Psycho-analytic Concept
of Religion
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system without permission in writing from the Publisher.

Price Rs. 135.00 $27

200-19
T738

Q:g(SM9)
L9

FIRST PUBLISHED 1979
BY S. BALWANT
FOR AJANTA PUBLICATIONS (INDIA)
MALKAGANJ, DELHI-110007

DISTRIBUTORS:
AJANTA BOOKS INTERNATIONAL
1-U.B., JAWAHAR NAGAR, BUNGALOW ROAD, DELHI-110007

PRINTED BY
M.R. PRINTS
1829, RAJGARH COLONY
AT GIANI PRESS
DELHI-110051
Dedicated as a mark of sincere and profound gratitude to internationally known Zoologist

Prof. B.C. Mahendra
D.Sc., F.A.Z., F.A. Sc., F.Z.S.I.

Ex-Professor and Head of the Dept. of Zoology
& Professor Emeritus, Agra College

President—The Academy of Zoology, Agra
Editor—The Annals of Zoology
Contents

Preface ix-xiv

1. RELIGION IN THE MODERN PERSPECTIVE 1-171
   Religion in the Perspective of Modern Knowledge.
   Change in Emphasis from the Theological approach to the Scientific.

   Modern Approaches to the Study of Religion
   The Anthropological Approach.
   The Historical Approach.
   The Sociological Approach.
   The Psychological Approach.

2. RELIGION IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 172-269
   Nature: Data and Methods of the Psychology of Religion.
   Approach to Religion in Different Schools of Psychology.

3. PSYCHOANALYTIC ORIENTATION TO RELIGION 270-438
   Freudian Approach to Religion
   Adler on Religion.
   Jung on Religion.
   Rank on Religion.
   Reik on Religion.
4. PSYCHOANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO RELIGION EXAMINED 439-474
5. CONCLUSION 475-495
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 497-508
INDEX 509-516
RELIGION has been widely characterized as embodying the most sublime of all human aspiration, as being a bulwark of morality, a source of public order and inner individual peace which is the outcome of spiritual vision, as ennobling and civilizing in its effect upon mankind, and as being the most powerful human impulse in search of the true, the good, and the beautiful in its absolute form. Max Müller holds that it is not political or military or economic history, but the history of religion that best reveals the deep seated forces which shape the course of human events. The great epochs in the world history are marked, not by the foundation or destruction of empires, by the migration of races or by any other revolutions. All this is outward history. The real history of mankind is the history of religion. Although we meet traces of it through all historic ages, we can, however, only suppose that until a certain stage in his biological evolution man was without any religion.

The vulnerability of religion, however, is not less striking. It has been accused of being a stubborn obstacle hampering progress, and of promoting fanaticism, intolerance, ignorance, superstition and obscurantism. In the name of religion, it is maintained that roads to hell have been paved. Records show religion to be among the strongest buttresses of an established social order, howsoever, inhuman and cruel. It also, however, shows to be capable of exhibiting profound revolutionary tendencies as is evident from the Peasant War in the sixteenth century Germany.

Xenophanes, a pre-Socratic philosopher criticising anthropomorphism in traditional religion, pointed out that men paint their gods in their own likeness. Ludwig Feuerbach claimed that man projects his being into objectivity and that religion is merely a projection of one’s own wish-world and the god
men worship are wish-beings and that god is the highest subjectivity of man abstracted from himself. Karl Marx held that religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium of the people. The pioeneer French sociologist Emile Durkheim, however, proposed that religion is the source of all higher culture.

Reinhold Neibuhr is of the opinion that modern man cannot understand his cultural order apart from its spiritual and ideational roots. Thus, appreciation of religion on account of its positive and functional role and attack on it due to its superstitious and illusory characteristics, have always been exhibited from Lucretius in ancient times to Freud in our own. That, however, it represents a set of human mind and a complex of social forms of considerable signifi-
cance, can never be denied.

Religions have persisted for so long because they meet in one way or the other the most peculiar type of human need. Anthropologists, and social scientists, all over the world, agree that all human societies exhibit practices, beliefs, rituals, forms of cultural behaviour that signify religious manifesta-
tions. It is amply evident from such facts that religion is ingrained in human nature because perhaps man alone is capable of the kind of thought and activities called religion. It is surely the prerogative of man.

In the occident, religion is a social phenomena, a matter of the ecclesia of the community. It is a prop for social stability and a shield against the innovator. Gods are the promoters of the social customs. In the orient, however, religion is more a matter of spiritual culture than a scholastic learning. It is an experience in life transcending logic and in it the truth is realized by deepening and transforming life and the level of consciousness rather than judging the truth. God is not the highest object to be known but the highest to be realised. According to Radhakrishnan, religion in the East, is the cultivation of the interior life. The radical difference between the West and the East is that the Western mind is rationalistic an analytical, positivistic and practical while in the East, the mind is more inclined to inward life and intuitive experience.
In the face of all that has been said about religion, there are claims of Psychoanalysts—Freud, Freudians and the Neo-Freudians. On the basis of an intensive psychological study of religious phenomena carried out since the beginning of the twentieth century, it can be fairly claimed that during these years much more has been learnt scientifically about religion than in the previous two thousand years. Psychoanalysis was primarily concerned with the investigation of mental processes and in the course of this it found itself in a position to throw nothing less than a flood of light on the most relevant facts relating to religion and its genesis that cannot be overlooked. As the youngest in the succession of sciences, it owes its place to earlier researches, more particularly in anthropology and comparative religion, which have provided it with adequate material about primitive society to apply in the study of sophisticated and civilized society. As a branch of modern psychology dealing with the deeply rooted motives and their peculiar mechanisms, it has endangered several psychological concepts regarding human consciousness in general and traditional religious concepts in particular, by its radically new and bold approach. Religion is an expression of need felt by fearful individuals searching to return to the safety of the womb, says Freud and adds that it is a universal obsessional neurosis of mankind and wishfulfilment, certainly seems to be very ambitious and startling claim apparently in the context of vast historical records of religion, quite contrary to it. One is, therefore, tempted to study the psychoanalytic concept of religion without inquiring into the backgroundal study of religion, that is to say, the condition of the primitive races and their culture, historical upheavals, social changes, man's inherent noetic quest to unveil the mystery of nature and his existence in the world in general, and psychoanalytic motivations and urges in particular, all this constitutes the proper perspective to understand the complex phenomenon of religion in general and trace out in particular whether anthropological and historical background revealing the origins and rise of religion paved the way to the psychoanalytic concept of religion as they say. If it is so, then we have also to find out why and how psychoanalysis asserts itself to present an
altogether new interpretation of religious phenomena which belies the opinion of historical linkage. Although religion, it is said by the spiritualists and theologians, is a matter of realization and to be understood intuitively and not of study, yet modern psychology allures us that religious phenomena are susceptible to scientific explanation like other mental phenomena and this view is not only logically sound but also gives impetus to an inquisitive mind. As such, the justifiability of the study is well grounded, and worthwhileness of the work in a way of new problems and novel understanding of religion is well assured. Besides, the study of religion in the perspective of modern disciplines taken up in this study, in general, and in the light of facts advanced by psychoanalysis and its related schools, in particular, has been engaging my attention since I was a student at Banaras Hindu University. But my keen interest and my ambition to launch on an exploration of this phenomenon flagged for a while only to be revived at Agra College, Agra under more inspiring conditions. My basic aim to study religion psychoanalytically was to present the genesis of religious phenomena involving the deepest and hidden levels of mental mechanism. Although psychoanalytic interpretations of religion, specially those of Freud, which once provoked hostile reactions and bitter criticism were later widely welcomed by the modern minds as scientific explanation of the rise of religion. The various approaches, viz., anthropological, historical, social and psychological ones were made the subjects of the present study with a view to presenting the basic theories of the origins of religion so that psychoanalytic approach to it could be viewed in the comparative perspective.

Religion is something innate in the human kind but what this something is and what religion represents is not fairly easy to answer. In the present study an attempt has been made to study this psychoanalytically, and it was accepted for the award of the degree of the Doctor of Philosophy by the Agra University.

The present work has been divided into five chapters. The first chapter attempts to present religion in the modern perspective; the second deals with the methods and data employed in the psychological perspective to investigate religious
phenomena and how religion has been viewed by different schools of psychology. The third chapter studies religion and its various concepts as explained by the prominent psychoanalysts—Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, Carl Gustav Jung, Otto Rank and Theodor Reik and the Neo-Freudians specially Erich Fromm and G. Stanley Hall who have made very distinctive contributions to the study of religion in the psychoanalytic perspective. The fourth presents a general evaluation of the psychoanalytic approach to religion; and the fifth brings out the conclusion—the contribution of psychoanalysis to our understanding of religion, its persistence, and the possibility of its extinction.

Although I have studied, and made use of a large number of works available within my reach, I do not claim to have exhausted all the material existing in the field. I also do not lay any claims to total originality. I have endeavoured in my own humble way to explain, assess and evaluate psychoanalytic concept of religion, which I believe, may add to the knowledge of the psychology of religion in which deep rooted motives and mysterious mental mechanisms are operative in giving rise to religious consciousness.

In the accomplishment of this doctoral dissertation, valuable suggestions and assistance have been received from various sources and persons. I am, indeed, deeply indebted to all those who have helped me in one way or the other. My sincere thanks are due to Dr. B.C. Mahendra, President of the Academy of Zoology, Agra, for helping me in the systematization of the early chapters of the work, to Dr. J.P. Awasthi, Convener, Board of Studies in Philosophy, Agra University for elucidating the concept of the philosophy of religion, to Dr. B.B. Jain, Head of the Dept. of English, Agra College, Agra and Dr. Ghanshyam Asthana, Associate Professor of English, Agra College, Agra and Convener, Board of Studies in English, Agra University, for going through some of the chapters critically from the language point of view, to Dr. Peter Homans, Associate Professor of Religion and Psychological Studies, University of Chicago for his assistance in locating some reference material pertaining to the subject matter of this work, to Dr. B.M. Chaturvedi, Head of the Department of
Sanskrit, Delhi University and Prof. M.S. Arya, Department of Fine Arts, Agra College for their valuable suggestions, and Messrs M.P. Singh and B. Lal, Senior Library Assistants of the Central Library of Agra College, Agra for assisting me in the compilation of the bibliography. Above all, I am extremely and sincerely grateful to Dr. R.P. Varma, Head of the Department of Philosophy, Agra College, and Ex-Convener of the Board of Studies in Philosophy, Agra University, my guide, but for whose critical insight, ungrudging guidance and kind help this work could not have been accomplished. M/s. Ajanta Books International have taken keen interest in the publication of the work and I am so thankful to them for their enthusiastic initiatives.

Last, but not least, I cannot resist my temptation to express my gratitude to all those authors whose works and of thought, I have made use with ample profit and benefit. Suggestions and criticism in any form will be most welcome and it will be my endeavour to incorporate them in the later editions.

5. 10. 1979
Agra College, Agra

S.M. Tripathi
Religion in the Perspective of Modern Knowledge

RELIGION is an almost universal phenomenon in all human societies, whether primitive and simple or advanced and sophisticated. Naturally, it is extremely diversified in its nature—a vast and complex entity which can be investigated from numerous viewpoints. It means very different things to theologians, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, Marxists, mystics, the Zen Buddhists, Jews, Christians and Hindus. As a result, a great variety of theories have been propounded about its origin, inherent necessity, or nature. This is particularly so, since religion refers to various moral codes, magical cults, shaman and priestly activities, ceremonials, rituals, mysticism, beliefs in theological system and faith in some supernatural power, deity responsible for the creation, preservation and annihilation of the universe. These aspects, although differing from each other, also pass on into each other, overlapping almost indiscriminately.

The aim in the present chapter is not to present the various kinds of religions, their forms and phases, nor a particular religion with its history or development, but to give a contemporary view of religion as a whole in general, in the perspective of human knowledge.
The Contemporary Position of Religion

Man is a religious creature by birth, inheritance, and culture, and consequently his institutions, traditions, conventions, sacred writings and religious beliefs can be observed and examined in the light of discoveries of modern disciplines. Furthermore, most religions claim to be more than a collection of empirical data, inner dispositions, values, or fundamental orientation to life. They regard themselves as based on spiritual experiences, revelations or the like. According to Feaver, "Religion is manifestly a content or element of human experience". Recent studies show that all religions exhibit certain similarities probably implying the same or similar source of origin—a fact which necessitates an explanation embracing more than the cultural processes of assimilation, conventionalization and diffusion, even though such factors might have played an important role in its genesis. These similarities, it may be reasonable to assume spring from such facts as the universality of human need, spiritual no less than physical, an impulse towards unity and completeness, and awareness of powers that appear to operate within the world and yet external to it.

In view of such facts, a justifiable rational interpretation of religious spirit must take cognizance of its possible fuller meaning and significance in relation to experience as a whole. Religions, specially, those professing to be revealed ones, claim to be completely true, and often in their more developed form, the ultimate truth, the only truth in harmony with the ultimate reality. However, this does not mean that religions represent merely an intellectual attitude towards reality, or the grasping of it, since thought in this connexion may be regarded as secondary to feeling or experience as most religious exponents affirm. Nor does it mean that religion is merely an interpretation of reality, although it apparently

implies an interpretation of the meaning of reality in terms of value to and for human beings. There seems to be in it a reckoning with the possibility that something at the core of reality does respond to and satisfy man’s demand for life and fulfilment of destiny.

While the claims of religions to be ultimate Truth, in addition to the available data and source of their genesis and development, call for careful examination, the alleged supranatural experience professed by them also from an appropriate subject for psychological study, specially in the light of psychoanalytic approach. This has now been accepted even by those who in earlier decades rejected the possibility of religion being made the subject of psychological analysis, without detriment to it. It is recognised that religious experiences, despite their creodal or revelatory criteria, proceed from common psychological motivations, from individual’s natural impulse, to record, communicate and interpret experiences that have an all compelling and unique significance. Similarly, metaphysics, though a highly intellectual discipline, is no less psychologically motivated than the lowliest and simplest forms of religious faith and practices, because this also is the result of man’s instinctual curiosity and inherent desire of interpretation and understanding. Man, both consciously and unconsciously, responds to the mystery of life and death and that they may be fair basis for the origin of religions. However, before taking into consideration the genesis of religious phenomena, it is advisable to define as far as possible, what we mean by the term “religion”.

Definition

The word ‘religion’ has been interpreted etymologically in two ways\(^1\), both accepted fairly widely. Cicero derived it from the verb ‘religere’, to execute painstakingly by means of repeated effort; while the ‘Christian Cicero’ Lactantius, a teacher of Latin rhetoric in the first half of the fourth century, derived it from “religare” to bind together, signifying that religion is

---

essentially a “bond of piety”. These interpretations refer to the twofold aspect of religion. On the objective side, it involves a recurring performance of certain activities and is thus concerned with the realm of external phenomena; on the subjective side, it indicates the hidden experiences of psychic life. In the context of the Western culture, religion conveys a suggestion to perfect ethical life. These etymological derivations imply that the more basic aspects of religion may be those of worship and of being a system of social relationships; in other words group identity and rituals.

In Indian languages the equivalent commonly used for religion is the word “Dharma” which, although it is not identical in connotation to, refers to the social, ethical, spiritual, moral, goal-oriented and humanistic aspects of religious behaviour. “Dharma” is one of those Sanskrit words that cannot be an exactly rendered in English. This word has passed through numerous changes so that it is scarcely possible to tell its meaning prevalent in the most ancient period of the Vedic Age. It is derived from the root “dhri” to uphold, to support, to nourish. In the Rigveda, the word appears to be used in the sense of “upholder or supporter or sustainer”. In most cases its meaning is “religious ordinances or rites” or “fixed principles or rules of conduct”. In the Atharveda, it is used in the sense of “merit acquired by the performance of religious rites”. In Chandogya Upanishada, it stands for the peculiar duties of “Ashramas”. Thus passing through several transitions in meaning, the word “Dharma” assumed its commonly accepted significance—“the privileges, duties and obligations of man, his standard of conduct as a member of the Aryan community, as a member of one of the castes, as a person in a particular stage in life”.

Jaimini² defines “dharma” as “desirable goals or result that is indicated by injunctive (Vedic) passages”. According to him it means such rites as are conducive to happiness and final beatitude and are enjoined by Vedic passages. Moreover, it was recognised that religion brings not only happiness and

2. यतो म्युदयाचे: अमेयससिद्धि: स यम्य: । वैशेषिक सूत्र २९.२
final beautitude in the earthly existence but helps human beings to achieve a rise and development to transcendental life. The underlying assumption is that there is another world, the spiritual world apart from this empirical world, which is more important than it. The word “Abhyudaya” implies the development and welfare in the empirical world, whereas “Nihashreyas” implies transcendental realisation. Religion helps men to realize the hidden powers of Self.

The Mahabharata has treated religion¹ basically as a symbol of humanity. According to it religion is not merely a symbol of the external conduct, practice, rites and belief but that energy which sustains society and keeps it organised and maintained. The relationship of the individual to the society is explained on the basis of religion as this it is which sustains everybody and everything. This concept is primarily humanistic since according to the Mahabharata none is more sublime and superior to man². In the Mahabharata, emphasis has also been laid on the code of conduct—“conducting oneself in accordance with the code of empirical as well as transcendental world, is religion”³. Self-contentment, purification, sustenance of all, and salvation are the main objectives of religion as envisaged in the Mahabharata, in which are enumerated and explained several types of religions. The welfare of society depends on the growth and strict observance of religion while its violation causes society to perish.

Etymologically, there are two meanings of religion propounded by the Mahabharata: first, that which helps in accumulating riches or containing opulence, the latter implying the pelf of the material world and as well as that of the spiritual or transcendental world; secondly, that which sustains all, i.e., taking which as pivot (axis) all life moves.⁴

1. धारणाद्वयमृद्यांतर्हुच्चर्व हारयते प्रजा:।
   वस्त्राहुरसंपुर्तसं परम्प्र इति निश्चय:।। महाभारत, कथ्यवर्धे नानारं क्रृष्णस २५९
2. न नानुपच्छेद्वत्तरं हि किरिचत। महाभारत मोक्षम श्रीवर्ते १२२२ एतर् २०१२२२।
3. लोकायात्माकिस्मीये तु दर्शन प्राधित रीतिः। महाभारत गान्तिपवर्ह १४२ १६
   चनात लब्धि चमो हि महराणाधिति निश्चय:। महाभारत गान्तिपवर्ह २०१२२२।
In the West, some philosophers, have laid emphasis only on the cognitive aspect of religion, ignoring the other aspects—conative and affective. Notable, among these are Hegel, Max Muller and Hoffding, etc. According to Hegel, "Religion is the knowledge possessed by the finite mind of its nature as absolute mind". He emphasized only the cognitive element.

Max Muller says, "Religion is a mental faculty or disposition which enables man to apprehend the infinite", but this definition does not take into account primitive religions which are supposed to be much developed. Tylor, who is an authority on primitive culture, defines religion as "a belief in spiritual beings". This is significant, since such belief as it is, concerns the world, although it omits a great deal.

Religion is not only knowledge but much more. As opposed to Max Muller and Hegel, Flints holds that "mere knowledge, however, clear, profound and comprehensive it may be, can never be religion". According to him there can be no religion where feeling and affection are not added to knowledge. Thus, the aspects of feeling (affective), and willing (conative) form the main basis of religion. Flint thinks that "religion is man's faith in being or beings, mightier than himself and inaccessible to the senses but not different to his sentiments and actions, with feelings and practices, which flow from such belief". Such a concept of religion touches different aspects of religious consciousness. "Man's belief in being or beings" indicates the cognitive side of religion.

Grensted defines religion in terms of external action of man and says—"Religion has the character of a deep inner sense of communion, carrying with it implications of guidance and security and giving meaning to the whole life". But this definition, Grensted himself points out, is not complete, as emphasis has to be laid also on faith in certain creeds or

1. Max Muller (F.) : Lectures on the origin and growth of Religion, 1898, p. 22.
3. Flint (Robert) : Theism, p. 2.
4. Ibid, p. 32.
system. This is unsatisfying according to him because it leaves out of account the necessity for a reasonable faith shaped into a known and accepted creed or system of beliefs and resting upon a recognised authority, tradition, scripture or church.

In analysing the bases of religion, Grensted points out that the trinity of action (conation), feeling (affect), and knowledge (cognition) form the basis of all religious experience and so for all purposes, these aspects of religion must be taken into account.

The great religions of the East illustrate the change of emphasis clearly. The earlier types—a primitive Zoroastrianism and the religion of the Vedas—were religions of cult and action closely linked with community. During the period of the Upanishadas, Indian religion passed into a phase of mystical exaltation of highly philosophical type, stressing the ultimate identity of all beings despite the illusion which separates this from that, the thinker from the thought, the mystic and all that he contemplates from the Brahma. In Buddhism, a derivant of Hinduism, though effective elsewhere, we find a religion which in its early form was almost purely ethical, its metaphysics being so simple that it has been regarded as a religion devoid of the idea of God and without any goal that has an objective meaning. Nonetheless it is one of the great religions of the world. Although very unlike Buddhism in most of its characteristic, Confucianism in China is also wholly ethical in type, with metaphysics reduced to the minimum.

In the history of Christianity, which has its roots in the religion of the early Hebrews, each of these three factors has come to the forefront one time or another. The Hebrew religion, which stated as strongly communal and active cult, primarily sacrificial developed later a lofty ethical framework under the leadership of great prophets. Unlike Buddhism, it was strongly and even passionately monotheistic, but its monotheism hardly developed at all in the direction of a theology or the type of mysticism which is aware of itself as the immediate and personal apprehension of God as known.

2. Ibid.
Jeremiah, making the direct knowledge of God the summit of his teaching, stands singular among the prophets. Some of the psalmists, who bear him company, were only singers and no philosophers. Thus the cognitive aspect of religion is almost absent in the Old Testament.

Against such a background, Christianity developed an unparalleled variety and richness of emphasis. What were the reasons behind the actual content of the first preaching of Gospel, is not explicit. What is apparent, however, is the fact that from the first century onward there were Christians who laid emphasis on good works, Christians who developed a new emphasis upon cult, Christians who developed the teaching of Sermon on the Mount into a simple ethic, and Christians who laid their first stress on the right belief about God, absolute sin and forgiveness, the meaning of redemption which that forgiveness implied, and the community of Church within which the old life was put away and the new life became possible.

Two major developments took place in Christianity during the Middle Ages. The rational aspects of it were worked out into an immense system of scholastic theology and faith, as right belief was strongly stressed. This was hardly modified, psychologically speaking, by the substitution at the Reformation of the inerrant Bible for the inerrant Church as the practical guide necessary alike to man's reason and to his salvation. A more fundamental and subtly very far-reaching change of emphasis came more recently with the influence of Albert Ritschl and a well-known representative of Romantic thought, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), who stressed the immediacy of religious experience and reasserted in different ways, at one and the same time, the primacy of direct "God consciousness" and of ethical values as against cult practice and theological formulation. Schleiermacher taught that religions emerged from an intense experience resulting in a felling of absolute dependence. In religion are included not only the beliefs, customs, traditions and rites belonging to particular social groups, but also individual experiences.

Naturally, any definition which stresses the communal aspects of religion excluding the individual's psychic life is incomplete; for it is the individual's apprehension of some supreme object, power or principle that constitutes one of the most important features of religion. Since religion embraces a wide variety of data, most modern definitions embrace essentials in addition to the above, covering other aspects of religion advanced from other standpoints.

Sir James George Frazer (1854-1941), an important representative of the Modern Age of Enlightenment, believed that religion developed out of the primitive search for answer to basic questions of existence. He says that by religion, "I understand a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life. Thus, defined, religion consists of two elements, a theoretical and a practical, namely belief in powers higher than man and an attempt to propitiate them." Frazer added the useful comment to this view that "belief clearly comes first, since we must believe in the existence of a divine being before we can attempt to please him. But unless the belief leads to a corresponding practice, it is not a religion but merely a theology". A different emphasis was laid by French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), on belief and practice within a social community. Durkheim says, "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden, beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community, called a Church, all those who adhere to them. The second element which thus finds a place in our definition is no less essential than the first; for by showing that the idea of religion is inseparable from that of the Church, it makes it clear that religion should be an eminently collective thing". As this view differed from his earlier definition, Durkheim mentions that formerly he had defined religious beliefs exclusively by their obligatory character, but

later he had to amend that definition, since their obligatoriness was the result of their being imposed by the group upon its members. In contrast to Durkheim’s view, George Galloway’s definition lays the main emphasis upon individual and his psychological needs. According to him, religion refers to “man’s faith in a power beyond himself whereby he seeks to satisfy emotional needs and gain stability of life, and which he expresses in act of worship and service”. He further adds that “the cognitive side of the religious consciousness is represented by faith, and faith is stimulated by emotion and posits the object which will satisfy the needs of the inner life. One of the most urgent and constant of man’s needs, is that which is expressed in the desire for self-conservation, or, as we have put it for stability of life in the face of the manifold forces which threaten and limit him. The practical aspect is denoted by the acts of worship and service which belong to the nature of religion.” Some of the religions, particularly polytheistic, as believed in by ancient Greeks, are not covered by this definition, because in it, belief in a single power beyond man has been considered to be synonymous with religion.

Two other definitions useful from the standpoint of psychology, were propounded, one by J.B. Pratt and the other by R.H. Thouless.

Pratt defined religion in the light of subjective responses of man, not confined to anyone of the three traditional aspects of mind—knowing, feeling and willing—but involving all of them. “Religion is the serious and social attitude of individual or communities toward the power or powers which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies”. The term “attitude” is a psychological concept that covers the responsive side of consciousness found in attention, interests, expectancy, feeling, tendencies to reaction etc. Religion, therefore, is not a matter of anyone “department” of psychic life, but it involves the whole man. It also includes the historical truth which pertains to the attempts to identify religion with feeling, belief and willing. Thus, Pratt’s definition points out that religion is immediately subjective

and as such differs from science which stresses on "content" instead of "attitude". Moreover, it indicates that religion involves and presupposes the acceptance of the objective. Due to these facts, Pratt holds that "Religion is the attitude of a self towards an object in which the self genuinely believes".

Thouless, after considering the various definitions given by others, concluded that any definition of religion to be adequate must include at least three factors—a mode of behaviour, a system of intellectual beliefs, and a system of feelings. In order to find a satisfactory definition, therefore, he lays emphasis on the enquiry, what is the particular mark of the conduct, beliefs and feelings in question which characterises them as religious phenomena. On such a basis, he defines religion as "a felt practical relationship with what is believed in as a superhuman being or beings". According to him, there are two terms in common use in the psychology of religion which must be explained. These are the religious consciousness and religious experience. The religious consciousness is that part of religion which presents to the mind and is open to examination by introspection. It is the mental side of religious activity. Religious experience is a vaguer term used to describe the feeling element in the religious consciousness, the feelings which lead to religious beliefs are the effects of religious behaviour. Thus, according to Thouless, the main business of the psychology of religion is to study religious consciousness but this study is not possible without relation to religious behaviour. In behaviour are included things done and things not to be done, ritual and taboo, no single of which can operate by itself.

J.H. Leuba, who made a thorough analysis of forty-eight definitions till then, expounded in his famous book "Psychological Study of Religion (1912)", divided them into two groups: those which treat religion as "the recognition of a mystery pressing for interpretation", and those which adopt Schleiermacher's view that religion is "a feeling of absolute

1. Pratt (James Bissett): The Religious Consciousness, 1920, p. 3.
dependence upon God”. To these two schools of thought, Leuba added a third one—“the propitiation or reconciliation of powers which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and human life”, although this is substantially the same as enunciated by Pratt.

Radhakrishnan’s concept of religion is based on spiritual experience, combined with ethical sense. He holds that “Religion is the discipline which touches the conscience and helps us to struggle with evil and sordidness, saves from greed, lust and hatred, releases moral power, and imparts courage in the enterprise of saving the world. As a discipline of mind, it contains the key and the essential means of coping with evil which threatens the experience of the civilized world. It implies the submitting of our thinking and conduct to the truth of spirit”. He further points out that “the common goal of all religions is spiritual life”. His view almost corresponds with Plato, the essential feature of whose philosophy is the world of spirit, the ground and basis of truth, beauty and goodness. According to Radhakrishnan, “any serious pursuit of ideas, any search after conviction, any adventure after virtue, arises from resources whose name is religion”.

For Radhakrishnan religion signifies faith in absolute values and a way of life to realize them. His concept of values is not static unlike Hoffding’s conservation of values, but rather dynamic.

Karl Marx considers religion to be result of economic factors. While Mahatma Gandhi regarded religion as essentially an individual experience, Marx held that it is essentially a social affair. In philosophising his own concept, Marx declared that his ideal of human society is worked out into the very texture of the world. According to Radhakrishnan, however, Marxism in its true sense and tenets is also a religion. But basically differing from the Marxist concept of religion, Radhakrishnan holds that, “man’s intense desire for life, and not any mode of production, leads him to believe in a future life”, which is an expression of religious faith and

2. Ibid, p. 47.
creed. Such a difference is also explicit from the concept of religion held by Engels, who admitted that religion is not determined by the mode of production. Engels held that “religion is nothing, but fantastic reflection of mind of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces. In the beginning of history, it was the forces of nature that were at first reflected and in the course of further evaluation they underwent the manifold and varied personifications among the various people”¹. Engels’ concept of religion will be clearer when religion will be examined in a later chapter from the psychoanalytic and anthropological viewpoints.

When we consider religion in all its ramifications in a broad sense, it appears that insofar as man earnestly believes in certain ideologies and acts compulsively and passionately on account of them, religion must need remain a fact of his being and of society. Viewed from this perspective, both socialism and communism although they claim by the humanism of their movement to supersede religion may be regarded as religion. As Das Gupta points out, Communism can be regarded as the ethics of love. Socialism is a matter of bread alone; although it may be that too, it is also a matter of man, of moral values and of human dignity. This is the truth that communism aims at. The communistic movement is a movement of humanitarianism². Carrying this sense, Albert Einstein once proposed that “Science itself could serve as the religion of the devoted scientist”.

Julian Huxley, who has been regarded as “religious humanist”, affirms that “religion to continue as an element of first-rate importance in the life of the community must drop the idea of God”. If this is admitted, even atheism can be regarded as a religion—the religion of those who passionately deny the existence of God. In the context of Indian Philosophy, the word ‘Nastik’ (atheism) has been applied for non-belief in the Vedas, and the ‘Astik’ (theism) for belief in the Vedas. The six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy are

theistic in this sense.

Such a broad and inclusive meaning of the term ‘religion’ violates those popular definitions which associate religion with a necessary belief in God (monotheism), or in many gods (polytheism). All the great religions of the world are theistic, except Jainism and Buddhism, in which the conception of God or the means of his realization as a necessary ingredient of religion, have been ignored. The later forms of Buddhism, however, for example, Mahayana Buddhism in practice have restored this belief in the existence of supernatural powers.

The foregoing definitions of religion show that it is not concerned with a single specific phase of human activity. Its role and importance are numerous. Even non-belief in a scripture or creed does not make one irreligious.

Religion which was hitherto considered as a sacred domain, and religious knowledge which was regarded as synonymous to the study of scriptures, is now considered susceptible of scientific explanation and is studied objectively like other mental and social phenomena by the same scientific method. In the light of modern knowledge, the form and content of religion, the religious manifestations of mind are studied from various angles by modern disciplines. One of the first theorists of religion who reflects the intellectual developments of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is F. Max Müller (1823-1900). He used the German term “religionswissenschaft” in 1867 to designate the scientific or comparative study of religions and differentiated this new field from the purview of theology and philosophy. Although Max Müller’s linguistically based theories on religion are no longer held valid, his comparative method and belief that religion springs from facts of human nature, earned him the title of “father of the scientific study of religion”. He tried to remain free from petrified dogmatic theological perspectives and to understand religion as a unique phenomenon of human existence—an ideal towards which many modern theorists now have strived. In the following sections, an attempt has been made to study the religious phenomena and its various concepts in the light of change in emphasis from the theological to the scientific outlook in general and in the light of anthropological, historical, sociological and psychological disciplines in particular.
Change in Emphasis from the Theological Approach to the Scientific

In the foregoing section, the meaning, nature and the contemporary position of religion have been discussed. In the present section, an attempt has been made to investigate the validity of the theological world-view in the light of facts advanced by science.

Either through the imagination of one or a few dreamers and poets, or through the cumulative and collective efforts of many, most people have developed some kind of theory and logic of the formation and origin of the world and of the gods and supernatural powers that govern the world. The explanations regarding the formation of the world have been termed as "Cosmogonies", while the beliefs in regard to supernatural or non-human beings, i.e. gods, goddesses, demons, devils etc. are known as "mythologies", and in connexion therewith if any religious worship is inculcated, they are regarded as "religion". However, there is a difference between mythology and religion. Those gods or goddesses or other supernatural beings whom people actually worship and propitiate, have religious significance. All those about whom the fables are told, but people neither worship them nor propitiate them, belong merely to mythology.

In the light of modern times, Wall defines religion as: "A religion is a form or embodiment which the devotion of a religious mind assumes towards God; it consists of certain rites or ceremonials practiced in the worship of God." Cicero defined religion as reverence for gods, the fear of God connected with a careful pondering of divine things, piety, religion.

According to Wall, "a true religion is the religion adhered to by the individual believer, while all other religions are regarded as "false religions"—or to say a familiar saying—"orthodoxy is my doxy, heterodoxy or unorthodoxy is the other fellow's doxy." This has always been the mental attitude of religious persons.

2. Ibid., p. 7.
The origin of religions must be traced in the records of earliest times when they were first proclaimed. There is no proper trace of what primitive men believed in from the time of appearance of the ‘Aladus’ to the dawn of authentic history. There is an impenetrable curtain drawn over untold ages. Scientists have variously estimated this span of time as ranging from a few tens of thousands of years to a million years or more, during which period man existed but was unable to leave us any record of his existence excepting such as we may discover in the stone implements, kitchen middens, dolmens, or fossils, etc.

There is no reason to assume that the primitive people had any religion, or that they bothered their head with speculations about abstruse mental problems. Though the practices similar to the religious activities have been discovered by the anthropologists which throw sufficient light on their belief in natural objects and powers which they used to propitiate for their personal gain. It seems reasonable enough to believe that the sentiment of religion is comparatively a late acquirement on the part of mankind, possibly not older than 10,000 or 25,000 years, a mere trifle in comparison with the ages during which he has probably existed1.

The leading religions of the world are based in great part at least on the Sacred Writings. The authors of these scriptures are supposed to have been the gods of the respective religions themselves; or the gods are supposed to have inspired certain persons with supernatural gifts, or to have dictated to them the contents of their writings. These writings are called the words of God by the adherents of those religions.

Collection of books are called “Bibles”, derived from the Greek word ‘byblon’ or its plural ‘byblia’ meaning thereby “books”. Thus the writings of Hesiod and Homer constitute the Bible of the ancient Greeks; the Rig-Vedas are the Bible of the Hindus; the writings of Moses and the prophets are the Bible of the Jews; and the last mentioned together with the modern writings of some Greeks and Jews are called the New Testaments, which form the Bible of the Christians.

There are several concepts regarding the evolution of the human race. Probably it started somewhere in Asia from its protohuman ancestors. There are scientists who believe that the human race may have originated in America. Others believe that it originated, when the time was ripe for its evolution, in several places at once, from where it overspread the earth. No dogmatic assertions of any kind regarding this point are needed here whatever one may believe individually about it, the scientists largely agree that the first traces of inscriptions or written records occur in the region about the Eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, in Asia Minor, in Assyria, Babylon or Egypt or even in India. The majority of anthropologists and historians agree that this was the region of the first home of the earliest mankind.

The Rig-Vedas are the oldest sacred writings of Hindus which are probably the earliest literary composition of the world. They are supposed to have been created sometime in between 5000 and 2000 B.C. Until about 1000 A.D., when they were reduced to writing, they were transmitted from one generation to another orally. There are, however, some authorities according to whom they were not composed earlier than 1000 A.D. The Vedas present the earliest record in writing regarding the religious activities and their utility and practices leading to the origin of religious consciousness throughout the Aryan race. They teach the doctrine of belief in one Supreme God, under the name of Brahma. His attributes have been presented as three personified powers of Creation, Preservation and Destruction which in course of time came to be recognised respectively under the names of Brahma, Vishnu and Siva, forming the Trirurty, or Hindu Trinity represented as one human body with three heads, or with one head but three faces.

The period of the Vedas presenting the most developed form of religion and its practices, has also been determined by various European orientalists. McDonnel has fixed the period of the Vedas in between 1500 B.C. and 200 B.C., whereas Max Müller determines their origin round about 1200 B.C. But Professor Jacobi differs from them, according to whom Vedic Literature is considerably of greater antiquity
than that of Greece. He has fixed the period of the Vedas on astrological calculation round about 4000 B.C.

The Bible of the Christians contains both Testaments. Its first part teaches that there is one God—JEHOVAH, and the second part gives the views which led to a belief in a Trinity. The Old Testament does not preach that Jehovah was a god of the Universe, but that he was a tribal god, the God of Israel, or the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. The older parts of the Bible were transmitted orally for many centuries, before they were reduced to writing and in their earliest writings they were imperfect and primitive. The books of the New Testament were written when writing had become quite a common accomplishment, and as such, they are in a more perfect state of preservation.

Christianity is based on the Jewish Bible, of which it claims to be the fulfilment and the object of its prophecies. It asserts that the New Testament contains the fulfilment of the Old Testaments and thus the two Bibles really constitute one completed work.

The recent researches have shed light on the fact that the Old Testament is largely derived from the same sources as the Assyrian, Babylonian, Chaldean and Egyptian religions, so that one should not feel surprised in finding traces of the religions and their symbolism and stories in Christianity. It is also a fact that the ancients themselves seem to have been well aware of the similarity of their myths, religious stories and theories to those of other neighbouring people, and this led to the accusation of plagiarism on one another. This is why many similar practices and beliefs in some changed forms are commonly visible in almost all the religions of the world. Some of the stories in the Bible, such as that of the flood, of the sun standing still to accommodate a human hero, of changing humans to pillars of stone or salt for their curiosity, had been in vogue in Assyrian and Babylonian inscriptions and Brahmanic writings in practically the same manner and forms as they have mentioned in the Bible.1 The Assyrian inscriptions are a thousand years older than the books of the Bible

containing these stories.

The Hebrews were probably too ignorant during their earliest times to have understood the abstruse speculation of monotheism. As such, Moses simply established a theocracy, that is, an absolute monarchy with a god as a ruler, for which God himself was the mouthpiece. He pretended to be on intimate speaking terms with this God. Moses transmitted the command of this God to his people. He made the people believe that they were the "Chosen people of God". This sort of belief still prevails.

The instances of plagiarism of religious writings and practices have been mentioned earlier which show the basis of common and similar belief and stories prevalent in various religions. Of the oldest religions, Jewish and Greek have borrowed material from the folklore common to all Asia Minor, specially to Assyrian, Babylonian and Chaldean writings. What is currently believed by the Christians, the Church as well as the masses appears to have been derived from folklore, the speculative or dogmatic writings of the Church-fathers, and from literary works such as Virgil's Aeneid, Dante's Divine Comedy and Milton's Paradise Lost, etc. Besides this, many beliefs and practices also seem to have been derived from Pagan religions, specially from the teachings of Zoroaster, from Manichaeism and Gnosticism and from Buddhism.

Various church councils have amplified and modified the earlier teachings. Thus, the Divinity of Jesus was affirmed in the year 325 A.D., the Divinity of the Holy Ghost was declared in 381 A.D. at Constantinople. The Protestants' belief in the theory of the Trinity, rests on the doctrine of the same kind of human authority which more recently declared the Immaculate conception of Mary and the Infallibility of the Pope to be articles of faith.

The Koran, the sacred scripture of the Islam, contains the religious and other social teachings of Mohammad who commenced his career as the prophet of Islam in the year 610 after Christ.

In his teachings appears the influence of the Jewish and early Christian views with which he had come in contact. But
the firm and strong belief of the Islamic World persists that Allah (God) had sent his angel Gabriel to dictate to Prophet Mohammad whole contents of the Holy Koran. Mohammedans all over the world believe and call the Koran the "Word of God" which is original and no change in it is possible at any cost. The Koran contains a peculiar mixture, more or less, of many unrelated materials, such as morals, religious, civil and political teachings. There are also in it formulas, promises of future reward to the true and devoted believers of Koranic doctrines and threats of future punishments to the unbelievers.

The three most sacred scriptures—The Rig-Vedas, the Bible and the Koran, are the bases of the Brahmanic, the Jewish and Christian, and the Mohammadan religions respectively. These are the leading religions of the world, whose adherents constitute the overwhelming majority. They are really effective religions, that is, they assign rites and ceremonials to be practiced by the people in the worship of God. They are well organised systems of strong doctrines and worship conceived and developed by their adherents to be of Divine Origin. They promise a life of happiness and complete salvation hereafter to the faithful believers and a life of eternal damnation to those who do not believe in their religion. They believe in the transmigration of soul after death.

If minutely observed, many features of these religions are common seemingly to have been borrowed from each other, or probably having been drawn from a common source, a sort of folklore, which were built, once upon a time, by oral transmission in Southern or South-Eastern Asia and North Africa during the countless ages which had passed since the earliest traces of thinking power among the primitive people to the first traces of authentic or recorded history of mankind. These religions of the world are the leading faiths, though their adherents, included in such classification, may be true or false followers and believers.

Before discussing the meaning and doctrines of these revealed religions, it seems necessary to describe, in short, the other beliefs which are not supposed to be Divine and
revealed religions, but which have their religious doctrines and philosophies, nevertheless, and are known as religions.

Generally speaking, not all beliefs pertaining to supernatural Beings, nor all mythological accounts of the origin and creation of the world, or creation of men, can properly be called "religions". A religion, actually speaking, inculcates a worship and propitiation of god or gods, and in the absence of such worship, whether by ceremonials, prayers, hymns of praises, sacrifices, or in any other manner, a belief is not a religion. In Asia there are numerous important beliefs which are usually known to be religions, though they are not really as such. Among them the most significant are Confucianism, Taoism, Shintoism and Buddhism. In Japan Shintoism and Buddhism are the prevailing beliefs and the mixture of the two is also frequently in vogue. Shintoism means "the Path of Gods" and it is much nearer to TAOISM and appear to have been probably derived from the latter. Shintoism was the only faith in Japan preceding Buddhism which inculcates no worship or propitiation of God, nor has it any moral code of conduct. The Mikado is a Japanese deity and is supposed to be a guide of good and evil. Shintoism teaches that Mikado is the direct descendant of the sun-goddess. In Shintoism are also included the elements of hero-worship, specially the ancestors of Mikado. Japanese believe that the powers of nature are spiritual agencies.

Lao-tze lived about 500 B.C. in China. On his teachings Taoism was founded which was called the Chinese "Way of Life". He took his birth in a supernatural manner, being carried in the womb of his mother for eighty-two years and during this period he devoted his time to introspective meditation and to the elaboration of theory of life. Taoism may not be treated as religion in the true sense, for it teaches no ritual for the worship of god, nor has it even a pantheon of gods. It teaches the appropriate way to live in the world, emphasising essentially the practice of virtue and the teachings of the Golden Rule. Both Japanese and Chinese worship the ghosts of their ancestors.

Confucius and Lao-tze were contemporaries and were personally acquainted with each other according to some
historians. Both preached practically the same tenets in which there was nothing about a god or a future life after death. Confucius formulated a version of the "Golden Rule" or "Rule of Life", which varies from the version that Jesus formulated. Rather, this is negation of that which Jesus taught. In Confucianism there are no active efforts at doing good to others as has been taught by Jesus. It cannot be regarded as a religion because it does not teach any belief at all in God nor does it exhort any worship of God. Taoism, which is conducive to happiness, but none of these beliefs lay emphasis on worship of God, nor do they hold out hopes of future reward or future punishment.

Gautam lived about 450 B.C. and became an ascetic after denouncing the worldly things. He devoted himself to religious meditation and turned into a preacher to liberate people from the miseries and sorrows of life. He is known as Gautam Buddha, and the belief and the mode of life he established is known as Buddhism. In the history of the world Buddha is the greatest agnostic. But after his death his disciples and followers ignored his teachings and made him an object of worship like Jesus Christ who was also defied after his death and is now worshipped as God by the Christians. After his death the Hindus took Buddha as an incarnation or an "Avtar" of Vishnu. Buddhism taught that misery is inseparable from life and the final bliss may be achieved after "NIRVANA", that is, a ceasing to exist in this world or the final extinction of the soul. To achieve bliss, Buddha enunciated four paths. In a very short period, by the end of the fifth century B.C., Buddhism had spread over the major part of Asia and soon even crossed over to European religions where it manifested itself as Gnosticism, which prevailed widely in the first four centuries of the Christian era and became a strong rival of early Christian religion. The Gnostic movement of Buddhism caused the decay and destruction of the beautiful religions of the Greeks and Romans.¹

The Chinese and Japanese Buddhists, along with the practice of Buddhism, retained their oldest practice of the worship

of their ancestors and their heroes. Lamaism or Tibetan Buddhism resembles to a remarkable degree the ceremonial and ritual of the Catholic Church excepting their religious teachings. Many Christian ceremonials, rituals and other beliefs and practices are very closely similar to those of the Buddhists. As Buddhism predated Christianity by many centuries, it sounds reasonable and appealing to believe that the Christians obtained their practices, ceremonials, rites and beliefs from Buddhists, though perhaps also borrowing the ceremonials in the temples of Jupiter and other Roman gods. Buddhism though originating in India, was not so popular there as it was effective and struck roots elsewhere. However, there are still a large number of Buddhists in India.

Taoism, Shintoism, Confucianism and Buddhism all agree that there is no question of the existence of a deity, and they also agree on the teaching to lead a pure life. There is no promise of reward or threat of punishment in a life hereafter. According to Buddhism, virtue accelerates and vice retards 'Nirvana' or the final extinction.

Most probably, none of these three leading religions and these three "Ways of Life" are followed by their adherents in their original forms. The two of the leading religions were handed down by oral transmission simultaneously for a thousand years or more in Southern and South-Eastern Asia. At a later stage, no doubt, they were altered by coming into contact with each other; moreover, the religions became encrusted with numerous superstitions of common origin, until they acquired many features, beliefs, rituals, and symbolism in common. Some of these will be discussed at appropriate places in the succeeding chapters.

Besides these faiths and beliefs there are others of minor importance, for instance, Animism. This is a belief in a sort of world-soul which inhabits all things. It is a kind of Fetishism prevalent in various parts of Asia and most parts of Africa. The believers of this faith have been estimated to be more than 158,270,000*. Then there is another system of belief known as Shamanism—a belief in magic, of which the priests

*Hall (J.A.) : Sex and Sex Worship, 1932, p. 20.
are sorcerors as among the North Asiatic people as well as among the North American Indians.

The most characteristic feature of the leading religions of which mention has been made above, is their authoritative and authentic concept of Divinity and revelation. This means that their sacred scriptures are not composed by men; rather they are creation of God Himself. The doctrines and teachings of these scriptures can neither be modified nor altered at any cost. They are supposed to be the words of God and Divine Power which is supernatural. It is a general belief of these religions that since they have been composed by God and they are words of God, they cannot be challenged. They can neither be questioned nor do they need any verification. They should be accepted as such and any change or modification may lead to a chaotic situation.

According to the modern scientific thinking, everything is subject to verification, and the truth of anything is acceptable only when it can be experimented upon and verified. Various techniques and experiments are employed to arrive at a conclusion before attributing any truth to it. Similarly, religious truth and concepts can be accepted as true, if they are found correct after scientific verification and experimentation. There are numerous explanations with a theological approach, regarding the origin of Universe, man, soul, earth, and life after death, heaven and the existence of the next world. Besides, God has been attributed as a supernatural being possessing intelligence and will Who is a most powerful Divine being and is responsible for the creation of the Universe and life.

It will be desirable here to enumerate some of the theological approaches in this context to elucidate them and then in the light of the modern scientific discoveries and explanations, to judge the validity of religious truths.

The world-picture of the mediaeval people was dominated by religion, while the world-picture of the modern people is dominated by science. Of course, it cannot be said that mediaeval times did not offer anything which could be called science or that the modern age is devoid of religion. Religion and science are two aspects of social life of which the former has
been important in the sense that it tells us of the earliest man's history, while the latter through a flickering existence among the Greeks and Arabs suddenly sprang up into importance in the sixteenth century and has ever since increasingly moulded our thoughts, ideas and institutions among which we live.

According to Russell, "Science is the attempt to discover, by means of observation, and reasoning based upon it, first, particular facts about the world, and then laws connecting facts with one another and making it possible to predict future occurrences. Connected with this theoretical aspect of science there is scientific technique, which utilizes scientific knowledge to produce comforts and luxuries that were impossible, or at least, much more expensive, in a pre-scientific era." Though the latter aspect of science making comforts and luxuries available cheaply, gives such great importance to science even for those who are not scientists. Regarding its former aspects, the majority of people believe that behind every phenomenon of nature, there is some supernatural power or God. Even scientists and those having scientific outlook believe in some power besides natural phenomena. Why even scientists have not been able to be free from this kind of belief is a subject of serious consideration that will be dealt with in the following chapter.

Religion, according to Russell, considered socially, is a more complex phenomenon than science. Each of the great historical religions in the world has three aspects (1) a church, (2) a creed, and (3) a code of personal morals. In different times and places, the relative importance of these three elements has greatly varied. For instance, little importance was attached to personal morals in the ancient religions of Greece and Rome until they were made ethical by the Stoics; in Islam church has been insignificant in comparison with temporal monarch; in modern Protestantism there has been a general tendency towards relaxing the recource of the creed. Nevertheless, though all these elements in varying degrees and proportions are essential to religion as a social phenome-

---
non. We are chiefly concerned with its conflict with science.

As far as personal religion is concerned, it can well survive without any disturbance in the most scientific age, so long as it avoids assertions which science can disprove and refute.

In fact, there was nothing in science purposively to contradict or oppose religion and its truths. But creeds are the intellectual source of the conflict between religion and science and the bitterness of the opposition has been mainly due to the links between creeds, churches and the moral codes. What concerns us more are the points where science and religion came into conflict in the past, or still do so at the present time. There are two kinds of the main conflicts so far as Christendom is concerned. The first is the Biblical assertions deduced from its texts which are considered to be an unquestionable fact. Such assertions when refuted by scientific observation and experimentation, cause difficulties for those who believe as most of the Christians did until science compelled them to think otherwise, that the word of the Bible is Divinely inspired and that it contained facts which could neither be challenged, nor disproved. Secondly, when the Biblical assertions concerned have no inherent religious importance, it is not difficult to explain them away, or to escape controversy by deciding that the Bible is only authoritative on matters dealing with religion and morals. Similar is the case with Hindu religious scriptures as well as other religious texts which claim to be Divine, based on eternal truth, unalterable and unquestionable. However, there is a deeper point of conflict when science controverts some important dogmas of Christianity and other religions or some philosophically explained doctrines which theologians believe essential to orthodoxy.

In the present time, religious people have come to feel that most of the creeds of Christendom as well as other religions as they existed in the Middle Ages, are redundant and are really a hindrance to the actual religious life and conduct.

To put a clear-cut picture, it is essential to mention some of the religious assertions supposed to be final and eternal truth on the basis of the Divinity, which have been exposed to be false and incorrect, when scientific methods and
observation are employed to prove their validity. The outlook of the ancient or mediaeval intellectuals was based on logical and specially speculative unity; this has now been lost and has also become incoherent. The manner in which science proceeds to unveil truth and arrives at its beliefs is quite different from that of ancient or mediaeval theological approaches. Starting from general principles and proceeding deductively is always dangerous because principles may be devoid of truth and reasoning based upon them may be fallacious. Science does not start from large assumptions but it starts from particular facts discovered by careful observation and experimentation. On the basis of a good deal of such facts a general rule is arrived at, and which, if finally proved true are quoted as instances. This becomes a working hypothesis. Again, if the fact is not found upto the mark in certain circumstances, the hypothesis is discarded and a new one is invented.

A religious creed differs from a scientific theory in claiming to contain an eternal and absolutely certain truth, whereas science is always tentative and modification at any stage is always necessary and acceptable. An important difference between the religious and mediaeval outlook and that of modern science pertains to authority. To ordinary men who do not possess scientific outlook, the Bible, the dogmas of religious faiths and almost equally the teachings of Aristotle as well as those of religious leaders were above question; the investigation of facts for them was a matter of question to be decided by deduction from Aristotle or Scriptures. The conflict between science and theology was quite as much a conflict between authority and observation. To the men of science, assertion that certain facts should be believed because some authority or the scriptures say they are true, is not the least appealing; on the contrary, they should look to the evidence of the senses and may be patent to all those who choose to make necessary observations.

To clarify that scientific truth has exposed certain religious facts to be false, it is essential to set some concrete examples.

The seventeenth century of the Christian era is regarded as having ushered in a scientific revolution which brought about
radical changes in the world-picture of European man. This brough about a complete change in the world-picture, coming down the centuries as unaltered truths. Though science had struck its roots in the past, this was the century which marked the advent of Kepler, Galileo and Newton on the scientific stage.

The first pitched battle fought between theology and science was the astronomical dispute as to whether the earth or the sun was the centre of what is now known as the Solar System. Throughout the Middle Ages the Geocentric Theory of astronomy held undisputed sway. Accordingly, the earth stood motionless at the centre of the Universe. The sun, moon, planets and the stars were believed to be revolving around it in circles. In ancient Greece the idea that the earth was a moving planet had been suggested more than once. In the Sixth century B.C., Pythagorean philosophers speculated that the earth along with other heavenly bodies moved round a central fire which is not the sun. At a later date Aristarchus, a renowned Greek philosopher proposed a definite idea of a heliocentric view. But these ideas in the Middle Ages were ignored and forgotten on account of the influence of Aristotle who espoused the Geocentric theory. As early as circa 499 A.D. a renowned Indian astronomer Aryabhattr gave a clue that the earth moved but due to the religious dogma prevailing at the time, he could not lay emphasis on his conclusion in this regard. At any rate, right from the rise of Christianity to the time of Copernicus (1473-1543), no one had the least doubt that the sun and the stars moved round the motionless earth. According to Ptolemaic Orthodox theory the earth is at rest in the centre of the universe while the sun, moon, planets and the system of fixed stars revolved round it, each in its own sphere. Copernicus discovered that the earth, far from being at rest, has a two fold motion. It rotates on its own axis once a day and revolves round the sun once a year. This theory of Copernicus which is absolute theory about the position of the earth setting aside the conception of theology, though appearing with all the force of novelty, in the sixteenth century, was in fact propounded by the Greeks who were very competent astronomers. Aristarchus was the first definitely known
astronomer who taught that the earth moved. He was a remarkable man in many ways and lived in the third century B.C. He also discovered theoretically a sound method to ascertain the relative distance of the sun and moon, though it was a little erroneous. Like Galileo he incurred the imputation of impiety and was badly denounced by the Stoic Cleanthes, though escaping capital punishment which Galileo had to suffer. However, the theory about the motion of the earth could not hold for a long time and about 130 A.D., Ptolemy rejected the views of Aristarchus and restored the earth to its old position, i.e. the centre of the Universe, motionless, and this view again prevailed unquestioned throughout the Middle Ages. But the erroneous imagination of Copernicus that the earth rotated round the sun in a circle, was later improved upon by Kepler (1571-1630) who asserted that the earth rotated round the sun in an elliptical orbit rather than in a circular one. The planets also revolve round the sun in elliptical orbits of which the sun occupies not the centre, but is one of the foci. Copernicus was afraid of the ecclesiastical censure and his work "On the Revolution of the Heavenly Bodies" was published in 1543 which was dedicated to the Pope. This was supposed to be merely a hypothesis rather than a positive truth without any assertion. It was actually Galileo's bolder defiance that brought retrospective official condemnation upon Copernicus. In the beginning Protestants were more bitterly opposed to him than the Catholics. Luther severely abused Copernicus. According to him astronomers' conceptions were against the doctrines enshrined in the sacred Scriptures. As such, there was no truth in them.

The next great discovery in astronomy was made by Kepler whose opinions were the same as of Galileo, but he never came into conflict with the authority of the Church. His astronomical services were valued by the Emperor and the Catholic authorities forgave him because of his scientific eminence. His three laws regarding connection between the five solids and five planets—Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn were most important from the point of view of the Solar System which stated that the planets revolved round the sun in elliptical orbits of which the sun occupied one focus. Th-
Greeks had supposed that all heavenly bodies must move in circles because the circle is the most perfect curve. But when it was discovered that this hypothesis would not work, they adopted that the planets moved in epicycles. Though Greeks were aware enough about ellipses and their mathematical properties, it never occurred to their mind that heavenly bodies could move in anything but circles because of their aesthetic sense, which dominated their speculations and made them reject all but the most symmetrical hypotheses. Thus the conception of aesthetics, and moral or theological beliefs were found misleading and Kepler was the first to go against them in this respect. His laws, however, are of a greater importance, in the history of science in the sense that they afforded the proof of Newton’s Law of Gravitation. But to the seventeenth century astronomers it seemed that there was something more than the simplicity of the theory of Kepler, which said that the earth rotates and the planets really go round the sun. This view was, in fact, reinforced by the work of Newton.

Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) was the most notable scientist of his time on account of his great discoveries and because of his conflict with the Inquisition in exposing the religious speculation about the world-picture. The great merit of his work was the combination of the experimental and mechanical skill in embodying his results in mathematical formulae. The laws governing the movements of bodies, i.e., the study of Dynamics virtually begins with him. Prior to him the Greeks had studied, only Statics, i.e., the laws of equilibrium. The laws of motion, specially of motion with varying velocity, were completely misunderstood by them as well as by the men of the sixteenth century.

Galileo applied this principle in explaining the results of his experiments on falling bodies and thus discovered the theory of Aristotle according to which the speed of falling bodies is proportional to their weight. But other professors decried Galileo as being wicked and developed great hatred for him because he believed that truth was to be sought in

sacred scriptures rather than in experiments. Experiments on falling bodies, no doubt, aroused anger and hatred among pedants but Galileo was not condemned by the Inquisition.

It was actually the discovery of telescope by Galileo that led him on to more dangerous ground and condemnation to death specially when he was going blind. He died in 1642, the year in which the greatest scientist Isaac Newton was born. Sixteen years earlier, Giordano Bruno after passing his seven years in the prison of the Inquisition, was burnt alive in 1600 for asserting similar scientific truths. There cannot be found more cruel examples of tyranny leading to death in such a wretched condition which the world's greatest scientists Bruno and Galileo had to undergo on account of scientific truths discovered by them, coming into conflict with the theologians to whom these discoveries were heresies.

Knowing that a Dutchman had invented such an instrument, Galileo reinvented it and almost immediately he brought to the light many new astronomical facts, e.g., the existence of Jupiter's satellites. This discovery besides that of the seven heavenly bodies was most upsetting to the Ptolemic scheme.

The telescope revealed another fact, horrifying to the theologians and religious leaders. It was brought to light that Venus has phases like the moon. Galileo discovered that the moon has mountains, and more upsetting still was his conclusion that the sun had spots. These facts were taken by the theologians as tending to belittle the position of the Creator, i.e., God. As such, teaching of these discoveries along with mathematics and geometry was banned for centuries. For the theologians were afraid that the new doctrine of the world-picture would detract from faith and belief the credibility of the concept of Incarnation and the purposive creation of the world and life.

Thus the Inquisition in the light of astronomical facts deduced two important truths from the Scriptures: The proposition that the Sun is the centre and does not revolve round the earth is a folly, absurdity and false in theology and heretical because it was contrary to the established facts of Holy Scriptures. The second proposition that the earth is not the centre but revolves about the sun is quite absurd, heretical
and philosophically false and from the theological point of view at least opposed to the true faith.

The old belief that the earth stands still, held on till 185 when the statue of Copernicus was installed at Warsaw to honour the great astronomer. Though the Catholic priests never agreed to accept the two doctrines. Even the great philosopher and mathematician Descartes felt so much terrified that he fled Holland. By this time the Government had adopted the policy of religious tolerance but the theologians and the Protestant Churches maintained the claim of Infallibility of the Scriptures. However, the interpretation of the Scriptures was left ever open to private judgment which soon found ways of explaining away the inconvenient fact of the Scriptures. Protestantism developed as a revolt against the ecclesiastical domination and secular authorities came up against the clergy. However, the mediaeval theology due to its single logical system not susceptible to any alteration in the opinions it held was liable to become engaged in a sort of war against the new frontiers of science. The natural laws, such as, laws of change in climatic conditions, rising and setting of the sun were difficult for the mediaeval mind to understand. What was unusual or non-recurrent was assigned directly to the will of God rather than due to any natural laws.

The genesis of the world from theological point of view, and the modern scientific theory of evolution, will make the point of conflict between religion and science clear, which needs to be discussed here. The old traditional conception based on religious truth of the scriptures points out that the world had been created in six days, and had contained, from time onwards, all heavenly bodies that it now contains. Being far removed from the concept of progress based on the law of the Universe and its evolutionary doctrine as most theologians now contend and all Christians believed, there had been a terrible combination of disasters at the time of the Fall. Adam and Eve were forbidden to eat the fruits of a certain tree by God which they did eat, and in consequence God decreed that they alongwith their posterity become mortal and after death even their remotest descendants would suffer an
eternal punishment in hell. From the day of Adam's sin animals took to preying on each other, thistles and thors grew up.

Different seasons came into being and the very ground lay under a curse so that it no longer yielded sustenance to Man except as a result of painful labour. Presently, men grew so wicked that all were drowned in the Flood except Noah and his three sons and their wives. It was not thought that man had grown bitter since but the Lord had promised not to send another universal deluge and now contented Himself with occasional eruption and earthquakes.¹

Wall in his "Sex and Sex Worship" has discovered that all religions are based on sex and even Heaven and Earth according to the ancient concept were considered to be the deities Uranus and Gea. These were supposed to have been at first permanently united, either in an unending sexual embrace or as an hermaphrodite deity. This idea was found in many mythologies. Heaven and Earth were then endowed with human parts and human passions. They begot the gods of Greek, Vedic, Hindu, Chinese, Polynesian and New Zealand mythologies, designated names in different languages. In Polynesian, New Zealand, Chinese, Vedic and Greeks myths, Heaven (Sky) and Gea (Earth-Nature) constituted a hermaphrodite being and their union was in permanent existence. Later on they were supposed to be a pair separated from each other and each one being uni-sexual.

In these ancient doctrines of scriptural and mythological truth the Creator was androgynous or hermaphrodite, derived no doubt from folklore. Some philosophers and theologians held the same notion in regard to Yahwe (Jehovah or Elohim), the god of the Deluge of the Old Testament and in the chapter of Genesis, it is revealed that "So God created man in his own image; male and female He created them." On the day God created man, in the likeness of God he made them, and God blessed them and called their name 'Adam'. Accordingly in Hebrew traditions the Talmud says that Adam was created androgynously. His head reached the clouds. God caused

¹. Russell (Bertrand): Religion and Science 1935, pp. 50-51
sleep to fall on him and God took something away from all the members and these parts he fashioned into ordinary men and women and scattered them all the world over. Lilith was first wife of Adam and mother of demons and giants. She deserted Adam, and after this God separated him into two sexual parts—one male and other female—Eve taken from his side. The Targum of Jonathan disclosed that Eve was made from the thirteenth rib on the right side of Adam. Modern theologists also hold that Adam had one more rib than his descendants.

Cosmological doctrines were developed in ancient India in the Vedas and Puranas. But they cannot be easily explained in the light of modern scientific discoveries based on the Theory of Evolution, due to their being completely blended with religious outlook, depending absolutely on the fact that their is the will of God behind the creation of every particle in the world. In the Rig-Veda, a hymn which is called the ‘Song of Creation’ provides the evidence of the most advanced theory of creation of today. It begins with a searching enquiry; “What was there in the beginning?” It asks and goes on to say that “In the beginning there was neither death nor immortality, nor day nor night. All that existed was void and formless.” This doctrine seems very much similar to our modern theory of cosmology developed by modern science of evolution. In the same way the episode of the Mahabharata pertaining to the churning of the celestial ocean by gods and demons can be linked to the origin of the Solar System. In the Vedas and Puranas we find the description of the celestial bodies—the sun, the moon, the planets and their celestial motions, though personified as gods and goddesses. Again, there is a passage in the Aitreya Brahma which is possibly dated 2000 years earlier than Copernicus, which mentions; “The sun never rises nor sets”. There is only the shifting. There are also fascinating descriptions of the creation of life in the Vedas. It begins with the formation of distinct elements about the primeval cosmic flux, the evolution out of chaos, the propping apart of heaven and earth. One of the most favoured Vedic versions relates that “the Golden cosmic Egg was floating on waters for a thousand years. At the end
of this period the egg burst open to reveal the Lord of the Universe." Many similar stories found in the Puranas and the Mahabharata closely resemble the present theory about the origin of life.

There is a mention of "Asat" in the Rig Veda which is compared with unmanifested Brahma or formless Brahma. In connection with the relation between the "Sat" and "Asat", it has been said that prior to the gods, "Sat" has been born out of "Asat in the world. Literally "sat" means that which has got its existence in the material form. Thereafter the origin of the earth, directions and planets took place. In the Rig Veda this "Sat" is also known as "Hiranyakartha" and herein it has been mentioned that "Hiranyakartha" was already in existence in the beginning of the creation and this was the only husband of all the lives that were born, "Hiranyakartha" means the womb out of which the Universe and the lives are born just as the seed grows out of the plants. In this way all the living creatures have developed out of "Sat" and "Hiranyakartha."

This has a striking resemblance with the modern theory of evolution. But this doctrine of the origin of the Universe and living beings is so much mixed up with the obscure philosophical and religious atmosphere that this explanation cannot be regarded as a scientific theory of the evolution as it has been understood and explained most scientifically on the basis of observation and experimentation.

Further, the story of the "Avtar", i.e., incarnation of Lord Vishnu is equally fascinating. The ten incarnations are chronologically described as—Matsya Avatar (the fish), Kurm Avaatar (the tortoise), Varah Avatar (the boar), Nara-singha Avatar (the man-lion), Vaman Avatar (the dwarf), Parshuram Avatar, Rama Chandra, Krishna, Buddha and the Kalki Avatar. According to the description of the Puranas, Lord Vishnu appeared in these forms to save the Universe from destruction. It is evidently accepted that this distinct order emerges in the manner which has striking resemblances with the modern evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin. But these godly narrations get confused with the idea which ultimately owes to Brahma, the creator. However, we cannot
afford to set aside the theory that the scientists also pondered over the origin of the world and evolution of life in it, ascribing it to material causes and laws of nature.

In the early chapters of Genesis, the causation of the world has been mentioned in the manner set forth by God and its date was uncertain. The popularly accepted date was 4004 B.C. derived by adding together ages of the generations of Adam as given in the Bible. But other dates had also been proposed. According to Dante the creation took place in 5200 B.C., whereas according to Hindu calculation the time of creation is reckoned as 1960852076, i.e., about two billion years. In future, at some far distant date, on the day of judgment, the material universe would come to an end, that might happen in A.D. 4004, so as to make the history of the world symmetrical, with the life of Christ in its exact temporal centre. Dante differed with the stipulation that the world would come to an end in 1800 A.D. In any case the whole history of the world from its origin to the last day would span only a few thousand years.

During the early period of its existence, the Christian Church borrowed from the Jews its dogma as to the creation and the early history of the world. Such beliefs, as every person in the modern scientific age knows full well, have long passed muster. The dogma, however, formed a background to Catholic Theology and consequently was associated with the Christian idea of God. That idea rests primarily on the preaching of Jesus of Nazareth and it is not wrong to say that He regarded it as an intuition which informs man's richest and deepest spiritual experience. But human thought rightly and naturally refuses to contend with such an intuition merely for God to whom spiritual and intuitional experience leads. For him it must also be the God revealed in Nature—which has actually been disproved in the light of the different pictures created by modern science.

As regards origin of life based on geological records, scant though our knowledge is of the past history of the earth, it is

certain that life emerged on it at some point in time. It is beyond any doubt that at the beginning of its formation, the temperature which obtained on the earth's surface equalled that on the Sun; as such, no living organism could exist on it. Water is a constituent part of the body systems of all terrestrial organisms known to us.

The Book of Genesis revealed the very simple view of the origin of man. God had built the stage for human drama in six days; and there was nothing of any real interest in the Universe excepting that drama which opened with Man, Woman and Others. Later books of the Bible indicate that the drama would shortly come to an end and the Universe would be destroyed. This world-picture persisted until the scientific discoveries were made which demolished the conception of the Book of Genesis. The modern time is the age of Evolutionists; nevertheless, the influence of the old notion of "Lord of Creation" persists and now people feel encouraged to argue that instead of man being introduced in a perfect form in the beginning of the world, he is evolving towards that form in some distant future which may, or may not, lead towards the end of the world. There can be nothing better than this view to reverse the theological scheme of things. However, theology has turned itself inside out; it has retained the deep-rooted idea of a purpose on behalf of mankind. People are still asked to adhere to the view that the Power behind the veil has schemed and created and supervised solely in order to achieve the human race which it is hard to disbelieve. Whyte supports this idea and asserts that "it is impossible to disprove this belief, because we can do no more than speculate in the vaguest manner about the existence of a purpose in the Solar System or the Universe". Sir George Darwin thinks that from five hundred to one thousand million years have elapsed since the moon was born from out of the earth. Life became viable on the earth at a point in time which is reckoned to be not less than one hundred million years. The emergence of man from the ape-like form is calculated to have taken place many hundreds of thousands of

1. Whyte (Adam Gowans); Religion of the Open Mind, 1935, p. 63
years ago. And the longest of these stupendous periods is only a fraction of time during which the Solar System itself evolved from a nebula.

The crust of the earth with its layers of sandstone and limestone and other rocks, is the vast graveyard where lie entombed remains of organisms which lived millions of years ago. These organisms were the fore-runners of man and they evolved in a most complex manner as aeons passed. Evidence of the existence of man appears only in the latest rocks. Geologists have divided the history of rocks into five eras and the following table indicates the periods at which each type of animal made its appearance, and it thus provides the basis for drawing up a genealogical tree of man.

**The Geological record showing the Characteristic Fossils of each Age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Fossils</th>
<th>Man</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quaternary (500,000)</td>
<td>[Holocene]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Pleistocene]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary (5,500,000)</td>
<td>[Pliocene]</td>
<td>Ape-men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Miocene]</td>
<td>Manlike apes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Oligocene]</td>
<td>Baboons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Eocene]</td>
<td>Lemurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (13,000,000)</td>
<td>[Cretaceous]</td>
<td>Birds; Flowering Plants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Jurassic]</td>
<td>Marsupials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Triassic]</td>
<td>Transition types to mammals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Silurian]</td>
<td>Monotremes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Ordovician]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Cambrian]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary (35,000,000)</td>
<td>[Permian]</td>
<td>Reptiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Carboniferous]</td>
<td>Amphibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Devonian]</td>
<td>Dipneusts (Transition types to amphibia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Silurian]</td>
<td>Fishes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Ordovician]</td>
<td>Marine invertebrates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Cambrian]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archaean (50,000,000)</td>
<td>No Fossils — the age of primitive organism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no sign of terrestrial life in the earliest periods. In fact everything points to the origin of life in the sea. The

first direct evolution towards human frame is represented by the Silurian fishes which had a rudimentary backbone. The science of Geology having developed in the latter half of the eighteenth century, distinguishing the living from the non-living. It is probable that the direct ancestors of man made their appearance sometime in the middle of the period when the lemurs were evolving into various types of apes. The structural relation between man and the highest apes is very clear, but the evidences point to a divergence from a common ancestor towards the lemur stage. This divergence is estimated to have taken place more than a million years before the first appearance of man, though it is noteworthy that during and since that periods the structural changes taking place were comparatively slight. Here the evolution was mainly connected with increase in size and complexity of brain. The mental and moral development of the human species alongwith the upbringing of the young after birth will be discussed later.

The question arises as to whether all life upon the earth has resulted from a single primitive organism or different organisms have arisen at different times to provide a whole series of organic departures. Ernest William Barnes, a renowned scientist and religionist, has strengthened with sound proofs and facts, the spiritual interpretation of the world along with the scientific outlook and has held the former alternative acceptable beyond any doubt in the light of the fact that many molecules of organic chemistry are unsymmetrical. Barnes further points out three fundamental elements of organic chemistry Carbon, Oxygen and Hydrogen from which innumerable stable organic compounds are made. In the gradual development of chemical action and reaction, it may be imagined that some such process took place under the influence of ultraviolet Sun's rays in the heavy hot gases which covered the cooling earth more than thousand million years ago. Most probably there was a gradual ascent to life during which colloidal carbon compounds became a living being. There are

2. Ibid., pp. 414-415.
biologists of distinction who hold the belief that the living could not have arisen from the non-living and between the two there is a gap which cannot be bridged save by a special creative act. Those who take this view will say that this creative act occurred. That is, God, when the earth was in a position to support life, created primitive forms of life; or they will postulate that elementary organism reached the earth in meteoric dust or with some similar material from the outer space where life was already in being. Now the former alternative does not accord with what we know of Divine action in the cosmos. We do not find therein what we may call visible creative acts—new things rather emerge within and through natural order. But according to Dr. Barnes one cannot dismiss the meteoric hypothesis of the origin of life upon the earth as absolutely incredible. It is not unlikely that life would be transmitted to earth in such a way from such region of the galactic universe where it happened to exist. Therefore it is correct to conclude that at a particular stage of the earth's history certain complex inorganic compounds were formed which made, as it were, a bridge between the non-living and the living. In fact there was a time when "spontaneous generation" of life took place. This view is held by those who believe in the uniformity of Nature. The same process of origin of life can be demonstrated in laboratories under the conditions which existed on the earth when life first emerged.

No laboratory attempt to create life out of inorganic material has yet been successful. But there is a possibility to create conditions whereunder certain substance through chemical complexity may become life-bearing. However, there is much evidence to suggest that no absolute gap exists between the living and the non-living. Organic substances which were believed to be produced by the agency of living animals have been made from inorganic compounds. The synthesis of urea made by F. Wohler in Giessen in 1928 was a highly significant step in this direction.¹ Further, the mechanism

of the human body and biochemical processes seem to be all capable of being interpreted in terms of laws of physics and chemistry formulated for the inorganic world. In particular, the same energy is generated and given out by man, so far as it can be determined by what are called colloidal solutions, which are, like the solutions of a fat in water, heterogeneous: they are not homogeneous like the solution of common salt. Though colloids belong to a world of matter different from that of crystalline solutions, they occur among inorganic substances. Such facts as these appear to indicate that there is no natural boundary between the lifeless and the living and to justify this assertion Barnes proves that "there is smooth slide upto life".

The publication of the monumental work of Charles Lyell's (1797-1875) "Principles of Geology" in 1830 was an epoch making event. The work profoundly influenced Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and must rank with his "The Origin of Species (1859)" as one of the two books which finally upset the traditional beliefs as to the age of the earth and origin of life upon it.

The modern discovery of the rate of disintegration of uranium has offered a way of estimating the age of any rock in which uranium, free from admixture with lead, has disintegrated into helium and uranium-lead. On this basis, geological eras historically have been divided in accordance with the following table, in which the remotest era finds place at the bottom. An idea of the kind of life which flourished in the main geological eras and of the changes which took place in such eras is essential to have a clear understanding of the theory of evolution. By means of this knowledge we can get a conspectus of the past history of the earth, as well as realise the force of some of the arguments adduced in favour of mutability of species.

**Geological Eras : Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tertiary or Cainozoic Era</th>
<th>Pleistocene</th>
<th>60 Million years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pliocene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Mammals</td>
<td>Miocene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oligocene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eocene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Secondary of Mesozoic Era
Age of Reptiles
Cretaceous
Jurassic
Triassic

Newer Paleozoic Era
Permian
Carboniferous
Devonian

Older Paleozoic Era
Silurian
Ordovician
Cambrian

Archaeozoic Era
Eozonic Era

85 Million years
175 Million years
250 Million years
300 Million years
500 Million years

Though the question "how old is mankind?" is not easy to answer, the theory of evolution has been widely accepted by scientists of distinction. To explain the subject thoroughly one has to depend upon the formation of earth according to geological record and discoveries. The age of life on the earth is reckoned by geologist at about 72,000,000 of years and this is an approximate guess.\(^1\) After the "Age of Reptiles" follows the "Age of Mammals" known as the "Tertiary Age" during which the reptilian forms of animals developed into mammals through the marsupials. Mammals including man appeared in the period alongwith birds. The last period, the "Age of Man" is characterised by the fossil record of man, and his handiwork, such as stone implements, kitchen middens and caves which evidence occupancy by primitive man. The time when the evolution from lower forms to primitive man took place, is variously estimated to range from about 20,000 years to a quarter of a million or two to three millions of years. The lower estimate is not reliable because man was too far advanced in the earliest days of authentic history; for the remainder of 20,000 years were not sufficient for his physical evolution. Written history of rather sculptured history goes back perhaps to four or five thousand years earlier than Christ, or in aggregate to about 7,000 years ago. The Brompton Lectures of the nineteenth century organised between 1800-1834 which dealt with the conflict between

\(^1\) Wall (D.A.) *Sex and Sex Worship*, 1932, p. 23.
Religion in the Perspective of Modern Knowledge

science and religion bear a fortified witness to the hostility of contemporary Oxford Divines.

The discoveries and outlook of science as stated earlier have never been anti-religious due to the fact that each of them deals with two realms of different concerns. Religion deals with the inner experience, values and morals which are considered to be outside the scope of the scientific investigation in which outer and objective experiences are the subject of study for forecasting results after long observation, experimentation and calculation, which are based on cause and effect. The preceding discussion of scientific explanation pertaining to the genesis of the earth, emergence of life thereon, heavenly bodies and their influences, negates the religious explanation and, as such, the Hand behind creation supposed to be a supernatural power or supernatural or innate Nature has been found to be totally untrue in the light of the scientific explanation.

But argumentative explanations have all the same been put forth in the light of the religious background, the existence of God who is held responsible for the creation of this Universe.

In this connexion fundamental problems have been explained by the philosophers, religious thinkers and metaphysicians which provide ample evidence to show the existence of God who is behind all the mysteries of the Universe. But if the scientific conception and its explanation are pushed away to one side, we find that there are three main philosophical ideas left—God, world-purpose and the moral order of the world.

In the light of seventeenth century and subsequent scientific revolution certain religious concepts have been examined and their validity has been disproved. Here the main consideration is the logical implication and the meaning of those concepts.

The most important idea is that of God which we have inherited from times immemorial. What this word means to man's mind is of primary importance to understand, i.e., what kind of a being God has been believed to be. The main point to be stressed here is that He has been thought of as a person that is to say, as conscious mind or spirit and it applied that God's mind must be like a human mind. It must
be conscious and makes plans with some purpose. Though, perhaps, this does not possess any physical sensation since God as pure spirit has no physical body but is supposed to have thoughts, ideas and also emotions such as love and anger. The sophisticated may say that psychological terms like 'idea', 'purpose', 'thought', 'emotion' are only used of God in some symbolical sense and that in reality God's mind must be entirely different from any mind known to us and in that case the question arises whether these psychological terms are meaningful or not. It is not our purpose to ridicule the idea of God as spirit. But there are difficulties in it which are implicit in our thinking. Theologians may say that the real nature of God is beyond human conception and the literal meaning of such words used of God cannot be given in such a manner as to satisfy the logician or ascetics or agnostics. Nevertheless, these words—spirit, purpose, thought, emotion and so on hint at some meaning which of course cannot be expressed explicitly in language. This may be true in case of religious thinkers and theologians who are orthodox. But what laymen have meant and implied when they have believed that God is a mind or spirits. This is a point to be explained. They must have believed what their words and thoughts logically imply that God is a consciousness having a psychology basically similar to human psychology so that the terms used of God by them could be properly attributed to Him. But the orthodox believe that God's mind is thought of as much larger, greater, more powerful and wiser than any human mind and they speak of God's wisdom, love, knowledge and power as infinite but still it is of the same kind as human.

Sophisticated thinkers, whether theologians or philosophers are well aware that in this anthropomorphic conception of God, there are to be encountered tremendous difficulties, as such they have attempted to substitute other more abstruse conceptions which, of course, possibly possess very great logical and philosophical merits. But they have never been able to escape from anthropomorphism and, in short, keeping in view the use of psychological words of God. The idea of God is incurably and necessarily anthropomorphic according
Anthropomorphism may be true, or it may not be so. Men who believe in God, believe in a mind which must have consciousness, thoughts, ideas, purpose and other mental states; this must have been so for the mediaeval men and this is what the idea of God means, that this is what is means to us ever now. In popular religion, in remote past and at present, it is obvious that this is what they meant and even the most elaborate and learned constructions of theologians and philosophers cannot refine the idea of God in such a manner as to avoid some element of anthropomorphism. This psychological being, God, created the world at some time in the past. According to mediaeval belief, it was created only a few thousand years ago. According to the modern thinking, it must have been billions of years ago. This belief of creation in the light of development of Geological sciences has been shattered as has been made clear earlier. It is relevant here to state that Swami Dayanand Saraswati, the renowned scholar of the Vedas, and social reformer, who was strongly against idol worship in India which is an evidence of religious attitude and religious consciousness to a great extent, believed and advocated the psychological conception of God full of intelligence and purpose but without any physical form as well as transcendent. Guru Nanak also had the same conception of God according whom God is immanent and transcendent.

The next idea, the meaning of which has to be discussed, is that of purpose as applied to the world and the consequent attempt to explain natural phenomena in terms of teleology. "Teleological" means "purposive" and the teleological explanation of a phenomenon means the explanation of it in terms of a purpose. Some philosophers have held that the fact of experience imply intelligent purpose as their only possible explanation. Some have held that the word embodies meaning although it may be that it is not conscious of its meaning. Either of these views or any view that regards the Universe as capable of realising its ends or values is a form of teleology.

Another important group of philosophers has held that all

facts are to be explained as a necessary consequence of previous facts, and not as an expression of any purpose or value. This view has been called mechanism. It rests on what Aristotle called “efficient cause”, while teleology explains the facts in terms of what he calls “final cause”. To give a teleological explanation of an event is to give the purpose of it; to give mechanical explanation is to give the cause of it. Mechanical explanation may also be defined as explanation by laws of nature. Though many believe that mechanism and teleology contradict each other, they either seek to modify each another, to make one consistent with the other, or to deny one or the other of these theories. Some also hold that both are true. The adherents of Vaihinger’s “As if” philosophy conclude that both are false and are mere fictions useful in organising experience but not objectively true.

The issue, according to Brightman, between mechanism and teleology is complicated by the fact that many different interests of the mind are at stake. This leads to different conceptions of what the real problem is. Mechanism sometimes is, for instance, thought of as opposed to idealism, mechanism is then conceived in terms of matter and motion and idealism in terms of mind and purpose. Again, mechanism may be opposed to freedom; and the issue is whether cause shall be explained in terms of temporal sequence or personal self-determination that transcends time or may be contrasted with vitalism. The problem thus turns about the nature of life, whether life is to be explained mechanically or there is any principle at work in the organism that realises the ends and that cannot be understood unless and until its relation to not-yet-real be taken into consideration. Both the conceptions need thorough examination to understand the real issues involved in understanding religion.

Mechanism

The word ‘Mechanism’ is actually derived from the word machine and a machine or mechanism is usually considered in contrast with an organism. Both these terms were applied

1. Brightman (Edgar Sheffield): Introduction to Philosophy, 1948, p. 250
by Aristotle. The former was used to mean human inventions and the latter to mean a living body. Since the time of Descartes and Roberts Boyle, there has been an increasing tendency to employ the term 'mechanism' in explaining nature as a whole, and the modern philosophers have greatly extended and deepened its meaning.

The physical changes in nature are then explained by the laws of matter and motion and present mechanistic philosophy is of this sort and it treats principles of physical science as being sufficient to explain any phenomenon or thing that is or can be in matter, mind, existence and value, particular or universal. This concept is called materialistic mechanism. This is not, however, confined to the materialistic type only and under the definition it is proper to speak of the association of ideas in a mind as a mechanism. The term 'organism' that was used of living bodies only, has also undergone changes. The contrast between mechanism and organism was not fully developed until the time of Kant and post-Kantian philosophy. Kant formulated the famous definition that "an organised product of nature is one in which all is end and, reciprocally, is also means". An organism, then, is a structure in which the parts are not merely related to other parts but the parts and the whole are also in mutual inter-relation.

As regards man's attempt to explain his world, teleological explanation may be considered to have been the first device; as such, teleology suffers from the disadvantages of having been the first explanation that was thought of according to Professor Brightman. As soon as primitive man began to wonder about the meaning of his experience about the natural objects and phenomena, he developed a crude teleology of his explanation of things. All natural objects, even trees and brooks he peopled with spirits more or less like human beings; diseases, accidents, eclipse and storms he attributed to demons. Any change in whatever sphere affecting man's interests was felt taking place due to some purpose, be it good or bad. Animism and spiritism are found alike in ancient times and also among primitive people even today. Numerous superstitious beliefs still persist among civilized man. Of course, these things have been banished from serious thought by the march of civiliza-
tion and scientific outlook. Two main streams of religious and scientific progress have contributed a lot to this end. The history of religion has tended towards monotheism which is the belief in one God as the sole creator and object of worship and reverence and any change and phenomena taking place was recognized as subject to or permitted by the will of one God. Thus sovereignty of God is the outcome of religious thought. The development of science aided more effectively the same result. Those dissatisfied with vague and lawless conceptions of traditional animism and popular religion, began to seek an explanation of the facts of the rational order in the laws and uniformity as may be found in the experience itself.

Thales, for example, as reported by Aristotle, might have thought that all things are full of gods, but less real interest was taken in the theory that water is the material cause of all thing. He had hit in a crude way on the essential principles of mechanism out of which sciences and mechanistic philosophy have actually grown.

The great materialist Democritus (370 B.C.) may be regarded as the exponent of ancient mechanism. Heraclitus, contemporary of Xenophane, believed that the universe has eternally existed, and that it passes through cycles of evolution subject to universal law of reason (logos). But it is not certain whether he meant by Logos god that may be worshipped, or simply impersonal law in the sense of modern physical sciences. He thoroughly disapproved of the anthropomorphic gods of popular religion. Anaxagoras (428 B.C.) worked out a thoroughly mechanical conception of the Universe, except that he found it necessary to post an initial god or mind (Nous) to set the physical elements into motion. Leucippus and Democritus developed the theory of atoms and a complete philosophical materialism.

This philosophical development was more effective and helpful to undermine belief in traditional religion than in improvising a substitute for it. Modern mechanism was fully advanced through the growth of experimental and inductive science and through the applications of mathematics to science which gave exact sciences a solid ground to explain the mysteries of the world. This outlook gave rise to the hypothesis
that every event in the universe is a necessary product of previous events and that an all-wise mathematician could predict the entire future of the universe with the same accuracy with which now an eclipse is predicted by the astronomers. From it all references to purpose are eliminated. Meanwhile the teleological thought continued to develop. Science itself was not satisfied with the mechanistic programme, especially in biology and psychology mechanistic explanation could not do justice to the organism and conscious life. Moreover, in this stream of thought theory was considered to be more important than facts. Meanwhile in religion, morality, education, and law, the category of purpose was effectively in use to interpret human life and its value and even the Universe as a whole. In the light of this thought, if the universe be merely a mechanism, in what way the purposes and values found in human experience and life are to be accounted for. Hence the problem became more acute.

Amongst the uncritical Christians some sort of satisfactions was derived from a view which was imperfect mechanism combined with an imperfect teleology. According to this view, God long ago created the world approximately in 4004 B.C. or even earlier. Since then it has gone on in accordance with mechanical laws of its own, quite apart from God, except that at some occasions God intervenes by a miracle which has been called deism. This is known as interrupted mechanism. Since then it was also thought that the ordinary course of nature is apart from the will of God. But the teleology of this law is as imperfect as its mechanism. The outcome of this explanation gave rise to another concept that nature and God are two foreign powers that can never survive together in a coherent world. Popular scientific thought also subsists on compromise.

Ordinarily, a scientist is a mechanist as far as his scientific explanation goes, as a result of previous conditions but in the life compartment the same scientist acts as though purposes were the deeper truth in nature. Thus the compromise of popular scientific thought appears scarcely less contradictory and unreasonable than the deistic compromise of religion. But the age-old debate has not been settled and
still there is division within the ranks of science, between
science and philosophy, science and religion, philosophy and
religion.

Now it is essential to ascertain the truth and value of
mechanistic explanation, which is actually the stand-point of
the physical sciences. This cannot be easily brushed aside.
If our philosophy as a world-view, is to be in any sense a
science of sciences, it must find place for mechanism, what is
to be questioned here is—whether mechanism is the final
explanation of everything or whether it leaves some facts
unexplained and needs to be explained in any other manner.
In the light of the facts established by modern science both
truth and value are evident. Science is the search of truth.
Any number of intellectual or interesting speculations may be
offered about the purpose in nature but none can be assured
of being the final fact. Bacon said that the “handling of
final causes mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, has
interrupted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and
physical causes”. Spinoza characterized the will of God as
“refuge of ignorance”. The mechanistic world-view with all
its implications, is an explanation of the law of cause and
effect. No prejudice and no authority can lead a scientist
away from facts gained through experience. The mechanical
explanation of astronomical and physical facts has been one
of the greatest forces for freedom in history and has banished
long-rooted superstitions and has been successful in bringing
enlightenment to the human race. It is capable of precise
verification; it has been proved beyond any doubt that there
are mechanical systems in the universe. What is doubted is—
whether this is adequate to give a complete and coherent
explanation of all the facts of human experience.

Limitations of Mechanistic Approach

The principles of mechanical explanation have proved
themselves true in the wide ranges of our experience. Never-
theless, many scientists and philosophers do not feel satisfied
with a merely mechanistic account of reality. Brightman
has pointed out the following limitations in the mechanical
Religion in the Perspective of Modern Knowledge  

concept of reality¹.

1. The universal truth of mechanism cannot be demonstrated. Science of mechanical laws may predict certain truth but what will be the behaviour of human beings tomorrow is not easy to explain by it. It is an article of faith and hope. Any theory is an interpretation of experience; as such, to assert that it is therefore true for all parts of experience is not verified.

2. Mechanism is also used for some purpose. It presupposes and in turn is used by purpose. Sir Isaac Newton’s mind set to work to the end of explaining all falling bodies under law and the concept of mechanism was the outcome of Newton’s purpose. It is undesirable fact that even the use of mechanical laws is made for fulfilling some purpose.

3. Further, mechanism explains the purpose in terms of non-purpose. The mechanistic philosopher holds that the control of mechanism by purpose may well be stated in purely mechanical term and purpose to use the control mechanism of nature. Purpose may be regarded as a process of biological mechanism which serves as cause of certain effects in the mechanical order of nature. Further conscious purpose may be regarded as the product of a biological mechanism.

4. Mechanism is considered untrue, sometimes, when it is considered by the teleological philosophers. That it is absolutely impossible to explain the conditions in terms of unconsciousness or purpose in terms of non-purpose. The mechanistic philosophy arises from the minute study of the law of motion, and comes to the facts of mind and purpose with preconceptions derived from the non-mental and non-purposive. The extreme behaviourist may regard consciousness, subjective feeling and life as meaningless or unintelligible. Renowned biologist Verworn and Jullius Schultz explain the organism on the basis of biogens and stress that the preservation of the life germs, i.e., biogens and their presence in friendly surroundings was either due to mere chance or was the expression of some plan or meaning. Thus

evolution of life from its primitive germs to higher types demands some cause.

5. Mechanism has been considered by certain philosophers as being quite abstract. It defines certain conditions apart from all the rest of the Universe and states what would happen if these conditions were all that there were in the universe. Mechanism does not interpret the fact as a whole and fails to unify our Universe.

6. Mechanism presupposes space and time. Mechanistic philosophy arose from a study of laws of motion. In general, science has tended to explain the qualitative differences in terms of the motion and material particles. Motion is always from point to point in space and from instance to instance in time. In so far, then, as mechanism is a generalisation of laws of motion, it presupposes that what is true of space and time is true of universe as a whole. In any case, if it could be shown that space and time are inadequate descriptions of reality, then foundations of mechanistic philosophy would be shaken. Experience and reflection show that everything cannot be explained in terms of space and time. The conscious, for instance, is intimately related to spatial object, the brain, and it refers to physical objects, both real and imaginary. But it will be erroneous to infer that consciousness occupies space because it can neither be pointed out nor observed. Brain may be observed but nowhere in the brain anyone has found the actual consciousness of love or disappointment, the idea of the past, or the ideal of intellectual honesty. There is only a collection of material particles in motion in the brain and consciousness which cannot be pin-pointedly located therein. Though it occurs at the same time with, or immediately before, or after, a particular event in the brain. But what consciousness means to others does not apply to the extreme behaviourist who rejects it because there is no place in his system if materialistic mechanism for such reality as consciousness is experienced to be. The discussion reveals that there are some important aspects of the world of experience that cannot be experienced in terms of space-time. Though some great philosophers persist and are convinced that the facts can be better explained if space is regarded
as empirically or phenomenally real but not as metaphysically or antilogically real.

Teleology

Some of the critics have found mechanism to be a difficult view to hold as it does not do justice to the facts of purpose and is not internally coherent. Though there is a similar view that teleology may be equally difficult. The question still remains whether the world has any purpose and teleology is capable of interpreting the facts of experience better than mechanism. One view is that if the relative ability of the two theories is taken into consideration to explain all the facts, both of mechanism and of purpose, of things and of values, of matter and mind, the problem can be solved.

1. As far as teleological functions of organism are concerned, the properties of living being suggest to many minds the fitness of the teleological explanation. It seems to them that structure of behaviour of organism can be interpreted only by appeal to the principle of end or purpose. "An organised product of Nature", according to Kant, "is one in which everything is end and reciprocally also means; nothing in it is in vain, nothing purposeless or to be ascribed to a blind mechanism of nature." In his "Creative Evolution", Henri Bergson argues on some appealing grounds the teleological function in organism. He illustrated the fact by his famous comparison of the eye of the vertebrata with the eye of a common pecten or scallop which contains the same essential parts. But how they have developed in different forms despite their origin from a common parent stem, cannot be explained, by evolutionary process. In the light of Darwin's process of evolution, a mechanistic theory of accidental variation and the theory of mutations of De Vries, it cannot be properly accounted for as eye is a most complex organ of which each part is adjusted to perform some function. This reveals that there is at work in nature a power that is non-mechanistic and that realizes the ends. Hans Driesch, a renowned German biologist and philosopher, in his "Science and Philosophy of Organism" has established entelechy dealing with the telic property of organism based on non-mechanical principles with a true
factor of heredity. This theory that explains life in terms of such an entelechy is called vitalism which is teleological in its explanation. Driesch, the famous vitalist assumes as basis of all life, in addition to its physical and chemical elements, a non-energetic immaterial force that controls and directs the development of the organism. He has accumulated a considerable mass of experiential evidence in favour of this theory. "Entelechy" is a revival of Aristotle's expression. Many eminent French biologist advocate the idea of an inner vital force of a psychological character which directs the activities of organism and their evolution in a teleological manner.

Wright, one of the ardent supporters of the teleological explanation of the world and the existence of God says that Darwinism and Lamarckism are superficially mechanistic. If five features of Darwinism—heredity, variation, struggle for existence, natural selection and sexual selection are closely considered, they are far from being through and through a mechanistic theory; it rather logically rests on a teleological foundation. According to him, one of the major difficulties and defects of the Darwinian theory is its failure to account correctly for the origin of variation.\footnote{Cf Wright (William Kelley): \textit{A Students' Philosophy of Religion}, 1938, pp. 322-23.}

Human life has a purpose which only philosophy can explain. This is what philosophers say. The mechanist may explain purpose by showing that it is the result of certain natural stimulations and responses which have been held defective. Purpose is a genuine whole and is also a plan. The Neural facts are not conscious.

Now it is essential to explain the spiritual life in the light of the facts of mechanistic philosophy and teleology because it is one of the vital issues of the thesis. The term spiritual life is one that arouses an intelligible antagonism in many minds. It is quite ambiguous also. According to Brightman, "by spiritual life is meant realization of the highest values".\footnote{Brightman (Edgar Sheffield): \textit{Introduction to Philosophy}, 1948, p. 258.} In view of the interdependence of these values, the
true spiritual life is unity in which all values are grasped as an organic whole. The true and beautiful, the morally good and religiously sacred, are all elements in the spiritual life. But no life is spiritual if it devotes itself to any one of these values. The true spiritual man is he who is a lover of true values and seeks to appreciate and realize them all. Mere ideal life is also spiritual because in many a mind the conception of an ideal of spiritual integrity exists and has also existed since man began to think. Therefore, Brightman regards the spiritual life as an evidence of teleology not because all wise and good have believed it but rather the existence and purposeful realization of an ideal of spirituality is a genuine fact.

The interaction of mind and body is another and different sort of evidence of teleology. The theory of psycho-physical parallelism of consciousness is a debatable issue. It is a doctrine that there are two desperate series in consciousness—one is physical as a physicist or physiologist explains it on the basis of the brain; the other is psychical as psychologist describes it. These series are said to proceed step by step. On the basis of physiological grounds mental activity is secondary and psycho-physical parallelism leads to the belief that we are conscious antamata. Therefore, the belief that we have freedom of choice is an illusion and thus the feeling of volition is not the cause of voluntary act; rather it is the immediate cause of the act. Accordingly, the mechanists hold that consciousness is but an epiphenomenon of the organism. There are many arguments against this conception and Barnes, though well known scientist does not support this sort of scientific belief and stresses that we are sensitive and as we receive impressions, we act with definite ends in view, which is truth, in fundamental experience. Such knowledge is more fundamental and real. The fault of this theory according to Barnes lies in the dualism of mind and matter. Mind and matter are not two disparate substances but the physical and psychical senses are two aspects of a single process. 

In the light of mind and body and their interaction Brightman says that there is coherence between the interaction and teleology; as such, human minds exercise intelligent control over such environment. Therefore it is reasonable to believe that a supreme mind exercises supreme control over all mechanical forces and laws.

Natural law is exploited to the maximum extent to argue against the teleological explanation which appears to be reasonable too. But, since no metaphysics, either mechanistic or teleological is primarily concerned only with describing, analysing and co-relating the observed facts within the purview of its investigation, it abjures all interest in the profound questions of the other side. He is confined to a description of certain order in experience like Auguste Compte who was a positivist. Merely descriptive or positivistic account of natural law does not always satisfy the human mind. In teleology, a more coherent and more connected view of the Universe is adopted which appeals, and in every law of nature and all forms of energy is manifest the expression of an eternal rational purpose. Purpose is considered to be real fact which is also a principle of totality, a spirit through which some meaning is revealed.

Despite some convincing arguments advanced in favour or teleological concepts of the world-view and existence of supreme power or God controlling the Universe, some objections have been raised to its validity. Every argument in favour of mechanism is an argument against teleology and every difficulty or defect in the argument for teleology is also an argument against it.

Teleology argues that mechanism is not adequate metaphysically and substitutes for the principle for mechanical cause. The principle of purpose in the true explanation of the present is to be found in future and the ends yet to be realised. This means that non-existent future explains the existent future.

Another objection to teleology is raised on the etiological gound on behalf of cause and effect. According to the mechanist every event may be explained as an effect of the preceding events. Any event directed to purposiveness would involve a
lawless intrusion into the order of law.

Whereas teleology finds purpose in the universe, the opposite view of dysteleological conception directs attention to the many facts that either serve no purpose or conflicting purposes. Thus, teleology appears as an illusion. An alternative theory that has appealed to contemporary thinkers who reject the teleological explanation, is the theory of a natural and indifferent Universe which means that reality is unconscious and purposeless.

Contemporary German personalist Wilhelm Stern has raised anthropological objection to teleology. The anthropological objection urges that the whole idea of purpose or end is derived from human psychology and that human conceit would make bold to read cosmic purpose in terms analogous to human experience. It is true that teleology and all idealistic philosophy interpret reality from the clues found in human experience. It is true that all thinking about reality must do this very thing. The common sense realist and materialist think that reality is source of their perceptions; the romanticist finds reality analogous to his emotion; the natural scientist holds that it is like certain theoretical models grasped by his conceptual thought processes. In this way, all thinking, then, is unavoidably anthropomorphic. A theory is not false because it is based on human experience. Indeed, it would be patently false if it ignored that experience, or if it be an unreasonable reading of it.

Another aspect of the anthropological objection is often urged. It is argued that the Universe is so vast and man is so insignificant that if cosmic purpose is true, man's place in the system of that purpose must be negligible. In comparison to the Solar System, the steller universe and beyond the possible universe, man's position is of least importance. Renowned social scientist Herbert Spencer and other thinkers have held this sort of view. It has been suggested by some astronomers that if the Solar System were in the centre of the Universe, it might be in order to regard man as an object of interest to the universal purpose, but since it is not central, teleology is disproved.

However, it has been felt that man, truly speaking, is
insignificant in space and time. But space and time criteria are not the real purpose or value. Value, according to Brightman, is an experience of conscious personality. He stresses that space of personality in the reals of ends is not to be determined by the space that man’s body occupies nor by the time that elapsed before he was born, but rather by values that he is capable of realizing. In support of teleological concept of anthropological view of God, Brightman says that, the existence of astronomical space and time is such a fact that man’s mind is capable of knowing, as such this is truth.

The theory of evolution is a very strong objection against the teleological concept which is believed to have destroyed the possibility of a teleology. Before the advent of the theory of evolution, it was strongly held that every species of organic life was due to a special act of divine creation. Every organ that adapted life to its environment was regarded as evidence of design. The theory of evolution has rejected the “special creation” theory in favour of the view that regards all forms of life as blood-relatives, the more complex and highly developed being “descended” from the simpler and lower types. Evolution has also explained the adaptations to environment by the theory of natural selection. Natural Selection is based on the facts that among the off-spring of any parents there are some better adapted to survive than others. Those that are adapted to survive do survive, and pass on their biological characters to the following generations. The non-adapted perish. Hence the present adaptations are not the work of a Creator who made organisms as they are, fully equipped for the battle of life, but they are the result of a sifting-process, which involves the apparently aimless birth and destruction of countless, maladjusted or poorly equipped organisms. Thus evolution appeared quite unfriendly and uncompromising to teleological conception of the design and purpose of organism and the world.

Again, in another direction evolution seems to undermine the belief in a world-purpose. Traditional philosophy and theology had usually regarded the purposes or purposes embodied in the Universe as eternal and unchanging. The realm of
Platonic Ideas, or the mind of God or Substance, or whatever enjoyed high standing in the philosophic world, was indeed sublime, holy, luminous, but it was static. Its sole business was to be; it was above beginning and becoming, change and time. The theory of evolution has shaken these beliefs. It sees change and growth, and the emergence of genuine novelties, the most characteristic features of our world. If evolution be true, the reality that embodies itself in the world process cannot be eternally static. This has led some, notably Henri Bergson, to the opinion that there can be no eternal world plan. It must be admitted that many philosophical and theological descriptions of God and the Absolute are notoriously difficult to relate to the empirical facts of life.

Brightman argues that taken for granted "that the notion of an absolutely timeless and unchanging purpose fails to do full justice by the facts of experience, it does not necessarily follow that mechanism in our only alternative. Bergson, for example, "is more hostile to mechanism than to finalism" as he calls teleology. The main arguments against mechanism are unaffected by the evolutionary views. No doubt, evolution rightly interpreted in the face of evolutionary facts is not a return to mechanism but a bitter conception of teleology, says Brightman.

Heraclitus (540-480 B.C.), the first philosopher of change, taught that everything undergoes changes excepting the "logos" or law of change. An adequate philosophy of evolution must reconcile change with permanent law. There must be place for real growth, real novelty, emergent evolution in our Universe; yet there must be coherence, reason, meaning, purpose in the whole process. Many traditional concepts have met these facts with satisfaction. In the light of this view, a metaphysical hypothesis of personalism has been developed based on the facts of our personality which changed identity, novelty and law, time and transcendence of time are realised at once in concrete unity. This gives rise to personalistic teleology as many philosophers conceive it. Through it the "arrival of fit" becomes intelligible. While it banishes the notion of petty, middling interventions on the part of deity, it opens the portals of new vistas of cosmic cooperation and
divine patience; it points to consciousness and spiritual life as the goal of evolution and furnishes modern intimation of immortality.

A different objection has been advanced by the thinkers of Positivistic School of thought who are against any metaphysical explanation whether mechanistic or teleological. They are adherents to knowledge of the description of observed uniformities. Thus, positivism is the refusal to think about metaphysical problems.

In addition to the foregoing arguments for the existence of God and a parallel scientific outlook against the existence of God, three schools of philosophy that have considerable influence at least in the English speaking world have advanced their own conceptions to prove that there exists some supernatural power which they designate as God. These are idealists, the pragmatists and the new realists. Their arguments are worth mentioning in favour of the existence of God.

There are numerous forms of idealism which believe in the existence of God. Two general types are current these days and they are known as Mentalism and Speculative idealism. They are also sometimes called subjective and objective idealism respectively.

George Berkeley (1685-1753) whose concept is based on mentalism argued that reality wholly consists of ideas that pass through minds, and the minds that know these ideas. Whenever one perceives any object, he is aware of that object and the oneself as perceiving it. Modern science has already established the primary qualities that actually exist in things—such as shape, size, solidity, motion and number etc. and secondary qualities—like colour, sound, odour, taste and temperature, that in reality do not exist in the outer world but only in our minds. Berkeley claims that the same objections apply to the supposition that the primary qualities exist independent of minds that hold in the case of the secondary qualities. Such qualities vary at different times, and give rise

to illusion. On analysing, one finds that it wholly consists of different sensation—such as colour, odour, taste etc. which is actually mental in its constitution. Some of our ideas are due to the activity of our minds—those of fancy—such ideas are our own creation which we can alter at will. Our other ideas, those that constitute the outer world of real things which we perceive through our senses involuntarily. Berkeley attributes such of our ideas of eternal world to a Mind somewhat like our own which according to atheists and materialists may be due to matter. But such ideas are due to something external to our own experience either material or mental. Thus Barkeley holds that it is more reasonable attribute then to the known than unknown, to another Mind than to matter. Since all of us experience a common world, composed of the same objects, the Mind must be the common cause of all our ideas of the external world. The matter, thus, according to Berkeley, is nothing but a system of ideas which God imparts to us all in a uniform way.

Speculative idealism has its ancestry in G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) who was the greatest exponent of objective idealism known as speculative philosophy. The Universe is for him one absolute spirit or idea which expresses itself by an eternal dialectical process. Thinking and being for him are identical. Speculative idealism does not maintain that everything, as a separate object, is either conscious or subconscious or an idea in some conscious mind. Many things, taken by themselves are not alive or conscious at all and this is true of the great bulk of the material of which the world consists. All this can be explained on different levels of Physics, Chemistry and Biology. Animals that are conscious belong to psychology plane. And besides, some objects are also found on the planes of aesthetics, ethics and so on. Each plane is an object of reality and true so far as it goes, none is the whole truth. Everything in the Universe has to be stretched in the light of the whole to which it belongs. The study of the inorganic universe viewed in the light of astronomy, physics, chemistry, geology reveals only one side of the Reality. Neither organic nor inorganic nature is incomplete system, each implies the other. It is impossible to understand the rest
of the Universe in separation from man with his awareness of secondary qualities, with his ability to reason, with his insight into goodness and beauty. Man cannot be understood apart from his earthly environment in which he has been living. According to speculative idealists even the opposite is also true.

Now if we think of the world as a whole as thus having a meaning, that each part of it is a system of values with the rest that man recognises and appreciates, is a significant part of this whole, we are led logically to a belief in God.

The God of religious worship has to be conceived in a more intimate and human way than the philosophers describe the Absolute; the God of religion is, however, a closer approximation to the Absolute than any other partial conception of it, far closer than any other conception with which sciences deal. Religious worship is, therefore, justified specially if God is conceived of as immanent. Speculative idealism thus approaches the problem of God in its own way. It claims that it would be impossible to prove the existence of God by a series of propositions such as those in geometrical theorem, or by resort to causal reasoning, such as saying that since everything has a cause prior to it, there ultimately must be First cause that causes everything else, but itself uncaused. In this proposition the existence of God cannot be established according to speculative idealism which lays emphasis on the question why things are there, what for they are and what is their meaning, value and significance rather than weighing it on logical ground, or causes of things which do not reveal a system of self-determining.

Now arises the third question of morality and its validity in the light of seventeenth century scientific revolution. The aim is to trace the set of consequences and effect of that revolution and the consequent domination of the modern mind by science on our moral ideas and values. Though there is no logical connexion at all between scientific discoveries and any moral question as far as the effect of science on religion is concerned. Yet, in fact, these scientific concepts have had a profound and adverse effect on moral ideas. According to Stace, "They have brought about collapse of
belief that the world is a moral order".¹ Taking into consideration that the belief in moral order means that the final control of the world is in some way a righteous government and as such there is a drive towards moral goodness in the world-process. This may be personified in the concept of a righteous God who is the Master of the world and administers it in a moral way. This conception gives rise to an idea that there is a force in nature aiming for goodness. It is born in the mere feeling that somehow or other, good prevails in the end and evil is defeated. This is similar to the conception of philosophers that moral values are objective. The conception that the world is not a moral order means that moral values are subjective. Any value is subjective if it depends upon human feeling, desire or opinion and it is objective if it does not rest on mental status of human beings. If moral values depend on human psychology, then, they do not exist in the Universe apart from the existence and thoughts of human beings. Before the advent of man there was no good or evil in the universe and the non-human universe is neither moral nor immoral, it being a non-moral world. So that the belief that the world is a moral order, is a part of intellectual and cultural heritage of all highly civilized people. In Christianity there is expression of righteous God. In ancient Greece it was expressed in different ways in the philosophies of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. It permeates the religious Scriptures of Hebrews. In Indian religions, in Hinduism and Buddhism, it is expressed dimly. Hinduism embodies such concept in the law of Karma. In the Western world right from Christ this concept is deeply rooted but there is a contrast between the mediaeval mind and the modern mind. The former believed that the world is a moral order, while the latter holds that it is not so. Even in the mediaeval times everyone did not believe that the world was a moral order, while today, nobody believes in it. In ancient India the Charvakas did not believe that the world is a moral order nor did they believe in the existence of God. Throughout the modern period there have been powerful protestations

against the doctrine of the subjectivity of morals. In spite of these protestations, it is characteristic of the modern Weltanschauung to hold that the world is not a moral order. This idea is getting popular and the drift of the modern mind since the rise of the modern science has been set steadily more and more in the direction. The primary reason lies in the consideration that the concept of values—may it be economic, aesthetic or moral, is intimately mixed up with the concept of purpose. If there is purpose in the world, there will be values in it and the values will be objective, but if there is no purpose in the world, there will be no values in it. It is quite natural to think that if something is valuable, it is for the fact that it is of value to somebody and of some purpose. There may not be any logical transition but it is certainly a psychological transition. It is easy to explain psychologically as to how in the modern age man came to believe that moral values are subjective. So long as man believed in a world-purpose whether existing in the mind of God or immanent in the world itself, what was morally good could be connected with that purpose and defined as that which was in accordance with God’s purpose, or it was defined as that which was in accordance with the immanent world-purpose. This sort of thinking was developed due to man’s capability of thinking out clearly the implication of his own ideas and thus in the pre-scientific times these theories of the moral values unconsciously controlled man’s thinking.¹

Belief in the purpose of God and the immanent world-purpose are independent of the human mind and such religious concepts pertaining to the theory of nature of moral value makes that value objective. In case people lose their effective belief in God or world purpose, they will never define them in terms of cosmic purpose or of a Divine purpose. But in terms of some purpose they have to be clarified that everything of value must have some purpose. This will be some human purpose; as such; man will be compelled to believe in some view of the nature of good and evil. But, again, this will be by definition, subjectivism. Accordingly,

the world is not a moral order.

In this way the thinking coming down from the pre-scientific era to the modern times may be described in brief as under:

If morality is based on some divine or cosmic purpose, it is objective. Thus the moral order in the world prevails. But Newtonian science caused a very great loss of effective belief in divine or cosmic purpose as has been clarified earlier. Hence morality could no longer be grounded in divine or cosmic purpose.

But values have to be related with and defined in terms of some purpose, from which if divine or cosmic purpose is eliminated, the only remaining alternative remains the human purpose. Hence the moral values are dependent on human purpose which is subjectivism. This reveals that the world is not a moral order.

From the above, it comes out that the thinking of the moral objectivism of the medieval mind passed into the moral subjectivism of the modern mind. This is due mainly to the scientific outlook based on modern discoveries pushing aside many religious and moral truths. If man's belief in God or moral order or in a world-purpose ceased to be effective, it was inevitable due to the reason that he began to think of moral values in terms of human values or purpose rather than in terms of divine or cosmic purpose. Thus, loss of religious faith necessitates the substitution of a secular ethics based on human purposes for an ethics grounded in religious outlook. Effective belief in religion, if considered in numerical context on the basis of true and devout adherents, it will be revealed that the people today are more apathetic towards religious matters than was the case in the past. The depth and effectiveness of religious belief has worn out in the modern age; so also the belief in the world being a moral order. Similarly, whereas the typical ethical thinking of the medieval period was objectivist, so the typical ethical thinking of the modern age is subjectivist. This type of changeover in the history of religious ideologies began to show at such a juncture of time which coincided with the rise of science and this was not a mere coincidence but a case of
cause and effect.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) who was a contemporary of Galileo may be regarded to be the first subjectivist. Though he was not a great philosopher, yet he was the philosophical mirror of the new science of his time and his philosophy is simply the generalization of the tendency of new science. Whatever truth in the limited area of physics was brought forth by Galileo, appears in Hobbes as a Universal truth about the whole cosmos. As revealed by the Atomistic science, matter is composed of atoms; Hobbes applies this scientific truth to the whole Universe. Accordingly, nothing exists which is not made of atoms. Even the human soul is made of atoms. Everything which exists is material and there are no non-material things. In this way Galileo's physical science was translated by Hobbes into philosophical materialism. Similarly the principles of new science based all events happening in the physical world upon some cause. This was universalized by Hobbes and applied by him to human actions. It was thought that either there is no free will, or free will has somehow to be understood within the framework of determinism. The world view of Hobbes flowed from science. Thus he established a clamp from mediaeval objectivism to modern subjectivism which gradually became the major theme of Weltanschauung and the idea that the world is not moral was preached by the philosophers of the time. John Dewey insists that morality is a human thing, having its roots in human nature. This is just the same subjectivism of Hobbes which is crude but Dewey's is subtle and sophisticated. The school of logical positivists says that moral statements are the expressions of our emotions or attitude is a version of subjectivism. Stace holds that any view is subjectivistic in which moral values are dependent on human psychology. The scientific revolution was the ultimate cause of modern moral subjectivism. But that moral subjectivism gave rise to another view of it, known as moral relativism; the theory that all moral values and standards are relative either to individual persons—individual relativism—or to culture or society's group relativism. This means that what is good for one man or set of men will not be good for another. Therefore, there is no such
thing as absolute goodness considered without relation. This concept is known as relativism.

In the “age of faith” before faith had been undermined in the light of modern science, it was taken for granted that the moral law is absolute and is the same for all men. There is one God, the father of all men, and His commands for all His children are the same. The same moral law is in reality the law alike for the Christian and for the most benighted heathen. The difference is that the heathen has not learned and does not know the law. Where such views coincide with a true moral law, they are correct and where there is any divergence, they are incorrect. This belief in a single absolute moral law is not in the least consistent with the fact that in different countries, ages and civilizations moral ideas have always varied. Similarly, what is considered good in one culture is considered bad in another culture. As a matter of fact, what is good and moral, should always be good and consistent everywhere and all the time independent of the beliefs or opinions of man. Thus, any kind of moral objectivism implied the existence of a single universal morality. It is only subjectivism which leads to contrary view. And, it is very important to realize that ethical relativism is in conflict not only with Christianity, but any genuinely religious view of the world. For, the belief that the world is a moral order, is the part of the religious view of things, and it implies a single universal morality. Relativism is characteristic of the modern mind in which there is no doubt. The most advanced philosophers of our present generation, the logical positivists, proclaim it, and other schools of philosophers also support this view. However, the so-called idealists may tend to deny it, they are out of date. Anthropologists and sociologists generally support it. The genealogy of moral relativism has now been traced and its root goes back to the seventeenth century science which has led to subjectivism, and subjectivism on its turn has led to relativism. According to the view of Stace, relativism was originated or proved by the anthropologists of the present time and he also proves that it was born before the rise of modern science of anthropology, which actually is evident from the views of Hobbes. What anthropology and
sociology have discovered, shows that moral beliefs vary from society to society and from religion to religion, and culture to culture. Thus, the conclusion appears logical that there is no single standard of moral truth as there is no objective moral standard and there are only the varying subjective standards of different cultures. Seventeenth century science encouraged the trend towards relativism, brought it into existence and the work of the anthropologists is merely seized on by an age which already believes in relativism as a prop for its conclusions.

What all this finally boils down to is that the older religious foundations of morality have disappeared on account of our scientific way of thinking. That no other foundation has been developed, and that in consequence the theory of morality is bankrupt and is falling by the wayside, though it is a difficult question to answer as to what influence the collapse of moral theory has had upon actual moral behaviour. Of course, people go on practising morality to a point of mere habit. It is an accepted fact that without a minimum of moral behaviour and code of conduct no society can flourish nor even survive. Such a modicum of decency is universal, that compels men to treat fellow human beings with a certain feeling of brotherhood, fairness and kindness.

Another very important line of thought which is an outcome of scientific outlook and revolution and which has influenced the moral outlook of the modern mind, is the problem of free will. This implies that a man has free will and is free to choose any alternative course of action. But it is very difficult to establish whether one is free to choose what he likes and to modify his attitude to things he does not like. Though there are certain actions or wishes where one can decide to choose what he intends to do. As far as the relation of free will with the theory of morality is concerned, it has usually been held by the philosophers that unless there is free will, nobody can rightly be held morally responsible for what he does. All normal people instinctively believe in free will. Nevertheless, it has been doubted by many scholars. They have trotted out arguments to show that free will, however, strongly we may feel that we possess
it, is in fact a delusion. This sort of idea has actually been derived from scientific revolution. This does not mean that science has invented the problem of free will, or that the difficulties which are inherent in the conception of it were discovered by modern science. The problem of free will has been there since man began to think. Thomas Aquinas raised the issue of free will in the Middle Ages and in ancient Greece it was taken up by Aristotle. What modern science did was to render the problem acute by providing an argument against free will.

Newtonian science gave rise to the assumption that there is a chain of causes behind every action which can be traced back indefinitely to the remote past, provided we are in a position to know enough of it. Hence whatever happens is certain and pre-determined from the beginning of time. This sort of concept is popularly known as determinism. Recent Physics has advanced arguments against this view being totally true. This view was an off-shoot of Newtonian science, which contributed to the making of the modern mind. However, despite the assertion of some physicists, the determinism of recent science has not succeeded in resolving the problem of free will.

The conception of determinism helped advance the modern argument against free will. Every event is completely determined by causes. A human action is just as much an event in nature as an earthquake or an eclipse of the sun, and as such human actions are wholly determined by the past causes which cannot be presumed to be other than they are. If all the causes which produce events are known, one can predict the event before it takes place. We may apply this thought to the actions of human beings which are, after all, nothing but motions of their physical bodies. Thus every thing which man does could be predicted beforehand by any one who knew enough about the causes. This means, whatever one does, he was bound to do which he could have not done otherwise, and there is no choice left. The general argument then is simply that all human actions must be wholly determined by causes of some kind and this is inconsistent with belief in free will. But it is not so easy to tell what kind of causes deter-
mine human actions. Answers to this question may be of two types. They may be called, respectively, the materialistic view and the dualistic.

The materialistic view holds that a human being is nothing more than simply a material object. What is called mind, soul or spirit is not a non-material thing but is material or a function or properties of matter. In the light of this view a human being—body and soul—as we say, is entirely composed of atoms. Human action are the motions of the body and these are ultimately reducible to the motions of swarms of atoms. The motion of each atom and therefore the motions of the whole body, are entirely controlled by physical laws and physical causes. Hence actions of a human being are no more free than are the motions of the individual atoms which compose the human body.

The dualistic view holds the belief that what we call mind cannot be reduced in this manner to material atoms. Thoughts, feelings, emotions, and mental states generally are not physical existences. This view of dualism of nature of mind frees us from the dilemma of free will because according to it our actions are not the result of the physical forces which control atoms. This view cannot, however, be completely adopted, because the general theory of determinism has been held to apply to mind even if it is not material. Dualism itself leads to another version of the denial of free will. According to the dualistic determinism, our actions are, usually, many of them, caused by motive, or desires, or volutions. This reveals that they must have had their causes and their causes must have had theirs. It makes no difference whether the universe is made of only one thing-matter, or there are two kinds of distinct things, mind and matter. According to it whatever happens is wholly determined by causes and is theoretically predictable which is applicable to mind and matter both. Therefore, in either view, human actions are not free.

It may be said that although physical determinism may be true, there may be reason to suppose that determinism applies to mind as well as matter. But this view is not correct. Whatever psychology one accepts, materialistic or dualistic,
it would be noticed that desires, motives, emotions, thoughts and other mental states certainly have causes, and that these causes have causes and so on indefinitely back into the past. Hunger, or desire for food, is caused by well known physiological states of the body. Desire for drink and sex obviously have bodily causes. Such actions of human being can easily be explained and understood. Similarly, even the more complex desires have some causes, though they cannot be easily explained or understood. The Psychoanalytic School of Psychology has been able to find out lots of clues to explain such mental phenomena as cannot easily be understood. A number of environmental factors play their part in it and if all the causes of mental condition of a man are known, one can predict his actions with certainty.

The fact remains that the causes which determine actions are very often untraceable, or so much complicated that it is impossible to ascertain them in detail. The same is true of the physical world. Nobody with ultimate certainty can predict all the causes of any or all natural phenomena taking place. If human actions often seem unpredictable, it is for this reason. If one knows more about a human being, and his psychological constitution, and the forces, social environmental, or spiritual, which beat down on him, the more easily he can say what the man will do.

In this way we have every reason to postulate that the law of causal determinism is universal; that it applies in the internal world of mind as well as in the external world of matter, whether we adopt a materialistic or a dualistic theory of human personality, in either case, free will seems to be impossible. Newtonian Science implies determinism, and determinism seems to imply the denial of free will. The concept of determinism, thus makes it clear that there is no free will and one is bound to choose what is predetermined and as such there is no question of morality or immorality as one is destined to commit what is predetermined.

Our aim is not to record all scientific discoveries and explanations which falsify the religious truths and other conceptions handed down to us from generation to generation since times immemorial. In presenting the scientific approach
to religion, analysing its repercussions, religious approach to the world, existence of God and moral order of the world, the aim has been to prove that in the light of scientific outlook religious conceptions do not reveal fundamental truths on which religion is supposed to stand. All religious teaching about the control of the world by supernatural power known as some divine force does not amount to a fact. Religion, if viewed from scientific angle, according to Stace, is nothing but a mass of false ideas and superstitions of which the ultimate source is wishful thinking.¹

However, despite the fact that science pushes aside the religious conception of the world-view, God and His creative powers and moral order of the world, people have all along believed that there is some divine power to control the world, i.e., God; the world is purposive and that it is a moral order and people still have strong faith in all these conceptions and those who advocate the scientific view of the world, have not been able to wipe out the religious faith from society. Religion in some form or the other is observed in all societies of the world. This shows that it is so deeply rooted in the human ethos that it seems impossible to do without it.

In every society religion in one form or the other has been retained and no community has been free from it. Even those philosophers who hold mechanistic view of the world or subscribe to scientific truth, believe in the existence of God. Their philosophy is deeply religious. Descartes who was a distinguished mathematician and a scientist of his time, and is regarded, sometimes, as the father of modern philosophy, could not restrain himself from religious faith. According to him, the universe consists essentially of three kinds of existences—the first as God; the second is mind and the third is matter. The concept of God is essential to the philosophy of Descartes whereas it is merely accidental with Hobbes. The reason is that matter exists depending on the concept of God. He held that existence of matter can only be proved if the existence of God is proved. Whereas the position of God in the system of Descartes is really important, Hobbes who is

considered to be an entirely non-religious philosopher also believed in some kind of God. Though there is difference between the two philosophers and God seems to both a mere intellectual abstraction, Descartes appears to be coldly logical throughout in his references to God but in his system the concept of God is necessary and central, while in the philosophy of Hobbes, God is an accidental appendage and, in fact, something of a nuisance. Hobbes believed that religion “is a pill which it is better to swallow without chewing.” John Locke (1632-1714), the first great British empiricist who argued against the authority of the Bible, had developed such a philosophy of his own which was a direct product of the new science. But he does not show the characteristic marks of the scientific view of the world nor does he show any strong religious bent. However, he produces proof of the existence of God and subscribes to conventional doctrines. Spinoza was a naturalist and determinist; yet the spirit of his philosophy was deeply religious, even mystical. Stace holds that “the essence of religion is not morality but mysticism and all religion is ultimately mystical, or springs from mystical side of human nature”. The views of C.W. Leibniz are also combined with naturalistic and religious elements. Even the scientists who discovered such scientific truth which demolished altogether the long-cherished religious concepts could not himself get rid of religious feeling and even evinced strong faith in the existence of God. A point of great importance in regard to the relation between religion and science is worth noting. It is a known fact that in the course of his study Newton noticed certain irregularities in the observed motion of planets which he could not explain in terms of his law of gravitation. That is, their actual motions diverged slightly from what they should have been as calculated by his law. Moreover, if the irregularities were cumulative, they would, in the course of times, pile up to such a great deviation that would upset the whole balance of the solar system. The planets would either hurtle into the sun or break loose from its gravitational force to rush headlong into outer space.

As to the reason why it does not happen so, Newton could think of only one explanation and that was that from time to time God intervenes and puts the errants planets on their proper path. This was actually the last historical occasion on which the greatest scientist of the world advanced an argument for supernatural intervention as the cause of an observed phenomenon. In this context the German philosopher Leibniz observed that Newton’s God was a mechanic, and a poor one at that, since he could only make a machine which could be kept going right by frequent subsequent tinkering. Laplace (1749-1827) who lived a century after Newton showed that the irregularities in the movements in the planets which Newton was unable to explain by his law of gravitation are not cumulative, as he had supposed but are self-correcting. Over a long enough period they cancel each other out. Therefore it is not necessary to introduce God to correct them. The fact that Newton supposed God to be a factor in balancing the irregularities in the motions of the planets despite his great discoveries which left no room for some supernatural power, that is, God, had a reason behind it. Newton was a very devout Christian. He took his theology even more seriously than his science. He would have been horrified if he had thought that his life work would result in a general undermining of religious faith. And his own opinion was that it would have exactly the opposite effect. He even supposed that his system of celestial mechanics provided a proof of the existence of God.

Ernest William Barnes, has made a thorough analysis of religion and science in his famous work, “Scientific Theory and Religion, (1933)” and has explained almost every element of science and religion. He has shown where science surpasses religion in establishing the fundamental truth which disapproves the religious conceptions. But while discussing the mechanistic view of the world in the light of modern science, he believes that the world cannot be without ultimate truth and holds the supremacy of religious approach some in

1. Leibniz (G.W.): Correspondence with Clarke: Letters 1,4, 2,8; 3,13.
explaining the world and life despite his being a scientist of the highest repute. But when we look into his life history, we find that he was brought up in a Christian milieu and was a Bishop of Birmingham, and as such he has not been free from religious bent of mind. Barnes holds that science can only be valuable if it is actually a search for truth in which the end can be attained.

Our ultimate belief in religion and God despite the scientific explanation is due to the fact that we have behind us a view of the world which we want to believe in, namely that it is ruled by a power which is friendly to us and imbibes the values of beauty and goodness which we cherish. This is evident if we take into account another important traditional approach to religion and the existence of God. This is known as antilogical argument. Religion practically and personally points men to God who is deeply established in themselves. The proof of God, the adherents to this concept hold, is the good faith of men with regard to religion. It is not a thing which religion can dispense with; nor has religion ever been willing to forgo it. According to this argument, we form an idea of God; therefore God exists. This means that God exists by considering merely the content of the conception of God. Anslem (1033-1109) was first to advance this view. His contention was that by God we mean "that than which nothing greater can be conceived". Hence God exists in the intellect as a mental construct. This was rejected by Thomas Acquinas (ca 1225-1274) and was stated in a modified form by Descartes and finally subjected by Kant to criticism which led philosophers to set it aside. Descartes restated this view in a slightly different form. By God, he argued, we mean a being perfect in every way and this perfection is an attribute to His existence. However, this view has not been given much importance due to several factors. Nevertheless, it contains some truth in the sense that the idea of God has been maintained throughout and ever since the scientists have not been able to get rid of it. Though this idea has its roots in the anthropological approach to the history of religion, revealing the persistence of the idea of God throughout the human history, the modern scientific age has not been able to wean away the
human mind from it.

Through scientific discoveries and many rational interpretations of the idea of God, the concept, His having some purpose in creating the world, it being a moral order have been thrown out and none has been able to prove scientifically that these are the facts—there being many rational interpretations and explanations both ways. But it is difficult to explain why those trained on scientific lines having analytical minds, accept and believe in the religious view of life, the world and God and everything of this sort, without questioning. It is because, in spite of all their sophistication and veneer of outward rationality, they remain in their heart of hearts the primeval men afraid of the unknown? Or do they, in spite of all their training, partake of the benefits flowing from the religious beliefs and miracles? It does not require dialects to explain the ambivalent attitudes of educated persons who are rebels outside but at heart are ridden by superstitions and believe in religion.

Another view which is relevant in this connection and which justifies to a great extent the retention of the belief in God and religious faith in all human societies, is the approach of pragmatism advanced by William James (1842-1910) which is opposed to idealism like new realism. Pragmatism which antedates both idealism and new realism is a doctrine of peculiar interest to Americans, for the reason that it had its origin in the United States. It is based on two fundamental propositions, a method of investigation, and a theory of the nature of truth. According to it, any idea, belief, theory, hypothesis, or doctrine should be tested by the practical consequences that follow from accepting it and acting upon it.

The tendency of pragmatism is to deal with religion by an empirical method and this method seeks to exhibit the implication of those values at work in the actual religious life of people. A speculative conception of God, for instance, which could not be related to vital way to needs and purposes of religious conduct would fail to command itself to the pragmatists. James holds “pragmatic principle, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience
shows that it certainly does work, and that the problem is to build it out and determine it so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the other working truth."

Thus retention of the idea of God and faith in religion, no doubt, are due to their serving some purpose of mankind. For instance, they may be getting some sort of consolation, encouragement, hope, and peace of mind by believing in God and religion.

If we look into the history of Indian philosophy closely, we will notice that in antiquity, the concept of the existence of God and His supremacy in creating the Universe and controlling it in His own way, and the world being a moral order, were all contradictory and it was argued that there is no God. The greatest philosophical and cultural heritage of India is its spiritualism. But the overwhelming majority of our ancient philosophers were committed theists. By this is meant that they were not indifferent to the question of God, like some early Greek philosophers perhaps were. The Indian philosophers, on the contrary, faced the problem of God with all seriousness they were capable of and they reached the reasoned conviction that His existence could be admitted only at the cost of clear logic. The Indian philosophers themselves could not arrive at an agreed definition of spiritualism. Though, nevertheless the outstanding exponents claim that the belief in God as the great basic fact of life constitutes the most important component of it. However, it is amply evident that the overall description of Indian philosophy being spiritualistic is a clearly fictitious one. The fact, on the contrary, is that, excepting for a negligible majority of them, the Indian philosophers themselves felt no need of God.

Indian atheism is nothing but another name of the philosophy of Lokayatas popularly known as Charvakas, which is essentially ancient. In case of Lokayatas, atheism formed part of a clear and consistent materialistic outlook. They must have found it necessary to deny God in order to make

3. Ibid., p. 4.
room for their doctrine of the exclusive reality of the material elements. The same was broadly true of the Samkhya philosophers, though their association with materialism is not so readily admitted.

According to Chattopadhyaya the Indian atheists wanted to prove that the concept of God was entrenched only in certain recognised forms of fallacious thinking. This means that for them God was only an illusion or a subjective error given to the status of an object truth. The acceptance of such an illusion could only be a superstition. Thus, the implication of Indian atheism should have been the rejection of not only this particular illusion but also of other superstitions that formed a close community with it. Indian atheism, in short, often allowed to coexist within the same framework of thought, the rejection of this particular illusion, and assertion of illusions that were intimately related to it. The special weakness of Indian atheism was thus the welfare of providing itself with a sufficient safeguard against the characteristic superstitions it tried to reject.

Moreover, some of the Indian philosophers treated the problem of God on its intrinsic merits and the solution devised was in terms of strict logic. With the logical or theoretical equipment at their disposal and with all the zeal with which they were eager to use these, Indian atheists eventually failed to reach their desired objective, which could only be the full eradication of the belief in God from the Indian mind. Our ancient philosophers were most keen on moulding the ideas of the people and thus even the abstruse philosophical ideas percolated to the masses and concept of God got so deeply entrenched in the minds of people. Indian philosophers, in fact, did their best to prove that logically speaking, God was only an illusion and from this point of view they were, no doubt, greatly successful. Now the question arises as to why despite being illusory, God could have such a hard grip on the human mind and no nation or society could wrench itself free from the illusory belief in God. In the Indian context, God is understood in the strict sense of the Creator, and moral governor of the world. But the majority of the Indian philosophers, far from feeling happy with the
idea of God as being the one great fact of life, were convinced that there was no such thing as God at all. As an important part of their philosophical activity, therefore, they were keen in proving it and in their atheistic enterprise they actually relied upon "critical intelligence" instead of any "creative intuition". Not only to the Indian philosophers of atheistic school was God a superstition, an empty assumption and an object of misdirected reverence. But the theistic glorification of God with all sorts of high sounding adjectives—omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and so on was also futile in the philosophy and religion of Jainism. Jainism and Buddhism both do not have any belief in the existence of God. But this does not mean that the Indian philosophers who were bent upon proving this were completely rid of superstitions of all sorts or that they were prepared to accept all the conceptions that atheism scientifically entailed. Some of the staunchest atheists in Indian philosophy were stubborn defenders of many hoary superstitions. Whenever they took up the question of God in the philosophical aspect, the Indian atheists, irrespective of their other beliefs, discarded it with all their philosophical seriousness. They frequently exhibited highly sophisticated logical acumen to prove the concept of God as being a baseless assumption. Chattopadhyaya points out the shortcomings of Indian atheism and according to him the atheism of the Indian philosophers could not be fully satisfactory from the scientific point of view. Philosophically speaking, they did not subscribe to consistent materialism on the basis of which alone atheism could be securely established. Even the materialism of the early and mediaeval Indian materialists could at least rely on a comparatively under-developed theory of matter. Besides, they showed little awareness of the need of extending their materialism to society and its history. As a result they could not realise that the belief in God had ultimately a social root and as such it could not be destroyed by logical demonstrations alone. Chattopadhyaya asserts that Marxism on the other hand, which is an atheistic approach in the matter of religion, has been successful in this respect and accordingly, he says, a social revolution can really liberate humanity from God.
Chattopadhyaya claims that in the teachings of Karl Marx one can see the scientific culmination of the atheistic enterprise of our Indian philosophers. He points out that the main weakness of the Indian atheism has been overcome only in the atheism of Marx. Our philosophers did their best to argue that logically speaking the idea of God was only an illusion, an empty assumption entrenched only in certain recognised forms of fallacious thinking. Yet they reached nowhere near their desired objective, which could have been nothing but the complete weaning away of the Indian mind from the idea of God. In the Indian mind the idea of God survived and that too in a big way—all philosophical considerations urging for its rejection. This was a situation which was impossible for our philosophers to understand. How was it that in spite of being illusory, God could have such a vice-like grip on human?

Evidently the idea of God has its roots somewhere outside the sphere of mere philosophising and therefore the philosophical demonstration of its hollowness—however sharp it might have been—could never be enough to uproot it. Marx in the opinion of Chattopadhyaya is the first philosopher to show the real basis of the idea of God and also the real way of outgrowing the need of it.

The preceding discussion shows that the religious conceptions and its explanation about the universe and life is merely illusory in the light of the scientific approach. Nevertheless, religion has survived despite opposition. No single factor can be adduced as a reason for its persistence. There are a number of factors which will be taken up in detail afterwards.

Modern Approaches to the Study of Religion

The religious life and activities of a nation; tribe or individual is highly complex phenomena arising out of numerous needs, urges, desires, attitudes, sentiments and impulses of man. The motivating force underlying Buddha’s renunciation of worldly pleasures and quest for religious wisdom was an

intense sensitiveness to human suffering and the desire to get rid of them. Another motivating force for the religious quest is mentioned in the Chhandogya Upanishad (VII.24.1); man’s dissatisfaction with the limitations of his finite nature, together with a nostalgic drive towards the Infinite or the Perfect. A more secular motive for religion is the desire for protection and security, which usually expresses itself in a belief for Omnipotent Father, Mother or Protector. In Christianity is stressed the notion of sin as a basis for religious atonement. The lowest type of motive in this context is the greed for pleasures and possessions in this life or hereafter. Impelled by such motives, man creates and visualizes various type of ideals and images which form the nucleus of his religious life. These, however, are being constantly recast and modified by him in the light of growing knowledge of the real world and the changing and developing concepts and values.

In modern times various approaches to these phenomena have been adopted throwing light upon the conditions and causes responsible for the rise of religious consciousness and its development from an embryonic stage to the highly developed one. Social sciences like anthropology, sociology, history and psychology have studied religion from their own perspective, while the historical approach reveals that religion has not been static but has undergone changes in the course of human civilization.

The Anthropology Approach

The development of the science of comparative religion owes its origin mainly to Frederick Max Müller whose series—"The Sacred Books of the East" is very important contribution to it, to E.B. Tylor, the author of "Primitive Culture" and "Anthropology", and to James G. Frazer whose monumental works "The Golden Bough" and "Totemism and Exogamy" abound in wealth of valuable data. The studies of many other anthropologists on the beliefs and customs of the savages and primitive tribes throw a flood of light on man’s early attempts to discern the hidden purpose of the Universe. R.R. Marett’s work "Anthropology" may be particularly mentioned in this connection. Decipherment of the Assyrian,
Babylonian and Egyptian texts have contributed to the growth of anthropological studies. The work of Christian missionaries is also very important in as much as it shows that religious faith and practices are universal. They have furnished extremely valuable and reliable accounts of the religious beliefs and practices of some lower tribes and primitive communities.

Religion as a subject of study in anthropology is less than a century old; but much anthropological evidence has accumulated to show that members of any race, may have any culture, given the social opportunity for it, and that all attempts to interpret differences in religions and cultures of the societies and the races of the world on the basis of innate differences in individual traits only result in confusion.

In order to explain the similarities and differences among the cultures of the world, anthropologists mainly emphasize culture and its relationship to the physical environment. In this study, although biological traits are taken into account and emphasis is laid on modes, rather than individual differences and variations. The general objective of cultural anthropology is to explain the nature of culture, the relationship among its distinct elements, its manner of growth and changes, and its effect upon man, its creator. The basic assumption is that culture—viz., the man-made universe of ideas, sentiments, skills, knowledge, and objects—constitutes a scientifically valid category of phenomena, amenable to objective observation and formulation of scientific generalizations. In it religion is regarded as an invention of man, subject to scientific scrutiny, and anthropological researches on its origin and growth have, therefore, followed the general trend of anthropological development. In the nineteenth century, prior to anthropological studies on religion, the prevailing theoretical orientation was evolutionistic. Anthropological investigations revealed remarkable similarities of customs among peoples in areas separated by great distances and physical barriers. It was discovered that similar or essentially identical beliefs and practices of supernaturalism appear-

ed over and over again among geographically far-flung societies and cultures, and that it was possible to classify the whole range of beliefs and practices under several small headings described later, which provide clue to the origin and development of religious consciousness and belief in supernatural powers. It appears that all people have some sort of religion, belief in soul and other spiritual entities, magic and rites that show many close resemblances. This was explained on the basis of evolutionistic concept which prevailed until about the beginning of the twentieth century when views of functionalism emerged. By the term functionalism is here meant an element of culture—the "contribution" it makes to the maintenance, or negatively to the disruption of the society or the individual.

Thus religion has often been interpreted as contribution to the maintenance of society by creating social solidarity through joint rituals, common beliefs and support of socially important rules of interpretation and behaviour. For the individual, religion is regarded as serving the function of providing psychological assurance in various ways. Certain religious beliefs and acts might be seen as negatively functional—for example, food taboos inhibit the efficient economic use of resources of nature, and religious teachings that instil fear. Such negative functions of religion have received little attention.

Another important area of anthropological research derived partly from psychology and psychiatry is the relationship of culture and personality which seeks to determine factors of the characteristic behaviour or personality employing the the functional theory. The interpretations of religion in this trends have mostly been concerned with the role of religion in culturally induced anxieties and with meeting psychic needs. The early views of religion, adopted by the evolutionists to formulate a developmental scheme from various hypothetical beginnings to culmination in monotheism, have been discarded by later anthropologists due to their ethnocentric point of view. In order to show the anthropological concept of religion, its origin and growth, it is essential to explain some of the phases and forms of religion prevalent in primitive societies and cultures.
Animism

Tylor believed that religion began with simple animism and belief in spiritual beings and evolved gradually to monotheism. Taking into account, the circumstances that lead to animism, he interpreted it as a cognitive effort on the part of the prehistoric man to explain the differences between life and death, sleep and wakefulness, and states of consciousness and normality. According to him, the idea of soul and spirits, separable from the physical body originated in the early man through the experiences of dreaming or becoming unconscious. Once the primitive man formulated the idea of spirits, he extended it to the whole universe, attributing spirits to phenomena of both the animate and inanimate worlds as explanations of their properties and behaviour. Tylor regarded the invention of the idea of animism as an intellectual achievement, a crude philosophy that had adjunctive value because it not only explained the unknown but also through these explanations suggested a course of action to be taken, to bring recovery of normal state of being. Such acts as prayer, worship and offerings he regarded as techniques to assure well-being and success.

Thus animism, according to Tylor in his famous work “Primitive Culture”, is a very important fact in the anthropological interpretation of religion; but while it appears to have almost a universal hold on the savages, few contemporary writers believe that religion originated in animism. In central Australia, the natives have a great many animistic beliefs as well as numerous religious practices but the latter are not connected with the former. In view of such facts, the French relgionist Halbwachs inferred that two factors (Animism and Naturalism) have coexisted, associated and blended in almost all religious systems. Naturalism originated from things of nature, either from the great cosmic forces like winds, stars, sky etc., or the manifold objects occupying the earth’s surface—plants, animals, rocks etc. The religion of spirits is called Animism and in its

ambit come other objects such as spiritual being, spirits, souls, genies, demons, divinities proper so-called, animated and conscious agents like man himself, although invisible and not sensuously perceptible to him.

Later workers, however, invariably held that animism was the primitive religion and naturalism was derived from it. The animistic theory is the first and foremost to demonstrate as to how the idea of soul might have originated among men who as yet possessed no religious faith. This view of Tylor has been supported by Herbert Spencer. This sort of illusion in the primitive society arose on account of dreams, since the savages confounded dream with reality. Thus, Tylor on the basis of this anthropological research concluded that at the root of primitive religion lay a belief in spiritual beings, either supernatural in origin or disembodied in spirits of dead ancestors or heroes, who were potent for good or ill and necessarily, therefore, must be placated or adored. Since the primitive men were not much critical and possessed no highly developed logical processes, the disappearance of personality at death might have suggested its survival in some immaterial form.

Reisor also emphasises the importance of animism as basis of the origin of religion and points out that animism of crudest sort gave way to polytheism, the worship of the personalised spirit elevated to the position of deities. Fire, wind, trees, clouds, mountains, rivers—all were deified and they entere the pantheon of the primitive religion. After this stage developed the polytheism of higher religions—the worship of the Forces of Nature personified and deified.

Barnes points out that Tylor has greatly exaggerated the contribution made by animism to primitive religion and thinks that the primitive man was more practical creature than animism would suggest. Halbwachs raises the objection that animism derives religion as a whole from the illusion of dreams, and sees nothing in them but a vast aberration, a sort of mystical delirium. He holds that such systems of idea of religion as accord no significant place to historical facts that have furnished people at all times with resources to support existence are nothing but tissues of illusions.
Wright also undermines animism as a basic source of religious development and points out that the universal characteristic of religion is belief in a particular agency which can be utilized to conserve value and may and may not be referred to a personal source. If it is based on a personal source, the religion appears to be associated with animism but according to him, religion and animism have had independent origins and the psychology of animism is so simple that it does not require the elaborate explanations often advanced in its favour.

Galloway thinks that religious conception arose as particular reactions of the mind to certain environment, which gave rise to two principles—the animistic conception of the world and the life experience of the human individual. He says that, though the animistic conception of the world is not in itself religious, yet it constitutes the basis on which religious ideas are developed. The second principle prompts the movement of the whole life towards a divine object conceived as ministering to the needs of the subject. Neither the animistic nor the experiential factors acts independently, but both meet and coalesce in the beginning of religion. Two types of beliefs are noticeable in primitive religion—beliefs that external things are possessed of a life akin to man’s; and the belief in spirit present in nature, the latter being a more advanced notion. Spiritism proceeds on the assumption that a spirit possesses or uses the object as instrument. It is interesting to note that many decades ago, at the beginning of the present century, Maret (1909) alluded to the presence of a pre-animistic stage of religion—a stage in which a vague awe of the supernatural prevailed, independently of any personification of elements in nature or attribution of souls to things. The primeval man in presence of the moving spectacles of nature conceived to be the expression of a living power, felt an awe in which fear, wonder and reverence were mingled.

Although the pre-animistic stage cannot be regarded as purely religious, it was religion in the making. The religious

2. Ibid., p. 90.
3. Ibid., p. 90.
significance of animism lies in the fact that man fits the object for its religious function by endowing it with soul like his own. Between the deification of things in nature like rivers and clouds, trees and sun, and the conception of them as possessing a soul there is no very clear distinction.

**Magic and Religion**

Magic had an origin similar to that of religion. It also grew out of human need as a response to his troubles and difficulties in life arising out of his environment. James G. Frazer, who held revolutionary viewpoints, regarded both magic and religion as tools of man. He discovered that the earliest human beings dabbled only in magic and that came afterwards to replace it. Though he viewed religion and magic as functionally alike, he distinguished them on the basis of the attitudes involved. Magic rested upon the belief that man can exercise control over the supernatural powers by means of some mechanical procedures, whereas religion implies ideas of control of man by supernatural powers, so that religious behaviour consisted of worship, prayer and other forms of propitiations. In Frazer's view, magic was rational but fallacious, the pseudo-science of primitive man by means of which he used to seek control of the universe for his own purposes. When he found the mechanical acts of magic unworkable to achieve his desired goals, he formulated a new interpretation of the nature of universe and began to engage in religious behaviour to reach the objectives for which he had formerly employed magic.

The primitive peoples of the Upper Paleolithic Age were capable of making a fire, hunting, shaping and using rudimentary tools, being superior to those of Neolithic era; but as they were helpless in subduing Nature, fear or desire, human feelings at the strongest in them created the occasion for magic, charms or spells, which represented neither a logical nor thoughtful endeavour. Magic has been characterised as a pseudo-science, constituting a body of rituals and casting of spells by which the course of nature is believed to be cont

rollable. It rests upon a belief in mystical, personal or impersonal powers.

Primitive religion, like music, is concerned with the unknown, the incomprehensible, vague power or powers which influence human life, thwarting or aiding man's efforts, bestowing or withholding what he longs for. By magic, man strives to control the forces of nature, to deflect their course and to compel the unknown powers to obey his commands. In religion, on the other hand, beliefs that such compulsion is possible, is set aside and ideas of entreaty, supplication, propitiation come to the fore. Frazer, discriminating in this way magic from religion by revealing in the former the idea of direct control and in the latter the propitiation of superior beings, regards religion as a subsequent event to animism. It is a consequence of the accession of belief in disembodied spirits, ancestors, gods and demons.

Frazer regards the transition from magic to religion as a great step in human progress; he says that it could only have been taken by deeper mind. This was responsible for adopting the sun or other similar objects as themes of religion.

Raglan while conceding that the beginnings of religion consisted in the adoption of such beliefs, maintains that it is illogical to think that the adoption of religious beliefs was a great step forward taken by the deeper mind.

In contrast to such views, some authorities point out that magic is a degenerate religion. James, for example, says, "It is the practical aspect of ritual invocation that causes worship in practice to degenerate into a quasi-magical control of impersonal super-natural forces; and prayer to become virtually spell, when success or failure of a rite is made dependent upon procedure and result secured by vain repetitions of prescribed utterances."

The magical use of religious rites began very early. Dowson found that magic was used for cure of snake-bite in Egypt in ancient times. Chattopadhyaya mentions that the

Samaveda, a Hindu scripture of remote antiquity was supposed to possess magical potency\(^1\). Winternitz says that the melodies of the Samaveda were looked upon as possessing magical power even as late as in Brahmanic times. The treatise of Samvidhana-Brahmana belonging to the Samaveda, contain a sacred part comprising instructions for employing of various melodies for magical purposes.\(^2\) He has further inferred that many of the magic songs like the magic rites pertaining to them, belong to a sphere of worldwide conception which recur with striking similarity amongst the most varied peoples. Among the Indians of North America, the Negro races of Africa, the Malays, the Mongols, the ancient Greeks, and frequently still the peasantry of the present-day Europe, are found almost the same views, the same strange leaps of thought in the magic songs and magic rites, as have come down to us in the Atharvaveda of the ancient Indians\(^3\). According to Chattopadhyaya, the Atharvaveda is mainly a compilation of the primitive magical charms for fulfilling a variety of desires, ranging from the cure of fevers to the winning of the lover’s heart\(^4\).

The origin of magical cults has been interpreted in various ways. J.H. King, in his famous work, “Supernatural: Origin, Nature and Evolution” (1892) distinguishes between two trends of power; (i) Impersonal or physical, and (ii) mental, i.e., man and animal. Man, according to him arrived from the concept of former kind at the practice of magic and from the second at belief in spirits, the magical being the earlier form of belief in physical forces. Human experience at all stages is subject to unpredictable interruptions by impersonal powers which men describe as good or bad luck. Magic arises from situations involving “luck”, and according to King, it is ‘the first germ of religion’. Marett suggests that primitive men when confronted with startling or extraordinary situations, expressed his emotional reactions by numerous physical gestures, and these tended to be repeated

whenever these situations recurred and so became by repetition, and association, a formal technique to avert danger or to satisfy some urgent need. Both Marret and King’s explanations apparently agree so far as man’s psycho-physical reactions to the unusual and unexpected are concerned, but King’s explanation does not refer at all to the collective aspect of magical rites. M.M. Herbert and Mauss argued that magic, like religion, was the expression of a collective consciousness, mass emotions which tended to endow physical acts with powers believed as capable of satisfying collective needs.

If simplicity is a characteristic of primitive thought, it seems probable that magic preceded animism in the development of religion. Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), while accepting this argument, stresses that the concept of a soul is older than magic because it arises directly out of two of the most striking of all human experiences, the phenomena of death and dream. “The order of development seems to be in the successive process: the concept of soul, the concept of mana, the practice of magic and the use of animatism followed by animism”\(^2\). Though this sequence is disputed by those who hold animism as having preceded magic, yet whatever be the order, it is clear that magical practices played an important role in the earliest stages of religion and continue to do so even now among civilized societies.

**Totemism and Fetishism**

Totemism is a widely distributed practice in Australia, West Africa, Polynesia and India. Among people probably belonging to Dravidian origin, it is a long established form of religion. Both as concept and as practice, it is well exemplified in the tribal customs of North America and Australian peoples. In them, societies consist of groups united by kinship, real or imaginary, each clan being distinguished from other clans by the name and worship of some species of animal or the plant, the totem.

The totem was not only thought as directly related to the

clan and its well-being, but was the subject of religious emotion as well as protecting taboo. It is the visible embodiment of the unity of the society and its life, and is treated as sacred.

If it is an animal, it may not be killed or eaten except on solemn and sacramental occasions. It is also venerated as a divine ancestor who in remote past brought the group or clan into existence. In totem various taboos and practice of exogamy occur, which in themselves are not necessarily religious, thereby showing that totem in some cases is a social custom rather than a religion. It has magical significance for the primitive man and is supposed to serve as a means of increasing food supply of the tribe. Its religious importance lies in the social motives behind it. Animism and spiritism are individualistic in their origin, as they are developed out of the experiences of individuals, but the implication of the totem is the full unity of the group, kinship of blood and life, of which it is the visible token and guarantee. The religious significance of the totem implies the social importance of religion. Although not a universal stage of religious development, it fosters, where it flourishes the growth of higher religious ideas.

Totemism represents a definite stage in social and cultural evolution. It does not only exist among the Australian aboriginals to whom its history has been traced, but clear evidences of it can be found in the pre-dynastic civilization of Neolithic Egypt and probably indications of it occur in the so-called Azilian period between the Upper Paleolithic and Neolithic of Western Europe.¹

Ancestor worship and totemism have sometimes been taken to be outgrowths of spirit worship. Galloway points out that totemism is a phenomena which is allied in its religious aspect to ancestor worship.²

The main value of the totem, as already indicated lies in its being the symbol of the unity and kinship of the clan. However, some anthropologists claim that the survival value

of totemism is due to the fact it tended to preserve food supply.

Spencer and Gillen suggest that totemism arose as an explanation of the conception of child birth, the totem power being thought of as that which fertilizes the female body. Andrew Lang (1844-1912), associated its origin with mana-like qualities of the tribal name; while Emile Durkheim considered totemism to be the indication of an impersonal force as resident in some totemic cult object. Robertson Smith in his “Religion of the Semites, 1898”, has suggested that totemism was the starting point of all religions. On the basis of this view, F.B. Jevons traces the development of monotheism and says that each tribe had its own totemic deity, then it was a believer in a sort of tribal monotheism.

In sharp contrast to totemism, may be mentioned another related phenomenon, the Fetishism. This term was used for the first time in 1760 by a German linguist De Brosses (1709-1777). While totemism depends upon the adoption of some living or non-living object by a tribe and investing it with superstitious respect as an outward symbol of an intimate unseen relation with itself, fetishism is neither adopted in such a way, nor regarded intimately connected with tribe. A fetish may be a stock or stone, a clan or even detached bit of human body, in which mysterious powers are believed to exist due to the presence of a spirit inside. Thus in the background of Fetishism lies a more or less conspicuous spiritism since fetish worship is apparently an attempt on man’s part to control the inherent spirit for his own purposes. It is indiscriminately mixed up with magic implying the influence of the magical element on occurrences. In the context of religion, it denotes a diversification of an existing religion on wrong lines. Galloway points out that it is a degeneration of religion rather than its development because in it man does not recognise that he must remain dependent on higher powers, but seeks to compel them to subserve his wishes. Consequently, when the cult of the fetish starts to play a dominant part, the power of a religion to evolve spiritual ideas fades and dies. Totemism has been regarded as an early source of the genesis of religion, while fetishism is an outcome and
expression of a fully articulated spiriting and it is in no way the
lowest, although the most antiquated form of religion as has
been pointed out by some anthropologists of religious studies.

Nature Worship

Frazer in his "Worship of Nature (1926)" maintains that
a considerable part of religion in its earliest stage was based
upon a personification of Nature. Later according to Max
Müller a mythology related to it came into being because of
primitive language. Although the primitive man had indivi-
dual names for individual objects, but in many cases he had
no general class names for objects of the same species. The
name, therefore, tended to get confused, and with the personi-
fication of Mana, this confusion eventually led to several gods
into one and one god into many. Max Müller has connected
this process with a threefold classification of cult objects:
(i) things that can be grasped by the hands, i.e., Petiches; (ii)
things that can be partially grasped but are too large to be
lifted, such as large natural objects, i.e., Nature Gods; (iii)
things that cannot be grasped at all, i.e., sky, sun, stars, which
became the greater Gods in whom alone stands the Infinite.

This conception of an all-presiding power emerged from
man's consciousness of a power within himself exceeding that
of ordinary waking consciousness, and which Max Müller
argued man produced "a psychological religion". This
interpretation has been regarded as the best comment upon the
place occupied by Nature worship in the development of
religion. The mind of man generally dwells in acquiescence
with the sense-phenomena, but by an irresistible impulse
it is driven to seek something beyond, which it assumes
to be more real and abiding than the shifting phantasmagoria
of the perceptible world.

Sometimes other developments, Ancestor worship and
Astral religion are advanced as explanations of the origin of
religion. Both are relevant, but former plays only a limited
part in religions of some primitive societies; while the latter
represents a somewhat later stage of religious belief1.

Since the primitive man has an urge to seek practical ends—sufficiency of food, welfare, increasing of the tribe, and control over the mischances to which he was exposed, he naturally turned to magic, and associated the crises of life and death with rituals that acquired a quasi-mystical significance. Thus as fancy played in a region specially suited to its exercise, animism came into existence. This led to an emotionally valuable belief that the dead hero was not wholly lost, but that this spirit lived on. A vague belief in some sort of human survival after death seems to have arisen early in man's mental development. The fact that primitive man sought non-physical means to satisfy his basic needs, implies a belief in the existence of spiritual agencies. Psychologically, man is not always on the same plane of consciousness. In sleep he becomes aware of another life apparently independent of his physical and actual activities. The primitive man being ignorant of his psychological nature might have developed beliefs in the existence of soul or psyche not only from dreams but from such practical considerations as the distinction between a body that breathes and a body that does not. Man's religious consciousness was extended by his awareness of an empathy between the interior forces of his own life and the things of the external world, which were endowed with the forces or souls thought of as personified beings, thus providing the first assembly of gods. Thus arose a sense of the Infinite, and later on, some of Supreme Power ruling over other powers. The primitive monotheism arose when the worship of All-Father of the tribe became a centre of its religion.

There seems to be no necessary connection between primitive religion and moral progress. In fact, religion and morality of a tribe alike were parts of its tradition. Primitive morality was but a system of rules of conduct found by experience to be of value, or at any rate not injurious to the welfare of the tribe. Barnes says, "in them room had to be made for the animal appetites of individuals, and also for occasional licence as a relief from labour and its monotony. So even when religions were no longer rudimentary, gods were jealously

tribal and gross orgies were countenanced by religious teachers. To-day in South India and elsewhere many religious practices mostly debased still exist, and when so-called civilized nations go to war they entreat their God, as though He were a tribal deity to avenge Himself on their enemies. The immoralities and hatreds and hostilities which enter into primitive religion have not been entirely rooted out from the more advanced peoples of the world; they lie dormant and are still dangerous.¹

**Mana**

In the religious practices both of the natives of the Central Australia and the Toda, the utilization of an implicit impersonal agency or force is evident. In Melanesia, this idea of impersonal power has been developed further and has received the name Mana. In certain Melanesian islands the social organisation is no longer totemistic, but totemism is still perceptible². The notion of Mana is equivalent to Wakan supposed to be the superio-most god in American tribes of the great family of Sioux and the Orenda of Asoquois and held by the savages as an inherent mysterious power in all objects of his environment, rocks, water, plants, animals, winds, clouds, etc. According to Bishop Codrington, "the Melanesian mind is entirely possessed of the belief in a supernatural power of influence, called almost universally Mana. This is what works to affecting everything which is beyond the ordinary power of men outside the common processes of Nature. It is present in the atmosphere of life, attaches itself to persons and to things and is manifested in results which can only be ascribed to its operation. Though this power in itself is impersonal, it is always connected with some person who directs it, all spirits have it. Thus all conspicuous success is a proof that a man has Mana; his influence depends on the impression made on the mind of people that

he has it; he becomes chief by virtue of it. The success of an individual is believed to be due to the presence of Mana of some spirit or deceased person in him. A man of power and influence is successful because of Mana. Bishop Codrington says, "It is a power or influence not physical and in a way supernatural, but it shows itself in physical force or in any kind of power or excellence which a man possesses". All Melanesian religion consists, in fact, in getting this Mana for one's self or getting it used for one's benefit.

Similar conceptions are found in other primitive religions belonging to the same plane of development. The Pygmies in Africa have a similar notion of Oudah. Among North American Indian tribes there are words having a similar import. The Algonkin term similar to this is Manitou. If man is brave, he possesses much Manitou. The concept of Mana has been regarded as important in the origin of religion, and according to Bishop Codrington it is common to the whole Pacific. Since Mana played a prominent part in the early forms of religion, there has been much debate as to whether Mana preceded animism and had connexion with magic.

Pringle-Pattison says that, "the history of religion may be treated as a continuous development from the vague Mana beliefs of primitive savagery. Progress will consist in the attainment of clearer and worthier conceptions of the nature of powers with which we have to do". M.M. Hubbert and Mauss advancing similar views in their "Melanges d'Histoire des Religion (1909)", identified the sacred Mana as the most elementary of all religious forms known to us. Although some conceptions resembling Mana is fundamental to every form of religion, it is not easy to determine how man came to believe such a superpower, primitive man seems to have conceived of every thing within his environment as being centre of certain forces. His earliest belief was that every object is actuated by life that is of the same kind as our own, which Marett has called

Animatism. Carveth Read suggests that it is but a step to the concept of Mana.\(^1\)

While discussing Robert Muyer's theory of conservation of energy, C.G. Jung explains how such an idea thrust itself into consciousness with such elemental force. He says that the idea of energy was a "primordial image" that emerged from the collective unconsciousness, and argues that some such concept as "primitive energetics" underlies religion in all parts of the world. It is the universal magical power which is behind all the dynamistic religion which Tylor and Frazer mistakenly interpreted as animism.\(^2\) Jung says that the power concept of Mana was not thought of in terms of souls or spirits, and adds that "primitive man does not analyse and does not work out why another is superior to him. If another is cleverer or stronger than he, then he has Mana. He is possessed of a stronger power. Historically this Mana-personality evolves into the hero and the godlike being whose early form is the priest.\(^3\) Discussing the primitive conception of 'Libido', Jung argues that "Mana is not something that refers to things that call forth reverent wonder, respect or love, but rather to what is effective, powerful and creative". The primitive conception of Mana, according to him seems, therefore, to be an initial stage of our general conception of psychic energy; this energy at the personification stage is seen as animism and so is an important prior condition of the God-idea, and perhaps the most primitive of all such concepts.

It is evident from the preceding discussions that some of the early interpreters, since the Enlightenment Age, have attempted to trace the basic philosophical features of religion in rituals and practices of the primitive races and to demonstrate its progressive development through various stages to modern times. Among these investigators Tylor stressed the fact that disastrous natural phenomena were

attributed by the primitives to personified powers (Spirits) and this assumption led to early rituals of worship and supplication as well as to various myths. Although these primitive beliefs, myths and rituals appear, rather ridiculous at present, Tylor pointed out that they were quite logical and adequate to the early humans who believed in them. Tylor in his works adopted Auguste Comte's scheme of evolution and traced the development of religion through three stages—savage, barbarism and civilization. During the first stage, the primitive belief in spirit dominated society, nature and ethics and the ethical notions arose as a result of animism. In the succeeding stages posited deities were supposed to control a number of phenomena, thereby giving rise to polytheism. It was only in the final stage of religious evolution that monotheism evolved.

Tylor holds that some of the childest beliefs still survive fossilized in superstitions.

While Tylor emphasized animism as an early factor in the rise of religion, Frazer thought before mankind developed religion, there was an era in which the early man attempted to control nature through magical means. By magic, he meant a pseudo-science based on the primitive man's childish and crude observations of natural phenomena. From this sprung up imitative magical rites and spells. During the course of ages, however, doubts arose about the efficacy of magic and the era of magic gradually has given way to religion and mankind started to believe in great superhuman magicians, who became the first deities worshipped by man.

From such a religion man progressed to an era of science in which, however, outmoded beliefs and practices still persist. In addition to this standpoint, Frazer popularized the involvement of totemism and taboos in the origin of religion and the significance of gods and goddesses that die and rise. He drew attention to the function of an animal deity apparently representing a certain clan or tribe. This, according to Frazer, is a sociological aspect of religion, taboos indicating certain traditional prohibitions which are seemingly universal among religions.

Unlike Frazer, Malinowski believed that magic is directed
to a specific function—the affirmation of human power, while religion possesses a broader social impact based on faith in some power beyond man.

Andrew Lang followed on the whole, the evolutionary and rationalistic theories of Tylor and Frazer, but rejected the animistic origin of religion. According to him, the primitive man faced with the problem as to who is the creator of him and the good thing in the world, inferred in contemplative mood the presence of a monotheistic magnified non-natural man, a god who is the Father of all things concerned about the ethics of his children. This belief gave rise to rituals of worship in awe and obedience. According to Lang, myths were not rational at their inception, but rather the product of a fanciful, crude and erotic imagination. On the basis of Judeo-Christian traditions, Lang concluded that there was a fall from rationalistic morality of religion to irrational and unethical mythology. From animism, he traced through polytheism the contemporary monotheism, which he regarded as purification of spirit beliefs wedded to a return to the original monotheism.

Wilhelm-Schmidt confirmed the data on early beliefs in super-creator being (Urmonotheism) among the primitive people but considered them to be the result of man’s search for a cause of the world. According to him this early monotheism integrated the social, economic, rational and emotional desires of mankind, but did not believe in a strictly evolutionary approach to religion. In this connexion, he stressed on the frequent degeneration from primitive monotheism and showed that culture move as whole retaining their structure and beliefs throughout their migration.

Broadly speaking, it is evident from the foregoing resume that the earliest origin of religion has been interpreted in four main manners: from animism (Tylor), from magic, totemism and taboos (Frazer), from a Supra-natural, personified creator, inferred as the prime cause of man, world and nature (Schmidt) and from an inherent impersonal super-power, Mana, vitalizing animate and inanimate object (Codrington). Although we may concede the validity of all such theories to a considerable extent, it must be pointed out to their detriment
that all of them suffer from implied assumption that all religions arose in the same manner. The greater likelihood, however, is that there may have been a diversity of early origins of religion in view of the diversity and isolation of primitive peoples and their environment in the prehistoric times.

The Historical Approach

Max Muller holds that "it is not political or military or economic history, but the history of religion that best reveals the deep rooted forces that shape the course of human events". Wach in the same vein says, "the real history of man is the history of religion, the wonderful way by which the different families of the human race advanced towards a truer knowledge and deeper love of God; it is the light, the soul and life of history, and without it all history would, indeed, be profane". Such view, Radhakrishnan also holds, although expressed in different way: "Religion is a movement, a growth, and in all true growth the new rests on the old. Every religion has in it survivals from the old".

According to Radhakrishnan, the main historical religions happen to be seven or eight. Out of them the Semitic races are responsible for three—the Jewish, the Christian and the Mohammedan, while the Aryan races developed Hinduism with its several offshoots of Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism. These, together with the systems of Confucius and Lao-tze, constitute the living faiths of mankind. Religions, however, have appeared and disappeared and from time to time they have influenced each other. Consequently, there are similarities in the world religions despite basic differences. Max Muller points out that no religion has ever stuck and lived, unless it found a congenial soil from which to draw its strength and support. By and large two types of theories have been advanced about the growth and development of religion: The Degeneration theory, which was prevalent in

Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the Evolutionary theory, which dominated the late nineteenth century and the early years of the present century.

The Degeneration theory crystallised when explorers brought back to Europe from America, Africa and East stories of the strange religious practices and beliefs found in those regions. The European thinkers tried to understand them within the general framework in which all social facts and ideas were being interpreted at that time. The crucial point in this framework was the belief of many religionists in an early 'Golden Age' of history, antedating the striking social, political and economic corruptions which they were eager to remove.

This belief emerged in two forms: one held by devout Christians, who believed in toto the story given in Genesis about Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden before they fell into sin; the other by romantic naturalistics, who visualized primitive people as living in innocence and simplicity not yet sullied by the evil of civilization. Since such ideas were accepted uncritically, it was but natural that contemporary thinkers and religionists elucidated the historical data of religion in either of these two ways.

Orthodox Catholics and Protestants tried to explain the history of religion in conformity with the Biblical views. To them it seemed self-evident the original religion of mankind as practised by Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden and was pure and true monotheism, uncontaminated by any error. As a result of the sin committed by Adam and Eve, their descendents fell into moral degeneration, whence man lost his high ethical conception of God and began to entertain a crude polytheism¹. Thus the loss of animistic powers led man to gratify his selfish aims through magic and sacrificial offerings. This tendency of degeneration continued to display itself through the later history of religion except for those regions which were under the influence of the Hebrew prophets. Christ was specially sent by God to combat this fatal trend towards idolatory and corruption. Christianity, therefore, is believed

to be a re-establishment through God’s grace of the early religion of Eden, when Adam and Eve lived in intimate filial relation with God. The other religion exemplify barbarism and pernicious crudities into which the pure faith degenerated among those peoples to whom God did not send accredited messengers. Among these are found the so-called primitive religions.

The other form of degeneration theory was adopted by many deists and by those whom they influenced. They believed that the religion, which prevailed originally among mankind was a religion of Nature—a simple and rational set of beliefs about God, moral obligations and human destiny. It, however, became corrupted largely through the machinations of clever priests who found in people’s susceptibility to superstition an opportunity to expand their authority and power. They claimed that they had access to the kingdom of God and were special agents through whom God could be influenced.

But both these two forms of degeneration theory suffered in credibility as the attitudes of modern science got entrenched. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, historical and comparative data about religion accumulated with increasing rapidity due to which the story of the Garden of Eden and the supposed primitive Golden Age were found far from truth. The assumptions underlying the ‘degeneration theory’, were seen as opposed to the rational, scientific and evolutionary standpoints as well as to the contemporary climate of anthropological discoveries so that the naturalistic historians totally discarded these assumptions.

The orthodox Christians, however, still adhere to the degeneration theory of religion. Burtt, for example, says that there are some well attested facts about primitive religion which if selected and emphasized, give plausibility to this theory. According to him, such cults as the “High Good” one, indicate that the people practising them had a more civilized form of Theism, which later became corrupted by the infiltration of magical practices. Andrew Lang, Wilhelm Schmidt and others have interpreted the entire

history of religion from such a point of view.

As the ‘degeneration theory’ declined in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, an overwhelming majority of serious thinkers took to the evolutionary theory, which was based on a diametrically opposite concept. The former held that the main cause for the significant changes evident in the history of religion is man’s tendency to degenerate, to fall away from the purer religious ideas of the past into cruder and more barbarous ones. The evolutionary theory, on the other hand, assumes that underlying these changes is the tendency to graduate from less adequate religious notations to more enlightened ones. In the late eighteenth century this assumption marked the faith, characteristic of the Enlightenment Age, that man gradually progresses through centuries from ignorance to rationality—a faith specially applied to the historical panorama of religion by the French optimist Condorcit and the German idealists Lessing and Harder. In the early nineteenth century, Hegel and his followers supplied a systematic philosophical framework to this belief in religious evolution.

Some thinkers hold that the concepts—evolution and religion are incompatible with each other, but religion far from being antithetical to the theory of evolution, offers one of the best proofs of it. Oliver L. Reiser believes that the lines of development followed by religion in the course of its evolution can be represented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sociological Forms</th>
<th>Simple Tribalism</th>
<th>Complex Tribalism</th>
<th>Nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Form</td>
<td>Animism</td>
<td>Henotheism</td>
<td>Polytheism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Universal Society</td>
<td>Planatory Democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monotheis</td>
<td>Pantheism (Cosmic Humanism)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The monotheistic religions, which represent more advanced stages in the evolution of religion, appeared later in the history of mankind. Monotheism is both a cause and an effect of the processes of social integration, an integration that is related to the economic, political and sociological forces at work; but it usually did not arise suddenly. The
transition from a loosely formed polytheistic tribalism to the more inclusive nationalism has been generally provided by henotheism, the form of religio-sociological development in which there are several deities, some worshipped by one tribe and the others by other tribes, but in addition to them, there is one supreme deity to be worshipped by all. Later on, when the supreme deity becomes the only one to be worshipped, monotheism arises.

There has been considerable debate as to which of the religions was the first to evolve monotheism. Some claim that Judaism in which only one God Jehovah is worshipped had the earliest monotheism. But James H. Breasted in his famous work—"The Dawn of Conscience"—traces that the first clear monotheism was in the religion taught by the Egyptian Pharaoh Akhnaton, who for a while succeeded in replacing the polytheism of the earlier Egyptian religion with monotheism. Orthodox Jews claim that their monotheism dates back to Abraham, a thousand years earlier. Nonetheless, it is certain that several other religions with a long cultural history made the transition from polytheism to monotheism.

Max Muller, for example, discovered that, "the earliest form of religion among the Vedic Indians can neither be monotheism nor polytheism, but only henotheism, that is, a belief and worship of those single objects, whether semi-tangible or intangible, in which man first suspected the presence of the Invisible and Infinite". This phase of religious thought can well be studied in the Vedas only. Max Muller concludes, "Vedic religion is also based on evolutionary process and reveals facts based on historical development as regards the final establishment of ancient Hindu religion. This is sufficiently evident from the collection of the Sacred Hymns and the Samhitas. There is an historical, or as it is now called an evolutionary succession to be observed in all hymns of Vedas, and that is far more important and far more instructive than any other chronological succession". De Brosses held that all nations had to begin

2. Ibid., p. 347.
with Fetishism, to be followed, afterwards, by polytheism and monotheism, there being only one exception—the Jews, the chosen people of God, who were never Fetish worshippers, while other nations first received a primeval divine revelation, then forgot it and then began again from the beginning, viz., with Fetishism. Max Muller, however, refutes this remark of De Brosses about the Jews and holds that there are traces of Fetishism in the old Testament. He further adds that while in the earliest accessible documents of religious thought we look in vain for any very clear traces of Fetishism, they become more and more frequent everywhere in the later stages of religious development, and are certainly more visible in the later corruptions of the Indian religion beginning with the Atharva-Veda than in the earliest hymns of the Riga-Veda.

From these facts, it might be inferred that religion has evolved and developed from a lower stage to the higher form. Burtt, however, is not inclined to support the evolutionary theory of religious growth, and points out that the difficulties that beset the 'degeneration theory', apply also to the revolutionary assumptions. Not only is there a difficulty in determining an objective and verifiable basis of the initial form of religion and how it arose, but this view lacks direct evidence. The earliest people, about whom anything is known, are found to be already practising some sort of cult that implies certain religious concepts and beliefs.

Many theories have been propounded, but none of them is decisively conclusive, as at different times and places different people showed religious attitudes in different ways and there is no single form of religion which can be definitely established as the prototype of religions everywhere. Herbert Spencer holds that ancestral worship was the earliest form of religion. Tylor felt that animism provided its core. Durkheim McLennan and others held that all other phases of religion grew out of totemism. Marett and Preuss thought that the idea of imper-

2. Ibid., p. 62.
3. Ibid., p. 62.
sonal Mana was the root of the more highly evolved religious form. Max Muller, Tiele and Reville inferred that divine powers located in the striking objects and processes of physical nature were the earliest beings worshipped and was the matrix of all the later religions. Crawley and Van Gennep thought that the mysterious forces which appear during the times of biological crises constituted the original divinities. Frazer, as already stated, regarded magic as the forerunner of religion, the latter replacing it in course of time when primitive thinkers became sophisticated enough to realise that the magic did not produce the desired results.

An imposing array of facts was marshalled in support of each of these theories, and similarly an imposing array of facts was advanced against each of them. Naturally, when different thinkers disagreed as to the original form in which religion began, they differed also more or less radically on the sequence of stages through which it advanced from that prototype to the highest form. But in all of them, the inherent difficulty lies in assuming that the process of evolution is aimed at a definite final goal, while no one can be certain what that final goal was. Since most of the investigators happen to be Christians, they naturally identified the final stage of religious evolution with the Christian ideology. It was, however, a serious embarrassment to them that Christianity, even though it has several hundred million adherents all over the world, arose six centuries later than Christ. Moreover, the founder-prophet of Islam, Mohammed was acquainted with Christianity and thought Jesus as one of the greatest of the prophets preceding him and relegated Christianity along with Judaism to a status of historical precursor of the religion founded by him. Islam largely displaced Christianity in North Africa, South-Eastern Europe and the Near East and subsequently never lost any substantial part of these geographical gains.

In terms of evolutionary theory these facts pose a puzzling situation for Christian thinkers. Due to this, many Christian revolutionists in the history of religion had to reverse the actual temporal order at this point and to replace Christianity above Islam in the development scale.

While during the early decades of the twentieth century,
such difficulties were embarassing the conscientious religionists, researches in anthropology were piling up relevant data on religion and developing the rudiments of a more adequate method than the evolutionary theory provided. The most remarkable feature discarded by the anthropological approach was that a human belief or custom may appear to be superficially the same or closely similar at different times, places and environment, but its significance to the people who accept and practise it may be quite different. Whether it is a totemic clan, or a society exemplifying some sort of polytheism or culture with strong ancestor worship, the significance of religious belief might be different if there are differences in the pattern of rites accompanying them. So in order to understand their significance correctly and completely one has to penetrate beneath the superficial likeness and differences and unearth the distinctive role they play in the whole setting of the society in which they occur. From this point of view the evolutionary theorists cannot be said to have interpreted the actual facts of religious development adequately. Consequently, there arose a new theory which might be called the "Specific Culture Theory" to explain the religious phenomena along with other social ones.

The specific culture theory differs from the previous two theories—the Degeneration theory and the Evolutionary theory—in an important respect. It sets out to show the futility of trying to set up a general historical scheme into which all the significant facts could be fitted. It aims to study each social group on its own terms, i.e., in the context of the continuous process of its adjustment to the major conditions under which it lives. According to it, therefore, the basic task is to analyse the life of the group in its own cultural setting and to bring out the meaning of each of its beliefs and practices, religious or otherwise in their relation to the whole complex which is unique in its own way. To achieve this objective, the investigators have scrupulously tried to avoid in their study of one human culture, the interpretations and expectations gained from that of another. The underlying idea of this method is that every cultural group has its own characteristic orientation—its own 'pattern' to use a new
popular term so that each of its practices becomes intelligible only when its role in this total pattern of living is grasped. Naturally this trend of thought has developed its own set of basic concepts for analysing and ordering the facts with which the study of religion deals—such as "culture focus", "integration", "function", "theme", "style", "pattern" and so on. These concepts reflect the essential differences of this theory which employs radically divergent categories of interpretations and explanations. Contemporary workers on cultural history, however, differ considerably among themselves, particularly in the mode in which they apply this idea.

In so far as religion is concerned, this approach has proved to be extremely fertile. It has freed the investigators from the hampering limitations of previous assumptions, and encouraged them to ascertain afresh what sort of thing religion must mean to the various peoples practising it in their own characteristic way. Prior to the appearance of this approach, few religionists had transcended the subtle control of the engrained presuppositions of Christian culture with respect to what religion is true or false, good or bad. Among other things, it became possible to understand the real significance of such otherwise puzzling phenomena as the Bacchian form of religion which attributes sacredness to intoxicating drinks and encourages their consumption for religious purposes and phallic cults.

While the contribution of the "Specific Culture" theory to the methodology of religious study must be conceded unreservedly, this unfortunately shelves the crucial question confronting the students of this discipline: How can we interpret and understand the inter-relationships and successive development of the manifold primitive cults not only of the present times, but during the course of ages, starting from the Dawn of Human evolution? Every civilized society has developed out of an earlier state exhibiting many of the characteristic features of primitive culture, and every civilized religion has apparently emerged from the preceding ones by stages. One would naturally ask how and why this transition took place, and how can it be explained in reference to the well established facts available about human history.
This brings us to a crucial conflict, sometimes explicit, but mostly implied between two drastically different attitudes in the modern study of religion: one claiming that the history of religion cannot be understood adequately if the intervention of revelation is discarded, and the other fighting shy of such roles because they are non-scientific.

As a representative of the former attitude, we might quote Burtt, who says, "If God is real, the long and tortuous course of man's search for the divine is also a process of the divine self-revelation to man." According to him, the reality of divine is a far richer reality and the truth about it is a far more inclusive truth than would be the case if man's religious experiences were limited to some single sectarian view.

Against such a stand-point, however, it must be mentioned that it would be very difficult and unconvincing, if not almost impossible, to explain the entire historical development of religion without unjustifiably bringing in and relying on numerous far-fetched, unproven assumptions in its detailed vicissitudes as the process of God's revelation to man.

Consequently, the only alternative left to us, is to accept the humanistic mode of investigation in this study. Without denying that religious ideas under investigation are a gradual revelation of a Super-Power or God to man, our aim is to understand how man's idea in this connexion developed. Whether they are God's disclosure to man or not, they are obviously man's concepts about God and have to be examined as such. It is consequently illuminating in many ways to pursue the significance of the relationship between man's ideas of God and his feelings on other matters—under changing circumstances of life.

The major forces shedding light on the history of religion as an integral part of human history are the pervasive needs and urges by which men at any time are dominated. So none of the major changes that have taken place in man's political, economic, artistic, literary, educational or religious life can also be understood adequately unless they are seen in relation to the growing needs and ruling interests which induced them.

When we start with this point of view, it is evident that
our humanistic explanation of religious history should not limit itself to some single basic religious need or instinct. Sometimes in the past, the psychologists propounded tests of original instincts in terms of which the recurrent features of human behaviour might be interpreted, and many historians of religion scrutinised these tests to locate a distinctive religious instinct to account for this side of human life. These efforts, however, proved of little avail.

Even if the idea of instinct may be of some value in the study of religion, it is vital to explain not only why man is religious, but also why the outstanding changes over many parts of the world, from primitive to civilized religions have taken place in the way in which this religiousness was expressed. Such changes obviously cannot be explained by appealing to a factor which has remained constant through all the transitions.

These handicaps, however, not only apply to the instinct theory but to all other attempts to account for religious phenomena in terms of any single major cause. According to Marxism, for example, it is held that religious institutions and their modes of operation can also be explained in the same manner as all social phenomena, i.e. by reference to man's innate demands for economic security and economic power. There is overwhelming evidence to support the claim that the most striking features of primitive religion can be explained in this way, if stress is laid on security rather than power, and if the accompanying ideas of primitive people about the causal agents in nature are recognised in the special role they fill.

The urge for security, however, cannot adequately explain the phenomena of civilized religion, although it may be justifiable in primitive religion. Burtt holds that there are fundamental differences in the two cases and that the true genius of civilized religion in its more developed form is likely to be completely missed if these differences are not taken into account. He adds that so far as Marx is concerned, a mere glance at the living civilized religion suffices to show that their guiding spirits were least motivated by concern for economic security. They are readier than any other group of persons to
subordinate such ambitions to the pursuit of other values that they envision and this motive must be strong in their followers, since idealization of and identification with the attitudes of the founder is a significant factor in the practices, sentiments, and doctrinal belief systems of great civilized religions. This means that in the development and growth of religion, inherent genius also plays an important role in changing the course of its history.

The two paramount human needs are reflected in the vast panorama of human life during the course of its history; the need to master the sub-human forces of nature in order to survive; and after this is satisfied more or less adequately, the need for the various tribes or other human groups to adjust to one another satisfactorily so as to ensure co-existence. Until about four thousand years ago, the first need was particularly dominant to secure congenial conditions in the face of adverse natural forces surrounding them. Many cultures perished in the struggle and many others that had survived succumbed later to some destructive forces. This is still the pervasive need, the urgent problem for most of the contemporary groups including the primitive ones. Although they have sometimes managed to survive the danger of the past by establishing cultural habits enabling them to co-exist from generation to generation, yet the need is still there. However, beginning about four millennia ago, some societies in solving this need with sufficient assurance to dispel the pervasive anxiety associated with it. Consequently, for them the second need has become more dominant. Each of these groups has still to learn how to live successfully and happily with other groups of men and women on the surface of the earth. The same factor which made possible a solution of the first need thrust people into an increasingly complex interaction with and interdependence on each other. This has led to conflicts among social groups as well as between one political unit and others on such a scale and intensity as was previously unknown. During the last century, civilization has penetrated so widely and insistently that even primitive groups have lost their isolation considerably and are being swept willy-nilly into the network of this all pervasive interdependence. The state of
primitive adjustment to nature no longer exists due to the more pressing requirement of adaptation under conditions of interaction and interdependence.

During the long ages preceding the emergence of civilized life, the religious ideas and practices of mankind reflected the dominance of the first of these two needs. When with the impact of the art of civilization, man was liberated over large areas of the earth from pre-occupation with the first need, religion became radically transformed to a fair extent indicating the dominance by the second need and the concern it essentially involves. Herein might lie the basic key to the understanding of the living civilized religions.

It is not fairly easy to fix a definite date marking the first clear emergence of civilization. Though archaeologists and historians disagree, it appears that this crucial transition took place somewhere around 2000 B.C. If civilized life is taken as having emerged before that time in Egypt, China, India, Mesopotamia or elsewhere, this dividing line ought to be dated earlier. By the beginning of the first millennium B.C., several such civilized cultures were already existent, and they were "gradually absorbing the primitive groups. But there seems to be a continuity from that time to the present in the transmission of the acquired art of civilization and the evolution into new forms of culture.

The primitive religion naturally was concerned primarily with the elemental physical need of man at that time under the recurring threat of drought, flood, storms, famine, epidemics, wild animals, or sudden attacks by other groups of men. They built simplest structures for protection against weather; for their food they took to berry picking, grubbing for roots, hunting for animals, herd raising and crude forms of agriculture. On the other hand, social problems occupy the centre of the stage under the conditions of civilized life, taking from primitive man relatively simpler forms. As there were small groups of societies, living separately most of the time, the problems caused by interaction and interdependence between societies became challenging only occasionally. Problems arising with the groups were settled on the basis of tribal customs. The major specializations of functions were those
due to sex and age, class distinctions giving rise to special privileges and special forms of authority rarely led to any tense and dividing class consciousness which is a source of hostile conflicts in civilized society. Ordinarily, there was little contact between one primitive group and the others despite their living even a few miles apart. There was usually no attempt to conquer neighbouring tribes or reduce them to a permanent state of submission. Thus, primitive man’s orientation towards the powers of Nature is determined mainly by his emotional associations rather than by knowledge of her laws. Because of this, his struggles to ensure physical well-being had an uncertain outcome and were time-consuming. The quest for power and authority on the part of even a clever and enterprising individual had its limitations. It was through magic rites and incantations or humble and hopeful supplication that primitive man sought to meet or placate the unseen forces. His divinities were these mysterious powers refracted through his emotional concerns and belief inevitably shaped under the stress while he remained ignorant of the natural laws that the civilized man succeeded in discovering. Nor were the other attitudes, which come to the fore and undergo significant development in civilized religion, wanting in his consciousness but they were largely subordinated to the feeling continually evoked by this consuming endeavour so that they had no change to evolve or to make more than a feeble and sporadic contribution to the primitive religion.

It is worth mentioning that there are certain primitive societies, blessed by nature, or favoured by accidental good fortune. In them no such anxious preoccupation with the continued struggles for existence is evident and religion has taken forms reflecting this fortunate situation. These societies, however, have developed the typical features of civilized religion, and viewed in a broad historical perspective, seem to throw little light on the main forces shaping the evolution of religion. The reason for such a state of affairs apparently lies in their continued isolation of living and in the absence or paucity of interaction and interdependence with other human societies.

Civilized society in general and civilized religion in part-
cular began to emerge in their distinctive features when the rudiments of the so-called scientific technology had been mastered. In the societies achieving this result, the fears of the natural forces which vitally affected man’s life conditions, were reduced, except in times of crisis. A confident feeling arose as man came to know how to ensure a regular supply of the resources on which his continued existence depended. This resulted in a saving of time and effort so that other concerns could come to the fore, and awareness of nature as the scene of verifiable laws resulted, may be more or less gropingly at first, but later distinctly.

One might expect that with this transformation taking place in the minds of the people and the leaders in civilized society, religion would tend to disappear, and there have been thinkers who assume that if it did not do so, it was only a very powerful cultural lag which kept it going. To them primitive religion is the only kind of religion that can be conceived, so that when science has done away with it, religion no longer has a place in human life. Frazer held this view. Nevertheless, religion has proved to be extremely conservative, specially in its popular forms. In all the civilized religions primitive relics still persist, and at times of unusual emotional stress they might determine the nature of the religious beliefs.

In religions of the present-day civilizations—prayers are offered for grace and some sort of Deity is regarded as the ultimate creator of the natural forces on which man’s welfare depends. This becomes more obvious in dire emergencies. Such historical lags are due not merely to the conservative momentum of established habits specially strong in religion, but also to the fact that the necessities of life and health are still extremely precarious for large groups of people—a fact reflected in their religious feelings.

As already stated, when a society emerges from its primitive state and develops the technical competence of civilization, the basic problem that confronts it is, how to live ‘co-operatively’ with each other in increasingly complicated interdependence of civilized life. Religion does not disappear; nor does it remain the same. It undergoes radical changes in order to conform to the new demands. Some of
the forces at work in the new range of human experience and expectations are obvious and dependable, while others are hidden and uncertain. His orientation to them is analogous to the orientation of primitive people to their unpredictable environment. Thus, there is a measure of continuity between the primitive and the civilized religion, despite their significant differences, justifying the use of the word ‘religion’ in both cases.

A similar view is held in the Theosophical approach to religion, because it is believed that religious genius creates religion from time to time, and that the ways of thought, moral preachings and rituals evolved, set religious patterns for the people who are induced to accept them. In Theosophical interpretation, religion has not evolved from a lower stage to higher, but it comes through some genius in whom God reveals Himself. Galloway claims that the history of religion in its broad features shows a gradual advance from the sensuous to the spiritual. According to him, in the lower stages piety is governed by material considerations, but later it is purified and elevated by ethical elements. Galloway professes to have found evidence for this process in the ancient religions of Persia, Greece, Israel, in all of which he traces how the advance in moral conceptions brought about a purification of the naturalistic elements in the earlier faith. Although, he concedes that this is not sufficiently visible everywhere, because through the development of rituals, the inner side of piety is overlaid and depressed by the practices of the cult.

It has been generally agreed that the movement towards a higher form of religion did not have its origin in a conscious and deliberate criticism of traditional beliefs, but arose out of the practical needs that accompanied a fresh advance in social organisation. It was the emergence of new wants and the rise of larger ideas through the blending of tribes in the greater social whole of the nation which led to a further development of the spiritual consciousness.

Powerful tribes established rules over the weaker ones, and the process might have precipitated revolutionary changes

in their religious beliefs and customs. Menzies points out that conservative instincts of the tribes which had been merged in a larger unity still persisted and more specially so in the sphere of religion. Thus, for instance, behind the cult of the Olympic deities in Greece, or of Amon Ra in Egypt, there was the religion of the folk, older and less developed which had its roots in tribal culture. The old local gods and spirits dear to the tribes proved inadequate to the wants of the larger and more complex society, and the national God must have a more determinate character and a more extended sphere of operation. The tribal gods who were connected with the greater phenomena of nature could best be made to meet these demands. Hence in the polytheistic systems of the national religions it is very common to find deities who were originally personifications of the greater powers of nature, such as Zeus, Jupiter, Ra and Marduk¹. Sometimes, however, a national god may originate in the cult, as Brahma, or may present a mystical ancestor or hero of a dominant clan or tribe. Some deities, again, signalise a fresh step in culture in which gods may assume a more definite character with special attributes. They became the representatives of and the protectors of particular departments of the nation’s life and of particular activities of the people. At this stage of the religious consciousness, it is imagination, not the conceptual thinking, which prevails; and imagination works fruitfully in giving form and content to the gods on the basis of their previous social order. The imaginative qualities of a race are reflected in the degree in which it gives definite outline and specific character to its departmental deities. It is specially significant when, through the development of social morality, the gods become the guardians of the moral order among men, and their old cultural character is transformed into an ethical one. The same phenomenon is still visible in India today as it has been described in William Crooke’s “The North Western Provinces of India, (1897)”, and a similar movement towards unification is also evident in what is usually called ‘Henotheism’ after Max Muller.

As an advance was made in the ethical and spiritual life, religion passed from the national to the universal stage. The more inward and personal religion becomes, the more universal is its appeal, the more insistent its demand for those moral values which know no limits of place and time. At this stage prophets and inspired teachers stepped upon the scene, proclaimed the growth of the inner life, and declared its superiority to the external rites and ceremonies. Thus the Gospel of Christ was a truly universal religion which developed on Jewish soil. Centuries before this, in India another great universal faith was ushered by Buddha who declared “My redemption is a redemption for all men”. Though Buddhism and Christianity are diverse in their ideals, yet they are one in their appeal to man as man, against all distinctions of caste and class, laying stress on the inward quality of the soul. The goal to which both religions point is for universal humanity. If we regard such a stage as the most perfect expression of the religious idea, then we might think that the three stages of religious belief broadly represented by spiritism, polytheism and monotheism correspond to tribal, national and universal religions.

Thus it is evident from the foregoing investigations that religion, far from being static, has continually evolved and developed not on account of one, or two single factors, but due to an aggregate of numerous vital conditions affecting life. Its progress has corresponded to a considerable extent to the advancement and development of mental evolution, imagination, thought, and fulfilment of mental and intellectual needs. The various phases of religion indicate that religion has been moulded and modified with the advancement and progress of human society and thought in its environment. Consequently, an adequate interpretation of religious development must involve a thorough explanation and evaluation of the psychological and social factors of religious consciousness. The question arises, as to how far the history of religion shows a development, or true progress in the idea of religion itself. In this connexion, one has to inquire what is constitutive and essential in religion and what sort of religion should be regarded as standard. In other words, we must have a clear notion of the essential
elements of religion, the involvement of which determines our evaluation and appreciation. Psychologically speaking, in all religions, there is a subject, an object and a bond of relationship between them. On the subjective side, the consciousness of this relation is piety, which appears as worship, reverence and adoration. In an individual, there is always a sense of need, a feeling of deficiency which impels him to go beyond himself. Through the fulfilment of the religious relation man gains an inner satisfaction, a harmony within himself and between him and his environment which would otherwise lie beyond his own powers and reach. A religion stands higher or lower, as it does justice to all these elements involved and brings about a rich and enduring harmony of personal life. But this inner harmony and satisfaction of the soul is formal principle only, and cannot be applied as a norm of religious evaluation. Accordingly, in our evaluation of religion, it is essential to combine both form and content and look to the spiritual and ethical character of the harmony that is realised.

If this standard is applied to the historic movement of religion, we find evidences both of growth and decline. In certain religions this process goes on, while in others it stops at a certain point, leading to stagnation and decay. The law of continuity, however, is not broken, as we can study the causes which have undermined the vitality of a faith, although the development in the true sense of the word has ceased. For instance, when animism and spiritism pass into pronounced fetishism, as among the West African Negroes, the process is that of retrogression. Here the need felt by the subject of help through the religion has sapped the sense of dependence on the divine object, and mechanical religion has degraded to be a device of its own being. It is also plain that in the history of religion one does not meet constant and continuous progress. Religions, Galloway describes, have their exuberant spring-time and their decaying autumn season. A period of great inner vitality and spiritual interest takes form in large expansive movement, when the spiritual forces seem

to fail and an epoch of stagnation follows. The time of growth once passed, a time of decay ensues and goes on more or less steadily till extinction is reached, as in the religion of ancient Rome. In harmony with this, a religion often presents different features at different periods of its history, and the earliest and the latest phases may be unlike each other. For instance, there is contrast between the modern Hinduism and the primitive nature worship of the Vedas, or between the Catholic Creed and worship of the later Middle Ages and the simple Gospel of Jesus. In these cases, it is not easy to explain the evolution of a religion by some dominating idea which existed in germinal form in the beginning.

The history of every religion is marked by a complex interaction of elements, but not all of these may be present from the outset. The influence of nations, one on another, and the development of science and philosophy at the riper stages of culture powerfully affected and modified the general religious consciousness. Nevertheless, some previous traits of the religious beliefs or practices may be still observed. This is notably the case, where in the formative period, there was little interaction with the other phases of belief. The spiritism in which Roman religion had its root was reflected to the last in the crowd of little gods who had taken place in worship of the State. The cult of the ancestors is still an outstanding and persisting note of religion in China. But this phenomenon is more evident in the case of the prophetic religions. In them the spiritual genius and the attitude towards the life of the founders, even though they might not explain the evolution, yet give abiding features to the religion. Zorathustra and Buddha, Confucius and Mohammed are examples. In general, it may be said that the power of personal element in religious history makes it possible to hold that all the factors of the higher ethical religions were contained in the lower form with which they had a link.

According to Galloway, the evolution of religion and religions is teleological, since they are an expression of pur-
pose human experience. The substantial identity of human nature is reflected in the universal needs out of which religion arises, and at each stage a religion represents the demand of
the human spirit for satisfaction. Galloway further explains that in the exercise of religion men seek to maintain such a communion with the divine that their own lives may be harmonized and completed. So the evolution of religion is teleological, because at every stage it reveals an endeavour of the spirit to work out the fulfilment of this principle. But while the formal ideal of religion remains the same throughout, the content of the ideal undergoes changes with changing life of man and his social environment, on the whole growing richer, yet sometimes becoming poorer as the result of social degeneration and decay. Religion, therefore, develops, not in obedience to some impersonal idea, but as the outcome of man's striving after an ampler self-fulfilment.

The Sociological Approach

Everywhere—in pre-literate remote villages, in highly developed commercial towns, in modern metropolis, etc., religion is woven into the fabric of social life of individuals. Beliefs, rituals, ceremonies, worship, prayers, and so on are enormously varied, but no society is free from them. Consequently, there can be no complete and fruitful study of human without the study of religion.

To begin with, it is necessary to distinguish between the sociology of religion and the sociological analysis of a particular religion, although neither of them could develop without the other. In the former attempts are made to discover general principles underlying the relationship of religion to society; in the latter one seeks to apply these principles to specific situations. The present analysis is a search for general principles in order to understand what religion is meant sociologically. The effort to develop a complete sociological analysis of numerous religions or even one of the numerous religions is beyond the scope of the present study. The question of desirability of an objective study of religion is even more controversial than the question of its possibility. The scientific study of religion will gain by a scrutiny of its role in the

2. Ibid., p. 63.
society so that a functional theory of religion may be systematically developed. This is all the more important, since as pointed out by Yinger, an accepted authority on the sociology of religion—a scientific study of religion is impossible. Religious beliefs and practices can be traced back in the history of man to tens of thousands of years ago, and the story of their origin has to be built up out of the flimsiest of archaeological, philosophical, sociological and psychological evidences supplemented with psychological and sociological assumptions. About the theorists working on the basis of these assumptions, however, Herskovists, a renowned sociologist, says that, “the contribution of these scholars, however, lies not in their having solved the social and psychological roots, but rather in different phenomena of religion, each emphasized and by doing so, imprinted indelibly on all future discussions of the subject”\textsuperscript{1}.

The early systematic studies of religion by rational and scientific investigators, were based largely on the data drawn from living preliterate societies. Although these data could scarcely support a theory of origins, since these societies had religions for thousands of years, they could not settle the problem of “how religion arose out of a life not religious at all”\textsuperscript{2}. They could as a by-product of their search for origins, throw light on the nature and variety of religious behaviour and on the functions it served.

The functional theories of the origin of religion, may be classified broadly under three main categories:

(a) The cognitive aspects of religion;
(b) Man’s emotional needs of religion; and
(c) Social interaction and Group life.

(a) The Cognitive Aspects of Religion: The theory based on the cognitive aspects of religion emphasizes the need for an explanation of mysterious and awesome events. It is basically intellectualistic, individualistic and evolutionary. Religion, according to this point of view, springs from the efforts of primitive men to explain the phenomena of dreams,

echoes, visions, and above all death. The key element of this interpretation, in Tylor’s formulation, is the concept of soul. Such a concept serves in the “savage mind” as an explanation of many puzzling, physical and mental conditions. They are the effect of the “departure of soul”. This animistic view of the world, the basic and earliest concept of religion in Tylor’s view, represents a “fairly consistent and rational primitive philosophy”. This point of view of the origin of religion is evidently founded on the primitive man’s efforts to interpret and explain the various phenomena which puzzled him, and adduces a more or less intellectual effort on his part. If we accept such a viewpoint, animism would represent a primitive effort to explain the mysterious and puzzling facts of a complicated world. It should, therefore, undergo modification and transformation as man’s knowledge about the facts of the world increases, the ultimate result being the disappearance of religion when its basic explanation has been replaced by other elements of culture, particularly by science. This obviously has not been the case. Moreover, the cognitive theory seems insufficient as a total explanation. Consequently, the failure to explore deeply-rooted emotional qualities of religion to the fullest extent makes the contribution of Herbert Spencer and Tylor an anachronism today.

The cognitive theory of religion is also inadequate, as it disregards the social and group element in religious life. According to Kingsley Davis, there is an obligatory element in religious belief which continues in modern life despite the growth of knowledge and the naturalistic causes of the events on which the concept of animism presumably rested. The origin of religion, therefore, can be accounted for only if there is an adequate theory to deal with the integrative social aspects of religion.

The assumption of unilineal evolution has proved to be equally unsatisfactory. This has been criticized both by those who shared the view held by Lang and Schmidt, that conceptions of “high gods” can be traced at very early stages in the development of religion; and by those who

1. Yinger (J. Milton); Religion, Society and Individual, 1951.
believed with Codrington, Marett and others that belief in an impersonal supernatural force (Mana) preceded the appearance of belief in spirit. These criticisms indicate an increase in attention to the emotional and to the emotional aspects of religion; but they attach far greater importance to the evolutionary approach.

A complicated problem thus arises as to whether religion in general centres about the individual or collectively. The sociological approach, according to Alfred Bertholet, may often fail to do justice to the inner experience of the individual. Attempts have been made to derive the origin of religion from clan or tribal consciousness. In accordance with such a view, the Semitic God, for instance, has been interpreted as merely the personification of tribal unity. But religion, in fact, is something more than an unilateral construction of human spirit and its origin cannot be deduced exclusively from group experience. This cleavage between individual and community is already apparent in the lower stages of culture. Primitive religion is predominantly collectivistic. The more primitive the culture, the greater the solidarity of the individual with the social group. Whereas in the modern world man is regarded as an individual, who, though bound to his kinsmen, constitutes the basic unit of existence, human personality in the primitive world is completely identified with the group. In such a world, the content of religion tends to be identical with the sensus communis.

(b) Man’s emotional need of Religion: The second major approach to the origin of religion attached great emphasis on man’s emotional needs. This view leads to a conception for functions and to a deeper interest in the sources of the continuing influence of religion in contrast to the effort at historical reconstruction.

Paul Radin explains that origin of religion on the basis of a functional theory. He raises the fundamental issue as to what led man originally to conceive the supernatural. The answer lies in visualizing the perilous conditions under which

man lived at the dawn of civilization—a helpless creature, surrounded by powerful and capricious forces of nature. He
describes the primitive man in connexion with the primeval
nature as follows:—

"Where economic security does not exist, emotional inse-
curity and its correlates, the sense of powerlessness and the
feeling of insignificance is bound to develop. It is but natural
for the psyche, under such circumstances, to take refuge in
compensation fantasies...the main goal and objective of all
his strivings was the canalization of his fears and feelings and
the validation of his compensation dreams"1.

Thus according to Radin, religion sprang primarily
from man's emotional responses to a threatening and awful
situation.

(c) Social Interaction and Group Life: The third approach
to the origin of religion differs from the individualistic
approach of the first two in emphasizing the fact that religion
is primarily an outcome of group life with all the implications
of the connexions and interactions within the particular group.
Naturally, in such theories social factors form the focus of
attention, although their ideas can be easily transposed into
functional terms without reference to historical origin at all.
George Simmel emphasizes human relations as the source
of religion and indicates that his attempt is not to trace the
historical origin, but the "psychological origin" as one of
the many sources. Emile Durkheim is important for his
speculations about the origin of religion. Simmel thinks that
one of the sources of religion is 'human relations' which
themselves are non-religious, and says, "I do not believe that
religious feelings and impulses manifest themselves in religion
only..."2. Religion abstracts and heightens from the particular
content of certain human relations—feelings of exaltation,
devotion, fervency, and the like that are found widely in social
life. Faith, for example, according to Yinger3, is first of all

2. Simmel (George): "A Contribution to the Sociology of Religion" in
_American Journal of Sociology_, 1950, p. 360.
a relation between individuals, since we do not base our relations with others on what we conclusively know about them. Simmel further adds that “the social role of this faith has never been investigated, but this much is certain that without it society would disintegrate. In faith in a deity the highest development of faith has become incorporate; so to speak, it has been relieved of its connexion with its social counterpart”.

Durkheim’s emphasis on the social origin of religion is more extreme than that of Simmel’s. For Durkheim, society is an object of religious veneration and the basic source of “the sacred”. The primary function of religion is the preservation of social unity. “So everything leads us back to this same idea; before all, rites are means by which the social group reaffirms itself periodically”. Thus Durkheim emphasizes that aspect of religion which had certainly been given inadequate attention—rites, cult organisation, and its relationship to the social structure. It is in such a context that he interprets totemic cults which he considered “the elementary forms of religious life”. The sociological theory of religion appeals to a generation which is acutely conscious of the powers of society to mould the mind of its members for good or evil.

Durkheim’s theory was set forth with such a wealth of detail and enthusiasm that it made a profound impression on religious investigators of the present century. However, some objections have been raised against it that it assumes totemism as the historical base of all forms of religion; without totemic power or symbol there would be no starting point for the collective representation of society as a spiritual power. A more fundamental objection refuting this theory is that it minimises or ignores beyond reason the individual in favour of the group. What is true of ritual and even of ethics as being in general a group-product is here transferred to primitive thought and emotions. As a theory of the origin of reli-

igion, Durkheim’s explanation is one-sided; but its importance rests primarily on the attention it focusses on the group aspect of religion. It is basically a functional interpretation rather than a theory of origin.

Hopkins contends that “French theory does not hesitate to insist that a man does not think at all as an individual; there is no such thing as an individual mentality and consequently all religious thought is social”\(^1\).

The Functional Approach

Emile Durkheim proposed that religion was the source of all higher culture and Marx declared that it was the opium of the people. However, it cannot be denied that it represents a set of human activities and a complex of social forms of considerable significance. Much that is worth-while in the growing research into the sociology of religion has been significantly influenced by a sociological point of view, called “functional theory”. O’Dea explains that as far as empirical research is concerned, functional theory sees society as an ongoing equilibrium of social institutions which pattern human activity in terms of shared norms, held to be legitimate and binding by the human participants themselves\(^2\). This complex of institutions, which as a whole constitutes the social system, is such that each institutional element is interdependent with all the other parts, and that changes in on part affect the others, as well as the condition of the system as a whole. In these terms religion is but one form of institutionalised human behaviour. Now the question arises how each institutional complex works for the maintenance of the social system. This may be either obvious or subtle. This means, according to Merton, that “a social institution has both manifest and latent functions as part of a total social system”\(^3\). The virtue of functional analysis is that it avoids the metaphysical controversy, and affirms instead of it that religious beliefs and practices do exist; they have consequences for human behaviour.

Religion in the Perspective of Modern Knowledge

A functional interpretation rests upon several related ideas in which the most important is the conception that societies are systems of interdependent parts. The religious patterns, therefore, cannot be understood in isolation from the whole structure in which they are embedded. Moreover, the functional theory of religion views culture as a more or less integrated body of knowledge, psuedo-knowledge, beliefs and values. Such elements define the human situation and the conditions of action for the members of a society. Culture, understood in this frame of reference, is a symbolic system of meanings, some of which define reality as it is believed to be while others define normative expectation resting as obligation on humans. Culture is integrated with social system so that it enters into the definitions of means and ends, of proscriptions and prescriptions of the forbidden and the permitted, by defining the roles in which a society's members conform with the established expectations of the social situation. Religion with its transcendent reference to a beyond is an important aspect of this cultural phenomenon. Thus culture enters deeply into the thinking and feeling of men and is a control to the social forms which emerge from their actions. In words of the famous American religionist Endell T. Busch, "religion is a very important part of imagination that functions socially and its verbal expressions represent only a small fraction of it".

The functional theory views men in society as characterized by two types of needs and two types of propensities to act: (i) the needs upon the environment so as to develop adjustments to it; and (ii) motivating and controlling the environment to ensure survival.

Thus human activity is adaptive and manipulative; but man does not remain merely confined to these activities. He also senses various types of emotions; acts out on felt needs; and responds to person and things in non-utilitarian ways. The functional theory regards these needs as the result of three fundamental characteristics of human existence:

(a) Man lives mostly in conditions of uncertainty, and events of crucial significance to his safety and welfare are

often beyond his pre-vision, i.e. human existence is characterised by contingency.

(b) Man's capacity and means to control and affect the conditions of his life, though increasing, are inherently limited. At certain points man finds himself in condition of powerlessness and hopelessness due to the conflict between his wants and his environments.

(c) Man must live in a society, and a society is an orderly allocation of functions, facilities and rewards. It involves both a division of labour and a division of product which requires imperative co-ordination, that is, some degree of super-ordination and sub-ordination in the relations of men. Moreover, societies exist amid conditions of scarcity. The requirements of order in society cause differential distribution of goods and values, and thus there is relative deprivation.

In this way functional theory sees the role of religion as assisting men to adjust to the three brute facts of contingency, powerlessness and scarcity, and consequently frustration, deprivation and disappointment. These are existential characteristics of the human condition in terms of the functional theory and are, therefore, inherent to some degree in all human societies of the world. Religion in these terms is seen as the most basic “mechanism” of adjustment to the abatory and frustrating elements and conditions. Human contingency and powerlessness man experiences in the uncertainty and impossibility contexts—carry him beyond the established and defined situations of everyday social behaviour and everyday cultural definitions of goals and norms. As inherent characteristics of the human condition, contingency and powerlessness bring man face to face with situations in which established techniques and mundane social prescriptions display a total insufficiency for providing the ‘mechanism’ experience, they raise problems which can find solution only in some kind of “beyond” itself.

Functional theory focusses our attention on the functional contribution of religion to the social system. Religion, by its reference to a beyond and its beliefs concerning man’s relationship to that beyond provides a super-empirical view of a total larger reality. In the context of this reality, the disappointments and frustrations inflicted on mankind by
uncertainty and impossibility and by the institutionalised order of human society may be seen as meaningful in some ultimate sense, and this makes accepting of society to be part of a larger supra-empirical ethical order, ordained and sanctified by religious beliefs and practices. Religion contributes to their enforcement when adherence to them contradicts the wishes or interests of those affected. Religion answers the problem of meaning. It sanctifies the norms of the established social order at what has been called the "breaking point" by providing a grounding for the beliefs and orientations of men in a view of reality that transcends the empirical here and now of daily experience. Moreover, men not only wish solutions to the problem of meaning in terms of their cognitive orientation to their world; they also, as indicated earlier, act out needs and enter into relationships. It is the characteristic feature of most religions that they offer ritual, prayers and liturgy, providing thereby a means to enter into relationship with God, gods or other sacred and supernatural forces and to act out responses and feelings involved in those relationships. Thus, we overcome their cognitive frustration which is involved in the problem of meaning, but the emotional adjustments to frustrations and deprivations inherent in human life and human society are facilitated and pacified.

The functional theory in this manner provides answers to the three questions which it raises and through which it provides an access to an understanding of the social significance of religious phenomena. Thus, in the terms of functional approach to religion O'Dea defines religion as "the manipulation of non-empirical or supra-empirical means for non-empirical or supra-empirical ends; magic as manipulation of non-empirical and supra-empirical means for empirical ends". Religion thus offers what is felt to be a way of entering into a relationship with supra-empirical aspects of reality, conceived as God, gods or otherwise.

All the same, there is an unmistakable implication in the

sociological part of the functional theory that society has the power of moulding for good or ill the minds of its members, because it suggests that gods whom men worship are imaginary beings, unconsciously fabricated by society as instruments whereby it exercises control over the thought and behaviour of the individuals. The theory claims that when men have religious feeling of standing before a higher power transcending their personal lives and impressing its will upon them as a moral imperative, they are indeed, in the presence of a greater environing reality, but this reality is not a supernatural being or power. It is natural fact of the human society. The encompassing human group exercises the attributes of deity in relation to its members, and gives rise in their minds the idea of God, which in effect is thus a symbol for society.

The sense of the holy and that of God as the source of the sacred demand claiming the total allegiance of the worshipper are thus accounted for as a reflection of society’s absolute claim upon the loyalty of its members. In primitive societies in relation to which Emile Durkheim’s theory was originally worked out, this sense of the group’s right to unquestioning obedience and loyalty is very strong. The tribe or clan is a psychic organisation, within which the human members live as integral parts of the group mind. The tribal customs, beliefs, requirements and taboos are sovereign and bear collectively the awesome aspect of the holy. In advanced societies, this primitive unity enjoys a partial revival in the time of war, when the national spirit is able to assert an almost unlimited authority over citizens.

The key to the complimentary sense of God as a man’s final relief and security is found in the way in which the individual is carried and supported in all the major crises and distress of life by the society in which he lives. Man is social to the roots of being being, is deeply dependent upon his group and feels unhappy and isolated when separated from it. It is the basic source of his psychic vitality, and he draws strength, reinforcement and hopes from it, when as a worshipper he celebrates with his fellows the religion which binds them together. The

basic meaning of religion derived etymologically, primarily indicates sustenance or binding together individuals and their society. Thus the society is a greater and forceful environing reality standing over against the individual, a veritable “ancient days” existing long before his little life and destined to persist long after his disappearance, that constitutes the concrete reality which has become symbolized as God1. The concept accounts for the symbolisation which transforms the natural pressures of society into the supernatural presence of God by referring to a universal tendency of the human mind and society to create mental images and symbols which form the basic religious phenomena. In brief, it is an interpretation of the observable facts of religion that involves no reference of God as a Super-natural Being who has created human beings and the world in which they dwell. According to this interpretation, it is the human animal who has created God, though without any objective truth in order to procure his own social existence.

Yinger has criticised the sociological explanation and functional theory on several grounds. The theory has a tendency to assume that social systems are completely integrated and all elements are functional and indispensable. However, he considers the effect of other factors upon the efficacy with which religion performs an integrating function, as well as the fact that religion can also be a disturbing and evolutionary factor. The contribution of religion to society may be either positive or negative, it may support the continued existence of the society, or it may play a part in undermining it. Consequently, the functional theory may be criticised because of its basic assumption that all surviving elements in a society must perform a predominantly positive function.

However, the functional approach is important in the sense that it provides a fruitful pathway or access to understanding religion as a universal social phenomenon. It calls our attention to a strategic aspect of all religions; their transcendent reference and its functional significance for culture, society and human personality. Religion provides culture with an

anchorage point beyond empirical proof or disproof, in terms of which the ultimate meaning is postulated. This ultimate meaning provides a ground for the goals and aspiration of man, thereby evoking an attitude of awe which ensures continuing and effective agreement with the values and goals of culture itself.

Religion and Social Causation

Radcliff Brown in his "Religion and Society, (1945)" stressed that rites together with their associated beliefs affect human behaviour, and that they are cause and not simply effect. Max Weber in his "Sociology of Religion", coined a new term ‘religionsszio-logic’ for the study of religion, specially Christianity and non-Christian religions, from social standpoint. His study was not centred upon religion as the theologians or church historians conceive it, but upon the relations between religious ideas and commitments and other aspects of human conduct, specially the economic characteristics of conduct within a society. Weber's primary interest was in religion as a source of the dynamics of social change not as a reinforcement of stability of societies. His study was oriented to the social causes, influences, social effects and interaction of religion upon group life. It was mainly focussed on the religious influence upon modern capitalism and on the far more comprehensive question of religious influences upon the evolution of occidental rationalism in general. It can be argued that this truly sociological perspective is broader than the reductionist economic focus of Marx’s, and reductionist positivistic focus of Comte’s study of religion². In his “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” and in his studies of the non-Christian religions of the world, he demonstrated the role of religion as an independent casual element influencing action throughout history. He sought to counteract the then current one-sided interpretation of Marx which viewed religion simply as a derivative of more fundamental

social variables, an epiphenomenon with no casual significance. Weber argued that the Ethic of Protestants is antecedent to modern capitalism and that it was an important factor in its development.

Weber saw religion as concerned with what he called “the problem of meaning”, by which he meant that men need not only emotional adjustment but also objective assurance when facing problems of suffering and death. He stressed also the human need to understand discrepancy between expectations and actual happenings in every society and every cultural setting. That is to say, men require answers to questions relating to human destiny, the demand of morality and discipline, and the evil of injustice, suffering and death. On the basis of his comparative study of world religions he pointed out that there are many channels in which men may go to seek and work out answers to such questions. Weber argues that the religious answers to these problems affect the practical attitudes of men towards various activities of every-day life: the formation of goals, the rules which regulate means, and the general value structure affecting choice and decisions. Thus the religious answer, through its institutionalization, enters as the casual factor in the determination of human action in varied spheres of human activities.

Durkheim discussing the role played by religion in human society as a ‘social thing’ par excellence, found that it was related to two radical divisions of human experience: “sacred” and “profane”, the latter comprising the experience of everyday life and workaday world. The sacred, somehow outside the sphere of the profane, evoked an attitude of awe and reverence. Religion was the attitude characteristic of the sacred kind of experience, and was concerned, through ritual and practice, with maintaining its radical segregation from the profane. Emphasizing the social character of religion, Durkheim pointed out that the objective of religion was to give concrete expression for believers to be the group. God was the hypostalization of society, the group tradition, embodying society’s requirements for human behaviour upon

which society ultimately rests. The society was greater than the individual; it gave him support and strength and was the source of the ideas and values which rendered his life meaningful. It made him a social being. Durkheim saw the worship of God as the disguised worship of society, the great utility upon which the individual depended.

O'Dea similarly believes that religion preserved society, kept it before men in terms of its value for them and elicited their reverence for it. In the rites of the cult the society reaffirmed itself in a symbolic acting out of its attitudes, which by strengthening the commonly held attitudes, strengthened society itself. Durkheim argues that "before all, rites are means by which the social group reaffirms itself periodically". Though Durkheim had no interest in individual phenomena, he recognised the supportive role of religion for the believer himself; it gave the believer an impression of comfort and dependence. Durkheim, by emphasizing the reaffirmation of the group in the religious cult and sanctification of society's norms in religion itself, points out the strategic social function of religion. Such also is the view of O'Dea, who argues that, "religion, in its rites, elicits the acting out of sentiments upholding fundamental norms and values and thereby re-establishes them in the consciousness of its adherents. In reciprocal reinforcement religious rites elicit and act out attitudes expressing, and thus strengthening, the awe and respect in which such norms are held". Thus religion provides through its sanctification and renewal of basic norms, a strategic basis for social control in the face of deviant tendencies and the expression of impulses dangerous to the stability of society.

Against such a standpoint, Hick argues that the responsible skeptic, whether agnostic or atheist does not deny that religious people had certain experiences as a result of which they have become convinced of the reality of God. On the other hand, the skeptic believes that these expressions can be ade-

3. Ibid., p. 323.
quately accounted for without postulating a God adopting instead of a naturalistic interpretation of religion\(^1\).

It may be advisable here to view whether communism is a religion in the perspective of the social goal of religion inspite of its apparent hostility towards the established religions and its atheistic outlook. The early Buddhism was also regarded as atheistic or at least agnostic with respect to the reality of God. Burtt adds that if communism may be called a religion, there is no doubt that it belongs with the Western triad of religious faiths—Judaism, Christianity and Islam\(^2\).

In the first place, Communism claims to offer an appealing social ideal of liberation from oppression and exploitation—an ideal whose pursuit promises justice and equality and hope for the downtrodden masses of the world. This is a vital note in the Old Testament prophets, a note in what the coming of the Kingdom meant to the symbolic Jesus, a vital feature in Mohammad's message to the poor and ignorant Arabsians. Secondly, communistic thinking is marked by a vivid sense of the reality of history, and of an inevitable law governing the way it unfolds. According to Marxian dialectic, social evolution necessarily passes through a certain sequence of stages in its march towards its "dea" society which is destined to be realised in future. Burtt points out that if one looks to the religions of the past from this angle, one will find that only Western religions have shown such a sense of the significance of history and offer such social promise for future. But the Eastern religions speak such messages of hope to the individual, but when it comes to an interpretation of worldly history, they usually conceive it as a ceaseless repetition of cosmic cycle, or even a shadowy appearance—ultimately illusory rather than real. Thirdly, communism believes that there comes a crucial moment in history when punishing judgment falls upon the forces of evil—the revolution which has already happened in the communistic countries, but which still waits to be realised on a world-wide scale. On this decisive day of judgment, the wicked capitalists who are

responsible for the miseries of mankind will be toppled from their seats of power, while the hitherto oppressed toilers will achieve triumph and their true reward. This denouncement has an unmistakable similarity to the judgment day of the earlier Western religions, when Satan with his cohorts will be consigned to destruction while the faithful adherents to righteousness will pass to their merited paradise in the Kingdom of Equality and Brotherhood. Fourthly, Burtt mentions that this communistic conception of the Kingdom of equality and brotherhood looks suspiciously like the Kingdom of God on earth, promised by the past prophets of the Western religions, whose establishment will inaugurate the 'millennium', a new era of justice, peace and happiness. In communistic terminology, the new social order in the "classless society" in which each freely gives to others what his talents can produce and freely receives from others what he needs for life and growth. Fifthly, the efforts of communists to spread their creed over the world are marked by the same aggressive and zealous fervour that has characterised the earlier Western religions in the heyday of their missionary spirit and enthusiasm. It is bound up with the same dogmatic conviction—an attitude radically alien to the tolerant teachableness characteristic of the Eastern religions.

So, in all these respects, a surprisingly full and clarifying parallel can be drawn. As far as the crucial differences are concerned, it is extremely significant how these differences are interpreted in their bearing on the meaning of religion in its proper and wide terms. The most obvious of these, is the difference in relation to belief in God. To the earlier Western religions such belief is basic, but communism is atheistic in its approach and rejects it not merely as a piece of superstition, but also as a peculiarly offensive way of exploiting the masses, benumbing them to the earthly injustices under which they live in the confronting illusion that divine compensation will be their lot hereafter. The contrast is not as stark as it seems to be. The practical and emotional meaning of faith in God to the earnest Christian or Muslim essentially means a confidence that the course of history is guided by an invisible power which is leading events towards a kingdom of
Justice and equality for all who accept the truth and give themselves to its service. Communism has this sort of confidence too; only it calls that invisible power not "God" but the "diegetic of history". The basic difference is that instead of conceiving the controlling force as a transcendent, personal deity, communism conceives it as an impersonal and imminent, but nonetheless inevitable, law governing the historical process.

But the really significant difference lies not in the presence or absence of the word "God" but in something else. If communism is a religion as it is now called in certain respects, it has until recently marked in at least one important respect, a return from civilized to primitive religion. In the typical primitive religion the individual is treated as a pawn, to serve the religious security of the community. He possesses no intrinsic worth which must at all costs be respected. If the priests select him as a needed sacrifice to appease some threatening power, he is sacrificed without the least consideration of his individual fate, if they decide that he is a needed scapegoat for the accumulated grit of the tribe; he is condemned to exile or death without any consideration as to what this means to himself. Now, such readiness to make an individual a mere means toward an accepted social end has been a part of the totalitarianism of the communistic view; an agent of communist policy will ruthlessly sacrifice any individual, himself or another, to serve the goal of that policy whenever the decisions of the leader so require. He will even frankly turn man's concern for truth into an instrument to be skillfully played upon. So convinced is he that what people now call "truth" is nothing but the product, in their minds, of capitalistic exploitation that he is ready to manipulate their ideas himself, whatever he can, toward the goal of his own faith. If it would help communist strategy for people to believe this or that, he will persuade them so to believe. He rejects as superstition the notion of an objective truth with which our thinking ought to accord. But the

2. Ibid., p. 364.
civilized religions, including the earlier western religions and faiths, have not in basic conviction at least, been led into any such self-deception and ruthlessness. There have been approximations to it in all their major sects, but in ideal these religions have committed themselves to the freedom of men to seek the truth, and to an ultimate respect for each individual as an end and not merely a means to some end beyond himself. In the light of this important consideration, it may be concluded that communism is a religion, but in this crucial respect it is a reversion to primitive religion, leaving behind one of the major insights and remarkable achievements of the civilized faiths. But there have been radical changes in the communistic policy in many matters in favour of collective responsibility and right to freedom of thought. So far as religion is concerned, they signify that if communism may be rightly called a religion, it has now begun in its own way—the process of evolution from primitive to civilized religion.

The Psychological Approach

In the previous three approaches to the scientific study of religion, the investigations described are primarily based on observations of religious behaviours seen from an objective standpoint. In the present section, however, they will be studied from the psychological perspective, i.e., from an inner or subjective standpoint.

Philosophical as well as religious interests inspired attempts at a psychological interpretation of religion much earlier than the modern approaches of various disciplines to it. Lactantius, quoting Petronius, declared that the basis of religion is fear. "It is fear that first made gods". Many philosophers propounded the theory of the relation of religion to human nature. Ludwig Feuerbach reversed the Hegelian conception of religion as a particular stage in the process whereby God comes to self-consciousness in man and held that the gods are merely projections of man's wishes so that in religion man comes to consciousness merely of what he himself is.

In the nineteenth century interest in world religions was specially aroused by the comparative study of Indo-Germanic languages. Till this time the religious ideas of the West were confined to the religions of classical antiquity and Christianity. In the seventeenth century, Lord Herbert of Cherbury advanced the view that the common "notions of religion are apprehended" by human instinct. John Locke held that the human understanding was not capable of apprehending the true nature of reality and that it needed to be supplemented by faith. English Deists who supported natural religion as against revealed religion attempted to find some underlying element common to all religions, an enquiry which was stimulated by the information which missionary enterprises brought back from newly open territories overseas. It was suggested by Father Joseph Lafitan in 1723 on the basis of his observation between the rites of American aborigines, classical Europe and the Catholic Church that the original religion was a universal form of nature worship. Charles Francois Dupuis suggested that behind Bacchus, Osiris, Mithras and Christ there was a common theme derived from Sun worship. But in real sense psychological features of world religions were taken up for serious consideration by Benjamin Constant in France and Christophe Meiners in Germany, who agreed that absolute distinction between 'heathen' religions and Christianity could not be maintained and that psychologically the various religions seemed to have more in common than their theological differences suggested. Thus, German studies in the nineteenth century came to the conclusion that all religions are expression of a primordial revelation1. For instance Schleiermacher, who represents one of the most important contributors to the psychology of religion in its formative stages held that religion was not a dogmatic system directed mainly to the intellect of believers, nor yet a corpus of precepts addressed to will; religion arose primarily from a simple, elementary feeling of dependence upon God. By basing religion on feeling and the yearnings of the soul, Schleiermacher furnished a common basis for the religions of mankind which

have to be viewed, each in its own way as a manifestation of man’s feeling of dependence on a power other than himself or society.

The introduction of the comparative method into the study of religion proceeded upon the assumption that the practices and ideas which originated in the remote past are operative in the present, because they spring from impulses common to mankind and relate to concepts which are valid in the modern world as they were in the elementary forms of society. Knowledge about the psychology of world religion was widened still further by a successful attempt by Herbert Spencer to apply the newly formulated theory of evolution to psychology in general. Alfred Wallace and Charles Darwin, by stressing the vital part played by evolution in mental progresses, enabled psychologists to view the behavioural processes of children, primitive peoples, and animals as a part of a general development.

Later development owes very much to the contributions made by Tylor in his “Primitive Culture (1871)” and W.R. Smith in his “Religion of the Semites (1889)”, both of whom inspired Frazer to produce several monumental works of which “The Golden Bough (1890)” and “Folklore in the Old Testament (1918)” are best known. In his “The Gorgon’s Head (1927)”, Frazer describes the comparative method used by Smith. “The idea of regarding religions of the world not dogmatically but historically—in other words, not systems of truth or falsehood to be demonstrated or refuted, but as phenomena of consciousness to be studied like any other aspect of human nature—is one which seems hardly to have suggested itself before the nineteenth century. When we examine side by side the religions of different races and ages, we find that not only do they differ from one another in many particulars, but the resemblances between them are numerous and fundamental and they mutually illustrate and explain each other, the distinctly stated faith and circumstantial ritual of one race often clearing up ambiguities in the faith and practice of other races. Thus, the comparative study of religion soon forces on us the conclusion that “the course of religious evolution has been, upto a certain point, very similar
among all men, and that no one religion, at all events in its earlier stages, can be fully understood without a comparison of it with others”.

Both Smith and Frazer reached an understanding of rituals, institutions and practices in Semitic religion by the use of analogies drawn from non-Semitic sources. The explanation of these universal or near universal practices might apparently seem cultural diffusion, but the cultural diffusions do not deny the existence of universal psychological factors in the human make-up. Many of the basic similarities in religion and culture must be regarded as due to the common psychological nature of man. Man has had and continues to have several types of needs, not all of them physical, which are common to all men everywhere. It is because of this that psychology is able to offer explanations of world-wide religious practices both as expression of and at the same time the means of satisfying these vital common needs.

The closing years of the nineteenth century and the opening years of the twentieth century, however, mark the beginning of a definite determination to use the resources of scientific psychology in the investigation and study of religion. Systematic and empirical methods were employed to analyse religious phenomena within the general perspective of the natural sciences, while coincidentally with such studies of individual life appeared the investigations of earliest forms of religion which included and stimulated attempts at a critical determination of the nature of religion and its relation to human evolution. The rise of modern psychology revealed that religious phenomena are susceptible to scientific explanation as the other mental phenomena. As a vast mass of facts about religion accumulated during the various decades, it was generally accepted that “the mediation of psychology is indispensable to a right understanding of facts which are primarily psychological, and of the movements of the human mind

2. Irving King’s—“The Development of Religion (1910)”, and Emile Durkheim’s—“Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912)”.
which give the facts the form of development\(^1\).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, when William James delivered his Gifford lectures on the varieties of Religious Experiences (1901-1902), he gave a great impetus to the study of religion psychologically. His work made both psychology and religion human, intimate and practically significant from the point of view of scientific study, and showed that scientific method means to study the religious facts quite apart from those based on theological and scriptural facts and approaches.

As a result, a considerable literature on the psychological study of religion has grown since then in which the real complexities and obscurities of the subject have gradually come to the fore. In this connexion, the contributions of J.B. Pratt, R.H. Thouless, L.W. Grensted, J.A. Coe and David Forsyth may be specially mentioned.

In 1913 appeared Freud’s “Totem and Taboo” which brought a startlingly original concatenation of religion, anthropology, the concept of unknown and the phenomena of mental derangement to bear upon the question of the origin of religion and religious reality. Religion, which was hitherto held as man’s grateful response to God divinely and historically revealed to him, was explained as a chronic mental aberration. This startled the English speaking world as his works began to be translated into English with their intriguing explanations of the mysteries of dreams, the unconscious, Id, Ego, and super-ego and their corrosive and plausible but apparently scientific criticism of all religious beliefs and practices. Naturally it provoked fiercely hostile reaction.

It was soon recognised that faith and practices come properly within the purview of psychology and psychological analysis. The truth of the primary assumptions of the real existence of that All-inclusive and Supreme Other to which is given the name of God may be a matter for the metaphysician or perhaps for the mystics and saints, but the psychologist can examine our responses to the ultimate reality

---

whatever be, since human responses can be scientifically observed and studied. Psychology is concerned with the reactions of the human psyche, its responses, collective and individual, to that Reality which in whatever way it be described and experienced, is at one and the same time the source of all religions, as well as that ultimate satisfaction for which the human soul is believed to crave, whether this craving be described as an aspiration for the Divine, a reorientation of personality and purpose, the urge to individuation or the quest for some form of mystical union. The one basic assumption in contemporary psychologies of religion, however, varied their approaches and conclusions, is that there are psychological motivations and responses which are common to all known forms of religion.

Religion begins in experience, and it is this fundamental fact that makes it a proper subject for psychological study and investigation. This has now been accepted by many who in the earlier decades rejected the possibility of religion being made subject to psychological analysis. Even theological presentation of religious experiences, despite their varying creedal or revolutionary criteria, proceed from common psychological motivations. Metaphysics also, which is highly intellectualized activity is no less psychologically motivated than the lowest and simplest form of religious faith and practice. Consequently, modern studies and investigations have found the concepts of analytical psychology particularly valuable when dealing with such representative religious responses as prayer, worship, ritualistic practices, and religious experiences. Psychology does not, however, offer any opinion as to the ultimate significance of these practices as it is only concerned to find out how these activities are related to the psychical constitution of man.

Initially the psychological approach to the religious phenomena, applying the scientific method was mixed up with metaphysical and philosophical considerations. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) tried to determine the exact nature of

2. Ibid., p. xv.
unconscious more than anyone of his predecessors. He believed that all human activities are directed by the Will which is responsible for the emergence and disappearance of ideas into and out of consciousness. A somewhat similar explanation of it was offered by Herbert (1776-1841), who suggested that some ideas are forced out of consciousness by other opposing ideas. Both these explanations resemble those held by psychologists, but whereas Schopenhauer and Herbert stressed the importance of conative and intellectual factors, the later explanations have emphasized the importance of affective elements, which is specially significant in considering psychological basis of religion.

In 1848 Carl Gustav Carus put forward views about the unconscious as the only way to understand man's conscious life. He held that it is the unconscious aspect of psyche which is the real subject matter of psychology. Much that is later to be found in Jung's theories of the unconscious and archetypes is anticipated by Carus's exposition, particularly his emphasis upon the non-individualistic nature of the unconscious and its ceaseless activities. It is interesting to note that Carus actually described the unconscious as "the creative activity of the Divine", while Jung thought that God, i.e., the God-image, is a function of the unconscious.

Von Hartmann's conception of the unconscious (1868, translated into English in 1931) bears a close resemblance to that of Schopenhauer, but he extended it to the extent that it appears to govern everything in the organic world. The unconscious was distinguished by conative and cognitive activities, but affective impulses were accorded no place of their own, since Von Hartmann held that emotion was capable of being resolved into will and thought.

Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1912), whose views also resemble Schopenhauer's, emphasized the part which emotions and intellect play in relation to the will which operates both consciously and unconsciously in a purposive manner. Similarly, the founder of the Society for Psychical Research, F. W.H. Myers (1843-1901) discovered a subliminal or ultramarginal consciousness whose activities are such that Myers concluded that there must be subliminal-self.
Religion, Instinct and Sentiments

According to McDougall instinct is "an innate disposition which determines to perceive any object of a certain class, and to experience in its presence a certain emotional excitement and an impulse to action which finds expression in a specific mode of behaviour in relation to that object."1 William James defines it as "the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends without foresight of the end, and without previous education in the performance"2. Stout, commenting on the history of the conception of instinct has pointed out two broadly contrasted tendencies: a tendency to render the concept strictly biological; and that to re-express the facts in psychological terms and to explore the characteristics of instinctive process3. In insects and the lower animal kingdom instinctive actions are performed perfectly from the outset, prior to all experience or practice, but in human beings such behaviour is essentially conditioned by intelligent consciousness. With whatever innate dispositions a child is born, among these is a capacity to learn by experience. McDougall holds that "there is every reason to believe that the purest instinctive action is the outcome of a distinctly mental process4, and this mental process involves three factors—the cognitive, affective and conative which are the basic elements of religion". Social influences in the form of certain conventions and practices give rise to several sorts of attitudes including the religious ones. But according to Pratt, "an individual brings with him into the world prior to any social influence certain innate tendencies and instincts which determine to a considerable extent what his religious attitude shall be"5. Some psychologists have suggested that among his many instincts man has also a religious instinct, but this is to advance too simple a psychological explanation for the existence of what

is obviously a highly complex activity. There are many disagreements on religious instinct as such. Morris Jastrow writes as if the existence of a religious instinct were almost axiomatic. Henry Rutger Marshall has long maintained that religion is instinctive, or is at least an instinct in the making. Recently Prof. Starbuck has advanced a similar view. He says that the original and instinctive religious element has two phases which he calls the “cosmo-aesthetic sense” and the “teleo-aesthetic sense”. These two together form the ultimate religious element of human nature, which he describes in its most primitive forms as “a delicate sense of proportion or relation of fitness or harmony that directs consciousness and determines at each point the particular advantageous response or emphasis”. King in one of his papers entitled “The question of an Ultimate religious element in Human Nature” has maintained the purely social origin of the religious sentiment. But Pratt refutes this sort of view of the religious instinct. Spinks holds that “the religious life involves the active collaboration of several instincts including those which relate to man’s gregarious and sexual nature”.

The gregarious instinct as it operates in human society makes the individual sensitive not only to the influence of group suggestion, but also to the fear of being separated from his fellow men. Moreover, the influence of society tends to modify the instinctual behaviour of the individual in a way that gives rise to what Freud called the Super-ego. These modifications operate in such a way that the energies of the crude instincts are directed to higher and more varied objectives. This process which is known as sublimation operates strongly in connection with man’s sexual instinct.

Following this trend, some psychologists have held that religion is “nothing but an expression of the sex instinct”. Such a view of religious development arises from a rather

5. Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 51-52.
inadequate appreciation of the nature of religion and from too restricted a view of sex. It overlooks the fact that the sex instinct plays a prominent part in most forms of human activity, but it is not so much the sexual energies themselves that are important as the ends to which they are devoted. Hall says "true piety is earthy love transcendentalized, and the saint is the lover, purified, refined and perfected". Sex is one of the highest, as well as one of the crudest of all forms of human interest. It is natural that since religion relates to the whole of man's life, and not only one part of it, it should be related to man's sexual life. Wall in his work "Sex and Sex-worship" has given a vivid description of sex-based origin of religion almost in all parts of the world. Starbuck showed in Christian religion that conversions occurring during adolescence are accompanied by emotions which are clearly related to the subject's developing sexual life. Moreover, religious situations involving personal contact between the human self and other should be described in the language of love and sexual relationship. The symbolic language of mysticism is in large measure derived from the activities of the unconscious which, being strongly instinctual by nature, furnishes symbolical forms which are emotionally suited to experiences of a sublimated libidinal kind. Although it has been frequently claimed that man differs from animals in his ability to use language, make tools and employ religion, yet even at its best it is an unproven assumption that man necessarily possesses a religious impulse similar to fear, anger, curiosity and others. Nor has he a religious tendency comparable to the non-specific impulses of play, imitation, sympathy and suggestion. Wright says, "We cannot even credit him with an innate tendency towards religion in the vaguer sense in which it might perhaps be maintained that there are such tendencies towards art, morality and science. For beauty, goodness and truth, after all, are fairly specific values. Hoffding's view that religion has endeavoured to

conserve all sorts of values, has very widely been accepted by many, but it has no very specific and characteristic value of its own, as have art, morality and science. But on the other hand it will not be accurate to say that the religious impulse in man is merely an ordinary habit, or an attitude in response to the environment. All races and majority of individual men of all races, have found religion an indispensable mode of conserving their socially recognised values, and this indicates that there is something about religion that makes it so. It may be inferred, therefore, that it is the religious sentiment which includes within its system a very large number of the strongest impulses that a man possesses. Pratt says that the individual's religion has two sources—namely, the abilities, tendencies and disposition which he brings with him into the world; and the experience, largely of a social nature, which he acquires by his intercourse with the world and with his fellow beings1.

Instincts give rise to emotions and sentiments and many of them form an emotional complex. The sentiment of admiration, for instance, is a complex emotional state in which implies pleasurable perception of an object or situation involving the emotion of wonder and negative self-feeling. If admiration be mixed up with emotion of fear it would give rise to another affective complex, awe. If gratitude be added to this complex, we have the basis of an essential religious situation, reverence2. In view of such consideration, Spinks opines that "these particular emotional reactions are fundamental to man's religious experiences and form 'the master sentiment' of religion"3. "The master sentiment completes that hierarchy of purposes, attitudes and emotions in which relatively narrow and immediate aims and values are subordinated to others which are wider and more permanently valid"4. The assumption underlying this view is that there is some supreme value or object about which the whole range of human

1. Cf Pratt (James Bissett) : Religious Consciousness, 1951, p. 68.
3. Ibid, p. 49.
emotions may finally be organised.

The argument that the religious sentiment is the completion of a hierarchy of sentiments has its counterpart in Dr. Hadfield’s ‘Law of Completeness’¹, according to which “every organism is compelled to move towards its own completeness”. Fullness of life is the goal of life—the urge to completeness is the most compelling motive of life. The craving in religion for completeness and the sense of incompleteness is well marked; indeed; it appears to be the basis of religion. Psychologically, the urge of incompleteness is most clearly marked in the instincts. “Every instinct actively craves expression”². This view of instinctual craving for completeness is similar to McDougall’s “hormonic” interpretation of the instinct. “McDougall uses the term ‘Horme’ to describe the fact that instinct in man always seeks expression in some form of purposeful activity, that all his activities, even his dreams and psycho-pathological symptoms, exhibit some urge to reach a goal, how ill-defined that goal may actually be in consciousness. Man’s intellectual urge for completeness is basic to religion; man has a craving for God, though his realisation of what that End is, has varied greatly from age to age”³. In the light of this fact C.G. Jung has defined religion as “the fruit and culmination of the completeness of life”⁴.

The Sub-conscious

The aim of psychology is to present a complete description of human behaviour and experience and interpret it in laws of regular and predictable sequence. But the perfect realization of this idea is impossible because there are breaks or gaps in this experience. All the sequences which we experience are not complete. This sort of difficulty can be met in two ways—(i) By discovering new events, actually experienced but hitherto unknown which will fill up the gaps; (ii) working

1. Hadfield (J.A.): Psychology and Morals, 1925, Chapter VII.
hypothesis of unexperienced events which cannot be genuinely verified but are nevertheless useful in enabling us to think together different phases of our unconnected experience. When gaps take place in mental sequences, the psychologist has two possible sources to which he may look for gap-fillers. One of these is physical world specially that part of it which is called nervous system of the individual. The other is the "subconscious". Each of these sources provide the psychologist both the kinds of aid which have been indicated above and from which he derives new experienced events and unverified but useful hypotheses. The sub-conscious looms so large in the modern interpretation of psychology of religion that it needs full consideration.

The conception of the subconscious originated with Leibniz, but as a philosophic doctrine it was Von Hartman who made it widely known. But in its stricter sense it was imported from philosophy into psychology partly by F.W.H. Myers and his followers and partly by various neurologists and medical psychologists whose researches and practices led them into the field of pathological mental phenomena. Coming into psychology through this double doorway, the conception of the sub-conscious has had a rather varied development. Whereas physicians groped out of a mass of abnormal and unpleasant cases, Myers's school developed on the basis of intuition and was found far more interesting and metaphysically significant.

According to Myers, the conscious self is a small part of the real self and underneath the conscious personality extends a much larger 'subliminal' self which lies below the threshold of our immediate awareness, dominates our actions and thoughts by powers not known to us, and constitutes the real and essential personality of which the conscious self is but a broken glass. In his "Varieties of Religious Experience", William James was much influenced by Myers's view, and accepted it almost as a demonstrated truth. Worcester holds that "the sub-conscious mind is a normal part of our spiritual nature. There is reason to believe that it is purer, more sensi-

tive to good and evil, than our conscious mind. Though it is
doubtless more generic and in closer contact with the universal
spirit than reason, yet its creations bear the imprint of indi-
vidual genius’’

Another meaning, however, is sometimes given to the term
‘subconscious’, making it identical with the conscious and
interpreting the unconscious as purely physiological. It is an
accepted hypothesis that brain facts accompany mind facts,
either as causal substratum or as correlates. Though it has
not been absolutely demonstrated, it seems more probable that
certain brain events are so correlated with certain mind events
that the former are regularly followed or accompanied by the
latter. Thus many of the phenomena of consciousness may
be explained by reference to the unconscious in the nervous
system. Moreover, the physiological mechanism of the body
performs many purposive acts without the direction of con-
sciousness, such as, organic reflex and instinctive movements.
In this way various phenomena attributed to the action of
subconscious may be explained as due to the unconscious.
Sometimes the word ‘Subconscious’—or more commonly the
word ‘Unconscious’, “das censbewusste”, “l’inconscient”—was
used to signify some kind of psychic state which is yet un-
conscious. Bergson, for instance, refers at times to such
unconscious mental states. Freud in some parts of the
“Traumdeutung” insists upon unconscious psychic state in no
uncertain terms. Bergson points out in his “Matier’re
Memoir” that “the whole of our past psychological life con-
ditions our present state without being its necessary deter-
minant, while also it reveals itself in our character”. “It is
plain, therefore, how important an influence the subconscious
in this broader sense exerts upon each man’s religion”

Star-
buck and James have given us further insight into this matter.
“A man’s religion is not merely a matter of his clearcut con-
scious processes; it is bound up with his whole psycho-
physical organism”. Our religion goes deeper down into our

1. Worcester in Religion and Medicine, 1908, p. 42.
3. Ibid, p. 60.
lives than most things, and is knit up with all that we and our personality are. It springs up out of our connection with the past. It involves our individual, our social ecology, racial character, and historical background; it is an important aspect of what we are and all we hope to be. The influence of the subconscious upon the religion of the peoples is due to their racial inheritance and their individual history. By nature and heredity we come to this world with definite instincts, needs and ways of reacting which respond to our condition of dependence in such a way as to make most of us "incurably religious". Thus it is in the subconscious that the main roots of our religion lie. The other roots of it are to be sought in the particular environment and experience of the individual. After the babies are born, the surroundings of the grown-ups, their parents and teachers, and, in fact, society as a whole bring the irresistible might of their combined influence to bear upon their pigmy selves to make them religious. This influence is never outgrown, although in our later life we might feel that we have freed ourselves from it. It is present and ineradicable in our subconsciousness, influencing our conscious life in such a way that we are not aware of its influence. The whole period of our maturity is passed through a background determined almost entirely by our social inheritance and our early experiences.

The religious ideas, promptings, emotions and ways of viewing things, impressed upon as during youth, or resulting naturally from inherited tendencies, become so ingrained into the very texture of our minds that we can never get away from them. They tinge and influence our feelings, opinions, attitudes and reaction perpetually in explicit and implicit ways. Certain thinkers hold that the subconscious is eminently conservative. Forsyth has pointed out that conservatism is one of the characteristics of religions. They tend to resist change and innovation not only within the boundaries of their own beliefs and practices but also in tribal and national life. Religion is a matter of the whole man, and is determined to a very great extent by the racial and personal past, by the ideas

Religion in the Perspective of Modern Knowledge

that have become ingrained and are now reversed, and by the feeling of profound respect for tradition, all of which, though they are at times matters of attentive reasoning, have their roots very largely in the background of the mud or even in the purely habitual reactions of the nervous system. The great source of the content of the subconscious is, then the conscious—the experience of the past, both the race and the individual being taken into account. If a supernatural source is claimed to be another source of the content of the mind, psychology has no definite proofs of it. Theologians and supernatural source of revelation, though something in which the philosophers might well believe, is not something which the man of science can verify.

The Unconscious

McDougall stressed the conative aspect of instinct, which is of great importance in our consideration of the unconscious, because behind our day to day awareness according to Nunn there is "a vast hormic organisation of which a great part is never presented directly in consciousness, while, of the residue, much that has once been in consciousness, can never normally and in its own character reach the conscious level."2

According to C.G. Jung, "We spend a greater part of our life unconscious . . . . It is incontestable that in every important situation in our life our consciousness is dependent upon the unconscious"3. The unconscious seems to be a level of activity of mental life which is complimentary and compensatory to our ordinary conscious life. Beatrice Hinkle in the Introduction to her translation of Jung's "Wandhungen and symbols de Libido", expresses the view that for Freud and apparently also for Jung, the "unconscious" means the realm where various unknown but disturbing emotions lie hidden, and that it is also "a name used arbitrarily to include all that material of which the person is not aware at the given time—

the not-conscious". The unconscious is both a depository for discarded or depressed ideas due to certain reasons, and a creative treasury from which images and ideas emerge of highly significant value. Psychoanalysis by the use of special techniques has been successful in bringing the consciousness experiences forgotten by the subject.

The unconscious proper contains not only elements which are forgotten, but also instinctual energies which have never been in consciousness. The instinctual forces are of two types: the sexual and the egoistic. The unconscious is, therefore, a repository for all the psychic processes which are not in consciousness and for those which cannot emerge into consciousness without overcoming certain "resistance". Repression operates in a three-fold manner: (i) It prevents unconscious elements from entering consciousness and is itself the result of early social and customary training exerted upon the infantile mind by the contentions and moral standards of society; (ii) it opposes attempts aimed at investigating the content of the unconscious; and (iii) it is a dynamic barrier which functions as a Censor to those mental events which seek to appear in consciousness. The Censor is not always active to check them; when it is relaxed, certain unconscious elements emerge as in dreams.

As a matter of fact unconscious comes into existence as the result of repression following an extended conflict between the child's innate instinctual endowment and the inhibiting conventions of the family and society. Jung agrees in this respect with Freud in recognising that the unconscious comes into existence with the growth of the individual, but holds that in addition to the "personal" unconscious there is an unconscious which is inborn and due to the process of repression. Jung, therefore, lays greater emphasis upon the hereditary aspect of the unconscious.

Jung's concept of the unconscious may be approached by way of analogy. H.G. Baynes, in the translation of Jung's "Psychological Types (1938)" says that a new born infant knows how to breathe, the heart known how to beat, the

whole co-ordinated organic system knows how to function. This is because, according to him, the infant's body is the product of inherited functional experience. The "knowing how" of the child's body represents the whole phylogenetic history of man. If there is, therefore, a functional inheritance in the matter of physical organisms, there is every reason to believe that man's psychical inheritance is also phylogenetic. It is this type of argument that led Jung to advance the concept of a racial or collective unconscious inherited by all men. He argues "Man is born with a brain that is the result of development in an endlessly long chain of ancestors". The collective unconscious contains the psychical tendencies and dispositions common to the whole race. It is "the all controlling deposit of ancestral experience from untold millions of years, the echo or pre-historic world events to which every century adds an infinitessimally small amount of variation and differentiation .... It seems in its totality a sort of timeless world image with a certain aspect of eternity opposed to our momentary conscious image of the world".

Knowledge of the contents of collective unconscious has been made possible, according to Jung, by comparing the mythological pattern of various religions with the complexes and dream symbols collected from various sources. The manner in which the collective unconscious produces the primordial symbolism of mankind will be discussed in detail afterwards.

Libido

The term 'libido' means the dynamic aspect of the sexual instinct, but often it is used to refer to the energy that operates in all physical processes. Libido is like waters of a stream which being diverted into certain channels can be raised to higher channels to give an increase in potential. Such a process in connection with Libido is generally referred to as "transformation" or "sublimation". Thus for Freud all higher

2. Ibid., p. 162.
activities of man, including religion, are result of sublimation of the sexual instincts. Jung's concept of Libido is an amplified form of the Freudian concept. Jung accepts that many expressions of libidinal energy are intimately related to sexual activities, but he holds that as man in the course of his evolution extended the range of his interests, his libidinal energy was diverted from its primary sexual expression to objectives largely desexualized. In the situation described as religious or numinous, libido presents man's reactions in terms of primordial symbols. Jung says that, "the psychological machine that transforms energy (Libido) is the symbol...The transformation of libido through the symbol is a process that has been taking place since the beginning of the time and its effectiveness continues".

Such a view naturally raised the significant question why man at the early stages of culture transformed his libido to some analogue which gave a symbolical rather than a direct satisfaction. According to Jung, this was because man found that by desexualizing libido he could release energy that would be available for other and higher interests. This may be easily suggested that these "higher interests" are really those by which man hopes and strives to achieve that completeness of life which Dr. Hadfield described as "the basis of religion". Desexualized libido is that supply of energy by which man has produced the whole range of activities which together make up civilization and express his reaction to the mystery of life and death which have been subject matter of religion. Libido has manifested itself in the human history in ways in which religion plays an important role. It incites man to new and creative activities and also permits him to sink into long period of seemingly uncreative inertia. "The regressive tendency of libido is the psychological expression of man's desire to return to the Mother." This tendency has been explained by Freud and Jung in different ways. "Anthropologically it appears that this recessive phenomena is a cardinal phase in

human history, associating itself with that fatigue of the primitive mind which lends itself to an uncertain acceptance of what is communicated within the tribe”¹. But this inertia or pause is a highly significant factor in the creative development of man. In much the same way as there is an accumulation of psychic energy when some obstacle is encountered in an individual’s life, so there are periods when the race or some part of it “pauses” until this accumulation results in some new and sometimes highly original development. This means that the programme of the libido as exhibited in the activities of the personal psyche is also the programme of civilization. This parallel is of special importance for religion since it shows itself in particularly significant forms in world mythology. For example, the familiar mythological pattern of the dragon-fight, with the victorious hero and the bound maiden set free, or equally familiar pattern of Mother and Child are vivid symbolization of the reversal of a negative libido. Anthropologically, it represents the movement from an old integration of custom to a new differentiation; psychologically, it represents that process of individualisation which Jung expresses as the basic desire of all men; religiously, it represents that reorientation or conversion of personality whereby a man is released from the “bondage of sin” and into “the glorious liberty of the son of God”².

Introversion and Extroversion

In addition to personal aspect and attitude of Introversion and Extroversion, it has been argued that ages exhibit one or other of these two attitudes, e.g. the Middle Ages appear as introverted as compared to the Renaissance or Modern world³. But this view is not to be regarded as a value judgment, since each attitude stands in a complimentary relationship to the other. In something of the same way as ‘normality’ is achieved by individuals who recognise the compensatory nature of their functional attitude, reconciliation of opposites within an extended historical context constitutes the main-

2. Op. cit., p. 55,
spring of religious and historical movements. Spinks says "Ying-Yang" of the Chinese, the personification of "Rta" in the Riga Veda, the principle of the unification of opposites, the existence of Mitra and Varuna, the two guardians in Hindu mythology, and the concept of Trio, each represents, as does the Christian opposition of God and the Devil, a metaphysical example of the complimentariness of opposed attitudes. A man of introverted attitude is more likely to be religious and moralist, though religious tendency is found in extroverted persons also.

In terms of Jung's libido theory, in the introvert the libido is turned inward. The extroverts, on the other hand, have a realistic objective attitude. They tend to react to the world of physical reality and are chiefly stimulated by the real world. If an individual is introvert in his conscious life, then in his unconscious he is extrovert, and vice versa. Although all men have a dominant attitude and none is completely introvert or extrovert, yet most people are not only mixture of both, but their attitudinal habits may change at different times in the personal life. Jung says that each of the attitudes is related to one of four functions—thought, feeling, intuition and sensation.

Anima and Animus

Anima is a feminine tendency, and Animus a masculine tendency found in male and female both. When a man becomes aware of unrealised potentialities of his psyche, he discovers within the unconscious his own soul image. In the male this image is of feminine character—Anima; in the female, it is masculine in character—Animus. The relevance of this distinction for the symbolical expression of the unconscious needs no lengthy explanation. That man sees his soul as a female figure is evidenced in dreams, and in the mythological themes of world religions where it appears as a "level-motif" in such familiar forms as moon-goddess, and in the various images of the Magna Mater—the Earth Mother. This

is what Jung called the "spiritual principle in man and material principle in woman".  

Projection

The anthropomorphic view of God and the criticism of it have already been discussed earlier, explaining the implication of projection. As a psychological mechanism, projection is intimately related with the concept of complex. Complexes come into existence as a result of an emotional shock by which a part of the human personality is "split off". The split off portion acts as an autonomous body in the sphere of consciousness and seems to possess its own voice; it appears as objective existence in external situations. Complexes which appear to enjoy autonomous existence within the unconscious project themselves on to external things. A great deal of the mythology of religion is the product of the projection of autonomous complexes on to situations expressive of a whole range of motifs such as Life and Death, Rebirth and Resurrection—themes which are as fundamental to historical religions as they are to mystery cults. "The fact that these autonomous complexes are often projected on to particular situations and personalities provide one explanation of the multitude of gods which populate polytheistic religions". According to Ludwig Feuerbach (1809-1872), the true content of religion, or of the conception of God is anthropological; religion is the projection of human nature into the beyond. He says "Man—this is mystery of religion—projects his being into objectivity, and then again makes himself an object to this projected image of himself thus converted into subject. God is the highest subjectivity of man abstracted from himself". Feuerbach calls our attention to the element of projection in religious conceptions. He sees man alienated from himself and thereby damaged in his self-fulfilment by such projection. A similar view of understanding religious phenomena has been advanced by an eminent sociologist of America,
T.H. Grafton, who, following George H. Mead, Charles Cooley and John Dewey, explains the "supernatural" as "Other" which man creates in order to respond to it. The views of Feuerback resemble those of Durkheim in one important respect: both see the content of religion as a projection of man.

Feuerback claims that man "projects his being into objectivity", that religion is merely the projection of one's wish-world and the gods men worship are wish beings. Thereby Feuerback denies the distinction between religion as projection and religion as empirical fact. Freud's projective theory of religion similarly identifies the religious experience with projection itself, by relating projection "of" with projection "upon". His religious view and its origin will be discussed in detail in a later chapter. Durkheim, however, introduces and emphasizes the sociological dimension. God represents the hypostatization of society, which supports man's morale but also impinges upon him as something other - in Durkheim's term with "exteriority" and "constant". Feuerback sees this projective process as a source of man's alienation from himself and consequently making man unable to accept and develop his own natural development.

Martin Buber points out this common fallacy in discussing the individual's relationship to God in the traditions of Judaism, when he describes "whenever we both, Christian and Jew, care more for God Himself than for our images of God, we are united in the feeling that our Father's house is differently constructed than our human models take it to be". It is Buber's view that God as reality is far greater than our projections of his nature. Thomas Aquinas claimed a similar truth when he insisted that God, as the object of man's faith, is infinitely more than propositional understanding of his nature. Martin Luther gives credence to the same belief in a hidden God—Deus absconditus. He is some thing more than our image of Him. Traditional religion, in general, respects the

2. Abernathy (G.L.) and Langford (T.A.) ; Ed. Philosophy of Religion, 1962, p. 91.
belief that God, man and religions are far more than our constructed models take them to be. They maintain 'a sharp distinction between man's symbolic understanding of religion and the religious experience in itself. Horosz's empirical concern with religious experience agrees with this mode of thought, that religious experience as projection and religious experience as reality or empirical facts are two clearly distinguishable aspects of religious affirmation'.

Complex and Oedipus Complex

The term ‘complex’ viewed psychologically means “an associated group of ideas, partially or wholly repressed, strongly tinged with emotions and in conflict with other ideas or groups of ideas more or less accepted by the individual”. The recall of any one of the constituent elements brings the whole complex into consciousness together with the emotional associations. If at any time a complex occupies the whole psychic field of an individual when he is in a highly emotional condition, he would be possessed by the complex. Besides these, there are complexes common to every one of us. The child, for example, collects a mass of emotions, different types of memories and ideas around his father and mother and these form the father-complex and the mother-complex. When the emphasis is laid upon fatherhood and motherhood rather than upon a particular person, this is called an image in the Freudian terminology in the psychological context. The idea of the complex was recognised in the system other than those of psycho-analysis. Herbert, for instance, postulated “appreciation masses”, and William James described the “many selves” within one personality. According to Freud, the father-complex is very important, because it is associated with the Oedipus complex which Freud used in his explanation of the origin of religion. The Oedipus complex has become a familiar cliche of popular psychology and does in fact represent with some accuracy the half-conscious or unconscious combination of respect and of rebellion which is inherent in

the status of sonship. Without it the son could neither take over, by what Freud calls identification, the moral authority of the father, nor assert his own free manhood. And by what Freud calls projection the elements rejected in the actual relationship are given a pseudo-reality\(^1\) of their own in fantasy, so that the "Father image" becomes the determining factor in creating and shaping the son's belief in God.

The term 'Oedipus Complex' was developed by Freud from the myth of Oedipus, son of King Laios of Thebes, who being exposed as an infant by his father's order, returned as a man and unaware of his royal parentage, slew a stranger who was his father and married unknowingly his own mother Jocasta. This myth was used by Freud to typify the boy's longing for his mother. The Oedipus-complex has also been characterised by a certain ambivalence involving hatred and affection for one and the same parent, and, since our unconscious life is intimately connected with our infantile emotions, it is easy to understand why opposed affective elements, which coexist easily in the mind of the child, exhibit a similarity in the adult mind. According to Freud, the effect of the Oedipus-complex is universal. Freud explains the origin of religion in a very simple manner: "When the child grows up and finds that he is destined to remain a child forever, and that he can never do without the protection against unknown and mighty powers, he invests these with the traits of his father-figure; he creates for himself the gods"\(^2\). The idea that religious beliefs arise naturally from the experiences of the early childhood has been developed by Forsyth in his "Psychology and Religion (1936)". He holds, for example, that the idea of God, the Father arises from the child's experiences of its father. The very attributes which grown-ups customarily attach to God are precisely those which have previously been experienced in a father. Omnipotence, omniscience and moral perfection are qualities with which little children for a time endow their father. Even God's physical attributes are those of a father: he has a masculine figure and speaks with male voice. These and many other

similar facts seem to have no reasonable doubt that the adult idea of God has originated in the earlier idea of father. But in holding such a view about the origin of religion, it must be stressed that although it may apply to Christianity, there are numerous other religions which cannot be interpreted in this manner. For example, the idea of God as father, is unknown in Buddhism. In many other religions a goddess has been the principal object of worship. In Islam it is strictly forbidden to regard God as father, though Muslims are patriarchal.

Moreover anthropologically, it is not clear at all as to how this could apply to those societies which are not patriarchal in structure. On the psychological side it is possible that every male is the subject of this Complex, but there are little evidence that it is equally active in everybody. This position has been substantially set out by Baudouin, who holds that “the Oedipus Complex is very frequent in occurrence, yet it would be false to maintain that the majority of men are in fact or by desire either incestuous or parricidal. The affair is much simpler. These impulses must be classified among the paleolithic monsters—vestiges from very early childhood dating from a period of life when the child is absolutely amoral; vestiges which have to be thrust into the subconscious at the first onset of the “moralage”). Spinks holds that “the relegation of this complex to the status of a vestigial psychic process does not necessarily disprove the wide-spreadness of its operation, for there is substantial evidence that this complex appears among peoples and cultures different from those of the civilized West”. He quotes from “Black Hamlet (1937)” of W. Sacks that “the situation which occurs in Hamlet is common to all humanity and this is the primary reason that Shakespeare’s tragedy appeals to men of all races and nations”. Sacks offers similar cases of this type. As such the Oedipus Complex seems to operate at many levels and in many cultures, but what is doubtful is, how far it is

"real" or how far it is symbolical of something else.

The Oedipus-complex for Freud was a "possession complex" in which a boy regards his mother as the source of his sexual gratification. Jung regards it more as in the nature of a symbolical expression of the desire of rebirth "as a regressive product of the revival of the archaic modes of function, outweighing actuality". This regressive activity of Libido is related by Jung to the process of "individuation" which is one of the most persistent desires of man's psyche. In a similar vein, Forsyth holds that the doctrine of the Trinity originates in the mind of every child: "Its earliest conception of human kind must surely be as consisting of its father, its mother, and its self. The notion of a threefold deity is, to say the least, a strange and remarkable one, and its world-wide prevalence puzzling, until we recognize the idea as having shape in the child-mind with reference to a human family". This notion of a threefold deity is not universal; it never takes shapes in the mind of a Jewish or Muslim child.

Forsyth's attempt to explain the origin of religion in the light of modern psychology has not been accepted widely. Lord Raglan explains that "one of the most popular theories is that man in general or at any rate savages and children tend naturally and instinctively to personify animals, inanimate objects, and even the forces of nature; that is, to regard them as human beings in disguise, or at least as possessing human characteristics and being actuated by human motives". This theory formed part of E.B. Tylor's general theory of animism, a theory which has had enormous influence by having been uncritically adopted by a large number of anthropologists and psychologists.

**Individuation**

Like L. Levy-Bruhl, the French psychologist, Jung held

3. Ibid., p. 144.
that primitive man was more or less identified with the collective psyche and there was no trace of individuality in the psychology of primitive societies. The emergence of individuality from the psychology of collectivism is of great importance for the development of mankind, since it is the primary means whereby the self is born out of conflict between the world of collective consciousness and the world of individual awareness. This conflict, according to Jung, is the "old play hammer and anvil: the suffering iron between them will in the end be shaped into an unbreakable whole—the individual". He holds that the achievement of personality is "nothing less than the optimum development of the whole individual human being."

"Individuation as a psychological process appears in religion as the desire of rebirth; it is not only one of the main incentives in the life of the individual, it is also one of the main engagements of religion." It is that longing for completeness which, whether it is characterized as "man's essential quest" or the earnest desire "for union with the other" is the "telos" or completion of religious activity. When in ordinary life an individual tries to create a place for himself in a society, he has to come to terms with the external world. The nature and the result of this struggle to a large extent depends upon a particular psychological type, but he has achieved some degree of social establishment, he may become aware of aspects of his interior life which were suppressed or ignored in his earlier years. Since man is by nature metaphysically curious, this inner life now demands his attention so that the individual is confronted with the difficult problem of resolving oppositions within his psyche and within the universe, problems of Good and Evil, Light and Darkness, Life and Death. If he is by habit or training a religious man he will find some symbolical tradition that will help him to resolve these oppositions. If not, the process will involve much interior suffering before he is able to be delivered from

1. Jung (C.G.): Integration of Personality, 1940, p. 27.
the burden of these oppositions and is reborn a "new man". St. Paul's expression "a new man in Christ" is a similar view. Religion in so far it is something more than a statement of belief, enables a man to reconcile aspects of his inner and outer life which he has so far not been able to accomplish by his own efforts and thus to achieve a complete and balanced personality.

In this connection Jung has cited his experience, gathered from his mental patients in the second half of their lives: "Over thirty five"—there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook of life. It is safe to say that every one of them fell ill because he had lost that which the living religions of every age have given to their followers and none of them has been really healed who did not regain his religious outlook. This of course has nothing whatever to do with a particular creed or membership of a church".

The foregoing concepts are relevant to the psychology of man as a religious being. Man's life is deeply rooted in the psychological and social heritage of the race, but his activities are strongly influenced by the hormic nature of libido. Now there arises a relevant query as to how objects and situations described as numinous or sacred come to be invested with a highly significant stamp of symbols, many of which seem to be very common to religions at all levels. Jung explains such a process as being due to the operation of certain functional power within the collective un-conscious. The symbolical forms are said to be means by which man's perception of the Ineffable becomes at one and the same time psychologically expressible and satisfying.

The Non-Specific Tendency

Wright expresses that religious sentiment has for its primary objects, the Agency through which the conservation of socially recognised value is sought. This agency is God in

the civilized European and American people. Associated with God, develop subsidiary objects, dependent for their sanction upon Him. Jesus, the Bible, the Church, the Sacraments are such subsidiary objects for the Christian community; the Blessed Virgin Mary and Saints are for Roman Catholics; God, Brahma, gods and goddesses, Vedas, Puranas and other sacred books, Smritis, are such objects for Hindus. For the civilized communities, the primary impulses and emotions directed towards God and the subsidiary objects of the religious sentiment include tender emotions, fear, intellectual curiosity and gregariousness. The last one, according to Wright, manifests itself in the desires for divine companionship and for sociability with one’s fellow communicants\(^1\). The non-specific tendencies—imitation, suggestion and sympathy—also contribute to strengthen the sentiment.

Man is a gregarious animal by nature. Consequently, each of his impulses is liable to be called into operation if the corresponding impulses of other human beings about him have been aroused, though this varies with different individuals, some being more susceptible to the social environment than others. Some impulses like fear, anger, sex curiosity are more susceptible to such influences than weaker impulses.

Such principles are responsible for the non-specific emotional tendencies, so-called because the mode of behaviour which they express is more variable and less specific than in the case with primary impulses. These are suggestion, sympathy and imitation.

Most of our beliefs as adults have been adopted by us as a result of suggestion. Our religious convictions like the moral, political and social ones have chiefly come to us in this way. Suggestion is the tendency for man to accept opinions and ideas, simply because they have been conveyed by others without any critical and logical explanation of the fact. So far as the moral acceptance of traditional beliefs through suggestion is concerned, religion stands on the same basis as other activities. Civilization and progress are only possible because we

---

have so large a heritage of beliefs and conventions to build upon. The majority of adolescents develop religious sentiments which rest upon beliefs that they have adopted from their religious environment without much conscious reflection. This fact is normal and inevitable.

Sympathy signifies 'the tendency to feel an emotion that is felt by others, without critical reflection upon the grounds for the emotion'\(^1\). The role of sympathy in religious life is important. It makes possible the growth of the common sentiments of love and loyalty. The desire to share the religious emotions of adults, that is, the desire to be able to sympathize—is one of the motives that help to effect religious awakening in adolescence\(^2\).

"Unreflective imitation is the tendency for a person to act in a certain manner simply because others act in that manner, without critical or logical examination on his own part of the reason for such conduct". Imitation is subconscious and involuntary, as well as unreflective. Quite different from imitation that is conscious and voluntary but unreflective, is reflective imitation. In the small children imitation is mostly unreflective, though they may often criticize their models to the extent of their mental capacity. When they attain adolescence, and their reasoning power increases, reflective imitation becomes more prominent. This holds true of the manner in which the child and adolescent learn all forms of conduct from their elders, morals as truly as speech, deportment, dress, and athletic sports. The same principle holds in religion too. The little children pray and go to temple and churches because they are told to do so and see others doing so. The adolescents not only feel this inward necessity of gaining the adult religious point of view, but also critically and reflectively weigh and lead religious life. In the religious life of adults all three forms of imitation continue.

In religion, as in other sphere of human activity, these

three non-specific activities are a conservative agency, leading the youth of each generation to adopt the beliefs, emotions and practice of their elders. The fact that the religious sentiments develop so largely in childhood and youth and receive its onset early in life, makes religion one of the most conservative forces in human society. Suggestion, sympathy, and imitation have done as much as critical reflection to ensure the triumph of new religious movements. These three elements involved in the genesis of religious consciousness are also closely related.

Twentieth Century: Genesis of Real Discipline of Psychology of Religion

The psychology of religion as a separate discipline emerged from the nineteenth century studies in Social psychology of which Spencer's "Principles (1876)" and Tarde's "Law of Imitation (1890)" were among the most noteworthy. A few years later, Le Bon in "The Crowd (1895)" described 'man in the mass' as an animal moved and governed by instinctual impulses and passions which swamp all rational considerations, thus furnishing an explanation of why the moral and intellectual level of a crowd is so much lower than that of a man as a normal individual. Le Bon's psychology of the Crowd is in part the outcome of the practical work of J.M. Charot, who had Pierre Junet and Freud among his followers. The general convergence of social studies and practical researches into unconscious processes produced at the turn of the century the first psychologies of religion.1

E.D. Starbuck in his "Psychology of Religion (1899)" made the first significant attempt to interpret the external facts of religious development on the basis of a widely distributed questionnaire. He was an advocate of the liberal and evangelical type of Christianity. Starbuck's book was based on a mass of personal testimony, gathered from many sources dealing chiefly with the phenomena of religious conversion. Starbuck's questionnaire pertaining to close connection between conversion and adolescence, despite the inherent diffi-

culties in interpreting the answers accurately, may perhaps be taken as the effective starting point of a truly scientific study of religion. A little later, Stanley Hall’s studies of child behaviour were taking religious development into account, though it was not until 1904 that his great book ‘Adolescence’ appeared. It contained inter alia a study of how ‘The nation of God’ and a moral sense develop among the young. Hall’s use of theory of ‘recapitulation’ — a theory according to which the individual in his early years repeats swiftly the evolutionary development of the species proved to be a valuable means of relating evolution, psychology and anthropology to the study of religion. This concept based on the theory of ontogenesis and phylogensis was further developed by J.Y. Simpson.

In 1910 two other important books appeared: “The Development of Religion” by Irving King and “The Psychology of Religious Experience” by E.S. Amis. Both of these emphasized the social aspects of religion, as well as the anthropological stages of religious development. Other remarkable theories of religion were advanced by Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, Hubert and Mauss mention of which has been made already. Levy-Bruhl argued that primitive mentality was characterised by ‘prelogical’ and ‘mystical’ forms of thought and mind of the primitive man and his religion ought not be assessed in the same terms as those applied to the more civilized levels of mankind. In this context, however, Freud points out that there was a psychological connexion between the religious practices of the primitive man and the behaviour of modern neurotic types. This type of interpretation was followed by a series of valuable contributions to the psychological understanding of religious phenomena by the adherents of the Freudian School such as Ernest Jones, Theodore Reik, Oskar Rank and by other important anthropologists—C.G. Seligman in his “Anthropology and Psychology (1924)” and B. Malinowski in his “Sex and Regression in Primitive Society (1926)”.

The environment comprises a great number of customs and beliefs, most of which have come down to us from the remotest past and had their origin in conditions which have long ceased to exist. However, the contemporary studies of religion tend
either to be somewhat highly specialized studies of individual aspects of religion or else elaboration and new interpretation of Freud, Jung and others.

Thus in the psychological study of religion an anomaly has come to exist during the several past decades. The history of religion starts plainly with the group aspect of religion, first beginning with the cults, practices and tribal worship which shed off at their margins into magic and taboo, then moving on to more complex patterns of national and universal types of religion, and finally investigating the various institutionalized forms and the comparable grouping of other religious traditions. But the individual has become more and more self-conscious; he has little concern with the history of religion, though he may be a loyal member of some kind of religious congregation. Consequently, religion signifies to him not what it means in the abstract or in community sense, but what in fact it means individually and directly in his life. The group might have come first in the history, but the individual certainly occupies the first and foremost position now in religion and therefore in the study on it. This order of the study of religion is preferred by the exponent of the psychology of religion\(^1\). Psychology has had little interest in history; it arose primarily as a science of the individual soul, now called ‘psyche’ almost as equivalent to human nature. What is expected today of the psychology of religion is to account for those aspects of human behaviour which are commonly regarded as religions, and to attempt to see how far, in the light of our present psychological knowledge, they can be explained partly or wholly, on principle and hypothesis derived by psychologists from the study of human behaviour as a whole.

While in the present section the psychological factors responsible for the rise of religiosity have been considered, in the next chapter various types of data and techniques employed in such a study will be discussed.

---

NEITHER theology, nor philosophy, nor the history of religion has succeeded in establishing a psychology of religion as a discipline in the present sense of the term—"Psychology". They have actually turned attention to one or another phase of the enormous complex called 'religion' and thereby, they have inspired investigations. The history of religion has, in addition, stored a large mass of data for psychologists' use for thorough study and generation of their general theories and concepts relating to religion, and its origin based on psychological grounds. Isolated views have been taken that may claim a permanent place in psychology. But a true scientific psychology of religion is more than an ancient philosophy, theology, and the history of religion. It implies in particular, a critical, systematic method for ascertaining data and for placing them within the general perspective of the mental life.

The present movement for a psychology of religion as an established discipline for the scientific study of religion derives momentum from the following favourable conditions:

(i) First, psychology itself has attained the stage of an independent science with a good number of experts devoting
themselves exclusively to it. Wilhelm Wundt is regarded as father of experimental psychology who founded the first psychological laboratory as early as 1875. He also studied religious phenomena psychologically. Since then well-organised branches of the science of animal psychology, genetic and educational psychology and abnormal psychology came into being. Social and anthropological psychology also emerged, shedding new light on mental life of society and individuals.

(ii) Secondly, anthropological researches conducted with unprecedented thoroughness have discovered a vast quantity of material that bears upon the evolution of religion which was held previously as having been revealed by God Himself, infallible and unquestionable.

(iii) Thirdly, there has occurred during the past years a general assimilation of the historical evolutionary principles as applied to the higher elements of culture. The most notable in this context is the firm establishment of the historical study of the Bible, commonly called the higher criticism.

(iv) Fourthly and finally, an ancient hindrance to the scientific study of religion, that is, the assumption of dogmatic authority, is in the process of rapid dissolution in Protestant circles. Besides, there has arisen in these circles the demand that the mechanism of the spiritual life and the nature of religion be laid bare, it being felt that religion must be among other things, an original grasp of life rather than a mere adherence to tradition.

The attempt to explain religious phenomena psychologically is related to general psychology. Actually, the psychology of religion is nothing but an expanded aspect of general psychology which is evident from its study of the most commonplace facts of mental life.

Reasons for a separate treatment are reasons of convenience and of accommodation to existing conditions because the problems are so fundamental, and the facts so complicated that an extensive treatment is necessary. Religious sensitivity or prejudice among religious circles and students tends generally to deter psychologists from a dispassionate discussion of religion. Moreover, religion,
though a commonplace fact, has nevertheless become, so to say, self-conscious.

Now the question arises whether psychology is competent enough to penetrate the heart of religion: whether one can understand religion without feeling it and also how feelings can be articulated. Again, whether or not the supreme and most religious experience are not ‘sui generis’, extra-natural, incapable of analysis and investigation by means of ordinary method or concept employed by psychology, science or any other means except the theological and scriptural facts. The answers to these questions are not beyond the reach of psychologists. Religion has a mechanism and there is great vocabulary of appreciation in religion and ethics like aesthetics. A psychology of aesthetics is possible because aesthetic experience, at least in its rudiments, is common to man. A psychology of moral life is possible because moral experience is universal. Similarly a psychology of religion in the same intimate sense is also possible if religious appreciations of at least a rudimentary sort, are likewise common. Whatever be the fact, the diffusion of religion in both space and time justifies a preliminary affirmative hypothesis on this point.

However, even if religion is supposed to be not a common experience, a psychology of religion in the sense referred to earlier should be practicable. Psychology has succeeded in analysing many supposedly exceptional religious experiences which many thought was beyond its scope. In the psychology of religion two main types of problems are recognised—First, religious experience is ordinarily a highly involved psychical complex which needs to be viewed in its elements. For instance, Starbuch’s pioneering work regarding conversion in Christianity is the central topic of this type. H.C. Stratton has taken up the explanation of crisscross of motives and beliefs appearing in the sacred books of the world which are a self-contradictory complexity. The search for the elements of a complex appears again in studies of the genesis and growth of religion in the individual and in the race.

Secondly, “religion has a peculiar relation to the valuatio-

nal phase of experience. In pre-eminent degree religion, even more than philosophy, is wrestling with destiny". It will force out a consciously adequate life out of the hard conditions of existence. With this value aspect of religious experience in mind new facts are unearthed and a new aspect of all the facts are met. Hoffding judges that the primary axiom of religion is "the conservation of values". King and Ames are interested in the functions that religion represents in the life of man as a whole, and how these functions originate and grow. Now it is worth indicating what the psychical signifies and which psychology will investigate it. What are the objective marks of presence or absence of the psychical? Can it be measured, and how is it related to the psychical? What role does the psychical play in the processes? Though these are debatable issues, some of them are of utmost interests for the psychology of religion because they involve fundamentally the contrasting point between mental mechanism and self-realization. This distinction emerges when the meaning of psychical is explained, which is nothing but consciousness which involves such facts as sensation, feelings and impulses to action, and that these are known primarily by introspection. Thus psychology accordingly has commonly understood itself to be the science of "states of consciousness as such", meaning thereby without any regard to their relation to any metaphysical soul or ego. This point of view has won a place for psychology among the empirical sciences. The objection that there can be no psychology without a soul, has been rendered invalid by a successful psychologizing without saying anything about the soul. The mental life has been held as compounded of simple elements, after the analogy of chemistry, or as "a mechanism of which sensation, feelings, and the like are the ultimate units.

Behaviourism in its extreme form declares that the assumption of consciousness has never helped in the solution of any problem. Psychological elements or facts should be amenable to observation so that an object may ascertainably be present, for instance, sensation is actually occurring. "But

2. Watson (J.B.); Psychology as the Behaviourist views it—*Psychological Review*, Vol. XX (1913), pp. 158-77.
sensations are not facts of experience but construents from experience as Coe explains it. No atoms of mental life appear to anyone at all, but a continuous flow which has various aspects, of which the sensational is one. This is why William James is convinced that the state of consciousness is not verifiable. Among the materials employed in analysing the states of consciousness are sensations and feelings. These are not mental aspects of life in their concreteness, but certain abstracted aspect of this life. It is by this abstracting, aided by analogies derived from the structure of the brain and the nervous system, that psychology has drawn its picture of the complicated mental mechanism—the mechanism of sense—perception of memory, and of emotion. In spite of the abstractness of such a psychology and objections thereto, this method of approach to mental life cannot be dispensed with, for these aspects of our experience are actual aspects, and these mechanisms, though they are the psychologists’ mental constructs, have uses both theoretical and practical that correspond to the parallel constructs of physics and chemistry. If any one suggests in the name of psychology that mental mechanism is all there is to mental life, he would sound convincing only to those whose analysis stops short of the primary empirical data. Coe holds that “religious experiences have a mechanism, to be sure, but they are occupied about ends or values”. This Tagore calls “the realization of life”. Psychologically, philosophically and theologically, attention is being paid to values as an aspect of experience. “A value”, according to Coe, “is anything experienced or thought of as satisfying or the contrary”. It may be in the sphere of interests, preference, individual attitude, or self-realization. In the scale of religion, as we move upward, we find that this is increasingly the case. At the top of culture the character of each religion consists in its working conception of life’s value, and the religious status of the individual is judged by his scrutiny, choice and pursuit of ends. Thus psychology of religion is supposed to be predominantly functional. The standpoint of ‘function’, in fact, emerges in various branches of psychologi-
cal growths in which religion has been viewed functionally. Here a functional psychology or a psychology that recognises the functional view is being created. Therefore, the idea of function needs to be carefully examined. J.R. Angell has been a great exponent of the view of the relation of the functional to the structural psychology, and his "Psychology (1904)" is the first systematic work on general psychology from the functional point of view. The importance and role of functional approach to religion in the light of psychological purview and the approach of behaviourism will duly receive a detailed discussion later.

**Nature, Data and Methods of the Psychology of Religion**

The first question to be asked in the context of functional psychology is what one does when one is religious. "What one does" religiously, implies in the first place all external acts that can be observed such as the religious dance of savages, going to church, temple, or mosque, praying, making sacrifices, founding a hospital or charitable home by a religious society, or an individual, and such other activities, supposed to be religious in nature. If comprehensive list of all the religious acts of men, women and children at the various stages of culture were prepared, it would be quite illuminating chiefly because we may be able to read into it the appropriate meaning of each act and could trace the significance and background of its origin. Into one act one should read hunger or anxiety regarding the problems of food supply, fear of demons and natural phenomena; into still another, hope and ideal society. In order that those readings and observations may be authentic, and not arbitrary, we need to note, in addition to religious acts, any further expression of man's meaning and purpose in these acts, and their effect. We must imaginatively get inside the experiences that we might understand. But this is not always so easy. For instance, if we observe a group of savages moving about rhythmically to the accompaniment of drums, we may call this a dance, and at once we are likely to commit the error of giving it a meaning too closely analogous to that of our own ordinary dances. Similarly, if we discover that this dance is like a
buffalow hunt or a battle, this may be called in our own way a
-dramatic representation, and we may erroneously imagine that
it has a close relation with our own dramatic interests. It is,
therefore, essential that we should know what people feel
about their religion as well as what they do. Their feeling is
partly speech, and partly pictorial or symbolic art.

The meaning of an act mentioned by a particular individual
or group must be compared with what other men and groups
say about the same or similar act. Earlier utterances are to
be compared with later ones, so that, if possible, meaning may
be noticed to have developed in accordance with some funda-
mental principles or law. Those who psychologize are not
required to accept as the value or meaning of religion what
religion asserts of itself at one stage, high or low, but must
analyse these different self-realizations so as to note the direc-
tion in which they are heading as a whole.

The present movement for a psychology of religion
attempted at the outset to collect its data in the most direct
way, namely, by going to living men and women with ques-
tions concerning their experiences and impressions about
religion and its various faiths, and their assessment of its
functional role in society and in the adjustment of individuals.
Starbuck may be regarded the first psychologist to have taken
up the study of religion in the psychological perspective and
based on scientific lines. His famous work "Psychology of
Religion" referred to earlier, is based, for the most part, upon
returns from question circulars known as questionnaires.
Another early study based on a similar pattern was conducted
among Manus people of the Admiralty Island, North East of
New Guinea by margaret Mead experimentally to verify the
religious theory. Among the limitations of Starbuck's process
of study the following are the noteworthy points:—

1. Unintentional Selection of Data

(i) The distribution of the questionnaires can be known to
cover only now and then, the sources of possible data evenly
and adequately.

(ii) Only a few of those receiving the questionnaires make a
positive response to it. Since the attitude of the non-
responding type may presumably be connected with some fact of religious life, those responding to the circular cannot be assumed to be representing the whole.

(iii) A long questionnaire may elicit answers at least to some of the questions.

(iv) A respondent rarely gives all the important data relevant to what he describes. Generally, he selects what seems to him the most relevant or appropriate.

(v) The questions commonly present a set of categories into which the answers are likely to fall. Persons whose experiences happen to be hit off by these categories have a special incentive to responding, while those who find no category that seems to fit them, do not respond. Thus the returns tend to become relevant in the direction of the investigation’s own presuppositions.

2. Answers suggested by the Questions

A major part of our intellectual process is not thinking in any street sense, but drifting with the idea that happens to be presented1. Therefore answer to a question concerning one’s inner life is likely to be bent to the direction of the question itself. The terminology of the questions may determine the terminology of the answers, regardless of appropriateness. The respondent may naturally and properly adapt himself to the mood of the questioner. The form of the question may recall certain things in, and put others out of, the respondent’s mind. In short, the attention of the respondent is likely to be passively controlled so that the question partly creates its own answer. Binet, well known for his testing in the field of psychology and education, conducted an extensive investigation of this process among school children about 1900 A.D.

3. Inaccurate Observation, Specially when Introspection is required

The distortions that occur in most persons’ observations about themselves, specially in the American society, are notorious. In India no such extensive study in religious

matters has ever been conducted. It is vain to accept question-
circulars to evoke psychological items all ready to be cata-
logued, summed up and generalized. For, sometimes the
questions themselves elicit reaction among conservative reli-
gious people.

4. Inaccuracy of Memory

Memory tends to drop out some important items and to
reconstruct others. The question-circular method has no
means to avoid such errors or to check them up.

5. Inaccurate and Inadequate Description

Since religion is very wide in its scope and role in which
the whole mental reaction of the individual is involved, de-
scription as well as observation require training. In matters of
religion, a majority of people seem incapable of tracing them-
selves from the stock phrases which they have imbibed in
temples, mosques, churches and religious gatherings. Other
persons simply lack appropriate vocabulary and therefore use
inappropriate terms. Moreover, a standard of accuracy and
precision is generally lacking in questionnaire methods.

6. Necessity of Interpreting Returns

Certain census returns, such as, date, age, place, profes-
sion, income etc. can be safely counted and the statistics of
the persons making the returns can be prepared. But caution
is necessary even here because of the liability to memory
errors, and because the things dated such as “Conversion”
in the Christian communities, may not be the same in all the
returns. Besides, the investigator has to interpret everything
himself. For example, traditional or Biblical language can
often mean several different things. Similarly, the scriptural
meanings of terms in other religions also mean different things
in different contexts. “Doubts” may mean intellectual atti-
tude or an emotional insecurity or rational approach. In
the Christian context “sense of sin” has correspondingly
different uses. Since the investigator has to reconstruct the
whole situation from given fragments, he must allow for the
respondent’s probable ignorance of certain factors; for bias
produced by training, for individual peculiarities collected by the investigator from the tone of the whole response. Starbuck has used his returns with caution in an objective spirit and has avoided the worst pitfalls, yet his numerical calculation and tabulation of emotions, motives and the like show nothing more than general drifts present in unbounded proportions. Interpretation made by historians is also worthy of confidence but history lacks exactness.

However, this does mean that question circulars are not scientific. A large part of the data in many scientific fields is, in fact, collected by question lists called report blank. Further, there is no absolute difference between questions asked of a subject in a laboratory, and those asked under other conditions. The main difference is there in the degree of our knowledge of the stimuli actually present. In both the cases we have to accept more or less the observation of the subject himself. The questionnaire method, therefore, should not be isolated from other instruments of research. Sometimes more detailed data can be run down by personal interview or experiment. It is relevant to mention the conclusion drawn by Margaret Mead from the data collected through her question-circular which shows that "there is no such thing as an innate idea" which Locke realised long ago. According to her "our temperaments and our abilities are, no doubt, largely innate, but the form in which they express themselves depends entirely upon our cultural environment. This environment comprises a great number of customs and beliefs, most of which have come down to us from the remote past and their origin in conditions which have long ceased to exist".

Question-circular returns are effective in establishing three types of generalizations.

(i) External situation: In this some broadly recognised psychic event takes place giving rise to religious development. Such facts as age, date and social environment can often be ascertained with approximate accuracy. "Largely through this method one great generalization of this type has been

established, namely, that there is a casual connection between religious conversion of the emotional type and physiological change during adolescence in Christian community.

(ii) The existence of contrasting types within a specified field: This certainly is a valuable psychological service. In the matter of prayer, for example, and in the individual realization of God in a high form of religion like Christianity, there are striking differences of type. Self-assertion characterises one individual, self-abnegation another. Some people have a mystical-emotional realisation of God while others find Him through abundant free activity. In addition, this method is important because it definitely establishes the existence of contrary reactions in groups, such as religious denominations that may appear to be homogenous.

(iii) The existence of a tendency or drift within a group: This may be ascertained, even though its extent or depth may remain vague. Coe has suggested several relevant points to ascertain through a denomination that cultivates realization on the basis of the question-circular method. Data for the psychology of religion are obtained in the second place by scrutiny of literary works and other records of religious life. William James’s, “The Varieties of Religious Experience” is based largely upon autobiographical record of different religious devotees. In his ‘Studies in Good and Evil’, J. Rayee’s study of religion is based on such method of collecting religious data. Many writers on religion have dipped into the records of the ethnic faiths, but G.M. Straton in his “Psychology of the Religious Life” bases thereon nearly an entire psychological theory of religion. In India, religion was first tested on the anvil of psychology by the renowned psychologist, the late Dr. N.N. Sengupta, former Head, Department of Psychology, Calcutta University, and of the Philosophy and Psychology Department, Lucknow University. Dr. Sengupta brought out three volumes on the Psychology of Religion for which he had drawn on Sanskrit and Pali religious texts of ancient India as well as the classics of Christian Mysticism.

Finally, inscriptions, pictures, statues, temple architecture and the like are the other important sources of data for psychology of religion. Such source material has an advantage over the questionnaire method, in as much as the investigator wields no influence over the basic record. These were produced in the ordinary course of life and development of religion and often the absence of psychologizing makes them psychologically more valuable. Certain difficulties in such sources, however, cannot be overlooked.

(1) The data gathered from the available biographical and autobiographical material is triply selected. First, the individuals portrayed in biographies and autobiographies are selected upon the principles which are irrelevant to the psychologists' interest. Secondly, material recorded in each case is also selected from a larger mass of facts, and again from motives that defy psychological classification. Thirdly, the psychologist selects only those writings which will bear analysis. William James has been criticised for having selected too large a proportion of extreme and even morbid cases. In brief, this material is available chiefly because, like question-test returns, it establishes the existence, in unknown proportions of certain types of religious experience.

(2) Sacred literatures offer the extraordinary advantage of being religiously motivated, and they present to us, religion itself at some stage of its progress. Yet we find comparatively little that is naively religious. Men make a written record, for the most part, because they become reflective and therefore selectors. Much is motivated by the desire to explain, reconcile, or systematize as is inherent in myth and theology. Some of the records are in the interest of some cause or idea, and consequently the exponent of one religion keeps silent about the weak points of his own and exposes those of his opponent's. Ritual formulae give word to be said rather than things to be done whereas these are essential to most rites. Prayers and hymns, on the other hand, sometimes let us peep deep into the religious mind but the meaning is likely to depend upon historical conditions which are unspecified. Sacred literatures as a whole arise and grow as part of a historical movement which they only partly reflect. Different
historical and literary strata are often present in various types of sacred literature of almost every religion. Therefore one can rarely make sure of one's psychological data by merely reading a piece of sacred literature.

Thirdly, the sophisticated as well as the culturally less advanced and primitive people offer data based on anthropological researches to develop religious hypothesis.

There is voluminous material discovered by anthropologists that bears upon the religion of savages. Much of it is very valuable for psychology and it enables us to get nearer to the beginnings of religion. In the matter of the origins of religion, definitely ascertained facts are now replacing speculation or inferences, drawn from our own highly developed processes. Religion, it is widely believed, follows the same evolutionary process of development as man's physical organism. Though the process is not straight and broad, it may, however, be gathered from the conflicts and rapid changes of theory in this field as well as from the following points of view:

(i) Almost every fact of the mentality of the savage has to be interpreted by psychologist. He cannot tell about it directly as much as through the question-test about the inner life of the respondents. Moreover, the interpreter is generally not the fact-gatherer. The psychologist has to make the best he can of the data collected by other persons who may not have had in their minds the psychologists' own questions, interest, or point of view.

(ii) Here, as in other evolutionary studies, two-phased difficulties are almost unavoidable. At our end of evolution stand highly complex processes and a set of preferences, ideals, or valuations that are called higher, as distinguished from the lower. At the other end of the scale we seek for minimum complexity, and for lower, instinctive preferences both process and preferences being such as to connect man with the animal species. The Evolutionary principle implies that we are to think these extremes somehow one, and the complex must be accepted to have emerged out of the simple, and the high value out of the low. Consequently, we tend to overlook contrasts. We do it, on the one hand, by over-
simplifying our own culture, or by forced classification of the higher with the lower, and on the other, by attributing too much particular phenomena of the savage mind. Coe holds that, “by combining the two oversimplification on the one hand and overloading on the other—almost every item of savage religion has been made to carry the religious universe on its back”¹. Thus, gods are the ghosts of dead men; the gods are nature-power that smite the attention; “the gods are imaginative projections of some social unity”². The psychical roots of religion are fear, experience of sex, and the economic interest of some group. Totemism, animism, magic, sacrifice, myth—each has appeared indistinctly and overwhelmingly. The movement from myth to theology, from spell to prayer, from festivals of fertility-god to Easter, from mystery-initiation to baptism in Christianity, from totemistic eating of the god to the eucharist, from taboo to Sunday, the other sanctities, from instinctive sense of tribal to solidarity to the ideal of a kingdom of God, from ghosts to hope of heaven—this movement, this mass of evolutionary chains between us and our ancestors easily creates an impression to believe that our religion is a vestigial phenomena, a remainder from savage crudity, whereas religion has evolved away from, as well as out of, savagery. The analysis of these religious elements establishes differences as well as similarities, and that the differences between two things are neither wiped out nor explained by placing them in the same evolutionary series. But one should not assume that origins are in the remote past alone. Evolution may be original at every step and may be going on with originality in our own experiences. Wundt's magnificent contribution to the psychology of early mythological and religious ideas are associated with certain significant conceptions of method and point of view. The final source of religion, he points out, is man’s appreciation of what helps and hinders in the struggle to live. Wundt stresses that the psychology of religion must be genetic, and that genetic psychology is the psychology of early man.

Fourthly, data may be ascertained by experimental methods. An indirect experimental contribution is made by laboratory studies of part processes that enter into religious reactions, such as suggestion, emotion and belief formation. Theoretically integral religious experiences with sincere and complete letting go, might be evoked under laboratory control and observations. However, the difficulties are obvious in this method. The whole laboratory spirit of aloofness from all other interests except the analysis hinders in the way. An experiment was conducted by W. Stahlhin in Germany in 1914 in connection with the psychology of religion in which the subjects listened to or read religious sentiments under controlled conditions and then wrote introspective records of the results. The upshot of the experiment concerns the psychology of language and of edifying discourse in general rather than the analysis of religious experience. Another report of different procedures appeared in the 'Journal of Philosophy'—XII (1915)—"A Study of the Elements of Certain Services of Common Worship" conducted by Marx A May in America by employing the order of merit method to determine value relation in religion. In India Dr. Raj Narain, late Professor of Psychology, Lucknow University, worked in the field of psychology of religion on the problems of Sensory Phenomenon in Mystic Life. Dr. Narain again revised his interest in the psychology of religion under the guise of para-psychology in 1960. Experiments on the study of religious attitudes were conducted at Annamalai University in 1963 and the conclusions emerged were: There seems to be a relation between the liberal conservative attitude and the religious attitude. Science students seem to be more religious than the students of humanities. Economic status seems to have some effect on the religious attitude of students. Rural and urban backgrounds also seem to have some effect on the religious attitude.

There is another procedure also, for the field use, as distinguished from the laboratory use, of an experimental method. In the religious education of children in regard to the conduct of worship in the whole plan and organisation of a religious society, particular factors can often be identified
but sometimes arbitrarily changed. Many a rough and ready experiment in religion has been made in the interest of religion and various modes of control have thus evolved in religious communions.

Still another remarkable source of ascertaining data of religious phenomena is careful observation and inner experience without adopting any kind of experimental and questionnaire method. Hofding ascertained data for his "Philosophy of Religion" without employing any one of the methods already discussed. He made little use of anthropology, sacred literatures, religious biographies, or of questionnaire returns. Despite this his analysis of the religious experience is among the most noteworthy. The reason is, though he hardly brings forward any new data to cite, he sees far into common facts. This far-sight of Hofding is not accidental; it is rather the ripe fruit of his long experience with psychological facts and problems. Therefore, in addition to digging out a fresh material, research in the direction of fresh analysis of material that is commonplace is essential for adding psychological facts of religion.

*Nature: Its Description in Scientific Orientation*

Out of the many ways and angles from which religion has been studied, three deserve special mention. The first, the philosophy of religion is the oldest form of human reflection and goes back to the very beginning of human thought. The second, the history of religion is not as old as is its philosophy and goes well back into the historical times of Greek antiquity. Third, the psychology of religion, the youngest of these three forms, was born in our times and is still hardly beyond its lisping infancy.

That the aims and methods of these three pursuits are arbitrary is amply clear from their very name. The philosophy of religion is the most ambitious of these three. It is not so much concerned with a study of religion as with a study of Reality and an attempt to determine the truth about the Determiner of Destiny. The history of religion is much less ambitious and takes religion as it finds it whether true or false, and seeks merely to discover how as an human institution, it
has developed and established its role. The psychology of religion is nearer to the second than to the first of these, both in the object of its study and in the humbleness of its aim. Like the history of religion, it takes religion as it appears, is interested in it basically as a great human fact and leaves out of account the question whether or not the concepts of religion are true. It differs from the history of religion just as psychology differs from history. It seeks, in short, to be a science. Therefore, before discussing its aims and methods, a brief reflection on what is meant by science should be pertinent.

According to Pratt, "the alpha and omega of science is art. Art is its source and art is its goal". But art is to be understood here, in its widest sense, as practice or reaction. The need of reacting wisely upon the environment goes before man's earliest search and quest for knowledge, rewards and justifies his latest scientific achievement, and determines the very nature of science through all its history.

The general emergence of the need of wise reaction appears primarily in two forms—the necessity of manipulating nature and predicting its course, and then the necessity of communicating with one's fellow beings. It is essential for a successful living that we use nature and her forces or at least look out for her. This requires a knowledge of how things act and react, and at the same time, of what one may properly expect. This implies learning the guidance of one's actions through influence of past experience and an intelligent learning means the identification of situation. For, among the many definitions of intelligence, one is that faculty of mind by which one is capable of adjusting oneself in a new situation. This means the understanding of the situation that surrounds us. Hence the need of more or less exact observation of conditions and more or less explicit description or formulation of them for future guidance makes our knowledge systematically organised and useable. The necessity for communication with one's fellows is hardly separable even in the abstract from this necessity of prediction and manipulation and it leads to the same attempt at relatively exact description. These two funda-

1. Pratt (James Bissett): The Religious \(\text{Consciousness}\), 1951, p. 23.
mental needs—prediction and communication—determine the nature of science and first of all they determine the scientific facts. Though every fact is not necessarily an object of science, science can be justified in taking cognizance of a proposed fact only on condition—first that it be verifiable by any other persons under similar conditions, and secondly, that it be in some relation to other facts, something which science is able to verify and state in general terms and under some laws and principles.

The three methods stated earlier, employed by science to achieve this systematic view of our world are called Description, Generalization and Explanation. Science affords no reason as to why things must happen regularly. It merely records the facts and gives advice. Any miracle would be an irregularity in nature and prior to experience an irregularity is no more unlikely than regularity. The regularity which is undemonstrable is the presupposition of both science and action. Hence science rightly makes the postulate that there are no miracles—which is no more than saying that science goes at her taste in a courageous spirit and with a sense of responsibility. The practical aims of science forbid its taking cognizance of any thing which is not ultimately explicable by the causal law, of any thing which will not fit into a general description of human experience. Science is for ever limited to data derivable from human experience. The very necessity for verification and communication demands this. In as much as nothing can be communicated to other persons or verified by them but that which is presented to common human experience, science is limited to describing the experience data of human beings and the relation between them. Human experience is not only limited, it is fragmentary. There are gaps within it, or, at least it seems so, and these gaps are very possibly filled out by events not experienced by human being. In fact, impulse is natural to fill in these gaps with creatures of imagination to construct hypothesis as to unexperienced realities conceived of as ‘really’ connecting the parts of our sundered experience. But so long as they are unverified they are not a genuine part of scientific knowledge. They can become such by being actually experienced by true represent-
ative of the race. No one can prove that an unexperienced hypothetical entity is the only solution of a given problem and no other guess is possible. Hence when a scientist proposes any such unverified entity as a gap-filler, he is simply inventing aids to the imagination and the memory, or else he is writing metaphysics. It may be perfectly good metaphysics, but not science. The distinguishing line between the two subjects is—the line dividing verifiable human experience from the hypothetical reality back of it.

Metaphysical hypotheses, though of various sorts historically, are divisible into two main classes—the materialistic and the spiritualistic. "While neither of these hypotheses belong to science, each of them is consistent with scientific aims and procedures so long as the hypothetical, ultra-empirical reality is not conceived as interferring with our experience world in ways that are necessarily incalculable by science". Materialistic hypotheses usually have an advantage over the spiritualistic if judged from this point of view. They fit into the scientific scheme better than the spiritualistic hypotheses usually do because they are framed expressly for the fulfillment of scientific aims. Though very often they are self-contradictory probably, the one or other of these hypotheses is, nevertheless, true. If so, then the ultimate explanation of the phenomenal world, the explanation of our experience as a whole world may be found in this ultimate reality. But this ultimate kind of explanation is not for science, but for philosophy. Science is concerned with the sphere of human experience and her only aim is description.

The fact that the practical aim of science determines its nature, has often been taken in such a rigid fashion as to make natural science almost impossible. Obviously prediction that shall be both absolutely exact and certain is one of the questions which still remains a question mark until the qualitative aspect has been completely rendered to quantitative form, and until all the relations between phenomena have been expressed in purely mathematical terms, in short, induction shall have given place to deduction. This is why Kant des-

paired of psychology because its object could not be expressed mathematically. This is what Lock meant when he despaired of physics because in our ignorance of the “real essence” of any given substance we could not reduce from it its various qualities. If the word science is taken in this strict sense, physics no less than psychology will have none of its actual meaning and there would be no natural sciences; and the only science left as such would be mathematics alone. Therefore the word science is to be taken in a large sense so as to cover any systematic description of the verifiable facts of human experience. However, this does not mean that the aim of prediction is given up.

In the light of this, then, psychology is a genuine, though not a very exact, science. Its aim is to describe mental processes. Psychology describes in the sense of putting its observations into communicable terms, generalizing them into empirical laws, and explaining the particular by the general. In explaining the phenomena it makes use of any known scientific generalization that is suitable to predict psychologically. Some of these are its own record of psychical events and others will be furnished by other sciences. Physiology in this event serves some purpose. There are gaps within the purely psychical field which may be filled out by known physiological events. Physiological events are very important from the point of view of filling the gaps. Titchener stresses, “If we attempted to work out a merely descriptive psychology, we should find that there was no hope for a true science of mind. There would be no unity or coherence in it. In order to make psychology scientific we must not only describe we must also explain mind. If we refuse to explain mind by body, we must accept one or the other of two equally unsatisfactory alternatives. We must either rest content with simple description of mental experience, or must invent an unconscious mind to give coherence and continuity to consciousness. Both courses have been tried. But if we take the first we never arrive at a science of psychology; and if we take the second we voluntarily leave the sphere of facts for the sphere of fiction.”

Commenting on Titchener's view, Marton Prince holds that "conscious mental processes belong no more to the sphere of fiction than do unconscious physiologic processes. Both are simply concepts which we postulate to explain the facts. We simply say that the phenomena occur as if the concepts were true. So far as such concepts satisfactorily explain the phenomena and allow us to predict events we may treat them as true and as the cause of phenomena". So far as the purposes of explanation are concerned it makes little difference, whether we treat unconscious processes as physiologic or as mental; both are concepts, and in this sense only belong to the sphere of fiction, according to Marton Prince.

A series of unconscious mental phenomena are sometimes invented for the same purpose. However, it is immaterial whether such hypothetical events are actually there or not; but they are useful in as much as the concept of them is helpful in linking the actually experienced series, and thus making regularity and prediction at least theoretically possible. Prediction is possible even in psychology. It cannot predict with absolute certainty or mathematical exactness, but it often can tell us what in a given situation one may reasonably expect. It thus enables us to utilize past experience for future action. Psychology cannot go beyond this and in order to be a science, it need not.

Only psychology is capable of systematically explaining and describing the human mind. "To describe the workings of the human mind, so far as these are influenced by its attitude towards the Determiner of Destiny, is the task of the psychology of religion. As its name implies, it means to be psychology that is, it means to be a science". Human experience is the subject of its investigation. Its aim is neither metaphysical nor transcendental. In Germany some exponents, approaching the subject from the theological side, insist that psychology of religion must seek and find in the religious experience a "metaphysical somewhat". But, in fact, transcendental analysis belongs to the philosophy rather than to the psycho-

logy of religion. Psychology of religion like any other science that studies its object, is the study of religious consciousness. Therefore, the psychologist is justified in making use of any material that seems promising. He will probe the most sacred depths of the private experience of individuals as thoroughly as he can. He will search thoroughly the published record of social religious practices and common religious ideas, and the results of these various investigations he will describe, compare, and generalize as completely as possible.

The task of the psychologist may appear relatively simple when stated in this abstract fashion. But difficulty arises when one undertakes it seriously. The relevant problem one has to face is how to get at the material for his study and how much it will be worth when he gets it.

The first of them is a study of individual experiences as portrayed in autobiographies, letters and such other spontaneous expressions by religious persons. The second method is the collection of answers to definite questions from a number of individuals through the use of questionnaires. The third method investigates by history and anthropology, and the sacred literature of various peoples.

The first two of these methods have the advantage of studying religious experience at its source, that is, in the individual soul. To avoid the difficulties met in the third type, some psychologists turn to the more objective and impersonal record of social religion, such as rites, ceremonies and theological concepts of objectivity, of course with all its inherent dangers. It is the real "inwardness" of religion that psychologists wish to know.

The difficulties of the first two methods can be overcome to a considerable extent. It is true that those who regard their religious experiences as sacred will hardly describe them to the psychologists for coldly scientific purposes, but will write out in detail for the edification of the faithful, and psychologists may make use of them freely for interpreting them psychologically. For many of such descriptions are not always superficial to the psychological point of view. Even this questionnaire, if carefully used, may elicit considerable and very reliable information. Pratt supports the questionnaire
methods and suggests collecting the answers through informal conversation. Finally, if the biographical and questionnaire methods be supplemented by a more objective study based on public and social-religious expressions, beliefs, rituals and the like, the psychologists will have at their disposal a very respectable body of facts as the raw material for their work.

Having collected the facts, the psychologist will proceed like other scientists proceeding with their data. He will group and classify his facts and note the general relations between them, thus seeking a systematic and general description of the various facts in the religious consciousness. Whenever possible, he will explain these facts by subsuming them under the laws of general psychology. Thus he will attempt to build up a scientific view of the religious life, interpreting and explaining it by itself and by the known facts and the laws of the human mind 'expounding nature by nature'.

Doubts may arise regarding the practicability of this procedure. It may be asserted that in the religious consciousness at its best we have something that nearly defies explanation by the laws of general psychology. None other than the psychologist himself will appreciate the force of this statement. On comparison, the deeply religious and spiritual persons are found to be possessing something that the non-religious ones lack. It is not that they are morally any better than the non-religious. On the contrary, they cherish a confidence in the universe and an inner joy which the others do not know. He is, probably, no more at home in this world than in the other. He feels that he is in touch, and behaves as if he were in touch, with the larger environment. His attitude towards the cosmos is one of larger hope and greater confidence, and as a result of this, he has an inner source of joy and strength which does not seem dependent on outer circumstance, and which in fact seems greatest at times when outer sources of promise and strength fail. He, therefore, sheds a kind of peace around him which no argument, no animal spirit, and no courage can produce. Now the question arises: wherefrom does this sort of difference come, and on what are these values founded? The immediate answer can be put in psychological terms. The peace and power in question follow, by regular psychological
laws, from a certain form and intensity of belief and a certain emotional experience. Again the question arises as to where-from this belief and this experience come. It is very difficult to trace these back to some precedent situation, because the conditions involved here—social, psychological, physiological—now become really very complex. Despite this, it may be done. But again question may be raised whether the belief involved here is illusory and the experience deceptive, whether a complete and ultimate explanation of them may be given in psychological terms, and if so, whether such an explanation, if known, would not destroy its object.

This is certain that the psychologists who started out on the assumption that every religious phenomenon is to be completely and ultimately explained by psychological laws, would be like a physicist who fails to recognize the possibility of gaps within his field—that there might be links in the chain of causes which from the nature of the case, could never be directly experienced by human beings. It is recognition of such gaps that has led the physicist to the inventions of the many atoms. These, in fact, are not scientific objects; they are devices to enable him more easily to put together the parts of his fragmentary experience.

Are similar gaps also there in the field of religious psychology? This is a question of fact. There are several types of gaps, and in these a connection is hard to find. These gaps may be filled by discovering actual experience, verifiable objects, that make the desired connections. Such examples abound in the explorations of the subconscious by Freud, Prince and many others, thereby bringing such facts to light as connect and hence explain much that before was unconnected. Where this is possible, we must recognize the fact, observe how the several parts vary in relation to each other, and note down resulting generalizations. General psychology has numerous such gaps and it usually seeks to fill them by some more or less ingenious hypothesis of brain physiology. The religious men and the theologians frequently insist that similar gaps exist among the phenomena of religious consciousness in prayer, mystical experience, and conversion in Christianity. But just as the general psychologist, adept as he
is in his business, knows that his physiological hypotheses cannot be genuine objects of his science despite their usefulness until empirically verified, so must the psychologist of religion remember that explanation through the Supernatural, though quite possibly true is not psychology, and that he must confine himself to the verifiable facts of human experience.

The question of the Supernatural so frequently occurs in the study of the psychology of religion that a word in this regard may be pertinent. In short, there are two main views of the Supernatural, and of its relation to the natural—the phenomenal and the numenal.

According to the former, the Supernatural, or the will of God is to be regarded as a cause among other causes, and usually depicted as also acting in ways that are to the human mind forever incalculable. Its ways are not regarded as altogether incalculable, to be sure, but frequently as dependent upon certain well-known conditions of a moral nature. However, there still remains a considerable residuum of inexplicability about its actions, and is described as interfering at unexpected times with the ordinary and regular course of events. Such a view may sound crude but this is held by a large number of religious people, and much can be argued for it.

However, Pratt holds that this view of the Supernatural can hardly be proved false. According to him, there are many seeming gaps in one experience, too much that is unexpected and unaccountable in our lives for us to be able to demonstrate in them an unbroken causal chain. As a matter of fact, to be sure, this view of the Supernatural vis-a-vis the outer world has been largely given up, and with no great harm to the cause of religion. "In the inner world, however, it is still defended and the theologian and the philosopher are perfectly free to accept and vindicate it, but not the psychologist. If the Supernatural breaks in upon the natural, psychology as a science is impossible onwards. The theological explanation is no explanation for the psychologist, because it is not capable of being confirmed by experience. In order to protect its fundamental principles science must act as if this view of the Supernatural and its interruptions of the natural were totally false. It cannot take cognizance of interruptions.
The other view of the Supernatural referred to earlier regard it as the numenal side, the inner being of all Reality the 'Nature Naturans' of Spinoza. It is immanent within the phenomenal world and is expressed by it as really, though probably not so completely, as by any transcendent world. It is a super-natural not in that it interferes with nature but in that it includes and transcends nature. Those, who hold this view, usually deny the existence and necessity of miracle to it.

The regularity of the causal law is regarded as being merely the way God acts. It sees God in order rather than in disorder, in the dependable working of law rather than incaulable interference with law. Thus there is no conflict between it and science. Pratt holds that “an extension of this view might suggest that some of the gaps in the religious experience may possibly be filled by realities and forces in another spiritual world which act according to regular laws, so that the results of the action are as certain and as predictable as the performance of the atoms”.¹ In this way the pragmatic value of the phenomenal view would be retained, because the Supernatural would thus make a difference. Though such a hypothesis would be a metaphysical reality, Pratt, nevertheless, holds that, “it would be perfectly consistent with the scientific view of the religious consciousness”.

Three types of different attitudes are possible towards the breaks that are to be found in experience, both the outer and of the inner world:

(i) We may make the theological hypothesis of Supernatural interference;

(ii) We may invent some other hypothetical intermediary to help us think over the break, e.g., atom, ether, brain-action, the unconscious;

(iii) We may frankly recognise the fact that any such stopgaps are purely hypothetical and beyond our experience, and content ourselves with simply describing the phenomena as we find them, leaving the guesswork for the time being to others.

The third type of attitude, Pratt holds, is the proper one

for the psychology of religion. It is essential to a right understanding of any of the great questions of religion and philosophy as well as those of science. Many cultured religious people have been led to expect that the psychological study of religion can demonstrate any of the truths of theology. Some leading functional psychologists are of the opinion that the psychology of religion can ever so develop as to be in any sense a substitute for philosophy or theology. In the opinion of this school, ethics, aesthetics, logic, epistemology and metaphysics, are ultimately nothing but functional psychology.

Apparently, one comes away wondering, not that they have included so much, but that they have included so little within their capacious science. Physical sciences are nothing but formulation of experience; similarly psychology too is the science of experience. The same arguments hold in the case of physics that held for metaphysics. Surely if the idea of God is subject to the same laws, the mental life, as are all ideas, the same may be said with equal truth of the idea of the solar system. But this may be both fallacy and danger of this pragmatic view. Psychology studies, according to Pratt, the idea of God and the idea of the solar system and stops there. But neither astronomy nor theology means to limit its study to our ideas. Both mean to be objective and none can be denied this privilege. If objectivity be denied to theology, the dangers that inevitably result are evident. Pratt holds that, "theology becomes a purely subjective description of the way we feel, the idea of God is substituted for God and hence becomes the idea of an idea, or a confessed illusion; and the psychology of religion having absorbed all that was objective in religion find it hear nothing left to study, or at least becomes a branch of abnormal psychology". Boutroux has criticised this method which according to him will lead to the abolition of the fact itself. Therefore, the psychology of religion must take a much humbler position than what some of its exponents desire for it. It should content itself with a description of human experience, while recognising that there may be some spheres of reality to which these experiences refer and with which they are possibly connected but which are yet beyond investigation of science. But this does not
mean that the psychology of religion is either valueless as a means. The psychology of religion shares with science its limitation as well as values. If religious people claim for it, it is worth cultivating as a human expression and should be carefully and scientifically studied. If religious values are bound up with each other to any extent and with the rest of life by any law of relationship, it is of great importance to know those laws and how they work. The psychology of religion is still too young to have done sufficiently well in the practical direction. Only in its outlines some surveys have been conducted, and only in a general way the practical religious workers can gain from psychology a knowledge of what to expect in a given case. Exact and perfectly certain prediction is, of course, out of the question. And also what is not possible is that one who would systematically cultivate the religious life could already find a good deal of practical help from the psychology of religion. However, as our knowledge about it increases we may confidently look to it for more and more assistance for the understanding of the facts.

Besides its practical application, the psychology of religion has a value as an end in itself for those who are curious to know and analyse objects. To know and analyse the truth is worthwhile for its own sake. Religion dominates the life of the lowest savage and fills the thought of the most transcendental philosopher. It is the central power of the primitive community and it animates the ideal of the most advanced civilization. Pratt says that, “it is the first thing the child learns at his mother’s knee, as it is the last to fill his mind as he enters the Great Unknown”. The present study is frankly inductive and empirical, and hence, may be, somewhat fragmentary.

It may be relevant and essential here to mention briefly some important types of experiments conducted to study religious facts and its consciousness. The scope of the present study precludes an exhaustive survey of the experimental research conducted so far in the psychology of religion. Only an indication of some specific experiments and their conclusion

1. Pratt (James Bissett): The Religious Consciousness, 1951, p. 43.
will be mentioned here. A reference however must be made before hand of the repercussions of the American view of the psychology of religion on German psychologists and theologians who adhere to its functional view. Out of the various approaches of both the functional analysis of religion, and the classification of the mind’s function, proceeds the implication that “Mental functions are correlative with interests; interests have their roots in instinctive satisfaction..... and therefore ‘an inventory of instinct would be ipso facto a list of the functions of mind’ ”\(^1\). Now the question arises about state of original nature of man that means the part of his nature that is disclosed antecedently to all culture, that is before the mind has performed some of its most characteristic acts\(^2\). The broad mental areas traditionally called instincts are disappearing from the psychological map and in their stead there is appearing a vast indefinite number of narrow adjustment acts. For example, Thorndike says that, “reaching is not simple instinct but includes at least three somewhat different responses to three very different situations\(^3\). Thus in going back in our mental history there is difficulty of functional classification unless we look forward as well as backward. On the other hand, the very minuteness and rigour of Thorndike’s analysis reveal certain general, forward-looking tendencies. Thus there is a tendency to be or become conscious; there is an original love of sensory life for its own sake\(^4\). There is spontaneous preference for experiences in which there is mental control; finally there is a native capacity of learning\(^5\), of various mental functions. There are four fundamental preferential functions determined by Thorndike, J.E. Creighton and Coe (i) to be conscious, (ii) satisfaction attached to mere movement of attention from one object to another as in ‘love of sensory life for its own sake’, that is to multiply its objects, (iii) control of objects and (iv) arrangement of objects in system function of mind to unify its

objects\textsuperscript{1}. If they are analysed further we find some sort of value categories relating to fact that ethical, noetic, religious and even economic values presuppose a function and each of these values depends upon the existence of society of inter-
communicating individuals. Thus another preferential function which may be recognised is the function of being social. Viewing these functions of mind, Coe holds that finally, religion is without a place in the list drawn up by him regarding the preferential functions, because it offers no particular value of its own. Religion is not coordinate with other interests but is rather a movement of reinforcement, unification, and re-
valuation of values as a whole, particularly in social terms\textsuperscript{2}.

Starbuck’s “Psychology of Religion” and James “Varieties of Religious Experience” aroused interest in Germany that concerns the task and method of the psychology of religion. They also arouse criticism, on the other hand, from theolo-
gians for the method oriented toward the American approach. Wundt regarded James’ contribution as not psychology but an extract from a pragmatic philosophy of religion. In fact, American writings on the psychology of religion have, as a whole, a common characteristic with respect to method. In one form or the other, with a few exceptions they assume that psychological analysis applies to function as well as to struc-
ture. They conceive their task as analysis of a certain phase of the struggle to live. They ask as to how this struggle gives rise to religion, and what religion contributes to the struggle. Here is an attempt at a dynamic view. It tends to make the psychology of religion talk about life in concrete terms like those of ordinary conversation. If as a consequence, Starbuck uses religious terms where we should have liked to use those of psychology, and if James offers the testimony of individuals as a finality where we think further analysis is possible, these are not essentials of method, but instances of failure to use it adequately. The notion of function in the valuational sense is still a new one in scientific psychology and it is in the process of development. Though it cannot reach its own full develop-

\begin{enumerate}
\item Coe (George Albert): \textit{The Psychology of Religion}, 1916, p. 39.
\end{enumerate}
ment as a psychological concept without presupposing the personal selves that are implied in conversation and in friendship, this is not equivalent to admitting transcendental principles into empirical science. It is at most an extension of empirical with respect to human desire and motive, and to what men mean by their will acts.

Wundt's magnificent contribution to the psychology of early mythological and religious ideas is, to us, associated with certain positive conceptions of method and point of view. The final source of religion for him, as for most American writers, is man's appreciation of what helps and hinders in the struggle to live. The psychical spring of the whole mythological complex is not why or how but some immediate relation to man's weal and woe. But the circle of mythological notions having once been formed by the common mind, we have therein, it appears, the whole psychological explanation of religion. At least Wundt is sure that the psychology of religion must be genetic and that genetic psychology is the psychology of the early man. Thus Wundt's views about man's first developed functions are somehow more explanatory than his later ones, and a group mind can be source of religion in a sense in which an individual mind cannot. This is evident from his investigations about the psychological explanation advanced by Wundt in his researches and observations. But Coe questions this view. There seems to be no ground whatever for the assumption that early steps in an evolution are explanatory in a sense in which later steps are not. Coe further expresses, "Nor do I see any evidence for, but a great deal of evidence against, the notion that the struggle to live merely repeats itself upon the same plane. In other words, while Wundt adopts a functional point of view for the first crude impulses that express themselves in mythology and there asserts his use of functional method, there is need that the method be affected through the entire evolution of religion and to the experiences of individuals as well as to the thought forms of early group". However, on scientific grounds of explanation about the origin of religious consciousness Wundt's view is more appealing and factual as far as initial stages of development of religion are
concerned. However, after a careful examination of the views of Wundt in detail, it is also revealed that Wundt is more interested in ideation structure and history than in the functions involved.

The Approach to Religion in Different Schools of Psychology

There is hardly any complete psychological theory to which one can turn with any assurance that it contains even a minimum of accepted opinion. It is not possible to study the psychology of religion by reading books directly upon that subject and no others. Some general reading in psychology, with a critical appreciation of storage and weak points of different schools of thought among psychologists, is indispensable for any real understanding of the problems involved in its study. From this point of view it is essential to describe the views and arguments of different schools of psychology about the origin and development of religion and its nature. The starting point is descriptive. The first business of it is to observe and record the facts. These facts are then used to build up a general controlling proposition or hypothesis which can be used and tested in making further observations. It is important to distinguish hypothesis from facts. The so-called unconscious, for instance, is a hypothesis. It is very valuable in the elucidation of many of the observed facts, and of the greatest practical importance in the treatment of the neurosis, but is not itself a fact for it cannot be brought directly under observation. The method employed by psychologists is that of experiment and observation, with the results capable of comparison and statistical analysis, coupled with the reports given through introspection. Psychologists differ widely as to the extent they admit the validity of the evidence of introspection. It is sometimes held, as in the earlier developments of Behaviourism, that consciousness is an irrelevance and that no facts are valid as evidence except those which can be observed, measured and recorded. This practically reduces psychology to the study of bodily reactions and responses, and makes it

distinguishable in principle from physiology. It is obvious that for psychology of this type almost every significant development in religion is likely to be an irrelevance, to be dismissed, as J.B. Watson, the apostle of Behaviourism, did. But it is quite clear that the data in introspection, if used rightly, must be very useful and of primary importance. Even the observed and record results of experiment cannot be of any use unless somebody is aware of them. And the accompanying feelings of various sorts, impulses, desires, emotions and effects generally are most certainly facts, whatever may be the difficulty of studying them with experimental precision. Analytical psychology could not have become an important school of thought in psychology were it not for the report given by the person whose dreams and other psychological symptoms are under analysis. Therefore, psychology is to be assumed in principle a descriptive science, taking into account both the material available for direct observation and for experimental and statistical treatment and also the material made available by the reports of introspection. It should be noted further that empirical science is capable of being developed practically in various directions of human activities. It is also an art as is evident from its application in the field of education and psychotherapy. There are many types of mental activities and operation of which the ends are determined in accordance with values of which psychology proper can afford no account. From this point of view the approaches of different schools of psychology need to be discussed so as to determine what religion means to them and what are the sources of its origin and why human beings are religious.

Contemporary psychological theory is far from uniform. Psychology up to very recent times has been held so rigidly under the dominance of both traditional religion and philosophy—the two great bulwarks of mediaevalism that it could not free itself to become a natural science. Chemistry and Physics have freed themselves. Zoology and physiology are now in the process of becoming emancipated. Psychologists are divided to a greater extent than are the physicists or biologists. Psychological systems differ in methods of research, in the selection of problems to be studied and in conclusion
drawn up. When psychologists, like all other scientists, form theories of general and comprehensive systems of interpretation, empirical findings, the differences among them are quite apparent. In the late sixties of the nineteenth century an attempt was made to make an experimental science of psychology and it was claimed that the psychology growing out of this attempt had become a science without soul—that is, a natural science, though this claim could not be substantiated. Its subject matter was not objective and the reason for its failure was largely of its subject matter and choice of method. "Psychology limited its subject matter to the so-called state of consciousness, their analysis and synthesis. States of consciousness like the so-called phenomena of spiritualism are not objectively verifiable and for the reason can never become data for science". In all other sciences the facts of observation are objectively verifiable and can be reproduced and controlled by all trained observers. That is, data of science verified observation are common property and the methods of science are the same in principle, however, much they may vary in form. There is, however, among the true natural science of division of labour and division of need. Psychology, on the other hand, as a science of 'Consciousness' has no such community of data. It cannot share them nor can other science use them. The method of introspection—the looking inward to see what goes on in one's mind—has been the principal method employed by structural psychologists. This use of introspection as its principal method by the psychologists has proved another serious hindrance to the progress of psychology as a science according to Watson, the great exponent of Behaviourism.

As regards differences in approach, in the second and third decades of our century, these differences reached a climax. Psychological theory looked like a huge field covered by several independent groups, some fighting one another, while some oblivious of the existence of others. It seemed that there was no room for psychology, instead, several psychologists,

independently pursuing their own causes, working their way through with minimum or no cooperation with each other occupied the stage. Contemporary psychologists, however, witness the encouraging phenomena of rapprochement between the respective schools. Though we are still much away from a generally accepted psychological theory and still divided into groups of disciples of Freud, Adler, Jung, Goldstein, Hull, Kohler, Lewin, Pavlov, Skinner, Tolman and others, an ever growing desire to lean from one another is predominant today, specially in American Psychology. There is a growing body of empirical evidence both experimental and clinical and an increasing desire to stick to it\(^1\). Psychologists belonging to various schools of thought have agreed to respect the contributions made by their adversaries.

Therefore the study of similarities and differences between the various systems seems to be both timely and useful from the point of view of judging the theory of each of the schools of psychology concerning the origin and growth of religion from different angles.

**Behaviouristic School of Psychology and Religion**

Behaviourism attempts to find principles underlying changes in behaviour. Behaviouristic psychology attempts to formulate through systematic observation and experimentation and generalisations, laws and principles which underly man’s behaviour. When a human being acts—does something with arms, legs or vocal cords—there must be an invariable group of antecedents serving as a cause of the act\(^2\). Watson uses the term ‘situation’ or ‘stimulus’ for this group of antecedent as a convenient term. Psychology is thus confronted according to Watson, immediately with two problems—the one predicting the probable causal situation or stimulus giving rise to the response, the other, given the situation of predicting the probable response.

“The man who crossed the bridge and closed the gap between the study of animal behaviour and the study of human

behaviour was John Broadus Watson" said Wolman. Watson's system is based upon determinism, empiricism, and environmentalism and these four principles guided him with great consistency in his research work. His psychological system is such that, "given the stimulus, psychology can predict what the response will be, or on the other hand, given the response, it can specify the nature of the effective stimulus". The goal of psychological study thus, according to Watson, is the ascertaining of such data and laws. In accordance with radical empiricism he rejected anything that could not be observed from without. He held that psychology must discard all references to consciousness in which mental states cannot be objects of observation. He proposes a psychology that takes as a starting point first, the observable facts of that organisms, man and animal alike, do adjust themselves to their environment by means of hereditary and habit equipment. Watson's psychology dealt without observable behaviour of the organism. He hoped that all human behaviour could be interpreted in physical and chemical terms. Psychology, according to the Behaviourists, is a purely objective, experimental branch of natural science which needs introspection as little as do sciences of chemistry and physics. It is granted that the behaviour of animals can be investigated without appeal to consciousness. The behaviour of man and the behaviour of animal must be considered on the same plane, has been stressed by the Behaviouristic School of psychology. This suggests complete elimination of states of consciousness as a proper object of investigation. In his pragmatic book Watson wrote "Psychology as a science of consciousness has no community of data. The reader will find no discussion of consciousness and no reference to such terms as sensation, perception, attention, image, will and the like". Thus behaviourism is nearer to the dialectical materialism of Karl Marx who was critical of mechanistic materialistic theories and held that, "consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence. . . ." It is not consciousness that determines life but life that tried to combine the philosophy of Marx, Engels and Lenin with the experimental studies of Pavlov and Bekhterev.

One of these two tendencies was represented by an
extremely mechanistic approach in which physiology was expected to be substituted for psychology. This crude mechanistic-materialistic philosophy, mostly influenced by Bekhterev, led to the belief that consciousness is a product of the inhibitions of the capitalistic system and will wither under socialism. Soviet Behaviourist Yenchman established a group of psychologists who aimed at the "liquidation of the consciousness which was an illusory deceptive product of the capitalistic class system". The club of these psychologists hoped that "through a correct socialistic peripheral uninhibited living, consciousness could be more quickly liquidated". This idea of Yenchman was in a way an over simplification of Bekhterev's concept of consciousness. Until 1915 there was no mention of conditioning in Watson's work and in 1920 he reported condition of gears in humans. He also admitted the existence of innate instincts and emotions but limited them to a very few relatively simple responses—fear, rage and love. In 1925 he discarded completely the instinct theory and came under the influence of Z.Y. Kao who believed that all human behaviour is learned. Watson took a radical environmentalism stand in the nature-nurture controversy and did not deny the fact that certain patterns of human behaviour were innate though they were unimportant in comparison to the rule of experience. He believed that instinct was a hereditary pattern reaction, the separate elements of which are movements principally of the stripped muscles.

Watson divided all human behaviour into explicit and implicit. Explicit behaviour included all observable activities, such as walking, talking, smiling etc. and implicit behaviour included the secretion of glands, visceral and nature function etc. Sensation and perception presented some difficulties for behaviourism. Introspectionists tried to interpret these phenomena with the help of the descriptions given by the perceiving subjects. Behaviourists rejected the notion of "sensation" because no one can observe another person's sensations. What can be observed is the response to certain stimulus, be it visual, auditory or olfactory. Watson suggested the verbal report as the way-out in the controversy with introspectionists.
Another biosocial behaviourist who defended reductionism as behaviourism was Albert P. Weiss. He supported the ban of the conscious, mentalism and introspection from the realm of psychology. He emphasized the biological and social component of the behaviouristic analysis. According to him, human organism is not only biological but social, that is, biosocial. To study the impact of social forces upon human behaviour is the most important function of psychology as suggested by Weiss. The problem of consciousness was dealt with in a different manner by Edward B. Holt of behaviouristic school of psychology. He did not discuss the term 'consciousness' or 'conscious' and suggested relating it to epistemological realism which believes that objects are as perceived even when they are not perceived by us. The conscious would mean an adjustment of sensorimotor apparatus to the perceived object.¹ Walter S. Hunter suggested to substitute another name which would better represent the new science of human behaviour. This is as 'anthroponomy' as a science of laws that govern human behaviour. According to him, "Psychology seems to describe and explain, to predict and control, the extrinsic behaviour of the organism to an external environment which is predominantly social". Hunter has tried to substitute environment for the conscious following the environmental orientation of behaviour.

From the above discussion of the concept of psychology of behaviouristic school, it is revealed that there is no religious consciousness nor there is any inner craving for religion. There are two terms in common use in psychology of religion which need explanation. These are 'religious consciousness' and 'religious experience' according to R.H. Thouless. The religious consciousness is that part of religion which is present to the mind and is open to explanation by introspection. It is the mental side of religious activity—religious element in religious consciousness—the feelings which lead to religious belief or effects of religious behaviour. Behaviourists adopt the wholly unsatisfactory attitude that psychology is concerned

¹ Wolman (Benjamin B.): *Contemporary Theories and System in Psychology*, 1960, p. 86.
with the study of overt behaviour only with this view that psychology is a natural science and within its purview what can be observed is to be studied to make it empirical. Behaviourists under the leadership of Watson held that religion is a matter of biology and nothing more. In the behaviouristic realm of psychology it is held that consciousness is an irrelevance and that no facts are valid as evidence except those which can be observed, measured, and recorded. This practically reduces psychology to the study of bodily reactions and responses and makes it distinguishable in principle from physiology. The main business of the psychology of religion is to study the religious consciousness. But it is impossible to study that alone; one must investigate religious behaviour also which is one of the aspects of the method of study of religion experimentally based on data observable.

Since, behaviour of human beings is the central object of the study of psychology in behaviourism, it is one of the appropriate methods of study of religion. Religion alone can not be only a study of only subjective aspect of it; several other elements involved in being religious are evidence of religious attitude and faiths as religion is not a matter of any one department of psychic life. Religion involves the whole man. Three factors—a mode of behaviour, a system of intellectual beliefs and a system of feelings are the essential basis to interpret religious phenomena. Action, feeling and knowledge, three account for religion. Accurately used in the language of psychology as conation, effect and cognition, these are always present in religion. The conative aspect of religion corresponds to the behaviour pattern involved in religion and thus this aspect of study of religion to ascertain the religiosity through observation, and experimentation. William James in his opening chapter of Gifford Lectures, remarked in his table of contents that, "primarily religion is a biological reaction", though he did not mean it seriously. He only meant that religious behaviour, like any other behaviour of a living organism, can be considered biologically and that such consideration is basic to the whole enquiry. His actual criterion derived ultimately from the Liberal Protestant tradition of Ritschl and more directly from his own environment in
American Methodism, which stresses the ethical and effective aspect of religion. The subject matter of psychology was originally conceived as the soul or psyche, but this introduces a metaphysical complication at the outset. It is simplest to regard it as the science of behaviour of human and animal with special emphasis upon the human. For this purpose, the term ‘behaviour’ must be used in its fullest sense covering not merely the external movements and responses. It includes the accompanying changes of mood, and feeling, the levels of awareness and the whole rational and cognitive system which accompanies our physical activities.

In behaviouristic outlook of psychology the environment factor has been held important in moulding the behaviour pattern of child whom behaviourism deems to be only a biological product during its early period of development. Watson, the chief exponent of behaviourism, claims to make a child any type of specialist. In the light of this fact at least in a given environment whether a child is religious or not, may be studied scientifically, and also in what environment there is conducive atmosphere to create religiosity in society and human beings as well. However, Spinks opposed any behaviouristic point of view on religion, and held that, “it repudiates all study of the mind as being non-experimental concept. For this reason it is not possible to accept any behaviourist verdict on religion. Whatever religion involves, it clearly involves a consideration of how man’s mind reacts to and formulates explanations of the content of experience and its environment”

Spinks further points out that religion includes at least three factors—belief, feeling and behaviour which include things done and things not to be done, ritual and taboo, no single one of which can operate by itself. Though behaviour and acts of human beings are the essential and sound objects to study religious phenomena, deeper levels of consciousness can only be studied by taking into account the subjective aspect of mental activities. Wilhelm Wundt did not believe that involved mental processes could be studied by the experi-

mental method. The lower mental processes, according to Wundt, can be studied by experiments that follow strictly the pattern set by physiological experiments, but no higher mental processes can be studied in the same way. Though behaviourism introduced a precise method of observation of overt behaviour having little concern involved in religious phenomena, it can be used as method of scientific study of religion so far as conative aspect of religion is concerned.

Gestalt School of Psychology: Approach to Religion

The year 1912 saw the first announcement of the important school of psychology when the debate between structuralists and functionalists had begun to die down. McDougall's purposivism first emerging into view received its full formation in 1912. The cleavage between Freud and his two adherents Adler and Jung took definite shape and Freud began to revise his later theories in the same year. Thus this year was an epoch-making year in the history of psychology. It so happened that three young German psychologists who had previously been together for years as research associates at the University of Berlin, were again located in and near the city of Frankfurt. These psychologists were Max Wertheimer (1880-1942), Karl Koffka (1886-1941), and Wolfgang Kohler. Wertheimer had shown how the free association test could be used for the detection of an individual's hidden knowledge as in examining persons suspected of crime. Koffka had done very important work on imagery and thought. Kohler had specialised effectively on problems of hearing.

These three psychologists were profoundly dissatisfied with the dominant psychology represented by Wundt—"the brick and mortar psychology". They also did not share Watson's disgust with all introspection. Quite contrarily, they believed that excellent psychological data could be gained from, "direct experience" and that dynamics of behaviour was more clearly revealed in direct experience than external observation. They founded a new school of thought known as the Gestalt Psychology, already introduced by an Austrian philosopher—psychologist Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932) who in 1890 brought the problem of shape out into the open,
which he called a Gestalt quality or form quality that is present in whole but not present in any parts making up the whole. The theory of the Austrian Gestalt school was rejected by the Berlin School of the Gestalt psychology, which argued that a higher level mental process of combining and constructing was not required in simple cases of seeing or hearing patterns because sensory process itself is a process of organisation. Sensations are not raw materials. The stimuli reaching the sense organs are raw materials unorganised, and uncombined. Sensations are self organising or the sensory field as a whole is self-organising. This school of thought has contributed much to our understanding of knowledge of perception: we perceive as a whole not as parts.

In fact, the Gestalt psychology sprang up from the study of chimpanzees by Kohler as a product of his internment on Teneriff during the first World War. Later, it was taken up by other followers, Kohler himself and Koffka in particular, into an elaborate system of detailed experimental psychology. The general principle underlying it is that of the dynamic influence of wholeness or pattern, always pressing towards fulfilment in the pursuit of desired end. The analysis of this observation was followed up by many experiments with animal and with man, and it has become clear that this dynamic tendency towards fulfilment and wholeness is one with which any future psychologists must reckon. The theory of Gestalt has already been applied to educational psychology in teaching children in which children learn through free response to graded toys, games and situations. This theory was applied by Madam Montessori in education. Thus though its practical and experimental value is considerable, it is not clear what bearing it comes to have upon the psychology of religion which is a very complex mental activity in the whole of man. Taking into account individual religion, wherein there should be multiplicity and variety of individuals in the manifold of God’s creation, our account of the condition under which conflict arises can be greatly enriched by adding to it the hypo-

thesis and experimental evidence of the Gestalt psychology\textsuperscript{1}. This school of psychology provides a detailed study of the ways in which the wholeness of pattern seeks to assert itself with a kind of dynamic energy in its self-expression. It is legitimate to see this dynamism of wholeness as making itself evident upon the large scale character formation and the integration of personal selves quite as clearly as in the smaller details of behaviour with which experimentalists can more easily deal. The real nature of this dynamism remains, of course, wholly unexplained\textsuperscript{a}. But as far as its principle of dynamic influence of pattern always pressing towards fulfilment in the pursuit of desired end is concerned, religion can be studied as a means of wish fulfilment, intellectual satisfaction and curiosity, and as a sense of consolation which men seek to achieve through religion. Further, in a given situation, man may develop different religious concepts and imagination about some power to help them in their helplessness and disappointment. This power they regard to be God or some Supreme being controlling the whole universe with some purposive notice.

**Personalistic Psychology**

W. Stern (1871-1938) offered his personalistic psychology to the world in 1906 just a few years after the self-psychology of Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930) made its appearance on the scene of contemporary psychology. Stern’s great ambition had ever been to develop a philosophy that should reconcile the atomistic tendency of science with the human demand for real values of the world, i.e. that should integrate mechanism and teleology. Like Calkins, he believed that concept of person made this reconciliation and integration possible. The person has unity, values and purpose. The person is a whole of many parts, “unitas multiplex”. Taken part by part, the person can and should be studied mechanistically i.e., in terms of cause and effect and the interaction of different factors, but taken as a whole he can be understood only in terms of purpose, goals, and values. Each person has

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. Grensted (L.W.): *The Psychology of Religion*, 1952, pp. 82-83.

\textsuperscript{a} Op. cit., p. 83.
an environment selected by himself to some extent and it is characteristic of a person to be in active relation to his environment. There are three levels of relations, according to Stern, between the individual and his environment; the biological level of nutrition, etc., the psychological levels of conscious experience, and the valuation level which Stern regards as the province of philosophy. Psychology, he holds, is concerned with conscious experience. Stern criticises the view of Gestalt psychology, for its emphasis on shape or configuration only and neglecting the important role of the non-Gestalt, the shapeless. According to him, visual figures, so much used by the Gestalt psychologists, are not suited to bring out the whole range of psychological dynamics. Feeling, according to Stern, as personal background experience has a great variety of shades and tones. It is shapeless but still has much influence on behaviour.

Stern, Spranger, and Gestalt and the Field theory of Kurt Lewin were very much influenced by Wilhelm Dilthey whose approach was different from experimentalists. He distinguished between explanatory and descriptive psychology. According to him, structural unity of the mind should be the main consideration of psychology. The man as a whole is its subject matter. Natural sciences explain nature in terms of cause and effect. Psychology sees the totality of life in the inner experience. According to him, explanatory psychology is unable to see what poetry, or autobiography or art or religion has been. He wanted to bring psychology closer to history, ethics, literature, art and religion. Dilthey pointed out the limitations of experimental psychology patterned on contemporary physics and mathematical inferences, and held that experimental psychology does not cover the entire area of the human mind. Psychological laws, wrote Dilthey, are pure laws of form; they deal with the formal side of human actions and dispositions and do not deal with the content of the human mind. He was opposed to reductionism of those psychologists who assumed physiological causes and stressed that generalization is the only permissible way of conclusion from what was given in the empirical observations. In accordance with Kant, Dilthey divided all mental acts or
attitudes into cognition, affection and volition which are the dominant elements involved in the religious activities of man. Dilthey held that the unity of life is teleological and in the whole teleological system particular functions work together to produce states which somehow have in consciousness the character of values and ends. According to Dilthey, all human studies require psychological knowledge and "any study of religion leads to the analysis of concepts such as feeling, will dependence, freedom, motivation, all these concepts must be interpreted in a psychological context". Dilthey did not accept the idea of a priori values. According to him, values are merely an expression of emotional attitude of humans. He also rejected the idea of transcendental ethics. Human beings strive to protect and improve their lives. All the cultural systems, the isotonic life, law, religion, art and science, the various forms of social organisation such as the family, community, church, state, are products of the functions of the human mind and, in final analysis, they can be understood only in the terms of the mind. Dilthey's analysis reveals that religion is a mental activity which comes within the purview of psychological studies but the methods of study of natural sciences cannot be of great value in tracing its genesis. Religion and its values depend upon attitudes of human beings. It is purposive and fulfils some purpose in the life of individuals.

Edward Spranger who implemented Dilthey's idea of psychology based upon understanding, was an important personalistic psychologist to view religion that can be studied if molar psychology is taken into account whose subject matter is the human mind and its total structure. He doubted the possibility of objective study in psychology. He held that psychology should describe and understand the totality of human actions rather than dealing with their fragments. His theory was, in fact, a theory of mental acts, but these mental

acts were closed and goal-directed entities. Spranger's emphasis upon the molar approach led him to seek total situations to which the total individual would relate himself. These situations were the cultural values found by Spranger in his society. Each mental act, according to him, has a goal and is directed to certain aspects of cultural life. Culture, whether art or religion, or Science, he held, is the sum of products of the human mind. The various cultural aspects of mental life represent a choice of goals. As such, history, not laboratory, is the proper place for the study of the human mind. Since experimental psychology is forced to look beyond its empirical data and interprets them by referring psychological phenomena to psychology, Spranger pointed out that human life cannot be understood in physiological terms. He held that understanding means to grasp in a meaningful way the mental relationship which are perceived in an objectively valid cognition. Meaning is a complexity which represents a total value. Spranger distinguished six human goal-directed patterns related to six areas of culture, namely Scientific theory, aesthetics, economic life, religion, sociability and power politics. Spranger suggested six ideal types which represent six types of philosophies of life. No human being is entirely devoted to a single value or a single goal, and no individual can be classified as a pure type.

According to him the religious type is a mystic who seeks unity between man and universe. His main consideration is inner truth and harmony. His approach to life is based on contemplation and search for eternal unity with the cosmos. Spranger's emphasis on relatedness of personality types to cultural areas has greatly influenced many psychologists including G.W. Allport, Alfred Adler, Karl Horney, Erich Fromm and Kurt Lewin and others. But Wolman criticises his system of values and personality types which Spranger arbitrarily set. According to Wolman, Spranger's use of the term "value" is ambiguous and his choice of six values is not representative of the total number of goals, aims and achievements. Value means, according to Wolman, something leading to a goal describing the usefulness of a certain thing as a means towards a goal.
Wilhelm Stern made synthesis of experimentalism and humanism. His synthesis did not aim at an eclecticism, rather it was a genuine effort to reconcile opposites and to overcome dichotomies such as body-soul, nature-culture and associationism wholism.

Stern distinguished three modalities of life which form the personality of human beings. The first is biological. On this level the individual's validity is dominant. The total of the individual is his biosphere. The second modality is life experience. Experience is 'life under cleavage and tension'. The content of experience is called phenomenon. Having an experience is a mental state. The third level or modality of life is absent in plant and animal. It is purely human and represents culture, social, moral and religious values. The individual accepts the social norms and standards, the moral code and cultural values of his social environment. This process is called by Stern introception. It resembles Freud's concept of 'superego' formed by introjection and identification. Experience has, according to Stern, an intermediate position between biological vitality and cultural introception. This means that religiosity is the product of social environment and religious attitudes develop on account of social actions and reactions. The personality factor is also one of the basic psychological elements to give rise to religious consciousness and religious mode of living among individuals.

The problem of nomothetic versus idiographic approach to psychological research has been analysed by two outstanding psychologists in America, Allport and Lewin. Both Lewin and Allport owe many ideas to Stern and may be considered the American representatives of the personalistic school of thought. Allport holds that within a given culture, people tend to develop 'roughly comparable' ways of behaviour or modes of adjustment. Yet any two individuals never behave in the same way. Each represents a unique case and is an idiophenomenon. Human behaviour is idiographic and, despite this, lawful. Behaviour is a continuous flow of energy, each successive act representing a convergent mobilization of all energy available at the moment, holds Allport. He suggested using the term 'drive' instead of McDougall's instinct or
propensity. There is no need of involving genetic factor to explain human behaviour. Allport accepted Stern's idea that personality was 'Unitas multiplex' and tried to assess basic factors of the 'Unitas'. The emphasis was laid on acquired goal-directed factor which he calls acquired determinants of human traits. Human behaviour is determined by a totality of factors acting at a given time. Allport and P.E. Vernon elaborated a method of measuring personality based on Spranger's topology, called 'study of values'.

The latest development in American psychology, personalism, has more in store for us about religious consciousness as mental activity revealed from the study of personality. Allport has given in his famous work 'The Individual and his Religion (1951)' a most valuable survey of the different expressions of religion in people of varying types and environments. The movement started in America regarding the study of psychology of personality was based on principles representing human mind in general. The main point of this reaction was its insistence upon the individual and the need for a psychological study of differences between individuals. For this purpose the normal methods of experimental psychology were employed in full, direct interpretation being preferred to statistical evaluation of the observed results of the experimental work. Allport's book is very largely a product of the highly organised psychological study of personality from religious point of view conducted at the Harvard University. It represents what is probably the most thorough and broadly based analysis of all that goes to make individual human personality as we meet it in ourselves and others. Religion appears in Allport's analysis as one of the unifying philosophies of life and the most comprehensive of them all. The other five, the aesthetic, the theoretical, the economic, the social and the political, all fall short of it in one respect or another, their main defect being their failure to do justice to the individual as such.

As to the validity of the presuppositions of religion and status of its fundamental aims, Allport, keeping strictly within psychological limits, does not presume to decide. But the insistence upon the importance of the individual is clearly a
matter vital to religion and here the American School of personalistic psychologists, is following with much more comprehensive methods, a lead given earlier by the analytical psychologists. Alfred Adler whose ‘Individual psychology’ first published in English in 1924, represents a development of Freud’s analytical theories already well established before 1914. One remarkable point that Allport has revealed, is the relationship between religion and various personality tendencies and needs. Virtually every human desire finds expression, at one time or another, in one individual or another, in religious beliefs and behaviour. The complex and varying conceptions of the deity, as Allport points out, indicate the multiplicity of human needs that become involved in religion. God is the source of security and strength. He is cosmic perfection. Albert expresses, “when we need affection, God is love; knowledge. He is omniscient, consolation. He granteth peace that passeth understanding. When we have sinned, He is the Redeemer; when we need guidance, the Holy spirit. Divine attributes plainly conform to the panorama of desire, although the individual is seldom aware that his approach to his deity is determined by present needs”.

Closely associated with the ‘function-dysfunction’ of religious connection with social integration is the relationship between religion and the need of the individual member of a society. This is one of the major elements in a functional approach to religion.

The most significant one of the various personality tendencies with which religion everywhere grapples, is the fear of death. Henri Bergson believes this to be the second major source of static religion. He writes, “Religion is a defensive reaction of nature against the representation, by intelligence, of the inevitability of death”.

Malinowski has pointed out in his famous work, “Science, Religion and Reality” that the savage is intensely afraid of death, probably as the result of some deep seated instincts common to man and animal. Yinger

does not support Malinowski's statement and says that fear of death is not a universal emotion, though religious systems everywhere are involved in the way individual and societies grapple with the problem of death. This does not imply an instinctive origin of fear of death nor does this imply that a belief in immortality is universally the way in which the religious meets the fact of death. But everywhere, the way in which man meets the problem of death is in the realm of the sacred. Yinger thinks that one of the most fundamental of the efforts of religion is to rescue individuals and societies from the destructive force of death. One of the functions of religion is to solve the personality needs that come from the fact of death. This is why Yinger stresses that the theory of religion must combine the analysis of societal and personality systems.

Russian School of Psychologists and their Approach to Religion

Russian psychologists tried very hard to combine the philosophy of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and V.I. Lenin with the experimental studies of Pavlov and V.M. Bekhterev. One of the two tendencies of Soviet psychology was represented by an extremely mechanistic approach in which physiology was expected to be substituted for psychology. This mechanistic materialistic philosophy mostly influenced by Bekhterev led to the belief that, “Consciousness is a product of the inhibition of the capitalistic system and will wither under socialism”. Bekhterev offered a most radical solution to the body-soul problem and physical energy was its answer. His materialistic solution encompassed both organic and inorganic nature and presented matter and psyche as phenomena of the same mechanical energy. He believed the consciousness or unconsciousness to be one of the states of energy. Yenchman who was a Soviet behaviourist, aimed at the liquidation of the consciousness. His ideas were based on an oversimplification of Bakhterev's concepts of consciousness.

In the early thirties most of the Soviet psychologists gave
up the naive materialism and tried to develop a psychological theory on the foundations of the dialectical materialism as expounded in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Dialectical materialism does not reduce psychological processes to physiology. Peter explained how a shift from biology towards the social sciences the trend in psychology follows: "Psychologists became increasingly aware that men were very different from animals not because they had a soul which animals did not have, but because they had a very complex social environment. They began to appreciate the large elements of truth in Marx's saying that it is not the consciousness of man that determines his existence but social existence that determines his consciousness". But Marx's influence upon psychology is much deeper than is stated by Peter, because Marx's theory emphasized the two way process in the man-nature relationship. Marx held that the distinctive character of social development as opposed to natural processes of development lies in the fact that human consciousness is involved and human beings "actively participate in making their own history by acting on the external world and changing it, man changes his own nature". There is a bipolar process according to Marx who was critical of mechanistic materialistic doctrine. Marx held that "Men are producers of their concepts. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence... It is not consciousness that determines life but life that determines consciousness". Engels wrote in 1877 that thought and consciousness "are products of the human brain and man himself is a product of nature". Lenin was critical of Bekhterev and supported Pavlov because Bekhterev was obviously representative of naive materialism. In order to create a truly Marxist psychology, Vygotskii, Laria, Leontyev and others developed a psychological system related to the history of culture. Their approach resembled that of Spranger and Dilthey, but in the vein of the materialistic

philosophy of history of Karl Marx. The Soviet "Kulturny psychologists" tried to relate the development of the human psyche to consecutive socio-economic states of development. The history of mankind in its economic aspects was regarded by Luria, Leontyev, Vygotskii and others as the frame of reference for psychology. Human mind was adapting itself to the economic development. These studies utilized Marx's philosophy of history, the Gestalt "Sign" theory and Pavlov's conditioning, with the emphasis put on Marxian concept of human psyche as a "super-structure" which reflects the more basic material and economic foundation of life and in return influences these foundations.

But the cultural school in Soviet psychology failed in the solution of the Soma-psyche problem. "The Marxist conception of the psychestaitis with a recognition of the fact that the psyche or consciousness is a product of the brain and is a reflection of the outside world, which means that psychic phenomena are derivative from and dependent upon, physical reality while the latter is independent of the psyche and primary, because the outside world by its very nature is material and develop according to the laws governing the movement of matter.

Marx was very critical of religion and emphasized the precept that man is the supreme being for man. Marx says: "Religion is only the illusory sun that revolves around man so long as he has not yet begun to revolve around himself."2 By revolving around himself, Marx means that he insists upon actualizing himself qua man, becoming what he essentially is instead of losing himself in the religious dream of self-actualization. The fantasy life of religion is a psycho-self-realization. Man does not become himself, he merely dreams about it. "It is the fantastic realization of the human being, since the human being possesses no true reality."2 So the life of man in religion is an acceptance of the shadow of self-realization

2. Mega 1/1, p. 608.
3. Ibid., p. 607.
in lieu of the substance, the seeming in the lieu of the being. Similar critical view of traditional religion may be taken by others. Thus a wide diversity of proposals for new ways to believe integration of society and to free man from self-alienation, ranging from "Scientific humanism" to "Scientific Marxism", has been developed from the point of view of religious humanism. It is paradoxical that Marxism, despite the vigour of its attack on religion, has itself been readily interpreted as a religious movement. In the new image he (Marx) appears not as the scientist of society that he claimed to be but rather as a moralist or a religious kind of thinker. The old assumption that scientific socialism is a scientific system of thought has tended more and more to give way to the notion that it is in essence a moralistic or religious system. Though in an article in 1892, Werner Sombart called it 'ethical socialism'. Benedetto Croce, a renowned philosopher declared that neither Marx nor Engels was a philosopher of ethics. Karl Kautsky, the leading theorist of German Marxism after Engels' death expressed that the teachings of Marx are ethically empty. Such was the older trend of thought. But specially in the middle years of the present century, there has been a change in the views towards Marxism and we are now frequently told "Marxism is essentially a moralistic system, that it stands or falls as ethical, that 'The Das Kapital' is a moral or even metaphysical treatise in economic disguise, that Marxism is a religion of the age of industrialism and so on. Even the Soviet Marxists deny that Marxism is ethically an empty thought, holding that it is essentially a scientific system of thought. But in non-communist part of the world, on the other hand, the view that Marxism is a scientific system seems to have become less tenable. It is non-scientific in some of its basic aspects of substance and structure. For instance, the materialistic conception of history, with its scheme successive world periods from primitive communism through the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and bourgeois historical epochs.

2. Ibid, p. 12.
to the final world communism, is not constructed on the plan of a scientific theory but rather on the plan of a philosophy of world history in the classic Western sense.\(^1\)

The point of view has stimulated the tendency to examine this system from another angle. If it is not a scientific theory then is it basically an ethical or religious system? This is the another view of Marxism in the non-communistic part of the world. Approaches to Marxism from a new angle of thought are different. Some have attempted to interpret it in religious terms and others prefer the hypothesis that Marxism is fundamentally ethical. It seems to them more feasible to analyse Marx as a moral philosopher than as a religious thinker. Any attentive reader will easily infer that there is a moralistic tone in his thought. If by moralist we mean simply a person whose thought moves in the orbit of prime concern with values of good and evil, a person whose thought process is decisively governed by a basic value judgement, then Marx is unquestionably a moralist. Now the question arises whether Marx was a moral philosopher because according to the Socrates tradition as conceived and practised in the West, moral philosophy is a form of inquiry. It is an inquiry into the nature of the supreme good for man or the criterion of right conduct. Moral philosophy, as inquiry, presupposes that the nature of the supreme good for man is problematic. It begins with the question: "What is the highest good or proper supreme end of man’s activity?" This issue has been raised by Aristotle in his 'Ethics'. Tucker says that "Marx is a moralist, but does not fit in this description of a moral philosopher. He is concerned alone all else with an issue of good and evil but not in the sense of inquiry."\(^2\) His system of thought, comprised within the framework of materialistic conception of History, is not developed in the manner of a system of ethics nor is it a system of ethical inquiry. It does not raise the question of the supreme good for man nor the criterion of right conduct. The moralist Marx is radically opposed to moral philosophy. K.R. Popper writes that Marx avoided an explicit moral theory

because he hated preaching. Marx was reluctant to formulate his ethical convictions explicitly. The principles of humanity and decency were for him matters that needed no discussion, matters to be taken for granted. Popper argues, however, that Marx's writings contain an ethical theory by implication, and this he calls as "historicist moral theory" or alternatively, "moral futurism". This term is used to distinguish Marx's position from the "moral positivism" expounded by Hegel. While the Hegelian moral positivism, according to Popper, holds that whatever is historically right, the Marxist moral futurism holds that whatever inevitably will be in history is, for that very reason, right. That is, Marxism as moral philosophy is said to be based on the principle of historical inevitability. Some adherents of Marxism hold that if Marx was a moralist opposed to moral philosophy, then he may be supposed to have been a moralist of the religious kind. Tucker holds that, the religious essence of Marxism is superficially obscured by Marx's rejection of the traditional religions. This took the form of a repudiation of religion as such an espousal of atheism. Marx's atheism, however, meant only a negation of the transmundane God of traditional western religion. It did not mean denial of supreme being. Indeed as shown by his words in the epigraph to this chapter, denial of the transmundane God was merely a negative way of asserting that man should be regarded as supreme being, or object of ultimate concern. Thus his atheism has positive religious propositions. It rules out consideration of Marxism as a religious system, though only if, with Marx, we equate the traditional religions with religion as such.

From the structural point of view, moreover, Marxism invites analysis as a religious system. It follows in certain ways the pattern of a great religious conceptions in the Western culture. In particular, it has a number of basic characteristics in common with the Christian system in its Augustinian and later medieval expression. One of these is the

aspiration totality of scope. Like medieval Christianity, Marx’s system undertakes to provide an integrated, all-inclusive view of reality, an organisation of all significant knowledge in an interconnected whole a frame of reference within which all possible question of importance are answered or answerable. It does not limit itself to some one province of reality. Thus Marx defies classification under any one of the accepted modern, specialized headings, such as economist, socialologist, historian or even philosopher. This, of course, indicates a source of his system’s appeal to some modern men in whom the hold of traditional religion has loosened but the craving for an all inclusive world-view remains alive and strong. Like the Christian religious system again, Marxism views all existence under the aspect of history. It predominantly tells a story that has a beginning, middle, and end. Theology in the thirteenth century presented the story of man and the world according to divine plan of salvation as stated by Carl Becker. It provides the man of that age with authentic philosophy of history. Theology related and expounded the history of the World. Marx too aims to provide the man of his age with the authentic philosophy of history. His all-inclusive world view is historian in essence. The materialistic conception of history is the matrix of the doctrine of Marxism. There is a theme in Marxism that corresponds to the master theme of salvation of the soul in the Christian theology of history. However, Marx does not use the term ‘salvation’ but cherishes the concept of a total regeneration of man. Another basic characteristic of Marxism common with the religious systems in general and the medieval Christian system in particular is the ‘unity of theory and practice’ or the integral relation between the world-view as such and set of prescriptions for actions in accordance with it. In Marxian proclamation of the unity of theory and practice, the historical process is a revolutionary drama like the concept of a drama of the original fall and ultimate redemption of man held in medieval christianity. The way of ‘salvation’ is the way of ‘revolution’. Thus the views of Marx are religious in the sense that humanism and the elevation of human society are the primary objects of his thought, which is one of the various aspects of religion.
Approach of Humanistic Psychology to Religion

Of the modern psychologists who have viewed religion from various standpoints, Cattell seems to have given by far the most thorough-going, consistent and courageous exposition of religious humanism. He has endeavoured to show in some detail that our relations to humanity are in many important ways similar to our relations to God, and that can find in them an adequate outlet for our religious needs and aspirations without recourse to any form of supernaturalism. Cattell prefers to put humanity to the Group mind which looked at in this way can, as he suggests, be appropriately called the Theopsche\(^1\). In the light of the fact of this concept of religion, Flugel points out the weakness of Christianity in neither indicating a suitable outlet for the energies of aggressive extroverted individuals nor an adequate and positive goal for social and political endeavour; indeed by its attitude of difference to the larger social problems, it fostered the divorce between ethics and politics which many thinkers have in recent years deplored. In the absence of any guidance concerning such goals and outlets, Christianity has probably never seemed entirely satisfying to the man of action, and has in modern times incurred the reproach of being no better than a ‘slave morality’ with ideals that are contemptible from the point of view of strong energetic individuals and societies\(^2\). Flugel advocates an increasing realization that the religious emotions must in their turn be canalized along active and social lines, if they are to serve or to save humanity. Such reactions show that other wordiness and tolerance are not enough, as Flugel holds, if this world is to be other than a roaring chaos, and recent events have made it clear in which direction the next step in religious development must lie. The religious emotions must be largely or entirely secularized and be put in the service of humanity. The religion of humanity is surely the religion of the near future\(^3\). A similar conception of religion has also been developed in India by Ram Krishna Parmahansa which is

based on humanistic approach. According to this religious sect the service of downtrodden people is the worship of God as He lives in them. Thus access to the kingdom of God may be achieved through the service of humanity. The meaning of theopsyche and humanistic religion developed by its renowned exponent, Cattell, may be summarized as follows:

(i) The individual depends upon his fellows, upon his social group, in much the same way as, according to revealed religion, he depends ultimately upon the will of God. Without the cooperation of his fellows he would soon cease to exist, just as, on the other view, his continuance depends upon the protection and benevolence of his divine creator.

(ii) He is to a very large extent spiritually created by the group mind what Cattell calls, "Theopsyche". His ideals, his goal, his frame of intellectual preference, his whole outlook on life are profoundly influenced by the mental atmosphere of the society in which he is brought up and grows up and in which he lives, just as his supernaturalistic view, his spiritual being is guided and influenced by God. Even his physical existence is largely determined by the social conditions and religious norms of his group, his actual parents, essential as they are, being indeed on both views, only the immediate instruments of a greater creative purpose.

(iii) The group as the cumulative reservoir of superindividual wisdom, provides the ultimate commands of morality incorporated in the super ego, just as God does on the theological hypothesis. The individual can find his own purpose in life in the service of the group, just as he can in the service of God's will.

(iv) This service may often call for personal sacrifice, even for the supreme sacrifice of life itself, in ways that are at least intellectually more satisfying than the sacrifices usually demanded by the religious rituals of the fast.

(v) The fact that the individual has during his life time influenced the group; for good or ill, and of course in varying degrees according to his ability and omenence, inevitably confers on him a sort of immortality, which is independent of any strictly personal survival. He continues to live, though not physically, through the ages due to his effect on human
society. If he has children, he gains a further, and more direct immortality through them and their descendents both by virtue of his physical parenthood and his special moral influence as parents. This fact of Cattell's view shows that he is keenly aware of the effect of eugenics and in certain cultures this sort of conception of immortality received a great emphasis.

According to Cattell, human progress has both biological and social aspects—on the one hand, the deliberate eugenic cultivation of the best human types based on scientific knowledge and experiments, and on the other, the determination and establishment, also by experiments of the optional conditions of human social life and individual development. Such a view, according to Flugel, involves no insistence on any dull uniformity, but on the contrary demands an impartial study of the possibility of every type. Mankind will, in fact, engage in an applied science of itself, specially of its own mental qualities and this science in Cattell's somewhat startling but quite consistent terminology may be called, "the experimental study of God". As Cattell fully recognises, such a substitution for the group, "Theopsyche" for the God of revealed religion can hardly function satisfactorily without some provision for the aim or purpose of the group. The mere maintenance of the group as such, or the mere preservation of its present status and traditions is less satisfying than trustful reliance on God's will, perhaps because of the inevitable realization of the pitifulness and transience of human affairs as compared with the might and majesty of a Being who is supposed to rule the universe. Such an aim or purpose Cattell finds in progress in the gradually increasing realization of the aspirations of mankind.

It is clear that any attempt to establish a religion of this type is not free from formidable difficulties. It involves two great interconnected problems, of the existence of which Cattell is certainly not unaware but which he can hardly be said to have treated adequately in his suggestive book referred to earlier:

(1) The relations of humanity as a whole to the various social, national, and other groups of which it is composed, and of these groups to one another. The Theopsyche is ultimately
the Group Mind of all the humanity, past, present and to come, but it would seem that loyalty to the minor group will, in his view, itself take on something of a religious character. The formation of a proper hierarchy of loyalties, so as to facilitate cooperation and prevent conflicts is, therefore, a matter of very great importance.

(2) The substitution of such a theopsyche for the more personal God of revealed religion also inevitably entails certain sacrifices and renunciations, and it would be well that these should be realised and admitted for the start. Today it is doubtful whether the belief in personal survival is a real force in the lives of more than a small minority of people and there is of course compensation in the fact that if the hope of heaven may be lost, so also the fear of hell. In many ways more important is the fact, which Flugel points out, that humanity or the theopsyche serves as a sublimation for the primitive feelings relating to the mother or the idea of brotherhood rather than those relating to the father. The society in which the patriarchal traditions are there, will perhaps not easily forgo the father. Even the supreme representatives of humanity, however, must appear relatively small and insignificant when compared with an Almighty Being.

The term humanistic psychology has been used and is being viewed in a somewhat vague rubric covering studies in values, anatomy, being, self, love, creativity, identity, growth, psychological health, organism, self-actualization, basic need gratification and related concepts. Methodically humanistic psychologists cover a wide spectrum in which religious studies are being considered in favour of studying the individual in depth. This method is known as ideographic approach and an emphasis has been laid on expanding the domain of psychology to include metamorphic as well as empirical-rational modes of knowing so that by such methods of study psychology may come to terms more adequately with religious experience. This will also help in clarifying some differences between religious and psychological knowing.

Psychical Research and its Approach to Religion

Wilhelm Wundt’s views also resemble those of Schopen-
hauer. Wundt emphasized the role which emotions and the intellect play in relation to the will which operates both consciously and unconsciously in a purposive manner. Before J.H. Herbart like him, Wundt distinguished between marginal and focal attention and between two fields of consciousness, that of general awareness and a more restricted area of focal awareness. These distinctions were anticipated by F.W.H. Myers (1843-1901) in one of his papers presented in 1886 in the Society’s proceedings on the Subliminal Self. He explained that beneath the level of ordinary awareness there is a subliminal or ultra-marginal consciousness whose activities are such that there must be a subliminal self. According to Myers’s conclusion hidden in the deep of our being is a rubbish-heap as well as a treasure house. From this subliminal source the work of genius no less than those of deranged personalities well up into consciousness, flashing for a moment in brilliant activity and smouldering again in a lurid and scattered glow. William James who was very much influenced by the discovery of the subliminal self, held that in certain subjects at least there is only the consciousness of the ordinary field, with its usual centre and margin, but in addition thereto in the shape of memories, thoughts and feelings which are extra-marginal and outside of the primary consciousness altogether, yet these must be classed as conscious facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. James further claimed that this discovery has revealed to us an entirely unsuspected peculiarity in the constitution of human nature. No other step forward which psychology has made can proffer any claim as this. The discovery and experiment undertaken under the activities of the Society for Psychical Research have revealed a different approach to the ways of study in which man communicates with man. At one time it was felt that these experiments would provide alternative explanations of many forms of religious phenomena and establish an inter-subjectivity that would eventually solve the psychophysical problems of body and mind. Descartes had suggested that mind and body

interact at a point in the middle of the brain due to a small gland. This explanation concluded that the mind was dependent upon the physical processes of the brain which was opposed by Bergson who explained that the brain is only the physical area within which consciousness penetrates matter. He suggested that memory is a psychical function and that the real purpose of the brain is to act as an organ of limitation preventing too much from being remembered. This point was later taken up by C.D. Broad who pointed out to two other theories of Brain and Mind, the ‘instrumental’ and ‘compound’. According to the first, the mind exists independently of the brain. This means that mind as a substance may not only have been in existence before the physical brain came into being but that can continue to exist after the brain has ceased to operate. The importance of this theory has been fully appreciated by all those who have been interested in psychical research. The second theory is that the mind is a compound of the body and some other substance. The other substance is not in itself a mind, but a psychic factor which may continue to exist after the death of the subject carrying, within itself for a time, those modifications which present the life time experience of the now defunct person. Broad suggests that this psychic factor could be united for a time with the physical organism of some other person if that person was in appropriate condition. Similar views on soul or psyche have been held by others also. It has been suggested that the cartesian dualism of mind and body should in point of fact be a trichotomy body, mind and soul. Mind is a factor brought into existence as a result of the soul’s contact with the space-time order though it is difficult to explain in how much time a contact takes place. This is in many ways similar to the compound theory developed by Broad. Mind comes into existence as initially a cluster or bundle of ideas; ideas emerge from the combination of soul and matter in as much the same way as water comes into existence as a result of the combination of one part of oxygen to two parts of hydrogen. This means that mind is a by-product of soul and body, a temporary

derivation. These theories bring us nearer to recent research on Extra Sensory Perception (ESP) called Paranormal psychological phenomena which are explained as being due to powers which the mind is supposed to possess and which operate independently of the brain. These seem to accompany some forms of religious experience. This extra-cerebral activity of mind is now thought of as manifesting itself in four ways which have been studied under close observation in detail in western countries by the experts of parapsychology. In Indian psychology this theory has also been viewed substantially. They are:

1. Telepathy, 2. Clairvoyance, 3 Telekinesis, and 4. Precognition and Post-cognition. Telepathy means describing the knowledge which one mind has of what is happening in another mind. Clairvoyance refers to that mental faculty of knowing what is happening elsewhere and of which the subject has received no information by the normal channels of communication. This sort of description of events taking place elsewhere is given by the subject specially when he or she has gone into a special state of mind apart from the normal course of consciousness. Telekinesis is a term used to describe that influence which the mind is supposed to be able to exert on the matter by means other than the muscular activity of the body. Pre-cognition and Post-cognition are terms intended to refer to a knowledge of events before they actually occur, or to events in the past of which knowledge is furnished by means other than those of memory or the normal record of history.

The importance of these activities is such that if E.S.P. proved to be empirically verifiable then we should be in a position not only to offer quite new explanations about the nature of mind and its relation, but also about many of the abnormal phenomena which have been associated with various forms of religious experience and spiritual activity.

The prolonged experiments and observations carried out by the exponents of parapsychology under the society of psychical research, suggested that there must be channels of intersubjective communication distinct from those of normal senses. The recent works of Rhine, Tyrrell, Heywood and
Price, and the proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research are valuable studies in the activities of the mind beyond the normal state of the human personality. However, three comments are necessary on the findings of the society for psychical research—first, telepathy has not been proved almost correct; secondly, there seem to be some doubts about the legitimacy of applying a statistical law that deals with large numbers to what are necessarily limited numbers of experiments and thirdly, many accomplished entertainers today are able to put on acts of ‘Second sight’ which have close resemblances to these experiments, obtaining remarkable results by some techniques other than those of E.S.P. The value of E.S.P. experiments is difficult to estimate but observations of importance call for attention.

Gardner Murphy suggests that E.S.P. may indicate the existence of some deep level in the human psyche which confers on man a capacity to be ‘en rapport’ with the whole of space and time¹. H.H. Price offers the valuable comment that thought is not only powerful, but it can also be dangerous, for what we think about seems to carry with it the power to bring into existence that which was the subject of thought, and if this thought does not in fact actualize, it is because it is prevented from doing so by the operation of some stronger thought radiating from another person. All of this promises to be quite rewarding for the psychology of religion, but the inclusive nature of these experiments prevents their results from being applied to specially although they seem to indicate possible explanations of religious phenomena—which are often the subject of considerable doubt or perplexity.

Grensted has also commented on the works of the Society for Psychical Research which experimentally and statistically falls, properly speaking, within the sphere of psychology. He points out the outstanding fact that the experiments in Extra Sensory Perception (E.S.P.) have now shown to an astronomical degree of probability that the mental processes are not bound finally and strictly by the same laws of space, time and causation as bodily processes. This has at present only a

bearing upon the hypotheses of religion in its possible and even propable connection with some form of theory of survival, and though it does not carry us far in the direction of a full conception of immortality, it does at best break down one of the most formidable barriers which stand in the way of its acceptance. Its orientation towards the reality of soul, survival after death and memory of the past life are vital issues of religious consideration. But the mental activities studied so far in the field of extra-sensory perception have not been recognized as reality by clinical psychologists who characterise them as abnormality of human personality.

**Psycho-Analytic Approach to Religion**

Psychoanalysis and related schools became a part of contemporary school of psychological theory after a long and complicated process of development. Psycho-analysis can not be traced from the philosophical discussion about the human soul nor was it born in the atmosphere of the academic Wissenschaft of psychological laboratories. It took its start in medicine and it was, and partially is, a part of the medical discipline that grew exceedingly slowly in its endeavour to understand and treat mental disorders. While official medicine pursued rigorously the path of anatomy, physiology, neurology and histology, rebellious psychoanalysis followed in the footsteps of unscientific, mentalistic and metaphysical concepts repudiated by the official science and studied the irrational and even metapsychological aspect of human life and activities. Sigmund Freud and his followers introduced into the area of irrationality the rational method of scientific inquiry, and proved beyond doubt that being scientific is not identical with choosing a rational phenomena, but depends upon the method applied in the study of empirical phenomena irrespective of being rational or irrational.

Originally Freud did not intend to create a full-fledged psychological theory, but finally he developed even more than a psychological system. All psychological theories started from a certain area, covered it throughly, and gradually expanded to other fields. Pavlov studied conditioned reflexes. Watson applied conditioning to the study of several aspects of overt
behaviour of human beings. Skinner studied complicated learning problems. Goldstein started with brain injuries. Freud studied primarily mental disorder and went on to the analysis of the etiological factors. The etiological research shed light on child psychology and the laws of human growth and development. Then emerged a general theory of personality dynamics, then a study of human nature through the ages and a theory that dealt with the impact of society, culture, and religion on personality, till finally psychoanalysis, originally meant as a psychotherapeutic technique became a great psychological theory covering almost every area of normal and abnormal personality and entering into the field of sociology, anthropology, history, education, religion and the arts.

Rarely has any theory been exposed to so much bitter and sometimes unfair criticism as psycho-analysis. In medical circle Freud was bitterly criticised for the neglect of organic factors. Academic psychologists criticised him for being unscientific, and by philosophers for being unethical and degrading the dignity of man. Freud attacked the issues of love and hate, of sexuality and destructiveness, and of life and death. He unmasked bigotry and hypocrisy and with unabated zeal, penetrated the areas of mental health and illness of an individual’s growth and decline, of religion and crime, and of creative arts and destructive wars.

The latest advances have been made by modern psychology with its greatly enhanced understanding of the human mind. Since the beginning of the present century an intensive psychological study of religious phenomena has been carried out and it can fairly be claimed that during these years more has been learnt scientifically about religion than in the previous two thousand years. Psychoanalysis was primarily concerned with the investigation of mental processes, and in the course of this it found itself in a position to throw nothing less than a flood of light on the subject of religion. As the youngest in the succession of science, it owes its place to earlier research, especially in anthropology and comparative religion, which have provided it with inestimable material about primitive man to use
the study of civilized man. Psychoanalysis began understanding the main groups into which humanity falls: normal, neurotic, insane, sexually perverted, delinquent, and criminal. In course of its study of the individual it found a religious side in every one, which proved to be closely related to the other aspects of human nature. It became a frequent observation that all these aspects were interdependent, and that as the other sides of an individual underwent change, so did his religious attitude and beliefs. It was not possible to regard the religious impulse as being in a watertight compartment by itself much less to accept it as sacred and outside the purview of research. It was seen rather as a part of the whole personality influencing it and being influenced by it. Two special lines of new research began to furnish unexpected information on religion. The first was the study of primitive races and their religious customs, already discussed in detail earlier. The second and more pregnant, was the psychoanalytical study of child psychology. This has now attained an advanced stage. It shows how the details of adult psychology have developed step by step from childhood, and the origin of adult psychological traits is to be discovered in childhood. The religious notions of an adult originate in the same way, and it is these observations that are to be set out here.

The more distinctive characteristic of religion is its concern with the supernatural. It seems to be an essential part of religious belief that a spiritual world as much exists around us as natural world. The spiritual world, it is held, is not subject to the operation of natural law. In different religions the spiritual worlds are various, but a feature shared by them all is the existence of gods and goddesses; these range from spirits and demons to a monotheistic God in accordance with the stages of religious culture. This kind of view of religion creates a cleavage between science and religion. Science is concerned only with the natural world. This has always been the extent and limit of its interest. But position has been transformed by recent psychoanalytical investigations. These

have been applied directly to the religious problems, with the result that the world of the supernatural and spiritual has itself at last been brought within the scope of scientific investigation, and its psychological relation established to other mental phenomena, specially to fantasies. With the progress of psychoanalysis it gradually became evident that all the relating activities come into one of two categories—some essentially pleasure giving—dreams and day-dreaming; others concerned with adapting our individual events to conditions of our environment. To these two kinds of thinking Freud gave the names ‘pleasure thinking’ and ‘reality thinking’, and underlying them are the pleasure principle and the reality principle, as the two main tendencies of mental action. The differentiation between them has proved fundamental in studying human behaviour of every kind, and it was the distinction between these two that gave the first clue to the understanding of the supernatural.¹

In general, psychoanalysis, being a branch of science, must in common with all its scientific thinking, endeavour to distinguish between beliefs based on clarifiable evidence and those largely based independent of such evidence or contradiction to it. But it has, in addition, made two special contributions to the subject of theology, one of a general psychological nature and one specified. The first contribution is the evidence it can bring to show the extent to which apparently intellectual operations are influenced by unconscious processes, specially when they concern matters of great personal moment. Once mental processes of this kind are built up, the resulting product can be given a philosophical, spiritual, and intellectual facade which would impose itself as the whole structure.² Jones holds that conclusion formed in this way may or may not coincide with external reality, but their internal coherence is in itself no guarantee that they will. The second contribution consists in a detailed application of this principle. The subject of religious beliefs compels investigations in many individual analyses, so that much knowledge has accumulated about their genesis and

unconscious correlates. In addition, too many exhaustive analyses of psychological significance have been made of various religious beliefs and practices on the basis of theological and anthropological material besides the social role of religion examined critically and analytically. A short account of the more generally important conclusions thus reached are stated here to show the psychoanalytical approach to religion and its reality.

The theological statement that God is our Father seems to be fully justified in a psychological sense. Both militant atheism and devout belief in God can be equally traced to the child’s earliest reactions to his earthly father or to the idea of a father when the actual one is missing. The attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection are invariably ascribed to the father at one stage or another during early childhood when the child gradually grows up and is being brought up. This, Jones says, is perhaps the gist of the mass of knowledge we possess about the complicated development of the idea of Godhead. Over and over again the religious systems of the world have culminated in the worship of a Trinity, which has almost always consisted of the primordial figure of Father, Mother, Son. It can be shown in detail that the various beliefs and legends relating to these figures are throughout related to the unconscious conflicts that have to do with the members of the individual human family. In the Christian religion the figure of the Mother has been partly replaced by that of the Holy Ghost, but the change has been affected from motives which are accessible to investigation.

Religion sets a great store by conscience as a sense of right and wrong, and holds that God has implanted it in the heart of each of us. In the course of psychoanalytic studies of individuals, conscience was met with often enough in adults and older children but seemed never to be traceable to earliest childhood and gradually it became evident that it first takes shapes only at about six or seventh year. On further study of its beginning, it was revealed that these are composed exclusively of parental injunctions and prohibitions. Specially

1. Forsyth (David): Psychology and Religion, 1956, p. 120,
what father and mother say sinks into the receptive mind of a little child, to become its first standard of right or wrong of good and evil. Conscience is accounted for in this way by psychoanalysis without the need of assuming a divine origin for it. Like conscience the idea of God is never found in the earliest childhood. The early stages of the origin of the idea have been now investigated. The notion of an abstracted God presents great difficulties to children and for a long time is beyond their understanding. The means that serve in shaping it is to represent God as a heavenly Father, because a child already possesses many ideas about the earthly father, and it is by linking these with the new idea of a father in heaven, that the more mature conception is gradually reached. The mental picture of God which children make, of both his appearance and his disposition, always includes details taken from the earthly father. This early blending of the two figures, the earthly and the heavenly account for the different attitudes of adolescents towards God. Even God's physical attributes are those of the father: he has a masculine figure, is tall, and speaks with a male voice which can at times be angry like that of the father. This explanation is supported by the exquisitely childish features of the adult religious attitude to God. Omnipotence, omniscience and moral perfection are qualities with which little children for a time endow their father. The feeling of dependence on a more powerful being, the wish to be succoured and helped by him, and awareness of inadequacy and helplessness in meeting the difficulties of life, feeling of love and reverence for him, the longing to be loved by him, the fear of offending him, of his relation, and the wish to propitiate him, to be forgiven and restored to his favour, in each of these, one can recognise a child's relation to its father.

All religion is founded on the idea of sin, as Dr. Jones holds, that is the sense of guilt at not reaching a prescribed standard. Without this idea religion loses all meaning. This is another important side of religion to which psychoanalysis has been able to add first facts relating to the sense of sin and guilt. This is a prominent feature in every religion according to Dr. Forsyth—Buddhism excepted—and in all the Christian churches it fills a very large place in both doctrine
and practice. The Bible abounds in references to sin. Even before the doctrine of original sin was established by St. Augustine, Christian Theology had come to be largely concerned with the tendered subjects of remorse, repentance, confession, absolution and forgiveness. The doctrine of the Atonement, according to which Christ sacrificed his life to take away the sins of the world, has long held in the central position in Christianity.

Psychoanalysis too finds that a sense of sin and guilt is universal, but its intensity varies greatly from one normal individual to another. Among some abnormal types it may be feebly developed; it is usually very notable in neurotics specially in the obsessional with whom it is always strongly manifested. It is in melancholic insanity that it reaches its greatest intensity and the wretched subjects of this mental disorder incessantly proclaim their utter wickedness. By tracing the growth of character year by year psychoanalysis has found that most children possess no sense of guilt for several years after birth, a period when they are light-hearted and carefree, and are in a position to enjoy the pleasure that each hour bestows on them. According to the investigation of Forsyth at about seven years, guilt is first experienced, and with it come the earliest feelings of shame. The original guilty feelings seem to arise from conflict between child’s inclinations and its parents’ wishes. Guilt may appear earlier, much earlier than seven years, in children whose upbringing is overstrict, specially bodily functions of any type. Among many fanatics, parents crush children’s primitive enjoyment instead of permitting it usually on religious grounds. Among such families quite little children may develop prematurely a heavy sense of guilt, which will remain as a source of life-long misery to them and perhaps to others, as grown-ups they tend, if religiously inclined, to adhere to those sects which lay stress on the sinfulness of the world. The less a child’s guilt and shame are appealed to, the better its chance of growing up happily. All sin can be expressed in terms of disobedience to the father even rebellion against Him, or else discretion of the Mother and her attribute or substitute. These are the two components of the primal Oedipus complex of childhood, coined and
expounded by Freud on the basis of Greek mythology in which Oedipus unknowingly married his own mother after killing his father. When the fact was disclosed he felt guilty of the sin and took out his eyes and became a blind beggar. The subject of guilt has had to be investigated by psychoanalysis in very great detail, for it plays an important role in every individual analysis. The problems of neurosis, as mentioned earlier are inseparable from those of guilt. A distinction can be drawn between childish guilt and its normal development into the adult conscience in which are incorporated all our moral and ethical standards. One speaks also of an aesthetic and scientific conscience. This normal conscience, according to Dr. Jones, is the heir of the Oedipus conflict of childhood. On the other hand, it commonly happens that errors in early development may prevent the normal evolution from taking place. There remains an excessive sense of guilt in the unconscious which is infantile and irrational in character and often morbid in its effect. The precise relation of sin of religion to these two forms of guilt is too delicate a question for the answer to be given in words. Only it can be said that the lofty sense of spiritual value attaching to religious feeling and belief at the same time fulfills the deepest cravings of human mind and afford some appearance to the unconscious moral tension. It is, therefore, not surprising that for a good number of people they come to represent by far the most precious thing in life.

The most important element of religious beliefs, namely that in after-life, displays the feature of wish fulfilment more prominently than that just considered. Salvation, which is common to many religions, betokens a joyful reunion with the parents against whom the unconscious sinful thoughts were directed. Heaven, Jones holds, is the reward of that atonement. All the unsatisfactoriness, hardships, and injustices of this life will find their due compensation there. And it is fitting that the symbolism of heaven should contain endless allusions to the unconscious identification of this reward with

the notice of recapturing a form of bliss that we once possessed of returning to the imperial palace whence we came.

The two kindred subjects of religious belief in a soul and the hope of immortality have also been studied in their psychological aspects. It was quite possible that a scientific investigation of this nature would have succeeded in finding evidence of the existence of a soul, no one could say before hand. In fact, no psychological evidence has been forthcoming just as physiology has failed to supply any thing in support of the belief and just as astronomy has searched out the skies without locating a heaven beyond the clouds.

On the other hand, a belief in the existence of soul is found very widely among the higher religions. The transmigration of soul is also universally believed. All the higher religions have taken it over from primitive and ancient religions. It is nowhere more generally accepted than among savages. Psychoanalytically, the belief in a soul has no other origin than the experience of dreaming. In dreams a dead or absent person of the tribe will appear in a dream, or a living member, while asleep, will see himself participating in some distant undertaking though his sleeping body has remained inside his cottage. To the undeveloped primitive mind these happenings permit of only one explanation that the body has a soul, which functions independently of the body and can separate from it during sleep which survives after death. It is relevant to add that savages never doubt the reality of dreams, nor do the young children of civilized races. An adult savage and a civilized child alike are on a mental level at which the real world and the world of imagination are not yet discriminated. Based on this substantial belief in a soul there has developed, first the worship of the dead relatives, then ancestral worship, and ultimately the Christian worship of a whole host of dead people, martyrs, saints and apostles. This may be one of the reasons of burying the dead bodies in certain communities. Though Hindus believe in the existence of soul and its transmigration which they believe to be immortal, eternal and free, they burn their dead. There was a common belief that the soul again may enter the body which it has left. Its reason is the lack of modern scientific knowledge about its reality.
Forsyth in this context holds that religion appertains to the childhood of civilization, to an earlier level of adult social development corresponding to that of the present day child in which case science, which seeks after reality, would be the expression of a civilization which is a growing up sense. He further expresses that perhaps we catch a glimpse here of a slow progress of social evolution extending over centuries, for a long time a child like stage of social intelligence, which was satisfied with the religious interpretation of life, later, a grown-up stage capable of distinguishing reality from imagination, and requiring the scientific explanation of life.

The conception and hope of immortality, which is another important theme of religion and is universally accepted proposition of it, has for so long been one of the most cherished beliefs of many religions, including Christianity, necessarily depend on the belief of a soul; for nothing in man survives death, eternal life is another figment of the imagination. Psychology, like other sciences, has failed to find any scientific evidence of an after-life such as it is believed to exist in religion, and places the conception of it in the category of many other trustful expectations indulged by human nature, on no firmer ground than that of a wish and its desired fulfilment.

Nevertheless, there must be more to it than this, because the almost universal religious belief in immortality need accounting for it as religion is unwilling to accept the idea of death. The significance in this behalf is an explanatory one and the question not only provokes scientific curiosity, but also invites a scientific answer relating to immortality, transmigration of soul and its existence. What is more striking in this connection is the idea of eternal life which is found in modern science. The mention of a relevant point of view advanced by modern science in the nineteenth century was distinguished by advances following on Linnaeus's lead in biology, specially Darwin's work on the origin of species, and Weismann's on heredity. The factors involved in heredity were studied by Weismann and he succeeded in establishing, contrary to

general opinion, that living things do not die, but that life is
uninterruptedly transmitted from one generation to another
by means of the germplasm, a microscopical element in sex
glands. This applies to man and all other forms of life. Since
Weismann put forward his germplasm theory in the eighties
of last century the biological continuity of the germ-cells has
become generally accepted. With each successive generation
of animal or plant life, the body cells die, but the germ-cells
live on in the body of the new generation. In this way the
germ-cells are actually held by biologists to be immortal.
Religion and science are two very dissimilar disciplines, but
that in both of them the same idea of eternal life should be
found is remarkable, and cannot be dismissed as a mere
coincidence as expressed by Dr. Forsyth. He further says
that it would seem as if both the religious side of human
nature and the science had come into possession of the same
singular notion. They might have inherited it, as it were,
from some common biological source, dating back beyond the
time when what religion represents biologically, and what
science represents biologically, first began to develop their
own lines. It is though the biological fact of immortality had
somehow come all the way through to psychological expres-
sion as a religious belief in eternal life\textsuperscript{1}. All this, of course,
is highly speculative, but ideas linking biology at the one end
with religion and science at the other are so striking that one
of them seemed worth mention.

As regards sexuality in religion, in the earlier days of its
history many people were profoundly shocked by the findings
and formulations of psychoanalysis within the sphere of sex.
It seems to be as certainly established that sexuality is mani-
ested in some aspects of religion, as it is that religion comprises
more than is derived from this one course. The primary concern
here is only with those aspects of religion which are demonstra-
bly sexual. A general relation between the two is evident in the
proneness shown all through history for religious excitement
and sexual licence, especially among religious sects. More particu-
larly sexual nature has now been established of several aspects

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. Forsyth (David): \textit{Psychology and Religion}, 1936, pp. 133-34.
of religious practice and belief. Sexual deprivation must also be the state of those, who like cloistered nuns, have taken vows of chastity. Psychologically, it is inevitable in these cases that their unsatisfied erotic feelings should find expression in some 'non-carnal' direction as is held by Forsyth. This can be recognised in comments in the fervour and warmth of the devotion and adoration with which nuns address their Lord Christ. Sometimes their feelings are under a veil of spiritual symbolism, but often in language which is unmistakably erotic. With healthy young women entering on a cloistered life, one of the necessary but hard tasks before them is to detach their feelings from the human man and bestow them on the Divine man and it is in just this way that their devotion becomes sexualized.

The most fundamental contribution of psychoanalysis to the field of religion is that the attitude of man to his god is determined to a large extent by displacement of his attitude towards his parents either in the original form as dominating external figure or as incorporated in his super-ego, in which latter case there is a projection of the internal super-ego on the external figure of God, as in the notion of the all seeing eye of God.

Christianity in fact emerged from the Jews, a people who had developed an exalted religion of their own, all power in the universe being attributed to a single Divine Being, who while He accorded a unique distinction on his chosen people, demanded from them at the same time a strict obedience. He was, in fact, a Jealous God and inspired much guilt in worshippers, who had indeed some cause for feeling guilty as a result of their considerable transgressions of his rule. Christianity differed in numerous ways from Judaism and one that is specially important is its attempt to diminish this sense of guilt, associated with which are certain other significant characteristics—its condemnation of violence, its universality, and its appeal to the lowly, the underdog. It displayed in fact many of the characteristics of moral progress and O. Pfister, a renowned psychoanalyst of Germany, has drawn

2. Ibid., p. 272.
an interesting parallel between the aims of Christianity and those of psychoanalytic view of religion, which may be summarized as follows:

(1) Both aim at reducing guilt.

(2) In both there is a tendency to look upon suffering as a punishment for infringing the commands of some stern authority—God and the super-ego respectively.

(3) In both this stern, implacable, punishing authority is replaced by a mild, kindly, healing authority with a view to eventual individual moral autonomy.

(4) This transition implies some degree of regression from emphasis on a stern father-figure (such as that represented in exquisitely partriarch Jahveh worship) to reliance on a kindlier, more tolerant mother-image.

(5) The satisfactory solution to conflict can only be found in love, as inculcated and represented by Jesus in the case of Christianity and as implied in the endeavour to remove the mental obstacles to loving in the case of psychoanalysis.

(6) The role of Christ as heavenly-earthly intermediary may be compared to that played by the psychoanalyst, who in his turn, cannot escape some degree of idealization and who serves as a father-surrogate with whose help aggression is worked off, guilt and fear alleviated, and a greater sense of love and reality appreciation attained.

(7) Both Christian teaching and psychoanalytic therapy involve some degree of regression to an infantile situation as a necessary condition of readjustment.

However, there are differences also which Pfister has not failed to point out. Above all, the fact that Christianity still speaks in terms of the projected divine father-figure while psychoanalysis concerns itself with the internal father representative, the super-ego. Christianity is, moreover, concerned with social and religious values, whereas psychoanalysis as a method of treatment has primarily a more modest therapeutic aim. An important point of Christianity is the element of universal companionship and equality that plays so important a role in Christianity that brings it into the left-wing

pattern of materiarchal brotherhood movements. Christianity then is a great attempt to escape from the authoritarian father-figure and the archaic aspects of the super-ego. It is pre-eminently a son and brother religion rather than a father religion.

If religious values are viewed from the point of view of psychoanalysis, we reach the fundamental and very delicate problem of psychoanalysis leaning upon religion. It is here more than anywhere else that we meet with that resentment against psychology as an illegitimate and vandalistic intruder in the realm of values. This resentment clearly springs from a deep fear. It is that psychoanalysis, specially by revealing so much about the motives that find satisfaction in religious beliefs and the mechanism, e.g. projection that produces them, has undermined religion, or indeed disproved it. A distinction between undermining and disproving is relevant here to be made. As already pointed out earlier, a number of thinkers including Freud assert that the mere fact of a thing being ardently desired does not disprove its existence. The existence or possibility of God himself, must be proved or disproved by independent evidence. But all that psychoanalysis has done, is to make us suspicious of our appreciation of reality. In our dreams, in the delusions of the insane, in the slips of the tongue, eye, ear, hand or pen, we lend support to the scientist's favourite theory that we are reluctant to admit or remember things to which we are allergic. It is a tendency to which even Darwin freely admitted and which he took steps to counteract. In the unrealistic anxieties and obsessions of the neurotic, and in many other ways, psychoanalysis has revealed the potent but disturbing influence of wishful thinking. When those who assert the existence of God and at the same time reveal that they ardently desire Him to exist, we are justified in feeling a little sceptical. Our scepticism is likely to be heightened by the fact that religions have so often regarded want of faith as itself a sign of wickedness which they resent or furnish. In this way, as Cattell has well brought out, the psychoanalytic doctrine of wish-fulfilment has to a large extent reversed the old ontological argument which reduced the
existence of God from our idea of him. In this way psycho-
analysis has in truth done much to undermine religion; by its
own methods it has continued the work in this direction that
physical and biological sciences had begun. But this has no
more 'disproved' religion than have these other sciences.
Indeed in so far as religious beliefs concern themselves, as in
their more primitive forms than they often do, with the nature
and origin of the physical universe and of mankind it is a less
formidable enemy than these other sciences, which have so
often been able to show that the knowledge gained from
scientific study is grossly at variance with the prevailing forms
of such beliefs. From the early days of the psychological
study of religion it was clear that there were two elements in
religion that could profitably be distinguished on the one hand
by a series of intellectual beliefs concerning the nature of the
universe and the powers that govern it, and on the other by
the provision of means for mobilization and canalization of
emotion. As this study progressed it became increasingly
evident that even though the belief may all be false, the
emotional aspects may still be of great importance. In the eyes
of some psychologists, indeed, the emotions are so important
that they afford a sort of pragmatic justification for the beliefs,
however erroneous or absurd these might appear when judged
by a purely intellectual standard, and however scientifically
verifiable they be as regards the truth thereof. Such psycholo-
gists occupy a position obviously akin to that of the
pragmatist philosophers who are inclined to be tolerant to the
truths of religion so long as these appear to work. To others
the same emotions just because they are attached to beliefs that
are intellectually suspect, appear to be unhealthy and in need
of redirection though of course not for that reason any less
worthy of attention. Jung is an example of the first of these
classes and Sigmund Freud of the second. To Jung, a religious
dogma may indeed be at least psychologically truer than a
scientific theory, for the very reason of its greater emotional
investment. In itself, Jung says that "any scientific theory, no
matter how subtle, has, I think, less value from the standpoint

of psychological truth than religious dogma, for the simple reason that a theory is necessarily highly abstract and exclusively rational whereas the dogma expresses an irrational entity through the image. This method guarantees a much better rendering of an irrational fact such as the psyche”¹ To Freud, on the other hand, religion is the universal obsession of humanity, which it should outgrow, just as child outgrows the seemingly inevitable neurosis of infancy, as looks forward to an admittedly remote future when mankind will be able to enjoy a primacy of the intellect, as a result of which emotion will no longer be able to distort the appreciation of reality.

In their ultimate metaphysical positions these two renowned psychoanalysts are not perhaps so very far apart, for Jung himself in the work just quoted, goes on to say that “it would be a very regrettable mistake if anybody should understand my observations to be a kind of proof of the existence of God”. They prove only the existence of an archetypal image of Deity, which is the most we can assert psychologically about God. The difference lies rather in the nature of their satisfaction with psychological truth or psychological reality. To both it is no doubt satisfying as an object for contemplation and study of the psychologist, but to Jung, Flugel says, it is so satisfying that he appears to be unperturbed by its frequent lack of agreement with truth or reality as judged by other standards whereas to Freud such lack of agreement makes it an Illusion, and brings it into the category of the primitive or pathological.² As a psychologist, Freud has not been willing to sacrifice the general criteria of truth observed by other sciences, while Jung on his part has become so enthralled by the psychological significance of religious dogma and symbolism that he seems to some extent to have lost interest in these criteria—psychological truth and psychological reality which have been held ambiguous by Flugel and may be taken to imply: (i) merely the existence of the mental states or processes concerned, i.e., conscious or unconscious, or (ii) that

these states or processes point to some further reality outside themselves, or again (iii) that they are peculiarly satisfying perhaps in ways that other forms of reality are not. According to Fliegel confusion arises because of the terms used as psychological and religious truth or realities which according to him could be overcome if such terms as value or significance were substituted and used, where no reference to a closely corresponding extra-psychological reality is intended. As regards the reality and significance of religious emotions there can be no doubt the general nature of satisfaction found in religion is briefly explained by Freud in his famous work, 'Future of an Illusion'.

The advantage that religion shares with all animistic beliefs is that we can deal with the forces of nature as with people: we can bribe, flatter, implore, cajole, or perhaps even threaten them. At the stage of religion proper i.e., when spirits become exalted into gods, we can enjoy a continuation of protection and guidance that was given to us by our parents in our infancy. We need not feel that we are weak and helpless puppets of Chance or Destiny, lost orphans in a vast and needless universe; on the contrary, we can enjoy the sense of playing an important role in a scheme of things run by an omnipotent creator, who watches over us lovingly as we play the role allotted to us by Him. Our puny efforts acquire dignity and meaning as a part of a Higher purpose. The seeming hardships and injustices of life lose their sting when we believe that they only appear to us in this light because of the shortness of our vision, or at least that divine justice will recompense us amply for the sufferings we have endured. When belief in personal immortality is added to our belief in God, the ever present threat of death loses its dismay and horror when confronted with the prospect of an eternity of bliss. Lastly our intellectual curiosity is gratified by an explanation of the origin, nature, and purpose of the universe so far as our limited intellects are capable of grasping problems of this magnitude, and our moral perplexities can be resolved with a minimum of trouble or conflict by a reference to the Divine will in so far as this has been made manifest to us. The attractions of all this are clear enough and we need hardly
wonder that men grasp eagerly at the illusion.

Flugal has pointed out two serious drawbacks against all these advantages. First, the 'illusory' quality of the belief itself, as manifested in the painful impact of the visible and tangible world, from which the protecting hands of the super parents seem so often to be lacking. Secondly, the fact that the divine love and mercy are offset by the divine restrictions on human desires and the divine wrath when these restrictions are infringed—corresponding to frustrating and punishing aspects of the infantile parent-figures, themselves magnified upon a cosmic scale. These drawbacks need not necessarily, and indeed do not usually, reduce the religious emotion. A variety of highly complex factors determines whether guilt is decreased or increased by disaster, and in the former case evil and suffering may only lead to an increased dependence on and submission to the Deity. In fact, it may be said to be the general rule that men have most need of God when they feel themselves most helpless in the face of evil. Although the very existence of this evil might seem to believe the divine love, yet it creates so great a need for super-human help that men will cling all the more desperately to the belief in such a love. The situation of helplessness naturally induces a dependence upon our earthly parents. Alternatively, the existence of overwhelming evil may be interpreted as a manifestation of the power of the divine displeasure, in which case the need for placating the angry Deity becomes all the more insistent. It makes no difference if the evil springs manifestly from the heart of man himself, for then we only regress to the infantile need of a parent to restrain us in our wickedness, on the whole men feel they can dispense with the Deity more easily on fair days than on foul, whether the foulness be due to human agency or to the inclemency of nature. It is when they fall on evil times that they tend to turn back with repentance and relief to ancestral creed that perhaps before had seemed to them outmoded.

Regarding the characteristics of the emotion involved, both

2. Op. cit., p. 268,
Freud and Jung are agreed that the influence of the past is of very great importance. To Freud this influence is to be found largely in a return to the repressed or of the surmounted such as animism or magic, a feature which the religious emotion has something in common with the peculiar conditions we describe as the ‘Uncanny’\(^1\). The repressed or surmounted elements in question may derive either from individual experiences or from the past history of the race. Freud has explicitly explained the second alternative in his last book, ‘Moses and Monotheism (1939)’ which brings his position into greater harmony with that of Jung who had for long maintained that racial archetypes play an extremely important role in religious beliefs and account for the remarkable similarities of dogma and symbolism found in different parts of the world. According to Flugel, the views of both the exponents of the psychoanalytic school of thought in this respect encounter the difficulty that they seem to imply the inheritance of acquired character something in the nature of innate ideas, which run counter to a vast preponderance of the evidence at present available from biology and genetics\(^2\). Jung’s position implies the further great assumption of the collective unconscious concerning which the majority of psychologists still display a justifiable scepticism, though the attractiveness of the view for the purpose of explaining to such feelings as that of being, in tune with the definite, cannot be denied\(^3\). This last consideration may serve to remind us that full justice can scarcely be done to the emotional satisfaction of religious experience at its highest by any bare enumeration of the advantages to be obtained from it, of the circumstances in which it is sought, or of the regressive tendencies that it may involve. Such high satisfaction is to be found in the peculiar exaltation connected with the fusion of ego and super-ego which will be discussed in the following chapter dealing with Freudian approach exclusively in detail. At its best, religious experience produces not a humbling but

an elevation of the spirit, the ego being somehow raised to the position of the super-ego, the child to that of parent, the worshipper to that of his God. But an exaltation of this kind may be experienced if not in the same degree, at best with something of the same quality, in connection with experiences that would not usually be termed religious. These latter experiences exhibit what might perhaps be regarded as a disassociation of the characteristic religious emotion from religious belief indicating that the metaphysical aspects of religion are not absolutely necessary for the achievement of its most valuable emotional satisfactions. Emotion and belief can in fact be separated, and this in turn prepares us for the fact that there is at the present time an increasing tendency to look for religious emotion elsewhere than in the company of metaphysical belief, in religions of humanity or nature, or even in the high devotion of the scientist, artist, or social reformer to their respective tasks.

To sum up the discussion of the bearing of psychoanalysis upon religious belief, we may arrive at the following conclusions:

(1) That, by revealing religious beliefs as elaborate social forms of altruistic thinking, psychoanalysis has reinforced the objections to the metaphysical implications of these beliefs that were already plentifully forthcoming from the other sciences. But although it is calculated to make us additionally suspicious of the validity of these beliefs, it has no power to disprove them.¹

(2) That, on the other hand, by demonstrating the fundamental nature and infantile origin of the needs underlying religion, by revealing something of intimate meaning and complex over determination of its symbolism, by drawing attention to its value from the point of view of mental and social hygiene as prophylactic against individual neurosis and by raising certain subtle problems as the reality of different kind of mental content, psychoanalysis endows religious belief with a significance far greater than that which we should be inclined to attribute to it from the standpoint of physical science.

(3) That, it reveals, above all, the great significance of the higher types of emotional attitude involved in religious experience, but at the same time indicate the possibility of attaining at least comparable emotional attitude apart from metaphysical religious beliefs, the attitude thereby acquiring perhaps a greater reality value.

(4) That, it shows at the same time that, alongside of its beneficent functions, religion in its wider forms can exercise a severe crippling and inhibiting effect upon the human mind, by fostering irrational anxiety and guilt, and by hampering the free play of the intellect. In this respect religion reflects an image of evil effects of the primitive internal super-ego, and in the long run even an increase in individual neurosis may not be too high a price to play for the removal of the restriction it imposes.

An evaluation of psychoanalytic approach to studies of religion reveals that it has a special character, conceptually as well as methodically. They are, in fact, basically studies of motivation for religion, and the person’s set of beliefs and practices are approached from the standpoint of wish fulfilment, derive control, primary and secondary-process thinking, object relations, the genesis of conscience and the ego ideal and the economics of libidinal and aggressive urges. Because the word symptom in psychoanalysis covers an almost infinite range of possibilities, religion can be approached as a symptom. Psychoanalysts said more forcefully what William James had said earlier that the people use God. Pryser holds that, “the mechanics of psychic household, the defence processes of ego, and fundamental psychosocial constellations, such as the Oedipal conflict, were all brought to bear upon religion, phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically, individually, and collectively, within a genetic-dynamic formula”. This formula brought about an entirely new dimension to the methodology of the psychology of religion in that it demanded longitudinal assessment of individual in the network of his object relationships. It also holds that the

2. Ibid., p. 6.
personal documents, which were the mainstay of Jame's studies, cannot be taken at full value but must be approached with analytic sophistication. And since for practical reasons such studies nearly always coincide with the process of psychotherapy, an excellent opportunity is provided here for evaluating the significance of religion in relation to other pursuits, preoccupations, values and needs of the individual. That is, it provides ample grounds in which it can be well studied as to how religion fits into life.

An interesting feature of psychoanalytic approach to the study of religion "is its shortening of the psychological distance between god and men". God's name, as Jones has remarked as Father, Maker, Sustainer, and Provider, are relevant to the family drama. The statement that God is a father figure may also imply its complement that biological fathers have numinous qualities. In Hindu religion and ethics parents have been equated with deities and are to be worshipped like gods. Thus psychoanalysis has established a new affinity rather than identity between gods and men which cuts across the technical distinction between the divine qualities of transcendence and imminence.

Freud's term "illusion" denoting the formal psychological status of religious beliefs, has given rise to bitter opposition and discontentment, particularly from those who have not cared to understand his views. His book "The Future of Illusion" itself clarified the meaning of the term: religious beliefs are illusions in the sense that they are not product of experience, or end results of rational thinking but fulfilments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind. An illusion is not mistake. An illusion is not necessarily false, that is, incapable of realisation or contradictory to reality. Now question arises: If illusions are needed, how can we have those that are capable of correction and how can we have those that will not deteriorate into delusions? Knowledge of any god is always approximate and always full of distortions. Our psychic organisation, our perceptions, our thoughts, our

wishes are moods participating in the shaping of our beliefs. There is no fault with Freud's illusory view of religion as held by Pruyser. Theologian Paul Tillich has pointed out that our doubts determine the dynamics of our faith. The divine purpose is never completely known by mortals, and, because of this, they find themselves making guesses about it. Though they may be wise and inspired, they remain merely to the guesses. Moreover, as Jones has remarked "what one wants to know about the divine purpose is its intention towards oneself". It is exactly because religion deals not with abstractions but with realities by which people live that psychoanalytic formulations must be taken seriously. The most significant contribution of psychoanalysis to the psychology of religion is its insistence upon the role of conflict in religion, and of religion in conflict, personal as well as social. Religion can no longer be seen as an isolated item or parcel of experience but as a quality of an individual's experiencing the world and himself; it can be defined as a way of problem-solving. George M. Stratton, a non-analytic psychologist had made it clear in 1911 when he saw the sources of religion in man's being entangled in all kinds of conflicts stemming from inner and outer polarities. This he has discussed in detail in his book "The Psychology of Religious Life", (1911). This position is heuristically of great importance to the psychology of religion.

The conclusion arrived at after viewing the psychoanalytic approach to religion, reveals that religious beliefs, whether savage, mythological or Christian or any other form of religions, may or may not be true—in their nature they are not capable of proof or disproof—but it is highly probable that they would have arisen in their identical forms whether they were true or not; the genesis of them can be adequately accounted for without invoking any external or supernatural agency. If one desired to apply psychoanalytic conceptions somewhat fancifully, one might say that mythological beliefs represent on the plane of social organisation of the stage of

Religion in the Psychological Perspective

childhood neurosis in the development of mankind, while much of religious belief similarly represents that neurosis is an expression of the same forces and conflicts that have led to the loftiest aspirations and profoundest achievements of our race, and that neurotics are often the torch-bearers of civilization. They may strain themselves in the efforts, but without the effort there would be no civilization.¹

Religion and Psychotherapy

With psycho-analysis the psychology of religion should have undergone a change in concepts, in orientation, and in attitude towards the material studies. But it underwent a change in personnel, because psychoanalysis is also a branch of psychotherapy and, through it, of medicine and psychiatry. Within the purview of psychology, its impact was felt mostly in the specialization of clinical psychology which, in fact, has had relatively little contact with psychology of religion—the latter has remained more closely in the fold of academic psychology and educational psychology. The psychoanalytic impact on psychotherapy is great. Its impact is also keenly felt in pastoral education and pastoral theology. This influence of psychoanalysis has greatly altered the status of scientific concern with religion in a major way.

First of all it has meant a shift from pure science to applied science. Secondly, it has meant a shift from the traditional academic field to the professional training programme. Thirdly, majority of the activities in psychology and religion has moved from the academic department to psychiatric clinic, the hospital and the parish. The combination of "Religion and psychiatry" is now more popular than psychology of religion and pastoral theology is rapidly becoming also a pastoral psychology. The application of psychiatric technique has brought about the possibility of an advancing psychology of religion. The combination of science and art in the application of psychiatric methods has created a unique position of nearness to deep and subtle process just at that level of depth which, many have surmised, is the level at which religion has

its significance in a person's life.

Though, religion and psychotherapy, differ superficially, thoughtful reflection discovers that basic function and goal of psychotherapy and religion are the same. To a purely rational approach, religion often appears a kind of philosophy, offering its alternative answers to traditional philosophical perplexities, but a more balanced view quickly sees that this is but the intellectual aspect of a far richer and deeper role, namely, the healing of troubled souls.¹ The essential task of religion is to assist the people in solving the problems of life in its emotional and volitional as well as intellectual environments, and by solving it to become full and happily adjusted to the realities of the universe. Its guiding conviction is that until an individual has achieved such a solution he is sick rather than a healthy soul—a source of spiritual corruption to himself and to others as held by Brutt. Pryser has also expressed that religion is problem-solving means though it is not problem-free. This is also the task of psychotherapy as the very word indicates. The aim of psychotherapy is to help people resolve disturbing conflicts and achieve the serenity, energy, and wholeness that only such an integration can bring—but there is no vital difference in what these two modes of statements mean.

Moreover, there is a common goal as well as common problem. In both cases what the solution essentially requires is an emancipation of the sick soul from bondage to its childish self-centredness and a realization of its hitherto obstructed power to love—whose full and free expression is conceived to be the distinctive mark of human maturity. Now the question arises as to what this striking identity of aim and goal betokens for the future of religion. The term “psychotherapy” has very broad meaning and covers any form of counselling whose purpose is the healing of souls. What we are concerned about is the relation between religion and psychotherapy as oriented in the psychoanalytic psychology developed by Freud and his great successors. If we give up its narrower sense and consider it in a broader sense, a brief survey of the divergent

background of psychotherapy and religion as it affects their approach to their common task, is in order.

The Eastern religions, specially Hinduism and Buddhism, quite obviously accepted the responsibility of healing sick souls. Their great pioneers conceived the task of religion as that of liberating man from bondage to self-centred craving and thus making him a source of dependable well-being to himself and to others. They realized that the process of liberation is normally difficult to achieve and they attempted to provide a structural and dynamic analysis of human nature such as would give effective guidance in it. Thus were formulated the psychological concepts that they found, and thus appeared also such theories of essential stages of growth towards freedom as are expressed in the Buddhistic rightfold path and the Hindu Systems of Yoga.¹

The Western religions attacked the task in terms provided by the theistic presuppositions of their theologies. To be sure, the mystic strain in them provides its own way of healing with this human need, which is more akin to the spiritual techniques of the East². But the dominant solution has been reached on the conviction that man is responsible to a personal God who is his authoritative law-giver and judge. Viewed from this standpoint, man naturally is in a state of sinful rebellion against God, proudly asserting his own self-centred will in opposition to God’s commands, and his salvation consists in a penitent revulsion from his willfulness, he becomes transformed into a state of obedient acceptance of the Divine Will. Such acceptance alone is true freedom, and it can only be realised through the experience of divine grace and forgiveness. The psychoanalytic concepts involved in this way of thinking are, hence, those of sin, guilt, repentance and forgiveness. The fact that they increasingly seem irrelevant or meaningless to modern Westerners, while the human problem which underlies them is as poignant as ever, partly explains the growing appeal of psychotherapy, which attempts to meet his need by the aid of an entirely novel set of concepts and a quite diffic-

cult theory of human nature.

Psychoanalytic therapy is grounded in the matter of theoretical and applied aspects in the framework and characteristic attitude of Western scientific approaches. When it emerged in the pioneering work of Sigmund Freud, it was, in fact, a branch of medicine, promising a more adequate method than those available then for treating hysteria and related diseases. Initially Freud began to analyse its problems in terms of the medical and physiological presuppositions with which he was familiar, but gradually he found some of these assumptions leading into behind alleys and then he had to depend on the psychological concepts suggested by his clinical discoveries. But so long as psychoanalytic therapy was not established on its own foundation as an independent response to human need and thus when the time became ripe for a constructive adjustment between it and religion, till then in no case, did it occur to Freud that any help might be derived from the experience of religion or from the ideas through which it has been interpreted. The main point at which in view of this background, psychoanalytic theory threw new light on general problems in the philosophy of science, concerns the postulate of determinism¹. Now question arises how we are to reconcile the universal generation of effects from their causes, as taken for granted by science, with the moral freedom required by a religious view of man. Freud had no doubt about the validity of the postulate; psychoanalysis can achieve its results only by assuming that there is an antecedent determining the case for everything that happens in the mental and emotional life of man, including even dreams, fantasies and causal associations that are ordinarily taken as entirely accidental². But during the course of his observation, Freud discovered that when these causes are located and made the objects of conscious awareness, freedom becomes possible in the only sense in which a reasonable man would desire it—namely liberation from the compulsive need to repeat the acts that conflict with

individuals's ideal of himself as a mature person. The patient becomes aware of the way in which the cause of such a compulsion appeared in his past experience, he sees that its appearance represented a choice that was adopted then but is now unacceptable in his quest for self-fulfilment; through realizations he or she can relieve the experience in a more constructive way and choose the acceptable alternative instead.

In the light of these considerations in mind, a more systematic examination of the framework of psychoanalytic theory seems essential to view religious phenomena. This framework, in fact, involves a dynamic and developmental concept of human nature, such as taken for granted by Greek psychology and is assumed in Confucian and Buddhistic thought, but has hitherto been generally rejected by modern Western psychology.¹ Many schools of the latter have conceived it as task simply to analyse conscious experience of man into its elements and the way in which they can be combined; some have even explained it in terms of accompanying physiological changes or overt behaviour. Their point of view has been explained earlier. But by none of them any question was raised as to whether the person studied is in a healthy or sick condition, and whether such an approach does not require an entirely different kind of analysis than would otherwise appear appropriate. In view of its origin as a branch of medicine, the psychoanalytic theory of man could not help raising this question and making it the central clue to the understanding of human nature which it worked out. Burtt, from this standpoint, expresses that “man is an essentially dynamic but inevitably chequered process of growth from the pristine torpidity of the unborn babe to the state of full adjustment of reality”.²

The aim in this topic is not to elucidate in detail the psychotherapeutic techniques and their application to the treatment of mentally sick patients. The primary purpose here is to discuss the present relation between psychotherapy and religion and what significant contributions each can make

2. Ibid.
to the other as they seek the fulfilment, in the future of their soul healing function and religion as object of healing of the sick soul and problem-solving device in man’s life. So far as it concerns influential thinkers of the Christian Churches, the present attitude is one of hesitant and tentative readjustment of ideas under the challenge of psychotherapy and its obvious success. Sufficient literature in this connection produced by Protestant authors aims to point the way towards reconciliation of psychotherapy with their religious convictions. The trend in pastoral theology has already been indicated and Protestant pastors who are inclined to use psychotherapeutic methods, are inquiring how to use, in their counselling of troubled persons, such analytic techniques as consistent with the Christian beliefs about the cure of souls. The Roman Catholic Church has not so far accepted to apply psychoanalytic theory. So far as the religions of the East are concerned there is as yet very little contact with Western psychotherapy. Swami Akhilananda’s book entitled “Mental Health and Hindu Psychology, 1951” has so far appeared which deals with psychotherapeutic technique in healing the afflicted person with help of religious approaches. Others have not yet glimpsed any significant relation between his principles and those reflected in traditional spiritual disciplines. When this awareness has clearly dawned, however, on both sides we may confidently expect a fertile give and take between psychological presuppositions of religion and psychotherapy leading to a far reaching and constructive result as expressed by Swami Akhilananda in his referred work. Burtt holds that indeed, it may well be that the most promising interaction between the two will take place in that area, and that the future syntheses of psychoanalysis and religion will be an achievement of the East more than the West.

Now again another question arises as to what major contributions psychotherapy makes to religion. The answers are several. If we think first of religion as it has been exemplified by its past pioneers, there are two important lessons to be learnt. One is emphasized when we note the fact that with rare exceptions the founders of religious faiths have encouraged a dependent attachment to themselves on the part of their follo-
wors instead of guiding the latter towards their own independent selfhood. In psychoanalytic terms they have been content to leave their disciples in the stage of “transference” where affection and trust have become fully focussed on themselves. They have failed to realize that a fully outgoing love would lead on to the achievement of an individual spiritual maturity which would be freed from any such dependent attachment, as it found in the case of psychiatrist and patient relationship. Here the essentially patient-centred orientation of the medical man has a vital contribution to make, as contrasted with the Master or teacher-centred orientation characteristic of religion. In Christian religion when the Holy spirit “leads to the full truth” that truth will free those who realize it from submissive attachment to any religious leader as well as from every other form of cramping dependence. The other lesson is revealed in the fact that while the great pioneers in religion have been fully responsive to spiritual truth wherever they could discover it, they lived in an age which was hampered by a very limited and inadequate framework of thought. The framework has been preserved by their adherents because, as embodied in doctrine, creed, and spiritual, it brings a sense of comfort and cosmic protection for which they continue to feel a strong need. But it is increasingly out of harmony with the interpretations of the world that modern minds, under the influence of modern scientific outlook, are coming to adopt. Psychotherapy is free from any need to perpetuate this ancient framework. It can adopt whatever concept proves best able to interpret the search for self-understanding in relation to everything else that has living meaning in contemporary experience.

If we think, secondly, of religion as it becomes structured in ecclesiastical institutions of the Christian world, three major lessons from psychotherapy can be learnt. One is freedom from the need to be loyal to any detailed set of theological doctrines, such as a typical organised Church has adopted. A school of psychotherapy has its basic beliefs, of course, which may be more or less united in theoretical systems and in some minds will take the form of fixed dogmas. Nonetheless, the patient entered commitment of psychotherapy, together with its scientific tentativeness, provides a
strong protection against this tendency. In the long run all beliefs have to be regarded as hypotheses growing out of clinical experience, and subject to revision whenever further discoveries, or insight into new interpretative possibilities, suggest the need of revision. Another contribution is the rejection by psychotherapy of dogmatic moralism in its treatment of sick souls. The first principle of psychotherapy is full and unqualified acceptance of the patient, however serious the moral confusion into which he has fallen. Through the therapist's aid he can achieve a liberating awareness of the super-ego in himself as well as of the bumptuous derive that have refused to cover before the super-ego. A third and equally important contribution is the awareness of the need for progressive correction of the spiritual ideals that have been adopted by religious groups. These prized ideals reflect such deep-seated emotional presuppositions that except under the impact of deep therapy they are likely to be adament against all charge. Hence the history of religion reveals the tragic misapprehensions and needless hostilities that it does. Not to mention the fanatical conflicts among the followers of different religious pioneers, there is the sad fact that those who respond to the active ideal of loving service tend to depreciate the contemplative ideal of the hermit saint, and vice versa, like the champion of prophetic religion and of sacramentarian religion sadly misunderstand each other. Burtt expresses, thus, in the light of this fact that the Hindus, with their recognition of the different Yogas, each being suited to its own kind of religious temperament, have done much to meet this situation in a wise and generous way. But it can only be fully met by a deep and steady probing that forces a person to perceive clearly the motives that lie behind his commitment to whatever ideal he has adopted. Such a radical, eye-opening disciplined religion rarely provides, in the case of institutionalized religion it would be safe to say that it is not provided at all. But psychotherapy, if it fulfills its role at the submerged levels of a person's experience is equipped just for this purpose. Psychotherapy can thus

foster an achievement without which religion will continue to be a source of conflicts as well as peaceful harmony in the world—namely a state in which religious people, though fully understanding themselves, will fully understand and accept each other, breaking down once for all the walls that have separated them.

The second part of the question is as to what major contributions religion can make to psychotherapy. This is relevant to state here. One of them may be clarified by considering the difference between the “restoration of health” and “ideal health”. The psychologist’s concern is essentially with the former of these aims. He is to treat the patient not beyond that point where the main resistances and the special problems of transference have been worked through, have led to the general assumption that this goal is an assured cure of what has been disturbing his patient rather than the latter’s achievement of ideal health. This usually means in practice the gaining of the patient’s power of successful adjustment to the expectations of social life in the community in which he will presumably function with all the limitations of its customary perspectives and its cultural background. The great religions have accepted no such modest goal. If their aims are to be expressed in medical terms, it would be to envision and clarify the supreme, universal ideal of mature well-being for man—of full adjustment to infinite whole of reality—and to spread the good news that this ideal can be realized by all men. Then their further practical task is to encourage people unceasingly to pursue it, to guide them step by step towards its realization and to teach them the systematic wisdom about life and the world which is the intellectual articulation of this vision. Far from being satisfied with successful adjustment to the cultural ways accepted in a given society, at a given time, religion stands in judgment on every such culture. It criticises every divergence from the way of life that would be exemplified by an ideal society of ideal personalities in full dynamic harmony with the universe and its divine ground. Erich Fromm discusses this theme provocatively in his book “The Same Society” (1955), indicating by implication what a psychotherapeutic orientation would
become when it fully makes its own the ultimate religious ideal, uncompromising affirmation of great religion is that all men are spiritually sick, not just those who have fallen into some neatly describable neurosis. The gap between the fulfilment achieved even by the normal person and the tremendous possibilities envisioned by the pioneers of religion is so great that a mere non-neurotic adjustment to this or that society's expectations is too petty an accomplishment to be called a soul cure. A genuine cure can be recognised only when an individual is shaken loose from such a paltry notion of his goal and is consciously, purposefully, and hopefully seeking the divine Kingdom that never was established either on land or sea. Here lies one vital contribution that religion can make to psychotherapeutic theory and practice. Psychotherapists will usually, no doubt, for compelling practical reasons, find it essential to stop far short of the achievement of any such state of ideal health in their patients, but their guiding theory will need to take full account of religious insight on this essential matter. Nothing less than true health is really health, nor any individual or any society.

The other contribution is one whose consideration brings us back to the very fundamentals of religious thought. Although many psychotherapists hold a positive religious faith, and some psychoanalytic thinkers—namely C.G. Jung and Erich Fromm, have attempted to square their theoretical foundations with religious ideas, it is amply evident that psychotherapy as such can fill its function without explicit commitment to any traditional conception of God. Though Freud, in fact, explained away such conceptions as illusory yet the effect and role of religion can never be denied. A relevant question in this connection arises whether psychotherapy can get along without any religious convictions or such an idea would be mistaken. Burtt explains that no sectarian concept of God is presupposed and it may be that many psychoanalysts shy away from any religious commitment because they cannot envision a non-sectarian concept of God. A very serious problem again arises before us whether

the variability and relativity of man's ideals about the divine so obviously displayed in detail, show that there is nothing really divine in the universe—that what people call "God" is merely a projection onto the cosmos at large of our diverse subjective hopes and dreams. The reality about the existence of God has made amply clear in the light of the scientific discussions in connection with the religious and scriptural view of the universe, and of the life as well. Science disproves specific religious beliefs and the scriptural explanations of the origin of the universe and the life and many other things which scientifically cannot be proved. But it does not disprove religion. There may be dispute between science and a given religion, if part of its total system is a series of propositions about the nature of the world but there is no general conflict between science and religion defined in functional terms. Science is concerned with problems of meaning. Though there are religions with God, it is essential for religion to include some sort of conception of God without which there can be no religion despite the fact that religion has a very wide and comprehensive meaning. Its phases and forms have always undergone definite changes to adjust in the changing atmosphere of society and values of life. Burtt strongly asserts about the truth of the existence of God and holds that the reality of the divine is a far richer reality and truth. God cannot be perceived by the organ of physical vision; He is the object of a spiritual perception. Such a conception of divine reality is implicit in the enterprise of psychotherapy as is in human life as a whole.
Psychoanalytic Orientation to Religion

HISTORICALLY it has been one of the functions of religion to effect a harmonization of the desperate elements in man’s being and his apprehension of the world. Religion aims at unification, in being all-inclusive and co-existent with the whole life. Religion does not mean simply to be one phase of experience among many existing side by side with others and on equal terms. It means to intensify, vitalize, enhance every human functional activity. In order to understand how this unification is brought about, some of the various types of religious experiences must be examined. In so far as religion aims at the unification of life—perhaps all being—it is important initially to make a distinction between primary experience and repetitive experience. The primary religious experience is the mode of an encounter. The person is grasped—perhaps even overwhelmed and shaken by an experience, suffered with fear, wonder, awe, and reverence. Religious writings all the world over have recorded types and elements of this experience and have indicated that the encounter of this type can take place under various circumstances. Sacred rocks, trees, groves, animals, artifacts and the like, are
worshipped because such experiences have occurred in conjunction with or through them; thereby these objects are set apart from what is profane or unholy and are felt to be sacred by the individual or group. Certain acts or rituals are often the carriers of the experience. Sometimes sex has been worshipped as a symbol of creative power in nature, and its meaning has been expressed in fertility rites or myths of a creation. This is one form of religious experience at the primary level. A further level of articulation is the rationalization of myth itself. That the origin of religion which actually, according to Paul Radin, springs primarily from man's emotional responses to a threatening situation, is also a matter of experience. Such types of experiences and origin and development of religion along with the concept of God have been discussed in detail in the preceding chapters in the light of facts advanced by different schools of psychology, besides anthropological, sociological and historical approach to religion. The psychoanalytic approach to religion and its concept is altogether a new development which has always been taken into account by those who have tried to study religious phenomena after the emergence of the psychoanalytic school. In the present chapter, the main point of discussion will be concerned with the individual views and approaches of exponents of different schools of psychoanalytic schools, pertaining to religion. The psychoanalytical view of religion and its origin have also been dealt with, and the concept of religion analysed from a new angle. In the following pages views of individual psychoanalysts will be put forth along with their critical examination.

Freud on Religion

Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), the founder of psychoanalytic school of psychology and a figure comparable in importance and fame with Galileo, Charles Darwin and Einstein, devoted a good deal of his attention to the nature of religion. Freud was theoretical reductionist and methodical non-reductionist. He represents empiricism and materialism in psychology and was greatly influenced by the Anglo-French empiricism—materialism and sensualism of Hume, Locke, Voltaire, J.S.
Mill, Auguste Comte, Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. Freud was determinist and believed mental process to be a part of and a derivative from biological processes. Psychoanalysis and related schools became a part of contemporary psychological theory after a long and complicated process of development. It cannot be traced from the philosophical discoveries about the human soul nor was it born in the atmosphere of the academic Wissenschaft of psychological laboratories. In fact it took its start from medicine. It was and is, a branch of the medical discipline that grew slowly while endeavouring to understand and treat mental disorders. In medicine the sub-disciplines of anatomy, histology and physiology were being pursued, rebellious psychoanalysis followed in the footsteps of "unscientific", while "mentalistic", and "metaphysical" concepts repudiated by the official science, and studied the irrational and even the metaphysical aspects of human life. Freud and his followers introduced into the sphere of irrationality the rational method of scientific inquiry and proved beyond doubt that being scientific is not identical with choosing rational phenomena but depends upon the method applied in the study of empirical phenomena irrespective of their being rational or irrational. Initially Freud had little intention to create a full-fledged psychological theory but finally he developed even more than a psychological system. All psychological theories started from a certain area, covered it thoroughly, and gradually expanded to the other fields. Freud studied primarily mental disorders and went on to the analysis of etiological factors. The etiological researches shed light on child psychology, and the laws of human growth and development. Then came a general theory of personality dynamics; thereafter a study of human nature and a theory that dealt with the impact of society, culture and religion on personality, till finally psychoanalysis, originally meant as a psychotherapeutic technique, became a great psychological theory encompassing almost all areas of human personality and venturing into the field of sociology, anthropology,

history, literature and the arts. Though rarely any theory has met with so much bitter and unfair criticism as the psychoanalytic views of Freud. He was criticised for the neglect of organic factors and for being unscientific; philosophers criticised him for being unethical and for degrading the dignity of man. But friend and foe had to agree on one issue in admiring Freud that he dealt with the most controversial problems in a frank and forthright manner despite social pressure and taboos. He thrashed out the issues of love and hate, of sexuality and destructiveness, of life and death. He unmasked bigotry and hypocrisy, and with unabated zeal penetrated into the areas of mental health and illness, into individual’s growth and decline, creative arts and destructive wars and ultimately into crime and religion. Religious philosophy as well as other fields of study are indebted to Freud a great deal for having discovered the genesis of religion and its various practices and notions. All his life Freud remained faithful to the monistic philosophy and the conception of unity of man and nature. His entire study was guided by the monistic and materialistic concepts of human organism.

A common mistake in religion is to identify the constructs of religion with religious experience itself according to William Horosz.¹ Martin Buber points to this common fallacy, in discussing the individual’s relationship to God in the relationship of Judaism, when he expresses: “Whenever we both, Christian and Jew, care more for God Himself than for our images of God, we are united in the feeling that our Father’s house is differently constructed than our human models take it to be.”² Buber’s view is that God as reality is far greater than our projection of his nature. Thomas Aquinas claimed a similar truth when he insisted that God, as the object of man’s faith, is infinitely more than the propositional understanding of His nature. Martin Luther too holds the same belief in a hidden God, “Deus absconditus” who is “something more” than our images of Him. Traditional religion in general.

respects the belief that God, man and religion are far more than our constructed human models take them to be. They maintain a sharp distinction between man's symbolic understanding of religion and the religious experience per se as is held by Horosz. He further holds that his empirical concern with religious experience is in tune with this line of thought which asserts that religious experience as projection and religious experience as reality are two distinguishable aspects of religious affirmation.

To say that religion is the product of man's fear, anxieties, hopes and wishes as propounded by Ludwig Feuerbach and Sigmund Freud, is to give intellectual assent to the misconception of religious phenomena mentioned above. Feuerback claims that man "projects his being into objectivity", that religion is merely the projection of one's wish-world and the gods men worship are wish-beings. He denies thereby the distinction between religion as projection and religion as an empirical fact. Freud's projective theory of religion similarly identifies the religious experience with projection itself by relating projection "of" with projection "upon".¹

By reducing religion to projection, Freud denies the factual, empirical nature of religious experience. Religion proper no longer has its own authentic being in the residual core of inner experience, because projection of it is viewed by Freud as the main mechanism in the formation of religious beliefs. The empirical nature of religious experience is denied because it is totally absorbed by the ego's defensive mechanism of projection. Faith is denied its conscious relation to the Other and is viewed as a psychological condition in the defensive behaviour of the ego. The basic choice of Freud is that between religion as projection and religion as reality. In choosing the former he denies the residual, inner, empirical experience of religion as reality. From his projective point of view one can no longer recollect the belief that religious experience is the immediate certainty of the uncertain, that religion is the immediate assurance of power, of love, of heal-

ing, of salvation. It is this primary form of immediate experience, the core of its residual meaning, that Freud rejects by equating it with the mechanism of projection. Since Freud regards religion as projection, it is not possible to hold a distinctive religious stand in reality, because religion is nothing more than the psychological outcome of defensive behaviour. The empirical component in religious experience, its distinctive and qualitative sentiments, is given status of an illusion. Though James H. Leube, no psychoanalyst, must be credited with having faced the question of the existence of God, he took the viewpoint that religion deals with an illusory reality.

Projection is the theory about the ego, postulated by Freud under his hypothesis of mental mechanism; it is a theory about how the wishes and desires of the ego operate. It is twice removed from religious experience in that it is a theory about the ego and its mechanisms of defence, a theory about its wishes and desires that relate to religious experience. To meet this immediate characteristic about projection is the error of most theorists on the topic of the project theory of religion. Projection can more appropriately be said to be one of the mechanisms of the ego that reveal the formation of the ego in some stages of its operation than the formation of religious belief. William Horosz is of the opinion that "projective religion is the name of a theory about religion, that it is merely a way of talking about religion from psychoanalytic point of view. Since it is merely a secularized construct of religious experience (which is a primary form of immediate reality), it belongs specifically to the realm of discourse. It is basically only a theory of communication about religion". He further expresses that "the projective activity is a form of transcendent meaning or mediate knowledge, not actually inhabiting the inner core of religious experience".

Projection is expressive of religious affirmations, but not formative of religious beliefs. It is not capable of producing religious experience because it is a matter of discourse only.

In his book, “The Psychopathology of Everyday Life”, Freud views religion as “nothing other than psychological processes projected into the outer world”\(^1\). In his defensive behaviour the individual, in projecting his fears, hopes, wishes, and anxieties on to the outer world, is going through the process of doing something with religious experience, but the process itself is rather secondary, and not the primary creative moment of religious experience. Freud points out here what one does with religious experience and how one does it, not what it is in its immediate creativity. His words have to do with the expression of religious experience but not with what it is.

To stress that Freud’s view is functional and dynamic and that he is little interested in the static structures of religious affirmations but more in the formations of these beliefs, is to miss the point according to William Horosz. No pure functionalism can survive inspection because any activity is an activity of something. Religious projection is a mediate form of activity of another form of religious experience. The basic psychological processes or wishes do not meet the requirements of the inner core of religious experience; they are secondary constructs and not primary data. Projection is what one does with the empirical facts. It is psychoanalytic way of communicating religious affirmations. The projective world is a subjectivized world of personal interpretations, according to Horosz who further stresses that project might be regarded as a synonym for interpretation. It is interpretation and not the empirical fact of religion\(^2\).

The projective view of religion elevates the symbolic or mythological nature of all religious beliefs but neglects to treat as important, the truth and reality which these symbols point to. That would be relating illusion with reality, which Freud’s method prevents him from doing. Although the truth of religious experience can no longer be viewed as literal or scientific, meanings are attributed to the represents of these symbols which are entirely different from the meanings which


Freud attributes to religious experience through his symbolism. "Religious symbols are symbols of something. They are symbols of something other than literal facts and scientific facts. They may be called in this context symbols referring to the fact-world of man or the human," Lebenswelt. If beliefs contain this something else, they cannot be reduced to pure forms of wish projections. Further, if religious statements are not literally facts, it does not mean that they are not expressive of the nature of religious reality.

Leopold Bellak expresses that there are two basic meanings of projection as described in the writings of Freud—projection as a defence mechanism of the ego and projection as an epistemological issue concerning with perception. Projection is a name for one of the defensive mechanisms of the ego; it means the "process of ascribing one's own desires, feelings and sentiments to other people or to the outside world as defensive process that permits one to be unaware of these "undesirable phenomena in oneself". The term "projection" in the field of psychology originated in the study of psychoses and neuroses as early as 1894 and Freud used it to connote as a process of mental mechanisms. The second meaning of projection assumes that "memories of percepts influence perception of contemporary stimuli". Bellak calls this process after renaming it "apperceptive distortion". He mentions that "it is suggested that the term projection be reserved for the greatest degree of apperceptive distortion. Its opposite pole would be, hypothetically, a completely objective perception... we may say that in the case of true projection we are dealing not only with an ascription of feelings and sentiments which remain unconscious, in the service of defence, but which are unacceptable to the ego and are, therefore, ascribed to objects of the outside world".

The second meaning of projection according to Horosz,

3. Ibid., p. 8
4. Ibid., p. 10.
5. Ibid., p. 1
has been a fruitful concept for projective psychology. But
the concept of religion is primarily tied to the first meaning of
projection as a defensive manoeuvre of the ego, what is the
main point is Freud’s definition of religion as a defensive
process against anxiety.

In his subsequent works, Freud developed the concept
of religion in detail from various points of view. Freud points
out in his “The Future of an Illusion” (1927) that religion is
the product of human needs and desires. He regarded religious
beliefs as “illusion, fulfilment of the oldest, strongest and
most insistent wishes of mankind”. Religion, as Freud saw
it, is a mental defence against the more threatening aspect of
nature—earthquake, flood, storm, disease and inevitable death.
According to Freud, “with these forces nature rises up, majes-
tic, cruel and inexorable”. But the human imagination
transforms the forces into mysterious person powers. “Impersonal forces and destinies, Freud said, cannot be approached;
they remain eternally remote. But if the elements have passions
that rage as they do in our own souls, if death itself is not
something spontaneous, but the violent act of an end—will, if
everywhere in nature there are beings around us of a kind
that we know in our society, then we can breathe freely, can
feel at home in the uncanny and can deal by physical means
with our senseless anxiety. We are still defenceless, perhaps,
but we are no longer helplessly paralysed, we can at least
react. Perhaps, indeed, we are not even defenceless. We can
apply the methods against these violent supermen outside that
we employ in our own society, we can try to adjure them, to
bribe them, and by so influencing them; we may rob them of
part of their power”. The solution adopted in Judaic-Christian
religion is to project upon the universe the buried memory of
their father as great protesting power. The face which smiled
at them in cradle, now magnified to infinity, smiles down upon
them from heaven. Thus religion, says Freud, is “the universal
obsessional neurosis of humanity,” which may be left

1. Freud (Sigmund): The Future of an Illusion, 1927, p. 34.
3. Ibid, p. 16-17.
4. Ibid, p. 44.
behind when at last men learn to face the world, relying no longer upon illusion but upon scientifically authenticated knowledge. An early step in applying psychology to religion was taken up by Freud after the first decade of the twentieth century, when he pointed out the remarkable likeness between religious practices and the behaviour of sufferers from obsessional neurosis. This kind of mental illness, subjects of which show a strong sense of personal sin and are also irresistibly constrained to perform a series of acts which may amount to regular ceremonies. The acts themselves are dictated by their feelings of guilt and are always protective or propitiatory attempts to ward off some imaginary harm which has been suggested by the feeling of guilt. The resemblance of these and other details of obsessional cases to religious practices suggested to Freud that the obsessional neurosis was a private religious system and a religion a universal obsessional neurosis.

The religious affirmations, as culture transmits them to the individual, comprise certain dogmas, ideas, and assertions. Religious ideas are primary "illusions, fulfilment of the oldest, strongest and more insistent wishes of mankind; the secret of their strength is the strength of these wishes". Thus religious experience is the outcome of human wishes and desires. Having asserted that religious beliefs are mere "illusions", Freud does not feel the need to relate illusion to reality; he disagrees with its relationship to reality, for it is capable of neither proof nor disproof. An illusion is devoid of truth and reality, as it is on this side of wishes and desires alone, with no objective reference in religious experience itself. Horosz stresses that these wishes and desires which Freud thinks are primarily psychological data, are secondary constructs of and belong to the side of discourse and communication about religion. The world of wish-fulfilment is already a highly subjectivized construct, an interpretation of man's biosocial structure. Horosz further points out that Freud

refines these constructs to make them elemental wishes determinative of religious experience. They involve to a high degree of psychoanalytic distortion.¹

The standpoint of Freud relating to elemental wishes which if projected on the outside world, are formative of religious beliefs, has been reviewed by Edwin Holt from a behaviourist perspective who analyses the Freudian wish as a dynamic process, a "course of action which some mechanism of the body is set to carry out."² The wish which dictates the religious beliefs is located exclusively in the ego's mechanism of projection. The motive power of these wishes comes from behind, they are not of forward intention. The ego itself in Freud's writing is a construct with many projective functions. Thus projection is neither the form nor content of religious experience. Religion is thus a way by which man protects himself against reality. When man succeeds in this defence action, he lives not in the world of reality, but in the world of his own making—his own wish-world. The Freudian wishes are secondary constructs, they are reactive experiences of the ego to religious experiences, or away from it. They involve distortion of a high degree in reacting to these religious experiences. David Trueblood, an exponent of Philosophy of Religion points out an interesting rebuttal to this Freudian wish regarding adult religion. According to him, religious convictions are "frequently at variance with wishes,"³ and thus affirmations are seldom or never flattering to ego. As regards defences of the ego against the use of religion as a defence pattern of behaviour, it might be argued that the Freudian wishes are quite flexible and that these "unwanted encounters" in life, these varying wishes, express another wish still, one associated with masochistic character traits. This is what one of the Neo-Freudians, Erich Fromm has in mind, with his human-side

perspective of religion. Arguing against the authoritative point of view of religion, Fromm states that we find people who have a tendency to incur sickness, accidents, humiliating situation, who belittle and weaken themselves... they are driven by one of the most irrational tendencies to be found in man, namely, by an unconscious desire to be weak and powerless; they tend to shift their life powers over which they feel no control, thus escaping from freedom and from personal responsibilities. Although such character trait is a prominent one in psychoanalytic field, it is not enough to offset the fact of religious experience that more often than not, religious affirmations are at variance with human wishes and desires. This wish for unwanted wishes, Horosz points out, is not the normal pattern of religious behaviour; it is the trait of a sick personality, a deviant from the norm. The fact that religious assertions are often at variance with human wishes and desires would indicate that projections are not a formative power in the genesis of religious beliefs, but the psychoanalytic way of assigning projective meanings and patterns to the given core of inner religious experience. The positivistic attack of Freud on religion was, in fact, part of the atmospheric current in the Western world.

Freud's problem of the religious world, according to Horosz, as the realm of wish fulfilment is "methogenic" in nature rather than "empirogenic". By reducing religious experience to projective experience, which is a repetition of early childhood experience, — "familism, dependence, and authority, wishful thinking, and magical practice" as pointed out by Gordon Allport, one cannot have serious attitude towards religion as a whole. For Allport says that "to feel oneself meaningfully linked to the whole of Being is not possible before puberty. This fact helps explain the one sided emphasis we experience in many psychological discussions of religion".

Freud's attitude to religion has been well expressed in his study of Leonardo da Vinci who was world's renowned sculptor, musician, mathematician, engineer and scientist, taken up

by him towards the close of his life. From the study of the
life of this Italian genius based on psychoanalytic investiga-
tions, Freud deduced that the basic root of the genesis of
belief in God is the father complex. He states, "Psycho-
analysis has made us aware of the intimate connection between
the father-complex and the belief in God, and has taught us
that the personal God is psychologically nothing other than a
magnified father; it shows us every day how young people can
lose their religious faith as soon as the father’s authority
collapses. We thus recognise the root of religious need as
lying in the parental complex".¹

Freud’s studies of religion and its reality are all variations
on this theme of God, the "magnified father" but before deal-
ing with these arguments, it will be profitable to look first into
Freud’s own religious background admirably set out by a
renowned English psychoanalyst (who was close to Freud),
Ernest Jones in his three-volume life of Sigmund Freud. What
the biographers of Freud had guessed about the infantile fat-
talities of the great founder of psychoanalysis on the basis of
his personal references made in the "Traumdeutung" and
"The psychopathology of Everyday life" has been amply
confirmed by the theme of "Freud’s Letters to Fliess". The
study of infantile events in Freud’s life reveals that he was
motivated by his Oedipal tendencies. Since they were deeply
repressed in him, he sought to revive, relieve, and reconstruct
them throughout his life by way of mastering them. This,
according to Dr. Masih, produced two fateful results. First,
this produced in him proclivities for a reductive and historical
method. This has worked excellently for the archaeological
reconstruction of psychical experiences of infants and has
given rise to the science of psychoanalysis with its methods,
data and theories".² Freud would be counted among the
immortals for extending human knowledge about psychology
of man. Dr. Masih says that the same cannot be said of the
second result with regard to his analysis of religion. No
outstanding contribution to psychology of religion, sociology

of religion and philosophy of religion has dared ignore the views of Sigmund Freud and no study of religion, from various points of view, will be complete without any mention of Freudian views.

Strongly motivated by hate of the father, Freud saw that the projected father-image of his infancy, namely God, was denied and overcome and as a result of this unconscious motivation, Freud has produced several characteristics in his analysis of religion. He was confined to that type of religion in which God could be conceived in terms of father-image. This is why Freud held totem worship to be the earliest and the monotheism to be the latest form of religion. The subject matter of religion has evoked in Freud the constellation of his infantile conflicts with his parents with such a force that he could never master it. According to Jones, in Freud's religious upbringing, there are two things—first, that he had a Catholic nannie in his first three years who took him with her to Church; secondly, that although born of a Jewish family, it was a home with "an almost entirely secular atmosphere". The usual religious experiences associated with adolescence don't seem to have played any role in Freud's development, for he confessed that he had never had any belief in the existence of the "supernatural". Despite this, he was familiar from his early childhood with the Old Testament and the religions of antiquity. Dr. Jones says, "Nevertheless, he went through his life from beginning to end as a natural atheist... that is to say, one who saw no reason for believing in existence of any supernatural Being and who felt no emotional need for such belief. The world of Nature seemed all-embracing and he could find no evidence of anything outside it". It was surprising to Freud that even intelligent people held religious beliefs but what is not clear, points out Spinks, is why he himself as "a natural atheist" should have been so deeply and so illuminatingly interested in the psychology of religion. This is because Ira Progoff in his "The Death and Rebirth of Psycho-

logy" (1956), says that Freud did not believe in religious truth but he did deny the role and effect of religion. In the third stage, after 1920, while Freud kept modifying his clinical theories and techniques, his main interest shifted towards the most general universal problems of humanity such as war and peace, civilization, religion etc.¹ Freud's work treated the old moral problems that had previously been experienced in spiritual terms, but he translated them into a language of psychological concepts. Appealing to an age that was on the verge of making science its religion, this psychological language seemed particularly "reasonable" and it carried a special aura of truth. It sounded convincing to those who were looking for such a new framework of belief to replace the old spiritual concepts and it was accepted as a realistic version of the truth about human nature specially because it was phrased in the modern scientific terms.²

In Freud's view religion was regarded as projection of the child's psychical relationship with its father. Even Jewish monotheism had behind it the nucleus of the father-figure, for once God was seen to be one, man could project more easily on to a single deity feelings which he had as a child directed towards his father³. This sort of conception is explicitly related to Freud's belief that the mythologies of the world religions show that religion itself is "nothing other than psychological processes projected into the outer world". Freud's arguments about the nature and genesis of religion appeared in his famous work, "Totem and Taboo" in 1913, in which he attributed the origin of not only religion, but of civilization, morality, law and culture to the psychological connection between the Oedipus Complex and Totemism as it existed within the small primitive society. He was indebted particularly to Frazer's "Totemism and Exogamy" and "The Golden Bough" as well as Robertson Smith's "Religion of the Semites", which, he had stated, confirmed many ideas he was not previously in position to publish for

want of their authenticity. He learnt from the contributions of Frazer that totem animal must not be killed except communally and that members of the same totemic group were not allowed to have sexual relation with women of the same tribe which is the basis of exogamy. These two practices were related by Freud to the situation to which he had given the name Oedipus Complex, a situation in which the son hates the father because of his desire to possess his mother. As a result of these psychological associations Freud arrived at the conclusion that God was, in fact, the projection of the father figure, and the sense of guilt, the practice of sacrifice, and standard of sexual morality within the tribe, were derived from the early forms of patriarchal totemism.

In his subsequent works, Freud developed the ideas which he had primarily discussed in "Totem and Taboo". His "Future of an Illusion" appeared in 1927, in which he defined religion as consisting of "certain dogmas, assertions about facts and conditions of external (or internal) reality, which tell one something that one has discovered oneself, and which claim that we should give them credence". The relevant fact of this definition is that Freud makes no reference whatever to experience, nor does it anyway refer to the fact that dogmas and statements of belief are based upon the richness of religious experiences of individuals. But since religion is related to "the most insistent wishes of mankind", to man's desire to escape from the stern facts of reality, it is no more than an expression of man's wishful thinking. This desire to escape from reality is related, according to Freud, to the psychological factors which characterize the relations of a small boy to his father, a relationship which is strengthened by the child's vivid awareness of his utter helplessness in the face of the reality of the unknown world with which he is surrounded. Man projects his infantile relationship on to the face of the external world, a world of cruelty, terror and stark indifference to human being. Freud says that it is difficult to believe that early man could have succeeded in facing the terrors of life, had it not been for such comfort as was afforded

1. Freud (Sigmund); The Future of an Illusion, 1934, p. 43.
by the illusion of religion. Freud's use of the word "illusion" has been the subject of bitter criticism but Freud himself explained that "an illusion is not the same as an error, it is indeed not necessarily an error. Aristotle's belief that vermin are evolved out of dung, to which ignorant people still cling, was an error... On the other hand, it was an illusion on the part of the Columbus that he had discovered a new sea-route to India. The part played by his wish in this error is very clear... It is characteristic of the illusion that it is derived from man's wishes... Thus we call a belief an illusion when wish fulfillment is a prominent factor in its motivation, while disregarding its relations to reality, just as the illusion itself does". Freud further argued that if man but employ his reason and thereby condition his emotions, he would be able to outgrow the childishness of an appeal to religion, an appeal that belongs properly to the childhood of the race. In his another famous book, "Civilization and its Discontents" (1930), this argument was emphasized even more strongly, wherein Freud said, "The ordinary man cannot imagine this Providence in any other form but that of greatly exalted father, for only such a one could understand the needs of the sons of men, or be softened by their prayers and placated by signs of their remorse". By concentrating upon religion as a matter of paternally induced activities and by omitting religion as experience, Freud was in a position to point out numerous resemblances between religious observances and the behaviour patterns of patients suffering from obsessive neurosis. This is a fact that a substantial part of religious observances and practices, in the Western religion in particular, is concerned with feelings of guilt, with the desire of finding some means to control instinctual activities and with a highly conscientious attention to detail. Much the same psychical impulses distinguish the behaviour pattern of neurotic personalities. But to describe the "observances by means of which the faithful give expression to their piety... as a universal obsessional neurosis" is to ignore the fact that

an obsessional neurosis is, so far as the individual patient is concerned, abnormality and it is strictly personal activity, whereas religion is universal and normal of mankind. Perhaps Freud seems to have never thought of the possibility that man might be by nature a religious animal. Freud’s last book on religion and psychology—“Moses and Monotheism” appeared in 1939, which has largely been discounted due to speculative nature of Freud’s views and because many leading scholars of Old Testament have pointed to serious errors in his argument which will be discussed later in this chapter.

**Totem and Taboo**

This work of Freud is the liveliest expression of his views on religion, its genesis and development; as such, it needs detailed discussion to explain Freud’s views. In introduction Freud expresses that these four essays “represent my first efforts to apply viewpoints and results of psychoanalysis to unexplained problems of racial psychology; the two principal themes, totem and taboo . . . . are not treated alike here.” The investigation of totemism may be modestly expressed as: “This is all that psychoanalytic study can contribute at present to the elucidation of the problem of totemism” . . . . Totemism is a religio-social institution which is alien to our present feelings; it has long been abandoned and replaced by new forms. In the religions, morals and customs of the civilized races where it is still retained it had to undergo great changes. In this book attempt is ventured to find the original meaning of totemism through its infantile traces; that is, through the indications in which it reappears in the development of our children.

Freud drew his material to explain the themes of religion, morals and customs psychoanalytically from the outstanding contributions of J.F. M’Lennan: “Primitive Marriage” (1866) and an essay on “The Worship of Animals and Plants”; W.Robertson Smith: “Animal Worship and Animal Tribes among the Arabs in the Old Testaments” (1880); “The Religion of the Semites” (1889); James Frazer: “Studies on Totemism” (1887); F.B. Jevons: “Introduction to the History of Religion” (1896) and Spencer and Gillen: “The Beginnings
of religion and Totemism among the Australian Aborigines" (1905). Besides anthropological material, Freud also adopted the Darwinian theory as it had been elaborated by F. Atkinsons who held that "at a very early period man lived in small communities consisting of an adult male and a number of females and immature individuals, the males being driven off by the head of the group as soon as they became old enough to evoke his jealousy". Atkinson was for many years in New Caledonia and thus was in complete ignorance of both of Robertson Smith's theories and of psychoanalysis. He produced evidence of an ever recurring violent succession to the solitary paternal tyrant by sons, whose patricidal hands were soon to be clenched in fratricidal strife". Some modern anthropologists have already criticised the Freudian theory on the ground that no valid evidence exists for Freud's totemic arguments. E.P. James, refuting Freud's argument, says that "There is no anthropological evidence for a dislocation in the family life of the primitive horde" as a result of the sexual urge, the sons slaying the father in order to secure the women for themselves, and then inventing a ritual device to expiate and commemorate their crime . . . at least no traces have been left of its occurrence in any known culture".

But Freud advanced his argument regarding the fact relating to the genesis of sense of guilt and of totemism out of the sense of guilt of the sons as follows:

"After they (the patricides) had satisfied their hate by his removal, and had carried out their wish for identification with him, the suppressed tender impulses had to assert themselves. This took place in the form of remorse, a sense of guilt was formed which coincided here with the remorse generally felt. The dead now became stronger than the living had been even as we observe it today in the destinies of men. They undid their deed by declaring that the killing of the father substitute, the totem, was not allowed, and renounced the fruits of their deed by denying themselves liberated women.

Thus they created the two fundamental taboos of totemism out of the sense of guilt of the sons, and for this very reason, these had to correspond with the two repressed wishes of the Oedipus Complex. Whoever disobeyed became guilty of the only two crimes which troubled the primitive society’’.

Robertson Smith had suggested that these two crimes are “murder and incest, or offences of a like kind against the sacred law of blood”2. Now the question arises as to how the feeling of guilt was handed down and by what means this primeval crime achieved its lasting influence due to which the action of the parricides became part of the psychical structure of successive generations. In order to clarify these processes Freud was forced to propound the theory of a mass psyche, or a collective soul. “We base everything on the assumption of the psyche of the mass in which psychic processes occur as in the psychic life of the individual. Moreover, we let the sense of guilt for the deed survive for thousands of years, remaining effective in generations which could not have known anything of this deed. We allow an emotional process such as might have arisen among the generations of sons that had been ill-treated by their fathers, to continue to new generations which had escaped such treatment by the removal of the father. Without the assumption of a mass psyche...social psychology could not exist at all. If psychic processes of one generation did not continue in the next... there would be no progress in this field and almost no development”3.

In the four essays on Totem and Taboo, which contain comprehensive arguments that are closely knit, Freud presents in the first one “The Savages’ Dread of Incest” elaborate precautions which primitive tribes used to follow in order to avoid any relationship that could be judged to be incestuous. The second one, “Taboo and Ambivalent Emotions” contains such argument that shows that the essence of taboo is the prohibition of contact with anything judged to be ‘sacred’.

Among the particular taboos discussed are those connected with leaders, i.e., Kings and priests, the extraordinary ambivalence of protecting their men and the ruthless measures taken to secure their deaths when their powers were thought to be failing. From these considerations, Freud drew two conclusions, first that the emotions of primitive people show a greater ambivalence than what civilized people do, and secondly, that psycho-neuroses of modern patients display an inescapable likeness to the ambivalences associated with primitive taboos.

In the third essay on “Animism, Magic and the Omnipotence Thought”, Freud adopted pre-animistic stage advanced by Dr. R.R. Marrett in his anthropological discoveries of religious phenomenon, which Freud said, was to be identified with the practice of “pure magic”. Maret had stated that the basis of magic was a solipsist belief in the omnipotence of one’s thought and wishes, a belief which Freud described a a form of primitive narcissism... In the fourth essay, “The Infantile Recurrence of Totemism” in which Freud’s argument reaches its climax wherein he accepted anthropological evidence that totems were originally animals, that totemism on its sexual side was related to exogamy, and that in primitive hordes the attitude of the younger male members to their horde-leaders was parricidal. Thereafter, Freud attempted to indicate that these anthropological occurrences have their psychological parallels in two features of the Oedipus Complex—the incestuous attraction of the mother to the son, and the death wishes directed by the son against the father. Another argument of great importance included in this essay is the psychology of worship, and in particular, the psychology of “sacrifice” as a prominent feature in man’s religious activities. Sacrifice at an altar is essential part in the ritual of all religions, and its origin appears to be the same everywhere. Originally, the word “sacrifice” referred to “an act of social fellowship between the deity and his worshipper”. Man shared with his god or goddess the same type of food as he himself ate, with an exception that vegetable offerings were not shared by man but they were left to his god or goddess. Animal sacrifices which were the earliest form of sacrifice,
were shared by both man and deity. The members of a clan or tribe used to participate publicly in the rite. Smith had identified on this evidence, the totem animal of the tribe with the sacrificed victim. The motive of this communal sacrifice has been explained by Smith to be that of participation which was an important aspect of communal worship. "The holy mystery of the sacrificial death was justified in that only in this way could the holy bond be established which united the participants with each other and their god". Freud himself assumed that the totem animal was to be identified with murdered horde father; that totemic religion included as its leading aspects, a sacramental killing and a communal eating of the totemic sacrifice. The memory of the original murdering of the horde-father defied all attempts at suppression, although the sense of guilt assumed different forms as man advanced and passed the nomadic food-gathering stage to the settled agricultural life. It is revealed by mythology that the son who carried out the totemic sacrifice released the rest of the tribe from their sense of guilt. But Freud holds—

"There was another sense of atoning this sense of guilt and this one that Christ took. He sacrificed his own life and thereby redeemed the brothers from primal sin".

In the Christian myth man's original sin is undoubtedly an offence against God, the father, and if Christ redeems mankind from the weight of original sin by sacrificing his own life, he forces us to the conclusion that the sin was murder.

This sacrifice of one's own life brings about reconciliation with God, the father, then the crime which must be expiated can only have been the murder of the father. But now the psychological fatality of ambivalence demands its rights. In the same deed which offers the greatest possible expiation to the father, the son also attains the goal of his wishes against the father. He becomes a god himself besides, or rather in place of his father. The religion of the son succeeds the religion of the father. Thus through the ages we see identity of the totem feast with animal sacrifice, the anthropic human sacrifice and the Christian eucharist and in

1. Freud (Sigmund): Totem and Taboo, 1938, p. 212.
all these solemn occasions we recognize the after-effects of that crime which so oppressed man but of which they must have been so proud. At bottom, however, the Christian communion is a new setting aside of the father, repetition of the crime that must be expiated. We see how well justified is Frazer’s dictum that “the Christian communion has absorbed within itself a sacrament which is doubtless far older than Christianity”.

The significance of Freud’s standpoint becomes clear when sacrifice is viewed as an essential part of worship. But the original and contentious nature of many of Freud’s theories has been subjected to many incisive criticisms. Freud’s contention that totemism is the source of all subsequent religions has been much criticised. Wilhelm Schmidt advanced the following serious objections to Freud’s point of view:

1. Totemism as a practice does not belong to the earliest forms of human development. Peoples who are ethnologically the oldest have neither practised totemism nor totemistic sacrifice.

2. Totemism is not a universal practice. Schmidt advanced substantial evidence to show that three of the leading races of mankind—The Indo-European, the Hamito-Semitic, and the Ural-Altaic had originally no totemistic practices.

3. Freud’s adoption of Smith’s assumption that the ceremonial killing and eating of the totem animal is an essential feature of totemism is valueless. Of the many hundred totemic races of the whole earth there are just four who know any rite even approximating to this one and they all belong, ethnologically speaking, to the most modern totemic peoples.

4. Pre-totemic peoples know nothing about cannibalism, so that the parricidal meal would be an impossibility.

5. Schmidt has summed up these four objections in a fifth one. “The form of the pre-totemic family, and, therefore, of the earliest human family, we can hope to know anything about . . . in neither general promiscuity nor group marriage, neither of which, according to the verdict of leading

modern ethnologists ever existed at all”.

Another renowned psychoanalyst Bronislaw Malinowski, as a result of his work among the Trobriand Islanders of Melanesia, his interest in psychoanalysis and his first hand studies of matrilineal forms of society, advanced serious criticism of the Freudian thesis in some different way. Culture and religion, according to Malinowski, do not spring suddenly into being as the result of a supposed historical event but are the slow accumulation of experience. “It is impossible to assume origins of culture as one creative act by which culture, fully armed, springs into being out of one crime, cataclysm or rebellion. This point of view of Freud may be criticised on psychological grounds also:

“If the real cause of the Oedipus Complex and of culture into the bargain, is to be sought in that traumatic act of birth by parricide, if the complex merely survived in the ‘race memory of mankind’—then the complex ought obviously to wear out with the time. On Freud’s theory the Oedipus Complex should have been dreadful reality at first, a haunting memory later, but in the highest culture it should tend to disappear”.

Malinowski has also criticized Freud’s patrilineal explanation of the origin of religion by comparing such systems with matrilineal forms of Trobriand Islanders. In the West patrilineal forms are understandably associated with the Oedipus Complex, but matrilineal societies show no feelings of hatred for the father while the infant’s feelings for the mother are spontaneous and non-incestuous. Besides Malinowski’s studies of matrilineal societies, another view has been advanced by Ian Suttie in his famous work, “The Origin of Love and Hate” (1939). Discussing the Painted Pottery cultures extended from North China to Spain once upon a time, Suttie says that their myth and ritual pattern reveals the same child attitude as modern analytical studies present to be operative in individual lives today, although this child attitude no longer exer-

cises any dominant influence in society. According to Suttie, the deity was not a Sky-father but an Earth-Mother, indicating that the worshippers were mother-directed instead of father-directed. Therefore crimes were offences against the mother and not against the sexual privilege of the horde-father as has been held in Freud's primal hordes. The "theology" of Earth-Mother expressed a pre-Oedipal attitude to the mother who was regarded as being good and terrible; as such aroused ambivalent emotions. The sacrificial theme of matrilineal religion was quite different from that of patrilineal cults, the "good" being treated with high honours before being offered as sacrificial "child" victim to the Earth-Mother. Therefore, the sexual factor was not so prominent as in patrilineal totem sacrifice because the Earth-Mother was the source both of children and of food.

"When in the cultural history of the race the fathers supplanted the mothers, the Sky-father supplanted the Earth-Mother and the victim of the sacrificial ritual who had died to support the life of the people, became scapegoat for the sins of parricidal and incestuously inclined males". From such facts Sutti concluded to show that religion instead of being an obsessional neurosis of guilt was a form of psychosocial 'therapy' that human life instead of being dominated by hate was regenerated and united by love".

Moses and Monotheism

In his studies of anthropology, sociology and culture, Freud could hardly evade the problem of religious feelings. He even went so far as to bring out a volume on the origin of Judaism and the monotheistic religions. Freud's last psychological explanation of religion is contained in his "Moses and Monotheism" (1939), which he completed in London after his departure from his home-town due to Nazi invasion of Austria. This volume covers a much wider range of interests and it is concerned not only with Jewish religion but with Christianity and religion in general. To begin with, a brief account of Freud's use of Old Testament references to Moses is essential before pursuing his psychological argument. According to
Psychoanalytic Orientation to Religion

Freud, since Moses is an Egyptian name\(^1\), the Moses of the Exodus was not a Hebrew. But if this is a fact, then why was the child delivered to the waters of the Nile? There are several myths which deal with the practice of the child-exposure, so that this Biblical incident would seem to belong to this mythical pattern, but this is not the deciding factor whether the child was Egyptian or Hebrew. It is said that Moses was brought up as the son of an Egyptian princess. If brought up in an Egyptian palace, why Moses should have joined the enslaved Hebrew community, gives rise to another question. Freud’s explanation is that by adopting the Hebrews as his own people, and by imposing upon them the knowledge of the One True God, and leading them out of Egypt, Moses was able to secure the survival of the new religion which had been introduced by the Pharaoh Amenhotep IV who is well known as Ikhnaton. The introduction of monotheism into Egypt was violently repudiated by the Egyptian priesthood after Ikhnaton’s death but survived, outside Egypt, as a result of Moses’ efforts with the Hebrews after the Exodus. During the period in the wilderness, Moses had to face various rebellions and uprisings against his authority and in the end he was murdered. Though this adoption of Freud has been refuted by E. Sellin, a renowned German religious expert, the memory of that murder was suppressed, according to Freud, for many centuries; the revival of this memory was to prove of great importance for Christianity. Biblical scholars have raised many objections to this thesis. Dr. Philip has also set out the chronological difficulties regarding the fact that Moses was associated with Ikhnaton’s reign, was a religious reformer, and established monotheism\(^2\). The importance of Suttie’s statement lies in the use which Freud made of this supposed fact, namely that revived knowledge of the “murder” of Moses and many centuries later the crucifixion of Jesus, released the supposed memories of the ancestral murder of the horde-leader. Freud argues in this context: “I invite the

1. The Egyptian word is MOSE(S)—The final ‘S’ being a Greek addition. The Hebrew form is MOSHEH.
reader to take a step forward and assume that in history of the human species something happened similar to the events in the life of the individual. That is to say, that mankind as a whole passed through conflicts of sexual-aggressive nature, which left permanent traces but which were for the most part warded off and forgotten; later, after a long period of latency, they came to life again and created phenomena similar in structure and tendency to neurotic symptoms.  

All religions are characterized by fixation “on the old family history” and “by reproductions of the past and a return long after to what had been forgotten”. Behind the historical developments of Judaism lie the repressed memories of the murder of the primal father, memories which were revived into consciousness by such “event” as the murder of Moses. The result was a strong revival of feelings of guilt among the Jewish people, feelings which were given fullest expression in the doctrines of Paul of Tarsus who traced this widespread feeling of guilt, as he experienced it under the catharsis of the death of Jesus of Nazareth, to its primal source. The Christ-figure assumed the long remembered, long forgotten, guilt of the brothers who were responsible for the murder of the lord-father. This fact has already been pointed out by Freud in his ‘Totem and Taboo’.

Repercussions of Freudian concepts

Although Freud’s conclusions stimulated severe opposition, it is noteworthy that the arguments have not discouraged many writers from adopting Freudian concepts both in their studies of religion and pastoral activities. Canon L.W. Grensted points out that C.H. Valentine in his “Modern Psychology and the Validity of Religious Experience” (1928) and he himself in his Bampton Lectures (1930) on “Psychology and God” were among the earliest English writers besides many others who “saw that the importance of Freud’s methods and their validity in applied psychoanalysis did not necessitate the conclusions

1. Freud (Sigmund): Moses and Monotheism, 1939, p. 129.
which he drew from them, but might well be interpreted in a quite different way.” Freud’s views that religion is a universal neurosis did not antagonise Oskar Pfister of Zurich, a Protestant pastor-theologian known to English readers. Pfister was not so much interested in the psychological explanations about the nature of religion advanced by Freud, as in the Freudian techniques of relieving those psychological disorders which impaired the religious life. He has praised Freudian techniques in his famous works: “Some Applications of Psychoanalysis” (1923), and “Christianity and Fear” (1948). Pfister’s main thesis is that the deviations of Christianity as a historical movement are attributable to psychical errors. He gives an account of how he looked for some means of curing these defects of Christianity in the lives of people known to him and found himself powerfully attracted by Freud’s psychoanalytic view that neuroses are caused by conflicts of the conscious repressed within the unconscious which, unless treated successfully by psychoanalytic methods, affects seriously man’s life for ill. While unable to accept atheistic and materialistic views of Freud, Pfister was greatly attracted by their psychological value and implications. He expresses that “the study of fear and compulsion neuroses of their effect on religion and ethical life opened my eyes to important complexes of the fact and the laws governing them. The neurosis of individuals leads to a neurotic malformation of their Christian Path” 2: Pfister’s analyses, as a working pastoral psychotherapist, were more or less confined to the treatment of adolescents troubled by moral conflicts, and he was able to supplement his procedure by moral and religious advice. In one of his letters, Freud wrote to Pfister whom he admired much, there are two sentences which indicate how it was so that Pfister and others like him, have found the Freudian techniques as helpful without sharing Freud’s views about the nature of religion. Freud writes: “In itself psychoanalysis is neither religious nor the opposite, but an impartial instrument which can serve clergy as well as the laity when it

is used only to free suffering people. I have been very struck at realizing how I had never thought of the extraordinary help the psychoanalytic method can be in pastoral work, probably because wicked heretics like us are so far away from the circle. There arises, therefore, a paradoxical situation. For as a technique, psychoanalysis has proved itself to be of great value in pastoral work—more so among Protestants than among Catholics, but as an explanation applied to religion its real contribution lies not so much in what it denies as in the lively and positive interpretations which such views have provoked, particularly among theologians.

Freud's interpretation of Monotheism

In monotheism there is a belief in the existence of a unique, eternal, omniscient and omnipotent God who demands the absolute obedience of His children in lieu of His protection of them against all the dangers from nature and society. This worship is simply the return of the repressed historical memory of the primal father who was characterized by the decisiveness of thought, strength of will and the forcefulness of his deed. Now the rigour of powerful monotheism is found in some races only. We have to explain the unique circumstances in which the repressed memory of the primal father has produced this mighty effect of monotheistic belief and practices, with its spell on the masses. It is the love of the primal father which had created the sense of guilt in the sons of the primitive horde. This sense of guilt was too painful which had to be repressed. The murder of the primal father for the sake of the incestuous love of the mother remains the repressed original sin of man. "With the rise of culture, with its subsequent increase of the greater tenderness between fathers and sons, the sense of original sin has deepened still. Thus all the races, with their roots in totemism, have to repress their historical memory of parricide, and now they carry collectively this

3. Freud (Sigmund): Moses and Monotheism, 1951, p. 163.
repressed memory in their unconscious by way of inheritance". Whenever the circumstances so conspire as to force the return of the repressed memory, then alone monotheism rises with all its rigour and grandeur. In Jews it is found in this form from whom the Christian and the Muhammadan have borrowed it. Moses who in all essentials resembled the primeval father, was killed. He was the beloved leader of Jews, who had brought them from their exile in Egypt. This murder of the beloved and honourable leader, known as Moses prepared a special condition for the return of the repressed historical memory, and produced a strong predilection for monotheism. The detail of it Freud gives as follows:

'The Jews in captivity in Egypt worshipped their God, Jahve who was originally a volcano god. They were idolators and were heavily oppressed by the Egyptians. There appeared Moses who was a powerful, zealous, irascible and an authoritarian Egyptian. He was neither a priest nor a ruler of a province where the Jews lived in bondage. He was himself brought up in the atmosphere of the monotheistic cult of King Ikhnaton who had borrowed it from Syrians. No other god besides this, one Sun-god was tolerable to him. But the influential Egyptian priests were polytheistic idolators. After the death of King Ikhnaton, monotheism began to disappear and reaction followed in favour of the former polytheistic cult. Every trace of monotheism had to be eradicated. At this critical time, Moses, zealous adherent of Ikhnatonic monotheism, had to flee from Egypt with Jews, either with an intention to escape persecution or to preserve the new path. Though the Jews got rid of the Egyptian bondage, yet they always sought to rebel against Aton monotheism which Moses inculcated into them. Moses taught the Jews to worship one God only, in exclusion to all others. They were not allowed to make even the image of this God. Probably, Moses had incorporated his own traits of irascibility and implacability into the attributes of Jahve whom he was foisting on the

2. Ibid., p. 55.
Moses was, no doubt, loved by the Jews for being a powerful, authoritarian leader who brought them out of bondage into the promised land of freedom. But they also hated him for being tyrannized because of their religious beliefs. It happened so in a fit of rage that one day the idolator Jews overpowered Moses and he was killed. After this killing of the powerful and beloved leader, tender feelings for him soon returned.

This murder of Moses who in all essentials resembled the primeval father of the primitive horde, at once served as a first stimulus for the upsurge of the repressed memory of the historical parricide of the primeval father.  

"The strong longing for the primeval father was revived in the Jewish people with full intensity. What Moses failed to achieve in his life was realised by his death. The ground for Aton monotheism was thus fully prepared. Jahve came to be worshipped as a universal, omniscient, omnipotent and exclusive God. "Only this form of God, the grandeur of the primeval father was restored the emotions belonging to him could now be repeated. Thus a transport of devotion to God is the first response to the return of the Great Father".

"Of course, the murder of Moses was also subsequently repressed as being painful to the race and was converted into a longing for the coming of Messiah. But monotheism was tenaciously held on by the Jews, for among the masses of the Jewish people arose again and again men who kept alive the fading tradition and who did not rest until the lost cause was fully won".

The well-prepared ground for Aton monotheism was changed into Mosaic monotheism. The Mosaic monotheism rests, according to Freud, on the positive feelings of the worshippers as sons in relation to God, who at bottom is the reanimated image of the primeval father. However, this could not satisfy fully the ambivalence of father-son relationship.

2. Ibid, p. 144.
3. Ibid., p. 211.
4. Ibid., p. 175-76.
5. Ibid., p. 204.
The Jews had always to take care of themselves against blasphemous thought against God. They were badly in need of some way of deliverance from their sense of guilt; as such, another event took place.

Among the Jews, there was a man known as Jesus. He did good to the people and nothing else. He was beloved of masses and was very powerful among his people. But he was hated also due to his teachings against the priestly class; as such, the influential group got him crucified. This murder of Jesus, who was, once upon a time, the beloved and hated leader as well, once again reanimated the repressed memory of the primeval father and once again strengthened the belief in monotheism.

It appears that without the murder of great men of the tribe, who are loved and hated at the same time, there can be no ascent to monotheism. The repressed memory of the primeval father has to be revived as a compulsion and it can be re-awakened by repetition of such murderous actions. Thus the Jews could reach such a stage of pure monotheism, because in them two loved and great leaders—Moses and Jesus were murdered by their own groups. Therefore, Freud says that "the genesis of monotheism would not be possible without some such causative events". Due to this reason Freud does not accept the height and perfection of Islamic monotheism and has poor opinion of Oriental monism. However, in Christianity there is not only pure monotheism but it has a remarkable feature of a gospel of salvation and it is this feature that has made it so popular among all the people who suffer from a sense of guilt. The preaching of Saul of Tarsus could be successful on account of it going so deep into the unconscious level of mind of the people. The psychoanalytic language of his gospel means:

"It is because we killed God, the Father that we are so unhappy. But we need not suffer for we have a way in which this parricide has been redeemed. We have been delivered from all guilt since one of us laid down his life to expiate our guilt". Christianity could succeed in easing the sense of guilt

1. Freud (Sigmund): *Moses and Monotheism*, 1951, p. 149.
by transforming Father religion of the Mosaic monotheism into a son-religion. But in doing so, it has decided advantage over the father religion.

First, the judicial murder of Christ reanimated the former belief in one God. Thereafter, it eased the sense of guilt by the explanatory death of Christ.

However, according to Dr. Masih, the main appeal of Christianity lies in maintaining Christ as Son-God. It preaches that God became in the person of Christ and willingly allowed Himself to be crucified, as ransom for the sin of mankind. So far in other past religions a totem was sacrificed which was the surrogate of the father himself. It was the community of the sons who were sacrificing. Their “original sin of hating the father” could be expiated only through compulsive bewailing and lamentation. But this sacrifice which Christ has arranged is a voluntary gift from God Himself; as such, the worshippers as the sinful sons have been absolved from the crime of murder.

Several lacunae have occurred in Freud’s concept of monotheism and its development. Freud confined himself to that type of religion in which God could be conceived in terms of father-image. On account of this notion he considered totem worship to be the earliest and monotheism to be the latest phase and form of religion. He had been completely ignorant about the claims of Jainism, Buddhism and Shankarite Vedantism as modestly developed forms of religion. Even regarding his views pertaining to monotheism he was confined to Semitic monotheism only. In this way the narrowing of field of religion in its various forms, phases and elements, has undoubtedly limited the validity of Freud’s approach and analysis of religion. Further, Freud has made attempt to show that all the living religions have evolved out of totem religion. In this context, he holds that monotheism is found only in the races in whom the admired or loved hero is murdered at the hands of his own group. According to Dr. Masih, Freud could not detect his unwarranted conclusion because he utterly ignored Indian Theism, from the time of the worship of Varuna to the prevailing Bhakti cult. According to Freudian

theory, the Judaic monotheism could grip the Jewish masses because its founder leader Moses was killed by the same community whom he had brought out of the Egyptian bondage into a promised land of political, economic and spiritual freedom. Freud has called religion as "illusion" on account of the presence of some insistent and persistent wishes in its construction. In this context, Freud's opposition to monotheism is in no way less than an illusion since it was also determined by the depressed Oedipal tendencies of Freud. Therefore, Freud's criticism of religion is rather metaphysical instead of being scientific in accordance with one of his definitions. The view of Freud that religion is an illusion need not be false; only its meaning lies in tracing out the wish that prompts it; as such, anti-theistic metaphysics of Freud need not be false. Freud has exploited his fertile imagination as his sensitive necessity in establishing a science of psychoanalysis; so the neurotic disposition of Freud has made him sensitive to the neurotic aspects of monotheism. Therefore, even the negative contribution to the study of religious phenomena made by Freud is worth consideration by those who intend to analyse it.

Analysing the various stages of theistic religion and following the arguments advanced by Freud, it is found that God in every case is modelled after the exalted father of our infancy. Taking into consideration Freud's analysis of painting of Anne, Mary and the Child done by the world's renowned genius Leonardo da Vinci, Ernest Jones sees in Trinity the familiar triangular situation of Father, Mother and the Son. Though the figure of Mother is disguised in the form of the "Holy Ghost", religion then rests on an infantile wish for a protecting father, in its motivation, with regard to reality, therefore, it is an illusion. If God at bottom is an exalted father of one's infancy, then for ever He would remain an object of

5. Freud (Sigmund); Totem and Taboo, 1938, p. 225.
love and hate. Therefore, every attempt will be made to cover the hate impulses by means of ritualistic acts. And this is what we find in religion. Religion is observance of certain days and months, etc. The religious rituals concerning birth, death, initiation rites, marriages, and so on are very well known, and warrant a detailed and explicit mention. This is why Freud calls religion the universal obsessional neurosis of mankind and conversely regards obsessional neurosis as a distorted private religion of the individual neurotic persons. It is often seen that both the religious worshipper and the obsessional neurotic devote hours and hours in carrying out their rituals. Just as worshippers are always afraid of committing any omission that may invite the divine displeasure, so also the obsessional neurotic feels a great deal of anxiety when his rituals are interfered with. In both of them the mechanism of displacement is most marked. For this reason rituals concerning petty observances come to occupy an important place. A similar presence of touch-prohibitions is very well marked in both of them. A religious person has to guard himself against pollution, and this is a well illustrated example in the social prohibition of untouchability in India. Thus religion and obsessional neurosis can be put on the same footing in Freud’s psychoanalytic views. Though there are marked differences in both religion and obsessional neurosis, the most important difference between them is that religion is social and public whereas the latter is private.

Freud is regarded a Darwin of human mind. He was much influenced by “The Theory of Evolution” of Charles Darwin and applied it to the theoretical development of science of psychoanalysis. The application of this theory to psychoanalysis means the explanation of the more complex psychical phenomena in terms of the earlier simpler processes, or, more simply reflexes and instincts. Like Darwin, Freud explains the higher in terms of the simple processes. This is the basis of concept of reJuctionism. Freud’s use of the ontogenetic and

phylogenetic relationship enabled him to show that relationship between certain mental states of fixation leading to arrests in the development of the individual and possible arrests in the development of the race. Pauses and periods of latency in the history of the human race as well as regression at certain stages have already been fully established. Therefore, one should not feel surprised that such regressions, fixations, and mutations should, under favourable circumstances, appear in the individual persons. Religion is shown to have evolved out of ontogenetic and phylogenetic Oedipus complex: morality is traced to the formation of the super-ego; and philosophy is explained in terms of infantile conflicts which find their substitute gratification in the symptoms of schizophrenia and paranoia.

Taking into account Freud's views on religion as a social-psychological phenomenon pervasive of the cultural set up, one of the prominent contemporary American sociologists, Thomas F. O'Dea says that "Freud presents a striking picture of how the limit situation impinges upon man in situations of contingency, powerlessness and scarcity" of which mention has been made under sociological approach to religion. Nature, says Freud, often shows itself to us in ways that mock at our best efforts to control it. The task of culture is to defend us from nature and from this effort comes all the achievements of civilization. Freud points out two aspects of culture: "all the knowledge and power that men have acquired in order to master the forces of nature and win resources from her for the satisfaction of human needs" and also "all the necessary arrangements whereby men's relations to each other, and in particular the distribution of the attainable riches may be regulated". But these responses, according to O'Dea, to contingency, powerlessness, and scarcity always prove inadequate; they produce results which at best still fall short of man's aspirations. Religion, says Freud in an analysis quite similar to that of the functional theorist, compen-

sates for both these grave difficulties. It also adds social control by helping to keep man’s anti-social tendencies in line, at least to some tolerable degree. Culture requires “a certain measure of coercion”, and men “are not naturally fond of work and arguments are of no avail against their passions”.  

Thus far Freud’s analysis has coincided with functional theory of religion, but he has advanced two new ideas. First of all, religion has done a poor job in defending us against nature, including our own nature. It is doubtful whether men were in general happier at a time when religious doctrines held unlimited sway than they are now; more moral they certainly were not. They have always understood how to externalize religious precepts, thereby frustrating their intentions. And the priests, who had to enforce religious obedience met them half way. The second one, of which mention has been made earlier, religion is an illusion, for the significant psychoanalytic reason that “wish fulfilment is prominent factor in its motivations” while it disregards the relationship of its content to reality. Religion, Freud says, “is born of the need to make tolerable the helplessness of man”. His analysis has shown that not only that human conduct springs from hidden and obscure motives, but that often re-enacts, in a current situation, behaviour learned in and appropriate to earlier situations. These earlier responses are usually of an “infantile” or “archaic” kind, recapitulated in adulthood in a disguised form. O’Dea points out that the importance of this Freudian insight is no longer doubted. Religion, for Freud, presented a striking example of this kind of recapitulation. It was a re-enactment of the infantile in the face of the limit-situations.

Freud says that “for the individual, as for mankind in general life is hard to endure. The human situation is one

4. Ibid, p. 54.
Psychoanalytic Orientation to Religion

of helplessness and defencelessness”¹. Thus “man’s seriously menaced self-esteem craves for consolation, life and the universe must be rid of their terrors, and incidentally man’s curiosity, reinforced, it is true by the strongest practical motives, demands and answers”. “Religion takes the first step in this direction by humanizing nature and with this one, much is already won. But such behaviour is not simply contemporary; it contains a substantial recapitulation of child past². It has an infantile prototype. Thus, “man makes the force of nature not simply in the image of men with whom he can associate as his equals—that would not do justice to the overwhelming impressions they make on him—but he gives them the characteristics of the father, makes them into gods, thereby following not only an infantile but also as I have tried to show, a phylogenetic prototype”³. Man at the limit situation, threatened by the overwhelming character of the confrontation recapitulates his childhood experience, and religion comes into the world⁴. For Freud, religion is a recapitulation of the infantile and naturally means giving up completely childish thing. Freud asserts that despite assurances and consolation of religion “man’s helplessness remains” and that—religious ideas which “should solve for us the riddles of the universe and reconcile us to the troubles of life” are themselves largely unfounded and have “the weakest possible claim to authenticity⁵. Freud takes his position with forthrightness and says that “man should give up infantile responses and wish-image. Man will then “find himself in a different situation...He will have to confess his utter helplessness...that he is no longer the centre of creation”... but is it not the destiny of childishness to be overcome⁶.

Freud’s treatment of religion raises relevant questions for the sociology of religion, according to O’Dea. He expresses that although the ultimate problem of what is actually involved

2. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
6. Ibid., p. 88.
in the religious experience lies beyond the scope of science
and it is a matter of faith, an analysis of the empirical charac-
teristics of this experience raises questions. That most reli-
gious behaviour contains markedly very important elements
of infantile projection is unquestionably a justified statement
on Freud's part. It is in fact one made by many theologians
and religious thinkers as well. "Does not Freud in his state-
ment unintentionally raise the question of the possibility of
mature religion and a mature response that is genuinely reli-
gious? Is the 'nothing else' response the only mature re-
response at the limit situation? Is the sacred, simple and infantile
projection born of experience with the parents?"1 Freud
pointed to the very real basis of infantile elements of religion.

Freud regarded religious feeling as a craving for protection
and power. In early narcissism the child has the feeling of
omnipotence. Gradually he must give up this feeling and
instead ascribe it to his parents, who, so he believes, are
omnipotent. Unsatisfactory object relations and frustrations
lead to a secondary narcissism, which is the need for regaining
the feeling of omnipotence and a wish for reunion with the
omnipotent beings. This is, Freud holds, the source of
religious feelings, the powerless individual strives to attain
power by introjecting the powerful figures or a part of them
or being incorporated by them. Religion is, in Freud's
judgement, "an attempt to get control over the sensory world
in which we are placed by means of the wish-world which we
have developed inside us as a result of biological and psycholo-
gical necessities. But it cannot achieve its end. Its doct-
rines carry with them the stamp of the times in which they
originated, the ignorant childhood days of the human race.
Its consolations desire no trust. Experience teaches us that
the world is not a nursery".2 Any religious group, according
to Freud, is based on illusion that there is a head or spiritual
being who loves all the members of his group with equal love.
This head is the father surrogate for all the group members,

2. Freud (Sigmund): New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis, 1933,
   p. 229.
who consider themselves brothers, in their faith. Several religious rites imitate brotherhood and sisterhood, and gods are called by the name of father.

Religious feelings contain the elements of regression to childhood and a wish to be taken care of by a loving parent or parent surrogate and to live in a childhood paradise united with family members in the love and admiration for the protecting father. People who do not belong to the community adherents, who do not love the head or the god and whom he does not love, stand outside this tie. Therefore, a religion even if it calls itself the religion of love, must be hard and unsolving to those who do not belong to it. Fundamentally indeed every religion is in this same way a religion of love for all those whom it embraces; while cruelty and intolerance towards those who do not belong to it are natural to every religion. "But their love within the group and hate for those outside applies to any group which is based on libidinal ties. In fact today religious groups represent less of love and hate, and more of inhibition of libido." 1 If today that intolerance no longer shows itself so violent and cruel as in former centuries. Freud said, "We can scarcely conclude that there has been a softening in human manners. The cause is rather to be found in the undeniable weakening of religious feelings and the libidinal ties which depends upon them. If another group tie takes place of the religious one—and the socialistic tie seems to be succeeding in doing so—then there will be the same intolerance towards outsiders as in the age of the Wars of Religion; and if differences between scientific opinions, could ever attain a similar significance for groups, the same result would again be repeated with this new motivation" 2. Religion, Freud said, satisfies man's desire for knowledge and competes with science. Religion assures man of protection in the face of the dangers and mishaps of life and promises them a happy end to their misfortune. This is beyond the reach of science. Science endeavours to help

2. Freud (Sigmund): Group Psychology and the Analysis of Ego, 1922, pp. 50-51.
people to avoid misery or to a alleviate it, but no science can offer a panacea for all human ills. Another task of religion is to guide men by a system of directions and prohibitions. Science cannot do that either. The aim of science is to discover facts and to find their relationships. Some recommendations for pattern of behaviour can be deduced from scientific facts and theories but science cannot offer any directive for behaviour. Religion combines teaching of the origin and nature of the universe with ethical precepts, with assurances of protection and happiness as reward for fulfilment of these precepts.

Thus, Freud contended that the religious man’s picture of the creation of the universe is the same picture of his own creation. This is why the idea of cosmogony of the God-Creator-Father is combined with ethical commandments and promises of comfort and protection. The Father, the symbol of parenthood, is the creator of life, the source of ethical norms and the punishing and protecting force.

Regarding mystical prayer and erotic language, Freud’s contention that religion is nothing but a sublimation of the sexual libido seems to receive support from the kind of language most frequently used in certain forms of mystical prayer and experience¹. On this matter of language, Freud adopts a suggestion advanced by the Swedish philologist, H. Sperber, that sexual needs played a decisive part in the origin and development of language². He argues that language is derived from the mating calls of animals. Language is a sublimated sexuality and as such, is a crucial instrument in the general deflection of libido from sexual to social end.

**Freud’s Psychoanalytic view of Morality**

With analysis of the role of civilization and religion psychoanalysis crossed the boundaries of the empirical science and entered the realm of speculation³. This seems to be the logical

and inevitable outcome of psychoanalytic inquiry. Freud seemingly avoided ethical and philosophical problems but he could not evade them. He pointed out that the psychoanalytic therapist should remain neutral and non-committal on the ethical issues and it would be inappropriate for a psychoanalyst to impose any moral standard on patients or to offer them any definite set of values. Psychoanalytic therapy aims at assisting the individual to get rid of infantile fixations and regressions so as to become a mature adult. Moralizing would not solve the problems. One of important attempts of Freud was to discover the truth about human beliefs and attitudes and the moral foundations of human behaviour have been scrutinized by the psychoanalytic investigation. Freud disapproved of the idea of a super-human origin of the moral conscience. He has written: "The philosopher Kant once declared that nothing proved to him the greatness of God more convincingly than the starry heavens and moral conscience within us. The stars are unquestionably superb but, where conscience is concerned God has been guilty of an uneven and careless piece of work, for a great many men have only a limited share of it or scarcely enough to be worth mentioning".

Morality starts in childhood as it develops as a part of the personality development. Small children are generally moral. The first source of their morality is an external power, the parental authority which inhibits their pleasure seeking impulses. Parents influence their children by affection and punishment; punishment affects in two ways—as a threat of pain and a loss of love. Fear of punishment and of loss of love and reward for compliance are the main sources of children’s compliance with the moral demands of parents according to Freudian views. To be bad means to act in such a manner that annoys parents and invites their grief and to be good means the performance of things that win their favour and approval.

This state of affairs is carried over by adult men into their religious beliefs. People believe that there is a superior, father-

1. Freud (Sigmund): New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis, 1946, p. 84.
like power that rewards them for doing good and for good conduct, punishes wickedness and protects human life. This sort of belief is carried over. The experiences of the early life when, Freud says, each child is "brought up to know its social duties by means of a system of love-rewards and punishment, and in this way it is taught that its security in life depends on its parents (and subsequently other people) loving it and being able to believe in its love for them".

This also applies to the phylogenetic development. The primitive man was forced by the society to restrain his pleasure seeking impulses. The norms set by the society for the protection of its members became internalized in the minds of individuals. Conscience is basically the fear of society; it is the inner restraint of individual who is "virtually an enemy of the culture", which is imposed on him. Moral and cultural restraints stem from without and the majority of men obey the cultural prohibitions "only under the pressure of external force . . . as long as it is an object of fear. This also holds good for those so-called moral cultural demands."

Love for another person is another source of moral behaviour. "Love for oneself knows only one barrier—love for others, love for objects . . . Love alone acts as the civilizing factor in the sense that it brings a change from the egoism to altruism". Once people share satisfaction of their needs, the libido chooses them as its objects. Members of a group primarily established for narcissistic purposes begin to like each other and cathect libido in each other. This object cathexis necessarily limits the narcissistic love of oneself. Freud's conclusions on this point are amply similar to those arrived at independently by J. Piaget in the study of the child's morality.

Critique of Freud's views on Religion

"Religious phenomena are very complex and a full appre-

cation of them is possible only when we make an exhaustive survey of all the elements which constitute them". But Freud did not keep to his sound observation. He has made attempts to evaluate and analyse religion on a very depreciative fashion. He calls religion "mass obsession", "delusion", "illusory" and "patently infantile". As a psychoanalyst Freud could have only analysed and discovered the unconscious factors involved in religion, but he has also assumed the role of a theologian and a philosopher in addition to his psychoanalytic outlook, inasmuch as he evaluated religion in terms of infantile illusoriness, etc. Psychical and non-psychical factors are always involved in every experience and a correct evaluation is possible only when we include both the factors. In such a case religion also has its affectual, emotional and subjective states as has been already discussed. Besides, it has also unconscious motivation as its driving force. But Dr. Masih holds that one should not forget that "it is a factor and not a factor in religion". There is hardly any experience in which affective and unconscious elements are not involved; as such, their presence cannot render an experience illusory.

Thouless asserts that "affective grounds can always be found for any opinion, and if that were the end of the matter, we would have to give up writing books".

Evaluation of religion by Freud has been considered by various exponents of religion to be not only unauthorised but also one-sided. Various claims have been made against Freud's attitude of "psychoanalytic totalitarianism" to religion. It has been pointed out that an experience can be called illusory-verdical only when it is a sophisticated rational experience. This category has no application of a non-rational experience. Rudolf Otto has contended that religious experience is unique and "sui generes" and is not reducible to any secular, ordinary and sophisticated experience. This should be called numinosus

experience which is wholly non-rational. "The significance of Otto's contention lies in the fact that he has shown that his analysis is easily borne out in relation to all kinds of religion, lower and higher, Eastern and Western, Semitic and Vedic". Mystery itself has been held to be a valid category of experience in current theological mode of thinking which can be legitimately applied to religious experience. "So a God understood and made intelligible is no God at all". The God of religion remains a "hidden God". He remains all the more mysterious to the worshippers who have the most favoured vision of him. This contention has been supported by a wealth of details. Freud has analysed the experience of "uncanny" but he has not treated it as a religious category for describing the numinous experience of course, the numinousness of religious experience, holds Dr. Masih, too has its unconscious motivation and Freud's attempt at showing this is both welcome and desirable. But then as a psychoanalyst, Freud has neither any right nor can he lay claim to the logical assessment of religious entities. In a typical monotheistic experience, and with this alone is Freud concerned, the worshipper is clearly aware of a transcendent Being in relation to whom he is overawed, subdued, fascinated, elated and so on. Psychoanalysis cannot aim at anything metaphysical or transcendental; as such, Freud should not have declared that religion is "illusory", "patently infantile", etc. The question as to why he has done so is evident from his own statement: "people unfortunately are seldom impartial where they are concerned with the ultimate things, the great problems of science of life. My belief is that every one is under the sway of preferences deeply rooted within, into the hands of which he unwillingly plays as he pursues his operation". In fact in his denunciation of God and religion, Freud was not actuated by any curiosity based on scientific assertion. "He was simply

unwittingly playing himself under the sway of the repressed hate for the father. That had forced him to overstep the boundary of psychoanalysis.\(^1\)

The legitimate field of psychoanalysis is the determination of normality-abnormality, health-unhealth. It is beyond its scope to deal with truth-falsity, reality-unreality, and illusory-verdical because they are the concern of logic. But Freud does not seem to have established any explicit conception of normality, abnormality, physical health and disease. His conception of physical "normality" or "disease" was purely practical\(^3\). That is, abnormal are those, according to Freud, who came to him for the treatment either due to some psychosomatic symptoms which caused them miseries, or, because of some trouble or maladjustment to their immediate demands of life. Freud has not pointed out any sharp distinction between normality and abnormality and between health and disease\(^3\); as such, the concept of normality-abnormality is to be determined statistically only. In the light of these considerations, religion could be called abnormal or disease from the standpoint of practical interest only. But hardly anybody has ever been come across, who would have approached any psychoanalyst to get rid of his religion. The worshippers never treat their need for religious experience as pathological. Though religious fanatics, sometimes, prove harmful to society and the masochistic and melancholic prove harmful to themselves. But these are pathological cases in religion. Instead of being pathological, Freud himself admits, religion has afforded protection against neurosis\(^4\).

Now question arises, when nobody called religion a disease nor any worshipper approached the psychoanalyst for analysing away his religion then on what grounds Freud called religion as "mass obsessional neurosis of mankind". The reason is apparent, for Freud was under the sway of preferences deeply rooted within him when he declared religion a "disease". As

a result of inner compulsion, he dogmatically assumed religion to be an obsessional neurosis and by way of rationalization has marshalled evidence for calling it so because overwhelming majority of people are religious despite the fact that religion contains no truth if examined scientifically according to Freud. Further there cannot be an essential identity between obsessional neurosis and religion because of important points of difference between them. Theodore Reik, S. Frenczi and Freud have admitted that religion is a social phenomena and obsessional neurosis is a private affair. Secondly, the sexual factor is accentuated in obsessional neurosis which is not the cause in religion. Since religion is regarded as a social phenomenon and is accepted by the society as a desirable practice, it cannot be called a “disease” i.e., an undesirable phenomenon. As far as the second point of difference between obsessional neurosis and religion is concerned, in the former, the factors involved are post-Oedipal and repressed oral impulses in which the patient remains extremely entangled, whereas the latter is a way out of one’s infantile sexual entanglement. Freud has himself pointed out that religion has made the socialization of instincts possible. Pfister has also significantly remarked that “God as father” is a great defence against neurosis and is a way out of neurosis. In this way, by making sexual factor insignificant religion goes beyond pathology and pertains to normality. But Freud was satisfied with the outlook that religion is a universal obsessional neurosis, whereas it was essential for him to have made a thorough and actual observation of religious individuals. “Therefore, Freud’s study of religion and its treatment as a universal obsessional neurosis is not a scientific conclusion.”

In Freud’s regarding religion as a mass neurosis or a “neurosis of mankind”, it seems that he thinks that there is a “group mind” and thus he reminds us that “the masses, too, retain an impression of the past in the unconscious memory

traces". But the concept of "group mind" has no real existence. It is only a metaphor; as such the phrase "neurosis of mankind" is also metaphorical. Statistically, religion cannot be called abnormal, much less morbid, seeing that it is a "universal phenomenon as Freud himself confesses". If the unconscious belief in religion is taken into account it will be found then that the majority is further strengthened in its favour. In this context Theodore Reik points out that most educated people do not believe in God, but they fear Him. Since statistically religion cannot be called morbid but let us take its criterion as happiness which is the very claim of religion that it affords peace and joy to the worshippers and which Ernest Jones also regards as most important. The history illustrates that religion has saved many ruined lives and has given peace to many 'tortured by love—disappointment', as such from the standpoint of happiness, religion will be said to provide happiness by scattering sunshine and beaming joy. That religion has helped the education of instincts has been accepted by Freud and his followers and Flugel considers this to be great achievement of religion. Further, Freud has conceded that monotheism has helped mankind, specially the Jews who most tenaciously held to it, in intellectual growth and ethical purity. This point of religious effect has been extensively expounded by Sillman according to whom, monotheism has helped the exaltation of the reality principle, the intellectual faculties and scientific curiosity. In this way, religion has helped the sublimation of instincts and unimpeded flow of energy, Sillman has further observed: "Thus monotheism equipped its adherents with more highly developed reality—ego and super-ego, enabling them to survive and/or dominate peoples with religions that did

1. Freud (Sigmund): Moses and Monotheism, 1951, pp. 151, 159.
less to encourage the development of man’s higher mental faculties. Freud had held that at least religion causes no intellectual retardation. It is known fact that religion, historically speaking, has succeeded in effecting sublimation to a great extent and in comparison to it psychoanalysis so far has not been able to achieve much in this direction; as such, it is not reasonable to call religion “neurotic” and psychoanalysis “scientific”. Since the theme of this thesis is psychoanalysis, in this context, it can well be said that “religion has civilized the tyrant father of the primitive horde, has helped the sublimation of narcissism and has sanctified the father-son relationship”. Even the most primitive religion, which Freud called Totem-religion, has contributed to the brotherhood of man and has laid the solid foundation of social organisation. However, epidemics of neurotic forms of religion have occurred besides those which sustained witch-hunting, religious animosities and wars, inquisitions, crusades, etc. But such neurotic form of religion, used as a basis of denunciation of religion, in any and every form is neither logical nor scientific.

Thus religion cannot be called a neurosis of mankind as asserted by Freud from the point of view of normality. The reason for Freud’s assuming religion to be illusory, without any empirical evidence, is revealed if his this outlook is viewed psychoanalytically. The father complex was deeply rooted in the unconscious level of Freud’s mind which haunted him throughout; as such, it became his destiny to deny him. God, for him is only the surrogate of the physical father; as such, denial of God remained a passion with Freud. Besides monotheism, there are also other forms and phases of religion, and while analysing religion all forms of it should have been taken into view which Freud could not touch despite his most thorough approach to religion. A religion which is only naturalistic in its earlier phases may grow later into a

2. Ibid., p. 129.
distinctly humanistic type just as contrarywise, a predominantly humanistic religion may also develop naturalistic tendencies. In the same manner what is polytheism in the beginning may later show an approach to monotheism, just as what is decidedly monotheistic may later develop pluralistic-polytheistic tendencies. Even Hallenistic polytheism and its hierarchy of gods and goddesses, are evidently an approach to monotheism. But Freud has ignored polytheism, goddess-worship, pantheism, etc. and concentrated on monotheism alone for five decades. He could have ignored some of the forms of the religion as obsolete stages of religious development but he could not have said the things as regards atheistic pantheism which was the teaching of Spinoza and was expounded by Jung under the concept of “individuation”. Freud has dismissed without any serious looking into, the cult of pantheistic worship and the primitive worship the “most high”. He held that “the apparently rationalistic religions of the East are in essence ancestor cults” and the worship of the “most high”, is a withering of religion. Dr. Masih asserts that “This summary dismissal of non-theistic religions shows the presence of repression in Freud’s thinking. Freud occupied himself with monotheism because it was this topic which psychologically fascinated him, and even here he is occupied exclusively with Judaic-Christian monotheism”. Freud has completely overlooked many oriental religions where Vedic theism, including Varuna’s worship, in no way can be said to be inferior to the ethical theism of the psalmist or that of Ramanuja etc. The apparent reason for ignoring the other forms of religion is due to Freud’s limited knowledge about them. Whatever he has discussed about the genesis of religion is based on the details gathered by him from anthropological contributions of the Western authors referred to earlier. Freud viewed Judaic-Christian monotheism because it alone provided him with suitable ground for the play of his repressed Oedipus Complex. The basis of Freud’s analysis of religion prompted by his psychical fatalities which he claims to be anything but

1. Freud (Sigmund): Moses and Monotheism, 1951, p. 149.
scientific, is, in fact, merely rationalization. "One of the many possible reasons for Freud's occupation with Judaic-Christian monotheism is that it was this tradition in which he was brought up and it was this alone which moulded him and his intellectual climate". Freud's arguments in this context are that for easy explanation of the analysis of religion and its development, he has confined his views to one single form of religion pertaining to the Western peoples. In his explanation, Freud has made use of the same archaeological and excavatory method which he had used in his psychoanalytical pursuit which helped him in unearthing the most primitive forms of religion. Further, Freud has pointed out that monotheism has ultimately evolved out of totem religion. Here it is essential to mention pin-pointedly all stages through which totem religion has passed to assume the final form and stage of monotheism which Freud cared little to fill up the gap. He says, "I can give here neither a survey of conditions on which it depends nor more than a scanty enumeration of the stages in which the return of the repressed proceeds". Freud holds that not only specific predispositions could be inherited, but also the memorial contents concerning the parricide of the primeval horde. In this respect empiricist Freudian view has surpassed even the speculative view of Jung who holds that the collective unconscious is transmitted as "a possible functioning of inherited brain structure". Though Freud has confessed the difficulty of maintaining it so, he has pointed out that the individual psychology cannot be easily translated into mass psychology. Thus, "unless the fact of transmitting acquired experiences be established and the reality of mass repression be confirmed, the explanation of monotheism remains a clever but dubious hypothesis in the psychology of religion". Moreover, the final part of Freud's psychoanalytic explanation of Judaic-monotheism is full of unverified and untested conjectures. Freud has selected only those views of the authorities

in this sphere which were befitting to his theory against the traditional belief. The conjectures advanced by Freud are neither original, nor historical, nor textual, nor even circumstantial records. Though he has given some reasons for their acceptance, they bud forth from his preconceived notions\(^1\). Freud’s analysis, instead of explaining monotheism, simply assumes it. Since the origin of monotheism has not been psychoanalytically clear by Freud, the psychological conditions leading to the genesis of the notion of monotheism is the subject matter of further investigation. Freud has traced the genesis of monotheism to the return of the regressed parricide of the primeval father of the primitive horde. But only in those types of races it originates and is sustained in which father-like heroes are murdered by their own group. Moses was the admired hero and resembled by all means the primeval father of the primitive horde. His murder by his own people therefore is a befitting occasion for the return of the repressed complex. Monotheism is found amongst the Jews; as such, Moses the patriarch must have been slain, otherwise the psychoanalytic insight into monotheism would not be confirmed. But the psychoanalytic explanation of monotheism advanced by Freud is merely a hypothesis. The central theme in the psychoanalytic explanation of religion centred round the sense of guilt is mentioned earlier. And this “original sin” of man, Freud says, dates from the regressed parricide of the primeval father of the primitive horde. The totem religion has issued from the sense of guilt of the sons as an attempt to palliate their feelings and to conciliate the injured father through subsequent obedience. All later religions prove to be attempts to solve the same problem, varying only in accordance with the stage of culture in which they are attempted and according to the paths they take; they are all, however, reactions aiming at the same great event which culture began and which ever since has not let mankind come to rest\(^2\).

“\text{This conjecture pertaining to the inherited sense of guilt}”,

2. Freud (Sigmund): \text{Totem and Taboo}, 1938, p. 222.
Ernest Jones says, "is from its very nature the most hypothetical and least demonstrable part of Freud's whole Moses theory, but it is the characteristic of his whole train of thought". Thus it is simply evident that the whole psychoanalytic conception and its interpretation of religion from totem worship to monotheism, is simply piling up hypotheses, one upon the other, though Jones has said that Freud set a higher value upon his contribution to the psychology of religion. As regards the secret of Freud's satisfaction from his analysis of monotheism, it is revealed that he obtained the satisfaction of the earliest and strongest tendencies of his infancy, that is, the hate of the father. All kind of neurotic attitude to religion has been correctly described to be in the nature of obsessional neurosis. "Freud's attitude, too, is no less neurotic. Naturally, it admits of spread and generalization of hate. First, the hate was directed against his physical father, and under this compulsion he identified himself with all those heroes who evinced in their life pattern the love of the mother and denial of the father". The examples are Leonardo and Moses of Michaelengelo. In Freud's 'Traumdeutung' the repressed hate has been fully materialized in the expression of its subject matter. Later on, in "Totem and Taboo", the actual killing of the father is carried out. The Jews were characterized by the rite of circumcision and by their adherence to the Mosaic monotheism. Freud has shown in "Moses and Monotheism" that Judaism itself is a product of gentile origin, and the father of Judaism was not a Jew at all. Thus, both the race and the progenitor of the race have been denied. Here there is the culmination of the hatred of the Jew father as such "Moses and Monotheism" has given satisfaction of that inner compulsion which sustained Freud's thoughts on religion throughout his life.

It is a fact that religion has both its reality and neurotic aspects. But Freud has dealt with the neurotic aspect of

religion. Any religion based on rituals alone is more neurotic than a non-ritualistic form of it. Even monotheism is likely to be used neurotically if it is backed up by one’s familial constellations of complexes. In the light of these facts it would have been more appropriate on Freud’s part as a psychoanalyst to have said that religion appears to be motivated by those wishes which lead to dream illusions. But his argument that it is a mass neurosis of mankind or that it is delusion or wholly a patently infantile phenomenon does not sound well. Jones has supported this view and tells us that nobody is in a position to assert that religious beliefs have no correspondence with any supernatural reality. The purpose here is not to show that Freud’s analysis of religion is altogether wrong. This is just to point out that since it is based everywhere on unproven hypotheses, it cannot be called scientific psychoanalysis. The account given by Freud may be true and legacy left by Freud is subject to further investigation. At most, it is a suggestion that monotheism in practice, particularly in the occidental world, is deeply neurotic. Jones regards Freud’s ‘Moses Theory’ as a brilliant example of his imaginative intuition. This is true also.

Freud has made attempt to explain that religion is an illusion because wish fulfilment is a prominent factor in its motivation. Masih holds that this could be additionally delusional if it could be shown that God, the object of religious worship, does not exist in reality. Freud endeavours to explain it by means of empirical philosophy. In the ordinary course, things are considered to be real scientifically, when they can be verified, and tested in principle by a number of sense-testimonies, fellow-observers and if possible, by other instrumental means and checks. But this last of objectivity is not applicable to religion, since God is not a sensible entity. Therefore God is said to be known by revelation and intuition. But Freud, however, attacks importance of the verifiability theory in

5. Ibid., pp. 54-55.
ascertaining the meaninglessness of discourse. The scientific Weltanschauung, Freud holds "asserts that there is no other source of knowledge of the universe, but the intellectual manipulation of carefully verified observations, in fact, what is called research and that knowledge can be obtained from revelation, or inspiration". Religion succeeds only by substituting intuition of the real world by wish world. According to Freud, therefore, it is not real but is simply a derestic product. Further, if there were a real God then we could have made cognitively meaningful statements about Him. A cognitively meaningful statement means one which could either confirm or disconfirm. But none has been able to prove the existence of God since the time of Kant. Moreover, his existence, could not be disproved either; as such, no meaningful statement can be made about Him too. Most of the reality of the religious doctrines, one cannot judge; just as they cannot be proved, nor can they be refuted. This indicates that religious doctrines pertaining to God, therefore, are illusory, or, in the current usage, one can say that they can be stated in emotive language only. Freud points out to another kind of proof regarding the existence of God, that is, the argument from religious experience according to which religious truth is "inwardly felt" and does not require any further reason to confirm it. Freud calls it an evasive attempt, because there can be no appeal beyond reason. On this point thinkers like Henri Bergson, Rad Otto, T. Corbishley have claimed special faculty of divination and they find its findings so clear, luminous and transparent that they do not require any further proof. A third argument advanced by Freud regarding the existence of God, is the people's need for greater guarantee. William James regards religious beliefs as helpful hypotheses. They are likely to be true, but above all, they pertain to meleorism. They may be considered as useful fiction. Freud's arguments against this kind of proof are extremely smashing. He points out that

3. Ibid., p. 49.
human beings demand far greater guarantee than that of "useful fiction" or "the right of will to believe"; in smaller matters, why should they remain satisfied with far less guarantee in the matter of their most important interests. "Ignorance is ignorance; no right to believe anything is derived from it", says Freud. Regarding the theistic approach to the problem of evil and sufferings, Freud takes advantage of this discomfort of the theists and points out that in the face of natural miseries one cannot argue for the existence of a Benevolent Providence. Secondly, virtue is not rewarded and wickedness is never punished.

"Dark, unfeeling and unsolving powers determine the human destiny; the system of rewards and punishments, which, according to religion, governs the world, seems to have no existence". Therefore, Freud concludes that psychologically considered, religious doctrines are illusions and it is sufficient for him to recognize them as such.

There is an extensive literature discussing the Freudian treatment of religion, which cannot be summarized here. The "primeval horde" hypothesis, which Freud took over from Charles Darwin and Robertson Smith, is now generally rejected by anthropologists, and the Oedipus Complex itself is no longer regarded even by many disciples of Freud himself, as the key which unlocks all doors. Philosophical critics and exponents have further pointed out that Freud's psychic atomism and determinism have the status not of observational reports but of philosophical theories. Although Freud's account of religions, taken as a whole, is highly speculative, and all probably be the least enduring aspect of high thought, his general view of faith is a kind of "psychological crutch" and has the quality of fantasy thinking, is endorsed by many internal as well as external critics as applying to much that is popularly called religion. Empirical religion is a bewildering mixture of elements and undoubtedly wish fulfilment enters in

2. Ibid., p. 57.
4. Ibid, pp. 35-36.
and is a major factor in the minds of many devotees\(^1\).

The most interesting theological comment to be made upon Freud’s theory is that in his work on the father image, he may have uncovered the mechanism by which God creates an idea of Himself in the human mind. For, if the relation of a human father to his children is, as the Judaic-Christian tradition teaches, analogous to God’s relationship to man, it is not surprising that human beings should think of God as their heavenly Father and should come to know Him through the infant’s experience of utter dependence and the growing child’s experience in being loved, cared for, and disciplined within a family. Heik says that clearly, to the mind which is not committed in advance to a naturalistic explanation there may be a religious as well as a naturalistic interpretation of the psychological fact. Again, it seems that the verdict must be “not proven”; like the sociological theory, the Freudian theory of religion may be true, but has not been shown to be so”\(^2\).

It is evident from Freudian views that he had a religion and metaphysics though quite different from traditional ones. He never regarded the problem of God as a pseudo-problem. He thought it to be a meaningful problem and tried to discuss it. Freud, therefore, has a positive religion of self culture or spiritual unfoldment which Buddhism, Vedantism and some other oriental forms of religion have taught. It is this spiritual heritage which Freud has enriched and fertilized\(^3\). Freud has started with theism and the warnings which have sounded with regard to it should not be ignored by those interested in religious studies. He has raised some very delicate points regarding some psychological dangers to which some neurotic forms of monotheism are exposed. He has also hinted at a form of religion, which, according to him, should be psychologically adequate and philosophically defensible. This one of the neo-Freudians, Eric Fromm calls to be “humanism”. Therefore, Freud’s approach is not fully negative as critics are

disposed to hold it. Freud's analysis of religion is not wholly useless. The truth about religion is useful in the sense that his negative approach to it arouses a theist and a healthy religious person from his slumbers. Freud's victory is the victory of man's reason over his passions. From the detailed discussion made about religion, it seems that a fresh understanding of religion and some revolutionary reconstruction of theological concepts are essential to find out truth about it. This can surely be achieved if we ignore the writings of Freud on religion.

Adler on Religion

Alfred Adler (1870-1937), like Freud was a Jew and spent much of his early life in Vienna. He joined Freud's seminar, wherefrom, he started regarding himself as a junior colleague rather than a Freudian disciple. The strictly biological foundations of Freud's theories appealed, from the outset, to Adler, who had for some time been interested in the capacity of the body to compensate for organic change. This was a known fact among physicians that damage to certain organs in the body is sometimes followed by a compensatory reaction which from teleological point of view may be regarded as the organ's attempt to overcome its defect. Adler believed that it was possible to observe similar reactions to organic defects in the psychological one. Such observations made it reasonable to suppose that it was the very inferiority of the functions which stimulated the individual to overcome his defect, to such good effect that once inferior function became the superior one. So far Adler's thesis, presented in his book "A Study of Organic Inferiority and Its Psychical Compensation" (1907) was readily acceptable by Freud and his followers, a unique contribution to ego psychology, but the next four years made it apparent that Adler was developing his concept, not merely as an interesting sideline, but as a key to the understanding of the whole mental life. Adler has expressed in his own words his basic thesis that "to be a human being means the possession of a feeling of inferiority that is constantly

pressing on towards its own conquest” (Social Interest; a challenge to Mankind).

But other factors, Adler held, than the organic ones of inferior physique, physical deformities, or defective bodily functions were to be considered as leading to lowered self-esteem and hence to an intense struggle for self-assertion. Adler differs from Freud in several respects, most noticeably at first by his emphasis on ego rather than libido as the great motivating force in life and the source of neurotic difficulties.¹

In 1911, ten years after psychoanalysis had begun to attract medical adherents, appeared the first cleavage in the group that had gathered around Freud in Vienna, and in the young international association of psychoanalysts. Adler was the first to defect from Freudian group and after being separated, he started a rival school of “Individual Psychology”, so named to emphasize the importance of individual differences in personality, dependent on differences in early environment, which were relatively uninteresting to Freud. The “infantile sexuality” which was so much stressed by Freud seemed to Adler a strained interpretation of the behaviour of child.

In Adler’s view the child’s resistance to domination and eagerness to dominate were much more fundamental. The child is, in fact, weak and inferior in many ways to those around him and feels inferior at times, but he combats this feeling by asserting himself as far as possible and by aspiring to grow up and be superior. According to Adler, everyone has a fundamental will for power, an urge towards dominance and superiority. In case, an individual feels inferior in certain respects he is driven by this feeling of inferiority towards a goal of superiority. This striving for superiority is innate according to Adler and he holds that it is a basic urge in man comparable to Freud’s instinctual forces of Eros and Thanatos. It is according to him, primordial, inherent in our nature. It is the continuous effort towards a better adaptation between man and the world. The compensation for inferiority feelings, thus collectively forms what Adler describes as the “life-style”

and it is upon this life-style that the adult character is based. The individual may compensate for inferiority in one respect by achievement in some other direction. Adler regarded the self-assertive impulse rather than the sex impulse as a major drive and as the drive most likely to be frustrated by the environment. The goal of the personal purposes pattern is always the goal of social significance, the goal of elevation of personal self-esteem, the goal of superiority. This goal is indicated by a variety of manifestations.

There are three possible results of the individual’s strivings for superiority and his attempts to overcome inferiority feelings:

(1) Successful compensation when the striving finally leads to good adjustment to three challenges of life—society, work, and sex.

(2) Overcompensation when striving becomes too apparent and leads to varying degrees of maladjustment.

(3) Retreating into illness as a means of obtaining power; for, as Adler wrote: “Every neurosis can be understood as an attempt to free oneself from a feeling of inferiority in order to gain a feeling of superiority.”

A few writers have tried to relate Adler’s “Individual Psychology” (1924) to religion because of his emphasis upon the significance of the individual’s own constitution. Adler himself in an exchange of views with a protestant Pastor, Ernest John, published in “Religion and Individual Psychology” (1935), admitted that there was a common ground between the religion and individual psychology, protesting that he was not willing to make his psychology into a Christian exposition since “the scientific nature of my work must be guarded against the hard and fast criteria of other movements which lie outside science. It cannot possibly make these criteria its own.”

Adler has developed the science of character of all human beings based on social factors and attitudes of individuals towards life and society. Out of this classification of character

traits he has pointed out an aggressive character trait in which are included vanity and ambition, jealousy, envy, avarice and hate. Another type of character, he says, is non-aggressive character which includes traits of seclusiveness, anxiety, faint heartedness, untamed instincts as the expression of lessened adaptation. The genesis of religion and religious attitudes emerges out of these character traits according to Adler.

According to Adler, "Character is a social concept. A character trait is the appearance of some specific mode of expression on the part of individual who is attempting to adjust himself to the world in which he lives. Character is a psychic attitude, it is the quality and nature of an individual's approach to the environment in which he lives". Adler points out how vanity and ambition which are the characteristic traits of individual's character, which he says is acquired, give rise to the idea of God which is held to be the central theme of almost all religions. Adler says that "there is no limit of the development of variety and ambition. It is very interesting to see how in fairy tales, as well as in the overheated psychic striving of vain individuals, the striving for power assumes the expression of desire for the ideal of God-likeness. One does not have to search far to find that a vain person acts exactly as though he were God, or he behaves himself as though he were God's lieutenant, or again, he expresses wishes and desires which only God could fulfil. The manifestation, the striving for God-likeness, is the extreme point of a tendency which presents itself in all his activities and amounts to a desire to project himself beyond the boundaries of his personality". This kind of explanation of Adler seems completely similar with the movement of thought from Kant to Hegel which revolved in a fundamental sense around the idea of man's self-realization as god-like being, or alternately as God's radical departure from the Western tendency. The German philosophy has resolved that "God is man". Marx's meaning of atheism is recognition of man as the sole divinity. Similarly, Hegelianism is a reve-

lation of the truth about religion as phenomenon of man's self-deification and resulting self-alienation. In the light of the views it is evident that Adlerian view of genesis of the idea is anthropomorphic deification of man himself. It is also a kind of projection of man's own wishes to become god-like.

This type of concept about the genesis of religious attitude and the idea of God, Adler has determined in the character traits of individuals. He further explains that "the evidences of this tendency are many in our age. That large group of people that interest itself in spiritualism, psychic research, telepathy and similar movements, is composed of just such people who are anxious to grow beyond the boundaries of their humanities who are desirous of possessing powers which human beings do not possess, who wish to remove themselves, beyond time and space as in the intercourse with ghosts and the spirits of the dead"¹.

The genesis of religious attitudes, apart from psychological reasons, according to Alder, is that "a large portion of humanity gets its first conception of the nature of man from the catch word phrases of the Bible which declares that man was created in the image of God"². This sort of conception, Adler holds leaves very deep impression upon the soul of child. By soul, Adler means "a moving and living organism". He holds that "the soul stands in innate relationship to free motion. Those organisms which are strongly rooted have no necessity for a soul"³. Closely related to this thirst for God-likeness is the ideal of the fairy-tale Utopia where every dream comes true according to Adler which leaves upon children a very deep impression of reality. This gives rise to religious tendency, which may not be got rid of until they are very old. "The satisfaction of one's vanity through the misuse of one's desire for religious satisfaction, is also found on the trail of the striving for God-likeness"⁴. Adler says that, "we have to only remark how important it may be to an indivi-

dual who has suffered psychic shipwreck, to remove himself from other human beings, and engage in personal conversation with God; such an individual considers himself quite in the proximity of God, who is duty-bound, by virtue of the worshipper’s prayers and orthodox rituals to personally concern Himself with the worshipper’s well being. Such religious hocus-pocus is usually so far from religion that it impresses us being purely psychopathological\(^1\). This sort of pathological explanation of character traits of an individual in thinking about God-likeness is quite similar to the concept of Freud that religion is an obsessive neurosis; that is, it is neurotic tendency which gives rise to religious attitude and feeling of thinking of god-likeness.

The types of personality traits based on the classification of character established by Adler in connection with religiosity in his famous work, “Understanding Human Nature”, he says that some of these chronically misunderstood people beat a retreat into religion, where they proceed to do just what they have done before. They complain and commiserate with themselves, and shift their pains to the shoulders of a complaisant God\(^2\). In this process they believe that God, this extra-ordinarily honoured and worshipped Being, is concerned entirely with serving them, and is responsible for their every action.

Adler was the first to enlarge the scope of depth psychology in a significant way. He perceived that, beyond the specific sexual and family factors, the question of the “meaning” of life to the individual has a prime importance in the functioning of the personality. Religion is one of the very important factors in this frame of reference. The individual, Adler said, unconsciously constructs a system of “fiction” by which he finds a “meaning” for his life at least in his own subjective terms. He does this, Adler maintained, because the nature of the human being is such that he inherently requires a frame of reference in order to be capable of functioning as a person. At this point in his work, as one will see clearly, when Adler’s

2. Ibid, p. 263.
work is discussed in detail, Adler was interpreting the psychological significance of the "meaning" of life within the format of his earlier analytical theories. Later, however, he realised that a concept thereof was only psychological and could do no more than hedging the fundamental issue. Adler then attempted the more difficult task of leading the individual psychology towards an absolute meaning of life; as such, he himself had experienced via his religious sense of social feeling. Here Adler achieved a limited success but the problems he encountered were ultimate ones and this scope was larger than he was equipped to handle at that time. This, in fact, led Adler to embark upon a new road for depth psychology.

Though Adler has not dealt with religious phenomena in such detail as Freud and Jung have done, theories developed by him may well be employed to study religion as a psychosocial factor in the life of an individual and society as well. He says that "the psychic life of man is determined by his goal." The first thing in the psychic trends, according to Adler, is that the movements are directed towards a goal. Since religion is said to be wish-fulfilment and it seeks to achieve some goal in an individual's life, Adler's theories in this respect may prove helpful in analysing religion psychologically and sociologically. This sort of striving, Adler says, is teleological and is innate in human beings. He expresses that "The goal towards which every human being's actions are directed, is determined by those influences and those impressions which the environment gives to the child." Thus, in the genesis of religious attitude and character traits for one's becoming religious, environmental factors play an effective role. Adler's theories of compensation, self-assertion, and inferiority complex and striving for superiority to compensate are basic factors to engender the religious attitudes in human beings. Freud says that religion is compensation. Adler's concept of compensation inherently present in individual is a great source of one's being religious for compensating his inferiority.

4. Ibid, p. 28.
Similarly, the concept of self-assertion is also compensatory by adopting religion as striving to make his personality felt in society. As regards the misfortunes, Adler says that people generally develop a tendency to ascribe their misfortunes to their ill-luck, as though some supernatural power had caused them in which, according to Adler, vanity plays an evil game. These are the same people who act as though some sinister deity spent its time persecuting them. This is a psychological truism according to Adler. This tendency is a source of the genesis of religious feeling and leads to believing in some supernatural power.

Adler has not discussed in detail the religious phenomena as Freud and Jung have done but his theories can be used as psychological method of study of religion and its genesis. Jung has followed implicitly Adler’s theory in developing an analytical psychology and neo-Freudians have also adopted Adler’s techniques. The noteworthy point of his approach is that Adler was more concerned with the conscious processes than Freud was. Adler’s theory is, to a great extent, a theory of what Freud called ego

Adler observed in 1933, about four years before his death, which represents a final statement of his understanding of the place of religious ideas in human thought and culture as under:

“The idea of God and its immense significance for mankind can be understood, recognised and appreciated from the point of view of individual psychology as the concretization and interpretation of human awareness of greatness and perfection, and that the individual as well as society are bound to a goal which rests in the future and which increases in the present the driving forces through the enhancement of feelings and emotions”

In order to distinguish the contribution to the understanding of religious idea nation made by Adler, it is helpful to

compare and contrast his views on this subject to those which Freud and Karl Marx have advanced.

Fiction versus Illusion or Opium

Adler’s argument relating to “goal” is always in the context of his assumption that human life and striving is oriented towards the future, and that this orientation is maintained by the unconscious creation of a “fictional final goal” of perfection in every individual’s personality formation. This goal is a “useful fiction” in that it becomes an organizing principle around which the processes of perception, thought feeling and action are unified in the unique individual personality. The idea of God, therefore, has “immense significance” because it has enabled human beings to organize their individual and communal perceptions of reality around strivings towards perfection in the manner that sanctify human life, the relationship between a human and human community itself.

Adler holds that the “fiction” is consequently seen as being necessary to human survival and development. Unlike the “illusion” in Freud’s scheme, which interferes with our perception of reality, the “fiction” makes perception, and all organized human activity possible. Adler’s view of approaching religious ideation did not, however, prevent him from utilizing the concept of illusion. His reference to it is an ironic broadside against the psychoanalytic system in which it plays so important a role. He goes on to say, “Now that man no longer sees himself as the centre of world events, he is satisfied with a more meagre concretization of the image of God and is inclined to conceive it as causally acting forces of nature. Individual psychology, however, because of its essential views, would have to regard such an unpromised mechanistic position as an illusion, inasmuch as it is without any goal or direction. In this the mechanistic position is like drive psychology which is cut from the same cloth”.

The concept of “fiction” used by Adler for understanding religious ideation is also opposed to Marx’s analogy of

religious imagery to "opium". According to Marx, religious beliefs induce a kind of dream-state into which the suffering and oppressed human being withdraws from the consideration of his misery and from the contemplation of the means and action which would be required to end it. In Adler's view the Marxist critique, if correct, would have to be turned against itself, since Marx also built his system around a "fictional final goal" of perfection. Adler holds that "The striving to gain strength from the divine goal always flows from man's insecurity and constant inferiority feeling. The fact that the form of the ideal varies is not essential. Whether the highest effective goal is called God or Socialism or, as we call it, the pure idea of social interest, or as others call it, in obvious reference to social interest, ego ideal, it always reflects the same ruling, perfection, promising, grace-giving goal of overcoming."

Religious Ideas: Expressive of Human Psychology Versus Psychopathological Systems

In Adler's system, the "idea of God" is an expression of normal human functioning, namely "the human awareness of greatness and perfection" etc. as pointed in the above quotation. The formation of religious ideas and convictions within the life of a society or group is, in Adler's view, an extension of the organisation of convictions and strivings which are involved in the normal and healthy development of individuals. As such, religious ideas are norms. Convictions are norms of human psychology, and not only of psychopathology. This view of Adler's is quite opposite to Freud's reduction that religious ideas are obsessive-compulsive symptoms.

But this does not mean that Adler was unaware of psychopathological uses of any guiding image. This will occur whenever the image is so highly self-centred and non-cooperative that it defies the requirements of social living and the individual is thus prepared "to devalue reality and

dogmatize the guiding image as occurs in the psychoses.

In this context, Adler stresses that furthermore anyone who formulates this goal of godlikeness as (already) real and personal (in his present life) . . . . is soon forced to flee from real life — since it is a compromise — and to seek a life apart from real life, at least in art, but usually in pietism, psychosis or crime.

Beyond History versus Within History: End of All things

Adler's use of the idea of God as "goal of goals" distinguishes his view of the "end of all things" from that of Marx, whose "dictatorship of the proletariat and withering away of the state" foresaw the end of history as being attainable within history. According to Adler, the end of history remains outside of history, and at the same time operates in every present moment as guiding fiction of perfection. Therefore, it increasingly functions both as a corrective to, and as a spur towards our overcoming the injustice, inequity and imperfection and every social system. Adler recognised that "perfection" is a concept that can never be applied to life, as long as there is life, since perfect means finished, permitting no further change or work. Adler stresses: "The continuous striving for security urges towards the overcoming of the present reality in favour of a better one. The goal of perfection must bear within it the goal of an ideal community, because all that we value in life, all that endures and continues to endure, is essentially the product of social interest."

No one knows which is the only correct way. Mankind has frequently made attempts to imagine this final goal of human development. The best conception which one has gained so far of this ideal elevation of mankind is the concept of God. There is no question that the concept of God actually includes this movement towards a goal and that it best serves the purpose of a concrete goal of perfection for the obscure desires of man to reach perfection.

2. Ibid., p. 107.
In Adler's individual psychology the continuity between religious faith and "scientific illumination" is stressed over any discontinuity. The idea of God and other religious ideas can be understood instead of "seen through" or "explained away". For, in this view, it is assumed that "strong possibility of a concretization of a goal of perfection, and the irresistible attraction to it are firmly anchored in human nature". Adler's approach to the understanding of human psychology, therefore, contains a profound respect for the importance of all the efforts of the creative human imagination to achieve orientation in a world of uncertainty and change. According to him, not only the higher religions, but also the primitive religious forms can be seen as contributing to human life, and to our understanding of the social interest which is the key to human survival and development. Adler holds: "The worship, too, of a fetish, of a lizard, of a phallus as a fetish in a pre-historic tribe does not seem to be scientifically justifiable. Still, we should not overlook the fact that this primitive conception of the Universe has furthered community life, the social feeling of humanity, since every one who was under the spell of the same religious fervour, was regarded as a brother, as taboo, and was accorded the protection of the larger tribe".

The individual psychology of Adler does not assert the "existence" of God, since that question is by definition out of the scope of any psychological investigation. According to him, "the highest effective goal" is "the pure idea of social interest" rather than God. Technically, then, Adler appears to be an atheist. It is relevant to mention here that this term was first used by the old Roman Empire to describe those, such as Jews and Christians who did acknowledge and honour the recognised "gods" of the time. In Indian religion, the term 'atheist' (Nastik) was primarily used to describe those who did not have faith in Vedas. Adler's 'atheism', like theirs, retains a religious feeling for the possibilities of human life and development, a kind of religious zeal to have those possibilities under-

stood and actualized.

Social interest means, according to Adler, "the striving for a community which must be thought of as everlasting as we could think of it if mankind had reached the goal of perfection. It is (never) a present-day community or society, a specific political or religious formation. This is rather the goal which is best suited for perfection, a goal which would have to signify the ideal community of all kind, the ultimate fulfilment (of societal evolution)"\(^1\).

Jung on Religion

Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) was a Swiss who left Freudian group in 1913 and resigned from the first presidency of the International Psychoanalytic Association founded by Sigmund Freud in 1910 after Adler's breaking away from Freud due to what he felt to be Freud's undue emphasis on sex. Both Alfred Adler and Jung rebelled against Freud's theory of libido in its sexual connotation\(^2\). Having a wide knowledge of religion, philosophy, myths and symbolism of so many cultures, Jung made use of this knowledge in his psychology—so much so, that many critics have commented that Jungian theory is more like a metaphysical system than a school of scientific psychology\(^3\). Though on many occasions Jung denied that his approach was unscientific, as a scientist he writes, "I proceed from empirical facts which everyone is at liberty to verify". But "there is an almost universal agreement outside the Jungian school that his attitude to scientific standards is somewhat unusual"\(^4\). This is particularly evident in his doctrine of "psychological truth" and his theory of "archetypes". The doctrine of "psychological truth", of "psychology of reality" causes Jung to infer that because a belief is invested with great emotional significance, it must

therefore in some sense be true. For instance, in one of his important works, "Psychology of Religion", he writes, "in itself any scientific theory no matter how subtle, has, I think, less value from the standpoint of psychological truth than the religious dogma, for the simple reason that a theory is necessarily highly abstract and exclusively rational, whereas, the dogma expresses an irrational entity through the image." One sees what Jung means; for a religious dogma, like a myth, like a dream, or a symbol does express some sort of truth, and as Freud was the first to show, all productions of mind must have some meaning or significance. But whether this meaning lies in the sphere of objective reality or subjective phantasy is important to the scientists and cannot be given up by talking of "psychological truth". Freud saw all symbols, whether in dreams, myth, or art, as primarily sexual in nature and also as being a generalized expression of a particular object. In Jung's theory, however, the symbol no longer points from the general to the particular, but on the contrary from particularized symbol to the generalized idea in the Platonic sense of the word. This novel approach has been described in detail by the Jungian Father Victor White in his work "God and the Unconscious". He writes, "Behind the particularised mother's womb lies the archetypal womb of the Great Mother of all living; behind the physical father the archetypal Father, behind the child the 'puer acternus'; behind the particular manifestation of the procreative sexual libido lies the universal creative and recreative spirit. The second of all these pairs appears now, not as a phantasy substitute of the first, but rather does the first appear as a particular manifestation and symbol of the second". Commenting on this view, Brown writes: "Although Freud may be wrong and Jung right, at least we have the advantage of knowing the early father, mother, and child, in a way that we do not know in any direct sense of the word—the archetypal Father, 'the Great Mother of All Living' or the 'puer acternus', and it is certainly unorthodox in science to describe the partly known in terms of the wholly unknown".

Jung and Freud became intimately acquainted and together

founded in 1911 an international psychoanalytical society with Jung as its first president. In 1913 it became amply clear that Jung's ideas were deviating considerably from those of Freud and at the insistence of Freud, Jung ceased to call himself a psychoanalyst. Instead, he began to call himself an analytical psychoanalyst and proceeded to develop an active school at Zurich and elsewhere. Thus he developed another system of psychology widely known as analytical psychology. Jung used the term libido used by Freud in an even broader sense than the latter, stripping it of its distinctively sexual character in which Jung included both Freud's libido and Adler's will for power. That is, in short, the whole range of motives. He made it equivalent to Schopenhauer's will to live or to Bergson's elan vital. Libido, according to Jung, was the total vital energy of the individual which finds its outlet in growth, in reproduction, and in all kinds of activity. Freud's further study of narcissism led him to combine libido and the other life instincts under another concept of Eros, which is essentially the same as Jung's libido, except of course, that Freud then postulated a death instinct or destructive tendency as the polar opposite of Eros. Jung's complicated theoretical system, without accepting the Freudian concept of the death instinct, had several polarities. The best known is that between "introversion" and "extroversion". Jung distinguished two types of individuals, those whose interest and attention were centred on what went on in themselves, and those whose interest and attention went out to physical environment; the former are, according to him, introverts and the latter extroverts. The extrovert is "set" for dealing with the external world, the introvert for dealing with the inner world of ideas and feelings. The extrovert finds the values of life in the objects and persons he perceives and manages, while the introvert finds his values in thoughts, feelings, and ideals. The libido, according to Jung, has an outward thrust in extroversion, an inward thrust in intro-


version. Individuals differ in the direction of their interest and activity accordingly as they are introverts or extroverts; but they also differ in the kind of mental activity to which they are more inclined. Jung distinguished four kinds of mental activity; thinking, sense perception, intuition and feeling in which feeling and thinking are polar opposites. Sense perception and intuition are regarded as another pair of opposites. On the basis of the combination of these four kinds of mental activity with two directions of interest, Jung has recognised eight main types of individuals besides the intermediate types. There is still the great polarity or the conscious and the unconscious according to Jung. He makes even more use than Freud of the concept of the unconscious of which he holds, there are deeper and deeper layers. The best deeper layer is the personal unconscious, which is composed in part of material repressed by individual, as pointed out by Freud. Deeper than the personal unconscious lies the racial or collective unconscious, which according to Jung, is the common groundwork of humanity out of which each individual develops his personal conscious and unconscious life. Jung holds that the collective unconscious is inherited, coming down to us from our primitive ancestors. It is inherited in the structure of the organism, including the native brain structures, which predisposes the individual to think and act the way human race has thought and acted through countless generations. The collective unconscious includes the instincts, the “id” of Freud’s later system and it also includes what Jung termed as “archetypes”. Jung points out that the instincts are primitive ways of acting, the archetypes-primitive ways of thinking and the two are not entirely disparate, since thinking and acting go on together, specially at the primitive level. An archetype becomes an idea when it is made conscious, but in the collective unconscious it is more like a tacit assumption, such as the primitive belief in magic and action at distance. While almost entirely submerged in the normal walking life of civilized adults, archetypes crop up in dreams, in the myths and fairy tales, which have been

handed down to us from distant ages and still make a mystic
appeal to our inner nature. In the Jung's theory total
individual is composed of the conscious and the unconscious,
the two being complementary. What is not present consciously
in an individual is present unconsciously. If one is an extrovert
consciously he is an introvert unconsciously. This is, in
nutshell, the nature and mental make-up of individuals as
envisaged by Jung. The purpose here is not to discuss in
detail, his theory of analytical psychology. But this back-
ground was essential from the point of view of understanding
Jung’s views about religious phenomena. In treating his
patients, Jung recognised the role of religion. In this context
he says, "Recognise the deeply human religious instincts, which
go beyond Freud's pleasure-seeking instinct and Adler's will
for power; without dictating the patient's theological beliefs,
lead him through direct acquaintance with his own collective
unconscious to a sense of one-ness with mankind and indeed
with the universe. And do not be disturbed as a scientist if
your patient comes out with a rather mystical viewpoint, so
long as life for him becomes once more meaningful and worth-
while"

Apparently, Jung not only followed Freud into the realm
of the conscious but became enchanted with it... The primitive
beauty of the primary-primordial mental resources, studies by
Jung in psychotherapeutical practice and in anthropological
and cultural-historical research, was tempting indeed. Jung
progressively ascribed to the unconscious, more and more
importance. Freud saw human nature in the perspective of
unconscious, preconscious and conscious, the conscious being
the controlling force. Jung definitely rejected the rule of the
conscious. Jung differed from Freud on several issues in which
methodological one was the first. Freud persistently applied
the scientific analysis to all mental provinces and his methods
were always rational and empirical observations. Jung was
deeply involved with the unconscious phenomena and bluntly

1. Woodworth (Robert S.): Contemporary Schools of Psychology, 1948,
2. Wolman (Benjamin B.): Contemporary Theories and Systems in
Psychology, 1960, p. 299.
refused to apply to them the method of scientific analysis. Freud was a determinist, Adler was purposivist. Jung originally accepted both causation and purposivism but in 1955, he added a third category of contemporariness of events which supposedly occur at the same time and yet are not causally interpreted. Consequently, Jung decided that man lives by aim as well as by causes. He did not see any contradiction in these two principles. Though he was opposed to the deterministic causalism he introduced a fatalistic predestination theory through the eternal factors of ancestral history, which influence the actions of each individual. Jung’s approach to religion will now be viewed in the following lines:

Jung, unlike Freud who maintained a clear-cut, critical attitude towards religion despite his sympathetic approach, has so frequently reassessed his attitude to make it difficult to give a really consistent account of position. Jung always refused to consider his voluminous output as a “system” and has expressed: “I regard my theories as suggestions and attempts at the formulation of a few scientific concepts of psychology, based in the first place upon immediate experiences with human beings.” Despite this, yet, Spinks writes that the value of Jung’s contribution exceeds that of any other writer on this subject in this country. Jung’s contributions to psychological concepts are unique type. Here a brief resume will be made of his personal record, an assessment of the significance of his views on theology and religion and then a comparison based partly on his own estimate between his attitude to religion and that of Freud.

Jung’s personal background

Jung was born in 1875 in Kesswil, Switzerland. His father was a Protestant pastor and a philologist. Jung wanted to become an archaeologist but later he qualified for a medical

degree at Basel intending to specialize in physiological Chemistry. By chance he read Krafft Ebing’s “Text Book of Psychiatry” which led him to become an assistant at the Burgholzle Asylum in Zurich where he collaborated with Eugen Bleuler. Later he also studied under Pierre Janet in Paris. He developed a new method known as Association Tests in Zurich, which helped him to confirm empirically some of Freud’s published conclusions; as such, a fruitful collaboration between Freud and him was established. Though a cleavage occurred when Jung’s “Psychology of the Unconscious” was published in 1912.

Jung’s knowledge of nature of the unconscious was profoundly augmented by his visit to primitive tribes of North Africa, Arizona, New Mexico and Kenya. As a result of these ethnological reseaches and observations, Jung traced out striking similarities between the myths and ritual patterns of primitive peoples, the religions of the classical antiquity and the contents of the unconscious of his patients. The interest in non-European tribal customs and religions was later extended to include the great religions of the East which resulted in his association with Richard Wilhelm in the “Secret of the Golden Flower” (1931), and with Kerenyi in his “Essays on Science of Mythology” (1941)\(^1\). It is evident from Jung’s “Integration of the Personality” (1941) that from his childhood he had been deeply impressed with the mystery of existence; in it, he tells how quite early in life he became interested in the subtleties of theology and the concept of Trinity. Jung’s interest in this particular aspect of theology nonetheless survived his youthful disappointment; many years later Jung brought out his “Psychological Approach to the Dogma of Trinity”. The other experience which, Jung says, profoundly affected his adult attitude to religion, was a dream which he had at the age of twelve. He dreamed that he was standing in the gloomy medieval courtyard of the Gymnasium at Basel and as he went out through the gate way, he saw—the Cathedral of Basel, the sun shining on the roof of coloured tiles, recently renovated, a most impressive

sight. Above the Cathedral, God was sitting on His throne. “I thought: 'How beautiful it all is!' What a wonderful world is this—how perfect, how complete, how full of harmony!’ Then something happened, so unexpectedly and so shattering that I woke up. There the dream ended. I could not allow myself to think of what I had seen”, says Jung.

For the next few nights he felt it would be an “unforgivable sin” to think of what he had had in that dream. Then came a great moment; he sat up in his bed, sweating and trembling, for he felt: “God must mean me to accept this awful scene as my own thought.” And at that moment he did accept it. It was as follows: “From His throne God “dropped” a vast faeces on the Cathedral and smashed it to pieces. This was a terrific thing, for it could only mean that the church, his father’s teaching, and his own beliefs had to be thought of then.”

Commenting upon this experience, Bennet says that this was a great dream in that it seems to have convinced Jung that he must take an independent attitude to religion, a conviction, which subsequently dominated the whole of his outlook, as his life’s work manifestly proves. During his association with Freud, Jung produced a small work, “The Significance of the Father in the Destiny of the Individual” (1909) in which he has expressed his views agreeing with those of Freud.

“What we see in the development of the world-process, the original sources of the changes in the Godhead, we see also in the individual. Parental power guides the child like a higher controlling fate. But when he begins to grow up, there begins also the conflict between the infantile constellations and the individual, the parental influence dating from the prehistoric (infantile) period is repressed, sinks into the unconscious but is not thereby eliminated. Like everything that has passed into the unconscious, the infantile constellations send up into the consciousness, dim, foreboding, feeling for mysterious guidance and opposing influences. Here are the roots of the first religious sublimations. In the place of the father, with his constellating virtues and faults, there

appears on the one hand, an altogether sublime deity, on the other, the devil". But his views underwent a considerable change. His attempts in dealing with the phenomena of religion as objective psychological "facts" led him to the conclusion that the psychological processes at work in modern believers were the same as those which operated in pre-Christian and non-Christian religions. All religions have their psychological roots in the collective unconscious of the race which Jung called racial unconsciousness.

Jung on Theology

Despite their positive nature, Jung's views on religion and theology have aroused profound doubts in the minds of many theologians as to whether he might be identifying psychical facts with spiritual realities. For instance, it seems difficult to reconcile such a statement as given by him, with the teaching of traditional theology: "To our analytical psychology... the image of God is the symbolic expression of certain psychological state, or function, which the character of absolute superiority to the conscious will of the subject... God is a function of the unconscious, namely the manifestation of a split off of libido which has activated the God-image. To the orthodox view God is, of course, absolute, i.e., existing in Himself. Such a conception implies a complete severance from the unconscious, which means, psychologically, a complete unawareness of the fact that the divine effect springs from one's inner self".

Even then theologians find it difficult to accept the view that:

"It is only through the psyche that we can establish that God acts upon us, but we are unable to distinguish whether these actions emanate from God or from the unconscious. We cannot tell whether God and the unconscious are two different entities. Both are border-line concepts for

2. Jung (C.G.): *Psychological Types*, 1923, p. 610,
transcendental contents". This sort of doubt arises again particularly when Jung declares that by "God" he means the "God-image", i.e. God-image and by "transcendental" he implies a transition from one attitude to the other and not any metaphysical equality. Jung's satisfaction with the psychologically experienceable and his rejection of the metaphysical, so far as his own system is concerned, are intended to imply no gesture of scepticism pointed against belief or faith in higher power. Jung as psychologist says, "God is an archetype". Then he means "the types in the soul", which as is well known, comes from 'below', 'stamp'. The word archetype itself thus presupposes something that stamps. The competence of psychology as an empirical science only extends to determining whether the "type" found in soul properly can be designated on the basis of comparative research as an "image of God" or not. Nothing is asserted thereby, either positively or negatively, about the possible existence of God, just as little as archetype of the "hero" presupposes that one exists. As the eye corresponds to the sun, so does the psyche to God. At all events, then, soul must possess a potential relation, or correspond to God's nature in itself, else no connection could be made between them. This correspondence is as described by Jung in his "Psychology and Alchemy" psychologically formulated, "the archetype of the image of God". He expresses that more cannot be said about it from standpoint of psychology, and more should not be asserted. Further, Jung holds, "The religious standpoint considers the type as the effect of the stamp, the scientific standpoint on the contrary the former as the symbol of an unknown and incomprehensible content". These difficulties, in fact, arose in the first place from certain ambiguities in the "Psychology of the Unconscious". Though Jung assumed that religion is psychologically irreplaceable, he implied that one man has succeeded in psychologically interpreted became "spiritually autonomous".

on the other hand, Jung's use of the term “undifferentiated libido” as distinct from sexual libido used by Freud, necessitated quite favourable orientation of the theological opinion about the nature of analytical theories. Father Victor White has pointed out that this “differentiated libido” could be synonymous with that formless energy which natural theology knows as “actus purus” which is a conception of God Himself. Jung's prospectively directed libido could be interpreted as that “natural desiderium” which St. Thomas Acquinas assumed, men have to reach out towards God¹.

However, Jung many a time protested that his theological critics have not taken into account the facts that his methodology—his gathering of observable facts, and his elaboration of their psychical nature—was the same empirical nature as the method of modern science. Jung in the course of time added the factor of faith to this empirical approach, which was based on his analytical practice. The psychical phenomena of his patients, and the information which his ethnological researches brought to him, showed that every man lives for some end whether he is conscious of it or not. Jung expresses that life is a “drama” in which plot, word, action and gesture are to be explained prospectively. The end to which the drama moves is what Jung calls the self. The archetypal image that leads out of this polarity to the union of both partial systems—consciousness and the unconscious—through a common midpoint is named the self. It marks that last station on the way of individuation, which Jung calls self-realization². Jacobi expresses that “only when this midpoint is found and integrated can one speak of a whole man. Only then, namely, has he solved the problem of his relation to the two realities which are the subject, the inner and the outer, which constitutes extraordinary difficulties, both ethical and epistemological”³.

But here lies the paradox inasmuch as that the Self which is the goal of the individual life, according to Jung, is above

the goal of all other individual lives even as Christ may be said to be the goal of one man’s life and at the same time the goal of all men’s lives. Spinks points out from the theological standpoint, misunderstanding of Jung’s prospective interpretation arises from the fact that Jung applied to the Self the same adjectives as Otto applied to the “numinosum-mysterium” in the sense that which is wholly other, tremendous in the sense of that which is possessed of a powerful and sometimes destructive nature and fascines, in the sense of a Goal to which men feel themselves to be drawn. Such a Self appears to be a substitute for God, although it should be borne in mind that many of the greatest mystics often referred to the Self in terms of the God resident in man”. However, for many mystics, as for St. Paul this Self is the Christ, who lives in me, but when it is referred to human experience, it should be remembered that the Self cannot be that totality which God is considered to be. In clarifying this point of objection that this conception of the Self seems to provide a psychological substitute for God, Jung has protested “I have never anywhere denied God. I proceed from a positive Christianity which is as much Catholic as it is Protestant, and I endeavour to demonstrate, in a scientific and responsible manner, those facts which can be ascertained empirically and which not only lend plausibility to the Christian dogma, and specially to the Catholic dogma, but are also likely to provide scientifically minded people towards understanding it”.

Theologically, another possible objection arose from Jung’s interest in the nature of the Trinity and his proposal that such a Trinity must be psychological a Quaternity in which the nature of the fourth one conceived by Jung is not amply clear; it may be the shadow, or darkness that is opposed to the light, or moral evil as opposed to goodness. According to Dr. Spinks, if the fourth member of the Quaternity is identified with evil, then the Godhead embodies the principle of evil. But such a belief is opposed to the traditional view. In this

context, Prof. Raymond Hostie reviewing this point says: "The evil that Jung is concerned with is pre-eminently psychic. But we must understand what this word means. Psychic evil includes external events independent of the person suffering them, as well as the purely objective inner realities that are hampering his development. But Jung often calls psychic evil, a moral evil. In doing so, he gives this latter phrase a meaning not sanctioned by the traditional terminology, which uses it to mean sin. For Jung moral evil is evil that attacks the psyche". But Jung attacked the theory of evil as "privation boni", as something that destroyed the reality of evil wherever he met it—Greek philosophy, and in the Church Fathers, particularly St. Augustine whom he accuses of taking it from the Greeks to get round his own mechanism. Jung by postulating that good and evil are found together in God, believes that he escapes from the dualism that seems inevitable when one stresses the real positive character of evil as strongly as he does.1

In Christian theology evil is closely allied with the matter, and matter, as pointed out by Jung, is psychologically associated with the feminine principle. This masculine-feminine association of God and Evil has its parallel in Hindu metaphysics where Brahman manifested as Siva is also manifested as Sakti, the female earthly principle. This has led Jung to say that the fourth principle is the Mother who with the Masculine Trinity completes the Figure of Quaternity. If the Mother is assumed into the Heavens as Queen, then says Jung, matter itself is spiritualized in a cosmic interpretation of matter and spirit which has its counterpart in the integration in the human psyche. Jung has supported this view in his extended study of "Psychology and Alchemy (Collected Works Vol. 12)" which has as a frontpiece a picture of "the Creator as a Ruler of the Threefold and Fourfold Universe with fire and water as the counterpart of heaven. Jung was very much influenced by Indian Philosophy and religion. He had visited

India. A child is a frequent symbol of the self, sometimes a
divine or magical child, sometimes an ordinary figure, or even
a rij a muffin. The endless pre-occupation of myth and
folklore with the child motive, and the high place it occupies in
many religions particularly in Christianity, shed considerable
light on the meaning of child as a symbol of the self. As other
extreme come the figures of Christ and of Buddha, which in
Jung's view are the most highly differentiated expressions of
the archetype of the self yet reached by mankind. Jung says
that the Christ symbol is of the greatest psychological impor-
tance in so far as it is perhaps the most highly developed and
differentiated symbol of self, apart from the figure of
Buddha ... This is probably one of the reasons why precisely
those religions founded by historical personages have become
world religions, such as Christianity, Buddhism and Islam.
The inclusion in a religion of a unique human personality—
specially when conjoined to an indefinable divine nature—is
consistent with the absolute individuality of self which
combines uniqueness with eternity and the individual with the
universal.

In pointing out the different approaches of science and
theology Jung says, "a science is to concentrate more or less
exclusively on its subject that is its absolute 'raison d'être'.
Since the idea of the self is of central interest in psychology,
the latter naturally thinks along lines diametrically opposed to
theology; for psychology the religious figures point to the self,
whereas for theology the self points to its theology's own
central figure". That is, theology might take the psychological
self as an allegory of Christ.

Jung's Interpretation of Religion

One of the various assessment of Jung's psychology of
religion, is said to be the assessment made by Dr. Hans Schaer
who has quoted the view of a well-known Protestant theologian

1. Fordham (Frieda): An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, 1963, p. 64.
2. Jung (C.G.): Collected Works, Vol. 12; Psychology and Alchemy,
1953, p. 19.
3. Ibid., p. 18.
Professor Adolf Keiler, as given below:

"The problem of religion has gradually acquired a ubiquity in Jung's thought that has no need of words to make itself felt. Where there is a soul there is also a religion—not, however, in the sense of an accepted ecclesiastical form, but of a fate—like encounter with a stronger spiritual reality which compels examination. If religion as generally understood rests on one's capacity to let oneself be profoundly affected by powers that transcend unconsciousness, then the first and essential thing about it is this influence and not the intellectual formulation of such experiences, for the formulation is bound to be made a posteriori on a plane that is alien to them. The reality of these seizures is prior to the truth of their conscious formulation. Jung has once more made room for this reality in psychology".

Religion for Jung, as it is evident, is not a matter limited to only creedal acceptances:— "By the term 'religion' I do not mean a creed. It is, however, true that on the one hand every confession is originally based upon the experience of the numinous and on the other upon 'pistis', the loyalty, trust and confidence towards a definitely experienced numinous effect and the subsequent alteration of consciousness". The conversion of Paul is a striking example of this. 'Religion', it might be said, is the term that designates the attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been altered by the experience of the numinous.

Religion is, therefore, a matter of experience, man knows or believes in God not as a theological concept but as an experience from which concepts may consequently be formulated afterwards. In fact, on account of this reason Jung refers to God as the God-image or God-symbol since a symbol by its very nature is capable of revealing reality in a way in which no other medium can. However, this does not mean that God is nothing but a psychic event within the unconscious. Jung has

been always careful in pointing out that "what exists in the psyche exists in reality". He further says that "when I say, as psychologist, that God is archetype, I mean by that the type in the psyche. The word 'type' is, as we know, directed from "blow" or imprint, thus an archetype presupposes an imprinter. Psychology as a science of the soul has to confine itself to its subject and guard against overstepping its proper boundaries by metaphysical assertions of faith. Should it set up a God, even as a hypothetical cause, it would have implicitly claimed the possibility of proving God, thus exceeding its competence in an absolutely illegitimate way. The religious point of view, understandably enough, puts the accent on the imprinter, whereas scientific psychology emphasizes the 'typos', the imprint—the only thing it can understand. The religious point of view understands the imprint as the working of an imprinter, the scientific point of view understands it as symbol of an unknown and incomprehensible content. Since the typos is less definite and more variegated than any of the figures postulated by religion, psychology is compelled by its empirical material to express the typos by means of a terminology not bound by time, place or milieu".

In the light of the above Jung's views again appear to be in direct opposition to traditional beliefs. As far as Christian belief is concerned, God is absolute, but if God is absolute, then He cannot be that God for whom men yearn. According to Jung, if God is 'psychologically real', He cannot be absolute because the Absolute cannot be ascertained experimentally, and, he supports his contention by referring to a saying of Meister Eckhart (1260-1327) who believed that God is born in the soul continuously. "God's" being is of the soul, but his Godhead is of Himself. In other words, according to this great German mystic, God is a "working function of the soul", and the soul itself is a working function of the Godhead which has been discussed in detail by Jung in "Answer to Job". God that is in the soul, i.e., God-image, is that

reality which one meets in religious experience, while the Godhead is that which is beyond our experience and beyond all human comprehension. Psychologically nothing can be said on this matter.

While discussing the theory of conservation of energy and “mana” in the context of the origins of religion, Jung explains as to how this new idea thrust itself into consciousness with such elemental force. He says that the idea of energy was a ‘primordial image’ that emerged from the collective unconscious. Jung argues that such concept as ‘primitive energetics’ underlies religion in all parts of the world; it is that “universal magical power” which is behind all the dynamic religions which Tylor and Frazer mistakenly interpreted as animism. The power concept of “mana” was not, Jung says, thought of in terms of soul or spirit. He writes on “mana personality”—“Primitive man does not analyse and does not work out why another is superior to him. If another is cleverer or stronger than he, then he has mana; he is possessed of a stronger power. Historically, this mana personality evolves into the hero and the godlike being whose earthly form is the priest”.

The primitive conception of mana, says Jung, seems, therefore, to be an initial stage of our general conception of psychic energy. This energy at the personification stage is seen as animism and so is an important prior condition of the God-idea and perhaps the most primitive of all such concepts.

Jung has defined religion as “the fruit and culmination of the completeness of life”. What led Jung to define religion in this manner is in fact, the effect of Dr. J.A. Hadfield’s “law of completeness according to which man’s instinctual urge for completeness is basis to religion; man has craving for God, though his realization of what that End is, has varied greatly from age to age. Religion for Jung, according to Martin Buber, “is a living relation to a psychical events which do not depend upon consciousness but instead take

2. Ibid, p. 231.
place on the other side of it in the darkness of the psychical
hinter-land, but this is not the relation of an I to a Thou but
of an I to the psychical content of its own soul”1.

It is important to keep clearly in mind from the outset that
when Freud speaks of religion as an illusion, a fantasy, a
structure from which (as from a childhood neurosis) man, if
he would grow to his full adulthood structure, must be set
free, he is not speaking only in the tune of a psychologist.
Freud is implicitly drawing, according to Grensted, the meta-
physical inference of atheism from premises which are strictly
concerned with the modes of our knowledge of God, not with
his real existence². Similarly Jung, when he asserts that gods
are derived by projection from the dominants of archetypes
of the historical collective psyche or racial conscious, has
commonly been understood as denying the existence of any
reality corresponding to the concept of gods or God. Though
this is a misunderstanding, points out Jung, about which
clarification has been made earlier, the whole group of French
sociologists including Durkheim and Levy Bruhl identified
religion with the cult practices which take their rise in the
needs of the social group. But the analytical psychologists
hold that religion is only interesting, as exemplifying the dyna-
mic movement of the libido or inner energy of the psyche to
creative self-expression, in which the group or church, though
significant enough is, in fact, secondary to the individual,
even when, as in Jung’s psychology, the individual is himself
regarded as an outcropping of the collective impersonal
unconscious.

Jung’s most influential writing in the sphere of religion
has been his “Modern Man in Search of Soul” (1936), written
between 1930-1932, in which religion and spirituality as prac-
tised in the East and the West alongwith their genesis in the
light of modern age have been viewed. The division of types of
personality of human beings argued as extrovert and introvert
by Jung, the two exclusive types in which an inward and an
outward reference has been made earlier, possess the four main

human functions of reason, feeling, sensation and intuition. The actual religious tendency may develop partly by the degree in which extroversion and introversion are blended in the particular individual and partly by the predominance of one or the other of these four functions. In this way where reason is dominant, a conversion experience in Christianity will be accompanied by an apparently instantaneous flash of insight shaped into a rational whole, theologically orthodox or heterodox as the case may be. Where feeling is dominant there will be a sense of emotional well-being, comfort and peace. In a sensation type this flash of insight and glow of assurance may appear as actual bodily sensation of light and heat, while the intuitional type may, as in a famous mystical experience of St. Teresa, have an intensive assurance of revealed truth and be entirely unable to explain the nature of the truth so revealed.1.

Jung says that God is an archetype. We do not know the ultimate derivation of this archetype any more than we know the origin of the psyche, which is our total personality. Man always worshipped the Sun-god who gives warmth and light. Jung did not prove or disprove the existence of God, e.g., the archetype of the hero does not prove the actual existence of the hero. Jung believed that all religions are different methods of stating the idea of God as a symbol of the psychic energy which carries a tremendous load of libido.

According to Jung religion starts as an autonomous system of an archetype nature. It binds together in their unconscious. People “live” and experience their religious symbols. The main archetype of religion is God. This archetype symbolizes the life energy and, accordingly, a great amount of mental energy is invested in it. Commenting on the efficacy of religion from the point of view of psychotherapy, Jung says that religion by harmonising the various aspects of personality, is an important factor of mental health. Modern man is beset by conflicting values and is often unable to reconcile them. Religion represents the unconscious archetypal elements in harmony with the conscious elements of personality and society.

Jung's Individuation Process and Religion

It has been widely held by metaphysicians, philosophers and certain psychologists that there is a holistic tendency in man which prompts him to be a whole. This was, for the first time, emphasized by Driesch in our modern time and this was raised to the status of an important concept by J.C. Smuts who held that there is holistic tendency from atom amoeba to man and even to the whole cosmos. Therefore, one need not read his psychic tendency in the outer world. It is enough to recognise that in man, in his psyche, there is a basic tendency by virtue of which he desires strongly to become an integrated whole. Jung terms this tendency "a process of individuation". K. Goldstien refers to it as "a centering tendency" in every personality. Kant had called it regulative principles of individuation, at once creating and giving shape to the individual and ever seeking fuller and more integrated expression in each individual self as it develops.

Jung's wide and deepest study of the archetypes of the collective unconscious led him to arrive at some very interesting conclusions. The most important one of them is that man possesses what he describes as "a natural religious function" and that his psychic health and stability depend on the proper expression of this, just as much as on the expression of the instincts. This view is in direct contrast to that of Freud's. Jung reminds us that all sorts of movements are manifestations of the collective unconscious which is common to all mankind. Moreover, "the archetype of the collective unconscious can be shown empirically to be the equivalents of religious dogmas"¹ And they correspond to all the known religious ideas. However, this does not mean that the unconscious actually produces dogmas. They are the product of conscious thought working on the raw material of the unconscious.

Through the study of the archetypes of the collective unconscious it is found that man possesses "a religious function" and that this influences him in its way as powerfully as do

the instincts of sexuality and aggression. Primitive man is as occupied with the expression of this function—the forming of symbols and the building up of a religion—as he is with tilling the earth, hunting, fishing, and the fulfilment of his other basic needs; and despite the modern attitude of denigration, men and women are just as naturally religious as ever they were. The energy that formerly flowed into ritual and religious observance now finds expression in political creeds, or is fritted away in peculiar cults, or attached to something for additional attainments. James says that "a scientist has no creed, but his temper is devout", while Jullian Huxley suggests in all seriousness that we should have a religion based on evolution—"evolutionary humanism, it seems to me, is capable of becoming the germ of a new religion, not necessarily supplanting existing religions but supplementing them".

Fordham, an exponent of Jungian psychology comments on this view and writes that "such a religion, for all its nobility of purpose, would fail to fill the deepest human need—that is, to relate the inner and outer man in equal degree. It is an essential feature of religion to give conscious expression to the archetypes; no completely rational system can succeed in this and religious "truths" are therefore always paradoxical. If religion tries to avoid paradox it merely weakens itself. Jung himself has asserted this fact and says, "Oddly enough the paradox is one of our most valued spiritual possessions, while uniformity of meaning is a sign of weakness. Hence, a religion becomes inwardly impoverished when it loses or reduces its paradoxes; but their multiplication enriches because only the paradox comes anywhere near to comprehending the fulness of life."

Jung defines religion as "a peculiar attitude of mind which could be formulated in accordance with the original use of the word 'religio' which means a careful consideration and observation of certain dynamic factors, that are conceived as

'powers'; Spirits, demons, gods, laws, ideals, or whatever name man has given to such factors in this world as he has found powerful, dangerous, or helpful enough to be taken into careful consideration, or grand, beautiful, and meaningful enough to be devoutly worshipped and loved".1

The operative word in this definition, according to Dr. Fordham, is dynamic. It is the dynamism of religious function that makes it both futile and dangerous to try to explain it away. This dynamism was materialized in the past in the great proselytizing movements, in crusades, religious wars, and persecutions, in heresy hunts, and in creative efforts which caused men to build tombs and places of worship filled with all kinds of treasure. Today this energy finds its expression in numerous "isms" and arouses men to dangerous ardour, or expends itself in cults which have been borrowed indiscriminately from the East.

What organised religion has always tried to do with varying success, has been to provide satisfying forms for those human needs which now find such dangerous or banal expression and to express "the living process of the unconscious in the form of dogmas of repentence, sacrifice and redemption". Dogma, creed, and ritual are crystallized forms of original religious experience, worked over and refined, sometimes for centuries until they reached the form in which we know them.

Jung does not undermine the religious experience and demonstrates the existence of the religious function in individuals and opens a way to its comprehension "by reasons as well as feeling" but stresses that "it is the prime task of all education of adults to convey the type of the God-image, or its emanations and effects, to the conscious mind". He further expresses that "so long as religion is only faith and outward form, and religious function is not experienced in our own souls, nothing of any importance has happened. It has yet to be understood that the mysterium magnum is not only

an actuality but is, first and foremost rooted in the human psyche”¹.

This is what Christian education has tried to accomplish, but “the Western attitude, with its emphasis on the object, tends to fix the ideal—Christ—in the outward aspect and thus to rob it of its mysterious relation to the inner man”².

The individuation process is one which develops gradually during a person’s life, more noticeably in the second half of life, and though it was observed by Jung in his patients, one should not think of it as either a neurotic or a pathological phenomenon.

Jung on Protestant and Catholic Christianity

Generally, it has not been realised that the division of Christendom has psychological as well as theological and historical explanations. As a movement, the Reformation was not so much an attempt to modify or to bring about any reformation of Catholic belief and practice, as the presentation of new psychological outlook on man and religion. Psychologically the Reform began with such radical reassessments of historical Christianity as were implied by Meister Eckhart’s declaration that man can know God only as an experience in his own soul³. Hitherto, for most of men, the Church had been a psychological necessity since, as an institution, it was a massive constellation of these symbols through which man was able to experience communally that reality, which if encountered directly and individually, might otherwise have overwhelmed him. That is to say, the Church was not only the greatest objectification of religious symbolism in the history of the West; it was also the means whereby man in his religious life could be protected against archetypal invasions from the collective unconscious. From the psychological estimation of the Church two conclusions may be derived—first, symbols are the most vitally effective means of spiritual communication and experience and secondly, the

Church itself as a Spiritual Community is the means whereby the individual enjoys a ‘safe’ and properly authenticated experience of reality. Both these beliefs were rejected by the Protestant Reformation.¹

Spinks states that the social and intellectual changes of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had made the hitherto long accepted symbolism of the Church irrelevant for large masses of people. This change known as “symbolic attitude” reduced Catholic symbolism to a meaningless confusion of images². When a symbol loses its meaning it may continue as an historical sign but as symbol it is dead. It is, in fact, this rejection of “dead” symbols that stimulated Jung to point out that the Reformation was a form of “psychological iconoclasm”. This might also be equally well described as an unusually energetic “spring-cleaning” of symbolical rejects. Symbols are effective only so long as they are relevant to life. Jung states that a symbol is always a creation of an extremely complex nature, since data proceeding from every psychic function have entered into its composition.

This psychological iconoclasm, according to Spinks, has its connection with the first fully Protestant affirmation—Meister Eckhart’s assertion that “God’s being is the soul”. If God or what Jung says God-image, is a function of the soul, then individual experience and not an historical Institution is the primary factor in religion. When an individual believes that he can have “in his own soul” a personal experience of God, he may not feel at all the need for an organised spiritual institution-Church. And if the Church is no longer felt to be an essential factor in his life then any sanction which the individual subsequently needs to strengthen his experiences will have to be sought for elsewhere. Protestantism found such alternative sanction in the Bible. But Jung points out that the Bible never exercised the same authority and influence over the post-Reformation Church as it did on the pre-Reformation Church. It is this absence of an all-comprehensive authority which has led to continuing divisions in Christendom accord-

2. Ibid, p. 98.
ing to Spinks. This integration has had a twofold effect. Jung says: "If Protestantism goes on disintegrating as a Church, it must have the effect of stripping man of all his spiritual safeguards and means of defence against immediate experience of the forces waiting for liberation in the unconscious". Jung holds that many of the neuroses, which attack people in the post-Reformation Western World arise from the fact that they are unable to establish the kind of relationship with their unconscious as would permit them to live without fear. When the conscious mind has repudiated symbols which in the past have been the means of "reducing" pressures from the unconscious, the individual becomes subject to fear and danger. But if the Protestant has to face the life without some form of insulation against invasions from the collective conscious, he is laid open to the possibility of some unique experience of the divine. "Protestantism on its positive side is a great spiritual adventure". Jung observes: "The Protestant is left to God alone. If a Protestant survives the complete loss of his Church and still remains a Protestant, that is, a person who is defenceless against God and no longer protected by walls or communities—then he has a unique spiritual opportunity for immediate religious experience". If this opportunity be fulfilled, Spinks says, the individual becomes spiritually autonomous, a religiously integrated personality, a "new man", a converted personality, all that Jung implies by the term Individuation discussed earlier.

Evaluation of Jung's views

Spinks writes that "Jung's views on the nature of the psychical forces involved in dogma, myth-and-ritual and experience gain an additional value from the fact that they have stimulated many religious people to view their traditional attitudes in the light of contemporary psychology". Many a

man, Jung says, has need of something which personal religious experience could provide but which his acquaintance with organised forms of traditional religion has not so far provided. If God is, in fact, a psychical reality then man, in his experience of the God-image in his own soul, can be psychologically an integrated personality or a spiritually happy soul, unless he has some purpose to live for, some object to be united with. But this is the cause of many conflicting views about the significance of Jung’s estimate of religion—in what way or how these psychological facts are to be related to “objective” truth is the main issue that remains unresolved. Jung never confessed to be a metaphysician, although metaphysics was never far removed from his mind. Commenting on Jung’s view, Michael Fordham writes that “Religion, in particular, theology, looks at the phenomena from its metaphysical position and comes to conclusion about the nature of God: psychology looks at them from the theory of the collective unconscious and comes to conclusions about human nature”. Despite this it is a basic belief in many religions that the nature of God and the nature of man are not two aspects but only one. Some of Jung’s arguments seem to support this view.

Jung and Freud: A contrast on Religious views

Diversities in the views of Jung and those of Freud are found in Jung’s best known of all works—“Modern man in Search of a Soul” and in “Collected Works: Freud and Psychoanalysis, Vol. 4”. Jung says that “the difference between Freud’s views and my own ought really to be dealt with by someone who stands outside the circle of influence of those ideas which go under our respective names”. Spinks writes that “Indeed this has been attempted by many writers but it may be doubted whether any interested person could claim ‘to be outside the circle of influence’ of either Freud or Jung. Jung points out that some people see things differently from other

people because of their own particular psychological constitution. Freud according to Jung, interpreted the nature of man too exclusively in terms of his defects. Freud was unable to understand the real nature of religion because of his interpreting everything in terms of the neurotic mind. Freud ignored the fact that all men have need of some external check on their conclusions, even if these conclusions be drawn from empirical data, because the individual research worker is influenced both by his own temperament and the limitations of experience and outlook. He says, “Knowledge rests not only upon truth alone, but upon error also.” However, the differences between them should not be regarded purely as a matter of temperament or differences of personal background; many of the differences are of a strictly logical approach. Freud believed that psychology would eventually succeed in explaining away in much the same way as neurosis can be dispelled and the patient cured. Freud held that man needs to be cured of his neurosis and obsession of religion. Jung, on the other hand, seems to have felt strongly quite early in his life that religion is an essential activity of man and that psychology instead of seeking to explain religion away must attempt to interpret how man’s nature reacts to situations normally described as religious.

Though Freud had a larger connotation of the concept of sexuality, he said that instincts are chiefly sexual in nature. Jung interpreted instinct in a more general way as the source of psychical energy and held that human behaviour is the result of a collusion between physical energy and spirit. Some of Freudian critics have accused Jung of being mystical in approach rather than scientific in his outlook on account of his using the terms ‘spirit’ and ‘faith’. But Jung had protested that it would be unscientific to ignore the fact that mystical idea “is enforced by the natural tendencies of the unconscious mind”.

In turn, Jung himself criticized Freud’s concept of the Super-Ego, saying that it was nothing more than a secret attempt

to smuggle in his time-honoured image of Jehovah in the
dress of a psychological theory".}

Jung held that behind all individual expressions of libidinal
activity there are the phyletic contents of the collective
unconscious, it is the archetypal figure Father-God operating
within the unconscious that causes the child to regard the
human father as the God-image and not the other way round,
as Freud had contended. Jung holds that man outgrows the
infantile stage of religion by becoming aware that his life and
thoughts are affected by archetypal activities which bring the
contents of experience within religious purview. Whereas Freud
has regarded phantasies and symbols as means whereby the
individual seeks to avoid "reality", Jung accepted such phenom-
ena as "symbols of transformation". In other words, all
such symbols are for Jung the means by which man gains a
knowledge of realities which are in themselves unknowable
realities which cannot be comprehended in other way. Jung
says that the symbol always presupposes that the chosen
expression is the best possible description, or formula of
relatively unknown facts; a fact, however, which is none the
less recognised or postulated as existing"

Freud looked into mythology, analysed it, and found in it
the products of sick and primitive mind. Jung was very much
fascinated by mythology and accepted it as an authentic
photographic copy of human mind. Freud found an analogy
between the prelogical thinking of mythology, of psychopa-
therapy and of infancy. Jung accepted the content of mytho-
logy as scientific evidence in psychology. Freud exploited
myth for scientific purposes; Jung, accepted myth as scientific
evidence. According to Jung religion is the discipline in
which symbolic attitude is most evident and where the correct
images are chosen for its application. The validity of mysti-
cal experiences may sometimes be doubted, but mystics dwell
in the midst of living symbols which continue to live because

p. 339.
3. Wolman (Benjamin B.): Contemporary Theories and Systems in Psy-
chology, 1960, p. 317.
of their attitude towards them which gives metaphysical reality to a cosmic system in which God is central, ultimate and incomprehensible. This cosmic system is conceived as a reality just as much as the material object and religion bends its energies towards realizing it in consciousness. Jung’s inquiry into human behaviour was guided by the acceptance of mystical beliefs and of what some humans had perceived at certain times as being the true picture of the Universe.

Religion for Freud is an obsessional neurosis and illusion which he never thought to modify. For Jung it was the absence of religion that was the main cause of adult psychological disorders. In “The Aim of Psychotherapy” Jung says that “it is particularly important for me to know as much as possible about primitive psychology, mythology, archaeology and comparative religion because these fields offer me invaluable analogies with which to enrich the associations of my patients”.

Of all psychoanalytical theories Jung’s have been the most criticized. The criticism raised against Jung is mainly directed against his arbitrarily, almost dogmatically, set system which was modified several times, almost at will. His theory was often criticized for being exceedingly involved. However, his greatness lies in the wealth of his studies in the history of mysticism, irrational thinking, anthropology, history of culture, Alchemy and Religious phenomena. Jung undoubtedly offered some valuable observations into the darkest sports of the human mind in which religion is of great importance. His apparent weakness lies in his uncritical enthusiasm for his discoveries.

Jung’s religion is Gnosticism-imminentist and mystical. Jung recognised in religious phenomena, the signs of “Suprapersonal forces which wield a fate-like power over our lives”. These are the forces of the unconscious: “the aggregate of all psychic events occurring beyond consciousness where the lowest is one with the highest and where we reach the end of all

knowledge and nothing remains for us but to marvel at the sublime”. Religion, in Freudian view represents the externalization of man’s unconscious conflicts and their raising to the cosmic level. In one of its aspects, it provides substitute gratification for primitive drives. Religion, as indicated earlier, according to Freud, is “the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity in which is perpetuated the illusion of a loving heavenly Father who promises happiness in the hereafter in renunciation of instinctual desires on earth”. This is the theme and theory viewed by Freud in his famous work, “The Future of an Illusion” and in his “Civilization and its Discontents”. Freud asserts that civilization, suppression, and neurosis are inevitably associated in such a way that more civilization, the more neurosis, and conversely the less suppression, the less neurosis and the less civilization. Society, by an ever-increasing tendency to suppression, makes man more and more unhappy and he seeks relief in substitute gratifications: drinking and smoking or drug-taking, religion and love—sublimation is only a possible answer for a superior view. When the inhibiting forces of civilization are removed, we see men in their true light as “savage beasts to whom the thought of sparing their own kind is alien”.

In short, Jung regards religion or rather a religious attitude as an element in psychic life, the importance of which can hardly be overestimated¹. He claims that all the patients over thirty-five who consulted him during the last thirty years of his observation, had the same problem, that of finding a religious outlook on life. Religion for Jung does not mean a dogma or creed. The truly religious person has a kind of deep respect for the facts and events and for the person who suffers from them, hence, a respect for the “secret of such a human life”. Healing or psychotherapy can also be called a religious problem according to Jung. The patient needs faith, hope, love and insight.

Jung’s attitude towards religion, he says, is one of the points of difference between him and Freud. I do not, however, hold myself responsible for the fact that man has,

everywhere and always, spontaneously developed religious forms of expression, and that human psyche from times immemorial has been shot through with religious feelings and ideas. Whoever chooses to explain it away, or to enlighten it away, has no sense of reality¹.

**Rank on Religion**

The matters on which Adler and Jung opposed Freud were Theory and Principle. Both Adler and Jung rejected the concepts of Eros and Thanatos, the theory of developmental stages, and the id. ego, and super-ego personality model developed by Freud. Among those who started as orthodox and faithful disciples but ended in open rebellion and defiance of the basic principles of Freud was Otto Rank (1884-1939). Rank was not a medical doctor. He was a student of culture and was a favoured disciple of Freud. He was the Secretary of the group of the “Big Four” from its earliest days and exceedingly prolific in applying psychoanalytic theories in cultural spheres beyond the immediate limits of psychotherapy. In 1924 after the publication of his famous work entitled “The Trauma of Birth”, Rank became the third major figure to leave the original Freudian circle and to work independently in the field of depth psychology. In Rank’s case, no definite name has emerged as regards his psychological studies. His general standpoint is sometimes referred to as “Will Psychology”, or “Relationship Psychology”, and sometimes the term “therapy” is substituted for “psychology” but none of these terms accurately describe the major contributions made by Rank in his later writing.

In later years, after he had worked in collaboration with Freud for more than twenty years, Rank came to the conclusion that analytical attitude adopted by Freud, involved a specific kind of self-conscious mentality peculiar to what he called “the Psychological Era”. Rank found in Freud’s works the epitome of the intellectual outlook in an age so weakened in its capacity for faith that it was reduced to brooding self-analytically over all its motives and acts. He recognised

from his own experience, that this was a spiritually paralysing point of view, and he was impelled then, in the last years of his life, to seek a new road that would lead away from the analytical attitude and go beyond psychology. The theory of the “birth trauma” and the “analytical situation” developed by Rank, though based on Freud’s analytical habit of thought, made Rank an important psychologist among the related schools of psychoanalytical thoughts. Rank’s impassioned drive to reach the irrational ground of artistic and religious experience was a unique method to unveil the mental activities of human beings.

Rank’s views on religion are contained in his famous works—The Myth of the Birth of the Hero (1952), Psychology and the Soul (1950), Beyond Psychology (1941), and The Trauma of Birth (1929). He traces historically the genesis of religion and writes in the context of artistic creativity—“Egyptian culture is produced by three factors, which can all be traced back in the same way to the first effort to repress the positive attitude to mother, which in the Asiatic world view seems to work itself in a high sexual esteem of the primeval mother, and appears in sublimated form in the Christian mother of God. First, the religious factor, appearing in a peculiar cult of the dead, which in every peculiar detail especially the preservation of the body is equivalent to a further life in a womb. Second, the artistic factor appearing in an exaggerated esteem of the animal body (animal cult); third, the social factor appearing in a high evaluation of women (right of the mother). These originally purely ‘maternal’ motifs, in the course of a development process lasting thousands of years and making their contributions to the overcoming of the birth trauma, became masculinized, that is, remodelled in the sense of adjustment to father libido. Typical of all three manifestations of the mother principle, as the initial tendency to overcome it, is the veneration of the moon goddess Isis, alongside the gradual gain in importance of her brother, son and husband Osiris. The same is reflected in gradual development of the “cult of the sun” which not only allows assimilation with the rebirth of phantasy in Jung’s sense, but in the meaning of the more original mood vene-
ration also gives expression to the mother libido. Not only because the sun rises does the hero identify himself with it but because it disappears every day afresh into the underworld and so corresponds with the primal wish for union with the mother night. This is proved beyond doubt precisely by the Egyptian sun-worship, with its numerous pictures that present by preference the sun-ship on its night journey into the underworld, as also in the texts of the "Book of the Dead".

But the development of sun-worship always goes hand in hand with a decisive turning from mother-culture to father-culture as is shown in the final identification of the new born King (infant) with the sun. This opposition to the dominance of the woman both in the social sphere (right of the father) and in the religions continues as the transitional process from Egypt (via Crete) to Greece, where it leads, by means of the entire repression of women even from the erotic life, to the richest blossoming of the masculine civilization and to the artistic idealization corresponding to it.

In developing his theory of society and culture, Rank recast Freud's version of the Oedipus myth. He holds that "Religion tends ultimately towards the creation of a succouring and protecting primeval Being to whose bosom one can flee for all troubles and dangers and to whom one finally returns in a future life which is a faithful, although sublimated image of Once lost Paradise." The religious development runs parallel to the historical development. Rank writes, "The original god represents the primeval father; his son rebelled against him and became god". The historical importance of Christianity rests on the fact that it was the first to place the Son-God in the Centre without simultaneously attacking the original rights of the mother and the secondary rights of the father.

Rank applied his ideas to the history of culture and distinguished between mother and types of culture. The ancient

2. Ibid, p. 113.
3. Ibid, p. 129.
Egyptian culture was a mother type composed of the religious factor appearing in a peculiar cult of the dead which emphasized the preservation of the body, the idea of a further life in the womb. The Egyptian culture included the artistic factor appearing in an exaggerated esteem of the animal body, i.e., animal cult and then the social factor appearing in a high valuation of women. It is amply evident from the view of Rank that religion is a social phenomenon and culture and society are the carriers of the practices and beliefs and serve several definite purposes of human beings and society.

In this book, "Beyond Psychology", Rank has expressed his views in two different ways. At one extreme, it presents the severe intellectual analysis of symbolism by means of which he probed the depth history, and at the other extreme it reveals the spirit of an artist straining to convey at least the outline of his personal religious experiences which reveal a glimpse into the irrational hinterland of the psyche. Rank's attempt of large interpretation of history for understanding the significance of psychoanalysis and as a result of this theory of history best expressed in his books, "Psychology and the Soul" and "Art and Artist", he was able to see the inherent limitations of analytical point of view of psychology as a whole and in looking "beyond psychology" then, Rank reached a profound insight into the role and meaning of artistic and religious experience.

Rank has advanced a schematic conception of history of psychological development of human mind in a progressive process into four "eras", which are—(1) Emamism, the primeval era of the wil, nature of which is the key to all men's work and activities, (2) Animism, which is the "era" of the soul; (3) the sexual era, and (4) the psychological era presenting a subtle psychological reconstruction of the long range inner trend of history. Human being, Rank says, experiences his individuality in terms of his will, and this means that his personal existence is identical with his capacity to express his will in the world. This, according to Rank, is the psychological fact that underlies the development of the individual personality and the variety of man's work in religion, art and civiliza-
tion. This will is a very important factor in the genesis of religious phenomena. In the era of Emamism, the primeval era of the will, Rank holds that their was no spirituality, no soul and no heaven; for at that level of life man experienced his social existence as identical with his immortality. In the Animistic era, as Rank interprets it, presents a view of underlying reality of life that is altogether different from the era of the will. Man’s dawning sense of death, Rank says, led him to make distinction between the physical body and a spiritual “doubt” that is completely identical with the individual, but does not cease to exist when physical body dies.¹ This is the primary source of belief in the existence of the soul. The spiritual era discovered a new reality that had hidden from the Emamistic era of the will higher reality that gave new meanings to all man’s experiences. It was now according to Rank, the soul and the realm of the soul that constituted the realm of life and this provided the criterion by which validity of all man’s activity and thought could be judged. Thus, from the view of Rank, it seems that religion has emerged through the process of development of human society.

The quest for immortality and the universal belief in the existence of the soul are the vital issues in almost all religions with an exception to some of the oriental religions. Rank has attempted to explain the genesis of concept of soul and immortality. Rank’s views on these subjects are based on anthropological concepts, although his system of explanation is a new approach to these issues.

According to Rank, the “urge to immortality” is man’s inexorable drive to feel connected to life in terms of his individual will with a sense of inner assurance that that connexion will not be broken or pass away. In the earliest religions, said Rank, men believed in the immortality of their own souls (shadows). Totemism put an end to this belief and introduced the idea of incarnation. The spirit of the dead enters the mother’s womb and new life starts; a continuity of life develops. Human history is rich with examples of the

¹ Rank (Otto): *Psychology and the Soul*, 1950, p. 34.
ways in which the urge to immortality has been fulfilled. According to Rank, one common form that has many varieties is the belief in the permanent existence of the "soul" after death, in a "heaven" or in an "astral" plane from which the departed soul may both interfere with and assist in mortal affairs; or it may be a belief in the transmigration of souls, or reincarnation. Another major approach to immortality is by means of sexuality, either directly through the procreation of children, or indirectly through the ancestors or blood ties such as clan, nations or races. Shared beliefs, participation in groups whose members are "chosen" by some higher agency, or who possess an "eternal truth" or a sacred ritual are the other roads to immortality.

The will strives for immortality in an indefinite variety of ways. It may seem when we speak of it thus that "immortality is much too exalted a word with which to describe the prosaic fact that man covers his fear of death with most ingenious and grandiose fantasies". But Rank uses the term "immortality" metaphorically in neutral sense. He speaks of the belief in immortality as nothing more than a psychological fact but he does not dismiss the possibility that there may be a cosmic fact of even greater significance behind the persistent recurrence of that faith. Rank places the different kinds of immortality beliefs in historical perspective in order to find their meaning for the individual personality in modern times. The first belief in immortality was in Rank's views, natural and naive. Man was closer to nature then, and his sense of the continuity of life was immediate and specific. The earliest human being could not conceive of something as abstract as everlasting life, but neither could he conceive of a condition after the end of his life. His own person, and more important, the immediate group in which he was born, was the only reality of his existence, and since he could not conceive of any other basis or way of life, his main fear was that the group would change or would come to an end. The primeval man identified his own existence with that of the group and as in the "participation mystique" of which German sociologist Levy-Bruhl says that the continued existence of the group was the equivalent of the individual's own self-perpetuation.
In this regard Rank's historical analysis is similar to that of Adler's theory. Rank accepts Adler's basic adjustment that it was because of man's social nature that the human species was able to emerge in its present form from the competitive struggle of evolution, but he adds the observation that man's social nature inherently involved a sense of immortality that was originally experienced in and through the group. Thus agreeing with Adler that social sense is innate in the human species as one of the conditions of its selective evolution, Rank adds that the sense of immortality is also innate in the human being and is, in fact, inseparable from his social nature. The two are experienced together, for the "sense of immortality" is primarily a social fact whose main content is the culture of the group. In the early days of man's history, the individual considered as unreal and invalid every aspect of life other than the one in whose term he experienced his identity with his group. This was the primeval era of the will—Emanism, according to Rank in which there was no spiritual reality, no soul, nor any religious activity on the part of man and at that level of life man experienced his social existence as identical with his immortality. Rank developed his own concept and says, "Man's ubiquitous effort, inherent in his evolutionary nature, to secure his immortality by maintaining an identity between his individual will and the continuous life of his group", which means man's endless struggle towards "self-perpetuation". This earliest expression of the urge to immortality was able to avoid the problem of death as long as the individual was still submerged in the collective experience of life. As man became aware of his own individuality, however, the stark fact of the physical death of the individual human being became increasingly difficult to ignore. Thus a new conception of the world became necessary. The outcome of this was Animism, the second major era that Rank distinguished as the "era" of the "soul", in which there eventually emerged the belief in the "soul" as a definite spiritual entity. Immortality, thus, was no longer a collective experience but something that each individual had to achieve for himself on the plane of spiritual realities.

According to Rank, mankind yearns for some kind of eternal spirituality out of various forms of expression of immortality. Totemism, he says, is the first form of religion in which a kind of "collective immortality was established in the rebirth of soul of dead through the totem clan. Through religion they became alike, thus gaining a "new kind of collective immortality" in the clan totem. Rank holds that incest is a symbol of man's self creative urge drawing its strength from the belief in immortality.

As regards Rank's conception of the soul, he presents it in the cultural perspective. Freud believed that sexuality, since it is expressed in a biological act, is an instinctual and therefore a universal part of human nature. Rank's cultural analysis led him to another conclusion. "Primitive man's attitude during the pre-sexual era" that is, the "era" of the "soul", clearly indicates that sexuality meant something inner and not something as realistic as a relation with the opposite sex". Originally, Rank maintained, man did not think of sexual contact as significant in its own right and to primitive man it did not seem important enough even to be an object of guilt feeling. Sex was only a play then and it was only a later "stage of human evolution" that the discovery of sexuality was accomplished. Sexuality is not mainly a biological fact of human existence independent of man's non-sexual beliefs; rather it depends upon other and no less irrational attitudes towards life. In the animistic era where the belief in spiritual realities provided the context of life, "sex and reproduction were" Rank points out, "sharply distinguished" and the basis for the distinction was to be found in the belief in the soul. In all the varieties of soul belief, the physical body was considered to be ephemeral while the soul was eternal reality which chose the body of a new born human being only as its secondary role. In such a view of life sexual act did not mean as causing birth. Birth would not be possible unless the divinities willed it, unless a soul was available and was seeking to enter the mortal realm

2. *Ibid*, p. 34.
and a host of other contingencies that derive from the lore of spiritual immortality. Rank says, “In general, primitive man believed that reproduction was mediated not by sexual intercourse, but by entrance of the soul of the dead into the body of women, who then effected rebirth and immortality of soul. Therefore, sexual taboos were not restrictions, but experiences of man’s inherent belief in his individual immortality”. Rank explains that in the “era of the soul” immortality was a spiritual fact, but in the “sexual era” that followed it, immortality could be achieved in much more tangible way, simply by having children. Instead of approaching life in terms of a view of reality based upon belief in the soul, the sexual era conceived of its realities in terms of relationships deriving from the basic fact of procreation. Characteristic of the sexual era, for example, was its emphasis on family ties, inheritance, honour and obedience. Personal connection based on “blood ties” took precedence over all other, and even man’s relationship to God depended on descent from a particular father. In the “animistic era” all these relationships had been experienced not biologically in terms of procreation but spiritually in terms of the belief in the soul. This is how Rank deduced the conception of soul and immortality—historically based on their most fundamental preconception of life.

One of the most sensitive psychological areas that Rank studied was the point where sexuality and spiritual belief come into conflict. Though on the surface it would appear that the attitude of the animistic era while emphasizing experience of the soul, would inhibit the sexual impulses, but Rank points out to be quite opposite. “Under the primitive world view”, he observed, “in which the spirits of the dead effected impregnation independently of the sexual act, it was natural act of pleasure to which man gave himself under certain circumstances and at certain times. The very fact that the sexual act did not participate in higher spiritual values of life, freed it, and permitted a greater leeway for sexual expression accor-

ding to Ira Progoff. Only in the age that made sexual activities the core of its approach to reality did sex become important enough to be associated with guilt. The “native playful activity” of the spiritual era “became tabu” and sex act was hemmed in with restrictions and ritual observances both to control it and exalt it as the centre of society’s way of life. “The issue”, Rank reiterates, “has always been one of immortality and of the salvation of man’s soul from dissipation under the sexual era’s ideology of fertilization. Here we find fundamental difference between the views of Rank and those of Freud as regards the sources of neurotic forms and social behaviour. Freud held that the sexual resistance with its concomitant anxieties was the source of the neurotic forms of individual and social behaviour. Rank’s profound and fundamental point—the inner meaning and cause of this behaviour was not sexual as Freud thought, but spiritual, for its root lay in the old beliefs of the spiritual era upon which the ideologies of the sexual era had been superimposed.

Thus the road to immortality became uncertain because man was caught in a confusion between sexuality and his belief in his soul. “As an expression of will”, Rank says, “sexuality became evil, guilt and a cause of death”, and there were precisely the characteristics that “had formerly been ascribed to the will” in the era of the soul. Sexuality became identified with negative will and it was from this point of view that not only Freud had proceeded, but both his renowned philosophic predecessors Schopenhauer and Nietzsche as well. Since Rank points out that it seemed to the man of the second era who was still influenced by the old spiritual beliefs that “will could bring about death” and will was labelled as bad itself. “Yet it did not simply disappear; instead it became transformed into a negative power manifested as guilt feeling, and interpreted or explained causally under the concept of sin”. Commenting on this Progoff says, “This was the begin-

ning of psychology which only deals further with the broken, denied will and with guilt as a moral phenomenon now shorn of its former connotations of power.\textsuperscript{1}

Thus the process of religious development and genesis of spiritual phenomenon, in fact, “runs absolutely parallel” with that of social development.

The schematic conception of division of history to show the spiritual development advanced by Rank assigning definite qualities and attitude to each, he gives an impression that he is trying to mark history off into four separate stages of development, but that is not his aim at all. He was too sophisticated a thinker to attempt a rigid theory of history. In fact, this was a subtle psychological reconstruction of the long range inner trend of history. Working with a massive accumulation of cultural and religious data, he condensed his material into an outline form that highlighted its outer structure rather than its inner flow\textsuperscript{2}. Rank undertook, towards the end of his life, the task of framing a new point of view based upon culminating insight that “Man is born beyond psychology and he dies beyond it but he can live beyond it through vital experience of his own—in religious terms, through revelation, conversion or rebirth”\textsuperscript{3}. This type of vital experience, Rank says, takes place at psychic level deeper than rationality which he speaks in the traditional religious terms of “revelation, conversion or rebirth” but refers to the general pattern of spiritual transformation and not to a specific theology.

Rank professes a “relativity” theory of knowledge according to which the nature of will determines truth and falsity, not the nature of the world. That truth is subjective. Rank mixes up terms badly and creates confusion. The highest confusion is reached when he speaks of not only art, religion and love as illusions but philosophy and science too. Deeply pessimistic, he says with the truth, we cannot live. Therefore, religion, though illusory, is essential for living.

Otto Rank followed Freud into speculations upon social

---

1. Progoff (Ira): \textit{The Death and Rebirth of Psychology}, 1956, p. 211.
and religious origins but based them upon the hypothesis of
the “birth trauma”—discussed in detail in his famous work—
“The Trauma of Birth” (1929). The theory and concepts
expounded by Rank are his altogether new and original points
of view. According to Rank, the function of the father in
the primeval horde was to thwart the sons’ desires to return
to the mother, since there exists a “perpetual insatiable ten-
dency to force one’s way completely into the mother” and
thus undo the trauma of birth. Because they were thwarted
in this way, the sons killed the father and thereafter renounced
coveted mother. Only the youngest son, it is told, is permitted
to return to the mother because he was the last to occupy the
womb. He is the “hero” of mythology, Rank says and his
superiority consists in the fact that “he comes last and so to
speak, drives the others away. In this he is like the father,
with whom he alone, and from the same motives, is able to
identify himself”. It is the youngest son who, after the mur-
der of the primeval father, and following a period of rule by
the mother or women in the family, i.e., matriarchy, becomes
the leader. In a matriarchy right and justice spring from the
protecting aspects of the mother, i.e., her womb, and on the
other hand, the fear of her terrifying aspects relating to the
birth trauma. In a patriarchy the ruler is the one who pre-
vents return to the mother and the primeval anxiety of the
mother is transformed into respect for the king or ruler.
Increasing masculine domination results from the desire to
exclude women in order to keep repressed the memory of the
birth trauma, but periodically the wish to return to the mother
asserts itself and revolutions against masculine dominance
occur. Religion in this view “tends ultimately to the creation
of a succouring and protecting primeval Being to whose
bosom one can flee away from all troubles and dangers and
to whom one finally returns in a future life, which is a faith-
ful, although sublimated image of the once Lost Paradise, i.e.,
the mother and her protecting womb”. This is how Rank
presents the genesis of religion and its functional utility. In
Christianity, Rank says, the Son becomes God and the prim-
eval mother Mary while the primeval father is the Lord of
Hell. The crucification is a punishment for rebellion against
the Father and is followed by resurrection—that is birth, it is a symbolical representation of the process of birth and the dogma of the Immaculate conception asserts that Christ was not born in the ordinary way, that in fact, Christ the ‘Hero’ has conquered the birth trauma.

Reik on Religion

Theodore Reik (1887-1969), an adherent to Freudian School, was very close to Sigmund Freud before migrating to the United States. He was one of the earliest masters of applied psychoanalysis and along with Otto Rank, and Hans Sachs exemplified Freud’s conviction that the main contribution of psychoanalysis lay outside of its medical or therapeutic application. Reik’s great love for psychoanalysis was expressed in his applied works and specially in the field, he called “psychoanalytic archaeology”—the reconstruction of primal events from mankind’s dim beginning. A radically different approach to religion appeared in 1913 after publication of Freud’s “Totem and Taboo” in which he applied new psychological explanations to primitive culture, and to anthropology in general. Freud explained that there was a psychological connexion between the religious practices of the primitive man and the behaviour of modern neurotic types. This particular exposition of the relation of psychopathology and primitive culture was followed by a series of interpretations advanced by the exponents of the Freudian School, prominently among whom were Ernest Jones, Theodore Reik and Oscar Rank.

Reik used the facts of Freud’s “Totem and Taboo” as a basis of his studies on the psychology of religion in his four famous works, e.g. “Ritual”, “Dogma and Compulsion”, “Mystery on the Mountain, and Myth and Guilt”.

Theism and Neurotic Compulsions

As already mentioned in a previous section, Freud interpreted the theistic beliefs on the basis of infantile modes of thought corresponding more or less to neurotic manifestations. According to him, theism, like many neuroses, is a sort of regression to infantile modes of organisation and bears traces
of it in the way it conceives God and leads men to feel towards Him. Continuing on the basis of this analogy between religion and infantile regression, Reik has elaborated further in this trend and has pointed out in detail, how religion exhibits many features of neurotic compulsion both in its rituals and doctrinal aspects.

The neurotic rituals are compulsion in character, since he must carry them out consciously and experiences guilt if he fails to do so. This is true of religious rituals also to a considerable extent. Obsessions and compulsions simultaneously allow some substitute gratification both of desire and its prohibitions. In the same manner, Reik interprets the development of the trinity idea as a compromise between feial rebellion and veneration for the father.

In religion, there are taboos—in Christianity, for example, working on Sabbath days, food before communion and so forth. Neurotics also exhibit avoidance of certain behaviour-touching about certain things. According to Reik, the taboos surrounding religious dogma developed as a defence against scepticism while at the same time the dogma grew enormously to absurd detail, reflecting an underlying contempt for it and resulting by an emphasis on minor parts to many schisms and persecutions. Similarly the real conflict in neurotics becomes displaced to trivial details and verbal matters. This is the functional approach of religion as argued by Reik.

**Judaism and Totem Religion**

Judaism is against every form of idolatory, but the marks of totem are unmistakably present in it even though disguised through centuries of development. Freud had pointed out the bull totem underlying Judaism\(^1\). Reik analysed the ritual of playing on “shofar”\(^2\) and thereby illustrated the totemic origin of Judaism.

Shofar is a kind of trumpet made out of ram’s horn which Jews sound on the occasions of the New Year’s Day, the day of atonement and throughout the month of Elul. Its sound is

---

believed to intercede with God for mercy, and it is played no
to call on the Israelites to repent and return to Jahve and to
mislead the devil.¹

Reik states that according to tradition, Jobel was first to
invent shofar. However, etymologically “Jobel” means a
“ram”. This signifies that the totem god ram ordained the
sacrifice of ram and later on this was transformed to sounding
of shofar. Repentance and warning which the sound signifies
are expiation for killing the ram god, which reminds one of
the murder of the primal father.

Reik supports this interpretation of shofar by referring to
the incident at Mt. Sinai, when amidst the sounding of the
shofer Moses gave the commandments to the people. The
sounding of the trumpet was believed to be the very voice of
the totem god ram. The Israelites were exorted to assemble
at the foot of the Mt. Sinai, at the sound of the trumpet. Just
before Jahve spoke to the assembly of the people, the trumpet
sounded long and “waxed louder and louder”².

Reik further explains that the literal meaning of the Hebrew
word is ‘ram and trumpet’, and therefore Jahve stands for the
ram-god. The lamb was the most common animal of sacri-
cifice among the Jews. This is evident from the Book of Genesis
and Exodus that the first sacrifice refers to the sacrifice pro-
bably of a lamb by Abel. Abraham sacrificed a ram by way
of making a covenant with god and finally the Lord Passover
had to be observed by Lamb’s sacrifice. Jesus Christ himself
was likened to be a dumb lamb of God as such was sacrificed
for the sins of many. In this way shofar reminds of the
totem god ram that was worshipped by the Israelites before
Jahve was raised to the position of a monotheistic God.

The sound of the shofar reminds one of the historical and
consequent remorse and repentance for it. In this connexion,
Reik states that “the sudden resounding tone of the shofar
which calls to mind the bellowing of a bull at the slaughter
and which is the voice of the totemic father—substitute,
unconsciously reveals to every hearer that old outrage and

². Ibid., p. 242.
awakens his hidden guilty conscience, which, in consequence of the child’s repressed hostile wishes towards the father slumbers in each individual and admonishes him to repent and improve”

This is how Reik associates the essence of totemic element of religion with Judaism in its early phases. His interpretation, based on such a concept is altogether different from that earlier referred historical fact employed by Freud in interpreting the genesis of totemism giving rise to advanced monotheism. But this explanation by Reik of totemic religion and interpretation based on sense of guilt are not applicable to religions other than Judaism. In fact, Israelites had fallen a great many times into the worship of ox and ram, and the classical story of the worship of the molten calf is well known. The relics of the same totem—religion are preserved in the Christian rite of Holy communion.

**The Genesis of the Idea of God**

According to Freud, the father is usually the chief source both of frustration and of protection and served as the model for God through the Oedipal situation. In this the individual development parallels the historical account. The male child at about the age of four, manifests a sexual tendency towards the mother, regarding the father as a rival. Later depending more or less on actual indications, he becomes so afraid of the father’s hostility that he not only gives up his sexual tendencies but also regresses the complex of desires and fears, while his complex remains in greater or less intensity, in the unconscious. The theistic God provides an external figure on which this material is projected so that the inclination to believe in such a being is crystallised into the attitude and practices that go along with it. The termination of the Oedipal situation leaves the individual with many conflicts, the exact nature of which is hidden but the main conflict between the tendencies to rebel against the father and to submit to him are usually apparent. The projection of the childhood father-image on to a supernatural being serves to

alleviate, or at least reduce this distress.

The view of Freud about the genesis of theistic God and the emergence of religious tendencies has been interpreted by Reik in another manner based on the Freudian concept. In his “Dogma and Compulsion”, Reik carries out an elaborate analysis of the development of the Christian doctrine of trinity as a series of shifts in the balance of rebellious forces in the son-father conflict. Even though no female deities are available, there are feminine aspects of God, or perhaps the Virgin Mary, in relation to these the individual may achieve substitute satisfaction of the Oedipean desires.

Reik points out that the Oedipean situation leaves a heavy deposit of guilt, as well as conflict in the unconscious-guilt for the persistent sexual desires for the mother and hostility against the father. Projection of these on to a super-natural deity serves not only to alleviate them, but to bring them out into the open, thereby making it possible to make reparation and provide means for it and for dissipating the guilt, viz. confession, penance, restrictions and renunciations of several types. Some later Freudian exponents of religion, specially M. Ostow and B. Scharfstien, have emphasized on this function of religious projections in relieving guilt, expounded by Reik.

Christian Dogmas and Compulsive Neuroses

In illustrating his standpoint, Reik takes Christian Dogmas as a representative example and analyses them to unravel the psychic processes that led to their development and establishment pointing out the obsessional motives resembling those in compulsive neuroses. According to him, “in the shaping of dogma the same defence mechanisms are involved as in the compulsive processes in the individual”.

Reik develops his thesis concerning the fundamental analogy between dogma and compulsion, first, on the basis of the idea of the analogy between religion and compulsive neurosis. He expects to find this agreement in all individual aspect of both phenomena, and therefore also between religious thinking and compulsive thinking. Then he turns to explain the evolution of dogma and sees how it is carried out
along the lines of a continued struggle over small differences; it does not seem far-fetched to suppose that this striking likeness between dogmatic development and obsessional thinking is to be interpreted as proof of the identity of the two phenomena, and thus the unknown is to be explained by the known, the shaping of dogma is to be understood as following the same laws that govern compulsive neurotic processes. The hypothesis of an inner relationship between the two phenomena is confirmed by the fact that in the Christology dogma in particular the relation to God the Father, with its basis of ambivalence, plays a striking and special role.

Erich Fromm explained the development of dogma on the basis of changes in the actual social situation and function of Christianity, and pointed out as the shortcomings in Reik's methods, certain assumptions which are not clear. The most striking of these is that a religion, in this case Christianity, is conceived and presented as one entity and the followers of this religion are assumed to be a unified subject, thus masses being treated as if they were one man, an individual. Like organistic sociology in which society is conceived as a living entity and different groups within society understood as different parts of an organ, Reik adopts an organistic concept—not in anatomic but in psychological sense. Furthermore, he does not attempt to probe into the masses, whose unity he assumes, in their real life situation. He supposes the masses to be identical, and deals only with the ideas and ideologies produced by the masses, not concerning himself concretely with the living men and their psychic situation. He does not interpret ideologies as produced by men, rather, he reconstructs the men from the ideologies. Therefore his method is relevant for the history of dogma and not a method for the study of religious and social history. Reik's theological approach emphasizes the unity of Christian religion, indeed, Catholicism claims immutability.

The standpoint, discussed above, is of great importance in the investigation of Christian dogma, because it is decisive for the concept of ambivalence, which is central for Reik's work.

Whether the assumption of a unified subject is acceptable or not, is a matter that can be decided only after an investigation lacking in Reik’s work of the psychic, social and economic situation, of the ‘psychic surfaces’ of the group.

Both in the interpretation of the content of Christological dogma and the psychological evolution of dogma, a different method leads to different result. There is a common point of departure, the interpretation of early Christian faith as an expression of hostility to the father. In the investigation of the further dogmatic development, however, one may come to a conclusion precisely the opposite of Reik’s. He considers Gnosticism a movement in which rebellious impulses, supported by the non-religion of Christianity, have predominated to the extreme, to the downgrading of the father-god, whereas Fromm has shown that, on the contrary, Gnosticism eliminated the early Christian evolutionary tendencies.¹ Reik’s error seems to grow out of the fact that, according to his approach, he notices only the Gnostic formula of the removal of the Jewish father-god, instead of looking at Gnosticism as a whole, in which a quite different significance can be attributed to the formula of hostility to Jahve. The interpretation of further dogmatic development leads to other equally contrary results. Reik sees in the doctrine of the pre-existence of Jesus the survival and conquest of the original hostility to the father. In direct opposition to this idea, Fromm has made an attempt to show that in the idea of the pre-existence of Jesus, the original hostility to the father is replaced by an opposite harmonizing tendency. The psychoanalytic interpretation leads to two opposite conceptions of the unconscious meaning of different dogma formulations. This opposition, in fact, does not depend upon any difference in the psychoanalytic presuppositions as such. It rests only upon the difference in the method of applying psychoanalysis to sociopsychological phenomena. This seems correct because, unlike Reik’s, they stem not from the interpretation of an isolated and absolutized religious formula, but rather from the examination of this formula in its connexion with the real life situation of the men holding it.

Evaluation of Reik’s Views

Reik views dogma as an expression of compulsive thinking, and ritual as an expression of collective action. While it might be conceded that in Christian dogma, as well as in many other dogmas, ambivalence towards the father plays a great role, but this is in no way an evidence that dogma fantasies are matters of Compulsive thinking. In fact, Reik’s view that dogma is the result of compulsive thinking can not be regarded as valid on account of variations in its development. Fromm, who was once a student of Reik at the Psychoanalytic Institute in Berlin, was much stimulated by Reik’s views employing traditional methods in interpreting dogma, but he held that instead of trying to understand people by their ideas and ideologies, we should interpret ideas and ideologies by understanding the people who created them and believed in them. In order to do so one has to transcend individual psychology and enter the field of psychoanalytic-social psychology. Fromm points out that dogma is to a large extent conditioned by realistic political and social motives. On this basis, it is understandable that religions which are sufficiently consolidated by extra-religious elements are able to dispense almost completely with a system of dogmas in the Catholic sense.

Reik, in trying to establish an infantile and/or neurotic character in theistic belief, apparently depends on the presence claimed by him of substantial correlation between it and such factors as degrees of unconscious conflict and tendencies to regression. In this sort of argument, however, many other significant mental factors—such as degrees of intelligence, cultural background, deepseated unconscious urges, etc. are completely ignored. Consequently, it may be more reasonable to take cognisance of an integrated psychological development in our interpretation. In evaluating Reik’s claim, we must distinguish between the existence of similarities between the “form” taken by theistic belief and the “form” of infantile and neurotic behaviour, and the existence of causal factors for theistic belief of an infantile or neurotic kind. A great deal of the psychoanalytic investigation of religion reveals points of similarities between it and obsessional neurosis, on the
basis of such surface similarities, the conclusion that the both are the same thing, is untenable. A man “obsessed” with a radically new idea and constantly preoccupied with thinking it through, seeking its implications, devising ways and means to test it, exhibits marked similarities to obsessional neurotics, but it would be a mistake to dismiss his theorizing on that basis. As a matter of fact, despite the obvious similarities in patterns of overt behaviour, his obsession with an idea is psychologically quite a different thing, and has a very different psychological roots from the obsession of a neurotic.

Reik made use of the Freudian outlook in explaining religious phenomena psychoanalytically and naturally his views are based on similar hypotheses. Against this, Jung’s view that religious orientation is an alternative to neurosis, or even constitutes a prophylaxis against, or cure for, a neurosis, seems to be appropriate.

The Neo-Freudian Approach to Religion

Rigid adherence to all of freud’s ideas is no longer considered necessary by those who use Freud's methods perhaps with some freedom and who certainly deserve the name of psychoanalysts. Some of them, however, who wish to differentiate their theories and even their techniques quite sharply from those laid down by Freud, are sometimes spoken of as forming a neo-Freudian school of Psychoanalysts. This convenient name, in fact, was applied by C.W. Valentine to a group of psychologists and psychiatrists who recognise the important truths in the basic principles of psychoanalysis, but do not subscribe to its doctrine in toto. The neo-Freudians represent a sympathetic yet critical attitude towards the psychoanalytic construction. There is no authoritative exposition of their position, nor is there any organisation of the adherents of this selective movement. The Neo-Freudians criticised the concepts and methods developed by Jung and Adler as strongly as those of Freud.

The Neo-Freudians urge that psychoanalysis should shift its basic orientation from a biological approach to the sociological approach and regard itself as one of the social rather than biological sciences. Instead of tracing human motives to the inherited instincts of self-preservation and sexual reproduction, with or without the death instinct, psychoanalysts should seek the source of human motives in the requirement of human situation which is mostly a social one. Instead of regarding the child's emotional development as correlated to bodily growth and delayed sexual maturity, psychoanalysis should focus on the influences, affecting the child from the family and its environment, the school and the culture. And since the family, the school and the culture differ in different countries and undergo changes in the course of time, we have to expect corresponding differences and changes in child development, in human motives and in the frustration and maladjustments of emotional life. What Freud so keenly observed in the European cultures during his life-time might not hold good in other times and places in every culture.

These four postulates: psychic determinism, the role of unconscious, the goal directed nature of behaviour and the developmental or historical approach, have been accepted in one form or another by all the analytic schools and probably by most of those psychologists who concern themselves with the study of the personality. But there are two further and related postulates fundamental to the orthodox Freudians who, especially in recent times, have produced profound disagreement in many quarters and notably in the United States: its biological orientation and the libido theory. In fact, it is basically over this issue that the major division has occurred between what may be called the "libido school of Freud and his followers" and the "non-libido schools of Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, H.S. Sullivan, G. Stanley Hall and others", who may be said to have built up their theories specially against these concepts. The Neo-Freudians believe that personality is a social product using biological energy but modifying it as circumstances demand, strongly influenced but

not narrowly determined by constitutional or developmental factors which are less important on the whole than cultural ones, possessing needs which arise as much from the individual's society as from his biology. According to Freudian theory, human nature is the basis of culture. Culture is the product of human nature, and psychology of the individual is the key that opens the door to the study of culture. To Freud, culture is a result of personality structure. Men are driven by their drives and desires, sometimes sublimated or modified. Their social life is directed by the very same forces, e.g. oral or anal problems may become problems of social behaviour. Nobody denies that biological factors are important or that mental energy must ultimately be rooted in the body, but what the non-libido schools refuse to accept is the assertion that all behaviour is directed towards satisfaction of biological needs in the straightforward way emphasized by Freud. For instance, if for the sake of an argument, one accepts the orthodox thesis that hoarding or collecting is a trait connected with a particular stage of libido development, the anal retentive phase, the Neo-Freudians and others can never accept this absurd view. Fromm points out that there are historical periods, such as the rise of capitalism towards the end of the eighteenth century when anal traits of acquisitiveness, punctuality, regularity, cleanliness, and meticulous attention to detail, predominated and became the ethos of a whole society, which recognised them as virtues. This is difficult to explain on a purely biological hypothesis according to many critics, who held that it implied either that the changing patterns of child-rearing brought about the Industrial Revolution, which is manifestly non-sensual, or that the changing economic structure brought about a new personality type, which would be tantamount to admitting that the biological factor is not primary as social factors are1.

Freud's biologism led him to the conviction that the source of man's trouble lies deep within himself and is not simply the result of adverse social or material conditions. But these biological justifications of original sin and predestination appeal

primarily to old tradition-bound societies and as such are categorically rejected by new or post-revolutionary ones committed to the contrary hypothesis that men are naturally good, are born free and equal with almost infinite potentialities, and that therefore whatever troubles they have to meet must be due to social and environmental factors rather than to individual ones. Stemming from John Locke and Rousseau, this belief passed to the United States through Jeffersonian concept of democracy and to the Soviet Union by way of Marxism, whose dictatorship of the proletariat was, of course, to be succeeded by a Rousseausque classless society. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that both these countries shared in the birth of Behaviourism which rejected the concept of original sin in the form of innate ideas, or the claim that America was the birth place of Social Psychology\(^1\). Wolman calls the School of the Neo-Freudians as Sociological School. Watson also believed that men are born free and equal and that all their troubles are essentially environmental ones. Freud's aristocratic distaste for the rabble which, like Voltaire, he believed should be ruled over for its own good by the intelligent, his fatalism, and his conviction of the non-perfectibility of man being in conflict with these self-evident truths, the Neo-Freudian Americans solved the problem to their own satisfaction by turning him upside down and transforming him into a supporter of Jeffersonian democracy. He did not discover that sin was socially derived or that aggressiveness is not innate because nobody has done so and it is difficult to see how any one ever could\(^2\). There are no means of proving scientifically that men are naturally either bad or good, that their relationship with society is this or that when things go wrong one or the other is to blame, because these are not scientific propositions but articles of faith and the hypercritical may even doubt whether they have any meaning in them.

Frustration is and will always remain universal, so is hostility, whether innate or not, also universal. Since the individual man only becomes a human being within the

---
society, the antithesis between the two is unreal. Behind this rather futile philosophizing, however, there is a real issue, the issue of whether in practice human problems are best approached as individual or as social ones. The American approach is characteristically sociological and the Neo-Freudians, although dealing with individuals by analytic methods, tend to regard the patient's conflicts as a microcosm of social ones. Most neo-psychoanalysts, and especially the sociologically oriented Fromm, Horney and Sullivan, postulate that society is the first cause of psychology. This assumption leads them beyond the borders of psychoanalysis. They hold that social relations mould personality, and there is little, if any, influence of instinctual forces upon society and culture. Their theoretical systems have little to do with Freudian concepts. They have created new conceptual systems, which though rooted in Freudianism, can hardly be called Freudian.

There are, in fact, considerable differences among Horney, Fromm and Sullivan and even more between the first and the latter two. However, all the three have so much common that it is justifiable to refer to them collectively as the sociological school. Horney, Fromm and Sullivan have common roots in Freudianism but they have even more in common in their deviations from Freud. All of them discard the biological foundation of psychoanalysis. All of them deny the Freudian theory of instincts and libido and all of them deny the energetic principle of psychoanalysis. The entire group represents the environmentalistic point of view. They minimize the importance of hereditary forces and as such are more optimistic about human nature. All of them believe that man can be changed, since man is a product of environmental factors. These are in brief the theories and beliefs of the Neo-Freudians.

As regards the concept of religious phenomena of this group, though religion is considered to be social and cultural phenomenon, Horney and Sullivan despite their wide study of

culture and society have not written on religion at all either implicitly or explicitly.

Erich Fromm on Religion

Like Horney, Fromm was born in Germany and these two had exchanged ideas before coming to the United States. There they met Sullivan and finding that they had many interests in common, the three worked in close association for several years. Amongst the Neo-Freudians, Fromm occupies most important position for his outstanding contribution in the field by suggesting different approaches of psychoanalysis which Wolman calls "Historical and Ethical psychoanalysis".

It was Freud who introduced the law of evolution of the psyche into contemporary psychology. He was convinced that many ancient and archaic patterns are carried over into the personality structure of the modern man. This principle has been applied in two ways—first, the biogenetic principle according to which each individual is supposed to "recapitulate" the development stages of mankind; second, the contemporary social institutions such as law, religion and family have developed from primitive solid forms and they transit the heritage of the past to the present generation.

Fromm shifted away from the Freudian philosophy on several points. He refused to accept the biogenetic principle and attached more importance to the cultural heritage. In fact, Fromm regards human behaviour at any historical moment as a product of cultural influences at a given time. He assumes that "Man's nature, his passions, anxieties, are a cultural product; as a matter of fact, man himself is the most important creation and achievement of the continuous human effort, the record of which we call history".2

This statement is of great importance. The majority of psychologists deal with human behaviour in terms of either individually inherited traits or of individual's experiences, or both. The environmentalists are likely to emphasize one's

life history, the field theorists the immediate situation. Fromm introduced a new sphere of research into the study of human nature. Human history serves as a means of a huge laboratory in human nature where several patterns of human behaviour are shaped and reshaped. . . . Human history is both a source of factual data and a major case study which enables us to understand the impact of social factors on human life and mental activities. Fromm is, like Horney, an environmentalist, but has found in history the changing scenery of life of mankind and an important field for psychological study.

Freud's philosophy of history was an addition to his psychological theory; Fromm's philosophy of history was the corner-stone of his psychological theory. The reason is quite apparent. Freud regarded history as man-made whereas Fromm regarded man as history-made. We can, therefore, say that Fromm has done to Freud what Marx did to Hegel. Both Fromm and Marx applied the principles of their masters in a reverse direction¹. Marx changed Hegel's idealism and spiritualism into materialism and economism. Fromm reversed the order of man in society; instead of regarding society as a result of man's instincts; he regarded man as a product of social influences. As Fromm points out, Freud accepted traditional beliefs that, first, there exists a basic dichotomy between man and society, and secondly, that human nature is at roots evil. Man is “naturally” anti-social and it is the function of the society to domesticate him. Some expression of biological drives may be permitted, but ordinarily the instincts must be checked or refined, and through thwarting of the sex impulse and its deflection to symbolic ends there arises by the process described by Freud as “sublimation” what we know as civilization. If the assumption of Freud is accepted, it will be evident that there exists an inverse relationship in any society between the satisfaction of man's drive and his level of cultural attainment. In the consequence of suppression of natural impulses by society something miraculous happens. The suppressed drives turn into strivings

that are culturally valuable and thus became the basis for culture. Freud chose the word sublimation for this strange transformation from suppression into civilized behaviour. If the amount of suppression is greater than the capacity for sublimation, individual becomes neurotic and it is necessary to allow the lessening of suppression. In general, however, there is reverse relation between satisfaction of man's drives and culture; the more suppression the more culture and more danger of neurotic disturbances. The relation of the individual to the society in the Freudian theory is essentially a static one; the individual remains virtually the same and becomes changed only in so far as society exercises greater pressure on his natural drives and thus enforces more sublimation, or allows more satisfaction and thus sacrifices culture. Fromm criticizes Freud's biological orientation but unlike Horney, he goes on to make analysis of the Freudian theory in more or less Marxian terms according to which human relations as Freud sees them are similar to the economic relations to others which are characteristic to the individual in capitalist society.

Man, in fact, has created the human nature. In order to understand it, Fromm stresses to turn to history. There is a difference between the outlook of the Renaissance and the Middle Ages. Freud, Klien, Roheim and others attempt to describe all sociological problems in terms of individual psychology, and, on the other hand, Durkheim, Marx and many modern American sociological psychologists try to explain individual behaviour in basically sociological terms. Fromm does not accept any of these two approaches. He not only refuses to accept Freud's biological and individual approach but also does not accept those theories with a socio-

logical bias which reduces the psychological factor to a shadow of culture patterns. He attempts to show not only how passions, desires, anxieties, change and development as a result of the social process, but also how man's energies thus shaped into specific forms in their turn become productive forces, moulding the social process. Culture, according to Fromm,

1. Cf. Fromm (Erich): Escape from Freedom, 1941, pp. 10-11,
cannot be reduced from and interpreted by a theory of innate instincts, such as love and hate. Societies are not shaped by libidinal forces, as Freud held, but by objective conditions embedded in geography, history and economics.

Fromm accepted the generality of physical needs in which instinctual effect is important. Man, according to him, shares his biological needs with other animals, but the manner in which these needs are satisfied is culturally or socially determined. The idea that all humans follow the same pattern of behaviour in pursuing their goals, is not acceptable to Fromm. He rejected instincts as uniform pattern of behaviour in man. Fromm holds that the emergence of man occurred when instinctual behaviour reached its lowest point. Man does not follow the instinctual pattern; he learns from his environments, and his behaviour is conditioned by culture. In fact, Freud regarded the id-level behaviour as independent of cultural influences, but no adult individual could live on that level. With the exception of severely disturbed individuals, all humans live in some kind of balance between the id, the ego and super-ego, the two latter are products of cultural influences. Moreover, Freud assumed that the instinctual forces can be modified, sublimated, suppressed but never annihilated. Fromm denied their very existence in humans. That man possesses certain needs is a biological fact, but how he satisfies them lies in the realm of culture according to Fromm. To recapitulate, the main problem of psychology is to consider the manner in which the individual relates himself to his society, the world and himself, but the particular mode of doing so, Fromm holds, is not innate, rather it is acquired in the process of learning or acculturation. Human behaviour cannot be understood purely in terms of the satisfaction or frustration of biological drives because the social processes and influences generate new needs which may be as strong and effective or even stronger and more powerful than the biological ones. That men give away their last piece of bread, permit themselves to be destroyed rather than give up their convictions, are patriotic, religious and so on—these forms of behaviour cannot be explained biologically but only in terms of society and culture.
Man is "a part of nature" and it is not possible for him to escape the physical laws of the universe nor can any one change them. Man can never free himself from "dichotomies of existence". These fundamental facts of existence—that man is born without choice and he must ultimately die, that man is here for only a brief period of the whole historical process, that his abilities can never reach far beyond the limits set by the level of culture attained at that time, are described by Fromm as "existential dichotomies" and contrasted with "historical dichotomies". Thus man realizes his powerlessness and the limitations of his existence. He knows that there is no solution to the eternal dichotomies; that he is a part of nature, yet "transcends that rest of the nature". Besides these existential dichotomies man faces historical dichotomies. The contradictions in the life of society and individual are man-made and can be solved by man. These contradictions between the abundance and production and the human inability to enjoy it in peace and welfare is historical dichotomy. It is not an eternal and insoluble contradiction of mankind; man can solve this problem.

Existential dichotomies can never be solved. Very often the people try to deny their existence by development of "ideologies". One of the possible ideologies is religion and the belief in an immortal soul. While Freud saw in religion a kind of neurosis, Fromm arrived at the conclusion that "a neurosis is to be explained as a particular form of religion differing mainly by its individual, non-patterned characteristics". Man may try to escape the dichotomies of his life and appease his mind by several activities but peace and satisfaction are not generally achieved in this way. Fromm holds that the only true way to cope with the existential dichotomies is for man to unfold his own powers which will lead him to achieve happiness. This ability to live a productive life is embedded in human nature. Man's most compelling problems are not those of hunger, thirst or sex. Humans strive for power and love, and fight for religious or political ideals. They do not live by bread alone. The existential

dichotomies compel man to seek to restore the unity between himself and nature. In search for unity man needs orientation in and devotion to the world for which a frame of reference becomes necessary. Such a frame of reference, described as "a frame of orientation and devotion" corresponding to what is called "ideals" may take the form of some sort of supernatural religion, or as in the case of communist ideology, a secular religion. All religions, metaphysical systems or all inductive ideologies serve the same fundamental need to relate men significantly to the universe, to himself, and to his fellowmen. This observation leads Fromm to reverse the opinion of Freud that religion is a form of universal neurosis—on the contrary, he says "neurosis is a private religion"; whereas a religion is a generally accepted frame of orientation and devotion, a neurosis is a personal non-socially patterned one designed by the individual in order to explain his relationship to life. In Fromm's opinion as in Jung's, the need for a frame of this sort is man's most fundamental and all-inclusive desire. He needs, as pointed out by William James, "to feel at home in the universe". These are, in short, the points of views of Fromm about the human psychology in society and the salient differences between him and those of Freud's views pertaining to human psychology. This was essential to discuss Fromm's views in brief so as to understand his outlook of religion.

Out of the thirteen famous books of Fromm "The Dogma of Christ and Other Essays on Religion", "Psychology and Culture", "Psychoanalysis and Religion", "The Sane Society", "Man for Himself", "Beyond the Chain of Illusion" and "Life without Illusion" contain the detailed analysis of religion as propounded by Fromm from different points of view though mainly based on social and humanistic approaches.

Psyche Down the Ages

Fromm has traced how religious phenomenon has developed and evolved in society and the gist of his description will be discussed briefly here. According to Fromm, animals are a part of and live in accordance with nature. Man's history started with the denial of identity with nature though he was a part of nature, he was no longer identical with
nature. Fromm says that "He (man) changes his role toward nature from that of purely passive adaptation to an active one, he produces. He invents tool and, while mastering nature, he separates himself—rather his group—as not being identical with nature". As man moved away from nature, he became more aware of his unchangeable fate. He could not change the law of nature and he felt helpless and alone. Animal did not face dichotomies of life; man did. Man realised that his ultimate end was death.

The primitive man tried to escape his fate. He developed myth and religion and identified himself fully with his group or clan. His group-belonging instinct saved him from the feeling of being alone. The group decided how one should live; the group assigned each individual a definite place; the group was source of security. The beliefs of the group shared by all its members alleviated man's isolation in nature. The primitive religion tied man to nature, people worshipped sun and moon, land and sea, wind and fire, animals and plants. These "primary ties" served to strengthen man's security feeling and deny by imaginary and magic devices that man transcends nature.

This situation could not last for ever on account of man's critical mind which prevented him from remaining subservient to a group. People revolted and criticised, reasoned and developed new concepts. They strove towards independence, towards freedom of reasoning and decision and free use of their power. This process "which we may call 'individuation' seems to have reached its peak in modern history in the centuries between the Reformation and the present". In Western civilization, the Middle Ages present, as in Fromm's view, the era of social security, solidarity and stability. There was not much personal freedom during those days since place of every individual in the society was well defined by his class status in the feudal system. However, each class enjoyed the feeling of security and belonging in the frame of their social class. Thus during the Middle Ages the theory of

a static society ordained by God with the fixed classes served as a rationalization to explain why it was that "rich man in his castle, the poor man at the gate", should be accepted as a natural state of affairs. In the early capitalist society the rationalization was that in a free market the best man would inevitably reach the top and consequently the poor were lazy individuals who did not prefer to work hard in order to improve their condition. In this context Mosca and other philosophers have pointed out that the ideologies of various communities are not to be taken as scientific hypotheses or law, but "they answer a real need in man's social nature of knowing that one is governed not on the basis of mere intellectual or material forces but on the basis of a moral principle". The unconscious function of an ideology is to satisfy this need. Fromm has elaborated in great detail in his work "The Fear of Freedom" the significant changes that took place in the human personality at certain historical epochs. By the Middle Ages, man had largely lost his feeling of unity with nature as was the state during the period of primitive animism, when he existed in a condition of cosmic unity, not only with his fellow men, but also with the physical universe around him. But he still possessed his social solidarity. The economic sphere, like any other, came under the control of religion. Inspite of dirt, disease, and misery in the physical environment, suffering and pain were made tolerable by the "frame of orientation and devotion". Supplied by the doctrines of the Church, while it certainly fostered a sense of guilt, also assured the individual of her unconditional love to all her children and offered a way to acquire the conviction of being forgiven and loved by God. The universe, too, at this time seemed too mild and easy to understand; the earth and man were its centre, heaven or hell lay in future, "all actions from birth to death were transparent in their causal inter-relation". The Renaissance encouraged the development of a "passionate egocentricity". Protestantism destroyed the identification with God through belonging to the Church. Man had to pray alone and alone to face his responsibility towards the 'Lord'.

In these conditions the human individual might well be supposed to have lived in bondage. But mediaeval society did
not deprive the individual of his freedom, because the individual did not, being still bound to his society by primary ties, and full awareness of himself and others as separate being had not yet developed. In the late Middle Ages, however, the structure of society began to change and with it the personality of the individual, and a growing individualism began to make its appearance in other spheres due to rise of a new merchant class based upon private capital, competition, and individual enterprise disrupting the static unit of feudalism. This process came to the peak at the time of the Renaissance when “a growing individualism was noticeable in all social classes and affected all spheres of human activity, taste, fashion, art, philosophy and theology”. The builders of the Gothic cathedrals had been content to remain for the most part anonymous. The subjective side at this time asserted itself with corresponding emphasis; man became a spiritual individual and recognised himself as such.

But the new individualism was paralleled by a new disposition and in gaining freedom and self-awareness emotional security was lost. From this time onwards social life became to an ever-increasing extent a life-and-death struggle for supremacy and those who failed in the fight were regarded with contempt rather than pity. Economic life, freed from the moral control of the church, developed a life of its own, controlled no longer by ethical considerations but solely by the limits permitted by the law of the land. The individual could no longer depend upon the security of his traditional status and became actually aware that everything depended upon one’s own efforts. With the freedom from bondage of tradition and fixed status and role, man was also freed from the ties which had given him security and a sense of belonging. With the Reformation, a similar attitude appeared in the field of religion. Protestantism and capitalism meant individual enterprise in the sphere of religion and economic position. Man now stood naked before God alone, and without the church to intercede on his behalf, he was a powerless tool in God’s hand who might be saved, if at all, not as the result of any understandable process, but in Calvinist theory by the mere whim of the Deity. The individual was explained to
accept his powerlessness and the essential witness of his nature, to consider his whole life as atonement for his sin, and to submit completely to the will of God. Whereas in the Middle Ages the poor had been thought to be particularly the object of God’s love, it was now believed that wealth was a sign of God’s approval and poverty a disgrace. The later developments of capitalism are traced by Fromm up to the present day, and he described modern totalitarianism as a reaction against thealoneness of man cut off from his primary ties of family, guild, and religion. This is how Fromm explains the rise of totalitarian systems in contemporary society. In the totalitarian state, artificially created secondary bonds are substituted for the primary ones in a self-conscious attempt to submerge the individuality which so terrifies man. Modern industrial society, in Fromm’s view, lacks any universal frame of orientation and devotion, hence the individual is unable to impose any rational order upon the universe to explain his position in relation to himself, his fellow-men, or the world in general. Faced by these pathological conditions in his social world, the individual attempts to escape from his intolerable feelings of helplessness and aloneness. Fromm describes certain “psychic mechanisms” by which man tries to relate himself to society and solve this problem. These escape mechanisms are moral masochism, sadism, destructiveness and automation conformity. This is how Fromm traced the psychic development and religious phenomena based on social factors historically.

The Function of Religion

Fromm has discussed in detail the social-psychological function of religion in his famous book “The Dogma of Christ” (1963), which dealt with a narrowly limited problem of social psychology, i.e., the question concerning the motives conditioning the evolution of concepts about the relation of God, the Father to Jesus from beginning of Christianity to the formulation of the Nicene Creed in the fourth century. Theoretically the investigation set forth by Fromm aims at determining the extent to which the change in certain religious ideas is an expression of the psychic changes of the people
involved and the extent to which these changes are conditioned by their condition of life, which he calls "Psyche surfaces in which mainly three factors are involved—spiritual, economic, social and political. These factors present the life situation of the people in which place of religious phenomena has its own effect in the social and on the individual as well. Fromm holds that the evolution of the dogma can be understood only through knowledge of the unconscious upon which external reality works and which determines the content of consciousness.

Fromm stresses that the individual strives to experience under given circumstances—a maximum of libido gratification and a minimum of pain, in order to avoid pain, changes or even frustrations of different component sex impulses can be accepted. A corresponding renunciation of the ego impulses, Fromm says, is impossible. The peculiarity of an individual's emotional structure depends upon his psychic constellation and primarily upon his experiences in infancy. External reality, which guarantees him the satisfaction of certain impulses, but which compels the renunciation of certain others is defined by the existing social situation in which he lives. This social reality includes the wider reality which embraces all members of society and the narrow reality of distinct social classes. Fromm says, "Society has a double function for the psychic situation of the individual, both frustrating and satisfying. A person seldom renounces impulses because he sees the danger resulting from their satisfaction. Generally, society dictates such renunciations; first those prohibitions established on the basis of social recognition of a real danger for the individual himself, a danger not readily sensed by him and connected with the gratification of impulses; second, repression and frustration of impulses whose gratification would involve harm not to the individual but to the group; and, finally, renunciations made not in the interest of the group.

but only in the interest of a controlling class.

The "gratifying" function of society is no less clear than its frustrating role. The individual accepts it because only through its help he can, to a certain degree, count on gaining pleasure and avoiding pain, primarily with regard to the satisfaction of the elementary needs of self-preservation and, secondarily, in relation to the satisfaction of libidinous needs. What society can permit and what it must prohibit, the members of a society do not consult one another to determine the same. Rather, the situation is that so long as the productive forces of the economy do not suffice to afford all and adequate satisfaction of their material and cultural needs, the most powerful social class will aspire to the maximum satisfaction of their own needs first. The degree of satisfaction they provide for those who are ruled by them depends on the level of economic possibilities available and also on the fact that a minimum satisfaction must be granted to those who are ruled so that they may be able to continue to function as co-operating members of the society. Social stability depends relatively little upon the use of external forces. It depends for the most part upon the facts that men find themselves in a psychic condition that roots them inwardly in the existing social situation and a minimum of satisfaction of the natural and cultural instinctual needs is necessary for such purposes. However, at this point Fromm stresses that for the psychic submission of the masses, something else is important, something connected with the peculiar structural stratification of the society into classes.

In this connexion Fromm points out Freud's theory that man's helplessness in the face of nature is a repetition of the situation in which the adult found himself as a child which he could not do without help against unfamiliar superior forces, and when his life impulses following their narcissistic inclinations, attached themselves first to the objects that gave him protection and satisfaction, namely his mother and his father. To the extent that the society is helpless in respect to nature, the psychic situation of childhood must be repeated for the individual member of the society as an adult. He transfers from father or mother some of his childish love and fear and also
some of his hostility to a fantasy figure, God³.

In addition to the views of Freud, Fromm points out that there is a hostility to certain real figures, in particular to representatives of the ruling classes. In the social stratification, the infantile ritual is repeated for the individual². He sees in the rulers the powerful ones, the strong, and the wise persons to be revered. He believes that they wish him well, he also knows that resistance to them is always punished, he is content when by docility he can win their praise. There are the identical feelings, according to Fromm, which as a child an individual had for his father, and it is understandable that he is disposed to believe uncritically what is presented to believe without criticism every statement made by his father. Fromm holds that the figure of God forms a supplement to this situation; God is always the ally of the rulers³. Fromm further points out that the latter, who are always real personalities, are exposed to criticism, they can rely on God, who, by virtue of His unreality, only scorns criticism and, by His authority, confirms the authority of the ruling class.

Fromm says that in this psychological situation of the infantile bondage of the rules to the ruler, resides one of the principal guarantees of social stability. The ruled are willing to forgo the satisfaction of certain instinctual impulses in favour of the ruler; they are willing to respect the latter’s threats of punishment and to believe in the wisdom of their injunctions. They find themselves in the same situation as they did as helpless children in relation to their father, because the same mechanism operates now as it operated in childhood. This psychic situation becomes established through a great many significant and complicated measures taken by the ruling class, whose function it is to maintain and strengthen in the masses their infantile psychic dependence and to impose itself on their unconscious as a father figure.

In the light of these views, Fromm points out that “one of the principal means of achieving this purpose is religion. It has

3. Ibid, p. 11.
the task of preventing any psychic dependence on the part of the masses, of intimidating them intellectually, of bringing them into the socially necessary infantile docility towards the rulers”¹¹. It has, according to Fromm, another essential function at the same time—it offers the masses a certain measure of satisfaction that makes life sufficiently tolerable for them to prevent them from attempting to change their position from that of obedient son to that of rebellious son.

The question now arises regarding the nature and type of these satisfactions required by man. Fromm clarifies that this was not, in fact, satisfaction of the ego drives of self-preservation, nor of better food or other material pleasures. He points out that “such pleasures are to be obtained in reality and for that purpose, one needs no religion, religion serves merely to make it easier for the masses to resign themselves to many frustrations that reality presents. The satisfactions religion offers are of a libidinous nature; they are satisfactions that occur essentially in fantasy, because, as Fromm holds, libidinous impulses, in contrast to ego impulses, permit satisfaction in fantasies”².

Fromm’s such views manifest one of the psychic functions of religion which he justifies on the basis of the most important results of Freud’s investigations in this area described in Freud’s “Totem and Taboo”. Freud has shown that the animal god of Totemism is the elevated father; that in the prohibition to kill and eat the totem animal and in the contrary festive custom of nevertheless violating the prohibition once a year, man repeats the ambivalent attitude which he acquired as a child towards the father who is simultaneously a helping protector and oppressive rival. Theodore Reik has specially shown that this transfer to God of the infantile attitude towards the father is found also in the great religions. Fromm argues on the basis of these investigations that the emotional attitude of the believing Christian or Jew towards his God reveals the same ambivalent characteristic as that of the child towards his father. The question posed by Freud and

2. Ibid, p. 11.
his followers concerned the psychic quality of the religious attitude towards God; the answer is that in the adult's attitude towards God, one sees repeated infantile attitude of the child towards his father. This infantile psychic situation indicated by Freud according to Fromm, represents the pattern of religious situation. He further comments that Freud passes beyond this question to a broader one in his "Future of an Illusion". Freud no longer asks only how religion is psychologically possible, he asks also why religion exists at all, or why it has been necessary. This Freud clarifies taking into consideration psychic and social facts simultaneously. Freud attributes to religion the effect of a narcotic capable of bringing some consolation to man in his impotence and helplessness before the forces of nature.

Fromm quotes those views of Freud that constitute the inner power of religious doctrines and the extent of the circumstances these doctrines owe their effectiveness independently of rational approval. Freud says, "These religious ideas which are given out as teachings, are not precepts of experience or end-results of thinking; they are illusions, fulfilments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind. The secret of their strength lies in the strength of those wishes. As we already know, the terrifying impression of helplessness in childhood aroused the need for protection—for protection through love—which was provided by the father; and the recognition that this helplessness lasts throughout life made it necessary to cling to the existence of a father, but this time a more powerful one. Thus the benevolent rule of a divine Providence allays our fears of the dangers of life; the establishment of moral world-order ensures the fulfilment of the demands of justice, which have so often remained unfulfilled in human civilization; and the prolongation of earthly existence in a future life provides the local and temporal frame-work in which these wish-fulfilments shall take place. Answers to the riddles that tempt the curiosity of man, such as how the universe began or what relation is between body and mind are developed in conformity with the underlying assumptions of this system. It is an enormous relief to the individual psyche if the conflicts of its childhood arising from the father-complex
conflicts which it has never wholly overcome—are removed from it and brought to a solution which is universally accepted”.

Commenting on Freudian views in this context, Fromm points out that Freud sees the possibility of the religious attitude in the infantile situation; he sees its relative necessity in man’s impotence and helplessness with respect to nature and he draws the conclusion that with man’s increasing control over nature, religion is to be viewed as an illusion that is becoming superfluous. Concluding the social function of religion, Fromm expresses that man strives for a maximum of pleasure; social reality compels him to many renunciations of impulse; the society seeks to compensate the individual for these renunciations by other satisfactions harmless to the society—that is for the ruling class. These satisfactions, Fromm says, are such as in essence can be realised in fantasies, especially in collective fantasies. They perform an important function in social reality. In so far as society does not permit real satisfactions, fantasy satisfactions serve as substitute and become a powerful support of social stability. The greater the renunciation men endure in reality, the stronger must be the concern for compensation. Fantasy satisfactions have the double function which is characteristic of every narcotic: they act both as an anodyne and as a deterrent to active change of reality. The common fantasy satisfactions have an essential advantage over individual day-dreams; by virtue of their universality, the fantasies are perceived by the conscious mind as if they were real. In this way, Fromm says that “an illusion shared by everyone becomes a reality. The oldest of these collective fantasies is religion. With the progressive development of society, fantasies become more complicated and more rationalised. Religion itself becomes more differentiated, and besides, it appears in poetry, art and philosophy as the expressions of the collective fantasies”.

As regards the primary functions of religion in a society,

Fromm determines a three-fold function of religion; for all mankind consolation for the privations exacted by life; for the great majority of men, encouragement to accept emotionally their class situation; and for the ruling classes relief from guilt feelings caused by the suffering of those whom they suppress.

The above views advanced by Fromm about the function of religion is the outcome of investigation of a small segment of religious development. He has made a systematic attempt in his own way to view the development of Christianity in his "Dogma of Christ" and has shown what influence social reality had in a specific situation upon a specific group of men and how emotional trends found expression in certain dogmas, in collective fantasies and further what psychic change was brought about by a change in the social situation. In his investigation of the development of Christianity, Fromm has attempted to show how these psychic changes found expression in the new religious fantasies that satisfied certain unconscious impulses. It becomes thereby clear how closely a change in religious concepts is connected, on the one hand with the experiencing of various possible infantile relationships to the father or mother, and on the other hand, with the change of attitude towards the ruling class and its representatives, that is, with changes in the social and economic situation. He traces the development of Christianity as a product of social class situation from which the early Christian faith originated. According to Fromm, those who first had faith in Christ were the masses of the uneducated poor, the proletariat of Jerusalem and the peasants in the country who, because of the increasing political and economic oppression and social restrictions, felt the urge to change the existing condition. From this stratum of the poor uneducated revolutionary masses, Christianity arose as a significant historical Messianic revolutionary movement. Early Christian doctrine could not appeal to the educated and the property owners but the poor, the oppressed and the suffering. The small artisans and the poletarians supported the new message and such was

the structure of primitive Christianity. The psychic surfaces of the followers of early Christianity helps us in interpreting the Christological fantasies sufficiently well. Those intoxicated with this idea were people tormented and despairing, full of hatred for their Jewish and pagan oppressors, with no prospect of effecting a better future. A message which would allow them to project into fantasy all that reality denied them, must have been extremely fascinating, says Fromm.

By substituting fantasy for reality, the Christian message satisfied the longing for hope and revenge, and although it failed to relieve hunger, it brought a fantasy satisfaction of no little significance for the oppressed.

The psychoanalytic investigation of the Christological faith of the early Christian community, according to Fromm, raises questions pertaining to the significance for the first Christians of the fantasy of the dying man elevated to God (Jesus after His death is by the Divine awakening raised to the right hand of God), the fantasy winning the hearts of so many thousands in a short time and its unconscious sources and the emotion needs satisfied but it. Fromm explains the first most important question—a man is raised to a god; he is adopted by God—basing his views on the psychoanalytic arguments advanced by his teacher Theodore Reik. "We have here the old myth of the rebellion of the son, an expression of hostile impulses towards the father-god". This reveals as to what significance this myth must have had for the followers of early Christianity. These people hated intensely the authorities that confronted them with "fatherly" power. The priests, scholars, aristocrats, in short, all the rulers who excluded them from the enjoyment of life and who in their emotional world played the role of the severe, forbidding, threatening, tormenting father—they also had hate for this God who was an ally of their oppressors, who permitted them to suffer and be oppressed. They themselves wanted to rule, even to be the masters, but were helpless to try to achieve this in reality and to overthrow and destroy the present masters by force. Fromm points out "So, they satisfied their wishes in a fantasy. Consciously they did not dare to slander the fatherly God. Conscious hatred was possible for the ruling class only, not
for the elevated father figure, the Divine Being Himself. But the unconscious hostility to the Divine Father found expression in the Christ fantasy. They put a man at God's side and made him a co-regent with God, the Father. This man who became a god, and with whom as humans they could identify, represented their Oedipus wishes, he was a symbol of their unconscious hostility to God, the Father, for if a man could become God, the latter was deprived of his privileged fatherly position of being unique and unreachable. The belief in the elevation of a man to God was the expression of unconscious wish for the removal of the Divine Father".

Fromm points out that the significance of the fact is that the early Christian community held the adoptionist doctrine, the theory of the elevation of man to God. In this doctrine, the hostility to God found its expression when in the doctrine that later increased in popularity and became dominant—the doctrine about the Jesus who was also a god—was expressed in the elimination of these hostile wishes toward God. The faithful identified with the son. They could identify with Him because He was a suffering human like themselves. This is the basis of the fascinating power and effect upon the masses of the suffering man elevated to god; only with a suffering being could they identify. Thousands of men before Him had been crucified, tormented and humiliated. If they thought of this crucified one as elevated to God, this meant that in their unconscious this crucified god was themselves". Later on the people of higher classes became the followers of Christianity. This is how he traces the origin of this religion.

From the above discussion it is evident that Fromm has based his views partly on the Freudian analysis of Christianity and partly on the views of Marx, as he was greatly influenced by the views of both of them. Therefore the shortcomings of their views have also crept in the views of Fromm in which three primary elements of cognition, conation and affection forming the basis of religion were not given any importance. Though Fromm felt the drawbacks despite a

2. Ibid, pp. 35-36.
conscious change in his psychoanalytic views yet he could not do so. However there is substantial truth in his analysis of psycho-social function of religion which, of course, is confined to Christianity only.

Fromm's Concept of Humanistic Religion

Among the Neo-Freudians, Erich Fromm is outstanding for his interest in the phenomenon of religion in both individual and social life and his contribution to a functional theory. Quite different from Freud in his approach, Fromm differentiates among varieties of religion, in terms of their relationship to what he calls “self-realization”. Of all the cultural analysts, Fromm has given the most explicit attention to the ethical and religious implications of psychological theory. He is keenly aware of the general significance of the inter-action between persons and their cultural stimuli but he has singled out the complex problem of authority and freedom as the prism through which we may refract and study the forces which distort and frustrate proper human growth. From the point of view of contemporary social sciences, Fromm’s analysis is much more adequate than that of Jung who is much more inclined to stress the positive functions of religion in helping to achieve “individuation” or self-realization, because Fromm explores the kind of socio-cultural conditions in which various types of religious patterns are most likely to appear. Fromm has defined religion in very broad terms “I understand by religion any system of thought and action shared by a group which gives the individual a frame of orientation and an object of devotion”. The very conditions of human existence, Fromm believes create in man a need for a common system of orientation and an object of devotion. Religion, according to him, is an inevitable aspect of any culture. The question for Fromm as a therapist is not that there shall be a religion, but what kind of religion shall man have and with consequences for human life. Many

traditional religionists will applaud this statement but may not agree, however, with his instrumental approach, so with the comments on the kind of religion that Fromm thinks necessary for the full realization of human potentialities, Fromm to be sure points out that there are aspects of the major world religions which contribute to full human development, but he stresses the ease with which they regress towards more “primitive” forms that are “incompatible with the essential teachings of monotheism”. Ancestor worship, totemism, fetishism, compulsive ritualism, in Fromm’s judgement, lie beneath the surface of most contemporary religion, and are frequently encouraged by institutional forms. In his famous work “Psychoanalysis and Religion” (1950), Erich Fromm has explained that religion is that which contributes to the full realization of human power and that one which is different from the traditional varieties. The distinctive point of view he has taken into account is, which cuts across non-theistic and theistic religion that between “authoritarian” and “humanistic” religions. The analytic distinction is sharp, although particular religious complexes may contain both tendencies. The usual conception of religion, Fromm believes, inclines strongly towards the “authoritarian” type. In his “Psychoanalysis and Religion” he has outlined his ideas of religion of humanity which he believes are compatible with our psychological wisdom and which will serve men in their striving for self-realization and productivity. To begin with, the warrant for religion lies in its necessity. “There is no one”, Fromm says, “without a religious need, a need to have a frame of orientation and an object of devotion”1. But not all religions are good for men. Much of it is, in fact, psychologically harmful.

According to Fromm, bad religion is authoritarian religion—the authoritarian element in it is what makes it bad. For his definition of religion, he borrows the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of theistic religion which is not of religion as such, but “is a rather accurate definition of authoritarian religion”. It reads that religion is the “recognition on the

part of man of some higher unseen power as having control of his destiny, and as being entitled to obedience, reverence and worship”. In its emphasis on the recognition that man is controlled by a higher power outside of himself, Fromm says, alone does not constitute authoritarian religion. He stresses that “what makes it so is the idea that this power, because of control it exercises, is entitled to ‘obedience, reverence, and worship’. I italicize the word ‘entitled’ because it shows that the reasons for worship, obedience and reverence lie not in the moral qualities of the deity, not in love or justice, but in the fact that it has control, that is, has power over man. Furthermore, it shows that the higher power has a right to force man to worship him and that the lack of reverence and obedience constitutes sin”.

Fromm states that “the essential element in the authoritarian religion is the surrender to a power transcending man. The main virtue of this type of religion is obedience; its cardinal sin is disobedience. Just as deity is conceived as omnipotent or omniscient, man is conceived as being powerless and insignificant. Submission to a power authority is one of the avenues by which man escapes from his feeling of aloneness and limitation. In the act of surrender he loses his independence and integrity as an individual but he gains the feeling of being protected by an awe-inspiring power of which, as it were, he becomes a part”. Ignoring all questions as to the possible existence of such ‘power’, Fromm proceeds to argue that any such conception of man’s contingency is inimical to man’s freedom and self-determination. The fatal defect in any religion which acknowledges God as man’s ground and end is that it necessarily implies ‘the surrender of man to a power transcending men’. Such a surrender transfers the conflict between man’s freedom and arbitrary power from the social to the cosmic order and is even a bit worse for its enlarging the dimensions of servile action. Fromm expresses that “it is one thing to recognise one’s dependence and limitations, and it is something entirely different to indulge in this dependence, to

worship the forces of nature on which one depends. To understand realistically and soberly how limited our power is, is an essential part of wisdom and of maturity; to worship is masochistic and self-destructive”.

Now the question arises as to why according to Fromm's analysis of personality authoritarian religion is dysfunctional. This is because it alienates man from himself. In humanistic religion, God is the image of man’s higher self, a symbol of what he ought or might be; “in authoritarian religion God becomes the sole possessor of what was originally man's: of his reason and love. The more perfect God becomes, the more imperfect becomes man. He projects the best he has on to God and thus impoverishes himself”.

Moreover, Fromm says that in authoritarian religion God is a symbol of power and force. He is supreme because He has supreme power, and man in juxtaposition is utterly powerless. Similarly, authoritarian secular religion, says Fromm, follows the same principle. In this form “Father of His People”, or the State or the Race, or Socialist Fatherland becomes the object of worship and the life of the individual becomes insignificant. Man's worth consists in the very denial of his own worth and strength very often authoritarian religion postulates an ideal which is so abstract and so distant that it has hardly any connexion with the real life of the people.

As regards humanistic religion, Fromm explains that it “is centered around man and his strength. Man must develop his power of reason in order to understand himself, his relationship to his fellow-men and his position in the universe. He must recognise his power of love for others as well as for himself and experience the solidarity of all living beings. He must recognise the truth both with regard to his limitations and his potentialities. He must have principles and norms to guide him in this aim. Religious experience in this kind of religion is the experience of oneness with the All, based on one’s relatedness to the world as it is grasped with thought and with love”. He further expresses that man's aim in humanistic

religion is to achieve the greatest strength, not the greatest powerlessness, virtue is self-realization, not obedience. Faith, according to Fromm, is certainty of conviction based on one's experience of thought and feeling, not assent to propositions on credit of the proposer. The prevailing mood is that of joy, while the prevailing mood in authoritarian religion is that of sorrow and of guilt, expresses Fromm so boldly. "Inasmuch as humanistic religions are theistic", he says, that in such form of religion "God is a symbol of man's own power which he tries to realize in his life, and is not a symbol of source and domination having power over man". In humanistic religions, Fromm counts early Buddhism, Taoism, the teachings of Issiah, Jesus, Socrates, Spinoza, certain trends in the Jewish and Christian religions and the religion of Reason of the French Revolution. In this way Fromm points out clearly the primary distinction between authoritarian and humanistic religion which cuts across the distinction between the theistic and non-theistic and between religions in the narrow sense of the word and philosophical systems of religious character. According to him, human attitude underlying these systems is more important than their thought system. Fromm appreciates Zen-Buddhism for its being expressive of even more radical anti-authoritarian attitude. This proposes that no knowledge is of any value unless it grows out of ourselves; no authority, no teacher can really teach us anything except to rouse doubts in us; words and thought systems are dangers because they easily turn into authorities whom we worship. Thus according to this doctrine, life itself must be grasped and experienced as it flows and in this lies virtue.

Surveying the history of Western culture, Fromm came to regard Christianity as the prime importance of authoritarian religion—and within Christianity he views Calvinism with a special psychiatric distaste. He sees a fateful parallel between Calvin's concept of divine sovereignty and the modern authoritarian Police State. "Their common spirit is one of submission to power and lack of love and respect for the individual person". Humanistic religion, on the other hand, has a wider

and more wholesome record to show.

Religion can be of great service to the human society only when it encourages love and the assertion of one’s own powers, not fear and submission. Fromm points out that early Christianity and the mystic thinking in many religions are strongly humanistic. “Jesus’s precept that kingdom of God is within you”, is the simple and clear expression of non-authoritarian thinking. “In emphasizing this aspect of early Christianity, Fromm doubtless minimizes the paradoxes and the complexities, indeed even the contradictions, which it contains. His tendency to make Jesus a kind of early day Neo-Freudian and a full supporter of ‘humanistic’ religion seems wide of the mark”. This is how Yinger appreciates Fromm’s outlook of early Christianity which was primarily humanistic in its tenets. But it does not emphasize in a dramatic way, however, the insights into personality that Christianity contains. The Oedipus complex advanced by Freud, Fromm stresses, can be understood in its full significance only when it is detached from the sphere of sex and is applied to interpersonal relations. The “incestuous” craving for the parent is not sexual according to Fromm, as Freud believed, but is an expression of the “much more profound” desire to remain a child, to remain attached to protecting figure.

When Jesus said “For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against the mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law”, he did not mean to teach hatred of parents but to express in the most unequivocal and drastic form the principle that man must break incestuous ties and become free in order to become human.

One can think of this interpretation in several ways and terms. But the man’s concern here is only to describe it as a part of Fromm’s attempt to define a religion which in his view is positively functional for human personality and self-realization. The attachment to parents, although it is the most

fundamental form of “incest” in the psychoanalytic view, is the only one form. The tribe, the nation, the race, the class may serve as protecting “home”. Here are the roots of nationalism and racism which in turn are symptoms of man’s inability to experience himself and others as free human beings.

It is thus amply evident that Fromm does not share Freud’s categorical view that religion is an infantile fixation which man hopefully some day be able to afford to discard. While stressing the ease with which it serves selfish interests and neurotic trends in the individual, Fromm also declares that religion can assist men to achieve their highest potentialities. But under what condition this is likely to occur, Fromm does state the detailed explanation and ground. He shows his full awareness of the fact that the kind of personality capable of “humanistic” religion will emerge in certain kinds of socio-cultural situations. He who would make a man religious, in Fromm’s view, must work to create a kind of conducive conditions in which character structure capable of mature religious experience will develop.

“What people think and feel is rooted in thin character, and the thin character is moulded by the total configuration of their practice of life—more precisely, by the socio-economic and political structure of their society. In societies ruled by a powerful minority which holds the masses in subjection, the individual will be so imbued with fear, so incapable of feeling strong or independent, that his religious experience will be authoritarian, whether he worships a punishing awesome God or a similarly conceived leader, makes little difference. On the other hand, where the individual feels free and responsible for his own fate, or among minorities striving for freedom and independence, humanistic experience develops.”

Such a hypothesis, Yinger says, one can scarcely say that it has been fully demonstrated—is pertinent to an instrumentalist approach to religion, which raises question as to how religion affects the quality of human life. To those who seek to

2. Ibid., p, 52.
establish or defend "the truth" and to those for whom relevance of religion to quality of adjustment to this life is quite unimportant, as held by Yinger, and Fromm's observations have little significance. However, to those who share his orientation, the important issue of religion, remains: whether "humanistic religion" merely reflects mature personalities which in turn are the product of favoured socio-cultural condition, or whether such religion once established helps to create mature persons and a non-authoritarian society. Fromm strongly implies that the latter is true, but does not adequately describe the process by which the influenced is conveyed. The ease with which religions turn to become authoritarian shows that man has not yet learnt how to prevent religion from becoming an accumulating reservoir of his projected needs. But there are also enough evidence of close connexions between religion and personal growth which Jung calls "individuation", about which mention in detail has already been made. Yinger stresses that the full picture must include both tendencies".

Fromm's Concept of Sin

The conception of the theory of sin and the sense of guilt are the important themes of the Christian religion and their explanations are based on several speculations and religious realities. Freud has viewed them in his own ways and his psychoanalytic theories pertaining to them are largely based on anthropological assumptions already discussed. But Fromm's theory and conception of sin are quite different from those of Freudian views and the explanations advanced and established in Christianity. It has already been indicated that man projects the best he has onto God and thus impoverishes himself. Fromm explains that this mechanism of projection is the very same which can be observed in inter-personal relationship of a masochistic, submissive character, where one person is awed by another and attributes his own powers and aspirations to the other person. It is the same mechanism that makes people endow the leaders of even the most inhuman systems with

qualities of super-wisdom and kindness. Thus by projecting his own most valuable powers onto God, Fromm points out that man’s powers are separated from him and in this process he has become alienated from himself. Whatever he has now is God’s and nothing is left to him. His only access to himself is through God. In worshipping God he tries to get in touch with that part of himself which he has lost through projection. After giving God all he has, he begs God to return to him some of what originally was his own. But having lost his own, he is completely at God’s mercy, as such he necessarily feels like a “sinner” since he has deprived himself of everything that is good and it is only God’s mercy or grace that he can regain that which alone makes him human. Again this alienation from his own powers, Fromm declares, not only makes man feel slavishly dependent on God, it makes him bad too. Then in that situation he is a man without faith in his fellow-men or in himself, without the experience of his own love, of his own power of reason. As a result, the separation between “holy” and the “secular” occurs. As regards his worldly activities, man acts without love, then in that sector of his life which was reserved to religion, Fromm points out, man feels himself to be a sinner, which, in fact, he is, since to live without love is to live in sin. Therefore, he tries to recover some of his lost humanity by being in touch with God. He also, simultaneously, tries to win forgiveness by emphasizing his own helplessness and worthlessness. Thus the attempt to obtain forgiveness results in the activation of the very attitude from which his sins stem. He is caught in a painful dilemma. The more he praises God, the emptier he becomes. The emptier he becomes, the more sinful he feels. The more sinful he feels, the more he praises his God—and the less able is he to regain himself. Fromm further points out that real fall of man is his alienation from himself, his submission to power, his turning against himself even though under the guise of his worship of God. This is how Fromm explains the origin of the sense of sin in man.

1. Fromm (Erich): Escape from Freedom, 1941, p. 158.
Humanistic Religion and Psychotherapy

The aim of Psychotherapy and humanistic religion come near to convergence, in Fromm’s conception of them. He speaks of the psychotherapist as “a physician of soul”. Better than the priest and ministers of authoritarian religion, a devout psychotherapist could help men towards their highest possible plane, “an attitude in which life is devoted to the realization of the highest principle of life, those of love and reason, to the aim of becoming what he potentially is, a being made in the likeness of God”—“God” being still understood as the symbol of humanity’s powers of self-realization. Fromm has gone further than any other psychologist in working out the structure of religion of secular man, as a real alternative and rival of historic Christianity.\(^1\) He has followed out the naturalistic presuppositions which are evidently widely implicit in much psychotherapeutic doctrine to their explicit and positive conclusions—for naturalists much have their devotion too. But he is, by no means, says Oulter, a solitaire prophet of humanism, critic of Christianity. For instance, Marjorie Brierley in “Trends of Psychoanalysis” concedes that “it is far from evident that assumptions of Christianity’s rapid demise are correct”. But she maintains that “the mode of personal integration offered by Christianity is inherently unstable”, and goes on to expound “the leben sanschauung implicit in psychoanalysis”, which she calls “neo-realistic humanism”. This, she believes, offers a superior morality as well as psychology to anything she sees in Christianity. Flugel in his “Man, Moral and Society” has weighed Christianity, found it wanting, and gone on to confess his own humanistic faith. “The religion of humanity”, he believes, “is surely the religion of the near future”\(^2\). Therefore, Flugel suggests that the religious emotions must be largely or entirely secularised and be put in the service of humanity. In all the ideas of human destiny is the firm conviction that all

distinctively human meanings and values in life are supplied by man himself. The human possibility is man's achievement in a natural process which is essentially impersonal. It might even be said to be indifferent to anything more than the evolutionary process of organic life. With this natural order, if they are sufficiently free and rational unabused, men can mature into at least a brief span of rational, benevolent and productive living. In such a soundness of mind, they may gain confidence and wisdom both to live and also to suffer extinction. They require no God whose sovereign wisdom and love are the forte and ground of existence—indeed they do better to be rid of such overriding power. They need no redemption from their sin and guilt; indeed such notions are disabling and obstruct the healing work of proper "loving care for one's self". They need no church or culture of worship and in common life of course they need psychotherapy but only to the extent they can attain by their own true power life's largest freedom and sufficiency. While supporting Fromm's views, Oulter states that Christianity produces, in actual results an inferior pattern of personality organisation and that the Christian world-view is psychologically invalid. But one must weigh the claim that a humanistic religion and ethic is able to keep up into it itself and conserve the real values of Christian wisdom while it rightly discards the psychological disvalues which are so apparent. He further suggests that if the Christian wisdom were as harmful as Fromm, Flugel and Brierley allege, we should certainly prefer the choice of abandoning it. In the name of our commitment to the essential biblical faith, we should have to reject any wisdom about life which inevitably and systematically distorts the evident design of human existence. Oulter recommends that if "the religion of humanity were, in actual results, as vital and valid as its devotees affirm, we have to consider seriously the choice of adopting it because like other religious faith it also affords the widest, deepest, truest wisdom concerning both the ends and means of human life. However, such a choice, Oulter says, cannot be made simply by direct appeal to the authority of science or dogma because the humanist faith greatly exceeds any warrant of scientific autho-
rity, and the Christian dogmas are expressly founded upon prior choices of faith. "The secularist, humanist faith maintains that all the crucial questions of the meaning and value of life lie inside the parenthesis of being which the laws of birth, and growth and death. The Christian faith focuses the question of life's meaning on the parenthesis itself. Whatever life means and whatever final quality it may have, must, therefore, be derived from the relation between man and the reality on which he does, in fact, depend the finite on the infinite. Fromm contends that men may acknowledge the fact of their dependence without any corresponding need for insight into the nature and disposition of the reality involved. He claims, further, that "clinical examination of masochistic character traits" supports his views that "to worship the forces on which one depends" is "masochistic and self-destructive". Oulter criticizes the view advanced by Fromm by pointing out that this is an illicit appeal to fragmentary evidence unless Fromm can show that all such worship is invariably masochistic and that the humanist attitude towards the given is invariably non-neurotic. One might more reasonably, in fact, contend that men do, and must, worship that upon which they "believe" they depend. This is actually, Oulter says, what worship means. Man's acknowledgement and celebration of his fundamental reliance on what he takes to be reliable, his trust in what he takes to be trustworthy, his devotion to what he takes to be the shaping forces of his destiny. Thus in humanism, man may refuse to worship God or nature. Thus he proclaims his faith that God does not exist and that nature is not man's final arbiter. But he still will worship that on which he does rely—humanity and himself. "In Christian view, the basic fault of the humanist account of human possibility is that all meanings and values which may be achieved in human life stand surrounded by a bracket of inexorable, inscrutable, givenness". Fromm has accepted that "the development of the self is never completed;
even under the best conditions, only the part of man's potentialities is realised. Man always dies before he is fully born". This shows that ultimately life is meaningless. Nature conceived as the ultimate context or process of existence, is itself without meaning of purpose, or purpose beyond the infinite occurrence of life atoms is a dynamic system which defies further explanation—or inquiry.

In Fromm's opinion as viewed, it is evident that the underlying theme of the problem of religion is not the problem of God, but the problem of man; religious formulations and religious symbols are attempts to give expression to certain kind of human experience. The important point of it is the nature of these experiences. The symbol system is only the clue from which we can infer the underlying human reality. Though since the days of Enlightenment, the question pertaining to religion has been largely concerned with the affirmation or negation of a belief in God rather than with the affirmation or negation of certain human attitudes. It is easy to see that many who profess the belief in God are in their human attitude idol worshippers or men without faith while some of the most ardent atheists devoting their lives to the betterment of mankind, to deeds of brotherliness and love, have exhibited faith and a profound religious attitude. In the opinion of Fromm, centering religious discussion on the acceptance or denial of the symbol God blocks the understanding of the religious problem as a human problem and prevents the development of that human attitude which can be called religious in the humanistic sense.

G. Stanley Hall (1844-1924), a renowned American psychologist was technically a philosopher and was responsible for the wide application of psychoanalytical theory to the study of human personality in the United States. He invited Freud for the first time to America in 1909 for delivering lectures on

psychoanalysis in the academic realm. Prior to this psychoanalysis was confined to the field of medicine as a psychotherapeutic technique for the treatment of the patients suffering from mental disorders. He started publication of the “American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education” in 1904 and was its editor from its start to 1915.

Hall’s main approach to the study of human personality had been genetic psychology and he was keenly interested in the study of religion, anthropology, sociology, physiology and sex. Out of his ten books of outstanding merits, “Adolescence—its Psychology and its Relation to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education” (1904) and “Jesus the Christ in the Light of Psychology” (1917) contained detailed analysis of Hall’s view on religion, its genesis and function as well. Starbuck developed the questionnaire method of investigation of religion which was concerned with such particular questions as the precise age of conversion. Hall’s patient accumulation of material was directed almost entirely to the study of adolescence, with its special bearing upon the development of the religious life, as one only of its main interests.

As regards the genesis of religion, as mental phenomena, Hall expressed that idealism, metaphysics and religion spring from the basal needs of the human soul and are indispensable in some form to every sound and comprehensive view of it as well as necessary to a complete service. Laying down the definition of religion, he suggests that “religion may be described from the viewpoint of psychology as favouring the old and now often discarded etymology of the word religion, as rebinding, bringing back, or restoration. As natural, it is re-established unity with nature; as ethical, a reunion of conduct with conscience; as theoretical, it is reatonement of the mind with truth; as feeling, it is the ecstatic closing in again of the highest love with its supreme object, or fresh impulses along a forsaken but recovered path. The common element is atonement with implication of previous estrangement or, heterization, the ecstatic closing in by faith or intuition
with what is felt to be normative and central". Since different authorities have viewed religion from the point of view of noesis, realm of feeling or volition and morality, Hall has taken a wider view of it, besides God being the central theme in the traditional religions. In religious state, according to Hall, the reunion must be in the field of higher nature, must be generally achieved with effort and anxiety. Such interpretation of religion shows that three elements involved in religiosity—conation, cognition and affection, are essential according to Hall in the development of religious attitude in individuals. He further points out that man’s duration with his ideal or the cause or extent of his departure from it, the form under which the ideal is conceived, whether subjectively or objectively; how the “rapprochement” begins; whether the process is transcendent or immanent, objective or subjective, are important for cult, theory, conduct, sentiment, are less central in man’s aspiration for reunion with the higher nature, which is the primary object of religion according to Hall. The objective of religion in his opinion “is the reinstallation of the individual or the race in its true place in the world, recovery of health or wholeness. Always and everywhere, the full motif is present, however far is the background and joy is always felt at the reascent”.

Some of the elements and facts which are generally held to be essential for the study of religious consciousness, have been pointed out by Hall, not so effective for the development of religiosity. They have been indicated in the preceding discussion. In the context of origin of the sense of spirituality, Hall observes that “as a psycho-pedagogic theory, a reversionary goal or term, or an even possible reminiscence of the race, this conception is a precious element in man’s spiritual idealization of his own life”. It is evident from the facts mentioned by Hall that social background and climatic atmosphere of the age in which the individuals lived, played very effective role in the rise of feeling of spirituality. This he

2. Ibid., p. 352.
3. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
supports with anthropological facts tracing it since the time of primitive cultures in which various types of rituals and ceremonials were performed connected with changes of age of adolescent girls and boys. According to Hall the development of sex is normally perhaps the greatest stimuli to mental growth which co-ordinates with religion. In connection with atavistic ecstacy in exposure of the body of boys and girls, Hall cites such a proof that “in many primitive religions, it has been an act of worship what society deems shame, and many a youth and even maiden, from the Spartan days down, often elaborately ritualized conditioned, have stripped ‘ad majorem Deigloriam’, Gods see through all disguises and hence unclothing is a symbol of successfully challenging divine inspection”¹. In India this cult is in vogue still and a good number of monks keep their body unclothed without any sense of shame.

**Love and God**

Hall has equated the sanctity of Love with God and says that “in the most unitary of all acts, which is epitome and pleroma of life, we have the most intense of all affirmations of the will to live and realise that the only true God is love and the centre of life is worship”². This sort of view of love and God, he has expressed while discussing the development of adolescent love when an individual comes in touch with a woman under wedlock or when he falls in love with a woman. Under this situation, according to him, every part of mind and body participates in a true paragenesis. This sacrament is the enunciation hour with hosannas which the whole world reflects. Communion, he holds, is fusion and beatitude which opens to man, the ideal world. That religion and sex are in close psychological relation the world knows well. The rise of religiousness and the development of sex awareness takes place in adolescents in the same situation and the same period of the age. This is evident even in their abnormality and in the acute attunement of the adolescent soul to the former. One of the

primary reasons of effectiveness of Christianity is its theme of love. Hall says that “Christianity has exercised its salvatory and soteriological power in the world because it rescued love by developing it upon a higher plane and building a temple whose vice makes a sewer”. It is this upon which it rests. This is why Hall regards the Bible of his community as best of all ethnic Bibles, because it is so deeply based upon generic truth. The story of creation in the Western world as full of ancient and subtle symbols of divine generation, whatever historical validity the tale of Eden and the “fall” have, or may not have, it is a masterly allegory of the first stage in the decadence of love as held by Hall. He further stresses that God is our Father and heavenly Parent and the Gospel is through and through a literal deification of love as the chief thing in the world. Psychologically, religion and love rise and degenerate together¹. One test of an age, race or civilization is to keep these two as near as love and death to each other and as in wholesome relations. The only way of knowing God according to Hall is to love Him with all the heart, soul, mind and strength because He can only be known by love and not by arguments from design or sufficient reason and cause. God, Hall holds, is the most immanent of the things and that the higher monotheism is not altogether separable from the higher pantheism. One should always realise this point in order to know God.

The fact that love sensitises the soul to the influences of nature makes it a generic factor in the evaluation of art, literature and natural religion, and perhaps to some extent of science. Love and God are inseparable that Hall justifies by saying “Love is God and God is love”. Hall’s this view of God and love is quite similar to the concept of love held by Spinoza. The God-intoxicated Spinoza characterises the intellectual love of his pantheistic God, which simply nature knows, “sub specie itermitalis”, as giving freedom, salvation, blessedness, joy and immortality, and which can only be known by love. In the light of this view of God and Love, Hall stresses that “the supernatural religion, is, therefore, the

homologue of the idealization of the mistress in whom, despite her defeat, the lover sees the perfection". While explaining adolescent feelings towards nature, he states that of all the changes normal at adolescence none are more comprehensive, and perhaps none are more typical of the psychic transformation of this age than those that occur in the attitude towards the various aspects of nature which gives rise to religious feelings in adolescents. The domain of law in this period is limited and superstition flourishes. Anthropologically he points out that every aspect and thing in nature has somewhere and by some race been an object of perhaps supreme worship. The traces of these old idolatries are still found in the ooze of sentiment, in the depth of the soul, which like the sea-bed ooze, are not inorganic but the sedimentary products of extinct form of life. In the soul, too, these are not only residual but has a proteoplasmal promise and potency of a larger and fuller life for modern youth. Love and enthusiasm for nature, if it is ever to arise, is now in order and the open secret may seem ever slipping, but revelation, although slow, is sure, because it comes by growth and does not depend on the solutions of specific problems. The love of nature, how basal and conditioning is for all that is best in the soul of the youth, the world probably never will be able to realise. The creators of physical science and the greatest achievement of man in the world so far have first been passionate lover of nature and this has been their initial impulsion to think of natural aspects and its mysteries. Religion, according to Hall, has also sprung from nature and to a great extent thrives and languishes with love or difference to nature. Since the Aryans in India were very close to nature and used to worship natural objects, Max Muller has isolated some three thousand Aryan nature gods. Hall thus points out that "after profuse polytheistic deification of nature monotheism was aided by the idea of one all-covering vault of heaven which gave us a universe, and pantheism is but the culmination of religion of nature". This shows that

2. Ibid., p. 145.
3. Ibid, p. 146.
the earliest form of religion in India was polytheistic and monotheism was another form of later development. The rise of pantheism, thus it is revealed, is the product of a general belief in the earliest stages of human society in the natural phenomena and object as living beings. The monotheistic conception gradually developed as a production unification thereof. Hall traces out the naturalistic view of beliefs prevalent in ancient Rome too. His facts are based on the study of Edward Zeller. He points out the germ of the ancient Roman religion in the Latine Sabine veneration of invisible spiritual being in nature. The solitude and gloom of the forest, the gurgling of springs, the cracking and leaping of flames, sky phenomena and the scenes—all these suggested three classes of forces—heavenly, terrestrial and sub-terrestrial, which were poetically personified as good instead of scientifically interpreted. The transition from these conceptions to matured ethical religion, can nowhere be fully studied as among the Romans, the most superstitious of all civilized races whose fundamental characteristic was awe of the unknown forces and constraint before supernatural influences. It will not be irrelevant to suppose that three thousand Aryan nature gods and their worship by them, might have been the products of nature's bounty and various natural phenomena deified by the Aryans as was the case in ancient Rome. Similar outlook of the divine is also evident from the German idealistic philosophy of nature developed by Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel who were haunted by this old sense of the divinity of nature. There was a rich old feeling that nature was God's body and He its soul—and that it is all One great apocalypse.

Explaining the aim of religion and love, Hall says that religion at man's highest potence is union with God to which everything in religious life leads up to its goal. Love is the greatest thing in the world for both the religionist and the amorist. Both furnish in the sphere the strongest motive both to assert and to renounce the will to live. They are exalted and degraded together and the best work of each is to keep the other pure. Religion is at its best when its earthly image is most spotless and un tarnished, and love is at its best where religion is purest and most undefiled. This is the chief charac-
teristic of love and religion, according to Hall, that both religion and love should manifest. He further points out that this type of religion is indispensable to perfect love. This thought of relation between love and religion was the central theme in the mind of Jesus who held that true piety is earthly love transcendentalized. As regards the place of love in Christianity, Hall indicates that love is one of the very important aspects of religion in Christianity in which a higher interpretation of love has been given. It is the greatest power of soul fixed upon the greatest object, God and next to him man. Thus in Christianity love is transcendentalized which is meant for God and the next object apart from Him is man. This is love for humanity. Those both pray and serve best who love most. In Christianity, Hall holds that to the Christian God Himself is love and without the Pauline Charity of love, all is secondary brass and tinkling cymbals. The very end and essence of both moral and religious culture is to conceive and cultivate love in the purest, loftiest and most all-comprehending way, which Hall emphatically stresses and teaches for adolescents. Some similarities and covariants of religion and love best seen at adolescence are those that both suggest death and may not only risk, but court, fly to, despise, and triumph over it. True love and religion both make the soul highly sensitive to nature. The superiority of Christianity is that its corner-stone is love, and that it meets the needs of this most critical period of life as nothing else does. It is a synonym of maturity in altruism and a religion that neglects this corner-stone is not a helpful religion.

It is amply clear from the above discussion that Hall's concept of love in this context, is not the ordinary type of love. In fact, he means love of the mind and not of body, of ideas and not of the physical forms which culminates in the union of some higher object through religion. The object of divine love, according to him, is not sensuous, or transitory but spiritual and abiding.

Religion and Sex

Religious consciousness, according to Hall’s investigation, emerges in the age between twelve and twenty. It is spontaneous like the other interest in art, music or the love of nature. According to Hall, the development of the sex is normally, perhaps, the greatest of all stimuli to mental growth which he correlates with religion and points out that “sex is the most potent and magic open sesame to the deepest mysteries of life, death, religion and love”. Therefore, he holds that it is sin against youth to repress healthy thought of sex at the proper age and its repression leads the youth to unhealthy imagination and vile conceptions which undermine the strength of virtue. It is thus no accidental synchronism of unrelated events if the age of religion and that of sexual maturity coincide, any more than that senescence has its own type of religiosity. Nor religion is degraded by the recognition of the intimate relationship, save to those who either think vilely about sex or who lack insight into its real psychic nature and so fail to realise how indissoluble is the bond that God and nature have wrought between religion and love. In this respect Hall supports Plato’s view to be right. Plato held that love of the good, beautiful, and true is only love of sex transfigured and transcendentized, but the Gospel is better, he expresses, which makes sex love at the best the type and symbol of love of God and man. That religion and sex are in close psychological relation the world knows well. This is seen even in their abnormalities and in the acute attunement of the adolescent soul to the former.

This erotogenesis theory of religion, advanced by Hall, reveals the involvement of sex-instinct as correlate in the rise of religious consciousness manifesting in adolescents. In this connexion, Das Gupta points out that “sex-instinct cannot be regarded as the whole of religion or even major part of it; it may certainly be regarded a part of the instinctive foundation of religion. It shows itself more prominently in adolescent conversion and in the mental pathology of many of the mystics

which reveals its superfluity in intoxication of emotions". He supports the sex based explanation of the genesis of religion and points out that "the sentiment of religion is partly built on that aspect or function of mind that we call sex instinct". Das Gupta is of the opinion that "it is wrong to suppose that the association of sex-instinct with religion has any revolting or degrading effect", which is the main purpose of Hall’s explanation of sex and religion functioning as correlates in the rise of religion. The sex-instinct may underlie many of the highest expressions of human character which at its best is held as love and its worst is called sexuality. In associating sex with religion, Hall means that sex and religion are closely related and are helpful in attaining perfection in life and unity with God.

Function of Religion

In viewing the adolescent psychology of conversion, Hall points out that all are born twice—once as individuals and next as representatives of the species. The best measure of the state of civilization in a nation is the way in which it achieves its revolutions; when the true civilization is achieved they cease to be sudden and violent and become gradually transitory without abrupt change. The same is true of that individual crisis which physiology describes as adolescence, and of which theology formulates a spiritual aspect or potency called regeneration and conversion. True religion, Hall says, is normally the slowest because of the most comprehensive kind of growth and the entire ephebic decade is none too long and is well spent if altruism or love of all that is divine and human comes to assure supremacy over self before it is ended. Afterwards adolescence merges lower into the higher social self. This process of development is very complex, but a pivot is somehow discernible where the ego yields to the

2. Ibid, p. 262.
3. Ibid, p. 262.
altar. Ideally this evolution is normal and imperceptible, but the transition is in fact the chief antithesis in all the human cosmos. While it involves transformation in nearly every sphere of thought, conduct and sentiment it may occur in one field after another, and be so slow in each field as to occupy the longest and fullest lifetime and even then may remain incomplete. This change, in fact, says Hall, fills and gives unity to history, because Christianity marks the pivotal point in ethnic adolescence where self love merges in resignation and renunciation into love of man. About the function of religion in the course of this process, Hall points out emphatically that "Religion has no other function than to make this change complete and the whole morality may well be defined as life in the interest of race, for love of God and love of man are one and inseparable". Hall's this explanation of religion and its function is oriented towards humanistic form of religion which is amply evident when he emphasizes that love of man is actually love of God. Another chief function of morals and religion, Hall stresses, is to adjust the instinct.

As regards religious philosophy, Hall says that the religious life and growth might be almost said to consist in gradually transforming theological into psychological ideas. as Greek transcendence is gradually replaced by the original Hebrew immanence. He supports the view of Thiel that "the science of religion is not a natural but a mental science", which should be, according to him, interpreted and understood psychologically. Ever since, in some remote age, psychic changes become more important than physical for evolution of mankind, the life of the soul has been more than that of the body. Human life could not have been so meaningful if man would not have grasped the higher meaning of life to give it a psychical exegesis and to rise thereby to a loftier consciousness of the world. This is another function and effect of religion and religious attitude of man towards the world. None other than Schleiermacher, out of all modern religious thinkers has ever realised so adequately and urged that religion was the highest expression of man's subjective states and the best

hall mark of his legitimacy. Even theology to him was not constitutive but regulative and dogmas were ancient vestiges produced by vast activities of human instinct and feelings. Even Hegel, according to Hall, did not think the consciousness of freedom intellectually the sole criterion by which to measure all human progress, but the feeling of absolute dependence upon the power at the heart of the universe was for him the psychic principle that struggle in expression in all myths, ceremonies and doctrines that made not only the natural religion, but Christianity natural, and was the only possible basis of complete and world-wide religious unity. He did not care at all to prove the facts of religion but only the legitimacy of the psychic state they represented.

Thus theologies are forms of interpreting pious feelings and religion is not theology nor yet ethics, but personal and experiential. Its forms are to it as the world to God. The denial of objective truth of religious doctrine and history may bring religious feeling to purer expression. Hall describes that Hegel’s deep Moravian fervour impelled him beyond even Plato to worship the fathomless infinite with Spinoza and to suspect that the entire universe of consciousness might be a mere allegory. Therefore he stresses that all of us must follow only the most universal human interest and further points out that the different religions are only the one universal religion divested of its infinity, and all are one if regarded ‘sale specie aeternitatis’. Hall suggests that sex is a great psychic power which should be utilized for religion which would be inconceivably different thing without it, and the chief function of the latter in the world is to normalize the former.

Impact of Psychology on Modern Theology

Hall’s ‘Adolescence’ appeared in 1904, two years after James’ famous work ‘The Varieties of Religious Experience’ (1902), containing in detail ‘inter-alia’—a comprehensive study of

how ‘the notion of God’ and the moral sense develop among the young. Hall’s adoption of the theory of recapitulation—a theory according to which the individual in his early years repeats swiftly the evolutionary development of man as a species—proved to be a valuable theory and means as well of relating evolution, psychology and anthropology to the study of religion in a systematic manner. In the light of these processes Hall has explained religion as an effective mental phenomena in the growth of human personality.

Hall’s another important work dealing with religion—“Jesus the Christ in the Light of Psychology”—a unique contribution to the modern understanding of Jesus from the point of view of psychology of religion appeared in 1917. He has interpreted in detail the impact of Jesus Christ and his teachings on the religious outlook and in presenting them he has shown that the primary reason of spread of Christianity and its wide popularity was due to its psychological effect over the people who were prompted to follow Christianity and elevating Jesus to the position of divinity. Dean Mathew in his “The problem of Christ in the Twentieth Century”, has similarly attempted to show the influence of psychology on modern theology taking into account Hall’s interpretations.

Regarding the position of Jesus Christ in the realm of religion and his great impact on the masses, Hall has interpreted it, psychologically and points out that rather than spirituality, patristic metaphysics and higher unity the psychology of Jesus’s postulate of love and his preaching for humanity were the chief factors in influencing the masses who were afflicted and down-trodden. Other objects were secondary in his theme of preaching. In whatever sense Christ was divine, his humanistic approach was of primary importance and divinity was surplusage after humanity has been filled to the utmost. Jesus himself grew by degrees into full Messianic consciousness or as Scripture, as history shows, became the Bible by its own intrinsic merit. The truly superhuman factor is, in philosophic terms, the objectivization of what subjectivism cannot yet fall appropriate. Jesus made love the basal for true religion. He sought to fulfil and not to destroy and
the story of cross, psychologically considered is both provoc-
tive and regulative of the soul’s highest achievement and is
also the chief symbol of Christianity.

Hall, though was influenced by Freud, has viewed religion
from a different angle, quite different from that of psychoana-
lytic approach. Whereas Freud has viewed religion as a disease,
universal obsessional neurosis and psychological projection
of man’s own wishes on outer objects, Hall has regarded religion as
man’s highest achievement and means of unity with
the highest object. Freud suggests to get rid of religion but
Hall suggests that religions should form the basis of modern
education. According to him, even scriptural facts, though
being far from some of the facts, are to be taught to the youth
for enlarging his horizon of thought and ideas. Hall has
dealt in detail psychologically before the advancement of
psychology of religion as to how religious consciousness origi-
nates in adolescents. He has made a systematic study of origin
of religion basing his views on anthropological investigations.
His views in this respect are similar to those of Freud in which
Hall adopts the recapitulation theory about which mention
has been made. Hall seems to have been much influenced with
some of the Indian religious cults in which sex and love have
been considered very pious means of seeking union with God.
He has attached importance to the intellectual function of
religion also. He has faith in the existence of God, and as
such he is not an atheist. His conception of God is pantheis-
tic, transcendental and immanent as well. But his approach is
more philosophical and metaphysical and some of his ideas
about religion empirically cannot be studied. His approach
to religion is not purely metaphysical but it is humanistic also.
Hall’s approach to the study of the development of religious
phenomena in adolescents psychologically is of great impor-
tance. Religion in his view is a healthy phenomena and is
essential from the point of view of genetic psychology.
Psychoanalytical Approach to Religion Examined

BOTH reductions—psychological and sociological—mark religion as an intellectual instrument for the betterment of man and society. There is loss of individuality, community, and reality when religion is viewed as projection and alienation. Both, Marx and Freud have rebelled against religion because it deprives man of self-direction through alienation and projection even though their naturalistic deductionism prevented them from seeing the proper significance of human self-direction.

To view the problem of relationship of religion, man, culture and society in modern perspective is to regard it from the standpoint of the functional approach rather than religious, scriptural and theological view of the world, reality and various types of beliefs and practices as explained purely from traditional religious point of view. The fact is that the modern mind is readily more concerned with the processes, activities and functions of experience rather than with the entities which reflect the static and traditional forms and fixed structure. The happenings in experience are more amenable to reflective scrutiny because they radiate their energy, potency, or dynamism in the context of human experience more than
entities of a more substantial nature. Having fully understood the sphere of religion, culture and society functionals, by relating them to the individual, to the group and to the psycho-social techniques and situations that give rise to these functionings, one can more appropriately evaluate the social and cultural roots and genesis of religion as well as the spiritual and ideal aspects of the culture order and the religious quest of the individual. The truth about religion in the light of ‘scientific’ view of the world and the psychoanalytic approach to it, seems more accessible from the functional standpoint than from substantival point of view. The modern man is fascinated with this fact of inquiry into religious phenomena instead of static and traditional speculation and faith.

Having learnt to distrust religion in various cultural circumstances, the modern mind has gone one step ahead in developing a universal critique of religion in general, to the effect that religion is not an adequate force to mould the modern culture and society. Religion has been held by John Dewy either absolute in its solutions to the problems of rapidly growing culture, or it is infantile in its attitudes of wish-thinking and wish-believing, in solving the problems of real existence, according to Sigmund Freud; or as expressed by Karl Marx, it lacks the revolutionary zeal and the power necessary to bring about required cultural transformations. The question raised by these three systems is the omnicompetence of religion to effect a vital culture in which modern man can seek a meaningful life. Religion is denied in them, its traditional role of being a culture-building phenomena. Dewy’s naturalistic moralism denies it in favour of the specific sources of knowledge in the sciences. Freud’s naturalistic psychology denies it in favour of adult responses to the realities of existence under the enlightenment of psychoanalytic knowledge. Marx’s naturalistic sociology denies it in favour of humanistic and communistic solutions to man’s problems of alienation from existence. Their contention against religion is that even under the best possible conditions the relation between religion, culture and society must be terminated if mankind would achieve the stage of mature humanity, that
unless the religious life is terminated, man’s tendency and attitude of myth making, wish believing and life-denying and his susceptibility to superstition, credulity, and social delinquency will assert afresh and man will be hopelessly and utterly lost in secondary solutions to the problems of existence instead of understanding the root cause of human life and its meaning to the healthy growth and development.

To accept that religion is the product of man’s fears, hopes, anxieties and wishes as contended by Feuerbach and Freud, is to give intellectual assent to the misconception of religious phenomena as explained earlier. Ludwig Feuerbach had claimed earlier than Freud that man “projects his being into objectivity and according to him religion is merely the projection of one’s own wish-world, and the gods men worship are wish-beings. In this way Feuerback denies the distinction between religion as projection and religion as empirical fact. Freud’s projective theory of religion much in the same way identifies the religious experience with projection itself by replacing projection “of” with projection “upon”.

Thus it is evident from Freudian theory that by reducing religion to projection, Freud attaches no importance to factual empirical nature of religious experience. Thus religion proper no longer possesses its own authentic being in the residual core of inner experience of individuals because projection “of” is viewed by Freud as the primary mechanism in the formation of religious beliefs. The empirical nature of religious experience is totally denied because it is completely absorbed by defensive mechanism of projection of the ego. Faith is denied its conscious relation to the other and is viewed as purely psychological condition in the defensive behaviour of the ego. The relevant point in Freud’s choice is that between religion as projection and religion as reality¹, and in choosing the former he denies the residual, inner and empirical experience of religion as reality. From this point of view, one can no longer remain in the belief that religious experience is the immediate

certainty of the uncertain, that religion is the immediate assurance of power, of love, of healing, of salvation. It is this primary form of immediate experience, and its inner core of residual meaning which is the basic foundation of religious phenomena that Freud has rejected by equating it with the mechanism of projection. Because Freud regards religion as projection, it is not possible to form a distinctive religious stand in reality which is something objective, for religion is nothing more than the psychological product of defensive behaviour. The empirical component in religious experience, its distinctive and qualitative sentiment, is given the status of an illusion and a universal obsessive neurosis of mankind from which one can hardly be completely free.

In fact, projection is a theory about the ego which reveals how the wishes and desires of the ego operate. "It is twice removed from religious experience in that it is a theory about the ego and its mechanism of defence, a theory about its wishes and desires as they relate to religious experience. To miss this mediate characteristic, about projection is the error of most theories on the topic of the projective theory of religion".

Projection can be more appropriately characterized as one of the main mechanisms of the ego that reveal the formation of the ego in some stage of its operation than the formation of religious belief. Therefore projective religion is a term of a theory about religion, according to William Horosz, that it is merely a way of explaining the religious phenomena from the psycho-analytic standpoint. Because of the fact that it is only a secularized construct of religious experience, which is a primary form of immediate reality, it belongs specifically to a realm of analysing religious phenomena from a different angle. Thus it is basically only a theory of communication about religion. The projective activity is a form of transcendent meaning or mediate knowledge, and does not, in fact, inhibit the inner core of religious experience. Freud's psychoanalytic approach substitutes the projections of the ego for religious

experience itself: it thus equates projection "of" with projection "upon"².

Actually projection does not indicate anything about the formation of religious belief; it is rather expressive of religious affirmations. It has no power to give rise to any religious experience, because it is one standpoint of explaining religion from psychoanalytic approach. In his "Psychopathology of Everyday Life", Freud has viewed religion as "nothing" other than psychological processes projected into outer world"°.

According to this point of view expounded by Freud, in his defensive behaviour, the individual, in projecting his fears, hopes, wishes and anxieties onto the outer world, is going through the process of doing something with the religious experience, but the process itself is secondary and not the primary creative moment of religious experience. Freud explains here, in fact, what one does with religious experience and how one does it, not what it is in its immediate creativity. Freud's explanation deals with the expression of religious experience rather than with what it is.

To assert that Freud's view is functional and dynamic, that he has no interest in the static structures of religious affirmations, but only in the formation of these, belief is not altogether incorrect. No pure functionalism can survive inspection of any activity as an activity of "something". Religious projection is a mediate form of activity about another activity rooted in the creative moment of the immediate form of religious experience. The basic psychological processes or wishes do not fulfil the requirements of the inner core of religious experience; they are the secondary constructs and not the primary data. Projection is what one does with empirical facts; it is the psychoanalytic way of communicating religious affirmations. The projective world is subjectivized realm of personal interpretations. Project might be regarded as a synonym for interpretation. It is merely interpretation,

and not the empirical fact of religion. Though projective explanation of religion lifts out for emphasis, the symbolic or mythological nature of all religious beliefs, it neglects to treat as important the truth and reality which these symbols indicate. That would be relating to illusion with reality, which Freud’s method prevents him from doing. This is a fact that the truth of religious experience cannot be viewed as literal or scientific, only meanings are attributed to the referents of these symbols which are totally different from the meanings which Freud attributes to religious experience through his symbolism. Religious symbols are symbols of something other than literal facts and scientific facts. These might be called symbols referring to the fact-world of man. If religious beliefs contain this something else, Horosz stresses that they cannot be reduced to “pure forms of wish projections”¹. He further argues that if the religious statements are not literally true of the nature of things, it does not follow that they are not expressive of the nature of religious reality.

Leopold Bellak points out that in Freud’s writings, there are two basic meanings of project, namely, projection as a defence mechanism of the ego, and projection as an epistemological issue having to do with perception². According to him, projection is the name for one of the defensive mechanisms of the ego; it means the “process of ascribing one’s own drives, feelings and sentiments to other people or to the outside world as a defensive process that person one to be unaware of these ‘undesirable’ phenomena in oneself”³. The term projection in the psychological field emerged in the study of psychosis and neurosis as early as 1894. The second meaning of projection, according to Bellak, assumes that “memories of percepts influence perception of contemporary stimuli”⁴, and this process has been renamed by Bellak as

3. Ibid., p. 8.
appreceptive distortion”. Bellak has reserved the term “projection” for the greatest degree of appreceptive distortion of which the opposite pole is hypothetically objective perception. In the case of true projection, we are dealing not only with an ascription of feelings, sentiments which remain unconscious, in the service of defence, but which are unacceptable to the ego and are therefore ascribed to the objects of the outside world\(^1\).

The meaning of projection is a very important concept for projective psychology. But the matter of religion is primarily tied to the first meaning of projection as a defensive manoeuvre of the ego. The question, in fact, is Freud’s definition of religion as a defensive process against anxiety. Freud has pointed out in his “The Future of an Illusion” (1927) that “religion is the product of human needs and desires”\(^2\). The religious affirmations transmitted by culture to the individual, consist of certain dogmas, ideas, assertions. Religious ideas are primarily “illusions, fulfilments of the oldest, strongest, and most insistent wishes of mankind; the secret of their strength is the strength of these wishes”\(^3\). Thus, according to the Freudian theory, religious experience is the resultant of human wishes and desires and having asserted that religious beliefs are mere “illusion”, Freud does not think it appropriate to relate illusion with any objective reality because it is capable neither of proof nor disproof. An illusion is far from truth and reality, as it is on the side of wishes and desires alone, with no objective reference in religious experience itself. Horosz commenting on the projective view of religion propounded by Freud asserts that these wishes and desires which Freud thinks are primary data of, are secondary constructs and belong to the side of “discourse” and communication of religion\(^4\). He further points out that the world of wish-fulfilment is already a highly subjectivized construct, an interpretation of man’s bio-social structure. Freud has specified these constructs to make them elemental wishes determi-

2. Freud (Sigmund): The Future of an Illusion, 1930, p. 34.
native of religious experience. They involve to a high degree psychoanalytic distortion\(^1\). Regarding the question of how these elemental Freudian wishes, if projected on the outside world, give rise to the formation of religious beliefs has been viewed from a behaviourist perspective by Edwin Holt as a dynamic process a “course of action which some mechanism of the body is set to carry out”\(^2\). The wish dictating religious beliefs, according to Holt, is located exclusively in the ego’s mechanism of projection. The motive forces of these wishes come from behind which are not of a forward intention. That is, the wish is the ego’s plan of action with reference to outer reality. In the case of projective religion, it is a defensive action. In Freudian writings, it is noticeable that the ego itself is a construct with many projective functions. Therefore, projection is neither the form nor the content of religion. Religion, according to Holt, is man’s way of protecting himself against reality. When man succeeds in this defensive action, he lives not in the realm of reality, but in the world of his own making—his own wish-world”. The Freudian wishes are secondary constructs; they are reactive experiences of the ego to religious experience, or away from it. They involve a high degree of distortion in reaching to these religious experiences\(^3\). While viewing adult religion, David Trueblood has refuted the Freudian wish. He points out that religious convictions are “frequently at variance with wishes”. Religious affirmations are seldom, perhaps never flattering to the ego. It might be argued that the Freudian wishes are very flexible and that these “unwanted encounters” in life, these varying wishes express another wish still, one associated with masochistic personality traits\(^4\). This type of conception has been expounded by Erich Fromm in connection with huma-

nistic perspective of religion about which a mention has been made earlier.

Although this type of character trait is a prominent one in psychoanalytic literature, it is not sufficient to disprove the fact of religious experience that more often than not religious affirmations are at variance with human wishes and desires. The desire for unwanted wishes is not the normal pattern of religious behaviour; it is the trait of a sick mind, a deviation from the norm. The fact that religious assertions are often at variance with human wishes and desires would indicate, if viewed carefully, that projections are a formative source in the formation and development of religious beliefs, but merely the psychoanalytic way of assigning projective meanings and pattern to be given the core of inner religious experience. The reason of Freud’s positivistic attack on religion was a trend of the atmospheric current of his age in the Western world. His problem in analysing religious world as the realm of wish-fulfilment is “methogenic” in nature rather than “emperio- genic”. While disagreeing with this view, Allport asserts that by reducing religious experience to projective experience, which in its turn is repetition of early childhood experience: familism, dependence, authority, wishful thinking, and magical practice, one cannot have a responsible attitude towards religion as a whole, because, as he points out “to feel oneself meaningfully lined to the whole of Being is not possible before puberty. This fact helps explain the onesided emphasis we encounter in many psychological discussions of religion”\(^1\). The psychoanalytic method cannot be fully helpful in understanding the religious stand in experience, of a wholly committed self, and all that goes with it. By denying the autonomy and distinctive quality of empirical religious experience the psychoanalytic approach to religion leaves itself no substance to work on.

If in the context of projective religion, it is conceived that the world is not as it is, but as a wish-world, the question arises as to in what sense the concept of responsibility relates to projection, and as to what relationship is there between

---

wish projections and responsibility. In Freudian theory there is no responsibility with reference to God as reality because all our human notions of God are projections, and there is no other symbol for the culmination of these projections. But man cannot live by projection alone. The world of projection is the pure world of symbolism with no objective reference to reality. Theologians and religionists assert that symbols point to a reality beyond themselves; the case is not so in Freud. Therefore in projective view of religion one is absolved of the responsibility to the divine.

The deity, to the projective view, is merely the objectification by one’s wishes and desires, and as such one is absolved of responsibility to God. A determinist framework prevents the person from showing an attitude to responsibility. So long as one does not pose the assumption of freedom, it is of no meaning to speak of genuine responsibility, because behaviour becomes merely a habitual way of handling conflicts of anxiety by the intuitionalized ego. No one can help himself in this respect as it is the expression of one’s need. This view of religion gives rise to an attitude of irresponsibility towards the self as well. The defensive behaviour of the ego prevents it from functioning as a mature, free and responsible self.

Allport points out similar deficiency in the projective theory of religion, namely, that in locating religion “exclusively in the defensive function of the ego”, rather than in the spiritual core of self-hood, the psychoanalytic view deprives man of the “forward intention” needed to relate himself to reality. The self’s functioning is absolved of responsibility and decision making considerations in the process of ficti- sizing and wishful thinking. “Hence the developed personality will not fabricate his religion out of some emotional fragment but will seek a theory of Being in which all fragments are meaningfully ordered.”

“Through projective religion modern man absolves himself of responsibility to the eternal, from responsibility to himself, and also from responsibility to the given nature of all primary

2. Ibid, p. 94.
religious assertions. Thus in reducing religious affirmations to projection and identifying the two, the empirical nature of given religious experiences is fully overlooked. Empirically projective theory expounded by Freud in the framework of psychoanalytic view, emanates an irresponsible attitude. If projection is basically the world of symbolism, devoid of objective reality and truth, then it is no longer possible to make empirical claims for religious experience. From this standpoint, religious experience is an "illusion" rooted solely in one's personal desires and wishes. A similar reduction of the religious phenomena by the psycho-sociological approach was performed by Karl Marx also. So long as Marx is receptive to the projective theory of religion, the above criticism of Freud is equally applicable to Marx. One is more likely to see the implications and consequences of the projective technique when it is fused with the highly charged symbolic notion of alienation.

According to the Freudian psychoanalytic view, society is founded on the complicity in the common criminal deed, while religion develops from the ensuring feeling of guilt and subsequent remorse. "Morality, likewise, while founded partly on the exigencies of social life, is also based on the necessity of expiating common sense of guilt". Thus, the beginning of religion and ethics, society and art, are said to meet in the Oedipus complex in accordance with Freud's theory of religion. But this fact relating to the origin of religion is not correct in the case of many other religions excepting the Western society which Freud has studied. Many researches reference to which has been made earlier reveal that the Oedipus complex is not common to all societies.

Freud himself thought a great deal of his contribution to the psychology of religion, which is amply evident from the application of his psychoanalytic method and theory to the study of religion. But we have to evaluate his views in the light of his infantile vicissitudes of life and current climate and atmosphere of his time and prevalent philosophical language. Freud's biographical sketches about the infantile fatalities of

1. Freud (Sigmund): *Totem and Taboo*, 1927, p. 276,
the founder of psychoanalysis on the basis of personal references made in the "Traumdeutung" and "The Psychopathology of Everyday Life" have been amply confirmed by the contents of "Freud's letters to Fliss".

It is amply evident from the study of infantile events of Freud's life that he was motivated by his Oedipus tendencies which were deeply repressed in him. Throughout his life he sought to revive, relive and reconstruct them by way of mastering them. Strongly motivated by the hate of the father, Freud lived to see that the projected father-image of his infancy, that is God, was denied and overcome. This unconscious motivation of Freud's has produced many important characteristics in his psychoanalytic concepts of religion. First, this made the field of religion very narrow. His view is confined to that of religion in which God could be conceived in terms of father-image. This is why he has considered totem-worship to be the earliest form of religion and monotheism to be the latest form of religion. Even with regard to monotheism, Freud has confined his views to Semitic Monotheism only which has decidedly narrowed his validity of the analysis of religion which is very wide and varied. Freud has completely ignored the importance of Jainism, Buddhism and Shankarite Vedantism which are highly developed forms of religion. The apparent reason appears to be that he was ignorant about them. Moreover, the theme of religion brought forth in Freud the constellation of his infantile conflict with his parents so forcefully that he could never overcome it. Consequently, Freud could not study religious phenomena with scientific disinterestedness. Also he could not accomplish the task of analysing religious persons in order to understand their unconscious drives and urge. He has simply developed his psychoanalytic theories to fit the requirement of his view of analysing religion based on his inner necessities, which has resulted in simply developing and piling up hypotheses one after the other. Therefore, Freud's psychoanalytic account seems to be based on guess work rather than on empirical facts. Freud has made use of Darwin's hypothesis, according to which primitive people used to live in small hordes with parricide as their recurrent theme.
From this hypothetical theme, of recurrent parricide, Freud deduced that totem worship must have been the earliest form of religion without any sound anthropological proof of it. Moreover, Freud has asserted that all the living religions have evolved out of totem religion and in this context he holds that monotheism is found only in those races in whom the loved or admired hero is killed by a group of their own people. From this point of view, his conclusion seems to be unwarranted because he completely ignored Indian theism, from the time of the worship of Varuna to the prevailing Bhakti-cult. Moreover, there are several phases of religion apart from monotheism about which Freud’s psychoanalytic approach has little to say. According to Freudian theory, it is reducible that the Judaic monotheism could maintain fast hold on the Jewish masses because its founder Moses was killed by the same people whom he had brought out from the thraldom of Egypt into a promised land of political, economic and spiritual freedom. Thus Freud’s psychoanalytic explanation from the beginning to the end is based on universified hypotheses and conjectures, as such it can hardly lay claim to scientific coerciveness. Hence Freud’s open declaration of presenting a scientific view of religion, has, in fact, degenerated into a metaphysical explanation.

Freud has called religion an illusion on the basis of some insistent and persistent wishes in its construction. In view of this, Freud’s opposition to monotheism is less than an illusion because it was also determined by Freud’s repressed Oedipal tendencies. Hence, Freud’s criticism of religion is neither scientific nor empirical, rather it is metaphysical. Freud says, ‘an illusion need not be false’; only its meaning lies in finding out the wish which prompts it. As such Freud’s antitheistic metaphysics need not be false. Freud has called religion an obsessiona universal neurosis of mankind. This means that people are obsessed of religion and this is why religion persists despite its being far from an objective truth. But there can be no identity between obsessiona neurosis and religion because religion is a social

phenomena and obsessional neurosis is a private affair. This point of difference has been accepted by Theodore Reik, Sandor Ferenczi and Freud himself. Many exponents of religion have viewed neurosis as a secular alternative to religion by presenting religion as obsessional neurosis which is a private pattern of belief and ritual used by unhappy individuals in their attempt to counter personal failure and isolation. In extreme cases, this private system has been identified by others as a neurosis. Some of them have noted the thin line that separates a moving religious experience from a neurotic illness. William James has developed this point in the context of the sick souls in his classic work. Freud, of course, tended to identify all religion as an expression of neurotic trends. Erich Fromm adds that neurosis can be seen as a private form of religion—an attempt to struggle with the isolation and powerlessness that overwhelms anyone. If reality is too painful to bear, one can redefine it with the schizophrenia, stand in opposition to it, with paranoiac or alternate run past it and hide from it with the manic-depression. That each of these responses has its religious equivalent can easily be seen. A.T. Boisen in his detailed study of seriously disturbed patients, has observed the similarities between their efforts to struggle with their pains and religious behaviour. He has pointed out that many great leaders had emotional disturbances yet they were not neurotic persons. According to Boisen, the correct contrast is not between the pathological and the normal in religious experience but between spiritual defeat and spiritual victory. But Boisen has not indicated the conditions under which one may hope for visions instead of illusions and delusions of a disturbed person. Those interested in the psychology of religion may discover the social, cultural and personality factors that incline one towards a religious effort in dealing with his anxieties rather than towards a neurotic effort. Now, which alternative is the better one comes up as a relevant issue to decide. Freud was willing to grant that in most cases religion was better than

neurosis, because it was a shared illusion. The religious person as he deals with others, finds his way to some part of reality which to Freud was the basic goal. The neurotic is an isolated person because the most painful and difficult part of every neurosis is the overwhelming sense of isolation.

According to Jung, neurosis often results from a direct refusal or inability to find the right direction for our religious instincts. The religious instinct represents itself as a drive for significant relation of personal self to the “numenonsum”. If this instinct is frustrated or repressed, one falls ill just as surely as one does when other basic instincts are obstructed. For Jung, neurosis is the suffering of a human being who has not yet discovered what life means for him. Jung described the human soul as the capacity of relationship to God. Failure to develop that capacity means loss of soul, in the sense that the meaning goes out of life, making one lose one’s centre.

Jung used his own vocabulary interchangeably with traditional religious terms. He himself has stressed, however, that he confined himself to the examination of what is empirically observable in human psyche. Thus god-images are clusters of emotion—laden symbols that operate within the psyche as unifying centres of psychic life. Inherent in these is the self- psyche—the principle of ‘Orientation and meaning’. Jung pointed out that God is not the self and cannot be reduced to the self- archetype, but we can study the psychic efforts of belief in God by means of such terms. As regards his personal conviction, he said emphatically, “I do not believe; I know”. In this archetypal world our personal religious symbols increasingly appear as clues to collective human experience, suggesting a personal coming to terms with human problems that contribute to collective value systems, ritualized worship and all the other primary materials of religion. Jung held that religion is not a substitute for life but rather the symbolic expression of the process of integrating the self into life in relation to the unconscious. For this we must pay close attention, says Jung, to what our individual unconscious experience says to us through dreams, god-images, and even neurotic systems.

The religious person, in accordance with Jung’s perspec-
tive, is one who has immediate experience of the “numinous”, an awe-inspiring confrontation with a “dynamic agency or effect” over which the subject will exert no control. The person thereafter pays close attention to his powerful dimensions to otherness that has taken hold of him and places confidence in its meaning for his life. Jung contrasts the immediacy of such personal experience of the numinous with the more remote allegiance to a religious creed. Creeds may serve as valuable protection against the searching nature of the experience by channelling its effects into the conventional religious tradition. Too often, however, and for too many, Jung holds that creeds serve as substitutes for authentic religious experiences. In describing the psycho-dynamics of such a numinous event, Jung has made use of his own terminology for traditional religious terms. According to Jung, in religious experience, the ego, the centre of unconsciousness, is gripped by the autonomous manifestation of the self, the centre of the whole psyche, conscious and unconscious. Consciousness is invaded by the contents rising from the deepest layer of the unconscious—the collective unconscious or objective psyche. These contents are archetypes, primordial images that arrange behavioural and emotional reaction of the people of different cultures and historical periods into patterns and motifs that operate in certain typical and thus predictable ways. The archetype for the self, for instance, makes itself felt to the ego in the form of powerful “god-images”.

Jung viewed the function of his psychology for religion as a means to help persons see direct connexions between their own personal experiences and the archetypal symbols contained in religious tradition. The forgoing of these connexions is crucial for psychic hygiene. Much of the anxiety, restlessness, destructiveness of the twentieth century men, Jung stresses, results from the fact that their psychic energy no longer flows into religious symbols that can give them a picture of their place in the universe. Instead, traditional symbols are for many people obscure anachronisms that no longer command any quickening of spirit. Jung was first to understand that psychoanalysis belonged to the sphere of religion, more accurately, to the
dissolution of religion in our time. To him neurosis was a symptom of the man who loses his support in religion. But he was deterred from professing atheism openly as Freud did. He was also deterred from professing a religion by the insight that all of us had been thrown into such a deep crisis of religions that there was no longer a word in the language which had not become ambiguous. In his "Psychology and Religion" his attitude was speculative, not professing. He held that "there may still be men who have or who believe they have the support of religion; in the case of the others, among whom he seemed to reckon himself, the situation is different; they must pay a price for it if they abandon themselves to illusion. The consequence of the loss of support, the loss of the centre, is neurosis". Thus, it may be said that while Freud was discovering and building up psychoanalysis, Jung's was the illusion that it was a medical task, the task of a physician which could be founded on scientific truth. Once Jung had discovered the religious core, he could no longer keep up this illusion, but he needed to preserve it outwardly in order not to be misunderstood.

Freudian approach to religion which is the primary part of his research reveals that his research methods belong to the category of case studies. The weakness of the case study method lies in the lack of objective evidence. Its strength lies in the ability of a detailed analysis of all possible variables which may escape the experimentalists and statisticians. The clinical observation conducted by Freud was explicitly "participant observation", but there is hardly an observation quite free from some sort of interaction between the observer and the observed. A certain part of Freud's empirical data was derived from a meticulous introspective technique, and the most unconscious phenomena were rather inferred than observed. Though there have been several efforts to experimentally prove or disprove psychoanalytic propositions but success could not be achieved partially because of the coarseness of the experimental method and partially because of the wide diversity of psychoanalytic concepts and inappropriate application of Freud's terminology. But most of the studies have offered significant support to Freud's empirical findings and empiri-
cally validating data. Certainly, the unconscious processes which are not accessible to direct observation have been most difficult to assess experimentally. Moreover, empirical generalisations do not go beyond facts. Scientific system cannot be built up by empirical generalisations, for such a purely empirical system is not possible even in physical science. Empirical generalisations concern observable facts only. A considerable part of psychoanalytic theory is presented in the form of scientific models, and as such psychoanalytic study of religion contains significant truth within its purview which cannot be altogether ignored. But the whole of Freudian philosophy, according to Jacques Martin, rests upon the prejudice of a radical denial of spirituality and freedom. Established in the illusion and deception of a false nominalist consciousness of the self, he made great use of moralism and spiritualism but emptied of their content.

Another school of psychoanalytic thought is represented by the revisionists known as Neo-Freudian. The most prominent of them is Erich Fromm. He has viewed religion in different ways. Though to a great extent he agrees with Freud's criticism of theistic religions, he still favours ethico-religious practices of Buddhism and Spinozism. Fromm argues that in religion which he takes upon himself as a cause, "God is the image of man's higher self, a symbol of what man potentially is or ought to become". Thus the problem of religion, in Fromm's view, is not the problem of God but the problem of man. It is the unique nature of man's religious experience which he has delineated and assessed in his humanistic approach to religion. His psychoanalytic approach is humanistic psychoanalysis. Other forms and phases of religion are not of any great importance to him. Fromm's concept of religion and its implications are ethical and social rather than traditional or empirical.

While delineating the meaning of the concept "alienation" in the light of Marxian view in the context of humanistic psychoanalysis, Fromm gives a new interpretation to the

difference between monotheism and polytheism, giving them a meaning from an altogether new angle quite different from those given by Tylor, Frazer and Lang. He has drawn a similarity between the terms "alienation" and "idolatory", and says that the prophets of monotheism did not denounce heathen religions and the idolatrous primarily because they worshipped several gods instead of one. "The essential difference between monotheism and polytheism is not one of the number of gods, but lies in the fact of self-alienation". He further explains the genesis of both these forms of religion and points out that "Man spends his energy, his artistic capacities on building an idol, and then he worships the idol, which is nothing but the result of his own human effort. His life forces have flown into a thing and this thing, having become an idol, is not experienced as the result of his own productive effort, but as something apart from himself. Over and against him, which he worships and to which he submits". Thus according to him, idolatrous man bows down to the work of his own hands. The idol represents, Fromm says, his own life force in an alienated form. The reason of it is that "the principle of monotheism, in contrast, is that man is infinite, that there is no partial quality in him which can be hypothetized into the whole. God, in monotheistic concept, is unrecognizable and undefinable; God is not a thing". If man is created in the likeness of God, he is created as the bearer of infinite qualities. In idolatrous man bows down and submits to the projection of one partial quality of himself. He does not experience himself as the centre from which living acts of love and reason radiate. Through the process of regression and projection, Fromm explains how religious phenomena arise, and says that "monotheistic religions themselves have, to a large extent, repressed into idolatary. Man projects his power of love and reason unto God; he does not feel in them any of his own powers and then prays to God to give him back some of what he, man, has

projected into God”\(^1\). This view of monotheistic concept of religion advanced by Fromm is blended partially with Freudian projective concept and Marxian view which is largely similar to that of anthropomorphic view of God explained from a different point of view. This explanation does not satisfy the noetic quest which is one of the several basal reasons of the genesis of the idea of God and religious phenomena. This is also not so appealing and scientifically well supported as are the rationalistic views of Tylor and Lang who have traced the genesis of ideas of polytheism and contemporary monotheism based on their anthropological discoveries. Moreover, Fromm’s explanation does not contain any role of reverence, awe and numinous experience which are considered basal in the belief of God.

One of the central themes of the psychoanalytic interpretation of religion centres round the sense of guilt. This “original sin” of man, Freud believes, has arisen from the repressed parricide of the primeval father of the primitive horde. He holds, “The totem religion had issued from the sense of guilt of the sons as an attempt to palliate this feeling and to conciliate the injured father through subsequent obedience”\(^2\). Freud, in the Biblical fashion, describes the fall of man as an historical event—the first patricide—and this gave sin and anxiety, a definite historical origin. Even those who believe that the “original sin” is no better a guide to the nature of man than any other can find support in Freud’s gloomy doubts about man’s capacity for progress.

But Fromm holds a different view of the sin. According to him, sin is socially derived, and so far as psychoanalysis is a philosophic view of a man and a body of speculative insights that can be turned on every area of culture, it is gloomy, stoic and essentially tragic. Its basic recognition is the radical imperfectibility of man, a concept it derives not from the Christian Fall, but from the Darwinian Descent. Rank and Hall have taken a different view of the sense of guilt and its origin. Though from a different angle, both of them have

taken it to have originated from sex. Fromm stresses that sin is socially derived and history is ultimately redeemable through human effort. Freud has condemned ritualism, which, according to him, aims at symbolic gratification of the sense of guilt.

Freud has viewed man basically from the point of view of biological product with little importance of the cultural and social points of view which are in no way less important in his development even in religious matters. Therefore, Freud does not have any pious view about man who is imperfect and by nature not unique. As the culminant of an evolutionary process, man could still view with smug satisfaction and claim that God or Nature had shown a persistent wisdom in its effort to produce a final perfect product. But it remained for Freud to present the image of man as the unfinished product of nature struggling against unreason, impelled by driving inner vicissitudes and urges that had to be contained if man were to live in society, hosts alike to seeds of madness and majesty, never fully free from an infancy anything but innocent. According to him man at his best and man at his worst is subject to a common set of explanations; that good and evil grow from a common process. Freud has held instinct so strong that it overwhelms both reason and conscience. Freud's is Hobbesian both in conception of man and its notion of the function of society. There are present in all, Freud says, destructive and therefore anti-social and anti-cultural tendencies. But the Neo-Freudians see man as fundamentally good, innocent and unfallen. To Fromm, who is the most manifest Rousseauean, natural man is born free and good, only to be enslaved and corrupted by an evil society. Freud finds the evil drive in man's biological nature, i.e. the tendency to aggression is innate, independent and instinctual disposition in man. But Fromm sees man with different eyes and finds man's aggressive anti-social tendencies to be the result of social pressures, particularly social frustration and insecurity. The locus of evil and irrationality is thus, not in man but in the society. Fromm envisages man in his perfection and looks to the perfect, that is to say, rational society to release its perfection in man. Fromm's man is essentially untouched by the dreadful dis-
order of human sinfulness; Freud's man is an imperfectly tamed beast desperately trying to domesticate himself. Freud does not allow us to see ourselves as blameless, innocent creatures victimized by history, society or culture, whereas Fromm holds that our troubles come to us from outside, from the evil society. Freud's teaching reinforces the Jewish-Christian conviction of the dubiousness of all human virtue and the ambiguity of all human achievements. Fromm repeats the Enlightenment Themes of the essential innocence of man, the wickedness of existing society, and man's unlimited faculty to establish the Kingdom of God on earth without God. Freud has also left God out of his calculations but at least he did not pretend to do God's work for him. Both Fromm and Freud are rationalists and naturalists—Freud a biologicist naturalist and Fromm largely of a culturalistic variety. Even in his view of society, Freud permits a strong element of rationalism to creep in, specially when he deals with religion. To him religion is, of course, an "illusion", but an illusion that somehow does not meet with the same kind of tolerant understanding that it extends to most other forms of human self-deception.

Freud presented two interlocking pronouncements on religion which correlate religious phenomenon to the psychological development of the child. In his "Future of an Illusion" he has made his famous pronouncement and points out that the belief in an all-powerful Father God originates in infant's helplessness. This infantile powerlessness arouses in the child the need to cling to the human father for protection and love. The physical necessities and other basic needs and guidance regarding code of conduct and behavior in society provided by the father make the anxious child look upon his father as all-powerful and all-knowing. But on his attainment of maturity, the child realizes that human father falls far short of his infantile image. Besides this, the child also finds that happiness he searches for in life is not a permanent possibility in view of his body which is most likely to decay, and his often strained relationship with others. Freud holds that this situation leads mankind to conceive of a magnified father in heaven. This father and the belief soon surrounding
him allay the anxiety about his existence by assuring fulfilment in the heavens. Thus, man is reconciled to life by this illusion of the non-human father of religion which arises from his original feeling of powerlessness as a child.

Freud's other pronouncement links religion to the psychic experience of childhood. The Oedipus complex explained in his "Totem and Taboo", and of which mention has already been made above, lays down that the desire for possessing the mother and killing the father is repressed and its psychic energy is released in other activities. Freud holds that this complex, in fact, might reflect a historic event accounting for the rise of culture and its first religious form, totemism. But this complex is not considered as a universal phenomena in the genesis of other religions. Erich Fromm has viewed Oedipus complex from a different standpoint. For Fromm, Oedipus complex is the central phenomena of psychology and the nucleus of all neurosis, but it is not a nasty sexual attraction to one parent and a murderous rivalry with the other, but merely a normal and healthy struggle against parental authority in the quest for freedom and independence.

**Psychoanalytic Arguments Against God's Existence**

Freud has shown that religion is an illusion because wish-fulfilment is a prominent factor in its motivation. The fact is that this could be additionally delusive of it could be shown that God, the object of religious worship, does not exist in reality. This Freud attempts to show by means of empirical philosophy.

In ordinary course, things are said to be real when they are verifiable in principle with sense-testimonies and other methods or by instruments. But this objectivity test cannot be applied to religion because God is not a sensible entity. Therefore God is said to be real as known through revelation and intuition. But Freud stresses the verifiability theory in ascertaining the meaningfulness of a discourse. The scientific "Weltanschauung", according to him, "asserts that there is no other source of knowledge of the universe, but the intel-

lectual manipulation of carefully verified observations, in fact, what is called research, and no knowledge can be obtained from revelation, intuition or inspiration."

"Religion succeeds only by substituting the real world by a wish-world". As such, according to Freud, God is not real but simply a dereistic product.

Again, had there been a real God, cognitively meaningful statements about Him must have been made, which could be either confirmed or disconfirmed. But we find that God's existence cannot be proved. Also God's existence cannot be disproved either. Hence any meaningful statement about the existence of God cannot be made. Freud holds that "of the reality value of most of the religious doctrines, we cannot judge; just as they cannot be proved, neither can they be refuted". Religious doctrines concerning God are illusory, and therefore, or in the current language, one can only say that they can be stated in emotive language alone.

Freud refutes another kind of modern proof for the existence of God, that is the argument from religious experience. In view of this argument, religious truth is only "inwardly felt", and as such does not require any further reason to confirm it. Freud calls it an evasive attempt because there can be no appeal beyond this. On this score, several renowned religious exponents such as Rudolf Otto and Henri Bergson have claimed special faculty of divination and they consider its findings so clear, luminous and transparent that they do not stand in need of any further proof.

Regarding the mystic experience, James points out that "His (mystic's) insight into the 'what' of life leads to results so immediately and intimately rational that the 'why' and the 'how', and the 'whence' of it are questions that lose all

2. ibid., p. 343.
3. Hospers (J.): An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, 1918, p. 322.
4. Flew and McIntyre: New Essays in Philosophical Theology, 1945, Symposia IV and V.
urgency"\(^1\). Freud holds this claim to be in favour "of quite a few", by excluding reason which all men possess, as unreasonable. James has held religious beliefs as helpful hypotheses. They are likely to be true, but above all they pertain to meliorism. They may be considered as useful fiction. Adler has also stressed the usefulness of the illusory situation about which a mention has already been made. Freud's argument against this proof of James, is very smashing. He states that human beings demand far greater guarantee than that of "useful fiction" or "the right will to believe" in smaller matters. Why should they remain satisfied with far less guarantee in the matter of their most important interests\(^2\)? Freud further points out that "Ignorance is ignorance; no right to believe anything is derived from it"\(^3\).

The criticism of James's pragmatic approach by George Santayana is worth mentioning here in support of Freud's views. He stresses that "To be boosted by an illusion is not to live better than to live in harmony with the truth; it is not nearly so safe, not nearly so sweet, and not nearly so fruitful. These refusals to part with a decayed illusion are really an infection to the mind. Believe certainly; we cannot help believing; but believe rationally holding what seems certain for certain; what seems probable; what seems desirable for desirable, and what seems false for false"\(^4\). This means that religious phenomena, even if they are meaningful and purposeful, and even if belief in God is some sort of strength and consolation experienced by individuals universally, is in Santayana's view an illusion, and so devoid of truth.

As regards the problem of "evil and truth", if we take into account the explanations advanced by Freud and Fromm, mention of which has been made earlier, theists have not been successful in explaining rationally and scientifically the root cause of this problem. Taking advantage of this discomfiture of the theists, Freud points out that in the face of natural

3. Ibid., p. 56.
calamities and miseries one cannot argue in favour of the existence of the [Benevolent Providence. Secondly, virtue is never rewarded and wickedness is not punished. "Dark, unfeeling and unloving powers determine human destiny; the system of rewards and punishments, which according to religion governs the world, seems to have no existence"1.

Therefore Freud concludes that psychologically considered religious doctrines are illusions and it is sufficient for him to recognize them as such2. Thus, this is philosophical argument against religion in the light of psychoanalytic background of religious phenomena.

In a general view, religion is regarded in classical psychoanalytic theory as a symbolic repetition of the early childhood experience and thus as a cultural analogy of the individual phenomenon on which the theory is based. Its, "mysterium tremendum et fascinans" pointed out by Rudolf Otto, "mystery that makes one tremble; and yet entrances" is founded on prolonged infancy and universal helplessness of the human child. The inevitable separation from symbiotic union with the mother results in the primitive terror of abandonment, and the human being, with his capacity for symbolization, reveals the world of disembodied or incarnate presences from infancy to protect himself from feeling alone in the universe. These presences retain their uncanny, awesome, and entrancing power to the extent that their sources in early childhood experiences remain unconscious and, therefore, alien from the expectable flow of life3. However, religion "escapes the course of isolation", as pointed out by Freud, by its derivation from social context, its celebration of group identity and its offer of socially sanctioned contacts with the irrational specific forms of religious expression are related to the experience of the child in a given family and culture. Freud's recognition of the profound similarity between obsessional symptoms and religious rituals, initiated the psychoanalytic investigation of religion. The religion of the preliterate peoples in his view

made explicit and reflected in sharp relief the unconscious fantasies and dynamic processes that gave rise to mental disorders and character problems in his own culture. Several features of these religions are illuminated by psychoanalytic discoveries.

Eastern Religions

Psychoanalytic exponents of religion have devoted little attention to these religions, despite sometimes startling availability of underlying fantasies. An ancient and a modern oriental religion have received most intensive scrutiny.

The Great Mother Religions

In general, the elevation of spirits and demons to the status of gods and goddesses is accomplished through the elevation of the level of object representation from a part object to the whole object figure. The disorganised welter of numerous types of spirits yields to the more structured family of deities or pantheon. In ancient times Orient generally had polytheistic religions organised around a central triad of deities, representing father, mother and son. Some of the most widespread and influential ones represent the figure of the father receded into the background, or may have never even emerged at all. In these religions, the son became the mother’s lover and an accessory figure, or in fact was treated as little more than her phallic appendage. The “Mother of Gods” under various names together with her lover-son eventually spread beyond Asia Minor and Mesopotamia through the Roman Empire and, by a process of syncretism and assimilation with mother deities of other people came to be worshipped as the universal mother.²

The Oedipal nature of this religion is of course made explicit in the dual son-lover status of her consort and in his punishment, castration. But these themes are elaborated in rather unique manners. Although nothing is known about

bringing up of children in the religion of such cultures, yet the factors relating to the hypothesis form a coherent and clinically identifiable father requiring further investigation psychoanalytically.

Hinduism

This highly complex religion derives its power from all aspects of psyche and contains the most animistic-magical and the most spiritualized element side by side. Spirits, demons and deities are pervasive and variable, and all these and the ghosts of the recently deceased possess the priests who have contact with the other world. This possession and devotional fervour of the illiterate and poor people directly reflect the sensual-sexual underpinnings of religious experience identified by psychoanalytic observation. These underlying desires receive overt behavioural expression in the secret cults where the highest act of worship is communal sexual intercourse believed to take place indiscriminately. The “higher” version of Hindu religion conceals what the “lower” reveals. The highest goals of life are to become one with the spirit of the universe, to lose one’s consciousness of self and to attain release from the chain of rebirth. These aims have as their counterpart in individual development the wish to experience symbiotic unity with the mother for ever and to lose consciousness of one’s separate self. In this state one loses all illusory desires, for the fundamental desire has been achieved. The Hindu psyche is thus pre-eminently narcissistic. One must refrain from emotional development with other people and to Hindu men and women, viewed as seductive, demanding and destructive, are the chief threat to self-absorption. The austerities, mortifications and mechanical narrowing of attention upon thoughts of union, as practised in “Yoga”, one negates desire and involvement in “Maya”, the world of senses, that is, of illusion. The Hindu ego-ideal is personified as the important God-Shiva, who is often symbolized in art as

an erect phallus projecting out of the female genital organ. This representation of Shiva suggests that which a "Yogi" wishes to attain. Psychoanalytically the themes of such a religious expression is of great importance to unveil the underlying motives. But no psychoanalyst has advanced any detailed and clear-cut picture of this type of religious cult from psychological viewpoint as some of the Western religions have been studied psychoanalytically.

As regards the Western religions, psychoanalytic explanations on classical Greek and Roman religions have been largely limited to the interpretation of myth and literature. But the historical development of monotheistic religions that have come to dominate the Western thought originating in the ancient Orient has attracted strong interest of psychoanalytic thinkers due to their providing cultural backdrop of psychoanalysis itself. But no mention of great Mother religions in psychoanalytic literature regarding their genesis, psychological and spiritual background, the concept of Oedipal theory can be generalized. Therefore Freud's concept of God of religion appears to be based on his pseudo-historical narrative relating to those factors, in the development of the individual which rendered him susceptible to belief in theistic God. Psychoanalytic theories of religion in a form in which it can be taken most seriously, in fact, relates more appropriately to an account of the role played by individual development, rather than cultural evolution in the formation of religious belief.

The above are the critical views of psychoanalytic approach to religion examined. Besides some views of psychoanalytic approach established on examination mentioned in this chapter, it seems relevant to view the place of psychoanalytic outlook in the realm of the study of religion—without which its consideration will not be complete.

Place of Psychoanalysis in Religion

Art, science and religion—all are the products of evolution of human experience, in which are comprised the subject and the object, the psychical and the extra-psychical processes. Invariably, both these factors are always found inseparably mixed together in every piece of knowledge. But the true
knowledge is the scientific knowledge which is not attained when its subject is fully dehumanised and is free from one's personal and subjective influence. Therefore, science is regarded as disinterested knowledge of such data as have been obtained in most impersonal way. But the standpoint of religion is at the other end of this extreme position. In order to have religious experience, the worshipper makes himself psychologically prepared for it and makes effort to perceive what he desires to perceive. Religious experience is best understood, according to Martin Buber, when it is expressed in I-Thou relationship. Therefore, religion is most inward, most subjective and largely psychically induced. In order to understand this religious experience, we are to accept readily what psychology has to offer about it and its inner source.

It is now widely agreed that psychology, whether defined as science or not, is not concerned with the uniqueness of any particular religion, nor yet with the validity of any particular set of beliefs, although one can hardly avoid reaching the conclusion that some religions convey a higher degree of reality than others.

Psychology is concerned with the reaction of human psyche, its responses, collective and individual to that Reality, which, in whatever way it be described and experienced, is at one and the same time the source of all religious experience as well as that ultimate satisfaction for which the human soul craves, whether this craving be described as an aspiration for the Divine, a reorientation of personality and purpose, the urge to individuation or the quest for some form of mystical union. The one fundamental assumption in contemporary psychologies of religion, is that there are psychological motivations and responses which are common to all known forms of religions, be it primitive, highly advanced or historical, and it is these motivations and their related phenomena that psychology has to deal with and analyse faithfully. Since religion begins in experience, it is this fact that makes it an appropriate subject matter for psychological study. Psychoanalysis is a psychology of drives and impulses and is regarded simply as a

special branch of psychology. It sees human behaviour as conditioned and defined by emotional drives, which it interprets as an outflow of certain physiologically rooted impulses themselves not subject to immediate observation. What psychoanalysis is concerned with is experience, and the investigation of its influence on emotional development is its primary purpose. It is also concerned with the investigation of the influence of the individual's life situation on his emotional development. It tries to investigate the unconscious factors underlying any mental phenomenon. It endeavours to show the repressed, infantile complexes which underlie religious experiences. Its emphasis on unceasing powerlessness of man, from the cradle to death and on the parental imido by way of protection and fulfilment of his desires against the unknown calamities which life may bring forth is an important contribution in understanding religious experience.

But this fact can never be denied that there is hardly any experience whether in science or in art or anywhere in which unconscious motivation is not involved. Without some repressed urethral erotism, nobody would be motivated or interested in tunnel and bridge-engineering¹. The unconscious motivations behind the artistic production and homosexuality of Leonardo Da Vinci, were the repressed love of the mother which determined the fate. Theodore Reik has emphatically hinted on this point regarding Freud himself. He states, "We would thus presuppose that Freud who was a genius at psychological observation, must have been subjected to emotional conflicts of such a nature that they made psychological interest not only possible but also necessary"². Thus Freud himself was motivated to pursue the psychoanalytical studies due to his repressed love of the mother and hate towards the father.

It will be evident from the above facts that the mere presence of repressed complex in a psychological phenomenon is not enough to render it abnormal or morbid. For Freud

himself has made it clear. Reik points out in this context that "the function of psychoanalysis lies in analysing religious experience with a view to describing the unconscious motivation which lies at its roots". This type of psychoanalytic knowledge will help a great deal to control, predict and guide the religious development of individuals and also negatively help us in avoiding neurotic forms of religion. Freud himself has pointed out—"As a sincere psychoanalysis is characterised by the methods with which it works, not with the subject matter with which it deals. The method can be applied without violating their essential nature to the history of civilization, to the science of religion. Psychoanalysis aims at and achieves nothing more than discovering of the unconscious in mental life". The reason of this is very plain. Religious phenomena are very complex and full and a full appreciation of them is possible only when we make an exhaustive survey of all the elements which constitute them. But quite contrary to his own observation, Freud has endeavoured to depreciate religion by calling it "delusion", "illusion", "patently infantile", and "mass obsession", whereas he should have only analysed and discovered the unconscious factors involved in religious phenomena, he has even additionally assumed the role of a theologian and a philosopher in as much as he evaluated religion in terms of infantilism, illusoriness, etc.

It has already been pointed out that in every experience psychical and non-psychical factors are always involved. As such for a correct appreciation both these factors are to be included. In such a case religion also has its effective emotional and subjective states. Similarly, unconscious motivation as its driving forces is also involved in it. But this point one should not forget while viewing religion that it is a factor and not the factor in religion. In every experience effective and unconscious elements are always involved as has already been indicated earlier and their presence cannot render an

experience illusory. Moreover, Bertrand Russell and R.H. Thouless emphatically point out that “effective grounds can always be found for any opinion”. Therefore, Freud’s evaluation of religion seems to be unauthorized and also one-sided. In so far as the applicability of the scientific concepts of psychoanalysis in describing religious experience exhaustively and completely, is concerned, various claims have been made against Freud’s attitude of “psychoanalytic totalitarianism” to religion. First, it has been held that an experience can be called illusory-verdical only when it is a sophisticated rational experience. This category has no application to a non-rational experience. Rudolf Otto has contended in his famous book “The Idea of the Holy” that religious experience is unique and “sui generis” and is not reducible to any secular, ordinary and sophisticated experience. This should be regarded as numinous experience. Its essence lies in “mysterium tremendum et fascinans” which is wholly non-rational. The significant point about Otto’s contention is that his analysis is easily borne out in relation to every kind of religious or lower or higher, Eastern or Western, Semitic or Vedic. Further, it is held in the current theological realm that “mystery” is in itself a valid category of experience which can legitimately be applied to religious experience. The mystery like archetypal symbols can never be completely understood. Therefore a God understood and made intelligible is no God at all. Paul Tillich stresses that “the God of religion remains a hidden God and He remains all the more mysterious to the worshippers who have the most favoured vision of Him”. Though this contention has been supported by a wealth of details, it is not expected of every psychoanalyst that he should familiarise himself with the current theological categories. Freud has analysed the experience of “uncanny” but he has not treated it as a religious category for explaining the numinous experience. The above point has been raised with this intention that one should confine oneself to one’s own sphere only. But, in fact, the numinousness or religious experience

is not without unconscious motivation but the attempt made by Freud at showing this as desirable. But from this standpoint it is not appropriate on his part as psychoanalyst either to elevate or to lay claim to the logical assessment of religious entities. In a typical monotheistic experience, the worshipper is explicitly aware of a transcending Being in relation to whom he is overawed, fascinated, elated, subdued. Freud is concerned with this alone. As long as there is an object of worship before the worshipper, its authenticity will be determined by its own philosophical and theological criteria rather than by the unconscious urges that lead the worshipper in its presence. In this context against the psychoanalytic standpoint of unconscious motivation of explanation of religious experience, it has been argued at the instance of the scientific discovery which is motivated and sustained by some unconscious repressed impulses of which objectivity and value are determined by its appropriate science. For example, Einstein must have been motivated by some repressed impulses, but his theory of relativity has to be evaluated by standard of mathematical physics instead in terms of psychoanalytic findings. Indeed “it is true, it is very difficult to establish the objective existence of God, even with the help of philosophical standard”. It will be relevant to state in support of psychoanalytic view, the point of view of Leuba who insists that the only kind of God logically thinkable is an Absolute who never does anything, but merely always does everything. He argues to show that “inner experience cannot be regarded in any sense as evidence of the existence of God”. To make inner experience the only source of religious knowledge, “would amount to making religion surrender to psychological science”. And by a surrender to psychological science, he means a surrender of all transcendental reference. But Pratt has argued against this view of Lauba and states that “if the psychologist can explain all the facts of religious consciousness by scientific laws then there is no psychological

1. Flew (Antony) and MacIntyre (Alasdair), eds: New Essays in Philosophical Theology, 1955, p. 165.
proof of God’s presence and existence and influence in our life. To be sure, psychology is still a long way from any such universal explanation, and it seems likely enough that no such complete explanation may ever be attained.”

However, this task is to be reserved for the philosopher and cannot be taken by the psychoanalysts. This point has been supported by Ernest Jones. According to him, all that psychoanalysis has established is that a great deal of subjective element enters into religious experience and that the parental relation in one’s infancy is enough to produce a delusional experience of God, but the objectivity of God’s existence cannot be determined by psychoanalysis. He states, “Men must believe in the existence of God for purely internal reasons, reasons which would be operative whether He existed or not are not the same as asserting that therefore God exists. The question is not one for any scientific specialist . . . as such, but for the philosophic thinker, if any one”.

Therefore, psychoanalysis cannot aim at anything metaphysical or transcendent and it is not appropriate on the part of Freud to have declared religion as “illusory”, “patently infantile” etc. As to why Freud has done so despite his known limitations is evident from his own statement—“. . . . people unfortunately are seldom partial where they are concerned with the ultimate things, the great problems of science and life. My belief is that everyone is under the sway of preferences deeply rooted within, in the hands of which he unwittingly plays as he pursues his speculation”.

Thus in his denunciation of God and religion, it may be said that Freud was not actuated by any scientific motive. Rather he has simply played unwittingly under the sway of the repressed hate of the father which forced him to go beyond the purview of psychoanalysis.

However, the psychoanalytic approach to the study of religion is in no way less important, specially Freud’s views on religion. Psychoanalytic theory of religion is important for

several reasons. First, it attempts to spell out in any detail the psychological mechanism involved in religion. Although Swanson in supporting the Durkheimian theory shows by statistical survey that there is a considerable correlation between features of the structure of a society and certain features of its theology, neither he nor any other protagonist of this viewpoint has done so far anything to indicate what psychological processes effect the transition between one's awareness of the structure of one's society and one's readiness to accept a certain theology. Second, this theory is a live issue at present; there are specialists, as has already been mentioned, who are working to develop and extend it, and so long as psychoanalytic theory continues to develop, this explanation of religious belief will have considerable growth potential. Third, though, it is a fact that no theory which proceeds in terms of one sort of factor can possibly be a complete explanation of religious phenomena, it can be said emphatically that Freudian theory is in possession of a large segment of the complete explanation of psychological interpretations of religious belief.

Conclusion

THE theories and concepts of religion covered in the preceding chapters are representative of numerous attempts made to unveil the mystery of the phenomenon of religion as viewed from the different standpoints taken up for study in this thesis. Each of these theories can be criticised as one-sided, but this by itself is not a condemning criticism. The interpretation of each exponent, by focussing on one aspect of religion, has broadened our perspective of religiosity. Its interpreters have revealed that religion is not confined to any single aspect of man and his universe, rather it has its social, economic, noetic and psychological elements as well as its functional, experiential and rational aspects. Taken together, these factors illustrate the depth and multiplicity of the religious phenomena.

Basically, all religions of the world, whether primitive, ancient or contemporary, are intimately concerned with man’s place in nature and his quest for a meaningful existence. This quest for a meaningful existence takes varied forms and approaches. But while some of the religions have claimed to have attained an absolute answer to this quest, developments even in these systems manifest an increasing search for something more. “If religion is a result of this quest for
which there is no certain answer, theories of religion, if they are to reflect the mystery of religion, cannot become abso-
lute". However, all religions are hypotheses trying to explain certain basic facts in the every-day existence and conflict of man, though unfortunately their significance in this context was obliterated by an overwhelming mass of speculations subserving vested interests of one class or another. They are highly anthropocentric and try to interpret the natural and human phenomena by creating a personal God or Deity or other similar forces. Naturally they abound in artifacts, unverifiably as they go far beyond reasonable inferences. But the main theme of this study is psychoanalytically oriented views of religion and its genesis as interpreted by the expo-
ners of the related schools of psychoanalysis. Therefore, an elaborate attempt has been made to view religion and its genesis in the light of psychoanalytic discoveries which reveal the deepest activities of the human mind beyond the thresh-
hold of its conscious state. Though like other theories of religion and various approaches to its study, psychoanalysis is also one-sided in interpreting religious phenomenon, it has given us an ontology. But for the imaginative profundity of man's inner life—without our debt to psychoanalytic explo-
rations of dreams, myths, symbols and religion—the systematic study of religion can never be complete. Specially from this point of view, the interpretations of the Freudians and the related schools of thought are a unique contribution to our understanding of religion in which the deepest layer of human mental activity is unveiled to deduce the core of relig-
ion and its genesis. Since no other system of thought in modern times, except the great religions themselves has been adopted by so many thinkers as a systematic interpretation of human behaviour, to those who have no other belief, psy-
choanalytic theory in general, and Freudianism in particular serve as a philosophy of life.

In the light of psychoanalytic theories and other approa-
ches discussed in the opening part of this book, the following generalizations may be made about the genesis of religion and

people's universal belief in the existence of some supernatural personal beings:—

(1) Man possesses a natural tendency to personify things in his environment. This tendency seems to have come down from the primitive stages of civilization which has been anthropologically held on the basis of the theory of recapitulation in which human beings recapitulate what man used to think of natural objects in the ancient past when they were living in primitive societies. Ontogeny and Phylogeny testify to this process. Freud's application of the ontogenetic and phylogenetic relationship led him to show that there is relationship between certain mental stages of fixation leading to the arrests in the process of development of the individual and possible arrests in the development of the race. Jung's view of the recapitulatory theory is connected with his theory of racial inheritance. He held that the individual not only inherits racial experience and racial modes of reaction, he also inherits in his collective unconsciousness the ancestral man's interpretation of his experience. The theory, that the phylogenetic development of the species is repeated at a vastly increased tempo in the ontogenetic development of the individual, was also employed by G. Stanley Hall in formulating his theory of psychological recapitulation. Thus this tendency persists even today when man's knowledge is so advanced.

(2) The belief that the course of events is controlled by one or several personal beings which can, by appropriate devices, be persuaded to direct it in a way favourable to man, serves to alleviate man's fear of the dangers in his surroundings. On account of this belief numerous types of gods and goddesses were speculated to exist and control everything in the universe. In order to propitiate such forces magic in the primitive society and rituals and several types of worships in the later periods were adopted by men so that no harm is done to them.

(3) Fear, awe, wonder and helplessness of the people amidst the natural objects responsible for natural calamities, and for want of sufficient knowledge thereof, are the root causes of genesis of religion. And these factors have been
universally recognised in order to give rise to the belief in some supernatural forces. Thus the emergence of religion owes its origin to this type of belief.

(4) These beliefs are a survival from the earliest human endeavours to explain the natural phenomena in the form of some being.

(5) Among the other important factors leading to the belief of some supernatural personal being, are the theological view of the world and the moral order of the universe. Though in accordance with the science of psychoanalysis, basically no moral order governs the world/universe, teleologically it is believed that there is some plan behind the universe and the world is purposive, keeping in view the conducive effect of nature for the welfare of men and their society. This world view leads people to believe in some personal being having intelligence. This is a strong cause of the emergence of religious phenomena.

(6) Noetic and speculative faculties of the human mind and the quest for understanding and delineating the mystery of nature gave rise to several types of religion. Polytheism though based on diversity in natural phenomena, pantheism and dualism are the products of intellectual and speculative quest of human mind. More elaborate attempts made by the modern exponents during the last hundred and fifty years may be generalized as follows:

(a) Ludwig Feuerbach’s “The Essence of Christianity” has long been recognised as a provocative interpretation of religious belief. He has held that religion is a projection of human imagination and an expression of the human need. He claimed that man “projects his being into objectivity”, that religion is merely the projection of one’s wish world and the gods men worship are wish beings. Thus Feuerbach denies the distinction between religion as projection and religion as an empirical fact. Therefore, religion is purely psychological construct without any objective reality.

(b) The socio-philosophic concept of alienation is Marx’s main instrument for effecting a sociological reduction of the religious phenomena. According to Marxian theory, religion is one of the ideological reflections of the current state of
economic inter-relations in a society, and all religious affirmations are projections of sociological conditions. In the Marxian view these projections are the product of man's theoretical intellect and reflect his imagination more than reality. This view of the Marxian projective, however, supports the view that noetic and speculative factors are also effective in religious constructs. Religion is both a projected reflection of civil society and a compensation for its miseries. Because it reflects the immediate and sentimental relation of man to nature and history, it is likely to maintain itself, so long as men share these attitudes. It will continue to manifest itself in the form as long as men view their transcendent fictions as external forces, once they are mistakenly objectified by man. But as soon as they give up objectifying their own mental productions as primary causes having transcendental sense, religion, then, they die a natural death, because there will remain nothing to reflect and project.

(c) The concept of Durkheim is similar but his theory is a more extensively developed one. According to him, religious belief represents a projection into another realm of the actual structure of society.

(d) The Freudian theory explains that belief in gods arises from projections which are designed to alleviate certain kinds of unconscious conflicts. According to Freud, religion is nothing but the psychological processes projected into the outer world, and by projecting his fears, hopes, wishes and anxieties into the outer world, man creates religion as a means for his consolation which is wish-fulfilment and childish fantasy. Freud's view that religion is a mass universal neurosis of mankind is evident from the fact that an overwhelming majority of people believe in religion despite scientific advancement which, as it were, puts aside scriptural and biblical truth about religion. Since religion is also a social phenomena, psychoanalytically it is also evident that it persists as an obsession on account of social anachronism.

(e) Exposition of Freud's interpretation of religion rests on two main contentions, i.e. (i) Every theistic religion simply repeats on its own level of culture the fundamentals of a totem religion; (ii) The totem religion itself dates back to the murder
of the primal father for the sake of the incestuous love towards
the mother. All theistic religions have emerged from the
phylogenetic Oedipan tendency in man according to Freud.
But everywhere totem religion has failed to evolve into mono-
theism which arises only in those races where their beloved
leader is killed by his own followers.

This is how religious experience arises and leads to the
belief in some supernatural being as creator of the world,
which is God.

The critique of conscience as the ground of morality is,
perhaps, the most notable contribution of psychoanalysis to
ethics. This critique is not simply a matter of tracing the
development of moral sense to the introjection of parental
standards. To discard conscience because of its origin is to be
guilty of the errant genetic fallacy. Freud, of course, criticises
conventional morality—and even more, conventional moraliza-
tion,—as futile and dishonest. For moraliser relies heavily on
repression, anxiety, guilt and the magic of word, rather than
on mature moral insight and conviction. The prevailing moral
code is largely a tyranny tempered by hypocrisy. In fact,
Freud offers, for philosophical consideration, a perspective in
which morality is seen to be no less complex than the moral
agent himself.

Positive Approach of Psychoanalysis to Religion

Freud was hostile to religion, but much of what he took for
religion was sham and deserved his hostility. Above all he
hated sham. He had nothing but contempt for those who were
trying to win favour for religion by presenting it under false
colour so as to deprive it of its “scandal” and challenge.
Freud himself has pointed out that religion has made the socia-
lization of instincts possible. It is a way out of one’s infantile
sexual entanglement. That religion has helped the education
of instincts has been accepted by Freud and Freudians. Flugel
considers this to be a great achievement of religion.

Freud has also conceded that monotheism has helped man,
specially the Jews who most tenaciously held to it, in intel-
lectual growth and ethical purity. This point has been elabo-
rately expounded by Leonard R. Sillman. Monotheism, according to him, has helped the exaltation of the reality-principle, the development of intellectual faculties and scientific curiosity. In this way religion has helped the sublimation of instincts and the unimpeded flow of energy.

Sillman has further expressed "Thus it (monotheism) equipped its adherents with a more highly developed reality-ego and super-ego, enabling them (believers) to survive and/or dominate peoples with religions that did less to encourage the development of man's higher faculties".

From religion have emerged all kinds of arts, poetry, literature, aesthetics and even science. It has given energy and courage to great prophets of the world. In fact, Freud does not maintain that religion causes intellectual retardation, rather, he himself has set a higher value to his contributions to the psychology of religion.

It cannot be maintained that Freud's analysis of religion is wrong. The utmost one can say is that it is not scientific psychoanalysis, because it is based everywhere upon unproven hypotheses. Nevertheless, the account may turn out to be true. At the most it is a suggestion that monotheism in practice, specially in the West is deeply neurotic. Jones regards Freud's Moses Theory "as a brilliant example of his imaginative intuition". And, in fact, it is. In itself such an intuition is not objectionable, but it has to be verified by the successive generations of psychoanalysts. Thus, Freud has left a legacy for future analysts.

This fact cannot be ignored that religion has both its healthy and neurotic aspects. Freud has primarily chosen the neurotic aspect of religion. A religion based on ritual alone is more neurotic than a non-neurotic form of it. Erich Fromm in his "Psychoanalysis and Religion", tells us that Freud taught explicitly to follow the ideals of brotherly love, truth and freedom. He criticised the theistic form of religion, because according to him, it does not allow full development

2. Ibid., p. 129.
of individual worshippers, and, inspite of itself, encourages mutual hate and contempt. As no man can live without an object of devotion so man cannot live without a religion. Fromm points out: "The question is not religion or not but which kind of religion, whether it is one furthering man’s development, the unfolding of his specifically human powers or one paralysing them".

In this sense Freud was also deeply religious; only his religion does not look to the traditional line. Fromm points out that Freud taught the religion of humanism. He did not talk of bettering human lot so much as he taught about the upholding of the latent powers lying dormant in man.

Freud had faith in the spiritual destiny of man where he could be inwardly free and would be guided by the lamp of truth which can be reached by reason uninhibited by passions. Thus Freud had a religion and metaphysics. At many places in his works, he did write like logical positivists whose great ally he is, but never regarded the problem of God as a pseudoproblem. Freud, therefore, had a positive religion of self culture or spiritual unfoldment which Buddhism, Vedantism and some other Oriental forms of religion have preached. In fact, it is this spiritual heritage which Freud enriched and encouraged. The ultimate aim of psychoanalysis, Freud pointed out, is the primacy of reality principle and education of reality. He negated religion in toto. His denunciation of religion is confined to monotheism and mostly to those features which are neurotic. His religion of reason remains firm.

Jung has given a far greater scope to the term ‘religion’ than Freud did. He believes religion can be equated with the processes of the psyche and as such provides a total existential and balanced orientation for man. Religion as a reflection of the psychic process is a therapeutic and essential aspect of life. Jung has reduced religion to a psychic phenomena, but in doing so, he sees some of the meaning and depth of the myths and symbols. This amply reveals one to perceive primitive systems, not as childish, but as meaningful ways of providing orientation to the relevant questions of life. Similarly other exponents

1. Fromm (Erich): *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, 1939, p. 34.
of psychoanalytic schools while criticising the dark sides of religion have seen also some meaning in religion.

Psychological Efficacy of Religion

After making a thorough survey of human activities down the ages, the renowned historian Arnold Toynbee came to the conclusion that religion occupies the centre and holds the key to the mystery of existence\(^1\). If this is so, then application of psychoanalysis to the study of religion turns out to be of great importance for all those interested in religion from psychological standpoint. Freud himself thought a great deal of his contribution to the psychology of religion. Jung was greatly lulled by the "mystical" side or religion and discovered that majority of his patients above thirty showed the religious tendency. Erich Fromm has made an attempt to explain religion in general, and Christianity in particular from the point of view of their psychological utility. Freud regarded religion as a mass illusion, but has also conceded certain points in its support as pointed out by Reik, who states—"In the discussion Freud has conceded that there are useful illusions, which advanced civilization, he granted that in the past religion has been valuable as a force for education and progress, but he believed that now it had become a break upon the progress of civilization and must be cast aside"\(^2\).

The primary role of religion lies in socializing and moralizing the crude instinctual nature of man. The earliest period of the human civilization shows that in the natural state man lived in constant threat and dread of his neighbours due to their attack on one another. This crude state of nature "in the tooth and claw" was humanised and civilized by religion. The totem religion being the earliest form of theistic religion with its two prohibitions of not killing the father and not marrying the members of the same totem laid down the foundations of society, morality, code of conduct and religion which society can neither flourish nor sustain itself for a long time.

The religious conception of the vigilance of God over those escaping from the violation of the moral principles in actual life and award of punishment by the Divine afterwards, has helped the development of an interlized moral faculty in man. It has been made clear that culture and civilization are based on sublimated instincts and sublimation is based on the sacrifice of sexual desires. Religion plays very effective role in it which can be illustrated with reference to Mosaic Monotheism.

According to the psychoanalytic hypothesis of primeval horde, man has phylogenetically to evince the hate of the father, and love for the mother. This would have left him involved in his familial conflicts. But Pfister holds that "God as father has been man's greatest help in his fight against the father as God". Similarly Flugel points out that child's feelings to the family environment are crude and primitive and yet so powerful and persistent that any means of displacement is essential and for this service above all other religions in the past was an effective means.²

The effect of religion on the renunciation of the instinctual gratification is evident from the fact and process in child's securing his sense of narcissistic security by gaining love and protection of his parents. This parental authority is projected and displaced on the greater controller and determiner of his destiny called God. Therefore, the believers have to seek the pleasure of God in feeling secured in their continued helplessness in relation to the natural calamities and social disharmonies. Since God stands for the physical parents of one's infancy, the believers have to renounce their parricidal and incestuous impulses for obtaining his help and protection. Freud points out in this context that the more a believer succeeds in renouncing his instincts the more he feels rewarded by the love of God. The ego feels uplifted and proud of its renunciation"³.

The need of renunciation at the command of the projected and deified super-ego called Jahve helped the Jews in attaining a high stage of ethical perfection. Jahve demands a life of mercy and piety which the later prophets have proclaimed. Freud points out that "... even the exhortation to believe in God seems to recede in comparison with seriousness of these ethical demands".¹

The ethical perfection among the Jews was symbolised by the rite of circumcision, which Freud has psychoanalytically explained thus—"Circumcision is the symbolical substitute of castration, a punishment which the primeval father dealt to his sons long ago out of the fulness of his power, and whosoever occupied this symbol showed by doing that he was ready to submit to the father's will, although it was at the cost of a painful sacrifice"². The more the Jews submitted themselves to the will of God the greater was their instinctual renunciation and ethical perfection. Their God also became a Righteous Being and borrowing greatness from Him the Jews called themselves the "Chosen People" of Jahve and this high calling prepared them for a still higher morality. From these considerations special advantages from Mosaic Monotheism were made possible for the Jews. They were protected against magic, mysticism and were encouraged for spiritual development³.

Again the worship of an invisible God without any "graven image" helped in promoting the capacity for abstraction which resulted in subordinating sense perception to an abstract idea. Thus this was a kind of triumph of spirituality. This was further aided by the fact that the Jahve was a paternal and not a maternal deity. This means that maternity is known through the sense, but paternity is known through inference⁴.

Culture and civilization demand maximum sacrifice of instincual aim of man. Thus man gets psychological relief by resorting to religion. Reality is too painful and culture ins-

1. Freud (Sign und): Mose and Monotheism, 1951, pp. 187-188.
2. Ibid., p. 192.
3. Ibid., pp. 138, 178, 180, 186.
stead of bringing relief to man has increased his burden. As such man seeks relief and satisfaction "when realistic and permanent pleasure cannot be obtained, man for ever seeks ephemeral pleasure. He will hug the illusions of religion as something more precious than reality". Religion has thus saved mankind from individual neurosis. Jung sees, in attempt to impose traditional morals and traditional religion on the soul of man, a basic source of neurotic conflict. Freud states that "Even they who do not regret the disappearance of religious illusions from the civilized world of today will admit that so long as they were in force they offered those who were bound by them the most powerful protection against the danger of neurosis".

Vulnerability of Religion

Whereas religion has been an effectual means of the welfare of the individual and the society, in certain respects, it has certain disadvantages too.

It has been held in various specific cultural situations of the present that religion is not an adequate moulder of the modern mind and culture. John Dewey holds that religion is obsolete in its solutions to the problems of a rapidly developing culture. Freud denounces it because it is infantile in its attitudes of wish-thinking and wish-believing in solving the problems of real existence. Karl Marx points out that it lacks the revolutionary zeal and the power to bring about essential cultural transformations. What has been questioned is the omnicompetence of religion to effect a vital culture in which a modern man can seek a meaningful life; religion is denied its traditional role of being a culture-building agency. Freud's naturalistic psychology denies it in favour of more adult responses to the realities of existence under the enlightenment of psychoanalytic knowledge. Marx's naturalistic sociology denies it in favour of a humanistic and communistic approach to man's problems of alienation from existence.

1. Reik (Theodore): From Thirty Years with Freud, 1940, p. 119.
Conclusion

charge against religion is that even under the best possible conditions the relation between religion and modern culture must be terminated if mankind would achieve the stage of mature humanity. So long as the relationship is not terminated, man's tendency of myth making, wishful thinking and believing, life denying and his susceptibility to superstition, credulity, and social inadequacy will assert themselves afresh and man will be hopelessly lost in secondary solutions to the real problems of existence.

Freud would not have been seriously concerned with religion, had it been simply an innocent construction. But Freud strongly believed that its further continuance was a serious threat to human progress. He said that "The consolations of religion are unworthy of man's critical beliefs and the religious belief in a moral governor of the universe is purely childish". Religion becomes a serious threat to science also, and creates impediments in the way of scientific progress in many realms of life. This is not only a true historical statement of the past but even in the present time it is so. However, one has to trust science in our slow enquiry into the mystery of the universe. Freud states that true science has not been able as yet to penetrate into every problem, but it would be an illusion to expect knowledge, from religion or intuition. Freud further points out "Religion is an attempt to get control over the sensory world, in which we are placed, by means of the wish-world, which we have developed inside us as a result of biological and psychological necessities. But it cannot achieve its end."

Religious beliefs induce infantilism by subduing intellectual energy. The intellectual energy comes from the sublimation of sexual impulses. But religious beliefs induce sexual inhibition which leads to intellectual obscurity. Freud has supported this observation with regard to women's poor intellectual development due to their strong religious beliefs. He asserts that

women have to undergo far greater sexual privation than man by virtue of their religious beliefs and this, according to him, is the real reason of inferiority in them. Freud’s daughter Anna Freud has also supported the same view.

The fact that religion has helped in the development of morality cannot be ignored, but now it is imperative for morality to secure its own autonomy. There are several reasons for it. First, morality based on religion is basically negative and this kind of morality insists on prohibitions and avoidances. Secondly, religious morality is too archaic because it deals with taboos relating to sex. This is much flexible which is evident from the Laws of Moses and Manu as well. Thirdly, religion being a mass neurosis of mankind is bound to be outgrown by man, and, if morality remains wedded to it, then with the disappearance of religion, morality is also likely to disappear. And this would result in a serious loss to human culture and civilization. As to how mankind will outgrow the mass neurosis and illusion of religion, Freud answers that only when man attains maturity and wisdom, he frees himself of illusion, of neurotic infantilism, and the “soft voice of intellect” would prevail. How maturity is to be attained, Freud points out that the continuous sacrifice of “nature” that is demanded by “civilization” means that it was only through rationality and conscious awareness that maturity could be achieved. Wisdom for Freud was neither doctrine nor formula but the achievement of maturity. This is how he points out to get rid of illusion and neurotic religion.

It is undeniable that religion has been at the basis of the formation of society serving as a cementing force to unite and sustain it. But mutual intolerance and hate that religion creates cannot serve as the basis of wider international understanding. Historically, religion very often has been able to unite many races under one banner. But as soon as this has been accomplished it has failed to sustain it and soon such a

world was torn into pieces. From the psychoanalytic point of view, specially according to Freudians, one may say that religion being based on ambivalence cannot establish a true international harmony. Freud stresses that reason alone is expected to promote any lasting unity among men

Now the question arises whether it is possible that man, whose plan of life is drawn up by pleasure principle, can be guided by reason alone. Freud has expressed the possibility of it in his “Future of an Illusion” and hopes that man, in a very distant future, would allow himself to be guided by reason and science. Commenting upon Freud’s hope, Reik points out that “whereas the main section of Freud’s essay shows the future of an illusion, we may say with little exaggeration that this last section presents the illusion of future”. Reik believes that men are basically creatures of instincts which are so effective that they cannot rise above them. But Freud does not condemn all men. Some men, he thinks, will be able to rise above instinctual nature. Freud’s views in comparison with those of Reik’s are optimistic and moderate. Dunham, a renowned sociologist, holds that it is not possible to change the instinctual nature of man. Freud too has almost the same opinion about the majority of men. The basic thing is religion. Freud holds that it “is so patently infantile, so incongruous with reality, that to one whose attitude to humanity is friendly it is painful to think that great majority of mortals will never be able to rise above this view of life”.

However, it will be relevant to state here that Freud has not taken into account the social aspect of the individual wherein society plays a very important and effective role as the carrier of religion. Since man is not merely a biological product and his whole development takes place in social environment, he is so deeply affected by social traditions that he hardly gets rid of it despite his scientific outlook. An ample elaboration of this has already been attempted in the second section of the first chapter. The old traditions to which indivi-

duals and society are accustomed so deeply, die hard. Partly this is due to the unconscious process that religious phenomena persist and one can hardly be free from it.

The Future of Religion

Freud and other psychoanalysts of related schools have deduced this conclusion that religion is a childish construction and is retained by infantile wishes, hopes, fears and powerlessness. Since psychoanalytically it is held to be an infantile institution of man, religion is bound to disappear slowly and slowly but with inevitable education of man to reality. According to Freud, whatever might have been the service of religion, it is an obstacle in the way of progress. Similar view has been held by Marx also despite radical differences between psychoanalysis and Marxism. A psychoanalytic account of religion is simply a means of hastening its judgment before it is too late.

Freud asserts that—"Every child outgrows his infantile obsessional neurosis, as is found in animal-phobias. Religion too is a mass obsessional neurosis of mankind. With the growth of knowledge, this neurosis is bound to disappear in the same way in which childish animal-phobias disappear with the intellectual development of the child". This firm belief in the inevitable doom of religion has been elaborated in detail by Money-Kyrle who characterizes religion as a false act of symbolism. According to Money-Kyrle, "A repressed impulse gets its satisfaction only symbolically. A symbol is a false and irrelevant substitute for the repressed. The symbolic acts, however, are very often rationalized. A rationalization is an advancing of a reason in place of accepting the real motive of an act. Religion consists of falsely rationalized symbols. Now the elaborate prohibitions and precautions of religion are only symbolic and not real revolt against the father. Besides our own fathers are no longer our enemies and the childish fears themselves are unrealistic".

1. Freud (Sign. und): The Future of an Illusion, 1953, pp. 75-76.
Further in religion there is not only avoidance, but positive seeking for a benevolent father. But as far as this longing of a heavenly father is concerned, it is an illusion. For the existence of such a Being cannot be intellectually established. Hence the conclusion of a Money-Kyrlle is thus—"Therefore, I think, that the great edifice of religion, both with positive and in its negative forms, is doomed to fall before the slow but inevitable widening of self-consciousness which modern psychology will bring. Religion may be exquisite illusion, but it is built on superfluous fears and hates. It thus involves anxiety which is unnecessary for its devotees, and interference which is tiresome for their opponents. We may regret the passing of much that was beautiful in the childhood of our culture, but we shall admit that the gain is greater than the loss". But it cannot be denied that with the passing away of religion a great solace of mankind will disappear. But this is inevitable. Man cannot live in the paradise of childish fancy. He must venture into the real but hostile world. Freud further stresses that the man truly educated to reality will confess his helplessness and insignificance in the scheme of things, but then he will learn to endure things with resignation. This is, in fact, the spinozistic fact for which Freud appreciated Leonardo Da Vinci and says—"The sentences which contain the deep wisdom of his last year breathe the resignation of man who subjects himself to the laws of nature and expects no alleviation from the kindness or grace of God".

Now the question arises whether actually religion in all its phases and forms will disappear for ever when man has outgrown his childish infantilism, after attaining full maturity, wisdom, reason and education to reality. Since religion has persisted unceasingly from time immemorial in its various phases and forms despite its superstitions and superfluity, it can never disappear completely. Religion also has its brighter side which is its humanistic aspect—brotherhood, love,

compassion, moral responsibilities etc. Freud has accepted this aspect of religion and is only against traditional religion. Erich Fromm asserts that this aspect of religion will continue for ever as uniting force and as a source of human development and transformation of society.

Fromm, prominent among the Neo-Freudians, who has viewed religion in the light of his humanistic psychoanalysis based on the structure of society and individual's position, asks whether a spiritual transformation of the society is feasible without taking into account religion and its various dogmas. He states that—"teachings of the great monotheistic religions stress the humanistic aims which are the same as those which underlie the 'productive orientation'. The aims of Christianity and Judaism are those of the dignity of man as an aim and an end in himself, of brotherly love, of reasons and of the supremacy of spiritual over material value". Here Fromm's stress is on the humanistic side of religion which is more of ethics and rationality than any other aspect like rituals etc. His approach is also not materialistic in which material development of an individual is the primary object. Fromm further explains that "these ethical aims are related to certain concepts of God in which the believers of the various religions differ among themselves, and which are unacceptable to millions of others. However, it was an error of the non-believers to focus on attacking the idea of God; their real aim ought to be to challenge religionists to take their religion, and especially the concept of God seriously; that would mean to practise the spirit of brotherly love, truth and justice, and hence to become the most radical critics of present day society."

This means that the central idea of theistic religion in which God is the primary object of worship, is not the basic object of religion according to Fromm and religion may continue without any concept of God if its theme and concept are humanistic. He holds that even from a strictly monotheistic standpoint, discussions about God mean to use God in vain. For, if we cannot say what God is, we can state what

2. Ibid. p. 351.
Conclusion

God is not. The spiritual qualities of man are in danger not because, says Fromm, the concept of God is abandoned, but on account of deification of the State and power in authoritarian countries and the deification of the machine and success in our own culture. "Whether we are religionists or not, whether we believe in the necessity for a new religion or in the combination of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, inasmuch as we are concerned with the essence and not with the shell, with the experience and not with the word, with the man and not with the institution, we can unite in firm negation of idolatory and find perhaps more faith in this negation than in any affirmative statement about God. Certainly we shall find more of humanity and of brotherly love."1

Fromm believes, thus, in a humanistic side of religion and asserts this above "statement remains true even if one believes that the theistic concepts are bound to disappear in the future development of humanity.2 In fact, for those who see in the monotheistic religions only one of the stations in the evolution of human race, it is not too far-fetched to believe that a new religion will develop within next few hundred years, a religion which corresponds to the development of the human race; the most important features of such a religion would be its universalistic character, corresponding to the unification of mankind which is taking place in this epoch; it would embrace the humanistic teachings common to all religions of the East and of the West; its doctrines would not contradict the rational insight of mankind today, and its emphasis would be on the practice of life, rather than the doctrinal beliefs.3 Thus, a form of religion, according to Fromm, would create a new ritual and artistic form of expression, conducive to the spirit of reverence towards life and solidarity of man.

Fromm, of course, does not mean by this that an altogether new religion has got to be invented, or will be invented. What he means is that it will come into existence with the appearance of a new great teacher, just as they have appeared in

previous centuries when the time was ripe. In the meantime, Fromm suggests that those who believe in God should express their faith by living it; those who do not believe, by living the precepts of love and justice and waiting. In his "Evolutionary Humanism"¹, Julian Huxley has suggested for the same type of a new humanistic religion which will be based on humanism—a religion without revelation.

Thus the type of religion which is likely to continue or emerge when man outgrows and attains maturity and wisdom, will be a religion without reference to God. It is how psychoanalytically religion is understood. However, religion as an essential aspect of human culture will continue for ever though in a changed form free from superstition and even without a God.

In the end it seems essential to indicate that any dogmatic approach to the study of religion would lose the sight of the depth and creativity of humanity. Therefore, attempt has been made to link the question of what religion is with the question of what man is, and it is a question which will continue. The psychoanalytic approach is a part of it and never the whole.

Retrospect and Prospect

The difficulties and limitations of the application of psychoanalytic knowledge and methods of conceptualization to religion require as careful attention as its accomplishments. The psychoanalytic treatment of religion has revolved round recurrent and associated culture themes and pattern of belief and practice that are reminiscent of those reflected in individual psychoneurosis but have very rarely been based on the role of religion in individual's life. An individual may have the motive for his belief largely unconnected with the psychological functions, apparently served by the religious sects to which he belongs. Thus, the relationship between private and public, or between individual and cultural manifestations of religion is unknown though in principle knowable. Another problem lies in the predominantly a historical nature of most

psychoanalytic formulations concerning religion. The historical development and change of religions has generally been ignored or has at least not been sufficiently treated. This difficulty has given many of these formulations a static or timeless cast, in sharp contrast to the ordinarily dynamic emphasis of psychoanalytic thought. It seems likely that this static quality may be attributed to a lack of charity about precisely who or what is being analysed; rigorous psychoanalytical thought eschews any concept of "group mind", but insufficient information is available on individuals of past or non-industrialized cultures. Their weakness consists in the over-simplification of the complicated interaction between childhood experience and cultural expression. For these reasons in past this work has had little impact on the serious students of the history of religions. Truly interdisciplinary communication may fertilize future contribution of psychoanalysis to the study of religion and render the insights already reached in this field of great significance than as just a means of supporting the cross-cultural applicability of psychoanalytic thought. The firm and unshaken accomplishment of this field has been the education of the motives and reasons why people choose to believe what they do about the world.
Select Bibliography


James, William: *The Will to Believe.* London: Longmans Green, 1927.


Vol. 4 *Freud and Psycho-analysis*, 1951.
Vol. 5 *Symbols of Transformation*, 1956.
Vol. 8 *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, 1961.


Lang, Andrew: *Customs and Myth*, London: Longmans, Green, 1904.


Lang, Andrew: Myth, Ritual and Religion. London: Longmans, Green, 1901.
Leuba, J.H.: The Belief in God and Immortality, New York: Open Court, 1921.


Murphy, John: Lamps of Anthropology. Manchester Univ. Press, 1943.


Thouless, R.H.: *Conventionisation and Assimilation in Religious Movements*. Oxford University Press, 1940.


Index

Abernathy, G.L., 160-61, 273, 280
Acquina, Thomas, 69, 75, 160, 273, 349
Adam, 32-34, 101-2
Adler, Alfred, 206, 212, 217, 220, 327-39, 341, 343-44, 369, 375, 389, 463
Aesthetics, 217, 481
Agnostics, 44
Aitarcya Brahmana, 34
Akhilananda, 264
Aldus, 16
Allport, G.W., 217-20, 281, 447-48
Ames, E.S., 170, 175
Anaxagoras, 48
Ancestor Worship, 91, 93, 414
Angell, J.R., 177
Anima, 158
Animatism, 90, 97
Animus, 158
Ansbacher, J.L., 334-39
Anselm, 75
Anthropomorphism, 44, 45
Anthroponomy, 209
Archetypes, 342, 349, 354, 357, 358, 361, 454, 473
Aristarchus, 28, 29
Aristotle, 27, 30, 46-48, 54, 63, 225, 261
Aryabhätt, 28
Astral religion, 93

Astronomy, 28
Atheism, 13, 77, 80, 84, 226, 240, 330, 338, 455
Atheistic Pantheism, 319
Atharveda, 4, 89, 105
Atkinson, F., 228
Aton monotheism, 300
Augustine, St., 242, 351
Bacchian form of religion, 108
Barnes, Ernest William, 39-41, 55, 74, 75, 85, 94, 95
Baudouin, Charles, 163
Baynes, H.G., 154
Beatitude, 5
Becker, Carl, 227
Behaviourism, 175, 203-12, 392
Bekhterev, U.B., 207-8, 221-22
Bellak, Leopold, 227, 445
Bennet, E.A., 346
Bergson, Henri, 53, 59, 151, 220, 233, 324, 341, 462
Berkeley, George, 60, 61
Bertholit, Alfred, 123
Bible, 8, 16, 18, 20, 26, 27, 36, 73, 167, 242, 331, 362, 429, 437
Binet, A., 179
Bleuler, Eugen, 345
Bloss, Lewell, 475
Boisen, A.T., 452
Brahma, 35, 116, 167
Breasted, James H., 104
Brierley, Marjorie, 422-23
Brightman, Edgar Sheffield, 46, 47,
Eden, 429
Ego, 142, 334, 441-42, 444-46, 448, 485
Einstein, Albert, 13, 271, 472
E touching, 372-73, 375
Empiricism, 207, 271
Engels, F., 13, 207, 221-22, 224
Entelechy, 54
Environmentalism, 207-8
Eros, 328, 341, 369
Experimentalism, 218
Extroversion, 157, 341, 357
Fälscher complex, 161
Ferenczi, S., 316, 352
Fetish, 105
Fetishism, 23, 90, 92, 105, 118
Feudalism, 402
Fénelon, Ludwing, 138, 159-60, 274, 441, 478
Fichte, J.G., 431, 452, 466
Flew, Antony, 472
Flint, Robert, 6
Fliss, 450
Flugel, J.C., 228, 230-31, 247-48, 251-255, 303, 317, 422-23, 480, 484
Fordham, Frieda, 252, 257, 364
Forst, David, 142, 152, 162, 164, 239-42, 345-47
Frazier, James George, 9, 81, 87, 88, 93, 98, 99, 106, 140-41, 284-85, 287, 355, 457
Free will, 68, 69
Freud, Anna, 488
Galileo, Galilei, 28-31, 66, 271
Gallowy, George, 10, 86, 87, 91, 92, 115-16, 118-20, 142
Gandhi, M.K., 12
Gnosticism, 19, 22, 367, 387
God image, 144, 347-48, 353-54, 360, 364, 366, 453
Goldstein, K., 327, 358
Grensted, L.W., 6, 7, 142, 162, 171, 203, 214, 235, 296-97, 356-57
Hadfield, J.A., 149, 156, 355
Halbwachs, Maurice, 85, 95
Hall, G. Stanley, 147, 170, 390, 425-435, 458
Hallstattistic polytheism, 319
Hegel, G.W.F., 6, 61, 226, 330, 395, 431, 436
Hegelianism, 330
Henotheism, 104, 116
Heracleitus, 45, 59
Herbert, J.H., 232
Herbert, Lord, 137
Herskovists, M.J., 121
Heywood, Rosalind, 224, 235
Hick, John, 125, 129-31, 134-35, 325, 326
Hinduism, 7, 63, 218, 224, 226, 228, 422, 424, 461, 466, 494
Hinkle, Beatrice, 153
Hiranyakartha, 35
Hobbes, Thomas, 66, 72, 173
Hoffding, Harald, 12, 147, 175, 186
Holt, Edward B., 209, 280
Holt, Edwin, 446
Hopkins, E. Washburn, 126
Horney, Karen, 217, 390, 393-96
Horosz, William, 2, 82, 161, 273-77, 279-81, 441, 443, 445-46
Hostie, Raymond, 344, 351
Hubbert, M.M., 90, 96
Humanistic Religion, 494
Hume, David, 271
Hunter, Walter, 209
Huxley, Julian, 13, 359, 494

Id, 142, 343
Idealism, 76, 396
Indian atheism, 77-80
Individualism, 402
Individuation, 164-65, 358, 361, 420, 468
Immortality, 373-377
Introversion, 157, 341, 357
Islam, 19, 106, 135, 351

Jacobi, Hermann, 17
Jacobi, Jalande, 153, 159, 344, 349
Jaimini, 4
Jainism, 79, 100, 135, 302, 450
James, E.O., 88, 288
Jastrow, Morris, 146

Jevons, F.B., 287
Judaic Christian monotheism, 319, 320
Judaic monotheism, 303, 320, 450
Judaism, 104, 160, 247, 273, 294, 296 322, 382, 384
Jung, Pierre, 169, 345
Jung, C., 6, 97, 149, 153, 154-59, 164-66, 171, 206, 212, 251, 254, 268, 319-20, 333-34, 339, 341-70, 389, 399, 413, 420, 353, 455, 477, 482, 485
Jung, Hinkle, 154

Kane, P.V., 4
Kant, Immanuel, 47, 53, 75, 211, 215, 324, 330, 341, 358
Keilier, Adolf, 353
Kepler, 28, 29
King, Irving, 170, 175
King, J.H., 89, 146
Koffka, Kart, 212-13
Kohler, Wolfgang, 212-13
Koran, 19, 20

Lafitan, Joseph, 139
Lamaism, 23
Lamarckism, 54
Lang, Andrew, 92, 99, 102, 122, 457, 458
Lao-tze, 21, 100
Laplace, 74
Le Bon, 169
Leibniz, C.W., 73, 74, 150
Lenin, V.I., 221-22
Leonardo da Vinci, 281, 302, 322, 469, 491
Leuba, J.H., 11, 12, 275, 472
Leucippus, 48
Levy-Bruhl, 164, 170, 357, 374
Levin, Kurt, 215, 217-18
Libido, 93, 153-58, 166, 312, 341, 347, 349, 371, 393, 402
Linnaeus, 245
Locke, John, 73, 139, 181, 191, 271, 292
Luther, Martin, 160, 273
Lyell, Charles, 41

McDonnell, A.A., 17
McDougall, William, 145, 149, 153
Magic, 23, 87-90, 96, 98, 101, 185, 254, 290, 480, 485
Mahabharata, 5, 34, 35
Mahayana, Buddhism, 14
M’Lennan, J F., ’87
Malinowski, B., 98, 170, 220, 221, 294
Man, 90, 93, 95-97, 99, 106, 355, 488
Marrett, R R., 8, 86, 89, 90, 96, 105, 123, 290
Marshall, Henry Rutger, 146
Martin, Jacques, 456
Marx, Karl, 12, 80, 110, 126, 132, 207, 221-27, 330, 335-37, 395, 396, 412, 439, 440, 449, 450, 478, 479, 485, 490
Maxism, 12, 79, 110 221-27, 392, 490
Masih, Y., 282-299, 302, 303, 313-17, 319, 321-23, 326, 327, 469
Materialism, 66, 221
Mathew, Dean, 437
Max Muller, F., 6, 14, 17, 81, 93, 100, 104-6, 116, 430
Mead, George H., 160
Mead, Margaret, 178, 181
Mechanism, 40, 46, 48-53, 56, 59, 175, 176, 274-275, 277, 280, 303, 326, 402, 406, 420, 442
Meliorism, 324, 463
Mentalism, 60, 66, 209
Merton, Robert K., 126
Metaphysics, 3, 7, 56, 143, 190, 198, 437, 451, 482
Middle Ages, 8, 9, 26, 28, 29, 69, 119, 157, 396, 400-2
Mohammad, 19, 20, 106, 119
Money, T. Kyrl, R., 150, 491
Monotheistic religion, 467
Moral positivism, 226
Moral relativism, 66
Mosaic monotheism, 300, 302, 322, 484 485
Mother-Complex, 161
Motlier-religion, 465, 467
Mullahy, Patrick, 368
Murphy, gardner, 235
Myers, F.W.H., 144, 150, 232
Mythology, 15, 93, 158, 159, 202, 284, 291, 345, 366, 380
Nanak, 45
Narcissism, 308, 318, 466, 486
Naturalism, 84, 85
Nature worship, 93
Neo-Freudians, 280, 326, 334, 389-94, 417, 456, 459, 483, 492
Neolithic age, 91
Neo-realistic humanism, 422
New Testaments, 18
Newton, Isaac, 28, 30, 31, 51, 73, 74
Nietzsche, 378
Nirvana, 22, 23
Nunn, T.P., 153

Objectivism, 65, 66
O’Dea, Thomas, F., 126, 132, 134, 305-8
Oedipus, 162, 243, 371, 412, 465, 467
Oedipus complex, 161-64, 242, 282, 289, 290, 293, 305, 319, 325, 417, 449, 461
Oedipus situation, 284, 285
Old Testaments, 18, 33, 105, 135, 283, 294, 387
Olympic deities, 116
Ontogeny, 477
Oriental monotheism, 301
Otto Rudolf, 313-14, 324, 362, 364, 471
Oulter, Albert C., 413, 422-25
Pagan religion, 19
Pantheism, 319, 429-30, 438, 478
Parallelism-psycho-physical, 55
Parapsychology, 234
Pathagorean philosopher, 28
Pavlov, I.P., 206, 207, 221, 223, 336
Peter, R.S., 22
Peterson, H., 462, 464
Petronius, 138
Pfister, O., 247-48, 297, 316, 484
Phillip, H.L., 295, 351
Phillip, Margaret, 148
Philosophy, 50, 58, 59, 61, 66, 72, 85, 175, 182, 204, 208, 215, 225-27, 273, 280, 305
Phylogeny, 477
Phylogenetic oedipean tendency, 480
Piaget, J., 312
Plato, 12, 433
Polytheistic religion, 465
Positive religion, 482
Popper, K.R., 225-26
Pragmatism, 76
Pratt, 11-12, 142, 145-46, 148, 150, 188, 190, 192-93, 196-97, 199, 472, 473
Price, H.H., 234-35
Prince, Martin, 192, 195
Pringle Pattison, A.S., 96
Primitive man, 43, 85, 94, 96, 99, 124, 165, 355, 359, 376, 377, 381, 400
Primitive religion, 85, 88, 95, 96, 102, 110, 112-13, 123, 137-38, 318, 400
Primordial image, 97
Progoft, Ira, 283-84, 333, 378-79
Protestantism, 32, 362, 402
Pruyscr, Paul W., 256-58, 260
Psychical research, 144, 232, 234-35
Psychotherapy, 257, 259-61, 263-67, 357, 368-69, 422-23
Quarternity, 350
Radhakrishnan, S., 12, 100
Radin, Paul, 123-24, 271
Raglan, Lord, 88, 164, 181
Rank, Otto, 269-73, 375-81, 458
Rank, Oskar, 170, 381
Rayee, J., 182
Read, Carveth, 97
Realism, 76, 209
Reductionism, 209, 304
Reik, Theodore, 170, 313, 316-17, 381-82, 384-89, 407, 411, 452, 469, 470, 483, 489
Reiser, L. 103
Relativism, 66-67
Religion—definition, 3-6, 8-10, 12-15
Revealed religion, 20, 21
Rhine, J.B., 234
Rigveda, 16, 17, 20, 34, 35, 105
Ritschel, Albert, 8, 210
Russell, Bertrand, 25, 30, 33, 471
Sachser, Hans, 53, 81, 352
Samaveda, 89
Santayana, George, 463
Skepticism, 249, 254
Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 8, 11, 139, 435
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 143-44, 232, 241, 478
Schultz, Juliuss, 51
Sellin, E., 295
Semitic Monotheism, 302, 450
Sengupta, N.N., 182
Sensualism, 271
Sex Worship, 147
Shaman, 1
Shamanism, 23
Shintoism, 21, 23
Sikhism, 100
Stillman, Leonard R., 317-18, 481
Simmel, George, 124-25
Simpson, J.Y., 170
Skinner, C.E., 237
Smith, Robertson, W., 92, 140-41, 284, 287-89, 291-92, 325
Socrates, 63, 225, 417
Sombat, Waren, 224
Speculative ideal, 60-62
Spencer, Herbert, 57, 85, 92, 105, 122, 140, 169, 287
Sperber, H., 310
Spinoza, 50, 73, 197, 319, 417, 429, 436
Spinozism, 456
Spiritism, 86, 92, 93, 117-19
Spranger, Edward, 216-17, 219, 222
Stace, W.T., 36, 45, 62-64, 66, 67, 72, 73
Stahlhin, W., 186
Starbuck, E.D., 146-47, 151, 169, 174, 181, 426
Stern, Wilhelm, 57, 214-15, 218-19
Stoic Cleanthes, 29
Stratton, H.C., 174
Stratton, George M., 258
Strout, G.F., 145
Sub-conscious, 149-51, 153
Sublimation, 155, 231, 317-18, 368, 395, 484
Subjectivism, 64-67
Subliminal self, 232, 346
Sullivan, H.S., 390, 393-94
Super-ego, 63, 142, 146, 218, 247-48, 255, 262-66, 297, 415
Supernaturalism, 228
Suttie, Ian, 293-95
Synchronism, 443
Syncretism, 465
Talmud, 33
Taoism, 21-23, 417
Teleo-aesthetic sense, 146
Teleology, 46, 47, 49, 54-59
Thanatos, 328, 369
Theism, 13, 102, 381
Theistic religion, 480, 483
Theosycbe, 228-31
Thiel, 435
Thorndike, E.L., 200
Thouless, R.H., 10-11, 142, 209, 313, 471
Tillich, Paul, 238, 314, 471
Titchener, E.B., 191-92
Totalitarianism, 137
Totem, 90, 91, 284-85, 289, 322, 381, 407, 461
Totem religion, 318, 320-21, 382, 384, 458
Totem worship, 451
Totemism, 81, 90, 92, 95, 98, 99, 105, 185, 287-88, 290, 292, 298, 373, 376, 407, 461
Toynbee, Arnold, 483
Trinity, 17-19, 164, 240, 302, 345, 351
Tucker, Robert C., 224-25
Tylor, E.B., 6, 81, 84, 85, 97, 98, 105, 122, 140, 164, 355, 357-58
Tyrrell, G.N.M., 234
Upanishadas, 7
Upper Paleolithic age, 87, 91
Uncanny, 254
Universal religion, 117
Vaihinger, H., 46
Valentine, C.W., 256, 319
Psychoanalytic Concept of Religion

Vedantism, 282, 302, 326, 450
Vedic Age, 4
Vergin Marg, 167, 385
Vernon, P.E., 219
Von Ehrenfels, christian, 212
Von Hartman, 144

Wach, J., 100
Wall, D.A., 15, 16, 18, 23, 33, 42
Wallace, Alfred, 140
Watson, J.B., 175, 204-8 210, 212, 236, 392
Way, Lewis, 329
Weber, Max, 132-33
Weismann, 245-46
Weiss, Albert P. 209
White, Victor, 340, 349-50
Whyte, Adam Gowan, 37, 38
Wilhelm, Richard, 345
Winternitz, M., 89
Wirtheimer, Max, 212

Wohler, F., 40
Woodworth, Robert S., 213, 328, 341-43, 389
Wright, William Kelley, 84, 146, 166-68
Wundt, Wilhelm, 90, 144, 173, 185, 201-2, 211, 213, 231-32

Xenophanes, 48

Yinger, J. Milton, 121-22, 124, 131, 221, 413, 418-20
Yoga, 261, 266, 466

Zen Buddhism, 417
Zen Buddhist, 1
Zoroaster, 19, 119
Zoroastrianism, 7, 100