PREFACE

The idea of preparing, under the auspices of the Government of India, a history of philosophy which would be truly representative of the growth of human thought in the different civilizations and cultures of the world was first mooted by The Honourable Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Minister of Education, Government of India. In inaugurating the All-India Education Conference in 1948, he pointed out that in Europe “even the general history of Philosophy starts with the Greeks and ends with modern European Philosophy, touching merely the fringe of Indian and Chinese thought. This is the history of Philosophy which the Universities teach in India. But you will all admit that this does not represent the true facts of the development of philosophical thought in the world. No one can today deny the supreme achievements of the Indian mind in the realms of metaphysics and philosophy. It is true that recently Indian philosophy has been introduced as one of the subjects of study in Indian Universities, but it has not yet gained the position which it deserves in the general history of the Philosophy of the world.”

He further elaborated the idea during the course of the budget discussions for 1948-1949 and said,

“Honourable Members are also aware that Indian Philosophy is one of the proudest possessions of human civilization. In our college histories of philosophy, Indian Philosophy is, however, relegated to an obscure corner. In order to get a true perspective of philosophy, it is necessary that a student should know of the great contributions of India, along with the developments which took place in Greece and modern Europe. I propose to appoint a committee of eminent philosophers, with Dr. Radhakrishnan as Chairman, to write a history of philosophy in which due and proper emphasis will be given to these facts.”

In pursuance of this statement a committee was appointed consisting of the Chairman and Professors A. R. Wadia, D. M. Datta and Humayun Kabir. This committee served as the Editorial Board for the production of a book which would include within its scope the development of philosophy in all parts of the world, with special emphasis on the development of philosophy in India.

We were fortunate in obtaining the ready and willing co-operation of about sixty scholars who have written on subjects of their special study. While many of them are Indian, we did not hesitate to call upon Chinese, Japanese and European scholars. We are grateful to all our contributors for their valued assistance. The Editors selected the writers and prescribed the topics, but the contributors had full freedom in the treatment of the topics. Co-operative ventures of this kind suffer from serious limitations
of which the Editors are aware. They tried, however, to give a unity of purpose to the whole undertaking.

Philosophy is not like one of those progressive sciences whose history is merely their less enlightened past. Progress in the sciences depends on external and usually measurable evidences. Philosophy is not the less scientific simply because its tests are not external. In spite of advances in science and technology we cannot be confident that we have a greater degree of philosophical insight than the great thinkers of the past. Some even think that it may be less mature and adequate than in the time of the Buddha or of Plato. Whatever it may be, no one can undertake a serious study of philosophy if he has not an adequate knowledge of the history of philosophy. Though history of philosophy is not a substitute for the independent effort of philosophy, it provides the framework within which the study of philosophy becomes intelligible and fruitful.

Growth in philosophy is not the same as the increase of knowledge in the sciences. It is of a different quality. In the sciences there have been definite additions to knowledge; in philosophy it is not addition but growth. The ideas are the same today as yesterday, but we apprehend them with a new shade, with a new fineness.

This work may claim to be the first of its kind since it brings together philosophies of different countries and ages, and enables cultivated readers to compare and contrast varied manifestations of the philosophic spirit in humanity. It may perhaps lead to a better international understanding, and demonstrate the unity of human aspirations which transcend geographical and national limitations. The differences are only in the distribution of emphasis. There is more emphasis on the nature of the external world in the Western systems of thought, on psychological and metaphysical analyses in Indian systems, Hindu and Buddhist, on social problems in the Chinese schools of thought. The horizons of thought outlined here may serve as a release at a time when philosophy is becoming restricted in scope and limited to logical and linguistic analysis.

While we tried to find a place for the main currents of philosophy in all countries, we do not claim to any completeness. It is not easy to maintain a uniform standard in a composite work of this character. We have to make allowance for individual interests and preferences. In the matter of spelling we have aimed at a certain uniformity.

Philosophical systems that have arisen in different cultural traditions cannot be compared easily. There are categories in one tradition for which it is difficult to find adequate equivalents in another. The concepts signified by átman and māyā are very inadequately rendered by self and illusion or appearance.

A history of philosophy in the strict chronological sense of the term is not possible, for the philosophical spirit has found independent manifes-
tations in different countries and among different peoples. That is why we thought of calling this book Philosophy: Eastern and Western. But subsequently we came across a book with a similar title and in order to avoid any confusion we adopted the present title.

The inclusion of a chapter on the Scientific Achievements in Mathematics and Astronomy and other sciences in India perhaps requires a word of explanation. It has been a widespread belief that the Indian mind is pre-eminently metaphysical. This has been sufficiently disproved in our own generation by the work of Indian scientists, but it should be of interest to note that the Indian mind made substantial contributions to the development of the sciences, even in early times. This chapter will also supply the background of ancient Indian Philosophy.

We are grateful to The Honourable Maulana Abul Kalam Azad for the inspiration that he has given us.

The Editors would like to express their special appreciation to Prof. S. Bhattacharya, M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt. Barrister-at-Law of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, who acted on their behalf in London and undertook the tedious but important task of correcting the proofs and preparing the index.

THE EDITORS
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*Hon. Minister of Education, Government of India*

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INTRODUCTION

A PERSIAN poet has compared the Universe to an old manuscript of which the first and the last pages have been lost. It is no longer possible to say how the book began, nor do we know how it is likely to end.

MĀ ZI ĀGHĀZ O ZI ANJĀM-I-JAHĀN BI-KHABAR-ĪM AWWAL-O-ĀKHIR-I-IN KUHNA KITĀB UFTĀD AST.

Ever since man attained consciousness, he has been trying to discover these lost pages. Philosophy is the name of this quest and its results. A philosopher writes volumes to describe philosophy and its nature, but the poet has done so in a single couplet.

The purpose of this quest is to find out the meaning of life and existence. As soon as man attained self-consciousness and began to think, two questions arose in his mind, namely, what is the meaning of his life; and what is the nature of the universe he sees all around. We do not know how long he groped in diverse directions, but a stage came when he adopted a definite course and started to advance along the path of reason and thought. This was the beginning of systematic speculation. The day the human intellect reached that stage marked the birth of philosophy and from that day the history of philosophy begins.

I

_History of Philosophy._—Till the eighteenth century, the pattern which European histories of philosophy followed was similar to that adopted by Arab historians and philosophers of the Middle Ages. They did not seek to study the progress of philosophy from a philosophical standpoint, but, on the contrary, compiled for the benefit of those who were interested a record of philosophers and their Schools. In truth, their accounts were not histories of philosophy but histories of philosophers. In parenthesis, it may be added that this is how the Arab writers had correctly described such books. It was in the beginning of the nineteenth century that histories of philosophy, as we know them today, were first written, and ever since the pattern then adopted has generally been followed. Anyone who wants to write on this subject today—whether he intends to write a textbook for students or a book for the general reader—invariably adopts (maybe with minor modifications) the method of discussion followed in such books.

Since then there have been great advances in the study of the history
of philosophy. Scholars of many nations have written important books, but when reading them, one fact has always attracted my notice. I have felt that prevailing accounts of the origin of philosophy and its division into different compartments do not give a full or true picture of the theme. There is therefore need for a more comprehensive account of the general history of philosophy.

Some of the pages of this history have been lost in a manner which makes restoration impossible. The sources of information about them are no longer accessible. It is known to us that Egypt and Iraq had developed a high degree of civilization long before Greece. We also know that early Greek philosophy was deeply influenced by the ancient wisdom of Egypt. Plato in his writings refers to Egyptian maxims in a way which suggests that their authority as sources of knowledge was unquestioned. Aristotle went farther and said that the Egyptian priests were the first philosophers of the world. But we do not know the details of the relationship between Egypt and Greece. Not only are we ignorant of them, but we have little hope of ever recovering them. Similarly, we have no definite knowledge as to what was the nature and scope of the philosophical speculations that developed in the civilizations of Babylon and Nineveh. Nor do we know whether these speculations were in any way responsible for the birth of Greek philosophy. These lacunae in the history of philosophy are due to gaps in our knowledge which from the nature of the case are not likely to be filled up.

There are, however, certain other regions of ancient history of which we have fuller knowledge today. This enables us to draw a more accurate outline of the growth of philosophy. The increase in our knowledge of ancient Indian history has opened to us a new source of information about ancient philosophical developments. It has thus become possible to trace the rise of philosophy to a period earlier than the Greeks and determine the nature and scope of its development at that stage. We have, however, failed till now to pay adequate attention to these developments and still cling to the limited vision of the history of philosophy which has prevailed since the nineteenth century.

European philosophy originated in the philosophical enquiries of Greece. Its progress was retarded after the spread of Christianity, and there was a stage when philosophy disappeared from the European scene. After a lapse of some centuries, the Arabs began the study of Greek philosophy in the eighth century A.D. Later through their agency its study was revived in Europe. These studies in course of time led to that movement of enlightenment which is generally described as the European Renaissance. During this period, Europe secured direct access to the original Greek texts which till now she had known only through the works of Arab translators and commentators. After the Renaissance began the movement of thought to which we can trace the rise of modern philosophy.
INTRODUCTION

The history of philosophy in Europe is thus often divided into four periods: (1) Ancient; (2) Mediaeval; (3) Renaissance and (4) Modern.

When in the nineteenth century European scholars attempted to draw a general outline of the history of philosophy, it was this division into periods which came before them. The impact of Christianity on the European mind was also a factor responsible for such division. European scholars tend to interpret the whole course of human development from the standpoint of the emergence of Christianity. Thus they divide human history into two broad periods, pre-Christian and post-Christian, and subdivide the latter into pre- and post-Reformation. Historians of philosophy, like Erdmann, have sought to designate periods in the development of philosophy on the same basis. Thus, according to Erdmann, the periods of philosophy are (1) The pre-Christian Greek, (2) the post-Christian Mediaeval and (3) the post-Reformation Modern period.

It is evident that this was not an account of the general history of philosophy but only of the history of Western philosophy. Since, however, Indian and Chinese philosophy had not yet fully come to light, this limited picture took the place of a general history and, in course of time, came to be accepted as such. All the histories of philosophy written during the nineteenth century, whether textbooks for students or meant for the general reader, repeated the same story. This limited view of the history of philosophy has become so ingrained in our minds that we have not been able to cast it out in spite of the new knowledge revealed by later research. Whenever we think of a history of philosophy, it is this limited picture that comes before us. We cannot otherwise explain the manner in which a scholar like Thilly, writing in the second decade of this century, dismisses the contribution of the Orient and starts his account of the development of systematic philosophy with the Greeks.

Such an account of philosophy is incomplete not only in respect of its beginning but also in respect of several later periods. Our view of the progress of philosophy has been so influenced by this Western conception of three or four periods that we are unable to see it in any other perspective. Historically, it is generally recognized that long before the Christian era began, Buddhist metaphysical thought had crystallized into definite Schools of philosophy. If we are to study the progress of philosophy in these ages, it is as necessary to attend to these developments in India as to those in Greece. A comparative study of the nature and scope of the philosophical discourses in India and Greece during these centuries would thus have been of great interest. The standard histories of philosophy are, however, so used to consider only European philosophy that they miss all these developments and overlook the contribution of the Orient. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, our knowledge is no longer confined within the four walls of Greece and much of the wealth of Indian and Chinese philosophy has been revealed to us. This knowledge is, how-
ever, even now limited to a circle of specialists and has not found the place it deserves in the general history of philosophy.

Undoubtedly, some recent writers have realized the limitation of the old conception. Attempts are being made to produce in place of the old sectional histories of philosophy more adequate accounts. It cannot, however, be said that the old limited conception of the history of philosophy has been fully replaced by a new and more complete account. Nor can we say that Oriental philosophy has secured in the general history of philosophy the position it deserves. The time has now come when with the material we already possess we must attempt to write a comprehensive history in which the contribution of the East and the West will alike receive proper recognition.

It is with a view to providing a first outline of such a comprehensive history that steps were taken to compile the present work. I will consider our labour justified if this endeavour draws the attention of scholars to the need of further studies for the fulfilment of that object.

II

The Earliest Sources of Philosophy.—A basic question that arises in this connection is that of the beginnings of philosophy. Where should we start the story? In Greece or in India? In other words, which country contains the traces of the earliest developments of philosophy?

So far as Greek philosophy is concerned, we are aware of some of its earliest phases. It has been generally recognized that philosophical speculations in Greece cannot be traced earlier than the sixth century B.C. The first Greek thinker whom we can appropriately describe as a philosopher was Thales. A specific incident has helped us to determine his chronology. It is said that he had predicted through his calculations the correct time of an eclipse which took place in 585 B.C. Two men who after Thales gave a new turn to the development of philosophical thought in Greece were Pythagoras and Socrates. Pythagoras lived about 532 B.C. and the death of Socrates took place in 399 B.C.

When, however, we look at India of the sixth century B.C., we see a completely different picture. This period in India witnessed not the beginnings but the development of philosophical thought. It was not a case of the dawn of philosophy as in Greece but what may be described as the full glow of philosophical day. It was not the first faltering steps of the human intellect along the long and arduous way of philosophical quest but it marked a stage which could have been reached only after a considerable journey.
INTRODUCTION

Two facts are inevitably forced upon our attention in any discussion of this period:

(i) The emergence of Buddhism and Jainism took place in this epoch.
(ii) Before the advent of the Buddha and Mahāvīra, there had already been a considerable development of philosophical thought in India and systems had emerged which presupposed a long period of wide and deep philosophical speculation.

Gautama the Buddha occupies a peculiar place among the greatest men of the world. It is a debatable point whether we should place him in the category of prophets or of philosophers. In other words, what was the purport of his teaching? Was it a new revelation or was it a new philosophical discovery? In spite of long controversy, both philosophy and religion continue to claim the Buddha. I do not want to repeat that controversy, but it seems clear to me that it is easier to see him in the role of a philosopher than in that of a prophet. He started on his enquiries in order to solve the problem of life, not to search for the existence of God. Similarly, his quest ended with a solution of that problem and did not concern itself with either the nature or the existence of God. He broke away completely from that religious life of India which believed in innumerable gods and goddesses. He sought and found the consummation of his quest without the intermediation of the concept of God. The principle on which he based his speculative enquiries was itself philosophic. For him the goal of human endeavour is to find a solution of the problem of life and this can be done without recourse to deus ex machina. It is, of course, true that after his death, his followers soon transformed his teachings into a full-fledged religious cult. When they found that he had left unfilled the place normally assigned to God in religion, they placed the Buddha himself on the vacant throne of the deity. This was, however, a development for which the Buddha was not responsible.

Jainism also arose about the same time and was even more indifferent to the existence of God. Like the Buddha, Mahāvīra also sought an answer to the riddle of existence without any reference to the existence of God. The intellectual constructions of the Jainas are based on principles which properly belong to the world of philosophy.

What I am anxious that readers should specially consider is not the personality of Gautama the Buddha or Mahāvīra but the background of thought which made their emergence possible. It is a study of this background which is of the greatest importance to the historian of philosophy. The fact that India in the sixth century B.C. could exhibit the method and approach of Gautama the Buddha and Mahāvīra is in itself evidence that the country had developed a widespread and deep philosophical insight. An atmosphere was already in existence in which there could develop different theories and interpretations of the mysteries of life. It is
also clear that a stage had been reached where these problems could be solved without presupposing either the existence of God or the revelation of His will.

Such a philosophic temper did not emerge in Greece till much later. Ionian philosophy which is one of the earliest of the Greek Schools believed in a theory of souls informing the planets and other stellar bodies. These can hardly be distinguished from the gods and goddesses of popular mythology. Located on the peak of Mount Olympus, they were the gods of religion; when, however, the same gods put on a philosophic garb and mounted the heavens, they acquired the philosophic title of Intelligences of the Spheres. This tendency of Ionian philosophy continued in all the later Schools of Greek thought. If the heavenly souls of Aristotle are subjected to proper scrutiny, it will be seen that they are not very different from the old Hellenic gods. It is true that Socrates protested against the worship of gods, but even he was not able to eradicate completely from philosophy the influence of the popular conception of gods.

If after a general survey of the history of philosophy and religion elsewhere we turn to study the way in which the Indian intellect reacted to their problems, we find ourselves faced with an entirely new approach. Elsewhere, philosophy and religion pursued distinct and different paths; though their paths had at times crossed and the one had influenced the other, the two had never merged. In India, on the other hand, it is not always possible to differentiate between the two. Unlike Greece, philosophy was not confined here to the walls of the academies but became the religion of millions.

The solutions which Gautama the Buddha and Mahāvīra had found for the problems of existence were, as we have already seen, basically philosophical, but their teachings created religious communities in the same way as the preaching of the Semitic prophets. Socrates was, in many respects, a unique character among the Greek philosophers. He was essentially a philosopher, but to call him only a philosopher does not fully describe his personality. When we try to think of him, we are inevitably reminded of Jesus Christ. What we know of the events of his life have close affinities with the life of the prophets of Israel and the yogins of India. He was often in a state of trance. He also believed in an oracle or inner voice which guided him in all moments of crisis. When in his last days he was addressing the court in Athens, he was guided by the behest of this inner voice. Nevertheless, Socrates has been classed among philosophers. His followers did not try to create a religious community based on his personality or his teachings. This fact shows clearly the difference between the Indian and the Greek spirit. In Greece elements of religion acquired the characteristics of philosophy; in India philosophy was itself turned into religion.

The distinction we have drawn between philosophy and religion can-
not, therefore, describe accurately the Indian situation. If we try to apply
to India the criterion which distinguishes philosophy from religion, we
will either have to change the criterion itself or recognize that in India
philosophy and religion have pursued the same path.

We have attempted to form an idea of the intellectual make-up of India
of the sixth century B.C. from an analysis of the personalities of Gautama
the Buddha and Mahāvīra. We should now enquire into the external evi-
dence to justify the conclusions we have drawn from such internal con-
siderations. This is supplied by the second fact to which I have already
drawn the reader’s attention. All students of Indian philosophy are today
agreed that the philosophy of the Upanisads had already begun to develop
before the emergence of Gautama the Buddha and Mahāvīra. It is also
admitted generally that those Upanisads which are recognized to be the
oldest were composed about the eighth century B.C. Authorities, however,
differ as to the period and order of emergence of the six Indian systems or
Darśanas. According to some, the Cārvāka School had been developed be-
fore the time of Gautama the Buddha. They quote in evidence certain
references in the Upanisads which suggest that a materialistic interpreta-
tion of the universe had already taken shape, and this is the essence of
Cārvāka’s thought. Others have expressed similar opinions about the Sām-
khya and the Yoga systems. They emphasize the fact that Buddhism con-
tains some parallel lines of thought and infer that these two Schools must
be, if not earlier than, at least contemporaneous with Gautama the Buddha.

If the views of these scholars are accepted, the beginnings of Indian
philosophy will have to be pushed back several centuries earlier than the
seventh century B.C. It is evident that in order to account for such a stage
of development in the seventh century B.C., metaphysical speculations
must have begun here at least several hundred years ago. In Greece it
took almost three hundred years to reach from Thales to Aristotle. There
would be nothing surprising if in India also it had taken an equal period to
develop the systems of the Sāmkhya, the Yoga and the Cārvāka from
the first gropings of philosophical speculation. It would thus be a plausible
inference to hold that the beginnings of Indian philosophy can be traced
back to a thousand years before Christ.

Our present state of knowledge does not, however, permit us to go so
far back. Undoubtedly there are indications which lend support to such
inference. History cannot, however, be based on suppositions and inferences
and demands tangible evidence for its assertions. The fact is that we do
not have such evidence. A safe position would, therefore, be to agree with
those modern scholars who hold that the evidence for the development of
these Schools before the age of Gautama the Buddha is not conclusive. All
that we can say with assurance is that in the age of the Buddha, the
foundations had already been laid on which the six systems of philosophy
were later built. To deny this would be less than truth, but to assert more
would be an exaggeration. The verses in the *Upaniṣads* which are regarded as evidence of the existence of conflicting Schools should be more properly interpreted as anticipations of their positions. They may be regarded as evidence of the fact that different points of view had begun to emerge. It is clear from these hints that some of the thinkers of the day had started to give a materialistic interpretation of the universe. These hints may be regarded as the basis of the Cārvāka philosophy, but it does not follow that the Cārvāka philosophy had already appeared as a fully developed system.

Those scholars who insist that the Śāṁkhya and the Yoga schools developed before the time of the Buddha on the ground that Buddhism and these systems have certain similarities forget that the same evidence can lead to an opposite conclusion. The fact of similarity between them can be equally well used to infer that Buddhism was earlier than the Śāṁkhya and the Yoga Schools and had influenced them.

These discussions thus prove two things:

(a) There had been a considerable development of *Upaniṣad* philosophy before the age of Gautama the Buddha;

(b) The foundations of some of the other Schools had been laid although the evidence does not establish conclusively that they had reached their full development. We may therefore safely say that considerable speculative activity had preceded the emergence of the Buddha.

A study of the history of philosophy therefore leads us to the unassailable conclusion that philosophical speculations began earlier in India than in Greece. The sixth century B.C. marks the beginnings of philosophy in Greece, but in India it is an age of considerable philosophical progress. In a general history of philosophy we should therefore begin the story with India, not with Greece.

III

*Mysticism and Philosophy.*—The earliest Indian philosophy is to be found in the *Upaniṣads*, and the *Upaniṣads* have a distinct mystic and religious strain. From this fact we should not, like Zeller or Erdmann, draw the erroneous conclusion that early Indian philosophy should be excluded from an account of empirical or rational philosophy. It is true that so long as mysticism is the experience of an individual, we cannot apply to it the tests of philosophical enquiry. But when an attempt is made to build up a logical system of speculation on the basis of such experience, it must not only be included within the province of philosophy but may well constitute an important part of it. If we do not apply to it the name of philosophy, there is hardly any other term which can describe it.
INTRODUCTION

What is philosophy? Philosophy is an enquiry into the nature of life and of existence. We have two ways of dealing with reality. One starts and ends with revelation and tradition; we call it religion. The second depends on the free exercise of reason and thought and is called philosophy.

Philosophical enquiry from the earliest times has adopted one of two alternate ways of approaching its problems. One is through the world of man’s inner being and the other through the world external to him. The characteristic of Indian thought is that it has paid greater attention to the inner world of man than to the outer world. It does not begin with an investigation into outer phenomena and reach towards the inner reality. On the contrary, it starts from the realization of the inner world and reaches out to the world of phenomena. It was this way of approach that revealed itself in the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. In Greece also, the earlier Schools of philosophy had adopted a similar procedure or at least it was not excluded from their general approach. What we know of the Orphic or the Pythagorian philosophy tends to support this statement. The dialectical method of Socrates was, no doubt, logical, but he declared that he was guided by an inner voice. Like Indian philosophy, the message of some Greek philosophers also was “Know thyself.” In Platonic idealism we find the germs for the future development of mysticism, as well as of the knowledge of the inner self, but his disciple, Aristotle, did not choose to develop either of these lines of thought. Ultimately, however, mysticism came to fruition in Alexandria and culminated in the philosophy of Neoplatonism. We cannot say definitely whether the Upaniṣad philosophy of India was responsible for the development of this Alexandrian School. We, however, know that Alexandria had in that era become the meeting-place for the religions and civilizations of the East and the West. Just as gods of different religions had met in its market-place and led to the foundation of the Serapeum, it seems probable that the different streams of human thought and enquiry met here and mingled in one common flow.

What is the basic principle of mysticism? It is that the knowledge of reality cannot be obtained through the senses. If we are to reach reality, we must withdraw from the world of sense into that of inner experience. This principle, in some form or other, worked in the philosophical systems from Pythagoras to Plato. Plato made a sharp distinction between the world of thought and the world of sense. He expressed their difference by the analogy of the distinction between the light of midday and twilight. According to him, whatever we perceive through the senses is perceived as in twilight. What we perceive through the intellect is seen in the clear light of day. He emphasizes, again and again, the distinction between Appearance and Reality. The senses can reach us only up to the world of Appearance but not to the world of Reality. He expresses the ultimate
real as the Good. Science, knowledge and truth deal with Ideas which are like the Good but it is only the Good that is ultimately real. We cannot reach the Real through the mediation of sense. The famous parable of the cave-dwellers which he relates in The Republic is the final statement of his philosophy. Though he does not speak of intuitive reason on which Upaniṣad Philosophy is based, the way in which he repudiates objects of experience given through sense perception brings him very near the attitude of the mystics towards the world of sense.

There is also a second similarity between Indian and Greek philosophy which should not be overlooked. The concept of Nous in Greek philosophy is not very dissimilar to that of ātmā in Indian philosophy. Plato rejected the views of Anaxagoras and distinguished between two souls. He regards one as immortal and the other as mortal. The mortal soul (irrational soul) is not free from the influence of the body and may be called the ego. The immortal soul is the Idea of the Universe and is free from all influence of the body. This immortal soul is called by him "Universal Soul." If therefore we try to contrast Plato's concept of the mortal soul with that of the immortal soul, it will not be very different from the contrast between jīvātmā and paramātmā in Indian philosophy.

It will not therefore be proper to exclude Upaniṣad philosophy from a general account of philosophy on the ground that it is mystic. If we do so, we would also have to exclude a major portion of Greek philosophy from any such general account.

We must also remember that what differentiates philosophy from what is non-philosophy is not difference of subject-matter but of method and treatment. If a person's conclusions rest upon the authority of revelation or on individual ecstasy, we would more properly describe his findings as theology or mysticism and not philosophy. If, however, he adopts a method of intellectual construction and considers that the mystery of existence must be solved on the rational plane, we cannot exclude him from the rank of philosophers even though religious or mystic beliefs may have influenced him. Actually, some of the most important material of philosophy is derived from such discourses.

In Christianity and Islam there developed certain Schools which sought to subordinate philosophy to religion. But their own discourses have by general consent been included among philosophical writings. The reason for this is that they sought to defend religion against rationalist attacks by the use of rationalist methods. The discourses of St. Augustine and the later Christian scholastics cannot therefore be excluded from philosophical literature. The same remark applies to the writings of the Muslim scholars. So far as Arab philosophy is concerned, one of the Schools of which it can justly be proud will be excluded if we leave out this scholastic literature. Among the Arab philosophers the names of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn-al-Rushd (Averroes) are well known, but they were not spokesmen of
Arab philosophy proper. They were in fact followers and commentators of Aristotle. If we want to enquire into Arab philosophy proper, we must turn our eyes from them and study the writings of the scholastics who were often regarded as the antagonists of Greek philosophy. It is interesting to note that in modern times Bishop Berkeley, who embarked on philosophical speculations in order to establish the truth of religion, has been always counted among the philosophers and no history of philosophy is complete without an account of his writings.

Nor is Zeller’s criticism that “Indian philosophy never lost contact with religion and never became independent” justified. He perhaps had in mind the veneration in which the Vedas were generally held, but he was probably not aware that there were at least three unorthodox Schools that repudiated the authority of the Vedas. Neither Buddhism, nor Jainism nor Cārvāka philosophy depends on authority or tradition for its findings. Not only so, but even among the orthodox Schools Nyāya and Sāṁkhya philosophies often paid only lip service to the authority of the Vedas. We may therefore safely say that Indian philosophy had in the age of the Buddha already established a position independent of religion.

IV

Philosophical Contacts between India and Greece.—There is one other question to which I would like to make a brief reference. If it is an acknowledged fact that philosophy began in India earlier than in Greece, would it be unjustified to suppose that Indian philosophy may have had some influence on the beginnings of Greek philosophy? We know that the civilizations of the Nile and the Euphrates blossomed much before that of Greece. We have reasons to believe that the influence of these civilizations contributed towards the first development of Greek philosophy. Can we not also establish relations, whether direct or indirect, between India and Greece?

Historians of the present day have discussed this problem but have not yet reached any valid conclusions. It is true that some of the earliest Schools of Greek philosophy exhibit characteristics which have a striking resemblance to Indian modes of thought. Such similarities invite the inference that they were probably due to Indian influence. This applies specially to the Orphic cult. Historians are generally agreed that it exhibits elements that are essentially non-Hellenic in nature and suggest an Asian derivation. The idea of salvation as the liberation of the soul from the body is a central theme in the Orphic cult. Zeller admits that this idea originated in India but nevertheless he held that the Greeks had derived it from Persia. Later research does not, however, indicate that such an idea of liberation or mokṣa was an essential element in
Zarathushtra’s faith. It would not, therefore, be unreasonable to suppose that this concept travelled from India to Greece and influenced the early Greek Schools directly or indirectly.

It was an accepted belief in Greece that a journey to the East was necessary for the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom. It is recorded of various philosophers that they travelled to the East in quest of knowledge. We read of Democritus that he spent a long period in Egypt and Persia. Of Pythagoras it is said that when he left his home in Samos, he travelled to Egypt. It is well known that Solon and Plato had also travelled extensively in the East. It would therefore not be surprising if Pythagoras or some other Greek philosophers of this early period had travelled to India. But there is no historical evidence of such a visit. It has, however, been generally recognized that the philosophy of Pythagoras contains elements which are characteristically Indian. If we describe his philosophy without mentioning his name, a student of Indian philosophy could easily mistake it to be the account of an Indian philosopher. How and why this was so remains one of the unsolved problems of the history of philosophy.

We find it stated in the accounts of Alexander that his teacher, Aristotle, had requested him to find out the state of knowledge among Indians. This in itself suggests that the renown of Indian wisdom had reached as far as Greece before Alexander’s invasion. After the death of Alexander, legends were built round him. They were written in Greek, but some were translated into Syrian and later from Syrian into Arabic. They contain accounts of his encounters with Indian philosophers. He enquires from them about philosophical problems and admits that philosophy had reached in India a higher stage than in Greece. These stories cannot be regarded as historical. Nevertheless, they indicate that the renown of Indian wisdom had spread to these areas. This is borne out by the fact that such stories were freely composed and people listened to them with interest and credence. These legends are said to have been composed between the first century B.C. and the first century A.D.

We know that in accordance with the usual practice of setting up Greek colonies in all the lands he conquered, Alexander established such colonies on the banks of the Indus. We further know that the founder of Sceptic philosophy, Pyrrho (d. 275 B.C.) was in the army which came with him to India. After Alexander’s death, Seleucus Nicator established close contacts with Candra Gupta Maurya and sent Megasthenes as his ambassador to his court. Relations had thus been established between the Indians and the Greeks before the age of Aśoka. This lends support to the theory that intellectual exchanges had also taken place between them. As for Aśoka, we know from a still extant inscription that he sent missionaries to the Mediterranean countries and to all the Macedonian kings, though unfortunately no Western account of these missions has survived.¹

We may now try to indicate the conclusions which the available evidence
justifies. The countries mentioned in the Aśokan inscriptions had certainly received the message of Buddhism. It is probable that it had reached still farther as Buddhism was in those days a vigorous proselytizing religion. It is also probable that the influence of India had reached Greece even before the days of Aśoka. We have already referred to the remarkable resemblance between Indian thought and some of the early Greek Schools, particularly the philosophy of Pythagoras. Unless we are to assume that these resemblances are entirely fortuitous, there must have been contacts between India and Greece. Such contacts were likely to result in Indian thought influencing Greek thought, as Indian philosophy had already achieved considerable progress and reached a greater degree of maturity than the early Schools of Greek philosophy. All these lend support to the theory that Indian philosophy had perhaps contributed to the development of early Greek philosophy, though we have no definite knowledge of the nature and extent of such contribution.

What I have written so far deals with the possible influence of Indian philosophy on Greek philosophy. We should now consider the other aspect of the question, namely, what, if any, are the influences of Greek philosophy and science on India? It is difficult to give any detailed account of what can be regarded as conclusive. It can, however, be said with confidence that at least in the fourth century A.D. and thereafter Indian astronomy was influenced by Greek astronomy. In fact, some Greek terms became current in India. One well-known Indian astrologer, Varāhamihira, who died round about A.D. 587, has in his book, Brhat-Samhitā, referred to Greek astronomers. Another writer of this period whom Alberuni has quoted in his Indica has recorded high praise of Greek scholars. We can certainly infer from all this that after the third century A.D. India had become familiar with Greek knowledge and its influence was felt among the learned circles here. So far, however, as the different Schools of Indian philosophy are concerned, it is difficult to say with confidence to what extent, if any, they were influenced by Greek thought.

To sum up. It seems that our conclusions will be reasonable if we select two periods in the pre- and the post-Christian eras. We may say that in the pre-Christian era Greek philosophy in its earlier phases was perhaps influenced by Indian philosophy. So far as the post-Christian era is concerned, there are reasons to believe that some aspects of Indian thought were influenced by Greek knowledge.

V

Greece and India.—I would like to make it clear that my emphasis on the need of a comprehensive history of general philosophy is based solely on historical considerations. There is no question of the exaltation or
diminution of any country's or nation's contribution. We have divided humanity into groups based on geographical boundaries and painted Europe, Asia and Africa in different colours in the map of the world. The map of human knowledge cannot, however, be divided into regions of different colours. Knowledge is above all limitations and boundaries. Whatever be the region of the globe where it first emerged, it is the common heritage of all mankind. All human beings, regardless of country or nation, can lay claim to it with equal right. The fact that Socrates was born in Greece and the writers of the *Upaniṣads* in India may be important from the point of view of their own biography but is irrelevant so far as the history of human knowledge is concerned. It is true that Socrates was a Greek and the writers of the *Upaniṣads* were Indians. The addition they have made to human knowledge is, however, neither Greek nor Indian and belongs to the whole of humanity. If philosophy began in India earlier than in Greece, its only effect is that in narrating the history of philosophy we should begin with the mention of India. This does not, however, give any special virtue to India nor detract from the glory of Greece. We can apply to human knowledge what the Arab poet has said of the tribe of banu-Āmir:

"LĀ TAQUL DĀRUHĀ BI-SHARQĪ NAJDIN KULLU NAJDIN LIL-ĀMIRĪYATI DĀRU."

*Do not say that his house is to the east of Najd.*
*For all Najd is the dwelling of the tribe of banu-Āmir.*

VI

*World Philosophy.*—I have already stated one of the main considerations which led us to undertake the compilation of the present work. There is another consideration which is perhaps of still greater importance. Till now, the fragmentation of philosophy into different compartments has prevented the survey of philosophical problems from a truly universal point of view. We have histories of philosophy which deal with philosophy in one country or period, but there is no single study which covers the philosophical developments of all climes and ages. The time has therefore come to write a history of philosophy which will include the contributions of India, China and Greece, and of the ancient, the mediaeval and the modern periods.

Increasing control over the forces of nature has brought men of different regions nearer one another. Different cultures have thus been brought into close proximity. Closer contacts have created conditions in which the contributions of different peoples can be brought into one common pool
of human knowledge. They also facilitate the task of philosophy in effecting a reconciliation between the different principles underlying the outlook of different civilizations. The evolution of a world philosophy has become today a matter not only of theoretical interest but of great practical urgency.

From this viewpoint also the history of philosophy must be re-written. The contributions of different nations and periods must not only be fully recognized but given their proper place in the evolution of a common world philosophy. For example, in studying the problem of knowledge, we have till now considered the views of either Indian thinkers or Greek epistemologists or Arab philosophers. In consequence, we have looked at philosophical problems not in their pure light but as seen through the glass of a national or a geographical outlook. We must now attempt a solution of the problem which will take into consideration the insights acquired by these different systems. In this way alone can we approach the problems of philosophy from a truly philosophical point of view.

The present work, it is true, has not surveyed the problems of philosophy from this synoptic point of view. It has at least sought to bring together in one common compass the knowledge attained by different peoples at different times. It is my hope that this accumulation of material into one common pool will serve as a first step towards the writing of that world history of philosophy which alone can serve the needs of humanity at the present juncture.

VII

Conclusion.—We opened this introduction with a quotation from a Persian poet, which said that the first and last pages of the Book of Existence are lost. Philosophy is the quest for the recovery of these lost pages. Some three thousand years have passed in this quest but the lost pages have not yet been recovered, nor is there any hope that they will ever be recovered. The history of philosophy is the record of this quest. Though it does not tell us of the attainment of the goal, it has unfolded to us a fascinating story of voyage and enquiry.

The pilgrims of philosophy did not succeed in securing the object of their quest but they have in the course of their journey obtained something else of great value: in their search for philosophy they discovered science. Science has brought to man new power but has not given him peace. It first appeared as an instrument of construction, but is now threatening to become a weapon of destruction. The time has now come when philosophy should turn its attention towards the problem of human peace. If it succeeds in this quest and rediscovers the peace which man has lost, then, although it cannot re-write the two lost pages, it will write
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a new book for humanity. It will then, in the words of another Persian poet, have the right to say:

RAHRAWĀN RĀ KHASTAGI-YE-RĀH NĪST
ISHQ HAM RĀH AST-U-HAM KHUD-MANZIL AST

Those who follow this path never tire:
Because it is both the way and the destination.

NOTES

1. Arab writers had written two distinct types of books. One type was mainly biographical and dealt with the lives of philosophers so that the accounts of their philosophies were only incidental. In the second class of books, the main interest was in the Schools of philosophy, and biographical accounts were included only incidentally. The first class of books was called "Tārikh-ul-Hukāma" or Tārikh-ul-Falāsafa" ("History of Philosophers"). The second class was called "Kitāb-ul-Milale-wan Nahāl" ("Books of Religious and Philosophical Sects") or "Al Ārā wal Malqālāt" ("Opinions and Discourses"). There were also books which dealt with particular epochs of philosophy. Thus Al Fārābī (b. 925), wrote a book dealing with pre-Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian philosophy. We can perhaps describe these studies as the first attempt to write a systematic history of philosophy.

3. Thilly, Frank, History of Philosophy, p. 3.
7. cf. The following inscription of Aśoka, quoted in Bevan, House of Seleucus, Vol. I, p. 298: "And this is the chiefest conquest in His Majesty's opinion—the conquest by the Law; this also is that effected by His Majesty both in his own dominions and in all the neighbouring realms as far as six hundred leagues—even to where the Greek King Antiochus dwells, and beyond that Antiochus to where dwell the four kings severally named Ptolemy, Antigonus, Magas, and Alexander... and likewise here, in the king's dominions, among the Yonas (i.e. the Greeks of the Punjab)."
PART I
THE BACKGROUND OF INDIAN THOUGHT

PRE-VEDIC ELEMENTS IN INDIAN THOUGHT
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THE VEDAS
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THE UPAṆIṆADAS
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THE EPICS
A. The Rāmāyaṇa
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B. The Mahābhārata
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MANU AND KAUṬIĻYA (SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT)
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THE VIṢṆU AND THE BHĀGAVATA PURĀṆAS (MYTHOLOGY
AND DEVOTIONAL THOUGHT)
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CHAPTER I

PRE-VEDIC ELEMENTS IN INDIAN THOUGHT

In the development of philosophical thought in India there are two main currents, the Vedic and the non-Vedic. It is true that since early mediaeval times the Vedas have been regarded as the source of all Indian wisdom, but this was possible only by interpreting the term Vedas in a very wide sense. Thus, the Agama-Sastras and sciences and arts, like medicine and music, were accepted as parts of the Vedas, though they could not be traced to any extant text of the Vedas.

Nothing definite can be said as to whether Hindu thought is the result of the addition of the Aryan or the Vedic elements to an earlier Dravidian civilization or the addition of Dravidian elements to an already existing Aryan or Vedic civilization. This much is certain, that what is called Hindu thought is not a simple growth from Aryan or Vedic civilization. The element other than the Aryan or the Vedic, which contributed to this development, will be described in this paper as Dravidian. This Dravidian element is the most important other element in Hindu thought and the other non-Vedic elements may therefore be ignored.

It is difficult to define what is meant by the term Dravidian. The term is applied to a group of languages, to a people, and also to a civilization. The languages that are Dravidian have preserved their individuality, though mixed up with the Aryan languages. The ethnic inter-mixture in India has been so great that it is not possible at present to say who are the Dravidian peoples. Similarly, it is difficult to define Dravidian civilization, as distinct from the Aryan or Vedic civilization. Linguistic and ethnic surveys make it clear that it is wrong to think of North India as wholly Aryan and South India as wholly Dravidian. Linguistically, this division is not very wrong, but various minor languages spoken in North India show pronounced Dravidian elements. All that can be done is to mark out features in Indian thought which cannot be traced back to the Vedas as direct and natural developments from Vedic texts and treat them as Dravidian in this broad sense.

The part played by the forest in the evolution of Indian thought has deservedly received recognition in modern times. The Ashramas of the rsis were the centres for the development of philosophical thought in India, but only from the time of the Upanisads. Forests played no part in the pre-Upanisadic Vedas. The Ṛg-Vedic rsis were citizens living in cities and villages, and not people who retired to the forest for contemplation.
The forest plays no part in the civilization of the Brāhmaṇas either. In the Taithirīya-Aranyaka there is, however, a reference to obligatory study being in a place other than the village and the home. The place is described as a-
chadi-darśa, a place from which there will not be the sight (darśa) of the roof (chadi) of the homes. The distinction of the two parts of the obligatory study as what could be done in the village (grāmya) and what should be done in the forest (āranyā) is very clear in the later literature of the Vedas relating to the life of the Hindus.

The gods of the Vedas are not forest deities. They came in chariots drawn by horses and there is no mention of hunting associated with the Vedic gods. But when we come to the non-Vedic gods of Hinduism, we find that they are associated with the forest and with hunting. Nearly all the Śaivaite gods of Hinduism are non-Vedic, and are recognized as Dravidian. There are especially two deities, Kāli or Durgā and Ayyappan (a Dravidian god that is supposed to be the offspring of Śiva through Viṣṇu as māyā, who distributed nectar to the gods after the churning of the ocean). The temple of these two deities is called a kāvu in certain parts of South India and the word means a forest or grove. This shows that these deities were worshipped in forests and groves. The place where the serpent images are installed and worshipped is also designated by the same term.

The influence of the non-Vedic element was not merely in introducing a new kind of scene for the development of thought in the country, but also in bringing about a change in the approach to the problem of truth. The Vedic civilization is one of ritualism. The offering of soma at the sacrifices formed the most important feature of the religious life of the people among the Vedic Aryans. The Vedic texts are intimately associated with this form of ritual. The thought element in it is subordinate to the factor of sacrifice. No doubt, in the case of some of the poets who have composed the Ṛg-Vedic poetry, the element of communion with the gods is quite clear. The element of speculation and even philosophical thought is also not absent from the Vedic texts, but a system of ritualism is not the best environment for the development of philosophy and abstract thinking. There is too much action in such an environment for the development of speculative thought. Contemplation and concentration are necessary for the development of abstract thinking, and a sacrifice is hardly the suitable occasion for it.

Worship of the Divine in a more concrete form leads to higher thinking about God and the universe and their mutual relations. Such worship may be in a temple where there is a visible symbol of divinity or an actual image. The system of sacrifice as a public institution is seasonal, and performed only in certain specified months. The day-to-day sacrifice is in the home. The worship of the Divine in a temple is, on the other hand, a standing institution. Here, it is not merely a few poets with mystic
faculties who are in communion with the Divine. Others also have a more concrete vision of the Divine than is possible at a sacrifice where they see only the fire, and where they do not have any opportunity for participation. The concreteness, the community and the continuity associated with temple worship are a more suitable environment for the development of speculative thought.

In the Upaniṣads we find a combination of the element of the worship of the Divine in the forest with the Vedic sacrifices. Ritualism was not given up. But contemplation became a more important feature in the fire sacrifice in the forests.

The temples were forest institutions in the beginning. Perhaps it is the association with the Vedic practice of worship in the homes, in the villages and in the cities that led to the development of temples in the villages and cities and the installation of shrines also in the homes. There are many temples where the idol is accepted as self-installed. Such idols are called swayam-bhū (self-born). There are temples even now where the idol has to be left exposed to rain. There might be a temple, but no roof is put up above the idol. All these show the original connection of the temples and image worship with the forest. In the change from cities to the forests which are more congenial for contemplation and abstract thinking, and from the sacrifice to the more concrete temple worship we thus have two factors of non-Vedic origin that had great influence in the growth of philosophy.

The idea of unity of the universe is present in Vedic texts, but not the preliminary requirements for the growth of philosophical thought. There are two great elements in the non-Vedic side of Hindu religion that contributed to the recognition of ultimate unity in this world. These are met with also in the Vedas, but were interpreted and presented in a systematic way only in the later stages. One of these factors is the emergence of the female element in the pantheon. The Vedic religion is essentially the worship of the Divine in its male aspect. There are few goddesses in the Vedas, and the few who are there are not of great importance.

Perhaps Aditi identified with the earth is the only goddess that has a high position in the Vedic pantheon, being the mother of the gods. But even Aditi is not worshipped in the Vedas like the other gods, Agni (fire), Indra, Varuṇa, and Viṣṇu. Sarasvatī is a very insignificant figure in the Vedic pantheon. Indraṇī appears in a very casual way in the Vedic text. It is only at a later stage that we find the Mother Goddess appearing on the scene in the Hindu religion, and the presumption is that this is due to the influence of the non-Vedic scheme of gods. Thus we find in course of time the Goddess as the most prominent power in the world, the Goddess as the creative power of the highest God, and a goddess associated with practically all the important gods. Thus we have Śrī (the Goddess of wealth) and Bhūmi (the earth) as the consorts of Viṣṇu, Pārvatī as the
consort of Śiva, and Sarasvatī as the consort of Brahmā. The tri-mūrti (the triad of divinity) had thus also a female aspect.

From Kālidāsa's works we gather that Brahmā occupied a high position in the religion of the times. The fact that this Vedic deity did not continue as a great god shows the non-Vedic influences then working in the religious life of India. Although on the male side, both Viṣṇu and Śiva continued to occupy the highest position, on the female side, it is the aspect of goddess as the consort of Śiva that prevailed in the Hindu pantheon. Pārvatī, Kāli and Durgā are various aspects of the goddess who occupies an independent position in the Hindu religion of later days. There are certain Schools which regard the highest Divinity as the Mother, and Śiva is worshipped only as her consort. Śiva is also worshipped as the ardha-nāriśvara, or the Lord who is half woman. Beside the Goddess, there are associates like mahā-vidyās (the great wisdoms), the yoginis (those who have attained to yoga), and various other elements which show the high position assigned to the female aspect of divinity.

The theistic Sāmkhya of the Purāṇas traces the cosmos to the Divine, which transformed itself into puruṣa and prakṛti. Through their interaction, the world is originated and continues. This Sāmkhya metaphysics is one of the strongest foundations of the Upaniṣadic system. It is doubtful if this doctrine could be evolved from the Vedic heaven and earth as Father and Mother and the Vedic Aditi, without some outside contribution which assigned to the female aspect a position of requisite importance.

The other great contribution of the non-Vedic religions to Indian thought is the position assigned to animals, birds, trees, etc. In the Vedas, animals and trees play very little part. This is natural in a city civilization. Animals and trees have a higher position in a civilization evolved in the forest. In the Vedas, there is the horse which drew the chariots of the gods, there is the cow that gave milk. Many other animals and birds are also mentioned as well as fish. There are also references to soma and its juice, and the log of wood from which the sacrificial pole is made. Animals, birds, fish, trees and plants, however, come into the picture only incidentally in the Vedas. They are referred to as a subordinate material in the life of man and not as integral parts in the scheme of the total world.

We see a different picture in later Hindu thought. Cow-worship becomes one of the most important features in Hindu life, but this is an aspect that did not appear in the Vedas. Various other animals and birds appear as vehicles (vāhana) of the different gods, and they are also the banner signs for the gods. Thus Śiva has a bull and Viṣṇu has a kite (Garuḍa, which is the Sanskrit form of the Dravidian word kaukōgan, a vulture). Brahmā has swans. Viṣṇu rests on the coiled body of the serpent Śeṣa or Ananta that supports also the earth. Śiva has the serpent Vāsuiki as his ornament. Elephant, lion, tiger, buffalo, etc., come into the picture.
as associated with divinities. The vehicles of the gods are also objects of worship along with the gods. Trees also began to be worshipped by the Hindus in the post-Vedic times. Especially is this the case with the banyan tree. Other trees and plants and creepers also were associated with various powers. The scope of Divine emanation was thus extended and increase of time gave rise to the doctrine of śrīhaś (holy places, especially in rivers and oceans). It is not merely in temples that the Divine was present, but also in certain localities in this world. Contact with such localities contributed to the spiritual elevation of man.

The deification of man is another feature of post-Vedic religion. Great heroes, considered as gods, came down to the earth as men for the protection of humanity, and were worshipped as gods in temples erected for them. A typical instance of this process which continued till recent times is the goddess Karnījī in Rajputana. In the Vedas also, human beings became gods like the Maruts and the Rbhus, and human beings attained to divine powers and some of the divine rights, e.g. the rṣis known as Aṅgiras. But there is no mention in the Vedas of gods coming down to earth as human beings. In post-Vedic Hinduism God appeared also in the form of animals. There is Hanumat, the monkey god. There is Gaṇeṣa, the man-elephant god. Nandin, the attendant on Śiva, has the form of a bull. Skanda or Subrahmanya has the form of a serpent. The avatāra doctrine associated with Viṣṇu is, however, a later development. There is only one avatāra of Viṣṇu for which there is a trace in the Vedas. That is the Dwarf, who measured out the whole world in three steps. From the word varāha which occurs in the Veda, commentators have tried to show that this is a reference to the Boar incarnation (varāha), but there is no basis for this interpretation. All the other avatāras of Viṣṇu are extra-Vedic.

The gods in the Vedas have little individuality and hardly any concreteness. But the entire conception of God changed in later Hindu thought. There is greater clearness owing to the more concrete nature of the divine form and the greater differentiation in the functions of the gods. Brāhma was assigned the function of creation, but as this remained an abstract conception he dwindled in religion though he continued to find a place in mythology. Śiva and Viṣṇu, on the other hand, became concrete and highly individualized and took the highest position in Hindu thought. The image of Viṣṇu reposing on the coiled body of the serpent Śeṣa, with his two consorts Śrī and Bhūmi, and with his functions of preserving and protecting the world cannot be derived from the conceptions of God we find in the Vedas. The same applies to Śiva on the Mount Kailāsa, with his consort Pārvatī, and his sons and attendants, and charged with the destruction of the world so that there may be a better creation. Gaṇeṣa, Skanda and other deities acquire distinct individualities and distinct functions.

The growth in personification helped in the development of the doctrine
of bhakti in Hinduism. We find traces of bhakti also in the Vedas, especially in the hymns to Varuṇa; but how can true bhakti evolve with the Vedic gods who are incorporeal and abstract and cannot be seen even in the form of idols? Vedic sacrifices remained domestic or village institutions and it was temple worship that assumed the form of national institutions. The rṣis of the Vedic times who had communion with the gods gave place to the great devotees who surrendered themselves to the gods.

There evolved a new literature relating to Hinduism, distinct from the Vedic literature. These are the Āgamas relating to temple worship. Tamil has an immense literature of the Śaiva School. The earliest religious literature in Tamil consists of devotional songs of the saints called the Ālvārs. They are all collected together into what is called Tirumurai. Names of works like Nāl-adiyār, Tiru-vācakam, Tevāram, etc., are very famous in South India. Similarly there are the Divya-prabandhas of the Vaiṣṇavites. These works, along with epics like Manimekhalai, all belonging to the early centuries of the Christian era, contain much of philosophy and controvert many of the Buddhist and the Jaina doctrines. The saints were able to convert the rulers back to Hinduism from Buddhism and Jainism, but it cannot be said that the conversion was to Vedic Hinduism.

From the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads, which interpret the ritualism and the philosophy of the Vedas respectively, to the works of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Śaṅkarācārya it is a long leap. These two thousand years are covered on the one hand by the śūtras of the Mimāṁsā and the Vedānta, and on the other by the Épics with the Bhagavad-Gītā as a part of the Mahābhārata in Sanskrit, and an immense literature of worship in Tamil. This literature paved the way for the revival of Vedic religion, but it may be pointed out that the southern languages also developed a mass of literature relating to the higher aspects of non-Vedic religions. There are also Schools like Śaiva-siddhānta and some sections of the Vaiṣṇavite religion that accord an independent authority to their basic texts without recognizing them as part of the Vedas. It is also interesting to note that the revival of Vedic religion was almost entirely due to the contribution of men speaking the four main Dravidian languages. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa was an Āndhra, Śaṅkarācārya came from Kerala, Rāmānuja came from Madhva, and Madhva had his home in the Kannada area. It is true that the revival was in the name of the Vedas and not in the name of the new religion of temple worship. The texts relating to the latter accepted the supremacy of the Vedas and their own literature was given a place in the religion as forming parts of the Vedas. Śaṅkara's monism may be Upaniṣadic but his theology is certainly not Vedic. In the systems of Rāmānuja and of Madhva, only the texts are taken from the Vedic store. The entire interpretation is based on the latter-day religion of temple worship and the Āgamas.

Viṣṇu of the Vedas has only the name in common with the Viṣṇu of
latter-day Hinduism, along with the attribute of the three strides (tri-vikrama). Rudra of the Veda has little resemblance to the Śiva of later Hinduism, except that the name Rudra continued as synonymous with Śiva. The multitude of village gods and goddesses with their various functions and legends and attributes brought about a revolution in the whole of the Vedic religion, though the new religion professed its allegiance to the Vedas.

Within the last thirty years, our knowledge of the non-Vedic elements in the evolution of Indian thought has greatly increased from the discovery of the remnants of an ancient civilization in the Indus Valley, in places known as Mohenjo Daro and Harappa. The archaeological finds in these regions reveal the existence of cities there as early as about 3000 B.C. The study of this civilization is still in its early stage and its chronological relation to Vedic civilization is still a matter of dispute. Nevertheless, valuable information regarding the civil, the social and the religious life of these people has helped to remove some of the gaps in our knowledge of ancient India.

There is no evidence of the existence of anything corresponding to Vedic ritualism in the Indus valley civilization. We, however, find many of the features of the non-Vedic civilization that contributed to the growth of later Hinduism. Thus phallus worship was a prominent feature of the religion of the Indus peoples. It represents the creative aspect of the Divine, a feature that is very indistinct in the Vedic conception of gods. Certain powers relating to the early stages of the world are attributed to the various gods in the Vedas, but God as creator is not an aspect of the Vedic texts. The Vedas speak with scorn of those who do not perform sacrifices and those who do not make gifts. This may well be a reference to the Indus valley civilization.

Another prominent feature of the Indus valley civilization was the worship of the Mother Goddess. Various forms of the deity have been found in this region, but there is no doubt about the identity of these forms. Thus the predominance of the female aspect of the Divine in this civilization is another non-Vedic element which influenced the Indian civilization of later times. Temple worship was also prominent in this civilization. These two aspects are common to the Dravidian civilization already dealt with above. But this civilization was essentially a city civilization and it could not be otherwise in so far as the remnants are available only from the city sites. The appearance of animals and birds is another feature in this civilization that is common with the Dravidian civilization. Various figures have been discovered, but it is uncertain whether they were decorations or objects of worship. They may even form only a system of alphabet of the picture-writing type. There is much that is uncertain, but the predominance of animals is a feature that demands our attention.
Another important non-Vedic element which can be clearly discovered in the Indus valley civilization is the mode of the disposal of the dead body. Burial urns have been unearthed in the Indus valley which indicate that the dead bodies were buried and not cremated. This is distinct from the Vedic practice where dead bodies were cremated. It is interesting to speculate on the reasons for burying the dead. Is it in the hope of the soul returning to the earth, and perhaps occupying the same body that the body was not destroyed? Is this the beginning of the doctrine of transmigration? Traces of a belief in the return of the soul to the earth after death are not totally absent in the Vedic texts, but the life of the soul in a higher and happier world is the more dominant feature of the Vedic religion and not the return of the soul for another span of life in this world.

The doctrine of karman too is very faint in the early Vedic texts. The doctrine of karman is not merely a belief in the attainment of happiness as a fruit of good deeds. The essence of the doctrine is that while man in the present may be the product of his own past, he is also the sole architect of his own future. The śrāddha and various other Vedic rites show that there is a remedy in the hands of others for the evil effects of one's own actions. The doctrine of reincarnation and the doctrine of karman are interlocked and prominent in the Upaniṣads, but in the earlier texts they are very faint, if traceable at all. The belief that the dead person can mould his own destiny and return to this world may be at the root of not burning the dead body in this non-Vedic civilization. The idea of man being his own architect fits in better with the non-Vedic religion than with the Vedic religion of ritualism where man performs the sacrifices to propitiate gods who bestow benefits on man. The system of burying the dead bodies is based on the belief of the ability of the dead person to work out his own destiny and to return to life. The literatures of the Southern languages mention various kinds of disposal of the dead body of which one is burial of the dead body. But cremation is not unknown. Perhaps the literary evidences are influenced by the admixture of the Vedic custom of cremation. The samnyāsa is not an institution that has developed independently from the early Vedic civilization. According to custom that has continued till today, the samnyāsins are buried after death and their bodies are not cremated. Perhaps this may be a survival of all bodies being buried instead of being cremated, and the samnyāsins, with their yogic powers, may be able to return to life and as such their bodies are not destroyed in fire through cremation.

It is doubtful whether the Indus valley civilization is distinct from the Dravidian civilization. Scholars have declared that there is great affinity between the two. It is for this reason that the Dravidian contribution to Indian thought has been discussed in detail because nearly everything said about that civilization applies to Indus valley civilization as well.
PRE-VEDIC ELEMENTS IN INDIAN THOUGHT

To sum up: The important contributions from the non-Vedic or Dravidian and Indus valley sources are: (1) The influence of forests in the life of the people; (2) Temple worship along with contemplation of the Divine in a more concrete form; (3) Elevation of animals, birds, trees, etc., to a higher position in the scheme of the universe; (4) The exaltation of the female aspect of the Divine; (5) The creative aspect of God; and (6) God appearing as national heroes and the deification of man.
CHAPTER II
THE VEDAS

§1. THE SOURCES

The Veda consists of Mantras and Brähmanas. Mantras are of four varieties—three mainly concerned with the sacrifice (yajña), viz. (i) verses for recital (Ṛc), (ii) verses for chanting (Sāman), and (iii) prose formulae (Yajus), and the last (iv) Atharvāngirasah, formally indistinguishable from either (i) or (iii), with magical and sacramental rites. A settled collection of each of these presenting normal euphonic features is a Saṁhitā, to wit, Ṛg-Veda-Saṁhitā, Sāma-Veda-Saṁhitā, Yajur-Veda-Saṁhitā (called “Black” or “White,” according as Brähmana portions are included or not), and Atharva-Veda-Saṁhitā. The Brähmanas, dependent on these, are prose treatises elaborating and eulogizing sacrifices. They are attached to one or the other of the Saṁhitās and are considered to include the mystic and philosophical Āranyakas and Upaniṣads, treated in the next chapter. Each of the Saṁhitās, and some Brähmanas, developed different canonical recensions in course of time.¹

Indian tradition lost all count of the age and authorship of the Vedas, persistently crediting them, as it does, with eternity and impersonality. The accredited seers (ṛṣis) are no more than media of revelation at the beginning of each aeon. Max Müller's was the first attempt to fix the period of composition, on purely arbitrary grounds,² as between 1200–600 B.C. Curiously enough this view has found favour with most scholars who have since spared no pains to offer corroborative arguments and fought tooth and nail, if anybody had the temerity to challenge its authenticity. From astronomical references in the texts Tilak in his Orion (Bombay, 1893), and Jacobi in a paper in Festgruss an Rudolf von Roth (Stuttgart, 1893), "simultaneously and independently of each other," arrived at 4500–2500 B.C. (the former pleading, further, for the maximum limit of 6000 B.C. for some of the earliest hymns). Patient scrutiny discloses the essential soundness of their conclusion which has been further confirmed through various other articles by Jacobi.³

For the sake of convenience the varied philosophical conceptions of the Vedas will be presented here under the captions (i) Religion, (ii) Theology, (iii) Monotheism, Pantheism and Monism, (iv) Ethics, (v) Cosmology and Cosmogony, (vi) Eschatology, (vii) Psychology, and (viii) Logic.
§2. RELIGION

Consideration of the deities worshipped by the Vedic people will occupy us in the next section. Their worship consisted mainly of offering of hymns, obeisances and oblations. Although, later, these appear only as parts of the yajña, there is evidence to indicate the independent value attached to the first two acts, separately or conjointly. At the yajña, before one or more fires were ceremonially kindled, favourite articles of food—milk, honey, melted butter, grains, and their preparations, flesh, and the stimulating juice of the plant soma—were offered with the utterance of Yajuses, recital of Rcs, and chanting of Sāmans according to set rules and conventions. Great sacrifices called śrauta-yajñas required the specific services of several priests, but the sacramental domestic rites (grhya-karman) could be performed by the householder and his wife with or without the assistance of any officiating priests. The fire-god Agni is asked to carry the oblations, committed to his care, to the gods, or to fetch the latter to receive them. The yajña, originally conceived to secure the goodwill of the gods granting mundane happiness and a delectable heavenly life after death, developed endless varieties and was clothed with ever-increasing mysticism with the march of time. TS. 2. 5. 5. 6 calls it a “razor-edge,” which may as easily bring about blessings as death, and inculcates right conduct in the initiate. It became an independent means of achieving any object and usurped to itself reverential faith (śraddhā) at the cost of the gods,4 who had been its primary recipients (cf. RV. 2. 26. 3; 10. 151; TS. 1. 6. 8. 1; VS. 19. 77; TB. 3. 12. 3. 2; KB. 2. 8). Accordingly, the gods themselves and even Prajāpati, the Creator, appear frequently in the Brāhmaṇas as sacrificers. The yajña became mystically equated with Prajāpati, Viṣṇu, the year, or death.

The Mantras, too, are invested with similar mystic powers even in the earliest hymns and hence called Brahman, like the mysterious power of the gods. A purely devotional tone, however, shorn of any consciousness of compelling power, runs through innumerable hymns. Terms of endearment, fondly addressed to the gods, also bear this out (§3). Meditation on the nature and glory of the gods is emphasized in RV. 1. 24. 1; 3. 62. 10; 5. 1. 4, etc. Powers and efficacy of austerity (tapas) are celebrated in RV. 10. 154. 2, 4, 5; TS. 5. 3. 5. 4; KB. 2. 8; TB. 3. 12. 3. 1. TS. 5. 2. 1. 7 mentions the nomadic ascetic (yāyāvara) who “pursues that which yields peace and tranquillity, clenches his fist, controls speech,” and RV. 10. 136 dilates upon the mystic and superhuman character of the hairy anchorite (muni), who naked or clad in brown dirt (cf. AB. 7. 13), “moving in the haunts of the gandharvas, the apsarases and the deer,” enjoys communion with the gods. Ethics which will occupy us later (§5) permeated all these religious activities. It is noteworthy that no reference to images or temples
occurs unless deva-māna, "a building of a god," in RV. 10. 107. 10, be the solitary instance. RV. 4. 24. 10 (and perhaps also 8. 1. 5) seems to refer to some sort of fetishistic image of Indra, which could be sold or hired. Totemism and animism as such do not occur, but animism prompted by the sense of the immanence of God is abundantly in evidence (§3).

Beside this picture, is to be set that of the widespread popular belief in the potency of charms, spells and magic. Although stray references are scattered throughout Vedic literature, it is the special province of the Atharva-Veda and its ritual work, the Kauśika-sūtra, which thus anticipate the Tantras. The charms are directed mostly against demons and sorcerers, diseases and accidents, as also towards securing welfare, peace and harmony, but a few are certainly designed to secure advantage over rivals or even to injure enemies. Here, too, the gods are the friends and the demons the enemies of the Vedic people, and black magic is condemned as strongly in the AV. itself as in the other Vedas.

§3. THEOLOGY

Superhuman might and wisdom, luminosity, immortality, benevolence and intolerance of sin characterize Vedic gods and their appurtenances. Bases for their conception are principally of three different kinds: (1) The grander aspects of nature. The degree of nearness to these leads to a further classification into (i) transparent, e.g. heaven (dyaus), earth (prthivi), sun (sūrya), dawn (uṣas), wind (vāta or vāyu), fire (agni), waters (āpāh), along with the various river-deities and the beverage-deity Soma; (ii) translucent, e.g. Pūṣan, Viṣṇu, Indra, Rudra, Apām-Napāt, etc.; and (iii) opaque, e.g. Aditi, Varuṇa, Mātriśvan, the Ṛbhus, etc. (2) Certain functions, e.g. artificer (Tvāṣṭṛ), stimulator (Savitr), Lord of prayer (Brhaspati or Brahmaṇaspati), etc. And (3) abstract notions, e.g. faith (śraddhā), wrath (manyu), disease or dissolution (nirṛti), etc., which are often mere apostrophes and play but a secondary role. Animals, plants, and inanimate objects, including man-made articles, are sometimes similarly apostrophized to grant peace and prosperity.

The conception is on the whole anthropomorphic. But anthropomorphism here is often indefinite in outline—fairly distinct about translucent, opaque and function-gods, but shadowy about the rest. This attitude underlies occasional attribution of differences in age, stature and mutual relationship (RV. 1. 27. 13; AV. 1. 30. 2), parentage, and acquisition of immortality through drinking soma (RV. 9. 106. 8), performing austerity or certain rites (RV. 10. 167. 1; AV. 4. 11. 6; SB. 11. 1. 2. 12), or favour of certain deities (RV. 6. 7. 4; 4. 54. 2). Again, all this is denied, they being "equally great" (RV. 8. 30. 1) and "sons of immortality" (RV. 6. 52. 9; 10. 13. 1). They live in heaven, but are classed (RV. 1. 139. 11; AV. 1. 30. 3)
also as inhabiting heaven, atmosphere and earth—Sūrya, Vāta and Agni respectively representing them symbolically (RV. 10. 158. 1; TS. 7. 3. 12). Individual gods like Indra, Varuṇa, or Savitṛ often appear as the highest. Max Müller explains this as henotheism or kathenotheism, which makes each god in turn the highest and independent of the rest. The better explanation may, however, lie in the natural tendency of the devotee to extol the deity engaging his attention for the time being, or more probably in the widespread belief in their equality and even in their unity (cf. RV. 1. 164. 46; 8. 58. 2; 10. 114. 5; and §4). 8

Great cosmic activities (such as creating and stabilizing heaven and earth, planting the sun on high, digging the courses of the rivers and ordaining their constant downward flow, etc.) are attributed to some of the gods and they are busy fighting the disturbers of the cosmic order, the great demons of drought, darkness, etc., whom they ultimately overpower. The cosmic order, conceived as immutable and inviolable, is called ṛta, literally “the course (of things)”. Ṛta must have immediately covered also the religious and moral orders, these, too, being regarded as equally immutable and inviolable. The gods, especially the Adityas and their leader Varuṇa, are zealous guardians of this extended ṛta. But not only that: they are also born in or out of it (ṛta-jāta), abide by it (ṛṭavat), and flourish in it (ṛṭāvṛdh). Men supplicate them also to remove or annihilate the smaller spirits causing trouble or disease, to help overpower enemies, and to eliminate the “tortuous” course of sin or forgive slips. They are affectionately called “father,” “mother,” “brother,” “friend,” “comrade,” or “relative”—terms indicative of the cordial relation and implicit faith subsisting between the worshipper and the worshipped. But there are sceptics, too, flatly denying the existence of Indra (or, for that matter, of any divinities), for “who has seen him?” (RV. 2. 12. 5; 8. 100. 3; AV. 11. 2. 28, etc.), and the ṛṣis are at pains trying to refute them.

The battles of the gods and the demons, both offspring of Prajāpati, form a frequent topic in the Brāhmaṇas, but SB. 11. 1. 6. 9. 10 appears to lift the veil when it authoritatively denies any such occurrences. The Brāhmaṇa cited is a variation of RV. 10. 54. 2, which stigmatizes Indra’s battles as an “illusion” (māyā). RV. 3. 53. 8 and 6. 47. 18 also ascribe Indra’s assumption of forms to his māyās. This fact, read in the light of §4 and of epithets like “sons of (the) great might,” “of the reality,” “of immortality,” “of consciousness” (Dakṣa)8, “of infinity (Aditi)”8 (RV. 8. 25. 5A; 8. 69. 4C; 10. 13. 1C; 6. 50. 2A and 8. 25. 5B; 7. 60. 5D), and “born of the mind, allied with the mind” (TS. 1. 2. 3. 1), clearly indicates that the ṛṣis were conscious that the gods and their myths were but different aspects of the self-same immanent principle. Their attitude (recognized in the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa 10. 87. 15) is the one recommended in the Bhagavad-Gītā 10. 41, viz. whatever entity exhibits magnificence, beauty or might has its being in an aspect of the spirit of God.
§4. MONOTHEISM, PANTEHEISM AND MONISM

The reference to RV. 3. 55, "the mighty divinity of the gods in one," makes explicit the idea of oneness underlying the paradox of mutual generation and alternative supremacy of the gods. It is further clarified in RV. 1. 164. 64, which avers that sages describe diversely that which is One, and in 10. 114. 5, where the wise sages with their words are said to turn into many the eagle (suparna) which is really one. The conception of the supreme being as an eagle might have been suggested by the sun—a great creative, controlling and vivifying force in the Vedas, which is often so fancied and which appears to have led to another important conception, that of the golden embryo (hiranya-garbha). This one being finds mention in the RV. under various unqualified appellations such as "unborn" (aja) (I. 67. 3; I. 164. 6; 8. 41. 10, etc.), "spirit" (asura) (5. 63. 3. 7; 10. 177. 1), "father" (pitṛ) (1. 160. 2; 164. 22; cf. I. 160. 4; 4. 56. 3), or "one" (eka) (I. 164. 46; 8. 56. 2; 10. 129. 2). But two hymns on "the All-doer" (Visva-karman) (10. 51–2) and one on Hiranyakarbara (10. 121) set forth vividly its character as the all-embracing creator, controller and supporter of the universe. In 1. 164. 31 He appears in the role of the guardian (gopā), who, never resting, moves hitherwards and away and, "robing Himself in centripetal as well as centrifugal elements, rolls recurrently amongst the entities." The AV. presents Him besides as the "heavenly gandharva" (2. 1. 2; 2. 1), the "supporter" (skambha, 10. 7–8), the "ruddy one" (rohita, 13. 1–4), the "vital principle" (prāna, 11. 4), and the "time" (kalā, 19. 53–4). This monotheism is often tinged with pantheism. Thus RV. 5. 3. 1c speaks of all the gods being in Agni, 3. 54. 17b in Indra and 1. 35. 6c round Savitṛ "as round the axle-point," while the burden of 10. 100, addressed to the All-gods (Viśve-devas, refers to Aditi as "all" (sarvaditi). Similar is the trend of 10. 82. 6 and 10. 121. 7, 8. But when RV. I. 89. 10 equates Aditi with everything conceivable, including "what has been, or will be, born," pantheism passes into monism.

Monism is indicated also in RV. 8. 58. 2, where, on the analogy of there being only one fire, one sun and one dawn that function everywhere, it is concluded that "one became diversified into all this." Similarly, in 2. 35. 2, 8 it is said of the god Apāṁ-Napāt, "Son of the Waters," that all the other entities, which he himself has created, are "but his branches." VS. 31. 19ab says: "Prajāpati moves inside the embryo—unborn, He produces Himself in various manners"; to which AV. 10. 8. 13cd adds: "He produced the whole universe with one half—where is that light which is His (other) half?" Immanence and transcendence implied in this last passage appear also in the Puruṣa-sūkta (RV. 10. 90. 3cd): "All
the beings (together) constitute one-quarter of Him—His three-quarters are immortality in heaven” (cf. also AV. 10. 7. 8, 9). Monism is highly elaborated in the two skambha-sūktas of the AV. (10. 7–8).

A corollary of monism is the identification of the individual with the universal soul, which appears to be postulated in RV. 4. 26, where Vāmadeva identifies himself with various mythic personages and gods, and in 10. 61. 19, where another sage declares, “I am all.” VS. 8. 9 emphasizes the vastness and secrecy of the self (aḥam, “I”), while AV. 10. 7. 17AB proclaims that “those who recognize the Brahman (i.e. the universal soul) in man (puruṣa) know Him who is stationed at the summit (paramesṭhin)” (cf. also TB. 3. 10. 8). Reference to the two souls (or, to the body and the soul?) as two birds resting on the same tree—one eating sweet fruit, but the other lustrous without eating—is to be seen in RV. 1. 164. 20. Soul must be the theme also of verses 21, 22, 30, 31 and, most probably, of 37 in this mystic hymn. The two skambha-sūktas (AV. 10. 7–8; so SB. 10. 5. 4. 15, 16; 10. 6. 3; 11. 2. 13 among others) have anticipated most of the ideas of the Upaniṣads. Even the principle of illusion (māyā) of the Advaita Vedānta appears forestalled in 10. 8. 34: “Where gods and men rest like spokes in the nave—I ask you of the Flower (i.e. the quintessence) of the Waters, of the place where it is deposited with māyā.” The whole position regarding the soul and its liberation is summed up in 10. 8. 44: “(It is) free from desire, wise, immortal self-born, satiate with sap (rasa), not deficient in any respect; knowing only it one fears not death—(it) the self (ātman), (that is), wise, un-aging, young.” Similar is the trend also of VS. 31. 18–19.

§5. ETHICS

The concept of rta (§3) invested the moral order with sublimity and inviolability and its working with inevitability and justice, anticipating thus the doctrine of karna. “Divine ordinance (vrata), was similarly extended to include “vows” or “conduct.” The gods (§3) assess merits of thoughts, speeches or deeds from the inside (RV. 2. 27. 3; 8. 18. 15), dispensing rewards or punishments accordingly. “Agreeing or agreement with reality” (satuṣa), and “negation of rta” (anrta), later restricted to truth and falsity of speech respectively, appear in moral contexts to represent virtue and vice generally (cf. RV. 7. 49. 3; TB. 3. 7. 12. 3). Malign intention, swearing, falsehood, imprecation, calumniation, back-biting, dishonesty, sorcery, gambling, debt, egoistic enjoyment, wantonness or adultery, theft and any injury to life are sins (RV. 1. 23. 22; 4. 5. 5; 7. 104. 1–25; AV. 6. 112. 30; VS. 30. 5. 13; MS. 4. 14. 17; TB. 3. 7. 12), while honesty, rectitude, fellow-feeling, charity, non-violence, truthfulness, salutary and agreeable speech, continence and control of senses
(brahmacarya), reverential faith, and austerity are virtues highly extolled (cf., further, *RV. 10. 117. 154; AV. 11. 5; GB. 1. 2. 1-4; VS. 19. 77; 26. 2; *KB. 2. 8). Only compunction for slaughtering the victim could have prompted the remark that it did not die, but went to heaven (*RV. 1. 162. 21; *AB. 2. 6). Three performances of sacrifices, improper eating, and inordinate acceptance are further sources of trouble (*TS. 1. 1. 13. 3; *PB. 19. 4. 10-11). Even association with sinners might contaminate (*AV. 7. 65. 3). Incapacity to understand (*RV. 7. 86. 6; *SB. 4. 4. 5. 23), or confession (*SB. 2. 5. 2. 20) might lessen the heinousness; condonation, nevertheless, is solicited for unconscious, accidental or unavoidable sins (*TB. 3. 7. 12. 1-4).

Mutual love, respect and agreement, obedience to parents, community of pursuits, agreeable and salutary address, and conjugal love and obligation are enjoined amongst the members of a family (*AV. 3. 30; *RV. 1. 73. 3D; 10. 34. 2). The wife enjoys a high, affectionate status (*RV. 3. 53. 4A; 10. 85. 46; *TS. 6. 1. 8. 5; *SB. 5. 2. 1. 10). A woman might occasionally choose her husband (*RV. 10. 27. 12; cf. *TB. 2. 4. 2. 7) and remarry (*AV. 9. 5. 27-8), but polygamy, not polyandry, is approved (*TS. 6. 5. 1. 4; *SB. 9. 4. 1. 6; *GB. 2. 3. 20).

Socially, a man is born with debts to seers, gods, manes, men and animals, repayable respectively with *Vedic* study, sacrifice, procreation, hospitality and offering, called the five "great sacrifices" (*TS. 6. 3. 10. 5; *SB. 1. 7. 2. 1-5; 11. 5. 6. 1). Society, consisting apparently from the earliest times of the priestly (brahman, brāhmaṇa), ruling (rājanya, kṣatriya) and professional (viś, vaiśya) classes, is strengthened by admitting a servitor class (śūdra), the erstwhile dāsas (cf. *AV. 4. 20. 4-8; 5. 22. 7; *TS. 3. 2. 6. 2). Árya, however, continues to designate only the first three. But evidence of rigidity of the caste-system is as yet lacking. An Árya's life comes to be divided, first during this period, into four successive stages (as student, householder, forest anchorite and mendicant), called "hermitages" (āśramas), where one could toil for spiritual progress,18 *AB. 7. 15 expressly denying any prosperity for one who has not toiled.

Politically, the king, chosen and liked by the people (*RV. 10. 124. 8C; 173. 1; *AV. 4. 8. 4), is their guardian (*RV. 3. 43. 5), having devoted friends (*RV. 1. 73. 3B = 3. 55. 21B) and feeding on the rich (*RV. 1. 65. 7B). Solicitude for courteous speech (*VS. 26. 2), concord and harmony (*RV. 10. 191), and the optimum condition of prosperity (*VS. 22. 22; cf. *RV. 1. 91. 20) in the state reveals a high sense of civic responsibilities.

The goal of right conduct is variously held out as prosperity (*RV. 1. 189. 1; 8. 97. 13), heaven (*RV. 154. 4; *AV. 11. 4. 11), or immortality (*AV. 11. 5. 19). But in *RV. 10. 31. 2 right conduct according with one's conscience and understanding seems to be stressed as an independent value.
§6. COSMOLOGY AND COSMOGONY

To the Vedic Indian the universe consisted of three regions—earth, atmosphere, and heaven which lay beyond the vault of the sky. The immutability or regularity in the position, succession or behaviour of the phenomena of nature was attributed, as already noted, to an all-pervasive order, termed ṛta. The self-sustenance of the sun, the manifestation of dawn or storms, etc., are sometimes referred to an innate power, termed svadhā (RV. 1. 64. 4; 4. 13. 5; 7. 78. 4). The mythic fixation of heaven and earth with pillars is only figurative, there being distinct statements to the contrary (cf. RV. 2. 15. 2; 4. 56. 3; 10. 149. 1). The question of the origin or creation of the universe, which evoked considerable interest (cf. RV. 1. 164. 4; 10. 31. 7; 81. 2, etc.), has been mythologically treated in various hymns, Brāhmaṇaś and Brāhmaṇa portions of the Black Yajur-Veda. As there is little of philosophical import in them, we shall be concerned here mainly with RV. 10. 72 and 129—and a number of relevant texts found elsewhere—for a true estimate of the higher thoughts on the subject.

According to RV. 10. 129 there was, at the primeval stage, neither “non-being” (a-sat) not “being” (sat); no trace of air or heaven; of any covering, refuge, water, or deep abyss; of death or immortality, night or day; “there breathed that one windless through its innate power (svadhā),” besides which there was nothing else. Gloom being then enveloped in gloom, all this was indistinguishable “fluid” (salīla). Then that one “which was to come into being” (abhū) and had been concealed with “void” (tucchya) became manifest through the majesty of tapas (i.e. inherent determined urge). Upon this appeared desire which was the first seed of the mind. The wise investigating in their hearts with contemplation (manīśā) found the bond (i.e. cause) of being in non-being. Their rope of assessment spread across, gauging above and below, found that there were “impregnators” (retodhāḥ) (and) “great powers” (mahimānah)—“innate urge” (svadhā) below, “arduousness” (prāyatī) above. (Verses 1–5.)

This hymn posits that before the emergence of the sensible world there was something which cannot be described in terms of being or non-being—that is, cannot be referred to time, inasmuch as not only were there no events to lead to its conception, but even the mind and the senses along with the whole phenomenal world were as yet inchoate. “Tapas” appears frequently in cosmogonic contexts (cf. RV. 10. 190. 1; AV. 10. 7. 1; 11. 8. 2, etc.), and the Brāhmaṇaś positively attribute to Prajāpati its assumption, prior to creation. It is very significant, however, that AV. 11. 8. 6 has: “tapas was there, and karman—then they adored the highest.” It is probable that here we have the germ of the theory of collective
karman that leads to the emergence of the universe, and that tapas merely stands for its potentiality like apūrva or adṛśa in later conceptions. Arṇava in this passage and salila above, both meaning "the heaving ocean," and ap "water" (AV. 10. 2. 7; 8. 34-40, etc.) in such contexts can have reference only to the formless, limitless, inchoate energy that is the perennial spring of the universe, and doubtless represent the "cosmogonic water" (kārana-vāri) of later literature. The "desire" was simply the urge for creation, and this evoked the collective or cosmic "mind." The "impregnators" would correspond to the individual souls (jīvātman or puruṣa) and "great-powers" to properties constituting matter (prakṛti) in later philosophy. The "innate urge" and the "arduousness" would refer to these two in the reverse order. To use the language of later philosophy, matter is credited here with blind tendencies and individual souls, endowed with persistent mental impressions (vāsanā, saṃskāra = tapas here), with positive effort.

RV. 10. 72 makes some further contribution to the cosmogonic idea: "In the primeval age of the gods being came out of non-being. The quarters (i.e. space) followed it (i.e. being) in their emergence; it (viz. being) issued out of (i.e. became manifest in) the world. Dakṣa was born of Aditi, and Aditi of Dakṣa. For (when) Aditi who is thy daughter was born, O Dakṣa, in succession to her were born the gods (that are) beneficent (and) cognate with immortality." (Verses 2-5). Here "being" stands for the primeval world that can be referred to time and space, while "non-being" for that which precedes it in the sequence of evolution and which cannot be so referred to. "Lying outstretched" (uttāna-pad), (cf. AV. 3. 21. 10, where "waters" (āpah), are called uttānasī vārīh, "lying outstretched"), can have reference only to the limitless, indistinguishable mass called salila or ap above. The first half of v. 4 simply explains v. 3, while its second half brings out another important feature. Aditi, literally "boundlessness" or "infinity," can stand here only for what has just now been described as uttāna-pad and a-sat, and Dakṣa, literally "understanding" or "consciousness," the principle of subjectivity. Thus Dakṣa issuing out of Aditi accords well with the Sāmkhya view as recorded in Caraka-Saṁhitā (IV. 1. 61. 65), in which the unmanifest (a-vyakta) represents the state previous to the distinction of prakṛti and puruṣa. Whereas Aditi issuing out of Dakṣa would indicate the view-point according to which the first principle is all consciousness (cīnmatra) and matter is only its aspect or characteristic.

Reference to creation having taken place only once is found sometimes (cf. RV. 6. 48. 22; 10. 74. 4 = VS. 33. 28), but in RV. 10. 190. 3 the Creator (dhātṛ) is said to have fashioned the various cosmic objects "as previously" (yathā-pūrvam) and in AV. 10. 7. 26 Skambha, while creating, is said to have "rolled out what was old." On the other hand, creation and dissolution are frequently represented as events, constantly taking
place in the ultimate reality (cf. AV. 10. 8. 29, 39-42; RV. 10. 90. 2, etc.), and immortality and death as both ensconced in it (RV. 10. 121. 2; AV. 10. 7. 15).

§7. ESCHATOLOGY

That the Vedic Indian was fondly attached to this world, as against the next, is clear not only from the constant prayers for long life and its blessings, but also from its description as the “dearest” (AV. 5. 30. 17) or the “world of immortality” (AV. 8. 1. 1)—immortality for the mortal consisting in “being better here” (KS. 8. 1), or “attaining full life (i.e. of a hundred years) and being better” (PB. 22. 12. 2), and continuing himself through progeny (TB. 1. 5. 5. 6; cf. RV. 5. 4. 10)—and from occasional distrust of the other world (KS. 8. 8; TS. 6. 1. 1). Rebirth is even offered as a reward (SB. 1. 5. 3. 14). It is no wonder, therefore, that thoughts on the future life are mostly evoked by death, the inevitable. Here, again, myths grew round cremation, although there is occasional reference to other modes of disposal (AV. 18. 2. 34; RV. 10. 18. 10-13). Agni is said to carry and join the departed to the manes in the highest heaven, where he is to meet Yama, their pathfinder and king, and Varuṇa (RV. 10. 14. 1, 7, 8). The process is called asu-niti or asu-nīta, “leading the spirit,” or rather “leading to the spirit state” (cf. RV. 10. 15. 10). Agni consumes only the body, and the departed soul, the “unborn part” of RV. 10. 16. 4, issues forth as from the father or the mother (SB. 2. 2. 4. 8), furnished with a body, all lustrous (RV. 10. 56. 1) and free from imperfections (AV. 6. 120. 3). References to enjoyment by the departed offerings made here and the delights in heaven indicate that this body—which could scarcely be gross—was conceived as endowed with the senses, similar to the “subtle” body (sūkṣma-śarīra) of later conception.

The heavenly delights are described in RV. 9. 113. 7-11: “There are eternal light and swift waters; there movement is unrestrained; there is spirit food and satiety; there are joy, glee, gladness, and the fulfilment of all desires.” A few more heartening touches are added by other texts (RV. 10. 135. 7; AV. 3. 29. 3; 4. 34; SB. 14. 7. 1. 32-3, etc.). Agni is supplicated to carry the newly departed to this place, which is assured (RV. 10. 154. 2-5) for those who have undergone rigorous penance (tapas), or died heroically in battles, or made liberal sacrificial gifts, or adored the law of righteousness (ṛta). In contrast, hell where, by rights, the sinners should go is only vaguely referred to as the “deep place,” “endless abyss,” “intangible darkness” (RV. 4. 5. 5; 7. 104. 3. 17), and “lowest, black, or blind darkness” (AV. 8. 2. 24; 5. 30. 11; 9. 2. 10). VS. 30. 5 and AV. 12. 4. 36 are the first to call it nāraka or nāraka loka. Torments of hell are touched in AV. 5. 19 and described with greater detail in SB. 11. 6. 1 and JB. 1. 42-4.
Merits of sacrificial and charitable acts accrue to the departed in heaven (RV. 10. 14. 8; VS. 18. 64). It has been noted already (§6) that the term karmam appears very significantly in the AV. (cf. also II. 7. 17). According to the SB. “a man is born to the world he has made” (6. 2. 27), and one is placed in a balance in the other world for an estimate of one’s good and evil deeds (II. 2. 7. 33). Thus the idea of proportionate recompense appears to be gaining ground progressively. SB. 10. 6. 3. 1, going still further, declares that as a man is constituted by his desires (kratunāyā), he is born in the other world with reference to these.

Macdonell sees a probable germ of metempsychosis in RV. 10. 16. 3, where the departed spirit is asked to go, among other places, to the plants and “stay there with bodies.” Growing belief in rebirth becomes evident in the Brāhmanas (cf. SB. 1. 5. 3. 14; 10. 4. 3. 10) and words like punar-mṛtyu, “re-death,” punar-asu, “coming to life again” (SB., TB.) and punar-āyāti, “rebirth” (GB.), are coined to denote it. Some scholars explain punar-mṛtyu as “repeated death” in the other world, having no reference to rebirth, but “repeated death” of one already dead makes scarcely any sense. The reason why “re-death” instead of “rebirth” struck the Vedic people first seems to lie in the fact that they dreaded death, not birth as in later times. Interpreted by this outlook of theirs, rebirth seems to be suggested even in RV. 10. 14. 8c, where the departed is asked to “come home once again” and in 10. 16. 5, where Agni is supplicated to see that he may “assume life (āyus) and obtain progeny.”

Adoration of the self through meditation in the right manner, as fetching more valuable rewards than worship of the gods, is preached in SB. II. 2. 6. 13–14 and 10. 6. 3. 1–2. The view of final release from fear of death or rebirth through right knowledge of the self, along with a more philosophical outlook on the events of the world, has already found notice (§§4, 6).

§8. PSYCHOLOGY

The principal word for the entity which is responsible for all mental activities is manas. It often stands for the combined thinking and vivifying principle (RV. 1. 164. 18; 10. 57. 4–6; 59. 5. etc.), which is referred to as the “light” implanted in the heart (RV. 6. 9. 6; 7. 33. 8) and forms the theme of VS. 34. 1–6. Frequently, however, the vivifying principle alone is so termed and separated from the other (RV. 3. 26. 8; AV. 10. 2. 31–2; 8. 28, 43). The heart, generally conceived as seat of the mind, is occasionally separated from the latter, either as the physical organ with mind as its function (RV. 3. 26. 8; 5. 56. 2; 10. 71. 8, etc.) or as having some separate function altogether (AV. 3. 20. 9; 5. 21. 2; RV. 10. 191. 4). Rarely, however, the head is conceived as the seat of certain mental attributes (RV. 2. 16. 2; 8. 96. 3; 5. 57. 6). “The nine-doored lotus, enveloped with three
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gunas” (AV. 10. 8. 43), where the soul resides, is evidently the heart identified with the mind. The passage is suggestive of the Sāṃkhya constituents of the mind (cf. also AV. 8. 2. 1, where rdjas and tāmas appear together). Desire has already figured (§6) as the first seed of the mind.

Three states of the mind, viz. waking (jāgrat), dreaming (svāpna) and sleeping (supti or niśrā) are indicated (RV. 10. 164; AV. 19. 56, 57), and dream is said to be “neither alive nor dead” (AV. 6. 46. 1) and “born of the heated mind” (AV. 19. 56. 5). The vital principle (prāṇa) is said to keep erect and awake, while others lie asleep (AV. 11. 4. 25). Mahidhara equates the words cit, manas and dhī in VS. 4. 19 with the later citta, manas and buddhi, faculties respectively of indeterminate cognition, deliberation and determination. Agility and restlessness of the mind (as well as its range covering all distances and times) are often alluded to (VS. 34. 1, 4; AV. 10. 7. 37, etc.). The five senses (indriya) with the mind as the sixth appear in AV. 19. 9. 5. In the RV. indriya still means “relating to Indra” or “power or energy belonging to, or similar to that of, Indra.” The words indriya-sāmyaya, “control of the senses,” chārāmatā, “concentration of the mind,” and yuktama-manas, “concentrated in mind,” appearing in SB. 11. 5. 7. 1 point to leanings towards yoga.

§9. LOGIC

In the RV. the incidence of human ignorance (1. 164. 5, 6; 10. 88. 18, etc.) and of the elusiveness of truth (5. 85. 8; 10. 139. 5; cf. 8. 100. 3) is frankly admitted. The means of attaining truth appeared to be (i) direct perception with the senses or the mind (1. 184. 2; 8. 25. 9; 10. 67. 2 and 130. 6), (ii) statement of one who knows (1. 164. 4; 10. 129. 6), and (iii) investigation with the mind, i.e. reasoning (10. 81. 4; 129. 4, 5). Asceticism (tapas) as a source of special insight finds mention not only in the Brāhmaṇas and the other Vedas, but even in the RV. itself (TS. 5. 3. 5. 4; RV. 8. 59. 6). Infallibility and independence of the Vedas as a source of knowledge is already insisted on in the Brāhmaṇas (cf. SB. 10. 4. 21, 22; TB. 3. 12. 9. 1). Immediate or perceptual (pratyakṣa) and mediate or non-perceptual (parokṣa) knowledge are frequently distinguished in the Brāhmaṇas.

Enquiry about material and efficient causes is common (RV. 10. 81. 2, 4; 168. 3), and the development of meanings of nidāna, “bond” > “root-cause” (RV. 10. 114. 2; 130. 3), bandhu, “connection” > “cause” (RV. 10. 129. 4; AV. 4. 1. 3), nābhi, “navel” > fountain-head” (VS. 23. 59), and ārambhāṇa, “grasping,” “tackling” > “achievement” (RV. 10. 81. 2 = VS. 17. 18), point to the same direction. Similar development or coinage of a few more technical terms may be noted here with their sources in parentheses: thus kāraṇa, “cause” (GB.), kṣetra, “field” >

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"sphere" or "scope" and kṣetra-viś, "knowing the subject" (RV.), nānātva, "difference" (Br.), pākṣas, "wing" > "side" or "party" (RV.), prakṛti, "source," "original form" (GB.), prākṛta, "original" (SB.), vikṛti, "change" or "modification" (SB.), bhūta and bhuvana, "entity" (RV.), and majmanā, mahīman or mahman, "greatness" or "power" > "quality" (RV.; cf. AV. 10. 2. 12).

Statements supported by reasons indicated with the particles khalu, vai, hi, etc., are frequent. An instance of an analogical reasoning (RV. 8. 58. 2) has already been cited (§4). A type of deductive reasoning, styled mīmāṃsa and consisting of (i) vicikīlsā, "doubt," (ii) mīmāṃsā, "deep deliberation," and (iii) sthiti, "final position" is frequent in the Brāhmaṇas. Such terms as prāś, "query" or problem," pratiprāś, "opponent in debate" (AV. 2. 27), praśnīn, "questioner," abhipraśnīn, "counter-questioner," praśna-vivāka, "arbiter," or "umpire," and maryādā, "limitation," i.e. "conventional rules" (VS. 30. 10) indicate the popularity of debate. Habit of presenting thought in pairs, distinct or dichotomic, such as (i) iṣ (refreshment), īrṇa (strength), ista (sacrifice), pūrṇa (charity, nāman (essential nature), rūpa (external form), etc., or (ii) vidyā (knowledge), avidyā (ignorance), sat (being), a-sat (non-being), etc., becomes more and more common. In the Brāhmaṇical portions indulge in long lists of associated concepts, set off against one another, in describing different collateral subjects or situations is frequent (cf. AV. 12. 5; 13. 4; 15. 2-7). Attempts at definition through etymologies or otherwise are not infrequent (cf. AV. 3. 13. 1-14; 11. 8. 34; KB. 2. 8; SB. 4. 1. 4. 1).

The intimate connection of thought and speech is often emphasized (RV. 6. 9. 6b; 10. 71. 2; 177. 2). According to KB. 2. 7 all sensations have to be converted into speech before they find expression, while in 9. 3 mind and speech are said to contain everything. In RV. 1. 164. 45 and 8. 100, 10, 11 vāc, "voice," "speech," appears in the role of an all-inclusive sonority and is called rāṣṭri, "sovereign ruler," in the latter place and in RV. 10. 125, where its mystic divine character, guiding and controlling the activities of gods, men and all other entities, is especially stressed. RV. 10. 71 lays particular emphasis on the care and accuracy with which the agreeable and salutary contents of speech are to be presented and understood, while AV. 10, 8, 33 declares that speeches are impelled by the "unprecedented one" (a-pūrva); and speaking rightly, they go to the great Divinity (Brāhmaṇam).

§10. CONCLUSION

The above survey brings out in bold relief the emergence of certain characteristic features of later Indian religious and philosophic thought.
The various bhakti cults are anticipated in respect of their emphasis on the character of the favourite deity as an aspect of the Absolute (§3), and on the tenderness of devotion and strictly ethical conduct of the devotee (§§2, 5). Asceticism of various types and even Tantric practices are forestalled (§2). Monism of the Vedānta with a hint at māyā and liberation through knowledge (§4); omnipotence of the sacrifice as in the Mīmāṃsā (§2); the three guṇas (§8) and blind tendencies in matter (§6) of the Sāṁkhya; control of the senses and concentration of the mind (§8) of the Yoga; and right mental perspective and right speech leading to the Absolute (§9) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are also foreshadowed, besides consideration of the common problems of ātman (§4), manas (§§7, 8), the Absolute Reality (§4), the emergence of the universe (§6), karman (§§5, 6, 7), rebirth (§7) and liberation (§4). No wonder later thought should regard the Vēdas as the fountain-head of all religion and philosophy.

**ABBREVIATIONS**

(a) Texts

| AB  | Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa. |
| AV  | Atharva-Veda. |
| Br. | Brāhmaṇas. |
| GB  | Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa. |
| JB  | Jaiminiya-Brāhmaṇa. |
| KB  | Kaushitaki-Brāhmaṇa. |
| KS  | Kāṭhaka-Saṁhitā. |
| MS  | Maitrīya-Saṁhitā. |
| PB  | Pañcaviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa. |
| RS  | Rg-Veda-Saṁvānukramaṇī. |
| RV  | Rg-Veda. |
| ŚB  | Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa. |
| TB  | Taittiriya-Brāhmaṇa. |
| TS  | Taittiriya-Saṁhitā. |
| VS  | Vājasaneyi-Saṁhitā. |

(b) Treatises

| ASL. | Max Müller, History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature. |
| BRV. | Bloomfield's Religion of the Veda. |
| GRASS. | Grassmann, Wörterbuch zum Rig-veda. |
| GRR. | Griswold, The Religion of the Rigveda. |
| GVB. | Geldner, Vedismus und Brahmanismus. |
| HIL. | Winternitz, History of Indian Literature (Eng. Trans.), Vol.I. |
| IP. | Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. |
| MVG. | Macdonell, Vedic Grammar. |
| MVM. | Macdonell, Vedic Mythology. |
| MVR. | Macdonell, A Vedic Reader. |
| MW. | Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit English Dictionary. |
| OST. | Muir, Original Sanskrit Texts, Vols. I–V. |
| RPVU. | Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and the Upanishads. |
NOTES

1. For these and other details, see HIL, pp. 55–225.
2. HIL, pp. 292 ff.
4. RPVU., pp. 450, 462.
6. First made in BRV, p. 96, pp. 150 ff., with minor differences.
7. ASL, pp. 526, 532, 546.
8. MVM., pp. 26 f.
9. cf. OST, V, pp. 51 f.
10. cf. Heaven and Earth: gods; Aditi: Dakṣa; Savitṛ, an Ādītya: gods; Puruṣa: Virāj, etc.; MVM., 12; OST, V, p. 50.
11. cf. RV, 1. 115. 1; 3. 62. 10; 4. 53. 6.
14. GVB, p. 105 n.
15. cf. also RV, 3. 53. 8; 6. 47. 18; 10. 54. 2; SB. 11. 1. 6. 10 discussed above, §3.
17. OST, V, pp. 457 ff.
19. Kīm ā varṇah, “what covered” (: vṛ, OST, IV, 4; “what did it contain?” MVR, p. 207 and MVG; “what rolled forwards and backwards? (: vṛ), i.e., was there the wind?” GVB, p. 88, with Grass and MW.
23. GVB, loc. cit.
24. cf. ibid., p. 89.
26. MVM, p. 166.
27. ibid., p. 168.
29. See para. 1 of this section.
30. This “home-coming” is referred to heaven, MVM, p. 166; GRR, p. 316.
32. RPVU, p. 483.

OTHER REFERENCE BOOKS (SELECT)

CHAPTER III

THE UPANIŚADS

1. INTRODUCTION

It is no exaggeration to say that the Upaniṣads constitute the basic springs of Indian thought and culture. They have inspired not only the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy but also some of the so-called heterodox Schools like those of Buddhism. The Upaniṣads are not systematic treatises on philosophy; they are not the works of a single author. The teachers whose intuitions are recorded in the Upaniṣads are more mystic seers than metaphysical investigators. There is a directness about their teachings, and an authenticity born of first-hand experience of the highest reality. They pour forth their findings in the form of stories and parables, informal discussions and intimate dialogues. The method they adopt is "more poetic than philosophic." Even where the language used is prose the poetic quality is only too evident. It is true that in many places symbolic expressions are employed which hide the meaning rather than make it patent. Sometimes there are puns on words and mystic explanations of certain abstruse terms. Even these, it may be noted, add to the charm of the Upaniṣads.

2. EVOLUTION OF THE UPANIŚADS

The Upaniṣads are called the Vedānta, as most of them constitute the concluding portions of the Veda, and as also their teaching represents the aim or goal of the Veda. The Sanskrit word anta, like the English end, may be used to mean both "terminus" and "aim." The later Vedāntic Schools derive their name from the fact that they claim to interpret the Upaniṣads. The etymological meaning of the term "upaniṣad" is "to sit (sād) close by (upa) devotedly (mi)," and is indicative of the manner in which the doctrines embodied in the Upaniṣads were learnt at first by pupils in small conclaves sitting near their respective teachers. The expression which thus means "a session" came to be applied in course of time to what was taught at such sessions. Since the Upaniṣads are regarded as teaching the highest truth, they could be imparted only to those who were competent to receive and benefit by them; and such competent pupils could be only a few at any given time. So the meaning "secret" came to be attached to the term "upaniṣad"; and it is in this sense that we find the expression used in the Upaniṣads themselves. When, for
instance, some important formula is given in the Upaniṣads, it is characterized as the upaniṣad. Thus in the Brhadāranyaka, the formula "the Real of the real" (satyasya satyam) is described as the upaniṣad of the universal soul. We also come across such expressions as the "secret teaching" (guhya ādeśa), the "supreme secret" (paramāṁ guhyam) applied to what may be considered to be the key-passages in the Upaniṣads. Commentators like Śaṅkara interpret the expression "upaniṣad" to mean what "destroys" ignorance, or what "leads" to Brahman—a meaning which may be etymologically incorrect, but which, nevertheless, correctly defines the scope and aim of the Upaniṣads.

The Upaniṣads are mostly the concluding portions of the Brāhmaṇas; and usually the transition from the Brāhmaṇa to the Upaniṣad is effected through what is known as the Āranyaka. The Brāhmaṇas lay down rules and directions concerning the performance of rituals. The Upaniṣads contain the teachings about the ultimate Reality. In the Āranyakas the rituals are given an allegorical interpretation and certain meditations are prescribed, which prepare the way for the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. It is difficult to say at this distance of time how exactly the Upaniṣads came to be evolved. Probably the term "upaniṣad" originally referred to what we have called the key-passages like the "the Real of the real" and "That thou art" (tat tvam asi). These texts, when they were taught to the pupils, were naturally accompanied by explanations. Later on these explanations together with the central texts may have been reduced to the form in which the Upaniṣads have come down to us.

The texts that bear the name "upaniṣad" are now known to be more than two hundred. One of the Upaniṣads, Muḥtiḥā, gives the names of one hundred and eight Upaniṣads. Many of these texts, however, are late compositions, distant imitations of the ancient canonical Upaniṣads. One of the criteria by which the canonical nature of an Upaniṣad may be judged is the fact that it has been commented upon or is quoted from by a thinker like Śaṅkara. Judged by this test, the first ten Upaniṣads mentioned in the Muḥtiḥā, along with a few from the rest, may be regarded as ancient and genuine. They are: Īśāvasya, Kena, Kaṭha, Praśna, Mūndaka, Māndūkya, Taittirīya, Aitareya, Chāndogya, Brhadāranyaka, Kaushitaki, Maitrāyanīya and Śvetāśvatara. Even of these, the Brhadāranyaka and the Chāndogya are the most important, as they are not only old and comprehensive texts, but also represent the two main, but not exclusive, traditions of thought in the Upaniṣads, the acosmic (niś-praṇa) and the cosmic (sa-praṇa) respectively.

It is not possible to state definitely the chronological order of the canonical Upaniṣads. Most of them were composed earlier than the time of the Buddha. About the thinkers of the Upaniṣads too nothing much can be said. A few like Yājñavalkya and Uddālaka figure prominently, each with a definite set of teachings influencing a group of pupils.
3. ATTITUDE TOWARDS VEDIC GODS AND SACRIFICES

In order to appreciate the teaching of the Upaniṣads we must understand first the attitude of these texts to the sacrificial cult of the Brāhmaṇas. The spirit of the Upaniṣads by its very nature is opposed to ritual. In the Brhadāraṇyaka, he who worships a divinity other than the self is described as a domestic animal of the gods, and it is also stated that while Yama, the god of death, has his abode in sacrifice, sacrifice has its basis in the fees paid to the priests. Parodying the priestly procession in a sacrifice, the Chāndogya describes a procession of dogs chanting “Om! Let us eat. Om! Let us drink . . .”

By far the most scathing attack on ritual is to be met with in the Mundaka, where the sacrificial forms are compared to unsafe boats, and those who value them are characterized as fools that are overtaken repeatedly by old age and death. In several texts of the Upaniṣads, however, the opposition to ritual is not so open; the sacrifice in its usual form is ignored, and an allegorical or philosophical meaning is given to it. The task of the Āraṇyakas, as we remarked earlier, is to allegorize ritual, but this is continued in the Upaniṣads also. We have a typical instance in the opening sections of the Brhadāraṇyaka, where the horse-sacrifice (aṣvamedha) is interpreted allegorically. Over-lordship of the earth may be gained by sacrificing a horse. But spiritual autonomy is to be achieved by renouncing the whole universe which the Upaniṣad conceives in the image of a horse. In the Chāndogya the entire life of man is symbolically explained as a soma sacrifice, and offerings to the different manifestations of breath (prāṇa) take the place of agni-hotra. Another mode by which the Upaniṣads indicate the inferior status of ritual is to show that it leads only to the world of the Fathers which is a temporary abode for man and from which he must return to this earth in due course to follow the cycle of birth and death again.

When we turn to some of the later Upaniṣads, however, we find a spirit of accommodation and an anxiety to assign a place to sacrifice in the Upaniṣadic scheme. Thus in the Svetāsvatara, the mode of ancient prayer (brahma pūrvam) to the gods like Agni and Soma is recommended, and it is said that where sacrifice is performed, there inspiration is born. But even here the goal that is held as worthy of attainment is not the heavenly world, but God by knowing whom one is said to be released from all fetters.

For the antecedents of the main doctrine of the Upaniṣads we must turn rather to those hymns of the Veda which reveal a monistic attitude than to the Brāhmaṇas which are liturgical manuals. The tendency which
appears in the philosophical hymns of the Veda to reduce the multitude of
gods to one principle becomes prominent in the Upaniṣads, and the impli-
cations of such a doctrine are worked out in greater detail.21 Questioned
about the number of gods, Yājñavalkya starts with the number 3306, and
then successively gives the numbers, thirty-three, six, three, two, one and
a half, and finally one. The one God is Brahma whose powers the other
gods are. The Vasus, the Rudras and the Ādityas, who constitute the
principal groups of gods, are identified with the different cosmic phe-
omena and individual functions, such as the sun and the sky, the moon and
the stars, the senses and the mind.22 The Maitrāyaṇīya characterizes the
gods including Brahmā, Rudra and Viṣṇu as the principal manifestations
of the supreme, the immortal, the incorporeal Brahma.23 In the Kena,
Indra learns from Umā Haimavatī that the source of the power and the
glory of the gods is Brahma.24 The Katha-Upaniṣad declares that for
fear of the supreme Brahma the gods carry out their allotted functions.25
Even Prajāpati, the highest god of the Brāhmaṇas, is subordinated to
Brahman. In the Kausīṭaki, he, along with Indra, is made a door-keeper
of the abode of the Absolute.26 Thus, the Upaniṣads would brook no rival
to Brahma, the supreme reality. The "ekam sat" (the one reality) of the
Rg-Veda becomes in the Upaniṣads “ekam eva a-dvītiyam” (one only with-
out a second).

4. HIGHER AND LOWER KNOWLEDGE

The Upaniṣads make a distinction between two kinds of knowledge, the
higher (parā) and the lower (a-parā). The lower knowledge consists of all
the empirical sciences and arts as also of such sacred knowledge as relates
to things and enjoyments that perish. It is interesting to note that even
the four Vedas are included in the category of lower knowledge. Nārada,
in spite of his encyclopaedic learning, both secular and sacred, finds that
he is sorrow-stricken, and so seeks enlightenment from Sanatkumāra who
characterizes all the former’s knowledge as mere name (nāma eva).27 That
alone is higher knowledge which relates to the Imperishable (a-kṣara).28 It
is described as that knowledge whereby what has not been heard of be-
comes heard of, what has not been thought of becomes thought of, what
has not been understood becomes understood.29 This is further explained
as the knowledge of the ground which is more than and inclusive of the
knowledge of the various expressions or manifestations of the ground.
Just as by one piece of clay all that is made of clay may be known—the
modification being only a name depending on a word; the truth being
that it is just clay—so is that teaching.30 Compared with the knowledge
of the ultimate ground which is the absolute self, the lower knowledge is
nescience or false knowledge (avidyā). “Widely contrasted and different
are these two," says the Kaṭha, "nescience (avidyā) and what is known as knowledge (vidyā)." The Śvetāśvatara refers to knowledge and ignorance that are placed hidden in the imperishable, infinite, supreme Brahman, and characterizes ignorance as a thing perishable and knowledge as a thing immortal.

Yājñavalkya speaks in more than one place of the unknowability of the self. How, then, can there be knowledge of the self? In the course of his teaching to his wife, Maitreyi, the sage observes, "After departing, there is no consciousness (for the soul)." This bewilders the lady, who asks for clarification. The reply that Yājñavalkya gives is, "Where there is duality as it were, there one sees another, one smells another, one hears another, one thinks of another, one understands another. Where, however, everything had become just one's own self, there whereby and whom would one smell, see, hear, speak to, think of, or understand?" This, then is the answer to the question about the unknowability of the self. The self is unknowable not because it is unknown, but because it is the basis of all knowledge, nay, knowledge per se. In short, it cannot be known as objects are known. "You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot hear the hearer of hearing. You cannot think the thinker of thinking. You cannot understand the understander of understanding. He is your soul, which is in all things." The Kena-Upaniṣad teaches the same doctrine when it says that thither, viz. to the self, the eye goes not, nor speech, nor mind, and that it is other than the known and above the unknown. The Taittiriya declares that words and mind turn back, not being able to attain it. Our words and thoughts are relevant to the realm of plurality; they fail with reference to the non-dual spirit. Yet, we have to make use of them as indicators or sign-posts, and not as vehicles taking us to the very end. "As unity the self is to be looked upon—this unknowable, constant Being, free from blemishes, beyond space, the unborn self, great, permanent." The self is to be comprehended as "It is." This is the supreme knowledge, para-vidyā, true wisdom. The Upaniṣads ask us to seek this knowledge from a competent teacher who is not only learned but also in possession of the plenary experience. It is true that such a teacher is difficult to get but so is a competent pupil. All good things are rare and hard to accomplish. "Wonderful is the declarer, proficient the obtainer of It! Wonderful the knower, proficiently taught!"

5. BRAHMAN AND ĀTMAN

The two words, without grasping whose implications it is not possible to understand the Upaniṣads, are "brahman" and "ātman." They are the two pillars, as it has been said, on which rests nearly the whole edifice of Indian philosophy. There has been some difference of opinion among
scholars regarding the way the two words came to bear their present connotations. The word "brahman" probably meant at first "prayer" or "speech" from the root byh, "to burst forth" or "to grow." Gradually it came to signify the ground of the universe or the source of all existence, that which has burst forth into the universe, or that from which the universe has grown. The other word "ātman" probably meant "breath" and then came to be the expression for the soul or self of a living being, especially of man. And the remarkable discovery which the ancient seers made was that the two are one and the same; the ātman is Brahman.43 This doctrine of unity is the greatest contribution which the Upaniṣads have made to the thought of the world.

In many places in the Upaniṣads, the two terms, "brahman" and "ātman," are used in apposition, and are regarded as synonyms. The Chāndogya frames the central question in philosophy thus: "What is ātman? What is Brahman?"44 In certain contexts where the inquiry is into the source of the universe, the expression "ātman" is employed, and in certain others where the topic of investigation is the true self of man the term "brahman" is used. In the teaching which Āśvapati Kaikeya gave to the six Brahmins, the spirit of the universe is described as the Vaiśvānara-ātman.45 Bhrgu enquires into the nature of the self through an analysis of the sheaths that cover it; but the term of reference in this analysis is Brahman.44 Thus to the Upaniṣadic thinker brahman and ātman came to mean the same reality, within and without. Through an enquiry into the source of the universe and through a quest after the true self, he discovered that it is the one non-dual reality that appears as the manifold world and as the plurality of individuals.

The same question is asked in the Upaniṣads about the ground of the universe as about the true nature of the self. The line of advance too is similar in the two cases, viz. a progress from the grosser expressions of the real to the subtler. We shall illustrate this by citing a few leading examples from the Upaniṣads.

In the philosophical contest that was held at the court of King Janaka, Gārgī, a woman-sage, questioned Yājñavalkya about the support of all things. The precise form in which the question is put is "On what is all this woven, warp and woof?" In a series of answers, Yājñavalkya leads the enquirer to higher and higher worlds; and lastly, when the lady asks him, on what is space woven, warp and woof, he replies that it is the Imperishable (a-kṣara) which is the support of space.45 Another questioner, Uddālaka, enquired about the inner controller of all things. In a set of beautiful passages, Yājñavalkya explained that the principle that lies behind all things, cosmic as well as individual, the principle which these things do not know but which controls them from within, is the inner ruler; and this ruler, said Yājñavalkya, addressing Uddālaka, is your own immortal self. "He who dwelling in all things, yet is other than all things,
whom all things do not know, whose body all things are, who controls all things from within—He is your self, the inner ruler, immortal." 46

Bhrugu approaches his father Varuṇa with the request for instruction about the nature of Brahman. 47 Varuṇa gives his son a formula which is indicative of the general nature of reality, and asks him to discover for himself the truth through austere enquiry (tapas.) "That, verily, whence these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which on departing they enter—that be desirous of knowing. That is Brahman." Bhrugu makes of this formula the base of his operations and enters upon the quest after the real. The first discovery that he makes is that food (anna, i.e. matter) is essential for existence. But soon he realizes that food is only the outer shell of what animates it, viz. life (prāna). Even this knowledge does not satisfy him; for upon further enquiry he finds that mind (manas) is the substratum of life. Subsequent analysis reveals to Bhrugu that mind too is a product and cannot answer to the definition of Brahman given by his father. He now thinks that intellectual awareness (vijñāna) is the final reality. Just as materialism, vitalism and mentalism were found wanting on closer scrutiny, intellectualism too is seen to be inadequate. And at last, Bhrugu arrives at the final truth that bliss (ānanda) is Brahman. In this delight which is the Absolute there is no distinction of the enjoyer and the object enjoyed. In the infinite there is no division. The Indra-Virocana myth related in the Chāndogya 48 is also illustrative of the fact that both competence and persistent enquiry are required for understanding the nature of the self.

The method of enquiry into the states of experience, waking, dream and sleep, is one of the frequent ways adopted in the Upaniṣads for arriving at knowledge of the real self. The most concise and systematic statement of this method is to be found in the Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad, which is said to contain the essence of the entire Vedānta (sarva-vedānta-sārīṣṭha). 49 The Upaniṣad begins by identifying the mystic sound aum with all-that-which-is. Aum is all this—what was, what is and what will be. It is also what is beyond the three divisions of time, viz. the unmanifest ground of the manifest universe. All this is Brahman, of which aum is the sound-symbol. The self is Brahman. Then, our text goes on to show how, corresponding to the three modes (mātrās) of aum (a, u, m) and the fourth mode-less (a-mātra) part, there are the three forms in which the self appears in the states of waking, dream and sleep respectively, and the fourth which is the natural state of the self, the unchanging and unconditioned turiya. In the state of waking, the self consorts with the objects of sense which are external, and its enjoyments are gross. In dreams it revels in a world of images, and its experience is subtle. In sleep there are no desires, nor dreams; the self becomes one, without the distinction of seer and seen object; it remains then as a mass of sentience, as bliss enjoying bliss. The self of the three states is designated respectively as vaiśvānara, taijasa
and prājña. The fourth (caturtha or turiya), which is the real self is beyond the changing modes of existence. It is not caught in the triple stream of waking, dream and sleep, though it is the underlying substratum of these states. It is invisible; it is not the content of empirical usage; it cannot be grasped; it does not have identifying marks; it is unthinkable and unnamable; it is the one self which is the essence of consciousness; it is that into which the universe gets resolved; it is tranquil bliss which is non-dual. Thus does the Māndūkya teach the real nature of the self.

The ultimate reality according to the Upaniṣads is not the subject as over against the objects; it is that which underlies both subject and object. This truth could be realized only when the apparent distinction between cosmic and the individual forms of the self is broken. As an aid to this realization, it is taught that there is non-difference between the individual and cosmic forms of the self at each level of experience. It is from this point of view that in the Māndūkya the self in the state of sleep (prājña) is characterized as the lord of all (sarvesvāra). In the Chāndogya, the Person seen in the eye is identified with the one observed in the sun, and the mind and space are identified as Brahman. In the dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru in the Brhadāraṇyaka which is repeated in the Kauśātakī, there is first an objective approach to the problem of reality. Bālāki refers to the Person in things like the sun and the moon as Brahman. Ajātaśatru shows in each case that there is a deeper principle behind the cosmic phenomena. These are the adhidaiva forms of the real. Then the discussion turns to the adhyātma forms like one’s shadow, echo, body and eye. And finally, Ajātaśatru gives a description of the cosmic soul from which come forth all worlds, all gods, all beings.

The Identity-doctrine which is the central theme of the Upaniṣads is also illustrated in the teaching of Uddālaka to his son Śvetaketu. Here Uddālaka identifies the sat which is the ground of all existence and the source of all being with the self of Śvetaketu. “That which is the finest essence—this whole world has that as its soul. That is reality. That is the ātman. That thou art, O Śvetaketu!” This declaration of non-difference is repeated nine times, thereby indicating that it constitutes the central teaching of Uddālaka. It must be noted, however, that it is not the individual soul that is stated here to be the ground of all being. The philosophy of the Upaniṣads is not a variety of subjective idealism. It is true that the individual soul is non-different from the universal spirit. But it is the universal spirit that explains the whole world and the individual souls as individuals.

The non-dual Brahman-ātman is conceived of in two forms in the Upaniṣads: (1) as the all-inclusive ground of the universe and (2) as the reality of which the universe is but an appearance. The former is the cosmic view (sa-prapāṇca) of the Absolute, while the latter is the acosmic
view (niś-prapañca). It is the difference between these two views that made possible the divergence later on between the theistic and absolutistic Schools of Vedānta. We shall illustrate the two standpoints by citing a few texts from the Upaniṣads. The cosmic view of reality may be discerned in the following passages: “He who consists of mind, whose body is life, whose form is light, whose conception is truth, whose soul is space, containing all works, all desires, all odours and all tastes, encompassing the whole world, the speechless and the calm—this soul of mine within the heart is smaller than a grain of rice, or a barley-corn, or a mustard-seed, or a grain of millet, or the kernel of a grain of millet; this soul of mine within the heart is greater than the earth, greater than the mid-region, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds.”57 “The self, indeed, is below. The self is to the west. The self is to the east. The self is to the south. The self is to the north. The self, indeed, is this whole world.”58 “It is Brahmā; it is Indra; it is Prajāpati; it is all these gods; and these five great elements, namely earth, air, ether, water, fire; these things and those which are mingled of the fine, as it were; seeds of one sort or another; those born from eggs, those born from wombs, those born from sweat, and those born from sprouts; horses, cattle, men, elephants; whatever creature there is here—whether moving or flying, and what is stationary.”59

As typical of the texts that teach the acosmic view, the following may be considered: “This is imperishable, O Gārgi, which the wise men adore—not gross, not subtle, not short, not long, not red, not adhesive, without shadow, without darkness, without air, without space, without attachment, without taste, without smell, without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind, without light, without breath, without mouth, without measure, and without either inside or outside. Not that does anything eat; nor that does eat anything.”60 “Devoid of sound, of touch, of form, without decay, and likewise devoid of taste, eternal, and devoid of odour, beginningless, endless, superior to the Great (mahat) and firm; realizing that, one is released from the jaws of death.”61

The implication of the negative description of the Absolute is not that Brahman is a blank or non-being; the meaning is that it cannot be delimited by the categories known to human thought. It is “not this, not this” (neti neti).62 Such statements, however, should be construed along with other texts which speak of Brahman as reality (sat), intelligence (ciñ) and bliss (ānanda). It is true, no doubt, that these expressions are not to be understood in their ordinary sense. But they represent the highest concepts the mind of man has been able to evolve to indicate the nature of the supreme spirit. The Brhadāraṇyaka describes Brahman as “the Real of the real” (satyasya satyam);63 and splitting the word satyam into three syllables, sa ti and yam, the Upaniṣad says that the first syllable and the third mean truth, while the second syllable signifies untruth, and that
the whole world implies the enclosure of untruth on both sides by truth. That the self is consciousness (cātānāya) is declared in several texts. One of the modes in which this is taught is to say that the self is the light of all lights, that it is self-luminous. "Not there does the sun shine, nor the moon and the stars; nor do these lightnings shine, much less this fire. After Him, as He shines, does everything shine; by His lustre is the whole world illumined!" Brahman is not only unconditioned existence and self-luminous intelligence, but also unexcellable bliss (ānanda). In the Brhadāranyaka and the Taittirīya a calculus of bliss is given, taking the highest human bliss as the unit measure. According to the former Upaniṣad, the bliss that is Brahman is a billion times that of the human bliss; and according to the latter, it is a hundred trillion times superior to the highest bliss of man. The implication of such teaching is that Brahman-bliss is unlimited and measureless. The Chāndogya describes Brahman as the Infinite (bhūman) which alone is bliss (sukham), and declares that there is no bliss in the small (alpa). In later Vedāntic literature, Brahman is referred to as sac-cid-ānanda, a formula coined out of the texts such as the ones we have considered. The Brhadāranyaka defines Brahman as consciousness and bliss (vijñānam ānandam brahma). The Taittirīya says, "Brahman is reality, consciousness and infinitude" (satyam jñānam anantam brahma).

6. THE WORLD

Corresponding to the two views of Brahman, the cosmic and the a-cosmic, there are in the Upaniṣads two conceptions of the world, one which considers the world to be a real emanation of Brahman, and the other which regards it as an appearance of the Absolute. The treatment of the topic of creation is neither full nor frequent in the Upaniṣads; nor is there consistency of detail among the different passages that deal with the subject of creation. But on one point there is unanimity of view, i.e. the origin of the whole world is traced to the self, and not to a material source. The Svetāsvatara begins by asking such questions as "What is the cause? Whence are we born? Whereby do we live? On what are we established? And by whom supervised do we experience our pains and pleasures?" It finds that an adequate answer to these questions cannot be given in terms of any material or finite principle. Time (kāla), nature (svabhāva), necessity (niyati), chance (yadṛcchā), the elements (bhūta), the womb (yoni), or the male (purusā) cannot serve as the first cause. The Upaniṣad discovers that over all these, which may be regarded only as the secondary causes, there rules the self-power (ātma-śakti) of God (deva), hidden in His own qualities (guna). A second point on which most of the creation-texts of the Upaniṣads are agreed is that Brahman does not create the universe out of an ex-
traneous matter, but that the universe is a manifestation of an aspect of Brahman. That is, Brahman is immanent as well as transcendent. In the terminology of later Vedānta, it is the material as also the efficient cause of the world (abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa). In the Chāndogya text, "All this, verily, is Brahman. Tranquil, let one worship it as tajjalān," the expression tajjalān is interpreted by Śaṅkara to mean "that (tāt) from which the world originates (ja), into which the world dissolves (lī) and in which it breathes (an) and lives." The Taittirīya explicitly says that Brahman is the cause of the origination, sustentation and destruction of the universe. The Iṣa and the Kena Upaniṣads together seek to establish the causality of Brahman in relation to the world. The Iṣa opens with the statement that all this (the universe), is enveloped by God. That is, the universe derives its substance from God. The Kena teaches that Brahman is the prime mover of all things. The very first word kena (by whom?), from which the Upaniṣad gets its name, is cast in the instrumental case, showing thereby that the Scripture is concerned with the teaching about the efficient cause of the universe.

That the efficient cause of the world is non-different from the material cause may be shown also by a study of the texts which deal with the procedure of creation, and by the analogies employed in the Upaniṣads for explaining the emergence of the many from the One. In the Taittirīya it is said: "He desired, 'May I procreate myself!' He performed austerity. Having performed austerity, he created all this, whatever there is here. Having created it, into it, indeed, he entered." The Chāndogya, similarly, declares "It thought: 'Would that I were many! Let me procreate myself,' " and then proceeds to describe the emergence of fire, water and food in succession. The Brhadāraṇyaka describes how the world was at first unmanifest, and how later it was made manifest through names (nāman) and forms (rūpa). Having manifested the world, the self, in the words of the Upaniṣad, entered it, even to the nail-tips, as a razor would be hidden in a razor-case, or fire in a fire-holder. The manifestation of the world out of Brahman is likened to the ejection of the thread from a spider or the scattering of sparks from fire, to the sprouting of herbs from the earth, and the growth of the hair of the head and body on a living person. Though the world of plurality has emerged out of the one inner self (antarātman), the latter is not affected by the defects of the former. After mentioning the analogies of the one fire and the one wind assuming different forms, the Katha says, "As the sun, the eye of all the world, is not sullied by the external defects of the eyes, so the one inner self of all things is not sullied by the misery of the world, being external to it."

The self is the source of both the inorganic and the organic components of the world. The Chāndogya text quoted already refers to three elements, fire, water and earth, emerging in succession from Brahman. In the
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Taiyiriya there is mention of five elements: ether (ākāśa), air (vāyu), fire (agni), water (ap), and earth (prthivi). These are said to have evolved from the self (ātmā) one after the other. The basis of the five-fold classification of the elements is the five-fold character of sense organs whose distinctive objects, viz. sound, touch, colour, taste and odour, are respectively the distinctive features of ether, air, fire, water and earth. These elements, however, are not to be identified with the elements which we experience. The latter are not pure elements, but mixed ones, and, therefore, are said to be gross (sthūla). The basic elements are subtle (sūkṣma). Out of these, by a process of mutual mixture called quintuplication (pañcīkaraṇa), the gross elements are formed. In the Praśna-Upaniṣad, the subtle elements are called ākāśa-mātrā, vāyu-mātrā, tejo-mātrā, āpo-mātrā and prthivi-mātrā. Though the terms “quintuplication” (pañcīkaraṇa) was coined later, the principle of the intermixture of elements is not unknown to the Upaniṣads, for in the Chāndogya, where there is mention of three elements, it is said that each is made threefold (tri-vṛta). The world of things that is evolved from the five elements provides the souls with the objects, instruments and locations of enjoyment. The organic bodies are classified into three groups, those born from eggs (aṇḍaja), those born from germs (jīvaja), and those born from sprouts (udbhijja). To these a fourth class was added later, those born from sweat (svedaja). In the earlier Upaniṣads there is no mention of the repeated alternation of creation and dissolution. The Śvetāsvatara, however, refers to it in more than one place. Rudra, it is said, after creating all beings, merges them together at the end of time; it is also stated that He repeats the act of spreading the net of illusion many a time.

From the standpoint of acosmism, there is no real creation. As Gauḍapāda says, the creation which is taught in different modes, with the illustrations of clay, metal, sparks, etc., is only a means of introducing (the truth of non-difference). In no way is there any difference. The world only appears; it is not real. Such a view naturally involves the notion of māyā, the principle which accounts for the apparent conditioning of the unconditioned Absolute. It is true that the doctrine of māyā is not to be found in the Upaniṣads in its full-fledged form. But the thought itself is not unknown to some of the seers of the Upaniṣads. The teachings of Yājñavalkya, for instance, imply such a notion. The sage declares that there is duality as it were (iva). Here the expression “as it were” implies that the world of duality is not real, that it is illusory, māyā. The Chāndogya characterizes all modifications to be mere names, verbal expressions (vācārambhānam, nāmadheya). In the Maitrayaniya, the Absolute is compared to a wheel of fire, an analogy which was developed later by Gauḍapāda to explain the illusory nature of the world. The term “māyā” itself can be traced to the Rg-Veda where the assumption of many shapes by Indra through his illusions (māyā) is mentioned. And it is significant.
that this text is quoted in the *Byhadāranyaka* in a context where real difference is denied. When we come to the *Svetāsvatara*, we find the term *māyā* used in the sense of illusion, and the Lord of all beings is described as *māyāvin*. As for the term *avidyā* which is an equivalent of *māyā*, it occurs in quite a few of the *Upaniṣad* texts. That the manifestation of the world is a marvel is what terms like *māyā* and *avidyā* tell us. The production of the pluralistic universe does in no way affect the integrity and absoluteness of Brahman. “That is full; this is full. The full comes out of the full; Taking the full from the full, the full itself remains.”

7. THE INDIVIDUAL-BONDAGE AND LIBERATION

The individual soul is called “*jīva*,” from the root *jīv* which means “to live.” Both according to the cosmic and the acosmic views, the individual is not different in essence from the absolute spirit. To Uṣasta Cākṛāyana’s question, “Which is the direct and immediate Brahman, the inner self of all beings?” Yājñavalkya replies: “It is your soul which is the inner self of all beings.” The analogy of the two birds is given, not to teach that the *jīva* and Brahman are different, but to show what makes for their apparent difference. “Two birds, ever united companions, cling to the self-same tree. Of these two, one eats the sweet berry. The other looks on without eating. On the self-same tree a person immersed (in the sorrows of the world) is deluded and grieves on account of his want of strength. But he becomes free from sorrow, when he sees the other who is worshipped (by many) and who is the Lord, and also his greatness.” The *Kāṭha* compares the supreme self and the individual soul to light (*āṭaṇa*) and shade (*chāyā*) respectively. The *Praśna* says, “From the Ātman this life (*prāṇa*) is born. Just as there is this shadow in the case of a person, so is this (life, i.e. the individual soul) connected therewith (i.e. the Ātman).” Thus it will be seen that what makes for the state of *jīva* is the apparent conditioning of the self by a complex of body and mind. It is these latter that account for the soul’s transmigration and travail.

In the *Taittirīya* doctrine of *kośas*, five sheaths of the soul are mentioned: *annarasamaya*, which is the outermost sheath made of food, viz. the physical body; *prāṇamaya*, the sheath of vital airs; *manomaya*, the sheath of mind; *vījñānamaya*, the sheath of intellect; and *ānandamaya*, the sheath of bliss. In later Vedānta, the first is also known as the gross body (*sthūla-śarīra*), the next three constitute the subtle body (*śūkṣma-śarīra*), and the last is called the causal body (*kāraṇa-śarīra*), viz. ignorance or nescience (*avidyā*). These together constitute “the empirical home” of the soul. Being conditioned by these, the soul becomes the subject of experience and enjoyment. The *Kāṭha-Upaniṣad* compares the self to the
lord of the chariot, the body to the chariot, the intellect to the charioteer, the mind to the reins, the senses to the horses, and the sense-objects to the roads; and it adds that the individual soul as associated with the body, the senses and the mind, is the experiencer or enjoyer (bhokter).\textsuperscript{100}

In all experience and enjoyment, the mind or manas, of course, is the central factor. The Bhādaranyaka enumerates the main functions of the mind—desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, intellection, fear—and says that all these are manas only.\textsuperscript{101} The mind functions through the sense-organs which are ten in number—five of cognition, viz. the organs of sight (cakṣus), hearing (śrotra), touch (tvac), taste (rasana) and smell (ghrāṇa); and five of action, viz. the organs of speech (vāc), grasping (pāṇi), moving (pāda), excretion (pāyu) and generation (upastha). Manas, as the central organ of consciousness, gathers knowledge through the cognitive sense-organs, integrates the bits of information thus gathered, and acts with the aid of one or more of the organs of action.

The body (annamaya) and the breath (prāṇamaya), which are graded below manas, are respectively the physical basis of the soul's activity and enjoyment, and the principle of life which makes for the animation of the body. The vijnānamaya and the ānandamaya which are higher than the manomaya represent the moral and the supra-moral levels of experience. In describing the different parts of the vijnānamaya, the Upaniṣad says, "Faith (śraddhā) is its head; righteousness (ṛta), the right side; truth (satya), the left side; contemplation (yoga) the body; might (mahas), the lower part, the foundation."\textsuperscript{102} The ānandamaya is the highest reachable level of experience for the jīva in its state of bondage. Here it enjoys, for a temporary period, peace and happiness. Such is the case in deep sleep, as also in the enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure. This experience, however, is not to be confused with mokṣa, which is spiritual freedom, unconditioned and eternal. The state of mokṣa is designated "the fourth" (caturthā or turīya), to distinguish it from the three states of empirical existence, viz. waking, dream and sleep.

The soul, in the view of the Upaniṣads, is not born with the body, nor does it perish therewith. "The wise one (i.e. the soul) is not born; nor does it die. This one has not come from anywhere; nor has it become anyone. Unborn, constant, eternal, primeval, this one is not slain when the body is slain."\textsuperscript{103} What happens at death is only the deccase of the physical body. The soul migrates from life to life, being conditioned by the cause of such migration, viz. ignorance, and by the instrument which enables it to migrate, viz. the subtle body. We first meet with a clear reference to the transmigration-doctrine in the Bhādaranyaka. Asked as to what happens to a dead man after the different components of his body are resolved into the elements like fire, etc., Yājñavalkya is reported to have taken the questioner aside and discoursed on rebirth to him in private.
Giving the gist of the discourse, the Upanishad says, "What they said was karman. What they praised was karman. Verily, one becomes good by good works, and evil by evil." In a later context the same sage explains more fully his views on rebirth. On death the soul shuffles off its present body and enters a new one, as a caterpillar, having come to the end of a blade of grass, draws itself together and takes a leap to another blade. This process is also comparable to a goldsmith making a newer and more beautiful form like that of the fathers, or of the Gandharvas, or of the gods, or of Prajapati, or of Brahmā, or of other beings. The kind of form that the soul takes would depend on its previous karman. "As is a man’s desire, such is his resolve; as is his resolve, such is the action he performs; what action he performs, that he procures for himself." The rebirth of the human soul in the sub-human species is also held to be possible. The Katha-Upanishad, for instance, says: "Some go into a womb for the embodiment or a corporeal being. Others go into what is stationary, according to their deeds, according to their knowledge." The Chāndogya declares: "Those who are of praiseworthy conduct here—the prospect is, indeed, that they will enter a noble womb, either the womb of a brahmīn, or the womb of ksatriya, or the womb of a vaiśya. But those who are of hateful conduct here—the prospect is, indeed, that they will enter an ignoble womb, either the womb of a dog, or the womb of a swine, or the womb of an outcaste." The view is also held that when a person dies, he may go to other regions, like heaven and hell, to eke out his merit or demerit as the case may be, before he takes another birth in this world. Referring to those who are attached to sacrificial forms, the Mundaka says, "Having had enjoyment on the top of the heaven won by good works, they re-enter this world, or even a lower region."

Anticipations of the karma-doctrine are to be found in the Vedic concept of ṛta which meant not only the ordered course of things but the moral order as well, and also in the notion of istrapūrta, according to which the merit acquired by a man through sacrifices and acts of charity procures for him happiness in a hereafter. The principle of karman is the counterpart in the moral realm of the physical law of causality. But what is worthy of note is that the philosophy of the Upanishads postulates the possibility of the soul’s release from the cycle of karman.

Mokṣa, or release, is the goal of every man; and release consists in the soul’s freedom from the need to be re-born. There are two views in the Upanishads regarding the nature of the goal. According to one of them, mokṣa is attainable only after death; and according to the other, it can be attained here in this very life. The former of these views is, in effect, an inheritance from the eschatological doctrines of the Mantras and the Brahmanas according to which heaven is a far-off place which could be reached by the soul only after it has cast off its physical body. But this view is transformed in the Upanishads. The ideal is no longer a becoming
something which one is not, but attaining Brahman with which the soul is identical in essence. "Into Brahman which is the soul of mine," says the seer of the Upaniṣad, "I shall enter on departing hence." The soul which thus realizes its identity with Brahman is said to go by the path of the gods (deva-yāṇa), which is different from the path of the fathers (pitr-yāṇa) which is for the bound soul still in the course of rebirth. The path of the fathers lies through smoke, the night, the dark half of the month, the six months during which the sun moves southward, the world of the fathers, and space, to the moon, and then back to this world. The path of the gods takes the soul through light, the day, the bright half of the month, the six months during which the sun moves northward, the year, and the sun, to the moon. Here it is said, a person who is non-human (a-mānava-puruṣa) appears and leads the soul on to Brahman. This mode of attaining release came to be called in later Vedānta krama-mukti, or the path of gradual release. The other view of the goal, which is in accord with the acosmic conception of the Absolute, is that release is not a state to be newly attained, as it is the eternal nature of the self itself. When ignorance which is the cause of bondage is dispelled by wisdom, the soul realizes its non-difference from Brahman; and this is release, which, therefore, need not wait till the decease of the body. "When all the desires that abide in one's heart are cast away, then a mortal becomes immortal; he attains Brahman here." "His prāṇas do not depart. Being Brahman, he attains Brahman." In later Vedānta, this view of mokṣa came to be known as sadyo-mukti, instantaneous release, and jīvan-mukti, release while yet living. So far as the content of release is concerned there is no difference between the two views. Mokṣa is release from bondage, freedom from samsāra. It is not a mere negative state of absence of sorrow; it is absolute bliss, undisturbed peace.

The course of life that a man should adopt in order to be able to attain mokṣa is outlined in several of the Upaniṣad texts. Generally, the Upaniṣads assume on the part of the aspirant a high grade of ethical culture. "Not he who has not ceased from bad conduct, not he who is not tranquil, not he who is not composed, not he whose mind is turbulent can obtain Him by intelligence." Because the moral life is assumed as a condition precedent for enquiry into Brahman-Ātman, the Upaniṣads do not elaborate on ethical codes. But even as it is, there are many texts where, in unmistakable terms, good life is insisted upon. In view of this, it is ununderstandable how it could be maintained, as does Keith, that "in comparison with the intellectual activities of the Brāhmīns the ethical content of the Upaniṣads must be said to be negligible and valueless" and that the aims of the Brāhmaṇ were bent on things which are not ethical at all." In Upaniṣads like the Taittirīya, instructions are to be found even as regards the most ordinary rules that an individual should adopt in his dealings with others. In the Brhadāranyaka, an entire philo-
sophy of ethics is summarized in the three rules, "Cultivate self-control" (dāmyata), "Be generous" (datta), and "Have compassion" (dayadhvam), given respectively to the three classes of beings, demons, men and gods. The man who has realized Brahmān is, no doubt, declared to be above rule. It is stated that he may live as he likes. But this only means that there is no question of external constraint in his case; he is perfectly moral by his very nature. So, it is a travesty of the Upaniṣad teaching to say that "the possession of metaphysical knowledge actually cancels all past sins and even permits the knower unblushingly to continue in "what seems to be much evil," with perfect impunity."\(^{115}\)

Forgetfulness of the true nature of the self is, according to the Upaniṣads, the foundation of bondage. This brings about the soul's wrong identification with the ego, mind and body; and in consequence thereof, the soul is caught in the wheel of birth and death. The path to release must naturally be a reverse process. The soul has first to withdraw itself from the narrow limitations of empirical existence, by breaking the walls of finitude. This has to be accomplished by the cultivation of the spirit of renunciation (vairāgya or śvāga). But renunciation could be complete only with the dawn of knowledge. It is through knowledge of Brahmān that ignorance is finally overcome. The knowledge that is referred to here is not to be identified with discursive thought or theoretical appreciation of the non-duality of the self. Brahmān is to be known by being it. The process of realizing Brahmān is through three stages: śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana.\(^{116}\) The first stands for the study of the Upaniṣads under a proper guide. The second requires an intellectual conviction in what the Upaniṣads teach, obtained through untiring reflection and logical analysis. The third stage which is continued meditation leads to the final wisdom. As aids to contemplation, many modes of meditation known as vidyās are taught in the Upaniṣads. The aim of all such discipline is to lead the aspirant to the knowledge of the non-dual reality. "If a person knew the self as 'I am He,' then, with what desire, for love of what would he cling to the body?" It is for such a consummation that the Upaniṣadic seer prays:

> "From the unreal lead me to the real.  
> From darkness lead me to light.  
> From death lead me to immortality."\(^{117}\)

### ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<th>Abbr.</th>
<th>Sanskrit</th>
<th>English</th>
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<tr>
<td>AU.</td>
<td>Ātareya-Upaniṣad.</td>
<td>Atreya-Upaniṣad.</td>
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<td>BAU.</td>
<td>Bhādarānyaka-Upaniṣad.</td>
<td>Bhādarānyaka-Upaniṣad.</td>
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<td>CU.</td>
<td>Chāndogya-Upaniṣad.</td>
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<td>KAU.</td>
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<td>KU.</td>
<td>Kauṭilya-Upaniṣad.</td>
<td>Kauṭilya-Upaniṣad.</td>
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NOTES

1. See Bloomfield, The Religion of the Veda, p. 51: "There is no important form of Hindu thought, heterodox Buddhism included, which is not rooted in the Upanisads." As evidences of the Upanisadic influence outside India may be cited Neoplatonism, Gnosticism, and Sufism. And the Upanisads have influenced indirectly the thought of those countries where Buddhism and Hinduism have spread.

2. See Alexander Koyé, Discovering Plato, p. 3 n. "In a certain sense the dialogue is the form par excellence for philosophic investigation, because thought itself, at least for Plato, is a 'dialogue the soul holds with itself,' and because, moreover, in the dialogue philosophic thought, freeing itself from all control of an external authority, frees itself likewise from its individual limitations by submitting to the control of another thought."

3. M. Hiriyananna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 52. "To read in practical language is to be told," says Max Easterman, "but to read in poetry is to learn by experience." See Enjoyment of Poetry, p. 131.

4. This expression appears in the Upanisads themselves. See SU., vi. 22; and MU., III. ii. 6.

5. BAU., II. i. 20.

6. UC., III. v. 2.

7. KAU., iii. 17; SU., vi. 22.

8. See Śaṅkara's introduction to KAU., BAU., TU., and MU.

9. Either Upanisad, however, is not without traces of the other tradition.

10. See S. Radhakrishnan's Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 141. An interesting attempt to enumerate the number of the Upanisad thinkers and to classify them into five generations has been made by Walter Ruben in his book Die Philosophen der Upanishaden (A. Francke Ag. Verlag. Bern, 1947). Ruben fixes the Upanisad age between 700 B.C. and 550 B.C. on the basis that there were five generations, that they preceded the Buddha, and that at the rate of 30 years for a generation the whole period covers 150 years.

11. BAU., I. iv. 10.

12. BAU., III. ix. 21.

13. CU., I. xii.

14. MU., I. ii. 7–10.

15. CU., III. xiv–xvii.

16. CU., V. xix–xxiv; also KU., ii. 5.

17. BAU., I. v. 16; VI. ii. 16; CU., V. x. 3–7; PU., i. 9; MU., I. ii. 10.

18. SU., ii. 6–7.

19. SU., ii. 15.

20. See RV., I. 164. 46.


22. BAU., III. ix.

23. MAIU., iv. 5–6.


25. KAU., vi. 3.
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26. KU., i. 5.
27. CU., VI. i. 4.
28. MU., I. i. 4–5.
29. CU., VI. i. 3.
30. CU., VI. i. 4.
31. ii. 4.
32. SU., v. i.
33. BAU., II. iv. 12–14.
34. BAU., III. iv. 2.
35. KEU., i. 3.
36. TU., ii. 4.
37. BAU., IV. iv. 20.
38. KAU., vi. 13.
40. KAU., ii. 7.
41. BAU., IV. iv. 5, sa vā 'yam ātmā brahma.
42. CU., V. xi. 1, ho nu ātmā, kim brahma?
43. CU., VI. xi–xxiv.
44. TU., iii.
45. BAU., III. vi and viii.
46. BAU., III. vii. 15.
47. TU., iii.
48. CU., VIII. vii–xii.
50. MAU., 6.
51. CU., I. vii. 5.
52. CU., III. xviii. I.
53. BAU., II. i.
54. KU., iv.
55. CU., VI.
56. Josiah Royce, who devotes a considerable portion of Lecture IV in his first series of Gifford Lectures to an exposition of the Mysticism of the Upāniṣads, makes a mistake, it seems to the present writer, in characterizing the philosophy of the Upāniṣads as a form of subjective idealism. See The World and the Individual, Vol. I, p. 158.
57. CU., III. xiv. 2–3.
58. CU., VII. xxv. 2.
59. AU., v. 3.
60. BAU., III. viii. 8.
61. KAU., iii. 15. See The Upāniṣads (G. A. Natesan & Co.), p. 40.
62. BAU., IV. ii. 4.
63. BAU., II. i. 20.
64. BAU., V. v. i.
65. KAU., iii. 15; MU, II. ii. 10.
66. BAU., IV. iii. 33.
67. TU., ii. 8.
68. CU., VII. xxiii.
69. BAU., III. ix. 28.
70. TU., ii. i. Deussen makes the suggestion that anantam might be an ancient error, ratified after a time by tradition, for ānandam. See op. cit., p. 127.
71. SU., I. 1–3.
72. CU., III. xiv. 1.
73. TU., iii. i.
74. TU., ii. 6.
75. CU., VI. ii. 3–4.
76. BAU., I. iv. 7.
77. BAU., II. i. 20; MU., I. i. 7.

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78. BAU., II. i. 20; MU, II. i. 1.
79. MU., I. i. 7.
80. KAU., v. 9–11.
81. CU., VI. ii. 3–4.
82. PU., iv. 8.
83. CU., VI. iii. 3.
84. CU., VI. iii. 1.
85. SU., iii. 2.
86. SU., v. 3.
87. Kārikā, iii. 15.
88. BAU., II. iv. 14.
89. CU., VI. i. 31.
90. MAIU., vi. 24; Kārikā, iv. 47–52.
91. RV., VI. 47. 18.
92. BAU., II. v. 19.
93. SU., iv. 10.
94. See KAU., ii. 5.
95. BAU., III. iv. 1; also III. v. 1.
96. The Upaniṣads (G. A. Natesan & Co.), pp. 108–9; MU., III. i. 1–2; SU., iv. 6–7.
97. KAU., iii. i.
98. PU., iii. 3.
99. TU., ii.
100. KAU., iii. 3–4.
101. BAU., I. v. 3.
102. TU., ii. 4.
103. KAU., ii. 18.
104. BAU., III. ii. 13.
105. BAU., IV. iv. 3–5.
106. KAU., v. 7.
107. CU., V. x. 7.
108. MU., I. ii. 10.
109. See CU., III. xiv. 4.
110. KAU., vi. 14.
111. BAU., IV. iv. 6.
112. KAU., ii. 24.
113. op. cit., p. 584.
114. op. cit., p. 586.
116. BAU., II. iv. 5.
117. BAU., I. iii. 28.
CHAPTER IV

THE EPICS

A—THE RĀMĀYĀṆA—

1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The RāmāyaṆa, a national epic like the Mahābhārata, in the truest sense of the term, has exerted profound influence on the thoughts and feelings and conduct of the Indian people ever since it saw the light of day. It has set up ideals of manhood and womanhood which have been cherished and imitated by people of all classes and denominations and have thus helped to ennobler them and succour them in their tribulations. It has served as an inexhaustible source of inspiration to the great Indian poets, using Sanskrit, Prākrit or the vernacular as the vehicle, who have drawn upon it not only for their themes but even for poetical conception and imagery.

But in spite of its unsurpassed popularity, and mostly because of it, it has not come down to us in the original form in which its author, Vālmiki, conceived it, but as considerably overlaid and disfigured with interpolations of all sorts. Moreover, it appears today in at least three important recensions, the West Indian, the Bengal and the Bombay, which differ from each other to such an extent that about one-third of the verses in each is found in neither of the other two.¹ Jacobi, who in his Das RāmāyaṆa (Bonn, 1893) has made by far the greatest contribution to the critical study of the text of the RāmāyaṆa, holds that of the seven books constituting the present-day RāmāyaṆa the whole of the seventh and parts of the first are comparatively later additions. Even if he is right, they must have been made very early, as all the recensions have them and all later tradition includes them. Discussing the age² of the RāmāyaṆa, he comes to the conclusion that it must have originated before the fifth or probably in the sixth or the eighth pre-Christian century. The present gleanings of philosophical views are made from the Bombay recension which, according to the experts, contains mostly the oldest version and is the one most widely used. It is hoped that they represent the spirit of the RāmāyaṆa fairly correctly and will not lack corroboration from the other recensions. The references in the present article are to the second Nirṇayasāgara Press edition (Bombay, 1902).
2. THE SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND

The Rāmāyaṇa envisages a society in which the order of the four castes (varṇas) and that of the four stages of life (āśramas) are firmly established, and the various occupations and professions are suitably attended to; firm faith in the Vedas and the sayings of the seers (ṛṣis) is ingrained; sanctity of the cow and the brāhmaṇa is repeatedly emphasized; and a sense of the overriding importance of religious and moral duties (dharma) amounts to an obsession. Vedic studies and rites are attributed even to those that are designated vānaras (apes), and rākṣasas (ogres). The cities (and presumably also the villages) abound in places of worship, with or without images and called āyatanas and caityas. Ascetics of various types, who usually live in hills and forests, roam about the country and are highly respected. On the other hand, there are also the unbelieving sceptics (nāstikas) who are a constant source of worry to the pious. The king, who rules with the consent of the people and on the advice of wise ministers and is called the protector of the varṇas and the āśramas and defender of dharma, has to be very careful in his private life, lest he should set a bad example to the people.3

On the intellectual side, great emphasis is laid on education (vinaya) as bringing out and adding to the innate virtues, and the following subjects, besides others, appear, from express or tacit references, to be cultivated: Vedas, Upanişads and the six auxiliaries to their study (viz. phonetics, rituals, etymology, grammar, metrics and astronomy), codes on law and duty (dharma-śāstra), legendary and mythic lore (Purāṇa), politics (artha-śāstra and rāja-niti), military science (dhanur-Veda), logic (ānvikṣikī), astrology and palmistry (jyotiṣa), fine arts (vaishārika-silpa), medicine, and agriculture, cattle-breeding and commerce (vārttā). The terms śruti (direct revelation), and smṛti (sacred tradition), so common in later literature, have already gained currency. Practical effects of a sound mastery of grammar, phonetics, logic and the Scriptures mark the conversation of the cultured and are highly appreciated, while theories of politics are at the tip of the tongue of anybody, man or woman, talking about the king or the State. In addition to this, a general belief in omens and portents, the fantastic and the miraculous, and the powers of magic, sacred formulae and austerities may be inferred.

3. PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERCURRENTS AND GENERAL OUTLOOK

Darśana in the sense of "view," "attitude towards life," or "philosophy," and pradarśana, interpreted by commentators as "knowledge of subtle, non-perceptual matters by means of authority and inference,"
are terms of common occurrence. In spite of the repeated indulgence in description of miraculous facts or situations, immutability of the laws of nature and of the order of things appears to be recognized in such statements as: “Just as old age, death, time or divine decree is never impeded amongst all beings…”; “Three couples (dvandva) operate indiscriminately among animals; you should not be (affected) like this about them that are inevitable”; “earth, wind, ether, water and light abide by their own nature, following the eternal course”; “Nobody touching the burning flame of fire escapes being scorched”; “No animal in this world can be absolutely immortal.” Frequent use of the terms maryādā (bounds) and sthiti (settled state of existence), with reference to natural as well as religious or moral affairs also points to the same conclusion. A good number of technical terms scattered throughout the work indicate strong undercurrents of philosophical speculation, and although testimony of the supersensitive sages as revealed in the Scriptures is, as a rule, held in high esteem and preferred to the depositions of perception and inference in subtler matters, nothing appears to be too sacred to be immune from the searching logical criticism (ānvikṣikī) of the Lokāyatikas who are fairly in evidence.

The general outlook seems to be characterized by a sensible optimism, grounded, as it apparently is, on a dispassionate view of the inevitable concomitants of life. Unlike later literature and the teachings of the Upaniṣads notwithstanding, life is nowhere looked upon as a bondage and final release (mokṣa) from the concatenation of births and deaths does not appear to be openly preached as a desideratum. “No living being,” it is said, “is immune from calamities,” and “uninterrupted happiness is not easy to secure,” but “joy comes to a person, if he holds on to life, even after a hundred years.” “A heartless evil-doer causing anxiety to created beings does not survive even though he be the lord of the three worlds.” “All piles end in decay, elevations in fall, connections in separation, and life in death.” “Just as two pieces of wood may come together in the ocean and, after a while, separate, so wives, sons, relatives and wealth come upon a man and slip off, their separation being inevitable. No living entity can escape the course of nature, so one is powerless, lamenting over the dead.” Considering that “life is constantly and irrevocably gliding off like the stream, one should direct one’s self towards happiness, for all created beings are held to deserve happiness” and one of the five congenital debts is that to one’s own self, repayable with pleasurable experience. But true happiness cannot be had by pursuing it per se, but is derivable only from dharma.

4. THE DOMINANT IDEAS

The ends of human existence.—The ends which motivate human activities and which every normal human being should strive to attain (puruṣārtha)
are, according to the Rāmāyaṇa, three in number and hence collectively called tri-varga. They are dharma (spiritual merit), artha (wealth or material advantage), and kāma ([gratification of] desire or pleasure). Of these dharma is the supreme and the other two should be subordinated to it. One who is actuated only by artha comes to be hated in this world, while excessive seeking of pleasure cannot be commended, as it leads one promptly to grief. One should judiciously and harmoniously pursue each of the three at its right moment, but one who pursues only pleasure to the neglect of the other two wakes up after a fall like one asleep at the tree-top.

Dharma is ubiquitous in the Rāmāyaṇa and has been used almost indiscriminately for the end as well as the means, viz. any or all of the religious, social and moral duties, enjoined by the Scriptures or recognized by the wise as such. The conception of dharma has been of profound significance in Indian thought of all times and its etymology is a pointer to its connotation. In Vedic times dharma in its variant form dhárman (धर्मन् “to hold,” “to support”) meant “prop” or “support” and “law” or “ordinance”; later it naturally developed the senses “innate property of a thing,” “customary law,” “religious injunction” and “duty.” All these meanings it has ever continued to have, so that dharma has been understood and interpreted as that which supports the universe as well as the society. “Dharma is supreme in this world” and “the most potent refuge.” “Material advantage or pleasure issues out of dharma; one gets everything through dharma; dharma is the sustaining power (or quintessence) of this universe.” Dharma guards one who guards it, and “those who are devoted to truth and dharma have no fear of death.” But the fruit of dharma alone does not accrue to one who has earned it, but who is bound up (also) with the fruit of a-dharma, its opposite, nor does dharma destroy a-dharma: one gets the fruit of the one as surely as that of the other.

But the course of dharma is subtle and extremely difficult of apprehension even by the wise. The inscrutable ways of events in this world often raise doubts as to its pretensions. Owing to frequent apparent anomalies in recompense in the shape of prosperity or adversity in this world, the potency and even the existence of dharma and a-dharma are sometimes challenged and the absoluteness of might, wealth or expediency advocated, while those who deny themselves enjoyment and undergo austerities for the sake of dharma are ridiculed.

Theology and Religion.—By the time of the Rāmāyaṇa the Vedic deities have become completely anthropomorphized and a host of new deities has been introduced. Their immortality is not absolute, being only an exaggeration of the ordinary human span, and their positions are now considered attainable by human beings through virtuous actions. But three super-deities Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva, credited respectively with
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the cyclic evolution, maintenance and merger (srṣṭi, sthiti and laya) of the universe and deemed as three functional, personal aspects of the Absolute (Brahman), appear on the scene. They form the Trinity and are given, jointly as well as individually, all the epithets of the Absolute such as “unborn,” “eternal,” “immutable,” “all-pervasive,” “infinite,” “the source and container of all,” etc.35 The impersonal Absolute as the source of Brahmā is termed a-vyaktā36 (unmanifest), or ākāśa37 (the All-pervasive one), and as ātman or paramātman38 (the soul of all beings), the individual soul receiving the characteristic designation bhūtātman39 (“the spirit apparent in the senses and sensations”), or līṅgīnto (“endowed with indicators”). The inscrutable power in the Absolute that is responsible for the evolution, duration and merger of the universe and for its assumption of personal forms is termed māyā.41

In religion the Vedic mode of worship is supplemented by the worship of images in temples. The articles of offering also are augmented by flowers, scents, sweets and all the best varieties of food, and, in fact, it has become a truism that “the deities of a person have the same food as he himself.”42 “Sitting in right posture” (āsana),43 “control of the breath” (prāṇāyāma),44 “meditation” (dhyāna),45 and “absolute concentration of the mind” (yoga and samādhi), and vows of all sorts are frequently mentioned in this connection. Austerity, study of the prescribed portion of the Veda, liberality to the brāhmaṇas and the needy, hospitality, and adoration of the manes as well as the brāhmaṇas form other items of pious work. Great liberalism in the matter of worship seems to prevail and bigoted sectarianism of the later times is clearly out of the question.

Asceticism is in the air and, besides confirmed ascetics of various orders,46 every pious man or woman exhibits ascetic traits in his or her habits. There seem to be two classes of hermits, tāpapas and śramaṇas (both including women),47 the subtle distinction between them, if any, is not apparent from the text. Bhikṣu and bhikṣīṇī for the male and the female hermit respectively are also met with.48 Although regular asceticism is often resorted to for attaining objects, ordinarily wellnigh impossible of attainment, there seems to be a much higher motive for the best of the ascetics who are presented as striving after absolute placidity of the mind through control of the senses and passions, freedom from desires and compassionate kindliness towards all living beings.49 It has been stated above that “final release” (mokṣa), is not openly preached, but there are occasional hints that this is what they are striving after, their goal being indicated by the ambiguous term brahma-loka (the word of Brahman or of Brahmā).50 The last stage of asceticism seems to be characterized by absolute disregard for the creature comforts and constant meditation on the self.51

Ethics.—Ethical virtues, as an integral part of dharma, have found so much emphasis in the Rāmāyāṇa that it is virtually “ethics turned
poetry,' and its success in this difficult task may be gauged by the immense popularity and veneration it has enjoyed among millions of Hindus throughout the ages. Kindly regard for all animal existence, truthfulness, self-control, forbearance, tolerance for the shortcomings of others, hospitality and succour even to an enemy who seeks it, and purity in mind, speech and act are some of the virtues highly extolled. Devotional regard for the parents, the teacher, the elder brother, the husband and the master and the corresponding affectionate regard in them for the others are emphasized again and again. Monogamy and chastity form one of the highest virtues for both the sexes. Women, who are normally dependent on the father, the husband or the son, are entitled to tender courtesy under all circumstances, and no females must be killed. The wife, who is the inalienable self of the husband and his comrade in the pursuit of dharma, enjoys solicitous care and supreme authority in domestic life. Her character is her best armour, and the respect and even veneration that a chaste and devoted wife, reputed for her character, enjoys is unparalleled, and is hardly less than that enjoyed by any great ascetic. The king, who owes his position to the loving consent of the people, is to be looked upon as a god in disguise, since it is he who is the guarantor of the dharma, welfare and life of the people. But he commits a heinous crime, if he, while enjoying the privileges, neglects his duty. The judge and the criminal who is justly punished, both go to heaven. It is not a sin to kill one who has struck first, for one has to save one's life as best one can. But even in war one must not kill an enemy who is not fighting, has taken to hiding or sought refuge with folded hands, is running away or drunken. Killing of a king, a woman, a child or an old man, or desertion of a dependent is considered a great sin.

The absoluteness of moral conduct is emphasized more than once. But its disparagement is sometimes met with in the speech of one engaged in immoral action or as an outburst of passion, roused by occasional non-appreciation of moral virtue in this world. Thus in the speech of Indrajit killing the magic Sita: "That a woman should not be killed, as you say, O monkey, anything that causes suffering to the enemy has to be done"; or in the speech of Rāma offended with the behaviour of the ocean: "The world honours a boastful, evil-hearted, shameless fellow who rushes about and chastises everybody," and "Chastisement is the supreme expedient for a man in this world, I should think, fire upon forgiveness, sweet words or presents to the ungrateful."

The criteria of moral judgment appear to consist in (1) consideration for the other world, (2) regard of the ēlite, (3) effect on other people's morals, and (4) one's own conscience and self-respect.

Fatalism.—Fatalism is frequently exploited in the Rāmāyaṇa as a refuge in irremediable adverse circumstances. "That which surpasses logic is fate (daiva) and its course is unimpeded amongst all entities."
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Fate matures in time and the two are so inseparably connected that often time (kāla) is held responsible for all that happens.⁶⁹ Sometimes fate is looked upon as predestination (niyati) ruling absolutely over all that is, as in the address of Rāma to Tārā:⁷⁰ “Niyati is the author in this world; niyati is instrumental in achievements; niyati is responsible for the undertakings of all entities in this world. Nobody does anything; one is not one’s master even in respect of one’s undertaking; the world rolls on its inherent state, and time is its supreme resort. Time does not transgress itself; time is not to be avoided; and having attained its inherent state, nothing transgresses. For time there is no relationship, no logic, no powers; connection with friends and relations is no consideration; it is beyond one’s own control. But one, who sees rightly should observe the evolution of time: dharma, artha and kāma are achieved in the course of time.” Often, however, fate is regarded as the maturation of the deferred potentialities of one’s actions (karman) in this or a previous life, thus entailing a belief in transmigration.⁷¹ The two concepts are evidently due to two angles of vision: the one looking upon the individual as a tiny particle buried in the immensity of the universe, and the other regarding him as distinct from other individuals and hence responsible for whatever he comes by, injustice or chance being ruled out.

Despite this homage to daiva, the importance of human effort (purusākāra or pauruṣa) is nowhere disparaged. In fact, success is considered to be dependent on both.⁷² The second of the above conceptions also implies the importance of purusākāra, for daiva here is the fruition of some previous purusākāra.⁷³ Some protagonists of purusākāra would even pity daiva as powerless before human effort, while not to be submissive to time (i.e. daiva) is considered a great virtue.⁷⁴

Materialism.—The views of the materialists, who are vehemently condemned as Nāstikas (nihilists), time and again, appear summed up in the speech of Jābali to Rāma:—

“A creature is born and annihilated alone; it has no relations or comrades. Therefore, a man who is affected by the consideration that it is his mother or father should be looked upon as a lunatic. For men ‘father,’ ‘brother,’ home,’ ‘wealth’ are all like a halting stage for a traveller, and no sane persons become attached to them. The father is just the initiator, but it is really the seminal and menstrual fluids combined in the mother’s womb that leads to a man’s birth. At death one meets the inevitable end: this is the way of things and one need not be aggrieved. Those that give precedence to wealth and spiritual merit are really to be pitied—not the others, since it is they who suffer misery here and annihilation at death. People busy themselves with funeral rites and offerings to the manes: just look at the extravagant waste of food, for what can a dead man eat? If food eaten by one is transferred to the body of another, similar offerings should be made in favour of those that are living abroad instead of

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supplying them with provender. ‘Sacrifice,’ ‘give,’ ‘receive initiation,’
‘practise penance,’ ‘renounce’—such texts inducing liberality have been
composed by clever people. Therefore, an intelligent person should make
up his mind that there is nothing else, and entertain that which is directly
apprehended by the senses and reject the rest.”

These materialist ideas of Jābāli look like an exact replica of the views
of Cārvāka who, however, is nowhere mentioned by name.

5. CONCLUSION

It will appear from the foregoing survey that the Rāmāyana presents a
practical philosophy, underlining ethics and religion, in the shape of a
poem of engaging human interest. The higher philosophical truths and
the views of the heretics are touched only incidentally in presenting a
verisimilitude of the cultural atmosphere. No philosophical Schools, except
ānivṛkṣikė favoured by the Lokāyatikas, are mentioned by name, nor views
that are peculiar to any particular School, although the general trends and
the numerous technical terms show that philosophical speculations along
various lines must be rife. Sectarianism is not in evidence, although pious
devotion to various deities is frequently alluded to. On the whole, the
philosophy of the Rāmāyana, free from dogmatism and sectarian prejudice
as it is, deserves to have a universal human appeal for all times to come.

NOTES

1. Macdonell, History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 308.
2. op. cit., pp. 100-111.
3. II. 109. 9; VII. 43. 19.
4. II. 21. 64; 109. 3; III. 66. 14; IV. 18. 59; 28. 65; VI. 22. 32; 64. 2; VII. 50. 16, etc.
5. VI. 50. 40.
6. III. 64. 75.
7. II. 77. 23. The couples are variously interpreted by the commentators as
“hunger and thirst, grief and stuper, old age and death,” or “birth and death,
pleasure and pain, gain and loss;” or “existence, birth, increase, decay, change,
disintegration.”
8. VI. 22. 23.
9. IV. 30. 18; VI. 118. 17.
10. VII. 30. 9; also 10. 17.
11. cf. anupapanna (illogical), VI. 64. 11; anumāna (inference), IV. 6. 9; 10. 34;
VI. 18. 37; “inferential knowledge,” 52. 13; avayāka (unmanifest), I. 70. 19;
ākāśa (free space), > (the Absolute as the all-pervasive one), I. 34. 4; II. 110. 5;
VII. 110. 10; indriya (organ of sense), V. 9, 29; indriyārtha (object
of sense), V. 9, 29; VI. 93. 22; upapatti (reasoning), V. 9. 39; upapanna (logical),
II. 118. 15; tattva (the ultimate reality), in tattva-jñā (knower of the ultimate
reality), II. 77. 24; tamas (one of the guṇas), II. 109. 17; tarka (logical analysis),
IV. 32. 9; VI. 2. 7; tri-varga [group of three (viz. spiritual merit, wealth and
pleasure)], IV. 38. 23; nāśreyasa (the highest good), VI. 64. 8; nisarga
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(nature), IV. 58. 30, 31; nyāya (reasoning or syllogism) III. 50. 22; VII. 22, 24, 30; pañca-tev (merger in the five elements), IV. 11. 46; V. 13. 23; pañca-varga (group of the five (senses)), II. 109. 27; purusārtha (object of human pursuit), IV. 64. 10; V. 13. 18; brahma-bhūta (become Brahman), I. 33. 16; bhūta (entity), II. 94. 18; bhūta (being), III. 64. 75; VII. 34. 39; (animate being), II. 77. 23; (primary elements) > (the senses including mind), VII. 96. 21; bhūtātman (the individual soul), VI. 93. 22; maryādā (bounds, settled order, propriety), II. 35. 11; III. 64. 64, etc.; māyā (the inscrutable divine power), V. 54. 37; VII. 104. 2. 4. 5; 110. 11; māyā-yoga (obviously = yoga-māyā), "māyā" as yoga (q.v.), I. 29. 9; moha (delusion), II. 54. 30, and sammoha (delusive), VII. 84. 9; yoga (self-concentration), II. 20. 48; III. 6. 6; rāga (passion), II. 2. 44; V. 55. 16; rājasya (due to rajas, a constituent of prakṛti), V. 55. 16; rūpa (being), VI. 116. 30; lakṣana (definition or accurate description), VI. 64. 6; vāda (debate), I. 14. 19; VI. 17. 52; vipāka (fruitation of karman), V. 68. 4; vyākhyānta, III. 9. 27, and vyākhyāta II. 106. 18 (self-contradictory): saṅga (attachment), II. 37. 2; sattva (one of the gunas), VII. 58. 6; (mind), II. 39. 32; (spirit), II. 21. 39; samādhi (self-concentration), IV. 30. 16. 17; VII. 49. 8; svabhāva (innate nature), VI. 22. 23; 64. 6.

12. III. 50. 22.
13. II. 100. 38-39.
15. II. 18. 13.
16. V. 34. 6; VI. 126. 2.
17. III. 29. 3.
18. II. 105. 16 = VII. 52. 11.
20. II. 105. 31, cf. also vv., 19-21.
21. II. 4. 13-14. The other four are to the gods, the sages, the manes, and the brāhmaṇas, repayable respectively with sacrifice, study, begetting a son, and gifts. Compare these with the Five Great Sacrifices.

23. II. 21. 57-58.
24. II. 100. 62-63.
26. II. 21. 41; VII. 3. 10.
27. III. 9. 30.
28. II. 25. 3.
29. VI. 40. 32.
30. V. 51. 28-29.
31. IV. 18. 15.
32. II. 39. 12. 52. 17; III. 52. 39; 64. 52; V. 28. 12-13.
33. VI. 64. 6-9; 83. 14-42; 13. 2-5.
34. II. 109. 13; VI. 13. 2.
35. II. 110. 3. 5; VI. 117. 13-26; VII. 6. 2.
36. I. 70. 19.
37. II. 110. 5; VII. 110. 10.
38. IV. 18. 15; VI. 125. 32; 111. 11; VII. 41. 7.
39. VI. 59. 55; 93. 22.
40. V. 13. 40.
41. I. 16. 15; 29. 9; V. 54. 37; VII. 104. 2. 4. 5; 110. 11.
42. II. 103. 30; 104. 15.
43. II. 99. 15.
44. II. 4. 33; VII. 7. 6.
45. II. 6. 3.
46. III. 6. 2-6.
47. I. 14. 12; IV. 18. 33; II. 29. 13; II. 38. 4; III. 74. 7, 10; IV. 50. 38-39.
48. II. 29. 13; IV. 3. 2. 23.
49. II. 99. 13-16; III. 1. 15, 21; V. 26. 45-6.

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50. I. 33. 16; 34. 4; II. 19. 33; 21. 53; 94. 19; III. 5. 28, 31, 41; 74. 13. 35.
51. II. 67. 23.
52. II. 33. 12; 109. 31; VI. 113. 43; 18. 27–28; II. 109. 21.
53. II. 64. 43; 29. 16; 117. 23–9.
54. I. 32. 21 f.; II. 61. 24; IV. 33. 36, 39, 61; II. 78. 21.
55. II. 37. 24; III. 10. 21; IV. 24. 37–8; 65. 23–4.
56. VI. 114. 27.
57. II. 102. 4; III. I. 18–20; IV. 18. 41–3.
58. III. 6. 11.
59. IV. 18. 61.
60. II. 96. 24; VI. 9. 14.
61. VI. 80. 39; IV. 11. 36.
62. II. 75. 37.
63. II. 109. 4; VI. 113. 42–4.
64. VI. 81. 28.
65. VI. 21. 15–16.
66. VI. 22. 45.
67. II. 109. 3–9, 16–19, 24–5.
68. II. 22. 20.
69. II. 24. 33; 88. 11; III. 68. 21; 72. 16; VI. 32. 13; 95. 48.
70. IV. 25. 4–8.
71. II. 39. 4; 53. 19; 109. 28; III. 49. 27; VI. 111. 25–6; 113. 37–8.
72. I. 18. 47; V. 36. 19; VI. 73. 6.
73. II. 23. 7, 16–20.
74. II. 1. 31.
75. II. 108. 3–17.

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CHAPTER IV—continued

THE EPICS

B—THE MAHĀBHĀRATA
including THE BHAGAVAD-GĪṬĀ

I. GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE WORK

The philosophy of the Epics is to be chiefly found in the Mahābhārata, which, with its large mass of legendary, mythological and didactic material, gives greater scope to it, and even directly inculcates certain philosophical and religious doctrines. But the work itself, in this aspect, baffles systematic or consistent analysis, for it hardly contains, in its jumble of conflicting ideas, any system or consistency. The reason for this is that, although ascribed to one author, the Mahābhārata is a vast and composite work spreading over many centuries and stages of growth and expansion. While the epic substance was enlarged and embellished, the ultimate form of the work became, more or less, that of a huge dharmaśāstra in the epic garb, containing as it does a mass of legends, myths and fancies mixed up with morality, religion and philosophy. Some of the myths and legends go back to Vedic times, but some of the parables and moral narratives are of later growth; while the philosophical and religious ideas are as much survivals as accessions.

Throughout the Epic we find religious and philosophical ideas curiously intermingled. But what is more interesting is that here we have a fairly large number of professedly philosophical and religious discourses. These are the Sanatsujātiya (in the Udyoga-parvan); the Bhagavad-Gīṭā (in the Bhīṣma-parvan); the Mokṣa-dharma (in the Śanti-parvan), including among miscellaneous discourses a series of nearly a dozen so-called Gīṭās and the Nārāyaṇīya section and the Anu-Gīṭā (in the Aśvamedha-parvan). All these are, of course, episodic and do not pretend to be systematic treatises.

2. THE GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

It is natural to find in the Epic a tacit acceptance of older thought, and echoes, not systematic but eclectic, of Vedic ritualism and Upaniṣadic ātmanism. The way of karma (ritualism) is not indeed denied, but the attitude of the Epic towards ritualistic religion is quite indefinite. Passages
can be cited which glorify it, but there are also other passages which are distinctly unfavourable and even antagonistic. The way of knowledge (jñāna) forms the central teaching of the Upaniṣad and is similarly presupposed in the Epic. In an atmosphere of intense military activity, it cannot be expected that the Upaniṣadic teaching of self-control (nivṛtti) could have been accepted in actual practice; but there are passages which reflect the view that activity (pravṛtti), whether ritualistic or otherwise, is not necessary for those who have reached the absolute realization of "the One with many names." Indeed, the idealistic Absolutism of the Upaniṣad underlies most of the Epic teaching in its theoretic aspect; but it is difficult to determine what particular form of it is accepted. Both the cosmic (sa-prapañca) and acosmic (niṣ-prapañca) views appear. But having regard to the essentially popular character of the Epic, the general tendency appears to be towards the more realistic cosmic conception, which believes in the provisional separateness of the world as a conditioned emanation from the unconditioned Brahman (parināma-vāda). From the empirical standpoint this view would make a greater appeal than the extremely idealistic acosmic doctrine, which maintains that Brahman is the only reality who does not evolve into, but merely appears as, the world of experience (vivartta-vāda). While aiming at unity, the Epic attitude thus clings to the double notion of God and the world. But the idea of divine immanence is utilized to explain the diversity of numberless Epic gods, who have now been added to the Vedic pantheon, as different emanations of one Supreme Being. The older polytheism was hard to die in the popular belief; but under the influence of Upaniṣadic teaching, the Epic faith is fundamentally monotheistic, whether the object of adoration be Viṣṇu, Nārāyaṇa or Kṛṣṇa-Vāsudeva or one of their numerous incarnations. It is recognized that the unconditioned Absolute is superior to these conditioned manifestations; but since the new theistic faith required an object of personal love and worship, the impersonal Brahman of the Upaniṣad is invested with a distinct personality, being transformed into Īśvara appearing under various names. This feeling of one supreme personal god in the individual consciousness, however, is often accompanied by a popular polytheistic reverence for "other gods"—Brahmā, Śiva and others—who are also admitted, properly classed and given well-defined powers and functions.

The waning belief in Vedic ritualism as such probably explains the absence of Epic reference to the tenets of the Māraṇas, if this School of thought had at all come into existence. The word vedānta occurs, generally in the wider sense of Upaniṣad-Aranyaka, but the system of the Vedānta, as we have it, was probably unknown. As in the earlier Upaniṣad, so also in the Epic, there is little trace of an explicit māyā-theory. Even if māyā be regarded by implication as the principle which shows the unconditioned Brahman as conditioned, it appears to have no place in the Epic scheme
of creation. In the same way the Epic is unaware of the specific teachings of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Kaṇāda's name appears for the first time in the supplementary Hariyamāṇa in a different context, while there is no mention of Gautama as the teacher of the Nyāya. The word nyāya generally signifies logic, but not any particular system of logic. Even if the Epic mentions a pentad of argumentative group (XII. 320. 80–85), it has hardly any affinity with Gautama's syllogistic constituents. The only sources of knowledge (pramāṇa), acknowledged in the Epic, are perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and traditional wisdom (āgama or āmnāya); but as a theistic faith, the Epic religion believes ultimately in the enlightening divine grace.

The five current Schools of philosophy (jñānāṇi) which the Epic directly mentions are (XII. 349. 64): the Vedas, the Sāṁkhya, the Yoga, the Pāṣupata and the Pāñcarātra. Of these, we have already referred to the Epic attitude towards the Veda; but it is noteworthy that the Epic names Apāntaratamas, otherwise called Prācīnagarbha, as the original teacher of Vedism. The Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Pāṣupata and Pāñcarātra are said to be revealed by Kapila, Hiraṇyagarbha, Śiva and Nārāyaṇa respectively. Among other teachers mentioned is Ātreyya, lauded as a teacher of unconditioned Brahman (XIII. 137. 3); Sulabhā instructing Janaka (XII. 190–3); Sanatkumāra instructing Dhṛtarāṣṭra in the Sanatsujātiya; authors of the various Gītās interspersed, including Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa; Kapila and his pupils Āsuri and Pāñcaśikha, teachers of Sāṁkhya-Yoga; Asita Devala, Jaigisavya, Parāśara, Vārṣaganyā, Bhṛgu, Śuka, Gautama, Ārṣṭiśena, Garga, Nārada, Pulastya, Śukra, Kāśyapa and Sanatkumāra mentioned in a comprehensive list (XII. 318. 59 f.) as teachers of the twenty-fifth Principle.

Of these, Kapila and his School, teaching Sāṁkhya-Yoga, appear to be the most important. Indeed, this ubiquitous system occupies a prominent place comparable only to the prevailing theism of the Epic. Kapila, author of the Sāṁkhya, is said to be the most ancient seer, identical with the gods Agni, Śiva and Viṣṇu; while his work is repeatedly declared to be the oldest. The originator of the Epic Yoga is not Patañjali, but Hiraṇyagarbha, although Śiva is spoken of as a Yoga-lord and Śukra as a Yoga-teacher of the demons. The Yoga had some difference of opinion from the Sāṁkhya, but the difference is nowhere emphasized as involving a distinction. Perhaps originally they constituted a single doctrine, and therefore sometimes declared to be identical; at least the Sāṁkhya is taken to be the norm. The chief difference between the two Schools of thought appears to be that while the Yoga laid stress on practical discipline, the Sāṁkhya on knowledge. The Yoga was perhaps more orthodox, but the Sāṁkhya is the philosophy of knowledge par excellence which did not adhere strictly to traditional views. While both are dualistic and accept spiritual aloofness (kevalatva) as the goal, we are told that the Sāṁkhya,
unlike the Yoga, is devoid of a belief in a supreme personal god (nir-Iśvara). Since this is the essence of Epic theism, the difficulty is got over by adding a twenty-fifth Principle, called Iśvara to the twenty-four of the Sāmkhya. Partly in its metaphysics, and certainly in its cosmology and psychology, the Epic accepts the Sāmkhya speculation. This Epic Sāmkhya has all the essentials of classical Sāmkhya, and Garbe would regard it as full-fledged Sāmkhya itself in the epic garb. But it would be preferable to take it as proto-Sāmkhya in the making, just as the Epic Yoga doctrine is similarly proto-Yoga.

3. HERETICAL SCHOOLS

But the old heterodoxy, like the old orthodoxy, continued to develop on its own lines. There are numerous references in the Epic to heretical views. Ordinarily, the word nāstika (negator) means in the Epic (XII. 133. 14 = Gītā IV. 40; XII. 125; XII. 269. 67; XII. 180. 49) a dissenter from received opinion in regard to transcendental entities or to the authority of hallowed tradition. We have also mention of the Lokāyatika (naturalist), the hetumā (Rationalist) and the pāṣaṇḍa (reviler of the Veda); but from the meagre references it is difficult to determine the exact scope of their teaching. The Epic often stigmatizes heretical opinions as demoniacal (āsura); and in view of the continued revision of the text it is probable that they came under the review of unsympathetic editors and suffered distortion and even elimination. Nevertheless, they represent an important stream of thought; and to half a dozen such views the Svetāṣvatara-Upaniṣad (I. 2) already refers. In the midst of the diversity of heretical teaching two views, known also to the later history of Indian thought, stand out prominently and can be distinguished. They are the yādṛcchā-vāda (also called animitta-vāda) or Accidentalism and svabhāva-vāda or Naturalism, the last of which is ascribed to the demon Prahlāda (XII. 222). In sharp contrast to both Vedic supernaturalism and Upaniṣadic transcendentalism, both are positivist in character, repudiating supernatural sanction for their views and rejecting the idea of any transcendental power behind the world (adṛṣṭa-vāda). While the one denies causation and regards the world as a chaos, the other ascribes whatever order there is in it to mere chance, which is a necessity inherent in the very nature of things and not imposed by an external agency. In this sense, the views can be called Lokāyata or a heterodox philosophy of the mundane, and are opposed to the orthodox adhyātma-vāda or philosophy of the spirit. Perhaps they believe in a self lasting as long as life lasts, but they certainly deny immortality of the self and, as a corollary, the law of karman and rebirth.
4. MIXTURE OF DOCTRINES

Thus, with regard to theoretic teaching, the Epic reveals a somewhat incongruous mixture of doctrines. It would be profitable to indicate here briefly the general philosophical thought which dominates. In metaphysics, there is an interaction of diverse ideas. We have, on the one hand, the polytheistic ritualism of the Veda and the Brāhmaṇa and the monistic idealism of the Upaniṣad; but all this is coloured by the naturalistic dualism of proto-Sāṁkhya and the disciplinary deism of proto-Yoga, although much of it, it must be admitted, is neither the Sāṁkhya nor the Yoga. On the other hand, we have the monotheistic devotionalism of the Pāṣupatas, the Vaishnavas, the Nārāyaṇiyas and the more important Bhāgavatas, which derives its speculative ideas from diverse sources. In cosmology there is a similar blending of more or less conflicting views. While the Vedic idea of the cosmic egg and the creator Prajāpati still survives, the Epic appears to favour that shade of Upaniṣadic teaching which would regard creation of the world not as an instance of illusory appearance (vivartta) but as an instance of transformation (parināma) of the Absolute; for in this view, the manifold world of experience receives a more real place in the Absolute which, in theistic terms, is called God. On the other hand, we find a general acceptance of the Sāṁkhya scheme of creation, although there is no uniformity of Epic teaching in this respect also. The activity of prakṛti and non-activity of puruṣa, and the doctrine of guṇas and elements, which consist of twenty-four principles, are recognized; but, as we have said above, a twenty-fifth, or even a twenty-sixth, principle is added. Apart from these divergent theories of personal-impersonal creation, there are also references to the theory of emanation or vyūha, which is a curious medley of myth and speculation, and of which we shall speak more hereafter as a distinctive Epic doctrine.

The psychological ideas of the Epic are similarly coloured by proto-Sāṁkhya teaching. It accepts sense-perception, the five senses of sight, touch, hearing, taste and smell being connected respectively with the five primary elements of light, earth, ether, water and air. The manas is the transmitting agent of perception arising from the contact of sense with sense-object, while buddhi is the deciding factor. All the processes of sensation, perception, thought, emotion and will are material processes conditioned by prakṛti. The soul is conceived as the Upaniṣadic ātman when in bondage and Paramātman when free; but it also corresponds to the puruṣa of the Sāṁkhya as a fettered and passive spectator of the activity of prakṛti, which is the source of sensation, thought and action. The Epic theistic faith, however, adds to the plurality of individual souls or puruṣas, a supreme soul, called Uttama-Puruṣa. The bodily constituents are the three so-called dhātus (vāta, pitta and kapha); but as constituents
of the conscious ego the three gunas form the deciding factors of the individual, in accordance respectively with the qualities of inertia (tamas) causing ignorance, of energy (rajas) producing desire, and of equilibrium (sattva) leading to stability of existence. As the literal sense of the word implies, the gunas are fetters as well as qualities. They determine the variety of human activity, just as they give rise to the variety of natural phenomena, by the interaction of equilibrium, motion and inertia.

In Ethics, a moral interpretation is given to the Sāmkhya doctrine of three gunas as determinants of individual character, the sattva being conceived as the goodness-mood, rajas as the passion-mood, and tamas as the darkness-mood. But the implications of earlier thought are also to be found. The ritualistic duties enjoined by the Veda are admitted as duties to a certain extent, just as caste-duties are ordained as means to an end; while we have also the basic idea of the Upaniṣadic ethics, which does not inculcate sacrificial rectitude but conceives evil as ahamkāra or affirmation of the finite self, a deluded attitude which sees variety where it should see unity of the universal self. But in the traditional enumeration of the four ends of life (catur-varga), mokṣa or emancipation alone does not figure; it speaks also of dharma, artha and kāma. Artha and kāma constitute profit and pleasure, but they spring from dharma which, as a goal of human endeavour, represents the principle righteousness as a means of salvation. Artha and kāma are legitimate because worldly activity is not to be despised, but dharma is the ultimate object. In the pursuit of happiness, however, the conception of dharma is not hedonistic; it does not consist of mere satisfaction of desires, but it is an effort which involves striving and suffering. For practical discipline purification of body and mind is a preliminary necessity; and a great deal of positive moral precepts is inculcated, and long-recognized aberrations condemned. The theory of āpad-dharma or expediency, no doubt, which lays down a practical course of conduct, not usually proper but allowable in times of extreme necessity or distress, shows that the idea of virtue and vice was admitted to be relative and dependent on circumstances. But, at the same time, cardinal virtues and fundamental vices are recognized in accordance with the general trend of traditional piety. Whatever might have been the actual conduct of fighting warriors on the savage battle-field, there can be no doubt that the Epic as a whole upholds a high standard of morality both in theory and practice. It is also fully recognized that purification is not only an individual preparation but also a social endeavour. The dharma has always a social implication, its watchword being devotion to duties rather than assertion of rights. The obligation, again, is not confined to human society alone, but it extends in universal fellowship to the whole of creation.

This social and humane attitude naturally disfavours the ascetic ideal, and the dharma is characterized by activity (pravṛtti) rather than by
THE EPICS

abstention (nivṛtti); but here also uniformity of opinion is not found. The idea of disciplinary austerity (tapas) and renunciation (saṁnyāsa) is prominent, particularly in the heretical Schools; but retirement from the world before one's legitimate duties are fulfilled is also deprecated. Both the standpoints are illustrated by the parable of dialogue between a father and a son (XII. 277), in which the father insists that detachment is unattainable without a preliminary social attachment, but the son argues that it should be achieved at once in a mood of disillusionment, for dilatory discipline is only a hindrance. Nevertheless, renunciation or saṁnyāsa was by no means universal in the normal scheme of life, and the greatest value appears to have been attached to individual and social duties. A spirit of renunciation is indeed enjoined by the teaching of disinterested action, but the way of karman is considered to be better than every other way.

The Epic accepts all the implications of the inexorable karma-doctrine and believes in the fatality of human acts as much as it believes in fate itself as divinely ordained. But it also asserts that fate is "for eunuchs," and that the fruits of action can be modified by human effort. The idea of karman, however, is not here a blind and mechanical determinism, but an intrinsically ethical conception of a cosmic, but divinely directed, law of justice. As the Epic faith is not mere intellectualism nor mere moralism, and bases its essential teaching on the loving adoration of a personal god, devotion to the deity and his saving grace are regarded, theistically, as supremely capable of nullifying the otherwise unavoidable fruits of karman. The ethics, therefore, is not divorced from religion. Morality is regarded as necessarily religious and religion as necessarily moral. The ethical and the devotional are inseparable; right is right because it is divine; the question of sanction is solved in the terms of the postulate.

In the same way, on the question of the state after death there is no consistent account. The heretics do not naturally look forward to a future life, but the view does not predominate. It cannot be said that death had no terrors; for the idea of total annihilation, as well as of hell and punishment, heaven and reward, was a part of the popular belief. The widely accepted karma-doctrine had its definite eschatological implication. The well-known parable of Mṛtyu and Prajāpati (XII. 256–8) represents the god of death as the god of justice, for punishment does not come from any external agency but the deed itself recoils upon the doer. At the same time the rigours of the karma-doctrine are sought to be mitigated, as we have seen, by the theistic postulate of divine grace and deliverance.

The pursuit of mokṣa or release from bondage of karman and saṁsāra (rebirth) is undoubtedly the ideal, but regarding the kind and means of escape there is much uncertainty. The Vedic promise of heaven and future prosperity is as much believed in as the attainment of passionless serenity, whether in this life or after death, by Upaniṣadic Brahman-
realization. But we have also references to the dualistic Sāmkhyya doctrine of the release of the puruṣa from empirical existence on realization of its distinction from prakṛti, as well as to the deistic Yoga view of kevalatva by means of severe self-discipline. There is also the theistic faith in a personal god which involves belief in various stages and processes of emancipation, leading finally to a glorified sectarian heaven, whether the heaven be that of the Pāṣupata, the Pañcarātra or the Bhāgavata. But however divergent be the eschatological ideal, the general tendency is to believe that liberation (mokṣa) is a condition which can be attained, not only hereafter but also here, if one wills (jīvan-mukti). It does not consist of becoming but being, and the present life is considered adequate enough for that purpose.

5. RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES

In spite of this bewildering diversity of philosophical thought, the religious tendency of the Epic is unmistakably clear. It is predominantly theistic and frankly dualistic. It believes in the intimate realization a personal god in the individual consciousness through symbols (pratīkas), manifestations (prakāśas or prādurbhāvas) and incarnations (āvatāras), in living adoration and worship (bhakti) and in complete-surrender (prāpatti) to divine grace (prasāda). This mystic and emotional mood, which goes by the general name of bhakti or devotion is given supremacy over mere moral sufficiency or intellectual conviction. The religion is monotheistic in essence, but distinct attempts are made to justify the innumerable gods, old and new. The ancient Vedic gods survived; but some of them, like Indra and Varuṇa, were reduced in stature; some, like Yama, changed their character; some, like Prajāpati, were left untouched; while others, like Viṣṇu and Rudra, were raised and invested with a new glory. The idea of tri-mūrti (the word itself does not occur in the Epic) or Trinity was slow to evolve; but Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva as the Triad practically dominate the Epic, henotheistically as supreme deities in turn, polytheistically as co-ordinate deities and monotheistically as aspects of one supreme deity. It is not necessary to trace the evolution of these gods here, nor dilate upon the shifting character of Epic theism; a few words on the general Epic conception of these deities will suffice. The grandsire Brahmā, youngest god in the Vedic pantheon but oldest in the Epic, who had his origin and basis in abstract speculation rather than in concrete nature myth, was a full-fledged deity only in the later Vedic period. As such, he never had much prestige and gradually dwindled in significance. Whether there was any Brahmā-sect is very doubtful. It is Viṣṇu and Śiva who are alternately supreme. But more than the ascetic and terrible Śiva, the gracious and benignant Viṣṇu is the central
6. RISE OF SECTARIANISM AND ITS GENERAL CHARACTER

It is difficult, in the absence of tangible evidence, to trace the rise and growth of sectarianism in the post-Vedic period. Although they swayed the lives of a larger population and had been of greater living force, the sectarian faiths were possessions of the people which, being dissociated from the sympathy of the hieratic orthodoxy, appear to have left no records of their own. But when one considers the general trend of thought and practice, however obscure it may be, one can presume that, while in the intervening Upaniṣadic period the formal sacrificial religion of the Brāhmaṇa was being gradually replaced by a more intellectual theosophy, within this intellectual theosophy itself, not only theistic but devotional tendencies were slowly developing. This is evident especially in the younger group of the major Upaniṣads. In the Śvetāsvatara-Upaniṣad, for instance, the word bhakti, signifying devotion to a god (deva), distinctly occurs; and a theistic tendency, bordering almost on the devout, emerges. It centres round a somewhat inchoate sectarianism, which does not indeed reject the impersonal Brahman but tends towards its more personalized form in a new great god, Rudra-Śiva, derived partially from orthodox mythology and recreated partially by popular belief. This presumably indicates a compromise between the high speculation of the Upaniṣads, which was never discredited, and the popular faiths, which now demanded recognition. The common Aryan people must have had their own beliefs and practices, but these must have been profoundly modified (as the very notion of Rudra-Śiva itself indicates) by the cultural ideas of the non-Aryan people of the Gangetic plain. We have as yet no means to determine the exact nature and extent of the influence which contact with non-Aryan culture exerted on the Aryan; but it is now generally admitted that the fusion of races and cultures, which probably began even in the Vedic period, must have been a great factor in the development of the philosophy and religion of the post-Vedic times. The so-called popular element, as distinguished from the hieratic, was thus a strange blending of polygenous ideas and fancies. In course of time a mutual reaction
between the two was inevitable, and the barrier, which was probably never a rigid barrier, broke down. An exclusive ritual and a highly philosophical creed had to be relaxed so far, even for their self-existence, as to adopt deities and countenance practices to which the heterodox popular religion inclined; while the mass of people, having little time or interest in elaborate ritual and philosophical abstraction, allowed their larger emotions and sentiments to be recognized and re-interpreted by the intellectual aristocracy in order to obtain the stamp of orthodox authority.

Thus, about the time when formal heresies, which came to a head in Jainism and Buddhism, were assailing the very core of the Śrauta religion, the orthodox ritual and creed were faced with the no less difficult task of remodelling themselves by assimilating and moulding the current popular beliefs and practices of the new environment. These popular cults, centring round the worship of Rudra-Śiva, Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa or Kṛṣṇa-Śaṅkara, were strongly marked by a tendency towards emotional devotionalism, which must have had a disintegrating and even disruptive effect on the older ceremonial and theosophic religion. The emergency led, on the one hand, to a practical codification of the older tradition and stricter regulation of daily life and conduct in the śrauta gṛhya and dharma śūtras; on the other hand, it resulted in a renewed and systematic philosophic activity, sometimes keeping more faithfully to the old Upaniṣadic spirit (Vedānta), but sometimes starting from a different point and diverging more widely (Sāṅkhyā). But all this did not prove enough, and an entire re-shaping of the older religion gradually began. The elasticity of orthodox philosophy admitted a whole world of new personal gods as a temporary reality into its idealistic scheme; and the old placid theology, disturbed by the new worship of the sectaries, conceived their old gods anew as wielding power of love and grace. There may not have been any deliberate theological attempt; but the result of gradual compromise is seen not only in the fully developed sectarianism of the Mahābhārata in general, which is a mixture of the old and the new, but also in particular in the syncretic theism of the Bhagavad-Gītā, which cannot be satisfactorily explained as an isolated phenomenon. As there was a strain, original or developed, of theism in the Upaniṣads themselves, it could easily, if not perfectly, mingle with the theistic element of the popular cults. If the one was predominantly reflective and the other essentially emotional, both the theistic streams had their source in the same hopes and longings of the human heart; and this fact could partially reconcile, if not fully obliterate, the incongruities of a strange alliance.

7. THE BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ

The Bhagavad-Gītā (or the Gītā, as it is generally called) forms a part of the Mahābhārata. Its value has been differently estimated by critical
scholarship; but it has never been denied that it ranks, as it really does, as one of the greatest religious documents of ancient India and holds a unique place in its religious life. That it contains echoes of the different voices of the past admits of little doubt, but its strong and unmistakable religious note supplies the ultimate stimulus for their synthesis, which is not merely speculative but also practical. A greater and more ardent attempt is nowhere made to turn philosophy into practical religion and bring the individual and the universe into personal relation with a living god. As the various earlier streams of fluid philosophical thought meet in the work, the uncertainty of its philosophical position has presented opportunities for the exercise of subtlety of interpretation, on the one hand, and scepticism regarding its consistency, on the other; but this unique combination also explains the vital influence which the work has exercised over many types of the Indian mind. While philosophers of diverse Schools interpret it in accordance with their own conceptions, and critical scholars quarrel over the question of its consistency, its deep ethical and religious fervour lifts it above sectarian and scholastic considerations and supply nourishment to devout minds as a gospel of deliverance.

With regard to the original form and character of the work, it has been alleged that it went through a process of remodelling; but critical scholarship has not been unanimous on this question. Holtzmann maintains that the Gitā is a Vaiṣṇava remodelling of an originally pantheistic or Vedāntic poem; Hopkins thinks that it is a Kṛṣṇaite version of an older Vaiṣṇava poem, which in its turn was originally a late unsectarian Upaniṣad; Garbe regards it as a popular devotional Bhāgavata tract revised in a Vedāntic sense by Brähmanism; Deussen is of opinion that it is a late product of decadent Upaniṣadic thought; Barnett believes that it is a document of the Vāsudevic cult, but that the different streams of tradition became confused in the mind of the author; Keith takes it as an Upaniṣad of the Śvetāśvatara type adapted later to the Kṛṣṇa cult; while Belverkar puts forward the view that it represents the last elaborate attempt made by the Śrauta religion to defend orthodox Brähmanism against the disruptive forces of the popular religion. It is not necessary to accept any of these conjectures; but it must be made clear that it is neither scientific nor is it possible to split up the text convincingly and separate the alleged additions on these or similar preconceived grounds. It is not denied that, like the other portions of the Epic and like some of the Upaniṣads, the Gitā probably suffered occasional interpolations or that it existed in different recensions; but to maintain that the work is a poor patchwork, or to deny that it is a vital synthetic expression of a particular trend of religious thought is to miss the essential significance of the work, as well as to go directly against the testimony of Indian tradition which has always attempted, even from different points of view, a synthetic interpretation of the work as a whole.
We have said above that if we investigate the traces of devotional ideas in the *Upaniṣads*, we can see that, within their intellectual theosophy, distinctly theistic and devotional tendencies were gradually developing. This may have been due partly to an innate theistic strain in the *Upaniṣads* themselves and partly to individual spiritual illumination of particular seers; but it must have been also due to an inevitable compromise between the high philosophy and speculation about the impersonal Brahma, on the one hand, and the vivid popular faiths which, on the other, must have been gathering round the devout worship of personal gods. As the impersonal Brahma was more and more personalized and brought nearer to popular consciousness, the larger devotional emotions and sentiments of popular faiths began to be justified and reinterpreted by the philosophy and practices of hieratic Brāhmaṇism. The *Gītā*, as we possess it, is neither a purely priestly product nor a purely devotional document of a popular faith. Such deliberate theological artifice, as some scholars have presumed, is hardly effective in controlling the tides of religious life. It can produce a marvellous systematic theological treatise, but it is hard to believe that it could create a genuinely religious document like the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. Having regard to these considerations, it would be better and more historical to presume that the *Gītā* embodies a certain trend of religious thought or feeling as it finally crystallized itself, and therefore contains as much hieratic as popular elements, inseparably merged into one another.

The incongruities of such an alliance between the high philosophy of an intellectual aristocracy and the living fervour of popular sentiments are, however, so great that it is only natural that critical scholars have exercised themselves a great deal over the consistency of the compromise. But one would be hardly justified in regarding these incongruities as extraneous and artificially connected; they form a part and parcel of its peculiar theology, and cannot be isolated or rejected without detriment to the peculiar religio-historical significance of the work. We have here a strange blending of divergent ideas and sentiments; but the speculative aspect of the *Gītā* is as much essential as the fervent religious aspect which enlivens its speculations. The incongruities, such as they are, should thus be recognized and explained by a consideration of the probable circumstances under which the work originated. Even admitting that there are heterogeneous doctrines, exaggerations and repetitions, they do not by themselves prove the actual fact of one or more revisions. The theory of a recast document is founded for the most part on the fact that the work attempts to reconcile so many conflicting points of view; but there is nothing unusual in adopting this attitude in an age of genuine spiritual uncertainty. It is superficial criticism which stigmatizes such a powerful work as "an ill-assorted cabinet of primitive philosophical opinions." Its purely philosophical position is perhaps not quite strong,
but its object appears to be less philosophical than religious. It is more a reconciliation of existing beliefs and speculations by the living warmth of a dynamic religious feeling than a careless throwing together or haphazard revision of an inconsistent medley. In realizing its particular object, the work was merely giving expression to a particular tendency of its age, to a new situation that might have arisen out of conflict of views. We must take the work in its total significance. Its unity lies in its general religious tendency and purpose, and the presence of heterogeneous ideas or of a fluid terminology is not in itself incompatible with consistent teaching, though it may be with systematic doctrine.

There is no doubt that divergent ways of thought meet in it, but it would be scarcely correct to regard it as a deliberate attempt at synthesis, for the simple reason that these somewhat fluid doctrines themselves, as the Gitā itself as well as the various religious and philosophical documents in the Epic would indicate, have not yet arrived at such a fully articulated stage as would place them in explicit antagonism. But since the work aims at reaching a unity in the midst of such diversity by its undoubted religious power, it possesses a more synthetic character than most works of the same type. We shall confine ourselves in this essay chiefly to the consideration of the Gitā as one of the earliest ethico-religious works which inculcate a clear and fundamental doctrine of bhakti. The philosophical background is also important and cannot be ignored, but the deep ardent feeling with which it expresses certain aspects of an early bhakti religion is of much greater interest.

It has been already amply demonstrated by competent scholars that the Bhagavat-Gitā shows a full knowledge of the earlier philosophical and religious literature. The Brāhmaṇic ritualism and its dogmas, which must have by this time wellnigh spent their force, are recognized in many a scattered passage but there is an anxiety to reinterpret and reconcile them to its own peculiar teachings. The formal conformity of the ritualist, who believes in the efficacy of a correct performance of the Vedic sacrifice, is disapproved, but the way of ritualism is not altogether rejected. The cosmic purpose of the Vedic sacrifice is still admitted, but it is fully emphasized that the normal ritualistic acts should not be undertaken with the narrow object of specific rewards or for the mere purpose of attaining merit. Those who desire lower ends, no doubt, attain them; but such ends do not carry them very far. Such merit is exhausted after a time, and there is no permanent release from the cycle of births and deaths. Those, on the other hand, who abjure all desire for the fruits of action and dedicate them to God attain mental equipoise and elevation above their work, which lead them to true devotion and ultimate salvation. An attempt is also made to rationalize the yajña or sacrifice by understanding it in a wider and more spiritual sense, a tendency which set in at the Upaniṣadic period but which is further developed in a new way. There
are many ways, we are told, of performing sacrificial acts, but we may distinguish the literal performance from the symbolical. Restraint of the senses, attainment of knowledge, indeed all dutiful acts, all tapas, are spoken of as symbolical sacrifices. If they are done in a spirit of perfect selflessness they are sāttviKa; if with a selfish purpose, they are rājasika; if in ignorance, they are tāmasika. The root idea of a yajña is the sacrificing of the lower for the higher good. Generalizing this concept, the highest yajña is held to be that in which a man lays down all his cosmic desires and interests at the altar of God. Thus, accepting the authoritativeness of the BrāhmaNic ritualism, as well as the right performance of the prescribed duties of caste and class, the Gitā makes them subservient to its peculiar doctrine of rituals in relation to devotion.

In the same way, the Gitā shows a full knowledge of the diverse teachings of the Upaniṣads, but modifies them in its own light. The Upaniṣadic doctrine of ātman-Brahman, the conception of puruṣa, and the somewhat late idea of Īśvara are clearly represented in the Gitā, as well as the Yogic methods of self-realization, the description of sacrifice as a form of Brahman and its mystical explanation, the doctrine of deva-yāna and pitr-yāna ways and other minor technicalities made current by the Upaniṣads. The Brahma-vidyā is acknowledged and all religious implications are fully drawn out; but the impersonal Brahman is fully personalized, and the efficacy of pure knowledge for release and of the quietistic methods of the Upaniṣads is admitted only up to a certain point. The Gitā assures us that all this is Sāṅkhya doctrine, but in reality it is Upaniṣadic, and does not resemble the Sāṅkhya of later times. But by Sāṅkhya, which as a technical term in the Epic is contrasted with Yoga, is probably meant the reflective and meditative method of those who rely on knowledge for release; while Yoga is the practical attainment of self-control and balance of mind by a selfless performance of ordained duties.

Somewhat in the manner of the Svetāsvatara-Upaniṣad the Gitā speaks of three aspects of godhead, admitting two parallel manifestations of prakṛti or Primal Matter and jīvātman or individual soul, and regarding them both as phases of the cosmic form of the Ātman or Brahman, who is of course identified with the personal God. The doctrine is metaphorically set forth in the well-known description of the kṣetra and the kṣetrajña (in Ch. XIII), where the kṣetra or the field is presumably the ceaseless area (in the Sāṅkhya manner) of the activity of prakṛti, as the seat of the conditioned soul, i.e. of the kṣetrajña, who is an aspect of the supreme kṣetrajña, God (the Bhagavat), indwelling in all kṣetras. Although the Gitā does not accept the Sāṅkhya theory of non-active puruṣa and its silence about God, the Sāṅkhya terminology of categories, which was apparently ancient, is introduced to explain the relation of the supreme self to the material and spiritual worlds of conditioned being. The evolution of prakṛti is attributed to the five elements and the buddhi, ahamkāra
etc., which correspond to the twenty-four principles of the Sāṃkhya as phases of energizing matter; and the doctrine of the three guṇas is recognized in explaining cosmic causation and activity. The Gitā also speaks of two puruṣas, the perishable and the imperishable, as well as a third Puruṣa or Puruṣottama, who transcends both the perishable and the imperishable, so that the three Puruṣas are really one Puruṣa in three aspects. This theistic Puruṣa-doctrine is obviously a development of the Upaniṣadic teaching and not of the Sāṃkhya, which denies a supreme Puruṣa and believes in an infinite number of separate Puruṣas. It will be thus seen that although the Gitā employs the Sāṃkhya terminology, it does not employ it always in its Sāṃkhya signification; nor does it accept all the implications of the classical Sāṃkhya metaphysics. The Gitā is openly theistic, but the Sāṃkhya avoids the question of God. The Sāṃkhya influence is recognized in its conception of prakṛti and puruṣa, but the dualism is reconciled by the existence of the Supreme Person (uttama Puruṣa). It would seem, therefore, that some forms of inchoate Sāṃkhya doctrine existed when the work was composed, but, as in the Epic generally, the later classical Sāṃkhya philosophy was probably unknown.

The Gitā does not appear to accept the specifically Vedāntic position of the unreality of matter, but holds firmly to the Sāṃkhya in this respect. The term māyā is indeed employed, but the māyā is not material existence. It is rather the mode in which the matter is apprehended by the mind, both of which are eternal verities. The Gitā appears to agree with the Svetāsvatara in making Īśvara the creator of māyā, which however is not identical with prakṛti or with avidyā. It is the divine power of cosmic illusion whereby, through the medium of prakṛti and the guṇas, the Īśvara veils his real being.17

These and other instances of absorption and reconciliation of divergent philosophical ideas make it almost futile to seek in the Gitā a technically perfect philosophical system, promulgated with scholastic accuracy and precision. Its philosophical teaching has all the characteristics of the confused philosophy of the Epic itself and its somewhat uncertain terminology. The essentially religious, rather than philosophical, character of the work is also clear from the way in which certain older metaphysical ideas are harmonized, somewhat incongruously, with its clearly theistic and devotional attitude. Its mystical devotional reconciliation is indeed often brilliant, but from the point of view of cold reasoning it does not always give us exact information as to how contradictory ideas are to be logically combined. The problem, for instance, of the transformation of the impersonal Absolute into a personal God is solved by the supposition that it is due to māyā or cosmic illusion; in other words, it is a mystery. In the same way is explained the relation of the Absolute to the world. The final union of the individual self with the Supreme, which the Sāṃkhya
explains by the action of the purified buddhi, is attributed in the Gitā to
divine grace responding to human faith and love.

The Gitā accepts implicitly the Upaniṣadic Brahma-vidyā in a somewhat
modified form, but it hardly subscribes to the extreme Upaniṣadic stand-
point of quietism or release through knowledge. With its characteristic
attitude of tolerance and compromise, the Gitā does not entirely reject
the way of knowledge or jñāna-yoga, which (designated as the practice of
the Śāmkhya) teaches the intellectual intuition of the Absolute by the
casting off (saṃnyāsa) of all works and practising meditation on the
distinction between self and not-self. This intellectual gnosis of the old
Upaniṣads and the Śāmkhya is indeed recognized, but the method is not
commended because of its difficulty and uncertainty of success. Much
easier, we are told, is the way of works (karma-yoga) which consists in the
performance of all social and religious duties in a spirit of perfect selfless-
ness and devotion. Thus, while not rejecting saṃkhya or philosophy based
on knowledge, it makes a special pleaing for yoga or philosophy based on
action; for it aims at teaching not so much a system of speculation as a
rule of life. The traditional doctrine of karman is accepted but with
certain important modifications. The Gitā disapproves, as we have seen,
the method of those who act with a desire for reward, but it does not
also approve of the view of those who push the doctrine of karman to its
misdirected logical extreme and teach that inasmuch as action binds the
self to saṃsāra or repeated rebirth, release can be attained by a complete
cessation from activity.

But meditative discipline, we are told, is as important for the way of
knowledge as for the way of action. A mood of detachment and equiipoise
(saṃstava) must be secured in order that works done under the rule of
action become in the end no-works, and do not fetter the self. Apart from
practical Yogic methods, this is achieved, in the first place, by a conscien-
tious discharge of all proper duties (dharma); in the second place, works
must be performed without “attachment,” that is, without egoistic
consciousness of the agent (kārttyévābhimāna) and desire for the fruit
(phalāśā); and lastly, devoid of selfish thought or purpose, all acts and
their fruits must be dedicated to God, making every act an offering of
devotion and love. The complete abandonment of egoism and selfish ends
destroyed that element in action which fetters the self to material existence
and causes rebirth, for works done in this spirit are really no-works. He
has truly abandoned action who has abandoned the interest and the fruits
thereof. This is the true renunciation (saṃnyāsa), the true control (yoga),
and prepares one infallibly for divine grace and salvation. It involves no
irresponsible renunciation of ordained duties, no break from wholesome
social life, but brings into play the best elements of human nature. It is
not the meditative inactivity taught by some philosophers, for it is a
state of freedom from action (naishkarmya) reached through right action.

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The discipline thus prescribed is not only moral but also religious. The universal order of things demands activity from man, but if his actions are disinterested he conforms to the categorical moral imperative of doing his duty because it is duty. But he also performs his duty because it is the will of God, to Whom he dedicates all his acts and the fruits thereof. The aspirant truly becomes a yogin and sannyāsin, disciplined in sense and intellect; but the spirit of constant love and services gives a spiritual significance to his merely ethical acts. Thus, the activism which the Gītā presents is not a formal conformity to a prescribed code, but is based upon a knowledge of philosophy of action and a strong religious feeling. This makes every act of life symbolically an act of sacrifice, frees the self from attachment and delusion, and absolves it from the polluting effect of action. God Himself sets the highest example of work by incarnating Himself from time to time in a cosmic spirit of self-surrendering grace for the good of the world. His cosmic work is no-work because it is done in divine unselfishness, and does not involve Him in the bondage of karmāṇi. By dedicating all works to Him, the devotee merges, as it were, his own individual action in His cosmic action, his own individuality in His cosmic life. This ethical and theistic position gives a remarkable synthesis of the ancient fatalistic axiom of karmāṇi with the belief in a personal God of grace and love, admitting its inexorableness but tempering, moralizing and sanctifying it with the idea of divine cosmic work and grace. Under this teaching, human activity, like the divine, does not transgress but transcends the law of karmāṇi.

This brings us to the special doctrine of the Gītā, the bhakti-yoga, the spirit of love and service to a personal god, which supplies the unifying principle to the alliance it seeks to establish between knowledge and work, renunciation and devotion. The older philosophic speculation had already taught that knowledge alone is the way to release, but the Gītā maintains that this knowledge, partly won by intellectual and partly by practical activity of a certain kind, is the knowledge not of an unqualified entity, but of a Being of infinite good qualities and illimitable grace. He is the Ātman, Brahman, Īśvara, Puruṣa or Puruṣottama, but He is also really, though infinitely, qualified by all conceivable good attributes, endowing with reality the eternal but conditioned categories of matter (prakṛti) and individual self (jīva), which emerge periodically from Him into manifestation. The power by which He thus determines Himself into conditioned being is His own cosmic power of illusion or māyā which veils His true nature. The way of approach may be found through knowledge or through austere works, but in all seekings there must be an undivided spirit of loving devotion and service, which alone is capable of finding what is even hidden from the sage or the yogin.

The Upaniṣads had already prescribed certain methods of symbolic meditation for turning the senses inward and attaining a mystical in-
tuition of Reality, but they had also gradually reached an almost theistic position of realizing an all-indwelling and all-transcending Brahman, who is invested more or less with personal attributes and conceived as Isvara. The purely intellectualistic position of meditation on the unconditioned Non-manifest is characterized by the Gitā as avyakta-upāsanā, which is indeed a way of approach but which involves a long and arduous process of discipline, open only to the few. It is easier to concentrate upon a concrete object of worship; and the vyakta-upāsanā, which is meditation upon the Absolute as a manifest and concrete personality, is not only open to all but also affords a scope for a direct personal relation of love and service.

This vital and vitalizing element of bhakti changes the emphasis from the speculative to the practical, and converts what would have been a merely philosophical treatise into a powerful religious document. It teaches the love and service of a personal god of love and grace, probably in an age when God was being lost in divergent speculations. It gives expression to a form of synthesis between the conflicting conceptions of previous thinkers and ritualists, on the one hand, and the popular worship of a personal God, on the other. It presents the worshipper with a visible object of devotion approachable at all times and places, and teaches the value of a harmonious combination of knowledge, discipline and service in religious life. As the teaching checks extreme rationalism, on the one hand, it tends, on the other, to rationalize blind sectarianism by placing it on the firm foundation of knowledge and discipline, and by preaching tolerance to all modes of worship as aspects merely of the worship of a supreme deity. Whatever value its synthesis of traditional philosophical and religious views may be held to possess, there can be no doubt that it speaks of bhakti with no uncertain voice; and it is this element which supplies stimulus to its synthesis and gives it whatever unity it possesses.

There is no direct exposition or philosophical justification in the work of the doctrine of devotion and grace (prasāda), probably for the reason that the mutual relation of the devotee and the deity is regarded as an object of realization and not of description or discussion. But the leading ideas are clear. It may begin with belief or śraddhā, and belief implies the recognition of an object which is true and worthy of devotion; but it is essentially a proper activity of the emotional possibilities of human nature in its striving after the supreme or the ideal which affords an escape from the limits of egoism. As it is essentially an emotion, it implies a dualism, as well as the fact of a living personal relation. The supreme or ideal, therefore, cannot be an abstraction or a shadow of our own minds, but it must have a concrete individual existence, with which loving communion is possible. At the same time, it cannot be entirely foreign to or entirely identical with, the consciousness of the aspirant, in order that it may be the object of attainment. There is thus a necessity
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for an undivided and endless striving of the intellect, will and feeling, and
for an awe-inspiring sense of the supreme and of consequent humility and
self-surrender; but the striving at every point touches the ideal, because
the unfailing and infinite love of the supreme responds to the full and
self-surrendering love of the individual.

The devotion (bhakti) of the Gītā is, no doubt, an emotional attitude of
worship, which every true religion must recognize; but from what has
been said above, it is clear that it is not a blind intensity of feeling or an
unreasoned ecstasy, divorced from knowledge or the duties of practical
life. True bhakti is declared to be the most vital of all elements which
contribute to that equipoise or balance of mind (samatva), in which
reason, will and emotion play their proper part, because it leads to the
consecration of every act of life to the disinterested service of the Lord.
The various descriptions of the ideal man, whether he is the jñānin, the
śhīta-prajña, the yogārūḍha, the brahma-bhūta, the guṇāśīla or the
bhakta,18 practically depict the same man looked at from the points of
view of jñāna, karman or bhakti. In this respect the speculative and
ethical bhakti of the Gītā differs from the bhakti of the mediaeval Indian
emotionalists who would reject jñāna, and even karman, and regard
eccstatic passion of a mystic-erotic character as essential. The Gītā doctrine
is characterized by a broader view of human personality; and it does not,
therefore, isolate the fervour of religious emotion from intellectual
seriousness and ethical activity.

We find the same broadness of outlook of the Gītā in recognizing
whatever value there was in older beliefs and practices; for an attitude of
toleration and compromise also marks its view about other gods and
other modes of worship.19 When the Bhagavat calls upon Arjuna to
leave all and follow him (XVIII. 65–6), he may be understood as
preaching sectarian worship; but the Gītā by its speculative equipoise
and its liberal attitude regarding liberty of thought and worship, rises
far above narrow sectarianism; and it is a high tribute to its achievement
in this direction that it has lent itself to interpretations other than the
Bhāgavata, and has been understood as teaching even such extreme
idealistic monism as that of Śaṅkara. The justification of this tolerant
attitude is found in the recognition of the infinite variety or aspects in
which the supreme deity may present itself to the diversity of men and
minds, as well as in the view that some kind of worship is better than
none. The worship offered to other deities is represented as indirect, even
if imperfect, worship offered to the Bhagavat himself. Different men are
actuated by different motives and desires; but a man is as his thoughts
and desires are, and attains what he seeks. Those who desire lower ends
and worship lower forms receive their ends and their fruits of worship
accordingly; for the Lord resorts to men in the way in which He is
approached. The lower forms are really stepping-stones to the higher, for
worship offered with devotion to whatsoever deity has its own regard and prepares the mind to higher consciousness. Other devotees attain finite ends; but the devotees of the Supreme God attain Him.

Sectarian gods are really different aspects of the Supreme Deity; and the Mahābhārata doctrine of avatāra helped to absorb these other gods as aspects of or identical with the Bhagavat. The Gitā recognizes different kinds and grades of devotees (VII. 16-18; XII. 9-12), for a man’s faith is determined according as he is influenced by the qualities of goodness, activity or ignorance (VII. 2 f.; XV. 6 f.). With the exception of scoffers and unbelievers (XVI. 19 f.), the Gitā shows an anxiety to throw the way of bhakti open to men of all castes and conditions, even including the śūdras and women, who have been excluded by Brāhmānic orthodoxy, as well as to the feeblest seeker, the worst of sinners, and the ignorant who conforms blindly to śāstric injunctions and knows nothing higher (III. 25-6). The Gitā accepts the established social order, and approves of the injunctions regarding the duties of different castes and stages of life (XVIII. 41-5; XVI. 23-4); but its sanctifying theory of desireless and devotional action does not make caste or condition a barrier, but an avenue to salvation.

The doctrine of bhakti, therefore, is presented in a very simple and comprehensive form, and does not show any such bewildering and unattractive display or analysis as the mediaeval exponents of the bhakti cult delight to elaborate. Although various means are suggested for the realization of the devotional attitude, it is recognized that no fixed rules can be laid down. The bhakta need not, like the followers of jñāna and karma kāndas, practise his devotion singly or in solitude, nor need he engage himself in elaborate schemes of ritual; he may (X. 9) meet other devotees, and enlighten one another by religious discourses. But the feeling must mould itself according to the habits and minds of men. Thus, giving up of sensuous desires, turning the mind inward by means of symbols and discipline, yogic methods, realization of the supreme being in nature and self, contemplation of divine attributes, constant remembrance, discourse and conversation on God, adoration and external worship, selfless performance of all acts as dedicated to God, by mentioning these and other ways of spiritual experience and worship, the Gitā recognizes that the one Supreme God, revealing Himself in different ways, can be approached and worshipped by no fixed rule or method. To all men the Bhagavat is impartial, desiring in His infinite grace the welfare of all, and resorts to men in the way in which they resort to Him. All may approach Him, and these are only some of the means. But supreme devotion in the end implies a complete self-surrender, not in inactivity but in selfless activity, not in ignorance but in the fulness of knowledge, merging one’s life in the cosmic life of the deity, dedicating all thought, action and feeling to Him.
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As the doctrine seeks to establish a personal relationship between the deity and the devotee, it not only invests the deity with a personality and an infinitude of attributes, but it also emphasizes divine grace, on the one hand, and man’s need of loving devotion, on the other. One of the greatest acts of divine graciousness to the world is God’s coming to birth from birthlessness by His own cosmic power of illusion (māyā) and veiling His real nature by manifesting Himself as an individual at the time of the world’s need. The doctrine of avatāra or periodical descent of godhead, which should be distinguished from the vyūha doctrine ignored in the Gītā, is generally acknowledged in the Mahābhārata; but the fact of avatāra in this work is probably a necessary corollary to its proposed identification of Kṛṣṇa-Vāsudeva with the Bhagavat. The doctrine of repeated avatāras was also necessary to connect him with earlier myths and legends. Kṛṣṇa-Vāsudeva is thus identified not only with Viṣṇu, the greatest deity in the Epic, as well as with his various forms and incarnations, but is also related to Śiva, Brahmā and other gods of rival sects, who are subsumed under one supreme name. In this way the doctrine attempts to establish a unity of the godhead and check blind sectarian attitude by its somewhat elastic and tolerant scope. The raison d’être of the avatāra doctrine, however, is found in the recognition of the supreme deity as the Upholder of the moral order of the world, and in the conception of repeated descents for settling the world right. Looked at from another point of view, the doctrine implies the deification of the human, a belief in superior beings who become the embodiment of the divine. It affords, therefore, tangible and effective divine ideals towards which imperfect mortals may strive and grow.

NOTES

1. Our references are to the Bombay edition of the text unless otherwise specified. In a sense it is not accurate to speak of Epic Philosophy with reference to the Mahābhārata. The original Epic, like the Rāmāyaṇa, probably had no connection with philosophy at all; it is the pseudo-epic which contains a mixture of philosophical doctrine. But since it is difficult to distinguish the pseudo-epic from the real, we must accept the present enlarged text with this reservation, that it presents the philosophy of the epic at a certain stage of its development.


3. Hopkins (Great Epic of India, New Haven, 1920, p. 138 ff.) is perhaps right in holding that the Epic māyā, in most cases, is merely a trick of delusion indulged in by the gods (especially by the chief of illusion-gods, Kṛṣṇa) for overcoming the enemy. In the Gītā (VII. 14 f.) māyā is a divine (daivi) delusion, caused by the gunasa; but this guna-made delusion appears to be equivalent to the prakṛti-made delusion of the Sāṁkhya; if it is also ātma-māyā, it is a psychic delusion which causes the unborn god, by means of prakṛti, to appear as born.

4. Namely, Sāṁkhya (reckoning the value of valid and weak arguments), saukṣmya (subtly in discriminating objects of knowledge), krama (proper sequence in argument), nirṇaya (determination of a conclusion after recognizing differences, and prayojana (motive to follow a certain line of argument). See Hopkins (op. cit., pp. 95–6).
5. Which term connotes not always the *Veda*, the *dharma-sāstra* and *ācāra* (custom) but also the sectarian Scriptures, like the *Bhagavad-Gītā* for the *Bhāgavatas*.

6. In an immediately preceding passage (XII. 349. 1) only four Schools are named, with the omission of Pāṣupata.


8. The reference, however, is doubtful, as Nīlākanṭha’s interpretation shows (I. 70. 46 = Grit. Ed., 1. 64. 37). There is a disparaging reference in *Rāmāyaṇa* II. 100. 38–9.

9. See XII. 19. 23–4; 180. 47–9; XIII. 37. 12–15, etc.

10. e.g. XIII. 23. 67.—Jābāli’s advice to Rāma in the *Rāmāyaṇa* II. 108 is described by commentators as *nāstika* view; certainly it is heretic. Jacobi (*Das Rāmāyaṇa*, p. 88 f.), however, considers the episode to be an interpolation; but Hillebrandt (*Festschrift Kuhn*, p. 23) does not agree.

11. These convenient English renderings are given by J. McKenzie in his *Hindu Ethics*. Oxford University Press, 1920, p. 122.


13. For a study of the theistic tendencies, original and developed, in the *Upaniṣads* in general and in younger *Upaniṣads*, like *Katha, Muṇḍaka* and *Śvetāsvatara*, in particular, see *Indian Historical Quarterly*, VI, 1930, pp. 493–512.

14. As the content of the *Atharva-Veda* and part of the *Rg-Veda* would show.

15. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 399. The view is repeated by Barnett, in more recent times, in his English translation of the *Gītā*, cited above.

16. II. 42–6; III. 9–16; IV. 23–33; IX. 20–1; XVI. 22–3; XVII. 11–13; XVIII. 3–8.

17. In this the *Gītā* agrees partially with the *Nārāyaṇiya* conception of *māyā*.

18. II. 56–72; VI. 4–32; X. 9–10; XII. 13–20; XIII. 7–11; XIV. 21–35; XVI. 1–3; XVIII. 50–60.

19. IV. 11; VII. 21–3; IX. 23–5.

20. It must be noted that the incarnations in the *Epic* belong peculiarly and almost exclusively to Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa; we have little or nothing of the incarnations of other deities.
CHAPTER V
MANU AND KAUNTILYA

1. GENERAL

Virtue (dharma), wealth (artha), enjoyment (kama), and liberation (moksha) are the four great aims to be attained by all human endeavour, and the pursuit of each of these was aided by a normative science (sastra) devoted to an exposition of its nature and the means to its attainment. The Manu-Smriti is the leading work on the sacred law (dharma-sastra) of ancient India and the Artha-sastra of Kautilya takes the same rank among the manuals of polity. The former is a metrical work of 2,685 verses, though a few versions include some more. It purports to contain the teachings of Manu (svayambhuva) expounded at his desire by his pupil Bhrigu to the sages who approached him for knowledge of the dharma of all varnas (castes). Manu is a hoary name in Indian tradition, and Bhrigu is equally legendary. The present text was apparently composed out of the earlier material passing under the name of Manu and was certainly revised once afterwards to bring it abreast of changed notions of morality. The revision may be dated between the second century B.C. and second century A.D. 1 Well over 250 verses of the Manu-Smriti occur in the several sections of the Mahabharata, and many legends are common between the two works; it was long held that the Smriti borrowed from the Epic; but recently Kane has argued with much force in favour of the opposite view, and demonstrated the probability of the original draft of the Smriti having preceded the extant text of the Epic. On the other hand, the Smriti is much in advance of the early Dharma-sastras of Gautama, Baudhayana, and Apastamba, which must be placed at least some centuries earlier. While there is much agreement between Manu and Kautilya in the fundamentals of sociology, their differences in detail on such matters as niyoga and divorce clearly indicate that the more puritanical views of the Smriti belong to a slightly later age than the Artha-sastra. 2 The Manava School cited by Kautilya is clearly not represented by the extant Smriti.

The Artha-sastra of Kautilya is a prose work in fifteen Books comprising 6,000 units (slokas) of 32 syllables each in length. The long-forgotten work was recovered in 1909, and gave rise to a long and many-sided debate regarding its authenticity and real date. But no decisive grounds have emerged for regarding the work other than what it purports to be, viz. the work of the Chancellor of Candragupta Maurya composed about 300 B.C. In composing his work the author says that he took account of all the literature on the subject already in existence and con-
sulted the practice of contemporary states (prayogān upalabhya ca, II. rö).
There are features in the work which distinguish it from others of the
kind and indicate Kauṭilya’s close acquaintance with the administrative
methods of the Hellenistic states, particularly Syria and Egypt.3 “Artha,”
says Kauṭilya, “is the condition of men, i.e. the inhabited part of the
earth; and the śāstra (normative science) which aids the acquisition and
protection of such (inhabited) country is the Artha-śāstra.”

When Kauṭilya wrote, Artha-śāstra was already an old discipline. He
refers to the views of no fewer than five different Schools on various occa-
sions besides the unnamed teachers (ācāryāḥ), possibly an honorific
reference in the plural to his own teacher; he also cites a dozen individual
authors, half of them only once and the others more often.5 But the works
of all these schools and authors, like those of early authors mentioned by
Jaimini, Pāṇini, Bādarāyaṇa and others have perished. When learning was
sacred, knowledge a secret to be revealed only to tested and trustworthy
pupils, and writing was seldom used to multiply copies of books, out-
moded works had no chance of survival. Kauṭilya, it may be noted, does
not refer to the writers of dharma-sūtras some of whom certainly preceded
him.

Dharma-śāstra and Artha-śāstra alike study man in society. The former
treats of social life from the point of view of religion and morality, the
latter from that of utility, expediency and policy. In elaborating the
duties of a kṣatriya, works on dharma like that of Manu have necessarily
to cover practically the whole ground of Artha-śāstra. On the other hand,
a writer on artha, like Kauṭilya, should specify in detail the nature of the
social order which the state is there to uphold, and in doing so he traverses
ground that belongs properly to the sister discipline. All the same, dharma
works cover wider ground, rest on the finer and more basic values of life,
and therefore command a wider appeal. The cosmogony and eschatology
of the opening and closing chapters of the Manu-Smṛti, for instance, have
no counterparts in Kauṭilya’s work; according to Manu, a breach of the
code is not just a legal offence to be dealt with by the courts, but also a
sin to be expiated by a penance. Later literary tradition has deprecated
the logic of material interests propounded in the artha-works, selected
Kauṭilya for particular censure, and generally discouraged the growth of
an extensive political literature.6

Geographical Outlook.—Developing an ancient tradition to suit new
conditions Manu divides Northern India, Āryāvarta, into different graded
regions according to their precedence in social culture. He lays down that
the traditional customs of Brahmāvarta, the land between the two divine
streams of the Sarasvati and Drśadvati as the most authoritative. The
geographical outlook of Kauṭilya, on the other hand, is coloured by his
dominantly political purpose. He recognizes the presence of small states
and elaborately discusses their inter-relations. But with his eye on the
expanding empire of his creation, and possibly on the age-long traditions
of universal empire, he defines the Cakravarti-kṣetra (the emperor’s field)
as the whole country stretching from the Himalayas to the southern ocean
which is a thousand yojanas across its width, i.e. the whole of India as it
was before the partition of 1947.7

2. SOCIOLOGY

Varṇa.—The society envisaged by Manu and Kauṭilya is organized in
four classes (varṇas), each with definitely marked spheres of duties and
rights. Its beginnings are to be traced to a natural and necessary division
of social functions, and to say that in it “early colour prejudice is ration-
alized into a divinely appointed social order”58 does not represent the whole
truth of the matter. The ideal was one of co-operation for the common
good among the different orders of co-ordinate standing. But in practice,
hierarchical notions developed, and as new regions and peoples were
admitted into the fold, a theory of mixed varṇas (varṇa-saṅkara), of new
castes (jātis) arising out of illicit unions was evolved.9 And Manu, though
not Kauṭilya, is not free from the assertion of extreme claims on behalf
of the brāhmaṇas10 on account of their birth. But the better view that a
brāhmaṇa is entitled to no particular regard unless he is both good and
learned, which receives great emphasis in the dharma-sūtras, is not un-
represented in Manu.11 The functional basis of the concept of varṇa was
always stressed. Plato thought that the greatest possible happiness of the
community as a whole was promoted by its being divided into three
orders—rulers, auxiliaries and craftsmen, roughly corresponding to the
brāhmaṇa, kṣatriya and vaiśya of the Hindu system. And modern
thinkers like Heard, Steiner, and Waterman trace the malaise of Western
civilization to its failure to recognize clearly the need for adequately
organizing a threefold social order respectively to look after the cultural,
political and economic fields of human activity.12

Under normal conditions each varṇa was to devote itself to its own
particular duties (sva-dharma)—the brāhmaṇa to learning and intellectual
and spiritual pursuits; the kṣatriya to soldiering and protection of the
community, internal and external; the vaiśya to agriculture, industry and
trade; and the śūdra to the service of all. But in critical times and in
situations of extreme danger a strict adherence to the code was not ex-
pected.13 “Everyone ought to perform the one function in the community
for which his nature best suited him. Well, that principle, or some form of
it is justice.”14

Āśrama.—Another governing concept regulating social life is that of
the āśramas, stages of life, of which again four were recognized, viz.
brahmacārin (student), grhastha (householder), vānaprastha (forest-
dwellers), and saṁnyāsin (ascetic). Here again departures from the norm were quite common in practice and at no time did the bulk of the community follow the prescriptions relating to the two last stages, though the élite were ever ready to do so and earn the respect of the community by disinterested well-doing.

Nothing can be farther from truth than to represent Hindu society as world-negating or other-world-minded. Every man is required to discharge the three-fold debt (ṛṇa-traya) with which he is born before he thinks of mokṣa, release for himself. He must (r) educate himself properly to fulfill his obligations to the seers of the race, (b) procreate children to repay his debt to his forefathers and (c) perform sacrifices according to his means to free himself from his debt to the gods, before thinking of renouncing the world. He must take to an ascetic life only after attaining satiety in the enjoyment of the good things of life, after drinking life to the lees, as it were.\textsuperscript{15} From another point of view, Kauṭilya lays down a punishment for a person who turns ascetic without making adequate provision for the maintenance of his family.\textsuperscript{16} The householder is the pivot of society and the support of all others; being as it were, the life-breath of the āśramas, that of the grhaṣṭha is the highest of them all. He provides food for those who do not cook for themselves, viz. the students, ascetics and others.\textsuperscript{17} The entertainment of guests is counted among the major duties of the householder, and he and his wife are to have their meal after all the others, including even their own servants, have been satisfied. Even a pseudo-religious foundation for the rule of hospitality is furnished by the suggestion that by the use of the quern, pestle and mortar and other appliances for preparing food they incur sins which they expiate by the performance of five great sacrifices (mahā-yajñas) every day, among which entertainment of guests is counted as one (nr-yajña).\textsuperscript{18}

Marriage: Woman.—Both Manu and Kauṭilya describe the traditional eight forms of marriage, some of which hardly deserve the name. But their statement as well as all other known evidence leave no doubt that the normal form of marriage was a monogamous sacramental union between a youth and a maiden of the same varna. But prescriptions and laws avail only within limits in the sphere where the most powerful impulse of the race is active, and the facts of life were sought to be accommodated not only by the theory of mixed castes mentioned above, but by prescriptions relating to marriages among different varṇas\textsuperscript{19} and inheritance among children of such unions. Niyoga (levirate) is allowed by Kauṭilya, but Manu mentions it obviously as a permissible practice, but then follows it up with a condemnation which some annotators explain as relating to the present age (kali-yuga). There is little doubt that there grew up a more puritanical attitude between the time when Kauṭilya wrote and that when the Smṛti was finally redacted.\textsuperscript{20}

Manu gives a high place to woman in social life and in the family.
MANU AND KAUṬILYA

"Where women are honoured, there the gods are pleased; but where they are not honoured, no sacred rite yields rewards." "In that family where the husband is pleased with his wife and the wife with her husband, happiness will assuredly be lasting."21 He is so keen on girls getting proper husbands that he goes so far as to say that when a suitable husband is not to be found, a girl might be kept in her father's house as a spinster to the end of her life rather than be given over to a man destitute of good qualities.22 Passages which admonish women to consult their male relatives in all matters and warn men, particularly those engaged in austerities, against danger from them are no detractions from the robust outlook on women's part in family and social life that pervades the code.

Slaves.—The Greek writers are positive that slavery was unknown in India in the Mauryan epoch. The best way of understanding their statement is to suppose that slavery of the Greek type, "chattel slavery," as it may be called, was unknown in India. But the dāsas or servants were in a condition of semi-slavery though not without rights. Kauṭilya lays it down definitely that an Ārya could never be enslaved by another, and lays down punishments for the sale of Aryan children of all the four varṇas. It is, however, open to an Aryan adult to accept voluntarily the condition of a dāsa to another to tide over an economic crisis, but then he could recover his freedom by repaying the debt or in other stipulated ways.24 Manu also makes the distinction between dāsas who are purchased and those who are not, but in language that recalls Aristotle's views on men who are slaves by nature, Manu affirms that śūdras were created by Brahmā for the service of others.25 He mentions the different classes of dāsas. There is a distinct worsening in the status of the last varṇa from Kauṭilya to Manu.

3. POLITY

Though Kauṭilya devotes a section (Book XI) of his work to republican states (saṅghas), he is no friend of the non-monarchical states and devotes less attention to a description of their working than to suggesting methods by which the prince might promote dissensions among them with a view to getting them under his power. The State of Kauṭilya and Manu was thus a monarchy, and Kauṭilya anticipates Louis XIV by several centuries and roundly affirms: The King is the state (rājā rājyam).26

Origin of the State.—Kauṭilya makes only an oblique reference to the origin of the state and records the tradition that men troubled by the fish-law (of the bigger fish eating up the smaller fry) agreed to set up Vaivasvata Manu as king who undertook their protection from injustice in return for a sixth part of the produce from land and a tithe of the returns of trade.27 Elsewhere he points out that in the absence of a king (danda-dhara) the strong devour the weak, whereas with his protection
the weak hold their own against the strong. This view of the origin of the state comes close to the contract theory as it was developed by Hobbes. But while Hobbes was free to press his theory to its logical conclusion and advocate monarchical absolutism, the Indian milieu in which Kauṭilya wrote was an effective bar against such a course on his part. Yet of all the Indian writers on polity, Kauṭilya stands closest to Hobbes as he exalted royal power much more than any other author before or after him.

_Daṇḍa._—To understand the full force of the term _daṇḍa-dhara_ by which Kauṭilya designates the king in the significant context cited above, we must turn to _Manu_. When the world was without a king it was much agitated with fear; and for its protection the lord Brahmā created a king, says _Manu_, to protect the good and destroy the wicked. He follows this up with the statement that for the king's sake the Lord created His own son _Daṇḍa_, the protector of all creatures. _Daṇḍa_ is full of Brahmā's glory (_lejjas_); through fear of him all created beings observe the law of their nature; _Daṇḍa_ is leader and ruler, and surety for the four _āśramas_ observing their _dharma_; he keeps awake while others are asleep, and is the embodiment of _dharma_. Properly directed by a wise king, _daṇḍa_ pleases the subjects; it is by _daṇḍa_ that gods and other superhumans contribute to the universal welfare. _Daṇḍa_ declines to be a tool in the hands of an uncultured king (_a-krīḍāmaṇ_ and turns against an unrighteous ruler, destroys him together with his kith and kin; and then everything and everybody would suffer not only within the kingdom but even the sages and gods in heaven.

_Daṇḍa_ is often translated as punishment; though this is indeed one of its meanings, it is inadequate in the present context where _daṇḍa_ is seen to be the embodiment of the principle of universal law and order, the descendant of the _Vedīc_ _ṛtā_. The common saying "the king makes the age" (_rājā kālasya kārānam_) is true in the sense that a righteous king aided by _daṇḍa_ brings about universal prosperity and happiness, while a bad king fails in the task and brings ruin on himself and his kingdom. Such ideas were widespread in the ancient Aryan world. "When a blameless king fears the gods and upholds right judgment," says _Homer_, then the dark earth yields wheat and barley, and the trees are laden with fruit; the young of his flocks are strong, and the sea gives abundance of fish"—statements which have many parallels in Indian literature. On this view the sovereign is not the king, but the law which is prior to him and which he has to follow himself and enforce justly upon others. _Manu_ is not averse to contemplating the king punishing himself for mistakes much more heavily than his subjects. And his statement that _daṇḍa_ ruins an unrighteous king and his family links up with the story found in the _Mahābhārata_ of the tyrannical rule of _Vena_ which was put an end to by a revolt of his subjects ending in the killing of the tyrant. Such a mystic

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doctrine which carried the seed of revolution had no appeal for Kauṭilya, the practical administrator and architect of empire; we hear nothing of it in the *Artha-sāstra*.

Though monarchy is a divinely ordained institution, the king himself is by no means a god. No Indian king ever called himself "Theos" or "Epiphanes," and none was worshipped as a god in his life-time. It has been rightly pointed out that "in Asia there was little soil for deification of rulers to germinate" and that this was a native product of Greece, evolved to meet "the need of finding a legal basis in a constitutional state for an extra-constitutional authority." Manu, indeed, says, "Even an infant king must not be despised (from an idea) that he is a mere mortal, for he is a great deity in human form." But the verse occurs in the midst of the long passage which gives the basis for our commentary in the last paragraph, and the context shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the statement is what Mimāṃsakas call an *artha-vāda* meant only to stress the necessity of upholding monarchy.

_Brahma and Kṣatra._—By the side of the kṣatriya king stands the brāhmaṇa, primarily in the capacity of a priest or purohita (lit. placed foremost), to advise and assist the king in his onerous tasks. Manu only repeats a well-established tradition harking back to the early Vedic period when he says: "After creation Prajāpati made over the cattle to the vaisyās to the brāhmaṇa and to the king he entrusted all created beings." Again, "kṣatra without brahma does not prosper, nor does brahma flourish without kṣatra; brahma and kṣatra being closely united prosper in this world and the next." A discerning critic of Hinduism has observed: "In politics the brahmans had the good sense to rule by serving, to be ministers and not kings. In theory and to a considerable extent in practice, the brahmans and their gods are not an imperium in imperio but an imperium super imperium." In the ceremonial of royal consecration, the purohita commended the king to his subjects and excluded the brāhmaṇas from that category saying: "Here is your king, O ye people; as for us brāhmaṇas, Soma is our king." There are some verses in Manu which cast on the brāhmaṇas in particular the duty of restraining despotic kings; "When the kṣatra becomes in any way overbearing towards brahma, brahma by itself shall duly restrain it; for the kṣatra sprang from brahma," and cannot prevail against its source any more than fire against water.

Though in Manu the office of the purohita has ceased to be important and he is no more than the priest of the royal family officiating in its domestic ritual, stress is laid on the need for the king consulting a wise brāhmaṇa minister of high character apart from the regular consultations with other ministers, particularly before reaching decisions on critical points of state policy involving questions of peace and war. Kauṭilya treats the office of the purohita as a key-post and lays down high qualifications of learning and character for its holder; having chosen a proper man for the post, the
king is to follow him as a pupil follows his teacher, a son his father, or a servant his master. And he affirms: "The kṣatra strengthened by the brahmaṇa, purified by the counsel of ministers and following the precepts of the code (śāstra) becomes invincible and attains success (even) without (the use of) arms!" The constant co-operation based on mutual understanding between brahma and kṣatra—sacerdotium and imperium—is thus, according to Manu and Kautilya, the true foundation of a prosperous and successful state.

Anāgas.—The anāgas or prakṛtis (component elements) of a state are reckoned to be seven in number. Manu enumerates them as (1) the king (svāmin), (2) the minister (amātya), (3) the capital (pura), (4) the country (rāṣtra), (5) the treasury (koṣa), (6) army (danda) and (7) ally (suḥṛt or according to Kautilya mitra). The order in which they have been named is also the order of their importance. The State stands to suffer more by mishaps to earlier members in the list than to the later ones. This does not, however, mean that in their normal functioning one is superior to the other; each is efficient in its own sphere and as in the triple staff of an ascetic no single part is less essential than another for the efficiency of the whole. Kautilya mentions the anāgas in nearly the same order as Manu, with the difference that he puts the country (janapada, Manu’s rāṣtra) before capital (durga for Manu’s pura). He cites the view of his preceptor that each preceding member in the enumeration is more vital and entitled to greater care in abnormal times than the succeeding members, and has an elaborate discussion of rival views on the relative importance of the different factors; he agrees with none of these scholastic and a priori considerations, and concludes on the common-sense note that the action to be taken in a crisis will have to be guided not by textbook rules but by the actual nature of the danger involved to any part or parts of the state and its probable effects on the rest.

The King.—The welfare of the state, it is well recognized, depends on the personal qualities and conduct of the king and elaborate prescriptions are laid down for his education and training before he is called to the throne, and for the manner in which he should, after accession, divide his time and attention between his personal affairs and public duties. Kautilya wants the king to think of the succession in good time; and has laid down elaborate rules for the selection and training of a suitable successor.

Other elements.—The king should be ever active in the interests of his subjects and be accessible to them; he should promptly attend to urgent matters neglect of which may lead to complications. Exertion is the secret of success. "The happiness of the subjects," says Kautilya, "is the happiness of the king; their welfare, his; his own pleasure is not his good, but the pleasure of his subjects is that." The king must appoint, says Manu, a council of seven or eight ministers of good family, learned, courageous and of established reputation for character and efficiency, to assist him in
the affairs of state. Kautšilya has discussed in detail the principles of governance, selection of different ranks of ministers, the layout of the capital, the economic development of the country, principles of taxation and maintenance of the discipline and morale of the army.

Inter-state Relations.—The theory of inter-state relations both in Manu and Kautšilya is dominated by the notion that he who could not be hammer will necessarily become the anvil. The ideal king is a vijigīṣu, one desirous of fresh conquests. This certainly means enterprise and perhaps aggrandizement, but not necessarily war which is recommended only as a last resort. We have to pass by the elaborate and rather scholastic disquisitions, naturally more detailed in Kautšilya than in Manu, on the Mañḍala or diplomatic circle, on the four-fold policy (upāya) and on the six-fold action (sādgunya). Kautšilya distinguishes three kinds of conquerors—the dharmavijayin—virtuous conqueror, who is content with the acknowledgment of his suzerainty; the lobha-vijayin, covetous conqueror, who seeks territory and wealth; and the asura-vijayin, the wicked conqueror, who wants to confiscate everything of the conquered ruler including his person, wife, and children and even puts him to death. He also suggests in detail the steps by which conquered territory is to be pacified and normal life restored in it. Manu, on the other hand, lays it down definitely that when a conquest is over the normal life of the country should be restored to its status quo ante—its laws and customs, its religious and social institutions, even its ancient royal family.

Administration.—In the sphere of internal administration Kautšilya’s work is unique. The Adhyāṭsa-pracāra (Book II) with its detailed description of town-planning, fortification, and financial administration together with the duties of about thirty adhyāṭsa, heads of departments as we should call them now, is unique in ancient Indian political literature, and may well stand comparison with a modern manual of administration. Kautšilya contemplates a vast bureaucracy, busying itself over the study, regulation, and control of the entire field of the nation’s social and economic activities with a measure of centralization unknown in India again till we reach the period of British rule. The volume of authentic and up-to-date information at the disposal of the state regarding each city and village, the number of its inhabitants and their occupations, its resources in land, cattle, and so on, must have been very considerable if the precepts of Kautšilya were followed, and there is little reason to doubt that they were followed in the Mauryan empire at least to the end of the reign of Aśoka. The model for Kautšilya in this respect was doubtless the Hellenistic state which, in its turn, followed the practice of the Persian kings of the Achemenid line and their satraps. The Mauryan state thus departed from the usual rule of the Indian state of not interfering actively in the daily avocations of the people but limiting itself to the task of preventing hindrances to their lawful pursuits.
Justice.—In the administration of justice, Kauṭilya distinguishes two kinds of courts—the dharmashāhya (Book III) for dealing with vyavahāra, civil litigation, considered usually under eighteen convenient heads, and the kaṇṭaka-śodhana (Book IV) for dealing with crimes against society including misconduct of officials in the discharge of their public duties. The former are the regular law-courts where all the regular forms of legal procedure were observed and justice was administered by royal officials assisted by the advice of brāhmaṇas versed in law. The latter were administrative courts of a summary character which sought to remove the thorns (kaṇṭaka) of society. Difficult cases were sometimes transferred to these courts from the regular ones. They employed spies and agents provocateurs for the detection of crimes and resorted to torture to extort confessions. The basis of distinction between the two sets of courts is nowhere stated in terms; but we may suppose that Kauṭilya created these new courts to meet the growing needs of an increasingly complex economy, to protect the state and people from the actions of anti-social persons, and to place an effective check on the administration of a mass of new regulations by a growing number of officials and thus secure reasonable efficiency in government and freedom from oppression and discrimination for the people. With Kauṭilya this new type of court figures as the key-stone of the elaborate system of bureaucracy he envisages. Of all other writers on polity, Manu stands closest to Kauṭilya in this respect, for though he does not mention the special courts, he deals with the kaṇṭaka-śodhana at some length, and his treatment of the subject bears close resemblances to Kauṭilya’s in its particular reference to spies, to misdeeds of officials, and to a large number of crimes and offences on the part of others very similar to those mentioned by Kauṭilya.

In another important respect Kauṭilya figures as an innovator, and once again the source of his inspiration is to be sought in the Persian monarchy and the Hellenistic states which succeeded it. He says: “dharma, contract, custom, and royal decrees are the four legs of law (determinants of litigation). Of these each later item is of superior validity to its predecessor.” In the words that Rostovtzeff applies to the Hellenistic monarchies: “it is evident that a royal law, order, or regulation, if it conflicted with other laws was always regarded as over-riding them and that the royal verdict in law-suits was final.” With the solitary exception of Nārada, the later law-books allowed this un-Indian exaltation of royal authority to fall into oblivion. The usual rule was that the king was bound by dharma, an elastic term which included revealed law, local and group custom, and every traditional practice—but not royal decrees. Manu enumerates the sources of dharma as the entire Veda, the tradition and conduct of those who know the Veda, and the customs of holy men, and finally, self-satisfaction.
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4. ETHICS

We may conclude with a sketch of the ethical outlook of Manu which has had an incalculable measure of influence on literature and on the conduct of men through the ages. The content of dharma (the moral code) is not fixed once for all, but must be learned in each generation from what is observed or allowed by learned men who are good and ever free from hatred and inordinate affection.51 Ten virtues are particularly commended to the brāhmaṇa, viz. contentment, forgiveness, self-control, abstention from appropriating others’ property, purity, restraint of the senses, wisdom, knowledge, truthfulness and abstention from anger.52 A foolish and greedy brāhmaṇa is condemned in no uncertain terms and gifts to him deprecated as likely to hurt even the giver.53 Flesh-eating and drinking liquor are recognized as natural, but abstention from them is praised as very meritorious; evidently this marks a transitional stage in the practice particularly of the brāhmaṇas.54 Anyone who would instruct others for their welfare must follow the rule of ahimsā (not causing pain) and use sweet and gentle speech towards them; the commentators take this to apply particularly to the relation between a teacher and his pupil.55 Wealth, kinship, age, achievement and learning are entitled to social respect in an increasing order; wealth, it will be noticed, gets the lowest place and learning the highest.56 Personal freedom is highly prized as the source of real happiness, and one is advised to undertake work that he can put through on his own and find satisfaction in doing so. Elsewhere, service is condemned as a dog’s life.57 Incredible as it may seem, Manu advocates full employment for the vaiśya and śūdra for the sake of social peace.58 Elsewhere, he permits a starving man to take food from wherever he finds it, though not with a view to hoarding it, and roundly affirms that a man who takes wealth from the wicked and distributes it among the good and needy makes himself the means of redemption for both.59 There is no virtue higher than truth; truth purifies the mind and speaking the truth is nobler than silence. At the same time, “let one say what is true, let one say what is pleasing, let one utter nothing disagreeable, and let one utter no agreeable falsehood; that is the eternal law.”60 To lie in a court of law in cases where it was a question of life or death was, however, considered venial.61 The rule of good conduct on all occasions was more binding on the higher classes than on the common folk and deviations from the right called for higher pains and penalties in their case, as their responsibility was in proportion to their status and knowledge.62 Confession and repentance are held to be of value in restoring one’s peace of mind and keeping one from repetition of the same errors.63

II7
NOTES


2. Kane: op. cit., pp. 95–6, works out the differences and p. 140 n. points out the similarities.


4. XV. i.

5. Kane, i. 99.

6. cf. Bāna’s Kādambari, Śukanāsa’s advice to prince Candrāpiḍa.

7. Manu II. 17–23; KA. IX. 1; also Cakravartihṣetram, K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar Commemoration Volume, pp. 81–6.


10. ibid., VIII. 380; IX. 313–17; X. 3; XI. 31–2.

11. e.g. II. 157, III. 97.


15. Manu VI. 34–41.

16. KA. II. i.

17. Manu III. 77–8; IV. 32; VI. 89–90.

18. ibid., III. 68–70; 77–8; 116–17; IV. 32; VI. 89–90.

19. Manu VIII. 44 which contemplates only hypergamy.

20. KA. III. 7 last verses; Manu IX. 57–63 and 64–8.

21. Manu III. 56, 60.

22. IX. 89.

23. V. 147 ff.; II. 213 ff.


25. IV. 413.

26. VIII. 2.

27. I. 13.


31. VIII. 336.

32. By W. S. Fergusson, CAH. VII, p. 15.

33. VIII. 8.

34. cf. Medhātithi on VIII. 29.

35. IX. 322, 327.


37. IX. 320–1.

38. VII. 78.

39. VII. 58.

40. I. 9.

41. IX. 294–7.

42. VI. 1; VIII. 1.

43. I. 19.

44. Manu, VII. 199.

45. KA. XII. 1.

46. ibid., XIII. 5.

47. VII. 201–3.

48. cf. Manu VIII. II.

49. IX. 252–93, also VII. 123.

50. II. 6.
51. II. 1.
52. VI. 91–2.
53. IV. 190–3.
54. V. 52–6.
55. II. 159.
56. II. 136.
57. IV. 159–61; 6.
58. VIII. 418.
59. XI. 16–19.
60. V. 109; II. 83; IV. 138.
61. VIII. 104.
63. XI. 227, 233.

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CHAPTER VI

THE VIŚṆU AND THE BHĀΓAVATA PURĀṆAS

I. HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF PURĀṆAS

The Viśṇu-Purāṇa and the Bhāgavata are the two most important poetical works, representing a particular type of Sanskrit religio-philosophical literature, known as the Purāṇas. The Purāṇas together with the great Epics, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, played a unique role in the cultural amalgamation of the diverse races and tribes and clans and religious sects of ancient and mediaeval India and in the spiritualization of the outlook of all classes of Indian people. Pargitar has rightly remarked that "taken collectively, they (the Purāṇas) may be described as a popular encyclopedia of ancient and mediaeval Hinduism, religious, philosophical, historical, personal, social, and political."1

The Purāṇas do not identify themselves with any particular scholastic system of philosophy or any particular sectarian religion. They take their stand on the spiritual experiences of all Schools of saints of the highest order—of the seers of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads as well as the later saints of the jñāna-mārga (path of knowledge), the bhakti-mārga (path of devotion), and the karma-mārga (path of action)—and seek to represent and harmonize the views of non-dualism (a-dvaita), dualism (dvaita), dualism-cum-non-dualism (dvaita-advaita), qualified non-dualism (viśiṣṭādvaita) and even those of Sāmkhya and Yoga and Nyāya.

A leaning towards bhakti (devotion) is, however, predominant in all the Purāṇas, and this is very appealing to popular minds and hearts. Their interest lies more in inspiring the lives of men than in establishing any particular metaphysical views.

2. PHILOSOPHY OF THE VIŚṆU-PURĀṆA

The Viśṇu-Purāṇa is an earlier and simpler work than the Bhāgavata. It has also a representative character. As Winternitz says: "A more detailed summary of the contents of this Purāṇa will best serve to give the reader an idea of the contents and significance of the Purāṇas altogether."2

The Viśṇu-Purāṇa is presented in the form of a conversation between Maitreya and his teacher, Parāśara, father of Vyāsa. In reply to the disciple's question as to the ultimate truth about the origin, sustenance,
regulation and end of this phenomenal world (jagat), Parāśara makes the
categorical assertion that "the world originated from Viṣṇu; it is in Him
that the world exists as a harmonious system (saṁsthitam); He is the sole
sustainer and controller of the world, and in truth, the world is He."³
This may be said to be the sum and substance of the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa and
in fact of all the Purāṇas. Viṣṇu is evidently identical with the one non-
dual absolute Spirit, that is spoken of as Brahman and Paramātman in the
Upaniṣads and the Brahma-sūtra. Parāśara makes it clear in a hymn
on Viṣṇu, in which he describes Him as the one, infinite, eternal, changeless,
perfect, all-pervading, all transcending supreme spirit (Paramātman)⁴ and
proclaims that Hiranyakarśa, Hari, Śaṅkara, Vāsudeva, Tāra, Acyuta,
Puruṣottama, Nārāyaṇa, Brahmā, Śiva, and all such significant divine
names are applied to Him and Him alone.⁵ The mention of these names is
probably intended to point out the essential unity of all the religious
communities. Parāśara suggests here and elsewhere that Veda-vādins,
Vedānta-vādins, Vaiṣṇavas, Śaivas, Paṇcarātrins, Ekāntins, Bhāgavatas,
Pāṣupatas, Yogins, Śaṣṭa-Brahma-vādins and all other sects really worship
the same supreme Spirit, who is the absolute ground and lord and self
of the universe, though in different names and forms, and that all exclusiveness
and sectarian bigotry and narrowness are born of ignorance.

In order to explain the world-process, which is without beginning or
end in time, but which passes through cycles after cycles (kalpas) of
creation and development and dissolution, Parāśara starts from the
absolute spiritual monism of Vedānta. He says that the absolute Spirit,
which is the sole ground of this world process, is in Itsel above the highest
concepts of the human understanding (parah parāvāṁ paramāḥ) without
any form or colour or any other determinate characteristic, without any
special predicate in terms of which It can be positively conceived, without
any temporal qualities such as birth, growth, change, decay and destruc-
tion, and nothing can be said of It except that It eternally exists.⁶
This is obviously the idea of nir-guna Brahman and, according to Parāśara,
this is the ultimate nature of Viṣṇu. Parāśara goes on to say that it is this
infinite, eternal, changeless, effortless, attributeless absolute Spirit, which
manifests Itself in this world of finite temporal ever-changing contingent
realities, which dwells everywhere in all the things of this world and in
which everything dwells and which is therefore spoken of as Vāsudeva
by wise men—men having insight into the essential truth of this world.⁷
Vāsudeva eternally transcends the world and is eternally immanent in it.
Though eternally one without a second, He also eternally manifests
Himself as Puruṣa (the cosmic self as well as the individual selves),
pradhāna or prakṛti (the undifferentiated primordial energy, the material
cause of all differentiated subtle and gross existences), nyaya (the world of
differentiated existences) and kāla (time). The essential character of
Viṣṇu (Viṣṇoḥ paramaṁ padam) is eternally above and unaffected by his

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diversified manifestations in the forms of puruṣa, pradhāna, vyakta and kāla; but all the same, such differentiated self-manifestations of Viṣṇu are not unreal and they are the sources of the productions, harmonious operations, systematic changes, developments and destructions, etc., of all finite conditioned derivative realities constituting the world-order. The self-manifestations of Viṣṇu in all these forms may be likened to the free, motiveless, joyful movements or self-expressions of a playful boy. This is what is called Lilā-vāda, and it is accepted by all the Purāṇas. Parāśara, then, follows the Sāṁkhya method in tracing the progressive evolution of the cosmic system and also its dissolution in course of time. He thus combines the dualism of the Sāṁkhya with the monism of the Vedānta in explaining the world-order. He differs from the orthodox Sāṁkhya in emphasizing the necessity of recognizing kāla (time) as a dynamic determining factor in evolution and involution.

Maitreya raises the most puzzling question—how is it possible for the indeterminate (nir-guṇa) to become determinate (sa-guṇa), that is, how is it conceivable that the infinite eternal attributeless, changeless, effortless pure spirit, Brahman, is also the active creator, ruler and destroyer of this material world or manifests Itself in countless orders of finite changing relative phenomena? It is this question which has divided the Vedāntists into a large number of Schools. Parāśara does not take the side of any School, for he holds that the question is above human understanding. He unhesitatingly answers that it is the unique inscrutable power inherent in the nature of the supreme Spirit which makes really possible what appears to be logically impossible to our discursive knowledge. His argument implied in his assertion is this: The powers inherent in the nature of things are always inscrutable. They can only be intuited or imagined in the light of the effects produced, without reference to which they cannot be said to have any powers at all. The absolute Spirit must also be conceived as possessing such a unique power as may adequately account for the origination, sustenance, regulation, destruction, etc., of these existences, without in any way affecting the transcendent character of the Spirit.

On account of this unique power, Brahman is, says Parāśara, eternally being as well as becoming (asti-jāyate), one as well as many (ekāneka), unmanifested as well as manifested (vyaktāvyakta), attributeless as well as possessing infinite glorious attributes (nirṛtyānanta-guṇa), inactive as well as ever-active (niṣ-kriya-satata-kriya) and so on. This unique power of the supreme Spirit is spoken of as māyā-śakti. Since māyā has no separate existence from Brahman, the non-dual character of Brahman is in no way contradicted. But as the unique power of Brahman, māyā, though non-different from Brahman, furnishes an adequate explanation for the cosmic order. This is the general Purānic conception of Reality.

To satisfy the truth-seeker’s hankering for more and more knowledge
THE VIŚNU AND THE BHĀGAVATA PURĀNAS

about the divine order of the world, Parāśara explains in detail the Purānic ideas about the gradual expansion and diversification of inanimate nature, the evolution of the various species of sub-human creatures, the growth of the human race, the diffusion of intellectual, moral, social and spiritual culture in different sections of the race, the alternate rise and fall of the divine and the satanic (daiva and āsura) forces in the world, the reign of moral law (law of karmāṇa) in the cosmic system, the occasional appearance of outstanding personalities (extraordinary saints and sages and heroes) in the human society, the special manifestations of divine power and wisdom and love in times of crisis in the world-order, and so on. All these dissertations revolve round the one central truth which is constantly stressed, viz. that the supreme Spirit is at the origin, in all the steps as well as at the end of all these natural, historical, cultural, moral and spiritual processes in the world-order. With the help of interesting illustrative anecdotes it is sought to be proved that in the world-scheme the moral law is superior to the physical law and that the law of love and compassion is superior even to the moral law or the law of justice. Among the incarnations (vibhūtis and avatāras) Kṛṣṇa is represented as the most perfect self-expression of the supreme Spirit in human form and hence his life story is most elaborately described. ¹⁰

This is in short the philosophy of the Viśṇu-Purāṇa and it is representative of the spiritual outlook of the Purāṇas in general.

3. PHILOSOPHY OF THE BHĀGAVATA

The metaphysical viewpoint of the Bhāgavata is the same as that of the Viśṇu-Purāṇa. The Bhāgavata clearly states that “the ultimate Reality is one eternal non-dual consciousness (jñānam adīvayam) and that it is the same one Spirit that is called Brahman, Paramātman and Bhagavat.”¹¹ The Bhāgavata, like the Viśṇu-Purāṇa, accepts equally the nir-guna and the sa-guna aspects of the supreme Spirit. In one famous sloka, Bhagavat thus reveals His true character to Brahmā: “In the beginning (before My self-manifestation as the cosmic order) I alone existed in and by Myself and there was nothing other than Myself, whether in a manifested or in an unmanifested form. After the creation of diversities also I alone exist (because all these are My self-manifestations and nothing has existence independent of and separate from Mine). After the destruction of all these diversities also I alone will exist (because all My temporal self-manifestations will be dissolved in time in Me). ¹²

Conceived in His all-transcending attributeless aspect, He is called Brahmā: as the all-originating, all-sustaining, all-regulating dynamic self of the universe, He is called Paramātman; but when He is conceived with all His infinite glorious powers and attributes, manifested in relation to the
cosmic order, He is called—Bhagavat. It is as Bhagavat that He is the supreme object of admiration, reverence, devotion, meditation and love to all human beings, who are His relatively self-determining, self-conscious intelligent, finite self-manifestations in His cosmic system. The Bhāgavata is specially interested in singing the various glories of Bhagavat displayed in relation to the various orders of His self-manifestations. His inconceivable power and wisdom and splendour are revealed in the order and harmony and complexity of the cosmic system; but His higher spiritual attributes such as love and compassion, beauty and sweetness, are specially revealed in relation to the higher orders of His self-manifestations; the highest of all in relation to His highest order of devotees.

The Bhāgavata follows the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa in having resort* to the doctrine of Bhagavat’s māyā for the reconciliation of all the apparent logical contradictions in His perfect spiritual nature (seyam bhagavato māyā yan-nyāyena virudhyate).13

Like the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa it also assimilates the Sāmkhya process of the evolution and involution of the cosmic order from and in prakṛti with its own view of Bhagavat being the efficient as well as the material cause of all the diversities. It goes even one step farther inasmuch as it not only gives a consistent theistic interpretation of the Sāmkhya, but also accepts Kapila as one of the avatāras of Bhagavat and presents him as one of the greatest teachers of bhakti-yoga.14 (Sk. III. Chaps. XXV-XXIX). Moreover, māyā being of the nature of a unique power of the supreme Spirit, the sakti-doctrine of the Śaivaite Schools is also assimilated to it. The law of karmāṇa is subordinate to and one of the forms of operation of this unique inscrutable power.

What is most interesting in the philosophy of the Bhāgavata is its most artistic attempt to assimilate the māyā-doctrine of the Vedānta, the prakṛti-doctrine of the Sāmkhya, the sakti-doctrine of Śaivaite and the karma-doctrine of the Mimāṃsā and other Schools, into the Purānic-doctrine of divine līlā (sportive self-expression of the supreme Spirit. The conception of līlā which is elaborated and illustrated throughout the entire book, implies a radical transformation of man’s outlook on all the phenomena of the world-order. The world-order is ultimately neither the product of a natural evolution out of some insentient primordial energy, nor an illusory appearance of an inert existence-consciousness through the inexplicable operation of māyā, nor the product of any motive or desire or voluntary action or involuntary movement on the part of an active personality, nor the product of the karmāṇa of the individual spirits. The best way to understand the causal relation of this world system to Him is, according to the Bhāgavata, to conceive of it on the analogy of sport. Sport or play (when not contaminated by any ulterior motive or by any compulsion) is the free self-expression of the internal dynamic consciousness of joy and beauty and fullness of the player.
This conception of play furnishes the nearest approach to the nature of the unique power (māyā) of the supreme Spirit. The whole world-order is the play of the supreme Spirit (divine līlā)—the free unmotived self-expression in a spatio-temporal order of His supra-spatial, supra-temporal perfect self-enjoyment.

Now this viewpoint of līlā, if comprehensively realized, turns the phenomenal universe with all its diversities into a beautiful and magnificent work of art. It is an embodiment of the perfect beauty and glory and joy of the divine nature. Brahman is truth and wisdom and goodness and beauty and bliss—says the Upaniṣadic Ṛṣi. Everything in this world must therefore be a free, but unmotived, sportive self-expression of truth and wisdom, goodness and beauty, perfection and bliss. It is the Infinite and Eternal that plays everywhere as finite and transitory. The phenomena which appear to our imperfect understanding as untrue or unwise, evil or ugly, sources of bondage or suffering, have their proper places in this great work of art, contributing to the beauty of the whole system, and they also are the self-expressions of the perfect player. The ignorance and imperfect understanding, apparently vicious tendencies, the rivalries and hatreds and hostilities, the oppressions and depressions prevailing in the human society, change their colours, when viewed as the sportive self-expressions of the supreme Spirit. An enlightened person who learns to look upon all things from the standpoint of the divine līlā, is not horrified by the actualities of the world, does not want to fly away from it, does not seek deliverance in losing himself in the differenceless unity of the supreme Spirit. He finds the supreme Spirit everywhere in the world, loves and embraces and courageously faces all the apparently repulsive things as the playful embodiments of his infinite eternal absolute beloved. He sees and loves and serves the supreme Spirit within himself as well as in all persons and animals and things and forces of the world.

Līlā-vāda is closely related to avatāra-vāda upon which the Bhāgavata lays great emphasis.15 Avatāra literally means descent, coming down. The supreme Spirit, by virtue of his unique power, māyā, sportively descends from the plane of the absolute unity to the plane of the relative plurality, from the plane of infinity and eternity to the plane of time and space, from the plane of non-dual changeless existence-consciousness-bliss to the plane of the diversities of changing conscious and unconscious imperfect existences, without in any way losing Its transcendent essential character. While eternally enjoying the perfection of Its non-dual self in the supra-cosmic plane, It gives expression to Its transcendent perfection quite freely in a cosmic system of time, space and relativity, enters into all the parts of this system as their true selves, and enjoys the infinite glories of Its nature in and through them.

This conception of avatāra or the descent of the supreme Spirit into the plane of change, finitude and relativity is implied in the very idea of the
Spirit being the ground and self of the cosmic system and all the diversities within it, as revealed in the spiritual experiences of the seers of the Upaniṣads and the saints of all ages. The Bhāgavata has amplified and illustrated this conception. The first avatāra of Bhagavat is, the Bhāgavata says, His appearance in the form of Puruṣa or Person, the soul of the cosmos, the Spirit as immanent in the universe as a whole.16 This puruṣāvatāra is identified with Nārāyaṇa (which term also means the self and support of all naraś or finite beings, the cosmic self) and is regarded as the inexhaustible seed and refuge of all the various forms of avatāras.17

From this point of view, all the diverse orders of beings in the world may in a general sense be spoken of as incarnations (avatāras) of the supreme Being. But the term avatāra is used ordinarily in a special sense. All the apparently finite beings of the universe are undoubtedly self-manifestations of the supreme Spirit. To view them as essentially separate realities and different from the one absolute Spirit is avidyā or ignorance.18 But the māyā of this absolute Spirit presents Its self-manifestations in various orders of relations to It. Many of Its self-manifestations are of such forms that the spiritual character of the immanent Self is completely veiled in them. They appear as purely material things or material forces. In the lowest species of living beings, the spiritual character of the self is only slightly unveiled in the form of an unconscious life-power. In the higher and higher orders of beings the spiritual character of the Self is gradually more and more unveiled and appears as higher and higher forms of conscious self-determining life. Among all the cosmic self-manifestations of the divine Spirit, the spiritual character is most unveiled in the human beings, in whom there is a display of relative freedom of thought and emotion and will, and there is a possibility of the realization of the Infinite and Eternal in the finite and temporal, of the spiritual in the material, of the bliss of perfect freedom in this world of bondage. The Bhāgavata warmly commends the merits of human birth and tries to make men conscious of its infinite possibilities in all possible ways. The human life is eulogized as superior even to the lives of the heavenly beings, of the gods and goddesses.19 In the human species again, the divine characteristics are more prominently displayed in the extraordinary lives of great saints and sages, great heroes and philanthropists (great jñānins, bhaktas, karmins, prēmins). These are spoken of as embodiments of vibhūtis (special glories) of the supreme Spirit. The Bhāgavata teaches the truth-seekers to respect all orders of beings in this world as the manifestations or embodiments of the supreme Spirit.20 But it seeks to draw their special attention to a special order of revelations of the supreme Spirit which occasionally appear in the world with special missions, particularly in the human society for the worldly good and spiritual enlightenment of Its creatures (bhūtānām kṣēmāya ca bhavāya ca).21 He is believed to come down in times of crisis into His world with finite bodies, but with super-ordinary divine powers,
for some special actions which substantially contribute to the moral and spiritual elevation of the world, particularly of the human society. Such special appearances (āvirbhāva) of Bhagavat in finite forms with superhuman parts to play in the world are called avatāras in the restricted sense of the term.

The question as to why the Lord should have to come down and take bodily forms for accomplishing any purpose which He might have done by a mere act of effortless will or even by a change in the constitution of the cosmic order is altogether irrelevant. He is not under any compulsion to adopt this course or that course for accomplishing anything. We might raise a similar fruitless question as to why the order of the world is what it is or why the eternally transcendent absolute Spirit should come down to the plane of space, time and relativity and manifest Itself as a complicated cosmic system at all. All this is Bhagavat’s play; all this is the free self-expression of His eternally self-enjoying spiritual nature. We have to study and reflect upon the diverse modes of His sportive self-expressions in the cosmic system with admiration, reverence and love, and not to raise irrelevant fruitless questions.

Accepting what Bhagavat has said in the Gītā with regard to the purpose of His avatāra-līlā, the Bhāgavata adds that it is His love and compassion for His creatures (particularly His human manifestations) which brings Him down and makes Him assume bodily forms (particularly human). In such forms He plays such roles as are very attractive to people’s minds and hearts. Even by hearing descriptions of them people become devoted to Him. In every action of His, there is the visible expression of His beauty and goodness, love and mercy, purity and playfulness. In His incarnation (avatāra-līlā) He offers to His devotees visible demonstrations of the practicability of the cultivation of a state of consciousness, in which one may be divine and human at the same time, in which one may perform actions as finite beings without losing the bliss of perfection in the innermost experience, in which one may concern oneself with all the intricate affairs of the world and at the same time remain wholly unattached to them and enjoy everything as sweet play. Through the agency of His avatāras, the supreme Spirit humanizes Himself and comes very close to the human minds and hearts, and thereby draws the human beings towards His divine character and seeks to divinize them. The gulf of difference between divinity and humanity is bridged over by avatāras. The spiritual self-fulfilment of men is made very easy by this kind of divine play.

The Bhāgavata says that avatāras are countless; just as thousands and thousands of streams may flow out from an inexhaustible lake in different directions, so from Hari, the eternal source of all existences, innumerable avatāras descend into the earth. Among the avatāras, however, the Bhāgavata recognizes differences on the ground of different degrees of
manifestations of divinity. Those in whom divinity is most brilliantly revealed are called pūrṇa-avatāras; those in whom it is revealed only in particular aspects are called amśa-avatāras; those in whom it is still less manifested are called kaḷā-avatāras. And so on. The Bhāgavata mentions a good many avatāras. Nārada, Kapila, Dattātreya, Pṛthu (an ideal king), Vyāsa, the Buddha, are, amongst others, included in the list. Of all the avatāras, Kṛṣṇa is regarded as the most perfect and he is spoken of as the supreme Spirit Itself—(Bhagavān svayam.)

All through the book the Bhāgavata tries to give the readers enlightening and charming ideas about the various glorious attributes and powers of the supreme Spirit as exhibited in relation to the different orders of phenomena in its cosmic play, such as elemental creation, multiplication of creatures, preservation of world order, development of species, dispensation of justice, cyclical changes in human history, lives of devotees and seekers of divine mercy, lives of heroes and saints, dissolution of the world in pralaya, emancipation from worldly bondage through spiritual enlightenment, and so on. Special aspects of the inscrutable power and glory of God are displayed in connection with special orders of phenomena. It is in the lives of the sincere and earnest seekers of jñāna, bhakti, mukti, and relief from distress that the supreme player displays Himself as the bestower of true knowledge, the bestower of love and sweetness, the bestower of tranquillity and bliss, the deliverer from bondage and misery; and it is in the experiences of such persons that Bhagavat reveals Himself as infinitely merciful, infinitely loving, infinitely benevolent, infinitely good and beautiful. Enlightened men regard such moral, spiritual and aesthetic aspects of the divine nature as superior to His creatorship, rulership and destroyership of the world. The Bhāgavata accordingly deals more elaborately with these higher expressions of the divine character.

The life-story of Kṛṣṇa constitutes the most vital part of this Purāṇa. The entire tenth Skandha, consisting of ninety chapters, is specially devoted to it. Many saintly philosophers have written commentaries exclusively on this part of the book. The narration is as poetically charming as philosophically illuminating. In depicting the life of Kṛṣṇa the Bhāgavata does not deify an extraordinary human personality, but humanizes the supreme Spirit. It starts with the conception that Kṛṣṇa is the supreme Spirit Itself (Bhagavān svayam), and illustrates by reference to the events of His playful earthly career how divinity can be beautifully manifested in humanity. He plays excellently the parts of an infant, a child, a boy, a youth, a son, a playmate, a sentimental lover, a warrior, a controller of the forces of evil, an humbler of the Vedic deities, a politician, a social and religious reformer, and what not? His limitations are self-imposed, and He transcends them whenever He likes. The whole cosmic and supra-cosmic character of the supreme Spirit is visible in its life.

As a mere infant sucking the mother's breast, Kṛṣṇa playfully sucks out
the soul of Pūtana, who came to kill Him in the guise of a mother. Frightened by His mother’s chastisement, He opens His mouth and shows her the whole cosmic system within it; He shows the boundless space with all its contents within the small cavity of His mouth. As a boy He persuades His father to revolt against the long-standing religious practice of Indra-yajña, and when Indra comes to inflict punishment, He picks up the hill of Govardhana on the tip of His little finger, puts it as an umbrella upon the heads of the inhabitants of Vṛndāvana and protects them from Indra’s wrath. The law of gravity yields to His sportive will, and Indra, the great Vedic Deity, also bows down to this playful Human God. While playing with the simple boys and girls of Vṛndāvana, He devours the forest fire, which was about to burn them to ashes. Powerful demons appear now and then to create disturbances in His boyish games; and He kills them in various playful methods which only add to the pleasures of His playmates.

All the superhuman powers and skills which are exhibited, are parts of His sweet play, self-expressions of His joyful spirit. Vṛndāvana, where He played His childlike as well as superhuman games, is depicted as a spiritual and a material world, both at the same time.

The boys and girls of Vṛndāvana are depicted as the loving devotees of the highest order, who live for Kṛṣṇa, work for Kṛṣṇa, yearn for eternal union with Kṛṣṇa, who have no concern with the superhuman or cosmic powers and actions of Kṛṣṇa, but look upon Him as the eternally perfect embodiment of beauty and sweetness and love. The Bhāgavata shows that in relation to these devotees the most glorious attributes of the divine character are exhibited and that the kind of love which they cultivated towards Kṛṣṇa is superior in spiritual value even to the attainment of mukti through the realization of the identity of the individual self with the absolute Spirit. Eternal communion with the supreme Spirit through the most intense all-engrossing love is, according to the Bhāgavata, the highest ideal of human life. Not only the mind and heart, but all the organs of the senses, all the limbs of the body, should be saturated with pure emotional love for the divine; the infinite beauty of the supreme Spirit should be experienced and enjoyed not only within the inner consciousness, but also in all the diverse expressions of His cosmic and supra-cosmic play, and the entire being of the devotee should thus become perfectly spiritual, loving and beautiful.

NOTES

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PART II
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CHAPTER VII

THE CĀRVĀKA PHILOSOPHY

Introduction.—Those who are under the notion that India is a land of spiritualism know her but partially. The materialist School of thought in India was as vigorous and comprehensive as materialistic philosophy in the modern world. Spiritualism was dominant in the thought of India but there were people in ancient India who held views against the existing beliefs and observances. These formed the system of thought which is popularly known as the Cārvāka philosophy.

The original works of the Cārvāka School are now lost to us. Some fragments of views and utterances which are lying scattered in different works of the Hindus, Buddhists and Jains form the basis of our knowledge of the system.

Matter as ultimate reality was first envisaged by Bṛhaspati Laukya or Brahmanaspati of the Rg-Veda. It will not be wrong to think that Indian materialism in its primary stage was mingled with scepticism and agnosticism. Bṛhaspati gave it a distinct form. In the Rg-Veda, Bṛhaspati has been called Gaṇa-pati—the leader of a band of musicians. The Cārvākas were Bṛhaspati’s followers who were also designated as Bārhaspatyas or Lokāyatikas. Bṛhaspati is now in oblivion but the Cārvākas are still remembered.

Almost every period of Indian history has champions of the Cārvāka view. The sage Jāvāli of the Rāmāyaṇa was a teacher of materialism. His advice to Rama is comparable with the Cārvāka view. There is no being superior to an earthly monarch—is the view of the Cārvākas. King Vena of the Hari-vanśa was an advocate of this view. He was anti-Vedic and marked by Vyāsa as a non-religious person. The teachings of Ajitakeśa-kambalin, who, according to the old Buddhist and Jain works, was a contemporary of Lord Buddha, resemble the teachings of the Cārvāka School. Pāyāsi, who was Ajita’s successor, championed Ajita’s view. Bhāguri, it is learnt from Patañjali, the author of the Mahā-bhāṣya, was a famous supporter of the Cārvāka view. Purandara, who has been mentioned by Śāntiraksita in his Tattva-Samgraha, belonged to the cultured group of the Cārvākas. He partially admitted inference as a means of right knowledge as it was useful in our daily life. Guṇaratna, the commentator of Haribhadra Sūri’s Śaḍ-darśana-samuccaya says that some Cārvākas accept “ether” as an element. The theories of identification of “self” with the senses, vital power and lastly with mind have been, as mentioned by Sadānanda in his Advaita-brahma-siddhi, introduced in the Cārvāka philosophy by its later followers. Introduction of these new
doctrines in the system of materialism was necessitated by the oppositionists of brāhmaṇical Schools which revived during the post-Buddhistic period as powerful adversaries of the old heretics, Vātsyāyana, the author of the Kāma-sūtra, flourished probably in this period of materialism. Though he was not a materialist his doctrine of rational and scientific treatment of sensual pleasure exerted much influence upon the cultured representatives of the Cārvāka School.

Theory of Knowledge.—The philosophical system of the Cārvākas stands upon their theory of knowledge. They maintain that perception is the only means of knowing the truth. That which is amenable to sense-perception is true; beyond perception everything is doubtful. Inference, they say, cannot be taken as a means to right knowledge, for inference involves universal relation (vyāpti) which is never perceived. By perception we only know that this particular “A” is related to this particular “B.” With this particular knowledge how can we jump to the unknown and affirm a categorical universal proposition as “All ‘A’s are related to all ‘B’s’”? Such knowledge is, therefore, without evidence. Testimony is also unreliable, because the validity of testimony is to be ascertained by inference. Moreover, it is often found arbitrary and unreasonable. Even the Vedic testimony cannot be relied upon. The Vedas are full of ambiguities, absurdities and contradictions. A certain line of action prescribed by one text is condemned by another. They speak of results that are never realized.

But if inference is discarded totally, everyday life becomes stagnant. The cultured (su-śikṣita) Cārvākas therefore admitted inference as a means to knowledge, in so far as it refers to phenomena only. They divided inference into two classes—one referring to the past and the other to the future. They accepted the first and rejected the second, and so also inference about what has never been perceived. Some were of opinion that for practical purposes probable knowledge is sufficient. From smoke, we are aware of the probability of fire, and not its certainty. This is, however, enough for our daily life.

Causality.—The Cārvākas do not believe in the existence of any invariable cause or product of an event. Mere perception of two things cannot establish a causal connection between them. We see the two events—fire and smoke. How can it be said that fire is the cause of smoke? Or, in other words, if there is smoke, fire is inevitable and unconditional, and it was so in the past when we were not born and will be so when we are dead. It is a case of inference and therefore must be ruled out as uncertain. In reply to the why of an event, the Cārvākas assert that every occurrence is spontaneous or accidental. The sharpness of thorns, variegated instincts of the birds and beasts, sweetness of sugar canes and bitterness of nimba tree are all accidental products or come up spontaneously. These are not the creation of any supersensible being called God. This vast universe is a
chance occurrence. It sprang from the fortuitous combination of elementary particles of matter. This theory is called *yadṛcchā-vāda* (the theory of accidental causation). The moderate Čārvākas consider *svabhāva* (nature) as the guiding principle behind all phenomena. Conception of a supernatural intelligent being as the supreme cause is, therefore, superfluous. This theory is known as "*svabhāva-vāda*" or naturalism.

*Matter.*—The Čārvākas recognize only four kinds of primary elements, viz. earth, water, air and fire and these are eternal. The sage Kabandhi-Kātyāyana of the *Praśna-Upaniṣad* held the same view. Ether (*ākāsa*) was not accepted by the ancient Čārvākas as an element because ether is imperceptible. All beings animate or inanimate are the products of these elementary principles of matter. That matter is the ultimate reality is implied from Brhaspati’s dictum—"Out of matter came forth life"—which probably is based upon the sceptical view of Paramesṭhin of the *Ṛg-Veda*.

*Consciousness.*—Consciousness is a quality of the body. It originates from material particles when they mysteriously combine and become transformed into a human organism. The Čārvākas explain this mental phenomenon by a comparison with intoxication which arises from a mixture of certain ingredients which by themselves are not intoxicating. There is no spiritual entity called *ātman* (soul) as agent of all conscious experiences. The body itself is the soul. In the expression like "I am lean," "I am stout," etc., "I" certainly does not mean anything other than the body. With the dissolution of the body, consciousness disappears and each of its constituent elements is mingled with its kind leaving behind only ashes and dust. Transmigration of soul, retribution, etc., are, therefore, meaningless words. The doctrine of the origination of consciousness from material substance may also be found in the *Brhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad* and the theory of identification of the soul with the body has its parallel in the Indra-Virocana episode of the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*.

As to the cause of consciousness three more views were propounded by the later followers of the system. In the first, agency was ascribed to the senses but for which no consciousness is possible. In the second, agency was ascribed to the vital power (*prāṇa*), i.e. life, and in the third, mind (*manas*) was considered to be the agent of knowledge. But though life and mind were considered to be distinct from the body, their independent existence was not admitted.

*Religion.*—The Čārvāka theory of knowledge prepares the way for a new faith. Religion is based upon the supernatural which is an object of inference. Now with the discarding of inference the supernatural also disappears. The various phenomena of the world are produced spontaneously from the inherent natures of things and there is no supernatural creator—God. If there be a God, omniscient, omnipotent and compassionate, why does He not remove all doubts about His existence by speaking to His suppliants? God cannot be said to be the judge of our merits.
and demerits, because otherwise He would be guilty of partiality and cruelty. If God visits us with the evil consequence of our sins, He is our enemy. Therefore it is better not to have a God than to have a cruel one. There is no such God as the supreme author and governor of this world, but the only god is the earthly king, the ruler of a state, the arbiter of right and wrong in the society.

_Liberation._—According to the orthodox Schools _mokṣa_ means either liberation of the soul from all fetters of earthly existence or a state free from pleasure and pain. But the Cārvākas, positivists as they are, neither believe in soul as an entity different from the body, nor admit that human beings can attain a state free from pleasure and pain. By "_mokṣa_" (liberation) they mean either independence or unimpeded power or dissolution of the body. Heaven and hell, they think, were the inventions of some deceitful persons whose occupation consisted in making people believe in the supernatural and thereby earning their livelihood. There is no existence of any such place as heaven or hell beyond _this_ world. Pleasure is heaven. Pain is hell. Our religious ceremonies, our endeavour to propitiate the gods, to satisfy them by prayers and offerings for the attainment of heaven are all useless. Pleasure should be the only pursuit of man.

_The Goal of Life._—The spiritualistic thinkers of India may be called pessimists in as much as they run after heaven or liberation and try to get rid of the sorrows and miseries of worldly life. But the materialists are always optimistic. They do not hold the view that this world is full of misery. They hold that pleasure in _this_ world is the only thing which is true and good. The only reasonable end of man is enjoyment—_gratification of his sense (kāma evaika puruṣārthah)._ It is true that pleasure is never pure, never free from pain and there is sorrow everywhere—in kings' palaces and in beggars' huts. Still this world of ours is not full of misery. The amount of pleasure in this world is greater than that of pain. If it were not so, why do people so earnestly desire to live and become frightened at the very name of death? It is wise to enjoy the pleasure as far as we can and to avoid the pain which inevitably accompanies it. We should not forgo the chances of pleasure for fear of the pain that may be found with it. Shall we not take fish because there are bones and scales? Should we refrain from plucking lotuses as there are thorns in them? Should we give up rice because of its husk? We should boldly face the world as it is, rejoice at the weal of our dear ones and weep at their woes. There is the laughing face of a son or a delightful daughter to impart to us celestial happiness, just as there is death or disease to overwhelm us with grief. If the presence of a beloved wife makes a heaven of this earth, it is but natural that her departure will leave us in misery. We cannot get rid of such sorrow even when we have no tie of affection in this world. The heart of a man who has none to call his own is also full of misery and dry as a desert.
THE ČÄRVÄKA PHILOSOPHY

It is also to be remembered that happiness is at its best when it is contrasted with misery; and hence suffering is not altogether an evil. If you are to enjoy your food well, suffer from hunger first. The more you suffer the agony of thirst, the greater will be your delight in drinking cold water. The same thing happens when two lovers meet after long separation. Perpetual pleasure creates boredom. What pleases you now will be disgusting after constant use. Even palatable food cannot but bring satiety if we are to take it daily. So it is foolish to crave for perpetual pleasure. This life of ours is worth living. One should live in pleasure as long as he lives. He should take butter (ghṛta) even if he has to borrow it from others, for the body once gone never returns.

It appears that the doctrines of this School have undergone some distortion at the hands of its critics and opponents. Some vulgar views have sometimes been attributed to Brhaspati. But it seems unlikely that a person who was otherwise held in high esteem should encourage any licentious conduct and anti-social behaviour. The accomplished followers of Brhaspati emphatically discouraged forceful adultery. They were quite alive to the need of social discipline. The title “Gaṇa-pati” (party leader) of Brhaspati, the Lokāyata (prevalent among men) nomenclature of the system and the dictum—“loka-siddho bhaved rājā . . .” (the ruler of a state should be duly recognized by the people) testify to this view. The Čārvākas were advocates of human equality. According to them, as the blood of the same red hue runs through the veins of a brāhmaṇa as well as of a caṇḍāla, each is equally entitled to the opportunities of pleasure, the summum bonum of life.

Comparison with Epicurus and Aristippus.—It may be noted that the Epicurean philosophy has a close resemblance to the Čārvāka system of thought. Both the systems agree in identifying “body” with soul. According to Epicurus soul is a corporeal substance, a compound of atoms of four different species distributed throughout the frame but more densely massed in the breast. The Čārvākas say almost the same thing. The four elements of earth, air, fire and water are combined and transformed into the human body.

Epicurus says with the Čārvākas that all mental pleasures are derived from and related to the bodily pleasures of sense. The two Schools considerably agree again as to the end of life. According to Epicurus pleasure and pain are the sole motives of our actions. That pain must be avoided and pleasure pursued is a dictum as plainly evident as that fire is hot and ice cold. Every animal naturally and instinctively pursues pleasure and seeks to ward off pain. If all our striving, willing and acting thus relate to pleasure and pain, we may call pleasure the highest good and pain the worst evil. Here the Čārvākas say the very same thing; Pleasure is the aim of life. Adversity is hell. The views of Aristippus of Cyrene have also a resemblance to the views of the Čārvākas. According to Aristippus the
only good in life is the individual's own pleasure. Present enjoyment should never be sacrificed for the sake of future pleasures; for, what is future is always uncertain. The present is ours. Let us make the most of it. "Let us eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we may die." The Čārvākas also maintain the same view. "A pigeon of today is preferable to a peacock of tomorrow." "Live happily as long as you live, take 'ghṛta' even by borrowing, the body once burnt never comes back." We may also cite here a line from Omar Khayyam which agrees on this point with the Čārvāka view: "While you live drink! for once dead you never shall return." (English version by Edward Fitzgerald.)

Conclusion.—The voice of the Čārvākas was the voice of revolt—of protest against the age-long superstitions and prejudices that had denied freedom of thought. It was an invitation for enjoying the beauties of life unperturbed by the ideas of heaven, hell and God. In the domain of philosophy, the questions and doubts raised by the Čārvākas set problems for all the other Schools, made them think more carefully and saved them from much of dogmatism. Every philosopher in India had to satisfy the Čārvākas before establishing his own view. Thus the contribution of this School to the development of Indian Philosophy is really very great.

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CHAPTER VIII
THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY

I. JAINA HISTORY

The Jaina-Darśana, like other Indian systems, has a religious as well as a philosophical aspect. *Ahimsā* is the chief religious idea and *anekānta-vāda*—looking at reality from many points of view—constitutes the philosophical ideal. *Ahimsā* does not mean merely a negative virtue of non-violence. It is based upon the positive quality of universal love which is the result of a recognition of kinship among all living beings. One who is actuated by this ideal cannot be indifferent to the suffering of others.

*Antiquity of "Ahimsā."*—An impartial study of Vedic literature in its various stages of development will reveal the fact that there have been two parallel developments of thought, one in conflict with the other. One emphasizes strictly the principles of *ahimsā* and the other the duties of sacrifice. It is surprising to note that the doctrine of *ahimsā* was often championed by the *kṣatriyas* or kings, while Vedic rituals, including animal sacrifice, were supported by *brāhmaṇa* priests. An indication of this conflict between the priests and the princes is found in the mythological story of the conflict between Viśvāmitra and Vasiṣṭha.

*Rṣabha cult.*—According to the Jaina tradition of the twenty-four *tīrthaṅkara*, the first was Rṣabha who revealed the *ahimsā-dharma*. The last of these was Mahāvīra, who was an elder contemporary of the Buddha. It is now accepted that Jainism is older than Buddhism and that Mahāvīra who lived from 599 B.C. to 527 B.C., was not the founder of Jainism and that his predecessor Pārśva who lived 250 years earlier was also an historical person. The *ahimsā* doctrine preached by Rṣabha is possibly prior in time to the advent of the Aryans in India and the prevalent culture of the period.

2. METAPHYSICS

*Anekānta-vāda.*—Let us turn to the metaphysical aspect of Jainism. The Jaina philosophy claims to be *anekānta-vāda* as distinguished from various other philosophical systems which are Schools of *ekānta-vāda*. Jaina philosophy holds that the ultimate reality is complex in structure and must be examined from various points of view in order to comprehend its nature. No doubt, it is possible to attend to a particular aspect to the exclusion of other aspects for a definite purpose. This consideration of a characteristic reality in the abstract for a definite purpose may be useful
in its own way, but when pushed to the status of philosophical importance, with no regard to the circumstances under which the point of view is adopted, will lead to philosophical error. To over-emphasize a particular characteristic and to make it the ultimate nature of reality is to have a partial and incomplete vision of reality. Such a partial and incomplete view of reality is condemned by the Jaina thinkers as an inadequate description of reality, since it emphasizes only one particular aspect (ekānta) to the exclusion of the other characteristics which are not to be altogether neglected. Such a one-sided view is, therefore, called ekānta-vāda. For example, a particular School of thought may over-emphasize the ultimate identity and unity of reality to the exclusion of other aspects. An opposite School of thought may emphasize change and may describe reality as a perpetual and incessant change and nothing more. Among the Indian systems, the Advaita-Vedānta School represents the former type inasmuch as it emphasizes the unity of Brahman and the Buddhist School of thought represents the latter inasmuch as it emphasizes the change alone and does not take into consideration the underlying identity. The former is called, by the Jainas, Brahma-ekānta-vāda and the latter Kṣanika-ekānta-vāda.

In Greek thought also we have similar one-sided views. Parmenides maintained, for example, that the ultimate reality is altogether unchanging. Heraclitus, on the other hand, championed the opposite view that the ultimate reality is perpetual flux and change. Both would be regarded by the Jainas as one-sided views (ekānta-vāda).

The Jainas point out that over-emphasis on one side or aspect of reality to the exclusion of other aspects is analogous to the attitude of the blind men in the fable each of whom described the shape of an elephant according to the part of the animal he touched. Hence we have to recognize the complex nature of the ultimate reality and try to describe it in its completeness viewing it from many aspects (anekānta). Such a philosophical attitude is called anekānta-vāda.

According to this view, reality is described to be permanence in the midst of change, identity in the midst of diversity and unity in the midst of multiplicity. The definition of reality according to the Jaina philosophy is that it is a combination of three-fold nature; appearance, disappearance and permanence. Umāsvāmin says: “Utpāda-vyaya-dharmya-laksanam sat”—i.e. reality is characterized by origination, decay and permanence. Every object in nature has this three-fold aspect. It is most manifest in the organic world. The growth of a plant is a typical example of this three-fold nature. The tree begins its life in a seed. If the seed remains permanent as a seed and does not change and decay, the plant will lose its vitality to grow and will soon become dead. But the plant must maintain also the underlying identity throughout its process of growth. A plant growing out of a margosa seed cannot in the middle of the process change...
into a mango plant. Hence the underlying identity is the important aspect of any growing organism. Without this, growth will be an unintelligible and perplexing riddle in the world. We cannot be sure of the tree in our garden whether it will be a margosa tree or change into a mango tree overnight. Hence a faithful and natural description of reality must necessarily be taken into consideration of the three aspects of appearance, disappearance with a permanent underlying identity in the process. This comprehensive view of reality is analogous to the dialectical view of Hegel. Objects in concrete experience exhibit the three-fold nature of what Hegel called the dialectical principle: thesis, antithesis and synthesis—affirmation, negation and a comprehending unity. Jaina thinkers noticed this important nature of reality long ago and emphasized its complex nature in the definition of reality as a permanence in the midst of appearance and disappearance.

Dravya (substance).—Dravya is an important concept in the Jaina philosophy. It denotes a substance. The śūtra of Umāsvāmin—guna-parāyāyas dravyam—defines substance as that which possesses gunas or qualities and parāyāyas or modes. Any real substance in the world must possess its own characteristic attributes and must be liable to modifications. Attributes and modes are therefore inseparable from any substance. We may speak of the qualities of a substance in the abstract. But in reality the qualities are inseparable from the substance to which they belong. Similarly we may speak of substance in the abstract, but apart from its qualities there is no substance. Thus dravya apart from its gunas or gunas apart from their dravya are mere intellectual abstractions.

The modifications that dravya can undergo refer to the various shapes and forms into which the substance can be moulded either naturally or artificially. A living organism through its process of growth may undergo various changes, such as childhood, youth and old age. These changes are the natural modifications of a living organism.

Such modifications may be effected in inorganic substances also artificially. Clay may be moulded by the potter into various shapes and gold may be changed into various ornaments by the goldsmith. These are artificial modifications effected in the substance by artisans. The modifications whether natural or artificial are technically called parāyāyas by the Jaina thinkers. These changes or parāyāyas are changes in dravya or substance. The substance must exist in some form or other. If clay is not shaped into various vessels by the potter it will remain as an amorphous mass of clay. Similarly, gold before it is shaped into various ornaments will remain a shapeless nugget. While undergoing various modifications either natural or artificial the underlying substance remains identically the same. The substance is unchanging permanent identical existence. Its modifications are changing, impermanent. Dravya is, therefore, the
unchanging identity underlying the changes which are the inevitable manifestation of the underlying dravya. If we emphasize the permanence of a thing we attend to the underlying dravya or substance. When we emphasize the changing aspects or modes or paryāyas we attend to the changes in the thing. These two cases of directing our attention to the object are technically called Dravyārthika-naya and Paryāyārthika-naya—point of view of the substance and point of view of the modes. Every object when described from the underlying point of substance can be asserted to be permanent (nitya), and every object from the point of view of modification may be asserted as changing (a-nitya). The same thing therefore may be asserted either as permanent or changing according to the different points of view.

The possibility of many standpoints.—This has led to the logical crux of Jaina philosophy—asti-nāsti-vāda, i.e. that we can have two contradictory propositions relating to the same object. This view has perplexed many a non-Jaina thinker in the history of Indian thought. Even such an eminent thinker as Śaṅkara failed to realize the underlying implication of this logical principle.

Asti-nāsti-vāda implies the predication of contradictory attributes of asti and nāsti—“is” and “is not” to the same reality. Jaina thinkers certainly did not make the statement that the same object can be described in terms of the two contradictory attributes without any qualification. What this Jaina doctrine implies is that you can describe an object from one point of view that it exists and from another point of view that it does not. It is certainly impossible to speak of the same thing from a single point of view that the object is both is and is not. Jaina thinkers take a practical point of view even in explaining intricate principles of metaphysics. Take the case of a piece of furniture. It may be made of ordinary jungle wood and it may be so painted as to appear as rosewood. Now, it is rosewood in point of appearance and it is not rosewood in point of the underlying material. Thus two propositions, one affirmative and the other negative, are significantly asserted with reference to the same object and both the propositions are certainly valid. This point is explained by the Jaina thinkers in a technical way by reference to four aspects of a thing, its substance, place, time and form. From the point of view of substance, a thing exists or is, in respect of its own substance and is not in respect of other substances. The furniture, in the example cited before, is (exists as) jungle wood, but is not (does not exist as) rosewood. Similarly, in respect of place, a thing exists in its own place and it does not at the same time exist in any other place. While the cow is in her shed, she is not in the field. Again in respect of time also a thing is in its own time and is not in another time. Socrates existed before Christ, but did not exist after Christ. Similarly, in respect of form also a thing, while existing in its own form, does not exist in another form.
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Water below freezing-point exists as a solid, but does not exist then as a liquid.

These are the four points of view which form the foundation of this asti-nästi-väda. These are the ways in which an object may be affirmatively described from the point of view of its own substance, place, time and form, and negatively described from the standpoint of the substance, etc., of another thing. When the matter is understood in this way, it is quite obvious why the affirmative proposition will be true and why the negative proposition also will be true with reference to the same object of reality. There is no chance of confusion here and there is no mysterious metaphysical maze to be unravelled.

World of nature.—Now let us attempt to describe the world of nature according to the Jaina thinkers. The Jaina philosophy maintains two classes of objects in the world of reality—cetana and a-cetana—conscious objects and non-conscious objects. These are otherwise called jīvas and a-jīvas—the living and the non-living or, in the language of modern science, organic and inorganic things. A-jīvas or unconscious things are further divided into different groups. The most important of these is what is called pudgala dravya in the Jaina philosophy which exactly corresponds to matter in modern science. Like modern science the Jaina philosophy maintains that pudgalas or material objects are constituted by paramāṇus or atoms. The atoms of different elements build up physical objects which are, therefore, aggregates (skandhas). The whole physical world is itself a mahā-skandha, mighty aggregate. Pudgalas or material objects are perceived by the senses and have the sensory qualities as their attributes, such as colour, taste, smell, etc. Besides matter, the Jaina philosophy asserts also the reality of space or ākāśa. Material objects without spatial accommodation would be unthinkable. Hence the Jaina thinkers postulate space as the necessary category in the external world. Space has not got the sense of qualities associated with matter. It has no colour, or taste, smell or contact. It is also unconscious. A portion of this space accommodates physical objects. This space is called mundane space (loka-ākāśa) and this has beyond it infinite space, where there is no physical object.

Besides pudgala and ākāśa, matter and space, the Jaina philosophy postulates two other dravyas, dharma and a-dharma. These two words have technical and peculiar meanings in Jaina literature. These terms should not be confused with dharma (virtue) and a-dharma (vice) of Indian ethics. Dharma and a-dharma are here the principles of motion and rest respectively. These two pervade the whole of loka-ākāśa. These are not perceived, but postulated for explaining the possibility of motion and rest perceived in the world. The Jaina thinkers maintain that since the physical world is constituted by atoms these material elements would get dispersed and distributed throughout the space, including the infinite

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space beyond this world. On account of such dispersion of materials the world should disintegrate. But in fact it does not. So we must postulate some steadying principle helping to stabilize the materials of the world. This is called *a-dharma*. On the other hand, without some principle of motion the movements of the living and the non-living beings would remain inexplicable. So an opposite principle, helping things to move and progress, is also postulated. It is called *dharma*. The Jainas studied the laws of motion and are said to have anticipated some of Newton's laws.4

Besides these four categories *pudgala*, *ākāśa*, *dharma* and *a-dharma*, Jaina philosophy maintains the reality of *kāla* or time. Since Jaina thought maintains the reality of change and motion in the physical realm, and growth and development in the organic world, it insists on the reality of time. If time is dismissed as illusory, logically every change involving motion and growth must be equally illusory. This position is avoided by Jaina thought. Hence time is accepted as real. This *kāla-dravya* is supposed to be constituted by atomic moments of time. The five non-living entities together with *jīvas* constitute the whole world of reality.

*jīvas* or living beings.—*Jīva dravya* or living being is one of the most important categories of reality as contrasted with non-living substances discussed above. *Jīva* is a conscious substance. According to the Jaina philosophy, *jīvas* are of various kinds, but they are chiefly divided into two major groups, those still in bondage (*samsārins*) and those that have been liberated (*muktas*). The former class of living beings in the concrete world is subject to birth, growth, decay and death—which are the characteristics of this world. These fettered *jīvas* are again divided into many groups.

Confining ourselves to the human and sub-human beings of the middle world we find that the Jaina thinkers made an elaborate study of these living organisms. These are classified into various groups according to the number of sense organs present in the organism. The lowest of these organisms are plants which are endowed with one sense only, namely, touch. Plants and trees have got the sensory awareness of touch. All these are, therefore, called one-sensed (*ekendriya*). They are called static (*sthāvara*) since they cannot move.

Besides plants the Jaina philosophy recognizes the existence of microscopic organisms which are called *sūksma ekendriya jīvas*—microscopic single-sensed organisms. These subtle organisms are not ordinarily visible to the naked eye, but they are perceived by yogic consciousness. These microscopic organisms are generally found in earth, water, air and light. According to their place of residence these microscopic organisms are called dwellers in the earth, dwellers in water or air, etc.

Next higher to these are organisms possessing two senses—touch and taste. This class is, therefore, called two-sensed (*dvīndriya*). Beings with
two senses and above are capable of movement from one place to another. Hence they are called trasa-jīvas—moving organisms. Earthworm, caterpillar, etc., come under this class.

The next higher stage in the organic development is the appearance of three-sensed organisms—insects possessing touch, taste and smell. These are called three-sensed (trīndriya). Next above comes the four-sensed (catur-indriya), which possess besides touch, taste and smell, vision also. Above all these is the pāncendriya jīvas—animals possessing five senses. These have in addition the sense of hearing. All higher animals come under this class. Above these come the human beings who besides possessing all these five senses have also the sixth sense mind (manas). They are sometimes called six-sensed organisms. Five-sensed organisms with the additional attribute of mind form a class of beings which include besides human beings, devas (gods) and nārakas (inhabitants of hell).

Karma Theory.—The doctrine of karmāṇi is elaborately worked out by the Jaina thinkers as an explanation of the worldly (sāṃsārika) conditions of the jīvas. According to the Jaina philosophy there are eight main types of karmāṇi—jñānāvarāṇīya (the karmāṇi that obscures knowledge); darśanāvarāṇīya (the karmāṇi that obscures perception); mohāṇīya-karmāṇi (that which creates delusion); vedāṇīya-karmāṇi (that causes feelings of pleasure, etc.); nāma-karmāṇi (that which is responsible for the building up of body); antarāṇā-karmāṇi (that which creates impediments); gotra-karmāṇi (that which determines the family into which a person is born), and finally the āyuṣya-karmāṇi (that which determines the duration of the life of the individual). All living beings, whether human or sub-human, are subject to the determination of these different kinds of karmāṇi. The soul’s career in sāṃsāra is thus accounted for by its association with karmāṇi.

These karmāṇi are generally of two kinds, dravya-karmāṇi and bhāva-karmāṇi. The former is constituted by material particles. The subtle material particles form the nucleus of the karmic body associated with the soul. Around this subtle body the grosser material body is built up, by nutrition from the environment. The term bhāva-karmāṇi refers to the impure psychic dispositions. It is the presence of this that is mainly responsible for attracting the material karmic particles to the soul. The impure psychic disposition creates the necessary condition for building up the body, out of material (dravya) particles. This dravya-karmāṇi in its turn influences the psychic disposition. Dravya-karmāṇi being material and bhāva-karmāṇi being the psychic disposition, a sort of psycho-physical parallelism is maintained between the two. One causes changes in the other without there being any direct interaction between each other. Material changes must be attributed to material antecedent, and similarly psychic changes must be attributed to antecedent psychic conditions. The attempt to get rid of this association with material body, subtle and
gross, has to be secured by curing the impure psychic disposition in its own consciousness. A course of yoga or tapas is prescribed for this purpose.

Greatness of human life.—Even gods cannot directly attain liberation. They must be born here as human beings before they can hope to get salvation. Man seems to be the way-in for mokṣa; for he alone is capable of performing yoga which is the necessary condition for the breaking up of all the shackles of bondage before obtaining spiritual freedom. Thus man is given the place of importance which is denied even to gods. Man in this world is considered a very lucky being because he is proximate to the ultimate goal of life. In this respect Jaina thought places man on the highest pedestal among the souls in bondage. This attitude differentiates Jaina thought from most of the Vedic Schools which recognize the superiority of gods to men.

The human soul, by its practice of penance (tapas), is able to climb up to different stages, step by step, becoming purer and purer at every stage till it reaches spiritual glory and perfection from which there is no coming back. This process of yoga leads to spiritual isolation from the disturbing environment and material conditions leaving the soul in its pristine purity. Thus it shines forthwith in all its glory just like the sun when the obstructive clouds get dispersed and disappear. Each individual is the architect of his own spiritual greatness and can be free from bondage, the conditions of birth, growth, decay and death. The stage of perfection is associated with infinite knowledge, infinite faith, infinite power and infinite bliss, which are the intrinsic characteristics of the perfected soul. It is similar to perfection as conceived by the Vedānta.

3. THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

The sources of knowledge (pramānas).—According to Jaina thought there are various sources of knowledge. These are mati, śrūta, avadhi and manah-paryāya and lastly kevala. These are respectively, knowledge through sense perception, Scriptures, clairvoyance, telepathy and lastly perfect omniscience or knowledge par excellence. The other systems consider sense perception as direct knowledge. But the Jainas define direct knowledge as the direct perception of the soul without any intermediary. Accordingly the first two kinds of knowledge, mati and śrūta, sense perception and knowledge by Scriptures, are considered indirect (parokṣa) by the Jaina thinkers, since this kind of knowledge is obtained through the medium of the sense organs or books. The other three therefore come under the class of immediate (pratyakṣa) knowledge. Of these avadhi-jiñāna exactly corresponds to what modern psychology calls clairvoyance. Clairvoyant capacity enables a person to have vision of object or events in distant places or in distant times. The description given of avadhi-jiñāna
by the Jaina thinkers exactly corresponds to the psychological activity associated with clairvoyance. Some may have the capacity congenitally born with them. Others may have this capacity acquired by psychological development. Just as sense perception is liable to be frustrated by illusions, so avadhi-jñāna also has the chance of becoming erroneous.

The next extra-perceptual knowledge is called manah-paryāya, which exactly corresponds to telepathy of modern psychology. A person equipped with telepathic capacity is able to have a knowledge of the ideas and thoughts present in another’s mind. Avadhi is concerned with sense objects in distant place and time whereas manah-paryāya gives an insight to the psychic events taking place in another’s mind. This telepathic knowledge is acquired through the practice of yoga or tapas. It requires a rigorous discipline and concentration.

The last, kevala-jñāna, or knowledge par excellence, is attained by a perfect soul when it achieves complete self-realization, and frees itself from the bondage of karman. This kevala-jñāna is said to be infinite in nature. It is co-extensive with reality. There is no difference of time such as past, present and future in the case of kevala-jñāna since it is able to comprehend reality in its completeness and infinity.

Relation of knowledge to objects.—The Jaina epistemology maintains that knowledge and the object of knowledge are distinct from each other. In this respect the Jainas differ from the subjective idealists who maintain that the object of knowledge is a creation of the mind. According to the Jainas the distinction between thinking things and non-thinking things (cetana and a-cetana) is fundamental. They consistently maintain the view that the physical object in the external world is independent of knowledge and cannot be created by the knowing mind.

Consciousness (jñāna) according to the Jaina philosophy illuminates the external objects which are independent and not changed by the process of knowledge. Objects of knowledge may also be psychical facts. Knowledge related to psychical facts is practically the relation between the process of thought and physical events which are identical in nature with the process of knowing. Even here the facts in consciousness revealed by knowledge are considered independent of the process of knowing, or otherwise the knowledge so obtained will become illusory and unreal. Jñāna is self-luminous inasmuch as it reveals itself just as it illuminates the external objects.

4. Jaina Ethics—Mokṣa-Mārga

Jainism in common with other Indian systems prescribes a path to salvation or (mokṣa-mārga). Umāsvāmin says: "Samyag-darśana-jñāna-cāritrāṇi mokṣa-mārgāh." Right faith, right knowledge and right conduct
—these three together constitute the path of salvation. This sūtra of Umāsvāmin describes in a nutshell the Jaina conception of mokṣa-mārga. This consists of three distinct elements, right faith, as contrasted with false faith, right knowledge as contrasted with erroneous knowledge and right conduct as contrasted with wrong conduct. Some of the Indian systems emphasize any one of these conditions as necessary for salvation. Some emphasize faith or bhakti: if that is present the devotee is sure of salvation. Some prescribe knowledge or jñāna; if a person knows the true nature of things then he will realize his own pure self. This realization is considered to be the ultimate goal of life or salvation. Some others emphasize right conduct. All these are considered to be partial descriptions of the path to liberation, according to Jaina conception. All the three must necessarily be combined in the life of an individual if he wants liberation. Each one is necessary no doubt, but by itself incomplete and insufficient.

Generally the analogy of a sick patient is given for explaining the necessity of the three-fold discipline. A person suffering from some kind of illness and desiring to be cured must possess implicit confidence in the doctor, he must know the nature of the medicine prescribed and lastly he must actually take the medicine according to instructions. The three elements, right faith, right knowledge and right conduct must be cultivated together to ensure success. Collectively, they are called the threefold jewel (ratna-traya). It is important to notice that right faith (samyag-darśana) is conceived, not as blind faith, but, rational and judicious faith in the right type of teacher and teachings. The Jainas, therefore, insist that right faith can be attained only if three kinds of superstitious beliefs are discarded. These are: the belief of the common people (loka-mudā) that bathe in certain rivers, going round certain trees, etc., purify a man, the belief in gods (deva-mudā) and worshipping them for getting rid of diseases, etc., and lastly the belief in impostors (pāṣaṇḍī-mudā) and accepting them as religious teachers.

In this respect it is clear that the Jaina thinkers adopt a rational attitude. With spiritual progress there comes a stage when the person realizes that right faith, knowledge and conduct are but the intrinsic attributes of his own pure nature. Perfect realization itself would imply unwavering faith in one’s own purity, uninterrupted brilliance of one’s own knowledge and finally uncorrupt purity of one’s own activity. When the self is able to realize its own intrinsic purity and perfection it becomes paramātman the supreme spiritual being which is the goal of religious life. Thus every soul can attain godhead when it is perfect. The Jainas do not believe in one ever-perfect being like the God of other religions.

The five great vows.—For the perfection of right-conduct (samyak-cāritra), five kinds of vows are recommended: non-violence (aḥimsā), truthfulness (satya), non-stealing (a-steya), abstention from sensuality (brahmacarya), and from greed (a-parigraha). The practice of aḥimsā is
based on love and kindness to all living beings. It involves the activities of mind, speech and body. We should avoid causing injury to other beings actually through the bodily activity, through speech and through mind. Mere thought of injury is as sinful as the actual act of causing injury. It is not merely avoiding injury to life in mind, speech and body, that is insisted on by the Jaina moralists. They also insist on avoiding injury through indirect method. Thus, three forms of activity (kṛta, kārita and anumāta)—directly doing the act, indirectly causing it to be done through another agent and permitting evil conduct in others; should be avoided if the principle of ahiṃsā is to be strictly observed. The point to be noted here is that mere thought of evil is as bad as action resulting in injury. This is the highest ethical teaching similar to the Sermon on the Mount.

Truthfulness (satya) is conceived by the Jainas as speaking what is not only true but also pleasant and wholesome. All other principles are based upon ahiṃsā by the Jainas. If by speaking the truth you would cause the loss of life in another individual, man or animal, such true speaking is to be condemned. Hence the principle of satya should be adopted only if it is consistent with the principle of ahiṃsā.

Non-stealing (a-steya) consists in not taking another's property without his consent. Though it is called non-stealing, it includes many things. The using of false weights and measures by a trader is given as an illustration of the violation of the principle. Conversely, when you are purchasing things from an innocent person, if you dupe him by using false weights and measures to get his article, that also will be stealing. Acquiring property and wealth by unjust means or immoral methods would also come under the violation of the principle of a-steya.

The vow of brahmacarya chiefly consists in abstaining from sexual indulgence. But some Jaina moralists mean by it desisting from all kinds of sensuous gratifications.

The last vow, a-parigraha, literally means not taking or possessing, that is, giving up greed. According to the Jaina thinkers, this ethical rule has two forms, a lenient one for the householder and a stricter one for the homeless ascetics.

The five great vows are prescribed for both. In the case of the householder (who is called śrāvaka or listener), the five principles are enjoined with limitation. He is to observe these things as far as possible. For example, a householder who has to engage himself in agriculture cannot observe, without serious dislocation of society, the principle of ahiṃsā in the case of plants, the one-sensed immobile beings. So the householder is asked to observe ahiṃsā only in the case of the organisms above the plant world and which are capable of moving about. But in the case of the homeless ascetics this principle is imposed absolutely. He cannot cause injury to any living being whatever. Thus good conduct for ascetics
(yatī-dharma) implies the unconditional and absolute observance of these five principles.

In the case of brahmacarya, for the householder it implies strictly monogamous life (eka-dāra-vrata). He should not have any kind of sexual relation except with his own wife. But for the monk it implies absolute abstinence from sex life. He must observe the principle through the three ways, thought, word and deed (manas, vacana and kāya). Similarly in the case of the vow of a-parigraha the principle should be observed unconditionally and absolutely by the ascetics. He cannot have anything as his own. He is to relinquish all his personal property, even ornaments and clothes, entirely depending upon the householder for occasional feeding. The homeless holy saint is expected to concentrate his thought upon his own self and perform yoga. Even his own body is to be used as an instrument for spiritual progress. The ascetic gives up all family ties and attachment. The whole world becomes his family, all living creatures, men and animals have claim over his affection. There is nothing alien to him in the world. All are his kindred and every being is to be loved and sympathized by him. Thus while engaging himself in spiritual development he renders social service to the rest who may be in need of help and guidance. The cultural development of the society as a whole is looked after by these ascetics (śramanās) who are maintained by the householder.

Jaina ethical code does not prescribe duties according to caste. All men are equal in birth and every one is entitled to be either a householder or an ascetic according to his capacity and taste. According to his choice he must observe the ethical code prescribed for his status and society.

The Jaina conception of the vow of non-possession also needs special attention here. In recent years the world has witnessed two great wars caused chiefly by economic maladjustment. The Jaina thinkers would seem to have foreseen such economic trouble in society and hence they insisted on the principle of limited possession (parimita parigraha) as an essential principle to be observed by all householders. If each householder according to his own position voluntarily limits his property to a certain quantity and offers whatever accrues beyond that to society as a whole there will be no conflict between capitalists and labourers, the rich and the poor. Such an economic adjustment should be possible all over the world, for otherwise economic conflict will perpetually cause political and military conflicts. This will lead to the destruction of human civilization. The future peace and happiness of humanity lies in a more ethical re-adjustment of economic conditions.

Before concluding, a word may be said about the spiritual value of Jaina religion. From the previous account it is clear that this religion lays special emphasis on ahimsā and satya. Jaina literature is full of illustrations of the conduct of the Jaina holy saints in the midst of sufferings. Victory over suffering (upasarga-jaya) is the main characteristic of Jaina ascetics.
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Whenever faced with opposition, whenever opponents threaten with cruelty and persecution, Jaina saints will not get perturbed, but will merely smile at the ignorance of the opponent and pity him. This calm attitude presupposes an extraordinary courage and peace of mind which can be born only of spiritual integrity and strength. It is this strength of the spiritual power of the self that was recognized by Gandhiji in his political struggle against odds. Both in South Africa and in India he successfully made use of this spiritual weapon against the political opponents who were equipped with ordinary weapons of destruction and suppression. Thus Gandhiji has raised ahimsā and satya to universal importance. His socio-political experiments proved beyond doubt the value of this spiritual power. Equipped with this weapon of ahimsā and satyāgraha one can overcome any amount of opposition depending upon brutal force. While he was alive Gandhiji dreamed of offering this spiritual weapon to the world at large—a world, disturbed by mutual suspicion, always ready for warfare. He thought that this spiritual ideal would be able to serve as a cure for the various ills that afflicted the world at large. Let us hope that his spirit will ultimately prevail and convert the world of warring classes and nations into a world of peace and harmony where all can live in happiness, without distinctions of race, religion and nationality.

NOTES

1. Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, by Umāsvāmin.
2. ibid.
5. vide Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, Nyāyāvatāra and saḍ-darśana-samuccaya.
6. Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra.

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CHAPTER IX

THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

A. EARLY BUDDHISM

THE CULTURAL CONDITION OF THE BUDDHA'S TIME

The Buddha was born in the sixth century B.C. It was an age of spiritual restlessness and society was moving away fast from its old religious moorings. The Vedic sacrifices demanded a strict conformity to the letters of the law more than the observance of the spirit of worship. Obedience to the Scriptures usurped the place of devotion to the gods. The whole sacrificial cult became complicated, costly and uncertain of results owing to the possibility of formal lapses during the performance of a rite and naturally became the monopoly of those who could remember the minutiae of each type of sacrifice and recite the mantras faultlessly. Sacrificial cruelty continued unabated and the rise of princely patrons possibly favoured the development of priestly greed to some extent.

The factors that acted adversely to the interest of an elaborate theology, complicated rituals and priestly ascendancy are the philosophical speculations that tended to introduce monotheistic and monistic thought, the development of the practice of retirement to the forest towards the end of one's life to meditate on and approach the divine without the aid of costly material sacrifices, and the increased emphasis on self-knowledge, meditation and morality as the indispensable conditions of spiritual progress. A re-orientation of the faith was necessitated probably by the impact of Sumero-Dravidian culture of the Indus Valley and the need of cultural expansion beyond the early frontiers of Aryan domination towards the East and the South where tribes of the hill and the forest lived and alternately opposed the extension of Aryan influence and imitated Aryan ways of thought and worship. At this distance of time it is not possible to be positive about Aryan indebtedness to these earlier cultures of the land. It has been conjectured that yogic meditation, ascetic habit and belief in transmigration may have come from non-Aryan sources as well as the development of the Siva and, later, of the Sakti cult. The knowledge of Vedic theories and practices, as is to be found in early Buddhistic literature, does not include detailed information on technical matters and may well have been gathered by an intelligent observation of popular beliefs and religious rites. The attitude of literary Buddhism towards Vedicism was generally one of ridicule. Criticism of
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Vedāc practices had started earlier, in fact, for even the Upaniṣads belittled the efficacy of sacrificial rites and laid emphasis on knowledge of Reality as the best path of attaining a blessed hereafter—a hereafter not patterned after the pleasant heavenly abode of the sacrificially correct but regarded as a painless state of existence, a spiritual calm variously conceived but unanimously considered to be a result of strenuous moral endeavour and transcendence of the turmoils of sensuous life with its attractions and repulsions and tenacious clinging to the transitory things of the world.

MAGADHA, THE CENTRE OF THOUGHT FERMENT

This changed attitude was probably most accentuated in the region in which the Buddha and Mahāvīra lived, taught and died. It is not a mere accident that the court of Magadha should be the hospitable home of Upaniṣadic speculations about the nature of Brahman and their generally adverse attitude towards the cult of sacrifice (karma-kāṇḍa). In fact, the dissenters were very many and of diverse sorts, if the Brahmajāla-sutta is to be our guide. Apart from the six main heretical teachers (tīrthikas) from the Buddhist viewpoint, of whom Pūraṇa-Kassapa, Makkhali-Gosāla, Ajita-keśa-kambalin, Pakudha-Kaccāyana, Nigaṇṭha-Nātaputta and Saṅjaya-Belaṭṭhaputta, there were many others who were trying to find out a new approach to social, religious and philosophical problems, to disseminate their views far and wide by wandering from place to place and thereby to spread the contagion of doubt, disbelief and defection. The wanderers (parivrājakas) cultivated detachment in worldly matters, but the more ambitious of them seem to have been critical of one another's teachings and practices and made a bid for the leadership of men who had weighed or were tugging at the sheet anchor of their ancestral faith. True, the older methods of austerity (lāpas) and fire-sacrifice (yajña) had still a large following, but it is likely that these were being gradually outmoded as urban civilization began to spread and a new class-consciousness began to question the brāhmanic monopoly in spiritual matters by challenging the system of worship in which the brāhmanas were indispensable. Naturally, persons and places that were less privileged in the realm of the old spirituality were the first to show signs of rebellion, and the hinterland of Aryandom, which was destined to be the field of the missionary activity of Mahāvīra and the Buddha, seethed with spiritual discontents of diverse types.

The new wanderers, who belonged to all castes mostly passed into homeless state before paying the traditional debts to the gods, the sages and the ancestors. What they aimed at was self-culture under the tutelage
of a preceptor, who practically supplanted the gods; the method they adopted was developing a philosophy of their own regarding man, his duties and his destiny.

THE BUDDHA'S QUEST OF TRUTH

It is this brotherhood of monks that the Buddha joined after the Great Renunciation, and like many others he sought at first a teacher under whom he could practise meditation. After acclimatising himself to the life of a recluse at Anûpiya for a few days, he proceeded to Râjagṛha (modern Rajgir), the Magadhan capital, where Bimbisâra held his court and patronized the ascetic fraternity. Thereafter he put himself successively under two renowned philosophical teachers of the neighbourhood—Âlāra Kālāma and Uddaka Râmaputta, both professing to solve the ills of life by trance or ecstatic meditation (samāpatti) of different depths, in which the main objective was to transcend the consciousness of self, not-self and their distinction, and thereby to stop the flow of consciousness altogether—a stage which the Buddha claimed later to have reached. We may well believe that his apprenticeship included introduction to the orthodox philosophies of the time as known to his teachers and that these philosophies were predisposed towards the theoretical distinction between matter and spirit, as is to be found in Sāṅkhya philosophy of later times, for instance, the practical exercise of controlling the body and expanding the spirit, as is to be found in later yögic prescriptions.

Certain it is that before the Buddha’s time Indian thought had been moving definitely towards ascetic ideals. Naturally, sex came in for a severe castigation and sexual purity or chastity was equated to absolute dismissal of all thoughts, words and acts connected with sex and to the embracing of a homeless condition. Diet control culminating in fasts, indifference to bodily comforts about sleep and rest, and clothing restriction, amounting even to complete nudity and the abjuration of animal food, which was supposed to excite passions and create a habit of callousness to the sufferings of others, was adopted with greater or less strictness by the religious preachers of the time.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT

We may very well suppose that, failing to get what he wanted from his teachers, the Buddha turned to this ancient path of austerity to discover whether practical discipline could yield the secret of existence where ecstasy had failed. Six years of effort, of which graphic description is put into his mouth in the Nikāyas, were followed by an intensification of the
rigidity of ascetic practice and a profounder exploration of the depths of the personality and the secrets of the universe through intense meditation, but excessive fasting so weakened him that he fell into a fainting fit. He now discovered the futility of extreme asceticism and resumed his former diet though thereby he lost the allegiance of the five monks who left him. He tried his last and successful method of solving the riddles of existence.

He mastered all evil thoughts and dispositions and conquered desire (trṣṇā), attachment (rāga), and aversion (a-rāti), he gained deeper and deeper insight into the mysteries of existence—first of self, then of human destiny in general and lastly of the universe as a whole. He attained enlightenment and established his claim to be designated as the enlightened (Buddha) just as his fight against and conquest over temptation (Māra) entitled him also to be called hero (Vīra), and victor (Jīna). Thenceforward he was called Tathāgata (one who has known things as they really are), or Arhat (the worthy). It is evident that the Buddha did not question the validity of certain earlier ethico-religious beliefs and practices, and though he ultimately rejected some of them, a few he retained in his own system of thought and practice.

HIS NEW DISCOVERY

What then was the distinctive discovery that the Buddha claimed to have made on that fateful night at Uruvela on the bank of the Nerañjarā? Naturally we have to rely upon the Pāli canon for our knowledge of what early Buddhism was and in it the discourses that profess to record the utterances of the Buddha himself at the beginning of his ministry, e.g. the Dhamma-cakkha-ppavattana-sutta, the Anattā-lakkhana-sutta, and such other expositions. Unfortunately the present Pāli canon does not contain an unvarnished account of what the Buddha said and did, and embodies both earlier and later beliefs of the primitive Buddhist Church; hence it is not easy to detach the authentic position of the master from the attitudes of the earlier disciples and the later editors of the three baskets (Tri-piṭaka). It is not unlikely either that the mind of the Buddha developed in course of time, or that lacunae in his thought were filled up in response to the exigencies of his teaching and missionary life and a system was evolved to connect disjointed utterances of earlier times or that within the framework of the essential viewpoint minor adoptions and adaptations were made to suit local needs, or that elaborations had to be made in both theory and practice to provide for the understanding and discipline of an expanding Church, and that different schemes had to be propounded to suit the intellectual capacity of his hearers or to serve the immediate need of the moment.

This led in later times to link in the Buddha's teaching prajñā (wisdom) and upāya (mode)—matter and form of discourse. But a prima facie case
can be made out for the possibility or certainty of elaborations and interpolations by a pious and superstitious clergy and laity, faced with superior claims advanced on behalf of rival prophets and determined to uphold the superiori ty of their own teacher to his rivals. Though the canonical literature is not couched in the language of Magadha, which the Buddha probably spoke, but is in Pāli, which is allied to the language of Avanti, a form of Saurasanā Prākṛta, yet we need not, as Oldenberg has remarked, put away every complex thought from Buddhism under the impression that the Buddha taught only simple things and no metaphysics.

If the Sarnath Sermon is to be our guide, we may take one point of the Buddha’s instruction as basic, namely, that just as there are ills (heya) and their causes (heya-hetu), so also a cure (hāna) and a path thereto (hānopāya) exist, similar to the case of physical malady (roga, roga-hetu, ārogya, bhāsajya)—the world “nīdāna” or causative factor being used, in both the sciences of medicine and mental well-being, to designate the source of ill. These four—duḥkha (suffering), samudaya (cause), nirodha (suppression), and mārga (way), constitute the four noble verities (caṭvāri ārya-satyāṇi), without the acknowledgment of which spiritual quest would have no meaning. If this is pessimism, it is tempered with the optimism that the ills of life are escapable, unless of course we choose not to seek the way to escape and follow the blind alley of ancestral practice or wrong contemporary teaching. The suffering consists, not in the felt inconveniences of life, but in life itself—old age, disease, decay and other unpleasant experiences and death are only incidental to the fact of birth in the different forms of existence in the three realms of desire (kāma), form (rūpa), and formlessness (a-rūpa)—hellish, animal, ghostly, demoniacal, human and divine, none of which is free from suffering though there is a fond popular belief that gods are eternal and ever happy, which is wrong in view of the fact that they too decay and are reborn on earth, where alone man is the only creature that can attain nirvāṇa through spiritual insight and put an end to all ills. Doubt has been expressed by Mrs. Rhys Davids whether these certainties formed part of the Buddha’s original teaching, but Oldenberg is positive that they formed part of the earliest creed of Buddhism.

But it is when we take up the second certainty that we are faced with a great doubt. Did the twelve-linked chain of causation, the twelve nīdānas (causes) or the twelve-fold causal production or concatenation (pratītya-samutpāda) form an original part of the Buddha’s teaching? Sāriputta became converted to Buddhism when Āsājī (Assaji) told him that the Buddha had found out the cause of all transitory things and also how it could be suppressed—a popular verse which was inscribed in many a piece of Buddhist sculpture at a later time (ye dharmāna hetu-pāphavā hetustesām tathāgato hyavada tasya yo nirodho evam avādi mahāsramano). It is also mentioned in the Majjhima-Nikāya that he who sees paticca-samu-
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*pāda* (happening as causal) sees *dhamma* and *vice versa*, and that *dhamma* means nothing more than the apprehension of the causal law that on the functioning and cessation of the cause depend respectively the emergence and disappearance of the effect. Mrs. Rhys Davids strenuously combats the opinion that the Buddha was responsible for formulating this law of causation and thinks that he was pre-eminent a pathfinder and a guide. "For he was the maker-to-arise of a Way not arisen, he was the maker-to-perceive of a Way unperceived, he was the declarer of a Way undeclared, he was the Way-knower, the Way-witter, the Way-master."

He taught men how to exercise their will to become better and to realize the highest potentialities of their nature and not to meditate on a soulless formal law of causation, which, at least in its cosmic application, was known as *ṛta* in *Vedic* literature. Still it has been consistently claimed by Buddhism that the Buddha extended the application of the causal law to the inner world of man, showing how its operation is responsible for human destiny—for human embodiment through ignorance as the first term of a concatenated causal series and for human liberation through the dawning of spiritual insight which dispels ignorance, the cause of all bondage.

**THE LAW OF DEPENDENT ORIGINATION**

The flourish with which the discovery of dependent origination or causal concatenation is announced in the *Pāli* canon, viz. that it was the final phase of the Buddha's enlightenment, that there were twelve convulsions in ten thousand worlds as he recounted the twelve links of the causal chain in different ways, that there was universal jubilation over his insight and that under the *bodhi*-tree night after night for seven days after the attainment of *enlightenment* he repeated the series to himself to fix it in his mind and that he did not leave the locality for seven weeks, shows the importance the Buddhist monks and schoolmen attached to the formula which has caused no end of trouble to commentators and expositors down to our own times. It has been suggested that a rather recondite formula like the law of serial causation could not have been a proper message for the multitude. Seeing, however, that many wanderers with their divergent philosophies of life were getting an attentive hearing in the Buddha's time, this objection does not seem to be a strong one.

The real point is whether the rule of law governing the destinies of sentient existence was couched in the language of the dependent origination formula by the Buddha himself or some follower of his. That our fates are self-created and not due to the whimsies of the gods and that, as such, they are controllable by proper endeavour must have been a part of the Buddha's original teaching, whatever might have been the elaboration made in the Church in later times. If the *Brāhmaṇas* had extolled the
automatic fruition of *mantras* without reference to the favour of the gods whose names were invoked in a sacrifice, and the *Upaniṣads* had belittled the importance of the heavenly beings, the Buddha felt justified in eliminating the divine factor altogether and preaching the self-sufficiency of the causal law, later known as the law of *karma*, at least in so far as it related to human destiny. The problem of a free-will naturally attained a greater importance in the dissenting creeds of the time in which the divine element was excluded from philosophy and life, and so also did the origin, nature, function and destiny of the finite without assuming extraneous transcendent factors. As is the Sophistic and Humanistic movements of Europe, man became the centre of religious and philosophical interest in the Buddha’s time, only that the interest centred not round his intellectual capacity, but round the transcendental heights to which he might rise by moral perfection and rigorous spiritual discipline, the insights and powers that he might obtain by mental and physical training, and the control that he might gain over body and mind by cultivating a habit of dispassion towards the ills of life and keeping out theistic intrusions into the realm of personal spiritual advancement. The Buddha asked people to test his spiritual prescription by personal experience (*ehipassiko, come and see*), before adopting it and to accept his message not out of respect for him but because of its rationality, though, it must be admitted, the necessity of faith in the omniscience of the Buddha is repeatedly emphasized in the Scripture.

**THE RIVAL PHILOSOPHIES OF THE TIME**

The formula that came to be associated with the Buddha’s name appears in two forms—one simple and direct and the other recondite and learned. The simple truth that the Buddha derived from his personal experience was, as Aristotle discovered later, that the correct code of life is the pursuit of the mean and the avoidance of extremes. A life of indulgence does not befit those whom nature has endowed with the capacity of self-control: man is not brutish by nature and so he has no excuse to be a creature of impulses, lured away by passing fancies and driven by gusts of sudden passion. The materialists of the time—king Pāvāsi, Ajita-keśa-kambalin and others, came in for criticism in Buddhistic Scriptures because they advocated this-worldliness and a consequent moral irresponsibility due to want of faith in the ultimate distinction between good and bad, merit and demerit. They virtually taught annihilationism (*uccheda-vāda*), inasmuch as they did not believe in the transcendental or future life, or in present *karma* determining future human destiny. Some like Gosāla believed in chance causation (*adhipaca-sampāpa*), fortuitous origination (*yudroha-vāda*), automatic perfectibility of man without reference to his personal moral action—a kind of fatalistic creed (*niyati-vāda*) which left
nothing to human initiative and left no room for moral responsibility. Others like Pūraṇa-Kassapa were indifferent to moral distinctions and thought that actions had no moral significance as the soul was inactive by nature. A few others like Sañjaya-Belaṭṭaputta were sceptical in their philosophical outlook, while some others like Pakudha-Kaccāyana, who believed in the reality of material and spiritual elements (sāssata-vāda), thought that the relation between the two was not intimate enough to justify linking up physical actions like murder with psychic responsibility like moral guilt.

Nigantha-Nāṭaputta (Mahāvīra), who shared with the Buddha the largest following in later times, laid greater stress on self-restraint, and a section of the Buddha’s own followers, either out of honest belief or as a matter of policy (e.g. Devadatta), advocated similar harder ascetic practices (the dhūlāṅgas of later times) than the Buddha would countenance for his religious fraternity as a whole, though permitting individuals to accept more rigid rules of self-discipline regarding food, raiment, residence and medication (the four nissayas or supports) if they so desired, the Buddha counselled moderation here also and rightly preached that self-control and right knowledge constituted better spiritual disciplines than mortification of the flesh. He stressed the necessity of recognizing the importance of morality in the context of human destiny by propounding a theory of causation which took, perhaps gradually, the shape of the recondite law of dependent origination in his Church, though, as mentioned above, a very early tradition credits the Buddha with reviving the formula in his mind backwards and forwards, in the days following his enlightenment.

THE TWELVE LINKS OF MORAL CAUSATION

This law tries to cover the three dimensions of time (which, by the way, raised acute philosophical problems at a later time), by conceiving of man in his present life as a creature of the past and an agent of the future. The invisible thread that joins embodiments of the past, the present and the future is moral will working in concert with the intellectual factor which, if defective, contributes to rebirth and, if perfect, leads to salvation or drying up of the stream of embodiment, both samśāra and nirvāṇa being dependent upon the operation of the intellect—ignorance being responsible for the will to live and pain and insight for emancipation, and the path thereto. This chain of causation is constituted by twelve links (dvādaśa-nidāna), to use a later terminology, each preceding one being responsible for ushering in the next one in order (pratītya-samutpāda). These links are avidyā (ignorance), samsthāra (conformations), vijnāna (consciousness), nāma-rūpa (name and form), saḍāyatana (six fields of sense-organs), sparśa (contact), vedanā (sensation), tuṣṇā (desire or craving),
upādāṇa (attachment), bhava (existence), jāti (birth), and jarā-marāṇa (old age and death).

If a being in any of the realms of desire (kāma-loka), form (rūpa-loka), and formlessness (a-rūpa-loka) had acted in the past life under the influence of ignorance, he must have piled up a stock of impressions or conformations, which operates to bring about a renewal of existence, which is the present embodiment. The connecting link between the past and the present life is supplied by a vague consciousness or impulse to find embodiment in the maternal womb, the nature of which obviously depends upon the desires and deserts of the last embodiment. Gradually the embryo begins to assume both a mental (nāman) and a physical (rūpa) constitution by slow stages of growth till it develops into a child in the womb, fully equipped with the six organs of sense—the five external ones of vision, audition, smell, taste and touch and the one internal organ, mind or understanding. With birth the senses begin their function of contact with the world and this generates sensation or perception of the qualities of objects, tinged with a pleasant, unpleasant or neutral affective tone. Thirst or craving soon makes its appearance as a result of pleasurable experience and the child begins to covet things and feel desires of the flesh. Attachment begins to function when desires are not only produced in the mind but are sought to be fulfilled by a kind of grasping or clinging. In addition to these two, a third element, existence or becoming or a fresh longing for rebirth, is produced by the accumulation of the merits and demerits which are generated by karman prompted by attachment. This fresh saṃskāra is responsible for the next embodiment or birth, and the inevitable effect of birth is old age and death together with other evils like grief and lamentation, suffering and anxiety, dejection and despair, from which no being is free.

The ignorance (avidyā) that is ultimately responsible for the whole series of causes and effects is ignorance of the four noble truths, specially the delusion that life is not suffering but a process of pleasure. In the Buddha’s thought there was no idea of regarding it as equivalent to the cosmic illusion or māyā, or as the failure to recognize the identity of the finite and the absolute, or as an illusory projection of a world created by the mind on the canvas of nothing. The saṃskāras refer to the action of the individual in thought, word and deed, stored up in the form of merit and demerit, which takes shape in a new body, specially when reinforced by the desire for future life. Until the saṃskāras are completely root out, a fresh sprouting forth of life is inevitable, and this can be stopped only when the impermanent and transitory character of the body and its pleasures is realized and the saṃskāras are killed by gaining right knowledge. “Impermanent truly are the saṅkhāras, liable to origination and decease; as they rose so they pass away, their disappearance is happiness.” But this causal law operates not only without reference to a law-giver but also without a substantial basis. Like the Vedic yta and the Brāhmanic
mantra-śakti and apūrva, the karmā order operates autonomously and not according to the prescription of an ordering mind, the imperishable, as conceived by Yājñavalkya for cosmic phenomena in the Brhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad (3. 8. 9). So formations are succeeded by other formations in an unbroken series till ignorance is dispelled and automatically the saṁskāras are destroyed as a consequence and fail to generate a new aggregation of elements through the operation of the impulse towards embodiment. The causal law holds sway not only without but also within; and so man is not only made what he is by antecedent mental conditions, but he can also become what he wants to be by controlling his present thoughts and volitions in a proper manner. It is very rarely that the steps to the knowledge that burns up the saṁskāras are traced. But in the Saññyutta-Nikāya the positive seriation from suffering to knowledge is given as the succession of suffering, faith, joy, rapture, serenity, happiness, concentration, knowledge and insight into things as they really are. Thus, if ignorance ultimately leads to suffering, suffering itself may prompt a search for remedy which is found ultimately in knowledge and insight, the opposite of ignorance which is responsible for ills (klesā) through the veiling (āvaraṇa) of the proper object of knowledge (jñeya).

THE DOCTRINE OF NON-SOUL OR NON-INFRINGEMENT

We may well believe that the search after the nature and destiny of the soul was a craze of the time when the Buddha lived, and that the enquiry was not limited to the impediment to its ethical life and spiritual development but included also an investigation into its constitution and its relation to the body. Generally speaking, the body-mind relation was regarded as a negative one in the Upaniṣads out of which both the Vedānta and the Śāṁkhya took their rise, and so also in Jainism and Buddhism. The loathsome character of the constituents and contents of the organism, the deceptive nature of bodily beauty, which is only skin-deep, the troublesomeness of the impulses proceeding from organic needs and temptations prompted by sense-feelings, the necessity of getting the soul finally extricated from the prison-house of the body and, as a preparation thereto, the adoption of ascetic practices, indifference to bodily discomforts and even deliberate mortification of the flesh were all emphasized to bring out this negative relation. Enquiry into the nature of the soul brought out an astonishing variety of speculations—materialism and absolutism, in both of which the finite self disappeared as a reality in different ways, and dualism in which it retained its independent existence, though not with the same attributes according to the different Schools of thought.
Between the two opposite viewpoints of eternalism (whether absolutistic or dualistic) and annihilationism lies the creed of the Buddha that though there is no unchanging self (ātman), still it is not a function of matter and is not completely denuded of all causal efficacy when its particular bodily embodiment ceases to exist. The negation of the soul (anātma-vāda) amounts only to this, that its entitative persistence is denied. Viṃśāna (consciousness), which operates in the mother’s womb to form a new being (nāma-rūpa), is not a transmigratory soul, though like the latter it controls the assemblage of material elements, but a saṁkhāra which is changeable and unsubstantial in character. In the famous dialogue between king Milinda (the Greek prince, Menander), and monk Nāgasena, known as Milinda-pañha, what is sought to be brought out is that just as the body is a complex of many parts or elements, so also what we call an individual (later on designated as jīva or pudgala) is a similar complex of physical and psychical elements and that both are ultimately liable to dissolution into their components.

THE FIVE AGGREGATIONS

The number of factors that enter into individuality are five—these five skandhas or aggregates are comprised under two heads, viz. rūpa or physical form, composed ultimately of the four material elements (earth, water, air and fire), and nāman or the psychical factor distributed into four types, namely, sensation or feeling (vedanā), perception or idea (saṁjñā), conative disposition (saṁskāra) and discriminative intellection or reason (viṃśāna, which is to be distinguished, however, from the viṃśāna of the causal series) with slight variation of titles in different texts and with detailed subdivisions, running into nearly two hundred elements, all ephemeral. Thus the Upaniṣadic nāma-rūpa or phenomenal existence takes a new meaning in Buddhism to indicate the group of experiences or elements (five aggregates).

The assemblage of coenaesthetic and other presentations, representations and ideas, habits and dispositions, feelings and sentiments make up the entire texture of our personality, and all these are changing constantly like a mass of foam or bubbles and are ultimately unreal like a mirage, the trunk of a plantain tree, a spectre or magical illusion, so that there is nothing abiding in our psychical life to which the term soul (ātman) might correspond. The psychical contents form a stream (santāna), a term which played a notable part in later literature) in which individual states are instantaneous (kṣanika) either absolutely, in the sense of disappearance at the moment of origination, or relatively, in the form of a specious present in which the three phases of origination, persistence and decay are logically inseparable.
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Is there any permanent being behind these clear and obscure, simple and complex thoughts, pleasurable and painful feelings, impulses and tendencies, predispositions and residual impressions? None at all, just as behind and beyond the various parts that make up a chariot there is no additional substance called "chariot" which abides even in the absence of the component parts. The soul cannot be regarded as identical with, or as possessing or as containing, or as residing in the material particles, sensations, ideas, propensities and thought. It is quite likely that the concept underwent development in the mind of the Buddha and that while earlier in his ministry the self is not expressly denied and only its eternity was the problem discussed (e.g. in the Brahmajāla-sutta), later on āṭāna-vāda was included within the heresies (Sakkāya-diṭṭhi, heresy of individuality) as implying a kind of grasping (upādāna) and an approach towards Upaniṣadic absolutism and the ritualistic (Mimamsā) position, which Buddhism rejected (except perhaps in the Burden-sutta of the Saṅyutta-Nikāya). In the Anatta-lakkhana-sutta it is the impermanence, changefulness and painfulness of the skandhas that are held up as being not consistent with their being identical with the self, though this does not prevent the supposition that something opposite in nature might still be the self.

Consciousness being also a product cannot be abiding in character or be the vehicle of transmigration. A new life is generated from an old just as a new candle is lighted from an old one, namely, without the passage of any substance from the former to the latter. Just as a burnt-out candle cannot ignite another, so the dissolution of the birth-producing aggregation stops the birth of a fresh grouping of the skandhas with which a new individuality is identified. But the Buddha takes care to point out that if karman (merit or demerit) be the connecting link between one personality and another, this karman cannot be killed by rigoristic discipline as Jainism and Ājivikaism emphasized, but must be combatted with the triple purity (viśuddhi) of ethical action (śīla), mental training (samādhi) and complete knowledge or insight into the nature of the fourfold truth (prajñā), and by cultivating universal friendliness and other sublime attitudes (Brahma-vihāra-bhāvanā) and, according to some accounts, by ascending the successive stages of mastery and release, which, by the way, were passed through by the Buddha himself just before his great decease (parinibbāna). What prevents aggregation is the destruction of the āsava (lust, desire for existence, ignorance or false views) and the Buddha took care to point out that without discarding the three fetters of belief in a permanent individuality, doubt and belief in the efficacy of mere ethics and rituals, no one could even get into the stream of salvation (sotāpatti), the first stage of sanctification, much less attain nibbāna. But for further progress in spirituality and to get into the second stage (sakadāgāmin, once-returner), one has to discard passions (rāga), aversion (dveṣa) and delusion (moha). Higher still are those who get into the third
stage and never return (anāgāmin), but live out a diaphanous (opāpālika, apparitional) existence in a higher plane (like the krama-muktas of the Vedānta); and the highest are the arhats who have destroyed the last vestige of the āsāvas mentioned above and completed their sanctification and are free. It is often emphasized in later literature that final liberation is possible only for a human being who has succeeded in killing the seeds of rebirth through the triple purity of conduct, concentration and insight. The eightfold noble path (ārya āśāṅgika mārga) includes, therefore, right views, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration.

The successive individualities that replace their immediately antecedent form of embodiment are then neither identical with nor different from the latter inasmuch as these individuals are not the successive manifestations of a single transmigrating self or soul, nor are they unaffected in their formation by the actions (karman) of a previous incarnation, just as a light burning through the night is neither the same nor different at different moments of its existence, being fed on different parts of the oil and the wick and yet emitting a continuous flame which looks identical at all moments. This continuity we mistake for the unchanging existence of a single entity. In truth, nothing is identical with anything, but its own momentary state of being, or characterizable in terms of anything but itself (sarvam sva-lakṣaṇam), as the philosophers added later, to the two other dicta, “All is suffering, suffering” (sarvam duḥkhaṁ duḥkham) and “All is transitory, transitory” (sarvam kṣaṇikāṁ kṣaṇikam). Thus anātmatā (essencelessness), anityatā (transitoriness) and duḥkhātā (painfulness) mark all mundane processes. That “Everything is void, void” (sarvam śūnyam śūnyam) was a further corollary drawn in the Mahāyāna philosophy, but earlier thought was not so nihilistic.

The presentationism of the Vaibhāṣikas, the representationism of the Sautrāntikas, the idealism of the Yogācāras and the nihilism of the Mādhyamikas form a series of descent from the realistic position. It is doubtful, however, whether the Buddha’s own teachings went to the length of denying all substantiality, although it is likely that he subscribed to the theory, as did the Indian philosophers in general, that whatever had an origin in time had also an end in time and as such all compounds were liable to dissolution. As the body and the soul were each regarded as an assemblage, it logically followed that neither had any substantiality nor could a permanent individuality emerge out of their combination.

**THE ELEMENTS OF BEING**

But individuality implied the coming together of certain elements (dhamma or dhātu) which, not being decomposable, were not subject to
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destruction. The four physical elements—earth, water, fire, and air—and the psychical element (vijñāna) must combine to produce a temporary individuality. These five and space (ākāśa), which is uncompounded (a-saṃskṛta), constitute the six dhātus, and to these must be added deliberate destruction or liberation (pratisamkhya-nirodha, nirvāṇa), as another non-compoundable (a-saṃskṛta) element, and also unplanned destruction (a-pratisamkhya-nirodha), which means non-perception due to absence of necessary conditions or essential perishability of things. Roughly speaking, the first philosophers of Buddhism—the Sthavira-vādins and the Śrāvāṇa-vādins—acknowledged the reality of these four saṃskṛta (compounded), and three a-saṃskṛta (non-compounded) elements (dharma, dhātu) and only denied the reality of permanent individuality. This is corroborated by the repeated assertion of Nāgārjuna in his Prajñā-pāramitā that in Hinayāna or Śrāvakayāna only puṇḍra-sūnyatā (termed elsewhere as puḍgala-nairārya) is taught while Buddhāyāna or Mahāyāna teaches also dharma-sūnyatā. The Mahāsaṅghikas possibly initiated this denial of the reality of the elements in addition to that of the ego, and in this they were followed by the nihilists (śūnya-vādin) who, however, developed a positive philosophy in their doctrines of suchness (tathatā or bhūta-tathatā) and law-body (dharma-kāya) of the Buddha, but approximating in different degrees to the Vedāntic conception of Brahman. In the early Schools idealism and nihilism played a minor part as compared with the realistic tendency of thought, as Keith has ably brought out. The world was originally a moral, and not an intellectual problem.

BONDAGE AND REDEMPTION

The Buddha was convinced that much misery was due to the fact that men sought their own good in preference to that of others under the impression that they had a distinctive self of their own to nourish and preserve here and hereafter. Of the five lower fetters (saṃyojanā) belief in a permanent individuality is the first, while of the five higher fetters desire for existence in the world of form and desire for existence in the formless world are the first two. If men could be persuaded to give up their belief in the reality of an abiding self, they would see the futility of self-seeking on earth and hankering after a future life after bodily death. The Buddha taught the doctrine of a middle path between eternalism and annihilationism. There is no eternal soul, it is true, but then the elements that go into the composition of individuality persist. The skandhas, again, may dissolve, but then the karmans of a temporary aggregation, called a particular individual, pass on to another temporary aggregation, which is a different individual. Soul does not migrate but karmā does, and that should increase our sense of responsibility, seeing that by our action we are laying
the foundation of happiness or misery of another individual that is to come into being after our death as a result of our own karman. The brähmanical philosophers criticized the doctrine as involving a double injustice, namely, that the agent fails to reap the fruits of his own actions (kṛta-pranāsa) and somebody else suffers the consequences of his moral acts (akṛtābhyupagama), and belief in the Buddha’s previous births (jātaka) practically recognized some sort of continuity. The fructification of the moral act, according to early Buddhism, was not dependent either on a divine dispenser of justice or on the continuance of the same soul through different embodiments—the moral law was autonomous in its operation, only that it ceased to function when dominated by the superior law that spiritual illumination annuls the fruition of accrued (sañcita) and accruing (āgāmin) deeds though it does not cancel the results of actions that have begun to function already in this life (prārabdha). A Buddha or an arhat attains nirvāṇa with residue (upādhi-śeṣa) here below—becomes a jīvamukta, to use the Vedāntic terminology: his body continues to function till death, but his soul ceases to acquire a momentum for rebirth as all desires are now at an end. When the body drops off, he attains nirvāṇa without residue (anupādhi-śeṣa) as no fresh embodiment takes place and the stream of consciousness that formed an individuality dries up altogether with the accumulated actions (black, white or mixed), that neither ripen (vipāka) nor fructify (phala) any more.

It is natural that inquisitive minds like Mālunkyaaputta, Utiya and Vacchagotta should like to be enlightened about the destiny of the enlightened (tathāgata) after death. The Buddha discouraged inquisitiveness about matters that had no direct bearing on holy living and did not lead to detachment, cessation of desire, stoppage of sorrow, tranquillity, higher knowledge of spiritual illumination and peace. He used to say (e.g. in the Pāśādīka-suttanta), that of the things he knew he had chosen to have some not clearly explained (a-vyākta), and among these was the state of the enlightened after death (nirvāṇa), enquiry into which he considered to be vain and heretical.

NIRVĀṆA

What then is nirvāṇa—the final goal of all spiritual endeavour? If mukti were synonymous with extinction, then the mainspring of moral endeavour would be broken. If it were identical with eternal persistence as an individual, it would breed selfishness. When not inclined to commit himself to any definite view on the subject, the Buddha used to say (e.g. in the Brahmajāla and Poṭṭhapāda suttas) that nirvāṇa connoted neither existence nor non-existence separately, nor did it mean both or neither of them at once. It was indescribable in language. Just as it is irrelevant to ask where or in what direction the fire of an extinguished lamp goes,
so also it is improper to attempt to fix the location or direction of a departed saint. Both are simply blown out (nibbuto) and disappear from knowledge. This reticence might create the impression that the Buddha either did not know or did not teach what became of the departed soul. But being opposed to annihilationism, he taught also, in negative terms, that nirvāṇa was putting an end to the ills of life and that it was equivalent to escape from a world enveloped in the flame of desire, i.e. the extinction of all desires—of attachment, aversion and delusion. In describing the ascent of the soul through the various meditations and trances (jñāna) the Buddha places above the realm of nothingness (ākiñcanya) certain higher reaches of consciousness, thereby indicating that vacuity was not the last word on spiritual life and that the indescribability of nirvāṇa need not prevent us from describing it negatively as the complete removal of all passions (kleśāvaraṇa) and all impediments to true knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa). The Buddha is said to have felt immediately after attaining bodhi (enlightenment) that the two points in his philosophy that might prove a stumbling-block to the multitude were the theory of causality and the nature of nirvāṇa, and he even hesitated at first to preach his message to mankind; but ultimately his compassionate nature (symbolized by the vision of the soliciting Brahmā sahampati) prompted him to take up the burden of spiritual ministration for the happiness and benefit of many. But puzzles they still remain, and nirvāṇa specially has worn many shapes according to the inclination and cultural stage of the enquirers.

The idea that nirvāṇa was an uncompounded element gave it a positive character, and the further description of it as attainment of immortality (amata-padam) and bliss (sukha) tended to identify it with an eternally blissful condition, though a state of peace that passes all understanding in view of the fact that vimokkha (deliverance, emancipation), is supposed to correspond to absolute cessation of consciousness (saññā-vedayita-nirodha) and has nothing to do with the pleasures of heaven which the arhat is supposed to have spurned at, in course of his progress towards perfection, as a deceit and a snare. The yogin of brāhmaṇism, the tīrthamkara (not to speak of the siddha) of Jainism and the arhat of Buddhism are all superior to the gods whose long but terminable existence as such they all pity and do not envy at all. The many miraculous powers (iddhi) and transcendental knowledges (abhiññā) that the saint in his progress towards emancipation acquires, whereby the physical forces fail to hinder him and are completely dominated by him, and distant and subtle things, past and future events, the minds of others and the destinies of men enter into his knowledge, are also to be looked upon as mere incidental gains in which he should not exult, as released souls are not interested in action and accumulation of knowledge.

The true or noble power is the capacity to turn completely away from the impurity of life and to control the mind, will, purpose and thought,
and not to show marvels to create an impression on or win converts. Similarly, his mind should be directed towards ascending the different stages of ecstasy, trance or meditation, successively through ordinary reasoning and investigation, inner clarification, bliss and complete apathy, after which he quits the world of form altogether and passes successively through the knowledge of the realm of the infinity of space where plurality and finite materiality are at an end, the infinity of consciousness where objective references are totally absent, the realm of nothingness where complete absence of the subjective and the objective reference holds, the realm of neither presence nor absence of ideas where indeterminate and unspecifiable knowledge fills the mind and, lastly, the realm of the suppression of all empirical consciousness. When we talk of gods, they must be thought of as being merged in meditations of different depths, but none in possession of the final intuition of the four noble truths, which is the positive counterpart of the last stage of withdrawal from empirical knowledge of the formless world. Neither in this life nor after does the soul truly exist, and therefore no kind of embodiment can be looked upon as eternal—not even the divine type which is sometimes supposed to be so. The spiritual aspirant must therefore get rid of the ethical and intellectual impediments that prevent his getting into the stream of salvation and attaining successively the stages of a once-returner, a non-returner and, finally, an arhat.

It is obvious that hard spiritual exercise is needed to attain this ultimate objective. The four sublime contemplations, namely, benevolence towards all creation (maitri), compassion towards the distressed (karuna), joy at others’ happiness (muditā), and indifference towards others’ faults (upekṣā), are needed to expand one’s mind—to make one fit to roam in Brahman (brahma-vihāra-bhāvanā). And these four would be considerably reinforced if we contemplate also the loathsomeness of the body (a-suhbhāvanā). Constant remembrance (anu-smṛti) of the formula (refuge in the Buddha, dharma and saṅgha), the practice of breathing exercise and such other formulae must have been added later; but yogic meditation antedated the Buddha’s time and the same prescription of passing from the gross to the subtle, from the physical to the psychical, and from the feeling to the intuitive aspect of life, must have been in vogue in the contemporary systems of thought also. Quietude or equanimity (samatva) is what these systems all aimed at along with prajñā which goes beyond mere morality and contemplation. The noble or good law rested on discipline (vinaya) and discernment of truth (dhamma).

**BUDDHISM AS RELIGION**

That the Buddha who did so much to spread rationalism in dogma and rituals should himself be the locus of an adoration bordering on the
religious in the *Mahāpādāna Suttanta* is due to the Buddha's demanding a pre-eminence for himself over the other seekers after truth and salvation and even claiming a unique existence for himself (as the Buddha) as a being other than gods, men, etc. The marks of a great person (mahā-puruṣa) distinguished him from ordinary mortals, and miracles soon gathered round his life and activities. The ten powers or rather the penetrating knowledge of all things, the eighteen qualities peculiar to him which enabled him to possess omniscience and to adjust his conduct, speech and mind properly to all things, and the four assurances that made him know positively that he had attained the saving knowledge entitled him to many honorific titles, such as *Jina, Sarvajña, Sugata, Tathāgata, Bhagavat*, etc., the Buddha was made to claim also that he had come in the line of succession of other Buddhas whose number was expanded from six—Vipassi, Sikhi, Vessabhū, Kakusandha, Konāgamana and Kassapa—to four times that number, beginning with the Buddha Dipaṅkara under whom the present Buddha, then known as Sumedha, is supposed to have taken a vow that he would dedicate his life to the weal of creation and by whom final illumination was predicted for him.

The theory of later Buddhas, such as Maitreyya, meets us later. In the Buddha's time there was occasional recognition of householders attaining *moksa*, but not of *arhats* embracing the life of Bodhisattvas toiling through innumerable lives to become Buddhas in the end, for according to the canonical Scripture there could be only one Buddha in one cycle. No wonder that Buddhological speculations should start as a consequence and even docetism should be preached to justify the total distinction of the Buddha from ordinary mortals and saints, and the different Schools should wrangle over the nature of the Buddha, alive and dead, and discuss the purpose for which gifts were to be made to the departed Buddha and the spiritual well-being that was expected to follow from devotion to a released saint who could take no interest in or appreciate the reverential approach. The belief that the places of the Buddha's nativity, enlightenment, first sermon and decease were places of sacred pilgrimage to the Church, that monks and nuns could obtain liberation only by taking refuge in the Buddha, *dharma* and *sangha*, and could never hope to attain his position, and that the Buddha was superior to the gods of the *brāhmaṇical* pantheon, e.g. Indra and Brahmā, could very well start an attitude of religious devotion towards the *founder of the faith* and prompt the veneration paid to the *stūpas* as if to a god in his temple.

The real counter-reformation began, however, in the Mahāyāna when the Buddha was raised to the status of the *primal principle*, and a theory of emanation supplied the theogonic aspect of religious belief and later on reintroduced the old gods of *Vedic* times and adopted the new pantheon of *brāhmaṇism* in its own way under the impact of Śaivaism and
Vaiṣṇavaism that had begun to dominate the religious field after the Upāniṣadic upheaval had thrust the older gods out.

**THE HĪNAYĀNA AND THE MAHĀYĀNA**

Earlier Buddhism made no distinction between esoteric and exoteric teaching as Mahāyānism did; it did not encourage the idea that one should postpone attaining nirvāṇa in the hope that one would thereby be enabled to stay in samsāra to help others in the path of sanctification; it disdained the fond hope that all arhats could resolve to start life as a Bodhisattva and ultimately become a Buddha; it discouraged facile idealism and nihilism. It asked men to look upon the world to be sufficiently real to cause trouble to spiritual aspirants; it emphasized the loneliness of the advanced spirits and the necessity of personal endeavour to win salvation without looking forward to extraneous help or hoping to be absorbed in a universal essence—it was a kathina-yāna (difficult career or path) as opposed to the sahaja-yāna (easy course or path) of later belief in the efficacy of faith; it promised no blissful heaven to the saved.

Was it therefore a selfish creed inasmuch as it asked every soul to be a lamp unto himself and win personal salvation without caring for the spiritual emancipation of others? This would be hardly true in face of the fact that the Buddha resisted the temptation to keep the secret of salvation to himself, and that he directed the monks to roam all over the country, except during the rainy season, to bring the message of emancipation to the doors of the worldly-minded laity. Still it was nicknamed Hīnayāna by its rival branch, the Mahāyāna, because no saint (śrāvaka) had any objective but his own salvation, and that to be won as quickly as possible without reference to the religious progress of the community as a whole. Śrāvaka-yāna or arhat-yāna is, therefore, a little vehicle (hīna-yāna) which can only carry one passenger safely across the stormy sea of life while Buddha-yāna or Bodhisattva-yāna is the great vehicle (mahā-yāna) because in his capacious boat the saint can ferry other souls across the dangerous flood of samsāra.

It has been suggested that a better distinction, without indicating reproach of any kind, would be between Northern and Southern Buddhism. Ceylon, Burma and Siam are strongholds of the earlier creed, while Nepal, Tibet, China and Japan constitute the home of the later creed. From travellers' accounts, archaeological remains and literary evidence it would appear that the geographical distribution was not clear-cut, and latterly both forms—Southern and Northern, Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna—flourished side by side and even in the same monastic establishments. We must therefore content ourselves with the position that in language (Sanskrit or Pāli or mixed Sanskrit), in sculpture, in religious and philo-
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sophical belief, in the rigour of ethical discipline and the extent of sacred literature, divergence appeared and divided the followers of the Buddha into two major camps where the different Schools of Buddhistic thought gathered and that contact with foreign modes of belief and speculation was responsible for introducing greater innovations into Northern Buddhism than into Southern with its three baskets (Piṭakas) of Sutta (doctrine), Vinaya (discipline), and Abhidhamma (philosophy).

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The Tri-piṭaka contains the following works:—

I. Vinaya-Piṭaka.

(1) Bhikkhu-Vibhaṅga.
(2) Bhikkhuni-Vibhaṅga.
(3) Mahā-Vagga.
(4) Culla-Vagga.
(5) Parivāra-Piṭha.

II. Sutta-Piṭaka.

(1) Dīgha-Nikāya.
(2) Majjhima-Nikāya.
(3) Saṁyutta-Nikāya.
(4) Aṅguttara-Nikāya.
(5) Khuddaka-Nikāya, consisting of:
   (i) Khuddaka-Piṭha, (ii) Dhammapada, (iii) Udāna, (iv) Itivuttaka,
   (v) Sutta-Nipāta, (vi) Vinītāna-vattu, (vii) Peta-vattu, (viii) Theragāthā,
   (ix) therī-gāthā, (x) Jātaka, (xi) Niddesa, (xii) Paṭisambhidā-
   magga, (xiii) Aṭṭhāna, (xiv) Buddhavaṃsa, and (xv) Carīyā-piṭaka.

III. Abhidhamma-Piṭaka.

(1) Dhamma-Saṅgāni.
(2) Vibhaṅga.
(3) Kashyapa-vatthu.
(4) Puggala-paṭīṇati.
(5) Dhamma-kathā.
(6) Yamakā.
(7) Paṭṭhāna.

Many of the above texts are now available in excellent English translations published in the Sacred Books of the East, Sacred Books of the Buddhists and Pali Text Society Series. Mention may be made of The Vinaya Texts (Rhys Davids and Oldenberg), Dialogues of the Buddha (Rhys Davids and Mrs. Rhys Davids), Further Dialogues of the Buddha (Lord Chalmers), The Book of the Kindred Sayings (Mrs. Rhys Davids and Woodward), The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Woodward and Hare), Dhammapada (Max Müller), The Sutta-Nipāta (Fausboll), Psalms of the Brethren (Mrs. Rhys Davids), Psalms of the Sisters (Mrs. Rhys Davids), Udāna (Strong), Points of Controversy (Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids), Puggala-Paṭīṇati (B. C. Law), The Buddha-Vamsa (Morris), and Jātakamāla (Speyer).

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CHAPTER IX—continued

THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

B—HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE INDIAN SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM

I. INTRODUCTORY

A glance at the Buddhist and Jaina canonical works will show that in the sixth century B.C. the country was seething with a very large number of religious and philosophical speculations and their advocates were sharply divided into two classes, the śramaṇas and the brāhmaṇas. While the brāhmaṇas based their theories on the Vedas, the śramaṇas, i.e. those who perform acts of mortification or austerity as the means of pleasure and happiness here and hereafter, were quite opposed to them, discarding the austerity of the Vedas altogether. Both of them were preceded by some thinkers belonging to the brāhmaṇic fold, viz. (1) the karmins, or the “followers of the karma-mārga”—the path of the Vedic acts consisting in the different sacrifices and ceremonials, and (2) the jñānins, i.e. the followers of the jñāna-mārga, “the path of knowledge,” the sublime thoughts of the supporters of which found the fullest expression in the Upaniṣads.

Owing to the gradual growth of rationalism in society, growing abhorrence to animal sacrifice in Vedic rites, and the increasing dissatisfaction with various outward and complex practices in ceremonials there came into being different Schools also in the brāhmaṇic class who doubted the value and validity of sacrifices. They considered them to be frail rafts for crossing the oceans of the world (saṁsāra) and allegorical explanations of sacrifices were sought to be offered. For instance, at the very beginning of the Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad1 the aśva-medha (horse sacrifice) which is the most elaborate animal sacrifice,2 is interpreted as having cosmic significance.

As the above Schools lived in close contact, most of them were more or less mutually influenced, and the śramaṇas and the brāhmaṇas made the most remarkable and valuable contributions to the philosophical thoughts of the country.

We are concerned here with the śramaṇas or more precisely with the Buddhists. They are divided into two broad Schools, viz. Hīnayāna (inferior course) and Mahāyāna (great course). It is the Mahāyānists who, in order to assert their superiority over the Hīnayānists, used the epithets Hīna- and Mahā- before the word -yāna.
The Mahāyānists claim that the greatness of their course consists in its seven-fold merit which is not to be found in the Hinayāna (Mahāyāna-sūtrālankāra, XIX. 59. 60).

Two important questions are discussed among the ancient teachers such as Asaṅga (c. A.D. 300) and Śāntiraksita (A.D. 700). The first of them is: Do the Mahāyāna sūtras actually represent the original speech of the Buddha? The Mahāyānist teachers answer in the affirmative. The second question is: Which of the two, the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna, is earlier? The answer is quite clear that the Mahāyāna system is a much developed one unlike the Hinayāna. The very fact that the teachers have tried to prove the authenticity of the Mahāyāna shows that its authenticity was much disputed. We shall give here a general historical account of the chief branches of Buddhist thought in India and briefly show their relation to the central teachings of the Buddha and to early Indian thought.

2. THE VAIBHĀŠIKAS

As there were conflicting views with regard to Buddhism in Kāśmira under the great king Kaniṣka (c. 120) who espoused the cause of Buddhism, following the example of Asoka there was held a Buddhist council. In that council the Sacred Canon was revised and a great commentary on the Abhidharma called Vibhaṣā (expounder) was written. The original text in Sanskrit of this work is lost, but there are still two Chinese translations.

Now in Kāśmira gradually there was a split among the Buddhists, one section of them having a special faith in that Vibhaṣā, hence the members of it were called Vaibhāṣikas. Again, among the Vaibhāṣikas themselves there were different views on certain points and while those of Kāśmira were known as Kāśmira Vaibhāṣikas, those of the Western Country (i.e. Gāndhāra), were called Pāścātya or Western Vaibhāṣikas. These were referred to also as Aparāntakas (living in the Western border), Bāhiradeśakas or (belonging to the outside country), Gāndhārācāryas or (teachers of Gāndhāra) or Gāndhāra-mandala-ācāryas (the teachers of the district of Gāndhāra).

These Vaibhāṣikas formed one of the two most important Schools of the original Sarvāstī-vādins (asserters of the existence or reality of all things in all times, the past, the present and the future). One of these two Schools is known by the very name Sarvāstī-vādins and the other Sau-trāntikas of whom we shall have an occasion to write later on. The Sarvāstī-vādins of Kāśmira are known as Mūla or original Sarvāstī-vādins, while others are called simply Sarvāstī-vādins.

The most authoritative canonical work of the Sarvāstī-vādins is the Jñāna-prasthāna by Kātyāyaniputra, which is divided into six parts. The Vibhaṣā referred to above is the commentary on this work. This School
possessed also the Vinaya and Sūtra collections. The books that are now found of this School are in Sanskrit, but possibly first were in some Prākṛta and then in Sanskrit.

We may discuss here why the Sarvāsti-vādins are so called, so that we can understand clearly some of the most important philosophical views of the Vaibhāṣikas, as the latter are included in the former.

Vasubandhu, the great author of such an authoritative work as the Abhidharma-kośa says in the book (V, 25–26) that because one affirms the existence of the things in three times, past, present, and future one is known as a Sarvāsti-vādin. To assert that all, i.e. past, present, and future, exist, is indeed a very bold declaration. But what are the grounds on which this view is based? They are mainly four.

First, the authority of the statement of the Buddha himself. He clearly says that all the three things, past, present, and future, exist.

Second, the Buddha has also taught that when an idea (vijñāna) arises, as for instance, from the organ of eye, it is owing to two things, viz. the organ and its object (rūpa). So with regard to other organs and their objects. Now if there are no past and future things, the idea or the mental consciousness of those things are impossible. So if the “past” and the “future” were not there, then such notions as “there lived Mahāsammata,” “Saṅkha is going to be an all-world sovereign,” and so forth—which involve the idea of what was and is going to be—would be entirely baseless, in fact the object not being there its idea too was also not possible.

Third, if an object (ālambana) is given there may be its consciousness and not otherwise. Now if the past and future things are not there how can the consciousness be possible without the object?

And the fourth, if the past does not exist, how can the past act, good or bad, come to give fruit when it is devoid of essence and existence? In fact when the fruit is produced, its cause (vipāka-hetu) is lost.

It is from these grounds based on the Scripture and reasons that the Vaibhāṣikas affirm the existence of past and future. But how is it that the Sarvāsti-vādins or the Vaibhāṣikas can hold the view that an object continues to exist at three points of time, while the accepted doctrine of the Buddhists is that there is nothing that continues to exist? The reply comes here from different Vaibhāṣikas of whom the following four are prominent, viz.:

1. Bhadanta Dharmatrāta.—He is the upholder of the theory of difference of modes (bhāvanyātha-vāda). He defends his case saying that when there is a change of a thing, in fact, that change is only in its modes, but not in the substance. The substance gold undergoes several changes through which it comes to be called necklace, ear-ring, etc. But there is no change of the gold itself. In the same way, the object is different from the future and other modes. For instance, when a certain object abandons its future mode it reaches the present mode; and when it renounces its
present mode it reaches the past mode; and yet the object itself does not change; throughout three modes the same character of the substance continues. If it were not so, the future, present and past objects would be entirely different from one another.

2. Bhadanta Ghoṣaka holds that the changes undergone by an object are only in its distinguishing character (lakṣaṇa). He argues as follows: When an object is said to be past, it is not entirely deprived of the character of the future and the present. For example, a man may be attached to one woman, but he need not be disgusted with other women. Similarly, when the object is future or present it has that character, but is not entirely devoid of the other two characters.

3. Bhadanta Vasumitra holds that the changes undergone by the things are in their aspects of positions, states (avasthā). He argues that a thing is spoken of variously according to the varying aspects and these variations relate to the aspect not to the substance; as the substance remains the same in all three points of time. For example, when the clay counting-piece (myra-gudikā) is placed in the place of units it is denominated one, when placed in the place of hundred it is denominated hundred, and in place of thousand it is denominated thousand. Similarly, when the thing is in the state of activity (kārita) it is called present, and when it has ceased from activity, it is past and when it has not become active at all, it is future. So things are spoken of in accordance with their states, as in the case of clay counting-piece, where there is no change in the nature of the substance; only different denominations are assigned to it in accordance with the varying position, which makes it indicative of varying numbers.

4. Buddhadeva holds the view that the changes are due to the changes in relativity (anyathāanyathika). He argues as follows: An object is called one or other in relation to what has gone before and what is to come. For instance, the same woman is called mother as well as daughter. Here the usage in question is dependent upon the past and future; when it has something before it and also something after it, it is called present; and when it has something after it, but nothing before it, it is called past.10

The above views of the Vaibhāṣikas are, however, refuted by some Buddhists belonging to a different School.11

Vaibhāṣikas are realistic, as already said, and for the world order they accept the atomic theory refuted by the Yogācāras and the Mādhyamikas.12

3. THE SAUTRĀNTIKAS

Yaśomitra says in his Abhidharma-kośa-vyākhyā (B.B., p. 12): "Those who hold the sūtras as their authority and not the śāstras,13 are Sautrāntikas." They reject the authority of the Abhidharmas of the Sarvāstī-
vādins, for according to them, those Abhidharma are far from the sayings of the Buddha. The word sūtrānta actually means that which is definitely ascertained of the sūtras.

The Sautrāntika School is said to have been founded by Kumāralāta of Taxila. The original works of this School which contained a great variety of philosophical doctrines, are hardly accessible. Many of the Sautrāntika views may be known from the Abhidharma-kośa of Vasubandhu and its Vyākhyā, for though he was a Vaibhāṣika and mostly (prāyena) followed that School in the book, he had much sympathy with the Sautrāntikas and later on himself adopted the Yogācāra attitude.

Like the Vaibhāṣikas the Sautrāntikas are also realists, the main difference between them being that while the Vaibhāṣikas hold that the external world is perceived, the Sautrāntikas affirm that it is known by inference. They dispute vijñāna-vāda which holds that there is only consciousness (vijñāna), for without the object of consciousness there is no possibility of consciousness itself. Therefore it must be accepted that there is the existence of the external world. As shown by the Vijnānavādins\textsuperscript{44} atoms cannot be supported, and in that case owing to their absence and consequently to that of an object made of them, anyhow one will have to admit by inference the existence of the external things, otherwise there can in no way be consciousness of things around us, which we cannot deny.

One of the most important and remarkable thoughts of the Sautrāntikas is their theory of continuum (santati) of a person or a thing. It is best described in the Milinda-pañha (p. 40)\textsuperscript{15} from which we take the following:

The king said: “He who is born, Nāgasena, does he remain the same or becomes another?”
“Neither the same nor another.”
“Give me an illustration.”
“Now what do you think, O king? You were once a baby, a tender thing and small in size, lying flat on your back. Was that the same as you who are now grown up?”
“No. That child was one, I am another.”
“If you are not that child, it will follow that you had neither mother nor father, no! nor teacher. You cannot be taught either learning or behaviour, or wisdom. What, great king! Is the mother of the embryo in the first stage different from the mother of the embryo in the second stage, or the third or the fourth? Is the mother of the baby a different person from the mother of the grown-up man? Is the person who goes to school one and the same when he has finished his schooling another? Is it one who commits a crime, another who is punished by having his hands and feet cut off?
“Certainly not. But what would you, sir, say to that?”
The elder replied: "I should say that I am the same person, now I am grown up, as I was when I was a tender tiny baby flat on my back. For all these states are included in one by means of this body."

The Sautrāntikas are said to have two Schools (Abhidharma-kosa, IV, p. 136), one known by the same name, Sautrāntikas, and the other was called Dārśāntikas in the Vibhaśā. The reference to the Sautrāntikas as such in the Vibhaśā is extremely rare. One may, therefore, think that only the Dārśāntikas were known to the commentary. The history of this School is, however, not yet quite clear. It is, therefore, natural to establish some relation between the name and the work of Kumāralāṭa, Drśānta-pankti. One may want to know if the Dārśāntikas characterize them by the employment of similes, as said in Tibetan, according to which there is no difference between the Sautrāntikas and Dārśāntikas. However, the sense of the word drśānta is not yet established with certainty. One may think that the word drśānta may imply here some opposition to the Scripture. But what drśāntas are meant here? Certainly they are not other than the traditional ones. And one may think them to be such as we have in the Milinda-panha referred to above.

The continuum of persons and things referred to just now is not quite new to Buddhism, but is already well known in the Sāṁkhya system as the theory of transformation (parināma-vāda), only with this difference, that while in Buddhism the continuum is universal, in the Sāṁkhya it is of objects alone, and not of the spirit. This theory is accepted also in the Jaina philosophy.

Now this question of continuum is involved with that of the universal flux or momentariness (ksaṇa-bhaṅga), for if you admit a thing to be a fixed form, it can in no way be continuous. Either it must be fixed or continuous, never both fixed and continuous. On the following grounds one must admit that whatever is existent is momentary. It may be argued thus: We hold that all that is compound (samskṛta) is instantaneous. But how is it so? Because otherwise nothing can function. For function is that which is in an uninterrupted continuity. And it cannot be justified if there are not, every moment, origination and suppression (utpāda and nirodha) alternately. If, however, one says that, having remained for a time, a thing, by suppression of the preceding moment and the origination of the succeeding moment, functions in an uninterrupted continuity, then this cannot be accepted. For after that there will be no function as there is no continuity.

One may suppose that a thing after its production remains for some time. But how does it remain so? Does it remain itself, quite independent of anything else, or with the help from some other thing? The first cannot be justified. Why? Because afterwards it does not remain by itself. And why is it not able to remain at the end by itself? Because there must be some cause for remaining so. But it is not to be found there. It may, how-
ever, be argued that owing to the absence of the cause of destruction it remains and when the cause of destruction arises it is destroyed, as the blackness of an unburnt earthen pot disappears by the fire. But it is not right, because the cause is not to be found there. For there is no cause even afterwards. But is it not said that the blackness of an earthen pot is destroyed by the contact of fire!—a fact which is well known to all. But it can be explained differently. Here the fire simply produces a dissimilar continuum of blackness, and we see that by the contact of fire a dissimilar continuum of blackness is produced, not the total discontinuum of any function.

One may argue that if every moment a new thing is produced there will be no recognition (pratyabhijñāna) pointing out "it is that." But it is not so. For recognition is possible on account of the similarity of the preceding and succeeding moments just like the flames of a lamp. Thus the recognition is owing to the similarity and not to the actual presence of the thing. But how can it be known? By suppression (nirūdhātā). If a thing remains in the same state no suppression is possible, because it is that very thing.

Besides, some transformation (parināma) of a thing is also noticed at the end. Transformation is alteration, and if that transformation of things, either internal or external, does not begin at first it cannot be known at the end. Therefore the transformation starts at the very beginning, it spreads gradually and becomes manifest at the end just like the milk in the state of curd. As long as the transformation is very subtle it is not ascertained. Yet, every moment there is a change, and one must accept the instantaneousness of things.

Again, if a thing does not change every moment it cannot have its particular weight or measure. A small boy cannot grow into a young man. And if you admit one’s growth, it has no meaning, for without that change it will remain in the same state, and without further growth no increment is possible.

Take again some other thing such as a river or a tank, or a pool. Water is seen there sometimes dried or increased to some extent. It would be impossible if every moment there is no change, as nothing is found afterwards to account for it. The wind naturally moves, it becomes violent or is extremely slow. This cannot be justified if it remains always in the same state without a constant change.

4. THE YOGĀCĀRAS

We have discussed the Sautrāntika School. There are reasons to think that a section of the later Sautrāntikas coalesced with the Viśiṣṭādīcāras ("realists"). According to Sautrāntikas, though the external
world has its reality it cannot be perceived, but is known only by inference, while the Vijñāna-vādins ignore its existence altogether.

It is clear that originally Vijñāna-vāda is based on a number of Upaniṣadic passages containing the words jñāna and vijñāna referring to ātman ("self") or Brahman (the Absolute) in their Vedantic interpretation. Ātman, Brahman, jñāna and vijñāna are identical in the sense in this connection. There are passages which can very easily be interpreted from the idealistic point of view.

The followers of idealism are naturally known as Vijñāna-vādins. They are also called Yogācāras. The word yogācāra (literally, a practiser of yoga) originally meant an ascetic, but gradually it was employed for an idealist or the School. According to the commentary by Bhāskarācārya on the Brahma-sūtra, II. 2. 28, yoga means that way which leads one to the destination by śamatha (samādhi) (abstract meditation) and vipaśyanā (prajñā) (transcendental wisdom)—these two means being just like two bullocks tied to the yoke of a cart and leading to a destination. Thus one who proceeds along with yoga is Yogācāra.

The idealistic thought in Buddhism is already found in Mahāyāna-sūtras, but its first systematization is made by Maitreyanātha, the master of Asaṅga. The idealistic current as a system with its own Sāstras may safely be placed at about the end of the third century or the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Then there flourished a number of teachers of whom Dīnāga was a prominent one. The fundamental discourse, said to be of the Buddha himself, on which the idealism of the Buddhists is based, is the following: "O the sons of the Victorious One (i.e. the Buddha), all these three planes are only consciousness. The teachers also of this School declare that all this objective world is nothing but an appearance, for it does not exist in fact, just as to a man who suffers from an eye disease called timira appears a knot of hair, or such other things as two moons, the existence of which cannot even be imagined. The objects do not exist apart from the subjects perceiving them."

Here the following objections may be raised: If the consciousness of a particular object is without that object and not from that object, then why is it that in a particular place we have that consciousness and not in every place? Again, why is it that the consciousness is in a particular time and not always? On the contrary, why and how is it that the same person or thing can be seen always and not in a particular time, and in all places and not in a particular place, and by all persons and not a particular person, as in the case of a man suffering from partial blindness called timira?

Further, why is it that with things that a person with his defective eyes sees, such as a knot of hair, or two moons, no actual purpose of him is served, but it is done so with the things other than them? Or take another example. In a dream one may take food and drink, but in reality one's stomach is not filled up, but is it not so with other foods and drinks? Why
is this difference? Therefore, if one does not accept the existence of an object there can in no way be any adjustment.

All these objections are, however, met with the help of dream experiences. For, it is well known that in one's dream though there is no object whatsoever it is seen there and also in a particular time and place. Even a function may also be caused by the dream experiences, for though there is actually no union of a couple in a dream there is the resultant discharge.

From another point of view the idealists repudiate the existence of objects. They say that anything such as a piece of cloth cannot be accepted as real, for you cannot take it as one in the form of the whole as do the Vaiśeṣikas, for the whole is not an entity other than the parts; nor can you take it as many in the forms of atoms, for each of the atoms cannot be perceived. Nor can atoms be thought to be combined into one object. For, if on the six points (viz. east, west, north, south, and up and down) of an atom six atoms are united at the same time, it must be admitted that the atom has its six parts, and in that case it cannot be atom, for that is the atom which has no part whatsoever.

Maitreyanātha's Madhyānta-vibhaṅga-kārikā (I. 2) says of this theory: There is the false ideation (abhūta-parikalpa); there do not exist the two; but there exists voidness (śūnyatā), and it also (i.e. the false ideation) exists in this (i.e. the voidness).

There are four statements here. (i) The first declares: There is the false ideation. It implies that there are some who hold that there is absolutely nothing (sarva-dharma-śūnyatā) just like a horn of a hare. This cannot, however, be held, for in that case there is nothing to do for one's nirvāṇa. Therefore, it is said that there is the false ideation and an aspirant to nirvāṇa strives after it. (ii) The second statement is: The two, i.e. the subject and object do not exist there, as they are mere appearances, phantoms of our minds, endless series of mental states, having no beginning but ending with one's nirvāṇa. They are related to one another in a relation of cause and effect and this forms the saṁsāra. (iii) The third statement is that there exists voidness (śūnyatā). Here voidness is to be taken in the sense of the state of being void of both the qualities of a subject and an object. (iv) The fourth statement is that in the voidness, too, there is the false ideation, because in the meditation of the voidness as its support (ālambana) one has that false ideation, for without it there is no meditation.

As we have already seen, in accordance with this School the world is only consciousness (citta), therefore, its followers cannot but admit that this consciousness does the functions of three, viz. of that which is to be known (vedya), i.e. the object, of that who knows (vedaka), i.e. the subject, as well as of the function of knowledge (vedana). But one which has no parts cannot be endowed with such three different characteristics.
Seeing, however, that a lamp illuminates not only the other things around, but also itself, the teachers of viṣṇāna-vāda argue that the consciousness in the same way knows also itself, but the Mādhyamikas, refute it quoting a Scripture.\textsuperscript{35} It runs as follows: "Having not seen the consciousness (citta) he (Bodhisattva) investigates the current of the consciousness and asks whence it arises. Then it occurs to him: Consciousness arises only when there is an object. Now if it is so, is it that the object is one thing and consciousness is another? Or are they identical? If the former, how can consciousness recognize itself through consciousness? It does not or cannot do so. For instance, none can cut an edge of a sword by the same edge of the sword. Nor can a man touch the tip of a finger with the same tip of the finger." In the same way the same consciousness cannot be cognized by itself.

Besides, the lamp illuminates things other than itself and not also itself, because there is no darkness that can cover it.

In order to establish the self-consciousness of thought the idealists argue that if it is not admitted to be so, no thought can be remembered, but we all know that we remember our thoughts, and it is well known that nothing is remembered that is not perceived.

The teachers say\textsuperscript{36} that among the people and in Scriptures there are various denominations of self and elements of existence or things (dharmas), for instance, "self" (ātman), "living being" (jīva), etc., and "aggregates" (skandhas), "elements" (dhātus), etc. The application of these two kinds of denominations with regard to self and the elements of existence respectively is not primary, because they are not applied to actual self and the elements of existence respectively. Why? Because they are mere transformation (parināma) of consciousness as they do not exist outside. Here from the receptacle consciousness (ālaya-viṣṇāna)\textsuperscript{37} which continues like the stream of a river or the flames of a lamp and in which the impressions (vāsanās) of the imagination of self, matter, etc., are developed, such forms as self and matter, etc., come into existence. They are taken as external, though they are not actually so. This goes on from the time without beginning, even though, in fact, there is no self, nor matter outside.

The denial of self and elements of existence is nothing but the two most important theories commonly accepted by the Yogācāras and the Mādhyamikas, viz. pūdgala-nairātmya and dharm-a-nairātmya.\textsuperscript{38} The word nairātmya radically means here the state of being devoid of ātman which signifies in this case svabhāva, "own being," i.e. innate character which never undergoes any change, nor depends on any thing for its being. The self is called ātman, because according to those who believe in its separate existence, it has the nature just described and of which it is never devoid and consequently it is held to be eternal. Now pūdgala is nothing but what we know by such terms as "man," "person," etc., i.e. the self. Thus by pūdgala-nairātmya we understand that what is believed to be a pūdgala or self has
no independent nature of its own, and consequently no existence in fact, and therefore it is not a thing in reality (vastu-sat), but exists merely in imagination, a convention for serving our purpose of ordinary life. Similarly, dharmas or elements of existence have not their atman "nature," because they depend for their being on the causes and conditions (pratyaya-samutpāda). This is dharma-nairātmya.

In this School things are viewed from three different aspects, viz. imaginary (parikalpita), dependent (paratantra), and perfect (parinīpāna). These aspects are known as lakṣaṇa (characteristic) or svabhāva (nature). Let us take here the example of a magician who by dint of his power shows an elephant before us. That we see an elephant here cannot be denied, but this elephant is of imaginary character. It is also clear here that the form of the elephant depends on its cause and conditions. otherwise the animal could not appear before us. Therefore, the elephant is also of dependent character. Finally, that there is absolutely no elephant at all is quite clear, and thus it is of perfect character.

Now when this citta has no support (i.e. object, ālambana) whatsoever, and consequently does not perceive anything there being nothing perceptible, it rests in itself. This state is called vijñapti-mātratā or vijñānā-mātratā, i.e. only consciousness pure and simple. This can be realized by the disciplines advised, i.e. deep meditation (śamatha) and supreme wisdom (vipaśyanā).

This state of citta resting in vijñānā-mātratā is described variously owing to the variety of the aspects. It is called there—lokottara-jñāna (supermundane knowledge) and āśraya-parāvrtti (turning back of the source), i.e. the ālaya-vijñāna, in other words, the conscious subject or self. It means that owing to the elimination of the two sorts of evil states (dausṭhulaya), viz. covers or obstruction (āvaranās), i.e. "the knowable" (jñeya), and the passions (klesas), such as sensuality (rāga), aversion (dveṣa), and bewilderment (moha), the ālaya-vijñāna turns back to its natural state in the form of advaya-jñāna, i.e. "the knowledge free from the two, i.e. the subject and object. In other words, the ālaya-vijñāna which was before covered or obscured, the cover or obstruction being now removed," gets its own innate state, i.e. the state of advaya-jñāna. This is anāsrava-āhātu (undefiled element), and vimukti (deliverance).

It is clear that this vijñapti-mātratā is, in the Vedantic language of Gauḍapāda, the spiritual guide of Śaṅkarācārya, Brahman, as the older Vedānta, the Āgama-śāstra of Gauḍapāda shows. It is rather strange that this point has no place in the classical Vedānta.

Here it may be observed that Gauḍapāda’s Brahman points on one side the state of kaivalya, i.e. "the state of being not connected with anything else" or "the resting of the self (dṛṣṭy or puruṣa) in himself" as described in the Yoga-sūtra (1. 3), and on the other to the resting of the citta in itself (vijñapti-mātratā) of the Vijñāna-vādins.
5. THE MĀDHYAMIKAS

The Mādhyamika doctrine involving the Śūnya-vāda as in the Mahāyāna-sūtras is systematized by Nāgārjuna (A.D. 200?) as the Vijñānavāda of the Yogācāra was systematized by Maitreyanātha. Āryadeva (c. A.D. 200–225), the author of the Catuh-śatikā is his worthy disciple, and one of the most prominent exponents of Nāgārjuna's masterpiece, Mūla-mādyamaka-kārikā, is Candrakīrtti (c. A.D. 600–650).

Now the Mādhyamikas are those who followed the middle path of the Buddha. But what is this middle path? It is well known that he preached a middle path in his first sermon,35 rejecting the two extreme views of excessive worldly enjoyments and too much self-mortification.36 But the middle path with which we are concerned here is quite different from it, as will be clear from the following lines.

In Sanskrit lexicons37 one of the names for the Buddha is Advaya-vādin "one who asserts not-two." Here according to the Mādhyamikas38 the word two in "not-two," refers to two ascertainments (antās), or views. But what are these two views? They are such as existent and non-existent and eternal and non-eternal, self and non-self, and so on. That such views are harmful is abundantly clear in Buddhist literature, both in Sanskrit and Pāli. For instance, the Buddha is said to have declared: "As mostly, O Kātyāyana, the people are engrossed in the notion of existence and non-existence, they are not emancipated."39 And says Nāgārjuna:40 "Those ignorant people who see existence and non-existence do not see the cessation of the visible which is blissful."41 Again we read:42 "It exists" this is, "O Kāśyapa, one definite ascertainment. But what is the middle of these two definite ascertainments cannot be denoted, cannot be illustrated, it has no base, nor any appearance, nor any mark, nor any denomination. This is, O Kāśyapa, called the middle path by which there is the true examination of elements of existence."43 So it is clearly declared that the Buddha having not accepted the two definite ascertainments taught his doctrine of the middle.44 Therefore according to this view nothing is existent, nor is anything non-existent; nothing comes into being, nor does anything disappear: nothing is eternal nor has anything an end; nothing is identical nor differentiated; nothing moves either, nor moves anything thither.45 Thus as the followers of this School with which we are concerned here have accepted the middle path they are known as Mādhyamikas.46

In the above discussion only two points, one positive and the other negative, are taken; but sometimes three or even four47 points are taken.48

The idea of the rejection of both the opposite views of which the most important and well-known expressions are, sat (existent) and a-sat (non-existent), is to be found even in the Rg-Veda (X. 129. 1); "There was
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neither the non-existent nor the existent." Gradually it was used also in
the Úpaniṣads⁴⁹ and the Bhagavad-Gītā (XIII. 12).

This position of the Mādhyamikas will be intelligible if one understands
the law of dependent origination, i.e. the origination of things being
dependent on the cause and conditions (pratītya-samutpāda). This is
implied in the Śūnya-vāda which is the central conception of the system.
Let us explain it in the following few lines:

We say that every thing has its svabhāva “innate state” or “nature,” as
we say that heat is the svabhāva of fire. But what is it in reality? What is
the characteristic of svabhāva? It is that which is not fictitious (a-kṛtrima)
and does not depend on others for its existence, nor comes into being
afterwards having not been before. Now heat which is generated by its
cause and conditions, and comes into existence having not been before,
and depends on others for its being, can in no way be the innate nature
(svabhāva) of fire. Consequently with regard to fire, that characteristic of
it, if any, which in the three points of time, past, present and future does
not deviate from it and being not before does not come into existence, and
does not depend on others for its being, may alone be regarded as its own
nature (svabhāva). But is there anything of the kind of fire?

We say: “Neither it is, nor is it not.” Yet, in order to remove the
terror of untrained listeners, in practical truth, by imposition (samāropa)
we say “it is.”

But if you say that it is in its imposed form and in practical truth, of
what kind is it then in reality in the absolute truth?

The answer is: “It is dharmatā, ‘the state of being a dharma—the ele-
ment of existence.’” But what is dharmatā? Own-being (svabhāva).
“What is own-being? Nature (prakṛti). And nature? That which is called
voidness (śūnyatā). What does voidness mean? The state of being devoid
of own being (naiśsvabhāvya). And what are we to understand by it?
That which is suchness? (tathatā). What is this suchness? Being such, that
is, the state of being not liable to change (a-vikāritva), the state of remaining
always (sadiva sthāyitā).”

“Accordingly we cannot say that heat is the svabhāva of fire. But as the
non-origination of fire is independent of others and not fictitious, it is to be
regarded as its svabhāva.”⁵⁰ Now when there is no svabhāva of a thing it
has also no origination, and owing to the absence of it, it has also no
suppression.

Like fire, everything is devoid of its svabhāva as it itself has no existence.
This state of being devoid of svabhāva (naiśsvabhāvya) is in fact meant by
the word śūnyatā in this system in such cases in the sacred texts as “sarva-
dharmāḥ śūnyāḥ,” “all elements of existence are void.” Readers will
notice it also in the preceding paragraph.

Things that appear to us do not in their own characteristics but in
those which are imputed. Here a couplet quoted in a work⁵¹ declares that
the truth of itself free from all imputations shines; and by such expressions as śūnyatā, all imputations thereupon are repudiated.

But unfortunately the sense of the word śūnyatā was much misunderstood in the time even of Nāgārjuna himself, it being taken to mean annihilation (abhāva), or “non-existence” (nāstītā). And its inevitable evil consequence led Nāgārjuna to write (XXIV. 11): Just like a snake or a science, taken in a wrong way, śūnyatā being misunderstood brings about one’s destruction. The objections that may naturally arise from this misunderstanding may thus be summarized from Nāgārjuna’s own work (XXIV): If everything is empty and there is no origination nor passing away, then there can also be no four truths of the noble, no rules of life based on the knowledge of those truths, no fruit of good and evil deeds, no doctrine of the Buddha, no monastic community, and finally also no Buddha.

Nāgārjuna meets all the objections resorting mainly, inter alia, to two truths, conventional (saṃsvṛti-satya) and the highest (paramārtha-satya) as in the Vedāntic system of Śaṅkara (here one additional truth being prātibhāsika-satya—the truth existing only in appearance). He says those who do not understand the distinction between the two truths do not know the depth of the truth of the teaching of the Buddha. Nirvāṇa is not realized without knowing the highest truth (paramārtha) which cannot be instructed without following the everyday practice. And if śūnyatā is understood in its actual sense there is no room for such objections. This śūnyatā is the same as pratītya-samutpāda, which is nothing but the appearance of things owing to their cause and conditions, and this is in reality non-origination by their own nature. And here is the cessation of all expressions (prapaṇcopaśāma).

6. CONCLUSION

Now what is it that inspired the teachers to think in the above ways? The reply may at once be given that it is the māra-vijaya by the Buddha. Symbolically, māra-vijaya is the conquest of the tempter, but actually it means the cessation of desire (kāma) which, when not controlled, goes on increasing and becomes the root cause of all sorts of miseries in one’s life. As such it is a formidable enemy that must be conquered by all means. This idea of the cessation of desire, which is well known even in Vedic times, is the centre not only of Buddhism, but also of all the religious systems of India. It is to be noted that only by the conquest of the tempter the Buddha became a Buddha.

The problem for the Buddha who was much influenced by the Upaniṣadāc thoughts was as to how we can control desires which are so natural in human minds. He found the solution in his three fundamental principles
of Impermanence (anātta), Sorrow (duḥkha), and Non-self (anātman). If one deeply meditates upon them with regard to the worldly things, one's desire for their enjoyment is sure to vanish. The teachers of the Buddhist philosophy accept these views.

With regard to the Vaibhāṣikas we know not if they have added anything on this question, but the contributions of the other three Schools, the Sautrāntikas, the Yogācāras, and the Mādhyamikas are remarkable. It appears that they aimed at the elucidation only of the two principles, first and last, i.e. Impermanence and Non-self.

By the theories of Continuum (santati) and Instantaneousness (kṣaṇa-bhaṅga), as shown before, the Sautrāntikas have unmistakably pushed the theory of impermanence farther, infusing a new spirit into it.

In respect of the Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas their contributions are very striking. For desire there must be two things, the subject and the object, and both of them are attacked vigorously by them. By their vijnāna-vāda they ably demonstrate that there is neither a separate subject nor an object, there being only consciousness. They show the non-substantiality of both the self and the elements of existence (pudgalanairāmya and dharma-nairāmya)—a theory shared commonly by the Mādhyamikas. There is no room for desire; for who is to desire and what is to be desired? The Mādhyamikas have also explained by their śūnya-vāda that everything is śūnya, "void," i.e. void of its own state (nihsvabhava), and as such what is to be desired and by whom?

"One who believes in the void is not attracted by worldly things, because they are unsupported. He is not delighted by gain, nor is he cast down by not gaining. He does not feel proud of his glory, nor does he shrink from lack of glory. Scorn does not make him hide, nor does praise win him; he feels attached neither to pleasures, nor does he feel aversion to pain. He who is not so attracted by worldly things knows what void means. Therefore one who believes in the void has neither likes nor dislikes. He knows that to be only void which he might like, and regards it as only void. He who likes or dislikes anything does not know the void, and he who makes quarrel or dispute or debate with anyone does not know this to be only void nor so regards it."

NOTES

1. Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa, X. 6. 4.
2. Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa, XIII. 1-5.
4. It was called also Mahā-vibhāṣā, but in fact there was no difference between them as between nirvāṇa and mahā-parinirvāṇa, the epithet mahā- simply being meant to show some special respect.
5. Yaśomitra says in his Sphuṭārthā (B.B., p. 12) that those who praise or rejoice with or move with or know Vibhāṣā are the Vaibhāṣikas. The explanation of
the word as given in Sarva-darśana-saṅgṛaha (Government Oriental Hindu Series, p. 43) is obviously fanciful.

6. "tadasiti-vādāt sarvāsti-vādāt mataḥ."

7. As in the Sanyuktiṣāgama, i. ii.; See Madhyamaka-vṛtti XXII. 11; Majjhima-Nikāya, iii. 188.


9. Kārīra is expressed also by vyāpāra.

10. As says Vasubandhu in his Abhidharma-kośa V. 25, 26.


12. The Sautrāntikas believe in atoms, but these atoms for them are not actual but only nominal (prajñāpti-sal). Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgṛaha, Sautrāntika, 5.

13. As regards the Śāstra one may be referred to the Madhyānta-vibhāga-sūtra-bhāṣya-śāstra, Cuttaca Oriental Series, p. 11. Generally in such cases the speeches of the Buddha are sūtras and the writings on them by prominent teachers are śāstras.


17. Mahāyāna-sūtra-lahkāra, XVIII. 82-88.


19. Such as the following (Taittirīya U. III. 5. 1): "He perceived that Brahman was vijñāna, from vijñāna all these beings are born, by vijñāna, when born, they live, and into vijñāna they enter at the end."


21. Kāma-loka, rūpa, a-rūpa, "the planes or elements of desire, form and absence of form." The world is included in these three planes.

22. See also Lāṅkāvatāra (X. 15): "There is no external thing as imagined by the fools. The mind is moved by vāsana (impression) and an appearance of objects proceeds." It is to be kept in mind that the words citta, manas, vijñāna and viņñāpi are in fact synonyms, meaning "consciousness" in such cases.


24. Here it is to be pointed out that in both the systems, Vijnāna-vāda and Śūnya-vāda (i.e. the Madhyamika School) Śūnyatā, "voidness" is admitted, but in different senses. For while in the former it means the devoidness of subject and object, as we see here, in the Śūnya-vāda, it implies the devoidness of one's innate state (niḥsvabhāvavāta) as we shall see later on.

25. As in the Ārya-ratna-cūḍa-sūtra (or Paripṛcchā) quoted in the Madhyamaka-vṛtti, p. 62; Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā, p. 392.

26. Trimśikā I, p. 16.

27. This ālaya-vijñāna is regarded as self and is the object of the notion of "I." The consciousness of other things is known as pravṛtti-vijñāna "individual consciousness." They are thus described (Lāṅkāvatāra, II, 99-100): "As the waves of a sea being raised by the wind as their cause go on dancing, and there is no cessation of them, even so the streams of the receptacle consciousness being raised by the wind of objects go on always dancing with various ways of consciousness."

28. Candrakīrttī's explanation of these two words, see Catuḥ-satīkā in the Memoirs of the ASB, Vol. III, No. 8, pp. 449-514.

29. This word is explained by Sthiramati in the Trimśikā, p. 39, saying, "because generated by others, i.e. cause and conditions, it is para-tantra."

30. Sometimes the first and the last terms are used as simply kalpiṇa and naśpanna.

31. See Tri-svabhāva-nirdesa, 28.

32. Says Vasubandhu (Trimśikā, 28): "sthitam vijñāna-mātratve" rests only in vijñāna."

33. Trimśikā, 29-30.

34. For the idealistic views of Gauḍapāda see The Āgama-śāstra of Gauḍapāda,
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pp. cxxxiii ff.; specially the section 15: The Philosophy of Gañḍapāda; III. 35, 46; IV. 47–57, 72, 60–66.

35. Mahā-vagga (Vinaya), I. 6. 17.
36. These two ideas are condemned and a reasonable, i.e. middle, course is accepted also in the Bhagavad-Gītā, VI. 16.
38. With reference to Vijñāna-vādins the word "two" in this connection implies "perceipient and perceptible," i.e. subject and object respectively.
40. Madhyamaka-kārikā, V. 8.
41. See also Madhyamaka-kārikā, XV. 7; Sañyutta-Nikāya, Vol. II, p. 17.
42. Kāśyapa-parivarita, 60 (p. 90), quoted in the Madhyamaka-vṛtti, p. 270.
43. For a number of similar passages in original, one may be referred to the Agama-sūtra of Gañḍapāda, pp. 103–4.
44. Sañyutta Nikāya, II, p. 17 (XII. 15), "The Tathāgata teaches the truth with the middle course."
45. See the principle of the pratītya-samutpāda as described by Nāgārjuna at the beginning of his Madhyamaka-kārikā. There are infinite numbers of attributes, but for the sake of convenience only eight are generally taken as above.
46. The interpretation of the name given in the Sarva-dārśana-saṃgraha (p. 30) is fanciful.
47. They are: existent, non-existent, both and not both. See Catuḥ-satikā VIII. 20; XVI. 25, Madhyamaka-kārikā, XXII. 21.
49. Śvetāsvatara, IV, 18; cf. Byadhārayaśaka, III. 8. 8.
50. Madhyamaka-vṛtti, pp. 264–5. For other grounds against the svabhāva of a thing one is referred to the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra, XI. 50–1.
51. Tatva-ratnāvali included in the Advaya-vajra-saṃgraha, GOS, p. 121. It runs: "Sarvārūpa-vinirmuktām svatas-tattvām ca kāṣāti. Śūnya-tādyabhidhānais tu tatvārūpa-nirākriyā."
52. In māra-viṣaya the word māra, literally "death" or "that which causes death" means "kāma" desire. Considering its evil consequences no better name for it can be suggested.
53. With Madhyamikas the terms are Pudgala-śūnyatā and dharma-śūnyatā respectively.

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CHAPTER IX—continued

THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

C—THE METAPHYSICAL SCHOOLS
OF BUDDHISM

I. THE RISE OF THE SCHOOLS

The tendency to split and diversify itself into Schools and sub-Schools appeared very early in the history of Buddhism. The Kathā-vatthu (c. 246 B.C.) discusses the doctrinal differences of the Schools, which must have been quite well-established by then. The first recorded division of the Buddhist congregation occurred about a hundred years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa at the Council of Vesāli. There the elders (sthaviras) excommunicated the 10,000 Vajjian monks, ostensibly on the interpretation of the ten minor rules of discipline; the real grounds were doctrinal. The Vajjian monks formed themselves into the great order (Mahāsaṅghika). The beginnings of the Mahāyāna can be discerned in this schism. From the elders, the Sarvāsti-vādins and the Sāṃmitiyas separated themselves in course of time. Each of these comprised within it several sub-Schools.

Early Buddhist historians like Vasumitra, Vinitadeva and Bhavya speak of the eighteen different Schools, all rightly claiming to embody the true teaching of the master. Of these only four main Schools deserve consideration: Sthavira-vāda, Sarvāsti-vāda, Mahāsaṅghika and Sāṃmitiya; others are off-shoots of these.

The Sthavira-vāda, predominant at first, gradually declined in importance and influence from the time of the 3rd Council (Aśoka’s reign) till it disappeared altogether from the mainland of India; it, however, continues to thrive in Ceylon, Burma and Siam. The Sarvāsti-vāda was the most dominant and influential School; it had its ramifications all over the country, including Kāśmira and Gāndhāra. The Sāṃmitiyas (Vatsiputrīyas) must have been a prosperous sect with a considerable following. No original works of this sect have been preserved, and there is the disadvantage of having to derive our all too meagre knowledge of this School from its opponents. Universally condemned by the other Schools as heretical, they held tenaciously to the doctrine of the Individual (Pudgala-ātman), a quasi-permanent entity, neither completely identical with nor different from the mental states. The importance of this School is as a transitional stage between the one-sided modal standpoint of the other Schools and the no-position of the Mādhyamika. It is, however, the Mahāsaṅghikas who can be definitely termed the precursors of the Mahāyāna.
religion and philosophy. The implicit differences of the Schools regarding the conception of the real (dharma), nirvāṇa, the buddha-kāya and individual or universal salvation (Bodhisattva ideal) became accentuated and clearer. In their age-long disputation and the clash of ideas, the classical Buddhist systems grew to maturity.

Buddhism is not one unitary system but a matrix of systems. Their internal differences notwithstanding, no School of Buddhism conceived the real as substance (ātman), permanent, identical and universal. Conversely, all non-Buddhist systems, including the Jaina, accepted the reality of the ātman in some form or the other. Nairātmya (substancelessness) is the generic idea of Buddhism that is sought to be understood and interpreted by the several Schools, which thus constitute its species.

In the earliest realistic phase, the rejection of substance (pudgala-nairātmya) was interpreted to mean the reality of the separate elements (dharma). Thera-vāda and Sarvāstī-vāda (Vaibhāṣika) are the chief exponents of this dogmatic pluralistic phase. The classical Sautrāntika is a critical edition of this realism. It evolved a rigorous epistemology on Kantian lines. By its critical and subjective trends, the Sautrāntika paved the way for the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra systems.

The Mādhyamika philosophy, systematized by Nāgārjuna (c. second century A.D.), represents the second and central phase of Buddhist thought. It denied the separate reality of the elements also (dharma-nairātmya); if the substance is a thought-construct (unreal) the modes and attributes are equally so. If the real cannot be conceived as the permanent and universal, as the Sāmkhya and the Vedānta do, it cannot be conceived as momentary particulars either, as the earlier Buddhism does. The Buddha has taught the doctrine of momentariness only as a stepping-stone to the final teaching of the relativity of things (śūnyatā).

Like Śaṅkara's Advaitism on the brahmanical side, the Mādhyamika revolutionized Buddhism. It is a sustained attempt to synthesize the teachings of the Buddhist Scriptures by the adoption of the transcendental (paramārtha) and the phenomenal (saṃvyṛti) standpoints. The Mādhyamika dialectic was born of the criticism of the two radical viewpoints—the substance-view of the brahmanical systems and the modal view of earlier Buddhism. And like the Kantian dialectic, the Mādhyamika is a critique of all philosophy.

The basic ideas of the Mādhyamika system—the Absolute as devoid of empirical determinations, the falsity of appearance and the distinction between the ultimate and phenomena—were accepted. There was, however, a reaction against what appeared to some as its extreme and unqualified rejection of phenomena. The idealism of the Yogācāra (vijñānavāda) School is to be understood as a significant modification of the Mādhyamika negativism (śūnyatā). It contends that the sole reality of consciousness cannot be denied, while the duality of subject and object with
which it is apparently infected must be considered non-existent (śūnya); the duality is unreal; but that, where the negation of duality (dvaya-śūnyatā) obtains, does exist; it is nothing (śūnya). 8

The critical philosophy of Kant led to the idealistic systems of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel in the West; here too the Yogācāra idealism follows as a direct outcome of the Mādhyamika. This is the third great phase of Buddhism.

Tāntricism (Vajra-yāna, Mantra-yāna, etc.) supervened on Vijñāna-vāda. Tāntricism is a unique combination of mantra, ritual and worship on an absolutistic basis; it is both religion and philosophy. It was especially this phase of Buddhism that was propagated in Tibet when it disappeared from India (eleventh to twelfth centuries). Some of the classical Schools of Buddhism find their continuation in China and Japan9 even to this day.

This division of Buddhist thought into the realistic, absolutistic and idealistic phases is in full accord with its logical and chronological development. Buxton10 and other historians of Buddhism speak of these periods as the three swingings of the wheel of law (Dharma-cakra-pravarttana). The non-Buddhists invariably mention four Schools of Buddhism— the Vaibhāṣika, the Sautrāntika, the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra. The first two belong to the Hinayāna and are pluralistic and realistic, and the last two to the Mahāyāna and are absolutistic. The Vaibhāṣika (Ābhidharmika) system occupies the same place in Buddhism as the Sāṅkhya on the orthodox side. Other systems have grown as modification and criticism of this. It is not to be supposed that with the rise of the Mādhyamika, the Ābhidharmika ceased to grow or that the Mādhyamika went out of vogue when the Yogācāra appeared. These Schools continued to develop side by side for centuries; the priority of the one to the other applies only to its first systematic formulation. Buddhism has remained in all the three periods, a dharma theory based on the cardinal doctrine of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda), which received different interpretations; every Buddhist system has claimed to be the middle path. The earlier Buddhism of the Ābhidharmika systems take the dharma-theory as denying substance (ātman), but establishing the reality of the separate elements (dharman). Pratītya-samutpāda is the causal law regulating the rise and subsidence of discrete entities; the middle path is the steering clear of eternalism and nihilism. In the Mādhyamika, this principle is interpreted as the essential dependence of things, the unreality of separate elements; the middle path is the non-acceptance of the two basic views— affirmative (sat) and negative (a-sat). The Vijñāna-vāda avoids the dogmatism of realism (the reality of objects) and the scepticism of nihilism (the rejection of both object and consciousness).
2. THE BASIC DOCTRINES OF BUDDHISM

Existence is declared anicca (impermanent), anatta (substanceless) and dukkha (pain) in the Pāli Canons. But this was arrived at rather through intuition and observation than by any rigorous a priori arguments. This was done later, especially by the Sautrāntika. The characteristic nairatmya standpoint of all Buddhism can be presented as a polemic against substance, the permanent and the universal taken as real in the systems of the ālma-tradition; it maintains the three connected theses—momentariness (kṣanikatva) substancelessness (anāmatva) and uniqueness (sva-laksana) of entities.

The real is the efficient, i.e. that which causes some effect (artha-kriyā-kārin). The permanent as the non-efficient is unreal. Causal efficiency can be either simultaneous or successive. If simultaneous, all the effects being completed at once, it may be asked whether the permanent exists after the first moment or not? If it does, it should produce the same effects in the second and succeeding moments, thus giving rise to an interminable series of the same effect from one cause. This is an absurdity. If it does not produce this series, though continuing to exist in the succeeding moments, then it is evident that there is a manifest difference in its nature between the first and other moments: for, in the first moment it is efficient (samartha) while in other moments it is not so (a-samartha) with regard to the same effect. That cannot be one (i.e. an identical thing) of which two or more opposed characteristics are predicated. Nor is the permanent efficient successively, e.g. A first produces X, then Y, then Z. It might be asked whether A is capable of producing Y when it is producing X. If it were, A would produce all the effects at once, and the second alternative will be reduced to the first one of simultaneous production. If it is not capable, it will never produce the effect, as a piece of stone cannot produce the sprout given any length of time. If we still think that A is one and the same entity in two or more moments, then it is both efficient and inefficient at once with regard to the same effect.

It may be objected that a cause (e.g. the seed) is the same: only the efficiency is owing to the presence or absence of auxiliary conditions (sahakārin). But do these conditions mean anything to the permanent? The mere inoperative presence of them will not bring about any result. They must therefore first modify the seed before it can sprout. It is the seed as changed that produces the effect. If the modification were an integral part of the seed, it should have that always. If it is not, then the seed has two natures—one, what it is in itself and the other what it becomes in response to its auxiliary conditions. But accepting two natures of a thing is really to accept two things, according to the Buddhist dictum already mentioned. Thus things are different every moment; difference of
time is difference of thing; at no two moments is a thing identical. Existence is momentary (kṣaṇika).

The same conclusion can be enforced by the consideration of decay and destruction. The vulgar notion is that a thing will continue to exist unless it is destroyed by opposite forces. But if a thing is not capable of destruction by itself, no amount of external influence can affect it, much less reduce it to nothing. The blow from a stick destroys the pitcher, it may be said. But if destruction were not inherent to the pitcher, the blow should mean nothing to it; it should continue to exist as before untouched, like empty space. If the destruction were inherent to the pitcher, the blow of the stick is merely an occasion for its cessation; it does not bring it about. Consider for a moment what is meant by the ageing or decaying of a thing. It is not the case that a thing continues to exist unaffected for any stretch of time and then suddenly begins to change. It changes every moment, uniformly, unperceived, relentlessly. Can we not say, therefore, that change or even birth is death every moment; the thing must become different at every moment of its existence. Permanence of a thing is an illusion, like the oneness of the flame or of the stream. Existence is flux. A thing is a point-instant, having neither a "before" nor an "after"; it has no span temporally; there is no duration. Cessation is inherent to things and is entire (a-hetuko nir-anwuyo vināśah).

Precisely the same logic is applied to refute the reality of the whole (avayavīn). What constitutes one thing? We might hold with common sense that the table is one entity, the tree is one, though they may consist of parts. But the table is partly seen and partly not, as it is impossible to see all the parts at once. Parts of the tree move and some other parts do not; a part of it is in shade and a part of it is sunlit. How can that be one entity of which two or more opposed characteristics (e.g. seen and unseen, moving and unmoving, dark and sunlit) are ascribed? It is not possible to escape this logic by stating that what is moving is one part and what is not moving is different from it. For both the parts belong to the same thing; the characteristics of the parts belong to the thing—the whole of which they are parts. Therefore there are as many things as there are distinguishable "parts" or aspects. An entity has no extensity or complexity of content. The oneness of many things ("parts" and aspects) is illusory as the oneness of a heap of corn.

So a thing is not only an instant (kṣaṇika) lacking duration, but also a spatial point lacking all magnitude and diversity as well.

By the same logic we are led to the denial of the universal (sāmānya) or identical aspect of things. Each entity is discrete and unique (sva-lakṣaṇa). The existence of the universal, uniform and identical, in all the particulars is beset with insuperable difficulties. How can one entity exist in a number of particulars separated by distance of space and time, in entirety, untouched by what happens to the particulars? Moreover, in cognizing a
thing, we do not certainly cognize it (the particular) and its duplicate (the universal). Wherefrom does a universal, say manhood, come into a newborn man? Where does it go when the man dies? Owing to such difficulties the Buddhist holds that all existence is particular; the universal is a thought-construct, a vikalpa.

The existence of a thing or its destruction are mere modes of expression, like the body of a statue or the head of "Rāhu." Existence and destruction are not attributes or accretions of a thing but the thing itself. Change, on the Buddhist conception, is replacement of one entity by another; it is a series of entities emerging and perishing in entirety; one entity does not become another. Movement is not the passage of an entity from one point to another; it is the emergence, at appropriate intervals, of a series of entities, like the individual pictures of a "movie" show. There is neither flow nor movement in each entity nor in the series; it is the spectator who projects that into the several static entities.

As knowledge and object are not simultaneous, there is no grasping of or appropriation of one by the other; the relation is causal. And as there is no persistence of entities and they emerge and perish entire, causation really turns out to be a kind of occasionalism. These inherent difficulties lead Buddhist thought towards subjectivism and idealism.

3. THE ĀBHIDHARMKA PHILOSOPHY

The Thera-vāda and the Sarvāstī-vāda

The Ābhidhamka is the first systematic attempt to synthesize the Buddha’s teachings. It is the realistic and dogmatic tendency that gets expressed first; the absolutist systems arise as a criticism of this. "Abhidharma" is defined in the Abhidharma-kośa as pure intuitive knowledge of the dharma (existents) with its subsidiary discipline. It is an attempt to penetrate to the ultimate reality and define it.

Thera-vāda.—The seven Abhidhamma treatises of the Pāli Canon, traditionally treated as the word of the Buddha, are really the Thera-vāda interpretation. The Dhamma-saṅgani and its subsidiary works consist of interminable lists of dhammas (entities) from various standpoints, the ethical interest predominating. The statements are mostly headlines or mnemonic aids (mātikās) meant to be supplemented by oral exposition. There is little attempt at argument, and the underlying metaphysical principles are seldom elicited. This dogmatism continued to cramp Thera-vāda down the ages. The first systematic treatise of this School—The Visuddhi-magga of Buddhaghoṣa (Vasubandhu’s contemporary) compares rather unfavourably with the Abhidharma-kośa in metaphysical content; it is, however, valuable as an ethical treatise. Anuruddha’s Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha (eleventh century A.D.), widely used in Ceylon,
Burma and Siam, is not a very illuminating compendium; it is one more compilation of lists.

It is doubtful if Thera-vāda was ever cultivated on the mainland of India; it is an almost exclusive product of the southern Buddhist countries. When the Madhyamika or the Yogācāra refer to the Abhidharma system, it is invariably to the Sarvāstī-vāda and not to the Pāli or Ceylonese School.\(^{19}\)

Sarvāstī-vāda.—The Sarvāstī-vāda can claim to be as old as the Thera-vāda with which it has close doctrinal affinity. Its ultra-realistic tendency evinced in taking the past and the future events as equally existent as the present has been criticized by other Schools. From this the School derives its name, Sarva-(dā)sti-vāda as the doctrine that affirms existence at all times.

The Sarvāstī-vādins kept their Canons in Sanskrit; fragments of these have been discovered in Central Asia and Gilgit. Though spread in the entire country, it had its principal seat at Kāśmīra and Gāndhāra. Its extensive Abhidharma literature, lost in Sanskrit, is preserved in entirety in Chinese\(^{20}\) and partially in Tibetan. The basic work is the Jñāna-prasthāna of Kātyāyanīputra with the six subsidiary works\(^{21}\) (Sat-pādaḥ), three of which are attributed to the immediate disciples of the Buddha. These are: Prakaraṇa-pāda by Vasumitra, Vijñāna-kāya by Devaśarman, Dharma-skandha by Sāriputra, Prajñāpīti-śāstra by Maudgalāyana, Dhātu-kāya by Pūrṇa and Saṅgīti-paryāya by Mahākauśṭhila.

A further stage in the development of the Sarvāstī-vāda is represented by the composition of commentaries of epic proportions, the Mahā-vibhāṣā and the shorter Vibhāṣā during or about the reign of Kaniṣṭha (c. A.D. 125). According to Takakusu, the former belongs to the Kāśmīra and the latter to the Gāndhāra section.\(^{22}\) Sarvāstī-vāda is usually called the Vaibhāṣika\(^{23}\) because it is a system based on the Vibhāṣā.

The Abhidharma-hydaya by Dharmottara and its commentary mark the beginnings of the third and systematic period of the School. The Abhidharma-kośa\(^{24}\) of Vasubandhu (c. 350) is the acknowledged standard treatise (śāstra) of this system. Nyāyānusāra (Nanjio, 1265) and Abhidharma-samaya-pradīpikā (Nanjio, 1266) were written by his contemporary, Saṅgabhadra, to correct the Sautrāntika leanings of Vasubandhu. The Sphūṭārthā of Yasomitra is a very valuable and extensive commentary extant in Sanskrit.

Dharma.—The Vaibhāṣika is a radical pluralism erected on the denial of substance and the acceptance of discrete momentary dharmas. "Dharma" is the ultimate factor or element of existence—a sense which the term has only in Buddhism. Dharmas are ultimate, as they are simple (prthag) and not compounded of simpler entities. A thing (e.g. chair, tree, man) is an aggregate (skandha) of these elements; the aggregate or the whole (avaya) is not an additional reality as in the Vaiśeṣika. The elements are
impermanent; they are momentary and durationless. "There is no inherence of one element in another, hence no substance apart from qualities; no matter beyond the separate sense-data, and no soul beyond the separate mental data (dharma = anatman)."25

The dharmas are classified and defined in the Abhidharma treatises, notably in the Kośa. The Sarvāsti-vāda lists 75 dharmas in all, 72 conditioned phenomena (samskṛta, literally, the co-operating) and 3 unconditioned noumena (a-sanskṛta, the non-co-operating). Conditioned by ignorance (avidyā) and its satellite passions (klesas), the elements co-operate to flow as the defined stream (sāsrava) of phenomenal life26 (saṁsāra, upādāna); the sanskṛta are thus pain (duḥkha) or cause of pain (samudaya). The same elements, separated and suppressed through spiritual discipline (mārga) culminating in intuitive knowledge (prajñā), are reduced to quiescence,27 a state of blank (nirvāna). This is one of the three unconditioned realities. The second is the cessation (a-pratisamkhyāniruddha)28 produced, not by knowledge as in the case of nirvāna, but by lack of necessary conditions; for example, owing to attention being diverted elsewhere, smell, taste, etc., lapse away without being apprehended. The third unconditioned is space (ākāśa); it is defined as non-obstruction29: it neither obstructs as providing room for entities nor is obstructed, being empty.

Declaring them nominal, the Sautrāntikas rejected all the three unconditioned, including nirvāna. The Thera-vādins accepted nirvāna alone, while the Yogācāra increased them to six, adding acalā (stable), saṁjñāvedayitā-niruddha (catalytic ecstasy) and tathātā (thatness), the last of which alone is really the noumenon.

The classification of the dharmas into skandha, āyatana and dhātu is such a persistent and universal feature of the Canons that it can be attributed to the Buddha himself. These analyse the individual into a number of states without the residue of any soul or substance. The classifications may be called subjective, as the interest is predominantly in sentient experience, in the individual and his components.

The skandhas (groups)30 are five: rūpa (material or bodily factors), vedanā (feeling), saṁjñā (conception and generalizing), saṁskāra (will and other forces) and viññāna (pure awareness). The āyatana is literally a "door" for the emergence of consciousness and its factors. The āyatanas are twelve—the six sense organs (including the manas) with the corresponding six sense-data, including the objects of thought. The dhātu is a further elaboration of the āyatana; they make eighteen with the interpolation of the six resultant apprehensions, e.g. visual consciousness, etc., in between the sense-organs and the sense-data.

In the objective classification,31 the dharmas are divided into 5 classes: rūpa (matter) (11), citta [consciousness (1)], cetasika [mental states and characteristics (46)], Citta-viprayuktā-saṁskāra [forces which are neither
mental nor material but common to both (14) and the a-saṁskṛta [the unconditioned (3)]. The last category has already been considered.

Matter (rūpa) is impenetrable, hard (saṁpratīgha). It is divided into the five sense-data (colour, etc.), five sense organs (indriya) which are conceived as a kind of translucent subtle matter (rūpa-prasāda) and unmanifest matter (a-vijñapti-rūpa)32 which is the result, good or bad, of any act or resolution; this corresponds to the adṛṣṭa of the brāhmaṇical systems. Matter is either primary (bhūta or mahā-bhūta) or secondary (bhautika). The primary33 are four—earth, water, fire and air; they are known by their characteristics—solidity, moisture, heat and motion; their functions are supporting, cohesion, ripening and expansion.

"The general elements of matter, like all Buddhist elements, are more forces than substances. These four elements appear always together, always in equal proportion. There is as much element of heat in a blazing flame as there is in wood or in water, and vice versa, the difference is only in their intensity."34

Citta or vijñāna is contentless consciousness and represents but one element, though it may be spoken of as admitting six modes depending on the sense organs invoking it. The Thera-vādins elaborately classify this into 89 kinds according to the planes of existence and conditions.35 The Yogācāra enumerates eight vijñānas, adding ālaya and kliṣṭa-mano-vijñāna to the six.

The "mentals" (caittas, cetasikas) are enumerated as 4636 and are subdivided into those that are present in all states (mahā-bhūmi, 10), ten general properties associated with "good" (kuśala) states, 6 primary passions (kliṣṭas), 2 evil mental properties (a-kuṣala), 10 subsidiary passions (upā-kliṣṭa) and 8 indeterminate elements (a-niyata).

Under the category non-mental forces (caitta-vīprayukta-saṃskāra) the Sarvāstī-vāda brings fourteen77 functions, like attainment (prāpti) birth, continuation, decay, death, etc. The Yogācāras inflate this list to 24; all these are, however, phenomenal with them. The Sautrāntikas refused to accept these as separate entities, as they are but modes of conceiving the behaviour of elements.

Causal Law.—The ultimate elements of existence have been determined and defined. We have now to explain the modes of their combination to make phenomena (saṃskṛta); the question is about the dynamics of the world-process.

Buddhism has always insisted upon the universality and inexorability of the causal law. The Buddha, rejecting the opposite views of eternalism and nihilism, applied the principle especially in the context of moral responsibility. Things do not happen through chance, fate or God (Īśvara); nor are they immutable. It is karman—the deed that we did and do—that constitutes the world and accounts for its variety (karmajam loka-vaiś cittam).38 The causal law implies in Buddhism, as we have seen, momen-
tariness, substancelessness and particularity (sva-lakṣaṇa). It is inexorably and incessantly operative in all the three planes of existence; only the unconditioned are beyond the pale of this. It is also a necessary implication of the conditioned that it cannot be produced from a single cause (na hyekam ekasmāt), but from a conglomeration of causes, and that the effect is different from the cause.

Causality is conceived both in a general and a special sense. The former is represented by the division into principal cause (hetu, e.g. the seed in producing the sprout) and the three kinds of conditions (pratyayas), namely object condition (ālambana), immediate antecedence (saṃanantara) and dominant condition (adhipati).

The special application of the causal law in the case of the individual is the twelve linked chain of pratyāya-samutpāda. The Abhidharma-kośa interprets this thus: "The ātman (substance) exists not; the five groups progressing as a stream of momentary entities, conditioned by karmā and passions, enter into the womb. And nourished by the appropriate karmā and passions, the continuum of states passes from birth to birth. This incessantly rotating wheel of life is the pratyāya-samutpāda—the twelve-link-chain with its three subdivisions. The first two members—ignorance and passions (avidyā and saṃskāras)—belong to the previous life, the eight in the middle to the present and the last two to the future birth."42

Phenomenal existence is pain. It is caused by attachment, aversion, greed and the other passions (kleśas). These have their origin in ignorance, the wrong view that there is a permanent, identical being (ātman); we cling to things taking them as permanent. The wrong belief in the ātman (sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi) is thus the root-cause of pain; it starts and keeps going the chain of existence (pratyāya-samutpāda). Realizing this, the aspirant for nirvāṇa undertakes the spiritual discipline leading to the cessation of pain. As in all Buddhism, the discipline consists of three stages—practice of virtues (śīla) contemplation (samādhi) and intuitive insight (prajñā). The Abhidharma treatises speak of the four stages of attainment and the sixteen moments of realization of insight, four for each basic truth (ārya-satya).

According to the Abhidharma conception there is a real transformation of the conditioned (saṃskṛta) into the unconditioned noumenal state through the force of insight. Nirvāṇa is conceived almost as a state of negation or extinction of the phenomenal forces. All this implies that nirvāṇa and phenomena are totally different. The Mādhyamika controverts these.

4. THE SAUTRĀNTIKA SCHOOL

(Critical Realism)

Criticism of Sarvāstivāda.—The dogmatism of the Ābhidharmika, its tendency to hypostatize subjective notions and words into objective
realities and especially its doctrine of the existence of the elements at all times, evoked criticism from other Schools. The Sautrāntika, which discards the Abhidharma works and bases itself on the direct discourses (sūtra) of the Buddha, represents the systematic form of this criticism.

The Sarvāsti-vādins assert the existence of all elements (dharmas) in the past, present and future “(1) because this has been declared in Scripture, (2) because of the double (cause of perception), (3) because of the existence of the object of perception, (4) because of the production of a result (by previous deeds). Since we maintain that all this exists we profess the theory that everything exists (Sarvāsti-vāda).” The main argument is that as cognition is engendered by the appropriate sense-organ and the object, when we remember a past event or think of the future, these must be existent to function as objects. Past passions too are observed to influence our attitude in the present. Four alternative theories were propounded to explain the nature of existence in the three times.*

The Sautrāntika asks: “If the element in the future and in the past exists just in the same sense as in the present, why is it future and past?” All temporal distinctions would then get submerged. Nor can it be said that the essence of an element exists in the past and future and not its function; for a thing is nothing but the function. To accept the continued existence of elements is a species of eternalism. It is also not necessary that something must be actually present to be an object of thought. This would lead to absurd consequences: the remote future, the non-existent or the unattained nirvāna would exist when they are thought of. The naïve realist that he is, the Sarvāsti-vadin fails to distinguish between the existent and the subsistent thought-forms.

Dharmas.—The Sautrāntikas cut down the inflated lists of dharmas drawn by the Vaibhāṣikas. Not only did they reject the past and the future phases, but also space (ākāsa) nirvāṇa and the non-mental forces (citta-viprayuṭa). In the final analysis, a list of 43 elements under five heads was drawn up. This comprises:

(a) Matter (rūpa)—four primary forms (upādana) and four derivative (upādāya-rūpa);
(b) Feelings (vedanā)—pleasure, pain and neutral;
(c) Signs, sense-organs (saṃjñā) 6—five sense-organs and mind (citta);
(d) Consciousness (vijñāna) 6—corresponding to the six signs mentioned above;
(e) Forces (saṃskāras) 20—ten good and ten bad.

Epistemology.—The real contribution of the Sautrāntika to the development of Indian thought is the discovery of the subjective—the transcendent—function of the mind in constructing the empirical world. Diṇṇāga (fifth century) and Dharmakīrtti (seventh century) have formulated a rigorous and revolutionary logic and epistemology on Kantian lines.
Pramāṇa (valid avenues of knowledge) is the subject of enquiry. Pramāṇa is defined as knowledge that is not at variance with the real; further, it is the cognition of the un cognized. Four are the issues with regard to the pramāṇas—their number, nature, object and result (phala). The entire Buddhist logic is based on the acceptance of two modes of knowledge: immediate (pratyakṣa) and mediate (anumāna); they are mutually exclusive and exhaustive taken together. The function of the one is to receive (grahaṇa) or acquaint us with the given, of the other is to think (adhyaivasāya) it according to some pattern. There is a remarkable coincidence of this with Kant’s position: “... there are two stems of human knowledge, namely, sensibility and understanding, which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root. Through the former, objects are given to us; through the latter, they are thought.”

This does not mean that there are two co-ordinate realities—the particular and the universal. The particular alone is real (meyaṁ tvekaṁ sva-lakṣaṇam). But it is cognized in a two-fold way: one as it is in itself (sva-rūpa) in perception and second through forms other to it (para-rūpa) in the understanding. Of the two sources, perception is the prius of which the understanding is a secondary and false elaboration. The particular alone is unconditionally real (paramārtha-sat); the universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) is ultimately unreal (a-vastu); inference is essentially misapprehension (bhrāntam anumānam). Ultimately unreal, it is, however, empirically veridical. “Neither of the two rays, one emanating from the jewel and the other forming the lamp, is the jewel; but by mistaking the former for the jewel, it can be reached, not by the other.”

Indirect knowledge (anumāṇa) cannot be dispensed with. For, to assert that perception is the only source involves distinction and relation as we speak about it. Besides, to have the sensation “blue” is not to know it as blue. To be aware of perception as perception is to define and distinguish it from others. And definition (adhyavasāya) can come only through conception (vikalpa). Moreover, an intra-subjective world wherein several percipients participate necessitates exposition of one’s experience through the mediation of symbols and concepts. Inference (anumāṇa) has therefore to be accepted besides perception.

"Pratyakṣa" signifies, etymologically, "present to sense"; but the essential factor underlying such knowledge may be taken as immediacy, pure acquaintance. Diṅnāga defines pratyakṣa as (knowledge) free from construction (kalpanā), i.e. name and generality, etc. The definition is necessarily negative as excluding thought-construction; it only serves to distinguish perception from what it is not, from the nameable. It is not valid to urge that nothing is left over when the thought-forms are abstracted from a thing; for there must be in experience the irreducible core of the given, the that on which thought-forms are overlaid. If the that were not experienced, thought cannot be stimulated to begin its inter-
pretation. That the subject in a judgment is not reducible to the predicate does not warrant its rejection. The real subject falls outside the judgment which is an ideal content predicated of it. "Thought would be empty without the percept," the given in intuition. Its presence or absence marks all the difference to experience.

Intuition is essentially true, non-discrepant from its object. The possibility of error is ruled out as there is no judgment, interpretation. Its object is the thing-in-itself (paramārtha-sat) which the Sautrāntika, as a true Buddhist, takes as the unique point-instant (sva-lakṣana). Some Advaitins too assert that in perception we intuit the thing-in-itself; but here it is the universal differenceless Identity (Brahman).

Four are the varieties of intuition: (1) the sensuous (indrya-nimittam); (2) the mental (mānasa-pratyakṣa) which is consequent on the preceding sensuous intuition, having for its object the point-instant immediately following that of the sensuous. The need for admitting this rather ghostly function is the same that prompted Kant to formulate his schematism of the categories, i.e. to find a modus vivendi between perception and thought; (3) The direct intuition (self-awareness, sva-saṃvedana) of consciousness and the mental states as pleasure and pain, etc. These are neither non-cognized as in the Bhāṭṭa view nor cognized by another state as in the Nyāya; (4) The yogi-pratyakṣa is the non-sensuous intellectual intuition of the saint, who by the power of concentration (bhāvanā) perceives things as they are with the utmost clarity.

For the Buddhist, the determinate (sa-vikalpa) perception of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā is not perception, as it is complicated with thought (vikalpa). As synthesizing the thing with the one seen earlier, as in recognition, it is not confined to the immediately given. The baby’s recognizing its mother’s breast as the same (sa eveti) and leaving off crying has all the ingredients of vikalpa, though words may not be used actually. Vikalpa is thus knowledge that is identified with verbal designations or fit to be so. Diinnāga defined it as the application of name and universal. This has been criticized because the universal (substance, etc.) is nothing but a name.

As kalpanā is name, a classification of kalpanā is a classification of names. Diinnāga thus takes over the current categories of words as Kant does the table of judgments of formal logic. These are: Individual (proper) names, universals, substance, attribute and action.

If knowledge of generality (nāma-jāti) were the object of inference alone (sāmānya-visayam anumānam), and inference is impossible without the conscious use of the general (hetu, middle term), a vicious circle or a regress is unavoidable. Kumārila pertinently raises this objection against the Buddhist doctrine of two acts of knowledge with two exclusive objects. The Buddhist, however, escapes this predicament by accepting two orders of the vikalpa—one that is tied to the percept (pratyakṣa-
and the other freed from it and used consciously as a sign (liṅga, middle term) in inference (anumāna-vikalpa). The former is the judgment which is the ascription of an ideal content to the sense given; the latter is inference, the ascription of an idea through another idea.

The perceptual judgment—and this is judgment par excellence—is not a third74 source of knowledge in either of its forms: affirmative (vidhi-vikalpa) and negative, i.e. differentiation (nīṣedha-vikalpa). As entities are different by themselves, differentiation in thought does not state anything new; it is thus not a valid source of knowledge. Affirmation or glossing over differences of entities and their momentariness to present an identical generalized aspect is virtually a false ascription; hence this too is not a valid source.

Inference is two-fold, inference for oneself (svārthānumāna) and that meant for others (parārthānumāna). The first is primary and the second is but the verbal demonstration that convinces others. Inference is the cognition of the non-presented through the conscious use of a sign (liṅga, middle), e.g. smoke, necessarily possessing the three75 characteristics (trirūpa); the presence of the middle in the subject of inference (pakṣa, minor) wholly, its presence in similar instances (sapakṣa) only and its absence from all dissimilar instances (vipakṣa). The violation of these rules leads respectively to the three fallacies, a-siddha (inconclusive), anāikāntika (discrepent) and the viruddha (contrary).

There are only three types of concomitance76 (a-vinā-bhāva) or categories of relation between the middle and the major. The two primary modes are dichotomically two—one for affirming and the other for denying (anupalabdhi) the existence of the thing in question (sādhyā). The first admits of two sub-classes—one in which two concepts have one identical77 objective reference (tādāntmya or svabhāva-hetu), e.g. this is a tree, because it is an oak; and the other in which the two, though different, are yet necessarily dependent78 as cause and effect (tad-utpatti or kārya-hetu), e.g. there is fire, because of smoke. All these types of relation are established neither by observation nor by non-observation;79 they are the a priori necessity of thought.

In both immediate and mediate knowledge, the resultant knowledge (pramāṇa) is identical77 with the means which engenders it.

5. THE DIALECTICAL ABSOLUTISM OF THE MĀDHYA-MIKĀ

Criticism of Sautrāntika.—The Sautrāntika epistemology is a two-level theory. It is based on the recognition of two classes of objects—the thing-in-itself given in intuition and its conceptual representation in
thought (vikalpa). Experience is the synthesis or identification (sārūpya) of these two heterogeneous factors. This relation of sārūpya has been taken to mean representationism. The essence of representationism is that we do not directly perceive objects, but are aware of our ideas only (the copies of things). The Sautrāntika, however, emphatically asserts that we are in direct contact with the real in perception. His doctrine only means that the subjective factor in our knowledge is mistaken for the objective, the thing-in-itself. The mistake, however, is not empirical in origin. The Sautrāntika theory has greater affinity with Kant’s analysis of experience than with Locke’s; it reveals, through criticism, the function of thought.

This devastating discovery of the Sautrāntika led to important developments in two directions—to the Mādhyamika absolutism and the Yogācāra idealism. The Mādhyamika urges that the Sautrāntika indeed alights on the subjective, but does not appreciate its greater depth; he hastily erects a speculative system by accepting the reality of momentary entities on which thought-forms are imposed. He is not critical enough. An equally plausible system can be and has been erected, by the Vedānta, on the opposite theory of the real as permanent, universal and identical on which difference and change are superimposed. One is the nairātmya-vāda and the other is the ātma-vāda, and they are antinomical.79 Both cannot be true, and the conflict cannot be resolved except by rejecting both as subjective. The real cannot be conceived either as momentary or permanent, particular or universal. Both are vikalpa—conceptual construction. To apprehend the real as it is, these viewpoints (dṛṣṭis) have to be negated (śūnyatā of dṛṣṭis). This is the Mādhyamika dialectic; it is criticism grown to maturity.

The Yogācāra was considerably exercised over the relation (sārūpya) between the thing and its subjective counterpart. That the one is falsely identified with the other presupposes a foundational reality. This can be no other than consciousness (vijnapti-mātrata). The Sautrāntika, while insisting on the ideality of the phenomenal object, accepts the independence of the thing in itself. The Yogācāra criticism, like the Hegelian criticism of Kant, is that the other in thought (objectivity) is itself a creation of vijnāna—consciousness; the dualism of subject and object (grāha-dvaya)—presupposes a non-dual consciousness. This alone is ultimately real.

The critical realism of the Sautrāntika thus leads on the one hand to the dialectical absolutism of the Mādhyamika and the idealism of the vijnāna-vāda on the other.

Evolution of Mādhyamika Thought.—Dialectic is the soul of the Mādhyamika philosophy. It is anticipated in essentials by the Buddha when he declined to answer the fourteen questions (the avyākta) regarding the world, the soul and the perfect being (tathāgata) and kept silent.80 It has been suggested that the Buddha, practically minded, was indifferent to
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metaphysics or that he was an agnostic or a nihilist. Professor Radhakrishnan states the correct solution of this silence: "If the Buddha declined to define the nature of the Absolute or if he contented himself with negative definitions, it is only to indicate that absolute being is above all determinations." The Buddha sets himself above all dogmatism: "The Tathāgata is free from all theories." To Kaccāyana he says: "That everything exists is one extreme, that it does not exist is another. The Tathāgata preaches the truth from the middle position (majjhena dhammam deseti)." This is the essence of the Mādhyamika dialectic, and Nāgārjuna makes pointed reference to this passage.

The Prajñā-pāram-īta texts, Sad-dharma-puṇḍarīka, Kāsyapa-parivarta (ratna-kūla) and other Mahāyāna sūtras form the next stage in the development of the Mādhyamika. The one basic idea that is reiterated in these treatises is that there is no origination or cessation, no coming in or going out and that the real is neither ātman nor anātman, etc.; it is utterly devoid (śūnya) of empirical determinations. The doctrine of two truths and the non-distinction of the absolute and phenomena are also emphasized.

The Mādhyamika system seems to have been perfected at one stroke by the genius of its founder—Nāgārjuna (c. A.D. 150). There has not been many important changes in its philosophy after him. He has been ably helped by his brilliant disciple, Āryadeva. According to Busston, six are the main treatises by Nāgārjuna: Mūla-Mādhyamaka-kārikā (Prajñā-mūla) which is the Sāstra of this School, Śūnyatā-saṬṭati, Yuktī-śaṬṭikā, Vigraha-vyāvarttanī, Vaidalya-sūtra and Vyavahāra-siddhi. Numerous other works are also attributed to Nāgārjuna, some (Ratnāvalī, Catur-stava, etc.) with justification. Āryadeva's Catur-śatikā is next in importance only to the Mādhyamaka-kārikā. By his great dialectical skill and refutation of non-Buddhist systems as the Śāṅkhyā and the Vaiśeṣika, he made the system strong and popular.

In the next stage there is the splitting up of the Mādhyamika into two Schools—the Prāsaṅgika represented by Buddhāpālita and the Svātantra upheld by Bhāvaviveka, who considers that the Mādhyamika should not rest content with reductio ad absurdum (prasaṅga) arguments but must advance counter-arguments of his own. Hence the name Svātantra Mādhyamika. Both were contemporaries and belonged to the fifth century A.D.

It is Candraśīlī (sixth century) and Śāntideva (seventh century) that give to the Mādhyamika system its rigorous orthodox form, Candraśīlī is a commentator and author of unequalled merit; his dialectical skill is of the highest order. Stcherbatsky describes him as "a mighty champion of the purely negative method of establishing monism." Against Bhāvaviveka he reaffirms the reductio ad absurdum (prasaṅga) as the correct Mādhyamika method. Besides his commentaries on the works
of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, Candrakīrtti has written a valuable work on
the system entitled the Madhyamakāvatāra.

Śāntideva’s Śikṣā-samuccaya (a compendium of Mahāyāna texts) and
Bodhi-caryāvatāra are the two most popular works in the entire Mahāyāna
literature. A very high order of spiritual serenity and detachment pervades
his works.

In Śāntirakṣita’s (c. eighth century) Tattva-saṁgraha and his disciple
Kamalaśīla’s Pañjikā, we find a new phase—the syncreticism of the
Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika. “It is they who culturally conquered
Tibet and made it a land of Buddhism. The Mādhyamika remains to this
day the official philosophy of the Tibetan Church.”

The Structure of the Mādhyamika Dialectic.—Dialectical consciousness
is engendered by at least two viewpoints (dyṣṭis) diametrically opposed to
each other as thesis and antithesis. The opposition is total, as affecting
every aspect of things and practically interminable as there is no appeal
to experience. Philosophy, cultivated seriously and systematically, leads
to this conflict in reason; dialectic is implicit in philosophy.

The substance-view (ātma-vāda) of the brāhmaṇical systems and the
modal view (nairātmya-vāda) of the earlier Buddhism are the two “mo-
m ents” of the Mādhyamika dialectic. The primary alternatives are thus
two: the affirmative (sat, “is”) and the negative (a-sat, “not-is”). These are
conjunctively affirmed and denied, yielding two derivative alternatives of
the form, both is and not-is (sadasat) and neither is nor not-is (na sat
naivāsat). This is the celebrated catus-koṭi of the Mādhyamika. These four
alternatives87 represent all the possible standpoints from which every
problem can be viewed; they also provide a schema under which all systems
of philosophy can be classified.

The conflict is sought to be resolved in other dialectical systems, as in
Hegel and Jainism, by synthesizing or combining the alternatives. In the
Mādhyamika, the resolution is achieved by rejecting the alternatives
taken singly or in combination and rising to a higher standpoint which is
really no position. Every thesis is turned against itself; its implicit self-
contradiction is laid bare by the dialectic through reductio ad absurdum
(prasaṅga)88 arguments. The Mādhyamika does not adduce arguments and
examples of his own, as he has no thesis of his own to prove; his sole concern
is to disprove others on principles and arguments acceptable to them.89

To illustrate the dialectical procedure in the case of causality. The
Sāmkhya advocates the theory of self-becoming or identity between cause
and effect. The Mādhyamika cogently urges90 that there is no point in
self-duplication, nor is there any conceivable limit to such duplication.
The opposite theory of the effect being an other to the cause does not fare
better. As the two are different, the effect should be capable of emerging
from everywhere,91 nowhere. If on the former theory, there is really no
emergence or production, in the second, there is emergence but it is un-
caused. A synthesis of the two theories, like that of the Jaina, only exposes itself to the objections raised against either. The fourth alternative which denies both the views really denies causation and supports fortuitous origination.

The same devastating criticism is applied in turn against all categories—substance, quality, relation, etc. Like Bradley, Nāgārjuna comes to the conclusion that there is no entity which is not relative. And the relative is unreal. Thought distorts reality and gives us appearance only.

It is held that criticism is not possible without holding a standpoint of one’s own. The acceptance of a common or special standpoint by the disputants cannot obviously decide the issue in anyone’s favour. A theory can be refuted not by advancing a rival theory but by bringing home to the holder of the theory its self-contradictions. This and only this the Mādhyamika does. Nor can it be urged that criticism of theories is one more theory, that the śūnyatā of views (drṣṭis) is itself a view. Criticism as awareness or analysis of views is not the advocacy of one other view, but the showing up of the constitution of views. Prajñā (śūnyatā) is thus the resolution of viewpoints.

**Absolute.**—It might be thought that the Mādhyamika dialectic ends in utter negation and the system is a special pleading of elaborate nihilism. The criticism is misinformed and misses the nature of the system. The method is negative, and not the end. Denial of the competence of thought to cognize reality is not denial of the real. Thought is not the only form of knowledge. The Mādhyamika dialectic rises by three “moments” to an intuitive or non-dual knowledge of the real. There is first the clash of the views (drṣṭi-vāda) as indulged in by dogmatism. The second moment arises with the awareness of these views or thought-constructs as a falsification of the real. This is enforced by reductio ad absurdum arguments. The utter negation of thought is at once the intuition of the tattva (Real) free from the duality of “is” and “not-is.” It is prajñā (wisdom) or jñānam advayam, and is identical with the Absolute.

Tattva (Real) is accepted as basic to appearances, and is defined as “transcendent to thought, as non-relative, indeterminate, quiescent, non-discursive and non-dual.” Affirmative as well as negative predicates are denied of it. The absolute is devoid (śūnya) of every kind of thought-determination. The transcendence of the absolute does not mean that it is an other and is outside phenomenon; it is their essential reality. Nāgārjuna therefore declares that there is not the least difference between the Absolute (nirvāṇa) and the universe. The universe, viewed as a process in relation to causes and conditions, is the phenomenal world. The same when the causes and conditions are disregarded, i.e. the world as a whole, sub specie aeternitatis, is the Absolute.”

As implying a difference between what is in itself and its appearance under conditions, Absolutism has necessarily to make the distinction be-
tween two orders of reality and truth. According to Nāgārjuna, "Those that are unaware of the two truths—paramārtha and saṁyasti—are incapable of grasping the deep significance of the teachings of the Buddha."

Paramārtha-satya (Absolute truth) is the knowledge of the real as it is (a-kṛtmanvant-vastu-rūpa) without the mediation and distortion of thought-forms; it is really the unutterable (anabhilāpya), unthinkable, unteachable. Satya-satya is truth so-called, the appearance. Candrakirtti defines it in three ways: "as that which covers up entirely the nature of the real and makes it appear otherwise; it is also the mutual dependence of things, the relativity of all phenomena; it is further the conventional order of things, empirically real." This doctrine does not mean that there are two reals and two co-ordinate truths. The Paramārtha is the only real or truth.

The Mādhyaṃkika dialectic as culminating in intellectual intuition (prajñā) is not only the fruition of the theoretic consciousness; it is the fruition of the practical and religious consciousness as well. The root-cause of pain and imperfection is avidyā, the tendency to conceptualize the real and invest it with unreal forms. Mistaking it as permanent or impermanent, we get attached or evince aversion to it. Nāgārjuna says: "Freedom is the cessation of karma and evil; these have their origin in vikalpa—the tendency to misconstrue things. And this ceases with the knowledge of śūnaya." The dialectic as immediate knowledge nirvikalpa takes us beyond the possibility of pain. It is itself freedom (nirvāṇa).

The highest knowledge (prajñā-pāram-īta) is one with the Tathāgata in his aspect as the essence of all beings (Dharma-kāya). He is the ens perfectissimum which all beings are potentially and which they eventually become through spiritual discipline. "The Tathāgata is Bhagavat (personal God), endowed as he is with power and perfection. He has completely eliminated all passion and karma and the two obscurations (kleśāvaraṇa and jñeyāvaraṇa). He is omniscient (sarva-jña and sarvākāra-jña) having a full knowledge of the absolute truth (prajñā-pāram-īta) and the empirical world likewise." What makes the Buddha a loving God is his great compassion (mahā-karunā), his active, unceasing and disinterested help for all beings.

The Tathāgata is the free, phenomenalized (personal) aspect of the Absolute (śūnya, prajñā) which is the matrix from which the Tathāgatas manifest themselves from time to time according to the needs and circumstances. The Tathāgata, like the Īśvara to Brahman in the Advaita, is a free person but lower in status than the Absolute.

6. THE YOGĀCĀRA (VIJNĀNA-VĀDA) IDEALISM

The trend of Buddhism has been subjective. It had from the very beginning denied the objective reality of many entities commonly taken
as real, e.g. the whole, the permanent and the universal, and had reduced them to mere ideas (vikalpa). The Sautrāntika had already reached this position; but it still clung, as a realism, to the existence of the thing-in-itself. The Yogācāra denies the reality of this ghostly entity and makes it out as a creation of consciousness (vijñāna). Subscribing in the main to the śūnyatā of the Mādhyamika, the Yogācāra had its deviations from it, and modified it considerably.

Yogācāra.—The founder of the Yogācāra School is Maitreyanātha (c. A.D. 270–350) whose historicity is now generally accepted. But he is represented by his illustrious disciple Asaṅga and his more renowned brother, Vasubandhu. Five works are attributed to Asaṅga: Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra, Madhyānta-vibhāga, Dharmadharma-tā-vibhaṅga, Abhisamaya-lāṅkāra, and Ullāra-tantra. The first three are from the Yogācāra standpoint, while the fourth concerns itself with the spiritual path common to the Mādhyamika, and the last work is distinctly Mādhyamika in character. This presents a problem about the philosophical affiliation of Asaṅga. Vasubandhu’s Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi (Vimśatikā and Trimśikā) is the basic work of the system, and has been commented upon by Sthiramati, Dharmapāla and others. Vasubandhu has commented on the Madhyānta-vibhāga (the distinction between the middle and the extreme) and has written the Tri-svabhāva-nirdeśa and a host of minor treatises. Sthiramati (c. fifth century A.D.) has written very illuminating commentaries on all the principal works of Vasubandhu.

The Yogācāra was continued by the Vijñāna-vāda of Diṅnāga, Iśvarasena, Dharmapāla and Dharmakirtti. Diṅnāga and Dharmakirtti paid great attention to logic and epistemology; they had strong Sautrāntika leanings. The earlier Yogācāra doctrine of Alaya-vijñāna is dropped completely by them. It would be truer to speak of this later phase of this school as a syncretism of the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra: Sautrāntika with regard to phenomena and Yogācāra with regard to the ultimate reality. Owing to the impact and influence of the Mādhyamika, there was probably a combination with that too. Śāntiraksita and Kamalaśīla represent this last phase as we can gather from their works and the testimony of Tibetan historians.

Idealistic arguments.—“The Vijñāna-vādin maintains two contents. Vijñāna is real, not apparent; vijñāna alone is real, not the object. The first is against the Mādhyamika for whom both the knowing consciousness and the object known are relative to each other, and are therefore nothing in themselves. The second is against the realist who uncritically accepts the object as real on a par with vijñāna.”

(1) The most effective argument of Vijñāna-vāda against the Mādhyamika is that everything may be dialectically analysed away and rejected as illusory; but the illusion itself implies the ground (vijñāna) on which the illusory construction takes place. Accepting the śūnyatā of the Prajñā-
paramitās and even protesting that they interpret it correctly, they take it as meaning pure consciousness, which is devoid of the duality of subject and object (āvaya-sūnyatā). The object cannot stand by itself, but consciousness can. It alone undergoes modifications, is infected with passions (sankliṣṭa) and purifies itself by getting rid of the superimposed duality.

The Viśnāna-vādīn arrives at the unreality of the object on certain plausible grounds. It is supposed by the realist that the form of knowledge (jñānākāra) is engendered by the object-condition (ālambaṇa) existing independently of consciousness. There are several insuperable difficulties on this hypothesis. (1) There is want of conformity between the form of knowledge (viz. "tree," "chair," etc.) and the supposed object-condition, which is the "atom," singly or in combination. The cognition is of the gross sizeable form (sthūla-pratibhāsa), but the atom cannot serve as the objective counterpart, as it lacks the gross form. What figures in knowledge have no counterpart outside, thus the knowledge form is uncaused, and what is supposedly outside does not figure in knowledge. The whole (āvayavīna) or a real combination consisting of parts is not accepted, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does. The earlier Buddhism, specially the Sautrāntika, had already cogently refuted the reality of the whole (āvayavīna).

(2) The manifest difficulties inherent in accounting for cognition on a dualistic basis, viz. knowledge here and object there with a supposed relation of identity (sārīpya) between them point to its unsoundness. All relation is within knowledge and not between knowledge and an other outside it. For this relation can never be known or verified.

(3) The fact of cognition and its object being always inseparable, their being identical (sahopālambha-niyama) or the inconceivability of an unknown object is the chief idealistic argument.

(4) The occurrence of illusion, dreams, etc., where admittedly there is knowledge-form without any assignable object proves that consciousness creates its own content, it is self-contained and does not depend on the external object.

(5) The Viśnāna-vādīn can and does plausibly explain all facts of experience, viz. difference between true and false knowledge, a common intra-subjective world, duration of objects, etc., on his theory that viśnāna manifests the object content from time to time owing to its own internal modifications caused by primordial latent forces (vāsanās).

Strata of Consciousness.—Viśnāna is the sole reality; the object in its form as substance, e.g. (chair, table, man, etc.) and modes or attributes is a false superimposition (upacāra) on the states of consciousness which alone are real. The states or strata of viśnāna are three; ālaya-viśnāna, mano-viśnāna and pravṛtti—or viṣaya viśnāna.

The ālaya is the repository, the carrier, of all vāsanās, the potential state of things. The other viśnānas are connected with it as its consequences. The other two strata not only draw upon the ālaya, but also replenish it.
The ālaya is not static; it is compared to a mighty stream. Our mental dispositions change every moment; they get augmented or are enfeebled. The ālaya is coterminous with phenomenal existence. If there were no ālaya, one particular modification of consciousness or even a series of them will come to a dead stop. It seems that we are drawing upon our capital only to add something more to it. Again, if there were no ālaya, the endeavour to achieve freedom from saṁsāra would be meaningless. As it is the nature of one state to last but for a moment, no effort is required to remove it. The ālaya is definitely taken as ceasing even in the Arhat stage, a stage corresponding to Jīvan-muktī.

The second modification of vijñāna is the process of intellection, mano-vijñāna. If the ālaya is a realm of possibilities, manana is the state of actualization, not the actualized state. We may conceive this as the categorizing or the synthesizing activity of the mind nourishing on the false notions of the “I” and the “mine.” The third modification of vijñāna gives us the six kinds of objectivity—namely, the five external sense-data and the datum of the inner sense.

The Absolute Consciousness.—These modifications of consciousness are projected outside, and there arises the apprehension of things as houses, trees, mountains, etc., existing independent of consciousness. But they do not so exist. They are therefore called parikalpa, unreal by their very nature. What about the reality of the ideas? The tree may not exist outside, but the “tree-idea” certainly exists as a subjective fact, it might be held. Berkeley and other subjective idealists take this view. The position of the Vijñāna-vādin is totally different. Take away the object, and the idea, the subjective fact, also loses its distinctive character as this or that idea. The modifications of consciousness, including the ālaya, are called para-tantra, the dependent. They are unreal in so far as they depend on the object for their determinate character. They are not, however, unreal in essence, as they are one with the parinīspanna, with pure consciousness, the Absolute. Hence the para-tantra—the subjective world of ideas—is said to be neither identical with nor different from the parinīspanna. It is not identical with the Absolute (parinīspanna) as the para-tantra is infected with the duality of subject and object. Nor is it different; for the absolute is nothing else than the para-tantra without duality and without change and diversity. The parinīspanna is also called dharmatā or tathatā, the thatness of things. It is of one undifferentiated nature like space. It is realized in transcendental consciousness (jñānānīm lokottarān ca tat). That state is beyond all trace of the duality of subject and object. One cannot even be said to have realized it as long as there is this apprehension of having realized it. For this smacks of duality still. Vasubandhu concludes: “So long as consciousness is not rooted in pure consciousness, the tendency to apprehend duality will not cease.” “Even apprehending ‘This is all pure consciousness’ does one present something before oneself; and
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(so) does not remain in the state of pure consciousness." "When consciousness does not cognize any object, then it is pure consciousness: in the absence of the object, the subject as apprehending also ceases. How are we to describe that state of pure consciousness?" "It is not mind, not apprehension: but transcendental consciousness (lokottaram jñānam); ālaya has ceased owing to the destruction of the two-fold delusion." "It is the undefiled essence (dhātu), unthinkable, benign, eternal, blessed—the free dharma-kāya of the Lord Buddha.\textsuperscript{120}

7. CONCLUSION

Some Problems in Interpretation

Nirvāṇa.—"The history of Buddhism is the history of nirvāṇa." In the Hīnayāna Schools it is a real state of extinction engendered by spiritual discipline; a difference between samsāra and nirvāṇa is made. The Mādhyamika does not admit difference between the two; nirvāṇa is not the dissolution of phenomena, but of our wrong views only (kalpanā-kṣaya hi nirvāṇam). The Vijñāna-vādin, as an absolutist, rightly refuses to characterize it; but he identifies it with pure vijñāna which undergoes the double process of defilement and purification. For the Mādhyamika the identification of the absolute with vijñāna and the conception of a real transformation of it are dogmatic and unwarranted. In the Mahāyāna Schools, the dharma-kāya is the religious analogue of the Absolute.

Relation to other systems.—As the Buddhist Schools evolved alongside of Jain and Brāhmaṇical systems, mutual influence may reasonably be assumed. It is not, however, easy, owing to the vastness and complication of the problem, to estimate with any measure of precision the nature and extent of the influence. Influence may be expressed not necessarily by imitation and acceptance but by opposition and rejection. This is very true of Buddhist and non-Buddhist thought.

Despite great diversity, the Sāṁkhya provides the prototype and the point of departure for the Abhidharmika system. The conception of dharma is closely modelled on that of prakṛti. The problem of change is central in both the systems. Buddhism, however, refused to exempt any existent (like the puruṣa of the Sāṁkhya) from the pale of universal change; and change itself is conceived as replacement, the emergence and cessation of durationless entities.

At a subsequent stage, we find direct and sustained conflict between Buddhism (the Sautrāntika especially) and the realistic systems, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṁsā and Jainism. We have ample evidence of this in the works of Akṣapāda (Nyāya-sūtra), Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra, Kumārila, Udayana, Jayanta, etc., on the brāhmaṇical
side and Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrtti and Dharmottara on the other. The influence was felt on practically every important problem—perception, inference, apoha (nominalism), whole (avayavin), universal (sāmānya). The Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā reformulated their realism with greater thoroughness and self-consciousness. The Buddhists stuck to their subjective and critical trends. Each system gained, owing to this impact, in clarity and depth. An interpretation of Indian philosophy in terms of this conflict should prove instructive.

The influence of the Vedānta on the development of Mahāyāna and vice versa presents us with another problem no less interesting. Earlier Buddhism is realistic and pluralistic. The advaitic turn that it took in the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra systems suggests the influence of the conception of Brahman as the unaffected reality underlying the appearances. Some scholars hold that there has been direct borrowing.

Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara revolutionized the Vedānta thought by establishing non-dualism dialectically; they characterize phenomena as false appearance (māyā) and formulate the doctrine of three truths and two texts (para and a-para). The non-advaitic Schools of the Vedānta have roundly taken all these as concealed Buddhism, and some modern scholars have fallen in line with this view.

It must, however, be recognized that the Ātma-vāda of the Upaniṣads was impelled by its inner dynamism, heading towards advaitism like the prior movement on the Buddhist side. The pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta establishes the reality of one substance by a criticism of the Śaṅkhyā dualism; Śaṅkara himself arrives at his non-dualism by a criticism of the bheda-bheda (unity-in-difference) view of Bhartṛprapañca and others. There is no evidence of direct borrowing in Śaṅkara. Gauḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkyakārikā do, however, show in diction and doctrines the influence of the Māhāyāna. The different parts of it, however, are loosely connected; they may be the work of different authors, and only in the III and IV books are there unmistakable Buddhist influences. It is also difficult to conceive how the philosophers belonging to the ātman-tradition could borrow doctrines from the nairāmya tradition. It can therefore be suggested that there has been borrowing of technique rather than of tenets. The dialectic of Nāgārjuna, the Vijñāna-vāda analysis of illusion and their doctrines of two truths might have suggested to Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara the most consistent way of interpreting the Upaniṣadic tradition.

Different Absolutisms.—This leads us to the intrinsic problem about the correct interpretation of the different absolutisms, the Śūnyatā, vijñaptimātratā and Brahman. Do they differ merely in name?

Thanks to the lead of Professor Radhakrishnan, the nihilistic interpretation of śūnyatā is now discredited; perhaps it had relied on no better evidence than the awe-inspiring term śūnya. There is, however, the apprehension that the differences of these systems, at least in their method and
approach, might be glossed over. The systems criticize each other and distinguish themselves sharply. Can we find any meaning in their polemic?

It may be suggested that while agreeing with regard to the form of the Absolute, these systems differ in the mode of their approach and the entity with which they identify the Absolute. In all these systems, the Absolute is transcendent, as free from empirical determinations; it is at once immanent as being the essence of phenomena. Further, they all speak of it as realizable in a non-empirical mode of intuition. All of them have recourse to the complementary doctrine of appearance.

The differences should not be overlooked. The Vedānta starts with an extra-logical or theological revelation of the Vedāntas (Upaniṣads) about the sole reality of the ātman this is sought to be realized through reason (manana) and contemplation. The Mādhyamika takes hold of the dialectical consciousness, which emerges logically in the conflict of viewpoints. The Yogācāra is convinced of the sole reality of consciousness on the experience of trance-states where it continues to exist even though the object may be absent. The Vedānta and Vijñāna-vāda begin with the analysis of an empirical illusion, and they apply it analogically to the world. For the Vedānta, the real is the "this," the given or pure being; the "silver" as subsisting within consciousness only is appearance (pratībhāṣika). The Vijñāna-vādin takes the opposite view: the given "this" is an unreal or free projection of consciousness which alone is real. Vijñāna is understood not as pure being (static), but as creating and projecting; it can be construed as Cosmic Will. Differing from both, the Mādhyamika addresses himself directly to the transcendental illusion created by the opposition of standpoints; he reaches the Absolute through this dialectical consciousness. If Brahman is pure being and vijñāna is creative force, śūnyatā is identified with nothing that we empirically experience; it is the critical or reflective awareness itself. All these present problems in higher philosophical interpretation.

ABBREVIATIONS

MK. Madhyamaka-hārīka of Nāgārjuna. Ed. by de la V. Poussin (Bib. Budd. IV).
MKV. Madhyamaka-hārikā-értī (Prasanna-padā), by Candrakirtti (Bib. Budd. IV).
NB. Nyāya-bindu of Dharmakirtti (Bib. Budd. VII).
NBT. Nyāya-bindus-tikā of Dharmottara (Bib. Budd. VII).
PV. Pramāṇa-vārttika of Dharmakirtti with the Manoratha-nandini, JBORS, Patna.

NOTES

2. Dipa-vanīṣa, p. 36. In the Northern accounts the origin of the Mahāsamghika is given differently.
3. Though all authorities are agreed about the number 18, there is a discrepancy with regard to the individual names and the classification. Bhusn (History of Buddhism, Vol. II, pp. 97 ff.), relying on Bhiks-arasa-prycha and Vinladeva, enumerates thus: The Purvasailla, Apurasailla, Haimavata, Lokottara-vadins and Prajapti-vadins belong to the Mahasamghika School; the Mula-sarvasvadins, Kashyapiya, Mahishasaka, Dharamgupta, Bahusrutrya, Tamracaitiya and Vibhajya-vada belong to the Sarvasti-veda; Jetavanlya, Abhayagiri-vasins, and Mahasthavirasa form the School of Stavirasas; the Kurukullakas, Avantaka and Vatsyputrya belong to the Sammitiya sect. Reference may also be made to Vasumitra's Nihkayalambana Sutra (Nanjio nos. 1284–6), translated into English by Masuda (Asia Major, Vol. II, 1925); Max Wolleser's Die Sektem des alten Buddhismus gives Vasumitra's (pp. 24 ff.) and Bhavya's (pp. 77 ff.) account of the Schools; Rockhill's Life of the Buddha, pp. 181 ff., gives translations from Tibetan sources. The Kathavatthu, its commentary and the Dipavamsa (pp. 37–8) give the Pali or Southern version.

4. Abhidharma-kosa (Appendix), Pudgala-viniscaya (Trans. by Stcherbatsky—Soul Theory), Kathavatthu first section; Madhyamaka-karikas IX and X.

5. See Kimura, Hinayana and Mahayana, pp. 12, 15, 67, 115 ff. N. Dutta, Three Principal Schools of Buddhism, p. 3 ff.

6. See Bodhicaryavatara, IX, 7; Vinisatika, 10.

7. Founded by Maitreya (natha), Asanga and Vasubandhu (c. fourth century).

8. Cf. the first verse of the Madhyamka-vibhaga (p. 9)

   abhuta-parikalpa’si stva vyayam tatra na vidyate
   swnyata vidyate tvatra tasyam api sa vyayate.

9. Sarvasti-vada (Kusha), Sautrantika (Jojitsu), Yogacara (Fa-hsiang or Hosso); Madhyamika (Sanron). See Takakusu's Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, Honolulu, 1947.


11. This is the Buddhist dictum: Yo viruddha-dharmanaya santvekha.

12. arisam sahane pra-dipa iti upacaryate, et ahet kriv. AKV., p. 713; ravisvad dharmad iti. ibid., p. 705.


16. Prajna amala Sandecah abhidharma, AKV., p. 18; see also Mahayana-sutradhara, XI, 3.

17. These are: Dhamma-sangani, Vibhaanga, Dhatus-kath, Puggala-paunatti, Kathavatthu, Yamaka and Patthana.

18. Trans. by Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids.


21. This is according to AKV., pp. 9 and 11 and Bhusn, History of Buddhism, Vol. I, pp. 49–50. For a slight variation in authorship, see Takakusu's article on Sarvasti-vada literature, pp. 74–8.


24. The rare Sanskrit MS. of the Abhidharma-kosa-bhasya discovered in Tibet by Rahul Sankrityayan is still awaiting publication.

25. Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 74.


27. AKV., p. 16.

28. AKV., p. 17.

29. AKV., p. 15.

30. AKV., p. 42.


32. AKV., pp. 29 ff.
33. AKV., p. 33.
34. Central Conception, p. 13.
36. Central Conception, pp. 10 ff.
37. AK., II, 35 ff.; AKV., pp. 142 ff.
38. AK., IV.
40. AK., II, 49; AKV., pp. 231 ff., 41; AK., III, 18 ff.
41. Ye sūtra-prāmāṇīhā na sāstra-prāmāṇīhā, te Sautrāntikhāh, AKV., p. 11.
42. AKV., p. 25; AKV., pp. 468 ff.; Central Conception, p. 77.
43. AK., V, 26. There are four views inasmuch as they maintain (1) a change of existence (bhāva-parināma, attributed to Dharmatrātā); (2) change of aspect (lakṣaṇa-parināma ascribed to Ghosa); (3) a change of condition (avasthā-parināma, advocated by Vasumitra) or contingency (apekṣā-parināma by Buddhadeva). The third alternative is right. The difference in time rests on a difference in the functions (kārita-bheda) of the elements Central Conception, pp. 78–9.
44. This list is according to the commentary on Śiva-jñāna-siddhi a Śaiva-siddhānta treatise by Aruṇḍi (thirteenth century). Pt. Aiyaswami Sastri has been the first to draw our attention to this (see his Appendix to the Alambana-parīkṣā).
45. The magnum opus of Diṅnāga is the Pramāṇa-samuccaya with his own commentary (vṛtti). Its place in Buddhist Logic is like that of the Nyāya-sūtra. Besides this, he has written numerous smaller works of which Alambana-parīkṣā, Tri-kāla-parīkṣā, Hetu-cakra-samarthana and Nyāya-mukha are the important ones. Alambana-parīkṣā and Pramāṇa-samuccaya (partially) have been restored from Tibetan into Sanskrit; all other works are available only in Tibetan. Nyāya-pravēsa, attributed to Diṅnāga, is really the work of Śarvakarasvāmin.

Dharmakīrtiti has written the celebrated Pramāṇa-vārttika (a sort of running commentary on Diṅnāga's Pramāṇa-samuccaya), Pramāṇa-vidhiścaya, Hetu-bindu, Sambandha-parīkṣā, Santrāntara-siddhi and Nyāya-bindu. Only the first and the last of these are available in Sanskrit.

47. PV., I, 3; NBT., p. 3.
48. PV., I, 7; NBT., p. 3.
49. PS., p. 4; NBT., p. 5.
50. PS., p. 4; PV., II, NBT., pp. 5 ff.
51. NBT., p. 12; Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, pp. 147 ff.
52. Critique of Pure Reason (Kemp Smith’s Trans.), pp. 61–2. See also pp. 65, 93, etc.
54. PV., II, 55–6; NBT., p. 7, cf. Kant’s doctrine about the empirical reality and transcendental ideality of space, time and the categories.
55. PV., II, 57–8.
56. PV., II, 65 ff.
57. NBT., p. 6.
58. PS., p. 8.
59. NBT., p. 13.
60. Diṅnāga therefore does not find it necessary to define pratyakṣa so as to exclude the illusory. Dharmakīrtiti, however, defines it as knowledge that is free from construction and error. This is done to exclude errors that are engendered by thought-construction but by purely physical and physiological factors, e.g. swift motion, distance, injury and disease of the sense-organ, etc., see NB., I, 6.
61. NB., I, 12–14.
63. See Buddhist Logic, Vol. II, p. 28 n.
64. NB., I, II; PV., II, 281 ff.
65. NBT., p. 8.
66. NB., I, 5.
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67. TS., pp. 372 ff.
69. Śloka-vārttika (Anumāna-pariṣcheda, 149 ff.), quoted in Hatu-bindu-ṭhā of Arcata, pp. 23–4. This is a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s work (Hetu-bindu) undertaken for publication in the G.O.S., Baroda. The proof-copy of this ṭhā was shown to me through the kindness of my friend, Śrī Malvaniya.
71. ibid., pp. 25–8.
73. PV., III, 1; NB., II, 11–12.
74. NBT., p. 24.
75. NB., II, 18 ff.
76. PV., III, 30.
77. PV., II, 306; NB., I, 18 ff.
78. atyanta-vilakṣaṇānāṁ sālakṣaṇayam, Tatparya-ṭhā, p. 340.
82. Majjh. N. (Sutta 72); Warren, Buddhism in Translations, p. 125.
83. Sam. N., II, 17.
84. MK., XV, 7.
85. This is available in several recensions. The Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā (c. first century B.C.) appears to be the basic text of which the Sata-sāhasrikā, Paṇca-vaṃśati, etc., are elaborations and the Vajra-chhedikā, the Adhyādha-satikā are abridgments. Madhyamaka-vrtti and Prajñā-pradīpa are the commentaries on the Madhyamaka-kārikā by Buddhāpalita and Bhāvaviveka respectively. The latter is also the author of Tarka-jvāla, Madhyamakārthaka-saṃgraha, etc., all preserved in Tibetan.
86. Catasvas tветт дрыштая. MKV., pp. 572–3; see also Cattā-satikā XIV, 21.
89. See MKV., pp. 16, 18, 34.
90. MKV., pp. 14, 22; MK, XX, 20.
91. MKV., p. 36; MK., XX, 19.
92. MK., XVIII, 10, XXIV, 19. For the principle of the dialectic, see MK, II, 21, XIX, 6; MKV., p. 200.
93. MK., XIII, 8; XXIV, 11; MKV., pp. 247–8.
94. Prajñā-pāram-ita jñānam advayam sa lathāgataḥ, Prajñā-pāram-ita-piṇḍārtha by Dināgā.
95. MK., XVIII, Bodhi-caryāvatāra IX. 2.
96. MK., XXV, 19, 20, 9.
97. MK., XXIV, 9.
98. MKV., p. 493.
99. MKV., p. 492.
100. MK., XVIII, 5, XXIII.
102. There is difference of opinion with regard to the date of Vasubandhu, whether he lived between A.D. 280–360 or 420–500. The former is the one now generally accepted.
104. Triṃśikā-bhāṣya, p. 15.
105. Triṃśikā-bhāṣya, p. 66.
106. Madhyānta-ṭhā, pp. 9, 13–14, 18.
108. Ālambana-parīkṣā (of Diṅnāgā), 1, 2; Viṁśatikā II; see also TS., pp. 551 ff.
109. See section II of this article.
111. Viṁśatikā 1, 9.
112. Viṁśatikā 2 ff.
113. Trīṃśikā I.
114. evam ālaya-vijñāne sati samśāra-pravṛttir nivṛttiś ca. Trīṃśikā, p. 38.
115. ibid., tasya vyāvṛttir arhatve.
117. ibid., 21.
118. ibid., 22.
120. Trīṃśikā, 26–30.
121. “That the Mahāyāna is indebted to some Auṇḍaṇa influence is probable,” Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Nirvāṇa, pp. 51.
123. Professor V. Bhattacharya has established this with his characteristic thoroughness in his Āgama Śāstra of Gauḍapāda.
124. Āgama Śāstra, pp. cxliv, lv.

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CHAPTER X

THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

A—EARLY NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

1. INTRODUCTION

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika are realistic systems based on independent reasoning. They are a valuable set-off against the phenomenalism and idealism of the Baudhāya thinkers. While the Nyāya is mainly logic and epistemology, the Vaiśeṣika is primarily physics and metaphysics. The two, however, agree on essential principles and have the same end, namely, the liberation of the individual self. As the two systems are closely allied and had been for long treated as parts of one philosophy, they are dealt with here as one.

The history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika extends over twenty centuries. It is divided into two periods, an earlier and a later. The early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika begins with Gautama and Kaṇāḍa (c. third century B.C.) and ends with the advent of Gaṅgeśa (c. A.D. 1200), the founder of the modern School of the Nyāya. The first systematic work of the Nyāya is the Nyāya-sūtra of Gautama. Other important works of the early Nyāya are Vatsyāyana’s Nyāya-bhāṣya or commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra (c. A.D. 400), Uddyotakara’s Nyāya-vārttika (sixth century A.D.), Vācaspati Miśra’s Nyāya-vārttika-lāt̄parya-ṭīkā (ninth century A.D.), Udayana’s Nyāya-vārttika-lātparya-parīśuddhi (tenth century A.D.) and Nyāya-kusumāṇjali (tenth century A.D.), Jayanta’s Nyāya-maṅjarī and Bhāsarvajña’s Nyāya-sūtra (tenth century A.D.). Of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, the first systematic work is the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra of Kaṇāḍa, which seems to be of an earlier date than the Nyāya-sūtra. No bhāṣya or commentary on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra now exists, although we hear of one written by Rāvaṇa, king of Ceylon. Praśastapāda’s Padārthā-dharmasaṁgraha (fourth century A.D.) is generally called the bhāṣya or commentary on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra. But it is not the character of a bhāṣya and reads like an independent exposition of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. On this work of Praśastapāda there are three excellent commentaries, namely, Vyomaśiva’s Vyomavatī (ninth century A.D.), Śrīdhara’s Nyāya-kandali and Udayana’s Kīrāṇāvali (tenth century A.D.). Udayana’s Lakṣāṇāvali is a short compendium of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Śivāditya’s Saṭṭapāḍārth and Vallabhācārīya’s Nyāya-lilāvatī are two other important works of the Vaiśeṣika which belong to the end of the early period and anticipate the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy.
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: EASTERN AND WESTERN

The early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy may be conveniently divided into two parts, namely, epistemology and metaphysics.

2. EPISTEMOLOGY

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology deals with all the main problems of knowledge. Knowledge or cognition, which is an attribute of the self, consists in the manifestation of objects. It is of different kinds. In the Nyāya it is divided into prāma or valid and a-prāma or non-valid knowledge. The first includes perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. The second includes memory (smṛti), doubt (saṃśaya), error (viparyyaya) and hypothetical argument (tarka). In the Vaiśeṣika also knowledge is broadly divided into vidyā or valid and a-vidyā or non-valid cognition. But the first includes perception, inference, memory and intuitive experience (ārṣa-jñāna), while the second includes doubt, error, indefinite cognition (anadhyavasāya) and dream (svāpna). True or valid knowledge is a definite or certain (a-sandigdha) and an unerring presentative cognition (anubhava) of the object as it really is. On this view, doubt, error, hypothetical argument, indefinite cognition and dream are all excluded from pramā or valid knowledge either because they are not certain and definite or not true to the nature of the object. Memory also is regarded by the Nyāya as a form of non-valid knowledge because it is not a presentative but a representative cognition of some object experienced in the past. Some Vaiśeṣikas also exclude memory from valid knowledge, although others would regard it as such. Intuitive knowledge is admitted by the Nyāya as valid, but it is treated as a kind of extraordinary perception.¹

As to how true knowledge is distinguished from error or false knowledge, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is this: Knowledge is true when it agrees with or corresponds to the nature of the object, otherwise it becomes false. That a knowledge is true is known from the fact that it leads to successful practical activity. If it fails to lead to successful activity it is found to be false. Thus the truth and falsity of knowledge consist respectively in its correspondence and non-correspondence to the nature of the object known. And the test of the truth or falsity of knowledge is the success or failure of our practical activities as based on it (pravṛtti-saṃvāda or pravṛtti-visaṃvāda). This view is known as the doctrine of paratah-prāmānya and a-prāmānya because truth and falsity consist in certain external conditions like correspondence and non-correspondence to facts and are also tested by external conditions like the success and failure of practical activity. But some Naiyāyikas admit that in certain special cases the truth of knowledge is self-evident (svatāh-prāmānya).²

As pramā means true knowledge, a pramāṇa means the unfailing source of such knowledge. With regard to the number of pramāṇas the
Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika differ. While the Naiyāyikas generally recognize four distinct pramāṇas, namely, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony, the Vaiśeṣikas recognize only perception and inference as separate pramāṇas and reduce comparison and testimony to inference. Some Naiyāyikas, however, reduce comparison to testimony, while some Vaiśeṣikas recognize memory and verbal testimony also as separate pramāṇas. Both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika reduce all other pramāṇas like postulation (arthāpati), non-cognition (anupalabdhi), etc., to one or other of the pramāṇas recognized by them.3

Of the pramāṇas, perception (pratyakṣa) comes first and is generally defined in the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as a definite and true cognition of objects produced by sense-object contact (indriyārtha-sannikāraṇa). Another definition of perception which anticipates the modern view is given by some old Naiyāyikas who say that it is immediate knowledge, not due to any previous experience or reasoning.4 Perception as a true cognition due to sense-object contact is of different kinds. It is called external (bāhya) when brought about by the external senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell. It is internal (āntara, mānasā) when due to the contact of the mind, the internal sense, with its proper objects. Perception is also divided into the two kinds of nir-vikalpa or indeterminate and sa-vikalpa or determinate. Indeterminate perception is the cognition of an object as just an existent thing without any explicit recognition or characterization of it as this or that kind of thing. It is an apprehension of the existence and qualities of an object without any verbal judgment of it as a subject of which the qualities are predicated. Determinate perception is the cognition of an object as possessed of some character, or as the subject of certain qualities which are predicated of it. Pratyabhijñā or recognition is regarded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as a kind of sa-vikalpa perception. It is the cognition of an object as what was cognized before and, therefore, qualified by past experience as when one says: "This is the same jar that I saw."5

After perception comes anumāna or inference. It is a process of reasoning in which we know some unperceived character of a thing through the medium of a mark which is found present in the thing and is known to be universally related to that character. Thus we infer the existence of unperceived fire in a hill when we observe smoke in it and remember that smoke is always related to fire. The hill with regard to which we infer fire is called the pakṣa or subject of inference. The fire which we infer in relation to the hill is called the sādhyā or object of inference. And the smoke which serves as the mark or sign of the unperceived fire in the hill is called the līṅga, hetu or reason. But the smoke is the mark of fire in the hill because it is perceived to be present in the hill and known from previous experience to be invariably related to fire. The presence of the mark, līṅga, in the pakṣa, hill, is technically called pakṣa-dharmatā, and
the relation of invariable and unconditional concomitance between the 
linga, smoke and the sadhya, fire is called a-vinä-bhāva or vyāpti. The ground 
of inference is, therefore, not the linga as such, but a consideration of it as 
invariably related to the sadhya and present in the pakṣa. This con-
sideration is called linga-parāmarśa.6

It would appear from the above that an inference must contain three 
terms and at least three propositions. The three terms of an inference 
are pakṣa, sadhya and linga which correspond respectively to the minor, 
major and middle terms of the syllogism in Aristotelian Logic. The 
process of inference consists in relating the sadhya or major term to the 
pakṣa or minor term through the relation of the linga or middle term to 
the pakṣa or minor term, on the one hand, and the sadhya or major term 
on the other. This gives us three propositions, of which the first is a pre-
dication of the sadhya with regard to the pakṣa, e.g. “The hill is fiery.” 
The second is the affirmation of the linga as related to the pakṣa, e.g. 
“Because the hill is smoky.” The third is the affirmation of the linga as 
universally related to the sadhya, e.g. “All smoky objects are fiery, as 
the kitchen.” This gives us a three-membered syllogism which is used 
when one infers something for himself. But an inference which is meant 
to prove or demonstrate a truth has five avayavas or members. The five 
members and their order are as follows:7

1. Pratijña or an assertion: The hill is fiery.
2. Hetu or the reason: Because it is smoky.
3. Udāharana or the general proposition with examples: All smoky 
   objects are fiery, e.g. a kitchen.
4. Upanaya or the application: So is the hill smoky.
5. Nigamana or the conclusion: Therefore the hill is fiery.

Here then we have a syllogism consisting of five categorical propositions. 
There are certain points of similarity between the Indian and the Aris-
totelian syllogism. In both there are only three terms. The three-membered 
syllogism has three propositions which correspond to the conclusion, the 
minor and the major premise of Aristotle’s syllogism. In view of such 
similarity some scholars think that the development of the Indian 
syllogism is due to the influence of Aristotle. But there are certain funda-
mental differences between the two which make it difficult to accept this 
view. Even in the three-membered syllogism the order of the propositions 
in Aristotle’s syllogism is reversed. The fundamental rule of Aristotle’s 
syllogism, the dictum de omni et nullo, rests solely on the relation of class 
inclusion, whereas the main principle of the Indian syllogism is the relation 
of invariable and unconditional concomitance between the middle and the 
major term. Further, Aristotle’s syllogism is purely formal and guarantees 
only the formal validity of the conclusion. It is more like an implication 
than an inference. If we assert the truth of its premises, that of the con-
clusion can be asserted. The Indian syllogism is a real inference in
which from premises asserted as true we come to a true and necessary conclusion. The third premise of the Indian syllogism is a general proposition based on particular facts of experience. It thus combines deduction with induction, formal validity with material truth. The fourth premise of the Indian syllogism makes a synthesis of the major and the minor premises to bring out the identity of the middle term in them. That such a synthesis is a necessary step in syllogistic inference is admitted by some modern Western logicians like F. H. Bradley. There is no part of the Aristotelian syllogism which corresponds to the fourth proposition of the Indian syllogism.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas give different classifications of inference. The distinction between svārtha and parārtha anumāṇa, i.e. inference for oneself and inference for convincing other people, is common to both. The three kinds of pūrvavat, seiṣavat and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa inference given in the Nyāya are replaced by the two kinds of dṛṣṭa and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa in the Vaiśeṣika. An inference is pūrvavat or seiṣavat according as it passes from a perceived cause to an unperceived effect, or from a perceived effect to an unperceived cause. It is called dṛṣṭa when based on a previously observed invariable relation between the middle and major terms. It is sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa when based on an invariable relation observed between objects which are similar to the middle and the major, as when one infers the existence of sense-organs from cognitive functions on the ground that an action like cutting requires an instrument, say, an axe. Again, inference is said to be of three kinds, viz. kevalānvayin, kevala-vyatirekin and anvaya-vyatirekin. It is kevalānvayin when based on a middle term which is always positively related to the major, kevala-vyatirekin when the middle is only negatively related to the major, and anvaya-vyatirekin when the middle is both positively and negatively related to the major term.8

There are five kinds of fallacies of inference (hetvābhāsa) generally recognized by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, although some of them give their number as three or four or six.9 These are all fallacies of the hetu or the middle term and are called (1) sa-vyabhicāra, (2) viruddha, (3) sat-pratipakṣa, (4) a-siddha, (5) bādhistha. The sa-vyabhicāra or the irregular middle is not uniformly concomitant with the major term, but is sometimes present even where the major is absent, as when “fire” is taken as the middle term of an inference to prove the existence of “smoke.” The viruddha or the contradictory middle is that which proved the contradictory of what it is intended to prove. This is illustrated when one argues “Sound is eternal, because it is caused,” for what is caused is non-eternal. The sat-pratipakṣa is the inferentially contradicted middle. It is the middle term of an inference, of which the conclusion is validly contradicted by another inference. The inference: “Sound is eternal, because it is audible,” is validly contradicted by another inference: “Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced.” The a-siddha or sādhya-sama is a middle term which is not
a real fact, but an undue assumption, as when one argues: "The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it has lotusness in it like a natural lotus." The badhita is a middle term, the non-existence of whose major is ascertained by means of some other pramâna. This is illustrated thus: "Fire is cold, because it is a substance." Here the coldness of fire is disproved by perception.10

These five kinds of material fallacies have each many subdivisions. Other fallacies like chala, jâti and migraha-sthâna which arise out of equivocation, ambiguity, misunderstanding, etc., are separately treated by the Nyâya. This classification is like the Aristotelian classification of fallacies into those in dictione and those extra dictionem, in which also the formal fallacies of inference like undistributed middle, illicit process and so on are not included.

Upamâna or comparison is the third source of knowledge recognized by the Nyâya. It gives us the knowledge of the relation between a name and things so named on the basis of a given description of them in terms of their similarity or dissimilarity to certain familiar objects. A citizen who does not know what a "gavaya" or wild cow is, may be told by a forester that it is just like the familiar cow. If subsequently he happens to meet with such an animal in the forest and recognizes it as a gavaya, then his knowledge will be due to upamâna. The Nyâya view of upamâna is different from that of the Mimââmsâ and the Vedânta.11

Sabda or testimony is the last pramâna admitted by the Nyâya. It consists in the statement of a reliable person about things of which he has a direct knowledge. Those who have no direct experience of such things may have a true knowledge of them from the statement of the reliable person. Such knowledge being due neither to perception nor to inference, testimony is admitted as a distinct source of knowledge in the Nyâya and many other systems of Indian philosophy. There are two kinds of sabda, namely, that relating to perceptible objects (ârâârtha) and that relating to imperceptible objects (a-ârâârtha). The first includes the testimony of reliable men and the Scriptures bearing on perceptible objects of this world. The second includes both human and Scriptural testimony bearing on supersensible realities like soul, God, immortality, etc.12

3. METAPHYSICS

The Nyâya-Vaiâsêrika metaphysics is pluralistic realism. It admits many independent realities which are broadly divided into two classes, namely, being and non-being (bhâva and a-bhâva). There are six kinds of being or positive realities, namely, dravya or substance, guna or quality, karmân or action, sâmânyâ or generality, viśeṣa or particularity and sama- vâya or inherence. A-bhâva or non-being stands for all negative facts or all
kinds of non-existence. These are the seven padārthas or categories of the Vaiśeṣika. In the Nyāya we have sixteen padārthas or categories, namely, pramāṇa, prameya or objects of knowledge, saṃsāya or doubt, prayojana or an end, drṣṭānta or an example, siddhānta or a doctrine, avayava or members of the syllogism, tarka or an hypothetical argument, nirṇaya or ascertainment, vāda or discussion, jalpa or wrangling, vītāṇḍā or cavilling, hetvābhāsa or fallacies of inference, chala or quibbling, jāti or futile objections, and nigraha-sthāna or the points of defeat in debate. This, however, does not give us the categories of reality, but the topics of philosophical discourse, of which the second includes all objects of knowledge as well as the Vaiśeṣika categories of reality.

Dravya or substance is the substratum of qualities and actions, and the constitutive or material cause of composite things. There are nine kinds of substances, namely, prthivī or earth, jala or water, tejas or fire, vāyu or air, ākāsa or ether, kāla or time, dis or space, ātman or soul, and manas or mind. The atoms of earth, water, fire and air are eternal, while the compounds made of them are non-eternal. We cannot ordinarily perceive an atom. The existence of atoms is proved by inference. If we go on separating the parts of a composite thing, we shall pass from larger to smaller and smaller parts till we come to the smallest parts which cannot be further divided. These minute and indivisible parts of a material object are called paramāṇus or atoms. They are eternal entities and are qualitatively different from one another. In this the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas differ from the Jainas and the Greek atomists who hold that atoms differ in quantity and not in quality. Ākāsa is one, eternal and all-pervading physical substance which has the quality of sound. It cannot be perceived, but is inferred from the phenomenon of sound which as a quality belongs to no other substance than ākāsa. Space and time are imperceptible substances, each of which is one, eternal and all-pervading.

The soul (ātman) is an eternal and all-pervading substance. The qualities of the soul are cognition, desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, merit, demerit, etc. These cannot belong to any physical substance. So there must be an immaterial substance called soul, of which they are the qualities. The soul is different and distinct from the body, the senses, mind, and the stream of consciousness. Some Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that the soul is imperceptible and its existence is proved by testimony of the Scriptures and inference from the phenomena of consciousness like cognition, desire, aversion, etc. Some other Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, however, maintain that the soul is also directly known through internal or mental perception as when one says “I am,” “I am knowing,” “I am happy,” etc. Although knowledge or consciousness belongs to the soul as an attribute, it is not an essential and inseparable attribute of it. It belongs to the soul only in its embodied condition and is therefore accidental. With the attainment of liberation through the knowledge of reality, the soul
becomes free from its connection with the body and has no experience of pleasure and pain or consciousness of any kind.\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{Manas} or mind is an atomic and imperceptible substance. The mind is the internal sense (\textit{antar-indriya}) for the perception of the soul and its qualities like pleasure and pain. Just as external perception requires the external senses, so internal perception requires an internal sense called \textit{manas}. The existence of the mind is also known from the fact that we cannot have simultaneous cognitions of many objects, although there may be a simultaneous contact of them with the external senses. This shows that besides the external senses there is an internal sense which being atomic can be in contact with one external sense at a time. This is the reason why of the many objects round about us we perceive only that to which we attend or turn our mind.\textsuperscript{17}

\textit{Guṇa} or quality is defined as that which exists in a substance and has no quality or activity in it. It is a non-constitutive cause of things in so far as it determines their nature and character, but not their existence. There are twenty-four kinds of quality. These are colour (\textit{rūpa}), taste (\textit{vasa}), smell (\textit{gandha}), touch (\textit{sparśa}), sound (\textit{sabda}), number (\textit{saṁkhyā}), magnitude (\textit{parimāna}), distinctness (\textit{pythaktva}), conjunction (\textit{saṁyoga}), disjunction (\textit{vibhāga}), remoteness (\textit{paratva}), nearness (\textit{a-paratva}), cognition (\textit{buddhi}), pleasure (\textit{sukha}), pain (\textit{duḥkha}), desire (\textit{icchā}), aversion (\textit{dveṣa}), effort (\textit{prayatna}), heaviness (\textit{gurutva}), fluidity (\textit{dravatva}), viscosity (\textit{sneha}), tendency (\textit{saṁskāra}), merit (\textit{dharma}), and demerit (\textit{a-dharma}).\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{Karma} or action is physical movement. Like quality it belongs only to substance, but is different from both. All actions subsist in limited corporeal substances, and not in any all-pervading substance. There are five kinds of action, namely, throwing upward (\textit{uṭkṣepana}), throwing downward (\textit{avakṣepana}), contraction (\textit{ākuñcana}), expansion (\textit{prasārana}) and locomotion (\textit{gamana}) which includes all other kinds of actions. Actions are perceptible or imperceptible according as they belong to perceptible or imperceptible substances.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Sāmānya} or generality is the common essence of all the individuals of a class. It corresponds to the "universal" in modern Western philosophy. It is an eternal entity which subsists in an identical form in all the individuals of a class. Some modern Western realists also hold that a "universal is an eternal timeless entity which may be shared by many particulars." They agree further with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in maintaining that universals do not come under \textit{existence} (\textit{sattā}). Universals have \textit{being} and \textit{subsist} in substance, quality and action. There is no universal subsisting in another universal, because there is but one single universal for one class of objects. In respect of their scope or extent, universals are distinguished into \textit{para} or the highest and all-pervading, \textit{a-para} or the lowest and \textit{parāpara} or the intermediate. "Beinghood" is the highest universal or the \textit{sumnum genus}, "jarness" as present in all jars and having no other
universal under it is the lowest, and “substantiality” is intermediate between the highest and the lowest, since it is wider than universals like earthness, and narrower than “being-hood.”

Viṣeṣa or particularity is the extreme opposite of the universal (sāmānyā). The category of viṣeṣa, from which the Vaiṣeṣika system derives its name, stands for the ultimate difference or peculiarities of the partless eternal substances. The differences of composite things may be explained by the differences of their parts. But the differences of the partless, eternal substances like space, time, souls, minds and atoms of the same kind cannot be explained unless we admit certain original or underived peculiarities in them, called viṣeṣas. There are innumerable viṣeṣas, since the individuals in which they subsist are innumerable. They are imperceptible like atoms.

Samavāya or inherence is a permanent or eternal relation between two entities, of which one is in the other. The whole is in its parts, a quality or an action is in a substance, the universal is in the individuals, and particularity is in some simple eternal substance. In each case the relation is called samavāya or inherence of the one in the other. While conjunction (samyoga) is a temporary relation between two substances which can exist separately, samavāya is an eternal relation between two entities, one of which cannot exist without the other.

A-bhāva or non-existence stands for all negative facts. The reality of non-existence as distinct from existence cannot be denied. That a thing does not exist in a certain place at some time is as real a fact as that something else exists therein. There are four kinds of non-existence, namely, prāg-abhāva, pradhvanisābhāva, atyantābhāva and anyonyābhāva. The first means the non-existence of a thing before its production, e.g. the non-existence of an effect in the cause before it is produced. The second means the non-existence of a thing on account of its destruction after production, e.g. the non-existence of a jar when it is broken. The third means the absence of a connection between two things for all time, e.g. the non-existence of colour in air. Anyonyābhāva means mutual non-existence. When one thing is different from another thing, they mutually exclude each other and there is the non-existence of either as the other. A cow is different from a horse. This means that either of them does not exist as the other.

The Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika theory of the world is guided by the general spiritual outlook of Indian philosophy. In its attempt to explain the origin and destruction of the world it reduces all composite objects to the four kinds of atoms of earth, water, fire and air. So it is called the atomic theory of the world. But it is not a mechanistic or materialistic theory like the atomism of Western science and philosophy. It does not ignore the moral and spiritual principles governing the processes of composition and decomposition of atoms. Further, five of the nine kinds of substances, namely, ākāśa, space, time, mind and soul, are not reduced to material
atoms or their relations. The atomic theory of the Nyāya-Vaīśeṣikas explains only the composite objects of the world, which are non-eternal. All finite physical objects are created out of the four kinds of atoms in the form of dyads (i.e. compounds of two atoms), triads (i.e. compounds of three dyads each) and other larger compounds arising out of them. The world is a system of physical things and living beings having bodies with senses and possessing mind, intellect and egoism. All these exist and interact with one another in time, space and ākāśa. The order of the world is a moral order in which the life and destiny of all individual selves are governed, not only by the physical laws, but also by the moral law of kārman. The creation of the world is explained in the light of the unseen moral deserts (a-drśṭa) of individual selves and serves the end of moral dispensation.

The Nyāya-Vaīśeṣika system combines pluralistic realism with theism and believes in the existence of God as the supreme Self. God is one, infinite and eternal. He is the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the creation, maintenance and destruction of the world. He does not create the world out of nothing, but out of eternal atoms, space, time, ether, minds and souls. He is the first efficient cause of the world and not its material cause, i.e. a sort of demiurgus or an architect of the ordered universe. He is not limited by the world in so far as the world is related to Him as His body. He is also the moral governor of the world, the impartial dispenser of the fruits of our actions and the supreme arbiter of our joys and sorrows.

The existence of God is proved by the testimony of the Scriptures and inferences from the principle of causality, the moral law of a-dṛśta, the authoritativeness of the Scriptures, and so on. The causal argument, which is the most popular, is this. All composite objects of the world like earth, water, etc., must have a cause because they are of the nature of effects. That they are effects follows from the fact that they are made up of parts and possess a limited magnitude. Substances like space, time, atoms, etc., are not the effects of any cause because they are not made up of parts and are either unlimited or infinitesimal. Hence there must be a cause for all composite substances. This cause must be an intelligent agent. Without the guidance of an intelligent cause the material causes of the composite substances, namely, the atoms, cannot have just that order and co-ordination which enable them to produce these definite effects. This intelligent cause must have a direct knowledge of the material causes, a desire to attain some end and the power of will to realize the end (jñāna, icchā, prayatna). No individual soul possesses such knowledge and power. The cause of the world of composite things is, therefore, the supreme Self or God.24

The causal argument of the Nyaya-Vaśīṣṭha combines the causal and teleological proofs of God’s existence in Western philosophy. It
shows that the first cause of the world is an intelligent being and that we do not require a separate teleological argument to prove this. In this respect the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas agree with some Western thinkers like Paul Janet, Hermann Lotze and James Martineau who also hold that the first cause of the world must be an intelligent agent. But while these Western theists believe that God is the cause not only of the order of things in the world but also of the existence of those things with their materials, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas make God the cause of the order of nature and not of the existence of its ultimate constituents. Still, their view of God is theistic in so far as it holds that God maintains a continuous relation with the world (being conceived as not only the creator, but also its maintainer and destroyer). There is also the suggestion that the world of things and beings is related to God as one’s body is to one’s self. But these ideas are not properly developed in the direction of a full-fledged theism which makes God the author not only of the order of nature but also of its ultimate constituents, and sees God at the heart of all reality.

NOTES

1. Nyāya-sūtra, Bhāṣya and Vārttika, i. i. 1–3, i. i. 10, i. i. 15; Praṣṭapādābhāṣya and Nyāya-kandali (Benares ed., 1895), pp. 171 ff. cf. Tarka-saṅgraha (Calcutta ed., 1897), pp. 32 ff.
4. Nyāya-sūtra and -bhāṣya, i. i. 4; Praṣṭapādā-bhāṣya and Nyāya-kandali, pp. 186 ff.; Laksanāvali (Benares ed.), p. 3.
5. Nyāya-sūtra and -bhāṣya and -vārttika, i. i. 1, i. i. 7, i. 2. 2; Praṣṭapādā-bhāṣya, ibid.
6. Nyāya-sūtra, bhāṣya, and vārttika, i. i. 1; Praṣṭapādā, pp. 200 ff.
7. Nyāya-sūtra and bhāṣya, i. i. 1; Praṣṭapādā, pp. 231 ff.
8. Nyāya-sūtra, bhāṣya, and vārttika, i. i. 5; Praṣṭapādā, pp. 205 ff.
10. Nyāya-sūtra and bhāṣya, i. i. 1; Praṣṭapādā, pp. 233 ff.
11. Nyāya-sūtra and bhāṣya, i. i. 1; Nyāya-mañjarī (Benares ed.), pp. 128 ff.; Śāstra-dīpikā, pp. 74 ff.; Vedānta-paribhāṣā, Chap. III.
12. Nyāya-sūtra and bhāṣya, i. i. 1–8; cf. S. C. Chatterjee, The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, for a detailed account of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Epistemology.
13. Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, i. i. 1; Praṣṭapādā-bhāṣya and Nyāya-kandali, pp. 6–7; Kirtanāvali, pp. 5–6.
14. Nyāya-sūtra and Bhāṣya, i. i. 1, i. i. 9.
15. Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, i. i. 1; i. i. 1; i. i. 15; Praṣṭapādā, pp. 8 ff.; 27 ff.; Nyāya-kandali, pp. 31 ff.; Kirtanāvali, pp. 50 ff.
16. Nyāya-sūtra and bhāṣya, i. i. 1; i. i. 22; Nyāya-vārttika, 2. i. 22; Praṣṭapādā-bhāṣya and Nyāya-kandali, pp. 69 ff.; Kirtanāvali, pp. 127 ff.; Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 432.
17. Nyāya-sūtra and bhāṣya, i. i. 1; Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, 3. 2. 1 ff.; Praṣṭapādā-bhāṣya and Nyāya-kandali, pp. 89 ff.; Kirtanāvali, pp. 152 ff.
18. Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, 1. 1. 6, 1. 1. 16; Praśastapāda and Nyāya-kandali, 94 ff.; Kiranāvalī, pp. 161 ff.
CHAPTER X—continued

THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEŠIKA

B—LATER NYĀYA-VAIŚEŠIKA

I. INTRODUCTION

The general purpose of the early Nyāya and Vaiśešika literatures is to give us a knowledge of the true nature of things, both physical and spiritual. True knowledge, according to these systems, helps us in the attainment of freedom from misery. The technique of general discussion as a means to ascertaining the truth about things was developed very early. But thanks to the hostile criticisms of other Schools of contemporary thought, the Nyāya and Vaiśešika philosophers began to develop a greater and greater spirit of argumentativeness. They began to engage themselves in a thorough examination of their opponents' doctrines. Their own theories having been vigorously controverted they were compelled to examine each word, even the prefixes and suffixes employed by themselves and their adversaries. The natural consequence of this was that they, like their opponents, had to be extremely circumspect about their own statements. The ancient period came to a close, in this condition, about A.D. 1200. The period which followed in the development of these systems forms the subject-matter of the present paper.¹

The fact that the Nyāya-Vaiśešika literature consists mostly of commentaries, subcommentaries, glosses, etc., does not imply that it has very little scope for original thinking. Granting that there is not much scope so far as the explicit teachings of the sūtras are concerned, it cannot be denied, however, that authors have ample opportunities for showing their philosophical acumen in the explanation, explication and logical presentation of the doctrines of their respective Schools. The brief sūtras (of Gautama and Kaṇāḍa) set forth only the general and basic principles, epistemological and ontological, about things consistently with the viewpoint of the systems concerned. The other writers formulated their own views regarding the interpretation of the sūtras and other questions without violating their allegiance to the sūtras.²

History shows that the three centuries from A.D. 900 to A.D. 1200 represent a period of comparative stagnation in the history of Nyāya-Vaiśešika literature, and this was due to the fact that strong adverse criticism was wanting. At such a time Śrīharṣa, a staunch Vedāntin with great dialectical acumen, entered the lists and gave a severe blow to the
very foundations of these systems in his famous work, Khaṇḍana-
hāṇḍa-khaḍya.

The chief aim of the book was to prove that it can never be definitely
certained whether a thing is or is not. The author took up the
definitions that the Naiyāyikas put forward and showed that not one
of them would stand the test of reasoning. His critical examination of
the bases of thought and language acted upon the Naiyāyika scholars
as a great stimulus to analytic thinking and fresh investigation, which
resulted in the composition of an equally famous work, namely Tatvā-
cintā-māni by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya (about A.D. 1225), widely reputed as
the true founder of the Navya-Nyāya or the Neo-logical School.

This book, on its publication, exerted a great, in fact, a revolutionary
influence on the whole range of Sanskrit literature. It should not be
regarded as merely a formal reply to Śrīharṣa’s criticisms. It was written
in a spirit of self-criticism. Gaṅgeśa thought that it was more important
for the Naiyāyikas to examine closely their own theory of knowledge
and art of definition in order to establish the reality of things, than to
proceed to answer criticisms of others. The Naiyāyika believes in the
reality of a thing on the basis of flawless definition and incontestable
proof. If sufficient accuracy and precision in regard to these two are not
maintained it is not possible for him to uphold the integrity of his
doctrine of reality. Śrīharṣa’s criticisms were certainly an eye-opener,
and though they did not, in Gaṅgeśa’s opinion, upset the foundation
of his realistic conviction they undoubtedly helped to show that the art
of definition and proof as familiar to the Naiyāyika required to be con-
siderably improved in respect of explicitness and logical precision.
Gaṅgeśa therefore undertook an examination of the whole theory of
knowledge in detail, making necessary corrections in the current
definitions and illuminating them with examples.

Vādindra, a Vaiśeśika scholar (about A.D. 1225), also worked in the
same spirit. He successfully tried to cure the inordinate tendency of
Vaiśeśika philosophers to obtain a victory in a debate. He censured as
fallacious the method of reasoning (called mahā-vidyā) invented by certain
Vaiśeśika scholars to score a victory over an opponent in a debate at
any cost, and asked his followers not to adopt such methods.3

It is to be noted that the Nyāya and the Vaiśeśika which became
closely related at this time, joined hands and defended the cause of
realism which was attacked from various quarters. Some exclusively
Vaiśeśika treatises were indeed written in this period, but the main current
of contemporary scholarship was in the direction of a syncretism between
the two Schools. The Nyāya theory of knowledge, for instance, influenced
the Vaiśeśikas and the Vaiśeśika division of categories, a knowledge of
which was supposed to be indispensable for achieving the supreme end,
was accepted by the Naiyāyikas.
Besides, this period produced an independent thinker in Raghunātha Śiromaṇi of Navadvīpa (Bengal). His classification of the Vaiśeṣika categories is very original and differs substantially from the accepted scheme of the School. We must not forget to mention two earlier scholars, viz. Śaṅkara Miśra and Vācaspati Miśra II, of whom the former commented on the Vaiśeṣika sūtras, and the latter met Śrīharṣa's criticisms in "Khaṇḍanoddhāra" on behalf of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa and Gadādhara were the most respected writers of this period. Mathurānātha's commentaries on Kiranāvali, Lilāvati and Tattva-cintāmanī are indispensable for a clear understanding of the contemporary Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika thought. Jagadīśa by his Śabda-sakti-prakāśikā, a treatise dealing with the means and ends of verbal knowledge, deeply influenced the grammarians of India, especially those of Bengal. Gadādhara, who is often eulogized as Navya-Nyāya personified, solved many knotty problems of logic and also raised many interesting issues with the help of actual or imaginary situations of knowledge (called ankhura). The glory of the Navadvīpa School reached its climax in this stage. We find in about the seventeenth century students from distant countries like Mandalaya (Burma) coming over to Navadvīpa and studying philosophy there under distinguished savants.

We may now consider the views of this School on inference, testimony and definition.

2. INFERENCE

Inference is a class of knowledge originating from the awareness of invariable concomitance (vyāpti-jñāna) of the sign (hetu) with the signate (or the thing of which it is the sign) which is to be inferred (sādhyā), the former corresponding to the middle term and the latter to the major of Western logic. The awareness of invariable concomitance leads to the knowledge of the presence of the sign as concomitantly connected with the signate in the minor term (pakṣa). It should be noted that though inference immediately follows from the aforesaid knowledge (parāmarśa), the knowledge of invariable concomitance is its real cause. From the psychological point of view inference, like every voluntary action, presupposes as its invariable antecedents, arranged in order of logical sequence, three psychic elements as follows:

(i) Knowledge of the end and of the means leading to that end,
(ii) Desire (icchā) for the realization of the end,
(iii) Will (pravṛtti) in furtherance of that realization.

A person trying to infer something must therefore be equipped with—

(1) Knowledge of the invariable concomitance of the sign with the signate.
Knowledge of the end and means.
Desire for the realization of the end.
Will in furtherance of that realization.
Knowledge of the sign not as such only, but as present in the thing signified by the minor term.
Recollection of the invariable concomitance; and
Knowledge of the sign as such which implies its knowledge as concomitant with the signate and that of its presence in the thing denoted by the minor term (pākṣa).

This represents the actual process involved in inference, leading to a knowledge (conclusion) of the desired thing or the signate.

The Nyāya treatises illustrate the above process by the following classical example:

(1) Where there is smoke (sign) there must be fire (signate);
(2) Knowledge of fire and the means of such knowledge;
(3) and (4) Desire and will expressed in the form— "may there be a knowledge of fire";
(5) Knowledge of smoke, not as a sign only but as a thing present in, say, the hill;
(6) Recollection of the invariable concomitance referred to in (1) above;
(7) Knowledge of the smoke on the hill as a sign implying its invariable association with the fire on the hill.

Invariable concomitance (vyāpti), the essential factor in inference, has been defined as (i) "the absence of the sign in all those places where the signate is absent"; and also as (ii) "the co-presence of the sign with the signate that is not a counter-entity to any negation* which exists in the locus of the sign and which does not exist with its counter-entity in the same locus."\(^6\) This rather complicated definition is only a modest example of how these later Nyāya thinkers tried to attain accuracy of expression by providing against actual and possible objections.

Repeated observation is recommended only for strengthening our conviction about the concomitance, and not for generating it. It may be noted here that an extraordinary universal perception\(^\dagger\) of the concomitance is obtained from the observation of the very first instance of concomitance (say, of smoke and fire).

The means of this kind of extraordinary universal perception is the extraordinary contact of a sense-organ with the individuals which are the objects of the said perception, established through the universal

* What is negated (or is non-existent) is the counter-entity (pratiyogin) of that negation or non-existence.
\(^\dagger\) Perception of cow or smoke, not as possessed of its individual characters, but as possessed of the class character of cowhood or smokehood, is universal or general perception.
THE NYÄYA-VAIŠEŠIKA

(e.g. smokehood) inhering in those individuals and perceived, or supposed to be perceived, as present in the individual in ordinary contact with the said sense organ. This type of contact is called sāṁanya-lakṣaṇā. It is said that the resulting extraordinary universal perception is essential even for entertaining doubt about the discrepancy of concomitance in a particular case, because, according to the Nyāya, doubt about a thing which really means indefinite knowledge about it, is not possible in the absence of some general knowledge about it in our mind.

Now, in spite of a general knowledge of concomitance doubt is possible about it in a particular case. Even though we may know generally that smoke is always accompanied by fire, we may have doubt on seeing smoke on the hill about the existence of fire, which has therefore to be inferentially known. To remove this kind of doubt resort is taken to tarka or indirect reasoning.

Indirect reasoning (as tarka) is designed to show that doubt about the concomitance leads to the denial of what is already certainly known or to the acceptance of what is not true. For example, the doubt about the existence of fire in the hill when smoke is seen coming out of it, is removed by the following reasonings, "if there were no fire in the hill, then it would mean that smoke is not an effect of fire, a knowledge of which, however, is already established through perception." Thus the necessary negative evidence is supplied by reasoning.

Indirect reasoning (tarka) which removes doubt regarding concomitance is of five kinds, namely: (1) self-dependence (âtmâśraya), showing that the non-acceptance of the concomitance makes the object to be inferred dependent on itself; (2) reciprocal dependence (anyonyâśraya), showing that the inferable object depends upon something which in its turn depends on it, if the concomitance is not accepted; (3) circular dependence (câkraâka), proving that the non-acceptance of the concomitance makes the ground of the inferable object depend on it; (4) dependence as regressus ad infinitum (anavasthå); (5) the fifth kind which is technically known as "tadanya-bâdhitârtha-prasânga" includes all other cases where the acceptance of already rejected propositions on the non-acceptance of the concomitance becomes obligatory. The former three have each been subdivided into three classes. For example, in the case of self-dependence: (1) If the origination of a thing is said to depend upon the origination of the thing itself, then it is a case of self-dependence in respect of origination; (2) if the existence of a thing is said to depend upon its own existence, then it is a case of self-dependence regarding existence; and (3) if our knowledge (jñâpti) about a thing is said to depend upon the knowledge itself then it is a case of self-dependence regarding knowledge. The same threefold division applies to the second and the third.

Reasoning (as tarka) is really an inference or more precisely the
appearance of inference and as such involves invariable concomitance of
the hypothetical transgression of the concomitance (necessary for the
original inference and to establish which resort is taken to reasoning)
with the objectionable consequence of accepting things which are already
proved to be false or that of not accepting what is known to be true.
This leads to the supposition of mutual dependence of reasoning and
invariable concomitance. The Naiyāyika’s answer to this supposed difficulty
is that such reasoning is used only to dispel doubt about the concomitance
in the absence of which reasoning would be impossible.

The Naiyāyika’s analysis of what is necessary for a thing for becoming
the subject of an inference is as subtle as it is interesting, but, before
we actually take up the discussion it should be pointed out that according
to the Naiyāyika it is possible to have a desire to make an inference for
the strengthening of one’s knowledge of a thing, obtained through a
different pramāṇa or source of right knowledge. This implies that it is
a case of a special desire. The qualification for subjecthood (paksata) of
an inference is the negation of the certainty (or certain knowledge) of
its property, which is to be inferred, the certainty being unaccompanied
by a special desire to infer. In other words where there is just certainty
about the property of a thing the latter does not become a fit subject
of an inference in which the former is to be ascertained. But as this is
a special desire to infer, the certainty is not detrimental to inference,
whereas certainty unaccompanied by special desire closes the way to
inference. It follows that not to have certainty along with not having
a special desire to infer is essential for inference. The precise logical way
of expressing the idea according to Naiyāyika would be to say, that the
negation of the certainty of the inferable property of a thing, the certainty
being qualified by a negation of the special desire to infer, is the required
qualification of the thing for becoming the subject of an inference.9

3. TESTIMONY

As the Nyāya logic is combined with the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, the
Vaiśeṣika literature of this period also discusses in detail verbal testimony
as a means of right knowledge. The ancient doctrine that verbal testimony
is a word or sentence (śabda) spoken by a person possessing the right
knowledge of its meaning and desirous of communicating the same
knowledge, was widely accepted in the beginning of this period. Accord-
ingly Gaṅgeśa stated that any word or sentence the utterance of which
is preceded by the right knowledge of its meaning, is called verbal
testimony. Supporting this view the orthodox scholars held that the
essential conditions for the verbal testimony are that (i) the right know-
ledge of the meaning of the word (or sentence) to be spoken, acquired
through any one of the means of right knowledge, must be present in
the speaker's mind, together with (ii) a knowledge of the said right
knowledge, and (iii) a desire that others also should have the said right
knowledge.¹⁰

This implies that verbal knowledge follows from hearing or auditory
perception only of the word (or sentence). But the philosophers of the
Navadvipa School expressed the opinion that not only auditory percep-
tion but inferential apprehension also of the said word (or sentence)
based on a relevant sign or symbol may help in obtaining right know-
ledge. As an illustration of the latter, it is pointed out that the ideas of
an author may easily be followed even without reading aloud his writings.
It follows therefore that not only word (or sentence) as actually perceived
but as known (in any way) is sufficient for verbal testimony. In the
origin of verbal knowledge of any fact or idea communicated through
a word or sentence, the following successive factors are involved, viz.
(1) perception of the articulate sounds (in case of spoken words) or
inference of the same through representative symbols (in case of reading
written words); (2) recollection of the relation between the aforesaid
words and their meanings; and (3) ideal presence of the things denoted
by the words. The different kinds of knowledge auxiliary to the aforesaid
ideal presence are: (1) knowledge of the expectancy (ākāṅkṣā) or the
inability of a word to convey the meaning of a sentence on account of
the absence of some other word, (2) knowledge of compatibility (yogya-tā)
Or the non-contradiction of the sense; (3) knowledge of juxtaposition
(sannidhi) or the consecutive utterance (or writing) of words; (4) know-
ledge of the intention (intended sense) or tātparya of the framer of the
sentence.

A man desirous of communicating his knowledge of the blueness of
a pen to another says, "the pen is blue." To receive the knowledge the
latter must first perceive the articulate sounds of the said sentence and
then recollect the relation between the words and the things denoted
by them. Through this recollection only, the hearer acquires a knowledge
of those things. Then with the help of his (hearer's) knowledges of
expectancy, compatibility, juxtaposition and intended sense of the said
words the above knowledge originates in him a further knowledge corre-
sponding to the knowledge which the speaker intended to communicate,
viz. "The pen is blue." This is known as verbal knowledge (śabda-bodha).

Two possible relations are admitted between a word and its meaning
(i.e. object) to explain why a particular word conveys a particular sense.
Of these the first is called sakti which represents established convention.
The second, called lakṣaṇā or implication, hints indirectly at a thing which
is connected with the object of the conventional sense. For instance, the
judge sitting on a bench to try a case is referred to as the "bench."

The means to the knowledge of conventional relation are eight, viz.
(1) grammar; (2) analogy; (3) lexicon; (4) words of an authority; (5) usage; (6) context; (7) paraphrase; and (8) contiguity. In the initial stage this knowledge is acquired through usage only, the other means being secondary.

The means by which a child acquires knowledge of this relation is a type of reasoning based on the perception of the action in a particular individual, say A, in response to a call from another, say B. The reasoning may be expressed as follows: (1) The action of A to gain a particular end is due to will following a desire in his self; (2) the will presupposes a knowledge of the end and of the means, as is usual (in my case). Enquiry into the cause of the said knowledge then leads to a knowledge of the relation.

It is thus clear that the knowledge of the sounds uttered by B is the cause of A's knowledge about the object of the call, because A is found to act invariably on hearing the sounds of B. This knowledge is followed by desire and will on the part of A before his action commences.

As a result of this process the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence as a whole originates and not of the words separately. In the latter case the knowledge arises from the words heard in various combinations and in different contexts.

While the ancient School held the view that the relation of the word is with the universal (jāti), the individual (vyakty) and the form (ākṛti) of the latter, the modern School holds that the relation is between the word and the individual possessed of a universal (which inheres in it). It is to be noted that in the determinate knowledge of an individual the universal also is present as an adjective, but in indeterminate knowledge the two elements remain unrelated.

4. THE ART OF DEFINITION

The art of definition engaged the great attention of the Naiyāyikas. Their discussion of the topic seems to carry philosophical analysis to perfection. Definition (or lakṣaṇa-vākyay) is a precise statement of the characteristic mark (lakṣaṇa) of the defined (lakṣya) capable of distinguishing it from any other thing similar or otherwise. The precision implies freedom from the faults of (1) a-vyāpti or incomprehensiveness, when the definition is too narrow and does not cover all the individuals belonging to the class; (2) ati-vyāpti or overcomprehensiveness, when it is too wide and includes individuals not belonging to the class; and (3) a-sambhava or absurdity, when the defining characteristic does not at all belong to the things to which it is said to belong. Whiteness, horn and unclenched hoofs as proposed definitive characters of "cow" are respective examples of the three faults. It often happens that a special
characteristic, essential for definition, is not immediately available. To obviate this difficulty the Naiyāyika uses even a common characteristic as the essential factor of the definition and formulates it in such a way (with the help of a differentia) as to make it free from the fault of being too wide. The formulation of definitions on the basis of a common characteristic in the absence of a special one bespeaks logical acumen of a high order, for it involves the process of converting the common characteristic into a special one and as such it serves the purpose of definition very well.¹¹

The fine logical acumen referred to above is seen to a great advantage in the Naiyāyika's analysis of the problem of precisely describing relative things like knowledge, desire, negation, etc. Knowledge is relative in the sense that it is always of something, an objectless knowledge being an impossibility. Thus knowledge is relative to its object. So are desire, will, etc. Accordingly no knowledge can be precisely described except in reference to its object (content). It may be noted here that the elements involved in every act of knowledge, viz. the subject, the predicate and the relation are all subjects (viṣaya) of knowledge. An accurate description of any act of knowledge, therefore, requires a careful analysis of all the three. The knowledge expressed in the proposition "This is a pen" is distinguished from any other knowledge, say, what is expressed in the proposition "This is a book." This distinction is due to the difference in the two acts relative to the subject or the predicate or the relation concerned. A little reflection, however, will show that the terms "this" in these two propositions stand for the immediately present, the bare datum given in knowledge. Thus object qua object is the same in both the cases. Whatever difference there is is due to the difference in the two predicates viz. penness or bookness. Both the cases of knowledge "This is a pen" and "This is a book" refer to an identical subject "This." The differentiation is in the predicate technically known as vidiheyā. In one case the "this" has "penness" as its property, while in the other it has "bookness." The full and precise description according to the Naiyāyika, of the knowledge "This is a book" would be: It is the knowledge of the subject "this" as qualified by "bookness"; and that of the knowledge "This is a pen" is: It is a knowledge of the subject "This" as qualified by "penness."

A difference in the subject similarly brings about a corresponding difference in knowledge. Let us take as examples the two cases of knowledge "The pen is black" and "The shoe is black." It should be remembered that a particular thing is recognized as a subject only when it comes in relation with knowledge. The Naiyāyika also says that a subject is a subject because there is subjecthood in it. It follows, therefore, that the difference of subject as shown above is really the difference in subjecthood. The subjecthood, however, is a relationship with knowledge.
Now as things having subjecthood, that is, as things having relation with knowledge, they are the same. Yet there is difference between the two cases of knowledge. To the question what brings about this difference the Naiyāyika replies that there must be something which modifies the said subjecthood of the things. In the examples we have taken "penness" and "shoeness" are the limiting elements of the subjecthood present in the two things indicated by "pen" and "shoe" respectively. It will be seen that the inherent universals "penness" and "shoeness" are in these cases the limiting elements of the subjecthood of the things denoted by "pen" and "shoe" in so far as the latter become subjects on account of the adventitious quality subjecthood which in its turn is nothing but the relationship with knowledge. A full statement of the Naiyāyika's description of the knowledge "The pen is black" would, therefore, be of the form: It is a knowledge characterized by the predicatehood present in "blackness" as well as by subjecthood limited by "penness."

Just as subjecthood makes a thing a subject so predicatehood makes a thing a predicate. There are cases of knowledge for a complete description of which a statement of the limitation of the predicatehood becomes necessary. For instance, let us take the knowledge "The table is jarred" (i.e. it has a jar on it). Here "jar" is predicated of "table" which means that something which has "jarness" is being predicated of the table. Now the predicates as predicates, as having predicatehood, have nothing in them to distinguish them from one another. A limitation of predicatehood is therefore necessary. In the above example "jarness" limits the predicatehood present in "jar." Thus the full description of the knowledge "The table is jarred" according to the Naiyāyika would be as follows: It is a knowledge characterized by the predicatehood as limited by "jarness" and also present in it, as well as by the subjecthood present in "table" and limited by "tableness." The difference in knowledges due to the difference in the relation in which something is predicated of a subject has also been thoroughly discussed in later Nyāya works.

It might seem to some that the Naiyāyika's method of exposition though subtle is unduly inflated with wordiness and his discussion in most cases amounts to hair-splitting. But the fact is just the reverse. He has carried his love of precision to such perfection that not a single word can be removed without harm to the exact sense intended to be conveyed.

The way of describing a-bhāva, meaning bare absence, and difference as shown in later Nyāya is also of great logical value, but an exposition of the topic would require more space than we have.
NOTES

1. Umāpati in his Padārthāya-dīvya-caksuḥ divides the historical development of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies into three successive periods, ancient (prācīna), mediaeval (madhya) and modern (nayya). But the scope of the present paper embraces a portion of the mediaeval period also.

2. It is not to be supposed that the sūtras had to be followed at any cost, for a certain class of commentary familiarly known as vārttika claims the liberty of criticizing and supplementing the sūtras if necessary. In fact, concrete instances of distinguished commentators having departed from the spirit of the sūtras and discussed philosophical issues in an independent manner are not altogether wanting.


4. He does not believe in the existence of ākāśa, time (hāla) and space (diś) as distinct from Īśvara. See Padārthā-tattva-nirūpanam (Benares edition).

5. See India Office Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS., written in Burmese script.

6. Vācaspati II in his Khaṇḍanoddhāra supporting the view of Vardhamāna stated that invariable concomitance is an unconditional relation (anupādhikāḥ sambandhaḥ) between the sign and the signate. The definitions given in Tattva-cintā-maṇi (translated above) are in their opinion applicable to particular cases only. See Khaṇḍanoddhāra, pp. 76–7 (Benares edition).

7. There are differences of opinion about the character of the contact. Some authors held that it is not the universal itself, but the ordinary perception of it, through which the extraordinary contact may be established. It should also be noted here that Raghunātha Śiromaṇi has refuted the doctrine of sāmānyalakṣaṇa contact. See Siddhānta-muktāvalī and Didhitī on Tattva-cintā-maṇi on sāmānyalakṣaṇa section.

8. See the tarka section of Tārkika-rakṣā (Benares edition).

9. See Siddhānta-muktāvalī, anumāṇa chapter.

10. See Tattva-cintā-maṇi (śabda section) and the commentary on it by Mathurānātha (Bibliotheca Indica).

11. See Kaṇḍa-rakṣāya by Śaṅkara Miśra on prthivi, etc. (Benares edition).

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Nyāya-siddhānta-maṇjari by Jānakī Nātha (Benares edition).
CHAPTER XI

THE SĀMKHYA-YOGA

I. INTRODUCTION

The Sāmkhya philosophy seems to have been the oldest philosophical system in India. In the Upaniṣads also we have germs of Sāmkhya speculation. The occurrence of the Sāmkhya concepts in the Upaniṣads—the Kaṭha, the Svetāsvatara and the Maitrāyaṇī—cannot be explained unless Sāmkhya speculations had assumed some definite shape before them. The mention of Kapila, the reputed founder of the School, in the Svetāsvatara-Upaniṣad is significant, though Śaṅkara denies its historical value. It is true that atheistic doctrines, characteristic of prevalent Sāmkhya, are not supported in these works.

Of all systems of philosophic thought Sāmkhya has suffered the worst disaster. The works of Kapila, of Āsuri, the direct disciple of the former, and of Pañcaśikha are all lost. The only work which has escaped extinction is the Sāmkhya-kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, who cannot be earlier than the Christian era. Though opinions differ on the date, the general chronological status of the work is not indeterminable. At any rate we cannot place the work later than the fourth century A.D. Older commentaries on this work are also lost. We have, therefore, to start with Gauḍapāda’s commentary and Vācaspati’s Sāmkhya-lalitva-kaumudī as the earliest exposition. There is, however, dispute about Gauḍapāda’s date and personal identity. Fortunately, with the discovery of the Yukti-dīpikā, an early commentary which is posterior to Bhartṛhari, from whose work Vākya-padiya it makes quotations, and most probably earlier than Kumārila and Dharmakīrtti, who remain unmentioned in the work, we are in possession of earlier authentic data of Sāmkhya Schools.

In the Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali and the Bhāṣya attributed to Vyāsa we have abundant discussion of the Sāmkhya categories and tenets. Regarding Patañjali there is a controversy about his time and personal identity. The work is probably the product of the early centuries of the Christian era. The Yukti-dīpikā, which seems to be the product of the sixth century A.D., throws a flood of light upon the long course of evolution of the Sāmkhya philosophy. We find in it mention of a good number of early writers, most of whom founded sub-Schools after their names, whose divergent views are quoted or referred to in it. Certainly these differences could not arise unless the cultivation of the philosophy went on for several centuries. The record of Sāmkhya speculations in the Mahābhārata
and the Gītā, affords unchallengeable evidence of the great antiquity of the School. Besides, the tradition recorded in the Buddha-carita that the Buddha had his schooling in the Sāmkhya under Ājāra Kālāma lends additional support to the theory of its pre-Buddhist origin. We need not regard these definite categorical assertions as fanciful myths. But for want of early authentic works it is extremely risky to pronounce a definite opinion on the shape and structure of Sāmkhya thought at the time of its original promulgation and in the intervening centuries before the period of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

The antiquity of Sāmkhya philosophy is further attested by the fact that the fundamental doctrines of Sāmkhya School have been elaborately criticized in the Nyāya-sūtra and the Brahma-sūtra. Besides, Sāmkhya thought is reproduced in the Caraka-samhitā. In Āśvaghoṣa’s Buddha-carita also similar Sāmkhya doctrines have been expounded. In the Aihirbudhnya-samhitā also we find a representation of Sāmkhya doctrines with necessary adaptations and variations.

It seems therefore perfectly warranted to conclude that Sāmkhya philosophical tenets are pre-Buddhistic in origin. It is, however, the compendium of Īśvarakṛṣṇa which gives the systematic logical exposition of Sāmkhya categories, that will be the main basis of our exposition. This is an extraordinary work because it sums up in sixty-eight verses, though ambiguous and obscure in places, the fundamental concepts of the School with their logical justification. We have Vācaspati’s commentary called the Sāmkhya-tattva-kaumudi as an authoritative exposition. The discovery of the Yuktī-dīpikā enables us to trace some of the missing links in the chain of evolution of Sāmkhya speculation. The Sāmkhya-pravacana-sūtra with Vijñānabhaṅkṣu’s Bhāṣya is also of considerable value.

2. THE TWENTY-FOUR CATEGORIES OF THE SĀMKHYA

Sāmkhya accepts two ultimate principles as the fundamental categories under which the whole universe of reality, spiritual and non-spiritual, is comprehended. These are puruṣa and prakṛti. Puruṣa stands for ultimate selves or spirits which are steadfast, unchanging, eternal entities whose nature consists of pure consciousness alone. Pure consciousness is one which has no necessary reference to an object. The association of objects with such consciousness is vicarious superimposition. As the number of spirits is practically infinite it is not quite exact to describe Sāmkhya philosophy as dualistic unless puruṣa as a class is regarded as one kind of reality and prakṛti as the other. Now prakṛti is the prius of the whole material and psychical order of phenomena. Though prakṛti is numerically one singular entity it is by no means a simple
homogeneous substance. It is "the union of opposites." It consists of three elements, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas which are by their nature and functions hostile to one another. This hostility is kept in check when prakrti is in its pure state of equilibrium prior to evolution. Sattva is primarily responsible for self-maintenance and self-manifestation of prakrti. Rajas is the cause of all activity and energizing. Tamas is responsible for inertia and restraint of activity. These three elements have different expressions in the material and in the psychical plane. The order of evolution which occurs in and through prakrti is determined and justified by a logical necessity. The different stadia reached in the course of evolution are also regarded as different categories. The whole process of evolution is summed up in terms of twenty-four categories, of which prakrti is the primal and initial limit. It is the uncaused cause and so called the first original cause. The final limit or terminus or evolution is furnished by the five gross elements, the five cognitive organs, the five motor organs and mind. But in between these two limits there are seven categories, viz. mahat or buddhi (intellect), which is the material counterpart and revealer of pure consciousness, the principle of egoity (ahamkara) and five super-physical elements (tanmatras). These seven categories possess the dual characteristic of being evolutes and evolvents in their turn. Now the intellect is the first evolute from the primordial prakrti and is the evolvent of egoity. Egoity in its turn is the evolute of intellect and is the evolvent of the five subtle elements, viz. sound, touch, colour, taste and smell and the eleven organs. The five subtle elements are the evolutes of egoity and the evolvents of the five gross elements, viz. ether, air, fire, water and earth. These twenty-four categories plus purusa (pure spirit) complete the twenty-five categories which comprise among them the entire realm of reality, spiritual and non-spiritual. The spirit (purusa) is, however, neither the cause nor the effect of anything else and thus stands apart and aloof from the course of evolution.

Now the question arises as to the necessity of postulating prakrti as the primal stuff and as the prius of the universe. The necessity is found in the law of causation. The order, law and regular working of the phenomenal world cannot be explained away as the fortuitous product of chance. Causality is the supreme governing principle of all changes. The gross world that we perceive must be the product of a previous state of reality. It is characteristic of causation that the effect, while it must differ from the cause, must share in essential attributes of the latter. These common attributes of the effect must be inherited from the cause. The special features of the effect, which distinguish it from the cause, must also be causally determined.

According to the Vaiseshika two atoms combine to produce a binary compound and three such binaries combine to produce a triatomic compound and so on. The binary or dyad does not gain in magnitude,
THE SĀMKHYA-YOGA

whereas the triad does. The triad is greater in magnitude than the dyads or their constitutive atoms. But this explanation is exposed to a grave difficulty. The atoms are devoid of extension; how can they give rise to objects possessed of extension? The small can never become great. If, however, the cause be larger in magnitude, then smaller effects can be produced out of it, as the large comprehends the smaller in it. Only that can be produced which is already there in the cause. Again, the specific can be produced from the generic, because the generic comprehends and is not opposed to the specific. What is necessary to explain the magnitude in the effect is the presence of magnitude as such in the cause which must be wider and greater than that of the effect, because magnitude as such is comprehensive of all species of magnitude. The Sāmkhya accordingly concludes that the cause must be more general than the effect. We can deduce a species from the genus, but not vice versa.

This leads us to the consideration of the nature of causation. In fact casualty is the corner-stone of Sāmkhya metaphysics and the different categories are deduced by the application of the law of causation. It is admitted by all that no event can occur without a cause. The Sāmkhya adds that the effect must be pre-existent in the causal stuff. This is called sat-kārya-vāda—the theory of pre-existent effect. The Sāmkhya theory of evolution (parināma-vāda) is based on this theory of causation.

According to the Sāmkhya the cause and the effect are existent alike because the effect is only a transformation of the material cause and hence identical in substance. Now the existence of prakṛti as the unity of the three gunas is inferred to account for the triple character of all phenomena, mental or physical. The phenomenal world can be explained as the product of an ultimate principle, if the latter be possessed of the same essential characteristics which are found in the former. The theory of causation which maintains the essential identity of the cause and the effect can alone lead to this conclusion. Hence the supreme importance of the Sāmkhya theory of causation.

Serious objections have been advanced by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School against the Sāmkhya theory of causation: (1) The effect is a new whole different from the constituent parts and is not a mere juxtaposition of them. (2) The effect is not cognized before its production. Were it the same as the cause it would always be cognized along with the latter. (3) The effect cannot exist in the material cause before its production because in that case the activity of the agent would be unnecessary and superfluous. The contention of the Sāmkhya that the agent only achieves transformation of the material cause by adjustment of its parts and does not produce a novel event, is a suicidal argument on its part. Production of a new transformation which was not in existence before and the annihilation of the previous unorganized state amount to the surrender of the Sāmkhya position that nothing existent is annihilated and a non-
existential is not produced. (4) There would be no difference in the condition of the cause at the beginning and the end, that is, before and after the emergence of the effect if the effect were already in existence. (5) The pre-existence of the effect would make existence and origination the same thing. But the difference between them cannot be annulled without self-contradiction.

As regards the first contention the Sāṅkhya does not accept the proposition that the whole is in an entity different from the cause. Were it different it would be perceived to be different from its locus. But the whole is never perceived as different from the parts. To assume the numerical difference of the whole from its constituent parts is to beg the question at issue. To say again that the whole, being a product, must be different from its material cause as it is different from the other causes, viz. the agent and the instrument, is an argument of despair. In that case the whole should be perceived apart from the parts as it is perceived apart from the instrumental causes. Furthermore, the manner of existence of the whole as a different entity in the parts is incapable of logical determination. Does the whole exist collectively in all the parts in the relation of togetherness or severally in each of the parts? The former alternative is untenable as the whole would not then be perceivable without the perception of all the parts. As a matter of fact the whole is perceived even when we perceive a significant part. In perceiving an individual we do not wait for the perception of the back or the inside of the person. If, however, the whole were supposed to inhere in each part exhaustively and in its entire extent, there would be as many wholes as there are parts. It has been contended that the whole must be different from the parts because it is produced when the parts are brought into a particular juxtaposition and is destroyed when the juxtaposition is destroyed, though the parts may continue to exist. But the argument is vitiated by the fallacy of petitio principii so far as the Sāṅkhya is concerned, because the latter does not think that the whole is a novel entity which is produced or destroyed. According to him the parts only play the role of a whole according as they are arranged in a specific order.

As regards the third contention that the existence of the effect before its production would make the activity of the agent superfluous the Sāṅkhya advances a series of arguments in refutation.

Firstly, the effect must be existent in the cause, because a non-entity cannot be produced. A square-circle is never seen to be brought into being by any amount of exertion. Production has necessary reference to the effect and the operation of the agent and instruments can be significant if it bears upon it. But the effect is non-existent before the causal operation and is supposed to come into existence after the completion of causal operation. In between, the effect has no status and so no operation can
be brought to bear upon it. The Sāṁkhya theory obviates this difficulty. The contention of the nihilist that the effect comes from non-entity amounts to a denial of causality. A determinate cause produces a determinate effect. Determinism is the essence of causality. If non-being can be productive, it is available everywhere and so anything could be the effect of anything else. The monist Vedāntist’s contention that the cause is real and the effect is only an appearance amounts to an evasion and not a solution of the problem. Again, the contention of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School that the effect becomes existent after causal operation and was non-existent before is open to serious objections. The proposition “the effect is non-existent” is absurd, as the predicate, non-existence, can be affirmed if it belongs to the subject. Belonging implies relation and this is possible between existent terms. If the predicate does not relate to the subject, the existence of the effect cannot be repudiated, because the predicate, non-existence, is unrelated to it. Well, let the effect be pre-existent. What then does the causal operation serve to accomplish? The answer is that it only makes explicit what was implicit. Production is nothing but manifestation.

Secondly, choice of material implies the previous existence of the effect. Oil seeds—and not sands—are chosen for the production of oil, because oil is implicitly present in the oil seeds. That can be the cause, which is related to the effect. As regards the production of a whole from parts we have already shown that it is not numerically different from the parts. The cause and the effect are identical in essence.

Thirdly, production is not promiscuous. The effect being identical with its relevant cause, it cannot come into being from anything numerically different. If the cloth, for instance, were different from the yarns, as it is from the weaving apparatus, it would not be homogeneous with the yarns. It would have a different locus from the yarns as it has from the apparatus. Again, the yarns could have produced another cloth as the weaving apparatus does. So the relation cannot be other than numerical identity. This disposes of the first objection of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers.

As regards the second objection based on non-perception of the effect before production, it will suffice to say that non-perception is no evidence for non-existence. It was not perceived because it was implicit. The causal operation only makes it explicit.

Regarding the third objection that production of transformation and manifestation is tantamount to the admission of production of a new entity, the Sāṁkhya attributes it to misconception of the nature of transformation. Transformation does not mean the cessation of a pre-existent attribute or the production of a pre-non-existent attribute. Production means the manifestation of an attribute implicitly present in the substance and cessation connotes the relapse of the manifested attribute into
the unmanifest state. So the objection is wide of the mark. The fresh adjustment and organization requisite for the production of the effect are rather the attributes of the causal stuff and as such not anything different. The Sāṁkhya, however, does not repudiate the conventional difference between existence and origination. Origination only means the manifestation of a non-manifested entity, which being identical with the substance does not imply the creation of a novel phenomenon.

Fourthly, causality presupposes determinate capacity of the cause to produce a determinate effect. This capacity can come into play only if there is a relation between it and what is to be produced. This implies the potential existence of the effect in the cause. The concept of capacity is necessarily bound up with a substratum and an object. Now the substratum qua cause is pre-existent. The question is whether the object qua effect is pre-existent or not. But the very concept of power has a bipolar reference; it cannot be supposed to exist and function in the absence of the other term. If the object be non-existent how can the causal power operate upon it? If, however, the causal capacity could function upon a non-existent object then the charge of promiscuity incidental to the production of anything cannot be avoided.

Fifthly, the very possibility of causality implies that the effect must be existent in the cause. A non-entity has no need for a cause. It is difficult to make an intrinsic difference between one non-entity and another non-entity. If the cloth were non-existent in the cause just as a square-circle is, it would be impossible to account for the production of the one and the non-production of the other. An explanation might be possible if there were intrinsic difference between one non-entity and another. But such intrinsic difference either in the shape of a quality or action or class character is inconceivable in what is non-existent.

All the different arguments advanced by the Sāṁkhya are logical corollaries of the fundamental proposition that the cause and effect are identical in substance. Now there are very cogent considerations in support of this position. The product is an attribute of the material cause in the sense that it cannot exist in a locus where the material cause is absent. Now this relation of substance and attribute cannot subsist between numerically different substances. The cow is not an attribute of the horse. So this very relation of substance and attribute which subsists between a cause and an effect proves that they are not numerically different and hence must be identical. Even the very relation of a material and product cannot subsist between two different entities. For instance, there is no such relation between a jar and cloth. The relation of material and product between yarn and cloth then proves that they are not numerically different. There is another weighty consideration in support of this position. If the whole as product were a different substance from its constitutive parts they should have different weight. But the weight of
the product, for instance a textile, is not found to be greater or less than that of the yarns of which it is composed.

As for the differences between cause and effect in respect of causal efficiency, nomenclature, origination and destruction, they do not prove the absolute difference of the effect from the cause. A concrete illustration will elucidate this truth. The tortoise spreads out its different organs and again retracts them into its body. The expansion and contraction symbolize production and destruction. The production of different ornaments from the same piece of gold and their cessation in the same are rather cases of contraction and expansion, withdrawal and manifestation. The cases are typical and show that there is neither production of an absolutely new entity which was non-existent before, nor the destruction of an existent fact. As regards the difference of causal efficiency between a lump of clay and a jar, this too cannot be made the ground of inference of numerical difference. We find that one man cannot carry a stretcher though he can efficiently serve as a guide. But several such men can carry the stretcher. Likewise one yarn cannot serve as a wrapper. But several yarns combined actually serve this purpose. The difference of causal efficiency and function is therefore no argument for the numerical difference of cause and effect.

Prakṛti.—Prakṛti is the ultimate causal ground and prius of the whole flux of phenomenal order. The manifold phenomena are seen to originate, to perish, to occupy limited space, to move, to be dependent for subsistence and functioning. Now, these must have their causes. We have found that the cause must be greater in magnitude and more general than the effect. The particular and the specific cannot be produced from another particular and specific. Now to begin with, the gross material phenomena which are classified under five gross elements must be traced to causes which are less specific and more general. The causes of the five gross elements are the five subtle elements called tannmātras as already stated. These five subtle elements together with the eleven organs again evolve from egoity which evolves from intellect which again evolves from prakṛti. Prakṛti, as we have said, is a complex unity of three elements sattva, rajas, and tamas. Sattva is light and luminous. It is the cause of buoyancy of things and as present in the sense-organs it makes them fit and competent for apprehension of their objects. Rajas is active. All movement is due to it. Without its help sattva and tamas would be absolutely ineffective. All activity, internal change or external movement is possible because of it. Tamas is characterized by heaviness and obstruction. It causes gravitation in material bodies and dullness in organs. As illumination is the effect of sattva, obscuration is the effect of tamas. These three elements are found to co-operate in spite of their natural opposition in every object, physical or psychical. Just as the wick, fire and oil combine to produce illumination so these also always co-operate
throughout the course of evolution. The preponderance of one and the subordination of the others in different manner and proportion give rise to the plurality of phenomena in their infinite complexity. The entire process of evolution is, however, determined by an unconscious teleology which results in either enjoyment or liberation of the spirit. Every step in the evolution is purposive, though prakṛti is not conscious of it.

Now, we must try to understand the logical significance of the different stages of evolution.

Evolution.—The first evolute is mahat, the great, also called buddhi, intellect. It is called “great” (mahat) because temporally and spatially it has the greatest magnitude among the evolutes. Paradoxical though it may appear, intelligence, understanding, feeling, willing, and all other psychical phenomena are regarded by the Sāṅkhya as products of nature (prakṛti), their difference from gross material objects lying in the attenuation and refinement of their constitution. Now prakṛti is the equilibrium of the three opposing forces or principles and so far as the purpose of evolution is considered it is as good as non-existent as has been described in the Vyāsa-bhāṣya. It is indeterminate and imperceptible. We are, however, compelled to accept it as the ultimate prius if we accept the Sāṅkhya conception of causation according to which the cause is the unspecialized state of the specialized effect. The cause of all causes must then be bereft of every trace of specialization and can at best be thought of as pure being. But pure being is psychologically as inconceivable and unimaginable as pure non-being. Hence the purely negative description of prakṛti.

Now the primal prakṛti is characterized by absolute equilibrium of the constituent guṇas and though it undergoes change which is integral to its nature, the change is homogeneous, that is, from similar to similar. This absolutely homogeneous prakṛti, as we have observed, is as good as non-existent. For it serves no purpose. But the immanent teleology, which is temporarily held in check in the interlude between a preceding and a succeeding creation of the world, becomes released and the equilibrium is disturbed. The disturbance means the preponderance of one or other guṇa over the rest. The first evolute mahat is characterized by the preponderance of the sattva element. It is the highest and simplest entity; and perhaps because of its most generalized character it is placed at the beginning of evolution which consists in transition from simple to complex, general to particular, unspecialized to specialized. It is pure intelligence which, in its cosmic character, comprises all limited intellects with this difference that while the latter have felt reference to objects, the former is without any, since for it there is no object to be grasped. The second evolute is egoity or self-sense. It is relatively limited in scope because it has reference to self whereas the mahat is not circumscribed in its reference. It has everything as its possible object and in the cosmic plane.
it possesses this potentiality though the objective order has not come into being. From egoity proceed two parallel series of evolutes—internal and external. The former series consists of five cognitive organs, five conative organs, and mind which is of dual nature, as cognition and conation both are determined by it. The objective series consists of the five subtle elements. The internal series proceeds from the sattva aspect, and the objective from the tamas aspect of mahat. The rajas element serves only to activate these two elements respectively. All these evolutes are derived from egoity and this is logically deducible from the immanence of egoity in each and all. The different organs are the instruments for the fulfilment of the purposes of the ego and the objects are necessary for the satisfaction of the possessive impulse. The objects are the property of the ego who is the proprietor. The immanence of egoity is explicitly felt in the identification of the organs and the objects with it. It is for this reason that the ego is affected by the conditions of the organs and the objects. With the loss of the eye, for instance, the ego believes itself to be blind and it feels that it is wealthy or poor according as the material objects are in or out of its possession. The evolution of gross material elements from the subtle ones is a logical necessity because only the gross can be of service to the ego. The organs, it is obvious, are specialized forms of egoity, because while the former have specialized scopes and reference the latter's reference comprehends all of them.

It ought to be noted that the deduction of categories is a logical process. The particular is deduced from the general which is also the case with deductive reasoning. Another feature of the Śāṅkhya theory of evolution is its deduction of subjective and objective categories from one principle. The precedence of the subjective categories, viz. mahat (pure intelligence) and āhamkāra (egoity), in the hierarchy of evolution, to the objective categories, viz. subtle elements and gross elements, seems to be determined by a logical necessity. The subjective categories have a necessary objective reference. The objects are therefore necessary to satisfy this need. The world order consists of both these sides, the subjective and the objective.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the evolution, though successive, exhibits and embodies a continuity. The antecedent continues and is gathered up in the consequent. The prior stage is not annulled in the posterior. In spite of the variation, there is the all-comprehensive undercurrent of the primal stuff. Each stage is characterized by the triple character of Īśvara. The existence of this common thread in all the different stages of evolution makes it logically possible to trace them to one common principle.

Bondage and Emancipation.—The bondage of the self is effected by its identification with the buddhi and egoity. And this identification is due to the reflection of the pure spirit in the buddhi and the consequent failure on the part of the spirit to distinguish itself from the former. This non-
discrimination results in the identification of the two, which further and further leads to the identification of the pure self with the successive series of evolutes. It is for this reason that the pure spirit, which by its intrinsic nature is free and pure, unsusceptible to pain and sin and moral and intellectual defects, comes to feel its subjection to all these limitations.

It is, however, the presence of pain, which sums up all the limitations and defects, that compels the spirit to think about the means of delivery from its meshes. Hence the necessity of philosophical knowledge. It is the theoretical and practical conviction that the subject as pure spirit is by its very nature free from all contamination of pain and misery that ultimately leads to its emancipation. The emancipation is achieved by the discriminative knowledge that the self is entirely different from and unaffected by the not-self. This, however, is not easy to achieve. The theoretical conviction must mature into and culminate in direct realization of the truth. For this a long course of ethical discipline is necessary. The first essential condition is the abandonment of attachment to the attractive things of the world—honour, wealth, position and power. The practice of yogic discipline is recommended for this purpose. It enables the spirit to recover its sense of freedom.

Puruṣa.—The existence of puruṣa as the unchanging and abiding spirit of the nature of pure consciousness cannot be empirically known. Being devoid of sensible quality it cannot be externally perceived. Nor can it be internally perceived, because the object of mental perception is invariably a product of guṇas being possessed of feeling tone.

It is argued by the Sāṁkhya, however, that all aggregates and complexes subserve the end of an other. Now prakṛti and all her modifications are complex aggregates of triple guṇas. So they must be subservient to some other principle. It is a matter of experience that bed, chair, cushion, furniture, etc., which are compounds of manifold elements, cannot be supposed to be self-sufficient in their existence. They necessarily exist for the satisfaction of a need. The whole material and psychical order of existence cannot therefore be conceived to have self-sufficient existence. The other principle for whose sake they exist and function must be an uncompounded spirit in the ultimate analysis. Though empirically we have no knowledge of a pure spirit it must be admitted because if there were no simple, uncompounded substance, the process of subservience would have no limit. The regressus an infinitum is the reductio an absurdum of the denial of simple substances.

The second argument is a corollary of the first. Prakṛti as an aggregate of triple guṇas must have its opposite in a simple substance. By the first argument we have found that an uncompounded simple substance is the logical presupposition of the complex phenomena and so the opposition of it is obvious. The third argument is that all unintelligent objects must have an intelligent director which must be the spirit in the last resort.
The fourth argument asserts that the unconscious world of reality with its infinite change and complexity must be experienced by someone. The experiencer must be a pure spirit.

Finally, the striving for liberation is a felt fact. The longing for escape from the never-ending circuit of worldly existence is felt by all spiritually inclined persons. This longing points to the possibility of salvation, because it cannot be dismissed as a false treacherous guile of nature. Now, it is *prakṛti* which can strive for this end. But there can be no salvation and release from pain and imperfection so far as *prakṛti* is concerned. These limitations are inherent in *prakṛti* as an inalienable part of its nature. So the necessity of salvation proves that there must be a spirit who alone can have emancipation.

All these arguments are based upon teleology. The movement of *prakṛti* is asserted to be purposive in a twofold way. Firstly, it serves the end of enjoyment by *purusā* of the phenomenal plurality in and through the psychical apparatus and, secondly, for the emancipation. This is the teleology of evolution. All these arguments emphasize the fact that this teleology is fulfilled and becomes significant only if there be a pure spirit.

The Sāmkhya posits an infinite plurality of *purusās*. This seems to be a traditional dogma accepted as an article of faith. The arguments advanced are logically weak and unconvincing. They relate to the empirical self and have no relevance to the pure spirit in which the Sāmkhya believes. Thus the determinate occurrence of birth, death and the possession and exercise of different organs are supposed to prove the existence of different selves. If there were no plurality of selves, the birth and death of one individual would entail the birth and death of all other individuals. The selective activity of organs would not be possible if they belonged to a common self. Thus the loss of sight of one individual would make all other individuals blind. But this is contrary to fact. Secondly, the absence of simultaneous activity of all individual bodies proves that the self varies with each psycho-physical organism. Thirdly, the occurrence of various intellectual and moral qualities in different individuals should prove that they must appertain to different selves.

These arguments have very little cogency and logical value. Birth and death, possession of organs, and the varying distribution of intellectual and moral powers do belong to *prakṛti* and its different evolutes. The pure spirit is absolutely unaffected by them. So these phenomena cannot be made the ground of the inference of numerical difference of the *purusās* with whom they have no concern.

The greatest difficulty in the Sāmkhya philosophy is the possibility of the relation of *purusās* and *prakṛti*. We cannot conceive that it is one of conjunction because the eternal existence of *purusā* and *prakṛti* as parallel entities must make this conjunction an inescapable necessity. If this conjunction constituted bondage there could be no release from it. So
the relation must be of a different kind. As a matter of fact, the relation is posited between buddhi and puruṣa and the relation with the ultimate prakṛti is a matter of inference, buddhi and prakṛti being identical in essence in conformity with the law of causation. But what can be the nature of relation between buddhi and puruṣa? It is said that the puruṣa is reflected in the buddhi which is a luminous and transparent stuff. But the puruṣa being ubiquitous cannot but have such relation with all the buddhis and it is passing strange that the said reflection should not take place in each and all of them. The Sāṁkhya is constrained to admit that this is an ultimate fact which logic cannot comprehend. It is the presupposition of the whole course of evolution and makes it purposive and significant.

Epistemology.—Patañjali admits five mental states, viz. true cognition (pramāṇa), error (viśpyaya), objectless ideation (vīkālpa), cognition in dreamless sleep (nirṛti), and recollection (smṛti). Of these the first is the purveyor of truth and hence has logical validity. The rest are psychological facts devoid of logical value. Valid cognition is of three kinds—perception, inference and verbal testimony. Perception is determinate intuition of an object. In external perception the senses move forward to meet the objects and when the contact occurs the senses are transformed into the shape of the objects. The mind (buddhi) is then automatically transformed into the shape of the object. But the sense and mind being both unconscious, their transformation cannot be termed knowledge. It is the spiritual illumination of the mental form which makes knowledge possible. As regards the nature of this illumination there is a difference of view between Vācaspati and Vijñānabhiṣkṣu. The former holds that the mind and its modification, being extremely clear and mirror-like owing to the preponderance of the sattva element, is the closest possible analogue of pure spirit and so it at once catches the reflection of the spirit, and then becomes conscious as it were. This constitutes knowledge. It is both subjective and objective in reference. So every case of perceptual intuition is a judgment of the form "It is a jar and I know it is so." For the subjective reference it is not necessary that another mental modification or another reflection of the spirit in it should occur. This is called the theory of single reflection, being unilateral in character.

Vijñānabhiṣkṣu, following the texts in the Purāṇas, gives a different interpretation. He asserts that apprehension is possible only through transformation of the mind. The mind can perceive an object whose shape it assumes. But this mental transformation is perceived only when it is reflected in the puruṣa. All cognition takes place in the being of puruṣa and not in the mind. This primary reflection of the mental form of the object constitutes objective cognition, viz. "This is a jar." As regards the subjective judgment "I know the jar," it requires another process. In this judgment the subject is as much a content as the object. But as
cognition of an object is possible only through a corresponding mental transformation the knowledge of the subject “I” can occur only when the mind is transformed into the form of the “I.” And this transformation is imaged in the pure spirit; thus the knowledge “I know the jar” takes place. Here instead of one reflection we have got two, and accordingly two mental modifications. This interpretation seems to harmonize with the Śāṅkhya doctrine of purality of selves better than Vācaspati’s theory. The reflection may be a shadowy appearance. But the role of the puruṣa as epistemological and moral subject is held to be apparent and illusory. This theory of double reflection makes the play of this apparent role more plausible than the other theory.

There is one important point which ought not to be left out of account. Both Vācaspati and Vijnānabhirṣa classifysize perception under two heads —indeterminate (nir-viṣaṇa) and determinate (sa-viṣaṇa). But the text of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is silent upon this point. The explanation of the Vyāsabhāṣya explicitly makes perceptual intuition determinate. The Yukti-dīpikā also does not mention this dual character. The problem arises from the occurrence of the term alocana in the Śāṅkhya-kārikā, 28. Vācaspati explains it as indistinct perception. The Yukti-dīpikā, on the contrary, interprets it as the modification of the sense-organ. It is further maintained that cognition is only a mental fact. Besides, there can be no cognition of a general character exclusively. All cognition is the cognition of the particular and general combined. The sense-organ has no cognitive capacity as the admission of it would make the postulation of the mind superfluous. So the classification of perception into indeterminate and determinate seems to be an innovation incongruous with the original text.

Inference is broadly divided into positive (vītā) and negative (a-vītā), according as it is based on positive and negative concomitance. The positive is of two kinds—one based upon causal relation, and the other on general similarity. The inference of fire from smoke and of impending rainfall from the clouded sky belongs to the first category. The deduction of super-sensuous facts such as the primordial prakṛti or sense faculties is effected by means of the second. From the homogeneity of cause and effect, generally perceived, the ultimate cause of the world order is also inferred to be homogeneous with it in respect of triple character. The inference of senses is another instance. All acts are caused by instruments. Knowledge is an act and therefore caused by an instrument which must be the senses. The specific object of such inference is imperceptible. And hence there can be no direct knowledge of its concomitants. But the community of the nature of the imperceptible with the perceived facts makes the inference possible.

Verbal testimony is the source of knowledge of super-sensuous entities. It consists of the words (sabda) of a reliable authority, like the Vedas, free from all possible defects.
3. THE YOGA

It is said in the Gītā that Sāmkhya and Yoga are one and it is only fools who look upon them as different. Whatever may be the meaning of the terms Sāmkhya and Yoga, intended in the Gītā, it holds good if we take them to stand for the two disciplines. Yoga is applied Sāmkhya. The philosophical basis of Yoga is the same as that of Sāmkhya. The difference is the introduction of another category, viz. Personal God by Patañjali in his Yoga-sūtra. It is therefore called theistic Sāmkhya. By believing in an external god, the Yoga obviates the difficulty of the initiation of the evolutionary process after periodical cosmic dissolutions. It is God who brings the world process to a halt and also inaugurates the subsequent process of evolution. The cosmic functions of God are not emphasized in the Yoga-sūtra. But the scholiast Vyāsadeva believes in cosmic function and his commentators take considerable pains to establish these activities. In the Bhāmatī, Vācaspāti states that the movement of prakṛti is said to be guided and controlled by God. The existence ofGod is, however, not proved by the cosmological argument. It is proved as follows. Knowledge is found to vary in extent and scope from small to great in different subjects. Whatever is possessed of degrees of excellence must have its maximum in some substratum. For instance, magnitude which varies in degree is minimum in the atom and maximum in space. So there must be a person in whom knowledge reaches its maximum. That is God. He is not limited by time because He must exist eternally. Otherwise, the revelation of the Veda, the source of eternal infallible knowledge, will not be possible.

Patañjali, however, does not make the worshipful meditation of God the only means of enlightenment which leads to the release of the self from bondage of rebirths. Like the Sāmkhya, he holds the knowledge of the distinction of self from not-self as the sole and sufficient cause of emancipation. In the Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali various courses of meditation are prescribed for the realization of the nature of the pure self.

We must briefly explain the general nature of yoga. It is defined to be the suppression and control of the five-fold mental activity of which we have spoken before. The purity and freedom of the self are obscured by the constant fluctuations of the mind with which the self identifies himself. This identification is due to primal ignorance (avidyā) which is a positive entity and manifests itself in the forms of perverted cognitions. Thus under the spell of avidyā, the self regards what is non-eternal as eternal, impure as pure, pain as pleasure and non-self as self. It is due to its influence that the self feels his identity with the buddhi, develops attachment and hatred, and finally a will to live and irresistible dread for death. These are the passions and defilements which make the emergence of spiritual life difficult. There are various antidotes to these intellectual,
moral and quasi-physical disciplines. All these disciplines are prescribed for the achievement of the control of the mind and the body.

We may mention the parikarmans or the purifying disciplines. These are cultivation of love and friendly attitude (maitrī) towards those who are in happiness, compassion (karunā) for the distressed, feeling of happiness (muditā) at the spiritual exaltation of the pious men, and indifference (upeksā) towards sinners. And again such propaedeutic disciplines as non-injury (ahimsā), truthfulness (satya), non-stealing (a-steya), sexual continence (brahma-caryā), and non-appropriation (a-parigraha) are necessary. Among these non-injury is the most important and essential. The other disciplines are to be practised in conformity with the observance of this fundamental virtue. A truth, for example, which leads to injury is only a pseudo-truth.

All these different practices and courses of discipline are recommended for the achievement of samādhi, the quiescence of the mind. Now this samādhi is of two kinds, viz. samprajñāta which leads to the realization of the numerical and functional difference of the self and the mind, and a-samprajñāta in which even this realization as a mental occurrence is suppressed and the self achieves his freedom and is restored to his own nature as pure spirit.

In fine, we should note that supreme emphasis has been laid upon dispassion and detachment. The spiritual aspirant must realize the worthlessness of the things of the world and detach himself from the worldly pursuits. The highest dispassion consists in the relinquishment of attachment to the blessed experience of the distinction of the self and the not-self, because this is the condition sine qua non of the recovery of ultimate freedom. Mere dispassion without enlightenment is rather a snare and a pitfall.

NOTES

1. vide, pp. 14, 38.
2. On Yoga-sūtra, II. 19.
5. "Cetanādhiśhitam a-cetanam pravartate yathā yoginām Isvāra-vādinām." Bhāmati on Brahma-sūtra, II. 2. 2.

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CHAPTER XII

THE PŪRVA-MĪMĀecret

I. INTRODUCTION

The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā is a system of Indian philosophy which investigates the nature of dharma propounded in the former section of the Vedas—karma-kāṇḍa—just as the Uttarā-mīmāṁsā investigates the nature of Brahman in the latter section—jñāna-kāṇḍa. Owing to its recognition of the Vedas as the sole authority on dharma it is treated as an orthodox system of philosophy (āstika-darśana). Though the word āstika is interpreted also as that which recognizes the other world and that which accepts the existence of God, its general meaning is that which recognizes the Vedas as authority. The term darśana emphasizes the fact that these systems aim at the final release of man through the highest type of knowledge and realization of the highest truth.¹

Jaimini's Pūrva-mīmāṁsā-sūtra (c. 400 B.C.) refers to many Ācāryas, including Bādarāyaṇa. Since Bādarāyaṇa also refers to Jaimini, they may be contemporaries. The earliest extant commentary on the sūtras is Śabarasaṃvīna's Bṛhaṣya (c. A.D. 200) on twelve chapters, though earlier Vṛttis by Bodhāyaṇa, Upāvarṣa and Bhavadāsa are known from references. Bhartṛmitra and Bhartṛhari are also spoken of as Vṛttikāras.

Śaṅkara-bhāṣya was commented upon by Kumārilabhaṭṭa (seventh century A.D.) in his Śloka-vārttika on I. 1, Tantra-vārttika on I. 2 to III, and Ṭup-tīkā on IV to XII; and in his Bṛhattīka and Madhyama-tīkā which are lost to us. Kumārilas's discipline Prabhākara alias guru wrote two independent commentaries on Sabara-bhāṣya, the Bṛhatī (nibandhana) and Laghvī (vivarana) which are commented upon by Śālikanātha in Rju-vimalā and Dīpa-sīkhā respectively. Maṇḍanamiśra and Bhaṭṭomīveka were also Kumārilas's disciples; the former wrote Vidhi-viveka, Bhaṭavānā-viveka, Vibhrama-viveka and Mīmāṁsānukramani, while the latter, identified by some with Bhavabhūti, composed commentaries on Śloka-vārttika and Bhaṭavnā-viveka. Śālikanātha wrote Prakaraṇa-pańcikā elucidating Prabhākara's doctrines. Vācaspatimiśra (c. A.D. 850) wrote a commentary Nyāya-kaṇikā on Vidhi-viveka and a manual called Tattva-bindu.

By A.D. 1000 Devasāmin wrote a Bhāṣya on Saṅkarṣa-kāṇḍa, Sucaritamiśra and Pārthasārathimiśra wrote commentaries, Kāśikā and Nyāya-ratnākara, on Śloka-vārttika. Pārthasārathimiśra also wrote Sāstra-dīpikā, a commentary on the sūtras elucidating the adhikaranaṇas according
to Kumārila, Tantra-ratna on Ṭūp-ṭūkā, and Nyāya-ratna-mālā on the model of Prakaraṇa-panicīka. Bhavanāthamiśra’s Naya-viveka (Prabhākara School), Bhaṭṭasomeśvara’s Nyāya-sudhā and Paritoṣamiśra’s Ajitā, both commentaries on Tantra-vārttikā are important works of this period. Short manuals like Nandīśvara’s Prabhākara-vijaya, Cidānanda’s Nītī-tattvāvibhāva (Bhaṭṭa School), and Bhaṭṭa Viśṇu’s Naya-tattvāsamgraha (Prabhākara School); Murārimiśra’s Tri-pādi-nīti-nayana, a commentary on the second, third and fourth pādas of the first adhyāya of the sūtras, Madhavācārya’s Nyāya-mālā-vistara, Appayya Dikṣita’s Vīdhī-rasāyana and Mayūkhāvalī (a commentary on Sāstra-dīpikā), Venkāṭēśvara Dikṣita’s Vārttikābharana (a commentary on Ṭūp-ṭūkā), Khaṇḍadeva’s Bhaṭṭa-kaustubha, Bhaṭṭa-dīpikā and Bhaṭṭa-rahasya, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa and Nārāyanapaṇḍita’s Māna-meyodaya, Śamkara-bhaṭṭa’s Bāla-prakāśa, Appadeva’s Mīmāṁsā-nītya-prakāśa, Laṅgākṣibhāskara’s Artha-saṁgraha, Somanātha’s Mayūkha-mālikā (a commentary on Sāstra-dīpikā), Sambhūhaṭṭa’s Prabhāvalī (a commentary on Bhaṭṭa-dīpikā), and Rāmānuja-cārya’s Tantra-rahasya (Prabhākara School): these are some of the important works of the post-Kumārila period elucidating the pramāṇas and important rules of interpretation in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā.²

2. PRAMĀṆAS—EPISTEMOLOGY

Upavaraṇa, Śabara and Kumārila speak of six pramāṇas: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), verbal testimony (śabda), comparison (upamāna), presumption (arthapatti) and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). Prabhākara accepts the first five only, since he does not consider negation (a-bhāva) as a separate category. Pramāṇa is generally defined as the efficient cause of a valid cognition (pramāṇa-karana). Prabhākara explains pramāṇa as valid cognition (a-visamvādi-jñāna). To him all cognitions except remembrance are valid. Kumārila defines pramāṇa as a cognition presenting an object previously unknown (anādhi-gata) and not sublated by other cognitions (abādhi-ta). The repetitions (anuvādas) and invalid cognitions (bhrama) are not pramāṇas.

The doctrine of self-validity (svatāḥ-pramāṇya) of cognitions, i.e. all cognitions are produced, and known, as valid, is the corner-stone of Mīmāṁsā philosophy. The Prabhākara conception of pramāṇa highly favours it. First it is established with reference to cognitions arising from the Scriptures which are self-revelations and then the same is applied to other cognitions. Cognitions when generated by their causes reveal objects independently. So they are intrinsically valid and remain valid in the absence of any defect in the person, etc., and of a sublating cognition. The cognitions arising from the Vedic texts are not sublated by any other cognition and so they are ever valid. The invalidity of cog-
nitions is not self-evident in that it is explained by the defect of the perceiver, etc., and by the sublating cognition.3

As cognitions are self-valid, so they are self-illumined (sva-pratyakṣa). The Prābhākāras accept Tri-puṣṭi-vitti of cognitions: i.e. each cognition has three factors, the knower (self), the known (object) and the knowledge itself. The cognition “I know this” (aham idam jānāmi) has the three presentations of (i) I, the knower, (ii) this, the object and (iii) the cognition. In all cognitions of the self, its substratum is known and the object is mediate or immediate according to the nature of cognition. Cognition is known only as cognition (saṁvīt) and not as its object (saṁvedya). With its self-luminosity it illumines itself (as cognition) and manifests the self (as the cognizer) and the object (as the cognized).4

But the Bhāṭṭas hold that cognition is never immediately known, but inferred from the cognizedness (jñālatā) of the object, produced by the cognition. An act of cognition implies the relationship of the cognizer and the cognized object and the knowledge of this relationship helps us to infer the act of the cognizer, viz. the cognition. The knowledge, “The jar is cognized by me” can be fully explained only when the relation between the cognizer and the cognized (jñātṛ-jñeya-sambandha) is known. The Bhāṭṭas denied the self-luminosity of cognitions because they wanted to establish the objective reality of the external world against the subjectivism or nihilism of the Buddhists.

Murārimiśra who represents a third School of Mimāṁsā accepts the self-validity of cognitions and holds that a cognition is cognized along with its validity by its retrospective cognition (anuvyavasāya).5

Pratyakṣa or perceptual knowledge is stated in the fourth sūtra in the Pūrva-Mimāṁsā, to be a cognition produced by the contact of the self with the mind, of the mind with the sensory organs and of the sensory organs with the object.6 This is the same as what is accepted by the Naiyāyikas. The only difference is in the nature and number of relations (sannikarṣa). The Naiyāyikas accept six while the Bhāṭṭas and the Prabhākāras have only three. The Bhāṭṭas explain it as identity-cum-difference (tādāmya or bhedābheda), while the Prabhākāras accept inherence (samavāya).

This perceptual knowledge has two varieties, indeterminate (nir-vikalpaka) and determinate (sa-vikalpaka). Kumārila explains the former as the cognition appearing first as mere awareness (ālocana) pertaining to the object itself and resembling the cognition of the newborn infant about things around itself. In this cognition neither the genus nor the differentia is presented to consciousness; all that is present there is the individual wherein these two subsist.7 Prabhākara believes that indeterminate perception presents both the class characters and the specific features but the object is not then appreciated as actually belonging to a class possessing the specific features, since its real nature cannot be cognized until
it is compared with other objects of the same class. According to Kumārila, determinate perception presents the generic and specific qualities of the individual. It is based on the indeterminate perception where the genus, the name and the qualifying properties are implicitly apprehended. Prabhākara believes that determinate perception is not of a mixed character since it involves also the element of remembrance of other objects with which the object perceived is compared.

Error.—If all cognitions are valid by their nature, how do the so-called erroneous cognitions arise? Prabhākara says that the so-called erroneous cognition “this is silver” (idam rajatam) is not a unit of knowledge but a composition of two, a recollection and a perception. The “this” is actually perceived along with certain features of nacre common to silver, and the knowledge of these features rouses the impression of the former experiences and the “silver” is recollected. Hence the cognition “this is silver” has “this” a perception immediately followed by the recollection of “silver.” Of these two, the first is true since it is not sublated afterwards. The second is the recollection of silver previously cognized elsewhere, as silver stripped of its association with the past time and particular place where it was seen (pramūṣṭa-tattāka-smarana). The non-apprehension (bheda-graha) of this distinction between the two cognitions results in the cognizer’s voluntary activity to seize the silver. This view of invalid cognition is known as akhyāti-vāda meaning no-(invalid)-knowledge-theory. Error is only a jumble of two cognitions.

The Bhāṭṭas explain it as viparita-khyāti which is nothing but the anyathā-khyāti of the Naiyāyikas. When nacre is experienced as silver the erroneous cognition “this is silver” arises. Here “this” refers to the white object before him, the distinctive features of nacre being missed because of some defect in the eye of the perceiver. The property of silver (rajatāvā) belonging to real silver is presented here as existing in nacre. The Bhāṭṭas hold that the relation between nacre and rajatavā is asat (non-being) while the Naiyāyika explains it to be extra-normal (a-laukika).

Anumāna or inferential knowledge presents an object which has no contact with the sensory organs and which is one probandum of the two (related objects) and this knowledge arises on the basis of the perception of the other (probans) when their relation is known. The Bhāṭṭas define invariable concomitance (vyāpti) as the “natural relation” and the term “natural” is further explained as free from extraneous circumstances (upādhi-rahitam); and this condition (upādhi-rāhitya) can be acquired only by the experience of the existence of the probans and the probandum in many instances in different times and places (bhiyāo-darsāna). Cidāṇanda mentions counter-argument (tarka) as one of the accessories, in addition to repeated observation (bhiyāo-darsāna), necessary for determining unconditionality (nirupādhi-katva). The proposition “wherever there is smoke there is fire” represents ordinarily a restricted form of synthesis referring
to the observed particulars; and this is an adequate condition of inference if no suspicion of the existence of probans without probandum (vyabhicāra-samśaya) arises. The Bhāṭṭas do not accept the Naiyāyika view that vyāpti in the form of a universal generalization arrived at through extra-normal relation (sāmānyā-lakṣāna-pratyāśattī) is a necessary condition of inference; but they insist that cognition of such universal generalizations arises as instances of inference only.

The Prābhākaras hold that vyāpti is the unailing, true and permanent relation just like that between cause and its effect, between whole and its part and between substance and its quality, etc. It is to be made out as free from the limitations of time and space associated with them and thus assumes the form of a universal generalization. In the cognition of vyāpti the probans and the probandum are the two chief concepts while the relation between them and the time and the space associated with them are only subordinates to the same chief, cannot be associated with each other. According to the Prābhākaras the inference of fire in a mountain from the sight of smoke does not present anything previously unknown, since the object of inference has already been the part of the generalization arrived at through observations. Still inference is valid, since it is not a recollection. It is not necessary, according to the Prābhākaras, that a pramāṇa should present an object previously unknown. They call inferential experience by the term re-experience (grihita-grāhin). Though it does not mark any progress in knowledge it indicates that the knowledge of one leads to that of another invariably connected with it. Even a single observation of the probans and probandum is enough for the knowledge of the vyāpti, and that the repeated observations are useful only to show that the relation so observed is not brought about by any extraneous circumstance.11

As for śabda or verbal testimony, Upavarsa defines Śāstra, the Vedic śabda, as producing a cognition of an object having no contact with the sensory organs, on the basis of the cognition of śabda.12 Kumārila applies this definition to both Vedic and non-Vedic śabdas, since he accepts both as pramāṇa. Prabhakara who does not accept the validity of non-Vedic śabda, holds that real śabda-pramāṇa is the Vedic śabda. Both Kumārila and Prabhakara accept Śāstra—Vedas, Smytis and ācāras—as the authority on supernormal dharma.13

The Naiyāyikas and Vedāntins hold that the Vedas are the creations of God; but the Mīmāṃsakas hold that they are self-revealed and not composed by any person, human or divine. If the Vedas were composed (pauruṣeyas), the names of the composers, if any, would have been known to posterity.14 The Vedas are handed down to posterity from time immemorial from the teacher to the disciple as found even to-day.15 The names of the recensions like Kāṇva, Kṛṣṇa are based only on the teaching of those recensions by those ācāryas.16
Words in *Vedic* texts and in popular language are the same. According to Kumārila words convey their meanings by their significative potency (*abhidhā-sakti*) and the recollection of the meanings of the juxtaposed words (*padārtha-smṛti*) generates, on the basis of verbal expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), congruity (*yogyatā*) and proximity (*sannidhi*), the verbal cognition (*śābda-bodha*) presenting the mutual relation of the word-meanings in a sentence. This is known as the *abhīhitānvaya-vāda* of the Bhāṭṭas.\(^{17}\)

The Prabhākaras hold the *anvītābhidhāna-vāda* which emphasizes the importance of words in conveying the meaning of the sentence (*vākyārtha*). First there arises the recollection of the isolated ideas (*anvītārthas*) by the mere juxtaposition (*sāhacarya*) of words and then that of the *anvita-padārthas* (meanings mutually related to each other) from words on the strength of *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *sannidhi*. The charge that verbal cognition arising from the recollection of meanings (*padārtha-smṛti*) would be *a-śābda* (not based on *śābda*) is answered by the abhīhitānvaya-vādins by accepting *vākya-lakṣaṇā* (secondary significative potency in sentence) in the sense of *vākyārtha* on the basis of *padārtha-smṛti*.\(^{18}\)

*Upamāṇa* (comparison) is defined as similarity experienced in one object generating a cognition of the same in another having no contact with the senses.\(^{19}\) The similarity experienced in *gavaya* (an animal similar to cow) produces a cognition, "my cow is similar to this" (*gavaya*) which has no contact with the sensory organs. This definition does not agree with that of the Naiyāyikas who explain *upamāṇa* as similarity experienced between two objects, one known and the other unknown, generating the knowledge of the primary significative potency (*śakti-graha*) of the word (*gavaya*) conveying the unknown object (*asaugavaya-pada-vācyah*). The Naiyāyika explanation renders *upamāṇa* indistinguishable from inference. The Mīmāṃsakas defend their position by pointing out that the basis for inference, viz. the *vyāpti-jñāna*, is not needed here.\(^{20}\)

*Arthāpatti* (presumption) presents an object presumed to exist without which another object seen or heard of cannot be spoken of as existent.\(^{21}\) The presumption that Devadatta exists outside the house is based on the experience of his non-existence in the house and on the fact that he is alive. Here there is a conflict (*virodha* or *anupāpatti*) between two beliefs, one about Devadatta’s absence from his house and the other about his existence. To resolve this conflict it is presumed that Devadatta exists in some place outside the house. This reconciliation of apparent discrepancies marks out presumption from inference. This is the view of Kumārilabhaṭṭa.

Prabhākara, however, holds that it is doubt (*saṃśaya*) that gives rise to presumption and that this fact clearly distinguishes it from inference which functions only on the (valid) experience of *probans* (*hetu-niścaya*). The presumption that Devadatta lives outside the house is based on this
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doubt whether he lives or not, which arises on the basis of the experience of his absence from his home.  

A-bhāva or anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) is the absence of the five other pramāṇas and it produces a cognition presenting non-existence (a-bhāva) without any contact with the senses. Prabhākara does not accept non-existence as a separate category. It is thought to be none other than the locus itself (adhiyakṣa-svarūpa) and so he does not accept non-apprehension as a source of knowledge. Kumārila accepts non-existence as a separate category cognized by non-apprehension. He does not favour the Nyāya view that non-existence can be perceived. So the first five pramāṇas are positive (bhāva-pramāṇas) in that they produce cognitions of positive entities and non-cognition (a-bhāva-pramāṇa) generates the cognition of negative entities (a-bhāva).

Sambhava (possibility) and aitihya (tradition) are considered by some to be separate pramāṇas, but Mīmāṃsaka place them under inference and verbal testimony respectively.

3. METAPHYSICS

Categories of Reality.—Just like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā establishes the objective reality of the world by refuting the subjectivism and nihilism of the Buddhists. Kumārila accepts five categories, the first four positive (bhāva)—substance (dravya), quality (guna), action (karma), generality (sāmānya); and the fifth negative, viz. non-existence (a-bhāva). That which possesses a size (paramāṇa) is substance. Earth, water, light, air, darkness, ether, time, space, soul, mind and sound are substances. Darkness is regarded as a substance, since it is cognized by the eye in the absence of light. It is a positive entity since it has blue colour and action.

Atoms are not imperceptible as the Naiyāyikas hold, but are perceptible entities (e.g. the particles of dust shining in the sunbeams passing through the open window). Atoms produce objects of different magnitudes. The relation between the effect and the material cause is not inherence as held by the Naiyāyikas but difference-cum-identity. This explains the sat-kārya-vāda of the Mīmāṃsaka that the original substance is one though its effect differs considerably in its transformation. The clay before us is one and the same though it is once changed into a jar and then to a saucer. The substance endures while the transformation (parināmas) are changing. In this respect the Mīmāṃsakas agree with the Sāṁkhyas who are also Sat-kārya-vādins and Parināma-vādins.

Ether, time, space, soul, mind and sound are eternal and omnipresent and all of them except mind are perceptible too. Individual souls are innumerable yet they are eternal and all-pervasive, the supporters of
knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc.; they are therefore different from their perishable body, sensory organs and the knowledge. To Kumārila the soul is consciousness and is also the object of mental perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa). Mind is all-pervasive and eternal and the contact of two all-pervasive substances like the soul and the mind produces cognitions, etc., within the limitations of the corporeal bodies. Sound is also eternal and all-pervasive and it is manifested by dhvanis or nādas.25

Kumārila accepts twenty-four qualities as the Naiyāyikas hold; but sound, dharma and a-dharma are not regarded as qualities, whereas dhvani, prākatya and śakti are. Dhvani is the quality of air and it manifests the eternal sound. Prākatya is the quality of objects produced by cognitions when they are cognized. Śakti is potency either inborn (sahaja) or produced (ādhaya) subsisting in substances, qualities, actions and generality. It is known through presumption in the ordinary instances like the possession of the potency of burning by fire. The Vedic injunctions explain the potency of sacrifices to produce heaven or some other fruit.

Actions are perceptible. It is movement causing disjunction and conjunction and subsists in substances not all-pervasive. It rests on individuals by the relation of difference-cum-identity. Existence (sattā) is a generality to be accepted even in other than substance, quality and action.

Prabhākara has a few differences from Kumārila. He does not accept non-existence (a-bhāva) as a separate category, since a-bhāva is nothing but its locus (adhikaraṇa-svarūpa); e.g. the absence of jar on earth is nothing but earth here; its pratiyogin (counter-relative), viz. jar, if present, would have been experienced. Para-tantratā (inheritance), śakti (potency), sādṛśya (similarity) and samākhya (number) are also accepted as separate categories, in addition to substance, quality, action and generality. Kumārila accepts potency and number as qualities, replaces inheritance by identity (tādātmya) and explains similarity as nothing but a few common characteristics of two or more similar objects. Prabhākara thinks action to be inferred from conjunction and disjunction while Kumārila admits its perceptibility. Prabhākara accepts generality only among substances. Both Kumārila and Prabhākara accept śakti by virtue of which all objects become causes capable of producing the effect. Prabhākara views darkness as the absence of light and ether, time and space to be imperceptible. Ether is inferable as the substratum of the quality of sound; and mind is only an eternal atomic substance as the Naiyāyikas hold. Souls are eternal but numerous and different in different bodies. They are known in every cognition as the substratum of cognition. They are the agents (karta), enjoyers (bhoktra) and omnipresent (vibhu).26

Soul.—The conception of the soul as an eternal being is very important in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. Jaimini is silent on this question. Upavarśa has dealt with it in sūtra III. 3. 53. in the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā and Śabaravāmin has incorporated Upavarśa’s ātma-vāda into his Bhāṣya on I. i. 5. They
admit the soul as an eternal being distinct from bodies, senses and understanding, all of which perish. The *Vedic* injunctions enjoin sacrifices for fruits like son and heaven to be enjoyed by the sacrificer either during his life-time or after his death. It is a general rule that the agent is the enjoyer of the fruit of the action unless it is otherwise enjoined. So it is to be admitted that the soul of the sacrificer continues to exist even after death and is therefore different from these perishable objects. It is the cognizer, the substratum of cognition, not identical with it or its series. It is both eternal and omnipresent—not atomic—the doer and the enjoyer of the fruit of the action. Śabaravāmin holds that it is self-revealed. Just like the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṁsakas admit the plurality of souls without which the difference in actions, particularly dharma and adharma, cannot be explained. The Bhāṭṭa conception of ātman is briefly put by Madhusūdana-sarasvatī in the phrase: “*Jaḍo bodhāmaṇakaś ca,*” i.e. a soul is both unconscious and conscious. It is unconscious since it is the substratum of consciousness, and also since it is the object of self-consciousness.

Prabhākara views self as something non-intelligent and the substratum of knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc. The existence of an eternal substance is proved from the recognition involving one's recollection of an object based on its previous perception. The substratum of the previous perception and the present recollection is the permanent self. It is not self-illumined, lest we should have knowledge in deep sleep. The self-luminous cognition manifests the self as its substratum along with its object. The self is the agent, the enjoyer and omnipresent but non-sentient (*jaḍa*) since it is different from knowledge.

*Apūrva*.—Mīmāṁsakas are forced to accept *apūrva* as a link between the sacrifices and their fruits. The sacrifices are acts which do not last till their fruit is produced. The causal relation between these acts and their fruits cannot be justified without the acceptance of *apūrva*. Kumārila says that it is produced in the permanent self of the sacrificer by these acts and it lasts till he begins to enjoy their fruits. The proof of *apūrva* is a presumption based on Scripture (*srutārthāpati*), e.g. the injunctions like “*swarga-kāmo yajeta*” cannot be explained satisfactorily until we accept a connective link between the sacrifices and the heaven, its fruit, since the sacrifice, an action or a bundle of actions, cannot last till the production of heaven; and this *apūrva*, the subtle potency of the act, is to be accepted as produced by the act in the permanent self till the accomplishment of the fruit. Prabhākara denies that *apūrva* is in the self. It should be in the act or the exertion which produces it. The former being immediately perishable, the latter (which is conveyed by the principal suffix—*liṅ*—in the *Vedic* injunctions and technically known as *kārya*, something to be effected) is assumed to be lasting till the production of the fruit. This *kārya* is otherwise known as *niyoga* or *apūrva* since it
is a prompting mandatory force and new to all other means of knowledge except the injunctive sentence.\textsuperscript{30}

God.—Jaimini is silent about the existence of God as he is about the individual soul. How far his Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā is against the conception of God as a supreme force is not known definitely. It is decidedly against the inferential arguments of the Naiyāyikas for His existence and the view that the \textit{Vedas} are the creations of God. It does not also approve the Vedāntin’s argument that God is the apportioner of the fruits of the \textit{Vedic} sacrifices, since the sacrifices can themselves function with the help of the super-sensuous \textit{apūrva} without the intervention of God. Even if God intervenes, He cannot allow people to enjoy the fruit independent of their actions, lest He should be liable to partiality and mercilessness (\textit{vaiśamya} and \textit{nairghṛṇya}). In the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā, Jaimini’s view that \textit{apūrva} and not God is the apportioner of rewards is criticized. It is argued that if Jaimini were against the conception of God as the creator of universe, etc., then this view would have been criticized by Bādarāyaṇa along with other views on creation. The Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā believes that the universe has neither beginning nor end; it was and will be, always as it is at present (\textit{na kādācid anidrśam jagat}). There is neither the creation nor the total dissolution of the world. So God cannot be conceived of as the cause of this universe. In short, the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā cannot accept any doctrine which would affect the supreme authority of the \textit{Vedas}.

Neither Kumārila nor Prabhākara is against the acceptance of God. Their main task was to establish the \textit{Vedic} authority on supernormal \textit{dharma} and \textit{mokṣa}. On the question of the existence of a permanent \textit{ātman}, on which Jaimini is silent, Kumārila says that Śabaravāmin, desirous of refuting atheism, has established the existence of soul as a permanent being by arguments (taken from Upavāraśa’s \textit{vytti} on \textit{Vedānta-sūtra} III. iii. 53) and that a full knowledge of the same can be had by the constant study of the \textit{Upaniṣads}.\textsuperscript{31} About God, he observes that “this śāstra called the \textit{Veda} which is Brahman in the form of speech, is established by the one supreme Spirit (\textit{Ātman}).”\textsuperscript{32} Prabhākara also accepts the view that the universe is beginningless and endless, though its constituent elements have both beginning and end. He does not approve of God’s interference in the production of bodies of animate and inanimate objects.

The reaction among the later Mīmāṃsakas, however, is so great that many have expressed their willingness to accept God as the creator of the universe and the existence of creation and dissolution of the universe. The \textit{Vedic} authority is also maintained by the fact that God preserves the \textit{Vedas} during the time of each dissolution and imparts them to the newly created world in the same form as before.\textsuperscript{33}

The Mīmāṃsaka conception of deities (\textit{devatās}) may look strange. The sacrifices enjoined for the attainment of divine rewards are explained as
"tyāga" of an oblation to a deity in the form "this (oblation) belongs to Agni, not to me" (agnaye idam, na mama). Here the action of tyāga is the chief and the oblation and the deity are its accessories. Since the deities like Agni have to be present simultaneously at different places where they are invoked and given oblations by different sacrificers, it is accepted that these deities have no body and that they are nothing but the eternal words like "Agni" and "Indra." Though this resulted in the important fact that words and their juxtapositions (āṇupūrṇi) found in the Mantras cannot be altered, it is noteworthy that the over-enthusiasm of the Mīmāṃśakas to establish the supreme authority of the Vedas and the unquestionable power of karman over mankind forced them to deny forms to the deities who are left in the lurch by the assigning to them of a subordinate position to karman. The Mīmāṃśakas believe in the plurality of Gods possessing varying supernatural powers. The importance given to karman does not in any way minimize the importance of the deities who when properly worshipped bless the worshipper or enable him to enjoy the fruits of his actions.

Liberation.—The Pūrva-Mīmāṃśa deals with dharma which produces prosperity (abhyudaya) like heaven. Jaimini, Śabaravāmin and Prabhākara have not spoken of mokṣa. Kumārila and Śālikanātha and their followers could not ignore it since the system would not be complete or perfect without it. Kumārila understands it as freedom from rebirth, the cause of pain and suffering. For this the past karman should become exhausted through experience without any residue to produce a body. The seeker for liberation should not do any prohibited action or action for reward, since both these would generate new bondages. He should do the compulsory acts, both obligatory and conditional (nītya and naimittika), the omission of which would produce sin and suffering. This is what is known in the Gītā as the practice of duties in a dispassionate manner without a motive (niṣkāma-karman).

Knowledge is not the direct cause of mokṣa. It helps one to direct one's action to stop his further birth. It takes the form of worship and meditation and leads to liberation. The liberated soul is free from all kinds of pleasure and pain and appears in its true form (avasthā), the potency of knowledge (jñāna-sakti) since it has no body and senses and is free from their actions. Thus Kumārila and his followers uphold Jñāna-karma-samuccaya that both knowledge and action lead to liberation. His conception of mokṣa, i.e. freedom from rebirth, agrees with that of the Advaitins who explain the same on the basis of the Sūtri "na punar āvartate" (he who has realized the highest Truth is not reborn) and on the Brahma-sūtra, "anāvṛttīḥ śabdāḥ" (IV. 4. 22).34

According to Śālikanātha mokṣa consists in the disappearance of dharma and a-dharma, the cause of man's rebirth, pleasure and pain. It is not a state of bliss (ānanda) as the Advaitins hold, but the natural
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form of the soul. When the soul has no body and senses, all its troubles, physical and mental, vanish and it is free and liberated. Just like Kumārila, Śālikanātha emphasizes as the means of liberation the performance of all compulsory duties, non-performance of the prohibited acts and acts for rewards, the expiation for exhausting the previously accumulated karman and the attainment of the knowledge of the soul associated with contentment, self-control and other spiritual qualities which would prevent further accumulation of karman.35

4. ETHICS

The Pūrva-Mimāmsā is rightly called dharma-mimāmsā. It defines dharma as that which is enjoined by the Scriptures as the cause of moral excellence (sreyas). It emphasizes the moral duties of man that he owes to himself, to his family and relatives and to his community and nation. It fully believes that karman is all-powerful and that even God, if He exists, cannot interfere with its power. Its sole authority is the Vedas. Violence leading to death is prohibited, and is, therefore, a-dharma. But to kill an animal in a sacrifice (like Agniṣomīya) enjoined by Vedic injunctions, is not considered an a-dharma, though it is violence; for, the first is selfish (puruṣārtha) while the latter is dedicated to God’s worship or sacrifice (kratvartha). In the domain of morality it is the motive that determines the character of action, whether it is violence or not, though the ordinary world judges both violences alike. In these matters of supernormal character, the Vedas are the sole authority.

Karman is divided into (i) obligatory (nitya), (ii) conditional (naimittika), and (iii) optional (kāmya). The first two are compulsory. Their non-performance would result in sin and suffering (pratyavāya). Prayer in the morning and in the evening every day (ahar-ahāḥ sandhyām upāśita) is an obligatory action. That one should bathe during the eclipses is a conditional action, since it is to be performed only when the condition “eclipse” arises. The third, optional, is to be performed only when one desires to get the specified reward. It is not obligatory. It can be performed only by those who have the full capacity (adhiṣṭana) and means for the performance of the chief sacrifice and all the accessories to it (yathā-viniyogam adhiṣṭana). But the other two are to be performed during all life-time even by those who can perform only the chief action, without all the accessories (yathādhiṣṭanaḥ viniyogāḥ).36 The spiritual importance of these dharmas as a cause of liberation is emphasized by those Vedāntins also who accept karma-yoga as one of the means of self-knowledge and self-realization. The Upaniṣadic passage “tam etam vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇaḥ vividiṣanti yajñena dānena taśaḥ anāśakena” explains that the performance of all nitya and naimittika-karmans and the kāmya-karmans

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in a spirit of detachment and as dedicated to God would purify the mind of the spiritual enquirer who longs for the attainment of the knowledge of the Ātman.

Thus the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā is a system of philosophy investigating into the nature of dharma by enunciating several rules of interpretation of Vedic passages of doubt or ambiguity. It is, therefore, known as Vākyasastra, just as the Vyākaraṇa-sāstra and the Nyāya-sāstra are called pada-sāstra and pramāṇa-sāstra respectively.

NOTES

2. vide the writer’s Introduction, Pt. I, to his edition of Tattva-bindu.
3. “yasya ca duṣṭam karavana yatra ca mithyeta pratyayā, sa evāsamičinaḥ, pratyayakṣaḥ” (Śabara-bhāṣya, I. i. 5).
4. If one cognition is recognized as the object of another cognition, the latter would require another for its cognition and so on ad infinitum.
6. “sat-samprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṁ buddhi-janma tad pratyakṣam” (P.M.S., I. i. 4).
8. See Prakaraṇa-paṇcitkā, pp. 54–5.
9. vide A Primer of Indian Logic, p. 158.
10. “jñāta-sambandhasyaikadeśa-darśanād eka-deśāntare-sannikṣēṭrthe buddhiḥ” (Ś.B., I. i. 5).
11. For the two kinds of anumāṇa pratyakṣa-dṛṣṭa-sambandha and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa-sambandha, vide Śloka-vārttika, I. i. 5, Anumāṇa section, verses 141–4.
12. “Sāstraṁ śabda-vijñāṇat asannikṣēṭrthe vijñānam” (Ś.B., I. i. 5).
13. To the Mīmāṃsakas śabda is nothing but varṇas manifested by nādas or dhanis (vide P.M.S., I. i. 5).
16. “ākhyā pravacanat” (P.M.S., I. i. 8).
17. “padair-abhitiḥ paḍairthā vākyaṁttham bodhayeuyah” (Ś.B., I. i. 7).
19. “upamānām api sādṛṣṭam asannikṣēṭrthe buddhim utpādayati: yathā gavaya- darśanam go-smaranasya” (Ś.B., I. i. 5).
21. “artha-pattir api dṛṣṭaṁ svruto vārtho’nyathā nopapadhyate ityarthahalpaṁ” (Ś.B., I. i. 5).
23. “abhāvo’pi pramāṇābhaḥ naśityāsāntyāsāṁ sāmānyasāṁ” (Ś.B., I. i. 5).
25. The Mīmāṃsakas do not favour the doctrine of sphota of the grammarian since it involves the acceptance of the samudaya-sabda other than the varnas. (vide the writer’s Introduction to Tattva-bindu, pp. 152–67).
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CHAPTER XIII

VEDĀNTA—THE ADVAITA SCHOOL

A. ŚAṀKARA

Vedānta.—The Upaniṣads are said to be the Vedānta or the concluding portions of the Veda. Efforts were made in early times to give a consistent and coherent interpretation of the teaching of the Upaniṣads. We have noticed in the chapter on the Upaniṣads that there are two different tendencies in the Upaniṣads, one which affirms the identity of Brahman, the individual soul and the world, and the other which distinguishes them. We have to harmonize the two different sets of statements. How can the soul and the world be both identical with and different from Brahman? One such effort at reconciliation has come down to us in the Brahma-sūtra or the Vedānta-sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa. The Brahma-sūtra mentions that there were other attempts to systematize the thought of the Upaniṣads such as those of Auḍulomi, Kāśakṛtsna, Bādari, Jaimini, Kārṣṇājini, Āśmarathya. As they have not come down to us, Bādarāyaṇa’s work gained prominence.

The Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad-Gītā and the Brahma-sūtra form the triple basis of the Vedānta system. They constitute the prasthāna-traya of the Vedānta.

The Brahma-sūtra is also called the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā as distinct from the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā which deals with the ritual portion. Mīmāṃsā or systematic investigation assumes that what is given in the Vedas requires to be investigated.

Śaṁkara’s Interpretation of the Brahma-sūtra.—The Brahma-sūtra has four chapters each divided into four quarters or sections. Its laconic contents have given rise to several interpretations of which the chief are the Advaita, the Viśiṣṭadvaita, the Dvaita, Bhedābheda and Śuddhādvaita, associated with the great names of Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka and Vallabha, respectively. They seem to follow the views of one or the other of the ancient traditions mentioned by Bādarāyaṇa in his Brahma-sūtra. Each of them includes different types of teaching. Śaṁkara’s interpretation of the Vedānta philosophy is the subject of the present chapter.

Śaṁkara belongs to the eighth century A.D. He describes himself as a pupil of Govinda, who was himself a pupil of Gaudapāda. He lived for thirty-two years and wrote many works of which the chief are his com-
mentaries on the classical Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad-Gītā and the Brahma-
sūtra. Several others are attributed to him, though we cannot be certain of
his authorship of them.

Śaṅkara established spiritual absolutism or non-dualism as the main
teaching of the Upaniṣads. Nāgārjuna, author of the Mūla-madhyamaka-
kārikā makes out that a radical absolutism, advaya-vāda, is the main
teaching of the Buddha. Gauḍapāda gave an account of the apparently
conflicting statements of the Upaniṣads in his Kārikā on the Māṇḍūkya-
Upaniṣad. His Kārikā is the first exposition of the basic principles of
Advaita philosophy, the orders of reality, the identity of Brahman and
Ātman, the doctrine of appearance, the inapplicability of logical cate-
gories as causation to ultimate reality, jñāna or wisdom as the direct
means to mokṣa or freedom. His Kārikā is an attempt to combine in one
whole the negative logic of the Mādhyamikas with the positive idealism
of the Upaniṣads. He refers, however, to an ancient Advaita tradition.
His Kārikā is divided into four chapters. The first, called the Āgama,
explains the text of the Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad. Gauḍapāda tries to show
that his view of reality is sanctioned by the Sruti and supported by reason.
The second chapter, called Vaitathya, explains by means of arguments the
phenomenal nature of the world, characterized as it is by duality and
opposition. The third part establishes the Advaita theory. In the last
part, called Alātasaṁti, or Quenching the Firebrand, there is a further
development of the Advaita position regarding the sole reality of the
Ātman and the relative character of our ordinary experience. As a stick
burning at one end, when waved round, quickly produces an illusion of a
circle of fire (alāta-cakra), so is it with the multiplicity of the world.
Gauḍapāda refers to the Yogācāra views, and mentions the name of the
Buddha half a dozen times.

Gauḍapāda lived at a time when Buddhism was widely prevalent.
Naturally he was familiar with Buddhist doctrines, which he accepted
when they were not in conflict with his own Advaita. To the Buddhists he
appealed on the ground that his view did not depend on any theological
text or revelation. To the orthodox Hindu he said that it had the sanction
of authority also. His liberal views enabled him to accept doctrines asso-
ciated with Buddhism and adjust them to the Advaita design.

Gauḍapāda seems to have been conscious of the similarity of his system
to some phases of Buddhist thought. He therefore protests—rather over-
much—that his view is not Buddhism. Towards the end of his book he
says: "This was not spoken by the Buddha." Commenting on this, Śaṅkara
writes, "The theory (of Buddhism) wears a semblance to the Advaita, but
is not that absolutism which is the pivot of the Vedānta philosophy."

Gauḍapāda's work bears traces of Buddhist influence, especially of the
Vijñāna-vāda and the Mādhyamika Schools. Gauḍapāda uses the very
same arguments as the Vijñāna-vādins do to prove the unreality of the
external objects of perception. Both Bādarāyana and Śaṅkara strongly urge that there is a genuine difference between dream impressions and waking ones, and that the latter are not independent of existing objects. Gauḍapāda, however, links the two, waking and dreaming, experiences together. While Śaṅkara is anxious to free his system from the subjectivism associated with Vijñāna-vāda, Gauḍapāda welcomes it. Unwilling to accept the Vijñāna-vāda as final, he declares that even the subject is as unreal as the object, and thus comes perilously near the nihilist position. In common with Nāgārjuna, he denies the validity of causation and the possibility of change. "There is no destruction, no creation, none in bondage, none endeavouring (for release), none desirous of liberation, none liberated; this is the absolute truth." The empirical world is traced to avidyā or, in Nāgārjuna's phrase, saṁvṛti. "From a magical seed is born a magical sprout; this sprout is neither permanent nor perishing. Such are things and for the same reason." The highest state beyond the distinctions of knowledge cannot be characterized by the predicates of existence, non-existence, both or neither. Gauḍapāda and Nāgārjuna regard it as something which transcends the phenomenal. In addition to these points of doctrine, there are affinities in phraseology which point unmistakably to the influence of Buddhism. The use of the word "dharma" for a thing or entity, "saṁvṛti" for relative knowledge, and "saṁghāta" for objective existence, is peculiarly Buddhististic. The simile of the firebrand circle is often used in Buddhist writings as a symbol for unreality.

Authority, Intuition, Reason.—In the interpretation of texts, Śaṅkara is faithful to the spirit of the teaching of the Upaniṣads rather than to their letter. He claims for his views not only the authority of the Scriptures but also intrinsic reasonableness and direct experience. These different types of knowledge do not contradict one another. We may argue to the reality of an ultimate principle from the law of causation. We assume the world to be an effect and point to the necessity of a cause. Such an inferential argument cannot disclose to us the nature of the cause. Only direct experience can bring us into contact with reality. Reality is not a metaphysical concept but spiritual being. It is an object of intuition, not inference, of aparokṣānubhūti. When Śaṅkara says that the Sruti or Scripture is pratyakṣa, he means that it records the integral experiences of the seers. The validity of the Sruti is said to be self-certifying because anubhava or experience which is recorded is "of a self-certifying character." The Sruti illuminates the objects of its reference even as the light of the sun illuminates visible objects. Scripture is only a reminder, jñāpaka and not kāraka. Thought leads to intuition and the record of intuitions is Scripture. Śaṅkara interprets the Scripture, argues the case and holds that Brahma is an object of intuition. It is not an object of perception or other means of knowledge like inference, analogy, implication and Scripture.
Brahman is apprehended by immediate experience and not discursive reasoning. In this experience everything is felt as the self. The distinction between the knower, the process of knowing and the object known disappears. The conditions necessary for the ordinary empirical knowledge are not present. There is a feeling of certitude. Śaṅkara asks, “How can one contest the fact of another possessing the knowledge of Brahman, vouched as it is by his heart’s conviction?”

8 The experience is intimate, ineffable and incommunicable. The self alone is witness to it, ātmā-sāksikam anuttaman.9 It consists in the realization that one is the self of pure consciousness free from all pain.10 Pain is the result of alienation from reality and when that is removed, pain disappears.

Brahman.—In many passages of the Upaniṣads, it is said that it is impossible to give any positive determinations of the supreme Brahman. The famous passage neti neti (not this, not this), tells us that Brahman is absolutely non-empirical. It is beyond the reach of empirical thought. It is inapprehensible by logical knowledge. It is pure inwardness of which no conceptual interpretation is possible. It is indivisible, inalienable. It is neither external nor conditioned by external causation. To define it is to transmute it into object. We cannot even say that it is one. It is non-dual (advaita).

The difficulty of empirical characterization does not make it into a bare abstraction, a mere nothing. In his commentary on the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad Śaṅkara says that those who imagine that the metaphysical reality free from all determinations is as good as non-being are the feeble-minded.12 He would not accept the validity of the criticism made by Hegel on Spinoza’s substance that pure being devoid of all determination is as good as non-being. Ultimate reality, for Śaṅkara, is fullness of being. We can think the whole world away, yet we cannot but assume a real which is. Life becomes meaningless without this a priori notion of being (astītva-niśtha). From non-being we cannot explain the rise of being.13

The existence of anything presupposes the reality of being. This universe has its roots in being (san-mūla), has its basis in being (sād-āśraya), and is established in being (sat-pratiṣṭha). Being is eternal, self-existent. It alone exists for itself. It is non-dual, homogeneous. It assumes different forms on account of various adjuncts. “When it performs the function of living it is called the vital force, when it speaks the organ of speech, when it sees the eye, when it hears the ear, and when it thinks the mind.”

This being (sat) is consciousness (cāt). The ultimate reality is being and consciousness. The light of consciousness that illumines the universe is Brahman. “As pure consciousness, the self is self-subsistent and independent of everything else and never ceases to be.”15 Only in regard to the consciousness of self have we absolute certainty. We can doubt or deny any object but we cannot deny one’s own being, for in the very act of doubting or denying we affirm its existence.16 The reality of ātmā is self-
evident. Ultimate reality, though it transcends all distinctions of subject and object, is not wholly unknown to us for it is our very self. The real is not an objective something but a subjective reality, subjective not in the sense that it is peculiar or private to the individual but is the spirit discovered in the depths of the subject. Atman is not the subject (pramātra) but is the basis of the subject-object distinction. When we make a distinction between subject and object and oppose one to the other we are in the world of empirical discourse. The self (ātman) exists for itself; everything else has being in and through the self. What appears as not-self (anātma-vastu) has its being in the self. It is a bhūta-vastu which we have only to acknowledge. Brahman is being (sat), consciousness (cit), and bliss (ānanda). The universe lives on a fraction of the supreme bliss. Brahman is perfect being, infinite awareness and supreme bliss. These are not attributes possessed by Brahman as the substance, the very nature of Brahman. Brahman is jñāna-swarūpa and not jñāna-guṇāśraya. Knowledge is the essence of Brahman and not an attribute which qualifies Brahman.

If we wish to have intelligible discourse about Brahman, we have to use empirical forms. The wise understand these forms as necessities of relational thought; while the ignorant take them to be infallible truth. Reflection on the absolute Brahman is possible only through empirical discourse. We can reflect on Brahman only by subjecting it to empirical conditions. The supreme Brahman when viewed as the creator and governor of the universe is said to be sa-guna Brahman or the personal God (dvi-rūpaḥ hi brahmāvagamyate, nāma-rūpa-vikāra-bhedopādhi-viśiṣṭam, tad-viparitam sarvopādhi-varjitaṁ). Both are valid forms of Brahman. Sa-guna Brahman or Īśvara is the living God, the totality of all things that are. The pure spirit beyond subject-object distinction, the unconditioned Brahman is conceived as the subject confronting the non-subject or the object. We have the interaction between the two which is the cosmic process gradually realizing the values of spirit in its upward ascent from nothingness to the kingdom of God under divine inspiration and influence.

The Status of the World.—Śaṅkara does not assert the absolute oneness of Brahman and the world but only denies their difference. We deny only the existence of the world apart from or independent of Brahman. The world is traced to the development of prakṛti which is also called māyā in the Advaita Vedānta, but this prakṛti or māyā is not independent of spirit. It is dependent on Brahman. Brahman with prakṛti or māyā is sa-guna Brahman or Īśvara comprehending the diversity of souls and objects. Īśvara as the lord of all existences is immanent in the cosmic process. Brahman is both Īśvara and jīva (the cosmic lord and the individual ego) though there is a fundamental difference between the two in regard to the adjuncts with which they are associated. Īśvara is said to
be associated with cosmic māyā while the individual is associated with avidyā or ignorance. The supreme Lord is not subject to any ignorance but remains untouched by the vicissitudes of the finite objects. Attachment implies likes and dislikes, but God is detached since He is attached to all. God is sometimes represented as the creator of the universe and māyā is then treated as the power or śakti through which He creates. In this sense God is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe.\textsuperscript{33}

The world of not-self (anātma-vastu) derives its meaning from self of which it becomes an object. Apart from self or consciousness, the object world is non-existent. Only the self is svārtha or exists for itself; object world is parārtha or exists for another. The existence of the world is not of itself. In this sense, its reality is less than that of Brahman.

Brahman is real (sat). The world is not absolutely real but it is not a-sat or nothing. The world has empirical existence which is quite different from the eternal being of Brahman and absolute non-being. No non-entity exists. A hare's horn or a barren woman's son does not exist. The world cannot be said to be non-existent for we apprehend it.\textsuperscript{34}

Śaṅkara criticizes the śūnya-vāda on the ground that it is not possible to negate the empirical world without positing another reality. To negate an error is to accept the truth on which it is based.\textsuperscript{35} Śaṅkara here assumes that the śūnya-vāda negates all existence and does not posit an underlying reality. Both Śaṅkara and Nāgārjuna admit the unreality of the empirical world based on distinctions (dvaita-mithyātva). But Śaṅkara as a follower of the Vedānta tradition admits the reality of Brahman as the basis of the empirical world about which Nāgārjuna is reticent.

It is often said that the world is an illusory appearance for Śaṅkara. This view is encouraged by the illustration which Śaṅkara employs to describe the relation of the world to Brahman. The serpent which appears where there is only a rope is neither existent nor non-existent. It is a presented datum but is not real. When we examine the object we find that it is only a rope and not a serpent. The appearance of the serpent lasts until correct knowledge arises. This shows only that the self-existent character of the world persists so long as the knowledge of its rootedness in Brahman does not arise. In the state of enlightenment we realize that the world is only a manifestation of Brahman. By this analogy Śaṅkara wishes to suggest that the world is distinct from the real and the unreal, sad-a-sad-vilakṣaṇa. The things of the world are of an order intermediate between the absolute reality, Brahman and complete non-existence. The serpent appears. It is not real but it is not utterly non-existent. It lasts so long as the illusion lasts. It is apprehended as out there. The utterly non-existent cannot be known at all. The world cannot be viewed as either real or unreal. It is inexpressible. The Advaita Vedānta adopts the view of a-nirvacaniya-khyāti or the apprehension of the inexpressible. Logical thinking which is characterized by certain specific features, identity with
itself, avoidance of contradiction, exclusion of a third term between true and false is not all. The world which can only be described as inexpressible is sometimes called māyā. It is neither non-existent nor existent, nor is it both combined. It is not describable as either existent or non-existent. It is of the nature of mithyā and is eternal.26

Śaṅkara uses the example of rope and serpent to suggest the one-sided dependence of the world on Brahman. Whereas the appearance of the serpent is dependent on the existence of the rope, the existence of the rope does not depend on the appearance of the serpent. The world is dependent on Brahman in the sense that there will be no world without Brahman. The non-existence of the world does not make any difference to Brahman. The world rests on Brahman as the serpent on the rope and not Brahman as the world, not the rope on the serpent.

This one-sided relationship is indicated in the later Advaita, by the term vivartta (appearance) as distinct from parināma (modification). Brahman is the ground of the world and yet transcends it. Things of the world undergo change, but Brahman remains beyond change.

According to Śaṅkara, the whole conception of causation applies within the realm of phenomena. The world is the realm of causes and effects and we cannot, strictly speaking, say that Brahman is the cause of the world. An empirical category like causation cannot apply to a being that is essentially non-empirical. Śaṅkara is emphatic that the world is not to be equated with a dream phenomenon.27 The world is a cosmos, an ordered whole of spatio-temporal-causal events. There is no such orderedness in the world of dreams.

Again, in all knowledge there is an objective factor (vastu-tantraḥ hi jñānam). Only the object of dream experience has a status different from an object of waking experience. The former is sublated unlike the latter. The dream object is discovered to be merely a dream. But objects of waking experience like tables and chairs are not sublated in that way.28 The ideal of knowledge is to know a thing in itself without any distortion or interference by our mental forms. This ideal is not realized in empirical knowledge. The real object of knowledge exists in itself unrelated to the subject. It is the real in itself, pure being (sat). Empirical particulars are related to others. Dream objects do not exist apart from their appearance in dreams. That relationship exhausts their existence. Pure being is self-evidencing (svayam-prakāśa). Empirical objects are unlike dream objects: They are independent of the act of cognition.

Śaṅkara criticizes the vijñāna-vāda which reduces outer objects to states of consciousness.29 For the vijñāna-vāda error consists in the wrong identification of what is essentially a state of consciousness (vijñāna) with an external object. The given object is parikalpita or constructed while consciousness is the only reality. For Śaṅkara the object known is independent of the knowing act. It is vastu-tantra. Knowledge is of the given.

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Śaṅkara's is an ontological idealism and not an epistemological one. He rejects the theory which identifies the essence of a thing with our perception of it. He does not say that the world depends on the perceiver for its existence. To say that the self is the foundational reality is not to say that our awareness constitutes the reality of the object.

The worlds of dream and waking are both inexpressible since they cannot be viewed as either real or unreal. Again, if the test of truth is non-contradiction (a-bādhitā), neither of them satisfies that criterion. Only the ultimate reality, Brahman, is uncontradicted. From the metaphysical point of view they both fall short of reality. Yet there is a distinction between the two. While the illusory reality is confined to the individual percipient, empirical reality is open to all sarva-loka-pratyākṣa. Empirical reality is to be distinguished from dream existence as well as ultimate being.39

The word māyā is used to denote different meanings in Śaṅkara's system: (1) That the world is not self-explanatory shows its phenomenal character, which is signified by the word māyā. (2) The problem of the relation between Brahman and the world has meaning for us who admit the pure being of Brahman from the intuitive standpoint and demand an explanation of its relation to the world, which we see from the logical standpoint. We can never understand how the ultimate reality is related to the world of plurality, since the two are heterogeneous, and every attempt at explanation is bound to fail. This incomprehensibility is brought out by the term māyā. (3) If Brahman is to be viewed as the cause of the world, it is only in the sense that the world rests on Brahman, while the latter is in no way touched by it, and the world which rests on Brahman is called māyā. (4) The principle assumed to account for the appearance of Brahman as the world is also called māyā. (5) If we confine our attention to the empirical world and employ the dialectic of logic, we get the conception of a perfect personality (Īśvara) who has the power of self-expression. This power or energy is called māyā. (6) This energy of Īśvara becomes transformed into the upādhi, or limitation, the unmanifested matter (avayakā prakṛti) from which all existence issues. It is the object through which the supreme subject Īśvara develops the universe. The word māyā is used to denote different meanings. "Therefore this whole universe consisting of a series of thoughts and works, means and ends, actions and results, although held together by a series of works and impressions of innumerable beings, is transient, impure, unsubstantial, like a flowing river or a burning lamp, lacking in fibre like a banana, comparable to foam appearance, a mirage, a dream and so on, appears to those who have identified themselves with it to be undecaying, eternal and full of substance."39

The Individual Soul.—The jīva or the individual soul is a composite of self and not-self. All experience is based on the confusion between the
two. The wrong identification (adhyāsa) of the self with the not-self is the basis of all experience. Through association with the limitations (upādhi) like the internal organ (antah-karana) the self functions as enjoyer subject to rebirth or bondage. When we speak of the individual jīva as born or as growing we mean that its adjuncts come into being or grow and not that the spirit is born or grows. Jīva is an empirical form or manifestation of Brahma. Its finitude and separateness are due to the limitations of the media. The human individual belongs to the object side, is an element in the perpetual procession or saṁsāra.

The jīva when viewed in its true character as distinct from the adjuncts is the sākṣin or the witness self. It is consciousness, pure and simple. It is not objective cognition or vṛtti-jñāna which is a modification of the internal organ but is the very form of consciousness (svarūpa-jñāna). All changes are in this consciousness and not of it. The seer (sākṣin) is always present while the changes which it witnesses come and go. The seer is the implication of all empirical knowledge though it is not itself an object of such knowledge. Nothing can be both subject and object. The eye can see other things but not itself. When we say that we know ourselves, it is the empirical self that we know. The true self cannot be known as an object though as subject it is self-revealing.

How is the supreme self (Ātman) related to the individual (jīva)? What is the relation between the pure self and the limiting adjuncts which are the products of prakṛti? Śaṅkara says: “The self or the I-element is so opposed to the not-self or the thou element that they can never be predicated of each other.” The relationship between the two I and not I is inexplicable logically. It is inexpressible (a-nirvacanīya) on the analogy of the relation of Brahman to the world. The tendency to regard the not-self as real is there, psychologically given though not logically established.

The multiplicity of the world and the independence of the individual appear to be the truth owing to an inveterate (naisargika) habit of mind which is traced to avidyā or ignorance which is beginningless (anādi). This ignorance may be either negative, i.e. lack of knowledge of the unity underlying the diversity of things, or positive in the sense that it gives rise to a misapprehension. We see the manifold world where there is only Brahman. In the former case our knowledge would be partial; in the latter it would be misleading and erroneous. We must overcome this congenital ignorance by means of knowledge or enlightenment.

While māyā covers the whole cosmic manifestation avidyā relates to the ignorance of the individual. The limitations of each individual are derived from the avidyā of the particular soul. What distinguishes Īśvara or the supreme Lord from the individual soul (jīva), is the quality of the adjuncts. When freed from these adjuncts the egos are not distinct from one another. The famous text tat tvam asi (that art thou) affirms the identity, not actual but potential of the individual souls and supreme god. When we
realize our true nature we get rid of the feeling that we are the agents or the enjoyers. The liberated jīva is liberated from the limiting adjuncts. In empirical life we attribute to the jīva features that do not belong to it though they are all presented at the time. If we free ourselves from these limitations we realize the truth of the identity of the self with Brahman.

Mokṣa or Liberation.—When it is said that we should attain the self, the meaning is that we should know it. The end of knowledge is also the aim of human endeavour. When it is said that Brahman is to be seen, known, cognized and comprehended, it is assumed that we can cross our finitude and attain to our true nature. To become what we are is our ultimate aim. Right knowledge should displace the erroneous identification of the self with its adjuncts. The change has to be effected not in the world of being but in the world of thought. Avidyā has to be displaced by vidyā. According to the Mādhyamika system also, saṁsāra and nirvāṇa are the same; only our viewpoints in the two cases are different. "When the universe is viewed as a process of causes and conditions it is called the phenomenal world; the same world is called nirvāṇa when causes and conditions are disregarded." The identity of the self with Brahman is the fact; we realize it when the obscuration is removed. It is wrong to assume that in the state of liberation all plurality is annihilated and "only the knower in us and therefore the ātman remains as the unit." To get rid of the ego sense is not to get rid of all life and existence. What is needed is not merely a theoretical knowledge of the oneness of the self with the Absolute but a practical realization of it. Knowledge of Brahman has for its result personal experience. The Absolute consciousness is viewed either as being "without any limiting adjuncts or as being all the limiting adjuncts." It becomes the self of all salvation, is sarvātma-bhāva. "This universe is myself who am all this. Identity with all is his highest state, the self’s own natural, supreme state." The person who is freed is the jīva-mukta, one who is liberated while alive, i.e. while associated with his varied adjuncts. His life will be one of dedicated service to humanity, which is a spontaneous expression of his realization of the oneness of all. At death the physical body is cast off and the freed soul attains videha-mukti.

The question is raised whether illumined souls preserve their individuality after obtaining enlightenment. Śaṅkara admits that some of them do retain their individualities for fulfilling the functions assigned to them by the supreme Lord. Vyāsa-Vasisṭha-Bhrigu-Nārada-prabhṛtayāḥ para-meśvarena teṣu teṣu adhikāresu niyuktāh santāḥ karma-saṁśti-parāyantam saṁsāre avatisthante. In other words, the maintenance of individuality is not inconsistent with a state of enlightenment. Their spirit is other-worldly but their life is not colourless. They transform their energies into a living whole which expresses itself through love and power. Their lives are purposeful and purposeless, like the very act of creation.
When we know the truth of things, karman as such ceases to be obligatory (na karmāvasaro'sti). He has no need for action.

Karman.—The law of karman is assumed by Śaṅkara. Individuality is due to karman, which is a product of avidyā. The kind of world into which we are born is just the return of the works on the doer (kriya-kārakaphalam). The individual organism is the working machinery (kārya-kāraṇa-sanāghāta) intended to produce that requital in the form of actions and its results of suffering and happiness. Sometimes the works of a single existence have to be atoned for in several succeeding ones. Even as the atonement for the past is completed, fresh karman accumulates, “so that the clockwork of atonement in running down always winds itself up again.” Moral life is an unremitting active energizing, which is never exhausted. It takes endless forms, owing to the variety of the demands of the conditions of human life. This process goes on for ever, until perfect knowledge is gained, which consumes the seed of karman and makes rebirth impossible. Freedom from subjection to the law of karman is the end of human life. To get rid of avidyā is to be freed from the law of karman. But so long as the individual is finite, he is subject to the law of karman, i.e. he always strains after an ideal which he never reaches. Morality is a stepping-stone and not a stopping-place. All acts done with an expectation of reward yield their fruits in accordance with the law of karman, while those done with no selfish interest, in the spirit of dedication to God, purify the mind.

It does not, however, follow that we move like marionettes pulled by the strings of our past karman. It has already been said that the individual is responsible for his acts, and God is only the assisting medium, conserving the fruits of his deeds. God does not compel anyone to do this or that. Even those tendencies with which we are bound can be overcome by strength of will. Vasiṣṭha asks Rāma in the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha “to break the chain that holds us in bondage by free effort.” The individual has an impulsive nature by virtue of which he has likes and dislikes. Man, if guided by the unformed nature with which he is born, is completely at the mercy of his impulses. So long as his activities are determined by these, they are not free. But man is not a mere sum-total of his impulses. There is the infinite in him. The self as causal power lies outside the empirical series and determines them. The history of man is not a puppet show. It is a creative evolution.

Ethics and Religion.—To gain enlightenment we must cultivate vaishrāga, detachment of spirit. We must suppress our egotistic tendencies and perform our duties in a disciplined and disinterested way. Śaṅkara lays down the four-fold requirement for the study of the Vedānta. They are (1) ability to discriminate between the eternal and the non-eternal; (2) freedom from desire for securing pleasure or avoiding pain, here or elsewhere; (3) attainment of calmness, temperance, the spirit of renuncia-
tion, fortitude, the power of concentration of mind, faith; (4) desire for freedom.
Moral life prepares us for the apprehension of truth by purifying our affections and cleansing us of our egotism.

Śaṅkara argues that karman or ethical activity does not directly contribute to spiritual freedom. It creates in us the desire to know. It is the indirect preparation for mokṣa or liberation. Freedom is not the direct result of action. While the results of action are transitory, mokṣa or freedom is eternal. Our actions prepare for knowledge which reveals the reality. The real is not something to be achieved. It is a-sādhyam, for it is the eternal real. It is ever-accomplished (nitya-siddha-sva-bhāvam). Perfection is always present. It is not a thing to be acquired. It is revealed when the mirror of the soul is cleansed from dust. We have to break down the barriers that stand in the way of realization. Karman helps us to remove the hindrances to jñāna or wisdom.

If Śaṅkara is opposed to the way of works, he is opposed to the theory of salvation by works. The realization of Brahman as one's very self is the goal of human endeavour. The natural tendency is to assume that Brahman is other than self. Brahman is conceived as the divine Being, creator, ruler and sustainer of the universe. It is worshipped as the Lord and the Lawgiver. Upāsana or worship is different from jñāna or knowledge. In Upāsana there is an element of distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped. In knowledge or jñāna we experience the nature of reality as it is in itself; in worship or Upāsana we experience it under the limitations of name and form. The same Brahman is experienced in both these ways. Through worship we gradually overcome the distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped and experience the Real as it is. When the worshipper realizes that the God he worships is none other than his deepest self, when externality is broken down, he reaches the object of worship.

There are different modes of worship which lead to different results. These modes are different on account of the different limiting adjuncts. These are the different ways in which the ultimate Reality is mediated for us.

ŚAṂKARA AND BUDDHISM

The Indian tradition holds that Śaṅkara in the interests of the re-establishment of the Hindu faith wrote as a controversialist against Buddhism. The Buddhist tradition also confirms this view. It affirms that Kumārila-Bhaṭṭa, the famous expositor of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Śaṅkara were the chief critics of the Buddhist faith. Śaṅkara's works do not confirm this view. He wrote as a defender of the Advaita doctrine and attacked other views in order to vindicate his faith. In a work like his Bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra, the refutation of the Buddhist views forms
a small part. Śaṅkara’s criticism of the Śāṅkhya system is more severe and extensive. The primary purpose of his works is the vindication of the Advaita doctrine rather than propaganda against other views.

Many critics, ancient and modern, hold that Śaṅkara himself was greatly influenced by Buddhist thought. The famous line from the Padma-Purāṇa is often quoted that “the māyā doctrine is an untrue science and is only concealed Buddhism.”43 Yāmunācāryā made similar charges. The Buddhists also refer to the similarities between the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara and the Vījñāna-vāda and the Śūnya-vāda Schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

There is considerable measure of similarity between Śaṅkara’s views and Buddhist doctrine.43 Śaṅkara used some of the reasonings made familiar by the Buddhist dialectic in support of his non-dualism. Śaṅkara used every device to defend his belief in the reality of a transcendent non-dual Brahman. Gauḍapāda, who is Śaṅkara’s teacher’s teacher in his Kārikā on the Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad has used phrases and metaphors which are well known in Buddhist literature. After a careful and detailed study of the parallel passages, the late De la Vallee Poussin observed, “One cannot read the Gauḍapāda-kārikā without being struck by the Buddhist character of the leading ideas and of the wording itself. The author seems to have used Buddhist works or sayings and to have adjusted them to his Vedāntic design; nay more, he finds pleasure in double entendre. As Gauḍapāda is the spiritual grandfather of Śaṅkara, this fact is not insignificant.”

There is no doubt that Śaṅkara’s views are a straightforward development of the doctrines of the Upaniṣads and the Brahma-sūtra. No innovations are introduced into these by Śaṅkara which require to be traced to the influence of Buddhism.

Unfortunately we are inclined to forget that Buddhism also developed on the foundations which were already laid in the Upaniṣads. The two tendencies of the Vedānta and Buddhism are parallel developments out of a common background, though their emphases were different. The similarities between Śaṅkara’s Advaita and some Schools of Buddhism are not unnatural.

The greatness of Śaṅkara’s metaphysical achievement rests on the intensity and splendour of thought with which the search for reality is conducted, on the high idealism of spirit with which he grapples the difficult problems of life and on the vision of a consummation which places a divine glory on human life.

NOTES

1. The dates usually assigned are A.D. 788-820.
2. artha-jñāna-pradhānāvatāda upaniṣataḥ Ś. on Taittiriya Up. I. 2. 1.
3. Ś.B., I. 3. 28; III. 2. 24.

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4. vedasya hi niraṇekṣa svārthe prāmāṇyam raver-iva rūpa-viśaye. Ś.B., II. 1. 1.
5. Ś. on Brhadāranyaka Up., II. 4. 10; see also I. 4. 20.
6. anubhavāvasānātvāt brahma-jñānasya. Ś.B., I. 1. 2.
7. Ś.B., I. 1. 4.
8. Ś.B., IV. 1. 15.
11. VIII. 1. 1.
12. dig-desa-guna-gati-phala-bheda-sūnyam hi paramārtha-sad advayam brahma manda-buddhānām a-sad iva pratibhātī.
13. nābhaṅvādh bhaṅva uto vadyate. Ś. on Brh. Up., II. 2. 26; see Ś.B., II. 3. 9.
15. upadesa-sāhasrī, I. 2. 91.
16. ya eva hi nirākārā tād eva tasya svarūpam. Ś.B., II. 3. 7.
17. svayam-siddhatvāt, ibid.
25. Ś.B., II. 2. 31.
26. cp. Aditya-Purāṇa quoted by Vījñānabhikṣu in his Yoga-vārttika-bhāṣya.
    nāsad-rūpān sad-rūpān māyā nauvābhavātmikā
    sad-asadbhyāṃ anirvācyāmithyāभुितā sanātani.
27. vaidharmyācca na svapnādīvat. Brahma-sūtra, II. 2. 29.
28. naiyaṁ jāgaritopalabdham vastu kasyānicād apiyavasthāyām bādhate. Ś.B. II., 2. 28.
29. Ś.B., II. 2. 28 and 29.
31. Introduction S.B.
33. na sanśārasya nirvāṇāt kiṁcid asti viśeṣanam.
    na nirvāṇasya sanśārāl kiṁcid asti viśeṣanam.
    Madhyamaka-kārikā, XXV. 19.
34. ya ājavan-ja√iyāvā upādāyā pratītyā vā,
    so pratītyānupādāya nirvāṇam upādīṣyate.
    Madhyamaka-kārikā, XXV. 9.
36. Ś.B., III. 3. 32.
38. Ś.B., I. 1. 1.
40. Ś.B., I. 1. 12.
41. Ś.B., I. 1. 2.
42. māyā-vādam asacchāstraṁ praccchannam bauddhāṁ eva ca.
43. De La Vallee Poussin says: "The Vījñāna-vāda at least in some of its ontological
principles is very like Vedāntism in disguise, or, to be more exact, it is likely to be understood in a Vedāntic sense.” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1900), p. 132.
Keith observes: “The similarity between the *Vijñāna-vāda* and the Vedānta is patent and undeniable.” *ibid.* (1916), p. 379.

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DEUSSEN: *The System of the Vedānta*.
SINGH, R. P.: *The Vedānta of Śaṅkara*.
CHAPTER XIII—continued

VEDĀNTA—THE ADVAITA SCHOOL

B. POST-ŚAṀKARA

INTRODUCTION

The spirit and peculiarity of no system of Indian Philosophy can be grasped unless one studies it as part of the general spiritual tradition started by the Upaniṣads. Even the heterodox Schools of Buddhism and Jainism do not form an exception; for though they owe no allegiance to the Vedas, they continue the same tradition of spiritual inwardsness as belongs to the Upaniṣads and the orthodox Schools. They interpret the same spiritual reality and its relation to the mundane world. Whether it is the ātman or śūnya or Brahman, it shines right within us and is to be realized in our innermost hearts. Philosophy, for all, is the explication of the relation between the inward and the outward, between the innermost being and the outermost physical world. The only exception to this tradition is the School of the Cārvākas, which has no avowed followers. Regarding the rest, whether the School is realistic or idealistic, pluralistic or monistic, subjectivistic or objectivistic, the observation holds good. These differences are found both in the orthodox and the heterodox thinkers, except in Jainism, which remained from the beginning pluralistic and realistic. Yet all are spiritual in tradition

The Upaniṣads declare that Brahman is everything (sarvam khalvidam Brahma), that it is the truth of truth (satyasya satyam), and that the ātman and Brahman are one (ayam atmā Brahma). These statements can be understood either literally or figuratively and interpreted accordingly. Śaṅkara belonged to the line of thinkers who understood them literally. He upheld the non-duality (a-dvaita) of the ātman and Brahman (the individual and the Absolute) and, as Brahman is the only reality for the Upaniṣads, he contended that the material world had no reality of its own. By itself it was illusory (mithyā) and was superimposed (ādhyāstā) on Brahman. The existence (sattā) of the world was the existence (sattā) of Brahman. But if Brahman is the only reality, why and how does the world of plurality issue out of it? His answer is that the world is due to extraneous adjuncts (upādhis), which are themselves illusory (mithyā), and are due to māyā. The appearance of the Brahman as the finite
individual (jīva) is similarly due to adjuncts (upādhis) created by māyā.

Śaṅkara, in his commentaries on the Upaniṣads, the Brahma-sūtra and the Bhagavad-Gītā criticized and rejected the views of all the current rival Schools, the Śāmkhya, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Pūrva-Mimāṃsā, the Pāncarātra, the Pāśupata, Buddhism, Jainism and few minor Schools belonging to the main Hindu tradition. He utilized both logic and the Sruti (Upaniṣads) in his attack and defence. Though from this distance of time we are able to see that he worked out and elaborated the theories of Gauḍapāda, his grand-teacher and author of Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, who reconciled and synthesized the spanda (vibration) doctrine of Śaivaism, the Vijñāna-vāda of Buddhism and the Brahman-doctrine of the Upaniṣads, Śaṅkara’s theories were new both to his followers and rivals, who were dazzled and puzzled not only by his erudition and brilliance but also by the way he criticized Buddhism and Śaivaism while accepting some of their main doctrines. So during his own time the problems his theories created and the lacunae left in his own arguments could not receive much attention. But when his followers tried to think out his ideas systematically, they found they had to forge new links between his arguments and fill up the gaps. But in this process they differed from each other and produced many sub-schools.

The rival Schools recovered from the shock of Śaṅkara’s attack and from the magnetic influence of his personality after his death, and began their counter-attacks on the Advaita doctrines. Śaṅkara is the first commentator, whose works are available, on the important triad, the Upaniṣads, the Brahma-sūtra, and the Bhagavad-Gītā. Every other School, which claimed to belong to the Upaniṣadic tradition and so had to write similar commentaries, supported its own views by criticizing those of Śaṅkara. The most important criticisms that helped further progress of the Advaita came from the two Vaiśnava Schools of Rāmānuja and Madhva. Rāmānuja belonged to the eleventh century and Madhva to the thirteenth. The theory of the former is called Viśiṣṭadvaita or nondualism of the determinate Brahman. His main thesis is that God (Īśvara), ātman and the world are distinct, though not separate; and that the Upaniṣadic statement that everything is the Brahman has to be interpreted by treating the latter two, the ātman and the world, as adjectives (viśeṣaṇās) of God. Brahman is Īśvara possessed of the ātman and the world. Brahman then would be one, and yet the individual would be real. The relation between Brahman and the other two is the relation between the soul and the body.

Madhva’s philosophy is called Dvaita (dualism). It is the dualism of Brahman and the jīva. The physical world also is real and in fact forms a third entity. The philosophy is therefore pluralism and not merely dualism; but as the main interest is in the relation between Brahman
and the jīva, this philosophy is traditionally called dualism. Though the two entities are different from Brahman, the latter is able to exercise control over them as they are forms of its sakti (energy). They are different from it owing to a peculiarity (vīśeṣa) of their own. In fact māyā also is a sakti; but the Advaitins hold that it is not real, it has no sattā (existence, being, reality) of its own apart from Brahman. But the dualists like Madhva contend that it has a different reality of its own.

As both Rāmānuja and Madhva treat the sakti (energy) as real, their main attack was directed against the Advaita doctrine of māyā. They have no objection to the use of the word “māyā,” but criticize the connotation which the Advaitins give it. The followers of both Rāmānuja and Madhva show extraordinary logical acumen in their criticism of the concept, and the followers of Śaṅkara show an equally remarkable logical skill in their defence and counter-attacks, and subject the concepts of difference (bhedā) and negation (abhāva) to minute analysis in order to demonstrate their untenability. These controversies resulted in rendering the Advaita concepts more and more precise and their philosophy more and more systematic.

Meanwhile, the School of Nyāya developed its dialectical machinery and started its attack on the Advaita. Its earlier philosophers were interested in the discovery of the categories and in their application to the planning of life for the realization of the inner truth. But controversies between rival Schools necessitated clarification and definition of concepts, and introduced dry logical formalism, removed more and more from life and reality in course of time. The fashion set in of framing elaborate and involved definitions (lakṣaṇas) and of constructing and inventing syllogisms to prove or disprove anything. And for their own sake, both practices absorbed the interest of some of the greatest logicians and philosophers. The classical examples are Udayana’s Lākṣaṇāvali (tenth century A.D.), in which he gives exact definitions of the Nyāya categories, and Kulārkapaṇḍita’s Daśa-śloki-mahā-vidyā-sūtra (eleventh century A.D.), in which he gives sixteen types of syllogisms, so profusely qualifying the terms with delimiting adjuncts that they give just the conclusions wanted. All depended on manipulatory skill, anticipating objections and introducing qualifications, so that no exception to the major premise could be shown. Kulārka adopted what are called kevalānvalyin syllogisms, that is, syllogisms in which both the middle and the major terms are universally pervasive characters like nameability and knowability (abhidheyata and prameyata), in order to disprove the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the eternity of sound. The motive behind this logical practice could be easily discerned: it is to give no scope to the opponent for showing a fallacy. Vādindra of the thirteenth century, in his Mahā-vidyā-viṭāmbanā, refuted these syllogisms, saying that not only were such all-pervasive characters useless as major premises, but also
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that certain kinds of fallacies could be discovered in them. However, both the practices of definition-making and syllogism-construction, whether of the kevalānvaśīn or of another type, entered the lists during contests with the Advaita; and the Advaita philosophers, willingly or unwillingly, had themselves to resort to those practices either in defence or attack. Thus developed the dialectical literature of the Advaita.

The progress of the Advaita after Śaṅkara may therefore be treated conveniently under two main heads, the development of sub-Schools within the system and the dialectical development of attack and defence. Two short sections may be added; one showing the influence of the Advaita on the other ancient Schools and the other showing its influence on contemporary Indian thinkers. These four sections may be preceded by a short historical account.

HISTORICAL SKETCH

Among the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins, we have to reckon not only the younger but also the older contemporaries of Śaṅkara, whom he converted to his own persuasion. Of the latter, the greatest and the most well known is Maṇḍana Miśra, the author of Brahma-siddhi. Tradition identifies him with Sureśvara, the author of Naiśkarmya-siddhi, Byhadāryanaka-vārttika and Taippiriya-vārttika. But some scholars maintain that the two are different persons, as their views differ. Padmapāda, the author of Pañcapādikā and a direct disciple of Śaṅkara, is the founder of the Advaita right wing. The great Advaita tradition, to which many of the venerated Advaitins like Prakāśātman (thirteenth century), the author of Pañcapādikā-vivarana, and Vidyāranya, the author of Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, Pañca-dāśī, etc., belong, was started by him. All the three, Maṇḍana, Sureśvara and Padmapāda, belong to the eighth century.

A great scholar who started another line of thinking is Vācaśpati Miśra of the ninth century. He was not a direct disciple of Śaṅkara, and commented not only upon the Advaita works, but also upon those of the other Schools. His greatest work on the Advaita is his commentary Bhāmatī on Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Brahma-sūtra. Maṇḍana, Sureśvara, Padmapāda and Vācaśpati are the creators of four distinct lines of Advaita thought. Each has many followers. But it will not be right to say that these lines developed independently. The lines cross and re-cross each other; and as fresh problems were created by further controversies, their followers gave independent solutions.

Advaita dialectics started with Śaṅkara himself, though logical formalism set in much later. Maṇḍana had a critique of difference in his Brahma-siddhi, which was elaborated later by Ṣanandabodha (eleventh or twelfth century) in his Nyāya-makaranda, and by Ṣeṣimhāśrama
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(fifteenth century) in his Bheda-dhikkāra. But it should be said that all the Advaita dialecticians make it a point to criticize the concept of difference, for non-difference (advaita) is the central idea they have to establish. The greatest dialectician of the Advaita School is Śriharṣa (twelfth century), the author of Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khaḍya, who laid down once for all the main viewpoint of Advaita dialectics. Citsukha (thirteenth century), who commented upon Śriharṣa’s work and himself wrote Tattva-pradīpikā, a smaller work of the same kind, and Madhusūdana (fifteenth century), the author of Advaita-siddhi and several other works are also great dialecticians. Appayya Dīkṣita (sixteenth century), who was a great scholar, collected all the views of the different sub-Schools of the Advaita in his well-known work, Siddhānta-leśa-samgraha. He is known also for reading the Advaita theories into Nīlakaṇṭha’s Śaiva Viśiṣṭādīvaita in his commentary, Sivādvaita-nīrṇaya.

Some important works like Prakāśārtha-vivaraṇa (twelfth century) are available; but their author’s names are not known. On the other hand, some of the works of well-known authors are not available. The tradition is kept up generally by writing commentaries upon commentaries. But independent treatises on special topics like Bheda-dhikkāra and on the whole system like Vedānta-paribhāṣā (by Dharmarājādvarīndra, sixteenth century) are also found. Even they have commentaries upon commentaries.

Śaṅkara’s ideas exercised a great influence upon other Schools also, upon both Śaivaism and Vaishnavavaism. The attempts of Appayya to read the Advaita into Śaivaism have already been referred to. He failed because he tried to foist the Advaita upon one who was avowedly a Viśiṣṭādīvaitin. He would have had better success had he written an independent commentary upon the Brahmasūtra. The Kāśmīra School of Śaivaism was particularly the result of Śaṅkara’s visit to Kāśmīra when Buddhism was the dominant religion and philosophy of the place and the local form of Śaivaism went underground. But after Śaṅkara’s criticism of the Buddhists Śaivaism raised its head and grew strong. Vasugupta (c. ninth century), the founder of the Śiva-sūtra and the author of the Spanda-kārikā, is the first great exponent of this School. His Spanda-kārikā is clearly reminiscent of Gaṇḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkyya-kārikā.1 Abhinavagupta (tenth century), the greatest scholar and philosopher which Kāśmīra has produced, is the greatest exponent of the School.

It is said that Śāktism is as old as the Vedas. Some of the Tantras or Āgamas (Scriptures) of this School are pre-Śaṅkara. But curiously enough, in spite of all the criticisms levelled by Śaṅkara against this School, one of its most authoritative texts Prapāṇa-sāra-Tantra, is attributed to Śaṅkara. Not only the tradition of his School but also modern scholars like Woodroffe believe that the authorship is true. Besides, many of the orthodox Advaitins accept that the beautiful poem, Saundarya-lahari,
addressed to Śakti, the consort of Śiva, was composed by Śaṅkara. It contains the Śākta philosophical concepts. After Śaṅkara’s death, the followers of even the Śākta School like Bhāskara Rāya, began to refer to Śaṅkara as an authority. Their philosophy also like that of the Kāśmir School is a modified form of Śaṅkara’s Advaita.

Among the Vaiṣṇavas, Vallabhaścārya (fifteenth century) is the greatest Advaitin. He calls his system Śuddhādvaita or pure Advaita, in contradiction to Śaṅkara’s which he considers impure as it makes use of impure māyā in order to establish the Advaita of Brahman. Reference may be made also to the theory of Śuka (date unknown), who started a peculiar Advaita among the Bhāgavatas.

Differences within the School.—Though Śaṅkara said that the world was māyā and was due to māyā, and though some of his followers were more or less satisfied with that statement and turned their gaze towards the inner absolute Reality, most of them could not resist the urge for a conceptual construction of the world even on the basis of the concept of māyā. The latter treated māyā, not as a concept of value, but as a principle of explanation and creation. However mysterious it may be, its workings must have a method, which they wanted to grasp rationally.

Māyā indeed means inexplicability. But because it was used as a concrete term and because of its association with prakṛti, which is the root cause of the world, some followers of Śaṅkara felt that, along with the Brahman it should somehow be the explanatory principle of the causation of the world.

The first question naturally to be raised was: if the world is māyā and so not real, how could it be caused at all? How can the inanimate world issue forth from the Brahman, which is pure consciousness? Does māyā play any role in this process of creation? And what is it? For Śaṅkara Brahman was the sole reality and the world was mithyā (illusory) and māyā. Now, the question was raised: Though the world is māyā, as it is challenging our attention, how could it be caused at all? Sureśvara and his follower Sarvajña (also called Nityabodha, ninth century), the author of Saṅkṣepa-sārīraka, maintain that Brahman itself is the cause of the world. Padmapāda and his followers contend that both Brahman and māyā together constitute the cause. But Prakāśananda (sixteenth century), the author of Vedānta-sidhānta-muktāvalī, who seems to follow Maṇḍana’s Brahma-siddhi, holds that māyā alone is the cause of the world. Maṇḍana says that the individual souls are the result of māyā and that it is they who create the world. The question then is: What are their respective roles? The author of Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya says that Brahman is the vivarttakāraṇa and māyā the parināma-kāraṇa. Here a word should be said about the difference between the two kinds of causes. Some causes acquire a different nature when they become the effects, for example, when milk becomes curd it will no more be available as milk; but some causes do not
lose their nature when transformed into effects, for example, when gold is made into a bangle it is not changed into some other metal and is still available as gold. The former are called *parinama-karana* and the latter *vivartta-karana*.

By drawing the above distinction, an attempt is made to save the eternal purity and presence of Brahman even during the world-process. But Sureśvara and Sarvajña, who attribute causality to Brahman alone, say that the function of *maya* is to be only an instrumental cause. Brahman appears as many through the instrumentality of *maya*. Another important view on this point is that of Vācaspati, who thinks that the Brahman itself is the material cause of the world; *maya* is only an accessory. Of course, Brahman cannot be the *parinama-karana*; it is only a *vivartta-karana*. But *maya* is neither. Prakāśānanda, the author of *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktavali*, holds the opposite extreme that Brahman, which is beyond time, can never be the material cause; *maya* alone is the material cause.

In this context, another important question is raised: Is the plurality due to pure Brahman, or to Īśvara who is Brahman after it comes into contact with *maya*, or to *jīva* (the individual)? The significance of this problem can be appreciated when a similar problem in Spinoza’s philosophy is remembered. He said that the modes were to be derived from the Substance and yet the model appearance was due to the imperfect comprehension of the modes. It has been the practice of the critics to ask how, if the model appearance is due to the imperfection of the modes, the modes themselves could have come into being at all: there would be no model appearance without the modes coming into being first, and there would be no modes without their imperfect vision. But one may say that the plurality is due to the modes or that it is due to the Substance. A very similar consideration led to the question whether the world was due to Brahman or Īśvara or *jīva*.

Following the *Samkṣepa-śārīraka*, some say that pure Brahman itself is the cause of the world. The followers of *Vivaraṇa* hold that the cause must be Īśvara, who is Brahman taken along with *maya*. Some again contend that Īśvara is the cause of the objective world like space; but the individual’s mind (*aṁtaḥ-karana*) is due to *jīva*’s *avidyā* (*jīva*’s part of *maya*) together with the elements produced out of Īśvara’s *maya*. This is the view of those who distinguish between *maya* and *avidyā* (see below). But according to some who believe in the identity of the two, *jīva* is the cause of the subtle body (*linga-śarīra*). According to another view, Īśvara is the cause of everything in the world; but *jīva* is the cause of dreams and illusions. For Maṅḍana, as already mentioned, *jīva* alone is responsible for this world. But an extreme view on the point is that everything including Īśvara is projected by *jīva* out of himself as in a dream.
The relation between mâyâ and avidyâ may be discussed now. The nature of both is nescience or ignorance. But some felt obliged to draw a distinction between the two, because they thought that nescience belonging to Iśvara must be of a superior kind to that belonging to jīva. For if both Iśvara and jīva use the same, they must have the same powers. However, some like Sarvajña maintain that mâyâ and avidyâ are synonyms. But according to Prahaṭārtha-vivarana, avidyâ is only a part of mâyâ. For Tattva-viveka, mâyâ and avidyâ are two forms of mūla-prakṛti or original matter, which has three guṇas or attributes, sattva, rajas, and tamas (often translated as purity, activity and darkness). Mūla-prakṛti with sattva predominating, is mâyâ, but with sattva overpowered by rajas or tamas it is avidyâ. Some again say that mūla-prakṛti has two kinds of śakti (power): one is āvaraṇa-śakti or veiling power by which it screens or obscures truth; the other vikṣepa-śakti or projecting power by which it projects the objects of the phenomenal world and illusions. Mūla-prakṛti as projective and so as creative as mâyâ and as screening or obscuring is avidyâ. The question whether mâyâ is one or many is also relevant here. Some say that, as its nature is inexplicable and illogical, it can be both one and many. For instance, Madhavacārya, in his Sarva-darśana-saṅgrahā, while criticising the Sāṃkhya conception of prakṛti which as one involves the liberation of all jīvas when one is liberated on prakṛti ceasing to be active, says that this difficulty does not arise in the Advaita as mâyâ can be both one and many. Some say that mâyâ is one and is the upādhi or adjunct of Iśvara, while avidyâs are many and are the upādhis of the jīvas. Some again say that mâyâ is one and is the same as avidyâ; but this oneness does not entail the liberation of all the other jīvas when one jīva is liberated, just as a universal, which is one and present in all the particulars, does not involve the destruction of all the other particulars when one particular is destroyed. Here again Prakāśananda maintains that as there is only one jīva for him, this difficulty should not arise.

But if mâyâ works with Brahman in producing the world, what can be the relation between the two? It was a question similar to the one raised by the Sāṃkhya, namely, what is the relation between puruṣa and prakṛti? If, through some relation, they get together and form a unity, what would be that unity? Again, constructive efforts with concepts admittedly inexplicable lead to differences of view.

An interesting controversy arose thus about the problem of the relation between the Brahman and mâyâ. Mâyâ is not real; yet it is treated as limiting infinite Brahman by becoming its adjunct (upādhi). By what process, then, does mâyâ become the adjunct? There are three views on this question: the ābhāsa-vāda or the appearance theory, the pratibimba-vāda or the reflection theory, and the avaccheda-vāda or the determination theory. According to Sureśvara, Brahman screened by avidyâ appears as sākṣin or witness (see below for explanation), and screened by buddhi
or intellect appears as jīva. Sākṣin for this School is the same as Īśvara. According to Prakāśārtha-vivaraṇa, Īśvara is the reflection of the Brahman in māyā and jīva the reflection in avidyā, which is a part of māyā. For the author of Tattva-viveka, the reflection of the Brahman in the sattva aspect of mūla-prakṛti is Īśvara, and in any other aspect is jīva. The author of Samkṣepa-śāriraka holds that the reflection in avidyā is Īśvara and the reflection in antah-karana (mind) is jīva. Some followers of Vivaraṇa do not accept that both Īśvara and jīva are reflections; they say that jīva alone is a reflection and Īśvara is the prototype (bimba) of that reflection. This three-fold distinction between the original, prototype and the reflection is necessitated by the consideration that Brahman, as pure and infinite, cannot be reflected at all, for we can have reflections only of finite entities; but jīva as a reflection must have a prototype, which is Īśvara. Īśvara is thus conceived with reference to jīva, and Brahman is without that reference.

To obviate this difficulty, Vācaspati started the third view, namely, the avaccheda-vāda. Māyā, though not real, can limit the nature of infinite Brahman, and jīva is thereby obtained. What is not so limited is Īśvara. The same Brahman as the object (viṣaya) of avidyā is Īśvara; but the āśraya (locus) of avidyā is jīva. Thus avidyā becomes a determination of jīva and overwhims him; but it is not a determination of Īśvara, and so He is not overwhelmed by it.

The author of Citra-dīpa maintains that Brahman is the pure consciousness not limited by māyā, Īśvara is the same consciousness reflected in the impressions (samshāras) left in māyā by the buddhis (intellects) of the jīvas, Kūṭastha-Sākṣin is the pure consciousness limited by the gross and subtle bodies of a jīva, and jīva is the reflection of mind (antah-karana) produced in Kūṭastha. This view is a mixture of the limitation and reflection theories.

It was felt that māyā or avidyā could not be related to Brahman and jīva in the same way. And the feeling gave rise to a number of concepts.

We have already been discussing the differences between Brahman, Īśvara and jīva. According to Samkṣepa-śāriraka, the adjunct (upādhi) of Īśvara is causal, avidyā (kāraṇopādhi) and the adjunct of jīva is effect—avidyā (kāryopādhi). The author of Brahmananda and Citra-dīpa maintains, following the Māṇḍukiya-Upanisad, that original pure Brahman assumes two main forms, the microcosmic and the macrocosmic. Each of the two is again of three forms: the former being Viśva, Taijas and Prājña, and the latter being Virat, Hiranyagarbha (also called Śutrātmā), and Īśvara. The three forms of each correspond to the three states, wakefulness, dream and deep sleep. This is a development of the doctrine of Vivaraṇa. In Drg-dṛṣṭya-viveka, three kinds of jīva are distinguished. They are kūṭastha-jīva, vyāvahārika-jīva and prātibhāṣika-jīva. Kūṭastha is treated by many as the Sākṣin (witness), which is distinct from jīva; but
here they are identified. The author takes the example of the ocean, the wave and the bubble on the wave to explain the three. Kūṭāstha is the paramārtha-jīva or the true jīva and is the result of limitations (avacchēda). The other two are reflections. Buddhi or intellect is produced in Kūṭāstha, and the vyāvahārika-jīva is the reflection of pure consciousness in that buddhi. The prāthībhāsika-jīva is a reflection of this reflection in the body, etc., of dreams.

Kūṭāstha literally means what exists on the kūṭa or summit. The summit here is cit or consciousness standing above jīva, who enjoys the pains and pleasures of the world. It is therefore a pure witness (sākṣin). According to Kūṭāstha-dīpa, it is the pure witness of the gross and subtle bodies of jīva. Nāṭaka-dīpa says that, like a lamp in a theatre, it illumines both jīva and Īśvara. That is, it is different from both. Tattva-pradīpikā also holds the same view and says that pure Brahman itself, as different from both jīva and Īśvara, is the sākṣin with regard to jīva (jīvābhedena). Īśvara possesses creative powers and jīva is affected and polluted by his experiences; but Sākṣin possesses neither of the qualities and yet is a pure witness of jīva’s experiences but not of Īśvara’s doings. But according to Kaumudī, though Sākṣin is inner to jīva (jīvantaraṅga), it is a form, devoid of causal efficacy, of Īśvara himself and is called Prājña. Sākṣin is internal to jīva, because it illumines the latter’s avidyā. The same view is upheld by Tattva-suddhi in a different way. Just as in the illusory cognition, “This is silver,” the “This,” though belonging to the shell, appears as belonging to the illusory silver, Śākṣin also, though belonging to Īśvara, appears as belonging to jīva. But there are some who think that Sākṣin is jīva himself, and not a form of Īśvara; for jīva itself can be the pure witness of its own experiences. But some others, though identifying jīva and Sākṣin say that jīva limited by antah-karaṇa (mind), and not by avidyā, is Sākṣin. These do not accept that avidyās can be many and so different for the different jīvas, but say that antah-karaṇas can be many.

If the infinite becomes the finite when the limiting principle is added to it, and if the infinite is one and the limiting principle is one, can we have a plurality of finites? Whether jīva is one or many is another important question raised by the Advaitins among themselves. Some say that it is one, its body also is one, the reality of the other jīvas is like that of plurality in dreams, and their creation and liberation also is as real as dreams. But some others say that there is one supreme jīva, Hīranyagarbha, who is a reflection of the Supreme Brahman; the others are reflections of Hīranyagarbha. But some do not accept this view, but contend that the one jīva, like a yogin, creates several bodies and becomes many. But most of the Advaitins believe that the jīvas are many, as otherwise the liberation of one jīva would result in the liberation of the rest. The plurality of jīvas is based upon either the plurality of antah-karaṇas (minds) or the plurality of avidyās.
Another important topic is the nature of adhyāsa or superimposition. Śaṅkara defined adhyāsa as the appearance in another place of what was once seen and remembered (smṛti-rūpaḥ paraśa pūrva-dṛṣṭāvabhāsāḥ). But later Advaitins modified this definition to suit the logical requirements of their system and omitted from the definition the reference to the past object and the memory of it. Their definition is: “Illusion is the appearance of one thing in another.” Otherwise, as the thing seen and remembered is real, they would be contradicting their position that it is not real and would be accepting the doctrine of anyathā-khyāti (that the object of illusion is one real thing seen as another real thing), and giving up their doctrine of a-nirvacaniya-khyāti (that the object of illusion is not explicable as real or unreal). Now, Śaṅkara said that in illusion, whether individual or cosmic, there is a blending of truth and falsity (satyāntre mithunikṛtya).

How are they blended in the perception of the rope as a snake? The form of the perception is, “This is a snake.” Some say that illusion or falsity applies only to the predicate portion only, namely, snake, but not to the part which is the subject, namely, “this.” The “this” is true and the snake is false. The this remains common to this perception and to the latter true perception “This is a rope.” Without a common this, the latter judgment cannot negate the former. Accordingly, this School thinks that in the first perception avidyā is removed only with regard to the this, but not with regard to the rope; and the latter bit of avidyā becomes the material cause of the serpent. But some say that in no judgment can the subject and predicate be separated, and in the illusory cognition also the this and the serpent are not cognized separately. So the avidyā belonging to the this itself must be the material cause of the snake. Though in this illusion the avaraṇa-sakti of avidyā, veiling the this, is removed, its viśeṣa-sakti still remains and projects the form of the serpent. But according to Nṛśimhābhaṭṭa, all this discussion is pointless, because the this and the serpent of illusion form one unitary psychosis, which admits of no divisions. He says that the contact of a defective sense organ with the object starts an agitation in avidyā, which assumes the form of the serpent. But the defect of this view is that, as it admits no common factor between the two judgments, the false and the true, the latter cannot negate the former. For unless both the predicates, the serpent and the rope, refer to the same subject, there would be no opposition between them. Some again say that, though there is only one psychosis, the psychosis of the this, it first manifests the snake; and when later it manifests the rope, it keeps the snake as a latent impression. Some others say that the “this” is one psychosis and “This is a serpent” another psychosis. Naturally, “This is a rope” will be a third. To all three the this is common.

It is impossible in this short chapter to present all the important problems which the Advaitins raised for discussion among themselves, not to speak of the derivative problems created further. But a brief
account may be given of the problems of dream and liberation. Dream plays a far more important role in Indian philosophical discussions than in the Western. The Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad says that dream is one of three states through which the ātman passes, the two others being waking and deep sleep. The world of dreams like the object of illusion possesses only prātibhāsika (apparent) reality. Now, if dream is prātibhāsika, what is its locus (ādhāra)? Some say that it is the consciousness of Brahman on which the world of dreams is superimposed. For ajñāna (avidyā) is the darkness (tamas) of deep sleep, which is the root cause of dream and waking states. And as ajñāna is superimposed upon pure Brahman, dream and waking states also may be so treated. But some others say that dream is superimposed upon waking consciousness, because the reality of the objects of dream is negated by the objects of waking state. But others say that it is not the original ajñāna (mūlajñāna) that is the material cause of dreams but deep sleep, which is one of its states (avasthā-bhedā). Now, how can the objects of dream be perceived, as the senses are inoperative then? True, say some, it is not the senses that illumine the objects, but the individual himself (cp. svayaṁ-jyotiś). So the feeling that we hear, etc., is only an illusion.

The two main differences of view regarding liberation are sarva-muktivāda, or the theory that all souls are liberated simultaneously, and pratyekamuktivāda, or the theory that each soul is liberated separately. Vācaspati and some of his followers and Appayya adopt the former view, but the others, who form the majority, accept the latter. The primary question raised is: Does jīva after liberation become one with Iśvara or with Brahman? According to the author of Muktāvalī, for whom māyā is one and jīva also is one, the moment māyā is destroyed in liberation, jīva becomes one with Brahman. Even among those who maintain the plurality of jīvas, those who treat both jīva and Iśvara as reflections say that when avidyā is dispelled, jīva becomes identified with the prototype (bimba), which must be, according to them, the pure Brahman. But according to those who think that jīva is a reflection and Iśvara only a prototype of that reflection and not himself a reflection, liberation results in the identity of that jīva and Iśvara; and Iśvara becomes the pure Brahman only when all jīvas are liberated; for so long as a single avidyā and its jīva last, Iśvara does not cease to be a prototype of His reflection in it. Though Vācaspati does not accept the reflection theory, he derives the same conclusion from his limitation theory. He accepts the plurality of jīvas; and so long as a single avidyā lasts, as Iśvara is the object of that avidyā (avidyā-visaya), he cannot cease to be and the jīva liberated is only absorbed into Iśvara.

A connected problem is the nature of the liquidation of avidyā. The author of Brahma-siddhi says that the negation (destruction) of avidyā is identical with Brahman. According to Vimuktātman, its nature is
of a fifth kind, different from the usual four forms, namely, reality, unreality, both reality and unreality, and mithyā. The reason for holding this view is that, if the negation of avidyā is identical with Brahman; as the latter is eternal, the former also would be eternal and the necessity of destroying avidyā would not arise. This negation again cannot be a-nirvacaniya or māyā: for māyā is removable by knowledge, but there is no knowledge which destroys the negation of avidyā. But Advaita-vidyācārya says that the destruction of avidyā is a-nirvacaniya like avidyā itself; for birth and destruction belong alike to the same level of reality.

Dialectical Attack and Defence.—The many differences of view presented above show that the Advaitins utilize the ideas of māyā and mithyā (illusion) as descriptive logical concepts, but not as evaluatory. Yet Śaṅkara’s repeated assertion that the world was not real made his perplexed critics assail him from several angles. Some thought that his philosophy was pure subjectivism, some that he regarded the world as imaginary, and some that his thesis was only negativism. Further, as the Advaitins tried to raise the whole logical superstructure of their system on-their doctrine of illusion every rival School made it a point to criticize it and offer another doctrine consistent with its own system. Further, as Brahman, the absolute Truth, is self-revealing and is essentially knowledge, the Advaitins wanted to maintain consistently throughout their epistemological discussions that truth, whether relative or absolute, should be self-revealing. But this doctrine entails the view that knowledge and existence are identical or that existence must be self-conscious. This view, in its truth, implies that knowledge or consciousness (jñāna) is not merely an attribute (dharma) but subject (dharmin). But some Schools like Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, which were not prepared to accept this implication, were obliged to attack the self-revealing nature of truth. These attacks, defence and counter-attacks produced a huge amount of controversial literature. In these controversies the Advaitins were forced to define and clarify their concepts with reference to those of the rival Schools, and subject the concepts of the latter to critical examination.

The central concept of the Advaita, against which the most concerted attack was directed by the rival Schools, is that of māyā. Rāmānuja criticized the concept of ajñāna (avidyā), from the standpoint of epistemology, very severely. Ajñāna is absence of jñāna (knowledge); and how can mere absence of knowledge, which is a negative entity, be the cause of the world? But the Advaitins contend that ajñāna is not a mere negative concept but a positive one. We have experience of it in deep sleep when we know nothing. The form of its experience is “I was not aware of anything in deep sleep.” It is not negative for the reason that negation is always the negation of something specific. The Advaitins do not accept the negation of an unreal thing as having a meaning. Negation, in general
the counterpart (*pratīyogin*) of the object negated, of which nothing is definite is also not acceptable to them. Further, to say "I was not conscious," a man must be conscious that he was not conscious. So it is not true that we had no consciousness at all in deep sleep. Hence, what we were conscious of, namely, our unconsciousness, must be a definite object of our consciousness. Aṇāna, therefore, must be a positive entity (*bhāva-padārtha*).

If the world is a positive entity, why did Śaṅkara call it mithyā (illusion)? Vyāsatīrtha, the follower of Madhva, subjected this concept to a minute critical analysis in his *Nyāyāmrta* in order to expose its untenability. Madhusūdana wrote his *Advaita-siddhi* to meet those criticisms, and clarified the concept further. But a few points of this controversy may be noted. Vyāsatīrtha advances the dilemma that if the illusoriness (*mithyāvā*) of the world is illusory the world would be real, and if it is not illusory then also there would be something real besides Brahman; and both alternatives vitiate the *a-dvaita* (non-dualism) of Brahman. To this the Advaitin’s answer is that, though the first alternative is accepted, the world would not become real; for both the illusoriness of the world and illusoriness of that illusoriness belong to the same illusory level, since both are other than Brahman, the absolute Reality. Similar is the answer to Vyāsatīrtha’s objection to the definition of māyā as *a-nirvacaniya*, as that which is not explicable as either real, or unreal, or both; or neither. That objection is that if a thing is not real, it must be unreal; and if it is not unreal, it must be real; and nothing can be neither both nor neither. The answer is that what is not real need not necessarily be unreal; the illusory is neither but a third something. The real is that which is never contradicted like the Absolute; the unreal is the imaginary which is never experienced as an object like the horns of a hare; but the illusory is contradicted and so not real, but it is perceived as positively existing and is therefore not unreal. Hence it is neither real nor unreal. The implication is that absolute reality and absolute unreality are not contraries, nor contradictories, and do not exclude a third alternative, the illusory.

Accordingly, Madhusūdana gives five alternative definitions of mithyā. The idea logically basic to all is: mithyā is that which is negated just in the locus where it is experienced. As it is experience it is not absolutely unreal (like the son of a barren mother), and as it is negated it is not absolutely real (like Brahman).

But is not illusion the perception of one thing as another? If it is, as both the object in front and the object for which it is mistaken are real, the illusory object must be treated as real; and not as neither real nor unreal. The *a-khyāti* and *anyathā-khyāti* theories uphold the reality of the object of illusion. The former was held by a group of Mīmāṁsakas led by Prabhakara. The latter belongs to the Nyāya. The Advaita theory
is called the \textit{a-nirvacanīya-khyāti-vāda}. There are other theories of illusion which are variations of these three. According to the \textit{a-khyāti} (non-cognition) doctrine, illusion is just the non-cognition of the difference between the object in front and the object for which it is mistaken. But the latter object is a real one remembered. For the doctrine of \textit{anyathā-khyāti} (perception of one object as another), illusion is the perception of the object in front as something else perceived some time ago and remembered, the latter object being real. But the Advaitins argue that non-cognition is a mere privation, which could not have caused fear, etc., produced by the illusory snake. Further, we have no experience of remembering in illusion. They reject the second view on the same ground; for the glittering yellow object mistaken for gold, if gold were only remembered, would not have moved us to the action of picking it up. That is, the object of illusion is not an object of memory but of perception, and illusion is a form of perception but not of memory. So the illusory object is not real. Nor is it an object of mere imagination; for an object of imagination also is not an object of perception. Hence the illusory object is neither real nor unreal, but \textit{a-nirvacanīya} (inexplicable as either real or unreal).

An epistemological doctrine related to the above one is the doctrine of the self-revelatory (\textit{sva-prakāsa}) character of knowledge or truth. How is the truth of any perception known? In illusion, the judgment, for example, "It is a snake" is negated by the later judgment, "It is a rope." The falsity of the first judgment is made known by the second. So falsity, the Advaitins say is not self-revelatory but revealed by some other mental state (\textit{paratah a-prāmānya}). But how is the truth of "It is a rope" made known? Is it by itself or by another judgment? The Advaitins adopt the first alternative and say that truth is self-revelatory (\textit{svatah-prāmānya}). From this result follows another: every judgment is true by itself, but is made false by another. But the Naiyāyikas say that both truth and falsity are other-revelatory and made so by something else. According to them, perception is made true or false by some virtue (\textit{guna}) or defect (\textit{doṣa}) in the processes of sense-organs. Here they seem to be confusing between two questions, the logical and the epistemological on the one side and the physiological and the psychological on the other. However, the Naiyāyika position reduces itself to this, that perception or judgment is neither true nor false by itself but is made so by something else. According to the Sāmkhya, a cognition is by itself true or false. But the Buddhist Vijnāna-vādins maintain that it is by itself false but is made true by something else like workability (\textit{artha-kriyā-kārīta}). But none of these views is acceptable to the Advaitin. Nor does it accept the criterion of workability as criterion of the truth of a cognition or the reality of an object; for workability can give only workable truth or reality, but not unconditional and unconditioned truth. Even a false cognition does work sometimes.
If the phenomenal world is a-nirvacanīya (inexplicable), then naturally all the definitions given by the Naiyāyikas in order to explain the determinate things of the world must inherently be inexplicable. The Naiyāyikas think that everything known has a determinate nature and reality of its own; but the Advaitins say that Brahman alone is real and that is beyond determinations, and determinate things have no definite nature of their own; in short, determinations are mithyā, a-nirvacanīya. The Naiyāyikas reply that they are nirvacanīya, definable. They therefore give what they think unassailable definitions. Udayana's Lakṣānāvalī is the most famous work of the kind. Śrīharṣa criticizes all the definitions by exposing the inherent contradictions in each. In his criticisms of causality, substance, relation, quality, etc. etc., he anticipates almost everything that Bradley says in his criticism of the concepts in his Appearance and Reality. But in his turn, Śrīharṣa was anticipated by Nāgārjuna, the great Buddhist dialectician, in his Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā; and the arguments of both are practically the same. Śrīharṣa, like Nāgārjuna, has no determinate view of his own, which the opponent can criticize in the same vein. Both show how every determination is neither real nor unreal, nor both, nor neither. Śrīharṣa says that, for that reason, the indeterminate consciousness behind the determinations is alone real; but Nāgārjuna draws the conclusion that emptiness of determination (śūnyatā) is the reality.

Influence of Advaita on other Ancient Schools.—Śaṅkara brought to the forefront, in a logical and systematic way, the monistic utterances of the Upaniṣads and treated them as primary. Because of the great name and prestige he gained by vanquishing the Buddhists, his philosophical ideas influenced considerably the Śaiva, the Śākta and the Vaiṣṇava sectarian systems; some form of Advaita, they thought, was the conclusion of both logic and Scripture. In Kāśmīra, Vasugupta revived Śaivaism by introducing Advaitic thought into it, and the result was the Śaiva Advaita. He identified the Brahman of the Upaniṣads with the Śiva of the Śaiva Āgamas, and preached the essential identity of Śiva and the individual (jīva). But he was not prepared to accept that māyā was not real. Māyā is a form of sakti (power, energy) of Brahman and is not different from it. The world process is a parināma (transformation) of this sakti. We have already referred to the view of a group of orthodox Advaitins, for whom the world is a parināma of māyā and a vivartta of Brahman. The Kāśmīra Śaivaism would have no objection to this view except that it would not accept that māyā is not real. And even Śaṅkara calls māyā by the name māyā-sakti. Further, psychologically Vasugupta bases his philosophy, like Gauḍapāda, on the three states—waking, dream and deep sleep—of the ātman. But while for Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara the fourth stage is the pure ātman itself, for Vasugupta the fourth stage is still impure and is of the nature of empty space (ākāśa); pure Śiva, identical with the ātman, is the fifth stage.
The philosophy of the Śākta Agamas is the same as that of Kāśmīra Śaivism. The two differ only in some forms of religious practice.

Among the Vaiṣṇavas, Vallabhācārya is the best-known Advaitin. He wanted to excel even Śaṅkara in his emphasis on non-dualism by advocating it without the help of the concept of māyā. He therefore calls his philosophy pure non-dualism (suddhādvaita). But he does not treat the ījnas (individuals) as unreal but as parts (ān&s) of Brahman, just as sparks issuing from fire are its parts.

Suka wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sūtra from the Advaita point of view, but calls himself a bhāgavata (Vaiṣṇava).

Mention has already been made of Appyaya Dīkṣita's commentary on Nilakaṇṭha's commentary on the Brahma-sūtra. But Appyaya failed because Nilakaṇṭha was an avowed Viśiṣṭādvaitin of the Śaiva sect as Rāmānuja was of the Vaiṣṇava sect.

It should be mentioned that the Advaita influenced Sikhism also. The Udāsīna order of the Sikh monks adopt wholesale and without any modification the Advaita philosophy of Śaṅkara. It is one of their duties to study Śaṅkara's commentaries on the Upaniṣads the Brahma-sūtra, and the Bhagavad-Gītā.

**CONTEMPORARY ADVAITINS**

Of all the Indian religious orders, the one founded by Śaṅkara enjoys the greatest prestige and is called the Smārta order. And the traditional method of teaching his philosophy in the most orthodox form is maintained still. The great savants belonging to these orders are not much known to Western philosophers. Those who are well known to the West are greatly influenced by Western philosophy also. Professor Radhakrishnan, Śri Aurobindo Ghosh, Rabindranath Tagore, Dr. Bhagavan Das, and J. Krishnamurti are all monists in some form or other. Both Radhakrishnan and Dr. Bhagavan Das treat the world as a combination of both being and non-being, for which of course there is some support in Śaṅkara’s teaching (cp. satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya). But Śri Aurobindo Ghosh and Tagore treat the world as being and real. The position of Aurobindo is more allied to Śāktism and Kāśmīra Śaivism, and that of Tagore to Vaiṣṇava monism. The latter’s Absolute is a Person. Those who do not admit that māyā is not real will naturally be led to a view like Tagore’s. He does not say that the supreme Brahman of Śaṅkara cannot be true, but that for us the world of appearance is more significant. Krishnamurti thinks that the central principle of the universe is Life, which is similar to Bergson’s élan vital in import. The philosophical background of even Gandhi’s ideas is monistic. Of these thinkers, Radhakrishnan is more avowedly a follower of Śaṅkara than any other. Tagore is greatly influenced by the ideas of Vaiṣṇavism and the cult of love. Dr. Bhagavan Das says that the nature
of the Absolute is not merely "I" (aḥam) but "I-That-Not" (aḥam-etan-na), which includes the subject, the object and the negative relation between the two.

Among the academical philosophers, the practice of approaching the Advaita from the point of view of Western idealism has gained strength. Instead of expounding or interpreting Śaṅkara, they develop a line of thinking found in Western thought and reach the Advaita conclusions. Professor K. C. Bhattacharya is the most well known of this group of thinkers. He starts from Kant’s agnosticism regarding the Supreme Ideal of Reason and shows in what sense one can be conscious of Brahma. Obviously, consciousness here cannot be ordinary cognition, but what Radhakrishnan calls integral intuition.

NOTES

1. See the author's "An Unnoticed Aspect of Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkyakārikās."
2. See Siddhānta-lesa-saṅgraha, p. 57 f. (Haridas Gupta and Sons, Benares).
3. ibid.
4. Sarva-darbha-saṅgraha, p. 144 (Anandasrama ed.).

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CHAPTER XIV

VEDĀNTA—THE VAIŚṆAVA (THEISTIC) SCHOOLS

A. RĀMĀNUJA (VIŚIŚṬĀDVAINA)

INTRODUCTION

The Vedānta is the living philosophy of India today and its popularity is due to its being a view and a way of life at the same time. It is a speculative enquiry into the nature of Brahman as the highest reality as well as the way of spiritual realization of Brahman as the supreme goal of life. Of the three dominant systems of the Vedānta, Advaita, Dvaita and Viśiśṭādvaita, the Advaita is so well known that the Vedānta is sometimes identified with it, and the Dvaita is regarded as the best philosophic exposition of theism, in spite of its dogmatic and realistic tendencies. It is the merit of the Viśiśṭādvaita of Rāmānuja as a synthetic philosophy of love that it seeks to reconcile the extremes of monism and theism and, like all mediating systems, it is misunderstood by its followers as well as by its critics. It is called Śrī-Vaiśnavism in its religious aspect. Among the leading modern exponents of its philosophy there are many who call it qualified non-dualism or attributive or adjectival monism, by forgetting its essential tenet that jīva is a substance as well as an attribute.

The Dvaita insists on the eternal distinction and difference between jīva and Brahman; Bhedabheda expounds the dual and non-dual relation between the two. Pantheism says that all is God or God is all. But the Viśiśṭādvaita is different from all these systems as it states that God is immanent in all beings as their inner self and at the same time transcendent. Reality and value are one and Brahman is so called because it is infinite by nature and at the same time it can infinitize or Brahmanize the content of the finite self without destroying it. The name Viśiśṭādvaita can, however, be retained on account of its traditional associations and the rich meaning it has acquired in the historic developments.

The Viśiśṭādvaita is essentially a philosophy of religion in which reason and faith coincide and become reasoned faith. Its problem is "What is that by knowing which everything is known?" and the answer is "It is Brahman." Reality is knowable or realizable and not unknowable. The classical exposition of this method is contained in the Taittirīya-Upaniṣad in the dialogue between Varuṇa and his son Bṛğu. The
teacher elicits from the disciple that Brahman is annamaya, prānāmaya, manomaya, viññānamaya and ānandamaya, and the disciple by a process of spiritual induction seeks to verify them successively.

The history of the Viśiṣṭādvaita, like that of other Schools of the Vedānta, claims the authority of immemorial tradition. It is based on the triple authority of the Upaniṣadic seers or gītis, the Vedānta-sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa who systematized their intuitions and the Gītā containing the quintessence of the Upaniṣads. Rāmānuja, the first historic exponent of the Viśiṣṭādvaita, says in his Vedārthasaṅgraha and Śrī-bhāṣya, the commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra, that his system is founded on a work of an ancient teacher, called Bodhāyana-vṛtti and the prior teachings of Dāriḍa, Taṅka and Guhadeva; it is also traceable to the teachings of Nammāḷvār, the super-mystic of Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism. It was Nāthamuni (born in South Arcot in A.D. 824) who belonged to the Bhāgavata tradition from the North, that elevated the Ālāsrs’ divine songs in Tamil to the level of the Vedānta in the well-known scheme of Ubbaya-Vedānta, which insists on the language of the heart as the true spiritual language, and not merely the spoken word. The next important teacher of Viśiṣṭādvaita was Ālavandār, the grandson of Nāthamuni, who established the Vedantic value of the Pāñcarātra. Then came Rāmānuja (born in A.D. 1017), the Vedāntic successor of Ālavandār and the greatest exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Śaṅkara reinterpreted Buddhistic nirvāṇa and thus proved the truth of the Advaita. Bhāskara, who came next, refuted Śaṅkara’s māyā theory by his theory of upādhis and bhedabheda and Yādava, his successor, made bhedabheda more realistic, and it was left to Rāmānuja to give a new turn to philosophy by his synthetic philosophy of love. Soon after his time, conflicts arose in the interpretation of Ubbaya-Vedānta, the nature of God-head as Lord and Śrī and the meaning of bhakti and prapatti. While Vedānta-Deśika on the whole tried to balance the two sides, Pīḷḷailokācārya laid stress on the Tamil Vedānta, the monotheistic idea of one God, the efficacy of grace and the social side of the service of God (kaiṅkarya).

The method of exposition followed in this brief article is the classical way of developing Viśiṣṭādvaita under the headings of reality (tattva), good (hiita) and end of human life (purusārtha), as revealed in the Upaniṣad, “He who knows Brahman attains the highest.” It deals with the knowledge of reality (or tattva) as Brahman, a-cit and cit, the means of attaining Brahman (or hiita), and the nature of attainment (or purusārtha). It is an improvement on the Kantian way of stating the problem, namely, “What can I know? What ought I to do? and what may I hope for?” as it avoids scepticism and harmonizes metaphysics, morals and religion. Metaphysics includes epistemology and the study of the pramāṇas and ontology or the study of the three tattvas. Viśiṣṭādvaitic morals deal with the Saññhānas or the ways of knowing Brahman and its religion expounds the nature of mukti.

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THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

That reality is knowable is the key thought of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic theory of knowledge; and knowledge as ċaṅsana in the widest sense includes what is perceived through the senses, what is inferred by anumāṇa and what is intuited spiritually as Brahma-jñāna. If there is an unbridged gulf between being and knowing, then the theory of knowledge is the theory of no knowledge and scepticism becomes inevitable. This tendency is clearly discernible in the Kantian opposition between the noumenal and phenomenal Reality, the Bradleyan contrast between Reality and appearance and Śaṅkara’s distinction between the transcendental (or pāramārtika-satya) and the empirical (or vyavahārika-satya). Rāmānuja avoids this impasse by accepting the trustworthiness of knowledge in all its three levels ascending from sense perception, science and philosophy, to the integral and immediate experience of Brahman. The logical apprehension of Brahman (or Brahma-jijnāsa) as the supremely real leads to the intuitive realization of Brahman (or Brahmānubhava). Knowledge is the affirmation of reality and even negation presupposes affirmation. If Brahman is real, the world rooted in Brahman is also real and we can go from the partial to the perfect. Truth is an immanent criterion of knowledge. Truth is true and it attains the more of itself, till it is fully realized as Truth or the eternal value of Reality. To realize this end, Rāmānuja utilizes all the ways of knowing Brahman and employs the principle of dharma-bhūta-jñāna, the logical rule of a-prthak-siddha-viśeṣana, the grammatical rule of sāmānādhikaranya and the realistic view of sat-kārya-vāda.

The theory of dharma-bhūta-jñāna or attributive consciousness of the self furnishes the raison d’être of Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology as it throws light on the nature of the external world, the ātman and Brahman. Consciousness presupposes the self of which it is an essential attribute and it cannot be conscious of itself. The self and its consciousness are distinguishable but not divisible. Self-consciousness implies the self that is conscious and consciousness of the self and the distinction between substantive intelligence and attributive intelligence, like light and its luminosity.

Jñāna is attribute-substance like sunlight which is a quality and at the same time the substratum of colours. In the empirical state, jñāna is obscured by avidyā and contracted by karman; it reveals external objects and it is the source of all the mental states dealt with by psychology, normal, abnormal and metapsychical, from the stage of instinct to that of supranormal consciousness. The three states of jñāna, namely, the waking consciousness, dreams and sound sleep, are psychologically the variations of the same jñāna and are therefore continuous and not self-
contradictory. When jñāna is freed from avidyā-karmaṇ, it expands into infinity and becomes the integral consciousness of God (Brahmānubhava).

The theory of judgment may now be developed in the light of jñāna. The ātman is ever self-luminous and it is its jñāna conditioned by karmaṇ that reveals the external world either as objects or as a whole. Judgment is thus due to the judging activity of the self-conscious ātman and not to the passive reception of impressions from the visible and tangible world. All knowledge is sa-vikalpaka or determinate and not nir-vikalpaka or indeterminate perception without difference. Rāmānuja’s view that the external object is for consciousness and not in consciousness and that jñāna illumines or reveals objects, avoids the impasse caused by extreme realism and idealism and has the merit of simplicity. Realism is justified, when it refers to the object as given and not as constructed by thought, and idealism is true in so far as it accepts the a priori nature of consciousness and denies the utter externality of the object. Knowledge arises from the subject-object relation of the self (cit) and the not-self (a-cit), and the ultimate subject of every judgment is the whole of reality. It is Paramātman who shines in all thinkers and things and is yet beyond them.

The theory of a-prthak-siddha-viśeṣana the adjectival theory of the Absolute, brings out the meaning of judgment in its logical and ontological aspects. In the proposition, “man is rational,” the predicate is the inseparable or essential quality of the subject which is more than mere connection of content. The quality subsists in the substance and shares in its substantiality though it is different from it. The self as the knower is an eternal thinking subject and it has intelligence as its inseparable quality (prakāra). Logic is rooted in ontology and the ultimate subject of every proposition is the whole of reality. The logical subject is the knowing self (cit) with consciousness (caitanya) as its quality and the ontological subject is Brahman as the self of the self or the ultimate substance (prakārin). Just as knowledge (jñāna) is substance-attribute, so the self (cit) is itself a substance and also a quality of Brahman as an adjective of the absolute. As the logical ego, the self is a mode (or prakāra) of Brahman, but as an ethical ego it is a monad having its own intrinsic nature. It is at once an organ of the absolute and an organism.

The same truth is brought out by the grammatical rule of sāmānā-dhikaranyā or co-ordination and the Mīmāṃsā rule of connotation. According to the former, words in a sentence having different meanings can denote only one thing as in the example, “This is Devadatta.” It refers to co-ordination and personal identity and not to abstract identity. According to Mīmāṃsā, words connoting genus and quality (jāti and guṇa) also connote individual and substance (vyakti and guṇin) respectively, as in the example “This is a cow,” and in the Upaniṣadic text “Thou art that.” A substance may become the body or quality of another substance.
and a word connoting the body (śarīra) may connote the self, its possessor (śarīrin) also. In the last example, the term “thou” which connotes jīva (as šarīra) connotes also Brahman (the śarīrin). Thus, in the highest Vedāntic sense all terms connoting a thing or a person or a god connote also Brahman as the source, support and ultimate self of all.

THE THEORY OF TRUTH

The Viśiṣṭādvaita theory of Truth holds that what exists (sat) is alone cognized and that there is no bare negation. The Absolute is not Brahman versus māyā but is all Brahman (Brahmamaya), and since Brahman is real, the world rooted in it is also real. Reality and value are one and the more real a thing is the more true it is. The not-self (a-cit) is ever-changing and it is called unstable (a-sat). The self (cit or ātman) is eternal though its consciousness contracts and expands according to its kārman and it is called stable or real (satya). But Brahman is eternal, pure and perfect and is the supreme reality (satyasya satyam). Truth is true and becomes the more of itself till it expands into Truth which is Brahman itself as the only reality which sustains all things as the being of their being.

Viśiṣṭādvaita utilizes every theory of truth, pragmatic, realistic and idealistic, in so far as it satisfies its main thesis. Truth is ordinarily defined as the knowledge of a thing as it is and as what satisfies the practical interests of life. If the object as it is does not correspond to sense-perception and the thinghood of things in their structural unity in a realistic way it is rejected as false, as in the case of the shell mistaken for silver. The pragmatic test is useful in cases like the mirage which is false owing to its failure to serve the practical purpose of satisfying thirst. Dreams are real psychic occurrences caused by the moral law of kārman. When jñāna is purified, it can intuit Brahman and thus become perfect. But in the empirical state, knowledge is fragmentary as is evidenced in the three ways of knowing, namely, perception, inference and Scripture (pratyakṣa, anumāṇa and Śāstra) which are ascending stages and not stopping-places. The knowledge given in sense-perception is partial and is trustworthy as far as it goes. Inference establishes the integrity of the causal relation, and it identifies the cause with the because and finally with the ground of knowledge philosophically, and it relies on the evidence of reason though particular reasonings may not come up to the mark. Śāstra, as a body of spiritual truths verified and verifiable by the seekers after truth, furnishes the ultimate basis for valid knowledge. In all these cases truth is a progress to the more of itself and is not based on non-contradiction and sublation. Ignorance of nescience (avidyā) is not an innate obscuration of Brahman, but it is kārman. It is an imperfection of the finite self (jīva) and when one seeks to overcome it one becomes a seeker after Brahman (mumukṣu).
ONTOMETRY

The central truth of Viśiṣṭādvaita ontology or theory of being is the identity between the Absolute of metaphysics and the God of religion. It discards the distinction drawn between nir-guna Brahman which transcends the duality of relational thought and sa-guna Brahman or the personal God of theism as the highest conceptual reading of the Absolute by the popular mind. The Bhedābheda (dualism—non-dualism) Schools of Bhāskara and Yādava bring out the self-contradictions between the two standpoints by appeal to revelation, reason and sense-perception and reject the theory of nir-guna Brahman as pure abstraction in which being and non-being are one. Scripture would stultify itself if it first affirms the existence of sa-guna Brahman and then denies it later on. The theory is the denial of the reality of moral and religious consciousness. Negation denies only the finitude of reality and not the finite itself. The Absolute is in the conditioned but is not the conditioned, and if the world of space and time given in sense-perception is illusory and non-existent, the inevitable result would be acosmism and nihilism. Rāmānuja accepts Bhāskara’s refutation of the dualistic theory but repudiates his theory of limiting adjuncts (upādhis) of Brahman as a vicious view which attributes imperfection to God. The absolutisms of the West, like those of Plotinus, Spinoza and Hegel, are more allied to Bhedābheda than to Viśiṣṭādvaita. Plotinus’s view of the emanation of the many from the one, Spinoza’s philosophy of substance and modes and the Hegelian view of the fusion of opposites are all Western versions of Bhāskara’s view of upādhis, and even the adjectival theory of Bosanquet suffers from the defect of predicating imperfection to the Absolute. No School of the Vedānta is pantheistic if pantheism identifies Brahman with the universe without preserving its transcendence. In the history of the Vedānta from the age of Śaṅkara to that of Rāmānuja there is a transition, chronological as well as ontological, from the views of illusory adjuncts (mithyopādhis) of Śaṅkara to the real limiting adjuncts (satyopādhis) of Bhāskara, from the transformation theory (parināma-vāda) of Yādava and the dualism-non-dualism (dvaitādvaita-vāda) of Niṁbārka to the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja which makes the finite self responsible for the errors and evils of life. There is, however, not much difference between Śaṅkara, the practical Advaitin who adores Vāsudeva or the All-Self, and Rāmānuja or Plotinus. Plotinus comes nearest to Rāmānuja amongst the philosophers of the West specializing in mystic ecstasy.

Rāmānuja conceives Brahman as the absolute. Brahman is the whole of Reality and the home of the eternal attributes or values of Truth, goodness, beauty and bliss. Brahman is perfect as the secondless and stainless Reality (sat) and has all perfections (satyam, jñānam, apahata-
pāpamattvam, sundaram and ānandam) and thus satisfies the highest spiritual demands of metaphysics, morals, aesthetics and mysticism.

The word "satyam" connotes Brahman as real Reality, the true of the true to distinguish it from the migrating jīva and the perishing prakṛti. It is being which is the ground of becoming, the one which explains the many and the eternal in the temporal and is not bare being, identity or timelessness. Brahman is and has consciousness as the light of lights (jyotisām jyotis); it is self-related but not contentless pure consciousness arrived at by the negative method. It is the infinite with the quality of infinity (anantam). Brahman is called Sarīrin. It is a symbolic name which signifies Brahman as container, controller and goal (ādhāra, niyantṛ and īśeṣīṇa), a unity in trinity. Brahman is the source of all beings, cit and a-cit, and their inner controller, and they exist for its satisfaction. The Antaryāmi-vidyā in the Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad furnishes the chief text for this truth: "He who dwells in jīva, with jīva, who, it does not know, whose body jīva is, and which He rules from within, He is the self, the Inner Ruler, Immortal. He is unknown. Yet He knows without the help of the mind and the senses. There is no other knower than He. Everything else is of evil." Brahman is the life of our life, the inner ruler and the means and the goal. It is ādhāra or the being of our being and in it we live, move and have our being. It is the immanent ground of all existents and their inner meaning. This idea brings out the intimacy between God and the self which is so essential for spiritual communion, and it avoids the pantheistic tendency. It accepts the distinction between self and God (ātman and paramātman) but denies their separateness. The idea of Brahman as controller (niyantṛ) stresses divine transcendence and it provides the inspiring motive for ethical religion. It marks the transition from the Vedic imperative of duty as enjoined in Pūrva-Mimāṁsā to the Vedantic idea of the deity as the supreme ruler of the universe or niyantṛ. Brahman as ādhāra is the indwelling self, but Brahman as niyantṛ is the extra-cosmic ruler who is holy and perfect and therefore different from man who is steeped in sensuality and sin. As the moral ruler of the universe, Iṣvara apportions pleasure and pain according to the kārmāṇ of the jīva and there is no caprice nor cruelty in the divine law of righteousness. But the law of retribution is mathematical and legal and offers no scope or hope for redemption. The Viśiṣṭādvaita as ethical religion transforms God (Iṣvara) from a ruler into a world-redeemer (raksaka). The moral law of kārmāṇ is now fulfilled in the religion of mercy (kṛpā or dāyā) and not merely tampered by it. The creative urge in the godhead is impelled by kṛpā and it turns into the dual form of law and love (Nārāyaṇa and Śrī). Overpowered by kindness, Iṣvara incarnates Himself in moments of cosmic crisis, into humanity in order that He may recover the lost self. In this process the transcendental Brahman assumes three other concrete forms of mercy (kṛpā) which are equally real and valuable,
Viz. as Iśvara the infinite or the cosmic self that enjoys the cosmic līlā or play of creation, preservation and destruction; as the Inner Ruler in the hearts of all beings in order that they may directly intuit Him; and also as the temple god for worship. These three, added to the two already mentioned (namely Nārāyaṇa and Śrī) constitute the five forms of the manifestation of Brahman.

The idea of Brahman as goal (ṣeṣin) brings out the nature of God as the end of the world. The self (ciṭ) and nature (a-ciṭ) exist for the satisfaction of the Lord who is at once the way and the goal. Owing to this self-consciousness and moral and spiritual freedom, the self realizes that Paramātmāna is the real actor in the universe, and attunes itself to His redemptive will by shedding its egoity and making a self-gift of itself to God. The true self says, "I live, yet not I, but the God in me." This view solves the dualism between human freedom and divine freedom.

The definition of Brahman as bhuvana-sundara or the supremely beautiful is more essential to mystic communion than the values of truth and goodness. The aesthetic philosophy of the Viśiṣṭādvaita enshrined in the Bhāgavata and the divine songs of the Ālvars brings out the nature of Brahman as Śrī-Kṛṣṇa the enchanter of souls who ravishes them out of their fleshy feeling.

It will thus be seen that the Viśiṣṭādvaita idea of Brahman is different from that of monism, pantheism and theism and is wrongly construed as that of qualified non-dualism, adjectival absolutism of pan-organismal monism. It is a synthetic view of the Vedānta which is not to be confused with eclecticism though it is comprehensive enough to accept whatever is good and true in other systems and sects. It is the meeting-ground of the extremes of monism and pluralism and the doctrines of Ruler and Redeemer. It equates Brahman or Nārāyaṇa of the Upaniṣads with Vāsudeva of the Pāñcarātra, the Iśvara of the Purāṇas, the avatāras of the Itihāsas and the sundara of mysticism.

COSMOLOGY

The cosmology of Viśiṣṭādvaita is based on the integrity of the causal relation in its mechanical, teleological and spiritual aspects of uniformity and moral progression. Brahman is the ground of the cosmic order as its creator, sustainer and destroyer in terms of immanence and transcendence. Creation is not out of nothing, but is only the transformation of the potential into the actual (sat-kārya-vāda). The effect is continuous with the cause temporally and logically and does not contradict it, and by applying this rule to religion the Vedāntin concludes that by knowing Brahman everything is known. The Real (sat) without a second wills to be the many55 and becomes the world of name and form (nāma-rūpa) by its
own inner creative urge. God before creation is without any difference of name and form and the same, after creation, differentiates itself into the infinity of the space-time world and individuals and becomes their Inner Self. The cosmos is a physical and moral order and is sustained by the will of the Lord, When vice predominates over virtue, Iśvara destroys the world and thus prevents evil. The powers of doing evil by jīva are withdrawn for a while by the redemptive will of Iśvara, and punishment (danaḍana) is ultimately the effect of mercy (dayā). Creation and dissolution take place in a cyclic way endlessly and the cosmic purpose of the world process is the liberation of souls.

Causality connotes continuity in spite of change. Nature (prakṛti) is subject to transformation (parināma), that is, change in which the potential becomes the actual and the cause is continuous with the effect. The self is morally free to strive towards perfection but for itself. God has the inner purpose of adapting the process of nature to the spiritual progress of the individual and mould him into His own nature (tanmaya). The evolutionary process of nature here is of the Śāṅkhya pattern which is perfected by the addition of the twenty-sixth category of the Supreme Self or God (Puruṣottama) who enters into the heart of creation as sārīrin or over-soul. It is the divine creative urge that makes prakṛti energize and evolve into mahat, ahaṁkāra, the eleven sense-organs including manas, the five tanmātras and the five bhūtas. Then the process of individuation goes on by Iśvara entering into the jīvas as their Inner Self and bestowing bodies to them equitably, according to their previous kārmaṇ. In this way there is an infinity of individual (jīvas) from the amoeba to gods. Evolution is followed by involution and the process goes on in a uniform rhythmic manner. Ultimately creation is the re-creation or sportive spontaneity of the Lord or līlā in which the idea of parināma and the moral idea of kārmaṇ are reinterpreted by recognizing the reality of prakṛti, puruṣa and Puruṣottama and avoiding the extremes of naturalism, personalism and idealism. Evolution of nature is an occasion for the moral progress of self (puruṣa) and his attaining godliness. As the Vedaṇṭa is directly interested in the spiritual knowledge of Brahman by the self, cosmology as the philosophy of nature is only an indirect aid to such spiritual knowledge.

**PSYCHOLOGY**

The psychology of the self or ātman is described negatively by examining certain faulty definitions and views. The materialist (Cārvāka) view that the ātman is an assemblage of atoms and physical changes, is erroneous as matter does not think and seek mukti. For the same reason, the view of the vitalist that it is life (prāṇa) which is an inner activity or vital impulse that maintains and multiplies itself is untenable. The
sensationalistic or empirical view of the Buddhists that the self is a cluster of sensations or five skandhas made of mind-body is rejected on the ground that it denies the unity and continuity of the enduring self. Manas, the inner sense organ, is itself a mode of prakrti and is not a spiritual entity. The rationalist or idealist who says that “because I think, therefore I am,” ignores the different lapses and levels of consciousness and it is more true to say that “because I am therefore I think.” The sociologist also errs when he makes the self an element of the social organism. The adjectival theory which makes the self an attribute of the absolute ignores its uniqueness. Finally the monistic (Advaita) explanation that the jiva is an illusory reflection of Brahman in avidyā regards it as a mere fiction or phantom without any moral or religious value. Rāmānuja repudiates all these views. The term ātman brings out its eternal self-conscious and free nature more than the Western terms, soul, spirit or self, as they are not free from animistic and spiritualistic associations. It is a tattva or ultimate reality like God (Paramātman), and it is by metapsychical or logical insight and not by mere empirical knowledge that its meaning and value should be discovered. It is self-manifest and is its own proof.

The Gītā, according to the Viśiśṭādvaita, as expounded by Ālavandār, Rāmānuja and Vedānta-Deśika, clearly brings out the nature of the ātman by distinguishing it from prakrti and Paramātman. The ātman is different from the twenty-four categories of prakrti and is eternal, self-luminous and morally free. Owing to the confusions of previous ignorance (avidyā), it mistakes itself for prakrti, is imprisoned in embodiment and migrates from body to body. But by self-renunciation it can realize its own true nature. Then the self is freed from egoity or ahamkāra and knows it has its own intrinsic value. The jiva is monadic and infinitesimal, but its jnāna is infinite and all-pervasive like light and its luminosity, though at present it is limited by its karman. It can contract and expand according to its normal and spiritual development and it thus admits of different degrees of evolution and involution. It is almost inert in the unconscious state of sleep, dim in the sub-conscious state of dreams and clear in the waking state and is confused in the abnormal states of illusion, hallucination and hysteria. These states shade into one another and are continuous, but not self-contradictory like light and darkness. The ethical and religious meaning of dream psychology is ignored by psycho-analysis and subjectivism. The psycho-physical conditions of jnāna in the subtle or sūkṣma-śarīra and their feeling tone are the effect of the moral law of karman. If knowledge is obscured by avidyā, even omniscience is nescience on a cosmic scale and scepticism would be the only result of such panillusionism. Jnāna as self-consciousness is therefore an integral quality of the ātman. It is self-realized and exists in and by itself, but jnāna as attribute (dharma-bhūta-jnāna) exists for the self (dharmin) as its revelatory quality. The two are distinguishable but not separable.
VEDĀNTA—THE VAIṢṆAVA (THEISTIC) SCHOOLS

The relation between ātman and Paramātman in terms of the logical, ethical and aesthetic ego was already referred to in the triple attributes of Brahman as ādhaṁra, niyantṛ, śeṣin and sundara. The logical ego (jñātṛ) is the effect (upādēya) of Brahman the cause (upādāna). It is its a-prthak-siddha-viśeṣaṇa or inseparable quality and aṁśa or mode of Brahman who is thus the source, subject and true infinite (vibhu). As the ethical ego (karty), it stands to Brahman who is pure and holy as His means (śeṣa) or servant (dāsa) or son (putra) and exists as a means to His satisfaction; it subserves the divine end of spiritual perfection. The aesthetic ego (bhokṛty) combines intimacy and holiness as the enjoyer of the beauty and bliss of Brahman and is divinely transfigured. Brahman is thus the soul (śarīrin) of the jīva, its source, sustenance and controller. Though the jīva is the subject of its knowledge (attributive intelligence), it is itself, from a higher standpoint, the attribute (prakāra) of God and is inseparable from Him, the substance (prakārin).

The Bhdābheda explanation of jīva as an emanation of Brahman deprives jīva of its moral and spiritual value. The monist explains away individuality as a figment of avidyā. Rāmānuja’s view reconciles pluralism and monism, moralism and mysticism by insisting on the integrity of jīva as a moral and spiritual entity with its own freedom, but it abolishes separateness and exclusiveness by the idea that it is a spark of the supreme self, and therefore capable of mystic union. It is an organism and also an organ of the absolute. Rāmānuja’s view gives a new orientation to avidyā by identifying it with karman, and by attributing the imperfections of life (like avidyā, karman and kāma) to the jīva. Every jīva comes from God and goes back to Him as the home of all perfections, and is deified.

SĀDHANA—MEANS TO LIBERATION

The speculative philosopher who enquires into the nature of Brahman as the supreme Reality or tattva becomes a mumukṣu or seeker after liberation (mukti) by moral and spiritual endeavour. Liberation can be attained by the triple method of karma-yoga or self-purification, jñāna-yoga or self-realization and bhakti-yoga or the practice of the feeling of the presence of God as Love, as formulated in the Gītā.

Karma-yoga is the practice of nīśkāma-karman or duty for duty’s sake irrespective of the consequences. Nobody, not even a god or Īśvara, can be inactive. Consciousness in all its levels is conative, and even introversion which aims at cessation (niyṛtti) from activity is itself conative, and a life of inaction (a-karman) is a psychological impossibility. The metaphysic of morals based on this psychological principle turns out to be a philosophy of the ātman. Though every animal follows an end, man alone has an idea
of the end on account of his buddhi or reason and will. But owing to his false identification with the body made of nature (prakriti) and its gunas, the desire (kama) for the pleasures of the body arises in him, and when it is frustrated it leads to anger or krodha and mental confusion and finally to moral death. Every empirical action is impelled by the subjective inclinations (kama) and induced by the objective or utilitarian motives of gain (labha). It is determined by the three gunas of sattva, rajas and tamas or serenity, restlessness and inertia. But every man has the moral freedom to subdue his gunas and the karman influenced by them. By his disciplined will or practical reason he can subdue his sensibility based on the body-feeling and free himself from the feelings of “I” and “mine” (ahamkara and mamakara) which are the twin perils of empirical life. Then action (karman) is freed from all selfish inclinations of kama and becomes niskama-karman or duty for duty’s sake, and the moral man acquires self-sovereignty. He is no longer a thing of nature swayed by gunas and externally determined, but a person with moral autonomy gained by soul power (atma-sakti). He is then a person of steady wisdom (sthila-prajna) who has gained not freedom from, but freedom in, action.

Karma-yoga or self-less action is only a stepping-stone to self-realization gained by jñana-yoga. When the moral man seeks to know himself (the atman) as different from the not-self (a-cit), he ascends from morality to spirituality. There is a transition from niskama-karman or what a man ought to do, to what he ought to be, and such a soul-culture (jñana-nishta) demands self-renouncement (vairagya) and ceaseless practice of contemplation (abhyasa). The contemplative should free himself by yogic practice from the confusions of avidya by which he mistakes the atman for the bodily feeling and the seductions of kama by which he is drawn to sense objects. He seeks the state of complete detachment (kaivalya).

The state of kaivalya attained by jñana-yoga may, however, lapse into the defects of subjectivism and quietism and these defects are overcome by bhakti-yoga. Bhakti-yoga marks the consummation of moral and spiritual endeavour as attained in karma-yoga and jñana-yoga. The Viśeṣa-dvaita constructs a ladder, as it were, from ethics to religion and from religion to mystic union, and Rāmānuja refers to seven ancient sādhanas as aids to bhakti called viveka, vimoka, abhyasa, kriyā, kalyāṇa, anavasāda and anuddharsa. The first is the purification of the body as the living temple of God and such cleanliness is next to godliness. Vimoka is the inner detachment from the disturbing conditions like desire and anger. Abhyasa is the ceaseless practice of the sense-presence of God as the Inner Self of all. Kriyā is the social side of the contemplative life and it is the duty of service to all living beings from the sub-human and the human to the celestial beings or devas. Kalyāṇa is the practice of virtue as the inner side of duty and dāna or benevolence and ahimsā are among the cardinal virtues. Anavasāda and anuddharsa go together as they
VEĐANTA—THE VAIŞŅAVA (THEISTIC) SCHOOLS

connote freedom from despair and absence of exultation. All these sādhanas aim at the physical, mental, moral, spiritual and religious development of man and are integral aids to devotion to God (bhakti). They are different from the Greek idea of harmonizing the animal, the human, and the spiritual side of man and the sādhanas of Śaṅkara which are really no sādhanas at all as Brahma is self-accomplished and not attained as something new. Brahma the absolute of metaphysics is Bhagavat or the God of religion and, according to Rāmānuja, veđanta or knowledge of Brahma, dhyāna or upāsanā or meditation on Him and bhakti or devotion have the same meaning and they connote the inter-relation and unity of jñāna and bhakti. Dhyāna is ceaseless contemplation up to death on Vāsudeva or Nārāyaṇa as the Inner Self or the self in the form “I am, Thou holy Divinity and Thou art myself,” 27 and it means that Brahma is the soul (sarīrin) of jīva in the same way in which jīva is of the body. The two are inseparable as soul and body, but not identical. When bhakti deepens into perfect devotion and love (para-bhakti and premā) the quest for God becomes an irrepressible thirst for Him. But the soul-hunger for God is not so intense as the God-hunger for the soul. The Eternal One beyond, incarnates Himself as love in human form to satisfy His longing for union with the devotee (bhakta) whom He regards as His very self (mahātman). In the union that follows love is for love’s sake and bhakti is preferred to liberation (mukti) itself.

The building up of bhakti is a veritable Jacob’s ladder from earth to heaven (paramā-pāda-sopāna) 28 owing to its arduousness and it is well-nigh impossible to ascend it owing to its many pitfalls on the way. The Gitā, as the essence of Upaniṣadic wisdom, in its infinite tenderness to erring humanity offers prapattī or self-surrender as the easiest and most natural means to liberation (mukti). As the religion of universal redemption, it invites every man as the son of God, but laden with the sin of separation, to seek refuge at His feet and guarantees mukti to him.

The Ālvars are the seekers and seers of God like the Upaniṣadic rṣis and in their Tamil hymns which are equalized with the Vedānta owing to their divine wisdom, they stress the superior value of prapattī on account of its appeal to God as redemptive love and its universal applicability to all jīvas regardless of their birth, worth and station in life. In juristic religion, justice must be tempered by mercy, but in redemptive religion justice or retribution is dominated by redemption and even so-called punishment or dandaṇa has its roots in dayā or mercy.

In Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism as the religion of the Viśiṣṭādvaita, Godhead is both Nārāyaṇa and Śrī in whom the impersonal qualities of law and love are eternally wedded together in a dual personality. If law rules over love, karmā is inescapable; and if love rules over law, caprice becomes inevitable, but in the divine nature the two are harmonized and fused into one.

In the history of Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism two conflicting sects have arisen
called the Tenkalai School founded by Pillaiлокርarya and the Vadakalai school led by Vedānta-Deśika. The former insists on the unconditionality and spontaneity of the grace of God (nir-hetuka-kaṭākṣa) and the latter to sa-hetuka-kaṭākṣa, that is, the joint method of God’s mercy and the devotee’s merit called prapatti-yoga. But both recognize the truth that God is Himself the endeavour and the end (upāya and upēya) and that karmān is cancelled by mercy (kṛpā). The problem is not solved by the logical category of hetu or cause but is dissolved in the mystic experience of communion.

The Śrī-Vaiṣṇava and Christian theories of redemption have affinities as ethical religions in their acceptance of sin as a violation of the Divine Law, in their faith that sin is forgivable and actually forgiven by the mercy of God and in the doctrines of justification by faith and justification by works. But the Vaiṣṇavaite theory has a universality of appeal which is missed in the Christian doctrines of the only Begotten Son of God, original sin and the Judgment Day. In the former case retribution is followed by and transformed into redemption, but in the latter redemption is succeeded by the Judgment Day when wheat is separated from the chaff. Sin in Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism is separation from God and true atonement is atonement with the God of love and followed by the practice of service to all jīvas prompted by the immanence of divine love in their hearts. The highest state of devotion is the līlā or sport of love in which the Lord as the lover plays the game of hide-and-seek with the beloved till the two become united for ever. The līlā of love consists of two stages, namely, the joy of union (saṁśleṣa) alternating with the sorrows of separation (viśleṣa) leading to what is called the dreariness of the dark night of the soul. The līlā ends when jīva attains the eternal bliss of mukti.

MUKTI

Among the four ends of life (purusārthas), namely dharma or the practice of righteousness, artha or economic gain, kāma or enjoyment of the pleasures of life here and in heaven, and mokṣa or the attainment of freedom from the ills of birth, the last is extolled by the Vedānta as the supreme end and aim of life. The devotee liberated from ignorance and desire has a foretaste of the bliss of Brahman and the intimation of immortality in his momentary intuition of God in this life. But the experience of Brahman in this life is not eternal and integral and it is only by going to the world of Brahman that the mukta attains the security and stability of immortal bliss. The Advaitin thinks that liberation (mukti), is the knowledge of the self-existent absolute (nir-guṇa Brahman). Liberation is possible in this life, here-now (jīvan-mukti), and also afterwards (videha-mukti). All the other Vedāntins repudiate the theory. They
contend that *mukti* is one and it is not freedom in empirical life here but freedom from empirical life by actually transcending the world of space and time.

If Brahman is not to be attained anew by any *sādhana*, as Advaitins hold, then moral endeavour and religious attainment have no meaning and value. The Viśiṣṭādvaita avoids these defects by distinguishing between the empirical world of space-time and pleasure-pain and the transcendental realm (*parama-pada*) which is also the home of the eternal values of truth, goodness, beauty and bliss. It describes ascent of the *mukta* after the dissolution of the body to the blissful land of *Vaikuntha* by the straight and shining path of *deva-yāna.* There matter shines in a supernatural (*a-prākyta*) way without any mutability. Time exists under the form of eternity and the *mukta* freed from the limitations of *karma* regains his infinite *jnāna*, is deified but without the quality of cosmic rulership.

The liberated soul has a direct vision of Brahman and is absorbed in the eternal bliss of union with Him (*sāyuja*). To him the pluralistic world remains but the pluralistic view is abolished. The distinction between the *ātman* and Brahman is eternal, but the sense of separateness disappears in the state of union (*a-vibhāga*). There is no loss of personality. The liberated soul does not serve God by co-operating with Him but gives up egoity by realizing "I and yet not I, but Thou in me."

**CONCLUSION**

The Viśiṣṭādvaita is a philosophy of religion which thinks out all things in their togetherness or the synthetic unity of *Brahma-jnāna* and at the same time seeks to realize the union between *ātman* and Brahman. Brahman is the ground of all beings and also the goal of spiritual endeavour. By its definition of revelation (*Sāstra*) as a body of eternal spiritual truths spiritually verifiable by each man, it bridges the gulf between revelation, reason and intuition and frees itself from the charges of dogmatism, agnosticism and eclecticism. Its ontological view that Brahman is the soul of all beings and is their source, sustenance and goal brings out the divine purpose of creation. *Prakṛti* is a becoming, *puruṣa* is progressive and Paramātman uses *prakṛti* as an instrument for the perfection of the soul. While material things exist, *ātman* lives as an eternal person and not as a thing and Brahman is the infinite interested in infinitizing the finite. This view sets aside the errors and evils of materialism, personalism and abstract monism. The three spiritual paths of work, knowledge and devotion (*karman*, *jnāna* and *bhakti*) are a triple discipline of will, thought, and feeling and they avoid the pitfalls of moralism, intellectualism and sentimentalism. The doctrine of surrender (*prapatti*) guarantees
God to all jīvas without any distinction and offers an inspiring motive for spirituality and service. Every jīva can intuit God directly and serve others by intuiting the truth that all beings are in Brahman and Brahman is in all beings. This view combines contemplative insight and activist outlook. Viśiṣṭādvaita thus follows the way of synthesis and brings to light the working of divine love in humanity.

In the post-Rāmānuja period in the South, the two Schools of Śrī-Vaiśnavaism, namely, the Vadakalai and the Teivikalai, became prominent and doctrinal differences came to a head at the time of Pillai Lokācārya and Vedānta-Deśika and needless frictions and jealously arose and tried to bring down the high level of spirituality realized in the earlier stages. Progress is not always in a straight line and in the so-called mediaeval period of Indian history, especially in the North, great Viśnava reformers arose to check the proselytizing zeal of Islam and revitalize Hinduism. A follower of Rāmānuja called Rāmānanda migrated to the North and became the pioneer of the Viśnavaite movement there which influenced even the Punjab and Bengal. He tried to re-establish God’s kingdom (Rāma-rājya) on earth by spreading its triple truths of monarchy, monogamy and monotheism in the political, social and religious aspects of life and thus became the precursor of Mahātma Gāndhi. Of the followers of Rāmānanda, Kabir, Dādu and Tulsīdās were the most popular and of these Kabir, born in 1398, did the greatest service to the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity both by precept and practice by stressing the common features of the Vedānta and Sufism. Tulsīdās has immortalized himself by the Hindi translation of the Rāmāyaṇa in the same way as Kambar has done in its metrical translation in Tamil. Dādu (1544–1603) had frequent interviews with Akbar in the cause of cementing Islam and Hinduism. The Śuddha-Advaita of Vallabha has affinities with Śrī-Vaiśnavaite mysticism especially in its teachings of puṣṭi-bhakti or the intense love of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa which resembles the (nāyaka-nāyikā) love as experienced by Nammālvār and Āndāl. Bengal Vaiśnavaism known as Acintya-Bhedabheda was founded by Śrī-Caitanya born in 1485 in Nuddea and it was deeply influenced by Madhva’s teaching of Vaiśnavaism. The leaders of the Brāhma-Samāj were deeply touched by bhakti and they repelled the attack of Christianity by accepting Jesus as a great bhakta and rejecting Churchianity. While Bengal Vaiśnavaism is mainly emotional, that of the Maharatta bhaktas like Jñānadeva and Nāmadeva was influenced by Rāmānanda and it laid great stress on jñāna and bhakti. All the Schools of Vaiśnavaism agree in their view of God as Love and compel comparison with the Śaivaite theories of Śiva as love and with the teachings of Sufism and Christian mysticism. The idea of God as the beautiful is on the whole peculiar to Vaiśnavaism. The Viśiṣṭādvaita has thus through the ages permeated Indian life and made its own contribution to philosophy by its synthetic insight into the whole of reality as the soul of the
universe, and to religion by the intuitive realization of life, and the home of eternal values of truth, goodness and beauty. It offers to every man the most inspiring motive for spirituality and service and enables him to attain the immortal bliss of communion with Brahman.

NOTES

1. Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, VI. i. 3.
3. Taittirīya-Upaniṣad, II. i.
7. Śrī-bhāṣya, II. iii. 18.
8. Taittirīya-Upaniṣad, Ananda-vallī, 1.
10. Rahasya-traya-sūtra, Chapter III.
15. Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, VI. i. 4.
16. Vedānta-sūtra, II. i. 15.
17. Dayā-sataka, 16.
18. Śrī-bhāṣya, II. iii. 19. 33.
19. Śrī-bhāṣya, II. iii. 26.
26. Śrī-bhāṣya, I. i. 1.
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CHAPTER XIV—continued

VEDĀNTA—THE VAIŚṆAVA (THEISTIC) SCHOOLS

B. MADHVA (DVAITA)

Madhva and his Works.—The philosophy of Brahman (Brahma-Mīmāmsā) expounded by Madhva is popularly called Dvaita. Madhva was born in A.D. 1199 near Udipi. His social environment was moulded by the general tenets of this philosophy. Scholars studied this philosophy with great interest. Some were dissatisfied with the prevalent ideas about its meaning.

His works exhibit a unity of purpose. They may be studied under three heads: (1) Criticism of categories of knowledge and reality leading to the philosophy of Brahman. (2) Exposition of the philosophy of Brahman and (3) Application of the philosophy of Brahman.

I. CRITICISM LEADING TO PHILOSOPHY OF BRAHMAN

I

Madhva holds that correct knowledge (pramāṇa), as well as correct source of knowledge (pramāṇa), is that which grasps its object as it is (yat-kartha). Both knowledge and its source grasp their object as it is. Both are therefore correct. To dispute this is to make knowledge impossible. No knowledge is objectless. No object is unknown. Each is an element in the system implied by the other. To hold that knowledge is objectless is to make it baseless. To hold that the object is superimposed on knowledge is implicitly to recognize the object, for otherwise superimposition becomes impossible. Without recognizing real silver, superimposition of silver on shell (in illusion) is impossible. Abstraction of knowledge and object, each from the other, is responsible for wrong theories, like one-sided idealism or objectivism.

False cognition is that which apprehends its object as what it is not. It is no knowledge. Its cause is some defect in its condition. Knowledge or true cognition is independent of false cognition. The latter presupposes correct knowledge. Mistaking a shell for silver involves the correct knowledge of a shining something. True knowledge is characterized by intellectual and volitional harmony. Yet without any reference to any such
criterion such knowledge directly presents itself as true. The truth of any knowledge is thus self-evident. Only in cases of doubt, harmony as a criterion helps decision. False cognition is marked by the absence of harmony. Falsity is inferred from this absence.

It is wrong to say that the truth of knowledge is inferred from the soundness of its source (e.g. sense organs, data, etc.). For it makes truth (pramāṇa), which is the very essence of knowledge, dependent on conditions external to knowledge. If knowledge were not essentially true (i.e. that which apprehends its object as it is), then it would imply: (1) That knowledge is objectless and it has nothing in it to explain itself, and (2) that knowledge is dependent on external conditions.

Knowledge grasps its object as it is. It is evident to the self as “witness” (sāksin). Every person has a “witness.” The witness apprehends all that occurs to every thinking being.

Self, knower, knowledge, “witness” and their self-evident nature are only distinctions in unity. If they were altogether different, then they could never be brought together. It is absurd to insist on pure identity or non-duality in respect of knowledge. Pure identity is contradiction in terms. Every case of identity necessarily involves distinction of things identified. Every case of identity is thus qualified (sa-viśeṣa). The division of things into substances and attributes is also unwarranted.

The “witness” is the self itself. It endures in all states. In the waking state it witnesses the knowledge caused by perception, inference and verbal testimony.

Perception is the result of the operation of some organ of knowledge like “witness,” mind (manas), eye, ear, nose, tongue, and touch. But an organ does not work by itself. It is directed by the self. The self is thus an active principle. Analysis of perception shows that the self is not determined by things that are external to it.

Inference is the knowledge of the major term (sādhya) from that of the middle (hetu) on the basis of the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the middle and the major and that of the presence of the middle in a relevant minor (pakṣa). Concomitance is determined by repeated observation. It is expressed as “if the middle then the major.”

Verbal testimony (āgama) is the source of the valid cognition of what is intended to be expressed by words. Its validity consists in the unsublated character of the knowledge yielded.

In the waking state mind (manas) causes memory on the basis of past impressions. In dream also mind functions on the basis of past impressions. The dream objects are actual as such. But they do not possess the same status as objects perceived in the waking state. Mind and external sense organs do not function in deep sleep. This proves that they are different from the self which endures even then. The awareness produced by the senses and mind is always of some object and it is apprehended by
"witness" as a "this," being external to self. In all cases of such objective awareness there is a modification of mind, a psychosis of the form "this."

In dreamless sleep the witness alone functions. It apprehends the self as having sleep, happiness caused by sleep and duration of happiness. This is evident by the later memory "till now I slept happily." The following are the points of difference between knowledge by "witness" and knowledge through the modification of mind.

The former grasps its object as it is but the latter occasionally does not do so. The awareness of "I" as "I" and awareness of happiness as enjoyed by "I" are never falsified. But an awareness like "this is silver" may not sometimes be correct. Further, knowledge by "witness" is independent of knowledge as a modification of mind. But the latter is ever dependent on the former. Awareness of "I" is independent of mind. But the knowledge of an object like "this is silver" necessarily involves the knowledge of time which is due to the witness. The knowledge of time cannot be the work of mind. For, though the mind does not operate in dreamless sleep, there is still the knowledge of time. Further, "witness" is self-evident. It presents itself while presenting its object. But the modification of mind is not self-evident. Moreover, its object is specified as a particular. Specification is not its work. It is the expression of distinction of the particular from the rest of the universe. Therefore it presupposes the general awareness of the rest of the universe. But this general awareness of the rest of the universe falls outside the jurisdiction of the knowledge by mental modification limited to the particular object to which mind is related through sense. It must therefore be the work of "witness."

Distinction is not something externally imposed on a thing. It is the explanation of the thing as-thing. To deny it is self-contradiction. The denial must be distinct from non-denial.

Knowledge is never indeterminate. It is wrong to suppose that perception at the first instance is indeterminate being devoid of all determining factors. This supposition is falsified by the fact that perception involves modification of mind which is not independent of witness and witness by nature grasps its object as it is (with its characteristics). Further, to hold that indeterminate knowledge can be had from reflection and meditation is also not correct; because the contributions of mind and witness even to such knowledge can never be denied. Hence the claim for indeterminate knowledge is inconsistent with the very nature of knowledge.

Indeterminate knowledge is inconsistent with the nature of the object also. Every object is a system containing different elements within itself. It is also a member of a system of objects. It is in itself a unity of distinctions. With reference to the rest of the system of which it is a member it is a distinction in unity. To abstract it or its aspect from the system of which it is a member is unwarranted. But without abstraction indeterminate knowledge is impossible.
Scripture (Agama) receives special treatment in Madhva. He does not regard it as an authority or command. Authority and command arrest knowledge. They only prescribe courses of action. A spiritual text is essentially a source of knowledge.

Under verbal testimony Madhva chiefly considers the Vedas and the Upanisads. He points out that perception, inference and verbal testimony form the different levels of an identical process of understanding. He holds that the knowledge of Reality that is all-inclusive and self-explanatory can be had from the Vedic scripture.

To understand the Veda in this sense, Madhva points out, is to understand that it is indispensable (nitya) for all true knowledge. Perception, inference and even verbal testimony yield the knowledge of partial reality. But with the help of the Veda they become able to present the whole reality. The Veda is, therefore, the language of Reason. It has in view the whole of Reality.

The different passages of the Veda appear to state things that are opposed because of the distraction of mind. Distraction results from attraction to partial reality. To appreciate identity of purpose in the Veda is to realize the identical purpose of all sources of knowledge and therefore of life itself in all its aspects. With this realization one cannot abstract or over-emphasize particular portions of the Veda against others.

After the Mundaka-Upanisad Madhva distinguishes between two types of Vedic interpretation—lower and higher. The higher consists in giving the common-sense meaning to the Veda. The higher consists in seeing that the Veda presents the Truth Imperishable (a-kṣara). This higher meaning is not necessarily opposed to the lower. It includes in itself the significance of all that is lower. For after all it is seeing the Imperishable in the perishable. For this reason the Mundaka concludes: "Every Vedic passage gives rise to the knowledge of the Imperishable."

To see the Imperishable as the meaning of the whole Veda presupposes great insight and deep study. This insight or study is not one among many insights or studies. It is the insight or study which is the origin and goal of all insights or studies. It is in this sense that the Mundaka arrives at the conclusion: "The Philosophy of Brahman is the origin and aim of all knowledge."

To see the Imperishable as the only truth taught by the whole Veda is the result of a regular process of thinking involving, in order, understanding texts (śravaṇa), reflection (manana) and assimilation (nididhyāsana). This is the process of appreciating the inner harmony that governs the whole Vedic thought in all its aspects.

So the Veda, according to Madhva, is not authority, instruction or
revelation. It is not the exposition of Truth in its different grades or aspects by different persons according to their light. It is not a verbal testimony composed by different poets or philosophers according to their own beliefs. It does not teach different grades of discipline like action (karman), faith (bhakti) and knowledge (jñāna). It does not uphold different gods as the rulers of the world and recommend their worship. Nor does it hold different theories of the world or of its elements.

After the Kaṭha-Upaniṣad Madhva notes that to miss the real teaching of the Veda is to miss spiritual peace (sānti). Emancipation is the culmination of spiritual integrity. If it is possible, then the Veda is indispensable. Acceptance of the Veda (Veda-sūkṣma) presupposes not only rejection of common-sense ideas as applying to the Veda but also conscious recognition of indispensability of higher reason, i.e. Veda. Further, to have Veda is to see the inner harmony that pervades the Veda and thereby the All-pervading Truth as its meaning.

Madhva recognizes that this requirement is satisfied by Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma-sūtra, i.e. Brahma-Mīmāṃsā, i.e. philosophy of Brahman. "Brahma-sūtra" is the language of reason that brings out the unity of the Veda. It is the deciding principle. It discovers the real meaning of Vedic texts. Without it the Veda is unintelligible.

Brahma-sūtra and the Veda are therefore one unit of thought. Each is unintelligible without the other. The former, being the expression of inner harmony of the latter, merges itself in the latter so that what remains is only the Veda in its true essence.

All works of Madhva aim at achieving this end. Under each aphorism (sūtra) he shows on what principle the aphorism decides particular texts of the Veda the meaning of which is misleading and self-contradictory without the application of this integral principle. For an example, take the ordinary meaning of the passage in the Puruṣa-Sūkta which says: "One who knows the self (Puruṣa) in this manner becomes immortal." Apparently this passage will be thought to say that knowledge is the cause of immortality. But this would imply the negation of Brahman, the ground of all. For the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad says: "From which all these creatures arise. . . . That is Brahman." If Brahman is the cause of all, how can knowledge cause immortality? Or if knowledge cause immortality how can Brahman be the cause of all? Hence the idea that knowledge causes immortality is opposed to the truth of Brahman.

The apparent meaning is attributed to the passage owing to the influence of common language. But taking an integral view of things the first aphorism of Brahma-sūtra, in order to counteract the evil influence of common usage, shows that the true knowledge from philosophical enquiry

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(jiṣṭāsa) arises through grace (prasāda), independent Will, of Brahman and therefore immortality is the result of this Will. With the application of this governing principle given by Brahma-sūtra the passage in question naturally means that the attainment of immortality by means of knowledge is also ultimately due to the grace of Brahman.

In the same connection Madhva examines carefully and thoroughly all possible views that are opposed to his position. He shows that their defects consist chiefly in self-contradiction. For example, he shows the defects of the view that action (karmaṇa) or faith (bhakti) is the way to liberation. Action presupposes knowledge. It is therefore no expression of dynamic character of knowledge. Faith is the element of devotion in knowledge. It is therefore an expression of intensity of knowledge. Abstraction of action from knowledge presupposes doership on the part of the individual. It is therefore the negation of the truth that Brahman is the All-doer. To abstract faith from knowledge is to uphold non-spirituality.

In the language of the Isāvāasya-Upanishad, abstraction or partial knowledge is delusion (avidyā) and knowledge is integral awareness (vidyā). Knowledge cannot properly be appreciated without understanding delusion as delusion. But to concentrate on either alone is to miss the real significance of both. Brahman (Īśa) is the author of both. It creates delusion to justify knowledge. To create delusion is to create all circumstances that make delusion effectively oppose knowledge which may finally shine in all its perfection.

In recognition of these ideas Madhva defines knowledge not as a case of passive awareness but as an active process of understanding, reflection and assimilation in order. This process must involve (1) the rejection of delusion, (2) the substantiation or appreciation of knowledge and (3) the retention of the element that makes continuity of the process inevitable. Delusion is rejected because the ground that supports it is found to be logically defective. Knowledge is established because the principle that justifies it is recognized to be defectless. In the act of establishing knowledge against the agnostic, Madhva adopts two standards. The upholder of non-knowledge is totally unfamiliar with knowledge. So non-knowledge is criticized from his own point of view. Knowledge has its own standard. In full satisfaction of this standard he establishes knowledge. The speciality of knowledge is such that once it is appreciated there is no going back. In full appreciation of this fact he shows that non-knowledge is condemned by itself, i.e. by the self-contradiction it involves.

Self-establishment characterizes knowledge. To become fuller and fuller is its tendency. Madhva thinks that the recognition of this fact is the highest discipline (tapas, upāsanā or dhyāna). He says “Not even for a moment one ought to be without knowledge, i.e. philosophy of Brahman (jiṣṭāsa). If there is a break owing to sleep, etc., immediately after one comes to consciousness one ought to recontinue the same.” The whole
process of philosophy illustrates how action and faith are in essence knowledge. They are the language of the movement from understanding to reflections and then to assimilation. An appreciation of this truth enables one to see unity of purpose running throughout the Veda.

Madhva shows that to emphasize the Veda against the philosophy of Brahman leads nowhere. The theories (of Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja respectively) that Brahman is attributeless (nir-viśeṣa) and that Brahman is the soul of the world (śarīrīn) illustrates this truth. These theories are based on the apparent meaning of particular statements of the Veda. They are therefore cases of dualism and they create more problems than they solve. The attributeless is opposed to that with attributes. To maintain the attributeless is to negate itself. Nor does nescience (avidyā) explain dualism. If Brahman is attributeless, it cannot support nescience. Nescience is then baseless. Nescience and the attributeless Brahman cannot go together. Emphasis on nescience makes it independent and ultimate over against Brahman.

The other theory that Brahman is embodied is an expression of dualism. It is the dualism of substance and attribute. Every idea of relating them confirms dualism.

Madhva sees that the application of the philosophy of Brahman to the interpretation of the Veda results in an entirely different conception of Brahman. In formulating this position he brings Vedānta thought to its culmination. The conception of Brahman according to him is something arrived at only by means of philosophy in its application to the Veda. Hence it is Vedic. To be attributeless and to be Vedic are a contradiction in terms. The conception of Brahman as embodied is based on empirical distinctions, substance, attribute and their relation. But Brahman as taught by Veda transcends all empirical distinctions.

The Veda as a source of knowledge transcends all other sources of knowledge. It does not negate them. It gives them fresh significance. To illustrate, perception is commonly supposed to present an external object. If in the capacity of pure philosophy the Veda shows that the object is an expression of Brahman, its underlying principle, perception, ceases to be independent of the Veda. In this circumstance in place of common object it presents Brahman, the principle of object. In this experience awareness of object is merged in the knowledge of Brahman, the ground of object; and the object is merged in Brahman, its ground.

So the Veda transcends all other sources of knowledge without excluding them. Similarly Brahman transcends all other objects without excluding them. Hence no source of knowledge exists unenlightened by the
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Veda. Similarly no object exists outside Brahman. The Veda is the source of the sources of knowledge. Similarly Brahman is object of objects. The Veda is the highest source of knowledge. Similarly, Brahman is the highest Reality. The Veda is thus the supreme source of knowledge. Similarly, Brahman is the only Reality.

Madhva points out that this position can be arrived at only through philosophy. As philosophy, the Chāndogya comes to the conclusion "Brahman is secondless." (ekam evādvitiyam Brahma). Those that hold that Brahman is secondless, therefore the world is unreal, or that Brahman is identical, therefore the world is its body, take Veda as a mere verbal testimony and attribute common-sense meaning to it.

To hold that the world is unreal is to make the very consideration impossible. To hold that the world is body is to limit Brahman by something external. Hence these conclusions cannot withstand the philosophy of Brahman. Neither of them is, therefore, the position of the Veda.

The position of the Veda that Brahman is secondless is the result of the philosophy of Brahman. It implies that the world is real so that it gives rise to the problem of finding out its real ground. The reality of the world implied by the Veda is such that it makes the philosophy of Brahman indispensable.

That Brahman ought to be arrived at through the philosophy of Brahman is the one position of the Veda illustrated by expressions as "Enquire into That," "Enquire with devotion into Brahman," etc. The Brhadāranyaka-Upanisad defines the philosophy of Brahman as "If Atman were to be realized, then it ought to be understood, studied and assimilated." Brahma-sūtra brings out the implication of those statements by defining knowledge as philosophy of Brahman consisting of understanding, reflection and assimilation in order. Understanding is that of Brahman as it is expounded by the Veda. It takes place on finding out the insufficiency of all empirical explanations. The subject-matter of reflection is that which is understood. It consists in criticizing understanding with reference to all passages of the Veda so as to see the application of understanding to the whole Veda. Assimilation is the process of application of what is understood and criticized. It is this process that is called meditation or worship (dhyāna or upāsanā). Meditation or worship in the usual sense of fixing attention on what is already known is the act of obstructing spiritual progress. Philosophy of Brahman is thus the expression of freedom from passions and it is marked by spiritual progress. So philosophy creates mental equipoise. This enables the student to appreciate Brahman as is being expounded by the Veda. This is another reason why Madhva calls philosophy the highest discipline.
Philosophy is thus the process of finding out the *Veda*, the language of Brahman. It is not assuming some statement as the *Veda* and justifying it by philosophy. It is rather recognizing the language of Brahman as the *Veda*. Philosophy and the *Veda* are therefore the expressions of the absolute Mind. In the order of understanding philosophy comes first, takes the form of the *Veda* and makes further philosophy on its basis inevitable. In recognition of this truth Madhva describes himself as one who is not influenced by the *Veda* (*tyakta-veda*), i.e. one who is not a theologian. Consistently with this Jayatirtha observes that *Brahma-sūtra* is not composed after the *Veda* though it defines or finds out the *Veda*.

It may, however, be noted that to understand Madhva's thought, i.e. *Brahma-Mimāṃsā*, in the light of the foregoing ideas, is difficult. But Madhva says that it is indispensable. He notes that to understand Brahman is finally to understand that it is only Brahman that understands Brahman. Using the *Vedic* terms, philosophy of Brahman is the way in which *Nārāyaṇa*, the Highest, knows Itself as *Vāsudeva*, the All-comprehensive. In recognition of absolute All-comprehensiveness of Brahman, Bādarāyaṇa, Nārāyaṇa or Vāsudeva is characterized as Viṣṇu by *Veda*. Hence the process of Brahman understanding Itself as Viṣṇu is the philosophy of Brahman. It is the plan according to which creation takes place. There is, therefore, nothing apart from philosophy. In recognition of this truth Madhva calls philosophy the science of Viṣṇu. It is this that makes this science so comprehensive that it is the origin and goal of all sciences—branches of learning. Its study is the highest discipline including the merits of all disciplines. With a view to justifying all these ideas Madhva expounds the philosophy of Brahman.

### II. EXPOSITION OF PHILOSOPHY OF BRAHMAN

Philosophy of Brahman is the process of finding out the inner richness of *Vedic* teaching and thereby infinite and absolute perfection of Brahman. Clash between knowledge and different levels of non-knowledge and establishment of knowledge against it accounts for this richness. The reason (*yuktī*) employed in bringing out this richness is purely *Vedic*. It transcends the empirical. It has nothing to sublate it. It is marked by an integral spiritual outlook. It is, therefore, self-established. But the same reason employed empirically involves contradiction. It falsifies itself. For on the empirical level nothing is absolute and nothing complete.

On the general basis of these ideas the leading features of Madhva's philosophy may be briefly indicated.
The sense of imperfection leads to the idea of perfection. In some cases it leads one to doubt the existence of perfection, i.e. Brahma. Doubt is the source of philosophy. The doubt whether there is Brahma, whether there is any source of the knowledge of Brahma makes philosophy indispensable. But to hold that Brahma is self-evident in the sense that it is not an object of knowledge negates philosophy. But such negation presupposes some philosophy. It therefore contradicts itself.

Philosophy is possible so long as the standpoint of Brahma is kept in view. Any modification in the viewpoint makes philosophy fallacious.

Desire for emancipation does not lead to philosophy. Desire is misery. Illusion is its cause. Illusion and philosophy are incompatible. Illusion is due to prepossession. But philosophy presupposes nothing. It is the outcome of joy. It is in itself joy.

This joy is transcendent. It is not conditioned by the empirical. It is the expression of dispassionateness which again results from the conviction that nothing other than Brahma commands love. Everything is relative and falls short of the highest.

Philosophy is not the creation of man. It is rather the expression of the divine element in man. It is the result of the grace of Brahma.

Philosophy is the process of finding out the highest source of knowledge and highest Reality as its object. The word Brahma means both. Brahma as source of knowledge is indispensable (nitya), defectless (nir-doṣa), self-valid (svatāh-pramāṇa) and impersonal (a-pauruṣeya). In this sense it is called the Veda. Brahma as Reality is All-complete. The All-Complete is All-powerful which is the giver of reality to all. Reality implies (1) The thing itself (sva-rūpa), (2) its objectivity (pramitī), and (3) its functions (paurūṣṭī). As the doer and giver of all Brahma is called Viṣṇu.

Philosophy of Brahma becomes thus philosophy of Viṣṇu. To ignore this is bondage. To understand it is emancipation. Both are the works of Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu is both the means and the goal. The Veda recognized as pure philosophy is the only source of this knowledge. In the presence of this knowledge every idea and every word become expressions of the truth of God, so that the whole existence becomes dedicated to God (Viṣṇavarṣita).

Brahman (Viṣṇu) as All-Complete is beyond comprehension. But it is eternal and indispensable. It is made intelligible by seeing that it is the origin of all.

The world consists of conscious souls or knowers and unconscious
objects. Individual souls are many. They pass through eight states—existence, destruction, relative position, knowledge, ignorance, bondage and freedom. Different individuals have them in different degrees. All souls influence one another. Hence no one is completely free. The influence of one on others may be very great though each has an ontological status of its own. To be subject to change is to be dependent. Hence every conscious or unconscious entity in the world is found to be dependent (paratantra) in its every nature. Just as the dependent does not explain itself, it does not explain others. Therefore the dependent presupposes the Independent (svaratantra).

To negate the dependent or to hold that it is illusion is to posit negation or illusion in its place. But negation or illusion is dependent. At least as its source there must be the Independent. Hence the dependent is in some sense or other real. The Independent is therefore the real source of the real world. It is self-established in all its aspects. It manifests itself through its effects from which, therefore, it can be known. It is Eternal and All-powerful. It is the doer of all. It is the doer of doers. As All-doer It is all. It has all aspects. Every aspect is Independent. It is devoid of all distinctions within itself. But it is even distinguishable from the dependent. To posit the dependent against it is to negate it. But to negate It is to establish It. In recognition of these truths the Veda speaks of Its identity with the dependent as well as Its distinction from the dependent. The idea is that identity and difference each opposed to the other are irrelevant to the distinction between the Independent and the dependent.

Plurality, variety, grades, levels, kinds, activity, etc., of things are all due to the Independent. Independent is complete in all these aspects. All-doership therefore proves All-Completeness.

The truth that Brahman is All-doer is opposed to empirical ideas based on the wrong belief that every thing existent is self-active. Hence philosophy is the only source of this knowledge.

A dependent entity, conscious or unconscious, is dependent in all its aspects. It cannot, therefore, cause anything. That alone can be truly said to be self-active which has the power of doing, undoing and doing differently. This power must possess (1) ability to avoid evil and do good, (2) freedom from exhaustion, anxiety, failure of memory, misery, etc., (3) freedom from dependence, (4) ability to accomplish what is desired, (5) intelligibility, (6) absence of a dissipation of energy and (7) self-sufficiency. None of the things of the world can be said to possess such power and cannot therefore be said to be a real doer.

Brahman alone is possessed of such power and is the All-doer. It is
Independent. Doer, doing and done of the world are Its work. They amplify Its creative power. The world of activity is not therefore opposed to the All-doership, i.e. Viṣṇu.

All-doership consists both in creating things and in making them do things. The world is the result of All-doership, i.e. doing and making doers. This signifies that just as that which is done is not a doer, the doer is not a doer. For doer and done are finally the same. So whether a thing is presented merely as being done or as doer it is the manifestation of Viṣṇu’s creative activity. It is an expression of Its All-doership. The Veda is the expression of this truth.

The true meaning of a Vedic teaching is determined by the philosophy of Brahman. This point may be illustrated by taking, for example, Madhva’s interpretation of the science of the Independent (sad-vidyā) of the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad.

This passage begins with the Independent, the Real (sat), as the origin of all. It concludes with the idea of that which gives being to all (satya) as well as the idea of that which is All-complete (ātman). It emphasizes the All-pervading character of the Independent. With the application of this truth even the smallest entity like a banyan seed is recognized to be an expression of the Independent. “That thou art” (Tat-tvam-asi) is the expression of the result. This expression signifies that before this truth is realized the individual is taken to be independent of the Independent. But with this realization the individual is recognized as being entirely derived from the Independent. This realization constitutes emancipation. Uddālaka, the teacher, praises this knowledge as being all-inclusive and therefore indispensable. The whole weight is given to this knowledge. Lastly, the Independent as the origin of all presents the reason that explains the whole passage. The truth of the unaffected position of the Independent is further illustrated by means of nine examples. Taking the example of salt into consideration, it is obvious that salt is salt whether it is seen or unseen. Similarly, whether there is creation or no creation the Independent is Independent. It is therefore distinguished from all. So the real meaning of the passage is brought out by the method of interpreting a passage by considering its beginning, its conclusion, its point of emphasis, the result, the weight and the reason.

With reference to the same passage Madhva notes further the higher significance of Truth Independent. The passage illustrates the creation of the Independent from Itself as “The Independent intended: Let me be infinite in form. Let me create.” Consistently with this, whenever Madhva speaks of creation he has in view two types of creation: (1) Infinite forms of Viṣṇu coming from Viṣṇu, and (2) the corresponding things of the world coming from Viṣṇu. The former is the explanation of the latter. This idea can be applied to any passage on creation. Take the passage ‘From Ātman space came.” According to the meaning (1) Ātman is Viṣṇu.
Space also is Viṣṇu. According to the meaning (2) Ātman is Viṣṇu and space is empirical space. The whole idea is that space came from Viṣṇu, the space complete coming from Viṣṇu, the Independent.

Applying the same idea to the present passage, viz. the science of the Independent, it may be seen that all words that are applied to the things of the world really mean different forms of Viṣṇu complete with reference to the attributes that characterize the respective things. These forms are the immanent principle of the corresponding entities of the world. There are entities because of these forms.

The same idea may be applied to the concluding statement of the passage, “That thou art.” “That” means Viṣṇu. “Thou” means Viṣṇu, the source of the individual, i.e. Śvetaketu. “Art” means the identity of the two. This is what is meant by seeing identity of Viṣṇu throughout creation. Identity is Viṣṇu Itself. This is seeing All-doership and this is understanding All-completeness.

God (Viṣṇu), the Independent, is thus the primary meaning of every word. To apply a word to other things is negation of God or Viṣṇu. In explaining this truth Madhva considers first why at all a word is applied to a thing. The usual science of language is based on convention. It presents no reason. So he gives the correct approach.

A word by nature means something which comes to mind immediately after the hearing of the word. Hence there is something in the nature of the thing that determines the application of the word to it. It is in this inherent and underlying nature and principle of the thing that makes the thing what it is. This implies then that the application of a word to a thing is, in the ultimate analysis, the application of the word to the principle that governs the thing. But this principle is nothing but God. He is therefore meant by every word.

The same rule applies to sounds inarticulate. The sound of the flow of a river produces the feeling of wonder, the principle underlying which is also God. So sound means God. In this connection Madhva studies the process of linguistic developments and comes to the conclusion that the Veda is the highest form of language because it presents Viṣṇu. He therefore calls the Veda perfect language (saṃskṛta).

To hold that Brahman is beyond consideration is itself consideration. Brahman is thus essentially an object of knowledge. There is nothing that conditions Brahman. Brahman is bliss. Its creation is bliss. Attainment of bliss is emancipation.

Madhva concludes “Brahman, i.e. Viṣṇu is complete, defectless, object and goal.”

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III. APPLICATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF BRAHMAN

Madhva mentions two kinds of expressions of God, the Independent and the dependent. The former is the principle, and the latter is the effect of the principle in operation. So the dependent illustrates the richness of the Independent.

The dependent consists of the conscious and the unconscious. There are three kinds of the latter: (1) what is produced incessantly, e.g. the Veda; (2) Mixture of incessant production and occasional production, e.g. matter, time and space; and (3) what is occasionally produced, e.g. jar, etc.

A knower or a conscious being is incessantly produced in every case of mental activity. The application of philosophy should be the aim of life for all knowers. But there are different kinds of individuals: those that are after philosophy, those that are indifferent to it, and those that are opposed to it. Just as wrong knowledge is no knowledge, the latter two are not real knowers.

The philosophy of Brahman is difficult. One can follow it only in accordance with the grace of Viṣṇu. This causes degrees of philosophical knowledge. Accordingly five grades of knowers, in respect of philosophy, are distinguished—Controller (deva) of the world, teacher (ṛṣi), father (pitṛ), protector (pa), and man (nara). This gradation implies that controller, etc., are necessarily philosophers of different orders. To call others controllers, etc. is wrong.

Degrees of philosophical knowledge imply degrees of non-knowledge, including illusion. Superimposition of doership on man causes illusion. Illusion causes evils—attachment, hatred, etc. Birth, death, etc. are the results. These are all dependent on Viṣṇu who is their author. Viṣṇu as All-doer is the principle of every soul. This implies that no soul can be inactive or irresponsible unless it superimposes doership on it. To appreciate Viṣṇu as All-doer is to see that one’s body is the vehicle of Viṣṇu but not of the individual self. This results in acting consistently with disposition, birth, environment, etc. which are creations of Viṣṇu. Action is life. It is an expression of knowledge. It consists in realizing that it is dependent. This is to appreciate the Independent in Its creative activity. This is the practical worship of Viṣṇu.

The study and teaching of the philosophy of Brahman frees the soul from bondage. It presupposes complete absence of an opposite bias. The expressions of this absence are in order interest in finding out Truth, study of philosophy, devotion to Truth, absence of illusion, appreciation of Truth, overcoming opposition, satisfaction in knowledge, apprehension of the self-sufficiency of Truth, sense of dependence of the individuality, absence of essence and endurance in the elements of the world and unconditioned interest in understanding Brahman.
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: EASTERN AND WESTERN

One who has no preconceptions has legitimate doubt with regard to the source of the knowledge of Truth. Absence of doubt means presence of preconception. One who really doubts comes to enquire into the best source of knowledge that presents the highest Truth. This enquiry is philosophy. With philosophy the previous virtues become pronounced and help philosophy in turn.

So according to Madhva ethical or spiritual discipline is the process of making philosophy of Brahman indispensable, intensive and comprehensive. It results in clearer expression of the Veda and its meaning, Brahman. This state is attained by teaching. Teaching pleases Viṣṇu.

Study and teaching have a social implication. Madhva insists on a social reconstruction in which no body should go without philosophy. His leading ideas in this connection are these. In characterizing the disposition favourable for philosophy he prefers merit to birth. He holds that even the lowest caste (śūdras) may study the philosophy of Brahman. He recognizes that even the untouchable (antyajas) are devoted to Viṣṇu. He holds that enquiry into Viṣṇu is the common purpose of the human community.

Society is the creation of political organization. Madhva holds that it is the duty of Government to establish the environment in which alone philosophy of Brahman is possible. The ideas that are consistent with this education ought to be encouraged at all cost and the ideas that are opposed to this must be put down. Hence political organization is essentially the means of establishing knowledge.

Knowledge is at first mediate. With practice it became clear, i.e. immediate. With this the person enjoys philosophy of Brahman according to the intensity of his knowledge. This is emancipation in life (jīvan-mukti). By the grace of Viṣṇu, one attains Viṣṇu. This is emancipation. It consists in enjoying the bliss of Viṣṇu, i.e. enjoying Viṣṇu as the dearest.

CONCLUSION

Madhva’s philosophy of Brahman can thus be construed as the highest form of Monism. His distinction of the Independent from the dependent makes Monism faultless. His conception that the Independent is conceived only by philosophy distinguishes his Monism from other forms of the same.

Madhva’s philosophy is distinctive in every respect. Vigour of logic, clearness of thinking, insight into Truth, universality of thought, comprehensiveness of outlook are the outstanding features of his thought.

His discovery of the knowledge caused by “witness” as defining self and of the highest reason as expressed in the Veda are his chief contributions to psychology and logic. His idea of social reconstruction and
political organization in terms of philosophy of Brahman gives a fresh significance to social and political philosophy. His position that the Independent is the maker of reality and individuality; that man contributes to the welfare of the world, including himself only when he appreciates Viṣṇu, the All-doer; that ethical and spiritual virtues are those that make philosophy of Brahman indispensable; that for a philosopher, the Veda and Brahman are ever in the making; that emancipation is the philosopher's enjoyment of Viṣṇu as the dearest—is a real contribution to philosophy. An appreciation of this opens a fresh chapter in the history of world philosophy.

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CHAPTER XIV—continued

VEDĀNTA—THE VAIŚṆAVA
(THEISTIC) SCHOOLS

C. NIMBĀRKA (DVAITĀDVAITA)

1. INTRODUCTION

Nimbārka, a Tailang brāhmin, is generally supposed to have flourished in the eleventh century A.D. after Rāmānuja.

Like other Vaiśṇava Vedāntists, Nimbārka, too, admits three co-eternal, equally real substances (trī-tattva), viz. Brahman, cit or the sentient and a-cit or the non-sentient. The highest Reality, or Brahman, he calls "Krṣṇa" or "Hari." The word "brahman" literally means "one which possesses greatness" (vṛh + man). That is, that alone is Brahman which is the greatest Being, which has no one superior or equal to it, which is beyond all limits of space, time and the like, whose nature, attributes and powers are unsurpassedly and incomparably great. Brahman alone is the cause of this vast universe of souls and matter. The universe is originated from Brahman, sustained in Brahman and dissolved in Brahman. Thus Brahman alone is the material (upādāna) and efficient (nimitta) cause of the world. Ordinarily, the material cause of a thing is different from its efficient cause, as the lump of clay is from the potter. But Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. It is the material cause because it transforms itself into the form of the world, just as the lump of clay is transformed into the form of the clay-jar. Again, it is also the efficient cause, because it is its own self which transforms itself into the form of the world. Thus, the universe is a real transformation (parināma) of Brahman. Like other Vaiśṇava Vedāntists, Nimbārka, too, propounds the doctrine of parināma or real transformation of the cause into the effect.

2. BRAHMAN

Brahman being the material cause of the universe is immanent in it. Just as in a clay-jar there is nothing but clay, so in the universe, the effect of Brahman, everything is Brahman through and through. All the various sentient and non-sentient objects, as found in the world, though
apparently different from Brahman, are, as transformation of Brahman, nothing but Brahman in essence. That is why, it has been said in the Upaniṣads “All this, verily, is Brahman.” The fact is that although Brahman is transcendent to, yet it is immanent in the world. Brahman is not a mere external creation of the world, as a potter is of the pot. On the contrary although Brahman is not absolutely identical with the universe, although Brahman is higher and greater than it, as it cannot fully and completely manifest Brahman, yet Brahman abides in the universe and pulsates it as its inner soul and controller.

Several objections may be raised against this doctrine of the causality of Brahman. The first question is: Why should Brahman create the world? All the philosophical systems of the world have to answer this important question at the outset. The acts of a rational being must be due to a definite motive or an end. Now, creation is an act; hence this, too, must be due to some motive on the part of Brahman, the supremely rational Being. But what possible motive can God have in creating the world? Our acts are due to some wants or imperfections, some unfilled desires or unattained ends. But Brahman is eternally perfect, eternally satisfied, eternally blissful—there can never be any incompleteness or insufficiency in it. Hence the creation of the world cannot be for God’s own sake, as He lacks nothing. It cannot be also for the sake of individual souls, for the world, admittedly, is full of pains and sufferings, and the salvation of the souls consists in getting rid of this miserable mundane existence for ever.

This leads to a second difficulty, no less formidable, viz. Why should merciful God create the world and thereby plunge the souls into such infinite and intense sufferings? If He cannot prevent pains and evils on earth, then He is not all-powerful; if He can, but does not, then He is not all-merciful. Again, people undergo different lots in the world. The honest and the good often suffer; the wicked prosper. Hence, if God be the creator of the world, He must of necessity be charged with cruelty, partiality and unjustness.

In solving the first problem, Nimbārka, like other Vedāntists, has propounded the famous Vedānta doctrine of “līlā” or creation in sport. According to this view, the creation of the world by God does not imply any want of imperfection on His part, as it is but a mere sport to Him, just as a king indulges in sports, not because he is in want of anything, but, on the contrary, because, as a king, he has all his desires fulfilled and can therefore indulge in pastimes at will. In the same manner, God, the ever-perfect, ever-blissful Being, creates the universe out of the fullness of His nature, out of the abundance of His bliss. That is why Scripture describes the world as originating from bliss (ānanda), sustained in bliss, dissolved in bliss.

This līlā-vāda is, indeed, an ingenious attempt at explaining the motive
of creation. The dynamic conception of Reality as becoming (e.g. Hegel's) finds no difficulty in explaining creation because according to it the very nature of Reality is to transform and manifest itself constantly, so that the Absolute and the world mutually involve each other from all eternity—it being the very nature of the Absolute to evolve itself into the form of the universe. Thus the Absolute is not a static, unchanging, ever-complete Being, but is essentially dynamic, ever-changing and ever-evolving. Such "becoming" is the very nature of the Absolute. The Absolute is neither unchanging Being nor non-existing non-being, but the synthesis of Being and non-being, i.e. becoming. An object that becomes or is transformed into another object is neither pure Being nor pure non-Being, but both, e.g. the seed becomes the sprout—it is existent as seed, but non-existent as sprout, yet must of necessity, from its very nature, become the sprout. In the same manner, the Absolute must by nature become the world, there being no question of any motive on its part. But the conception of Reality as an ever-perfect Being accepted by the Vedântists, cannot avail itself of the above explanation, and thus is faced with the above formidable difficulty regarding the motive of creation. If God be unchanging and self-sufficient by nature from all eternity, then why should He again create the world? Here the Vedânta lîlâ-vâda does, indeed, afford an explanation. It denies the common view that all acts are due to some motives, wants or imperfections. Some acts, like sports, are not of this kind. Sports do not aim at any gain, not even at the attainment of joy or pleasure. For they are rather due to the exuberance of joy than to any lack thereof. When one's heart is full, when one's happiness is complete, then only does one safely relax and indulge in pastimes, for happiness has a natural tendency to overflow and express itself in external actions. Thus creation, too, a sport on the part of God, is but an outer expression of His eternal perfection and infinite bliss, and not an indication of His insufficiency or incompleteness. If we accept the view of ever-perfect Reality, this is the only way out, and credit must be given to the Vedântists for having thought of it.

But another question remains here to be solved. The creation of the world may be a spontaneous sport, and not a necessity, on the part of Brahman, but to the poor souls it is not so. How can God be called a merciful Being if He thus plunges the souls to infinite sufferings for the sake of sport only, not even for any essential necessity? The answer is that God's indulgence in this cosmic sport, though not serving His own purpose is not altogether arbitrary or motiveless, as it serves the fundamental purpose of justice. Justice or morality demands that every person should undergo the results of his own actions (karmans), good or bad. This is the famous law of karman of Indian Philosophy. But as an individual cannot experience the results of all the karmans he does in one birth, he has to be born again for undergoing them, and in that new birth he
performs many new karmans, and is born again—this goes on and on until he gets rid of all karmans by moral and spiritual perfection and is free. So the world, though ultimately rej ectible, has yet a moral purpose—as it affords opportunities to the individuals to experience the results of their past karmans and thereby attain freedom, provided in that new birth they no longer perform new karmans in a selfish spirit, but in an altogether unselfish way—for the fruits of the sa-kāma-karman or selfish acts alone are experienced, leading to further births, and not of the niṣ-kāma-karmans or the unselfish ones. Hence God creates the world according to the past karmans of the individuals, and so cannot be held responsible for their suffering and varying lots—it is the individuals themselves who are really responsible through their own karmans.

As against the Advaita doctrine, Nimbārka takes Brahman to be sa-guṇa or possessing numerous auspicious attributes, which are of two kinds: attributes of majesty, such as omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence; and attributes of sweetness, such as beauty, bliss and mercy. Thus Brahman is transcendent yet immanent, all-powerful yet all-merciful, all-pervading yet abiding within the heart of man, ruler yet helper. God’s supreme might and majesty constitute no truer aspect of His nature than His infinite love and sweetness.

The nature and attributes of Brahman being thus determined, the next question is: What is the proof of the existence of such a Being or Brahman? The answer is that Scripture alone is the proof of Brahman. Hence Brahman is described in the Vedānta as one which can be known through Scripture. The entire Scripture, though apparently concerned with a variety of topics, really depicts Brahman and Brahman alone. Brahman cannot be known either through ordinary perception or through inference. No senses can perceive Brahman; no inference can prove it, as inference is based on the similarity between things, e.g. when we argue:

All men are mortal.
Ram is man
... Ram is mortal,

Ram is taken to be similar to all other men, and that is why we can conclude that he too, like them, is mortal. But Brahman is unique and incomparable—so no inference is possible with regard to it.

Nimbārka frankly admits the limited capacity of ordinary human reason. Ordinary human beings, like ourselves, can infer or reason about ordinary, mundane and empirical objects only. But what is extra-mundane and transcendent is beyond the scope of reason. It is here that Scripture becomes our sole guide.

But what is Scripture? It is nothing but the product of the sustained thinking and mature reflection, superb inspiration and profound realization of saints and prophets. To them, to those extraordinary minds,
minds that are wiser and purer than our own, nothing is a sealed book, and even transcendental truths are known directly through intuition or super-developed power of reasoning. Thus Nimbārka does not deny that God can be known directly. He only draws a distinction between ordinary and extraordinary individuals. In the former case, of course, the reasoning faculty, being immature and imperfect, naturally fails to grasp God; as such, individuals have to rely on the Scripture, which, as pointed out above, is but the record of the elevated thinking and direct realization of wiser and mature minds. In the latter case, however, the reasoning faculty having attained its full development and culminating point, has the intuitive power to realize God directly; and so here God can surely be known by reason or its super-developed form, intuition. Hence it will be totally wrong to accuse Nimbārka, and for the matter of that, other Indian philosophers, of dogmatism—of a blind uncritical faith in authority or revelation alone. In the first place, the Indian philosophers are frank enough to recognize different grades of human reason—its undeveloped and super-developed forms. In ordinary life also, we have to admit this: what is intelligible to a father is not so to his son, and the son has to learn it through reliance on the father; what is simple and easy to a scientist is not so to a layman, and the latter has to gain scientific knowledge only through the help of the former. In the same manner, without the help of the sages who themselves directly realized the truth, ordinary individuals can never hope to learn of God. In the second place, even in the case of ordinary men, the Indian philosophers insist on the need of manana or reflection and logical reasoning, after śravaṇa or acquisition of philosophical truth from Scripture. After that, there should be nididhyāsana, constant meditation for direct realization of that truth, first acquired, on trust, from Scripture and then logically tested.

3. SOUL AND MATTER

The second reality, cit, the sentient or the soul, according to Nimbārka, is consciousness in essence and a conscious knower, a doer of deeds, and an enjoyer of the fruits thereof. Against the Advaita doctrine of the soul’s unity and universality, Nimbārka propounds the doctrine of the plurality and atomicity of souls. According to him, the infinite number of infinitely small souls are identical neither with one another nor with Brahman. Even the freed souls retain their individuality or separateness, and are not merged into God. Thus according to Nimbārka, salvation does not imply any annihilation of the personality of the soul; on the contrary, it means the full development of its real nature and attributes. When the soul acquires such a state of supreme self-development, it acquires the nature and attributes of God and is similar to Him. Such a state of salva-
tion is attainable only after death, and not here and now, as held by the Advaitins.

As regards the way to salvation, Nimbārka points to the straight and narrow path of virtue which alone, according to him, can lead us to our cherished goal. Nimbārka speaks of five sādhanas or spiritual means, viz. work (karmaṇa), knowledge (jñāna), devotion and meditation (bhakti and upāsanā), self-surrender to God (praṇāta), and self-surrender to guru or spiritual preceptor (gurupāsāta). Works by themselves do not lead to salvation, but when performed in an unselfish spirit, they purify the mind and help the rise of knowledge and devotion in it. Of these five sādhanas, the first three are meant for those who are confident of reaching the goal through their own efforts by hard study, deep meditation and ceaseless activity. But the last two are specially meant for those who are too timid to place any reliance on their own efforts, but must constantly be led and helped by someone, God or guru, to whom they completely resign and dedicate themselves.

The third reality, a-cit, the non-sentient, according to Nimbārka, is of three kinds: (1) prākṛta or what is derived from prakṛti, the primal matter, the stuff of the world; (2) a-prākṛta or what is not derived from prakṛti, but from a non-material yet a non-sentient substance, the stuff of the world of Brahman; and (3) kāla or time.

4. AN ESTIMATE

The above is a very brief account of the fundamental tenets of the Vedānta system of Nimbārka. There are five main Schools of the Vedānta, viz. Śaṅkara’s “Kevalādvaita-vāda” or strict Monism, Rāmānuja’s “Viśisṭādvaita-vāda” or qualified Monism, Nimbārka’s “Dvaitādvaita-vāda” or Dualism-Monism, Madhva’s “Dvaita-vāda” or Dualism, and Vallabha’s “Suddhādvaita-vāda” or pure Monism. The main question here is as to the relation between Unity and plurality, God and world: Whether there is a relation of absolute non-difference (abheda) or absolute difference (bheda) or both (bheda-abheda) between them. Briefly, according to Śaṅkara, Brahman alone is true, the world is false, so that the latter is absolutely non-different from the former. According to Rāmānuja, the world is real like Brahman, and both non-different and different from it, but here the stress is more on non-difference. According to Nimbārka, too, the world is real and both non-different and different from Brahman, but here stress is equally on both non-difference and difference. According to Madhva, the world is absolutely different from Brahman. According to Vallabha, the world is real and non-different from Brahman.

The system of Nimbārka is very similar to that of Rāmānuja. Still, it has been given a separate place and ranked as one of the five main Schools
of the Vedānta because of its new approach to the fundamental philosophical problem of the relation between the One and many, God and the world. Nimbārka insists on taking both bheda or difference and a-bheda or non-difference between the two to be equally and simultaneously true. This may sound self-contradictory. But Nimbārka’s brief yet entirely logical explanations dispel the doubt. He takes his stand on the cause-effect or whole-part relation. The cause-effect relation is neither a relation of pure identity, nor that of bare difference, but one of identity-in-difference. Thus the effect is different from the cause because it has a peculiar nature and many peculiar functions of its own. The clay-jar, the effect, for example, has a peculiar nature and form as a jar, and special functions, like fetching water, etc., not found in the lump of clay, the cause as such. Again, the effect is also non-different from the cause because it being a modification of the cause is nothing but the cause. The clay-jar, for example, is non-different from the lump of clay, for it is, after all, nothing but clay and depends on it for its very origin and existence.

The cause, on its side, is different from the effect because it is not fully exhausted in it but something over and above. The lump of clay, for example, is different from the clay-jar, because it is not only the jar but a hundred other things, like clay plates, etc. Still, the cause is non-different from the effect because it is the effect, so far as it goes, and permeates it through and through. The lump of clay, for example, is non-different from the clay-jar because, after all, both are equally clay. Thus, the cause-effect or whole-part relation is one of identity-in-difference.

In the same manner, the universe of souls and matter is different from Brahman, as its attributes (viz. impurity, grossness, finitude, etc.) and activities (viz. selfish works, etc.) are quite different from the attributes (viz. purity, omnipresence, etc.) and activities (viz. creation, etc.) of Brahman. But the universe is also non-different from Brahman because they, as modifications of Brahman, are Brahman in essence. Again, Brahman is different from the universe because it is but one among its infinite powers and elements, and Brahman as a whole is not exhausted in a single world. Brahman is no less non-different from the world because it permeates the world through and through as its cause.

Thus, according to Nimbārka, bheda or difference means: (i) difference in attributes and activities from the standpoint of the effect; (ii) transcendence over the effect from the standpoint of the cause. A-bheda or non-difference means: (i) non-difference of essence, from the standpoint of the effect; (ii) immanence in the effect, from the standpoint of the cause. If we understand difference and non-difference in this sense of transcendence and immanence, no contradiction will be involved in taking both of them to be equally real, natural and compatible. Here, non-difference does not mean absolute identity like the complete merging of a drop of water into the ocean; it simply implies sameness of essence and
the immanence of Brahman in the world. And difference does not mean absolute separateness or distinction, like that between a man and a table, but it only implies the difference of forms, attributes and activities, and the transcendence of Brahman over the world. This is Nimbārka’s famous Svābhāviṇa-bhedā, bheda-vāda or Doctrine of Natural Difference and Non-difference between God and the universe.

Thus from the philosophical standpoint, Nimbārka can well claim to have contributed something new to the history of philosophical speculation as regards the vexed question of the relation between the One and the many. In some other respects, too, Nimbārka’s solutions regarding the fundamental problems of philosophy are really praiseworthy, especially his doctrine of "power" (śakti-vāda) which enables him to unravel many a knotty and seemingly insoluble problem of philosophy.

From the standpoint of religion, too, Nimbārka’s contributions are no less noteworthy. What he repeatedly emphasizes is the essential need of a sweet, personal, intimate relation of love and comradeship between God and man. Reverence for and awe at the grandeur and majesty of God constitute only the beginning of religion. But religion must of necessity consummate itself in a closer and sweeter personal relation of voluntary submission in place of external compulsion and coercion, of love and trust in place of fear and mere blind obedience. Although one may at first be overwhelmed by the grandeur and majesty of the Lord, yet one cannot remain at a distance from Him for long, but is irresistibly drawn nearer by a bond of mutual love and living fellowship. Thus Nimbārka, the first Vaiṣṇava philosopher to emphasize mādhurya-pradhānā bhakti or devotion springing from love at God’s infinite sweetness, in place of aisvarya-pradhānā bhakti or devotion due to reverence at His incomparable greatness as emphasized by Rāmānuja and Madhva.

From the ethical standpoint, Nimbārka emphasizes not empty external ritualism but the inner cultivation of the spirit—the acquisition of the ethical virtues of self-control, simplicity, purity and the rest. According to Nimbārka, one need not give up the life of a householder to become free. It is the spirit in which one performs one’s duties that counts. If a man performs the duties incumbent on his stage of life in a disinterested spirit, he is sure to reach his cherished goal of salvation whether he be an ascetic or a householder.

Thus the Vedānta doctrine of Nimbārka is indeed a valuable contribution to the history of thought from the philosophical, religious and ethical standpoints. The most noteworthy feature of Nimbārka’s system is its spirit of compromise and adjustment. Perfectly equipoised and tranquil in his deep and comprehensive insight into the many-sided nature of Reality and into the multifarious impulses, inclinations and capacities of mankind, Nimbārka is ever eager to avoid the extremes and work out a happy synthesis between the conflicting claims of rivals and opposites.
That is why, in the sphere of philosophy, he tries to reconcile difference (bheda) with non-difference (a-bheda) or plurality with unity, by taking both to be equally real and compatible. In the sphere of religion, again, he strikes a happy balance between the rigid intellectualism of Advaita-vāda which denies a personal relation between God and man—and the impetuous emotionalism of later Vaiṣṇavaism which over-emphasizes such a relation—by giving a proper place to both reason and feeling, but not over-emphasizing one at the expense of the other. In the ethical sphere, no less, he manifests the same well-balanced judgment, the same commendable spirit of adjustment and broad-mindedness by providing for the manifold inclinations and capacities of the various types of human beings—scholars or workers, ascetics or householders, self-confident or timorous. It is this emphasis on the golden mean, this spirit of toleration and accommodation, this open-hearted generosity and catholicity that has made the doctrine of Nimbārka one of the popular philosophico-religious creeds in India.

NOTES

2. Brahma-sūtra, 2. 1. 32.
3. Taittiriya-Upaniṣad, 3. 6.
4. Sāstra-yaonīvā, B.S., I. 1. 3.

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CHAPTER XIV—continued

VEDĀNTA—THE VAISṆAVA (THEISTIC) SCHOOLS

D. VALLABHA (ŚUDDHĀDVAITA)

Life and Work.—Vallabha (A.D. 1473–1531), the advocate of the Śuddhādvaita (pure Non-dualism) system of Vedānta, was born of a learned Tailang brāhmin family living in a village called Kankaravad, about fifty miles to the north-west of Madras in South India. The parents of Vallabha left their home for Banaras, and Vallabha’s birth took place in a place called Campāraṇya near Raipur in the Central Provinces. The family belonged to the Taittirīya School of the Kṛṣṇa-Yajur-Veda, claimed Bhāradvāja as its gotra and scrupulously followed the karma-kāṇḍa by performing many soma sacrifices, with the result that it came to enjoy the title of Dīkṣita. It also followed a form of Vaiṣṇavism and worshipped the image of Gopāla. Starting with this spiritual legacy Vallabha received his education in Banaras, travelled thrice throughout the whole country, won laurels at the court of Vijayanagar, attracted a large following by his sermons, spent his life in Adel (a village about two miles from Allahabad), and breathed his last in Banaras, leaving two sons behind him. His connection with Viṣṇusvāmin is rather doubtful.1 He has written several works in Sanskrit some of which are not available in a complete form. His principal works include the commentaries on the Brahma-sūtra, the Jaimini-sūtra and the Bhāgavata, Tattvārtha-dīpa-nibandha and sixteen treatises.2 His mission was carried on by his descendants, and the line of his family continues even today; and there are at present about eighty male members in the family. The followers of Vallabha are generally found in the United Provinces, Rajputana, Saurāṣṭra, Gujarāt and Bombay, and belong to all the strata of society, from the order of princes to the most backward class.

Sources of Authoritative Knowledge.—Vallabha accepts four basic works as the highest authority for the solution of philosophical problems, viz. (1) the Vedas (including the Upaniṣads), (2) the Gītā, (3) the Brahma-sūtra, and (4) the Bhāgavata.3 These sources of knowledge are complementary to one another, and in case of doubts the preceding authority is to be interpreted in the light of the authority that follows in the above-mentioned order. As a natural consequence of this relative position, the Bhāgavata comes to enjoy a unique status in the School. From another point of view, the Vedas and the Brahma-sūtra form one group, while the Gītā and the
Bhāgavata form another group. The Bhāgavata has been, in fact, considered to be an exhaustive commentary on the Gītā, with full justification. There were several Schools of the Vedānta before Vallabha, and the founders of these Schools interpreted the sacred texts in their own way. The interpretation of Śaṅkara, for instance, evoked much criticism; and we are told that Vallabha was ordered by the Lord to appear in the world for bringing order out of chaos which resulted from Śaṅkara’s method of interpretation. Vallabha, therefore, describes himself as a missionary of the Lord, as a form of fire, and fulfils the mission by offering a different interpretation of the authorities, by criticizing the doctrines of Śaṅkara, and by opening the gates of the city of God to all, without any reservation.

That the problem of God in all its bearings has to be discussed solely in the light of the Sruti (revealed texts), there being no scope for independent reasoning, follows clearly from the authorities. Vallabha accepts this principle in toto, and interprets the sacred texts most literally, attaching equal importance to all passages, without caring to know what reason has to say on the point. This fundamental difference between Śaṅkara and Vallabha in the approach to the Vedic literature is responsible for the divergence in their philosophical views. Vallabha actually criticizes Śaṅkara for his complete reliance on dry logic in the discussion of metaphysical problems, and for the interpretation of the Sruti-texts so as to suit his preconceived notions, and remarks that he (Śaṅkara) is not a faithful interpreter of the sacred texts. Vallabha, therefore, naturally becomes a severe critic of Śaṅkara, and describes him as an incarnation of Mādhyamika Baudhā and a crypto-Buddhist, a remark offered by Bhāskara, Rāmānuja and others also.

Brahman.—The highest reality according to Vallabha is Kṛṣṇa known as Brahman in the Upaniṣads, Paramātman in the Bhāgavata, Puruṣottama (the Supreme Person) or the Lord Kṛṣṇa is, in fact, the highest God who represents the divine (Adbhutavīka) form of Brahman. He is one, and one only without a second, possesses all divine qualities, even attributes which are contradictory, and is absolutely devoid of material qualities. He is existence, intelligence and bliss. He is full of rasa (sweetness) and infinite joy which is His true form (ākāra), and from this point of view Vallabha describes the highest reality as possessed of form (sākāra-Brahman). He is eternal, unchanging, omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent. He has got the capacity to become anything and everything at any time, and this is what is generally known as His māyā-śakti. He possesses many powers such as knowledge, action, evolution and involution. He is absolutely free from all sorts of distinctions. He is the creator of everything and is both the material and efficient cause of the world. He is not different from the souls which emanate from Him. He is the enjoyer. All the attributes of God are quite
natural, and non-different from him. In short, Brahman possesses all qualities and is the origin of both nature and intelligence which lose their differences in Him, and in this respect Vallabha may be compared with the German philosopher Schelling. The world and souls are in essence one with Brahman, and consequently the system of Vallabha is known as Śuddhādvaita (pure non-dualism) as contrasted with the māyā-vāda of Śaṅkara. Brahman is absolutely pure, and is not affected in any way by anything like māyā (as in Śaṅkara’s theory). Moreover, both the cause (Brahman) and the effect (world) are pure and non-different from one another, and hence there is pure non-dualism. The whole Vedic literature describes Brahman only, in its various aspects. The Pūrva-kāṇḍa deals with Brahman’s quality of karmāṇ in the form of sacrifices, while the Uttara-Kāṇḍa deals with its quality of jñāna. The Gītā and the Bhāgavata, on the other hand, give a complete picture of Brahman in all its aspects.

Aksara-Brahman.—Vallabha accepts three forms of Brahman, viz. (1) Para-Brahman or Puruṣottama, (2) Antaryāmin, and (3) Aksara-Brahman. Krṣṇa or Puruṣottama is the Lord par excellence, full of rasa (sweetness) and ānanda (joy), and is the object of love and worship. The joy of Puruṣottama is infinite. He is, in fact, a complete undivided mass of bliss. He dwells in the souls in the form of Antaryāmin (inner-controller) who possesses limited joy. In the case of Aksara-Brahman, the joy is also finite. The Aksara-Brahman which is the spiritual (ādhyātmika) form of Para-Brahman, is the object of meditation by the wise (jñānins) who become one with it in their final stage. It is looked upon by the bhaktas as the foot and the abode of the Lord Krṣṇa (and in this capacity it is described as, caraṇa, parama-dhāman, vyoman, etc.). It is the Aksara-Brahman from which the souls, generally, emanate like sparks from fire. When the Lord desires to grant liberation through knowledge, He makes the Aksara-Brahman appear in four forms, viz. (1) Aksara, (2) time (kāla), (3) action (karmāṇ) and (4) nature (svabhāva). The Aksara form, then, appears as prakṛti and puruṣa, and becomes the cause of everything. The four forms referred to are eternal principles being one with God. When the joy of Aksara-Brahman is obscured by the will of the Lord at the time of creation, it is generally known as mukhya-jīva—a view which can be favourably compared with that of Auḍulomi who is of the opinion that the intelligent soul merges into the intelligent Brahman. Aksara as mukhya-jīva is, however, superior to souls. As a matter of fact, Aksara-Brahman possesses limited joy, and assumes the puruṣa incarnations of the Lord. The first will of the Lord, when it materializes, is known as prakṛti. The Aksara is higher than both prakṛti and puruṣa, and contains within it innumerable worlds. It is described in the Upaniṣads and the Gītā as avyakta, etc. The negative description of Brahman generally refers to Aksara-Brahman, which is lower than Puruṣottama, and similar to Śaṅkara’s Para-Brahman.
Vallabha rightly deserves the credit for the conception of Akṣara-Brahman which remained till then a forgotten chapter in Indian Philosophy.

World.—God is quite alone, and desires to be many. He desires to create the world for the sake of mere pleasure, and He actually creates it from His own self merely by His own desire, on the analogy of a spider and its web. The world comes out of the very essence (sva-rūpa) of Brahman, and not from the māyā, or the body, or the power of Brahman, as found in the systems of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja Nimbārka and others. In upholding the doctrine of the transformation of essence (sva-rūpasparināma), Vallabha remains most faithful to the Scriptural authority. God, therefore, happens to be both the material and efficient cause of the world; and although the Lord becomes the world by the process of modification (parināma), He does not suffer any change within Himself (a-vikṛta-parināma)—a position, although it fails to satisfy the test of logic, has to be accepted on the strength of the Śruti which is the final authority for Vallabha. The creation of the world is mere līlā (sport) on the part of God who is absolutely self-sufficient. The world is the sat (existence) aspect of Brahman, the other two qualities of Brahman, viz. intelligence and joy being obscured by the divine will. The world is, therefore, a real manifestation of Brahman, the physical (ādhibhautika) form of Para-Brahman, and is not an illusion. It is non-different from Brahman. The relation between Brahman and the world is that of cause and effect, and that of pure non-dualism, as there is nothing like Śaṅkara’s māyā to mar their purity. The world gives us an idea of the greatness of the Lord, and those who realize this greatness cannot but worship Him.

Everything in the world is Brahman, and different qualities manifest themselves in different objects at the will of the Lord, and the objects consequently are known by different names. But ignorance (māyā) obscures the vision of souls and creates in their mind another unreal (māyika) object similar to the real object in the world, and superimposes it on the real object. The result of this process is that objects are seen not in their true form but as possessing the imaginary (māyika) attributes superimposed on them by the deluding ignorance (vyāmohikā māyā). The imaginary object created thus is technically called viśayatā, while the real object as the manifestation of Brahman is called viśaya. The viśayatā is of two types; one is obscuring (the true nature of things) and the other is responsible for wrong impression. Those who have known Brahman can truly see the objects of the world as Brahman, and thus there is no error (a-khyāti) in their case, while others see only the imaginary objects (viśayatā), and hence there is apprehension of something else (anya-khyāti). The scriptural passages describing the world as māyā, really refer to this world of the individual’s erroneous experience (viśayatā), and not to the real world (viśaya) which is the manifestation of the Lord.

Vallabha draws a fine distinction between the real world and the unreal
world (saṁsāra) which is the creation of soul's ignorance. The saṁsāra consists of selfishness (ahaṁtā) and mineness (mamatā), and is destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman which the soul comes to possess. Vidyā and avidyā are the two powers produced by the māyā-sakti of the Lord, and have their own bearing on souls only. Vidyā has got five forms, viz. (1) renunciation (vairāgya), (2) knowledge (sāmkhya), (3) mental discipline (yoga), (4) penance and (5) devotion to Keśava. Avidyā also has its own five varieties, viz. (1) ignorance of one's own self, and the superimposition of the (2) inner organ, (3) vital breath (prāṇa), (4) senses and (5) body. When avidyā destroys avidyā of a soul, the creation of avidyā, viz. the saṁsāra, is automatically destroyed, and the soul enjoys full freedom. The world (jagat) is not destroyed by avidyā; but it is merged in the Lord when He desires to wind up the whole creation in order to enjoy within His own self. This distinction between the two worlds (jagat and saṁsāra) is a special contribution by Vallabha, who thereby succeeds in maintaining pure non-dualism. There are several ways of the creation of the world, according to the will of the Lord.

Soul.—At the time of the creation of the world, souls come out of the Lord or the Akṣara-Brahman, like sparks emanating from fire. Souls are many, eternal, atomic, and parts of Brahman. They are the knowers, agents and enjoyers. At the desire of the Lord, the quality of joy is suppressed in the soul which possesses the other two qualities of Brahman, viz. sat (existence) and cit (intelligence). The soul being the part of Brahman is non-different from it, and the pure non-dualism desired by Vallabha is not at all affected. The soul, although atomic in size, pervades the whole body by virtue of its quality of intelligence, on the analogy of a flower whose fragrance spreads in other places also. The soul is an intelligent reality, a part of Brahman, and not phenomenal as is the case with Śaṅkara. When the Lord desires to play the so-called game of the world, merely for the sake of pleasure—and pleasure is not possible without diversity—the element of joy becomes latent in the soul, and consequently the six divine qualities (bhaga) such as aśvārya, etc., are suppressed, and a fine variety of souls comes into being. The disappearance of the six divine qualities—(1) aśvārya, (2) vīrya, (3) yaśas, (4) śrī, (5) jñāna, and (6) vairāgya, from the soul is responsible for (1) dependence, (2) suffering of all miseries, (3) inferiority, (4) calamities of birth, etc., (5) ego and false knowledge, and (6) attachment to worldly objects respectively. In other words, the suppression of the first four divine qualities gives rise to the bondage of the soul, and that of the other two results in wrong knowledge. The soul is atomic, but when the suppressed element of joy becomes patent, the soul, like Brahman, enjoys omnipresence. The Scriptural passages mentioning the all-pervading nature of the soul refer to this aspect of the soul which, at the full manifestation of joy, has become Godlike. When the joy of the soul finds full expression,
innumerable worlds begin to appear in that soul which, then, knows no limitation of space. The soul is essentially one with Brahman.

The world is full of diversity, and souls stand on different levels. Although God has created such a world and made some happy and others unhappy, He is not open to the faults of partiality and cruelty, as the status of the world and souls is determined by the previous cycles of the world and the actions of the souls. As a matter of fact, the world and souls have come out of the very sva-rūpa of God, the whole universe is the self-creation (ātma-sṛṣṭi) of Lord, the creation by Lord from His own self, and hence there is no scope for any criticism.\(^\text{23}\)

*Means of Liberation.*—The temperamental differences in the world are responsible for the different ways of approaching God, and the Scriptures mention the three paths of action, knowledge and devotion, as the means of liberation. The emphasis on one of these three factors has resulted in differences among the different Schools of the Vedānta.

Vallabha has divided the souls into three classes in the descending order, viz. (1) puṣṭi, (2) maryādā, and (3) pravāha.\(^\text{24}\) Souls, which are aimlessly moving in the world, which are completely engrossed in it and which never think of God, belong to the class of pravāha (the current of the world), while those which study the Scriptures, understand the real nature of God and worship Him accordingly form the second class of maryādā (Law of Scriptures). The puṣṭi souls are, however, the chosen people of God, who worship Him most ardently out of their boundless love for Him. The souls are called puṣṭi (grace of God) as they are blessed enough to enjoy the divine grace, which enables them to realize the highest ideal.

Persons who live an objectionable life have to suffer and to move in the cycle of the world. Those who perform sacrifices for the fulfilment of desires or get their rewards accordingly and go to heaven, if desired, by the path of manes, and have to return to the world of mortals when their merit is exhausted. When a person performs *Vedic* sacrifices without any desire, he enjoys spiritual happiness (ātma-sukha), and later on when his life is over, assumes a new body according to the procedure laid down by the doctrine of five fires.\(^\text{25}\) In this new birth he gets the knowledge of God, and ultimately qualifies himself for union with Him by passing through the different stages of the path of gods. In the *Vedic* sacrifices, God manifests Himself in the forms of rituals (agni-hotra, darśa-pūrna-māsa, paśu, cāturnmāsa and soma); and those who worship the ritual power (kriyā-sākta) of God by performing these sacrifices and possess at the same time the knowledge of God, enjoy liberation in the form of divine joy.\(^\text{26}\) The liberation in the maryādā-mārga is gradual, as one is required to move spiritually by the path of gods. Immediate liberation is possible only through the grace of God.

There are, again, persons who come to possess the knowledge of God,
realize His presence everywhere in the world and devote their whole time to the meditation upon Him. These people, passing by the path of gods, merge in the Akṣara-Brahman which was the content of their knowledge. They consider Akṣara-Brahman as the highest reality and are not aware of anything else, such as Puruṣottama, the Supreme Person. But if these knowers of Brahman happen to worship Lord Kṛṣṇa, none is superior to them. These learned devotees of the Lord, at the end of their lives, become one with Him.²⁷

Devotion to Lord assumes different forms. There are nine varieties such as (1) hearing, (2) reciting, (3) remembering, (4) falling at the feet, (5) worship, (6) salutation, (7) service, (8) friendship, and (9) self-dedication.²⁸ These stages are in the ascending order, and show the progress of the devotee who ultimately comes to love God. One who studies the Scriptures realizes the greatness of God, considers Him as his own soul, and consequently bows down to Him out of strong boundless affection.²⁹ This kind of devotion which has been enjoined in the Scriptures and which is, therefore, practised accordingly, is known as maryādā-bhakti, and corresponds to the vaidhi-bhakti of other Vaiṣṇava Schools. The maryādā devotees generally enjoy union with Puruṣottama. Sometimes they enjoy the status of the Lord, or dwell in His vicinity, or remain in His place.

The Scriptures mention the aforesaid means for the realization of the goal, and declare in the same breath that the ultimate reality cannot be obtained by any means excepting God's grace.³⁰ Vallabha removes this contradiction by means of his theory of maryādā and puṣṭi. The knowledge and devotion which can be acquired by human efforts and which are recommended by the Scriptures, give rise to liberation called maryādā; while the liberation granted by God to those who have no means of approaching Him is known as puṣṭi. In the path of maryādā, the Lord desires to grant liberation according to the achievement of souls, while in the path of puṣṭi, the Lord wishes to liberate souls, although the latter have not acquired, even in the least, the means laid down in the Scriptures.³¹

The doctrine of election is, as with Augustine, a special feature of Vallabha’s system which is, therefore, otherwise known as puṣṭi-mārga. The devotees of the puṣṭi type have got natural love for Lord Kṛṣṇa, and do everything simply out of their boundless love for the Lord, as in the rāgānugā-bhakti of Bengal Vaiṣṇavaism. They, in all humility, solely depend on God and can enjoy divine bliss only when chosen by Him. In the path of maryādā, love for the Lord is the result of the nine forms of devotion, while in the puṣṭi-mārga, love is the starting-point which naturally results not only in the nine varieties of bhakti but in other spiritual activities also. Puṣṭi is thus the opposite of maryādā.

In the class of puṣṭi, the devotees are further divided into four categories according to their special qualities. The four types are (1) pravāha,
(2) maryādā, (3) puṣṭi, and (4) śuddha. The devotees of the first type are always engaged in the activities connected with the Lord, while those of the second type know the qualities of the Lord and worship Him. Devotees of the third type are omniscient, and those of the last type have got boundless love for the Lord, and are rare indeed! The gopīs are the best illustration of this. The puṣṭi devotees, in general, are first united with Puruṣottama without going through the stages of the path of gods, and the Lord, out of sheer grace, then brings them out, gives them a new divine form, and allows them to participate in His eternal sport (rāsa-lilā).32 The devotees of the highest order, like the gopīs, immediately enter into the Lord’s arena of sports, and enjoy the very bliss of the Lord for all time. In the eternal lilā, the devotee enjoys all sorts of pleasure in the company of the Lord who entirely places Himself at the disposal of the former. This is, according to Vallabha, the highest stage of liberation, the summum bonum.

Vallabha tells us that action, knowledge and formal devotion (maryādā-bhakti) had their day in the past, but they had ceased to be in his own time on account of unfavourable circumstances.33 It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to depend upon the grace of God for liberation. He who realizes his spiritual bankruptcy and utter helplessness naturally seeks the shelter of God, like an insolvent approaching a court of law for protection against his creditors. Such a person, a puṣṭi-bhakta, completely throws himself at the feet of the Lord by dedicating not only his own self but also all his belongings. He devotes his whole life to the service of the Lord, reads His account in the Bhāgavata, and minimizes worldly affairs, if any. Self-dedication does not leave any scope for selfishness and attachment to worldly objects, and the samsāra of the devotee automatically vanishes. The home of such a devotee becomes the temple of God, and the whole family can enjoy the divine happiness even in this world.34 The puṣṭi-bhakta loves God so intensely that he gives up all earthly loves and ignores the duties of class (varṇa) and order (āśrama). God Kṛṣṇa is rasa, ānanda, beauty par excellence, and Vallabha develops a special philosophy of aesthetics.35 Kṛṣṇa represents all the rasas (sentiments) in general, and śṛṅgāra-rasa (sentiment of love) in particular, and as śṛṅgāra has two aspects of union and separation, Kṛṣṇa exhibits them in His dealings with His devotees. The whole description of the boyhood of Kṛṣṇa, as given in the Bhāgavata, is most enchanting, and one who reads it indeed becomes God-intoxicated. All the actions of Kṛṣṇa in Gokul, which are full of philosophical significance, clearly show the wonderful efficacy of His grace, and it is for this reason that the boy form of Kṛṣṇa is recommended for worship. The gopīs were smitten with the marvellous beauty of Kṛṣṇa, became mad after Him, sacrificed all things at the altar of love, proved their sincerity by defying even Kṛṣṇa’s moral instructions, lost the company of the Lord on account of their
pride, expressed regret in a touching manner, won the Lord’s favour and enjoyed the divine bliss of His company.

It was by the grace of God that the gopīs cherished love for Him and could reach the goal. Whoever succeeds in establishing a permanent contact with God by any means such as love, anger, fear, affection, identity and friendship, undoubtedly enjoys the divine bliss.36

These are some of the ways of soul’s approach to God. The closest contact between God and soul is possible only through the ardent love of a lover and his beloved, and Rādhā is an embodiment of such love. Vallabha tells us that females alone are competent to enjoy the divine bliss, and it is well known that devotion is not possible without some kind of femininity.37 Some devotees worship Kṛṣṇa as their child and others as their lover. As a matter of fact all souls are females and their natural husband is Lord Kṛṣṇa.38 Every soul is, therefore, expected to love Kṛṣṇa, as a wife loves her husband, a theory which can be well contrasted with Sufism. The doors of the puṣṭi-mārga are thus open to all.

The puṣṭi-bhakti, as illustrated in the case of gopīs, although the highest ideal, is very difficult in the present circumstances. Vallabha, therefore, offers another happy solution in the form of self-surrender (prapattī) to God.39 All persons, irrespective of caste and nationality, can reach the goal by sustaining throughout the whole life the spirit of self-surrender and resignation to the will of God. With this mental attitude they may devote their life to the worship of the Lord, hearing and reciting the Scripture, the Bhāgavata.

The rāsa-līlā of Kṛṣṇa in Gokula is eternal, and the idea has been traced to the Rg-Veda.40 The conception of rāsa-līlā has been variously interpreted from the time of Śuka to the modern period.41 Vallabha understands it both literally and metaphorically. When it is taken in the literal sense Vallabha is most anxious to show that there is no tinge of sensualism, as God and all His activities are free from passion and as the reflection on the rāsa-līlā not only purifies a man but engenders in him devotion to the Lord.42 In the case of metaphorical interpretation there is no danger of the rāsa-līlā being misunderstood. The gopīs, according to Vallabha, are the Vedas or Srūtis, and the Srūtis are always connected with the Lord who is their only topic. The constant association of the Srūtis with the Lord is represented in the form of the rāsa-līlā.

Conclusion.—Vallabha taught the philosophy of Śuddhādvaita and the religion of puṣṭi on the authority of the Scriptures which are to him the final court of appeal. Some of his doctrines such as Brahman possessing attributes, transformation of Brahman into the world, the reality of the world, and combination of action with knowledge, were known even before Śaṅkara. The ideas of devotion, self-surrender and divine grace were current before Vallabha. What is, then, Vallabha’s own contribution to Indian Philosophy?
The doctrine of non-dualism, the conception of God as full of deliciousness (rasa) and joy, the coexistence of contradictory attributes in Brahman, the idea of Akṣara-Brahman, the theory of the creation of the world from the very form (sva-rūpa) of Brahman, the transformation of Brahman into the world without suffering any change, self-dedication to the Lord, emphasis on God's grace, and the aesthetic and emotional form of devotion are the special features of Vallabha's teaching.

Vallabha criticizes Śaṅkara for the doctrine of māyā, Bhāskara for his doctrine of upādhi, Rāmānuja for the trinity in the final stage, Nimbārka for his emphasis on dualism, Madhva for his advocacy of pure dualism, and the Śāktas for their doctrine of śakti as the efficient cause of the world. Vallabha holds that the Scriptures teach realistic (vāstavika) non-dualism which can be reconciled with devotion (a view expressed now by Śrī Aurobindo also) and not that monistic idealism as desired by Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara, as Radhakrishnan remarks, is unmatched for his metaphysical depth and logical power, and is supreme as a philosopher and dialectician.43 Vallabha, however, is matchless in his acceptance of the Scriptures as the final authority, and, naturally his system is purely theological and reminds us of Christian theology. Śaṅkara and Vallabha can, therefore, never agree.

Under direct instructions from Lord Kṛṣṇa, it is said, Vallabha started his mission of turning people to God, without any distinction of caste and nationality, by initiating them in the service of the Lord.44 Vallabha, like Plotinus, remarks that just as children immediately torn from their parents and for a long time nurtured at a great distance from them, become ignorant both of themselves and their parents, so also the souls separated from the Lord are suffering, and the earlier they are put again in His charge, the better for them. Vallabha's teaching elevated the life of all the sections of society and proved to be completely democratic. Painting, music and literature in Sanskrit, Hindi and Gujarati have richly flourished under the inspiration obtained from the system of Vallabha. And there has been a regular stream of mystics in the School of Vallabha who lost all individual life in an ecstasy of immediate union with God.

NOTES

4. T., II. 64, 218, 219.
5. Āra-bhāṣya (A.), II. 2, 26.
6. Subodhinī (S.) on Bhāgavata, I. 1, 1.
7. Brahma-sūtras (B.), I. 1, 2; II. 1, 27, etc.
8. A., II. 1, 14, 27, etc.; T., I. 24–7, 57, 64.
9. A., I. 1, 3, 12; II. 1, 14, 27; II. 3, 18; T., I. 1, 17, 18, 80–2.
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10. T., I. 6, 14; II. 118.
13. T., I. 12, 20; II. 90.
15. T., II. 98-103.
16. A., I. 4, 26; II. 1, 33; T., I. 27, 31-4.
17. T., I. 43, 44.
18. S., II. 9, 33; III. 26, 30.
22. A., III. 2, 5.
23. A., II. 1, 34; T., I. 78.
25. A., III. 1; T., II. 4-9, 254-68.
29. T., I. 43-5.
30. Mūndaka Up., III. 2, 3; Katha, Up., I. 2, 22; Śvet., III. 20, etc.
33. Kṛṣṇārāja; T., I. 50-2; II. 209-12, 215-17, 219-24.
34. T., I. 54; II. 249-50.
36. Bh., X. 26. 15; VII. 1. 30; S. on Bh., X. 84. 23.
38. S. on Bh., X. 26. 24; 44. 60.
40. RV., I. 154. 5, 6; 156. 3; 22. 18-21; VII. 100. 4; X. 113-14, etc.; YV., VI. 3; TŚ., I. 3. 6. 1; A., IV. 2. 15, 16; Vidvan-maṇḍana, pp. 279-349.
42. S. on Bh., X. 26. 42.
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CHAPTER XIV—continued

VEDĀNTA—THE VAIŚṆAVA (THEISTIC) SCHOOLS

E. CAITANYA (ACINTYA-BHEDĀBHEDA)

I. INTRODUCTION—RELATION TO OTHER SCHOOLS

The following account of Caitanya’s philosophy is mainly based on Daśa-mūla-śloka (the ten basic verses) ascribed by the Gauḍīya (Bengal) Vaiśṇavas to Caitanya himself.

It may be mentioned at the outset that though Caitanya’s spiritual preceptors (his dīkṣā-guru as well as saṁnyāsa-guru) were Madhvaites and Caitanya considered himself to belong to the Madhva sect and to be expounding the Madhvaite dualistic standpoint in his teachings, yet what he actually preached, as would appear from Daśa-mūla-śloka as well as from the accounts of his teachings by his disciples, was a form of bhedābheda or difference-in-non-difference which was very near the position of Nimbārka. Caitanya’s philosophy, as it has come down to us, is not undiluted dvaita-vāda or dualism emphasizing as it does not merely an eternal distinction between the Lord, the finite spirit, and the material world as we have in the Madhvaite interpretation of the Brahma-sūtra, but also an essential a-bheda or non-difference in spite of the eternally fixed distinction, an a-bhedā or non-difference despite difference which is not intelligible to the logical understanding. It should, therefore, be known as it rightly is, not as a form of dualistic personal Idealism as we have in Madhvaite Dvaita-vāda, but as a-cintya-bhedābheda or a form of idealistic Monism that reconciles all dualities in a superlogical unity or whole that surpasses strict logical comprehension.

Common to all Schools of Vaiśṇavas is their acceptance of the reality of the world and the rejection of māyā-vāda and its concept of jagannātha or falsity of the world as adopted by Śaṅkara. This is a common feature not merely of all Vaiśṇava sects but also of all Śaivas and Śāktas, i.e. all who acknowledge the authority of the Agamas and accord to them the status of revealed Scriptures. Caitanya as a Vaiśṇava is no exception in this respect so that while Śaṅkara would accord to Īśvara or the Lord as world-creator-preserver-and-destroyer an inferior status compared with the Indeterminate Brahman as the ultimate absolute Reality, the Caitanyaite as believers in the reality of the world would reverse the
relation, making nir-guna Brahman a passing phase or stage in the progress to the complete Truth which is the realization of Brahman as the Lord of Creation in intimate relations of love and affection with His creatures.

A second point is the Caitanyaite conception of the Lord and His energy or Sakti in the form of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā—a conception which distinguishes the followers of Caitanya, Nimbārka as well as Vallabha from those of Rāmānuja and Madhva, who conceive the Lord in the form of Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa with Lakṣmī as His Consort or Sakti in Vaikuṇṭha, which is to Rāmānuja and Madhva what paradise is to the Christians. The difference between the two conceptions of the Lord is radical and deep. In the conception of the Lord and His Sakti as Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa lording over Vaikuṇṭha and its denizens, what is emphasized is the Lord in His aspect of majesty (aśvarya), so that while one can prostrate oneself before Him and otherwise show one's reverence for His surpassing greatness and glory, one can do it only from a distance never daring to come in intimate living contact with Him. It is otherwise, however, in the conception of the Lord and His Sakti as Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa where one has a taste of the Lord's companionship in Vṛndāvana-līlā in intimate human social relationship as friend, child or beloved. It is described as the realization of the Lord in his mādhurya-rūpa or sweetness of intimate fellowship, and this is held by the followers of Caitanya, Vallabha, etc., to be a nobler, sweeter realization than the one that is afforded by the Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa concept with its stress on greatness and glory. In Siddhānta-ratna, mādhuryya-rūpa is described as one in which the Lord appears as human being amongst other humans without transcending the limitations of manhood (nara-rūpam anatikramya) as distinguished from the aśvarya-rūpa wherein the Lord appears in his transcendent glory and power (e.g. four-headed as in the case of the Lord's appearance in Dvārakā). Thus though both the forms afford scope for devotion or bhakti, yet while the latter affords scope for bhakti only as awe, submission and reverence, in the former bhakti takes the more intimate form of affection, fellowship and love.

2. SOURCES OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

Of the ten ślokas or verses of Daśa-mūla-śloka, the first deals with the question of pramāṇa or source of valid knowledge while the remaining nine verses expound the prameyās or ultimate objects of knowledge recognized by the followers of Caitanya.

According to the first śloka, the Vedas constitute the real pramāṇa and perception, inference and the so-called other pramāṇas are sources of valid knowledge in so far as they conform to the fundamental teachings of the Vedas and expound the nature of reality consistently with the
Vedic declarations. Mere logic has no competence in the determination of the ultimate reality. In so far as arguments are based on Vedic teachings and purport to expound the contents of Vedic declarations have they any scope in the determination of the spiritual reality. A reality that is spiritual surpasses the limits of ordinary, discursive thought. Ordinary thinking and reasoning follow in the wake of perception and have application therefore to such spatio-temporally limited objects as can be perceived by the senses. Therefore both perception and ordinary logical thinking are at home only in the domain of the sense-perceived material world (jaṭa-jagat). When, however, one has to deal with a reality that is spiritual not circumscribed in space and time as ordinary sense-objects are, perception and ordinary thought are of no avail and must be superseded by some higher mode of experience such as is attributed to sages and seers (rśis). Hence in the determination of the ultimate spiritual reality, the Vedas are our true guide—the Vedas, i.e. as the records of the higher, mystical experiences of seers and sages.

3. ULTIMATE REALITY

What are the deliverances of the Vedas as regards the prameyas or ultimate objects of knowledge? According to Caitanya and his followers, the teaching of the Vedas as regards the ultimate reality is as follows. Hari is the ultimate reality, i.e. Hari who is Bhagavat or the Lord. The halo of Hari's immaterial person or figure (aṅga-kānti) is the Indeterminate Brahman of Śaṅkara and a mere fraction of Hari’s essence (aṁśa) is the Paramātman or the supreme Self as the indwelling spirit of the created world. Hari is the whole (aṁśin) of whom Paramātman is the part (aṁśa) and Hari is the central reality of whom the radiating halo is the nir-viśeṣa Brahman. Hari is the unity of perfect beauty (śrī), perfect majesty (aiśvarya), perfect strength (vīrya), perfect glory (yaśas), perfect intelligence (jñāna) and perfect detachment (vairāgya). He is the embodiment of these six attributes in their unthinkable plentitude. These attributes are not all of the same rank, being related, as they are, as primary and subsidiary. Śrī or perfection of beauty is the most fundamental of these attributes being related as aṅgin (primary, principal or essential) to which majesty, strength and glory function as subsidiaries. What we call jñāna or intelligence and vairāgya or detachment in the Lord are only an effulgence of the Lord's attribute of yaśas or glory. Hence jñāna, and vairāgya, the two qualities which Śaṅkara stresses are attributes of a subsidiary attribute of the Lord and this explains why they appear as the halo of the Lord's person or figure. As these two attributes constitute the essence of Śaṅkara's Indeterminate Absolute, Brahman as thus conceived is no independent reality but only an adjectival aspect of Hari as
plenitude of being, joy and consciousness. Just as the light of a burning fire presupposes the fire as its source and substrate, so does the Indeterminate Brahman as the halo of the Lord presuppose the Lord’s spiritual person as its source and substrate. And Lord Hari in His completeness is the duality-in-unity of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā (as the Lord and His Śakti or energy), each bound to the other in inseparable bonds of devotion, love and affection.

What is known as the Paramātman or the indwelling spirit of the world is a fragmented or fractional Incarnation of Hari as the Lord in His completeness and perfection. Hari has created the world of māyā or nescience with the help of His two attributes of majesty and strength and having created it, has entered or charged it with a fraction of His essence in the form of Viṣṇu. Though a fraction of Hari, Viṣṇu as the world-soul does not yet fall short of the perfection and plenitude of the Lord Hari, who is His source. For it is true of the infinite spiritual reality that not only is it complete and infinite as an infinite, all-inclusive whole outside which nothing is, but also that a part (amīśa) of the infinite can also share the infinitude of the whole of which it is a part. And so it has been said that subtraction of even the infinite from the infinite leaves yet the infinite intact without diminution.

The question is raised as to how the Lord, Hari, who is infinitude of being, joy and consciousness yet has the form of Kṛṣṇa which is limited in space. To have a figure or form is not only to lose the property of ubiquitousness or infinitude but also to be limited in will and efficiency. In reply to this it is pointed out that the objection arises from a mistaken transference of the qualities of material bodies to objects which are spiritual in essence. So far as material objects are concerned, these, as unequal aggregations of sattva, rajas and tamas, reveal the properties of limitation in space and time so that for a material body to be in one place at one time is to be absent from all other places at the same time. But the figure of Lord is a spiritual form consisting of pure, unmixed sattva (śuddha-sattva), and not, as in the case of material bodies, of miśra-sattva or satva mixed with tāmasika and rājasika elements. And so while it is impossible for a material body to be in one place and also in all places at the same time, this is not at all impossible for a spiritual figure made of śuddha-sattva as the Lord’s person is. It is, in fact, one of the a-cintya or unthinkable attributes of the Lord that He may be limited and clearly defined in outline and figure and also be everywhere in His clearly distinguishable form at the same time.

The unthinkable properties which distinguish the Lord’s figure or person also characterize His sva-rūpa or essence and His manifold powers. The relation between the Lord’s essence or sva-rūpa and His manifold powers is one of unthinkable difference-in-non-difference so that while the Lord in one respect is non-different from the various energies (śakti)
He exercises, He has also a transcendent nature which is not exhausted in the different manifestations of His essence. Nor are the powers which the Lord exercises in His different manifestations intelligible in strict logical terms. The powers which the Lord exercises are, e.g. the different forms of His essential power or energy (sva-rūpa-śakti) as the ultimate spiritual reality, and yet this essential power He exercises in the three different forms of cit-śakti or power of illumination and intelligence, jīva-śakti or power of self-fragmentation and self-multiplication into finite selves and māyā-śakti or power of materialization and insentience in the form of inanimate world. How a sva-rūpa or essence which is inherently spiritual can yet appear as the insentience of a material world or how the infinite spiritual reality may yet split itself into innumerable limited spirits without prejudice to its integrity of being, is one of the mysteries of the ultimate Reality which defies logical resolution.

What precisely then, is this sva-rūpa-śakti which is supposed to function in the three forms of cit-śakti, jīva-śakti and māyā-śakti? Since the Lord’s essence (sva-rūpa) consists of being, consciousness and joy (sat, cit and ānanda), His inherent energy (sva-rūpa-śakti) must also consist of a joy (hlādinī) in being (sat) which is also the experience or consciousness (cit) of the joy in being. Thus the three aspects of the sva-rūpa-śakti are hlādinī corresponding to the joy, sanāthinī corresponding to the being and samvit corresponding to the experience or consciousness thereof.

The followers of Śaṅkara distinguish between the sva-rūpa-lakṣaṇa or intrinsic character and taṭastha-lakṣaṇa or extrinsic character of the Absolute, making of saccidānanda (being, consciousness and bliss) the essence or essential nature of the Absolute, and the relation to the created world and creatures, its taṭastha or extrinsic determination as arising only through the Absolute (Brahman) appearing falsely through the veil of nescience as creator, maintainer and destroyer of a world (śrṣṭi-sthitī-laya-kāryottva). Therefore for followers of Śaṅkara while being, consciousness and joy define Brahman’s nature truly, the relational characters are unreal appearances which do not belong to Brahman’s essence. Since for followers of Caitanya (as also for all Schools of Vaiṣṇavites) the world of experience is not an unreal appearance, the question of an absolute division between the sva-rūpa or essential and the taṭastha or relational characters does not arise. The taṭastha or relational characters are thus the sva-rūpa or essence itself in different aspects of its manifestation. And so for Caitanya and his School, what we call cit-śakti, jīva-śakti and māyā-śakti are not unreal appearances having no attachment to Brahman’s essence as the followers of Śaṅkara would say, but the diverse manifestations of the Lord’s sva-rūpa-śakti as hlādinī, self-enjoying, sanāthinī, self-realizing or self-positing and samvit, self-apprehending or self-conscious.

What, then is cit-śakti, and what is its character as a śakti or power
of the Lord’s essence (sva-rūpa) as being, joy and consciousness? As cit or intelligence, it is that śakti or energy in the Lord whereby He realizes His sva-rūpa as a spiritual unity-in-duality of the Lord and His śakti, i.e. the unity-in-duality of the Lord, Kṛṣṇa and His śakti, Rādhā, each as the other of the other and yet non-different from the other. In the aspect of hlādinī, this realization consists in the reciprocal love of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā just as in sandhinī it shows itself as the Lord’s immaterial world (Vṛndāvana) and its paraphernalia and as samvit as the experience of the joy or delight in this unity-in-duality. The cit-śakti is otherwise called antaraṅga-śakti, a centripetal force of concentration and inwardization whereby not only the whole is apprehended in its integrity as individual unity but also every element of the whole as the whole itself in an essential aspect of its being. It may thus be called a capacity to intuit the many as one and the one as many, a capacity to realize the spirit as a true spiritual unity obliterating all fixed distinctions and resolving external disjunctions into internal spiritual relations.

In direct contrast to cit-śakti is māyā-śakti which also is a form of the Lord’s sva-rūpa-śakti. While as cit-śakti, the sva-rūpa-śakti reveals the Lord as the ultimate spiritual reality as the all-inclusive spiritual unity of all that is, as māyā-śakti it reveals Him as the insentience of the material world and its atomic, sensuous values and interests. Māyā-śakti is thus otherwise described as the Lord’s bahiraṅga-śakti, a centrifugal force of self-dispersion and self-alienation in the Lord whereby the spiritual appears as sentient and purely material and the integral total point of view gives way to one of atomistic pluralism and particularism. Thus while in cit-śakti, the Lord’s essence or sva-rūpa appears in its intrinsic character as a spiritual unity integrating as well as transcending differences, in māyā-śakti there is a complete reversal of the outlook so that the integral, total viewpoint is substituted by one of fragmentation and particularization. And so while cit-śakti delivers the truth in its completeness without distortion, māyā-śakti gives us only an inverted image or imitation thereof (chāyā). In this way, through the influence of māyā-śakti, the particular appears not, as it really is, as a subservient element of the whole, but as itself the whole possessing absolute value and significance in itself. Further, while cit-śakti apprehends the spiritual as an immaterial spiritual reality, māyā-śakti reveals it as the insentience of the inanimate material world in which consciousness is in eternal slumber.

4. THE INDIVIDUAL—JĪVA

Between the complete truth as delivered by the Lord’s cit-śakti and the distorted imitation or copy thereof as presented by the Lord’s māyā-śakti, stands jīva-śakti which is the Lord’s sva-rūpa-śakti appearing in the
form of limited finite selves or spirits. As standing between the opposites of Truth and its distorted imitation, jīva-śakti reveals itself as a dual capacity for a spiritual as well as an unspiritual outlook. It is thus otherwise called tatastha-śakti suggestive of the dual nature of the finite individual as belonging to both earth and heaven at the same time. Just as the river-bank may be said to belong to the river as well as the surrounding land, so is the jīva the link between the Lord, in His intrinsic character as the all-inclusive spiritual reality and His extrinsic disrupted appearance as the insentience of a material world of unrelated particulars. The Lord, in other words, appears as jīva-śakti in so far as He splits Himself into infinitesimal spiritual monads bound to the Lord’s spiritual essence or sva-rūpa on the one side and limited by its appearance as a material world on the other. And so while the Lord remains essentially the infinite, all-pervasive spirit which He is, as jīva He becomes finite, limited, monadic, as liable to be led astray by the allurements of māyā-śakti as capable, in virtue of sharing the Lord’s spiritual essence, of extricating himself from the snare.

Since jīva-śakti is nothing but the Lord’s sva-rūpa-śakti in one aspect of its manifestation, it also must reveal, though in a limited form, the being, joy and consciousness that constitutes the Lord’s sva-rūpa or essence.

5. BONDAGE AND LIBERATION

The relation between the Lord and the jīvas is to be conceived on the analogy of a burning fire and the sparks which it throws out. Just as a burning fire gives off sparks from itself which share, in fragmented form, the nature of the source which gives them off, so does the Lord as the integral spiritual reality throw out jīvas as the sparks of its integral being. As such, jīva is both different and non-different from the Lord, non-different as being made of the Lord’s spiritual essence consisting of being, joy and consciousness, and different as sharing the essence in limited form conformably to its monadic nature. Hence while the Lord as the all-inclusive spiritual reality is māyādhīśa in the sense of being master and director of His māyā-śakti whereby He causes insentience and fragmentation to appear in His integral spiritual essence, the jīva as sharing the Lord’s essence in a monadic infinitesimal form is liable to be mastered and subjugated by māya (māyādhiṣa). The Lord’s māyā-śakti, in fact, functions in two different forms, viz. (1) as pradhāna causing the appearance of the insentient material world, and (2) as avidyā or power of nescience in the jīva causing it to forget its real nature as eternally subservient to the Lord and making it set up as an independent absolute possessing self-existence. It is avidyā and the forgetfulness that it produces that account for the undivine self-assertion of the finite self and
this explains the exaggerated values that are ascribed to the finite as such and the suffering and frustration that result therefrom.

The material world, though a product of māya-sakti, and its power of distortion, is not, however, an unreal appearance. On the contrary as a product of the Lord's sva-rūpa-sakti in the aspect of māya-sakti, it shares the reality of its source and is a very real snare to the limited, monadic jīva. But while it is true that as a real material world it is the source of a very real confusion in the individual jīva, it is also equally true that it is not eternal or everlasting either in itself or in its influence on the finite spirit. In fact, the material world has significance only as a house of correction wherein the individual in its deluded egoism and god-forgetfulness learns through repeated frustrations and failures the vanity of its earthly ways and turns at last to the divine way as the truth and essence of its being.

What, then, is this divine way as distinguished from the undivine and the earthly way? It is, according to the followers of Caitanya, a way of life in accordance with the jīva's true nature, the way, i.e. of bhakti, self-dedication and love wherein the finite spirit awakes to a realization of its real status as a spark of the divine Spirit and eternally subservient to its will. The earthly way is the way of self-will and self-assertion whereby the individual forgetful of its eternal subservience sets itself up as an independent absolute with a spurious claim to have its own way in all things. It is only as by repeated frustration and failure it learns the lesson of its real limitations that it begins to reflect on its true nature and realize its position as a subservient element of the spiritual whole. This marks the dawn of spiritual enlightenment wherein, through the school of suffering and frustration, the jīva perceives at last the error of its earthly ways and awakes to a realization of its true being, not as a self-existent, independent absolute as it mistook itself for, but as eternally subservient to the Lord. What at first comes as a shock of disappointment and failure and, through subsequent reflection on the cause, becomes an intellectual comprehension of the finite nature as a subservient factor of the whole, gradually spreads over the whole being of the finite spirit permeating its thoughts, its emotions and its will. In this way what at first appears as abstract, cold intellectual assent becomes at last a complete self-giving, an unconditional self-dedication of the whole nature, intellectual, emotional and conative. This stage, according to the followers of Caitanya, shows bhakti at its highest reach, wherein not only self-will gives way to the will of the Lord in all things, but all finite values, including the social and moral values of finite group life, are merged in and subordinated to the integral absolute life. When this stage is reached, there is straining of the entire personality towards the integral, whole life—a straining of the soul which is not merely contemplative surrender, which, at its best, is only negative self-emptying, but
also a burning desire as a soul-hunger and a soul-thirst that will not be appeased by anything short of the integral complete life. This is rāgātmikā-bhakti—bhakti not merely as an intellectual seeking or discovery, but a straining in every fibre of being for the integral, absolute life as an eternally subservient element of the Whole. The culmination of rāgātmikā-bhakti is mahā-bhāva which in the jīva is the limitation of its divine archetype as represented in the reciprocal love of the Lord, Kṛṣṇa and His śakti, Rādhā, the love that makes each find its fulfilment in the other and feel incomplete and void in the absence of the other.

Bhakti which defines the jīva's spiritual destiny is only life according to jīva's true nature as a monadic fraction of and therefore eternally subservient to the Lord's perfection and fullness of being. As such, bhakti is something that belongs to the jīva by nature and is not an acquisition or addition ab extra to the regenerate soul. All jīvas, in other words, are by nature bhaktas or devoted servants of the Lord as fractions of His essence or swa-rūpa as being, joy and consciousness. This inherent bhakti or devotion in the jīva is eternally manifest in the nitya-muktas, the eternally free souls, who constitute the Lord's constant attendants in Vaikuṇṭha and Vṛndāvana, and who, as denizens of these divine spheres, live permanently beyond the range of māyā-śakti and never fall a victim to its allurements. It is otherwise with the baddha-jīvas, the earth-bound souls, who live within the sphere of māyā's influence and are therefore liable to be deluded and led astray by its charms. In their case the inherent bhakti lies dormant at first till the individual through the hard school of experience realizes the error of his earthly ways and discovers at last the divine way as the path to the fulfilment of his spiritual destiny. When this happens, the inherent bhakti in the jīva awakes from slumber and reveals the individual in his true character as a servant eternally bound to the Lord by the bond of service, devotion and love. The awakening to bhakti and love in the case of the earth-bound soul is thus a reminiscence or self-discovery rather than an acquired quality.

Besides the two broad classes of jīvas as baddha or earth-bound and nitya-mukta or eternally free, there are sub-classes of earth-bound souls corresponding to their level of spiritual perfection and progress. Thus we have not merely the three classes of plants, animals and humans amongst the earth-bound souls but also amongst the humans themselves different levels of spiritual perfection and progress. For example, while some humans live a purely earthly life in utter forgetfulness of their real status as eternal servants of the Lord, there are others who prefer a spiritual life of devotion and love consistently with their destiny as monadic fractions of the absolute Spirit. The idea of the finite spirit as finite, limited and therefore eternally dependent on the Absolute as the inclusive whole is the beginning of bhakti. When the abstract idea through
heightening of consciousness becomes intensified into an intuition, the bare thought has passed over into the warmth and intimacy of devotion and love. Bhakti psychologically is thus knowing intensified and transformed into an intuitive realization—intellection, consciousness or thought so condensed and concentrated (cid-ghana) as to amount to a living, presentative experience. Thus while in the content aspect bhakti is the realization of the jīva's eternal dependence on the Lord, psychologically it is a form of intellectual intuition which transforms the entire personality, intellectual, emotional and conative.

The relation between the Lord, the jīvas and the material world is, as already noted, a relation of unthinkable difference-in-non-difference, not definable in strict logical terms. While jīva-śakti and māyā-śakti are themselves aspects of the Lord's sva-rūpa-śakti, yet the Lord has also a transcendent nature which remains complete and unchanged in spite of His exercise of the different powers. And while the Lord as both immanent in and also transcending the functionings of His various powers reveals Himself in unthinkable difference-in-non-difference from the powers He exercises, the powers themselves as cit, jīva and māyā-śaktis are also beyond comprehension both severally and in their mutual relation.

This is why the followers of Caitanya describe their standpoint as a-cintya-bhedābheda which must be distinguished alike from Brahma-vivartta-vāda and Brahma-parināma-vāda. While vivartta-vāda regards the world-appearance as an adhyāsa or false appearance in the eternally accomplished absolute Reality reducing the world thereby to an unreal appearance that does not affect Brahman’s essence, the followers of Caitanya consider the world to be real as a house of correction for the jīva or finite soul though in unthinkable difference-in-non-difference from the absolute Reality. In Brahma-parināma-vāda again the world, though considered to be real, is yet taken to be a parināma or substantial modification of Brahman, the absolute Reality. As against this view, bhedābheda offers the doctrine of Sakti-parināma-vāda explaining the world and finite spirits not as the substantial modification of Brahman itself, but as the transformation of its a-cintya-śakti, i.e. of the inscrutable powers of its sva-rūpa as cit-jīva- and māyā-śakti. This, while saving the integrity of Brahman in its transcendent being yet makes it one with the world through its supreme powers in an unthinkable difference-in-non-difference.

NOTE

1. Such bhakti is possible only amongst the angels, the eternally free spirits who are the Lord’s constant attendants in His immaterial world (Braja-dhāman). For the earth-bound soul what is possible is its imitation or copy in the form of rāganugā-bhakti, a devotion that follows in the wake of its original in the Lord’s immaterial world.
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Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa: Siddhānta-ratna.
Jiva Gosvāmin: Śat-sandarbha.
Rūpa Gosvāmin: Laghu-bhāgavatāmyta.
Kedāranātha Bhaktivinoda: Jaiva-dharma.
Kedāranātha Bhaktivinoda: Caitanya-śikṣāmṛta.
CHAPTER XV

ŚAIVA AND ŚĀKTA SCHOOLS

A. ŚAIVA-SIDDHĀNTA

1. RELATION TO OTHER SCHOOLS

ŚAIVA-SIDDHĀNTA is the name by which Tamil Śaivaisms is known. The expression literally means "the settled conclusion or final position of Śaivism"; and it serves to distinguish the system from non-Śaiva Schools as well as from other types of Śaivism. The systems of thought other than the Siddhānta are classed under four heads: (1) purap-purac-camayanam (outermost); (2) purac-camayan (outer); (3) ahaip-purac-camayanam (inner); and (4) ahac-camayanam (innermost). The heterodox Schools like the Lokāyata, Jaina and Baudhā are outermost in the sense that they are farthest removed from the Siddhānta. They had no belief in the Veda, nor in God. The next grade of Schools which are called outer are: Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Ekātma-vāda, Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Pāñcarātra. Though they recognize the authority of the Veda, they do not accept the Śivāgamas as authoritative. The inner Schools are some types of Śaivism, like Pāṣupata, Mahāvrata, Kāla, Vāma, Bhairava and Aikya-vāda which, while regarding Śiva as the supreme God, do not agree to the scheme of categories set forth in the Siddhānta. The last group of Schools which is called innermost also consists of varieties of Śaivism, such as Pāṣana-vāda-Śaiva, Bheda-vāda-Śaiva, Siva-sama-vāda, Siva-saṅkrānta-vāda, Iśvara-avikāra-vāda and Śivādvaita. These accept all the categories detailed in the Siddhānta; but they differ from it in defining some of the categories. Thus through a criticism of the rival systems from the most remote to the most proximate, the Siddhāntin, following the usual philosophic procedure, seeks to establish his view. Here we shall content ourselves with merely expounding the principal tenets of the Siddhānta. But before we proceed to that task we shall briefly mention the important authorities on the Siddhānta School of Śaivism.

2. THE CANONICAL SCRIPTURES

The primary sources of Śaivism are the twenty-eight Śivāgamas, of which the Kāmikā is the most important. The authority of the Vedas is also recognized. Saint Tirumūlar, author of the Tiru-mandiram says, "The
Agama, as much as the Veda, is truly the work of God; the one (Veda) is general and the other (Agama) special; though some consider these words of the Lord, the two antas, to be different, for the great no difference exists."

References to Śiva and the worship offered to him in South India are to be found in the earliest extant literature in Tamil, viz. the works of the Saṅgam age. The great period of Śaivaism, however, was when the sixty-three canonical saints,1 called nayanmārs or adiyārs lived and showed to the people the way of devotion to Śiva. Of these, Appar, Tiru-jñāna-saṁbandṭhar, Sundaramūrti and Māṇikkavācakar,2 are honoured as the great teachers of Śaiva religion (samayācāryas). The hymns sung by the first three constitute the Tevāram; of the Tiru-vācakam of Māṇikkavācakar, it has been said that he whose heart is not melted by it must have had a stone for his heart.3

The four great saints referred to above did not attempt any systematic exposition of the Śaiva doctrines. This task was left to the teachers who followed them. The most important of the santānācāryas, as these later teachers are called, are Meykaṇḍadeva, Aruṇandhi-sivācārya, Maṟai-jñāna-saṁbandha and Umāpati-sivācārya. Meykaṇḍa’s Siva-jñāna-bodham (thirteenth century A.D.) is the basic text of the Śaiva-Siddhānta philosophy. The tradition about this work is that it is a Tamil rendering made by Meykaṇḍa of the Pāsa-vimocana section of the Raurava-Āgama. But this is now disputed by some scholars who believe that the Tamil Siva-jñāna-bodham is an original work of Meykaṇḍa. There are twelve sūtras (aphorisms) in the Siva-jñāna-bodham with a vārttika (commentary) written by the author himself. Aruṇandi’s Siva-jñāna-siddhīyār has justly become famous as the classic of Śaiva-siddhānta. In the first part called “para-pakṣa” alien Schools are refuted; in the second part, “supakṣa” (Sanskrit sva-pakṣa), the tenets of Śaiva-siddhānta are expounded, closely following the Siva-jñāna-bodham. Maṟai-jñāna-saṁbandha is not known to have written any work. But his disciple, Umāpati-sivācārya, wrote several treatises expounding the Siddhānta. One of them is Siva-prakāśam, a book of one hundred verses.

3. MAIN CATEGORIES

The main categories of Śaiva-siddhānta are: pati (God), paśu (soul), and pāśa (bond). According to this system, God, soul and matter are all-real; and so the Siddhānta is a pluralistic realism.

God is the highest reality in the Siddhānta system. He is referred to as pati, because he is the only lord of all beings. The very first sūtra of Siva-jñāna-bodham gives an argument for the existence of God. It reads thus: “The universe which is diversified as ‘he,’ ‘she’ and ‘it,’ and is
subject to the three-fold change (viz. origination, sustentation and destruction) must be what is created (by an efficient cause). Owing to its conjunction with the ānava-mala (impurity of ignorance), it emanated from Hara (God), to whom it returns at the time of dissolution. Hence the learned say that Hara is the first cause.” Just as artifacts cannot be produced except by an artisan, so the world, in order that it may come into being, exists for a while, and then gets dissolved to be re-created after some time, needs a creator who is God. God Himself, however, does not change. “Just as time, the producer of all change, itself remains without change,” says Meykanţa, “so God who creates, maintains and destroys the world without any extraneous means, and by His mere will remains without change.” He is the unchanging ground of all that changes. The world is an artifact of God.

God is designated in the Siddhānta by such names as Hara and Śiva. He is Hara in the sense that he removes the bonds of the soul, as also in the sense that in Him the world gets resolved. He is called Śiva, because He is the supreme bliss. He may be referred to by any of the three genders corresponding to the three-fold form in which the universe appears, viz. as “he,” “she,” and “it.” He may be called Śivah, Śivā, or Śivam. All the names of Śiva may be rendered thus in the three genders. Maṇikka-vācakar says: “Lo, behold! He is the male and the female and the neuter.”

The Śiva of the Śaiva-siddhānta is superior to the Tri-mūrtis, Brahma, Viṣṇu and Rudra. It is significant that in the terminology of popular Hinduism, the terms Īśvara and Maheśvara refer to Śiva. And it is the claim of the Siddhāntin that even as identified with Rudra, the third of the Hindu Trinity, Śiva is superior to the other two in the sense that in pralaya Rudra alone stands unaffected, while even Brahma and Viṣṇu are affected in a way. The function of Rudra is continuous and lasts through srṣṭi, sthitī and saṁhāra, whereas Brahma and Viṣṇu have no function to perform in the period of saṁhāra or pralaya. In the language of the Śvetāsvatara-Upaniṣad, “Rudra is the one god; there is no second to him. He rules all the worlds with his ruling powers. He creates all beings, protects them, and merges them together at the end of time.”

God for the Siddhāntin is nir-guṇa. But the expression does not mean “attributeless” as in the system of Advaita; it only means “devoid of the guṇas of prakṛti, viz. satvaa, rajas and tamaś.” It is in this sense that Tīrūmālar uses the phrase “mukkuṇa-nirguṇam” (free from the three guṇas). Śiva is the Turiya (the fourth), and is beyond the states of waking (jāgṛat), dreaming (svapna) and sleep (suṣupti), which are conditions respectively of the three guṇas or prakṛti, satvaa, rajas and tamaś.3 Says Meykanţa: “Will not the Lord who is nir-guṇa, nir-mala (devoid of impurities), eternal bliss, tat-para (superior to all things) and incomparable, and appears to the soul when the latter gets rid of the categories such as
ether, etc., will not He appear (to the soul) as a surpassing wonder and as the inseparable light of its understanding?  

Usually eight qualities are attributed to Śiva. They are: independence, purity, self-knowledge, omniscience, freedom from mala, boundless benevolence, omnipotence and bliss. In Tirukkural, God is described as en-guṇattān (endowed with eight qualities). In Śiva are all perfections ensured. There is no limit to His greatness. The sixth sūtra of Śiva-jñāna-bodham declares that God is spoken of by the wise as Śiva-sat or cit-sat. As cit (pure consciousness) or Śiva, He is incomprehensible and transcends human intelligence. As sat or Being He is to be realized through divine wisdom. He is above the known, and yet He is not unknown.

Śiva is immanent in the universe and also transcendent. He is viśva-rūpa (of the form of the universe) and viśvādhika (more than the universe). Almost every Śaiva saint has sung the praise of both these aspects of God. Śiva appears in the form of the universe; but the universe does not exhaust his nature. He is with form and is formless as well. The conception of Aṣṭa-mūrtā (Śiva in eight forms) brings out the aspect of God’s immanence. Māṇikkaṇṭhācākaṇṭa sings:

“Earth, water, air, fire, sky, the sun and the moon,  
The sentient man—these eight forms He pervades.”

Appar describes Śiva as these eight forms, as the sacrificer (yajamāna), as good and evil, as male and female, as the form of every form, as yesterday, today and tomorrow. The view that is implicit in such descriptions is not to be confused with pantheism; for Śiva or God exceeds the world, while being its ground. Meykāṇḍa says that Śiva is beyond perception and thought. Māṇikkaṇṭhācākaṇṭa declares that, though the supreme Śiva became man, woman, and what is neither, ether, fire, nor the final cause, He transcends all the forms. He has no name, no form and no marks whatever.

God in the Śaiva-siddhānta is the operative cause of the world, and not its material cause also, as in some Schools of the Vedānta. The Siddhānta is not Brahma-parināma-vāda; it is prakṛti-parināma-vāda, and in this respect resembles the Sāṃkhya doctrine. It is māyā that is the material cause of the world, as clay is of pot. But mere clay will not transform itself into a pot, since for such transformation the activity of an agent, viz. a potter, is required. So also, for creating the world out of māyā an operative cause is essential; and that is God. Here, of course, there is difference between the Siddhānta and the Sāṃkhya. God creates the world, being its operative or efficient cause, through His sakti which serves as the instrumental cause, even as the potter makes his pots by operating on his wheel. The analogy of the potter, however, should not be pressed too far. The potter has only finite intelligence and limited power; and he plies his wheel in order to eke out a living. Not so is the
Lord, Who is omniscient and omnipresent, and has no ends of His own to accomplish. He is satya-saṅkalpa and āpta-kāma; His resolves are all true, and His desires are eternally accomplished. He makes the world evolve in order that souls may be saved through the removal of their impurities. Śiva has five functions: tirodhāna (obscuration), srṣṭi (creation), sthitī (preservation), saṃhāra (destruction), and anugraha (grace). Of these, the first four have the last one as their goal. The world-process is for the sake of the soul’s release; and it in no way affects God’s nature. Śiva remains the same whether the world evolves or not. The sun is impartial and the same to all things; but because of him, such diverse phenomena as the blooming of the lotus, the emission of heat by the burning-glass and the evaporation of water, etc., take place.9 It is the same sun that makes some lotuses bud, some bloom and some others wither away. Similarly, but for the power of God nothing would move, and the world-process would be impossible. Yet God’s nature remains unaltered by what happens to and in the world.

The Siddhāntin does not favour the doctrine of avatāra (incarnation). The author of the Śiva-jñāna-siddhiyār10 says that, while the other gods are subject to birth and death, suffering and enjoyment, Śiva, the consort of Umā, is free from these. Śiva has no incarnations; for without karman there can be no incarnation, and Śiva has no karman. Bodies that are born and are seen to die are the products of karman. God does not take on a body in the way the transmigrating soul does. This does not mean that God cannot appear in bodily form. He does appear in the form in which He is worshipped by His devotee and also in the forms that are required to save the soul.11 But all such forms are not made of matter; they are the expression of His grace. One of the precious modes in which He appears is that of the guru (teacher) whose purpose it is to save the struggling soul from saṁsāra. The conception of God as love and grace figures as a frequent theme in the hymns of the Śaiva saints. Tīrūmālar says in one of his memorable verses that only the ignorant distinguish between God (Śiva) and love (anbu), and that wisdom lies in identifying the two.12

Of the three categories of the Śaiva-siddhānta, viz. pāti, pāsu and pāsa, we have now explained the nature of the first which is the most fundamental category in the sense that it is the only independent substance. Before proceeding to understand the nature of the soul and its bonds, the other two categories, let us examine the nature of the world and its evolution, for it is the world that provides the soul with locations, vehicles and objects of finite experience.

Māyā is the material cause of the universe. The Siddhāntin argues on the basis of sat-kārya-vāda,13 that the universe which is an effect must have a material cause which is not different from it in nature. The universe is non-intelligent (a-cit): and God who is intelligence (cit) cannot be its material cause. So a material cause which is non-intelligent has to be
postulated. That is māyā. Māyā is so called because the universe is resolved (mā) into it, and is evolved (yā) from it. It is the primal matrix out of which the universe is made. It is from māyā that the souls are endowed with bodies (tanu), organs (karāṇa), worlds (bhuvana), and objects of enjoyment (bhoga). By itself, however, māyā cannot function, because it is non-intelligent. It requires intelligent guidance which is provided by Śiva. Śiva operates on māyā, not directly, but through his cit-sakti. Thus guided, māyā throws forth from itself the tattvas (principles) that constitute the universe.

The Siddhāntin makes a distinction between two orders of evolution, one pure (śuddha) and the other impure (a-śuddha). Māyā is, accordingly, two-fold, pure and impure, śuddha-māyā and a-śuddha-māyā. It is pure when it is not mixed with ānava and karman, and impure when it is mixed with them.

Śuddha-māyā which is also called mahā-māyā and kuṭilai is operated on by Śiva Himself through His sakti in its threefold aspects, viz. icchā (desire), jñāna (knowledge) and kriyā (will). There are five evolutes of śuddha-māyā: nāda, bindu, sādākhya, māheśvarī and śuddha-vidyā. Nāda is śiva-tattva, while bindu is sakti-tattva. The former is the result of the operation of jñāna-sakti on śuddha-māyā; the latter arises when kriyā-sakti operates on nāda. Jñāna and kriyā saktis operating on bindu in an equal measure produce sādākhya. From this, māheśvarī is derived when more of kriyā-sakti is active along with jñāna. And from māheśvarī, śuddha-vidyā is evolved when jñāna-sakti is the dominant operative factor. These five evolutes of śuddha-māyā are collectively known as śiva-tattvas or preraka-kānda.

From śuddha-māyā is evolved also the system of sounds. The forms of sound are four. The first is pāra which is absolutely supreme and subtle. The second is paśyanti which is relatively gross and yet undifferentiated, like the colours of the peacock in the contents of a peahen’s egg. The third is madhyamā which is grosser still and differentiated, but not articulate. The fourth is vaikhari which is articulate sound. Meaning is made known by a capacity (sakti) which is manifested through letters and words. The grammarians give the name sphaṭa to this capacity. It resides in nāda-tattva, the first evolute of śuddha-māyā.

The rest of the principles in the Siddhānta scheme of evolution arise out of a-śuddha-māyā which is also called adho-māyā (the downward māyā) or mohini (that which deludes). Śiva does not act on a-śuddha-māyā, because of its impurity. Over the remainder of the evolution it is the divinities like Sadāśiva and Rudra who proceed from śuddha-māyā that presides. Sadāśiva produces from a-śuddha-māyā by means of his sakti three principles, viz. kāla (time), niyati (destiny or necessity), and kalā (lit. particle), and from kalā two more principles, viz. vidyā (knowledge) and rāga (attachment). These five tattvas constitute the sheaths or cloaks.
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(paśca-kaṇcuka) of the soul. As conditioned by these sheaths, the soul becomes what is called puruṣa-tattva. Prakṛti which is the counterpart of puruṣa arises out of kalā by the activity of Rudra. The five sheaths along with puruṣa and prakṛti are known as vidyā-tattvas; and they constitute what is called bhogayitr-kāṇḍa, the part of evolution which brings about enjoyment, as distinguished from preraka-kāṇḍa which is the directive part consisting of the evolutes of śuddha-māyā, as already noticed.

From prakṛti in its avyakta (unmanifest) state arise citta and buddhi (intellect). From buddhi evolves ahamkāra (individuality). There are three varieties of ahamkāra, distinguished by the predominance, respectively, of sattva, rajas and tamas. The names which ahamkāra acquires in these three forms are tajjasā, vaikṛta and bhūtādi. From the tajjasā ahamkāra the organs of sense and manas (mind) are derived, from the vaikṛta the organs of action, and from the bhūtādi the subtle elements called tanmātras. From the tanmātras are produced the gross elements (mahā-bhūtas). With these the evolutionary scheme is complete, consisting of thirty-six principles.
Māyā is one of the bonds (pāśas) of the soul. It provides the soul with the means, locations and objects of enjoyment called bhogya-kāṇḍa. The world of māyā is usually referred to as a-sat. This expression, however, does not mean that the world is "non-existent" or "unreal"; it only means that the world is other than God who is sat. In the sense that māyā is a-cit or non-intelligent, it is a-sat.

Souls are by nature infinite, pervasive and omniscient. But because of their association with impurities (malas) or bonds (pāśas), they experience themselves as finite, limited and parviscent. They are called pāśu because they have pāśa (bonds). The three malas that bind the soul to the course of transmigration are ānava-, karma- and māyā.-16 (1) Ānava-mala is a connate impurity. It is in the Śaiva-siddhānta what avidyā is in Advaita-Vedānta. It deludes the soul and makes it a victim of saṁsāra. It is called ānava because on account of it the infinite soul becomes finite or atomic (aṇu), as it were. It is a positive entity which is beginningless and resides in the soul, like the green patina on copper. It is called mūla-mala, because it is the original cause of the soul’s bondage. It is described as the impurity of darkness (irul-malam), because it deludes the soul. It is non-intelligent; and so it has to be operated upon by the Lord through his power of obscuration (tirodhāna-śakti), which for that reason is itself called a mala. (2) Karma-mala is the bond forged by deeds. The soul, with its cognitive and conative powers limited by ānava, acts and enjoys—acts in order to enjoy the fruits of its deeds, and enjoys the results of its past works. Prompted by appetite and aversion, the soul acts in certain ways and acquires merit and demerit which constitute the impurity of karman. The soul’s transmigratory course is conditioned by karman. Since karman is a blind force, it needs the guidance of Śiva. And it is through the grace of Śiva that the soul could gain release from the stronghold of karman. (3) Māyā-mala, which is the third impurity, is the material cause of the universe. It endows the soul, as we have already explained, with a psycho-physical organism and provides it with worlds and objects of enjoyment. The three malas together constitute the bondage of the soul; they are in beginningless association with it. Like the bran, husk and sprout of paddy, they bind the soul differently, and are to be distinguished from one another.

The Siddhāntin classifies souls into three groups: sakala, pralayākala and vijñānākala. "Kalā" means a part or particle; and here it refers to the conditions of empirical existence. The sakala-jīva is the soul which is endowed with all the empirical conditions of existence, and is associated with all the three kinds of bonds. The pralayākala is the soul as it exists in pralaya (i.e. the period of cosmic dissolution) rid of māyā and its evolutes. Because of the continued presence of karman besides ānava, the pralayākala becomes sakala again when there occurs fresh creation. The vijñānākala is the jīva from which karman too has been removed, besides māyā;
and only ānava remains for it. It resides in the world constituted by śuddha-māyā, and has no need to return to empirical existence. It is in a state fit for release, which it attains when through the grace of Śiva the impurity of ānava is removed from it. The states of the three classes of souls are called, respectively, sakala-avasthā, kevala-avasthā and śuddha-avasthā.

One of the characteristics of the jīva, according to the Siddhāntin, is that it assumes the nature of the entity with which it is associated. Meykanda speaks of it as adu-adu-ādal (becoming that and that). The soul, like a crystal, reflects whatever it is united with. It takes on the colour of its environment. When in bondage it reflects the nature of mala; when in release it acquires the nature of Śiva. For this reason, the soul is described as sad-asat. It becomes a-sat when it leans towards mala, and sat when it inclines towards Śiva. In the kevala-avasthā it is a-sat; in the sakala-avasthā it is sad-asat; in the śuddha-avasthā it is sat.

The jīva is related to Śiva as body to soul. God’s relation to the soul is also explained by the analogy of the relation of the letter a to all other letters. The Siddhāntin describes this relation as a-dvaita, by which expression he does not mean non-difference (a-bheda) but only non-separateness (ananyatva). As an entity, the soul is different from God; in nature, it is similar to God. Even in release it retains its entititative distinctness. The argument for the plurality of souls which is advanced by the Siddhāntin is the familiar one based on the distinctness of body, mind, etc., for each soul.

4. LIBERATION

The release of the soul is accomplished through four means which are called caryā, kriyā, yoga and jñāna. These are, respectively, the paths of the dāsa, sat-putra, sakhā, and sat. The soul that goes by the path of caryā (observance) behaves as the servant (dāsa) of God. Cleaning the temples of God, rendering service to the daily worship of God’s images, singing the praise of God and serving God’s devotees are some of the forms which caryā takes. When the soul enters the next path which is kriyā (rites), it becomes more intimate with God and considers itself to be his good son (sat-putra). Its service to God becomes closer; it offers him its love and praise. Yet the acts of service are external in character, though the changed relationship between God and soul enables the latter to march forward and get nearer its Lord. At the next stage which is yoga (contemplation), the soul regards God as its friend (sakhā). The path of contemplation enables it to withdraw its senses from their respective objects and concentrate its mind on God. The three paths we have now described, caryā, kriyā and yoga, are preparatory disciplines which make the soul fit to receive unto itself the nature of God. These are different stages in
the pilgrim's progress towards perfection. The first is called sālokya, i.e. residence in the realm of God, which is attained by the path of caryā. The second is sāmïpya, i.e. attaining the nearness of God, which is the fruit of kriyā. The third is sārūpya, i.e. acquiring the form of God, which is the result of yoga. With this, however, the goal has not been reached. The supreme end is sāyujya, union with God, which is to be gained by jñāna or wisdom. As the root of bondage is ānava or ignorance, it has to be removed by jñāna. The path of jñāna, or san-mārga (good path) as it is otherwise called, is the last stage in the soul's journey to God. At the end of it, the soul becomes completely free of mala and attains perfection.

The modus operandi which makes the soul fit for receiving God's grace is elaborately set forth in Śaiva-Siddhānta literature. The soul must first learn to equate empirical good and evil. This is called "iriuvinaiyoppu," equating the two types of karman, viz. the good and the bad. That is, the soul becomes indifferent to both merit and demerit, realizing that merit is bondage even as demerit is. When the soul gets settled in such an attitude, the mala which had hitherto obscured its vision becomes fit for the divine surgeon's operation. The maturation of mala is called mala-paripāka. The soul at this stage no longer cognizes with the evolutes of a-śuddha-māyā, nor with its own feeble and flickering intelligence. It has no use now for pāśa-jñāna and paśu-jñāna. It is now filled, through contemplation, with the glory of God. And God's grace descends on it. This is known as sakti-nipāta, the descent of God's power. With the on-set of divine grace, Śiva reveals Himself to the soul and imparts to it the jñāna that liberates it. The state of the soul in the jñāna-mārga is the śuddha-avasthā, which is the state of grace or arul as distinguished from the kevala-avasthā which is the state of darkness or irul and the sakala-avasthā which is the state of confused knowledge or marul. The soul in the śuddha-avasthā is, as we have seen, the vijñāna-kala. To it Śiva reveals Himself as its own inner light; while to the pralayākala He appears in a divine supernatural form, and to the sakala in human form as a preceptor. By seeing, touching or instructing, God performs the purification (dikṣā) of the soul, and weans it from association with mala, and makes it realize its own Śivatva. This is mokṣa or release. Even after release the soul may appear embodied for a while, due to the residue of prarabdha-karman. But this in no way affects the soul's perfection.

The soul's attainment of Śivatva does not mean the merger of its being in Śiva. The entitative difference of the soul from Śiva is maintained even in mokṣa. The jīva can claim God's nature as its own too, but not that it itself is God. The difference between bondage and release is this: while in the former the soul's experience is through pāśa (bond), in the latter it is through pati (i.e. Lord). The soul's knowledge in the state of release is pati-jñāna—an expression which does not mean the Lord's knowledge, but the soul's knowledge through the Lord. There is
also this difference between the released soul and God. While the soul is
now free from *mala* and enjoys the bliss of Śiva, it does not share with
the latter His five functions of creation, sustentation, destruction, con-
cealment and bestowal of grace. *Mokṣa* thus is not a state of bare identity;
it is the experience of unity-in-duality. God is the giver of eternal bliss;
and the soul is the recipient thereof. Without becoming identical with
God, the soul enjoys His nature. This view is described by the Siddhāntin
as the true *Advaita*. What is denied by the negative particle (*a—*) in this
expression is not the existence of two but the duality of two. The Siddh-
āntin says, “They are not two,” and not “There are not two.” Umāpati
declares in his *Śiva-prakāśam*: “We expound here the beauty of Śaiva-
Siddhānta, the cream of the Vedānta, whose excellent merit consists in
its exposition of the *Advaita*, postulating an inseparable relation like
body and soul, eye and the sun, the soul and the eye, supported as it is
by the *dharma* of the highest authoritative books and unlike the *bheda*
and *bhedā*, *bheda* and *a-bhedā* relations illustrated respectively, by light
and darkness, word and meaning, gold and ornament, set forth by the
other Schools, and which is further supported by perfectly logical methods,
and is light to the truth-seekers and darkness to others.”

### NOTES

1. Sekkilār’s *Periya-purāṇam* gives the lives of these saints.
2. These four are said to be the exemplars, respectively, of the four main paths
   of devotions, viz. *dāsa-mārga* or the path of the servant, *sat-putra-mārga* or
   the path of the good son, *sakhā-mārga*, or the path of the friend, and *san-mārga*
   or the true path.
3. Nāmbi-āndar-nāmbi compiled the hymns of the four saints and the works of
   other Śaiva poets and seers to form what is known as the twelve *Tiru-murai*.
4. iii. 2.
7. i. 9.
10. II. ii. 25.
11. Three types of forms are distinguished: (1) *bhoga-rūpa*, which grants enjoyment
to souls; (2) *ghora-rūpa*, which destroys the *karmans* of souls, and (3) *yoga-rūpa*,
which effects the release of souls. See *Siddhiyār*, I. ii. 50.
13. This is the same as the Śāṅkhya view that the effect is pre-existent in the
cause and that the two are identical in substance.
14. *Āhava*, *karman* and *māyā* are the impurities (*malas*) that bind the soul.
15. In the Śāṅkhya system the *sāttvika-ahanākara* is called *vaiśṛṣṭa* and the *rājasana*
is called *taivasana*.
16. Sometimes *malas* are said to be five: these three with *tirodhāya* (i.e. Śiva’s
power of obscuration) and *māyeya* (i.e. product of *māyā*) which is the world.
17. See note 2.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPTER XV—continued

ŚAIVA AND ŚĀKTA SCHOOLS

B. KĀŚMĪRA ŚAIVAISM

I. INTRODUCTION

Śaivaism, as a monistic system of thought, as distinct from ritualistic religion, arose in Kāśmīra in the first half of the ninth century A.D. It is a non-Vedīc system, because it does not recognize the Veda as the final authority. Its appeal is not confined to the privileged three castes. It does not debar the śudra from following the path to liberation. It recognizes the universal brotherhood of all men, irrespective of caste and nationality. It is an Āgamic system. It traces its origin to the sixty-four monistic śaiva-Āgamas.

This system is called Svātantrya-vāda, because it accepts free will to be the ultimate metaphysical principle. It is called Ābhāsa-vāda, because it holds that all appearance is concretization of the Ultimate. It is called Trika because of its triadic tendency. And it is called Kāśmīra Śaivaism because all the writers of the available literature on the monistic Śaivaism belonged to Kāśmīra. It is primarily based, not on reason nor on Scriptural authority, but on the most direct experience of the true reality through spiritual discipline, the practice of Yoga.

Kāśmīra was the meeting-ground of the various philosophical currents at the time of the rise of the monistic Śaivaism. Buddhism had a stronghold in Kāśmīra, since the time of Aśoka (273–232 B.C.). It was in Kāśmīra that Kiṃśka convoked an assembly of the Buddhist theologians to reconcile the conflicting doctrines of different Schools of Buddhism. Its existence was particularly felt by the Śaivas, when Kiṃśka (A.D. 78–101) made a gift of Kāśmīra (Kiṃśka-puram?) to Buddhist church and Nāgārjuna came to power and began to spread Buddhism. The aggressive attitude of Nāgārjuna is referred to by Kalhana in his Rāja-taraṅgini and by Varadarāja in his Siva-sūtra-vārttika.

Pāṇini’s grammar was intensively studied. Kaiyaṭa wrote a commentary on the Mahā-bhāṣya of Patañjali. And Abhinavaguptapāda, as the name given to him by his teachers implies, was looked upon as an incarnation of Patañjali. Monistic Vedānta was fairly popular. Śaṅkarācārya’s visit to Kāśmīra (A.D. 820) further stimulated the interest of the learned in it. Monistic Śāktism was propounded by a section of the monistic Śaivas themselves. The Śaṅkhya philosophy was there as an integral part of the Vedānta.
2. HISTORY AND LITERATURE

Vasugupta (A.D. 825), the author of Siva-sūtra, was the first to present the Āgamic teachings in a philosophical form. He takes no notice of the other philosophical currents. His object was not to propound a system that would appeal to reason, but to show the three ways to the realization of the Ultimate. He therefore offers no logical proof, nor does he refer to Scriptural authority. He, according to a tradition, presents the sūtras as he discovered them inscribed on a rock.

Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, a pupil of Vasugupta, wrote or gave publicity to his teacher's work, Spanda-kārikā. Here we find for the first time a faint beginning of a rational approach to the problem of the ultimate Reality and an implicit reference to other Schools of thought.

Somānanda was a younger contemporary of Vasugupta. He made a definitely rationalistic approach to the problem of ultimate Reality. He distinctly refers to various Schools of thought and rationally proves the unsoundness of their theories. His attacks are directed primarily against the Sahda-brahma-vāda of the grammarians and the Saktyadvaya-vāda of a section of the Kāśmira Śaivas. He refuted the theory, propounded by Bhartṛhari (A.D. 650) in his Vākyapādiyam, that paśyantī is the Ultimate, the pari. He established pari to be distinct from paśyantī.

The earlier grammarians accepted only one stage of transition, the madhyamā, from the subtlest speech (paśyantī) to the grossest (vaikharī). In Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa, we find a different interpretation of those Vedic passages (cattvāri śṛṅgā, etc.) which are interpreted by Nāgęśa Bhaṭṭa, in his Udyota, as implying pari. Recognition of pari as distinct from paśyantī, by Nāgęśa Bhaṭṭa and his followers, was due to the influence of the Śaiva-Āgamas. Thus, the contribution of Somānanda to the philosophy of Grammar is the establishment of pari as distinct from and higher than paśyantī. This pari is recognized by the Śaivas as identical with what they call Svātantrya or Vimarsa.

Somānanda criticizes the Śaṅka monism (Saktyadvaya-vāda) in the third chapter. But he criticizes only summarily various Schools of Buddhism and the monistic Vedānta, along with other Schools of thought, such as the Jaina, the Śāṅkhyā, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika in the sixth chapter. He clearly brings out the distinction of the Ultimate, as maintained by the monistic Śaivas, from similar conceptions of other systems.

He discovered in the Śaiva-Āgama a means to final emancipation, which was unknown to Vasugupta. It is this means, the pratyabhijñā, which has given the system its name, under which it is recognized by Mādhava in his Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha. Vasugupta had recognized only three means to liberation—Śambhava, Śaṅka and Ānava. All these involved the practice of Yoga. Somānanda presents an advance on Vasugupta in so far as he
shows a new way to emancipation. He says that the Ultimate, the freedom, can be realized through recognition of it by the individual in himself in practical life. He holds that freedom is the inner being of the individual, but it is hidden by the veil of ignorance, which has to be removed to recognize it as identical with the essence of the individual.

Utpalācārya was a pupil of Somānanda. The latter had criticized different Schools of Buddhism summarily along with other Schools. Buddhism was fully alive in Kāśmīra at this time. And, therefore, very probably there was a counter-criticism of the monistic Śaivaism. Utpalācārya undertook to reply to this and wrote his Īsvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā and two commentaries thereon, which are mainly a reply to the Baudhā objections against the fundamentals of the monistic Śaivaism.

Abhinavagupta (A.D. 960), a grand-pupil of Utpalācārya, was an encyclopaedic thinker and a man of the highest spiritual attainment. He very often speaks of himself and mentions the dates and places of composition of some of his works. If we are able to write a fairly accurate history of monistic Śaivaism, it is primarily because of this distinctive feature of Abhinavagupta’s works.

We know of forty-one works of Abhinavagupta.² And there is strong evidence to show that he wrote many more. He began with writing commentaries on sixty-four monistic Śaiva-Āgamas and wrote an independent work, Tantrāloka, dealing with the mystical, theological, ritualistic, epistemic, psychological and philosophical aspects of the monistic Śaiva-Āgamas. Next he commented on the works on literary criticism and dramaturgy. He wrote Locana on Ānandavardhana’s Dhvanyāloka and psychologically established dhvani (the suggested spiritual meaning) as distinct from three types of linguistic meaning, conventional (abhidheya), contextual (tātparya) and secondary (lākṣānika). He also wrote Abhinava-bhārati on the Nātya-sāstra of Bharata and propounded a theory of aesthetics in the context of drama, which has been accepted by almost all the subsequent writers on the subject. And last of all he commented on the two works of Utpalācārya on the monistic Śaivaism, (1) Īsvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā and (2) Tīkā on it. His commentaries together with the originals are recognized to be authoritative books on the Pratyabhijñā system.

Abhinavagupta made two contributions. (1) He related the monistic Śaivaism in all its aspects to the recognized sixty-four Śaiva-āgamas by referring to the Āgamic passages. (2) He established the Indian aesthetic theory on the basis of the monistic Śaivaism. Aesthetic experience had been explained before him in Kāśmīra itself by Śri-Śaṅkuka in the light of the ancient Nyāya and by Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka in the light of the monistic Vedānta. Abhinavagupta clearly brings out the unsoundness of both.

After Abhinavagupta, we have only summaries of the system such as Pratyabhijñā-hyāya of Kṣemarāja (A.D. 1040) and commentaries on the
works of earlier thinkers such as the commentary on Paramārtha-sāra of Abhinavagupta by Yogarāja (A.D. 1060), the commentary on the Tantrāloka by Jayaratha (A.D. 1180) and the commentary on the Iśvara-pratyabhijñā-vidarśini by Bhāskara-Kaṇṭha (A.D. 1780).

3. TENDENCIES OF KĀŚMĪRA ŚAIVAIMISM

Kāśmīra Śaivaimism has a mystic tendency. It holds that Reality is absolute unity; that it is indescribable and, therefore, no predicate is applicable to it; that it is identical with the equally indescribable essence of hūman-self; that it is possible to reach the ultimate union with it; and that there are ways to realize such a union through different stages. It is rationalistic in its metaphysics. It takes up human experience for a critical analysis and shows that it is possible only on the basis of the metaphysical principle that it admits. It is authoritarian in the sense that after it has logically justified its principles, it shows that they have the support of the sacred Scriptures also. It is voluntaristic in the sense that its ultimate metaphysical principle is free will.

It is a synthesis of the various philosophic currents. It takes up the conflicting views, corrects and modifies them so as to reconcile and synthetize them into one system. It adopts, with necessary modifications, the twenty-four categories and puruṣa from the Sāṁkhya, the māya from the Vedānta and adds to them ten more categories, five of which are transcendent and the remaining five are the limitations of the individual subjects. At the top of them all it places the Absolute, of which the categories are mere manifestations.

It has given a definite place to each of the important systems of Indian thought within itself, according to the conception of the “self” that each upholds separately. Thus it holds that the “self” of the Naiyāyikas and others, who hold it to be the mere substratum of the qualities, such as cognition (jñāna), pleasure and pain, is identical with buddhi during the continuation of the world and with śūnya at its dissolution. The Vijnāna-vādin’s self, as a series of ideas, each of which gathers from its predecessors the impressions of the past, is nothing more than the modifications of buddhi. The Vedāntin’s Brahman, as pure sentiency (cit or prakāśa) without self-consciousness (vimarśa) and, therefore, sānta, is identical with the third category, Sadāsiva. This is very much like what Hegel does in the case of the recognized systems. He identifies “being,” the first of his logical categories, with “Being,” which Parmenides conceived to be the Absolute. And his second logical category, “not-being,” he identifies with the “nothing” or “śūnya” of the nihilistic School of Buddhism (śūnya-vāda).

It rejects dualism and pluralism in all forms, because they present a
layman's point of view and create an unbridgeable gulf between the self and the non-self. If the subject and the object are completely cut off from each other, are essentially different and have mutually exclusive and independent existence, they can scarcely be inter-related.

In regard to the subjectivism of the Vijnāna-vāda—which approximates to the philosophy of Berkeley, if we ignore the position that he assigns to God in his system—the attitude of Kāśmīra Śaivism is slightly different. It accepts the doctrine of momentariness of the ideas, but rejects the doctrine of momentariness of the subject in its inner nature. For, if there be no essentially permanent subject, capable of retaining the memory of the objective ideas, if the subject were to disappear with the disappearance of each idea, the unification of ideas, necessary for the consciousness of a combined whole, would be impossible. It refutes the Vijnāna-vādin's explanation of the variety of experience in terms of vāsanā. It rejects the phenomenalistic theory of the Bāhyārtha-numeya-vādin, who, like Kant, admits an external reality, which is never to be known directly, but is only inferable from the effect, the "given." For, though it may be a good hypothesis to explain variety in cognition, it cannot explain the practical life; because practical life cannot be carried on with what is only inferable and not directly present (na hi nityā-numeyena kaścid vyavahāraḥ).

It rejects the monistic idealism of the Vedānta, which holds that māyā is neither of the nature of being nor of not-being and therefore indefinable. For the Vedāntin lands himself into contradiction when he says that this indefinable is the cause of the phenomenal world. Is not the assertion that māyā is the cause of the phenomenal world by itself a definition?

Mysticism.—From the mystic point of view the Ultimate (Anuttara) is the Reality beyond which there is nothing. It is, therefore, free from all limitations. It is indefinable. No questions or answers are possible about it. It cannot be spoken of as "this" or "that" or as "not-this" or "not-that." The limited mind cannot grasp it, and therefore no talk about it is possible. It is not a thing to be perceived or conceived but simply to be realized. Whatever word or words we may use for it, we fail to convey the idea of its real nature.

This Reality can be realized through spiritual discipline only. The discipline is meant for freeing the individual soul from various impurities (mala), which constitute its limiting conditions, and thus differentiate the individual from the universal.

But the mystic reality is not different from the metaphysical. The Ultimate is both transcendental and immanent (viśvottirṇya and viśva-maya). Here Kāśmīra Śaivism has synthesized the mystical and the metaphysical conceptions. This has been done by the Western mystics also. Plotinus, for instance, on the one hand, speaks of the One as so transcendent that it is beyond the reach of mind and speech; it cannot
be represented in terms of even the highest categories; it is realizable only in mystic ecstasy. On the other hand, he presents the One as source and goal of everything, from whom all oppositions and diversities emanate.

"Realistic" Idealism.—Realism and Idealism are opposite currents of the philosophical thought. For while Realism believes in an extramental reality which exists independently of any relation to any mind, Idealism maintains that everything is essentially of the nature of thought and as such has no being independently of the mind. Kāśmīra Śaivism has synthetized the two. Hence it has been called "Realistic Idealism."\(^{16}\)

In contrast to the view of the subjectivist that the objects of experience are the products of the individual subject and to that of the "phenomenalist" that the external reality is known through inference only, it admits that the objective world exists independently of the individual subject and that it is objectively present in "non-empirical cognition." The external world, however, is of the nature of mind but not of the individual mind. That which acts upon the individual mind in sense-experience is not matter but a manifestation of mind other than the individual mind. The world of reality is the world of the universal mind. It exists both before and after the individual subject.

Realistic Idealism accepts all that is valid in subjectivism and realism. Subjectivism holds that materialism is impossible and that reality is mental. And realism holds that the objective world exists independently of the individual mind. Realistic Idealism accepts both the views, and says that the world in which we live is merely a manifestation of the universal mind and as such is mental. But it exists independently of the individual mind and therefore it is real.

Universal Mind (Mahēṣvara).—Kāśmīra Śaivism admits that the individual mind is identical with the universal. Its conception of the universal mind is therefore based upon the analysis of the individual mind, which reveals two undeniable aspects:

1. It receives the reflection of or is affected by the external objects no less than by the residual traces of the past experiences. In this aspect it is simply a substratum of the psychic images which are merely its modes, due either to external objects, as at the time of perception, or to the revived residual traces as at the time of remembrance, imagination and dream. The effect of an external stimulus on the mind is not like that of a seal of wax but like that of an external object on a clear mirror. The point that the analogy of mirror is intended to bring out, is that mind shows the affection as one with itself without losing its purity or separate entity. The point of distinction, however, between the mirror and the mind is that the former, in order to receive reflection, requires an external light to illumine it. A mirror in darkness does not reflect any image. But mind is self-luminous. It receives reflections independently of any external illuminator.\(^{17}\) Thus the first aspect of mind is that it is
a self-luminous entity, which receives reflections and makes them shine as identical with itself. This aspect is technically called *prakāśa*.

(2) The other aspect of mind is that it knows itself in all its purity, as in the case of mystic experience; it is free to analyse and synthetize the varying affections; it retains these affections in the form of residual traces; it takes, at will, anything out of the stock of memory to reproduce a former state, as in the case of remembrance; it creates an altogether new "construct," as in the case of imagination. This aspect is technically called *vimarṣa*. This is the characteristic aspect of human mind.

Thus human mind is self-luminous and self-conscious. It shines independently and knows that it so shines. And because there is identity of the individual and the universal, the Ultimate, therefore, is self-shining and self-conscious.

Admission of *vimarṣa*, self-consciousness, in the Absolute by the Śāiva is the point of distinction between the Śaivaite conception of the Ultimate Reality and that of Advaita Vedānta. The latter holds that the Brahman is *Śaṅkara*, without any activity. It is static and not dynamic. It is self-shining but not self-conscious. For all consciousness is activity, and therefore self-consciousness also is an activity and as such would disturb the peace (*śānti*), perfect restfulness. Brahman is indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*). And, therefore, thinking that admission of self-consciousness would mean admission of determinacy, the Advaitin holds Brahman to be self-shining only (*cin-mātra*).¹⁸

The Śaiva maintains that the Absolute is not only self-shining but also self-conscious, and at the same time holds it to be indeterminate. He explains his position as follows:

Determinacy (*vikalpa*) implies, (i) unification of a multiplicity into unity, as when a person combines a number of simple percepts into a complex whole, (ii) contradistinguishing the object of cognition "this" from "not-this," (iii) interpretation of a stimulus in a variety of ways and acceptance of one interpretation as correct and rejection of others as incorrect. Thus determinacy in all cases is dependent on the consciousness of multiplicity either for unification or for consciousness of distinction. Therefore, in the case of absence of consciousness of multiplicity, determinacy is not possible. Since in the case of transcendent self-consciousness there is nothing to be contradistinguished from self, as there is no "not-being" from which "being" is to be distinguished, it cannot be spoken of as determinate consciousness.

The *universal mind* brings forth everything from itself. It is wholly active and not passive. The concretization of its aspect of Will is the manifestation of the world, not only of limited objects but also of the limited subjects. In the metaphysical context it is self-conscious Will, which is nothing but freedom of thought and action. It is technically called *mahēśvara*.
In understanding Kāśmīra Śaivism we have to guard against confounding the conception of mahēśvara with the ordinary conception of God, as the first cause that is to be inferred from the order, beauty and design in nature. For it holds that the world-mind, as Will, is within the process of nature. The world is not a finished result that is to be ascribed to God, an external designer; but the very march of nature is the working of the universal mind.\textsuperscript{31}

Voluntarism.—In the context of metaphysics, the universal mind, according to Kāśmīra Śaivism, is the universal Free Will (sva-tantrā icchā).\textsuperscript{32} This Free Will is the same as vimarsa, but with the difference that, while vimarsa does not involve the antithesis of subject and object, Free Will does. The object, however, to which Will is related, is the universal “this” which lacks all determinacy, exactly as does the mental picture in the mind of a great artist, when the desire to produce a masterpiece first arises in him. It is like an imperceptible stir\textsuperscript{33} in calm water before the rise of waves. It is like the internal stir that precedes the perceptible movement of a physical organ. It is that aspect of the universal mind which is responsible for the objectification of what is identical with it. It is not a blind force, but self-conscious energy that expresses itself in blind forces of nature also. It is free, inasmuch as it depends on nothing that is external to it; in fact there is nothing which does not owe its being to it. It is changeless though it appears as if it were changing. It is absolute being (mahā-sattā) in so far as it is perfectly free to be anything (bhavane sva-tantratā). It is beyond the limitations of time and space, for they are its own manifestations. It is beyond the relation of causality, because the causal principle is empirical and not transcendent. If we personify the universal mind, the Free Will would answer to its heart (hrdayam paramesṭhinaḥ).\textsuperscript{34}

Svāntrya-vāda, therefore, holds that the Ultimate, as universal Free Will, manifests all from itself, in itself and by itself. All that constitutes the world of experience, whether unity or diversity or unity in diversity, whether subjective or objective or the relation between them, is the manifestation of Free Will, which is the ultimate Reality of all.

The Śaiva voluntarism agrees with the voluntarism of Schopenhauer, (i) That what is known at the empirical level is only a phenomenon.\textsuperscript{35} For, like Kant, it admits that the subject at empirical level can know the object, not as it is in itself, but as it appears through the limiting conditions, time (kāla), etc. (ii) That the thing-in-itself is the Will,\textsuperscript{36} of which we are immediately aware in voluntary action and emotion. For it admits that the principle of freedom (svāntrya) is immediately present to us in states of intense emotion,\textsuperscript{37} in which all external affections of mind disappear. (iii) That the physical act and the entire physical body are immediate objectifications\textsuperscript{38} of Will. For it holds that action is nothing but will\textsuperscript{39} externalized and accepts that the will of Yogin manifests
physical things independently of matter. (iv) That Will is the inner nature of everything and the one kernel of every phenomenon. (v) That philosophical wisdom is nothing but bringing the truth, "The world is my idea," into reflective and abstract consciousness. For the salvation of man in this very life (jīvan-mukti) consists, according to Śaivism, in nothing but the realization, "This entire universe is my manifestation" (saro 

But it differs from the voluntarism of Schopenhauer, inasmuch as he holds Will to be unconscious. He abstracts Will from intelligence, which he regards as a mere function of the brain, and identifies it with nature, which, according to him, works independently of intelligence. He was led to such an abstraction, because he wanted to identify the presuppositions of different sciences with something of which he was immediately aware at the empirical level; because he accepted the Kantian view that consciousness of the pure subject, in total isolation from the object, is impossible; and because his system grew in antagonism to that of Hegel.

Kāśmīra Śaivism, developed in the hands of Yogins to whom self-consciousness in isolation from the object was the most indubitable experience, did not feel compelled to abstract Will from self-consciousness. It admits will to be an aspect of the mind. This view is in consonance with our experience of will.

Ābhāsā-vāda.—Just as the metaphysical theory is called Svātantraya-vāda from the point of view of the Ultimate principle, so it is called Ābhāsa-vāda phenomenalism, from that of the manifested variety. In the Ultimate the entire variety is in perfect unity, exactly as the whole variety of colours that we find in a full-grown peacock is in a state of perfect identity in the yolk of the peacock. This analogy is called "mayurāṇḍa-rasa-nyāya."

All that emanates from or is manifested by the Absolute is called ābhāsa, appearance or manifestation, for the simple reason that it is a manifestation and therefore has some sort of limitation. Thus it is all that appears; all that is within the reach of external senses or internal mind; all that we are conscious of when the senses and the mind cease to work, as in the state of trance or deep sleep; in short, all that exists in any way and in regard to which the use of any kind of language is possible, be it the subject, the object, the means of knowledge or the knowledge itself.

The Ābhāsa-vādin holds that everything is a configuration of ābhāsas or limited manifestations. The subject is no less a configuration than the object. Both are unity in multiplicity. The apprehension of unity presupposes perception of multiplicity and is due to appearance of all, that is separately cognized, on a common basis. The configuration is called after that particular constituent of it which, because of the attitude of the perceiver, figures as the most important.

Thus, according to him, an ordinary object of cognition is a whole.
And its constituents differ according to the analysing individual’s tendency, attitude and knowing capacity. For instance, if we analyse our experience of a jar, we find that though ordinarily it is taken to be one object, it embodies as many ābhāsas as there are words, which can be used with reference to it by various analytical perceivers, looking at it from different points of view. To an ordinary perceiver, it is a combination of ābhāsas of roundness, materiality, externality, blackness, existence and so on. But to a scientist it is a combination of atoms and electrons.

The Ābhāsā-vādin holds that the ordinary object of cognition is a collocation or configuration of a certain number of ābhāsas, each of which requires a separate mental process to cognize. Each constituent as it is apprehended separately is an ābhāsa, a universal, which marks the farthest limit of the cognitive activity.

The subject also is a similar configuration. It is made up of the limiting conditions or forms of cognition and action, kāla or time, etc., purposiveness, tendencies, intellectual background, body, vital airs, senses and intellect. But none is its permanent aspect. Its constituents differ in the case of every distinct experience. The inner being, the self-consciousness, with the impurity, called ānaṇa-mala, alone is the persisting element in the flux.

Cognitive activity is of two kinds. (1) The primary and (2) the secondary. The primary activity consists in receiving the reflection of an isolated ābhāsa and in mental reaction, which consists in the rise of the inner expression (āntara-śabdana). Thus the object of primary cognition is very much like a universal, which the Vaiśyākaraṇas hold to be the meaning of an expression. As such it is free from temporal and spatial limitations. The secondary cognitive activity consists in mere unification of the various ābhāsas, separately cognized. It is responsible for bringing about a configuration.

Aesthetic experience in the light of Ābhāsa-vāda.—The Ābhāsā-vadin holds that an ābhāsa is a universal idea. It shines as a particular when it is related to time and space, because of the purposive attitude of the cognizer. Therefore, if the cognizer be free from purposiveness, his cognitive activity will terminate at its “primary” stage and will not proceed to relate the apprehended to the temporal and spatial conditions. Thus the aesthetic object, as it figures in the consciousness of an aesthete, is universal, because he approaches it disinterestedly.

The Ābhāsā-vādin also holds that the subject has no fixed constituents; its constituents are different in the case of each separate type of experience. Accordingly the aesthetic personality is constituted by taste (rasikatva), aesthetic susceptibility (sahādayatva), power of visualization (pratibhā), contemplative habit (bhāvanā) and capacity to identify with (or to be engrossed in) the object (tanmayībhavana-yogatā).

The aesthetic attitude, determined by taste, love of art, is an important constituent of the subject in aesthetic experience. It differs from the
practical, inasmuch as it is marked by total absence of the expectation of being called upon to act in reality. It consists in the expectancy of a short life in an ideal world of beautiful sights and sounds. It leads to self-forgetfulness when the aesthete contemplates on an aesthetic object. It brings about identification with the central fact of the presented.

Thus, when the aesthetic object is a dramatic presentation, the identification consists in the substitution of personality of the spectator by that of the focus of the situation. The aesthete, therefore, is affected by the situation exactly as is the hero. Then, assisted by taste, intellectual background and power of visualization, he arranges and moulds the given, unites it with the necessary elements from the unconscious, and so builds up a world of imagination. Here the aesthetic susceptibility comes into play, appropriate responses follow and emotive state is the result.

From emotive level the aesthete rises to the kathartic (sādhāranībhāva). Abhinavagupta\textsuperscript{36} has chosen Kālidāsa’s presentation of the flying deer, pursued by King Duśyanta (grīva-bhaṅgābhirāmam), to show the exact nature of aesthetic experience at the kathartic level and the process involved in it as follows:

The deer in terror, as it appears in the aesthetic vision, is free from temporal and spatial relations, and therefore is de-individualized. The judgment at this stage may be spoken of as “terrified” (bhītah). The “terrified” presupposes the cause of terror. That in the present case, being without any objective relation, is reduced to “terror” (bhayam). This universalized terror, appearing in the consciousness of the spectator who is free from all elements of individuality, affecting his heart as if penetrating it, and being visualized so as to seem to be dancing as it were before the eyes, is the objective aspect of the aesthetic experience at the kathartic level.

Ābhāsa-vādin Abhinavagupta, therefore, has rejected the two powers of language assumed by Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka to account for universalization. He explains the kathartic level in terms of the Ābhāsa-vāda.

Comparing this conception of katharsis with that of Hegel, we find that according to Hegel, katharsis\textsuperscript{37} of fear refers to the content of tragedy, the object to which the fear in the spectator is related. The object of fear is purified inasmuch as it is freed from the element of individuality. Because tragedy, in presenting the punishment of wrong, purifies what it presents from the individuality, and therefore presents the absolute might of right, the divine justice, the negation of negation.\textsuperscript{38} But, according to Abhinavagupta, purification of fear refers to fear itself. It is purified inasmuch as it is freed from all objective relation through an artistic presentation of it.

He has also shown how the final level in aesthetic experience is not the level of ānanda, which is nothing more than predominance of sattva, as Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka, in accordance with the Vedānta, held. He has shown it to be identical with the level of vīmaṛṣa, spanda, sphurattā or camatkāra.
ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABh  ABHINAVAGUPTA: Abhinava-Bhāratī.
Bh  Bhāskarakānta: Bhāskari.
IPV  ABHINAVAGUPTA: Iśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśini.
PH  KṣEMARĀJA: Pratyabhijñā-hṛdaya.
PhA  Hegel: Philosophy of Fine Art.
PhR  Hegel: Philosophy of Right.
PTV  ABHINAVAGUPTA: Para-trimśikā-vivaranā.
RT  Kalhana: Rāja-taraṅgini.
SDr  SOMĀNANDA: Śiva-dṛṣṭi.
SK  KALLATA: Spanda-kārikā.
SSV  VARADARĀJA: Śiva-sūtra-vārttika.
VP  BHARTṛHARI: Vākya-pādiyam.
WWI  SCHOPENHAUER: World as Will and Idea.

NOTES

1. Abh, pp. 77-80.
2. Abh, p. 179.
4. RT, 1, 175.
5. SSV, 1.
6. VP, Comm., 97.
10. Bh, 10.
11. LOGIC, pp. 159-61.
12. Bh, 222.
15. PH, 18.
18. Bh, 10.
22. SDr, 19.
23. SDr, 15-16.
24. Bh, 255.
27. SDr, II and SK, 39.
32. IPV, Vol. II, 266.
CHAPTER XV—continued

ŚAIVA AND ŚĀKTA SCHOOLS

C. VĪRA-ŚAIVAISM

The recent findings of Mohenjo Daro and Harappa have proved the existence of an advanced stage of civilization of a people who flourished in the Indus valley. They exhibit that the Indus people who belong to the Chalcolitic Age which goes as far back as 3000 B.C., are in possession of a highly developed culture in which little vestige of Indo-Aryan influence is to be found. Sir John Marshall in his Mohenjo Daro and Indus Civilisation devotes one full chapter to the religion of the Indus people. Therein he concludes that those people worshipped Mother Goddess, Sakti and a male deity, Śiva. He identifies the male deity with Śiva because of the prominent characteristic of the deity having three eyes and being a mahā-yogin, as represented on seals, images, carvings and other signs discovered in different sites. They also worshipped, he says, liṅga, sun, animals, trees, etc. Thus remarks Sir John Marshall: “In the religion of the Indus people there is much, of course, that might be paralleled in other countries. This is true of every prehistoric and of most historic religions as well. But, taken as a whole, their religion is so characteristically Indian as hardly to be distinguishable from still living Hinduism or at least from that aspect of it which is bound up with animism and the cults of Śiva and the Mother Goddess—still the two most potent forces in popular worship.”

These conclusions of Sir John Marshall regarding the religion of the Indus people are not considered to be very authoritative. Nilakanṭha Śastrī of Madras says: “While Marshall’s explanations appear conclusive in regard to the cult of the Mother Goddess, the phallic cult and the tree and animal cults, his speculations on the male God, who, he thinks, was prototype of the historical Śiva, are rather forced, and certainly not so convincing as the rest of the chapter. It is difficult to believe on the strength of a single ‘roughly carved seal’ that all the specific attributes of Śiva as maheśa, mahā-yogin, paśu-pati, and dakṣinā-mūrti are anticipated in the remote age to which the seal belongs.” It is thus essential that his conclusions should be further supported by the inscriptions being satisfactorily explained. And this is exactly what has been done by Father Heras whose reading of the inscriptions proves undoubtedly that Śiva and Sakti were the chief deities of the Indus people.

In his lengthy and learned dissertation, Father Heras very successfully unravels the network of the “Picto-phonographic inscriptions” of the
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Indus Valley. He raises the pertinent question as to the authorship of the Indus Valley civilization. Though Marshall and his collaborators have definitely proved with a number of arguments that inhabitants of Mohenjo Daro were certainly pre-Aryan, they are not definite about their race. Father Heras with his decipherment of picto-phonographic inscriptions proves that Mohenjo Daro people are definitely Dravidians in their race. It is no wonder that some scholars assert that Dravidians were the autochthons of India and evolved a civilization of their own gradually in all evolutionary stages and ages of early man’s life. Govindācārya Svāmin observes: "Hence we shall not be far wrong if we infer that South India gave a refuge to the survivors of the deluge, that the culture developed in Lemuria was carried to South India after its submergence and South India was probably the cradle of the post-diluvian human race. As the centre of gravity of the Dravidian people, as determined by the density of population, lies somewhere about Mysore, South of India must be considered as the home of these people, whence they might have spread to the North." 4 Dr. Chatterji says: "It would be established, provided Hall’s theory of Sumerian origin be true, that civilization first arose in India and was probably associated with the primitive Dravidians. Then it was taken to Mesopotamia to become the source of Babylonian and other ancient cultures, which form the basis of modern civilization." 5

The decipherment of the Mohenjo Daro inscriptions helps us to have a glimpse about the religion and philosophy of Proto-Indians or Dravidians. The Self-existence of God is evident from the name of God, Irivan, "The one who exists." 6 The early idea of Yogic discipline can be perceived from the images of the figure of An, the male deity, Śiva seated in a Yogic posture. The female deity is called Amma or Sakti; now Amma is the common word for mother in Dravidian languages and a good number of clay statues of Mother Goddess have been found in Mohenjo Daro and Harappa. The conception of Liṅga among the Indus people was in the sense of union, the union of male and female principles of Śiva and Sakti. Father Heras observes thus: "Before ending we must refer to another link still existing from those ancient days between Mohenjo Daro and Kārṇaṭaka. The modern Liṅgāyats of the Kannada country depict a sign on the walls of their houses, the meaning of which does not seem to be known to them. The sign is X. This sign is often found in the inscriptions of Mohenjo Daro and Harappa. It reads Kudu and means ‘Union.’ The sign very likely refers to the union of male and female principles which is so prominent in the religious tenets of the Vira-Śaiva sect." 7

The conception of Liṅga as the union of positive and negative principles is conspicuous in the Saiva-Āgamas, the antiquity of which goes back to the period of Āryanyakas. The attempt to identify Sakti with woman and Śiva with man is a blasphemous error. As a matter of fact, they are neither male nor female nor even neuter. For the Saiva-Āgamas declare

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in unmistakable terms that Siva is the sat aspect of Reality while Sakti is its cit aspect. Siva and Sakti are, as it were, the transcendent and the immanent, the static and the dynamic, the impersonal and personal aspects of Reality. But the Āgamic seers have endeavoured to resolve the perpetual opposition between these two aspects, not by taking these apparently incompatible aspects one after the other, but by ascending to a height of spiritual intuition at which they are melted and merged in the unity and perceived as the completing opposites of a Perfect-Whole. Linga is, therefore, the unifying principle of Siva and Sakti, of sat aspect and cit aspect of reality.  

The general bulk of the Āgamas from the Kāmika to the Vātula is twenty-eight in number. The latter portions of these Āgamas treat of Vira-Śaiva doctrines and rituals. Most of them contain either special or mixed pātalas in which may be found a detailed account of the characteristics of the Vira-Śaiva spiritual discipline. The fact that the latter portion of the Āgamas contains much of the Vira-Śaiva matter makes one believe that the School of Vira-Śaivaism probably branched off as a natural off-shoot from the same parent stem of the Āgamas which gave birth to the other Śaiva systems. But it is unlikely that at that Āgamic period of remote antiquity, Vira-Śaivaism existed as a full-blown system. To develop Vira-Śaivaism into a full-blown system, to give it an independent social status, to make it definitive and distinctive from Śaivaism was reserved to the genius of Basava, a great hero of Karnāṭaka, who flourished in the middle of the twelfth century.

There is a tradition which ascribes to the five great Ācāryas, whose antiquity is pushed as far back as prehistoric times, the foundation of Vira-Śaiva religion. These Ācāryas are not altogether mythical, but their devotees in their enthusiasm to make them and their religion hoary, have exaggerated facts about them to the extent of mystifying their personalities. That there is a clear reference to them in Kannada literature, that some works in Kannada and Telugu are attributed to them, that they tried to propagate the religion, that the mathas, which they are reputed to have founded, are still in existence—these are some of the facts about them. But with all this, that they are the founders of Vira-Śaiva faith is an exaggeration. For the assiduous and impartial efforts of Kannada scholars in the direction of historical research have proved beyond doubt that these so-called Ācāryas are not the originators of Vira-Śaiva faith since some of them are found to be contemporaries of Basava and others even later than he. As Prof. Sakhare aptly remarks: “The Acharyas after Basava are real personages; the Acharyas before Basava have no existence apart from his life. In the kingdom of a Jain King, Basava in spite of his being the prime minister of that Jain King, founded the Viraśaiva religion and heightened its glory within a decade or so. Whoever turns over the pages of Vacana-Śastra (the collections
of the sayings of Basava and his colleagues), that rich and vast treasure of religious literature, cannot but feel that it is all original. There is a freshness and a vigour about it which no borrowed literature can ever have. It pulsates with the life and spirit of the Saranas under the leadership of Basava. It was all inspired by Basava and Basava alone."

Vira-Saivaism as a religion owes its birth to Basava. It gathered momentum from Sivānubhava-Mantapa, the religious house of experience, which was a spiritual and social institution. Basava founded this institution about A.D. 1160 mainly to make man realize his place in the scheme of the universe; to breathe new spirit into the then decaying religion; to give woman an equality of status and an independent outlook; to abolish caste distinctions; to encourage occupations and manual labour; and to countenance simplicity of living and singleness of purpose. The institution, therefore, would bear eloquent testimony to the genius of Basava whose field of action was as varied as it was vast. It reveals not only his practical wisdom but also the happy blending in him of head, heart and hand. For it was he who freed Saivism from the shackles of varṇāśrama and gave it a new orientation.

This School of Vira-Saivaism is also styled Liṅgāyataism because its followers wear liṅga, the symbol of supreme Reality, on their person. Wearing of liṅga on the body is a prominent characteristic of Vira-Saiva faith. It connotes not only the distinctive feature of Liṅgāyata religion but also it makes the Liṅgāyata community a distinct religious entity. Religion in its purity is not so much a pursuit as a temper; or rather it is a temper leading to the pursuit of all that is high and holy. Liṅga is a representative symbol of all that is high and holy; and Liṅgāyata religion is a pursuit that is characterized by a distinctive faith, path and philosophy. Its faith is rooted in the divinization of life, its path is marked by Śaṭ-sṭhala—a hierarchy of six psychological stages, its philosophy is designated Sakti-viśisṭādvaita.

Man is born in a variegated world of which he forms a part. He is aware of this world in its concrete actuality, long before he feels himself impelled to try and become aware of it in its abstract possibility. But this impulse nevertheless arises at a certain stage of man’s development and the result is philosophy. Philosophy may then be defined as an offspring of the conscious endeavour to reconstruct the given world of perceptive experience—the world found constructed in actuality—according to its possibility. This problem, as a matter of course, exhibits a variety of aspects. The history of philosophy is but the history of these aspects as they progressively unfold themselves to the human mind.

The first aspect under which the problem presented itself in ancient times was that of being or existence. The aim and aspiration of the ancients was to discover the ultimate Reality of the phenomenal universe. In the next stage the problem became more refined. It was no longer an ultimate
cosmological principle that was sought for, but the psychological form of knowing that was the serious object of thinkers. They apprehended for the first time that the possibility of formulating, much more of solving the problem of being of the sensible world, would presuppose the capacity of knowing. Hence they comprehended that the first step in philosophy must be an investigation of the conditions under which knowledge arises.

In other words, they held that an examination of the capacity of knowing itself should engage the attention of philosophers. The philosophical labours of the Upaniṣadic seers in India, of Plato and Aristotle in Greece, were mainly occupied with this problem.

Man is a conscious being. Human consciousness is essentially self-consciousness. In the case of man even the simplest process of sense perception is not a mere change, but the consciousness of a change. All human experience, in short, consists not of mere events psychological or physical, but recognition of such events. What we apprehend, therefore, is never a bare fact but a recognized fact. This recognition or pratyabhijñā, according to Kāśmīra Śaivaism, implies a synthesis of relations in a consciousness which involves a subject as well as an object. And this object with which we are in relation is not wholly alien to our minds since we succeed in knowing it progressively but, so far as we can see, without limit. Thus knowledge implies the activity of the self or subject which intuits the presence of an intelligible reality, an ideal system, in short, a spiritual world. And such a world can only be explained by reference to a spiritual principle which renders all relation possible and is itself determined by none of them. It is an absolute and eternal self-consciousness which apprehends as a whole what man only knows in part. This principle, the absolute and eternal self-consciousness, is God, which goes by the name of sthala, the self-existent conscious Being, in Vira-Śaiva philosophy.

Sthala is defined by the Vira-Śaiva philosophers as the source and support of all phenomenal existence, as the ground and goal of all terrestrial evolution. Empirical reality or phenomenal manifestation is the imperfect unfolding in time of an eternally complete and self-existent saṁvit or sthala. Sthala, therefore, is the infinite and eternal rest into which all motion and dialectic are absorbed. The ultimate expression of this eternal Being is self-consciousness, the unity of apprehension of Kant. The question now arises, is this thought unity from which Kant starts really ultimate? Is the ultimate form of the category absolute? Is pure thought subject? Does not consciousness presuppose that which becomes conscious? We believe that it does. The synthetic unity of consciousness, the logical element, presupposes the alogical element, the I or the principle which becomes unified. This principle of I-ness or ahamtā when considered per se may be regarded as the matter of which thought or consciousness is the form. Now this material moment has been ignored by many leaders of speculation and an appearance of having transcended
the distinction has been obtained by the hypostasis of form. But the Vira-Śaiva philosopher does not abstract the unifying thought-form, the logos, from its alogical matter, the hyle. He contends that the ultimate, all-penetrating material moment gives us the aspect of being which is Śiva, the principle of ego; the formal and actual moment gives us the aspect of knowing which is Sakti, which is not ego but ego’s consciousness of itself. If philosophy is the rational explanation of the world and if self-consciousness is its ground and goal, the study of sthala or the self-existent consciousness reveals a double aspect of being and knowing, of Śiva and Sakti, of ego and ego’s consciousness of itself.

"Know thyself first" is the accredited motto of philosophy. What does the self know itself to be? It knows itself to be a knower. Whatever object the self may know, it knows itself with it as the knower. With whatever object-consciousness its self-consciousness is made manifest, the form of this self-consciousness is, "I am the knower." Self-consciousness is the universal principle that remains constant in the midst of changes of object-consciousness. Nothing can enter into consciousness without being conditioned by it. All knowledge is wound, as it were, with the thread of self-knowledge. The whole structure of the world-knowledge stands on the groundwork of self-knowledge. What, indeed, is the whole world-process but the unfolding of the knowledge aspect of the total content of Reality? We shall therefore say that in the development of our whole nature which is co-existent with the whole world-process, to know is as necessary as to be. Hence the distinction in self-consciousness of the material and formal moment.

The Vira-Śaiva philosopher then declines to accept the statement that in self-consciousness the distinction of matter and form is abolished. For even in self-consciousness he distinguishes a material and formal side, a potential and an actual moment. The potential and material moment of the Absolute he terms Śiva; the actual and formal moment of the Absolute he terms Sakti. He does not visualize an incurable antimony between Śiva and Sakti, between being and knowing, rather he effects a synthesis by saying that Sakti is the very soul of Śiva, that knowing is inherent in being. He envisages an integral association between Śiva and Sakti which he names Sakti-viśiṣṭādvaita.

For the Vira-Śaiva philosopher the material rather than the formal becomes the determining moment in the synthesis of all and every reality. Viewed from this standpoint creation, or rather the process of manifestation, is real and no illusion. He summarily rejects Māyā-vāda or the theory of illusion and proves that creation is the result of Śiva’s vimarṣa-sakti that has the power of doing, undoing and doing otherwise. He does not subscribe to the view of the unreality of the world. If the world is an illustrative appearance of conscious Being, he says, the affected world will be a hollow unreality. How can the world which is established to be really
existing by all methods of proof be a false transmutation of consciousness? Likewise he refutes the theory of evolution, Parināma-vāda of the Sāṁkhya. The Sāṁkhya system admits prakṛti as composed of three distinct qualities (gunaś) and holds it as the matrix out of which the whole manifestation would evolve. But Maritontadārya, a commentator of the fourteenth century, offers an original explanation of the three gunas as “derived realities” and traces their origin from a kind of apparent dissociation of the idea-aspect and the will-aspect of the Reality. Thus the three qualities, according to his view, can no longer be regarded as radical forms of matter entirely different from consciousness, but are really the same principle of the reflection of all-competing “I-ness” only in different degrees of manifestation. Thus we see that in his typically Vira-Śaiva explanation of three gunas, Maritontadārya cleverly manages to steer clear of the two positions of Sāṁkhya prakṛti and Advaita māyā and carves out altogether a novel path.

The Vira-Śaiva philosopher starts with a notion of sthala that represents the Absolute and eternal self-consciousness. After applying the acid test of sincere self-introspection, even in self-consciousness he distinguishes a material and a formal moment which he terms Śiva and Sakti respectively. The distinctions are only maintained as aspects of a whole and their significance as opposites consists merely in the genetic priority or posteriority of their respective moments as constitutive of the essence of this Whole. Otherwise expressed, he visualizes an integral association of Śiva and Sakti, the conception of which finds its culmination in Liṅga. The etymological meaning of liṅga is derived from two roots “iṅ” — to dissolve, and “gam”—to go out, affirming that it means the ultimate Reality into whom the creatures of the world dissolve and out of whom they all evolve again. Thus it is seen that the meaning of liṅga does exactly fit in with the notion of sthala only with this difference, that sthala is the beginning of the philosophical theme whereas liṅga is its end. The introduction and the conclusion of a theme have a similarity of features. In both places the complete aspect of Truth is given. Only in the beginning it is simple because undeveloped and in the end it becomes simple again because perfectly developed. Truth or sthala has the middle course of its career where it bifurcates itself into Śiva and Sakti only to find itself back in a fuller realization of liṅga. Hence the conception of liṅga in Vira-Śaivaism represents spiritual dynamic fullness.

Having once come to know the world in the generic order of its articulation as a rational whole, the philosopher is irresistibly driven to raise the problem of the end, purpose or ideal of progress. Strictly speaking, there is no such notion as finality or final aim in dynamic fullness, says Vira-Śaivaism. If we are to speak of any final aim or end, the only way in which it can be formulated in a single sentence is that it consists in realization—the bringing to consciousness of the world in its full meaning.
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To attain to a complete view of the world is the end of philosophy. The philosophic sense and intuition, therefore, present Reality in its comprehensive totality and concreteness. Changes it accepts but it integrates them into Reality, for changes are conceived in time.

The Vira-Śaiva philosopher has not totally banished time from the conception of Reality. He says time has two senses—one the metaphysical and the other the mathematical; mathematical time implies change, while metaphysical time implies continuity. The idea of continuity is evident here, so much so that it is necessary to indicate a difference between the functioning of time in the nature and the functioning of time in spirit. In nature, time functions as principle of transformation and creation is in a sense a transformation, otherwise it has no meaning. In spirit time functions as the principle of expression without any creative transformation. Hence in the philosophic sense the idea of Reality has been associated more with integral continuity than with change. Continuity and integrity are the main criteria of Reality in Vira-Śaiva philosophy.

NOTES

3. The Journal of the University of Bombay, July, 1936.
4. Indian Antiquity, 1911, p. 118.
5. Modern Review, December, 1924.
   Journal of the University of Bombay, V, Part I, p. 3.
8. 'Liṅgaṁ Saivam idam sāksāt śiva-śakti-bhayātmakaṁ'—Sūkṣmāgama, VI, 8.
10. 'Sarveṣaṁ śākṣaṁ-bhūtavāṁ laya-bhūtavatāṁ tathā
    iśātāṁ mahādāśāṁ śīhalaṁ iśyaścandraye'
    Anubhava-sūtra, II. 3.

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CHAPTER XV—continued

ŚAIVA AND ŚĀKTA SCHOOLS

D. ŚĀKTA PHILOSOPHY

I

The term “Śākta philosophy” loosely used in the sense of a School of philosophical doctrines covers the entire field of Śākta culture in India. Every system of culture has its own line of approach to Reality. An enquiry into ancient cultures would show that the cult of Śakti is very old in India as in other parts of the world. And it is quite possible that it existed along with Śaiva and Pāṣupata cults in the days of the prehistoric Indus Valley civilization.

In spite of the antiquity of Śākta culture and of its philosophical traditions no serious attempt seems to have been made in the past to systematize them and give them a definite shape. The result was that though the culture was held in great esteem as embodying the secret wisdom of the elect it did not find its proper place in any of the compendia of Indian philosophy, including the Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha of Mādhavācārya.

The reason why no serious attempt was made is said to have been either that it was deemed improper to drag down for rational examination truths inaccessible to the experience of ordinary men, or that no further systematization of the revealed truths than what is contained in the allied works of the Śaiva philosophers was needed for the average reader. This reason is not convincing enough, for if the Upaniṣads could be made the basis of a philosophical system, there is no reason why the Śākta Āgamas could not be similarly utilized. For the function of philosophy is, as Joad rightly remarks, to accept the data furnished by the specialists who have worked in the field and then to “assess their meaning and significance.”

The Āgamas have their own theory as to the manner in which supreme knowledge descends on earth-consciousness. The Scriptures as such are ultimately traceable to this source. The question as to how intuitions of a higher plane of consciousness are translated into thought and language, committed to writing and made communicable to others have been answered by Vyāsa in his commentary on Yoga-sūtra (I. 43). He says that the supersensuous perception of Yogins obtained through nir-vitarka-samādhi is really an intuition of the unique character (viśeṣa)
of an object, but being associated with verbal elements it loses its immediacy and is turned into a concept capable of being transmitted to others. This is how according to him Scriptures originate. The supreme Knowledge or pratiśbha is integral and cannot be obtained from the words of teachers. It is self-generated and does not depend upon an external factor.

The cult of Śakti produced a profound influence on general Indian thought. A topographical survey of India would show that the country is scattered over with numerous centres of Śakti-sādhana. It was widespread in the past and has continued unbroken till today.

The history of Śākta Tāntrika culture may be divided into three periods:

(a) Ancient or pre-Buddhist, going back to prehistoric age.
(b) Mediaeval or post-Buddhist, rather post-Christian, extending to about A.D. 1200.
(c) Modern, from A.D. 1300 till now.

No works of the ancient age are now forthcoming. The most authoritative treatises available today belong to the mediaeval period, though it is likely that some of these works contain traditions and even actual fragments which may be referred to the earlier period. The mediaeval was the most creative period in the history of the Tāntrika, as in fact in that of many other branches of Sanskrit literature. Most of the standard works, including the original Āgamas and the treatises based on them and commentaries on them by subsequent writers, fall in this period. The modern period too has been productive, but with a few brilliant exceptions most of the works produced in this period are of a secondary character and include compilations, practical handbooks and minor tracts dealing with miscellaneous subjects.

The Śākta literature is extensive, though most of it is of a mixed character. Śiva and Śakti being intimately related, Śaiva and Śākta Tāntras have generally a common cultural background, not only in practices but in philosophical conceptions as well. The Āgamas are mostly inclined towards Advaita, but other viewpoints are not wanting. It is believed that the sixty-four Bhairava-Āgamas which issued from the Yogini-face of Śiva were non-dualistic, the ten Śaiva-Āgamas were dualistic and the eighteen Raudra-Āgamas were of a mixed character. Besides these, there were numerous other Āgamas most of which have disappeared, though some have survived in a complete or mutilated form or are known through references and quotations. Among the works which have a philosophical bearing may be mentioned the names of Svacchanda, Mālinī-vijaya, Vijnāna-Bhairava, Triśīro-Bhairava, Kula-gahvara, Paramānanda-Tantra, etc., and also Āgama-rahasya, Abheda-kārikā, Ajnāvatāra, etc.

Each Āgama has four pādas, of which Jñāna-pāda is devoted to a discussion of philosophical problems. It is not to be supposed that the
approach to the problems and their solutions in each Agama have always been the same. Very great differences are sometimes noticed, but in a general way it may be said that most of the Agamas presuppose a common cultural heritage. From this point of view therefore a real grouping and a classification based upon the specific teachings of each group are possible. At some future date when a regular history of the development of Sākta thought will come to be written these differences and specific characters will have to be taken into account.

There are different Schools of Sākta culture, among which the line of Śrī-vidyā possesses an extensive literature. The School of Kāli has also its own literature, though not so extensive. The Śrī-kula includes certain Saktis and the Kāli-kula includes certain others. Both these Schools and all the other cults are in a sense interrelated. Agastya, Durvāsas, Dattātreya and others were devoted to Śrī-vidyā and produced a number of interesting works. Agastya is credited with the authorship of a Sakti-sūtra and a Sakti-mahimna-stotra.9 This sūtra, unlike the Brahma-sūtra or Śiva-sūtra, has not much philosophical value. But the stotra has its own importance. Durvāsas, who had been ordered by Śrīkāntṭha (Śiva) to propagate the Agamas, is said to have created three rṣis by the power of his mind and asked them to found orders to preach all shades of philosophical thought.10 Durvāsas himself is known to have been the author of two stotras dedicated to Śiva and Sakti, entitled Para-Sambhu-stotra and Lalitā-stava-ratna which go under his name.11 According to tradition Dattātreya was the author of a Saṃhitā work (called Datta-Saṃhitā) in eighteen thousand verses. Paraśurāma is said to have studied this extensive work, and to bring its contents within easy reach of students summarized it in a body of six thousand sūtras distributed into fifty sections. The saṃhitā and the sūtras were both abridged in the form of a dialogue between Dattātreya and Paraśurāma by Sumedhas, a pupil of Paraśurāma. This work may be identified with Tripurā-rahasya, in the Māhāmya section of which the tradition is recorded. The jñāna-khaṇḍa of this work forms an excellent introduction to Sākta philosophy.12

Gauḍapāda, supposed to be identical with the parama-guru of Śaṅkarācārya, wrote a sūtra work, called Śrī-vidyā-ratna-sūtra, on which Śaṅkarārāṇya commented. It is an important work in the history of Sākta literature but not of much philosophical value.14 His Subhagodayastuti and Śaṅkara's Saundarya-laharī deserve a passing mention. Śaṅkara's Prapañca-sūtra with Padmapāda's commentary as well as the Prayogakrama-dīpikā are standard works. So is Laṅkāma Deśika's Śrīveda-śilaka on which Rāghava Bhaṭṭa commented. Somānanda in his Śiva-dṛṣṭi refers to the School of the Sāktas as allied to his own School (Śaiva) and says that in their opinion Sakti is the only substance, Śiva being but a name reserved for its inactive condition.15 Though he was a Śaiva in conviction his analysis of vāc is a valuable contribution to Sākta thought. As regards
the great Abhinavagupta he was verily the soul of Śākta culture. He was a pronounced kaula and his literary activities in the field of Saiva-Śākta-
Āgama, as in that of poetics and dramaturgy, gave it a unique philo-
sophical value which has not yet been surpassed by any of his contem-
poraries or successors. His Tantrāloka is an encyclopaedic work on
Śaiva-Śākta philosophy based on many earlier works. His Mālini-vijay-
vārttika, Parā-Trimśikā-vivaraṇa, Pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī and Pratyabhijñā-
vivṛti-vimarśinī are full of extraordinary learning and spiritual wisdom.

After Abhinava the most important names are those of Gorakṣa,
Puṇyānanda, Naṭanānanda, Amṛtānanda, Svatantarānanda and Bhāskara
Rāya. Gorakṣa alias Maheśvarānanda was the author of Mahārtha-
mañjarī and also its commentary entitled Parimala, Saṁvid-ullāsa, etc.
He was a close follower of Abhinava. Pratyabhijñā-hṛdaya, referred to
as Śakti-sūtra by Bhāskara,16 was commented on by Kṣemarāja, also
related to Abhinava. Puṇyānanda’s Kāma-kalā-vilāsa is a standard work
on kāma-kalā and deals with Śakti in its creative aspects. Naṭanānanda
wrote its commentary called Cid-valli. Amṛtānanda was Puṇyānanda’s
disciple. His Yogini-hṛdaya-dīpikā, a commentary of the Yogini-hṛdaya
section of Nityā-śoḍaśikā-rṇava of the Vāmakēśvara-Tantra represents one
of the most valuable works on Tantrika culture. Other works also, e.g.
Saubhāgya-suhagodaya, are known to have come from his pen.
Svatantarānanda wrote his Māyākā-cakra-viveka, a unique work in five
sections devoted to an elaborate exposition of the Rahasya-Āgama or
secret wisdom of the Śākta Tantras. There is an excellent commentary
on this work by one Śivānanda Muni. Bhāskara Rāya is perhaps the
most erudite Śākta scholar in recent times (A.D. 1723-1740) who wrote
many valuable works on Śākta Āgama. His best work is probably
Setu-bandha, the commentary on Nityā-śoḍaśikā-rṇava. His Śāmbha-
vānanda-kalpa-latā, Varivasya-rahasya, Varivasya-prakhāṣa, commentaries
on kaula Tripura and Bhāvanā Upaniṣads, on Lalitā-sahasra-nāma
(Saubhāgya-bhāskara) and on Durgā-sapta-satī (Guptavati) are deservedly
famous works and exhibit the author at his best. Pūrṇānanda’s Śrī-tattva-
cintā-maṇi is a good book but contains very little philosophical information.

As regards the Kāli School the following works may be mentioned:
Kāla-jñāna, Kālottara, Mahākāla-saṁhitā, Vyomakeśa-saṁhitā, Jayadratha-
yāmala, Uttara-tantra, Sakti-saṁgama-tantra (Kāli section), etc.

II

The supreme Reality, called saṁvit, is of the nature of pure intelligence
which is self-luminous and unaffected by the limitations of time, space
and causality. It is infinite light called prakāśa with an unstinted freedom
of action called vimarśa or svātantra. This freedom constitutes its power

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which in fact is identical with its being and remains involved in it as well as expresses itself as its inalienable property. The essence of *saṁvit* is consciousness free from *vikalpa* and is fundamentally distinct from matter. It is one, being integral, continuous, compact and of homogeneous texture and there is no possibility of break in its continuity and of admixture of foreign elements in its essence. Being free it does not depend on anything else for its manifestation and function.

The *power* may be said to exist in two-fold condition. Creation, dissolution, etc., are in reality consequent on the play of this Power. It is always active, its activity being expressed on the one hand as self-limitation (*tirodhāna*) involving the appearance (*śrṣṭi*) of the universe as such till then absorbed in and identified with the essence of Reality and on the other as self-expression only (*anugraha* = grace) implying the disappearance (*saṁhāra*) of the same and its absorption in the Reality. Maintenance (*sthiti*) of the world represents an intermediate state between *saṁhāra* and *śrṣṭi*.

*Saṁvit* is like a clean mirror within which the universe shines as an image reflected in a transparent medium. As the image is not distinct from the mirror the universe is inseparable from *saṁvit*. But the analogy between the two need not be pushed beyond this limit. The mirror reflects an object, but *saṁvit* in its fullness being creative requires no object outside itself. This freedom or power of actualization is *svātantrya* or *māyā*. The world thus manifested within the Absolute has infinite varieties, but the *saṁvit* remains always the same unbroken unity of existence and consciousness. Reality as universal Being is one, but its specific forms are multiple, just as the mirror is one but the images reflected in it are many. The one becomes many, not under the pressure of any external principle but through its own intrinsic dynamism. Motion seems to be initiated and multiplicity evolved within the primal Unity under its influence. For this reason the one always retains its Unity and yet creation, etc., with their infinite varieties follow. The many is as real as the one, for both are the same.

We are thus confronted with three possible states for consideration:

(a) *Saṁvit* alone, but not the world appearing within it (*=cit*).
(b) *Saṁvit* as well as the world shining within it, without external projection (*=ānanda*).
(c) *Saṁvit*, the world within it and its projection outside (*=icchā*).

In every case *saṁvit* as such remains one and the same and is not in the least affected. Hence it is called *nir-vikalpa*, free from *vikalpas* and modifications. On comparison of the three states it would seem that the first represents a condition in which there is no manifestation within or without. The second is a state of manifestation within, but not without. The third state, being that of *icchā*, means external projection, though
in reality sanvīt in itself being full can have nothing outside it, for even the so-called externality is not really external to it.

That sanvīt is free from vikalpas and that creation is a vikalpa or kalpanā is admitted by both Śākta Āgama and the Vedānta. But the question is—how does creation as a vikalpa emanate from sanvīt which is pure and free from vikalpas? The Vedānta says, it does not so emanate, but is part of a beginningless process (in spite of cyclic beginnings) going on within the domain of matter or māyā and superimposed on sanvīt or Brahman which reveals it—a process which is not in any way initiated by it.

But the attitude of Āgama is different. It believes in svātantrya or power in the sanvīt to generate movement, though it is only an ābhāsa, and externality is only apparent. The universe is within this power and power is within the Absolute. When power is supposed to be dormant vimarśa is held to be dissolved in prakāśa (antar-līna-vimarśa): Śakti seems to be sleeping as kundaliini and Śiva is no longer Śiva, but a śava, the state being not one of Spirit but of lifeless matter. But when power is awake, as indeed it always is, the supreme Consciousness remains conscious of Itself. This self-awareness of the Absolute expresses itself as “I” or Aham, which is described as full (pūrṇa), since there is nothing outside it to act as a counter-entity in the form of “this.” In the technical language of the Āgama the state of the Absolute from this point of view is called pūrṇaḥ-haṁtā. The fullness of Aham implies the presence of the entire universe reflected within it as within a mirror. The universe is then one with Aham.

Sanvīt is prakāśa as well as vimarśa—it is beyond the universe (viśvottīrṇa) and yet permeates it (viśvātmaka). The two aspects constitute one integral whole. This is a-ha-m, the first letter “a” standing for prakāśa, the last letter “ha” representing vimarśa: the unity of the two, which would denote the unity of all the letters of the alphabet between “a” and “ha,” is indicated by bindu (m). Thus Aham is symbolized by bindu. The creative act of the supreme Will breaks as it were this bindu and sets in operation the entire cosmic process.

The externalization referred to above is the manifestation of a non-ego (an-aham-bhāva) within the pure Ego (Sūdha-Aīman), appearing as external to the limited ego: it is the root Ignorance (mūlā-vidyā) of the Vedānta. This non-ego is the so-called a-vyakta (unmanifest) or jaḍa-śakti (matter). But the freedom or the spiritual power of sanvīt, known as cit-śakti, is beyond this Ignorance, but to this power the Advaita Vedānta, as usually interpreted, seems to be a stranger.

As avidyā or the material power issues out of the spiritual power, the ultimate source of all contingent existence, there is no discrepancy in the statement, often found in Śākta works (e.g. Tripurā-rahasya—Jñānakhaṇḍa) that power has three distinct states of its existence:
(a) During the universal dissolution, when the Self is free from all vikalpas, Sakti exists as pure cit-sakti, i.e. Parā-prakṛti (of the Gītā). As mirror is the life of the image it is the life-principle of ķīva and jagat which are sustained by it.

(b) When after pralaya the pure state ceases and when although there is no vikalpa as such there is yet a tendency in that direction, the power is called māyā-sakti.

(c) But when the vikalpas are fully developed and materiality becomes dense Sakti appears as avidyā or jāda-sakti or prakṛti. When māyā and avidyā are subsumed under one name it is called jāda-prakṛti (i.e. aparā-prakṛti of the Gītā).

It has already been observed that the appearance of the universe in creation (sṛṣṭi) follows upon the self-limitation of the divine power, and the cosmic end in dissolution (pralaya) follows from the self-assertion of the same power. After the period of cosmic night is over the supreme Will, in co-operation with the mature adṛṣṭas of jīvas, manifests, only partially as it were, the essence of the Self, whereon the Self is revealed as limited. The appearance of limitation is thus the emergence of not-self, known as avidyā or jāda-sakti, called also differently by the names of void (śūnya), prakṛti, absolute negation, darkness (tamas) and ākāśa. This is the first stage in the order of creation and represents the first limitation imposed on the Limitless. The erroneous belief, generated through the freedom of the Self, that the Ego is partial (aikadeśika) and not full and universal (pūrna) is responsible for the appearance of this something which being a portion of the Self is yet outside of it and free from self-consciousness and is described as not-self or by any other name as shown above.

Thus the supreme Reality splits itself spontaneously, as it were, into two sections—one appearing as the subject and the other as the object. Pūrna'hamtā which is the essence of supreme Reality disappears after this cleavage: the portion to which limited egoism attaches being the subject and the other portion free from egoism the object. The object as thus making its appearance is the Unmanifest (a-vyakta) Nature from which the entire creation emanates and which is perceived by the subject as distinct from itself.

Caitanya is of the nature of self-luminous light (sphurat), which shines on itself (svātman) and is known as ahamtā or I-ness. When resting on the non-ego (anātman) it expresses itself as idamtā or This-ness. The essence of caitanya consists in the fact that the light (prākāśa) is always revealed to itself. This universal Ego or "I" stands behind all dualism. The supreme Ego is universal, as there is nothing to limit (pariccheda) or to differentiate (vyāpati) it, and the entire visible universe exists in identity with it. But this characteristic by its very nature is absent from matter (jāda), which
is not self-manifest. Just as light and heat co-exist in fire, in the same way universal Ahaṁtā and freedom or śakti co-exist in caityanya. This freedom is māyā which though essentially identical with caityanya (cideka-rūpa) brings out varieties of an infinite kind, but in bringing out this variety it does not in the least swerve from the Essence.

The appearance of the universe in pure caityanya has three distinct stages:

(a) The first is the germinal state (bījā'vasthā), when the material power, which is still in its earliest phase of manifestation, is pure. Matter does not assert itself at this stage and consequently there is no differentiation in experience. In other words, it does not yet appear as distinct from caityanya, though potentially it exists. This state is represented by the five pure tattvas, viz. Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, Suddha-vidyā and Īśvara.

(i) The avidyā, which has been described above as being caityanya in its limited appearance as an object external to the subject is called Śiva. In pure (caityanya), owing to the play of its own will, an infinite number of limited aspects (svā'mśas) arise. These are mutually distinct. From this point of view to every limited aspect of cit there is a corresponding object external to it, but to the unlimited cit or pure Self (pūrṇa-Ātman = para-Siva) there is no externality. The Universal (sāmānya) common to all the pure and limited cit aspects referred to above is called Śiva-tattva. This tattva is thus a universal, holding within it all the individuals (viśeṣas), but para-Siva or pure Self is transcendent and comprises both the Universal and the individuals. Hence Śiva-tattva may be more properly described as pure caityanya in its general but conditional form, free from all vikalpas and is to be distinguished from the Absolute proper.

(ii) The appearance of Śiva (paricchinnā-nir-vikalpa-cit) as “I” (Aham) is called Śakti. Although this self-presentative character (aham-bhāsana) is in the essence of cit, so that there can be in fact no differentiation between Śiva and Śakti as such, the cit is nevertheless known as Śiva in so far as it is free from all differentiating attributes and as Śakti by virtue of its characteristic self-awareness.

(iii) When the self-presentation (aham-bhāsana) is no longer confined to the Self but is extended to the not-self or the object (mahāśūnya) external to the Self, it is known as Sadāśiva. This state marks the identification of the Self with the not-self in the form “I am this” and indicates predominance of spirit over matter.

(iv) But when matter prevails and the consciousness assumes the form “This is I” the state is technically called Īśvara.
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(v) The term “Śuddha-vidyā” is reserved for the state which represents an equality in the presentation of the subjective and objective elements in consciousness.

(b) The second stage in the evolution of avidyā represents a further development of difference or materiality, when the subtle products of matter and spirit make their appearance. In this mixed condition the mixed (miśra) tattvas, viz. māyā, kalā, vidyā, rāga, kāla and niyati reveal themselves.

(i) The confirmation of difference due to the free Will of the Supreme, which characterizes the second stage, has the effect of reversing the normal relation between spirit and matter. Thus while in the first stage described above spirit or cit-śakti dominates matter or jāda-śakti which exists in a rudimentary state, merged in spirit, the second stage shows the preponderance of matter over spirit. Consciousness loses its supremacy and becomes a quality inherent in the material subject. All this is due to the emergence and development of difference in caitanya. This material subject which is matter prevailing over spirit and related to it as a substance to its quality—is called māyā.

(ii–vi) The five aspects of māyā are the five so-called kañcukas or wrappings which are the five eternal saktis of para-Siva in a limited form. The obscuring power of māyā acts as a veil as it were upon the omnipotence, omniscience, self-contentment, eternity and freedom of the supreme Self and thus acting is known as kalā, vidyā, rāga, kāla and niyati respectively.

(vii) The pure Self as obscured by māyā and its five-fold activities appears as purusa with its limitations of action, knowledge, contentment, eternity and freedom.

(c) The third or grossest stage in the evolution of avidyā is represented by the dense products of the mixed tattvas, where matter is overwhelmingly strong. This stands for the group of the twenty-four tattvas, from primary prakṛti down to prithivi, constituting the material order.

Prakṛti, with which the lower creation begins, is indeed the assemblage (samasṭi) of the dispositions and tendencies (vāsanās) of all persons with various and beginningless karmans: it may be fitly described as the body of the kārma dispositions of the jīvas, considered as inhering in cit-śakti or Self. This karma-vāsanā or prakṛti is three-fold, according as the experience which is its moral outcome is pleasant or painful or of the nature of a comatose condition in which neither pleasure nor pain is felt.

The dispositions exist in twofold condition, viz. as a-uyakta when they lie unmanifest as in dreamless sleep or as citta when they manifest themselves as in dreams and wakeful states. In the dreamless state there can
be no experience of pleasure and pain, because as the mature karmans only can be worked off through experience the others which are not yet sufficiently ripe are not ready for fructification. It is a fact that karmans, when they are matured by time, cause the cognitive power (jñāna-śakti) of the Conscious Self to move outwards and have contact with the external world, which is the objective outcome of prakṛti. In a state of sleep such movement is naturally absent. But the process of time during which the sleep continues acts on the karmans and matures some of them, so that the aforesaid power is allowed to come in touch with the outer objects or with their semblances and the sleep is over. The power as thus qualified by the body of kārma dispositions leading to contact with the objects and consequent experience (bhoga) is known as citta.

The citta differs according to the difference of puruṣa, but it is one with prakṛti in dreamless sleep. Thus it may be viewed as puruṣa or as prakṛti according as the conscious (citi) or unconscious (avyakta) element prevails in it. It is not therefore a distinct category, but falls either under puruṣa or under prakṛti.17 The citta is in fact the inner organ (antah-karana) which is known under three names according to the triple character of its function, viz. as ahamkāra when it feels the ego-sense, as buddhi when it comes to a decision and as manas when it thinks or cogitates within.

A short note on the Śākta view of manas (mind) would not be out of place here. Like the supreme sanātīta manas has two aspects, viz. prakāśa and vimarśa. Prakāśa indicates the resting of the manas on, and its contact with, outer objects; and vimarśa consists in mental agitation in regard to that very object caught as a reflection within and expressed in thought as “it is thus,” which involves association with past images stored in the mind. What happens may be thus explained. The manas becomes first connected with the object through the senses, etc., when the latter manifests itself in an undifferentiated form due to freedom from verbal references (śabdollekha). This is nir-vikalpaka-jñāna and is always inferable according to those who do not believe in the self-validity of knowledge. According to Śākta-Āgama, however, this is mere prakāśa (i.e. darsana) or bare awareness of the object. At the next moment the external object impinges its form on the manas by way of reflection, expressed in the judgment “it is thus.” This is called vicāra, a state of consciousness in which a particular object is differentiated from others and is mixed up with conceptual elements. It is vimarśa or sa-vikalpaka-jñāna. Thus the manas has twofold state, as mentioned above. The vimarśa may be fresh as in case of immediate experience (anubhava) or old as in case of memory (smyrti) and mental co-ordination (anusaṃdhāna). Both the latter states are due to psychic dispositions caused by experience.

The states of consciousness are now easily intelligible. The sleep-state (suṣupti), from this point of view, would come under prakāśa, viz. prakāśa of niḍra. It is a form of nir-vikalpaka-jñāna. It is durable and is not
momentary and is regarded as a state of insentientcy (mudha-daśa) due to absence of vimarśa. It is pure prakāśa, which is another name for insentientcy. The waking state (jāgara), on the other hand, is mostly of the nature of vimarśa and is not a state of insentientcy. Thus after an unbroken series of states of consciousness free from images (vikalpas) in dreamless sleep there arises during the subsequent state of waking a series of images.

But what is the nature of nidrā which is revealed in sleep? It is replied that it represents the great void to which we have alluded in the earlier pages as identical with the so-called ākāśa and which is the earliest externalized manifestation after the divine Ātman caused its first self-limitation. It is formless and unmanifest and is revealed in sleep when nothing else exists. It is absence of all visible forms conceived as one universal background. This being revealed in sleep the man on waking feels that he was aware of nothing during that state.

It is a well-known phenomenon, noted by the Śākta philosophers, that even during waking the mind becomes insentient as in sleep at the moment of seeing an object, but this insentientcy is not felt as such. The nir-vikalpaka-jñāna of the waking hours being momentary the insentientcy sinks below (tirohitavat) under the pressure of a quick succession of images.

In sleep the prakāśa aspect of the manas remains, but the vimarśa lapses. This is why the manas is usually described as being dissolved in that state. Similarly the manas is in a state of dissolution when an outer object is just seen.

The citta is really the Self as directed towards the knowable object. In sleep the manas being free from images remains quiet and motionless. Its momentary modifications being absent it is said to be dissolved. Such a state is therefore discernible in each of the three following conditions, viz.:

(a) Nir-vikalpa-samādhi, when the pure self remains established in its self-luminous essence.
(b) Sleep, when the Unmanifest or great void is revealed.
(c) Vision of an object, when there is prakāśa or revelation of the external object through the usual sense contact.

In all these different states there is an apparent similarity of concentrated prakāśa due to non-manifestation of vimarśa as “it is thus” (sabdānubedaḥ). Though the same prakāśa underlies all the states the states themselves are not identical, inasmuch as the subsequent vimarśa expressed in the form of mental co-ordination (anusandhāna) is different in each case. Thus the vimarśa in case of samādhi assumes the form “I was silent during this time”; in sleep it is expressed as “I knew nothing during this time”; but in vision of an external object it takes on the form, “It is such an object.” This difference in vimarśa is not explicable except on the assumption of some sort of difference in the objects concerned.
But it does not destroy the unity of the essence, viz., freedom from images or verbal associations in the three states in question. The difference in object is as follows: The object in samādhi is pure Self unmixed with the forms of visible body, etc. The object in sleep is the Unmanifest or a-vyakta which is an external formless thing. The object in vision is an external substance with peculiar features and distinguishable from others.

Hence though the objects (bhāṣya) are different the bare consciousness (bhāsa) or awareness which is common to all is one and the same and is undifferentiated. In other words, though samādhi, nīdā and the external object are different from one another the consciousness in which they are revealed is one. This shows that difference in the object cannot produce any corresponding difference in the consciousness or the essence (sva-rūpa). Difference in essence is possible only through reflection which is absent in all the three cases as they are equally of the nature of pure awareness (prakāśa).

Samādhi and sleep being of longer duration are capable of being thought about (vimṛṣṭa) in subsequent moments, but the case of vision of an object is different, because it is momentary. In the same manner momentary samādhi or sleep cannot be made an appropriate object of vimarṣa. Even in waking hours there exist momentary samādhis as well as suṣuptis which are generally ignored.18

III

Sāradā-tilaka (I. 7–8) while describing the origin of the manifested world, contains an important passage, which shows the order of manifestation as follows:

(i) Parameswara, described as "sakala" and "Saccidānanda-vibhava."
(ii) Sakti.
(iii) Nāda (para).
(iv) Bindu (para).
(v) Bindu
    (śastra).
(vi) Nāda (aṣṭa).

In the above context the word "Parameswara" means evidently the supreme Divine in which infinite power—Sakti or Kalā19—lies in eternal union. The divine Being is described here as of the nature of an eternal Self-Existence (sat), Self-Consciousness (cit) and Self-Delight (ānanda). During creation what first happens is the manifestation of power (Sakti) which so long lay hidden in the depths of Being. There is no doubt that this power is characterized by Will (icchā), which is its first evolute.

In the Siva-Purāṇa (Vāyaviya-Samhitā) it is said that the emergence
of Śakti in the beginning of creation is like the appearance of oil out of oil-seeds. It is a spontaneous act, initiated by the divine Will. In other words, it is through the divine Will that the supreme Power which is synonymous with it and remains concealed in the divine Essence reveals itself.\(^{20}\)

The appearance of Śakti after the great cosmic night is like the revival of memory in a re-awakened person, after the unconsciousness of sleep. The desire for a vision, again of the lost world, is associated with a sense of void, which is māyā. Māyā stands at the beginning of subsequent creation and the divine Principle which produces it is its Lord and Controller. The vision of void is accompanied by an indistinct sound called para-nāda, which fills the entire space. Nāda is of the nature of light. That sound and light co-exist and are related as phases of the same phenomenon are recognized in the Tantras. The first self-expression of the supreme Will (icchā) is the origination of void (śūnya) and of the sound and light filling this void. All this comes under the category of Will. The next step is represented by the concentration of this diffuse light-sound into a focus (under the secret influence of Will) called bindu. It is in this stage that the power of action (kriyā-śakti) distinctly unfolds itself. The creative principles (tattva) are evolved out of this supreme bindu. Bindu subsequently breaks itself into three, the three parts being known as bindu, bija and nāda. Bindu is the part in which the Śiva-aspect is predominant, while in bija Śakti prevails. In nāda, however, the elements of Śiva and Śakti are of equal strength.

What disturbs the equilibrium of the bindu? Sāradā-tilaka says nothing in reply to this question. Prapańca-sāra (I. 42–3) says that it is kāla which breaks the equilibrium of bindu. And in this view kāla is an eternal aspect of the eternal puruṣa, through which His intimate knowledge of supreme prakṛti is said to be derived. Prakṛti knows itself and is self-luminous.\(^{21}\)

The great sound which comes into being when the bindu splits itself is known as sabda-Brahman, as Sāradā-tilaka (I. 11–12) and Prapańca-sāra (I. 44) observe.

It is well known that what is figured as the pericarp of the thousand-petalled lotus within the crown of the head is the so-called brahma-randhra which is often referred to as a void. It extends through the susūmnā-nāḍī down to the very bottom of the interior of the spinal column. If the mind stays in the void it loses its restless nature and enables one to attain to the realization of oneself as above the guṇas. The Will power and supreme nāda emerge from this source.\(^{22}\)

The supreme nāda stands for the supercausal or mahā-kāraṇa state of Brahman, which is known as visarga-maṇḍala. If the supreme Śakti is called kula and supreme Śiva a-kula, the sphere of visarga may be described as below them both. But usually it is placed in the upper layer of brahma-
randhra below which in regular order are the so-called spheres of the
sun, the moon and the great vāyu—all within the limits of the thousand-
petalled lotus.

The causal state of Brahman is represented by śabda-Brahman or
kula-kundalinī, figured as a triangle consisting of three principles (tattva),
viz. bindu, bīja and nāda, issuing from the para-bindu under division.
The triangular kundalinī would thus appear to be a manifestation of the
primary power represented by para-nāda and para-bindu.

The subtle principles of cosmic structure issue out of the kundalinī
and begin to locate themselves in distinct centres in the forehead and
lower down in the sympathetic system. It has already been observed that
bindu (lower) is Śiva, bīja is Sakti and nāda (lower) is the product of their
Union. Bīja or Sakti is virtually the entire alphabet, the letters of which
are arranged in a triangular fashion designated in the Tantras as “a-kau-
tha” triangle—an equilateral triangle the three sides or lines of which
are formed of 16 letters each, beginning with “a,” “ka” and “tha”
respectively. Thus, 48 letters constitute the three equal sides of this
triangle. This triangle is intimately associated with the principles of
kāma-kalā. The constituent bindus of kāma-kalā are thus three—two
causal (kārāṇa) and one of the nature of effect (kārya).

The nāda which springs from the interaction of bindu (lower) and bīja
is to be distinguished from śabda-Brahman which manifested itself during
the division of para-bindu. The latter may be described as mahā-nāda.
The nāda contains within itself the indistinct sounds of all the letters of
the alphabet, much in the same manner as the sunlight may be said to
consist of all the coloured rays known to us. The truth of the matter is
that mahā-nāda or śabda-Brahman, in its manifestation as kundalinī, is
located in the body of a man and serves as the mechanism for the
articulation of sounds.

The continued practice of a mantra causes it to be sounded in a subtle
manner in the susumnā. The sound expands itself and is blended with
the lower nāda—it does not and cannot rise up to the mahā-nāda higher
up. The focus of mahā-nāda is free from the action of ordinary vāyu which
cannot rise up to it. It may be of some interest to note that mahā-nāda
is associated with para-nāda in the brahma-randhra above it on the one
hand and with the lower nāda on the other. The power involved in the
lower nāda crosses the middle of the two eyebrows (bhū-madhya) and
flows down the susumnā channel. At the lowest point nāda is converted
into the kundalinī. The forces of the bīja as concretized in the latter are
all within the lower nāda.

The position of para-bindu has a special value for contemplation,
insasmuch as it represents the nexus of the divine plane on the one hand
and the cosmic and supercosmic spheres on the other. It is the place where
nāda extends into mahā-nāda or śabda-Brahman, beyond which is the
śaiva and śākta schools

divine nāda within the Infinite. Para-nāda above is supramental (unmanī) divine consciousness and light, while mahā-nāda below is the source of universal creation. Para-bindu stands between the two. It is for this reason considered to be the best centre for contemplation of guru.

It may be stated that the bīja consists of varṇas and that these are driven down to take their respective places in the six centres below, as soon as the downward moving power of mahā-nāda passes through the middle of the two eyebrows and extends into the spinal column. These varṇas, the modifications of mahā-nāda, being the blends of nāda and bīja, are so many actions generated from para-bindu which is pre-eminently characterized by active power. Mahā-nāda cannot give rise to the different creative principles unless it passes through the stage of bindu.

We need not proceed further to describe the progressive stages of creation. We find that in the above analysis, which follows mainly the traditions set up by Lakṣmaṇa-Deśika, Śaṅkarācārya and others, there are three nādas: para-nāda, the antecedent of para-bindu; the mahā-nāda called therein sābda-Brahman, which follows the disruption of para-bindu; and the nāda which results from the union of bindu and bīja. Similarly, there are two bindus—para-bindu which is produced from the focusing of para-nāda and which is the source of sābda-Brahman, the immediate spring of creative forces; and apara-bindu which is the effect of para-bindu with the Śiva element prevailing. As regards the kālā, it would appear that the supreme Sakti which is the eternal associate of the divine Principle and remains always in it, either as completely absorbed in it and incapable of differentiation or as partially emergent, is the highest kālā. In a lower sense, however, the name kālā is used to signify the bīja mentioned above. That is to say, the varṇas, symbolized as the letters of the alphabet and conceived as the basic principles of lower nāda or the sound potentials, are kālās in this sense. From this point of view the triangle called “a-ka-tha,” otherwise described as kundalinī, is the kālā.

IV

The earlier Āgamas also generally support a similar view. The supreme Sakti, the instrument of transcendent Śiva in all His activities (samanā), is the totality of all the tattvas.33 It is within this that the entire universe lies hidden. From this down to vyāpinī or great void within brahma-randhra there is a regular series of saktis representing more and more diminished consciousness and power (e.g. anāśritā, anāthā, anantā and vyoma-rūpā), all being hyper-subtle and described by yogins in terms of negation. In fact not a single sakti beyond the brahma-randhra lends itself to a positive description. The suṣumnā canal along which the nāda flows up ends in brahma-randhra.34
The supreme Sakti is sometimes described as Amā-kalā. It is then intended to convey the idea that if it is eternal, ever-emergent and of the nature of unalloyed bliss, the other kalās which go into the make-up of the world being replenished and supplemented by it. When it is free from visarga it is not outwardly inclined and rests in itself. In this condition it is called sakti-kundalinī or parā-sanvīt and is likened to a sleeping serpent resting on itself. But when it is ruffled it becomes visarga which is of two kinds according as it represents the pre-creative flutter called ānanda and symbolized as “a” and the last creative effort bringing out life or prāṇa symbolized as “ḥ.” Prāṇa or “ḥ” is sometimes described as hanśa or śūnya. The two visargas are therefore known as higher and lower (“parā” and “a-parā”) graphically represented in nāgarī script as the two points of visarjanīya (ञ). The Amā-kalā reveals the two points and flows out in order to manifest forms. Every form in the universe, whether a subject or an object or an instrument of knowledge, is identical with Amā-kalā, though it may be made to appear as different from it. The determinate prakāśa in each form implies this difference. Hence Sakti-kundalinī expressed in visarga is still resting on itself as sanvīt and is free from movement. Prāṇa-kundalinī represents the other end where sanvīt has already developed into prāṇa. Sanvīt is full and self-contained. Its supreme creative act is to be distinguished from the later creative processes, as it means the projection of the Self out of itself into itself. As the source of creation is not anything extraneous to the Self the latter is the efficient (nimitta) as well as the intrinsic cause (upādāna) of the effect. Creation takes place within the Self and not within time and space different from it. What is projected or created is also not anything other than the Self. Thus every object in this universe, inner or outer, is a form of the Self. The projection is of the nature of multiple abhāsas manifested as both inner and outer realities. Sanvīt thus appears gradually as the different letter-sounds in its process of materialization. These are the multiple forms assumed by visarga, the outermost being called “ḥ.” The visarga which is only “ḥ” without manifestation is described in some treatises (e.g. Kula-gahvāra) as the Principle of kāma or unrestricted Will. As there is no real difference between the visarga and the objective world it is not possible to assume a causal relation between them. Visarga itself appears as vācyā as well as vācaka. Infinite manifestation is the essence of visarga, though it does not produce any real multiplicity. The supreme Sakti as being responsible for this manifold appearance, viz. delight (ānanda), will (icchā), knowledge (jñāna) and action (kriyā) is the hidden spring of visarga.25

The subtle visarga ceaselessly expresses itself, and as nāda (or para-bīja) existing in every creature it indicates prāṇa and its existence is felt within by all, though its special manifestation is confined to specific occasions. Visarga is thus the attribute of the supreme Divine which is eternally
free and has the power of five-fold divine activity, viz. creation, preservation, destruction or withdrawal, grace and alienation.

The Transcendent or anuttara (a), by means of visarga (up to "k" or prāṇa), reveals itself as Śakti (ha) and then returns to itself and abides in the indivisible prakāśa, which is its own eternal Self, called Siva-bindu (m)-a-ha-m. This is how in the universal consciousness which is no better than bare awareness there arises a sense of "I." Its relation to the not-self, e.g. body, etc., is an event in time which is psychologically explicable. The Ego-sense in pure consciousness reveals it as one's own Self (Śvātman). The unity of Śiva and Śakti follows logically from the integrality or oneness of this sense which covers both. This is the secret of the fullness of Ego or pūrnā-hamā to which reference has already been made.

The unity of prakāśa and vimārsa is the bindu called kāma or ravi (sun). The emergence of two bindus out of this primordial one is the state of visarga. The two bindus are agni (fire) and soma (moon), conceived as cit-kalā. It is not a state of dualism, but one of union between two inseparable elements of a single whole. The two aspects combined, namely, bindu and visarga, are represented as a significant symbol of divine Unity, though it is true that in the ultimate state even these elements lose their own lustre. The interaction of the bindus causes nectar or the creative fluid to flow out. This is the so-called hārdha-kalā, the essence of ānanda. The interaction is like the heat of fire acting on butter and causing it to melt and flow. The one is sat, the two is sat as aware of Itsself, i.e. cit (cit-kalā) and the hārdha-kalā flowing from between the two is the result of self-awareness felt as ānanda. The entire science of kāma-kalā is thus the science of Saccidānanda and brahma-vidyā as indicating an eternal creative act. The substance of delight which flows out constitutes the essence of all the creative principles.

Though prakāśa and vimārsa are identical it is to be remembered that prakāśa is always partless and continuous, while vimārsa is partless as well as divisible into parts. Whenever therefore prakāśa is referred to as discrete it is to be understood only in a secondary sense. The three bindus working together towards a common end form as it were a single triangle.

Prakāśa within vimārsa is of the form of a white bindu; and vimārsa within prakāśa is of the form of a red bindu called nāda. The two bindus in union constitute the original bindu called kāma of which these are kalās. The unity of the three is the substance called kāma-kalā from which the entire creation consisting of words and the things signified by them originates.

Bhāskara Rāya in his Varivasya-rahasya while speaking of kāma-kalā refers to the three bindus as well as the hārdha-kalā the nature of which is held to be very secret. The white and red bindus represent in his opinion male and female energies.
Mrṭananda says that ārdha-kalā flows from between the two bindus and is the wave (lahari) of vimarṣa or sphurattā. Prakāśa is like fire and vimarṣa is like the butter which melts under it. The flow is the so-called ārdha-kalā noted above. The baindava-cakra, made of three mātrkās, is the outflow of kāma-kalā along with ārdha-kalā, and it is out of this that the thirty-six creative principles emanate.36

The soul as a spiritual atom thus makes its first appearance when the freedom of divine Will is lost behind its own self-created veil through the transition of Sakti from parā-kundalinī to prāṇa-kundalinī. This transition is effected by a graded process in which Sakti-kundalinī coils itself more and more tightly through the evolution of mātrkās and varṇas and reaches the level of prāṇa or sūnya. It is a truism that sāṃvit is first changed into prāṇa before the regular course of subsequent creation represented by the emergence of the first principles or tattvas can possibly take place.

The universe of experience consists of a number of bhuvanas or planes of life and consciousness made up of tattvas. In the Sākta-Saiva-Āgamas thirty-six tattvas are recognized, out of which twenty-four counted from below are considered as impure, the next seven as mixed and the remaining five as pure. In this scheme prakṛti (24) marks the end of impure, māyā (31) that of mixed and Śiva (36) that of pure tattvas. Each tattva has a series of bhuvanas affiliated to it.36 The bhuvanas in spite of their mutual differences in detail have the common characteristics of the tattvas concerned as predominant, though it is recognized as in the Patañjala School that everywhere everything is to be found (sarvan sarvātmakam).27 The bhuvanas are the abodes of living beings, endowed with bodies and organs made of the substance the materiality of which corresponds to the nature of their karman or jñāna and the degree of their perfection. The bhuvanas of the ērthīva-tattva represent the sphere, known as brahmāṇḍa, the bhuvanas of the tattvas up to prakṛti form the prakṛtyaṇḍa, those of the tattvas up to māyā represent the māyāṇḍa and the bhuvanas of the tattvas up to Sakti beyond māyā constitute the śaktyaṇḍa which is the widest sphere.28 Beyond Sakti-tattva there is no limitation and consequently no sphere, though bhuvanas are said to exist even in Śiva-tattva which is identified with bindu and śāntyatītā kalā.

The tattvas are generally supposed to be the ultimate principles, but they are not so, as they are constituted by kalās and Saktis which represent the multiple units of energy underlying the entire creation, and which considered in their totality represent the ground of self-expression of the transcendent Śiva. Thus the stuff of the universe is Sakti and in
the manner shown in the earlier pages *prakāśa* with *hārdha-kalā* constitutes the substance out of which the *tattvas* are formed.

The divine attributes of the Self are all diminished, in its atomic condition, when the *cit* appears as *citta*. Of the three well-known impurities or *malas* this is the first, called *āṇava*. It is the state of a *paśu* in which the sense of limitation is first manifested. This limitation makes possible the rise of *vāsanās*, as a result of which the assumption of physical body for a certain length of time becomes necessary to work off these *vāsanās* through experience. These *vāsanās* constitute *karma-mala*. The *māyiya-mala* is the name given to the source of the triple body, namely, (i) the causal or the *kalā-śarīra*, (ii) the subtle or *puryaśṭaka*, i.e. the *tattva-śarīra*, and (iii) the gross elemental or the *bhuvanaja-śarīra*. In fact everything which reveals itself in our experience as knowable and objective comes under *māyiya-mala*. The function of this impurity is to show an object as different from the subject (*sva-rūpa*). All the principles from *kalā* down to *prthivi* represent the fetters of *māya* or *paśas*. These give shape to body, senses, *bhuvanas*, *bhāvas*, etc., for fulfilling the experience of the soul. Hence what is popularly known as *samsāra* extends from *prthivi* up to *kalā*, and not beyond the latter. These three impurities persist always in the worldly soul.

This worldly soul is technically known as *sa-kalā*, being endowed with body, senses, etc., corresponding to the *tattva* or *bhuvana* to which it belongs. Such souls range from the lowest plane to the plane of *kalā* and migrate from plane to plane according to their *karmans*. There is another state of the soul in which the *māyiya mala* as described above is absent, but the other two *malas* continue as before. This is a state of *pralaya* or dissolution in which the soul is free from all the creative principles, is in a disembodied condition and remains absorbed in *māya*. Such souls are called *pralaya-kalas* or *pralaya-kevalins*. These are bodiless and senseless atoms with *karma-saṃskāras* and the root Ignorance clinging to them. When, however, the *karmans* are got rid of through discriminative knowledge, renunciation or such other means the soul is exalted above *māya*, though still retaining its atomic state. It is then above *māya* no doubt, but remains within the limits of *mahā-māya* which it cannot escape unless the supreme grace of the divine Master acts upon it and removes the basic Ignorance which caused its atomicity and the limitation of its infinite powers. This state of the soul represents the highest condition of the *paśu* known as *vijñānākala* or *vijñāna-kevalin*. This is *kaivalya*. Among these souls those which are thoroughly mature in respect of their impurity are competent to receive divine illumination at the beginning of the next creative cycle. The dawn of divine wisdom which is the result of divine grace (*anugraha*) acting upon the soul is the origin of the so-called *suddha-vidyā*.

The states of the soul which follow are not those of a *paśu*, but of Śiva
himself, though certain limitations still remain. These limitations are those of adhikāra, bhoga and laya according to the dualists. They are removed in due course of time through fulfilment of experiences, etc., in the pure order.

The successive stages of spiritual perfection consequent on the dawn of wisdom are represented by the tattvas to which the souls are attached. Thus the lowest stage is that of a mantra which corresponds to śuddha-vidyā. The higher states are those of Mantreśvaras corresponding to Īśvara-tattva, of Mantra-mahēśvaras corresponding to Sadā-Śiva and of Siva corresponding to the tattva known under that name. The state of Siva is really transcendent, being that of pure and absolute consciousness, but the true Absolute is Parama-Śiva where identity with all the tattvas as well as their transcendence are present simultaneously.

Due to the limitation of its powers the Self is bound. The Śāktas hold that there are certain hidden forces latent in cid-ākāśa, known as mātykās (lit. mothers of the world), which preside over the malās referred to above and over the kalās or the letter-sounds of the language. The supreme mātykā, known as Ambikā, has three aspects, viz. Jyeṣṭhā, Raudrī and Vāma, each of them having a specific function. The kalās are the ultimate units of human speech with which thought is inextricably interwoven. The mātykās beget in each soul in each act of its knowledge, determinate or indeterminate, an inner cognition (antah-paraśarā) and produce a sort of confusion thereon account of intermingling with śabda. Knowledge in this manner assumes the form of joy, sorrow, desire, aversion, conceit, fear, hope, etc., under the influence of these forces. This is how bhāvas originate and govern the unregenerate human soul. Mātykās are thus the secret bonds which bind down a soul, but when they are truly known and their essence is revealed they help it in attaining siddhis or supernormal psychic powers.

These forces function in cid-ākāśa so long as the so-called brahma-granthi is not rent asunder. This granthi is evidently the node of identity between spirit and matter and is the spring of ego-sense in man. The moral effect of kundalini is so far clear. It is maintained that if the mātykā is not propitiated and if the node is not removed it is likely that even after the rise of truth-consciousness the soul may, owing to inadvertence (pramāda), be caught up in its snares, get entangled in the meshes of śabda and lapse into ignorance or go astray.

The divine Will is one and undivided, but it becomes split up after the origin of the mātykā, which evolve out of the nāda co-eternal with this Will. This split in icchā or svātantra causes a separation between jñāna and kriyā, its constitutive aspects. This is practically identical with what is described as a divorce between svātantra and bodha or vināśa and prakāśa, which takes place on the assumption of atomic condition by the supreme Self. In this condition jñāna evolves into three inner and
five outer senses, and kriyā into five īrānas and five motor-organs connected respectively with the vital and reflex activities of the organism.

VI

The viewpoint of the dualistic Āgamas may now be summed up. Here the divine Essence or Śiva is conceived as inalienably associated with a power or Sakti which is purely divine and identical with it. The Essence and power, both of the nature of cit or pure consciousness, constitute the two aspects of one and the same divine Principle. Śiva is a transcendent unity. Sakti too is really one, though it appears as jñāna or kriyā according to the character of the data on which it functions. It is the Will (iccā) of Śiva and is essentially one with Him. Bindu is the eternal material principle outside Sakti, but subject to Its action. It is co-eternal with Śiva and Sakti, and the three principles are usually described as the three jewels (ratna) of Śaivism and its holy Trinity. In creation (in pure creation directly and in impure creation indirectly) Śiva's place is that of an agent, Sakti's is that of an instrument and bindu serves as the material stuff. Sakti being immaterial never suffers any modification during action, but bindu does. The modification of bindu which follows from a disturbance of its equilibrium (kṣobha) under the stress of divine Sakti at the end of cosmic night (pralaya) gives rise to five kalās which appear as it were like five concentric circles with greater and greater expansion. These kalās which precede further progressive modifications called tattvas and bhuvanas bear the names of niṣvrtti (outermost), pratiṣṭhā, vidyā, śanti and śaṅtyatīlā (inmost). This represents one line of the evolution of bindu, as that of the objective order (artha). The other line is represented by the evolution of sound or śabda. In this aspect we find nāda, bindu and varṇa as the three-fold expression of bindu arranged in an order of increasing externality.

Bindu is synonymous in this system with mahā-māyā and kuṇḍalinī. It is pure matter-energy and is to be distinguished from māyā and prakṛti, which are impure. It is the matrix of pure creation and is the source of two parallel lines of evolution, viz. of śabda and artha, so that it is to be looked upon as of a dual nature. The Pauṣkara-Āgama says:

Śabda-vastubhayātmāsau bindur-nā‘nya-lārātmakah.

The order of śabda creation out of the disturbed mahā-māyā is thus given:

(i) Mahā-māyā (iv) Sādākhya
(ii) Nāda (v) Īśa
(iii) Bindu (vi) Vidyā
In this scheme mahā-māyā stands for para-bindu in its undisturbed condition and nāda represents the same bindu when the cit-Sakti has acted upon it. As the action of Sakti upon bindu is in a sense constant it may be assumed that (i) and (ii) are really two aspects (logically successive but in actual fact simultaneous) of the same principle, nāda representing the disturbed part of mahā-māyā. If mahā-māyā is kundalini in its essence, nāda is the same kundalini in its awakened and active state. Mahā-māyā as such has no relation with puruṣa or the human soul, but as nāda or kundalini it resides in every puruṣa, normal and supernormal.35 The truth is that the evolution of mahā-māyā into four-fold vāc e.g. parā or sūkṣmā, paśyanti, madhyamā and vaikharī and the obscuration of the inherent divinity (Siva-tattva) of every human soul under the veil of mala or original impurity working from the beginningless past (anādi) are co-eternal phenomena. Transcendence of parā-vāc and removal of this veil of obscurity signify therefore a single act, which is only another name of the culmination of the process of divinization of the human soul interpreted from the dualistic standpoint of the School as the restoration of its lost purity. We are thus in a position to understand why sometimes mahā-māyā and at other times nāda is identified with Śiva-tattva. Understood in this light bindu (iii) would mean apara-bindu and be a name for Sakti-tattva. The next evolution, Sādākhya (iv), which is held to comprise Sādāśiva-tattva, including the human sadā-śivas, Aṣu-Sadā-śivas, five brahmās, ten ānus (praṇava, etc.) and six āngas, stands for aksara-bindu36 and denotes nāda in its form of gross but undifferentiated sound (dhvani). The stage called Iṣa (v) represents an intermediate state between the aforesaid aksara-bindu and vaikharī-vāc expressed as letters of the alphabet in all their permutations and combinations.37 The eight Mantrasvaras and their Saktis (eight in number, e.g. Vāmā, etc.) fall under this class. The last (vi) named Vidyā, which includes the final stage of sound evolution, embraces all the mantras and vidyās, all the Agamas and the so-called Vidyā-rājñīs (queens of vidyās, seven in number)—in fact, all audible sensible sounds familiar to us.

It is interesting to observe that mahā-māyā as described above is called parā-Sakti and considered as the ultimate cause (parama-kāraṇa) of the world. It is also of the nature of nāda and is distinguished from the nāda lower down as sūkṣma-nāda.38

The dualists who maintain the doctrine of nāda repudiate the theory of sphaṭa and other allied theories of verbal knowledge and seek to explain the process of the origin of śabda-bodha on the basis of this doctrine. Rāmakaṇṭha in his kārikās has tried to show that the doctrine of sphaṭa is unable to render an adequate account of the meaning of a word. The relation between a word (śabda) and its meaning (arthā) is what is usually known as vācyavācaka-bhāva—a relation of what denotes or reveals (vācaka) with what is denoted or revealed (vācyā) by it. But wherein lies
the denotive character (vācakatā) of the word concerned? The object denoted by the word is external, but the word which denotes it is mental (buddhyāriṇāḥ)—the two are distinct and incommensurate. No word is capable of denoting its sense by virtue of its own nature, but its denotive power makes itself felt only when it represents in thought (parāmarśa) the object (vācyā) to be denoted which is external to it. This representation called parāmarśa-jñāna is of the nature of what may be called thought form and reveals the object. Hence, some thinkers are inclined to attribute denotive power to this parāmarśa-jñāna, in so far as it reveals the object concerned. But the Tantric philosophers are of opinion that though parāmarśa-jñāna as an intellectual act exists independently of the external object, it is a contingent phenomenon and arises under the action of some causal factors working behind. Such an act does not occur in the case of external objects not previously cognized by the senses. Rūpa, rasa, etc., become objects of mental parāmarśa of the speaker. That through which the origin of such parāmarśa becomes possible is called nāda. Nāda giving rise to parāmarśa-jñāna (antah-sānjalpa), and not physical śabda, possesses the denotive character (vācakatā). The physical śabda to which the vocal organ of the speaker gives expression manifests nāda. Nāda as thus manifested produces in the hearer the sense of the object meant. Nāda reveals all śabdas and arthas. Hence every act of discursive knowledge is impregnated with śabda.

Nāda is multiple, being unique in each individual, and is a product. Every animal soul (pāṣu-ātman), having a nature of its own, experiences its own nāda which arises from anāhata-bindu.

VII

The Śāktas believe in the importance of self-realization as a means to mokṣa. It is said to be of a determinate nature and expresses itself in the form of recognition (pratyabhijñā). The sequence of the preliminary state may be described as follows:

(i) Indirect knowledge of the Self gained through hearing of the teaching of Agama on the part of a person gifted with all the qualifications necessary for knowledge, e.g. detachment, etc.
(ii) Removal of doubts through reasoned thinking.
(iii) Direct knowledge or intuition of individual Self on removal of the false idea which has grown into a firm conviction regarding its identity with the body, etc.
(iv) Lastly, the recognition. It relates to the integral unity between the individual Self and the universal one made known through the Scriptures. Recognition as thus produced is destructive of ignorance lying at the root of worldly existence.
The recognition is not erroneous but is a form of *vikalpa* like other acts of determinate knowledge.

The indeterminate knowledge following from *samādhi* and the aforesaid recognition have the same object. But their difference is due to causal elements. In case of recognition the instrument in mind turned away from all objects other than the Self and aided by the presence in consciousness of the two objects indicated by the terms “I” and “He” in the judgment “I” and “He.” In knowledge from *samādhi* no such presence is needed. The recognition “It is the same jar” has for its object an integral substance. Thus the ordinary *vikalpa* having a jar, for instance, as its object and the recognition “It is the same jar” both have the same object, but the result is different on account of difference in causal factors. The indeterminate knowledge is pure, is the support of all *vikalpas* and is in conflict with none, so that it is incapable of destroying a *vikalpa*, like ignorance.

The purity of indeterminate knowledge is due to its freedom from reflection. It is on the background of such pure knowledge that all possible determinations arise owing to appearance of different forms during *samkalpa*, just as on a clean mirror reflection emerges due to the proximity of the object reflected.

The Śāktas view ignorance not as absence of knowledge like the Vaiṣeṣika nor as inexplicable like the Vedāntin but as a form of *sa-vikalpaka-jñāna*. The Āgamas hold that the supreme Self being of the nature of pure consciousness, what differentiates it from matter is its self-awareness (*sphurad-rūpata*) consisting in freedom (*svātantrya*), through which as already shown ignorance (*avidyā*) is manifested and through ignorance the world.

Ignorance is two-fold, according as it is viewed as a cause or as an effect. As a cause it is non-manifestation of the fullness of one’s own Self. This fullness is characterized by freedom from the limitations of time, space and form, though it is true that even these elements which are manifested in the light of the Self cannot limit the latter. If the Self which is not limited by time manifests itself as so limited it is certainly a case of non-manifestation of fullness or *pūrnatva*. This is the Śākta view of *root* Ignorance as already observed. As an effect ignorance is the manifestation as Self of what is other than the Self, e.g. body, etc. It is only a leaf (*pallava*) in the tree of Ignorance.

Knowledge of the integral Self may be indirect when it follows from a hearing of its nature from the Āgama taught by the *guru* or direct when it is derived immediately from *samādhi*. Direct knowledge called *vijñāna* can alone destroy the basis of mundane existence. Sense of identity with the body grows into *vāsanā* and becomes tenacious on account of its long continuance and prevents direct knowledge, even when it flashes for a moment in an impure mind, from producing a firm
Will (samkalpa). But when it follows from perfection in samādhi the requisite firmness is attained and it destroys the above vāsanā. There being a strong sense of identity with the body the direct knowledge of pure Self too is unable to overthrow ignorance and to effect mokṣa if it is obscured by doubts and errors.

Direct knowledge or vijñāna is preceded by indirect knowledge. The place of samādhi is between the two. It is maintained that even indirect knowledge has its use, for samādhi cannot beget the desired result, i.e. direct knowledge as recognition in the ignorant who have had no direct knowledge. A man, for instance, who has never heard about a gem and known it indirectly through descriptions cannot recognize it as a gem even when he sees it in the jeweller’s shop. Only he who has seen it can recognize it, provided that he attends to it. Hence even natural samādhi cannot produce brahma-jñāna in one who has not heard about Brahman. Advaita-jñāna is very rare. It does not and cannot appear until the mind has been purified from the blinding effects of māyā through the propitiation of one’s own divine Self by means of meditation or upāsanā. The importance of divine grace descending on the soul and purifying it cannot be overestimated.

There is an order of progression in spiritual experience. Svanatantrānanda in the mātrikā-cakra-viveka points out that on the rise of pure knowledge the knowables become one with the senses in consequence of which the knowables as such begin to disappear. But as the world still continues the sense of “thisness” as something external to the knower does not altogether vanish. The next position is that of Īśvara when the motor organs in which the movable objects are similarly absorbed become one with the cosmic body with which the subject as the agent is identified. The yogin in this stage is associated not only with an individual body but with the entire universe. In the state of Suḍā-sīva which follows, the senses in which the knowables have been absorbed become one with the Self, the true subject. It represents a state of omniscience. In the Sakti stage the universe body and the omniscient Self become unified—this is a condition of undisturbed equilibrium between spirit and matter (cit and a-cit).

NOTES

1. P. Panchanan Tarkaratna in his Sakti-bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra and on the Iṣa-Upaniṣad (pub. Banaras, Śaka, 1859–61), attempted to bring into prominence what he regarded as the Sākta point of view in the history of Indian philosophy. The attempt is laudable, but it does not truly represent any of the traditional viewpoints of the Sākta School.
2. Sarva-siddhānta-samgraha, attributed to Śaṅkarācārya, Suḍ-darśana-samuccaya by Haribhadra and Rājaśekhara, Viveka-vilāsa by Jinadatta, etc., are similar works, but in none of them the Sākta system is represented or even referred to by name.
3. The descent is from parā-vāc through pāśyantī and madhyamā to the vaikhāra
level (see Jayaratha on Tantrāloka, I, p. 34, and J. C. Chatterji, Kashmir Shaivaism, pp. 4–6). As regards the order of descent there are different accounts, though the underlying idea is the same. cf. Parasurāma-kalpa-sūtra, I, II; Setu-bandha by Bhāskara Rāya, 7, 47; Kāma-kalā-vilāsa with Cid-valli, 50–3; Yogini-hṛdaya-dīpikā, pp. 1–3; Saubhāgya-subbhagodaya (quoted in Dīpikā, pp. 79–82), etc.

4. As to how intuitive knowledge is converted into thought Patañjali holds that it is through association with sabā. The supersensuous perception of the yogin in regard to an object obtained through nir-vitarka-samādhi gives rise to an immediate knowledge of its unique character, but if it is to be communicated to others it has to be interwoven with sabāda and then in that thought-form transmitted through language.


7. See Jayaratha on Tantrāloka, 1, 18. There is a reference to sixty-four Tantras in Śaṅkara’s Saundarya-laharī v. 37. Laksnādīhara’s commentary gives a list of the names. Other lists are found in the Sarvottāsa and Vānakēśvara-Tantras.

8. Nāgānanda is supposed to have been the author of a Śakti-sūtra. Another Śakti-sūtra is attributed to Bharadāja (see Kalyāṇa, ibid., p. 624). The authenticity of these works is not very clear.

9. A work called Śrī-vidyā-dīpikā is attributed to Agastya. It contains an interpretation of the Pāñcadasa-mantra received by him from Hayagrīva.

10. See J. C. Chatterji, Kashmir Shaivaism, pp. 23–4; K. C. Pandey, Abinavagupta, p. 72 (cf. also p. 55, Durvāsas is said to have taught the sixty-four monistic Agamas to Kṛṣṇa).

11. In the colophon of the Lalita-stava-ratna Durvāsas is called Sakalāgamādhya-yacanavrata. Nityānanda in his commentary says that Durvāsas, alias Krodha-bhaṭṭāraka is really Śiva himself, the master of the teachers of Agamas, born of the womb of Anurūpa. The Śakti-stotra has been published from Bombay (N. Sagar). The Para-sambhu-stotra, of which a MS. was examined by me, is divided into several sections dealing with kriyā-lakti, kuṇḍalinī, māṭhī, etc. Here Para-siva is described as the world-teacher who reveals mahā-māṭhī in order to manifest brahma-tattva, which is His own self-revelation, the pракāśa having been hidden so long in His heart. Even in this stotra Durvāsas is called Krodha-bhaṭṭāraka. It is said that Somānanda, the great Śiva teacher of Kāṣmira, descended from Durvāsas.

12. Datta-samhitā is referred to in Saubhāgya-bhāskara.

13. It is evident that the work of Sumedhas (of Hārīta family and known as Hārītāyana) is really to be identified with the Tripurā-rahasya itself rather than with the Kalpa-sūtra of Parasurāma as some have done, because the Kalpa-sūtra is not in the shape of a dialogue between Dattātrey and Parasurāma and is not attributed to Sumedhas, whereas Tripurā-rahasya has the form of a similar dialogue and is attributed to Sumedhas Harītāyana.


15. See Śiva-dṛṣṭi, p. 94.

16. See Saubhāgya-bhāskara, pp. 96, 97, etc.

17. See Tripurā-rahasya, Jñāna-khaṇḍa, Ch. XIV, 33–77.

18. See ibid., XVI, 64–94; also Chapters XVII–XVIII.

19. In this context the word “kalā” stands for the supercosmic transcendent power of Lord and is to be clearly distinguished from the five kalās evolved as forces from bindu conceived as cosmic matter and force and related to the cosmic tattvas and bhuvanas.

20. Śiveccchāya Parā Śaktih Śiva-tattvaikhatām gataḥ, Tataḥ pariśphuratyādau sarge taisam tilād-iva.

21. Prapaṇca-sūtra, 1, 46. The actuating power of kalā is suggested elsewhere also
by the expression käla-prerityā. The Prayoga-krama-dīpikā (p. 412) explains the term thus: prahrier eva pralayāvasthāya yat paripakha-daśa' nantaram srṣyayamukhaḥ karmabhīr udbhinnām rūpaṁ yo’sau binduḥ.

22. The identifcation of mahā-śānya with vyāpini-kāla of pravāva is accurate to the Svachanda-tantra. But some writers equate mahā-śānya with the initial nāda. See Pūrṇānanda’s Śrī-tattva-cintāmaṇi. The terms sixteenth (ṣodasi) and seventeenth (saṁpta-daśi) kāla of the moon are used differently in different texts. When the supreme nāda (iii) is called the sixteenth, or amā-kāla the name ‘seventeenth kāla’ is reserved for the supreme power or sāmanā (ii). But at other times the term unmanī is attributed to the seventeenth kāla, when the words Sakti and śānya are used synonymously.

23. This position, in which kāla is called sānyaya, forms a kāla of sāmanā and is eternal (being unaffected by mahā-pralaya), is that of the so-called para-Brahman. It is not the state of Śiva. The atoms abide here in mahā-pralaya, for they are not yet transformed into the essence of Śiva. The movement of paśu as such commences from here. See Tantrāloka, VI. 138-167.

24. cp. Tantrāloka, VIII. 5. 400-5.


26. See Kāma-kalā-vilāsa with commentary, verses 3-8, pp. 4-9; Yogini-hṛdaya-dīpikā, pp. 8-12; Varivasāyā-rāhasya, pp. 48-60.

26a. For the Tattvas and the bhuvanas related to them, see Mygendra-Āgama, Vidyā-pāda, pp. 344-456 (Ed. Krishnā Sāstrī and Subrahmanyā Sāstrī); Bhogakārikā by Sadyojyoti, vv. 109-13; Raina-traya, vv. 89-118. cf. T. A. Gopinath Rao, Elements of Hindu Iconography, II (Pt. 2), pp. 392-7; Mārtha-cakra-viveka, IV, pp. 86-93.


28. For the four anuṣas, see Tantra-sāra, pp. 64-5. The different anuṣas are evolved and destroyed by different powers. Thus the brahmaṇa is destroyed by kālagni and created by Brahmā or Śrīkṛṣṇa. The prakṛtyaṇḍa and māyāṇḍa are destroyed and created by Śrīkṛṣṇa, Lord of kāla-tattva. The highest anuṣa of Sakti is destroyed and created by Aghoreśa. See Tantrāloka, VI. 170-82.

29. As regards the three malas, see Pratyabhijñā-kṛdaya, pp. 21-2; Saubhāgya-bhāskara, p. 95; Śiva-sūtra-vārttika (I. 2-3); Śiva-sūtra-vimarśini (I. 2-3). The anēva is two-fold according as it refers to the loss of pure aham in the Self and appearance of impure aham in the not-Self. The Self loses svātantra and retains bodha or it loses bodha and retains svātantraya. Māyā-mala is sometimes expressed as bheda representing the appearance of multiplicity in unity. It consists of māyā and the thirty-one tattvas produced from it. Kāma-mala is adṛṣṭa and may be regarded either as merit or as demerit (punya-pāpa). In different texts the meaning of the malas is sometimes found to be slightly different.

30. The illumination of a mature vijñānakāla is either intense or mild according as the hālusa or original taint attached to the soul has run its course completely (samākāta) or otherwise. The former types of souls are raised to the status of Vidyesvaras and the latter become mantras. The sakala and pralayākāla souls, too, in which the mala is mature, are favoured with divine grace and raised to the position of (i) Mantrāvāras (and acāryas) and placed in charge of the different divisions of brahmāṇḍa or the planes belonging to prthivi-tattva, and of (ii) Bhuvanesvaras or Lokesvaras with powers over the planes belonging to the higher tattvas beyond prthivi. The pralayākalas, however, where mala is immature but karman mature, are associated with subtle bodies called purvavyāstaka at the beginning of the next cycle and made to assume physical bodies and migrate from life to life, thus maturing the mala through experience. The Śaṅkta or Śaiva belief in the three-fold nature of the soul is comparable to the conviction of the Ophites and their predecessors the Orphics in the West—it presupposes a faith that the division corresponds to the degrees of grace and does not imply any essential difference. It is true, however, that according to the dualists some difference does exist between Śiva and Parama-śiva. The
Valentinian conception of essential distinction in human souls has also its parallel in India as evident from the views of sections of Jaina, Buddhist and Vaishnava writers, but finds no recognition in the Agamas.

31. See Ratna-traya by Srikanta, vv. 276–95.
32. The pure order or siddha adhvar represents the higher world of pure matter beyond the influence of maya.
33. See Pratyabhijna-hridaya, p. 8.
34. In the Siva-Agamas of all the Schools which recognize the thirty-six tattvas, maya and prakriti are distinguished. They are identified in the Svetasvatara-Upanisad (IV. 10): Mayan tu prakritih vidyai matriyam tu mahaevaram. In the Agamas generally maya is eternal, but prakriti is not so. For prakriti is evolved from kal, which itself is an evolute from maya. But in some places in the Tantras they are differently conceived. Prakriti stands for the material principle in a general way and maya is one of the vikalpas under this category.
35. The gloss on the Sarva-jnanaottara-Tantra cited by Umapati in his commentary on a karih of the Svatantrya-Tantra (being the 24th karih of his compendium) says:

Kundalini-sabda-vacya-tu bhujanga-kutilaharepa nadatman svaharyena prati-puruṣam bhedenavasthito na tu svarupena pratipurum avasthitah. The original couplet runs thus:

Yathā kundalini-śaktir mayā-karmāṇusāriṇī,
Nāda-bindu-dhikam kāryam tasyā iti jagat-sthitih.
36. Aghora Śivacarya identifies aksara-bindu with paśvantī-vāc in his commentary called Ulekhini on Srikanta's Ratna-traya (verse 74).
37. The Īśa stage may be said to correspond to the madhyamā-vāc, which is characterized by thought (antaḥ-sanjalpa-rūpā) and possesses an ideal order in its parts.
38. Sometimes the terms sūkṣma-nāda is applied to bindu. The commentary on Bhaja's Tatva-prakāśa holds that sūkṣma-nāda belongs to Śakti-tattva. This view is endorsed by Sarvajña Šambhu in his Siddhānta-dīpikā. Aghora Śivacārya in his commentary on Ratna-traya identifies sūkṣma-nāda with the first manifestation (called simply nāda) of bindu which is synonymous with para-nāda (see Ratna-traya, Kārikā 22).

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PART III

SOME OTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF INDIAN THOUGHT

* SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT IN ANCIENT INDIA

A. Mathematics
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INDIAN AESTHETICS

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CHAPTER XVI

SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT IN ANCIENT INDIA

A. MATHEMATICS

i. INTRODUCTION

Recent researches on the history of the development of Mathematics in Ancient India have brought to light the fact that the ancient Indians laid the foundations of several branches of Mathematics, viz. Arithmetic, Algebra and Trigonometry. Our present superstructures in these branches of knowledge are based on foundations laid in India more than 1,500 years ago. Indian Mathematics and Astronomy travelled to Arabia and were communicated to awakening Europe through the intermediary of the Italians and the Spaniards. For a long time European scholars ascribed the origin of these sciences to the Arabs. It was only in the eighteenth century that European scholars got access to some Indian Works on Mathematics, e.g. the Līlāvati and Bīja-ganita of Bhāskara II (A.D. 1150) and discovered the Indian origin of these sciences. It is now established that the Arabs learnt from India and Greece, preserved what they had learnt for about five hundred years and transmitted that knowledge to Europe.¹

Amongst ancient peoples, the Indians and the Greeks made important discoveries in Mathematics and Astronomy, but their outlooks were essentially different. The Greeks devoted their attention to the development of Geometry to the exclusion of other branches of Mathematics. Their Arithmetic, Algebra and Astronomy were completely dominated by their Geometry. They looked upon magnitude not as number but as length; they developed a geometrical theory of proportion and applied geometry to the solution of algebraic problems. The Indians, on the other hand, based their Mathematics on Numbers, so much so that their Geometry was also numerical and practical. Rigorous logic and systematic treatment are the outstanding features of the Greek Geometry. Boldness of conception, abstraction, symbolism and ingenuity are on the other hand the main features of Indian Mathematics. It has been influenced by Indian Philosophy and outlook on life. The Mathematical discoveries of the Indians have, on the other hand, influenced their thought and Philosophy. As an example may be mentioned the conception of the

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śūnya (Zero). This conception seems to have existed in both Hindu and Buddhist Philosophy (q.v.) before the śūnya was made an integral part of Indian Arithmetic. The use of the śūnya (Zero) in arithmetic suggested to Indian thinkers the power and utility of symbols. śūnya means void or nothingness. To give this conception a form, a shape and a symbol must be regarded as one of the greatest events in the history of human thought and progress.

The object of the present article is to give a brief account of some of the achievements of the ancient Indians in the Science of Mathematics and Astronomy which have influenced thought and contributed to human progress.

2. ARITHMETIC

The symbol zero and the place value Notation.—The system of writing numbers as we do now, that is, with the help of nine numerical symbols and a symbol for zero, was invented by the Indians. Europe got this system of notation from the Arabs and for a long time European scholars thought that the notation had its origin in Arabia, and consequently called their numerals Arabic Numerals. Arabic civilization began with Mohammad, but the notation had been in use in India several centuries before him, so that the theory of the Arabic origin had to be given up. Sanskrit inscriptions, dating as far back as the seventh century A.D., found in India and as far east as Indo-China, prove that the place-value system of notation was in common use in greater India in the sixth century A.D. The fame of the Indian system of numeration had reached as far west as Syria in the sixth century A.D. The evidences from Sanskrit literature point out that the Zero symbol and the modern system of numeration were in common use in India in the fifth century A.D., so that its invention must be placed somewhere about the beginning of the Christian Era. There is definite evidence in the Pingala-chandah-Sūtra of the use of a symbol for śūnya (Zero), but there is no definite evidence of the use of the Place Value Notation at that early period. It is not unlikely that Indian mathematicians had begun the use of the Place Value Notation as far back as 200 B.C., which is the date of the composition of the Chandah-Sūtra. At that early period, however, the system could have been known only to a very few and was not generally adopted.

All ancient nations knew the fundamental operations of arithmetic such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and division, the extraction of roots, the laws of proportion, etc. They had symbols for writing numbers, but they did not use the Zero symbol. They had separate symbols for 10, 20, 30, etc., for 100, 200, etc., for 1,000, 2,000, etc. Performing multiplication, division, etc., of numbers written with the help of the above symbols was a very tedious affair. This limited the
use of big numbers in Arithmetic and in fact hindered the progress of that Science. In Europe and Arabia manuscripts of works on Arithmetic employing this old system of numeration and belonging to as late a period as the twelfth to fourteenth centuries A.D. are available. In India, however, no work on Arithmetic using the old system of numeration has been found. The earliest work on Arithmetic available to us is the Bakshali manuscript which belongs to the fourth century A.D. It uses the modern system of numeration. The Āryabhaṭīya which was written in A.D. 499 contains practically the whole of Arithmetic that we teach today in our High Schools. Amongst other such works may be mentioned those of Brahmagupta (A.D. 628), Śrīdhara (A.D. 750), Mahāvīra (A.D. 850), Āryabhata II (A.D. 950), etc. In these works we find the methods of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, operations with fractions, etc., modifications of which are in use today.

The main contributions of the Indians to arithmetic are:

1. The symbol for zero.
2. The place value system of notation.
3. The methods of performing arithmetical operations with the place value system of numerals—addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, extraction of square root and cube root, etc.
4. The method of writing fractions.
5. Classification of fractions according to association, the method of reduction of fractions to a common denominator and the methods of performing arithmetical operations with fractions.
6. The rules of proportion—the Rule of Three, the Rule of Five, etc., and inverse proportion, i.e. the Inverse Rule of Three.
7. Problems on Interest, Compound Interest, Instalments, Profit and Loss, area, volumes, arithmetical and geometrical progressions, etc.

As has already been mentioned, the above are some of the topics dealt with in the Āryabhaṭīya (A.D. 499) and in all subsequent works. No trace of the use of the modern (system of) arithmetic is found outside India (e.g. in Arabia, Europe, China, etc.) earlier than the tenth century. Priority of occurrence, therefore, points to the Indian origin of our arithmetic.5

3. ALGEBRA

Algebra, as is known to all, deals with unknowns. Although all ancient nations utilized unknowns and stated arithmetical results in general terms, which may be interpreted as algebraic, any definite advance in algebra could be made only when a proper symbolism was evolved. The credit for this must be given to Indian mathematicians who were the first to use the letters of the alphabet to denote unknowns. Real progress,
however, was made when the Indian mathematicians realized that all arithmetical operations could be made with symbols (letters of the alphabet) and that the arithmetical signs (plus, minus, etc.) could be used along with those symbols. Only those accustomed to abstract thinking could evolve rules for multiplication and division, etc., with symbols like *plus* and *minus*, which are not numbers, e.g. Brahmagupta states:

"The product of a positive and a negative is negative; of two negatives is positive; positive multiplied by positive is positive."

"Positive divided by positive or negative divided by negative becomes positive, but positive divided by negative is negative and negative divided by positive remains negative." 6

The Indian mathematicians evolved also a symbolism for powers (squares, cubes, etc.) and wrote numerical coefficients as we do now. They wrote algebraic equations and evolved the rules of transposition of terms. All this was known in India in the fifth century A.D. Here again, because of priority of occurrence, the invention of Algebra, its basic methods and symbolism must be ascribed to India.

The Indians studied algebra theoretically. They classified equations according to degrees and treated determinate and indeterminate equations separately. Later advances made in algebra up to eighteenth century (in the west) were along lines chalked out by them. The Indian symbolism has no doubt been modified, but in all essentials our present day algebraic symbolism remains Indian.

Having evolved the appropriate symbolism, the Indians made rapid progress in algebra. They gave the general solution of the quadratic equation. The method commonly used in modern textbooks for the solution of the quadratic was stated by Śridhara in the eighth century.7 The greatest contributions of Indians to algebra lie in the field of the theory of indeterminate equations. They were interested in rational solutions of such equations and succeeded in solving completely the general indeterminate equation of the second degree.8 The results given by the Indian mathematicians were unknown in Europe and were rediscovered in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Indeterminate equations were studied by the Greek mathematicians in the early centuries of the Christian Era, but they could not make much progress because they tried to approach the problems from the point of view of geometry and lacked proper symbolism.

4. **GEOMETRY**

The ordinary geometrical figures like the rectangle, the parallelogram, the rhombus, the quadrilateral, the triangle, the circle, etc., were known
to all ancient peoples. The ellipse was also known to the Vedic Indians. Geometry in its modern form, however, was developed by the Greeks. The Indians were interested in mensuration only. The Vedic Indians knew the mensuration of the triangle, the parallelogram, the rectangle and the rectangular parallelepiped. They also knew that the ratio between the circumference and diameter of a circle is constant and tried to find out the value of this constant. Later Indian mathematicians studied the mensuration of the circle, the cone, the sphere and that of pyramids. There is evidence to show that they found out their results by methods which were unknown to the Greeks. The most powerful method employed by Indian mathematicians in the field of mensuration may be called the theory of deformations which leave areas and volumes unaltered. For instance they found out that:

(1) A rectangle could be deformed into a parallelogram with equal area by moving one of its sides in its own line.
(2) The area of a triangle remains invariant when the vertex is moved along the parallel to the base through it.
(3) The area of a sector of a circle remains invariant when it is deformed by making its arc straight and converting it into a triangle on that line (arc) as base and height equal to the radius.

Results corresponding to the above applicable to solid bodies were also obtained. Assuming these results it is possible to find all mensuration formulae known to the Greeks. The above method which is entirely of Indian origin is found to have been used for finding the volume of a cone. A detailed exposition of the method is given in the commentary known as Dhaś-alā written in the ninth century on the Jaina work Śat-khaṇḍāgama. Bhāskara has also used this method. It may be mentioned here that the technique of dividing a plane figure or solid into an infinite number of parts and summing the areas or volumes of those parts (i.e. summing an infinite series) for finding the area or volume was also used by Indian mathematicians. Amongst noteworthy achievements of the Indians in mensuration may be mentioned the formulae for the area and other elements of a cyclic quadrilateral. These are found in the Brāhma-sphula-Siddhānta (A.D. 628). If \( A \) denotes the area and \( m, n \) the diagonals of an inscribed quadrilateral whose sides are, \( a, b, c, d \), the results are:

\[
(1) \quad A = \sqrt{(s - a)(s - b)(s - c)(s - d)},
\]
where \( 2s = a + b + c + d \)

\[
(2) \quad m = \sqrt{(ac + bd)(ab + cd)} \over ad + bc
\]

\[
(3) \quad n = \sqrt{(ac + bd)(ad + bc)} \over ab + dc
\]
Value of \( \pi \).—Although the Greeks were great geometers they did not succeed in finding a good value of \( \pi \). They were content with the value \( \pi = 22/7 \). The Indians, however, required better approximations to the value of \( \pi \) and as early as A.D. 499 Āryabhaṭa gave the value

\[
\pi = \frac{62832}{20000} = 3.1416
\]

If the above fraction is converted into a continued fraction, the successive convergents are \( 3, \frac{22}{7}, \) and \( \frac{355}{113} \). The values \( 22/7 \) and \( 355/113 \) have been used by Indian mathematicians but were not popular. The value \( \pi = \sqrt{10} \), because of facility in its use, was preferred by some.

The value \( \pi = \frac{355}{113} \) has been used in the Dhavalā. The Chinese used this value probably under Indian influence. Later Indian works gave values of \( \pi \) correct to nine or more decimal places. In the beginning the Indian mathematicians found better approximations to the value of \( \pi \) by increasing the number of sides of an inscribed regular polygon. Later on in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they used infinite series for the purpose. Both the above methods were used by the European mathematicians, but certainly much later than they were used in India.

CONSTRUCTION OF RATIONAL FIGURES

The Indians made use of their knowledge of indeterminate equations to propose and solve a variety of problems concerning the sides and areas of plane figures, and thus they applied their knowledge of algebra to geometry.

The earliest attempt to obtain right-angled triangles having a given side is found in the Śulba. In particular, we find two such triangles having the sides \( a, 3a/4, 5a/4 \) and \( a, 5a/12, 13a/12 \). Brahmagupta (A.D. 628) proposed to find all right-angled triangles having a given side \( a \) and the other sides rational. His solution is:

\[
a, \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{a^2}{n} - n \right), \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{a^2}{n} + n \right)
\]

Śridhara (A.D. 750) and Mahāvīra (A.D. 859) also gave the above solution.

Bhāskara II found another solution

\[
a, \frac{2na}{n^2 - 1}, n \left( \frac{2na}{n^2 - 1} \right) - a.
\]

Similar results occur for finding all right-angled triangles having a given hypotenuse.
Mahāvīra proposes and solves the following problems:

1. In a rectangle the area is numerically equal to the perimeter; in another the area is numerically equal to the diagonal. What are the sides in each of these cases?

2. Find a rectangle of which twice the diagonal, thrice the base, four times the upright and twice the perimeter together equal the area numerically.

3. The perimeter of a rectangle is unity. Tell me quickly, after calculating what are its base and upright.

4. Find a rectangle in which twice the diagonal, thrice the base, four times the upright and the perimeter together equal unity.

5. Find all isosceles triangles with rational integral sides and areas.

6. Find two isosceles triangles whose perimeters, as also their areas, are equal or related in a given proportion.

7. Find all rational scalene triangles.

8. Find all rational triangles having a given area.

Brahmagupta has shown how to find an isosceles trapezium whose sides, diagonals, altitude, segments and area can all be expressed in rational numbers. He further formulated the following remarkable proposition:

Find all quadrilaterals which will be inscribable within circles, whose sides, diagonals, perpendiculars, segments, areas and also the diameters of the circumscribed circles will be expressible in integers.

Solutions of the above have also been given by Mahāvīra, Śrīpati, Bhāskara II and others. Finally, Mahāvīra has given the solution of the following remarkable problem:

Find all rational triangles and quadrilaterals inscribable in a circle of given diameter.

5. TRIGONOMETRY

Trigonometry, as the name suggests, is that branch of Mathematics (geometry) which deals with the measurement of triangles. Consider the figure (ABC right-angled at B).
The Indians called \( CE \) the \( jyā \) of the arc \( CD \) and \( AB \) the \( koṭi-jyā \) of that arc. In modern trigonometrical notation:

\[
CD = rθ, \quad jyā \quad CD = CB = r \cdot \sin θ, \quad koṭi-jyā \quad CD = AB = r \cdot \cos θ;
\]

so that, if we take \( r = 1 \) the Indian function \( Jyāθ = \sin θ \) and \( koṭi-jyā \ θ = \cos θ \). The Indians used also the \( utkrama-jyā \) (versed sine) function. They defined the values of the above functions for complements and supplements of an arc:

"The \( jyā \) is positive or negative in the quadrants above or below (the prime line); and the \( koṭi \) is positive, negative, negative and positive successively."

They knew trigonometrical formulae corresponding to the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad & \sin^2 \theta + \cos^2 \theta = 1, \\
(2) \quad & \sin(\theta/2) = \sqrt{(1 - \cos \theta)/2}, \\
(3) \quad & \sin(a \pm β) = \sin a \cos β \pm \cos a \sin β, \\
(4) \quad & \sin^2 2θ + \text{versin}^2 2θ = 4 \sin^2 θ, \\
(5) \quad & \sin \left(\frac{π}{4} \pm θ\right) = \sqrt{(1 \pm \sin 2θ)/2}, \\
(6) \quad & \sin \frac{a - β}{2} = \frac{1}{2} [(\sin a - \sin β)^2 + (\cos a - \cos β)^2]^{\frac{1}{2}}
\end{align*}
\]

Of the above the first three were also known to the Greeks; the fourth was stated by Varāhamihira (A.D. 505); the remaining two are due to Bhāskara II.

The Indian astronomers were also acquainted with the following formulae of spherical trigonometry:

\[
\begin{align*}
\cos c &= \cos a \cos b + \sin a \sin b \cos C; \\
\cos A \sin c &= \cos a \sin b - \sin a \cos b \cos C \\
\text{and} \quad \frac{\sin a}{\sin A} = \frac{\sin b}{\sin B} = \frac{\sin c}{\sin C},
\end{align*}
\]

which they used for solving spherical triangles.

Every Indian treatise on astronomy contains a table of sines and versed sines as also of their differences, calculated for the angle \( 33^\circ \) and its multiples. In this connection we have the following formula given in the \( Śūrya-siddhānta \) (c. 400):

\[
\sin (n + 1)θ - \sin nθ = \sin nθ - \sin (n - 1)θ - \frac{\sin nθ}{225}
\]

The above formula is used for calculating the table of sines. It depends on the calculation of their second differences. Delambre thought it to be curious and remarked: "This differential process has not up to now been employed except by Briggs who himself did not know that the constant
factor was the square of the chord or of the interval, and who could not obtain it except by comparing the second differences obtained in a different manner. . . . Here then is a method which the Hindus possessed but which is found neither amongst the Greeks nor amongst the Arabs.”

INFINITE SERIES FOR TRIGONOMETRICAL FUNCTIONS

Puthumana Somayājī (A.D. 1431) discovered an infinite series for the arc of a circle in terms of its sine and cosine and the radius of the circle. If \( r \) denote the radius of the circle, \( a \) an arc of it and \( \theta \) the angle subtended at the centre by that arc, then

(i) \[ a = r\theta = \frac{r \cdot \sin \theta}{1 \cdot \cos \theta} - \frac{r \cdot \sin^3 \theta}{3 \cdot \cos^3 \theta} + \frac{r \cdot \sin^5 \theta}{5 \cdot \cos^5 \theta} - \frac{r \cdot \sin^7 \theta}{7 \cdot \cos^7 \theta} + \ldots . \]

where \( 0 < \theta < \frac{\pi}{4} \); and

(ii) \[ \frac{r\pi}{2} - a = \frac{r \sin \left(\frac{\pi}{2} - \theta\right)}{1 \cdot \cos \left(\frac{\pi}{2} - \theta\right)} - \frac{r \sin^3 \left(\frac{\pi}{2} - \theta\right)}{3 \cdot \cos^3 \left(\frac{\pi}{2} - \theta\right)} + \frac{r \sin^5 \left(\frac{\pi}{2} - \theta\right)}{5 \cdot \cos^5 \left(\frac{\pi}{2} - \theta\right)} - \ldots . \]

where \( \frac{\pi}{4} < \theta < \frac{\pi}{2} \).

(iii) \( Jyā a = r \cdot \sin \theta = a - \frac{a^3}{3! \cdot r^2} + \frac{a^5}{5! \cdot r^4} - \ldots . \)

which in modern notation can be expressed as

\[ \sin \theta = \theta - \frac{\theta^3}{3!} + \frac{\theta^5}{5!} - \ldots . \]

and \( Kōti-jyā a = r \cdot \cos \theta = r - \frac{a^2}{2! \cdot r} + \frac{a^4}{4! \cdot r^3} - \ldots . \)

which can be written as

\[ \cos \theta = 1 - \frac{\theta^2}{2!} + \frac{\theta^4}{4!} - \ldots . \]

These results reappear in the works of Nilakanṭha (A.D. 1500) and Śaṅkara-varman.

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6. CALCULUS

The Indian mathematicians made use of the infinitesimal increment, i.e. the differential of given functions under the name tātkālika-gati (instantaneous-motion). Mañjula (A.D. 932) gives the differential formula

$$\delta u = \delta v \pm e \cos \theta \delta \theta$$

corresponding to the equation

$$u = v \pm e \sin \theta.$$

He uses the result for the determination of the true motion of a planet. He says:

"True motion in minutes is equal to the cosine (of the mean anomaly) multiplied by the difference (of the mean anomalies) and divided by the cheda, added or substracted contrarily (to the mean motion)."

The differential of sin θ is termed by Bhāskara II as the tātkālika bhogya-khaṇḍa, and the differential formula

$$\delta (\sin \theta) = \cos \theta \delta \theta$$

has been proved by him. It has been used by him for calculating the ayana-valana (angle of position). He has further made use of the following theorems:

1. When a variable attains its maximum value, its differential vanishes.
2. When a planet is either in apogee or in perigee, the equation of the centre vanishes, therefore, for some intermediate position, the increment of the equation of centre also vanishes.

Another very remarkable formula for the differential of a function involving the inverse sine function as well as the quotient of two functions, one of which is under the radical sign, is the following:

$$\delta \left\{ \sin^{-1} X \frac{a \sin \theta}{\sqrt{b^2 + 2ab \cos \theta + a^2}} \right\}$$

$$= \left( \sqrt{b^2 + 2ab \cos \theta + a^2} - \frac{b(b + a \cos \theta)}{\sqrt{b^2 + 2ab \cos \theta + a^2}} \right) \frac{\delta \theta}{\sqrt{b^2 + 2ab \cos \theta + a^2}}$$

This result occurs in the works of Āryabhaṭa II (A.D. 950) and Bhāskara II (A.D. 1150).
7. ZERO AND INFINITY

Zero.—As already stated the Indians used a symbol for denoting zero (śūnya) as early as 200 B.C. The Babylonians and the Mayas of Central America are reported to have used a symbol for denoting the absence of a figure or a number about 200 B.C. The Indians have been given credit for the invention of the zero because they used the zero symbol in the place-value system of writing numbers and developed the corresponding arithmetic. They regarded zero as a number with which and on which arithmetical operations could be performed.

The term śūnya (zero) is very old and occurs in Vedic literature. It has been used in Sanskrit literature in the sense of blank (abhāva), insignificant or negligible (tuccha), incomplete (a-sampūrṇa) and less (ūna). The definition of zero given by a majority of old Indian Mathematicians is: "the sum of two equal and opposite quantities is zero." Similar definition of zero was given in Europe in the nineteenth century by Martin Ohm and W. Bolyai de Bolya. Defined in this way, zero cannot either operate upon a quantity or be operated upon, for all operations imply the existence of the quantities concerned. Kṛṣṇa (A.D. 1575), a commentator of Bhāskara, when dealing with a proof of multiplication by zero said: "In fact multiplication is repetition and if there be nothing to be repeated, what should the multiplicator repeat, however great it be?" In order to get over this difficulty Kṛṣṇa as well as Gaṇeśa (A.D. 1545) remarked: "The utmost diminution of a quantity is the same with the reduction of it to nothing. Mahāvīrācārya calls zero a number (saṁkhya) in the same sense as the nine numbers 1 to 9. It has been further remarked by Kṛṣṇa that "cipher is neither positive nor negative: it is, therefore, exhibited with no distinction of sign."

The result of addition of zero to a number or the addition of a number to zero and subtraction of zero from a number or the subtraction of a number from zero are found stated in all extant Indian works on Arithmetic and Algebra.

Zero as an infinitesimal.—The conception of zero as an infinitesimal arose when Indian Mathematicians tried to explain multiplication and division by zero. The result of multiplication was correctly stated by Brahmagupta (A.D. 628):

\[ 0 \times (\pm a) = 0; \ (\pm a) \times 0 = 0; \ 0 \times 0 = 0. \]

The Indian viewpoint is explained by Gaṇeśa (A.D. 1545) in his commentary on Bhāskara's Lilāvatī. "Each time the multiplier is diminished by unity, the product is diminished by an amount equal to the multiplicand; so in the extreme for a number multiplied by zero, the product
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will be diminished by itself, i.e. it is zero." Obviously here Gaṇeśa assumes the multiplier to be an integer so that on subtracting unity repeatedly it is reduced to zero.

Krṣṇa (A.D. 1575) makes no such assumption. He remarks: "The more the multiplicand is diminished, the smaller is the product; and if it be reduced to the utmost degree, the product is so likewise; now the utmost diminution of a quantity is the same with the reduction of it to nothing: therefore, if the multiplier be nought, the product is cipher. In like manner as the multiplier decreases, so does the product; and, if the multiplier be nought, the product is so too."²

Infinite.—The arithmetical idea of the infinite arose out of division of a number by zero. The first writer to speak of division by zero was Brahmagupta (A.D. 628). Śridhara (A.D. 750) and Āryabhaṭa II (A.D. 950) do not mention division by zero. Mahāvīra (A.D. 850) gives an incorrect result "that a number remains unchanged when it is divided by zero."

Brahmagupta states: "positive or negative (quantity) divided by cipher is taccheda." The term taccheda literally means "with that as divisor." Thus according to Brahmagupta

\[ a \div 0 = \frac{a}{0} \]

Bhāskara (A.D. 1150) says: "A finite quantity divided by cipher is khaḥara," but further remarks that the value of khaḥara is infinite (ananta-rāsi).¹³ Krṣṇa has remarked: "As much as the divisor is diminished so much the quotient is increased. If the divisor be reduced to the utmost, the quotient is to the utmost increased. But, if it can be specified that the amount of the quotient is so much, it has not been raised to the utmost: for a quantity greater than that can be assigned. The quotient is indefinitely great and is rightly termed infinite."

With the above may be compared the remark of Martin Ohm (A.D. 1828) who says that "if a is not zero, but b is zero, then the quotient \( \frac{a}{b} \) has no meaning."¹³

According to Bhāskara (A.D. 1150) infinity remains unaffected by the addition or subtraction of a finite quantity, i.e.

\[ \frac{a}{0} \pm b = \frac{a}{0} \]

where \( a \) and \( b \) are finite.

He says: "In this quantity (i.e. infinity) consisting of that which has cipher for its divisor, there is no alteration, though many be inserted or extracted; as no change takes place in the infinite and immutable God, at the period of destruction or creation of worlds, though numerous orders of beings are absorbed or put forth."¹⁴

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Krṣṇa observes: "This fraction (khahara) indicating an infinite quantity, is unaltered by addition or subtraction of a finite quantity. For, in reducing the quantities to a common denominator, both the numerator and denominator of a finite quantity, being multiplied by cipher, become nought: and a quantity is unaltered by addition or subtraction of nought. The numerator of the infinite fraction may indeed be varied by the addition or subtraction of a finite quantity, and so it may be that of another infinite fraction: but whether the finite numerator of fraction, whose denominator is cipher be more or less, the quotient of its division by cipher is alike infinite." Thus

$$\frac{a}{0} \pm \frac{b}{c} = \frac{a}{0} \pm \frac{b \times 0}{c \times 0} = \frac{a + 0}{0} = \frac{a}{0}$$

$b/c$ being finite. Again

$$\frac{a}{0} \pm \frac{b}{0} = \frac{a + b}{0} = \text{infinite.}$$

The Sanskrit term ananta literally means "without end." This word is as old as the Vedas, but its exact significance was perhaps developed when mathematicians came to use it. The Indian mathematicians have consistently used the term "khacceda" or khahara (meaning "with zero denominator") for ananta. The various meanings in which the term ananta (infinite) has been employed in literature, have been classified and enumerated in the Dhavalā, a commentary on the Jaina work "Ṣaṭ-khaṇḍāgama," written in the beginning of the ninth century. According to the commentator, ananta (infinity) has been used with the following eleven meanings:

1. Nāmā'nanta.—Infinite in name. An aggregate of objects, which may or may not really be infinite, might be called as such in ordinary conversation, or by or for ignorant persons, or in literature to denote greatness. In such a context the term infinite means infinite in name only, i.e. Nāmā'nanta.

2. Sthāpanā'nanta.—Attributed, or associated infinity. This too is not the real infinite. The term is used in case infinity is attributed to or associated with some object.

3. Dravyā'nanta.—Infinite in relation to knowledge which is not used. This term is used for persons who have knowledge of the infinite, but do not for the time being use that knowledge.

4. Gaṇanā'nanta.—The numerical infinite. This term is used for the actual infinite as used in mathematics.

5. A-prādesihā'nanta.—Dimensionless, i.e. infinitely small.

6. Ekā'nanta.—One directional infinity. It is the infinite as observed by looking in one direction along a straight line.
7. Udbhaya'nanta.—Two directional infinite. This is illustrated by a line continued to infinity in both directions.

8. Vistara'nanta.—Two dimensional or superficial infinity. This means an infinite, plain area.

9. Sarva'nanta.—Spatial infinity. This signifies the three-dimensional infinite, i.e. the infinite space.

10. Bhava'nanta.—Infinite in relation to knowledge which is utilized. This term is used for a person who has knowledge of the infinite, and who uses that knowledge.

11. Sāsvatā'nanta.—Everlasting or indestructible.

The above classification shows that ancient Hindu thinkers made a thorough study of the term ananta (infinite) and their ideas about it were very nearly correct even by modern standards.

8. ASTRONOMY

Ancient records show that the Chaldeans, the Syrians, the Egyptians and the Mayas and other tribes attached importance to astronomy and cultivated that science. Generally the priest or the headman of the tribe was an astronomer. One of his main duties was to determine the time of sowing of harvest. For this, knowledge of the tropical year and of the yearly motion of the Sun was necessary. The lunar month was generally used and some method of making the lunar year correspond to the solar year had to be developed.

The ancient Indians have left record of their knowledge of astronomy in the Vedas and the Vedanga-Jyotisha. The date of composition of these works ranges from 3000 B.C. to 1400 B.C. The Rg-Veda (c. 3000 B.C.) mentions 12 divisions of the Sun's yearly path (rāsīs) and also 360 divisions of the circle.15 It is said that the ancient Chaldeans were the first inventors of the division of the circle into 12 parts, and that the Babylonians divided the circle into 360 parts. It is difficult to decide the question of priority, but it seems that the Chaldeans and the Babylonians learnt this division of the circle from the Indo-Aryans.

The Rg-Veda describes the Sun's annual course as "12-spoked wheel." According to the commentator Sāyana, these correspond to the 12 signs of the Zodiac. Similarly, the 12 Ādityas (Suns) mentioned in the Vedas refer to the Sun associated with these 12 divisions. The Vedic Indians determined the equinoctial and solstitial points and associated them with Agni and Indra, and Mitra and Varuna. Likewise they divided the Moon's path into 27 parts called nakṣatras. They reckoned months from full moon to full moon or new moon to new moon. There is evidence to show that in order to make lunar reckoning correspond with the solar year they
established the period of 5 years with 62 lunar months which they called a yuga.

The Vedas have survived the ravages of time because they were religious works. There might have been other works dealing with astronomy and the other Sciences and Arts which are now lost. Extant Sanskrit literature has thus a big gap. On the one hand we have the Vedic literature, and on the other works written in entirely different style and belonging to the early centuries of the Christian era. Practically no scientific work of the intervening period which covers about 2,000 years is extant.

The earliest work on Hindu astronomy available to us is the Āryabhaṭīya which was written at the beginning of the sixth century. The Pañca-siddhāntikā which was written about the middle of the sixth century mentions and gives the substance of five important works on astronomy which were known to the author Varāhamihira. These works were written before the Āryabhaṭīya and some of them may have existed even before the beginning of the Christian era. They are now lost. They were discarded because they did not use the place-value notation of writing numbers, which was universally adopted in India at the end of the fifth century A.D., or it may be that they were replaced by better texts. The astronomical works now available to us show that the Indians had attained a remarkable degree of perfection in astronomy and were ahead of all other nations in the world. It has been said that they learnt astronomy from the Greeks, but that seems to be pure speculation. They did come in contact with the Greeks and there must have been mutual exchange of knowledge. But the style, the contents and the astronomical theories of the Indians are so different from those of the Greeks that it is difficult to assess with our present knowledge the debt, if any, that the Indians owe to the Greeks in the field of astronomy or vice versa. There are some technical terms in Indian astronomy which are perhaps of Greek origin, on the other hand there are terms in Greek astronomy which can easily be traced back to Sanskrit. It will be unfair to base any conclusions on such evidence, as has been done by some Western scholars.

The earliest Indian work which deals exclusively with astronomy is the Vedāṅga-Jyotisā. It represents the primitive astronomy of the Indians two thousand years before Christ. It shows that at that remote period they considered astronomy as a separate subject of study, and realized its utility. There exist three recensions of this work. The Ṛg-Vedic recension gives rules for computing lunar dates, full moon and new moon, solstices and the positions of the Sun and the Moon with reference to the 27 nakṣatras. The Yajur-Vedic recension contains a study of the months, years, muhūrtas, lagnas, full moon and new moon, days, seasons, and equinoxes which fall in a period of five solar years. The water-clock is mentioned as an appliance for reckoning time. The Atharva-Vedic
recension deals with mūhūrtas, lunar dates, karaṇas and yogas and mentions the week days.

The five siddhāntas of established merit, viz. the Sūrya-siddhānta, the Pitāmaha-siddhānta, the Romaka-siddhānta, the Pulīśa-siddhānta and the Vasiṣṭha-siddhānta, mentioned and summarized by Varāhamihira in the Panca-siddhāntikā, were written in the old style. They were recast in different new styles. Brahmagupta (A.D. 628) mentions two versions of the Vasiṣṭha-siddhānta, one by Vijayanandin and the other by Viṣṇucandra; a new redaction of the Romaka-siddhānta by Śrīśena; and an edition of the Sūrya-siddhānta by Lāṭadeva, a pupil of Āryabhaṭa I. None of these siddhāntas stood the test of time and each was discarded with the advent of a new one. The interval A.D. 500–800 was a period of great activity and progress. A large number of works on mathematics and astronomy was written during that period.

Āryabhaṭa I was born in Āśmaka in A.D. 499. He studied and carried out his researches at Pāṭaliputra (modern Patna). At the age of twenty-three he wrote the Āryabhaṭīya, which is a small work containing 118 verses dealing with the main principles of mathematics and astronomy. Comparison of Indian astronomy as given in the Āryabhaṭīya with the Greek system of astronomy reveals essential differences between the two systems. Although the aim of both the systems was to calculate astronomical phenomena, the methods adopted and the theories were different. The Indians believed (1) that every astronomical phenomenon recurs after a fixed period, (2) that in the beginning of creation and each yuga all the planets were in one line, i.e. at zero-longitude, (3) that the epoch of calculation of the astronomical phenomena should be the beginning of creation or yuga, (4) that all heavenly bodies have equal linear motion, (5) that the rates of their angular motions are different because of their varying distances, and (6) that the motion of the planets is irregular because they are attracted towards moving points in the heavens (called mandaoca, āghrocca and pāta).

It was generally believed that the Earth was at the centre of the Universe around which all motions took place. But Āryabhaṭa I differed from other Indian astronomers in saying that the Earth rotated about its axis and also revolved round the Sun. For the sake of astronomical calculations, however, Āryabhaṭa I took the Earth as fixed, as the other astronomers did. That the Earth was spherical was well known. It was also known that the Earth existed in space amongst the heavenly bodies like an iron ball surrounded by magnets.

The method of calculation of the position of a planet was to find the mean position for a fixed point on the Equator and then to apply a number of corrections in order to get its true geocentric position. For this purpose the astronomers applied the longitude-correction (desāntara-samkhāra), the equation of the centre (manda-phala-samkhāra), the correction for the
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equation of time due to the eccentricity of the orbit (bhujā-vivara-saṁskāra), and the correction for the latitude-difference (cara-saṁskāra) in the case of the Sun and the Moon; and the desāntara, bhujā-vivara, manda-phala, ṣighra-phala and cara corrections in the case of the other planets. The method of applying the corrections in the case of the planets other than the Sun and the Moon, however, is not the same with all the astronomers. Later on one more correction known as udayāntara (correction for the equation of time due to the obliquity of the ecliptic) was introduced by Śrīpati. Two lunar corrections, viz. the evection and the variation were also subsequently discovered. In fact the evection was first detected by Āryabhaṭa I, but was employed into calculations for the first time by Vāteśvara. In order to secure equality in computation and observation other corrections were also devised from time to time.

For calculating the mean positions of the planets it is necessary to know their mean daily motions. The astronomers stated the motions in terms of revolutions (bhagana) performed by the planets in a period of 43,20,000 years. At the end of this period the Universe together with all its moving components was supposed to return back to its initial state. The revolution-numbers (bhaganas) of the planets, etc., were consequently represented by whole numbers. These, according to various authorities, are given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planets</th>
<th>Revolution-numbers in a period of 43,20,000 solar years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Old Sūrya-siddhānta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun</td>
<td>43,20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mars</td>
<td>22,96,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercury</td>
<td>1,79,37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jupiter</td>
<td>3,64,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venus</td>
<td>70,22,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturn</td>
<td>1,46,564</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be observed from the above table that the revolution numbers (bhaganas) were subject to correction. These corrections were introduced from time to time and were based on continued observations. As already mentioned, at the commencement of a yuga the planets were at zero longitude. The mean longitude of a planet at any other time was obtained by means of the formula:

\[
\text{Mean longitude} = \frac{\text{Revolution-number} \times \text{ahargaṇa}}{\text{Number of civil days}}
\]

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The data necessary for calculating the number of civil days elapsed on any particular day since the beginning of the yuga (called ahargana) were given.

The corrections applied to the mean longitude to get the true geocentric longitude were based on the so-called epicyclic theory. Comparison of Āryabhaṭa I's epicyclic theory with that of the Greeks reveals striking differences between the two theories. The epicycles of Āryabhaṭa I and other Hindu astronomers are different in size in the odd and even quadrants and vary from place to place whereas those of the Greeks are always the same in size.

The longitudes of the Sun and the Moon were used to compute the elements of the Hindu Calendar, viz. tilhi, nakṣatra, karana and yoga and the times of the eclipses. Indian astronomers were specially interested in the calculation and projection of the eclipses as they had an important bearing on their religious observances. Āryabhaṭa I's method for calculating the parallax (lambana) known as dasājyā-vidhāna is an essentially Indian method. In early times it was believed that the eclipses were caused by the demon Rāhu. Brahmagupta and Lalla have vehemently refuted this mithyā jñāna (i.e. false knowledge). In astronomical literature the term rāhu stands for the Moon's ascending node.

The Moon and its motion with respect to the nakṣatras has been a subject of study since the Vedic times. The Āryabhaṭīya and all later astronomical works deal with the rising and setting, the phases, and the elevation of the horns of the Moon as also with the conjunction of the Moon with the junction-stars of the nakṣatras. Amongst the other subjects dealt with in the Āryabhaṭīya and other astronomical works may be mentioned the helical rising of the planets and their conjunction with the junction-stars of the nakṣatras.

Amongst important contributions of the Indians to the science of astronomy may be enumerated the following:

1. The solar zodiac.
2. The lunar mansions (nakṣatras).
3. The precession of the equinoxes and determination of its rate.
4. The establishment of the luni-solar year.
5. The names of weekdays.
6. The calculation of the mean rates of motion of the planets, etc. (bhagaṇas) based on continued observations.
7. The construction of an astronomical Calendar on a scientific basis.
8. The spherical shape of the Earth, the Moon, the Sun and the other planets.
9. The calculation of the diameter of the Earth and the planets.
10. The calculation of mean distances of the planets based on the theory of equal linear motion.
11. The rotation of the Earth about its axis.

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The revolution of the Earth round the Sun (Āryabhaṭā I).

The assumption of interplanetary attraction in order to explain equilibrium.

Water-clocks.

The measurement of the position of the Sun, the latitude of the place of observation, and time, etc., with the help of the shadow of the gnomon.

The above is what was known up to the twelfth century in India. About that time northern India came under the sway of Muslim invaders. There remained, however, some Hindu kingdoms in South India and the centre of gravity of Hindu learning shifted to the South. Refinements in astronomy were made during the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries. From the material available today we find that the South Indian astronomers made observations and corrected the elements of astronomical calculations. They devised better methods of calculations and approximations. They used processes akin to the Differential and Integral Calculus in the calculations. They obtained expansions of trigonometrical functions in series and used those series for approximations.

The Indians did not have the telescope. All their observations were made with the naked eye using suitable devices for the measurement of angles. Astronomy, therefore, was confined to the motion of the planets, the Moon and the Sun.

Very few of the Indian astronomical texts are available in English translation. Western scholars, therefore, have not been able to assess the great advance that India at one time made in the domain of Mathematical Astronomy. Astronomers in the West had to rediscover what was already known in India.

NOTES


2. The earliest epigraphic evidence of the use of the decimal place value notation is found in the Gurjara grant plate from Sankheda (Epigraphia Indica II, p. 19). G. Coedes (Bulletin School of Oriental Studies, London, VI, 1931, pp. 323-8) mentions three inscriptions of King Śrī Vijaya; two found at Palembang in Sumatra, and one in the Island of Banka which contain respectively the dates 605, 606 and 608 of the Śaka Era (corresponding respectively to A.D. 683, 684 and 686), written in the Hindu place value notation. Another inscription found at Sambor in Cambodia gives the date 605 of the Śaka Era.

3. Attention was drawn to the following passage occurring in a work of Severus Sebokht, a Syrian scholar who lived in the Convent of Kenneshre on the Euphrates, by F. Nau (Journal Asiatique, II, 1910, pp. 225-7):

"I will omit all discussion of the Science of the Hindus, a people not the same as the Syrians, their subtle discoveries in the Science of Astronomy, discoveries that are more ingenious than those of the Greeks and the Babylonians; their computing that surpasses description. I wish only to say that this computation is done by means of nine signs. If those who believe because they speak Greek, that they have reached the limits of Science should know
these things, they would be convinced that there are also others who know something.''

5. For further details, see Datta and Singh, History of Hindu Mathematics, Pt. I.
7. For methods given by Brahmagupta (A.D. 628), Bhāskara II (A.D. 1150), etc., see Datta and Singh, History of Hindu Mathematics, Pt. II, pp. 61-9.
8. For details, see Datta and Singh, History of Hindu Mathematics, Pt. II.

The solution of the equation \( ax^2 + c = y^2 \)
and
\( Nx^2 + 1 = y^2 \)
were considered by Brahmagupta (A.D. 628) who established the following lemmas to obtain their general solutions in integers:

(i) If \( x = a, y = \beta \) be a solution of the equation \( Nx^2 + K = y^2 \)
and \( x = a', y = \beta' \) be a solution of \( Nx^2 + K' + y^2 \)
then \( x = a\beta' \pm a'\beta, y = \beta\beta' \pm Na\alpha \) is a solution of the equation
\( Nx^2 + KK' = y^2 \)

In other words, if \( Na\alpha + K = \beta^2 \)
and \( Na\alpha^2 + K' = \beta'^2 \)
then \( N(a\beta' \pm a'\beta)^2 + KK' = (\beta\beta' \pm Na\alpha)^2 \)

(ii) If \( x = a, y = \beta \) be a solution of \( Nx^2 + K = y^2 \)
then \( x = 2a\beta, y = \beta^2 + Na\alpha \) is a solution of \( Nx^2 + K^2 + y^2 \)

(iii) If \( x = a, y = \beta \) be a solution of \( Nx^2 + K^2 = y^2 \)
then \( x = aK, y = \frac{\beta}{K} \) is a solution of \( Nx^2 + 1 = y^2 \)

The above lemmas were rediscovered in Europe by Euler in A.D. 1764 and by Lagrange in A.D. 1768.

Brahmagupta's method for solving \( Nx^2 + 1 = y^2 \) consists in obtaining empirically \( a, K \) and \( \beta \) such that

\( Na\alpha \pm K = \beta^2 \)

and then using his lemmas to get the general solution of \( Nx^2 + 1 = y^2 \).

Śripati (A.D. 1039) seems to have been the first to give the solutions

\( x = \frac{2m}{m^2 \sim N}, y = \frac{m^2 + N}{m^2 \sim N} \)

where \( m \) is any rational number. This appears in the works of later Indian mathematicians. This solution was rediscovered in Europe by Brouncker (A.D. 1657).

Śridhara (A.D. 730) gave the solution

\[ x = \frac{2C(p^2 - q^2)}{N(p - q)\sim C^2(p^2 + q^2)} \]
\[ y = \frac{N(p - q)\sim C^2(p^2 + q^2)}{N(p - q)\sim C^2(p^2 + q^2)} \]

of which the above is a particular case.

To obtain solutions in positive integers Brahmagupta uses the auxiliary equation \( Na\alpha^2 - 4 = \beta^2 \) and obtains

\( x = \frac{1}{4}a\beta(\beta^2 + 3)(\beta^2 + 1), y = (\beta^2 + 2)(\beta^2 + 3)(\beta^2 + 1) - 1 \)

Putting \( p = a\beta \) and \( q = \beta^2 + 2 \) we can write

\( x = \frac{1}{4}p(q^2 - 1), y = \frac{1}{4}q(q^2 - 3) \)

This solution was rediscovered by Euler.

Śripati expressly observes that if \( K = \pm 1, \pm 2 \) or \( \pm 4 \), the roots obtained by Brahmagupta's method are integral, but no method seems to have been known to him for finding a root of

\( Na\alpha \pm K = \beta^2 \)
$K$ having one of the above values. Bhāskara II (A.D. 1150), however, succeeded in evolving a simple method of getting two integral solutions of the above. This method is called by him *cakra-vāla* ("the cyclic method"). Thus Bhāskara II succeeded in solving

$$Nx^2 + C = y^2$$

completely.

Bhāskara II also succeeded in obtaining the general solutions of the following equations:

1. $ax^2 + bx + c = y^2$,
2. $ax^2 + bx + c = A y^2 + By + D$,
3. $ax^2 + by^2 + c = Z^2$,
4. $ax^2 + bxy + cy^2 = Z^2$.

There are many other types of equations that occur in the works of Bhāskara II. These cannot be mentioned here. But before I conclude this topic I wish to point out that Bhāskara II obtained the solution of the double equation

$$ax^2 + by^2 + c = u^2$$

$$Ax^2 + By^2 + D = v^2$$

He takes the example

$$x^2 + y^2 - 1 = u^2$$

$$x^2 - y^2 - 1 = v^2$$

and gives its solution as

$$x = \frac{(4m^4 + n^4) + r^3}{(4m^4 + n^4) - r^3}$$

$$y = \frac{4mnr}{(4m^4 + n^4) - r^3}$$

$$u = \frac{2r(2m^2 + n^2)}{(4m^4 + n^4) - r^3}$$

$$v = \frac{2r(m^2 - n^2)}{(4m^4 + n^4) - r^3}$$

where $m$, $n$ and $r$ are any rational numbers.

A particular case of the above solution, for $r = S/t$, was obtained by Genocchi (A.D. 1851). Another particular case was solved by E. Clere (A.D. 1850). A third easily deducible solution was given by Drummond in 1902.

APPENDIX

A FURTHER NOTE ON SOME REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENTS OF INDIAN
MATHEMATICS

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I

The gradual discovery and decipherment of ancient manuscripts is
throwing greater and greater light on Indian Mathematics. Nilakantha's
work has been briefly referred to in the foregoing paper. His Tantrassamgraha (A.D. 1500) contains not only the series for \(\frac{\pi}{4}\) which goes after
the name of Gregory (A.D. 1671) in the West, but also some remarkable
rational approximations to the value of \(\pi\). These attempts would show
that Indian mathematicians anticipated by at least 150 years the efforts
of the Newtonian era to solve the problem of squaring the circle. The
general Indian plan of approximation to \(\pi\) has also the peculiarity of
yielding approximations to \(\log 2\).

All these approximations are stated by Nilakantha in the above-
mentioned unpublished work, Tantrasamgraha, without any formal proof.
These results arise from the formula:

\[
\frac{\pi}{4} = 1 - \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{5} - \frac{1}{7} + \ldots
\]

The formal proofs of these approximations as well as of the above
series for \(\frac{\pi}{4}\) are found, however, in a work called Yukti-bhāṣā by
Brahmadatta (A.D. 1639), presumably a Malayalam translation of Ganita-
yukti preserved in Madras Library. The outline of the proof can be split
up into three lemmas. The first of these corresponds to the formula

\[
d\theta = \frac{d(\tan \theta)}{1 + \tan^2 \theta}
\]

which was used by Gregory (A.D. 1671) to establish the
series for inverse tangent. The second was noticed in Europe by Euler
(A.D. 1739) and the third by Roberval (A.D. 1634), and also independently
by Fermat (A.D. 1636). Since the Indian origin of the first two lemmas
must be prior to A.D. 1639, it follows that they were known in India much
before they were known in Europe. The lemmas are stated below.

Lemma 1. Let BC be a small arc of a circle of unit radius whose centre
is O. If $OB, OC$ meet the tangent at any point $A$ of the circle in $B_1, C_1$ respectively, then an approximation to arc $BC$ is given by:

$$\frac{B_1C_1}{OB_1} \approx \frac{1}{1 + AB_1};$$

This is proved in *Yukti-bhāṣā* by taking first a finite arc $BC$ (see Fig. 2)

and drawing perpendiculars $BD, B_iD_i$ to $OC$. By considering the similar pairs $(\Delta OBD, \Delta OBD_i)$ and $(\Delta B_1C_1D_i, \Delta OC_1A)$, we get

$$\frac{BD}{B_1D_1} = \frac{OB}{OB_1} = \frac{1}{OC_1}; \quad \frac{B_iD_i}{B_iC_1} = \frac{OA}{OC_1} = \frac{1}{OC_1},$$

from which we have $BD = B_1C_1/OB_1 \cdot OC_1$.

Thus when $BC$ is small, we have

$$\text{arc } BC \approx \text{BD} \approx \frac{B_1C_1}{OB_1} \approx \frac{1}{1 + AB_1};$$

**Lemma 2.** $\tan^{-1} t = \lim_{n \to \infty} \sum_{r=0}^{n-1} \frac{t/n}{1 + (rt/n)^2}$, $|\tan^{-1} t| \leq \frac{\pi}{4}$

This is obtained by first dividing into $n$ equal parts the intercept on the tangent at one end of the arc between the bounding radii of the arc, and then applying lemma 1 to each part.

**Lemma 3.** $\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n^{p+1}} \sum_{r=0}^{n-1} r^p = \frac{1}{p+1}$
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which seems to have been proved for \( p = 1, 2, 3, 4 \) and assumed for all positive integral values of \( p \).

Expanding the expression on the right-hand side of lemma 2 and making use of lemma 3, Yukti-bhāṣā proves the theorem: \( \tan^{-1} t = t - \frac{t^3}{3} + \frac{t^5}{5} - \ldots \), \(|t| < 1\), of which the first explicit mention in Indian literature seems to be in Karna-paddhati, a work prior to Tantra-saṅgrahā. It may be noted that passage from lemma 2 to the theorem is equivalent to term-by-term integration of the relation \( \theta = \int_{0}^{\theta} d(tan \theta)\frac{1}{1 + tan^2 \theta}^{-1} \).

Now coming to the rational approximations to \( \frac{\pi}{4} \), we have the following three mentioned by Nilakanta while the proofs are supplied by Yukti-bhāṣā:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad \frac{\pi}{4} \approx 1 + \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{5} - \frac{1}{7} + \ldots + \frac{1}{n} = \frac{1}{2(n+1)}, \\
(2) & \quad \frac{\pi}{4} \approx 1 + \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{5} - \frac{1}{7} + \ldots + \frac{1}{n} = \frac{(n+1)/2}{(n+1)^2 + 1}, \\
(3) & \quad \frac{\pi}{4} \approx 1 + \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{5} - \frac{1}{7} + \ldots + \frac{1}{n} = \frac{4}{(n+1)^2 + 4 + \frac{1}{2}} \\
\end{align*}
\]

The point to be noted about the approximations is that similar approximations are not to be found anywhere else. The proofs of the above formulae are based on certain intuitive estimates of orders of smallness represented by powers of \( n^{-1} \). [For detailed discussions of these, reference may be made to the following papers on which this note is mainly based: (1) "On the Hindu Quadrature of the Circle," Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, N.S. Vol. 20, 1944; (2) "Gregory's Series in the Mathematical Literature of Kerala" (by M. Murar and Rajgopal), in The Mathematics Student, Vol. XIII, No. 3, Sept. 1945; (3) "A Neglected Chapter of Hindu Mathematics" (by Rajgopal), Scripta Mathematica, Vol. XV, Nos. 3–4, 1949; (4) "A Consolidated list of Hindu Mathematical Works" (by K. Balagangadharan), Vol. XV, Nos. 3–4 of The Mathematics Student, 1947.]

II

The Indian conceptions of magnitude, number, zero and infinity deserve special attention from philosophical as well as mathematical points of view.

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The realistic and pluralistic system of Vaiśeṣika founded by Kaṇāda accepts magnitude (parimāṇa) and number (saṃkhya) as objectively real qualities inhering in all substances. Magnitudes are differently distinguished, the most common distinctions being, infinitely large (paramamahat or vibhu), medium (madhyama) and infinitely small (paramānu) dimensions.

Regarding number, it is held by the Vaiśeṣikas that only unity is an objectively real quality inhering in substances (compare Boole's remarks in his Laws of Thought that "unity" stands for God who inheres in everything). But two and all other higher numbers are constructed by the mind by relating and grouping units (apekṣā-buddhi-janya). For example, two is generated when the mind judges two units as "This is one," "This is one" and groups them together. Apart from this relating mental act there would be neither two, nor three, nor any higher number.

This concept of one being fundamental is recognized by the celebrated mathematician Hilbert who considers "unity" as a "thought-thing" and constructs the rest of the numbers therefrom. Again from the intuitionist point of view also Brouwer holds that the most important element in the construction of Mathematics is the concept of unity which is the architectonic principle of the series of natural numbers.

It was Brahmagupta (A.D. 628), the prince of Indian mathematicians, who correctly defined zero. According to him,

(i) "The sum of two equal and opposite numbers is zero" and

(ii) \( 0 \times (\pm a) = 0; (\pm a) \times 0 = 0; 0 \times 0 = 0. \)

Here (i) gives the relation of zero with all other numbers in respect of addition; and (ii) gives the relation of zero with the rest of the numbers so far as multiplication is concerned.

It may be objected that the definition (i) mentioned above does not imply the existence of zero. But this objection is obviously based on the idea that "sum" means here the operation of summation. The objection does not stand if the word is taken to mean the result of the operation, for which also it is often used. Of course, it is a different question as to how opposite numbers should be first defined.

One remarkable thing about this definition is that Brahmagupta, unlike the lesser luminaries like Gaṇeśa (A.D. 1545) and Kṛṣṇa (A.D. 1575), who come after him, gives what may be called a relational definition, instead of attempting a half-scientific and half-intuitive definition of zero. This method of definition is adopted by modern Western pragmatists, logical positivists and mathematical philosophers like Russell. It is inspired by the philosophical attitude which would try to steer clear of the question of determining and defining the ultimate natures of things by pointing out that a thing can be defined, for all practical purposes, if its particular specifications and its relations to other things can be known. Brahmagupta
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will thus be found to resemble modern thinkers in respect of his relational and pragmatic definition of zero.

In Indian Mathematics the concept of infinity arises as a result of the attempt to discover the meaning of "division by zero." In modern Western mathematics division by zero is not defined. In India, on the other hand, attempt was made by prominent mathematicians like Brahmagupta, Bhāskara and Kṛṣṇa to generalize division. According to them:

(i) \[ \frac{a}{0} = \infty \] (infinity), where \( a \) is a positive or negative integer.

(ii) \[ \frac{a}{0} \pm \frac{b}{c} = \frac{a}{0} = \infty, \frac{b}{c} \] being finite; and lastly

(iii) \[ \frac{a}{0} \pm \frac{b}{0} = \infty \pm \infty = \frac{a \pm b}{0} = \infty. \]

Here also we find a relational definition of \( \infty \).

This arithmetical concept of infinity may be contrasted with the concept of infinity in Calculus, where \( \infty \) (infinity) is looked upon as an incomplete symbol—as a tendency. In calculus this symbol occurs in phrases like \( x \to \infty \) (\( x \) tends to infinity) which is nothing but an abbreviated form of the phrase, "the variable \( x \) can be made to surpass any pre-assigned number." \( \infty \) by itself is given no meaning here.

The striking idea contained in (iii) above, namely, that the subtraction of infinity from infinity leaves infinity \( (\infty - \infty = \infty) \), merits special attention. It appears to be a manifest absurdity. But modern mathematical notions of infinity support this idea. In fact an infinite set is defined now as a set which has got a one-one correspondence with a proper part of it. To illustrate, the series of natural numbers, \( 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 \ldots \) is infinite, and if we take out the even numbers from it what is obtained, namely, \( 2, 4, 6 \ldots \) would be a proper part of the former and yet itself also infinite (bearing one-one relation with the first series); and what would be left, namely, \( 1, 3, 5, 7 \ldots \) would also form an infinite series.

This conception of infinity is found in even some of the earliest philosophical works, as for example in Byādhāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad (5. 1) which says: "Infinite is that (the unmanifested Brahman), infinite is this (the manifested Brahman). From the infinite proceeds the infinite. On taking the (manifested) infinite from the (unmanifested) infinite, the infinite is left"—Pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya, pūrṇam eva avaśiṣyate. (vide Dr. E. Roer’s translation in the Twelve Principal Upaniṣads, Vol. II, p. 384.)

We may conclude with a little general reflection on the main trend of Indian Mathematics. In his The Meeting of East and West, F. S. C. Northrop has made an elaborate attempt to show that the Orient (including India) "has concentrated its attention upon the nature of all things in their
emotional and aesthetic, purely empirical and positivistic immediacy”
upon the undifferentiated “totality of immediately apprehended fact”
(p. 375), whereas the West starts with concepts postulated apriori and
only indirectly verified a posteriori (p. 294). On this assumption he
distinguishes the civilisations of the East and the West.

But such an hypothesis will appear to be too hasty when we observe
the general trend of Indian Mathematics—the conceptions and definitions
of zero and infinity, the use of place value notation in Arithmetic and
letter-symbols in Algebra, the conception of magnitude in Algebra and
Geometry in terms of number, rather than as (the perceptible quantity
of) length, as was the case with the Greeks. All these facts, considered
along with the highly super-sensuous concepts of Indeterminate Absolute
(nir-guṇa-brahman) and śunya found in Indian philosophy, would show
that the Indian mind, from the earliest times, revelled as much in pure,
non-sensuous ideas as in the attempt, rightly noted by Northrop, to
realize and see even the Absolute in the phenomenal world.
CHAPTER XVI—continued

SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT IN ANCIENT INDIA

B. OTHER SCIENCES

Historical.—To attempt anything like a chronological survey of the achievements of the Indians in the fundamental branches of science as they are recognized at the present day would for obvious reasons be an almost impossible task. The bulk of empirical knowledge and experience acquired by the ancients was not recorded, but transmitted from age to age, and to succeeding generations by rote, with additions or alterations made in between; as such, they could hardly be accepted as a sufficiently accurate basis for a chronological record of development.

Ancient Indian investigations cover roughly the period from the Atharva-Veda (about 800 B.C.) to late fourteenth century A.D. Some of the investigations of the ancient Indians, particularly in the mathematical, the physical and the biological sciences, and also in metallurgy, materia medica and therapeutics, are to be considered as outstanding achievements in positive knowledge, which were borrowed freely, through the intermediation of the Saracens, by many of the Western countries to their great benefit.

Fundamental.—Natural philosophy as propounded by the Indians conforms mainly to three systems: (1) the Sāṃkhya-Patañjali system, which confines itself to the principles of cosmic evolution; (2) the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, confining itself to the method of science, elaborating the concepts of mechanics, physics and chemistry; and (3) the Vedānta and other systems of philosophy which have contributed little to the development of the physical sciences.

The Sāṃkhya-Patañjali System which is one of the earliest attempts at explaining the process of cosmic evolution on a scientific basis, in relation to energy as the guiding principle, has its ideas embodied mostly in metaphysical language, not easy to correlate with the modern scientific ideas regarding evolution. The material universe with its manifold phenomena is assumed to be derived from prakṛti, the mūla or primordial force, which is depicted as all-pervading, endless, inimitable and indestructible, without shape or form. Finite universe is thus derived from the infinite prakṛti under three well-defined characteristics, the so-called guṇas or “Reals,” namely:

(1) Sattva or the essence, the cause of different manifestations;
(2) Rajas, the energy factor, constituting the principle of work, by overcoming obstacles or resistance and producing motion; and

(3) Tamas, the evil influence, which counteracts the effect of rajas, producing inertia.

All energy is kinetic, and even potential energy is motion in imperceptible form, reminding one of Ostwald's comparison of the action of catalysts with that of oil on a machine which is otherwise proceeding at too slow a rate for its motion to be perceived.

The material universe is evolved by differentiation and integration within the characterless and formless prakṛti. As a result of this, individual but still indeterminate stuff comes into temporary existence, and through further differentiation and integration by the two co-ordinate series, subject and object, determinate mind stuff (sensory and motor organs—jñānendriya, karmendriya and manas) as well as determinate material stuff (ordinary matter) in the shape of atomic and molecular species (paramāṇu) come into existence. It is from the latter that not only inorganic matter but also living vegetable and animal organisms are conceived as having ultimately developed.

Conservation of energy and mass. — The guṇas (reals) found in forms of infinite diversity can neither be created nor destroyed. The totality of mass (tamas) as well as of energy (rajas) remains constant, showing therefore that one could be transformed into the other; an idea approximating to the modern notion of inter-convertibility of mass and energy. The doctrine of causation follows as a corollary from this rule of conservation and transformation of energy. Since the total energy remains the same, while the world is continuously in the process of evolution, all objects are only evolved forms of the same ultimate energy.

Chain of causation. — The order of evolution with the transformation of energies follows a definite law. The qualities or properties of things (kinds of matter) are only modes or forms of energy: sometimes kinetic and sometimes potential. Inorganic matter, vegetable and animal organisms, so far as mass and energy are concerned, are thus essentially and ultimately one. They are the outcome of different manifestations or modes of energy and acquire generic and specific qualities, the sequence of appearance being governed by an unalterable law. Cosmic evolution (parināma) is a two-fold process, creative as well as destructive, dissimilative as well as assimilative, katabolic as well as anabolic. There is, to begin with, unequal aggregation of mass and energy resulting in the creation of inorganic as well as of organic matter; this is the genesis of the world.

The ultimate constitution of matter (lānmārika-srṣṭi) is a question of the profoundest interest in the Sāṅkhya-Patañjali system. The following orders of particles are recognized or formulated, viz. (1) original infinitesimal particles (bhūtādi) or units of mass which are homogeneous, and
susceptible to the influence of energy changes with disturbance of equilibrium; (2) infra-atomic particles charged with different kinds of energy (tanmātra); (3) Five different classes of atoms into which matter is capable of subdivision, through combination of the five senses—sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. As a result of this combination arise the pānca-bhūtas—ākāsa (ether), vāyu (air), tejas (fire), āp (water), and prthuvi (earth)—which stand for a classification of substances. This classification is more physical than chemical and in no way approaches the classification of elements or the mode of their evolution in modern chemistry. There has been a very vague attempt at classification of substances into elements and compounds. The latter were regarded as formed by intimate fusion of the former, the individuality of the parts disappearing in toto.

Physics.—Anything like a system of natural philosophy cannot be said to have originated from either the Greeks or the Indians. Both nations stand more or less on the same footing as regards either method or achievements. The Indian physicists may, however, be said to have, with their broader outlook, brought about better co-ordination of this branch with other branches of knowledge. Starting with a few hypotheses on the constitution of matter and its divisibility into atoms and molecules and the formation of the latter from the former through the operation of intra-atomic forces, the general properties of matter, such as elasticity, cohesion, impenetrability, viscosity, fluidity, porosity, etc., were analysed and explained by Kaṇāḍa (the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system), and also by Jains, Buddhists and other contemporaries. The ascent of sap on plants from the root to the stem and the penetrative diffusion of liquids in porous vessels were used to illustrate capillary motion, and the ascent of water in pipes was explained on the basis of transmission of pressure by air.

Doctrine of motion.—Almost every School of Indian thought conceived motion, both atomic and molecular, to be underlying the physical phenomena of sound, light and heat. Motion was defined somewhat in the manner of the modern definition, as change of place of a particle, two types of motion being distinguished, namely instantaneous (kṣanika) and impressed motion or momentum (vega) which implies a series of motions. In one and the same particle there could be only one motion at one instant and this motion might be (1) rectilinear, i.e. in the same direction, upward or downward, and (2) curvilinear, with successive changes in direction, i.e. rotary motion (bhramana) and vibratory motion (spandana). Both are collectively called "gamanā." Various kinds of motion were recognized, viz. (a) volition (prayatna), (b) motion of a body by gravity (gurutva) which is ascribed to forces of attraction (ākarsana) and which may be counterbalanced by volition, (c) motion of fluids downward (syandana), and (d) unclassified motion, causes for which are unknown (adṛṣṭa), examples of which are dispersion of gases, magnetic attraction, etc. They had a good grasp of the concept of force and were able to indi-
cate the resultant motion when a particle was subjected to a number of forces or motions. The direction depends on the fact that pressure or impact is made in the original or opposite direction.

The conception of infinitesimally small magnitudes of time and space were used by the Indians in their precision calculations, although the instruments of measurement were rather crude. An atom (truti) of time was regarded as equal to $1/33750$ of a second, while the size of the minimum visible or the just perceptible mote in the sunbeam was known to be $1/34925$ of an inch. The size of an atom was conceived to be less than $\pi(3.5)^{-1} \times 10^{-62}$ of a cubic inch, a figure which, curiously enough, is comparable in order of magnitude with the latest determinations of the size of the hydrogen atom. No unit of velocity was fixed upon, but the average velocity was measured according to the formula $v = \frac{S}{t}$. It is on the basis of these that remarkably accurate measurements of the relative pitches of musical tones were made and the motion of a planet at any instant determined, which forms the basis of the differential calculus. Motion being defined as the change of position of a particle in space, the exact position in space of one particle relatively to another was fixed by measurement along the three axes (Vācaspati, about A.D. 842), thus laying the foundation of solid or co-ordinate geometry. The following physical concepts touching the various branches of the subject could be gleaned from the writings of the Indians, although there is no satisfactory evidence of their being always supported by experiments:

**Heat.** 1. Light and heat are different manifestations of the same substance (Kaṇāda).
2. Light and heat are essentially particulate by nature, and are emitted rectilinearly (Vācaspati).
3. Evaporation produces rarefaction and the phenomenon of ebullition of a liquid is caused by the equalization of the pressure of its vapour with that of the surrounding air (Śaṅkara Miśra).

**Optics.** 1. Substances were classified as transparent, translucent and opaque to light.
2. The laws of reflection and refraction of light and the phenomena of shadows were known and explained.
3. Examples of the chemical effects of light were known and studied (Jayanta).
4. The making and polishing of glass was a great industry and the art of making some of the best varieties of glass was known to the Indians.
5. Lenses and mirrors of various kinds were used and ignition of combustible materials was brought about by focusing on them the sun’s rays.
Acoustics.—In their analysis of sound, three types were recognized: (1) nāda, a quality of vāyu (air), which is the physical basis of sound, (2) dhvani, or audible sound, and (3) sphoṭa, or intelligible sound. As regards the actual propagation of sound in air, the view was held (Śabara-
svāmin) that nāda (the physical basis of sound) was of the nature of a wave motion consisting in the transmission of conjunctions and disjunctions in the minute particles of air, the wave originating in the first impact being continued by successive impacts of minute particles. Sound was regarded as being transmitted by longitudinal vibrations and in the process of transmission, condensation and rarefaction were known to occur alternately. The presence or absence of water and other objects offering greater or less resistance to the transmission of the wave motion also accounted readily for the greater or less distance to which the sound could be carried.

Echo (prati-dhvani) was regarded as reflection of sound. It was sometimes compared to a reflected image (prati-bimba) and like the latter was not considered to be the real sound.

In musical treatises differentiation of sounds from one another was made by their pitch (tāra-mandādi-bheda), by their intensity (tīvra-mandādi-bheda) and by their quality or timbre, the differences between the intermediate, audible and distinguishable pitches (śruti-bheda) as well as of their degrees of intensity (tīvra-mandādi) being ascribed to the variations in frequency of the vibrations. For musical purposes two types of tones were recognized, “śruti” and “svara.” Śruti is a simple unalloyed fundamental tone of a certain pitch, whereas an ordinary musical tone svara is composed of a fundamental tone (śruti) and certain partial tones (anurāṇana). Twenty-two such śrūtis were named and recognized for musical purposes.¹

The Indians were also acquainted with the laws of vibration of strings, the pitch of a note (number of vibrations) being known to be inversely proportional to the length of the wire.² While the pitch of a true fundamental note was related to that of its octave in the ratio of 1 : 2.³

Magnetism.—Elementary magnetic phenomena, such as the attraction of iron by lodestone, or grass and straw by amber, were explained as due to “adṛṣṭa” or unknown cause. Bhoja (A.D. 1050) seems to have realized that the use of iron in any form for joining together the planks in shipbuilding would be detrimental, since the ships might be attracted by magnetic rocks in the sea, thus exposing themselves to danger.

The Indian ships, particularly those built during the early Christian era, were provided with a device known as a “matsya-yantra” (fish-
machine) which floated in a vessel of oil and pointed to the north. This device was used by those who migrated to the islands in the Indian Ocean. There is no reliable record to show that electrical phenomena were understood by the Indians, unless we read into the explanation
given for the union of atoms as containing the nucleus of the idea of opposite electrical poles, an idea put forward centuries later by Berzelius in his dualistic electro-chemical theory.

Chemistry.—Neither in the Orient nor in the Occident did chemistry in the early years possess an independent status as a science. At the beginning it was almost pure and simple alchemy, concerning itself with the transmutation of baser metals into gold. It soon became a handmaid to the art of medicine and later allied itself to metallurgy and the industrial arts. In all these subjects the Indian investigators are regarded as the teachers of the Saracens as well as of the Chinese.

In the Vedic Age, chemical knowledge was evolved chiefly as a handmaid of medicine until it became later an adherent of the Tantric cult. Aśvinis are the gods presiding over the art of healing, and we find herbs and plants endowed with active healing properties raised to the dignities of the gods; the juice of the soma plant, for example, was supposed to give immortality.

During the Āyur-Vedic period, the Indian system of medicine was methodized and arranged on a rational basis with a scientific terminology. The two great works of this period are the Caraka (about sixth to fourth century B.C.) relating to medicine, and the Suśruta (early Christian era) relating to surgery. In the Caraka, Āyur-Veda is regarded as a secondary (upānga) branch of the Atharva-Veda and as a direct revelation of the gods, while the Suśruta asserts that the self-existent (Brahman) created Āyur-Veda as an upānga of Atharvan. The Suśruta is far more scientific than the Caraka, who launches boldly into metaphysical disquisitions, while lacking in experiments and scientific observations. The precise contribution of Āyur-Veda to the development of chemistry lay first in propounding a theory of chemical combination and division and classification of substances. The “pañca-bhūtas” (kṣiti, āp, tejas, marut and vyoman) were responsible for the formation of chemical compounds, and depending on the number of bhūtas involved, they were named, mono-, bi-, tri-, tetra- and penta-valent (somewhat like the binary, tertiary and quaternary compounds of Dalton).

The preparation and use of alkalies (kṣāra) were detailed and they were made to perform the work of incision, punctures and scarifications. They removed diseased parts and destroyed skin and flesh, dried up discharge and stopped bleeding. Alkalies were known to be of two kinds, one for external application (“티कṣṇa-kṣāra” or caustic alkalies) and the other for internal administration (“mṛdu-kṣāra” or mild alkali). The latter could be causticized by the addition of lime.

Poisons were classified as animal, vegetable and mineral respectively. Medicines were considered to be of two kinds, one promoting strength and vitality and the other curing diseases. Whatever promoted longevity, strength, health and vitality was called rasāyana. By the sixth century
A.D., the Indian chemists were masters of the chemical processes of calcination, distillation, steam distillation, sublimation, fixation, etc. These processes were used by Patañjali and Nāgarjuna and their Schools to bring about chemical combination and decomposition. In his treatise on Metallurgy (*loha-śāstra*), Patañjali gave elaborate directions for many metallurgical and chemical processes, especially the preparation of metallic salts, alloys, amalgams and the extractions of metals such as copper, zinc, etc., from their sulphides and their purification. The discovery of *Aqua Regia* is also attributed to him. Unfortunately, the bulk of Patañjali’s contributions appears to have been lost, but extracts from it are frequently found in *rasāyana*. Nāgarjuna is also said to have written a treatise on metallurgy, earlier than Patañjali. *Rasārṇava*, which covers the middle of the Tāṇtric period (about A.D. 1200), stresses the importance of apparatus in chemical operations and contains detailed description of different kinds of yantra (apparatus) for “killing” metals (i.e. changing them into compounds), making crucibles, etc. The colours of metallic flames were also accurately described, copper giving a blue flame, tin pigeon-coloured, lead pale tinted, iron tawny, and so on. Interest in quicksilver was greatly in evidence during this period and methods for its purification and conversion (killing) into calomel, perchloride and sulphide (vermillion) were fully described. *Rasa-ratna-samuccaya*, which covers the period A.D. 1300–1550, is a valuable medico-chemical work dealing with various pharmaceutical preparations with mercury as the all-attractive metal. Indeed we find the word *rasa* used in various works, e.g. the *Bhāva-prakāśa*, in a two-fold sense, either in the sense of juice or chyle, or as a synonym of mercury and regarded as a metal.

Thus the term *rasāyana* came almost exclusively to be applied to the employment of mercury and other metals in medicine and it also meant alchemy. *Rasa-ratna-samuccaya* divides the mineral kingdom (earth substances, both elementary and compound) into (1) the light rasas: mica, pyrites, bitumen, blue vitriol, calamine, etc.; (2) light uparasas (useful for operation with mercury): sulphur, alum, green vitriol, orpiment, etc.; (3) gems: emerald, diamond, sapphire, cat’s eye, etc.; (4) metals: gold, silver, iron, copper, lead, tin; and (5) alloys like bell-metal and brass. Six salts, three alkalies and mineral earth also came under the category of earth substance. Processes such as calcination (*bhasmiḥarana*), distillation (*udhah-pātana*), sublimation (*ūrdhva-pātana*), steaming (*svedana*), and fixing (*stambhana*) are described. Preparation of mercury perchloride (*rasa-karpūra*) from salt and of sulphide of mercury (*hiṅgula*) from sulphur and mercury and of *svarna-sindūra* and *rasa-sindūra* are also described. The application of heat in different intensities, *khara-pāka* (strong heat), *madhyama-pāka* (moderate heat) and *mrdu-pāka* (low heat), are also referred to. Directions are also given for the erection of laboratories and types of apparatus which ought to be made available in the laboratory,
such as mortars, pestles, extractors, sieves, crucibles, heating appliances, bellows, iron pans, etc., are also described in detail. The life which the experimenters ought to lead, if the preparations are to be successful, is also indicated. *Rasa-ratna-samuccaya* may be said to be a sort of scientific encyclopaedia, embodying practically the whole of the chemical (including organic), mineralogical and metallurgical knowledge of the Indians developed through the ages.

**Metallurgy and other Industries.**—Although in the *Vedic* period gold and silver were known and worked into various ornaments, and other metals such as iron, lead and tin were also mentioned, any connected narrative of the metallurgical skill of the ancient Indians is not possible. Indians were noted for their skill in the tempering of steel, the secret of manufacturing the so-called “Damascus blades” having been learnt by the Saracens from the Persians, who had themselves mastered it from the Indians. The rustless wrought iron pillar at Kutub, over 1,500 years old, is a standing monument to their achievement in this field. Processes of extraction, purification, melting and casting of metals were clearly understood and practised. The natives of India could introduce the required contents of carbon into their cast steel by mixing an excess of carbon initially and taking the excess gradually away by means of the slow-tempering process, with skill in interrupting the decarbonization process at the proper time. The Romans of the Imperial epoch regarded the Indians as a nation of industrial experts, whose manufactures and enterprise in trade were well known to countries like Egypt, Persia, etc. The Indians specialized in bleaching, dyeing, calico-printing, tanning, soap making, glass making, steel manufacture, gunpowder and fireworks, preparation of cements (*vajra-lopā*), etc.

**Medicine and Surgery.**—Besides their historical importance, Indian achievements in this field as in others have some absolute values. The two great names in the Indian science of medicine and surgery are Caraka and Suśruta, the former being a physician and the latter a surgeon. While they may not claim to be the founders of the Science, the real importance of their work lay in evolving a system out of the chaos that prevailed before and raising both medicine and surgery to the status of a science by pressing to its aid the cumulative experience of previous centuries. Surgery as a well-developed art was recognized by about the second century A.D., while materia medica grew from age to age with the introduction of new drugs, vegetable, animal and mineral, the therapeutic efficacies of which were put to strict experimental tests. The Indians had hospitals and dispensaries as early as the third century B.C., and the numerous rock inscriptions of Aśoka bear testimony to the propagation and popularization of medical recipes for the treatment of men and animals. The smoking of *datura* for asthma and the treatment of paralysis and dyspepsia by *nux vomica* was known to the Indians long before they were known in Europe.
The internal use of mercury was first advocated by the Indians, mercurial preparations being used by practitioners as a tonic (makara-dhvaja). They were also acquainted with the preparation of soporific inhalation powders and drugs, which caused a local anaesthetic condition.

From the sixth century onwards, every Indian treatise on materia medica recommended metallic preparations in the shape of bhasmans for internal use. ‘Svarṇa-bhasman’ (gold), rasa-sindu (mercury) and rajata-bhasman (silver) were quite common specifics. The work of Indian physicians and pharmacologists was known in ancient Greece and Rome. Hippocrates, the father of medicine (450 B.C.) was familiar with such Indian drugs as pepper, cardamom, ginger, cinnamon, cassia, etc., and preparations of the Indian pharmaceutical laboratories were in use in Greece as well as in the Greco-Roman world. Indian physicians were also known to be employed as superintendents of Saracen hospitals at Baghdad.

Surgery was one of the oldest branches of medical science in India. It was considered by the ancient Indian surgeons to be the first and the most reliable of medical sciences, less liable than any other to the fallacies of conjectural and inferential practices. Surgery derives its name from śalya, or the art of removing the arrow and such other foreign substances from the body, and seems to have had its origin in warfare and accidents arising out of hunting. Although the ancient surgery could by no means be compared with the perfections of modern surgical practice, Indian surgeons had attained great skill in extracting the dead foetus, removing foreign bodies from body tissues and treating different kinds of inflammation, abcesses, ulcers and other diseases by surgical operations. The art of cutting and setting bones and other hazardous operations are also known to have been carried out successfully. Dissection of the human body was declared by the Suśruta School as one of the essential methods for a correct knowledge of the internal structure of the body. Besides giving an accurate knowledge of the human anatomy, it taught them to exercise great care in surgical operations, in avoiding vital centres or parts. The surgical laboratory counted at least 127 instruments, such as saw, lancets, needles, knives, scissors, forceps, etc. For practice, wax models, gourds, cucumbers were used and flexible models of the human body were in use for practice in bandaging.

The knowledge of the ancient Indians of such subjects as the Physiology of the digestive system, Embryology, etc., were fairly comprehensive and accurate. The food that is taken consisting of combinations of the five classes of elements was considered to be pushed down the gullet by the action of the particular bio-motor force known as prāṇa-vāyu. In the stomach, after getting mixed up with a gelatinous mucus, the food became acidulated further (evidently gastric juice) and the chyme so formed was forced by the action of samāna-vāyu into the pittāsaya (duodenum)
and thence to the small intestines (āma-pakvāśaya). The chyme was then converted into chyle (rasa) by the digestive juices of the bile and the chyle so obtained containing the tissue-forming earth compounds, watery fluids or ap compounds, heat-producing tejas compounds, force-producing vāyu compounds, and lastly, finer ethereal constituents, served as the vehicle of consciousness. The essence (sūkṣma-bhāga) of the chyle from the small intestines was driven by the bio-motor force prāṇa-vāyu along a dhāmanī or trunk (thoracic duct) first to the heart and thence to the liver, where the colouring matter of the bile acting on the essence of chyle, transformed it into blood. The greater part of the chyle is driven by the bio-motor force known as “vyāna-vāyu” all over the body. The blood, acted on by vāyu and mucus, was transformed into flesh tissues and the finer essence of the flesh tissue, acted upon conjointly by vāyu and metabolic heat, produced fatty tissue, an effect to which the ap compounds were supposed largely to contribute. The finer essence of the fat, finding its way to the marrow, and aided by vāyu, formed metabolic heat there, and was subsequently transformed into semen, which was conveyed down into a pair of receptacles (śukra-dhara-ṛṣaṇau). The latter (semen) gives off ojas (energy), which returns to the heart and again floods the body, starting the self-returning cycle of metabolism. The circulation of the blood was considered to be through śīrās (channels), dhāmanīs (passages) and srotas (ducts) in the body which included veins, arteries, nerves, lymphatic vessels, etc. Further, dhāmanīs were known to bring the impure (venous) blood from the heart to the liver and śīrās to conduct the pure (arterial) blood. The anatomical arrangements of the śīrās and dhāmanīs in Caraka and Suśruta were rather obscure, so that only a rough indication of the general features is possible. All the śīrās and such of the dhāmanīs as were not carrying the fluids of the body, constituted cranial nerves and proceeded from the heart to the cranium. The susūmnā or the central cord in the vertebral column (brahma-dāṇḍa) had two chains of sympathetic nervous systems, branching on either side to the left and right, which were named iḍā and pīṇgalā. There were seven hundred nerve cords of which fourteen, which cause the various movements, were important. Caraka and Suśruta describe the vāyus as the prime mover and the compelling forces which set in motion the various organs as well as the mind, and they were held responsible for the growth of the foetus as well. These vāyus were five in number, viz. prāṇa, which works the vocal apparatus, respiratory system and controls the muscles engaged in sighing, coughing, etc., apāna concerned with the excretory systems, vyāna with muscular action, samāna with maintenance of the body temperature through metabolism, and udāna in maintaining general equilibrium and exact positions of the organs.

The ovum fertilized by the sperm cell and developing under the influence of animal heat formed successive layers of tissues, which developed
successively, one out of the other. By chemical action or metabolism, chyle was transformed into blood, which in turn was turned to flesh, fat, bone, marrow, and so on. The rudiments of the head and limbs appeared in the third month and developed in the fourth, while bones, ligaments, nails and hair appeared in the sixth month. Sex itself was supposed to be indicated in the second month.

*Botany and Agricultural Science.*—It would be very difficult to answer the question as to whether a knowledge of systematic botany, as it is understood at present, was possessed by the ancient Indians. The interest in botanical studies arose firstly in connection with problems of food supply and secondly in the search for herbs which would have powers of healing illness and disease and prolonging life. It may be said that it was quest in these directions which led to a rough classification of plants. Caraka and Suśruta divided plants into (1) *vanaspatis* or trees bearing fruits only, without flowers, (2) *vānaspatyas* or trees bearing fruits and also flowers, (3) *oṣādhis*, herbs that withered after fructification, and (4) *vīruḍhs*, other herbs with spreading stems, the latter group comprising (1) *latās* or creepers, and (2) *gulmas* or herbs with cartaceous stems and shrubs. To this division, Praśastapāda adds (a) *tyṇas*, grasses, and (b) *avaṭānas*, arboraceous plants and shrubs.

Amara places parasitical plants in the category of the *latās*, but they were to be distinguished from the adventitious roots descending from the branches of trees (*avarohas*). The Indian materia medica also mentions other groups like *ākāśavatis* (sky creepers), *plavas* or weeds floating in stagnant ponds, and *śaivālas* (mosses and lichens).

*Plant Physiology.*—Udayana notices in plants the phenomena of life, death, sleep, waking, disease, drugging, movement towards what is favourable and away from what is unfavourable, e.g. the heliotropic movements of *sūrya-mukhī* flowers, etc.

Gujaratn in the commentary on *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* (A.D. 1350) records the following phenomena in plant life, (1) infancy, (2) regular growth, (3) various kinds of motion or action connected with sleep, waking, response to stimuli, (4) withering on wound, (5) assimilation of food according to the nature of soil, (6) disease and recovery from disease. Even the *vanaspatis* (flowerless but fruit-bearing trees) may be made to flower (Varāhamihira). In all aspects the genesis, growth and life of plants bear a close resemblance to human life as could be seen in the following question and reply.

Question by Hārīta: "Why, O sage, is there no conception without the union? Or, why are there no flowers and fruits produced without the union (of the sexes)? Why is the same kind of fruition not to be perceived in women as in the plants?"

Reply by Ātreya: "All plants are endowed with śīva and śakti, i.e. the male and the female procreative energies; that which has static property
is to be known as śiva, the male, and that which has dynamic property is to be known, O the great-souled one, as śakti, the female."

The Indian Scriptures taught that plants had a sort of latent consciousness and were capable of pleasure and pain, and that plants also possessed the sense of hearing.

The development of Agricultural Science, which was largely responsible for interest in the study of plants, dates as far back as the Rg-Veda, and owing to the network of rivers and plentiful water-supply, particularly in the north, the rṣis regarded agriculture as a holy and dignified occupation. Interest in agriculture naturally manifested itself in an equally keen interest in the welfare and development of livestock. Even during the fourth century B.C. the art of agriculture received the earnest attention of the State and attained considerable perfection. It became an important department of the government under the management of a superintendent with onerous duties and responsibilities, ranging from the collection of seeds to the growing of crops, preservation of grain and management of labour. A very valued treatise called Kṛṣi-Parāśara (about the first century A.D.) is devoted principally to the cultivation of paddy and secondarily to other aspects of agriculture, including meteorological observations, which throw a flood of light on the state of knowledge and progress attained in India in the early times. A verse concerning the ploughing of land runs thus: Ploughing in the autumn begets gold, in the spring copper and silver, in the summer mere grain, and in the rainy season dire poverty.

Similar directions are given for sowing seeds, planting, reaping, etc.

Zoology.—Animals have been given a predominant place by the Indians, particularly in relation to dietetics, economic life, medicine, fine arts and religion. They possessed a sound knowledge of the life habits, habitats and characteristics of domesticated as well as wild animals. Various systems of classification have been in vogue. According to Caraka, four main divisions were recognized:

(1) Jarāyuja—born from the uterus (e.g. man and the quadrupeds).
(2) Aṇḍaja—born of an ovum (e.g. fishes, reptiles and birds).
(3) Svedaja—moisture generated (e.g. worms, flies and mosquitoes).
(4) Udīhiṣa—born of vegetable organism.

The a-sexually generated animals are also called kṣudra-jantu (small animals). They are defined as those animals without bones (anasthikas), those without blood of their own (yēṣāṁ svam śonitam nāsti), those which are a very prolific species, and those which cannot be crushed.

In noticing different kinds of meat for dietary purposes, Caraka gives a classification of animals and birds which has a practical significance. The snakes are noticed by Suśruta and Nāgārjuna particularly in relation to toxicology. This School also named six varieties of ants, six varieties of flies, five varieties of mosquitoes, thirty varieties of scorpions and sixteen
varieties of spiders. Leeches have been used by Indian surgeons from very early times, a detailed account of their varieties, habits and mode of applications being given by Suśruta. The zoological lore of the Indians is a good record of scientific interest in the facts and phenomena of animal life. Knowledge of rudiments of veterinary science is also very old. The Indians were well versed in all essential particulars of anatomies of such sacrificial animals as goat, sheep, horse and also of animals such as elephants used in warfare, and they are known to have established hospitals for the treatment of animals as early as the third century B.C. They could set fractures and dislocations in animals and also treat them for various diseases.

Conclusion.—The spirit of scientific enquiry and a rigorous correlation of cause and effect in explaining the natural phenomena of the universe was particularly noticeable among the early Indians as in the case of some of the other advanced peoples like the Greeks and others. Concrete ideas on the ultimate structure of matter, the evolution of elements and their combination to form diverse substances of the earth, the classification of the compounds, etc., clothed in the speculative language peculiar to them, appear to have been put forward first by the Indians. Notwithstanding a lack of the finer and more precise instruments for measurement, which undoubtedly acted as the chief hindrance to progress, and also the fact that recorded instances of experiments as an independent method of discovery and proof were rare, it would be correct to state that their approach to scientific method was entirely on the basis of observations carefully analysed and sifted.

Specific scientific literature was built up in each branch with its own technical terminology. The sciences of Physics, Mathematics, Chemistry, Botany, Zoology, Agriculture, Veterinary Science, Medicine and Surgery, including Anatomy, had each an independent status, and there were different schools of workers in each field, criticizing freely the activities of each other. In anatomy in particular, the Indians went a step farther than others by practising dissections on dead bodies and those post-mortem operations as well as other major operations in obstetric surgery were availed of for embryological studies. The symptomatology of diseases, too, was based on precise and minute scientific observations. In materia medica, the bold and successful administration of poisonous drugs like Arsenic, Mercury and Antimony attracted the notice and admiration of neighbouring countries such as Persia, Mesopotamia and Egypt, where Indian physicians and surgeons were welcomed and highly honoured. In metallurgy, the Indians had acquired remarkable skill and their experiments led to great developments in arts and manufactures related to dyes and paints, perfumeries, pharmaceuticals, etc. In Botany, the classification of plants was somewhat arbitrary and superficial, but the observations which were made chiefly in the interests of therapeutics and
agriculture were of great diversity and importance. In Zoology, the classification of species appears to have proceeded on external characters and habits of life rather than on the basis of their anatomical characteristics. But as will be seen from the details under each section, many of the contributions of the ancient Indians to the Positive Sciences were of permanent value and marked a distinct advance on the achievements of other nations. A great wealth of knowledge had thus been accumulated, but the codification of the knowledge came later.

In brief, while a comparison of the scientific achievements of the Indians with those of the modern world would be neither sound nor fair, it may with perfect justification be stated that the spirit of scientific enquiry and rationalization prevailing among them in those ancient days was not essentially different from what is found in our times.

NOTES

2. Tāntri-tantu-svarūpā jñeyā tat-dārṣṭhaya-vyastā-mānataḥ.—Śeṣa-lilāvati, quoted by Mr. Devala in his Hindu Musical Scale.
7. Ibid.
8. "Hemante kṛṣyate hema, vasante tāmra-rauṣpākam
   Dhānyam nidāgha-kāle tu, dārīdṛyantu ghanā'gane."

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CHAPTER XVII

INDIAN AESTHETICS

PRELIMINARY

In this presentation of an approach to the beautiful from the Indian point of view, the word Aesthetics does not stand for a science that is concerned with the obscure knowledge as obscure, the knowledge in the form of feeling, the knowledge that does not admit of adequate presentation in words, as Baumgarten thought. Nor does it signify "Philosophy of fine art" as it would from the Hegelian point of view. Nor does it mean a theory of beautiful in general, whether in art or nature, as it would seem from the popular use of the word beautiful. In the present context it stands for "Science and Philosophy of fine art." (1) "Science of fine art," because the problem of art was originally a problem of the technique of art. The works, wherein the philosophy of art is discussed, are primarily concerned with the technique; and the philosophy is closely related to it. (2) "Philosophy of fine art" because the experience that a work of art arouses in an aesthete is accounted for in terms of different Schools of philosophic thought in India and also because the authorities on three arts, poetry, music and architecture, hold that art presents the Absolute as conceived by them. Thus there are three Schools of the philosophy of art: (i) Rasa-Brahma-vāda; (ii) Nāda-Brahma-vāda and (iii) Vāstu-Brahma-vāda. (3) "Of fine art" because fine art is recognized to have an independent value inasmuch as its product gives rise to an experience that no product of nature can, unless it be looked upon as a piece of art; and because the useful or mechanical arts are distinguished from the fine and the philosophical discussion is related to the latter only.

APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM

The problem of Aesthetics has been approached from the technical, metaphysical, psychological, epistemic, logical and critical points of view. The theory of meaning is an essential part of Indian Aesthetics. From the technical point of view the ways and means of producing works of art in different mediums, such as stone, paint, musical sound, linguistic expression and human body are discussed. From the metaphysical point of view the object of presentation, the content, and the nature of the final experience, that a work of art arouses, are presented in terms of metaphysical categories. From the psychological point of view the entire psycho-
logical process, involved in the different levels of aesthetic experience, is explained. From the *epistemic* point of view the following points are discussed: (1) The true nature of the relation of the aesthete to the aesthetic object; (2) the subjective conditions necessary for interpreting the aesthetic presentation and for the rise of an experience in the connoisseur, similar to that which is embodied in the work of art; (3) the mental faculties which are operative in the course of the development of the aesthetic image in the spectator; (4) the distinction of such faculties from those which operate at the empirical level; (5) elimination of the elements of the individuality of the subject and the object and their temporal and other limitations in aesthetic experience. From the *logical* point of view the aesthetic judgment is distinguished from the empirical, such as (a) right, (b) wrong, (c) dubious and (d) illusory, etc. And from the *critical* point of view the problem "What is the soul of the artistic presentation?" has been discussed.

It has also been approached from the point of view (1) of the end of art, (2) of the artist and (3) of the aesthete. The earliest theories of art (1) hedonistic and (2) pedagogic or moralistic represent the study of the problem from the point of view of the end of art, of what the products of art aim at. The theories of (1) imitation, (2) illusion and (3) idealization have been advanced from the point of view of the artist. They show what the artist does in artistically dealing with the object that inspires him. Similarly (1) confused or unclassifiable cognition, (2) inference, (3) katharsis and (4) mysticism are the theories of art from the point of view of the aesthete. They show the nature of experience that a work of art arouses in the aesthete and the means of knowledge which are employed by him in its acquisition.

**HISTORY AND LITERATURE**

Two works on dramaturgy, one by Śilāli and the other by Kṛṣāśva, are referred to by Pāṇini (4, 3, 110-11). They show that the dramatic art in India existed long before its rise in Greece.

Since these works seem to be irrecoverably lost we begin our historical account with Bharata, whose work is the earliest available work on the subject and who has been accepted as an authority in (1) the works on *sāṅgīta* (music), such as *Sāṅgīta-ratnākara* by Śāṅgadeva, (2) the works on architecture in the sections dealing with iconography, such as *Sama-rāṅgana-sūtra-dhāra* by King Bhoja, who describes the hand gestures, etc., mostly in the language of Nātya-śāstra of Bharata (ch. IX) and talks of *rasa-dṛṣṭi* in the context of painting almost in terms of Bharata (ch. VIII).
DRAMA

During the first three hundred and fifty years of the development of Aesthetics in the context of drama, that is, from the time of Bharata (c. A.D. 500) to that of Bhaṭṭa-Lollāṭa (A.D. 850), the problem of Aesthetics was mainly one of technique. In fact the sole aim of Bharata’s Nātya-śāstra is to instruct dramatists, stage-managers and actors in regard to the ways and means of producing drama, to tell them the necessary constituents of drama and the manner and material of presenting them. He has also attempted some of the problems which arise in modern minds.

(1) He holds that eye and ear are the only aesthetic senses. He excludes touch, taste and smell from aesthetic senses. On this point some of the Western aestheticians, such as St. Thomas, Addison and Kant, agree.

(2) The end of the dramatic art, according to him, is the moral improvement of the spectator, not directly through sermons put in the mouths of actors, but indirectly by making the spectator experience the goodness of the virtuous path through identification with the focus of the dramatic situation. (3) He maintains that the element of sensuous pleasure is undeniable in the experience arising from a dramatic presentation. But it constitutes only the starting-point. Thus aesthetic hedonism, which led Plato to the condemnation of art in his Republic, and pedagogism by which Aristotle tried to vindicate art, are fully reconciled by Bharata. (4) He recognizes the importance of women on the stage. (5) He states the necessary subjective conditions for the aesthetic experience from a drama. The most essential of them is the capacity in the spectator to identify himself with the focus of the presented. (6) Drama, according to him, presents rasa through four types of acting: (i) āṅgika (gestural), (ii) vācika (vocal), (iii) sāttvika (internal) and (iv) āhārya (extraneous or artificial). (7) Scenic arrangement, he holds, is indispensable for dramatic presentation.

RASA AS AESTHETIC OBJECT

The word “rasa” stands for what a dramatist presents. It is the object of aesthetic relish. It is not to be found in the creations of nature. It is not a pure unity but unity in multiplicity. The unifying factor in the multiplicity is a basic state (sthāyi-bhāva) of mind which binds together in an organic whole the following factors: (1) the emotive situation (vibhāva), in human setting, consisting of the physical cause (?) of the basic mental state, (2) the mimetic changes (anubhāva), which are inspired by the aroused basic mental state and as such are indicative of the internal state,
and (3) the transient emotions (vyabhicārī-bhāva). The basic mental state is the central and the most important phase of this configuration. The rest are simply necessary accompaniments very much like the paraphernalia of a king. They raise the basic mental state to prominence, which is the centre of attraction for the spectator.

But in the case of the persisting emotion, which is presented on the stage and which is experienced by the spectator, the situation, which the actor, representing the hero of the piece, faces, cannot be spoken of as the cause of his emotion; nor can it be spoken of as the cause of the emotion that the spectator experiences. For neither to the actor nor to the spectator as such is the situation related in the manner in which it was related to the historical character that he represents. For instance, Sītā, as an historical person, cannot be looked upon as the object of love either by the actor or the spectator, because the religious association with the historical character will prevent the rise of such emotion and will, on the contrary, arouse emotions of quite different nature from that of love, such as respect and veneration. The cause, therefore, being absent the effect cannot exist. Hence the facial and other changes, which the actor may exhibit, cannot be spoken of as effects of emotion or love. Nor can the transient states of mind, the physical signs and movements of which the actor may show, be looked upon as the invariable accompaniments of the persisting emotion. The entire situation is only a medium which helps the actor to work himself up to an emotional pitch. It is to indicate this difference in the relation of situation, physical changes and invariable accompaniments to the emotion as presented by the actor that they have not been called cause, effect and invariable concomitants. Instead, they have been given technical names, vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārībhāva.

PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

Most of the thinkers who have approached the problem of art from the philosophical point of view belonged to Kāśmīra. They have approached it from the points of view of four systems of thought: (1) the Nyāya, (2) the Saṅkhya, (3) the Vedānta and (4) the monistic Śaivaism of Kāśmīra.

BHATṬA-LOLLĀṬA (A.D. 850)

He is the earliest commentator referred to in the Abhinava-bhāratī in the course of the discussion on the rasa-sūtra. His point of view was essentially practical. He did not attempt to account for the rise of aesthetic configuration (rasa) in the mind of the spectator. He had two questions in his mind, (1) Where does the combination of the various constituents of
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*rasa* into a unity take place? and (2) How are the constituents related to one another in *rasa*, which is a *unity* in multiplicity. He knew that unity in multiplicity is a mental construct and, therefore, it can be in the human mind only. Accordingly, in answer to the first question, he asserted that primarily *rasa* is in original historical character and that only secondarily it is in the impersonating actor on the stage. The reason may be stated as follows:

The actor identifies himself with the historical character and, therefore, is able to unify the elements of his experience so as to produce the mental construct which corresponds in every way to that which arose in the original hero. His answer to the second question may be stated as follows:

Though the basic mental state ordinarily arises only when there is a real cause for it, yet the actor with the help of his training and dramatic environment on the stage so identifies himself with the character of the poet’s conception that he acts, moves and feels like the latter so as to have the same emotion also as that with which the poet associates the hero. The relation of the situation to the basic mental state is the same as that of a mystic symbol to mystic experience. Thus, aesthetic object, according to Bhaṭṭa-Lollāṭa, is the unity of *sthāyi-bhāva* in the multiplicity of *vibhāva*, etc., when it is supported, strengthened, intensified or brought to predominance by these very constituents of multiplicity.

THE THEORY OF ILLUSION IN ART

"Imitation" is recognized to be the principle of artistic production in the earliest period of the history of art everywhere: and imitation, when it is most successful, produces illusion. Theory of illusion in art was maintained in the West by the sophist, Gorgias. Plato condemned art because he accepted the above theory. Such a theory of art, namely, that a work of art creates illusion, that it deceives the connoisseur to take the product of art to be the product of nature and arouses the same psycho-physical responses in him, is attributed to Bhaṭṭa-Lollāṭa. Accordingly, it is said that he maintained that just as at the time of illusory knowledge of silver at the sight of brilliance of mother of pearl, there is the same experience for a moment as at the sight of the real silver, so, on the objective perception of the stage representation of the historic, there is for a moment an extremely pleasant experience very much the same as at the sight of the real. For the spectator is aware of the presence of an emotive state in the focus of the situation, the hero, though it is really not there.

The criticism of this theory is that if art creates illusion it would arouse ordinary attitudes and responses. And such an admission would mean the denial of an independent value to art. It would also mean condemnation
of all tragic presentations. For we will have to admit the rise of tragic feeling of sorrow from them, which as such is not relishable.

NYĀYA AESTHETICS

Śrīśaṅkuka (A.D. 860) approached the problem from the point of view of the Nyāya. He attempted to explain aesthetic experience by putting forward the imitation-inference theory. He held that it is due to the objective perception of the presented and that it consists primarily in the experience of the basic emotion that is presented. His problem was to account for its appearance in the aesthete. For the basic mental state, which is the central fact in artistic presentation, cannot be cognized in the manner in which other constituents of it are cognized; because it is purely a state of mind and as such does not admit of objective perception. He therefore put forward the theory of inference.

He holds that the content of consciousness in aesthetic experience is not the configuration of the situation, mimetic changes, transient emotion and the basic mental state but the last only. He asserts that the dramatic art has two chief means of presentation, (1) language and (2) psycho-physical training of the actors. These, with the help of other arts, can present an historical hero in such a way that the spectator takes the artistic presentation to be "real." He holds that the basic mental state cannot so objectively be presented even by these means and that the means of its presentation is "imitation" (anukarana). But he does not clarify its meaning.

He therefore maintains (1) that aesthetic experience is the experience of an imitated basic mental state that appears in the spectator's consciousness because of the inference of it from three types of reason realistically presented on the stage, (i) the situation, the cause, (ii) the mimetic changes, the effect, and (iii) the transient emotions, the invariable concomitants, of the basic mental state: and (2) that the imitated basic mental state, that is inferred, is called rasa simply because it is an imitation of a real basic mental state of a real hero, such as Rāma, and because, being associated with an enchanting situation, it adds to itself a peculiar charm and develops into an enjoyable state of the spectator's mind.

INFLUENCE OF PAINTING

He cites the analogy of the experience stimulated by a horse, painted by an expert artist, to explain the nature of aesthetic experience of dramatic presentation. The analogy implies (1) that aesthetic cognition is unique in itself and, therefore, is different from any form of cognition,
accepted in the system of Nyāya, (2) that it is recognition, which cannot be classed as true, false or dubious, (3) that it arises from the fusion of the image, already in the mind, with the one that is generated by the artistic object, and (4) that the consciousness of the original arises from a realistic presentation of it exactly as does that of a horse from a pictorial or plastic presentation of it. The inconsistencies of this theory are apparent. If the spectator takes the reasons, which are realistically presented on the stage, to be real, how can the basic mental state, inferred from them, be spoken of as imitation? But if he takes them to be the products of art, the inference of the basic mental state from them is out of question. Further, how can the cognitive judgment related to the hero, presented on the stage, be spoken of as unclassifiable? For if it is not subsequently contradicted, it is right. But if it is contradicted, it is wrong. The analogy of painting also is unsound, because in pictorial presentation we do not recognize the original, but are aware of similarity only.

SĀMKHYA AESTHETICS

There are two references in the Sāmkhya-kārikā to aesthetics. The one points out the nature of the relation of the actor to the hero that he represents. According to this, the actor does not imitate but himself becomes the hero. The relation between the actor and the hero is similar to that between the subtle body (sūkṣma-śārīra) and the gross body. Just as the subtle body becomes (bhavati) a man or an animal so does the actor become the character that he represents. The other asserts that in aesthetic experience the subject is free from two guṇas, rajas and tamas and, therefore, from the selfish and purposive attitude and the determinative cognitive activity (cf. Kant). He is simply aware of the aesthetically presented, exactly as the puruṣa is of the prākṛti, after the realization of his distinction from the latter. This accounts for the freedom of aesthetic experience from pain even when the presented is painful from the empirical point of view.

VEDĀNTA AESTHETICS

Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka (A.D. 883) attempted the problem from the point of view of the Vedānta. He admitted the Sāmkhya view that in aesthetic experience both the subject and the object are universalized. But then the question arose, “How does the universalization of both the subject and the object take place at the aesthetic level?” And he replied to it by the assumption of two powers of the poetic language in addition to the generally accepted power (abhidhā) to arouse the conventional meaning.

(1) Bhāvakatva, the power, which frees the presented, the aesthetic
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Object, from all relations, in which a similar object in ordinary life stands, and so universalizes it. (2) Bhogakatva, the power which throws the two qualities of the perciptent of the aesthetic object, namely, rajas and tamas, into the background and brings sattva to the forefront.

And when the question “How is the universalized subject related to the universalized aesthetic object?” is raised, he answers it by postulating a new cognitive activity technically called “bhoga.” His view may be stated as follows:

At the aesthetic level rajas does not function, because the presented is universalized and, therefore, is incapable of arousing any desire and consequent psycho-physical reaction. Rajas is relegated to the background; sattva predominates; and consequently tamas is ineffective. Hence there arises a state of simple awareness of the presented, which is akin to the mystic experience of the Brahman in so far as it is a conscious state but free from all volitional, psychological and physical activities. It is, however, different from the mystic experience of Brahman, because it is a limited experience, though without the consciousness of limitation at the time when it takes place; because the universalized aesthetic object still affects the universalized subject. Aesthetic experience, according to Bhaṭṭa-Nāyaka, is the experience of the universalized aesthetic object by the universalized subject in the state of perfect bliss (ānanda), due to the predominance of sattva. The view that aesthetic experience is akin to mystic experience is held by Plotinus in the West.

This view is not sound, because it is based upon mere assumptions of the powers of the poetic language and a spatial cognitive activity and because it brings in the contrary conceptions to explain the experience. For, bhoga, according to the Sāmkhya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Yoga, involves the limited subject-object relation. But “ānanda” is not possible so long as the subject-object relation persists.

Kāśmīra Śaiva Aesthetics

Abhinavagupta approached the problem from the point of view of the monistic Śaiva Philosophy of Kāśmīra. He admitted that the aesthetic experience at the highest level is the experience of ānanda; but pointed out that ānanda is not a mere predominance of sattva, nor is it at the level at which the universalized object stands against the universalized subject. He distinguished the transcendental level, the level of ānanda, from the kathartic level of sādhāraṇābhava. He showed that it is the dramatic technique, which is responsible for the universalization of the subjective and the objective aspects of the aesthetic experience at the kathartic level and that the assumption of the powers of the poetic language and of a special cognitive activity is unnecessary. He held that aesthetic experi-
ence is not pure emotive experience, i.e. the experience of a basic emotion in isolation from the situation, the mimetic changes and the transient emotions, as Śrīsaṅkukka held, but that it is the experience of rasa, in which the aforesaid unify in the manner of the ingredients of pānaka-rasa. He shows psychologically that aesthetic object is not an imitation, nor does it create illusion, nor is it a reflection (prati-bimba) nor is it a representation of any of the constituents of aesthetic configuration. He asserted that it is unworldly or transcendent (a-laukika). He recognized that the aesthetic personality is distinct from the empirical and that it is constituted by (1) taste (rasikatva), (2) aesthetic susceptibility (saṁśaya-yatva), (3) power of visualization (pratibhā), (4) intellectual culture (kāvyānuśīlana), (5) contemplative habit (bhāvanā) and (6) capacity for identifying (or losing) oneself (tanmayābhavana-yogyatā). He psychologically explained how we rise from the empirical level to different aesthetic levels such as those of (a) sense, (b) imagination, (c) emotion, (d) katharsis and (e) transcendency, as follows:

AESTHETIC ATTITUDE

The mental process involved in the rise of aesthetic experience from a dramatic presentation, begins with the rise of the attitude of play at the time of determination to go to theatre. This attitude differs from practical attitude in ordinary life inasmuch as it is marked by total absence of expectation of being called upon to act in reality. It consists in the expectancy of a short life in an ideal world of beautiful sights and sounds. It is responsible for fixing the attention as soon as the nāṇḍi, the introductory prayer scene, begins.

Soon after nāṇḍi the stage manager comes, announces the play that is going to be staged, introduces dance and music to bring about a state of self-forgetfulness in the spectator and retires announcing the arrival of the hero or some other important character. That music brings about self-forgetfulness is the view of Kālidāsa, expressed in his Abhijñāna-Sākuntalam.

The psychic effect of such an introductory scene is obvious. It determines the attitude of the spectator. The determination consists in (1) the supervention of the basic mental attitude, with which he is to face the entire presentation, (2) tendency to identify himself with the focus of the situation and to perceive the presented through the eyes and ears of the latter.

PROCESS OF IDENTIFICATION

The presentation of the plot begins, when the aesthete is self-forgetful. Therefore, when the hero appears in an extremely interesting situation
with his artistic look and the psychic state, as indicated by gestures and grimaces, no element of actor's personality is distinctly cognizable. The spectator cannot recognize the actor in the presented figure. The figure to all intents and purposes is an historical figure. But the time and some other factors do not permit the recognition of the historic person in him. The presentation is thus made up of the conflicting elements.

What happens then is this: The mind by its nature is so constituted that once it is drawn to a situation and feels pleasure in it, it ignores all that is dull and conflicting in it. Hence at the presentation of an aesthetic situation, the mind, because of the aesthetic attitude of the spectator, rejects all that is conflicting in the presentation and retains the rest. Thus the three conflicting elements in the presented, the time, the place and the person are inhibited and the rest affects the consciousness of the audience.

Thus the self-forgetful self on the subjective side and the psycho-physical conditions on the objective side united together bring about a state which is known as the state of identification, technically called "tādātmya."

FROM IDENTIFICATION TO IMAGINATION

As a rule, the appearance of the hero on the stage is never without a well-defined purpose. As every purpose has an objective reference, it naturally involves a certain psycho-physical attitude. When, therefore, the spectator, identified with hero, faces a situation, the disposition comes to the forefront and the following constituents of the aesthetic personality are evoked:

1. *Taste* not only keeps the attention fixed on the presented, but also does not allow any idea that might arouse the consciousness of individuality in the spectator to come to the forefront.

2. The *power of visualization* (i) partly removes the shifting opaque barrier that divides the *unconscious* from the conscious; (ii) unites the given with what is exposed from behind the barrier and (iii) puts the image so formed against the *intellectual background* and so constructs the world of imagination.

FROM IMAGINATION TO EMOTION

When the aesthete is in the world of imagination that he has built up with his power of visualization and intellectual background, another subjective power, the aesthetic (heart or) susceptibility (*sahṛdayatvā*) is evoked and requisitioned. Its harmonious working and arrangement with other subjective constituents leads to the formation of complete aesthetic image. Appropriate responses follow and the emotive level is reached.
FROM EMOTION TO KATHARSIS

For a summary view of the kathartic level the reader may refer to the section "Aesthetic experience in the light of Abhasa-vada" in the chapter on "Kāśmīra Śaivaism."

FROM KATHARSIS TO TRANSCENDENCY

Jagannātha in his Rasa-gaṅgādhara attributes a view of aesthetic experience to Abhinavagupta and points out how his own differs from that. Abhinava is said to have maintained that aesthetic experience is the experience of a basic mental state such as rati (amour or love), with the universalized self, the cit, freed from all obscuring limitations, as its attribute. Pointing out his difference, he asserts that in aesthetic experience the self does not shine as the attribute of the basic mental state: on the contrary, it shines as the substantive of which the sthāyin (the basic and abiding state) is an attribute.

But such a view does not seem to have been held by Abhinavagupta. For he definitely asserts that the substance-attribute relation cannot be talked of in reference to the Self, because the Self is neither objective nor external. There is nothing which can be put on a par with it: and the relation of substance and attribute can exist between such things only as are on a par. Therefore it is wrong to talk of the Self as the attribute of the basic mental state, because the latter is not on a par with the former.

Abhinavagupta states his view, clearly asserting it as his own (asman-mate tu samvedanam eva'nanda-ghanam āsvādyate). He holds that the aesthetic experience at the highest level is the experience of the Self itself as pure bliss. At this level the duality of subject and object disappears through intense introversion and the basic mental state sinks back into the subconscious because it is utterly disregarded. He admits that at the kathartic level, the universalized "this" shines against the universalized "I" but asserts that the relation between them is similar to that in which they appear at the level of Īśvara, the fourth category of Kāśmīra Śaivaism (q.v.).

POETRY

Although dramaturgists looked upon poetry as only a hand-maid to drama, yet poeticians assert that it has an independent status. There are many Schools of poetics. But their difference generally refers to the problem "What is the soul of poetry," a problem which both Kant and Hegel have attempted in reference to art. If we survey the history of
poetics we find that the conception of poetry evolved slowly, till in the final stage, *rasa*, which was established to be the soul of drama by Bharata, is accepted to be the soul of poetry. The poeticians differed from the dramaturgists not only in regard to the essence of poetry but also in respect of the experience that it arouses. For instance, Bhāmaha uses the word *priti* (pleasure) and not *rasāsvāda* for the poetic experience. He holds that *vakrokti*, embellishment in general, which consists in the striking manner of presenting a striking idea in equally striking words, is the essence of poetry.

Daṇḍin represents a more advanced School of literary criticism. His study of regional poetry was deeper. He established the distinction between two styles, (1) *Vaidartha* and (2) Gaudīya, through analytical study. He came under the influence of Bharata, accepted all the ten poetic qualities (*gunaś*) and represented them to be the very life of *Vaidarbhī* style. From his conception of the poetic quality sweetness (*mādhurya*), he seems to have discovered *rasa* to be an important element in all poetic presentations.

Vāmana was most interested in *riti*, the style or mode of linguistic presentation, characterized by the possession of ten poetic qualities, *ojas* (powerfulness), *prasāda* (clearness), *kānti* (brilliance), etc. He held that *riti* is the very soul of poetry.

Udbhata's view on what a poetic composition should be, marks the last stage in the conflict of the poetic and the dramatic ideals. His special contribution is the conception of *vṛtti*. He discovered that the sound value of the letters of words, used for the presentation of an idea, is very important in arousing the desired reaction. He divided the ideas into (1) exciting (*dīpta*), (2) charming (*masrṇa*) and (3) middling or moderate (*madhyama*). He made a similar division of the sounds of letters and held that the abundance of a particular type of sound is very important for the presentation of a particular type of idea. Ānandavardhana made an original contribution to poetics by putting forward his theory of the suggested meaning (*dhvani*). Abhinavagupta psychologically explained its distinction from other meanings, conventional, secondary and contextual. Mahima-Bhāṭṭa attempted to demolish *dhvani*; but his criticism has been satisfactorily answered by Ruṣyaka.

**ART OF MUSIC (SANGITA-KALĀ)**

The tradition of the art of music in India goes back to the *Sāma-Veda*. The system of music, expounded by Bharata in his *Nātya-śāstra* evolved out of the *Sāma-Veda*. It is the earliest system of the classical music, the record of which is available and the main principles of which are followed, with necessary modifications, down to the present day. The appeal of
music is recognized by Śāṅgīadeva (A.D. 1210) in his Saṅgīta-ratnākara and Nārada in his Saṅgīta-makaranda to be wider than that of any other fine art. Śiva, Brahmā, Kṛṣṇa, Sarasvatī and Nārada are well-known deities who are lovers of music. It appeals even to the child in cradle. Even deers and snakes are charmed by it.

HARMONY OF SVARAS IS THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF MUSIC

Svara (note or musical sound) is so called because it is pleasant in itself to the mind of the hearer. But gīta, though a combination of notes (svaras), is not necessarily so. The jar, that is often felt in it, is recognized to be due to the presence of a discordant note or a note (svara) that does not perfectly harmonize with the rest of the group. Hence the principle of harmony of svaras is accepted to be the most important. Music idealizes the sensible. It represents in tone, not the material extension, but only the movement and quivering of the inner parts of the material body. It suggests rasa through svaras and rāgas (tunes). In both, music and poetry, sound represents a spiritual content. In poetry the sound is a mere sign of an idea and does not form a content of poetry. In music, however, the sound is not a mere sign of an idea, feeling or emotion, but an independent medium. Hence the modes of tone, as artistically developed, become its fundamental aim and object. In music, the tone, though it has for its content the inward life, yet it is not completely cut off from the content. The tone penetrates consciousness and together with a feeling or emotion, that is its content, constitutes the objective aspect of experience at the emotive level.

NĀDA-BRAHMA-VĀDA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC

The Philosophy of music, because the art, the philosophy of which it presents, is concerned with sound, adopts the Sabda-Brahman (word-Absolute) of the philosophy of grammar under the name nāda-Brahman. It follows the School of Bhartrhari, who did not recognize the distinction between parā and paśyanti. It draws a distinction between nāda and nāda-Brahman, similar to the one that Bhartrhari drew between paśyanti and madhyamā. It recognizes nāda, which is in the heart and of which śrūtis are the manifestations, to be nothing but a manifestation of the nāda-Brahman. This nāda is very much like the sphoṭa of the philosophy of grammar and is related to nāda-Brahman exactly as sphoṭa is related to sabda-Brahman. Thus, nāda is the sphoṭa, which becomes manifest in the madhyamā-stage, just as the fire, which is potentially in a match-stick,
is the cause of perceptible flame; so nāda, which is in the cavity of heart and as such is grasped by buddhi only, is the cause of various śrutiś, when it is assisted by the activity of the nerves (nādis) and other speech organs. Śrutiś are nāda actualized. The relation between śruti and nāda is that of the actual with the potential.

It recognizes music to be the pleasant means to the realization of the Ultimate. Śrutiś, which are immediate expressions of nāda, naturally lead to the apprehension of it. And because nāda is related to the Ultimate exactly as the rays are to a gem, therefore, just as an approach to the rays of a gem leads to the attainment of the gem itself, so the apprehension of nāda leads to the realization of the Ultimate.

It was influenced by the system of the Yoga, which admitted the concentration on the anāhata-nāda (the perpetual sound in the heart, which is not the object of empirical cognition but which a yogin can grasp in introspective concentration; the sound that is not due to a stroke that the vital air gives to the fire that is in the centre of human organism) to be a means to the realization of the Ultimate. It asserts that this way to liberation is difficult. It needs the practice of yoga. The anāhata-nāda is not pleasant or beautiful. But the āhata-nāda (the sound which is due to a stroke, which is a product of will) can be pleasantly grasped through its expressions in śrutiś. It admits the ten cakras (centres) in human organism, as presented in the system of yoga, and holds that perfection in the performance of music can be attained through concentration of vital air in some parts of the sudhādhāra and the visuddhi cakras.

The Philosophy of music holds that music presents the Absolute, nāda-Brahman, in the sensuous medium of musical sounds (cf. Hegel). Music is beautiful because in it the Absolute shines through the pleasant sound. It addresses itself to both the sense of hearing and the mind. For a mere sensuous object is not beautiful. It is beautiful only when the mind sees the Absolute shine through it. The aesthetic experience that arises from the apprehension of the Absolute in the guise of gīta or saṅgīta, is characterized by complete identity between the subject and the object. In it the mind contemplates itself in its freedom and as such is infinite and attains the stage of the Absolute. It is characterized by immediacy.

ARCHITECTURE (VĀSTU-ŚĀSTRA)

Vāstu-śāstra is concerned primarily with the technique of planning and building cities, towns, villages, palaces, halls, temples and houses. It deals with the technique of sculpture (mīrī) and painting (citra) also from the point of view of decoration. It narrates the functions of various kinds of machines, such as (1) wooden aeroplane (ākāśa-gāmi-dāiramaya-vimāna-yantra) and (2) door-keeper machine (dvāra-pāla-yantra). But the methods
of constructing them are not given; not because they were not known, but because they had to be kept secret. The archaeological discoveries at Harappa and Mohenjo Daro have proved beyond doubt that the architectural tradition in India goes back to 3000 B.C.

Architecture is an external art, because its products stand in an external relation to the spiritual idea; they do not embody the idea. While painting and sculpture present the spiritual idea in terms of the immediate expressions of it, architecture presents the situation (vibhāva) only.

**VĀSTU-BRAHMA-VĀDA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARCHITECTURE**

Vāstu-Brahman is the metaphysical Reality, as it is conceived in the context of the architecture. It creates not only all that is recognized to be the evolute of prakṛti, but also the organic bodies. As the creator of the organic bodies, it is personified and from the various aspects of the personality different organic bodies are said to have sprung. In the context of the technique of architecture, this Reality is conceived as cosmic personality (vāstu-puruṣa). It is the cosmic order which a product of architecture represents. It represents the fundamental principle of architecture, the principle of organic order, harmony and proportion. Architecture presents the ideal. It represents heaven on earth and therefore arouses wonder (vismaya) and leads to the aesthetic experience technically called "adbhuta."

**ICONOGRAPHY (MŪRTI-KALĀ)**

Iconography sensibly presents a spiritual context in the medium of marble, clay, gem, gold or any other metal. In India it has been occupied mainly with the presentation of religious ideas. A statue manifests a religious idea to the devotee, who contemplates on it, exactly as the hero of a dream manifests an aesthetic configuration, a rasa, to an aesthetic contemplator. It brings the object of devotion as if it were face to face with the devotee. It is only a means to the visualization of the spiritual idea. It is a sign which leads to the rise of the signified in the consciousness, not as a fact of memory, but as something which is grasped immediately (sannidhikaram).  

**PAINTING**

Painting is limited by the dimension of surface only. It particularizes the visible by differentiation into the visibility of colour. Whatever surges in the human heart, a feeling or a representation of a purpose, may
be taken as the subject of painting. But it presents just a moment of inner life as it expresses itself in the physical changes. But drama presents it in all its important phases in proper setting by means of acting of four types. The works, therefore, dealing with painting, follow Bharata and say almost the same as had been said by Bharata in dealing with āngikābhiniyā, the presentation of the inner state in terms of gesture and grimaces. They particularly talk of the aesthetic configurations (rasas) in terms of their presentation in the expressions of the eyes “rasa-drṣṭi.” That the views of Bharata on āngikābhiniyā were followed in painting is illustrated by a dancing girl, as painted in Ajantā cave, the head and the neck of which are recognized to represent Bharata’s ideas of them in acting.

NOTES

2. ibid., 77.
6. ibid., Vol. II, 266.

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CHAPTER XVIII

GROWTH OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT IN INDIA

With the death of Harṣa an era in the cultural history of India closed and India of the Imperial Guptas gave place to the India of political particularism. In the north the period of the next three hundred years was marked by the establishment of independent principalities which under ambitious dynasts waged interminable wars against one another. Most of these rulers were petty chiefs of Rajput clans which represented the introduction of a new element in the Indian polity. Under them the old social system underwent a marked change which entailed modifications in the ancient forms of worship and ritual, law and custom, language and art.

The Deccan and the South, however, had a less turbulent history. Though there were frequent wars, the socio-political system did not undergo such radical changes as the North had witnessed. For nearly five hundred years there was no violent upheaval, and the continuity of culture remained undisturbed.

But after the tenth century in the North and two hundred years later in the South the political scene rapidly changed as a result of the growth of Muslim dominion in India. From now onwards till the end of the eighteenth century the social system, the scheme of life of the individual and the general pattern of culture remained more or less unaltered.

The advent of Islam in the eighth century created a new situation in the country. For although before the coming of the Muslims a number of Central Asian tribes had invaded India, they had been rapidly assimilated into Indian society. The newcomers, however, brought with them not only a highly individualized religion, but unlike their predecessors they also maintained the strongest links with the countries of their origin. The contacts between Indian Muslims and their co-religionists in Western Asia remained intimate and currents of thought and culture flowed uninterruptedly between Islamic countries and India. Language played an important part in keeping the relations alive. For the learned on both sides employed Persian and Arabic as the languages of religion and scholarship.

During the mediaeval period in India as a whole, but more specially in the South, the ancient currents of thought continued in great vigour and Sanskrit language and the knowledge of which it was the vehicle retained their vitality.
Thus two cultural streams continued to flow side by side, but out of the commingling of their waters a new culture appeared. So far as arts and crafts were concerned the union was so complete that few traces of independent cultures remained. In language, literature, science, philosophy and religion there was fusion in varying degrees. The speech of the common people, both Hindu and Muslim, was the same, and both co-operated in the evolution of modern Indian languages and contributed to the development of literatures in them. In philosophical and religious thought there were a number of Schools both among Hindu and Muslim thinkers. Some of them were conservative and attempted to remain true to tradition, some borrowed elements from one another, but others tried to find a synthesis between the two.

The history of mediaeval thought in India is characterized by variety and subtlety, and is concerned with the development of several lines of speculation. Hindu thought mainly based itself on the teaching of the ancient Scriptures and validated itself by an appeal to revealed truth. It minimized its originality, but the system makers in the process of interpretation of their authorities gave rise to different Schools of philosophy.

In India ancient philosophical speculation had taken largely didactic and aphoristic form. The Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad-Gītā and the six Darśanas—the primary sources of mediaeval Hindu thought, are not treatises on philosophy and religion in the ordinary sense. They embody conclusions, but the earlier works, at any rate, hardly explain the logical processes which lead to them. Intuition and insight rather than discursive reason seem to be the instruments of knowledge.

The thinkers of the Middle Ages took these source books as their point of departure. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhva and Vallabha—the great Ācāryas, wrote commentaries on their texts—more especially on the Vedānta-sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, and in explaining the sūtra teachings expounded their special points of view.

The movement of religious thought which the Ācāryas thus inaugurated, culminated in the establishment and propagation of bhakti cult throughout the length and breadth of India. It originated in the South and most of its great leaders belonged to the South. Their appearance at this period and in this region is a remarkable fact. It may be explained partly by the conditions of the state and society which then prevailed, and partly by the natural development of thought. But it has also to be remembered that from the earliest days of Islamic history, that is, the seventh century, Muslims had established contacts with the peoples of India on the southern coast, and had acquired opportunities of playing an important role in the life of these regions.

Whether this coincidence had any influence upon religious developments cannot be established with absolute certainty, but there is much
in the thought of the religious reformers of these times which appears to echo Islamic beliefs and practices.

The contacts established from the early days of Islamic history continued to grow till by the thirteenth century the greater part of India was brought under the sway of Muslim rulers. During these centuries Muslim divines, scholars and Sufis entered India in ever-increasing numbers. They, together with their Indian-born pupils, studied the writings of leading Islamic thinkers and produced treatises and established centres of study and training.

The history of Muslim philosophy in India is continuous with the developments outside, and to assess the contribution of India it is necessary to follow the movement preceding Indian developments. Islamic speculation like Hindu philosophy is rooted in the Scriptures, and the Qur'an is its point of departure. The holy book of Islam is not a philosophical treatise, and although it contains the Muslim creed, the fundamental religious beliefs and basic principles of ethics, law and polity, they are not systematically treated and are expressed in a language which lends itself to different interpretations.

From the earliest times political conflicts, requirements of an expanding empire and the mentality of converts hailing from different races and civilizations led to the rise of sects and Schools among whom debates raged, sometimes accompanied with persecution and bloodshed.

Then again the lands of the early Caliphate were the meeting-place of many ancient civilizations. Western Asia had numerous centres of Jewish, Greek, Hellenistic, Roman and Christian cultures, and similarly the Eastern regions were the homes of Persian, Buddhist and Hindu cultures. It was inevitable that Muslim speculation should have been influenced by the thought of Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus and Philo, Zoroaster and Mani, and Mahāyāna and Vedānta.

The essential teaching of the Qur'an is simple. Its central doctrines are the Unity of Godhead, complete dependence of man on God, and the necessity of prophethood. But each one of these bristles with difficulties. The companions of the Prophet (Sahābā) were so near to the Messenger and his message that they refused to apply reason to the revelation. But among the followers (Tabi'ūn) questionings arose, and people began to enquire into the nature of God and His relation with man. Is the word of the Qur'an eternal and merely its writing in time? Is the Will of man free, in choice as well as in action? What is good and what is evil and how and why do they involve reward and punishment?

The problem of free Will gave rise to two opposite sects of thinkers, the Predestinarians (Jabriya) and the Libertarian (Qadarīya). Those who maintained freedom of Will evolved into a new sect who called themselves "People of divine unity and divine justice (Ahl al-Tahrīd wa'l-Adl)" but are better known as M'utazila (Seceders). According to
them God's justice demanded that human beings should enjoy freedom of volition and of action. But soon deeper issues of theology arose. If God is just, then is justice an attribute apart from His essence? If attributes are eternal and possess an independent being then the unity of Godhead is surrendered, but the M'utazalites were uncompromising upholders of unity, and therefore they held that God's essence alone could be eternal and attributes merely modes of His essence. Then again the rigorous application of the idea of unity leads to the conclusion that the Qurān cannot be regarded as eternal. For if it was so, there will be duality of uncreated beings.

The M'utazila movement was an attempt to prove that the teachings of the Qurān were in conformity with the dictates of reason. It began with Wāsil bin 'Atā who led an attack against the dualist doctrines of Manichaean origin. It is also stated that Wāsil and his friends held discussions with the Sumanias (Buddhists). Some of the Abbaside Caliphs were supporters of the movement and Māmūn (A.D. 813–33) persecuted those who opposed their doctrines. But with the decline of Abbaside power the movement gradually lost its momentum.

The M'utazilites, however, gave an impetus to thought and three distinct lines of speculation stemmed from them. The Mutakallamūn (scholastics, dogmatists) who endeavoured to justify religious dogmas by the use of reasoning, the Falāsifūn or Hukamā (philosophers) who interested themselves in the problems of philosophy and who were much influenced by Greek thought, and the Sufis (mystics) who sought to call people to the religion of the spirit, to march along the path whose goal was the realization of God.

All classes of thinkers were concerned with philosophy as instrument or end, and all of them helped in the development of philosophical speculation. Each class produced a number of eminent thinkers. Disagreements among them stimulated discussion and emergence of new schools of thought.

The writers on 'Ilm-i-Kalām (scholasticism)—like mediaeval thinkers in Europe, were concerned with finding philosophical support for religious dogmas. Among them the M'utazilites belonged to the earlier times and the 'Asharites to a later age. The M'utazila thinkers, as stated above, were unitarians par excellence. But apart from the theological questions regarding the essence and attributes of God which led them to touch "the outer fringe of later pantheism," they prepared the way for the mitigation of the rigid externality of an absolute law in favour of internal discipline and order.

In discussing the nature of God, it was inevitable that they should come face to face with the metaphysical problem of the nature of the universe, its origin and existence. It was obvious that they should hold that the Universe was the creation of God and that matter was endowed with
existence by God and therefore neither the universe nor matter was eternal. In fact, substance (jaujjar), was merely a collection of qualities (’arz) and the universe was composed of an infinite number of elementary substances or atoms (jauhar-ul fard).

Later Kalâm, which is a reaction against the rationalism of M’utazilites, grew out of these discussions. Among its expounders the most important was Ash’ari (b. A.D. 873) who attempted to find a justification for dogma, not through reason alone, which ended in subordinating religion to philosophy, but through religious experience, revelation and faith. They tried to adopt a middle course between traditionalists (’Ulmā-i-Naqīl) and rationalists (’Ulmā-i-’Aql). The M’utazilites had denied the doctrine of eternity of attributes of God, for according to them the attributes were integral to His essence; the Ash’arites affirmed it. On the question of free will they held that although power of choice and origination of action are pre-arranged by God, man can acquire (kasb) ability to complete an action. Regarding the nature of God their view was that God is the ultimate necessary existence, whose existence (wuqūd) and essence (māhiyat) are identical and who carries the attributes in His own being. The universe is contingent (mumkin), as substance and quality are both contingent. Qualities are merely subjective relations, and as no substance can exist apart from qualities, the universe of things is a system of appearances, “a mere show of ordered subjectivities.” Substances with their accidents constitute indivisible elements or atoms, which are continuously created and destroyed by the Will of God. Each atom is simple in its nature, possesses neither extent nor quantity, and is inseparable from its accidents. But the accidents are mere potentialities, and creation is their actualization. Thus the atoms are in perpetual flux, subsisting only by divine will. Bodies are aggregates of atoms. Space and time too are atomic, for space is a multitude of particles separated by void (Khālā), and time is the chain of infinitely short instants separated by temporal voids. All physical and mental phenomena are products of atoms and voids acting in space and time.

The atomic view of the universe was a necessary consequence of the Qur’ānic concept of God. For if God is all, and apart from Him there is nought, then His will must be absolutely free, unaffected by any laws or necessities. Everything is possible to Him. He creates the world out of nothing. All change and movement are from Him, and there is no such thing as natural causation. There is no law; and every phenomenon is a miracle. The order of nature is an illusion.

Ash’arite Kalâm was developed by Bāqillānī (d. A.D. 1013), Fakhruddin Rāzī (d. A.D. 1222), Saifuddin Āmadi (d. A.D. 1233) and others. Māturīdī (d. A.D. 944), a contemporary of Ash’ari, the founder of Hanafite Kalâm differed on many matters from Ash’ari. Later Ibn Taimiyya (d. A.D. 1328) attacked Ash’ari dogmatics and expounded his own scholastic system. Ibn
Taimiya was an enemy of innovations (bid‘a), a literalist who relied upon the literal meaning of the Qurān and Hadīth, an anthropomorphist (mutashabbiha), who believed that God’s attributes were just like those of men, and a polemical writer who vigorously criticized all other sects. His ideas raised fierce controversies, but his influence spread far and wide, including India.

The second class of thinkers known as Hukamā or Falāsifā were primarily interested in science and philosophy, although it cannot be repeated too often that the distinction between philosophy and theology which the modern thinkers make, is scarcely relevant to Islamic thought. As in the case of Kalām the study of science and philosophy began with the Arabs in practical needs. The Arab conquests brought Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Egypt under their dominion. But the Arabs were not keen on bringing the communities living in these regions into the fold of Islam. In course of time large numbers of them accepted Islam in order to escape the poll-tax. Their conversion resulted in controversies and polemics between the defenders of the various faiths. The converts who came from older civilizations read into the new faith ideas which they had brought from their alien environment.

In order to meet the arguments of their opponents and to still the questionings of the converts it became necessary to borrow the dialectic methods used by the opposite parties, and their philosophical conceptions. The M‘utazila speculations had begun in an atmosphere charged with Greek, Persian and Indian thought and their leaders Mu‘ammar (c. A.D. 850), Nazzam (c. A.D. 845) and Abu Hashim (d. A.D. 933) constructed mixed systems.

The translations of Indian, Greek and Syrian books into Arabic gave a further impetus to speculation. The Abbaside Caliphs were patrons of learning and were solicitous of finding support for the rationalism which they had adopted. Māmūn collected scholars round him and established a House of Wisdom (Bait-ul-Hikmat) for discussion, translation and compilation.

Among the Greek translators were Hunain (A.D. 809–73) and his son Ishaq (A.D. 870–910) who rendered Aristotle and Plato into Arabic. Other translated books were: Commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias and of Porphyry and parts of the Enneads of Plotinus. Al-Kindī (died c. A.D. 873), Fārābī (d. A.D. 950), the Ikhwān-al-Safā (the brothers of purity, c. A.D. 970), Ibn Maskawaib (d. A.D. 1030), and Ibn Sīna (d. A.D. 1037), were great names in the growth of Muslim Philosophy in the East.

While it is true that the Arab philosophers were much influenced by the Greeks, it is a mistake not to acknowledge their indebtedness to India, and futile to ignore their originality. Indeed, they regarded themselves as pupils of Aristotle, although their knowledge of his works was limited, and in some respects incorrect and they ascribed
to him some of the ideas which really belonged to the neo-Platonists. Curiously they knew Plato's *Republic* but were ignorant of Aristotle's *Politics*.

Without entering into a detailed examination of each Arab philosopher, some of their important ideas may be noted. From Al-Kindi onwards the two branches of philosophy in which they were interested were metaphysics and psychology. In both their chief object was to fit into the severely monotheistic framework of Islam the conceptions derived from Greek and other philosophies.

In metaphysics the problem of one and many mainly occupied the attention of the Muslim philosophers. The *Qurân* teaches that God is one. He is Great and Powerful, Creator of the Universe, Master of the Sky and Earth, all nature obeys His orders, He is the First, the Last, the Apparent and the Hidden. He is the unique reality, beyond imagination and thought. What is the meaning and status of these attributes? One School had held that these were identical with the human qualities, they were anthropomorphists (*mushabbiha*). Another School maintained that God possessed positive and negative qualities, but His qualities were entirely different from those of human beings; these were the orthodox theologians (Sifâtiya, Mutakallamîn). The M'utazilites rejected the attributes in order to maintain the purity of divine unity. They were the liberal deniers (mu'attila). The philosophers belonged to the third category. For them, God is the necessary being, the first being and the source of all other beings. He exists and exists without cause. His existence is immaterial and without form. His existence is His essence. He is unique and perfect—perfect in greatness, in beauty and in essence. He is indefinable and simple.

God has no attributes beyond His essence. He is intelligent, intelligence and intelligible. His intelligence requires no intelligible beyond Himself. He is knowledge, and He needs no external object to know. He knows because He is knowing, knowledge is His essence. He is Truth, Life and infinite joy. God is Love.

The *Qurân* has designated God by many names. There are ninety-nine of these beautiful names. According to the philosophers these names do not imply either that His nature is composite or that there are any attributes apart from His essence. Unity and simpleness are the essentials of divine nature.

But if the reality is One, what is the explanation of the multiplicity of the universe? How did the One become many? If God is thought, who thinks of nothing but Himself, or is unmoved mover, then what moves Him out of His absolute solitude? Why does the Creator create?

The answer of the Muslim philosophers is that creation, the universe of multiplicity, is the grace (*fa'îz*) of God. It is through His divine grace that He enters into creation. His eternal knowledge is the creative cause
of all existence, other than Him. His ideas are His acts. His knowledge of order of nature is the cause of that order.

Two fundamental principles apply to this process of emanation. In the first place, from a perfectly unique being not more than one being can proceed. Secondly, being has two aspects—it is either necessary (wājib) or possible (mumkin), it is either essence ('āin) or existence (wujūd). In the case of God alone are essence and existence found together, in all other beings essence is separate from existence, from which it follows that all real beings are possible by their essence, and they become necessary by the act of the Creator. Thus in all beings there is a duality.

The first emanation from the necessary Being is numerically one, it is the first intelligence. In one aspect its existence is possible in itself and necessary through the first Being; in the other aspect it knows its own essence as well as the essence of the first Being. It has a two-fold existence—possible and necessary and is thus the spring of multiplicity. The first intelligence has three kinds of Knowledge—of the first Being, of its own essence in so far as it is necessary, and of its possible being, and therefore from the first intellect emanate three beings: the second intelligence, the first soul and the first sphere of the stars. From the second intelligence emanates another intelligence, a second heavenly sphere and its soul. Thus the emanations proceed till the last or the tenth intelligence appears and with it the ninth sphere of the moon and its soul. The last is the cause of the existence of human souls, and of the four elements from which all creatures are made.

The emanation of ten intelligences constitutes a hierarchy. The first intelligence is nearest the first Being and has the highest place, it is superior to all others. It is farthest removed from matter which comes last in the scheme of the concentric spheres. The earth is the centre of the system and is immobile. Eight planetary spheres rotate round the earth, and beyond the ninth sphere is the empyrean or the great sphere of the fixed stars. The spheres move eternally in circles. The soul of the sphere moves the sphere, but the soul derives its power to do so from the intelligence which belongs to the sphere. The first Being is the ultimate mover of all the spheres because all the ten Intelligences incline towards Him, from whom they receive their form and their perfection. So the universe is moved by the attraction which the Intelligences have for the first Being.

Love of God is the *primum mobile* of the universe.

The tenth Intelligence which is the mover of the lowest sphere does not play any role in the movement of the heavenly spheres. This Intelligence acts in our world. It produces the first matter (*hayūla*) which is passive, and which receives forms which are derived from the Intelligences—celestial and terrestrial. The first matter is the basis of the four elements whose composition and decomposition is the source of generation and of corruption of all bodies. But all these
transformations follow the regular order of the movement of the spheres and of divine law.

The regularity of the natural order implies that the course of things is predetermined. What appears indeterminate to us is so because we do not know the causes, some of which are immediate and others remote.

The tenth Intelligence or the active Intelligence ('aql fa'āl) is the dispenser of forms (wāhib ul Swar). It gives to each body a soul when it is ready to receive it, as it furnishes to each matter its proper form. The soul is a simple, incorporeal substance, and apprehends the intelligible forms. It is unique, incorruptible and immortal. It constitutes the entire reality of a human being. It survives after the death of the body and experiences, sorrow or happiness in different degrees.

The soul has a number of functions or states or faculties (quwaa). The active Intelligence is the spiritual principle of the soul, its divine aspect. It illuminates and activates the human intellect. It is like the sun to the eye whose vision remains potential. When the light of the sun spreads, the visual sense of the eye which was potential becomes actual. The active Intelligence is to human intellect as the form is to the body.

The human intellect is a hierarchy of three parts. The lowest part is the vegetative soul whose functions are assimilation, growth and reproduction; higher is the animal soul which has two aspects—perceptive and motive. The perceptive part has five external and five internal senses (sensation, perception, conception, imagination and memory); highest is the rational soul which has a practical and theoretical part. To the practical aspect belong the affective states—pleasure, pain, laughter, etc. The theoretical is divided into four stages: (i) potential intellect ('aqli-hay'ulānī), the intellectual capacity in man for understanding; (ii) habitual intellect ('aql bi l-malaka), the intellect trained in the principles of knowledge; (iii) active intellect ('aql bi l-f'īl), the intellect exercised upon intelligibles; and (iv) acquired intellect ('aql mustafād), the intellect which is a gift from the "dispenser of forms," the Active Intelligence ('aql fa'āl).

The four stages of human intellect or soul form an ascending series of matter and form. The potential intellect receives from the outer world sensible data, the habitual and active intellects derive from the data of sense the actual intelligibles, then what existed potentially in objects as forms separated from matter becomes actual in intellect, becomes part of thought as apprehended by intellect. The pure intelligibles, however, were potentially existent in material objects, the acquired Intellect seize by intuition their abstract forms which have no relation with sense data. The evolution of the human intellect which appertains to the human body is made possible by the active Intelligence which is pure spirit.

The third line of speculation originated in mystic circles. The beginnings of this line of thought may be traced to the Qurān which has a number of
verses whose import is mystical. But the earliest groups of Muslims who were inclined towards mysticism were ascetically-minded men who desired to turn away from worldly distractions in order to devote themselves wholly to contemplation and worship. They were swayed by powerful religious emotion and they laid more emphasis on inner discipline and purity rather than on conformity with religious injunctions and performance of religious rites. Nor were they satisfied merely with philosophical arguments which might appeal to the intellect but failed to quench their thirst for spiritual certainty.

Among such were some of the companions of the Prophet (zuhhād) who were known by various epithets—ascetics (zuhhād), preachers (gussās), penitents (bakkānīn), pietists (nussāk). They lived in isolation practising self-mortification and meditation. They had a lively consciousness of sin and a terrible dread of divine retribution, both communicated by the ardent teachings of the Prophet who was a great Warner. Then about the end of the eighth century the name Sufi began to be used. The early Sufis strictly adhered to what was commanded (amr) and forbidden (nahi) by Islam, but their ideal of life was renunciation, self-abnegation and poverty. They engaged in acts of supererogation, in fasting and in communion with God (dhikr). They believed in the attainment of the vision of God, union with the Divine, by following the mystic Path (tarīqa).

For the Sufis spiritual life became a journey (safar) along the road (tarīqa, suluk) which led to the goal or union with God. The journey has many stages and each stage (māqam) has its corresponding state (ḥāl)—achievement of certain virtues. For the traveller along the road there is a definite course of discipline which the adepts know. This Knowledge (mʿarifat) however, is different from the ordinary Knowledge (ilm), for this is wisdom of the heart (ʿilm ul Qulāb), as the other one is the product of intellectual processes, and no one can acquire it without the special signs (fawāid) of the grace of God (faiz). The object of the Knowledge is the attainment of cosmic consciousness, beatific vision, absorption in ecstatic union with the Truth.

The early Sufis gradually introduced these concepts with their teachings, e.g. Dḥul Nūn Miṣrī, the idea of Mʿarifat; Bayazīd Bistāmī of Fānā; Kharrāz of ‘Ain ul-jamʿa; Mansūr al-Hallāj of personal deification or divinity of man (anāl Haq).

With Mansūrʾs execution in A.D. 922 the period of systematization began and a number of treatises were written. For example, Kitāb ul Lumʿa by Abu Naṣr ul Sarraj, Kitāb ul Taʿaruf by Kalābādḥī, Qūṭ ul Qulāb by Makkī, Tabaqāt ul-Sulṭāna by Sulamī, Tabaqāt al Āṣāfīa by Isbahānī, Risāla Qushairīya by Qushairī, Kashful Mahjūb by Hujwīrī, etc.

By the end of the twelfth century Tasawwuf had so taken hold of the Muslim mind that almost every School of thought became imbued with it.
and what had been looked at askance in the beginning ended in becoming part of orthodoxy. This result was largely due to Imām Ghazālī (A.D. 1058–1111), who has been regarded as the greatest thinker of Islam, “the proof of Islam” (Hujjat ul Islam). After a profound and extensive study of philosophy he came to the conclusion that it was inadequate and unsatisfactory, and that personal experience, self-illumination and ecstasy alone could remove the doubts which assail the soul and give the assurance and conviction necessary for the proper guidance of life. He aimed at the reconciliation of Islamic teachings with mysticism, and applied rational methods in interpreting the dogmas and doctrines of religion. The basis of his teaching was the distinction between two types of Knowledge—spiritual Knowledge which can be acquired without the mediation of senses provided the mind is properly disciplined, and worldly Knowledge which is founded upon sense data. Spiritual Knowledge or gnosis required that one should obey the injunctions of religious law (shari‘at), follow the path of repentance (tauba), renunciation (fagr), mortification of flesh (tazkiya-i-nafs), trust (tawakkul) and unity (tawḥiḍ), and perform the exercises (dhikr) and meditation (morāqaba) which end in illumination and ecstasy. Thus the entire being of the traveller is transformed, desire and passion are extinguished, consciousness is purged of objects of the world and concentrated upon God, and finally the mystic is blessed with the Beatific vision, so that he passes away (fanā) from the self and abides in (baqā) the Divine Reality.

Ghazālī’s influence was pervasive and permanent. Among philosophers Ibn Tufayl (d. A.D. 1185) was his admirer, but among Sufis some of the great founders of the orders acknowledged him their leader. Abdul Qadir Jillānī (A.D. 1166), the inspirer of the Qādiriya order, Ahmad Al Rifā’i (A.D. 1182), founder of the Rifā’iya, and Shīhāb al Din Suhrwardī (A.D. 1234) of the Suhrwardia followed Ghazālī’s teachings.

Again the greatest Muslim mystic thinker Muḥi al-Dīn Ibn al-‘Arabī (A.D. 1164) came under Ghazālī’s influence. Ibn al-‘Arabī was the mystic philosopher par excellence. With him mystic philosophy attained its zenith. Writers on mysticism who came after him were commentators and expositors, not originators of new systems. He collected the concepts of mystics who went before him and wove them into the pantheistic system which became at once the inspiration of Muslim poetry and of Sufistic teachings. The philosophy of Ibn al-‘Arabī is rooted in the idea of “unity of being” (wahdatul wujūd). According to him all Being is one and an absolute unity. This Absolute Being is unknowable by human intellect, no one except God Himself knows his real transcendent nature or fully comprehends His essential Unity. It is independent of all predication, for in it there is no duality of subject and object. This is called the state of Oneness (ahadīiyah).

This Oneness in so far as it is apprehended by the intellect, gives rise
to the idea of a reality in which transcendence is coupled with immanence. This Reality is known as the absolute being, necessary being, self-begotten, self-caused, etc. (haqq), as contrasted with the contingent created or caused being (khalaq). But haqq (reality, essence, one), and khalq (appearance, form, many), are only two aspects—inward and outward—of the One. Says Ibn al-'Arabi, “If you regard Him through Him, then He regards Himself through Himself, which is the state of unity; but if you regard Him through yourself, then the unity vanishes.” What multiplies the one is the process of predication, the application of categories. In itself the One is simple and indivisible.

But the predicates of the One have to be distinguished from the predicates of the Many, although the two are ultimately and essentially identical. The One transcends all forms, the Many has two aspects—the aspect of unity (jihatul jama') and of difference (jihatul farq). The first is characterized by necessity (wujūb), lordship (rubūbiyyah) and eternity (qidām), the second by contingency (imkān), slavery (ubūdiyyah), and temporallessness (hudūd).

Haqq and Khalq, God and the universe are in essence one, hence they are co-eternal. One is the transcendent and the other immanent aspect of Reality. One does not create the many, creation (takwīn) is merely the manifestation of an already existing being; the eternal existent passes from the state of latency (thubūl) to the state of temporal existence in external appearance (zuhūr). The universe does not acquire existence, it acquires predications (ahkām) of external existence and relations (nisāb).

The universe which is co-eternal with God is not the universe as we know it. The eternal universe is the essence not the form, the latter is originated (hadīth), and is contingent and not-being.

Thus according to Ibn al-'Arabi Reality in relation to our Knowledge has three aspects:

1. Reality as manifested in the external world, and perceived and known to us, as the object of our minds;
2. Reality as an absolute transcendent being of which we can predicate nothing except bare existence;
3. Reality as an inferred existence, apprehended in intuition.

The first is the phenomenal universe, the second, the Absolute Being, and the third God as created in our beliefs. The first and the third are correlative, the two are characterized by attributes, the first by attributes of immanence (ṣifāt al tashbīh), the third by attributes of transcendence (ṣifāt al tansh). In God unity is coupled with multiplicity, unity in plurality, and is the unity of divine names (wāhidīyat).

The second admits of no plurality, its unity (āḥdiyat) is the totality of all potentialities, it is not an object of Knowledge or worship, it is a Blindness ('ama) covering being and not-being. God is the object of belief
on the other hand, is known through our Knowledge of ourselves and is thus created by us. The personal God of ethics and religion is only a mask of the Absolute Reality which stands behind.

Between the phenomenal world and God, many and one, comes the First Particularization (al-ta'ayyun al awwal) of Reality, the self-revelation (tajalli) of God to Himself. God sees Himself in an infinity of forms, states latent in His mind and essence—intelligible ideas and particular modes ('ayān al thābita). These fixed prototypes or latent states are merely potential beings, they have no external existence.

But the One reveals himself not only through the 'Ayān al Thābita, He manifests Himself as the universal consciousness, the First Intellect, which is the Reality of Realities (baqīqat ul haqāiq), and as the phenomenal world, as universal body (al jism al kullī) and as Prime Matter (hayūla). The phenomenal world is ever changing, it is an infinite series of individuations constituting an eternal and everlasting revelation (tajalli).

The universe, however, is a body without soul, an unpolished mirror. God willed the polishing of this mirror, so that the essences ('ayān) of His names (attributes) should be seen. Then appeared a microcosmic being (kawn jāmī') through which the inmost consciousness (sīr) of God becomes manifested to Him. This being is man (insān), vicegerent (Khalīfa), the originated in body, the eternal in spirit.

Ibn al-'Arabī calls the universal consciousness, the first intellect, the reality of realities, the spirit of Muhammad (haqīqat al-Muhammadiyya), which finds its fullest manifestation in the Perfect Man (insan-i-Kāmil), and which reveals itself in all prophets and saints. It is the indwelling spirit which transmits all divine Knowledge to those who possess it, and it is the Holy Spirit (rūh) and creative activity of God which maintains and guides the Universe.

The universal consciousness or reason manifests itself in its modes, namely, particular souls. The universal soul is conscious of itself as a whole and is therefore conscious of its modes, the modes or particular souls are not conscious of the whole, although they may be conscious of themselves individually. The particular soul or man has three elements—body, soul, spirit. The human body is a particular mode of the Universal Body (al jism al Kullī), the human soul is the vital principle which is a mode of the Universal Soul (al nafs al Kullīyāh), and the human spirit is the mode of universal reason (al 'aql al Kullī).

From the One (ahdīyat) which is utterly absolute to Man there is a continuous evolution in the self-revelation of Reality which passes through a number of stages. In man, spirit and matter, real and possible, inward and outward, meet. The stages by which the One manifests itself in the many are, however, of a logical character, man in order to realize his oneness with Reality has to follow the reverse journey, retraversing all the stages
GROWTH OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT IN INDIA

which the Absolute undergoes in His descent to our Knowledge. Ibn al-'Arabi counts seven such stages in the "Gnostic Involution," by which man realizes his essential unity with God. His realization proceeds from Knowledge of certainty (‘ilm ul yaqīn), through the essence of certainty (‘ain ul yaqīn) to the reality of certainty (haqqul yaqīn). The process implies a gradual passing away (fanā) from ignorance to infallible consciousness of the Unity of All, the disappearance of forms and the remaining of the Substances, the annihilation of the phenomenal and the manifestation (tajallī) of the Real. At every one of these stages one of the veils—one of the characteristics of the phenomenal world, is removed, and the seeker comes one stage nearer to the Truth, till ultimately all the veils are lifted—all that is other than God (māsiwā) is removed, Reality appears in its full glory, the soul attains absolute freedom, and enjoys ineffable happiness. The homeward journey of man is ended and the goal reached.

The mystic path along which the Sufi travels to his goal is a logical process which is based upon its own epistemology. According to this Knowledge is of two kinds: (i) ‘ilm or intellectual Knowledge, or Knowledge through discursive reason, (ii) m’arifat or intuitional Knowledge, immediate Knowledge. The instruments of the first kind of Knowledge are the senses and the understanding, through them we obtain the Knowledge of the Universe. The second kind is the Knowledge of Realities as such, it is different from cognitive Knowledge for it implies direct insight into Truth. This knowledge proceeds directly from the Universal Reason to human reason, it is divine Knowledge (‘ilm ladunni), Knowledge of mysteries, of the unseen (‘ilm ul israr, ‘ilm ul ghaib), it is the result of God’s grace (alfaiz al ilahi). Unlike intellectual Knowledge which is probable, inferential, limited, mediate, m’arifat (gnosis) is certain, ineffable, perfect and direct. The light of this Knowledge bursts upon the soul when it is in a state of utter passivity, tranquillity and purity. This state is induced by means of a psychological discipline which cleanses the heart and leads the soul to the realization of its unity with God.

The metaphysical system of Ibn al-'Arabi led him to interesting conclusions regarding religion. He believed in the unity of all religions. According to him, all paths meet in one "straight path" (al tarīq al'amam) which leads to God. Monotheism and polytheism, philosophic religion and the crudest forms of idolatry are all beliefs regarding one God, are all aspects of one universal religion. For the Qurān says, "for each one of you have we made a religion and a pathway." And then God is the essence of everything including gods that are worshipped, and therefore in every form it is He who is worshipped. In fact it is not possible to worship any except Him, for He has decreed "ye shall not worship other than Him." Men’s religions differ according to the objects they worship. Some worship partial manifestations of God, like stars, trees, gods and goddesses,
which are the creations of their minds (ilāh bil jʿal), but everyone is right in his belief. However, those who worship Him in the universal form, Allah, whose name is the most universal of all divine names are truly Knowing ('Arif). The basis of all worship is the love of the object worshipped, but love is a universal principle which pervades all beings and binds them together. Therefore, the highest and the truest worship, the highest manifestation in which God is worshipped, is love.

Ibn al’Arabi’s philosophic system is one of the most imposing structures built by the Muslim mind. All later thought bears its impress and its inspiration worked in song and verse and in the conduct of men and in the lives of Sufis and saints. Numerous writers wrote commentaries on his books and expositors explained them in erudite treatises and in popular works. He was assailed for heterodoxy and condemned as an infidel by some, but others regarded him as one of the greatest scholars (al-Shākh ul Akbar) and a God-drunken saint.

Shihab al Din Suhrawardi Maqtūl (A.D. 1155–1190) who was a contemporary of Ibn al’Arabi was another important mystic philosopher who held pantheistic views. His system is known as Hikamat al Ishrāq, for he regards the Primal Absolute Light (Nūr i Qiāhir), whose essential nature consists in perpetual illumination, as the ultimate ontological principle. 'Abdul Karīm Jīlī (A.D. 1365–1417), the author of a well-known treatise Al Insānul Kāmil (the Perfect Man), belonged to the School of Ibn al’Arabi, and so did Nur al Din Jāmī (A.D. 1414–92) the most eminent Sufi scholar of the fifteenth century. His short book Law-āīh (flashes) is a compendium of mystic philosophy which has had a wide popularity.

Now all the three streams of Muslim speculation—dogmatics (kalām), philosophy (hikmat), and mysticism (tas-awwuf), derive their origin from one source, namely, the Qurān. But their development was conditioned, apart from sociological and historical factors, by the intellectual environment of the Muslims. The important elements in which were neo-Platonic Christian speculation on the one side and Iranian and Indian thought on the other. It is difficult to assess the exact proportion of their contributions, nor is this the appropriate place to do so. But the fact remains, and as Brown, Max Horten, Goldziher and others have testified, there are important elements in Muslim speculation which have been derived from India.

The different Schools of speculation—dogmatics, philosophy and mysticism, came to India in the wake of the Muslims who settled in the country. They met modes of thought and of belief that prevailed in India. Unfortunately opportunities for contacts between the learned among Muslims and Hindus were few and exchange of philosophical knowledge meagre. Not many Muslim scholars cared to study Sanskrit, and therefore Hindu ideas passed to them through those who gathered round the Sufis and Dervishes attracted by their dedicated lives. As a result of this
intercourse Hindus and Muslims came very near one another so far as mysticism is concerned. Muslim Sufis and their orders adopted a number of Hindu practices and Sufi thought became closely assimilated to Hindu Vedānta.

On the other hand, the influence exercised by Muslim mystic and religious thought inspired a number of reform movements among Hindus which spread over the whole of the country and profoundly affected Hindu outlook upon life and Hindu modes of thought.

During the pre-Mughal times the courts of Muslim rulers in India were thronged with literary men from Central Asia and Persia. Among them were many poets, historians and theologians. Philosophy was not popular but jurisprudence (Fiqh) was cultivated. Mystic orders were, however, abundantly represented, and a large number of eminent Sufis lived and taught in the different regions of India. They attracted to themselves numerous followers and were responsible for the spread of Islam in the country.

The Tughlaks encouraged the study of Muslim law and arranged for the translation of Sanskrit works into Persian, especially on Astronomy, Music and stories. On the whole, however, this was an era of decadence of learning. But after Timur's invasion and overthrow of the Tughlaks many Muslim scholars came to India, and this movement received great stimulus from the establishment of the Mughal Empire in India.

Muslim scholarship in India up to the fifteenth century was largely concerned with the study of sciences in which authority was predominant ('ulūm manqūla), but from this period rational sciences ('ulūm M'aqūla) began to exercise their sway. With the result that logic and philosophy entered the curricula of schools and their study became widespread.

Thus dogmatics (kalām) and philosophy (ḥikmat) continued till the sixteenth century to follow the lines chalked out by thinkers outside India. There was considerable activity in these fields, but original thinkers appeared only in the Mughal period. Of these, 'Abdul Hakim Sialkoti who enjoyed the patronage of Shah Jahan was one, Mir Zāhid who served as Sadr under Aurangzib was another. Other well-known writers were Shaikh Abdul Wahhāb and Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (known as Mujaddidi-alf-i-Sānī). They were exponents of scholastic doctrines and controversialists.

The problems which occupied their minds were mainly concerned with the nature of God's Knowledge. Does God possess Knowledge or does He create without Knowledge? If Knowledge is a relation between the Knower and the Known, how can we predicate God's Knowledge of Himself? Is Knowledge the being and essence of God or an attribute other than God? Is God's Knowledge confined to universals or does it extend to particulars also?

The most original thinker among the Indian Dogmatists was Shāh
Wali Ullāh of Delhi (d. A.D. 1762), who is compared with Ghazālī, Rāzī and Ibn Rushd for his learning. He rendered great services to Islamic thought which in these times had become rather chaotic. The main object of his teaching was to show that there was really no disparity between religion and philosophy. He laid down the principles of interpretation and exegesis of the Qurān, determined priority among the books of tradition (Hadīth) and indicated the method of distinguishing those that should be considered reliable from those that are unreliable, he laid stress upon the points of agreement of various schools of jurisprudence (Fiqh) and explained that their differences were due to the fact that they were codified in different social milieus.

He laid equal stress upon the two elements of religion—dogma and commandment, and explained the compatibility of the commandments of the Qurān with the principles of reason; he re-established harmony between law (shari'at) and mysticism (tarīqat, m'arifat); he was the first Muslim writer who felt the need of translating the Qurān and the Traditions from Arabic into Persian in order to make them easily available to the large number of those among the public who did not know Arabic; he opened the way for progress in Muslim jurisprudence and prescribed limits to authoritarianism.

His masterly work, Huṣjatul Allah al Bālighah, discusses in the first place general principles and universal concepts underlying religion and faith, and, secondly, in the light of these principles examines the justification of Islamic injunctions and laws. In the first part Shāh Wali Ullah deals with the necessity of religion, its origin, the essential unity of religions and the causes of difference among them, and the problems of eschatology and of prophethood. Among these there is an interesting chapter on the existence of the world of ideas—a world which is immaterial, a world where objects make their first appearance before they come into existence in the sensible world.

Shāh Wali Ullah lived in a time of storm and stress when Muslim states were rapidly disintegrating, and Asia was fast yielding before the rising power of the West. His mind was naturally occupied with this question, and the problems of individual conduct and social ethics attracted his attention. According to him, good and evil, right and wrong are not determined in relation to the individual as such, but in so far as the individual is a particular of the species. In order therefore to lay down the ideal of perfection for a man it is necessary to find out what are the universal characteristics of man and wherein lies their perfection.

In this view ethics becomes part of the general philosophy of society, and morals acquire the two aspects of temporal welfare and eternal salvation. Man is by necessity part of a group, he is connected by many relations with other men, he is member of a family, of a village, of society and of humanity. Consequently the highest good of the individual consists
in the cultivation and exercise of the virtue which is the basis of social good. Wali Ullah held that justice was that good. Justice has four aspects; when it is observed in the ordinary affairs of daily life, in our speech and conduct, in our appearance and dress, then it is known as good behaviour, politeness (adab); when it affects our income and expenditure, our financial position, then it is economy (hifāyat); when it is applied to the affairs of our family, household and polity, then it is given the value of liberty and discipline; and when it becomes the foundation of mutual affection, brotherhood and human relations then it is the excellence of human fellowships (husn-i-m‘āsharat). A social organism which is founded on justice produces the conditions in which the individual becomes fully conscious of his duties involved in the relation between him and God, and between him and all God’s creation.

As an ideal society is based on justice, it is obvious that in so far as society departs from justice it becomes evil. According to Shāh Wali Ullah, when, for example, the Persians and Romans made wealth and luxury their aim of life and the individuals began to pride themselves on their property and possessions, the rich few condemned the poor, many to a life of misery and poverty, and extracted from the peasants, traders and artisans taxes which broke their backs, tyranny and injustice began to stalk the land and groups of flatterers became idle dependents of the rich and the powerful, goodness and virtue disappeared, and moral disease became incurable, then God sent an illiterate Prophet, who came and destroyed their corrupt and evil social structure and laid the foundations of a healthy organism based on right principles, abolishing social injustices, prohibiting demoralizing and luxurious ways, and establishing noble ideals. Similarly, analysing the conditions of India in his times he pointed out that there were two main causes of decline of the State and misery of society. In the first place the parasitical dependence of unworthy persons on the State and the drain on the treasury. Numerous men posing as soldiers and scholars claimed remuneration without rendering any service. Then many passed off as ascetics, sufis and poets and demanded State patronage. All these constituted a heavy burden. Secondly, as a consequence of increase of expenditure on such unproductive workers the State was obliged to levy heavy and unbearable taxes on peasants, traders and artisans, with the result that those who obeyed the State were ruined and others were turned into rebels and tax dodgers.

From such historical studies he derived certain interesting conclusions which lent support to his ethical theories. Among them one is that morality and politics cannot be separated, for decline of morals or weakening of the sense of justice affect adversely the conduct of the individual in whatever concerns his relations as an individual and as a member of society. Another, that social justice is rooted in economics, for what determines the status of an individual in society and his capacity to lead
a moral and religious life is his economic position. Economic security is necessary for peace and tranquillity of mind and without it the pressure of physical needs practically rules out the claims of moral duty. Yet excess of wealth and its maldistribution are great evils. Desire for wealth as such knows no limits and its accumulation promotes luxury and coarsening of moral fibre. It also engenders inequality, jealousy and enmity among individuals and groups and leads to degeneration and chaos in society. The only remedy is fair and equitable distribution of wealth and well-balanced structure of society, so that the producers may enjoy economic security and social freedom. The denial of these is bound to end in the destruction of society.

Shāh Wali Ḩull wrote a new chapter in Muslim theology and philosophy and entered a powerful plea for moral reconstruction and social reform. In his own times he was misunderstood by the protagonists of tradition, and blind followers of authority called him an innovator and actually assaulted him when he was leaving the mosque after prayers. But he remained steadfast in his mission and continued to spread his message undaunted by opposition till the end.

His sons and pupils handed down his teachings which exercised a great influence on the development of Muslim thought and life in the nineteenth century.

Philosophy (Ḥikmat) was extensively cultivated in India, but there is a sad lack of originality in thought. The scholars were chiefly interested in logic, but the treatises which they wrote consist of commentaries and glosses on the texts composed by the earlier Muslim thinkers. It is difficult to escape the charge of De Boer, "it has not distinguished itself either by propounding new problems or by any peculiarity in its endeavour to solve the old ones." Yet the hold of logic on the Muslim mind was strong, and whatever problems they discussed they did in accordance with precise logical methods. Logic formed part of the curriculum of schools.

Physics, metaphysics and ethics followed at a long interval. Here again exposition of well-worn theories is the main concern of scholars. In astronomy and medicine however, there was a commendable effort at the fusion of Hindu and Muslim sciences.

In logic much ingenuity was spent at definition, and the method of debate and discussion by which truth could be ascertained was examined in detail. A number of textbooks for students were written, among them Muhīb Allah Bihārī's Sullam al 'Ulūm was much in vogue. It deals with Knowledge and its kinds—concept (tasawwar), and judgment (tasdīq), and also with induction and the validity of inductive inference. Apart from a few textbooks the main output of Indian scholarship consisted of commentaries on foreign and Indian texts.

In philosophy two names stand out, that of Mullah Mahmūd of Jaunpore
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(d. A.D. 1651) and Muhibb Allah Bihârî (d. A.D. 1707). The first was the author of a number of works, among which Al Shams al B'âzigha enjoyed great reputation. This is a commentary on the author's work known as Al-Hikmat al-Bâligha. The two together were written to cover all the branches of philosophy—logic, physics and metaphysics. But the work was commenced during the last illness of the author and was left incomplete. It discusses the method, data and principles of science, non-being, matter, motion and form are the data of physics and causality includes the final cause. Space and time supply necessary conditions, while space excludes vacuum, time—is non-eternal in the absolute sense. He examines the properties of bodies, their finitude and infinitude, their motion and rest, creation and becoming.

The doctrines are mostly derived from Aristotle through the Physics (Al-Shifa) of Avicenna.

Mulla Mahmûd wrote also on the problem of determinism and free will (jabr-o-ikhityar). He takes the middle position between the absolute determinism of the Ash'arites and the extreme libertarianism of the M'utazilites. He holds the view that the will of man is the immediate cause of man's actions but has an ultimate determination in the will of God; thus man's actions are voluntary, but his will is restrained.

Muhibb Allah Bihârî was a writer on logic and philosophy. His philosophical treatise Al Jawhar al Fard discusses one of the fundamental principles of Muslim theology, namely, the indivisible particle. Now most of the dogmatists had held the view that bodies are composed of a limited number of indivisible particles. As against this Nazzâm an early M'utazila philosopher had advanced the view that bodies are composed of an unlimited number of divisible particles. The anxiety of the scholastic theologians to defend the theory of indivisible particles (al-juz la yatajazzû) is understandable. They wanted to establish the unity of God and His ability to create the universe out of nothing. But the philosophers like Mulla Mahmûd and Muhibb Allah saw insuperable difficulties in the theory, and in order to ward off the attacks of opponents sought to refute the conception of indivisible particles.

Any enumeration of philosophers in India will be incomplete without mention of Abul Fazl, the great minister of Akbar. He was not a professional philosopher, but he was one of the most learned men of the times. He was a statesman, historian, archivist, letter-writer and thinker. His introduction to the monumental Gazetteer of Akbar's reign (Ain-i-Akbari) is an epitome of his political philosophy.

His ideal state is a monarchy. He distinguishes between a true and a selfish king. Although both have in common treasury, army, servants and subjects, the first type of king does not attach himself to these, for the end which he places before himself is the good, from which follow security, justice, truth and virtue. The second is kept in bondage by the
external forms of royal power, and therefore pride, pleasure, slavery, instability, strife, and vice are its concomitants.

According to Abul Fazl the word padshah (king) literally means source of order and possession. Royalty is a divine gift, it is a light emanating from God, hence it is "the illuminator of the universe, the argument of the book of perfection, the receptacle of all virtues." God communicates this light direct to kings, hence kingsliness stands for paternal love, magnanimity, trust in God, piety and devotion. In a king, desire is subordinated to reason, anger to wisdom, justice is tempered with mercy, violence is banished and truth is sought.

Society is a compound of four elements. As the world is built of fire, air, water and earth, so is society a construction of warriors, artificers and merchants, the learned, the husbandmen and labourers. As the body politic maintains its equilibrium by adjustment between these four ranks of men, so does the balance of monarchy depend on the proper relation between the nobility which is headed by the Vakil, the assistants of victory whose chief is the Vazir or the Diwan, the companions of the King led by the philosopher or Hakim, and the servants who are the ministers to the person of the King.

Mysticism had a luxuriant growth in India. Many Sufis were attracted to the country and many settled down and made India their home. Quite a number of important Sufi orders established their branches here, with monasteries presided over by a Pir, Murshid or Shaikh (leader) guiding the disciples (murīd) along the path (tariqa) whose goal is self-realization. Mysticism had a practical side and a speculative side. It had its psychological discipline, ascetic ways, spiritual exercises, meditations. In India the Sufi orders approximated to the Hindu practices of Yoga.

On the speculative side the Muslim mystics in India were followers of two Schools—the extreme pantheists or the moderate pantheists, Wujūdiyā and Shuhūdiyā. The first believed that All is God (hama ost), and the latter that All is from God (hama az ost). The two Schools are paralleled in Hinduism by the Advaita schools of Śaṅkara and the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja. Muslim mysticism (tasawwuf) before coming to India had absorbed a number of important elements from Indian mystic philosophy, its advent in India led to interesting developments. Apart from the acceptance of practices a deliberate attempt was made to bring about assimilation of theories, both on the Muslim side as well as on the part of the Hindus.

Among the Sufis of the earliest times who visited India tradition mentions the name of Mansūr al Hallāj. There are stories of others who visited Southern India and settled down there. But the first important Sufi learned man who made India his home was 'Uṯmān bin 'Ali al Hujwīrī. He lived in Lahore and wrote the first treatise on mysticism in Persian—Kashf-al Mahjūb.
The *Kashf-al Mahjūb* contains a complete system of Sufism—its doctrines and practices, its different schools and brief accounts of eminent Sufis. It was written in response to the questions of a fellow-citizen who wanted to know the true meaning of the path and its stations. Its object is to show that "the universe is an abode of Divine mysteries; substances, accidents, elements, forms and bodies are veils of Divine mysteries, and from the standpoint of unification (ḥujud) it is polytheism to assert the existence of the veils." The phenomenal being is the veil of the spirit which is kept in bondage by association with it. The glamour of phenomenal being keeps man sunk in ignorance and apathy, so that blind to the beauty of Oneness he turns away from God, seeks the vanities of the world, and allows the appetites to dominate over his reason.

Hujwiri wrote at a time when the Sufi Schools had not developed into organized orders (*silsilahs*). In the twelfth century the process was completed and the monastic organizations with their distinctive practices, rules of conduct and discipline, and teachings came into existence. The fraternities traced back the chain of succession to the Prophet Muhammad who was regarded as the founder. Of these orders four acquired great prominence in India and each counted numerous followers. They are the Chishtī, the Qadrīyah, the Suhrawardīyah, and the Naqshbandīyah. Each one of these produced a number of eminent teachers who created a great impression in his times, but as Hujwiri has remarked, "every one of them has an excellent system and doctrine as regards both discipline (*mujahadah*) and contemplation (*mushahadah*), they differ from each other in their devotional practices and ascetic exercises; they agree in the fundamentals and derivatives of the religious law and unification.

The one aim of all the orders was to lead men along the path whose goal is the realization of the unitive state. The theory is that man the microcosm, in contrast to the universe the macrocosm, contains within himself the elements of the world of command (*'Ālam-i-'Amr*) and the world of creation (*'Ālam-i-Khulq*). The first is the world of spirit and the second of matter. The five spiritual elements in man are heart (*qalb*), soul (*ruḥ*), consciousness (*sirr*), the hidden (*Khafī*), the deeply hidden (*Akhfi*). The five material elements are ego (*nafs*), and the four elements—earth, water, fire and air.

The association of the spiritual elements with the material ones pollutes their pristine purity, makes man forget his real nature, and draws veils between him and God. But man's deepest longing is to remove the veils and attain the truth. The advancement in spiritual life is a journey (*tariqah*) and the seeker after God is a traveller (*sālik*). The first stage is that of preparation by repentance and obedience to law (*shari'at*); the second stage is that of discipline by renunciation, purification and remembrance (*dhikr*) to purge the heart of all desires except that for God; the third stage is that of gnosis (*m'arifah*) attained through meditation and ecstasy so
that the sense of individuality and separateness of self is annihilated and the universal self is found. This leads to the final goal of Reality (haqiqat) and Unity (wasl), when the journey ends and an abiding happiness and illumination fills the soul.

The differences between the orders so far as the philosophical foundations of their several paths are concerned are reducible to two. Some upheld the doctrine of absolute unity (wujudiyah) and others that of modified unity (shuhudiyyah). The first were the followers of Ibn al-'Arabi and 'Abdul Karim Jili. Among them 'Abdur Rahman Jami who spent a great part of his life in India wrote the treatise in Persian (Lavaih) which became a popular compendium of Sufi philosophy in India.

He points out that the term "existence" is sometimes used as a generic concept or an abstract idea, but at other times it signifies the Real Being who is self-existent and on whom the existence of all other beings depends. There is no real existence beside Him. Everything other than Him is a mental figment with no objective existence, and its form is a merely imaginary entity. The Real Being qua Being is above all names and attributes and exempt from all conditions and relations. The attributes are distinct from Him in thought, but are identical in fact and reality.

The Real Being manifests Himself in His epiphanies of which the first is Pure Unity wherein He revealed Himself, of Himself, to Himself, and realized the attributes of Knowledge, Light, Existence and Presence. Then come the other manifestations ending in the appearance of the universe of multiplicity. But this universe is merely an appearance for it has no real existence, today it is, tomorrow it will cease to be. The Universe is nothing but a number of accidents, ever changing and being renewed at every breath, at each instant disappearing and being replaced by a similar set. The fact is that the Real Being which is the reality in all things in One and unique and is not susceptible of plurality. The whole created universe is His display as He clothes Himself with phenomena, multiplicity and limitations. He conceals Himself in the Divine Mind and He manifests Himself in the Sensible World, His priority and His posteriority are all merely His relations and aspects. The relation between the two is that which obtains between the absolute and the relative, the One cannot be conceived without the other, but the absolute is the necessary while the relative is contingent.

On the basis of this absolute monism Jami builds up the system of his mystic philosophy, of the nature and destiny of the individual and of his psychological discipline.

For many years the predominant Sufi thought ran in the channels dug out by Ibn al-'Arabi's School. Its subordination of Law (shari'at) to gnosis (m'arifat) helped to strengthen antinomian and eclectic tendencies, of which the unorthodox (be-shar'a) orders, Akbar's religious experiment, and eclectic sects were examples.
In the seventeenth century came a strong reaction. The leader of this movement was Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (b. A.D. 1564, d. A.D. 1624), who is known as the Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Thānī (Renovator of the Second Millennium). His chief aim was to re-establish the supremacy of religious Law, and for this purpose he revived and propagated the Naqshbandiyah order. The principles and practices of the order were based in their entirety on the Sunni law and avoided all innovation. In fact he gave preference to theology over mysticism, and unfortunately accentuated the narrowness and bigotry which the spread of Sufi ways and teachings had combated and overcome.

Sirhindi's contribution to philosophy consisted of the formulation of the doctrine of modified non-dualism (wahdat-i Shuhūdiyyah). According to him God cannot be known through ecstasy but only through His revelation, for the Knowledge gained through mystic experience is purely subjective and unreliable. That God manifests Himself to man in the mystic trance is an illusion, for God is beyond the beyond and completely transcends the powers of our intellect and intuition. There can be no direct Knowledge of His essence or attributes. Faith alone in God's revelation to the Prophet gives the truth.

Sirhindi opposes the absolutist doctrine of the identity of essence and attributes of the Reality. He holds that the divine attributes are additions to His essence, and the universe is not the manifestation of attributes but is a shadow of the attributes, for God's attributes are perfect without any defect, but the universe is full of imperfections. Again, there is no resemblance between God's attributes and human attributes. The universe is a reality, is other than God and is a creation of God, but while God's existence is necessary and eternal that of the universe is possible and temporal. It follows from this that God and the universe are not identical, for one is the cause and the other is the effect. His conception of God is that He is the creator who creates from nothing, is the provider who gives to His creatures their nourishment, is the guide who sends His prophets for the instruction of men—in short, He is the bearer of all the qualities, powers and perfections.

Similarly, he holds that God and man cannot be regarded as one in essence, although God and the Soul transcend time and space. The soul is different from the material world, but in association with the body has become estranged from God. But it naturally inclines towards its essential spirituality, and through obedience to religious injunctions its natural tendencies may be stimulated and its evil proclivities checked. Thus man realizes his perfection in rendering obedience to God without hesitation and in full faith and trust.

The controversy between these two Schools of thought was carried on by their followers, but no fresh arguments were adduced, and no new lines of speculation were opened.
Among the eclectics, however, interesting attempts were made to draw close to one another Hindu and Muslim mystic philosophies. Among these Dara Shikoh’s on the one side and that of the leaders of the bhakti movement on the other side were most remarkable.

Dara Shikoh’s achievements as a scholar are amazing. He had a profound knowledge of many religions and of Muslim and Hindu philosophies. He translated all the then known Upaniṣads (fifty-two in number) from Sanskrit into Persian, wrote a number of treatises on Muslim mysticism and expounded the identity of Hindu and Muslim mystic philosophies.

The problems which he has discussed are epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical. He shows that both Hindu and Muslim mysticism have identical views on the question of the nature and validity of Knowledge and the means of its attainment. Both agree that Knowledge is of two kinds—human and divine, the first is intellectual Knowledge, knowledge of the world acquired through demonstration and argument, the second intuitive knowledge, knowledge which releases from bondage and takes us to the ultimate truth. The first is based on sense activity, the other comes when the sense activity is stilled. One gives contingent truth, the other certainty. Sufis call them Knowledge (‘ilm) and gnosis (m’arifat), Hindus Knowledge of the hither (apara) and of the beyond (para).

Concerning the problem of reality he points out that both Hindus and Muslims have similar views. The reality is one and its philosophy is monistic (advaita, tawhid). This reality is absolute (param, mutlaq), it is the truth of truth (satyasya satyam, haqiqat ul haqaiq), light of light (jyotiśāṁ jyotih, nūr ’ala nūrin). What is other than this (anyad, māsiwā) is a mental figment, imaginary entity (mithyā, kalpanā, māyā; m’alām-i m’adūm, maujūd-i mauhūm), it is both concealed (avyakta, bātin) and manifest (vyakta, zāhir), both transcendent (sarvavāpyin, muhīī) and immanent (antar-yāmin, sārī). It is indescribable and unknowable. The Bhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad says, “how should one know Him through whom he knows all this, how should one know the knower,” and Abul Husain al-Nūrī says:

“for it is not for reason to know God but through God.”

The Kena-Upaniṣad says:

“neither their eyes penetrate, nor speech, nor thought,”

and Jāmi says:

“the essence of the truth most glorious cannot be contained within Knowledge or vision.”

The absolute Reality is without name (nāman, ism) and form (rūpa, sifat), and without determination; as it is determined it ascribes to itself names and forms, and is manifested in modes and aspects. The Aitareya-Upaniṣad
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says, "this Soul verily was one only in the beginning, no other thing winking. He thought, let me now create the worlds." The Ḥadīthi Qudsi says, "I was a hidden treasure, then I desired to be known; so I brought the creation into existence."

There are similarities in the schemes of manifestation. The Hindu scheme according to Kaṭha-Upaniṣad is:

(1) The Absolute which is undirempted unity of subject and object; then (2) the universal subject (mahat-ātman) and the universal object (a-vyakta); then (3) from universal subject divine powers and souls, and from the unmanifest intellect (buddhi) and the elements; then (4) man the meeting-ground of the soul and matter. The Sufi Scheme, according to Ibn al-'Arabi, is analogous as given above.

Dara Shikoh indicates the close similarity between the Hindu and Muslim mystic practices and beliefs, both as regards the descent of God into man and the ascent of man to God. The aim of both is Knowledge and self-illumination. This is attained when the apprehensions of the eternal world cease to disturb the tranquillity of mind, meditation (dhyāna, marāqubah) and discipline (sāṇyāma, mūjāhida) are the means and the vision of Reality (sākṣātkāra, mushāhidah) is the end. The psychological process covers four stages (bhīmi, manzil). The first stage is that of ordinary consciousness (jāgrat, nāsūt), the second of abstraction (swapna, malakūt), the third of consciousness of unity in multiplicity (susupti, jābrūt), and the fourth of complete inwardsness (turīya, lāhūt) whence all awareness of time and space and distinction of I and thou have vanished and the mystic knows "I am That" (so'ham asmi, anal haq).

The bhakti movement which spread over the whole of India and which imparted moral significance and value to the lives of millions through the centuries had two objects. In the first place it was a protest against formalism in religion and externalism in worship. It sought to bring men back to the realization of the truth that religion is an affair in which the whole of mind and spirit are involved and that it is not merely a matter of rites and ceremonies and even of dogmas and doctrines. Secondly, the movement was an earnest effort on the part of many godly men to reconcile the Hindus and Muslims and to show to them that in essentials they differed little. Love and service were their watchwords.

The leaders of the movement appeared in every region of India. They addressed their message largely to the common people, and spoke to them in their own dialects eschewing the learned languages. Basava the founder of Liṅgāyatism, the Siddhars, the Vaśnava and Śaiva saints of the South, Kabīr, Nānak, Caitanya, Tukārām and a host of others in the North taught and spread the religion of bhakti or loving devotion. There were some whose deity was the attributeless Absolute, others who worshipped God with attributes—Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, but all were monists or
monotheists and their piety and faith were steeped in emotion. They believed in the purification of heart of all worldly desires, and in the surrender of human will to divine will. They all maintained that a teacher was necessary to guide the pupil along the difficult path of self-realization. They had little use for sacred books and learned priests and deprecated ritualism—fasts, pilgrimages, idolatry and elaborate paraphernalia of worship. In social affairs they laid stress upon the essential equality of all and rejected the caste system.

They combined the elements of Sufism and the Vedânta in their eclectic philosophy, abandoned all dogma and condemned all practices which appeared to them useless or provocative. Their simple faith founded on the love of God and of man and their dedicated lives provided a philosophy of life and set an example of high thinking and simple living which provided the foundation for a common Indian culture during the middle ages of India’s history.
CHAPTER XIX

SIKH PHILOSOPHY

1. INTRODUCTION

Sikh religion was founded conjointly by the great teachers or gurus: the line began with guru Nānak (A.D. 1469–1538) and ended with guru Govind Singh (A.D. 1666–1708). Sikh philosophy is contained in the religious, poetic compositions (Gurbāṇī) of guru Nānak—it is expounded in the hymns (sābads) of the other nine gurus and elucidated in the ballads (vārs) of a learned, devout Sikh, Bhāi Gurdās, who was a relative and contemporary of guru Arjun, the fifth guru (A.D. 1554–1606).

The fact that guru Nānak and the other Sikh gurus chose the medium of poetry or song—every line in the Sikh Scripture (Granth Sāhib) is set to music—is of great significance. Verse and music impart to thought emotion, beauty, brevity and power, and the person who recites or sings or even devoutly listens is filled with joy and reverence. He may find it difficult to grasp the full implications of the thought contained in the verse, and each line in the hymn may lend itself to diverse interpretations—nevertheless, the effect upon his mind is both profound and inspiring. He loses his self in devotion and rapture.

The philosophical and religious thought contained in the Gurbāṇī, in the hymns of the Sikh gurus, is the result of inspiration—revelation—and not of formal logic or reasoning. As guru Nānak himself put it:

“I relate as the divine word (the vāni of my Master) comes to me.”

The hymns are born of an inner illumination—of the spirit becoming in tune with the Infinite. They are the outpourings of a divinely inspired heart and it is they that deserve the name of divine or spiritual philosophy. Guru Nānak’s philosophy was not something distinct or apart from his religion or ethics—they were all one in his mind—Knowledge, Truth, Goodness and God. Sat (Truth) was bound up with Sat-nām, the holy name of the holiest being and with Sat-ācār or the right conduct, thus co-ordinating Truth with Goodness, the two supreme values of life. Writes guru Nānak:

“Truth is higher than everything but higher still is true conduct.”

The man of right conduct and culture is the man of right intuition, and the saint is our best philosopher and guide; for light descends on him from on High, as divine grace.

Guru Nānak dealt with problems of philosophy as they arose in his mind or in his conversations or disputations with saints of other persuasions and an attempt has been made in later sections to state the views

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of guru Nānak in his own words. Guru Nānak believed in enquiring into the value (qimat)—it is a Persian word that he uses—of every human action: its value for the time-being or its human value as well as its eternal or divine value. According to him, human values are derived from man-in-himself and all enduring values from man-in-reality or man-in-God. Reality is realizable only in and through such a valuable life—which is a glory to itself and a glory to God. The Sikh gurus lived such a life, and the truths of philosophy—the most uncompromising of them—are illustrated in their lives.

2. GOD: THE ONLY REALITY

In spite of the mention of the names of various gods and goddesses in different contexts in the Gurbâñī, the Sikh Scripture, the fact remains that the Sikh gurus were definitely opposed to polytheistic or henotheistic ideas. They were outspoken exponents of monotheism.

The Sikh Scripture begins with the numeral 1. Words may bear or may be made to yield different interpretations but not numerals. Their meaning is fixed once for all. To denote the oneness of the ultimate reality, therefore, guru Nānak uses the numeral 1. This number, followed by Om, is pronounced as Ik Oṅgkār. "The reality connoted by syllable Om is one. If you want to name Him, call Him sālya (Eternal—Truth). He is the Doer, All-pervading, Without-fear, Without-malice. His Being is unaffected by time. He is Unborn and Self-existent. He can be realized through the grace of the guru." These words constitute the mūla mantra or kalīma of Sikhism. At the time of initiation, every novitiate is made to repeat this mantra five times. Belief in One Eternal Reality, call Him God, Allah or Rāma, is one fundamental doctrine of Sikhism and the ultimate goal of the life of a Sikh is to realize His existence and be in tune with Him.

God as envisaged by guru Nānak and his successors is the sole creator of all that is visible and invisible in this universe. He does not stand in need of any other agency to bring the saṁsāra into being. "Thou thyself art the tablet, the pen, and the writing on it. Talk of One alone, Nānak: Why mention a second? Thou Thyself pervadest everywhere. Thou Thyself didst fashion the world. There is none else besides Thee. Thou art immanent in all. Thou Thyself knowest Thy measure and purpose and Thou Thyself canst evaluate Thyself. Thou art Unknowable, Unfathomable, Undiscernible by senses but Thou can be realized through the word of the guru."

Prakṛti, māyā, moha, gunas, gods and demons are His creation, they are not independent of Him. "Having created the conscious (puruṣa) and the unconscious (prakṛti) the creator Himself has promulgated His order (hukam)." "The self-existent brought into being the play of the whole
creation. He created the three gunas and intensified maya and moha." "He created millions of incarnations of Vishnu, millions of universes are His schools to teach dharma. He created and destroyed millions of Sivas and put millions of Brahmās on fashioning the world. My Lord is such a Master. I cannot describe the extent of His virtues." "Men repeat what they have heard. Siva does not know His mind. All gods have become tired in a search for Him. The goddesses are unable to fathom the mystery. The Unknowable Para-Brahman transcends all. He sports as He pleases. He Himself unites and Himself separates. Some wonder in doubt; others bow in devotion to Him. He creates the worlds and then reveals Himself. Listen to the true evidence of the saints. They say what they have seen with their own eyes. He is above all virtue and vice. The Lord of Nānak is Self-Existent."

"One light pervades all ages and all worlds. There is neither growth nor decay in it, nor shall it be ever subject to growth or decay." "My love is rooted in that true Being who neither dies nor transmigrates. He pervades all and cannot be separated. He destroys the pain and misery of the low. For His servant He is the Reality. The guru has united me with Him. O Mother: Who is of unparalled beauty and without impurity. O Brothers: make the Lord your friend. A curse on attachment to illusion and delusion, which bring happiness to none. He is Wise, Generous, Benevolent, Pure and of infinite Beauty; the greatest Friend and Helper, Lofty and beyond measure. He knows neither childhood nor old age. His Court is Eternal. WHATSOEVER we ask at His door, we get. He is the mainstay of the weak. Seeing Him all sins are destroyed and mind and body both get peace. Banishing all mental doubts and with one mind meditate on the One Ocean of all Virtues. He is ever young. His gifts are perfect. Propitiate Him day and night; never forget Him."

Some thinkers have held that the supreme Spirit is a mere witness, a non-doer. The creation is a play of maya or prakriti. The Sikh gurus do not subscribe to this view. "The one Lord is the cause of all causes, there is none else. O Nānak! may I be a sacrifice unto Him, who pervades waters, deserts, the earth and the skies." "He first created Himself and then He created the name. He created nature, entered it and was pleased to look at His own creation."

Diverse theories have been put forward to explain the existence of evil in this world. Some teachers posited two Gods: the God of good and the God of evil. Others subordinated the God of evil, Satan, to the God of virtues. Some say evil or ignorance exists from the beginning but can be destroyed through knowledge. Others assert that what can be destroyed never was, for whatsoever is shall ever be and hence maya or illusion, the root of all evil, is non-existent. Bhāi Gurdās has explained the existence of evil by an apt simile. "The Gods and demons churned the ocean and life-giving nectar and death-dealing poison both came out of it." None
knows why it happened this way but everyone knows "that if we take poison we die, and if we drink nectar we get the everlasting life." Guru Arjun likens the world to a great wrestling arena. In order to develop spiritual strength the soul has to wrestle against lust, anger, greed, delusion and egoism. These obstacles have been put in our way to make us spiritually stronger and greater. "I am a puny wrestler of the Lord of the universe, but on meeting the guru I have donned a lofty turban. We have come together for a wrestling bout; the Lord Himself is the spectator. The drums are beating, big bout-drums and small kettle-drums. The wrestlers are walking round in the arena. The guru patted me on the back and I pinned to earth the five opponents. They all came in force to attack me but they had to return crestfallen. Those who follow the guru earn high reward. Those who follow their own whims lose even the principal."

The Sikh gurus, therefore, regard the Eternal Akāl Puruṣa as the only reality. Modern scientists, too, have come to believe in the unity of the ultimate reality. Atoms have been further analysed and the different elements are now thought to be composed of electric charges of various kinds. But they still stick to the theory that life and consciousness have sprung out of unconscious and dead matter. The one ultimate Reality of which the Sikh gurus have sung is, on the other hand, a conscious entity. "He understands, perceives and distinguishes. He is one and He is many."

"He creates and He Himself destroys. He has knowledge of everything. He understands and thinks. Through His power He assumes many forms in a moment." The light of consciousness in all beings is from Him. There is light in all beings and that light is He. "Everything is illumined by His light." "In high and low pervades the light, in every living being dwells the Lord. O good men! He fills every vessel. The perfect One pervades all form. The Lord abides in the waters and in the deserts. Nānak sings praises of the Ocean of virtues. The true guru has removed all doubts. The In-dweller permeates everything though ever detached." The ideas of immanence and transcendence are thus reconciled.

Is God a mere hypothesis to explain the riddle of the universe or has He a real existence? This is a question which has puzzled many. The gurus have no doubt whatsoever. They have stated again and again that God does exist. We cannot know Him as we know an object different from ourselves, but we can be as sure of His existence as we are of our own. The existence of Reality is to be experienced and is beyond logical proof or sense perception. "How can the Immeasurable be measured? One could do so if He were an object separate from oneself. But none is separate from Him. How can He be evaluated?" But though beyond all thought and word He does exist. "The saints and servants of the Lord: brothers, listen to the evidence of the true guru—only those whom luck favours shall give it a place in their hearts. I slowly drank the nectar of
the sacred and lofty discourses of the guru on God. Then the light dawned and darkness disappeared as the sun chases away the night. Through the grace of the guru, I saw with my own eyes, the Invisible and the Unknowable, who is without impurity and so difficult of apprehension." "The eyes that can see my beloved are different from the physical eyes." And the fifth guru has given a detailed description of the beatific vision:

"Inside ourselves and outside us dwells the same Infinite. The Lord pervades all vessels. He fills the earth, the heavens and the nether regions and all the universes and sustains them. The supreme Being is in every blade of grass in the forest. All act as ordered by Him. He is in winds, in waters and in fires. He pervades the four quarters and the ten directions. No place is without His presence. Realize this through the grace of the guru and obtain peace. See Him in the Vedas, the Purāṇas and the Smṛtis. He fills the moon, the sun and the constellations. All speak the language of the Master. He is unshakable and never wavers. Equipped with full powers He is engaged in the play. No one can evaluate Him. His virtues are priceless. His light fills all luminous bodies. The Lord sustains them, warp and woof. Those whose doubts have been destroyed through the grace of the guru have this faith, O Nānak." Guru Nānak has painted the picture as follows: "Thou hast thousands of eyes, but no eye is Thine. Thou hast thousands of forms, but no form is Thine. Thou hast thousands of feet, but no foot is Thine. Without a nose of Thine, Thou hast thousands of noses. This play of Thine has bewitched me."

God is; He has created by His own power man and Universe, and the ultimate object of human life is to realize the Truth; this is, in substance, the Sikh doctrine.

3. THE PURPOSE OF CREATION

The Sikh gurus have not entered into any technical discussion about the why and how of creation. They have described creation as the outcome of the Will of God. "All forms came into being by his Order. That Order cannot be described in words. All life was created by His Order and His Order regulates all progress." There was a time when there was no universe. "For countless aeons there was darkness. There was neither the earth nor the skies, there was only the infinite Order. There was neither day nor night, neither the sun nor the moon." "When it pleased Him, He created the universe," but none knows when it came into existence." What was the hour, what was the time, what was the lunar and the solar day, what was the season, what was the month, when the universe came into being? The Pundits did not know the hour otherwise they would have stated it in the Purāṇas. The Qazis did not know the time, otherwise they would have put it down in the Qurān. The Yogins do not know the lunar
or the solar day; none else knows the month or the season. The creator who fashions the universe alone knows all these things.' When the Siddhas asked of guru Nānak, "Give us your views about the beginning of all this. In what state did He dwell before the thought of the creation crossed His mind?" He replied, "Reflection on how all this began leaves me lost in wonder. Even before the creation He was omnipresent."

The Sikh gurus do not subscribe to the doctrine of the creation being without beginning and without end, though they do hold that the process of creation and destruction has been repeated any number of times. Guru Arjun likens the whole process to the show of a juggler. "When the juggler gives a show, he appears in various forms and garbs. When he takes off the disguise he alone is left. Who destroyed forms that were seen? Whence did they come and where did they go? Numberless waves rise in water. Various ornaments are fashioned out of gold. Sowing of many kinds of seeds has been tried, but when the fruit ripened the selfsame seed came out of it. One space fills all the vessels, when the vessel breaks, space resumes its unity. Doubt, greed and attachment are all the various forms of māyā. When doubt is destroyed only He remains: He is indestructible and never dies. There is no coming or going. The perfect guru has removed the impurity of ego and Nānak has achieved the supreme state."

Some thinkers have denied the very existence of what is visible. The gurus hold that though all that is seen is subject to constant change, still it is a reality. "He himself is real and what He has created is also real." His actions are real and so is His creation. From the root of reality, reality springs." "Real is Thy universe and real are their parts. Thy lokas are real and their form too is real. Whatever is done by Thee is real. All Thy reflections are real." "This saṁsāra is the abode of the true One. The true One dwells in it." Hence there is no question of our being in a dreamland of unreality. Life is real. The whole creation has a purpose behind it, but that purpose is revealed to man only when he destroyed his I-am-ness.

In some systems of thought two more entities besides God have been postulated, matter and souls. It has been argued that a potter must have clay and a wheel to make a vessel. To create the world, therefore, God must have some materials and instruments. This is not the view of the Sikh gurus. "All forms and colours are from One, all the various combinations of air, water, fire, etc. Know them as the different hues of the Master. There is one Wonder, absolutely One, but such a realization comes through the guru only to a few." "Thou art the tree, it is Thy branches that have blossomed. From invisible Thou becamest visible. Thou art the ocean, the foam and the bubble, we find none else besides Thee. Thou art the thread and Thou art the beads, Thou art the knot and the chief bead at the head. The same Lord persists, in the beginning, in the middle and
in the end. None else is seen besides Him." He is thus, the efficient, the material and the final cause of creation.

What is the purpose of this creation? "The Lord sustains the universe for the saint," which, in other words, means the perfection of the human soul. In the Sikh Scripture the word saint has been used for a man who is in tune with the Infinite every moment of his life. A perfect man has been defined in similar terms. We have come into this world with some capital bestowed upon us by the Great Banker and we are to live our lives in such a way as not to waste that stock-in-trade but to increase it a hundredfold so that at the time of return we may be greeted with a warm welcome.

4. HUMAN PERSONALITY OR THE EGO

"Man, Thou art an image of Light, recognize thy essence," is the fundamental conception of human personality in Sikhism. Life and consciousness are found in various degrees in all the living beings, but so far as our present knowledge goes they are found in their most developed form in man. "All other beings are for thy service. Thou art the Lord of this earth." The materialistic conception that life and consciousness slowly evolved out of lifeless matter is not accepted by the Sikh gurus. "O my body, God endowed thee with light and then thou wast born in this world." The ego has been put down as an instrument of creation. The supreme Spirit created the Ego (lit. I-am-ness) in order to bring into being the universe. In reply to a question from a Yogin, "In what manner the universe was created?" guru Nānak said, "The Ego causes the world to come into existence." This has been explained further by guru Nānak in Asa-di-var (ballad sung in Asa rāga). "It is the ego that constitutes personality, all actions are based on the ego. The ego constitutes the fetters that make us wander in transmigration again and again. Whence does this ego come? How can it be made to depart? It is the divine Will that ego comes and goes bound by its own actions. The ego is a deep-rooted malady, but there is a remedy for it also. If God bestows His favour and the man practises the word of the guru. Saith Nānak, hear, O Servants of God, it is in this manner that this malady disappears."

Briefly, the conception of the individual soul may be stated thus. In the ocean of consciousness by an act of divine Will rise bubbles. These are the separate egos. They react to their different surroundings and develop different natures. The act of creation of different egos has also been termed "viyoga," i.e. the process of separation. The emphasis on separate existence creates many problems. Men develop ideas of possession (lit. "This is mine") and try to protect their own possessions from the depredations of others, and thus the so-called "struggle for existence" begins;
and so long as we look to bodies alone, this struggle gets more and more intensified. "Actions based on the ego become nooses round our necks. We stick to 'mine' and put shackles round our feet." "Greed is the dark cell of the jail and my vices constitute my fetters." "O Nanak, there are as many chains round the neck of a man as are his vices." An action leaves an impression on our mental structure. When the same action is repeated, the impression deepens. By repeating the same action over and over again, the impressions change into habits which in due course define our tendencies. Given a certain set of surroundings our tendencies drive us in particular directions and we become slaves to our habits. In this way our past karman influences our present actions. Writes guru Nanak in Raga Maru:—

"Mind is the paper and our actions the ink. Virtue and vice are the two writings inscribed thereon. We are driven unto paths determined by our past karman, O God, there is no end to Thy virtues. O mad man: Why do you not revolve this fact in your mind that by forgetting God all thy virtues rot. Night and Day have become nets in which you are being caught by the gharis [a ghari is measure of time, equivalent to twenty-four minutes] or time. You are caught every day while you enjoy picking your food. Do you know, O fool, how you can become free? Body has been turned a furnace, the mind is like iron in it and the five fires (lust, greed, anger, attachment and egoism) are consuming it. Your sins are adding fresh fuel, the mind is burning, gripped by the vice of anxiety."

How to end this suffering? The guru says, this suffering is the result of our forgetting the fact that all egos are bubbles of the same ocean. The bodies are separate but the same light illumines all of them. "Light fills all of them and that light is He. His illumination illumines all," as soon as this fact dawns upon a man his life is changed. In the last couplet of the above-quoted hymn, guru Nanak points the way out of the furnace:

"Mind that has been turned into dross can change into gold again if a man meets the guru, who has himself undergone that transformation. He puts the nectar of the name into his mouth and the fires in the body are extinguished." The guru does not emphasize the separateness of the egos, he emphasizes their unity. "We are all the children of the self-same father." "Allah created light first. All creatures are from him. From one light springs the whole universe, who is good and who is bad." Then begins the process of "sanyoga," i.e. uniting of the soul to its source; between "viyoga" (separation) and "sanyoga" (union) runs the whole gamut of life.

5. THE GURU: HIS NEED

To help men out of this slough of despair and helplessness a guru (religious teacher) is needed. The Sikh gurus do not believe in incarnation
—God does not come Himself but sends His servants from time to time to lead man to the right path. There is a world of difference between God and the guru and it is regarded by the gurus as a sacrilege to call the guru God. Guru Govind Singh in order to stop this practice of calling guru God told his followers in a clear and strong language: "Those who call me God shall go to hell. I am a servant of God, and have come to see this play of the world. I am a servant of His; there is not the least doubt in it." But who is the guru? "He who has known the true Person is the true guru. In his company a disciple will be saved by singing the praises of the Lord." "Hail, Hail to the true guru, the person who has recognized the supreme Truth and on meeting whom the thirst of desire is quenched and mind and body both get peace. Hail, Hail to the true guru, who looks with an equal eye on all. Hail, Hail to the guru, who is without malice and for whom praise and dispraise are the same. Hail, Hail to the true guru, whose mind ever reflects on the Brahman. Hail, Hail to the true guru, who is one with the Formless One, the Infinite. Hail, Hail to the true guru, who makes men practise Truth. Nānak, hail, hail to the true guru, who bestows on us the gift of His Name." "Meet the true guru, the friend in whose mind the ocean of virtues dwells. Meet the true guru, the beloved, who has destroyed his own I-am-ness. Blessed is the perfect teacher, who reforms the whole world by his teachings." A soul that has reached perfection and possesses the qualities enumerated above is the guru.

A disciple must put implicit faith in the guru. Religious life, according to Sikh teaching, is an experience which a disciple can have only when he puts himself completely into the hands of the guru. This has been termed a new birth. "When I was born to the guru, my transmigration came to an end." In a certain set of circumstances a disciple is to act not according to his own inclinations, but as is laid down by the guru. Such a disciple frees himself from the clutches of his past karmas. Our past karmas influence our present actions through our desires and inclinations. When we cease to be influenced by our own desires and habits and base our actions on the guru’s word, these tendencies slowly begin to wear out and then our past karmas is destroyed. "The load of past actions is lifted. We act without desire for fruit. By following the dharma of the guru we have reached the shore of the ocean." "Saith Nānak, the soul is subject to the law of karmas. It cannot get emancipation without meeting the true guru." "A disciple who wants to stay in the house of the guru, must subject himself to the will of the guru. He should give up his own ego and in his mind meditate upon Hari (God). Only the disciple who sells his mind to the guru, succeeds in his attempt. He who serves without any desire for fruit, finds the Lord."

For this it is not necessary to renounce the world or to give up family life, according to the Sikh gurus. On the other hand a Sikh is enjoined
to earn his living and share what he has with others. "Only he who eats what he earns and gives a portion to others, knows the path." Activity based on the ego is the cause of bondage, but selfless activity frees one of all fetters. Hence an ideal Sikh is to lead a life of service without any desire for fruit. "The mind of one who knows the reality bubbles to do good to others." Activity based on the guru's word makes a disciple ethically perfect. "God resides very near him who does not covet other people's wealth and women." "Looking at beautiful women belonging to others, he should regard them as mothers, sisters and daughters. Just as a Hindu shuns beef and a Mohammadan shuns pork he should shun other people's wealth. He should not be so bewitched by attachment to his own wife and children as to practise deceit and tyranny on others. Hearing calumny and praise with his ears he should never revile others. If he gets into power, he should never cause pain to others through pride. Such a disciple obtains the fruit of peace through the guru. He finds the joy and happiness of a Rāja-yogin."

Here the Sikh gurus have propounded another doctrine. It is not the body of the guru that is the guru. It is his word that is the guru. "The word is the guru, the guru is the word, the word contains all the nectars. If a disciple obeys what the word says, evidently the guru will make him cross the ocean." Hence obeisance to the guru's body or the guru's darśan does not bring any merit to the disciple. "Novitiates and disciples all come to worship the guru and sing the most excellent word of Hari. But Hari will accept the songs and audiences of those alone who truly obey what the guru orders." "Fashion your mind anew according to the word of the guru." It is a change of heart that is required, not the formal acceptance of a doctrine, nor the intellectual perception of a dogma. "He who knows the 'order',' says Nānak, "will not say 'I am'." All discipline is for the obliteration of the ego, otherwise "A man may perform crores of good actions, but if he bases them upon the ego all are in vain, he gets the fatigue only."

6. SAMYOGA (UNION OF THE SOUL WITH GOD)

Instead of imparting an attitude of dissatisfaction with the existing order or promoting perpetual intellectual unrest or a general sceptical attitude towards religious and philosophic problems, which modern civilization and culture appear to do, Sikhism regards faith, concentrations, peace of mind and universal love as essential prerequisites for the realization of truth and the final emancipation of the soul. Nothing, according to the Sikh view, can be achieved in a state of extreme doubt and dissatisfaction.
Love breaks down the barrier between the self and not-self, it widens or enlarges the ego, leads to an attitude of self-sacrifice, disinterestedness, and resignation which minimize repression and leave practically no scope for conflicts which are believed to be the root causes of pain and suffering.

Every line of the Sikh Scriptures is set to music and at the head of every hymn or *pada* detailed instructions as to how it is to be sung are given. *Saṅkīrtana* is a part of daily worship in every *guru-dvāra*. A disciple who accepts the *guru* must daily resort to *sat-sang* (company of the *true*) in order that he may be strengthened in his resolve to stick to the path. He must listen to *kīrītana*. "*Kīrītana* is a priceless jewel." When music has softened the mind, it is in a better mood to drink in the nectar of the *guru*’s word. By serving others he destroys his ego and then the *name*, the last and the highest gift of the *guru*, takes its abode in his mind. The word "*name*” has been used in the Sikh Scriptures in two senses, an appellation and as a symbol to denote the All-Pervading Spirit that sustains the universe. Constant meditation on the *name* destroys the ego altogether. "The *name* and the ego are opposed to each other, they cannot abide in the same place," and when a disciple through loving devotion constantly keeps the *name* in his mind the last stage is reached. The ray is united with the sun, water has run into water. Light has blended with light, perfection has been achieved." Through life of active service, which is only possible through *sat-sang*, a disciple takes to *kīrītana* and the *name*, and attains perfect "*saṁyoga*" (union). This is the supreme state, the bliss of which is indescribable. Like the newly-married girl who "full of the bliss of love finds no words to describe it," or even her spouse to her friends, a person who believes in "*saṁyoga*" finds it impossible to describe in words the bliss of union with God. And when a disciple has reached this stage and is absorbed in meditation on the *name*, and persuades others to do the same, he has attained the supreme purpose of his life. He goes beyond pleasure and pain. "He looks with the same eye on pleasure and pain. He passes beyond the stage of virtue and vice." Of him the *guru* says, "I crave for the dust of the feet of a disciple of the *guru*, who himself repeats the *name*, and makes others do the same." "He who undergoes the discipline is the true disciple. Nay, he is my master, and I am his disciple."
CHAPTER XX
CONTEMPORARY INDIAN THOUGHT (A)

I. RENAISSANCE, AUFKLARUNG AND REORIENTATION

India, so far as its thought is concerned, is now passing through a period of aufklärung (enlightenment), which follows close upon renaissance and precedes creative effort. India now is not merely reviving but reflecting upon and reinterpreting its past, its religion, its philosophy, its social and ethical forms; some of which it is discarding, some it is explaining away, and the rest it is reshaping. It is thus showing its great potentialities for progress, which is ultimately due to the plastic nature of its spiritual culture capable of change and adaptation. This is what Macnicol calls the "omnivorous capacity" of Hinduism, which has eluded the grasp of most of its Western critics, who try to identify it with some of its external and accidental forms, without understanding its essential spirituality which has assumed divergent external forms to suit changing circumstances. Many writers, both historians and philosophers, wonder how Indian culture could have survived impacts, attacks, conflicts and convulsions of more than four thousand years. The reason lies in the adaptable nature of its essentially plastic spiritual basis.

With the advent of the British, Christianity became an influential religion, which provoked Hinduism to reflect upon itself and compare its own doctrines with those of Christianity. Western orientalists, including some missionaries, began studying Indian languages, religions, history and philosophy, which stimulated the Indians to study their own culture. The dawn and growth of nationalism prompted them to discover what was truly great and strong in their past. Constant criticisms of Western scholars and thinkers enabled them to realize the weaknesses that had crept into their religion, philosophy and culture and to differentiate the adventitious from the essential. Nationalism is this-worldly. Its aim is the welfare and prosperity of the nation and the comfort and happiness of the individual here in this world. In the wake of the British rule entered scientific and humanistic thought of the West, which also necessitated a reshaping of India's spiritual culture. All these factors have brought about not only a revival but also a reinterpretation, and not only reinterpretation but also reorientation of Indian thought. This activity is expressing itself in four main fields, the social, the religious, the political
and the philosophical, though in India it is difficult to demarcate them sharply. Their difference is a difference between dominant aspects.

2. MOVEMENTS OF SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS REFORMS

Christian Criticism and Hindu Reaction.—With the establishment of the British Rule, the missionaries found in India a vast field for their activities. They did not understand the spiritual basis of Hinduism which presented to the external observer a medley of the highest forms of spiritual and yogic discipline combined with primitive forms of worship and sacrifice; the belief in the same Divinity in all human beings along with the worst forms of caste system and untouchability. The missionaries exposed these defects, identified Hinduism with them in their arguments for proselytization. The missionaries also started many educational institutions and hospitals, which helped to spread rational and humanitarian ideas among the people.

Hinduism baffles all attempts at definition. Unlike Islam and Christianity, it is not founded by a single person. It is a natural growth of the expression of the spiritual, and retains most of the outmoded features through which it grew. Its basic doctrine is the spirituality of man, and it upholds the realization of the inner Spirit as the highest aim of life. It allows and encourages every form of cult and worship, provided it recognizes this basic spiritual truth. This attitude led to the retention of all forms of idol worship, though the idol was reinterpreted as a symbol of the Divine. In this way, inwardness was conferred upon the crudest cults. But the external forms remained and their significance was missed by the common follower.

The educated who were influenced by the preachings of the Christian churches thought that Hinduism should be reformed rather than renounced. This led to the different movements for social and religious reform. We shall briefly discuss them here.

The Brähmo-Samāj.—Raja Ram Mohan Roy founded the Brähmo-Samāj in 1828, with the idea not only of reforming Hindu religion but also of reforming Hindu society. Strongly influenced by Islam and Christianity, he opposed polytheism, mythology and idolatry, and preached that Brahman (God) should be worshipped in its pure form. On the philosophical side, he upheld theism as opposed to what is generally called the pantheism of Śaṅkara, according to whom Brahman is all and yet beyond all determination. None of these teachings was new and objectionable to the orthodoxy. But Ram Mohan Roy went farther and abolished caste distinctions and introduced widow remarriage among his followers. He also persuaded Lord William Bentinck to abolish the cruel practice of
suttee in 1829. The Brâhmo-Samâj became a reformed church of Hinduism. Confined mainly to the Westernized and the educated Hindus, it had among its followers such eminent persons as Maharâshi Debendranath Tagore, Keshab Chandra Sen, Jagadish Chandra Bose, Profuella Chandra Roy, Brajendranath Seal and Rabindranath Tagore.

The Prârthanâ-Samâj.—A similar reformed society is the Prârthanâsamâj of Bombay, founded in 1867 by Dr. Atmaram Pandurang. Like Brâhmoism, it is theistic and devotional in outlook. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, Justice Ranade, Sir N. G. Chandravarkar and Ramabai were among its prominent members.

The Ârya-Samâj.—The Ârya-Samâj was founded by Svâmi Dayânanda Sarasvatî in the year 1875. Dayânanda is often compared to Luther for his preaching, "Back to the Vedas." He tried to revive the Vedic religion, emphasizing the importance of sacrifice and discouraging the worship of idols and many deities and distinctions of castes. He tried also to turn Hinduism into a combatant and proselytizing faith in order to prevent conversion and to reconvert the Hindus who had been converted into other faiths, and partly succeeded in his mission.

The Theosophical Society.—The Theosophical Society is another organization which contributed largely to Indian renaissance. Theosophy was introduced into India by Madame Blavatsky and Colonel Olcott and Adyar (Madras) became the Society's headquarters in 1882. The Theosophical Society, being a world organization throwing its gates open to the followers of every religion, is not a branch of Hinduism. But it came as a message from the West to the Hindus that there were many good things in their faith which even others can accept. Mrs. Annie Besant, who was, for a long time, its foremost leader, even taught that Hinduism and Buddhism were the greatest religions of the world. This helped the Hindus in rallying against adverse criticism and encouraged them to search for the greatest elements in their religion and get rid of its distorted expressions. The Theosophical Society began to publish the many basic Scriptures and their translations.

The main principles of the Society are to be found in Leadbeater's Textbook of Theosophy. Its central doctrines are the immanence of God and the solidarity of man. "Its secondary teachings are those which are common teachings of all religions, living or dead; the Unity of God, the triplicity of his manifestation; the descent of Spirit into matter, and hence the graded ranks of Intelligences, whereof humanity is one; the growth of humanity by the unfoldment of consciousness and the evolution of bodies, i.e. reincarnation, the progress of the growth under inviolable law, the law of causality, i.e. karman, the environment of this growth, i.e. the three worlds, physical, emotional and mental, or earth, the intermediate world and heaven; the existence of divine Teachers, superhuman men, often called the White Brotherhood, the Elder Brothers of
the race." It will be found thus that many of the characteristic elements of Hinduism have been incorporated in Theosophy. It is no wonder that it should have attracted many educated Indians to its fold.

The Rāmakrishna Mission.—It is difficult to dissociate social reform from religious reform in India. The first person to discourage social reformers as such, asking them to go back first to spiritual realization and learn to separate the essentials from non-essentials, was Svāmī Vivekānanda, who founded the Rāmakrishna Mission in 1897. He felt more strongly than many others that the true Hindu religion could not be lost if a śūdra read the Vedas, if a widow remarried, if an untouchable was touched, if a non-Hindu was converted to Hinduism or if a Hindu married a non-Hindu. Hence he taught that all reforms could be made within the Hindu fold itself, without starting new societies, which tended to become new divisions and castes within Hinduism, thereby endangering its solidarity. It should be said to the credit of the Rāmakrishna Mission that it has been trying systematically not only to eschew all caste, creed and race distinctions, but also as closely to associate and even identify itself with the main Hindu tradition as it is possible for it to do without reintroducing these distinctions. And it may be added that it has accomplished this task admirably well.

Vivekānanda was a disciple of Śrī Rāmakrishna, who preached that all religions taught the same spiritual truth. Rāmakrishna was not an academical philosopher and did not arrive at the conclusion through rationalization. He had no Western education and his knowledge of even the ancient śāstras was meagre. He was an ordinary priest at the temple of Kāli in Dakṣināstara near Calcutta. But he was a spiritual genius and realized the truth of the inner Spirit through devotion to the goddess. He prayed in a church and a mosque to realize the unity of faiths. He therefore preached the unity of all religions. Svāmī Vivekānanda also preached the identity of the spiritual truth behind all religions. He saw this truth in the monistic idealism of Vedānta as expounded by Śaṅkara in his commentaries on the Upaniṣads and the Brahma-sūtra. So philosophically, the Rāmakrishna Order follows the tradition (sampradāya) of Śaṅkara. But monks are taken from all sects and castes of Hinduism, and also from other religions.

One great innovation which Vivekānanda introduced into the order is compulsory social service which every novice had to do before becoming a monk (samnyāsin); and many do it even afterwards. Vivekānanda got the idea from the Christian missions. Service of the poor is called the worship of daridra-nārāyaṇa (God as the poor), which is an application of the ancient truth that the Divine resides in every man. In this field, the Mission has been doing splendid work, running educational and charitable institutions, hospitals and industrial schools, and organizing relief work. Hinduism, in this modern phase, tries to show that renunciation is not
opposed to selfless social and humanitarian service; nay, that the latter offers good training in the practice of selflessness.

3. THINKERS IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE

A Handicap of Traditional Outlook.—With the rise of nationalism, when India felt the need for strong and sincere political activity, her leaders felt that they were handicapped by the other-worldly attitude which the ancient religion and philosophy engendered in the minds of many. Reorientation of Hinduism for political inspiration thus became necessary.

Tilak and the New Interpretation of the Gītā.—Lokamānyā Bāl Gaṅgādhar Tilak reinterpreted the Bhagavad-Gītā showing that according to it karma-mārga (the way of action) is the highest of all the paths of God-realization. For Lord Kṛṣṇa repeatedly exhorts Arjuna to act without thinking that he is the agent of his actions, to do his duty without thinking of the results, and the whole of the Gītā would be pointless, were it not for prompting the dejected Arjuna to act.

In addition to the mārga (path to salvation) advocated by Buddhism, which consists, as later Buddhists understood it, in resolving the individual into nothing, orthodox Hinduism advocated mainly three, jñāna-mārga (the path of knowledge), bhakti-mārga (the path of devotion) and karma-mārga (the path of action). The first two generally involve renunciation of everything including action and eschewing all connection with the world. The third preaches performance of actions, at the same time thinking of oneself as only an instrument in the hands of God (nimittatma) and not as the agent of actions. For some reason or other, most of the religious leaders (ācāryas), including Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, underestimated the value of karma-mārga, with the result that, in general, the aspirant after the Divine developed indifference to action and values of the world; and this attitude resulted in lack of interest in matters social and political. This is considered to be one of the reasons for the political downfall of India.

The Revolutionary Movement and the Revival of the Heroic Cult.—The revolutionary leaders of Bengal found another aspect of the ancient religion useful for the purpose. Bengal has long been the home of the Tantric worship of sakti or the energy aspect of Divinity, which is identified sometimes with the terrible, destructive aspect of the universe and the worship of which is attended with the slaughter of animals. In Mahārāṣṭra (Bombay) also this form of worship has been prevalent, particularly among the fighting castes, as would be evident from the fact that the great Marhatta hero, Shivaji worshipped the goddess Bhavāni. The revolutionaries revived the worship of the dynamic divine power for the infusion of courage and heroism. The Bhagavad-Gītā interpreted as
a gospel of work without fear and attachment also became a source of inspiration to them. The motherland figured in their imagination as the concrete embodiment of the Divine Mother. She became Mother India (Bhārata-mātā) and an object of worship; service of this Mother became their religion. Killing of the enemy for the emancipation of the motherland came also to be justified and supported with the authority of the Gītā in which Lord Kṛṣṇa persuaded Arjuna to kill even his kinsmen as a matter of duty.

Mahātmā Gandhi.—Mahātmā Gandhi gave a new turn to the political ideology of India. Violence in every sphere and form was, for him, a sin. It was the result of inner weakness and fear and the lack of faith in the inner divinity of man. Political freedom was only a means to the spiritual freedom of man and not an end in itself. Adoption of a bad means, even for a good end, corrupts the man as well as the end achieved. He discouraged, therefore, the use of violence even in politics. He attempted also to interpret the teachings of the Scriptures, particularly the Gītā, in this light.

Hindu Spirituality and the New Ideas of Socialism and Communism.—Besides the ideas of democracy as represented by the British and American forms of government, the ideas of socialism and communism also have spread among the higher and lower strata of the Indian society. But they will not and cannot come into conflict with Hindu religion as such. One great difference between the Christian religious institutions and the Hindu is the emphasis which the latter place upon renunciation. Though Christ preached that it is as difficult for the rich man to enter heaven as it is for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, the history of the Christian Church, except for some orders, is a glaring example of how His teaching is discarded. Further, the Church entered secular politics so many times and so aggressively that it presented a most unfavourable contrast between itself and the meek humility of the Galilean who died on the Cross. The popular mind of Europe came in time to identify Christianity with power, capitalism and worldly splendour, and began to suspect an element of insincerity in its other-worldly teachings. But in India, whatever the labourer may say against the capitalist, he does not think that the samnyāsin in his red robes is an agent of the capitalists or that he can ever be made such an agent. It is therefore not safe to think that because the Indians are highly religious, socialism and communism can never establish themselves in India. They may fail, but not for that reason. The word religious is ambiguous: if it means spiritual, the Indians are certainly so; if it means that the Indians will tenaciously cling to certain external forms, then we are mistaken. Caste system, untouchability, and all forms of capitalism may be abolished; even then the Indians can claim to be spiritual and reject the materialism of Western communism. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru utters a significant truth when he says in his
India and the World: that, though India may turn, in her attempt to solve her new problems, to the new civilization built up and fostered by Soviet Russia, she will do so "in her own way, making the structure fit in with the genius of her people." It is again the truth of the plastic spirituality of Hinduism.

4. METAPHYSICAL CURRENTS

The religious, social and political movements described above form a stirring atmosphere to contemporary philosophers of India, both academical and non-academical. It is yet not true to say that all the Indian philosophers are actuated by all the currents. Even those who have felt their force have not developed their thought in all the directions. But it is a promising sign that many are becoming increasingly conscious of the new task that faces the philosophers of India.

The Philosophy of Tagore.—Rabindranath Tagore is a poet rather than a professional philosopher. But he attempted to present a coherent view of the world in some of his books. Tagore is a monist, though he does not deny the reality of the world. Like most of the contemporary Indian thinkers he denounces the negative attitude towards the world and does not regard it as a product of māyā or illusion, as some popular traditional forms of the Advaita did. He believes that God has expressed Himself in His creation. True insight reveals, therefore, the beauty and harmony of God's creative act behind all apparent conflict and chaos in this world. Tagore says that the world may be appearance, māyā, produced by God. Yet it is God's work of art, and God is the artist. We are interested naturally in the picture painted on the canvas and not in the blank canvas as such.

Though Tagore admits that logically the impersonal Absolute or Brahman cannot be disproved he says that in religion, which belongs to the phenomenal world, Reality is best understood as the supreme Person. Tagore's absolutism is, therefore, personalistic. As finite beings, we cannot understand the Supreme as impersonal; for our thought, which is limited and finite, puts its own limitations upon the unlimited, and "limitation of the unlimited is personality: God is personal when He creates."

The supreme Person is the Law of all laws. The so-called laws are only reflections of His unity in the manifold. So these laws will not be felt as restraining the activity and limiting the freedom of the finite human being, if he surrenders his individuality to the supreme Person and becomes one with Him. And becoming one with Him means losing ourselves in Him through love. Love is truth. In knowledge, the distinction between the known and the knower is not lost; but it is overcome in love.

Dr. Bhagavān Dās and his Advaita as Inclusive of Negativity.—The
unwillingness to treat the world as a mere negative entity, without being and value, is noticeable also in the philosophy of Dr. Bhagavān Dās. He thinks that Śaṅkara’s formulation of Advaita was not right: because, of the two factors, the “I” and the “This,” Śaṅkara affirmed the “I” and denied the “This.” But the one cannot exist without the other. The nature of ultimate Reality must include both as two moments. But the “I” is not the “This.” So the form of Reality is best expressed by saying, “I-This-Not” (aham-etan-na).

The relation between the “I” and the “This” is sakti (power, force) or negation. The relation is the relation of necessity, for it holds between the members of an indivisible whole. “I-This-Not” is a unity, not a mere combination of three independent terms. “This necessity is the one law of all laws, because it is the nature of the changeless, timeless, spaceless Absolute; all laws flow from it, and are included within it.” Dr. Bhagavān Dās calls this sakti by the name māyā, treating it as a combination of “Is” and “Is not,” not as Śaṅkara interprets it as neither “Is” nor “Is not.” He is more known as a writer on social problems than as a metaphysician. He thinks that philosophy ought to be practical and helpful to man and society. In his writings, he interprets caste in the light of the psychological divisions enunciated by Plato in his Republic.

Mr. J. Krishnamurti.—Once a central figure in the Theosophical Society, Mr. Krishnamurti does not claim allegiance to any philosophical system or tradition. He is an advocate of that principle of Hindu sādhanā (spiritual discipline) according to which one should try for one’s salvation and no vicarious help can redeem one from bondage. Neither a guru, nor the observance of ritual, nor obedience to tradition will help a man. Spiritual truth lies deep within oneself, and so it has to be realized by oneself and by one’s own efforts.

Reality is pure life running its course. Our individuality is created in it through ignorance. When the latter is dispelled, the individual becomes one with pure life, and his strife ends. Life passes from unconscious perfection in the lower forms of nature to conscious perfection in the “I.” It is in ignorance that we treat Truth or God as lying beyond us.

This life is beyond duality, and it is natural for man to become one with it. “As a river makes its way to the sea, so must the individual make his way to reality.” Nay, nature herself sees that man finally dissolves his individuality and so universal salvation is a predetermined fact.

The illusory “I,” which is opposed to “not-I,” is dissolved by what Krishnamurti calls the method of self-consciousness, which is the method of becoming more and more self-conscious until ultimately self-consciousness itself vanishes. “Consciousness is of the ego, and when we are rid of our consciousness, there is reality that is free of self-consciousness.”

Sri Aurobindo Ghosh.—Aurobindo Ghosh is a practical yogin and mystic.
In his philosophy, he is greatly influenced by the Western scientific theory of evolution and the Western positive attitude to the material world. But he discovered both the elements in the Śaiva and the Śākta forms of the Advaita. One can see the influence of those traditions (sampradāyas) both in his sādhanā (religious practice) and his philosophy. The Tantras interpret māyā not as mere illusion but treat it as a positive entity, as the Sakti (energy) of Śiva, which evolves, without affecting the purity of Śiva, the world out of itself. Aurobindo reinterprets the Gītā from his own point of view. The aim of his yoga is to gather the power of the Absolute and use it for the establishment of the kingdom of God on earth. As the jīva (individual) is essentially identical with the Absolute (Śiva), he can do so. The world is real and is the result of the transformation (parināma) of Sakti. Corresponding to the evolution of matter out of Sakti, there is involution of it into Sakti. This process is cyclic. Here Aurobindo introduces the modern conception of evolution of life and mind out of matter. Sakti is identical with Śiva (the Brahma or the Absolute) as heat is with fire, and is therefore conscious like Him. The involution of matter into Sakti, which is the reverse form of the original evolution, is the same as the evolution of the forms of life and mind out of matter. Matter transforms itself into the higher form of life, and life into mind and consciousness. The mind is the mind of the jīva, above which there are three supernal minds, the Overmind, the Supermind and Sac-cid-ānanda which is the highest ideal to be realized. The realization of it places at the disposal of man, who then becomes identical with Śiva Himself, the latter’s Sakti (power); and man becomes Superman. But this Superman, unlike the superman of Nietzsche, is not an egotist, self-assertive and aggressive, but one who has surrendered his own ego (ahamkāra) to Śiva and merged himself in the Absolute. He is a self-ruler and does not strive to stamp his own individuality upon the world.

Professor K. C. Bhattacharya.—Professor K. C. Bhattacharya supports the philosophy of Absolute Monism. He does not attempt to interpret or expound Śaṅkara’s doctrine, but tries to defend its truth by a new approach through the philosophy of Kant. He is not satisfied, however, with the agnosticism of Kant with regard to the Ideas of Reason. According to Kant, none of the categories of understanding are applicable to the things-in-themselves and they are, therefore, unknowable. At this point, Bhattacharya joins issue with Kant and follows the Upaniṣads which declare Brahman to be beyond speech and thought and yet not unknowable.

It is difficult to explain his intricate argument in a short section, but the central idea seems to be that we speak of everything including the Absolute; so everything is speakable. The speakable is of two kinds, the symbolically speakable and the literally speakable. The literally speakable comprises what is spoken of for information and what is only spoken but
not spoken of. Of these what is only spoken is spoken either as symbolized or as meant. Truth is only symbolically spoken, reality is literally spoken as symbolized, and the self-subsistent is literally spoken as meant. "None of these is spoken of as information, while fact is spoken of as information." We thus get Truth, Reality and Self-subsistent and Fact as the four kinds of objects of speech. The difference between Truth and Reality is that while the latter is enjoyed, the former is not.

*Radhakrishnan and the Advaita of Integral Experience.*—He is a follower of Śaṅkara, though he does not treat the world as an illusion as most of the traditional followers of Śaṅkara do. He regards māyā as a concept of explanation. It means only that the creation of the world is inexplicable, but not that the world is devoid of value and importance. He would rather regard the world as a combination of Being and Non-being, sat and a-sat, than as neither sat nor a-sat, as most of the later logical exponents of Advaita would hold. Śaṅkara himself speaks of the appearance, in one place, as the combination of truth and untruth (op. satyānte mithunikṛtya), and Radhakrishnan can be said to follow him in this respect.

Radhakrishnan reconciles the views of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja by maintaining that the Brahman of Śaṅkara is the Absolute and that of Rāmānuja is God. God is a person, but the Absolute is not. God is an object of the intellect, but the Absolute is known through intuition. Intuition is higher than intellect and it overcomes the dualism of subject and object. Our thought is limited; and when it tries to grasp the supra-rational Absolute, it imposes its own limitations on the former. Thus God is the Absolute pressed into the moulds of thought, which cannot do away with the distinction between the self and the other. But the distinction is overcome in intuition, which is yet a form of experience more direct (sākṣāt) than thought and perception, which is not infra-rational but supra-rational.

Radhakrishnan believes in the simultaneous salvation of all (sarvamukti) but not in the salvation of each separately (pratyeke-mukti). This view is not new to the Advaita, and was held by one of the sub-Schools headed by Vācaspati. As God is the creator of the world, so long as the world lasts God must continue as God without becoming one with the Absolute. But the individual (jīva) who is a creature of God, must remain with God till the latter enters the Absolute. And the world cannot disappear if there is a single soul without salvation. So individual salvation can only be incomplete salvation; and souls that realize the ultimate Truth will remain with God till the final dissolution of the world. Radhakrishnan is a meliorist. In fact, some form of meliorism is ultimately unavoidable; for it would be unreasonable to imagine that God would better the world by a fiat or an act of miracle while human beings merely look on. God works only through human beings, His creatures, leaders of men in thought and action. This is a truth implied by the Hindu
doctrine of incarnation (*avatāra*); for such men really possess sparks of the Divine.

NOTES

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CHAPTER XIX—continued

CONTEMPORARY INDIAN THOUGHT (B)

I

No precise date can be fixed for the birth of contemporary India, but we can trace its beginnings in the half-century after the death of Aurangzeb. This was the period which saw the gradual rise of European political influence and the parallel decay of power of Indian principalities. The decisive battle of Panipat took place in the same year as the battle of Wandewash. Between them, they decided the course of the future political developments on the Indian sub-continent.

An earlier chapter has indicated how the clashing movements and contending ideas of these tumultuous days led to the rise of Shah Walliullah who attempted a synthesis of old and new in order to achieve a regeneration of Moslem society. The seed that was sown by him germinated in his own life-time, but his influence became even more widespread after his death. Within a century after him, his teachings bore fruit in the form of a vigorous movement led by Maulvi Saiyyed Ahmed of Rae Bareilly and Maulvi Mohammad Ismail of Delhi. Saiyyed Ahmed was a pupil of Shah Abdul Qadir, the eldest son of Shah Walliullah. The object of the movement was to revive the spirit of Islam by creating a modern State on truly Islamic lines. With his friend and admirer, Maulvi Mohammad Ismail who was a man of great learning and a polished speaker, Saiyyed Ahmed selected the predominantly Moslem area in the North-Western part of India for organizing this movement. The geographical and political situation there offered greater chances of initial success and a strong band of Moslems all over Northern India flocked under his banner.

It is wrong to consider this movement as an attempt at the revival of narrow-minded theological orthodoxy. The last great martyr of the cause, Shah Ismail, was, like its founder Shah Walliullah, a very philosophical and broad-minded religious thinker. He too believed in the unity of faiths and gave utterance to his conviction that the same Divine Guidance is the source of all great religions. They differ in their forms and rituals but they are only the outer garb which had to be changed from time to time to suit different times and different climes.

Shah Ismail, in his philosophical book, the Abaqat, writes about the Divine Sage, "The Siddique," in the following terms: "If he finds himself among the people who believe in Torah (The Old Testament) and is asked
to sit as a judge among them he will give his decisions according to the Law of Moses, and similarly among the Christians he will decide according to the New Testament; and among the followers of the Qurān, he will decide according to the Qurān. The fact is that in all great religions followed by large portions of humanity, you will find people who are in tune with the Divine. Christian monks, Jewish Rabbis, Greek Philosophers, Zoroastrians, Hindu yogins; the patterns of their spiritual approach to the Life Divine are found in a stable condition in the Realm of the Spirit. All these great creeds originate in that Realm. They were all pure at the source, but with the lapse of time they acquired vicious accretions in the form of wrong ideas and bad customs. All creeds get distorted by perverted interpretations and the minds of their followers are prevented from realizing the original spirit of their teachings. Later generations give quite a different meaning to the original creed. The sage possesses the capacity of removing all accretions and discovering the original shape and essence of a religion. He sees it in the Realm of the Spirit in all its original purity because his soul is awake."

The British stigmatized the movement as the Wahabi Movement, but this is not correct. Maulvi Saiyed Ahmed, although he had been to Arabia and was fully acquainted with the Wahabi trend of thought, was not a follower of Mohammad bin Abdul Wahab of Nejd. The ultimate goal of both of them was, no doubt, almost the same. They both sought to purify Islamic thought and spirit from foreign elements and to present to the world a complete picture of genuine Islamic conceptions, political, social and religious. This parallelism between the two movements has led to the erroneous belief that the Indian movement was an offshoot of the Wahabi impulse. As a matter of fact, it was a thing of indigenous growth having its roots in the teachings of Shah Waliullah of Delhi and not of Mohammad bin Abdul Wahab of Nejd. The error is attributable to the general ignorance of Shah Waliullah’s views and of Maulvi Saiyed Ahmed’s association with those who had received inspiration direct from him.

The Waliullah movement which still continues to produce thinkers, revolutionaries and great theologians did not succeed in its attempt at an over all reformation or revolution, but it created potentialities which continued to be partially effective in the religious and political movements of modern times. The late Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi (1881–1948) lived and worked in the conviction that this teaching if properly understood and worked is capable of creating a revolutionary state and society. Such a society could synthesize the heritage of all the great cultures, leaving to every people the freedom to develop according to its own peculiar genius. Unity in diversity is the law of life in all its aspects and it should be the basis of the internationalism of peoples and creeds. God does not want a colourless uniformity of humanity. Intolerance of other cultures and
creeds is a sign of ignorance. A narrow-minded religious man is a contradiction in terms.

II

For any new movement of reconstruction of Muslim thought and life we have to come to the year 1857 when the mutiny finally smashed the already tottering body politic and gave a death-blow to Muslim power and influence. The new conquering and overwhelming power came from beyond the Seven Seas. It was very soon realized by great thinkers and reformers like Raja Ram Mohan Roy and Sir Syed Ahmed Khan that it was not a simple military conquest and that the West had gained power over the East by superiority of knowledge. Instead of vainly striving to revolt against the foreigner and to preach hatred for him, the wiser course would be to reform our own life and assimilate the new values brought by the West and create a new synthesis of material and scientific progress with our own spiritual heritage, if we could free it from all blighting and thwarting encumbrances. There is a great deal that is common between these great thinkers and reformers. Both of them were great scholars who set to work to make a study of comparative religion and get back to the essence of their own great heritage. Both of them strove to throw off the crushing burden of their respective orthodoxies. Both of them attempted a reconciliation of science and religion. Both of them were rationalists and believed that theism of the purist and the highest kind was a rational creed and the religion of nature. Both of them believed that no society can lead a healthy life that spurns all change and progress. Both of them believed that religion instead of being a conservative and reactionary force, retarding the progress of humanity by fossilized dogmas, ought to become a dynamic force for all-round amelioration and advance.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan began to interpret Islam in terms of rationalism and naturalism of the nineteenth century. He attempted to free Islam and Moslem society from the shackles of obnoxious orthodoxy. It was an anti-mullah movement, therefore all mullahdom gathered together to thwart his attempts at reform. For the history of Moslem thought in India the distinguishing feature of Syed Ahmed Khan’s attitude towards Islam is that he sincerely believed in the eternal truth of Islam and at the same time was convinced that original Islam could be completely reconciled with modern science and rationalism. He held that the best elements of modern European science and culture could be assimilated by the East as the West had once assimilated the cultural heritage of Islam. He was by no means a blind imitator of the West nor was he suffering from that inferiority complex from which at least two later generations of Indians suffered so deplorably. He gathered round him a batch of cognate spirits who together defeated the forces of reaction that were ranged against the
movement, though he did not achieve that amount of success which his progressive thought deserved. Aligarh continued to produce leaders of thought and action though none of them reached the calibre of its founder. He wanted his nation to get rid of British domination in the long run by assimilating the values of modern civilization. As Macaulay prophesied in his famous Minute on education in 1835, that English education will ultimately create dark Englishmen in India who will demand to be governed by British democratic institutions, so Syed Ahmed Khan his contemporary was convinced that Islamic abiding values could be and should be synthesized with modern science and progress to create a free and self-respecting nation. He was no mystic and revolutionary like Shah Waliullah but he was one with that great thinker of the early eighteenth century in believing in the rationality and universality of religion when seen in all its purity.

III

So far as the rational interpretation of Islam and the Qurán is concerned, the most notable commentary after the commentary of Syed Ahmed Khan is the work of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. He started as a versatile litterateur and journalist, then drifted into practical politics and the struggle to free the country from foreign domination and ended by becoming a great political leader on the one hand and one of the most liberal and scholarly commentators of the Qurán and Islam on the other. Although his early education was entirely Islamic and Oriental he imbibed through the gift of his supreme intelligence much of the spirit of modern scientific research. According to his own statement there is hardly any thorn of doubt that has not at one time or other pricked his heart. Off and on he has been plunged into scepticism but he has ultimately emerged as a staunch and sincere believer in Islam as presented in the Qurán. Like Syed Ahmed Khan he believes that there is no antagonism between genuine religious and genuine scientific research though his knowledge of modern science and modern movements is much wider and richer than could have been possible for Syed Ahmed Khan in his time.

As his thought attitudes touch Syed Ahmed Khan in one aspect, so one could regard him as a link in the chain of Shah Waliullah’s movement. We have already referred to the concepts of Shah Waliullah and his followers about the universality of religion and the fundamental unity of faiths. We have seen that both Shah Waliullah and Shah Ismail believed that beneath the difference of ritual and common law of various religions there is one and the same divine Spirit and source. The laws and conventions and the forms of worship of different religions are the outer garb of the spirit, and there should be no dispute about these forms. Abul Kalam has expounded at length his thesis that Islam is not one out of many religions
with any exclusive dogmas, but is the name given to that universal religion which consists of belief in one God who is immanent in the universe and also transcends it and a belief in the moral order and a life beyond. According to him, active love and Providence are His chief attributes which create all that is true and good and beautiful, and love is derived from love.

Abul Kalam's emphasis on Islam as universal religion necessarily makes him relegate to the background the laws and forms and rituals which are different in different religions. This is in accord with the interpretation of Shah Waliullah as given by his great modern disciple the late Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi. Both of these thinkers have provoked a good deal of opposition from orthodoxy which believes that the laws and rituals of Islam are an integral part of it; they are not a garb but a part of the body and spirit of Islam. Among the modern Moslem nations only the Turks have openly declared their belief and embodied it in their body politic that the eternal and abiding values of Islam are different from legislation which must vary as the circumstances change. If Abul Kalam Azad had been in Turkey he would have heartily and with considerable scholarship supported the Kemalist movement to separate legislation from the essentials of Islam and make progress free and unhampered.

Abul Kalam, who had ceased to believe in the separation of Islam as a religion, consistently strove to create one nation in India. He believed that that which separated the different communities in India was unessential and the essential unity of the multifarious humanity in India could be realized by liberal leadership in religion and politics. Some people think that his leadership in the national movement reacted on his religious conceptions and made him interpret Islam as a universal religion which could embrace the diversity of all other creeds. But the truth may well be otherwise. His belief in the universality of religion and the unity of humanity may well have made him averse to all separatist movements. The fact remains that his interpretation of Islam and the Qurán and his concept of a universal religion make a great appeal to all liberal souls and his commentary is a great contribution to Islam in particular and religion in general.

IV

Undoubtedly the most outstanding thinker in contemporary Moslem India has been the great philosopher-poet Sir Muhammad Iqbal. Iqbal had the good fortune of being educated in Eastern and Islamic as well as Western knowledge. He was born on February 22, 1873, and died on April 21, 1938. He started his career as a Lecturer in philosophy and literature but on his return from Europe in 1908 adopted law as a profession. Very early in life he became famous as a poet. From the very
beginning his poetry was replete with thought; it was thought tinged with emotion. Besides writing poems on general themes he diverted his supreme art towards producing patriotic poems which were widely sung all over the country wherever Urdu or Hindustani was understood. His poem *Hindustān Hamāra* became a sort of national anthem and was chanted in the Indian Assembly on the night that India attained independence. It was also a verse of his that was sung during the course of the running commentary when Gandhi's ashes were being immersed in the Ganges. On the other hand it was his verses which were chanted on the creation of Pakistan; that showed how the soul of a great poet rises above all political divisions.

While in Europe he studied European thought and culture with a penetrating mind. He was conscious both of the good that the West had to offer and the conflicts of industrial imperialism which were tearing to pieces the souls of European nations. It looks paradoxical that it was while he was in the West that he realized the abiding values of Islam and the East. It appears that it was in Europe that he decided to dedicate his gift of poetry to infuse a new life into his nation. After his return from Europe he began to ponder deeply over the problems of his country in general and of the Moslems in particular. The collapse of Moslem political, economical and cultural life touched his soul deeply and he began to devote his poetry to revive the drooping spirit of his people. But while addressing the Moslems, he infused into his poetry life-giving thoughts of the East and the West. He reinterpreted Islam for the Moslems and gave his thought such an emotional tinge that it stirred the chords of every soul.

His first philosophical poem was *Asrār Khud* (the Secrets of the Self) written in classical Persian. This was followed by a second equally long and varied philosophical poem, *Rahmat Be Khud* (the Secrets of Selflessness). He preaches the doctrine of self-realization and rightful self-assertion which was a blend of philosophical idealism, Nietzschean Will to Power, Bergsonian *élan vital* and Islamic thought and traditions. He went on producing philosophical poems and highly emotional songs that would stir his nation to effort and sacrifice. He complained about himself that he was not a man of action, but if it is true that "the verse that nerves a nation's heart is in itself a deed," then his life was a continuous deed. Although he was a lawyer by profession, he made no attempt to make fresh laws for his people, probably believing in the saying that "let me make a nation's songs and I don't care who makes its laws." He has become an integral part of the moral and intellectual consciousness of the Indian Moslems in a manner that is unparalleled in the history of Moslem India. In one of his poems he compares himself to Goethe, but although Goethe was more versatile and his influence on German culture is great and extensive, one could say without exaggeration that Goethe never
became a part and parcel of the German mind to the extent that Iqbal has become integrated with Indian Moslem consciousness.

It is difficult to summarize his teaching in a few words. Like all great geniuses, he imbibed knowledge from all directions. His poems touch all the vital problems of existence and always give you something which is high and deep. Like Shah Waliullah and his spiritual guru, Rumi, he is a great reconciler of opposites. He had a mystic strain in his soul but his mysticism lay in saying "yes" to life. He preaches not the negation of desire but the intensification, glorification and divination of desire. Instead of urging people to seek God he urges them to seek their own true selves because, as he has put it, "God too is searching for man."

Iqbal's thought and life-attitude are vital and dynamic forces of contemporary Moslem India. Although his first and direct appeal is to Moslem consciousness which he proposes to redirect and transform, the comprehensive sweep of his all-embracing outlook contains universal and abiding elements which create a place for him in world literature. In this respect he resembles very much Fichte and Mazzini. Their primary aim was rousing the German and Italian soul respectively, to awaken their humanity and their divinity. As thinkers and philosophers they, however, had to lay down sound and broad intellectual and moral foundations. They did not aim to raise an edifice of narrow and bellicose self-assertion by merely provoking the spirit of group consciousness. Their aim was to give their nations a mission and an aim of total self-realization.

While reading and reciting the songs of Iqbal, human and divine, one is sometimes reminded of the Eternal Bhagavad-Gītā, which Iqbal considered to be the greatest and deepest production of Hindu spiritual and ethical evolution. To convince the Pāṇḍava chief that fighting for a righteous cause is a primary duty, Kṛṣṇa had to traverse the whole gamut of philosophical and religious problems. The occasion appeared to be one of the great dynastic wars, not uncommon in the history of any country or nation, but the situation was utilized by a great soul to acquaint humanity for all time with eternal verities. It appears that an analogous phenomenon has happened in the contemporary history of India. Iqbal saw his nation bewildered by the claims of clashing forces, a victim of degenerate traditions and life-negating outlooks. He believed that the original spirit of Islam was the spirit of eternal and universal Truth which, if realized, could create a life-ameliorating vision for a people. Nations begin to perish only when vision fails and truth-embodying urges become dormant or destroyed.

In a very short sketch, one could only summarize very briefly the achievements of this great philosopher poet. What is the secret of his greatness? The fact appears to be that it was the greatness of his soul and his intellect which could take up into itself the apparent contradictions of life-movements and reconcile them into a great synthesis. When we see
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him opening his mind to every ideology without any fear of losing his centre of gravity, it sometimes appears that his thought system is mere eclecticism which picks up what appears to it good from every system and presents a beautiful bouquet of many colours. But no great soul is merely eclectic; mere eclecticism would not have made Iqbal the force that he proved to be. He has brought together as great opposites as Rumi the great mystic and Nietzsche the atheistic Darwinian Evolutionist. Nietzsche's vision of Superman sometimes degenerates into that of a super-beast that throws away into a limbo of degenerate concepts the spiritual values created during a long course of the spiritual evolution of man. About Nietzsche, Iqbal writes that he has the heart of a believer with the intellect of an infidel. Iqbal believed that some aspects of his revaluation of values are real and may be safely combined with and transformed by healthy spiritual development. Rumi said that the human species has to be transformed and transcended and thus spoke also Zarathushtra in Nietzsche; but the objective and the process made the difference.

On the grand canvas of Iqbal, even dark shades enhance the greatness of the picture. He was greatly influenced by Bergson's doctrine of creative evolution. He agreed with Bergson and the mystics about the inadequacy of a merely logical intellect. Without the help of intuition, intellect cannot get to the core of Being and make man in tune with the Infinitely Creative elan which he identified with the God of Theism and the religious experience of great mystics for whom ultimate Reality was static and dynamic at the same time. As it was the purpose of Iqbal to dynamize humanity, he laid great emphasis on the Dynamic Absolute in whose dynamism man must share in order to become truly human and Divine at the same time.

Evolutionism seems to be the "zeitgeist," the spirit of the times. Iqbal's great contemporary mystic and thinker Śri Aurobindo has transformed the entire Hindu spiritual heritage into a doctrine of dynamic spiritual evolution. Aurobindo takes in his sweep nineteenth-century materialism and twentieth-century socialism and communism and attempts to give an outlook to humanity of integral human development which should leave no side of his life untouched and untransformed. Śri Aurobindo has by a great spiritual vision comprehended into one organized whole the heritage of the East and the West, the old and the new. There is, however, one difference between Iqbal and Aurobindo; Iqbal is not a man of direct mystical experiences but his great emphasis on intuition makes him hover on the border line of mysticism. His perception of mystic truth is only with the apprehension of a poet and a philosopher. Aurobindo is rooted into Vedântic consciousness and harks back to the ancient sages of India who had a direct vision of Truth and lived it. Iqbal is rooted in the spiritual consciousness of Islam. Starting from different roads they seem to converge on very similar object. If Truth is one like God and the uni-
verse, this similarity of outlook of two great religious thinkers of India is nothing to be wondered at.

Many centuries back India produced two great men, Nānak and Kabīr, both theistic mystic thinkers, poets and revolutionaries, one born as a Hindu and the other born as a Moslem, both ultimately attaining to a similar religious consciousness. It may be safely prophesied that in the centuries to come, great souls will continue to emerge from the spiritual background of these two religions, in order to preach to humanity that one great Truth can be approached from different angles. Every great prophet will be a reconciler. However much time and circumstances may vary their approaches, their God will be the same. To quote Rumi who influenced Iqbal greatly as an evolutionary mystic, "Only narrow souls are divided; all great souls are united and form a single community."
PART IV

CHINESE AND JAPANESE THOUGHT

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE THOUGHT
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CONFUCIANISM AND TAOISM
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INDIAN INFLUENCE ON CHINESE THOUGHT
by Prabodh Chandra Bagchi, M.A.,(CAL.), Dr. ès. lettres(Paris)
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THE TEN SCHOOLS OF CHINESE BUDDHISM
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JAPANESE THOUGHT
by Professor D. T. Suzuki
Kamakura, Japan
CHAPTER XXI

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE THOUGHT*

I. INTRODUCTION

It is very difficult to do justice to the various factors and diverse tendencies in the course of the development of the intellectual life of a nation. First of all, the environmental influences on the trends of thought among a people inhabiting a vast territory of wide regional differences must be reckoned with. Koo Yen-Wu (1632-1682)\(^1\) revealed in his scholarly works some important mental and temperamental aptitudes of the Chinese people varying according to their Northern and Southern geographical locations, with the Yellow River as a rough line of demarcation. It is generally believed that, while the Northern mentality tends more to the practical and realistic, the Southern is more speculative and even metaphysical. To use the terminology of William James both in its philosophical and crude sense, the Northerners may be called “tough-minded” and the Southerners “tender-minded.” Although such generalizations are hardly conclusive and easily misleading, yet the environmental influences cannot be entirely overlooked.

The cultural contact of one nation with another may play a significant part in the intellectual development of either. It may enrich a nation’s spiritual heritage and it may also divert and even change the general course of its development. The internal integration of various cultural traits in China brought about a very brilliant period of Chinese philosophy dating from the sixth to fourth centuries B.C.; and the mission of this integration movement was carried on and almost fulfilled about a hundred years later when the Ching dynasty unified China. Thereafter, for a considerable length of time, and due to the extensiveness of her territory, China had failed to derive new stimuli for her culture from her contact with the comparatively backward neighbouring peoples, mostly nomads or tribesmen, until her closer contact with India during the third to the eighth centuries A.D. and that with Europe intermittently during the seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth centuries and then from the middle of the nineteenth century onward began to play their important roles in the later stages of Chinese cultural formation.

Moreover, in different periods of history the intellectual activities of

* In this paper the italicized words are the transliterated Chinese terms, and the words in capital letters are the names of books.—EDITORS.
a people usually converge their course of movement towards a certain specific direction. Their centre of gravitation may shift from time to time, which accordingly may in turn find its expressions in various forms. This historical truism is usually ascribed to the change of conditions of life or the emergence of new circumstances and new problems, or the maturity or even eccentricity of mind, or the interaction or integration of ideas, or the appearance of some master-minds in the form of a new sun around whose orbit other planets are moving. This is called the Spirit of Time or better expressed by the German word “Zeitgeist.” Only by bearing this in mind can we avoid committing any anachronisms of making incoherent and consequently incorrect interpretations of intellectual trends. In order to understand the general characteristics of Chinese thought, a brief survey of the various periods of the intellectual development in China may be appropriate.

2. THE MAIN PERIODS OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

Leaving out the different interpretations of the Chinese thought of the pre-Confucian period, I wish to start the treatment of my problem, only from the time of Confucius, about the sixth century B.C. onward, generally regarded as the beginning of the era of systematic philosophies in China. This is, undoubtedly, the most nourishing and brilliant period of Chinese thought.

To many historians of philosophy it is extremely difficult to explain why this particular period of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. was so unparalleled in history in witnessing the births of so many great philosophers and their great philosophical systems both in the East and in the West. Confucius, the Buddha and Socrates were virtually contemporaries. The opening of this era in China was in great part due to the changing political and social conditions after the decline of the central authority of the Chow dynasty, the encouragement given to the learned men, most of them being sophists, by the warring feudal lords along both sides of the middle and downstream of the Yellow River, and finally the inevitable accumulation of the cultural wealth in appreciable quantity after a long period of peaceful development of the people to be used then as a basis for building up different intellectual edifices.

This period, commonly named the period of “Hundred Schools,” bears a great deal of resemblance to the almost contemporary period in Greek history so far as the conditions of the intellectual activities in both lands are concerned. Multifarious philosophical problems were raised, arguments made, speculations advanced and solutions suggested. When the Ju Chia, afterwards named the Confucian School, expounded the doctrine
of the "Golden Mean" and worked out its consistent philosophy of human relations, Yang Chu (about the fifth century B.C.) advanced his egoism and hedonism, Mo Ti or Mo Tzu (480–439 B.C.) his altruism, stoicism and utilitarianism, and Chuang Tzu (365–293 B.C.) his philosophy of Taoism together with naturalism and even mysticism. The School of Logicians frequently concentrated its arguments on the problem of universals and particulars. Quite opposed to the Confucian interpretation of the Book of Change (Yi Ching) with emphasis on the dynamic and creative nature of the universe, they originated the same riddle against the possibility of motion by the method of analysis just as Zeno the Eleatic did in Greek philosophy; and the version of those Chinese Sophists is "Take a one-foot-long rod and divide it into two every day, and you will find that this halving can never be finished even for ten thousand generations." What an amazing coincidence of parallelism in the development of thoughts in the East and the West!

The limit of space does not warrant an attempt to deal with one and all of the Schools of Chinese philosophy specifically and in detail. Suffice it to mention the four most important ones, namely, Ju Chia or Confucianism, Tao Chia or Taoism, Mo Chia or the philosophy of Mo Tzu and the Legalist School represented by Han Fei Tzu (?–233 B.C.).

Confucius (551–479 B.C.) was primarily a moral teacher, who set up a new standard of human values and a new ethical code to improve the conduct of life of his contemporary and later generations. He had great confidence in his moral and cultural and even political mission. He digested and synthesized the cultural achievements of the past and of his time and re-evaluated and re-interpreted them within the framework of his philosophy. If one says that Confucius was only "a transmitter and not a creator," he is, of course, quoting Confucius describing himself humbly. Viewed objectively, the originality and creativeness of Confucius lie hidden and diffused in his interpretations of and particularly in his commentaries on the old classics. The central theme of his teaching is a perfect development of personality and a proper standardization and adjustment of human relations with a view to the attainment of the supreme good. Yet he took care to refrain from teaching anything much about the supernatural or even the metaphysical. Only in the later periods his disciples, notably Mencius (371–289 B.C.) and Hsun Tzu (298–238 B.C.), took it upon themselves to supply the Confucian philosophy with psychological and metaphysical discourses. The realization of Jen or "human-heartedness" and Yi or "righteousness" is regarded and stressed by the Confucianist as the chief aim of the conduct of a man who is a man. And to strike the "Golden Mean" is the sure way to individual perfection and social harmony.

Taoism as a School of philosophy is chiefly based upon the book Lao Tzu which is dated much later than the time of Confucius and has
nothing to do with the sagacious old man Lao Tan, whom Confucius met. The writings of Chuang Tzu are equally important as the basis of Taoism. And the names of Lao and Chuang are usually linked together as the designation of that School. This School of philosophy, while trying to reveal the underlying laws of nature, stands for conformity with, or is bent on, nature and its laws; hence the doctrine of "Wu-Wei" or inaction. Tao is unnameable: it is the oneness in which both Being and Non-being are dialectically embraced. Lao Tzu, the book named after Lao Tzu the man, is full of paradoxes that carry with them both brilliance and suggestiveness up to the state of being a crystal-gazing. With all its metaphysical veils, Taoism, to my mind, is, at least in certain aspects, an empirical philosophy which derives its truth both from natural phenomena and human experiences, and thus it may yet be developed into a brilliant philosophy of history from its present substance. One cannot fail to appreciate the paradoxes embracing, in the Lao Tzu, wisdom in a nutshell. Here are a few for example: "Real cleverness looks like stupidity; genuine eloquence sounds like stuttering," "Love is victorious in attack and invulnerable in defence. Heaven arms with love those whom it would not destroy." In accordance with the system of thought of the Lao Tzu, action is by inaction and advance by retreat. One is amazed at this theory that "when two armies, well matched in strength, meet, that which is deep in sorrow wins." Sze-Ma Tan of the Han dynasty was right when he said that the School of Military Strategy of the later part of the Chow dynasty owed its origin to the philosophy of Taoism.

Diametrically opposed to the philosophy of inaction is the stern call to action by Mo Tzu, philosopher and prophet. In the book Mo Tzu, Mo Tzu states his teachings in pithy expressions that resemble axioms and postulates of the Euclidean geometry. There is an astounding array of rules of logic and definitions of geometry and some interesting discussions of problems of epistemology. Mo Tzu advocated the doctrine of universal love, from which he derived his altruism, which carried him very far afield so that even Mencius, his philosophical opponent, in justice to him, described him as "a man who would rub his head and wear his heels off to do any man some good." He was a Stoic in the sense that he was strongly against any kind or form of comfort and regarded even music as a luxury. He was a utilitarian in the sense that he was one of the very first philosophers anywhere in the world to develop the theory of pleasure-and-pain and to strive for the greatest good for the greatest number and, for that matter, for the whole of mankind. He preached universal love, and peace as the foundation of human society; and that four hundred years before the Christian era. A true religious prophet, he never missed an opportunity to translate his words into deeds. Because he was by conviction against aggression and war, so he organized his disciples, three hundred strong, into a corps of volunteers and led them to help the weaker
Kingdom of Sung defend her capital against the invading army of the Kingdom of Tzu.

When feudalism began to disintegrate, chaos prevailed. The people wanted urgently political stability and social order to be restored and even the structure of the state to be remodelled. This state of things helped a new School of philosophy to emerge, the Legalist School, whose quick gaining of popularity was in the circumstances a logical outcome. The leading exponent of this School was Han Fei Tzu, a member of the royal family of the Kingdom of Han and a disciple of the famous Confucianist Hsun Tzu. He had the advantage of adopting from the Confucian School the principle of "rectification of names" as a means of putting political services and social functions in their proper order and respective places; from his own master the particular theory that "human nature is evil by origin"; and from Taoism its inherent implication leading to statecraft and political strategy. He preferred reforms to the restoration of the old order and wanted to substitute the rule of law for the reign of men. He advocated "the promulgation of law rather than the use of personal favour." He did not believe that mere education could be enough guidance of human behaviour. As far as one knows, the legalist theory is strongly opposed to the Confucian theory which tries to bring the pressure of moral and ethical principles to bear upon human conduct, as Confucius said, "Guide the people by governmental measures and control or regulate them by the threat of punishment, and the people will try to keep out of jail, but they will have no sense of honour or shame. Guide the people by virtue and control or regulate them by li (propriety), and the people will have a sense of honour and reflect." Besides Han Fei Tzu, Li Sze was another brilliant disciple of Hsun Tzu. Prime Minister of Ching, Li Sze helped his sovereign to complete the gigantic task of unifying China (246 B.C.). But this Legalist school, perhaps due to the powerful and persistent opposition from the Confucianists in turn, never achieved its full development to which it was entitled. Nevertheless, its influences had come to stay. In later periods, enlightened emperors and successful prime ministers and high officials, although dressed in the Confucian mantle, frequently adopted, explicitly or implicitly, the principles and measures of the Legalist School together with a bit of the Taoist philosophy for making constant adjustments to the changing circumstances.

After the Ching dynasty had achieved political unification of China, those rival philosophical Schools gradually died out or lost their significance. Dissidence of thought was no longer encouraged. When the Ching dynasty came to an end (206 B.C.), the succeeding Han dynasty was bent upon consolidating its political power and obtaining social stability, even at the expense of development of thought. Emperor Wu of this dynasty who reigned 140-87 B.C. had under him a Confucian scholar by
the name of Tung Ching-Shu (c. 179–104 B.C.) who was quick enough to take advantage of the tendency of the age and succeeded in persuading his sovereign to proclaim the Confucian classics as the orthodox teaching of the state. And, to satisfy the supernatural craving of the emperor, he took it upon himself to admit into the Confucian philosophical system a part of the theory of the School of Yin-Yang, a School with a mystical and even astrological tinge dating back to the later period of the Chow dynasty. From that time on there was a lull of philosophical activities and contentions, except that Taoism never entirely ceased to be a favoured School of thought in the Court circle and among the educated class. The Confucian scholars were, during that long period, generally devoted to recovering and editing the lost and damaged Confucian classics, which had been once almost completely destroyed by the great fire which occurred in 206 B.C. in Hsien Yang, the capital of the Ching dynasty. In connection with the salvaging of the classics, text criticism and philosophical research were regarded as more urgent, if not more important, than interpretation and philosophizing attempts.

The downfall of the Han dynasty early in the third century was followed in its wake by a long period of chaos. In the beginning of the fourth century, barbarian hordes began to invade China, and as their invasions gained momentum, they set up many petty kingdoms in Northern China, causing or rather forcing a great exodus of the Chinese people, among whom were numbers of literati. They crossed the Yangtze River and settled temporarily in the South-East. Confucianism now suffered a setback. While the barbarous tribesmen had not the good taste for the ethical philosophy, the literati, physically fatigued and mentally depressed as they were, could not take any more of the stern Confucian classical restraint. They looked to Taoism and Buddhism and found that the two philosophies offered in common something they needed very much at the moment: an escape into mystical ecstasy and an asylum in resignation. So Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu were quickly in vogue and the newly-translated Buddhist sūtras were always assured of an enthusiastic reception. So many learned Chinese Buddhists of that period were formerly or simultaneously Taoists. Among them the distinguished monk Huei Yuan (333–416) was known to be constantly quoting Chuang Tzu to help explain the Buddhist philosophy.

The sudden ascendancy of Buddhism in the fourth century opened a new era in Chinese thought, and its influence was strong and far-reaching. The work in translating Buddhist sūtras from the Sanskrit was not started on a large scale for the first time by Kumārajiva (344–413) and carried on by many Chinese Buddhist-scholars in the subsequent periods until it was finally consummated by Yuan Chuang in the seventh century. The result justified the long long years spent: stupendous quantity and unusual literary excellence. Buddhism was transplanted
in the Chinese soil and, consciously or unconsciously, the Chinese Buddhists gradually founded Buddhist Schools or sects of their own, known as Tsung. Although they all claimed to be each originated from certain Sanskrit or Pāli sūtras, yet they, as a matter of fact, developed variations of Buddhist thought with the passing of the years in China as a product of the local genius. There were ten or more such Schools, most of which were embedded in Mahāyāna rather than Hinayāna Buddhism. Among them only the Chin Tu Tsung (Clean Land School) and Chen-Yen Tsung (or Mi Tsung) could be looked upon as mainly religious sects; and the other eight were more identical with philosophy than with religion. While the latter group were able to satisfy the intellectual thirst of the philosophic minds, the former and lesser group supplied the less educated and crudely-thinking masses with concrete images of gods, conventional ways and forms of worship, and the conceptions of the cosmos with heaven and hell as its content, so that the supernatural vacuum in the minds of the common people left by the Confucian ethics could be in some measure filled.

After being under the predominating influence of the Buddhist philosophy for about six centuries, the Chinese genius came back into its own, and Confucianism headed for a development which was only recently given the name of Neo-Confucianism so as to distinguish it from traditional Confucianism. The later period of the Sung dynasty witnessed the high tide of Neo-Confucianism. Some of the leading Neo-Confucianists were characterized not only by their profound Confucian scholarship but also by their earlier excursions into Buddhism. Equipped with a knowledge of the Buddhist teachings and methodology, they worked out a new metaphysics for Confucianism. This new Confucian School formerly known as Li Hsueh, united and strong, flourished for some time as a main current of thought among Chinese scholars, and then it divided itself into two separate Schools. One of them was led by Chen Yi (1032–1085) and Chu Hsi (1130–1200), who together advanced the theory of eternal “Principles” (comparable to the Platonic Ideas) and contended that they were independent of human consciousness. The other School, led first by Lu Chiu-Yuan (1139–1191) and then by Wang Shou-Jen (1472–1528), held that “human mind is a manifestation of the Universal Mind, which is the legislator of the laws of nature.” In this connection I would refer back to Chu Hsi and observe that his commentaries on the Confucian classics exercised a tremendous influence upon Chinese education for many centuries, enjoying the unique position of being the official interpretation of Confucianism authorized by the throne.

In 1582 there came to China Matteo Ricci (1552–1610). His advent in the company of a select group of Jesuit missionaries was an event in the Chinese intellectual world, as he and his fellows, mostly distinguished scholars and scientists, brought with them philosophical and theological
ideas of the West together with the then most up-to-date knowledge of the mathematical and physical sciences. They immediately took to studying the Chinese language, and the Chinese version of the Euclid by Ricci was hailed as a precious piece of work both in the scientific and literary sense. Ricci was followed up by other scholars coming from the West at different times in the span of almost a century. Adam Schall was placed by the throne in charge of the State Observatory for a number of years, a great honour ever given to a foreign scholar. Ferdinand Verbiest held the same distinguished position, made considerable contributions to the increase of astronomical knowledge in China, and helped to reform the Chinese calendar. Terrenz and Gerbillion were physicists and mathematicians of repute. Aletii was deeply interested in translating books of different branches of Western learning into Chinese. This period of the introduction of new knowledge into China synchronized with the age of Galileo, Newton and Leibniz in Europe. Here I should like to think that if modern science, which was thus brought to China by the Jesuits, had had a better way of approach or a more favourable opportunity to take root, to spread, to accumulate and to multiply, China could have been modernized while Europe was being modernized and the entire course of cultural development in China and even in the East would have been changed. Unfortunately, two tendencies among the missionary scholars from the West developed to cut short this inflow of Western knowledge; consequently the newly forged cultural link, still feeble and unconsolidated, was broken. The first trouble was that the Jesuit, Franciscan, and Dominican orders constantly quarrelled among themselves as to the forms of worship which they were to approve for their Chinese converts. The second was that the Jesuits took too much interest and consequently got involved in the Chinese court politics. This break-off was the more lamentable because their cultural activities, even in a limited field and in the course of a comparatively brief period in Chinese history, had already produced some fruitful results. Nevertheless, the scientific spirit brought in by them had come to stay and was evinced by the subsequent development of Chinese philological research, a new scholarship of text-criticism, and the study of astronomy, geography and mathematics. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the broken link was taken up and welded together, so to speak, in a revived cultural contact between China and the West and consequently in a renewed movement among the Chinese people to study Western science and philosophy with greater zeal and avidity. Especially in the past three decades every aspect of Chinese life began to be reviewed, readjusted and re-evaluated by modern scientific standards, and this conscious effort was primarily due to the prevailing influence of the New Culture Movement which was started by Dr. Hu Shih and his group in 1917. The various results of this cultural contact and its subsequent movements in different
fields are still being seen and multiplied in our present day, and even more so in the future.

3. THE CHIEF CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE THOUGHT

Against the historical background of Chinese thought we can proceed to make some observations on its characteristics, which may be regarded as an important part of China’s cultural heritage exercising considerable influence upon the ways of life of the Chinese people.

In the first place, Chinese thought is fundamentally humanistic. The ethical system of Confucius concerns itself chiefly with improvement and harmonization of human relationship. Its starting-point is self-cultivation of the individual and its final goal is realization of Jen or human-heartedness, which is an honest love and the sense of fellow-feeling toward other men. Mencius says: “I should treat the aged in my family properly and extend this to the aged in other men’s families; I should treat the young in my family properly and extend this to the young in other men’s families.” Yi or righteousness is also a cardinal virtue supplementary to Jen. Confucius says: “The noble-minded man comprehends righteousness, whereas the low-minded man comprehends profit.” Li, which used to be wrongly translated as mere “ritual” means, in fact, propriety or proper behaviour or self-discipline. It should, according to Confucius, be supplemented by Yueh or music which has a soothing and harmonizing effect on human nature. It is the negligence and finally the omission of musical nourishment of the life of man in the educational system in the later ages that makes the Confucian ethical code appear rather rigid and restrained.

In the second place, as a result of the strong humanistic influence upon Chinese life and thought, the Chinese mind tends to become more and more detached from the supernatural. Confucius said, “Look after righteousness for the sake of the people; respect the heavenly and earthly spirits and keep them at a distance.” Confucius never talked about monsters, physical exploits, unruly deeds, or heavenly spirits.” He did occasionally mention “heaven,” but by heaven he usually meant “Supreme Being,” “Universal Mind,” “Moral Realm,” or even “First Principle.” True, he and his disciples were inclined to view unusual occurrences or natural upheavals as indexes of good or bad administrations of the powers that be. But they had the true idea to find in some big and concrete event an encouragement or a warning, as the case might be, to the monarch and his officials, hoping thereby to guide them on the right path and to check their autocratic tendencies. A bumper harvest or a lean crop was usually ascribable to a fatherly king or a tyrant. Confucius placed filial piety high among human virtues and allowed ancestral worship not for
any religious reason but as a form of nourishing the affectionate memory of the departed parents and parents' parents and as a way of keeping good family traditions and examples for the living children and children's children. Idol worship went alongside ancestral worship, from both of which common people might derive some mental peace or spiritual consolation. But idol worship was tolerated only as heterodoxy was tolerated, and it was never given an intellectual justification.

While most Chinese people have little or no interest in the supernatural, they are content with harmonizing themselves with nature and seek delight in nature. This bent of mind is to a great extent attributed to the influence of Taoism and particularly to the teaching of Chuang Tzu. Chinese scholars and poets simply love to be intoxicated by the beauty of nature and to feel lost in the bosom of Mother Earth with her mountains and rivers. Landscape, therefore, occupies a unique and unrivalled position in Chinese painting. Those who love nature not only do not wish to conquer nature but also seek to absorb nature into the mind and then to project nature in colours and lines, or to form nature in a string of poetic conceptions. Hsun Tzu was the only philosopher in China who upheld the theory of the conquest of nature, but his conception was never persistently stressed by his followers. That was why the physical sciences had not been systematically developed in China until she came into contact with the West.

In the third place, the Chinese mind is secular and tolerant, and when religion enters there it generally and often quite unnoticeably loses its intolerance, if any in its nature. A household adage runs, "Religions may be many, but reason is one." Reason does not go together with intolerance, still less fanaticism. Religious tolerance means the freedom of worship and the equality of one faith to another. The modern Chinese family is, not infrequently, the home of different religions: the father may be a Buddhist, the mother may be a Taoist, the son may be a Christian; and nobody worries about them. Religion is a matter of the individual's own choice, or sometimes even a matter of the individual's taste, that should be entirely free from interference or conversion. No state religion in the sense of formal and supernatural religion, no established Church, and no Conformist movement has ever existed in China. So a religious war is quite inconceivable to the Chinese, who find it very difficult to understand and explain the Crusades or any Holy War. In Chinese thought, as in Chinese history, there is no such institution as "Inquisition," or such a system as "Index."

Since there is tolerance in religion, there is tolerance in ideas. New ideas, scientific, philosophical or even political, always find an open mind which absorbs them as they come along. The Copernican theory and Darwinism, which had such a long struggle for emergence and caused so much persecution for their reception in the West, the land of their birth,
had simply a smooth sailing into the minds of educated but alien Chinese as soon as they learned these novel theories from some authoritative works and convincing proofs. Tolerance, when and if it is carried to the extreme, may produce a state of mind bordering on intellectual indifference; but it, nevertheless, has shown the great merit of facilitating the assimilation of new knowledge by the Chinese people.

In the fourth place, the democratic trend in Chinese thought is strong and evident. It was mainly derived from Confucian humanism, but to this important current of thought the teachings of other masters, such as Chuang Tzu's doctrine of "Levelling all Things" and Mo Tzu's principle of "Universal Love," all contributed their proper shares. The great exponent of the democratic ideas was Mencius who took, in his political philosophy, the people as the measure of everything. The will of Heaven is manifested in the will of people. "The people are of first importance, the state next and the ruler is least important of all," said Mencius. "The institution of monarchy is merely functional and nothing is divine in the king. Even the ancient sage-kings Yao and Shun were of the same species as ourselves." Revolution can be perfectly legitimate in case of serious misgovernment and political oppression. The view stated in the Book of Change, an ancient classic, that "the revolutions led by Tong and Wu (both being ancient sage-kings) were in accordance with the order of Heaven and in response to the wish of men," was just the thesis that Mencius vigorously defended.

These democratic principles of Mencius were actively revived in the later part of the seventeenth century by Hwang Chung-Hsi (1610–1695) whose two famous treatises "On Ruler" and "On Subject" launched a vigorous and brilliant attack on the theory of the "divine right of kings." The powerful exposition of the idea of contract between the ruler and the ruled in Hwang's treatises is found only comparable to that in Rousseau's Le Contrat Social (1762), in a comparatively later period of the modern history. Hwang's work, however, appeared about a century before that of Rousseau. Although Hwang failed to make his influence felt during his life-time when the imperial rule of the Tsing or Manchu dynasty was at its zenith, yet the revival of his School of thought did take place in the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. His book Ming Yi Tai Fond Lu, containing the two famous treatises, was reprinted and circulated in hundreds of thousands of copies to support, substantiate and strengthen the revolutionary cause that led to the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1911.

One would like to raise the question, quite legitimately, why China, with such a treasure of democratic ideas, had failed to establish her democratic form of Government prior to any in modern times. There are, naturally, some social and political reasons to be given. But to an historian of philosophical thoughts, the long existing gap between the
Confucian ethics and the conception of law held by the Legalist School serves as an explanation that, just for that reason, the noble political principles of the former School failed to be institutionalized. And the decline of the School of Mo Tzu caused the decline of the evangelical spirit of the Chinese people in regard to political and social reforms. Yet, in spite of that, a great under-current of social democracy has always been there, half hidden and half apparent, in China. The long-established state examination system for selecting talents for public offices precluded and removed class or caste distinctions. The broad view of parentalism, the extensive size of the family and the different systems of local relief work all served and are no doubt still serving as great socializing forces, particularly in the rural and interior parts of China.

The Principle of Ta-Tung or the Great Commonwealth of Confucius which covers all the political, social, economic and cultural aspects of human life, should always remain as the guiding philosophy towards an ideal state for mankind:

“When the great Tao prevailed, the world was a common state, rulers were elected according to their wisdom and ability, and mutual confidence and peace prevailed. Therefore, people not only regarded their own parents as parents and their own children as children. The old people were able to enjoy their old age, the young men were able to employ their talent, the juniors had the elders to look up to, and the helpless widows, orphans and cripples and deformed were well taken care of. The men had their respective occupations and the women had their homes. If the people didn’t want to see goods lying about on the the ground, they did not have to keep them for themselves, and if people had energy for work, they did not have to labour for their own profit. Therefore there was no cunning or intrigue and there were no bandits or burglars, and as a result, there was no need to shut one’s outer gate (at night). This was the period of Ta-Tung, or the Great Commonwealth.”

The above-mentioned components and manifestations of thought form such stuff as Chinese civilization is made of. They have their merits and demerits, advantages and disadvantages, blessings and curses, cherished achievements and unpleasant consequences. Before this philosophical panorama one stands inspired with a desire to study, review and re-evaluate.

What is more important, we find ourselves in a new era of cultural contact, impact and integration. East is no more East and West is no more West, as the dwindling of distance and the ever-increasing inventions for
transmitting thoughts and disseminating ideas are constantly forcing
the Titan twins to meet. The birth of a new civilization, perhaps a world
civilization, or possibly several civilizations, is being heralded. Nothing
old can retain its old form or substance because it is old and nothing new
can come into being or come to stay by completely shaking off the past, as
this past is inherent and living in the nature of those who inherit it. This is
part of the great scheme of evolution, which merely means change and
never implies progress. Progress presupposes an aim, an ideal before or
ahead of us. In this gigantic process of a new cultural formation, broad
visions and high ideals among all thoughtful people in the world are the
prerequisites for fulfilling their common noble mission of accelerating
cultural advancement toward perfection of mankind through united
endeavour in intellectual co-operation.

NOTES

1. 顧炎武
2. 儒家
3. 楊朱
4. 墨翟
   Also known as Mo Tzu.
   "Tzu" means master.
5. 莊周或莊子
6. 名家
7. 易經
8. 道家
9. 墨家
10. 法家
11. 韓非子
12. 孟子
13. 荀子
14. 仁
15. 義
16. 老子
17. 老聃
18. 司馬談
19. 兵家
20. 李斯
21. 董仲舒
22. 隨陽子
23. 咸陽
24. 慧遠
25. 鳳濤羅什
26. 玄奘
27. 宗
28. 龔士宗
29. 真言宗或密宗
30. 理學
31. 程顥
32. 朱熹
33. 陸九淵
34. 王守仁
35. 利瑪竇
36. 湯若望
37. 南懷仁
38. 鄧玉函
39. 張誠
40. 艾儒略
41. 胡適
42. In the long history of China there were only three
cases of religious persecution worth mention. They
were also short-lived.
43. 尧
44. 舜
45. 湯
46. 武
47. 黃宗羲
48. 明夷待訪錄
49. 禮運大同篇
CHAPTER XXII

CONFUCIANISM AND TAOISM

I. INTRODUCTION

It must be said at the very beginning that "Confucianism" is a Western term. It is said to be the equivalent of the Chinese term Ju Chia which means the School of Literati. The Western term does not suggest, as the Chinese term does, that followers of this School were scholars as well as thinkers; they were the teachers of ancient classics and thus were the inheritors of ancient cultural legacy. This is the reason why this School always carried on the orthodox tradition of the Chinese society, and for more than two thousand years its teaching was recognized by the State as the official philosophy both in education and in daily life.

"Taoism" is also a Western term with an ambiguous meaning. It is said to be the equivalent of two Chinese terms: Tao Chia and Tao Chiao. Although these two terms have the term Tao in them, their denotations are quite different. Tao Chia denotes a philosophy while Tao Chiao a religion. The teaching of Taoism as a philosophy and that of Taoism as a religion are not only different, they are even contradictory. Taoism as a philosophy teaches the doctrine of following nature, while Taoism as a religion that of working against it. For instance, according to the teaching of the Taoist philosophy, life followed by death is the course of nature and man should follow this natural course calmly. But the main teaching of the Taoist religion is the principle and technique of how to avoid death, which is expressly working against nature. In the present chapter I will take the term Taoism to mean Taoist philosophy, because it is Taoist philosophy that has been a real rival of Confucianism.

Confucianism in its original type is a philosophy of social organization, while Taoism in its original type is a philosophy of an anti-social character. Confucianism emphasized the social responsibilities of man, while Taoism emphasized what is natural and spontaneous in him. As the Chinese used to say, Confucianism valued ming chiao (the teaching of names denoting social relationships), while Taoism valued tsu jen (spontaneity or naturalness). These two trends of Chinese philosophy correspond roughly to the traditions of classicism and romanticism in Western thought. These two trends of Chinese thought rivalled one another, but also complemented each other. They exercised a sort of balance of power and the interactions between them marked the development of Chinese thought through Chinese history.
2. CONFUCIANISM

There are three great figures in the Confucianist School: Confucius (551-479 B.C.), Mencius (c. 371-289 B.C.) and Hsun Tzu (c. 298-c. 238 B.C.). As I just said, most of the Confucianists were both scholars and thinkers; Confucius, the founder of the School, was no exception. Besides, he was a great educator. His primary function as a teacher, he felt, was to interpret to his disciples the ancient cultural heritage. That is why, in his own words as recorded by his disciples, he was “a transmitter and not an originator” (The Confucian Analects, VII, 1). But this is only one aspect of Confucius, and there is another one as well. This is that while transmitting the traditional institutions and ideas, as recorded in the ancient classics, Confucius gave them new interpretations derived from his own moral ideas.

Confucius had his own moral ideas about the individual and society. In regard to society, he held that in order to have a well-ordered society, the most important thing is to carry out what he called the “rectification of names.” Things in actual fact should be made to accord with the implication of the names attached to them. In other words, every name contains certain implications which represent the essence of that class of things to which this name applies. Such things, therefore, should agree with this ideal essence.

This sounds quite Platonic, but Confucius’ interest was much less in the logical and metaphysical aspects of this theory than in its moral aspect. What he emphasized is that every name in the social relationships implies certain responsibilities and duties. There are five social relationships: father and son, ruler and subject, husband and wife, elder and younger brothers, and friends and friends. These are all names of social relationships, and the individual bearing these names must fulfil his responsibilities and duties accordingly. If every individual in the society acts in this way, then the society will be in great peace.

In regard to the virtues of the individual, Confucius emphasized human-heartedness (jen) and righteousness (yi). Righteousness means the “ought” of a situation. It is a categorical imperative. Everyone in society has certain things which he ought to do, and which must be done for their own sake. This is rather a formal idea, but that of human-heartedness is more concrete. The formal essence of the duties of man in society is their “oughtness,” because all these duties are what he ought to do. But the material essence of these duties is “loving others,” i.e. jen or human-heartedness. The father acts according to the way a father should act who loves his son; the son acts according to the way a son should act who loves his father. Confucius said: “Human-heartedness consists in loving others” (The Confucian Analects, XII, 22). The
man who really loves others will certainly be able to perform his duties in society.

While Confucius developed these moral ideas, Mencius gave them psychological and metaphysical justifications. Mencius had a famous theory which is that human nature is essentially good. Jen or human-heartedness is not something alien to human nature but something inherent in it. According to him, all men have "a mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others" (The Mencius, IIa, 6). This he called the "unbearing mind." The practice of jen or human-heartedness by an individual is nothing more than the natural development of his "unbearing mind." This is the psychological justification which Mencius gave to the Confucian virtue.

Mencius further said: "He who completely develops his mind, knows his nature. He who knows his nature, knows Heaven" (The Mencius, VIIa, 1). The mind here referred to is the "unbearing mind" which is the essence of our nature. Hence when we fully develop this mind, we know our nature. According to Mencius, our nature is "what Heaven has given to us" (The Mencius, VIIa, 15). Therefore, when we know our nature, we also know Heaven.

But what is Heaven? According to Mencius, the universe is essentially a moral universe. The moral principles which are inherent in human nature are also metaphysical principles of the universe, of which the nature of man is an exemplification. It is this moral universe that Mencius meant when he spoke of Heaven. An understanding of the moral universe Mencius called "knowing Heaven."

Through the full development of his nature a man can not only "know Heaven" but can also become one with Heaven. Mencius remarked: "All things are complete within us. There is no greater delight than to realize this through self-cultivation" (The Mencius, VIIa, 1). According to Mencius, the way to achieve this realization is the practice of jen or human-heartedness. Through this practice, one's egoism and selfishness are gradually reduced. When they are completely reduced, one comes to feel that there is no longer a distinction between the individual and the universe. That is to say, one becomes identified with the universe as a whole. This leads to a realization that "all things are complete within us."

This is the metaphysical justification which Mencius gave to the Confucian virtue and is also the mystical aspect of the Confucianist philosophy. Confucianism of the eleventh and twelfth centuries developed this aspect of Confucianism still further.

In the third century B.C. there was another very prominent and influential Confucianist who was a rival of Mencius and developed another aspect of Confucianism. He was Hsun Tzu (c. 298–c. 238). Mencius represented the idealistic wing of Confucianism, while Hsun Tzu the realistic wing.
Hsun Tzu was best known by this theory that human nature is originally evil. Superficially, it may seem that Hsun Tzu had a very low opinion of man, yet the truth is quite the contrary. Hsun Tzu’s philosophy may be called the philosophy of culture. His general thesis is that everything that is good and valuable is the product of human effort. Value comes from culture and culture is the achievement of man. It is in this that man has his great importance in the universe.

Human nature, too, should be cultured, for, from Hsun Tzu’s view, the very fact that it is uncultured means that it cannot be good. According to him, “nature is the unwrought material of the original, what are acquired are the accomplishments and refinements brought by culture. Without culture there would be nothing upon which to add the acquired. Without the acquired, nature could not become beautiful of itself” (the Hsun-tzu, ch. 23).

This leads to the question: How, then, can man become morally good? For if every man is born evil, what is the origin of good? To answer this question, Hsun Tzu gave two lines of argument.

In the first place, Hsun Tzu maintained that man cannot live without some kind of social organization. In order to enjoy better living, men have need of co-operation and mutual support. They also need to be united in order to conquer other creatures. So they must have a social organization. And in order to have a social organization, they need rules of conduct. Social institutions and morals are just the representation of these rules.

In the second place, Hsun Tzu pointed out the facts that “people desire and hate the same things,” and “that their desires are many, but things are few” (the Hsun-tzu, ch. 10). This is certainly one of the fundamental troubles in human life. If people do not all desire and hate the same things, for instance, if one likes to conquer and the other enjoys being conquered, there would be no trouble between them and they would live together quite harmoniously. Or, if all the things that everyone desires were very plentiful, like the free air, then too there would be no trouble. Or yet again if people could live quite apart from one another, the problem would be much simpler. But, unfortunately, the world is not so ideal. People must live together and in order to do so without contention, limit must be imposed on everyone in the satisfaction of one’s desires. The function of social institutions and morality is to set this limit. When one acts beyond the limit in the satisfaction of one’s desires, one acts immorally.

Thus Hsun Tzu gave a quite utilitarianistic explanation of the origin of morality. Confucius emphasized morality and the virtues, but did not give a theoretical justification for them. Mencius and Hsun Tzu both tried to give them theoretical justifications which were based upon their theories of human nature. Their theories are different, so are their justifications.
3. TAOISM

There are also three important figures in Taoism: Yang Chu, Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu. Yang Chu lived probably at the same time as Mencius. The main ideas of Yang Chu’s teaching can be summarized in two phrases: “each one for himself” and “despising things and valuing life.” He was reported to have taught that “though he might have profited the whole world by plucking out a single hair, he would not have done it” (Mencius, VIIa, 26). The Han-fei-tzu, a book of the third century B.C., also spoke of the follower of Yang Chu as: “even for the great profit of the world, he would not exchange one hair of his shank” (ch. 50). These two statements about Yang Chu perhaps illustrate two aspects of Yang Chu’s teaching. The statement that Yang Chu would not sacrifice a single hair even in order to gain the whole world, as reported by Mencius, illustrates his teaching of “valuing life.” The statement that Yang Chu would not give up a hair from his shank even to gain the entire world, as reported by the Han-fei-tzu, illustrates his teaching of “despising things.” According to his teaching, every man should value his life and despise things, and the consequence is that “every man for himself.”

Yang Chu represents the first phase in the development of early Taoist philosophy. Every man, valuing life, ought to attempt to preserve his life and avoid injury. How to achieve this is originally the main problem of Taoism. Yang Chu’s method of doing this is “to escape.” This is the method of the recluse who flees from society and hides himself in the mountains and forests. By doing this he thinks he can avoid the troubles and evils of the human world. Things in the human world are so complicated, however, that no matter how well one hides oneself, there are always troubles and evils that cannot be avoided. There are times, therefore, when the method of “escaping” does not work.

The ideas expressed by the Lao-tzu represent an attempt to reveal the laws underlying the changes of things in the universe. Things change, but the laws underlying the changes remain unchanged. If one understands these laws and regulates one’s actions in conformity with them, one can turn everything to one’s advantage. This is the second phase in the development of Taoism.

According to tradition, Lao Tzu was an old contemporary of Confucius. The book bearing his name, the Lao-tzu, has therefore been regarded as the first philosophical work in Chinese history. Modern scholarship, however, has forced most scholars to change this view and date it to a time considerably after Confucius. It is quite possible that there actually lived a man known as Lao Tzu who was a senior to Confucius, but that the Lao-tzu the book is a later production. So I take the ideas expressed in the book as representing the second phase in the development of
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Taoism without necessarily denying that Lao Tzu the man was an old contemporary of Confucius.

In the Lao-tzu, the idea of Tao becomes prominent. The literal meaning of the word Tao is the way. But the Tao in Taoism is what the Taoists called the unnameable. In their system, the Tao is that by which all things come to be. Since it is that by which all things come to be, it necessarily cannot be a thing. Things have names, that is to say, they have some attributes because of which they are named. For instance, a tree is called a tree, and a table is called a table. But the Tao is necessarily not anything, so Tao is necessarily having no name. Everything is a being. Tao is necessarily not anything, so it is not a being. It is non-being, as the Taoists called it. The ideas of Tao, being, and non-being, are all clearly mentioned in the Lao-tzu.

According to the Lao-tzu, all things come from the Tao. When there are things, there are also the laws that govern the changes of things. Among them, the most fundamental one is that “reversing is the movement of the Tao” (ch. 40). The idea is that if anything develops certain extreme qualities, these qualities invariably revert to become their opposites.

This constitutes a law of nature. Therefore, “It is upon calamity that blessing leans, upon blessing that calamity rests” (ch. 58). “Diminish a thing and it will increase, increase a thing and it will diminish” (ch. 42). The Lao-tzu is full of such paradoxical statements. They are no longer so, if one understands the fundamental law of nature. But to the ordinary people who have no idea of this law, they seem paradoxical indeed. Therefore in the Lao-tzu it is said: “The gentleman of the low type, on hearing the Truth, laughs loudly at it. If he had not laughed, it would not suffice to be the Truth” (ch. 41).

The man who understands the law of nature will regulate his conduct accordingly. The general rule of his regulation is that if he wants to achieve anything, he starts with its opposite, and if he wants to retain anything, he admits in it something of its opposite. For instance, if one wants to be strong, one must start with the feeling that one is weak, and if one wants to preserve capitalism, one must first admit in it some elements of socialism.

In this way a man can live safely in the world and achieve his aims. This is the answer and solution to the original problem of the Taoists, how to preserve life and avoid harm and danger in the human world.

Chuang Tzu (c. 369-c. 286 B.C.) is perhaps the greatest of the early Taoists. The book bearing his name, the Chuang-tzu is a very important document in Taoist literature, but we are not sure which part of it was really written by the philosopher himself. The first chapter of the Chuang-tzu, entitled “The Happy Excursion” expresses the idea that there are varying degrees of happiness. A free development of our nature may lead
us to a relative kind of happiness; absolute happiness is achieved through a higher understanding of the nature of things.

To carry out the first of these requirements, the free development of our nature, we should have a full and free exercise of our natural ability. That ability is our Te, as the Taoists called it, which comes directly from the Tao. It is said in the Chuang-tzu, "When things obtained that by which they came into existence it is called the Te" (ch. 12). Thus the Te is what we obtain from the Tao and is what makes what we are. We are happy when this Te or natural ability of ours is fully and freely developed.

The happiness achieved in this way is of a relative kind. Relative happiness is relative because it has to depend upon something. It is true that one is happy when one has a full and free exercise of one's natural ability, but there are many ways in which this exercise may be obstructed. If one's happiness depends upon this exercise, one's happiness also depends upon the circumstances which render this exercise possible. Hence, one's happiness is limited by these circumstances and therefore relative.

To achieve absolute happiness, one needs knowledge and understanding of a higher kind. This is discussed in the second chapter of the Chuang-tzu which is entitled "On the Equality of things." The first chapter of the Chuang-tzu maintains that there are two levels of happiness; the second that there are two levels of knowledge. The knowledge on the first or lower level is the opinions that are made by each individual from his own particular finite point of view. Being thus finite, these opinions are one-sided. Yet most people not knowing that their opinions are thus based on finite points of view, always consider their opinions as right and those of others as wrong. According to this chapter, the distinction of right and wrong is not very much different from that between "this" and "that." Everyone necessarily considers oneself as "this" and others as "that."

If we see that the distinction of right and wrong is not very much different from that between "this" and "that," we already see things from a higher point of view. This is called in the second chapter "to see things in light of Heaven," which means to see things from the point of view of that which transcends the finite, which is the Tao. In the Chuang-tzu, the finite point of view is compared with the view of the well frog. The frog in the well sees only a little sky, and so thinks that the sky is just so big.

From the viewpoint of the Tao, not only the differences of opinions are relative, that between things are relative too. Although all things differ, they are alike in that they all constitute something and are good for something. They all equally come from the Tao. From the viewpoint of the Tao, things, though different, are yet united and become one.

The distinction between the "me" and the "non-me" is also relative.
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From the viewpoint of the Tao, the "me" and the "non-me" are also united and become one. In the second chapter, it is said: "Heaven and earth and I come into existence together, and all things with me are one."

This statement in the second chapter is immediately followed by another: "Since all things are one, what room is there for speech?" If all things are one, this one can neither be discussed nor even be conceived. For as soon as it is thought of or discussed, it becomes something external to the thinking and speaking. So since its all-embracing unity is thus lost, it is not the "one" at all. It cannot be known. The only way to get it is to be identified with it.

To be identified with the "one," is to have the experience of living in the "realm of the infinite," as the Taoists called it. He who has this kind of experience has forgotten all the distinctions of things, even those involved in his own life. In his experience there remains only the undifferentiable whole, in the midst of which he lives. He is really the independent man, so his happiness is absolute.

Here we see how Chuang Tzu reached a final solution of the original problem of the early Taoists. To the sage who has achieved the identification of himself with the "one," the problem ceases to be a problem. As is said in the Chuang-tzu: "The universe is the unity of all things. If we attain this unity and identify ourselves with it, then the members of our body are but so much dust and dirt, while life and death, end and beginning, are but as the succession of day and night, which cannot disturb our inner peace. How much less shall we be troubled by worldly gain and loss, good luck and bad luck" (ch. 20). Thus Chuang Tzu solved the original problem of the early Taoists by abolishing it. This is really the philosophical way of solving problems. This represents the third and last phase in the development of Taoism.

The method of achieving the identification of the individual with the whole is discarding knowledge on the lower level through knowledge on the higher level. The function of knowledge in the ordinary sense, the knowledge on the lower level is to make distinctions about things. The knowledge on the higher level leads us to understand that all distinctions are relative and thus lead to the abolition of all distinctions and finally even the higher knowledge itself.

As I just said, the culmination of Confucianism is also the identification of the individual with the whole. But to achieve this, the Confucianists used a different method. The method of the Taoists is known as the method of discarding knowledge, while that of the Confucianists that of accumulation of moral practices. Through the accumulation of moral activities, the selfishness of the individual is gradually reduced, and finally all the distinctions between the "me" and the "non-me" is abolished, and thus the individual is identified with the whole. The oneness achieved by
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the Confucianists is emotional, while that achieved by the Taoists is intellectual. Therefore the Confucianists always spoke about "loving people as one's brothers and all things as one's friends," while the Taoists about that "abandoning the world and living independent of it." The Confucianist sages were enthusiastic souls, while the Taoists sages men of imperturbable calm.

4. NEO-CONFUCIANISM

We have seen from above that the original Confucianism emphasized more man's social relations, while the original Taoism more man's relation with the universe. Hence the former is much less metaphysical than the latter. The later Confucianists of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Neo-Confucianists as we now call them, under the influence of Buddhism on the one hand and Taoism on the other, improved the original Confucianism and supplied it with metaphysical systems even greater than the original Taoism.

Among the Neo-Confucianists there are two main Schools. By happy coincidence, the two Schools were initiated by two brothers known as the two Ch'eng Masters. Ch'eng Yi (1032-1108), the younger brother, initiated a School which was completed by Chu Hsi (1130-1200) and was known as the Ch'eng-Chu School or Li Hsueh (School of Laws of Principles). Ch'eng Hao, the elder brother, initiated another School which was continued by Lu Chiu-yuan (1139-1193) and completed by Wang Shou-jen, better known as Wang Yang-ming (1473-1529) and was known as the Lu-wang School or Hsin Hsueh (School of Mind). The full significance of the difference between the two Schools was not yet recognized at the time of the two Ch'eng Masters. But Chu Hsi and Lu Chiu-yuan began a great controversy which has been carried on until the present day. The main issue between the two Schools was really one of fundamental importance. In terms of Western philosophy, it was one as to whether the laws of nature are or are not legislated by the mind or Mind. That has been the issue between Platonic realism and Kantian idealism, and may be said to be the issue in metaphysics. If it were solved, there would be not much controversy left.

At the beginning of this chapter, I said something about the Confucian theory of the rectification of names. The implication of this theory is that every name contains certain implications which constitute the essence of that class of things to which this name applies. If the metaphysical implications of this theory are fully developed, it becomes the Platonic theory of Ideas, Ch'eng Yi and Chu Hsi did make such a development.

What Plato called Ideas or Aristotle called Forms, Ch'eng Yi and Chu Hsi called Principles. For them, just as for Plato and Aristotle, all things
in the world, if they exist at all, must be the embodiment of some Principle in some material. If a certain thing exists, there must be for it a certain Principle. If there be a certain Principle, however, there may or may not exist a corresponding thing. The Principle is what they called Li, which may also be translated as the law.

For Ch'eng Yi and Chu Hsi, the Principles are eternal and independent of human consciousness. But for Lu Chiu-yuan and Wang Shou-jen, "the mind is the Li." The human mind is the manifestation of the universal Mind, which is the legislator of the laws of nature.

According to Wang Yang-ming, the individual mind is the manifestation of the universal Mind, and the manifestation of the individual mind is the "intuitive knowledge" of the individual. For Wang Yang-ming, the "intuitive knowledge" is the innate faculty of every one, which knows with immediacy and certainty what is morally right and what is morally wrong. This is so, because the Laws, including the moral law, are simply the legislation of the mind. If a man just follows the dictates of his "intuitive knowledge," he will naturally in his conduct love all people and indeed all things. This is so, because there is an original oneness innate in the mind of all people, which is lost to a man when he is selfish, and restored when he is altruistic.

Although there is a great difference between these two Schools in their metaphysics, they both followed Confucius in emphasizing the importance of the social duties of man. They emphasized even more than Mencius that in practising his social duties, if he has the right understanding of the principles or the mind, a man really achieves something much more important and valuable. According to the neo-Confucians, the ideal man whom they called sage cannot perform miracles, nor need he try. He does nothing more than most people do, but having a higher understanding of the universe, what he does is to him the exemplification of the Principle and the Mind, and thus have a cosmic significance. The difference between him and the other people is not in his doings and activities, but in the fact that he does what he does in a state of enlightenment, while other people do what they do in a state of ignorance. What he does has not only moral value but also value which—may be called super-moral. Or we may say, through his higher understanding of the universe, the moral value of his actions is transformed into super-moral value.

Here we have the most essential revelation of Chinese philosophy, which is just this open secret. Chinese philosophy simply takes life as a fact of nature and tries to improve it spiritually by an attempt to transform the meaning and value of daily life to make it worth while in the best sense. This Neo-Confucianism accomplished to a great extent. It is not without reason that since the twelfth century, Neo-Confucianism had been the leading philosophy in Chinese society until the invasion of
Western ideas into China since the end of the last century, when new circumstances lead to the need of a new philosophy. China is now undergoing a violent revolution. But in the long run a revolution is after all a continuation of the old. In the new the best of the old is preserved. This is what will happen to Chinese society and also to Chinese philosophy.
CHAPTER XXIII

INDIAN INFLUENCE ON CHINESE THOUGHT*

I

The first contact of China with India goes back to the second century B.C. when certain scientific and cosmological notions infiltrated into China probably through the nomadic agencies of Eastern Turkestan. One of the most renowned Taoists of this period, Prince Lieu-ngan (Huai Nan-tseu) introduced for the first time a cosmology according to which the universe is divided into nine regions spread around a central mountain upon which are arranged the heavenly worlds. This cosmology is of Indian origin and specially developed in the Buddhist literature.

China received Buddhism from the same nomadic sources towards the end of the first century B.C., and within a century it was officially recognized as a religion worthy of toleration. Buddhist scholars began coming to China from the end of the first century after Christ and their activities were more and more intensified. But throughout the Han period (A.D. 65-220), although a number of scholars had come to China, worked among the Chinese and translated a fairly large number of texts into Chinese, Buddhism had a hard struggle with the indigenous systems. Confucianism with its traditional prestige in the court and its hold on the nobility looked down on Buddhism as a barbarian religion. The Chinese, like the Greeks, looked upon all foreigners as barbarians and Indians were no exception to the rule. In the Han period attempts were made to transform Confucianism into a religion by its religious character was much less developed than Buddhism. Taoism was more established as a religion but its philosophical background was much weaker than Buddhism. This gave Buddhism certain advantages over the indigenous systems.

As Buddhism was a much richer religion than Confucianism and as it possessed a much deeper philosophy than Taoism it soon attracted the Chinese. The Chinese literati themselves started pleading for Buddhism. Thus Mou-tseu who lived towards the closing years of the Han period (A.D. 170-225) wrote a treatise in which he compared the doctrines of Buddhism with the teachings of Confucius and Lao-tseu and tried to establish the superiority of the former. "The five classics," he says, "are the five tastes

* The French system of spelling Chinese words has been followed in this paper. For connecting the spellings of this paper with those of the preceding ones treat tseu as teu, Ki (K'i) as Chi (Ch'i), Kiu as chiu, King as Ching, Liu ngan as Liuan, Hsian-tsang as Yuan chwang, Chu Hi as Chu Hsi.—Editors.
while the doctrines of the Buddha are the five kinds of grains. Since I heard the doctrine, I see the fully resplendent sun across the hanging clouds, I enter darkness with a torch. To live a family life, to have worldly connexions, to take advantage of all occasions, to take interest all the time in present things, these are the ways of the common literati which are given up by the really learned one. The saints, however, follow the way of immense perfection (Buddhism). It is mysterious like the sky and deep like the sea."

The writings of such people as Mou-tseu succeeded gradually in creating confidence in the minds of the educated Chinese about Buddhism. Besides, the life of purity followed by the Indian Buddhists who had come to China and by their Chinese disciples did not fail to attract the Chinese to this new faith. The patronage of the foreign dynasts in China also helped the cause of the new religion. The Wei dynasty which came in power in the fourth century was of foreign origin. They were great patrons of Buddhism and the beginnings of all great works of Buddhist art were made by them. The first Emperor of the dynasty made Buddhism a State religion. The edict of toleration which he promulgated in A.D. 335 ran as follows:

"The Buddha is a god worshipped in the foreign countries. He may not be worthy of receiving offerings from the Emperors of China and from the Chinese. But I who was born in the frontier province, have the good fortune to be a ruler of China. In regard to religious duties I must abide by the customs of my people. As the Buddha is a foreign God it is in the fitness of things that I should worship him. It is a pity that the same old laws of ancient times should be followed even now. When a thing is found perfect and faultless why should they still stick to the customs of the ancient dynasties. My people are called barbarians. I grant them the privilege to worship the Buddha and adopt the Buddhist faith if they like to do so."

Since then Buddhism went on prospering in China till about the eleventh century. Successions of Indian teachers coming from India kept the torch burning. From the fourth century onwards the Chinese monks themselves started going to India and making a deep study of Buddhism with Indian teachers. A vast literature of Buddhism, translated from Indian sources by the Indian as well as by the Chinese scholars, helped the Chinese to read Buddhism in translations. Some of the translations also had great literary value and came to be considered classics in Chinese literature.

The influence of Buddhism on Chinese life and thought was tremendous. Dr. Hu Shih, the leader of the Chinese intellectual renaissance, says: "When China was brought face to face with India, China was overwhelmed, dazzled, and dumbfounded by the vast output of the religious zeal and genius of the Indian nation. China acknowledged its defeat and was completely conquered."
Indian influence on Chinese thought first manifested itself in attempts at its approximation to Chinese ways of thinking. The pioneer in this attempt was Seng-chao who lived towards the beginning of the fifth century and was a disciple of the famous Kumārajīva. Kumārajīva, a scholar of rare genius, born in Eastern Turkestan and educated in Kāshmīra came to China in A.D. 401. He worked in China till his death in A.D. 413 and translated a large number of texts into Chinese, many of which are still considered to be classics in Chinese literature. He was a scholar of deep insight and profound understanding of Buddhist philosophy, especially that of Nāgārjuna which he was the first to introduce in China. He did not fail to notice that the system of Nāgārjuna and the philosophy of Lao-tseu had many things in common. So he was not against interpreting the philosophy of Nāgārjuna in the language of Taoism. He is even believed to have written a commentary on the Tao-te-king which is lost. It was probably an interpretation of the Taoist philosophy from the Buddhist point of view. Among his disciples there were many illustrious Chinese scholars and Seng-chao was one of them. It was probably at the dictates of his master that he interpreted the philosophy of Nāgārjuna or rather attempted to synthesize it with Taoism for the first time.

Buddhist thought presented the antithesis between the immutable reality (bhūta-tathāta) and the temporal (utpāda-nirodha), between permanence and change and between nirvāṇa and rebirth (saṃsāra). These were very much similar to the Taoist contrast between non-being and being, immutability and mutability and wu-wei (non-existence) and yu-wei (existence). On the question of mutability and immutability, Seng-chao says: “Most men’s idea of mutability is that things in the past have not come down to the present. The result is that they say that there is mutability and no immutability. That things of the past do not come down to the present is my idea of immutability; and the result is that I say that there is immutability and no mutability. That there is mutability and no immutability is because the things of the past do not come down to the present; that there is immutability and no mutability is because things of the past do not vanish away.” This reminds one of the famous example of the burning lamp cited in the Milinda-panha. The lamp is burning throughout the night, but the lamp of the first part of the night is not the same as that of the midnight or the last part. From one point of view it is the same lamp whereas from another point of view it is not the same but is changing every moment. On the question of reality Seng-chao says: “All things have that in them which makes them not be something, have that in them which makes them not be nothing. Because of the first characteristic, the result is that although they seem to be
something, yet actually they are nothing; because of the second characteristic, the result is that they seem to be nothing." The theory of causation (pratītya-samutpāda) is the corner-stone of Seng-chao’s synthesis. Everything is the product of causation. The effect is something new but that does not mean that it is not an effect, of a particular cause.

Seng-chao tries to solve another problem, the problem of the prajñā, the highest knowledge. Knowledge has an object and an object has a character. It is not qualityless and hence not the Absolute truth. If that be so, how can prajñā lead to the attainment of the Absolute truth? Seng-chao says that it is not knowledge in the ordinary sense. He compares it to a mirror which "though vacant reflects (the Universe) but though it reflects, it is vacant (i.e. it is not affected by the impressions it receives)." So from his point of view this knowledge "has a complete purview of essentials and yet is not knowledge." This does not mean that the Absolute truth exists apart from the relative. "Although it is outside the sphere of things, yet at no time does it fail to deal with things. Although his spirit is in the beyond, yet it is all the time in the world. . . . Hence in illuminating the qualityless, the sage does not lose the power of dealing with things yet at no time does he fail to deal with things. In his observation of change he is not in opposition to the qualityless. . . . He thus lives in the realm of change and utility and yet abides in the sphere of wu-wei."

This synthesis of the Absolute and the Relative, although borrowed from the system of Nāgārjuna, was taken as a Chinese contribution because it was expressed in Taoist phraseology. It was attractive to the Chinese thinkers and they came to regard Seng-chao more as a Chinese philosopher than as a Buddhist thinker. Seng-chao had a great influence on later Chinese thought by showing how Buddhism could be assimilated to Chinese philosophy. It was no more possible to discard Buddhism. It had come to stay and lost its exotic character. Various attempts were made during the next few centuries to create something new out of Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy which would be acceptable to and easily understood by the Chinese who generally abhorred complicated metaphysical speculations. They wanted something simpler, more of a short-cut. While the Chinese monks educated in the orthodox Buddhist tradition went on strictly following the hard life of a Buddhist monk as prescribed by the canonical works, others continued their attempt at evolving some simpler course.

A contemporary of Seng-chao, Hui-yuan, who though not a disciple of Kumārajīva was working under his influence, laid stress on certain religious aspects of Buddhism. He was, like Seng-chao, well versed in Confucian and Taoist classics and as a student of Taoism it was the contem-
plative aspect of Buddhism which attracted him most. He created a new centre of Buddhist studies at a place called Lu-shan, collected a number of followers who gradually formed a School which came to be known as the Lu-shan School. This School, also known as the “Pure Land School,” introduced the cult of Amitābha in China. It was a new type of theism in which the object of worship was Amitābha and the goal was the Paradise of Amitābha—a land of infinite light, longevity and bliss. Faith and meditation alone could lead one to this Promised Land. Hui-yuan himself emphasizes meditation (dhyāna) when he says: “Of the three phases of Buddhistic Life (i.e. moral discipline, meditation and insight) dhyāna and insight are of fundamental importance. Without insight, meditation cannot attain the highest state of quietude. Without meditation, wisdom cannot achieve its profundity of insight. . . . I regret very much that since the introduction of the Great Religion into the East so little is known of the practices of dhyāna that the whole structure is in danger of collapse because of the lack of the solid foundation of meditation.”

Tao-sheng, a disciple of Hui-yuan and also of Kumāra-jiiva, developed a philosophy of dhyāna and laid the foundation of the famous dhyāna School of Buddhism which had a tremendous influence on Chinese life and thought. The School was known in China as Ch’an and in Japan as Zen, which are only transcriptions of the Indian word dhyāna (in Prākṛta, jhāna). In common with all mystics, Tao-sheng was against attaching any importance to the Scriptures. They do not help in the realization of the truth. They are a means to the end, but it is insight alone which helps to reach the truth. Thus he says: “The symbol is to express an idea and is to be discarded when the idea is understood. Words are to explain thoughts and ought to be silenced when the thoughts are already absorbed. Ever since the introduction of Buddhist Scriptures to the East, the translators have met with great impediments, and the people have clung to the dead letter and few have grasped the all-comprehensive meaning. It is only those who can grasp the fish and discard the fishing net that are qualified to seek the truth.”

Tao-sheng was responsible for two theories which are considered to be revolutionary by the Chinese scholars and interpreted by them as a sort of Chinese revolt against the foreign religion. Revolt or not, they certainly represent an attempt to evolve a Chinese way of thinking. The doctrines are not new and can be traced to Buddhist sources but the emphasis on them was really Chinese. The two doctrines formulated by Tao-sheng were “good action requires no return” and “Sudden Enlightenment.” When Tao-sheng speaks of “goodness requiring no reward,” he speaks not from the relative point of view but from the absolute. He is speaking of those who are emancipated. He is in the world but is also above it. Reward and retribution are true only from a relative point of view. But they do not exist for one who has attained the utpāda-niruddha or cut through the
chain of causation. This doctrine also is a necessary corollary of the Buddhist view of life. The theory of Sudden Enlightenment leading to the attainment of Buddhahood means that this enlightenment is not a gradual process. It dawns all on a sudden. This theory is also not new to Buddhism. It does not do away with all the preparatory stages, the moral discipline, the holy life, etc. Enlightenment, when it comes, comes all on a sudden. Later development of this theory in China brought in certain aberrations of the real view of life. But so far as Tao-sheng is concerned, there is nothing to show that he was raising a standard of revolt against the Indian view of life. He was emphasizing certain aspects of spiritual life with a view to warn his fellow Buddhists against confusion of the ultimate and relative views of truth.

Although Tao-sheng’s theories provoked the thought of the Buddhist scholars of his times, his followers did not seem to have formed a School immediately. The origin of something like a School of dhārāṇā goes back to an Indian mystic who, in spite of the fact that a good number of myths had grown around his personality, was an historical personage. This was Bodhidharma who came to China in the first quarter of the sixth century. He was in China between A.D. 486 and 536. An almost contemporaneous account written in A.D. 534 testifies to his presence in the newly-built temple of Yong-ning-sse at Lo-yang.

The teachings of Bodhidharma in China decidedly marked a departure from the old. He emphasized the practice of meditation as a religious means for the attainment of enlightenment. The philosophy which he preached was only a new interpretation of the system of Nāgārjuna. It looks like a Viśṇāna-vāda interpretation. According to him everybody possesses the Buddha-nature and real enlightenment means the awakening of this Buddha-nature. He discards the study of Scriptures, practice of all monastic rules, and too much attention to the formal aspects of religion as useless for the realization of the Buddha-nature. It is meditation alone, a looking inward and not outward, that helps in the realization. He said: “The heart of every man is in communion with all that was in all times and in all spaces. This heart is the Buddha. There is no Buddha outside the heart. Enlightenment and nirvāṇa are also in the heart. Outside the reality of the heart, everything is imaginary. To search for something outside the heart is to try to seize emptiness. The heart is the Buddha and the Buddha is the heart. To imagine a Buddha outside the heart is madness. So it is necessary to turn one’s looks not outside but inside. It is necessary to concentrate on self and to contemplate on the Buddha-nature of the self.” His philosophy is further elaborated on the same line. When everybody has the Buddha-nature and when there is no Buddha outside the heart, there is no question of saving another or being saved by another. There is no need of praying or offering worship to anybody. As the Buddha is the heart, it is the heart—the real self which is knower of everything. It is
useless to go to anybody else or to read the Scriptures with a view to acquiring knowledge of the reality. There is no need of asceticism, praying, begging, worshipping and the like for that purpose. If one sees the Buddha in one’s own self that brings about deliverance and that only constitutes nirvāṇa. There is then nothing good or bad, meritorious or sinful in his acts. Some scholars would like to discover in the philosophy of Bodhidharma, the Vedānta philosophy of India. In fact, by substituting a “Brahman” or “Ātman” for the Buddha we get something like a system of Vedānta. But a Vijñāna-vāda version of the philosophy of Nāgārjuna would also look like it. Although Bodhidharma went from South India he lived much earlier than Śaṅkara who was responsible for the new Vedānta in which the doctrine of māyā plays an important part. It was the Buddhists, the Sautrāntikas and the Mādhyamikas who preached something like a doctrine of māyā before Śaṅkara.

The reported conversation between Bodhidharma and the Emperor Wu clearly shows that it was the Buddhist philosophy which Bodhidharma was interpreting. “The Emperor asked him: Since the time of my accession to the throne I have been incessantly building temples, transcribing sacred books and admitting new monks to take the vows. How much merit may I be supposed to have accumulated? The reply was: None. The Emperor: And why? Bodhidharma: All this is but the insignificant effect of an imperfect cause not complete in itself. It is the shadow that follows the substance and is without real existence. The Emperor: Then what is true merit? Bodhidharma: It consists in purity and enlightenment, depth and completeness and in being wrapped in thought while surrounded by emptiness and calm. Merit such as this cannot be sought by worldly means. The Emperor: Which is the most important of holy doctrines? Bodhidharma: Where all is emptiness nothing can be called holy. The Emperor: Who is that thus replies to me? Bodhidharma: I do not know.”

The teachings of Bodhidharma helped the Dhyāna School to be firmly established on the Chinese soil. Although the movement had started earlier with Tao-sheng, Bodhidharma’s visit to China and advocacy of the same philosophy gave it a sanction that was much needed. This is why all later Dhyāna teachers trace their lineage from Bodhidharma. The School had a great success in China and later on in Japan. During the subsequent centuries a number of sects sprang from it. There were two tendencies among them distinguished respectively by the emphasis they put on the positive and the negative aspects of the Dhyāna philosophy. According to one, the reality is all emptiness, without any quality whatever and cannot be defined as something. The mind as well as the Buddha-nature are also this emptiness. This doctrine was characterized as the doctrine of “not mind and not the Buddha.” According to the other, it is the mind that realizes the emptiness. Without mind nothing would come into existence.
It is the mind again that attains enlightenment or *nirvāṇa*. So it is the mind that is the real nature or Buddha-nature. This doctrine came to be characterized as "the doctrine of being mind, being the Buddha." These two tendencies again are not quite Chinese. They represent the two old aspects of the Mahāyāna philosophy as represented by the Śūnya-vāda and Vijñāna-vāda. But the origins of the two tendencies were forgotten and they were looked upon as real Chinese interpretations of Buddhist philosophy, something really Chinese and acceptable even to those who had a dislike for the foreign religion.

The *Dhyāṇa* School by its challenge to Buddhist scholasticism created great confusion in the minds of the Chinese Buddhists. There were numerous monks and nuns in China in this period. Large monasteries had been built in important Buddhist centres. Through the activities of the Indian and Chinese scholars a vast Buddhist literature had come into existence in translation. It contained, according to tradition, "the words of the Buddha." Besides, the works of the great masters had also been translated. The followers of the *Dhyāna* School would attach no importance to this sacred literature. Besides there was a growing tendency among them to describe the current religious practices: the observance of the rules of monastic discipline, the worship of the Buddha and other divinities, praying to the Buddha, living on alms, etc., which are prescribed by the holy texts as futile.

One of the most illustrious Chinese thinkers of the sixth century attempted a bold synthesis of the conflicting views in order to evolve a system out of the confusion. This was Chi-k'āi who was born in A.D. 531. He was a follower of the *Dhyāṇa* School and though not a direct disciple of Bodhidharma must have been familiar with his teachings. He founded a monastery at a place called T'ien-t'āi and hence the name of the School. Chi-k'āi evolved a very comprehensive system of his own which was developed by his disciple Tu-shun who died in A.D. 640. Although Chi-k'āi was a follower of the *Dhyāṇa* School, he could not completely agree with other masters. He admitted that all beings possess the Buddha-nature but maintained that its realization depends on one's own exertion. So there is need of instruction as well as of striving to remove the error and arrive at true ideas. This was the corner-stone of Chi-k'āi's new system. A deep study of the Buddhist literature soon convinced him that in spite of the apparent diversities and contradictions in the teachings of the Buddha, there is an underlying unity of purpose in them. There are numerous philosophical theories but the ultimate end is the same. It is to get over the evils, and to attain the truth and the ultimate good. It does
not matter by which method that goal is attained. It was in this light that Chi-k’ai attempted an ordered classification of the literature and a synthesis of the doctrines. The system evolved by him was so rational that it was accepted by all Buddhist Schools of China and other countries in the Far East and has come down to us. This was the real contribution of the Chinese genius to the systematization and rationalization of Buddhism.

In regard to the teachings of the Buddha as embodied in the literature, Chi-k’ai proposed that they were to be classified in a chronological order. He divided the Buddha’s active career into five periods and classified his predactions accordingly. The first period is represented by the *Avatamsaka-sūtra*. The Buddha just after the attainment of bodhi passed twenty-one days under the tree, dazed by the light of Illumination. During these days he taught only to the gods who had come down to congratulate him, and the teachings of this period, which contain the most sublime truths of Buddhism, not intelligible to the ordinary man, constitute the *Avatamsaka-sūtra*. This is Mahāyāna. The second period starts as soon as he leaves the place underneath the bodhi tree and begins his career of a popular religious teacher. His teachings of this period are included in the *Āgamas (Sūtra-piṭaka)* which are purely Hinayāna. The teachings are destined for the novices and do not contain any sublime truths. This period continued for twelve years.

In the third period the Buddha embarked upon an attack on the various religious and philosophical texts which preached doctrines at variance with his own profession. The preachings of this period are in the form of controversies which are embodied in the *Vaipulya-sūtra* which has the character of both Mahāyāna and Hinayāna. This was a period of eight years. The fourth period was a period during which the attacks of other philosophical schools became so intense that the Buddha had to reveal to his disciples the deeper metaphysical truths. His teachings of this period are embodied in the *Prajñā-pāram-ītā* which is purely Mahāyāna. It was a period of twenty-two years.

The fifth period was the period of culmination. The adversaries had been silenced and Buddhism had been established on a firm footing. The Buddha’s teachings in this period were mainly confined to an exposition of the way of the Bodhisattva, regulation of the life of those who want to attain Buddhahood. The teachings of this period are contained in such Mahāyāna works as the *Sad-dharma-puṇḍarīka, Nirvāṇa-sūtra*, etc. It was a period of eight years ending with his nirvāṇa. So from Chi-k’ai’s point of view, the teachings of the Buddha followed a particular order and none of them was without its importance. They fulfil the religious needs of all grades in a progressive order. Hence the contradictions in the teachings are only apparent; seen in the proper context there is nothing contradictory. The Indian teachers also, specially those of the idealist School, looked at some of the teachings of the Buddha in the same light in order to
explain away the contradictions. Those teachings of the Buddha which did not fit in with their interpretation were described by them as meant for ordinary students incapable of understanding the profound metaphysics of the Mahāyāna. Although the viewpoint was not quite new, it was left to Chi-k’ai to develop it into a comprehensive system.

Chi-k’ai regarded the *Avatamsaka-sūtra* as the highest and the noblest product of Buddhism. He took it as the basis of his exposition of Buddhism. His exposition is, however, not a slavish imitation of the Indian exposition but an original one. It has a syncretic character inasmuch as it does not discredit any part of the teachings of the Buddha. According to him Buddhism is concerned with three faculties of the mind—intelligence, feeling and will. "Intelligence" helps one to know the real nature of life, "feeling" supplies a strong faith in the ultimate goal and "will" leads one to act with a view to attain the goal. Chi-k’ai does not take the Buddha to be an extraordinary being but a simple man who attained enlightenment through the exercise of those virtues. Everyone has that Buddha-nature in him. This Buddha-nature is the universal reality. Everything in nature has a share of this reality. It has a threefold character—the true, the beautiful and the good. So the beauty of nature, the greenness of the leaves, the colours of the flowers, the songs of the birds and such other things are only manifestations of the same universal reality, the Buddha-nature. It is this latent Buddha-nature in us that has to be awakened. The Buddha succeeded in doing that. That is enlightenment. Chi-k’ai does not distinguish between the phenomenal and the noumenal—he takes them to be two aspects of the same reality. In this he follows the philosophy of the *Dhyāna* School and through it that of Nāgārjuna. He does not apparently believe in the theory of "Sudden Enlightenment."

Chi-k’ai accepts the Buddhist theory of eternal causality. The causality has no beginning and no end. Every effect is cause of other effects and that goes on in an infinite chain. The essence of the universe is eternal and the ephemeral beings who owe their individuality to the causality are only small waves which are instantaneous (*kṣaṇika*) on the surface of this unique permanence. They are transitory phenomena and do not either add to or diminish the permanent reality.

The individuality is characterized as instantaneous, transitory and phenomenal. The existence is a succession of instants (*santāna*) which are mutually related as cause and effect of *karma*. There is therefore no soul in an individual. His body is composed of the four elements—earth, water, fire and wind which are united at the time of birth and dissolved at the time of death through the effect of *karma*. Chi-k’ai takes into account two kinds of causes, the material cause (*yuan-yin*) and the efficient cause (*yin-yuan*). Thus the seeds are the material cause, but it is the efficient cause which leads to their sowing and producing.

In regard to ultimate reality, Chi-k’ai accepts also the Madhyamika-
vījñāna-vāda view. This reality is not the impermanent phenomenal world. It is hidden under the multitude of appearances. It is the sole permanent reality, true essence of the world, and the substratum of all the forms. The universal reality has no birth and no death, no increase and no decrease, and no beginning and no end. The phenomenal world has a beginning and an end, increase and decrease, birth and death. It does not end in annihilation but in the beginning of a new series of phenomena. The cosmic reality is absolute, one, infinite, independent and unique. The phenomenal world is relative, distinctive, finite, dependent and multiple.

We have seen that according to Chi-k’ai the relation between the noumenon and the phenomenon is that of the ocean to its waves. As the two are identical so also are the nirvāṇa and samsāra. Nirvāṇa is “the being” and “Buddha-nature” in their permanent aspects whereas the samsāra constitutes their transitory aspect. In the permanent ocean of nirvāṇa, the individuals are the impermanent waves.

Three articles of faith are important to a Buddhist from the T’ien-t’ai point of view: (i) The cosmic reality fills up the whole space and time and has no beginning and no end. It is eternal and infinite; (ii) This cosmic reality produces the phenomenal world under the influence of causality; (iii) The phenomenal world is also real as it rests in the cosmic reality. The diversity is also unity. The unity becomes diversity under the influence of causality.

This is in short the philosophy of Chi-k’ai. In fact it is an adaptation of the system of Nāgārjuna, but the systematization of the entire Buddhist literature and thought from this angle of vision was Chi-k’ai’s own contribution. His system had a tremendous success in his own times and during the subsequent centuries. It gave to the Chinese an extremely rational system free from the absurdities and contradictions caused by the growth of petty sectarianism. It also helped the Chinese philosophers of later times in evolving a new synthesis of Buddhist and Chinese thought in the eleventh century, but about that we will speak later.

While Seng-chao, Hui-yuan and Chi-k’ai and their followers were striving hard to interpret the Buddhist thought in their own light, conservative Buddhist scholars of the type of Hiuan-tsang, Tao-siuan, etc., were ceaseless in their efforts to impose Buddhist scholasticism of India on their countrymen. They succeeded in introducing some of the Buddhist philosophical Schools of India in China. These Schools also had a fairly prosperous career in China. Some of them still exist in China and Japan.

Hiuan-tsang himself was responsible for founding the Yogācāra-Vijñāna-vāda School. He himself belonged to it and studied its philosophy in India with Śīlabhadra of Nālandā, one of the greatest exponents of the
School. He translated the fundamental texts of the School and published in Chinese an exposition of the philosophy of Vijñāna-vāda, documented with copious illustrations from commentaries of nine different teachers of the School. He had a deep understanding of this philosophy and not only his own works but also those of his famous disciple Kui-ki amply testify to it.

This School is known in China as Fa-hsiang (Dharma-lakṣaṇa) and in Japan as Hosso. The name Dharma-lakṣaṇa was given to the School as its philosophy mainly deals with the true nature of the dharmas which constitute the phenomenal world. This School is a true interpretation of the idealist philosophy of Buddhism. According to it vijñāna, consciousness is the only reality; the world of phenomena is a projection of this consciousness. In the analysis of the vijñāna, the masters of the School establish that the highest kind of vijñāna is the Ālaya-vijñāna, a sort of sub-consciousness which contains the seeds of all creations. The phenomena (dharmas) are all illusory, consciousness alone is real. After Huiantsang, the principal teacher of this philosophy was his disciple Kui-ki who is regarded as the best exponent of this philosophy in China and Japan. The School is the only one of the scholastic type that has survived in China till now.

The origin of another Buddhist School of China also goes back to Huiantsang. It is known as the Kiu-she (Kośa) school. The name is derived from the name of the famous philosophical treatise of Vasubandhu, the Abhidharma-kośa which contains an exposition of the philosophy of the Sarvāsti-vāda School. Vasubandhu was an adherent of this School before formulating his new philosophy of Vijñāna-vāda. The Abhidharma-kośa is based on the seven metaphysical works of the Sarvāsti-vāda School. Huiantsang translated all these works into Chinese. He was anxious to popularize the doctrines of this School in China as they were useful for a proper understanding of the Vijñāna-vāda. In fact Vasubandhu himself meant his Abhidharma-kośa to be a stepping-stone to his Vijñāna-vāda. The philosophy of the Kośa School is a kind of materialism. True to the original teachings of the Buddha, it holds that Atman (self) is not real; it is an ephemeral combination of the five aggregates of existence (skandha). These aggregates are, however, real. They are composed of infinitely small atoms (paramāṇu) which alone are real. Their combinations are unreal and illusory. After Huiantsang some of his followers continued to preach the doctrines of this School. It was then taken to Japan where it is known under the name of Kusha.

Another School, founded by Tao-siuán, a disciple of Huiantsang, was called the Liu (Vinaya) School. In Japan it is known as Riotsu. We do not know how far its founder was influenced by his teacher Huiantsang in formulating the doctrines of this School. His attitude was not inconsistent with that of other Buddhists of the period. Chi-k’ai had already taught that no branch of the sacred literature was without utility. In the same
strain, Tao-siuan taught that Buddhist monastic discipline was not to be neglected. Unless one passes through the life of strict discipline, he cannot form his character and arrive at an advanced stage to practise meditation with an amount of success. For the preparation of the early career, Tao-siuan recommended the *Vinaya* of the Dhamaguptaka School as the most suitable compendium of monastic discipline.

Still another School of Buddhism was introduced in China in the eighth century by Vajrabodhi and developed by his disciple Amoghavajra. It was *Tantrika* Buddhism, already prevalent in India, specially in Nalanda and also in South India. Both Vajrabodhi and Amoghavajra carried a large number of texts to China and translated them into Chinese. The School is known in China as Chen-yen (true-word) and in Japan as Shingon. According to the teachings of this School, the primordial principle is *Mahā-vairocana*. He is identical with *bhūta-tathātā* (ultimate reality) of the philosophical Schools. The teachings of this School are concerned with three mysteries—the body, speech and the mind. They are found in all beings, either animate or inanimate. All aspects of nature are expressions of these three mysteries. These three mysteries in the human beings are the same as those in the Buddha. It is therefore possible to lead all beings to Buddhahood. This march towards Buddhahood involves a system of mental evolution through the acquisition of merits.

The philosophy was not quite new and did not attract the Chinese Buddhists very much although in Japan it had great influence. It was the magical side of this mystic Buddhism that attracted the Chinese very much. Taoism of this period had a good deal of it and when new spells, charms and magical formulae were introduced the mass of the Chinese people accepted them with great eagerness. Buddhism seems to have exhausted itself and had nothing new to bring to China.

The next few centuries form a period of decadence both in India and China. Communication between the two countries did not cease; large numbers of Chinese monks continued to visit India, the “holy land” of the Buddhists and there were also Indian monks in China who translated Buddhist texts of not much significance into Chinese.

A new period of activity starts only in the eleventh century with a new philosophical movement which though not Buddhist was greatly inspired by Buddhism and embodied certain fundamental elements of Buddhist philosophy which may be considered as lasting contributions of Buddhism to the development of Chinese thought. This new movement is the Neo-Confucianist Philosophy.

The new movement was started with a view to revitalizing the ancient Chinese philosophy and also with a bias against Buddhism. All previous
wars against Buddhism had failed. But Buddhism was now decadent as a religion both in India and China. So far as the Buddhist philosophy was concerned, its scholastic systems were unintelligible to the uninitiated. Those elements of the Buddhist metaphysics which had a universal appeal had become accessible to the Chinese through the interpretations of Seng-chao, Chi-k’ai and the masters of the Dhyāna School. Buddhism, however, still enjoyed a high prestige on account of its former glory—and hence the attempt to fight it once again.

Although the new movement was directed towards a revitalization of the old philosophy, the new philosophy that was created contained less of the old and more of Buddhism which it wanted to destroy. Certain notions of positive sciences such as mathematics, astronomy, biology as applied to philosophy had been introduced by Buddhism. The Sāṃkhya with its principles of puruṣa and prakṛti, the atomism of Vaiśeṣika, the materialism of Sarvāsti-vāda with their theories of evolution were known to the Chinese through translations of original texts as well as through interpretations of Chinese Buddhist scholars.

The principal leaders of this new movement were Chou-tseu (A.D. 1017–1073), Shao-tseu (A.D. 1011–1077), Ch’eng-hao (A.D. 1032–1085), Cheng-yi (A.D. 1033–1107) and Chu-hi (A.D. 1130–1200). The system evolved by them was perfected by Chu-hi. Contrary to the views of the ancient philosophers, Chu-hi maintained that there is no God, no sovereign power, no judge and no providence. The whole universe is composed of two co-eternal principles which are Li and K’i, the norm and the matter. Although they have distinctive characters, they are inseparable from each other. The norm is also called T’ai-ki because it is the directing force and Wu-ki because it is imperceptible and subtle. It is further described as one, infinite, eternal, immutable, unalterable, homogenous, unconscious and unintelligent. It is under the impulsion of this norm that matter evolves alternately as Yang (progression) and Yin (regression). The T’ai-ki has no material form and thus no power to create. But in spite of its transcendental character, it has a real subsistence. Here Chu-hi distinguishes his T’ai-ki from the Buddhist conception of reality. He says: “The T’ai-ki consists of the Li of the Five Sources and the Yin and the Yang. All these are not unreal. If they were unreal they would correspond to the Buddhists’ idea of the nature of things.” He further says: “The Buddhists’ idea of the unreal is not wholly wrong, but behind the unreal there must be the Li. If we only say that we are unreal and we do not know there are the real Li, that surely is inconclusive.” This seems to be a misrepresentation of the Buddhist view of life. The world is unreal but that does not mean that it is wholly unreal. From the relative point of view it is as real as anything. The highest reality is transcendental as well as immanent. It is indescribable but that does not mean that it is unattainable.

In regard to the relation between the norm and the matter and the
process of evolution, Chu-hi says that the norm is not outside the matter. It puts the matter into action. It does not and cannot exist separately. While the norm itself remains immobile, it produces the manifestations which are the beings of the world. These manifestations are not successive but simultaneous. They are translations of the force into action, passage from non-perceptible to the perceptible. The norm in the individuals is only like a shoot of the universal norm and not really separate. The relation of the universal norm to the individual is best expressed by the analogy of the moon reflecting in thousands of water-pots but remaining unchanged all the time.

Chu-hi does not believe in rebirth. Everything gets dissolved with death. When a man is born his elements are derived anew from the two great reservoirs, the norm and the matter. Existence, however, is continued through descendants. Something of the ancestors is continued through them. The descendants are like waves of the sea. Each wave is complete in itself. The first is not the second, the second is not the third. But they are all modalities of the same water. Likewise an individual is a modality of the universal norm and of the matter of earth and heaven. Then ancestor also is a modality of the same elements and so a man is one with his ancestor only by the community of the constituents, the norm and the matter.

The fundamental basis of this philosophy is not quite different from that of the T'ien-t'ai philosophy. Chi-k'ai, we have seen, accepted the Buddhist doctrine of universal and eternal causality. This causality is independent of space and time. The chain is infinite, one effect becoming the cause of the other effects, and so on. The essence of the universe is eternal and the beings are only momentary small waves in this ocean of permanent reality. The waves of the ocean neither add to nor take away from its water. The same is true of the transitory phenomena. There are two causes: material and efficient. From one unique material cause, innumerable efficient causes create innumerable beings who are distinct in appearance. Chu-hi's theory of evolution in the progressive and regressive orders under the impulsion of the norm (T'ai-ki) which is infinite, eternal and immutable, is a translation of the same philosophy in another language.

In regard to the relation between the norm and the world, the noumenon and the phenomenon (the Buddhist nirvāṇa and saṁsāra) the Neo-Confucianist philosophers also accept the Buddhist position. Thus Ch'eng Hao says: "With regard to what I speak of as spiritual composure, in activity there is this composure: in stillness also. There is no anticipating and no retrospecting, no distinction of internal and external. If you take external things to be external and regard yourself as implicated in following them, then you are taking your nature to be divided into two parts, external and internal. Further, if you regard your nature as able to
follow after things outside, then whilst it is engaged outside what is there inside you? You may have a purpose to eliminate the enticements of the external, but you are then ignoring the fact that in one's nature there is no distinction of external and internal... As to regarding the external as wrong, and the internal as right, this is not so good as forgetting that there is any external and internal. If you forget this distinction, then you are in a limpid state with nothing to disturb you. In that state you have spiritual composure. Having spiritual composure, then you are clear-minded: being clear-minded what is there which can catch you in its toils when you respond to things?" Everything according to the Dhyāna view of life is Buddha-nature. From this point of view there is no inside and no outside, both being in the same reality. There is no difference between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra; they are also in the same reality. Ch'eng-Hao also was translating the same view of life.

The Neo-Confucianists in their attempt at synthesis of the old and the new, created a new philosophy which has been exercising a tremendous influence on the Chinese mind till now. Decadence of Buddhism in China during the subsequent centuries has led people to forget the part played by Buddhism in this new movement. There is no denying the fact that the Dhyāna and T'ien-t'ai Schools prepared the way for it. The absorption of the fundamental principles of Buddhist philosophy gave the new philosophy a universal character and made Buddhist thought almost superfluous to the Chinese intelligentsia as a separate system.

India had a large share in the development of the Chinese civilization. Besides certain forms of theistic religious beliefs, Buddhism introduced in China the doctrine of rebirth, the idea of causality, the belief in reward and retribution, etc. Although the Confucian ethics inculcated a certain pragmatic outlook of life, these doctrines took such a deep root in the Chinese mind that they could not be destroyed. The Buddhist philosophy, especially its conception of reality which permeates everything in nature and the notion of universal impermanence, had an abiding influence on the poets and artists and influenced the Chinese aesthetic outlook. The poets of the T'ang period work under these influences. They have a deep feeling for nature and consider themselves inseparably bound up with it. They also have a consciousness about the fleeting nature of everything and feel melancholic for it. The artists discover the signs of the highest reality in nature, in the greenness of leaves, in the music of birds, and so forth. Buddhism also brought to the Chinese a deep religious feeling, a profound faith, which inspired the great works of art in China such as we find in Yun-kang, Lung-men Tun-huang and other places.
INDIAN INFLUENCE ON CHINESE THOUGHT

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CHAPTER XXIV

THE TEN SCHOOLS OF CHINESE BUDDHISM

The evolution of "Chinese Buddhism" was marked by the rise of Chinese Buddhist Schools (Tsung). They bore different names from the Schools of Buddhism, Hinayana or Mahayana in India and were by no means their replicas or counterparts in China. The Tsungs were essentially native growths from the Chinese conception and apprehension of India Buddhist doctrines of various Schools. These doctrines reached China fortuitously, imported by Indian monks or Chinese scholar-pilgrims.

Most of these Schools came into existence between the fifth and the eighth centuries, and in their growth and later development, several lost their distinctions, coalescing with others ceasing to exist separately. Of the fluidity of these Schools, a significant indication is the mixed character of a Chinese Buddhist monastery, where monks of different Schools find no difficulty in living in perfect harmony in the same congregation together.

The traditional number of Schools is ten and their names are derived either from principal Scriptures or from fundamental doctrine, or from the locality where they were founded or flourished later, e.g.:

(1) Chêng-shih ("True success").
(2) San-lun ("Three Sástras").
(3) Chan ("Meditation," corruption of the Sanskrit word, dhyâna; also called tsung-mên, "Door of Escape").
(4) Tien-Tâi (from the name of a monastery in the province of Chekiang; also called Fa-Hwa, "Good Law").
(5) Lien ("Lotus," so-called because the founder lived in a monastery by the side of a lotus-pond).
(6) Fa-hsiang (translation of Sanskrit dharma-lakśaṇa, title of its Scripture).
(7) Chü-shê (transcription of the Sanskrit word, kośa, meaning Abhidharma-kośa-śāstra, its principal Scripture).
(8) Hua-yen (translation of Sanskrit Avaśyaka-śāstra, its principal Scripture).
(9) Lü (translation of Vinaya; also called Nan Shan, "Southern Mountain" in Shensi province where the School flourished).
(10) Chên-yen ("True Word"; also called Mi-Chiao, "Secret Teaching").

These Schools were not mutually exclusive, and some of them (e.g. Nos. 3, 5 and 10) have so reacted on other Schools and diffused their
influence over them that in course of time they have become rather cults or general aspects of Chinese Buddhism than Schools proper.

The oldest of these was No. 5, founded in the fourth century by Hui Yüan (A.D. 333–416) and it flourished for several centuries. The School was perhaps the first fruit of the process of Taoist assimilation of Buddhism, and it is not without significance that its founder had been an ardent Taoist himself and that even after he had embraced Buddhism his Taoist leanings remained. Its principal Scriptures are three, two of which, the Sanskrit Mahāyānist Scripture, Sukhāvatī-vyūha, in a longer and a shorter version, describe the Buddhist Paradise. The artistic and the romantic in the Taoist temperament seems to have seized upon this conception of “a paradise of bliss” to which once translated, the devotee might enjoy mortal life.

The idea of achieving immortality had been the basis of a very ancient magical cult in China, practised by the so-called Wu priesthood. In the third and fourth centuries, the mysticism of ancient Taoism of the Book of Tao and Chungtse had absorbed and been adulterated by this cult. The Wu priesthood practised alchemy as the way to heaven and immortal life; the Taoist founder of the Lotus School simply spiritualized the conception and substituted spiritual means for the crude magic and alchemy. The School evolved the Doctrine of the White Way (Pai-tao) to paradise along which the Buddha, under the Mahāyānist name of Amitābha, guides the souls of the faithful. It thus made short work of the intricacies and difficulties of religious practice and inculcated simple faith in an unrelenting appeal to Amitābha. The Chinese cult to which the name Amidism has been given, evolved out of this doctrine. The Scriptural “paradise of bliss” is called by the Amidists the Western Paradise or the Pure Land.

The School next in time that arose in Chinese Buddhism was, perhaps, No. 3. While the Lotus School centred in Faith, the Meditation School in the Power of Intuitive Knowledge. This saving knowledge, according to its doctrine, is received in a flash through pure meditation—“meditation on the Void.” Hence Dhyāna—an ancient doctrine of Buddhism transmitted from the Hinayāna to the Mahāyāna—is made the all-important practice in its system. Its postulate is that the Buddha-nature (Bodhi-citta) or the essential spiritual entity (Dharma-kāya—in Chinese Fa-shen) of the Buddha is latent in every human heart. The devotee, through pure meditation, has to identify himself with it—to “awaken” it, as the process is technically called.

The doctrine is said to have been preached in China by Bodhidharma, an Indian monk who arrived at Canton in A.D. 520 or 526, around whose life and personality many miraculous legends have been woven by the Chinese. In Chinese annals occurs the account of an interview between the Chinese emperor, Wu-Ti, and Bodhidharma from which it appears that the
latter was a follower (Śūnya-vādin) of the Nihilistic School of Mahāyāna Buddhism, founded by Nāgārjuna.4

Teaching that merit does not lie in good deeds nor knowledge in the reading of Scriptures and telling the Chinese emperor that “where all is emptiness, nothing can be holy,” Bodhidharma must have seemed to the Taoists to belong to the venerable company of the famous Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove who lived early in the Tsin dynasty (A.D. 265–316). The Confucian historian, casting on them an unfriendly eye, described them thus: “They all revered and exalted the Void and Non-action and disregarded the rites and law. They drank wine to excess and disdained the affairs of the world.”5

With the mysticism of the Book of Tao (Tao Teh Ching) and the spicy half-humorous and half-serious disquisitions of Chuangtse, Bodhidharma’s teachings somehow harmonized. As Lin Yutang says: “Certain traits in it (Chuangtse’s mysticism), like weeding out the idea of the ego and quiet contemplation and “seeing the Solitary,” explain how these native Chinese ideas were back of the development of the Chan Buddhism.”6

The Chan School flourished in China for centuries after its foundation at the end of the sixth and gave rise to five subsidiary Schools, of which Lin-chi (from a place-name) still survives. But it was in Japan that the Chan School under the name of Zen prospered most and is flourishing still at its headquarters at Kyoto.

This particular School of Chinese Buddhism may be deemed to be the very antipodes of Confucianism. But we find, curiously enough, towards the end of the fifteenth century, a great Chinese writer, Wang Yang Ming, undertaking to demonstrate that the fundamental doctrine of the Chan School had been already latent in Mencius’s conception of Liang Chih (intuitive knowledge) which comes of contemplation of the mind by itself.7

In No. 4, which arose both as an offshoot of and a protest against the extreme idealism of the Chan School, we find an original effort of the Chinese mind at a novel syncretism. The School is nominally based on the Scripture, known in its Sanskrit version as the Sad-dharma-puṇḍarīka (The Lotus of the Good Law), from which the School derives its alias. But grounding itself on the distinction between “fundamental Buddhahood” (Pen) and “derivative Buddhahood” (Chin)—a doctrine which has its counterpart in the “Lotus” Scripture—it aims at a new synthesis of all the teachings of the Buddha, both of the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna varieties, dividing them under five periods of the Buddha’s career in the world. The apparent inconsistencies in the teachings are explained away by the doctrine, held by the Mahāyānists, that the Buddha, adapting himself to the various capacities of his hearers, delivered himself in words of dual import, obvious and esoteric.

The School also devised a system of interpretation of the Scriptural lore. “The special objective of the Tien-Tai School,” says Edkins, “has
been to strike a middle path between the credulous acceptance of the sacred books as literally true, and their entire rejection by extreme idealism. It was thought best to recognize both these modifications of Buddhism as genuine developments of the system, and to add a third reconciling principle which distinguishes the others, compares and combines them, and then chooses the path between them.”

Nos. 1 and 2 did not last long and probably got merged in other Schools. The former based itself on a Scripture of which the Sanskrit name is Satya-siddhi-śāstra, from which its name “True Success” is taken. It is the Chinese equivalent of a subdivision, called Saṃvṛāntika, of the Indian (Mahāyānīst) Madhyamika School. The second one has for its principal Scriptures two works of Nāgārjuna and one by his pupil, Āryadeva.

Nos. 6, 7 and 8 represent Chinese Buddhist scholasticism, nourished on the metaphysics of some of the Mahāyānīst Schools of India. Each of them embodies not so much a form of faith and religion as a system of scholastic philosophy. No. 6 was founded by the great Chinese scholar and translator, Yuan Chaung, who, having spent sixteen years in India in pilgrimage and Buddhistic studies, returned in A.D. 645 to China to devote the rest of his life to the translation of Indian Buddhist works. He had studied philosophy in the University of Nālandā in Magadha (in India) with Śīlabhadra, the head of the institution, and the School of Yuan Chaung, therefore, claims Śīlabhadra as its founder. No. 8 was a School of Monism—its principal tenet, which agreed with Taoist philosophy, was “the belief in an absolute unity, transcending all divergencies, in which even contraries were seen to be but forms of the Primal One.”

We have seen how Taoism, with its subtle affinities, both temperamental and doctrinal, to Indian Buddhism of the Mahāyānā variety, formed the background for the emergence of some major Schools of Chinese Buddhism.

Confucianism, however, offered antagonism to Buddhism in several respects. First, the former in its essential outlook was trenchantly secular and purely humanistic, while the latter was decidedly other-worldly; secondly, its fundamental ideas of social and political order, based on family life, were opposed to the monastic institution of Buddhism. In the long and chequered history of Buddhism in China, there were many attacks made upon it by the Confucian literati. The most famous in Chinese annals is Han-Yü’s epistle to Emperor Hsien-Tsung in A.D. 819, regarded by Chinese scholars as the best specimen of classical Chinese prose-style, condemning the Emperor’s patronage of Buddhism.

Yet between Hinayāna Buddhism and Confucianism there was a point of contact in the emphasis on self-discipline and propriety of personal conduct. Confucianism is sometimes called “the Religion of the Li,” an untranslatable term which embodies the central concept of Confucian teachings. The concept has two aspects: “as a broad principle of personal
conduct it means propriety in everything, or doing the proper thing; as a broad social principle it means _the order of things, or everything in its right place._" In its former sense, the conception of Li has a certain parallelism to the conception of _Vinaya_ in Hinayāna Buddhism. So at least one Chinese Buddhist School, No. 9, took its stand on _Vinaya_.

The School, founded by Tao Hsüan (A.D. 595–667), emphasized discipline and asceticism as the main essentials in its system. It caught much of the spirit of Hinayāna Buddhism and its principal Scripture was the _Vinaya_ of the Indian Dharmagupta School. The _Lu_ School still exists in China with its headquarters in the Pao-hua-shan monastery in the province of Kiangsu. The spirit of the _Lu_ School is Confucian: its contents are Buddhist.

The last School of Chinese Buddhism, founded towards the end of the eighth century, was No. 10, an esoteric School (hence the name "True Word" or "Secret Teaching)," inspired by the _Tāntrika_ developments of Indian Buddhism which were popularized in China by an Indian monk named Vajrabodhi (died in China in A.D. 730). In its higher aspects, the School incultates the doctrine of one Buddha-Spirit under the name Vairocana, manifesting itself in a series of emanations and reflexes. But, as Eliot remarks, "in its popular and unfortunately commoner aspect, it is simply polytheism, fetishism and magic.""12

Its appeal to the Chinese lay in its extensive use of magical ceremonies and formulae. The Chinese, since time immemorial, had recognized ritual as a means of regulating and controlling the unseen forces of the universe: a series of ancient rituals, based on sympathetic magic, is still practised in China in the ceremony of securing the welfare of departed souls. Nor did Chinese philosophy discard this kind of magical ritualism, and the ancient _Book of Rites_ is one of the thirteen Confucian classics. The _Tāntrika_ practices of magic, with a background of mystic philosophy, were not uncongenial, and the "True Word" School became influential enough to affect other Schools and give a certain colouring to Buddhism in general in its later developments when it mingled with Lamaism introduced from Tibet.

_Scripture Collections._—The literary genius of the Chinese and their reverence for the written word have passed into a by-word. The first Indian propagators of Buddhism in China seem to have recognized and made use of this outstanding Chinese characteristic. They started to supply _texts_ on the new religion to the people in abundance. The first Buddhist monastery in China—the White Horse Monastery at Lo-yang—was for centuries a beehive of literary industry. Available texts were translated into Chinese, and the language not only received an accumulation of new words—literal renderings of technical terms and proper names, but developed a sort of literary dialect, sometimes called "Buddhist Mandarin" different in style from Chinese classical and historical works.
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The importance, from the historical viewpoint, of the Chinese Scripture collections is two-fold. In the first place, they throw some light into the obscurity of the evolution of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India, helping us to place in chronological sequence some of the fundamental works of the different Mahāyāna Schools. They also preserve in translations, the accuracy of which, however, cannot be assessed, a good number of Mahāyānist works lost in their originals. In the second place, they put a new perspective on the unsettled, though all-important, question of the relation between the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna, though their distinction was all too imperfectly conceived by the Chinese Buddhists. With a few exceptions the translations are from Sanskrit, though some phrases and forms of expression suggest exploitation of Pāli sources also. A portion in each collection is catalogued as Hinayānist, but includes works commonly recognized in India as Mahāyānist, opening the vexed problem whether this classification is due to the cataloguer's ignorance or to some obscure interpenetration between the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna in India itself.

NOTES

2. "Amidism substitutes for the original authentic, Gautama, Amida or Amitabha . . . He is a deity born of a lotus, in the marvellous paradise Sukhavati which the Chinese call Hsi Tien, the Western Heaven. . . . To escape the torments of hell and be reborn in Western Paradise, it is only necessary to invoke the name of Amida." ibid., p. 281.
4. ibid., p. 255.
10. The famous epistle is quoted in an abbreviated translation in Giles's Chinese Literature, pp. 201 and 202, and is partly quoted from Giles's translation in Hinduism and Buddhism, pp. 266–7.

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CHAPTER XXV

JAPANESE THOUGHT

While Shinto, "the way of the Gods," contains a great deal of mythological superstition and ultra-nationalistic nonsense, which have done more harm than good to the healthy development of Japanese thought and culture, there is one thought in it which can be considered highly and characteristically expressive of the Japanese way of responding to environment. By this I mean the phrase kannagara or kannagara no michi.

Kannagara has been abused by scholars, "patriots," and historians whose minds have been warped by the narrowness of their intellectual outlook as well as by their sentimentalistic obsession. The phrase when properly interpreted really echoes the gist of Japanese thought.

Kannagara is a composite term: kan, that is, kami, is "deity" and nagara is "in accordance with," "in conformity with," or "as it is." Kannagara thus means "in accordance with the gods," or "such as the gods are"; more fully, it is "in conformity to the gods' will," or "to follow the gods in such a way as they are in themselves," or "to be like the gods," or "to reflect in oneself the image of the gods."

Kannagara first occurs in the Annals of Japan (Nihon Shoki) under the Emperor Kōtoku (reigned A.D. 645-54), who declared Japan to be the land of the rulers descended from the gods whose beginning is coeval with heaven and earth, and therefore to be governed in conformity with the will of the gods.

The term had thus first a political significance, but as time went on it gradually came to have a more universal application. It ceased to be restricted to politics. It began to assume a moral and religious tone, and the "gods" were identified with "Nature." To be or to act in accordance with the gods was to take Nature as she is and not to exercise any human intelligence over Nature. This is gleaned from The Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves (Mannyō-shū) which is the collection of the ancient Japanese poems compiled probably by Otomo-no-Yakamochi in the latter part of the eighth century. It was Moto-ori Norinaga (A.D. 1730-1801) who definitely gave this turn to kannagara.

As long as "in accordance with the gods" was understood in the political sense, the idea was liable to be confused with imperialism, nationalism, and theocracy. The results of this confusion are in a most tragical manner illustrated by the recent events in the history of Japan. The bigoted nationalistic and in my view highly superstitious Shinto scholars went through every manner of twisting the Japanese thought to suit their provincialistic prejudices. While Norinaga himself was not free from these
prejudices he was fair-minded enough not to run to the extreme views such as were cherished by his followers headed by Hirata Atsutane (A.D. 1776–1843).

What we may call properly Japanese thought did not become evident until the eighteenth century when Kamo-no-Mabuchi (A.D. 1697–1769), and Moto-ori Norinaga began to revive the study of the ancient “way of the gods” against Confucianism. They were quite displeased with the prevalence of the Confucian rationalism and the aggressive attitude of its Japanese followers who ignored Shinto altogether and were consequently apt to disregard the significance of Japanese history not only political but cultural. Norinaga contended that the Confucians were inclined to be too “human” in their attempt at the rationalistic interpretation of Japanese mythology as narrated in the *Kojiki* (Records of Ancient Events) and the *Nihon Shoki*. He insisted that the gods are not human beings, that whatever irrationalities they acted they are to be so taken as told in the ancient records, and that if we applied our limited intelligence here and judged them “humanly,” we would certainly miss the point, that is, Japanese history would lose its supernatural significance and our rulers cease to claim their heavenly descent. Rationality is to be banished from the chronicle of the gods, let us naively accept it as was bequeathed to us by our ancestors, let us not measure the gods by our modern moralistic standards. This was the contention of Norinaga and his followers.

It is very strange as we see now that the Shinto scholars, when they made these statements, were using the human standard of reason and morality just as much as their opponents, Confucians or others. The Shinto scholars forgot that whenever there is a contention of any kind this was to be based on logic.

Though they certainly erred in their illogical demonstration of logic in the evaluation of the deeds of the gods humanly recorded and humanly transmitted from one generation to another, they were not quite in the wrong in their attempt to intimate that there is something in human experience that eludes human estimation and that this is to be accepted as going beyond rationalism, as being just as it is, as ultimate reality, either natural or supernatural. But the error they committed—in this case most grievously—was that they endeavoured to apply the irrationality of the gods to the political fields, attempting thereby to prove the divine origin of the Japanese imperial household.

The Japanese contact with foreign cultures took place too early in the history of the people, and for this reason they had no opportunity to discover what most characteristically belonged to them. This latter was rather suffocated or smouldered under the superior weight of Chinese and Indian culture and thought.

When the Japanese were ready to unfold their own way of reacting to their environment so as to grow out of the mythological stage of
primitive psychology, they found themselves confronting Taoism and Confucianism introduced by the Chinese immigrants from the Asiatic continent. Their cultural influence was overwhelming. There was no choice for the Japanese but to follow their steps humbly and even eagerly and greedily.

The first thing the Japanese adopted from their neighbours was their method of writing in ideograph. The characters were used not only to indicate the sounds but also to express ideas. In the Mannyo, the Chinese script represents to a very large extent the Japanese sounds, while the Kojiki is a complicated mixture of the Japanese sounds and the Chinese ideas, and the Nihon-Shoki is entirely written in the Chinese style with the Chinese ideographs. This adoption meant largely the moulding of Japanese thinking into the Chinese frame.

The cult of ancestor-worship is generally regarded, or rather made to be so regarded, as inherent in the Japanese racial psychology, but in reality it was taken over from China.

The philosophy of Ying and Yang which afforded the foundation of fabricating the prehistorical section of Japanese history was also borrowed from our neighbour.

The idea of deifying the rulers was also probably adopted from China where the rulers are considered deriving their authority from Heaven, whatever they mean by this. The Japanese made the idea more definitely concrete by replacing Heaven by the gods and by making the reigning Mikado the lineal descendant of the gods. Here we may have a glimpse into the Japanese way of thinking, which mainly consists in transforming the abstract into the concrete.

These ideas running through the warp and weft of the official chronicle of Japan known as Nihon-Shoki and regarded by the Shintoists as one of their “sacred Scriptures” are the engraving of the Confucian thoughts. The Japanese are also greatly indebted to the Taoists. Their liking for puerile naïveté, primitive simplicity, original purity, and empirical realism comes from Lao Tzu’s teaching. This is especially noticeable in Motoori’s interpretation of the “ancient way of the gods.” His doctrine of the kannagara is the Japanese version of Lao Tzu’s indictment of human hypocrisy and of the artificial reconstruction of social order.

While examining the so-called sacred texts of Japanese Shinto I should like to make a reference to their compilers’ grand way of describing the origin of the imperial rule. Jimmu the first Emperor, who is supposed to have ascended the throne 2600 years ago, is no doubt a fictitious person and the district he is said to have ruled could not have been any wider than a portion of the region now known as Honshu; but the compilers of the Nihon-Shoki make him say, “It is my idea to establish a central capital by uniting the six quarters and to construct one grand roof whereby to cover the eight frontiers.” “The six quarters” and “the eight
frontiers" are a poetical allusion to the universe or the world, a typically Chinese way of expressing their idea of the world.

Confucianism represents the culture of the northern people and Taoism that of the southern people. China is predominantly northern and it is no wonder that Confucian influence is everywhere in evidence. It is true that Taoism as taught by Lao Tzu, Chwang-tzé and others had been embraced also by the literati, but the main current of Chinese thought has its origin in Confucianism. Confucianism is the preserver of social order and the upholder of rationalism and humanism, while Lao Tzu's doctrine advocates escapism and transcendentalism.

As long as Japan was under Confucian influence she had no opportunity to develop whatever Lao Tzuanism she had in her reaction to the environment peculiar to her. There is no doubt that her land is principally inhabited by races coming from the southern islands, and their psychological pattern is naturally more southern than northern. If they were left to themselves they would surely have developed the Lao Tzuan way of interpreting reality.

But as history would have it, the Chinese immigrants with their higher Confucian culture were here already strongly entrenched, and the first chapters of Japanese history were written under their influence. This was inevitable, and there is good reason to be thankful for this turn Japanese history took in its early stages. Our people were not really ready to appreciate Lao Tzuanism which indeed requires a great deal of reflection and the power of thinking, and we could not expect this of a people not yet out of a state of primitive civilization.

While the Japanese people were putting their community life in order according to the Confucian model, they never forgot—no, they could not forget—what was deeply moving in their southern hearts which hankered after the Lao Tzuan expression.

What was this? What were they after to give vent to their inner aspirations? It was their feeling for the kannagara. This struggled to express itself in thought. The feeling is nothing until and unless it translates itself into a thought, and the thought has no life except when it is sustained by the feeling. Japanese thought must be one growing out of Japanese feeling. The kannagara is thus at once Japanese feeling and Japanese thought.

But Moto-ori's conception of the kannagara is far from being adequate to the Japanese feeling which goes beyond Shinto thought. As long as Moto-ori remained a Shinto exponent standing up against Confucian rationalism, he could not rise above the level of Confucianism. His merit as an expounder of Japanese thought consisted in his picking up the phrase kannagara from the so-called "Sacred texts" of Shinto. His Shinto insight failed to penetrate into the deeper aspect of the kannagara, but he must have felt something in his heart, however superficial and merely
"irrational," when he confronted this phrase. He lived late in the eighteenth century when Buddhist thought had already deeply entered into the Japanese religious consciousness, but his "irrational" insight failed to see in the kannagata what the Japanese soul was really after. This was because he was a Shinto follower, who is by nature unable to discover anything really spiritual in his "Sacred Texts" except statism, or insularism, or provincialism, or nationalistic fanaticism.

What helped the Japanese soul to penetrate into the depths of the kannagata feeling and made it the actually viable expression of Japanese thought was Mahāyāna Buddhism. Shinto supplied the term while Buddhism gave it a spiritual significance satisfactory to the Japanese religious and philosophical yearnings.

When Mahāyāna Buddhism was introduced to Japan, the Prince Shōtoku embraced it at once saying that Japan was truly the land fit for the Mahāyāna teaching. By this, he meant that the Mahāyāna was the teaching truly appealing to the Japanese mind because the Mahāyāna gave what it had been asking for. The prince wrote commentaries on the three great Mahāyāna texts. In this respect he was a great representative Japanese. He was the first Japanese thinker who perceived something deep moving in the Japanese soul.

But as a matter of fact he belonged to the aristocracy of Japan and what he saw in the Japanese mind was naturally from this higher point of view. Being a Japanese, he was, of course, conscious of something beating in his heart in unison with that of the masses. He was too far ahead of his time and his people. It took some centuries yet for the latter to come up to his level of feeling and thought. It was in the thirteenth century that the religious, and consequently philosophical, consciousness of the people began to assert itself.

Between Shōtoku Taishi (A.D. 593–621) and the Kamakura period (A.D. 1083–1338) we have two great figures representing Japanese Buddhism, Dengyō Daishi known as Saichō (A.D. 767–822) and Kōbo Daishi known as Kūkai (A.D. 773–835).

They were contemporaries and exercised great influence each in his own field, the former as founder of the Japanese School of Tendai (T'ien-tai) and the latter as founder of the Shingon (Chen-yen, Mantra). Kōbo was on more intimate terms with the masses than Dengyō, but neither of these great Buddhists belonged to the masses because they did not rise from below but came down from above.

It was in the thirteenth century that the Japanese masses were really awakened to the religious consciousness and along with it a philosophical reflection on reality. This was the time when the aristocratic culture of Kyoto nobles and courtiers gave way to a new cultural pattern created by the warrior classes, who had their seat of sustenance in the provinces and living close to the earth. The Kyoto culture had no direct concrete
touch with the soil and was literally up "in the clouds." It lacked solidity, for it was created out of abstractions. The Kamakura revolted against it, which was quite natural. In fact, the Kyoto even when left to itself was bound to collapse.

This state of affairs is reflected in the Buddhist teaching of Hōnen (A.D. 1133–1212) and Shinran (A.D. 1173–1262). Scholars say that they made Buddhism easier for the general multitude to understand, for the older form was full of abstractions and high speculations, the understanding of which demanded much learning. Buddhism, however, being a religious teaching for all classes of men, ought to be accessible equally to the nobles, to the warriors, to the peasants, to the erudite, to the illiterate. In Buddhism there is nothing that could be made easier or more difficult to comprehend. Buddhism is Buddhism as long as it is a religion. The scholar's appraising altogether misses the mark.

The fact is that the teaching of Hōnen and Shinran really and truly echoes what was then moving in the hearts and minds of the Japanese people generally. It was not their artificial production, it was simply the response to the spiritual needs of the people of those days. Buddhism then became the religion of the Japanese who re-created it to satisfy their requirements. The Pure Land School of Buddhism is the creation of the Japanese religious genius.

China has her Pure Land School, and Hōnen as the founder of the Japanese Pure Land enumerates some Chinese teachers as his predecessors. This was actually what was in his consciousness at the time, but historically speaking Hōnen did not truthfully estimate his position—probably he could not, as he had then no way of reviewing himself as an historical personage. But the fact is that Hōnen followed by Shinran simply gave vent to the spiritual yearnings in the hearts of the Japanese people.

That the Japanese people in those days were really seeking something spiritual is also shown by the Shinto followers' approach to Buddhism. Hitherto it was the Buddhists who made a move towards Shinto trying to reconcile its beliefs with the Buddhist doctrine of man and nature. Shinto remained altogether passive in this respect, this was owing to Shinto's not having anything in it, which could be made to function actively towards the absorption of Buddhist teaching, or towards its destruction as antagonistic to the Japanese way of feeling and thinking. Shinto had not yet arrived at the stage of self-consciousness. It has had its kannagara idea for some time now, but it was still something foreign to it, showing that it had not yet come of age. For the first time the Shintoists of the Kamakura period moved to assert themselves in the name of Ise Shinto. Ise is the seat of the Japanese ancestral shrine. It now openly denounced Buddhism, but it was in reality no more than an attempt to assimilate the latter from the point of the Shinto world-view.

Ise Shinto, influenced by the conceptualism of Mahāyāna philosophy and
of Lao Tzuang, speculation, tries to give a new expression to the thought of the kannagara by stating that "a man of the gods keeps watch over the beginning of the Chaos," that "the sacred mirror from which heaven and earth have their start is to be received with purity of heart, to be sought with the mind of the gods, and to be looked into with the formlessness and gradelessness of (the absolute)." When the kannagara is interpreted like this it loses its characteristic intuitive directness of Japanese thought.

The Nihon Shoki where this term makes its first appearance does not go beyond the political bearing in which it is made to stand, but underneath the term there is an explanatory gloss which reads: Kannagara means, "in accordance with the way of the gods, one has, too, within oneself the way of the gods." This is evidently a later insertion, but it is most expressive of the notion implied in the term as peculiarly Japanese thought.

The time has come now to explain what is really implied in the kannagara and what it is that makes it characteristically Japanese thought.

When the Japanese consciousness was still in its primitive stage of development, it could not go beyond its natural simplicity and naive empiricism. It was confined within the frame of sense-experience and fantastic imagination which could not suffer any degree of intellectual analysis. The gods came down from Takamagahara, "heavenly fields," and walked on earth. They were wild, immoral, irrational, and unnatural. Their behaviour could not be measured by human standards. The primitive Japanese just accepted whatever was told of them and were even proud of their achievements full of unreasonableness and unnaturalness. And this way of accepting the gods and their works was understood to be "in accordance with them," to be loyal subjects of their descendants, and also to be religiously consoled, whatever this meant. The crude Japanese minds were not at all conscious of the deeper implications of the phrase, kannagara, except being natural, simple-minded, accepting things as they are, negating nothing, naively obeying the order of things as they came to them—and all this on the plane of sense-experience. The kannagara was not yet a clear, well-defined thought, it only adumbrated it.

In the Heian period (ninth to twelfth centuries) the kannagara went through a poetical transformation, it ceased to be political. As long as the rulers were identified with the gods and as long as there was some political background which necessitated the upholding of this idea, the phrase had its living value. But when the people became peacefully settled in their archipelago with their sovereign gods securely holding their power—even nominally—and when they reached a certain advanced stage of civilization enjoying a culture acquired from the study of Chinese literature and also developing a degree of culture of their own creation, the Japanese turned their attention to Nature and began to appreciate its deeper aspects. They were then initiated to enjoy the feeling known as
mono no aware. This feeling may seem apparently to have nothing to do with the kannagara. The one is a poetical, aesthetical, sentimental reaction to Nature while the other is strongly tinged with political and ethical colour. But my contention is that the kannagara and the mono no aware demonstrate two different facets of one and the same Japanese feeling—and Japanese feeling is Japanese thought.

Mono no aware, which swept over the minds of the poets of the Heian period (A.D. 897–1185), sounds somewhat sentimental and the Japanese are a sentimental people. Mono means “things” generally, no corresponds to “of,” and aware is “emotional response” in its broadest sense. The whole phrase thus means “to feel the sentiments moving in things about oneself,” and “thing” may be inanimate objects or sentient beings capable of emotions.

When the autumnal moon peeps into a humble hut, or when the spring foliage shines in the sun, or when the winter field is covered all white with snow, the Heian poets feel various emotions moving in Nature as the seasons alternate. We may say that these emotions are in us, moving through us, and only transferred into Nature which remains all the time insensible. But the Japanese who coined the term kannagara felt that Nature herself was the symbol of it just as much as we humans were; for we, each one of us, whether animate or inanimate, are the gods, and when this truth is felt or experienced, though not necessarily intellectually analysed, whatever utterances that come out of us straightforwardly are sure to ring with the rhythm of the kannagara. The poets of the Heian period strove to feel this heavenly rhythm which they called mono no aware.

Mono means things in general; not only are natural objects mono, we sentient humans are also mono. When our hearts are released from egocentric impulses and rationalistic subtleties, they become resonant with the spirit of the gods, which is kannagara, and are enabled to see deep into the value of human emotionality. This is when they read mono no aware in all phases of our social activities calling forth our emotional responses in all their varieties. To feel mono no aware in natural events and in human affairs is no more than an aspect of the kannagara asserting itself in the Japanese heart.

The spiritual meaning of the kannagara, however, was not realized until the thirteenth century, when Hōnen and Shinran responded to it for the first time from their mountain retreats on Hiei. The idea of the Pure Land naturally suggests Buddhism, but here is one thing that has escaped the notice of most Japanese historians, and which I wish to take up for a special consideration here.

The central point in the doctrine of the Pure Land is not necessarily our rebirth there, but the way to it paved for us while still in this life. For this way is the one essentially created by the Japanese mind. While its metaphysical basis had been laid down by Buddhism which came to
Japan from its original birth-place, India, through the Chinese mind tending towards pragmatic empiricism, the Japanese of the thirteenth century did not approach it metaphysically or rationalistically, but in a most direct practical manner.

Shinran, the founder of the Shin branch of the Pure Land School, teaches that the way to be absolutely assured of one’s rebirth is to accept wholeheartedly the Original Vow announced by Amida, and that this acceptance is effected when one has what Shinran designates as a “side-wise leap.” Instead of following a continuous logical passage of ratiocination, he tells us to abandon all our intellectual calculations and to jump right down into what seems to be a dark bottomless abyss of the absolute, when the white road to the Pure Land opens up before us. This leaping side-wise, to use the favourite expression of the Shintoists, is to move in the kannagara fashion, to see one’s original image reflected in the sacred mirror wrought by the gods, to plunge into the beginning of the Chaos and thus return to the essence of timelessness.

Shinto terminology is generally apt to give us false impressions as it is intimately associated with data gained from the senses and almost inextricably—and intentionally—mixed up with the deification of the rulers. But we must not forget that in it we can discover the fundamental thought of the Japanese people struggling for an adequate expression, and that their discovery is possible only when we make it go through the sieve of Buddhist thought and experience. The same idea may be expressed in this way that Japanese thought aided and deepened by Buddhist experience unfolds all its implications and sheds light on the feelings valued by the people through their history of centuries.

The Japanese mind is not analytical but intuitive; it has never been trained in inductively collecting data and abstracting a principle running through them. It just grasps at each concrete datum of experience and wants to identify itself with it. It does not postulate anything supposed to be underlying the experience. It does not go beyond what confronts it. This does not mean that the Japanese world of experiences does not go beyond that of the lower animals living within the frame of sense-events. It means that the Japanese intellect tends to move on the plane of intuitions or that of radical empiricism, in its dealing with a concrete world of sense-perceptions. The kannagara point to it, the Shintoists wish to take the gods as they are and not to bend them to suit human logicality. The Japanese Buddhists, however, who have actually passed through the experience of negation are not disposed just to swallow the Shintoistic pill. They would transpose the gods on to the higher spiritual fields of experience and translate the primitive naturalism of Shinto into a deeper state of religious consciousness where obtains the feeling of absolute passivity. This is what is meant by the Buddhist seeing into the suchness of things (tathatā).

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The *kannagara* interpreted spiritually is no other than objectively yielding to the call of Amida which is, as designated by the Pure Land teachers, the Original Vow of Amida. This is the *tariki*, “other power.” The Mahāyāna taught prior to Hōnen and Shinran was too abstract, metaphysical, or too Indian and did not appeal to the Japanese way of thinking and feeling. In order to make Buddhism a spiritual teaching indigenous to Japan it was imperative to do away with abstractions, postulations, indeed everything that would savour of intellection. The Japanese wanted to follow the way of the gods though not in the naïve Shinto fashion which could not rise above sense-experiences.

When treating of anything relating to Japanese culture, we cannot ignore the problem of *sabi*, in which we discover the main current of Japanese thought aesthetically conceived as flowing from the *kannagara*.

*Sabi* is difficult to define in a few words, but metaphysically or rather spiritually I would describe it as a feeling of absolute aloneness—aloneness not in the sense of loneliness or being away from one’s comrades. Absolute aloneness is realized when one touches the depths of individuality; and this realization must take place existentially, as some philosophers would say, and not conceptually or postulationally. Some Japanese scholars would identify this realization with attaining the virtue of sincerity which is more or less Confucian, while the Shinto would have for it honesty, naturalness, spontaneity, plainness or straightforwardness of heart. It is following the way natural to the gods before it became tainted by the crookedness of human reason.

According to Basho’s instruction given to his disciples, sincerity in *haiku* (seventeen-syllable poem) consists in feeling like the pine when you face the pine, like the bamboo when you face the bamboo, and this feeling he wanted to be given expression without any admixture of Self-centred mentality. The exact words of Basho are: “as to the pine follow the pine, as to the bamboo follow the bamboo.” The Japanese for “follow” is *narau*, which has several meanings: “to follow,” “to imitate,” “to learn,” “to practise,” “to discipline,” “to be in accord with,” “to accustom oneself to,” etc. One of the disciples comments: “To *narau* is to enter into the object and to bring out what is innerly there and to give it a literary form. When, however, the expression is not in accord with the feeling naturally emanating from the object, there is a split between the object and the expressions which violates sincerity.” In other words, when the *kannagara* losing its state of self-identity assumes a dualistic aspect, it ceases to be the way in accord with the gods prior to human contamination. The suchness of things is warped.

We can now see what is behind all these thoughts, *aware*, *tariki*, and *sabi*; it is, to use Shinto terminology, the *kannagara* or *kannagara no michi*, the way natural to the gods, or the way of the gods as they are by themselves without being affected by human intellectuality.
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We can thus state that the kannagara summarizes Japanese thought. The Japanese mind ever since its awakening to reflection has been under the influence of foreign culture, Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist, and recently the Western mode of thinking has found its way here, the scholars are now endeavouring to unfold what is essentially Japanese by adopting Western methodology. At the same time most young men these days are so taken up by Western thought, and those who read recent Japanese humanistic literature will find there every possible shadow of the West. But in spite of all these foreign accretions, what flows deeply underneath is this Japanese thought and feeling of the kannagara, which will always assert itself in one way or another whatever its superficial coatings may be.

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