deed, and when it is complete, the end has been attained. In this condition which is commonly known as Nibbāna all mental defilements are removed, and as a result spiritual enlightenment is acquired. The Buddha himself reached this condition by means of strenuous efforts, and so did his disciples who are commonly known as Arahans. Spiritual enlightenment, whether of the Buddha or of the Arahana, is acquired at the moment when all mental defilements are removed. All our efforts must be directed to this final condition. The Buddha² tells us how he attained supreme purity after ‘developing morality, concentration of mind, and wisdom, the paths of enlightenment’. Kassapa of Gayā³ declares: ‘I have cleansed myself of all my sins; I am stainless, pure and clean. As a pure being, I am heir to a pure one; I am the Buddha’s own son.’ ‘A man may be a warrior, a priest, a commoner, a slave, or an outcast, but if he is energetic, intent, and always making strenuous exertions, he will attain to the Supreme Purity.’⁴ These are only a few of many

¹ S. i. 103; cf. 169, 183; iv. 372.
² S. i. 108.
³ Tha. 348.
⁴ S. i. 166; Kindred Sayings, i. 207.
examples in which Nibbāna is given as the supreme purity attainable after vigorous efforts.\(^1\)

We have said that the Brāhmanic ideas of purity and purification are as a whole materialistic, ceremonial, and non- or super-moral. The Buddha himself has often referred to them in his discourses as different from his own ideas. The Brāhman Saṅgārāva was in the habit of bathing morning and evening, supposing that he could be cleansed from the sin which he committed during the daytime by the evening bathing, and from the sin which he committed during the night by the morning bathing. The Buddha pointing out his fault said:

Righteousness is a lake, with virtue as its strand for bathing, Clear, undefiled, praised by the good to good men, Wherein in sooth masters of lore come bathing. So, clean of limb, to the beyond pass over.\(^2\)

A doctrine to the same effect was taught at Gayā, where ascetics with matted hair (jaṭila) used to bathe in the river in the night during the cold season, with the hope that they would thereby be cleansed from their sins. The Buddha told them in verse that this idea was wrong, and that they would be purified only by means of truth and righteousness.\(^3\)

The nun Puṇṇikā, seeing a Brāhman who believed that he could be purified by bathing in a river, asked him what was the merit of bathing. He told her that that was the way of purification from sin. The nun laughed at the idea, saying that if water was able to

\(^1\) The Visuddhimagga, p. 2: ‘Here the term purity is to be understood to mean Nibbāna which is perfectly free from all impurity, and which is exceedingly pure.’

\(^2\) S. i. 182; Kindred Sayings, i. pp. 232-3.

\(^3\) Vin. i. 81, 82; Ud. 9.
cleanse a being from his sin, frogs, tortoises, snakes, crocodiles, and other aquatics would be free from any sin, and naturally go to heaven. Butchers, says she further, fishers, hunters, thieves, murderers, and other sinful people might bathe in the river and get rid of their sin. The way of escape from suffering and pain was not bathing, but rather taking refuge in the Buddha, the Teaching and the Order, the observance of the Precepts, and avoidance of any sinful action. The Brähman was dissuaded from his wrong idea and became a nhātaka or completely cleansed.¹

In a sutta² which we have already quoted, a potter’s son called Cunda mentions five ways of purification which the Brähman practises. The Buddha, after patiently listening to his detailed explanation of them, discourses on the way of purification which he declares is taught in the ‘discipline of the Noble One’ or Buddhism. It consists in abstinence from the ten sinful actions, three in the body, four in the mouth, and three in the mind, and the practice of the reverse. Thus we may safely say that the Buddhistic ideas of purity and purification are far more spiritual and moral than the Brähmanic.

How the idea of the possibility of purification through the agency of water arose is quite intelligible, as everything becomes pure when it is washed with water. Water is perhaps the first thing that anybody will think of as a means of purification. Such an idea may be primitive, but the practice still remains in various forms among both uncivilized and civilized people.

Fire is another medium employed by the ancient Brähman. (a) It burns and consumes everything, thereby purifying it; or (b) it gives us light and warmth as

¹ Thi. 236–51; cf. Sn. 521. ² A. v. 263–8; cf. ante, p. 162.².
fire on earth, as lightning in the air, and as the sun in the heaven, because, according to the ideas of the Vedic poets, these last two are fire only in different forms. The idea of its power as a purifier comes from these two aspects. But the Buddha, refuting the idea, said 'Do not, O Brāhmaṇ, take burning wood for a means of purification, for it is but external. One may wish for purity through an external way. The wise, however, do not call it purity. Having rejected burning wood, O Brāhmaṇ, I light a lamp within me. Being constantly on fire, and constantly calming myself, I as Arahaṇ perform religious practice.'

Anāgārika Bhāravadāja, a converted Brāhmaṇ, telling his experience as a fire-worshipper, says: 'Seeking for eternal purity, I attended upon sacred fire in the forest; and without knowing the way leading to purity, I practised austerities for heaven.'

Nādiyasāpāṇa also says the same thing: 'I offered various sorts of sacrifices and fed sacred fire; blind and worldly as I was, I thought this was the way of purity.'

Asceticism was also considered to bring about purification. Fasting, for instance, was practised by ascetics, evidently for this purpose. The Buddha himself practised it. He tells Sāriputta his experiences in his struggle for the attainment of purity. The Buddha tells this as one instance of the useless efforts which he made in his past days. We shall quote a few passages from the discourse in his own words: 'There are, O Sāriputta, some Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇs who declare and teach that purification is possible by means of food. They say, we shall live on a jujube fruit (every day); and they eat a jujube fruit, eat it powdered, drink its juice, and enjoy every eatable thing made from a jujube. I remember, O Sāriputta, I

1 S. i. 169; cf. M. i. 82.  
2 Tha. 219.  
3 Tha. 341.
also used to live on a jujube fruit (every day). Some may, however, think, O Sāriputta, that a jujube fruit might be larger than it is now. It ought not to be thought so. The jujube fruit was then of just the same size as it is now. While I took a single jujube fruit for my daily food, O Sariputta, my body became extremely lean.'

The attenuation of the physical body as a result of fasting must appear holy in the eyes of the religious Indians. They believe, as an ascetic of any religion does, that if the body is mortified through asceticism the spirit will become pure and holy. This means for them the defeat of the flesh and the conquest of spirit.

In the discourse just quoted, we find eight means of purification mentioned: (a) burning wood, i.e. attending on sacred fire, (b) taking a small quantity of food or extreme fast, (c) passing through the round of rebirths, (d) individual rebirth, (e) residence in some sphere of the world, (f) sacrifice, (g) being a king or (h) a Brāhman, all of which are rejected by the Buddha as vain. Fire-ritual with sacrifice and austerity is always repudiated in Buddhism as of no moral and religious value. It is said in the Dhammapada (verse 107) that paying homage to a wise man for a moment is better than worshipp ing fire in the forest for a hundred years. And in the next verse (108) we find the same thing said about sacrifice. Even austerity, on which Brāhmanism lays such great stress, has no intrinsic value in the Buddha's teaching.

We come now to consider purity and purification in wider senses. Purity, which is commonly expressed by the words suddhi, visuddhi, pārisuddhi, pariyodāta, &c., means not merely freedom from stain, depravity, or other evils, or blamelessness, faultlessness, sinlessness;

1 Mahāsihanādasutta, M. i. 80.
but also goodness, justice, worthiness, completeness, and holiness; even the sentiment of beauty is not lacking in it. Any person or thing, who has value from the Buddhist moral or religious point of view, or who has one of these various attributes, is said to be *suddha*, *visuddha*, or pure. The threefold training,\(^1\) morality, concentration of mind, and wisdom; the three holy objects, the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Saṅgha; the Eightfold Noble Path, right view, right thought, right speech, &c., are said to be pure. The Tathāgata, the Brāhmaṇa in the truest sense, a disciple of the Buddha, and any person of good or right conduct, are also said to be pure; alms are said to be pure when the giver and receiver are pure;\(^2\) and Nibbāna, the highest mental attainment of the human being, is called *paramaviśuddhi*, or the supreme purity.\(^3\) In other words, persons or things are *visuddha*, or pure, if they are wholly or partly good, right, or worthy from the Buddhist point of view. Or we may say, whoever or whatever is regarded as good, right, or worthy in Buddhism ought to be pure as his or its first condition. These persons or things are looked upon as pure, viewed from different standpoints, but still all of them have one common import, or one common aim and end. That is to say, they always have Nibbāna in view, whether it is possible to reach it or not, according to circumstances. All efforts that the Buddhist makes in his high mental culture are nothing but a process of purification, with Nibbāna, the supreme purity, as its

\(^1\) Or this is shown as the way for attaining the supreme purity or Nibbāna, S. i. 103.

\(^2\) A. ii. 80–1.

\(^3\) S. i. 108, 166; M. i. 147–51. The Buddha is a seer of the supreme purity, Sn. 693.
goal. Some good, right, or holy actions or conditions have value by themselves, while others are valuable only as means of attaining to higher conditions, perhaps to the supreme purity. In any case, purity in its wide sense is regarded as the most important attribute in these actions or conditions. Nibbāna is the highest purity, and the process which is adopted in reaching it is wholly or partly pure.

This relation, according to the Rathavinītasutta,\(^1\) was once discussed between the Buddha’s two prominent disciples, Sāriputta and Puṇṇa. The latter explained to the former that perfect Nibbāna without attachment (an-upādāna) is attained through seven stages of purification: purification of (a) conduct, (b) heart, or (c) view; purification in consequence of (d) the abandonment of doubt, purification of (e) knowledge and insight concerning the right and wrong courses, of (f) knowledge and insight concerning the right path, and of (g) complete knowledge and insight. When one has gone through these seven stages, perfect purification, i.e. Nibbāna without attachment, will be realized. None of these stages, however, can be called perfect purification without attachment, because there still remains some attachment (sa-upādāna), so long as all the stages have not been passed through; but on the other hand, except through these seven, there can be no possibility of attaining perfect Nibbāna, because such a state is that of an ordinary or unconverted person (puthujjana). Perfect Nibbāna without attachment is therefore to be understood as being attainable through these seven stages, and only when they have all been passed through.

\(^1\) M. i. 147–51; *The First Fifty Discourses of Gotama the Buddha*, vol. i, pp. 186–94.
It will be clear from the above statement that perfect Nibbāna is identical with perfect purity and is reached by means of continual purification. 'A man may be a warrior, a priest, a commoner, a slave, or an outcast, but if he is energetic, intent, and always making strenuous exertions, he will attain to the supreme purity.'\(^1\) As a Chinese Dyānist says: 'We ought to take heed to keep our hearts always clean, and not to let dust collect on them.'\(^2\) 'Let a wise man', says the Buddha, 'blow off the impurities of his self, as a smith blows off the impurities of silver, one by one, little by little, and from time to time.'\(^3\) Purification ought to be the task of every moment. 'Purify yourself, cleanse yourself' was the Buddha's watchword, which he repeated hundreds of times, and which most tersely expresses his guiding spirit as a religious teacher.

Purification or cultivation in the general sense is considered necessary even for one who has attained to the condition of Nibbāna. Sāriputta, for instance, who was praised by the Buddha as a person of the greatest knowledge of all his disciples,\(^4\) did not give up cultivation till long after his attainment of Arahatship. He declared that though he 'honoured and revered the seven objects, i.e. the teacher (the Buddha), the doctrine, the community, learning (sikkhā), concentration of mind, watchfulness, and friendliness (paṭīsanthāra), and, living dependent on them, abandoned evil and cultivated good',\(^5\) still he wished for further purification at the hand of the Buddha. As a man who has obtained a bright stainless gold ornament takes it to a goldsmith and tells him to polish it, so that it may be brighter or considered

\(^1\) S. i. 166. \(^2\) JPTS. 1907, p. 14. \(^3\) Dh. 239; Sn. 962. \(^4\) A. i. 28. \(^5\) A. iv. 120-2.
to be brighter than before, so, he says, he went to the Buddha and asked him for an instruction about these subjects.

Purity and purification have thus very important meanings in Buddhism. As to objects to be purified, conduct, view, and heart are most frequently referred to. These form the most important items of the nine things which are sought for attaining perfect purity. The frequent references made to them show their great importance. Besides those which we have mentioned as stages for gaining perfect Nibbāna, much is said about the purification of livelihood, release, wisdom, &c. 'Even celestial beings will praise a monk who, though he receives little, does not look down upon what he receives, and who is of pure life and vigorous efforts.' Life, as may be understood from our own experience, has a close connexion with the formation of character, and in one sense it may be said to be a part of conduct. No wonder then that such great stress is laid upon livelihood.

The Buddha is no doubt a person of perfect purity. He declares himself as having attained to the supreme purity, or as being pure in conduct, livelihood, preaching the doctrine, exposition (veyyākaraṇa), and insight won through knowledge; and he further says: 'As a person of perfectly pure conduct I declare my conduct is perfectly pure, completely white, and free from any stain. No one of my disciples supervises me with regard to conduct, nor do I expect to be supervised by any of my disciples with regard to conduct.' He repeats the same declaration concerning livelihood, preaching the doctrine, exposition, and insight through knowledge.² He is a

¹ D. iii. 288. ² Dh. 366. ³ A. iii. 124. ⁴ A. iii. 124–6.
person of perfect purity. It may be said that purity in its various forms is incorporated in his body. The Buddha's disciples are pure, because they have attained Arahantship, in which condition all impurities are removed. Brāhmans are sometimes mentioned as pure. The Buddha, opposed to the Brāhman as he was with regard to their caste system, sacerdotalism, ceremonialism, symbolism, asceticism, &c., still regarded the true pure Brāhman as worthy of praise, respect, and of all other marks of honour.¹ 'I shall call him a Brāhman', says he, 'who has passed beyond both bonds, merit and demerit, and who is free from sorrow, corruption, and pure.'²

As for its moral imports, evil actions committed in thought, speech, and body are regarded as impure, while good actions done in these three are considered to be pure. In other words, a man of good conduct and character is a pure man, because his conduct and character are free from any blame. Blameless conduct and character are considered to be pure. This may be partly because bad actions chiefly have for their motives the three fundamental evils, lust, hatred, and ignorance,³ which are always looked upon as stains, depravities, evils, shadows, &c. Those who do not commit evil actions in thought, speech, and body are said to keep themselves pure.⁴ In the Buddha's teaching, moral culture and high religious culture are so closely connected with each other that it is impossible to draw the exact boundary line between them. Moral culture, however, on the whole precedes religious culture. A

¹ Sn. 636; Dh. 412; Sn. 637; Dh. 413; M. ii. 148; see the last chapter of the Dhammapada, Brāhmaṇa-vagga.
² Dh. 412; Sn. 636.
³ A. iv. 44, passim.
⁴ A. ii. 121.
man ought to be moral before he is religious. Roughly speaking, ‘Do not commit any evil actions, but do good and be good’, the first half of the well-known verse,¹ may be regarded as a moral instruction; while ‘Purify your own mind, this is the teaching of all Buddha’s teaching’, may be taken for a religious instruction. Buddhist culture thus may be said to start from moral training and pass to religious training, and when it is complete the final purity will be attained. But in its interwoven part there can be no dividing line drawn between them. Purity and purification therefore have religious import as much as they have moral import. This is the reason why Buddhism is regarded as an ethico-religious system. Whether moral or religious, purity and purification in Buddhism are solely concerned with spiritual matters. Sipping water, burning fire, asceticism, sacrifice, or other external formal ceremonies have nothing to do with Buddhist purity. It is a striking contrast that Buddhism thus teaches purity and purification for spiritual ends, while Brähmanism attaches great importance to material objects and external ceremonies.

¹ Dh. 183 ; D. ii. 49 ; Mahāvastu, iii. 420.
XII

HUMILITY


Buddhism as a religion of self-control and contentment will naturally regard humility highly. This is another important Buddhist virtue. When a monk is spoken of as walking turning his eyes to the ground¹ and being fully possessed of decent deportment,² it is not merely his outward appearance, but also his mental condition, that is in view. The outward appearance is merely a visible manifestation of the inner psychology; and therefore decent deportment implies a humble restrained mind. We can picture to ourselves the mental condition of a monk who walks turning his eyes to the ground, or another who goes on his begging round in lowness of mind, guarding the senses and controlling himself well.³ Such a person must be self-restrained, self-contented, and humble. He will never regard himself more highly than he really deserves, or he will be satisfied with regarding himself, or with being regarded by others, below his true merit. He may praise others, but never

¹ He is taught to walk fixing his eyes ahead on the ground always at the distance of a yoke, i.e. four hands.
² Referred to before, p. 107. This demeanour is often mentioned in the Piṭaka, e.g. Vin. i. 39; SBE. xiii. 144.
³ Tha. 579.
himself; he may find fault with himself, but never with others. 'Whosoever exalts himself and despises others, being mean through pride; let one know him as an outcaste' (Sn. 182). Praising oneself and finding fault with others are considered in Buddhist morality as vicious as examining one's own faults and weaknesses and praising others' excellences are regarded as virtuous; and in later Buddhism they are included in the ten precepts.¹

Buddhism again is a religion of self-examination. The monk, who has taken up religious life in it, is taught to go through perpetual self-examination. In the Aṅguttara (v. 87–8), we find the items of self-examination,² the first three of which are as follows: 'I have attained the state of (bodily) disfigurement; my life depends upon (the aid of) others; and I ought to attire myself in a different way from others.' Being in the state of bodily disfigurement, and attiring himself in a different way from others or lay people, both of which are the emblems of the religious person, he ought to behave himself in a different manner, being fully conscious of the fact that he has placed himself in the position of self-humiliation. When he is conscious that his life is dependent upon the help of others or lay people so far as his bodily existence is concerned, he ought to keep himself in the state of humility. But it ought to be borne in mind that the instruction concerning the consciousness of dependence in this case is merely meant to humble his proud mind, but not to lead him to the

¹ 'Abstinence from praising oneself and slandering others' is the seventh of the ten precepts, which are set forth in the Brahmajalasūtra, a Mahāyāna book of discipline.
² The first three of the ten are found in A. v. 210.
feeling of servility. If he is humble merely because his living depends upon the charity of others, such humility will hardly be worthy of being regarded as a virtue. If he feels humble merely because he is dependent upon others for his living, he will feel haughty when he is able to give help to others. Not servility, therefore, but low or lower estimate of one’s own merit, is meant by this term.

Pride or arrogance, which is usually expressed by the word, Māna, and its derivatives, is one of the most abominable vices from the Buddhistic moral point of view, and it is through these expressions that we understand that Buddhism regards humility as a high virtue. ‘Abandon anger and pride’ (Dh. 221; S. i. 23, 25), ‘Do not be controlled by anger and pride’ (Sn. 968). Anger and pride are twin vices,¹ detestable in everybody’s eye, and therefore the monk is taught to abandon them, and not to be controlled by them. ‘Leave inclinations for pride, and then you will wander calmly through the destruction of pride’ (Sn. 842), is part of the instruction given by the Buddha to his son Rāhula. A monk is said to be one who has entirely destroyed pride (Sn. 4). A wandering ascetic (pariibbājaka), who has completely given up pride and other vices, has attained to the completeness of asceticism (Sn. 537). The Buddha calls him a Brāhman whose passion, hatred, pride, and hypocrisy have dropped like a mustard seed from the point of a needle (Sn. 631; Dh. 407). A knower of the Vedas does not become proud through a philosophical view or by thinking; for he is not of that sort (Sn. 846). The Tathāgata in whom there lives no delusion, no pride,

¹ ERE. x, p. 277, ‘Dante classes pride with envy and anger as sins of the spirit.’
who is free from covetousness, selfishness, and desire, who has banished anger and calmed himself, deserves the oblation (Sn. 469). Or it is said that whosoever does not abandon pride, self-debasement (omāna), vainglory (atimāna), excessive self-esteem (adkimāna), stupefaction (thambha), and excessive self-debasement (atnipāta), is not able to attain Arahatship (A. iii. 430). From these quotations we may conclude that a monk, a wandering ascetic, a Brähman, a Tathāgata, or an Arahan, in each case the word being taken in its ideal sense, is understood to have abandoned pride together with other vices. In other words, an ideal monk, an ideal ascetic, or any other ideal person, harbours no pride. The destruction of pride is essential to any of them. Down with pride, or the gate of religious life will be shut against you.

Buddhism ascribes pride to too great self-feeling or self-interestedness. As a religion of 'non-self-ism', therefore, Buddhism teaches the destruction of self-feeling and its result pride, root and branch, as essential to religious life. If self-feeling is a detestable object, pride, which according to its tenet is a natural result of it, must be equally detestable. And if the former is destroyed, the latter will be destroyed of itself. "May both householders and monks think that this is my work, and may they be subject to me in everything which is to be done or not to be done"; this is a fool's thought, and thereby his desire and pride increase' (Dh. 74). This is the idea of the egotistic, vainglorious person, as this aphorism asserts. His intention is always concentrated on himself, and his efforts are always to bring himself into prominence; he is selfish and ambitious; and he does not mind if others suffer on that account. What he thinks is always of himself; he cannot get rid of
thinking of himself; he is far from forgetting himself, destroying the idea of self, as Buddhism teaches. If he can abandon this, he will be able to abandon anger, pride, hypocrisy, illusion, covetousness, or all other vices which spring from the idea of self. As long as he cherishes the idea of self, he cannot attain peace of mind. Abandon the idea of self and self itself, and pride and other vices will be naturally destroyed, and thereby mental peace will be attained. As the Buddha says: 'If a monk lives much with a mind intent on the thought of selflessness with regard to what is painful, his mind will be free from self-interestedness (ahaṅkāra), desire of possession (mamaṅkāra), and from inclinations for pride (mānānusaya), with regard to this body with its consciousness as well as all outward characteristics, he will get rid of arrogance, be quiet, and emancipated' (A. iv. 53). In this connexion, the monk is recommended to contemplate that form (rūpa) is not his own, nor is it he, nor is it his self (S. ii. 253), and the same contemplation is to be practised with regard to the other four aggregates (khandha), feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), predispositions (sankhārā), and consciousness (viññāna). These five aggregates compose the human being, mind and body, which when thus composed seems to be governed by something like self; but this is an illusion of the ignorant. In fact there is no self or personality in them, collectively speaking, as the ignorant consider. The main purport of meditation taught in the Buddha's religion is to destroy this illusory view, and thereby to attain to final enlightenment. Sometimes name (nāma) and form (rūpa), instead of the five mentioned above, are given as parts composing the

1 Similar discourses are found in S. iii. 3-5; 80; 136, 169, 170; v. 202-8.
human being, on which the illusory view of self depends, the former corresponding to the mind, and the latter to the body. Whether composed of five aggregates or two parts, the human being has no self in it; but a man who is ignorant of the fact, thinking that there is a self in the human being, namely, his own self in his own being, becomes attached to it, and harbours lust, pride, anger, hatred, hypocrisy, illusion, and other vices, according to occasion. If a man has the idea of self, as existing in him, he will first of all desire to regard himself, or to be regarded by others, as distinguished among his fellow beings. The idea of self, therefore, is the root of pride. And if the former is destroyed, the latter will be destroyed of itself.

What we have said above may be summarized in the following few words. Buddhism teaches as its philosophical tenet that there exists no self in the human being; self therefore should not be pursued or clung to. The search for, or clinging to, self is a useless task, and at the same time a vice, because it begets many other vices, and leads us to pain and suffering. 'Leave anger, forsake pride, and get rid of all attachment. Pain will not fall upon the man who is not bound in the fetters of name and form, and who calls nothing his own' (Dh. 221). If a man can give up everything he has, i.e.

1 Sn. 871–2; Dh. 221, 367, cf. Sn. 587. 'He never identifies himself with name and form, and does not grieve at what is no more; he is called a true monk' (Dh. 367).

2 We may cite the following verse in this connexion: 'A man who has renounced pride has no bonds; all his pride and bonds having been completely eradicated. This wise man who has escaped from conceits might say: "I speak" or he might say: "They speak to me". But this expert person, knowing the usage universal in the world, says so only in conformity with it' (S. i. 14).
subjective and objective possessions, and declares himself as possessing nothing, he will attain to complete humility of mind, and everything will be his own. As Christian humility originates from the feeling of worthlessness or the sense of imperfection before God, and consists in the utter or creaturely dependence upon His will, so Buddhist humility also springs from the sense of the selflessness of our own being and our belongings, which are but an extension of our being. When we understand that our being is absolutely void of what is to be clung to, our pride, which hangs so much upon this feeling, will be naturally crushed down.

The Buddha as a general rule sets forth vices more vividly than virtues. The former are usually depicted in stronger words and more frequently referred to than the latter, so that the audience may be more vigorously impressed with the detestableness of vices. As to corresponding virtues, on the other hand, they are generally very little mentioned, and in some cases they are left entirely unnamed. But we must understand that the mention of vices implies corresponding virtues, as defilement implies purity; and therefore when we are told to abandon anger and pride, we are to understand that we are recommended to follow gentleness, patience, tolerance, love, modesty, or humility.
XIII

BENEVOLENCE


What we here call benevolence is to be understood to comprise love, kindness, friendship, sympathy, mercy, pity, and other kindred virtuous feelings and actions, which are mostly expressed by the Pāli words mettā, karuṇā, muditā, anukampā, anuddaya, ahiṁsā, avera, and some others possessing the same meaning. The chief function of this virtue is to ward off pain and suffering from other beings, whether human or non-human, and further to promote their pleasure and happiness. Its generic maxim, therefore, according to the Buddhist ethical idea, will be: 'We ought not to hurt mentally and physically our fellow-creatures as well as our fellow-men, but to love and protect them.'¹ It is true that not only in Buddhism, but also in other religions and moral teachings, e. g. in Christianity and Confucianism, this is taught as a high moral virtue. The former of these two, Christianity, in its tenets of charity or mutual love among mankind and of divine love, and the latter in its tenet of Jēn or benevolence, holds this as a virtue.

¹ Cf. H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 239.
BENEVOLENCE

This is not therefore a virtue peculiar to the Buddhist; still Buddhism may claim a unique position among all religions and ethical systems which teach benevolence as a virtue, for it lays special stress upon it. It regards it as comprising all virtues, as the root and basis of all virtuous conduct. In the meditation of universal love which it teaches, a loving heart is extended over all creatures without any distinction; but it does not treat benevolence merely as a subject of meditation. As is clear from the fact that the history of this religion, which covers twenty-four hundred years, is free from any bloodshed, benevolence is a practical virtue in Buddhism.

One reason why Buddhism attaches such great importance to this virtue is that this is the antidote for *dosa*, or hatred, one of the three radical mental evils. Hatred, which is expressed by the words *dosa*, *paṭigha*, *vyāpāda*, *kodha*, *vera*, &c., is regarded as a most cursed hindrance to Buddhist culture. This may be alleviated or destroyed by cultivating its antidote, benevolence. Through the cultivation of benevolence one may attain to a mental condition which is free from hatred, the peaceful state of mind which is so much yearned after by the practical Buddhist. The first business of benevolence, therefore, is to ward off hatred through its power,¹ and thereby to enable one to reach a peaceful mental condition. As two opposite forces neutralize each other and produce rest, so benevolence in this case restrains hatred and produces peace; and it is valued as such. We find many sayings of the Buddha in this connexion. 'Let a man overcome anger by love' (Dh. 223). 'He abused me, he beat me, he defeated

¹ 'Kindly feeling must be cultivated for the purpose of abandoning hatred', A. iv. 353.
me, he robbed me, . . . in those who harbour such thoughts hatred will never cease' (Dh. 3). 'He abused me, he beat me, he defeated me, he robbed me, . . . in those who do not harbour such thoughts hatred will cease' (Dh. 4). 'For hatred does not cease by hatred at any time; hatred ceases by love; this is an eternal law' (Dh. 5). 'He who by causing pain to others wishes to obtain pleasure for himself, he, entangled in the bonds of hatred, will never be free from hatred' (Dh. 291). 'Let him be free from lust and ward off hatred; cultivating an infinite loving feeling, and being strenuous unceasingly night and day, let him spread infinite goodwill over all regions' (Sn. 507).

Love or goodwill is thus always contrasted with hatred or ill-will; the presence of one implies the absence of the other: and as the presence of hatred is detrimental to the attainment of peace of mind, it is usually treated as the fatal enemy of the Buddhist. Destroy hatred and cultivate love in your heart, and thus you will obtain peace of mind. This is the Buddhist idea about this virtue and its value. As humility is contrasted with haughtiness, liberality with avarice, intelligence with ignorance, so benevolence is contrasted with hatred, and we are taught in every case to keep off the latter with the force of the former. This will account for the former being regarded so highly. Benevolence is thus considered to be a virtuous character because it counteracts hatred, an ugly vice in the eye of the Buddhist, and a fatal hindrance to attaining mental peace. In this case, it may be said, benevolence has its moral value as the antidote against hatred.

The second ground for the value of benevolence in Buddhist ethics is based upon its doctrine of rebirth or
transmigration, as it is commonly called, according to what we beings, not only human, but otherwise, have been to one another, parents, children, brothers, sisters, relatives, friends, during the repetition of rebirth, which has ever been going on since time immemorial. Through this long duration of time our relations to one another have been indissolubly complicated, it being possible to conjecture that family, social, and other innumerable relations, near and distant, have existed among us. An ancient poet monk of Japan expressed this idea in a short poem: 'When I hear a copper pheasant singing in a loving tone I wonder if it were my father or mother.' In this connexion the Buddha also says as follows: 'This repetition of rebirths, O monks, has neither beginning nor end; and the beginning of beings, who are possessed by ignorance and hindrance, thirst and attachment, and who run through and migrate from birth to birth, cannot be known. It is not easy, O monks, to find out any being who has not been mother, father, brother, sister, son, or daughter to us during this long time. Why is that so? For this repetition of rebirths, O monks, has neither beginning nor end; and the beginning of beings, who are full of ignorance and hindrance, thirst and attachment, and who run through and migrate from birth to birth, cannot be known' (S. ii. 189–90). We are not here going to enter in detail into the explanation of the doctrine of rebirth; it will be sufficient for us at the present moment if we know that according to this doctrine we have gone through countless births, and in so doing we have been related to one another as parents and children, brothers and sisters, masters and servants, relatives, friends, and so forth. The idea of the possibility of the existence of
such relations among us makes us contemplate other beings, superior and inferior, regardless of our present relations, with love and respect. Even those whom we take for our enemies may have been our parents, brothers, sisters, or some near relation; and it is only from our ignorance that we regard them as such, in the same way as we treat our own parents or children as strangers, so long as we are totally ignorant of our real relations with them. From the standpoint of the doctrine of rebirth, therefore, we are recommended to regard one another with the eye of benevolence.

Thirdly, the Buddhist morality of benevolence is founded upon sympathetic feeling.\(^1\) It is based upon compassion which arises within us when we see or hear of somebody's being situated in an undesirable position and imagine ourselves situated in the same position. Life is dear, for instance, to every living being. Whether a protozoal animal or a higher one, any being shrinks from being deprived of life. As we do not wish for death, other beings also do not wish for it. As we are frightened merely at the idea of death, so also are other beings frightened at it. We, therefore, should not take the life of other beings, and moreover we should cultivate a loving heart within us. We should not do to others what we do not wish done by them; and at the same time we should do to others as we would they should do to us. Living beings are naturally selfish, or at least self-centred or self-interested,

\(^1\) 'J. S. Mill tries to establish a logical connexion between the psychological and ethical principles which he holds in common with Bentham, and to convince his readers that because each man naturally seeks his own happiness, therefore he ought to seek the happiness of other people' (The Methods of Ethics, p. 85).
and naturally they consider themselves dearest to them, for which no further comment is needed, I think, but a reference to a few statements found in Pāli literature. King Pasenadi of the Kosalan country once asked Queen Mallikā if there was anything dearer to her than her own self, to which the queen replied that there was nothing. Her own person, she said, was the dearest to her. The king agreed with her, saying that there was nothing in the whole world dearer to him than his own self. Later the king repaired to the Buddha’s monastery, and told him all about the conversation which had passed between him and his queen. The Buddha approved this assertion and admonishingly added these words: ‘Traversing over all regions with his thought, a man will in no place find anything dearer than his own self. The self is equally dear to others, and therefore let a man, who regards his own self as dear, not injure others’ (S. i. 75; Ud. 47). If any of us knows that his own self is the dearest to him, he must know that another’s self is the dearest to another. This sympathetic feeling plays a great part in the virtue of benevolence. With regard to this virtue in connexion with this feeling, we find many references in the Piṭaka. ‘All (beings) are frightened at the rod, all are afraid of death; by comparing (others) with yourself, do not hurt and kill (them). All (beings) are frightened at the rod, life is dear to all; by comparing (others) with yourself, do not hurt and kill (them)’ (Dh. 129–30). You should not only refrain from taking life, but also cultivate a loving heart within yourself. It ought to be borne in mind that benevolence as taught in Buddhism is not merely a negative virtue, but also a positive one. It lays as great stress upon its positive side as upon its
negative side. It teaches us not to hurt or kill beings, and at the same time to love and protect them. The presence of the precept 'Do not take life', in the formula of elementary virtues, gives us a wrong impression that Buddhism only teaches a negative virtue in this connexion, but nobody can deny that love, or, to use a more comprehensive term, benevolence, is a prominent feature of Buddhist morality. And this virtue of not killing beings, but loving them, is based upon sympathetic feeling.

Now we come to investigate what Buddhism teaches us about the mutual benevolence of human beings, or love between man and man. Dāna, or donation, whether spiritual or temporal, to which we shall refer later on under the heading Gratitude, is a form of benevolence, and the feeling or expression of gratitude is a form of return for benevolence shown in mind, speech, or deed. If every person in human society is benevolent and grateful, or ready to be benevolent to others and to return grateful feeling or kindness for benevolence shown to him, society will be very pleasant to live in. If in the private and public life of human beings mutual love is a predominant element in everything, there will be no friction whatever among them. Love is oil poured on the waters. Love makes the world go round. The efforts of the Buddha were always on these lines; he strove to make society happy first of all by teaching its members to cultivate mutual love among themselves. Thus, as Professor Rhys Davids rightly says: 'We can realize how happy was the village or clan on the banks of the Ganges, where the people were full of the kindly spirit of fellow-feeling, the noble spirit of justice.'

Ward off hatred and cultivate love towards all. This was the watchword the Buddha used in teaching his disciples in this connexion.

About the benevolence of monks towards their fellow students, the Buddha says that by behaving themselves towards their fellow students with benevolent thought, speech, and deed, whether in public or in private, they are expected to prosper, but not to decline. In other words, bearing a kindly thought towards their fellow students, or speaking or acting kindly towards them, is a way of prosperity, but not a way of decline in their religious life. A Codaka, or ‘reprover or Warner’, is a legal functionary in the Buddhist monkish community whose office it is to decide an ecclesiastical case according to the ordinances prescribed by the Buddha. The high importance of the office may be inferred from the statements which we find made in the Piṭaka that several eminent disciples of the Buddha, e.g. Sāriputta, filled it. There are five qualifications essential for a monk who takes up this office. He has to examine, previous to taking it up, whether he finds all these qualifications in himself; and the third of them is as follows: ‘Is a kindly heart ever present in me, one without hatred against those who are my companions in the religious life (or fellow students)? Is this quality found in me, or is it not?’ Or the following is given as an address of Sāriputta to his fellow disciples, which may not be out of place to mention in this connexion: ‘A monk, O friends, who wishes to reprove another for some matter, ought to do so on establishing the following five things in himself. (a) I

1 D. ii. 80.  
2 A. v. 79–81; Vin. ii. 248–51.  
3 D. iii. 236–7; A. iii. 196–8.
shall speak in the right time, not in the wrong time; (b) I shall speak in accordance with the truth, not with untruth; (c) I shall speak in gentle language, not in harsh language; (d) I shall speak in beneficial language, not in meaningless language; and (e) I shall speak with a kindly heart, not with a heart full of hatred. A monk, O friends, who wishes to reprove another for some matter, ought to do so after establishing these five things in himself.' This is a legal case in which we expect justice solely to be done. A case, right or wrong, we think, can be decided only in the light of justice. There seems in it to be no room for benevolence. Still it is said that a monk, who is going to take up this office, should examine if he is not lacking in this virtue, or that he should first of all establish himself in five things in which this virtue predominates. In other words, a Codaka is required to be at once just and benevolent. He ought to exercise, among many other good qualities, justice and benevolence, two virtues of almost opposite nature, towards a monk who is to be examined. Justice will require him to do just as much as his duty as a Codaka calls upon him, while benevolence will prompt him to go a step farther or beyond the boundary of justice, and act for the good of the monk.

The following story is told in the Vinaya (i. 301–2). One day the Buddha, while going round the monks' cells in company with his favourite disciple Ānanda, found a sick monk lying on a soiled bed, seemingly with nobody in attendance. The Buddha asked him if he had anybody to attend him. The monk replied he had no one, because he had never attended others in sickness. The Buddha washed him with the help of
Ānanda, and when everything was properly done, he assembled his disciples, and, after making some inquiries about the sick monk, told them that they should attend one another in sickness, because they had no father and mother to attend them. Any one, he said, who wishes to attend the Buddha should attend a sick monk. And he said that teacher and pupil, and pupils of the same teacher, should attend each other. Not only in attending the sick, but in fulfilling the duties towards each other, benevolence, sympathy, gratitude, together with respect and obedience, are necessary for teachers and pupils and fellow pupils. 'The teacher, O monks,' says the Buddha, 'should regard his pupil as his own son, and the pupil his teacher as his own father. Thus these two, united by mutual benevolence, confidence, and communion of life, will progress, advance, and reach a high stage in this doctrine and discipline.' Monks who have given up family life, though for that reason deprived of natural family bonds, have to keep alive their fatherly feeling, child-like, and, in the same way, brotherly feelings. And these feelings are to be extended towards their fellow men and fellow creatures. Monks are, therefore, called sabbabhūtahitānukampī, or 'those who are benevolent and compassionate to all living beings', or they are said to live in remote districts, from sympathy with inhabitants there. The charge that the Buddhists of the primitive period of the history of Buddhism were a community of egoistic, self-interested hermits or monks is absolutely unfounded. Monks, ... in the true sense of the word ..., are entirely free from lust, passion, or attachment, but benevolent, com-

1 Vin. i. 45.  
2 A. i. 61.  
3 We have treated this subject before; see chap. V, p. 96 f.
passionate, and merciful feelings are still living in their hearts. 'Ever since I left a householder's life', says a monk, 'to lead a homeless life and became a monk, I have never remembered any ignoble malignant thought as "May these beings be struck, killed, subject to suffering," occurring to me. But I remember that I have cultivated boundless love in myself, and accumulated it little by little, as is said by the Buddha. Being a friend, comrade, and sympathizer of all beings, I always cultivate in myself a loving heart, taking delight in doing no injury. I take pleasure in a heart which is not moved and does not drift. I cultivate the holy exercise of goodwill which is practised by good people.' This is a recital of a monk about his feelings towards all beings. Can there be any selfish feelings in it?

As to the love and compassion between people of domestic and other relations, it will be best for us to quote a passage from Mrs. Rhys Davids's introduction to the translation of the Singalovadassuttanta, which runs as follows:

'As good and loving gods take compassion upon their sincere devotees, who wait upon them with offerings material and spiritual, so in all the six relations adduced the seniors are represented functioning as little gods, the juniors or subordinates as devotees. Anukampati is the type-word for the protecting tenderness of the stronger for the weaker, and means vibrating along-after. It thus in emotional force is even stronger than our compassion or sympathy. And because the pulsing emotion is other-regarding, a feeling-together whatever the loved one feels, it is justifiable to render it often by love, thus taking the smaller concept up into the greater... In the attitude of parent to child love is at bottom a tender compassion, a vibrant care to protect. So wife-love is largely motherly.'

1 Tha. 645-9; cf. Tha. 602-3.  
2 SBB. iv. 171-2.
But the most frequent reference that we find made in this connexion in the Piṭaka is about benevolence towards all beings, as to which the following stanzas may be taken for a specimen: ‘Whatever living beings there are in existence, whether feeble or strong, without any exception, whether tall, big, medium-sized, short, small, or great; whether seen or unseen, living near or far, those who are already born, or those who are seeking birth; may all beings be happy-minded. Let no one cheat another; let no one disdain another under any circumstances; let no one wish for another’s pain and suffering from anger and resentment. As the mother protects her only son with her life, let every one cultivate a boundless kindly mind towards all sentient beings.’¹ This is the general idea of Buddhist love. The loving heart is thus to be extended over all sentient beings, undoubtedly resting upon the grounds which we have already explained. Buddhism certainly teaches love among mankind, between those of domestic, social, and other relations, but at the same time it teaches love towards all beings with equally great emphasis. Love towards all beings which Buddhism teaches us cannot be a mere extension of love among mankind. If we know why this religion regards benevolence as a virtue, we shall understand that the love of all beings in Buddhism has its own special meaning and moral value by itself, not supplementary to the morality of mankind. The same idea seems to be shared by many scholars of ethics. Dr. Rashdall, after refuting it as illogical to say, like Green and his followers, that we ought to avoid causing animals unnecessary suffering not in their own interest, but in that of our own humanity, says that

¹ Sn. 146–50.
The well-being of animals . . . seems to me quite distinctly to possess some value, and therefore to form part of that good which constitutes the ethical end'.

In another place he says: 'When we say, "Everyone to count for one", we are no doubt thinking merely of human beings; but why are the lower animals to be excluded from consideration? I should be prepared to say that in point of fact they ought not to be wholly ignored. Their pain is certainly an evil, possibly as great an evil as equal pain in human beings, apart from the question of the activities with which the pain may interfere: their comfort or pleasure has a value to which every human person will make some sacrifice.' His case is not an isolated one. We understand from his statements in connexion with these quotations that there are several scholars who agree with him on this subject.

The universality of love in Buddhism is best understood in its meditative exercise of love (mettā), compassion (karunā), delightfulfulness (muditā), and equanimity (upekkhā), which are collectively called the Brahmavihārā, or 'states of divine life', or Apamaññāyo, or 'boundlessness'. The practice of this meditative exercise is frequently referred to in Pali literature, old and new. It seems, therefore, to have been practised very much by the Buddhists of the primitive period and later. According to the statements which we find made in the Piṭaka, the Buddha practised it (A. i. 183). His noble disciples practised it (A. i. 196–7). Mahāsudassana and Mahāgovinda, two legendary kings, practised it over all beings when they were still on the throne.

3 The Wheel of the Law, p. 38.
BENEVOLENCE

(D. ii. 186–7, 250), and another legendary king Makhā-
deva practised it after leaving the throne and taking up a religious life (M. ii. 76). The meditation of the fourfold boundlessness is thus considered to be essential for the Buddhists, whether of real life or of legendary life in accordance with the Buddhist ideal. And this has high moral value on its own account. ‘As the mother protects her only son with her life, let him cultivate an infinitely kindly mind towards all beings. Let him cultivate an infinitely kindly mind towards all the world, above, below, and crosswise, without any obstruction, wrath, and enmity. Standing, walking, sitting, or lying down, so far as he is awake, let him abide in this mental mood. They call this the state of divine life in this world’ (Sn. 149–51). Looking upon the whole world with the motherly eye, the disciple should begin by cultivating a loving heart within him; then, extending it little by little, he ought to abide in this mental mood all the time, in whatever posture his body may be. Jhāna meditation is first practised in a secluded undisturbed place, so that the mind may be properly concentrated or quieted, but later, when the monk is quite accustomed to it, he may perform it at any time, or he may remain in the condition of jhāna meditation in any posture of his body and mind. In the same way; a monk when thoroughly trained may exercise this meditation in any bodily and mental attitude. A prose passage which most frequently appears in Pali literature in connexion with this exercise runs as follows: ‘He abides letting his mind, fraught with love, pervade one quarter of the world, and so also the second quarter, and so the third, and so the fourth. And thus the whole wide world, above, below, around, and everywhere, and altogether does he continue to pervade with
love-burdened thought, abounding, sublime, and beyond measure, free from hatred and ill-will. He abides letting his mind, fraught with compassion, ... delightfulness, ... equanimity ...’

In the meditative exercise of love, the monk extends his loving heart over the whole world of living beings, or we may say, perhaps more fittingly, he unites himself with the world of beings through this heart. He gives to his loving heart an infinite expansion. He touches or pervades the hearts of other beings with his own heart, which is burdened with love. He abides in the hearts of others by means of love. Others’ hearts may be filled with hatred, anger, disgust, and other kindred feelings; nevertheless he sees them only with loving, compassionate eyes. As the verse, ‘Let us live happily then, not hating those who hate us! Among men who hate us let us dwell free from hatred’ (Dh. 197), tells us, he regards others with love and compassion, whether others regard him with love or hatred. In the Rājovādajātaka (Jāt. ii. 1–5), King Mallika of the Kosalas is said to have returned harshness with harshness, and softness with softness, to have overcome good by good, and evil by evil; but King Brahmadatta of Bārāṇasi is said to have overcome anger by love, evil by good, greediness by liberality, and falsehood by truth. The latter is exactly the idea of Buddhist love. Anger, evil, &c., may be overcome by their respective opposites; or the hard hearts of others, which are fraught with these evils, may be softened through the force of love and compassion on our part. When hatred, anger, &c., are completely overcome, the hearts of both parties will be filled with infinite delightfulness, and their life will be a

1 Passim; the translation is taken from SBB. iv. 44–5.
life of delightfulness; and then the equanimity of mind which is so much yearned after will be attained.

The Buddhist doctrine of benevolence has been brought to its climax, when in later forms Metteyya (Skt. Maitreya), Avalokiteśvara, and Amitābha (or Amitāyus), two Bodhisattvas and a Buddha, though they are rather legendary in nature, have appeared with love and compassion as their characteristics.

Liberality is a particular form of benevolence shown in practical action. It is an extension of benevolence. The main distinction between the two is: benevolence is charitable feeling or disposition to do good to others;¹ while liberality is, so far as the present discourse is concerned, charitable action, or practical exertion put forth to promote the happiness of others, by giving them chiefly food, drink, and other requisites of life. As benevolence is an admirable disposition, so liberality is an admirable action. In many cases, benevolence has ethical value only when it is put in action, or, in other words, when it takes the form of liberality. Mere benevolence cannot be highly valued as a virtue, unless it is accompanied by some practical action prompted by a similar feeling. Liberality therefore takes its place next to benevolence in its origination; it presupposes the existence of benevolence in the agent. If not, that is to say, if the agent is

¹ In the previous chapter, in discussing benevolence, we have included in it love, kindness, friendship, sympathy; and expression of goodwill, and an action of kindness; but benevolence in its proper sense is understood to mean charitable feeling or disposition.
not incited to liberal action by this or other similar feelings, but moved by some material motives, his action, however much resemblance to liberality it may bear, will be hardly worthy of the name. Charity, generosity, or liberality must have benevolence or its sister feeling sympathy as its necessary element. This is the reason why we are going to discuss this subject next to benevolence.

Liberality was not solely the pride of the Buddhists in ancient India. They only inherited this admirable disposition from their ancestors. Ancient Indians were especially famous for their liberality and hospitality,¹ about which abundant records are found in the Sūtras. It may not be out of place to cite a few specimens of them. Vedic students, while living a religious life under the supervision of their teachers, could by right beg food for themselves and their teachers. They could beg it² from everybody except low-caste people, who are of course unfit for association with Aryas, and Abhisastas or 'accursed people' (Ap. I. 3, 25–6; Ga. II. 35). The community had to support them with alms. It was regarded as everybody's duty to maintain them with necessaries during their religious life. Almsgiving thus was a common practice among the ancient Indian community. Liberality in giving alms to religious students

¹ Man has four debts: he owes to the gods sacrifices; to the seers, the study of the Vedas; to the Manes, offering; and to man, hospitality (Sat. Br. I. 7, 2, 1 ff.).
² The Buddha once in his discourse referred to this subject. He says that the ancient Brāhman observed complete celibacy for forty-eight years, studied the Vedic texts, and sought for the wealth of his teacher rightly, but not wrongly, i.e. not by means of agriculture, trade, cow-keeping, not as a warrior, an officer, or a scientist, but by means of begging, without disgracing his begging-bowl (A. iii. 224–5).
was considered to be meritorious on the one hand, and on the other people were threatened with some sorts of punishment in case of refusal to comply with their humble requests (Āp. I. 3, 26); but generally everybody fulfilled this noble duty of their own free will.

It is further prescribed in the Sūtras that the householder should, before he eats, feed his guests, infants, old or sick people, female relatives who are under his protection, pregnant women, and those of low condition. The householder and his wife should not refuse a man who asks for food at the time when offering is made to all gods. If there is no food to give them, earth, water, grass, or even a kind word, are considered to be suitable for offering (Āp. II. 4, 10–5; Ga. V. 25). Everybody except those mentioned before will find hospitality in the house of a twice-born man. Hospitality is regarded as part of his religious duty (Ga. III. 30). Money must be given to those who are going to offer a sacrifice, those engaged in study, travellers, and those who have performed the Viśvajit-sacrifice (Ga. V. 21). Some special rules are prescribed for hospitality to guests. Respect, honour, kindness, hospitable entertainment, which ought to be shown or given to them, and the rewards which are supposed to result from these hospitable actions, are elaborately explained. In some instances they are carried to an extreme, even to the degree of absurdity. A guest is called Goghna or cow-killer, because in ancient days, when any distinguished guest was in the house, the host used to kill a cow to entertain him (e.g. Āśvalāyana, I. 30–3; Pāraskara, 3, 26–8). 'If a guest comes to a king, he shall make his Purohita honour him more than himself' (Āp. II. 7, 12). 'He who entertains guests for one night obtains earthly happiness, a second night gains the middle
Liberality

Air, a third heavenly bliss, a fourth the world of unsurpassable bliss; many nights procure endless worlds. That has been declared in the Veda' (Ap. II. 7, 16).

Such ideas about liberality and hospitality prevailed in India even previous to the rise of Buddhism; in other words, almsgiving, which is frequently enjoined in the Piṭaka, was a common practice among the Brāhmaṇic community. The Buddhist inherited or learned it from his heretic predecessors or neighbours, as he did some other matters; but still the Buddhist has his own peculiarity, which we are going to make clear in the course of this chapter. As to the liberal Buddhist, 'One leading a householder's life with the mind free from defilement and avarice, with clean hands, being liberal in giving, ready to be asked, and taking delight in giving and distributing alms', seems to be a typical example (A. i. 150, 226; ii. 66; iii. 53; iv. 271, 273; S. v. 351–2, 391, 395). Mental defilement and avarice being abominable vices, their opposites, on the contrary, are praiseworthy virtues; and clean hands, which are not soiled by defilement and avarice, are the symbols of benevolent, sympathetic, liberal hearts. 'As the bright moon going through the element of air, outshines all the groups of the stars in the world by her light, just so a man, who is endowed with morality and who is faithful, outshines all avaricious people in the world by his liberality' (A. iii. 34). Every virtue has its corresponding vice, and in each case the conquest of the latter is considered to be the first step in realizing the former. Liberal-heartedness therefore in one sense is freedom from avarice.

Dānapati or 'lord of gifts' is an appellation commonly given to a charitable householder. According to the
famous commentator Buddhaghosa, this means a giver who is neither a comrade nor a slave to a gift, but a lord to it. If we are allowed to disregard what follows this explanation, and to supplement it with our own, we should say that 'lord of gifts' means 'one who is not a slave but a lord to gifts', because he knows where to give away his gifts, because he knows who are proper recipients of his gifts.

As to recipients of gifts mention is generally made on the one hand of paupers, travellers, beggars, or other needy people, and on the other hand the Buddha and his holy disciples. The five timely gifts are said to be gifts offered to a guest, a traveller, and a sick person, gifts offered in the time of famine, and lastly gifts offered to the virtuous person when new crops or fruits are gathered, and of all these the last are the most important (A. iii. 41). Benevolence or liberality is an eminent quality or rather an important qualification of a noble disciple of the Buddha, whether in connexion with a household or a homeless life. In the Jātaka, Bodhisatta, when he was born as a king during his repeated rebirths, is said to have built six almonries in his city, one at each of its four gates, one in its centre, and at the gate of his palace.¹ In the Visayhājātaka (no. 340), a merchant, and in the Saṅkhājātaka (no. 442), a rich Brāhmaṇa, both of whom were previous incarnations of the Buddha, did the same thing. This was intended to give food and drink to beggars, paupers, travellers, and other needy people. Sometimes a king, incarnate Bodhisatta, himself visited his almonries, perhaps to see how the almsgiving was going on, and distributed alms with his own hands (e.g. Jāt. ii. 369). These stories are rather of legendary

¹ Jāt. i. 231, 262; ii. 194–5; iv. 176, 355, 402.
nature, still we can infer from their import how important almsgiving is, and that almsgiving is considered to be a necessary accomplishment of a king or any other noble man. In particular cases, the rich may practise charity among their relatives. In two places in the Aṅguttara (i. 152; iii. 44) a virtuous, liberal-hearted son of a good family is described as being trusted by the members of his family, relatives, kinsmen, and dependants, as a tall stately tree standing in the midst of a forest is surrounded by other trees growing around it. With material help and spiritual guidance in the way of virtue, such a person is worthy of being trusted by his relatives. As in Brāhmanism religious students, ascetics, &c., are considered to be proper recipients of alms, so in Buddhism the Buddha and his noble disciples are regarded as recipients par excellence of gifts. They are the most auspicious field where seeds of liberality should be sown; which it is declared will yield great fruit and great reward. This seems to be more often mentioned in later than in earlier Pāli literature.

Liberality in Buddhism as in Brāhmanism is always exhibited as followed by some rewards in this life or in the next. 'The giver will be regarded as dear and pleasant by the multitude; wise and good people will honour him; his good fame will spread abroad; he will never deviate from the law of the layman; on his death, when his body is dissolved, he will be born in a good place, the heavenly world' (A. iii. 39–40, 41). Or in another passage we find the following declaration: 'Having given food to many, and alms to those who are worthy of receiving them, on dying in the human world, benefactors will go to the heavenly world. There they will rejoice in bliss. The liberal enjoy the fruit of their
free distribution' (It. 26). This declaration will remind us of a passage in Manu (III. 148): 'A gift duly presented to a wise man renders the giver and receiver alike partakers of the fruit both here and in the next world.' So in Buddhism the practice of almsgiving is expected to meet with some sort of reward in this life or in the next, in visible or invisible form. This is the natural conclusion from the Buddhist doctrine of retribution, according to which good actions such as belief, the observance of the precepts, almsgiving, learning, knowledge,⁰ &c., are sure to be crowned with corresponding desirable fruits. According to this doctrine, giving is receiving. The giver may always bear this in mind, that is to say, he may perform a liberal action (as well as other good actions) in the expectation of its recompense, or the motive which impels him to perform a liberal action may be the obtaining of its reward, which is expected to appear in exact proportion with the original action. A good action performed in the expectation of some sort of reward may not be so highly praiseworthy, from the moral standpoint, as one done merely as duty, or for the sake of virtue, independent of the idea of recompense. If any one says, 'I perform liberality, because I am sure it will bring an ample recompense on me', everybody, if not astonished and disgusted at his egoism, will hesitate to praise his action as genuine virtue; or at least will value it far below an unselfish, altruistic action, so far as the motive is concerned. But whether done in the expectation of reward or merely as duty or virtue, or for benevolence sake, the action will

⁰ Almsgiving is usually shown in connexion with belief, the observance of the precepts, learning, knowledge, e.g. A. iii. 53, 80, 181–2; S. iv. 250.
be good so far as its result is concerned. The only difference will be whether the action is performed from a selfish or altruistic motive, entirely indifferent to the result. The presence of this egoistic element in the motive seems to reduce its value to a great extent. This is quite true; liberality done in the expectation of a reward is surely of less value, judged from the commonsense point of view. The action, however, will never be nullified, and the agent will be rewarded as much as he deserves. But if we know that it is hard to find a purely altruistic action from which selfish motive is absolutely absent, or in which its result on the agent himself has never been considered, a liberal action performed in the expectation of a reward will be justified for its presence among virtues. The Buddha recognizes this sort of liberality as virtue, still he seems to value it far below liberality done only for the sake of benevolence or of virtue. In one discourse he specifies the following seven as motives of almsgiving. (a) One man gives alms with the expectation (of the reward), he does so with a heart bound (by the reward), he does so expecting to store up (the reward), he does so thinking, 'I shall enjoy (the reward) in the other world.' (b) Another gives alms thinking, 'almsgiving is good.' (c) Another gives alms thinking, 'almsgiving has formerly been practised by my father and grandfather, and it will not be proper to neglect (hāpetum) an old family custom.' (d) Another gives alms thinking, 'I cook food, but they do not, and it is not proper for one who cooks food not to give alms to those who do not cook food.' (e) Another gives alms thinking, 'As great sacrifices were offered by ancient seers, such as Aṭṭhaka, Vamaka, Vamadeva, Vessamitta, Yamataggi, Angirasa, Bharadvaja, Vesettha, Kassapa,
Bhagu, I shall also distribute alms likewise.’ (f) Another gives alms thinking, ‘When I give alms thus my mind will become serene, and delight and satisfaction will arise within me.’ (g) Another gives alms for the sake of ‘the ornament and decoration of his mind’ (A. iv. 60-3; cf. A. iv. 236; D. iii. 258). It is added that the first one will be reborn in the Cātummahārajika world, and the last one in the Brahmakāyika. Now since there are, according to the Buddhist cosmology, five spheres of the heavenly world between the Cātummahārajika and the Brahmakāyika, it seems that these motives are arranged according to the value of rewards which these seven will bring in the next world; but we cannot be too sure of it. Anyhow it is quite interesting to find in the Piṭaka the mention of these seven motives.

Liberality is thus regarded as a good action because it brings a good or desirable result on the agent, and some practise it because they expect thereby to have such a result. Liberality, on the other hand, is an indication of freedom from attachment, an abominable vice, detrimental to the attainment of Nibbāna. Freedom from attachment is an important condition for attaining Nibbāna, and avarice (macchera) is a form of attachment. Liberality is therefore regarded as a virtue from this standpoint too. Any one ‘taking delight in giving and being of kind nature’, or ‘one intent on giving, wishing to give’, or ‘one generous in giving, ready to be asked, &c.,’ will surely be free from attachment. As we have already said, in Buddhist ethics every virtue has its corresponding vice, and as the latter in each case is a hindrance to attaining the nobler life which the Buddhist seeks, a disposition or action which reverses or opposes it is always regarded as a virtue. The Buddhist
seeking a nobler life should renounce attachment to worldly possessions as a condition of primary importance for attaining it, and liberality is a sure indication of this renunciation.

As Christ teaches us: 'If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow me',\(^1\) or 'Sell that ye have, and give alms';\(^2\) so also the Buddha teaches us to renounce attachment to material possessions. 'You should be, O monks, heirs of spiritual things, but not of material things.'\(^3\) Or on many occasions he has said, 'There are, O monks, two gifts. What are the two? Material gifts and spiritual gifts. Of these two gifts, the spiritual are pre-eminent.'\(^4\) These words suggest that the giving of material things, though praiseworthy in itself, will rank inferior to the giving of spiritual things. It is quite natural that in Buddhism, or in any other religion which always attaches greater importance to spiritual than to material things, the giving of the former should be regarded more highly than that of the latter. The saying that 'The gift of the law (Dhamma) exceeds all gifts' (Dh. 354) will naturally lead to the idea that the givers of the spiritual gifts are pre-eminently worthy, receiving respect, honour, hospitality. They are generally called Dakkhiṇeyyas or 'those who are worthy of receiving offerings'. It is usually to them that the Buddhist layman who is capable of offering gifts is advised to make offerings, and what is given to them, it is declared, will bear much fruit. The Brāhmaṇ

\(^1\) Matt. xix. 21.  
\(^2\) Luke xii. 33.  
\(^3\) M.i.12–16, Dhammadāyasutta or 'Discourse on heirs of spiritual things'.  
\(^4\) A. i. 91, 92; It. 98, 100.
Sundarikabhāradvāja says in praising the Buddha as follows: ‘Thou Buddha deservest the oblation, thou art the best field for good works, the object of offerings to all the world; what is given to thee will bear much fruit’ (Sn. 486; cf. 191). The community of holy persons is also considered to be the best field for good works, and gifts offered to them are equally productive of much fruit. ‘The eight persons that are praised by the righteous, and make these four pairs, they are worthy of receiving offerings, being the Sugata’s disciples; what is given to these will bear much fruit’ (Sn. 227). The Buddha and his disciples who have already entered the holy Paths leading to the attainment of Nibbāna are thus considered to be persons who are most worthy of accepting gifts. Any monk is to be supported by the layman with requisites of life, as Vedic students and ascetics in Brāhmanism are supported by Brāhmanic householders; but those who have entered the four holy Paths are specially regarded as deserving of gifts of faith.

A wandering ascetic Vacchagotta once asked the Buddha if he prohibited heretics from receiving alms when he said: ‘Alms ought to be given to me and my disciples, but not to heretics; alms given to me and my disciples will bring a great result, but not that given to heretics.’ Buddha denied it and said: ‘They are not saying what I have said, and they accuse me falsely saying what is untrue and unreal’. ‘Any one’, he continues, ‘who prevents alms from being given to others will be hindering and obstructing it in three respects. What are the three? He will hinder the giver from attaining merit, and the receiver from obtaining the gift, and first of all his own self will be wounded and injured. As for me, O Vaccha, I say as follows: Slops which are pro-
duced by washing kettles or saucers are thrown into a dirty pool or a dirty ditch, so that creatures living in them may be fed by them. Even from this action, O Vaccha, I declare that merit is obtained, how much more then (from giving alms) to human beings? Still, O Vaccha, I declare that alms given to the virtuous person will produce much fruit, but not that given to the vicious person." It is clear from this declaration that the Buddha is never against alms being given to those belonging to any other religious sect, so far as they are virtuous enough for receiving it. He is a person of a tolerant nature.

Such are free from all mental defilement or depravity; they are pure, serene, limpid, straight in thought and in action; they are virtuous, wise, benevolent, sympathetic, &c.; all desirable qualities and conduct belong to them. Such persons are the salt of the earth; they are examples of moral as well as religious life; the community is indebted to them for its moral soundness. Apart from the thought of special rewards which are said to come out of almsgiving to such holy persons, the community should supply them with the necessaries of life. On the one hand out of sympathy for their life of self-denial, and on the other out of gratitude for their being models of moral life, they fully deserve the material support of the whole community.

Mencius, a Chinese sage, says: 'If a small basket of rice and a platter of soup are offered with an insulting voice, even a tramp will not receive them, or if you first tread upon them, even a beggar will not stoop to take them.' In giving food or anything else from benevolent motives, due respect ought to be paid to the receiver, of

1 A. i. 160-1.  
whatever quality the thing offered may be. The Buddha therefore blames a man for this disrespect and carelessness, because 'he gives coarse or fine alms, and that not respectfully, not considerately, not with his own hands, but in an offhand manner, not believing that it will bring any reward, wherever the reward of that almsgiving may be realized'.\textsuperscript{1} They should give alms 'with believing and cheerful hearts' (\textit{pasannacitta}), and 'with their own hands', which is an indication of respect; and they should not repent of what they have done.\textsuperscript{2}

Attention is equally drawn to receivers. It is not everybody that is entitled to accept offerings, especially those made through believing hearts. Those who have entered the four holy Paths are rightly entitled to receive them, though they will naturally decline to claim this privilege. They have completely or incompletely succeeded in controlling themselves, in purifying themselves from mental depravities, especially from covetousness, and have attained higher stages of self-culture; they are patient, humble, and contented. Nothing will therefore be further from their thoughts than making such a claim. Still it is declared that they are most worthy to receive such offerings, and that offerings made to them will bring the richest fruit.

Monks are often reproved for their inattention to trades or professions, the Buddha himself not being an exception. A Brāhman once blamed him for not ploughing and sowing. The Buddha however declared that he did both, and said: 'Faith is the seed, penance the rain, understanding my yoke and plough, modesty the pole of the plough, mind the tie, thoughtfulness my ploughshare and goad. I am guarded in respect of the body,

\textsuperscript{1} D. ii. 356. \textsuperscript{2} Jāt. iii. 300.
I am guarded in respect of speech, temperate in food; I make truth to cut away (weeds), tenderness is my deliverance. Exertion is my beast of burden; carrying (me) to Nibbāna he goes, without turning back, to the place where having gone one does not grieve. So this ploughing is ploughed, it bears the fruit of immortality; having ploughed this ploughing one is freed from all pain.\textsuperscript{1} Such a person will be fully worthy of receiving alms.

\textsuperscript{1} Sn. 77-80.
XV

REVERENCE


Reverence is an emotion which we feel towards persons who are superior to us in some respects or towards objects which are regarded religiously as sacred. It is on the one hand an expression of gratitude for the indebtedness which we feel we owe to them, and therefore another form of benevolence, and on the other it is negative self-feeling. Whatever the object to which this emotion is directed, these and other feelings, such as trust, awe, wonder, &c., in some cases blend together in it. In Buddhism in which there is no supreme God, this emotion is generally expressed on the one hand towards the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Saṅgha, and on the other towards parents, elders, wise men, teachers, benefactors, &c. In the family and social life of laymen, or in the religious life of monks, reverence is always regarded as a prominent virtue. Early Buddhist literature shows us how the order or well-being of the community has been established by the presence of this virtue among them. It is an essential condition of social welfare. 'So long as', the Buddha says, 'the Vajjians honour, esteem, revere, and support their elders,
and hold it a point of duty to hearken to their words, so long, it may be expected, they will not decline, but prosper' (D. ii. 74). As it is an important condition of the welfare of social life in general, so also it is with the religious community. Mutual respect among them is taught as essential for their harmonious life.

Our first research about this subject will be to discover who or what are regarded in Buddhism as worthy of receiving reverence, honour, respect, or any other marks of esteem from others. The three holy objects, the Buddha, the Dhamma or his doctrine, and the Saṅgha or holy community, will first of all receive profound reverence from all Buddhists. This is a vital condition of conversion in Buddhism. Of these three, the Buddha as the founder of this religion, as the head of the community, as the perfect ideal embodiment of morality and knowledge, and as the unwearyed teacher of the multitude, will naturally deserve the highest homage of the Buddhist community, whether he is alive or dead. In Buddhism, in the early part of its history, or in the Buddha’s lifetime, as may be expected, the consideration of the human side of the Buddha’s personality was still predominant, and it is in later times that his personality was carried to the degree of deification. He was in his simplest capacity merely a teacher, fully self-controlled, fully purified, fully enlightened, and therefore endowed with perfect knowledge and goodness, &c. As the epithets most commonly applied to him show, ‘He is an Arahān, fully awakened, perfect in knowledge and demeanour; he is the well-attained; he has the knowledge of the world; he is the supreme leader of men willing to be tamed; the teacher of gods and men; and the awakened and exalted one’.
The Buddha was the leader of one of the religious movements going on in those parts of India when he appeared in the world. Hundreds of epithets are given to him signifying and eulogizing his various merits and works; their number increased as generations went on; and at the same time explanations about his personality became more and more elaborate. Such elaborateness, however, is the production of the speculation and devotion of the Buddhists in later ages. The Buddhists in the primitive period were satisfied with ascribing less elaborate attributes to him. He was revered merely as a teacher, leader, and saviour. What makes him deserve to receive the worshipping homage and adoration of his followers is the compassionate self-sacrificing spirit which he manifested in both his teaching and life. He is *bahujanahitānukampī* (Sn. 693) or ‘one who sympathetically feels for the welfare of the multitude’; he is *sabbabhūtānukampī* (A. ii. 9; Com. on Thi. p. 175) or ‘one who is compassionate to all beings’; and as such he made strenuous efforts to save the world from suffering, ignorance, and sin. What he did throughout his long life was to accomplish the duty of a saviour of the world. He taught his disciples to do as he did. In the early part of his ministerial life when he had sixty-one disciples, he sent them forth as missionaries to propagate his teaching with these words: ‘Go forth, O monks, on missionary journeys for the benefit and welfare of the multitude, out of compassion for the world, and for the good, benefit, and welfare of beings, divine and human’ (Vin. i. 21). The Buddha’s intention and exertion were thus to promote the good, benefit, and welfare of the world by means of the teaching which he had instituted. He did this himself and taught his disciples to do the same.
Such a person, whether he is a Buddha or not, will be fully worthy of receiving all forms of reverence, not only from his followers, but also from others.

Next to the Buddha comes the Dhamma. It is very difficult to define this pregnant term in a few words. As one of the three objects of worship and reverence, however, it seems to denote the doctrine which the Buddha taught, which is summarized in the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths, and concentrated in Nibbâna, the summum bonum of the whole system of Buddhist culture. The most frequently recurring passage explaining the nature of the Dhamma is: 'Well proclaimed by the Exalted One is the Dhamma as bearing on the present life, not involving time, inviting all to come and see, to be understood by every wise man for himself'.¹ The Dhamma ought to be revered by the Buddhist, as the sacred fire is revered by the Brâhman (Dh. 392).

The third object of reverence is the Saṅgha or community of monks. As we have already mentioned, the Buddhist lay people on the one hand out of sympathy with them for their self-controlled way of living, and on the other out of thankfulness to them for exhibiting social virtues in themselves, ought to revere, honour, and support them with the necessaries of life. Monks are called sons of the Buddha; they are inheritors of the Dhamma of the Buddha,² as the laymen are inheritors of material things of their fathers; they are also teachers, leaders, and saviours of the world, as the Buddha himself is. As the Buddha's sole intention is to save the world from pain and suffering, from ignorance and sin, so also is their intention. And as the Buddha himself is

¹ D. iii. 5 et passim; the translation is taken from SBB. iv. 10–11.
² M. i. 12–16.
respected, so also they must be treated with every form of respect; they must be supplied with the requisites of life. This is a duty incumbent upon the Buddhist layman. The Brāhmans do this to their Vedic students and ascetics, and the Buddhists must do this to their homeless brethren. But it ought to be borne in mind that it is not every monk that deserves to receive such liberality and reverence at the hand of his lay brother. As we have repeatedly stated, properly speaking it is only those monks who have entered the paths of sanctification that are worthy of receiving such honour. To quote the most familiar passage: 'They are those who are trained well, the order of the Exalted One's disciples, even the four branches thereof; the eight classes of individuals well trained in uprightness, in principle, and in courtesy. This order should be respected and revered; gifts should be given to it, and homage; for it is the world's unsurpassed field (for sowing) merit.'¹ Or a monk who is not attracted and distracted by a pleasant object, but is able to tranquillize his mind even in its presence, as the king's state elephant, which sees and hears the hostile army approaching, though struck with one or many arrows, is yet able to stand fast in the battle-field—such a monk is worthy of receiving respect, honour, offering, or any other form of reverence.²

On the other hand, monks are often warned against receiving marks of reverence without fully deserving them. Monks may not yet have entered the paths of sanctification; but are making strenuous efforts to attain superior morality, superior contemplation, and superior wisdom. Such monks will probably deserve to receive liberality and homage from others. 'If a monk even

¹ D. iii. 5, passim. ² A. iii. 158; cf. 162, 248, 279.
for the time of snapping the fingers extends his loving, compassionate, pleasing, or equanimous heart towards others, he is called a true monk; he lives not vainly in his contemplation; he is a preacher of the doctrine of the Teacher, a practiser of exhortation; and the alms which is given by the public and enjoyed by him is not without fruit. Reverence paid to these three objects may be called religious reverence, which is incumbent upon all Buddhists. They ought as one of their duties to revere them whole-heartedly. Such reverence, together with the observance of the five precepts and belief in the Buddha’s perfect enlightenment, is always mentioned as the first condition of Buddhist conversion.

As to moral reverence, contrasted with what we call religious reverence, parents should first of all receive deep reverence from their children. The most important virtue in the domestic and social life of the Buddhist is filial duty. This we may understand from aphoristic sayings of the Buddha, which we find recorded here and there in the Piṭaka, or from long discourses, specially delivered for the purpose of teaching its importance. ‘He who being rich’, says the Buddha, ‘does not support mother or father who are old or past their youth, ... that is the cause (of loss) to the loser’ (Sn. 98); ‘Whosoever strikes or by words annoys mother or father ... let one know him as an outcast’ (Sn. 124). ‘Let the householder dutifully maintain his parents, and practise an honourable trade; he who observes this strenuously goes to the gods by name Sayampabhas’ (Sn. 404). ‘Waiting on mother and father, protecting child and wife, and a quiet calling; this is the highest blessing’ (Sn. 262). Mother and father are placed in the same rank as the

^ A. i. 10.
Buddha and his disciples; and it is said that 'on account of right behaviour towards these four persons, the wise, good, and sensible man lives, his virtues maintained and preserved; he is praised and well spoken of by the wise, he stores up much merit' (A. i. 90; ii. 4). Families, the children of which honour their mothers and fathers at home, are called families like Brahmā, families like ancient gods, families like ancient teachers, families worthy of worship (It. 106).

Buddhism is strikingly contrasted with two great Oriental religions, Brāhmanism and Confucianism, in some respects; and among these is the absence of filial duty in Buddhism after parents have departed from the world, which in the other two religions is regarded of as much importance as the duty which is to be fulfilled during their lifetime.¹ The Śrāddha or funeral rite performed in honour of departed parents and relatives is one of the first obligations of a Brāhman householder. Offering sacrifice to the Manes of fathers is enjoined in Confucianism as a duty of primary importance.² But nothing of this sort is found in Buddhism. In spite of the fact that the Buddha attaches great stress to filial duty, that he teaches the existence of the future world, and the great merit of almsgiving, he never instructs his disciples to offer sacrifice or oblation for the welfare of departed parents or relatives. If the words Pumuñcantu sādham (Vin. i. 7) and Muttasaddho (Sn. 1, 146) mean, as some scholars suggest, 'Give up performing funeral rites' and 'one who has abandoned performing funeral rites' respectively, the abandonment of rites to be per-

¹ As to the funeral rite, performed for dead parents or relatives, see Gautana, XV.
² *The Chinese Classics*, vol. i. 147; ii. 236.
formed for the sake of the departed is one of the first conditions of the conversion of a Brāhman into Buddhism. This shows a striking contrast with Brāhmanism. While in the latter it is regarded as a duty of high importance for a householder, in the former it is absolutely discarded. In this respect Buddhism entirely differs from the two others. Filial duty in Buddhism ends in the world. Both in Brāhmanism and in Confucianism the maintenance of lineage is the most important family duty, and this is regarded as important because rites can only be performed by keeping it up. In the former a son is believed to be able to save his father from the suffering of hell, while in the latter the interruption of the family lineage through the absence of a male descendant is considered the greatest sin against fathers. But we have nothing of the sort in Buddhism.

Filial duty as it is taught in Buddhism is not founded upon authority on the part of parents, as is the case in Brāhmanism; but upon gratitude on the part of children for the affection, benevolence, &c., of parents. It is generally admitted that mutual affection between parents and children is natural; still while the affection of parents towards children is so strong and common that no admonition is needed for anything more than how parental affection can be turned into the true benefit of children, that of children towards parents is not always present. In other words, parental love is the commonest and strongest of all loves, and every parent loves his child, but it is not every child that is grateful to his parents for what they feel, think, say, and do for him. Still if it is virtuous for us to feel grateful to any one for what he feels or does for us or for our sake, the affection and benevolence of parents felt or shown to us ought to
be requited before anything else. Filial duty is thus based upon the gratitude of children to their parents for what the latter feel or do for them. They are ekantahita, or 'those who solely wish for the welfare of children' (Jāt. i. 114); the mother is said to be the best friend of her children at home (S. i. 87). Or, as the frequently recurring passage shows us: 'A mother is good towards her only beloved child' (e.g. Tha. 33), or, 'A mother at the risk of her life watches over her own child' (e.g. Sn. 149); so mother and father always and solely wish the welfare of their children. True motherly and fatherly feeling is solely wishing the welfare of their children. No mother and father of normal sense will ever dream of wishing for the adversity of their children. They are ready to sacrifice everything lying in their power for the benefit of their children. As the Buddha says in the Siṅgalovādasuttanta, 'they restrain the child from vice, they exhort him to virtue, they train him to a profession, they contract a suitable marriage for him, and in due time they hand over their inheritance to him' (D. iii. 189). Materiaally and spiritually our indebtedness to our parents is great and not easy to be requited. As to the unrequitableness of this indebtedness, the Buddha says as follows: 'We may carry our mothers on one shoulder, and our fathers on the other, and attend on them even for a hundred years, doing them bodily services in every possible way, and establishing them in the position of universal sovereignty; still the favour we have received from our parents will be far from being requited' (A. i. 61–2). The indebtedness of children to their parents for their affection and benevolence is so great; in some sense, they owe everything they possess to their parents. In teaching
gratitude it is natural that Buddhism should enjoin us to revere our parents, and to requite what we owe to them. 'In five ways', says the Buddha, 'a child should minister to his parents as the eastern quarter... Once supported by them I will now be their support; I will perform duties incumbent upon them; I will keep up the lineage and tradition of my family; I will make myself worthy of my heritage' (D. iii. 189).

Nothing is enough to repay so great a favour, except to induce faithless parents to adopt the faith, impious parents to practise piety, selfish parents to be liberal, and unwise parents to be wise (A. i. 62).

Besides the three holy objects and parents, reverence ought to be paid to elders, wise men, the learned, teachers, &c. Elders are generally respected in the Oriental countries. A Chinese sage teaches that old age should be regarded highly in village clans. The same idea prevails in Buddhism. In the family and social life of the layman, and in the religious life of the monk, old people or senior members are always respected, simply because they are senior to others in age and in experience in the community. As we have already said, the Buddha among the conditions of social welfare and prosperity, mentions 'honouring, esteeming, revering, and supporting their elders, and holding it a point of duty to hearken to their words'. Senior members of society are thus to receive due homage from the junior. This idea perhaps comes from the desirability and rarity of long life, and on the other hand it is because old age generally implies great social experience and wisdom, which are invaluable in human life. As the Buddha says, grey hair is not always an indication of the elder,
it merely indicates the maturity of age (Dh. 260); still the maturity of age is generally the sign of much experience, and the high value of experience in any department of human life goes without saying. In the Tittirajātaka (Jāt. i. 217-20), a partridge, a monkey, and an elephant, who were dwelling together near a banyan tree, but always quarrelling with one another, come to a decision to live in harmony, paying respect according to their age. And as it was proved that the partridge, the smallest creature of all, was the oldest, he received the highest homage from his two neighbours. The Buddha once quoted this story in admonishing the monks about the necessity of junior brethren paying respect to senior members of the Order, which he says is essential for their harmonious life. Monks' religious life in the Order is reckoned from the date when they joined the Order through the Upasampadā ceremony. And the mere seniority of joining the Order is considered to be a reason of receiving homage from others. The Buddha praises Aññātā-Koṇḍaññia among monks, and Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī among nuns as rattāññius, or 'those who have passed most nights in the Order'; because these two were the first monk and the first nun whom the Buddha ordained; and simply as such they received high reverence from their brethren and sisters.

Old people, however, strictly speaking, deserve to receive high respect and homage from others as the resources of social wisdom. If therefore there is no wisdom in old age, it will be far from being valuable. It is quite natural that the Indian religions, Buddhism included, which always regard wisdom highly, should esteem old age equally highly on the supposition that it indicates the existence of wisdom. But it is only as
possible sources of wisdom that they are worthy of receiving high homage from their fellow men. If old folk lack the wisdom of social life or anything else, they will cease to deserve respect. As the Buddha says: ‘A man is not an elder because his hair is grey; his age may be ripe, but he is called Old-in-vain’ (Dh. 260). Old age is only to be respected so far as it is an indication of wisdom; and anybody, regardless of old age, if he possesses some sort of wisdom, ought to receive due homage.

In Brāhmanism wisdom and learning are of high value. Wise Brāhmans are said to be the best of all Brāhmans (Mn. I. 97); a king and a learned priest must be respected (Mn. III. 120; Ba. II. 5, 37); the offerings to the gods and the Manes are to be given to a learned man (Mn. III. 128; IV. 31; Va. III. 8); or a king should honour a learned man by exempting him from taxes and by not calling him as a witness (Mn. VII. 133; VIII. 65, 395; Ga. X. 11; Ap. II. 26, 10; Va. I. 43; XIX. 23). These are only a few instances to show how wise or learned men thus enjoy special privileges, material and spiritual, in Brāhmanism.

Old age and wisdom are thus to receive high respect in Buddhism, but the highest respect is due to virtue. The Buddha is revered among many other things because of his being richly endowed with virtue; the Sangha is respected because it is a group of *religieux* who are virtuous regarding themselves as well as others. We have said before that in Buddhism morality or virtue is regarded more highly than knowledge; and therefore virtuous men should be more valued than wise men. Pasenadi, king of the Kosalas, once questioned the Buddha how he, being still young in age, dared to declare
himself as having attained the supreme perfect Enlightenment, while those six teachers, who were each the leader of a group of followers, and who were well known among the people, did not make such a declaration. The Buddha replied that there were four objects, a prince, a snake, fire, and a monk, which could not be disregarded and disdained on account of their youthfulness, and that a monk should be respected because of his virtuous and other endowments (S. i. 68-9).
XVI

GRATITUDE


Men are social beings, and naturally have an inclination for forming societies. While they associate with one another, establishing some sorts of relations among themselves, they show affection or respect to one another, or they do service to one another. While benevolence, in its general sense, originates in the love of fellow-beings, gratitude springs from the feeling of obligation for affection, respect, or service received. The former is primary and active, while the latter is secondary and passive, as this feeling arises when something good or desirable, whether material or immaterial, is conferred by another. Nevertheless it is valuable as a social virtue.

Human beings are related to one another in a thousand complicated ways. Besides relations between those who are closely connected, there are numerous others, though some of them are of an indirect and consequently obscure nature. Those who live in places of the remotest distance may be connected in some way; and some relations may be established between those who live in this age and those who lived in the earliest part
of the history of mankind. Distance of time and space does not impede the formation of relation. The doctrine of transmigration, taught by all Indian religions, and especially by Buddhism, convinces us, though apparently merely theoretically, of the probable presence of some relation between one being and another, not only among mankind, but among all sentient beings. And if there is any relation between them, it follows that they are benefited in some way or other by each other. And strictly speaking, we ought to be grateful to one another for these benefits. Grateful minds will remember that they owe some benefits to those who now inhabit far distant regions of the world, or to those who lived in a time of great antiquity. It may sound merely absurd to speak of such a sort of obligation, but on further consideration it will be found not at all absurd. The veracity of this assertion has been amply proved by modern science. But it is not this sort of obligation and gratefulness that we are going to discuss now.

We have said before that where there is any relation, the giving and receiving of kindness is going on in some form. To limit the discussion to the Buddhist community, there are relations between monks and lay people, between one monk and another, and among lay people, and as any one is always receiving kindness from another, he ought to feel obliged for it and make efforts to requite it in some way, if it is not impossible to do so. Mention is often made of two sorts of donation, spiritual and temporal, the one meaning 'preaching the doctrine' or spiritual guidance, and the other 'giving requisites of life' or support of livelihood. Monks on their side have a spiritual gift to bestow upon lay people.

\[^{1}\text{e. g. A. i. 91; It. 98.}\]
The former are the leaders of the latter so far as spiritual matters are concerned. The community of monks, monks in the true sense of the word, i.e. those who are walking on one of the Four Noble Paths leading to Nibbāna, forms one of the three objects. 'The disciples of the Bhagavā (or the Buddha) are well-conducted, they live uprightly, prudently, and properly; they are (classed collectively as) four pairs and eight individuals. The disciples of the Bhagavā are fit objects for worship, worthy of hospitality, offering, and respectful salutation. They are the best merit-producing field for the lay world.'¹ They are collectively regarded as a refuge, a lamp, an object of recollection, an object of faith and worship; they are donors of the spiritual gift, which is 'the best of all gifts' (Dh. 354); they are 'leaders of the world of men and gods' (Sn. 86). They are heirs of the Buddha in spiritual matters (dhammadāyādā, M. i. 12–16). They have freed themselves from every sort of defilement and evil; they 'have attained the highest gain, i.e. Nibbāna' (Sn. 228), and 'having known the best, i.e. Nibbāna, as the best, they expound and explain the Dhamma' (Sn. 87). Leading a life of purity and holiness, and making constant efforts to ennoble and elevate themselves, monks guide lay people not only through their speech, but also through their action and life of self-control and self-contentedness. They are perpetually 'intent on the accomplishment of their own as well as others' benefit'.² A community of such monks fully deserves gratitude at the hand of the laity. They are fit objects of worship, they are worthy of hospitality, offering, and respectful salutation; because they form

¹ A. i. 208; ii. 56; iii. 212, 286, et passim.
² A. iv. 134–5; S. i. 162; ii. 20.
the field yielding the best fruit for the laity, the gift which is bestowed upon them will yield the richest fruit.

Assistance, however, is mutual. While monks feed their lay brethren and sisters with spiritual food, the latter on their part supply the former with material food and other requisites of life. As the latter are bound to the former for spiritual guidance, so the former ought to feel obliged to the latter for their material support. Pleasure of life, in the ordinary sense of the word, is absolutely denied to monks who are bound through their monastic vow to live contentedly with scanty food, clothing, and other necessaries; but as there is no possible means for them to maintain themselves, they must resort to their lay friends for help; because earning a livelihood is absolutely forbidden them by the commandment of the Buddha. In this connexion the Iti-vuttaka says as follows:—

Both those with houses and those without houses,
Being mutually dependent upon each other,
Do exalt the Good Law,
Which is Security unsurpassed.
And from them that have houses the houseless
Receive clothes, requisites (for sickness),
Beds and seats,
Shelter and entertainment.
Through reliance, moreover, on the Auspicious One,
Both householders and those without houses
Have faith in the Sanctified One,
And meditate with noble wisdom,
Having here (on earth) fulfilled the Law,
The Path that leadeth to Felicity,
They rejoice within the world of the gods,
(For) they follow their pleasure, and take joy therein.\(^1\)

\(^1\) It. 107: *Sayings of the Buddha*, p. 125.
Indebtedness is thus reciprocal, and both monks and lay people ought to feel obligation to each other. It is a rule with Buddhist monks to express their thanks when they receive alms at the hand of the laity.¹ The Buddha prescribed this rule to be observed by all monks; accordingly the head of the assembly, as occasions arise, always has to express thanks on behalf of all. This Sāriputta did.² So also did the Buddha himself (e. g.) on two occasions, when the chief of Rājagaha constructed sixty cells (vihāra) and dedicated them to the Buddha and his disciples, and when the pious Sudatta dedicated the famous Jetavana monastery to them. Among other things, he uttered the following words on these occasions:³ ‘... Therefore any wise man who regards his own benefit should construct cells agreeable to live in and make the learned reside therein. He should give with a pure heart food and drink, raiment and places of rest to the upright-minded. They shall preach to him the doctrine, which will remove all pain and suffering, and on understanding it he being free from depravity will enter into Nibbāna in this very life.’⁴

The technical term representing gratitude on these occasions is Anumodana, meaning ‘subsequent rejoicing’ or ‘sympathetic joy’, that is to say, ‘taking delight in another’s meritorious deed’. It was self-evident to people of those days that the material support conferred upon those who were making strenuous efforts for deliverance or enlightenment would bring ample merit on the giver in this life and in the next. The Buddha

---

¹ Vin. ii. 212.
³ Vin. ii. 147–8, 164; see also Jat. i. 91, 422.
⁴ SBE. xx, p. 160.
in conformity to this idea praises the generous deeds of the donors and approvingly declares that they will produce happy results. It must be pleasant for donors to hear their deeds spoken of in such high terms. The happy mood in which donors are placed as the result of the Anumodana formula will sufficiently reward their liberal-mindedness. No wonder therefore that in Pali literature of a later period we see that Anumodana itself came to be regarded as one of the meritorious deeds.¹

As to the Buddha's discourses on gratitude and ingratitude, we do not find many of them in the Pitaka. Perhaps the following are the few that are worth mentioning for the present. The Buddha once discoursed on the condition of the wicked person and that of the virtuous person. 'The wicked person', he says, 'is one who is not grateful and who does not bear in mind any good rendered to him. The disposition of the ungrateful man, who does not bear in mind a good rendered to him, is recognized by wicked people. The disposition of the ungrateful man, who does not bear in mind a good rendered to him, is the condition of the wicked person.' The Buddha then proceeds to discourse on the condition of the virtuous person in the reverse words.² One early morning the Buddha heard an old jackal crying, and that day he interwove this incident into a discourse, in the course of which he said: 'Did you, O monks, hear a jackal crying at dawn this morning?' 'Yes, reverend sir.' It is possible that that old jackal may have a grateful mind, and that here (in our religion)

¹ Abhidhammaṭṭhasaṅgaha, 297; Saddhammapāyana, 213, 218, 510–16.
² A. i. 61–2.
those who profess to be followers of the son of Sakya may not have one. Therefore, O monks, you ought to train yourselves like this: Let us be grateful and bear in mind what has been done to us, and let us not forget even a particle of what has been done to us. O monks, you ought to train yourselves like this.\textsuperscript{1} The Mahāmaṅgalaśutta, though, according to its introductory narrative, said to have been preached for a certain god, has the following interesting passage: ‘Respect, humility, contentment, gratitude, and listening from time to time to the doctrine preached; this is the highest bliss.’\textsuperscript{2} Gratitude is thus spoken of in high terms, it is regarded as one of the most blissful mental conditions, and the Buddha admonishes his disciples to train themselves in gratitude, while ingratitude is regarded as the condition of the wicked person.

In the Siṅgalovādasuttanta\textsuperscript{3} the Buddha distributes relations between parent and child, teacher and pupil, husband and wife, householders and friends and relatives, employer and employee, and householders and Samaṇas and Brāhmans, in six directions, i.e. the four cardinal points and the nadir and zenith. Distributing six relations in the six directions, he points out that there are duties to be exchanged between the two of each pair. To be more exact, according to his idea, there are duties to be fulfilled by a child to his parent, by a pupil to his teacher, by a husband to his wife, by a householder to his friend and kinsmen, by an employer to his employee, and by a householder to a Samaṇa and a Brāhman, for the affection, benefit, or service which the former receives from the latter. It will be too tedious for us to go through all these one by one, though we

\textsuperscript{1} S. ii. 272. \textsuperscript{2} Sn. 265. \textsuperscript{3} D. iii. 180-93.
believe that they are fully worth describing; and consequently we are obliged to be satisfied with the verse which summarizes the detailed explanation of these duties. The verse may be roughly translated like this: 'Mother and father are (distributed in) the eastern direction, a teacher in the south, wife and child in the west, friends and relatives in the north, servants and labourers in the nadir, and Samaṇas and Brāhmans in the zenith. A layman who has sufficient wealth in his house should worship all these directions (as representing them). One who is wise, gentle, and not harsh, possessed of virtue and intelligence, and of humble disposition, will obtain fame. One who is vigorous, wise, and not lazy, who does not tremble in the face of disaster, and whose conduct is free from blame, will obtain fame. A kindly, friendly, bountiful person, who has got beyond selfishness, a guide, a leader, a teacher, will obtain fame. Charity, agreeable speech, fruitful conduct, and having the same interest in things whatever they happen to be, these are the elements of goodwill of the world, like the linchpin of a wheel in motion. If there are not these elements of goodwill, mother and father will not obtain honour and reverence on account of their son. As wise men reflect upon these elements of goodwill, so they attain greatness and are praiseworthy.'

In this discourse the Buddha prescribes the mutual duties between those who are particularly related to each other, and admonishes them that they should with thankful minds requite benefits which they receive from others who stand in various relations with them under different circumstances. Of all duties which we understand to be different forms of expressing gratitude, so far as they mean requitals of kindness shown to us or
benefit given to us, the most prominent is that towards our parents, because the most important relation in human society, at least from the Buddhist point of view, is that between parent and child. Throughout the Piṭaka, therefore, we find this relation most frequently referred to, and at the same time the greatest importance is attached to it. Matricide and parricide are included in the greatest crimes.\(^1\) The Buddha once,\(^2\) as we have referred to in the previous chapter, preached on the impossibility of returning the kindness done by parents to their children, because of its greatness. Bodily services which children can do to their parents, and material gifts which they can offer them, are not sufficient to requite the kindness which has been done to them. A child, as we have said before, may requite the kindness of his parents only by doing them spiritual services.

In the Mahāyāna-mūlajāta-hṛidayabhūmi-dhyāna-sūtra\(^3\) the Buddha is described as having preached on four sorts of indebtedness which the Buddhists owe: to parents, king, fellow-beings, and the three holy objects. So far as the Pāli Piṭaka is concerned, we do not find these sorts of indebtedness mentioned together, as in this Sūtra. What the Buddha most emphasizes in this discourse is children’s indebtedness to their parents, and what interests us in this connexion is that the relations between a king and his subjects, a human being and his fellows, and the three holy objects and the Buddhists, are all likened to that of parent and child. In other words, the king looks upon his subjects, one man upon another, and the three holy objects upon the Buddhists, with fatherly or motherly loving eyes, while the latter upon the former

\(^1\) See Vin. i. 88, 136, 166, 320, 321, 322; ii. 212.

\(^2\) A. i. 62.

\(^3\) Nanjo’s Catalogue, No. 955.
with gratitude which children have to their parents for what they feel they owe to them. We may say therefore that the Buddhist love, wherever it may find itself, is always motherly or fatherly love, and the Buddhist gratitude is always the same as that which a dutiful child feels to his parents. The idea of all relations in human society is thus allied to that of the relation between parent and child, which is natural and changeless, and which in the Buddhist ethics is regarded as the most important of all.
XVII

TOLERATION

The Buddha, a Person of a tolerant Nature (237). He never uses harsh Language in rebuking his Disciples (238). He sees them with fatherly Eyes (239). His Tolerance towards Heretics (239). He does not prevent Alms being given to Heretics (240). He is tolerant and patient in converting People (241).

In dealing with the Buddhist virtues we should not pass over toleration without making some remarks upon it; this is another characteristic Buddhist virtue. The Buddha himself was a person of a wonderfully tolerant nature; and in overlooking insults or injuries which his religious adversaries inflicted upon him, in recognizing the excellent doctrinal points of other philosophical or religious systems, in forgiving the faults which his disciples consciously or unconsciously committed, or furthermore in recommending his new converts to offer food and drink to their old religious teachers and their followers, he showed an unparalleled toleration. He was a wonderfully broad-minded person. And nobody will fail to see that while the self-regarding virtues of Buddhism are generally strict or even of an austere nature, other-regarding or social virtues, one of which is toleration, are of a conspicuously catholic nature. Be strict to yourself, but be tolerant to others. Forbear or forgive the indolences or offences of other people; but be strict in controlling yourself. This is the gist of the Buddhist moral idea. Buddhism, we dare to say, is the religion that is the freest from prejudice or exclusiveness, or even from bigotry.
The monk Sarabha, after leaving the Buddha's religion, declared as a wandering ascetic that he understood this religion perfectly well, and that as the result of his perfect understanding of it he left it. Other monks hearing of the declaration reported it to the Buddha. He accordingly went to see Sarabha and asked him if the report was true. He then said: 'Tell me, O Sarabha, how you understand this doctrine of the Samanā, son of the Sakya. If what you declare is not perfect, I shall make it perfect; but if what you declare is perfect, I shall be pleased with it.' Even in the case in which his disciples committed offences, the Buddha never used any harsh language, but simply rebuked them gently for their committal, usually saying: 'It is improper, O monks, what these foolish persons are doing, it is unbecoming, indecent, unworthy of Samanās, unallowable, and to be avoided,' or sometimes, 'How dare these foolish persons commit this offence? This will not do for converting the unconverted, and for augmenting the number of the converted, but it will result in the unconverted being repulsed from the faith and many of the converted being estranged.'

These were the words which the Buddha used in rebuking his disciples when they committed any offence. The group of six notorious monks, who gave so much trouble to the Buddha by their constant evil-doing, was merely blamed for it in the same words. Devadatta, the Buddha's own cousin, who as we have already said plotted to cause a schism among the community, after

---

1 A. i. 185-8.
2 Vin. i. 45; ii. 2; iii. 20; SBE. xiii. 153; xvii. 330.
3 Vin. i. 154; SBE. xiii. 322, passim.
4 Vin. i. 84-5, passim.
5 A. ii. 73; Vin. ii. 178-203.
failing in the attempt to take over their leadership upon himself was merely told to be publicly denounced by the community as his words and actions were not in accordance with the Buddha's doctrine. And we can imagine how gently he admonished and instructed his disciples when they were divided into two parties during his stay in Kosambi. He told them the beautiful story of Prince Dīghāyu, though it proved useless, and in consequence he was obliged to leave them alone for some time. No angry words came out of his mouth in these cases. He was strict, but in his strictness there was something which attracted others to him.

The Buddha always saw his disciples with fatherly eyes. Between him and his disciples there were feelings similar to those existing between parents and children. Nandaka calls himself 'The Buddha's own son of noble breed' (Tha. 174). Gayākassapa, Kālidāyi, Aṅgulimāla, and an unknown monk call themselves the Buddha's sons (Tha. 348, 536, 889, 1237). These feelings also exist between teacher and pupil among monks. Their feelings towards each other are not merely those existing between ordinary teacher and pupil. Though the natural family bonds of monks are entirely cut off, still fatherly and childlike feelings in their new relations are regarded as essential for teacher and pupil. Rebuoke therefore which the former utters for the latter's sake is that which a father utters when he reproves his son on account of his wrong ideas or bad conduct. He rebukes him out of benevolence, compassion, pity; he rebukes him with tears in his eyes; in other words, he rebukes him with a motherly or fatherly heart.

The Buddha was tolerant towards heretics. He had no

1 Vin. i. 387-59.
prejudice against their ceremonies, though surely on many occasions he taught the uselessness of ceremony and asceticism. When he went to convert Uruvelakassapa and his brothers, he stayed one night in a room where a sacred fire was kept burning.\(^1\) He sat one day by a sacred fire, discussing the unprofitableness of the worldly life.\(^2\) In these cases, we may say, he simply disregarded the sacredness of the fire. Fire, whether sacred or ordinary, made no difference to him. And though he blames Brāhmans for their ceremonialism, asceticism, caste system, greediness, haughtiness, and other vices, he always praised, as we have said before, Brāhmans in the true sense of the word, genuine or ideal Brāhmans. He was not that sort of man who takes amiss anything good or bad, because of its connexion with others. Many a time heretics being jealous of the Buddha’s success, plotted to defame him by foul means; but they never succeeded in their plots. And in these cases he is never known to have attacked them openly, or even uttered any angry words against them.

The most noteworthy instance of toleration, however, is that which he showed towards Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, when he (the Buddha) converted Sīha, general of the Licchavi tribe, who was originally a follower of Nātaputta. One day Sīha approached the Buddha, and, as a result of listening to a long discourse, became his follower. On his confession of faith in the three holy objects of the Buddhist, the Buddha advised him in two respects: he told the general to do things with due consideration because he had been well known among his community as a follower of Nātaputta; and secondly he told him to give food and drink to the Nigaṇṭhas, such as they had

\(^1\) Vin. i. 24. \(^2\) M. i. 502-3.
been used to have in his house. This toleration on the part of the Buddha pleased the general very much.\footnote{Vin. i. 233–8; SBE. xvii. 108–17.} Nātaputta on his part seems not to have restrained his indignation and jealousy against the Buddha, because according to the Jātaka (ii. 262) he blamed the Buddha for taking flesh which was purposely prepared for his entertainment, which, if true, is evidently against the Buddha’s own instruction.

The Buddha declares that he does not prohibit the gift of alms to others, for this prohibition would hinder the giver and receiver from partaking in the merit accumulated by this action; and at the same time such a person uproots and destroys his own self. As for himself, the Buddha says, he will never do such a thing, but he insists upon alms being given to virtuous people, but not to vicious ones; because alms given to the latter will be fruitless, while that given to the former will bear ample fruit.\footnote{Quoted before, p. 211; A. i. 160–1.} What concerns him are religious views and moral conduct, whether right or wrong, good or bad, from his own standpoint; and if they are wrong and bad, he will set them right.

In converting or merely instructing people the Buddha was patient and tolerant, as in the case of Ālavaka, when this Yakkha or demon, so says the story, three times told the Buddha to come out and go in. The Buddha obeyed him so far, but when he was told to do the same for a fourth time, he refused to do it, and told the demon to do anything he liked. The latter asked him some questions, saying that if he failed to give satisfactory answers to them he would tear his heart, and taking him by the legs would throw him across the river. He was,
however, so much satisfied with the answers that he was converted to the faith (Sn. 181–92; S. i. 213–15). Kasībhāradvāja reproved the Buddha for his idleness or eating without ploughing and sowing. The Buddha’s reply to this was that he also ate by ploughing and sowing. He then explained how he ploughed and sowed in his own way. The Brāhmaṇa being convinced by it was converted (Sn. pp. 12–16; S. i. 172–3). Another Yakkha called Sūciloma (Needle-haired) threatened to harm the Buddha by rubbing his body against him. The Buddha took his body away, and when the Yakkha asked his questions, he was satisfied with answers and became a convert (Sn. pp. 47–9; S. i. 207–8). Or in the conversions of the three Kassapas (Vin. i. 24–35) and Aṅgulimāla (M. i. 97–100), the Buddha showed unparalleled patience and tolerance.

1 This Brāhmaṇa called the Buddha a Muṇḍaka or shaveling.
2 The Yakkha called him a Samaṇaka or contemptible ascetic.
XVIII

VERACITY

Lying, its different Forms (244). Truth-seeking and Truth-speaking essential Things (245). The Buddha's Titles to show the Importance of Knowledge (246). Knowing Things as they are is essential for Buddhist Culture (247). Aphorisms with regard to Truth-speaking (248). Ancient Brāhmans allowed to speak Untruth under certain Circumstances (249). Two Reasons for telling Lies (250). Saccakiriya or solemn Asseveration (252). Brāhma Ordeals (254). No Gods are called on in Buddhist Asseverations (255). Truth is a religious and moral Duty (256).

Abstinence from lying is one of the five precepts. It is included in the eight precepts of the layman,¹ the ten precepts of the novice, and the Patimokkha.² That is to say, Buddhists of all classes are specially taught to avoid lying. A layman, a novice, and a monk and their female equivalents are equally admonished to refrain from telling a lie. Generally speaking, lying is one of the most common evils existent in society. People of the primitive ages could not free themselves from committing it, and people of the most civilized community are apt to give way to it. Young or old, wise or ignorant, people intentionally or unintentionally, some with innocent harmless minds, while some others from wicked harmful motives, perpetrate this sin. In its simplest form it is committed independent of other sins,

¹ About the eight precepts, see A. i. 211-12, 214-15 (= Com. on Thi. p. 38); iv. 248-51, 388-90; Sn. 400-2; Mil. 383, 336.
² Pacittiya, No. 1.
but in the vast majority of cases it is committed in connexion with others. In fact hardly any serious sin will be found without this sin being interwoven in it to some extent. Hypocrisy, treachery, dishonesty, double-tongue, false testimony, to all of which the Buddha has referred so many times in his sermons, are but different forms of lying. It is the root and a necessary element of every moral sin. As the Buddha says, 'If a man has transgressed one law (or the truth, so says the commentator), and speaks lies, and scoffs at the other world, there is no sin which he will not commit.'¹ A sinful man in general is or has been a liar, and a liar in course of time is apt to turn out some sort of a sinner. Lying is followed by other sins, or they go together. Surely there will be no sin which a liar does not commit. It is therefore quite necessary to warn against this evil.

As lying is a detestable vice, so truth-speaking or veracity is an admirable virtue; and it is to this virtue that we have to refer chiefly at the present. Buddhism is a religion of truth, as much as it is a religion of good and purity. It teaches us 'not to commit any evil, but to do good'; it teaches us 'to cleanse ourselves of mental evils,' and it teaches us 'not to tell a lie, but to cling to the truth'. The truth, we may say, is the supreme goal which this religion always recommends us to reach; and understanding the truth,² or knowledge of things as they are,³ is regarded as a highly valuable thing from the Buddhist philosophical point of view. We may mention in this connexion that Moha or stupidity is one of the three radical evils in the Buddhist

¹ Dh. 176.
² Saccabhisamaya; Sn. 758; Tha. 593.
³ Yathābhūtānāṇa; S. ii. 130-1, et passim.
philosophy, the other two being Rāga or lust and Dosa or hatred, and that Avijjā or ignorance is always looked upon as the root and basis of all evils. The Buddha himself sought after the truth and found it out. So did his direct disciples who always followed the example set by the Buddha. Buddhism, which objectively is a religion of truth, subjectively is a religion of knowledge, as Indian religions generally are; and as such it teaches the possibility of final salvation through the force of knowledge. Salvation, as set forth by Buddhism, is based upon the perfect knowledge of things; and naturally a high value is assigned to truth-loving, truth-seeking, and truth-attaining. The Buddha asserts that the truth eternally exists whether he had appeared in the world or not;¹ and that he has only succeeded in revealing it to mankind, as the result of the exercise of his intellect. In the first declaration of the Buddha after he attained enlightenment we find the words: 'The true nature of things has been revealed to (me)';² which amounts to saying that he came to know things as they really are. Understanding things as they really are was the main purport of the Buddha's enlightenment. The Pāli word for the truth is Sacca, equivalent to the Sanskrit Satya, which comes from the root as, 'to be'. The truth therefore with the ancient Indians, Buddhist or non-Buddhist, was that which is. Or Bhūta, which is derived from the root bhū, 'to be', means 'real, true, or right'; and Bhūtavādī is one who speaks according to facts or a speaker of truth, while Abhūtavādī is a liar; and yathābhūtam, or 'as it is', is the very manner in which the genuine Buddhist always endeavours to understand and speak.

¹ S. i. 140.  
² Vin. i. 2; SBE. xiii. 78; Ud. 2, 3.
One of the titles which the Buddha used most frequently in referring to himself and any other Buddha is Tathāgata. Among many other interpretations given to this term,\(^1\) we find one, i.e. Tathā+āgata, or ‘one who has come at the real truth’. It is natural that the Buddha, who, as he declares in the Ariyapariyesanasutta,\(^2\) has sought after truth and found it out, should call himself, or any one else who does just as he has done, by this term. They know things as they really are. They are therefore Tathāgata. Another title, Sugata (a well-reached one), may be explained as conveying a similar meaning. And others which are commonly used, such as Sammāsambuddha (a completely perfectly enlightened one), Vijjācarāṇasampanna (one who is endowed with wisdom and good conduct), Lokavidu (a knower of the world), Sabbaññīu (an omniscient one), Cakkhumā (one who is endowed with spiritual sight), Samantacakkhu (an all-seeing one), Bhūripañña (one with great wisdom); all these and many others used in referring to the Buddha have some connexion with knowledge. So also does the title Buddha or ‘enlightened one’ itself. The young man Māgha admits the Buddha as ‘knowing things in the world truly and really’, or as they are.\(^3\) The Buddha declares himself as ‘making truth to cut away (weeds)’.\(^4\) And among other epithets given to the Buddha we find Saccanāma,\(^5\) which I interpret as ‘One whose name is truth’. He is called a Saccavādī, or ‘truth speaker’, a Saccasandha, or ‘truth-holder’\(^6\). In thought, speech, and action he never deviates from the truth. His whole being is pervaded

\(^1\) Buddaghosa gives eight explanations, Sum. i. 59–67.
\(^2\) M. i. 160–75.  
\(^3\) Sn. 504.  
\(^4\) Sn. 78.  
\(^5\) A. iii. 346; iv. 285, 289.  
\(^6\) D. i. 4.
by the truth. He thinks truly, speaks the truth and nothing but the truth, and acts according to the truth. And as Max Müller truly says: 'The enlightened, from a moral point of view, means the good, the perfect man.'\(^1\) The Buddha, therefore, who is intellectually enlightened, is morally good, and the perfect man from both intellectual and moral points of view.

As the truth is essential for the Buddha himself, so is it for his followers. On many occasions he preaches about seeing or perceiving (\textit{passati, samanupassati}), knowing or understanding (\textit{jānāti, pajānāti, abhijānāti, vidati}), or penetrating (\textit{pativijjhati}) things as they are, as essential for his followers. Though most of these exhortations are connected with the Four Noble Truths, four elements, five aggregates, three characteristics, the concatenation of cause and effect, &c., still on many occasions reference is made to other subjects. And just in the same way as in the case of the Buddha, understanding things truly is mentioned as essential for the perfection of Buddhist culture. 'A wise monk in this world having listened to the Buddha's sermon understands it, for he sees everything as it really is' (Sn. 202). 'The wise, who see the concatenation of cause and effect, and who well know the result of acts, understand action as it truly is' (Sn. 653). 'The destruction of depravities, i.e. the realization of Nibbāna, belongs to one who knows and sees' ('jānato passato āsavānam khayaṁ hoti', S. ii. 30).

'You ought to look for a teacher so that you may understand things as they are' ('yathābhūtam nāṇāya satthā pariyesitabbo', S. ii. 130–1). The truth therefore must be said to be the final goal to which the Buddha's

---

\(^1\) Preface to the Jātakaṃāla, translated by J. S. Speyer.
followers are always looking, or the means by which they attain to that goal. Their religious training is to realize it completely, and when it is realized completely, their intellectual, moral, and we may say, religious perfection has been reached. They are wise, good, and perfect men, as the Buddhist would call them.

As to truth-speaking, we have still much to say. As a religion of truth, as we have repeatedly said, Buddhism teaches us to cling to the truth in speech and act as well as in knowledge, and never to deviate from it. We have many aphorisms with regard to truth-speaking. 'The truth is a word which never dies' (Sn. 453; Tha. 1229). 'The truth is indeed the sweetest of all things' (Sn. 182). Words cannot be said to be well spoken unless they contain truth in them (Sn. 450-4). And all good things are promised to a truth-speaker. 'He will be praised by the wise' (Tha. 1077); 'he will be beloved by the world' (Dh. 217); 'one will obtain fame by truth' (Sn. 187-9); while a liar is threatened with falling into hell in the future. Or 'a faithful man leading the life of a householder, who has four things—veracity, righteousness, firmness, and liberality—does not grieve when passing away' (Sn. 188). 'Speak the truth, do not get angry, and give even a little if asked; one may approach the gods through these three causes' (Dh. 224). 'The wise stand firmly on the truth, good, and righteousness' (Tha. 1229). 'Those who possess two things are pure Brähmans, truth and righteousness' (Ud. 9). 'He is called a wise elder, in whom there are truth, righteous-

1 A verse to that effect is found in several places: Sn. 601; Dh. 806; Ud. iv. 8; It. 48. The first half is: 'One who tells anything as it is not, will fall into hell; so will one who having done something swears that he has not'.
ness, harmlessness, restraint, moderation, and who is free from depravities' (Dh. 261). As one of the five necessary conditions of a good monk, the Buddha says, a monk 'must not be treacherous, fraudulent, but manifest himself truly as he really is to his teacher or wise fellow-students' (A. iii. 153). All these are only milk for babes; but we may judge from these few aphoristic sayings on what points Buddhism lays great stress. According to the Buddhist idea, we should love and revere the truth, know things according to their true nature, think of and speak the truth, and nothing but the truth. No wonder then that the Buddha has named the fundamental principles of the doctrine the Cattāri Ariya-Saccāni or 'Four Noble Truths'. These are shown as the greatest of all truths (Dh. 273).

Ancient Brāhmans, in spite of their love and reverence for the truth and truth-speaking, allowed people to tell lies under certain circumstances. Thus we read in Gautama (v. 24): 'An untruth spoken by people under the influence of anger, excessive joy, fear, pain, or grief, by infants, very old men, persons labouring under a delusion, those under the influence of drink, or by mad

1 We find in the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad (4. 4) a story of a son of Jabala, Satyakama (the name means 'Lover of Truth'), who wishing to be initiated under a teacher asks his mother what his family is. The latter replies that as she led a wanton life in her youth, she cannot identify his true family. He goes to a teacher's house and asks to be initiated. The teacher asks him his family name, which of course he cannot mention, but he gives his personal name and his mother's. The teacher says that truth-speaking is a proof of being a true Brāhman, and that as he does not attempt to conceal the fact, he should be initiated. As to the truth of the Brāhman, we find many references made in Buddhist suttas, e.g. Sn. 682 (= Dh. 408), 463; Dh. 398; Ud. 4. These sources are more important than those which are found in Brāhmanic literature.
men, does not cause the speaker to fall'. In these cases lying is regarded as guiltless morally as well as legally, and as these cases are not serious, we may say, as Max Müller does, that 'In that open admission there is a certain amount of honesty'. As for the Buddhist, I think the Buddha has never made any concession in telling lies. Truth-speaking in the case of the Buddhist is absolutely demanded. In no case is he allowed to tell a lie. Even for a moment he must not deviate from the truth and truth-speaking. As to which is reasonable and practicable, the Brāhmanic or the Buddhist law with regard to veracity, as in the case of taking life or drinking, there will be divergence of opinions. If blame is to be laid upon the Buddhist law, it will be because of its unpracticability, especially in a country like that where it arose.

Why do people tell a lie? Why do they not speak the truth? It is on the one hand because they are selfish and ambitious, and on the other because they are cowardly, and not courageous enough to speak out. They expect on the one hand to gain something, material or immaterial, by means of lying. Their falsehood in such cases results from their inner selfishness and ambition. The Buddha refers to this human psychology

1 According to Max Müller's interpretation, this means that these are venial sins, and not mortal ones; see India, what can it teach Us, p. 70. A parallel passage is found in Va. XVI. 35; cf. Ga. XXIII. 29; Viṣṇu. VIII. 15; Manu. VIII. 103; IV. 188.

2 'Much lying, perhaps most of it, is directly or indirectly due to cowardice, and is therefore open to the emotional condemnation that cowardice calls forth. The other most common motive is a desire to get an unfair advantage; on this side lying is a form of injustice, and has to reckon with the feeling of moral indignation.' A. K. Rogers, The Theory of Ethics, pp. 161–2.
when he preached as follows: 'Gain, respect, and praise, O monks, are harsh, fierce, severe, and detrimental to the attainment of the highest bliss. There is here, O monks, some one whose mental condition I have grasped with my own mind, and understand it to be like this: This venerable person will never speak a falsehood consciously even for the sake of his mother. But some time later, I shall find him being overcome and possessed by gain, respect, and praise, telling a falsehood with full consciousness. Gain, respect, and praise, O monks, are thus harsh, fierce, severe, and detrimental to the attainment of the highest bliss.'

Even men of lofty ideas have some mean desires, they may not be free from selfishness and ambition, and those whom the Buddha calls 'venerable persons' are not exceptions. Obtaining material gain and immaterial respect and praise may be taken as motives impelling them to tell a lie.

But on the other hand cowardice also has much to do with falsehood. People have not courage enough sometimes to speak out what they really mean to say, and in consequence they refrain from freely and wholly expressing their opinion. What is worse, their moral weakness compels them to express themselves falsely or to tell a lie. It may be quite innocent and harmless in some cases, but sometimes such a false expression or lying will bring upon them or others concerned a serious sequel. All this results from mere lack of courage; and therefore great courage is needed for truth-speaking. An important position therefore must be given to truth-speaking among social virtues.

But still greater courage will be needed for a positive declaration of one's own faithfulness, sinlessness, or

---

1 S. ii. 218.
merit, or for a confession of one’s own sinfulness. Saccakiriya, or ‘solemn asseveration’ or ‘Act of Truth’, takes the form of a declaration, confession, or sometimes the recollection of Buddhas who have appeared in the past or other holy objects; and it seems that it was believed in ancient days that such a declaration, confession, or remembering had force enough to avert evils, such as shipwreck, death caused by snake-bite, death from forest fire, disease, &c. We have several specimens of these sorts of declarations, confession, or remembrance in the Jātaka. A wife in order to establish her innocence takes a solemn oath and enters a fire, which is supposed not to burn or hurt her if she is really innocent (Aṇḍabhūtajātaka).¹ A king, to prove whether a child is his own or not, tosses it up into the air. It is supposed that if the child is a genuine one it will stay in the air, but if not, it will fall down and die (Kāṭṭhahārijātaka).² One young quail being surrounded by a forest conflagration recollects, so says the tale, the powers of virtue, truth, Buddhas, their doctrines, and of his own veracity; and he utters the following asseveration: ‘There are in the world powers of virtue, veracity, purity, and compassion. Through this truth I make the most solemn asseveration. Remembering the force of the doctrine, recollecting Buddhas in the past, and depending on the force of truth, I make a solemn asseveration’ (Vaṭṭakajātaka).³ This pathetic story is retold in Ārya Sūra’s Jātakamālā, which is written in far more poetical and impressive style than the prosaic Pāli original. And it will be better for us to reproduce the

¹ Jāt. i. 289–95; Hopkins, The Religions of India, pp. 275–9, ‘Ordeals’, fire-ordeals, No. 3.
² Jāt. i. 188–6.
³ Jāt. i. 212–15; Jātakamālā XVI; Cariyāpiṭaka III.
parallel passage of the story from Professor Speyer’s English translation. It runs as follows: ‘Yet the Great Being knew his power and was not at all disturbed. When the fire with impetuosity approached, and was about to seize upon the nest, he addressed it with these persuasive words: “My feet are not strong enough to deserve that name, nor are my wings able to fly, and the disturbance caused by thee puts to flight also my parents. Nothing worth offering to a guest like thee is to be found here. For this reason it becomes thee to turn back from hence, Agni.” When the Great Being has spoken these words, hallowed by the power of Truth, that fire, though stirred by the wind, though raging in dry underwood mixed with very arid grasses, abated suddenly, as if it had reached a swollen river, having come near to his utterance of speech.’ One child is bitten by a venomous snake, and its parents take it to an ascetic to have it cured with medicine or by means of a spell. The ascetic promises that he will remove the poison by means of Saccakiriya, and he first makes a solemn utterance, in which he reveals a secret which has never been known by any other person, he blesses the child with the words: ‘Blessed be (the child) through the act of veracity’. Father and mother follow his example, confessing their sins (Kaṇhadvāyanajātaka).

1 SBB. i, pp. 140–1.

2 In invoking the god Agni, the story is more Brāhmaic than Buddhistic, because while in Brāhma ordeals the gods Agni, Varuṇa, &c., are invoked to indicate the innocence or guilt of the person concerned, in Buddhist asseverations no gods are invoked, so far as the Jātaka stories are concerned; but as we see here, in Sanskritized stories, the god Agni is invoked, which shows the influence of Brāhmaism in the later Buddhist literature.

3 Jāt. iv. 27–87.
Suppāraka, while drifting on the ocean, endeavours to save the ship and crew by means of Saccakiriya. He bathes himself in scented water, and dresses himself up in a new suit. Taking a bowl full of water, and standing on the bow of the ship, he makes a solemn utterance, in which he declares that he does not remember any harm he has done towards any being, and prays that his ship may safely return to the port from which she started. He says, 'Through this act of veracity, may the ship go safely back!' (Suppārakajātaka). Lastly, Sambulā, the wife of a prince, endeavours to cure the incurable disease of the prince through the force of her faithfulness to him. Sakka, the chief of gods, is moved by it. She says: 'As I do not know any other one dearer than thou, so may my faithfulness protect me, if it ever protects me. Through this faithfulness may thy disease be cured.' And the desired result follows (Sambulajātaka).

To the modern mind these stories, especially the results which are attributed to these solemn asseverations, sound entirely absurd. Of course these stories are not to be taken too literally; they are mostly productions of Indian imagination and exaggeration, and intended for practical instructive purposes. We are not ready to believe them as matters of fact, but in those days when matrimonial purity, faithfulness, religious oath, confession, asceticism were believed to possess a mystic force, it is quite natural that results such as are mentioned should be supposed to have followed their solemn asseverations. Similar cases of asseveration and ordeal are found in the Upaniṣads. In the Chāndogya (v. 16), for instance, mention is made of a thief who is

1 Jat. iv. 136–43.  
2 Jat. v. 88–98.
made to grasp a heated hatchet. If he is innocent of the charge of theft, it is said, he will not be burnt by the hatchet, but will remain unhurt; but if he is truly guilty, he will be burnt and killed on the spot. In the former case, the writer says, his true self is covered by truth and consequently well protected; while in the latter, it is covered by falsehood and left unprotected.

In no case, so far as the Buddhist asseveration is concerned, did they pray or complain to gods or any other beings for help. They simply declared their own innocence, faithfulness, benevolence, confessed their sinfulness, or remembered the Buddhas, their doctrines, symbols of the truth, and prayed that their innocence should be established in a mystical way, or that evils should be averted through the power of these asseverations; and the results for which they had prayed are said to have followed. In the Vidhurapanaṅjitajātaka the Great Being declares that in this world there is no protection like the truth, and therefore we ought to speak the truth only. In the Suppārakajātaka, Suppāraka praying for the safe return of the ship says: ‘Through this act of veracity, may the ship go safely back!’ And we find several passages of a similar meaning in the Piṭaka, where truth-speaking was thus believed to have a power to bring welfare or avert woe. This is by no means all due to their credulity. If we see with our own eyes that it is simple truth-speaking that finally wins moral victory, and not dishonesty, hypocrisy,
treachery, and the like, however cunningly they may be planned, and however brilliant they may look in their processes, we can understand why the ancient Buddhist Indians ascribed to truth-speaking such a miraculous power. This is true from the moral point of view. They only carried it from a moral sphere to a religious sphere; and they seriously thought that such results would follow these asseverations.

'Truth', says Professor Hopkins quite rightly, 'is a religious as well as moral duty';¹ and it is the final goal of scientific and philosophical studies. Truth, however, does not reveal itself manifestly, but often being hidden in obscurity is revealed only in a circumstantial way, or never revealed at all. We should nevertheless love the truth, value it highly, and make every effort to reveal it. In the moral life of mankind it may not always be good to cling to the truth; clinging to the truth sometimes may have to give way to some other higher good; in other words, it may be good not to cling to it at least for the persons concerned; and sometimes we find it very difficult to judge whether it is good or bad to cling to the truth. Still clinging to the truth under ordinary circumstances will be the best and safest road open for us. The primitive Buddhism therefore admits no exception to the general rule of truth-speaking, as Brähmanism and later Buddhism do. It requires us to speak absolute truth.

¹ The Religions of India, p. 208.
XIX

RIGHTeousness

First Ṛita and then Dharma expressing Righteousness (257). No corresponding Word to Ṛita found in Buddhist Literature, Dhamma takes its Place (258). Various Meanings of Dhamma (259). Righteousness or Morality (259). The Monk’s Righteousness (261). The Householder’s Righteousness (262). The Ideal King (264). The Elements composing the Notion of Righteousness (264). ‘Every one to count for one’ (265). Just Requital (266). Truth (267). The Buddha’s Personality as the perfect Representation of Righteousness (268).

In ancient Indian literature the idea of righteousness is expressed by the term Ṛita, a term meaning the cosmic as well as the moral order, law, right, righteousness. According to the thought of the Indians of those days, the Ṛita manifests itself equally in nature and in human society; the river constantly flows, the dawn comes after the night, the sun traverses the sky, the moon and the stars keep their courses, and everything in human society goes on as it ought to, when it is in accordance with the Ṛita. Thus the order of nature is identified with that of human society or the moral life of mankind through the idea of the Ṛita. Quite naturally this idea is connected with the actions and characters of gods, and some gods are said to be born of or in the Ṛita, some follow the laws of the Ṛita, some others support or guard the Ṛita. Mitra, Varuṇa, Agni, &c.,¹ who are generally regarded as the guardians of moral and cosmic order, are called regulators or increasers of the Ṛita. And as there is no untruth in the sphere of the Ṛita or in the moral

as well as cosmic order, the Ṛita is considered to be equivalent to the Satya or truth.

Side by side with this, another term Dharma is used to denote nearly the same thing in old Brāhmanic literature. In earlier Vedic literature, this word in its neuter form signifies law, firmly established norm, cosmic as well as moral order; and as in the case of the Ṛita, virtuous gods, Mitra, Varuṇa, and others, are said to rule over the Dharman, and their power is said to be founded upon the Dharman. Later on, however, the word—not in its original neuter form, but in its new masculine form, Dharma, as it is always used in later Sanskrit literature—came to signify, besides these ancient ideas, new ones, such as good custom, duty; goodness, virtue, &c.

In passing from Brāhmanic literature to Buddhist, one interesting thing is that we never meet in Buddhist literature the Pāli word corresponding to the Ṛita. This is perhaps because in the time when Buddhism arose this word was not used much in this sense, and the word Dharma took its place to express what the word Ṛita used to denote. This is the reason why we do not find its corresponding word, but see the word Dhamma, generally in the masculine form, but rarely in the neuter, so extensively employed in the Piṭaka. In Buddhist literature the latter word is used in an immense variety of senses, the comparative study of which would prove very interesting, but we cannot enter on it at the present moment. The word Dhamma, which is formed from the root dhṛ, ‘to hold’, possesses the following different shades of meaning in the Pāli Piṭaka.¹

¹ This classification of senses of the word Dhamma is mainly based upon the classification found in the indexes of the Saṁyutta and the
i. Things of objective existence, phenomenal objects; conditional, composites;
ii. Mental, moral, physical states of the individual, condition of life;
iii. Having the nature of, being subject or liable to;
iv. Custom, duty; rule, ordinance, law;
v. Any religious doctrine, a philosophical system, or a point of it;
vi. Buddha-dhamma, implying roughly the following different meanings:
   (a) General name of the Buddha-dhamma;
   (b) One part of it, the other being Vinaya, if divided into two, or Vinaya and Abhidhamma, if divided into three;
   (c) One of the three Buddhist holy objects, the other two being the Buddha and the Saṅgha or community;
   (d) The truth attained to and revealed by the Buddha and his disciples;
   (e) Any point or form of the Buddha-dhamma, or words in which it is expressed;
vii. Righteousness, justice.

It is the last sense of the word, righteousness, justice, that we are interested in just now. In this sense it may be said to imply virtue or morality in general, and

Aṅguttara, the former compiled by Mrs. Rhys Davids, and the latter compiled by Miss Mabel Hunt, and revised and edited by Mrs. Rhys Davids, with slight alteration according to our own idea. We have numbered the items, but this is merely for convenience sake, because it is an extremely hard task, if not absolutely impossible, to trace the philosophical development of the term which is so extensively used with an immense variety of senses. And this is at the same time unnecessary for the present discussion. We have therefore adopted the result of the labour of prominent Pāli scholars.
therefore not merely righteousness, but the whole of ethics or morality may be understood to be included in this term in this sense. As will naturally be understood, the fulfilment of our duties as well as the exercise of our rights is nothing but a right thing, if they are done as they ought to be. In other words, we are acting in perfect conformity with Dhamma when we fulfil duties which are assigned to each of us, or when we behave as we morally ought to towards ourselves and others. The word Dhamma thus concerns the whole of our moral life. But on the other hand there is something more specific implied in this term. Dhammatṭha, dhammacārin, and dhammajīvin may be translated ‘being established on Dhamma or righteousness’, ‘one who acts and lives in accordance with Dhamma or righteousness’, or ‘a person who is just or upright in action and living’ respectively. And when we meet with the phrase, ‘being established on Dhamma’, or when we say some one is established on Dhamma, the word Dhamma will remind us of something more special than mere virtue or morality, which will form the foundation of our moral conception or serve as the fundamental principle of our moral action or life. We may call it righteousness, or truth, as the ancient Brāhmanic Indians identified moral and natural order with truth through the idea of the Rūpa.

Whether it means righteousness or morality, the two ideas are very closely connected with each other, which we shall see in the following passages: ‘People hold dear that man who is endowed with Sila and established on Dhamma, and who knows the truth and minds his own business’ (Dh. 217). ‘He is established on Dhamma and endowed with Sila, he speaks the truth, and his
mind is modest’ (A. i. 162; iii. 47, 214; iv. 77). ‘The merits will always increase day and night of those who plant groves and forests, those who make causeways, watering sheds and wells, and those who build asylums; they are established on Dhamma and endowed with Sila. These people will go to heaven’ (S. i. 33).

Judging from the contexts, we clearly understand that Dhamma in these passages is analogous to or at least closely connected with Sila or morality. If therefore we have to translate it, we should understand that it means morality or virtue in the strict sense of the word, and if it is necessary to be more precise, we should call it righteousness or truth. The general idea which is expressed in these passages will be this: One is a virtuous person, because he is established on righteousness; or a virtuous person is always established on righteousness. Like a mountain consisting of a compactly solid rock, which is often compared to a righteous man, he will stand firmly without faltering amidst praise and blame (Dh. 81; Tha. 643; Vin. i. 185), because he is steadfastly established on righteousness, and he believes it; he will never be shaken, because he has nothing to fear. A righteous man is a virtuous man in the highest sense of the term. As beings seeking for moral perfection, we should never deviate from the way of righteousness; and when we do not deviate from it or when we are firmly established on righteousness, or act or live in accordance with righteousness, there will be nothing left to be desired for us in our moral life. In social as well as private life, the most essential thing for us is conformity to righteousness.

The monk, in the settlement of a question which has arisen in the community, whether it is a reprover
(Codaka), or one who is reproved (Cudita), or merely a witness, should examine others, or be ready to be examined, or give evidence, in accordance with righteousness or justice, *yathādhammaṁ*. The householder should accumulate riches only with justice; and the king should rule over the country with justice and fairness. It is said of a monk who is being tried for some offence: 'If I know that I am right (lit. this righteousness is in me), I will declare “I am right”, and this righteousness lies with me.' If, however, I know that I am not right, I will declare ‘I am not right’, and this righteousness does not lie with me' (A. iii. 198). Again in the Anguttara (i. 103) we read: ‘A man, O monks, who is in possession of three conditions is to be known as a stupid person. What are the three? He does not recognize a sin in its sinfulness; he recognizes a sin in its sinfulness, but does not atone for it according to the law of righteousness; and he does not forgive a sin committed by somebody else according to the law of righteousness, when he declares his own sin.’ So the most essential thing in the settlement of a question, as we may expect, is obedience to the law or to be in conformity with righteousness; but this is necessary not only in such cases, but in daily life also. *Yathādhammaṁ paṭipajjitaṁ* (or it ought to be done according to law or righteousness) is the demand in ordinary intercourse, as it is in the ecclesiastical court.

As to the householder’s righteousness, the Buddha in preaching to the headman of a village, as he usually does, mentions many different sorts of men according to how they seek wealth, how they enjoy it themselves, and how they distribute it among others. About the last sort of men he says as follows: 'Here, however, O
headman, is a certain man enjoying worldly pleasures. 
(a) He seeks for riches through justice, but not through violence; (b) having sought for riches through justice, but not through violence, he makes himself comfortable and satisfies himself; (c) he divides riches and accumulates merits; and (d) he enjoys the riches without clinging to them, without being stupefied by them, and without falling into guilt, being conscious of the danger lurking in them, and knowing the results’ (S. iv. 332–6).
Or the Buddha says that there are three persons in the world: the blind person, the one-eyed person, and the person with two eyes. The first person lacks (a) the eye to acquire wealth which he has not yet acquired, or to increase the wealth which he has already acquired; and he lacks (b) the eye to know virtuous things from vicious things, blamable things from blameless things, inferior things from superior things, and white or good things from black or bad things opposing each other. The second person has the first sort of eyes, but not the second sort; and the third person has both of them. ‘But the person with two eyes’, says he, ‘is declared to be the supreme personality. This person of superior thought and of unbewildered mind gives away the wealth which he has acquired through righteousness, and the riches which he has obtained through exertion; and he goes to the good place where he is not sorrowful on arriving’ (A. i. 129–30). The householder is thus told to accumulate riches according to righteousness, but not by any dishonest means. He should himself enjoy and distribute to others what he has obtained through righteousness or by honest efforts (dhammaladdhehi bhogehi, S.i. 20–1). Thus in the production and distribution of wealth the householder is told always to depend upon righteousness.
The ideal king, according to the Buddha, is always described as a *dhammika dhammarājā* or ‘righteous lord of righteousness’. He rules over his people with justice and equity. When he has conquered the earth to its ocean bounds, he will be established not by the scourge, not by the sword, but by righteousness (D. iii. 142, 146). Laying aside the scourge and sword, which are the symbols of violence, the righteous lord of righteousness will rule with righteousness and impartiality. The secret of ruling over a people is revealed in a conversation which passed between the Buddha and Māra. The following is given as something which presented itself in the mind of the Buddha and which was suggested by Māra. ‘It is possible to exercise governance without hurting or making others hurt, without conquering or causing others to conquer, without grieving or making others cause grief, but through righteousness’ (S. i. 116). In the Dīgha (iii. 93; cf. 61) the Buddha himself comments on the word rājā (king) as ‘one who charms (raññjeti) others by Dhamma or righteousness’. So righteousness or justice is one essential qualification of a ruler. It is therefore no wonder that King Asoka in his edicts is so fond of using the word Dhamma, though what he means by it in these inscriptions is not exactly the same as what we mean in the present discussion. Nevertheless it is evident that righteousness is a vital element of the kingly virtue.

What are the elements composing the notion of righteousness, according to the Buddhist idea of the word? In the first place, there must be impartiality or equity in it. This we infer from the synonym which is often found together with this word. The *dhammarājā* or righteous king is always expected to be just and
impartial in the governance of his people. The Cakkavatti or 'universal monarch' will rule his country justly and impartially (*dhammena samena*). The word *sama*, which means equity or impartiality, is used together with *dhamma* as its synonym in the description of the ideal rule of an ideal ruler. The Cakkavatti or any other righteous monarch is always said to reign with righteousness and impartiality. So we know that righteousness in these cases is synonymous with impartiality; the latter forms the vital element of the former. This is clear, though not quite, but if we are asked what impartiality or equity means, we are not in a position to give any definite answer to it. It is very difficult to answer this question, mainly owing to the pregnancy of the term from which we have derived the idea righteousness, or the indefinite-ness of the sense in which the term is used in the Piṭaka, and the discrepancy of ancient and modern ideas which are expressed by the same term.

One thing, however, is certain, that is, 'every one to count for one'. Buddhism, unlike Brāhmanism, which attaches great importance to the caste system and places the Brāhman in the supreme position of society, recognizes no privilege obtainable merely through birth and profession. There is no aristocracy in Buddhism. If there is any, it is moral or intellectual aristocracy. Men may be superior or inferior by their morality or intellect, but not by birth or profession. Men are not superior or inferior because they are born in the Brāhman or outcast families; their superiority or inferiority depends upon the nobility or meanness of their moral character and action, or intellectual acquirement. In spite of moral or intellectual aristocracy, human beings are recognized as equal in Buddhism. As the waters of
the five great rivers enter into the great ocean, and lose
their original names, so men belonging to the different
castes, when they leave home and join the Buddhist
brotherhood, all lose their original caste or family dis-
tinctions and are called followers of the son of the Sakya
(A. iv. 202). And the condition which they have reached
as a result of their individual efforts is said to be the
same as the attainment of the Buddha. This condition
is called Nibbāna in the case of both the Buddha and
his disciples. Both are called by many common names
Arahan, Muni, Buddha, Tathāgata (M. i. 140), &c., which
indicate their equality to some extent, though the Buddha
has his particular epithets and superior characters which
these epithets denote. In family life as well as in
religious life men are regarded as equal; and the attain-
ment which men reach as a result of their own efforts is
believed to be the same in the case of the Buddha and
others. And as we know very well that in Buddhism
beings, human or non-human, as we have shown in the
chapter on Benevolence, are alike in sharing love and
sympathy, I think it is not too much to say that the
Buddhist righteousness has equity as its important
element, and this implies 'every one to count for one,
and not more than one'.

The second vital element of righteousness will be just
requital, or recompense according to one's deed or merit
or demerit. I think nothing more clearly and definitely
proclaims the principle of just requital than the Buddhist
doctrine of moral retribution and the law of causation.
Recompense according to one's merit or demerit will be
most precisely observed in these doctrines. As the term
Yathākammaṁ or 'according to one's deed' indicates,
we owe everything in our possession, existence, status,
rank, physical and mental conditions, character, and even environment to the Kammas which we have performed in our previous and present existences. The process of causation, that is, how the cause brings about the effect, though mostly hidden, is partly revealed to us; and from it we can fairly well judge how strictly it is observed. We commit bad actions, and thereby we ought to inflict punishment upon ourselves; we perform good actions, which will necessarily cause us to meet with good recompense in this world or in the coming. Nothing and nobody outside us can help or favour us in obtaining rewards which we do not deserve or in escaping from requitals which are due to us according to our deeds. We should always expect to meet with the result of what we do. And though we may fail to see the process, the law is strictly observed. The doctrine that 'we reap as we sow' is perfectly in accordance with the Buddhist doctrine of retribution and law of causation. 'Justice and injustice are not of the same effect' (Commentary on Dh., i. 22); the just will be rewarded with good or desirable results, while doers of unjust actions will meet with unhappy results in some form, either in this very existence or in one of the coming existences. The process of cause and effect, though indissolubly complicated and of a prolonged duration, goes on operating (according to Buddhist teaching) with the minutest precision. In performing an action which is morally good or bad, we ought to bear in mind that we have to meet with the result of it sometime and somewhere, whether willing or unwilling.

Truth is also an element of the Buddhist righteousness, or there is identity between the two to some extent. In the Dhammapada (176) we read: 'If a man has transgressed the one Dhamma, and speaks lies, and scoffs
at another world, there is no evil which he will not do.' Now what is the one Dhamma in this verse? The commentator (Com. on Dh., iii. 182) says, and surely rightly, that this is truth. If we are just and upright in our thought, speech, and action, do we deviate from the truth? Certainly justice and truth cannot always be identical, and there are some justifiable errors or blunders. But we cannot be just or upright unless we are faithful to truth, or truthful. Mere error or blunder, practical or theoretical, may not be fatal to our being just or upright, but righteousness in its strict sense must be absolutely free from any error or blunder; how much more so if this error or blunder has moral significance. Quite rightly therefore truth and righteousness are said to go together, though not exactly identical.

Righteousness is perfectly represented in the personality of the Buddha. He is absolute moral perfection according to the Buddhist moral idea. In this sense he is the embodiment of righteousness. He is not only the lord of righteousness (dhammarāja, dhammassāmi), but he makes righteousness his own body (dhammakāya), or he is righteousness itself (dhammaññhīta). 'He (the Buddha) is the eye itself', says Ānanda, preaching to his fellow-disciples, 'knowledge itself, righteousness itself, Brahmā himself, a preacher, one who produces advantage, one who gives ambrosia, the lord of righteousness, one who has reached the truth.'

While preaching to two Brāhmans about the unreasonableness of the claim to superiority by the Brāhman caste, the Buddha declares that the Arahant is the best among men through the virtue of righteousness, because he says righteousness is the best among beings in this life.

1 S. iv. 94.
and in the next. He further depicts the mentality of the Buddhist, who declares: 'I am the genuine son of the Blessed One, born from his mouth, born of righteousness, created of righteousness, and heir of righteousness. Why is that? Because these are the epithets of the Blessed One: One who makes righteousness his body, One who makes Brahmā his body, One who is identical with righteousness, and One who is identical with Brahmā.'

According to the idea of the Brāhmaṇa, Brahmā is the highest existence, and absorption into Brahmā is the highest attainment for the Brāhmaṇa, the highest attainment for the human being in the eye of a Brāhmaṇa. The Buddha therefore has taken over this idea to his doctrine and placed righteousness side by side with Brahmā. Dhammakāya is equivalent to Brahmakāya, and Dhammabhūta to Brahmbhūta. Thus in this sutta we see on the one hand that righteousness is identified with Brahmā, and on the other that the Buddha is regarded as a visible manifestation of righteousness. He has absorbed himself into righteousness, as the Brāhmaṇa of the highest attainment has absorbed himself into Brahmā. His whole being is righteousness itself, he is all righteousness.

1 D. iii. 80-4.
XX

CONCLUSION

Buddhism is a System of Self-perfection (270). But there are other-regarding Virtues (271). Sympathy (272).

Buddhism as an individualistic religion has self-perfection, in its narrower sense, for its final end. In this case the Buddhist has nothing to do but cultivate and perfect himself morally, and act in accordance with this ideal. He should restrain his sense-organs; he should guard his three doors of action; he should be temperate in eating, drinking, and enjoying every sort of pleasure; he should be patient and persevering; he should be contented and humble; and lastly he should cleanse himself of mental depravities; and when he has perfectly purified himself from these depravities, and attained as a result to mental enlightenment, the Buddhist culture has been completed. He has attained Arahatship or the state of self-perfection, the chief end towards which every Buddhist is told to proceed in moral and religious culture.¹

¹ It is generally believed that the lay disciples of the Buddha cannot attain to Arahatship; but in the Cullavagga (Vin. ii. 148, 164) we find the following declaration which the Buddha made about a lay donor: 'Having perceived that truth here in this world, he who is free from depravity will enter into Nibbāna'. And it is perhaps not out of place to refer in this connexion to the following passage of the Mahāmaṅgalasutta, which is apparently intended for the instruction of the lay Buddhist, 'Penance and charity, discernment of the noble truths, and the realization of Nibbāna, this is the highest bliss'
CONCLUSION

So far as the self-regarding duties of Buddhist morality are concerned, self-perfection is the supreme good and anything helpful for the attainment of it is good, while anything detrimental to it is considered to be bad. Thus in this case the Buddhist has solely to mind his own good, his personal salvation, his individual happiness. And he has to attain to this condition through his own efforts. He cannot expect to depend on the power of any other being, man, god, or otherwise. It is purely individualistic both in its end and in its means. We call this simply self-perfection or self-perfection in its narrower sense.

But self-perfection does not comprise all Buddhist morality. It is only one side of it. The human being as a social being cannot be solely interested in himself. He must realize that he is not the only being in existence in society, but that there are other beings, human and non-human, who are related to him directly or indirectly. The presence of such relations means the presence of social duties or other-regarding virtues, the idea of which necessarily arises from the relations which he forms with others in numerous and complicated ways. As to cardinal virtues with regard to others, Buddhism mainly teaches benevolence, liberality, reverence, gratitude, and tolerance. The Buddhist should love others, not only human beings, but also other beings; he should be kind and liberal to them; he should revere or respect them;

(Sn. 267; Khu. p. 8). The monk, it is true, is the Buddha’s disciple or follower (Sāvaka) in the truest sense of the term; and the monk-hood is shown as the truest and surest way to moral perfection; but we understand from these passages that Nibbana is not denied to the layman too. Still, see a passage of the Vacchagottasuttanta, M. i. 488, where the Buddha asserts that no layman can put an end to suffering when his body is dissolved without abandoning home life.
he should be grateful for the kindly feeling and action which have been shown to or done for him; and he should tolerate any pain or injury which he is made to suffer by others, or pass over any inappropriate opinions or actions which others harbour or perform; all these virtues are included in the single virtue of benevolence. Viewed from the standpoint of the self-regarding virtues of Buddhism, these seem to have no import, or rather to be contradictory to them. At first sight the morality of self-perfection seems to have no place for them. But the doctrine of sympathy which Buddhism teaches will necessarily lead us to the consideration of these altruistic virtues. And the human being as a social being\(^1\) will not be perfect without being perfect in these other-regarding virtues.

As we have already pointed out in the chapter on benevolence, the human being has the noble feeling of sympathy, a feeling which both in its etymology and significance is almost analogous to the Pāli words Anukampā and Anukampana. It is the feeling which we experience at the moment when we see another in pain or distress and imagine ourselves in the same situation. This feeling may arise intuitively when we witness such a case without considering the consequences, or with the perfect knowledge of the consequences; still it is clear that the feeling always refers to our self directly or indirectly. 'It is hard for us to bear such a hardship; in the same way it will be hard for another to bear it.'

\(^1\) We have used the terms 'society' and 'social', but these are rather misleading, because we do not mean by the term any special organization, such as a state, a clan, a church, a sect, or any other community; and because when we say 'others', we mean any other beings, human and non-human.
CONCLUSION

This is our feeling at that moment. Life is dear to every being; we should therefore refrain from hurting or causing another to hurt the life of any being. No being likes to suffer pain; we should therefore refrain from causing any being to suffer unnecessary pain. Every being naturally seeks his own pleasures; we should therefore make efforts to promote the pleasure of others. The Buddhist benevolence thus arises from the sympathetic feeling which we have when we imagine ourselves to be in the same pain or misery to which some one else is exposed. An interesting thing in this connexion is that a similar sympathetic feeling is felt or expressed in witnessing the pleasure or happiness of others. According to the Buddhist psychology, as we have the feeling of Anukampā or commiseration, so we have the feeling of Anumodana or Mitfreude.\(^1\) We feel sorry in seeing others in pain or distress, and we are glad at seeing them in happiness. In both cases we refer to our own self. Such sorts of feelings cannot be said to be purely altruistic, but at the same time they cannot be said to be purely egoistic. This beautiful feeling (and action resulting from it also) is well expressed in the teaching of the four elements of popularity;\(^2\) liberality, courtesy, benevolence, and treating others as one treats oneself. We call attention especially to the last element, in which we are taught

\(^1\) We have no single word in English equivalent to this term. 'Sympathetic joy' and 'feeling of pleasure from sympathy', which are given in Sir Monier Monier-Williams's Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Oxford, 1899), are somewhat expressive of the meaning of the original term. But I prefer this German word, which renders the original sense better than these English phrases.

\(^2\) D. iii. 152, 190, 192; A. ii. 32, 248; iv. 219, 364; Jat. v. 330; SBB. iv. 182, 223.
to treat others just as we treat ourselves. In treating others as we treat ourselves, there can be no selfish self, which is utterly destroyed.

On the one side we have to fulfil duties with regard to ourselves; but we also have to mind the duties arising from the relations which we form in connexion with others. And here will necessarily arise the idea of righteousness, which has equity and just requital for its elements, and is founded upon truth. This may be directed to regulating the relations between ourselves and others and between one and another among the latter. Such relations are innumerable and intricate, and it will be impossible to regulate them except by the virtue of righteousness.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Texts (all, with the exception of the Vinaya-Piṭaka, Jātaka, and Jātakamālā, published by the Pali Text Society, London).

Vinaya-Piṭaka, edited by H. Oldenberg, Lond. 1879-83.
Saihnuttara-nikāya, edited by L. Feer, 1884-98.
Aṅguttara-nikāya, edited by R. Morris and E. Hardy, 1885-1900.
Dhammapada, edited by S. Sumangala, 1914.
Udāna, edited by P. Steinthal, 1885.
Iti-vuttaka, edited by E. Windisch, 1890.
Suttanipāta, edited by D. Anderson and H. Smith, 1913.
Petavatthu, edited by Professor Minayeff, 1889.
Theragāthā, edited by H. Oldenberg, 1883.
Therīgāthā, edited by R. Pischel, 1883.
Jātaka, edited by V. Fausboll, Lond. 1877-96.
Jātakamālā (Sanskrit), edited by H. Kern, Boston, 1891.

II. Translation of Texts.

The Vinaya Texts, translation of the first two volumes of the Vinaya-Piṭaka, Mahāvagga and Cullavagga, by H. Oldenberg and T. W. Rhys Davids, Oxford, 1881-5; SBE. xiii, xvii, and xx.

The First Fifty Discourses of Gotama the Buddha, by Sīlācāra, Breslau, 1912.


Aṅguttara, translation of Aṅguttara-nikāya, i., by E. R. Gooneratne, Galle, Ceylon, 1913.

Dhammapada, by F. Max Müller, Oxford, 1881; SBE. x.

Dhammapada, by Sīlācāra, Lond. 1915.

Iti-vuttaka or Sayings of Buddha, by J. H. Moore, New York, 1908.

Sutta-nipāta, by V. Fausboll, Oxford, 1881; SBE. x.


Buddhist Sutras, translated by T. W. Rhys Davids, Oxford, 1900; SBE. xi.

Jātakamālā, translated by J. S. Speyer, Lond. 1895; SBB. i.

III. Principal Works on Buddhism (dealing more or less with its ethics and morality).


T. W. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, Lond. 1877.

H. Oldenberg, Buddha, translated by W. Hoey into English, Lond. 1882.

M. Monier-Williams, Buddhism, Lond. 1889.

R. S. Copleston, Buddhism, Lond. 1892.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

M. Anesaki, Rüpakaṣyaśca Dharmaṅkaṣyaśca Buddhasya Tathāgataśya, Tokyo, 1904.

M. Anesaki, Kompon-Buikyō (or Primitive Buddhism), Tokyo, 1910.


L. de la Vallée Poussin, Notes de Morale Bouddhique, Bruxelles, 1914.

A. Coomaraswamy, Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism, Lond. 1916.

Sir Charles Eliot, Hindūism and Buddhism, Lond. 1921.

W. Bohn, Die Psychologie und Ethik des Buddhismus, München und Wiesbaden, 1921.

IV. INDIAN RELIGIONS, PHILOSOPHIES, LITERATURE, LAWS, &C.

M. Monier-Williams, Indian Wisdom, Lond. 1875.

E. W. Hopkins, The Religions of India, Boston, 1895.

F. Max Müller, India, What can it teach us? Lond. 1899.

A. A. Macdonell, A History of Sanskrit Literature, Lond. 1899.

L. D. Barnett, Antiquities of India, Lond. 1913.


E. J. Rapson, Ancient India, Camb. 1916.


W. Bohn, Die Religion des Jina und ihr Verhältnis zum Buddhismus, München und Neubiberg, 1921.


The Laws of Manu, translated by G. Bühler, Oxford, 1886; SBE. xxv.

The Ordinance of Manu, translated by A. G. Burnell and E. W. Hopkins, Lond. 1884.

The Upanishads, translated by F. Max Müller, Oxford, 1876–84; SBE. i, xv.

The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, translated by R. E. Hume, Oxford, 1921.

V. Works on Ethics and Philosophy.

T. H. Green, *Prolegomena of Ethics*, Lond. 1883.

SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY

A guide to further reading will be found on the pages immediately following the Foreword to this new impression.
INDEX

Abuse, abusing, using abusive language, 68, 70, 83, 86.
Abstinence, 1, 3, 111-23; in connexion with eating, drinking, sexual intercourse, 118.
Actions, 52; altruistic, 206-7; evil, 175; good, 175, 207-8; ten good, 67 ff.; liberal, 207; ten sinful, 163.
Adhikaranaśamathas, 80, 84.
Adorning and beautifying the person, 64, 77.
Adulterer, adultery, 58, 60, 68, 91, 122.
Affection, 150, 221-2, 227.
Aggivacchagottansuttānta, 6 n.
Aggregates (Khandha), five, 181-2, 247.
Aghamārśana, hymn of sin-effacing, 58, 164.
Agni, god of fire, 26 ff., 29, 253, 257.
Ahūnā, 184.
Ahura Mazda = Ormuzd, 2, 160.
Aitareya Brähmaṇa, 40.
Ajātasattu, 20, 21, 128.
Ājivaka, ascetic, 15.
Akusa, bad, 86.
Ālavaka, 241.
All-conqueror, all-knower, 15.
Almonries, 204.
Alms, almsgiving, 41, 115-17, 171, 201 ff., 219-20, 231, 241.
Amagandhasutta, 116 n.
Amata, immortality, 19.
Ambāṭṭhasutta, 24 n.
Ambition, 250.
Āmitābha, Amitāyus, 199.
Ānanda, 22, 90, 192-3, 268.
Aṅgabhūtaśāšātaka, 252.
Anger, 70, 121, 185, 179 ff., 183, 185, 198.
Angra Mainyu = Ahriman, 2.
Aṅgulimāla, 239, 298.
Aniyatas, 80, 88.
Aṇṇāṭa-Koṇḍaṇṇa, 16, 224.
Anuddaya, 184.
Anukampa, 184, 272-3.
Anukampati, 194.
Anumodana, 231-2, 273.
Āpas, gods of water, 27.
Āpastamba, 118, 162.
Appamaṇīyo, boundlessnesses, 196.
Ārāhan, 16, 24 n., 32-3, 53, 55, 67, 72, 97, 166, 169, 180, 215, 266, 268.
Ārāhatship, 32, 34, 55, 82, 97, 110, 143-4, 175, 180, 270.
Āriyapariyesanāsuttānam, 13 n., 14, 192, 246.
Arrogance, 179, 181.
Āryan, 5, 24-6, 37, 41 ff., 65, (Aryas) 201.
Ascetic, 118, 134 ff., 140 ff., 167, 169 ff., 205, 218, 253, 272; five, 15-16; wandering, 19, 93, 179, 180, 210, 238.
Asceticism, 1, 3, 5, 56, 112, 149, 169, 170, 175, 176, 199, 240, 254.
Asoka, 264.
Āśramanas, four, 140.
Assaji, 19, 107.
Asseveration, 252, 254, 256.
Asura, 31, 33, 34.
Ātāṇīyaśasuttanta, 32.
Āṭhabbana, 24 n.
Atharvaveda, 24 n.
Ātmān, 46 n., 47 ff., 55; Ātmanism, 13.
Atittiri, 26.
Austerity, 5, 6, 13, 15, 113, 141, 146-7, 149, 162, 165, 169-70.
Autonomous, autonomy, 33, 90, 92.
Avalokiteśvara, 199.
Avarice, 69, 186, 203, 208; five avarices, 144.
Backbiting, 69.
Bahujanabitāukampi, 216.
Balas, four forces, 50.
Bārāṇasi = Benares, 15, 16, 19, 134, 198.
Bathing, 161 ff.
Bed or seat, high large, 66-7, 77-8, 80; see also Couch or seat.
Belief in the Buddha's enlightenment, 219.
Benevolence, being benevolent, 2, 28, 85, 95, 97, 186, 184 ff., 200-1,
Buddhism, 3, 14, 30 n., 270; compared with Brāhmanism, 31, 38, 39, 41, 49, 52, 56, 58, 78, 82, 139-40, 142, 166, 168, 170, 176, 203-6, 220-1, 250, 256, 265; compared with Confucianism, 220-1; compared with Jainism, 3, 46, 60. See also Iññāyāna, Mahāyāna.

Buddhist, in general, 12, 24 n., 119; lay, 64 ff., 117; Northern and Southern, 12 n.

Buddhist brotherhood = monkish community, 146, 151, 266; celibacy, 192; community, 119, 191; culture, 8, 34, 49, 72-3, 76, 102-3, 149-4, 166, 176, 185, 217, 247, 270; morality: its characteristics, 86, 88 ff.; its classification, compendium, 57 ff.

Cakkavatti, 265.

Cakkhumat, 50, 246.

Caṇḍāla, 161, 163.

Carnal pleasure, 77.

Caste system, 5, 41 ff., 175, 240, 265; loss of, 118-19, 164.

Cattāri Ariya-Saccāni, four noble truths, 249.

Citumnahārājika, 208.

Causality, causation, 19, 76; law of, 92, 266-7.

Cause, 19; and effect, 267; concatenation of, 247.

Celibacy, 1, 60, 95, 139 ff.

Ceremonialism, 5, 39, 175, 240.

Ceremony, ceremonial rites, 5-7, 88-9, 42, 47, 176, 240.

Chūndogya (Upaniṣad), 46 n., 48, 53, 58, 77 n., 82 n., 165 n., 249 n., 254.

Characteristics, three, 247.

Charitable feeling or disposition, 200; action, 200.

Charity, 93, 179, 201, 234.

Chastity, 61, 66, 151 ff.

Child-birth, 160.

Christ, 145, 209.

Christianity, 101, 184.

Clothes, clothing, 128-9, 230.

Codaka, reprover or warning, 191-2, 262.

Commoner = Vessa, 41-2, 166, 173.

Community, monkish, see Saṅgha.

Compassion, 117, 188, 194, 196, 198-9, 239.

204, 211, 214, 221-2, 227, 230, 271; mutual, of human beings, 190; mutual, of monks, 191.

Bhikkhu, Buddhist monk, 54, 66, 76, 80, 141-2.

Bhikṣa, Brāhmaṇic, 140 ff.

Bimbisāra, 17-18, 64.

Birth and profession, 41, 44, 265.

Bodhisattva, 134, 138, 158, 204.

Bodhisattva = Bodhisattva, 96-7, 199.

Bodily characteristics, thirty-two and eight, 9.

Bonds (Sahyojanas), three, 72; five, 143; seven, 144.

Brāhmaṇa (male), creator, 35, 46 n.

Brāhmaṇa (neuter), prayer, 35.

Brāhmaṇa, 5, 6, 24 n., 44 ff., 56, 112, 118-20, 137, 141-2, 180, et passim; murder of, 48, 58, 82, 164; true, pure, genuine, ideal, 9, 171, 175, 179, 240, 248, 249 n.


Brāhmaṇa or priestly caste, 18, 36, 42, 43, 268.

Brāhmaṇa = Brāhmaṇa, 43, 54, 91-2.

Brāhmaṇa (literature), 4-5, 24, 38 ff., 43, 45 ff.

Brāhmaṇaspati = Brāhmaṇa, 34.

Brāhmaṇism, 35, 45, 101, 155, 159-60, 164; see also Buddhism.

Brāhmaṇivāra, states of divine life, 196.

Brāhmaṇa, lord of prayer, 27, 35.

Buddha, 3, 12 n., 32 ff., 39, 54 ff., 72-3, 112, 149-50, 214 ff.; and Socrates, 3, 7 ff.; deified, 215; forbids philosophical speculation, 6 ff.; nurses a sick monk, 192; person of perfect purity, 174; sends forth his disciples, 16, 216; his broad-mindedness, 237; his contemporaries, 1; his epithets, 50, 52, 215-16, 246, 266; his last sermon, 22; his life, 12 ff.; his personality, 9, 11, 15, 18, 90, 215, 268.

Buddhaghoṣa, 70, 204.

Buddhahood, 15, 55, 97, 134.
Concentration of the mind = tranquilization, Samādhi, 50, 52, 110, 166, 171, 173.
Concord, 70.
Conduct, 44, 48; moral, 241; three forms of, 111.
Confession, 254.
Confucianism, 2, 101, 155, 184, 220-1.
Confucius, 2, 3, 85, 104.
Consciousness, never losing, 107, 122.
Contentment, 87, 95, 124 ff., 131, 177, 233, 270.
Continency, 151, 155.
Contumely, 70.
Corpse, 161.
Couch or seat, high large, 64: see also Bed or seat.
Council, the first Buddhist, 84; the second, 119.
Covetousness, 62, 68, 71 ff., 104, 125-6, 180-1, 212.
Cowardice, 69, 113, 251.
Cūḷamūlakṣaṇyasuttanta, 6 n.
Culture, mental, 150; moral, religious, 181, 175.
Cunda, monk, 93, 168.
Cunda, smith, 22.
Cursing, 27, 70.
Dākkhinēyas, those worthy of receiving offerings, 209.
Dāna, donation, 190.
Dānapati, lord of gifts, 203.
Dancing, 64, 66, 77-9.
Darmesteter, J., 159, 165.
Dasabala, 50.
Dasakusalakamma, ten good actions, 67.
Dāsas, Dāsyus, 26.
Death, regarded as being impure, 160-1.
Debauchery, 147-8.
Defilement, 27, 160 ff., 188, 203, 211, 229.
Delightfulness, 196, 198.
Deliverance, 150, 231.
Demeanour, impressive, 107, 177.
Department, decent or dignified, of monks, 107, 177.
Depravity, 49-50, 72, 175, 211-12, 247, 249, 270.
Desire = lust, 55, 62, 72, 113-14, 132, 144, 150, 165, 180.
Desires, animal, 109.

Devadatta, 21, 238.
Devas, 33.
Dhamma, four precious things, 50.
Dhamma, righteousness or doctrine, 87, 264.
Dhamma, the doctrine, 14, 34, 120, 171, 173, 214 ff., 228 ff., 259.
Dhamma, things, 19.
Dhammabhūta, Dhammakāya, 268-9.
Dhammacakkappavattanasutta, 5 n., 16.
Dhammacārin, Dhammajīvin, Dhammattha, 260.
Dhammaladdhehi bhogehi, 263.
Dhammapada, 10, 45, 53, 170, 267.
Dhammarāja, Dhammika, 264, 263.
Dhammassāmi, 263.
Dhammikasutta, 65, 120.
Dharma, Dharman, 258.
Dharma, its various meanings, 258 ff.
Dharmaśūtras, 24, 139, 141.
Dhātus or worlds, of Arūpa or formlessness, of Kāma or sensuality, of Rūpa or form, 33 n.
Dhyānist, Chinese, 173.
Disfigurement, bodily, of monks, 178.
Disrespect, 83, 212.
Dissatisfaction, 126.
Dissension among monks, 21; see also Schism.
Doctrine, the, see Dhamma.
Dog, unclean animal, 161.
Donor, 229, 232.
Doors of the senses, 129.
Dosa, hatred, 55, 72, 185, 245.
Doubt, 143.
Drinking, see Liquor.
Duties, of husband and wife, the master of a family, 151 ff.; between six pairs, 233-4.
Dviya, twice-born, 42, 139.

Eating at forbidden times, taking meals after noon, 64, 66, 77 ff., 114, 117.
Economy, 130.
Eighthfold Noble Path, see Path.
Ekantātīta, 222.
Elders, 214.
Elements, four, 247.
Eliot, Sir Charles, 94.
Endurance, 66, 131.
Energy, 187.
Enlightenment, 13-14, 18-19, 31, 49, 72, 110, 132, 166, 245, et passim.
Enmity, 183.
Envy, 69-70.
Equality, 44.
Equanimity, 196, 198-9.
Esteem, marks of, 215.
Evils, three fundamental moral, 72, 175; three radical, three roots of, 34, 50, 72, 76, 143-4, 185, 244-5.
Exalted One = Buddha, 217-18.
Expulsion, perpetual, from the monkshood, 50.
Extremes, two, 112, 148.

Faithfulness, 251, 254.
Falsehood, 61-2, 82, 198, 249, 251; see also Lies.
Family, in which parents are honoured, 220.
Felicity = Nibbāna, 230.
Field, for good works, 210.
Filial duty, 2, 219 ff.
Fires, 72; sacred, 26, 140, 168 ff., 240; doctrine of five, 48, 58.
Fire-worshippers, 17.
Flesh, which the monk cannot eat, 115.
Flesh-eating, see Food (animal).
Food, 115-16, 128-9, 201, 230; and drink, 200, 204, 231, 237; animal, 115 ff., 241; material, spiritual, 230.
Foolish talk, 68 ff., 79.
Forbearance, 115, 136.
Forgiveness, 28, 95, 133, 135.
Fornication, 59.
Fortitude, 133, 135.
Four Noble Truths, see Truths.
Fraternity, 43-4.
Friendship, 184, 200 n.
Funeral rite, see Śrāddha.

Gandhabba = Gandharva, 31.
Gaṅga = Ganges, 48, 164, 190.
Ganges valley, 46.
Garlands, wearing, 64, 66, 77 ff.
Gautama, a Brāhmaṇic law-book, 118, 162.
Gayā, 17, 166-7.
Gayākassapa = Kassapa of Gayā, 239.

Generosity, 201.
Gentleness, 95.
Gifts, five timely, 204; material, 209; recipients of, 204, 210, 212; spiritual, 209, 228.
Gods, 26, 32-3, 36, 253 n.; the supreme, 214; the Vedic, 4, 23 ff.
Gold and silver, accepting, 77, 80, 83; the theft of, 48, 58, 77, 81-2, 164.
Good and evil, 2, 49, 52, 54, 55, 198.
Good, one's own and others', 93 ff.; good, benefit, and welfare of beings, 216.
Good Law, Dhamma, 230.
Goodwill, 186, 200 n., 234; Brahmānic exercise of, 194.
Gormandize, 114.
Gotama, 12 n., 107, 112 n.
Gough, A. E., 29.
Gratitude, 95, 190, 193, 211, 214, 221, 223, 227 ff., 271.
Greediness, 198, 240.
Greek philosophy and philosophers, 3-4.
Green, T. H., 195.
Gṛhaspati, 26.
Gṛhastha, 140.
Guru = teacher, dishonouring his bed, 48, 58, 77, 82, 164.

Harem, 134-5, 155-7.
Harsh language, using, 70-1, 79, 192, 238.
Hatred = Dosa, 34, 50, 69, 75, 183, 175, 179, 182, 191, 198; see also Dosa; antidote for, 185.
Haughtiness, 186, 240.
Heart, kindly, 192; loving, 194-7, 219; benevolent, sympathetic, liberal, 203.
Heirs of spiritual things, 209, 229.
Heresy of individuality, 143.
Heretic, 210, 239-40.
Hermit = Vānaprastha, 140-1.
Heteronomy, heteronomous, 88.
Hetu, reason, 91.
Hinayāna school, 95-7.
Hinduism, 30 n.
Hiraṇḍāvati, 22.
Holiness, 141.
Homa, Hutta = Hutra, Havya, Huta, 41.
Hopkins, E. W., 56, 165, 256.
Hospitality, 201-3, 209.
INDEX 283

Humiliation, 125, 127.
Humility, being humble, 86, 95, 125, 131, 177 ff., 186, 233, 270.
Husband and wife, 153; their mutual duties, 151, 157.
Hymn, 4; of sin-effacing, 58, 164.
Hypocrisy, 179, 181–2, 244, 255.

Ignorance, 84, 49, 50, 55, 72, 75–6, 143, 175, 186–8, 245; and sin, 217.
Illusion, 181–2.
Ill-will, 121, 143, 186, 198; stirring up, 83.
Impartiality, 264–5.
Impure person or thing, 161–2.
Inclinations, seven, 144.
Inda = Indra, 30, 32 ff.
Indebtedness, 222, 231.
Individuality, 143.
Indra, 26, 30 n.
Indriyas, five faculties, 50.
Infatuation, 150.
Injury to seeds and plants, 79.
Insight into the knowledge of emancipation, 98, 110.
Instinct, 109, 147–9.
Instruction, 89.
Intelligence = knowledge, 51, 186.
Irubbeda = Rigveda, 24 n.
Isāna = Isāna, 31, 34.
Iṣikā, reed, 48.
Iṭi-vuttaka, 290.

Jābāla, 249 n.
Jain, 5–6, 56, 59, 112, 116 n.
Jainism, 3, 46, 56, 60, 79, 112 n.
Jātaka, 12 n., 134, 204, 240, 252, 253 n.
Jātakanālā, 252.
Jēn, benevolence, 184.
Jesus, see Christ.
Jetavana, monastery, 20, 231.
Jhāna, meditation, 50, 197.
Jhāna, realm, 35.
Jiva, soul, 6.
Jivaka, well-known physician, 20.
Jivakassuttanta, 116.
Jivatman, individual soul, 45.
Jumna = Yamuna, 46.
Justice, 95, 190, 192, 259, 262, 264, 268.

Kāludāyi, 239.
Kalyāṇa, good, 86.
Kāmadhātu = world of sensuality, 38.
Kamma (religious action), 5; (moral action), 5, 7, 55, 90, 92, 267.
Kaṇhadīpyanajātaka, 253.
Karma = Kamma, 3, 5.
Karunā, 184, 196.
Kasibhāradvāja, 242.
Kassapa, Buddha, 116 n.
Kassapas, three, 17, 242; of Gayā, 166; of Nādi, 169.
Kāthā (Upaniṣad), 48.
Kaṭṭhahārījātaka, 252.
Kern, H., 94.
Kevaddasuttanta, 36 n.
Khattiya, 18, 43.
Kibbisa, evil, 86.
Killing, 58, 77, 81–2, 85, 116, 122; a Brāhman, 58, 77; see also Life (destruction of).
Kindness, 184, 200 n., 228.
Kind-wordedness, 70, 86.
King, the ideal, 264; four great kings, 83, 86.
Knowledge, 1, 6, 8, 46, 48 ff., 163, 268; and virtue, 1, 2, 4, 7, 52, 215.
Buddhist, 8, 51, 98, 110, 206, 245.
′Know thyself′, 7.
Koṇḍaññā, see Ānātha-Koṇḍaññā.
Kričcha, 118.
Kṣatriya = Khatiya, 46, 118, 155.
Kunala-jātaka, 156.
Kusala, merit, 86.

Lakkhana-suttanta, 9 n., 70.
Laocion, 2, 3.
Leaders, 215–16, 229.
Liberality, 10, 33, 41, 86, 200 ff., et passim.
Liberation, 47, 49.
Licchavi tribe, 240.
Lies, liar, telling lies, lying, 27, 58, 61, 77, 79, 83, 85, 122, 243; two reasons of, 62, 250. See also Falsehood.
Life, destruction or taking of, 59, 63, 67–8, 79, 81, 116.
Life, homeless or religious, 12, 48, 147, 150, 194, 197. 201, 204, 214, 228–4, 266; family, household, domestic, worldly, 86, 150, 152, 157, 194, 203–4, 214, 223, 240, 266; of purity
and holiness, 229; of luxury, 129; unchaste, wanton, 151, 156; necessaries, requisites of, 21, 79, 128, 200-1, 210-11, 217-18, 228, 230; pleasure of, 78, 230.
Liquor, drinking intoxicating, 48, 58-9, 62, 64, 77, 82, 118 ff., 163-4.
Living creatures, 3, 59, 81, 88.
Lokavidū, knower of the universe, 50, 94, 246.
Love, 8, 10, 33, 41, 56, 70, 184-5, 190-1, 194 ff., 236, et passim; for animals, 50, 94, 246; parental, 221.
Low-caste people, 201.
Lust, 18, 34, 50, 149-4, 148, 175, 182, 193.
Maddi, 153.
Magadhâ, Magadhâse, 17, 64, 128.
Mâgandiya, 98.
Mâgha, 246.
Mahâbrahmâ = Brahmâ, 30 ff.
Mahâgovinda, 196.
Mahâkassapa, 84.
Mahâmaãgalasutta, 86, 233.
Mahâparinibbãnasutta, 21, 84.
Mahâságamasutta, 32.
Mahâsûnãdasutta, 170 n.
Mahâvagga, 21, 64.
Mahâvîra, 3, 112 n.
Mahâyânism, Mahâyâna school, 14, 95-7, 178 n.
Malice, being malicious, 68, 71.
Mallikâ, queen, 18, 189.
Mûlûkysutta, 6, 7, 93.
Mûna, pride or arrogance, 179.
Manes, 220, 225.
Mahûsri, 96.
Mantras, 24.
Manu, 118 n., 155 n., 162 n., 164 n., 206, 250 n.
Mûra, personification of evil, 132-3, 264.
Matricide, 235.
Max Müller, 247, 250.
Meals, taking after noon, see Eating at forbidden times.
Meat, accepting raw, 80.
Meditation of universal love, 185.
Meditative exercise of love, 196, 198.
Mencius, 211.
Mercy, 184.
Merit, meritorious deeds, 86 ff., 252; ten —— = ten good actions, 153.
Metti, 184, 196.
Metteyya = Maitreyya, 199.
Micchâdiõthi, viewing in a wrong way, 76.
Middle Country, the, 37, 43.
Middle path, course, way, 16, 113, 148-9.
Mind, lowliness of, 177; kindly, 197.
Mitra, a sun god, 28 ff., 257 ff.
Mitra-Varuna, 28.
Moderation in eating, 113-14, 121, 143.
Moggallâyana, 19.
Monk, 243, 261; five conditions of a good, 249; six notorious, 288.
Monkhood, 76.
Monogamy, 155 ff.
Moral retribution, 76, 90.
Moralism, 5, 39, 44.
Morality = Sila, 50-52, 98, 171, 261.
Mother and father, waiting on, 219.
Motives, material, 201; seven sorts of, 207-8.
Mudittâ, 184, 196.
Murderer, 91.
Music, playing, 64, 66, 77-9.
Nâma = mind, name, 181.
Nibbâna, 18-14, 49-51, 72-3, 93, 166 ff., 247, 266, 270 n., et passim; in this life, 231; perfect, without attachment, 172, 174; the highest grain, 229; the highest security, 18-14, 137; the highest purity, 167, 171 ff.; the sumnum bonum, 217.
Nigaõthâ Nâtapattra = Mahâvîra, 116 n., 240-1.
Nirvâna = Nibbâna, 45.
Nissaggiya Pãcãtthiyas, 80 ff.
Non-Aryans, 5, 44.
Non- or super-moral, 164, 167.
Novice, see Sâmaãera.
Oath, religious, 254.
Obedience, 95, 198.
Objects, the three holy, 34, 63, 168, 171, 215, 229, 233, 240, 259; seven, to be honoured and revered, 173; to be purified, 174.
Obligation, 227-8, 231.
Ointments, using, 66.
Once-born, 42.
Ordeal, 253 n., 254.
INDEX

Rig-veda, 24 n., 28, 38, 41–2.
Ṛite, moral and natural orders, 27, 257 ff.
Ṛitasayogapā, keeper of order, 28.
Ṛudra, Vedic god of destructive nature, 29.
Ṛūpa, form, 181.
Ṛūpadhātu, world of form, 35–6.
Ṛūpakāyaśca Dharmakāyaśca Buddha Tathāgatasya, 14 n.

Sabbabhūta(hi)ṃukampī, being benevolent and compassionate to all living beings, 193.
Sabbāṇhū, omniscient one, 50, 246.
Saccakiriyā, 252–4.
Saccanāma, 246.
Saccasandha, 246.
Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra, 96.
Sakya’s son = Buddha, 44, 233, 238, 266; Sakyamuni, 12 n.
Sakya princes, 20; tribe, 12.
Sallekhasutta, 6 n.
Salvation, 12–15, 31, 72, 89, 97, 136: (through knowledge), 245.
Samaṇa, 87, 90–92, 120, 146, 169, 233–4, 258.
Samaṇerag, 66, 76, 141–2, 243.
Sāṃśāhaphalasutta, 128 n.
Samantacakkhū, possessor of supernatural eyesight, 50, 94, 246.
Sambhū, 254.
Sambalajātaka, 254.
Sammādiṭṭhi, right view, 50.
Sammāsati, right recollection, 50.
Sammāsambuddha, 246.
Samraj, universal monarch, 28, 42.
Sanctified One = Buddha, 230.
Saṅgha, the monkish community, 34, 44, 80, 171, 179, 210 ff., 225, 259, et passim.
Saṅghādisesa, 80 ff.
Saṅgārava, Brāhmaṇa, 167.
Saṅjaya, 19.
Saṅkhājātaka, 204.
Saṅkhāra, predispositions, 181.
Saṁñā, perception, 181.
Santuṭṭha, Santuṭṭhi, Satuṭṭhita, Satusita, Santosa, 124.

Sanyāsin = Bhikṣu, 140–1.
Sapiṇḍas, 161.
Sarabha, monk, 238.
Sarabhu, 43.
Sarcasm, 70.
Ṣāriputta, 19, 107, 169 ff., 191, 231.
Satapaṭha-Brāhmaṇa, 40, 65.
Sati, recollection, 50.
Satisfaction, 124, 127, 129.
Satya, Sacca, truth, 245, 258.
Satyakāma, 249 n.
Sāvatthi, 20.
Saviour, 216.
Scents, using, 77, 78 n., 80.
Sceptical, being, 68.
Schism, 21, 68, 119, 238; see also Dissension.
Scornful language, 70.
Seeing shows or spectacles, 64, 66, 77–9.
Sekha, one who has still more to learn, 53.
Sekhiyas, 80, 82.
Selasutta, 9 n.
Self, idea of, 181, 182, 189.
Self-centred, 188.
Self-contented(ness), 177, 220.
Self-culture, 102, 212.
Self-debasement, 180.
Self-denial, 211.
Self-examination, 178.
Self-feeling, 180, 214.
Self-humiliation, 178.
Self-interested(ness), 96, 180–1, 188, 198.
Selfishness, 83, 180, 188, 250.
Self-perfection, 270–2.
Self-possession, 68.
Self-purification, 102.
Self-restraint, 6, 95, 101 ff., 111, 126, 147, 177.
Self-torture, 6.
Sense-organs, 102 ff., 147, 270.
Servility, the feeling of, 179.
Sexual intercourse, 80, 118, 142, 146; pleasure, enjoyment, 113, 147–8; relation, 147, 150–1; uncleanness, 64, 66, 79, 82.
Sibi, 153.
Sights, four, 12.
Siha, general, 116 n., 240.
INDEX

Sikkhā, three trainings, 8, 50-1, 171, 173.
Sikkhāpada, precept, 84.
Sīla = morality, virtue, 260-1.
Sīladhana, the treasure of virtue, 63.
Sīlasaumpadā, success in morality, 63.
Sīlavā, 156.
Simple life, 78.
Sin, 15, 244; four deadly, 43; sinfulness, 252, 262; sinlessness, 251.
Sin-effacing, hymn of, see Ahamara-sana.
Śīgalovādasuttanta, 61 n., 151, 194, 222, 233.
Singing, 64, 66, 77 ff.
Sipping water, 162-3, 176.
Śīva, 29.
Slander, 68-9, 79, 83.
Slađe = Sudda, 166, 178.
Slugliness, 62, 120-1.
Society, human, 235.
Socrates, 3, 4, 7 ff.
Soma juice, 27.
Soma, Vedic deity, 51.
Sophists, 3.
Speaking falsely, 59, 64, 68.
Speech, 68, 218; agreeable, 33, 234.
Spirits, drinking, 58.
Śrāddha, funeral rite, 220.
Śūvakaś, 96-7.
Śrotisiya, 161.
Śrutis, revelations, 45.
Staffs and swords, laying aside, 67.
Stains, 175; four, 120.
Stealing, 48, 58, 60, 77, 85-6, 122, 164.
Sudassana, 156.
Sudda, Anāthapindika, 20, 152, 251.
Sudda = Śudra, 42-3, 155, 161.
Suddhaṭṭhakasutta, 98.
Suddhodana, 12.
Sugata, well-attained one, 50, 210, 246.
Suicide, 81.
Sujatā, 152-3.
Sunanagavilāsinī, 69.
Sunādhēpa, 40.
Sundarīkabāhradvāja, Brūhman, 210.
Supparaka, 254.
Suppāmakkāṭaka, 254.
Support, material, 280-1.
Śūtras = Dharmasūtras, 201-2.
Suttanipāta, 53.
Symbolism, 175.
Sympathetic feeling, 188-90, 273; joy, 251.
Suyāthya, 10, 41, 62, 70, 95, 138, 184, 194 n., 266, et passim.
Taittirīya (Upaniṣad), 53.
Taoism, 2.
Tapakričha, 118.
Tathāgata, sentient being, 6.
Tathāgata, one who has understood things as they are, one who has come at the real truth, 19, 43, 50, 148, 171, 179-80.
Teacher's bed, see Guru.
Teachers, six, 226.
Telovādajitaka, 116 n.
Temperance, 10, 66, 95, 102, 111 ff.
Tevijjā, its two different meanings, 24 n.
Thankfulness, 217.
Theft, thief, 91; see also Stealing.
Theravāda, branch of Buddhism, 96.
Things, five, 192.
Thirst, 127.
Thirty-three gods, 33, 36.
Tīsa Metteyya, 126.
Tittirajitaka, 224.
Tolerance, 2, 10, 70, 95, 133, 135, 271; toleration, 95, 237 ff.
Torpidity, 62, 121.
Trainings, three, see Sikkha.
Tranquillization, tranquillity, 52, 98, 101-2, 148.
Transmigration, 1, 3, 47, 49, 52, 165, 187, 228.
Truth, 62, 192, 198, 248, 260, 268; truth-speaker, 248; -speaking, 62, 244, 248, 249 n., 251, 255.
Truths, Four Noble, 14, 16, 49, 87, 144, 217, 247, 249, 270 n.
Twice-born, 42, 58, 139, 202.
Udena, 61, 156.
Uggā, 156.
Ummadantī, 153.
Unguents, using, 64, 77, 78 n., 80.
Upaka, 15, 19, 107 n.
Upayana, 189-40.
Upaniṣads, 7, 24, 45 ff., 254.
Upāsaka, layman, 66.
Upavasatha = Uposatha, 65.
INDEX

Upavattana, 22.
Upékkhā, 196.
Uposatha, 64-5, 67, 77, 117, 119, 142.
Uruvela, 17; Uruvelakassapa = Kas-
sapa of Uruvela, 240.
Uṣas, goddess of dawn, 27.

Vacccha family, a Brāhmaṇ of, 107.
Vaccchagotta, 93, 210.
Vain conversation, 71.
Vaṅglorey, 180.
Vaiśyas = Vessas, 42, 118, 155.
Vajjians, 20, 119, 214.
Vāmādeva, ancient seer, 207.
Vāmaka, ancient seer, 207.
Vānaprasatha, Vaikhānasā, 140.
Vardhamāna Jñātapatra = Mahā-
vīra, 8 n.
Varuṇa, Vedic god, guardian of Rita, 27 ff., 84, 253 n., 257 ff.
Vāsetṭha, 44; Vāsetṭhasutta, 44.
Vāsetṭha, ancient seer, 207.
Vāsiṣṭha, 162-3.
Vatsas or Vaṁsas, 21, 156.
Vattakajātaka, 252.
Vedagu, Vedantagū, 24 n.
Vedanā, feeling, 131.
Vedas, Mantra, 8, 24, 83-4, 140, 161, 163, 179, 203.
Vedic gods or deities, 4, 25, 28-9, 36; their non- or super-moral na-
ture, 29 ff.; what they bestow on worshippers, 29 ff.
Vedic literature, 28; mythology, 23.
Vedic student = Brahmākarīn, 140, 201, 210, 218.
Veluvana, 17.
Venaga, 107.
Vinanda, 159.
Veṇhu = Viṣṇu, 31.
Vernacity, 88, 95, 243 ff.
Vesāli, 20, 119.
Vessamitta, ancient seer, 207.
Vessantara, 153.
Vessas, 48.
Videha, 18.
Vidhurapanditajātaka, 255.
View, right, 171-2.
Vibhāra, 231.
Vijjācaraṇasamppanna, 52.
Vikalabhōjasāveramanī, abstinence
from eating at forbidden times,
77 n.

Vinaya texts, 14, 20, 96, 192.
Viṃṭhāna, consciousness, 181.
Violence, 183, 263-4.
Virtue, 51-2, 225; other-regarding,
self-regarding, 237, 271-2; viru-
ous actions, 97.
Visākhā, 66.
Visayhajātaka, 204.
Vrata, abstinence, 65.

Warrior, 41, 166, 173; warrior caste
= Khantiya, 18, 36, 38, 42 ff.
Water, filter, 59; medium of pur-
cification, 168; sipping or touching,
168, 176.
Way of nature, 2.
Way of purification, 11; Brāhma-
ical, 162, 166 ff.; Buddhistic,
166 ff.
Way of salvation, 12.
Weakness, moral, 62.
What is not given, taking, 59, 63, 68,
79, 81.
Wife, 151 ff.; seven sorts of, 153;
number of wives, 155.
Will, freedom of, 91; weakness of,
109.
Wisdom, 171; social, 224.
Women, 80, 82-3, 146, 156, 165;
three ways of seeing, 61; associa-
tion with, 145.
Worldly enjoyment, 78, 118.
Worrying monks in assembly, 83.
Wrong idea, harbouring, 71.

Ya evān veda, one who knows thus,
47, 52 ff.
Yajjubeda = Yajurveda, 24 n.
Yajurveda, 24 n., 38.
Yakkha, 241-2.
Yamataghri, ancient seer, 207.
Yamuna, 43.
Yāśīa = yājña, 41.
Yathābhūtaṁ, as it is, 245.
Yathābhūtaṁ patipajjitaṁ, 262.
Yīṭhā = īṭhā, 41.
Yogakkhema, the highest security,
18.

Zarathustra = Zoroaster, 2, 3, 160.
Zarathustrianism, Zoroastrianism,
2n., 159, 165.
Zend-Avesta, 159.
Central Archaeological Library,
NEW DELHI

Call No. 894.31 Tra.

Author—

Title—Ethics of Buddhism

"A book that is shut is but a block."

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY
GOVT. OF INDIA
Department of Archaeology
NEW DELHI

Please help us to keep the book clean and moving: