THE

HISTORY OF THE SIKHS,

BY W. L. M'GREGOR, M.D.

VOLUME II.

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Chapter I.

The Death of the Maharajah Runjeet Singh.

As has been already related, consequent upon a life of intemperance, and the hardships, toil, and exposure attending his numerous victories over the Sirdars of the Punjab, as well as the Afghans across the Indus, whereby he obtained complete possession of a country which had never, previously, been subjected to one ruler, the Maharajah began to suffer from severe illness in 1834. His attack was very sudden and severe, leaving him insensible for some time, and though he survived it, he was afflicted with paralysis. He recovered so far, however, that he could use his limbs; but, the power of utterance was for a time lost, and he never perfectly regained the use of his tongue.
His Sirdars and followers were delighted at even his partial recovery, and submitted willingly to the sway of the only man who had preserved discipline and order amongst them. In Dhyan Singh, the Maharajah possessed an able minister, while the well-known talents of Azeezoodeen insured the firm stability of public and private affairs. This old man conducted the correspondence with the British, knew their power, and entirely concurred in opinion with his master, that any cause of quarrel with that powerful nation and firm ally would entail eventual ruin on the Punjab.

For a time the Maharajah was perfectly helpless, and borne along from place to place in a covered litter; his body was enfeebled, and he was obliged to express his wants by signs, his power of speech being nearly lost. But had he, even then, led a regular life, and subjected himself to regimen and medical advice under his painful sufferings, recovery might have taken place: his, however, was not a disposition to be thwarted, and he would not entirely give up his habits of revelry and indulgence in the fiery spirit to which he had been so long accustomed; though he restricted himself to a moderate allowance, meted out to him in a small golden cup. He submitted, likewise, to the power of electricity and galvanism, in the fond hope that it might remove the paralytic affection of his tongue. No sooner had Sir Henry Fane reached Lahore, in March, 1837, on the occasion of the marriage of his grandson, Nonchal Singh,
than the Maharajah threw off all restraint, thinking it necessary to shew an example of hard drinking to his guest.

When the army of the Indus was collected at Ferozapore, in 1838, the Governor-General, Lord Auckland, had an interview with him, and the Maharajah crossed the Sutlej a second time, in order to renew the treaty which had been first formed between him and the British in 1809, and strengthened at Roopur in 1831, when Runjeet Singh visited Lord William Bentinck at that place. Seven years had produced a great change in the Maharajah. At Roopur, he entered the lists with his own Sirdars and Skinner's horsemen, in shooting at marks and cutting at tent pegs with his horse at full speed. At Ferozapore, he required assistance in mounting his horse, and his feeble arm could neither wield the sword nor support the matchlock. But his energetic spirit, still, remained unsubdued: the mental power survived physical decay.

We have had opportunities of witnessing the vigorous and powerful frame of this remarkable man, even when afflicted with paralysis; and his muscular system showed, that, to a mind of no ordinary power had been united a bodily frame capable, before it suffered from disease, of undergoing any labour and fatigue.

Runjeet Singh knew that the Affghans could not successfully resist the British; and he no doubt rejoiced, in his old age and decay, that he would
have his powerful allies between him and Dost Mohummud, whose rising power he dreaded ever since the conquest obtained by the Affghans over Hurree Singh at Jumrood in 1837. He received daily accounts of the progress of the British Troops under the command of Sir John Keane, who, crossing the Indus, advanced through the Bolan Pass, overcoming almost insurmountable difficulties; but he did not live to hear of the capture of Ghuznee, having expired on the 30th June 1839. His death was not unlooked for, but the event spread universal affliction throughout the Punjab, for he had left no successor worthy of him or capable of maintaining his kingdom entire.

The immediate successor of Runjeet Singh, was his eldest son, Khurrruk Singh, who possessed none of his father's qualifications for rule, though resembling him strongly in feature; and it was soon apparent, that Nonehal Singh, the son to the heir of the throne of Lahore, would be, in reality, the Ruler of the Punjab. There was another man who had been extremely popular with the army, and, though never acknowledged by Runjeet Singh as his real son, had still been treated as a prince; we allude to Shere Singh. When Khurrruk Singh ascended the throne of Lahore, Shere Singh made his willing submission as a subject, and received an addition to his allowances of one lakh of rupees annually.

The first act of the new ruler was an unpopu-
lar one, and gave great dissatisfaction. Instead of allowing the Rajah Dhyan Singh to remain as Wuzeer or prime minister, he raised a creature of his own to that high appointment. This man, named Chet Singh, had nothing to recommend him but arrogance and sycophancy. His good fortune was of short duration. Dhyan Singh, at the instigation, it was supposed, of Shere Singh, entered the Durbar and slew the prime minister before his master's eyes. The treasurer Belee Misr Ram and others shared the same fate. After this act of violence, Khurruk Singh shut himself up; and, though he occasionally attended the Durbar, he never forgave the insult. His intellect, never very powerful, became impaired, and the management of public affairs thus fell into the hands of Nonehal Singh, who had always shown a dislike to the British, and now made preparations in the vicinity of Lahore for hostilities against that power. After a short reign of a little more than twelve months, Khurruk Singh died of a broken heart.

All eyes were now turned towards the favourite of the Sikhs, the grandson of their great ruler, whom he resembled in features and disposition. He was popular with the army, for he had been a soldier from his boyhood, and was of a brave and indomitable spirit, united, at the same time, to great caution, discretion, and forethought. Runjeet Singh was very proud of Nonehal, and fondly anticipated that in him the Sikhs would find a successor worthy of filling the throne of Lahore, and
preserving his kingdom entire. But this fond hope was not destined to be realized. Nonehal Singh, on returning from the obsequies of his father, was killed by a stone falling on his head from one of the gateways of Lahore, while passing under it in his howdah. Oodum Singh, the eldest son of Rajah Goolab Singh, of Jummoo, who was on the same elephant, shared the same fate. Dhyan Singh ordered his nephew's body to be burned, while that of Nonehal Singh was carried to the palace, and a report industriously circulated, that though badly hurt, the prince was still alive. This was done at the advice and suggestion of Azeezoodeen, Goormukh Singh, Bhaee Ram Singh, and other influential persons.

Shere Singh was immediately summoned to Lahore from Mukherya, where he resided, and on his arrival it was deemed no longer necessary to conceal the death of Nonehal Singh, whose body was accordingly burned with the usual honours. The mother of Nonehal Singh, Chund Koonwur, perceived the object of Dhyan Singh in sending for Shere Singh, and she was determined to frustrate it.

Among the most powerful Sirdars in the Punjab, was the Scindinwala, and Chund Koonwur determined to ask his aid in her endeavour to expel Shere Singh from Lahore, and keep the government in her own hands. The chief Sirdar of the Scindinwala family, at this juncture, was Uttur Singh, who was then absent at Hurdwar, and to him she sent a message to return to the capital
with all possible expedition. On receiving her order, Uttur Singh hurried back by forced marches and soon reached Lahore. Chun I Koonwur, thus strengthened, distributed alms to the Brahmins, and was proclaimed Ranee or queen. Uttur Singh was installed as the chief adviser, and by his advice and counsel, as well as that of other Sirdars favourable to her cause, she expelled Shere Singh, and shut the gates of Lahore. Shere Singh was inclined to offer resistance, but Dhyan Singh, who from the first espoused his cause, dissuaded him from making any hostile attempt, promising, at the same time, that he would establish him on the throne of Lahore. Shere Singh accordingly returned to Mukherya, where he employed himself in his favourite pursuits of hunting and shooting until he should receive further advice from the Rajah regarding his future steps. In the meantime, the Ranee appointed Uttur Singh her prime minister, and Dhyan Singh remained unemployed. The affairs of the state were conducted by the advice of the prime minister, assisted by a council of four others. It was soon apparent, that, with the Ranee at the head of affairs, the government could not be carried on in an efficient manner, and Dhyan Singh embraced every opportunity of rendering her unpopular among the Sirdars and the soldiers. At length, he persuaded them that a woman should no longer be allowed to rule them, but that a man of energy and talent was required for this purpose, recommending strongly that the Prince Shere
Singh should be recalled and placed on the throne. This suggestion was adopted, but to prevent the supposition that he himself was engaged in the affair, and still further to mask his design, Dhyan Singh went to Jummoo, leaving his brother Goolab Singh and his son Heera Singh with the Ranee. Before leaving Lahore, he wrote to Shere Singh, requesting him to hurry to Lahore, where he would meet with support, adding that he himself would soon return to his post. Shere Singh, at the same time, received the assurance of the Sirdars and soldiers, that he would be kindly received on his reaching the capital.

On his way to Jummoo, the Rajah met his brother Soochet Singh, to whom he communicated his design of placing Shere Singh on the throne of Lahore, and obtained his ready co-operation. Shere Singh lost no time in making his preparations, and dispatched a letter to the British Agent, informing him of his intentions, adding, that whatever aid might be afforded him would be rewarded by a grant of all the Sikh Possessions on the left bank of the Sutlej. He, likewise, sent a letter by the hands of his trusty adherent, Mukhee Khan, to the Rajah Dhyan Singh, advising him of his intention to reach Lahore without delay, and requesting the Rajah to join him there. Mounting his horse, he left Mukherya in the morning, and after halting half-way for the night, he reached the vicinity of Lahore next evening. On the road he gave a hundred rupees to one of his attendants for the purpose of
purchasing gunpowder at the city or village of Chumeearee. The place where Shere Singh alighted was near the house of Mons. Avatabili, and since called "Futleghur," or the house of victory. Here he was joined by crowds who welcomed his arrival, not by the firing of cannon, for they had none, but by their voices in long and continued cheers. The Ranee, hearing the news of his arrival, ordered the gates of Lahore to be shut, though the gate-keepers, after obeying her order, immediately joined the standard of the prince!
CHAPTER II

THE REIGN AND DEATH OF SHERE SINGH, AND THE WUZEER RAJAH DHYAN SINGH.

SHERE SINGH was scarcely proclaimed king by the unanimous voice of the people, when he proceeded to besiege the capital. Dhonkul Singh, a commander of two regiments of the Royal Musjid, joined him, and conducted him into the fort. Rajahs Goolab Singh and Heera Singh pretended to oppose the prince, and the guns of the fort were directed against him. The fire was returned, and the whole city was in an uproar. After a few hours Soochet Singh joined Shere Singh. General Ventura likewise acknowledged him as king. In the midst of the confusion and plunder, a report prevailed that the British were in Lahore. Vast quantities of pearls, money, and other valuables were carried off; wood, wherever it was to be found, was also taken away, and not a piece was left on the premises of the Jemadar Khooshyal Singh. The uproar continued throughout the night, and in the
morning Shere Singh, learning that the Rajah Dhyan Singh had reached the left bank of the Ravee, went to visit him. The Maharajah and Dhyan Singh then proceeded towards the city and the lines of the soldiers. The Rajah now ordered Goolab Singh and Heera Singh to cease their fire, as it did not become brothers and relatives to be thus quarrelling with and destroying each other. In the course of three days, Chund Koonwur was left helpless and nearly deserted.

In the year 1897 Bik., A.D. 1841, Shere Singh was seated on the throne of Lahore. All the Sirdars, with the exception of the Scindinwala, paid their allegiance. In consequence, the territory of that powerful family was confiscated, and orders sent to the Sikh Army in the Hill States to bring Lena Singh, a younger brother of Uttur Singh, a prisoner to Lahore. Uttur Singh himself, and his nephew Ajeet Singh, escaped across the Sutlej, with the intention of supplicating the aid of the British Government to expel Shere Singh, and establish the mother of Nonehal as Ranee. The army which Lena Singh Scindinwala then commanded at Kumlagurh replied to the order of the Maharajah, that they would bind themselves on oath to bring the Scindinwala to Lahore, but not as a prisoner. On arriving at Lahore, Lena Singh was surrounded by Shere Singh's troops; and, seeing no alternative, his adherents were obliged to deliver him up to Shere Singh, by whom he was immediately imprisoned.
When once firmly established in his kingdom, Shere Singh employed himself in his favorite pursuit of hunting, and the affairs of the state were prudently and wisely conducted in his absence by Dhyan Singh, the prime minister.

Shere Singh had always been addicted to pleasure, and indulged in the use of spirits to a free extent before he became Maharajah. He was, however, of a mild, affable disposition, and his failing was readily overlooked among a people who consider drinking as one of their amusements, and often measure a man’s physical powers by the quantity of liquor he can consume at a sitting! This used to be no uncommon test, even in countries pretending to greater civilization than the Sikhs; and in the days of Burns, the Scottish poet, the last man who fell below the table was considered the “king among them a’.” After a time, however, Shere Singh threw off all restraint and became a complete drunkard and debauchee. The prime minister who had raised the prince to the throne of Lahore and rejoiced in his good fortune, could ill endure to witness the altered conduct of Shere Singh, who, from being a mild, just prince, became a drunken tyrant; moreover, to increase the growing dislike on the part of Dhyan Singh, Shere Singh had not only released the Scindinwala Lena Singh, but recalled Uttur Singh and Ajeet Singh. He restored them to their confiscated estates and heaped fresh favors on them. He was guided by their advice in every-
thing, and totally disregarded that of Dhyan Singh. Neither by night nor day was he ever separated from them: they were his boon companions, and no demand from either Lena Singh or Ajeet Singh was resisted. Every thing they asked was granted, and the interest of every one else disregarded. This state of affairs could not last long, nor could it be supposed that, even, if Dhyan-Singh should smother his disgust, the Sikhs themselves would endure the rule of a debauchee whose excesses rendered him incapable of governing the State. In their hours of revelry, it happened that the Maharajah and his favorites often quarrelled among themselves, and Ajeet Singh frequently threatened to kill the Maharajah, but the latter did not regard the threat, and hugged himself in a perfect security while he possessed so careful and wise a servant as Dhyan Singh. The Scindin-walas saw the difficulty that attended the assassination of Shere Singh, and did not fully comprehend what advantage was thereby to be gained, unless they could secure the powerful influence of the Rajah. They accordingly devised a plan, whereby the latter might be incensed, and actually connive at the act which they contemplated. Accustomed to obtain the willing consent of Shere Singh to their demands, they resolved to avail themselves of this advantage to effect their design. An order was written out to the effect that Rajah Dhyan Singh should be put to death, and to this the Maharajah’s signature was obtained at a time when, overcome by
the effects of liquor, he was unconscious of what he was doing. The next point was to make the Rajah aware of the hostile feelings entertained against him by his master. The Scindinwalas broached the subject to Dhyan Singh, by saying that although ill-will might exist between him and themselves, they were equally servants of the state and deserved well of the Maharajah. Dhyan Singh admitted the justness of the remark. The Scindinwalas then added "What would you think of a master, who, instead of rewarding our efforts to serve him, should actually wish for and order our deaths?" The Rajah replied, "that he could not believe Shere Singh would ever be guilty of such ingratitude." To show that he could, the order was produced, wherein, the Rajah's own life was ordered to be taken away! Still Dhyan Singh was incredulous, and said that unless both the signature and seal of his master were attached, he could not believe that he entertained such hostile intentions towards him. On hearing these sentiments, Lena Singh and his nephew lost no time in obtaining both, and then presented the order to the prime minister. The latter was caught in the snare, and irritated to the highest degree. Advantage was taken of his state of mind, and the cunning Scindinwalas observed, "If the Maharajah is, thus ungrateful to you, it is easy to repay him by ordering him to be slain; only attach your signature to such a document, and it shall be executed to the letter." Thus, by the cunning of the Scindinwalas, the Maharajah and his Minister were made the
unconscious murderers of each other. Dhyan Singh signed the fatal paper, and Ajeet Singh promised him that it should be executed on the morrow, which happened to be a Friday. On the evening of the day preceding the murder of Shere Singh, Ajeet Singh requested that he would be pleased to look at his troops in the morning. To this he readily agreed, and left the city early for that purpose. He passed out on horseback through the Roshnaee gate of Lahore, and taking the road towards the parade ground alighted near the garden of Tej Singh, where the tents of his son Prince Pertaub Singh were pitched. He had no attendant except the Dewan Deenanath and his armour-bearer, Boodh Singh, who always accompanied him. Ajeet Singh speedily joined him, and reported that his soldiers were all present, and ready for the inspection of the Maharajah. The latter called for Deenanath and ordered him to enrol their names as soldiers. While thus employed, Ajeet Singh produced a handsome case containing a new English rifle, which he shewed to Shere Singh. The Maharajah inspected the box and its contents, and raising the barrel and stock adjusted the one to the other, and then tried the sight. Ajeet Singh remarked that it was loaded, on which, Shere Singh gave the rifle to one of Ajeet Singh’s attendants and desired him to take an aim and fire it off. His master gave the signal, and the contents of the rifle were lodged in the Maharajah’s chest: Shere Singh exclaimed “What have you done, villain!” and immediately expired. The sword of Ajeet
Singh separated at one blow his head from his body. The report of the gun instantly brought Boodh Singh to the spot; he cut down two of Ajeet's followers, and aimed a blow at himself, but the sword snapped in two, and he ran to procure another: but his foot slipped, and he was speedily dispatched by one of Ajeet Singh's followers, whom the noise of the gun had likewise attracted to the spot.

While this tragedy was being enacted without the garden, Lena Singh entered it and found Pertaub Singh, the son of the murdered Maharajah, at his prayers on the occasion of an eclipse. The Sirdar quickly dispatched him, and cut off his head. A messenger was now dispatched to Dhyan Singh to request his presence, for the Rajah had forgotten the business altogether, and did not anticipate so speedy a compliance with his order. He was worshipping at the time, and after dressing, he went in search of his master. Outside the fort he was met by Lena Singh and his nephew, who remarked that "the job was done." The Rajah was incredulous until the heads of both Shere Singh and his son were exhibited! He blamed them for killing the young prince, but they merely observed, "that what was done could not be helped." Seeing that the followers of Lena Singh were numerous, and his own few in number, Dhyan Singh returned to the fort accompanied by the Scindinwalas: at length, Lena Singh, taking the Rajah's hand in his, enquired "Who was now to be king?" Dhyan Singh replied "There is no
one but Dhuleep Singh." Lena Singh rejoined "And so he is to be made king and you become his prime minister, while we get nothing for our pains?" The Rajah became annoyed, and wanted to get away, but the Gooroo Goormukh Singh being present observed, "What is the use of words? Remove the Rajah as you have done Shere Singh and his son, and then your path will be clear." On hearing this remark, Ajeet Singh, who was standing behind the Rajah, shot him in the back, and he fell dead on the spot. Thus, in the course of a few hours, were the Maharajah, his son, and minister, slaughtered by the Scindinwalas. This account of the murder, and the manner in which it was concurred and executed, are on the authority of Said Hussein Shah, the son of Said Ahmed Shah of Wittald, in whose possession are the very documents giving orders for the deaths of Shere Singh and Dhyan Singh, under their own signatures!

It is difficult to conceive the ingratitude thus manifested by the Scindinwalas towards their benefactor, though we can easily believe that this powerful family had still a wish to see the mother of Nonehal Singh restored to power; and Lena Singh, no doubt, looked forward to the post of Wuzeer by getting rid of Dhyan Singh, It is said, that Ajeet Singh before he murdered Shere Singh repeated a Persian distich, to the effect that "his affairs were in a disordered state and that he was no longer able to pay his soldiers." The report of the Rajah's death quickly spread through the city,
and Misr Lall Singh, who afterwards became so conspicuous in the war with the British as a Sirdar, was dispatched to bring Heera Singh into the fort. The young Rajah knew that the death of Shere Singh had been determined on, but he never suspected that his own father would share the same fate; he had absented himself on purpose that morning, and gone to Monsieur Avatabili’s house, where Lall Singh found him haranguing the troops and telling them not to mind the death of the Maharajah. The news of the Wuzeer’s death alarmed Heera Singh, and he ascended the terrace of Avatabili’s house and seated himself there, leaving the sentry to keep a good look out, and allow no one to follow him. He then dispatched a message to the several Sirdars requesting their immediate attendance. They soon arrived, when, the young Rajah unbuckling his sword laid it before them and bared his neck. He said, “The sword has this day deprived my father of life. I am left alone and fatherless, and I now throw myself on you; either kill me or give me your support.” The appeal had the desired effect, and they all promised to support Heera Singh, who next addressed the soldiers and promised an advance to each of three rupees a month if they would obey him. The proposition was received with loud cheers. Ajeet Singh, in the mean time, had caused Dhuleep Singh to be proclaimed Maharajah by beat of drum, and himself Wuzeer. During the night Heera Singh reached the Delhi gate, followed
by the Sirdars and numerous troops: the foremost amongst the latter were those of Ventura and Avatabili. Entering the gate with drums beating, the people became alarmed, believing as they did that Ajeet Singh was in possession of the fort and prime minister. The guns soon began to play on both sides; great numbers fell, and the fight continued unabated throughout the night. In the morning, Heera Singh's force was joined by General Ventura with six guns, which he placed in position. About nine o'clock, Raee Kesree Singh advised his master Soochet Singh to seize the royal musjid; but the Rajah was unwell at the time, and requested his follower to do as he recommended. At this juncture, Lena Singh was observed coming from the Huzoorree Bagh (Royal Garden) and going towards the Badshabee Musjid for ammunition. Kesree Singh took aim and the Sirdar fell mortally wounded, but was dragged through the gate into the sleeping apartments, where he died two days afterwards. When Kesree Singh had cleared the Musjid, he applied his scaling ladders and entered the fort; here he seized on several Sirdars who were brought to him by the troops, who begged forgiveness and asserted that not they but their leaders were to blame. Ajeet Singh, seeing that the fort could no longer be maintained, escaped over the wall by means of a rope, but a Mussulman soldier observing him, pursued, and Ajeet Singh thus hotly pressed, took off his golden bracelets and threw them at the man.
requesting him to spare his life; but to this he would not listen, and slew Ajeet Singh, cutting off his head with which he hurried to Heera Singh. The latter ordered the body to be brought also. At the sight of the lifeless corpse of the murderer of their king and prime minister, the rage of the soldiery knew no bounds, and they begged of Heera Singh to lead them forthwith to the fort. In the course of an hour all within the fort were either killed or had fled; among the former was Goormukh Singh, who had advised Ajeet Singh to kill the Rajah Dhyan Singh.

The Ranee’s house was pillaged by the soldiery, and vast quantities of clothes, shawls, jewels, in short every thing that could be met with, were carried away. The merchants in the city left their shops, and fled, leaving every thing to the infuriated Sikhs, who committed all kinds of outrages on the inhabitants, cutting off the noses of the common women in the streets! When the fort was completely in the hands of Heera Singh, he first went and kissed the young Maharajah Dhuleep Singh’s feet in token of submission. He next went to the royal garden, and ordered every relative and follower of the Scindinwala to be murdered. One of them, who had concealed himself in a ditch or drain, was dragged out, and his belly ripped up. Heera Singh ordered the corpse of Lena Singh Scindinwala to be brought before him. It was dragged through the city, and afterwards cut into pieces, which were hung up on the different gateways.
The body of Ajeet Singh was treated in the same manner. Uttur Singh, who had heard of Ajeet Singh's proclamation regarding himself, had advanced about fifteen miles to lend his aid if necessary; and, for the purpose of seizing him, Heera Singh dispatched a strong force. When the news of the defeat and death of his brother and nephew reached him, Uttur Singh retreated, and he and his followers crossed the Sutlej. This Sirdar remained some time in Hindostan, but re-crossed the Sutlej, and in conjunction with Cashmeera Singh, a reputed son of Runjeet, engaged the Sikh troops under Heera Singh, who totally routed him, when both he and the prince were killed.

During the reign of Shere Singh on the throne of Lahore, our disasters at Cabul had occurred; and had he been hostile to the British, the army destined to relieve Jellalabad, under Brigadier Wild, might have met with serious difficulties in traversing the Punjab. Even the better constructed force under General Pollock, sent to effect the same purpose, and avenge our injuries on Akhbar Khan, could hardly have passed through the Punjab had its ruler and his people been hostile to us. With the Sikhs as our enemies, it may be safely stated that neither army would have reached Jellalabad in a state to attempt the forcing of the Khyber Pass, in which Brigadier Wild was forced to retreat on Peshawur. Fortunately, the government of Lahore, under the Maharajah Shere Singh,
preserved a strict and firm alliance with the British, and not only assisted the troops proceeding towards Afghanistan with supplies, but likewise with a Sikh force which acted in concert with that of the British. It was considered a fortunate occurrence that Captain, now Sir Claude Wade, was enabled to force the Khyber Pass, and thus conduct Timour, the eldest son of Shah Soojah, to Cabul. A leader less skilled in eastern politics might have encountered insurmountable difficulties. It must not be forgotten, that Captain Wade, as Political Agent for so many years at Loodianah, had ample opportunities of not only acquiring a thorough knowledge of the Sikhs, but likewise of the Affghans; and though he may not have coincided in the policy of retaining Dost Mohummed at the head of affairs in Afghanistan, thereby securing a powerful and efficient ally, he still accomplished the object of bringing Timour through the Khyber Pass.

On the advance of General Pollock towards Cabul, and during the successful operations against Akhbar Khan, the Sikh government rightly believed our disasters in that country to arise from the inclemency of the weather, and the perfidy of Akhbar Khan; still, the Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough, dreading any change that might take place in their friendly feelings, assembled a large Army of Observation at Ferozapore in 1842, in order to render assistance, if necessary, to the army returning from Afghanistan under Generals Pollock and Nott. The force was complete in every de-
partment, and ready to cross the Sutlej had its services been required. At length, the British army returned victorious from the right bank of the Sutlej, and a large Sikh force were made spectators of the marked respect shown to it by the Governor-General. The whole of the troops at Ferozapore, comprising the Army of Observation, as well as that just returned, were reviewed by the Governor-General and the Sikh Sirdars; and the utmost unanimity prevailed. On the breaking up of the Army of Observation, an embassy was sent to Lahore, acknowledging the valuable aid afforded by the Sikhs.
CHAPTER III.

EVENTS FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF SHERE SINGH, AND ADMINISTRATION OF HEERA SINGH.

It was feared that the discord and anarchy likely to follow the death of the Maharajah Shere Singh and the Rajah Dhyan Singh, might affect the friendly terms which had existed between the British Government and that of Lahore for a period of nearly five and thirty years; and some troops were accordingly hurried towards the frontier stations of Loodianah and Ferozpore. At this juncture, the British were in the field against Gwalior, and the Sikhs, no doubt, watched the issue with anxiety. Several times the alarm was raised at Loodianah that the Sikhs were crossing. That the Sikhs, at the period referred to, did intend to invade the British territories appears pretty certain; but the overthrow of the Mahrattas or the fields of Maharajpoor and Puneear had so decided an effect on their movements, that the idea of crossing the Sutlej was, for a time, abandoned by the Sikhs.
Nevertheless the force at Loodianah and Ferozpore was kept on the watch.

Heera Singh had succeeded his father as prime minister. He had been the especial favorite of the Maharajah Runjeet Singh. He was always near him, and allowed to be seated in his presence, an honour denied to even Dhyan Singh. In appearance, he was rather effeminate, and did not resemble his father, who was a fine, tall, powerful man. Little of energy was expected from him, but his first act showed, that his intercourse with Runjeet Singh had conferred advantages on Heera Singh which made up for any deficiency in natural talents. His measures were prudent and such as the crisis demanded. He had utterly destroyed the powerful family of the Scindinwalas who had murdered his father, and cherished a deep-rooted hatred to Shere Singh, which however had been smothered for a time by the favours lavished on the members of it by the Maharajah. But Heera Singh had injudicious and interested advisers, and it was soon discovered that a Pundit named Julla possessed an entire influence over the Rajah, who followed the advice of this cunning Hindoo in all matters of state. In order to reconcile the army and render it subservient to his wishes, Heera Singh was obliged to make promises which he could not possibly fulfil. The Treasury was exhausted, and the more he bestowed on an idle and discontented soldiery the greater were its demands. Discontent followed, and the Rajah, no longer able to stem
the march of anarchy, endeavoured to escape, but it was too late, he was pursued and both he and his favourite Pundit were killed.

The behaviour of Heera Singh to his brave uncle Soochet Singh, had raised a powerful party against him; and his uncle Goolab Singh, the Rajah of Jummoo, was disgusted at the death of a brother who had fallen fighting gallantly against fearful odds under the command of his own nephew.

Soochet Singh was the _beau ideal_ of a Sikh soldier. In his youth, and before debauchery had spoiled his looks, he was a very handsome man: muscular, agile, and well skilled in the use of the sword and matchlock; an excellent horseman: in short, a complete soldier. In his dress, Soochet Singh was particularly gorgeous, and wore a profusion of jewels; while his arms and horse-trappings were magnificently ornamented with gold and tinsel. Though thus a gallant soldier, he was of a mild and pleasing disposition; affable to strangers, and a universal favourite with the army. Possessed of such qualifications, it is not to be wondered at, that his nephew should have become jealous of his power and influence; and desirous of ridding himself of a man so much superior to him in every respect, save cunning; for Soochet's was not a suspicious nature; he was frank, free, and ingenuous. In compassing the death of his uncle, it was universally believed, that Heera Singh had acted under the advice, and at the instigation of
the Pundit Julla. The cruel act had the effect of estranging the Rajah of Jummoo, who became suspicious of his nephew's protestations of friendship, while his hands were yet red with the blood of his uncle.

The widow of the deceased Rajah and his numerous friends and adherents were loud in their cries for revenge on the murderer of Soochet Singh, and Heera Singh dreaded the pernicious consequences of his barbarous and impolitic act. Still, he maintained too much power to render successful any effort on the part of the widow of his uncle.

The wealth left behind him by Soochet Singh, consisting of several lakhs of rupees, was sent across the Sutlej, and safely lodged with the British authorities at Ferozepore. Several demands were made for its restoration by the Sikh government, but to these little or no attention was paid. The refusal to deliver up this money served to irritate the Sikhs, since the Lahore government considered Soochet Singh as a rebel who had forfeited all his property to the state.

The ostensible reason for Heera Singh's taking away his uncle Soochet Singh's life, and the manner in which the latter died, were related to us by a faithful adherent and follower of Soochet Singh named Esree Singh, a man who had behaved with marked attention to the officers visiting the court of Lahore. It appears from this statement, that the Rajah Soochet Singh had been induced to visit Lahore at the solicitation of the Punches of the
Sikhs who wished to establish the Rajah as Prime Minister. He thereupon reached the right bank of the Ravee with a considerable force, which he left encamped there, crossing over to Lahore with only about fourteen of his followers, among the rest Kesree Singh, who had performed so prominent a part after the death of Dyan Singh. Soochet Singh, on reaching Lahore, informed the Maharaja that he had arrived and wished to pay his respects. In answer to this, he was ordered to leave his camp. Immediately after this reply, he observed an immense force moving from Lahore towards Meean Meer, where he then was. His attendants warned him, that their purpose was hostile, and advised him to recross the Ravee and join his own soldiers. To this he lent a deaf ear, as he could not believe that his nephew would thus take him by surprise. The guns, upwards of two hundred in number, approached, and the Rajah was urged to flee, but in vain. At length he rose up, and armed himself; the Sikhs rushed upon him, and a fierce and sanguinary conflict ensued, but of short duration, as he had but a handful of brave men wherewith to contend against thousands. Soochet Singh slew three men with his own hand before he fell mortally wounded by two bullets. Kesree Singh killed five, and two of these after he had fallen. Conspicuous for bravery among Soochet's men was Busunth Singh, who slew no fewer than seventeen Sikhs. The desperate valour of the Rajah struck a panic through the Sikhs, and the gunners fled in
dismay; not a gun was fired, though Heera Singh was seen urging the gunners with a lighted match in his hand. Thus died the brave Soochet Singh, displaying a degree of desperate courage worthy of his high name. His wives, to the number of forty-five, burned themselves with his body. Eleven women immolated themselves with Kesree Singh, five with Busunth Singh, and eleven with Nehal Singh. There is a temple or school, near where the action took place, named Burumeeahka Dursut, and the Rajah was actually reading the Gruth there, when informed that the Sikhs were advancing against him; he wrote with his own hand on the book that "his head and his name should fall with him." He left behind him no offspring.

Thus in a short space of time, the two brothers of the Jummoo family had fallen: one only remained, namely Goolab Singh, who was destined to act a conspicuous part in the Punjab. He was the eldest of the three, and inferior to his younger brothers Dhyan Singh and Soochet Singh in talent; his manners were those of a warrior, but not softened down by intercourse with the Court of Lahore as were those of Dhyan Singh and Soochet Singh. He was, also, accused of cruelty, and according to Vigne, he sometimes "flayed his captives alive." He was allowed, nevertheless, by his enemies to possess some good qualities, among the rest, that of keeping his promise, and he never defrauded any one of what he had led them to
expect. In 1837, when attending the marriage of Nonehal Singh, he was a stout, fair man; he was strongly built, and shorter in stature than either Dhyan Singh or Soochet Singh. Like all other chiefs dependent on the Lahore Government, he was perfectly submissive during the reign of the Maharajah Runjeet Singh, but it might easily have been anticipated, that in the event of any disturbance in the Punjab, or rupture with the British, he would not be slow in seizing an opportunity of aggrandising himself. During the life time of Shere Singh, the prime minister had frequently threatened to supplant him by a reputed son of Runjeet, who, with his mother, had been under the protection of Goolab Singh at Jummoo. On the death of Shere Singh, and even before that event, arrangements had been made by the Jummoo family for bringing this boy to Lahore; and the first step taken by Heera Singh as well as Ajeet Singh was to acknowledge him as king. Though the events in Sikh history possess an interest as evincing their extraordinary rise and formation into a warlike nation under the auspices of Runjeet Singh; yet the history of the Sikhs under the reign of Dhuleep Singh, places them in a position which must be considered of vast importance by the civilized nations of Europe; for it was during his reign, that the Sikh power had become so arrogant, that no longer confining itself to the Punjab, it aimed at the conquest of Hindostan and imagined itself capable of overthrowing the British supremacy.
Such a project might be futile, and had never been even dreamt of by Runjeet Singh, but the sequel will shew that, though unsuccessful, the Sikhs had reason to be confident of their success; and against a less brave and indomitable foe, there can be little doubt that they would have vanquished Hindostan.
CHAPTER IV.

THE ACCESSION OF THE MAHARAJAH DHULEEP SINGH TO THE THRONE OF LAHORE.

The boy Dhuleep Singh, as already stated, was the supposed son of Runjeet Singh by a Hill-woman to whom the Maharajah had been married. When Shere Singh and Dhyan Singh were murdered by the Scindinwalas, Dhuleep was about four years old, and did not, of course, take any part in his own exaltation. He was chosen, since there was no other lineal descendant of Runjeet alive, if we except the children of Shere Singh, whose eldest son, Pertaub Singh, had been murdered on the same morning as his father, and Dhyan Singh. Pertaub Singh was a fine manly fellow, and a great favorite with the French officers. He was, unlike Nonehal Singh, very partial to the English, and expressed himself freely on this subject; had his life been spared, he would no doubt have preserved a friendly alliance with the British, and it was an unfortunate occurrence when Lena Singh ruthlessly
slew this promising lad. His death was regretted by all, and Dhyan Singh blamed the Scindinwalas for an act of such cruelty to an unoffending boy, but they knew that they could expect little clemency at his hand, if Dhyan Singh should support his claim to the throne of Lahore. Disappointed in their hopes of Shere Singh, the powerful family of Jummoo had determined to have a king of their own-making, and Dhuleep Singh was reared for this purpose. His putative mother was, we believe, named Gulloo, and in her time made some figure as a Nautch or dancing girl. Who the real father of Dhuleep Singh was, is a doubtful point, but it was sufficient for their purpose, that Gulloo had been the wife of the Maharajah. The Sikhs, and particularly Khurruk Singh and other branches of his family, were very much disgusted at the strong attachment shown to Gulloo by the Maharajah, who was then old and infirm. They used every means to wean his affection from her, but in vain; and in order to prevent further opposition to his wishes, he married her, much to the disappointment of all. There seems some reason to doubt, that Dhuleep Singh is a son of Gulloo, and it seems more probable, that, like Shere Singh and Tara Singh he was substituted for political purposes by the wily Ranee and her friends of Jummoo. The real lineage of Runjeet Singh, ceased with the death of Nonehal Singh. Even Cashmeera Singh and Peshora Singh, though styled princes, were in no way related to Runjeet.
Singh. They were his adopted sons through one of those capricious acts of which the Maharajah was guilty. The former, as a boy, was adopted when Runjeet Singh was on his way to Cashmeer, and hence named after that country; while Peshora Singh was, in like manner, adopted and named after the Province of Peshawur when subdued by the Maharajah. But even the adopted sons of a man universally revered by the Sikh nation were looked upon by many as entitled to his throne, and an attempt was made in favour of Cashmeera Singh by the Scindinwala, Uttur Singh, but which was frustrated by the activity and energy of Heera Singh; while Peshora Singh succeeded in raising a strong party in his favour; but, at length fell into the hands of Sham Singh Atareewala, by whom, it was supposed, he had been murdered, though many disbelieved the account of his death.

As regards the British Government, any ruler selected by the Sikhs was sufficient for the purpose, provided he could establish and maintain a government which would prevent any infringement of the treaty or aggression across the Sutlej; and Dhuleep Singh was therefore tacitly acknowledged as the successor of Shere Singh to the throne of Lahore. His vakeels remained in the British territories, and order was preserved during the administration of Heera Singh, and for some time afterwards. So long as the young Rajah continued to follow the steps of his father and the lessons he had learned from Runjeet Singh, he wisely abstained from the commission of any act
which might give cause of umbrage to the firm allies of the state, and turned a deaf ear to the rash advice of those who urged hostilities against the British. It was impossible for Heera Singh to be ignorant of the sentiments daily expressed by Runjeet Singh regarding a rupture with the powerful nation which had subdued the Mussulman power in Hindostan, and continued to govern that immense country by wise and just laws. He must have heard from the lips of the Maharajah himself, the frequent temptations held out to him to invade the British territories. He could not have been ignorant of the offer made to the Maharajah by Doorjunn Saul in 1826, when the fort of Bhurtpore was besieged by the British; for we have ourselves been present when Runjeet mentioned that the usurper had offered him a lakh of rupees a-day if he would assist him against the British. But he would not listen to terms which would have involved him in a ruinous war with his powerful ally, and he sagaciously remarked, “I might perhaps drive the British” or the Ungreez Bahadour, as he styled them, “as far as Allyghur, but I should be driven back across the Sutlej and out of my kingdom.” At the time when the Maharajah made this observation, there were no troops at Umballa, and there is little doubt that he could easily have effected his purpose; and still less that he would have been again driven across the Sutlej, and expelled his kingdom.

The repeated demands of the Sikh soldiery for
increased pay, and the inability on the part of Heera Singh to meet their clamour, led to a deep-rooted hatred on both sides. It was impossible for him to pacify a set of men who had no employment but warfare, and the consequence was, as already stated, his attempt at flight, and his death.

Thus, in the short space of five years, Khurruk Singh, Nonehal Singh, and Shere Singh, had been removed from the scene of action; one of these had been lately murdered, and suspicions existed of foul play towards the two others. The minister who had gained such credit for his wisdom and foresight during the lifetime of the great Runjeet had been sacrificed to party feelings, and lastly his son, Heera Singh, had fallen a victim to anarchy and discord.

On the death of Heera Singh, the mother of Dhuleep Singh turned her eyes towards her brother Juwaheer Singh, a man of some energy and talent. His being the reputed uncle of the young Maharajah was in his favour, and the soldiers recognized his claim to the office of Wuzeer or prime minister: for a time, he managed affairs, but his enmity to Peshora Singh exasperated the troops against him, and when that prince was reported to have been killed, their rage knew no bounds, and though accompanied by Dhuleep Singh and his mother, he was killed before their eyes.

The death of her brother was a heavy blow to the hopes of the Raneé, who now remained the solitary individual at the head of affairs. At first, she refused to take any part in the government of
a people who had committed such a glaring outrage in her very presence regardless of her son’s authority.

After the death of Heera Singh, the Sikhs resolved to appoint Goolab Singh his successor; and though the Rajah was on the point of waging war with the Lahore government, yet he was prevailed upon to come to the capital, with the promise that he should be made prime minister. It is probable that the Ranee herself gave a tacit consent to this arrangement, for had she opposed it, her relationship to Juwaheer Singh would have been seized upon as a ready pretext for wishing to serve him at the expense of the Rajah of Jummoo, who was considered by all parties the best fitted for conducting the affairs of the state during the minority of her son. Besides, she had been indebted to Goolab Singh for protection, at a time when the enemies of her cause might have taken revenge on both her and Dhuleep Singh.

It is a curious instance of moral courage on the part of Goolab Singh, that when he knew the dislike entertained towards him by Juwaheer Singh, and the doubtful professions of his sister, he actually trusted himself in the power of both, and became a prisoner in reality, though without restraint, at Lahore. Several attempts were made to assassinate him, but no open outrage was attempted,—a caution which entirely arose from the dread of displeasing the large portion of the army that had guaranteed his safety. Strange to relate, after being kept in suspense by the vacillating policy
of the government, in the hope of being appointed Wuzeer, Goolab Singh eventually returned in safety to Jummoo.

Previous to the death of Heera Singh, his uncle had sent his young son as ambassador to the court of Lahore; and the boy shared the fate of his cousin. Thus had Goolab Singh been deprived of his two sons; his eldest, Oadum Singh, having been killed at the same time with Nonehal Singh by the falling of a stone from one of the gateways of Lahore. The Rajah of Jummoo vowed bitter revenge on those who had been concerned in the death of his son and nephew, and prepared to make war on the Sikhs, who, on their part, sent an army to Jummoo to reduce the Rajah to allegiance; and he so far complied, that he paid a large sum of money, and showed marked attention to those sent to receive the tribute, but they were way-laid by his people, and the money afterwards re-taken from them. After such a glaring insult to the Government of Lahore, we can hardly account for Goolab Singh's subsequent conduct in coming to the capital, on any other supposition than the thirst of revenge on the murderers of his relatives; his reply to the wish expressed by the Sikhs, after his return to Jummoo, that he would supply the place of Juwaheer Singh as prime minister, seems to prove that, if this was not his sole motive, it swayed his conduct, as he replied, that on certain conditions he would consent to accept the office. One of these was, that "he should have the full power of capital punishment, without any appeal from his decision."
CHAPTER V.

STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE PUNJAB ON THE DEATH OF JUWAHEER SINGH. HOSTILITIES COMMENCED AGAINST THE BRITISH.

On the death of Juwaheer Singh and the return of Goolab Singh to Jummoo, there was, in fact, no one at the head of the administration of affairs at Lahore. The Ranee, it is true, became nominally the guardian of her son and director of affairs; but she could perform no act contrary to the wishes of the Punches of the Army, who became in reality the rulers of the country, and every thing was decided by them. Possessed of an immense force in soldiers, inexhaustible military stores, and no employment for either, the Sikh Army determined to wage war with the British. The advice of the Ranee and many of the Sirdars was disregarded.

An army was ordered to assemble by the very individual whose wishes were against the armament, and the Sirdars were obliged to join it.
Sirdar Tej Singh, the nephew of the late Jemadar Khooshyal Singh, and who had lately returned from the Government of Peshawur, was among the number of those who were averse to a war. He was a man of great military talent, and expressed his dissent in no measured terms; but this was of no avail, and he was forced to comply with the popular wish and put himself at the head of his troops.

Sirdar Lall Singh who had been raised by Heera Singh from a comparatively low condition to a Sirdarship, had been taken into the confidence of the Ranee on the death of her brother. Her wish was, that he should succeed Juwaheer Singh as prime minister, but there was a strong opposition on the part of the army to such an arrangement, and it was well known, that, to the personal favour of his mistress and to no talent of his own, he was indebted for the interest she took in his advancement to the wuzership. Though thwarted in her attempts for the promotion of her favorite, it will be seen that she resolved to gain her object.

The Sirdar was called upon to join the troops, and after various pretexts and excuses, he was obliged to leave the society of the Ranee and participate in the coming struggle. Unlike Tej Singh, he had no pretension to military talent or experience; and, though, agreeable to the Ranee's wishes, he was nominally Commander-in-chief of the Khalsa troops, the latter looked upon Tej Singh as the man on whom alone they could place reliance as a leader.
While these hostile proceedings were being enacted at Lahore, Goolab Singh demanded the reason of the Sikh government breaking treaty with the British; and enquired, whether the latter had given any cause of offence? To these questions, no satisfactory reply was returned, for none could be given, since the British had behaved, hitherto, with the utmost forbearance. Goolab Singh knew well that the Sikhs would fail in their endeavours to fight against the British; but he was not in a position to oppose the Sikh army himself, and had he evinced any hostile disposition towards it, their army might be turned against himself at a time when he was unable to oppose the combined force of the Sikhs. He therefore "made a virtue of necessity," and instead of opposing their views, he actually promised his support and agreed to send supplies to Lahore, nay, more, he even consented to join the Khalsa troops! This conduct on the part of the Rajah completely deceived the Sikhs, who, though unwilling to await his arrival, firmly believed that they might rely on his support and presence.

But had Goolab Singh believed that the Khalsa troops could be successful over the British, he determined to await the result of the struggle, knowing well, that, whatever result followed, his position was a safe one. If, as he really thought, the Sikh army would be destroyed by their powerful opponent, then, he could safely step in as a mediator between the British and the Sikhs, and,
while obtaining the credit of restoring peace, he would insure independence for himself. The Rajah had a difficult part to play, and the repeated demands of the Sikh army that he would join it, obliged him to leave Jummoo and proceed to Lahore, but he had determined to keep clear of the struggle until the onset should show how he was to act.

Had Goolab Singh succeeded Juwaheer Singh as Prime Minister, he would have used his best endeavours to prevent a collision between the Sikhs and the British; but he did not forget, that a brother and nephew who had held that responsible post had both fallen victims to the sword, and a similar fate might befall him. From every consideration, therefore, the Rajah believed that a rupture with the British would most effectually accomplish his ambitious views; and he was resolved to act with great caution and avoid mixing himself up in the quarrel: even when he reached Lahore, after the war had begun and he was requested by the Ranee and the Punches of the army to join the latter, he availed himself of the excuse of wishing to act independently at the head of his own troops in any work she might assign to him.

Such, then, was the aspect of affairs in November, 1845. But though daily reports were spread, that the Sikhs intended to invade the British territories, and though the news-writers at Lahore gave minute accounts of the hostile preparations, yet the British government would not believe that
such an event could occur. The orders from the home authorities were so stringent not to interfere with the Punjab, unless actual aggression were first perpetrated by the Sikhs, that the Indian government was crippled; and acting on his instructions, the Governor-general, who was then in the Upper Provinces, did not deem it advisable to take measures for raising an army capable of opposing the Sikhs, should they actually cross the Sutlej. Sir Henry (afterwards Lord) Hardinge, if left to his own decision, would, no doubt, have taken the steps early which he afterwards adopted with a promptitude which must ever mark him as an energetic, wise, and talented governor.

It was different with Sir Hugh (afterwards Lord) Gough, the Commander-in-chief. He was at the head of the army, and as such, was resolved to be prepared for the coming events. His acts were under the control of the Governor-general, so far as organizing an army was concerned; but, trusting to his own foresight and military experience, he gave early warning to the troops on the frontier, as well as those at the important military station of Meerut, to hold themselves in readiness, and the sequel showed that Sir Hugh Gough was justified in the measures he wisely adopted.

The time which elapsed between the hostile preparations at Lahore and the actual crossing of the Sikhs, was too short to allow of extensive preparations being made, but the crisis demanded the utmost exertion on the part of the Governor-
general and Commander-in-chief; and when it was known, that a Sikh force was actually on the left bank of the Sutlej, and the Governor-general no longer restricted in any measures he might think proper to adopt, Sir Henry lost no time in setting the whole troops in the Upper Provinces in motion towards the frontier, while he and the Commander-in-Chief proceeded with all expedition to Kuna Ka Serai. An express was sent to Kussowlee and Sobathoo to order down Her Majesty's 29th regiment from the former place, and the Honourable Company's 1st European light infantry from the latter. At 9 p.m. on the 10th December, 1845, the order arrived at Subathoo, and at 10 a.m., next morning, the European light infantry marched from their cantonments to Kalka, a distance of nineteen miles, while Her Majesty's 29th marched the same morning and reached Muneemajirah. The celerity of the movements of these two regiments with so short a warning, proved that the Governor-general and Commander-in-chief might rest assured that no delay would occur in their endeavours to reach the place of rendezvous on the appointed day, the 13th; and had not a halt of one day occurred at Muneemajirah, the hill regiments would have been at Kuna in time to join the Commander-in-chief. From Muneemajirah to Kuna both made forced marches.

Fortunately, Lord Ellenborough the previous Governor-general of India, had established a large force at Umballa which could be thus available at
a moment's notice. The troops at this station were moved on towards Kuna, and the Governor-general issued at that place his manifesto of war. He confiscated Dhuleep Singh's possessions on the left bank, or British side of the Sutlej, since the Sikhs had made an unprovoked aggression on the British territories, and broken the treaty which had existed between the two nations since 1809.

The manifesto was couched in the most moderate and cautious language, but declared in the firmest manner, that such an unprovoked aggression should be punished, and the British sway preserved over those on the left bank of the Sutlej who had placed themselves under its protection. It was clearly explained that the government of India had refrained from hostile demonstrations until the Sikh government had twice refused to give a reason for their warlike preparations.

From Kuna Ka Serai, the Governor-general and Commander-in-chief proceeded by forced marches towards Busseean, with the intention of seizing on the fort of Wudney belonging to the Lahore government. At Busseean the army was increased by troops from Loodianah under Brigadier Wheeler. Orders were sent to the two European regiments, which reached Kuna Ka Serai from the hills on the day following the departure of the Commander-in-chief, to hurry on to Busseean, where it was expected they would join head-quarters, and the whole march against Wudney.
The insulated position of Ferozapore became now a matter of the utmost anxiety, for Sir John Littler, though he had placed all his available force in an entrenched camp, could not be supposed capable of withstanding the immense army which was now in his neighbourhood. In order to relieve Ferozapore by causing a diversion on the part of the Sikhs, it was deemed advisable to pass Wudney and push on the army towards Ferozapore; and accordingly, on the two regiments, Her Majesty’s 29th and 1st European light infantry, reaching Bussean, they received further orders to hasten on, which they did by forced marches. On the 18th December, the first encounter took place between a portion of the Sikh army and the British; the latter had finished a long march when it was called upon to engage the Khulsa troops, who were rapidly advancing. The Sikhs took up a favourable position among the jungle and stunted trees which covered the ground in the vicinity of Moodkee, thus concealing themselves, and enabling them to take deadly aim at the mounted British officers and European soldiers, and throughout the whole campaign this appeared to be their chief object. The British and Sikh guns opened against each other, and it was evident that the Khulsa gunners served theirs with great efficiency. The British guns were merely the six-pounders attached to the troops of horse artillery, and it was soon apparent to the British Commander-in-chief, that with his guns alone he could not silence those of the enemy; he accordingly resolved to adopt the
never-failing, though desperate mode, of charging them with his infantry, and seizing the guns at the point of the bayonet.

The shortness of time prevented any guns of a large size from being brought into action, and the only ones of sieging calibre were in the rear with Colonel Dennis, escorted by the two European regiments from Kussowlee and Subathoo.

The available force in European infantry was small, consisting merely of Her Majesty’s 9th, 31st, 50th and 80th regiments, while the only European cavalry present was Her Majesty’s 3rd light dragoons. But the Commander-in-chief knew the brave troops he had to trust to, and the gallant deeds of the European infantry on the fields of Maharapoor and Punneear, where the Mahratta guns were captured at the point of the bayonet, and two glorious victories obtained in one day, were fresh in his recollection. He calculated correctly; and the British infantry charged amidst a murderous fire of cannon and musketry, for in this action, as well as all the others, the Sikh infantry fired admirably. The dust and darkness added to the confusion of the scene, but nothing could withstand the British; the Sikh columns were broken and dispersed, but, not before they had made a desperate stand and committed great slaughter among the European officers and men.

Sir Robert Sale, the gallant defender of Jellalabad, fell mortally wounded, and expired in a few days. Sir John Mc Caskill, the victor of Istalif, was also shot dead while gallantly leading his division.
Almost every officer attached to the Governor-general as aide-de-camp was either killed or wounded. Many officers were shot by those Sikhs who concealed themselves among the trees and jungles for this purpose, after the main-body had fled, and the officers thus slain were returning to their camp. In this way Captain Jasper Trower of the artillery received his death; his farrier sergeant shared the same fate, while attempting to avenge the death of his captain.

The 3rd dragoons pursued the Sikhs, but the nature of the ground rendered the gallant charge of this distinguished regiment less effectual than it otherwise would have been. The swords of the dragoons penetrated with difficulty the quilted clothes of the Sikhs, yet they slew many and nothing could resist their impetuous career. It was the first time the Sikhs had encountered European dragoons and infantry, and the noble and gallant bearing of both served to confirm the character they had always borne. The Khulsa troops could compare them to nothing else but Demons.

Every one was astonished at the precision and celerity of firing on the part of the Sikhs; but had they considered, that these troops were taught the art of war under the instruction of such men as Allard, Ventura, Court, and Avatobili, and that no expense or pains had been spared by Runjeet Singh to have an army disciplined according to European tactics, it could never have been reasonably anti-
icipated, that the Khulsa troops would be suffered to recross the Sutlej without a desperate struggle, and yet this opinion was cherished by many. The Maharajah devoted the greatest attention to his ordnance department, and constructed an immense number of guns in his arsenal at Lahore, under the superintendence of Monsieur Court, a scientific French officer, many years in his employ; but he never intrusted any command in the artillery to Europeans, and it is said that Scindia had advised him to keep this powerful arm in the possession of his own people. Many Sikh Sirdars, generals and commandants had numerous guns; but the chief artillery officer was a Mussulman, the well-known Sultan Mahmood, a brother of Dost Mohummud. The attachment of our native artillery-men to their guns is well known, and on the occasion of two guns being taken from Captain Johnson’s troop, for the purpose of being presented to the Maharajah by Lord William Bentinck at Roopur in 1831, the Native officers were so much affected, that they actually shed tears, and said “it was unlucky to give away guns to which they had been so long attached, and which they loved as their own brothers.” An estimate might have been formed of the number of guns possessed by Runjeet Singh, from the circumstance of his usually having one hundred pieces of ordnance at the celebration of the Dusserah festival, and which kept up an incessant fire with blank cartridges, while twenty thousand muskets responded with continued and
unremitting roll. We have ourselves been present on such occasions, and the sound was perfectly deafening; the Maharajah used to remark "That is the way I fire against my enemies in battle, only quicker, and with many more guns and muskets than are now present." While sitting with the Maharajah at the field-day, he asked us "Which side of the square fired the best?" The question was difficult to answer, but we hazarded the opinion that a certain side did so, and he said he was of the same way of thinking, and ordered the Sirdar who commanded to be summoned to his presence. This was no other than Tej Singh, who received a purse and was told that "he did well!" As to the infantry of the Khalsa troops, great care and attention were bestowed on them by the French officers: they were regularly drilled daily, until they became perfect in the use of the musket and sword. The latter is a weapon often employed by the Sikhs, when their columns are broken. On such occasions, they throw away their muskets and seize their swords, which are exceedingly sharp, heavy, and efficient weapons. The artillery-men are likewise skilled in the use of this weapon, with which they defend themselves when their guns are spiked.

Since the death of Allard, the discipline of the Sikh cavalry has been neglected, and throughout the campaign against the British, the Ghorchurrahs were next to useless. Among the best cavalry officers in the service of Runjeet Singh, Sirdar Soochet Singh stood pre-eminent. But in their best
days, and when disciplined, the Sikh cavalry could never resist the impetuous charge of European dragoons, and the handful of men composing Her Majesty’s 3rd dragoons would have ridden through and through them. The British cavalry are so superior in the horse, that the weight alone of the latter would disperse them when mounted even by a native, much more when carrying a European dragoon, who knows no other command than “Forward!” It was supposed by many, that the Sikh army had deteriorated so much since the days of Runjeet Singh, that they might be considered next to a rabble; but it should not have been forgotten, that the Sikh is naturally a soldier, and cares for no other employment, which he is forbid by the tenets of his religion to adopt. The sole aim of his life is to fight, and, however idle and dissipated he may become, he never forgets a science to which he has devoted his whole time and attention. As regards artillery, the Sikhs had not ceased to increase the number of their guns after the death of Runjeet Singh; and the events of the campaign against the British proved that they could take nearly three hundred guns into the field, independent of those employed in the forts of Lahore, Govind Ghur, and Umritser, besides numerous guns at Peshawur and Mooltan. The artillery of the Sikhs, previous to their crossing the Sutlej, may be safely estimated at 500 guns of all calibres.

The portion of the Sikh force sent to Moodkee was evidently an experimental one, and though
beaten, the Sikhs were satisfied, that with an overwhelming number of guns strongly entrenched, they might safely await the attack of the British, who appeared to possess but little strength in this important arm, though one by which our early conquests had been chiefly made, and which rendered us the terror of the Native powers. So well aware was Sir David Ochterlony of the immense power of guns, that in the campaign against the Nepaulese he carried two to Malown and thereby completely astonished the Goorkhas. For the first time at Gwalior, the superiority of British artillery was overlooked, and the consequence was, that guns were taken by infantry at the point of the bayonet. The same took place at Moodkee. There is every reason for believing, that at both places, the enemy was despised, but the results at both showed how mistaken the opinion was, if ever entertained. No blame can be attached to the Commander-in-chief at Moodkee, for he was obliged to fight with the means at his disposal. The heavy guns and mortars were not available and his enemy must be beaten. He had no alternative, and before his artillery could possibly join him, there was every likelihood that he would have to engage the whole Sikh army.

No British officer or soldier fell into the hands of the enemy at Moodkee, but from a Sikh Sirdar who was taken prisoner the disposition on the part of the Sikhs to make a further stand was clearly shown. He remarked "that if a few thou-
sand Sikhs required the united force of the British to conquer them, and if opposed to such a small force, the former lost so many men and officers, how much more difficult must it be to conquer the Khulsa army, and how infinitely greater must necessarily be the loss.” The war, thus begun, must be carried on, and the Sikh force was expected to advance on the 19th December. On that day the heavy guns escorted by Her Majesty’s 29th, the 1st European light infantry and some Native regiments reached Moodkee and the Commander-in-chief determined to attack the Sikhs’ intrenched camp on the 21st December, thus giving a day’s rest to the troops which by forced marches had reached him.

Nothing could exceed the attention of the Governor-general and Commander-in-chief to the European soldiers who were thus hurrying on to their aid. Elephants were despatched to Churruk, seven and twenty miles from Moodkee, to carry those who might be unable to walk, and thus enable them to come on. When near Moodkee, and almost overcome with marching and thirst, water was received from the head-quarters’ camp brought out on elephants. Being thus refreshed, the men marched vigorously to Moodkee, where the Governor general’s band was in readiness to conduct them to camp.

On the morning of the 20th December, the European infantry consisted of the regiments already mentioned with the addition of Her Majesty’s 29th and the 1st European light infantry. The British force increased on the 19th December.
heavy guns had, also, come up, as well as the 11th and 41st regiments of Native infantry. With this increased force the Commander-in-chief resolved on the following morning to attack the Sikhs, who were entrenched at a place named Feerozshuhur, or, as written in the despatches, Feerozshah. It may be said there is little in a name, but, in the present instance, it would be well if the point were settled regarding the name of a place where the hardest fought battle ever witnessed in Indian warfare took place.*

In every warfare, there are a number of personal adventures which occur, interesting to the individuals concerned, and one happened previous to the battle of Moodkee which may be mentioned. An officer was on his way to join a new appointment at Ferozapore, and had reached Moodkee, where, he fell into the hands of the Sikhs. Various reports were, as usual, circulated regarding the treatment he was likely to receive or had received. He could not have less than his ears and nose cut off by a savage and cruel people like the Sikhs!! Torture and death were, in the opinion of others, to be his fate!! As to his ever being sent back, none dreamt of such an occurrence. All pitied his unfortunate situation, and all rejoiced when Lieutenant Biddulph reached Moodkee safe and sound. He afterwards,

* In the Ferozapore district, the addition of “Wala” is a common term in naming villages, such as Sultan Khan Wala, Bootawala, Akberwala; and probably the name of the place in question may have been Feerozshahwala, and from the length of the word, the latter part may have been dropped or Shuhur (a City) substituted. We are therefore inclined to use the word Feerozshuhur in speaking of it.
wrote an interesting account of his capture, treatment, and release, and we cannot do better than give the statement in his own words. His letter, which was published in the Delhi Gazette, is dated "Army of the Sutlej near Ferozapore, January 19th 1846."

Lieutenant Biddulph says:—"I left Umballa on the 5th of December to join my corps. I reached within four stages of Ferozapore, when alarming reports prevailed of a Sikh invasion, and the villagers told me I must be on my guard; parties of plundering horsemen scoured the country, and I had several serious alarms, but considered that to turn round and run would only insure instant destruction. I put a bold face upon it therefore, and continued to advance. At Moodkee, sixteen miles from Ferozapore, on my arrival, I saw we should probably be attacked, and made preparations accordingly: horsemen left the village at dusk and proceeded on different roads, as it seemed to me to bring up more during the night; three men came singly to me after dusk, saying I should be attacked, and advising me to ride for my life, but these men I treated as spies, and told them I feared nothing, and would abide with my people and baggage. During the night we kept anxious watch, and observed fifteen horsemen enter the village; at daylight the attack commenced. I was surrounded by matchlock men, spearmen, and swordsmen, and told to surrender. I said 'Never.' Twice we drove them back, but at length more and more men came on;
they seized my horses, plundered the baggage, and separated many of the servants from me. I then attempted to force a passage to Ferozapore; spearmen and matchlock men held me at bay in front, others rushed on me from behind, I was knocked down and stunned with blows on the head and face, carried into a small fort and kept prisoner. Soon after the people in the fort manned the walls and prepared for a battle; this told me some of our troops must be near at hand, but ere they arrived, I was hurried out of the place, put on a horse behind a Sikh trooper, and with a strong escort galloped off some nine or ten miles. Judge my horror when I saw before me the whole Sikh camp and army! I was taken up and down their position amidst excited crowds, who abused and poked me right and left; my gallant horsemen, however, protected my life, but I saw with alarm a large beam on two posts, bearing a most unpleasant resemblance to a gallows; multitudes were around it, and I prepared for death, praying that I might not be tortured, and die calmly. We passed this, however, and at last reached Rajah Lall Singh's tent; Akalies going in and out, shook their swords at me, and crowds thronged me; Lall Singh came out and I addressed him, but he would not hear me, ordering me to be put in irons and made over to the commandant of artillery; thither I was taken. The general spoke angrily and sent me away to his men; I was then chained under a gun, and a guard placed over me. Thus I lay for three days
and nights; bitter cold it was; chappatees* my food, water my drink; and many anxious thoughts prolonged my days into weeks, my nights into months. Daily I was thronged, abused, and threatened; hundreds of questions put to me; and tempting offers of services made, all of which I steadily refused. The artillery-men became my fast friends, defended my life, and as far as possible drove back the crowds, and tried to shame those who threatened me. Even in such a precarious situation, life has its pleasures and enjoyment; the calm of night, cessation from teasing multitudes, a chat with the artillery-men, smoking through my hands from a chillum† without a pipe; the thousands of reports, strange sights and scenes, the pity of some, the wonder of all!—was not this happiness? Indeed, I began almost to be happy; at any rate I could laugh. But the scene was now to change.

"The battle of Moodkee roused my hopes; I sat on a board behind a gun, and the artillery-men with lighted matches stood around. It seemed the fight drew near and more near, fancy almost rang the clangour of a charge in my anxious senses, and then the thought whether victory to us would not be death to me came to calm my too-buoyant hopes. I remembered Loveday,‡ he was my ship companion!! At eleven at night the gun ceased, the file-firing died away, and I heard the bustle of

* Flour cakes. † The bowl of a hookah containing the tobacco. ‡ Lieutenant Loveday was killed while a prisoner in the hands of the Scindians.
the Sikh troops retiring into camp; who shall describe then the prisoner's feelings? I cannot.

"Morning at last came, and I soon perceived that the boastful pride of our enemy had greatly abated, their tone was altered and my condition seemed better. Another day, another night, succeeded; the third I was suddenly summoned to the Chief Beharie Ally Khan, and on my way to him, a smith appeared, and my irons were taken off. On entering the chief's tent, he spoke kindly, gave me water to wash, and said he would get me released. Some conversation ensued, and an Affghan Sirdar, who had visited me the day before, evidently interested himself in my behalf; we started for Lall Singh's quarters, but on the way there I was sent back to my gun. Some anxious hours passed, and when the unruly multitude heard I was likely to be released, a row commenced; my friends of the artillery stood to their guns, and declared they would fire if I were touched; by degrees matters smoothed down, and the crowd dispersed. Suddenly, I was told I might go! I desired the messenger to make my grateful acknowledgements to the chiefs, and took leave of my Bhaiees, the artillery-men, but I said, 'I shall be cut down directly I leave your lines.' Two of them offered to accompany me, and though their authority was not much to protect me, the risk must be run; off we set, and the sun never seemed to me to shine so cheerfully before. Then a brother of the artillery chief's ran after us, and said he would get me through their outposts; he sent the two artillery-men back,
and on we went. Many were the stoppages and much demur at the last outpost, five miles from their camp, but my friend satisfied them all. Merrily we trudged the ten miles to Moodkee, and the reception I met from all was grateful indeed, and never to be forgotten. My companion received from the Governor-general 1000 rupees, and offers of service if he chose to stay with us; but he returned, however, after the battles, to his own people or home. The 21st and 22nd saw the Sikhs routed after a desperate resistance, but the Governor-general would not allow me to mingle in the fray, as he said I owed that at least to the enemy who released me, although I refused to give any pledge not to fight."

At a later period of the campaign, a medical officer was carried prisoner to Lahore, along with several European soldiers who were taken when Sir Harry Smith's baggage was attacked at Bundeewal, near Loodianah; they were all restored to their freedom, and sent to the British camp by Goolab Singh after the army had crossed the Sutlej. They were tolerably well treated, while prisoners; but had they fallen into the hands of the vanquished Sikhs after the battle of Alleewal, their fate might have been different. The release and escape of Lieutenant Biddulph was a most providential one, and well might the fate of poor Loveday present itself to his mind. He appears to have owed his safety to the generous feelings of the artillery-men, who afterwards proved themselves the bravest soldiers among the Sikh troops, and served their
guns manfully. Not only did Goolab Singh release the Lahore prisoners, but presented each with a sum of money. It was related, that a few European soldiers straggled into the Sikh camp after the action of Moodkee; they soon discovered their mistake, but instead of being made prisoners or ill used, each received a rupee and were allowed to return to their own camp without molestation. This forbearance on the part of the Sikhs to men whom they so much wished to destroy, may have arisen from motives of policy, and a wish to make a favourable impression on the European soldiers, and induce them to desert. Several European soldiers were said to be in their ranks, both Englishmen and Frenchmen; but no instance of a desertion from the European regiments occurred during the campaign, and the same was true as regards the Native troops, with one or two solitary exceptions. The kind treatment experienced by the prisoners at Lahore is easily to be accounted for, since the Ranee and Goolab Singh knew well, that the retribution would be full and complete if they injured them. In fact, they calculated on their release and safe conduct to the camp of the British as likely to make a favourable impression on the Governor-general, at a time when the Sikh government could expect but little clemency; and their chance of this would be still further lessened, had they dared to ill treat or put to death the prisoners. We have given Lieutenant Biddulph's graphic and highly interesting account of his cap-
ture and release, and we wish we possessed the means of affording our readers an opportunity of perusing that of Dr. Banan.

At the close of the battle of Moodkee, and while the British troops were pursuing the Sikhs, a gallant officer had his horse shot under him. The poor animal fell with his rider, and on the latter recovering himself, he found a Sikh with a drawn sword standing over him. He received a wound on his left arm, and two other sword cuts were made at his body by the Sikh, who in order to render them more effectual, took his sword in both hands and cut at the officer with all his might. Fortunately in both instances, the sword struck against a powder flask. The Sikh now considered that he had killed his victim; and drawing the officer's sword from its scabbard walked away.

When thus freed of his company, the officer drew his pistols, and with one in his hand, prepared for the return of his enemy, who on observing him moving, was coming back. At this juncture a European soldier came to his aid, and either killed the Sikh or the latter fled. It was now dark, and a dooly, or litter, obtained, in which the officer hoped to reach camp; but he had not gone far, before he found an officer mortally wounded, though still alive. He left the dooly, and wished Dr. Graydon, the assistant surgeon of Her Majesty's 50th, for it was no other than he, to occupy his place, while he walked by his side. From loss of blood, he could not keep pace long with the dooly, and offered the
bearers a high reward if they would carry both himself and his wounded brother officer to camp; but there being only three men, the attempt failed. Graydon then begged that he might be left behind, as he said he knew he was mortally wounded and could not survive. At length a loose pony belonging to an officer who had been killed, was secured, and on this the officer reached camp. Two medical officers were wounded at Moodkee, and both eventually died. They had advanced with their respective regiments, the 31st and 50th, with the laudable purpose of assisting the wounded officers and men, but in doing so, they necessarily exposed their own lives. At Moodkee, the dust prevented a view of what was going on in front, and the officers in question were not aware of their dangerous position. On the line of march in an enemy's country, the rear is perhaps the least safe place, but in a pitched battle, the medical officer's place is out of the range of shot, if he wish to be of service to the wounded, and his exposing himself to the enemy's fire can serve no good purpose, while it renders his services unavailable, in the event of his being shot or wounded; in either case, he is justly blamed, and the remark is made that "he had no business there." In case of retreat, there is of course no place of safety for any one, and all must encounter the risk of being slain, but with the British army in a fair field, there is little chance, at least, in India, of such an occurrence.
We have remarked that the dragoons experienced considerable difficulty in penetrating the quilted and padded clothes of the Sikhs, and at Moodkee an officer of the irregular cavalry who had wounded his adversary in the sword-arm, actually could not kill him from this cause, and was obliged to leave the work to one of his own men who came to his aid!

Though Lall Singh was nominally the Commander-in-chief of the Khulsa troops destined to cross the Sutlej and measure arms with the British, yet, Tej Singh was the most influential man in their army and considered their leader. Averse as the Sirdar had been to war with such a powerful foe; when, once in the midst of his soldiers, he resolved to do his utmost, and took the lead in the hostile operations which had now commenced.

To meet the coming struggle nearly all the Khulsa troops had been sent across the Sutlej, and only a few battalions under Dhonkul Singh and some Mussulmans with fifty or sixty guns left at Lahore. The Sikhs crossed with the purpose of not simply vanquishing the British in one or two battles and then returning to the Punjab, but of forcing their way to Delhi, Benares, and Calcutta!! Their ambition and arrogance knew no bounds. To effect this purpose Tej Singh marched towards Kussoor with a large force, consisting of at least twelve battalions of infantry under the command of Mehtab Singh and Mir Sookh Raee; there were
several regiments of cavalry attached to his force, and both foot and horse artillery. Sirdar Tej Singh, likewise, commanded the Hureekee brigade, equal in strength to that of Kusoor, and under him were Generals Goolab Singh and Jemadar Kunnr. To the Hureekee force were attached five thousand cavalry. Thus the force at Tej Singh's disposal amounted to 24,000 infantry and at least 10,000 cavalry with a hundred guns. Runjoor Singh was in command of an army of 10,000 men, moving on Phulooor with upwards of sixty guns, and a portion of cavalry. In addition to these three brigades numbering upwards of 30,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry and 160 guns, there was a force under Shum Shere Singh amounting to 15,000 infantry, 7,000 cavalry and thirty guns, besides horse artillery. Thus a Sikh force was marching on the Sutlej of nearly 50,000 infantry, 25,000 cavalry and 200 guns. On the 19th December, the main body of the Sikh army, consisting of at least 35,000 infantry and upwards of a hundred guns with 25,000 cavalry, was strongly entrenched at Feerozshahur, after allowing for its losses at Moodkee. A portion from each branch of their service had been sent to that place. During the 19th and 20th of December, the Sikh troops who had fled from Moodkee joined their head quarters, and awaited the attack of the British. Had the Khalsa troops encountered a less desperate resistance in their first engagement, they would, in all likelihood, have rallied on the following day, and made another
attack, which was anticipated by the British Commander-in-chief. But Tej Singh considered that a detached force without the assistance of an overwhelming artillery was certain destruction, and he resolved to await the advance of the British in his entrenched camp, and thus preserve his whole force entire. His scouts had informed him, that the only arm in which he could trust against the enemy was his artillery, and that even his guns were not safe, since the British at Moodkee had resorted to the desperate plan employed at Maharajpoor of seizing them at the point of the bayonet. The Sirdar, though well aware of this fact, conceived that such desperate courage only belonged to the European portion of the British army, and from the smallness of their number, imagined, that with upwards of one hundred guns, he could defy their efforts. In short, he came to the conclusion, that his position was safe, and victory on the part of the British next to impossible. The Sirdar knew well, that the guns of a large calibre possessed by the enemy were few in number, and could never silence his own, many of which were of battering calibre. Let us now see what force the British Commander-in-chief had to oppose to his large army. The only accession he had received to his strength since the battle of Moodkee consisted of Her Majesty’s 29th foot, the Honorable Company’s 1st European light infantry, the 11th and 41st regiments of Native infantry and the heavy guns brought up by Colonel Dennis.
He had thus six European regiments of infantry, amounting probably to upwards of 4,000 men: these were Her Majesty's 9th, 29th, 31st, 50th, 80th, and the European light infantry; five of these had suffered severely from cholera at Kussowlee, Subathoo, Umballa, Loodianah, and Meerut, so that their average strength could not exceed 800 men.

The Native infantry at his disposal consisted of the 2nd, 11th, 16th, 24th, 26th, 41st, 42nd, 45th, 47th, 48th, and 73rd, eleven regiments, each of which may have averaged 1,000 men, making a total of 11,000 Native infantry.

The deficiency in cavalry was much felt, and the only European regiment in that branch was Her Majesty's 3rd light dragoons, with the Governor-general's body guard, the 4th and 5th regiments of light cavalry, and the 9th irregular cavalry.

In horse artillery there were Brind's, Dashwood's, Todd's and Swinley's European troops, with Garbett's Native troop. To these are to be added two horse field batteries, Nos. 7 and 9, manned by two companies of European foot artillery.

The Meerut force was on its way to join, but there was no time to be lost, and Sir John Littler's force was ordered to come up on the 21st from Feerozpore, which it did about 2 p.m., not more than an hour previous to the battle of Feerozshuhur. This force consisted of Campbell's European troop of horse artillery and Day's Native; the 8th regiment of light cavalry, and the 3rd or Tait's irregular cavalry. The Native portion of infantry consisted
of the 12th, 14th, 33rd, 44th, and 54th, with Her Majesty's 62nd Regiment: two light field batteries manned by two companies of foot artillery accompanied the Feerozpore brigade.

Private instructions had been given to commanding officers on the evening of the 20th, to have their regiments in readiness to march at two on the following morning. Accordingly, at the hour appointed, the camp was left standing with a detail from each regiment; and a regiment and a half of Native infantry being kept as a guard over it and the wounded, the army of the Sutlej left Moodkee, and by daylight the several regiments had joined their respective brigades. The whole marched onwards, making a long detour with a view of attacking the weakest points in the enemy's position, though, as matters turned out, the attack was made on the strongest.

Several halts were made, for the march was a long and fatiguing one of about sixteen miles. About two p.m., Sir John Littler joined. The force now consisted of seven regiments of European infantry, fifteen regiments of Native infantry, a regiment of European dragoons, four regiments of Native light cavalry, including the body guard, two of irregular cavalry, seven troops of horse artillery, four light field batteries, and four companies of foot artillery, with two eight-inch howitzers. The whole may probably have amounted to 20,000 infantry, 3,500 cavalry, 900 artillerymen, horse and foot, with forty-two six-pounder and twenty-
four nine-pounder guns, besides the two heavy pieces of ordnance. Soon after the Feerozpore brigade joined, the Sikh horsemen were seen on the right! They fired off their matchlocks, but did not approach very near the column. Some riflemen were sent out, however, to keep them at a distance. After passing a mud village, the troops were halted and formed into battle array. When Tej Singh saw the British preparing for the contest after a long march, and without any chance of obtaining water or food, his hopes must have been raised to the highest pitch. In the entrenched camp of the Sikhs, food and water had been stored up in abundance. The Khalsa troops were fresh and ready for action, confident of success and victory.
CHAPTER VI.

FURTHER REMARKS ON THE BATTLE OF MOODKEE,
AND OTHER MATTERS REGARDING THE STATE
OF AFFAIRS.

Before proceeding further, it may be as well to
give a more full and detailed account of the action
of Moodkee from the pen of His Excellency the
Commander-in-chief, as contained in his despatch,
dated "Camp, Moodkee, 18th December, 1845." We
have merely given a general description of the
battle, for we do not profess to be writing a detailed
account of the military operations of the British: still
it is incumbent on us to give as much information
as will convey to our military readers a correct idea
of these operations, and in doing so, we can follow
no surer guide, than the general who commanded
the victorious army of the Sutlej from its first
formation, until its breaking up under the walls of
Lahore; the gates of which were then guarded by
British troops, and the very existence of the Sikh
Government preserved by a portion of that gallant
army. In the despatch alluded to, his Excellency continues:

"Soon after mid-day, the division under Major-general Sir Harry Smith, a brigade of that under Major-general Sir John M'Caskill, and another of that under Major-general Gilbert, with five troops of horse artillery, and two light field batteries under Lieutenant-colonel Brooke of the horse artillery (brigadier in command of the artillery force), and the cavalry division, consisting of Her Majesty's 3rd light dragoons, the body guard, 4th and 5th light cavalry, and the 9th irregular cavalry, took up their encamping ground in front of Moodkee.

"The troops were in a state of great exhaustion principally from the want of water, which was not procurable on the road, when about 3 p.m. information was received that the Sikh army was advancing, and the troops had scarcely time to get under arms and move to their positions, when the fact was ascertained.

"I immediately pushed forward the horse artillery and cavalry, directing the infantry, accompanied by the field batteries, to move onward in support. We had not proceeded beyond two miles, when we found the enemy in position. They were said to consist of from fifteen to twenty thousand infantry, about the same force of cavalry, and forty guns. They had evidently either taken up their position, or were advancing in order of battle against us."
"To resist their attack, and to cover the formation of the infantry, I advanced the cavalry under Brigadiers White, Gough, and Mactier, rapidly to the front in columns of squadrons, and occupied this plain. They were speedily followed by the five troops of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke, who took up a forward position, having the cavalry then on his flanks.

"The country is a dead flat, covered at short intervals with a low, but in some places, thick Jhan jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks. The enemy screened their infantry and artillery behind this jungle, and such undulations as the ground afforded; and while our Native battalions formed from echellons of brigades into line, opened a very severe cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied to by the battery of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was soon joined by the two light field batteries. The rapid and well directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyse that of the enemy; and as it was necessary to complete our infantry dispositions without advancing the artillery too near to the jungle, I directed the cavalry under Brigadiers White and Gough to make a flank movement on the enemy's left with a view of threatening and turning that flank, if possible. With praise-worthy gallantry, the 3rd light dragoons, the 2nd brigade of cavalry, consisting of the body guard and 5th light cavalry, with a portion of the 4th lancers, turned the left of the Sikh army, and sweeping
along the whole rear of the infantry and guns, silenced for a time the latter, and put their numerous cavalry to flight. Whilst this movement was taking place on the enemy's left, I directed the remainder of the 4th lancers, the 9th irregular cavalry under Brigadier Mactier, with a light field battery, to threaten their right. This manœuvre was also successful. Had not the infantry and guns of the enemy been screened by the jungle, these brilliant charges of the cavalry would have been productive of greater effect.

"When the infantry advanced to attack, Brigadier Brooke rapidly pushed on his horse artillery close to the Jungle, and the cannonade was resumed on both sides. The infantry under Sir Harry Smith, General Gilbert, and Sir John McCaskill, attacked in echelon of lines, and the enemy's infantry were almost invisible amongst wood and the approaching darkness of night. The opposition of the enemy was such as might have been expected from troops who had everything at stake, and who had long vaunted of their being irresistible. Their ample and extended line (from their great superiority of numbers) far outflanked ours, but this was counteracted by the flank movements of our cavalry. The attack of the infantry now commenced, and the roll of fire from their powerful musketry soon convinced the Sikh army that they had met with a foe they little expected; and their whole force was driven from position after position with great slaughter and the loss of seventeen pieces of artil-
lery, some of them of heavy calibre; our infantry using the never-failing weapon, the bayonet, whenever the enemy stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster, for this stout conflict was maintained during an hour and a half of dim starlight, amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain which yet more obscured every object."

In reading a despatch, we are struck with the apparent simplicity and regularity of every movement; but to those engaged in the fight all seemed confusion. In the present instance nothing can appear more easy than to comprehend the flank movements of the cavalry, the advance of the horse artillery and infantry, the breaking of the Sikh column and their dispersion; but if we ask individuals regarding their position, they cannot tell whether they were on the flank, in the front or rear of the enemy. If this be difficult in daylight, and on a plain unobstructed by brush wood or jungle, and the whole atmosphere clear and not one vast cloud of dust, the attempt becomes vain when such obstructions are superadded. A Commander-in-chief knows what movements he ordered, and when those performing them are enveloped in dust and darkness, it is impossible for any one to see how these orders are carried out, and it is only known that they have been so by the result. If the latter be successful, then the manœuvre is supposed to have been devised and executed in strict accordance with military tactics.

When a victory is gained, it must be achieved by
a combination of skilful movements and the bravery of the troops employed. In Sir Hugh Gough, the army employed at Moodkee had a gallant and experienced general. The dispositions for the attack were such as were most likely to insure victory; and all accounts agree in stating, that the European and Native troops behaved with their accustomed steadiness and bravery. In the list of killed and wounded, appended to the Commander-in-chief’s despatch, we find that the whole number of killed and wounded amounted to 872; of these, no fewer than fifty-one were European officers, while the Native officers amounted to eleven; twelve of the former and two of the latter being killed. Again, in the ranks of non-commissioned officers, drummers, rank and file, the number of killed and wounded was 705, and out of this amount, upwards of 500 were European soldiers of Her Majesty’s 3rd dragoons, 9th, 31st, 50th, and 80th foot, inclusive of non-commissioned officers and drummers; so that two-thirds of the whole wounded and killed were among the European portion of the army, which did not, probably, equal a fifth of the whole. One of two conclusions must be drawn from these fearful odds, either that the Europeans were more exposed, or that the enemy directed their fire with unerring aim against them: we have in our general sketch of the operations remarked that the European infantry seized the enemy’s guns at the point of the bayonet, but this is not prominently alluded to by the Commander-in-chief,
though giving every credit to the bayonet as the "never-failing weapon when the enemy made a stand," so that it is fair to conclude that the Native infantry charged the guns equally with the European; and no invidious distinction should be drawn, when the man best capable of forming a correct judgment was satisfied with the conduct of all. The Sikhs are stated to have lost seventeen guns at Moodkee, so that the remaining twenty-three must have been brought back to their entrenched camp at Feeruzshuhur. As to the actual loss of the enemy, it was not very great; this arising entirely from the causes mentioned in the despatch, namely, the nature of the ground and the darkness of night, which prevented the full effect of the cavalry charges.

The 5th light cavalry under the command of Major Alexander vied with the European dragoons, while the body guard maintained its well-earned name, and out of the few officers attached to it, three were killed and wounded. The battle appeared to have raged the thickest near the Governor-general and Commander-in-chief, since, almost every mounted officer attached to both, was either killed or wounded, including the aides-de-camp with the Governor-general and one with the Commander-in-chief; while Major, now Lieutenant-colonel, Patrick Grant, deputy adjutant-general, was very severely wounded, and Sir Robert Sale, the quarter-master-general, received a wound from which he soon afterwards died. There could be no
doubt that the Sikhs directed their fire against the mounted officers, and those with cocked hats and staff uniform were their particular marks.

Many who were within hearing of the guns, on the evening of the 18th, deeply regretted that they were not sharing in the struggle which might be the last, but after forced marches in the hope of reaching head quarters in time, were doomed to arrive a day too late! This disappointment was vividly felt and deplored by the European regiments which reached Moodkee on the evening of the 19th December; but the determination on the part of the Sikhs to fight to the last, restored their hopes, that they might yet share in the dangers and glory of the coming battles; and they were soon destined to see their most sanguine wishes realized on the field of Feerozshuhur. At Moodkee, the Sikhs had fought on the open plain, and were routed after a desperate fight; but though thus discomfited their spirit was in no way broken; and though they lost the victory, in the common acceptance of the term, yet it was a very dearly bought one on the part of the victors; and such as crippled the British Commander-in-chief's means much more than those of the Sikh leader. The latter was so perfectly satisfied with the result of the experiment he had made, that he saw with pleasure the British troops fronting the strongest position of his entrenched camp on the evening of the 21st of December, and even sent out his horsemen, to point out as it were the way to his stronghold.
Having thus entered a little more minutely into the action at Moodkee and supplied our readers with the details of it, we must now return to the position of the contending forces at Feerozshuhur, where a much more fierce encounter was awaiting the British than they had met with even at Moodkee, though that battle will be recorded as one of the most hard contested which had hitherto occurred in India, and that with a people who excelled in numbers, and in the possession of the implements of war, the brave troops hitherto vanquished by the British under a Clive, a Wellesley, a Wellington, a Combermere, or the chief who had led the army of the Sutlej to a victory through a fiercer struggle than he had encountered with his brave army on the field of Maharajpoor; where the indomitable bravery of troops capturing the guns at the point of the bayonet proved the obstinacy and determination of the Mahrattas. These people though brave soldiers, had encountered the British before, and though determined to try their strength, yet they must have been sensible that they might be vanquished; but not so with the Sikhs, whose confidence in their own strength and resources induced them to look upon the British as hardly their equals, and determined to bring the test of their superiority to a fierce trial. They might be beaten, nay, exterminated; but to fight and try the issue of the battle they firmly resolved upon, in spite of every advice offered to them by their great leader, Runjeet Singh, while alive, and that of the
Ranee who now conducted affairs, not to measure arms with a people whom they would not allow to be wholly invincible like themselves. True, the British had been the paramount power in India for many years, even the Sikhs on the left bank of the Sutlej avowed its supremacy; but still its army had been annihilated in Afghanistan: and calculating on this disaster as the result of deteriorated skill, instead of the consequence of irresolution, misplaced confidence, and the inclemency of a northern winter, the Sikhs had now the temerity to resolve to encounter the British army in its own territory, or at least on its own side of the Sutlej, led by a determined commander who had never known defeat, and supported by the Governor-general of India, a soldier himself, who would spurn all their arts of circumvention, and listen to no terms of peace until he had avenged the insult offered by a proud and ambitious nation, to the country whose welfare had been committed to his charge, and at a season when the cold air of December had invigorated the European frame, and restored many to health and strength, who had been laid on a bed of sickness, during the debilitating and pestilential months of July and August. It is a curious feature in the history of the Sikhs, that instead of crossing the Sutlej in the hot winds, when the European soldier could never withstand the burning sun of India, and his services therefore be unavailable without the risk of death from fever, apoplexy, or cholera, they
have invariably made their threats after the Dusse-rah at the beginning of the cold weather. One reason for their overlooking such an advantage, and of not acting on it, may doubtless be attributed to the rise in the rivers of the Punjab, during the hot months, and particularly the Sutlej and Gharra: the latter river, in which are situated the principal ghauts of Hurreekee, Koonda, and Huggur, would then be impassable to them by means of a bridge of boats, and this is probably the chief cause that has operated in restraining them from invading the British territories, during a season of the year when a European force could not be brought into the field in tents without its certain destruction from the causes already mentioned. It may be that the Sikhs themselves, who are notorious for their laziness and apathy, are averse to exertion at the hottest period of the year; and requiring stimulus have delayed warfare until the Dusserah, when their sluggish spirits appear to be roused to war, discord, and murder. In Runjeet Singh, they had an example of making their hostile preparations at the commencement of the cold months.

Another curious feature in the present campaign, particularly at its commencement, when regiments were marching to join the army, was that no molestation or annoyance was offered to our troops on the road, though alarms were often given of the Sikh horsemen being in the neighbourhood; and there is some reason to suppose that they hung
upon the flanks, but did not like to try their hand with European soldiers, ready at least to receive them on the point of the bayonet. A party of them did rob a cart with some commissariat and private property near Moodkee; the bullocks were unable to keep up with the column, and the contents of the cart fell an easy prey into their hands, though a guard of native soldiers was over them. But from the time of leaving Kulka, until the regiments reached Moodkee, not a single Sikh horseman was seen, and no theft or robbery committed, with the exception of the solitary case alluded to.

It can hardly be accounted for why the Sikh troops did not attack Feerozpore; for, notwithstanding the place was defended by a considerable number of troops, and in an entrenched camp, Sir John Littler could hardly have held it against a siege with large guns and shells, backed by an overwhelming army of infantry and cavalry. The only Europeans he possessed were the 62nd Queen's, and two troops and some companies of foot artillery. What the nature of the attack would have been, may be easily imagined from the desperate struggle at Moodkee and Feerozshuhur, and in the latter engagement, the Feerozpore force under their gallant and distinguished leader, found the enemy opposed to them such as they had not probably anticipated when they expected them at Feerozpore.

The Sikh troops are said to have pressed Lal Singh to lead them against Feerozpore repeatedly, but he refused; and at length sent them to Mood-
kee in order to satisfy their demands, and get rid of their importunity.

His excuse for not attacking that insulated post, was, that he wanted to fight the Commander-in-chief, and considered any one else as below his notice!! Others asserted that his forbearance arose from the supposition that the cantonments had been filled with mines, since the desertion of them by the British.

Whatever the real cause may have been, it was most fortunate that the Sikh army on crossing the Sutlej did not march on Feerozpore; for the least they could have done, would be to burn the barracks and officers' bungalows, and plunder the bazaars. Great consternation prevailed among the inhabitants of the city, which would have fallen an easy prey to the Sikhs, and become the scene of pillage and outrage; for which the Khalsas, and particularly the Ukhalies, have been always so celebrated. Had Runjeet Singh been ruler of the Punjab at the time of the Sikh invasion, his first act on crossing the Sutlej would have been to send the Ukhalies to burn and pillage every town and village belonging to the British or under their protection; and it is unaccountable why this mode of proceeding was neglected. We are almost tempted to believe that the Sikh leaders wished to keep their troops together, in order that the British might have a full and fair opportunity of destroying them! The Sirdar Lal Singh left Lahore unwillingly, and no doubt wished to get back as speedily as possible;
and had he scattered his troops about the country, thus allowing them to be beaten in succession, the war would be much longer delayed than suited his views or assorted with his wishes.

It was calculated that when once the Commander-in-chief should reach Moodkee, Feerozapore would be comparatively safe; for the 19th December would have seen the army of the Sutlej encamped at the place, or at least in a position, where the Feerozapore force could easily and safely join it. The result of the battle at Moodkee, and the entrenchment at Feerozshuhur, rendered a march to Feerozapore uncalled for; but it formed an admirable place to fall back on should any reverse take place; which no one, however, dreamt of, except a few who considered that the force at the Commander-in-chief’s disposal could not do more than it achieved at Moodkee, and that the Sikhs in full force, and with an immense artillery, were fearful odds against the British army, possessing so few guns of any large size.

The hour, however, was approaching which would decide the point whether the Sikhs were to beat their enemy, and force their way to Delhi, Benares, and Calcutta; in other words, to become masters of India, or be again forced to fall back on the Sutlej, and recross the river which they had now traversed with such buoyant hopes and insolent arrogance. Before leaving Lahore, the Khalsas had taken care to impress the Mussulman portion of the inhabitants with their objects; and
though the faithful dared not oppose them, their thoughts and wishes on the subject would not have responded to those of a people whom they thoroughly detested, and who they conceived had at length sought a foe who would level their pride, and probably subdue their kingdom. The Mussulmans of the Punjab disliked the despotic and arbitrary sway of the Sikhs; they could not forget that in former times they had been rulers at Lahore, and that their great Emperor Akhber treated the poor Gooroo kindly, as a harmless creature who could never be supposed by his words or acts to give any cause of offence. They had daily before their eyes the minarets of Jehangeer's tomb across the Ravee; in short, they rejoiced at the coming struggle, which would once more enable them to offer up their prayers, and follow all the pomp and show of their religion under the British sway, which never interferes with any faith, but allows to all the benefit of perfect freedom in religious matters, regardless of whether it be the idolatry of the Hindoo, or the fanaticism of the bigoted Mussulman.

Though the Sikhs were thus disliked by the Mussulmans, several of the latter were in high employ in the Sikh army, as well as in affairs relating to the state. A Mussulman was at the head of their artillery; and their best gunners were of the same sect; this accounts readily for the generous bearing towards Lieutenant Biddulph by the Sikh artillery. They were not fighting for their country, like the Sikhs; they were mere mercenary
Their fidelity to their employers.

Their fidelity to their employers, and though true and faithful servants, they could well afford to be generous to a nation whose cause they prayed for the success of, although obliged to aid the very people whom they wished from motives of religion to see overthrown. It has always been remarked of our Mussulmen servants, that they never prove unfaithful, when well treated and regularly paid; and in the contest between the Sikhs and British, the opposing combatants might each number men related by blood and united by the ties of one religion. This remark applies still more strikingly to the hill-men or Goorkhas; many of these were in the Sikh service, while two battalions of the same "little brave fellows" composed a portion of the British army during the campaign. Yet on either side they were the same resolute, daring soldiers, disregarding "kith or kin" in their strenuous endeavours to fulfil their duty to their respective employers, though fighting perhaps against their nearest and dearest relatives. These hill-men had been ordered to the plains on the first breaking out of the war, and did good service in every action in which they were engaged. So much did they please the Commander-in-chief, that it was resolved to raise more regiments of these hill-men, and their pensions were increased to the same scale as those granted to the Native soldiers of the line. When it was proposed to send them to the newly acquired Doab, they gave their willing consent, though from their having their huts and families at Deyrah and Futog,
they no doubt preferred returning to those two places, and which they were allowed to do. On the line of march in the plains of India, the Goorkhas are unable to take the long stride of the Hindoo and Mussulman soldier, but for energy, bravery, and a love of fighting they are a match for any Native troops, and look on the latter as even inferior to them. Their habits are more congenial to those of the European soldier, with whom they prefer to associate; and on joining the Army of the Sutlej, the Sirmoor battalion, it is said, requested to be brigaded with the 1st European light infantry, and accordingly joined the 4th brigade before the battle of Sobraon, where their gallant conduct elicited the admiration of the Commander-in-chief, who resolved to encourage them by every means in his power, by raising new hill corps, and increasing their allowances, so as to place them on an equal footing with those of the line.

We have probably given too high an estimate of the British force, and too small a one of the Sikh when prepared to oppose each other on the 21st December at Feerozshuhur; but a common fault in estimating the results of a victory is for each side to underrate its own strength, if beaten, and, from the same motives, to overrate that of the victorious army. This false estimate has pervaded the records of all warfare, ancient and modern; so that it is impossible to arrive at anything approaching a correct idea of numbers from written accounts. If this be difficult as regards European warfare, the
task becomes much more so, when we endeavour to calculate the hordes of the East. In the time of Runjeet Singh, we ourselves saw the book in which he kept a correct list of his regular or Aeen troops; and in 1835 these amounted to thirty-five regiments of infantry of a 1000 men each; while the regular cavalry or Ghorchurras numbered 15,000 men. Great additions have no doubt been made since that time to both branches; but in estimating the regular troops at so low a rate, it must be recollected, that the Sikh force consisted of an immense number of irregular regiments, both cavalry and infantry, under the command of Sirdars, who disciplined them and brought them into action at their own expense. With such a resource as this at command, the number of men comprising the Sikh army when it resolved to cross the Sutlej was incalculable. There might have been 70,000 infantry and half that number of cavalry; but with the exception of the Aeen or regular troops, much opposition could not have been expected against the British disciplined troops, either European or Native. The opinion of Runjeet Singh himself was, that his regular troops were equal to any in the world; he had probably been told by the French officers in his service, that they were a match for their own countrymen, and as a matter of course equal, if not superior to the British, whom the Maharajah had been industriously made to believe had been beaten by the French, and hence were inferior to the latter! We have had frequent opportunities of discussing
this knotty point with Runjeet Singh, and though unwilling to flatly contradict an assertion supported by those who might have some object in view in advancing it, we merely referred him to the battles in the Peninsula, where the two nations had measured arms with each other. This excited his curiosity, and he was most anxious to ascertain the merits of the case, and asked in what book he could find information. We referred him to Napier's celebrated work, and even promised to make, or get a translation of it made, into the Oordoo or Persian language, for his express use. The idea pleased him, and with that energy which marked the character of this wonderful man, he insisted that the book should be sent for immediately! His state of health and impaired strength at that period, forbade any hopes of his ever regaining either, and the subject was lost sight of. Notwithstanding his belief in the superiority of the Khalsa troops, he never once hinted that they were a match for the "Ungrez Buhadoo," or the "warlike English," as he was always wont to style the British soldiers; he said he had heard of the latter performing extraordinary long marches for a succession of days, weeks, and months, and yet when called upon to fight, entering the field with as much freshness and courage as they would have exhibited had they had no previous heavy marches. He doubted if the Khalsas would be able to accomplish such a feat, and asked our opinion on the subject. We corroborated what he had heard from other European officers who
had visited his court, but left it doubtful if the Sikhs had physical strength for such exertion. It must be honestly confessed, however, that the Sikh soldiery have remarkable pedestrian powers, and these have obtained for them the cognomen of "iron legs." The distance between Lahore and Umritsir backwards and forwards, nearly sixty miles, is often travelled over by a Sikh during a single night.

With a view of ascertaining our sentiments regarding the comparative merits of the Sikhs and Affghans, the Maharajah, after showing us the list of his regular troops, inquired how many of the troops of Dost Mohummud five and thirty thousand of his were likely to vanquish? We replied, that considering the superior discipline of the Khalsa in the knowledge of European tactics, they might beat double their number. The answer fell below the estimate of his Sirdars, for they shouted out "More, more, a lakh!"—or one hundred thousand. The Maharajah silenced them, and said we had given a very fair reply. This high opinion of their own strength and bravery has always been inherent in the Sikh tribe, since it was first formed into a warlike nation by Gooroo Govind. By his tenets, every Sikh or Singh is enjoined to carry a sword; the whole business of his life is declared to be war; no other trade or occupation must engage his attention. Thus fighting upon religious principles, it is not to be wondered at, that after the battles of Moodkee and Feerozshuhur, and even after Sobrion and
Allewal, though defeated in one and all, the Sikhs persevered in shewing a front: they were bound by the obligations of their faith never to lay down their sword but with their lives. This spirit will account for the obstinate opposition of the Sikh soldiers to the wishes of the Ranee, and even many of the Sirdars themselves. In the struggles with other oriental states, one complete victory on the part of the British generally decided the fate of the Native power, because the troops of the latter gave their services for hire, and were animated by no other principle than that which governs the mercenary in all countries. When conquered therefore, they sought peace at the hands of the victors; and when no longer required, laid aside their swords and supported themselves by following the arts of peace; in short, war with them was a matter of necessity, not of choice; and if they ceased to be soldiers they infringed none of the rules of their religion. Even upon the slaughter sustained by the Sikhs at Sobraon, and when thousands of them covered the ground, or found a watery grave in the Sutlej, those that escaped were as ready and deter-

mined to fight as if victory had crowned with suc-

cess their former endeavours.

Overlooking this important feature in the charac-
ter of the Sikhs, many of the English believed that their army would not fight on the 21st December, and various conjectures on the subject became the theme of conversation during the march. Others thought the Sikh resistance would be feeble, and
that they might calculate with certainty on eating their dinner at Feerozapore, or on the bank of the Sutlej; nay, it was a mooted point, whether they might not be on the right bank of the Sutlej on the same day, and the Sikhs in full retreat upon Umrit-sir and Lahore. An officer who for some time had held in his hands the direction of the British affairs, as connected with the Lahore government, was of a different opinion from the rest as regarded the warlike purposes of the Sikhs, and the writer of these pages heard Major Broadfoot on the morning of the 20th, when addressing some officers, thus give his opinion, "You may be prepared for one other desperate fight at least." His words were destined to be verified to a further extent than even he had anticipated, and this energetic and gallant soldier was doomed to fall in the very struggle which he predicted would take place.

Major Broadfoot had been selected by Lord Ellenborough to fill an important post in the Tenasserim district or province; but when Colonel Richmond, chargé d'affaires in the Punjab, was transferred to the residency of Lucknow, the Major was appointed his successor. The military reputation he had acquired in Affghanistan was of the highest order; there, in the rough defiles and precipitous heights of the Khyber Pass, was he to be seen, ever foremost in the struggle; no danger or difficulty ever arrested his progress; in his eager desire to assert the interests and honour of his country. He was the admiration of all, and some-

Opinion entertained by Major Broadfoot on the subject.

His high military character.
times incurred blame for a determined courage and impetuosity which hurried him to places where, accor-
ding to rules and orders, his presence was not expected. Lord Ellenborough was one of those
statesmen who paid the highest tribute to bravery and daring; though not a soldier himself, he could
appreciate the qualities of one, and he mingled in
the battle strife at Punneeah with a zeal and
courage which proved that had he been bred a
warrior, his career would probably have been as
glorious in the field as his talents and energy had
rendered him eminent in the cabinet. Both Major
Broadfoot and Colonel Richmond had been selected
for office by Lord Ellenborough on account of their
bravery and military skill only, since neither the
one nor the other possessed a knowledge of the
people with whom they had now to mingle in
affairs of a political nature. Colonel Richmond had
not even the necessary acquaintance with the lan-
guage used in the correspondence with Native
states. His high employment consequently be-
came irksome to him; he was sensible of the dis-
advantage under which he laboured, and the
anxiety of his mind preying upon his body, he
prudently removed to another sphere of action,
and eventually sought in the invigorating breezes
of the sea, that health which he could neither hope
to regain nor enjoy amidst the harassing duties
necessarily imposed upon him by his political
trust. Broadfoot, on the other hand, was perfectly
conversant with the language of the Punjabees,
but he could not have had opportunities of studying the policy and character of the Sikhs, equal to those enjoyed by Sir Claudius Wade, Captain Mackeson, Cunningham, and others. It is impossible for those who were not in the secrets of government to blame or praise Broadfoot’s acts during the present struggles. If he estimated the Sikh character by the standard of other people of the east with whom he had come in contact, and who, viewing the British government as omnipotent, gave no cause for alarm, and led it to neglect the proper means for resisting invasion; then it must be admitted he was not the person capable of filling the post conferred upon him. If, on the other hand, he gave early warning of the consequences likely to follow the anarchy and confusion consequent on the weakness of the Lahore government, and its inability to control its own subjects; we may lament the futility of his efforts to preserve the friendly alliance first formed between Runjeet Singh and the British in 1809; but we surely cannot blame him for any want of foresight.

United with Broadfoot in the management of Sikh affairs were Major Leech, Captains Mills, Nicolson, Cunningham, and Abbot. Perhaps the most important of these appointments was the one held by Captain Nicolson, for he was stationed at Feerozpore, an isolated frontier station, and would necessarily be the first to feel the effects of any hostile disposition on the part of the Sikhs across the Sutlej. This energetic officer lost no opportunity of making
himself thoroughly acquainted with Sikh affairs and their actual position at Lahore. Though appointed to another office, he kept his place, and watched with intense interest the coming events, the progress of which he communicated to his superiors, who, it is said, acknowledged his vigilance by calling him an alarmist! How he merited this, results have shewn:—When the Khalsa troops were actually marching on the Sutlej, Captain Nicolson could not possibly mistake their intentions, nor forget his duty so far as to conceal his belief that they would soon cross the river into the British territories. His position gave him the best opportunities of receiving correct information, and if he supplied this to his superiors, and took measures for guarding against any sudden inroad on Feerozapore, he performed his duty as a faithful servant to the state. As in the case of Broadfoot, we have no means of ascertaining the real merits of the case; and Nicolson, like his superior, falling in the field, has left to others the task of doing justice to his acts. He had been trained in the political school, and his intercourse with the Afghans, and particularly with the Ameer Dost Mohummud (whom he conducted to Hindostan and again back to the left bank of the Sutlej), rendered him a man unlikely to be prematurely alarmed, or circumvented by the Sikhs.

It may be asked what all this political or personal discussion has to do with the battle of Feerozshuhur. Not very much perhaps; but our military readers must excuse us, if, in our endeavours to trace effects
to their causes, we take a view of men and matters which might at first sight appear foreign to the subject: ours is a history, and not merely a military detail, and we are therefore forced into an elucidation of all the events which have had such an important influence on the country of which this work treats. Our task is to supply those who may honour these pages by perusing them with a general knowledge of the operations of the army of the Sutlej; but even in this attempt, had we not received the valuable aid of an esteemed friend, we doubt if success would have attended the undertaking.*

To return. Whatever the conduct of the political agents may have been, or by whatever means the hostile disposition of the Sikhs had been roused which induced them to cross the Sutlej, it was proved at the battle of Moodkee, that they were far superior to any foes the British army of India had ever encountered in the field.

We have endeavoured to shew the spirit which actuated the Khalsa troops in their attempt to spread their conquests over Hindostan; and it now seems proper to enquire, whether the Native portion of the British army was likely to have opposed a firm resistance to the Sikhs.

The victories gained in India by a Clive, an

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*We trust our friend Captain Combe, will not blame us for thus acknowledging but a small portion of the valuable and never-to-be-forgotten aid we have experienced at his hands; and without which, and his persevering example, this work might never have seen the light.—Author.
Ochterlony, and an Adams, shewed that the Native troops of their days were, at least, a match for any power opposed to them. The men were steady, brave soldiers, obeying implicitly the orders of their European officers, between whom and the men the freest intercourse existed. The officer commanding a company knew every sipahee personally, while the commanding officer of the regiment was so associated with the interests and welfare of his men as to be looked up to with a species of filial reverence. The position of affairs is somewhat changed. The bonds which united the Native soldier to his officer have been sundered. The means whereby the former was made to look with esteem and respect on his commander no longer exist, for the independent power of the latter has been curtailed, and the sipahee is drilled and taught the mechanism of the art of war, without an attempt being made to enlist his feelings in the cause. He consequently takes but little interest in the service, and merely looks upon it as a means of present livelihood and future comfort. Many officers in the Native army do not know even the names of their Native officers, (the Subedars, Jemadars, &c.); and a wide chasm has separated the two classes.

When a dislike to any particular duty arises, it spreads throughout the whole ranks: it is in vain that the commanding officer urges his men to a sense of their obligations; they are sulky and sullen, and refuse to obey officers whom they hardly know, except by name. We need only instance the
unruly spirit which prevailed in the corps that mutinied in 1843, and which, in spite of every exertion on the part of their officers, refused to march to Scinde, until the presence of two European regiments threatened their very existence.

No body of officers can excel in zeal and energy those of our Native army in India, but they cannot, under the present state of interference with the internal management of their regiments, calculate with certainty on those strenuous exertions and that determined courage which marked the sipahee of former times. The mounted branch of our army, called the regular cavalry, is not now composed of men sprung from a race of warriors. Many of them are persons of low caste, whose fathers and brothers are the cooks and table-attendants of the officers, and it not unfrequently happens that the latter swell the ranks of a light cavalry regiment. We look in vain for the gallant Rajpoot and high-caste Mussulman who formerly displayed such courage and daring in the hard-fought fields of Indian warfare. Their officers indeed are the same gallant men who formerly led them to the charge, emulating in every respect the European officer at the head of his countrymen, but they have not the same material to work at. How is it then, that the irregular cavalry are said to excel the regular in effectiveness? They are officered from the classes of Englishmen who command regular cavalry, but the horses of the latter are of a better stamp. The regulars have not, it is true, the same amount of
cloth and trappings about them, and are armed with a sword intended merely for a thrust, while the irregulars are in possession of a strong heavy weapon, capable, when properly wielded, of doing great execution. Nevertheless there is another vast difference existing between the regular and irregular cavalry: the latter possess in their ranks men of high caste and family who are accompanied and followed into the field by young relatives who do their utmost to imitate them. This spirit of emulation does not exist in the regular cavalry; every man does what he considers his duty, and no more. In Affghanistan one of our regular cavalry corps refused to charge the Affghan horse, even when it was certain, from the very weight of its horses, to overthrow the enemy! The advantage of charging en masse has not yet been fully impressed on the Native cavalry; they still trust to their individual exertions, which, in the absence of effective weapons, can achieve but little. Could the regular Native cavalry be brought to believe that a dense and compact body of well-trained horsemen will bear down undisciplined troopers, less reliance would be placed in individual power, and the full advantage of a body of dragoons might be realized. In some regular Native cavalry corps a proper impression prevails (as witness the 1st Bengal regiment in Affghanistan, the 3rd at Alleewal, the 5th at Moodkee, and the 9th at Meeance) but it is far from being universal. In the battle of Moodkee, the loss in the European infantry and cavalry was great, as compared with that sustained by the Native branch of the service,
and we endeavoured to reconcile such a marked difference by supposing that the Sikhs took more deadly aim at the former, without for an instant doubting that both were equally exposed. The effect, however, produced on both branches of our Native army at that hard-contested fight, was somewhat to shake their courage, and it could not be denied, that, previous to the battle of Feerozshuhur, a fear prevailed that opposed to formidable batteries, our Native infantry might waver, and our regular Native cavalry shrink from charging guns, or even the squares of Sikh infantry.

Such a feeling was industriously suppressed, however, if ever entertained by the Commander-in-chief and Governor-general. The Native troops marched with alacrity to Feerozshuhur, but a resistance there awaited them, which they could not have anticipated, and which certainly caused the wavering of the best troops Europe could produce. The Sikhs defended their entrenched camp with a spirit which even European intrepidity could not at once overcome, and if a less courageous bearing were manifested by the Native troops, it should be remembered that they had not acquired that contempt for an enemy, which the European entertains: their highest aim was to follow and emulate him.

When entering, therefore, the field of Feerozshuhur, some doubted whether the Native character for bravery was equal to the approaching struggle; but the hopes of all were buoyant, and it was soon to be proved to what extent the Native soldier could be trusted.
CHAPTER VII.

THE BATTLE OF FEEROZSHUHUR OR FEEROZSHAH.

When last speaking of the army of the Sutlej, it had halted and formed into the order of battle. The disposition was soon made for the coming strife. The Commander-in-chief, Sir Hugh Gough, commanded the right wing; while the left was under the command of General Sir Henry Hardinge, who on the previous evening, set aside his dignity of Governor-general, and volunteered his services as second in command. Sir Harry Smith commanded the 1st infantry division, consisting of the 1st and 2nd brigades; the former containing Her Majesty's 31st, 47th, and 24th regiments Native infantry, the latter Her Majesty's 50th and the 42nd and 48th regiments of Native infantry. The second infantry division fell to the lot of Major-general Gilbert, and was usually styled the centre division; it contained two brigades, numbered the 3rd and 4th; the former consisted of Her Majesty's 29th, and the 45th Native infantry with Her Majesty's
80th regiment* attached; the latter, of the 1st European light infantry and the 2nd and 16th regiments Native infantry grenadiers.

The 3rd infantry division devolved on Brigadier Wallace, and was composed of Her Majesty's 9th, and the 26th and 73rd regiments Native infantry, forming the 5th brigade.

The 4th infantry division consisted of two brigades, numbered the 7th and 8th, containing exclusively the troops under Sir John Littler, and which had joined the army on the 21st. Those composing the 7th brigade were Her Majesty's 62nd, and the 12th and 14th regiments of Native infantry. The 8th contained the 33rd, 44th, and 54th regiments of Native infantry, being the only brigade without a European regiment.

The cavalry division was composed of the regiments already mentioned, viz. Her Majesty's 3rd light dragoons, the 8th Bengal light cavalry and 9th irregular cavalry constituting the 1st brigade. The Governor-general's body guard, the 5th regiment light cavalry and 8th regiment of irregular cavalry, forming the 2nd brigade. The 4th regiment light cavalry (lancers) and 3rd regiment of irregular cavalry, constituting the 3rd brigade, and commanded by Brigadier Harriott.

The artillery division, composed of the troops

* The 11th and 41st regiments of Native infantry, which formed with Her Majesty's 80th; the 6th brigade of infantry were not present, and the 80th was accordingly attached to the 3rd in Gilbert's division.
and batteries mentioned in a former chapter, was under the command of Brigadier Brooke.

The principal objects of the army on leaving Moodkee were to effect a junction with Sir John Littler, and make an attack on the weakest part of the Sikh entrenchment; and for this latter purpose, a long detour of about sixteen miles was made; but, instead of gaining the object in view, the British, when preparing for battle, did actually front the longest and strongest side of the entrenchment, which was in the form of a parallelogram of about a mile in length, and half a mile in breadth, including within its area, the strong village of Feerozshah, the shorter sides looking towards the Sutlej and Moodkee, and the longer towards Feerozapore and the open country.* The side on which the British advanced was the longer one, looking towards Feerozapore, instead of the shorter, from which the Sikhs had no doubt advanced on the 18th when attacked by the British. It is curious how such a mistake could have been made; for it is said that the position of the entrenchment had been accurately described. The side of the parallelogram looking towards Moodkee was the shorter, but perhaps the Sikhs imagined it might be more easily defended; and they were, no doubt, prepared to place their guns in position on whatever side the attack should be made. Their scouts could easily

* The Commander-in-chief's despatch.
put them in possession of the manner in which the British were advancing, and it may have so happened that the longer side looking towards Feeropezpore had been previously less strongly defended, until the Sikhs became aware that it was destined to be the point of attack. In fact, the Sikhs were thoroughly acquainted with the country, and knowing by what roads the enemy could advance, were prepared for their reception. So that it mattered little whether the approach was made on the longer or shorter side, though the preparations on that fronting Feeropezpore showed that it was considered by the Sikhs as the proper front of their position. How the British were led to believe the contrary is a question only solved by supposing that the information given on native authority must have misled them.

"The ground in front, like that at Moodkee, was jungley; the three divisions of the British, under the command of Major-General Gilbert, Sir John Littler, and Brigadier Wallace, deployed into line, with the whole of their artillery in their centre, except three troops of horse artillery, one on either flank, and one in support. The reserve was under Sir Harry Smith, and the cavalry, small in number, formed the second line with the brigade in reserve to cover each wing."* The artillery were ordered to the front, and the infantry wheeled into line. After a reasonable time had been allowed for the

* The Commander-in-chief's despatch.
mortar practice, which it was speedily seen could never silence the Sikh guns, the artillery opened their fire, to ascertain the position of the Sikh batteries, and the latter responded at somewhat less than a mile’s distance. The calibre of the British guns rendered them useless at such a distance; the artillery, therefore, advanced, protected by the whole of the infantry moving by echelon of regiments from the right at eighty paces distance. When thus several hundred yards nearer, the guns were unlimbered, and several rounds of shot fired; this was repeated until they approached within 250 or 300 yards of the enemy’s batteries. “The Sikh guns could not be silenced by the British, and the artillery advances nearer and nearer.

General Gilbert’s division was completely successful in carrying the batteries, and entered the Sikh camp. But when the batteries of the Sikhs were thus apparently within the grasp of the British infantry, a fire of musketry was set up against them by the Sikhs drawn up behind their guns.”† Almost the whole of General Gilbert’s division passed to the right of the village of Feerozshah, which formed the centre of the enemy’s position. On forcing the batteries, the infantry were exposed not only to musketry, but to a terrific explosion from a

* The Commander-in-chief’s despatch.
† The Sikh infantry were lying down, and consequently fired high, killing many mounted officers.
mine formed in the rear of the guns, which blew up and did great mischief among the advancing troops: every thing was blown into the air, and for a time nothing but confusion ensued. Several smaller mines exploded, and the noise occasioned by them resembled an interrupted discharge of thunder-clouds, while the whole atmosphere over them was filled by a vast cloud of smoke, supported on a murky flame, throwing its lurid glare far and wide. Sir Harry Smith entered the village of Feerozshah, and cleared it. He then proceeded further into the entrenched camp, and halted in consequence of night coming on. "In spite of the indomitable bravery of the British, a portion only of the Sikh entrenchment was carried. Night fell, but still the battle raged."* General Gilbert took the 29th, 80th, and 1st European light infantry some distance to the right and rear of the village, and there halted. Thus, on the setting-in of the night of the 21st December, were the European infantry regiments placed in the enemy's camp, having captured a portion of it, while the Sikhs occupied the rest; their cavalry and infantry moving about throughout the whole night, harassing and firing on the British who were bivouacked. A large Sikh gun was brought up close to the British, and its contents discharged; but so near that the grape could not spread itself, and the men and officers thus escaped, while the chargers of the latter were

* The Commander-in-chief's despatch.
knocked over even when their masters were holding the rein while lying on the ground. On another occasion, while the 50th and other European soldiers and officers were lying on a tent and on the ground, a battalion of Sikhs passed and deliberately fired into the midst of them! but strange to say, with little or no effect! This was a fearful position to be in, and from the intervals between the European infantry regiments and the Native brigades with them, being left vacant, there was no possibility of forming a line, or acting in concert; portions of one regiment got mixed up with more of another in the entrenchment, and in the darkness of night, could not regain their respective positions. If a regiment had attempted to move right or left in search of another, the Sikh guns were sure to be directed to the spot; and where the 50th bivouacked, Sir Harry Smith, with admirable prudence, forbade a shot to be fired in return for any that might be directed against his position. The white covers were taken off the caps, which served as marks for the enemy, and every means adopted for keeping the men out of the hostile fire. The gallant soldiers who had, at the point of bayonet, captured the batteries of the Sikhs, were thus glad to actually conceal themselves under the darkness of night. It was not flight, but as near an approach to it as can be well conceived; and no wonder if, at this time, the Governor-general of India felt the precarious position of the troops. Never in the annals of warfare in India had...
matters attained such a threatening crisis. The European infantry alone could now support him, and he knew well what their daring bravery had accomplished at Plassy, Bhurtpore, and Ghuzni. In this action "the reserve was brought up by Sir Harry Smith, and seized another portion of the position, while the 3rd dragoons charged, and took some batteries; yet the Sikhs remained in position, and in possession of a considerable portion of the quadrangle."*

We see that though Gilbert's division drove everything before it, and though Sir Harry Smith followed up with equal success, yet the Sikhs persisted in keeping their position. On the left, where the Feerozapore force was engaged under the command of Sir John Littler, the fire was so terrific, that Her Majesty's 62nd regiment was unable to make good their charge and were ordered to retire; at least, this is the explanation afforded by those who ought to know best; and it does not follow that though one portion of an entrenched camp be carried, all the rest can be so. There was a half moon battery at the right corner of the Sikh position, which played with deadly effect on the 62nd, and against which they could not stand; had they formed a portion of the centre division, there is little doubt but the 62nd would have done their part well, and emulated their brave countrymen in capturing the batteries. It unfortunately happened, that Sir John Littler, in his private

* The Commander-in-chief's despatch.
despatch, intended solely for the Commander-in-chief, used the words "panic struck" as applicable to this regiment, and attributed the irresolution on the part of the Native regiments in his division, as arising from the example of the 62nd.

Whether, as their own brigadier stated, the regiments had received an order from himself to retire from a position which they could not carry without the risk of being annihilated; or whether this check was a necessary consequence of the insurmountable obstacle opposed to them; the loss in men and officers attests, that the efforts of both were great, for we find that this gallant regiment had no fewer than seven officers killed and ten wounded; while among the soldiers of a weak regiment in numbers, there were 76 killed and 154 wounded, a greater number in both grades than fell to the lot of any other European regiment. Both the Governor-general and Commander-in-chief did everything in their power to reassure the regiment that its well-known character for bravery was fully borne out, and it is to be lamented that an occurrence should have happened which could ever have rendered it a matter of doubt.*

* Since this was written, we have the Duke of Wellington's remarks on the subject, in his speech in the House of Lords. His Grace continued—"I have read with pain of one regiment to which the word 'panic' was applied, and I considered it my duty, in the position in which I am placed, to examine particularly into the circumstances. I see in the returns made, it is stated to have lost five-twelfths of its numbers, and a vast number of officers; and I have seen accounts, that in the first quarter of an hour one-
As a contrast to the killed of the 62nd, let us see what the list of the other five Native regiments exhibited. We find the number of casualties scarcely amounted to half that of the 62nd in rank and file; while not a single European officer belonging to the five regiments was killed; and the whole number of their wounded European officers, little more than equalled that of the 62nd regiment alone. We do not, for an instant, wish to draw any invidious comparison between the European officers of the Native army, and those of Her Majesty's service; but we may rely upon it, that the list of killed and wounded among these, is a good proof that they and their men were in a position of danger, and that both suffered equally. The fact, as regards Feerozshah, cannot be concealed. The Native infantry were not equal to the work. If it were otherwise, how came it that the capturing of the guns became the work of the European infantry and European cavalry? How did it happen, that long ere the European infantry found themselves in the entrenched camp, the Native regiments connecting them with one another had disappeared? They did not, perhaps,

third of its officers fell. I cannot question the report of the operations made by a commanding officer; but I wish this official, when he sat down to write an elaborate report of the conduct of the troops under his command, had referred to the list of killed and wounded; and if he had enquired into the loss sustained by that regiment, I believe he would have found that they were absolutely mowed down by the fire under which they were advancing."—Duke of Wellington's speech in the House of Lords, 26th Feb, 1846.
run away, but they did what in in its effect proved much more injurious; they hung back, lost their proper distances, and, instead of being side by side with the European soldiers, they got behind them and fired, often accidentally killing or wounding the latter. So far as the result of the battle of Feerozshuhur is concerned, it would have been far more eligible to have formed the whole European force into one line, and left the Native regiments in reserve, and at such a distance as to prevent the consequence of their ill-directed, though well-meant fire. This point may be disputed by those partial to the Native soldier; and had it been mooted before the campaign with the Sikhs, the supposition we have advanced would have been spurned; but facts have proved the truth and justice of our statement. It is well known, that the European officers had the greatest difficulty in getting their men to advance, and that many threatened to cut them down. On the night of the 21st, the fate of India depended on the continued bravery of the European infantry. Had the battle been commenced early in the day, and with the troops fresh, and not fatigued by a long march and want of water, the conduct of the Native troops would certainly have been far different; and we have heard regrets uttered by even themselves, to the effect, that they could do nothing—"Psiyasa aur bhook se murjata"—"I am dying from want of water and food," and concluded by a downcast look and shrug of the shoulders, "Hum kya kurne supta!"—"I am good for nothing."
Those who do not know the Native character may smile at our endeavours to extenuate their want of a combative spirit, but with those who know how incompetent a Native is to do anything without his water and food, the excuse will go far to prove, that we have not attached too much weight to these circumstances. A Native knows none of the stimulating and exciting effects of wine, beer, or spirits. The European soldier can exist, it is true, without either, and be a robust, courageous individual; but the energy of the Native is paralysed when he cannot procure water; his physical strength and courage give way in its absence. A European soldier, on the other hand, suffering from thirst, finds a mouthful of rum sufficient to quench it more effectually than perhaps a gallon of water, and this was verified on the night of the 21st, at Feerozshuhur. Those who were dying of thirst, and loathed the taste or even the smell of the soldiers' rum, were speedily obliged to own its magical effect, in moistening their parched lips, and restoring the energy of mind and body. Fortunately, the causes which we have assigned for the apparent want of spirit and purpose, on the part of the Native soldier, were afterwards tested at Sobraon, where many Native corps charged side by side with the European regiments, and with a gallantry equal to that of their brethren in arms. This, it is hoped, will act as a warning to commanders in all future battles, not to call upon the sipahee to fight on an empty stomach. So well are
the Sikhs aware of the baneful effects of such privations on the Natives of British India, that in all their wars, they have invariably endeavoured to entrench themselves in a position where water is scanty; and the tact which Gooroo Govind exhibited when fighting against the Mussulmans, at Moogutsir, in the desert of the Hissar district, was as strong a case in point as that furnished by the Kulsá troops, in 1845, under Lal Sing and Tej Singh. Though far outnumbering the army of the Gooroo, the Sikhs got possession of the only water then procurable, and the Mussulmans consequently fled, and many died.

We must now give an account of the renewed battle between the British and Sikh armies on the 22nd December; but before doing so, an instance of the bravery of the European infantry, given in the Commander-in-chief's despatch, may be here introduced, more particularly as the Governor-general himself makes a conspicuous figure in the narration. In Sir Henry Hardinge's offer to assume the post of second in command, Sir Hugh Gough could not but admire the spirit of so experienced and gallant an officer as Sir Henry; but at the same time, he could not be insensible to the risk incurred in exposing the life of the Governor-general. Politicians may blame Sir Henry's devotion, yet all must admire the intrepid spirit which thus risked every thing in the wish to vanquish an enemy who appeared determined to wrest from Sir Henry the country which he governed. If Sir
Henry Hardinge had been thus anxious for the result on the 20th December, what must have been his feelings when he found himself in the Sikh entrenched camp (not master of it) with the European soldiers who had gained the portion they held at the point of the bayonet? Delivering his watch and star to his son's care, he showed that he was determined to leave the field a victor, or die in the struggle! When the eventual completion of the victory enabled him to send home his despatches, little could the people of England imagine what had been the situation of the Governor-general; a functionary with whose position they associate the idea of every luxury and comfort. Exposed in the Sikh entrenchment, sharing the privations of the lowest European soldier, his mind suffering pangs unknown to them, with the fate of India hanging on the doubtful issue of the morrow—it was a situation to which that of our Henry the Fifth at Agincourt could alone offer a parallel. The European troops lay bivouacked, exposed to the musketry of the Sikh battalion, daring not to move or return a shot! Nothing but the hand of Providence appeared capable of deciding the action in favour of the British. Their situation during the night was miserable enough; but this might have been borne with cheerfulness, if any ray of hope could have been expected to dawn on them with the coming day. The enemy, still numerous, had guns at their command, though a great many had been captured. The British guns were ineffective,
from the expenditure of all the ammunition. The
computation of events was most disheartening.
Even if the infantry could be formed into line with
the light of day, there was no gun to defend their
advance, and no cavalry capable of completing any
advantage they might gain. On the other hand,
the Sikh force was numerous, and their strength in
cavalry incalculable; with such advantages on
their side, nothing could be expected but a fierce
renewal of the fight.

"The Sikhs during the night remained in posi-
tion, and in possession of a considerable portion of
the quadrangle. The British kept possession of
the rest and bivouacked, their ranks greatly thinned
and exhausted by their arduous efforts, but above
all by the want of water. In the middle of the
night a large Sikh gun was advanced, and played
with deadly effect upon the British. To silence
this formidable cannon, Sir Henry Hardinge formed
Her Majesty's 80th and the 1st European light
infantry, and "the gun was captured by as brave a
charge as there is on record."* The incessant
booming of the gun here alluded to was heard
during the stillness of night, and though numerous
parties of Native infantry and cavalry were seen on
the road leading to Feerozpore, it was evident the
battle still raged, and the Sikhs maintained their
position. The shells aimed at the British infantry
often found their way to the interval which sepa-

* The Commander-in-chief's despatches.
rated the latter from the cavalry; but from their bursting high, little mischief was done to those in the vicinity. It was during the night of the 21st that the 8th light cavalry were ordered off the field to Feerozpore. This was done by an officer in the Adjutant-general's department; and at a time when the British were weak in this branch, the withdrawing of even one regiment was a serious mistake. What the object of this movement was, if there really were any, it is difficult to divine, but the officer commanding the regiment thought it was necessary for him to obey the order he received, and weakness was the result. The want of a sufficient force of cavalry was severely felt at Moodkee, and where thirty thousand Ghorchurras were waiting to charge, the loss of even one cavalry regiment was likely to be serious at Feerozshuhur. So sensible was Sir Henry Hardinge of his deficiency of cavalry, particularly of European cavalry, that he is reported to have said "he would give half a lakh of rupees that Her Majesty's 16th lancers should arrive."

During the night of the 21st many a poor wounded European soldier found his way to the rear in search of medical aid, but the arrangement for affording it was very incomplete, excepting through the efforts of the regimental surgeons, who did everything in their power with the means at their command. As for the field hospital, it had no existence. True, a field surgeon had been appointed and a superintending surgeon also, but both officers remained behind at Moodkee with the
wounded. So confidently had the opinion been entertained that the Sikhs would not offer resistance, that it was deemed unnecessary to make any arrangements for a field hospital. There were no medical stores or surgical instruments on the field, except those attached to regimental hospitals; and the hurry of the movements prevented any sufficient supply from being obtained without great delay. It was, to say the least, an anomalous event that the "field surgeon" should have been fifteen or sixteen miles from the field! but so it was; not that his presence could have effected much without the requisite supply of medical stores and instruments; and the fault of not possessing these did not rest with him, for there was no possibility of obtaining them from the dépôts owing to their great distance. The writer of this work had recommended a dépôt for medical stores being formed at Kurnaul, to meet any sudden demand which the hostile appearance of the Sikhs might render necessary.* He likewise advised the appointment of a superintending surgeon at Feerozpore; but such recommendations coming from an humble individual could not be expected to meet the eye of superior authority, and had they been offered in a more direct manner, the probable result would have been a reprimand, to the effect, "that the adviser had better confine himself to his own duty."

These observations may appear foreign to the

* Medical and Literary Journal for January 1845.
subject, but there is surely no more important point connected with the efficiency and welfare of an army, than the medical provision for the gallant soldier who is wounded in the defence of his country; and the energetic measures adopted by the Governor-general, after the battle of Feerozshuhur, clearly proved that he was determined to save no expense or trouble in providing for the wants of the sufferers, both European and Native. But in a campaign commencing so suddenly as the present did, the attention of the ruler of the land is necessarily directed to the means available for opposing or attacking an enemy; and it is only when the cannon and musket have done their work, that arrangements for the care of the wounded men are forced on his attention. We will return to this subject; meanwhile we proceed to the renewal of the battle of Feerozshuhur on the morning of the 22nd.

"The British infantry formed into a line, supported on both flanks by the horse artillery, while the fire was opened from the centre by a few heavy guns and a few flights of rockets sent among the Sikhs. But on these a masked battery of the Sikhs played with great effect, dismounting the British guns and blowing up their tumbrils."* We were assured by the horse artillery-men, that they had never witnessed any thing so terrific as the effect of the Sikh guns on theirs, which they described as being actually blown into the air!

* The Commander-in-chief's despatch.
It was evident that the battle must be won by the British infantry, the Governor-general as second in command having placed himself at the head of the left, while the Commander-in-chief occupied a similar post on the right.

"The line advanced unchecked and drove the Sikhs out of the village of Feerozshah, as well as their encampment; then changing front to its left on its centre, the force continued to sweep the Sikh camp and dislodged the enemy from their whole position. The British captured seventy-eight pieces of cannon and were masters of the field; but Tej Singh brought up fresh battalions and a large field of artillery, supported by 30,000 Ghorchurras which had been kept as a reserve near the river."* This immense force in Cavalry had occupied the ground about Sultan-Khan-Wala, where there was also a supply of five thousand maunds of gunpowder afterwards seized and destroyed by the British. What a contrast between this immense quantity of gunpowder, and the miserable supply on the part of the British! The small force constituting the British cavalry could not withstand such a multitude of foes. The despatch continues,—"he drove in the British cavalry, and made strenuous efforts to regain his original position, but was unable to effect his object. Still the Sirdar renewed the contest by a combined attack on the left flank of the British, which compelled

* The Commander-in-chief's despatch.
them to change their whole front to the right, his guns playing with great effect, while those of the British were rendered useless from want of ammunition, the whole of which had been expended and could not return a single shot."

What a position for the British! Ever the boast of the nation, and the dread of her foes, their cannon were now useless! The guns could not be taken, it is true, as those of the Sikhs had been, but of themselves they were helpless, and saved alone by the indomitable spirit and courage of the British infantry.

With an overwhelming cavalry, guns well served, and plenty of ammunition on the one side, and a handful of European infantry, without a single gun, and a few regiments only of cavalry on the other; what result could have been anticipated but that victory must decide in favour of the former? But the opposing foe was the British infantry, who had seized the guns at the point of the bayonet. The formidable cannon was no match for them, though, in all warfare, its power has been allowed. The Sikhs felt convinced, that with their numerous guns, they were invincible; and Tej Singh therefore determined to contest the battle to the utmost. He had driven back the British cavalry; his guns were causing great destruction; the British, reduced in numbers and suffering from fatigue, had no guns to oppose him; yet with all these available resources, "an attack was now made on the Sirdar, by the British infantry supported on the flanks by
the cavalry. The Sikhs ceased their firing and abandoned the field."

Thus terminated the hard-contested fight of Feerozshah, which, but for the indomitable bravery of the British infantry, must have been gained by the Sikhs.

The British, from the first, had no guns capable of silencing those of the Sikhs; and even those they did possess were rendered useless for want of ammunition, a proof that they had done their duty while means were at their disposal. We can never forget the look of disappointment so vividly depicted on the faces of the brave artillery-men when they turned their horses' heads from the field on which they had so nobly acted their part. Dire necessity compelled them to withdraw from a contest where they could no longer be of use, and this at a moment when the British infantry had so many thousand cavalry threatening their very existence.

The British cavalry were driven back by Tej Singh. The few regiments of regular and irregular cavalry composing the former, though having before them the daring and intrepid 3rd dragoons, were appalled at the sight of the almost numberless horses of Sikh Ghorchurras, and it was in vain to attempt the charge. The British infantry, therefore, formed into line with the cavalry on its flanks, determined to drive the combined force of Tej Singh off the field. Already, as we have said, had the cavalry been driven back, and the entire mass
of living beings which crowds the rear of an army was in flight to Feerozpore. The whole ground between Feeruzshuhur and the latter place appeared, indeed, covered with men; some running, others looking behind them with terror depicted in their faces, the dread of the Sikhs at their heels almost depriving them of the power of motion. The latter effect, amounting to paralysis, when certain death seems inevitable, is not unfrequently witnessed on the field of battle; and a gallant field-officer related his own case at Feeruzshuhur, when in front of the enemy's guns—He saw the gunner apply his match three successive times, but without effect. The sight of instant destruction so absorbed his attention, however, that he stood for the moment unable to move to either side to avoid the shot. He was rooted to the spot by some indescribable fascination. When the panic spread to the rear of the army, the bearers of the doolies threw down the wounded men, and fled. No threat could induce them to remain, and to add to the confusion, the doolies containing the surgical instruments were in many instance deserted and upset. The ground was strewn with bedding and other clothing, and the wounded men were left on the road with little power or prospect of reaching Feerozpore before the darkness of night overtook them.

Fortunately Feerozpore was not more than eight or nine miles from the scene of action, and the authorities there, in the commissariat and executive
departments, used their utmost endeavours to bring in the wounded. All the men who arrived were forthwith put into the entrenched camp, and the doolies sent back for more; elephants, carts, &c., were put in requisition, and during the whole night of the 22nd, the wounded were being brought in, or found their way on foot in a state of dreadful exhaustion from pain, loss of blood, and want of food and water. Every available place in this entrenchment was filled with wounded men calling loudly for assistance, but little could be afforded until morning. The writer had an opportunity, on the morning of the 23rd, of witnessing the lamentable condition of the brave European soldier who had bled for his country's cause, now imploring in vain for a mouthful of water. As it was impossible to accommodate the numerous cases belonging to the European regiments in such a confined place, we suggested the propriety of getting a range of barracks for the wounded of each corps. The suggestion was acted upon by the senior medical staff present, and in a few hours carts were procured, and the men sent to the vacant barracks of Her Majesty's 62nd regiment. By noon they were all in their own quarters; and quilts and cots furnished in abundance; in fact, it was almost incredible how the commissariat and executive departments could supply so much comfort in such a short space of time. The wounded owe much to the unwearied efforts of Captain W. B. Thomson and Lieutenant Goodwyn (who responded to every
call) for their comparatively snug condition on the 23rd and 24th, and it was a gratifying sight to the Governor-general when he visited them to find so much comfort where he anticipated so little. He generously gave strict orders, that every thing required should be supplied; and without the usual formality of an indent. Sir Henry Hardinge visited all the wounded men and officers, and had a cheerful word for all. If a poor man had lost an arm, the Governor-general consoled him by pointing to his own sleeve, and assuring him he would soon be all right. The men were delighted at the urbanity and kindness shown towards them by the Governor-general of India, and for a time forgot their own sufferings in the admiration which his kindness elicited. Nothing is at any time more gratifying to the wounded than attention from the humblest individual, but when the Governor-general thus deigned to comfort and address them, their hearts were filled with sentiments of gratitude and esteem. The Commander-in-chief, whose arduous military duties did not allow him to visit the wounded at Feerozapore for some days later, did every thing in his power to cheer the men; he praised their undaunted bravery in one of the hardest battles ever fought in India, and though the casualties in killed and wounded had been heavy, he was grateful that Providence had enabled him to conquer a proud and fierce foe, and thus sustain the honour and courage of the British soldier. He spoke to all and listened to all, their every want and every wish found in him a
chief eager and willing to remove the one and gratify the other.

The Governor-general took immediate measures for having all those who had lost limbs, or whose wounds rendered them unfit for service, conveyed to Europe as soon as they could be safely moved. He visited the wounded again and again, and watched over their welfare with a solicitude that could not have been surpassed had his own children been the objects of his attention.

Such details may be considered uninteresting to the general reader, but the discipline and efficiency of an army, its endurance under the severest deprivations, its determined efforts to support the honour of the Nation, are not to be fully attained without a careful watch over the soldier's wants and a generous attention to his sufferings: of this fact the noble commanders at Feerozshah proved they were fully sensible.

A battle so desperately contested on the part of the Sikhs, must necessarily have been attended with a great loss in killed and wounded. It is impossible to arrive at any thing like accuracy on this point, as regards the enemy. Their artillery-men stood manfully to their guns, and the greater part of them must have fallen. The British lost upwards of 2,000 in killed and wounded, including thirty-seven officers among the former, and double that number wounded, several of whom afterwards died. Adding this loss to that sustained at Moodkee on the 18th December, the total in killed and wounded.

The killed and wounded necessarily great.

British loss.

Computed loss on both sides.
wounded will amount to three thousand and upwards. The loss on the part of the Sikhs was computed at four times that number, but it is impossible to arrive at any certainty on this point, since many who had been missing, and were supposed killed, afterwards found their way to their homes.

The guns captured from the Sikhs at Feerozshuhur, and placed in the entrenched camp at Feerozapore, amounted to seventy-three, making with those taken at Moodkee, a total of eighty-eight, but several were thrown into wells by the Sikhs themselves, and others though in the possession of the British were not spiked. The loss of the enemy in guns was, therefore, probably little short of one hundred.

An inspection of the guns captured from the Sikhs, proved that they were heavier in metal than those of a similar calibre with the Bengal army, and "the whole were well fitted for post guns."

It was found at Feerozshuhur, that the Sikh artillery was the only arm which had any chance against the British, deficient as the latter were in this important implement of war.

At the battle of Feerozshuhur, the greatest loss sustained by the British arose from grape shot; though the Sikh musketry did, no doubt, great mischief. The loss on the part of the Sikhs from the British musketry, however, must have been great, as the men fired without raising the musket

* Warner's return of captured guns.
above the hip, whereas the Sikh infantry lay down, and their shot passed over the heads of their opponents excepting when it came in contact with a mounted officer or his horse.

But though the European infantry thus escaped the musket shot of the Sikhs, it must not be concealed that they suffered from that of the Native infantry in the rear, when endeavouring to thread their way through the entrenchment. This unfortunate occurrence could hardly have been prevented, unless the sipahees had fired their muskets in the air. A Native soldier with a loaded musket fires to his front; and as, unluckily in many instances, the Native infantry got in the rear of the European soldiers, the effect may be imagined. The young officer* who carried one of the colours of the 1st European light infantry, was thus *riddled* by a volley of musketry from the rear, just at the moment when he was congratulating himself on having escaped unscathed into the entrenchment. As we have remarked in a former place, it would have been more eligible to form the whole of the European infantry in one line, and keep the Native in reserve.

Several mounted officers were killed at Feerozshuhur; among the rest the gallant Major Somerset, Military Secretary to the Governor-general. When the army was drawn up in line to prepare for the engagement, this officer was conspicuous,

* Ensign Moxon.
mounted on a black steed, and elicited by his noble bearing the admiration of all. On the morning of the 22nd he was borne to the rear mortally wounded, "while conducting himself with the hereditary courage of his race."*

Major Broadfoot, the political agent, also fell. He was first thrown from his horse by a shot, and the Governor-general failed in his endeavours to make him leave the field. "He was as brave as he was able in every branch of the political and military service."†

Captain P. Nicholson was also doomed to fall at Feerozshuhur on the 21st, where he received a mortal wound through the chest, of which he died before reaching Feerospore, the scene of all his active labours.

With the exception of Captain Mills, who took the command of a troop of horse artillery, all the political agents were either killed or wounded in this fierce struggle, shewing by their death and example, that though employed in diplomacy the daring bravery of the British soldier had been in no way diminished.

Among those who shared in the dangers of this battle, were Prince Waldemar of Prussia, and his staff Counts Grueben and Oriolo, and Doctor Hoffmeister; the last officer was unfortunately killed by a grape shot, or as one of the Prussian gentlemen expressed it, "by a mouthful of grapes!"

* Sir Henry Hardinge's despatch. † Idem.
Prince Waldemar left the field at the request of the Governor-general, who was unwilling that a foreign prince should be further subject to the risk of losing his life. The issue of the battle was not then decided, but fortunately the prince returned to Feerozpore, and had the satisfaction of knowing, that though the British had a fierce foe to contend with, victory had decided for them.

Colonel Wallace, who commanded a division, was also killed by a cannon shot at a time when the enemy's guns were playing with deadly effect on the morning of the 22nd.

Among the first who fell on the 21st December was Captain Thomas Box, of the 1st European light infantry, as brave a soldier as ever entered the field of battle, which indeed might emphatically be said to have been his true sphere of action; his gallant bearing was acknowledged by all, and his conduct at Kooner, in Affghanistan, will not soon be forgotten by those who witnessed it. He was, to use a common expression, "a soldier every inch of him," and he bravely died the death of a soldier, while cheering on his gallant men. He was universally beloved by men and officers, and his death left a blank in the regiment which cannot be easily filled up.

Captain D'Arcy Todd, whose escape from Herat will be in the recollection of many readers, had his head carried away by a cannon shot, while with his troop of horse artillery. Like many others, he had a presentiment that he would be killed in action.
All the European regiments had to deplore a heavy list of killed and wounded; and among the rest Her Majesty's 31st, which lost two officers, Lieutenants Pollard and Bernard; the former officer had been wounded at Moodkee and was not recovered, yet no persuasion could prevent his again joining his gallant regiment, and he was mortally wounded. Major Baldwin of the same regiment afterwards died of his wounds; he was a Peninsular officer and much beloved in his corps. Her Majesty's 3rd dragoons suffered severely in officers and men, having had three of the former killed and six wounded, and no fewer than fifty-two rank and file killed.
CHAPTER VIII.

PROGRESS OF AFFAIRS.

After his defeat at Feerozshuhur, Lal Singh fled to Lahore, and Tej Singh sent an urgent request for more troops; otherwise, as he said, the disaster which had befallen him would be fatal to the Sikh nation. He doubted his ability to again resist the British without the aid of Goolab Singh, who appeared, however, but little inclined to leave Jummoo, and perhaps rejoiced at the overthrow of the Sikhs in the fields of Moodkee and Feerozshuhur; for he conceived, as the power of the dominant party declined, his own would be in the ascendant. His object, and that of the Ranee, was to preserve friendly terms with the British, since they well knew that in the event of the complete conquest of the Punjab, their position as hostile parties would not be an enviable one.

The Khalsa troops believed the army of the Sutlej, on defeating them at Feerozshuhur, would follow up its advantage by crossing the river and

The Sikhs expect the British to follow up their advantage and cross the river.

Tej Singh doubts his ability to again encounter the British.
invading the Punjab; but this measure could not be accomplished without a powerful battering train, and more cavalry as well as more European troops, since the result at Feerozshuhur had amply proved the necessity of the one and the value of the other: moreover, the Sikhs were still in possession of numerous guns; and it was even doubtful if the whole of their regularly disciplined infantry had been present at Feerozshuhur. The Khalsas had made a fierce stand at that place, but they might still make greater efforts; and the Commander-in-chief therefore wisely resolved to wait for the guns and mortars then moving upwards, with the 9th and 16th lancers, and Her Majesty's 10th and 53rd regiments of foot, which, with the 3rd light cavalry, and the 43rd and 59th regiments of Native infantry composed the Meerut force under Sir John Grey.

The Scinde troops, under Sir Charles Napier, had also been ordered up, and their services were likely to be put in requisition for checking the governor of Moultan, who had already made several attacks on convoys of supplies as well as troops coming up the river.

At length, the Sikhs, after witnessing the apparent inaction of the British, and detecting no wish on their part to follow up their success, resolved to make another effort to maintain their position on the left bank of the Sutlej; and for this purpose, they began to construct a new bridge of boats below Hurreekee. This they were allowed to do unmolested by the British; but the latter, though
delaying the invasion of the Punjab, or at least the crossing of the Sutlej, nevertheless resolved to effect one or both purposes, when the means should arrive. The army of the Sutlej accordingly moved from Feerozshuhur to Sultan Khan-Walla, and afterwards to Mullawala, Attaree, Bootawala, and lastly to Akhberwala, only a few miles from the Sutlej. At Sultan Khan-Wala, as already stated, 5,000 maunds of gunpowder were destroyed.

The Sikhs, though driven across the Sutlej after the battle of Feerozshuhur, began to recross as soon as their bridge was finished, and advanced just as Little Sobraon was taken possession of by a British brigade of infantry: the brigade was subsequently withdrawn, and a picquet substituted. On two or three occasions the alarm was given that the Sikhs were advancing for the purpose of attacking the British camp, but such an occurrence never took place.

The Governor-general, in his manifesto, had confiscated all the possessions of Dhuleep Singh on the left or British side of the Sutlej. Among these was Wudnee, a fort belonging to the jagheer of the late Shere Singh. The gates of this place were shut against the Commander-in-chief’s force when advancing to the frontier, but the wish to relieve Feerozapore induced him to hurry forward without besieging Wudnee, which place afterwards surrendered to Sir John Grey and the Meerut force.

Another place of some importance to the Sikhs, and situated about half-way between Feerozapore...
and Loodianah, was Dhurrumkote, and against this Major-general Sir Harry Smith was sent, with the first division of the Army of the Sutlej. The place was speedily evacuated by the Sikhs, and some Afghani soldiers left for its protection were taken prisoners.

One of the Sirdars under British protection, and who early joined the Sikhs, was Ajeet Singh, of Ladwa, near Loodianah. He held a small jagheer from the Lahore Government, named Buddeewal. Here he had constructed a small fort, which had been seized by the Loodianah force, under Brigadier Wheeler, on its march to join the head quarters of the army at Busseean. Ajeet Singh, however, returned when the operations at Moodkee and Feerozshuhur had diverted the attention of the British from Loodianah, and obtained possession of the females belonging to his family. Nor this alone; but, assisted by the Sikhs, he burned a portion of the barracks, and the mess-house of Her Majesty’s 50th, at Loodianah, and eventually retook possession of Buddeewal.

After Sir Harry Smith had taken Dhurrumkhote, he proceeded towards Loodianah, but when passing Buddeewal, he was fired on by the Sikhs, who seized a great portion of his baggage, and made prisoners of Assistant-surgeon Barron and some European soldiers. Sir Harry Smith did not return the fire, but pushed on with all expedition to Loodianah, where he arrived with his troops much harassed by the march, and their situation
rendered uncomfortable by the loss they had sustained in their baggage.

Runjoor Singh, the younger brother of Lena Singh Majeetheea, commanded the portion of the Sikh army intended to act against Loodianah, as well as to seize the siege train in progress to join the head quarters of the army. Both these objects were to be kept in view by Sir Harry Smith: had he stopped to return the fire of the Sikhs at Buddeewal, all fears for Loodianah might have been removed; but then there was the risk, that, if discomfited, Runjoor Singh might have crossed the country and seized the siege train, which was only escorted by a Native infantry regiment, and the 11th light cavalry, with some artillery-men. The condition of Sir Harry Smith's troops at Buddeewal was such, that he could not, effectually, hope to drive Runjoor Singh across the Sutlej that day; and he probably considered half measures worse than useless. Besides, though making a great sacrifice of baggage and even of lives, there was the hope that his forbearance would be construed into fear by the Sikhs; who might, in consequence, be induced to meet him in a fair field, when he would have an opportunity of accomplishing the two objects he had in view: namely, the defence of Loodianah and the safety of the train; winding up, perhaps, with the total defeat of the Sikhs, when his troops should be a little refreshed.

Runjoor Singh was in possession of a large number of guns, and his army more than doubled
the force at Sir Harry Smith's disposal; but this disparity never concerned a general who had fought at Moodkee and Feerozshuhur, with such fearful odds as had there presented themselves on the part of the Sikhs. His only wish, and that of his brave army, was to have another opportunity of measuring swords with the Khalsa troops.

The small fort of Loodianah contained all the sick of Her Majesty's, and the Honourable Company's troops, which had left the place to join the army of the Sutlej, as well as all the ladies and children of the officers. For the defence of these, there were at Loodianah only a couple of Native regiments, the Nusseeree and Sirmoor battalions, afterwards augmented by the 30th Native infantry, the 1st light cavalry, and about 1,500 of the Puttealah horse. Such a mere handful could hardly be expected to meet Runjoor Singh's numerous army in the field, though they might keep possession of the fort until relieved; the arrival of Sir Harry Smith, with the first division of the army of the Sutlej, must therefore have been anxiously looked for, and joyfully hailed by the inmates of the fort, as well as the inhabitants of the city of Loodianah, many of whom were in the greatest state of alarm, and had actually sent their money across to Phillaer, to be in the safe keeping of the Sikhs, since they looked for no protection from the British. Many of the Hindoos, at least, adopted this novel plan, but the Mussulmans, both in India and in the Punjab, never doubted the
eventual success of the British arms against the Sikhs.

It was not, however, at Loodianah alone that a panic had seized the inhabitants; even at Subathoo, Simla, and Umballa, the greatest alarm prevailed. At the first mentioned place, the gallant young officer (Lieutenant Williamson,) who had been left in charge of the depot of the 1st European light infantry, had made the most judicious arrangements for its defence, and the few guns there, were placed in a position capable of sweeping the parade which commanded the road up the hill. He was assisted in his preparations by the advice of an old and experienced officer (General Tapp), whose long residence in the hills at once suggested the best measures to be adopted; and there is little doubt, that had the Sikhs reached Subathoo, they would have met with a warm reception from the handful of Europeans left there, and the gallant little Goorkhas, who had been sent as a guard to the place. At Simla the panic was, if possible, still greater, as the place possessed considerable inducements for the pillaging propensities of the Sikhs. One and all of the European residents were ready to leave the station, and cross the hills to Mussooree; the baggage mules even stood ready, and the hardy Ghoonts were in requisition for a safe and speedy flight.

Though the hill stations had reason to expect a visit from the Sikhs, their descent on Umballa was considered so much more certain, that an imme-
diate and simultaneous flight of the ladies took place. Some bent their steps towards Meerut, others looked to Saharunpore for refuge, while most of them deemed Mussooree their only place of safety. All, however, turned their backs on Umballa, and the Sikhs. But this sudden flight could not be accomplished in the usual way, by means of palanqueens; one or two, indeed, might thus find a ready conveyance, but where dozens of persons were concerned, it became necessary to put ponies, horses, buggies, and bylees, into requisition; and thus along the road they might be seen hurrying onwards, except when—as was often the case—the animals became jaded and would not move. It was amusing to see ladies whipping their ponies, but all to no purpose. We may now smile at the fears which prompted this fugacious movement; but, had Sir Harry Smith not advanced on Loodianah, there is every reason to believe, that the siege train might have been lost, Loodianah pillaged and burned, the hill stations destroyed, and Umballa and even other places in the provinces sacked and occupied; so that the movement of the first division was one of the utmost importance, and not only prevented such sad disasters, but was followed by one of the best-managed actions on record.

In order still further to ensure the safety of the siege train, the Commander-in-chief thought it necessary to send the third infantry brigade, commanded by Brigadier Taylor, towards Dhurrumkote; but it returned to camp on the 30th January.
On the morning of the 28th January the firing of heavy guns was heard in the camp of the army of the Sutlej, in the direction of Loodianah, and it was immediately surmised that an engagement had taken place between Sir Harry Smith and Runjoor Singh; the former proving victorious, as the firing did not last long. All was suspense, however, during that day and night. Major Laurence and an aide-de-camp rode off to Dhurrumkote, where the former received a hurried note, written, we believe, in pencil, to the Commander-in-chief, announcing that Sir Harry Smith had completely defeated the enemy, and his artillery was, at that moment, “teaching the Sikhs how to swim the Sutlej.” On the night of the 28th it was deemed advisable to keep the army in readiness, for it was thought probable, that if Sir Harry Smith should meet with any decided reverse, the Sikhs might attack the British camp at Akhberwala. Everyone was therefore prepared to turn out at a moment’s notice; but all remained quiet, and at daybreak of the 29th, a royal salute announced to friend and foe that a victory had been gained somewhere by the British, though it was supposed the Sikh leaders at Sobraon were either unaware of the fact, or wished to keep their entrenched troops in ignorance, since they actually imitated our bands in playing the national anthem of “God save the Queen!”

It is some time before the particulars of a battle can be ascertained; and the accounts given by two
individuals are sure to vary, unless they both happen to be in the same position during the engagement. Hence the conflicting, and often contradictory accounts obtained. The battle of Alleewal was no exception to the rule. Some stated that the Sikh infantry, after receiving the cavalry charge, threw down their arms and betook themselves, in confusion, towards the river. Others said that the Khalsa troops did throw down their muskets, but on doing so, drew their swords and cut manfully at the British cavalry, wounded and killing many of the latter, and after the repeated charges made by the cavalry, the Sikhs merely walked off or retreated sulkily towards the river.

Runjoor Singh had entrenched himself at Alleewal, and entreated his soldiers not to leave their position; but the circumstance of Sir Harry Smith having allowed himself to be fired upon at Buddeewal without returning a shot, impressed the Sikhs with the idea that he was afraid of them, and they insisted on leaving their camp and going out to meet him in the open field. "The enemy had, up to the evening of the 26th (January) fifty-six guns, and 20,000 men. On that evening he received a reinforcement of twelve guns and 4,000 men, regular or Aeen troops. Our force consisted of thirty-two guns, and not half the number of those men. Yet, so ably were the orders of attack conducted, with the regularities of a field day, each column and line arriving at its point of attack to a moment, that the enemy
was driven by repeated charges of cavalry and infantry headlong back over the river."* This gives a general idea of the success on the part of the British.

Sir Harry Smith marched from Buddeewal, early on the morning of the 28th January, towards the enemy, who appeared in sight after the British had traversed about eight miles of the country. The right of the Sikh force rested on Rhoomaree, and their left on Walleepore, and they advanced some distance from their entrenched camp and cannonaded the British for half an hour, until the latter stormed the village of Alleewal, the key of their position. The whole of the British line then advanced, charged, and took the Sikh guns, on which the Sikhs fled towards the river. It was at first computed that at least half their force was destroyed, but later accounts stated that the number of killed was comparatively small. On making enquiries of officers engaged at Alleewal, they all declared that the affair at Buddeewal was the only harassing one. Her Majesty’s 16th lancers charged in gallant style, but the Sikhs lied down on the ground, and the lances could not reach them, while they either fired their muskets or cut with their swords. This regiment had upwards of one hundred men killed and wounded, but the total loss of the British force did not exceed 400. When the cavalry first charged the mass of Sikh infantry, it was too dense and compact to be broken; the work

* Sir Harry Smith’s despatch.
had to be accomplished by the guns of the horse artillery. All the Sikh guns were captured or destroyed: one was carried across the river, where it was spiked by Lieutenant Holmes of the irregular cavalry and Gunner Scott of the horse artillery, who forded the river in pursuit of the enemy. The victory was so complete and the confusion among the Sikhs so great, that had Sir Harry Smith been in a condition to follow them, he might have driven the Sikhs before him to Lahore.

Previous to the battle of Alleewal, a European came into Loodianah from the camp of Runjoor Singh. He said his name was Brown, but this was merely an assumed one, his real name being Potter. He had been originally in the Bengal horse artillery, from which he deserted after the capture of Bhurtapore in 1826 or 1827. Ever since that period, he had been in the Sikh service as an artillery man. He had nearly lost all appearance of an Englishman, and retained but little of his national feelings, as he himself candidly confessed. The object of his visit was somewhat doubtful, though he professed himself willing to surrender and return to his allegiance as a British subject. It was suggested to him that he had better return to the Sikh camp, where he might be of service to the British interests. He was taken prisoner on the 28th, and asserted that he had purposely laid the Sikh guns high, so as not to injure the British; that their guns were thus elevated seems probable, but whether or no this was owing to Potter’s management, was
very doubtful. He was brought a prisoner to Akhberwala, and along with him four of the captured guns. These were exquisitely finished and ornamented. They had been manufactured by Lena Singh Majeetheea, who paid great attention to the mechanical arts.

When the army of the Sutlej crossed that river at a later period, and the prisoners captured at Bud-deewal were restored by Goolab Singh, they stated that but for Potter their condition would have been worse, and that he had interceded for them. The Governor-general, therefore, gave Potter his liberty. Potter was not the only European soldier in the Sikh force. A man named Lairdie, under the assumed name of Sultan Mohummud, and who had deserted from Captain Delafosse's troop of horse artillery in 1842 or 1843, was among the Sikhs, and a man named Boyle, a deserter from the first European light infantry. Likewise. The artillery-men must have been of infinite service to the Sikhs in training them as gunners, and the conduct of the latter showed that their instructors had not bestowed their labour in vain. The Sikh gunners were as much attached to their guns as are the Native artillery-men of Hindostan: at Alleewal, for example, one of these brave fellows was found clasping his gun, and could not be separated from it until cut down or bayoneted.

The battle of Alleewal was a fortunate and brilliant event: Loodianah was released, the Sikhs dispersed and driven across the Sutlej, after losing all their
guns, and the safe transit of the siege train effectually secured. Confidence was likewise restored to the inhabitants on the frontier, as well in the plains as on the hills, where the dread of the Sikhs had caused such consternation. The hill tribes declared early in favour of the British, and the Honourable J. C. Erskine, the British resident at Simla, had already organized them, and taken up a position in some fort at Saeehuttee, commanding the ascent from the Ghumbur. Across the Sutlej the states of Nundee, Sookhet, and Koolloo were not slow in expelling the Sikhs, to whom they owned an unwilling allegiance, and were ready to break it on the first opportunity. The Lahore Government was not in a condition to punish them; and they, no doubt, looked for British supremacy, and a release from the hateful and oppressive yoke of the Sikhs.

The news, at length, reached Lahore of Runjoor’s defeat, but it was hardly anticipated from the first that he would have any chance of success against the British; and to his demands for money and more guns, he received for answer, that he must find those he had lost, and that more would not be entrusted to him. The resistance on the part of Runjoor’s force would no doubt have been more effectual had it not left the camp, and given battle to the British. The Sirdar had in his recollection the fate of Moodkee; and though, as there, the Sikhs were beaten at Alleewal, yet the desperate struggle at Feerozshuhur warrants the conclu-
sion that the loss on the part of the British, had the Sikhs entrenched themselves at the former place, would have been great in a corresponding degree. The British troops were, however, fresh at Alleewal, and they fought during the morning under a clear, serene sky; whereas at Feerozshuhur they were obscured by clouds of dust. The Native portion of the force behaved gallantly, both cavalry and infantry, thus confirming our position that they are thoroughly effective when neither fatigued by long marches, nor deprived of food and water.

The only occasion on which the Sikhs had been molested, since the battle of Feerozshuhur, by the British was on the 14th January. On that day, some cannonading took place on both sides, but without producing any decided effect on either. The bridge across the Sutlej was completed by the Sikhs, and covered by guns on the right bank, so as to prevent its destruction by the British. Why the Sikhs were suffered to prosecute so important a work unmolested, is a problem to the present moment.

The picquet formerly mentioned as occupying Little Sobraon had been withdrawn for some time, during the night, and only planted at day-break on the following morning. The Sikhs discovered this, and therefore took possession of the post one night with their usual war cry,—"Wah! wah! Gooroo jee ke futeh." The circumstance was not known to the sergeant of pioneers, who was superintending a party of men in constructing a small entrench-
ment or breast-work for the picquet; and he, as usual, proceeded to the place early one morning, and did not discover his mistake until he found himself in the midst of the new occupants, one of whom seized the bridle of his horse! He fortunately disengaged himself, and lost no time in riding back at full speed to camp, while the Sikhs vainly discharged several matchlocks after him.

On getting possession of this position, where there was a small round tower at no great distance from the village, the Sikhs burned the latter, and levelled the tower with the ground. Their advanced post now occupied the vacant space, and they could be seen in great numbers crowding about it, and moving occasionally to a picquet of cavalry in front of the British camp. On their right, the British had an entrenched place named Rhodawala, defended by an infantry brigade, with some mounted guns. It was only a short distance from camp, and a favourite ride for the officers. On one occasion a party of Sikh horsemen was surprised in the neighbourhood, and a gallant charge made on them by Lieutenant Becher, of the irregular cavalry, who killed some and wounded others. In front of the British camp there was the dry bed of a Nullah, which might have been defended against cavalry; and if the Sikhs had availed themselves of it, they would have had some chance of making a successful night attack on the right of the British camp. Such an event was probably expected, as the troops were ordered to
hold themselves in readiness several times during
the night, while turning out in the day-time was
a common occurrence. The noise of a mounted
officer's horse galloping through camp was looked
upon as a sure sign that the Sikhs were advancing,
and that an order to arms would speedily follow!
But the Sikhs were otherwise employed, construct-
ing a work of defence, which would in their opinion
defy the attack of any troops, however daring; the
engineer who planned it having assured them that
they might rest perfectly secure in their strong-
hold. No attempt had been made since the 14th
January to molest or disturb them, and latterly the
Sikh horsemen did not show themselves in such
numbers about Little Sobraon. There was, in
short, a perfect lull in the campaign—a calm that
foreboded a coming storm; and the Sikhs were
busily employed in preparing the ingredients for the
tempest. Though at Moodkee, Feerozshuhur, and
Alleewal, they had lost upwards of 150 guns, they
were still reported to have a great many more, but
few of any large size; and most of their gunners
were said to have fallen in those actions. The
latter fact seemed certain from their anxiety to get
more men. A Native soldier belonging to the
43rd light infantry, who had incautiously advanced
too far to the front of the camp, was taken prisoner,
and at once appointed to the artillery branch, of
the duties of which, however, he was profoundly
ignorant. He was placed on a horse, and the
Sikhs were mightily amused at his awkwardness as
a horse artillery-man. He managed, however, to escape and return to his regiment, where he related his adventure with great glee. Those of the Sikh horsemen who appeared in front of Little Sobraon were perfectly civil, and one of them being hailed by a British officer readily came forward, and even accompanied him to camp, where he was interrogated by the Commander-in-chief. He said that the Khalsas had no doubt been beaten several times, but they were determined to fight again; and it must not be supposed that they would prove unfaithful to their employers, and desert their cause. He got his leave, and promised to come back; but the honour of a second visit was politely declined. A sipahee of the 41st Native infantry was caught in the act of deserting to the enemy, and was sentenced to be hanged. Already had he reached the fatal gallows, where the rope was dangling to receive his neck, and every spectator looking for his exit into another world, when a reprieve arrived! His delight may be guessed, and the clemency shown him was appreciated by the Native soldiers, who remarked to one another—“Oh! he is a soldier; it would not do to hang him!” Desertion was so uncommon that an example was not required; for, with the exception of this man, and another from the 45th Native infantry, all the Native soldiers were faithful to the British cause. Their confidence in our continued prosperity is unbounded. Even when the catastrophe happened at Cabul, the Natives still relied
on the fortune of the British, or the "Ikbal Un-
grez," as they express it. Without troubling him-
self to enquire from what circumstances this
good fortune arises, the Native soldier has implicit
faith in its permanency; and certainly, during the
present campaign with the Sikhs, fortunate occur-
rences did take place, under circumstances which
boded difficulties, if not disasters.

Look at the whole course of the campaign.

The Sikhs, instead of awaiting the invasion of
the British on the right bank of the river, the
passage of which might have been stoutly opposed
by them, and great loss necessarily sustained by
the invaders, cross over into the British territories,
taking the government by surprise, and causing a
hurried movement of troops to oppose their further
progress without any guns capable of silencing
theirs. This, at first sight, had a serious aspect;
but look at the sequel! The loss of Sir Harry
Smith's baggage and of troops at Buddeewal were
thought untoward events, and the gallant general
was censured accordingly; yet, we see that from
that very loss the most brilliant results ensued.
The Sikhs came out on a fair field, were beaten
and sent "headlong over the Sutlej." Loodianah
was relieved, and tranquillity restored on the fron-
tier. The siege train made a sure and safe pro-
gress, though weakly defended by a Native regi-
ment of cavalry, and one of infantry, with a few
hundred artillery-men, armed only with their
swords.
Such are the fortunate results, which, in war, sometimes arise from what at first appear untoward events, and which are hardly within the sphere of calculation. Nor were those the only happy accidents.

The position of the Sikhs at Sobraon, entrenched strongly, and covered by their guns across the river, with a bridge at command, whereby they could transport their implements of war to the left bank of the river, was looked upon as formidable in the extreme. Those who had read of the desperate resistance offered to troops crossing large rivers in the face of the enemy, naturally dreaded the passage of the Sutlej, if they did not consider it an impossibility. They had no fears that victory would ever decide for the Sikhs on either bank, provided the British were once in the Punjab; but how to get there was the point. Now, had the most skilful means for securing this dreaded passage, in the face of a determined foe like the Sikhs, been devised, they could not have effected the purpose so completely as the very act of the enemy itself did: and the tactics of a general must be admitted to be of no ordinary kind, when he can turn events, considered by common minds unfortunate, so entirely to the advantage of his own arms.

One more link in the chain of seemingly unfortunate occurrences, must not be passed over. Had the large guns been at command when the Sikhs were constructing their bridge, there is every probability that it would have been destroyed, and the
Sikhs thus rendered incapable of entrenching themselves on the left bank of the river; we should then have been obliged to construct our own bridge under a terrific fire.

After the defeat of the Sikhs at Feerozshuhur, they urgently appealed to Goolab Singh for assistance, and requested his presence; but the Rajah, as already hinted, had a deep game to play, and though he obeyed the summons of the Ranee, or, in reality, the order of the Khalsa troops, and reached Lahore, he was determined not to mix himself up with either in the ill-judged opposition offered to the British.

The emissaries from Lahore reached the British camp early in February, but the siege train had now arrived, and Sir Harry Smith's division rejoined the main army, so that no reply was given to the Lahore Government though one was promised.

The Sikhs had met the British twice in the fields of Moodkee and Alleewal, and once in their entrenched camp at Feerozshuhur; they had been beaten on every occasion, yet, observing the effect of their artillery, they conceived that if they could only again entrench themselves more strongly, and be thereby enabled to direct their musketry from behind their walls against the European soldiers, they might still effectually oppose their enemy. Against the British in the field they felt they had no chance, seeing that their guns were invariably captured at the point of the bayonet.

Accordingly, when their bridge had been com-
The entrenchment of Sobraon ably constructed, and very strong.

Governor-general arrives in camp.

The battle decided on: this known at a distance, and the manner in which it became so.

Plan for crossing the Sutlej.

Completed, they set to work in constructing the entrenchment of Sobraon, under the direction, it is said, of a Spanish engineer named Hobron. From the 14th of January till the beginning of February 1845, they had been industriously employed in building their defences, covered by their guns on the opposite side of the river. The works, as might have been supposed, were of great strength; indeed, they far outran expectation. The Governor-general reached camp on the 9th February; when the plan of attack on this formidable entrenchment was settled; and it was speedily known, that a battle would take place the following morning. However strange it may appear, people at a long distance from Akhberwala knew, or asserted, that the 10th February was the day appointed. It is impossible to prevent such intelligence from reaching the Natives, many of whose relatives are writers in every public office, with open eyes and ready ears for every coming event, which they at once communicate to their friends all over India.

Sir John Grey, with a considerable force, had occupied Attaree, near the Nuggur Ghat, while a bridge of boats had been thrown across the river some miles below, at the Koonda Ghat. It was not at first deemed advisable to contemplate crossing the Sutlej by the Sikh bridge, even if it remained entire after the battle; the passage of the river, it was thought, could be readily accomplished while the attack was making on Sobraon, and thus the great difficulty be overcome of the British
entering the Punjab. The Sikhs overlooked this circumstance, and apparently conceived, that as the British did not follow them across the Sutlej after Feerozshuhur, there was a chance of their not doing so, even if they themselves were forced to retreat over the Sutlej, in which case they could destroy their bridge, and be ready to oppose the passage at Nuggur. These may have been their calculations, but they were doomed to be woefully disappointed. That they did contemplate delay on our part was evident from the government of Lahore suggesting, when the news of the disaster at Sobraon reached the capital, that an emissary should be sent to offer terms, so as to prevent the invasion of the Punjab. But it was then too late.

Whatever their ulterior plans might have been, the Khalsa troops were determined to defend their entrenchment to the last, and felt assured that it could not be taken by the best troops in Europe, much less by an Anglo-Indian army. They had completed it, and quietly awaited the attack, full of confidence in their ability to repel it, although Runjoor Singh's defeat, at Alleewal, had deprived them of numerous guns. Within the entrenchment at Sobraon, the Sikhs collected a large force, and what was of more consequence, the soldiers were chiefly those who had been trained by the French officers, and on whom they could consequently rely, as adepts in the use of the sword and musket.

Since the large guns and mortars had arrived,
the British Commander-in-chief resolved to employ artillery to the fullest extent, in order to render the attack infinitely more effectual and much less sanguinary than had been the previous actions of Moodkee and Feerozshuhur. The large siege guns, as well as the mortars and rockets, had been brought out from Feerozpore; the rest of the artillery consisted of horse and foot, the men of the latter branch serving the guns attached to light field batteries of both classes.

On the morning of the 9th of February, there was a report that scaling ladders were being made up, but whether these were for the walls of the Sikh entrenchment, the high bank on the opposite side, or the walls of Lahore, was a problem difficult of solution by people not in the secret. Suggestions for spiking guns, or rendering them useless, had been promulgated some days previously, so that everything boded some desperate exploit; and every one rejoiced at the prospect, for there are no men in the world that get sooner tired of inactivity than the soldiery, and the army of the Sutlej was beginning to desire some more stirring scene than the turning out to arms, upon false alarms of hostile approaches.

Some readers may be surprised, that the Sikhs never did make a night attack; but it should be remembered, that such a step must have been disastrous to them, for if repulsed, which there was every prospect of their being, they would have been assuredly followed to their entrenchment by
the British, who would thus enter the works with themselves, before they had time to organize any resistance. They wisely abstained, therefore, from any nocturnal sortie, and concentrated all their resources within the entrenchment. No Sikhs were ever to be seen on the face of the country lying between Feerozpore and Akhberwala. Immense supplies of grain and other articles of food, were therefore brought daily from the one place to the other, without any other guard than a few irregular horse, who could have offered no resistance to a large body of Sikh cavalry.

As already stated, the British troops longed for an engagement, but they most assuredly did not anticipate the kind of encounter which awaited them at Sobraon. Few could conceive a more desperate opposition than that experienced at Feerozshuhur; but circumstances which could not be foreseen, rendered the battle of Sobraon one of those, in which the assailants suffer for some time very severely, without having it in their power to make any effectual return. Walls, only to be surmounted by scaling ladders, afforded a secure protection for triple lines of musketry pouring their murderous fire on their assailants, while the latter could not risk a shot with the slightest chance of its doing any execution.
CHAPTER IX.

THE BATTLE OF SOBRAON.

Sir Hugh Gough being now the assailant, with an enemy before him calmly awaiting his attack, was enabled to choose his own time. He therefore judiciously ordered the whole army to march on Sobraon, at half-past three o'clock, on the morning of Tuesday, 16th February, 1846, when his men were fresh and there was a certainty of many hours of daylight operation. The Commander-in-chief had made himself fully acquainted with the position of the Sikhs at Sobraon, for he says "the enemy's works had been repeatedly reconnoitred during the time of my head quarters at Nihalkee, (Akhberwala) by myself, my departmental staff, and my engineers and artillery officers. Our observations, coupled with the report of spies, convinced us that there had devolved on us the arduous task of attacking, in a position covered with formidable entrenchments, no fewer than 30,000 men, the best of the Khalsa troops, with seventy
pieces of cannon, united by a good bridge to a reserve on the opposite bank, on which the enemy had a considerable camp, and some artillery commanding and flanking the field works on our side.”

Sir Harry Smith’s force, after its brilliant feat at Alleewal, had joined head quarters, and the army of the Sutlej was now in numbers and efficiency much more complete than when it engaged the Sikhs at Feerozshuhur. In cavalry it had been greatly strengthened, since Her Majesty’s 9th and 16th lancers, as well as the 3rd light cavalry, and Leeson’s irregular cavalry had joined; the 43rd and 59th regiments of Native infantry were also added to the list, as well as several companies of foot artillery.

It had been intended to drive in the enemy’s picquets in front of Rhodawala, and Little Sobraon, during the night of the 9th February, but this could not be accomplished until near daybreak of the 10th. Little Sobraon was, however, deserted in the night, and found unoccupied in the morning by the Goorkhas, who were sent to clear it of the enemy. Both this post, and that in front of Rhodawala, had, it seems, been only occupied by the Sikhs during the day and abandoned at night, in imitation of the British during their tenure of the former post.

The troops were moved out of camp at the ap-

* The Commander-in-chief’s despatch.
pointed hour, and marched in silence to their destination. "The battering and disposable field-artillery was then put in position in an extended semicircle, embracing within its fire the work of the Sikhs. It had been intended, that the cannonade should have commenced at day-break, but so heavy a mist hung over the plain and river, that it became necessary to wait until the rays of the sun had penetrated it, and cleared the atmosphere."* On the evening of the 9th, some Sikh guns were heard in the direction of the river, and it was supposed that they were signal ones, announcing the approaching event. But it appeared that this was not the case; for on Captain Grant's battery of horse artillery guns beginning at day-break to play on the entrenchment from Little Sobrawn, the Sikh drums were heard distinctly beating to arms. When the sun rose and dispelled the fog, a magnificent sight presented itself on all sides. In front were the gun and mortar batteries forming a semicircle, while Rhodawala was seen in the rear, filled with armed men. Masses of European infantry covered the plain, and everything portended deadly strife. The disposition of the British force, is thus described by the Commander-in-chief. "On the margin of the Sutlej on our left, two brigades of Major-general Sir Robert Dick's division, under his personal command, stood ready to commence the assault against the enemy's

* The Commander-in-chief's despatch.
extreme right. The 7th brigade, in which was the 10th foot, reinforced by the 53rd foot,* and led by Brigadier Stacey, was to head the attack, supported at 200 yards distance by the sixth brigade, under Brigadier the Hon. T. Ashburnham, which was to move forward from the entrenched village of Rhodawala, leaving, if necessary, a regiment for its defence. In the centre, Major-general Gilbert's division was deployed for support or attack, its right resting on the village of Little Sobraon.

"Major-general Sir Harry Smith's division was formed near the village of Guttah, with its right thrown up towards the Sutlej; Brigadier Cureton's cavalry threatened by feigned attacks the ford of Hurreekee, and the enemy's horse, under Rajah Lal Singh Misr, on the opposite bank. Brigadier Campbell taking an intermediate position in the rear, between Major-general Gilbert's right, and Major-general Sir Harry Smith's left protected both. Major-general Sir Joseph Thackwell, under whom was Brigadier Scott, held in reserve on our left, ready to aid, as circumstances might demand, the rest of the cavalry."†

It has been mentioned, that the British guns from Little Sobraon had given the Sikhs warning of our approach. "But it was half past six before the whole of our artillery fire was developed."‡ Nothing could be conceived grander than the effect

* Brigadier Orchard commanded this portion of the brigade, being the only regiment belonging to his brigade on the field.
† The Commander-in-chief's despatch.
‡ Idem.
of the batteries when they opened, as the cannonade passed along from the Sutlej to Little Sobraon, in one continued roar of guns and mortars; while, ever and anon, the rocket, like a spirit of fire, winged its rapid flight high above the batteries in its progress towards the Sikh entrenchment. Well might the Commander-in-chief call the opening of the cannonade "most spirited and well directed."

The Sikh guns responded with shot and shells, but neither appeared to do much execution; the latter were seen bursting in mid-air long ere they reached the British batteries; while some of the shot passed over Rhodawala and struck the ground in front of General Gilbert's division. It now became a grand artillery concert, and the infantry divisions and brigades looked on with a certain degree of interest, somewhat allied however to vexation, lest the artillery should have the whole work to themselves! The Commander-in-chief, however, was determined to give full play to an arm which he did not possess to an efficient extent in other hard-fought battles. It was reported, that the guns were to play for four hours at least; but there is some reason to believe, that the rapid firing had nearly exhausted the ammunition before half that time had elapsed; and it was once more to be proved, that the British infantry were not to remain mute spectators of a battle. "Notwithstanding," wrote the Commander-in-chief, "the formidable calibre of our guns, mortars, and howitzers, and the admirable way in which they were served and
aided by a rocket battery, it would have been visionary to expect that they could have silenced the fire of seventy pieces, behind well constructed batteries of earth, planks, and fascines, or dislodge troops covered either by redoubt or epaulets, or within a treble line of trenches.”

Tej Singh, by all accounts, maintained his confidence in the strength of his position when thus attacked; and his French officer, Monsieur Mouton, is said to have assured him that it was utterly impossible for the British to make good their entrance. Compared with Feerozshuhur, the works at Sobraon were fortifications, in the construction of which no labour had been spared; the utmost ingenuity of the Sikhs and their European advisers was exerted to render this, their last stronghold, impregnable; and so the Frenchman believed it to be.

“The effect of the British cannonade was, as has since been proved by an inspection of the camp, most severely felt by the enemy; but it soon became evident that the issue of this struggle must be brought to the arbitrament of musketry and the bayonet.”

Thus, notwithstanding the large field of artillery now possessed by the British; the same arm which had gained the fields of Moodkee and Feerozshuhur was to be again employed. It has been imagined that the artillery practice might have been longer continued, but there is reason to believe that the

* The Commander-in-chief’s despatch.
want of ammunition presented an insurmountable obstacle: the elephants could not be made to bring up a fresh supply. Though the Sikh batteries continued to play, yet the firing on their part became fainter and fainter; and, instead of their guns being directed to the quarters in which the British artillery was placed, the cannon-shot appeared to be distributed amongst the infantry columns, which the Sikhs could easily distinguish in their front.

"At nine o'clock, Brigadier Stacey's brigade, supported on either flank by Captains Horsford's and Fordyce's batteries, and Lieutenant-colonel Lane's troop of horse artillery, moved to the attack in admirable order. The infantry and guns aided each other correlative. The former marched steadily on in line, which they halted only to correct when necessary; the latter took up successive positions at the gallop, until, at length, they were within 300 yards of the heavy batteries of the Sikhs. But notwithstanding the regularity and coolness, and scientific character of this assault, which Brigadier Wilkinson well supported, so hot was the fire of cannon, musketry, and zambooruchs,* kept up by the Khalsa troops, that it seemed for some moments impossible that the entrenchment could be won under it."

The temporary hesitation springing from this apparent impossibility, was, it is said, construed into a check; at least, by the Governor-general,

* Guns mounted on carriages and carrying a pound shot.
† The Commander-in-chief's despatch.
who ordered Gilbert's division to advance, with a view, no doubt, of diverting the Sikhs from the right of their entrenchment, towards the centre and left. The matter is, however, differently stated by the Commander-in-chief, the highest authority in these matters. He continues, "But soon persevering gallantry triumphed, and the whole army had the satisfaction to see the gallant Brigadier Stacey's soldiers driving the Sikhs in confusion before them within the area of their encampment. The 10th foot, under Lieutenant-colonel Franks, now, for the first time, brought into serious contact with the enemy, greatly distinguished themselves. This regiment never fired a shot until it had got within the works of the enemy. The onset of Her Majesty's 53rd foot was as gallant and effective. The 43rd and 59th Native infantry, brigaded with them, emulated both in cool determination."* It may be here observed, that the four regiments so prominently mentioned in this place, had not, on any previous occasion, come in contact with the Khalsa troops, and it was a wise measure to select them for such duty at Sobraon; since the daring of the Sikhs at Moodkee and Feerozshuhur had left a vivid impression on the minds of the troops engaged there, both European and Native. The Commander-in-chief praised the four regiments alike, but an anonymous writer in the Delhi Gazette assumed for Her Majesty's 53rd the credit.

* The Commander-in-chief's despatch.
of having been the first to enter the entrenchment, and thereby to chiefly contribute to the success of the attack. As regards the 59th Native infantry, we had it from a gallant officer who witnessed their attack, that no troops could have behaved better, led as they were by their brave commander, Lieutenant-colonel John Thompson. The 43rd Native infantry, trained under the eye of the brigadier who commanded the attack, had always distinguished itself; and, without wishing to draw any invidious distinction, a better selection could not have been made for this attack, both as respects men and officers.

We must now turn to a very important-point in the despatch: namely, the advance of Gilbert's division, as well as that of Sir Harry Smith. The Commander-in-chief says expressly that, "At the moment of this first success, I directed Brigadier the Honourable J. Ashburnham's brigade to move on in support; and Major-general Gilbert's and Sir Harry Smith's divisions to throw out their light troops to threaten the works, aided by artillery."* It is evident, that previous to the advance of the 1st and 2nd divisions, and the 6th brigade, an advantage or first success had been gained; and Stacy's brigade had driven the Sikhs into their entrenchment, following at their very heels. There is no word about a check, but there appeared to be some doubt, for some moments, "that

* The Commander-in-chief's despatch.
the entrenchment could be won." It was deemed, therefore, advisable to order on more troops; and the accounts appear to agree in stating, that orders were sent to General Gilbert by both the Governor-general and Commander-in-chief. We happened to be with a portion of Gilbert’s division when the order arrived from the Governor-general, and the troops immediately advanced. Onward they went; but if intended to support Stacey on the right of the enemy’s position, they missed the object, for they unfortunately came in front of the centre and strongest portion of the encampment, unsupported by either artillery or cavalry. Her Majesty’s 29th and the 1st European light infantry, with undaunted bravery rushed forward, crossed a dry nullah, and found themselves exposed to one of the hottest fires of musketry that can possibly be imagined; and what rendered it still more galling was, that the Sikhs were themselves concealed behind high walls, over which the European soldiers could not climb. To remain under such a fire without the power of returning it with any effect would have been madness: the men would have been annihilated. Thrice did Her Majesty’s 29th regiment charge the works, and thrice were they obliged to retire, each time followed by the Sikhs, who spared none, and cut to pieces the wounded. Similar was the fate of the 1st European light infantry, who, in retiring, had their ranks thinned by musketry, and their wounded men and officers cut up by the savage Sikhs. To the latter, the nullah presented
an admirable defence, for the slope was towards them, while the Europeans on the high bank were completely exposed. At length, the second division, which at Feerozshuhur had driven the Sikhs before them, capturing their guns at the point of the bayonet and entering their encampment, were led to the right of the entrenchment at Sobraon.

We cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of continuing the vivid and animated despatch of the Commander-in-chief. "As these attacks of the centre and right commenced, the fire of our heavy guns had first to be directed to the right, and then gradually to cease; but, at one time, the thunder of full 120 pieces of ordnance reverberated in the mighty combat through the valley of the Sutlej; and, as it was soon seen that the weight of the whole force within the Sikk camp was likely to be thrown on the two brigades that had passed its trenches, it became necessary to convert into close and serious attacks the demonstration, with skirmishers and artillery of the centre and right, and the battle raged with inconceivable fury from right to left. The Sikhs, even when at particular points their entrenchments were mastered with the bayonet, strove to regain them by the fiercest conflict sword in hand. Nor was it until the cavalry of the left, under Major-general Sir Joseph Thackwell, had moved forward, and ridden through the openings in the entrenchments, made by our sappers, in single file, and reformed as they passed them; and the 3rd dragoons, whom no obstacle usually held
formidable by horse, appears to check, had on this day, as at Feeruzshuhur, gallopped over and cut down the obstinate defenders of batteries and field works; and the weight of three divisions of infantry, with every field artillery gun which could be sent to their aid, had been cast into the scale, that victory finally declared for the British. The fire of the Sikhs first slackened, and then nearly ceased; and the victors pressing them on every side, precipitated them in masses over their bridge, and into the Sutlej, which a sudden rise of seven inches had rendered hardly fordable. In their efforts to reach the right bank through the deepened water, they suffered a terrible carnage from our horse artillery.

"Hundreds fell under this cannonade; hundreds upon hundreds were drowned in attempting the perilous passage." This awful slaughter, confusion, and dismay, were such as would have excited compassion in the hearts of their generous conquerors, if the Khalsa troops had not, in the earlier part of the action, sullied their gallantry, by slaughtering and barbarously mangling every wounded soldier, whom, in the vicissitudes of attack, the fortune of war left at their mercy. I must pause in this narrative, especially to notice the determined hardihood and bravery with which our two battalions of Goorkhas, the Sirmoor and Nusseeree, met the Sikhs whenever they were opposed to them. Soldiers of small stature, but indomitable spirit, they vied in ardent courage in the charge with grena-
diers of our own nation, and armed with the short weapon of their mountains, were a terror to the Sikhs throughout this great combat."*†

Seventy guns were supposed to be in the Sikh entrenchment at Sobraon, and of these, sixty-seven were captured, with upwards of 200 camel swivels, (zambouruks), as well as numerous standards. Before noon this great battle was over, having lasted, without intermission, from day-break. It might be well termed a glorious fight, and complete in its results. The battles of Moodkee, Feerozshuhur, and Alleewal, though great ones, were less decisive; they had, indeed, weakened the power of the Sikhs, but that of Sobraon had completely broken it. Such a victory, however, could not be achieved without an immense sacrifice, and probably there is no action on record, where so many officers were killed and wounded, as that which occurred on the 10th February. Witness the loss of killed and wounded in Her Majesty’s 29th, and the Honourable Company’s 1st European light infantry: the list of the former exhibits, 13 officers, 8 serjeants, and 167 rank and file; and that of the latter, 12 officers, 12 ser-

* The Commander-in-chief’s despatch.
† These indomitable little men are armed with a formidable and deadly weapon named a "koorkee", sharp and narrow at the point, suddenly increasing in breadth, and thus presenting a great surface of cutting edge, which is rendered still more effectual by its bent shape and short edge. The Goorkhas generally drive the koorkee into the abdomen, or belly, of their opponents, and thus rip them up with great dexterity and expedition.—Author.
jeants, and 173 rank and file. Her Majesty's 31st, a regiment which had fought nobly at Moodkee, Feerozshuhur and Alleewal, had 7 officers and 147 rank and file, killed and wounded at Sobraon. Her Majesty's two regiments who led the attack on the right of the enemy's entrenchment, sustained a less severe loss than the European regiments of the 1st and 2nd divisions. The list of killed and wounded in Her Majesty's 10th foot, comprehends, 3 officers, 3 serjeants, and 127 rank and file; and Her Majesty's 53rd foot, 9 officers, 1 serjeant, and 111 rank and file; while Her Majesty's 50th, or Queen's own, had 12 officers, and 227 rank and file killed and wounded. Her Majesty's 9th, and 80th, suffered little, as compared with their loss at Feerozshuhur; and the same is true of Her Majesty's 62nd. The loss in staff and mounted officers at Sobrabn, was also trifling, as compared with that at Feerozshuhur and Moodkee. The gallant Sir Robert Dick fell in the attack on the entrenched camp; he had been present in many a hard fight, and the brave veteran was heard to say, "the bullet is not moulded that will kill Bob Dick." In the Peninsular war, Sir Thomas Picton had frequently escaped in a most miraculous manner, but at length fell by a cannon shot, on the glorious field of Waterloo; and Sir Robert Dick, who in the same campaign "bore a charmed life," was doomed to the death of a soldier, on the banks of the Sutlej. He died, as he had lived, a brave and gallant...
warrior, who at Waterloo led the 42nd Highlanders in the thickest of the fight. Another gallant and meritorious officer, was also mortally wounded: we allude to Brigadier McLaren,* who was borne off the field when leading the 4th brigade of the centre division, against the strongest part of the Sikh entrenchment at Sobraon. He was beloved by the Native soldiers, and also greatly esteemed by the Europeans of the brigade. When confined to his bed, after the receipt of his wound, he said he must cross the Sutlej, with the gallant European light infantry, even if carried in a dooly! His mild, gentlemanly manners endeared him to every one who had the pleasure of serving under him; and his loss could not have been felt more severely, even by the "husseenees" (16th grenadiers), which he commanded, than by the 1st European light infantry, which he led at Feerozshuhur, and with which he entered the fatal field of Sobraon. The 29th foot had to deplore the loss of their commanding officer, Brigadier Charles Cyril Taylor. In him were united, in an eminent degree, the qualities of the soldier and the accomplished gentleman: he was universally esteemed for the urbanity of his manners, and none ever left his society, without being impressed with the opinion, that he was a superior man in every respect. The gallant bearing of Her Majesty’s 29th, proved that a military spirit of no ordinary stamp had superin-

* Since dead.
tended its organization. The drunkard found in Colonel Taylor, an officer who could never forgive the vice of which he was guilty, while the sober soldier looked up to him as his firm friend and gallant commander.

Fortunately for his country, Major-general Gilbert was only slightly wounded: any eulogistic remark regarding him from our pen is uncalled for; but the battles of Feerozshuhur and Sobraon will for ever be associated with his name, and the centre division of the army of the Sutlej will be fondly recollected by all men who served in it under Major-general Gilbert. The gallant veteran, Colonel Ryan of the 50th, was also wounded severely. For upwards of forty years had he served his country in all quarters of the globe; and though his state of health might well have, excused his absence from any of the engagements, he could not yield to any one else the high honour of leading his fine regiment, where danger was to be met with, and glory won. It is needless to allude to the Colonel's gallant conduct at Maharajapore, where he joined Her Majesty's 39th, having hurried down from the hills, even in infirm health, and mixed in the conflict before he could reach his own regiment in the field.

But while thus noticing officers of rank, let us not forget the young and brave, who had for the first time entered the battle field. Poor Hamilton*
was one of these. Left behind with the depot of his regiment in a state of ill health, he no sooner could move than he proceeded with all haste, and at considerable risk, to join the head-quarters of the corps with the army of the Sutlej, but reached them too late to share the dangers of Feerozshuhur. His countenance used to gleam with delight when any of his brother-officers were describing that hard-fought field, and he longed for an opportunity of joining them in another battle. His wish was soon to be gratified. He left the camp on the morning of the 10th of February, the fine handsome rifleman; and ere the sun had attained its meridian height, he lay a lifeless, mangled corpse before Sobraon. He was wounded and could not retire, and in this helpless condition was cut to pieces by the ruthless and barbarous Sikhs, who spared none of the wounded. His sorrowing relatives have the melancholy satisfaction of knowing that he died the death of a brave and gallant soldier, beloved and esteemed by all his brother-officers.

Poor Davidson, of the same regiment, likewise received his death-wound at Sobraon. To the meekest, mildest spirit, he united the daring courage of a soldier: this was his second battle, for he had shared the danger and glories of Feerozshuhur. On receiving his wound this brave youth's only regret was that it had not at once proved fatal; but ere twenty-four hours had elapsed, he was mingled with the dead; and had a brother fallen
the grief could not have been more poignant, than was that of his young companion in arms who shared the same tent with him and also watched his departing spirit.

Lieutenant Shuttleworth* fell in the desperate charge on the centre of the Sikh entrenchment. This officer had previous to the campaign obtained leave to revisit his native land, and renew the ties of affection and friendship, after a residence of ten years in a foreign land. He looked forward with pleasure to the day when the cessation of hostilities would enable him to fulfil his intention, a day which had been necessarily postponed. But, alas! a fond mother or affectionate sister, while perusing the glad tidings of the proposed return of a son or brother, little dreamt that the object of their love was then marching to a field where he was destined to fall in the defence of his country, and that by the hand of a barbarous and inhuman foe who turned a deaf ear to the imploring look and feeble arm of a wounded man. But his body was not hacked to pieces like that of poor Frederick Hamilton; and both were interred by their brother-officers and men, with military honours, on the day following the battle. Shuttleworth was a modest, unassuming man, kind-hearted and a firm friend. While at Akhberwala an incident occurred which may be mentioned. Lieutenant Shuttleworth's company was warned for picquet duty at Little Sobraon,

* Of the right wing of the First Bengal European regiment.
but it had become dark before he left camp, and though the distance was short, he and his men missed the direction of the post, and the first challenge was from a Sikh sentry! To advance would have ensured their being taken prisoners; return they could not; and therefore retreating a little, they remained quiet until morning, when it was discovered, that the position was close to the place which he was in quest of. Others of this regiment received severe wounds, which afterwards proved fatal; among the rest, Lieutenant John Lambert. To speak of him as merely a brother-officer, would be doing injustice to his memory; he was our friend, the friend of the writer of these pages, and never have we known a more zealous and enthusiastic soldier, or one who more fully sustained the honour of his profession. He had talents of no ordinary kind; and had he been spared, poor Lambert would have been an honour to the fair town of Alnwick, which gave him birth; but he died the death he coveted,—fell fighting side by side with his gallant companions before Sobraon, universally lamented by his brother-officers, and by none more than him who offers this humble tribute to his memory.

One other officer must not be passed over in silence.

Though wounded at Feerozshuhur, Lieutenant Beatson did not dismount until his horse, wounded in three places, obliged him to do so. The wound experienced by Beatson was a severe one, but even this did not preclude the hope that he would soon
return to his post; and while yet weak, and barely recovered, he rejoined the regiment of which he was acting quarter-master, and with it entered the enemy's entrenchment at Sobraon, where he was again wounded, but not dangerously, and there was no reason to entertain any fears for his recovery. He left camp, however, on his way to Feeropore, was seized with lockjaw, which speedily proved fatal, and thus his friends and the service were deprived of as gallant a young officer as the army could boast of. His mild manners and evenness of temper, combined with his gentlemanly bearing, under which was concealed the most daring courage, gained him the esteem of the regiment to which he was attached, and his own (the 14th Native Infantry) could not more poignantly lament his loss than did the 1st European light infantry.

If our readers do not forgive us for this seeming partiality, in introducing men unknown to fame, we trust the surviving friends of the latter will be more lenient. We do not mention them as having performed deeds which any other officers would not have done, but merely because we knew them personally. It would be a pleasing task for us to record the brave young soldiers of other regiments, were we as well acquainted with their claims and deserts. There is nothing that tends more to encourage the European soldier in the midst of battle, than the gallant bearing of his young officers; and it so happened, that this particular regiment had scarcely any old officers present;
many of the officers had but just joined, and had never heard a shot fired, nor seen the face of an enemy; but one and all behaved like true soldiers, and vied with veterans in undaunted courage and gallant bearing.

We have been rather particular regarding the 1st European light Infantry, as many Queen's officers of high rank often exhibit but a very imperfect notion of the Honourable Company's European regiments. On one occasion a general officer in Her Majesty's service, actually asked "How many havildars there were in the 1st European light infantry, and if there were any Native officers?" Even the highest authority in India had some misgivings about the European light infantry, as to their equipment and fighting qualities; both of which he had an opportunity of witnessing on the march to Feerozshuhur, and during the eventful night of the 21st of December. To sum up in one word, every European officer who composed the army of the Sutlej, from the Commander-in-chief down to the youngest ensign, merited high encomiums. A braver spirit never pervaded an army. The battle of Sobraon may be justly termed the "Waterloo" of India; it was the last, and one of the hardest contested; like that great and ever memorable engagement, it completely broke the power of the foe.

Let us now turn to the Sikhs, who confident in their security amidst their triple walls and ditches, began the battle of the 10th with great spirit. The
firing of their cannon showed, that in that arm they
were still far from despicable. 'Tis true, their shot
did little execution compared with that of Feeroz-
shuhur; as the centre division advanced, the can-
nons made more noise than mischief, for the shot
passed harmlessly over the line, and even beyond
Rhodawala. The ground was light and sandy, and
where the ball struck, it lay embedded. But far
different was the effect of their musketry and
grape. Ranged behind their walls, between which
there were numerous traverses, the Sikhs poured
with impunity a deadly and incessant fire on the
approaching enemy; not for a few minutes only, or
in repeated volleys, but in one long continued roll.
The devoted British troops, could not return their
murderous fire with the least prospect of success.
The nature of the strong entrenchment of the
Sikhs left the centre and left portions impracticable
to infantry, and as the British guns were chiefly
directed to the right, where the attack was intended
to be made, to that quarter the Sikhs first directed
their defence, and with such energy, that it ap-
peared impossible to force an entrance into their
camp. Fortunately for the British, the right por-
tion of the entrenchment was its most vulnerable
point, owing to a passage or road leading to their
bridge, being here, which (after our guns had done
their work,) was discovered by the 53rd foot, and
through this the other regiments of the respective
divisions entered. Until the entrance of Brigadier
Stacey, Tej Singh was perfectly satisfied that the
British could not break into the entrenchment; but no sooner did espy the British bayonets, than he fled in dismay, leaving his troops to defend themselves. This they did with their swords and muskets; for the Sikh bayonet is nearly harmless in their hands, and they could not long withstand that never-failing weapon when wielded by a British soldier. They yielded, retreated, fled, plunged into the river, or attempted to cross the bridge. Whether with a view of preventing the victors from following them across the river, or more probably with the design of cutting off all hopes of retreat from the Sikhs, and thus obliging them to fight, one of the boats from the centre of the bridge had been let loose, and the passage by it totally cut off. In one dense mass of thousands, the discomfited Sikhs had no alternative but to take to the river breast-high; their progress was necessarily slow, and their pursuers had ample time to give them volley after volley, while the horse artillery mowed down those at the greatest distance with murderous grape. The river was covered with dead and dying, the mass of the former actually formed a bridge in the middle of the stream, while as the musket and grape took effect, hundreds were seen raising their heads for an instant, and then disappearing for ever. The fire on a retreating foe in the field of battle is at all times injurious; but when that foe not only turns his back, but is intercepted by a deep stream of water, he becomes a sure aim, and the carnage committed by his pur-
suers must be deadly beyond conception; and such it was at Sobraon. None were spared, for they had spared none. All shared the same fate.

In the whole annals of warfare, no parallel can be found to the carnage at Sobraon, even when a battle has been fought under circumstances which gave every possible advantage to the victors. In vain did the Sirdars, (among whom was the brave old Sham Singh Attareewala, who died nobly) endeavour to rally the flying Sikhs. Onwards they rushed, death and destruction following them, and the deep waters of the Sutlej ready to engulf their dead bodies, or finish what the musket and grape had half performed. Five days after the action, and when the walls of the entrenchment had been nearly levelled with the ground, the sand-bank in the middle of the river was completely covered with dead Sikhs; and the ground on the left bank, and within the entrenchment, thickly strewed with carcasses of men and horses. Then all was quiet; the European soldiers had been carefully covered with earth, and at one spot near the dry bed of the nullah, no fewer than twenty-seven soldiers of the 1st European light infantry, lay interred in a single grave. The Sikhs had returned for their dead, and the Commander-in-chief generously allowed them to carry off the body of Sirdar Sham Singh, and other persons of note; but the task was found irksome, and hundreds of Sikhs were left as food for the jackal, the dog, and the vulture.

**State of the dead.**
No attempt was made to follow the Sikhs across the river, but while the bloody scene was being enacted at Sobraon, troops were passed over the bridge at Koonda Ghat. Had the British followed the Sikhs on the 10th, they might have made their way without resistance to Lahore, and there renewed the conflict; but such was not the intention of our sagacious commander, and the capital of the Punjab was destined to be occupied by the British, without the repetition of the struggles which had occurred on the left bank of the Sutlej, and in which the vaunted power of the Khalsa troops had been effectually destroyed.

Previous to the battle of Sobraon, we find that the Commander-in-chief was confident of success, for he says, when speaking of the Governor-general, in his despatch to the latter, "I could not permit myself to doubt, that, with the blessing of Divine Providence, the victory would be ours."

The plan of the attack had been submitted to the Governor-general, who, as an experienced General, could appreciate its merits, or defects, as a final attempt to overthrow a people against whom he had now been carrying on a fierce war for nearly two months. At the battle of Feerozshuhur, as we have seen, Sir Henry Hardinge had, as second in command, led the left of the British army, and by his skill, courage, and decision contributed to the attainment of that great victory. He was now about to share the dangers and glories of another
battle, in which the fate of the Sikhs would, in all probability, be decided, and a death-blow given to a war of their own seeking. He had the proud satisfaction of thinking, that he had long and scrupulously avoided war as a great evil, with a forbearance that few statesmen would have been inclined to practice; but when the collision was forced upon him, his energy, zeal, and courage, could not be surpassed. In the military operations of the army of the Sutlej, the Commander-in-chief found in Sir Henry an inestimable coadjutor, and he was not insensible of the great advantage. His Excellency expresses himself thus on the subject:—

"I cannot describe the support which I derived from the circumstance of its (the plan of attack) details meeting your approbation. When a soldier of such sound judgment and matured experience as your Excellency, assured me that my projected operation deserved success, &c. Nor did your assurance stop here. Though suffering severely from the effects of a fall, and unable to mount on horseback without assistance, your uncontrollable desire to see the army once more triumphant, carried you into the hottest of the fire, filling all who witnessed your exposure to such peril, at once with admiration of the intrepidity that prompted it, and anxiety for your personal safety, involving so deeply in itself the interests and happiness of British India. I must acknowledge, also, my obligations to you, for having, whilst I was busied with

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\text{The decided effects likely to follow victory at So-braon.}
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\text{The invaluable aid of the Governor-general acknowledged by the Commander-in-chief.}
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\text{The Governor-general exposed to all the dangers of the battle, and anxiety for his safety.}
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another portion of our operations, superintended all the arrangements that related to laying our bridge across the Sutlej, at Feerozpore."

The bridge erected under the eye of the Governor-general, at Koonda, and constructed by Major F. Abbott, of the Bengal engineers, was of the most perfect kind. In fact, there were two bridges, along which guns, elephants, and troops could march with the same ease and facility as if no Sutlej existed, and they excited the admiration of every one.

In his despatch, the Commander-in-chief bore ample testimony to the bravery of the army at Sobraon, and the gallant conduct of the officers concerned. Regarding Sir Harry Smith, he remarks, "in his attack on the enemy's left, Major-general Sir Harry Smith displayed the same valour and judgment which gave him the victory at Aleewal. A more arduous task has seldom, if ever, been assigned to a division; never has an attempt been more gloriously carried through." The mention of Major-general Gilbert in such flattering terms, but nothing more than he deserved, proves him to be one of the ablest generals that India can boast of. The Commander-in-chief says, "I want words to express my gratitude to Major-general Gilbert; not only have I to record, that in this great fight all was achieved by him, which, as Commander-in-chief, I could desire to have executed; not only on this day was his division enabled, by his skill and courageous example, to
triumph over obstacles, from which a less ardent spirit would have recoiled as insurmountable; but, since the hour in which our leading columns moved out of Umballa, I have found in the Major-general, an officer who has not merely carried out my orders to the letter, but whose zeal and tact have enabled him, in a hundred instances, to perform valuable services in exact anticipation of my wishes. I beg explicitly to recommend him to your Excellency's special notice, as a divisional commander of the highest merit."

The noble daring of Her Majesty's 3rd dragoons, at Sobraon, has been already alluded to, in quoting the Commander-in-chief's despatch, and a well-merited eulogium is paid to the Major-general who commanded the cavalry division at Sobraon, and who had previously commanded that branch in the army of the Indus. "Major-general Sir Joseph Thackwell has established a claim, on this day, to the rare commendation of having effected much with a cavalry force, where the duty to be done consisted of an attack on field works, usually supposed to be the particular province of infantry and artillery. His vigilance and activity throughout our operations, and the superior manner in which our out-post duties have been carried on under his superintendence, demand my warmest acknowledgments."

It was to be expected that the gallant conduct of the brigadier who led the attack at Sobraon would be prominently noticed, and accordingly the
Commander-in-chief brings Brigadier Stacey to the notice of the Governor-general in the following terms—"On him devolved the arduous duty of leading the first column in the attack, turning the enemy’s right, encountering his fire before his numbers had been thinned or his spirit broken, and, to use a phrase which a soldier like your Excellency will comprehend, taking off the rough edge of the Sikhs in the fight. How ably, how gallantly, how successfully, this was done, I have before endeavoured to relate. I feel certain that Brigadier Stacy and his noble troops will hold their due place in your Excellency’s estimation, and that his merits will meet with fit reward."

The officer next brought to the notice of the Governor-general, was one of those brave men who love the profession of arms for its own sake, and by whom dangers are relished as rich rewards for their labour. He had gone on leave before the Sikh war commenced, and, like many others, thought the Sikhs would never dare to cross the Sutlej. But though thus absent, the first rumour of warlike operations roused his spirit, and raised his desire to join in the coming strife. At a distance of fifteen hundred miles, the accomplishment of his wishes was no easy task, but he resolved to brave all difficulties, in the hope of sharing in the dangers and glories of his favourite profession. By great exertion he reached Kurnaul, and there he found his rapid progress arrested. Disappointed and chagrined at this delay, he was obliged to march with the siege train, in the full hope that he might yet
be in time. It is only necessary to state that every officer and man of his own regiment, lamented the absence of one who had often led them to victory. He reached Akbherwala on the 8th February, and his wish was no doubt to lead the brigade, to which his regiment belonged, into action; but this could not be accomplished, and the only regiment of the brigade to which he was appointed was attached to Brigadier Stacey's brigade. It was a matter of indifference to Brigadier Orchard, under whose command he served, and he accordingly joined the 53rd foot, and the result of the day proved how nobly he and his regiment fought. Many men would have been dissatisfied with any but the most extravagant eulogiums upon their services on the occasion; but the modesty of this officer, where his personal services are concerned, is as conspicuous as his bravery. He looked on his own exertions, on that memorable day, as a common-place occurrence, requiring no particular notice; he had done his duty, and expected every man to do the same. For thus acting, he neither required reward nor notice, but nevertheless he deserved both. The Commander-in-chief notices the brigadier in the following handsome and trite manner—“Brigadier Orchard, C. B., in consequence of the only regiment under his command that was engaged in the action being with Brigadier Stacey's brigade, attached himself to it, and shared all its dangers, glories, and success.”

The brave and gallant Brigadier Taylor is thus Briggadier C. C. Taylor.
noticed by the Commander-in-chief. "Brigadier Taylor, of Her Majesty's 29th, fell nobly, as has already been told, in the discharge of duty. He is himself beyond the reach of earthly praise, but it is my earnest desire that his memory may be honoured in his fall; and that his regiment, the army with which he served, and his country, may know that no officer had a higher place in my poor estimation for gallantry or skill than Brigadier C. C. Taylor."

The brigadiers of cavalry and artillery are all noticed in the despatch in the most favourable manner; and, also, the commanding officers of regiments, troops, batteries, and detachments, as well as the staff officers of the various departments.

Dr. Macleod's exertions we had personally an opportunity of witnessing; and, as superintending surgeon, his labour was unwearied, and his attention to all most marked. There is, probably, no medical officer in the service who could have filled the appointment with more efficiency; and certainly none with more zeal. But it becomes us as faithful historians to refer to the appointment formerly alluded to, the incumbent of which is noticed along with the superintendent of the depot. Neither at Feerouzshuhur nor at Sobroan was this gentleman present. On the one occasion he was at Moodkee, and on the other in Feerozpore. It seems, as we have said, an anomaly that the field-surgeon should have been thus twenty miles absent
from the field on both occasions. We have endeavoured to account for the occurrence: at Feerozshuhur his presence, without instruments, might have tended little to render his aid efficacious; but surely, after a lapse of nearly six weeks, the deficiency of materiel might have been supplied.

With regard to Dr. Walker, surgeon to His Excellency the Governor-general, we willingly acquiesce in the praise bestowed upon him by Sir Henry Hardinge. Before daybreak, on the morning after the battle of Sobraon, he came to offer his valuable assistance to ourselves in the necessary operations, all of which were performed before the men left the camp for Feerozpore. The necessity for promptitude was well exemplified by what occurred in some regiments, where hardly an amputation succeeded when performed at a late period. In all engagements, in India at least, the sooner a limb is lost after it has been wounded, the greater will be the chance of success; in fact, the amputation, if delayed, had better not be performed at all. Hence, the necessity of a field-hospital is an important point that will not, it is hoped, be overlooked in future wars.

As every officer takes an interest in the welfare of his soldiers, a few remarks on the state of the wounded will, we feel assured, be acceptable to our military readers.

At Feerozshuhur, the grape of the enemy committed the greatest havoc; and accordingly, the greatest number of wounds were inflicted by a
heavy iron bullet, which, on being extracted, left a large opening, and often caused severe inflammation in the surrounding parts. In the attack on the entrenchment at Sobraon, the musketry was the deadly weapon in the hand of the Sikhs, and the musket ball was oftenest met with; it was a small bullet, and caused but little harm if in a fleshy part; but when entering a knee-joint, the succeeding inflammation was such as often caused death; and from the experience gleaned at Sobraon, as well as at Feerozshuhur, there is little doubt (in fact, the point appears to be completely settled) that a musket bullet or grape shot, lodged in the knee, requires immediate amputation. This is an important point, and had it been fully appreciated, we should not have to lament the death of many men and officers thus wounded during the present campaign. Though a bone be simply fractured, and even a smaller joint, such as the ankle, injured by a gun-shot wound, recovery without loss of limb may occur, provided proper apparatus for treating such accidents be available. There is always much more credit due to the surgeon who saves a limb, than to him who cuts off legs and arms indiscriminately: but when saying this, it must not be forgotten that a gun-shot wound of the knee-joint or other joint, when the bones are much injured in the latter, demands immediate amputation; and delay, or as it is usually termed “giving a chance,” is worse than useless, and puts the patient’s life in jeopardy. In a military surgeon, decision is the
first quality: when he has decided on the propriety of operating, no time should be lost in putting the design into execution; for a wound of a joint which at first appears simple and unattended with any danger, may in twenty-four hours assume an aspect which will render amputation too late. These remarks will be sufficient for our non-professional readers: the illustration of military surgery in India must be conveyed through another channel.

Through the exertions of the commissariat and executive officers at Feerozpore, all the wounded were borne to that place a few days after the battle of Sobraon, and the intention of the Governor-general, to send down the river all the survivors with stumps, to be conveyed to England with as little delay as possible, was eventually carried into effect; the other wounded were sent to the dépôt at Landour, to Subathoo, and a great number to Meerutt, so that when the remainder of the army of the Sutlej recrossed that river, on the 26th March, no wounded men except those of Her Majesty's 62nd and 80th remained there. Over this dépôt, Dr. Graham was appointed Superintend-ent, and many young medical officers highly distinguished themselves for their skill and attention; we need only mention the names of Stewart, of Her Majesty's 31st, than whom few more expert or zealous surgeons are to be met with in Her Majesty's service in India—Mackie, of the 9th foot—Thring, attached first to Her Majesty's 62nd,
and latterly to the 1st European light infantry, who, with many others, deserve the highest praise for their unremitting attention to the wounded.

Such dépôts are, no doubt, useful, but the rule already inculcated should be strictly adhered to, and as many amputations as possible performed before the men are sent to them. Immediately after receiving a wound, no soldier offers an objection to lose a limb if he have confidence in the regimental surgeon: we ourselves incurred the high displeasure of a poor fellow, because, tired with numerous amputations after the battle of Sobraon, we wished to delay his until a future day!

In order, however, to secure every advantage to wounded men, the selection of a skilful surgeon, who has had experience with European soldiers, should be made at an early period, with strict reference to his capacity, and a field-hospital immediately formed, supplied with all requisite instruments. The selection of a field-surgeon is always made from the medical officers belonging to the Honourable Company's service, and it must not be supposed, that though they may be of old standing, they are necessarily best calculated for performing operations. Many such persons never did take off a limb in their lives, and are constantly at a loss when they find themselves appointed field-surgeon! To refuse the post would be paying but a bad compliment to those who selected them; but the responsibility is a fearful one, if they know
that their nerves and hands are not equal to the task which they are expected to perform.

Let the test be the success which has attended the surgeon's operations; his decision in operating, and the number of good stumps which he can exhibit, and not the favourable opinion of individuals formed by people high in office, who can be no judges of surgical skill. A medical officer may be an excellent physician, and a very indifferent surgeon; and the reverse is equally true. We are aware that many regimental surgeons suppose that it forms no part of their duty to operate on the field, and that this is solely the province of the field-surgeon. In Europe such may be allowed to be the rule; but in India, every regimental surgeon is called upon to do his best in attending to the necessary operations required by his own men, at least; and in cases of his vicinity to depôts for wounded men, thither also he should repair, when men are carried there from the field, as often occurred at Feerozshuhur.

Some commanding officers may wish the surgeon to be with the regiment, and in consequence, the latter instead of following his wounded, and commencing his operations immediately with every prospect of success, sends a young assistant, who cannot be supposed to be the best judge of what is required, even though an expert operator; and who, instead of acting on his own opinion, if he venture to form one, puts off a capital operation from day
to day, or confines his attention to the extracting of bullets and dressing wounds. In whatever situation a battle may take place in India, the duty of the regimental surgeon is to be with the wounded, no matter whether these be on the field or at a depot near at hand, until all the capital operations be performed. During the present war, and when the Governor-general visited the wounded frequently at Feerzapore, his Excellency appeared to entertain the opinion here advanced; and even when the army crossed the Sutlej, no more than one medical officer was allowed to accompany his regiment, since his services were much more required at Feerzapore than with a healthy body of men, who no longer stood in need of medical aid.

When performing his arduous and bounden duties, often under great privations, there can be nothing more galling to a man of any feeling than to find that his object is entirely mistaken by his commanding officer who fancies he is enjoying himself, and acting on this somewhat ridiculous idea, applies for another medical officer to take charge of his regiment; military men can hardly enter into such a feeling, but nevertheless the occurrence has happened, and may do so again. Nay more, while thus detached, and probably not in possession of a single dooly, the surgeon is all but reprimanded for not achieving impossibilities, and a threat held out, that the subject will be brought to the notice of higher authority!
Though the regimental surgeon has not the honour of leading men into the thick of battle and is enjoined not to expose himself unnecessarily, it will be readily seen, that his annoyances must sometimes make him wish that he did go where danger awaited him, rather than remain where his services were required, but are not appreciated and are even misunderstood.

Since there exists such difficulty in keeping dooly-bearers at their post in the field, thereby causing loss of instruments at a time when they are urgently required, every medical officer attached to Europeans at least should be furnished with what is called a surgical saddle, and in which a case of amputating instruments, and one of medicines and dressing; supply the place of pistols, weapons rarely of any use to him.

All these arrangements require but little foresight, and should be made before troops enter on active service. They are not the province of a Governor-general or Commander-in-chief; but they certainly lie within the province of a superintending surgeon, or the surgeon-general of the medical board, both of whom might urge their necessity with every prospect of success, though the regimental surgeon, in doing so incurs displeasure, so jealous are seniors of any interference.

As regards ourselves, we are not writing a treatise on military surgery, gun-shot wounds, or medical policy, and therefore may be pardoned for thus entering on forbidden ground; and we shall be
satisfied if the observations here made shall render future arrangements in the medical department of armies in India more efficient than they were in the campaign against the Sikhs.

Instead of a medical board and superintending surgeons being left to make the arrangements on which we here dwelt, a director-general on the field might be more useful in time of war and full power given to him to act according to circumstances in everything relating to the medical operations. In time of peace the appointment might cease, though to ensure efficiency and be prepared for sudden emergencies, it is worth the attention of a powerful government, like that of the British in India, to overlook a small outlay in order to secure a permanent benefit. Such an officer should be entirely untrammeled by any board, and communicate directly with the Commander-in-chief of the force, since much time is lost when the details of an important duty have to travel through various offices. Energy, dispatch, and efficiency are great requisites in everything connected with war, and they are just as essential in the medical as in the military department of an army. It will not do for one man to trust to another; he must have power to act for himself, and meet every emergency without loss of time.

We have by no means exhausted the subject, but the general reader may think he has had a sufficient share of medical tactics, and we shall therefore not again trouble him with any such details.
Before closing this chapter, a glimpse may be taken of the number of killed and wounded on the side of the British, for as on other occasions, that on the part of the Sikhs cannot be ascertained with any approach to correctness, but it may be safely advanced, that at Sobraon, their actual loss in men exceeded that of all their former losses put together. If fewer of their guns were taken than at Feerozshuhur, the cause is of easy solution; all left on the British side of the river at Sobraon had been already captured.

In the battle of Sobraon no fewer than thirteen European officers were killed, and one hundred and one wounded. The small number killed in comparison with those wounded, is to be accounted for from the wounds being chiefly inflicted by musket-bullets, instead of cannon-shot and grape, though it must not be supposed that great numbers were not struck by the latter, and many no doubt were killed and wounded by them.

Among the Native officers eight were killed, and only thirty wounded.

The list of warrant and non-commissioned officers, rank and file, exhibits 301 killed, and 1913 wounded.

Of all ranks and denominations, the wounded amounted to 2063, and the killed to 320. The grand total of both was 2383.

On the part of the Sikhs, several Sirdars fell as well as general officers; among the rest, Sirdar Sham Singh Attareewala, whose daughter married Great comparative loss of the Sikhs at Sobraon.

Great number of British officers killed and wounded at Sobraon.

Loss of Native officers.

Rank and file; total of all grades.
Nonehal Singh in 1837. He was an old and a brave soldier, one of those who had fought under Runjeet Singh during his warlike career. He was a fine fellow and a great favourite with the Maharajah: like most of the Sikhs, he was fond of his glass, and we well recollect on one occasion in the Durbar, his jeering his old companion-in-arms on the pitiful pittance of liquor meted out to them, compared to what they had both been accustomed to in former days. He determined to sustain his character to the last, and did all in his power to stop the flight of the Sikhs at Sobraon, until he fell in the struggle. It was said that it was he who had removed the boat from the Sikh bridge, thereby cutting off their retreat, and obliging them to stand to their arms.

Sirdar Kishen Singh, a son of the late Jemadar Khooshyal Singh, was also killed; he was younger brother to Ram Singh who died some years ago, and he had an adopted brother, Bishen Singh, who is still alive. The latter was educated at the missionary school at Loodiana, where he acquired a tolerable knowledge of the English language. He was the son of Lal Singh, brother to the Jemadar, who adopted him as his son, and in consequence Bishen Singh became a Sikh, though his own father adhered to the Hindu sect, or caste of Brahmin.

The others of note who fell at Sobraon were Generals Goolab Singh Kooptee, who was chiefly employed in watching the hill states in the west Jalindhur, Heera Singh, Jopee, Moobaruk Allee,
Ellabec Buksh, Shah Nuwaz Khan, son of Fultch Vodeen Khan of Kussoor, and many more of less note.

Thus terminated the last battle in the campaign against the Sikhs, who had crossed the river in the vain hope of conquering Hindostan, and had been employed for several months in bringing guns to the left bank, where they were said to have been hidden in grass and about villages previous to their being collected at Feerozshuhur; at least, this was the explanation given by themselves when interrogated on the subject, and when surprise was expressed as to how they could possibly have transported so many pieces of ordnance across the Sutlej in so short a time. The arrogance of the Khalsa troops led them to rely with confidence on becoming masters of the British possessions, and a Governor of Benares had even been appointed! Even this acquisition could not entirely satisfy their ambitious views; for their ultimate destination was to have been London, by which they understood the British Empire; but how they were to reach that remote kingdom, whether by a voyage round the Cape or by the Isthmus of Suez had not been definitely settled, and would, no doubt, have occupied their attention on reaching Calcutta! They looked forward to the sacking and pillaging of Delhi, and because Nadir Shah had preceded them, their vanity led them to believe the same feat might be performed by themselves, forgetting that there was no British force to oppose that rapacious soldier!
CHAPTER X.

THE BRITISH ARMY CROSSES THE SUTLEJ.

After the battle of Sobraon and even during its continuance, the existence of a bridge at Koonda Ghat enabled the army of the Sutlej to cross that river in a few days, without the slightest opposition. The first place of any consequence was Kussoor, which had in former times twice defied the power of the Maharajah Runjeet Singh to reduce it to his subjection. It was held out against him, as formerly related, by the Mussulman family whose descendants now own Mumdhote on the left bank of the Gharra below Feerozpore. Though then a strong and extensive fortification, it possessed but little strength when the army of the Sutlej reached it, and no opposition was offered. On the 17th February 1846, the siege-guns crossed the bridge along with the 4th brigade infantry, under the command of Brigadier Orchard, C. B.

From Kussoor the Governor-general of India issued his proclamation, which as giving a much
better idea of the great objects attained and contemplated by the British arms, than any words of ours can possibly convey, we make no apology for transcribing.

*This proclamation of the Right Hon. the Governor-general of India* is dated, Kussoor, the 14th February, 1846.

"The Sikh army has been expelled from the left bank of the river Sutlej, having been defeated in every action, with the loss of more than 220 pieces of field-artillery.

"The British army has crossed the Sutlej, and entered the Punjab.

"The Governor-general announces by this proclamation, that this measure has been adopted by the government of India, in accordance with the intentions expressed in the proclamation of the 13th December last; as having been forced upon the Governor-general for the purpose of 'effectually protecting the British provinces—for vindicating the authority of the British government, and for punishing the violaters of treaties, and the disturbers of the public peace.

"These operations will be steadily persevered in and vigorously prosecuted, until the objects proposed to be accomplished are fully attained; the occupation of the Punjab by the British forces will not be relinquished until ample atonement for the insult offered to the British government by the infraction of the treaty of 1809 A.D., and by the
unprovoked invasion of the British provinces shall have been exacted. These objects will include full indemnity for all expenses incurred during the war, and such arrangements for the future government of the Lahore territories, as will give perfect security to the British government against similar acts of perfidy and aggression.

"Military operations against the government and army of the Lahore state, have not been undertaken by the government of India from any desire of territorial aggrandisement. The Governor-general, as already announced in the proclamation of the 13th December, 'sincerely desired to see a strong Sikh government re-established in the Punjab, able to control its army and protect its subjects.' The sincerity of the professions is proved by the fact, that no preparations for hostilities had been made, when the Lahore government, suddenly and without a pretext of complaint, invaded the British territories. This unprovoked aggression has compelled the British government to have recourse to arms, and to organize the means of offensive warfare; and whatever may now befall the Lahore state, the consequences can alone be attributed to the misconduct of that government and its army.

"No extension of territory was desired by the Government of India; the measures necessary for providing indemnity for the past, and security for the future will, however, involve the retention, by the British government, of a portion of the country
hitherto under the government of the Lahore state.

"The government of India has frequently declared, that it did not desire to subvert the Sikh Government in the Punjab; and although the conduct of the Durbar has been such, as to justify the most severe and extreme measures of retribution, (the infliction of which may yet be required by sound policy, if the recent acts of violence be not amply atoned for, and immediate submission tendered;) nevertheless, the Governor-general is still willing that an opportunity should be given to the Durbar and to the chiefs, to submit themselves to the British government, and, by a return to good faith and the observance of prudent counsels, enable the Governor-general to organize a Sikh government, in the person of a descendant of its founder, the late Maharajah Runjeet Singh, the faithful ally of the British power.

"The Governor-general at this moment of a complete and decisive victory, cannot give a stronger proof of the forbearance and moderation of the British government, than by making this declaration of his intention: the terms and mode of arrangement remaining for further adjustment.

"The Governor-general, therefore, calls upon all those chiefs who are the well-wishers of the descendants of Runjeet Singh, and especially such chiefs as have not participated in the hostile proceedings against the British power, to act in concert with him, for carrying into effect such
arrangements, as shall maintain a Sikh government at Lahore, capable of controlling its army and protecting its subjects, and based upon principles that shall provide for the future tranquillity of the Sikh states—shall secure the British frontier from a repetition of acts of aggression,—and shall prove to the whole world the moderation and justice of the paramount power in India.

"If this opportunity of rescuing the Sikh nation from military anarchy and misrule be neglected, and hostile opposition to the British army be renewed, the government of India will make such other arrangements for the future government of the Punjab, as the interests and security of the British power may render just and expedient."

The terror and consternation produced at Lahore, by the tidings of the signal and complete overthrow of the Sikhs at Sobraon, may be readily conceived. In this last battle, the Khalsa troops had fought with every advantage that a strongly fortified camp, defended by numerous artillery on the opposite bank and behind walls, where they could safely assail their enemy, could bestow.

This complete failure proved to a certainty, that the remnant of the Sikh force could never again meet the British army. The existence of the very kingdom was at stake, and it was felt that if the British should cross the Sutlej, the flag of the victors might in a few days be flying on the citadel of Lahore.

There was no alternative then, but to propose
terms, and endeavour to prevent the victorious army from crossing the Sutlej; for the Lahore government never anticipated that the battle of Sobraon would be the immediate signal for crossing the river.

The Ranee was, no doubt, alarmed, though she foresaw from the commencement, what the issue of the war would be; and, as far as lay in her power, she endeavoured to provide for coming events, by sending emissaries, in conjunction with those of Goolab Singh, to the Governor-general before Sobraon.

Summoned from Jummoo, by the Khalsa troops and the Ranee, the Rajah Goolab Singh had been sometime at Lahore, when the crisis arrived which he was expected to meet; and to him the Ranee referred the danger of her position, and implored his advice.

We have already explained the wily policy of Goolab Singh, and he was now to carry it through, at whatever sacrifice on the part of the Sikhs. He was, in short, to become the mediator between the falling state of Lahore, and the victorious Governor-general of India.

Not a moment was to be lost, in adopting measures for retarding the progress of the British army towards Lahore; for, once there, the Governor-general would dictate his own terms, and then the Rajah's position might, probably, not be an enviable one; at least, it would not be so agreeable as he desired. He accordingly proceeded with all
expedition towards Kussoor, to endeavour, if possible, to arrest the progress of the Governor-general; but his intentions and hopes were doomed to meet with disappointment, for the Governor-general indignantly refused to listen to any arrangement, which would prevent him from sealing under the walls of Lahore, any treaty that might be made. There, and there alone, must the indemnity be paid for the expense of the war, and there alone atonement must be made for the blood spilt in the warfare brought on by a military force uncontrolled by its own government.

The Rajah was alarmed at the posture of affairs, and saw, with mortification that even his personal presence was not sufficient to insure the objects which he had in view. The British had crossed the Sutlej, their army was at Kussoor, and two or three days more, might see it occupying the plain of Meean Meer, which a few months before had witnessed the Khalsa troops collecting their strength, for the invasion of British India. What a contrast! and what a change had been produced by the fortune of war! Not that Goolab Singh expected any other result, and he was not the man to abandon his object. He was referred to Major Lawrence and Mr. Currie, and recommended by the Governor-general to make his proposals to them, as they were in his confidence. But having failed in preventing the advance of the British, Goolab Singh now changed his tactics, and determined on bringing the young Dhuleep Singh to meet the Governor-general.
nor-general. He saw plainly that little was to be
done with the major and secretary; one falling
asleep on his bed, and the other leaving the Rajah
alone; Goolab Singh accordingly returned to
Lahore, to fetch the young Maharajah. The re-
sult was, a meeting between the Governor-general
and his youthful Highness, at Lulleeana. Out of
respect for the late Maharajah Runjeet Singh, and
the tender years of his grandson, the Governor-
general received Dhuleep Singh with the utmost
kindness, and repeated to him, that his wish still
was, that a government should exist in the Pun-
jab, under the descendant of a man who had pre-
served a strict and lasting alliance with the British
for a period of thirty years.

The first point in any treaty to be now con-
cluded, was the indemnity for the expense of the
war, and that was laid at a crore and a-half of
rupees, (a million and a-half sterling.) The
demand may have been greater, since in addition
to the money part of the question, the Doab or
Bist Jalindhur was added. The Sikh guns which
had been pointed against the British by the Sikhs,
and were still in possession of the latter, were to be
given up. The rebellious troops and their turbu-
lent leaders disbanded. These were the principal
stipulations, to all of which a willing assent was
readily agreed to by the Lahore government.

Still it was insisted that their ratification
should take place under the walls of Lahore.

The Maharajah was now conveyed back to his
palace at Lahore, by a large escort from the British

Dhuleep Singh returns to Lahore.
army, there to await the arrival of the dictator of the terms of peace to the haughty Sikhs.

On the return of her son, the Ranee's mind was greatly relieved; she, however, foresaw that her own power and Dhuleep Singh's reign, were entirely dependent on the British, and she never regarded the concessions which had been made, as more than equivalent to the preservation of a government which might have been entirely overthrown.

The politicians who view the proclamation of the Governor-general at Kussoor as too temperate in tone, and who are inclined to blame him for not, at once, subjugating the Punjab, will have reason to confess, that such a step was impracticable; except at the risk of destroying the European portion of his troops, by exposure to a burning sun, during the hot and rainy months. Never for an instant could the idea of such a sacrifice enter the mind of a statesman, who throughout the campaign had evinced the warmest interest in the welfare of his European soldiers. He deeply lamented the great loss already sustained by them, in nobly fighting against a desperate foe; but the latter subdued, his immediate object was attained, and no further exposure was necessary. Sir H. Hardinge did not want territory: the portion ceded between the Sutlej and Beas, and annexed to the British possessions, had probably been forced upon him as an equivalent for some part of the required indemnity, and this could be retained by Native troops.
alone. The terms of the treaty were so couched, that while the Sikhs were rendered unable to make further aggression, for some time at least, the nation might still be able to maintain a government of its own, capable of controlling its military force and protecting its subjects, which was all that the Governor-general desired.

Had the Sikhs contented themselves with waging war in their own country, and the army of the Sutlej entered the Punjab with hostile purposes, the turn of affairs might have been different. The Sikhs might, in that case, have opposed the British, not in the open field as at Moodkee and Alleewal, or in the temporary entrenchments as at Feeroshshuhur and Sobraon, but at Umritsir, shutting the gates and placing their guns in that fortress and the still stronger adjacent one of Govind Ghur. Several months might have been required for the subjection of those strongholds; and the Sikhs would, in all likelihood, have often crossed the Ravee, and even the Chenab and Jelum, pursued by the British. But conquest, and not defence, was the object of the Sikhs; and they came to risk the fortune of war on the left bank of the Sutlej, where a speedy blow was struck at all their hopes; and they were driven back across that river. They were now at the mercy and clemency of their victorious foe; their pride humbled, and the very government of the country tottering to its base.

The effect of the forbearance of the British Government, and the prudence and energy displayed visible.
by the Governor-general, were now conspicuous in
the completion of a war which could not possibly
have been confined to a few months' duration, had
the British been aggressors, and the Punjab the
scene of the struggle.

It is highly probable that Lord Ellenborough
had resolved to invade the Punjab with a powerful
and overwhelming army, had any sufficient provo-
cation been offered; and if the Sikhs had been
taken unawares, conquest might have been rapid
and complete. But even in that case, had his
Lordship begun his campaign in October, instead
of December, the triumph of his design would, in
all probability, have involved the necessity of re-
taining a strong force of Europeans in the Punjab,
thereby endangering their lives by exposure.
Under this view of the case, therefore, it is a matter
of congratulation that the campaign against the
Sikhs did not occur in 1843-44, instead of 1845-46;
but those who look to the entire subjugation of the
Punjab, as the only means whereby rule and order
can take the place of anarchy and confusion in that
country, would probably support the views of the
former Governor-general. There is, however, one
point connected with the present campaign that
throws the balance into its favour, and forms a
pleasing contrast to the wars formerly carried on
in India and other countries.

Our invasion of Afghanistan was undertaken to
serve a political purpose, to replace a king on the
throne of Cabul who had been expelled by a man
far superior to himself in energy, bravery, and intellect, and in every way adapted to the control of a fierce, disorderly race. This imbecile, fugitive king had remained for nearly thirty years dependent on the generosity of the government of India: he had made two unsuccessful attempts to regain his throne, and was forced to return to his asylum at Loodianah; no aid was afforded him in either of his attempts, and whether he had any right to expect it, is a matter of doubt. But his right to the throne of Cabul was as strong in 1812 as in 1839; and when in the latter year, the army of the Indus took the field, in order to re-establish Shah Soojah-Ool Moolk, the plea was not stronger than it would have been when he first took up his abode at Loodianah.

The invasion of Afghanistan was hardly sanctioned on the principle of right; it failed ultimately, and a catastrophe befell the British which will be ever memorable in the annals of British rule in India. The annexation of Scinde, Mysore, the Carnatic; in short, of the whole of the British possessions in India might, perhaps, be disputed on the same principle; but, not so, the annexation of a portion, or even the whole, of the Punjab. A people making an unprovoked aggression in defiance of treaties of peace and alliance, justly subject themselves to the loss of their territories; and if they suffer all the horrors of war and bloodshed, they are alone to blame for the issue. The victors have every right to deprive them of the means of repeating such outrages. The Sikhs did not appear to un-
derstand this view of the matter, and previous to their final overthrow at Sobraon, expressed some hopes that their captured guns would be returned to them. Even the annexation of the Jalindhar Doab to the British territories was looked upon by many of them as a hardship; and they blamed Goolab Singh and the Ranee for yielding up a portion of their country, never taking into account that their very existence, as a nation, was at stake.

On the restoration of young Dhuleep Singh to the head of the government, Goolab Singh was appointed Wuzeer or prime minister; but it was speedily seen that Lal Singh, the favourite of the Ranee, envied his position. Goolab Singh himself was not quite at ease. The office which he held was one which did not exactly suit his views, and he seemed anxious to be relieved. He was indifferrent who his successor might be, though, had he possessed a choice, it would not have fallen on a man who had no pretensions to the Wuzeerut, except those founded on the somewhat questionable character of paramour of the Ranee.

The Khalsa troops, when taking the field against the British, insisted on the presence of Lal Singh, not from any high opinion they had formed of his fighting qualities, but solely because while they held possession of him, the Ranee was less likely to compromise them with the British. The command of their army was neither in the hands of Lal Singh, nor Tej Singh, but invested in the Punches or counsellors of the Khalsa troops, chosen from their
own body, and by whose advice they bound themselves to act. The government of Lahore was merely a shadow, neither the Ranee nor the Sirdars had any but a nominal power in all that related to military operations. These Punches or Punts were all powerful among the Sikhs; and, guided by them, the system of government partook somewhat of the feudal character. It is a weak system of government, and has always yielded to a monarchical form. In this respect, the kingdom of Lahore, under the reign of Runjeet Singh, was far stronger than the same under the management of the Punts; the latter rendered it one of military anarchy, disobeying any orders given by the head of the government, and paying no respect to treaties of alliance, which they neither willingly made nor were likely to preserve.

The government of India, represented by the Governor-general, was perfectly aware of the unstable nature of such a system, and wisely refrained from entertaining any negotiations emanating from such a source. A government must be established, and with it alone could the Governor-general treat. Sir Henry Hardinge wished to see a descendant of its original founder seated on the throne of Lahore.

Dhuleep Singh, after his visit to the Governor-general, was, as already stated, sent back to Lahore under a strong escort from the army of the Sutlej; and the latter precaution was by no means uncalled for, since the Khalsa troops, still in the field, were
watching with a jealous eye the movements of the Ranee and her young son, as well as those of Goolab Singh, for these were the only persons connected with the Lahore government recognized by that of the British. Through them alone could peace and order be restored.

The steps adopted by Goolab Singh to bring about a reconciliation between the British and the Sikhs, though they might appear hard to the latter, were still those which necessity demanded; and however great the sacrifice might be, it could not affect the Rajah’s prospects: on the contrary, if the demand were exorbitant, and such as the Lahore government was not prepared to meet, an opportunity was thereby offered of his liquidating a portion of the indemnity, and as an equivalent, securing to himself not only the stability of Jummooh, over which he would rule as an independent prince, but likewise of becoming master of the rich province of Cashmere, which he had long coveted. But all these advantages must necessarily emanate from the victors, who had now become the power paramount, and could dictate whatever terms they pleased, without a chance of their being refused by the treating powers. The unruly Sikh Sirdars and discontented soldiers might view the matter in a different light, but to remove any chance of further annoyance from them, the leaders of the remnant of the Sikh army were called upon to return to their allegiance, and a powerful incentive for ac-
HISTORY OF THE SIKHS.

quiescing in the call was the approach of the British army to the capital of the Punjab.

On the 20th February 1846, the Commander-in-chief with the army of the Sutlej, was encamped at Meean Meer, in front of the military cantonments of Lahore, and the tents actually occupying the parade ground, on which the Khalsa troops had assembled, previous to invading the British territories. What a change had a few months produced! Then, inflated with pride and confidence, they looked upon their success on the left bank of the Sutlej as certain; with the glittering prospect before them of the possession of Hindostan! They would listen to no advice, nor consider for an instant the danger of the steps they were about to take. Their army was numerous, their guns of a calibre and numerical extent to render the Khalsa troops capable of routing any foe who might oppose them. No persuasion could induce them to believe that they were not a match for the British. Where were the Khalsa troops now? The miserable remnant of them dared not visit the place they so lately paraded with such confidence. Where were the guns, almost innumerable, which they looked upon as a bulwark against all enemies? Out of the whole number they had now only about thirty remaining, all the rest, amounting to upwards of 200, had been wrested from them, and were now safely lodged in a fortress belonging to the British, and within a few days' march of their own capital.
It was almost beyond the power of belief, on the morning of the 10th February, that in ten days more the army which was then about to attack the strong Sikh-entrenchment at Sobraon would be encamped at Lahore, and that fortress be in the possession of the British! But such are the glorious uncertainties of war—which in a few hours change the destiny of nations, and produce results which no previous calculation nor foresight could anticipate!

When the army of the Sutlej had crossed the Punjab without the slightest opposition, the Sikh-troops who were still in the field could not meet the British; their power was broken, and they were a miserable, starving rabble, glad of any security whereby their entire annihilation might be prevented. Accordingly when their leaders were ordered to return to their allegiance, and disband their soldiers, as well as deliver up all the guns still in their possession, which had been pointed against the British, little or no difficulty was opposed to a compliance with the measure, which dire necessity forced upon them. The Sirdars, though obliged to join and lead the Khalsa troops, were in general averse to the war, and now that the result of the struggle had completely broken the warlike or rather the disorderly spirit of the Sikhs, they were not unwilling to embrace an opportunity of being restored to their homes and families. Lal Singh trusting to the power of his mistress, the Ranee, was no doubt glad to exchange the toil and trouble
of a campaign, for the quiet enjoyment of peace in the palace of Lahore; he had left the palace, not from his own wish, but the necessity of complying with the repeated demands of the Khalsa troops, who were the ruling power.

Though Goolab Singh might for a time be invested with the Wuzeership, yet Lal Singh knew that the ambitious views of the Rajah would not stop short at even such an honour, and the vacancy in the management of affairs would no doubt be therefore soon filled by himself.

Tej Singh, who had from the first discouraged the wild and disorderly Khalsa troops, whom he could lead, but not control, willingly embraced the summons to return to his allegiance. Runjoor Singh, somewhat elated with the only advantage (and which he magnified into a victory) that had been gained over the British, namely, the capture of some of Sir Harry Smith's baggage at Buddewal, was probably averse to peace, for he dreaded the displeasure of the British, on account of his burning the barracks of the 50th at Loodianah, and no doubt anticipated the confiscation of his property.

On the 24th February, it was announced that the whole of the British army employed against the Sikhs, would receive a donation of twelve months batta, and the glad tidings were acceptable to all. The share of a Lieutenant-colonel would be about £900 sterling, that of a major upwards of £700, a captain about £200, and a lieutenant £150 ster-
ling. These respective sums do not appear much when converted into English currency, but there were so many to share, that the total amount required was upwards of £700,000 sterling, or seventy lakhs of rupees. The payment of this batta was understood to be immediate, and everyone endeavoured to obtain his share, but in vain! Some no doubt succeeded, but the demand for cash became so great, that the payment was actually postponed for some months. It was reported that the Ranee had offered to pay a similar amount to the British troops, and as far as promises went, she might have done so; but the difficulty experienced in raising the first instalment of the indemnity to the British, (amounting only to fifty lakhs, or half a million sterling,) proved that much could not be expected from the royal treasury, and the report had probably no just foundation.

Only those guns which had been pointed against the British were required to be given up, and they were consequently with the Sikh troops, in the vicinity of Umritsir, and from whence they had to be brought to the camp of the Governor-general at Lahore. On one occasion, it was said, that instead of serviceable guns and the real ones employed in the war, some old honey-combed pieces of ordnance were brought, but the trick was readily discovered, and it was not likely that the sharp eye of the commissary of ordnance* would allow such a substitute to be made.

* Captain Warner.
It was soon found that the expense of the war had drained the treasury of Govind Ghur, and instead of fifty lakhs being available from such a source, it was deemed necessary to appeal to the Sirdars for their contributions, and some angry discussions in the Durbar were the natural consequence. A few who had received immense sums from the state, pleaded that their property had been confiscated, others urged their poverty. Many, however, were too glad to see order and rule established to grudge their share, and among others Chuttur Singh Attaree Wala.

In the first account of the treaty, the Jalindhur Doab, including the portions in the hills and plains, was annexed to the British territories, but afterwards it would appear that the rich province of Cashmere was included, probably in lieu of the fifty lakhs, and thus the Sikh government was actually obliged to sell its possessions piecemeal. The Rajah Goolab Singh, who had no doubt hoarded up immense wealth at Jummoo, became a ready purchaser of this tract, paying the sum demanded, namely, fifty lakhs, or half a million sterling. This money could never have obtained that country from the Sikhs, and he was not in a condition to wrest it from them by force of arms; but now he obtained the completion of his wishes, and that on a footing which secured a firm and indisputable hold of a place which he had long coveted.

Perhaps those who have only heard of Cashmere,
through the pages of a romance, might think there was no province belonging to the Lahore government, which might be more prized by Europeans, and it is not unlikely that the cession of that fruitful valley may cause regret, among those who view it as possessing all the requisites of an earthly paradise. But unless Sir Henry Hardinge had subjugated and annexed the whole kingdom of Lahore to the British possessions, he could not possibly have occupied Cashmere, insulated as it is from the Punjab, and at such a distance from the British frontier, subjected to the attacks of refractory hill-chiefs, and a convenient bait for the Rajah of Jummoo; and it was no doubt considered wiser policy to give the latter a place which he might have seized, for a consideration, than leave it at his mercy, to become a bone of contention between him and the British. The territory annexed to the British lay convenient to their present frontier; the Jalindhur Doab could be taken possession of by their troops; while the hill-portions of it had already thrown off the Sikh yoke, and offered allegiance to the British. The confiscated Sikh-territory on the left bank of the Sutlej became thus defended by our troops in advance between the Sutlej and Beah, and would soon be in as settled a state as any of the other British provinces.

When Major Broadfoot was killed at Feerozshuhur, the selection of an officer to fill his place was a task of some difficulty, since there were few who knew much about Sikh affairs of sufficient
rank and standing to fill the post held by such men as Clerk, Wade, Richmond, and Broadfoot. The only two individuals who could be chosen for such an important charge were at a great distance from the scene of action. These were Major Lawrence, resident at Katmandhoo in Nepaul, and Major Mackeson, who held the appointment of superintending the collection of taxes at Sirsa. The merits of both these officers were acknowledged by every one who had had opportunities of witnessing their career. Major Lawrence, it is well known, was the author of a work termed the "Adventurer in the Punjab," which, under the mask of a somewhat romantic love story, gives a true and exact account of the Punjab, its late ruler Runjeet Singh, his physician and secretary Azeezoodeen; in short, supplies a most valuable mass of information regarding the politics and government of the country. He had also taken a prominent part during the operations in Afghanistan; and his labours were eminently useful in assisting General Pollock to force the Khyber pass. Possessed thus of an intimate knowledge of the Sikhs and their country; endowed with a persevering industry, combined with firmness and decision, the Governor-general could have no hesitation in making choice of him as a successor to Major Broadfoot.

But while thus selecting an officer every way fitted for a high appointment, it was not forgotten that the claims of Major Mackeson rested on an equally firm basis.

The selection of Major Lawrence.

His qualifications.
For a period of fifteen years had this talented officer been employed in various situations on the north west frontier, sometimes, it must be confessed, of little importance in a political point of view; and still less in a pecuniary one; but whether as superintendent of the navigation of the Indus in the hot and sickly locality of Mittenkote, commanding a band of unruly Sikhs in Afghanistan, or employed in the humble capacity of tax-collector in the desert, Major Mackeson invariably manifested the same zealous and conciliatory disposition. When returning from Afghanistan, where his conduct had been rewarded by a brevet-majority and a companionship of the Bath, so little was his intimate acquaintance with Sikh affairs appreciated, that he was not even appointed to a subordinate place in the political arrangements of the north west frontier; but obliged to fall back upon the only appointment which he could hold as a regimental officer: namely, interpreter and quarter-master to a Native infantry regiment! This would have disgusted most men, but a patient forbearance and determined zeal were strong features of his character. He made no remonstrance, but submitted patiently; and had it not been for the efforts of Mr. Clerk, Major Mackeson, C.B. might actually have been interpreter and quarter-master of the 14th regiment of Native infantry, to the present moment! Through the influence of Mr. Clerk, however, he obtained the appointment already alluded to at Sirsa, which he retained until the serious aspect of affairs on the
north west frontier appeared to open a field wherein he might be usefully employed.

He was now brought from his seclusion, and the whole management of the confiscated Sikh states on the left bank of the Sutlej entrusted to him. That he was well adapted for this important office no one can doubt; but we suspect had his own wishes been consulted, he would have preferred the management of affairs with the Sikhs.

Of the officers appointed as assistants to Majors Lawrence and Mackeson, several are in every way fitted for the charge; we need only mention the name of Major Macgregor, whose conduct, both in a political and military capacity at Jellalabad, during the trying period of its defence, elicited the warmest thanks of General Sale. Major Macgregor’s, as well as Major Mackeson’s merits were somehow overlooked by Lord Ellenborough, but this did not prevent the gallant Sale from acknowledging them publicly at Feerozpore in 1842, when proposing the health of the former officer at the Governor-general’s own table! Captains Mills and Cunningham, with Lieutenant Edwardes, Messrs. Vansittart, Agnew, and Cust, now complete the corps diplomatique for the management of the north west frontier of India, while Mr. John Lawrence has been appointed a commissioner in the newly acquired Doab of the Jalindhur. A more efficient body of men could not have been selected. Their appointment reflects the highest credit on the discrimination and judgment of the
Governor-general; for on merit alone, did he rely in his choice.

Notwithstanding this complete arrangement as regarded the political management of Sikh affairs, it was speedily seen by the Ranee that the only power on which she could rely for the stability of her son's kingdom, and her own and his personal safety, was the British army. The unruly Sirdars, and still more unruly soldiers, might give a tacit consent to the treaty which had been entered into, and even promise to preserve order and rule; but she knew well, from past experience, that if the British troops were withdrawn, her safety and that of the Lahore government would be endangered. In fact, so convinced was she of this, that she hesitated not to announce to the Governor-general, that if he left her and her son to the mercy and forbearance of the Sikhs, he had better at once remove both to the left bank of the Sutlej, or locate them in the Government-house in Calcutta!!

A little reflection was sufficient to convince the Governor-general of the justice of the request on the part of the Ranee; though he no doubt regretted the necessity that existed for exposing troops to the inconvenience of remaining several months in Lahore, instead of returning to their respective cantonments during the hot and rainy seasons. There was no alternative, however; and he must either annex the Punjab to the British territories, which, as had been shown, he could not possibly do without the risk of destroying his
European soldiers by exposure to the heat of the Punjab, or he must enable the government which he had sanctioned to maintain itself, at least, for a few months, when he could, if required, complete the subjugation, and annexation of the Punjab. By people unacquainted with the posture of affairs, and living in the temperate climates of Europe, the forbearance of the Governor-general has been already blamed, but his policy was founded on a careful view of the difficulties which opposed the complete annexation of a country which he had in reality subjected to his sway, and whose government looked to him for advice and protection.

There will, no doubt, be a numerous class of croakers, who might see, in thus leaving a garrison in Lahore, the seeds of a repetition of the Cabul tragedy! But the parallel was in no respect similar; and with a force in the Jalindhur Doab ready to act with, and in fact forming a part of the Lahore force, no sudden emergency, likely to be followed by disastrous consequences, could be even dreamt of by the most confirmed alarmists. The only drawback to the efficiency of this force was its containing but one European regiment, and there were no others in the Doab.

The delight of the Ranee and her son may well be conceived when thus placed under the protection of a strong British force. They could now repose in comfort in their own capital, a place which they no longer considered one of safety unless guarded by British troops.
In order to prevent any sudden insurrection on the part of the disaffected Sikh Sirdars and their followers, the guns belonging to the fort of Lahore were put in possession of the British; and to secure comfort for the troops, European and Native, a plentiful supply of grain and other articles of food was laid in by the commissariat. The time occupied in this, detained the Commander-in-chief and the European regiments at Lahore until the 23rd of March, when this portion of the army of the Sutlej with their gallant chief left Lahore, and recrossed the Sutlej on the 26th at the Nuggur Ghat by means of an excellent bridge erected there by Major F. Abbot, Lieutenant Goodwyn, and other engineer officers.

We must not omit to mention that Sir Charles Napier, the governor of Scinde, reached Lahore in time to witness the final settlement of the treaty.

The army of the Sutlej was drawn up for Sir Charles's inspection, and among the other regiments then present was his own, the gallant 50th or Queen's Own. He was introduced to it by the Governor-general; and his feelings on the occasion were so overpowering, that he could scarcely address the companions of many a hard-fought battle in the Peninsula. It was a noble sight to see the whole army march past, with the huge elephants dragging the siege guns in front. It might well recall the days of Porus with his hundreds of majestic elephants, harmless as they were, however, compared
with those which dragged after them such terrible instruments of war. None of the Sikhs attended on this occasion; it would have been too humiliating a sight for them; but on a subsequent day, after affairs were settled, the instalment paid, and the hostile guns delivered up, there was a similar review of the whole troops for the young Maharajah and the Sirdars who had now returned to their allegiance. In passing along the line, Sirdar Lal Singh remarked the weakly state of the 1st European light infantry, observing, that the regiment must have suffered severely; and truly so it did, for in the two battles of Feerozshuhur and Sobraon, two-thirds of the men at least were killed and wounded; and out of twenty-seven officers who left Subathoo on the 11th of December, only seven escaped the same fate.

Lal Singh wore a suit of armour, which he remarked was not adapted for modern warfare.

The escort of cavalry and infantry attached to the Maharajah formed a sad contrast to that which used to accompany Runjeet Singh; and it is probable that neither these branches, nor the Sikh artillery, will ever attain the discipline which distinguished the Aeen troops in the time of Runjeet Singh, and even after his death, down to the disastrous war with the British.

When gun after gun was being delivered up, the sight was too much for Sooltan Mahmood, the commandant of artillery. He shed tears of pity and chagrin, deploiring at the same time his own
downfall; while those who had known him in better days, jeered and laughed at the old warrior.

We have now given a brief and imperfect sketch of the war between the Sikhs and the British during the latter portion of the year 1845 and the early part of 1846. The objects attained, and the treaties formed, will be best understood from the proclamations of the Governor-general, which are transcribed and given below.

"GOVERNMENT NOTIFICATIONS.

"Foreign Department, Camp, Umritsir, "the 16th March, 1846.

"The Right Honourable the Governor-general of India has been pleased to direct the publication, for general information, of the subjoined extracts from the proceedings of the government of India, relative to the re-establishment of amicable relations between the British Government and the State of Lahore, and the recognition of the independence of Maharajah Goolab Singh.

"Note of conference between F. Currie, Esquire, and Major H. M. Lawrence, on the one part, and the Minister and Chiefs of the Lahore Durbar on the other, 8th March, 1846."

The minister and chiefs having assembled at the tent of the Governor-general's agent, for the pur-
pose of signing the treaty, the conditions of which had been previously discussed and determined, produced, on the part of the Maharajah, a letter addressed to Major Lawrence, the Governor-general's agent, of which the following is a translation:

"The feelings of consideration, kindness, and generosity which have been evinced towards the Lahore State by the Right Honourable the Governor-general, and his Excellency's respect for the former friendship of the British government with the late Maharajah Runjeet Singh, have been communicated to me through Mr. Secretary Currie and yourself, and have caused me to feel most grateful.

"Certain important matters will now be represented to you by the following confidential personages:

"Bhaee Ram Singh.
Rajah Lal Singh.
Sirdar Tej Singh.
Dewan Deenanath.
Fuqueer Noor-Ood-Deen.

And you, who are the guardian of the perpetual friendship of the two governments, will represent these matters to the Governor-general, and will, doubtless, use your endeavours to procure a favourable decision regarding them.

"The Lahore government, it is known, is endeavouring to arrange its affairs; and it is necessary that effectual measures should be taken to
prevent the recurrence of any disturbances. With this view, it is very desirable that some British regiments, with artillery and officers, should be directed to remain at Lahore for a few months for the protection of the State. After affairs have been satisfactorily settled, and the period which may be fixed upon expired, the British troops will then return."

To the above paper the following reply was made verbally, and was, at the request of the minister and chiefs, written down and given to them:—

"The letter from the Maharajah to Major Lawrence, expressing gratitude to the Governor-general, has been read in presence of the minister and chiefs of the Durbar. At the close of that letter, it is requested that a British force may be left at Lahore for a limited period.

"Upon this it is to be observed, that from the wording of the letter, it is not evident that the retention of a British force at Lahore is sincerely and urgently desired by the Lahore government, and the nature of the disturbances which are to be provided against, are not specifically described. In so important a matter, general expressions are out of place. The British government desires to exercise no interference with the government of Lahore, after the treaty of peace is concluded; and the Governor-general is not willing to have any concern with the Lahore government, or to accede to any measures not provided for by the
treaty. This has been repeatedly explained to the Lahore Durbar. If, therefore, for any special reason, and on any particular account, the assistance and intervention of the British government are desired by the Lahore Durbar, the fact should have been more distinctly stated in the Khurreeta, and the causes which render such aid indispensable, should have been given in detail. However, as the Maharajah has authorized the chiefs named in the Khurreeta, and who are present, to make known all the particulars of the case, they should now state all the circumstances in full."

The minister and chiefs, after consultation, read aloud the substance of the paper, of which the following is a translation, but requested that it might be put in the form of a Khurreeta from the Maharajah, and sent in the evening. A communication was then made to the Governor-general, who determined that a British force should, under certain conditions to be entered in a separate engagement, occupy Lahore for a limited time; the treaty was then signed by the commissioners, and the meeting broke up.

Translation of document alluded to in preceding paragraph, afterwards sent from the Durbar as a formal Khurreeta, with the seal of the Maharajah.

"All the circumstances regarding the disorganization of the government of Lahore, since the
demise of the late Maharajah Runjeet Singh, until the present time, are well known to the British government.

"The satisfactory settlement of affairs, the discharge of the disturbers of public peace, and the reorganization of the army, under the stipulations of the new treaty, are now engaging consideration. But lest, after the departure of the British forces, the evil disposed should create fresh disturbances, and endeavour to ruin the State, it is the earnest and sincere desire and hope of the Lahore Durbar, that British troops with intelligent officers should, for some months, as circumstances may seem to require, be left at Lahore for the protection of the government, and the Maharajah, and the inhabitants of the city. When the affairs have been satisfactorily settled, and the period prescribed for the stay of the British force shall have expired, the troops may then be withdrawn.

(True note and translation,)

(Signed) "F. CURRIE,
"Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-general."

"General Order by the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India. Foreign department; Camp, Lahore, the 8th March, 1846.

"The treaty of peace between the British government, and that of His Highness the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, has been signed.

"The treaty will be ratified by the Governor-
general, in presence of the Maharajah and the Sikh chiefs, to-morrow afternoon, the 9th instant, at 4 o'clock, in the Governor-general's tent.

"The Governor-general invites His Excellency the Commander-in-chief, His Excellency the Governor of Scinde, with their present staff, to attend on this occasion, also the generals of divisions, the brigadiers, the head of each department, and all officers commanding corps, with one Native officer from every regiment.

"His Highness the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh will be received by a salute of twenty-one guns. The street leading to the Governor-general's tent, will be lined by detachments of regiments, according to the orders which His Excellency the Commander-in-chief will be pleased to issue.

"The following day, the Governor-general will pay His Highness the Maharajah a visit of congratulation, on the restoration of peace between the two governments, and will leave camp for that purpose at 3 o'clock. The escort will be fixed in the general order of His Excellency the Commander-in-chief.

"The thirty-six pieces of Sikh artillery, which were pointed against the British army, have been surrendered and brought into camp. The disbandment of the Sikh army, its reorganization, on the same rate of pay as in the time of the late Maharajah Runjeet Singh, and the limitation of its numbers, have been settled by the treaty.

"At the earnest solicitation of the government of
the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, the Governor-general has consented to occupy the citadel and town of Lahore, by British troops, for a limited period, that opportunity may be afforded the Lahore government of completing the reorganization of its army, according to the stipulations of the treaty.

"If by the good offices of the British government, peace and order can take the place of the military anarchy and misrule, by which the Sikh nation has been brought to the verge of dissolution, the Governor-general will rejoice that the co-operation of the British government, by the aid of its faithful army, shall have been successful in effecting that object. It is the strongest proof which the British government can give, of the sincerity of its desire to see a Sikh government re-established. The British government having afforded the protection desired, the troops will be withdrawn before the end of the year. The details of the force will be determined between the Governor-general and His Excellency the Commander-in-chief. During the period of occupation the Native troops will continue to receive Scinde pay and allowances.

"It is by the valour and discipline of the British troops, led by their distinguished commander, that these important and complete successes have been gained; and the Governor-general is confident, that during the temporary occupation of the fortified town of Lahore, the troops will prove by their good conduct, that they are as generous and
humane after victory, as they are brave and invincible in the field of battle.

"By Order of the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India.

(Signed) "F. Currie,
"Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-general."

Memorandum of the proceedings of a Durbar, held at Lahore, on the 9th March, 1846.

"At four p.m. of the 9th March, a public Durbar was held, in the state tent of the Right Honourable the Governor-general, at which His Excellency the Commander-in-chief and staff, His Excellency the Governor of Scinde and staff, with the British and Native officers invited in the Governor-general's order, dated 8th instant, attended.

"The Young Maharajah of Lahore, attended by the Minister Rajah Lal Singh, Rajah Gqolab Singh, the Commander-in-chief of the Lahore army, Sirdar Tej Singh, and about thirty other sirdars and civil officers, with their suites, being present.

"After the treaty of peace was ratified and exchanged with the usual ceremonies, the Governor-general addressed the chiefs in the following terms; the address being translated, sentence by sentence, by the Secretary to the government of India, Mr. F. Currie.

"On this occasion of ratifying the treaty of
peace between the British government and the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, in the presence of His Excellency the Commander-in-chief, His Excellency the Governor of Scinde, and the officers of the British army on the one hand, and of the Sikh chiefs on the other, I have to repeat the assurances which have been so often given by me and by my predecessors, of our desire that peace and friendship may always subsist between the two governments.

"'The British government desires to see a Sikh government re-established, which may be able to control its army, protect its subjects, and willing to respect the rights of its neighbours.

"'By this treaty, the Lahore government has sufficient strength to resist and punish any Native power which may venture to assail it, and to put down all internal commotions.

"'Wisdom in council, and good faith in fulfilling its engagements, will cause the Sikh government to be respected and enable it to preserve its national independence.

"'For forty years it was the policy, in Runjeet Singh's time, to cultivate friendly relations between the two governments, and during the whole of that period the Sikh nation was independent and happy. Let the policy of that able man towards the British government, be the model for your future imitation.

"'The British government in no respect provoked the late war. It had no objects of aggrandisement
to obtain by hostilities. The proof of its sincerity is to be found in its moderation in the hour of victory.

"A just quarrel, followed by a successful war; has not changed the policy of the British government. The British government does not desire to interfere in your internal affairs. I am ready and anxious to withdraw every British soldier from Lahore. At the earnest solicitation of the Sikh government, I have reluctantly consented to leave a British force in garrison at Lahore, until time shall have been afforded for the reorganization of the Sikh army, by which assistance the stipulations of the treaty may be more easily carried into effect.

"In no case can I consent that the British troops shall remain in garrison for a longer period than the end of this year.

"I state this publicly, that all the world may know the truth, and the motives by which I am actuated in this matter.

"The Sikh army must, according to the treaty, be immediately reorganised by reverting to the same system and rate of pay as in Runjeet Singh's time.

"If the friendly assistance now afforded by the British government be wisely followed up, and honest exertions made by the chiefs without delay, you will become an independent and prosperous state.

"The success or failure is in your own hands: my co-operation shall not be wanting; but if you
neglect this opportunity, no aid on the part of the British government can save the State.

"'I leave my political agent, Major Lawrence, assisted by Major McGregor and a most able general officer, Sir John Littler, to command the British troops. These officers possess my entire confidence.

"'Again I repeat, my anxious desire is to see a Sikh government strong and respected, an obedient army, patriotic chiefs, and a happy people.

"'I trust the reign of the Maharajah will be long and prosperous, and celebrated for the happiness of his people under a just and pacific government.'

"At the close of this address the Sirdars expressed in warm terms their gratitude to the Governor-general, and their resolution to follow the advice His Excellency had given them.

"The usual presents were then given, after which the Durbar broke up.

(Signed) "F. Currie,

"Secretary to the Government of India,

"with the Governor-general."

Treaty between the British government and the State of Lahore.

Whereas the treaty of amity and concord, which was concluded between the British government and the late Maharajah Runjeet Singh, the ruler of Lahore, in 1809, was broken by the unprovoked aggression on the British provinces, of the
Sikh army in December last, and whereas, on occasion, by the proclamation, dated 13th December, the territories then in the occupation of the Maharajah of Lahore, on the left or the British bank of the river Sutlej, were confiscated and annexed to the British provinces, and since that time hostile operations have been prosecuted by the two governments, the one against the other, which have resulted in the occupation of Lahore by the British troops; and whereas it has been determined, that upon certain conditions, peace shall be re-established between the two governments, the following treaty of peace between the Honourable English East India Company and Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, Buhadour, and his children, heirs and successors, has been concluded on the part of the Honourable Company by Frederick Currie, Esquire, and Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, by virtue of full powers to that effect, vested in them by the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B. one of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-general, appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and on the part of His Highness the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, by Bhaee Ram Singh, Rajah Lal Singh, Sirdar Tej Singh, Sirdar Chuttur Singh Attareewala, Sirdar Runjoor Singh Majethea, Deewan Deena Nath, and Fukeerhoor Oodeon, vested with full powers and authority on the part of His Highness.
"**Article I.**—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British government on the one part, and Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, his heirs and successors, on the other.

"**Article II.**—The Maharajah of Lahore renounces for himself, his heirs and successors, all claim to, or connection with, the territories lying to the south of the river Sutlej, and engages never to have any concern with those territories or the inhabitants thereof.

"**Article III.**—The Maharajah cedes to the Honourable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories and rights, in the Doab or country, hill and plain, situated between the rivers Beas and Sutlej.

"**Article IV.**—The British government having demanded from the Lahore state, as indemnification for the expenses of the war, in addition to the cession of territory described in Article III, payment of one and a half crore of rupees; and the Lahore government being unable to pay the whole of this sum at this time, or to give security satisfactory to the British government, for its eventual payment, the Maharajah cedes to the Honourable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, as equivalent for one crore of rupees, all his fort, territories, rights, and interests in the hill countries which are situated between the rivers Beas and Indus, including the provinces of Cashmere and Hazarah.

"**Article V.**—The Maharajah will pay to the British government the sum of 50 lakhs of rupees on or before the ratification of this treaty.
"Article VI.—The Maharajah engages to disband the mutinous troops of the Lahore army, taking from them their arms, and His Highness agrees to reorganise the Regular or Aeen regiments of infantry, upon the system, and according to the regulations as to pay and allowances, observed in the time of the late Maharajah Runjeet Singh. The Maharajah further engages to pay up allowances to the soldiers that are discharged, under provisions of this article.

"Article VII.—The regular army of the Lahore state shall henceforth be limited to twenty-five battalions of infantry, consisting of 800 bayonets each, with 12,000 cavalry; this number at no time to be exceeded, without the concurrence of the British government; and should it be necessary at any time, for any special cause, that this force should be increased, the cause shall be fully explained to the British government; and when the especial necessity shall have passed, the regular troops shall be again reduced to the standard specified in the former clause of this article.

"Article VIII.—The Maharajah will surrender to the British government all the guns, thirty-six in number, which have been pointed against the British troops, and which, having been placed on the right bank of the river Sutlej, were not captured at the battle of Sobraon.

"Article IX.—The control of the rivers Beas and Sutlej, with the continuations of the latter river, commonly called the Garrah and Punjund, to the confluence of the Indus at Mithunkote, and

The army of Lahore to be reorganised.

The future strength of the army.

The hostile guns to be surrendered.

The control of the navigation of the Indus and tributaries to rest with the British.
the control of the Indus, from Mithunkote to the borders of Beeloochistan, shall, in respect to tolls and ferries, rest with the British government. The provisions of this article shall not interfere with the passage of boats belonging to the Lahore government, on the said rivers, for the purposes of traffic, or the conveyance of passengers, up and down their course. Regarding the ferries between the two countries respectively, at the several ghats of the said rivers, it is agreed, that the British government, after defraying all the expenses of management and establishments, shall account to the Lahore government, for one-half of the net profits of the ferry collections. The provisions of this article, have no reference to the ferries on that part of the river Sutlej which forms the boundary of Buhawalpore and Lahore respectively.

"Article X.—If the British government should, at any time, desire to pass troops through the territories of His Highness the Maharajah for the protection of the British territories, or those of their allies, the British troops shall, on such special occasion, due notice being given, be allowed to pass through the Lahore territories. In such case the officers of the Lahore state will afford facilities in providing supplies and boats for the passage of the rivers; and the British government will pay the full price of all such provisions and boats, and will make fair compensation for all private property that may be endangered. The British government will, moreover, observe all due consideration
to the religious feelings of the inhabitants of those tracts through which the army may pass.

"Article XI.—The Maharajah engages never to take or retain in his service, any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American state, without the consent of the British government.

"Article XII.—In consideration of the services rendered by Rajah Goolab Singh, of Jummoo, to the Lahore state, towards procuring the restoration of the relations of amity between the Lahore and British governments, the Maharajah hereby agrees to recognise the independent sovereignty of Rajah Goolab Singh in such territories and districts, in the hills, as may be made over to the said Rajah Goolab Singh by separate agreement between himself and the British government, with the dependencies thereof which may have been in the Rajah’s possession since the time of the late Maharajah Kurruck Singh; and the British government, in consideration of the good conduct of Rajah Goolab Singh, also agrees to recognise his independence in such territories, and to admit him to the privileges of a separate treaty with the British government.

"Article XIII.—In the event of any dispute or difference arising between the Lahore state and Rajah Goolab Singh, the same shall be referred to the arbitration of the British government, and by its decision the Maharajah engages to abide.

"Article XIV.—The limits of the Lahore terri-
tories shall not be at any time changed, without the concurrence of the British government.

"Article XV.—The British government will not exercise any interference in the internal administration of the Lahore states, but in all cases or questions which may be referred to the British government, the Governor-general will give the aid of his advice and good offices, for the furtherance of the interests of the Lahore government.

"Article XVI.—The subjects of either state shall, on visiting the territories of the other, be on the footing of the subjects of the most favoured nation.

"This treaty, consisting of sixteen articles, has been this day settled, by Frederick Currie, Esq. and Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under the directions of the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B. Governor-general, on the part of the British government; and by Bae Ram Singh, Rajah Lal Singh, Sirdar Tej Singh, Sirdar Chuttur Singh Attareewala, Sirdar Runjoor Singh Majethea, Dewan Deena Nath, and Fukea Moorooddeen, on the part of the Maharajah Dhu-leep Singh: and the said treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor-general, and by that of His Highness Maharajah Dhuleep Singh.

"Done at Lahore, this 9th day of March, in the year of our Lord, one thousand, eight hundred and forty-six, corresponding with the 10th day of
Rubbee-ool-awul 1262, Hijree, and ratified on the same day.

(Signed) "MAHARAJAH DHULEEP SINGH, (L.S.)
H. HARDINGE, (L.S.)
BHAEE RAM SINGH, (L.S.)
RAJAH LAL SINGH, (L.S.)
SIRDAR TEJ SINGH, (L.S.)
F. CURRIE.
SIRDAR CHUTTUR SINGH ATTAREEWALA, (L.S.)
SIRDAR RUNJOOR SINGH MAJEETHEA,
(L.S.)
DEWAN DEENA NATH, (L.S.)
H. M. LAWRENCE.
FUQUEER MOOROODDEEN, (L.S.)

"By Order of the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India.

(Signed) "F. CURRIE,
"Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-general."

"Memorandum of a State Visit paid by the Governor-general, to the Maharajah of Lahore, in His Highness's palace, on the 10th March, 1846.

"On the afternoon of the 10th March, the
Governor-general, attended by His Excellency the Commander-in-chief, His Excellency the Governor of Scinde, and the British officers who were present at the ratification of the treaty on the 9th instant, paid a visit of congratulation to the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, at the palace in Lahore. On this occasion Dewan Deena Nath, by direction of the minister and assembled chiefs, read from a written paper an address, of which the following is a translation:

"It is impossible for us adequately to express the gratitude which we feel to the Governor-general, for his having determined to continue the ancient relations which existed with the late Maharajah Runjeet Singh, and for his generosity, kindness and mercy, in maintaining this government.

"For the excellent advice which was given yesterday, through kindness and friendship, to the assembled Sirdars, exhorting them to unanimity, prudence, and good government, we are also most grateful. We consider this good advice as having a direct tendency to effect the re-establishment of the government of the country. We have further to express our gratitude, for arrangements having generously been made, in compliance with our solicitations, for leaving a garrison in Lahore of British troops, with Major Lawrence and other trustworthy officers, for our protection and that of the city.

"These troops will assuredly be honourably dismissed towards the Sutlej, upon a satisfactory
settlement of affairs being effected, within the period prescribed for their stay.

"" The various acts of generosity shown by the Governor-general on the present occasion, entirely satisfy us, that His Excellency will ever maintain the same magnanimous and generous policy towards this state, and that taking compassion on the extreme youth of the Maharajah, His Excellency will maintain all those friendly relations which existed in the time of the late Maharajah Runjeet Singh."

"After the presentation by the Maharajah of the usual offerings, the Governor-general and suite returned to camp.

" (True memorandum and translation,)  
(Signed) " F. Currie,  
" Secretary to the Government of India,  
with the Governor-general."

"Note of the proceedings of a meeting of the Minister and Chiefs of the Lahore Durbar, and the British Commissioners, held at the tent of the Governor-general's Agent, on the 11th March, 1846.

"On the forenoon of the 11th instant, the minister and chiefs of the Durbar attended at the tent of the Governor-general's Agent, when the following agree-

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ment was concluded, and subsequently confirmed by the Right Hon. the Governor-general.

"Articles of Agreement concluded between the British government and the Lahore Durbar, on the 11th March, 1846.

"Whereas the Lahore government has solicited the Governor-general to leave a British force at Lahore, for the protection of the Maharajah's person and of the capital, till the re-organization of the Lahore army, according to the provisions of Article VI. of the treaty of Lahore, dated the 9th instant. And whereas the Governor-general has, on certain conditions, consented to the measure. And whereas it is expedient that certain matters concerning the territories ceded by Articles III. and IV. of the aforesaid treaty should be specifically determined, the following eight Articles of Agreement have this day been concluded, between the afore-mentioned contracting parties.

"Article I.—The British government shall leave at Lahore, till the close of the current year, A. D. 1846, such force as shall seem to the Governor-general adequate for the purpose of protecting the person of the Maharajah, and the inhabitants of the city of Lahore, during the re-organization of the Sikh army in accordance with the provisions of Article IV. of the treaty of Lahore; that force to be withdrawn at any convenient time, before the expiration of the year, if the object to be fulfilled shall,
in the opinion of the Durbar, have been attained; but the force shall not be detained at Lahore beyond the expiration of the current year.

"Article II.—The Lahore government agrees that the force left at Lahore for the purpose specified in the foregoing article, shall be placed in full possession of the fort and the city of Lahore, and that the Lahore troops shall be removed from within the city. The Lahore government engages to furnish convenient quarters for the officers and men of the said force, and to pay to the British government all the extra expenses in regard to the said force, which may be incurred by the British government, in consequence of their troops being employed away from their own cantonments, and in a foreign territory.

"Article III.—The Lahore government engages to apply itself immediately and earnestly to the re-organization of its army, according to the prescribed condition, and to communicate fully with the British authorities left at Lahore, as to the progress of such re-organization, and as to the location of the troops.

"Article IV.—If the Lahore government fails in the performance of the conditions of the foregoing article, the British government shall be at liberty to withdraw the force from Lahore, at any time before the expiration of the period specified in Article I.

"Article V.—The British government agrees to respect the bonâ fide rights of those Jagheerdars
within the territories ceded by Articles III. and IV. of the treaty of Lahore, dated 9th instant, who were attached to the families of the late Maharajah Runjeet Singh, Khurruk Singh, and Shere Singh, and the British government will maintain those Jagheerdars in their bonâ fide possession, during their lives.

"Article VI.—The Lahore government shall receive the assistance of the British local authorities, in recovering the arrears of revenue justly due to the Lahore government from their Kardars and managers in the territories ceded by the provisions of Article III. and IV. of the treaty of Lahore, to the close of the Khurreef harvest of the present year, viz., 1902 of the Sumbut Bikramaject.

"Article VII.—The Lahore government shall be at liberty to remove from the forts in the territories specified in the foregoing article, all treasure and state property, with the exception of guns. Should, however, the British government desire to retain any part of the said property, they shall be at liberty to do so, paying for the same at a fair valuation; and the British officers shall give their assistance to the Lahore government, in disposing on the spot of such part of the aforesaid property as the Lahore government may not wish to remove, and the British officers may not desire to retain.

"Article VIII.—Commissioners shall be immediately appointed by the two governments, to settle and lay down the boundary between the two states,
as defined by Article IV. of the treaty of Lahore, dated, 9th March, 1846.

(Signed) "Maharajah Duleep Singh, (L.S.)
H. Hardinge, (L.S.)
Bhaee Ram Singh, (L.S.)
Rajah Lall Singh, (L.S.)
Sirdar Tej Singh, (L.S.)
F. Currie.
Sirdar Chuttur Singh Attareewala, (L.S.)
Sirdar Runjoor Singh Majeethea, (L.S.)
Dewan Deena Nath, (L.S.)
H. M. Lawrence.
Fuqueer Noorooddeen, (L.S.)

"By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India.

(Signed) "F. Currie,
"Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-general."

"Treaty between the British government and Maharajah Goolab Singh, concluded at Umritsir, on the 16th March, 1846."

"Treaty between the British government on the one part, and Maharajah Goolab Singh of Jummoo on the other, concluded on the part of the British government by Frederick Currie, Esquire, and
Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under the orders of the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., one of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-general appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and by Maharajah Goolab Singh in person.

"Article I.—The British government transfers and makes over for ever, in independent possession, to Maharajah Goolab Singh and the heirs male of his body, all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies, situated to the eastward of the river Indus, and westward of the river Ravee, including Chumba, and excluding Lahool, being part of the territory ceded to the British government by the Lahore State, according to the provisions of Article IV. of the treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March, 1846.

"Article II.—The eastern boundary of the tract transferred by the foregoing article to Maharajah Goolab Singh, shall be laid down by commissioners appointed by the British government and by Maharajah Goolab Singh respectively for that purpose, and shall be defined in a separate engagement after survey.

"Article III.—In consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs, by the provisions of the foregoing articles, Maharajah Goolab Singh will pay to the British Government the sum of seventy-five lakhs of rupees, (nanukshahee) fifty lakhs to be paid on the ratification of this treaty, and
twenty-five lakhs on or before the 1st of October of the current year A.D. 1846.

"Article IV.—The limits of the territories of Maharajah Goolab Singh shall not be, at any time, changed without the concurrence of the British government.

"Article V.—Maharajah Goolab Singh will refer to the arbitration of the British Government any disputes or questions that may arise between himself and the government of Lahore, or any other neighbouring state, and will abide by the decision of the British government.

"Article VI.—Maharajah Goolab Singh engages for himself and heirs to join with the whole of his military force the British troops when employed within the hills, or in the territories adjoining his possessions.

"Article VII.—Maharajah Goolab Singh engages never to take, or retain in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American state, without the consent of the British government.

"Article VIII.—Maharajah Goolab Singh engages to respect, in regard to the territory transferred to him, the provisions of Articles V. VI. and VII. of the separate engagement between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar, dated March 11th, 1846.

"Article IX.—The British government will give its aid to Maharajah Goolab Singh in protecting his territories from external enemies.
"Article X.—Maharajah Goolab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the British government, and will in token of such supremacy, present annually to the British government one horse, twelve perfect shawl goats of approved breed (six male and six female) and three pairs of Cashmere shawls.

"This treaty, consisting of ten articles, has been this day settled by Frederick Currie, Esquire, and Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under the directions of the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B. Governor-general on the part of the British government, and by Maharajah Goolab Singh in person, and the said treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B. Governor-general.

"Done at Umritsir this 16th day of March in the year of our Lord 1846, corresponding with the 17th day of Rubbee-ool-awul 1262, Hijree.

(Signed) "Goolab Singh (L.S.)
H. Hardinge (L.S.)
F. Currie,
H. M. Lawrence,

"By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India.

(Signed) "F. Currie,
Secretary to the government of India, with the Governor-general."

(True Extracts)

(Signed) "F. Currie,
Secretary to the government of India, with the Governor-general."
CHAPTER XI.

GENERAL REMARKS.

The chief features in the campaign which we have endeavoured to describe in the foregoing chapters, were the suddenness of its commencement; the desperate resistance on the part of the Sikhs; the fearful loss among the European officers and soldiers; and the short duration of the operations under which the capital of the Punjab was taken possession of by British troops, and terms dictated to a proud and overbearing people by the Governor-general of India. But these were not the only striking points. A new territory had been acquired; the cis-Sutlej Sikh possessions confiscated; and the far-famed valley of Cashmere bestowed on a vassal of the government of Lahore as a reward for services performed to that state; add to which, an indemnity of a million and a half had been levied on the Lahore government. Such were the objects attained, but the moral effect of the victories over the Sikhs was not confined to that nation alone;
but to every state in India and its vicinity, from Cape Comorin to Cabul. The protected Sikh states on the left bank of the Sutlej wavered in their allegiance while the contest lasted, but no sooner had the army of the Sutlej crossed the river than confidence was restored, and these states became removed as it were from the frontier into the centre of our provinces. The Sutlej was no longer the boundary line; nor did the mountain tribes of Soochat, Kooloo, and Mundee continue to dread the Sikhs: they felt that they were now the subjects of a power under whom they could enjoy peaceful possession of their mountain homes.

With regard to the apparent suddenness of the commencement of the Sikh campaign, it would seem that the Sikhs had been employed for months bringing their guns across the river and concealing them. The reports long spread about their intended invasion of the British territories were not credited, though the news-writers at Lahore continued to furnish almost daily tidings of what transpired in the Durbar; dwelling on the inability of the Ranee and the nominal government, to control the unruly Sikhs, who had come to a full determination to cross the Sutlej. One reason for disbelieving such reports originated in the Sikhs having used the same menace before, in 1843. But since that period the frontier had assumed a very different aspect, and a bridge had even been prepared for the purpose of passing over a British force into the Punjab. The Sikhs now wished to
anticipate us in crossing the boundary line, and if they ever believed that we meditated the subjugation of their country, it was not a bad stroke of counter-policy to resolve to effect a similar purpose by annexing Hindostan to the empire of the Punjab. The outbreak was not in reality, therefore, so sudden as may have been supposed from the tone assumed by the Sikhs and the futile attempt of their government to control them. It has been said, that the cession of the Sikh states belonging to the Lahore government on the left or British side of the Sutlej had been demanded, and that such a proposition had given dire offence. If the proposal were really made, it might have been expected, that a force capable of taking possession of the states in question would have been in readiness in case of refusal.

In resolving, therefore, to cross the Sutlej, the least that the Sikhs could expect was the restoration of their old boundary line, the Jumnah; instead of yielding any territory to the British, they were fully bent on regaining possession of all the protected Sikh States on the left bank of the Sutlej, as well as the small tract of country about Feerozpore, which had merged into our possession by the death of the Sirdarnee, much to the annoyance of the Lahore government.

The next feature in the campaign, namely, the desperate resistance on the part of the Sikhs, might have been expected. Had the Sikh army, however numerous its ranks may have been, met the British
in a fair field, the contest would have been of short duration, though the loss of life would, no doubt, have been great if the guns had been taken at the point of the bayonet, as occurred at Maharajpore. But the Sikhs had before their eyes that famous engagement with the Mahrattas; and they were perfectly aware that they could not calculate on the chance of victory without entrenching their position. Having formed such an entrenchment at Feerozshuhur, the loss of European officers and soldiers was necessarily great, when exposed to the murderous fire of upwards of a hundred guns dealing out the deadly grape upon a comparatively small force of Europeans. Again, at Sobraon the entrenchment assumed the form of a regular fortification, and the troops opposed to the portion where an entrance was impracticable, must have suffered severely in killed and wounded; and the result of the attack by the first and second divisions shows how terrible the loss was against impregnable walls lined by Sikhs in triple rows.

When the campaign first began, most of those engaged in it were of opinion that two years, at least, would be required for its completion; and had affairs taken another turn—had the Sikhs, after the battle of Feerozshuhur, remained on their own side of the river, and opposed the passage of the British across, we should, after forcing the Sutlej, have followed them to their capital or to Umritsir and Govindghur, and the campaign would have been prolonged to one or two years, instead
of being finished within four months. The circumstance, therefore, of the war being carried on, on the left bank of the Sutlej, was the chief cause of the shortness of its duration.

The features of the campaign are, therefore, readily accounted for, and need not surprise any one who takes the trouble of inquiring into all the bearings of the case; and we trust the details given in the present work will enable those who take an interest in the affairs of the Sikhs to understand their present position and future prospects; regarding both of which, however, a few observations may be offered:—

The kingdom of the Punjab, as established by the conquests of Runjeet Singh, no longer exists. It has been shorn of its fairest territories; the Bist Jalindhar, looked upon as the garden of the Punjab, has been ceded to the British. The states on the left bank of the Sutlej, formerly owning the supremacy of Lahore, have been confiscated by the same power, and the beautiful province of Cashmere has been sold to Goolab Singh, a vassal of Lahore.

What, it may be asked, now belongs to the government of Lahore? We have taken the richest Doab of which the Punjab can boast. The country no longer lays claim to five rivers; it is bounded on the east by the Beas, and on the west by the Indus. But all the hill or mountainous tracts have been yielded up; not only those included in the Bist Jalindhar, but likewise those from the Beas to the Indus; and over this last tract, Goolab Singh

Goolab Singh as an independent sovereign.
reigns an independent king, unless his annual present "of one horse, twelve perfect shawl goats of approved breed, (six male and six female), and three pairs of Cashmere shawls," can be construed into tokens of the British supremacy.

The government of Lahore may be said to be annihilated. In appearance, it exists: there is a king, a prime minister, and an army. But one and all are dependent on the British power! The capital of the country is not garrisoned by Sikhs. It is entirely in the hands of the paramount power, whose soldiers are lent for a time to preserve the semblance of a government, but in reality to keep possession of the advantages already gained, until the season of the year shall enable the Governor-general to annex the whole country to the British possessions, if such a step be deemed necessary. It is in vain to dissemble the fallen condition of the Punjab. Already has rebellion broken out in several places; and there is reason to fear that even the possessions belonging to the Lahore government across the Indus, will be wrested from it by Dost Mohummad, if not yielded without a struggle. The kingdom founded by the Maharajah Runjeet Singh is thus being broken up; and already have the richest portions of it been parcelled out and sold! The respect which the tributaries of Lahore showed to its government is now turned into contempt, for the sovereignty is virtually extinct. Dhuleep is, indeed, king of the Sikhs, his mother is Ranee, and both are supported by the British!
True, but the very fact of being "supported" by a foreign power proves, in the plainest manner, the weakness and nominal character of the government. Dhuleep Singh, king or Maharajah, is under one or both titles a mere puppet; possesses no real power, and is wholly a dependent on the British, who are now in reality the rulers of the Punjab. It will be a fortunate event if, by the arrangements and treaties set forth in the Governor-general's proclamations, the people of the Punjab can be made to believe that they have a king and government; but it is not likely that the turbulent Sikhs, who yielded no allegiance either to Dhuleep Singh or his mother before their invasion of the British provinces, will now pay them homage, degraded as they conceive mother and son to be by the treaty formed with the British; whereby the kingdom gained by their great ruler, Runjeet Singh, has been divided among strangers, and the richest province belonging to it bestowed on a man who once owed to the Lahore government allegiance as a vassal.

The fortune of war has deprived the Sikhs, for the present, of the means of showing how irksome, degrading, and humiliating their position is; but it would argue a very imperfect knowledge of the character of the Sikh, to suppose that he will long yield even a seeming obedience to the present government. Any change would be preferable, and it is not improbable that before many months have elapsed, there will be a new head of the government. At all
events, discord and anarchy must soon result from the present condition of the Punjab: there may be a king at Lahore, but how far does his power extend? Can he leave that fortress, and trust himself to his own troops, or can his mother retreat from her stronghold without the risk of being murdered?

Goolab Singh appears, at present, a firm ally of the Lahore government, and sincere in his endeavours to arrange matters between it and the British; but such mediation is only nominal on his part. Had the Lahore government been guilty of instigating the Sikhs to their invasion of the British territories, the heads of it might justly have dreaded the displeasure of the latter. But we have shown, and the government well know, that neither the Ranee, nor her son, had sufficient control over the soldiery, to restrain their desire to invade India. Had it been otherwise—had they instigated the hostility of the Sikhs, the Governor general would have entered into no treaty with them. The opportunity was favourable to Goolab Singh’s intervention as a mediator, since there was no other influential person who could undertake the task with any prospect of success; for the Sirdars were all, more or less, implicated in the invasion; whereas Goolab Singh had stood aloof throughout the contest. He was thus the only person connected with Lahore, that could be called to the aid of the Ranee and her son, at a time when the safety of both, as well as the existence of the Lahore government, was at stake. The
Rajah deserves credit for the able manner in which he arranged matters between the two governments; but he never supposed that out of all he effected, any permanent good could arise. Before the Sikhs invaded the British territories, the Rajah of Jummoo knew that the force which he could bring against us was unequal to the contest, and this was one of the reasons why he forbore to aid his countrymen—but what could have induced Goolab Singh to come to Lahore and risk his life, if he had not some great object to gain? We have attributed his motives to the thirst for revenge on the murderers of his nephew and son; and the terms he proposed before he would accept the Wuzeersh, appeared to confirm this view; but the Rajah, in visiting Lahore, wished also to impress on the Khalsa troops, that he was their friend and ally; and they believed him, nay, relied upon his aid in the time of need. This was the impression he wanted to make, and calculating on the favourable opinion entertained of him by the Sikhs, he returned to Jummoo, there to await the coming struggle, which he foresaw would lead to his being called for at a time when nothing could save the Lahore government but his own interference and mediation.

Goolab Singh became Wuzeer, because in that capacity he could more easily and expeditiously arrange the terms of treaty as regarded the Lahore and the British governments; but when the critical time arrived, he found it convenient to quarrel
with the Ranee, and vacate an appointment which he had accepted merely to suit his own political views. From being a vassal of Lahore, he was now about to become an independent Rajah, not only of his own territory of Jummoo, but of the whole mountainous tract between the Beas and the Indus; and this accession of authority and influence arose from a war which he himself had secretly fostered, with a view of reducing the power of the Lahore government, and rendering it wholly dependent for its existence on one with which he knew he could make favourable terms for securing his own independence.

But in accomplishing his own end, to what a degraded condition has he reduced the government of Lahore! We believe that few will be inclined to doubt what we have asserted, namely, that in reality no independent government now exists in the Punjab. Through the fortune of war, the Sikhs were so completely humbled by the British, that the means of governing their vast kingdom no longer existed; and it has been shown, that long before the Jaldihur Doab was ceded to the British, the hill tribes, occupying the mountainous districts of it, had thrown off their allegiance to the government of Lahore; so that our taking possession of this Doab was a mere matter of necessity, forced upon the British in consequence of having weakened and broken the power which had, heretofore, been paramount in this Doab. The same reasoning applies to Cashmere, and other hilly
districts made over to Goolab Singh. Had the latter not thus received them, there is every probability that he would have seized upon them by force, if they had remained as portions of the kingdom of Lahore. A government, though not entirely overthrown, may be so far weakened, as to be incapable of defending itself against internal disorders and anarchy; and this has been the position of that of Lahore, not only since the campaign with the British, but from the day of the death of Shere Singh and the Prime Minister Dhyan Singh. The government of the Punjab has been, virtually, in the hands of the soldiery, who plundered the state as long as anything remained; and when the treasury was exhausted, and the disaffected troops saw no prospect of their being longer maintained, they resolved to hasten a crisis, whereby the independence of themselves and their government would be compromised, or their ambitious views realized. But they cared not for consequences: they were reckless and determined to fight; and though their several defeats have taught the Sikhs a lesson, yet their return to order and peace is far distant. Their progress has been arrested and themselves beaten and destroyed in great numbers; but the Punjab is a populous country, and it is not likely that those men who have been disbanded, will all at once settle down quietly; they must have employment, but they will not exchange the sword for the ploughshare, and therefore their only means of procuring a livelihood must depend on
the former. If there be no public enemy against whom they can wield it, nor any government capable of maintaining them as soldiers, what alternative remains for them, but to turn their arms against each other?

The present condition of the Punjab is as degraded as it was when the Mussulmans conquered the fierce and barbarous hordes of Sikhs led by the fanatic Byrojee Bunda; the only difference being, that on the latter occasion, the Sikhs had never had a king, while on the present, they have one in name at least, if destitute of the other attributes of sovereignty. There had never been a man amongst them who could not only assert his own independence as a Sirdar, but overcome all his peers, and form a kingdom, until Runjeet appeared on the stage, and effected an object which must ever impress us with the highest opinion of his energy, courage, and judgment. Even aided by a British force, the government of Lahore is feeble, and could not exist a day were the garrison of Lahore withdrawn.

The present arrangement in the Punjab is an experiment which may prove successful, and every one who wishes to see order and good government take the place of misrule and anarchy, must wish for its success. We have had quite enough of warfare.

It may be said that other states have been similarly situated, for instance, that of Bhurtpore; and that after leaving a regiment, or even half a one,
for a few months for the protection of the young Bulwunt Singh, the state has remained in a peaceful and flourishing condition for a period of twenty years. But in making this comparison, we must not forget, that the strong fortress of Bhurtpore was dismantled, and its walls so far destroyed as never again to offer a resistance which had twice defied the power of the British. In the Punjab, the strongholds of the Sikhs remain entire: no breach has been made in the walls of Lahore, Umritisir, or the still stronger fort of Govind Ghur; and though one of these is at the present moment in possession of a British force, and the others nominally in the power of the government, it would be no difficult matter for the Sikhs to render both Umritisir and Govind Ghur strong garrisons, capable of standing a siege. That the British have taken all the guns that had been pointed against them is true, but there is every reason to believe, that there are many more in Govind Ghur and Umritisir. The treasury of Lahore may be exhausted, but what has become of the vast wealth amassed by Runjeet Singh? A great deal, no doubt, fills the coffers of the Rajah of Jummoo, but much of it must be in the possession of the various Sirdars of the Punjab, and it only requires a coalition amongst them, to raise the means of arming their followers, and rendering them once more formidable even to the British. The wealth and strength of the government itself have been exhausted or destroyed, but the private resources of the
Sirdars have been left almost untouched, though for form's sake, they were called upon to contribute in raising the indemnity which Deena Nath, Chuttur Singh, Bhaee Ram Singh, or Tej Singh, could readily have paid out of their own coffers!

If the government of Lahore found so much difficulty in raising half a million of money, at a time when the repeated overthrows of its troops left no alternative, how much more will this difficulty be increased when a similar sum is demanded? The government itself will not be in a condition to respond to the call, and the Sirdars will turn a deaf ear to the renewed demands made on them. They will rather trust to the fortune of war, and stake their wealth on the hazard of the die, than yield it for the support of a weak and imbecile government.

The war cry has ceased for the present; there is an ominous lull; the recollection of their loss weighs heavily on the Sikhs at this moment, and may continue to do so for some months, or even until the withdrawal of the British force which now garrisons at Lahore, but sooner or later the day must come when the British standards will be again unfurled, and the Indus, and not the Beas, become the frontier barrier of her possessions in the east.

Such is the present position of the Punjab, and such the shadows of the future, and it therefore becomes a subject of the first importance, to consider how the latter are to be guarded against; in other words, how the British are to hold possession
of a country boasting a numerous population of warlike and unruly men like the Sikhs! They cannot be driven out of the country, for where could they go, unless they crossed the Ravee, Chenab, Jelum, and Indus, pursued by the British? And this leads us to advert to the measures to be adopted in case it becomes necessary for the British to subjugate the whole of the Punjab.

The campaign which has just been terminated, proved incontestibly, that the only efficient arm that could maintain an equal contest with the Sikhs, was the European infantry and cavalry. If ever the Khalsa troops therefore re-assemble and wage war on the British, the army of the latter must be composed of a much larger force in Europeans, than it can at present boast of. The present Anglo-Indian army is required for the protection of the territory which we already possess; and though the great moral effect of our late victories over the Sikhs, may render it a safe measure to leave 20,000 troops beyond the Sutlej, yet this impression, like every other, will daily become fainter. If, then, the present strength of this army is needed for the security of the British territory in India, the acquisition of the four remaining Doabs lying between the rivers Beas, Ravee, Chenab, Jelum, and Indus, will necessarily require a great addition, not perhaps for the acquisition of these extensive tracts of country, but for retaining them. It is no doubt true, that the British government do not want more territory, but it will not do for us to take merely the accession of more territory unavoidable.
a slice or two from the loaf; the whole must be devoured for security's sake. As yet, the only increase to the army has taken place in the irregular cavalry branch: the proposed augmentation in the Native infantry has been for the present abandoned.

The cause of the outcry against raising new regiments of European infantry or cavalry is the expense; but surely if the European soldiers be more efficient than thrice the number of Natives, or rather, if the former possess qualities which are looked for in vain among the latter, it is obvious that the European soldier must be less costly than the sepoy.

Already the Anglo-Indian army of Bengal numbers seventy-four regiments of Native infantry, but possesses only two of European infantry. The Queen's government allows a certain number of regiments for India, because in all probability some doubts formerly existed in England, as to whether the European soldier, disciplined under officers who never leave India, could be equal to the men drilled in Europe. There is no longer any ground for this opinion. The Bengal European infantry was proved in the late war to be equal to the regiments in Her Majesty's service.

Now, it will be seen from what occurred in the war with the Sikhs, that Natives may be made as efficient artillery-men as Europeans, and the Sikh artillery proved that this branch of their service could not have been better served, or have done
greater destruction, had their gunners been Natives of Europe, instead of the Punjab. The efficiency of the Native artillery in our own service, likewise confirms the high character of this branch of the army, whether the gunners be Native or European. The former are proud of this branch of the service, they love their guns as they do their brothers, and never desert them but in death. The same feeling was strongly evinced among the Sikh artillery-men, on several of them being disbanded. They were offered service in the line; but they, one and all, refused to serve as infantry soldiers.

The Native of India forms his own opinion regarding the efficiency of his weapons, and while the Native cavalry-soldier longs for a heavy cutting sword, instead of one meant merely for the thrust, and the infantry soldier may also wish for some other weapon in lieu of the bayonet, the artillery-man has nothing further to demand; there is his noble gun, which, if properly served, needs no further assistance; once in position, it deals out its murderous contents with certainty and terrible effect. A sword or a lance may fail in penetrating the quilted clothes of the Sikhs, but not so the shot or grape! The arm is perfect in itself, and is not feeble when exposed to the indomitable charge of the British bayonets. Allowing therefore, every weight to this important arm, we yet see, that it must yield the palm to European infantry, and the charge of the latter against the Sikh guns, sustains the character in the nineteenth century, that the
Macedonian phalanx did when led by Alexander the Great against Porus.

From what has been said and shown of the European infantry, it may be inferred, that to possess strength in this arm, is to secure victory under any circumstances. Hence the necessity for raising more European regiments than at present exist in India.

But while allowing its full weight to the European infantry, it must not be overlooked that the cavalry is equally important and requisite. We have in a previous chapter discussed the merits of regular and irregular Native cavalry; but whatever their respective merits may be, it is an undeniable fact that neither are at all equal to European cavalry: we do not deny that the regular Native cavalry have often charged gallantly, and vied with the Europeans; and as far as the knowledge of the sword is concerned, there may be superiority in many instances on the side of the Native horseman; but where a combined, irresistible heavy charge is required, the great superiority of the European cavalry must be allowed. In the Native infantry, there are numerous individuals who in single combat would triumph over a European footsoldier, for the Native is skilful with his sword; but there is something in the European when highly excited on the field of battle, allied to madness, which nothing can resist; all his milder feelings give way to a fierce and terrible impetuosity; the quiet, orderly soldier becomes at once a daring and despe-
rate warrior. At Feerozshuhur, nothing could exceed the individual courage of the European soldiers; the havoc committed by individuals is hardly to be credited. One remarkable case may be noticed, that of Drill-serjeant Snooks, a quiet and inoffensive man, but an exceedingly smart and strict disciplinarian, who was so excited at the battle alluded to, that he actually killed eleven men with his own hand! Some he shot, the brains of others he knocked out with the butt-end of his musket, and several were bayonetted. This feat, as witnessed by an officer who related the circumstance to us, was one of the most extraordinary that can be well conceived; the man more resembled a demon than a human being. But indeed, in this he was not singular; the fierce spirit exhibited by the 3rd dragoons at Moodkee, for example, impressed the Sikhs with the idea that they were something akin to fiends, if not entirely supernatural!

In all great engagements, however much the infantry may do, the victory can never be complete without an efficient force of cavalry; not such cavalry as the Sikh Ghoorchurras, but brave, dauntless fellows like our European dragoons; and the want of this branch was sadly felt at the commencement of the late campaign, particularly at Moodkee and Feerozshuhur.

The necessity, therefore, for raising European cavalry regiments who may be at all times available is obvious. Our strength in regular Native
cavalry is sufficient; and so it will be in irregular cavalry when the number of the latter shall equal fifteen regiments; but surely there ought to be two complete regiments of European cavalry in the Company's service, or even more; and the men enlisting into the Company's service would furnish numerous candidates for this important branch.

In the event of the Punjab being annexed to our territory, there will necessarily be required five complete regiments of European infantry and one of European cavalry for each Doab, in addition to a considerable force of Native infantry, cavalry, and artillery; at least, until the refractory spirit of the Sikhs should be completely broken. The European regiments of infantry, making five in all, should each be kept complete to the strength of 1000 bayonets.

It may be here observed, that it is alleged, the expense of maintaining such a force in the Punjab would more than counterbalance any immediate advantage to be derived from its possession. This may or may not be true; but the aspect of affairs is so completely changed in that country within the short period of six months, that force alone can maintain its tranquillity; and before annexing it to the British possessions, it may be necessary to annihilate the whole race of disorderly Sikhs who live by the sword alone. Such a war of extermination will of course be avoided if possible, for humanity shudders at the bare idea of extensive bloodshed;
but the fierce and barbarous character of these people must be taken into account; and if any one is inclined to believe that clemency would be shown by the Sikhs, were any untoward and unlooked-for event to cause our troops to fall into their hands, he is more mistaken than if he looked for it from the Afghans in the defiles of the Khyber Pass. The Mussulman will spare, as was evinced in the case of Akhber Khan, but such pity is not to be expected from the followers of Gooroo Govind. How did Biddulph escape? Merely through the kindness of the Mussulman artillery-men. Does any one suppose that Dr. Banan and the men of the 31st would have escaped death if the Sikhs, under Runjoor Singh, had got possession of them? No wonder, then, that the British government should feel disinclined to have anything further to do with the Sikhs beyond endeavouring to re-establish rule and order, and assisting their government in obtaining and preserving control over its own subjects. Rather than come in contact with this sanguinary people by keeping possession of Cashmere, this fertile tract has been made over to Goolab Singh, who, though not a Sikh himself, is yet, from experience, well adapted for defending his own possessions against their assaults.

There is some reason for believing, that sooner than annex the whole of the Punjab to the British territories, the country might be placed in the hands of the Rajah of Jummoo and Cashmere. But Goolab Singh cannot live for ever; the lives
of the Ranee and her young son are very uncertain also; and if these three individuals should disappear, what is to become of the Punjab?

If such a crisis should occur, the Sikhs might probably look to a son of Shere Singh as the rightful heir to the throne of Lahore; but still British interference would be required to support him. Such a weak kind of government could not exist long; and, therefore, the only alternative, short of subjugation, is the adoption of the system of supporting the government by a contingent or subsidiary force. The Sikhs, if regularly paid and entertained as soldiers, might, no doubt, be made serviceable in this way; but the feudal system in force would throw great obstacles in the way of this arrangement, and render the attempt at supporting a king at Lahore as nugatory as was that of maintaining Shah Soojah Ool Moolk on the throne of Cabul. Like that imbecile man, the person seated on the throne of Lahore might for a time appear grateful for our aid; but sooner or later he would find our presence irksome, and endeavour by every means in his power to rid himself of the very people to whom he stood indebted for his exaltation.

The present aspect of affairs in the Punjab differs widely from that in Afghanistan during the short reign of Shah Soojah. No ruler has been dethroned to give place to another. The present Maharajah of the Sikhs is tacitly allowed to be the rightful heir of the throne of Lahore, and there appears to
be no other candidate who wishes to dispossess him. Still a weak government will ever have secret enemies, and when its head requires the assistance of a foreign power, it is impossible for him to secure the esteem or firm adherence of his subjects.

It may be a point for consideration, whether the Punjab be worth annexing to the British territories. At first, the expense of securing it would probably more than counterbalance the revenue advantages accruing from the possession; but the affair is not entirely one of profit and loss. Here is a large and populous nation without any efficient government. If the support of the British be withdrawn, the return to anarchy and misrule is certain, and we must either allow the contending powers to settle matters by a civil war, or seize at once the country and bring it under British rule; or suffer some other contiguous power to interfere for its settlement. This last alternative cannot, on broad and obvious political grounds, be permitted. The complete annexation of the Punjab will, therefore, sooner or later be forced on us, and though attended by great outlay, the rich tracts of country might, under careful British rule and management, eventually be made to yield a rich return. Let us then be prepared for the emergency. No means must be overlooked for curbing the disorderly and treacherous spirit of the Sikhs; by force, and force alone, can this be accomplished, and in adopting
the necessary measures let the principle of economy for a time be overlooked: the acquisition of the Punjab, with the Indus forming our boundary on the west, will no doubt tend to consolidate our vast empire, and ensure a permanency of peace and its countless blessings.
CHAPTER XII.

THE BRITISH GARRISON AT LAHORE.

The Natives of India, using the words in their most extensive sense, have always admitted the indomitable valour of the British arms. They surmount obstacles and overcome difficulties which are ordinarily deemed impracticable by oriental nations. Rivers, mountains, rugged defiles, offer but a temporary resistance to a British force.

Observe the campaign of the army of the Indus. Instances of it. That river had previously been regarded by the Natives of Hindostan as a natural barrier, beyond which it was unsafe to pass. They had a horror of the bare act of using the water of a stream which they hold in no esteem. Unlike their favorite Ganges, the sluggish waters of which flow, after leaving the mountains at Hurdwar, in a calm and an uninterrupted current to the sea, fertilizing the countries through which they pass, and bearing on their bosom numberless boats freighted with the produce of India as well as foreign articles of trade.
and traffic; the Indus, rising in a wild and desolate region among the unexplored fastnesses of the Himalayan range, and winding its rapid course through mountains and defiles, reaches the plains of the Punjab in a rapid current, and in its course towards the ocean receives the tributary streams of the five rivers. Its banks, in many places, are peopled by a fierce and lawless race who inhabit the almost inaccessible countries in its neighbourhood, and instead of following the peaceful arts of agriculture and commerce, wage continual war with their neighbours, and not unfrequently turn their arms against each other. Such was the river which bore the fleet of the great conqueror Alexander to the ocean, when his veteran troops, tired and worn out with conquest, refused to advance further in their victorious career towards the east, and such is the river which now bears the steamers of the British nation through regions which only a few years ago were possessed by the bigoted and insolent Ameers of Scinde, who ventured to arrest the progress of another Alexander, Sir Alexander Burnes, not attended by a numerous army like the first of his name, but the peaceful bearer of a noble present for the great ruler of the Punjab.

The army of the Indus crossed this great river, threaded the Bolan pass, reached Candahar, and pursued its victorious progress to Cabul after seizing Ghuzni, the stronghold of the Affghans. This was a great achievement, and the nation
capable of performing it was looked upon by the fierce and warlike tribes of the country as invincible. 'Tis true there were no organised troops to arrest the progress of this army, nor could the Afghans oppose it with any force of artillery like that brought into the field by the Sikhs; still, the occupation of Cabul by the British was a great enterprize. That such a task was accomplished by sheer bravery and perseverance, no one will deny who has read the records of the campaign. The capture of the chief fortress of the Ameers was a fitting sequel to the deeds of high emprise enacted in Afghanistan, and the victory on the Sutlej capped the whole. Thus, in a period of eight years, did the British troops under a Keane, a Napier, and a Gough make themselves masters of Cabul, Hyderabad, and Lahore. Ten or twelve years ago, such feats were hardly dreamt of, and the policy of Lord William Bentinck in 1831 would have shrunk from such acts of daring. And how was it that this enlightened governor never contemplated such conquests? Not, certainly, from any dread that the army of India could not accomplish them; but solely from his unwillingness to risk the lives of his own countrymen, as well as those of the Natives of India, in a warfare for the possession of territory which he had the sagacity to perceive would entail endless trouble and expense on its possessors.

The experiment was made by his successor of placing a dethroned and imbecile king on the throne of Cabul; and for what purpose? The
dread of Russian invasion had given rise to suspicions regarding the ruler of Afghanistan; he was supposed to be friendly to Russia. He was also hostile to our old and steady ally Runjeet Singh. He must be dethroned, in order to secure the aid of a man who could not of himself maintain a government, and who, restored to his lost throne, would be the first to prove his ingratitude, by destroying the very people who had placed him there. Shah Soojah ool Moolk was once more king of Cabul, his claims were tacitly allowed, his capital was held possession of by those who had restored him to his kingdom. The army which had accomplished this, was then reduced in strength, and the safety of Afghanistan entrusted to a force composed chiefly of natives of Hindostan, whose only wish was to return to their own country. With the fierce spirit of the Afgghans unbroken, and thirsting for the blood of the invaders of their country, what was then to be expected? Could it ever have been contemplated that such a people would allow any opportunity to pass of expelling the invaders? Was it not rather to be looked for, that by the sword, and the sword alone, our dominion and power were to be preserved? Could any arrangement of a peaceful nature, with the hostile tribes whose country had been invaded, and a ruler forced on the throne whom they despised, ever have been calculated on? Could the bare retreat or withdrawal of the British force satisfy the Afgghans for the insult and injury heaped on
them? No. Nothing less than the destruction of their invaders, offered a balm to their outraged feelings.

The invasion of a country without due provocation, is to be avoided as an evil in itself, and fruitful of disastrous consequences. A people may be conquered, but their conversion into obedient and loyal subjects is always difficult—often impossible. The dangerous experiment of invasion was, therefore, wisely avoided by the present Governor-general of India. He was averse to war under any pretext short of the defence of the British territories, and his forbearance led him to await aggression on the part of the Sikhs. War was forced on him; he adopted hostility as an unavoidable evil; and he triumphed over the foe who rashly attempted invasion. From motives which cannot be misconstrued, the Governor-general in the moment of victory, expresses an ardent wish for the restoration of peace and order among the very people who had threatened to wrest the British possessions in India out of his hands.

Though thus conquered and discomfited, the Sikhs, like the Afghans, cherish the hope of yet retaliating on their conquerors, and the spirit which urges them to seek for the lives of the British, has already manifested itself; not emanating, it is true, from the head of the government, but in the personal malice of the people. In the bazaar of Lahore, the bunniah, or merchants, have dared to ill-treat the political functionaries, while they were
in the act of endeavouring to restore peace and order.

The ringleaders were seized. But what did that amount to? Merely to a demonstration on the part of the Lahore government, that it is ready to redress any insult offered to the paramount power. But does any one believe that Lal Singh, while thus punishing the bunniahs and other disturbers of the public peace, was annoyed at the occurrence? Quite the reverse: Lal Singh, with Tej Singh, Runjoor Singh, Chuttur Singh, Bhaee Ram Singh, and Nooroodeen, the worthies who signed the treaties, were rejoiced at an event, which could in any way degrade a British officer; for while with one hand they would deal out punishment, with the other they would reward the offenders for the attempt to bring disgrace on British authority. There is a well known prejudice in favour of the cow among the Sikhs, and the same prejudice extends to her offspring. It appears, that an artillery-man, while on sentry duty, found two of the latter in his way, and pushed them aside rather rudely. On this the whole bazaar of Lahore is in an uproar, and the shops are shut! The latter proceeding is a favourite one on the part of these bazaar bunniahs, or venders of grain, to mark their contempt for the public authorities. It has occurred in our own bazaars. At Loodianah, an occurrence of the kind took place on the occasion of a horse-dealer killing a cow for the purpose of supplying food to his servants. The animal was slaughtered
by the unsuspecting Mussulman in broad day, and close to the city of Loodianah. The result was that all the shops were closed, and the owners resolutely refused to sell grain or any other commodity to the soldiers cantoned there. This farce was being enacted for the space of two days, when the circumstance was brought to the notice of the author of this work,* by the commanding officer, with an appeal to the effect, that if grain was not obtained the Sipahees must starve! The remedy for such an evil being extremely simple, an order was issued to the kotwal, or chief Native magistrate, to proclaim, that "if in a certain space of time the shops were not opened, the owners would be expelled from the bazaars, and their property confiscated." This proceeding had speedily the desired effect, and the shops were opened.

This powerful prejudice regarding the cow led the authorities at Lahore, during the stay of the army of the Sutlej, to forbid the slaughter of cows or bullocks for the supply of beef to the European troops. How far the order was carried into effect in the commissariat department, we are unable to say with any degree of certainty; but this we can vouch for, that at private messes the beef never appeared in better order, and was never more relished. For an army to be thus dictated to by its prostrate foe, appears somewhat absurd. Had the British been at Lahore on a visit of ceremony, such

* He was officiating for the political agent, during the temporary absence of that functionary.
as happened in 1837, when the Commander-in-chief, Sir Henry Fane, attended the nuptials of Nonehal Singh, the abstaining from the slaughter of cows might justly have been expected; but to deprive the British soldier of his roast beef, to suit the caprice and prejudice of the Sikh government in 1846, is somewhat unreasonable, to say the least of it, and impresses the Sikhs with a belief that our present position at Lahore is one of sufferance. They would dictate to us, even in their prostrate condition; and, therefore, they ought to be reminded that we are able to render the execution of our wishes absolute, without any reference to their absurd prejudices. We are sufficiently acquainted with the firm and determined character of Major Lawrence, to be assured that the Sikhs will not dare to tamper with him; and they may rely upon it that he will not allow any of their absurd notions to interfere with the execution of his arduous duties. One of his assistants was actually struck severely on the head by a brickbat! Hardly a month had elapsed after the ratification of the treaties dictated by the Governor-general, when his representative was grossly assaulted in the streets of Lahore!! The Natives of India smile at such occurrences, and with a shake of the head exclaim, the "Ungrez Buhadur can conquer all, but they do not know how to govern!"

The city of Lahore has been so accustomed to be pillaged, that the inhabitants, particularly the bunnialhs, or merchants, could not account for the
forbearance of the British on any other ground than the fear of Sikh resentment! Had the cities of Lahore and Umritsir been given up to pillage, a more lasting impression of our strength would have been produced than by the act of garrisoning one or both with British soldiers. The Native soldier, moreover, was sadly disappointed at the forbearance shown by the Governor-general and Commander-in-chief. When tired and fatigued with the long march, the sipahee exclaimed, "Oh! sir, only let us loot (pillage) Umritsir for three days, and we shall be amply repaid for all our sufferings!"

The British garrison at Lahore has an ample supply of food for a considerable period. In case, therefore, of a repetition of the insult offered by the bunnias, the political agent might dispense with them, and make over the contents of their shops to the government; supplying their place with his own bunnias, protected by the British force.

Though placing every confidence in the zeal, talent, and energy of Major Lawrence and his assistants, we are, nevertheless, doubtful of the propriety of entrusting the management of a nation like the Sikhs to political deputies. The latter signally failed at Cabul, and would have probably been equally unfortunate in Scinde, had not the military skill and decision of Sir Charles Napier been called into action at a critical moment. We do not mean to insinuate for an instant, that
Colonel Outram was not fully capable of managing affairs at Hyderabad in a military capacity, but the very constitution of political diplomacy is inert as regards the semi-barbarous nations of the East. They pay no respect to civil institutions, and regard the exercise of the functions of a political agent as entirely dependent on the military force at his command. Without a demonstration of this power his orders are disregarded; and, therefore, it might be more effectual were orders to issue at once from the military commandant.

The disaster at Cabul is fresh in the recollection of all. The splendid success in Scinde is equally so. With two such glaring examples before our eyes of the respective value of political and military control, the choice was apparently easy. The Governor of Scinde was at Lahore, and it becomes a question whether it would not have been more advisable to entrust Sir Charles Napier with the full and complete command of the newly acquired territory in the Punjab, as well as the garrison of Lahore and our political relations with the Sikhs, than to send him back to a country which he had already brought into a state of order and good government. It may be urged, the one command was inferior to the other; but this we are disposed to deny. The country of Scinde was under the rule of Mussulman Ameers, with a half-disciplined army which could never have opposed the disciplined troops of Runjeet Singh. The kingdom of the latter has been virtually subdued by the British,
but the complete subjugation of it delayed. A task yet remains of more importance than even the reduction of Scinde; and there appears to be no one so well calculated for its performance as the gallant officer who chastised the insolence and bad faith of the Ameers and the wild tribes of Beloochistan.

The appointment of Sir Charles Napier to command the Punjab would have rendered political agents quite unnecessary. He would have enforced his orders at the point of the sword. Such is his practice in Scinde. There is thus no appeal from his mandates. No doubtful controversy interferes with his movements. No delay takes place in carrying out his measures. He forms his own opinion of the necessities of the moment; and his object being to secure-firm possession of territories once acquired by the sword, his resolve is carried into immediate execution. These are the leading principles by which he has conquered and retained Scinde; and had such principles directed our affairs in Afghanistan, the disastrous events which blemished the fair fame of the British arms would never have occurred.

At Cabul, the management of affairs was entrusted to a political agent or envoy, whose energy and spirit were conspicuous, not as a political leader, but as an adviser in military matters! In the former capacity, he allowed himself to be over-reached by the wily Affghan, and he could only have been extricated by the decided and prompt measures of the military force, but this was in the
hands of another, who considered himself in a great measure the judge of the necessity for its employment. Vacillation was the consequence. The man who knew what was required could not command the resources imperatively called for, and he who ruled these did not understand the critical position in which affairs had been placed, and hesitated to render the necessary assistance. He who conducts political matters in a newly acquired territory ought to have troops at his sole command. His calculations may embrace certain political arrangements, which nothing but a strong military power will enable him to carry out; and unless he possess the full power and management of the force, his plans may be followed by disastrous consequences.

For these reasons we advocate the expediency of a military ruler who shall be invested with full political authority. True, it may be said, a military commandant has only to act under the direction of the political authority; but if measures are recommended which professional experience teaches him are sure to miscarry, his proud and independent spirit will probably spurn the idea of allowing misfortune and disaster to follow any proceeding which he has it in his power not to adopt.

The British policy in Scinde has been a matter of dispute. While some writers applaud Sir Charles Napier's energy, others have endeavoured to vindicate Colonel Outram. What the effect of the measures recommended by the latter would have
been it is now difficult to say, but from the well-known character of the Natives for prevarication, cunning, and deceit, we are induced to believe that the Ameers of Scinde would have proved faithless to their engagements, and disastrous consequences might have followed. We have been somewhat unwillingly led to discuss the affairs of Scinde and Cabul; but in treating of the relative advantages of vesting authority in diplomatists and soldiers, the latest illustrations that presented themselves were naturally adopted. We now repeat, we are warranted, in so far as past experience can guide us, to draw the conclusion, that in governing a country whose inhabitants are decidedly hostile to us, and only wait for an opportunity of expelling and destroying our servants and troops, surely military power is the best adapted for preventing both disasters.

Poor Burnes imagined he knew the Affghan character sufficiently to make him despise the tumult which resulted in the loss of his own life, and eventually in our disasters in Cabul! And the officer who conducts our political affairs at the court of Lahore may see little in an emeute in the bazaar to require more than a reference to the Durbar. A recurrence of such an event, however, must be put beyond the range of possibility, and instead of referring to a weak and merely nominal power, the resident should be in a position to vindicate his own authority. The Durbar of Lahore is certainly bound to punish the inmates of
the bazaar, but what gives it the power to do so? The British garrison. Then why not take the strong ground at once, and without any appeal to another party, inflict condign punishment on all offenders? Had the buniahs of Lahore, instead of directing their brick-bats at the head of the political agent and those of his assistants, aimed them at Lal Singh, Tej Singh, or Bhaee Ram Singh, what would have been the consequence? But it is needless to indulge conjectures on such a subject. Any outrage against these worthies is not likely to assume so mild a form as a flight of brick-bats!

We would fain persuade ourselves that such comotions as that at Lahore are not likely to recur; but from what is known of the Sikh character, we should say they will not allow any opportunity to pass of insulting the Europeans; and as for the Ukalees, the genuine remains of the true followers of Gooroo Govind, they will never be made to respect people of any other religious creed than their own. During the late war, this tribe of religious fanatics fled to their homes. The Ukalee is only needed in predatory warfare, and succeeds much better in burning and pillaging than in making a fair stand on the field of battle. But though the Ukalee has fled, there can be little doubt that he will speedily return to his favorite haunt, Umritsir; and there the disaffected Sikhs are most likely to congregate and discuss their affairs over the sacred tank of the Gooroos.
The poverty of the government of the Punjab is apparent from the demands made on its officers to restore all horses formerly bestowed as presents, and to render account of money, which had been expended by individuals in the general cause. Lal Singh, the prime minister, or wuzeer, has a difficult part to play, and is determined to institute the most economical and rigid measures with a view to recruit the public treasury. He is the medium of communication between the Sikhs and the British government, and so long as the latter supports him, he may continue to hold his place and maintain his authority.

What will appear odd, to an English reader at least, is the circumstance, that a slave usurps the place of royalty at Lahore, gives advice on matters of state, and inspects the troops! This is a female named Mungloo, who is the favourite of the boy Dhuleep Singh, and occasionally takes his place in the management of affairs. The interests of Lal Singh are intimately mixed up with those of the Ranee and her son, and it may be somewhat offensive to his pride and self-conceit, to be thus under the surveillance of the favourite slave. But such influence as that enjoyed by Mungloo at Lahore, is no unusual occurrence at oriental courts; and at one time it was thought, this woman would exercise considerable power over the councils of the Lahore Durbar.*

* The power of this slave appears to be already on the decline, as she has made over her jagheers, or lands, to Lal Singh.
The garrison of Lahore must be prepared to crush every disturbance in the very bud, no matter from what source it may originate. The members of the Lahore government will carefully abstain from giving any direct cause of umbrage. They will assiduously endeavour to meet the wishes of the British, but all this apparent good will and friendly feeling are not to be trusted. Every tumult that may occur, will, in all likelihood, originate in a wish on the part of the Sikh government, to show that it is still capable of managing its own affairs, and so long as the garrison at Lahore is composed of British troops, the government will no doubt last. At the present moment, it is with the greatest difficulty that the revenues can be collected,* and the order to deliver up the fort of Kangra to the British authorities, was at first disregarded.† The settlement of boundary lines has been at all times a fertile source of discord, not only between individuals, but between nations. Goolab Singh is already anxious to possess portions of the hill states, which the Sikhs contend are the property of the Lahore government. A dire spirit of enmity exists between the Sikhs and this independent chief, and it is easy to see how unsettled an aspect

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* Among the first to dispute the power of the Durbar, was the governor of Moolton, Moolraj, the son of the late Saroum Mul; but the presence of a British garrison at Lahore has had the effect of bringing him to a sense of his duty. It is probable that he will not be slow in withdrawing his allegiance when they are deprived of that garrison.

† And it was not until a large British force had reached Kote Kangra that the killadar surrendered.
the posture of affairs between them will speedily assume. Goolab Singh has promised to pay seventy-five lakhs of rupees for the sovereignty of Cashmere and other hill provinces; and the money left by his brother Soochet Singh, and lodged at Feerozpore, has been assigned to him as nearest of kin. This grant in his favour will enable Goolab Singh to liquidate the balance with greater ease. The money is already on the left bank of the Gharra, and can be more easily conveyed to the Honourable Company's treasury than if it were in the stronghold of Goolab Singh at Jummoo.

Goolab Singh will speedily make the people of Cashmere and his other hill territories, make up the balance which he owes to the British, and possessing as he does the protection of the latter, none can dispute his claim with any chance of success. It is to be hoped, that he will exert a mild government in Cashmere, for the resources of this fruitful valley might be greatly increased. It is only through the rapacity of the Sikhs, that its inhabitants have been induced to flee from their native country, and endeavour to gain a precarious livelihood at Umritsir and Loodianah. Were there any inducement held out to these poor people, they would, one and all, return to Cashmere; and, therefore, it is to be lamented, that the British rule cannot prudently be extended over that province.

The manufacture of shawls is carried on to a considerable extent at Umritsir and Loodooanah, and there is no reason why the quality of the manufac-
ture at both places should not equal that produced at Cashmere. The wool is not indigenous to the valley, but brought from Ladakh, and provided the quality is good, the same wool might be spun into as fine and elegant threads at Umritisir and Loodianah as at Cashmere, even though the weavers of the shawls, and the other people concerned in the preparation of the raw material, who resort to these places, may be inferior to those in Cashmere. There is no doubt, that the emigrants employed in the manufacture of shawls, are unhappy; they look in vain for their green plots of land, the lakes and cool streams which give fertility and beauty to Cashmere. Immured in the narrow, close, dirty lanes of Umritisir, they pine in misery and indigence. Hundreds of these poor creatures are carried off annually by fever, cholera, and other epidemic diseases. Were an inducement held out to them to return to Cashmere, and there prosecute their labour in the manufacture of shawls, and the cultivation of the soil, under British rule, we might again see the "earthly paradise," peopled by a happy race, but neither under the Sikh government nor that of Goolab Singh can such be expected.
CHAPTER XIII.

The communications addressed by the Governor-general to the Secret Committee, having been laid before Parliament, we are enabled to avail ourselves of many particulars regarding the origin of the Sikh campaign, which were previously beyond our reach. In the concluding paragraphs of Minute No. 10, the Governor-general expresses himself thus, "My own impression remains unaltered; I don't expect that the troops will come so far as the banks of the Sutlej, or that any positive act of aggression will be committed." This Minute is dated, Camp, Umballa, 4th December, 1845, and shows plainly that the Governor-general did not anticipate the approaching invasion; but he adds, "It is evident that the Rajah and Chiefs, are, for their own preservation, endeavouring to raise a storm, which, when raised, they will be powerless, either to divert or allay." His next Minute is dated from Feerozapore, 31st December, 1845, after the battles
of Moodkee and Feerozshuhur had been fought and won. In the month of October, the Governor-general in his letter, dated, 24th October, 1845, to His Excellency the Commander-in-chief, says, “In the present state of our relations with the Lahore government, your Excellency is aware that I do not anticipate the probability of any emergencies arising, which can require the army under your Excellency’s orders to take the field this autumn.” If by the word ‘autumn,’ the Governor-general meant the months of August, September, and October, he was certainly correct in the opinion he here expresses; but there is every reason to conclude, that the word is to be understood in a more extended sense, comprehending the cold season to which the term winter is seldom or ever applied, in the plains of India at least. “Nevertheless,” the Governor-general continues, “having to deal with a mutinous Sikh army, which has usurped the functions of the government, and whose caprice may at any time force on a rupture with our forces on the frontier, I have deemed it advisable to be prepared with the means of movement to the extent noted in the margin: viz., seven troops of horse artillery, six companies of foot artillery, four light field batteries, two regiments of dragoons, three regiments of light cavalry, five regiments of European infantry, thirteen regiments of Native infantry, six companies of sappers and miners, and two regiments of irregular cavalry; and as it is desirable, that the arrangements should be made on the
most economical scale, the whole will be hired at
the halting rates."

In consequence of this communication, the Com-
mander-in-chief warned the troops on the frontier,
including the 2nd European regiments in the hills,
to hold themselves in readiness. The Meerut
force was likewise furnished with the same instruc-
tions. We are not certain whether the Com-
mander-in-chief actually gave the order for the
troops to move, on these data, or merely warned
them to be ready. That the Governor-general
deemed the steps already taken sufficient to meet
coming events, is gleaned from his Minute No. 9,
dated December 2nd, 1845, previous to which a
meeting had taken place between him and the
Commander-in-chief, at Kurnaul, and at which it
was surmised, that the steps taken by the Com-
mander-in-chief, in consequence of a letter ad-
dressed to him by Major Broadfoot, had not
exactly met the views of the Governor-general.
In the Minute alluded to, the latter says, "The
precautions already adopted to provide against the
possibility of our forces being unprepared to meet
any movement of the Sikh army this season, and
the arrangements of the Commander-in-chief on
the receipt of Major Broadfoot’s intelligence, ren-
dered it, in my opinion, unnecessary to allow these
reports of invasion to make any change in my
movements."

What the arrangements herein al-
luded to were, as having been made by His Excel-
cency the Commander-in-chief, will be best learned
from his own letter to Major Broadfoot, dated the 20th November, six days before the meeting took place between the Governor-general and Commander-in-chief, at Kurnaul. The extract just made from the Governor-general’s Minute, shows clearly, that so far from disapproving of the arrangements made by the Commander-in-chief, the Governor-general coupled them with his own; and adds further, “I had the satisfaction of concurring in all the orders which His Excellency had given.”

The Commander-in-chief thus writes to Major Broadfoot, from his Camp at Umballah, 20th November, and we are sure our readers will forgive our extracting the whole letter, as it exhibits a clear and valuable document regarding the steps to be adopted, to meet the emergency which might be anticipated.

“Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt, this moment, of your letter of this date, conveying to me intelligence of the hostile attitude which has been assumed by the Lahore Durbar.

“Under the circumstances, I have ordered the following preparations to be entered upon immediately, to meet whatever may take place.

“Her Majesty’s 9th lancers to move at once from Meerut to Umballah.

“To be held in readiness to move from Meerut to Kurnaul, on the shortest notice, two troops of horse artillery, Her Majesty’s 16th lancers, the 3rd regiment of light cavalry; Her Majesty’s 10th foot,
save one company; the corps of sappers and miners; all save one of the regiments of Native infantry.

"The 9th regiment of irregular cavalry, will likewise be held prepared to move from Hansi to Kurnaul, and the Sirmoor battalion from Deyrah to Saharanpore, where it will be centrically situated and ready to be moved wherever it may most be required; the 4th regiment of irregular cavalry will be brought up from Bareilly to Meerut.

"I beg that you will instruct the civil authorities at Simla, to place themselves in communication with the officers commanding European corps in these hills, and ascertain from them what number of coolies will be required to enable the regiments to move, in order that they may be collected at once. Supplies for the corps in the hills, will be required to be laid in on the road leading thence to Sirhind.

"I shall direct the other corps of all arms in this division, to draw their carriages into cantonments, in view to the troops being prepared to act on the shortest notice.

"Previous to adopting any further measures at present, I would await a communication of the views of the Governor-general.

(Signed) H. Gough."

This letter points out in the clearest manner possible, not only that Major Broadfoot anticipated the coming event, but that the Commander-in-chief had taken efficient measures for meeting it.
The European regiments in the hills were ordered to hold themselves in readiness, and the Meerut force had actually marched; when, after some days, and probably subsequent to the meeting between the Governor-general and Commander-in-chief, the urgency of the preparations seemed less, and the Meerut force moved back, while the hill corps were countermanded.

Though the Governor-general states distinctly, that he concurred in the arrangements adopted by the Commander-in-chief, and which are detailed in his letter, he evidently did not see the necessity of putting them into immediate execution.

This is a form of etiquette, we suppose, in conducting great political and military arrangements, but to plain-thinking people, there appears to be a want of concurrence, where an object to be obtained by the arrangement of one authority, is delayed by the advice, order, or suggestion of another.

The 9th lancers did not move on Umballah, and the 16th lancers remained with the 3rd light cavalry, horse artillery, Her Majesty's 10th, and Native infantry regiments at Meerut. Instead of the hill regiments leaving their cantonments at Kussowlee and Subathoo, and encamping at the foot of the hills, both gave up all idea of their services being required; and just before the express reached Subathoo, on the evening of the 10th December, bets were offered that there would be no movement downwards! It was thought that
considerable delay might occur in getting coolies for these regiments; but when the demand did arrive for their services, they were able to leave their respective cantonments in twelve hours after receiving the notice, and had not a halt taken place at Muneemajirah, both Her Majesty's 29th and the 1st European light infantry would have joined the Commander-in-chief at Kuna, and thus been present at the battle of Moodkee, on the 18th of December.

We have, in discussing the events of the war, endeavoured to shew that out of apparently untoward affairs, success arose; but the movement of the Meerut force, when ordered by the Commander-in-chief, would have greatly contributed to render both Moodkee and Feerozshuhur more complete victories, since the want of European Cavalry was felt at both, particularly the latter.

The contrast exhibited on this occasion between our present Commander-in-chief and Sir Henry Fane, who commanded the army of the Indus in 1838, is very striking. Though, no doubt, annoyed at the arrangements ordered by him having been delayed, (for we cannot say they were disapproved of), yet Sir Hugh cordially and zealously co-operated with the Governor-general; while Sir H. Fane, when disappointed in procuring the full amount of force he required, withdrew from the scene of action, and left the management of the campaign to others. The gallantry of Sir Hugh Gough in the field of battle is not more to be admired than his conduct.
on this trying occasion, where he appears to have displayed a moderation and forbearance for which in some quarters he has not obtained credit.

In the discussions which have taken place in the Parliament of Great Britain, regarding the splendid results of the campaign, all mention of the policy of the Governor-general is carefully avoided; but had it been discussed, the measures adopted by the Commander-in-chief would have shown at once that he was prepared for the coming invasion, and had taken steps to meet it.

The wish not to be the aggressor, and to avoid all appearance of hostilities, coupled with the impression on the mind of the Governor-general, led him, no doubt, to delay the active measures suggested by the Commander-in-chief; but when the crisis did arrive, and the Sikhs actually crossed the boundary, then the zeal, talent, and energy of the Governor-general were such as to excite universal admiration. The rapidity in the movements of the troops was such as must have elicited the approbation both of Sir H. Hardinge and the Commander-in-chief; and there is not, perhaps, on record, a more marked instance of zeal, determination, and courage on the part of troops, than was exhibited by those composing the Sirhind division when called on to move. Longer marches may have been executed, (without adducing that of Cæsar, of a hundred miles), but the daily forced marches of the troops from Umballah and the hills, from the time of leaving their cantonments, until their arrival at Mood-
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kee, will bear comparison with any succession of operations in modern times. The rapid movement of the Loodianah force was equally conspicuous. In one day, Brigadier Wheeler reached Busseean, a distance of thirty miles! Such marches in Europe might be looked upon as nothing extraordinary: but we must take into account the hot, burning sun of India, which even in December is very trying, and apt to induce fatigue; and the nature of the roads must not be lost sight of, when speaking of marches in the north-western provinces of India. None but those who have traversed the roads leading from Umballah to Loodiana, and from thence to Feerozapore, can estimate the labour and toil of walking ankle-deep in sand for a succession of days with a hot sun over head; and the incessant calls for the bheesties or waterman's water-bag, showed how harassing such marches were.

The successful prosecution and termination of the war were the themes of the British Parliament, when voting thanks to the Governor-general, Commander-in-chief, and the army of the Sutlej. Nor were the bravery and endurance of the Governor-general passed over in silence. These, though known to eye-witnesses on the field of battle, were disclosed to the people of England through the means of a private communication, very happily introduced by Sir Robert Peel in a most eloquent and brilliant speech on the occasion; and we are glad to see the weight attached by the Governor-
general to his attention to the poor wounded men at Feerozpore, a subject to which we have endeavoured to attract notice. His cheering words to the European soldiers on the night of the 21st of December, had, no doubt, a most beneficial effect, coming as they did from the ruler of India, who had thrown off his state for the nonce, and shared all the privations of the common soldier, bivouacking on the field of battle after a hard-fought action. His determination was, as already stated, to leave the field a victor, or not at all; and, however much the original delay and forbearance of Sir Henry Hardinge may be blamed, there is no one who possesses a spark of good feeling, but must be proud of the gallant and invincible bearing displayed by him in the Sikh campaign when "hard blows" were to be dealt.

Sir Howard Douglas, in his place in the House of Commons, showed, that, notwithstanding the forbearance of the Governor-general, "though pushed so far as to have exposed Sir H. Hardinge and the Commander-in-chief to a surmise, that a policy so forbearing was not consonant with the rules of tactical and stratagetical science," no errors had been committed. The grounds of his explanation are not given in the report of his speech, but they appear to have been satisfactory; and when we see success attend every step, by which complete victory was obtained, we may rest assured that the operations were such as suited the crisis. War has
been called a Comedy of Errors, and the greatest commander is he who commits fewest.

According to the documents laid before Parliament, Major Broadfoot appears to have been most zealous throughout, and endeavoured by every means in his power to gain correct information. It is now clear, that from his communication to the Commander-in-chief, on the 20th November, his Excellency was led to adopt the arrangements he did. Neither Major Broadfoot nor the Governor-general could have said with certainty that the Sikhs would advance to and cross the Sutlej; but the public duty of the former was fulfilled, when he gave such information as induced the Commander-in-chief to make preparations. We are glad, before closing our labours on the present occasion, to have the opportunity of placing Major Broadfoot's exertions in their true light; and equally so, at finding this gallant and deserving officer bearing ample testimony to the intelligence and zeal of the late Captain Nicholson.

In the beginning of 1845, Major Broadfoot estimated the Sikh force at 16,000 men: this must have been an error, for at no time had the Sikh infantry fallen below 30,000 men, since the days of Runjeet Singh. That the army was scattered, may perhaps, have been true, but the force at all times available in the Punjab could not have been less than 30,000 men. In the beginning of 1843, when the Sikhs threatened to cross the Sutlej, their force
probably exceeded that number; to meet which there was only a European regiment with a portion of artillery, and a couple of mutinous corps at Feerozpore, and something of the same kind at Loodianah; on the fortress-walls of which place serious intentions one night existed of planting two guns.

Though Major Broadfoot's intelligence regarding the strength of the Sikh army in January 1845, may have been erroneous, yet in November of the same year, before the invasion actually took place, his estimate was correct, for he then describes it at 50,000 or 60,000 men, or of seven detachments of from 8,000 to 10,000 each.

On a review of the late campaign, we are hardly justified in supposing that the Governor-general wished the war to be carried on in the British provinces, or even on the left bank of the Sutlej; the thing was unavoidable. The weak government of Lahore, glad to get rid of an unruly soldiery, which had exhausted its treasures and obeyed no laws, was anxious to force the Sikh army across the river, in order that the spirit of anarchy which existed in it might be broken by the British, and thus the power of the Sikh government be again established.

The Governor-general and Major Broadfoot were so convinced of the wishes and intentions of the Lahore government, that so long as they believed the latter capable of sustaining its power, they would not credit the reports of an invasion, but the Governor-general explicitly says, "In the present.
state of our relations with the Lahore government, your Excellency is aware, that I do not anticipate the probability of any emergencies arising, which can require the army," &c.

Up to the latest period, the relations between the two governments remained of the same friendly character, and to the last moment the Governor-general drew a just distinction between the intentions of the people and their rulers.

He remarks, "Having to deal with a mutinous Sikh army, which has usurped the functions of the government, and whose caprice may at any time force on a rupture with our forces," &c. Here is a candid view of the case: the Lahore government, with which he had hitherto maintained friendly terms, no longer existed; "its functions were usurped by a mutinous Sikh army," and hostile results might be anticipated. It was not the Lahore government then, that made war upon the British, and invaded the territories of the latter, but "a mutinous Sikh army."

Though the anomalous state of the Lahore government with regard to its army, was thus known to the Governor-general and his agent, it is very probable, that the Commander-in-chief required no other justification of his arrangements, than the risk of our territories being invaded by a hostile army. It was a matter of indifference to him, whether such an army was a mutinous one, usurping the functions of its government, or acting under the orders of the constituted authorities.
We can, however, easily conceive, that the Governor-general, knowing the disposition of the Lahore government towards the British, should be averse to any hurried arrangements indicative of war, confining himself to the means of movement of a certain force detailed in his letter to the Commander-in-chief.

It is more than probable, that in its negotiations with Major Broadfoot, the Lahore government cautiously concealed its weakness, thereby leading him to believe, that it possessed the power of controlling its army; and if the agent was so deluded, we can understand how he should be incredulous of any invasion from troops which belonged to a government professing the most friendly feelings towards his own.

So long as the Vakeels of the Lahore government received and transmitted the friendly correspondence between it and the agent of the British, the latter could not believe that a rupture would take place. But when no answer was received to his letters, demanding explanations regarding the large numbers of Sikh troops moving towards the Sutlej, his suspicions were roused, and he then learnt that a "mutinous Sikh army had usurped the functions of the government."

Such being the humiliating and feeble nature of the Lahore government, what answer could be expected from it, unless to confess, what the Governor-general already knew, that it was helpless, and in the hands of a lawless and mutinous soldiery?
There was no cause for the Lahore government to make war on the British, and yet it was compelled to countenance hostilities; but in doing so it must have anticipated that the army would be overthrown and destroyed by the British, and the authority of government then be restored. That the Rajah and Chiefs hurried on the war as a means of directing the army to other objects than themselves, and for their own preservation, the Governor-general was perfectly aware; and he knew equally well, that when once war was declared, this government would be unable to arrest its progress.

The Governor-general did full justice to the pacific intentions of the Ranee and her son; but as a consequence of their seeming participation in the acts of aggression which led to the war, he, in his proclamation of the 13th December, very justly confiscated the possessions of Dhuleep Singh, on the left or British bank of the Sutlej.

As before hinted, the forbearance of the Sikhs as regards Feerozpore would seem to have been premeditated by Lal Singh, whose object was to keep his troops in one place; and it is very doubtful whether the burning of the barracks at Loodianah was ever authorised by Runjoor Singh, but rather might not have been the work of Ajeet Singh.

The circumstances of the Sikh army not destroying Feerozpore as well as Loodianah, neither molesting our troops, nor stopping our supplies, appear inexplicable on any other ground, than the sole wish of the leaders of the Sikh army to get that body of the Sikhs under arms.
destroyed without making any uncalled-for aggression on the British. But though allowing this spirit of forbearance to the leaders and chiefs, there existed no doubt as to the determination on the part of the Sikh soldiers, to do their utmost to conquer the British and exterminate them if possible. They probably did not dive into the state policy, and never imagined that Lal Singh, in sending a detachment of them towards Moodkee, had any other object in view than that of surprising the British.

It is easy to foresee, as we have said before, that as long as our troops garrison Lahore, so long may the government of Dhuleep Singh exist, but no sooner will they be withdrawn than anarchy and discord will be once more rife in the Punjab. In fact, so thoroughly convinced must the Ranee and Lal Singh be of the utter impossibility of conducting a government of their own without the aid of the British, that it becomes a doubtful question, whether they will ever attempt it. The probability is, that the Ranee will decline putting the government into the hands of her young son, unsupported by the British; and then, if we are not prepared to annex the country, a strong contingent must be left in the Punjab for the support of its feeble rulers.
CHAPTER XIV.

The Sikh government had sent orders to the killadars of Kote Kangra and other hill forts in the Jalindhur Doab, to deliver them up to the British authorities.

At first a message to this effect was dispatched by some horsemen, but the killadar of Kote Kangra paid no attention to the order. He despised the Sikh government, and though by the articles of the treaty, the latter had surrendered a portion of the Punjab, this man vowed that "unless the Maharajah Runjeet Singh himself came to demand the keys, he would keep possession of his stronghold."

The fort of Kangra is one of those which is strong from its position: it is built near the conflux of the Ban Gunga with the Beas, and is bounded, for the most part, by precipices nearly perpendicular; and where the declivities are less formidable, the aid of masonry has been had recourse to, so as to render the place, in the opinion of Vigne, impregnable under European engineers. It was once attacked
by the Goorkhas, when in possession of Sunsar Chund, who defended it against them for four years, and then delivered it up to Runjeet Singh. Runjoor Singh, who was on escort duty with Captain Cunningham, sent for the purpose of taking possession of the fort, sent his purwannah to the commandant to deliver it up, but without success. A moonshee was then dispatched to receive a written answer from the killadar; but the latter replied that his only answer would be "shot and powder," or "gooleebarood." A party of soldiers was then sent to reconnoitre, when the guns were opened on them, and they were obliged to retreat. The occupants of the fort were believed to amount to about 500, chiefly Ukalees, and the guns were said to be ten in number.

Not only did the Sikhs refuse to deliver up Kote Kangra, but also the forts of Kumlagurh and Hurreepore, and the circumstance was duly represented to the Sikh government, which dispatched reiterated orders to comply with the wishes of the sirkar, and threats were held out, that the friends and families of the refractory killadars at Lahore would be imprisoned. On Major Lawrence representing the necessity of his proceeding towards Kangra, the Ranees expressed a wish that he would remain at Lahore and allow the Sikh troops to take possession of the fort. The political agent having however other matters demanding his presence in the hill territories, departed.
The disturbance alluded to in a former chapter, whereby the political authorities had been assaulted, had been strictly enquired into, and the ringleader, a brahmin, was seized, and hung in the presence of seven of his accomplices and a vast crowd of spectators. This was the sentence of Lal Singh on the brahmin, Dutt, and being made known to the British agent, the latter apparently coincided in the stringent measures adopted. Lal Singh was no doubt glad of an opportunity of convincing the British that the disturbance did not originate with the Sikhs.

According to Native reports, the disturbance originated in a European wounding a cow. The owner ran off to the brahmins in the Behoovallee and complained to them of the outrage. The brahmins immediately came into the bazaar and created a disturbance. Some of them ran off towards the fort, threatening Lal Singh with death, for having, as they said, made over the town to the British. They were prevented from entering the fort, and returned to a baolee situated near the Soneree Musjid (Golden Temple). Here they collected a number of brahmins and fukes; also many khatrees who closed their shops. Some of the Mussulman shopkeepers likewise closed their shops. Major Lawrence having heard of the disturbance, went out attended by some other gentlemen and some sowars, (horsemen) and proceeded to quiet the rioters, promising to make every enquiry. The brahmins and khatrees
would hear nothing, but declared that rather than put up with such an outrage, they would destroy themselves. They then began to throw bricks at him, and one of the gentlemen with him, and wounded also some of the sowars; but the agent, instead of setting these on the rioters, kept them back and passed quietly along the streets. He had however, no sooner reached his home, than he wrote to the general to have all the troops out, to close the gates, and to shoot the first man who attempted to attack the troops.

"Major Lawrence told Lal Singh, when the latter waited on him, that the only thing required was, that they should forthwith produce the originators of the disturbance." *Delhi Gazette, 2nd May.*

The above riot occurred on the 21st April; and on the 24th, the kotwal's exertions had been carried on so actively, that the ringleader was discovered and hung.

In trying to assuage the feelings of the British, the Lahore government offered money. Major Lawrence spurned every offer and explanation, and insisted on the originator being given up. This trait in his management will cause the brahmins and khutrees to be more cautious in fomenting riots and disturbances; but the deep-rooted hatred of the Sikhs remains the same, and a constant watchfulness on the part of the British garrison at Lahore is rigorously required, to check every disturbance in the bud, and punish the authors of it, whether the latter be brahmins or Sikhs.

In the discharge of his arduous duties, Lal Singh
is necessarily the object of dislike to those men who have been disbanded, and it appears clearly, that previous to the Sikh invasion, such a large body of foot and horse had been engaged by the Sikhs, that the payment of their full arrears of pay was out of the question. They had received money in hand, with a promise of more when the Khalsa troops should reach Delhi and Calcutta. Frustrated in their thirst for conquest, these disappointed hordes being discharged, agreeably to the treaty, are loud in their demands for arrears, and have occasionally asked the aid of the agent, who, in remonstrating with Lal Singh, appeared to excite the displeasure of the latter, who plainly told him that the treasury of Croesus would not satisfy the cupidity of the disbanded troops. He added, that he considered the agent's business was to assist the Sikh government in putting down the refractory troops, and not to interfere in matters of payment.

As the mutinous Sikh army crossed the Sutlej against the wish of the government, whose treasury it had exhausted, and in the full hope of procuring means of supporting itself in the British territories, it appears somewhat unreasonable that the Sikh government should now be expected to settle the arrears, such a compromise would defeat the ends of justice. If discontented and unruly subjects chose to engage in war, in defiance of the government, they must expect the just reward of such conduct, by either falling in the field of battle, or receiving their discharge with ignominy.

Discontent must, of course, follow the measures
necessarily adopted by Lal Singh, to meet the emergency which has overtaken the government. With the most rigid economy, he can only hope to keep up a small army for the support of the nominal government.

The reductions already effected in the revenues of the sirdars and their followers, have caused a loud cry of discontent, and these disband ed and refractory Sikhs will readily raise their arms against a government from which they can expect nothing.

The force sent against Kote Kangra under Brigadier Wheeler, consisted of the 2nd, 11th, 41st, and 44th, and a wing of the 63rd regiment, Native infantry; with a siege train of three eighteen pounders, two eight-inch howitzers, and six mortars, under Colonel Wood, with Captain Fitzgerald's battery.

Our old friend the Ladwa Rajah Ajeet Singh does not appear inclined to abandon his hostile intentions against the British, for he is stated to be in Kote Kangra, urging the garrison to offer a determined resistance to both the Sikhs and British. He has now become desperate, having lost his paternal estate of Ladwa, and forfeited his jagheer of Buddeewal. Should he fall into the hands of either the Sikh or British government, he will doubtless receive the just reward of the malice he has displayed towards his former protectors in particular.

It would be highly injudicious on the part of the British, to expend their shells and shot on a place
which they cannot hope to storm. The obtaining possession of it might have been left with great propriety to the Sikhs, as suggested by the Ranee. The 44th regiment, Native infantry, has taken possession of the fort of Mulkhera, and occupied the town of Kangra. The country people were favourable to the claims of the British, and a neighbouring Rajah lent them three guns.

The Ranee, who may justly be considered at the head of the present government of Lahore, has been seriously indisposed of late, and her illness is said to be caused by one of those untoward events which cast doubts on the integrity of the people about her person. Should the Ranee eventually be removed from the scene, it is not likely that Lal Singh will long hold his place as prime minister, and even Dhuleep Singh may be supplanted by a son of Shere Singh, who has certainly as much right to the throne of Runjeet Singh as its present occupant, for his father once sat upon it, which is more than we can venture to say as regards Dhuleep Singh.

On the 28th April but little progress had been made in inducing the killadar of Kangra to deliver up the keys, even though a royal purwannah had been carried to him from the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh. The exposure of men at such an inclement season of the year, with the thermometer at 97°, must produce sickness among the European portion of the force sent against the place.

Nothing can more clearly show the weakness of
a government, than the refusal of its servants to obey its orders. Here, at no great distance from the capital, we see the commander of a fort putting his government at defiance; and, therefore, instead of receiving the fort of Kote Kangra from the Lahore authorities, we were absolutely obliged to send a force against it.

We are almost inclined to adopt the belief, that already has the Lahore government repented of its having given up the Jalindhur Doab into the hands of the British; and though the towns in the plains of this Doab, such as Jalindhur itself, Hooshyarpore, &c. could offer no resistance, yet the hill forts of Kangra, Kumlagurh and others, may have received a hint, that necessity alone caused their surrender to the British. If such be the case, it cannot be wondered at, that the killadars take upon themselves the responsibility of holding out against the latter.

It is true that the capital of the Punjab is at present garrisoned by British troops, but would the killadar of Govindghur, if ordered to do so by Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, deliver the keys to the British? Or would the commandant of Umritsir comply? One or both might have done so when the army of the Sutlej was encamped at Meean Meer, on the 25th March, but it is doubtful if these authorities would yield on the 25th June.

It may be said, that the British have not conquered the Punjab, though the army of the latter has been beaten in four engagements. And there-
fore it would be unreasonable to demand the surrender of such places as Umritisir and Govindghur, which are in possession of the Lahore government, and the continued existence of which, under Dhuleep Singh, we acknowledge and support.

The experiment might, no doubt, be a dangerous one; but we venture to predict, that if the royal purwannah were sent to deliver up Govindghur to the British, it would be spurned as that for Kote Kangra has been. The British are at present looked upon in the light of intruders, not only as regards Lahore, but also as relates to the Jalindhur Doab, and the confiscated possessions on the left bank of the Sutlej, and it will be a long time before the Sikhs can reconcile themselves to the idea, that these provinces must belong to another power as the necessary result of conquest.

The Sikhs have experienced defeat and disaster on the left bank of the Sutlej, and will not therefore readily take the field again. But in a country like the Punjab, abounding in forts, some of them of great strength, there is every probability that the Sikhs, sooner or later, will assume a mutinous spirit, and shut themselves up in their strongholds. The disbanded soldiers have nothing to lose, and by raising the standard of revolt against the British, their situation could not be rendered more desperate, and might be temporarily ameliorated. The Sirdars are already disaffected towards the government of Dhuleep Singh, or more properly that of the British, and many of them would willingly join
in a hostile coalition, whereby the British might be expelled from the Punjab.

About the middle of April last, Deenanath arrived at Kangra, bringing positive orders to the killadar Soondur Singh to deliver up the fort to the British. But though thus called upon by a most influential person of the Lahore Durbar, Soondur Singh not only refused to comply, but treated the bearer of the purwannah with the utmost disrespect, telling its bearer to call in the evening for an answer.

It would appear that in the evening Major Lawrence, having reached the place, went towards the fort, expecting a reply from the killadar; but instead of this being a favourable one, he was saluted by a round shot, which hit the ground or rock close to him.

Such behaviour on the part of the killadar of Kangra, could not fail to raise suspicions of foul play. Major Lawrence remonstrated with the Lahore Durbar, and the latter threatened to imprison and otherwise punish the relations and friends of the refractory killadar, but without any other apparent effect than rendering the obstinacy and determination of Soondur Singh more marked.

If a single fort with a few guns, can thus bid defiance, not only to the Sikh government, but the British authority, what a desperate resistance might the Sikhs not have offered to the British troops, had they, instead of placing their numerous guns in the entrenched camps of Feerozshuhur and
Sobraon, planted them in Govindghur, Umritsir, and Kote Kangra! One difficulty, however, was opposed to this plan of operations, and that was the determination of the British not to invade the Punjab; at all events, not to be the first aggressors. The Sikhs might, however, have drawn them into the territory, if after the reverse and defeat they experienced at Moodkee and Feerozshuhur, they had retreated across the Sutlej and manned the forts of Govindghur, Umritsir, and Kote Kangra. Had they done this, instead of risking their fate in entrenched camps, the war now concluded would have been greatly prolonged.

To return to Kote Kangra. The obstinacy with which the killadar defied both the Sikh government and the British authorities, was quite unlooked for. The British agent naturally began to suspect foul play in some quarter, and his first act on reaching Kangra was to dispense with the presence of the Sikh troops. It will probably be ascertained, should the fort of Kangra yield to Brigadier Wheeler's force, how far the obstinacy of the killadar was to be attributed to himself, or to secret orders received from the Lahore Durbar; of course, the latter will deny all reports prejudicial to its own interest, or likely to displease the British government. What weight may be attached to the assurance, however, after such a glaring instance of disobedience on the part of its own subjects, is another affair; but certainly the refusal on the part of its commandant to surrender Kote Kangra, is
an untoward occurrence, at a season of the year when the exposure of both European and Native troops may be attended with sickness and mortality.

It has been mentioned in a former portion of this work, that Sirdar Ajeet Singh had set fire to the barracks of Her Majesty's 50th regiment, or Queen's own, at Loodianah. This gallant regiment suffered severely, in killed and wounded, during the late campaign, and it was destined to suffer in even a more marked, awful, and totally unlooked for manner. In one of those violent storms denominated "north-westers," and which fill the atmosphere with dust, converting day into night, the temporary barracks of this gallant regiment were blown down, and the inmates buried in the ruins. The loss of killed and wounded was truly melancholy, amounting to no fewer than 210 men, women, and children. This melancholy catastrophe occurred on the evening of the 20th of May.

These barracks were erected in the beginning of 1844, for the reception of a wing of the Honourable Company's 2nd European regiment, as a temporary residence in the hot weather and rains. During these seasons the buildings stood and served the purpose for which they were originally intended. But instead of their places being afterwards supplied by permanent barracks, Her Majesty's 50th were placed in them after the departure of the 2nd European regiment for Scinde. During the year 1845, the European soldiers at Loodianah, like
those at other stations on the frontier, suffered severely from cholera; and while yet in a weakly condition, the 50th regiment was obliged to take the field in December against the Sikhs, where it maintained its well-earned character for bravery, experiencing a great loss in killed and wounded. Such a regiment ought to have been cared for, but on its return from the field it was placed in the ricketty cantonment; and in the midst of their families, the gallant fellows who had escaped the grape and swords of the Sikhs were, in an instant, hurried into eternity. Were a ship of inferior structure to be launched, and from its frailty, fall a prey to the waves, when others of a stronger build would escape, the catastrophe would not be attributed to any other cause than the original fault in her construction; and if temporary barracks are blown down in a north-wester, which more substantial ones would have weathered, the cause of the calamity is plain enough.

Putting aside the fearful destruction of life among the women and children, as not entailing actual loss on the state, we have here a sacrifice of no fewer than fifty fighting men. The value of each, in a pecuniary point of view, is one thousand rupees. Thus, a loss has been sustained of £5000 sterling, at the lowest estimate. Not only, however, must the individuals who were actually killed, be taken into the account, but many of those who were so maimed and confused as eventually to be rendered unfit for service. Could such an accident have been prevented?—is the
natural question asked by the friends of humanity. In all human probability and calculation, it could. There is, however, little use at present in commenting on such a melancholy occurrence, unless to draw the attention of government to the cruelty and impolicy of trusting the lives of their brave soldiers to temporary habitations.

It would have been a fortunate circumstance, had Ajeet Singh completed the work of destruction he began, and burned the whole barracks. Such would have been considered a grievous calamity at the time; but, like many other events during the late campaign, viewed in the same light, most favourable and providential results would have followed.

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Fall of Kangra. Since this chapter passed through the press, we have learned that Kote Kangra has surrendered, and that, unconditionally. The killadar having so long defied his own government and that of the British, ought to have fought to the last, and thus gained a name for himself; but his conduct is another exemplification of Sikh courage, which is mixed up with a considerable portion of bravado. The fall of this important fortress will, as in former times, have the effect of rendering the hill tribes more submissive to the paramount power in the Punjab.
CHAPTER XV.

As the battle of Sobraon was the last and most complete during the campaign, any further particulars regarding it will, we feel assured, be acceptable to our military readers; at least, we owe the information which we are now enabled to give, to the politeness of a gallant officer who took a conspicuous part in the conflict; and his description is so full, plain, and easy of comprehension, that the details cannot fail to throw considerable light on the movements of the cavalry.

In the Commander-in-chief's despatch regarding Sobraon, he alludes pointedly to the gallant feats of Her Majesty's 3rd light dragoons, in a situation and under circumstances where cavalry is not expected to act with much effect; namely, "entering an entrenchment in single file and forming up inside."

Before entering into the particulars of Sobraon, however, it is necessary to observe that the 3rd
Dragoons had distinguished themselves highly at Moodkee and Feerozshuhur; and though reduced, at the latter place, to a mere handful, the indomitable spirit and bravery of the men were as conspicuous as in their first encounter with the Sikhs at Moodkee. There they had contributed greatly to the overthrow and flight of the Sikhs; and their example was not thrown away on the Native cavalry, both regular and irregular, each vying with the other in charging the Sikhs, who were astonished at the overpowering gallantry of the European dragoons, whose prowess they had never before witnessed.

We had occasion, when speaking of Sobraon, to allude to the zealous wish of officers, on leave of absence in India, to join their regiments; and we may now be allowed to give an instance of the same feeling displayed by officers in England. Major-general Sir Joseph Thackwell, who commanded the cavalry in the army of the Indus, though deeming it necessary to proceed to England, was so well convinced of the approaching collision with the Sikhs, that on his reaching Bombay, in February, 1845, he sent back his horses to the 3rd light dragoons at Umballah, in order to be in readiness for him. He reached England in April, and after a short stay of four months, he again embarked at Southampton on the 20th of August; and in little more than two months, or on the 30th of October, reached Cawnpore. Even then, the reports of a Sikh war were considered so
well founded, that the major-general applied for leave to proceed to Umballah, to be as near the seat of war as possible. Had his wishes been complied with, he would have been on the north-western frontier in time to assume command of the cavalry when the army left Umballah. From the earnest wish on the part of the Governor-general to avoid all premature hostile preparations, however, it was not deemed advisable to comply with the request, and Sir Joseph Thackwell was obliged to wait patiently until he received his orders to join the army, which he did on the 17th of December, the day before the battle of Moodkee. He could not lay his dak before the 20th, when both he and Sir Robert Dick started from Cawnpore, and Sir Joseph Thackwell reached Umballah on the 26th. It may be easily conceived that the major-general, who there heard of the battles of Moodkee and Feeruzshuhur, had no wish to prolong his stay at such a distance from the seat of war; and though the road, through the protected Sikh states, was very unsafe at this period, he started on the same day, taking the route through Pattealah, Naha, Busseean, and Moodkee, and reached the headquarters camp, at Hurruf, on the 1st of January, 1846. It may be here noticed that his aide-de-campe, Lieutenant Roche of the 3rd light dragoons, accompanied him from Meerut. It was doubtless a source of gratification to the major-general to learn the gallant deeds of the European dragoons at Moodkee and Feeruzshuhur; mixed, however,
with regret that he had not been himself an eyewitness of them.

On his arrival at head-quarters, Sir Joseph Thackwell was at once appointed to the command of the cavalry division which had been under Brigadier Harriot at Feeroxshuhur. Here we may again allude to the 8th light cavalry at the last named engagement. On that day the regiment was on the road to Feeropore; but it halted repeatedly, with the ostensible view of awaiting the result of the fight, which was still being carried on; and it was only when the firing ceased, and the battle concluded to be at an end, that this regiment moved forward towards Feeropore, at the time when the several troops of horse artillery were moving in the same direction. Our own impression is, that Captain Lumley, before ordering Brigadier Harriot to Feeropore, was satisfied that the regiment was no longer required; and he, therefore, merely committed an error of judgment. We have no other interest in giving what may be conceived a favourable opinion of the parties concerned, than the earnest wish, natural to true historians, to place the matter in its proper light; which our position, while sitting under the shade of a tree waiting the result of a battle, and with a view of lending our aid to the wounded, enabled us to do. The feelings of Sir J. Lumley, the gallant father of Captain Lumley, on hearing of his son's error, while holding his own place as adjutant-general, may be more easily conceived than described. To Captain Lum-
ley’s bravery in the field, however, all who witnessed it can bear ample testimony; and his Excellency the Commander-in-chief willingly gave his meed of praise. Few men ever filled the post of adjutant-general to the army with greater ability than the lamented General Lumley. Though in a delicate state of health, and such as might readily have prevented his accompanying the Commander-in-chief from Simla, this worthy man and zealous officer could not allow the opportunity to pass, of lending his aid to those who might be called upon to supply his place in the field; and he, no doubt, fondly anticipated that in a son, and in an officer whom he almost loved as one, the important duties of his office would be zealously and efficiently attended to. The result at Moodkee amply proved that he had every reason to be satisfied. In that bloody engagement, the acting adjutant-general was severely wounded, and Captain Lumley was called upon to take his place. The 21st of December must have been an anxious day for the general. Left behind at Moodkee, and unable himself to assist his son with his advice at a time when an inexperienced soldier most needed it, his illness must have been sorely aggravated. The day passed, and the night approached, but still the battle raged. The morrow saw the fight renewed, and witnessed the defeat of the enemy; but with the news of victory came the sad tidings of the son’s fatal error. The shock was too much for the gallant old soldier, who had hoped to see his friend.
supply his own place, and his son placed the next in the department. His health was feeble; and in his sorrow he is said to have exclaimed, "I have lived a day too long." But his end was approaching; and though he resigned the high appointment which he had so ably filled for many years, he was not destined to hear the just and high eulogium paid to his worth and services by one who could so well appreciate both: we allude to the order of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief on the occasion of General Lumley's resignation.

His character. It may be safely asserted, that never will the Bengal army have an adjutant-general who more zealously and ably performed his duties; nor one who, without ostentation, had the welfare of the army more at heart than the late General Lumley. He was not only an able, zealous officer in his public capacity, but no one who had the honour of calling him his friend, had to complain that he ever forgot his promise, or deserted him when his advice or counsel was required.

We cannot now deny ourselves the pleasure of giving the history of the cavalry division, after it was put under the command of Major-general Thackwell; and for this we are altogether indebted to that gallant officer. It may be said, that other branches of the army claim equal notice, and we believe few will blame us for what we have recorded of the infantry. It is a source of gratification to us, that we are now enabled to do equal justice to the cavalry; and if sufficient notice has not been
taken of the artillery, it is not from any wish
to conceal its merits, but from inability to give
any particulars. Fortunately, this branch needs
no remark from our feeble pen:—the Bengal
artillery has ever maintained its character as a
service equal to the same branch in any army in
the world.

On assuming command of the cavalry division, Cavalry divi-
General Thackwell found it to consist of the 4th, sion.
1st, and 8th regiments of Bengal light cavalry; the
3rd, a wing of the 2nd, the 8th and 9th irregular
cavalry, and the body guard. On the 2nd January picquets of irregular cavalry were established
watching the Nuggur, Meetawalle, and Tilleewalle
ghauts on the Sutlej. The 8th irregular cavalry
joined General Sir Harry Smith at Mullawal, about
five miles to the right of the head-quarters' camp,
watching the bridge then being constructed by the
Sikhs, and the ford of Sobraon. On the 6th
January, Sir Robert Dick, with the 9th and 16th
lancers, (Queen's) 3rd light cavalry, and 4th irregular
meerut cavalry arrive.
cavalry, arrived; and the three last corps belonging
to Brigadier Cureton's brigade: they were detached
to the right of Sir Harry Smith's division; and the
Queen's 9th lancers were encamped near Jumalwal
to keep up the communication between the main
army and the division on the right, the body-guard
disposition of the cavalry division.
were also sent to join Brigadier Cureton's brigade.
Most of the boats up the ghauts mentioned had
been sunk by the Sikhs, but a few serviceable ones
were still on the other side of the river. Sir John
Grey, with two battalions, arrived at Attaree on the 8th, and the 8th light cavalry were sent to join him; the 3rd irregulars having been previously sent to watch the Khoonda ghaut near Feerozpore, and the 8th and 9th irregular cavalry were posted at Kumulwalla, the latter corps having been detached in the first instance with Sir Harry Smith's division.

These regiments had strong picquets at Rhodawala, Asyah, and Aleewalleee, watching the Sutlej on the left and the sick encampment.

There were strong rumours of an attack by the Sikhs, on the morning of the 10th, but they were considered unfounded. On the 12th, the army took ground to the right, and the head-quarters were established at Bfoota wala; the 3rd and 2nd divisions of infantry extending from Jilleewala along the line of the nullah towards Kumulkee; the first division of infantry, and Cureton's brigade of cavalry on the right, near Tilwundee, watching the Hurreekee ghaut; the 9th lancers and the 2nd irregular cavalry under Brigadier Campbell were posted on the left of Jilleewala; the 4th and 5th light cavalry, under Brigadier Scott, in front of Mullawal, in support of the left, and the picquet at Zilleewala; and a Résalâh of the 9th irregulars was near Hurreekee, preserving the communication with the Nuggur ghaut and Sir John Grey's camp.

On the 13th and 14th there was some exchange of cannon-shot, but nothing of consequence occurred, except the bursting of one of our 24-pounders on
the latter day, fortunately without doing any more harm than wounding a gunner. As the Sikhs displayed a considerable force, two divisions of infantry and some cavalry were brought near Rhodawala, but soon after 4 p.m. the Sikhs and their light guns retired across the river; but little loss being sustained on either side. On the 17th Sir Harry Smith, with the 1st brigade of infantry, and part of the 4th irregular cavalry, moved from their camp towards Dhurrumkote, and on the following day, Cureton, with the 16th lancers, 3rd light cavalry, and the remainder of the 4th irregulars, marched to overtake Sir Harry Smith. The 9th lancers were moved towards Tilwundee, and on the same day, the 3rd light dragoons marched from Feerazpore, where they had gone to refit after Feerozshuhur, and joined Brigadier Scott’s brigade at Mullawal, and on the morrow encamped on the ground left by the 9th lancers, on the left of Jilleewala. On the 20th, Major-general Sir J. Thackwell removed the cavalry head-quarters from Mullawal to Jilleewala, and strong picquets of the 2nd and 9th irregular cavalry were posted to support Chota (little) Sobraon, the line between that place and Rhodawala, and the advanced post at the watch-tower, besides those before-mentioned, and those on the right, watching the Hurreekee ghaut, and the road by Murko. On the 24th, the 5th light cavalry marched from Mullawal to join Brigadier Wheeler with his two battalions, and the body-guard marched to reinforce Sir Harry Smith;
the 4th light cavalry moved to replace the body-guard, and Brigadier Scott assumed the command of the two regiments of this brigade at Jilleewala and Kumulwala, to which were attached the 2nd and 8th irregular cavalry. The country between General Thackwell's camp and the Sikh bridge was chiefly a low tamarisk and grass jungle, which gave the enemy every advantage in assailing the outposts with infantry and sowars; and scarcely a day passed without skirmishing, which caused some casualties. On the 23rd, Sir Joseph Thackwell's red jacket attracted much attention, and in passing the line from Chota Sobraon, towards Rhodawala, forty or fifty shots were fired at the General, who imagined the enemy's sowars intended to drive the picquets in. On the 24th the enemy's sowars made a rush on the picquet at Sobraon to turn their right, but the 2nd irregulars composing it drove them back in good style. The posts at Chota Sobraon and the watch-tower were day-posts, as they afforded great facilities for viewing the Sikh proceedings; the infantry occupying them returned to camp at night, and nothing was left there but the cavalry picquet. The Sikhs, as previously observed, had become acquainted with this, and on the night of the 26th occupied both posts in force, and it was not deemed expedient to dislodge them, although there was an idea of doing so. On the morning of the 28th, about 10 A.M. Sir Harry Smith's guns and those of his opponent were heard at Allewal, and about mid-day the picquet at
Alleewala, of about fifty men, was driven from the village by 500 or 600 Sikh infantry and sowars, and the village burned.

Major-general Sir J. Thackwell sent a squadron of the 3rd dragoons to support, and soon after marched with the remnant of the regiment, a troop of horse artillery, and two battalions of infantry, to repulse any force which might be endeavouring to turn our left flank; but before the general could reach Asyah, Captain Becher had reinforced his picquet with fifty men of his corps, (the 8th irregulars,) and the enemy were driven out of the village and chased to near their own lines, with the loss of from twenty to twenty-two men, the British having only lost one man. The general had posted an additional picquet of cavalry in rear of Guttah from the 4th light cavalry, when the wing of the 2nd irregulars marched with Brigadier Taylor’s brigade towards Dhurrum Kote. On the 7th, Sir Harry Smith’s force returned to their camp near Tilwunde, Cureton having left the 4th irregulars at Loodianah. His brigade was still on the right; the 4th and 5th light cavalry joined their brigade on the left at Jilleewala, to which Lane’s troop of horse artillery was attached, and the 2nd brigade of cavalry having also Campbell’s troop of horse artillery attached, encamped in front of Brigadier Scott’s left, and the village of Kumulwala, where there were the 8th and 9th irregulars.

The last few days the outposts had been on very friendly terms, the sowars talking freely with each other.
Anecdotes.

other. An officer asked one, "Why the Sikhs did not leave their entrenched camp?" His reply was, "They were waiting for Goolab Singh," and added, "Why don't you attack it?" The officer replied, perhaps not prudently, "We are waiting for some heavy guns." On the 9th (February,) the generals of divisions and brigades waited on the Commander-in-chief, and received his orders relative to the attack on the Sikh army on the following morning.

The 3rd brigade of cavalry was five or six miles to the right, and the 2nd brigade in rear of Chota Sobraon was far away to the right. The Major-general, therefore, attached himself to the cavalry on the left, viz., Brigadier Scott's, consisting of the 3rd light dragoons, 4th and 5th light cavalry, and the 8th and 9th irregulars. These extended in an oblique line, the right nearly in front of Asyah, and supporting the two left brigades of the 3rd division. During the cannonade by the heavy guns, some of the enemy's cavalry moved out of their entrenchment on their right, but on the 8th irregular cavalry and a squadron of the 3rd light dragoons being detached to keep them in check, they soon returned to their camp. When the firing of the heavy guns ceased, and the brigades on the left were ordered to advance, the cavalry supported them most effectually; and on the entrenchments on the enemy's right being carried, Sir Joseph Thackwell rode back to the brigade, to order a part of it to advance, and enter the entrenchment which had been carried; but at that moment, Bri-
gadier Scott had received an order from the Governor-general to move to the right, and support the 2nd division of infantry. The general then placed himself at the head of two squadrons of the 3rd light dragoons, followed by the 4th and 5th light cavalry, and the remainder of the 3rd light dragoons; the 8th and 9th irregulars being left in support of the 3rd division. On moving in front of, and to the right of the watchtower, the battalion on the right and within the entrenchments was observed by the general to be making no progress, and the Sirmoor battalion on the left of the 2nd division, checked and eventually losing ground: the latter circumstance was pointed out to him by Captain Tucker, of the adjutant-general's department; and the general spoke to the Governor-general on the subject. On this, Sir Joseph Thackwell trotted down to the ditch of the entrenchment, and along the glacis, but could not discover a place to cross the ditch. He halted the two squadrons of the 3rd, and galloped on to where, just in rear of the battalion on the right, he discovered a band across the ditch, passable in single file, with no ditch within the rampart. This was within sixty yards of the Sikh right, and 150 of a flanking battery of three guns, the grape from which was too elevated to do much damage. Sir Joseph brought the 3rd light dragoons forward, and the Sirmoor battalion passed among the horses into the trenches. He led the 3rd in single file into the entrenchment, but no sappers were there to fill the ditch, (as quoted Sikh.)
in the Commander-in-chief's despatch.) The right of the Sikhs lining the ramparts, began to give way as they approached; and when the first squadron was formed, it was led by the general over difficult ground, and down a steep bank, and it charged the retreating Sikhs to near the ford; the retiring masses obliged it to return up the bank, by which time another squadron was formed, and the general led them again against the retreating masses, but numbers obliged them to leave the road to the ford clear, and return to support the remainder of the cavalry under Brigadier Scott, who had entered the entrenchments more to their left; after which, several other charges were made, until the whole of the enemy's left were driven into the ford. The Sikh infantry behaved bravely, and would not run. Sir Joseph Thackwell witnessed some of the dragoons fairly cut off their horses; and one, a fine fellow, was on his legs immediately, and attacked the Sikh manfully, and would have slain him, had not that work been done by another dragoon. When all was well over, the cavalry returned to camp, some irregulars only being left for the security of the wounded on the field and in the entrenchments.

On the morning of the 11th, at 3 A.M. the 1st brigade of cavalry marched to Attaree, followed by the 2nd and 3rd brigades, and on the 12th these brigades of cavalry encamped near the Khoonda ghaut, to be in readiness to pass the bridge of boats on the morrow, the passage of the first divi-
sion of infantry that evening making it impossible to do so sooner.

On the 13th, these brigades of cavalry crossed the Sutlej, and the 1st brigade arrived at Kussoor at 10 a.m. and took up a position on the Lahore side of the town, and in the course of that day and the following, nearly four brigades of cavalry were in position there.

On the 20th the cavalry reached Lahore and were encamped; the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd brigades on the right of the army, and the 4th brigade on the left. On the 23rd March, the cavalry for the provinces began its march from Lahore, and on the 26th recrossed the Sutlej at the Nuggur ghat, and on the following day marched to their several destinations.

We have nothing to add to the foregoing interesting account of the cavalry division, from which it will be seen that on picquet duty the cavalry were actively employed. The subject was indeed prominently noticed by the Commander-in-chief when commenting on Sir Joseph Thackwell, though the Major-general's conduct in gallantly leading the two squadrons of the 3rd light dragoons at Sobraon is not alluded to. The deficiency is now supplied. All the cavalry, both regular and irregular, appear to have done their duty while under Sir Joseph Thackwell's command.
CHAPTER XVI.

As we have in the last chapter given some particulars regarding the cavalry movements, both at Sobraon and previous to that battle, we may be allowed to point out some particulars not generally known, with respect to the artillery at Feerozshuhur. In our own observations regarding that action, we commented fully on the small number of our guns, and also their small calibre, as compared with those of the Sikhs. From the statement of a writer in the Delhi Gazette, it appears that after Sir John Littler had joined the main army on the 21st December, there were forty-two 6-pounders of 6 cwt., and twenty-four 9-pounders of 10 cwt. each. The writer asks if the royal artillery have any heavier. Though, when thus opposed to the Sikhs, there were sixty-six guns of the calibre mentioned, the firing from the Sikh entrenchment made the byestander suppose that the odds in favour of the latter were great; and as they
possessed upwards of 100 cannons, many of them of battering calibre, the British guns were not a match for them. But there were also, according to the same writer, two iron 8-inch howitzers, with shrapnell shell ammunition filled with 4\(\frac{1}{2}\) oz. balls.

It would seem that the British guns did not commence their fire at such long distances as 1,200 and 1,000 yards, but they were felt at a distance beyond 600 yards, contrary to the opinion entertained by military men in England. The writer next quotes the report from the artillery in the left wing, commanded by the Governor-general. It runs thus:—"We opened to cover the line at about 900 or 800 yards, when the line coming up went to 500 yards; and again to about 250 yards, less rather than more; at this time our grape told so well, that the enemy's fire slackened: here we were raked by two of their guns a long way off."
The account continues, "The artillery of the right wing had the howitzers and rockets in front of the centre; also the 9-pounder batteries in reserve of, but close to the line. The heavies opened at about 1000 yards." In a note the writer here adds: "The two first shells thrown were the first pieces fired on either side; these were seen to burst just over the nearest line of the entrenchment, sweeping clear the space beyond for a considerable way; the enemy's fire instantly opened—no more could be seen." The account of the artillery on the right continues: "They were advanced from 200 to 360 yards, and there joined by the 9-pounder.
batteries coming into action; the line coming up, the artillery were advanced 300 yards, and the reserve troops of horse artillery brought up into action. A further advance brought the whole close to the enemy's entrenchments, where the fire was continued until the line passed on, when, in attempting to follow, a mine was sprung in the midst of the 6-pounder and 9-pounder batteries, which caused a fall-back to watch for required support. After-enquiries, from the Sikhs themselves, shew that on all occasions the ricochet fire of our light artillery, and the shell of the heavies, were felt by the enemy to be as destructive as we felt theirs to be to ourselves."

The chief object of this writer appears to be, to correct some statements made by Sir Howard Douglas; and his letter proceeds, "It may not be amiss to acquaint Sir Howard Douglas that our 9-pounder makes certain practice up to 800 yards, and that our 6-pounder only commences to be soiled at 500 yards. * * * * Our experimental practice tables will show Sir H. Douglas, that with 1 lb. 8oz. charge, and two degrees elevation per quad., our 6-pounder will give a first graze at 900, and ricochet to the extreme distance of 2,100 yards." From these details, the writer concludes that much weight is not to be attached to the opinions entertained and promulgated by military authorities, both in England and India, regarding the effect produced by the British artillery at Feerozshuhur. He adds, "Our 9-pounder (of
10 cwt.) will, with a charge of 2 lb. 4 oz. with two
degrees elevation by quad., give one graze at 900,
but ricochet to the extreme distance of 2,500
yards."

It would appear that the newspaper editors
made remarks on the artillery, which in the opinion
of the above writer were not warranted by the
circumstances. He accounts for the want of ammu-
nition at Sobraon from the shortness of time that
elapsed between the arrival of the siege train on
the 7th, and the evening before the battle on the
9th February.

There can be little doubt, that to the hurry of
the movements previous to Feerozshuhur, and the
want of time after the train arrived, is to be attri-
buted the apparent ineffectiveness of the artillery.

The movement of infantry with their pouches
filled, and their ammunition close to them and
ready for use, renders the full effect of this branch
of the army a much easier matter than that of the
artillery, where great labour is required for prepar-
ing of shrapnell, which is not stored in the magazine.
To provide the means of sustaining a constant dis-
charge of shot and shells for even the space of two
hours, as occurred at Sobraon, required no small
exertion on the part of those employed in prepar-
ing the missiles. Had the siege train arrived
earlier, and more time been thus allowed, the Com-
mander-in-chief might have completed his original
intention of giving the Sikhs the full force of his
artillery for four hours. There appears to be a feeling
of disappointment in the artillery employed in the late campaign; not at any want of success with the means at their disposal, but that their efforts were not justly appreciated. Though willing to give every credit to a branch which has always been the dread of our enemies in India, there is no disputing that a war may occur in so sudden a manner as to preclude the possibility of this great arm being brought into play. Such was the case in the late campaign against the Sikhs. Totally unexpected in its commencement, the magazines, instead of being at Umballah and Feerozapore, were at Delhi, Agra, and Cawnpore. Great delay was necessarily incurred in bringing the heavy ordnance and stores to the frontier; and when they did arrive, the urgent necessity of employing them almost immediately, prevented their being of that incalculable use which might have been expected from them, under more favourable circumstances. The infantry was in consequence called upon to perform feats which are seldom expected from it; namely, capturing guns at the point of the bayonet. We have, on former occasions, discussed these matters; but we are glad to have an opportunity of recording the sentiments of an artillery officer, which may tend to remove erroneous impressions from the minds of those who expected effects which could not result from the means employed.

His Excellency the Commander-in-chief bears ample testimony to the effect of the British artillery at Sobraon; and it is to be regretted that this
branch had not an opportunity of playing on the Sikh’s entrenchment, until such breaches had been made as would have admitted the infantry divisions at several points, and so spared the second division the galling and destructive fire from the centre of the entrenchment.

Had the second or centre division been placed in support of the third, the dreadful loss sustained by the former might have been avoided; but it was not intended that this division should be engaged at all; and when it moved forward against the centre of the entrenchment, the strength of the position might not have been anticipated. The idea that Gilbert’s division was brought up to cause a diversion from the right of the Sikh entrenchment, and against a position which infantry could not carry, and to be consequently exposed to a murderous fire which could not be returned, is absurd. The check, if any did occur, was on the left of the British line; and on that point, the second division might naturally have been directed: an easy matter had it originally been placed in support of the attacking division. Time and many lives were lost by the straight-forward advance of this division to the centre of the entrenchment.

It is, however, an easy matter to find out errors after events have occurred. All things considered, the plan of attack on Sobraon was, no doubt, skilfully arranged in the main, and ably executed.

It is pleasing to observe the well-merited honours bestowed on the army of the Sutlej, and

Honours bestowed on the army of the Sutlej.
the warm thanks returned by both Houses of Parliament, as well as the Honourable Court of Directors.

The Governor-general has earned his peerage; and the gallant Commander-in-chief who has fought and conquered, not only in India, but in China, has been rewarded for his gallant deeds in a manner that must be gratifying to the army which fought under him. The battle of Alleewal has gained for its hero the grand cross of the Bath, and a baronetcy. The gallant Major-general Gilbert has justly earned his honours of K.C.B., and the commanding officers of regiments have received promotion or suitable honorary distinctions. All these honours, and a donation of twelve months' batta, are the reward of many; and those whose rank and standing do not entitle them to the former have the prospect of participating in some future day.

As the Jalindhur Doab, or as it is generally named the "Bist Jalindhur," must now possess considerable interest in the eyes of Englishmen, as forming a rich province of the British possessions in India, we are glad to have been enabled, through the kindness of a friend, to present our readers with a very complete map of this Doab, which is looked upon by the Sikhs as the "Cashmere" of the Punjab. In the introduction to this history we have given a few particulars regarding it; and from all accounts, the troops stationed in it are highly pleased with the climate, which, in the
higher parts, partakes of that of the Himalayas, being cool and beautifully wooded; while the gurgling streams give a freshness to the vegetation, looked for in vain in the arid plains of India. In the hilly tracts of this Doab, patches of table land might be found capable of forming eligible cantonments for European troops; and already several such spots have been pointed out. With a view of ascertaining the natural resources, as well as the climate and other particulars, Mr. Corbyn, the zealous and talented superintending surgeon of the Punjab division, has been calling on medical officers for topographical accounts of their respective stations; so that, ere long, the country will be as well known to us as are the other Doabs.

The Jalindhur Doab is famous for the manufacture of various kinds of cloths; also for a breed of horses; while the common grains are cultivated to a great extent. It appears to be remarkably well adapted for the growth of fruit trees, and the mangoe flourishes there in great perfection.

In the records of the Punjab, it is stated that a great flood destroyed the whole country from the Sutlej to the Chenab, and that the Bist Jalindhur was the first tract that was again inhabited. At what period this happened is not exactly known, but its occurrence can be readily believed in the event of the rivers overflowing their banks to a great extent.

The revenues of the Bist Jalindhur, even under
Sikh management, are considerable; and as the rule of the British is already popular, there is no doubt but the resources of the country will be greatly increased in a few years.

Though the ryots, or cultivators of the soil, be thus friendly to the British, the idle and unruly Sikhs are still thirsty for revenge, and will threaten our position when the rivers of the Punjab rise; but with Sir John Littler's force at Lahore, there is not much to be apprehended. Nevertheless, it behoves the Lahore force, and that in the Bist Jalindhur, to be on their guard against any sudden outbreak.

Accounts from Lahore to the 21st May, are to the effect that a party of officers belonging to the garrison having crossed the Ravee for the purpose of searching for game, their servants were attacked on their return, and all their master's guns taken possession of by a body of Sikhs, armed to the teeth! This outrage, for it surely deserves such a name, was not probably perpetrated under the sanction of the government; but it clearly exhibits the feeling that prevails towards the British. The party was conducted by some Sikhs to the shooting ground! The plan was no doubt, a concerted one, and with a view to prevent the recurrence of it an order had been issued forbidding parties crossing the river.

If the officers of the garrison of Lahore ever suppose that the Sikhs will be on friendly terms with them, they are much mistaken; a few there may be among the sirdars, whose friendship and
good feeling may be sincere, but the popular dislike of the Sikhs to the British will manifest itself on every fitting occasion; and there is the greatest necessity for being at all times prepared to avoid giving them such opportunities.

It is not at all unlikely that, should any hostile rising take place, this Doab will be selected; and the plan of the Sikhs will be to cut off all communication between the garrison at Lahore and those troops in the Doab, as well as between the latter and the British on the left side of the Sutlej.

When the rivers of the Punjab are swollen by the periodical rains, the troops at Lahore and in the Doab will be perfectly insulated. At present, when a free passage is easily accomplished across the Sutlej and the Beas, such a statement may appear incomprehensible, but the aspect of the country is completely changed in the rains, and the land in the vicinity of the Beas, stretching from the latter to Kapoorthullah, is a complete swamp, which would render the march of troops a matter of the greatest difficulty, and the transport of guns an impossibility. At such a period, therefore, the garrison of Lahore and the troops in the Bist, must be prepared to act independently of each other, and it would be well to concentrate the latter, and carefully provide for the safety of detached regiments. The obstacle to crossing the rivers of the Punjab in the rains has, no doubt, heretofore operated in preventing the Sikhs from making aggressions on the British territories on the
left bank of the Sutlej; for we can in no other way account satisfactorily for their selecting the cold weather, when every likelihood existed of our being prepared for them. A similar obstacle will present itself to the operations of the British, should any necessity exist for movement in the rainy season, and it will therefore be a fortunate circumstance if the unruly spirit of the Sikhs can be kept under due restraint until the cold season. They make no secret themselves of their intentions, and it need not consequently be matter of surprise if the attempt be made when circumstances are in its favour.

Once in possession of Umritsir and Govindghur, the route between the Jalindhur and Lahore would be in their power; and neither place could be taken at a season of the year when a battering train could not be moved across the Beas, and when European troops would have to take the field destitute of the implements of war and provisions.
CHAPTER XVII.

In a preceding chapter, we alluded to the surrender of Kote Kangra. We are now enabled to borrow from the newspapers of the day, some particulars respecting the event which may be of interest. The following are contained in the "Chronicle," published at Agra, 3rd June, 1846.

"Kangra, 26th May, 1846. The fort holds out, but the guns are all up, and will probably be in battery in three days, when the garrison may discover, that their defiance of the English is more honoured in the breach than in the observance."

"Camp, Kangra, 27th May, 1846. Since my last, the force has been increased in artillery, by the third troop, 1st brigade horse artillery, and No. 9 light field battery, from Jullinder, having joined. The siege force arrived here on the 25th, having surmounted great difficulties—the road most difficult for heavy guns, the ghauts steep, and between Na-
gatal and Putteewalee it had to cross the Guy river between two and three feet deep, nearly fifty times. The Sikhs still hold out, and batteries by the engineers are in the course of erection. Several formidable positions have been decided for batteries, distant not more than 400 to 600 yards; we expect to open fire about the 1st proximo. The scenery is the most beautiful I have seen in India; the fort strong, but I think it cannot stand long against the heavy fire that will be on it. The three infantry regiments, the 2nd, 11th, and 44th, with Her Majesty's corps and artillery, are encamped together, and all anxious for the fray."

"Camp, Kangra, 27th May. After miraculous exertion, a feat has been accomplished reflecting everlasting credit upon the artillery. The train arrived at the top of the last climb to camp on the 25th, with three 18-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, four 8-inch mortars, two batteries of nines, and a troop of 6-pounders, and six 5½-inch mortars. The garrison still holds out, and the rascals pop at us whenever we show our noses. We have not yet got a single gun or mortar into position, nor are the batteries prepared; fascines and gabions are making, and a sheltered communication will be made between the batteries, and in about a fortnight, I suppose we shall begin. The place is very formidable, and our shells are likely to make it very uncomfortable, and as we can get our heavy guns within 250 yards, and cover the advance of a storming party by the rapid fire of our small guns,
and even musketry, it would appear simple, but it is no such thing; there are eleven defences, I believe, to get through before we reach the citadel. I do not think we could get possession in less than ten days after we commenced, and by that time, the rains will be fairly upon us, and as we came by a mountain torrent, we can't get back that road, and our baggage can't get back by the other, so we are in a fix! This is a beautiful place, with a high range bespeckled with snow close to us, from which we get snow for our beer, if we had any beer for our snow, but it is very scarce. The thermometer ranges from 66° at sunrise, to 102° in the day-time in the tents; yet I am alive and well."

From this last extract, it would seem, that the writer considered the place of great strength, and likely to stand a siege of ten days at least, thus rendering the position of the force very uncomfortable, and its return to the plains a task of some difficulty. The toil of bringing guns up the bed of a river, or nullah, can only be conceived by those who have travelled up the ascents to Malown in Nepaul, where the late Sir David Ochterlony planted his two guns, much to the wonder and dismay of the Goorkhas, and to the no small surprise of the late Fukeer Azeezoodeen, who was then in Sir David's camp. Probably the killadar of Kangra anticipated that we should experience insurmountable difficulties in bringing guns and mortars against his strongholds, and so preserved his determination of holding out until he should see them. The follow-
ing extract from the *Delhi Gazette* will show, that Soondur Singh soon made up his mind when he was aware of the arrival of the British guns.

"The guns (heavy) commenced the ascent of the Mulkera hill to proceed to their respective batteries in the town, on the morning of the 28th. This fact became known for certain, to the garrison about 10 o'clock. They ceased their fire, and sent a messenger to Deenanath to intitate their inclination to surrender, if their lives were guaranteed to them. The agent to the Governor-general declined any other terms but an unconditional submission. An hour was allowed them to come out and lay down their arms. Within this time, about 3 o'clock the killadar (Soondur Singh) accompanied by his sirdars came out; they laid down their arms at the gate, and were made over to Captain Goddard commanding the town, who had previously received the necessary instructions; by him, they were immediately conducted to the presence of Major Lawrence, who had arrived to receive them. Even then the garrison were wavering, and brought a gun to bear on the party, suspecting treachery. Soondur Singh, however, proceeded to tender his submission on the part of the garrison, and the same being accepted, he and his followers were immediately permitted to return to the fort, and acquaint the inmates that each person would be allowed to bring out one bundle, but nothing more. In an hour's time, men, women, and children, and bundles in great numbers, made their appearance;
the men laying down their arms as they came out
and giving up their names. * * * * They then
all passed through the town with their bundles
(containing clothes and cooking utensils) on their
heads, protected by extended files of sepoys, to an
appointed place of rendezvous under fort Mulkera.
Captain Goddard with three companies then
marched in, and the British colours were hoisted
upon the highest point.

"All this was so sudden and unexpected among
the Native part of the community, that their as-
tonishment is said to have been indescribable.
Soondur Singh is represented as rather a fine but
debauched-looking man. The British force, we
hear, was to break up about the 31st May; officers
and Europeans much disappointed at this result.

"The fort was inspected by the political authori-
ties immediately after its surrender, and found to
have ten gates; the masonry massive but dilapi-
dated. It is believed that some guns and a party
of sappers and miners would be left with the 44th
Native infantry. The 2nd grenadiers to escort the
guns back to the plains."

Thus terminated the gallant defence of Kote
Kangra, much to the annoyance of the force sent
against it; and which, after encountering so many
difficulties in wending its way through rugged and
difficult roads, was obliged to return without firing
a shot! To the artillery the disappointment must
have been great, thirsting as they naturally were
for an opportunity of showing the Sikhs what Bri-
tish guns can do. The surrender of this strong fort, which held out under Sunsar Chund against the Goorkha chief, Unmur Singh, for four years, must have created wonder among the Natives; but Soondur Singh knew well how little chance there existed of his being able to follow the daring example of the Kutoch Rajah, against a British force complete in all the implements of war. He considered prudence the better part of valour. As we before surmised, Major Lawrence was not likely to accept any thing short of an unconditional surrender; though it would, no doubt, have pleased the Sikh government better had less stringent terms been enforced. The energy and determination displayed by Major Lawrence, have been conspicuous on all occasions; and the Sikhs have already discovered that the Governor-general's agent is not to be tampered with, or talked over by their smooth words and deceitful promises. Such a man is alone capable of sustaining our supremacy among a people who thoroughly detest us, and who will lose no opportunity of indirectly thwarting the British authorities. Soondur Singh may probably be able to enlighten the agent, regarding his conduct in refusing to obey the repeated orders of his own government; and it may transpire, that he was merely an instrument for the execution of a measure which has entailed great trouble and expense on the British Government. Be this as it may, the fall of Kangra will have a most beneficial effect on the hill tribes, who will
now have no difficulty in believing that their new rulers are of a very different character from the Sikhs, whom they detest and despise.

Every account agrees in describing the country about Kangra as exceedingly beautiful and picturesque; and so must every place be within view of snow-clad hills; for it is associated in European minds with the idea of a cool climate, so much more congenial to northern constitutions than the hot, sultry, sandy plains of India. There can hardly be any feeling more delightful to the sojourner in the east, than that produced by an approach to the mountains, where he once more finds himself in possession of the full faculties of mind and body; and views around him trees, shrubs, plants, and gurgling brooks, which bring vividly before him the scenes of his early years. The European soldier is a callous being; and provided he gets his daily food and liquor, cares but little in what climate he is placed, even though his health becomes impaired, and he is eventually rendered unfit for service. But the European officers who have spent much of their time in the plains, find in the climate of the hills an approach to an equivalent to a trip to their native country. While on this subject, it may not be out of place to allude to the generous and praiseworthy endeavours made by Major Lawrence, to establish a school for the children of European soldiers in the hills. He has contributed largely to the funds himself, and by great exertions obtained many
supporters of his plan. The European soldier, however, is not sufficiently alive to the blessing opening to his child. Deriving some pecuniary advantage from his children, more than sufficient to maintain them under his own eye, his views extend no further than to see them in the ranks; and he deems even a limited education calculated to render his son discontented with his lot! The same contracted views influence his conduct towards his daughters, whose highest ambition is to marry a non-commissioned officer, or perchance a conductor; indeed, in either case, he imagines that too much learning would instil into his offspring notions of gentility incompatible with their sphere in life. Acting on such ideas, he is perfectly satisfied with the efforts of the regimental schoolmaster or mistress. But, independent of the enlarged views of Major Lawrence as regards education, he places considerable stress on the advantages of climate which such an institution in the hills would confer. On this point there can exist no doubt in the minds of those who have witnessed the pallid, sickly countenances of the children of both European officers and soldiers in the plains of India, where the mortality is great among both.

The improved morals of the children are, however, the chief advantage which the Major contemplates; and there can be little doubt that these would attain a higher standard in the hills
than in the barracks. But the parents of such children argue that their return to a barrack would speedily efface all the advantages of such an institution. This is, however, more plausible than just; for when the principles of religion and morality are engrafted on the young mind by precept and example, they are not liable to be very quickly effaced, even in a barrack; and it is well known that a religious and moral soldier is not an uncommon character among our European troops in India. In all these respects the plan is worthy of support; but there is one consideration connected with Major Lawrence's scheme which has already raised serious objections, and that is on the score of religious instruction. In most European regiments in India, the number of Roman Catholics is equal to that of the Protestants, and in many the former are in excess of the latter; and as the scheme only contemplated the instructing of children according to Protestant principles, the Catholics are necessarily excluded from the benefits of the institution. To overcome such an obstacle is no easy matter, and every suggestion tending towards such a result must, therefore, be acceptable.

The exclusion from the proposed institution of all children born of a Native mother, is another measure which appears to have caused considerable disappointment among the soldiers. Many of the men have children by Native women, to whom
they are married. We are not sure that the prohibition does not extend to the children by half-caste or Eurasian mothers.

It would almost appear from Major Lawrence's scheme, that considering the Roman Catholic religion as heterodox, he was inclined to put a complete bar to its adoption by the rising generation. We do not mean to insinuate that he wishes to make converts of the Roman Catholic children; but as no religious instruction is provided for them, it is naturally to be supposed that their young minds would readily imbibe the established religious worship of the institution. Should no mode of removing this obstacle be devised, we fear the establishment of this school must be partial in its operation, and its advantage confined to the offspring of Protestant parents.

The history of battles is a matter which seems to be never correctly given at the time of their occurrence; and Feerozshuhur is no exception. In the general account which we were enabled to give from the Commander-in-chief's despatches, and other sources, the impression to be conveyed is, that Sir Harry Smith's division participated in the storming of the Sikh entrenchment, and also in the capture of the city or village of Feerozshuhur. That a portion of his division entered the village admits of no doubt, but the fact is equally well established, that it was the 2nd, or Gilbert's division, which entered the entrenchment first. In our account of the battle, it is stated that Sir
Harry Smith during the night of the 21st was exposed to the fire of the enemy, and caused the men to take off their white cap-covers. Now if this account be correct, the gallant general could hardly have been in the village of Missreewallah, which was nearly two miles in rear of the position occupied by the 2nd division; and yet it is perfectly true that Sir Harry Smith advanced from that place early on the morning of the 22nd, as he was heard giving strict orders to the sipahees scattered about the rear, not to discharge their muskets, which they were in the habit of doing, throughout the night; thus tending to lead the enemy towards their defenceless position, had not the attention of the Sikhs been wholly directed to the portion of the army which occupied their entrenchment. At what particular time the 1st division, or a portion of it, entered the entrenchment and Feerozshuhur, we do not know; but that the 2nd division (which suffered no check,) preceded it, is beyond a doubt; for on the blowing-up of the great mine, and when fears were entertained that the 1st European light infantry had been annihilated, there were none of the 1st division in sight. It is therefore probable that Sir Harry Smith, with a portion of the 1st division, had become separated from his main body, and took up his position at the village of Missreewallah, where he might have remained during the night of the 21st, and from thence advanced at day-break on the morning of the 22nd. Several troops of horse artillery were
at the same village, and the presence of the 1st division with Sir Harry Smith, could not have been overlooked or mistaken by the artillery officers who mentioned the fact. That Sir Harry Smith wished to join the advanced division in the entrenchment, there is no doubt, from the marked displeasure evinced by him towards the late Colonel Ryan, who advised him to remain in the position until daylight. It is, notwithstanding, difficult to conceive how Sir Harry Smith, when once in the entrenchment, could have withdrawn to the village of Missreewallah, as is so confidently asserted by a writer in the Delhi Gazette, under the signature of "Bengal Fusilier." "Bengal Fusilier" also alludes to the spiking of the "grape-belching gun": that feat was performed by Her Majesty's 80th foot, though he is perfectly correct in associating his own regiment with the event, as it was formed up for that purpose by the Governor-general himself; and the gallant charge only proved, that however formidable the gun might have been, it needed not for its capture two regiments of Europeans; and the light infantry had no wish to rob the 80th of the exclusive glory. But as regards the advance of Gilbert's division without a check, and its first entrance into the Sikh entrenchment, the writer and every one connected with the division are fully satisfied; and it is a pity that the conduct of this gallant division was not placed in a clearer light in the despatches. Had the Sikhs been completely dislodged, and put
to flight on the 21st, the 2nd division would, doubtless, have received its full meed of praise.

On referring to an officer of the 2nd division, who got mixed up with the 1st, regarding the position of Sir Harry Smith and Her Majesty's 50th, during the night of the 21st, he states, "I should say it was between 1 and 3 A.M. on the 22nd, that he (Sir H. Smith) moved out of the entrenched camp, having been under a desperate fire all night up to that time, and quite separated from the rest of the army. He was in the very centre of the enemy and pitched into on all sides."

This statement coming from one in no way connected with the 1st division, further than that he was accidentally mixed up with it, is conclusive as to the point at issue.

All that the second division contended for, seems to be their priority in entering the entrenchment, and this, considering it was the attacking division, and met with no check in capturing the Sikh guns, was naturally to be expected; and if the first division claim the honour of first entering the entrenchment, the mistake could only have arisen from its not seeing the second division, which had previously established itself in the entrenchment.

It may be asked, what would have been the effect had Gilbert's division been withdrawn during the night? The question is easy of solution. The Sikhs would have regained their original position, and the most disastrous consequences would have ensued, as Tej Singh, instead of bringing up his
30,000 Ghorchurrs on the morning of the 22nd, might have done so immediately and driven the British army in disorder on Feerozpore; in fact, the safety of India depended on Gilbert's retaining his position, and preventing the advance of the Sikhs during the night of the 21st, and we have good reasons for believing that this was the opinion of both the Governor-general and Commander-in-chief; and therefore the little notice taken of General Gilbert on this momentous occasion, is one of those anomalies in warfare which are not easily accounted for.

These particulars are of little interest except to the parties concerned, but it becomes the duty of an historian to reconcile as far as possible conflicting accounts, and to render due honour to gallant troops engaged in a hard-fought battle, by assigning to each the proper meed of praise without detracting from the merits of others, and this has been our aim throughout this work. We have alluded to every thing which might in the most remote degree elucidate the subject, and if we have overlooked individual claims to distinction, we shall be ready to remedy the omission if the parties concerned will give us such information as may lead to just and unbiassed conclusions.
CHAPTER XVIII.

Since the accounts promulgated regarding the movements of the first division at Feerozshuhur are of a conflicting nature, we resolved to have recourse for accurate information to the general commanding it; and Sir Harry Smith, with a ready compliance which claims our warmest thanks, put us immediately in possession of the particulars which we sought. We are sure they will be interesting to our military readers. We wished in the first place, to ascertain the period at which the general entered the entrenched camp, and put the following query on the subject.

“Was it before or after the blowing-up of the great mine that you advanced with the first division, or a portion of it, including Her Majesty’s 50th, Queen’s Own?”

“As the 50th crossed the trenches, the mine blew up—the mine exploded some short distance to our right and front. We were all momentarily
staggered by the explosion.” This answer shows that the 50th passed the trenches soon after the attacking division.

The next query related to the further progress of Sir Harry Smith and the 50th.

“Did you pass through the village of Feerozshuhur and take up a position in advance of it nearer the enemy?”

“Yes—the first person who entered the village was* Sir Harry Smith, followed by the colours of the 50th, and a few of the 1st European light infantry. We drove the enemy through it, and many sought refuge and barricaded themselves. A position was taken up beyond the village towards the enemy, and the troops formed in a crescent as well as the darkness admitted.” It was stated by the anonymous writer in the Delhi Gazette, “That Sir Harry Smith had left the entrenchment soon after nightfall on the evening of the 21st;” and we were particularly anxious to receive correct information on this point, since others asserted that the occurrence took place at 9 o’clock p.m., though no one, as far as we can learn, even insinuated that Sir Harry Smith himself was seen at Missree-wallah before 3 a.m. on the morning of the 22nd.

“How long did you maintain your post, and at what time did you leave it?”

“The day had closed in when we first took up

* These answers were furnished by Captain Lugard, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-general of the first division, and their accuracy is vouched for by Sir Harry Smith.
the position, and we left it a little after 3 o'clock on the morning of the 22nd." This settles the point regarding the time when Sir Harry Smith left the entrenchment.

We next wished to ascertain the object which the General had in view in leaving the post, and the following question was put.

"In leaving the advanced position thus gained, was your object to effect a junction with the main body of the army, or to take your troops to a place of greater safety?"

"Most assuredly to effect a junction—our ignorance of the exact position of the main army, and the untenable post we held (unsupported,) obliged us to fall back. The enemy had discovered our isolated situation, and every fresh gun that opened upon us, showed their intention of cutting in between us and where we imagined the main army to be. Long before we left, we had been under a cross fire, which dealt death to many at nearly every discharge. Hull, a noble soldier, Griffin, and others, were killed there. Lieutenant Galloway, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-general, had his horse shot under him, and was himself badly wounded."

From what is stated in giving a general account of the battle, the situation of Sir Harry Smith was a most critical one, and unsupported as he was, there was every chance of his being cut off from the main army had he not fallen back. If Sir Harry Smith had left the entrenchment early on
the night of the 21st, it was naturally to be sup-
posed, that he would have bivouacked at Missree-
wallah, and we therefore put the next question.

"In not effecting a junction with the rest of the
army, at what place did you afterwards bivouac, and
was it at the village of Missreewallah, about two
miles in rear of the field of battle?"

"We did not bivouack any where after leaving
Feerozshah, till we joined the main army. In falling
back we had nothing to guide us, and made for the
first fires that came in sight, imagining they be-
longed to the army. They proved to be Missree-
wallah, where stragglers from every corps had col-
llected. After enquiries had been made as to the
direction of the main body, and when the men who fell
out in search of water, as also the stragglers found
there, had been got together, we moved on to form
a junction, and the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-
general was ordered to gallop in the direction of
the firing, and report our being ready to support.
The day had well broken by this time. The De-
puty Assistant Adjutant-general found the Gover-
nor-general and reported our advance, and received
orders to move on steadily."

The next point was to ascertain how long Sir
Harry Smith halted at Missreewallah, and this ques-
tion was accordingly put.

"After how long an interval did you again move
forward to join the Commander-in-chief?"

"We halted at Missreewallah. The men fell out
to get water, and some grog coming up was served
out. The general sought for those who could give information of the main army. Captains Lumley and Christie were found at one of the bivouac fires; the former urged a march towards Feerozpore. Sir Harry replied, he wanted but one piece of information, 'Where was the Commander-in-chief, as there he would take his men.' Captain Christie, commanding the 9th irregulars, finally volunteered to show the way, the day broke just about this time, and as soon as the men could be collected, we moved off to form the junction.'

In addition to the foregoing replies, which satisfactorily settle the points at issue, namely:

1st.—That Sir Harry Smith entered the entrenchment after the 2nd division, which was in it when the mine blew up;

2nd.—That he passed through the village of Feerozshuhur, and took up a position in advance of it, nearer the enemy;

3rd.—That he did not leave his position until the latter became untenable, and a risk existed of his being cut off from the main army;

4th.—That he did not leave his position until three A. M. of the 22nd, and then with the intention of joining the main army, which he could not at that time effect, but halted at Missreewallah; again advancing at day-break on the morning of the 22nd under the guidance of Captain Christie,—we were also furnished with an interesting Memorandum of Operations of the 1st division of the army of the Sutlej, on the 21st and 22nd December, 1845,
by the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-general of that division, the accuracy of which is attested by Sir Harry Smith.

"The 1st and 2nd brigades, 1st division, late in the afternoon of the 21st December were drawn up in line, separated by the whole of our artillery; the 1st brigade on the right, and the 2nd on the left.

"The 2nd brigade was just formed, and but a moment before had been joined by the Major-general commanding the division, (who had been seeing his 1st brigade properly placed for attack,) when orders were received to move forward. As we advanced, the round shot told heavily on our men.

"Upon nearing the trenches, a heavy and most destructive fire was poured upon the brigade from the batteries immediately in front. The Governor-general was at this time with the brigade, and under the fire I allude to, he spoke to and encouraged the men. As we closed the battery, Major Broadfoot rode up to Sir Harry Smith, and told him that several battalions (four I think) of Avitabili's troops were moving down from our left to attack us.

"The right of the 50th foot was brought up as much as circumstances would allow, and a storm of musketry announced the attack. Here the much-to-be-lamented Major Somerset received his mortal wound; he was close up in rear of the centre of the 50th at the moment. One cheer, with a charge headed by the Major-general, repulsed and drove back the Sikh battalions; the battery was carried at the point of the bayonet, and the charge was
continued through the camp up to the village of Feerodshah, where the head-quarters of the enemy had evidently been established, for the village was filled with richly caparisoned horses, tents, &c., &c., and men who sought refuge in the houses and walled enclosures.

"A desultory attack was forthwith made, and many lives lost on both sides; for the entrances to some of the houses were most intricate. Much confusion ensued, owing to the darkness of the evening having closed in; the 50th foot, however, were formed by the Major-general as well as circumstances would admit, and posted beyond the village. The various detachments, from nearly every regiment in the army, that now joined us, were posted and got into as much order as possible; parties of men, some without, some with officers, came straying in from the enemy's camp, that had been carried, and which was now burning in all directions. Amongst others too numerous to mention, were a party of the 9th foot under Major Barnwell, Captain Bethune, &c.; of the 16th Native grenadiers under Major Hull; of the 26th Native light infantry under Captain Taylor, and Lieutenant Hall; and of the 1st Europeans under Captain Seaton, and other officers of the 62nd foot, &c. Lieutenant Peel, of the Governor-general's staff, was also there.

"Hardly were we in position, when an alarm was given of the enemy's cavalry, and a body did come down on our right; they, however, drew off on seeing our force ready, which they could by means of
the many large fires kindled about, though the night was pitch-dark. By the same means the enemy's artillery became aware of our vicinity, and after a few wide shots, brought a gun to bear upon us with great accuracy, dealing death at every discharge throughout the night. Poor Major Hull who had exerted himself to the general's admiration in endeavouring to form up the sepoys, here received his death-wound, (when in the 50th square.) Brevet Major Griffin, too, was here killed, and many other officers wounded; nearly every mounted officer had his horse killed.

"The general alone, as if bearing a charmed life, escaped untouched, both himself and charger.

"Throughout the night the brigade remained on this spot under arms, and under a destructive fire. When towards morning, the enemy got a gun to bear more on our right flank, and were evidently creeping round our position as if to cut us off from the main army, of which we had not heard, as to what had become of it, what it had accomplished, or what it was then doing!!

"Our position was becoming untenable, Sir Harry Smith, therefore, a little before 3 o'clock, apparently with great reluctance, gave the order for the force to fall back in the direction we had attacked. The 50th and other Europeans were got into the best order for repelling an attack, and thus we traversed the enemy's camp; after leaving which, we directed our course towards a large fire, where it was expected the army might be bivouacked; this we discovered to be the field hos-
pital of the 62nd foot and other regiments; but no
direct intelligence could be obtained here of the
army. Some short distance further on we came to
the village of Missreewallah, where cavalry, artillery,
and various detached parties of infantry had, appa-
rently, bivouacked. Here the men sought for, and
procured some water, and grog was served out;
they were nearly exhausted from the night's
fatigue.

"After some delay, caused by enquiries as to the
direction of the main army, and the dispersion of
the men in search of water, they were finally got
together; and under the direction of Captain Christie,
commanding the 9th irregulars, who kindly offered
to shew the General where the Commander-in-chief
was, we again moved off to join the army.

"It was now broad day-light, and the troops
were fagged, and our progress was slow in con-
sequence.

"We came in sight of the other troops just as
they had carried the batteries. Our 1st brigade
was part of this force, and the 31st Queen's greatly
distinguished themselves in the morning's fight.
They lost on the 21st and 22nd, two officers, and
seventy-eight men killed, with five officers and
ninety-six men wounded; one of the officers and
many of the men died shortly after, of their wounds.
The 50th had fifty-four men killed, and six officers
and ninety-one men wounded.

"The 2nd brigade, with the numerous detach-
ments, formed on the extreme left of the remainder,
and were about to deploy when the attack of Tej
Singh commenced. The enemy's second shot fell into the 50th column, and the regiment lost many men."

Here ends Captain Lugard's interesting account, and as we surmised in a former chapter, the 1st division saw nothing of the 2nd, nor knew what the "rest of the army had done, or were doing," though the burning of the Sikh camp showed that the army had been in it; and had Sir Harry Smith fallen back on the right of the village, he would have found the main army to the right and rear, but the darkness of the night precluded his taking this route; and yet it is strange that he did not come in contact with the cavalry in rear of the advanced columns; but it was only the bivouack fires of the field hospital that could be seen after leaving the field, and it is surprising that none of the enemy's horse made a descent on the former, which they might have easily done.

From this account, Sir Harry Smith left his position with "apparent reluctance," but still our opinion remains unaltered, that to the circumstance of the 2nd division retaining its position, may be safely attributed the check of the Sikh army.

It was, perhaps, fortunate that Sir Harry Smith occupied the position he did during the night of the 21st, had it only been to collect the parties from the various regiments which strayed around him, though, it is probable, that these would have found their way to Missreewallah, where the numerous fires would have directed their steps. His position
appears to have been untenable, and had he fallen back earlier, his loss might have been less severe, but still, it is to be regretted, that he should have been obliged to retire without being able in so doing to rejoin the main army. We are not sure that it is agreeable to the tactics of war for the reserve to push forward and take up an advanced position; but if such a feat be accomplished, the advantage is lost by being obliged to fall back; and had the 1st division kept its place, and supported the 2nd division throughout the night, the advantage would have been more conspicuous. Sir Harry Smith’s refusal to march on Feerozpore, or in any direction save that where he might find the Commander-in-chief, at once shows the determined courage of the General and forms a striking contrast to the officer commanding the cavalry division; it is true, that the latter received an order, while Captain Lumley’s advice to Sir Harry Smith was merely a suggestion.

It may be said, that the Commander-in-chief and Governor-general were, in reality, at the head of the portion of the army which captured the Sikh guns, entered the entrenchment, and maintained its position during the night of the 21st, and that Gilbert in consequence held a secondary command; yet, we are struck with the despatch of the latter, and had we not known that the Commander-in-chief and the second in command were present, it would have seemed that General Gilbert was really the leading spirit in the affair.
It may be said, that in making such remarks on military movements we have forgotten the maxim "Sutor non ultra crepidam," and that none but military men versed in the tactics of war are competent judges. This may be true, as regards modern warfare, but our contest with the Sikhs partook of the ancient mode of fighting, on our side at least; and if we substitute the word bayonet for pike or halbert, the British attack on the guns at Feerrozshuhur, and the storming of their entrenchment, resembled closely what might have been expected from the Roman legions under Julius Cæsar, or the Macedonian phalanx under Alexander the Great! Such being the case, those who have perused the commentaries of the former, or the records of Arrian and Quintus Curtius, though not military men, can form a pretty accurate judgment regarding the importance of keeping in a close body when the bayonets are the never-failing weapons, and not to expose a body of men thus armed to a murderous fire from cannon, such as Sir Harry Smith experienced on the night of the 21st of December. His driving the enemy before the bayonets of Her Majesty's 50th through the village of Feerrozshuhur, was consonant to ancient warfare; a Cæsar himself would have done the same with his pikes and halberts; but having accomplished this, he would not have taken up a position in the darkness of night with an enemy's guns playing on him, entirely ignorant of where he was, and totally isolated from the rest of the army; and though his
10th legion could not have been braver men than the Queen's own, yet, neither the one nor the other could be expected to withstand round-shot and grape, when unsupported. In pursuit of a flying enemy, the advance of Sir Harry Smith might have been attended with the happiest effect, but though deprived of many guns and obliged to retire, the spirit of the Sikhs was unbroken, and they kept possession of a part of their camp during the night, and but for the obstinate stand of the 2nd division would, in all probability, have regained the whole of their entrenchment.

If the battle of the 21st December resembled one of the ancient conflicts, that of the 22nd was in complete accordance with it, where British bayonets were alone the weapons used by our troops, no artillery being available! The British formed their infantry in a body and attacked the whole Sikh army, though 30,000 Ghoorchurras appeared in support of the latter. The reason why the Sikh cavalry did not charge our infantry, can only be accounted for from witnessing the determined bravery of the latter in capturing guns at the point of the bayonet, and advancing against them unsupported by artillery. The result of Feeroz-shuhur on the 22nd, proves that it is not altogether to the weapons employed that victory must be looked for, but to the indomitable courage of troops; for we here see that the Sikhs, though, possessing all the implements of modern warfare, guns, cavalry, and infantry, opposed to British
infantry alone, were obliged to yield to the latter. Had the two forces changed sides, and the guns and cavalry been on our part, the Sikh infantry would have been annihilated, as they nearly were at Sobraon; for, as before stated, it was not artillery opposed to artillery, nor cavalry to infantry, but a body of European infantry fighting against all the three arms: such was the battle of Feerozshuhur, and such its glorious result under gallant leaders and indomitable troops, maintaining the name and valour of British soldiers against fearful odds.

It was not our original intention to have entered into the full particulars of the late engagements with the Sikhs, but we found ourselves compelled to give as much information as we could collect; for it is not from general statements that the true nature of battles is to be gleaned; and though Waterloo was fought thirty years ago, it is only of late that the researches of Captain Siborne have enabled us to come to a true knowledge of the particulars of that great battle. We are, therefore, vastly obliged to Sir Harry Smith and Sir Joseph Thackwell for the information politely furnished by them regarding Feerozshuhur and Sobraon; and should the present work ever see a second edition, we have do doubt that time will enable us to correct errors, and add many more facts regarding the Sikh campaign of 1845 and 1846.
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Grand total killed and wounded: 6,322

Table showing the loss of the Army of the Sutlej in the Campaign of 1845 and 1846.
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NO NEHAL SINGH
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