ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SĀMKHYA SYSTEM OF THOUGHT

By

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Dedicated to
Dr. B. C. Law, M.A., B.L., Ph.D., D.Litt.
as a token of friendship,
respect and gratitude.
एकाकी दुर्गेमे घोरे विषमे पथि सम्भरत।
प्रार्थये स्वतिष्ठत् पूर्वचार्यपदाश्रयम्॥
PREFACE

This volume was originally intended to serve as an introduction to the Yuktidipikā. But my long absence from Calcutta delayed its publication. In the meantime, almost all the copies of the Yuktidipikā were exhausted and a thoroughly revised edition is now under preparation. As the portion of the introduction which is already printed cannot for different reasons be held up for an indefinite period till the publication of the proposed edition, it was decided to enlarge the contemplated introductory volume by incorporating into it elaborate discussions on some of the fundamental topics of Sāmkhya and thus to issue it under a separate title. The revised edition of the Yuktidipikā will not contain any separate introduction; it will be furnished with a summary of the text, notes in important places and textual comments where necessary. In this connection I beg to point out the fact that the readings of the quotations from the Yuktidipikā appearing in this volume are adopted entirely on the basis of the proposed revised edition, and so these will be found to vary slightly in some instances.

An attempt has been made in this volume to trace the origin of Sāmkhya and specially the development which the system underwent in the different stages of its growth and evolution. The vast literature of this system with its numerous schools is almost lost to us and what has survived in the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is only a skeleton of it. However, I have spared no pains to present before the scholars a picture of early Sāmkhya as I could draw up from the evidence of the Yoga-bhasya and specially the Yuktidipikā. Besides these two source books of immense help, I have also utilised various stray references to the views of ancient teachers of Sāmkhya as far as I could pick them up from the ancient literature of India. Amongst numerous topics of Sāmkhya that are discussed here, special mention may be made of the doctrine of plurality of prakṛti by Paurika and its criticism
by the author of the Yuktidipikā. Discussions on the five vital breaths and the five springs of activity (karma-yonis) also contain several new materials. The chapter on the evolution of embodied beings (pp. 278-314) will rouse further interest on the study of Sāmkhya. The doctrine of 'ṣās-siddhi' appearing in this connection is entirely new to the ordinary students of Sāmkhya. Then again, proper attention has been paid to the views of Pañcadhikarana, Patañjali (who is different from the author of the Yoga-sūtra), Vāraśaganya and his followers, Vindhyavāsin, Mādhava, and the like. Very little has been said here which is not supported by quotations from original texts. Except in a few instances, the present Sāmkhya-sūtra and the school of Vijñāna Bhikṣu have been generally ignored.

The hostile criticisms of the Buddhists, Vaiśeṣikas and specially of Uddyotakara (who is found to refute a school of Sāmkhya which is other than that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa) and their counter criticisms from the standpoint of Sāmkhya are not dealt with here. This is reserved for a subsequent publication.

A detailed treatment of the various schools of Sāmkhya cannot be expected at this stage for lack of sufficient materials. Further light may, however, be obtained if some of the manuscripts of Sāmkhya that are listed in the different catalogues could be thoroughly examined. For instance, notice is made of one "Sāmkhya-ṣaḍvidha" by Indra in Bülher's "Catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts contained in the private libraries of Gujrat, Kathiavad" etc. Then again, Rai Bahadur Hiralal in his "Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit manuscripts in the Central Provinces and Berar" (1926) acquaints us with the names of some unknown manuscripts of Sāmkhya. These are:—Sāmkhya-dipikā by Kaiyaṭa (No. 6368), Sāmkhya-ṣastra-śākhā (No. 6369) and Sāmkhya-sūtra by Pañca-śikhācārya (No. 6371). It is needless to state here that the titles of these manuscripts are indeed alluring to the students of Sāmkhya. Recently at the National Museum in New Delhi, Sri Fatehchand Belany organised an exhibition of some of the important manuscripts belonging to the Jesalmere Bhandars. Amongst them,
there were two old manuscripts of two unknown commentaries on the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa—one of them was copied in V. S. 1173 (A. D. 1116) and the other in V. S. 1200 (A. D. 1143).

In fact, some of the privately owned manuscript libraries of India possess such treasures as are still unknown to the scholars. And if an extensive search be undertaken, the result is sure to be fruitful to a certain extent. I am expressing here my gratitude to my friend Lalsaheb Kumar Sri Prafulla Chandra Bhanj Deo, M.A. (Cantab) at whose initiative and encouragement I am intending to visit some of the private libraries of Central India for the purpose of examining the contents of some of the important manuscripts deposited therein. And if my mission be fulfilled, I shall not be failing in my duty of reporting the result of my search to the scholars in due time.

I am greatly indebted to my teachers MM. Jogendranath] Vedantatirtha, Professor of Indian Philosophy, Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, and Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, head of the department of Sanskrit, Calcutta University, for the help and encouragement which I have always received at their hands. My thanks also go to my colleague Prof. Kishori Mohan Maitra, M.A., for his constructive criticisms in some important places. I am also to thank Pt. K. Sankar Sarma, assistant librarian to the Asiatic Society, for some technical assistance.

Calcutta

Pulinbihari Chakravarti
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SAUMKYA—WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

By Saumkhy, the system of Kapila is generally meant, but its meaning in different stages of Sanskrit literature deserves special attention. The term occurs for the first time in the Svet. Up. (VI. 13) and there it is stated that the supreme reality is to be achieved by Saumkhy and Yoga. In the Mahâbhârata (Mbh.) Droña is said to breathe his last by having recourse to the supreme Saumkhy. From the context it appears that in both the places the term has been used in the sense of spiritual discipline. Saumkara in his commentary on the Vishnu-sahasra-nâma quotes a verse from the Vyâsa-smrti which defines Saumkhy to be the knowledge of the true nature of the self.

Grammatically speaking, the term is derived from samkhya which usually means 'number'. Hence, some try to maintain that the system of Kapila is called Saumkhy as enumeration plays an important part in it; for in the history of Indian philosophical speculation the system of Kapila for the first time is found to enumerate its different categories. This view is based upon conjecture and we are not inclined to attach sufficient weight to it. The theory of number as set forth by Pythagoras cannot throw any light upon this point which is discussed by Dr. Keith and others, hence it need not occupy us here.

Again Saumkhy if derived from samkhya (number), would naturally mean something pertaining to number, and in this sense it is used even in the Mahabhasya of Patanjali. The term thus

1 दृष्टां दृष्टां दृष्टां महाभासयम् परमं संस्कृतिस्यः: Mbh. VII. 192. 49.
2 'विभावतो ब्राह्मिनां संस्कृतम् मिथुनि।ै'—Hall's Saumkhyaśara, p. 5.
3 Keith—The Saumkhy System, p. 76.
4 भावम् सांस्कृतिक विषयों न मिथुनि—Mahabhasya, 2. 2. 24. under Vārttika 8, and also see—हरिदासानाथका कमलाबाद्ध-कालदय द्वितीय कला सांस्कृतिक विषयनि, Vārttika 9.
derived may well serve its purpose in grammatical speculations. But it has very little to do with any philosophical enquiry.

Apart from denoting 'number' the term *saṃkhya* has got other meanings also. In the Sulabha-Janaka episode of the *Mbh.* XII. 320, *saṃkhya* is mentioned as one of the essential requisites of a sentence and Sulabha defines it as the principle which establishes by proof the defect and merit of a particular aspect in a sentence.

Amara in his lexicon states that the term *saṃkhya* is used in the sense of discussion and investigation. Patañjali uses the term *prāsādya* in his *Yoga-sūtra* in the sense of supreme knowledge. In the *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya* also we find the same term used in the same sense. Kautilya in his *Arthaśāstra* mentions both Sāmkhya and Yoga, and describes them to be the *ānvikṣikīs*, i.e., the systems which try to establish defects and merits of something by means of reasonings.

Further light is thrown upon the point if we examine the sense of the term *saṃkhya* in which Caraka uses it in his medical treatise. In order to make the point clearer, we quote the following lines from *Caraka* where the term is used:

1. *Saṃkhya*: संख्यात्-संख्येयेः: सहस्रीन्म पुनरुपयू| जनित्वातः प्रच्छ विद्वेशः: स्वसंस्थयाम्॥ (Sūtra, XIII. 3)
2. पहिधन्तुन्त्तु पुनर्म्म रोगा: पहिधान्तुनालथा । राज्य: पहिधन्तु: सांख्यराजेः: संपरिक्षितिः।॥ (Sūtra, XXV. 10)

यथा वा आदित्य: प्रकाशक्त्वतः सांख्यवाच्यां प्रकाशकमिति | (Vimāna,

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1. शीतोष्णो च मुष्णापि प्रमाणो प्रवज्ञातिः।
2. केशद्रवमीतिः स भक्षकुपपरागवचाः॥ XII. 320. 82.
3. चन्द्रः संख्या विद्वारणः—*Amara*, I. 5. 2.
4. Also see, *Arthā*... संख्यानुपर्षित: केश्वरः॥ II. 7. 5.
5. प्रकाशक्षात्मककुरुध्वस साहवा विद्वारितानरसमिदः: समाधि:—*Yoga-sūtra*, IV. 29.
6. विद्वारितानरसि: प्रकाशक्षात्मकानि... वैराज्यम्—*Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya*, I. 15.
7. Also see, प्रकाशक्षात्मकानि... समाधि:॥ II. 2.
VIII. 6. 28.) From the context it is evident that everywhere the term *sāmkhya* stands as an epithet to the teachers well-versed in medical science, and has very little to do with the particular system of philosophy. In the above-mentioned places *sāmkhya* means one who is possessed of *sāmkhyā* i.e., perfect knowledge. But in the following couplets of Caraka, the term *sāmkhya* stands for the particular system of philosophy:

अयनं पुनरायतमेत०, योगस्य योगिन्यं।
सांव्यतर्गमः सांव्यायाः सुकृत्तिमां कार्यनाम।॥ (Sārīra, I. 150.)
सर्वभास्वव्याहो यया भवति निस्तुहः।
रूपं यया साखयेत सांख्येः सम्पद्येत यया।॥ (Sārīra, V. 15.)

It is interesting to note that the term *yoga* is also used here side by side with *sāmkhya*.

In conclusion, we intend to maintain that ‘Sāmkhya’ which passes for a philosophical system is derived from *sāmkhya* that means knowledge, contemplation, examination, discussion, investigation, discrimination etc. The system of Kapila is called *sāmkhya* as it is more or less endowed with all these attributes.

Guṇaratna in his commentary on the *Sūd-darśana-samuccaya* suggests a peculiar significance of *sāmkhya*. He says that the name of the system in accordance with the ancient tradition is also read with a palatal ś (*sāmkhya*), for it is associated with the name of the seer Šāmkha. But this view does not seem to be trustworthy, for everywhere we find the name of the system written with a dental s. The *Mbh* in one place mentions two different sages named as *Sāmkhya* and *Yoga*. But we do not find any reasonable ground to connect the Sāmkhya and Yoga systems with the name of so called sages.

1 यदा ताल्लुकादिरथि शाख्यायनिर्पल्लकतिः हदायम्। तत् गौरवाम् कथित्विव: पुष्पविशिष्टपर्ययः।
सांस्कारस्य पौराणिकगतिः सन्तुमिन्यां वैष्णवियः यहां संस्कारानितिः संख्या शाखा कर, Guṇaratna’s commentary, p. 22.

2 शाखास्यौः नाश्यद सुर्याय शाखालिङ्गः—Mbh, XIII. 150. 45.
ORIGIN OF SĀMKHYA

[Sāmkhya and the Vedas]

The origin of the Indian philosophical systems is almost enveloped in darkness. Sāmkhya also shares the same fate. Probably the system of Kapila was formulated at an age when the performances of the Vedic sacrifices were in full swing and the popular belief was that the correct performances of a sacrifice in accordance with the prescribed injunction would surely lead the performer to heaven. To the Vedic priest heaven was the sumnum bonum of life. But Sāmkhya offers a challenge and comes forward to show that heaven cannot be regarded as such and along with it points out the defects of the Vedic sacrifices. The verse beginning with 'द्व्यक्ति' in the Sāmkhya-kārika (ka. 2) bears testimony to this. Though the Kārika cannot be regarded as a work of high antiquity, yet it preserves the tradition of the ancient authorities; for it explicitly mentions at the end that the topics that are treated in the seventy distiches are those of the Saśītantra—divested of parables and doctrines of other teachers (ka. 72). This Saśītantra is regarded as the first systematic work upon Sāmkhya. The Āhirbyudhna-samhitā of the Pañcarātra school furnishes with a list of the sixty different topics of the Saśītantra and there we find that the anūravika-kānda forms one of them.¹ The Kārika-verse which we have referred to above, while criticising the anūravika (Vedic means) states that they are impure in character; for several beasts are to be slaughtered in the soma and other similar sacrifices and as a result of this the performer is sure to bind himself with some degree of sin. This is further echoed in a

¹ See, ानवकाकांक्षे दु:खकामनस् परम्—Āhirbyudhna, 12. 17.
fragment quoted in the Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya (II. 13) and it is attributed to Pañcasikha by Vācaspati. The idea in the said fragment is this: the Vedic sacrifices can bring about good result, but owing to the slaughtering of beasts the result is attended with some degree of evil however trivial it may be and if some sort of penance is not performed to wipe away this evil, it would cause some misery even in heaven.

Again, the Vedic sacrifices can certainly bring about heaven. But when the fruits of merit will be exhausted, the performer is sure to return from heaven and will have to share again the miseries of the world. Further, all the sacrifices do not produce equal merit. For instance, the Horse-sacrifice leads one to heaven whereas by the Vajapeya the agent achieves sovereignty in heaven. Hence the Vedic means cannot be regarded as absolute and final. In his Śata-sāstra, Āryadeva also refers to the same attitude of the Sāmkhya towards sacrificial performances in a quotation from a Sāmkhya work. Hence, it will not be unjustified to maintain the view that Sāmkhya came out as a reaction against the practice of Vedic rituals.

Further result may be obtained from the Kapila-Syuvarṣimi episode of the Mbh., where we find Kapila making a reflection upon the Vedic sacrifices. Though this Kapila is not explicitly mentioned there as the propounder of the Sāmkhya system; yet he is praised there as one ever observant in sastric duties, always engaged in restraining his senses, possessed of true know-

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2 ।।

3 See, Mbh, XII. 268-270.
ledge, firm and ever directed towards truth etc. These factors lead one to believe that he may be even that Kapila with whom the Śāṅkhya system is associated. The kernel of the narrative is this:—In days of yore god Tvāṣṭr came to the palace of Nāhuśa and the latter to observe the duties of hospitality in accordance with the Vedic injunctions was attempting to slaughter a cow. Beholding the cow in a pitiable position, Kapila uttered the following words—'Alas, ye the Vedas', meaning thereby what cruelty do the Vedas sanction. On hearing these words, the sage Syumaraśmi entered into the body of the cow through his yogic power and challenged Kapila for passing such an opinion against the Vedas. A discussion follows between the two and Kapila observes that he does not mean to abuse the Vedas. But there are two ways prescribed in the Vedas—one advocates works and the other renunciation and he prefers the latter. By the performances of karma, the body is purified whereas renunciation leads one to liberation.

Though from some stray references one Kapila is found to be associated with the Vedas, but there is no such conclusive evidence as to regard this Kapila as the propounder of the Śāṅkhya system. To make the point clearer, we are pointing out the places which refer to Kapila as mentioned above.

In the Rgveda occurs the following:

इश्नामेके क पि ल समासं ते हिन्ययनि कतवे पार्याय।
गर्भ मता सुखितं वद्वास्वे नयं तुषयती विभक्ति॥

(X. 27. 16.)

Here one Kapila is mentioned and Śāyaṇa thinks that this is the name of a great sage (यह मुख्य कपिलेमेत्नामां प्रसिद्धमुख), but here we cannot rely upon his interpretation. For from the context, this Kapila appears to be one of the Maruts. The term 'Kapileya' also as found in the expression स है देवरातो वैद्यामित्र आस, तस्याते कापिलेय-
of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (VII. 17.) does not reveal anything in connection with the propounder of the Sāmkhya system. These Kapileyas are the clans of Kapila, but who was the original Kapila, we cannot know; for the text does not supply us with any further data. In his article on the Śākhās of the Yajurveda, Dr. Raghuvira acquaints us with one Kapila Śākhā that was studied in the Āryāvarta. But we do not know anything else as regards the Kapila with whom the said branch was associated. Further in the khilas of the Ṛgveda, one Kapila is mentioned along with some other sages. But the account of all these Kapilas is very meagre and hence cannot be much estimated in discussing the attitude of Sāmkhya Kapila towards the Vedas.

Though the Sāmkhya vehemently criticises the Vedic sacrifices, but thereby it does not totally set aside the validity of the Vedas. In that case it is sure to fall under the category of the nāstika philosophy and could not exercise so much influence upon the orthodox minds; for it is well known that most of the branches of orthodox literature are more or less replete with the praise of Sāmkhya. It criticises karmāṇ to be the final means of liberation and emphasises upon the knowledge of Prakṛti and Puruṣa as the means of final beatitude which is not the heaven as the Vedas maintain but the complete cessation of pains.

The Mādhava Vṛtti and the Chinese version of Paramārtha throw further light upon the origin of Sāmkhya. Both the texts depict the circumstances under which Āsuri was initiated by Kapila. Before his initiation, Āsuri was a staunch advocate of the sacrifices; for both the texts characterise him with the epithet "कर्पसहस्रायाजी" i. e., one who has sacrificed for a thousand years. This fact also

1 खण्डक चाणकचंद्रा — Journal of Vedic Studies, Vol I. part II.
2 संस्कारभविन मुन्यकन्थ महामहिम:।
3 पि नै सम्मन्तरायिक: पौड़े मुखमाधिन:। — Būlakhilā hymn, 2. 9.
4 See commentary on Kā, I.
suggests that the first disciple of Kapila was initiated at an age when the Indian atmosphere was surcharged with Vedic ritualism. The Satapatha Brāhmana mentions one Āsuri who is held there as an important teacher of sacrificial performances. But there are no data left to us which help to identify the said Āsuri with the disciple of Kapila.

Scholars have attempted to trace the origin of Sāmkhya in the Vedas, but so far without any satisfactory result. Paramārtha in his Chinese version refers to the doctrine which Kapila imparted briefly to Āsuri and there we find that in the beginning there was tāmas and in that tāmas, kṣetrajña appeared for the first time. Tamas is said to be the Prakṛti and kṣetrajña the Puruṣa. This is clear from the following statement of Paramārtha:—

"Le sage Kapila l’expliquait à Āsuri brièvement comme suit : ‘Au premier commencement il n’y avait que de l’obscurité. Dans cette obscurité il y avait un ‘champ de connaissance’. Ce ‘champ de connaissance’ était le Puruṣa. Le Puruṣa existait, mais aucune connaissance n’exista. C’est pourquoi on appelait (le Puruṣa) ‘champ’. Après vinrent l’évolution et la modification ; ansi naquit la création primordiale par évolution, etc., jusqu’à la délivrance finale (kā, 1)."

Māthara and the Jayamāṅgalā also echo the same statement. To make the point clearer we quote below the corresponding lines from Māthara and Jaya.

Māthara—तन्त्रमिति व्याख्यायते—‘तम एवं खलितदमृग आसीत, तर्कस्मस्तमिसि क्षेत्रोधविचारते प्रथम्’, तम ह्यतु जन्यतेप्रकृतिः, पुरुष: क्षेत्रशः।

Jaya—तत्स्मै विभ्रायायुक्तपथा संख्यित द्वित्वाद्—‘तम एवं खलितदमृग आसीत, तर्कस्मस्तमिसि क्षेत्रशः एव प्रथम;’। तम: प्रथानम्, क्षेत्रशः: पुरुष: जन्यतेः (Kā, 70).

1 See, वदु होषानासरि—Satapatha, I. 5. 2. 26. p. 419.
2 Takakusu—La Sāmkhya Kārikā, p. 147.
3 See notes of Takakusu :—‘obscurité’, ‘tamas’, un des noms de la matière originelle. ‘Connaissance-champ’, semble correspondre à ‘Kṣetrajña’, un des noms de l’Āme,
As all these commentators in one voice speak this to be the doctrine of Kapila, it appears therefore that they might have received it from a common source. The idea of this tāmas which is regarded here to be the first existing principle, reminds us of the Nāsadiya hymn of the Rgveda\(^1\) where also tāmas is held to be the only entity that existed in the very beginning of the creation. But it is difficult to assert whether the tāmas of this hymn has been used in such a sense as to convey the idea of the prakṛti of Śāṅkhya. Most probably it means darkness as we understand in the ordinary sense of the term. Kṣetrajña is conspicuous by its absence in the Vedas. A similar cosmogonical account occurs in the Maitrāyani Upaniṣad (V. I). It speaks that in the beginning there was tāmas, and it further states how from tāmas came out rājas and from rājas came out sattva. Again, it is interesting to note that the same expression also acquaints us with the conception of the kṣetrajña. But this text is regarded as the work of a later period and hence sufficient weight cannot be attached to it in discussing the origin of the Śāṅkhya system.

Some important result may be obtained from the following passage of the Rgveda—

हा सुपण्ण सयुता सख्यम् समां वृष्ट परिचयते
तत्तौरत्नः विपपलो व्यासित्वभान्नत्वोपदिष्टति

(I. 164. 20.)

It speaks of the two birds residing in the same tree. One of them tastes the sweet pippala fruit and the other watches it without eating. Various commentators have explained it in various ways, but there are such ideas in it as may be taken to be the precursors of the Śāṅkhya thought. The two birds in the aforesaid couplet correspond to the buddhi and the purusa of Śāṅkhya. Like the bird that tastes the pippala fruit, the buddhi of Śāṅkhya

\(^1\) तम आसीत तमसा गृहमेधप्रकृत्—Rgveda, X. 129. 3.

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also reap the harvest of the merit and demerit acquired by itself. The *puruṣa* is like the second bird—it is the witness, it is not the agent, it is indifferent and hence not to be overcome by the action of the *buddhi* though through delusion the achievement of the *buddhi* is ascribed to it. This interpretation of the two birds as signifying the *buddhi* and the *puruṣa* of Śaṅkhya is further corroborated by the account of the *Paiṅgirahasya Brāhmaṇa* which Śaṅkara refers to in his *Bhūṣya* on B. S, 1. 2. 12. Śaṅkara while discussing on the individual and the supreme self also refers to this verse in his support. But the opponent urges that this verse cannot be the subject matter of the individual and the supreme self as it has been explained otherwise in the *Paiṅgirahasya-Brāhmaṇa*¹. In the opinion of this text, the expression ‘तत्वेयार्थः पिपळवङ्क्ति स्वातंत्र्यः क्षेत्रान्नां’ signifies the *sattva* and ‘अनवभक्तान्नवपि मित्रवाक्षलोकितः’ stands for the *jña* (the puruṣa). This *sattva* and the *jña* are nothing but the *buddhi* and the *puruṣa* as conceived in the Śaṅkhya literature. This is clear from the very statement of Śaṅkara who apparently to strengthen the version of the opponent states that *sattva* and *kṣetra-jña* as it is well known denote the *antahkarna* and the individual self respectively, for the said text itself explains them as such—“*sattva* is that which dreams and that which is the individual self—the knower, is the *kṣetra-jña*”. Thus we find that even an early authority like the *Paiṅgirahasya-Brāhmaṇa* is keen to maintain the idea of the *buddhi* and the individual soul in the said Rgvedic verse. Again in B. S. 1. 3. 7, Śaṅkara refers to this text in the same connection, but names it as *Paiṅgi-upaniṣad*. The *Brāhmaṇas* also are found to deal with cosmogony here and

¹ See, अपर आद—‘द्रा सुपपण’ हि नेष्मग्रुयास्थिकरणेव सिद्धान्तं महते, पैरिक्षरस-मापोपायायम् व्यख्यातावतः। ‘तत्वेयार्थः पिपळवङ्क्ति स्वातं, अनवभक्तान्नवपि मित्रवाक्षलोकितः खः—तातेती सब्ज्ञेत्रोजङ्गी’ हि। सत्त्वादिन्द्री जीवः क्षेत्रशाश्वः परमात्मेत्वत् यथैति, तत्र—सत्त्वोहिन्ऋद्धोऽयेतः-करण-शास्त्रियपरत्या प्रभित्वातः। तस्य च व्यास्तातायतः—“तदेतत् सत्त्वं नेत्र तवम् पदवगिता, यथ योद्धं वातरेशं उपद्रवः, स क्षेत्रः ; तातेती सत्त्वोहिन्ऋः” हि।
there, but these cosmogonical speculations are to a great extent coloured with ritualistic interest and hence they do not reveal anything as regards the origin of the Sāṃkhya thought.

*Sāṃkhya ideas in the Upaniṣads*

In the upanishadic speculations, the monistic tone is predominant and the central interest lies upon the *brahman* or the *atman*. The seers try to find out the ultimate reality in various ways and in their discussions we meet with here and there such ideas as may be taken to be the four-runners of the Sāṃkhya thought. Sāṃkhya is a system based upon two distinct principles: one *prakṛti* and the other *puruṣa*, and the germ of this dualistic tendency can be traced even in the monistic speculations of the ancient prose Upaniṣads. In the *Br. Up.*, (I. ii. 5) we find the idea of the food and the eater of the food and further it is the *puruṣa* who is mentioned there as the eater of the food. Sāṃkhya also treats *prakṛti* to be the enjoyed (*bhogya*) and the *puruṣa* to be the enjoyer (*bhoktra*) and this idea of the ‘enjoyer and the enjoyed’ has got a clear resemblance with the idea of the food and the eater of the food as mentioned above. The *Katha Up.*, explicitly mentions *atman* to be the enjoyer (I. iii. 4.) and both the terms *bhoktra* and the *bhogya* are to be met with in the *Śvet. Up.* (I. 12).

The *guna* theory is another distinct achievement of Sāṃkhya and most probably Sāṃkhya adopted the idea from the tripartite scheme of the *Ch. Up.* (VI. 4). The said *Upaniṣad* boldly declares: The red colour of the fire is the colour of brilliance, its white colour is the colour of water and its black colour is the colour of the food. The fire loses its fireness, the modification is but a name, the three colours are the reals. So also is the case with the *vāyu*, *āditya* and the like. The advocates of Sāṃkhya also explain
the universe by prakṛti which is said to have the three guṇas as its constituents and all the objects other than the self are only particular formations of the guṇas and hence in reality are not different from them (सच्चिदानन्द सत्विकृतविकृतसत्वादि परमार्थोऽणम्—Yogasūtra-bhāṣya, IV. 13). This is further proved by the following verse:

गुणानां परमं रूपं न हृदिपथमृद्धिति
चतुरं हृदिपथं प्रातं तन्मात्रेऽव सत्त्वब्रह्म

which is quoted in the Yogasūtra-bhāṣya (IV. 13.) with the remark 'तथा च शास्त्रानुग्रहासनम्' and Vacaspati states this to be a verse of the Śaṭṭhitantra. The verse states that the real form of the guṇas does not come within the range of vision, what does come within visual range is altogether insignificant like illusion. Again, it is interesting to observe that the terms lohita and śukla as we have pointed out in the tripartite scheme of the Ch. Up. also find their place in the verse अजामेकं लोहितादसुरक्षां etc. of the Śvet. Up. (IV. 5) where ajā stands for the unborn prakṛti and the three colours most probably refer to the three guṇas: redness (lohitā) taken to be the symbol of rajas, whiteness (śukla) to be that of sattva and blackness (kṛṣṇa) to be that of tamas. This we shall discuss in detail in our examination of Śvet. Up. The term guṇa is explicitly mentioned for the first time in the Śvet, Up., and in one place it even mentions the term triguṇa (V. 7).

The Śaṅkhya theory of causation (sattkāryavāda) is hinted in the Ch. Up. (VI. 2. 1-2.) where the theory of existent coming out from non-existent is overthrown and the doctrine of one absolute real existing in the beginning is maintained.

Now we come to the categories of Śaṅkhya. The Brahma-sūtra as well as the Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara throw some light in finding out some of the passages of the Upaniṣads where Śaṅkhya idea can be traced. Śaṅkhya is the chief opponent of Vedānta. As a result of this we find that some of the sūtras of Vedānta are directed against
Sāmkhya. The śūtra ‘न संहयोपसंहयादिपि, नानाभावाविरंविराकास’ (B. S. 1. 4. 11) also constitutes one of them and it reflects upon a passage of the Upaniṣad where Sāmkhya—the opponent, is accustomed to show his own doctrine. Here Śaṅkara refers to the verse:

‘यस्मन प्रक्रिया पञ्चजना आकाश्च प्रतिष्ठितः ।
तमेवमन्य आत्मां विद्वानः श्रवायते।’ (Br. Up., IV. 4. 17)

where Sāmkhya finds its doctrine of the twenty-five categories, for the expression ‘पञ्चजना’ means ‘five’ multiplied by ‘five’ and this comes to twenty-five.1

The term prakṛti is conspicuous by its absence in the ancient prose Upaniṣads. But the Br. Up., asserts that in the beginning the universe was unevolved (IV. 7) and this idea possesses some similarity with the prakṛti of Sāmkhya. For, Sāmkhya also explains the origin of the manifest from the unmanifest, that of the evolved from the non-evolved. Buddhī, the first evolute of prakṛti may be partially treated as vijnāna which is referred to here and there in the ancient Upaniṣads. The advocates of Nyāya hold jñāna to be a synonym of the buddhi, but Sāmkhya maintains it to be a sāttvika modification of the same. Āhamkāra as mentioned in the expression...अथतोष्णद्विद्वेद्देवेद्युपाद्योपपणध्योपीतत्तुष्णद्रविभवत्ते पञ्चासहूँ देवत्तोष्णदेवेद्युपाद्योपपणध्योपीतत्तुष्णद्रविभवत्ते... (Ch. Up. VII. 25. 1) tallies to a considerable extent with the Sāmkhya conception of the same. Manas and saṅkalpa are described side by side in the ancient Upaniṣads and are regarded as two separate principles, but Sāmkhya holds saṅkalpa to be the function of the mind. The ten organs along with their respective functions are referred to in the Br. Up., II. 4. 11 and IV. 5. 12. The ancient Upaniṣads do not men-

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1 See...पञ्चासहूँ देवेद्युपाद्योपपणध्योपीतत्तुष्णद्रविभवत्ते—साक्षर-ह्याय, I iv. 11.
tion the tanmātras, but the word bhūtamātrā occurs in the Kauś. Up. III. 5; and it is difficult to ascertain whether the tanmātra doctrine is adrambated there. The Praśna Upaniṣad speaks of prthivi and prthivimātrā, apa and apomātrā etc. (IV. 8.) and thereby it hints on the tanmātra doctrine, but it is not regarded to be so old as the other prose Upaniṣads, viz, the Chāṇḍogya, Bṛhadāranyaka, Aitareya, Taittirīya and Kauśitaki. The Mbh. also in its exposition of the Śaṃkhya doctrine does not generally speak of the tanmātras and mentions the five sense-objects in their place. This fact indicates that the tanmātra theory is a later modification of the Śaṃkhya system. The five sense-objects viz, the śabda, sparśa etc. are referred to in the Br. Up. (II. 4. 11 and IV. 5. 12). The expression 'पच शामहृताति प्राधिवी वायुराकाश आणो ज्योतिभि, of Aitareya Up. (V. 3) contains clear reference to the five gross elements.

The Praśna Upaniṣad which can be regarded at the head of the second stage of the prose Upaniṣads furnishes in IV. 8 with a list of numerous entities, both physical and psychical. It contains the five gross elements together with their subtle forms, the ten organs, mind, intellect, individualisation, thought, light and the breath. It is interesting to observe that except the last named three entities, the remaining twenty-three constitute the different categories of Śaṃkhya. Prakṛti is excluded from the list. With regard to the last three entities we may say that 'thought' (citta) holds a very important place in the Yoga system. But it has got no separate existence apart from the mind, individualisation and the intellect. With regard to 'light' the Upaniṣad speaks 'illumination' to be its function. But the classical Śaṃkhya does not hold 'light' to be a separate category and illumination is regarded as the function of the quality of sattva (सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकः का, 11). Breath is said to be the common function of all the organs (सामान्या करणप्रति: प्राणाशा रायवः पच्च. का, 29). The Tattva-samāsa also speaks of the five breaths in the sūtra 'पच्च भायवः'. Again these five vital
breaths find an important place in some of the treatises of the ancient Śāmkhya teachers and this we intend to discuss later on. But the tone of the Upaniṣad is everywhere vedantic and nowhere it offers any clue which helps to point out the existence of Śāmkhya as a different system.

For the first time in the Upaniṣadic speculations, clear reference to some Śāmkhya tenets is to be found in the Kaṭha, which though not so old as the ancient prose Upaniṣads1 that we have already examined still deserves to be regarded as the foremost of the second stage of the metrical Upaniṣads. In I. iii. 10-11, it is stated that beyond the senses there are the objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the intellect, beyond the intellect there is the great self, beyond the great there is the unevolved, beyond the unevolved there is the puruṣa. Beyond the puruṣa there is nothing; it is the termination, it is the highest goal. These two verses not only speak of the Śāmkhya categories, but it is interesting to observe that the categories are mentioned according to their graded hierarchy. This doctrine differs in some respect with the classical Śāmkhya; for the objects are regarded as higher than the senses, egoism is ignored, buddhi and mahān-ātman are treated as two separate principles whereas in the classical Śāmkhya mahān ātman is described as a synonym of the buddhi. The same doctrine with some modifications is again repeated in the Kaṭha, II. iii. 7-8 which has every possibility of being regarded as a later addition and there it is found that 'beyond the senses is the mind, beyond the mind is the highest sattva, higher than the sattva is the great self, higher than the great is the highest unevolved. Beyond the unevolved is the puruṣa—all-pervading and without any distinctive mark, by knowing whom the being is liberated and attains to immortality'. Here mind is regarded as greater than the senses and not than the objects as were previously

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1 Most probably, the Praśna is not older than the Kaṭha,
done. Egoism is still ignored. *Sattva* which takes the place of *buddhi* is still regarded as a separate entity from the *mahan atman*, but in the classical Sāmkhya *sattva, buddhi* and *mahan atman* are regarded as synonyms. The epithet *alīnga* is given to *purusa* but in the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya* (II. 19) it is regarded as an attribute of the *prakṛti*.

In 'इङ्गतेर्वन्तवर्मू' B. S. I. 1. 5. *aśabda* is refuted to be the ultimate cause and here Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* treats *aśabda* to be a synonym of *pradhāna* which is held by the Sāmkhya to be the cause of the universe. But *aśabda* as a synonym of *pradhāna* is not to be found in the school of Sāmkhya as represented by the *Kārikā* and its commentators. But we find the term occurring in the expression 'अश्चिद्रस्तपश्चमहस्तपर्वयं' etc. of the *Kātha* (I. 3. 15). Further in his *Bhāṣya* on 'बद्वैतिते चैव प्राची विश्व त्रिपकरणात्र' (B. S. I. 4. 5) Śaṅkara quotes this very *Kātha* verse where Sāmkhya the opponent, finds *pradhāna* as the object of knowledge (श्रवणवचन). The *Tattvasamāsa-sūtra-rāṣṭrīya* which is the oldest among the existing commentaries on the *Tattvasamāsa-sūtra*, refers to the following verse in connection with the definition of *pradhāna*:

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"अश्चिद्रस्तपश्चमहस्तपर्वयं
तथा च नित्यं रसगन्धवर्जितम्।
अनातिमहत् परं अबुवं
प्रधानमेतत् प्रवद्दतिः सूर्यः।
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But it is nothing but the *Kātha*-verse as already referred to and the line 'निचाचयं तं महायुक्तन प्रसुच्चते' of the *Kātha* is replaced by the line 'प्रधानमेतत् प्रवद्दतिः सूर्यः'. Moreover the *Kātha*-line 'अनातिमहत् परं अबुवं' clearly speaks of the *pradhāna*; for *pradhāna* is also without any beginning or end and it is higher than the *mahat*.

1 See,....महच्यंक हस्थि उत्तरे सचाचाचार्य महत्सवतमयस्वयम...., *Yoga-sūtra Bhasya*, II. 19.
2 It is also called *Krama-dīpikā*.
3 See the *sūtra*, 'अदि प्राचनयः'.

These facts tend to show that a definite idea of pradhāna is maintained in the Kaṭha-verse.

The first book of the Kaṭha (I. i-iii) which is decidedly older than the second, deviates from the method as followed in the ancient prose Upaniṣads. Brahman forms the main subject of investigation in them and the seers in order to find it out search it even in various psychical and physical entities. But here the syllable ‘Om’ is regarded as brahman (I. ii. 15-16) and the central interest lies upon finding out the self. Moreover, an effort is made here for the first time to differentiate it from the physical body which is a peculiar feature of the classical Śāmkhya. This is evident from the verses where the self is described as ‘unborn, eternal, everlasting, ancient, it is not slain, though the body is slain’ (I. ii. 18); ‘if the slayer thinks that he slays, if the slain thinks that he is slain, they do not understand; for this one does not slay, nor is that one slain’ (I. ii. 19); ‘the self as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among the changing things’ (I. ii. 22) etc.

The Bhagavad-gītā in its second chapter throws further light on the point. Arjuna is perplexed and in course of dispelling his ignorance, the Lord vividly describes the characteristic of the soul and at the same time is very keen to differentiate it from the physical body. Thus, states the Lord: ‘the soul is unborn, unchangeable, eternal and ancient; it is not slain upon the body being slain’; (II. 19); ‘it is incapable of being cut, burnt, drenched or dried up’; ‘it is unchangeable, all pervading, stable, firm and eternal’ (II. 24). It is interesting to notice in this connection that the Kaṭha-verses I. ii. 18-19 are almost taken verbatim in the Gītā, II. 19-20. Thus we find that the teaching of the particular section of the Gītā and the Kaṭha is similar. But in the Gītā the Lord states that His answer to Arjuna proceeds from the standpoint of Śāmkhya (II. 39); where as the term ‘Śāmkhya’ is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the Kaṭha,
though yoga finds its place here and there. In I. ii. 12 of the Kātha, it is stated that the highest object of attainment is to be recognised by adhyātma-yoga, but the sense of the expression as offered by the commentators does not seem to be convincing. In II. iii. 11, yoga is described as the firm concentration of the senses; but the explanation of adhyātma is still ignored. Towards the end it is mentioned that Nāciketās became free from passion and death and obtained brahmaṇ by receiving this knowledge as well as the entire rules of yoga; thus it will be with another also who knows adhyātma (II. iii. 18). Hence it is evident that the Kātha emphasises upon adhyātma-vidyā and yoga as the means of apprehending the supreme reality. This being the case, the expression adhyātma-yoga of I. ii. 12 may be treated as a dvandva compound meaning thereby adhyātma and yoga. Now, what does this adhyātma mean? The Kātha only speaks this to be a sort of knowledge (विषाणे-योगविविषयत् हलुकम् II. iii. 18) and in the Gītā, the Lord declares Himself to be the adhyātma-vidyā among the vidyās while proclaiming His own glory. But the meaning of the term is not still clear. Literally adhyātma means ‘relating to self’ and hence adhyātma-vidyā means ‘self-knowledge.’ The Mābh. throws further light on the point. In the mokṣadharma section of the twelfth book, some chapters are found to deal with adhyātma, but the explanation of adhyātma as found in those chapters contain nothing but the principal tenets of Śāṅkhya. Further in XII. 351. 6, the sage Kapila is said to have expounded his doctrine on the basis of adhyātma. In XII. 310. 10, while explaining Śāṅkhya, Yājñavalkya also states that those who

1 ‘अध्यात्मिक्षि विशाः सर्वदत्तमहं’, B. Gītā, x. 32.
2 Vide chapters 194, 247 and 285.
3 ‘वसंगणय्यववैदन श्रविमि: श्रविलादिरिमि:। ’
   अध्यात्तमिन्तामासिन्धु श्राक्षणधुधामि भारतः॥
contemplate upon adhyātma speak of eight kinds of prakṛti. Hence it appears that the knowledge which does not differ from that of Śāmkhya was maintained as the adhyātma-vidyā in the ancient philosophical circle. Further, Br. Up. in IV. 5. 11, furnishes with a list of the numerous sources of knowledge and in this list Vidyā and Upanisad are enumerated side by side with the Rgveda, Yajurveda etc. This Vidyā must be different from the Upanisads, otherwise there is no necessity of reading them separately. But in the absence of sufficient data the relation of this Vidyā with the adhyātma-vidyā cannot be definitely ascertained.

It has been already pointed out that the earlier portion of the Katha is to a great extent saturated with Śāmkhya ideas and further we have tried to show that adhyātma does not differ from Śāmkhya. Taking all these points into consideration we hope that it may not be unjustified to call the first book of the Katha which comprises the first three chapters to be an Upaniṣad of the earliest Śāmkhya school.

The Śvet. up. explicitly mentions the term ‘Śāmkhya’ (VI. 13) as well as the name of the seer Kapila (V. 2) who is held to be the reputed propounder of the Śāmkhya thought. It also furnishes us with an account of Śāmkhya, much more developed than what we have noticed in the Katha. For instance, the series of numbers as are found in the following verses may be interpreted as the enumeration of principles common to the Śāmkhya system:

1. तमेकन्यमिं नित्यां पोषिष्यान्ति शताद्वैरं विविधतप्रत्ययम्।
2. अष्टादश: प्रकथितां प्रकृतिप्रत्यक्षां विविधान्य केद विविधोत्समोत्सम।
3. पञ्चसौतोवस्तुं पञ्चविद्याञ्च पञ्चाश्राणोमिः पञ्चवृत्तविद्यामिलाम्।
4. पञ्चाश्राणीं पञ्चदु: सोक्ष्मां गं पञ्चाश्राणेऽथ पञ्चवृत्तविद्यामिलाम्।

(I. 4-5).

1 'तन हु प्रकृतितथी प्रकृतिप्रत्ययमिलाम्।'
2 See, अश्व अश्वोत्सवं निद्वितसतं विद्यामितदेव यहुः प्रकृतियम्: सामवेदोधपांविन्यसं

शिम्मालास: पुराण विषय उपनिषद: इलोक: सुवाच्चन्त्रपुराणानानि.
The expression *ekanemim* literally means the wheel with one circumference and this perhaps means the wheel of metempsychosis, for the simile of the wheel is applied in this connection here and there in the Śaṅkhya-yoga literature. It may even mean the wheel of *brahman* as the commentator suggests, for a little after we come across the expression *brahmacakra*². The *brahman* is also read as the synonym of *prakṛti* by some ancient commentators of Śaṅkhya. *Trivṛtam* stands for the three *gunaḥ*. *Ṣoḍaśāntam* refers to the sixteen *vikāras* (modifications) of Śaṅkhya and they are the ten organs, *manaḥ* and the five gross elements; but in the Śaṅkhya accounts of the *Mbh.* and the *Caraka-saṁhitā* the five objects of the senses are mentioned as modifications and these sense-objects are maintained as the outcome of the gross elements. *Ṣaṭārdhāram* means the fifty spokes and they refer to the fifty psychic states of the *buddhi*⁴. These are the five kinds of error, the twenty-eight kinds of infirmity, nine kinds of contentment and the eight kinds of perfection. *Vimśati-pratyarābhīh*—the twenty counter spokes stand for the ten organs and their functions. *Aṣṭakaiḥ saḍbhīḥ* means the six sets of eight and they probably refer to (1) the eight-fold *prakṛti* (*prakṛti*, *buddhi*, *āhaṁkāra* and the five subtle-elements or in the opinion of the *Mbh.* and *Caraka*, the five elements; for these texts do not speak of the *tanmātras*), (2) the eight modifications of the *buddhi* (righteousness, knowledge, renunciation, power and their opposites), (3) the eight perfections (kā, 47), (4) the eight-fold *daiva-sarga* (kā, 53), (5) and (6) the eight-fold *tamas* and *moha* (kā, 48). Besides these, in the *Yoga-sūtra* we find the eight sub-divisions

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1. See ‘प्रशुचिमिदं पंड्रं संसाररथम्’, *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*, iv. 11.
2. ‘तसिनम् एसो आस्मायो महानके’, *Svet. up.*, i. 6.
3. Vide commentaries of Māṭhara, Paramārtha and Gauḍa on *Kārikā* 22.
4. See ‘तथ नेतारस्तु प्रजाशब’, *Kā*, 45.
of yoga and further Aśvaghosa in his Buddha-carita and Caraka in his medical treatise mention another group of eight which causes to bind the self. This group is enumerated and explained by them in connection with their brief exposition of Śāṅkhya. Under these circumstances it is difficult to ascertain the particular sets of eight which were meant by the seer of the Upaniṣad. The expression viśvarūpāvai-pāsam probably refers to the prakṛti which also assumes manifold forms like an actress and thus binds the puruṣa. Trimārga-bhedam—possessing three kinds of path and these paths probably refer to the three kinds of emancipation as mentioned in the Tatvā-samāsa (T.S.). The said text also mentions other different sets of three—such as the three types of sorrow, the three types of bondage etc. and the expression under discussion may even mean any one of these groups. But it should not be confounded with triyātam which refers to the three guṇas as has already been discussed. It may even refer to the three entities—the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the director as mentioned in the text (I. 12). Further, Aśvaghosa mentions another group of three under whose influence the soul travels in the cycle of metempsychosis and this group comprises ‘ignorance, action and hankering’. The expression dvinimittāvai-moham is difficult to interpret. Literally it means (the cycle) ‘having one delusion as the result of two.’ The commentator here speaks of the ‘merit and demerit’ or ‘happiness and misery’ as the two. Though these two are certainly the causes of rebirth, they cannot be

1 'विम्भवाद्वध्वाराद संवेदिताविमिश्रितवाद, ।
अविशेषायाप्राणायां सत्तास्मयवातः ॥' Buddha-carita, xii. 24.
and 'मोक्ष:मंगलमुलम प्रकरणिः, तत्त्व ध्वाराद-संव-संवेदाविमिश्रिताविमिश्रित-विम्भवाविशेषायां-
लक्षणमिति...' न सत्तास्मिवंतः, Caraka on Śārīra, v. 12.

2 'शिरिवृण्डी सी: ।', T.S. 20.

3 'शिरिवृण्डी हृ-समसै: ।', 'शिरिवृण्डी करम: ।', 22 and 19.

4 'अभां वर्जेन त्रृणाः च भेय: संसाराणवतः ।', Buddha-carita, xii. 23.
maintained as the cause of delusion. Perhaps the expression refers to the identity of the buddhi and the puruṣa which brings forth delusion and as a result of which the individual soul fails to free itself from the realm of the prakṛti.

Let us now turn our attention to the second verse. Here the subject matter of discussion is ignorance (avidyā) and it is compared to a river. The water consisting of the five streams (pāñcaśrotas) probably refers to the five objects of the senses, for we meet with the expression visaya-srotas here and there in the Śaṅkhya-yoga literature. The five springs (pāñca-yoni), five breaths (pāñca-prāṇa) and the five kinds of determination (pāñca-buddhi) are mentioned in the TS\(^2\). The expression pāñca-buddhi may even refer to the five organs of sense which are called buddhindriyas in the Śaṅkhya literature. The five whirl-pools (pāñcāvara) probably stand for the five doṣas which as we know from the statement of the Bhājī were admitted by the followers of Kapila.\(^3\) The five-fold miseries (pāñca-duḥkha) are those which are experienced in earning, saving, spending, attachment and killing\(^4\). They may even refer to the five-fold klesas of

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1 See ‘वैदिक विषयस्रोत: खिलौतिकशः’, Yogasūtra-bhāṣya, I. 12; also compare ‘पञ्चोऽस्तिः व: सत्राकारे वर्षसंहितान्म’ and ‘पञ्चोऽस्तिः नामानाः’, Bhāṣya. xii. 218. 10-11. Further, Yuṭktidīpikā quotes a fragment from an old work upon Śaṅkhya with the remark ‘यवं हि शास्त्रम्’ and there the expression ‘पञ्चोऽस्तिः सत्राकारे नामानाः’ has been used to mean the five kinds of vipāryaya of the kārika 47, (see, p. 152. 12). Hence it is difficult to ascertain precisely the sense of the expression pāñca-srotas.

2 See Ts., ‘पञ्चम कामयोगम्’, ‘पञ्च वायुः’ and ‘पञ्चमिषुद्रम्’.

3 ‘पञ्चम दोपानु प्रथो देहे स्ववदन्ति मन्नीणिण:।
मानोऽस्त्र: काविल: सांस्काः स्थुत्वा तानवदिनुः इ’ Bhāṣya. xii. 301. 54.

the Yoga-sūtra. The term kleśa in its technical sense is found even in the ancient Buddhist texts. The Śaśītantra list of the Akhirbyudhna also speaks of duḥkha-kāṇḍa. The Ts. mentions only three types of miseries. Pañcāśādhibhodām stands for the fifty psychic states of the buddhi as we have already mentioned in course of examining the previous verse. Pañca-parvā refers to the five-fold ignorance and in his commentary on the kā. 47, Vācaspati attributes the expression ‘pañca-parvā avidyā’ to Vārṣaganyā. This is further corroborated by the statement of Asvaghośa who also in his Buddha-carita refers to the five-fold ignorance.

We have tried to read the tenets of Śāmkhya in the two verses, but scholars may differ from us in certain points. But terms and expressions of these Śvet. verses discussed above at once remind us of the doctrine of Śāmkhya. Even the commentators who are strictly Vedantists explain some of the expressions, such as saḍāśāntam, satārdhāram etc. in the light of Śāmkhya; for they cannot be explained otherwise. Hence it appears that the seer of the Upaniṣad has referred in these verses to the principal tenets of Śāmkhya. Johnston has examined these two verses in detail in his paper on “Some Śāmkhya and Yoga conceptions of the Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad”; but in some cases I have tried to offer different interpretation.

1 ‘अविनासिता-राग्देशाभिनिरीक्षणः पञ्चक्रेशः’, Yogasūtra, ii. 3., also see ‘पञ्चक्रेशः पञ्च च’ of the Śāṣṭi-tantra list of the Akhirbyudhna-sāṃhitā, xii. 25.

2 ‘द्वारकाण्डमः परम्’, xii. 27.

3 अत एव ‘पञ्चपर्वी अविवा’ हत्याः भगवानं भांगणयः; Tattva-kaumudi on kā, 47.

4 ‘स्लाविष्ठा दि विव्रांत: पञ्चपर्वी समीहते’, Buddha-carita, xii. 33.

The conception of the prakṛti of Saṃkhya is contained in the verse ajām ekām etc. (Śvet. IV.5). Speaking in a broad way, it means one she-goat with three colours, red, white and black and producing many offspring of its own form. There is one he-goat that enjoys her in love and the other he-goat forsakes her whom it has enjoyed. The underlying idea is this: the one she-goat is nothing but the prakṛti, for Saṃkhya also holds it to be one and unborn (ajā). Elsewhere also the Upaniṣad mentions the term ajā which as it is clear from the context stands for the prakṛti, for she-goat does not form the subject matter of discussion anywhere. Again, prakṛti, as it is well known, has the three guṇas as its constituents and they are represented in the said verse by the three colours—red, white and black. In the Purāṇas also redness is held to be the symbol of rajas, whiteness to be that of sattva and blackness to be that of tamaś. In the opinion of Saṃkhya, prakṛti with its three guṇas goes on changing in ever moment resulting in innumerable modifications which are the particular formations of the guṇas of the prakṛti and in fact do not differ from them. Hence the unborn prakṛti also is said to be producing many offsprings of its own form. In the second hemistich, the he-goat is the puruṣa; for it is also held to be āja (unborn). The term āja in this sense may be traced even in the Vedas. The expression ‘अज्रो इति जयमाणोलुधे’ speaks of the puruṣa who is not yet liberated from the fetters of prakṛti and ‘जातात्वेन रुक्मोगामजोडन्य’ signifies the other puruṣa who is liberated and is thus free from the yoke of the prakṛti. The Upaniṣad elsewhere explicitly mentions the terms prakṛti and pradhāna (IV. 10, VI. 16). The term guṇa also finds its place here and there and in one place it is interesting to observe that the term triguṇa is even mentioned (V. 7). But the specific names of the guṇas as sattva, rajas and tamaś do not occur until in the Maitrāyanī (II. 5, V. 2). Besides these, the Śvet. Up. mentions such

1 See p. 12,
other terms as have got a very distinct place in the Śāmkhya literature. For instance, we find terms and expressions like vyaktā-\textit{vyakta} (I. 3), \textit{jña} (I. 19, VI. 2 and 17), bhokta and bhogya (I. 12), \textit{samyoga-nimittā-hetu} (VI. 5) etc. Further, it does not ignore the name of the seer Kapila who is held to be the reputed propounder of Śāmkhya. More interesting is to observe, that it mentions the term ‘Śāmkhya’ along with ‘Yoga’ for the first time and expressly suggests them to be the means of attaining to the supreme reality. From these facts, the \textit{Śvet. Up.}, appears to be the Upaniṣad of the Śāmkhya school. But a careful examination of the entire text reveals some doctrines which are distinctively Vedantic and warns us not to treat them as Śāmkhya.

The enquiry begins with \textit{brahman} and the classical Śāmkhya does not speak of such an entity. Emphasis is laid upon the three principles: the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the director whose knowledge brings about \textit{brahman}.

In the classical Śāmkhya also \textit{puruṣa} is called the enjoyer and \textit{prakṛti} to be the object of enjoyment; but the advocates of Śāmkhya generally hold \textit{prakṛti} to be independent and hence discards the idea of a separate director. Again in the classical Śāmkhya \textit{puruṣa} is held to be the \textit{jña}, the knower; but here we find the \textit{jña} to be the lord. In another place \textit{jña} is taken as an epithet to the supreme being, who is the maker of everything who knows all, who is self-caused (स विष्णु, विश्वविद्यायमृतः, VI. 16) etc. But the \textit{puruṣa} in the classical Śāmkhya is never maintained as the maker of anything.

Again, though this Upaniṣad as we have previously remarked is so much saturated with the Śāmkhya ideas, yet absolute monism is maintained everywhere. One supreme being is emphasised in and through the Upaniṣad and the independence of \textit{prakṛti} is

1 कि कारण नक्ष...I. 1.
2 भोक्ता भोग्य भेरितारुचि मतः सर्वेष भोक्ते विविधं महामेतद्, I. 12.
emphatically denied. The supreme being is maintained as the lord of the *pradhāna* and *kṣetrajña*; he is the lord of the *gunaś* (VI. 16), he directs the *gunaś* to perform their functions (*गुणांश सत्वान विनियोजयेद् यः*, V. 5), his knowledge, power and action are inherent (VI. 8). He is the generator of the sage Kapila, he beholds him born and transmits knowledge to him for the first time (V. 2); but the classical Śāmkhya always maintains him to be the first among the wise and holds his knowledge to be innate. Not only this, the Upaniṣad in one place even discards the separate existence of the *prakṛti* and speaks this to be an illusion; the great lord is the magician and he creates the universe, his self-power is enveloped in his own *gunaś*. But it is curious to notice that the Upaniṣad suggests Śāmkhya and Yoga as the means of apprehending the supreme lord. Now the question arises, whether the Upaniṣad speaks of a different school of Śāmkhya other than what is represented in the *Kārikā* of Iśvarakṛṣṇa or it makes an attempt to reconcile the conflicting doctrines of the Śāmkhya and the Vedānta.

With regard to the first alternative, we may say that Śāmkhya underwent doctrinal changes in its different stages of growth. This point we intend to discuss in detail later on. If this be the case, then it would not be proper to hold what does not tally with the *Kārikā* of Iśvarakṛṣṇa is not Śāmkhya at all. Now in our Upaniṣad the enquiry begins with *brahman* which is ignored in the *Kārikā*. But elsewhere in the brief exposition of Śāmkhya we find that *brahman* is not ignored and a place is assigned to it. In the *Mbh.*, Āsuri in the assembly of the followers of Kapila is found to explain *brahman* who is one and immutable and seen in diverse forms.¹ Attempt is made to explain

¹ एतत् कविवारं भ्रमणानांन्यं प्रहस्तते \* आवृत्तिसंध्ये तस्मिन्न प्रतिपेदे तदन्यन्तम् \* *Mbh*. xii. 218. 14.
brahman even in the Janaka-Pañcaśikha episode. Asvaghosa as well as Caraka in their brief exposition of the Śaṃkhya speak brahman to be the ultimate stage. Caraka elsewhere uses the term in the sense of the inner self and in this sense it is also used in a verse as quoted by the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya from some ancient Śaṃkhya or Yoga treatise. There we find that ‘the cave in which the eternal brahman rests is the modification of the buddhi which does not look different from it, thus the sages point it out’. Prabhakara in his Brhatī states the advocates of Śaṃkhya to be the knowers of brahman. Even Bhojarāja in his commentary on the Yoga-sūtra treats the Śaṃkhyaïtes to be the śaṅkta-brahmavādins. Some important light is thrown upon the point by the Ahirbudhna-samhitā of the pañcarātra school which supplies us with a list of the sixty different topics of the Saṣṭītantra, the first systematic treatise on Śaṃkhya; and it is

1 ‘न यत्र साध्यं तदृ भगा नादिमथं न भान्तकात्’, Mbh. xii. 221. 18 (Southern recension).

2 ‘पतं परमं भगा नितिः शूचमारणः।
वेमोोऽवतीत तत्त्वः: कथयति मनीषेण: ||’ Buddha-carita, xii. 65.
also ‘अत: परं भগमूलौ भूतात्मा नोपख्यये॥
निःसूति: सर्वभावात्मिकादि वर्णः न विषये, Caraka on Sūrīra, i. 99.
विशारं विरजः: शालं परमभामवयम्।
अभूतं भगा नितिः पति: पति: शालिनिपथे, ibid, v. 19.
3 ‘तस्य पुरुषस्य प्राणिः मृतिः: . . . महानान्तरात्मा’, ibid, v. 34.
4 ‘गुहा वृत्तां नितिंतं भगा शालकम्।
इद्रिष्टिमविशिष्टं कवये वेददये॥’ Yogaśūtra-bhāṣya, iv. 22.
5 ‘अत्तपे सत्वविदः: कर्मिभादात् स्वयविषयवतात् महादर्शभूतस्वप्नस्वात्, शरीरात्मिरिक्ष-मासामस्याचमामामेवति प्रतिपदा:)’, Brhatī, I. 1. 5, p. 120.
6 ‘शान्तमहाशामिदिम: सत्त्वे:’; iv. 22 and also ‘शान्तमहाशामिदिम: सांस्कृतिरात्मा: ततेय संसारं दशायं मोक्षार्थात्मिकोक्तमामामोष्ठि’; iv. 23.
curious to notice that the first topic of the *Saṣṭiṭantra* constitutes that of the *brahman.* From these evidences it appears that the pre-śāṅkara Śaṅkhya did not ignore *brahman.* But it is difficult to determine precisely the sense of the term; for we find it somewhere used in the sense of one universal soul, somewhere it is identified with the stage of liberation and elsewhere it means the inner self.

Though the term *brahman* is conspicuous by its absence in the *Kārikā,* yet the early commentators do not leave it untouched. *Yuktisāra,* the newly discovered commentary on the *Śaṅkhya-kārikā* states *brahman* to be the ultimate stage. Paramārtha, Māṭhara and Gaṇḍhapāda hold the term to be a synonym of *prakṛti* (Ka. 22). But elsewhere Māṭhara mentions Śaṅkhya as imparting the knowledge of *brahman.*

Then comes the question of the director. Our Upaniṣad insists upon three principles: the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the director (I. 12). But the school of Śaṅkhya as represented in the *Kārikā* and its commentaries does nowhere speak of any director of the *prakṛti* or *purusa,* for *prakṛti* is regarded as independent and functions out of its own accord for the liberation of the *purusa* (Ka. 57) and hence it does not require any separate director. Thus it appears that our Upaniṣad intends to speak of the theistic school of Śaṅkhya, otherwise there is no necessity of introducing the director.

Patañjali in his *Yoga-sūtra* speaks of *iśvara* (I. 24), but neither in the *sūtra* nor in the *bhāṣya* this *iśvara* is maintained as

1 तत्साथ भक्तःत्म दुह्दितीय पुरुषः—*Akibhyudhna,* XII. 20.
2 परं परं भक्तः भुवम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्मभम्म� 3 असुग्दिकोत्त...ककोपपेश्विग्राह्य...वाचिसंययाच, Māṭhara on Ka. 1, p. 2.
the director. Bhojarāja in his commentary on the *Yoga-sūtra* states that the conjunction of the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* cannot happen without the will of *īśvara*,¹ but sufficient weight cannot be attached to his version as he is not regarded as a very early authority on the subject. Haribhadra also in his *Ṣaḍdārśana-sānscāraya* speaks of a school of Sāṁkhyā which admits *īśvara*,² but the function of this *īśvara* is not distinctly stated by him anywhere. Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattva-saṁgraha* acquaints us with a school of Sāṁkhyā which insists upon the joint activity of the *prakṛti* and *īśvara* in the matter of creation.³ This is further hinted in a *sūtra* which Kamalaśīla quotes in the introduction to his commentary on the *Tattva-saṁgraha* and ascribes it to the lord Buddha.⁴ The said *sūtra*, which criticises the theory of causation of other teachers urges: 'the sprout does not come out of itself, nor it is created by both *prakṛti* and *īśvara* nor it is created by God, nor it is evolved from *prakṛti* etc. The buddhist *sūtras* in their sanskritised form though not so ancient as the Pali canons, yet cannot be placed very later than the first century A.D. From this it appears that there had been a school of Sāṁkhyā as early as the beginning of the Christian era which maintained both *prakṛti* and *īśvara* as the cause of creation. But our Upaniṣad is not still content. It speaks that the power of the Lord is supreme (VI. 8.) and in another place, it is stated that the self-power of the Lord is enveloped in its own *guṇas* (I. 3) and hence it does not intend to offer a prominent

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1. ‘प्रकृतिपुष्प-संयोगवियोगवोरीत्यर्हे: व्यतिरेक्षणानुपस्ते’; *I. 24.*
2. ‘सांस्कृतिक निरीक्षण: केवलं केवलिन्द्रव: देवता:’; *Ś. 35, p. 32.*
3. ‘प्रकृतिशरयादेवेन हेतुप्रपातिश्वेतादि।
प्रत्येकं साहित्यं कर्तवी नोभवं जम्मिनाम्बुद्धस्।’ Tattva-saṁgraha, p. 58.
4. त्वेवेदसुंस्कृतं भवताऽस स चायमहंहरो न चथं कर्तव्यं न नोभवं नैष्ठरसिद्धं न प्रकृति-
सम्बूच्चानं नैककारणादिनं नापर्येतः समुपप्फः; Kamalaśīla’s commentary, p. 11.
place to the prakṛti. But in the classical Sāṃkhya, the independent prakṛti itself is held to be the power. In the Saṣṭiṭantra list also power forms a distinct item1 and elsewhere in the Ahirodydhna, prakṛti itself is regarded as the power.2 Not only this, the Upaniṣad explicitly mentions prakṛti to be an illusion and the great Lord as the magician3 and thereby it intends to ignore the separate existence of the prakṛti.

But we are not inclined to believe in such a school of Sāṃkhya as treats prakṛti to be an illusion or as the self-power of the supreme deity and thereby goes to deny its separate existence. Whatever be the manifold schools of Sāṃkhya, it always insists upon the independent existence of prakṛti and if it is disregarded it merges into Vedānta. Then, is it an attempt on the part of the Śvet. Up. to reconcile the conflicting views of the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta?

Some satisfactory results may be obtained if we compare some portions of the Kaṭha with the Śvet. Up.. The first three chapters of the Kaṭha which comprise the first book emphasise upon the puruṣa. It is held as higher than the unevolved, there is nothing higher than this, it is the highest consummation, it is the supreme goal (I. iii. 11). The central interest lies in finding it out. There is no tinge of any supreme deity as the lord or as the director. In one verse only it is stated that the person who is without any desire or free from grief realises the majesty of the self by the grace of the creator (I. ii. 20). Except this, nowhere we meet with any such expression as speaks of any creator or supreme being other

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1 See, 'श्रीमाण्डश्रीमाण्डीयाणि श्रापेन्द्रधिकाल्यम्', Ahirodydhna, XII. 20.

2 'यद तद्दुष्टस्य रूपं शक्तितत्त्वः प्रकृतितत्त्वः', ibid VI. 16.

3 'मायाय शक्तिः विपानमाधिनन्दु महेश्वरस', Śvet. IV. 10.
than the self. But this very verse is also found in the Svet. Up. (III. 20) and we shall not be unjustified in holding the said verse which suddenly appears in the Katha without bearing any important relation with the preceding verses, to be an interpolation to it. Otherwise the verse which calls the purusa to be the highest consummation becomes useless.

The second book of the Katha (II. i-iii) which seems to be a later addition emphatically discards the idea of many realities (नेह नातादिति किष्कन, II. i. 11). The said book emphasises upon one universal soul who though manifests himself in different bodies yet transcends them. 'Just as one fire, after it has entered the world, though one becomes different according to whatever it burns; so also the one self which is the inner self of every being becomes different according to whatever it enters and exists also without' (II. ii. 9). 'As the sun, the eye of the whole world is not contaminated by the external impurities seen by the eyes, thus the one self within all beings is never contaminated by the misery of the world, being himself without' (II. ii. 11). But even this universal soul is not stated as the agent. Svet. Up. also speaks elsewhere the atman to be infinite, assuming all forms and inactive (आनन्तात्मा विद्वा तोष्णो हक्कल, I. 9); it is one hidden in all beings, all pervading, the self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one and free from qualities (VI. 11).

Further, towards the end of the Katha, II. ii, all the verses contain the conception of one universal soul and it is interesting to notice that some of these verses also find their place in the Svet. Up. The verse II. ii. 15 of the Katha is read verbatim in the Svet. Up., VI. 14. The two verses II. ii., 12-13 of the Katha are also read in the Svet. Up., VI. 12-13 with some variants in reading and this fact deserves special attention. The reading of the Katha is:
It is apparent that the second hemistic of the previous verse is almost repeated in the subsequent one. The first verse as well as the first hemistic of the second verse are read in the Śvet. Up. with a slight variation in reading, but the second hemistic of the second verse is entirely replaced by the line "तन्न कारण संस्क्य-योगांथिमयं झालता देवं मुख्ये सर्वपाले" which suggests Sāṅkhya and Yoga as the means of apprehending the supreme reality, but the Katha (I. ii. 12) suggests adhyātma-yoga in their stead. We quote below the following verses for the sake of critical examination.

तन दुर्दश गुप्तप्रविम गुहाहितं गदरेष पुराणम।
अच्छात्मयोगांथिममें देवं मतवधीरो हर्षशोको जहाँ। (Katha, I. ii. 12)

नित्यौनित्यानां चेतनश्रेष्ठनामेकं कहूः शो विद्यावति कामान्।
तमात्मस्थं येदुपद्यन्तिः धीरास्तेषां शाितिः शािवती नेत्रेषाम्। (Katha, II.ii. 13)

नित्यो नित्यानं चेतनश्रेष्ठनामेकं कहूः शो विद्यावति कामान्।
तन्न कारण संस्क्य-योगांथिमयं झालता देवं मुख्ये सर्वपाले। (Śvet, VI. 13)

These verses refer to the supreme reality, the means to attain it and the result to be obtained therefrom. The second verse only does not speak of the means; the result is the same, more or less everywhere. In one case adhyātma-yoga is suggested as the means and in another case 'Sāṅkhya-yoga' constitutes the same. Adhyātma-yoga does not differ from 'Sāṅkhya-yoga' as we have already discussed. But the supreme reality varies everywhere. Puruṣa is the central figure in the first book of the Katha and this puruṣa does not differ from the individual soul as we have already

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1 See above, pp. 18-19.
tried to show. Here also the *deva* of the first verse who is to be apprehended by the *adhyātma-yojana* is the *purusa* as is evident from the context. Further, the expression 'गुहालालितम' of the first verse reminds us of a quotation in the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya* where also the eternal *brahman* is said to have got his residence in the cave. This cave is the function of the *buddhi* which does not look different from the *brahman*. The inner self is meant here by the term *brahman* and hence it is not different from the *purusa*. In the second place, one universal soul who is the inner self of every individual is the supreme reality. But with regard to the third case, it is something else which excels even the universal soul. Though the first hemistiche is almost common with the preceding verse, yet the conception of the deity (*deva*) who is resorted to to be the cause (*tattvārthanam*) is something else as is evident from the other passages of the *Śvet. Up.* This *deva* is the supreme lord of the lords (*VI. 7*); he is the maker of everything, he is the lord of the *pradhāna, kṣetrajña* and the *guna* (*VI. 16*); he first creates *brahman* and delivers the Vedas unto him (*VI. 18*). But Sāmkhya cannot entertain the conception of such a *deva* in its philosophy. The fact is this that the *Śvet. Up.* attempts to synthesise the Sāmkhya with the Vedānta with the result that the Vedantic idea remains predominant and the Sāmkhya conception is undermined. Again the Upaniṣad itself states towards its end that in the ancient cycle of creation, the highest mystery was delivered in the Vedānta (*VI. 22*) and hence it is not surprising to note that the absolute monism which is the doctrine of the Vedānta should be maintained in and through this Upaniṣad. This is not all. The aim of the Upaniṣad is to unite all the principal doctrines which were prevalent at the time of its compilation. Sāmkhya as we have already

1 'पुडा वस्त्रा सिद्धियते मात्रा शास्त्रं सुदृढ्धिचिन्तनयिः संस्कृये वेदवस्ते,'

*Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*, IV. 22.

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pointed out, has been mentioned in it. The second chapter is entirely given to Yoga. Rudra is sometimes highly spoken of in the third and the fourth chapters. Śiva also holds an important place and at the end it even speaks of the bhakti (VI. 23).

In conclusion, we may suggest that Śāmkhya picked up its categories from the store house of the Upaniṣadic speculations and at the time of the most ancient prose Upaniṣads it did not attain to any definite shape. It was still in its embryonic stage. But at the time of the Katha it immerged from the womb and at the age of the Śvet. Up. it was much more developed and most probably it then enjoyed a very wide popularity in the Brahmanical circle. This is why the Śvet. is very keen to synthesise it with the Vedānta.

Stray references to some Śāmkhya tenets are also found in the Mahānārāyana, but they are also surcharged with the Vedāntic doctrines. Like the Śvet, the said Upaniṣad also reads the verse ajñām ēkām etc. (III. i. 1) where the Śāmkhyaites find the conception of the prakṛti with the three guṇas as its constituents. Again, the term prakṛti-līna as found in the last verse of the tenth chapter reminds us of the conception of prakṛti-laya as found in the Yoga-sūtra, I. 19. Prakṛti-layas are those who believe the prakṛti to be their self and remain wholly absorbed in its meditation. As a result of this, their internal organs are saturated with the idea of the meditation for the prakṛti. They merge into the prakṛti after the separation of their bodies and remain absorbed in it until the fruition of their previously acquired merit. But the idea of the prakṛti-līna as found in the Mahānārāyana is wholly coloured with the Vedāntic conception.

1 'भो वेदारी स्वरः भोक्सते वेदार्थे च प्रतिश्वः।
तत्रय प्रकृतिलीनस्य वः परः स महेश्वरः॥'
The Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad acquaints us with some Sāṃkhya tenets, much more developed than those which we have examined before. The title of the text varies, for it is also read as Maitri. It begins with a pessimistic tone which is a special feature of the Sāṃkhya. With regard to the cosmogony it states that "in the beginning there had been only tamas, it rested on the supreme (purusa) and being moved by him it becomes uneven and thus it becomes rajas; rajas also being moved becomes uneven and thus it becomes sattva. This sattva being moved, the essence was generated. This is the part which is consciousness itself. It is the knower of the body (kṣetrajña) abiding in every purusa and is attested with determination, willing and egoism" (V. 2). Though the ordinary Sāṃkhya does not speak of cosmogony in this way, yet we meet with a similar statement in some of the early commentaries on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā—such as the chinese version of Paramārtha, Māthāra-vṛtti and the Jayamaṅgalā. All these commentaries refer to the doctrine which Kapila imparted to Āsuri in brief. The doctrine runs thus 'In the beginning there was only tamas, in that tamas the kṣetrajña appeared for the first time'. The commentators speak this tamas to be the prakṛti. But the classical Sāṃkhya nowhere states the kṣetrajña as the essence of sattva.

The Upaniṣad states the ātman as pure, firm, stable undefiled, unmoved, free from desire, spectator and abiding in itself (II. 7). The kṣetrajña is the individual self and it is mentioned as the part of the ātman; it is attested with determination, willing and egoism (II. 5). The text further speaks of one bhūtātman (elemental self). "Bhūta means the five subtle and the gross elements and the body is said to be their combination. Hence, he who resides in the body is said to be the bhūtātman. It is the

1 See above, p. 8.
self who is overcome by the gunās of the prakṛti. Being subjected
to egoism he thinks "it is I, this is mine" and thus binds his self by
his own self just as a bird does itself by the net" ( III. 2 ). This
conception of binding oneself by his own self is also found in the
Kārikā where prakṛti is stated as one who binds herself by her
own self ( kā, 63 ). The ātman who is thus attested with deter-
mination, willing and egoism is bound and who is different from
it is liberated ( VI. 30 ). This conception of bondage and
liberation also tallies with that of the classical Sāmkhya.

Further, the Upaniṣad mentions for the first time the
specific names of the gunās; the functions of tamas and rajas
are also elaborately described in III. 5. In VI. 10, prakṛti is
described as the food and the inner self as the eater. This food
which is not different from the prakṛti becomes the linga beginning
from the mahat and ending in the specifics ( vīṣeṣa ) owing to the
different transformations of the gunās. The universe also is des-
cribed as attested with pleasure, pain and delusion and hence we
find that its doctrines are keeping perfect harmony with those of
the Kārikā. In III. 2, it explicitly mentions the tanmātras. Besides
these, the Upaniṣad always strives to differentiate the prakṛti from
the ātman. This tendency of the Upaniṣad and specially some of
its expressions such as 'प्राक्तमाधि तिर्गुणमेवपरिनामोपनाश्चतत्त्वमाधिकृप्य, सुभवः-समोहितवीं हास्यभूतमिदं जगत् ( VI. 10 )' etc. bear testimony to the
fact that at the time of its compilation the Sāmkhya attained to a
very developed stage. The remarkable difference with the doctrine
of the classical Sāmkhya is this that ātman is still maintained
as one and the kṣetrajña or the individual self is regarded as its
part'.

But this Upaniṣad cannot be regarded as a very ancient one.
It is post-buddhistic, for it mercilessly criticises the Buddhists for

1 'सोऽऽशृणु वक्षेतामाहः प्रतिपुर्वं क्षेत्रवः सहस्पाध्यनसावनामिनिनः; ... , II. 5.'
advocating the doctrine of the non-existence of self. Again this Upaniṣad cannot be maintained as a genuine one, for the Upaniṣad itself speaks that it conveys the knowledge of all the Upaniṣads. Moreover, it frequently refers to the view of other texts to substantiate its own statements. This is evident from the common expression ‘अथान्यन्यायुक्तम’ as found here and there. Most interesting is to notice that it quotes such lines from other texts and authorities as distinctively speak the doctrine of Śāṅkhyā. Hence it is better to regard it as a summary of other texts and not to treat it as a genuine Upaniṣad.

Of the minor Upaniṣads, the Jāvāla refers to the sattva, rajas and tamas (IV.) and speaks of them as the three dhātus. The Nṛṣimha-tāpani while speaking of the absolute, mentions it as free from the sattva, rajas and tamas (IX. 20). Both the Subāla and the Maṇtriṇa mention the term ‘Śāṅkhyā’ and the Garbhā. Up. speaks of the eight-fold prakṛti and the sixteen modifications; but thereby they do not preach absolutely Śāṅkhyā doctrines.

We have already pointed out that Śāṅkhyā borrowed some of its principal tenets from the Upaniṣads. Further, the BS. in some of its sūtras refers to some fragments of the Upaniṣads where Śāṅkhyā is accustomed to hold its own doctrine. This fact

1 ‘नेतामधवदकिष्कृष्णःश्वाभाद्यात्मद्वैमन्यः’, VII. 8.
2 अथ खरियः...सर्वपिनिविबिधा बा..., II. 3.
3 See the beinnings of III. 3, 4, 5; IV. 2; V. 4, 5; VI. 4, 5, 12, 13 etc.
4 सोमसंघोद्वयं भुतामाधविशिष्ठोपप्यवर्षितस्य इति चनादेऽ... VI. 10;

5 इत्यतीयाधिकृत, I. 1. 5; बताति चेत्त वास्तो व प्रकरणात, I. iv. 5;
महाद्व, I. iv. 7; स संह्योपसंह्राहादि नानाभावाद्वादिकाच, I. iv. 11.
indicates that at the time of the *BS*, Sāmkhya endeavoured to prove itself as an offshoot of the Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara in his commentary plainly states that Sāmkhya tries to show its own tenets as being based upon the Upaniṣads and in support of his view, traces some passages of the Upaniṣads which are explained by the Sāmkhyaites in such a way as to strengthen their own views. He further states that the explanation of the advocates of Sāmkhya is illusive and should not be regarded as the genuine one.

However, Sāmkhya cannot be regarded as the direct descendant of the Upaniṣads like the Vedānta. The central interest of the ancient Upaniṣads rests generally upon monism whereas the Sāmkhya always strives to maintain its dualism. The pluralism of the soul is another important deviation of the classical Sāmkhya from the Upaniṣadic conception of the one universal soul. But whether Sāmkhya advocated the doctrine of pluralism from its very inception is a problem which is not easy to solve. We have already pointed out that the pre-kārikā Sāmkhya admitted *brahman* and it is somewhere used to mean the inner self and elsewhere it is identified with the stage of liberation. The Śaṅkitantra list of the *Añirbyudhna* sheds further light on the point. The topic on *brahman* comes first in the said list and then comes the topic on the *purusa*. Hence it appears that *brahman* was maintained as something other than the *purusa*. The said list further informs us that the topic on liberation constitutes the last chapter of the Śaṅkitantra and hence *brahman* cannot be even identified with the stage of liberation. Then, does the *brahman* of the Śaṅkitantra stand for one universal soul? From the statement of the *Mbh.*, we know that Āsuri, the first disciple of Kapila, explained in the assembly

1 साम्याधिक: स्वप्नशापनाय वेदान्ताचार्यानन्यश्रुन्दाहिव सप्ताहापुण्येनिव योजयनानी न्याचार्यः, देवां बद बह्यवाणान तद बह्यवाणापारमस्..., II. ii. 1.
3 तत्तां अप्पारस्यां दु: देवीयं पुरुषाभिन्नम्, XII. 20.
of the followers of Kapila, the *brahman* who is one, immutable and seen in diverse forms*. This reminds us of the second book of the *Katha* where some verses speak of one universal soul, who is the inner self of every being and exists also without*. The conception of liberation as set forth by *Pañcasikha* throws further light on the point. He states: "just as the rivers falling into the sea lose their forms and names, in the same manner occurs the extinction of life which is called liberation. Under these circumstances, the individual soul which through delusion is attested with attributes, when united with *brahman*, the universal soul and where its so-called attributes disappear, then there remains no sign by which it can be differentiated. As a result of this rebirth is also impossible, for the individual soul is then taken up by the universal soul". Thus we see that in the opinion of *Pañcasikha*, liberation is the unification of the individual soul with *brahman*, the universal soul. Even the *Maitrayani* which is too much saturated with *Sāmkhya* ideas speaks *kṣetrajña*, the individual soul, to be the part of the *purusa*. Though this is not counted as one of the most ancient *Upaniṣads*, yet it should not be regarded as a very later one; for the *Mbh.*, in its *Mokṣa-dharma* section of the twelfth book seems to have borrowed some lines from it*. 

Hence it appears that there had been some ancient school of

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1 *Mbh.* XII. 218. 14, also see above p. 26n.
2 *Katha*, II. ii. 9-11.
3 'वर्णात्रीज़वः नर्मः व्यक्तिः खृष्टः नः
नष्ठृश्च तस्मिन्निः तातः: सत्यसूत्रः:
एवं सति कुतः संवा प्रेषमां: युनंभेतुरः
शीवे च प्रतिसुब्जः शुक्यमां: च सबेतः' XII. 219. 42-43.
4 "In my opinion these parallels together with the *cittasya hi prasidena* stanza above, indicate that the epic has copied from the sixth chapter of the *Upaniṣad* as well as from the earlier portions". See, Hopkins' *The Great Epic of India*, p. 46.
Sāṃkhya which incorporated into its philosophy the doctrine of brahman, the one universal soul. Our assumption is based upon the Saśātantra list and is further corroborated by the statements of the Mbh., etc. But the Ahirbudhna itself at the end of the said list states that there had been numerous forms of the Saśātantra. Under these circumstances it is difficult to ascertain whether the Ahirbudhna informs us of the original Saśātantra or of a different recension of it. This being the case, it cannot be definitely stated whether the original Saśātantra, the first systematic treatise on Sāṃkhya really advocated the doctrine of brahman, the universal soul or not. From the available resources we intend to hold that the most ancient form of the Sāṃkhya is contained in a nut-shell in the first book of the Kaṭha which is content with finding out the real nature of the self by differentiating it from the physical body, it does not speak of brahman as the one universal soul. It is after the compilation of the first book of the Kaṭha that Sāṃkhya advocates the conception of brahman as the one universal soul. The theistic school of Sāṃkhya which is reflected in the Śvet. and elsewhere as we have already remarked comes afterwards. Oldenberg is of opinion that the pre-classical form of the Sāṃkhya consists of a trune-unity as set forth in the Śvet. U.p.², but we are not prepared to accept the philosophy of the Śvet. as the genuine Sāṃkhya, nor the theistic coloured accounts of Sāṃkhya of that Upaniṣad to be the original form of Sāṃkhya.

The theory of evolution is another distinctive achievement of Sāṃkhya from the cosmogonical accounts of the ancient prose Upaniṣads. The central interest of Sāṃkhya lies in differentiating the soul from that which does not constitute the soul and in order to exhibit the real nature of the non-soul it invents for the first time its theory of evolution which speaks of its subtle power of

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1 "विद्विश्वास्यवेभवभे नानाविविष युने", XII. 30.
reasoning as against the dogmatic tendencies of the Vedas. Though it is indebted to a great extent to the Upaniṣads, yet it chalks out an independent path of its own; for it establishes its tenets by absolute reason and does not rest content upon only citing the scriptural passages in support of them. Even in supporting the conception of the prakṛti and puruṣa etc., it does not generally quote the passages of the Upaniṣads where such ideas are found but establishes them by logical reasonings. This is why the newly discovered Yuktidipikā in its very beginning compares the Śāṅkhya to an elephant who has got the vita and the avita forms of inference as its two tusks. Even the BS, which is always very keen to refute the doctrine of Śāṅkhya speaks the prakṛti as the anumāna or anumānika (lit. based upon inference). This fact tends to suggest that even at the time of the composition of the BS, the Śāṅkhya was famous for its rationalism. This is not all. Kauṭilya explicitly speaks the Śāṅkhya to be the avvikṣakī, i.e. the system which tries to establish the validity of its tenets by the process of logical reasonings.

1 "वीतानीतिविवाणस्य पञ्चवातत्रोबिन: "
प्रवादा: सांस्कृतकरिणः शतानुसारमण्डलुरः." 

2 कामाक्ष नातुमानापेक्षा, I. i. 18; नातुमानमत्तौष्ठद्वार, I. iii. 3; बानुमानिकास्मेकेक्षण्थं प्रतिष्ठात्, I. liv.1; रज्जनायस्तुष्पेक्ष मातुमानं, II.ii.1.

3 "सांस्कृत विदीयो वेयकावत्सलान्नीखरिकी", Kauṭilya under vidyā-samud-deśa.
THE SĀMKHYA ACCOUNTS OF THE
MAHĀBHĀRATA.

In the philosophical discourses of the Mbh., Sāmkhya holds a very prominent place. But the numerous forms of Sāmkhya as are found there, are not always consistent and none of them fully tally with the Sāmkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. This is evident from a careful examination of the Sāmkhya tenets as are found here and there and specially in the Mokṣadharma section of the twelfth book. Let us first of all examine the evolution series of the Sāmkhya system. Thus we find that the twenty-four constituents of Sāmkhya, i.e. the prakṛti and its twenty-three evolutes are divided into two groups of (1) eight primary constituents and (2) sixteen modifications. The former which is called the eight-fold prakṛti constitutes the prakṛti, mahat, ahamkāra, and the five gross elements; the latter being the ten organs, mind and the five objects of the senses. The classical Sāmkhya always maintains the five gross elements to be the products only, for they do not give rise to any new tattva; but in the Mbh. we find that the five objects of the senses which are stated there as the tattvas, come out from the gross elements. The orthodox Sāmkhya never mentions these sense-objects as the tattvas and maintains the gross elements to be the evolutes of the tanmātras or the subtle elements. But the Mbh. in its exposition of Sāmkhya does not generally speak of the tanmātras and they occur only in I. 90. 13-14 and XIII. 14. 202 and Hopkins holds this passages to be the latter additions in the epic. Again the Mbh, somewhere states the gross elements to be the evolutes of the ahamkāra and elsewhere as those of the mind, while the orthodox

1 See Hopkins, The Great Epic of India—p. 173.
2 'पञ्चमवृत्तत्त्ववादः सांख्यावलम्बिनः', XII. 306. 28.
3 'मनस्तत्त्व समुद्रवता महाभूता नराशिनि', XII. 311. 19.
Sāṃkhya always states them to be the products of the subtle elements.

Another difficulty arises with regard to the view of Pañcaśikha who is held to be a reputed teacher of Sāṃkhya. His view as we find in XII. 209 goes against the doctrine of the orthodox Sāṃkhya in many important respects. Let us first of all briefly observe his treatment of psychology. In his opinion, the entities, namely knowledge, heat and wind produce three kinds of activity. Again he introduces svabhāva (nature) and feeling along with the senses and their objects etc., and in his opinion these constitute the body of an individual. Along with the organs of action, he states 'power' as the sixth organ of action. Like other teachers of Sāṃkhya, he also speaks of the kṣetra and the kṣetrajña. Kṣetra as we know, is the physical body and this constitutes the prakṛti and its twenty-three evolutes. But in his exposition, we do not find the name of the twenty-four categories, i.e. the prakṛti and its evolutes in a systematic way. Ahamkāra is ignored and his manner of exposition also is haphazard.

His conception of liberation also differs from that of the orthodox Sāṃkhya. In his opinion, the individual soul when liberated is united with the universal soul and as a result of this it then loses its individuality. "Just as the rivers falling into the ocean lose their forms and names, in the same manner occurs the extinction of life which is called liberation." Thus it appears that Pañcaśikha advocates the Vedantic view in this respect. But the pre-Kārika sāṃkhya also seems to advocate the doctrine of

1 'शानमुव्वा न वाजुश्च विनिपिख कार्यसिद्धास्थः', XII. 219. 9.
2 'हिद्रयात्रीनिद्रयायाप्य भवावशेषत्वम् मनः', XII. 219. 9.
3 'विक्षमानि वशायस्य वद्यवेदानिवाणि हु', XII. 219. 20.
4 See 'बर्द ष्ट्रीरे कौन्तेर भैरवमिलिति प्रवर्तकान्ति', B. Gītā XIII. 2.
5 XII. 219. 42.
brahman as the one universal soul and this we have already tried to show above.  

But in other main principles, he does not generally deviate from the orthodox Sāṃkhya. He states "ignorance" as the cause of bondage and emphasises upon renunciation and elsewhere upon non-attachment as the means of liberation. He also speaks of the three guṇas and his conception of them does not go against the view of the orthodox Sāṃkhya.

Hopkins states that in XII. 321. 96-112 there is a different account of the views of Pañcaśikha, for here there are thirty principles with God superadded. This is due to an oversight; for the verses which speak of the thirty principles come from the mouth of Sulabhā and not from Janaka, the disciple of Pañcaśikha. Further, Sulabhā is nowhere found to speak herself as the disciple of Pañcaśikha. Hence there is no ground to regard the exposition of Sulabhā as the view of Pañcaśikha.

The author of the Yogasūtra-bhāṣya is found here and there to quote some fragments from the works of the ancient Sāṃkhya teachers and some of these fragments are attributed to Pañcaśikha by Vacaspati. We shall discuss them afterwards and intend to compare them with the view of Pañcaśikha as we find in the Mbh.

Another difficulty arises with the philosophy of Asita-Devala. He states that the knowledge of Sāṃkhya is essential to wipe away the fruits of merit and demerit, but his exposition as we get specially in the Mbh. XII. 274, does not

1 See above pp. 26-28.
2 "वैराग्यं पुनरत्र मोक्षस परमो विधि"; XII. 320. 29.
3 Hopkins, The Great Epic of India, p. 152. Prof. Keith also wrongly supports him; see Keith, The Sāṃkhya system, p. 47.
4 "पुष्पपापायांहि सांख्यांबाबाण विचारवः", XII. 274. 38.
always tally with the orthodox Sāṃkhya. He offers a prominent
place to ‘time’ which in his opinion plays an important
part in the field of creation. But ‘time’ as an independent entity
is always rejected by the orthodox Sāṃkhya. Again, he
speaks of the eight elements which comprise the five gross
elements together with ‘time’, ‘entity’ and ‘non-entity’. The last
named three are not reckoned as separate categories in the ordinary
Sāṃkhya. Further, he states that citta is higher than the sense-
organs, mind is higher than citta, higher than mind is the buddhi
and higher than buddhi is the kṣetrajña. Difference among the
citta, mind and the buddhi is not clear; the ahamkāra and the
prakṛti are ignored. Unlike the Kārikā, he reckons eight organs
of knowledge. Like Pañcaśikha he also speaks of ‘power’ as the
sixth organ of actions and the stage of brahman (XII, 274. 37)
to be the final achievement.

The B. Gitā also refers to the tenets and doctrines of Sāṃkhya
here and there and these do not generally differ from those of the
orthodox Sāṃkhya. But in one place Krṣṇa is found to state
that through him—the overooker, the prakṛti produces the universe
of mobiles and immobiles. The reason is not very far to seek.
The central interest of the Gitā is to maintain Krṣṇa as the
supreme lord and hence it cannot be expected that the independence
of the prakṛti would be maintained everywhere.

The Sāṃkhya as it is well known is a system that speaks of
the twenty-five principles and of these, the puruṣa is counted as the
twenty-fifth. This puruṣa in its true nature is the pure conscious-
ness itself and is never regarded as the agent. Further, the ortho-
dox Sāṃkhya always maintains its pluralism. But we have already
pointed out that Pañcaśikha, like the Vedantists, advocates the

1 For further about Devala, See p.
2 मयांप्रयोगाण प्रकृति: सब्जे सच्चाचारमे, Gitā, IX. 10.
conception of one universal soul as the refuge of the individual souls. Āsurī also, as it is stated, explains in the assembly of the followers of Kapila, the brahmaṇ who is one, immutable and seen in diverse forms. Further, Bhiṣma in his exposition of Śaṅkhyā in xii. 301, speaks of Nārāyaṇa as the highest consummation; he is higher than the prakṛti, he is eternal, he is the supreme soul. Being freed from merit and demerit, the individual takes shelter in him and never returns again. He is the agent, from him proceeds creation and dissolution and he holds the entire Śaṅkhyā. The classical Śaṅkhyā cannot tolerate the conception of such a supreme soul. But Bhiṣma himself is not consistent everywhere; for elsewhere in the same chapter he is found to state that the individual souls who seek after liberation on the path of Śaṅkhyā are carried by Nārāyaṇa to the paramātman or the supreme soul. The individual souls thus attaining the supreme soul merge in him and are thus liberated, never to return again. Thus we find that in the same chapter Nārāyaṇa is somewhere maintained as the supreme lord and elsewhere he is stated as holding the intermediate position between the individual soul and the supreme soul.

1. MBh, XII. 218. 14; also see above, p. 26n.
2. प्रक्रियात्मितिक्रमः गर्भच्छायामानममात्मेः।
    परं नारायणामानां सिद्धंद्रः प्रहलेते: परम् ॥ 96।
3. विमुक्तः पुंशपमेव: प्रविष्टमनमनायम्।
    परमात्मानमयुण्यं न मित्ततित्तिः भारत ॥ 97।
4. अमादिमध्यमिथ्वं निन्द्रंद्र तस्मि शाब्दम् ।
    102।
5. बत: सब्बय: प्रवर्तनीयं सत्त्वयत्रविक्रियाः: ।
    103।
6. क्रमशः साक्ष्यं चूहेतेस महाक्षमा ।
    नारायणो भारतवेदप्रमेयम् ।
    114।
7. सस्ते वदति शुद्धात्मनु र्यं नारायणम प्रभुम।
    प्रभुवेद्विति शुद्धात्मा परमात्मानमात्मना ॥ 77।
    परमात्मानमात्मायं वदुत्तायत्तनान्मलः।
    अमूत्तायां कल्पने न मित्ततिति व विमो ॥ 78।
But in other respects, Bhīṣma is not found to advocate any conflicting view; in and through the chapter he is keen to find fault with the objects and lays emphasis upon knowledge by dint of which the sages overcome the obstacles that stand in their way (XII. 301. 72).

Vasishtha also in his exposition of Śāṅkhyā to Karuṇā-Janaka (xii. 302-308) speaks of the twenty-five principles of Śāṅkhyā. But the tanmātrās do not find their place therein and the objects of the senses are also counted as the tattvas. First of all, he enumerates the twenty-four principles, i.e. the prakṛti and its evolutes and then states that Viṣṇu is to be regarded as the twenty-fifth. This reminds us of the exposition of Bhīṣma who offers a prominent place to Nārāyaṇa. But Vasishtha nowhere mentions Viṣṇu either as the agent or as the cause of creation and destruction. Again, in his opinion the twenty-fifth principle, i.e. the purusa is not really a different tattva; through delusion it embraces the tattvas and this is why it is also regarded as a separate tattva (302. 38). Though the twenty-fifth principle is without any form, yet it assumes numerous forms by coming in contact with the prakṛti; though it is not subjected to creation and destruction, yet in conjunction with the prakṛti which is attested with the attributes, it also takes the attributes as its own (XII. 302. 39-40). But in its real nature, it is without any form; it is absolute, conscious and eternal. There is no other tattva beyond the twenty-fifth.

So far we do not notice any discrepancy. But in xii. 308, we find him introducing the twenty-sixth principle and he is thus found to deviate from his own statement as well as from the standpoint of the orthodox Śāṅkhyā which never speaks of any principle beyond the twenty-fifth. The solution of this apparent contradic-

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1 पञ्चविशालिमो विष्णु; ... XII. 302. 38.
2 पञ्चविशालः परं तत्तं पञ्चवे न नररिषयः, XII. 307. 47.
tion comes from the statement of Vaśiṣṭha himself. The
topics of discussion in the chapter where the twenty-
sixth principle finds its place are the aprati-buddha, the
budhyamāna and the buddha. Of these, the aprati-buddha
is the prakṛti. The budhyamāna is the puruṣa—the twenty-
fifth, who being associated with the prakṛti thinks its activities
as his own; it is the jīva and not the puruṣa in its true nature.
The buddha is the liberated soul who has cut off all connections
with the prakṛti and thus transcends it; this buddha is the
twenty-sixth principle. It is not a different tattva; for the tattvas
are only twenty-five in number (307. 47). The individual spirit
which is conditioned by the prakṛti becomes one with this twenty-
sixth when the former can recognise that he is not practically
different from the latter. A little after, it is clearly stated that the
twenty-fifth is united with the twenty-sixth when the former fails to
apprehend anything by his own intelligence. Thus we find that
Vaśiṣṭha is going to reconcile the Sāmkhya theory of the plurality
of the spirits with the doctrine of unity. Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not
speak of the twenty-sixth, nor he is found to introduce such terms
as the buddha and the aprati-buddha etc., in explaining the tenets
of the Sāmkhya.

In the concluding verses of the previous chapter (xii. 307),

1 See, 'अनेनाप्रतिप्रकृतिविद्वत्तेन विद्वयम्बप्रकृताम्', XII. 308. 5.
2 प्रकृतिकर्मावतामुत्तमाः सत्यसतिः', XII. 306. 44. Nilakaṇṭha
   reads प्रकृतिकर्मावतामुत्तमाः...
3 पञ्चिंविंदे विद्वत्तेन ज्ञातान्त्रिकप्रकृताम्', XII. 308. 7.
4 पञ्चिंविंदोपपतिस्मिति प्राको गुणमाणोऽहारमारः;
   केवलेन केवलेन समातं वास्तवानवृत्तम्. II 308. 16.
5 चेतनेन समेत तथा पञ्चिंविंदोपपतिस्मिति ह ।
   पञ्चिंविंद वै महत्त्वं यदा हुद्धा न उचवे || 308. 18.
Vaśiṣṭha states that the buddha, aprati-buddha and the budhyamāna form the topics of discussion in the Yoga system. In xii. 303, he speaks of the characteristics of those principles and introduces the twenty-sixth. Towards the end of the chapter, he further states that he obtained this knowledge from Hiranyagarbha. But Hiranyagarbha is known to be the propounder of the Yoga. Hence it appears that Vaśiṣṭha is going to speak of the doctrines of the Yoga in this chapter and if this be the case, it will not be wrong to suggest that the early Yoga advocated the doctrine of the twenty-sixth principle. But we are disappointed to find that Vaśiṣṭha himself fuses the doctrines of the Yoga with those of the Śāmkhya; for a verse in the said chapter definitely states that the Śāmkhya also advocates the doctrine of the twenty-sixth.

Like Vaśiṣṭha, Yājñavalkya also in course of his exposition of Śāmkhya and Yoga (xii. 310-319) refers to the buddha, aprati-buddha and the budhyamāna and thus introduces the twenty-sixth principle. His exposition of the pure Śāmkhya comprises the chapters xii. 310-315. So far we do not find him speaking of the twenty-sixth. But from his own statement (xii. 316-1) we know that he is going to elucidate the principles of the Yoga in the following chapters (xii. 316-319) and it is in xii. 318, that we find him speaking of the twenty-sixth principle together with the explanation of the aprati-buddha etc. Hence it appears that the twenty-sixth principle forms the subject matter of

1  बुध्मानिदुर्दैवतादुच्यते मानवमानव तस्यत: ।
   उच्यते मानवमानव प्राहंसुमिन्द्रियश्चादि ॥ xii. 307. 48.

2 ‘अवानिहेति मया सनातनानानातिर्थिष्ठा गदति नराशिप’। xii. 308. 40.

3 ‘पादंभिकोऽवृद्धित्वाऽप्रमाणो दुर्दैवतादुच्यते ।
   पत्रानानात्रेविन्दुः सण्णात्सुर्विन्द्रियश्चादि ॥ xii. 308. 17.

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discussion in the Yoga system. But Yājñavalkya's account of
the Yoga also like that of Vāsiṣṭha cannot be regarded as a pure
one; for the chapters which deal with the twenty-sixth and other
allied principles contain an admixture of both the Sāṁkhya and
Yoga accounts. This is evident from the statement of Yājñav-
alkya himself. Thus we find him stating:

"When puruṣa, the twenty-fifth, can realise that he is one principle
and the prakṛti is another, he attains to liberation and apprehends the
twenty-sixth principle; this is why the advocates of the Sāṁkhya
and Yoga are not prepared to accept the twenty-fifth as the final stage"
(xii. 319. 77-79).

The aforesaid lines thus clearly state that the doctrine of
the twenty-sixth principle finds its place not only in the Yoga but
also in the Sāṁkhya system.

While discussing the philosophy of Vāsiṣṭha, it has been
noticed that the twenty-sixth principle is identical with the one
universal soul with whom the individual souls are united at the
time of their liberation. But it is a matter of astonishment that
Yājñavalkya in one place advocates the doctrine of the plurality
of souls¹ and in another place he is found to deviate from his own
statement; for it has been shown above that he ascribes the
doctrine of the twenty-sixth to both the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga
systems. How to account for this discrepancy? Prof. Oldenberg
is of opinion that puruṣa, the twenty-fifth, includes both the indivi-
dual and the universal soul in the Sāṁkhya, while these two are
differentiated in the Yoga of the Epic². But Jacobi, who finds
fault with this suggestion, urges that in this case the distinction
between the individual and the universal spirit would be the same

¹ अष्टविकःवमिस्त्रायुचनासां पुरुषासाधा, xii. 315. 11.
² Nachrichten von der Kgl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu
Göttingen, 1917, p. 231.
as between the manifest and the unmanifest prakṛti. In our opinion, the twenty-sixth principle cannot be regarded as the doctrine of the pure Śāṅkhyā; but it is the Śāṅkhyā-Yoga School of the Epic which is found to advocate the said doctrine.

Though there are some minor differences of opinion, the philosophy of Vasiṣṭha and Yājñavalkya tallies to a considerable extent with the traditional Śāṅkhyā. Vasiṣṭha states the prakṛti as a śīla (303. 47) i.e. without any distinctive mark and this epithet of the prakṛti is also to be met with in the Yoga-sūtra (II. 19). He further states that the conception of the prakṛti and puruṣa is based upon inference and Iśvara also establishes both of them by the same process. Again, Yājñavalkya plainly states that the prakṛti is constituted of the guṇas, it cannot transcend them (315. 3). It is devoid of consciousness; being presided over by the puruṣa, it creates and destroys. The orthodox Śāṅkhyā also advocates the same view. This is not all. Both Vasiṣṭha and Yājñavalkya describe the characteristics of the guṇas and strive to differentiate the puruṣa from the prakṛti. Further,

1 Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen, 1919, p. 6, n. 1.
2 Prof. Keith also after discussing the view of Oldenberg and Jacobi comes to the same conclusion—Śāṅkhyā system, p. 57.

But the Janaka-Pañcaśikha episode (xii. 218-19) speaks of the absolute and hence Prof. Keith regards the theory of liberation as propounded by Pāṇcaśikha to be Vedantic. However, on the strength of some early references, we have already tried to show that some early school of the Śāṅkhyā advocated the doctrine of brahman (pp. 26-28). But the distinction between the twenty-sixth and brahman is not very clear.

3 अविद्याः प्रकृति तावदृश्यितं निहयतुमानादिः गमये || 303. 47.
4 अचेतना च चेतना गता प्रकृतिभेदि परिष्वभृत ।
पृथ्वीनासिरिता चैव सृष्टि संपरस्त्यि || 314. 12.
the relation of the prakṛti and puruṣa is vividly explained by Yājñavalkya:

"Just as the mosquito which is encased within the fig is different from the fig, though existing with the fig the worm thereby should not be regarded as forming a portion of the fig (315.18); the fish is different from the water in which it lives, though the fish and water exist together yet the fish is not drenched by the water (315.14); the lotus leaf that floats upon water is distinct from the water on which it floats, its co-existence with water does not make it a portion of water" (315.16).

Similarly the prakṛti and puruṣa, though exist together, should under no circumstances be considered as forming one principle. They should always be regarded as two distinct principles; under the spell of ignorance the ordinary people fails to differentiate them.

So far we have tried to point out the doctrines as tally with those of the orthodox Sāṃkhya. Now we intend to point out some of their important deviations. Both Vasīṣṭha and Yājñavalkya enumerate the twenty-five principles, but none of them speak of the tanmātrās. In the opinion of Vasīṣṭha, the gross elements come out from the ahamkāra¹, whereas Yājñavalkya regards them as the evolutes of the mind². Further, Vasīṣṭha intends to maintain the unity of the prakṛti in the stage of dissolution and manifoldness in the stage of evolution³; but the classical Sāṃkhya always maintains the unity of the prakṛti.

1. भूतसर्गमहाभारत द्वितीये विद्भिष पाथिब । 302. 24.
2. मनससाता सधुःता महासूता नरासिप । 310. 19.
3. सम्प्रवृत्य एतावाव्रूप्तेप्सर्वम ।

एहवे प्रकृतेन नास वहिसंह वदासृवद्दव ॥ 306. 33.

There had been a school of Sāṃkhya which advocated the doctrine of the plurality of the prakṛti. In this connection, Yuktidīpikā refers to one Paurika who had been the exponent of this school. See—

¹पुष्पसम्पद्य प्रपाने शीरोपचर्य करोति, तेषव्र शास्त्रस्वरूप-परमेव बदव प्रकृतेन

'वरेतारायण, तविक्षो च तेषामिन निर्मितिः पी रे कः सांस्कृतिमयम् मनवते—

Yukti-dīpikā, p. 169. 17-18; see also the foot notes in the said page.
Besides these, there is a peculiarity in their method of explanation of the dualism of the Śāṅkhya. The said system which is a dualistic one, lays emphasis upon two distinct principles—one prakṛti, the other being the puruṣa. The former which is unconscious is characterised by pleasure, pain and delusion while the latter in its true nature is nothing but the pure consciousness abiding in itself. Being subjected to ignorance, the puruṣa ascribes the activities of the prakṛti to himself and as a result of this he binds himself and becomes subjected to miseries. When he can differentiate the prakṛti from himself, he regains his true nature and thus attains to liberation. But the Epic and specially Vaiśeṣika and Yājñavalkya do not always explain the relation of these two conscious and unconscious entities by the terms prakṛti and puruṣa only; it is somewhere explained by the kṣetra and the kṣetrajña and elsewhere by the kṣara and aksara etc. But everywhere the central interest lies upon distinguishing the self from what does not constitute the self. Whether these different manners of treatment arose in independent circles of thought or they are the off-shoots of the doctrine of a particular teacher is not easy to determine; for the data as are left to us are not sufficient.

The conception of the puruṣa in the Epic Śāṅkhya also deserves special attention. The orthodox Śāṅkhya always insists upon the plurality of the puruṣa. But the Epic is not consistent in this respect everywhere. In xii. 315. 11, Yājñavalkya plainly states that the prakṛti is one and the puruṣas are many. Again, in reply to the question of Janamejaya, Vaiśampāyana explicitly states that the advocates of the Śāṅkhya and Yoga always insist upon the plurality of the puruṣa, they never maintain its unity (xii. 350,9). But we find a different view in the Janaka-Pañcaśikha episode (xii. 218-19). Here Asuri, the first disciple of Kapila, is said to have explained brahman, which is absolute, immutable and seen in diverse forms (218. 14). This is not all. Pañcaśikha’s conception of liberation also bears testimony to the same view. In
his opinion, the individual spirits at the time of their liberation are merged into the absolute spirit\(^1\) (xii. 219. 42-3).

Though the Epic does not always offer the same interpretation of the Sāṃkhya in its different chapters, yet it has got one special characteristic; for it is always found to represent the atheistic school of Sāṃkhya. It boldly declares that the Sāṃkhya system is devoid of belief in a supreme God. This is clear from the verse xii. 300-3, where the Sāṃkhya is said to be the atheistic and the Yoga as the theistic system.

We have already tried to show that the Sāṃkhya and the adhyātma-vidyā are almost identical\(^2\). The explanation of the adhyātma is found here and there in some of the chapters of the twelfth book.\(^3\) All these chapters contain nothing but the principal tenets of the Sāṃkhya, the important deviation from the orthodox Sāṃkhya is this that the organs are described everywhere as material objects (xii. 247. 9-12).

_The Epic pre-supposes the existence of the Sāṃkhya literature._

It has been already stated that the Mokṣadharma section of the twelfth book deals with the Sāṃkhya in some of its chapters. From a careful examination of those chapters we find that a number of verses are repeated here and there. For instance, the adhyātma which contains almost nothing but the principal tenets of the Sāṃkhya is explained in three different chapters (xii. 194, 247, 285). In one place, Vyāsa is the speaker and in the other chapters Bhīṣma constitutes the same. The teaching does not vary anywhere and it is interesting to notice that a considerable number of verses are found common everywhere. This is not all. Some of these verses which speak of the characteristics of

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1 See above, p. 43.
2 See, pp. 18-19.
3 Chapters 194, 247 and 285.
the guṇas are read almost verbatim even in the Janaka-Pañcaśikha episode. This tends to suggest that these verses were taken

The following couplets find their place in the exposition of the adhyātma in xii. 194. 31-36.

"तब यदृ प्रतिसंबंधुबं काये मनसि वा भेदः।
बतेते सांसिको भाव श्रवाचश्रावत तद्व तथा॥
अथ यदृ दुःखं सङ्करे प्रसंतकमांकलामं॥
प्रकटं रज इंते वत तस्म चित्तमेव॥
अथ यस्मोद्धं सङ्करैं चालिपलं भेदे॥
अप्रस्तव्यप्रिष्ठे तस्म दुःखशारायेव॥
प्रहर्षे: प्रतिरानन्द: सुले संग्रामचित्रता॥
कथिष्ठिविष्टवते इंते सांसिका गुणा:॥
अतुस्ते: परितापश्च शोको लोमस्तथादक्षमा॥
विभानि नरसरसाति दुःखपे देवगतेन:॥
अवमानं स्वव: भूमद: लघुतित्रित्रा॥
कथिष्ठिविष्टवते विदिषास्तास्मात् गुणा:॥

These verses are also found with some alterations in reading in xii. 247. 20-25 and xii. 285. 29-31 & 25-28.

For the sake of comparison, the corresponding couplets from the exposition of Pañcaśikha in xii. 219 are also given below:

अभ्र यः प्रतिसंबंधुबं काये मनसि वा भेदः।
बतेते सांसिको भाव श्रव्यपेते तद्व तथा॥ 29
विज्ञानस्तोयः सङ्करमात्मकालामं।
प्रकटं रज इंते वत तस्म चित्तमेव॥ 30
अथ यस्मोद्धं सङ्करैं काये मनसि वा भेदः।
अप्रस्तव्यप्रिष्ठे तस्म दुःखशारायेव॥ 31
प्रहर्षे: प्रतिरानन्द: सुले संग्रामचित्रता।
अकुलाद तुतुतित्रा शराग्नि: सांसिका गुणा।॥ 26
अतुस्ते: परितापश्च शोको लोमस्तथादक्षमा।
विभानि नरसरसाति दुःखपे देवगतेन:॥ 27
अवमानं स्वव: भूमद: लघुतित्रित्रा।
कथिष्ठिविष्टवते बतेते विदिषास्तास्मात् गुणा।॥ 28
from a common source. Again, the Epic explicitly states that the Sāmkhya system consists of a vast literature (नृष्णविचारमित्र शास्त्रमित्यादिविद्यो जनाः; xii. 307.46; सांस्कृत्व विशालं परम्पुराणम् xii. 301.114). Hence it appears that the Epic was aware of the existence of the Sāmkhya literature.

The B. Gītā sheds further light on the point. It highly speaks of the renunciation of the fruits of karman in the beginning of its last chapter and in this connection it refers to the Sāmkhya system which speaks of the five kinds of causes as are held indispensable for the completion of all sorts of actions. Then follows the enumeration of those causes and all these may be noticed in the following couplets:

पश्चेमानि महावाहो कारणानि निवोधेन मेन।
सांस्कृत्वे ज्ञाताये प्रोक्तानि सिद्धाः सर्वकथिताम्।
अविष्कारं तथा कर्त्ता करणक्ष्युपासुतम्म।
विविधा युक्तकृते चेत्य दैवचेतवात्र प्रधानम्। (xviii.13-14).

The expression 'सांस्कृतये ज्ञाताये प्रोक्तानि' deserves special attention. Kṛtānta means 'established conclusion' and hence it shows that the Sāmkhya was systematised before the composition of the Gītā.

Though such a manner of treatment is conspicuous by its absence in the orthodox Sāmkhya, yet on the strength of this reference it appears that the said five-fold cause found its place in an ancient and elaborate treatise on Sāmkhya.

More satisfactory result may be obtained from the thirteenth chapter of the Gītā which deals with the prakṛti, puruṣa, kṣetra and the kṣetrajña etc. First of all, the Lord goes to explain the kṣetra. The physical body is said to be the kṣetra (xiii. 1) and it comprises the gross elements, individuation, intellect, the unmanifest principle, the eleven organs and the five objects of the sense-organs etc. (xiii. 5-6). Thus we find that this explanation
proceeds from the standpoint of the Śāṅkhyā. Just before the commencement of the enumeration of these principles, the Lord states that this kṣetra together with its source and other allied topics, are vividly described by the sages in numerous metres as well as in the Sūtra and Pāda forms. The following couplets bear testimony to this:

तत् क्षेत्रं यक्ष यात्रक्ष च यद्विविचारि यत्स्वयं यत्।
स च यो यत्स्प्रभावत्य सर्वनामेन मे भूणु ॥
कृत्यिष्ठिनः हितं च न्यायोपप्रतिविचि: प्रथक् ।
प्राकृतसूत्रपदेशेत् हेतुमध्यविनिविष्ठतिः: ॥ (xiii. 3-4).

The expression 'प्राकृतसूत्रपदेशेत्' of the above-mentioned verse has been explained by the commentators from the standpoint of the Vedānta. However, the Brāhma-sūtra as referred to here, cannot mean the present Brahma-sūtra which is found to enunciate the doctrines of the Vedānta; for the kṣetra as the sum-total of the prakṛti and its evolutes, does not form the subject matter of discussion anywhere in the latter treatise. Hence it appears that the Gītā refers to a different Brāhma-sūtra which unlike the present one, explained the kṣetra after the fashion of the Śāṅkhyā. The term pada also as found side by side with the Brahma-sūtra

1  ब्राह्मण: कुशेत् पदेष्टः पदार्थानं एकार्थितम् ब्राह्मण: 'तथो वा ब्राह्मणी भूतानि भावते' इत्यादिनि तत्स्कृतै: वाक्यार्थाणि ज्ञायनप्रत्ययानि, तथा ब्राह्मण पद्धति साधारण शास्त्रोऽन्ते एकार्थितम् पदार्थानं सदाप्रकृत्य-पराणि 'सत साधारणां शास्त्र' इत्यादिनि, तेषस्य पद्धतिः शैवसमानम्—स्रिद्धरभाष्यम्.

2  पृष्ठोत्तरत्वस्य ब्राह्मणपदेषेत्, तै: पदार्थे शास्त्रोऽन्ते एकार्थितम् पदार्थानं, तै: 'अहो स्वत: भास्त्रोऽन्ते । ' आहो भास्त्रोऽन्ते ।' इत्यादिनि: ब्राह्मण: पदेषेत्तथा शास्त्रोऽन्ते—

Śāṅkara-bhāṣya.

2 Pāṇini also presupposes the existence of the philosophical discourses in the sūtra form; for he refers to one Pūrāṇāra-Bhikṣusūtra in 4. 3. 110. For further about the Bhikṣu-sūtra, see pp. 77.
of the above mentioned expression sheds some important light. This \textit{pada} should not be taken in its usual sense. Most probably it stands for a commentary upon the \textit{Brahma-sutra} as discussed above; for we find Patañjali in his \textit{Mahābhāṣya} referring to both the \textit{Pada-kāra} and the \textit{Sūtrakāra} and on a closer examination it appears that the author of the \textit{Vārttika} is meant by this \textit{Pada-kāra}. The identity of the Pada-kāra with Kātyāyana, the author of the \textit{Vārttika}, can be further established on the strength of a reference in the \textit{Yuktidipikā} where in connection with the discussion of the compound in the expression 'तद्यथाय' (Kā. 1), a fragment of the \textit{Vārttika} is attributed to one \textit{Pada-kāra}. Thus we find that the term \textit{pada} in its technical sense passes for a commentary.

Besides these, the first hemistich of the second couplet informs us about the existence of some versified treatises which also contained the explanation of the \textit{kṣetra}. Taking everything into consideration we find that the Epic presupposes the existence of the Śāṅkhyā literature.

\textit{The reflection of the full-fledged Śāṅkhyā in the \textit{Gītā}.}

The \textit{Gītā} furnishes us here and there with some valuable informations about the contemporary Śāṅkhyā. It speaks of the different types of the \textit{guṇas} and their functions. But the ethical

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1) \emph{रक्षणे द कोर श्रवणे जानून} (Pada-kāra in the \textit{Mahābhāṣya} under the \textit{Vārttika} (a) in 3. 1, 109).

2) \emph{द कोर श्रवणे जानून} (\textit{Vuktidipikā}, p. 7). The fragment 'श्रवणकाव्य' does not occur anywhere in the \textit{sūtras} of Pāṇini. It occurs only in the following \textit{Vārttikas}:

\begin{enumerate}
  \item न \emph{वांकारर्थानुपर्यसंस्कृत्यम्बनम्बनमित्वावधयह्यकाव्य} (7); 4. 1. 4. न वांकारर्थानुपर्यसंस्कृत्यम्बनमित्वावधयह्यकाव्य (1), 1. 2. 10.
\end{enumerate}
interest is predominant everywhere. In xviii. 19, we find the Lord addressing Arjuna thus:

"In the exposition of the gunas it is declared that the knowledge, action and the agent—all of them are of three-fold character owing to the variation of the gunas in them. Here them also properly."

Then follows a description of the said entities from the standpoint of the variation of the gunas. Thus we find that the Gita in order to support its own statements is going to refer to another work where the exposition of the gunas finds its place. Most probably the work as referred to here would be a Sāmkhya one; for the gunas constitute a vital portion of the Sāmkhya.

As regards the prakṛti and the puruṣa, the Gita states that both of them are held as eternal; the modifications and the gunas are to be taken as the evolutes of the prakṛti. In the functioning of the cause and the effect, the prakṛti is regarded as the instrumental; whereas in the experience of pleasure and pain, the puruṣa is regarded as such (xiii. 20). The puruṣa identifying himself with the prakṛti experiences the gunas; the reason of his birth in good and evil wombs is due to his attachment towards the gunas (xiii. 21).

The classical Sāmkhya also advocates the same view. The only difference being that the Gita maintains the gunas as the products of the prakṛti, whereas the classical Sāmkhya holds them as its constituents.

In the second chapter of the Gita, the puruṣa is described as 'unchangeable, all pervading, stable, firm and eternal' (II. 24). An effort is also made to distinguish the self from the physical body, and in this connection it is interesting to notice that the Lord himself states that his answer to Arjuna proceeds from the standpoint of the Sāmkhya (II. 39). The Sāmkhya theory of causation also is clearly hinted in the following couplet:

नास्ति विद्यः भानो नाभानो विद्यः सतः ||
हम्योरिपं हस्त्रोष्णतस्तवन्योस्तस्तवविद्विन्मिः || (II. 16).
From these evidences we may suggest that the Gītā was acquainted with the full-fledged Sāṃkhya.

*Does the Epic preach the true Sāṃkhya view?*

We have already pointed out the different forms of the Epic Sāṃkhya and have further attempted to show that the Epic presupposes the existence of the Sāṃkhya literature. Now the question naturally arises whether these different and divergent accounts of the Epic form the expositions of the different schools of the Sāṃkhya as were prevalent in those days or they are to be regarded as the contamination of the true Sāṃkhya. It has been already stated that in good many instances, the Epic faithfully follows the traditional Sāṃkhya. But the most serious deviation being in the case of the doctrine of brahman as the one universal soul which the ordinary Sāṃkhya cannot approve at any rate. The doctrine of the twenty-sixth principle as found in the exposition of the philosophy of Vāṣiṣṭha and Yājñavalkya has been already maintained by us as forming the part and parcel of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga school. But how to account for the brahman doctrine of the Janaka-Pañcaśikha episode? Here both Āsuri and Pañcaśikha who are held as reputed teachers of Sāṃkhya even by the orthodox school, are found to advocate the doctrine of brahman as the one universal soul with whom the individual souls are united at the time of liberation. The reason of these discrepancies is not very far to seek. The Epic as we have it now is not the product of a single brain. Some centuries were taken when it was redacted into its present shape. Within this period, the teachings of the numerous sects and systems as were prevalent in those days, were poured into it to give it a wide popularity. During this formative stage of the Epic, the Sāṃkhya also most probably was divided into numerous schools. Moreover, it had been the most popular system of thought in those days and hence
the Epic did not hesitate to incorporate within itself the teachings of the said system even with its different and divergent forms. Thus we are not inclined to support the view of Hopkins who holds the Epic Sāṃkhya to be the hybrid hotch-potch of the genuine Sāṃkhya.

Prof. Keith is of opinion that the Epic does not ascribe the doctrine of brahman to the Sāṃkhya proper\(^1\). But apart from the statement of the Janaka-Pañcasikha episode, the said doctrine may be attributed to a school of Sāṃkhya even on the strength of some other references. For instance, the Ahirbudhyāna speaks of the brahma-tantra in the very beginning of the enumeration of the sixty different topics of the Śaṣṭi-tantra. Further, the Caraka-samhitā as well as the Buddha-carita also speaks of the brahman in their brief exposition of the Sāṃkhya. All these references have been already pointed out by us and hence it is needless to repeat them here (pp. 27-28).

But thereby all the chapters of the Epic which apparently seem to deal with Sāṃkhya cannot on a closer examination be regarded as representing the true Sāṃkhya view; for some of them are blended with such materials as warn us not to hold them as such. For instance, the philosophy of Bhīṣma (xii. 301) though abounds with the terms and tenets of the Sāṃkhya, maintains after the fashion of the Purāṇas, Nārāyaṇa as the supreme lord from whom proceeds creation and destruction (xii. 301. 15-16). Thus we find that the sectarian interest is predominant there and hence, we may take his exposition as the contamination of the proper Sāṃkhya.

The Purāṇas also are found to speak of the tenets and doctrines of the Sāṃkhya here and there; but the sectarian interest is predominant almost everywhere and as a result of this, the true philosophy is for the most part undermined by religion. We find

\(^{1}\) Keith, Sāṃkhya system, p. 57.
the evolutionery series of the Śāṅkhyas taken into the cosmogonical accounts of the Purāṇas and unlike the Mbh., the subtle elements (tanmātras) also find their places therein. But it is a matter of astonishment to notice that the four vyūhas of the Bhāgavata doctrine, such as the vāsudeva, saṁkarṣaṇa etc. are equated to the prakṛti, mahaḥ and such other principles of the Śāṅkhyas. The guṇas also are equated to the truine unity which constitutes Brahman, Viṣṇu and Śiva. Thus Brahman is held to be the creator, Viṣṇu as the preserver and Śiva as the destroyer and they correspond to the rajas, sattva and tamas respectively. This is not all. Viṣṇu is somewhere regarded as the supreme deity and elsewhere Śiva constitutes the same, and they are mentioned even as the director of the prakṛti—a conception which the ordinary Śāṅkhyas cannot approve at any rate. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa deals with the Śāṅkhyas and Yoga in the Kapila-Devalūti episode (iii. 24-33), but the main interest is centred upon Viṣṇu who is held as the supreme lord. The Brahma-Purāṇa offers a much more detailed description of the Śāṅkhyas in the chapters 238-45, and it is curious to notice that the expositions of the Śāṅkhyas by Bṛśma and Karāla-Janaka as found in the Mbh. (xiii. 301-8), are almost taken verbatim in it; the only difference being that in the Mbh. Bṛśma is found to address Yudhiṣṭhira, whereas Vyāsa addresses the sages in the said Purāṇa.

So far we have tried to offer a general review of the pre-classical Śāṅkhyas1. It has been already stated (pp. 4-5) that the

1 Garbe in his 'Die Śāṅkhyas-Philosophie' is not prepared to admit any pre-classical form of the Śāṅkhyas. He holds that the Śāṅkhyas which was thought out as a complete and well planned system by Kapila alone, passed for more than a dozen centuries as unaltered in its essentials. During this long period it did not undergo any change or important modification in its principal doctrines. In his opinion, Isvāra-kṛṣṇa represents the original form of the Śāṅkhyas.
origin of the Sāmkhya is due to the reaction against the performances of the Vedic sacrifices which were specially advocated by the orthodox Brahmins and hence the question naturally arises whether the Sāmkhya which criticises the Vedas is of Brahmanical origin or not. Garbe in his 'Die Sāmkhya Philosophie' urges that the Sāmkhya is not of Brahmanical origin, but he is not found to adduce any weightier ground in support of his view. On the other hand, we find that the system received a special sanctity in the ancient scriptural literature. The Mbh. which speaks highly of the Sāmkhya states in one place that all kinds of supreme knowledge as are available in the Vedas and the Purāṇas etc. owe their origin in the Sāmkhya². The Āśvalāyana-Gṛhyasūtra in its tarpana ceremonial list (iii. 4. 1) gives direction for offering the oblation of water to the Sāmkhyaiteśa and the siddhas³. Here the term siddha as found side by side with the sāmkhya reminds us of

Prof. Oldenberg does not advocate this view (Nach. G. W. 1917, pp. 218-253). In his opinion, the founder of the most systems sets forth some new ideas and it is the followers who work them out in detail. In doing so, the original tenets and doctrines are modified here and there whenever any difficulty stands in the way of the progressive movement of the thought. As a result of this, the original system is divided into numerous schools. This opinion of Oldenberg, specially holds good with respect to the principal systems of Indian thoughts.

The only difference of opinion with us lies in the fact that Oldenberg postulates the pre-classical form of the Sāmkhya consisting of a truine unity as set forth in the Svēt. For our criticism of this view, see p. 40.

2 'भाने महर्षि यवि महद्युर राजन्
वेदेश्व सांख्येश्व तथेष्व थोऽगे ।
वचापि चृत्व विविधेन पुराणे
सांख्यावते तत्तथिके नरेन्द्र II
Mbh., xii, 301, 108.

3 देवतासत्यवति...सा ख्या: सिद्धा: समुन्तः... ...
Āśvalāyana-Gṛhyasūtra, iii. 4. 1,
Kapila—the propounder of the Šāmkhya, who is held to be the foremost among the siddhas (सिद्धान्त कपिलो मुनि:, Gitā, x. 26). Further, the Atharvaveda-Parishṣṭa speaks of the Šāmkhya teachers, such as Kapila, Āsuri and Pañcasikha (xliii. 3. 4.) in connection with the tarpana invocation. The Baudhāyana-Grhyasūtra is found to advocate the view of Kapila¹ in prescribing the duties of a recluse. Thus we find that not only the Šāmkhya, but also its propounder and followers were given a high place in the ancient literature of the Brahmins. Hence we are not prepared like Garbe to assume that the Šāmkhya which exercised such a remarkable influence upon the orthodox mind, was originated in the non-brāhmanical circle.

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¹ अयाताः क वि क-संख्याशिष्ठिः ब्रह्मवासयमः;

Baudhāyana-Grhyasūtra, iv. 16. 1.
SĀMKHYA AND YOGA

The Sāmkhya and the Yoga are so much inter-related in the Sanskrit literature that whenever any occasion arises of explaining or referring to the tenets and doctrines of the Sāmkhya, those of the Yoga also are not generally overlooked. The two systems do not vary in their essentials. The Sāmkhya lays emphasis upon knowledge which is regarded as the only means for attaining to the supreme reality, whereas the Yoga gives its whole-hearted support to meditation by which the mind is progressively stillled and thus gradually becomes fit for achieving the supreme stage. The former is specially busy with the theoretical investigation, whereas the latter deals with the practical side. Speaking briefly, the two systems are nothing but the concave and convex side of the same sphere.

The main difference between the Sāmkhya and the Yoga, as it is generally known, lies in the fact that the former is regarded as atheistic while the latter is known to be theistic. The so called theism of the Yoga deserves special attention. The Mbh. while describing the respective superiority of the two systems, states that one i.e. the Sāmkhya which is anīśvara cannot bring about liberation; this is why the advocates of the Yoga regard their system as the supreme (xii. 300. 3.)1 From the term 'anīśvara' of the verse as referred to above, some body try to guess that the Sāmkhya is the upholder of atheism and the Yoga is that of theism. Such would be the case if the term ‘anīśvara’ be replaced by ‘nirīśvara.’ But the term ‘anīśvara’ does not speak of him who intends to do away with God. It stands for the person who is

1 अनीश्वर: कथ मूलविशिष्यं शबुकश्ऩं |
बदलित कारणगैः ज्ञातं: सत्यव्यतिजिष्णः |

Y—9
lacking in power or perfection; for the verses which follow afterwards are busy to declare nothing but the superiority of the ‘power’ as can be achieved by the practices of Yoga. Hence ‘anisvara’ means one who is not isvara or powerful. The term is used here in its derivative sense; it speaks of him who is devoid of power or perfection and there is no reasonable ground to take it here in its technical sense. Indeed, there is not a single couplet anywhere in the exposition of the Sāmkhya and Yoga in the Mbh., which speaks of Isvara as the supreme being from whom proceeds creation and destruction.

The twenty-sixth principle as has been already discussed by us, is attributed to the Yoga as well as to the Sāmkhya by both Vaśiṣṭha and Yājñavalkya. Hence we have maintained this as the doctrine of the Sāmkhya-Yoga School of the Epic. But the said principle is not declared anywhere as the director of the prakṛti and hence it has nothing to do with creation or destruction of the universe.

Īsvara finds a prominent place in the system of Patañjali. He is described there as a distinct purusa, who is never affected by afflictions, actions and impression etc. (I. 24). Though he is differentiated from the ordinary purusa, yet he is not to be regarded as a different tattva other than the purusa. Thus we find that Patañjali does not hold Isvara as the twenty-sixth. With regard to the necessity of postulating such an Isvara, the Bhāṣya remarks that though Isvara has got no selfish motive to be fulfilled, yet he is naturally compassionate to the living beings. For he rescues the transmigratory spirits at the periodical and final dissolution by imparting knowledge and virtue to them (तत्स्य आत्मानिः भाष्यादं विषयं सूतान्तरम् यत्कथा भाष्यम् स्म अत्यद्वलयेऽद्य संसारिन्ति गद्यम् इति, Bhāṣya, I. 25). In order to justify this statement, the

1 केशवकार्तिरौपाकाश्वेतपाराः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः ।
Bhāṣya quotes a fragment from an ancient work which states that “the revered great sage, the first among the wise, adopted the nirmāṇa-citta and out of compassion imparted the doctrine to the enquiring Āsuri” (तथा चौक्तम्, ‘आदिविद्वान् निम्माणचित्तमविधायकाश्याय भगवान् परमर्चिराये ज्ञासयामानाय तत्त्रे प्रोवाच’ इति I. 25). This fragment clearly refers to Kapila and hence we find that the author of the Bhāṣya is going to identify Īśvara with Kapila. Elsewhere the Bhāṣya regards Īśvara as the foremost of the siddhas and Kapila also is regarded as such. But Vācaspati who in his commentary attributes the above mentioned fragment to Pañcaśikha, remarks that this view of transmission of knowledge and virtue by the compassionate Lord is also accepted by the followers of Kapila. He differentiates Kapila from Īśvara of Patañjali by the fact that the former is first among the emancipated (आदिपुरुष), whereas emancipation of the latter is without any beginning (अनादिसुक्त).

Udayana also in his Nyāya-Kusumāṇḍali refers to the view of the numerous sects and systems in connection with the definition of Īśvara. He is found to state there that in the opinion of the followers of Patañjali, Īśvara is one who is never touched by afflictions, actions and impressions etc. and who adopting the nirmāṇa-kāya inspires the followers out of compassion towards them (केदकर्मविपाकाह्यंरपरमुप्रे मिमांकायमविधाय सम्प्रदायविद्याः, I. 3). This statement clearly indicates that Udayana also does not ignore the view of the Bhāṣya; for he is not content with quoting the portion of the Sūtra of Patañjali only, but supplements it with the statement of the Bhāṣya. Taking everything into consideration, we find that in the opinion of the followers of Patañjali, the main function of Īśvara is to impart knowledge to the followers so that they may be finally emancipated. The term ‘īśvara’ again finds its place in the Sūtra II.32, and here

1 बः अस्य संगीतां प्रकर्षति सिद्धां... i. 26.
also the Bhāṣya explains it as the supreme teacher. This interpretation of Īśvara as made by the author of the Bhāṣya, does not affect the view of the Sūtra in any way; for Patañjali himself regards Īśvara ‘as the teacher of even the earliest teachers’ (I. 26).

Again, the knowledge of a man, however enlightened he may be, is limited and hence it is not proper to hold him as the supreme teacher. But Īśvara’s wisdom is unparalleled (तत्र निरतिशयं सर्वनिर्वैयम्, I. 25) and hence it befits him only to impart knowledge to the followers so that they may attain to final beatitude and never to return to the whirlpool of existence.

Now the question naturally arises whether this Īśvara has got any hold over the prakṛti which is regarded by the Saṃkhya as the fundamental cause of the universe. The Yoga-sūtra as well as the Bhāṣya always regard the prakṛti as the eternal principle and hence it cannot be held as the creation of Īśvara; for what is known to be created can never be eternal. Further in the Sūtra ‘निमित्तमप्रयोजनं प्रतितीनां वरणेदस्तु तत: क्षेत्रिकवत् (IV. 3), it is stated that the prakṛti functions of its own accord and the incidental causes such as the ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’ etc, cannot move her into action. The said causes only remove the barrier that stands in the way of the functioning of the prakṛti and when the barrier is removed, the prakṛti itself plays its part and does not require the assistance of any other external agency. Hence we find that in the system of Patañjali, Īśvara is not held as the director of the prakṛti. But Vācaspati intends to connect Īśvara with evolution and involution of the world. For, he explicitly states in one place that the Lord performs the dissolution of the world1.

Bhojarāja in his commentary remarks that the conjunction of the prakṛti and the puruṣa cannot happen without the will of

1 ... ... प्रणधानं दुःखा भागतमं जगद्ध संजाहार; i. 24.
Isvara. But we are not sure that this is the orthodox Yoga view, for such an idea is not even hinted anywhere in the Sutra. Further the author of the Bhasya explicitly mentions that the conjunction of these two principles is held as eternal and in order to justify his view quotes a fragment from an ancient work which runs thus: "वर्मेणामत्वितिसंयोगाद्वारमात्रामाण्यवन्धः: संयोगः" (II. 22). Speaking briefly, neither the Sutra nor the Bhasya attaches any importance to Isvara with regard to the evolution of the universe. Under these circumstances, Patanjali's system which maintains Isvara as an ethical personality cannot be strictly regarded as theistic; for theism implies belief in the existence of God who is regarded as the creator and preserver of the world.

Ancient works on Yoga.

The Mbh. mentions the Sankhya and the Yoga as two eternal systems of thought. But the most ancient works of the Yoga school like those of the Sankhya have not come down to us. It is well known that Hiranyagarbha is known to be the propounder of the Yoga and and Kapila as that or the Sankhya. But we know very little as regards the first systematic treatise of Yoga—the work of Hiranyagarbha if there had been any, except some vague outline as furnished by the Ahirbudhnya-Samhita of the Pancharatra school. This text enumerates the different sections of the vast Yoga treatise which was revealed through Hiranyagarbha. It is stated therein that Hiranyagarbha for the first time disclosed the entire science of the Yoga into two different texts, the first was known to be the Nirodha-samhita and the second as the Karma-samhita. The former text consists of

1 प्रक्तिपुरसंन्योगविद्यामिवीरर्दे-व्यतिरिक्तायुपपति, i. 24.
2 सांस्कृतिक विमोल सनातने हे, xiii. 30.
twelve different sections and the latter of four. All these can be noticed in the following couplets of the Ahirbudhnya (xii 31-38).

विष्णुसंकल्पपत्रम् महायोगानुवासनम् ।
हिरण्यगमिदुर्तं तस्य श्रेण्य शुभं ॥
आदी हिरण्यगमिणं दे प्राप्ते योगसंहिता ।
एका निरोध-योगासंस्कृतं संहिता त्रु निरोधायु तव द्रादश्वास्मात् समुत्त ॥
अद्वितन्त्रस्वकथा तु द्रोपदंतन्त्रमतः परम् ॥
उपसागरीयं तन्त्रं तथा विविषानकं परम् ॥
आदारतन्त्र योगासंस्कृतं वहितंद्वपमिकारतवन ॥
रिलयोगासंस्कृतं पूण्योयोगासङ्गमेवच ॥
सिद्धियोगासंस्कृतं त्रीणि श्रीक्षेत्रन्तन्त्रमतः परम् ॥
इति द्रादशामेवहस्ति निरोधायां: प्रकर्षितिः ॥

(कमेंसंहिताय: चादनिष्ठम्)
ब्रह्मा गद्वितास्त्रं चतुर्स्तं: कमेंसंहिता: ।
नानाकर्षिम्यां प्रेक्षा परा त्वेका क्रियाभयी ।
वास्तवितर्कस्त्रस्त्रेष्टि द्विविधे स्मृते ॥
योगानुशासनं शाख्यांसिद्धिस्त्र योद्वासिस्तरम् ॥
युद्धनमयं विष्णुसंहितं ततु प्रजापते: ॥

It is interesting to observe that the Ahirbudhnya calls the vast treatise of Hiranyagarbha as ‘योगानुशासनम्’, and Patañjali also begins his work with the Sūtra ‘अथ योगानुशासनम्’. Again, of the two works of Hiranyagarbha, as the Ahirbudhnya informs us, the first one passes under the name of the ‘निरोधसंहिता’ and Patañjali also emphasises ‘निरोध’ specially in the first chapter of his work; for he defines ‘Yoga’ as ‘योगश्रिविद्विति-निरोध’ (Yoga is the suppression of the function of the thought-staff). This is not all; but clear traces of some of the items of the Nirodha-samhitā with its twelve sections are also left in the Yoga-sūtra. For
instance, the ‘अक्षप्तः’ is represented in the Sūtra ‘यम-नियम-समान-प्रणामवायाम-अन्ताहार-वायान-ध्यान-समाध्योलं व ज्ञा नि’ (II.29) which speaks of the subdivisions of the Yoga. The ‘दौप्यतं’¹ and ‘उपसमांतर’ are referred to in the Sūtra I. 30-31; for these two Sūtras speak of the defects and barriers that stand in the way of practising Yoga. The subject matter of discussion under ‘अथियन’ and ‘आधारतं’ is not clear. ‘योगस्व बहुस्तावदिकारणः’ speaks of the form of Yoga where an external object is chosen as the substratum of meditation and Patañjali also treats them in greater length in I. 35-46, and classifies them as ‘सत्यक’, ‘सत्वाच’ etc. Further, the so called types of meditations are termed by him as ‘समी-समाधि’ (I. 46), because they owe their origin to concentrating the mind on an external object. ‘रिक्षोः’ as the name itself suggests, means such types of Yoga where there is no substratum of meditation and it is better known as ‘असमाध्यात’ (I. 18) or ‘निर्विभासमाधि’ (I. 51) in the system of Patañjali. ‘पूर्णेऽयोः’ is hinted in the Sūtras III.52-54. It is to be practised by the samyama over the ‘moment’ and its order of succession." The moment is to be regarded here as the infinitesimal particle of time. As a result of this, the discriminative knowledge springs forth. It is the intuitional knowledge, it covers everything, it operates under all conditions and it is never ending. This is the highest stage of knowledge and Yoga terminates herein." ‘सिद्धेऽयोः’ is vividly described in the third chapter and this is why it is also called as the ‘विमूल्यिपत’ i.e. the chapter which speaks of the various kinds of prefections. ‘मोक्षमण्डः’ is represented in the end of the Sūtra, for here we find Patañjali speaking of the stage of liberation as maintained by the upholders of the Yoga.

1. Cp. ‘यां मोइः तथा स्वेभ कामेन क्रीरक पञ्चमन्।
   बोधामित्वित कति हि प या नु पञ्चिनाम पाण्डुलिपि ते, Mbh. xii. 300. 11.
2. ‘श्रणुवक्षमयोः संवमाध्येकेज सानम्’ iii. 52.
3. ‘प्रतिद्वितिक्तं शाने प रि पु णं म्,..., Bhāṣya, iii. 54."
So far about the Nirodha-Samhita. In the Karma-Samhita, kriya or ‘practice’ finds a prominent place and Patañjali also lays emphasis upon the same in the beginning of the second chapter of his work. This is evident from the Sūtra ‘तप:-
स्वाध्यायेश्वर-प्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः’ (II. 1) where the term ‘क्रियायोग’ itself finds its place.

This remarkable dependence of the Yoga-Sūtra on the vast literature of Hiraṇyagarbha (if we do not disregard the table of contents as furnished by the Ahirodbhanya and there is no apparent reason for doing so), tends to suggest that Patañjali was an adherent of the Hiraṇyagarbha school of the Yoga. Though he had been highly influenced by the so called treatise of Hiraṇyagarbha, yet his manner of treatment is unique in itself. Even in the midst of depicting the principles of the Yoga, he speaks of the fundamental principles of the Sāmkhya whenever any necessity arises and thus we find that both the theory and practice find equal importance in his treatise.

The Yoga-bhāṣya sheds further light in this connection. It explains the aphoristic statements of Patañjali in a dignified manner and sets out the results of the theoretical discussions and practical discipline in such a way as speaks of its subtle power of observation. The theoretical discussions are so informative that the views of the particular school of the Sāmkhya which he represents therein would have otherwise remained almost unknown to us. Speaking briefly, Patañjali and specially the author of the Bhāṣya may be better regarded as the exponents of the Sāmkhya-Yoga School.

1 The author of the Yogaśūtra-bhāṣya represents the Vārṣaganyā school of the Sāmkhya and this we intend to deal with in greater length later on.
2 This is different from the Sāmkhya-yoga school of the Epic with its twenty-sixth principle. It is an admixture of the teachings of the Vārṣyaganyā school of the Sāmkhya and the Hiraṇyagarbha school of the Yoga.
It is further interesting to observe that the colophon at the end of the different chapters of the Yoga-bhāṣya generally runs thus: 'इति पात्रार्थे सांस्करणवच्चे योगासः....पादः समासः'. The expression 'सांस्करण' as found here side by side with 'योगासः' clearly shows that the text was composed with a view to elucidate the principles of both the Śaṅkhyā and the Yoga.

We intend to discuss the date of Patañjali and the author of the Bhāṣya in a separate section along with that of the other Śaṅkhyā teachers.

Of the other ancient works on Yoga philosophy we know very little except some fragmentary quotations from them as found here and there. Śaṅkara in B.S. II.3, quotes the aphoristic statement 'अयो तस्मादर्शनापरिपोषे रेग:' with the remark 'तथा च योगासः'; but the commentators supply us with no further data regarding the same. The Yoga-bhāṣya also quotes profusely from both the Śaṅkhyā and the Yoga works, but unfortunately none of them have come down to us.

There are different varieties of Yoga, such as the Rāja-yoga, Mantra-yoga and Hatha-yoga etc., and Patañjali emphasises the Samādhi-yoga only and disapproves the rest. Discussions on the occult powers and the method of attaining them find a prominent place in the literature of the so-called forms of the Yoga and philosophical interest is almost conspicuous by its absence therein.

It is strange to notice that the doctrines of the Nyāya and specially of the Vaiśeṣika are sometimes attributed to the Yoga system. Thus we get from the evidence of Vātsyāyana who in his comment on Ns. Li.29, states that the advocates of the

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1 Vide the Śūtras iv. 1 & 6.
Sāṃkhya hold that “an absolute non-entity can never come into existence and an entity can never lose its existence, the conscious element is not subject to change while the body, the sense organs, the mind, the gross elements and their rudimentary causes all are subject to modification; on the other hand, those of the Yoga are of opinion that the creation is due to the past activities of men and the ‘defects’ and ‘inclinations’ give rise to activities, the intelligent beings are endowed with their own respective qualities, non-existing principles come into existence and that which is produced is destroyed.”\(^1\)

Further, Uddyotakara adds here that in the opinion of the Sāṃkhya, the sense-organs are the products of āhaṅkāra, whereas the Yoga regards them as elemental products.\(^2\)

Thus we find that Vātsyāyana regards the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga as two independent and different systems of thought. But from the evidence of the Mbh. and other scriptural works we find that the doctrines of the Yoga are based upon those of the Sāṃkhya and thus we do not find any reason why Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara regard the doctrines of these two systems as ‘प्रतितितबिद्धान्’ instead of ‘समानतविद्धान्’.\(^3\)

In connection with the discussion on ‘dharma’, Bhavanātha also in his Nāyaviveka states that the Sāṃkhya regards it as the quality of the ‘buddhi’ and the Yoga as that of the

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\(^1\) ‘यथा नासवत आत्माः; न सत्त आत्मानां; निरतियाशयेतत्मा देहनिरस्तराः।

\(^2\) विपृष्टं तत्तदृशं कपोऽपि न विशेष श्चति सां स्वयं ना मुः।

\(^3\) ध्वर्तिरम। स्वनिविष्कन्देश्चेतता; ; अर्दरपरम परशृंवति निरश्चति च गा गा ना मुः।
soul. Besides these the Jainas frequently refer to the Yaugas and everywhere the doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika are attributed to them. Guṇaratna in his Saḍḍarśana-Samuccaya identifies the Yaugas with the Naiyāyikas but does not put forward any ground for his doing so.

What is the reason of regarding the advocates of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems as ‘योगा:’ or ‘योगिः’? The point has received attention of the modern orthodox scholars also. Some of them suggest that the term ‘yoga’ ordinarily means ‘combination’ (संयोग) and hence ‘योग:’ or ‘योगिः’ would necessarily speak of the combinationists or the Vaiśeṣikas who explain the origin of the world from the combination of atoms. But this view does not seem to be plausible as most of the principal systems of thought depend more or less upon the ‘combination of two different entities’ in explaining the origin of the world. For instance, the Saṁkhya explains it by the combination of the prakṛti and the puruṣa, the Vedānta by the brahman and māyā, the Vaiśeṣikas by the combination of atoms and so on.

Most probably, in ancient times the practice of Yoga found a prominent place in the circle of the followers of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools and this is why the advocates of these two systems are styled as ‘योगा:’ or ‘योगिः’. This is further corroborated by the evidence of the Vaiśeṣika Śūtra which is found to

1 ‘नवु कार्यांपी न धर्मः’, तीर्थिकविमत्ते:...सुधिगुण वति सांख्यः; सिद्धप एवाकृपु; द्रति योगः’, I. i. 2, p. 57. See also the commentary which states: ‘सिद्धार्थार्थ भागाकृपु द्रति वैशेषिकात्.’

2 See, ‘योगाधार्मीयमि..., बीमास्त्र प्रधानमि...’, the commentary Ratnākarīva-tūrikā on Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra, p. 12 & 86. ‘योगात्मां:’... com. on Syādvadāvaṃjari, p. 75.

3 ‘अभादो नैथाधिकातं योगाधार्मिकानां विज्ञानित्वातिकविद्वयेत्’, (ii).
lay emphasis upon 'yoga' here and there. This is not all; Praśastapāda in the end of his work informs us that Kaṇḍaṇḍa formulated the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika system after pacifying Maheśvara by dint of his Yogic achievement.

1 See the sūtras, ix. 1. 11 & 13; ix. 2. 13.

2 ‘योगाचारविभूत्या व स्तोपयिक्षा महेश्वरस्।
चेन्त्र वैशेषिक्ष शास्त्रं तत्रसे कण्ठकुले नमः॥

Further, Praśastapāda also speaks of Yoga while discussing on 'perception'.
SĀMKHYA AND BUDDHISM

The problem whether the Buddhism as represented in the ancient Pāli literature presupposes the doctrine of Sāmkhya or not, has already received attention of the scholars. In his 'Die Sāmkhya Philosophie' (p. 15), Garbe endeavours to prove that Sāmkhya is older than Buddhism and in support of his view refers to a passage of the Brahmajāla Sutta¹ where Buddha is found to condemn the view of some recluses and Brahmins who hold both the soul and the world as eternal, and he considers this view to be the forecast of the Sāmkhya doctrine of dualism. For Sāmkhya also holds the primordial prakṛti and the puruṣa as two eternal principles. But this finding of Garbe, is disproved by Rhys Davids² who urges that the advocates of Sāmkhya hold the primordial prakṛti as eternal and not the world as such, for it is considered as the product of the former. And if the vange expression 'world' in its special sense is taken to mean the prakṛti, it then leads to another contradiction. For the heretics in the said Pāli passage are found to hold the soul as well as the world as barren and giving birth to nothing³ whereas in the Sāmkhya system the visible world is held to be the outcome of the prakṛti. Hence in the opinion of Prof. Davids, the passage of the Brahmajāla-Sutta does not speak of the Sāmkhya view proper⁴. He further adds that "there is nothing at all in any of the details peculiar to the

1 Santi bhikkhave eke samāna-brāhmaṇa sassatavādā, sassataṁ attānaṁ ca lokāṁ ca paññāpenti ca tatiṁ ca tatiṁ hi, D. 1. i. 3.
2 Buddhism, American lectures, pp. 27-29.
3 Sassato attā ca loko ca bañjo ke kutaṁ ke esikal̄hā-yīllum̄, D. 1. i. 34.
4 Otto Schrader who deviates here, is of opinion that the Pāli passage as referred to above probably speaks of the doctrine of Sāmkhya. He suggests that the term kulaṣtha is to be taken here as a substantive and not as an adjective as the previous scholars did. As a result of this, the meaning of the passage becomes thus:

'The self (1) and the world (2) are eternal; (for), the kulaṣtha (1) is unproductive as a piller firmly fixed; and the beings (2) run through births, transmigrate, pass away and spring up, which is (again) a sort of eternity'.

Sāṃkhya which has been borrowed by Gautama or is even to be found at all in any of the oldest Buddhist writings (p. 29)".

However, there are ideas in the ancient Pāli literature which have got a striking resemblance with those of the Sāṃkhya. Let us first of all take up the conception of ātman. The ancient Pāli texts occasionally refers to the various conceptions of the soul and in this connection, the Dīgha (ix. 23) states that the soul is formless and consists of consciousness¹. In the next passage it further points out the view which holds consciousness as the self of a man². This view of the self holds good with the Sāṃkhya also. According to this system, puruṣa is regarded as the self of an individual and it is in its true nature nothing but the pure consciousness abiding in itself.

Again, one of the characteristic features of Sāṃkhya is to differentiate the soul from the physical body and a similar manner of treatment is also to be met with in a passage of the Dīgha (i. 2. 13.) where Buddha is going to speak of the fourth semi-eternalist doctrine. The passage runs thus:

"Yam kho idam vuccati cakkhuñ ti pi sotan ti pi ghānan ti pi jivha ti pi kāyo ti pi ayam attā anicco adhuno asassato viparītāma-dhammo. Yoñ ca kho idam vuccati cittan ti vā mano ti vā viññānan ti vā ayam attā nicco dhuno sassato aviparītānāma-dhammo sassali-samam tath' eva ñḥassatitī".

(This which is called eye and ear and nose and tongue and body is a self which is impermanent, unstable, non-eternal, subject to change. But this which is called heart or mind or consciousness³ is a self which is permanent, stedfast, eternal and knows no change, and it will remain for ever and ever)⁴.

¹ Arupīṁ kho aham bhante attānam paccehi saññāmayanti.
² Sānāṁ purīsassa attā' ti vā, D. ix. 24.
³ 'Viññānam' corresponds to sk. viṣāṇa and in the Sāṃkhya literature it is mentioned as an attribute of the buddhi. Hence from the strict Sāṃkhya point of view, it is different from 'consciousness'.
⁴ From the translation of Rhys Davids.
The above-mentioned passages speaks of two different groups of soul and at the same time it is very keen to differentiate one group from the other by exhibiting their opposite characteristics. Sāmkhya also differentiates the self from the physical body in the same manner. This is clear from the fact that the said system also holds the ātman as permanent, stedfast, eternal and without any change; while the physical body is regarded as possessing the opposite characteristics. But the serious deviation lies in the fact that Sāmkhya never regards any one of the citta, mind or intelligence (vijnāna) as the ātman or even as its constituent.

From the evidence of the Chāndogya Upanisad (vii. 2-7), we find that there had been such sects as used to worship some one or other of these aforesaid entities as the ātman or brahman. In the Pūthapāda Sutta also, Buddha refers to the different theories of soul and here we find a view which held the mind as the soul. But unlike the Pāli passage as quoted above, attempt is not made in those places to differentiate one kind of soul from the other.

Again, Buddha in his introductory remark to this heretical doctrine states that "in this case the heretic who is addicted to logic and reasoning gives utterance to the conclusion of his own, beaten out by his argumentations and based on his sophistry." But the passages of the Upanisad which apparently dictate to worship the 'mind', 'citta' or the vijnāna and such other entities as the self, do not take recourse to logical arguments in doing so. On the other hand, Sāmkhya differentiates the self from the non-self by logical reasonings; for the said system was famous for its rationalism even at an early age. This is evident from the statement of Kauṭilya who in his Arthasastra explicitly mentions the

1 'Tayo kho me Pūthapāda atta-patilabhī, olariko attapatilabbho, manomaya atta-patilabbho, arūpa atta-patilabbho, D. ix. 39.
2 See above, p. 41, n3.
Sāṃkhya as anvikṣa(i)kī, i.e., the system which is based on logical reasonings," These facts tempt us to suggest that in the above-mentioned Pāli passage Buddha’s main intention was to condemn the view of the Sāṃkhya.

Discourses of Buddha with Uttara, the pupil of the Pārasariya Brahmin in Majjhima\textsuperscript{4} reveals further interest in this connection. Here Buddha is found to refute the view of Pārasariya in whose opinion indriya-bhāvanā comes at a stage when the 'eye' does not see any colour and the 'ear' does not hear any sound. Briefly speaking, it is the state where the senses cease to function. The Bibhāśa (Taisho Issakiyo ed., XXVII, 729, a 20)\textsuperscript{8} attributes this tenet to one Pārasari tīrthika (heretic). A similar view is also referred to in the Yogabhāṣya (ii,55) where in the opinion of Jaigīśavya sense-control consists in the non-perception of the objects and this stage comes as the result of the full concentration of the citta.\textsuperscript{4} The Bhāṣya also more or less advocates the same view. It states that when the citta is suppressed, the senses automatically cease to function and herein lies the perfect control of the senses. Thus we find that the view of the Pārasariya does not fundamentally differ from that of Jaigīśavya and the Yoga-bhāṣya. Now the question naturally arises whether this Pārasariya is a Sāṃkhya-Yoga teacher or not. In the Buddha-Carita (xii. 67) we find one Vṛddha Pārāśara mentioned side by side with Jaigīśavya and Janaka who are regarded there as the exponents of the Sāṃkhya School and the Mbh. in the Janaka-Pañcaśīkha episode further mentions Pañcaśīkha, the reputed Sāṃkhya teacher, as the Vṛddha Pārāśara in the following verse:

\begin{quote}
'पराशरसंगोत्रस्य बुद्धस्य सुमहत्ममः: ||
मिष्ठोऽपि धारिश्रयस्याः शिष्यः परमसम्मतः: II (Mbh. xii. 320.24).
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Indriya-bhāvanā-sūttam (152).
\item \textsuperscript{2} Pointed out by Johnston, Early Sāṃkhya, p. 9n.
\item \textsuperscript{3} विनेताचार्यशिष्यसिद्धिः प्रसिद्धिः भेदानि.\textsuperscript{1}
\end{itemize}
Again, the Yoga-bhāṣya here and there quotes some fragments from the works of ancient teachers and some of them are attributed to Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati and this particular tenet of sense-control may be even based upon the view of Pañcaśikha. Thus, the heretical teacher Pārāśarya of the Majjhima may even be identical with Pañcaśikha—the renowned Sāṃkhya teacher.¹

In this connection, I further beg to draw the attention of the scholars to one ‘Pārāśarya Bhikṣu-sūtra’ as referred to by Pāṇini² in his grammar. The Bhikṣu-sūtra as the name itself suggests probably speaks of the rules and principles by which ascetics are to be guided. The Dharma-sūtras and the Smṛtis also here and there give directions to the mode of their living. It is interesting to notice that the Baudhāyana-Gṛhya-sūtra is found to formulate the duties of the ascetics on the basis of Kapila which is evident from the Sūtra ‘अधात: क पि उ-सन्न्यासविधि व्याह्यास्याम :’ (IV. 16.1).³ Hence it appears that there had been in ancient times a group of ascetics who had been the followers of Kapila; and the Bhikṣu-sūtra of Pārāśarya also may be a further development of the principles as laid down by Kapila, provided the identification of Pārāśarya with Pañcaśikha be taken as certain. However, Pārāśarya of the Majjhima may even be identical with this Pārāśarya, the author of the Bhikṣu-sūtra, as referred to by Pāṇini.

The Vedantists generally hold Pārāśarya as Vyāsa, the son of Pārāśara, to whom the authorship of the Brahma-sūtra is ascribed. Hence, by Pārāśarya-Bhikṣu-sūtra they would naturally mean the Brahma-sūtra which is also held in high esteem by a particular group of ascetics. But the present Brahma-Sūtra is blended with such materials as speak of its uncertain date.

¹ Discussed in detail by Johnston, Early Sāṃkhya, p. 9.
² पाराशार-सिलालिक्ष्यां सत्यन्तरप्रेषी, iv. 3. 110.
³ Also see above, p. 64.
The doctrine of Purāṇa-kassapa also as expounded in the Dīgha, II. 17, deserves special attention. In the opinion of this heretical teacher (as Buddha states him), there is neither merit nor demerit in the activities of a man. If any body goes on slaying persons, or committing robbery and adultery, it would not be thereby resulting into any demerit. On the other hand, if he goes on giving alms and offering sacrifices, there would be no merit then resulting. Buddha holds this to be the theory of non-action (ittham kho me bhante...... a k i r i y a m vyākāsi). The Jainas also refer to this doctrine of non-action. In one of their canonical texts, it is stated that the upholders of this doctrine deny karman and they are not prepared to admit that the action of the soul is transmitted to the future moments. Śīlāṅka, the commentator, reckons Sāmkhya as one of the upholders of this अक्रियावादृङ्ग. The Tattvārtha-Rājavārttika states that the akrīyā-vādins comprise of eighty-four different schools and it furnishes a list of teachers who are held to be the advocates of this doctrine. The said list includes the names of Kapila, Bādhali and Māthara who are elsewhere known to be reputed Sāmkhya teachers.

The reason of charging Sāmkhya as advocating the doctrine of non-action is not far to seek. The puruṣa of the Sāmkhya is held to be inactive, he is merely the onlooker, he is not to reap the harvest of merits and demerits acquired by the prakṛti. This is why the advocates of Sāmkhya are held as akrīyāvādins. The Yoga-sūtra also explicitly states that the activities of a Yogin do not produce any result, for his karman is neither white nor black (कर्माधिकृत्योगिन् विद्विदिधमिन्तरेऽयम्, IV. 7). This view has got a remarkable resemblance with the doctrine of

1 Sūtrakṛtāṅga-sūtra, i. 12. 4.
2 मरीच-कुमार-कपिलोत्तम-गार्ग-स्मारण-कृति-भाग-बाहु-विक्रमादित्य-भागवत-महाभारतानामितान्नामानां चतुर्दशि: Tattvārtha-Rājavārttika, i. 5., p. 51.
3 For Bādhali, see Yukti-dipikā, p. 175.
Pūraṇa-kassapa. But it should be taken into consideration that this doctrine of transcending merit and demerit holds good with him only who is beyond the range of the prakṛti. The ordinary man who is associated with the activities of the prakṛti, must reap the result of actions performed by him.

So far we have pointed out some tenets and doctrines which are attributed to the heretics by Buddha and side by side we have tried to show the similar teachings of Sāṃkhya. But the term 'Sāṃkhya' is conspicuous by its absence in the Pāli canonical literature though the term 'saṃkhyā' even in the sense of 'right knowledge' or 'correct thinking' finds its place in two or three instances. The terms 'padhānam' (sk. pradhānam) and 'pakāti' (sk. prakṛti) occur here and there, but they are nowhere used in the technical sense of Sāṃkhya.

The relation of Sāṃkhya with Buddhism as well as the problem of dependence of one system upon another has been fairly dealt with by Prof. Keith and hence it is needless to discuss the same here in detail. But it is interesting to observe that some of the ideas of Buddha, nay even some of his technical expressions also, find their place in the Sāṃkhya literature, specially in the Yoga-sūtra and its Bhāṣya. We are pointing out some of them below and hope that these parallelisms will rouse further interest on the subject.

1 See, 'Yodha puṇānam ca pūpaṇaḥ ca bāhitvā brahmacarīyam, S a n-k hāya loke carati sa ve bhikkūṣa vuccati ti', Śānyutta, Brahmin Suttas, vii. 2. 10. The expressions 'Saṅkhīyā-dhammo udāpōdi' (D. i. 1. 3) and 'saṅkhīyā-dhammaḥ viditvō' (D. i. 1. 4) also deserve special attention in this connection, but it is difficult to ascertain the exact sense in which they are used, Buddhasātuṣṭa here explains saṅkhīyā as conversation, but it does not seem to be convincing.

2 Sāṃkhya System, pp. 24-30.
(i) The Yogabhāṣya (ii. 15) states that just as the medical science comprises of the four-fold doctrine of the disease, its cause, healing and medicine, so also the science of Sāṃkhya-Yoga speaks of the four-fold doctrine of birth, its cause, liberation and the means to attain it. It is interesting to note that such a manner of treatment corresponds also to the four truths of Buddhism, such as the pain, origin of pain, cessation of pain and the path that leads to the cessation of pain. In this connection, Prof. Keith further points out that in one Buddhist text, these four truths are compared with disease, its origin, its healing, and the prevention of recurrence.

(ii) Avidyā (ignorance) and samskāra (impression) play a prominent part in the causal series as propagated by Buddha. They are also fairly dealt with in the Sāṃkhya and specially in the system of Patañjali.

(iii) Both Sāṃkhya and Buddhism hold the view that the objects are in a state of constant change (parināma). But the serious deviation lies in the fact that Sāṃkhya insists on the existence of a permanent stuff which lies at the root of all manifestations. This abiding principle though undergoes change in every successive moment, does not thereby lose itself entirely. It is real and eternal. Eternity of this primordial stuff (prakṛti) is what is called eternity of mutation (परिपरिभाषन) as opposed to the immutable eternity (पूर्वस्थिति) which belongs to the pūrṇa. But Buddha advocates the doctrine of constant change only and emphatically states that there is no such abiding principle at all.

(iv) It is stated in the Sāṃkhya literature that Kapila furnished himself with a nirmāṇa-citta before he appeared before Āsuri to impart him the knowledge of Sāṃkhya, and the Yoga-sūtra describes how it is evolved from the stuff of asmitā (individuation).

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1 Ibid, p. 30.
2 निर्माण-विचारान्वितमेंतमामावृत्, iv. 4.
Buddha also speaks of nirmana-kāya i.e. the calling up of a mental image while describing the immediate fruits of the life of a recluse who has entered into and abides in the supreme meditation. In this connection, it is further interesting to observe that Buddha explains this method of calling up of one body from another body by the simile of ‘the reed and the sheath’ (muñja and isikā), the ‘sword and the scabbard’ (asi and kosa) and ‘the snake and its slough’ (ahi and karanda). This is clear from the following lines:


Some of these similes which already found their place in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads also occur here and there in the exposition of Śaṅkhya.

(v) In D. ix. 25, Poṭṭhapāda is found to ask Buddha whether the world is eternal or not, and in reply to this Buddha states that this is a matter on which he expressed no opinion. Yoga-bhāṣya also raises this very question and states that this is a problem which is not possible to solve.

(vi) Buddha is very keen to find fault with the objects, for in his opinion they are impermanent, subject to change and bring forth suffering (Savve te bhavā aniccā dukkha viparīṇāṃa-

1 See, 'वथ श्रुः श्रीकाण्ड तत्त्वादिति नाचये', Yajñavalkya's exposition of Śaṅkhya, Mbh. xii. 315. 12. Also, 'ततो मुशादं यथातिति शकृति: पहारीति, श्रेष्ठो नि:चतु: देशमुक्त इष्ठमिति नि:ति, Philosophy of Araṇḍa, Buddha-carita, xii. 64; 'जीवां त्वच्छन्निः' quoted by Vijnānabhikṣu in his bhāṣya on the śūtra अहिन्दित्वायनात्र, S.S. iv. 6.

2 'अध्यात्म संसारस्य शिल्पमा गंभीरं खण्डे गतयां वत्समणंस्याश्रयितं कस्मस्मातहि वेदि, आवच्चनीय- नेतर . . . , अवन्त अवच्चनीयः प्रशः: संसारोपदेशमण्डवादासारन्त्र श्रवः'. iv. 33.
DHAMMA\'TI). SAMKHYA also holds this view. Further, PATA\'JALI emphatically states that to the wise all is pain. This is evident from the SUTRA `PARINAMA-TAP SANSKRATU:\' BAREUNA TRITIVIRAYA DHU: DHARMAV SARVAM CHAYAM:
" (YS. II. 15) where he comes to the said conclusion after pointing out the defects of the objects.

In this connection, we beg to draw the attention of the scholars to the fact that in the above mentioned SUTRA, PATA\'JALI speaks of the three different aspects of suffering, such as, PARINAMADU:K, TAPADU:K and SANSKRATADU:K. Similarly Buddha also speaks of the three states of suffering which is clear from his following utterance:

TISU DUKKHA-DUKKHA-DUKKHA DUKKHA-SAMKHYA-DUKKHA VIPARINAMA-DUKKHA.

Of these the TAPADU:K of PATA\'JALI and DUKKADUKKHA of the P\'ALI text only vary in name and not in essence, for the terms TAPA and DUKKHA are held as synonymous in the Sanskrit literature.

(vii) The expression "NA ETAM MAMA, N\'ESO HAMASMI, NA ME SO ATTALI\" (there is no mine, no 'this is I' no 'this is myself') occurs here and there in the P\'ALI Canonical literature. This reminds of the expression 'ETAM TATVAMASA TATVAMASAM N ME NAHDAM' of the SAMKHYA-KAR\'IKKA (64) which also speaks of a similar idea.

(viii) The following verse occurs in the Dhammapada (APPA-MADA VAGGA, 2):

PANA\'PASA\'DAM ARUJHA ASOKO SAKINIM PAJAM,
PAVATATTHO VA BHUMATTHO DHIRO VALE AVEKKHATI.

The Yogabh\'ASYA (I. 47) also quotes a similar verse which is given below for the sake of comparison:

\[\text{\textbf{References:}}\]

1 Ud\'ANA, NANDAVAGGA, LOKASUTTAM.
2 D. XXXIII. 10 (XXVII).
3 MAJjhIMA, SALLEKHA SUTTA (8)
It is curious to notice that Vācaspati in his commentary attributes this verse to Paramarṣi (the great sage) who is no other than Kapila.

Besides these, there are some technical terms and expressions which are found common in the Pāli Canonical texts as well as in the Yoga system. An attempt is made below to point out some of them.

(1) The Pāli texts speak of the three bases of discourse, which are concerned with the past, future and the present. These are generally represented by the expression ‘atito addhā, anāgato addhā, etc’. Similarly, the Yoga-sūtra and the Bhāṣya also apply the expressions ‘atitu addhā and anāgata addhā etc, while speaking of the past, future and the present stages of an entity’. Such a manner of expressing these different stages of an entity is not generally to be met with in the other systems of Indian thought.

(ii) Buddha speaks of ‘paññā-vimutti’ and ‘citta-vimutti’ here and their in the Canonical texts (... ceto vimuttim paññā-vimuttim; also, Imā kho bikkhave rāga-virāgā ceto vimutti, avijjā-virāgā paññā-vimutti). The Yoga-bhāṣya also

1 अनेन पारमे पाण्डुराइति, ‘तथा च हि’.
2 Tayo addhā: atito addhā, anāgato addhā, pacchippamna addhā, D. xxxiii. 1. 10 (xxiv); also see, yē hi keci bho aśīam addhānum... anāgataṁ addhānām... D. xviii. 20.
3 अतितानामस्त महापालस्यस्ययतास्याम, iv. 12; also see, ‘लिमिरीध्यविपुतम... Yoga-bhāṣya, iii. 13.
4 D. xxviii. 3.
5 Aṅguttara, ii. 3. 10,
refers to these two different phases of liberation (इत्येकम् विपलमित्री कार्ये वियुत्कं गर्भाय:; चित्रबिमूहितस्तु त्रियी...).

(iii) The terms sādhu, viriyām, sati, samādhi and pañña are used side by side in the following Pāli passage:

No kho Āḷārass'eva Kālāmassa atthi sādhu mayhaṃ pi atthi Sādhu... Viriyām... Sati... Samādhi... Pañña... This reminds us of the Sūtra च्छलो विपलान्ती-साधनिग्रहणहोत्तथाप्ति इतरप्रभृतिः where also the said terms are mentioned successively. The only difference lies in the fact that the term 'sati' of the Pāli text is not recorded by Patañjali.

(iv) Buddha speaks of the four brahma-vihāras (the sublime resting places of the mind); such as mettā, karuṇā, muditā andupekkhā. Patañjali also refers to these terms in the Sūtra  ‘मेत्ताकरुणासुदृढ़कृति-मुद्रितस्वरूपविपरिशिष्टात् भावानात्मकिर्मित्यत्रसाधनम् (I. 33). But unlike Buddha, he is not found to style them as the brahma-vihāras. However, they are simply stated as the vihāras in a fragment of an ancient Sāmkhya-Yoga text which is quoted by the author of the Yoga-Bhāṣya (वे वितावर्नो ध्यानविदितां वि हा रा:......iv. 10). The Sanskrit-Buddhist texts also do not leave them untouched; for the Gaṇḍavyūha-Sūtra is found to refer to them.

(v) Both Buddha and Patañjali speak of the different stages of meditation, such as the सत्तेवर्क, सत्तेवर्क, निन्तेवर्क and निन्तेवर्क etc.

(vi) Instead of पाप and पुण्य, the Pāli texts are generally fond of using the terms कुशल and अकुशल to mean virtue and vice.

1 YS. ii. 27.
2 Majjhima, Ariyapariyesana-suttam (26)
3 YS. i. 20.
4 वे वे मेत्ताविनिर्णयः न करुणाविनिर्णयः करुणाविनिर्णयः न करुणाविनिर्णयः संपर्कद्विनिर्णयः; वे वे मुद्रिताविनिर्णयः मुद्रिताविनिर्णयः; वे वे अविनिर्णयः अविनिर्णयः, p. 472.
5 Kusalaṁ, akusalaṁ, Maj. i. 98; Kusalesu dhammesu, i. 417; akusalaṇca, akusala-mulāṇca, kusalaṇca, kusala-mulāṇca, i. 46; Akusalehi dhammehi, D. ii. 75.
The Yoga-bhāṣya and some other ancient Sāṃkhya-Yoga texts also are found to follow the same principle. But it does not thereby mean that the former terms are entirely absent in the said texts. The thing is this that they occur only in a few cases.

(vii) Though Buddha is not found to deal with the guṇas and their varieties after the manner of Sāṃkhya as represented specially in the system of Patañjali, yet the terms rajas and tāmas find their place here and there in the Pāli literature. But these terms are used in their ethical sense just as we find them for the most part in the Sāṃkhya accounts of the Epic.

(viii) The Kevalīda Sutta (D. xi.) refers to the different groups of gods, such as the Cātummahā-rajika, Tavatimsa, Nirmāna-rati, Paramīmāna-vasavatti Tusita and Brahmakāyika etc. The names of some of these gods, such as the Tusita, Parinirmāna-vasavartin, the Brahma-kāyika and the like, are also referred to in the Yoga-bhāṣya (iii. 26) where in connection with the explanation of the different regions of the universe, the names of the different groups of gods residing in different celestial abodes are mentioned. But the names of these peculiar types of gods are not generally to be met with in the ordinary Sanskrit literature.

These remarkable similarities of some of the ideas and expressions of Buddha with Sāṃkhya and Yoga tend to suggest that one of these two systems was influenced by the other. A careful perusal of the aforesaid parallelisms reveals the fact that the

1 कुशाकुशाविनि कर्माणि, i. 24; समाना हि तबो: कुशाकुशालयो...बालनेति, ii. 9.; क्षीणनुभ: कुशो न जनिष्यते, iv. 33; कुशलस्य नात्पञ्चाशाल्लम्, कर्माद, कुशल हि ने वाक्यार्थत्वं, quoted in the Bhāṣya from an ancient Sāṃkhya treatise (ii. 27). Vacaspati attributes this fragment to Pañcasikha.

2 Moha is regarded as one of the akusala-mulas, D. xxxiii. 1. 10. 1. for rajas, see appa-rajakkha (skt. alpa-rajaska) Maj. Vol. i. p. 169, also mahā-rajakkha, Sāmyutta, Vol. i. p. 137.
form of Śāmkhya with which some of the teachings of Buddha resemble to a considerable extent is not what is represented in the Kārika of Iśvarakṛṣṇa; but it is the Śāmkhya-Yoga school which is represented in the Sūtras of Patañjali and especially in its Bhāṣya. Now the difficulty arises that the Yoga-sūtra is not regarded to be a very old work, for it is found to refute the doctrines of later Buddhism. Hence, it is far from convincing that Buddha was ever influenced by Patañjali. On the other hand, there is no such conclusive evidence to prove that all the ideas and technical expressions of the Pāli canonical texts are the independent achievements of Buddha, though there are good many ideas which are his own inventions. Hence, the probable view is that both the systems were nourished by a common heritage. But this common heritage belongs to an independent stream of thought other than what we find in the speculations of the most ancient Upaniṣads with which Buddha was familiar; for such ideas and technical expressions as have been pointed out above are almost conspicuous by their absence in those texts.

In order to substantiate its own statements, the Yoga-bhāṣya is found to quote profusely here and there from works of ancient Śāmkhya and Yoga teachers. But, unfortunately none of these texts have come down to us; hence in the absence of any satisfactory evidence it cannot be definitely ascertained whether some of those works were of Pre-Buddhistic age or not. Patañjali also cannot be credited with the sole invention of the Yoga-system. From the evidence of the ancient Sanskrit literature we find that Hiraṇya-garbha is held to be the propounder of the Yoga and not Patañjali as such. Moreover, the great Epic and other ancient texts which preceed Patañjali by some centuries are found to contain brief expositions of Śāmkhya and Yoga here and there. This is not all. The Epic, as we have already tried to show, pre-supposes the existence of Śāmkhya literature\(^1\). Further, in one place it emphati-

\(^1\) See above, pp. 54-8.
cally states that Śāmkhya and Yoga are the two systems of eternal existence. Under these circumstances, it is not legitimate to conclude that all the ideas in the Yoga-sūtra are the independent achievements of Patañjali; he must have received the principal ideas from the works of his predecessors. The fact is that his manner of treatment is independent and it is at the same time unique in itself.

In his commentary on the Tattva-Samgraha (p. 11), Kamala-Śila quotes a sūtra which he ascribes to the Lord Buddha. The said Sūtra together with his introductory remark upon it runs thus

न न्यायमम्करो न स्वर्य कृतो नोभस्यकृतो नेत्वर-निमित्तो
प्र कु लि स म्यू तो नेक्कारणणाङ्गी नाम्यस्वतः: समुपल्ल्यः।

Amidst other things, Buddha disregards in this Sūtra the view which holds prakṛti as the agent. Evidently this is a reflection upon the Śāmkhya. Unfortunately, this Sūtra cannot be traced in the existing Pāli canonical texts.

Reference is made to one Gandhabba Pañcasikha in an old Pāli text. This stray reference does not furnish us with any data to establish his identity with Pañcasikha, the reputed Śāmkhya teacher. Elsewhere we find Buddha speaking of one Brahma Sanamkumāra (sk. Sanatkumāra) who having created a grosser personality, became in appearance as the Kumāra Pañcasikha. The name of Sanatkumāra as a Śāmkhya teacher is also read in the Epic along with Pañcasikha, Āsuri and such other teachers.

1 सांकेत्र योगश समालने वे, xii. 349. 73.
2 Also referred to by Candrakirti with slight variations in reading, Commentary on The Mādhyamika-Sūtra, p. 567.
3 Sakka-pañcha-sutta. D. xxi. 1. 2.
4 Janavasabha-sutta. D. xviii. 18. Further, Pañcaśikha is stated as the tenth kumāra in the Yuktidīpikā, p. 1759.
from whom the Gandharva Viśvāvasu is said to have received the knowledge of Śāṅkhya.

The doctrine of Arāḍā-kālāma as set forth in the Buddha-Carita of Aśvaghoṣa (xiii) also deserves special attention in this connection. Here Buddha before his enlightenment is found to approach before Arāḍā to seek perfect knowledge by which one can completely overcome miseries. In reply to the question of Buddha, Arāḍā offers an exposition of his philosophy which is nothing but on offshoot of Śāṅkhya. But the Pāli texts nowhere portray such a comprehensive account of the view of Arāḍā as Aśvaghoṣa does. Hence in the opinion of some scholars, the authenticity of the account of Aśvaghoṣa is questionable. However, it can be held without any hesitation that even at the time of Aśvaghoṣa, Śāṅkhya was regarded as a very ancient system of thought and he definitely knew it to be a Pre-Buddhistic one.

The Jainas also refer to the Śāṅkhya teachers, their works and tenets here and there in their canonical texts. But the dates of these texts are uncertain and hence it is not possible to deduce any correct information therefrom as regards the antiquities of the Śāṅkhya system.

1 XII. 318. 59-62.

2 In the Ariyapariyesana-sutta ( Majjhima, 26 ), Buddha is found to make a passing remark upon Āḷāra-kālāma. On being asked by Buddha as to what point he himself had reached and realised of the doctrine he had entered on, Āḷāra states that he had reached up to the plane of Naught ( akiñcaññāyatanaṁ pāvedesi ). Similarly, in the Buddha-carita ( xii. 63 ) also, Arāḍā speaks of the final stage as such:

अध्यात्मिकस्वयम्बो निबन्ध: मानमातमा
किंचिन्तस्तस्ति संप्रभवत्वसिद्धान्तर्य इति स्मृतः; Cf. एवं तत्त्वायात्मापम转变

न मे नामितपरिशोचन, का, 64.
Samkhya and the Abhidharma literature

The Abhidharma literature (Skt.) is far more superior in philosophical discussions to the Pali texts that we have examined before. It is indeed astonishing to notice that some of the fundamental conceptions of the Abhidharmists together with the manner of argument advanced by them to establish their validity, closely follow those of the particular school of Samkhya represented in the Yoga-sutra and specially in its Bhasya. Let us first of all examine the gunas of the Samkhya and the dharmas of the Abhidharmists which constitute the basic conceptions of their respective systems.

The advocates of Samkhya explain the phenomenal world, physical as well as mental, by the gunas which are infra-atomic quanta of three different energies, vis; illumination, activity and inertia. Their mutual inter-actions give rise to everything whether physical or mental. Speaking briefly, all entities other than the purusa are the conglomerations of these gunas which are infinitesimal particles of reals, rather forces than substance. They are dynamical and are in a state of constant change. The Sautrantikas also explain in their turn all phenomena as the assemblage of the minutest units of force, which are called dharmas and like the gunas they are also in a state of constant change and give rise to new entities in every succeeding moment. But the serious deviation lies in the fact that the dharmas are momentary units and do not retain their existence in the succeeding moment, while

1 The point has already received attention of Prof. Stcherbatsky, Central conception of Buddhism, chapter xii, also see n3, p. 47.
2 Discussed in detail by Prof. Stcherbatsky, The dharmas of the Buddhists and the gunas of the Samkhya, I.H.Q. Vol. x, pp. 737-60.
3 See Yogabhāṣya, ii. 18 & iv. 13.
4 चतुर्भुजा गुणानुसारः, ibid, iii. 13 & iv. 15.
Sāṃkhya speaks of a dharmin which is a pervading principle, manifesting itself in and through the dharmas. Though the manifestations i.e. the dharmas are in a state of flux, thereby they do not affect the dharmin in any way with which they are inherently connected—a conception which is always rejected by the Sautrāntikas; for they are not prepared to admit the existence of any such dharmin or abiding principle apart from the dharmas.

Secondly, the orthodox school of Sāṃkhya postulates the existence of a subtle intermediate body which transmigrates in the next world after death. The Sarvāstivādins and later Mahāsākhas also believed in the existence of such a body (antarābhava).

Both the Sarvāstivādins and the Sāṃkhya-Yogins are keen to establish the reality of the past and future and are found to advance almost the same arguments in support of their view. The Sarvāstivādins urge that in the entire absence of an underlying object, its cognition cannot arise at all. If the past and future did not really exist, their cognition also would be nonexistent. But in reality it is not such. Hence, past and future really exist. Again, a deed whether good or bad produces its fruition at a future moment, for it requires some amount of time to become ripe. If the past and future do not exist, then a deed which had been executed in the past moment could not produce its fruition at a future moment. Hence, past and future are existents.

The Yoga-system also establishes the reality of the past and future in a similar manner. The sūtra "अतीतानागर्त्त स्त्रह्वपतोस्त्यवच-

1) व एतेषंविष्णुकानविष्णुकेषु धमेश्वरां ति सामायंविवेश्यां, रोक्वदिर धर्मी,
   Yoga-bhāṣya i.14; also see चामोऽविक्रिन्देश्य धर्मीयवर धमेश्वरां मप्यः, iii.13.
3) See the commentaries on the Abhidharma-kośa, v. 24.
रेखायो इस्मियामः (iv. 12) bears testimony to this. Here, the Bhāṣya argues that if the past and the future did not exist in reality, then in the absence of any substratum their cognition also would not arise at all. Further, in case of the negation of past and future, the fact that former deeds produce their fruition in future would always remain inexplicable. If any deed whether performed with a view to enjoy the merit to be obtained therefrom or to attain emancipation would tend to no result at all, then the performance of meritorious deeds would be futile. Thus we find that both the Sarvāstivādins and the Saṃkhya-Yogins apply almost the same process of reasoning in proving the reality of past and future.

In this connection it should be taken into account that neither Saṃkhya nor Yoga admits of the existence of ‘time’ as a separate entity. The Yoga-bhāṣya emphatically states that ‘time’ is an empty construction of the mind without any reality behind it. Though they insist on the reality of past and future, one need not apprehend that the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya is thereby going to controvert his own statement. The fact is this that the past and the future whose reality is admitted above refer to the different stages of an entity and they do not speak of the duration-time. Here, both Saṃkhya and Sarvāstivādins explain the reality of past and present by the term adhvaṇa which speaks of a transitional period as opposed to kāla, the duration-time.

Most interesting is to observe the four different theories of the Sarvāstivādin teachers, propounded with a view to explain the relation of the permanent essence of an element and the various manifestations it undergoes in its past, present and future stages. In this connection, four prominent teachers hold four different views.

(i) The venerable Dharmatṛata maintained a change of existence (भावान्यथाबादारी). He holds that an element has got...
different existence at different times and in course of transition, it
does not lose itself entirely. The manner of existence is only changed
and not the essence; just as a golden pot when broken, changes its
form only, but the gold itself is not affected thereby at all.
Similarly, an element which enters into its present stage from the
future one, gets rid of its future stage and when from the present
it becomes past, it gives up its present stage and retains the present
one. But the substance itself remains the same always.

(ii) Ghoṣaka holds that an element changes its aspect in
different times (क्षणान्वयावादी). For instance, an element when
enters into its past stage, retains its past aspect without being
detached from its present and future stages; when it is in its
present stage, it retains its present aspect without being detached
from its past and future stages and so on. This is illustrated by
the case of a passionate man who when in love with a partic-
cular woman does not thereby totally ignore his love for other
women. The fact is this that his passion becomes prominent at
the time for the particular woman whom he loves, whereas it is then
latent in the case of other women.

(iii) Vasumitra advocates a change of condition (अवस्था-
अन्वयावादी). He maintains that the condition under which an
element does not produce its function is called future, when produces
it, it is called present and when having produced it ceases to func-
tion, it is then called past. Thus everywhere there is a change of
condition and not of the very essence of the element itself. This is
illustrated by a line which when marked in the place of tens becomes
ten, when in the place of hundred becomes hundred and so on.

(iv) Finally, Buddhaeva was of opinion that past, present
and future were contingent upon one another (अन्वयान्वयितः);
just as the same woman becomes a mother with respect to her
child and a daughter with respect to her mother.

It is curious to notice that Patañjali also refers to these
different forms of manifestations in the Sūtra ‘एतेन भूलेन्त्रयेषु धर्म- लक्षणाक्स्तापरिणामा न्यायवताता’ (iii. 13). The Yoga-bhāṣya explains and illustrates them almost in the same language as has been done by the Sarvāstivādins. Of these, the धर्मपरिणाम of Patañjali does not differ from the भावपरिणाम of the Buddhists, for the Bhāṣya itself counts धर्म and भाव as the same thing. Buddhadeva’s theory is

1 After the manner of Vasubandhu on the Abhidharma-kośa, Kā, V. 25, Kamalaśīla also in his commentary on the Tattva- samgraha (Trikītya-parikṣā p. 504), is found to utter the following lines in this connection:

वा भावाध्यात्मकोऽधर्मसंपर्केत, त किलाह, भूसंस्थायं वर्तमानम् भावाभाषात्मक घेवं न तु द्वैतेति। वा शृवणद्वैतेन कः केवल-कुण्डलिनिमित्तस्य वृहस्पतियाः न सुवर्णस्य तथा भौसंस्थायात्मक वृहस्पतियाः। तदावधिक मानवविद्यानिर्देशाय वाक्यमानाय बहुप्रायो भूस्य वृहस्पतियास्य नागिनीम्, नं द्वैतेन्याः, सवेतु हृदग्राह्याः।

यथवृहस्पतियाः व्यापारहर्षाच। त किलाह, भूस्य वृहस्पतियाः स्तराधिकतानि कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत। तथा पुरुष एकत्र्यं चिन्यं रक्तं: शृवणद्वैतस्य, एव एव।

वा हृदयाभ्यासायान स्वप्नमानानि:। त किलाह, भूस्य वृहस्पतियाः स्तराधिकतानि कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत। तथा पुरुष एकत्र्यं चिन्यं रक्तं: शृवणद्वैतस्य, एव।

वा हृदयाभ्यासायान स्वप्नमानानि:। त किलाह, भूस्य वृहस्पतियाः स्तराधिकतानि कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत। तथा पुरुष एकत्र्यं चिन्यं रक्तं: शृवणद्वैतस्य, एव।

वा हृदयाभ्यासायान स्वप्नमानानि:। त किलाह, भूस्य वृहस्पतियाः स्तराधिकतानि कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत। तथा पुरुष एकत्र्यं चिन्यं रक्तं: शृवणद्वैतस्य, एव।

Similarly the Yoga-bhāṣya also argues:

तव प्रसंस्य भूमिभूति वृहस्पतिस्वायत्वम् अतितात्मकाद्वैतानेऽभावाभाष्यम्। वा सूवणैवायवक्ते अस्तित्वमेववृहस्पताद्वैतानेऽभावाभाष्यम्।

स्वप्नपरिणामः—वृहस्पतिस्वायत्वमुक्तरहस्यनामोत्तमस्य लक्षणनिर्देशायाः।

वा हृदयाभ्यासायान स्वप्नमानानि:। त किलाह, भूस्य वृहस्पतियाः स्तराधिकतानि कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत, कवितान्तर्गत,
not counted separately in the Yoga system. Probably it was included in the अवस्थापरिणाम; for the very illustration of the same female as being the mother and daughter finds its place there along with that of the 'mark' which is counted as ten, hundred and one accordingly as it is made in the place of tens, hundred and unit etc.

Of the four theories mentioned above, only that of Vasumitra found general acceptance to the Sarvastivādins, while the rest were rejected by themselves. But the Sāṃkhya-Yogins accepted all these views with a synthetic spirit. In this connection, the Yoga-bhāṣya emphatically remarks that practically there is only one kind of manifestation of the object which is being treated differently under different circumstances.

The question whether the idea of these different manifestations were received by the Sarvastivādins from the Sāṃkhya or it was the Sāṃkhya who received them from the Buddhists is not easy to ascertain. Vyāsa who is not generally counted as a very early authority on the subject may be influenced by the Buddhists, but it also should be taken into account that the later Sarvastivādins reject the theory of Dharmatrāta on the ground that such a view would drift them towards Sāṃkhya.

Further, while establishing the reality of the past and the future, the Vaibhāṣika is also charged by the Sautrāntika as advocating ultimately nothing but the theory of the followers of Vāraṇagāṇya. In this connection, the Sautrāntika is found to urge that "if everything without any exception is pre-existent, there can be nothing that could have a force to produce anything!" In the end it comes to the same as the theory of the followers of Vāraṇagāṇya. Accordingly to them there is neither production of something new nor

1 'पक एव वस्थापरिणामो मेरे नीतिविद्वितः', iii. 13.
2 तत्र प्रथमः परिणामवादित्वात् सांवपणात् मिश्रते, Kamalaśila on Tatvāsambhāra, p. 504. Also see the commentaries on the Abhidharma-koṣa, Ka. 25.
extinction of something existent: what exists is always existent, what does not exist will never become existent".

Thus it appears that the Vaibhāṣikas were, more or less, influenced by Sāṃkhya in establishing their special theories.

SĀṂKHYA ACCOUNTS IN THE CARAKA-SĀṂHITĀ AND BUDDHA-CARITA

The Caraka-Sāṃhitā here and there deals with some topics of philosophical interest and some of them contain clear traces of Sāṃkhya. In the beginning of the first chapter of the eighth book, the pupil Agnivesa is found to ask Ātreya about the nature of ātman. In reply to this, Ātreya speaks of the three different types of ātman as are conceived from the different angles of vision. Of these, the first one is the conglomeration of the five material substances and the conscious element, the second forms the pure consciousness alone and the third being the conglomeration of twenty-four principles which comprise the mind, the ten organs, the five objects of the senses and the eight-fold prakṛti (viii. i. 15-16).

The first puruṣa is the ordinary individual (पूर्वार्थः समुदितो लोक इति शब्दं लमाते, तदृश ध्विप्रियापत्तेऽजो वायुप्रकाशं श्रद्धा चायम्बकमिति, viii. v. 5). The second type wholly tallies with what is conceived in the Sāṃkhya literature. The third one deserves special attention. Its

1. Stcherbatsky, Vasubandhu on Sarvāstivāda, Central conception of Buddhism, p. 89.
2. Perhaps the influence of Sāṃkhya upon the Abhidharma literature was brought about by scholars who had been previously adherents of Sāṃkhya, but later on embraced Buddhism. For instance, Harivarman (3rd century A.D.) is said to have been a follower of Sāṃkhya before he became a Buddhist. But he introduced some doctrines of Sāṃkhya in his Satyasiddhi-śāstra, U०, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p. 5n. Similar may be the case even with some of the earlier Sarvāstivādins.
3. The fact came to the notice of Prof. S. N. Dasgupta for the first time, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, pp. 213-17.
twenty-four constituents are nothing but the evolutionary series of
the Śaṅkhya. But the purusa of Śaṅkhya is nothing but the
pure consciousness itself and it is generally reckoned as the twenty-
fifth principle. Further, Śaṅkhya is always keen to differentiate
the purusa from the group of the prakṛti. Then why does Caraka
maintain the rāsi, i.e. the conglomeration of the twenty-four prin-
ciples as the purusa which from the strict Śaṅkhya point of view
cannot be called purusa at all? The answer proceeds from the
statement of Caraka himself. He concludes that the supreme
purusa is not subjected to birth, for it is without any beginning.
But the purusa which is called rāsi is the outcome of delusion, desire
and hatred (viii. i. 52). It is endowed with delusion, happiness
misery, life and death (i. 36); it is the object of medical treat-
ment (चिकित्सां च वेदं यथातिष्ठ किंचन, i. 37). Further, Caraka is an
authority on the Āyurveda, and it is natural that his interest should
be centered upon the type of purusa that can undergo medical treat-
ment; but the purusa of Śaṅkhya is always without any modi-
fication and hence a physician has very little to do with such a
purusa. Speaking briefly, the rāsi which is the conglomeration of
the twenty-four principles is nothing but the individual and it
passes for the purusa in its ordinary sense. Further, a critical survey
of the entire text of Caraka reveals the fact that he was highly
influenced by Vaiṣeṣika and Śaṅkhya. The first conception of
the individual proceeds from the standpoint of Vaiṣeṣika and the
last from that of Śaṅkhya. But the difficulty is not still removed.
While speaking of the first purusa he states that it is the conglomera-
tion of the five material substances and the conscious element,
whereas in the case of the rāsi, he absolutely disregards the conscious

1 This series differs from the traditional Śaṅkhya in some respects,
for further discussion about it, see below p. 103.

2 चतुर्विनिमित्वो चाय शास्त्र: पूवस्तंबकः; Śārira, i. 34. Also compare ‘य
सन्तुस्तक्षेत्रयो शास्त्रे बुधक्ष च सः’, Mbh. xii. 351. 16, where rāsi speaks
of the subtle body.
element. Under these circumstances, the rāsi can be better treated as a dead body which is also devoid of consciousness.

In viii. i. 59—67, Caraka deals with the vyakta and anyakta, prakṛti and vikāra, kṣetra and kṣetrajña. Let us examine all these points and see whether we can arrive at a satisfactory solution of the problem as raised above.

The eight-fold prakṛti as it is stated there, comprises the five gross elements, the ahamkāra, buddhi and anyakta. The vikāras are sixteen in number and they are the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, the mind and the five objects of the senses (i. 62-3). Thus we find that the prakṛti and vikāra groups contain twenty-four principles in all and they do not differ from the rāsi which is also held to be the conglomeration of these twenty-four principles. But these principles which constitute the prakṛti and the vikāra groups are further divided into kṣetra and kṣetrajña. Kṣetra is the combination of the twenty-four principles except the anyakta, whereas anyakta is known to be the kṣetrajña (i. 64). From anyakta comes out buddhi, from buddhi appears ahaṅkāra and from ahaṅkāra come out the five gross elements. This conception of kṣetrajña as well as the manner of the evolution of the tatvas differs in some fundamental points from the orthodox Śaṅkhya. First of all let us examine the conception of anyakta. In the orthodox Śaṅkhya, anyakta is read as a synonym of prakṛti. Caraka also states this to be one of the constituents of the eight-fold prakṛti and holds buddhi to be its evolute, and so far he does not practically deviate from the traditional Śaṅkhya. But it is curious to notice that he identifies anyakta with kṣetrajña which ordinarily passes for the ātman. This is not all. He emphatically declares anyakta, pradhāna, prakṛti, jīva as the

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1 Johnston wrongly remarks that jīva is not referred to anywhere by Caraka, Early Śaṅkhya, p. 46. The word occurs in Śrīra, iv. 7. See also p. 102, footnote 1.
synonym of \( \text{atman}^{4} \), which the orthodox Sāṃkhya cannot sanction at any rate; for its main interest is to show the \( \text{atman} \) and the \( \text{prakṛti} \) as the two distinct principles. Speaking briefly, in the opinion of Caraka, \( \text{avayakta} \) or \( \text{prakṛti} \) and the \( \text{atman} \) constitutes one single principle\(^{5} \) and this is why he enumerates twenty-four principles in all.

The identity of \( \text{avayakta} \) with \( \text{puruṣa} \) is also hinted at in the expression ‘\( \text{पुरुसात्ममवन्त भर्मराश्च क्षेर्वेदयण्य} \)’ \( \text{Mbh. xii. 218. 12} \), where Pañcaśikha is found to state that the supreme reality is the \( \text{avayakta} \) in the state of \( \text{puruṣa} \). Further, Yajñavalkya also refers to a school of Sāṃkhya which holds \( \text{puruṣa} \) as the twenty-fourth principle\(^{4} \). Hence it appears that there had been a school of Sāṃkhya which combined \( \text{avayakta} \) and \( \text{puruṣa} \) as one principle and Caraka was an exponent of that particular school.

The first chapter of the Śārīra is an admixture of Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika views. We find that the answer to the question of the enquiring pupil proceeds sometimes from the standpoint of Sāṃkhya and for the most part from that of the Vaiśeṣika. Thus we find that the supreme self is stated to be endowed with will, hatred, happiness, misery\(^{3} \) etc., a purely Vaiśeṣika view. Such

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1. See, समान्तव: सुभुक्तिशास्त्रम दशका कारणमेव जै, i. 340, also...चतुताःपतु:...मन्त्रा वोधविला...पुरुषः...प्रवाहमन्वतस्त्रौ जीवो:...जन्तारत्नम श्रीमि, iv. 7.
2. The Yajñavalkya-samhitā also identifies \( \text{avayakta} \) with \( \text{atman} \) in the hemistic 'वधानामानो ब्यास्त्रा: ब्यास्त्रा निगदने' iii. 178.
3. Nilkantha, the commentator, explains the fragment in the light of Vedānta.
4. See, प्राणिसं दशविषद चतुर्विश्वाति न प्रभुति, \( \text{Mbh. xii. 318. 72} \) also, प्राणिसं दशविषद नार्योदिति परतो मम, न चतुर्विश्वास्त्रो आर्यो मनुवेशान्वदिशम्: ii, 78-4.
5. वा वा देवं सुंदरु: दु:सं ध्येयं ध्येतत्त्रा धृति:।
   बुध्यि: सुन्दरद्वीरो विश्वानि परमात्मन:। i. 71.
instances have sometimes rendered it difficult to differentiate the
genuine Śaṅkhyā accounts from those of the Vaiśeṣika.

But in other important respects his exposition of Śaṅkhyā
does not necessarily deviate from the ordinary one. For instance,
the guṇas and their characteristics are referred to here and there.
The Śaṅkhyā theory of causation is clearly hinted at in the expres-
sion 'सतो द्वारवशास्त्रगद्गमनमात्रमेव हि जन्मोच्चते' (iii. 16 ). The existence
of a subtle intermediate body capable to migrate into the next
world¹, is also maintained in i. 51.

Let us now turn our attention to the twelfth canto of the
Buddha-carita of Aśvaghoṣa where Arāḍā, the former teacher
of Buddha, is found to offer an exposition of his philosophy
which is nothing but a brief treatment of one of the various
schools of Śaṅkhyā. From a critical examination of this account
of Śaṅkhyā we find that it tallies to a considerable extent
with what is furnished by Caraka in the Śarīra-sthāna of
his medical treatise. We are showing some points of their striking
similarities below:

(i) Unlike the Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, both Caraka and
Aśvaghoṣa classify the anyakta and its evolutes into two groups.
The first is the eight-fold prakṛti which constitutes the anyakta,
buddhi, ahaṅkāra and the five gross elements; the second being the
vikāra (modification) group which comprises the ten organs, the
mind and the five objects of the senses. Neither Caraka nor
Aśvaghoṣa mentions the tanmātras and both of them count the
objects of the senses as the tattvas. The main difference of opinion
lies in the fact that Caraka combines the prakṛti and puruṣa into
one single principle which he calls anyakta, whereas Aśvaghoṣa
is not found to advocate such a peculiar view. Both the authors
speak of the division of kṣetra and kṣetrajña and at the same time

¹ अहृत्यः पतं कर्मे देवान्तरगतिः स्मृति:).
बिसते सति भूतानि कारणे देहमन्तरा।
are keen to differentiate the *avyakta* from the *vyakta*, i.e. the unseen from the seen.

(ii) While explaining the cause of misery, Caraka states that “delusion, desire, hatred and activity—these four are at the root of inclination and this in its turn gives rise to अहंकार (egoism), संज्ञा (attachment), संशय (doubt), अभिसंध्य (wrong conjunction), अभ्यवशत (downfall), विप्रत्यय (wrong notion), अविशेष (lack of discrimination) and अनुपाय (wrong means). Just as trees with huge branches subjugate a tender tree that springs up by their side, even so the *purusa* is overcome by these eight factors and as a result of this he fails to transcend his worldly existence.”

Of these, the idea that I am endowed with such a caste, such beauty, such wealth, such intellect, such character, such learning, such rank, such age and such influence is said to be अहंकार.

*Saṁyoga* or attachment is that stage when mind, speech, body and activity do not tend to emancipation.

*Saṁśaya* is to express doubt in the existence of the fruits of action, emancipation, soul and the future life etc.

The idea that I am unchanged under all circumstances, I am the creator, I am naturally established, I am the conglomeration of the body, senses, intellect, memory and the like, is what is called अभिसम्पलवा.

That parents, brothers, wife, children, kinsmen and relatives are mine and I am theirs is to be regarded as अभ्यवपाता.

*Vipratyaya* is the wrong notion of what should be done and what should not be done, of what is beneficial and what is not beneficial, of what is good and what is bad.

*Aviśeṣa* is the lack of discrimination between the pairs of opposites, such as the conscious and the unconscious element, the primary constituents and the modifications, inclination and abstention.

Sprinkling (of water with *kusa* grass), fasting, *Agniḥotra*
ceremony, taking ablutions thrice in a day, invocation, performance of rituals on one's own account as well as for others, begging for religious purpose, sacrificing life on entering into water or fire and such other practices are to be known as anupāya.

Aśvaghoṣa also enumerates and defines these eight factors which are at the root of worldly existence. The sequence of these motive factors as counted by Caraka and Aśvaghoṣa is not the same and both the teachers slightly differ here and there in their definitions. To make the point clearer, we are quoting below the corresponding portions of the Caraka-Saṃhitā and the Buddha-Carita:

महानिवाच—मोहेव्व-प्रेक्षकमूर्त्तितः, नजा श्वेताभ-स्तु-संज्ञावियः-संधुपयायपत-विपर्ययाविशेषपत्यायाय महानिवाच तु ममतितिवृद्धिमातस्तरोपभिभूषण पुरुषमन्त्रै-वै-विचित्र-सीताविविशिष्ट-व्योद्रय-प्रमातस्मयोंसिद्धिमल्लत्तहारः।

यस्मात्वालकाय सिद्धान्तिः नायकवार्य, स सहः। कर्मफल-मोक्ष-पुरुष प्रेत्यभावाद्य: सत्त्व न वेदति संज्ञा:। सर्ववस्त्रारस्वन्योधामहं श्राद्ध स्त्रे-संसिद्धोधामहं शरीरीनिरविवेकेयाराजितति सहस्रामिव-संधुप:।

मम मातृ-पितु-चानू-सुज्ञात्म-नक्षु-मित्र-भुत्यग्नो, गणथे वाहिनिमय-प्रपातः।

कर्माणां हिताहित-शुभाङ्गेदेवेणी विपिनसामिविवेशसः विष्णु:। झालोऽरुऽऽ: प्रकृति-विकाराः: प्रकृतिविवेशसरामस्त्र: सामालद्विवमिनिद्रह्व-विकाराद्: प्रकृतिनिर्विवेशसरामस्त्र: सामालस्त्र: प्रकृतिते भावायः।

Caraka, on Śāvite. V. 12—20.

विप्रत्यायाद्विकाराद् संदेहायमधिमिष्कुः।
विविधोपायार्थायं सखाद्विकारात: || २५ ||
तत्र विप्रत्याय नाम विपिनसामिविवेेशसः।
अन्यथा कुलस: कार्य मन्त्रेण मन्त्रेतेन्यथा || २५ ||
प्रकृतिनिज्ञायं वेदिण गच्चामयप्रभृत: ।
इहिष्ठेद्विकारावद्विकारात्विनेति || २६ ||

Some of these variations are pointed out by Johnston in his translation of the corresponding verses of the Buddha-Carita.
(iii) The conception of liberation, as advocated in the Śaṅkhya accounts of these two texts, also deserves special attention. In this connection, it is stated in the Caraka-Saṃhitā that in the final stage of renunciation all knowables become known and as a result of this all sorts of feelings with their roots are exterminated (śāvīra, i. 153). After this the individual soul which becomes one with brahman can no longer be experienced; being divested of all ideas, it then leaves no trace of its individual existence. Brahman is indescribable and without attributes, and it is the goal of all who know it. Thus we find that in the opinion of Caraka, brahman is the supreme felicity of life and it is identified with the stage of liberation.

1 अतः: परं न हि भूते भूतात्मा नोपल्लस्वबः, 
नि:सुत: सत्यंतवेत्यभिभो वर्षं न विष्ठते ।
गति में हि बि दां न हि तच्चास्वरममयम्,
झाने न हि बि दां चात नाशस्ग्रु ब्रांवमहिति ह, i. 154-55
The identity of brahman with the stage of liberation is further mentioned explicitly in the following couplet which reads the various synonyms of final beatitude:

विपाप्त विरजः शान्तं परमत्तमवहयम्,
अमृतं ब्रह्म नि वाण पराधः शान्तिरहर्षये ।

Like Caraka, Aśvaghoṣa also identifies the stage of liberation with brahman. Thus he is found to state that 'the supreme brahman is without any attribute, it is real and immutable. This is called liberation by the wise men. The following verse bears testimony to this view:

पद्मात्रेति तत्वं तत्त्वं कथयिन्ति मानोपि ।

These remarkable similarities of the Sāṃkhya accounts of Caraka and Aśvaghoṣa tend to suggest that both of them received their ideas from a common source, and evidently it was different from the school which was represented by Iśvarakṛṣṇa.

Besides these, there are some other technical terms of Sāṃkhya which find their place in the accounts of Aśvaghoṣa, whereas Caraka does not care to discuss them seriously. First of all, let us turn our attention to the definition of sattvā. Here Aśvaghoṣa states that the primary matter, its modifications, birth, death and old age—all these are said to be sattvā*. Reference is also made to sattvā in the fragment 'व्यक्तमय्यते वा सत्त्वात्मात्मवेनाभिमत्तीत्व', which is quoted in the Yoga-bhāṣya (ii. 5) and attributed to Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati. But Caraka does not define the term,

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1 Elsewhere Caraka states the inner self as the brahman. See तत्वमेयश्च प्राणवेदः प्राणवेदः सन्ततिः—प्राणवेदः, v. 6.
2 Śārīra, v. 34.
3 Buddha-Carita, xii. 65.
4 prakṛtihitam bhikṣāraha jana sādhu sādhu bhṛṣṭaḥ, v. 12, Buddha-Carita, xii. 17.
though he refers to the expression ‘गुद्रसत्व’ here and there. The varieties of five-fold ignorance (पञ्चाविना अविद्या) are also enumerated and defined in the Buddha-Carita (xii. 33-7) whereas Caraka does not mention them at all. The doctrine of this five-fold ignorance is attributed to Vārsāganyā by Vācaspatī.

Further, there are some ideas in the exposition of the philosophy of Arāda, which are closely related to some of the passages of the Sāmkhya accounts of the Epic. First of all, let us examine the conception of vyakta and its differentiation from the anyakta. In the opinion of Arāda, vyakta is that which is subject to birth, old age, disease and death, while the reverse is known to be the anyakta. This we know, from the following couplet of the Buddha-Carita (xii. 22):

जायते जीर्ष्यते वैव बाध्यते ग्रियते च यत्वत
तद्वात् कमिति विशेषमञ्जर्यते नु विपर्ययत
d

A similar idea can be noticed also in the following couplets of the Mbh. (xii. 236. 30-1):

प्रोक्तं तद्वात् कमिति वेव जायते बाध्यते च यत्वत
जीर्ष्यते ग्रियते वैव चतुर्मिठ्टिं च वर्णितम
d

विपरीतसमतः यत्तु तद्वात् कमिति मुहानायत
d

Secondly, Āsvaghoṣa is found to introduce some technical terms, such as प्रतिबृद्धि, अप्रभुड़ित and the like, while depicting the philosophy of Arāda. The Epic also frequently refers to such terms in the Sāmkhya accounts of Vasīṣṭha and Yājñavalkya. But these

1. अनन्यप्रतिबृद्धि, Tattva-kaumudi, Ka, 47.
Also see, ‘संयम प्रतिबृद्धि मन्नति अविद्या………’ एवं सत्वकमविशिष्टाति: तत्संज्जितां महामायेऽसामिः: अपनात्तिश्च शति, Yoga-bhāṣya, i. 8.

2. See, ‘प्रतिबृद्धिकेक्रियाद्रुतमां वयस्मयकस्यमेव च’ xii. 40, also ‘स पुनः प्रतिबृद्धिः प्रजापतिरिहऽयोे’ 21.

3. See above, pp. 48-9. The term ‘अप्रभुड़ित’ occurs even in a quotation in the Yoga-bhāṣya which runs thus: व्यक्तमयस्तः ब्राह्माण्यमयस्तः सत्त्वमयस्तः सिद्धमयस्तः: च सत्त्वमयस्तः प्रतिबृद्धि: (ii. 5).
terms are conspicuous by their absence in the Śāmkhya-Kārikā and its commentaries.

The classification of the twenty-four tattvas into two groups of eight primary constituents and sixteen modificiations, and consequently the negation of the tannmātras are also to be met with in the Epic 1.

Arūda is of opinion that ignorance, activity and desire—these three are at the root of the cycle of existence; he who abides in these three cannot transcend existence. This we know from the evidence of the following verse:

अज्ञानं कर्म तुण्या च श्रेया: संसारहेतसः;
स्थितोपस्मिन्स्विष्टेऽज्ञानुस्वतु सत्य नातिवर्तिते ( xiii. 23 ).

The Epic also reiterates the same thing in the following couplet:

प्रथा पर्याय संसारे तासु तास्विह योगिनुः,
अविद्या-कर्म-तुण्यास्मिन्स्विष्टेऽज्ञानुस्वतु ( iii. 2. 71 ).

Of these ‘अज्ञान’ and ‘अविद्या’ do not differ fundamentally.

Again, Arūda regards Jaigīṣavya, Janaka and Vṛddha-Pāraśara as the upholders of his philosophy. The Epic also in its turn does not ignore the view of these celebrated exponents of Śāmkhya 2.

Thus it appears that Āśvaghoṣa, Caraka, the Epic and even the authorities cited in the Yoga-bhāṣya were more or less influenced by a common school of Śāmkhya. But Āśvaghoṣa deviates from all other Śāmkhya teachers in one important point. His conception of the four kinds of meditations 3, the practice of which,
in his opinion, gradually leads one to final emancipation, is conspicuous by its absence in any of the existing works on Sāṃkhya. These meditations correspond to some extent with those of the Buddhists; but the fact whether these conceptions of the numerous meditations and trances were the independent achievements of the Buddhists or they were borrowed by Buddha from the Sāṃkhya is not possible to ascertain, for the data as are left to us are not adequate.

The doctrine of the guṇas does not find its place in the accounts of Arāda, hence Āśvaghoṣa is sometimes accused by scholars for expounding a school of Sāṃkhya which does not speak of the guṇas. The reason of not incorporating the guṇa theory into the teachings of Arāda is not very far to seek. Arāda’s treatment is after all brief and concise. Like the guṇa theory, he also ignores other fundamental doctrines of Sāṃkhya. For instance, he is not found to speak of the satkārya theory which asserts that the effect really exists beforehand in its material cause, nor does he care to speak of the pramāṇas and their varieties. Does it thereby indicate that he is going to expound a form of Sāṃkhya which ignored not only the guṇas, but also the doctrine of causation and epistemology as well? The fact is this that Āśvaghoṣa is after all writing a Kāvya and not a philosophical treatise. Hence for philosophical discussions, his space was limited. This is why he made a brief statement of the philosophy of Arāda and did not consider it necessary to set out his philosophy in detail. Thus we do not find any reasonable ground to accuse Āśvaghoṣa of having expounded a form of Sāṃkhya that did not speak of the guṇas.

That Āśvaghoṣa was not ignorant of the guṇa theory can be further proved from the evidence of the Buddha-Carita at xxvi. 10—14, where he is found to refute the doctrine of the guṇas.

1 See Keith, Sāṃkhya System, pp. 25-6.
SĀMKHYA TEACHERS AND THEIR WORKS

Kapila, the great sage, is regarded as the propounder of Sāmkhya. In the Sāmkhya tradition, he is held to be the first among the wise (आदिविद्वार) and he appears at the beginning of each cycle of creation. Virtue, wisdom, dispassion and power are natural to him and he is the foremost of the siddhas. His siddhi or perfection is regarded as an instance of what is called 'जन्मसिद्धि', i.e., he was endowed with perfection from the very moment of his birth. It is stated that out of compassion he imparted the knowledge of Sāmkhya to Āsuri, his first disciple. This is corroborated by the expression 'आदिविद्वार निर्माणचित्तमदिधाय काश्यपान भगवान् परमदिधार-सर्वेः जिन्द्रासामानय तत्त्रे प्रोवाच' as quoted in the Yoga-bhāṣya (i. 25). The term 'निर्माणचित्त' deserves special attention. It shows that the teacher assumed a form by dint of his supernatural power and appeared before Āsuri to impart to him the knowledge of Sāmkhya. This shows that Kapila had no physical body and thus he cannot be regarded as an historical person.

The Mbh. also mentions him to be the propounder of Sāmkhya. But he is somewhere stated as the incarnation of fire, somewhere as the light residing in the orb of the Sun and elsewhere as one of the mind-born sons (मानसपुत्र) of the god Brahman. Further, he is in one place identified with Viṣṇu and in another with Śiva. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa mentions him to be the fifth incarnation of Viṣṇu. All these facts clearly point to his mythological origin and he may not be taken as an historical personage.

1 For janma-siddhi, see Y.S. iv. 1.
2 'साम्यापूर्व वधा कपिलः परमर्थः स च चित्रः', xii. 349. 65.
3 'पश्चिमः कपिलो नाम भिन्नः भार्तविंशतम्
श्रीवाचासुरेः स स्वं तत्वाब्धिविनिवेष्ठम्', i. 3. 10.
The initiation of Āsuri by Kapila, as depicted by Paramārtha, Māṭhara (Kā, 1) and Jayamaṅgalā (Kā, 70), is also fanciful. All these authorities declare unanimously that Kapila appeared thrice before Āsuri—each time after a lapse of a millenium. Perhaps the story came down to these teachers from the works of ancient authorities on the subject. Thus we find that mythological element is prominent everywhere and as a result of this, the historical fact has totally disappeared. Speaking briefly, Kapila cannot be taken as an historical personage. His name was associated with Śaṅkhyā probably to give a greater sanctity to the system.

Further, the commentators as mentioned above characterise Āsuri with the epithet ‘दण्डवद्धख्याजी’, i.e. one who had performed sacrifices for thousand years. This shows that before his initiation, he was a staunch advocate of the Vedic sacrifices. The fact whether he was identical with Āsuri of Śatapatha Brahmaṇa is not possible to ascertain. The Purāṇas read his name along with Kapila and such other mental creations of the god Brahma; but Māṭhara (Kā, 1) and the Jayamaṅgalā (Kā, 70) mention the pupil of Kapila as a Ṭrahmin, belonging to the clan of Āsuri. Hence it appears that some of the commentators regarded him as an historical person. The Mābh. states him to be the upholder of the doctrine of brahmaṇa.

Gujaratna Sūri² attributes the following couplet to Āsuri:

"विविक्ते हक्वरिणलो बुद्धो मोगोस्य कथयते ।
प्रतिनिधिवद्यः स्वच्छ्य यथा चन्द्रमसोउस्मसि।
"

But how far he is correct, is difficult to ascertain.

1 xii. 218. 14.
2 See his exposition of Śaṅkhyā in the Saṅdarśana-samuccaya.
3 The commentary Vyomavati also quotes and explains this verse, but does not mention the source. The reading is slightly different; it reads ‘विविक्तेनाथकपिणलो’, p. 521 (chowkhamba edition).
In the hierarchy of the Śāṅkhya teachers, Pañcaśikha comes next to Āsuri from whom he is said to have obtained the knowledge of Śāṅkhya. Like Kapila and Āsuri, he is also portrayed mythologically in the Purāṇas.

It has been already pointed out (p. 91) that a Pāli text refers to one Brahma Sañāṇ-kumāra who having created a grosser personality became Kumāra Pañcaśikha in appearance. The Yuktidipikā also regards Pañcaśikha as a Kumāra. Further, Sañatkumāra is known to be a mythical figure in the Sanskrit literature; for he is said to have originated from the mind of god Brahman and elsewhere in the Mbh., he is mentioned as a Śāṅkhya teacher along with Pañcaśikha and others. Taking everything into consideration it appears that one Pañcaśikha passed as a mythical figure even in the days of Buddha and he may even be identical with the Śāṅkhya teacher of that name as represented in the Purāṇas. Āśvaghōsa also in one place mentions Āsuri and Pañcaśikha as celestial beings.

However, Pañcaśikha figures as an historical personage in the Epic. In xii. 218, he is mentioned as the son of Kapila, the female brahmin, and elsewhere his pupil Janaka states him as a mendicant belonging to the family of Parāśara. Āśvaghōsa also refers to one Vṛddha-Parāśara along with Janaka and Jaigishavya as an exponent of Śāṅkhya, and attempt has been already made (pp. 80-1) to identify him with the mendicant Pañcaśikha of the Mbh. Thus we find two Pañcaśikhas, one mythical and the

2 Mbh. xii. 320. 24.
other historical. This Vṛddha-Parāśara alias Pañcaśikha must be placed at a period before Christ as even an early authority like Aśvaghosa speaks of him to be an ancient authority on the subject. Buddha also seems to pre-suppose him, for he is found to refute the doctrine of sense-control of one Pārāśariya who appears to be identical with Pañcaśikha. The point has been already treated elaborately in pp. 80-1. The Mbh. also speaks of him as a teacher of remote antiquity. On the otherhand, if we assume that the Janaka-Pañcaśikha episode of the Epic conveys a faithful representation of his philosophy, it becomes difficult to place him at a period before Buddha, for some of his utterances in that episode, bear testimony to the fact that he is going to refute therein the doctrine of Buddhism.

The Philosophy of Pañcaśikha as depicted in the Epic deviates in some fundamental principles from the traditional Sāṃkhya and this has been already noticed by us (pp. 43-4) while discussing the Sāṃkhya accounts of the Mbh.

In order to corroborate its own statements, the Yoga-bhāṣya is found to quote some fragments here and there from the works

1 See, वर्मिका कर्म तुष्णा च केवलद्वानु: पुनःभवेत्।
 कारणं कोमलं हृ दोषाणाः हृ निःपेवनस्तु॥
 अविष्मा कुपमाहुर्तं कर्मभीं तथा हुतास्तु॥
 तुष्णास्वणनं स्नेह एव तेषां पुनःभवेत्॥

.............................. xii. 218. 32-9.

Cp. अथ वेमान्यस्य द्राम्भस्व दृढ्यशास्त्राद्वादश्च चत्तवर्याहस्य सशाहाक्षि मेवेहुः हेमुलेन प्रवर्तने। कमतान्ति चत्तवर्यं, बुद्धविषयं तुष्णा कर्म विचारान। तत्र विद्यानं क्षेत्रस्मावशेषोऽहुः। कर्म-क्षेत्रमावशेषोऽहुः। अविष्मा तुष्णा च क्षेत्रस्मावशेषोऽहुः। कर्म-क्षेत्रमावशेषं विचारान। बुद्धविषयं तुष्णा कर्मस्मावशेषं स्नेहाति। अविष्मा विचारान। बुद्धविषयं तुष्णा कर्मस्मावशेषं स्नेहाति। अविष्मा विचारान। बुद्धविषयं तुष्णा कर्मस्मावशेषं स्नेहाति। अविष्मा विचारान। बुद्धविषयं तुष्णा कर्मस्मावशेषं स्नेहाति। अविष्मा विचारान। बुद्धविषयं तुष्णा कर्मस्मावशेषं स्नेहाति। 

Candrakirti on ‘द्राम्भस्व-परव्याय’, नाथ्यमाक-व्यत्ति, p. 566,
of Ė身体健康 and Yoga teachers. Thus the Bhāṣya (i.e., 4) quotes the aphorism ‘एकाङेव दृश्येन स्वतििरेव दृश्येनम्’ with the remark ‘तथा च सूत्रम्’, while Vācaspati states this to be the sūtra of Pañcaśikha. The sūtras as it is well known must be brief and concise. But it is astonishing to notice that even the longer quotations in the Yoga-bhāṣya which under no circumstances can be regarded as sūtras, are sometimes attributed to Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati. It thus appears that Pañcaśikha was not only the author of a Sūtra, but also wrote a Bhāṣya or some such treatise in prose on Sāṃkhya-Yoga. But this does not seem to be convincing. Had Vācaspati ever seen the works of Pañcaśikha, he would have naturally furnished us with some accounts of them. Moreover, nowhere in his commentaries on Sāṃkhya and Yoga, he is found to acquaint us with any of the teachings of this celebrated teacher other than what have, in his opinion, already been quoted in the Yogabhāṣya. Hence the authenticity of his statement seems to be doubtful.

Further, the fragment ‘रूपातिनियया वृत्तिविग्यायां परस्यपेरण विरहयन्ते’, सामाय्यानि त्वतिशयेन: सह प्रवर्तन्ते is quoted in the Yoga-bhāṣya (iii. 13) and Vācaspati regards this to be the view of Pañcaśikha. But the author of the Yukti-dipika who has every reason of being regarded as an earlier authority on the subject, attributes this to Vāraṇaṣāya. Not only this, the Yoga-bhāṣya itself in one place attributes a quotation to this celebrated exponent of Sāṃkhya. Taking everything into consideration, it appears that most of the longer quotations in prose in the Yoga-bhāṣya were taken from the work of Vāraṇaṣāya and not from that of Pañcaśikha as

1 स्यान्नमप्पकाणि सस्मार्थमस्मापि समीक्षथेन्...समाधिपितः, ii. 5; स्यात् सङ्कः
   सङ्कः—करियति, ii. 13.
2 तथा च भगवानं वार्षमणं: परमाणि रूपातिनियया... p. 72.
3 भूति-वयञ्च-वातिंद्रामाणांभारित मूलशुक्लभणित वार्षमणं: iii. 53.
Vācaspati thinks them to be. But what about the authorship of the Sūtra as referred to by Vyāsa himself? In the present state of our knowledge, it is not possible to determine precisely the fact whether the aphoristic treatise containing the said Sūtra¹ came from the pen of Pañcaśikha or from that of Vārṣaganyā.

The Sāmkhya-Sūtra refers to the view of Pañcaśikha² on the nature of 'invariable concomitance' (vyāpti) which plays a prominent part in logical discussions. Again, his view on the cause of the conjunction of the prakṛti and the puruṣa is also referred to in vi. 68. But we are not prepared to attach too much weight to this Sūtra, for it is generally held to be a later work. Again, some of the later writers on Sāmkhya are of opinion that Pañcaśikha wrote a commentary on the Tattvasamāsa-Sūtra. We shall disprove their view in our discussion on the 'Tattvasamāsa-Sūtra and its commentaries'. Bhoja and Hemacandra ascribe the authorship of a Kāvyā treatise of the title of Śūdraka-kathā³ to one Pañcaśikha, but it cannot be definitely stated whether he is identical with the re-nowned Sāmkhya teacher of that name.

**Sāśṭītantra and its authorship**

In the last verse of the Sāmkhya-kārikā, Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that his treatise in seventy distiches is a compendium of the entire Sāśṭītantra, divested of parables and the controversial doctrines of

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¹ The fact that there existed a Sūtra text upon Sāmkhya even at an early period, can be noticed in the expression 'पूर्वाध्याय व्याख्यानम्' of the *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 175. Further, in his *Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prākṛt MSS. in the Central Provinces and Berar*, Rai Bahadur Hirala informs us of the existence of a Ms. of a Sāmkhya-Sūtra of Pañcaśikhācārya (No. 6371) in possession of Pt. Govinda Prasad Sastri of Jubbulpore. No opinion can be expressed here until the text is thoroughly examined.

² आवेदितकम्रियम् शस्त्र पद्दतिः, v. 32.

other teachers. This shows that the original work on the basis of which he composed the Kārikā, passed under the name of Saṣṭītantra and the significance of the name was probably due to the fact that the text dealt with the sixty different topics of Śaṁkhya.

According to the Rājavārttika, the sixty topics of discussion consist of the ten fundamental principles, the five kinds of error, the nine contentments, the twenty-eight infirmities of the organs and the eight perfections. Of these, the ten fundamental principles constitute (1) the reality of prakṛti, (2) its unity, (3) its purposefulness, (4) its difference from the puruṣa, (5) its activity for the sake of the puruṣa, (6) the plurality of the puruṣas, (7) their union with and (8) release from the prakṛti, (9) the duration of the body and (10) inactivity of the puruṣa. The remaining fifty topics are dealt with in Kā, 47-51.

Unlike the Rājavārttika, the Ahirobyudhha-Śaṁhitā of the Pañcarātra school furnishes a different list of the topics of the Saṣṭītantra. It classifies them into two heads of prakṛta and vaikṛta-manḍala. The former consists of thirty-two topics called tantras and the latter of twenty-eight called kāṇḍas. This can be noticed in the following couplets of the Ahirobyudhha (xii. 18-30):

सांक्यरूपेण सदद्ये वैष्णवं कपिलाह्ये; ।
उद्धो यादवं पूर्वं ताह्रवं श्रीणु मेहसहितम् ॥
पश्चिमेवं स्मृतं तत्तैं सांक्यं नाम महामुने ।
प्राकृतं वैकृतं चेति मण्डले देय समासतः ॥
प्राकृतं मण्डलं तत्त भार्तिसङ्केत्रमिद्यते ॥
तत्तार्थं प्रभात्तन्त्र तु दूर्योद्योगी पुरुषाशिल्म्।
श्रीगुण तन्त्रार्थायत्त्वं शास्त्रीयभाष्यपार्थः ॥

1 Referred to by Vācaspati, kā. 72.
From the evidence of the verses quoted above, we find that of the two series, the first one includes the topics on brahman, puruṣa, sakti, 'destiny' and 'time'. Then come the three topics on the guṇas which are followed by aksara. Next is that of the prānas which refer to the five vital breaths and they find an

1 The expression 'सिद्धिकार्' also finds its place in the Yukti-dipikā, Tāmōra-pāṇī—क्रि: माण्डलयन्ति किं किं का क्षा हु-पतिवां, p. 113.
important place here and there in the Śāmkhya literature'. The kartarātra probably speaks of ahaṅkāra which is nothing but egoism and under whose influence the puruṣa thinks himself to be the agent. The significance of sāmitantra is not clear. The term sāmi in sanskrit means 'half'. Perhaps this topic refers to 'mind' which is regarded as an organ of sense as well as of action. Speaking briefly, it is half 'śāleśṭeśa' and half 'karmāṇītiv'. The remaining topics of this series are those of the five organs of sense, five organs of action, five subtle elements and five gross elements.

A careful perusal of these thirty-two topics which constitute the so called prākṛtya-maṇḍala reveals some points of interest. First of all, let us take up the case of brahman which constitutes the first of these topics. The Kārikā ignores it altogether, but it has been already pointed out (pp. 26-8) that it found a prominent place in some of the early schools of Sāmkhya. Sakti probably speaks of prakṛti which is held to be the store-house of energy. The term is also referred to here and there in the Ahirbyudhna, but it is difficult to ascertain the exact sense in which it is used. In ii. 57, it is defined as the material cause of the Universe (जगात्स्रव- मानवे य: सा शक्ति: परिक्रियातिता ) and in the hemistic 'यदू तदू गुणयं रूपं शक्तिस्तय: प्रकीर्तिम' (vi.16), the term evidently speaks of prakṛti which is held to be the conglomeration of the guṇas. But it is astonishing to observe that in another place puruṣa is mentioned as one of the various aspects of the sakti, and it can be noticed in the following couplet:

व्यक्ताव्यक्त-पुमाल्यायथ: तथा काळाश्वयामुने।
उत्ता चतुष्मूलि: सैव शक्तियं सांविन्योगयो:। (51. 42)

1 'प्राशाया वाचव: पवः' Kā, 29. For a fuller treatment of the prāṇas, see Yukti-dīpikā, pp. 125-9.
2 Prof. Keith has altered the reading into Svāmin, Sāmkhya System, p. 71.
This reminds us of the expression 'देवारम्भकृति स्वमुनिर्मित्याम्' of the Śvet. up (I. 3), where it is stated that the self-power of the supreme deity is enveloped in his own guṇas. However, from this stray references it is not possible to determine precisely the fact whether the Śaṣṭītantra advocated the theistic coloured Sāṃkhya or not.

'Destiny' and 'time' are not regarded as separate categories in the orthodox Sāṃkhya. But the Ahirbyudhna, in its stray references to Sāṃkhya, attaches some importance to 'time'; for the verse as quoted above explicitly mentions 'time' as one of the aspects of sakti. Devala also in his brief exposition of Sāṃkhya in the Mbh., is found to assign a prominent place to 'time'. In his opinion, it plays an important part in the building up of the cosmos 1.

These three factors, viz, 'शक्ति' (energy), 'नियति' (destiny) and 'काल' (time) play an important part in the speculations of the Bhāgavatas. They hold that at the time of dissolution tamas enters into rajas, rajas in its turn into sattva, sattva into kāla, kāla into niyati, niyati into sakti, sakti into the puruṣa and so on. Thus it has become a point of investigation whether the Ahirbyudhna gave a Bhāgavata colouring in its enumeration of the topics of the Śaṣṭītantra.

Aksara deserves special attention. The term occurs here and there in the Sanskrit literature. In his exposition of Sāṃkhya and Yoga in the Mbh., Vasiṣṭha is found to identify aksara with prakṛti2. On the other hand, the Gītā states it to be the immutable self. Hence the subject matter of discussion under

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1 See, 'केतने समानी भूतानि काल भार्शमन्दिरिः', xii. 275. 5.
2 Ahirbyudhna, iv. 39-78.
3 सम्प्रदायविभाजनकृत पारंपर्य, xii. 307. 13.
4 दासिनी पुरुषी लोके ब्रह्मायक एव च
   खुर: सर्वानि समानिः कुटस्योद्धर उच्चवे, xv. 16,
this head is difficult to ascertain. If *prākṛti*, which does not find any separate place in the list, comes under *sakti*, then *aṅkara* is to be regarded as the immutable self as distinct from the ordinary one.

It is curious to notice that *buddhi* is absolutely overlooked in the series. Perhaps, this as well as *aṅkara* was included under the category of *skārṣṭrāntara*. The name ‘*prākṛta-mandanā*’ suggests that the series deals with the primary principles of *Sāṁkhya*.

Of the second series, *khyākānda* comprises the first five topics and they are most probably, the five sources of actions, generally known as *karma-yonis*. Then comes the topic on *bhoga*, i.e. the experience of the fruits of merit and demerit by *purusa*. Next is *vṛtta* which, as Prof. Keith rightly suggests, refers to the ‘circle of becoming and passing away, the *samecara* and *pratīsamecara* of the Tattvasamāsā’. The five topics which follow this, deal with the five *klesas* and they correspond to the five kinds of ignorance of *Sāṁkhya*°. The next three items speak of the three forms of proof. These are followed by the topics on *khyāti* (knowledge), *vairāgya* (dispassion), *dharma* (righteousness) and *aṅsvarya* (divine power) which are stated in the *Kārikā* (23) as the Sattvic modifications of *buddhi*. The topic on *guna* which comes next, already found its place in the previous series; but

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1 ‘पञ्च कर्मयोनिः’, *TS.* 9; for a fuller treatment of them see *Yukti-dīpikā*, p. 128.


3 सेतुं पञ्चयोनिः भवति अविभा, अविभाविविभा रागोद्वानिविविभा: कलेश शति, एते पवि स्वसंभविन्य: तमो मोक्षो महामोक्षांतिनिन्य: अभिवतिहिषत्तिनि, *YS.* i. 8.

4 The term occurs in this sense here and there in the *Sāṁkhya* and Yoga literature. For instance, ‘तत्त्वं परं प्रस्यक्षमिदं यस्मि कर्मेऽथ’, *YS.* i. 16.; *विविधविषयं च च च च च प्रक्तिप्रतिप्रक्तिः*, quoted in *TK.* under Kū. 44. *SS.* deals with it in a different light in ‘सदस्यक्षमिदं यस्मि कर्मेऽथ’, *V.* 56.

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it is strange to notice that it reappears here. The subject matter of discussion which falls under this head is not easy to ascertain. Then comes the topic on liṅga, the subtle intermediate body that migrates into the next world after death. Dṛṣṭi and amūśravika refer to the ordinary means and the Vedic ones respectively; their inefficacy to wipe out the miseries is proved in the kā, 1-2. Next are the topics on miseries (kā, 1) and perfections (kā, 51). Kasāya, which comes afterwards, speaks of ‘attachment’ and such passions as appear as the result of the prevalence of tāmas. Samaya means ‘established conclusion’ and it refers to the criticism of the controversial doctrines of other teachers." Last of all comes the topic on final emancipation.

Thus we find that the second series deals with those principles which come into existence as a result of vikṛti or modification of the primary ones, and this is why it is called Vaiśkṛta-maṇḍala.

Comparing this table of contents of the Śaṭṭitantra with what is furnished by the Rājavārttika, we find that the difference is not negligible. Rājavārttika divides the sixty topics of the Śaṭṭitantra into two groups of ten primary principles and fifty modifications (of the buddhi), whereas the Ahirbudhnya does so into thirty-two and twenty-eight. Further, there are such topics of discussion as occur in one of these two lists, but are conspicuous by their absence in the other. Most interesting is to notice that the tuṣṭis (nine contentments) and aśaktis (twenty-eight forms of disability) are totally ignored by the Ahirbudhnya, whereas a prominent place is assigned to them in the traditional Śaṅkhya. It thus appears that there had been different recensions of the Śaṭṭitantra and hence there are discrepancies. This suggestion is

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1 The term also finds its place in T.K.—रामानुज: कषष्यात्मन्तरिन, Kā. 23.
2 Cf. ‘परकाविविषमताकामि’, Kā. 72.
further corroborated by the evidence of the Ahirbudhnya itself; for this text explicitly states that there are numerous forms of the Saśītantra.

The authorship of Saśītantra is also a controversial problem. From the evidence of the Kārika it appears that Kapila only promulgated the doctrine of Sāṃkhya and it was Pañcaśikha who extensively propagated the system (तेन च बहुः चतुः तत्रत्म, Kā 70). The Chinese commentary on the Kārika sheds some important light here. While commenting upon the above-mentioned expression it states that Pañcaśikha dealt the doctrine elaborately in a treatise of sixty-thousand verses, while the Jayamāṅgalā explicitly mentions him to be the author of Saśītantra, a treatise consisting of sixty chapters. But it does not state anything as regards the bulk of the treatise. Reference is also made of Saśītantra in the Canonical Literature of the Jains, but nothing important can be obtained therefrom. However, the fact that there existed a huge treatise on Sāṃkhya even at an early age, is further borne out by the evidence of the Mbh., where Vasīṭha is found to state that ‘Sāṃkhya consists of a vast literature, so say the wise men’. Again, the additional verse which Māṭhara reads at the very end of the Sāṃkhya-Kārika, also states that Īśvaraḥsa’s compendium is, as it were, a reflection in a mirror of the original text of enormous bulk. Most satisfactory light may be obtained from the Yukti-dipikā which in its introductory remark (p. 1) expressly states that the huge treatise is not possible to master even

1 ‘पञ्चिन्त्रायण्यमेकमेवं नानाविभ चुने’, xii. 29.
2 ‘पञ्चिन्त्रायण्यमेकमेवं पञ्चिन्त्रायण्यमेकमेवं हस्तिमति’, Kā. 70.
3 काविकों-रसिसमतं माउँ…, Uttarādhīyāyana-Sūtra, The same passage with a slight variation in reading, also occurs in the Nandi-Sūtra.
4 तद्वैयमिर्त्यं शास्त्रभियाहुबिस्थो जनय, xii. 307. 46.
5 तत्समयं च तद्वैयमिर्त्यं सत्तमप्रस्थितिविविभवाम्.”
in hundred years\(^{1}\). But it ascribes the authorship of the text to Kapila and not to Pañcaśikha as Paramārtha holds it to be. Elsewhere it states that Śāmkhya consists of several thousand verses\(^{2}\). Speaking briefly, it was the tradition that the original systematic treatise on Śāmkhya consisted of a tremendous volume.

Again, the last verse of the Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa states that the treatise in seventy verses is a compendium of the entire Śaṣṭītantra, divested of parables and controversial doctrines of other teachers. Hence it appears that the Śaṣṭītantra was written in a fashion akin to that of the Great Epic, where also philosophical problems are explained for the most part through parables.

But the difficulty as regards the authorship of this huge treatise is not still removed. The Ahirbudhnya (xii. 30) as well as the Yuktidipika (p. 1) asserts that it was revealed through Kapila. Bhāskara also in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra (II. i. 1) remarks that Kapila was the author of the Śaṣṭītantra (कपिलमहर्षी-प्रणीत-पञ्चिन्त्रमार्थय-स्मृते:). On the other hand, the Jayamaṅgala and the Chinese version of Paramārtha plainly state that Pañcaśikha was its author, and this has been already noticed by us above. Further, Vācaspati has rendered the problem still more complicated. For instance, he holds the verse 'पञ्चिन्त्रमार्थय' etc., as quoted in the Yoga-bhāṣya (i. 47), to be a gāthā (psalm) of Paramarṣi who is no other than Kapila, the great sage. The reason of calling this verse a gāthā is not known. On the otherhand, from the evidence of the Yuktī-dipika\(^{3}\) we know that the verses of the Śaṣṭītantra also were passed as gāthās. But thereby it cannot be definitely
stated whether the said verse also constituted a part of the Śaṣṭi-
tantra. So far it can be said that there had been a philosophical
treatise which passed as the production of Kapila, provided due
regard is paid upon the statement of Vācaspati.

Again, the couplet ‘गुणान्तरसन म हयम्’ etc., is quoted in the
Yoga-bhāṣya (iv. 13) with the introductory remark ‘तथा च शास्त्राचेच
शासनम्’. This shows that the couplet forms the injunction of a
Śastra, but the name of the particular Śastra from which it is
quoted, is not mentioned. Here Vācaspati in his commentary
holds it to be an injunction of the Śaṣṭitantra. The same verse
with a slight variation in reading is also quoted by him in his
commentary on the Brahma-sūtra (ii. i. 3) where it is attributed
to Vārṣaganyya whom he mentions to be the expounder of the
Yoga-śastra. Hence it appears that Vācaspati considered Śaṣṭi-
tantra to be a Yoga treatise and Vārṣaganyya as its author. But
his enumeration of the sixty topics of the Śaṣṭitantra as he quotes
from the Raja-vārttika goes to show that the text consisted of the
different principles of the Śaṅkhya and not of Yoga.

The reason of his regarding Vārṣaganyya as an expounder of
Yoga is difficult to ascertain. In our discussion on ‘Vārṣaganyya
and his followers’, it will be pointed out that the school of Śaṅkhya
as represented in the Yoga-Sūtra and specially in its Bhāṣya is
based upon the school of Vārṣaganyya and not upon that of Isvara-
krṣṇa. This is why perhaps Vācaspati considered Vārṣaganyya
as an expounder of Yoga.

Difference of opinion as regards the style of the text, has
also made the problem more complicated. In their commentary
on the Kā. 17, Gauḍa and Māṭhara are found to quote a prose
fragment from the Śaṣṭitantra². Paramārtha also cites here the

1 See his commentary on Kā. 72.

2 Gauḍa, तथा चैवो श्रद्धिशेष—‘पुरुषार्थिन्तं प्रथानं प्रवेशते’; Māṭhara, अथि
परिष्ठ्यशेष—‘पुरुषार्थिन्तं प्रथानं प्रवेशते’ हति ।
same expression from the said text'. But in his commentary on Kā. 70, he explicitly states that the text consisted of sixty-thousand verses. Further, it has been already noticed above that the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya quotes the verse ‘गुणानां परमं रूपम्’ etc., from the Śāstra while Vācaspāti identifies the Śāstra with the Śaṭītantra. The Yuktidipikā* also quotes profusely from the Śāstra, but curious to notice that all those quotations are in prose.

From these different and divergent accounts, it is difficult to form a correct idea of the Śaṭītantra. Taking everything into consideration, it appears that the nucleus of Sāṃkhya was formulated by Kapila and it was Pāṇeasīkha who propagated the system into a huge treatise of verse. Later on, Vārṣaganyā thought it necessary to re-write the text of Pāṇeasīkha and as a result of this, the original text of verse became an admixture of prose and verse.

The re-writing of a text by a different author is not absolutely new in Sanskrit literature, nay even in the case of Sāṃkhya. From the evidence of the Chinese source, we know that Vindhyavāsin also re-wrote the text of Viṣāgaṇā or Vārṣagana*. Thus we find that different teachers of different ages played their

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1 See, 'as is said in the Treatise of the sixty Categories'; "Nature, it is that in which spirit resides, and it is because of that that she can produce actions'. From the translation of Suryanarayan Sastri.

2 तथा च शास्माद—‘पत्रसमादि महत आभासन हमें न आभासन: सुज्ञमेवैवेकिकसुज्ञापतेऽस्मादब्रह्मण:। आहिमवेषेथ सामायते व्यक्तियते, गुणांधव्यति च गुणविपतेताब्रह्मण:’ इति p. 114; शास्माद—‘तदेततिसमुदहै वेकिकसमुदहै तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते तस्मादेकिते

3 For further about Viṣāgaṇa and Vārṣagana, see our discussion on 'Vārṣaganyā and his followers'.
respective parts in bringing about the Śaṣṭítantra into its final shape. To explain the fact more clearly, we beg to draw the attention of scholars to the medical treatise of Caraka. It is well known that the original text of Agnivesa which was based upon the teachings of Ātreya, was re-written by Caraka. Similary the original text of Pañcasikha which was based upon the teachings of Kapila, was re-written by Vṛṣaganyya. This is why even a single treatise is sometimes ascribed to different teachers though they belong to different age.

_Some Sāṃkhyā teachers as referred to in the Epic_

Reference is made of some teachers in the Epic1 from whom Gandharva Viśvāvasu is said to have received the teachings of the system with twenty five principles. They are Jaigitaśava, Asita-Devala, Parāśara, Vṛṣaganyya, Bhṛgu, Pañcasikha, Kapila, Śuka, Gautama, Ārṣṭiśena, Garga, Nārada, Āsuri, Pulastya, Sanatkumāra, Śukra, Kaśyapa and Rudra-Viśvarūpa.

It is obvious that the list consists of the names of mythical as well as of historical figures. Of these, Jaigitaśava is also mentioned in the Buddha-carita2 as an exponent of Sāṃkhyā along with Janaka and Vṛddha-Parāśara. In xii. 229, the Epic records a dialogue of this great teacher with Devala which is rather ethical than philosophical. In his opinion, the highest stage can be attained by him who is not agitated by blame or praise.

But from some stray references as we get here and there, he appears to be a teacher of Yoga and not that of pure Sāṃkhyā. The Kūrma Purāṇa sheds some light in this connection. It refers to the hermitage of Jaigitaśava as the abode of great Yogins where the teacher used to reside with his disciples, prominent among whom were Śaṅkha, Manohara, Kauśika, Kṛṣṇa, Sumanas

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1 xii. 318. 59 62.
2 xii. 67.
and Vedavāda\(^1\). In another place it mentions him as one of the different incarnations of Mahādeva in the Kali Age and credits him with the epithet Yogendra\(^2\) (foremost of Yogins). The Īśvaragīta (xi. 128) states that he as well as Pañcāsikha was pupil of Kapila.

The Yoga-bhāṣya refers to his view of sense-control\(^3\). In his opinion it is the stage when the senses do not perceive any object and it comes as a result of the full concentration of the thinking faculty. Again in iii. 18, it refers to an instance of his wonderful Yogic achievement. Further, in NVT. (iii. 2. 42), Vācaspati also mentions him as the author of the Dhāraṇā-Śāstra\(^4\).

Let us now turn our attention to Devala. His philosophy as treated in the Mbh. xii. 275, differs to a considerable extent with the orthodox Śāmkhya and this has been already noticed above (pp. 44-5). Further, he is credited with the authorship of a Dharma-Śūtra which also abounds with the tenets and doctrines of Śāmkhya and Yoga. This can be noticed in the following quotations from his text as found in the Aparārka (iii. 109), a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti.

"अथातो धर्मविषयत्वान्त्विथग्रेन्वैः पुरुषायोपदेशः। देवमलुप्तयो दिविविहः पुरुषः—अस्मुद्यो नि:अयस्मिति। तथोरस्मुद्यः पूर्वोपकः। दिविविंश नि:अयस्मप—
साध्यवाचीन्द्रियान्तः साध्यम। विपयेत्वा निपृण्निभुमेश्वरेऽनन्मसो-उस्थापनं योगः। उभयान्वेयाः: फलम्। जन्म-मरण-प्रदक्षिणं योगवत्तमात्मावरेऽपकः।"

Śaṅkara also accuses him of adopting the terms and tenets of Śāmkhya into his Dhrama-Śāstra\(^5\).

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1. i. 47. 17-9.
2. धभिवर्षो धैर्यस्याश्च सहस्रे, i. 52. 5.
3. ॥विचारसमावद्यक्षिपिरे वैधा भैरव:॥, ii. 55.
4. प्रभारादश loadData: 'भैरवमय्यन्यामिकलम्।'
5. ...वेदव्रत्तमध्यमे विविधनदेश्चकैः स्नायुपीतिः, Bhāṣya on BS. I. iv. 28.
The case of Vārṣaganyya will be dealt with in a separate chapter. Kapila, Āsuri and Pañcaśikha have been already noticed above. Nārada is found to give an exposition of his philosophical and ethical views in his advice to Śuka in xii. 329-31. It is interesting to notice that some of his ideas, nay even some expressions and verses also, are found almost verbatim in the philosophical account of the Caraka-Saṃhitā. In another place

1 See, Mbh. xii, 329. 46-52:

Cf. Caraka-Saṃhitā, Śārtra, i:

Śārtra, v. 31-2.

Y—17
it is stated that he taught Śāmkhya to the sons of Dakṣa¹. Sanatkumāra is elsewhere mentioned as one of the mind-born sons of Brahman². Nārada attributes a verse to him³ which he cites before Śuka. Some of his verses are also referred to in xii. 342. 16–9, but they speak of the superiority of Brahmins and nothing else. As regards the philosophical views of others, we know very little worth-mentioning.

POST-PAŃCAŚIKHA ŚĀMKHYA TEACHERS

From the evidence of the Yuktī-dipikā⁴, we know that Pañcaśikha transmitted the knowledge of Śāmkhya to Janaka, Vāṣistha and such other pupils. But the gap between him and Īśvarakṛṣṇa is very wide and from the present state of our knowledge it is not possible to bridge the gulf. The Yuktī-dipikā boldly declares in this connection that the Śāstra was promulgated by Kapila at the beginning (of creation), hence it is not possible like other systems of thought, to enumerate its lineage of teachers even in hundred years⁵. He briefly enumerates the names of some

padat: सन्मूतानि सौविवधाि सब्दरि ।
बक्ष्मपूरवत्संतो न जुद्दयोपपत्ते ॥

1 सहलसिंवधाि सन्मूतानि दक्षणपाञ्ज नाराद:
मोक्षसम्बणवायां संस्कारारसनुचरम्, Mbh. i. 75. 7.

2 The mind-born sons of Brahman are held to be well versed in Śāmkhya and Yoga (एवे युगविद्य मुख्या: कांविवधान विशारदा:, Mbh. xii. 340. 72.). But none of their doctrines have come down to us, except that the Śāmkhya-Sūtra refers to Sanandanaśārya in whose opinion the subtle body is responsible for the connection of prakṛti and puruṣa (विद्वंसिसिसिस्मिस्वात्त्र इति
सनान्ताराय:, vi. 69).

3 Mbh. xii. 329. 5.

4 जनसागरविषयादिकम: समाख्यातम्, p. 175. The Mbh. also mentions Janaka to be a pupil of Pañcaśikha.

5 अस्य तु शात्स्य भगवतोदभ्रुत्वानु न शात्स्यारकर्(त) वंशः शास्यो वर्णे
शतसाहसर्पांवालम्, p. 175.
prominent teachers who appeared between Pañcaśikha and Īśvara-krṣṇa. They are Ḥārita¹, Bādhali, Kairāta, Paurika, Rṣabheśvara, Pañcādhikaraṇa, Patañjali, Vārṣaganyā, Kaṇḍāṇya, Mūka (?) and the like. Similarly Māṭhara mentions the names of Bhārgava, Ulūka, Vālmikin, Ḥārita and Devala, while the Jayamaṅgalā mentions Garga, Gautama and such other teachers who intervened between Pañcaśikha and Īśvara-krṣṇa. All these can be noticed in the following lines:

Māṭhara—‘तस्मान् भागवोक्तक-वाल्मीकि-हारीत-देवत्र-प्र भृ तिना गतम्, तत्स्तेय द्रव्यरक्षणे’ (Kā, 71).

Jaya—‘पञ्चशिलस्तथा गर्ग-वोक्तम-प्र भृ ति जीर्णां अक्ष्याः (?) द्रव्यरक्षण-नामां निर्माणकमित्वनय शिश्यपरमपरया.

Everywhere the term ‘प्रभुति’ indicates a wide gap. It is Paramārtha who attempts to bridge the gulf. In his opinion, Pañcaśikha transmitted the knowledge of Śāmkhya to Ho-kia, Ho-kia to Ulūka, Ulūka to Po-p‘o-li and Po-p‘o-li to Īśvara-krṣṇa. But the gulf is not so narrow as he thinks it to be.

Of the teachers mentioned above, nothing is known about Ḥārita, Kairāta, Rṣabheśvara, Kaṇḍāṇya, Mūka (?) Bhārgava, Ulūka², Vālmikin, Garga and Gautama as teachers of Śāmkhya, except that some of these names only find their place in the list of the Epic. Devala has been noticed in the previous chapter. Ho-kia of the Chinese is read as Kat‘kia in the Japanese version and this seems to be Garga of Sanskrit. Po-p‘o-li is read as

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¹ There is a lacunae in the Ms. of the Yukti-dīpikā just before the name of Ḥārita; thus it appears that the names of some other teachers have been left out here.

² It is peculiar indeed to notice that Śrutadeva Śūri attributes the Śāmkhya system to Ulūka. See सांक्तमुद्दातेः सांक्तायोगपरंतमेवम्—Com. on Vaśistilaka Campū, Vol III. p. 111.
Bat'ba-li in the Japanese version and this corresponds to Baddhali of the Yukti-dipikā. He is also referred to in the Tattvārtha-Rajavārttika of the Jains as an advocate of the doctrine of non-action (अक्त्र्यावाद) along with Kapila Gārgya, Māthara and others.

The remaining teachers, such as Paurika, Pañcādhikaraṇa, Patañjali and Vārṣagāṇya deserve special treatment.

Paurika

This teacher is only referred to in the Yukti-dipikā. In his opinion, there is a separate prakṛti attached to each puruṣa. Thus he deviates from the orthodox Sāṁkhya which is very keen to establish the unity of prakṛti. Guṇaratna Sūrya attributes this doctrine of the plurality of prakṛtis to the ancient teachers. That this theory was current in Sāṁkhya at a very early period can be further proved from the fact that even Vārṣagāṇya is found to criticise it. This can be noticed in a quotation from him in the Yoga-bhāṣya wherein he refutes the plurality of prakṛti—the ultimate cause.

1 Takakusu’s suggestion of the sanskrit original of Po-po’li is not convincing. Finding it difficult to get back to the original, he suggests that Po-po’li is a mistake for Po-li-so; Jap., Bat-li-sha, Sk. Vīśā (cf. Vārṣagāṇya)—La Sāṁkhya Kārikā, p. 148, n. 3. Had he been aware of Baddhali as a teacher of Sāṁkhya, the problem would not be so much puzzling to him.


3 प्रत्यूत्कर्ममुन्न्य, प्रथानां शरीरवार्थ करति। वेयात्र मात्रात्मशरीरार्थार्थान यदा प्रवर्तिते तदेवतार्थाय, तदित्वात्रत्वं व वैपुत्रण निर्दिशितिः पि रि क: साक्षात्यायो मन्वयेत्, Yuktidipikā, p. 169.

4 मौलिकसांख्यो शास्त्रार्थार्थमात्रान्त्रि प्रश्न शृङ्ख्लाप्रश्नानं वर्तन्ति, उच्चे द्व सांख्य: सांवत्स्वर्थायं नित्यं प्रश्नान्तिति प्रश्नाः, commentary on Śaḍārśana-Sāmuccaya, Sāṁkhya Section.

5 मूलिकशिष्यमित्रमित्रदाचार्यार्थिः मूलप्रश्नकल्पिति सांख्यं, iii. 53.
His views on some critical points of Sāṃkhya are referred to here and there in the Yukti-dipika. According to the Kārikā, the organs are thirteen in number whereas he regards only ten as such. Further, in his opinion they cannot function out of their own accord. They are like a dry river and whenever there is an influx from the prakṛti, it is then only that they can operate. Most interesting is to notice that unlike other teachers of Sāṃkhya he holds the indriyas to be elemental products. The process in which the puruṣa enters into migration is also explained by him in a different manner. The point will be specially treated by us in our discussion on ‘the subtle-intermediate body’. He also deviates from Īsvarakṛṣṇa in his classification of the bhāvas. However, like Paurika he is not an absolutely new figure in the Sanskrit literature; for he is also referred to in the Naresvara-Parikṣa as well as in the Padmapāda’s commentary on the Prapañcasāra-Tantra.

**Patañjali**

The view of one Patañjali is referred to here and there in the Yukti-dipika. He plainly denies the separate existence of

1. दशविषयमिति तास्तिकाः प्रज्ञाधिकरण-प्रवृत्तम्; Yukti-dipika, p. 132 infra.
2. करणं नितिकिरितिक्षचेति तु श्रवणिमृण्डुपक्षम्; प्रज्ञाधिकिरिति कृति प्राणाः प्राणां श्रवणिमृण्डुपक्षम्; ibid p. 108. Also see p. 114 supra.
3. भौतिकान्तिनिर्यात्त्राति प्रज्ञाधिकरणमेति; ibid p. 108.
4. ibid p. 147-8.
5. The text reads the name of the teacher as Pañcāṅgādhiḥkarana. However, he is not different from Pañcāṅgādhiḥkarana, the Sāṃkhya teacher. See, Nāyavistarikāvārttikā-वैदिकविश्वविद्याविनितविकल्पम्; बलो नेबे दोप; प्रति प बा रा धि-के र रा;। यदाहे—ताहीय-प्रतिविद्या साधनं भीम आत्मानि’ प्रतिति; p. 19, infra.
6. See, कशं कष्टायेव इति। तस्माद दशायति... रेत: शौचित्यमिति प्रा धिकरण नां प्रा; i. 94-7.
ahāṅkāra\(^1\), for he holds egoism as the function of the intellect. Unlike Pañcādhikaraṇa, he is of opinion that the organs wholly act from within and not from without\(^2\). He has also got his independent view on the subtle intermediate body, which we intend to deal with in a separate chapter along with that of Pañcādhikaraṇa and others. Padmapāda also refers to his view in the commentary on the Prapañcāsāra Tantra\(^3\).

But it is strange to notice that these views are not supported anywhere in the Yoga-Sūtra or in its Bhāṣya. This tends to suggest that there were different philosophers of the name of Patañjali.

Alberuni also translated some passages from the work of one Patañjali. Unfortunately, most of those passages cannot be traced in the Yoga-Sūtra or in its Bhāṣya. However, from the evidence of his translation it is risky to assume the existence of a different philosopher of the name of Patañjali other than the author of the Yoga-Sūtra, for the simple reason that his translation scarcely observes fidelity to the original text. This is evident from the fact that in the translation of some verses of the Bhagavat-Gītā as found here and there in his work, he has traversed a long way off from the original.

A Ms. of a text of the title of Yoga-Darpana, attributed to one Patañjali, is noticed in the ‘Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit Mss. in the Central Provinces and Berar\(^4\). But no opinion can be passed until it may be thoroughly examined.

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1 सैन्याब्दहारे विषयं श्रयं प एव विश्रयं; महतीस्मिन्दन्यानपवस्तान्युपमानाद, Yukti-dipikā, p. 32. supra.

2 करणां श्रवणेष्वरा द्राः द्रास्त्रं श्रवणं रूपं श्रवणं न द्रास्त्रं श्रवणं पताकास्य; ibid, p. 108.

3 कर्मेः क्षेत्रधारणेष्व हृदिः तत्र मतमेव दर्श्यति—नैपाद नैपादोत्सर्वमिति पताकास्य-निःसंतान्याविद्यमयम्; i. 94-7-

Orthodox Scholars regard Patañjali of the Yoga-Sūtra and the author of the Mahābhāṣya as the same man. But from internal evidence, we do not find any such clue as may help us to establish their identity. On the contrary, the thing appears to be otherwise if we compare the grammarian’s conception of dravya (substance) with that of the philosopher. According to the grammarian, substance is the aggregate of attributes (गुणसमूहोऽव्ययः)¹; whereas in the opinion of the philosopher, it is the aggregate of components which are inseparably connected with one another (अभ्युविश्वाक्षरमेधान्तः समूहोऽव्यमिति पताकः)². Thus we find that the grammarian’s conception of the same has not attained such a developed stage as that of the philosopher. Again, the Yoga-Sūtra seems to attack the doctrine of the Viśiṣṭavādins and it is doubtful whether their doctrine could attain such prominence as may deserve criticism of reputed scholars even at the time of the author of the Mahābhāṣya which is usually admitted to be the middle of the second century B.C.

VĀRṢAGANṆṆA AND HIS FOLLOWERS

Vārṣaganyya is a distinguished teacher of Śāmkhya, but unfortunately none of his systematic works has come down to us. All that we can know of him are a few references to his views scattered in the Sanskrit literature³. However, he is a very ancient authority on Śāmkhya, for the Mbh.⁴ even mentions him as a teacher on the subject. The name also appears in the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali⁵, but it is not certain whether the particular teacher is referred to there. In our opinion he re-wrote

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1 Mahābhāṣya, IV. i. 1 (Vārttika, 7).
2 Yogabhāṣya, iii. 44.
3 Yuktidiśikā, pp. 72, 108, 130; Nyāyavārttikā-tātparyaśākā, I. i. 4; Yogabhāṣya, iii. 44.
4 xii. 318, 59.
5 Pā, I. i. 51 (Vārttika, 2).
the original Şaṣṭitaptra of Pañcaśikha, and this has been already discussed above (pp. 126-7).

His followers (बार्षंगणः:) are frequently referred to in the Yuktidipika, but they do not always hold the same view as that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. They are also referred to in Padmapāda’s commentary on the Prapāṇḍasāra Tantra, Rasaavaisēśika-Sūtra and Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu.

Some Chinese texts also seem to speak of this teacher and his followers. But in some cases the authors of those texts have suggested fanciful etymology of Sanskrit proper names, hence the accounts furnished by them cannot be always much estimated. For instance, in his commentaries on the Vijñānamātra-Siddhi and Nyāyānusāra, Kuei-chi, the pupil of Yuan-chhwang says: "The Sāṃkhya school was formerly split up into eighteen different groups, the head of which was Fa-li-cha meaning ‘Rain’ (वर्ष). His associates were all called the ‘Rain-host’ (बार्षंगण:)”. Evidently he refers here to the followers of Vāraṇagāṇa who are called ‘बार्षंगणः’ in Sanskrit. But he failed to understand the real significance of the original Sanskrit name ‘बार्षंगण’ which usually denotes a follower of Vāraṇagāṇa. Instead of having the term derived from ‘बार्षंगणः’, he wrongly takes it to be the juxtaposition of two words ‘बार्षि’ (pertaining to Varṣa:) and ‘गणः’ (host). Thus in his

2 (श्रेणः:) महाराजादाराराद भो रसः पाकशः तद्वारण गमेन्तारीरं विशालति बार्षंगणः: i. 94-7.
3 आदिवार्षिकारीनः बार्षंगणः: (णा:), भौलूक्या: दुनसातिःकाटि, iii. 2, p. 124.
4 See, ‘In the end it comes to the same as the theory of the followers of Vāraṇagāṇa. According to them there is neither production of something new nor extinction of something existent; what exists is always existent, what does not exist will never become existent’. Vasubandhu on Sarvāstivāda—Stcherbatsky, Central conception of Buddhism, p. 89.
5 Pointed out by Takakusu, J. R. A. S., 1905, p. 44.
opinion ‘चारण’ means the associates of Varṣa—an interpretation which is not at all convincing. This is not the only instance of his fanciful etymology. Even while speaking of Kapila, the propounder of Sāṃkhya, he states that the term denotes ‘red’ and the teacher was called such as his complexion was red.

Paramārtha in his ‘Life of Vasubandhu’ states that Pi-li-cha-kia-na, the king of the Nāgas, having assumed the form of a sage lived at the foot of the mountain of Vindhyā. He was well versed in Sāṃkhya, and Vindhyavāsa was his pupil. The name of the teacher is read as ‘Bi-ri-sha-gaṇa’ in the Japanese version, and in the opinion of Takakusu the original name was either Vṛṣagaṇa or Vārṣagaṇa. The former suggestion does not seem to be plausible; for Vṛṣagaṇa is not mentioned anywhere else as a teacher of Sāṃkhya. With regard to him so far it may be said that he is a progenitor and Vārṣagaṇya was his descendent. The Yuktidīpikā also refers to one Vṛṣagaṇa-vīra who is no other than Vārṣagaṇya himself for the term ‘vīra’ in sanskrit means a ‘son’ which again in its wider sense passes even for a descendent. Speaking briefly, Vārṣagaṇya which is an appellation, is grammatically derived from Vṛṣagaṇa and there is no reasonable ground to regard the progenitor also as a teacher of Sāṃkhya.

If it is a fact that Paramārtha really meant Vṛṣagaṇa to be the teacher of Vindhyavāsa, he probably did so for the reason that he found Vindhyavāsa generally passing as ‘Vārṣagaṇa’ in the Sāṃkhya literature, and by Vārṣagaṇa he wrongly meant a follower of Vṛṣagaṇa; but he failed to understand that the same term may

1 See Takakusu’s Introduction on ‘La Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, p. 38, Supra.
2 The original Chinese name is 咭梨沙伽那.
3 La Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, Introd., p. 40 infra.
4 The grammarians read the name in the ‘गार्दि’ class.
5 See p. 130.
also mean a follower of Vārṣagaṇya¹, the reputed teacher of Śāmkhya and not that of Vṛṣagaṇa, the progenitor.

The alternative suggestion of Takakusu seems to be more probable. In this case Vārṣagaṇa becomes the teacher of Vindhyavāsa. Vārṣagaṇa also is an appellation given to a follower of Vārṣagaṇya and thereby Vindhyavāsa becomes a remote follower of Vārṣagaṇya.

**Vārṣagaṇya, his followers and the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya**

It has been already noticed above that the tenets and doctrines of Śāmkhya referred to in the Yoga-bhāṣya, do not always tally with those of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The reason is not very far to seek. From a careful perusal, it reveals that the Bhāṣya follows the Vārṣagaṇya school of Śāmkhya and specially that of Vindhyavāsin. This can be noticed from the fact that the author of the Bhāṣya in support of his statements, occasionally quotes fragments from the works of Vārṣagaṇya and his followers. For instance, in anticipation to the objection as to how a single entity can consist of the characteristics of pleasure, pain and delusion which are contradictory to one another, he remarks² (ii. 15) :—

रूपातिशया चूत्यतिशयाय परस्परेण विबन्धयन्ते, सामात्यानि त्वतिदयै: सदि प्रवान्तः (The forms as well as the functions when in their intensity, are contradictory to one another; the ordinary ones, however can co-operate with those that are in their intensity). The idea is this:—the forms here speak of the eight forms of buddhi which are virtue, wisdom, dispassion and the like; while the functions refer to pleasure, pain and delusion—the so called characteristics of the gunas. When all these are in their zenith and equally ready to function, it is then only that they can contradict one

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1 See, कथादित्तमो मोक्षे, Pa, 4. 2. 111.
2 The author again quotes this expression in iii. 13, while Vācaspati holds it to be the view of Paṇcaśikha,
another; but when one of them is in its ordinary form, it can easily co-operate with the other which has gone to the extreme. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, unlike the Yogabhāṣya, explains the same by the illustration of the wick, oil and the lamp which though contradictory to one another, work together for a single end (Ka, 18).

Thus we find that the manner of exposition of the two teachers is different. But the above-mentioned fragment by which the author of the Bhaṣya made his position clear, is also quoted in the Yuktidīpikā where it is attributed to Vārṣaṅgaṇya. This tends to suggest that he was influenced by the doctrine of this celebrated exponent of Sāṃkhya. In another place of his Bhaṣya (III, 53) also, our author substantiates his own statement by a quotation from this teacher.

Secondly, the reply of the Bhaṣya to a charge of the Buddhists against Sāṃkhya, reveals some amount of interest in this connection. The Buddhists accuse Sāṃkhya for maintaining the existence of an abiding principle (धर्मि) which manifests itself in and through its properties (धर्म्). They argue:—The object has no separate existence of its own, apart from its properties. If the object continued its existence even through the various modifications of the properties, its reality would be the same even in its past and future stages. It would thus lead to its immutable eternity like that of the puruṣa. To this charge of the opponent the author of the Bhaṣya replies that his system does not maintain the immutable eternity of an object like that of the puruṣa. In this connection, he makes his position well established by the introduction of the following logical argument (iii, 13):—

तद्वेति भैलोक्यं व्यवहारप्रति न्यत्तप्रतिपति। कस्मात्? नित्यतप्रतिपतिः। अपेतमप्रति विनायप्रतिपतिः। संसाराद्या सौध्यम, सौध्याद्यानुपविभिन्नति।

The idea is this: The object, nay even the entire universe, is liable to enter into its past stage from the stage of its mani—

1 तथा ज मोहनान्। बा व ह ग्यः परति—‘क्यतिद्विया...’, p. 72, supra.
festation; thus it is not (absolutely) eternal. Though it becomes past, thereby it does not lose its very existence; it then only lies in its latent stage into its primary cause and this is why it cannot be perceived then.

It is curious to notice that the aforesaid lines are attributed to the followers of Vāraṇagāṇya in the Yuktī-dipikā. The Nyāya-Bhāṣya as well as the Vārttika also refers to these lines, but does not mention the source.

Thirdly, the followers of Vāraṇagāṇya are of opinion that there is neither production of something new nor extinction of something existent; what exists is always existent, what does not exist will never become existent. The Yoga-Bhāṣya (iv. 11) also utters verbatim the first half of this expression and this may be noticed in the line:—‘नास्त्यसत: सम्भव:, न चास्ति सतो विनाश’.

Vātsyāyana also refers to a similar expression. Evidently, all these expressions speak of the Sāṃkhya theory of causation. But Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s manner and language of expounding the same is different.

Further, the Yoga-Bhāṣya (ii. 23) states that ‘अद्वेदन’ (ignorance, lit. non-perception) is the cause of the conjunction of prakṛti and puruṣa, and at the same time refers to the various interpretations of the term attempted by other teachers of Sāṃkhya. Even Vātsyāyana also refers to the term. This shows that the term played an important part in the ancient literature of Sāṃkhya. Īśvarakṛṣṇa only hints upon the same in the expression ‘न दन्तनुपैति पुरुष’ (Kā, 61), but he is not found to attach any importance upon the term.

1 तथा च वा पै ग णा: पद्धिन—तत्तेतार वैसिकवयं... p, 89.
2 N. Bh. i, ii. 6.
3 See, Stcherbatsky, Central conception of Buddhism, p. 89.
4 ‘नस्ति आस्माः, न सत आस्मानस्...इति सांख्यानाम’, N. Bh. I, i, 29.
5 N. Bh. III, ii. 68.
Most interesting is to notice that in numerous instances, the Bhāṣya follows the view of Vindhyavāsin. Firstly, we know from the evidence of Kumārila⁴ that Vindhyavāsin rejects the doctrine of the subtle intermediate body called ‘अन्तराभववेदन’⁵. The Bhāṣya⁶ also is not prepared to accept the same.

Secondly, Vindhyavāsin, unlike Īśvarkṛṣṇa, is of opinion that the ahamkāra as well as the five subtle elements come out from the buddhi⁷; the Bhāṣya⁸ also endorses the same view.

Thirdly, Bhoja in his commentary on the Yoga-sūtra (iv. 23) attributes the expression ‘सत्वतपत्यत्वस्तः पुरुषपत्यत्वस्तः’ to Vindhyavāsin. It means that it is the buddhi which is afflicted by rajas; but the purusa also appears to be afflicted in as much as he is reflected in the buddhi which is transparent like a looking glass. A similar expression is also to be met with in the Yoga-bhāṣya (सत्वे ततष्माते तदारात्तुरोधी पुरुषोज्ज्वलयत्व इति दास्यते, ii. 17).

Fourthly, in the opinion of Vindhyavāsin everything is experienced in the mind⁹ and not in the buddhi as other teachers of Sāṃkhya hold. A similar view is also hinted in the expression ‘एकात्म नन्द: सत्वम’ in the Yoga-bhāṣya (ii. 19).

All these facts tend to suggest that the theoretical portions of the Yoga-bhāṣya is based upon the system of Vārṣaganya and his followers.

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1 Śloka-vārttika. ātmavāda, 62.
2 See, चतुर्थधार्माण्डीपम्पं संकोचविकाशि सिष्यं सर्वपरिमाणाकारां भाष्मिषयने प्रतिपन्न:, तथा चा त रा भव: संसारकं वृक्त शिलं। इतिरविश्व विमुन: संकोच-विकाशिनीश्वानेन:, IV. 10.
3 यहत: याबविशेषं सत्त्वते, पञ्चसत्त्वाणां नकलाकर्षकं व नत्व वा सिंभनेन:, Yukti-dipikā, p. 108.
4 See, ii. 19, but it is peculiar to notice that in another place (i.45) he closely follows the ordinary view.
5 ...सत्वाणांविन्धवभि:, सन्ति विन्धववासिन:, Yukti-dipikā, p. 108.
Vindhyavāsin is one of the celebrated exponents of Sāṃkhya whose views are referred to here and there in the Sanskrit literature. He is somewhere mentioned as Vindhyā-nivāsa and elsewhere as Vindhyavāsa. For instance, Kumārila in his Śloka-vārttika says:

तेन नायन्त्रभिभ्रोधः साख्यमिति वर्णितम्।
प्रत्येक विन्ध्यविवासेन आत्मः साहित्यमुच्यते॥

The commentator Umbeka remarks here: विन्ध्यविवासिनोपि तिष्ठन्तिः साख्यमिति वर्णितां नायन्त्रभिभ्रोधः. Thus we find that the commentator regards Vindhyānivāsa as a synonym of Vindhyavāsin. Again, Kumārila refers to Vindhyavāsin's view of the rejection of the subtle intermediate body in the hemisticch: 'अन्तरामक्षेत्रस्तु निष्टद्विविन्ध्यवासिनः' while Medhatithi in his Bhaṣya on Manu (i. 55) ascribes the same view to Vindhyāvāsa whom he mentions to be an advocate of Sāṃkhya. This can be noticed in the expression 'साख्या अयं केवलात्मरामविविभाष्टित। विन्ध्यवासिसम्भवतः. Hence it is clear that Vindhyavāsin, Vindhyā-nivāsin and Vindhyavāsa refer to one and the same person. This fact invalidates the assumption of Prof. Keith who in his Karma-mīmāṃsā (p. 59) considers Vindhyavāsin and Vindhyavāsa as two distinct persons, one being a teacher of Sāṃkhya and the other of Mīmāṃsā.

Vindhyavāsin and Vyādi

Pt. Tanusukharam in his introduction to the Māṭhara-vṛtti endavours to establish the identity of Vindhyavāsin with Vyādi, the famous grammarian. His contention is that some lexicographers are found to read Vindhyavāsin as a synonym of Vyādi. Further light is shed in this connection by Umbeka who in his

1 Ākrīṭivāda, 76.
2 Śloka-vārttika, ātmavāda 62.
introductory remark on a verse of the Śloka-vārttika' states: 'अन्तः व्याधिराहः, पिण्डसाहात्म्यमेव सामान्यमिति'. Again, under another verse of the same book² he says: किंतु, विन्यासात्मको धिष्ठी मन्त्र कर्तव्यसंभवाय: साह्यमेव सामान्यमिति. Thus the commentator attributes the view 'पिण्डसाहात्म्य सामान्यम्' (universality does not differ from similarity) in one place to Vyādi and in another place to Vindhyavāsin, and thereby establishes their identity.

Again, Kumārila in his discussion on 'आक्तिवाद' holds Vindhyavāsin to be the advocate of 'व्यक्तिवाद'; while Śyālikanātha in his commentary on Prabhakara's Vṛhati (1.iii.33) states Vyādi to be the same (अतो व्यक्तिमिधानी मन्त्रे व्यक्तिरिति निदित्तितम्). Thus the doctrine of vyakti is ascribed by one author to Vindhyavāsin and by the other to Vyādi. This fact also shows that Vindhyavāsin and Vyādi was the same man.

Much has been said in favour of identity of the two teachers. But we are still hesitating to hold the view that the two names speak of one and the same person. First of all, Vindhyavāsin is an exponent of Sāṁkhya, while Vyādi generally passes as a distinguished grammarian. Thus we find that the sphere of activity of the two teachers is different. Secondly, all the tenents and doctrines ascribed to Vyādi in the Sanskrit literature, speak more or less of grammatical speculations and none of them falls under the province of pure Sāṁkhya. It is indeed true that Sāṁkhya, as we know from the evidence of the Yuktī-dipikā³, regards 'सामान्य' (universality) to be nothing but 'साह्य' (similarity)—a view which again is ascribed to Vyādi by Umbeka, yet it is mainly concerned with grammatical speculation and very

1 Ākṛtivāda, 65.
2 ibid, 76.
3 See, न हि व: सामान्यं द्विवादयोगसूत्रशरसितं, साह्यवस्तवस्मातः सामान्यान्य्यमिति-कल्पनां, p. 76.
little to do with Śāmkhya proper. Thirdly, Vyādi is a very ancient teacher; for he is referred to even in the Vārttika of Kātyāyana¹, while the Kathāsarit-sāgara (1. ii) mentions him to be a contemporary of Pāṇini. He is usually held to be the author of Saṁgraha— a huge treatise on the philosophy of grammar. Patañjali also refers to the text in the Mahābhāṣya (p. 6). Bhartṛhari while speaking of this Saṁgraha in his Vākyapadīya², states that it was impossible on the part of the ordinary grammarians to grasp the huge text. As a result of this, it became extinct during his time. Considering everything we find that Vyādi lived at a period some centuries before Christ and consequently Vindhyaśāsin also must be placed at the same age if he is held to be identical with Vyādi. But such an early date on the part of the Śāmkhya teacher, seems to be over lapping. The plausible view is that Vindhyaśāsin is an appellation³ given to both the teachers. Of these, one is a Śāmkhya teacher, the other being a grammarian.

The fact that Vindhyaśāsin was an appellation given to the Śāmkhya teacher while his real name was Rudrila, is further borne out by the evidence of the following verse quoted by Kamala Śila in his commentry on the Tattva Saṁgraha (p. 22):

यदेव दशि तत् क्रीरं यत् क्रीरं तदू दर्धिति च।
वर्द्धति सैंरिणेत्र व्यापिता विन्ध्यशासिता॥

From the statement of Paramārtha⁴ we know that Vindhyaśāsa composed some couplets in which he revised the doctrine of

1. Dr. Whitman, J. G.; Pa. I. ii. 64 (45).
2. See, ii. 484 & 488.
3. Both Vyādi and Vindhyaśāsin are common names. Alberuni refers to one Vyādi as an alchemist who lived at the time of the king Vikramāditya of Ujjain—XVII. pp. 189-91.
4. Similarly, one Vindhyaśāsin is mentioned as the author of Lohapradīpa—See, Altenreich, Catalogus Catalogorum.
5. See his ‘Life of Vasubandhu,’ translated from the original Chinese by Takakusu—Tsung Pao, July 1904.
his teacher Pi-li-ch'a-kia-na. Further, he is said to have defeated Buddhmitra, the teacher of Vasubandhu in a debate. Upon this, the king Vikramāditya of Ayodhyā who had been an adherent of Sāṃkhya, rewarded him with three lacs of gold. Vasubandhu was then at Puruṣapura (modern Peshwar). On hearing the news of the defeat of his teacher, he came to Ayodhyā and challenged Vindhyavāsa for a further debate. Finding no response from the heretic, he searched him here and there and at last found him dead in the Vindhyā mountain. He then composed Paramārtha-Saptati—a treatise in seventy verses, as a refutation to the revised work of Vindhyavāsa. The crown prince Bālāditya was his patron.

Let us now examine the statement of Paramārtha. As regards the couplets composed by Vindhyavāsa we know nothing except that Ṣūraudra Sūri in his account of Sāṃkhya in the Śaḍdarśana-Samuccaya quotes a verse which he ascribes to Vindhyavāsin. The same verse is also referred to in the Vyomavattā without mentioning the source.

It is also true that Vindhyavāsin revised the Sāṃkhya-Śāstra generally current at his time. For instance, the early definition of perception is 'अध्यात्मिकस्त्रिबृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षम्,' whereas Vindhyavāsin holds it to be 'अध्यात्मिकस्त्रिबृत्तिरविकलिपिका'. Again, Sāṃkhya generally holds the five subtle elements to be the products of ahamkāra, but he maintains that ahamkāra as well as the five subtle

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1 पुरुषोपिकृतालंशक विषयाकृतमकृत्यानां, मनः करोति साविक्ष्याद्यापि: रस्ति को वर्ता ।
2 P. 521 (Chowkhaamba).
3 Referred to in the Yukti-dipikā, p. 4; Nyāya-vārttika, i. i. 4;
Pramāṇa-Samuccaya of Diṇnāga, p. 64 (restored into Sanskrit by R.
Iyengar.)
4 See अध्यात्मिकस्त्रिबृत्तिरविकलिपिके ति नयः वा ति-प्रत्यक्ष-श्रवण-नारेमेव निरस्तवः,
Sanmats-tarkaprabarana, p. 533; also referred to in the Nyāya-
mañjari, p. 100 (Vizianagram edition).

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elements come out from Buddhī. Besides these, there are many other points in which he deviates from his predecessors and these will be treated in their proper place.

The reference to the debate of Vindhyaśāsa with the teacher of Vasubandhu and the subsequent reward of the former by the king Vikramāditya of Ayodhyā, deserves special attention. If this be the case, Vindhyaśāsa becomes an elder contemporary of Vasubandhu. But the date of Vasubandhu is controversial. It was placed in the last three quarters of the fifth century A. D. by Takakusu. But on the strength of Chinese source N. pérī placed it a century earlier, while V. A. Smith further pushed it back to 280-360 A. D. Further light in this connection is shed by Vāmana who in his Kāvyālāṅkāra Sūtra-vṛtti quotes the last half of a verse which runs thus:

कोट्यं सम्प्रति चन्द्रप्रस्यतन्यकद्राकाशो युवा,
जातो भूपतिराश्रयः इत्यथियाय दिष्ट्याः इत्तत्त्वयोः।

The idea is this: 'The very son of Candragupta, young and shining like the Moon, a patron of men of letters, fortunately in the success of his effort has now become king'. Here Vāmana remarks that the expression 'आर्य: इत्तत्वियाय' (patron of men of letters) indicates a reference to the minstership of Vasubandhu. Thus we find that Vasubandhu received patronage of the son of Candragupta. Now, who is this Candragupta? Is he Candragupta I, the founder of the Gupta Empire or his grand son Candragupta II? In our opinion he seems to be the latter; for it is he and not the former who assumed the title of Vikramāditya.

1 See above, p. 141, n3.
3 BEFEO, xi, 356 ff.
4 The Early History of India, appendix iv.
5 III. ii. 2, p. 86.
6 आर्यः इत्तत्वियागत्यस्म व सु वर्णः—सानियोपपरवात्रां साध्विप्रत्ववम्.
and in every possibility identical with the king Vikramāditya of Ayodhya as referred to by Paramārtha. If our suggestion is right, the verse quoted by Vāmana speaks of the achievements of Kumāragupta, the son of Candragupta II. The date of his accession to the throne is usually held to be 413 A. D. Consequently the Sāmkhya teacher who was rewarded by his father, died not later than in the beginning of the fifth century A. D.

Nothing is definitely known of the Paramārtha Saptati of Vasubandhu. Kamala Śila only refers to the text and does not furnish with any detail. However, he quotes a verse in his commentary (p. 22) which apparently seems to be a quotation from the text of Vasubandhu; but he does not mention the source. The verse runs thus:

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\text{यदेव दृढ़ि तनं क्षीरं यत् क्षीरं तद् दृढ़िति च ।}
\text{वद्यता दृढ़िदेवै द्विपिता विन्ध्यवासिता ॥}
\]

Here Vindhyavāsin is indirectly called a beast. The real name of the Sāmkhya teacher was Rudrila, while Vindhyavāsin was an appellation given to him. As the teacher is of opinion that milk and curd do not differ materially—the Sāmkhya theory of causation which makes no distinction between the material cause and its effect, so the opponent sarcastically remarks in this couplet that the appellation Vindhyavāsin really befits Rudrila for such silly utterance. The idea is this: Vindhyavāsin literally means an inhabitant of the mountain of Vindhya, and it is a beast that usually inhabits a mountain.

As this verse mercilessly criticises Vindhyavāsin, hence some are of opinion that it may constitute one of the couplets of Paramārtha-Saptati where Vasubandhu is said to have refuted the view of the Sāmkhya teacher. However, this is a mere suggestion and there is no conclusive evidence in support of it.

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1 आचार्यवेत्ताविद्याप्रमिति: कोश-परमाधासांतिकादिध्विप्रवाहवकालानां पराकान्तम्, p. 129.
Unlike Paramártha, Yuan-chwang¹ mentions Manoratha to be the teacher of Vasubandhu. His pupil Kuei-chi² also narrates a similar account of a debate between a Sāmkhya teacher and a Buddhist; but he does not mention their names. He states that the Sāmkhya teacher composed the ‘Gold-Seventy’, a metrical treatise in seventy couplets in which he revised the doctrine of Sāmkhya. It was called such, as the king awarded the author with gold for his triumph in the debate. Vasubandhu composed ‘Paramártha-Saptati’ in opposition to the ‘Gold-Seventy’.

This ‘Gold-Seventy’ is no other than the ‘Sāmkhya-Saptati’ of Iṣvarakṛṣṇa; for the latter also is a treatise of seventy stanzas. Further light in this connection is shed by the Catalogue of Nānjiō where it is found that ‘Gold-Seventy’ was the familiar name of the Sāmkhya-Saptati in China³. Mention is also made of one ‘Kanaga-Sattari’ (Sk. Kanaka-Saptati) along with Kābila, Saṭṭhitanta and Māḍhara in the canonical literature of the Jains⁴. It thus appears that Kanaka-Saptati, Gold-Seventy and the Sāmkhya-Saptati speak of the same treatise. If this be the case, Vasubandhu wrote his ‘Paramártha-Saptati’ in opposition to the Sāmkhya-Saptati, i.e., the Kārikā of Iṣvarakṛṣṇa. On the other hand, Paramártha states that Vasubandhu did so with a view to refuting the revised Sāmkhya work of Vindhyavāsa. How to account for these two conflicting statements? Takakusu⁵ attempted to get rid of the difficulty by holding Iṣvarakṛṣṇa and Vindhyavāsa as the same man. But these two teachers are sometimes found to hold different and even contradictory views on some important

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⁴ See above, p. 123, n3.
points of Sāṃkhya; hence it is far from convincing that they were one and the same man. For instance, Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition of perception is ‘प्रतिविधियाव्यक्तिसयो रद्धम्’, whereas Vindhyavāsin defines it as ‘अवतात्सारविविधविकवाक्यां’. The former advocates the doctrine of the subtle intermediate body, whereas the latter rejects it altogether. One is of opinion that the organs are thirteen in number while the other regards only eleven as such. Besides these, there are many other points where one deviates from the other.

Further, there is evidence to prove that Vindhyavāsin was a predecessor of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. In course of discussing on the different members of a syllogistic reasoning, the Yukti-dipikā remarks that Īśvarakṛṣṇa did not dwell upon them for the simple reason that these had been already treated by Vindhyavāsin and such other teachers in their respective works; hence it is needless on the part of Īśvarakṛṣṇa to repeat them here. This fact clearly indicates that the author of the Yukti-dipikā knew Vindhyavāsin to be a predecessor of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The Pramāṇa-mimamsā (p. 39) of the Jains also considers Vindhyavāsin to be earlier than Īśvarakṛṣṇa. While referring to the heretical conceptions of perception, the said text observes that perception, according to the early teachers of Sāṃkhya is ‘अवतात्सारविविधविकवाक्यां’, whereas Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines it as ‘प्रतिविधियाव्यक्तिसयो रद्धम्’. The former, as has been already pointed out above, constitutes the definition of Vindhyavāsin and the latter that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Thus the identity of Vindhyavāsa and Īśvarakṛṣṇa, as proposed by Takakusu cannot be established at all, and as a result of this it has become impossible to reconcile the conflicting statements of Paramārtha and Kuei-chi.

However, let us turn our attention to Kuei-chi and see whether any other evidence may be obtained in favour of his state-

1 Also see Gopinath Kaviraj's Introduction on Jayamaingali.
2 तम्भानलरे दिष्के सशस्यमुय्यमयिं चाविष्ठविद्यां......... विशालविद्या, p. 4.
ment. Unlike Paramārtha, he states that Vasubandhu wrote his Paramārtha-Saptati in opposition to the Gold-Seventy which has been already maintained by us to be the Karikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa. Hence in his opinion, it was Iśvarakṛṣṇa and not Vindhyavāsa who vanquished the Buddhist teacher in the debate and was subsequently rewarded by the king. The Yukti-dipikā sheds important light in this connection. A careful perusal of the entire text reveals the fact that in writing this commentary, the main intention of the author was to refute the arguments of the opponents and thereby to establish the validity of the Karikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa. Almost in every page, he first of all faithfully puts forward the contradictory views and arguments of the opponents and criticises them step by step. But the major portion of his criticism is marshalled against the anti-Saṃkhya arguments and counter arguments of the Buddhists who are all anterior to Dharmakirti. Unfortunately the author himself does not always mention the names of the teachers whose views he is going to refute therein. However, in one place it has been possible to point out that he vehemently criticises the view of Vasubandhu; but thereby it cannot be definitely stated whether all the anti-Buddhistic arguments of the author were advanced against this reputed Buddhist teacher. Most interesting is to observe that our author while putting forward the version of the opponent, occasionally quotes some verses which are anti-Saṃkhya in character. The following couplets bear testimony to this:

(i) भिन्न लक्षणमेवादिबेन भिष: सत्तवादयो गुणाः
तर्केह लक्षणयुक्तवात् पद्घुणाः प्राप्तवर्तिन्ते । (p. 72)

Here the opponent urges: You Saṃkhya are of opinion that sattva is light and illuminating, rajas is dynamic and exciting while tamas is massive and inert. By way of explaining and illustrating these different characteristics of the guṇas, you come

1 See Yukti-dipikā, pp. 136-7 (notes).
to the conclusion that the *guna*ṣ are three in number and thus disregard their unity. Now the question naturally arises whether these pairs of characteristics, such as lightness and illumination, mobility and excitement, massiveness and inertia, differ between themselves or not? If they differ, the number of the *guna*ṣ becomes three multiplied by two, i.e. six; if they do not, it is superfluous to count them separately.

Evidently the couplet quoted above makes reflection on the following Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa:

सत्तं लघु प्रकाशां च चलयुपपभवकर्त्त ॠजः,  
गुरु वर्णकर्मे तम: प्रदीपवक्षार्थितो ब्रूतिः।

In this connection, our author quotes another couplet (p. 72) where also the opponent attacks the *guna* theory of Sāṅkhya. The couplet is quoted below:

(ii) अक्षभावं वजनं सत्तं दुःखं समप्यते वदि,  
वैहृप्यस्योपसवहारान्त पूवंदेयाणिर्वतनाम्।

Most interesting is to notice the following couplet (p. 107):

(iii) बिना सर्गवेण कथो हि पुरुषस्य न गुञ्यते,  
सर्गस्तस्येवं मोक्षार्थमिव संहृतस्य सुङ्क्तात्।

Here the opponent makes a sarcastic remark on the Sāṅkhya view of bondage and liberation. This appears to be a reflection on Īśvarakṛṣṇa who is of opinion that the *puruṣa* experiences pain arising of decay and death as long as he abides in the metempsychosis, and further that the *prakṛti* performs the manifold creations for the sake of liberation of the *puruṣa* though it appears that it does so for its own sake.

It thus appears that the main intention of the opponent in writing these couplets was to condemn the doctrine of Sāṅkhya and specially that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

So far we could not know the source from which these couplets were quoted. But the versified reply that proceeds from
our author to the sarcastic remark of the opponent, sheds important light in this connection. It may be noticed in the following pair of couplets:

हर्षयदपशीर्षाभावेन प्रक्ष्येत पुरुषस्य च ।
अपेक्षाशास्त्रवचनात्मकहयं इत्यमिश्रितयेत ॥
एवं विनायिपी समणं यत्स्वादू बहद्रः पुमानं गुणः ॥
तस्मादू विकल्पः वायु म नो रथ-मनोरथः ॥

In these two couplets, the author first of all explains the true Śāṅkhya conception of bondage as opposed to the wrong notion of the opponent, and finally remarks that let the intention of Manoratha be thus frustrated. This fact clearly indicates that these anti-Śāṅkhya couplets speak of the remark of one Manoratha whose main intention was to find fault with the doctrine of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Now, Manoratha is mentioned to be the teacher of Vasubandhu by Yuan-chwang. On the other hand, Kuei-chi states that Vasubandhu wrote his Paramārtha-Saptati in opposition to the Gold-Seventy, i.e., the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Then, is it a fact that both the teacher and the pupil wrote separate metrical treatises in order to condemn the view of Īśvarakṛṣṇa? But this does not seem to be the case. The plausible view is that the teacher himself did not write any such treatise, and it was Vasubandhu who in his Paramārtha-Saptati tried to restore the fame of his teacher who had been vanquished in a debate by the Śāṅkhya teacher, and in doing so it would be natural on the part of the pupil to ascribe sometimes even his own arguments to his teacher Monoratha and thus to make the position of the teacher more safe. This is why Manoratha became the target of attack of our author.

Speaking briefly, all the anti-Śāṅkhya couplets hitherto mentioned, were quoted from the Paramārtha-Saptati. Our author also in his turn gives a fitting reply not only to these couplets but
also to other arguments of Vasubandhu, and thus establishes the validity of the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. In short, the Yuktī-dipikā may be better called a rejoinder of the Paramārtha-Saptati.

Thus, the statement of Kuei-chi seems to be more authentic than that of Paramārtha. Had Vasubandhu actually written his Paramārtha-Saptati with a view to refuting the treatise of Vindhya-vāsa, the author of the Yuktī-dipikā would never take so much trouble in pleading the case of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. In that case, he would certainly write a commentary on the treatise of Vindhya-vāsa instead of the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

That Paramārtha’s statement cannot be always taken seriously, is further borne out by the evidence of his translation of the Vijñaptimātra-Śāstra which for the lack of complete fidelity to the original Sanskrit text, had to be replaced by another translation of Yuan-chwang. But thereby it does not mean that his statement which occupied us so long is totally negligible. His main drawback is that he has confused between Vindhya-vāsa and Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and mentioned Buddhāmitra instead of Manoratha as the teacher of Vasubandhu. However, reference is made of one early Vasubandhu in the Buddhist texts and Buddhāmitra may be the teacher of that Vasubandhu. Besides these, there is nothing to contradict his statement. In conclusion, we may say that it was Īśvarakṛṣṇa and not Vindhya-vāsa who had been rewarded by the king Vikramāditya of Ayodhya. This Vikramāditya, as we have already noticed above, is no other than Candragupta II. He died in or about 413-14 A.D., and consequently Īśvarakṛṣṇa may be placed at the second half of the fourth century A.D. His

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1 Yaśomitra refers to the view of one Sthavira-Vasubandhu which is criticised by Vasubandhu, the author of the Abhidharma-Kośa. See ‘अपर इति तथिरो बुद्धसंहर्व बार्यममीर्योपप्याश्च एवमाह, आत्माय आह किमिन्ति—Sphūtārthabhādharma-Kośavyākhyā, (Tokyo) p.289. l 6-7. Also see आश्रयस्वत्तत्त्ति—इति बुद्धासारं-बुद्धसंहस्त, p. 35. l 20.
predecessor Vindhyavāsin becomes still earlier. But from the present state of our knowledge it is not possible to trace his exact date.

It will not be out of place here to speak a few words with regard to some other ancient teachers of Śāṁkhya whose names though do not appear in any of the printed works of Śāṁkhya, but are referred to in the other branches of Sanskrit literature. Thus Guṇaratna in his brief account of Śāṁkhya in the Śaḍdarśana-Samuccaya is found to mention one Ātreya-tantra as a treatise of Śāṁkhya. Evidently, its author was one Ātreya. Unfortunately nothing else is known of him as a teacher of Śāṁkhya. The relation of this Ātreya with the medical teacher of this name is not possible to ascertain. The Pramāṇa-nayatattvālokālaṅkāra¹ of the Jains quotes some lines from the Bhāṣya of one Ātreya, but he seems to be a teacher of Vaiśeṣika. However, we cannot take the statement of Guṇaratna seriously; for it is indeed peculiar to notice that the same Ātreyatantara is mentioned by him in one place as a treatise of Śāṁkhya, while in his account of the Vaiśeṣika system it is mentioned to be a treatise of Vaiśeṣika.

Another Śāṁkhya teacher of the name of Mādhava, is referred to in two or three instances in the Sanskrit literature. Thus we find Kumārila in his Śloka-vārttika criticising the view of a teacher who finds fault with the Mīmāṃsakas for advocating the slaughtering of animals for sacrificial purposes. Here Umbeka² in his commentary states that it is Mādhava, the prominent teacher of Śāṁkhya, who is referred to and criticised by the author. This teacher is also referred to in the commentary on the Pramāṇa-

¹ See p. 332 (Poona edition).
² सोंक्ष्या-वांशयकमामधवर्थप्रदाताः-महानवामानानार्थप्रत्येकार्थिकं विपदान्ति तेन्द्रप्रनामानातां कथन्यति विद्यार्थीदलाङ्कवर्त्तिकाः चलतानां ॥ Slokapārttika, pp. 112-3 (Madras University).
Samuccaya of Diinnaga'. Further, from the statement of Yuan-
chwang we know that this famous Sankhya teacher was challenged
by Guanamati-Bodhisattva for a debate. Now Guanamati is men-
tioned to be a pupil of Vasubandhu, while others hold him to be
a contemporary of Sthiramati. The latter's work was translated
into Chinese as early as A. D. 397-439. Thus his lower limit
can not be placed later than the fifth century A. D. Consequently
Madhava also should not be pushed later than this.

THE SANKHYA KARIKA AND ITS COMMENTARIES

So far we had been traversing into the region of conjecture,
supposition and doubt; but with Iswarakrsna we come to a period
in which the particular School of Sankhya with which we are
generally acquainted, finds its beginning. As regards his personal
history we know very little worth mentioning. Speaking of him
Paramartha in his Chinese version only states that he had been
a brahmin of the family of Kausika, and nothing more. One
Iswarakrsna is credited with the authorship of the lexicon of the
name of Prayukta-majjari.

His Karika is a compendium of the vast literature on
Sankhya. In this connection, the Yukt-dipika in its introductory
remark states that the huge treatise of Kapila was not possible
to master even in hundreds of years; hence the veteran teachers
of Sankhya for the sake of benefit of their pupils dealt with the
teachings of Kapila in the short treatises of their own. The

1 कमिकादयो मन्यन्ते शुचादीनार्थ सहस्र्पर सर्वश्रेष्ठ एकमेरेलि, मा म्व असु सर्वश्रेष्ठ
tानि निघन्ति श्री, p. 77; also see p. 81.
2 See 'The Sankhya teacher Madhava and Guanamati Bodhisattva'
3 For Guanamati, see Takakusui-I-tsing's 'Record of Buddhist
Religion', notes at the end (P. 181.).
4 See the introductory verses 3-8, p. 1.
Vaiśeṣikas, Buddhists and such other sects became their opponents, and with a view to refuting their arguments, the celebrated exponents of Śaṅkhya introduced most terse and subtle reasonings into their respective works. As it was most difficult on the part of the ordinary pupils to grasp those reasonings, so Īśvarakṛṣṇa composed this compendium. Our author himself also states at the end of the Kārikā that the treatise in seventy couplets consists of all the topics of discussion of the entire Śaṅṭītantra—exclusive of parables and controversial doctrines of other teachers.

In writing the Kārikā, our author has revised some of the tenets and doctrines of Śaṅkhya current at his time. Among these, mention may be specially made of his definitions of perception and inference. Early definitions of them are ṿoṇḍuvaṭṭiti: प्रत्ययम् and ‘सम्बन्धाधिकर्त्तन्, श्रेयसिद्धिर्तनुमानम्’ respectively; whereas in his opinion these constitute ‘प्रतिविपयाध्यवसायो र्ग्रुप् and तन् (अनुमानम् कित्वातिन्यपूर्वकम्)’ (Ka, 5). The minor points in which he deviates from his predecessors have been occasionally noticed here and there and we need not repeat them here.

The text of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is written in the ārya metre and it generally passes under the name of ‘Śaṅkhya-Kārikā’ or ‘Śaṅkhya-Saptati’, while in China it is usually called ‘Gold-Seventy’ (Skt. Kanaka-Saptati ). The term ‘Saptati’ implies that the text speaks of the principles of Śaṅkhya in seventy couplets. Gauḍapāda did not explain the last three couplets. This has led the late Pt. B. G. Tilak to doubt their authenticity. He argues

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1 For reference see above p. 145, n3.

2 Referred to in the Yuktī-dīpikā, p. 4; Nyāyavrūttika, 1, i. 5. Also criticised by Diṃnāga in his Vṛtti on the Pramāṇa-Samuccaya—pointed out by Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, pp. 265 & 267.

3 Sanskrit Research, Vol. I, pp. 107-117. The point first of all came to the notice of Mr. Wilson, but he did not attempt to reconstruct the missing couplet.
that the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā which originally consisted of seventy couplets has now only sixty-nine as such and one couplet is thus missing. He reconstructed the missing couplet from the Bhāṣya of Gauḍāpāda on Kā, 61 and suggested that some body dropped the couplet as it preached atheistic ideas. The couplet reconstructed runs thus:

कारणमीत्रमेके बुद्धे, कालं परे स्वमात्व वा, ।
प्रणो: कालं निर्गुणतो न्यूकः कालं: स्वमात्व ।

We need not examine here the arguments he has advanced in supplementing this couplet; for a fitting reply of his view is to be met with in the Sanskrit introduction on the Māṭhara-vṛtti. So far we can say that the last three couplets are also read by Paramārtha who precedes Gauḍāpāda by some centuries. Thus we find no reason to doubt their authenticity. The fact is that the last three couplets are not difficult to understand and this is why Gauḍāpāda did not consider it necessary to explain them. Further, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has finished all what he has to say in the seventy couplets and in the concluding two couplets he only attempts to prove the authenticity of his treatise and nothing else. Thus the significance of the term ‘Saptati’ cannot be questionable.

The couplet LXIII is lacking in the Chinese version, while both Māṭhara and Vigraharāja Bhatta1 read the following additional verse at the end of the text:

तथमात् समतत्र शास्कमिदं नार्यत्रश परिहीनम् ।
तन्त्रस्य च त्रिष्टमौल्लिपदं प्रसंकान्तिमिव विश्वा ।

It is interesting to notice that in the works of ancient teachers we occasionally meet with such lines as bear a striking resemblance with some of the expressions of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. For instance,

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1 A Ms. of this author’s commentary on the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā is deposited in the private library of His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmere. For further about this Ms., see appendix.
while enumerating the various causes by which an existing object also cannot be perceived, Patanjali in his Mahabhasya states:

पद्मी प्रकारे सतानाम वालनामविवर्णरूपाणिर्विपक्षा दत्तमूल्ये मूलत-न्यायेन स्वेतात्मकदिन्द्रियधीनात्मकश्वेतात्मक।

Caraka also utters a similar expression which runs thus:

सताच्यं रूपाणामतिप्रकर्षादितिप्रकर्षादिवारणवातुं करणदेवेन्यातुं मनोजनव-स्थानान्तु समानाक्षादवादीभवतिस्तीस्माश्च प्रत्यक्षायुपविन्यास।

Turning our attention to Ishvarakrsna we find that he also enumerates more or less the same causes in the following Karika:

अतिदूरातु सामीत्यादितिर्यात्प्रातामन्योडवनस्थानातु, लोकत्यातु व्यवहारादिभवावातु समानाक्षाराच।

Again, Aryadeva in his Satasstra quotes the following lines with the remark as it is said in the Sutras of the Samkhya's:

‘That the dharma of sacrifice is impure in as much as it has the characteristic of non-eternity, And of superiority and of inferiority; therefore it must be abandoned.’

This reminds us of the expression ‘व्यवहारलुतिऽश्च: स विविद्विक्ष्यानिविश्वुक्त’ of the Karika (2). However, all these authorities received these similar ideas from a common heritage and there is no conclusive evidence to hold that all these expressions were the independent achievements of Ishvarakrsna. Otherwise, his date must be pushed back to some centuries earlier, which is absurd. For we have already attempted to place him at the latter half of the 4th. century A. D.

There are numerous commentaries upon the Karika, the principal among whom are the Chinese version of Paramartha, Māthara-vṛtti, Yuktidiipika, Gaudapada-Bhasya, Tattvakaumudi and the Jayamangala.

1 Pa, 4, 1, 3.
2 Sutrassthana, xi.
3 From Tucci’s translation of Satasstra, p, 18 (6)—Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, XLIX.
The earliest available commentary on the Kārikā is what had been translated into Chinese by Paramārtha during his literary activity in China which covers a period of twelve years from 557 to 569 A. D. It is written in a way, specially to serve the purpose of the beginners. The name of the commentator is not furnished by him, but it is strange to notice that Kuei-chi attributes the authorship of this commentary to Vasubandhu.

Maṭhara-vṛtti

Maṭhara is an an ancient teacher of Śāṅkhya, for the name also appears in the Annyogadvāra-sūtra of the Jains, together with Kābiliyam, Saṭṭitantaṇ and Kanaga-sattari. One Maṭhara is mentioned by I-tsing as a minister of the king Kaniska, but it cannot be definitely stated whether this Maṭhara also was a teacher of Śāṅkhya. Further, Maṭhara is an appellation and not a name. However, the present Maṭhara-vṛtti is blended with such materials as clearly speak of its later date.

Mention is made of an old palm-leaf Ms. of the Maṭhara-vṛtti in the ‘Catalogue of Mss. in the Jaisalmer Bhāṇḍār’s.’ The editor remarks that its bulk is greater than that of the printed edition of the same, and it thus appears that it is a different work of a different author. But nothing can be definitely known, unless it is collated with the printed text.

Dr. Belvalkar is of opinion that the Maṭhara-vṛtti is the original of the Chinese version of Paramārtha and in support of

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1 Pointed out by Takakusu, La Śāṅkhya-Kārikā, Introd., p. 38 infra.
2 Edited in the Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, No. XXI.
3 See, ‘माठरादिक्षेत्र सांपृतें मुद्रिता, तस्यांश प्रमाणं न महत्, द्विते तु महती। इस्यि शृंखलायस्यायनं सम्बन्धेत्—५’, २२.
his view he cites several similar passages from both the texts. But we are not prepared to accept his view; for there are good many instances where the two commentators offer different and sometimes even contradictory explanations. Some of these had been already noticed by Suryanarayan Sastrī¹ and we need not repeat them here. The plausible view is that both the commentators were indebted to a common source.

Yukti-dipikā

It is a unique commentary on the Kārikā, edited² for the first time by the present writer from a transcription of a birch-bark Kāsmirian Ms. deposited in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.

The text refers to the views of numerous Śāṁkhya teachers such as, Paurika, Paucādhikaraṇa, Patañjali, Varsaganya and his followers and Vindhayāsin who are all anterior to Īśvarakṛṣṇa. This has enhanced the value of the text to a great extent. For these teachers are not always found to hold the same view as that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and thus the author helps us to have a glimpse of the different schools of Śāṁkhya existing before Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

It has been already observed that the main intention of the author in writing this commentary was to give a fitting reply to the hostile criticisms of the Paramārtha-Saptati of Vasubandhu, and thereby to establish the validity of the views of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The author also states towards the end that his Yukti-dipikā (lit. illuminator of reasonings) dispels darkness in the shape of wrong notions (झुठड़ितिमितारामक्ष). Speaking briefly, the text serves the purpose of a rejoinder of the criticisms of Vasubandhu.

The style of the author is archaic and highly polemical. He first of all puts in a nut-shell what he has to say, and then

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² Calcutta Sanskrit Series, No. XXIII.
expands the same. In doing so he attacks the view of the opponent who also in his turn re-attacks that of the defendant. In this way attacking, re-attacking and counter-attacking go on continually till the accepted conclusion is reached. This method has sometimes rendered it difficult to trace the place where the version of the opponent begins and that of the defendant ends.

Further, our author was not only a philosopher but also a grammarian. This is evident from his discussions on the samāsa in 'तद्रपालक' (kā, 1) and 'सुक्लयूति' (kā, 2). He also raises a good deal of grammatical problems in the expression 'प्रेक्षकसु विकार.' (kā, 3). Besides these, there is evidence to show that he was thoroughly conversant with the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. For we find expressions and quotations from the Mahābhāṣya here and there in the Yuktī-dīpikā. Not only this, in some places he even attempted to imitate the style of Patañjali.

The classification of the different chapters of the text is also worthy of notice. The whole text is divided into four prakaras and eleven āhnikas—an old fashioned division which is not ordinarily to be met with in the other commentaries on the Kārikā.

The authorship of the text deserves special attention. The colophon at the end of the Ms. on the basis of which the text is edited, states Vācaspati Miśra to be its author. But this is far from convincing. For instance, the author of the Yuktī-dīpikā attributes the fragment 'सुत्रप्रत्येक तत्त्वस्थवद परस्परेण विकृत्यते'... to Vārṣaganyya (p.70) whereas Vācaspati in his commentary on the Yoga-Bhāṣya (iii.13) attributes the same to Pañcaśikha. Further, his style as well as the manner of presentation is quite different from that of Vācaspati. Besides these, there is reason to believe that our author preceeded Vācaspati not less than by a century. The exact date of the author is not possible to ascertain. But from the internal evidence so much we may guess that his upper limit cannot be placed before the date of Bhartṛhari which is usually

1 Vigrahārāja Bhāṭṭa also classifies his commentary on the Sāṁkhya-kārikā into seven āhnikas. A ms. of the said commentary is deposited in the personal library of his Highness, the Maharaja of Kashmere.
admitted to be the first half of the seventh century A.D.; for the author is found to quote some couplets in his work which find their place with slight alteration in reading in the Vākyapadiya of Bhārṭṛhari. Considering the style of the text and the different authorities quoted therein, the date of the author does not seem to be later than the eighth century A.D.

But the name of the author is still shrouded in obscurity. A ms. of the name of ‘Sāmkhya-dipikā’ whose authorship is attributed to Kāitya, is noticed in the ‘Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit Mss. in the Central Provinces and Berar’. The present writer tried his best to secure the said manuscript but to no effect. Hence, it is not desirable to pass any opinion unless the said manuscript can be thoroughly examined.

\textbf{Yukti-dipikā and Rāja-vārttika}

In his Tattva-kaumudi while commenting on the expression ‘पतितन्त्र’(kā, 72) Vācaspati is found to quote some couplets from the Rāja-vārttika. It is curious to notice that these couplets also find their place in the introductory stanzas (p 2, couplets 10-12) of the Yukti-dipikā, and from the context it appears that the said couplets came from the pen of the author himself. Again, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his Nyāya-māṇjarī (p. 109) while refuting the definition

1. प्रमाणान्तानं तां लोकं सवे: समानुप्रक्रियत।
   समार्थमा: प्रवृत्ते तिरंगामपि तद्ने०—Vākyapadiya II, 149, quoted in the Yukti-dipikā p. 38.
   Also see, Prayojtanānta—Prayojtanānta…n viṣhe: \textit{ibid.}, II. 426-7, Yukti-dipikā, p. 8.
2. No 6368, deposited with Pt. Ramnath Trivedi of Dhamtari, Raipur District.
3. तथा च राजावासिस्तम—प्रवाहनयितरत्नस्यक्तम् यथावचक्षमथानयत।
   परार्थवाङ्गले तथामैत्रे स्वयोगो लोक एव च।
   \textbf{Śānti Purāṇa: Pravāhanāyatam: sād vedāntī}.
of perception of Ṣvarakṛṣṇa, refers to the explanation of the same by one Rāja in the following lines:

चतु राजा व्याक्यात्वान—प्रतिरामिर्युयते बताते, तेनामिरुयते विषयाध्यवसायः प्रतिच्छिन्निति।

The author of the Yukti-dipikā (p.42) also in his turn makes a similar statement. This may be noticed below:

विषयाध्यवसायो हृदयित्वशुचत्रयमने विषयाध्यवसायं समप्रत्ययं स्वातं, प्रतिना तु आपि-

मूल्यं दौरत्यते। तेन समप्रत्ययुर्क्षुयुुपनिपाती वोव्याध्यवसायतव् हृदयित्वशुचत्रयमने।

From these striking similarities, it appears that both the Yukti-dipikā and the Rāja-vārttika may pass for the same commentary.

Again, in his Nyāya-vārttika-tātparyatīkā (I. i. 5) Vacaspati quotes a verse which enumerates seven sorts of connections on the basis of which early Śāṅkhya used to establish ‘inference’. Here Udayana in his commentary on the same states this to be a quotation from the Śāṅkhya-vārttika. From the present state of our knowledge it is not possible to state precisely whether the Śāṅkhya-vārttika and the Rāja-vārttika speak of the same treatise. But the said quotation does not find its place in the Yukti-dipikā. However, it is strange to notice that the expression ‘तत्त्वार्थदिधिः’ (kā, 5) which defines ‘inference’, is not touched at all in the Yukti-dipikā. Most probably, it was due to carelessness of the scribe that the explanation of this important expression has been altogether left out in the Ms., and if this be the case who knows that the verse referred to above did not find its place therein?

1 मानात्मीयमद्योर्गिरिद्विरविद्विविद्वर्तैः।

2 एक मूर्ति, एक ज्ञानमें वार्त्तिका जिसका प्रतिपादन वहीं (तत्त्वसमाधिक सूtras) विद्युत्तिका, द्वारा दिवाने विश्वास्का, M.A., of Hindu School, Calcutta. An account of the said ms. is furnished in the ‘Journal of the Vangīya Sāhitya Parisat’. Its author is Rāja-candrin. It is a later work and has nothing in common with the Rāja-vārttika or Śāṅkhya-vārttika referred to above.
The Bhaṣya of Gauḍapāda

This Bhaṣya is written in plain and simple language, and is free from the discussion of unnecessary topics. Its author is Gauḍapāda. But it is not possible to state precisely whether he and the author of the Gauḍapāda-kārikā on the Maṇḍukya-Upaniṣad was one and the same man. Alberuni speaks of one Gauḍa, the anchorite, who composed a book that passed by his own name. But it is not certain whether he refers to the Gauḍapāda-kārikā or the Śaṅkhyā-bhaṣya.

Tattva-kaumudi

The author of this commentary is Vācaspati Miśra who needs no introduction to the students of sanskrit. The commentary is very lucid and expressive, and like the Yukti-dipikā it is not found to raise any hair splitting argument in elucidating the text of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Vācaspati lived in the first half of the ninth century A.D.; for he is found to state in the end of his Nyāya-sūcini-bandha that he completed the work in the year 898. Here reference is made of the Vikrama era, for his commentator Udayana is found to state that he finished his Laksṇāvali in the Śaka year 906. If the year referred to by Vācaspati be held to be the Śaka year, then Vācaspati and Udayana become contemporaneous which is untenable. Hence the era referred to by Vācaspati is that of Vikrama which corresponds to 841 A.D.¹

Jayamaṅgalā

The authorship as well as the date of this commentary is difficult to ascertain. From the benedictory verse we know that its author was a Buddhist; but strange to notice that the colophon at the end ascribes the authorship to Śaṅkara, the famous teacher

¹ On the other hand, Mr. Bhattacharyya is of opinion that the year referred to by Vācaspati is the Śaka era and consequently he places Vācaspati in the latter half of the 10th century A.D. For the arguments advanced by him, see ‘Date of Vācaspati Miśra and Udayanācārya’, Gāṅgānāth Jha Research Institute Journal, Vol II, Part 4, pp. 349-56.
of Vedānta. M. M. Gopinath Kaviraj in his masterly introduction on the Jayamaṅgalā spares no pains to discuss on the authorship of this commentary and finally attributes the same to one Śaṅkarārya, the author of the commentary of the name of Jayamaṅgalā in the Nītisāra of Kāmandaka as well as the Kāmasūtra of Vātsyāyana. On the other hand Mr. Kavī after briefly observing the various commentaries of the name of Jayamaṅgalās comes to the conclusion that these different Jayamaṅgalās came from the pen of one Śaṅkara who had also been the author of the Yogasūtra-bhāṣyavivaraṇa. He further attempts to prove that this Śaṅkara was a pupil of one Govinda Bhāgavatapāda and that he was a member of the Payyur family that flourished between 1300-1400 A.D. But the serious objection to this finding of Mr. Kavī lies in the fact that the author of the Śaṅkhya commentary was a Buddhist while there is no reason to consider Śaṅkara of the Payyur family as such.

However, an early date cannot be assigned to the author of the Jayamaṅgalā on the Kāmasūtra; for he is found to quote from the work of Kakkoka who belongs to the tenth century A.D., while there is every reason to believe that the author of the Śaṅkhya commentary of the name of Jayamaṅgalā flourished at an earlier period.

Firstly, the numerous quotations cited in the text are taken from the works of such authorities as are in every possibility earlier than Vācaspati. Some of these quotations are also to be met with in the Chinese version of Paramārtha and the Yuktidipikā. Unfortunately none of the authors refers to the original source. Of the philosophical works quoted, Jayamaṅgalā only mentions the name of Śaṅkhya-pravacana by which it means the Yoga-sūtra as well as its Bhāṣya.

2 Ms. deposited in the Adyar Library, Madras, Cat. No. 39c 13.
Secondly, there is evidence to show that the author of the Jayamaṅgalā was influenced by the works of the ancient Śaṅkhya teachers in writing this commentary. Thus we find that he enumerates and illustrates the seven sorts of relations (kā, 5) by which early Śaṅkhya used to explain ‘inference’. These relations are not mentioned by Iśvarakṛṣṇa, nor these are recorded by other commentators. But these are indispensable in explaining the early Śaṅkhya definition of ‘inference’ which runs thus:—

‘सम्बन्धावेशकत्मात् वैधसिद्धिरतुमानन्’

Further, it is well known that the puruṣa of the Śaṅkhya is not the agent (अक्तुभावकाḥ, kā, 19). While explaining this, the Jayamaṅgalā traverses a far way off from the ordinary commentators. He enumerates seven factors in this connection and quotes a verse from some Śaṅkhya text in support of his view. The Yukti-dipikā only adopts this method; but other commentators are not found to go into such details.

However, the author of the Jayamaṅgalā seems to pre-suppose the existence of the Yukti-dipikā. For he is found to refer to a different interpretation of the expression ‘कारणकार्यविभागान्’ (kā, 15) which closely follows the corresponding portion of the Yukti-dipikā.

1 See above, n 2, p. 156.

2 Cf. आह—तरनुपथमस्मेवादा, न हि शांभारीनां कारणकार्यविभागात् क्रिक्रिक्रिप्पमात्रे, तथासहवेकश्रेयः। उन्हें—न, कारणकार्यक्षेत्रपकारकोपकारियम्...वस्त्रवाट कारणं कार्यमिति विवेकानिवेकानिवेकश्रेयः। विशेषकारकोपकारियान्:। स चापस्म शांभारीनां व्यक्तायः। अतो न प्रभावाधिशामनेवतः।

आह—क: पुनःन्यायस्त्व परस्परकार्यकारणमन् हति। उन्हें—पुण्यां तावद सिध्यते समस्तस्मां प्रकटं अविनाश्चित्तियमाधिन्यमेविस्मितेऽक्षेत्रोपकारिणे वा प्रकृतिष्ठितार्थं, तथा ‘प्रीठमित्विभागाधिकारियोऽद्’ (का, 19) इत्येवशमावतः चेतः व्याक्तायः। तथा शांभारीनां प्रकृतियदिपिः परस्परकार्यकारणमन्। आहारास्त्रीय भिन्नतिकारावैक्षेत्रोपकारिण:। कारणक्षेत्र कार्यस्तव रथसंपन्नमेविस्मिताधिकारिण: कारणादु, विष्णु-श्रीमदं विजयसहित: श्रीमद:। यव्विस्तन्नामस्मित्विभागाधिकारिण:। संबंधवारेश्तरश्रावत्वाणि। कारणां सम्बंधश्रुतियोपिष्ठेयाः। अत sigue la línea del Yukti-dipikā, p. 79-80.
With regard to the antiquities of the Jayamaṅgalā, most satisfactory result may be obtained from Vācaspati’s commentary on the kā 51, where he refers to the explanation of the various ‘perfections’ (सिद्धि) by a different commentator whose version he is not at all prepared to follow. It is curious to notice that the said interpretation has got a striking resemblance with that of the Jayamaṅgalā. To make the point clearer, we quote below the interpretation referred to by Vācaspati and the corresponding portions from the Jayamaṅgalā:

Tk:—अन्ये व्याख्याते—‘विनोपदेशादिना प्रागृहीयाध्यायासवशान् तरवस्य स्वयमूलेन वत् सा सिद्धि:—उहः। यस्य सांख्यशास्त्रमन्यदेह्रीयमार्कण्य ज्ञानसुमुपस्ते सा सिद्धि:—शब्दः, ज्ञानपाठान्तरभावान्। यस्य शिश्वाचार्यसमन्वयनः संवधनेन सांख्यशास्त्रमन्यतथाश्रीयमार्कण्य ज्ञानसुमुपस्ते सांख्यशास्त्रनेतृत्वः सिद्धि:—अध्ययनम्। सहुसुभाषिरति—वर्णोपदेशातः मृदुः प्राण्य ज्ञानसुमुपस्ते सा ज्ञानक्षण्य सिद्धिस्तस्य सहुस्बाहिति:। “दानम्” सिद्धिहेतु:—वर्णादिद्वानेराराहतो ज्ञानी ज्ञाने प्रध्वजति।’

अद्व व बुकावकल्ले परिमित्यानास्तथेऽहत्तितुष्टे: इति कर्त्ते परदुपोज्जरावनेन सिद्धार्थात्माशास्त्राय श्रवणामिति।

Jaya:—उहः इति। जन्मान्तरस्थस्तित्वायो यस्य वन्ध्मोदकारणास्थाप्तामार्कणाः प्राध्यान्तपुनस्तर्ज्ञानसुमुपस्ते तस्य सिद्धिस्वहेतुका प्रथमा तारमित्युच्चते।

यस्य सांख्यशास्त्रभास्मन्यत्रीयमार्कण्यं तरवस्य स्वयमूल्यचार्यानात्र: सा सिद्धि: शब्देहेतुका द्वितियो सुतारमित्युच्चते ।

यस्य शिश्वाचार्यसमन्वयनेन सांख्यशास्त्रमन्यतथाश्रीयमार्कण्य ज्ञानसुमुपस्ते, तस्याध्यात्मनेतृत्वः। अध्ययनेन हि तत्परिस्मानात्त। एष तु नृत्यीया ताराश्रेष्ठः। इत्युच्चते।

अध्यात्मया व्याख्याते—वदुपकरोती तत् कारणम्। वदुपकरोति तत् कार्यम्। तत् विवद्यानां उपकारायोगकारभावार्थस्य। तत् कार्यम्—व्यास्तति च वार्तालखे स्थानसङ्गाः। तत् कारणाः—स्वप्नपुकृत्तति। कारणाति च बुकावस्तेदर्जनेनालः: कार्यादि। वार्ता च कारणानि श्रुति:।

तत् अवधानाः परम्परानुपयोगनाति। सांख्यशास्त्राय श्रवणात्: इत्युच्चते।
Comparing both the versions, it appears that Vācaspati referred here to the Jayamaṅgalā. So far about the principal commentaries that have come down to us. But reference is made of the views of other commentators in the Yukti-dipikā and Jayamaṅgalā; unfortunately there works are not still available. Hence it is not possible to state precisely which of the commentaries on the Kārika was the earliest one.

The later commentaries are not found to supply any such data as may throw any important light on the dark period of Sāńkhya. Hence it is needless to examine them here.

THE TATTVA SAMĀSA SUTRAS

The commentators ascribe the authorship of the Tattvasamāsa-sūtras to Kapila. These sūtras are very concise and simple and were at one time very popular to the pandits of Benares. This fact led Prof. Maxmuller to assign an early date to them. But others are not prepared to accept his view on the ground that ancient writers are not found to comment upon them, nor these are quoted or referred to anywhere by any early writer.

But in the Bhagavadajjukiyam (p. 50–1) of the Jains, the following passage occurs².

1 Vācaspati has left out the corresponding portion.

The above mentioned passage reminds us of the Tattvasamāsa-Sūtras where also almost all these expressions find their place, and it may not be impossible that the author of the Bhagavadajjukiyam had in his mind the Tattvasamāsa-sūtras while composing the said passage. If this be the case then these sūtras were in existence even before the eighth century A.D., for the author Bodhāyaṇa Kavi of that Jaina text is mentioned in the inscription of the Pahlava king Mahendravikrama Varman who belonged to the eighth century A.D.

Bhāvāganēsa at the beginning of his Tattvāyāthārthyaadipana states that he has followed the exposition of Paṇcaśikha in writing this commentary on the Tattvasamāsa. He also quotes some couplets from Paṇcaśikha. Even his teacher Vījñānabhikṣu also in his commentary on the Saṃkhya-sūtra (I.127) quotes a prose fragment and ascribes its authorship to Paṇcaśikha. That Paṇcaśikha wrote a commentary on the Tattva-samāsa does not

1 Edited in Vol. IV of the ‘South Indian Inscriptions’.
2 समासस्मानालयमन्य यास्यम् प्रबलिङ्करण च
   मावामिनाः कुरुक्षे तस्या बहीश्रीनाम्।
3 तथा चोक्के प्रवशिलोक्तम समासावकम्
   ‘प्रवशिलोक्तस्य सत्र कुरुक्षे समासारे’
   जवी गुणी हिलय बाधी हुन्ये नाव सर्वः। (p. 61),
   सर्वत्रत्वाय सानकस्ते चोक्के प्रबशिलोक्तानाम्
   ‘तस्यात्मस्य ये वेदंस्ये यथा दृश्यस्य भावमिद्
   देवस्य, बिलुक्कामना गति देवस्यी कोणास्तु बुके न युक्ते। स गुणस्ये’ (p. 72, उक्तज
   प्रबशिलोक्तायः——‘प्रातिके तु करेन तथा वैकारिकेन च। दिक्षामिकोन्निकेन करो जन्मु
   विन्यस्ते’ p. 82, Saṃkhya-saṃgraha, (Chowkhamba edition).
4 अभविदशब्दायायः प्रक्रियाप्रकटमायः——वर्तस्य नाम प्रसादार्थवाभिव्याहन्यितितितिक्षाङ्गतिप्रकाश्यमानं समासं संसाराय द्विलक्षम्।
   एवं राजोश्चिं शोकारिणामेवं समासातो दु:कालकम्। एवं तनोष्ट्वो नित्रारिणामेवं समासातो मोक्षालमकमिति।

Y—22
seem to be convincing. On the other hand all the aforesaid quotations of Bhāvāganēśa and his teacher Vijnānabhikṣu are to be met with in the Kramadīpikā, a posthumous commentary on the Tattva-saṃśāsa. But Kramadīpikā cannot be the work of Pañcaśikha, for the author himself refers to the view of Pañcaśikha and Patañjali in one place (p.125). However, the said treatise which is undoubtedly the earliest of all the existing commentaries on the Tattvasaṃśāsa, cannot be placed at a very later period. Firstly, Prajñākaramati while refuting the Saṃkhya view quotes a couplet from some Saṃkhya treatise which he does not mention by name; but the said couplet finds its place in the Kramadīpikā. If the author of the Kramadīpikā be not supposed to take this couplet from a different source; he can be safely placed at an earlier period.

Secondly, in the ‘Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss. in the private libraries of the North-Western Province,’ notice is made of a Ms. of the title of Saṃkhya-kramadīpikā-vivaraṇam by Sadāśivendra. It is further remarked there that the said Ms. is an obscure commentary on the Saṃkhya-kramadīpikā and it was copied in 1415 Vikrama era which corresponds to 1358 A.D. This being the case it can be safely suggested that the commentator lived before the fourteenth century A.D., and the author of the original Kramadīpikā should have preceded him by a period which we cannot definitely state. Taking every thing into consideration the date of the original sūtras cannot be held so late as some of the modern scholars suggest.

2 ‘प्रवृत्तिमानस प्रवृत्तिरिमान युक्तस्तत्तमोत्तत्वाद् विप्रेतिधातेन,’
अहि करोदेशुक्तो हि मनः तत्स्तव कुप्रदिकलपोऽपनीयत्यार:—
Bodhicaryavatāra-pañjikā, under couplet 60, p. 455.
3 See p. 124.
4 See No. 15, p. 388—Cat. of Sans. mss. in private libraries of the N.W.P. part I (1874, Benares).
THE SĀMKHYA-SŪTRA

This aphoristic treatise cannot be placed at an early period and sheds no important light on the dark period of Sāmkhya. Aniruddha wrote a simple commentary on it, while Vijñānabhiṣkū composed an elaborate Bhāṣya on it. In the preface to his edition of Aniruddha’s commentary, Garbe advanced various arguments to show that Aniruddha lived about 1500 A.D. Keith also supports him.

Vijñānabhiṣkū extensively quotes from the Purāṇas and attempts to reconcile the conflicting doctrines of the Sāmkhya and Vedānta. In the opinion of Garbe and Keith, he flourished at the second half of the sixteenth century A.D. But in the ‘Catalogue of sanskrit mss. in private libraries of the N. W. P’, notice is made of one ‘Sāmkhya-sāra-viveka’ by Vijñāna and it is remarked there that the said ms. was copied in 1516 of the Vikrama era. This being the case, Vijñāna should be placed at least one century earlier.

THE SĀMKHYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Having thus glanced at its history and literature, we now intend to discuss some of the main doctrines of Sāmkhya. Before dealing with the metaphysical side of the system, let us turn our attention towards its epistemological conceptions; for, it is, as Iśvarakṛṣṇa rightly observes, through the sources of cognition that the objects can be apprehended (प्रमेयसिद्धः प्रमाणातिः, kā, 4).

According to Sāmkhya, there are three sources of cognition. These are (1) ‘perception’, (2) ‘inference’, and (3) ‘valid testimony’. Of these, ‘perception’ in the opinion of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, is the determinate cognition produced through the sense-organs in contact with the objects. He defines it as प्रतिविधयायब्यायसायो द्यम् (kā, 5). The author of the Yuktī-dipikā, elucidates this and brings out the significance of all the terms in the definition. By ‘विपय’ the objects of cognition are meant. These are the gross and the subtle matters. The gross matters are the objects of our cognition while the subtle matters fall within the province of perception of the yogins (kā, 34).

1. See No. 4, p. 584, part I (1874, Benares).
The commentator breaks up the expression ‘प्रतिविषयाध्वसायः’ in the following way: विषयं विषयं प्रति वर्तते प्रतिविषयम्—that which comes in contact with particular objects, i.e., the sense-organ in its intercourse with the object. By ‘प्रतिविषयम्’ a real object must be present and it thus differentiates perception from illusion. ‘प्रति’ denotes proximity, i.e., the sense organ must be in contact with the object and this characteristic excludes perception from inference. प्रतिविषयं अध्यवसायः प्रतिविषयाध्वसायः—अध्यवसाय is the function of intellect (अध्यवसायो बुद्धि:, का, 23). The entire definition comes thus: the senses come in contact with their objects, the buddhi or intellect then operates in it. The idea is this: the senses are modified in the shape of their objects when they come in contact with them, the inertia or darkness of the buddhi is then removed and there is a flow of sat्त्तva. As a result of this a definite and determinate cognition of the object is thus produced. ‘अध्यवसाय’ also means ‘ascertaining’ and by this doubtful cognitions are excluded. Now the question arises as to how ‘happiness’, ‘misery’ and such other mental intuitions are to be cognised by this definition; for the said entities cannot be perceived through the channel of the sense-organs. The author of the Yukti-dipikā avoids this difficulty by taking recourse to grammatical jugglery. Finding no other means, he finally holds the expression ‘प्रतिविषयाध्वसायः’ as an instance of एक्षेप compound and expounds the same as ‘प्रतिविषयाध्वसायाः प्रतिविषयाध्वसायाः—प्रतिविषयाध्वसायाः’: Thus he gets the same expression twice which again he explains in two different ways to serve his purpose. Of these, the first प्रतिविषयाध्वसायः in his opinion speaks of the sense-organs in contact with the objects and consequently the operation of the intellect in it (विषयं विषयं प्रति वर्तते प्रतिविषयम्। किं ततु? इद्द्वयम्। तत्स्मिन्तोष्यवसायः). This has been already discussed above. Here the term ‘प्रति’ is directly connected with the sense-organs. But by the second member of the compound he intends to mean the function of the intellect or buddhi with respect to all entities—physical or psychical, nearer or further (विषयं विषयं प्रति योष्यवसायः). This explanation has rendered it possible to explain perception of the mental intuitions as well as the supersensible
objects by the yogins. Here the term ‘प्रति’ unlike the former, is directly connected with ‘अथ्यवसाय’.

Vārṣaganyā’s definition of perception is thus rejected. According to him ‘perception’ is the functioning of the sense-organs (अज्ञातिज्ञानिति: प्रत्यक्षम्). The Yuktidiśīka (p. 42, lines 11-15) criticises the said definition on the ground that it fails to cover the mental intuitions as well as the pre-science knowledge of the yogins (प्रतिभाज्य), for these entities cannot be perceived simply by the functioning of the sense-organs.

*Indeterminate and determinate perception*

It has been already observed above that ‘perception’ is the definite and determinate cognition of the objects arrived at through the contact of the sense-organs with their respective objects. The author of the Yoga-bhāṣya also more or less advocates the same view. According to him the thought-stuff (चित्त) comes in contact with the external objects through the gate ways of the sense-organs and thus receives an impression of the object; as a result of this there arises a definite and determinate cognition of the objects possessing both generic and specific qualities (सामान्यविशेषपञ्चमोऽध्यस्य-विनिषेधाभारणप्रमाणा व्रतिः प्रत्यक्षम् I. 7)

But in the opinion of Vācaspati perception is of two kinds—indeterminate and determinate (kā, 27). Of these, indeterminate (निर्विनिष्ठक) perception is the immediate cognition of an object, pure and simple. It presents only a vague idea of the object as ‘it is’ and not ‘like that’ just as what belongs to the mind of an infant, the dumb and the like. It is purely presentative in character and does not involve any representative process. On the other hand, determinate perception is the definite cognition of an object related with its properties and qualified by its generic and specific characteristics. It is presentative as well as representative in character; for it involves the recollection of name, class and such other properties of the object as were experienced in the past and

1 See above, p. 145, n 3.
these are revived in the mind by the law of similarity. In determinate perception ‘mind’ plays an important part, for it assimilates and discriminates the image brought about by the senses; where as in indeterminate perception ‘mind’ does not interfere at all, everything rests there with the sense-organs.

It is curious to notice that Vindhyavāsin’s definition of ‘perception’ (अथान्त्रिकविचिनितिकाः) speaks of indeterminate perception only and not the determinate one. In the opinion of this celebrated exponent of Śāmkhya, the sense-organs come in contact with their respective objects and are accordingly modified into the form of the objects as they are. This is perception. It is free from imagination (अबिकल्पिकाः) i.e., from all associations of name, class and such other categories. It thus presents an immediate and vague impression of the object to the mind. Buddhists also hold a similar view. According to them ‘perception’ is a non-erroneous cognition of the object free from imagination (प्रत्ययः कल्पः नामात्यायायस्यस्यादूपमू).  

Psychological process in perception

Śāmkhya generally holds that the external organs receive an immediate impression of the object which they in their turn make over to the mind. The mind reflects upon the said impression brought about by the senses and gives it over to ahamkāra (egoistic principle) which again in its turn appropriates this and finally presents this self-appropriated impression to the intellect. The latter thereupon resolves what is to be done and thus ascertains its duty towards the object known.

1 For Vindhyavāsin’s definition of ‘perception’ see above, p. 145, n. 4.

2 In his exposition of the Śāmkhya view in the Saḍdarśana-samuccaya (p. 108), Guṇaratna explains the above mentioned definition of perception in the following lines:—

वेदंतोदित्वार्थविज्ञानिकाः प्रत्यक्षितृति । अविचार तथा नाट्याचार्यानिः नात्मिकत्व चैति पद्यांमर्थति । अविचारीति विद्विधार्थि, तेषां इति परिणाम इति स्वाभवः । इतिन्द्रविधिवेत विद्विधार्थिवक्ष्यार्थिनि प्रत्यक्षितृति हि तेषां सिद्धान्तः । अविचारिकाः—नामात्यायादिकविधार्थिः शास्त्रस्मात्यायामववह, व्यास्येतिः ।
Vācaspati illustrates the process thus: just as the headman of
a village hands over the revenue collected by himself to the collector
of the district who again in his turn delivers it to the governor of
the country who finally hands it over to the king. Similarly the
external organs make over the immediate impression of the object
received by themselves to the mind for reflection who in its turn
makes it over to the egoistic principle for appropriation who again
presents this self appropriated impression to the intellect for final
determination. Thus perception involves the operation of the
external sense-organs, the mind, the egoistic principle and the
intellect.

Of these, the external organs are classified into two groups: (1)
the organs of knowledge and (2) the organs of action. The former
comprises (1) the visual organ, (2) the auditory organ, (3) the
olfactory organ, (4) the gustatory organ and (5) the tactual organ;
while the latter consists of (1) the vocal organ, (2) the prehensive
organ, (3) the locomotive organ, (4) the evacuative organ and (5)
the generative organ.

But whether these organs are limited or pervasive is a problem
that deserves special attention. For, the ancient teachers of Sāmkhya
are not found here to follow the same view. From the statement
of the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 108) we know that there are some teachers
who hold that the sense-organs have got no fixed magnitude of
their own. Whenever they receive the particular impression of an
object, they are modified accordingly into the very shape of that
object. Others are of opinion that they are limited, while Vindhya-
vasin regards them as pervasive (इन्द्रियाणि संस्तकविशेषयोगानि परिधीत-रूपाणि केविनि, परिविच्छेद्यपरिक्रमणानितवरे, किमूच्छिति विन्द्यवासिनंतपूि).
Iṣvaraṅka himself is silent in this respect; but the author of the
Yukti-dīpikā regards the sense-organs to be pervasive. This is evident
from his criticism of the Naiyāyika view of the sense-organs where
in connection of supporting his own view he is found to quote a
fragment from the work of some ancient teacher of Śāmkhya where-
in the sense-organs are explicitly mentioned to be pervasive being
the products of ahaṁkāra (आहंकारिकाणि तत्प प्रयाप्तत्वानि, p. 123/12).
Pañcādhikaraṇa, an ancient teacher of Śaṁkhya, is of opinion that the organs are material products. But other teachers of Śaṁkhya vehemently criticises this view. In their opinion the sense-organs are the sattic modification of ahāmkarā and thus they are differentiated from the eye, ear, nose and such other gross material parts of the body. If these physiological sites of the organs are to be regarded as organs themselves, then one whose eyes have been affected with cataract would be able to see, one whose feet have been paralysed would be able to walk and so on. Hence the physiological sites are not identical with the organs.

Again, perception requires direct contact of the sense-organs with the object without which it cannot be explained; for we cannot perceive even nearer objects hidden by an opaque body. This is why Śaṁkhya holds the organs to be भावकारित, i.e., they function when they come in contact with the object of perception. A physical organ like the ‘eye-ball’ which is limited and material cannot account for the visual perception of an object lying at a distance or behind a glass. This becomes possible if the organs are regarded as pervasive. Further, the sense-organs can receive impressions of all objects, whether great or small. But they could not do so if they were regarded as material substance. In that case they could receive such objects as were equal to them in magnitude. But from practical experience we find that they can receive objects both great and small. All these can be explained if the sense-organs are regarded as pervasive and this becomes possible if they are held to be the products of ahāmkarā.

1 ‘भौतिकानीतिनिर्देशांति पद्धतिकरणमयम्’—Yukti-dipikā, p. 108.
2 For the arguments advanced in this paragraph, see the following quotation in the Yukti-dipikā, p. 123—

एवं हि सास्यश्राद्धां आहुः—‘आद्वारकानीतिनिर्देशां तथां साधितथानि नान्यथा। तथापि कारकं कारकन्विदं प्रायकारित भवति। भौतिकानि चैतिनिर्देशां कर्मः प्रायकारिणम् हृत्वतिनि विचने सहेजः। आद्वारकाणि तु वेषां व्यापकालस्। विनवाकर्ष्यं ज्ञानमारिकम् श्रुतिरूपितमितैः सर्वं प्रायकारिणम्। अधि च महःश्रुद्धमादाङ्गानां आद्वारकाणि तथां कथये, न भौतिकानि, भौतिकानि हि यद्यपिमां करणं तद्यथाभिमाणं भावं युक्तियत्र। Also quoted in the Nyāya-Maṅjari, Vol II, p. 49.
Now the question naturally arises as to how the contact of the sense-organs, specially in the case of visual and auditory perceptions, becomes possible with the external objects. In that case we do not find any direct contact of the said organs with their objects. Modern scientists are of opinion that the light waves are transmitted from the object to the eye, and in the case of auditory perception the sound waves travel through the ether and are received into the ear-passage. Thus visual as well as auditory perception become possible. But Śaṅkhya takes the opposite course. According to this system, an organ of knowledge when explained in the western light, is the sensory psychophysical impulse that goes out of the body and like the photographic process receives an immediate impression of the object. It is called vṛtti of the sense-organ through whose instrumentality direct contact with an external object becomes possible. All these can be explained if the sense-organs are regarded to be the products of ahaṁkāra with preponderance of sattva therein.

The function of the external organs is to receive only an immediate impression of the object and nothing more (क्षत्रियाकोशाश्व युक्तीप्रमाणणसूत्रं तत्रैः, kā, 28). The Yukti-dipikā explicitly states that ‘आलोचन’ means ‘to receive’. The sense-organs come in contact with the object and are modified into the shape, of the objects as they are. This is the only function of the sense-organs and nothing more. This view goes against that of those who hold that general cognition of an object belongs to the sense-organs and special cognition to the intellect.

Let us now turn our attention to the organs of action. The functions of these five organs are speaking, handling, walking, excretion and gratification (in the shape of sexual intercourse). Every organ has got its special function which cannot be performed by the other. This is why the Śaṅkhya counts the motor organs also as īndriyas; for the act of speaking, handling, walking and the like

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1 See, युक्तीदिपिकाय:—‘सामान्यकालमनिद्रायणां विशेषतान् इद्द्वितीत तद्, प्रतिबिंदु मवते,—Yukti-dipikā, p. 121/18-9.
cannot be performed without these respective organs of action. In this connection Jayanta Bhaṭṭa urges: the motor organs have got no justification to be held as *indriyas*, for the functions of some of these organs can be performed to a certain extent even by the other parts of the body also. For instance, one whose feet have been amputated, can proceed certain steps even by crawling. Further, if the respective parts of the body be held as *indriyas* for functioning a special action, then the throat, breast, shoulder and such other limbs also should be included in the list of the organs of action; for these are also found to function the special act of swallowing, embracing and carrying burdens etc. The Jains also disregard the Sāṁkhya view. In their opinion, the organs of action are to be included in the tactual organ.

*Mind and its function*

Mind (*manas*) also comes out of *ahāṃkāra*. It is a sensory organ as well as a motor organ. In this connection Vācaspati observes that the sensory organs as well as the motor organs can operate only when they are presided over by the mind. Hence 'mind' is both a sensory organ as well as a motor organ. Its special characteristic is discernment. The sensory organs only take a vague impression of the object as a homogeneous unit. The mind thereupon reflects 'it is such and such, not that', and thus assimilates it to similar objects and discriminates it from dissimilar ones. Hence, function of the mind is to discern (मनं संबुध्यति).

*The function of ahāṃkāra*

*Ahāṃkāra* or the egoistic principle is the effect of the intellect (*buddhi*). Its special function is self-appropriation. When the mind has finished its assimilation and discrimination of the vague and indeterminate impression of the object produced by the sense-organs, the *ahāṃkāra* steps in and appropriates to itself the apprehension arrived at by the mind. The commentators explain the function of the *ahāṃkāra* thus: 'I alone preside over what has been

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1 Nyāya-maṅjarī, pp. 482/3.
discerned by the mind’, ‘I am entitled to this’, ‘all these objects are for my use’, ‘there is no one else entitled to it’, ‘I alone exist’—this self-appropriation is the function of *āhamkāra*.

**The function of buddhi**

The function of the intellect (*buddhi*) is to ascertain its duty towards what has been appropriated by the egoistic principle (*āhamkāra*). Vācaspati illustrates the process thus: every body who has to accomplish something, first of all ponders over it, then reflects on it, then associates himself with it, and finally resolves that he should do this and then proceeds to do it. This is the familiar way to every body. Thus intellect operates when it ascertains that such a duty is to be performed by me. This is the specific function of the intellect. This is called ‘अध्यवसाय’ (*kā, 23*) and it does not differ from the ‘intellect’ itself. The relation of *buddhi* with ‘अध्यवसाय’ is like that of the lamp with the flame.

The motor and the sensory organs are called external organs, while the mind, ego and intellect are called internal organs. Thus *Iśvara* counts thirteen organs in all. But with regard to the number of organs all the teachers of *Śāṅkhyā* are not found to hold the same view. From the evidence of the *Yukti-dipikā* (pp. 108 & 132) we know that according to *Pancādhikaraṇa* there are only ten organs, while the followers of *Varṣagānyā* regard eleven as such. *Vindhyāvāsin* also is of the same opinion *Patañjali* does not regard *ahamkāra* as a separate entity. He includes it within *buddhi*. Hence in his opinion there are only twelve organs.

The function of the organs is to grasp, retain and illumine the objects (आहरण-वारण-प्रकाशकरण, *kā, 32*). Here commentators differ in their expositions. According to Gauda grasping and retention belong to the motor organs and illumination to the sensory organs. On the other hand Vācaspati states that the motor organs grasp, the internal organs retain and the sensory organs illumine. The author of the *Yukti-dipikā* refers to the view of a teacher in whose opinion the motor-organs grasp, ‘mind’ and ‘individuation’ retain, while the sensory organs and ‘intellect’ illumine the objects. But he himself does not advocate fully any of the views mentioned above.
He holds that the motor-organs grasp the objects, for they are capable to seize them. Retention belongs to the sensory organs which in the process of perception come in contact with the objects, take an immediate impression of them and are accordingly modified into the very shape of their respective objects. Hence, they sustain the objects through their \textit{vrttis}. Elsewhere he vehemently criticises the view of those who hold that the sensory-organs illumine the objects, and finally comes to the conclusion that the said organs retain the objects and not illumine them like a lamp (तस्मात्युक्तमेवत् याहुकमिनित्रेय नतु प्रतीपवर्त प्रकालकमिति, p. 122/20). The function of the internal organs is to illumine \textit{i.e.}, to manifest the objects.

Now the question arises whether the organs function successively or simultaneously. Vācaspati states that they function successively as well as simultaneously (युगपञ्चनण्यस्य लु बृत्तिः कम्भस्य तत्स्य निर्दिष्टः, का, 30). He illustrates this in the following way. In dim light a person possesses a vague impression of something, then fixing his mind towards it he observes that it is a terrible robber aiming at him with his bow and arrow, then follows the self-appropriation that the robber is advancing to catch hold of me and finally resolves that I must run away from the place. Simultaneous operation is also illustrated by him thus: When by the flashes of lightning one sees a tiger in the dark just facing him, then vague impression, reflection, self-appropriation and determination are instantaneous and he runs away from the place at once.

Here also the author of the \textit{Yukti-dipika} offers a different interpretation. He is not prepared to support simultaneous operation. Though in the case of the tremendous sound of thunder-strike or seeing a venomous snake lying in the way, operation of all the organs seems to be simultaneous; but philosophically it cannot stand such. For, it is an established fact that the internal organs cannot directly receive the objects; they do so through the instrumentality of the sensory organs. Further, it is an well known maxim that the external organs are like the gates while the internal ones are the gate keepers (का, 35). The said maxim also becomes
invalid if simultaneous operation of the organs are maintained (प्रातार्थिभमक्रमणातसङ्गमः, p. 130/23). However, he finally comes to the conclusion that the ancient teachers used to maintain simultaneous operation of the organs in the case of the present percepts, whereas in the opinion of Īśvarakṛṣṇa the organs operate successively in apprehending all percepts past or present (अस्य हेतूः कर्मोंन् युक्तरूपः, वृत्तिः: पृष्ठाचार्यं निर्देशिः, आचार्येण तु कमेन्द्रेयमः:। अहेतुसन्नियाढ़िप्रकाशः कः कमेन्द्रेव, p. 130/28-9).

With regard to the characteristic feature of the internal organs also, the ancient teachers of Saṅkhya are found to differ in their opinion. There are some teachers who hold that every thing is experienced in the buddhi, whereas in the opinion of Vindhyavāsin it is done in the mind. Other teachers regard 'reflection', 'self-appropriation' and 'ascertaining' as distinct separate entities; but Vindhyavāsin speaks of their unity. Again, the followers of Vāraṇagaṇa are of opinion that whenever the organs function abnormally, the influx comes into them directly from the prakṛti, while in the ordinary course they act from within. But Patañjali holds that they act always from within, while Pañcādhikārana adopts quite the opposite view. In his opinion the organs by their very nature are without any impression left in them. They are like dry rivers and empty villages. Whenever there is an external stimulus of knowledge, they receive automatically an influx from the prakṛti and it is then only that they can operate. Knowledge according to his system wholly imanates from the prakṛti.

He classifies 'knowledge' primarily into two heads—(1) प्राकृत (natural), and (2) वैदिक (acquired). The former is again subdivided into three classes—(1)तत्त्वसम, (2) आपविद्विद्, and (3) आभिविद्विद्. Of these, तत्त्वसम is that variety of knowledge which appears in a text:

1 तत्त्वसमेता महति सर्वायमान्यविद्विदः, मनसि विद्विद्विदिः, युक्ति-दिपिकाः, p. 108/12.
2 सहस्र्यावविद्विदयवविद्विद्विदानालमन्येयाम्, एकाचं विद्विद्विदिः, ibid, p. 108/12-3.
3 करणाम् महति सर्वायमान्यविद्विदः: प्रथानात, सर्वा न खतः दति वार्षययः; ibid,p.108/15-6.
4 समवेद्विद्विदिः पतितविद्विदः, समवेद्विद्विदिः पतितविद्विदिः, ibid. p. 108/16-7.
5 करणान्य निद्विद्विदयवविद्विदयवविद्विद्विदानालमन्येयाम्, प्राकृतिकालिकानि तु द नान्म त्रिकृपातीवर्तीवानि प्रथानानधिति चेति पतितविद्विदि; ibid, p. 108/13-5.
(evolute of the \textit{prakrti}) \textit{e. g.}, the ‘intellect’ (\textit{buddhitvav}) at the very moment of its manifestation from the \textit{prakrti}. Pañcādhikaraṇa, the upholder of this view, thus intends to hold that an object and its knowledge are correlated; one cannot exist without the other. The object exists but its knowledge is absent becomes untenable according to his opinion. By \textit{तत्क्रमः} he goes to maintain that as soon as an evolute of the \textit{prakrti} is manifested, its knowledge also emanates simultaneously in it. ‘सांसिद्धिक’ is what exists innately in a composite body consisting of the organs and their objects (\textit{उपयोगकार्यकरण}). For instance, the knowledge of Kapila, the great sage. \textit{आत्मोपनिषिक} also belongs to such a body. But it cannot function out of its own accord like the former. It requires a stimulus. ‘वेक्षण’ is classified under two heads—(1) \textit{स्वावलं} and (2) \textit{परवेक्षण}. The former is called ‘तारक’, (lit. acquired by self-reasoning)\textsuperscript{1} a name given by the ancient teachers of Śāṅkhyā to the first of the eight achievements called ‘\textit{siddhis}’ (\textit{kā, 51}). The remaining seven \textit{siddhis} fall under \textit{परवेक्षण}. ‘Virtue’ ‘dispassion’ and such other properties of the \textit{buddhi} (\textit{kā, 23}) also are classified by him similarly\textsuperscript{2}.

Vindhyāvāsin disregards \textit{तत्क्रमः} as well as ‘सांसिद्धिक’. In his opinion ‘knowledge’ does not function out of its own accord. It cannot be innate, it is to be acquired. It subsists in the substratum in its potential form, and whenever there is a stimulus it reveals itself. Even in the case of Kapila, the revered sage, it is not innate, it reveals in a subsequent period after he immerses into existence. For he is said to have obtained it through oral transmission from his spiritual teacher (\textit{�धी प्रसूतं कपिल यस्तमये ब्राह्मविभाषिति ज्ञातमानवं प्रदेयं, Śvet. V. 2}), and so will be the case even in the succeeding cycle of creation. By this, Vindhyāvāsin intends to say that a stimulus in the form of an efficient cause is necessary for bringing out an already existing object into revelation. It helps to manifest the substance

\textsuperscript{1} This is the exposition of the \textit{Yukti-dīpikā} (p. 161). But some of the commentators differ here.

\textsuperscript{2} For Pañcādhikaraṇa’s classification of the different varieties of knowledge, See \textit{Yukti-dīpikā}, pp. 147-8.
which already exists in a latent form in the material cause; but thereby it does not help to produce something altogether new. The difference between Kapila and an ordinary being lies in the fact that in the case of the revered sage there is very quick transmission of knowledge, for in him lies the highest degree of sattva. Hence his wisdom is unparalleled. But in the case of an ordinary being with predominance of tamas, it is obstructed to get itself fully manifested. With regard to the "वैकृत्" group which comprises the eight siddhis, there is no difference of opinion.

But Ḡṛṣṇa classifies 'wisdom', 'dispassion' and such other properties of the buddhi into three groups (kā, 43)—(1) सांविद्यक (innate), (2) प्राकृतिक (natural), and (3) दैवितिक (incidental). He is not prepared to admit 'तत्त्वसम' of Pāṇḍhikāraṇa. In course of elucidating the view of the Kārikā, the Yuktī-dīpikā (p. 148/15-7) boldly asserts that such a type of knowledge cannot exist. Puruṣa experiences the agreeable and disagreeable cognitions produced in the buddhi—this is one of the main conceptions of Śāṅkhya. If it be maintained that 'knowledge' is revealed in the buddhi just at the time of its manifestation from the prakṛti, then how would that knowledge be experienced? The puruṣa can experience knowledge only when it becomes associated with a composite body consisting of the organs and the elements. Moreover, cognition is produced in the buddhi through the organs in contact with the objects. If cognition is revealed in the buddhi just at the time of its manifestation from the prakṛti, then further evolution of the tattvas and consequently the production of the composite bodies with the organs and elements would be superfluous. Thus 'तत्त्वसम' is disregarded.

Again, by advocating 'सांविद्यक' the author of the Kārikā goes to refute the view of Vindhyavāsin who holds that even 'wisdom'.

1 For Vindhyavāsin's view which is discussed in this paragraph, see the following fragment from the Yuktī-dīpikā, p. 148/10-4.

"विद्वानसिद्धान्त नानित तत्त्वसम सांविद्यक, किं तात्त्व त्वदिकमेव। तत्त परमपर्वतमेव संपं संपातविद्यकारामेव बान्न निविदमेव, वसाव, युक्तिस्मात्मप्रज्ञानकमेव—तत्त्व तत्त्वसम यस्मात् तत्त्वसम्यायं—सूक्तमेव नार्योपपिनाकमेव (cf. Yogabhidya, IV. 12), निविदेश, नार्यिस्तिकमाह्यां तत्त्वसम्यायं—तत्त परमेव पद्मकुलं, अभ्यास्यं किं तत्त्व तत्त्वसम्यायं। तत्त्वसमेव तत्त्व तत्त्वसम्यायं।"
belonging to Kapila reveals at a subsequent period after he immer-
ges into existence. The commentator states that in the revered
sage, there lies the highest degree of sattva. Thus owing to the
absence of rajas and tamas there is no obstruction in him, and
knowledge reveals itself automatically. So it does not wait for a
subsequent period to function. The relation of knowledge with him
is just like that of the lamp with its light. Speaking briefly, wisdom
is innate with Kapila. In him it reveals automatically, it does
not require any stimulus. Similarly ‘virtue’ is innate with Bharu,
dispersion’ with Sanaka and ‘divine power’ with those in whom
there is a flow of sattva and rajas only. They are called
‘माहातम्यशरीर.’ With regard to their reverse also (that is, the
tamasic modification of the buddhi) it may be illustrated that ‘vice’
is innate with the Yakṣas and the demons, ‘passion’ with the
animals and so on.

‘प्राकृतिक’ (natural) wisdom and such other dispositions (भावा:) are
those which exist potentially in the substratum, but reveal very
quickly whenever there is an external stimulus. Just as seeing a
venomous serpent lying on the way, movement becomes sudden
and very quick, so the manifestation of the natural dispositions
becomes sudden and very quick by coming in touch with an excep-
tional stimulus. For instance, dispassion of Āsuri revealed
abnormally by coming in touch with Kapila. Here the revered
sage is the stimulus in dispelling the barrier of Āsuri and conse-
quently there appeared an abnormal flow of dispassion in him.
Similarly the divine power of Nandin revealed incessantly from his
association with Maheśvara, the supreme lord. But in the case of
‘सांतिक’ no such stimulus requires. However, in both the cases
the influx comes directly from the prakṛti.

1 वर्ष सत्ववृक्षानं कार्यकर्मि स परमर्शः। वर्ष सत्ववृक्षायुपदस्तः स माहातम्यशरीरः;
Yuktidiṣṭikā, p. 88/22-3.
2 Such a view is also hinted in the Yoga-sūtra (IV. 3)—
‘सत्त्वसत्त्वगृहां रस्त्रसायाहृत’,

Incidental dispositions belong to migratory beings like ourselves. The ordinary individuals with predominance of tamas strive to dispel the inertia of the buddhi by dint of their own effort and thus sattva begins to flow by slow degrees. As a result of this wisdom and such other dispositions begin to reveal. Here the quantity of these sattvic modifications of the buddhi is comparatively meagre and unlike the previous cases they come out from the buddhi. Isvarakrsna is not prepared to say that the buddhi is like a dry river, as Panchadhihakara suggests. In his opinion, it is not absolutely dry; it can irrigate to a certain extent, but it cannot inundate. In that case it would be exhausted. Speaking briefly, whenever there is super-abundance of these dispositions as in the previous cases, the influx comes directly from the prakrti and in the case of those who attempt to remove the barrier i.e. the tamas by their own effort, the flow of sattva comes directly from the buddhi. By classifying the dispositions of the buddhi into these three different grades, Isvarakrsna intends to support the view of Varsaganyya according to whom whenever the organs function abnormally, the influx comes directly from the prakrti, and in the ordinary cases it comes from within the buddhi. Thus he disregards the view of Patanjali in whose opinion the organs always act from within, and also the view of Paichadhihakara according to whom they always act from without. The author of the Karikas here takes a synthetic attitude; for he attempts to reconcile both the extremes.

Buddhi and Purusya

The organs function out of their own accord; they are not directed by any other external agent. They are mutually incited to activity. One understands the motive of the other and thus they act mutually. The Yuktidipika (p. 131/19-22) illustrates the process thus:—the visual organ wistfully looks at the colour of a pomegranate. The gustatory organ is thus incited and becomes impatient to grasp it. Understanding the motive of the said organ, the feet begin to proceed towards the object and the hand seizes it. In this way the gustatory organ comes in direct contact with the
object and it operates its function. Thus one organ incites another
to activity\(^1\). Hence there is no anomaly in their operation.

Vācaspati illustrates their incitement to activity (आकृति, ka, 31)
in the following way:—just as a number of persons with sword, lance,
stick and such other weapons flock together for a joint operation
against a common enemy and proceeds to act only when they know
each other’s motive. But in doing so the man with sword weilds up
his sword only and not the lance, and the man with stick weilds up
his stick only and not the sword. Similarly each of the organs are
proned to their respective activity after knowing each other’s motive.
Hence, due to this mutual motive force which regulates the activity
of the organs there cannot arise any complexity of functions.

Here an objection arises that the lancers, and the like are
sentient beings. So they can easily understand each other’s motive
and can act accordingly. On the contrary, the organs are never
sentient and as such the analogy cannot be applied in their case.
Consequently there must be an intelligent director of them. Here
the Kārikā (31) replies ‘पुज्वार्थ्यं एत देवर्ष्यं केनचित्ता कार्यते करण्य्’. The
idea is that the organs function only for the sake of fulfilling the
purpose of the puruṣa. No body is their director.

The purpose of the puruṣa is twofold—(1) to experience the
desirable and undesirable modifications of the buddhi derived
through the sense-organs called ‘भोग’ and (2) finally to realise its
true nature called ‘अपकार’. Now the buddhi of Sāṃkhya is un-
conscious, active and subject to mutation; while the puruṣa is
conscious, inactive and immutable. Then how does this bhoga or
experience of desirable and undesirable cognitions of the buddhi
becomes possible on the part of puruṣa who is quite heterogeneous
in nature to it. Here the author of the Yogabhāṣya replies that
the puruṣa is neither entirely similar to the buddhi nor entirely

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\(^1\) Vyomavatī in course of elucidating the Sāṃkhya conception of bhoga
states that beholding puruṣa’s eagerness to bhoga there arises an incitement
in the buddhi. The sense-organs in their turn understanding this incitement
of buddhi are consequently modified into the shape of the objects. Hence, in
its opinion it is the buddhi which is incited and not the sense-organs. See
below, p. 188, n2.
different from it (स बुद्धिन सत्त्वो नात्येन्ति विहृष्ट इति, II. 20.). Buddhi, unlike the self, is unconscious no doubt; but it is not entirely foreign to the nature of the purusa. Whenever sattva predominates it becomes transparent and light like the self-luminous purusa, and it can then easily catch the reflection of the purusa. The unconscious buddhi also in its turn becomes as if possessed of consciousness due to the reflection of the conscious purusa upon it.

The manner of experiencing the agreeable and disagreeable cognitions of the buddhi by the purusa is clearly explained and illustrated in the following couplet quoted in the Vyomavatī from some ancient treatise of Śāmkhya.

1 "विविधाक्षरिणानि बुद्धिः अहोगोस्य कष्ट्यते, प्रतिविशिष्यविज्ञ: स्वच्छे यथा चतुर्दशस्त्रमन्सिः।"

The idea is this:—buddhi is really a distinct principle from the purusa. The sense-organs are modified into the shape of their respective objects when they come in contact with them. Consequently the buddhi also assumes the very form of the sense-organs thus modified. As a result of this, there arises a flow of sattva in the buddhi which thus becomes transparent like the self-luminous purusa. In this stage the purusa is seen reflected in the buddhi. Just as the moon is reflected in the transparent water and not in the polluted one, similarly the self-luminous purusa is reflected in the buddhi when sattva pre-dominates in it and not in any other gross material object with 'preponderance of mass-stuff' (tamas) which is held to be the factor of obstruction.

It is true that in the aforesaid instance the moon does not actually get itself united with the clear water, still it seems to be so in as much as its reflection is united with the water. Similarly the purusa though does not get itself actually united with the buddhi,

1 Vyomaśīva explains this couplet in the following way:—बिविकक्क्रियायाः कार्यधारणातिरिक्तात्माकार्यार्थ: स तथाभास, तस्यं हुः सत्यामार्थो भोगः कष्ट्यते। किं रूपः? प्रतिविधिः द्विवेद्यो न वातस्य। यथा चतुर्दशः: प्रतिविधिमनम्मति: एव। विविधाक्षरिणासम्पत्तिः इति, वातस्यं हि: भोगं पुर्वसय पूर्वस्य भासकाः सत्यात् । तथा चाचैतन्यवाद-नक्ष्यत्तमिति।—pp. 521-2 (Chowkhamba).
still it seems to be so since its reflection has been united with it. Just as even without activity of the moon the wavy transparent water into which the reflection of the moon has fallen makes the moon as if quivering, though the moon itself is never quivering; so even in the absence of any activity of the purusa, the buddhi with which the reflection of the purusa has become united makes the purusa as if possessing activity. In this way the properties of the buddhi are ascribed to purusa. Just as victory and defeat belonging to the soldiers are ascribed to the king for it is he who enjoys the benefit derived thereof; similarly ‘enjoyment’ and ‘liberation’ actually exist in the buddhi, but these are attributed to the purusa for it is he who enjoys the result attained thereof (Yoga-bhasya, ii. 18). Purusa thus does not directly experience the cognitions of the buddhi, but it does so through its reflection on it. This bhoga on the part of the purusa is apparent and not real.

Vindhyavasîn explains this bhoga in a slightly different way. He states that just as a red javâ flower makes the transparent crystal as if red by virtue of its proximity to it; similarly the purusa makes the unconscious mind as if conscious by virtue of its proximity to it without himself undergoing any modification. This is expressed in the following couplet attributed to him by Guñaratna.

" пурушовिविष्टालमेव स्वतिनिमासमचेतनम्,  
मनः करोति सार्वनिःश्चादृशेः स्फटिको यथा " ।

From this evidence of the Yukti-dipikâ, we know that in the opinion of Vindhyavasîn everything is experienced in the mind and not in the buddhi as other teachers maintain ( तथास्त्येण महति स्वार्वोपसविच: मनसि विन्यासविसः, p. 108/11-2 ). This is why he states सार्वनिःश्चेतनं मनः करोति. Such a view is also hinted in the expres-
sion 'एकादश मनः सन्तिैंम' of the Yoga-bhāṣya (II. 19). In this connection it is to be noticed that in the opinion of this celebrated exponent of Saṁkhya there are only eleven organs and not thirteen as such; and like other teachers of Saṁkhya he is not prepared to hold 'discernment' (संकल्प), 'self-appropriation' (अभिमान) and 'ascertainment' (अध्यवसाय) as distinct separate entities. He speaks of their identity.

So far about bhogā. Now what is the relation between the substance which experiences the agreeable and disagreeable cognitions and the substratum in which the said cognitions exist? Here the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya (1. 4) observes that the thought-stuff (चित्त) is like a magnet and it attracts the puruṣa to perceive it as a witness. It helps the puruṣa to do so by the mere fact of being proximate to it. Thus its relation with the puruṣa is that of the 'property and the proprietor' (स्वत्वाधिभावसम्बन्ध). Hence the reason why the puruṣa experiences the fluctuations of the thought-stuff is its beginningless correlation with it. Due to ignorance, puruṣa imposes this relation upon himself. By acquiring discriminative knowledge when he can realise that the thought-stuff is entirely foreign to him in nature, he becomes isolated from it and the so called relation then ceases to exist. This is liberation.

**Inference**

Let us now say a few words about the Saṁkhya conception of ‘inference’. It will not be possible on our part to give an elaborate treatment of the subject, for the resources at our disposal is very limited.

‘Inference’ according to the early school of Saṁkhya is the establishment of a fact on the basis of a relation perceived previously (सम्बन्धात् क्षमाभिः साधणांस्व भावति पुरुषस्व स्थानिनः)². Just as perceiving the relation of mutual extermination (पात्यपातसंविन्य) in the case of the snake and the mongoose, it can be inferred that snakes are absent in a place

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1 विचारसमक्षतमात्रिक्षितसमंधिताविभूतियानुप्रथम स्वभावति पुरुषस्व स्थानिनः: ।

2 तस्मात्तत्समधिततः पुरुषस्वामित्सम्बन्धो हेतुः।

2 This seems to be the definition of Vārṣaganiya. For reference, see above, p. 156, n2.
where mongooses abound. In this connection the said school of Sāṃkhya is found to speak of the seven sorts of relations, and the presence or absence of something is to be inferred on the basis of some one or other of these relations. The relation on the basis of which ‘inference’ is made must be between the probans and the probandum, and most probably it was the practice with this school that before inferring something the relation thus perceived was incorporated into someone or other of these seven kinds of relations.

This view of inference on the basis of seven kinds of relations is refuted in the Nyāya-Vārttikā (I. i. 5). In course of elucidating the text of the Vārttikā, Vācaspati quotes a verse wherein all these seven relations are enumerated. This may be noticed below:

\[
\text{मात्रा-निमित्त-संयोगी-विरोधि-सहबारिम्,}
\text{स्वस्तारिम्-व्यवहारायेः सांख्यानां सस्तवाचुमा।}
\]

Vardhamāna in his Prakāśa (p. 671) attributes this verse to the Sāṃkhya-Vārttikā. Jayamaṇgalā also enumerates and illustrates all these relations in course of commenting on Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s view of ‘inference’ (kā, 5); but it slightly differs from those pointed out in the above mentioned couplet.

However, the above-mentioned definition may not withstand the severe criticism of the commentators of Indian philosophy; but the previous knowledge of a ‘relation’ is absolutely necessary in inferential knowledge. The author of the Yoga-bhasya also emphasises upon it. In his opinion, ‘inference’ is that fluctuation of the thought-stuff which is based upon the relation present in things belonging to the same class as the subject of inference and absent from things belonging to classes different from the subject of inference (अनुमानस्य तुत्त्वज्ञातितिवृत्तिः भिन्नज्ञातितिययं व्याख्यतः सम प्रमाणं वर्त्तितरुपानम्, I. 7). For instance, the moon and the stars get from one place to another like Chaitra, hence they possess motion; (negatively) the Vindhyā mountain does not get from one place to another, hence it does not possess motion. Unlike perception, it is mainly concerned with the generic knowledge of the object.

The ancient teachers used to classify ‘inference’ primarily into two heads (1) वीत, and (2) अवीत. The former comprises the
positive figure or more precisely the *modus ponens* and the latter comprises the negative figure or *modus tollens*. Most of the fundamental conceptions of Śāṅkhaṇya are based upon one or other of these two figures. Its *prakṛti*, its *puruṣa*, may even its theory of causation are established by sheer reasoning and this shows that ‘inference’ played a very important part in the building up of the Śāṅkhaṇya as a system. This is why the Yukti-dipikā at its very beginning compares Śāṅkhaṇya to an elephant having the positive and negative figures as its two tusks. But unfortunately the ancient works of Śāṅkhaṇya are almost lost to us and traces of subtle power of reasoning of the ancient teachers may be observed only here and there in the Yoga-bhaṣya and the Yukti-dipikā.

According to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, ‘inference’ is the cognition derived through the previous knowledge of the relation between the middle term and the major term (*तत्त्वज्ञानिकिरङ्कम*), kā, 5), and it is of three kinds. Vācaspati explains this and in doing so he seems to have been influenced by the Nyāya school to a great extent. The three kinds of inference are:—(1) पूर्ववृत्त (a priori), (2) शेषवृत्त (a posteriori), and (3) सामान्यतः द्य (based on general observation). Of these, पूर्ववृत्त is an inference from the antecedent to the consequence, i.e., from cause to effect. For instance, beholding the thickening cloud in the sky it may be inferred that a shower of rain is impending. शेषवृत्त is an inference from the consequence to the antecedent, i.e., from effect to cause; as of rain in the upland from the flood in the river. That which lies beyond the range of sense-perception is to be cognised by सामान्यतः द्य; as from the previous knowledge of the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire in numerous instances, the existence of fire can be inferred from the smoke in the distant hill. The commentators are found to differ among themselves in explaining and illustrating the said varieties of inference. A detailed treatment of the subject has already been offered by Prof. Dhruva, hence we refrain from

1 Cp. कप्पर्यक्तिनित्रित्ते सामान्यतः द्यहिन्दर्दशयः विसमस्थीते, N. Bh., I. i. 5.
further elucidation. Vācaspati classifies श्रेष्ठत्व under ‘अचर’ (negative figure), and the remaining two under ‘चर’ (positive figure).

Now, with regard to the members in a syllogistic reasoning, Śaṁkhya commentators are found to differ among themselves. Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself is silent in this respect. His commentator Māthara holds that an ‘inference’ is based upon three members and it must be free from the thirty-three fallacies (एवं त्रयुपादामासारहितं त्रयावचयमनम्, kā, 5). The three members are: (1) प्रतिप्रण (thesis), (2) हेतु (reason), and (3) उद्दाहरण (exemplification). Of the thirty-three fallacies, nine belong to wrong thesis, fourteen to wrong reason, and ten to wrong example (pp. 12-3). It is strange to notice that such a classification of fallacies are not to be met with anywhere else in the available works on orthodox logic— not even in the Nyāya-Varttika which spares no pains to show almost all the possible permutations and combinations of fallacies. The three-membered logical reasoning is generally found to be adopted by the Buddhist teachers. The said thirty-three fallacies also are recognised in the Nyāya-Praveśa⁴, a Buddhist treatise on logic. Now the question naturally arises whether there had been on old school of Śaṁkhya which was in favour of the three-membered logical reasoning or Māthara was influenced by the Buddhist teachers in advocating such a view. The Chinese translation of the Madhyāntānusāra Śāstra (Nanjio, No. 1246) sheds important light in this connection. From the evidence of this text we know that the three-membered logical reasoning was introduced by the Śaṁkhyaśas and Pāṇḍūrājas before Vasubandhu. The Jaina writer Hemacandra also in his Pramāṇa-mimāṃsa-sūtra-vṛtti (II. i. 8) states that in the opinion of Śaṁkhya an ‘inference’ consists of three-members (प्रतिप्रणस्तुदाहरणानीति त्रयावचयमनम–माननिति साहित्यः). It therefore clearly shows that there had been a prominent school of Śaṁkhya which used to hold ‘thesis’, ‘reason’, and ‘example’ as the only members of a syllogistic reasoning. But the Chinese version of Paramārtha, the Bhāṣya of Gaudapāda and the present Śaṁkhya-sūtra are in favour of the five-membered reasoning.

1 See pp. 2-7, part I, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, XXXVIII.
On the other hand, the author of the Yukti-dipikā supports neither of these two views. In his opinion, a purely syllogistic reasoning rests upon ten members (p. 47/20-1). These are:—(1) जिज्ञासा (desire to know), (2) संशय (doubt), (3) प्रयोजन (purpose), (4) शास्त्रप्रयासित (possibility of a solution), (5) संशयविद्यास (dispelling of the doubts), (6) प्रतिपत्तिः (proposition), (7) हेतु (reason), (8) श्रम्यत (exemplification), (9) उपसंहार (application), and (10) निगमन (conclusion). In support of his view he states that though Īsvarakṛṣṇa himself is silent in this respect, but some of the commentators collected them in their respective treatises—the validity of which cannot be ignored. He further argues (pp. 3-4) that the author himself hints upon these different aspects of syllogistic reasoning. For instance, in the expression ‘तुःकथवाभिमतातिप्रिज्ञासा’ (kā, 1) he starts enquiry, in ‘कारणस्तत्त्वस्वयम’ (kā, 16) he places the thesis, in ‘मैत्रालो परिमाणाणि’ (kā, 15) he speaks of the reason, in ‘नवप्रवर्तितस्तत्त्वहर्ष’ (kā, 14) he sets out the example, in ‘शीर्षस्य विषयस्य प्राकृतिः: प्रशास्य’ (kā, 57) he makes the application, and in ‘तत्त्वालो तत्त्वविचारकरणं द्वारिः’ (kā, 35) he arrives at the conclusion. In support of this view of the ten-membered reasoning he further states that the said syllogistic members have been described by Vindhyavāsin and such other reputed teachers of Sāmkhya in their respective treatises; hence Īsvarakṛṣṇa did not think it necessary to treat them separately.

Reference is made of the ten-membered reasoning even in the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. Vātsyāyana also in his Nyāya-bhāṣya (I, i. 32) criticises the view of certain Naiyāyikas who are in favour of the ten-membered reasoning. He rejects them on the ground that

1 ‘वाक्यस्य सूक्ष्मकारणार्थार्थोपदेशो न इत्स्तत्त्वार्थिभाष्यार्थः: केवलदेवो संयतामकः; ते च न: प्रमाणाम्’—Yukti-dipikā, p. 3/16-7.
2 ‘किंवद् तत्त्वाचार्यः, तत्त्वांतर्पणं हि विश्वासास्त्वभूतिष्ठित्वात्नात्यथं: प्रमाणं नस्ते इत्स्तत्त्वार्थिभाष्यो त्वावलिकार्थम्—Yukti-dipikā, p. 4/7-8.
3 See under Vārttika, 1, Pa, V, ii, 42.
4 But the sequence of reckoning of Vātsyāyana does not tally with that of the Yukti-dipikā. In the Nyāya-bhāṣya ‘शास्त्रप्रयासि’ (possibility of a solution) is followed by ‘प्रयोजन’ (purpose) whereas in the Sāmkhya commentary the former is preceded by the latter.
these additional members beginning with 'enquiry' and ending in 'dispelling of doubt' are certainly phases in the psychological process of reasoning, but they have no place in proper syllogistic argument.

Though they may not have any logical necessity for proving a conclusion, yet they serve a very useful purpose in the discussion and exposition of a philosophical problem. Let us quote the examples given in the Yukti-dipika (pp. 47/22—48/5) in order to bring home the application of these additional members in exposition. For instance, a student of philosophy approaches a teacher of Śāmkhya and solicits him to explain the nature of puruṣa. He wants to know whether the puruṣa as conceived by the Śāmkhya exists or not. It is this impulse to know the truth about puruṣa which is direct motive of philosophical speculation. The master follows the Socratic dialectic and poses a question in order to bring out the intellectual make-up of the enquirer. Certainly no man of a serious disposition would attach any importance to such a frivolous question. It is therefore necessary to ascertain that the enquiry of the student is induced by a serious quest of truth and not a frivolous pastime or a dishonest move intended to make a capital offhand assertion. So the next step would be a question on the part of the teacher as to the raison d'être of the doubt. "Why should you be in doubt that the puruṣa may exist or not"? The student may answer "well sir, my doubt is due to the fact that the existence of the self i.e., the puruṣa is not a matter of direct observation and what is not directly observed may be of two classes—an entity or a non-entity. The other side of the moon and the sun though not observed, is definitely known to be existent; but a hair's horns equally incompetent to observation is known to be a non-entity. So mere non-observation cannot be made the ground of inference of the non-existence of a thing. The self as described by the Śāmkhya as an unchanging ubiquitous self-luminous principle is not a matter of observation. Were it so there would be no dispute among philosophers. This non-observation, because it is found to appertain to existent and non-existent things alike is the cause of my doubt".
In order to taste further the seriousness of the enquiry the master would interrogate him about the motive of this query. “But why should you bother yourself about this problem which is a matter of idle speculation? What consequence would you derive by the knowledge of the truth as to the existence or non-existence of the self?” The student may then unfold his motive in the following terms. “Well sir, I want to know the truth about the self, because the knowledge of the truth is the surest way to ultimate salvation if it is known to be the truth that the self exists and is different from matter, indifferent to all changes and circumstances and is not bound by any spatial or temporal limit, I must conclude that the doctrine of self-lessness as propounded by the Buddhists is an unfounded illusion and the knowledge of the truth will enable me to shake up all bondage and to attain salvation than which nothing can be greater and more durable. And this is the position of the Śāṅkhya which maintains that the knowledge of the true nature of the manifest, unmanifest and puruṣa leads to salvation. If on the other hand the doctrine of the Buddhists be found to be true then I must be bound to conclude that the system or metaphysics as propounded by the Śāṅkhya philosopher is full of untruth and calculated to misguide an enquirer after truth and a seeker of salvation. The knowledge of the truth that there is no such thing as self will make it imperative for me to give up all allegiance to the doctrines which are served by the self. On the contrary, I must follow the discipline of the Buddhists and by an unremitting pursuit of a course of meditation I shall come to realise that the transcendent truth will dawn upon my mind according to the Buddhist teachers and this will automatically entail the final cessation of passions and defilements which characterise the existence of the denizens of the three worlds. And this is called nīrāvana or extinction of personalised and individualised existence.” And certainly the problem is competent to be decided by the application of the triple source of knowledge. The statement of this four steps thus satisfies the teacher that the enquiry is inspired by a real and honest difficulty. And it is now incumbent upon
the teacher to eliminate the doubt of the disciple, and this can be secured only by the five-fold syllogistic argument.

Valid testimony

Valid testimony (आत्मबचन) is also reckoned by Śāṃkhya as a separate source of knowledge. It includes all valid revelations—such as the Vedas and the Brahmapas, the religious codes of Manu etc., and the utterings of a person who is free from any defect. Such imperceptible entities as lie even beyond the range of inference are to be cognised by the said source of knowledge (kā, 6).

Besides these three, there are other sources of knowledge which find their place in different systems of philosophy. These are ‘analogy’, ‘presumption’, negation’, ‘probabality’ and the like. Śāṃkhya is not prepared to assign a separate place to them. This system includes some of them under ‘inference’ and the rest under ‘valid testimony’.

CAUSALITY

Puruṣa of Śāṃkhya is always passive. It is never held to be the agent. All activities are attributed to prakṛti which has got the three guṇas as its constituents. Cause and effect are therefore nothing but the different modes of the guṇas. Causality is explained by the doctrine of ‘satkārya’ which is a distinctive feature of this system. Unlike the Buddhist and the Naiyāyikas, the Śāṃkhya is of opinion that the effect is real and it is always existent. It is not an entirely new production; it exists in its cause in a latent form even before its production. The following Kārikā verse seeks to establish the said theory by a set of five arguments:

असद्धरणादुपदा नामश्रवणात् सर्वस्वबिभावात्।
शक्तिः शक्तिकरणात् कारणबमावाच सत् कार्यम् ॥ (Sk. 9)

The commentators have explained this verse elaborately. The idea is this: (1) A non-entity as the horn of a hare can never come into existence. Vācaspati in this connection boldly states that ‘blue can never be made yellow even by thousand artists’. (2) An appropriate material is resorted to for a certain
effect to be brought about. This means that there must be a
definite relation of the cause with the effect. This being the case,
the cause gives rise to the effect only when in relation with it.
But if the effect be held to be non-existent, there would be no
relation with the cause and consequently there would not be any
production. (3) If the relation between the cause and its effect be
deemed as unnecessary, then everything would come out of every-
thing which would go against our common experience. (4) The
Mīmāṃsakas are not prepared to admit of the aforesaid relation.
They hold that the cause has got certain potency by which it gives
rise to the particular effect. But Saṃkhya intervenes here and
argues that even the said potency can help to produce that effect
only for which it is efficient. Otherwise oil could be pressed even
from sands. This implies that cause and effect are co-related and
the latter cannot come out from that which does not possess the
necessary potency. (5) Finally, the effect does not essentially
differ from its cause. Cloth does not differ in its essence from the
threads. All these arguments attempt to establish the fact that the
effect is not altogether a new entity. It is always existent; it is
hidden in its cause even before its production.

The subject requires further elucidation. According to this
system nothing new is produced. Effect is the developed stage of
what was previously latent. It is the manifestation of the implicit
(सूक्लम्मण सूक्लित्वम्: कार्यम्). The oil already exists in the sesamum,
it is to be extracted by pressing; rice exists in the paddy and mere
husking is required to bring it out. Thus we find that the effect
already existed in its material cause and the efficient causes such as
pressing and husking etc., only help it to reveal itself. The figure of
the statue is not essentially different from the block of stone from
which it was built, the jar does not vary in its essence from clay
which is resorted to as its material cause; the skill of the sculptor
and the potter made the forms only and nothing more, while the
original matter remained the same without undergoing any funda-
mental change. Though the jar can contain water while clay cannot do so, yet materially they do not differ. Their identity is fundamental while their various outward forms have their respective practical purposes to serve. Similarly, destruction also is not total annihilation. It is merely a change of forms while the original matter remains unaffected.

The Pātañjala school also explicitly states that a non-entity can never come into existence and an entity can never be annihilated. But it tackles the problem of causality more scientifically. Its viewpoint may be briefly stated thus: The primary prakṛti is at the basis of all manifestations. It is constituted of the three guṇas which are always functioning. They do not rest even for a single moment without giving rise to one or other kind of modifications. But all these modifications or changes are nothing but the different collocations of the guṇas and materially do not differ from them. The collocations only vary in their shape while the substance whose different modifications they are, remains always at the back-ground. In the Yoga-system, this main substance is technically called dharmin while the modifications are called dharmas. The former is the substratum while the latter forms its different aspects. The relation of cause and effect then may be better maintained as that of the dharmin with its dharmas. Speaking of the characteristic feature of the former, the Bhāṣya states that 'it is at the back-ground of all the aspects or dharmas whether manifested or un-manifested, it is the substratum of both generic and particulars, and further it is inseparably connected with them.' It is an abiding principle manifesting itself in and through the dharmas. From these statements of the Bhāṣya, it is apparent that both the terms dharmin and dharma are inter-related, and the full implication of one cannot

1 नास्तेववतः सम्बन्धः | न चास्ति सती विमार्य हिति, IV. 12
2 चास्तियुक्तार्थाद्यात्मा: | यूरुयं न रन्यम: गुणावचारं मयादित्वे, चलच शुण्डस, III. 13.
3 सवेष्ठिक्य सुभाषिणी सविभवविषयवालमिति परमावर्तो गुणसमान: | IV. 13.
4 ये प्रतीक्षभावकांतिकत्वेन भयंकरयुपाती सामान्यविशेषसामा सोकस्त्रयी भासि, III. 14.
5 भिन्नलिखितशेष चर्मेदरा प्रणवम्यते, III. 13.
be clearly understood without knowing that of the other. So let us now turn our attention to the dharma and observe what is actually meant by this in the Yoga-system.

Patañjali only classifies it into three heads, but he does not define it. It is the author of the Bhāṣya who is found to explain it in the following line: 'धर्मिन: शक्तिः धर्मिनः' (III. 14) The underlying idea of this statement is rather difficult to understand. If the expression 'धर्मिनः' be taken to be a qualifying attribute of 'शक्ति:' then the sense of the whole sentence generally comes thus: The dharma is nothing but the power of the dharmin capable of giving rise to that effect only for which it is equipped with the necessary efficiency. Vācaspati attempts to bring out the significance of the said statement in two ways. Firstly, he states that the dharma is the power of the substance—the original matter, which constitutes the 'earth' and the like. Here the 'power' is to be regarded as the capacity of producing dust, lump of clay, jar and similar other aspects that exist in the earth—their material cause, in an undeveloped state. Be it granted that they may evolve from the said substance. But how to account for the fact that a jar has the capacity of bringing water while the original substance in the shape of earth has not got anything as such? This difficulty is removed by the epithet 'धर्मिनः'. This means that the power itself that generates the jar and such other forms is equipped with the efficiency of bringing water and the like. Hence the capacity to bring water etc., is not to be regarded as incidental. This has been inherited by the jar from its material cause along with the said power by which it becomes manifest to the objective world.

In his second interpretation he takes the expression 'धर्मिनः' in its plural form and thus making it a qualifying adjective of 'धर्मिनः' (धर्मिनः—धर्मिनः, the aspirant is dropped by the rule of sandhi). By construing the sentence thus, he arrives at the following conclusion: The dharmins or the principal materials are equipped with the necessary efficiency (धर्मिनः,�र्मिनः); it is the power which alone is to be regarded as the dharma.
(शक्तिर्द्व धर्मः). The power here is nothing but the ‘efficiency’ as already stated above. From this it follows that ‘efficiency’ only and nothing else is to be regarded as the dharma (योगवैद्वत्त्व धर्मं इत्यतः), and that which possesses this ‘efficiency’ is said to be dharmin.

The subject requires further clarification. The dharmas are classified into three heads (III. 14) :—(1) Past (शान्त), (2) present (बिन्त) and (3) future (अत्वपदेह्य). Of these, the first is that which is in its quiescent state after finishing its function and this is called past. The second is that which has manifested itself. It is actualised and called present. The remaining one is indeterminable. It is yet in the womb of its material cause and not yet commenced its operation. This is called future. Of these, the future one is followed by the present which again in its turn is followed by the past. But the past is not to be followed by the present as there does not exist any relation of antecedent and consequent between them; for the past cannot be held to be the antecedent of the present.

Now, what happens to the past? Is it totally annihilated? No, from the principle of the conservation of energy it has been absorbed by its dharmin into its bosom. The ‘अनागत’ or the

1 Is there any chance on the part of the past dharma of reappearing again even under favourable circumstances? From the doctrine of ‘सत्कार्य’ and specially from its corollary (नामान्तो विचारे सतः) it becomes evident that an existing principle is never annihilated. From this it follows that the past dharma which formerly existed in its present form is now absorbed into the dharmin and exists there in union with it. It is not destroyed; it simply disappears. Now, in the Yoga-bhāṣya it is stated that the past has got no sequence (नातिस्वासित क्रमः, III. 15). Then how the yogin is said to be vested with the power of recalling the past form. A fitting reply proceeds from M.M. Gopinath Kaviraj in this connection that ‘the yogin (the yogin) does not usually call back, but revokes only a phantom, an exact duplicate of the past’.

But the difficulty is not yet fully removed. It is an admitted fact that at the time of dissolution this stupendous universe is finally absorbed into the *prakṛti*. It then becomes nothing but a past aspect. This being the case, how does the universe emerge again at the time of new creation? Does the same universe which went into its past stage re-appear or a similar one does so? Bhārtrāhari in his *Vākyapādiya* and specially his commentator Helārāja are found to deal with the problem. In course of his discussion on *kāla* the author in one place states that the present is contradicted by the past (अतीतस्तर तु वा शक्तिस्तर अग्नि निरस्तः, III. iii. 51), meaning thereby that the past is not to be followed by the present—the view which is also advocated by the author of the *Yoga-bhāṣya*. While explaining the hemistich as pointed out above, the commentator explicitly states that a dead is not born again; similarly an entity which has entered into its past stage never re-appears (पुनःप्रभेदते नातीतवस्तो नतिवस्तं परिवर्तितस्य वस्तु) From this it follows that the same universe does not come out again in the succeeding cycles of creation.

But a little after, we find Bhārtrāhari referring to the view of those who are not prepared to follow the view supported by him. According to them the same universe which merged into its primary cause at the time of dissolution and thereby went into its past stage, reappears at the time of fresh creation (अतीताद्वारा वेदादिक ज्ञानविविधिकम्, III. iii. 53). Helārāja here in his commentary states this to be the view of the *Pāñcādhi karaṇa* school of Sāmkhyā. The followers of this school maintain that an entity which entered into its past stage re-appears in due time in the different cycles of creation. The entities which have finished their functions are ultimately absorbed by the primary *prakṛti* into its bosom. They reveal themselves at the time of fresh creation and also disappear into the *prakṛti*—their final cause, at the time of dissolution. From this it follows that the same entity appears and disappears in the process of evolution and involution. The upholders of this view stick to this principle on the strength of the dictum ‘नामात्तो विशेषते सतः’ i.e., an existing entity never becomes non-existent. But the commentator while expounding
future one is not yet manifested. It is still in its embryonic stage. Patañjali calls it ‘अन्यपदेव्य’¹. It is the present one only which is revealed in the world of objects. Thus we find that both the past

the view of Bhartṛhari states here that an entity which entered into its past stage cannot function again. Even in the course of the new cycle of creation the same universe which merged into the womb of its final cause does not re-appear. It is a similar one that comes out. Briefly speaking, the followers of Pañcādhi karaṇa hold the view that the same revolves in the succeeding cycles of creation whereas Bhartṛhari and specially the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya are of opinion that it is a similar one and not the exact same that does so. These two divergent views have been pointed out by Helaraja in the following lines:

¹ केवल यादीताथ्वति (तिनो) संप: कालान्त्ये जगत्सरासंवेद्य ब्रह्म, लूकपरितिनिश्चित हि साभः प्रथमसेवकास्त्रात्या वन्धकालमसवेद्य भास्ते पुनः प्रकटः वैष्णव तिरोभविति शति पार्कर रण-दश्यन्त्यान्त्या सार्थ्यानात् (मयमल्ल्युप)गमः।

A similar Śāmkhya view like that of the Pañcādhi karaṇa school is also referred to in the Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa. The text by way of refutation speaks of the ‘three-fold change’ of Śāmkhya. While explaining ‘change of aspect with reference to time’ (क्षणसमय) the author is found to state that the future stage of an entity is followed by the present one and this again in its turn is followed by the past. This is not all. He proceeds further and states that the past is also followed by the future. And in this way the wheel always revolves. This is expressed in the following lines (p. 58):

सम्बर्तः कथमनातकलक्षणापि तत्वसमय कर्त्तानि कल्पणाय ब्रह्म ब्रह्मानि कर्त्तानि कल्पय ब्रह्मानि कल्पय ब्रह्मानि कर्त्तानि कल्पय ब्रह्मानि कर्त्तानि कल्पय ब्रह्मानि कर्त्तानि कल्पय ब्रह्मानि कर्त्तानि कल्पय

¹ The term occurs also in the Nyāya-sūtra (I. i. 4) where Vātsyāyana explains it as ‘that which cannot be designated’. It
and future are not manifested. They are one with the dharmin, while the present one alone is distinct from it; and according to yogic terminology it may be called विशेष (particular, special).

is what is not yet come to light. It exists potentially in its material cause. The author of the Yoga-bhaṣya (III. 14) when expanding the idea contained in the term states that 'everything contains everything potentially.' He further corroborates his statement by a quotation from some ancient authority wherein it is stated that 'various kinds of taste etc., arising out of the mutation of earth and water can be experienced in in-organic substances. Similarly that of the in-organic into the organic and vice versa. In this way everything contains everything potentially in so far as their generic property is not destroyed'. This will be clear from the following lines:

अथ अन्यपदेः। केः? सर्व सत्तात्मकति। श्रवणातः—जगभूमिः। पारिषानिकरसादिवैभवस्वादः स्वास्वाय द्वृत्तर। तथा स्वाच्छराणं जगभूमिः जग्मानाः स्वाच्छर्भिवें जाबुधुतेऽदेन सर्व सत्तात्मकति।

The fragment needs further clarification. It seeks to explain the reason of diversity in nature. Let us explain this after the manner of Vācaspati. The gross element of earth contains odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, while that of water contains the last four. But it is strange to observe that the whole of the vegetable kingdom which forms a mutation of these two gross elements, is found to contain varieties of taste. This is not all. It is gathered from experience that even the roots, fruits, blossoms and foliages of the same species of tree, creeper or shrub as the case may be, contain peculiarities in taste. Similar is the case with their odour, colour and such other aspects also. This cannot be absolutely due to mutation of earth which does not contain so many varieties; nor it can be that of water for similar reason. Then how all these variations may be said to be arising out of the mutation of earth and water? For, it is an established fact that a cause cannot give rise to an entirely new effect.
Similarly, the effect arising out of mutation of vegetations is clearly visible in organic world. Thus animals acquire varieties of forms by subsisting on the roots, twigs and fruits of trees. And conversely, various forms are developed in the vegetable kingdom owing to mutation due to organic substance. It is found that pomegranates are highly developed if the root of the plant is sprinkled with blood. How to account for this heterogeneity? The reply is found in the expression 'एवं जात्युच्छिदेन सर्वं सत्तामकम्' which ordinarily means that everything contains the essence of everything, provided its common characteristic is not annihilated.

The full significance of the expression is brought out by Vācaspati in the following lines:—

एवं सर्वं जात्युच्छिदिकं सर्वसत्तामकम्। तत् हेतुमाइ—‘जात्युच्छिदेन’ शति।

Here the commentator strives to show that all things which owe their origin due to different permutations and combinations of earthy and watery substances inhere all the varieties of taste, colour, odour and the like from the original gross elements, for the simple reason that earth-hood and water-hood do not totally disappear from them. The rudimentary elements whose different manifestations they are, are not wiped off from the mutables; the former any how manifest their existence in and through the latter. This invalidates the theory of some scholars according to whom 'all contains all potentially, and if the, barrier be removed than anything can come out of anything'. They stick to this view on the strength of the expression 'सर्वं सत्तामकम्'—the real significance of which was misunderstood by them. Here the term 'सर्वं' does not stand for anything and everything; it is used here in a restricted sense. It has been explained by Vācaspati with reference to the quotation following it. This is why he explains the term 'सर्वं' as comprising everything that exists in the shape of water and earth (सर्वं—जलभूमियादिकं). The expression 'सत्तामकम्' also in its turn does not stand as containing anything and everything. It means that
A dharma also may be regarded as a dharmin with respect to its further manifestation. Really speaking, all these varying modes or aspects which are technically called dharmas constitute nothing but the marking of different events in the life-history of an entity. Of these the 'अग्निप्रेक्ष्य' or the future one is the initial stage of its history and finality is achieved when it enters into its past stage.

Now as has been already referred to above, the dharmin is that which persists in both the manifested and unmanifested dharmas—manifested are those which are revealed to us and these are the present ones, while the unmanifested ones comprise both the past and future ones. It is also the substratum of both generic and

which contains all the varieties of tastes and such other entities (सवैयाक्ष—सवर्तसाधायकन्). From this it follows that everything which is regarded as the outcome of the mutation of earth and water, contains all the varieties of tastes, colour and such other entities. Why is it so? The reason is given in the expression 'जालस्तुप्पेदार'. This is so because 'water-hood' and 'earth-hood' do not totally disappear from them (जलबूलाभिरवायते: सम्बन्ध प्रतिक्षितत्वमत्वनासुप्रेरित). Again if anything without discrimination could come out of anything, the expression 'जालस्तुप्पेदार' which is indirectly used to restrict the province of production would be superfluous. This is not all. In that case the expression 'सत्सेवमभाषानाद्य' (काः, 9) which has been already explained above (p. 197) would also be meaningless.

However, it is true that the primary prakṛti which is the storehouse of all energy, contains everything potentially. Its power is unlimited and it is never exhausted. It possesses infinite possibilities. If the barrier that stands in the way of its manifestation be any how removed, then anything and everything can come out of it. But it cannot be so in the case of the various manifestations of the gross-elements which are always limited, and a limited cause cannot contain unlimited potency.

1 भणाइपि भगवान भववन्यभवस्वपनपेक्षा, III. 15.
specific (सामान्यविवेकत्वम्)—by generic the past and future ones are
to be meant, for they are one with the dharmin; while the present
ones which are being experienced by us are to be regarded as specifics and these also in their turn look forward to their material cause
for their sustenance. Further, it is inseparably connected (अन्तःक्रिया) with the aspects. No question arises with regard to the past and
future aspects, for they are merged into the dharmin. The present
ones also are not absolutely different from the dharmin. Though
the jar has got a distinct shape of its own by which it can be
differentiated from the earth—its material cause, yet it has got its
existence in and through the earth. It cannot be separated from
the original matter.

From this discussion on the characteristic feature of the dharmin
and the dharma it may be concluded without any hesitation that the
dharmin is nothing but the original matter and the dharmas are
their varying manifestations or forms. Consequently, the relation
of cause and effect is that of the matter with its varying forms,
and it is the relation of identity in difference (तत्तवत्वम्). Though
the past and future aspects are identical with the dharmin, yet
they are left open to the perfect yogins whose doors are never
barricaded.

Really speaking, this apparent distinction of dharmin and the
dharma can only be experienced during the course of cosmic
process (बृहि). But in the time of dissolution when the primordial
prakṛti absorbs everything within itself, then one dharmin in the
shape of prakṛti alone exists, and no other external dharmas.

So far we have dealt with the material cause only, and in doing
so its various aspects have also been examined. Now, the
Vaiśeṣikas are found to assign equal importance to an efficient cause
(निर्मित्तकारण) also. What is its position in the Saṁkhya-yoga
school? A suitable reply in this connection is to be met with in
the Yoga-śūtra (IV. 3) and specially in its Bhāṣya. The fact is

1 सामान्यं परिमिथ्रपम्, विदेषं: परं प्रतिया उद्धारात्मक: क्लेषीः:
this: Prakrti is self-propelled (स्वतः परिणामिति). Motion is inherently in it. Impulse does not come in it from outside. Though it is equipped with infinite potentiality and has got a natural proneness towards actualisation, yet it cannot always function. There is an obstructing force that stands as a barrier towards its functioning and unless it be removed it cannot act spontaneously. The efficient causes play their role here and render assistance to the prakṛti. This has been beautifully described by way of illustration in the Yoga-bhāṣya (IV, 3). Just as a farmer with a view to irrigate the corn-fields does not himself carry water from the reservoir to the fields, but makes an outlet in the embankment and when this is done water flows to the distant fields out of its own accord. So also the efficient causes in the shape of 'virtue' and 'vice' etc., do not move prakṛti into action; they simply remove the barrier and when this is done energy from prakṛti is automatically liberated. Just as the same farmer does not himself force the water into the roots of the plants, but only weeds out the field and when this is finished, the roots of paddy-plants can easily suck out earthy and watery juice; so also the efficient cause such as 'virtue' only removes 'impurity' that stood as a barrier in the way of functioning of prakṛti and consequently helps to liberate the energy stored up there in. Speaking briefly, prakṛti is the sole agent. Activity is inherent in it. The efficient causes do not move it into action. They only help to remove the barrier. When the barrier is removed, there is an automatic liberation of energy so long confined in the womb of prakṛti.

Much has been said about cause and effect. But one important factor in this connection should not be lost sight of. Though the causes are present with their necessary concomitants, still the effects do not become manifested always and everywhere owing to limitation in 'space,' 'time,' 'form' and 'condition'. For instance, the saffron plants do not thrive anywhere else except Kashmir.

1. देशकालकारनिमितौपवयमन्तु स खुदु समादेशकालमालमनामित्वक्षिणिति, Yoga-bhāṣya, III. 14.
though the other conditions remain elsewhere the same. This
is due to limitation in space. Similarly, paddy plants do not yield
harvest if they are transplanted in summur, for they thrive in
rainy season and not in summur; and this is due to limitation in
time. A doe does not give birth to a man, for the human form
does not develop in her. This is an instance of limitation in form.
Similarly, a vicious man cannot experience pleasure for the
effectuating cause in the shape of ‘virtue’ is wanting in him1.

We need not prolong our discussion on the topic here. But the
subject cannot be said to be fully treated unless the principle of the
‘conservation of energy’, the ‘theory of change’ (परिणामवाद), the
‘doctrine of succession’ (क्रमनियम) and such other allied topics are
explained. However, these will by the way come up for discussion in
the next chapter and there we intend to reserve some space for
further discussion on the subject that may be deemed necessary.

THE SĀMKHYA THEORY OF EVOLUTION
Prakṛti and the Guṇas

All the principal systems of thought are keen to explain the
universe as to how it is constituted and whither it will return; and
they do so from different angles of vision. Some are found to
apply the positive method, others stick to critical one, while there
are some who attempt to explain the problem purely from the
negative point of view. The contribution of the Sāmkhya teachers
in this respect is indeed worthy of notice. They seek to explain the
universe from the stand-point of cosmic evolution which again is
based upon the principle of conservation, transformation and
dissipation of energy.

According to this system prakṛti is held to be the ultimate
principle at the back-ground of the universe. It is unmanifested,
undifferentiated, ubiquitous, undecaying and unconscious. It has got

1 The illustrations have been drawn up from the commentary of
Vācaspati.
three constituents which are called *gunas* in the Sāṃkhya literature. But the reason of calling them as such is not definitely known. The later commentators suggest fanciful etymologies according to their own way, but the earlier authorities are silent in this respect.

The philosophy of the *gunas* is very deep. From the evidence of the Yukti-dipikā it may be stated that they are infra-atomic quanta of reals, rather forces than substance. Speaking of their characteristic features the Yoga-bhāṣya states that they are always in a state of flux. Their varying permutations and combinations give rise to all sorts of collocations which are manifested in the world of objects. But really speaking, all these manifested objects do not essentially differ from the *gunas* from which they appear for the simple reason that Sāṃkhya strickly maintains the view that the cause is immanent in its effects. However, the manifested objects only appear to our experience while the substratum whose manifestations are these objects of the visible world always remains beyond the range of perception. In this connection the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya quotes a verse wherein it is stated that the *gunas* in their real forms do not come within visual range; what comes within the range of vision is appearance like *māyā*. From this it follows that the *gunas* in their original forms are very subtle while it is their effects only that become manifested. Likewise, the Yukti-dipikā also is found to state in one place that even the revered sage Kapila can experience the effects of the *gunas* only, and not the *gunas* themselves in their potential state for the simple reason that they in that state remain imperceptible.

1. परमविभागमुप्सप्समसात्। यद्यम: श्रावः। p. 57/12
2. तद्वर युणाचार्यसिद्ध, II. 15.
3. सर्वसिद्ध गुणां। शर्यतेषविशेषार्थार्थर्थार्थर्थार्थर्थार्थ, Y. Bh. IV. 13.
4. तथाच शास्त्राचार्यांतवम्—
   गुणां निर्भवं न दृष्टिभविष्कृतिः
   तत् दृष्टिभवं प्राप्तं सर्वभवेन सुतुच्छकाम, IV. 13.
5. परमेश्वरस्य गुणां। कार्यमेव प्रत्यक्षम्। न शास्त्राचार्यावस्थामसर्वेष्वत्वाद्। p. 72/22-3.
They are classified in the Sāmkhya literature as (1) sattva, (2) rajas, and (3) tamas respectively. Of these, sattva has the characteristic of manifestation. It has the tendency of illuminating a phenomenon. When sattva does not manifest itself the puruṣa cannot experience any cognition, for the latter can cast its reflection on the buddhi when it becomes transparent and this is possible only when sattva predominates in it. Hence sattva serves as the medium for all conscious reflections of the puruṣa. Rajas is dynamic. It produces motion and it has the tendency to do work by overcoming resistance. Tamas is inert. It is the mass element which resists the other two gunās to function. Speaking briefly, in any entity whether physical or psychological, whatever is serene and tranquil is due to sattva. All excitement, motion, force or energy is due to rajas, and all that is massive, inert or dull is due to tamas.

All these three constituents of the prakṛti play their respective parts in the building up of the cosmos. If rajas would be the only operating force, there would be unnecessary flow of activity everywhere which would never allow the formation of a grand and stupendous structure in the shape of this universe. In order to resist this the prakṛti provides itself with another constituent called tamas which by its very nature is massive and inert. Again, if there would be no illuminating force in the shape of sattva, there would not be any conscious regulation and adaptation. Consequently the prakṛti would be nothing but a blind force acting in a haphazard manner.

The three gunās are interdependent and inseparably connected with one another. In every reality, whether physical or psychological, one of them becomes predominant and the other two sub-ordinate. The latter do not counter-balance the function of the former. They rather cooperate with it. Though contradictory to one another they can work together for a single end. The Kārikā (13) is found to explain this by the simile of the lamp. Just as the wick
and the oil, though opposed to the activity of fire, can co-operate even when in contact with fire for the single purpose of illumination, similarly the three gunas though mutually possessed of contradictory properties, can work together for a single end.

The fact as to how these three divergent constituents of prakriti can co-operate with one another has been more scientifically dealt with by Vārṣaganyā, the celebrated exponent of Sāṁkhya. This is known specially from a reference in the Yukti-dipikā where the author in course of dealing with the problem states that the two entities in a pair of opposite resist each other provided they are equally strong. But the result becomes otherwise when one of them becomes prominent and the other subordinate. In that case there is no opposition. On the contrary, the weaker one remains closely associated with the stronger one and thus helps the other to function. This he goes to support by the following quotation from Vārṣaganyā (p. 72):

तथा च भगवानं वर्तिष्ण्यं: प्रभुत्व—प्रभुत्विश्व विविष्ण्यक्षाः, सामात्मानि त्वत्तिष्ण्यं: सह प्रवत्तन्ते। तद्व यथा—जटली पंचनीय-स्वेतविष्णु भार्या, क्षयतये च सुसम्भवप्रकाशो श्रीतोष्णों: च अत्यधिवस्थोऽर्थ तत्त

portion of this passage is also quoted in the Yoga-bhāṣya (II. 15 & III. 13), but without reference to the author. Vacaspati attributes this to Pañcasiṅkha. However, let us attempt to bring out the sense conveyed herein. The term ‘rūpa’ in the passage speaks of the eight forms of buddhi, four with pre-dominance of sattva and the other four with that of tamas (सात्त्विकमेतद् हर्यं ताम तस्मात् विपर्यस्तम्, kā, 23). These are (1) virtue, (2) wisdom, (3) dispassion and (4) power; the remaining four are their opposites. Vṛtti means the inner fluctuations of the mind and these are pleasure, pain and delusion. When these forms or the fluctuations are in their intensity, it is then that one opposes the other. Thus both ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’ constitute forms of buddhi. When both of them are equally developed, they resist each other. But when one of them is pre-dominant and the other is in its
normal stage, then there is no opposition. What then happens is that one is over-powered by the other and there is no other alternative on the part of the weaker one but to co-operate with the stronger one. Similar is the case with 'pleasure' and 'pain'. When one of them is prominent, the other becomes sub-ordinate. The weaker one is then forced to help in the functioning of the stronger. This is what the revered teacher goes to illustrate by the simile of 'water and fire,' 'shade and light', and such other pairs of opposites. Just as water is opposed to fire, but their joint activity serves the purpose of cooking and boiling. Here fire is intense, while water is sub-ordinate. Being closely associated with fire, water also becomes extremely hot and thereby it helps the purpose of boiling and cooking. But the single fire without the close co-operation of water could never bring about the desired end. If on the other hand, both of them were equally powerful, one would try to collapse the other, and in that case there would not be any co-ordinated activity. Likewise, 'light' is opposed to 'shade'. But it is due to their co-ordinated activity that an object of minute shape may be revealed to the eye. Here the special condition under which the said object can be perceived is that it must be exposed to light; but the eye must be protected from intense ray of light. If both of them were equally exposed to severe sun-shine or similar other light, the eye-ball would be dazzled and consequently it would not be able to cast its glance on the minute object under perception. Hence 'shade' though opposed to 'light' co-operates in visual perception. Similar is the case with other pairs of opposites, such as 'heat and cold,' 'motion and rest', etc.

Two gunas never become equally developed. In that case they would coalesce—a fact which Sāmkīaya can never admit. If, however, in a particular phenomenon one of them be in the highest degree of its development, then what happens with the remaining two is that one becomes latent and the other sub-latent.
The power of one is never confused into that of the other\(^1\). The triads of these three \textit{gunās} are innumerable. Hence the number of permutations and combinations arising out of their various groupings are countless. As a result of this, anything and everything can come out of them\(^2\). The particular aspect goes by the name of that \textit{guna} which is dominant in it\(^3\).

\textit{Modern Science and the doctrine of Guṇas}

The naturalists hold the doctrine that "total energy of any body or system of bodies is a quantity which can neither be increased nor diminished by any mutual action of these bodies, though it may by transformed into any one of the forms of which energy is susceptible, and that the universe is such a system whose total energy remains the same in quantity amid all the changing forms in which it may exhibit itself." This is called 'conservation of energy'. So also 'conservation of mass' and the like.

Sāmkhya also maintains more or less a similar view. From the doctrine of 'स्त्रकार्य' and its corollary it follows that the sum of effects exist in the sum of causes. And ultimately these causes are nothing but the \textit{gunās} themselves. But the aforesaid doctrine of 'conservation of energy and mass' is much more reflected in a passage of the \textit{Yoga-bhāṣya} (II. 19) which seeks to explain some of the important features of the \textit{gunās}. In order to facilitate a fuller discussion on the point, the said passage is quoted below:

\begin{quote}
\textbf{गुणास्तु सर्वधर्मालुपातिनो न प्रत्यक्षमय्यन्ते नोपज्जायन्ते। व्यक्तिभिरेवतीतानागतमवयामभवतीभिमुग्नास्यन्विनिर्मणजनाधिकारत्वमहास्वरूपकः इव प्रत्यक्षमास्वते।}
\end{quote}

The idea is this: The aspects which are technically called \textit{dharmas} constitute various modes of the \textit{gunās}. In a time-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} अक्षारितवेद्यसंबंधोऽस्माकानुप्रकाशिक्रियामः, \textit{Y. Bh}., II. 18.
\item \textsuperscript{2} संधे वा सार्वकप्य सर्वस्व, \textit{ibid}, II. 15.
\item \textsuperscript{3} गुणप्रतिमयानामकावलितेन विशेषः, \textit{ibid}.
\end{itemize}
series they are called future, present and past accordingly as they are in their potential state, or actualised, or absorbed into the primary cause. It is these aspects which come into being and pass out of existence. The gunās, though they conform to them, are neither thereby increased nor diminished. What happens to them is that some of them are manifested and others remain unmanifested. However, it is a self-evident truth that totality of mass, energy and illumination always remains constant provided both the manifested and the unmanifested ones are taken into account. But the case appears to be otherwise by reason of their differentiated forms which are phenomenal appearances. It is they who come and pass. They are subject to growth and decay. As these aspects are closely associated with the gunās and are also sustained by them, so the property of one is wrongly ascribed to the other. This is beautifully illustrated in the text by the simile of Devadatta and his cows. Just as Devadatta is said to become poor for the reason that his cows are dying. But the cows are quite distinct from him, yet poverty arising out of their loss is ascribed to him. The aspects on the other hand are nothing but the effects of the gunās, and therefore may be taken as different as well as non-different from their cause. Under these circumstances, it is not unnatural that the properties of the owned would be ascribed to the owner.

Though herein we find a glimpse of the doctrine of ‘conservation of energy,’ yet the approach of the Sāmkhya teachers is purely metaphysical. It cannot be held to be scientific.

The electron of modern scientists also bears some affinity with the guna of Sāmkhya-yoga. Both are infra-atomic. The former constitutes a unit negative charge having inertia. The latter also constitutes mass charged with energy. But the serious deviation lies in the fact that the former is capable of isolation as in cathode rays, while the latter can never be detached.

1 See तन्मायस्य द्वृत्तच्छयते, Y. Bh., IV. 13.
Psychical aspects of the Guṇas

So far we have tried to deal with some of the prominent metaphysical features of the guṇas. Let us now turn our attention to the psychical side. From this point of view the Śāṅkhyā teachers unanimously hold that the three guṇas give rise to pleasurable, painful and delusive cognitions. The earlier commentators are found to explain this by the simile of क्षी (lady), चतन्य (warrior) and तेव्र (cloud). Just as a virtuous lady affords pleasure to her husband, becomes the source of pain to the co-wives, and deludes a sensuous person who fails to get her. Thus it is found that the same woman becomes the source of pleasure, pain and delusion to different persons. Let us also take up the instance of a warrior and cloud. A brave warrior affords pleasure to his lord, afflicts the enemy, and deludes them who begin to retreat quickly. The raining cloud also affords pleasure to the husbandman, afflicts the traveller, and deludes the woman who is separated from her husband at a great distance. By this it is evident that the same object becomes the source of pleasure, pain and delusion to different persons having different bent of mind. Similarly all the manifested entities are endowed with these three attributes. Hence, prakṛti which is resorted to to be the ultimate cause of all unconscious entities must possess the guṇas as its constituents; for it is the dictum of Śāṅkhyā that the properties of the effect exist even in the cause (कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यश्च, kā, 14).

Prakṛti and its evolutes

All manifested entities pre-suppose a cause. From the Śāṅkhyā doctrine of causation it follows that the effect is more developed than the cause. Even an effect becomes a cause with respect to its further manifestation. For instance, the lump of clay is the effect of the gross element of earth while it becomes a

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1 See Jayamangalā, kā, 12; also Vukti-dipikā, p. 71/5-12.
cause with respect to the jar—its further manifestation. Similarly
the gross-element of earth which is the cause of the 'lump of clay'
becomes an effect of the subtle-element of earth' and so on. If
this series of cause and effect be minutely examined it is found
that the effects beginning with the gross element of earth and
ending downwards into the jar are becoming more and more
developed; while in the series beginning from the lump of
clay and ending upwards into the subtle element of earth what
happens is quite reverse of the former. Here in the ascending
order, the degree of manifestation is gradually diminishing. In
this way if we continue to proceed upward with the causal series a
stage will finally come when the cause will become totally un-
manifested. And the Śāmkhya teachers equate that stage with
their prakṛti. Again, the pitcher has its cause in the shape of the
lump of clay, that again has got the gross element of earth as its
cause and that again in its turn has got the subtle element of earth
as such, and so on. Hence, in order to avoid a regressus ad in-
finitum the Śāmkhya teachers postulate the existence of prakṛti
which is held to be the uncaused cause of all entities, whether
physical or psychical. It is the final substratum of all empirical
realities.

The author of the Yukti-dipikā is found to treat the problem
more philosophically. He states that the cause and effect are not
ontologically different. What was subtle and undifferentiated is
called effect when it becomes manifest and differentiated. But
when the effect loses its differentiation and remains undivided and
undistinguished, it is then looked upon as the cause. In pursuing
this apparently unending chain of cause and effect the philosopher
has got to cry halt and stop at a state in which all possible differen-
tiation has become defunct, all change into diversity has become
arrested, and all its energies become quiescent and cease to operate
in the teleological order as means end and as subsidiary and
supreme. This state of the causal matter cannot be characterised
as existent or non-existent, because existence is ordinarily considered
to be concomitant with teleological evolution; nor it is non-existent, for it cannot be absolutely rejected like the lotus in the sky. This state of absolute quiescence in which all movement and change are absolutely homogeneous and uniform is the final and ultimate reality than which nothing subtler\(^1\) can possibly be imagined. This ultimate state of causal matter is the primus of the whole physical, biological and psychical order of being. It is the uncaused cause, and is the first term in the causal series. The language in which the topic is dealt with is very expressive, and this may be noticed in the following quotation from the text (p. 31/11-16):

"सुक्ष्माणां मूर्तिलाम् कार्यम्। निब्रुवतविशेषाणामविभागमनासवस्थाः कारण-मित्यथ सिद्धान्तः। तत्रात्मानंतिविशेषाणां निब्रुवतपरिभाषायपाराणामज्ञानालिनभावमनुप-
गच्छतापुरसेहतश्चति शं सब्यिकारसाम्यं सर्वभक्तिक्षेत्रं नि:सत्ताभत्वा नि:सदसदयज्ञह-
क्षणमवस्थान्नतरपश्चात्तिना नास्त्यन्यत्, सुक्ष्मतरमवस्थान्नतरं, यस्येवंक्षणमवस्था-
न्तरं कार्य स्वात्त। तस्मातू सुप्रूच्चे "मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिरिति"।

The Sāmkhya-kārika (15-16) advances the following arguments in support of its existence:

(1) Individual objects that we behold around us are all limited in magnitude. Whatever is limited cannot be the final source of all these manifested objects, for the main cause must be something more enduring and more pervasive than the effects. Hence the ultimate cause must be vested with unlimited potency.

(2) All manifestations are analogous to one another. All of them again are more or less endowed with the characteristics of pleasure, pain and delusion. Because of this homogeneity their ultimate source must be one which would be the conglomeration of pleasure, pain and delusion.

(3) While dealing with causality, it has been pointed out above

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1 See, 'सूक्ष्मविविधत्व चालिङ्गवेदाण्यः,' Y. S. I. 45.
2 Also compare, प्रतिसंसरुक्ष्मानाशः तत्समन्नेव सचामाले महसामपरवस्थां नरं

Y—28
that a cause can give rise to that effect only for which it is held to be efficient. This causal efficiency speaks of the fact that the effect lies in its unmanifested stage in the cause. This is why sand cannot be the source of oil, for it is the oil-seed and no other entity else in which the oil subsists. Similarly, prakṛti is the ultimate cause in which all effects subsist in their manifested stage; it is the main source which is equipped with necessary potency of giving rise to all manifestations.

(4) The cause differs from the effect though it is immanent in it. The jar has the capacity of containing water while the lump of clay cannot do so; but it is the latter which though less manifested gives rise to the former. That which is the final substratum of all effects is unevolved, and this is called prakṛti.

The author of the Jayamaṅgalā refers here to the view of a different commentator who explains the expression कारणकार्यविभागत in a different way. In his opinion, whatever renders some service is called कारण and that which receives the same is called कार्य. Both of these again are mutually served by each other. Then he attempts to show as to how the created beings and the gross elements of earth, water, etc., mutually work for the interest of each other. The human beings by dint of their physical labour level the earth where necessary, construct roads thereon, excavate canals and tanks, and thus make it fit for habitation. They erect reservoirs, build dams to preserve rain-water for the purpose of irrigation; otherwise those regions of the globe where rain-fall is scanty would turn into arid lands. Even the vegetable kingdom is found to render some useful service to the earth. Plants by their roots hoard up moisture and thus keep the earth wet. Trees keep it cool by their shade, and so on. Hence it becomes evident that even the bounteous earth requires some sort of external service to yield a satisfactory return. Earth and such other elements also in their turn sustain and nourish the animal as well as plant life, otherwise the latter could not thrive. If any wound be inflicted on their person, the loss of organic matter incurred thereby could not be recovered.
unless the elements fill up the same from the back-ground. This kind of mutual service is not confined to this world only. It may be observed even in higher sphere. Heat, cold, wind, rain and such other natural phenomena appear in due time by the influence of their presiding deities. In this way gods also are found to render useful service to mankind. The latter also in their turn try to pacify the former by means of offerings of oblations and prayer. Again, if we turn our attention downward to the world of animals we find that some of the animals are employed by man for vehicular purpose, while others are engaged in ploughing land, and so on. Their owners also in return rear them, and also heal them by administering drugs whenever any disease prevails among them. In this way the commentator seeks to establish the truth that in nature all is for all. Such mutual bond of service cannot be explained unless some principle works from the back-ground, and this is the prakrti.

The author of the Yukti-dipika also speaks here of this mutual service, and attempts to point out the same almost in a similar language. In this connection he also refers to the fact that even the guṇas, though of diverse nature, mutually support one another in working together for a single end. But his final approach is different from that of the Jayamaṅgalā. He urges that this skilful division into the server and the served presupposes their undivided state. Whatever entities are discrete and mutually served by one another must

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1 See above, pp. 166-7, n. 2.

The view that in nature all is for the service of all is also advocated by the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya in II. 28, wherein he attempts to explain and illustrate the cause of sustenance (bhūtikārya) which forms one of the nine kinds of causes that are enumerated in a couplet therein. The following lines from the Bhāṣya thereon bears evidence to this: शततावर्गे जयतिनिदिष्टायाः, तातनि च तथा। संहातारित्वस्य शरीरारित्वस्। तातनि च परस्परं संस्रवायम्, तेषां दीर्घवासः परसपरार्थानि परसपरार्थानि।

2 See, अन्योपनिषतावतीर्थं जननिमित्तमुद्धरम् गुण:; Kā, 12; also, प्रक्षा-प्रतिरिथतित्रथम् बुद्धिद्युणः परस्परानुप्रतिरिथत्वः स्वलोण: ... Y. Bh. II. 15.
possess primarily an indiscrete state, and this is the unevolved which is also called prakṛti. This unevolved principle which is held to be the ultimate cause is always self-propelled. It does not look forward to some other principle for mutual service. Just as the subtle particle of fire has got its own minute light, but in order to illumine a pot or similar other entity it requires the service of the wick and oil. Similarly the first impulse of the guṇas is due to their own power, but all other manifestations from mahāl downward are in need of mutual service.

(5) As the entire universe with all its diversities disappears at the time of dissolution and reappears at the time of fresh creation, hence there must be some unmanifest principle in which it is absorbed at that time. Vacaspati explains this process by the simile of the tortoise. Just as the limbs of the tortoise are protruded and then retracted into its shell, similarly the effect is nothing but the manifestation of something already existent. It comes out from the unmanifest and merges into it. Hence, causal operation speaks of evolution of the unevolved. From this it follows that whatever is evolved is entirely caused by what is unevolved.

By this set of five modus ponens, Īśvaraṅkṛṣṇa establishes the existence of prakṛti as the ultimate cause of all entities other than the self. In Kārikā 16, he speaks of the manner in which it operates. Prakṛti functions through the guṇas. It never becomes inactive. Even at the time of cosmic dissolution it continuously acts within itself. But the distinctive feature of activity at this stage

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1 See, तद्व वषय—यहा उपक्रान्त्य—यथान्नाम स्वयमेव करोति, धर्मादिदर्शान्यं हृदयवस्तुपेक्षे: तद्व गुणानामां: प्रकौप: स्वाभाविक:, महत्त्वपेक्षात्तुकारत: , Yukti-dipikā, p. 81/17-8.

2 See, एवमेत: पञ्चमिश्चित्वकार्य कारणमात्वक्ष्यमात्वक्ष्यमात्वितिसद्ग्रह, — Yukti-dipikā, p. 82/1-2. But unlike other commentators, Vacaspati combines the last two reasons into one, and this is placed by him at the very outset.
lies in the fact that each *guna* then functions independently without being blended with one another as in the creative stage. The reason of this independent activity will be discussed elsewhere when 'involution', 'dissolution' and such other allied topics will be dealt with. However, in the creative stage the *gunas* through which it functions become blended up with one another. One of them becomes then dominant and the other two act in subservience to it. In this way the *prakrti* functions through the *gunas* continuously giving rise to numerous modifications which are diverse in their nature.

This diversity is due to varying permutations and combinations of the *gunas*. The process has been illustrated by the simile of rain-water which having been discharged from the cloud becomes mixed up with various kinds of soils possessing different ingredients and thus transforms into the juice of cocoonut, wood-apple, myrobolan and such other fruits acquiring thereby a variety of taste, though this diversity was not present in it as pure rain-water.

Thus the whole fabric of this mysterious creation lies with the unevolved *prakrti* which functions in and through the *gunas*. It has got no separate existence apart from them. Hence its unity is an abstraction.

Not only the existence of *prakrti*, but its unity also constitutes one of the ten fundamental principles of Sāmkhya1. But there had been an earlier school which maintained its plurality. While referring to this school in his Saḍḍarśana-saṃuccaya, (Sāmkhya section) Guṇaratna Śuri is found to state that the advocates of the original school of Sāmkhya maintained a separate *prakrti* for each individual *purusa*2. Further light in this connection is thrown by

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1 See, प्राधान्यनित्यमेकलबः......भूमिकायोः स्वातः देश, quoted by Vācaspati from the Rāja-vārttika (kā, 72); also अतिसत्यमेकलबः......स्थिति: वर्त्तमान न वर्षौतिति; क्रमदिपिकाः under the Tattva-Samāsa-sūtra 'दश सूचिकायः.'

2 मौलिक्याः साम्या भालसाजामात्सां वङ्गी द्वेष्टतः प्रतिद्वेष्टतः भालां वत्त्यं, उच्चे दु सांख्या: सत्त्वसत्त्वें निर्मितः प्राधान्मितिः प्रपत्त:.
the Yukti-dipika (p.169/17-8) wherein it is stated that the propounder of this doctrine of plurality of prakṛti was Paurika. This teacher maintains that a separate prakṛti which is attached to each individual puruṣa, produces the physical body and such other objects for the sake of the latter at its empirical existence. But these separate units of prakṛti are sustained by another main prakṛti which again is attached to a ‘महाल्म्यशरीर’—a term which is not found in any other available text of Śāṁkhyā. It is referred to here and there in the Yuktidipika. Hence it requires elucidation.

The term speaks of those divine personalities who by dint of their strong power of will can give rise to various forms of creations. Brahman, or Hiranyagarbha, Maheśvara and such other divine beings fall under this category. But Kapila is excluded from the list. He is called paramarṣi or great sage, and is thus differentiated from them. Though all of them emerge into existence at the beginning of each cycle of creation, yet the revered sage is distinguished from the rest by the fact that his activity proceeds from an abnormal flow of sattva, while in the case of the māhālmya-śarira group, both sattva and rajas become equally dominant. Just as ‘knowledge’ in the case of Kapila is innate, so also ‘power’ is with them. These divine personalities are vested with uncommon power by which they can give rise to peculiar varieties of creations as desired by them. The case of the great lord Śiva may be taken as an illustration. He is said to have produced hundreds of crores of Rudras by his will force. Such a kind of evolution

1 प्रतिपुरुषमध्यत्म प्रचारश्रीरावर्ष करति। तेषां महाल्म्यशरीरमध्यत्म यद्र प्रबोध्ये

2. In the Mbh. (XII. 337), Nārada is found to address Nārāyaṇa under two hundred different names, and Mahālmya-śarira forms 174th. of them

3 यथा सांस्कृत्तिकोपायक न परमपि, यथा सांस्कृत्तिकोपायक न महाल्म्यशरीरः, yukti-
dipika, p. 88/22-3.

4 यथा न परमपरे प्रकाशिकायेन महाल्म्यशरीरस्थे नयेम, ibid, p. 148/22-3.
is equated by the author of the Yukti-dipikā to the prākṛta form as mentioned in the Karika (43). He differs here with other commentators. In his opinion, this class is distinguished from the other two of the name of ‘sāmsiddhihika’ (innate) and ‘vaikṛtva’ (incidental). He states that the ‘prākṛta’ form of evolution comes out from the will-force of a māhātmya-sārīra, and whatever is desired by him is readily supplied by the prakṛti from the background. This may be noticed in the following lines (p. 149/6-12).

The term ‘अभिमान’ in the passage deserves special attention. It tends to suggest that such a form of evolution results from the sense of personality of the agent. This atonce reminds us of the aphorism ‘निर्माणविद्यायस्मितमात्रान’ (Y. S. iv. 4) where Patañjali is found to state that the so called mind-stuffs called ‘nirmanas-cittas’ spring up from the strong personality of the Yogan vested with superior divine power. It is interesting to observe that a māhātmya-sārīra and a Yogan of the above-mentioned rank are almost similar. The former creates on the strength of ‘अभिमान’ and the latter does so from ‘अस्मिता’—the two terms only varying in name but not in sense. Again, the mind-stuffs created by the will of such a Yogan is regulated and guided by a principal mind-stuff which is also created by the Yogan himself. Otherwise, conformity to intention, or readjustment of memory of this Yogan who has now so many bodies, cannot be explained. This is the idea that is expressed in the next śūtra ‘पञ्चिंतेते प्रयोजने चित्तेप्रविषयं’ (Y. S. iv. 5). The ‘nirman-kāya’ which was adopted by Kapila at the time of imparting knowledge of Sāmkhya to Asuri may also be taken as a variety of such evolution as proceeds from the strong desire of the agent.

Taking every thing into consideration, we find that the process
adopted by a māhātmya-sarīra in giving rise to prakṛti variety of evolution and that of the Yogin with superior power in creating the so called mind-stuffs are almost the same. By the way it has also been pointed out that the said mind-stuffs resulting from the strong feeling of personality of the Yogin, are regulated and guided by one principal mind-stuff. This bears a close affinity with the doctrine of Paurika. This teacher is also of opinion that a principal prakṛti attached to a māhātmya-sarīra guides and regulates the sub-ordinate prakṛtis of those personalities that are called up by his power of strong desire (अभिव्यक्तनात्).

Of these māhātmya-sarīras or divine personalities emerging into existence at the beginning of each cycle of creation, Brahman is held to be the foremost. He excels all other of his rank in his capacity as a creator. In the Purāṇas, he is stated to be the

1 Paurika's view of the two-fold prakṛti, one main and the other sub-ordinate, reminds us of the similar conception of avidyā as held by Maṇḍana and Vācaspati. In the opinion of these two teachers, avidyā is both general as well as specific. For a fuller discussion, see Brahma-sūtra, I.i.1.

2 Brahman or the, lord of creation is equated in the Purāṇas with Mahat. The author of the Yukti-dipikā (p. 108/22) also reads Mahat, Brahman, Īśvara as synonyms. In some commentaries, Hiranyakartha is also reckoned as such. But the reason of regarding all these as synonyms are not distinctly mentioned in any of the available works of Sāmkhya. Further light in this connection is shed by the following passage quoted in the Yukti-dipikā (p. 152/9-14):

"एवं हि शाख्या—'महादिविवेकपात्रः सर्वा बुद्धिपूर्वकतादा। उपर्यक्षिपुर्वकरणस्तु महात्म्य-शरीर एव्यौगिनमनल्लभमेवत्सतिध्री स्वागार पुराण सहरे वे से करे अरिस्तनि वे मां परे नारंब्र श्रास्त्रे। तत्तथाभिध्यतात: पदम मुख्यसहीतो देवा प्रानुसुभुर:। तेषुपुरुषु सुमुखे के से। ततोष्के तितिक्षोगृहीतश्रविविहारे, प्रजाशिरे, तेष्वास्त्रय महत्तेन तरसे। अबधारे नवोद्धिजोत्तस्ते देवा: पदम-बुधुर:। तेषुपुरुषु नेव हस्तान्वल्लान्न गेमे।। ततोष्के तितिक्षोगृहीतो उत्ते:। एव तस्माद् श्रवणे॥""

The passage in a beautiful style speaks of the view of the ancient teachers of Sāmkhya as to how the various forms of volitional evolution called
creator of the visible universe. But even such a divine personality is absorbed into the womb of prakṛti at the end of each cycle of creation, and a new Brahman occupies his place. Such is the case with Mahēśvarā and other divinities of this rank.

‘स्वयं’ spring up from the will of Brahman who is again identified therein with Mahātmāsāra. The Kārikā (46) states this class of evolution to be the outcome of buddhi, and Brahman is not even mentioned anywhere in it.

However, the passage itself which in every possibility must have been quoted from an authority earlier than Īśvarakṛṣṇa, tends to show that Brahman also plays certain parts in the process of becoming. Reference is also made to Brahman and Hiranyagarbha in a few instances in the Yukti-dīpikā. As regards the emergence of such personalities, it is stated that in the beginning of each cycle of creation the guṇas having been transformed into the various evolutes of prakṛti, beginning from mahat and ending in the five gross elements, generate the physical bodies of Kapila, Hiranyagarbha and such other personalities (प्रत्ययपूर्वपतितगतं नरशुभयातरारोपितपतितवां नारायणस्य शुभार्द्धी सहस्रादेवी सहस्रकार-नमस्तिद्मेव मूलनाम-श्राद्विष्णु-रसेन्द्रोत्तमोत्तमोत्तमोत्तमो कर्त्तवयात्वर्तम्, p. 164/6-8). This goes to show that the evolutes of prakṛti called tattvas emanate first, and then come the divine personalities. Elsewhere the text is found to state that the gods have four kinds of physical bodies; of these the first one belongs to Kapila and Brahman, and this emanates through prakṛti (रत्न धीर्यवस्तवाद धीर्यवस्तवाद्वाद्राधाता धीर्यवस्तवाद्वाद्राधाता, p. 143/12-3).

It will not be out of place to state here that the Śāṅkhyā conception of Brahman or Hiranyagarbha as we get specially in the statements of the Yukti-dīpikā, should on no account be confounded with that of the Vedāntists. The main points of difference lie in the fact that in the Śāṅkhyā, Kapila is the first personality who immerses into existence at the beginning of creation. He is the eldest of all (परम्पराबाद्वाद्राधाता धीर्यवस्तवाद्वाद्राधाता धीर्यवस्तवाद्वाद्राधाता, p. 174 supra). He is followed by Brahman or Hiranyagarbha. This is also corroborated by the two fragments from the Yukti-dīpikā quoted in the preceding paragraph where the name of paramarṣi or the revered sage Kapila is found to be followed by—that of Hiranyagarbha in the first instance and viriṇca or Brahman in the other. But in the Vedānta, Hirānyagarbha is held to be the first personality from whom proceed the other organic, bodies (विरिणाकार: समवेताय, RV. X.121). He is further maintained there as the efficient as well as the material cause of
It thus appears that the Sāmkhya teacher while propounding this doctrine of plurality of \textit{prakṛti} might have been influenced to a certain extent by the Pauranic conception of creation, and as a consequence of this he had to introduce Brahman, Maheśvara and such other divinities of supreme grade, called \textit{māhātmya-ātivaras}—a term which seems to be specially connected with \textit{mahāt-ātman} or the great self that passes as a synonym of \textit{buddhi} in the ancient Sāmkhya literature. If this be the case, then it goes to indicate that \textit{buddhi} or intellect of these divinities must be abnormally developed, and consequently the \textit{prakṛtis} attached to them should also be more enduring and powerful than those of the ordinary beings that come into existence at the call of their strong will-power. The different units of \textit{prakṛti} which are associated with the ordinary beings are limited; hence they look forward to the principal \textit{prakṛtis} attached to the said supreme divinities for their sustenance and nourishment. Whenever one or other of these principal \textit{prakṛtis} operates the different sets of ordinary \textit{prakṛtis} under its command also do so. And finally, with the retirement of the principal \textit{prakṛtis} at the end of a cycle of creation, the ordinary ones also disappear. In this way, the different units of \textit{prakṛtis} that are associated with the ordinary beings are found to follow the principal ones in their evolution and involution. Of course, the \textit{prakṛti} of a particular being who is liberated does not reappear.

The orthodox Sāmkhya could not recognise this doctrine of plurality of \textit{prakṛti}. The \textit{Yukti-dipikā} (pp. 169-70) marshalls the following sets of criticisms in refutation to it. Firstly, there is no such proof as may be applied in favour of this doctrine of plurality. Perception fails herein; for these \textit{prakṛtis} are beyond the range of the world of cosmos. But Sāmkhya always disregards this view. According to this system, Brahman or Hiranyagarbha is regarded to be equipped with uncommon divine power, and through his power of will he can call up numerous entities to come into existence. And whatever is desired by him is readily supplied by the \textit{prakṛti} from the back-ground. This fact explicitly shows that Hiranyagarbha is the efficient cause, while \textit{prakṛti} is the material cause.
perception. Nor there is any definite reason by which this plurality can be inferred. Valid testimony also cannot be applied in support of its existence. Hence this plurality cannot be proved by any source of cognition. Secondly, it is superfluous to postulate the existence of different prakṛtis when one prakṛti with its unlimited power is capable enough to generate the physical bodies of the vast multitude of beings. If on the contrary, a separate prakṛti is maintained for each individual puruṣa, then such a prakṛti cannot be held to be equipped with unlimited potency. And consequently a stage will appear when this prakṛti must be exhausted. For, it is an admitted fact that an entity with limited potency at its disposal cannot serve its purpose eternally. Just as milk, though capable of giving rise to curd, butter, cheese and such other products, is after all perishable for the simple reason of its being limited; similarly a limited prakṛti though capable of generating the physical body of an individual, will finally become exhausted. As a result of this there will appear a stage when the course of metempsychosis will be arrested. Thirdly, it is well known to the students of Sāṃkhya that a Yogin who is vested with superior power can call up several physical bodies (nirmanakāyas) by his strong power of will. But according to this doctrine of plurality, even the prakṛti of a yogin is to be regarded after all as a limited entity. And it is not possible on the part of a prakṛti with its limited resource to generate any number of physical bodies for the purpose of fulfilling the desire of the yogin. Again, the upholder of this doctrine cannot equate the prakṛti of a yogin to that of an ordinary being for the simple reason that one can generate several physical bodies while the other cannot do so at all. Hence it must be admitted that there are different grades of prakṛtis. And if this difference in prakṛtis be maintained, then it will give rise to such intricate problems as will require further explanations and suppositions. The orthodox Sāṃkhya easily averts these intricacies by maintaining one single prakṛti which is vested with unlimited potency. The upholders of this view are of opinion that whatever is desired by the yogin, is readily supplied
by the prakṛti from the back-ground. Thus it is found that one prakṛti can better explain the world-process. Hence it is unwise to maintain the doctrine of plurality of prakṛti. Again, as it has been clearly stated above that whenever the principal prakṛti attached to one or other of the supreme divinities, called māhātmya-sarīras, steps in, side by side the various units of prakṛtis at its command also begin to function; and with its retirement at the end of a cycle of creation, these prakṛtis also cease to operate—such a view also cannot be accepted on the ground that there is no such specific feature of each individual prakṛti by which one may be differentiated from the rest. For the upholder of this doctrine of plurality there is no other alternative but to admit finally that there are different grades of prakṛtis. The prakṛtis of the māhātmya-sarīras, of the yogins and that of the ordinary beings are not of the same cadre. Each has got special characteristics of its own. This is why one can direct and regulate the other. Such a view though apparently sounds well, but finally becomes untenable. All the prakṛtis should be equal. There can not be any excess in quality in one or other of them. Just as one purusā cannot direct the other owing to lack of such excessiveness, for the same reason one prakṛti cannot direct the other. If on the other hand, this excessiveness on the part of a particular prakṛti be maintained, then it will automatically speak of different grades in prakṛtis which again will unnecessarily involve a series of suppositions for their support. And in this way the main prakṛti will finally remain unestablished. Hence it is justifiable to hold that there is one single prakṛti which functions for the liberation of all individual beings.

Vāraṇaṇya also is found to level his criticism against this doctrine of plurality of prakṛti. This can be noticed in a quotation in the Yoga-bhāṣya (मृतिक्यविधिज्ञातितीभावाभास्तिमूलपृथक्‌
त्वमिति वा व ए पवः, III. 52). Here the revered teacher goes to state that the notion of distinction among several entities arises when there exists any difference of form, or of intervening space, or of genus. As there cannot be observed any such differentiating
factor therein, the final cause of one entity is not distinct from that of the other.

Having thus established the existence of *prakṛti* and its unity, let us now turn our attention towards the Śaṅkhya theory of evolution. It has been already stated above that *prakṛti* is the final cause of all entities other than the *puruṣa*. It is the prius of all physical, psychical and biological realities. 'Its centre is everywhere, but its circumference is nowhere'. In its final state, it is the equilibration of three different forces, called *guna*s. It is dynamic and self-propelled. Even in its quiescent state it works within its own self. Just as respiration is going on even in the state of sound sleep, and if it be stopped then there would be an eternal sleep from which there would be no further awakening; similarly *prakṛti* is always working within its own self, and if its movement be regarded to be stopped at the time of dissolution then there would be no further evolution. For there is no such outward agency as can move it into action; it is always independent (*स्वतःतः*). Motion is inherent in it. It does not require any external stimulus. It is like an organic whole that works from within, and not like a machine that does so from without.

Evolution proceeds from the conjunction of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Both of these two entities are all-pervading; hence their conjunction also is eternal. But when this conjunction is viewed as a means for some definite end, it is then only held to be the cause of evolution. What this end is, will come up for discussion at its proper place. Now, *puruṣa* of Śaṅkhya is inactive; it is undefiled and changeless. It is merely the onlooker. Hence its conjunction with *prakṛti* is regarded as secondary. Virtue and vice cannot stimulate *prakṛti* for activity; for these are held to be the products of *buddhi*—an entity which has got no separate existence at the period of dissolution when *prakṛti* absorbs all its manifestations within its bosom. It is the transcendental influence of *puruṣa* that rouses *prakṛti* from her slumber at the advent of a new cycle of creation. The fact as to how *puruṣa* though devoid of any activity, exerts its influence upon *prakṛti* is explained in
the Yoga-bhāṣya by the simile of magnet and iron. Just as iron is attracted by magnet when placed adjacent to it, but the magnet itself is not affected thereby at all; similarly prakṛti is influenced by the puruṣa by the fact of its mere proximity to it, while the latter remains always uneffected. The Kārikā attempts to explain the utility of this conjunction by the simile of the ‘lame and the blind’ (kā, 21). Just as the lame though capable of seeing the way cannot walk, while the blind though capable of walking can not see the way. But the lame when placed on the shoulder of the blind can direct the latter to proceed ahead. Thus it is seen that their joint activity can serve a common end which none of them can fulfil without the help of the other. Similarly, the puruṣa is inactive, but it is conscious; while prakṛti is active, but it is unconscious. But their mutual co-operation can bring out an end which one of them cannot achieve independent of the other. Now, what is this end for which evolution proceeds? The problem requires elucidation, for it is held to be one of the ten fundamental principles of Sāṃkhya (अर्थवर्तमान).

This end is two-fold. One belongs to the prakṛti, and the other to the puruṣa. The end of prakṛti is fulfilled when she becomes the object of enjoyment of puruṣa (तदस्य एव दर्श्येऽत्मा, Y. S. II. 21). But puruṣa is a passive observer, so he cannot directly enjoy her. This is done when he experiences the pleasurable and painful images presented to him by the buddhi. This is called 'bhoga'. And this becomes possible only when prakṛti reveals herself to the puruṣa in and through her various manifestations. This revelation of her own self to the puruṣa is the end of prakṛti. Puruṣa's end, on the other hand, is to free himself from the clasp of prakṛti. Though he is undefiled and without any attribute, yet he ascribes pleasure, pain and such other properties of prakṛti to his own self, and thus becomes affected by them. Really speaking, he is not to be touched by these attributes. But due to his constant association with the prakṛti, he fails to discriminate his own self from that of her. But when this non-discriminative knowledge ceases to function, he can differentiate himself from the prakṛti,
and thus regains his true nature. He is no longer afflicted by pleasure and pain. He thus withdraws himself for ever from the province of prakṛti. This is liberation, called aparavarga. These two ends cannot be achieved unless prakṛti manifests herself, and this manifestation in its turn necessitates her conjunction with puruṣa.

This doctrine of two-fold end has been severely criticised by the Buddhists. The Yukti-dipikā (p.107) points out in this connection the sarcastical remarks levelled against Sāṃkhya by a quotation which in every possibility seems to have been taken from the Paramārtha-Saptati of Vasubandhu¹—a treatise which was composed with a view to refuting the Karikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The opponent here urges: You Sāṃkhya are of opinion that puruṣa by his very nature is free and that he ascribes happiness, misery and such other properties of the guṇas to his own self and thereby brings his bondage during the course of metempsychosis. If there would be no evolution, there would not be any manifestation of the guṇas, and consequently no question of bondage would ever arise. Hence it becomes evident that the bondage of puruṣa is ultimately brought about by the process of evolution. But it is indeed peculiar to notice that in your opinion the same course of evolution proceeds also for the sake of liberation of the puruṣa; for you are found to hold the view that prakṛti is urged to activity for this end (cf. प्रतिपुरुष विमोक्षार्थ स्वायत्तत् इति परार्थ आर्यम्, ka, 56; also, पुरुषविमोक्षानिमित्त तथा प्रदूषित: प्राचारंक, ka, 57). Hence it becomes clear that according to your system the same cause can bring about two ends in the shape of ‘bondage’ and ‘liberation’ which are contradictory to each other—a conception which is illogical. This is what is reflected in the following couplet quoted therein:

बिना सागरण कहने हि पुरुषस्त्र न गुभायते ||
सागरस्त्रवीर्य मोक्षार्थमहो सांत्वस्त्र सुकुष्ता ||

But the author of the Yukti-dipikā (p. 107/6-22) clarifies here the view of Sāṃkhya and refutes the misconception of the

¹ For a fuller discussion on Paramārtha-saptati, see above, pp. 147-153.
opponent. He points out that evolution proceeds from the conjunction of purusa and prakruti. Even before this conjunction, purusa's existence as a separate entity free from the fetters of prakruti is not questionable. He then existed as consciousness abiding in itself. But pure consciousness must require a vehicle to express itself. Just as the act of burning on the part of fire, and that of hewing on the part of axe cannot be revealed without fire or wood, similarly a vehicle is required for the conscious reflection of purusa, and it is prakruti which is to be regarded as that vehicle. Again, the unconscious prakruti also in its turn cannot function for bringing out a systematic and coherent cosmos unless it receives help from the purusa. Even the sattva element in prakruti is after all unconscious. It is illuminated by the reflection of purusa. Without this help of purusa there would not be any conscious regulation and adaptation in the activity of prakruti. In that case it would become nothing but a blind force acting in a haphazard manner. Hence both of these two entities are interdependent for all practical purposes. It is true that there is polarity in these two entities, which appears in consciousness and unconsciousness, mobility and immobility, productivity and non-productivity, and so on. Still they are inter-related. One cannot serve its own purpose without the help of the other. The relation between them is that of the knower and the known. Speaking more clearly, it is like that of the spectators and the dramatis personae. Both these knower and the known are eternal. Hence their connection is also without any beginning. The seed of this connection exists even at the state of dissolution when prakruti is at rest. Otherwise further evolution could not be explained. If the connection of a particular purusa with prakruti any how discontinues, he is then liberated. And for him prakruti does not operate any more. But for others, her service is not yet terminated. They are still within her jurisdiction. So this connection continues to exist even at the state when prakruti is at rest. This connection

1 इति श्रीश्रीमशानकोनिष्काशादनादि: संयोगो व्यास्यात्त श्वि, Y. Bh. II. 22.
of purusa with prakrti at this stage was technically called 'अधिकारक्यम्' by the ancient teachers.

The commentator then brings out the philosophical significance of the simile of 'the lame and the blind.' The former can see, but he cannot walk. The latter can walk, but fails to see the way. So none of them can reach the destination independent of the other. Both of them are in need of each other's service. The unconscious prakrti also is like the blind. It can move out of its own accord, but cannot experience the result of its activity. If left entirely to itself, it would continue to proceed blindly and would never turn back. It can proceed directly towards the goal only when it receives conscious reflection of the purusa. Similarly purusa is like the lame. It is the knower, but has got no activity of its own. In its empirical existence it experiences pleasurable and painful cognitions. But what would it experience unless there would be any object of cognition? The knower's end is fulfilled when it can realize the true nature of the object of knowledge, and ultimately that object is the prakrti. As both of these two entities are in need of mutual service, hence their union is due to sheer necessity.

The author now goes to dispel the misconception of the opponent who finds fault with Sāmkhya on the ground that bondage is not intelligible without creation. He urges that this is not the position of Sāmkhya. The fact is this: prakrti is the object to be known, while purusa is the knower. Hence these two entities are complimentary. So long as this relation of knower and the known goes to continue, one cannot be detached from the other. This is what is called 'bondage'. It is not an effect of creation. According to genuine Sāmkhya view, the existence of such a relation is without any beginning. Bondage on the part

1 This 'अधिकारक्यम्' is refuted by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in the following couplet:

तस्मातैवोदिकारक्यो कथयेत: प्रकृत्यतेत ।
भोव्यवहोदिकारक्यो विषयमायो न दुःखवे ॥

—Stoka-vārttika, sambandhākṣepa-parihāra, 99.
of the purusa is to be entangled within the gunas of the prakrti, and this is due to his beginningless correlation. This does not necessitate any previous creation. Let thus the evil intention of Manoratha¹ be frustrated. This is what the author of the Yukti-Dipika (p. 107) intends to say in the following two couplets:

\[
\text{देयवदनभावन प्रक्रत: पुरुस्त्य च।}
\text{अपेक्षाणामवते ववशृष्टिकार्यस्य इत्यमिवयते॥}
\text{एवं विनादिपि सर्गण वस्मादकुक्क: पुमाना गुणे।}
\text{तस्माद् विपक्तां बलु म नो र ध-मनोरथः॥}
\]

It has been already observed that prakrti does not function aimlessly. Its intention is to fulfil the purpose of the purusa. But such a view appears at the first instance to be contrary to reason. Prakrti is unconscious; and an unconscious entity is not expected after all to work for an end which it does not itself understand. This urge to activity on the part of an unconscious entity for the sake of a conscious one has been explained in the Kārika by the simile of milk and the calf (kā, 57). Just as milk in the cow is secreted for the nourishment of the calf, similarly the unconscious prakrti also functions for the purpose of purusa. The problem has also received attention of the followers of Vāraṣaganya². In their opinion it is like the excitement of the physical body of a male and that of a female for each other. None of these explanations is so sound as it ought to be. This is rather drifting the system towards the theory of spontaneous origin of the universe (स्वभाववाद). However, the Sāmkhya always insists that the unconscious prakrti proceeds for the cause of the conscious purusa, and in this case the former cannot be expected to understand the end for which it works. Viewed from this aspect, evolution may be held to be mechanical.

On the other hand, we find that the world-order is not hap-

¹ For details about Manoratha, see above, p. 152.
² वारसागनायं तथा वस्मादकुक्कद्विनादिपि सर्गणानामस्मिनिवेदते, प्रक्षितस्थः प्रधानस्वेतवर्गः, Yukti-dipika, p. 170 infra.
hazard. The whole process of evolution has got a purpose to serve. Every thing whether great or small has got its respective part to play. Nothing comes out at random. Everywhere there is selection of means for a definite end. The course of evolution and change follows a definite law. There is a sequence in the successive appearance of numerous accessories in the order of becoming (क्रमनतिष्ठते; Y. Bh. II.19). Taking every thing into consideration it is found that the whole process of evolution, even with an unconscious principle at the back-ground, presupposes an order, adaptation of definite means, a value and a system. Otherwise it cannot move towards a definite end. This end is two-fold—one is to experience pleasure and pain, while the other is dissociation from them. The latter is achieved when the puruṣa completely withdraws himself from the worldly objects, and this becomes possible only when discriminative knowledge prevails. This is liberation—a stage from which nobody returns. Prakṛti ceases to function any more for him who has attained this stage. This is the final end of life, and the whole world-order is ultimately moving towards it. Viewed from this aspect, evolution may be regarded as teleological.

Though prakṛti does not function any more for the particular individual who is liberated, but its functioning is not thereby totally stopped. It continues to do so for those who are still associated with the world of objects: Now what will finally happen to the prakṛti if one by one all the individuals are liberated? The problem has been raised by the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya (IV. 33). He puts the question as such: Is there any end of transmigration or is it without an end (संतारोपयमन्त्वात्मनत्वति)? But his reply is not very satisfactory. He only attempts to avoid the dilemma by simply stating that such a question cannot be answered as such. So far it can be stated that it is totally stopped for those who have attained discriminative knowledge; but for others

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1  तस्य नामवदनमाने हि प्रवोदनमुदयते। Y. Bh. II. 18.
2 See क्लाय प्रकी निन्द्रापनार्ण तदन्त्वसापवरणयाि, Y.S. II. 22.
it will continue as usual. This very question was also put to Lord Buddha\(^1\). But in reply to this he simply stated that this was a matter upon which he had expressed no opinion. Though the problem is an intricate one, yet the Sāmkhya-yoga commentators make an attempt to arrive at a solution. They are of opinion that *prakṛti*'s functioning will never come to a standstill. Firstly, from time without any beginning an infinite number of individuals have settled into the jurisdiction of *prakṛti*. Of this vast multitude, a very negligible fraction is only heard to be liberated. Hence *prakṛti* shall have to continue its functioning for the remaining overwhelming majority. Secondly, as everybody's liberation is beyond expectation so there will never appear a period when *prakṛti*'s stock will be completely exhausted. Consequently the world-process will continue for ever. It will not totally stop. Briefly speaking, the consensus of opinion is that the world-process has neither any beginning nor any end. It is always revolving like a wheel, and each round is technically called one *kalpa* or a cycle of creation.

By this conception of cyclic process, the Sāmkhya teachers go to point out the fact that evolution is not a continuous progress in one direction only. Just as each point in a revolving wheel reaches its zenith as well as nadir alternately, similarly evolution and involution are alternately going on in the activity of *prakṛti*. Here involution speaks of the fact that the universe is subject to periodical dissolution. In the Tantric literature the process has been compared to the state of 'sleep and awakening.' Just as the state of awakening is naturally followed by that of sleep and vice versa, similarly the forward movement of *prakṛti* also after proceeding ahead to a certain extent is overpowered by an inherent resisting factor that drags it back to its pristine state. The thing is that *prakṛti* has a persistent tendency to revert back to its state of rest, and then again to

\(^1\) See above, p. 85.
move onward. Thus evolution and involution are continuously recurring as an eternal rhythm of awakening and sleep—the two phases of a single process.

This evolution and involution or in other words emergence and absorption have a terminus—one in the descending order and the other in the ascending order. The latter culminates in prakṛti, and this has been already pointed out above. The former, i.e., the order of evolution now requires explanation. But the subject cannot be thoroughly grasped unless the Sāṁkhya conception of evolution is properly understood. Evolution according to Sāṁkhya is the gradual development of what existed inherently within the primary cause in a diffused state. It is the process which makes the undeveloped or less developed one more developed, the integrated or the less differentiated one more differentiated. Like Spencer's conception of civilization it is "a progress from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity towards a definite, coherent heterogeneity." The author of the Yoga-bhāṣya clearly brings home its significance by the expression 'तत् तत् संर्थे विकिर्द्यते कमानिक्यूँते' (II. 19). The whole process is confined within the primary cause itself; it cannot overstep it. That which evolves stays within the cause. It is not detached from what gives rise to it. It is immanent therein. Still it is differentiated from the cause as its effect. It is nourished and brought up to its fullest extent by following a definite order of sequence which cannot be violated. This fact warrants us that the Sāṁkhya evolution is not an emergent one; it does not include any sudden jump. The entire operation passes in quick succession. So the order of appearance in all of its varying stages cannot be always fully visualised. Vacaspati is found to elucidate the point in his commentary by way of illustration. He states that the seed of the banyan tree does not bring out all on a sudden the full-grown tree with its thick setting of leaves capable of protecting from the scorching rays of the sun. The tree comes out gradually in the ordered appearance

1 विकिर्द्यते, Y. Bh. II. 19.
of root, stem, leaves and branches brought about by contact with earth, water and heat. Similarly the evolutes do not appear suddenly. They follow a definite order of succession.

The central conception of evolution from the standpoint of Sāmkhya lies in the expression तत्त्व विविध्यते as pointed out above. Roughly speaking, it is the gradual unfoldment of the differentiated within the integrated. The full significance of this संस्कृतविवेक is very ably elucidated by Dr. B. N. Seal in the following lines:—“Evolution (विराजम्) in its formal aspect is defined as differentiation in the integrated (संस्कृतविवेक). In other words, the process of Evolution consists in the development of differentiated (वैयक्त) within the undifferentiated (साम्यावृत्ति), of the determinate (विशेष) within the indeterminate (अविशेष), of the coherent (युनस्तित्व) within the incoherent (अयुनस्तित्व).”

At the advent of a new cycle of creation, prakṛti is roused from her slumber by the transcendental influence of the puruṣas who are confined within her jurisdiction. As a consequence of this there occurs a disturbance within the gunas that breaks up the equipoise of prakṛti and results in the relative preponderance of one guna over the other. This loss in the balance gives rise to peculiar collocation of the minute units of gunas from where occurs the first start in the process of becoming. At the first stage of evolution it is the sattva element that predominates over the other two. For it is the special feature of Sāmkhya evolution that it starts from the finest and proceeds towards the grossest.

From prakṛti evolves mahaṭ or the great cosmic principle. It is also called buddhi as it is held to be the cosmic matter of experience. The reason of calling it mahaṭ lies in the fact that it

1 The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 7.
2 From the reference in the Yukti-dipikā (p. 108 supra) we know that there are some teachers who are in favour of maintaining the view that a vague and indistinct principle first of all emanates from prakṛti, and from this nebulous stuff evolves mahaṭ (केवलाभ: अधात्तरपि: कथा नागरमुक्तिः, नागरसम्बन्धमानृ, तत् नागरं). But this view could not gain currency in the orthodox Sāmkhya.
is great in space as well as in time; for there is no other evolved principle which is so extensive and durable as this is. This significance of the term has been expressed in the Yukti-dipikā (p. 108 infra) in the following lines:

स तु दैवमहावानः कालमहावानः महानः। सत्वोपायो महापरिमाणयुक्तवानः महानः।

In the Yogabhāṣya it is described as an extensive transparent stuff like the bright sky. This is due to predominance of the satīva element in it. The text also states that in the physical body, its centre is in the lotus-like cavity of the heart wherein it resides in union with the puruṣā. In some of the Tantric and Pauranic texts the equipoise of prakṛti is compared to night, and buddhi is described there as the rays of the sun after the end of nocturnal darkness.

From mahat evolves ahamkāra. It consists of the notion of self or ‘T-ness’ in every form of cognition. It is more developed than the former both from objective as well as subjective point of view. This is due to its further differentiation within mahat, the less differentiated one. As differentiation and further differentiation go on according to a series in the descending order what happens is that the effects one after another become more and more developed and intelligible while their bulk gradually goes on diminishing. Just as ‘time’ in its undifferentiated state as ‘mahākāla’ cannot be clearly conceived; but when it continues to be differentiated into year, month, fortnight, week, days and so on we find that its extensity goes on reducing while its conception is becoming more and more developed and intelligible. And in this descending order it is found that the subsequent ones develop within the preceeding ones, while the whole series finally remains within one ‘mahākāla’, the undifferentiated whole. This view is expressed in a nut-shell in the following lines of the Yukti-dipikā (p. 114/14-15):

1 हस्तेश्वरस्त्रेम्य यो भारतमाकाशकल्पस्य, Y. Bh. I. 36.
2 हरिनुष्ठलं वायस्व एव इदि साधित इति ibid; also see, यादिरसिनम् महापुरे द्वरं पूर्णिस्तैः वेशम् तत्त्व विशालाम्, ibid, III. 83.
स च मूर्तिप्रत्ययायां महतः स्थूलतरः। कस्मान् \? अविभागान् विभागतिः
निष्पत्ते: कालाविवतृ।

The process is, to speak according to the scientific conception of physical evolution, like the formation of a physical system through nebula and stars; it is like the gradual thickening of extremely diffused stuff that pervades the vast expanse of unbounded space.

The Sāṃkhya authorities speak of three-fold ahamkāra:—
(1) वैकारिक, (2) तौजस and (3) मूलादि. The first one abounds in sattva, the second in rajas and the third in tamas. This division has been planned with a view to explain the sixteen evolutes of ahamkāra which are bifurcated into two series—subjective and objective. The former comprises the eleven organs. These are the five organs of sense, five of action, and the manas. The latter comprises the five subtle elements, called tanmātras in the Sāṃkhya literature. Upto the evolution of ahamkāra, the subjective and objective aspects are not differentiated. They are so far held up together in one principle. But with the forward progress in evolution, the integrated state of these two aspects needs differentiation. And this differentiation is actualised in the evolutes of ahamkāra.

The subjective series comprising the eleven organs emanates from the vaikārika form of ahamkāra. This speaks of the fact that the organs also like their cause abound in sattva. On the other hand, the objective series comprising the five subtle elements emanate from the bhūtādi form, and consequently these abound in tamas. Tāijasa does not give rise to any new evolute exclusively by itself. It only excites the other two to function. The differentiation in the evolute is brought out either by tamas or by sattva according as the primary cause abounds in sattva or in tamas. The topic has been nicely dealt with by the author of the Yuktidipikā (p. 116 infra) while explaining the expression ‘तेजसादुभयम्’ (kā,25). He States that whenever the vaikārika gives rise to the eleven organs, it looks forward to the tāijasa for excitement and also to the bhūtādi for bringing out differentiation in its evolutes. Just
as 'fire' thrown into fire or 'water' poured into water cannot be differentiated, similarly sattva within sattva cannot be differentiated if left entirely to itself. But according to the law of evolution the sattva element in the shape of the organs necessitates differentiation within the sattva element of vaikārika, the immediate primary cause. And this differentiation in the organs is brought out by the bhūtādi. This is what is expressed in the following lines:

यद्य हि वैकारिकोऽहंकार इक्षुयमावेन प्रवर्तेत तदा दिक्यत्वात् तेजसं प्रसारस्तवेनान्तरतिः, भूताति भेदस्तवेन। कस्मात? तेनेव तदुभेदात्। तदवयथा—

Similarly the bhūtādi also in its turn looks forward to the tajasa for excitement and also to the vaikārika for bringing out differentiation in its evolutes. Without interference of the vaikārika, the tanmātras could not be differentiated within the bhūtādi, their immediate primary cause. The author finally substantiates his own statement by the following quotation from an authoritative Sāṁkhya work:

शास्त्रेर्माहां—तदेवतिमन स्वातिकेक्षमस्ताम प्रयूतातिस्तेज्ञेनेपपाध्यत। तदेवतिमन, भूताति श्लेष्मणाम प्रयूतातिस्तेज्ञेनेपपाध्यत।

Some of the ancient teachers of Sāṁkhya are found to differ in their conception of the order of evolution. According to Vineyavāsin, ahāmkāra as well as the five subtle elements evolve from maha. Such a view is also expressed in the Yoga-bhāṣya (II. 19). But elsewhere in I. 45, the Bhasya describes the subtle elements to be the evolutes of ahāmkāra. Again, Yuktidipika refers to one Patañjali who is not in favour of counting

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1 भास्त्रेवसारं: भार्मिद: सन्यस्त: प्रवत्यावाण्यन्तिनारिति सिद्धानामस्तस्वं—Yuktidipika p. 108/6-7.

2 भार्मिद: संदयथास्यन्त्यामां स्वर्गशालाम एवयमां स्वयमां ग्यात्मकां चैत्य, एकार्थस्वतेन भावनम्: पद्धतिः पद्धिषिः: पद्धतिभिदिक्षातृतमान हि। एते स्वयमानम् समयः प्रवत्यावाण्यन्तिनारिति:।
ahāmkāra as a separate category. In his opinion egoism or the notion of ‘I-ness’ belongs to mahat. This teacher¹ is different from the author of the Yoga-sūtra.

The number of organs also are differently held by early teachers of Śāmkhya. According to Ṣvarakṛṣṇa there are thirteen organs. Of these intellect (mahat), individuation (ahāmkāra) and mind (manas) are called internal organs (antahkaraṇa). The remaining ten which comprise the five sensory organs and the five motor organs are called external organs. As Patañjali disregards ahāmkāra, so in his opinion there are only twelve organs. Pañcādhikaraṇa goes a step further. In his opinion there are only ten organs. The characteristic features of the organs, their functions and also the conflicting views held by the early teachers of Śāmkhya in this connection have already been discussed in detail in course of explaining the Śāmkhya theory of knowledge. So it is useless to treat these topics here again.

So far about the numerous apparatus of thought that constitute the psychical aspect of reality. Let us now turn our attention towards the physical side of evolution. The bhūtādi form of ahāmkāra which dominates in tāmas generates the five subtle elements of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. In the Śāmkhya literature these are called (1) श्वद्वत्तमात्र, (2) स्पर्शत्तमात्र, (3) रुपत्तमात्र, (4) रसत्तमात्र and (5) ग्यत्तमात्र respectively. As regards their respective properties, the Śāmkhya teachers are found to differ in their opinion. In this connection, reference is made to two divergent schools of Śāmkhya in the Yukti-dipikā (एकतंत्रण तन्त्रमात्रारणीये, एकत्रस्वास्थ्यति वा एं ग एन्यः, p. 108/8-9). There are some teachers who hold that every tanmātra has got only one property, and not more than one as such. For instance, in श्वद्वत्तमात्र heret is only sound, in स्पर्शत्तमात्र there is only touch, while in रुपत्तमात्र there is only colour, and so on, But Vārṣa gāṇya differs here in his opinion. Like others he also holds that in श्वद्वत्तमात्र there is only sound. But in स्पर्शत्तमात्र there is not only touch;

¹ For further about this Patañjali, see above pp. 133-134.
the property of the previous element also accompanies it. So it has got both sound and touch. Similarly in श्वास there are sound, touch and colour, and so on. In this way the number of their properties gradually goes on increasing by one, and finally in गुणमयप्रत्यय there are all the five properties of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. This view is also accepted by the author of the Yogabhāṣya. In II. 19, he expressly states that the five subtle elements of sound and the like are endowed with one, two, three, four and five properties respectively (एकाक्षितविवेकतन्मात्रा: विविधाद्वारः पञ्चकर्मिकविशेषः).

Prof. Radhakrishnan states in this connection that “according to the Vyāsabhāṣya, the tanmātra of sound is produced from ahamkāra, and from the tanmātra of sound accompanied by ahamkāra is produced the tanmātra of touch with the attributes of sound and touch, and so on.” This view appears to be more philosophical; this helps to explain the addition of one attribute to the tanmātras at each succeeding step. But the author of the Yogabhāṣya himself is not found anywhere to express such a view. It is Viṣṇūnātha Bhikṣu who in his Yogavārttika (II. 19) explains the above mentioned expression of the Yogabhāṣya in such a way.

These subtle elements are the rudiments of all sorts of physical realities. These are inert, but possess quantum or mass. And this is due to preponderance of tāmas element in them. Ordinary beings cannot perceive them, but they are open to the yogins and such other superior beings. These are stated as अविशेष (non-specific) in the Śāṅkhya literature. In this connection Vācaspati (kā, 38) is found to state that these are called as such because the different aspects of sattva, rajas and tāmas in them cannot be distinctively experienced by us. The reason of calling them tanmātras lies in the fact that they do not reveal the specific characteristics of their inherent properties. The author of the Yuktidipīkā (p. 140/20-24) elucidates the facts by way of illustration. For instance, the subtle element of sound only possesses
sound-potentiality. But the peculiarities of sound as stress accent, pitch accent, nasalisation and the like are not manifested therein. Similarly in the subtle element of touch there is only touch-potentiality. But touch as rough or smooth is not revealed therein. Such is the case with the other subtle elements also. As the specific characteristics of their respective properties are not manifested in them, this is why these are also called ‘अविशेष’ (non-specific).

From these subtle elements evolve the five gross elements of ether, wind, fire, water and earth having one, two, three, four and five attributes respectively. Thus the gross element of ether with its attribute of sound evolves from the subtle element of sound. Similarly the gross element of wind with its two attributes of sound and touch evolves from the subtle element of touch, and so on. Finally, the gross element of earth having all the five attributes of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell evolves from the subtle element of smell. Speaking briefly, everywhere it is found that a gross element inherits the respective property or properties of the tanmātra from which it evolves, and that one tanmāтра independent of another tanmātra gives rise to a gross element. This is the view which is accepted in the Yukti-dipika (p. 141 supra) and also in the Yoga-bhāṣya (I. 45).

But those who hold the view that every tanmātra possesses only one attribute, and not more than one as such, cannot accept this account of the evolution of the gross elements. The reason is that it is one of the fundamental principles of Saṃkhya that the effect inherits the property of the cause, and what did not primarily exist in the cause cannot be contained by the effect (कारणपूर्णात्मकत्वाद कार्यस्य, का, 14). Of course, there is no difference of opinion with regard to the view that the subtle element of sound exclusively gives rise to the gross element of ether. Here both the cause as well as the effect possess only one attribute of sound. The difference between the subtle element of sound and the gross element of ether lies in the fact that the former is non-atomic and more extensive, while the latter is atomic and less extensive. The distinction is like that of the karaṇākāśa and kāryākāśa of the Vedānta.
But according to the school referred to above, the gross element of air can on no account be held to be the exclusive product of the subtle element of touch. In that case, air would have got only the attribute of touch and not of sound. Similarly the subtle element of colour cannot exclusively give rise to the gross element of fire. If this would be the case, then the fact that fire possesses the three attributes of sound, taste and colour could never be explained. By the law of causality it would inherit only the attribute of colour from its respective cause, while the remaining two attributes of sound and touch would be lacking in it. The same anomaly would arise with respect to all other gross elements having more than one attribute. In order to get rid of this difficulty the upholders of this school maintain that the subtle element of touch accompanied by the subtle element of sound gives rise to the gross element of wind with the result that the effect has got both the attributes of sound and touch. Similarly the subtle element of colour accompanied by those of sound and touch gives rise to the gross element of fire having the three attributes of sound, touch and colour. The subtle element of taste also in its turn being accompanied by those of sound, touch and colour gives rise to the gross element of water which is equipped with the four attributes of sound, touch, colour and taste. And finally, the subtle element of smell in combination with the four other subtle elements of sound, touch, colour and taste generates the gross element of earth wherein there are all the five attributes of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. In this way everywhere the particular tanmātra is accompanied by the preceding tanmātras in giving rise to the respective gross element. The result is that the particular gross element thus evolved gets the specific attribute from the principal tanmātra with the addition of one subsidiary attribute from the accompanying tanmātra at each successive step.

The various properties of the gross elements are stated in detail in the Yuktidipikā (pp. 141-142). In this connection,
it is stated therein that touch of wind and water is cool, while that of fire is hot. Earth is neither cool nor hot. Further, both fire and water are white and bright, while earth is dark. Taste also is not same everywhere. Water is sweet, but no special taste is appreciated in the earth-element. Smell is the exclusive property of earth, but it is sometimes appreciated in other elements also through the admixture of earth atom therein.

A detailed list of the properties of the elements appear in a quotation in the Yukti-dipika (p. 141). The same quotation with slight alterations in reading appears also in the Tattva-vaishārdi (Y. S. III,44) of Vācaspati Miśra. But nowhere the commentators are found to mention the source. Evidently it has been quoted from some ancient text. In this quotation we find that the properties belonging to earth are:—Form, weight, acridity, resistance, stability, position, divisibility, sustenance, dark shade and usefulness to all. Those of water are:—Liquidity, thinness, brilliancy, whiteness, softness, weight, coolness, protectiveness, purification and cohesion. The properties of fire are:—Upward movement, purification, burning, cooking, lightness, brilliancy, destruction, power and lustre. Those belonging to wind are:—Horizontal motion,
purification, pushing, impulsion, power, dryness, casting no shadow and coolness. And finally the etherial properties are the following: Pervasiveness, interpenetration and unobstructiveness. All these constitute different specific characteristics of the elements. Again, a minute observation of the characteristic features of these properties reveal the fact that some of these are tranquil, some are dynamic, while others are obstructive. This is why the elements which are possessed of these properties are called specific (विषेष, kā, 38).

By virtue of these properties the elements can serve the manifold purposes of the embodied beings. It is one of the fundamental conceptions of Śāmkhya that all collocations are for the sake of puruṣa. And the author of the Yukti-dipikā (p. 142) has spared no pains in this connection to show the way as to how the different elements through their respective properties serve the various purposes interests, needs and well-fares of the created beings. This service is not only external, but it is internal as well. The different organisms, as it is well-known, are made of five elements. Of these, it is the earth material that brings out the respective configurations of these bodies. Even in artificial constructions, as in the case of a pitcher or some other earthen pot, it is due to the presence of earth material that the potter can give them their respective forms and shapes. This is why ‘form’ is stated be one of the properties of earth. Again, existence of ‘weight’ in the earth material helps mankind as well as animals to hold up their physical bodies. Due to natural ‘aridity’ belonging to the said material, the different organic bodies can absorb water with the result that both mankind and animal can thereby acquire some degree of tenderness in their persons (तन্মालास्तं तत्वं गच्छिनाम घटायितक्ष्य आकारणिः स्वः । गौरवदेवाः सवत्ते वैवच्छ भृतानाम ।), and so on with the remaining earthly properties. Let us now take up the case of the water element. Liquidity of this element brings out beauty in the created beings. This property also heals wind, subdues heat and brings out cohesion in the earth material that
forms the major portion in such organic bodies (क्लेश्यः रूपसम्पर्कः, वायुपत्तिकारोपिनिशचार्मण संवदनः पुष्पिक्यः). In this way the author goes to speak of the fact that the different organisms look forward to these five elements for their nourishment, and the efficiency of each and every property of the elements to serve that end is very clearly pointed out in the text.

The different aspects of the elements are also dealt with in the Yoga-sūtra and specially in the Bhāṣya. The author of the Bhāṣya is of opinion that all elements have got two-fold characteristics—one specific (विशेष) and the other non-specific (सामान्य). The former comprises the five attributes of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. In the Yoga-sūtra (III. 44), these five attributes together with 'form', 'weight', 'aridity' and such other properties as stated above are technically called to be the gross aspect (स्थलक्रम) of the elements.

The non-specific characteristic of an element comprises its essential feature. This is called स्थल in the Yoga-sūtra (III. 44). The term is explained as 'स्वसत्तान्य' in the Bhāṣya. This is illustrated by hardness in the earthelement, liquidity in water, heat in fire, motion in wind and pervasiveness in ether.1 Speaking more clearly, 'सामान्य' with reference to the elements constitutes nothing but their different substantive aspects.

From a few stray references that are found here and there, it appears that 'सामान्य' formed an important topic of discussion in the ancient works of Sāmkhya. In the Yuktidiplka (p. 76/14-15) it is stated that 'सामान्य' has got no separate existence apart from the substance; it means only the similar or common characteristic of the individuals belonging to the same class or community. This is what is expressed in the following line:

निन्दित्वान्यः सामान्यः द्वाध्याद्धात्मांतरभूतमति, सामान्यमाणे सामान्यपरिकल्पनातः

The aforesaid view was originally held by Vindhyavāsin. And this is referred to in the following couplet of the Śloka-vārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (अक्रितिवाला, 65):

1 Cp. विद्याध्यात्मांतरभूतमति, सामान्यमाणे सामान्यपरिकल्पनातः।

| Caraka on Sarira, I. 29. |
According to Kumārila 'सामान्य' means 'universal'. He makes no distinction between 'सामान्य' and 'जाति'. While propagating his doctrine of universal, he incidentally refers to the view of a teacher (finally stated to be Vīndhyāvāsin) according to whom 'सामान्य' means 'पिण्डसाकृति'. He now urges as to what is actually meant by 'साकृति' by that teacher. If it be maintained that the term means 'sameness of form' then it does not differ from our conception of 'जाति'. If on the other hand the term speaks of 'similarity', then the question naturally arises as to whose and with whom and how this 'similarity' occurs. Thus he is found to argue in the next couplet:

सामान्यप्रकृति: सामान्यामरितये।
साकृतिकः साकृति केनेति वा कथम्।

Finally he comes to the conclusion that Vīndhyāvāsin in his own work has used 'साकृति' to mean 'sameness of form', and it is an entity which is not to be treated as absolutely different from the individuals that comprise a class. It is due to ignorance that 'similarity' has been asserted here by others. This is what is expressed in the following couplet occurring at the end of ākṛtivāda:

लेन नायक्तिविनेठिः साध्यसमिति विरितम्।
प्रायः वि नय नि वा से न भान्ते: साध्ययुक्तै।

But it is difficult to ascertain whether Kumārila could maintain fair justice in his exposition of Vīndhyāvāsin's view. The plausible view is that Vīndhyāvāsin was regarded as a high authority even at the time of Kumārila, and it is not unlikely that the author made here an attempt to explain the term 'साकृति' in such a way as may be helpful to support his own doctrine of universal. However, the Śāṅkhya conception of 'सामान्य' differs fundamentally from Kumārila's conception of the same. For 'सामान्य' in Śāṅkhya has got no separate existence of its own apart from the substance—a view which Kumārila cannot accept at any rate. The fact is that its notion is based upon 'साकृति'.
that means similarity of forms belonging to the same class, community or genus. Again, viewed from the standpoint of Sāṃkhya ‘साधृष्ठ’ cannot even ultimately mean ‘जाति’ as Kumārila prefers. This is evident from a statement in the Yoga-bhāṣya (तुल्यवर्योऽध्यात्मानसाधृष्ठं जातिरूपेऽपर्यायं हृदु; गौरियं वहःते, III. 53) where both the terms ‘साधृष्ठ’ and ‘जाति’ are occurring side by side. Here ‘साधृष्ठ’ means ‘exactness’ or ‘similarity’ while ‘जाति’ means ‘genus’. Kumārila may not prefer that ‘साधृष्ठ’ means ‘similarity’. But even an ancient authority like Uddyotakara makes no distinction among ‘सामान्य’, ‘साधृष्ठ’ and ‘साधृष्ठ’. This is what we know from his statement in the Nyāya-vārttika.

The two aspects, one generic and the other specific, are relative. The same entity may be generic with reference to some other entity, and it may as well become specific with reference to another. Further, these two aspects are not confined to the world of material objects only. A careful study of the Yoga-bhāṣya and the Yukti-dipikā reveals the fact that their sphere is extended to all manifested entities—physical as well as psychical. The expression ‘सामान्यविशेषतमनोर्थवर्त्य’ found in a few instances in the Yoga-bhāṣya, bears evidence to this. Even the attributes of sound, taste and the like are said to be possessed of these two aspects. This is what we get from the statement of the Yoga-bhāṣya (सामान्यविशेषतमाश्चार्यार्थवर्त्य, III. 47). Again, from a quotation in the Yukti-dipikā2 we know that ahāṃkāra also has got these double aspects. The notion of ‘I-ness’ constitutes its non-specific characteristic, while the idea that I am involved in sound,

1 See, श्रविद्वाराणात् साधृष्ठविशेषतमनोर्थवर्त्य, NS I.i. 6. Here Vātsyāyana makes no distinction between ‘वाण’ and ‘सामान्य’ (प्रकरणं सामान्यान्ततुतुतु....). The author of the Vārttika goes a step further. He states ‘भूतस्य सार्थे गव्य मश्तुष्य क्वचिं प्रतिपादति, indicating thereby that सामान्य, साधृष्ठ and साहस्य do not differ from one another. Finally Vācaspati states—‘न सामान्यतिमिश्रनेन वाणवात्मनोर्थवर्त्य’.

2 तथा शास्त्रानात्—एतत्सांत्रिक महत्त्वात् भास्त्रान्त,युक्तिदिपिकाः | श्रविद्वाराणात् सा मा यें लक्षणं महतिः, गुणप्रचुरं त पुनं वि वो व अहंकारित्वं, Yukti-dipikā, p.114; also see एवं गुणप्रचुरितमेऽपवर्त्यता वस्तुमार्शमेऽपवर्त्यस्य वि वो य राशिः महतिः—श्रविद्वाराणात् स्वर्यं संपेद्यं गन्तेश्वरित्वं, p. 115 supra.
I am in touch, I am in colour, and so on is what is said to be its specific characteristic. Even *buddhi* is not exempted. The fact that this entity has also got these two aspects is hinted in the expression 'प्रकाशातमनः कुदिसत्तथा सामान्यविशेषशः' occurring in the *Yoga-bhāṣya* (III. 47).

The fact that all manifested entities are possessed of these double characteristics is further corroborated by the conception of 'substance' (*द्रव्य*) as found in the *Yoga-bhāṣya* (III. 44). It is emphatically stated there that a substance is an aggregate of generic as well as specific characteristics (*सामान्यविशेषसङ्गविद्यायोऽव द्रव्यम्*). This aggregate is again two-fold:—(1) where the parts can be separated from the whole (*पुनर्विद्याय* and (2) where the component parts are inseparably connected with the whole (*अपुनर्विद्याय*). The author finally states that in the opinion of *Patañjali* a substance constitutes an aggregate whose component parts are inseparably connected with the whole (*अपुनर्विद्यायवेदवाजगतसः सः द्रव्यतिमति पतञ्जलिः*). This is the substantive feature of an entity, and it is called 'स्वरूप' in the *Sūtra* (III. 44). This conception of 'substance' of the philosopher *Patañjali* differs fundamentally from that of the grammarian *Patañjali*. According to the grammarian a substance is distinct from its quality and genus\(^1\), while the philosopher does not assign any separate existence to them apart from the substance itself. His approach here is synthetic. This conception of substance is not confined to the material objects only. Even a sense-organ also comes within the range of this definition. It is also regarded as a substance whose component parts are inseparably connected with the whole. This is clearly expressed in a statement of the *Yoga-bhāṣya* (III. 47) itself.

Our main interest was centered upon the discussion on the

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\(^1\) See, अय दीर्घित्र के शब्दः। कि यत्र सास्त्रांगुरुकुरुविद्याण्यभेदः स शब्दः। नेत्राय—द नवे नाम तदः। यथाभिः तदस्तिंबः वैमिति विमिति स शब्दः। नेत्राय— निम्न नाम सः। यथाभिः तदस्तिंबः कृष्णः कृष्णः कृष्णः शब्दः। नेत्राय—य शो नाम सः। यथाभिः तदस्तिंबः मित्रोपतिमयैं छिन्नमितिमयैं सा मा भूं तं स शब्दः। नेत्राय— भाष्यतिमयैं सः।—*Mahābhāṣya*, p. 1.
characteristic features of the gross elements. And in this connection we have spared no pains to discuss other relevant topics associated with them. All these find a detailed treatment in the Vaiśeṣika system also. But the doctrine of Śaṅkhya should not be confused with that of the Vaiśeṣika. In several instances these two systems are found to differ fundamentally. Let us take up the case of 'atom' (परमाणु) that forms one of the main topics of discussion in the Vaiśeṣika system. An atom, to speak according to this system, is the smallest hypothetical unit that cannot be further subdivided into any part. In the Yoga-bhāṣya (III. 52) also it is stated that an atom constitutes the smallest unit of substance. But the difficulty lies in the fact that according to Śaṅkhya-yoga view a substance however minute it may be, must constitute an aggregate whose component parts are inseparably connected with the whole. And it is indeed strange to notice that in the Yoga-bhāṣya, the case of an atom also like that of an organic body and a tree, has been furnished as an illustration of the particular aggregate where the parts are inseparably connected with the whole (अयुतसिद्धायवः संघातः—शरीरं द्रव्यं परमाणूरितिः, III. 44). This fact at once suggests that according to Śaṅkhya-yoga an atom also has got its component parts—a conception which cannot be accepted at any rate by the Vaiśeṣika teachers. Further, an atom in its turn constitutes a component part of the tanmātras (पुष्पिकेयपरमाणू स्तन्मात्राक्षयः, Y. Bh. IV. 14). This is due to the fact that according to the law of evolution it develops within the tanmātra; it cannot transgress it. But Vaiśeṣika's approach is quite different. This is not all. According to Śaṅkhya-yoga there are five kinds of atoms. These are: (1) earth-atom, (2) water-atom, (3) fire-atom, (4) wind-atom and (5) ether-atom (Y. Bh. I. 47). But Vaiśeṣika teachers never speak of so many classes of atoms.

Our discussion on the evolutionary series of Śaṅkhya has now been brought to a close. In this chapter we have dwelt upon

1 अपर्याप्तप्रभुच्छन्ति द्रव्यं परमाणुः।
the twenty-four principles of Śaṅkhya beginning with prakṛti and ending in the gross elements. We have also made an attempt to discuss here other connected topics with special reference to the gross elements. Puruṣa, the twenty-fifth, will be treated later on. All these principles pass under the general name of tattva in the Śaṅkhya literature. But the reason as to why these are called as such is not stated anywhere by the ancient authorities whose works have come down to us. Ordinarily the term means nothing but what constitutes the essence of an entity. And this meaning of tattva can be found even in the Mahābhāṣya (I. i. 1, p. 7)\textsuperscript{1}. But the idea of tattva in Śaṅkhya conveys something more. A quotation from the followers of Vāraṇgaṇya as found in the Yukti-dīpikā sheds some light in this connection. While speaking on the Śaṅkhya view of destruction they state that it is nothing but the disappearance of the manifested form of an entity, while the substance itself is not affected thereby at all. This disappearance of manifestations is two-fold. With reference to the tattvas it may be stated that they retain their manifested forms intact from creation up to dissolution of the world of cosmos, while the other manifested entities disappear after retaining their existence for some period. This is what we find in the following lines (p. 67):—

\begin{quote}
तथान वा य ग पा: पद्धति—तदेतत् वेदोषथं व्यक्तेरैति
स्त्रस्माद्व व्यत्र्<br />
हम्मनो विनाश:। स यु द्विविधः—आसर्मंपठयात् तत्त्वाना किष्किरत्नाला-
न्तःस्यालानितर्यायत्वामिति।
\end{quote}

Similarly Bhojadeva also in his Tattvapraṅkaśikā (VI. 3) states:—That which retains its existence up to the period of dissolution, which forms the object of enjoyment of all the beings, is called tattva. This is why organic bodies, jātṛ and similar other entities of short duration are not regarded as such. This is what is stated in the following couplet:

\begin{quote}
आभवं निद्रित्व यत् सर्वं सः भोगवपि च सूतानाम्।
तत् तत्त्वमिति स्रोक्तं न शरीरस्याःत्र पत्तमतः॥
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1} तदयै तित्न भरितस्त्यन्न न विहन्ये। कि पुनस्त्यन्न । तद्रास्त्यन्न।
The commentator sheds here further light by a quotation from some other text wherein an attempt has been made to furnish the derivative meaning of the term. Thus he states (p. 174):

तदुक्म गुरुदेवाचार्यां —
तत्त्वां सत्तत्त्वव्याच्छ तत्त्वानीति ततो विदुः।
तत्त्वं दैवतो ध्याति सत्तत्त्वव्य झालत।॥
ठठादिपियजन्माध्यापि तत्त्वाम्प्रलोभत स्थितम्।
अन्यथा सत्त्वत्त्वकुमाराधिपि तत्त्वं प्रसवयने॥

The term tattva is derived from the root तन् (तनु), to extend. Owing to extensity and long duration (सत्त, सत्त), these are known to be tattvas. Extensity speaks of pervasiveness with reference to 'space', while duration does so with reference to 'time.' A tattva which extends up to lac of yojanas exists up to the period of dissolution. Otherwise even a stump of a tree or a pitcher and similar other entities would come under the province of tattva. This definition is specially meant for the twenty-three evolutes. Both prakrti and purusa are eternal principles; these do not disappear even in dissolution. Evolution of the tattvas terminates in the gross elements.

**Time and Space**

Time and space are regarded as substances in the Vaisheṣika system. But these are viewed otherwise in the Saṁkhyya-yoga literature. 'Time' according to Yoga-bhāṣya (III. 52) forms a successive series of moments. A moment is the minutest limit of duration, called kṣaṇa. In other words, it is the time taken by an atom in motion in leaving its former position in space and reaching the next point. The uninterrupted flow of moments constitutes an order of succession, called krama in the Saṁkhyya-Yoga literature. Speaking from the Saṁkhyya-yoga point of view, the sum-total of these moments as well their sequences do not actually form any aggregate of reals. All that are conceived as hours, days, nights and such other aggregates of moments have got no substantive existence of their own. These are superimposed, by the intellect.
for the sake of practical purpose. Though these are outcome of fanciful imagination, still all these have got their corresponding terms that find expression in ordinary usage. From the trend of this discussion it appears that the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya intends to include ‘time’ within vikalpa\(^1\) which is held to be one of the five-fold modifications of the thought-stuff.

But the moment which is conceived as the minimum unit of infinite duration and hence atomic\(^2\) in nature is itself real, for the idea of succession is based upon it. This succession is a sequence whose existence rests upon the continuous flow of moments, and this is called ‘time’ by the authorities. Really speaking, moments cannot be stung together in a linear arrangement. This is due to the fact that it is the present moment that alone exists. The previous and the succeeding moments have no independent existence of their own. Hence there cannot be any actual continuity. Two moments cannot co-exist. In that case there cannot be any succession. The reason is not far to seek. For, succession implies that one event is to be followed by another. This being the case there cannot be any succession of two events appearing simultaneously. In that case there may be a combination of them, but no succession. A time-sequence also is a succession wherein an earlier moment is followed by a later moment, and that again by another, and so on without any break of continuity. Thus it is obvious that the moments do not appear simultaneously. As a consequence of this it can be safely stated that it is the present moment that alone exists, past and future moments have got no independent existence of their own, and consequently there cannot be any combination of moments.

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1 ‘शब्दद्वातानमुपति कस्तुस्वरूपो विकल्पः’, Y.S. I. 9; also see, स स्तुति स्वरूप ध्वनि इत्यि इक्ष्यमि: श ब्लृ श्रा नां तु पादि ले कौसिन्कानां श्यालिंधरश्च नाति कस्तुस्वरूप ह्यावभाससे’, —Y. Bh. III. 52.

2 Idea of ‘time’ based upon such a conception of moment is also hinted in the Caraka-samhita, ‘सम्भवति तु खड़ो तद्व यूष्णीपदानसन्नि काशिन भवति’, सूरिर, IV. 8.
By this it should not be meant that the past and future moments are absolutely non-existent, The fact is that these cannot exist exclusively by themselves. These are inherent in the changes undergone by the manifested entities. Speaking more clearly, past and future refer to the different stages of an entity. Of these, the entity which has retired from the field of operation is called past, and that which has not yet commenced its function is called future. It is one of the fundamental doctrines of Sāṃkhya that a manifested entity undergoes change in every succeeding moment. Past and future constitute nothing but the two different aspects of the ever changing entity. The change does not occur all on a sudden. It passes through each and every moment. But it is so rapid that the ordinary people fail to perceive all of its minute stages. In fact it is the one single moment upon which the whole world of cosmos completes one round of change. But the change brought out by a single moment is extremely subtle. It can be perceived only by the yogins of superior power.

The author of the Yukti-dipikā also criticises the view of those who are in favour of maintaining the view that the universe owes its origin from ‘time’ (p. 88 infra). In this connection he boldly asserts that there is no such entity as ‘time’. It is conceived for the sake of marking a particular limit in the continuous flow of an activity, such as in the movement of the luminaries or in the beating of pulse etc. Hence it does not essentially differ from actions. Now, actions according to Sāṃkhya are held to be the functions of the organs. In other words these constitute one or other of the numerous fluctuations of the organs, called vṛttis. But these fluctuations also, to speak from the standpoint of Sāṃkhya, do not essentially differ from their so called substratum, the organs themselves. Thus ‘time’ ultimately falls within the jurisdiction of the organs. This view is expressed by the author of the Yukti-dipikā in the following lines (p. 158/10-12):

1 अतिदानान्तरं स्वकप्तोदस्तवच्चनेराःश्वगृणाम्, Y. S. IV. 12.
2 भगवेदस्तु नित्तिकुन्तिकम् यभ, Y. Bh. III. 53.
But what was the attitude of the most ancient Sāmkhya teachers towards 'kāla', specially at the time when Sāmkhya was promulgated as a system, cannot be definitely stated. From the evidence of the Ahiroddhnya Sāmhitā we know that 'time' formed one of the sixty topics of the Šaṣṭištātra (शृण्ण तन्त्रांश्यान्त्यानि शास्त्रिकियत्वाततिकालोः). In another place (51, 42) the text is found to state that 'time' is regarded in Sāmkhya and Yoga as one of the aspects of the Supreme power. Devala also in his exposition of Sāmkhya (Mbh., xii, 275, 5) assigns a prominent place to 'time' that plays some parts in cosmogonical affairs. These have been already pointed out by us². In some allied schools of thought 'kāla' is regarded to be the main cause of integration (संकलन) and disintegration (अवकलन) of the entire cosmos. But the author of the Yukti-dipikā totally disregards this view. He states that 'time' is not the factor that brings out modification in an entity; it only renders some assistance by means of its mere relation (कालस्तु सम्बन्धस्माकोपकारी, न विक्रियाहेतु; p. 89/7-8).

'Space' also has got no separate existence of its own in Sāmkhya and Yoga. It is also hypothetically constructed for the sake of practical usage. Conception of space is relative. What is 'east' to one may be 'west' to another. But it is strange to notice that in the Sāmkhya-Sūtra³ both 'time' and 'space' have been mentioned to be the products of ether. Such a view is not even hinted anywhere in the more authentic texts of Sāmkhya and Yoga.

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1 Cp. नामनेन क्रियां भूतभविभवद्वत्सानां: काला भवन्ते,—Mahābhāṣya I, iii. 1/11, p. 258.
2 See above p. 120.
3 विज्ञानवाकाशाशिभ्यः, II. 12.
DOCTRINE OF CHANGE

Though the gross elements do not give rise to any new evolute or tattva still these are in a state of constant change. It is one of the characteristic features of the gunas that they are dynamic; they do not rest even for a single moment without undergoing any change. This is why their different manifestations also are ever changing. Now, what is to be meant by change? Here the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya (III, 13) replies that “change is the disappearance of the previous aspect and appearance of another aspect of a substance, while the substance itself remains constant”¹. This is what is also echoed in the following couplet, probably quoted from some earlier text in the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 90):

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जहदमान्तरं पूर्वमुक्तं यदापरम।
तस्याद्रव्यति॥ धर्मिः परिणामः स उच्चते॥
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1 भव कोशपरिणामः ? अवसिष्यः न हन्सस्य पूर्वमेतिित्रि धर्मान्तरोपयति: परिणामः हति।
2 Cp. ‘विभिन्नरूप सत्यव्यवास्थपरत्व तस्याद्राविकार्यः,’ Nirukta, I. 2.

The different stages through which an entity passes in the course of its modifications have received careful attention of even the most ancient thinkers. In this connection, the six-fold analyses of modification by Vārṣyaṇi deserves special attention. From a reference to his views in the Nirukta (I. 2), we know that according to this teacher there are six modifications of becoming. These are:—(1) Genesis, (2) existence, (3) transformation or change, (4) growth, (5) decay and (6) destruction or disappearance. Of these, ‘genesis’ denotes only the beginning of the first stage of appearance; it neither affirms nor denies the succeeding state. ‘Existence’ affirms a being that has been manifested. ‘Transformation or change’ speaks of the modification of an entity which is not detached from its essence. ‘Growth’ denotes the development of one’s own limbs or of objects with which one is associated, as one grows with victory or one grows with his body. ‘Decay’ constitutes the counter-proposition of the preceding one. ‘Destruction or disappearance’ speaks of the beginning of the next state; it neither affirms nor denies the previous state. Other modifications of becoming are only further developments of one or other of these stages as enumerated here. For a better understanding of these modifications, we quote below the entire extract from the Nirukta (I. 2):

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यथा सार्वविकारः सत्यतिः त्वा भावं न लिः:—जापरेण्मधिः विभिन्नरूपस्य विभिन्नरूपस्य
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Some portion at the beginning of this extract is also quoted in the Mahābhāṣya (I. iii. 1/11, p. 258). But Patañjali himself does not explain these modifications. However, the doctrine of modification is reflected in a few instances here and there in his work. In one place he is found to state that a substance, such as clay or gold, may assume different forms which in their turn appear and disappear; but the substance itself remains as it is (I. i. 1, p. 7). In this connection he also speaks of two-fold eternity which has got a striking similarity with the Sāṃkhya doctrine of immutable eternity and eternity-in-mutation (For comparison, see below p. 264, n 2).

In another place he states that nothing within its own self is at rest even for a single moment. Either it is continuing with its growth onward up to the extent it can reach or it is going on decaying (न शीर्ष वारदात्मक श्रविवायति व विद्वानः, I. ii. 64/53, p. 216). Here we find a glimpse of the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution and involution.

The author of the Nirukta might have introduced these different modifications to explain ‘bhāva’ which forms an intricate topic of grammatical speculation. But it is interesting to notice here that Vārṣṭyaṇa himself recognises even ‘destruction’ (विनष्ट) as one of the aspects of modification. Moreover, the particular line containing the explanation of ‘विनष्ट’ towards the end of the above quoted extract tentatively suggests that ‘destruction’ does not mean annihilation. It is not the denial of the very existence of an entity. It only speaks of giving up its previous state and landing into the beginning of another state.

In fact these six modifications speak of the sequence through which an entity passes from its future state to the present, and from the present to the past. In the Sāṃkhya account of the Mbh., some of these modifications are stated to be the characteristic features of a manifested entity. “That which is subject to birth, growth, decay and death is called vyakta (manifest) while the reverse is known to be. avyakta (unmanifest)”. This is what is stated in the following verse (XII. 236. 30-1):—

प्रोहे तद्वाययः जायेन वर्षे च वर्षे।
श्रीते भवनेत्रौ चैव चात्मिनिन्यायूत्तमः।
• विकीर्तमेतो पशु तद्वाययः नारायणम्॥

(The verse states that birth, growth, decay, and destruction are the marks of manifestation while non-manifestation is the reverse.)
An attempt has been made in the above couplet to define 'change' which is called parinama in Samkhya. When the dharmin or the substance itself without losing its very essence assumes another aspect by giving up the previous one, it is then said to have undergone a 'change'. Thus 'change' implies passing out of the existing manifestation and appearance of a new one while the very essence of the substance is not disturbed thereby at all. The Yukti-dipika illustrates the process as follows (p. 90):— Just as the palasa leaf being affected by heat and such other efficient causes gives up its greenness and becomes yellowish, but it has not thereby assumed any other characteristic other than that of palasa—its palasa-hood remains intact always while its different aspects only appear and disappear; similar is the case with all other changes. The underlying substance that remains unaffected is called dharmin while its varying aspects are called dharmas. The dharmin is an abiding principle manifesting itself in and through the dharmas.

Likewise Asvaghosa also in his exposition of the philosophy of Arada states (Buddha-carita, XII. 22):—

जावे जीवे ठै चाव वाब्याते (चावे ?) भ्रिये च यदा ।

tadyānāṃ vijnātaḥ vibhavamabhāyakṛtu vibhyāgār ॥

Here bhīyate (death) is not different from vibhavati (destruction or disappearance) of Varṣyāyani. Similarly jīvātē is equivalent to jāvātē.

We do not intend to prolong our discussion further. In our opinion there is a clear reflection of the tenets and doctrines of Samkhya in this passage of the Nirukta. Our suggestion is also corroborated by the evidence of the commentary of Skanda-Mahēśvara (pp. 29—30) wherein an attempt has been made to explain the passage in the light of the Samkhya theory of causation (बकारवाद ). The question does not arise here as to whether Samkhya attained a developed stage at the time of Yāska. However, in the Parisisṭā portion of the Nirukta we find a brief discussion on the three guṇas (xiii. 16). Most interesting is to notice that in a couplet which possibly has been quoted from some other source, reference is made to Samkhya, Yoga and puruṣa—the twenty-fifth (सवसयो गोमं समवैत्वं पुरुषं वा पयविषयकं, XIII. 19). But this Parisisṭā might have been appended to the Nirukta at a later stage.

1. For a fuller treatment of dharmin and dharma, see above pp. 198-206.
This doctrine of change should not be confused with the Buddhistic doctrine of universal flux. The advocates of this Buddhistic school of thought maintains that the *dharmas* are momentary units, retaining no existence of their own in the succeeding moment. They reject the idea of any *dharmin* or abiding principle, apart from the *dharmas*, that remains constant in the midst of changes. The topic has been already discussed above (pp. 93-94). Hence it does not require any further elaboration here.

In the Yoga system of Patanjali (Y. S. III. 13), 'change is stated to be three-fold:—(1) वर्मिपरिणाम, (2) लत्त्वपरिणाम and (3) अवस्थापरिणाम. These are examined in detail in the Bhāṣya. Of these, 'वर्मिपरिणाम' speaks of the change that an element undergoes through its various manifestations. It is a change of aspect while the original substance remains constant. Just as a lump of gold when turned into bracelets, rings or bangles, what happens is that it assumes different shapes in passing through its different aspects while gold itself remains intact. 'लत्त्वपरिणाम' speaks of the change of an aspect in a time series; it is not the change of the original substance. Thus an aspect when it enters into its present stage from the future one has undergone a change. At that stage its present aspect only becomes prominent while it is not altogether detached from its past and future stages. These two stages then remain latent in it. Similarly when it enters into its past stage, it is not severed from its present and future stages, and so on. This is illustrated by the simile of a passionate man who when attached to a particular woman is not absolutely free from his passion towards other women. The fact is that his passion towards the particular woman becomes prominent at that time while it becomes latent towards other women for the time being. 'अवस्थापरिणाम' is the change of state. that an aspect undergoes in every succeeding moment in any of its particular stage in a time series. Thus an aspect when exists in its present stage is generally held to be new. But even its newness begins to diminish in every succeeding moment. Thus what was brand
new becomes new, from new it becomes old, from old it turns
into older, and so on. Thus everywhere the aspect remains
the same, but it looks different with the changes in its states.
This is illustrated by a line which becomes ten when marked
in the place of tens, becomes hundred when marked in the
place of hundred, and so on. It is also illustrated by the case
of a woman who becomes mother in relation to her son, becomes
sister in relation to her brother, and daughter in relation to her
father. Finally the author of the Bhāṣya in his concluding
remark states that ultimately there is only one change which is
differently described under different circumstances. Thus he
states that the earth material when giving rise to a pot is first of
all turned into a lump. From lump it assumes another shape, and
then another. In this way it passes through different aspects till
it is turned into a pot. This is what is called change of aspect. The
pot again in its turn reaches its present stage by giving up its
future stage. This is called the change of stage in a time-series.
Then again the pot changes showing comparative oldness and
newness in every succeeding moment, and this is called a change
of state. Thus everywhere it is the object that changes, while the
substratum always remains constant.

This change cannot be haphazard and arbitrary. It follows
an unviolable order of succession called 'क्रम' in the Sāṃkhya-yoga
literature. Diversity in the order of succession is the cause of
diversity in change. Let us take up the case of a water-jar. We
see it appearing and disappearing. But in the midst of change it
has to follow an order of succession. Thus the clay material is
first of all powdered, then it is formed into lump, then it assumes
the form of a water-jar, then comes the stage of its disappearance
when it is reduced into pot sherds, small bits and so on. From
this it is clear that an aspect follows a sequence in its order of

1 For a comparative study of the different theories of change of the
four Buddhist teachers of the Sarvāstivāda school, see above pp. 95-98.
2 "><\nY S. III. 15. 

appearance and disappearance. Thus 'कम्' is a relative sequence between one aspect that is present and the other which is immediately contiguous to it.¹ The lump of clay disappears and the water-jar appears. Here we get an instance of 'कम्' with reference to 'change of aspect' (धर्मवरिणाम). Like wise, 'change in time-variation (क्षणवरिणाम) also follows a sequence. The future becomes present, and the present becomes past.² Everywhere the aspect passes through a sequence in its transition from one stage to another. This happens so because there is a relation of antecedent and consequent between the previous stage and what follows it. But the sequence followed by the future in manifesting itself into the present is not visible by the ordinary beings. However, it is open to the Yogins of superior power of vision.

'अवस्थापरिणाम' (change of state) also follows 'कम्'. But sense-perception of ordinary beings cannot penetrate into it. Thus a brand new water-jar when becomes old what happens is that oldness is first marked in its rim. Then by degrees it attacks the entire phenomenal appearance of the jar. Even a new garment when kept up in a sealed box for a long time, automatically becomes old. It is a persistent tendency with all sorts of manifestations to become old. But this oldness does not appear all on a sudden. It is arrived at through a sequence whose different stages are extremely subtle. Thus what was brand-new becomes new, what was new becomes oldish, what was oldish becomes noticeable old, what was noticeable old becomes old, what was old becomes older, and so on. But we ordinary beings cannot perceive the sequence through which an aspect passes in the course of its transition from one state to another.

The idea of 'कम्' is based upon an uninterrupted series of moments; it is cognised at a particular point in the series when a

¹ वो वस्त्र भ्रमरस्य समनवत्रो भ्रमः: स तस्व कमः, Y. Bk. III. 15.
² The past has got no sequence, as there is no immediate contiguity after it. For a fuller discussion, see above pp. 200-202, n 1.
unit of change has entered into its final limit. When the change is rapid, consequently ‘कम’ also becomes of short duration, and it is then treated as subtle. However, even the subtle units of ‘कम’ should not be ignored. Their cumulative effect is indeed surprising. The geometrical point, however, may be insignificant. But it is these points which well-knit together make up lines, planes and solids. Similarly it is the subtle units of ‘कम’ through which appears this grand and stupendous universe from its primary cause and finally reverts back into it.

This ‘कम’ is not confined to the world of limited entities only. Its scope extends even to eternal realities. Eternity in Śāmkhya is two-fold—one is immutable eternity (कृतस्थितिवता), the other being eternity in mutation (परिप्रेक्ष्याविवर्तन). The former speaks of an eternal principle which is not subjected to change or decay, and this is no other but the पुरुष. The latter is also eternal; it undergoes change but even in the midst of change its very essence is not lost. And it is the प्रकृति of Śāmkhya. Now with regards to the non-eternal entities beginning from buddhi and ending downwards to the various manifested aspects of the gross-elements, this ‘कम’ is found to have reached finality. But no such finality can be achieved with respect to पुरुष and प्रकृति. Of course ‘कम’ in the case of पुरुष is nothing but a mere abstraction. However, in the opinion of the Śāmkhya teachers there will never appear any such stage when the order of succession with reference to these two particular principles will come to a standstill. In that case the world of cosmos cannot function any longer—a stage which Śāmkhya is not prepared to admit.

1 See, ‘श्रुतप्रविधियोऽ परिप्रेक्ष्यानसत्यर्मां प्रकृति: कम्; Y.S. IV. 33.

2 दसी बैंकिल, कृतस्थितिवता परिप्रेक्ष्याविवर्तनतां च। तत्र कृतस्थितिवता पुरुषस्च, परिप्रेक्ष्यानसत्यर्मां गुणानां स। वर्तिष्णु परिप्रेक्ष्यानवते तत्र न विद्वषः तत्स्माय, Y. Bh. IV.33.

Also compare, अथवा नैदेश्वर वित्तविहार्य धृत्रु तृत्वम् विद्वषः तत्स्माय, Y. Bh. IV.33.

3. For further about the discussion on the question whether the world order will ever come to a standstill or not, see above pp. 235-236.
THE FIVE VITAL BREATHS

The characteristic feature of an organic body lies in the fact that it is fitted for carrying on a vital operation. Vitality according to Śaṅkhyā rests upon the joint working of the organs. The organs function in two ways, externally as well as internally. The external function is indicated by the cognition of colour, touch and the like. Here each organ plays its own part separately. The internal function, on the other hand, is confined within the frame work of the body. Here all the organs work jointly for a common end—an end by which the physical body is sustained and becomes fit for self-propagation. This end is life. It manifests itself through the operation of the five breaths called (1) प्राण, (2) अपान, (3) समान, (4) उद्धान and (5) स्थान respectively. These breaths are different modifications of the element of wind (वायुत्रस्त्र) which is incited to function by the joint operation of the organs. The functions of these breaths are indicated by the different motive forces working

1 सामानकरण्वस्फ: प्राणय: नावं; पथ, Kṣ, 29. Also see, सत्वविशेषात्म: भावायोऽक्षया जीवनम्, Y: Bh III. 38. Elsewhere ‘vitality’ is stated to be one of the seven substantive aspects of the thought stuff (citta). These aspects are:—(1) supression, (2) merit and demerit, (3) impression, (4) modification, (5) vitality, (6) movement and (7) power. All these are latent, and this is why these cannot be perceived. But their existence is established by means of inference. These are enumerated in the Yoga-bhāṣya (III. 15) by the following couplet which is probably quoted from some other earlier source:—

निर्भागमेंसंस्कारः परिमोक्ष जी ब न मू।
चेद्य शक्तिबिस्तारं सभी दर्शनविन्यासः॥

Now, vitality (वीजन ) is an effort to sustain the breath. Though it is not open to perception, still it can be inferred from expiration and inspiration. The remaining six also can be similarly inferred.

2 This view is expressed by Vācaspati in his Tattva-vaiśāradī, Y.S. III. 39. But such a view is refuted in the Brahma-sūtra, 'न बहुती श्रवणप्रीति', II. iv. 9. However, Śaṅkara in the introductory remark in his Bhāṣya on this sutra is found to quote a śrutī which goes to substantiate the statement of Vācaspati. See, तत्त्व-वैशार्दी-परिमोक्ष-कृत्य-वीजन-शक्तिबिस्तारं

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within the organic body. These breaths are briefly described in the Yoga-bhāṣya, and to a greater length in the Tattvavaiṣāradī (Y. S. III. 39). Of these, prāṇa is located within the heart. But it extends upto the mouth and the nose through which air is drawn and then expelled from the lungs. From a physiologist’s point of view it may, however, be stated that this particular breath is to a certain extent associated with the ‘respiratory system’ which is primarily concerned with the oxygenation of the blood and the removal of carbon dioxide. Samānas’sphere of activity is down from the heart upto the naval. It is called so because it carries equally (समन्ततितिसमानः) the juice of food and drinks to different parts of the body for proper adjustment. It is thus partially associated with the ‘digestive’ and specially with the ‘circulatory system’ which is concerned with the distribution of blood, lymph and other substances transported therein. Āpāna’s sphere is down from the naval and upto the soles of the feet. It is called so because it carries away urine, stool, foetus and similar other substances downward (अपनयनाध्यानः). It is thus primarily associated with the ‘excretory system’ concerned with the removal of wastes, and to a certain extent with the delivery of the child from its mother’s womb. Udāna’s sphere is extended from the fore-part of the nose unto the head. It is called so because it carries upwards chyle and such other fluids (उदयनाध्यानः). It is thus connected with the arterial pulsation in the higher members of the body. Vyāna is called so because it pervades the entire physical body (व्यापी व्यान इति). It is thus associated with the ‘nervous system’. Of these, prāṇa is stated to be the chief. Because whenever prāṇa passes out of the body, the remaining breaths also follow it. This is also stated in the Brhadāraṇyaka (IV. iv. 2).

1 The enumeration of the five breaths is not uniform everywhere. In the Yoga-bhāṣya prāṇa is followed by samāna. Even in the Upaniṣads, these are differently enumerated. In one place samāna appears last (Br.Up. III. ix. 26) while elsewhere in Chh. Up., it is udāna which is enumerated last (prāṇāgniḥotra section, v).
The author of the Yukti-dipika (pp.125-127) furnishes an elaborate treatment of these vital breaths. He states that each of these breaths has got double functions—one internal and the other external. Now, the functioning of the prāṇa through the mouth and the nostrils as stated above is what is known to be its internal function. Its external function is manifested in an individual when he is in a mood of acting in subservience to some other agency. Etymologically speaking, prāṇa means pranati. It means obedience, subordination or susceptibility to something. For instance, obedience on the part of a soldier towards the general or tendency to bend downward as in the case of a tree by the weight of its fruit or susceptibility on the part of an individual to virtue, wealth, enjoyment and wisdom as well as their reverse—all these are due to external manifestation of prāṇa.

The function of apāna is to carry downward (अपक्रमण). Its internal function is to carry urine and such other substances downward, and this has been already stated above. Its external function is perceived in an individual when he is in a mood of reverting from some lower or higher ideal, such as reversion from vice or virtue. In the physical body, its seat is underneath prāṇa. Still it is stronger than prāṇa. This is so because its nature is to drag prāṇa downward with the intention of keeping it confined therein, and so on.

Samāna is situated between prāṇa and apāṇa. Any pleasure derived from functioning jointly along with others is due to prevalence of this breath. This particular breath incites an individual to make others as sharers of his pleasure and pain. Any joint activity, such as making of gifts jointly, sacrificing jointly, performing penance jointly, living jointly with other members of the family, and so on—all these are the results of the external manifestation of samāna (सहावस्थानतः सहभावाच समान:). This breath is stronger than prāṇa and apāṇa. As it is situated in the middle of those two breaths, hence like a middle man it attempts to keep them in proper balance. Just as an ox with a loaded cart does not lose its balance, or an wild antelope when severely afflicted by the
scorching rays of the sun gives up its fickleness and thus prefers to rest, similarly it is samāna under whose pressure the two opposing breaths of prāna and apāna become balanced.

That motive force which reaches higher upto the brain, which drags the spirit from the lower level to the higher, is called udāna. Surpassing the zones of prāna, apāna and samāna it pushes upwards fluids and semen up to the brain. And receiving obstruction therefrom it recedes and thus becomes the cause of releasing letters, words, sentences, verses, and such other compositions through the mouth. This is what is known to be its internal function. Any superiority complex that appears in an individual is due to external manifestation of this breath. For instance, I am superior to one who is inferior, I am equal to my equals or I am even greater than them, I am more qualified than others—such a notion of superiority arises due to manifestation of this particular breath. It is stronger than the three other breaths as mentioned previously. This is due to the fact that it drags those breaths upwards. This can be noticed in the case of a man when his body is sprinkled with cold water. What he then does is that he all on a sudden jumps up, and this happens so owing to the activity of udāna. The superiority of udāna over other three breaths can also be illustrated by the posture that a man takes up whenever he draws up a sword from its sheath. In that case the activities of all the other three breaths are subdued, and that of udāna becomes manifested.

Vyāna is diffused throughout the system. Through its instrumentality blood and such other fluids are circulated even upto the extremity of nails and pores. This shows that this breath is particularly associated with the nervous system. This is its internal function. Any acute feeling of inseparable connection or strong union between different individuals arises as a result of external manifestation of this breath. The author illustrates this by the case of a devoted woman who ascends the funeral pyre of her deceased husband with the idea that he may be her husband even in the next birth. Such a deep bond of unity expresses itself due
to external manifestation of vyāna. It is the strongest of all the breaths. As long as the bodily frame is pervaded by this breath, the other subordinate breaths work in perfect harmony with it. Their equilibrium is then not at all disturbed. But whenever vyāna discontinues to function, the result is that the entire system gradually begins to collapse. The fact that this particular breath is associated with the entire bodily frame and keeps the system working can be realised specially at the time of death when the different limbs of the body gradually become cold and thus cease to function. Consequently, this brings out a serious disturbance in the harmonious working of the other breaths. And finally there is a complete deadlock in the working of the system.

These five breaths together with the sensory organs, the motor organs and individuation, are collectively called ‘प्राणायाम’ (the eight constituents of vitality) in the ancient literature of Śāmkhya. The term occurs in some instances in the Yuktidipikā. In one place, the author furnishes an enumeration of these eight constituents by the following sentence quoted from some authoritative text of Śāmkhya:

शास्त्र चेतनान यथा "प्राणायामस्मानोदहानि पञ्च चायव: पदं मन: सतमी पूर्तमी वायुः" (P. 127/23-24). Here ‘चायव’ includes the entire set of motor organs, and ‘मनस्’ the sensory organs. ‘पञ्च’ is ahamkāra, the cosmic principle from which proceeds the bifurcation of the realities into two heads, one psychical and the other physical. It is the fount of all psycho-physical impulse. Whenever the bodily system in

1 In the Prāṇa-episode of the Upaniṣad (Br. UP. IV. iv. 2), it is prāṇa which stated to be the chief of the breaths. Whenever prāṇa passes out of the body, other breaths also follow it. Also see, 'एष्य प्राणं प्राणं', Y. Bh. III. 39. But it is the author of the Yuktidipikā who states vyāna to be the strongest, and this he does from a different angle of vision.

2 Elsewhere these eight constituents are called पुष्करक. See,

—quoted by Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya on B.S.II.iv.6.
its natural course is going to be exhausted of any such impulse, it then refills the same from the back-ground. This is why it is called ‘पूर्ण’ (पूर्णतिकृत पूर्ण; that which refills). Unlike the material body, these eight constituents (प्राणायण) are not subject to penetration, combustion or decay. They retain their existence up to the end of a cycle of creation. They transmigrate. They are to be treated as the supports of the puruṣa in the course of his migration from one body to another.

**THE FIVE SPRINGS OF ACTIVITY**

The aforesaid vital operations proceed from the five springs of activity called *karma-yonis*¹ in the Śāmkhya literature. These are ृष्टिः (tenacity), भक्तिः (faith), लोकेऽवस्त्रिः (desire of bliss), चित्तिः (yearning to know) and धिति (incapacity of knowing anything). Briefly speaking, all these constitute different motive forces that stimulate an individual from the back-ground to work². From the statement of the author of the *Yuktidipikā* (p. 128 supra) we know that these springs are generated by the *rajasic* element discharged from the *buddhi* when the latter is in the course of its modification into knowledge. Though knowledge is held to be the *sattvic* modification of *buddhi*, still the *sattva* element in the latter cannot exclusively by itself give rise to the former without being excited to do so by the *rajasic*. And it is this *rajasic* element, thus discharged from the *buddhi*, that generates in the midway these springs of activity before *buddhi* itself has been finally modified into knowledge. In other words, these are more or less may be regarded to be the by-products of *buddhi*. Briefly speaking, these springs hold an intermediate stage between the initial excitement of *buddhi* and its final modification into knowledge. This is why these have been compared to the eggs of the hen in the ancient literature of Śāmkhya. Just as eggs hold an intermediate position between

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¹ See, कुल: पुनरियं प्राणायत्तिः: प्रत्रतं श्रीं | उपयोगः—सा कल्याणिनिः, *Yuktidipikā* p. 127 infra.

² See, तत्र फलेन्द्राय: योगी: प्राणायक्ष श्रमुखीकेत्य निरमातामयये, *ibid* p.147.
imregnation of the hen and the release of the chickens, similar is the case with these springs of activity. This is what is briefly stated by the author of the Yukti-dipikā in the line:—‘महत्रः प्रच्छुतं हि रजो विभ्रतमण्डलस्यानीयः पञ्च कर्मयोनियो अवलितः’ (p. 128/1). He further corroborates his statement by a metrical stanza which he quotes from some earlier text of Sāṃkhya without mentioning the source. It runs thus (p. 128 supra):—

प्रच्छुतो महत्रो यह्नु न प्रत्यो भानक्तेऽपनम्।
व्यापारं भानयोनित्वात् सा योगि: कुञ्जराण्डवत्॥

All these karma-yonis are briefly explained by the author of the Yukti-dipikā. He first of all defines them. Then he speaks of their scopes. This is not all. He also points out the dominating guṇas that influence each of these yonis from the background. This he does in accordance with the ancient tradition. Of these, ‘सूचि’ means adherence to purpose. It is due to this factor that an individual becomes keen to keep up his promises made in words, deed or in aim. At this stage, he wholly sticks to his promise and determines to carry it out. In other words, this factor refers to energy that prompts an individual to activity. Its scope extends to all sorts of physical and mental activities. It is dominated by rajas and tamas. ‘अख्ति’ or faith inspires one to his keen sense of duty towards religious observances without hankering after the reward to be derived therefrom. These observances mainly include non-injury to others, practice of brahmaṇacarya, performances of sacrifices for one’s own sake as well as for the sake of others, making of gifts as well as receiving the same according to the prescribed injunctions and maintenance of external and internal cleanliness. Its sphere extends to such duties as are set apart for the different stages of life, called आश्रमस. Both sattva and rajas

1 The Tattvasamāsa-sūtras also speak of these karma-yonis. See, “पञ्च कर्मयोनियत्”. In the Krama-dipikā, these are explained by some metrical stanzas evidently quoted from some other ancient source. It is interesting to notice that these very couplets are also quoted in the Yukti-dipikā (p. 128) with slight alterations in reading.

2 For further discussion on this point, see below p. 277.
become manifested in those who follow these rules of conduct. शुद्ध is the desire of bliss. An individual under its inspiration strives to attain bliss by the application of both the ordinary and the Vedic means. He thus takes up the study of the Vedas, performs good deeds, practises penance and also regularly observes other religious austerities solely with a view to attain bliss which may be fruitful in the present as well as in the next birth. Its scope is extended to both the ordinary and the Vedic processes. Sattva and tamas become manifested here. ‘विद्विद्विष’ is the desire for true knowledge. It inspires an individual to know the real nature of an entity as to whether it is single or diverse, eternal or noneternal, conscious or unconscious, and so on. It is also due to this quest of knowledge that he becomes keen to know whether the effect is existent even before its production or it was nonexistent. The nature of acquiring true knowledge is thus in keeping with the Sāmkhya theory. Its sphere extends to all the manifested entities, and it is the rajas element that becomes prominent here. ‘अविद्विद्विष’ is the reverse of the preceding state. It is a state of ignorance when an individual becomes indifferent to all higher pursuits and prefers to accept sensual pleasure as the end of life. Such a state becomes specially manifested in an individual when he is effected by any intoxicating drug, liquor or deep sleep. To him all phenomena remain under darkness; for his intellect under that state fails to proceed upward. Such a state is totally enveloped in tamas. This state is diametrically opposite to ‘विद्विद्विष’. Both of these are described side by side by the following quotations in the Kramadīpikā:—

विद्विद्विषुः सिद्धितान्त: करणत्वमविद्विद्विष: ।
विद्विद्विषुः न भ्यालिनां प्रभान्योति: ॥
एकत्वं पृथकत्वं नित्यं चैव मन्त्रविद्विष: ।
लोकः सत्वार्यमतीवत्यमः केलया विद्विद्विष: व सा ।
कार्यकः(क) रणजयकरी विद्विद्विष वारुषकारी दृष्टि: ॥

These couplets are also quoted in the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 128). But the text as well as the order of the quotation vary there to a certain extent. For the sake of comparison we are quoting below the same:—
According to Kramadipikā, it is vividīṣā that leads one to emancipation, while the remaining four bring out bondage. These kārma-yonis and the eight vital constituents (प्राणाष्ट्र) as have been already explained above (p 269), correspond respectively to the power of will (इन्द्राष्ट्र) and that of action (क्रियाष्ट्र) as propagated in the other schools and systems of orthodox thought.

But these yonis as well as the five vital breaths are viewed more philosophically in the Yukti-dipikā (p. 129). An attempt has been made there in this connection to show that all these entities can help to attain liberation provided their currents be diverted towards the right course and receded from the wrong one. The author first of all deals with the vital breaths. Now these breaths, as already stated above, function in two ways—internally as well as externally. Of these, the internal functions do not require any stimulus; these proceed automatically from within. Hence the question of their diversion or retraction does not arise at all. But the case is otherwise with the external ones where the agent can exert his own influence. And if their course be well regulated then what happens is that the sattva element of the buddhi begins to flow increasingly with the result that the individual is then gradually dragged towards liberation. For instance, the external functioning of प्राण is stated to be प्रणति which means susceptibility, indulgence or bending. If this functioning be not let loose and confined solely to virtue, wisdom, and the like, then automatically there will proceed an increasing flow of sattva with the result that the sattvic modifications of the buddhi will be manifested more and more. Similarly, ‘disinclination’ (अपक्रमण) with reference to samāna should be confined to ‘vice’, ‘ignorance’, and such other tāmasa modifications of the buddhi. As a result of this, there will be a check in the flow of the tāmas element and consequently the bondage of the self will be
gradually slackened. Likewise ‘co-operation’ (साहचर्य) with reference to vyāna should be maintained as far as possible with the sattvic modifications of buddhi. This being done, "the individual will for ever find his abode in sattva; he will become consort of sattva" (यस्मात् शाक्तमाहसे सत्त्वारामं सत्त्वसिद्धवल्क्सा स्तव स्यात्" इति ). Let us now turn our attention to udāna whose external functioning finds expression through self-aggrandisement (आत्मोत्कर्ष). But this claim of superiority also becomes fruitful if it be applied rightly. And its right application lies in the fact when the individual thinks of his superiority in the terms of ‘I am above ignorance’, ‘I am above delusion’, ‘I am above attachment’, ‘I am above bondage’, and so on. He thus paves his way towards liberation. Lastly, absolute concomittance (अत्यन्तविनामय) with reference to vyāna should also be applied wholly to wisdom and nothing else. The individual should thus think that he is inseparably connected with wisdom, he manifests himself in and through wisdom, he is one with wisdom, and so on. In this way, the author attempts to explain the fact as to how the external functionings of all the breaths can bring out satisfactory result, when their currents are diverted towards the right course. As a consequence of this, the evil propensities will gradually cease to get any response from the agent, and will thus no longer be able to play their foul games. The individual will thus be swept away towards liberation.

The author then turns his attention towards the yonis. In this connection he states that except avividīśa, the four other yonis are apparently found to generate merit (dharma). But this merit also should be looked at with contempt; for this is also regarded as the seed of the next birth. By knowing this, the individual should not indulge in these yonis. Avividīśa (unwillingness to know anything) also can help the agent to traverse along the right path, provided it is solely applied to such activities as produce evil results. In this way, it can save the agent from being carried away by wrong current. If the individual continues to pursue such a course what happens is that the yonis become purified, and consequently these cease to produce any such result as may become an obstacle
towards his progress along the right path—the path that leads towards liberation. The author finally puts the sum and substance of his statements in the line “संस्कृत प्रवर्त्तित: सत्त्ववपूर्ण: विनिद्रत्वे ज्ञाननिद्रे योगियोणिद्रयां प्रगुर्थेन प्रहोपवेच सत्त्वावस्तु।” This speaks of the fact that the individual thus being inclined to the sattvic modifications of the buddhi and disinclined towards their opposites takes absolute delight in the element of sattva, and thus becomes freed from egoistic tendencies. He now gives himself solely to the pursuit of wisdom, makes the yonis purged of all impurities, and thus attains to the supreme brahman without delay. This view is substantiated by a metrical quotation, but unfortunately the source is not mentioned in the text.

Though these karma-yonis are not even touched in the Kārikā or in the Yoga-system of Patañjali, still we have sufficient ground to believe that these formed an important topic of discussion in the ancient literature of Śaṅkhya. In course of elucidating them we find that the author of the Yukti-dipikā furnishes a few quotations, metrical as well as prose, to substantiate his own statement. But unfortunately he does not mention the source from where he quotes. However, important light is shed by the expression ‘परिपक्षक्ष्यं सत्त्वावस्तु’ occurring in the Śvet. Up. (I. 5) which explicitly speaks of the fact that these five yonis or springs of activity are not the invention of the later writers. These were popular in the circle of the seekers of truth even at the time of an earlier Upaniṣad like the Śvetāsvatara.

It has been already stated above that it is some one or other of these five karma-yonis that lies at the root by which the agent is inspired to undertake a particular course of activity. But it is strange to notice that even karmans or activities themselves are not elaborately treated in the majority of the existing texts of Śaṅkhya, and what to speak of the yonis—their fountain sources. However, from the evidence of the

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1 Such a view is also expressed in the following couplet quoted elsewhere in the Yukti-dipikā (p. 163):—

तत्त्वस्तु निजङ्कूर्तवद्विनिद्रते ज्ञाननिद्रे योगियोणिद्रयां प्रगुर्थेन प्रहोपवेच सत्त्वावस्तु। 

तत्त्वस्तु निजङ्कूर्तवद्विनिद्रते ज्ञाननिद्रे योगियोणिद्रयां प्रगुर्थेन प्रहोपवेच सत्त्वावस्तु।
B. Gitā it can be stated without any hesitation that karman and other allied topics found a detailed treatment in the ancient authoritative texts of Śāṃkhya. The following couplets occurring in xviii. 13—15 shed important light in this connection:

प्रावृत्तम् महाकाले कार्यम् नियोर्य पि।
सं शुचि कः ता मे प्रस्थानि सिद्धये सर्वंकर्मादि॥
अविशालं तथा कर्ता करणं प्रयविभयं॥
विशिष्ठं पुष्पं चेद्य दैवत्वावल प्रद्याम॥
शरीरवामनोत्ति तं कर्म प्रारम्भे नरः।
न्यासं तो विषरीते वा पाश्चे तस्य हेतुः॥

Here the Lord speaks of the five causes that are held in the Śāṃkhya doctrine to be indispensable for the accomplishment of all works. These five are, first, the physical body which is the standing ground of the unliberated purusa, next comes the doer, the personal ego, third, the various instrumentations of prakṛti, fourth, the various kinds of efforts which make up the force to act, and the fifth, fate, the invisible power that paves the way from the back-ground. These five make up all the efficient causes that determine the whole process involved in a work beginning from its shaping and till its accomplishment. Whatever work man undertakes with mind, speech and body, these five are the indispensable requisites.

The expression ‘वाचें कन्यस्य' प्रोक्ति’ (lit. as laid down in the Śāṃkhya doctrine) deserves special attention. This clearly speak of the fact that the different factors connected with the execution of karman had been minutely discussed in some authoritative text of Śāṃkhya even at a period earlier than the Gitā. This is not all. A little after this, the Lord is found to state that “knowledge, the object of knowledge and the knowing subject—these three go to constitute the mental impulsion to action; there are again three factors, the instrument, the action, and the doer that make up the composite action” (xviii. 18). This again is followed by the statement that each of knowledge, action and doer is threefold, and it is the difference of the three gunas that determines the character of each of them. This is what is expressed in the following sloka (xviii. 19):

श्रोऽद कमी च करी च विषेष गुणेननं।
प्रेमावते गुणसंयमिते यथार्थाय नात्मवि॥

The expression ‘प्रेमावते' ‘गुणसंयमिते' refers to the Śāṃkhya system, for it is this particular system wherein the science of the gunas has received an elaborate treatment.

Then follows the threefold description of 'knowledge', 'action' and 'doer' respectively. These again are followed by a similar description of
‘buddhi’ (understanding), ‘dhṛti’ (steadiness) and ‘sukha’ (happiness) respectively. One thing that strikes here a critical reader is that unlike other factors as stated above, these three are found to step in here without any preliminary introduction. So the question naturally arises here as to what should be their relation or connecting link with karma which forms the main theme here. To us it appears that these three refer to some of the karma-yonis as discussed above. Now the sattvika and tāmasa forms of buddhi as described here in in the Gītā (xviii. 30&32) correspond to a considerable extent to vividiṣā and avividiṣā of Śāṅkhyas. Dhṛti appears both where. Sukha of Gītā and sukha of Śāṅkhyas slightly differ in name only, but not in essence. Śraddhā alone does not find its place here in the Gītā, but it has been already described there in detail in the previous chapter.

From a careful perusal of the descriptions of these factors as found in the Gītā as well as in the Yukti-dīpikā, there reveals one important point of difference that cannot be overlooked. Gītā’s interest is centered upon exhibiting the difference in guṇas of each of these factors. This is clearly expressed in the following couplet (xviii.29):

इदिनेतरं द्वातैः विनातिर्विविधिविरं भ्रम।
पर्यत्तामाणसः कृत्य त कः ले न भन्ति॥

The term ‘पर्यत्तामाणसः’ deserves special attention here. It clearly speaks of the fact that the Gītā is keen to point out the three-fold division of each of these factors, and the differentiation in each case is brought out by the prevailing guṇa. But the author of the Yukti-dīpikā does not analyse these factors on the basis of the guṇas. On the other hand, he is found to possess a synthetic attitude. Unlike the Gītā, he states that dhṛti is dominated by rajas and tāmas, śraddhā by sattvā and rajas, sukha by sattvā and tāmas, vividiṣā by rajas and avividiṣā by tāmas. This is what is stated by him in the following lines (p.128 infra):

युक्तिदीपिकाः राजसमोच्छुक्तं भ्रम, सत्त्वरोजन्यं श्रद्धा, सत्त्वमोच्छुक्तं सुख, राजसमोच्छुक्तं अविविद्भिः, तामसमोच्छुक्तं अत्तितिविद्भिः।

He further goes to substantiate his own statement by the following quotation without mentioning the source wherein it is stated that ‘him I think to be the foremost of ascetics who is aware of the characteristic feature, scope and synthesis of the three guṇas prevailing in the five yonis:

उक्तचः—‘हस्ताक्षरनियततत्तवं ते यु प्रय सम मर्य य श्र प्रजानां योगीनां चे विषय विशिष्टतमं ते स्वभावय यहे॥

This fact at once suggests that up to the time of the Gītā, the Śāṅkhyas teachers were keen to analyse each and every yoni on the basis of the guṇas, and subsequently when a prominent teacher felt the necessity of reconstructing the older text, the spirit became synthetic. The expression ‘हस्ताक्षरनियतत्तवं’ itself of the above quotation hints at this suggestion.
EVOLUTION OF EMBODIED BEINGS

Puruṣa adopts an organic body whenever he enters into becoming. Such a body is usually found to be emanating from the sexual intercourse of father and mother. But the question naturally arises here as to how does such a body come into existence at the beginning of creation when there was no extra stock of parents left at the disposal of prakṛti? Then again, who is the first embodied self and with what end in view he appeared into the universe? Whether the process of entering into becoming is always uniform throughout the beginning and end of a cycle of creation or it is also subject to modification. These are some of the questions that naturally strike an inquisitive mind. Ishvākṛṣṇa himself does not explicitly state anything in this connection. But his commentator, the author of the Yuktīdīpikā, does not leave these questions untouched. He raises the problem in the introduction of his commentary on the kā.52, and makes an attempt to elucidate the view held up by the teacher. He states (p.164) that there are some Sāṃkhya teachers who hold that merit and demerit are at the root of the conjunction of prakṛti and puruṣa from which proceeds creation. Now, merit and demerit cannot be acquired without a physical body, and a physical body also cannot come out without merit and demerit. So their relation is like that of the seed and the sprout, and this speaks of the fact that both of them are without any beginning. This being the case, it may be said that the process of becoming is always uniform. Just as in our time we know that a puruṣa enters into the womb and becomes released therefrom by acquiring a physical body through whose instrumentality he reaps, on the one hand, the harvest of merit and demerit acquired during his previous lives, while on the other hand he performs fresh deeds for whose fruition he has to take up another physical body in another life; similar was the process in the previous cycles of creation, and the same will continue for future cycles also. But Ishvākṛṣṇa cannot entertain such a view for the simple reason that merit and demerit cannot be held responsible for the conjunction.
of prakṛti and puruṣa. These two are stated to be the properties of buddhi, and as such their very existence is even impossible at the time of the initial start of prakṛti when buddhi itself has not been evolved. This clearly proves that prakṛti does not initially start functioning for the purpose of fruition of the accumulated results of good and bad deeds performed by the migratory puruṣa in his previous births. It is motivated into activity at the outset for serving two purposes of the puruṣa—one being the cognition of sound, taste, colour, and the like, while the other lies in discriminating his own self from non-self. It is with these two ends in view that the gunās at the beginning of creation having been modified into the various tattvas beginning from buddhi and ending into the five gross elements generate the physical bodies of Kapila, Hiranyagarbha, and such other supreme personalities as are abnormally endowed with sattva. The course of metempsychosis which dominates in rajas and tamas appears after the loss of the six varieties of spiritual power, called ब्रम्हसिद्धि in the ancient literature of Śāṅkhya. This is what is expressed by the author of the Yuktidipika (p.164) in the following passage:—

पर्य यत् पुरुषमपिवद् ‘संयोगकुक्ति सर्व’ इति तद्व व्यास्याताम। अलेवानीमांचा-योणां विप्रतिपति:—चर्मविंद्रों शरीरंस्तरेणाजुप्तिष्ठे, शरीरस्य व च चर्मविंद्रों निमित्तान्तरासम्बन्धायमयमिद्दायदाय। तत्समवेश्या प्रयायं वयवायवये तथेवलिकालांचित्रु काठकोटिष्ठ सर्व इति। ब्रह्मचार्य आह—बैतदेवाम्। किं तत्त्व प्राकृतम् प्रत्येकारम्भं अंशोरसचारों कुदिर्धमहत्स्व, तत्साध्य प्राकृतिकारपत्वात्। ततसंतत्व-व्यतिरिक्षिन्द्र शास्तिरपूपालिकाहत्तू मुनिकुर्तित्तू योगमनुष्ठित्तू चार्यमुनिश्च सत्त्वाध्यो महद्वकारत्वाचेर्वनुत्तत्तबाबाद्वय परमत्वं हुम्यवार्त्तं तरीणगों.शरीरानुदत्त्यूष्ठित्त, पद्मसिद्धिकालोऽस तु गुणविविशेषिविवाह जीतशमाशत्तचुपाति संसाराचं प्रकाशम्।

From the evidence of the passage quoted above, it appears that the personalities that enter into becoming at the beginning of a cycle of creation are no other but Kapila, Hiranyagarbha, and the like, and that their physical bodies are generated by the prakṛti itself. This clearly speaks of the fact that the physical bodies of such supreme personalities do not come into existence

1 This will be treated in a subsequent section.
through normal course. Elsewhere also it is expressly stated that the physical bodies of the divine personalities that enter into becoming at the beginning of a cycle of creation do not emerge from the womb.\(^1\) Owing to preponderance of sattva element in them, such personalities are naturally equipped with supernatural power by means of which they can adopt a physical body according to their own sweet will. And whenever there arises any necessity on their part to enter into becoming what they do is that they call up a physical body to appear before them, and it is everywhere prakṛti which readily supplies the same from the background. Such a physical body does not require gradual development in the womb. It appears simultaneously with the desire of the supreme personality who intends to adopt it, and this happens so due to the sattva element which manifests itself specially at the primary stage of creation. This is also hinted in the expression “गुणान्तः प्रात्मांगलान् तन्निमित्तानि शरीराग्राहिस्थिनः सासिदिक-कान्तुफळने” occurring elsewhere in the Yukti-dipikā (p. 83/21-22).

The first personality that enters into becoming at the start of creation is Kapila, the revered sage. Such a view is not only expressed in the passage quoted above, but is more definitely known from another evidence of the Yukti-dipikā (p. 174)\(^2\) where he is stated to be the eldest of all beings that have ever appeared into the universe. Virtue, wisdom, dispassion and power are innate in him, and with their help he can easily adopt a physical body befitting his own self. He is followed by Hiranyakartha, Mahēśvara, Prajāpati, and such other divinities of supreme order, called māhātmya-śārīras in the ancient literature of Śaṅkhya. Now, these māhātmya-śārīras found the universe empty. So they felt a desire to procreate with the intention that the universe may be filled up with their progenies. With this end in view, the lord Brahman created Sanaka, Sanandana, and such other divinities. Similarly Mahēśvara created cores of Rudras,\(^3\) and so on. These personalities of the supreme order do not beget their offsprings

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1 See, प्रतिवाने चाभृतिनिविवाशुर्द्वीरारामादिगं च, Yukti-dipikā, p. 88/12.
2 परमेश्वरभन्न सासिदिकैवाद्वक्षनेनेवस्यविभृक्तिष्ठो विधेयकं वि शाय ज: कथितमुः:।
3 See the extract from the Yukti-dipikā as quoted above in p. 228.
through sexual intercourse—a process which according to the doctrine of ‘प्रकृति’ evolved at a later stage. Being actuated by a desire to procreate what they do is that they by dint of their superior power of will call up some personalities to appear, and it is everywhere prakṛti which from the background readily generates the physical bodies of these new comers. But no such creation proceeds from Kapila for the simple reason that the element of rajas which is held to be an indispensable factor of creation does not manifest in him even to the slightest extent. In him there exists the highest flow of sattva, whereas there is intensity of both sattva and rajas in Hiranyagarbha and such other mālātmya-sarivas.

Divine embodiments are asserted to be of four different kinds. The first kind is made possible by direct causality of prakṛti, as in the case of Kapila and Brahman. The second is due to spiritual power, as in the case of the sons of Brahman. The third is generated by the combination of parents, such as the sons of Aditi and Kaśyapa. The fourth is from either of the parents singly—from male member only, as in the case of Vaśiṣṭha who is said to have born of Mitra and Varuṇa. Human creation as a matter of general rule, is due to the joint cooperation of the male and the female partners both. Of course, there are exceptions, as in the case of Drona, Kṛpa, Dhṛṣṭa-dyumna and such other personalities who are said to have born out of the sacrificial fire altar, and this was made possible due to the instrumentality of

1 From the evidence of the Yuktidipika, we have already in numerous instances pointed out the fact that the physical body of Kapila is directly generated by prakṛti at the beginning of creation; it does not come out of parents. Hence, the orthodox Saṃkhya cannot accept the account of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (iii. 24. 6), where Kapila is stated to have been begotten by the sage Kardama in the womb of Devahūti.

2 The case of reproduction from the female member singly is not illustrated in the Yuktidipikā. But there are cases of reproductions in the lower order of lives without impregnation by a male, as in aphids or plant-lice, &c. This is called parthenogenesis by biologists.

Also see, 'the female crane conceives from hearing the roaring of thunder' (युक्तिदीपिकायं गर्दनिविषयं वसुव्रतो गन्धपल्लि), Saṅkara-Bhāṣya, B. S. II, i, 25.

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special spiritual power arising out of the performances of religious rites. All these are pointed out by the author of the Yukti-dipika in the following lines (p. 143/12-16):

तत्र देवानां चतुष्किंत्य शरीरम्। प्रधानातुप्रहाद यथा—परमेवचिरिष्टस्य च ।
तत्त्सिद्धिमयो यथा—श्रंकन: पुनःराणां नन्युन्त्रणापी च। नास्तापिन्नमयो यथा—अन्विते:
कल्याणस्य च पुनःराणाम्। केवलाद्वा यथा—पितृतो मित्राववशान्यां वशिष्टकस्य।
मन्वानातु जरायुनम्। अभमेष्टिकिश्लेषात् कर्त्तव्यमिद्यथापि भवति, यथा द्रेण-कुपकुपी-शुष्ठर्मार्दीनाम्।

Now, regarding the possibility of the creation of the supreme order of beings without sexual intercourse, it has been already pointed out above that there had been a class of thinkers even among the Śamkhyaś who raised grave objections and maintained that the inclusion of this order in the evolution of embodied selves is irrational and unwarranted. Their view is that the creation of individuals must have been possible exactly in the way and order in which we see them happening in the present time. The course of nature must be uniform and any departure from it would be an inexplicable freak of chance. The creation of embodied selves is due to personal merit and demerit acquired by them in their previous lives. There can be no creation without the moral and spiritual niches derived from the moral values acquired before.

Adhikāra-sarga

The author of the Yukti-dipika maintains that this attitude smacks off empiricism of a dogmatic character. There is no absurdity in the theory that the creation of the gross biological order was preceded by that of a higher order of personalities who were not determined by their personal merit and demerit. Thus the evolution of such divine personalities as the supreme sage, Hiranyagarbha, and the like, was possible owing to the self-determined activity of prakṛti at a time when the evolution of other categories could not take place due to inoperativeness of the moral value. The individuals of this order of creation are not born to enjoy the fruits of their previous activities. They are said to possess perfect wisdom, and so the potentiality of their activities is completely destroyed. Of these, some are born with an impersonal disinterested mission of their own in order to render selfless
service to the individual selves that would come later on. The case of the revered sage Kapila may be furnished here as an illustration. Thus it is stated in a quotation in the Yoga-bhāṣya (I. 25) that the revered sage, the first among the wise, took pity upon Āsuri, the seeking disciple, and appeared before him by assuming a निर्माणकाय, and imparted to him the teachings of Śāṅkhyā. Other personalities of this order are entrusted with certain administrative duties (अधिकार)\(^1\) which are conducive to the subsistence of the universe. Thus Brahman or Hiranyagarbha is vested with the lordship of the universe, while Maheśvara is associated with destruction. Both of them also procreate. But the duty of procreation is specially assigned to the Prajāpatis who are also included within this order. Then again, the lordship of heaven is allotted to Indra, that of the deads to Yama, and so on. The creation of this order of personalities to whom any such office is allotted is called ‘अधिकारसंग’. Though the expression does not occur anywhere in the Kārikā, still it finds its place in a few instances in the Yuktidipikā\(^2\) from which it appears that the ancient teachers of Śāṅkhyā might have dwelt upon the topic in greater length. Reference to this office bearers is also made in the Brahmasūtra (III. iii. 32)\(^3\) where it is stated that “the body

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1 See, ‘द्वारा नमित ब्रह्मसैनिककारमाधववस्तुति यारोद्वेयति: स्वाद’, Yuktidipikā, p. 88/14-15.
2 See, ‘तस्माद द्रिष्टा समगोपकारक्खणो भावावृत्ति:’ p. 164/15-16; also, तस्मादगृहरस्मिन्निमित्वो द्रिष्टा सम्यः’, p. 164/21.
3 ‘वाक्रधिकारमविशिष्टिताधिकारिकाणाः’, III. iii. 32.

Here Śāṅkara in his Bhāṣya refers to Apāntaratamas, the sun god Savītṛ, Vāsīṣṭha, Sanatkumāra, and such other high personalities who are stated to have assumed new bodies although they are possessed of perfect wisdom. By this the validity of the statement that ‘wisdom when reaching its perfection brings about complete isolation of the self from all embodi-ments’ should not be questioned. Such personalities assume a new body for the simple reason that they are entrusted with certain offices, such as the promulgation of the Vedas and the like, and they continue their bodily existence as long as their office lasts, after which they attain final release. Thus Apāntaratamas, an ancient sage and teacher of the Vedas, was born
of those who have a certain office subsists as long as their office lasts". All these personalities to whom any such office is allotted are not of equal status. Hence, the duration of their office also varies. Some retain their existence up to the end of one kalpa or cycle of creation, some for thousand kalpas, some still more, and so on. The period of duration of the different order of divinities is also stated in the Yoga-bhāṣya (III. 25).

These office bearers enter into becoming at the primary stage of creation when the guṇas of the prakṛti do not function for any other purpose but to serve the double interests of puruṣa— one being the enjoyment of sound, touch, colour, and the like, while the other lies in the discrimination of his own self from the guṇas. The course of metempsychosis does not proceed at this stage; it depends upon linga-sarga and bhāva-sarga which again manifest themselves after the loss of the six varieties of spiritual power, called "पद्मिनि"

*Doctrine of sāl-siddhi*

The expression "पद्मिनि" is little known to the students of Saṅkhya. Barring a few instances in the Yukti-dipikā, it does as Keśa-Dvaipāyana. Similarly, Vaśiṣṭha by the order of Brahmān was procreated by Mitra and Varuṇa. Likewise, Sanatkumāra also was born as Skanda. This is not all. Several other instances of this kind are recorded in the Smṛtis and the Purāṇas. Śruti also states that the sun god Sāvitr having performed the office of watching over these worlds for thousands of yugas enjoys the condition of release at the end of that period when he neither rises nor sets. Thus it is stated in Chh. Up. (III. 11. 1)— "When from thence he has risen upwards, he neither rises nor sets; he is alone standing in the centre." Saṅkara further states that these high personalities in order to discharge the duties of their offices can pass by their power of will from one body to another as if from one house to another, all along retaining the memory of their identity. Through their power they can create for themselves new physical bodies and adopt them all at once or in succession. In doing so, they never forget the sense of their individuality. All such personalities are called "वाहिकारिकरश्च", and they are called so because they are entrusted with certain "वाहिकार" or office to function.

1 सोबंत निम्प्रभु महाभाष्य पतिविद्वेशकाल्विधे भवति, गुणसम्बन्धध्रुवे दु अधिकारलक्षणः, Yuktidipikā, p. 164/14-15.
not occur anywhere else in any other existing treatise of Sāṃkhya. It refers to six kinds of spiritual power, and these are:—
(1) power of will (बंक्षयसिद्धि?), (2) power of vision (दृष्टिसिद्धि?), (3) power of speech (बाक्ष्यसिद्धि), (4) power of touch by hand (हस्तसिद्धि), power of clasping (आस्तेषसिद्धि), and (6) power of mutual friction (नवन्तसिद्धि). At the primary stage of creation when the element of sattva was abnormal what happened then was that an embodied self of that period used to be naturally equipped with the spiritual power of will (संक्षयसिद्धि) by the application of which he could produce an offspring or any other else as he desired. The progeny at that time was born by a mere fiat of will without having recourse to any sexual commerce. Numerous instances of this type of creation are also recorded in the Vedas, Purāṇas, and other scriptural texts. With the progressive deterioration of spiritual excellence, the creation of embodied beings was determined by less subtle and more gross activity. Thus in the next stage, an offspring was produced by mere wistful amorous glances of the parents. This still survives even in the biological order. For instance, the female tortoise conceives by casting a glance at the male partner without recourse to any gross sensual combination. In the third place, with the loss of this power an issue was born by mere utterance of an expression like ‘let us have a child’. This also survives in the lower biological order, as the female conch conceives an issue by uttering a shrill sound. Even in the higher order of biological creation we see that a glance at the beloved and consequent conversation on an object of love cause delight. In the fourth place, with the loss of spiritual power implied in the former activities, creation was made possible by mere touch of the hand of the male partner. This is illustrated by the fact that when after a long separation the couple meet and touch each other with the hand, they derive exquisite pleasure from the act. With the loss of this power, the origination of progeny was made possible merely by the mutual embrace of the partners. This is attested by the fact that embracing of each other by the lovers yields special gratification. Lastly, in the sixth place with the loss of this power the origination of progeny is made possible by gross sexual intercourse.
which is found to be the pre-eminent means of creation. All these six ways of creation were invariably and infallibly effective owing to preponderance of sattva. With the loss of spiritual power presupposed by this six-fold creation and with the preponderance of rajas and tamas, the present day mode of origination by means of gross sexual act which is by no means an infallible cause of production of issue has gained currency. In this stage, there prevails the egotistic notion of ‘this is mine, this is mine’ which results in the migration of the purusa from one body to another, and this state of affair continues until he is released. This is what is furnished by the author of the Yuktidipika in the following passage (pp. 143-144):

पूर्वसंह महतेरस्षंशां मार्गां सत्त्वमोक्षकाराध्यपाणि इत्यस्माप्ति मनसंते-अपत्यमन्यद्र वा बधेपितं सत्त्वमप्रदृष्टित, यतु (क) श्रम्पिका निरिक्षितेऽन्नविधारण (१) करोति; प्रिय खलविपि भाँगुण निरीक्ष इतरार्थमालमार्गं मन्यते। तस्यामपि क्षीणां बादासिद्धविन्युं। अभिभाव्यां प्राणिना यदिस्तिनि तदन्त्वाप्ति। तदन्त्वाप्ति, यष्टुप्रभी बिहरेनार्थ निर्भरि; प्रिय खलविपि सम्भवाय महति प्रीतिमनन्भवि। तस्यायुपकृतियां इत्यसिद्धिविन्युं। परम्पर्य प्राणिमिश्रितमिश्रितमुपसंबूच्छि। नवेत्रायुप्वनुच्छि, यत्र प्रिय विराजितस्वय पापो परम्पर्य प्रीतिमनन्भवि। अस्यायुपकृतियामास्यसिद्धिविन्युं, आलिङ्गनं प्राणिन इतिसं लबन्ते। नवेत्रायुप्वनुच्छि, यत्र विरामितस्वय निरुक्तिन्तेऽविष्ट। तस्या-युपकृतियां इत्यसिद्धिरार्थया। तस्यायुपकृतियां इत्यसिद्धिविन्युं, ममेवं ममेवं निर्मतिं च परिश्रमः प्रज्ञाः। एतिन्मेवर्तन्ते सृजानं वर्णयिः। The passage quoted above unfortunately contains a lacuna, and it is probable that the names of the first two siddhis have been left out therein. However, we have suggested their names as ‘संक्लसिद्धि’ and ‘द्विद्विदिधि’ respectively. And this has been done on the basis of the following couplet occurring in the Mbh., (XV. 30. 22):

सन्नित द्वनिकायानि संक्लसिद्धिपन्ते। वाचा द्वन्ना तथा स्पर्शाय संचयेनेन प्रक्षाव।।

Here Vyāṣa is found to state before Kunti the fact that there are personalities of divine order who beget offsprings by will, by speech, by sight, by touch, and by sexual intercourse. It is interesting to note that barring ‘आत्रेयसिद्धि’, all the remaining five siddhis are hinted in this couplet.
The expression ‘संक्यपसिद्धि’ is also found in the statement ते सदां सं कल्पिति इत्रा अर्णसाध्वयोऽपि पुष्पना: कलपनायो गृह्वारका: कामसोगेन ओऽ पा दिः कर कर हि: … occurring in the Yoga-bhāṣya (III. 25) where it has been used as an epithet to the divine order of beings residing in the Mahendra-loka. The expression ‘आपपारिक्षद्वा:’ also is very significant here. It speaks of the fact that these personalities can assume a physical body according to their sweet will, and this fact fully coincides with the conception of the first of the six siddhis as we find in the Yuktidīpikā.

This doctrine of ‘पद्धितिः’ helps us to a certain extent to trace some of the chapters of the history of evolution. By the way, it also seeks to establish the fact that the process of becoming is not constant. It is also in a state of change. It also in strict conformity with the Sāṁkhya theory of evolution starts from simplicity and proceeds gradually towards complexity. The fact is that at the dawn of creation when the sattva element was unusually predominant everything was simple, fine and huge. With the advent of time, all these attributes began to deteriorate. As a result of this what was originally simple began to become complex, that which was fine began to become coarse, and that which was huge began to become limited. The following couplet of Nyāya-Kusumāṇjali (II. 3) throws interesting light in this connection:—

जनमसंस्कारविद्याः श्राचे: न्यायाभ्याकर्मणौः।
हस्तक्षेपात्तो हस्तस: सम्मतास्व भीतताम्॥

In elucidating the couplet, the author himself in his own commentary states the fact that at the primary stage of creation, progenies were created by mere mental exertion. After this stage, there appeared the process of sexual intercourse, and even that was committed solely for the sake of an issue. This very process later on developed entirely for the gratification of the senses, and there would be little harm in regarding the progenies generated therefrom as bye products. Now a days there is no restriction of time and space in the process, and it has thus surpassed even the behaviour of the beasts. The author then speaks of the progressive deterioration of the ceremonial purifications.
In this connection he states that originally it was the custom that the food of the parents was ceremonially purified, at a subsequent period the child in the womb was done so, now a days it is done after the child is released from the womb. Similar is the case with learning. Originally the students used to study the whole of the Veda with its thousand branches, then some of those branches, then one branch with the six āṅgas. Now a days only one branch has survived and that is even hardly studied. The author thus seeks to establish the truth that everything in nature moves towards degeneration.

(पूर्व हि नानाश: प्रजा: समानम् । ततोदपवैवक्रोधमेवमैभुनस्मवः । तत: कामावज्जिनी-सत्त्विज्ञायः । द्वारानी देशाकाठामानस्वया पदुकथाकेव भूविधु: । पूर्व नयमस्तुतिः संस्कराः समाभाष्यह: । तत: क्षेत्रप्रभुतिः, ततो भागितिः । द्वारानीतु नाटिः कौकिकस्वारसाधिक । पूर्व सहसोनारी नेत्रीदस्याधिः, ततो व्यस्तः, तत: वनक एक: । द्वारानीतृत कृजिदेशास्वाभिति ।

We have dealt with the doctrine of चट्टित्ति as far as our resources allowed us to do so. In doing so, the fact has been revealed to a certain extent that this six-fold siddhi is generally confined to the superior order of creation where the element of sattva is naturally predominant. Human beings who are dominated by rajas are not naturally equipped with any such divine power; they are created at a stage when the sexual appetite develops after the *loss of all these spiritual powers*.  

The subtle medium of migration

The physical bodies of human beings are derived from the sexual intercourse of parents. Such types of bodies are said to be possessed of six sheaths (पद्ध्वीयाक). Of these, hair, blood and flesh are derived from the mother, and the arteries, bones and marrow from the father. Now, mūrṣya is not subject to any change or modification. So the fact must be explained as to how he adopts a physical body and thus migrates from one state of existence to another. Different teachers of the Śāmkhya school have propounded different theories on the problem. Unfortunately, we are not acquainted

1 See, 'अनेष्वय पद्ध्वीयवकाशकोषानां मानुषणाम्', Yuktidipikā, p. 148/24. Progressive deterioration of siddhis is also referred to in the Vāyu Purāṇa, viii. 72-88.
with any such text as contains a detailed exposition of their views. All that we can know in this connection is contained in a brief statement of the Yuktidipika and the Prapañcasāra Tantra and its commentaries. However, we shall make an attempt to elucidate their views as far as possible in the light of these statements.

According to Pañcadhikaraṇa, puruṣa in his migratory state is associated with a subtle medium which he calls वैवर्त्तिरीर. Unfortunately, we have failed to trace any such text as explains the constitution of such a body. However, from the evidence of the Yuktidipika we know that the different organs become integrated with this वैवर्त्तिरीर at the time when puruṣa through its medium enters into a new birth. Now, the organs according to Pañcadhikaraṇa are ten¹ in number, and not thirteen as enumerated in the Kārika. Further, he does not regard them as the products of ahamkāra as other teachers of Sāmkhya do; in his opinion these are elemental products². As the organs (five cognitive and five conative) are separately stated to be integrated with the वैवर्त्तिरीर, the latter must be supposed to be constituted of buddhi, ahamkāra, manas and the subtle elements. The individual personality of the puruṣa can be affected only by means of a differentiating medium, and this is stated to be the वैवर्त्तिरीर plus the organs integrated with it. It enters into the blood and semen of the parents at the time of their sexual intercourse. As a result of this, the parental seed reaches into the womb and thus forms the embryo which again in its turn gradually begins to develop as ovum, foetus, and the like. In this way when it has attained full development and becomes sensitive, the result is that it is then released from the womb as a child. The physical body, thus derived, retains its existence as long as the fruition of merit and demerit acquired during the period of 'प्रशिक्षित' is not completely exhausted. The subtle medium after its separation from the gross physical body at death migrates to heaven provided virtuous deeds have been performed all along throughout

¹ See above, p. 133, n 1.
² Ibid, n 3.

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that embodiment and consequently merits acquired therefrom leave their impressions upon the organs integrated therein. If, on the other hand, the organs retain the impressions of demerits, the migration takes place into hell or into the world of plants or animals. By an admixture of both merit and demerit, the migration occurs into the world of human beings. The subtle medium or intermediate body thus serves as the vehicle of puruṣa in his migration from one embodiment to another. It has got the capacity of holding and seizing the sense-organs. The relation between this medium and the gross physical body lies in the fact that the former is enveloped by the latter at the time of a new birth and is forsaken by the same at death. Again, the subtle medium comprising buddhi, ahaṅkāra, manas and the subtle elements with the ten organs integrated in it should on no account be regarded as the effect of merit and demerit. It is generated by prakṛti at the beginning of creation. It lasts till final release is attained, while the gross physical body perishes after death.

According to Patañjali (he is different from the author of the Yoga-sūtra), the subtle body varies with each birth. It is not one single constant associate of the puruṣa throughout the length and breadth of his different embodiments. At the period of enjoying the benefits of the six siddhis, this body transmits the ten organs, five cognitive and five operative, into the seed of karmāṇa. This results in the integration of the organs with the merit and demerit of the individual. At the termination of siddhi when death becomes inevitable what happens then is that this body pushes the integrated organs from behind in order that the latter may get themselves in touch with the parental seed of the next birth. As soon as this is accomplished, the said subtle body automatically disappears. All these happen simultaneously with death. The migration into the higher or lower world is determined by the merit and demerit of the individual acquired during the period of siddhi. In the next life also, another fresh subtle body is derived by the individual due to operativeness of his good or bad karmāṇa. The newly generated subtle body also in its turn transmits the organs in a similar
manner into the seed of *karman* of the individual and pushes them from the background to get in touch with the parental seed of the next birth. And as soon as this conjunction takes place, the former disappears simultaneously with death. In this way, the series of subtle bodies continues till the entire stock of merit and demerit of the individual is completely exhausted. And this is possible when liberation is imminent.

This process of migration from one body to another can be better explained by the simile of the movement of a leech upon a bed of grass. Just as a leech in moving from one leaf of grass to another, first of all stretches the upper portion of its body to catch hold of another leaf, and as soon as conjunction with another leaf takes places it automatically withdraws its hinder half from the particular leaf to which it was so long clinging; similar is the process of death and rebirth. There is no gap between migration from one body to another. Kāśyapa also advocates such a conception of migration. According to this teacher of medical science, forsaking of the former body by the individual self and its consequent entering into a new one occur simultaneously. There is no intermediate station between death and rebirth.

As regards the constituents of such a subtle body according to the school of Patañjali, nothing can be definitely known from the scrappy account of the Yuktidipikā. However, it is evident that the ten organs cannot form constituents of this body. Otherwise, their transmission by the subtle body to the seed of *karman* becomes meaningless. The internal organs also are to be eliminated for similar reasons. This is due to the fact that the subtle body according to this teacher is not permanent; it disappears after death making room for another fresh one for the future embodiment. But the internal organs, on the other hand, retain their

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1 “नृवश्च बहु भो सर्वदत्त्वादीश्वरुपसमन्निति: पूर्णश्रीरङ्गकामान्ति परस्वरी चिन्ताकामाति युग्मतः, न कर्तपिरति शांतिर्गुरोदितासाधारितासाधिंहुदिविषिणित्युपूर्णतः। सर्वदत्त्वात्म न कुशालित वेष्वः नृपस्य नृपस्य श्रवणफलानुभवादित।”

—Kāśyapa Samhitā, Śārvīra 4, p. 47.
existence till final, release is attained after which they are re-absorbed into the prakrti. Taking everything into consideration, it appears that the subtle body of Patañjali comprises the five subtle elements and the vital breaths.

Such a conception of subtle body having the subtle elements and the life forces only as its constituents is not usually found to occur anywhere else except to a certain extent in some of the medical texts. According to Caraka, the subtle body is the effect of the previously acquired merit and demerit; it is formed of four subtle elements. In his opinion, the subtle element of sound does not form its constituent. Suśruta does not definitely speak of the constituents of such a body. But in one place, he states bhūtaśāman as one of the constituents of life force while his commentator Dallana explains the term to be the subtle body formed of the subtle elements. A similar conception occurs also in the Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya (II. 2).

In the Prapañcasāra Tantra, Śaṅkara refers to the conceptions of various teachers as regards the process of the descent of puruṣa into the womb. In this connection reference is made to one school according to which it is the individual self of the father that is ultimately born as the child. The doctrine as briefly stated there is what as follows. The pure self is ubiquitous. So its connection with everything whether remote or near is not questionable. At the time of cohabitation of the parents, the individual self of the father in association with the pure self is impelled by the life breath to descent into the womb of the mother in and through the semen discharged during the process of intercourse. This has been explained by the simile of transmission of light from one lamp to

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1 Bṛhadāraṇyaka: सदित: सुष्रुःसूनिरोज्जवो देहसूपैलि देहहाद, also, Bṛhatārṇविक जनवारिकमेजानि वायुवातिनीनांि विश्वास्य गमः, —Caraka Samhitā, Śārira, II. 29 & 33.
2 चतुरामान्यं ब्राह्मणिकरिष्य सुष्रुःसूनिरः विद्यातिकरिष्य यह, II. iii. 2.
3 वीरूक्ताध्यायामतः: सुष्रुः: सचातृतिक व: । मातृवच्यालार्जजः कमालुः कुःक्ष्या विस्वर्धे ||
another. Such a view has also gained currency in the Smṛti literature. The name of the school to which this doctrine is ascribed is not mentioned in the text. But Padmapāda in his commentary states this to be the doctrine of the school of Patañjali and Dhanvantari. He further comments here that it is not only the individual self of the father that descents into the womb, but that of the mother also does so through her menstrual blood discharged at the time of sexual operation. However, it is indeed peculiar to notice that such a doctrine is not found to occur in the medical text of Suśruta which is said to have represented the school of Dhanvantari. In the absence of any other data, it is futile to make any attempt to proceed further with Patañjali’s conception of the process of migration from one embodiment to another.

Vindhyavāsin¹ does not admit of the existence of any subtle intermediate body. According to him, the sense-organs being directly derived from āhamkāra are naturally ubiquitous, and as such there can be no movement of them from one embodiment to another. What is meant by fresh birth happens only by the manifestation of the sense-organs in a particular bio-physical medium in the shape of the parental seed. And whenever this manifestation is withdrawn, the result is death.

According to the followers of Varsāganyā, puruṣa does not enter directly into the parental seed; it enters into the foetus through the chyle generated by the fermented food assimilated by the mother.

According to Āpadya(Āvatsya ?) and such other teachers, the entry of the puruṣa into the womb takes place due to pious bankering of the parents for a child and their consequent

¹ For further references to the denial of a subtle intermediate body, see above, pp. 141 (n 2) & 142; also see the following couplet occurring in the Mbh., (III. 193. 77) where the existence of a subtle intermediate body is denied:

आयुक्तैर्भर्ती प्रायेर्भर्ती श्रीमण्यं कष्टेवर्षम्।
सम्भवत्येन युगपदू योनी नास्त्यातामम्॥
observance of restriction in food and movement in conformity with the religious injunctions.

[...] वा वा वा क र ण स्व तायत वैक्यं शरीरं मातापितसंतानःकरणाविचः शुक-शोणितमनुष्यविवेकि। तद्दुगमावद्यावदिरिव्येन चित्रविदः। न्यूनत्वावरं तपस्याध्यायं मातुरादिष्ठं स्त्यो धर्मीयेर्मं पदाव्रूःपुष्णांविति कृतं तद्दाराविवेकि। यावत् तत्क्षणो शरीरपल्लवाद्विशान्। यदि धर्मसंस्कृतं करणं ततो युद्धेऽऽ सुखसारीं प्राणयते। तद्विपर्यावरूप्यातु यात्रनांस्यां चित्रगृहिणि वा, चित्रीमानि सायायम्। येवामातिवाहिः सुखसारीन्मित्रियनं धारणप्रकाशसमं के नित्यबाध्यापापिनि परिवृत्तवेकं परिवृत्तवेकं नृत्तवेकं च। पर ज जे ते छर्णमारीं यत्र चित्रकृतके पुरुषमित्रियनं बीजवें स्यायिः। तत्र तत्क्षणाय विद्याधारुणु युद्धेऽऽ यात्रनांश्च वा करणात्म प्राणयते। तत्र च वै युक्ताययस्य कर्मवियतनयुत्पत्येऽविद्यनियनं बीजवें स्यायिः नयति तद्वि निबृतति च, शरीरपाये चालितुष्टः वा, एवमन्वेताः च बिंदुः करणात्म प्राणयते। वि कण्या वा च्यि न स्यूतुविद्यनियनं बीजवें बुद्धा जन्म। तस्यात्र गरणम्। तस्मानान्ति सूक्तसारीं। तस्मानन्ति। बिंदुः संसार इति पक्षः।—Yuktidipika, p. 144/10-22.

अत्रापि चेतनायातोगागति बहुया विद्युः। रेतःशोणितजं प्राहुवेक्षये मातुराहताः।। आहारादूर रसेऽग्रहुः केवलं कम्फलं विद्युः।। केवलवस्त्र्य परं धार्मो व्यूहिंमेव प्रचक्षः।। कादिनं कर्मप्राप्तवः पिषुःहातंना सुक्तः।। समवेत् मध्य(ु)नोद्रेकविनोनान्तुकः।। तत् परं धार्मविजसं संकार्यं मास्तनेन तु।। शूद्वे रत्नविनुक्तादृ दीपाददृ दीपान्तरं यथा।।

—Prapannaasara Tantra, I. 94-97.

तत् कथं क्षेत्रश्रवेण इति। तत् मतेंदं दर्शयति—अलापिति, चेतनायातोविहितवेदेवस: पुरुषः। अपिशब्देन विश्वज्ञायं भाषणमातुपपतिचिदिष्टाः। न यदि निदेशकस्य पुरुषस्य एवंविश्व: प्रवेशा उपयवात् इत्यथं। रेतःशोणितज्ञमिति व चा वि कर्णा नां पक्षः। मातुराहतादाहारादौ र्म र्म: वाक्यं। तद्वि रणेण गर्भसारिः विवेदिति वा थं गा योः। कम्फलमिति अपवार्तिनां वधोकांविहितान्त्रद्विमितिुतिष्ठादूः
Let us now turn our attention towards Iśvarakṛṣṇa’s conception of subtle body (kā, 40). He states that at the beginning of creation prakṛti itself provides each unliberated puruṣa with a subtle body. This body serves as the medium of puruṣa in his migration from one embodiment to another. Its movement is not obstructed anywhere; it can penetrate even a solid block of rock. Except in the case of those who have attained liberation, such a body lasts from the beginning of creation till dissolution of the world-process when it is reabsorbed into the prakṛti. Iśvarakṛṣṇa thus goes to discard the view of Patañjali according to whom the previous subtle body disappears and a fresh one appears at each migration of the puruṣa. As regards the constituents of this body also, he differs from other teachers. In his opinion, such a body is composed of buddhi ahāmkāra, manas, five organs of perception, five of action and the five subtle elements. He thus goes to maintain this subtle medium as a psycho-physical entity. A purely psychical

1 The reading 'चाव्याय' appears to be corrupt. So the editor goes to suggest 'चाव्या' Its new. But the reading as found in the manuscript belonging to the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal (G. 8543, fol. 17b, 15) is 'चाव्या' It is not unlikely that the actual reading may even be चाव्या. For, the name of Āvatya occurs along with that of Jaigūṣavya in the Yoga-bhūṣya, III. 18.
apparatus which is to pass from one physical body to another cannot stand by itself without a support, as a picture without a canvas. The inclusion of the subtle elements remedies this defect.

The different bhāvas or pre-dispositions comprising virtue, wisdom, dispassion, spiritual power and their opposites leave their impressions upon the subtle body as a result of which it is destined to migrate into higher or lower plane of existence. But this body cannot by itself enjoy the fruits of previous kārman for which a gross physical body is required. The latter is derived from parents and is perishable after death.

We have thus briefly described Īśvarakṛṣṇa's conception of subtle body. He deviates here in many important respects from other teachers whose views we have treated previously. Unlike Patañjali, he advocates one subtle body for each puruṣa which is competent enough to migrate into various planes of existence. Further, the subtle body as conceived by him can exist independently by itself between death and subsequent rebirth. But no such gap can exist according to Patañjali. Then again, by combining the thirteen organs (three internal and ten external), the five subtle elements and the impressions of the previous activities into one single fold, he has been successful in tackling the problem of migration in a more efficient way than Pañcādhiyākaraṇa and Patañjali. Besides these, it also speaks of the fact that his approach is synthetic.

Vindhyaśvin's view is totally different from that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. In refutation to the view of the former, the following arguments have been advanced by the author of the Yuktiḍipikā (pp. 145/18-25). Firstly, the sense-organs cannot be regarded as all-pervasive. If this would be the case, then anything and everything, whether near or remote, would always come under the range of the sense-organs as a result of which perception would never be obstructed. Secondly, in that case perception of all objects would be simultaneous. For, an all-pervasive entity is simultaneously contacted with all objects even though these are variously scattered in different regions of the globe. Thirdly, even those objects
which are situated at the farthest region of the globe would be adjacent to the sense-organs. As a result of this, there will not be any difference of cognition whether derived by perception or inference or valid testimony. The opponent may urge here that the difference of cognition is achieved due to the special manifestation of the sense-organs. But such an assumption is illogical. He is not found to assign any reason here in support of his assumption that an all-pervasive entity can manifest itself differently under different circumstances. So Vindhyavāsin’s conception of all-pervasiveness of the sense-organs and consequent disapproval of a subtle intermediate body cannot be logically established.

The author of the Yuktidipīka spares no pains to plead the case of Iśvarakṛṣṇa. In the concluding portion of the commentary on kā. 41, he makes an attempt to show that the different problems connected with the process of migration of the purusā from one embodiment to another cannot be satisfactorily solved unless a subtle intermediate body be maintained apart from the gross physical one. Both these two bodies are equally indispensable. It is not always the case that the entire stock of previously acquired merits and demerits is exhaustively fruitioned in a particular embodiment. And it is the subtle body which retains the surplus stock of unfruitioned merits and demerits. If it be, however, insisted that the stock of merits and demerits acquired during the immediately preceding embodiment is completely fruitioned in the present embodiment and what is acquired in the present embodiment will be fruitioned in the next succeeding embodiment, and so on, then the question of surplus stock does not arise at all and consequently the supposition of a subtle intermediate body retaining the traces of previous karmāṇus may be altogether done away with. But the complexity cannot be averted thereby. If it happens that the foetus itself is anyhow disintegrated in the course of its development, then the question of acquiring any fresh merit and demerit will be automatically sealed up for ever, and consequently no future embodiment. Hence, the particular incident will indirectly bring out liberation of the individual. But this is
absurd. Then again, if the individual during his present embodiment pursues such course of activity as will determine his future life into the world of plants or such other immobiles, then ultimately it would be rather a sort of blessing to him. The reason is not very far to seek. It is well known that migration into the world of immobiles is destined absolutely for the fruition of previously acquired demerits. No fresh merit and demerit can be acquired in such lives. Consequently, there will not be any possibility of future birth. All these defects can be remedied if a subtle intermediate body be resorted to. It is the subtle body which inures the impressions of previous activities and migrates from one embodiment to another. It is generated by the prakṛti at the beginning of creation to serve the purpose of the puruṣa and retains its existence until that purpose is fully served.

Similar notions of subtle body is not foreign to western thinkers also. The early Greek philosophers also entertained the notion of a subtle body which was inseparably connected with the soul until the latter was finally released from future transmigration. The astral body of the theosophists also resembles to a certain extent with the subtle intermediate body as propagated by Isvarakṛṣṇa.

Corporeal creation (मैत्रिकसत्ता)

The subtle body plays the distinctive role in biological evolution. Such a body can assume any form accordingly as it is destined to do so. Like an actor, it plays the parts of different personalities under different robes. It is competent to enter into all possible corporeal forms comprising three orders of divine, human and inferior beings distributed respectively in the higher, middle and the lower planes of existence. The divine order is further classified into eight heads. According to Māthara and Vācaspati, these are:—(1) राज, (2) प्राजापत्य, (3) ऐन्न, (4) पैत्र, (5) गार्भवेद, (6) वाश, (7) राजस and (8) पैशाच्य. But the author of the Yuktidipikā differs here slightly (p. 165). He reads नाग in the place of वाश. In his opinion, the latter does not form a separate class; it is included within राजस. He further goes to point out the fact that all supe-
rior forms of creation are included within one or other of these eight classes. For instance, Asuras though not classified separately, are to be included within ‘ऐन्न’. This is due to the fact that they are stated to be the earlier gods. So goes the Sruti — पूर्वे देवा हृदुरा. Then again, due to similarity of nature, Kinnaras and Vidyādharas are to be included within ‘गात्व’.

Similarly Pretas are included within ‘रासस’, for both these two classes have got Yama as their common lord. This classification of the divine beings into eight heads has been done according to their order of superiority. Thus it is ‘आदि’ which ranks foremost of this order. Lower than this is ‘प्राणापत्य’, and so on. Then again, it is the element of sattva which predominates in the superior order. But the degree of sattva is not equally distributed throughout the different classes. It is highest in ‘आदि’, and begins to decrease comparatively in the remaining classes.

Human beings form a separate class. In them there exists preponderance of the element of rajas. They are located in the middle plane. Inferior beings are classified into five heads. These are—

(1) herbivorous beasts (पशु), (2) carnivorous beasts (मुग्ग), (3) birds, (4) reptiles and (5) immobiles. All of them are distributed into the lower plane. In them there exists preponderance of tamas. But the degree of tamas is highest in the immobiles. It then begins to diminish gradually in the remaining classes till it becomes comparatively less in the carnivorous beasts.

Speaking briefly, the entire biological world has been classified into fourteen heads—eight of divine order, one of mankind and five of inferior order. Any embodied being is included under one or other of these fourteen classes. This is what is known as ‘भौतिकम्’ (corporeal creation) in the Śāṅkhya literature (का, 53). As long as the puruṣa remains associated with the subtle body, he becomes encaged in one or other of these classes of embo-

1 The distinction between ‘पशु’ and ‘कृमि’ is not very clear. Here Jayamaṅgala states ‘तच्छ गर्भाय रासभावला: यथा:; सिङ्गाया बिङ्गालाया कृमि’. Also see, ‘विविधसंग्राहानां: यथा:; विङ्गायितविधायानां गर्वी’—

Śāṅkhya-saṁgraha, p. 137.
diments as a result of which he has to experience misery arising out of decay and death (kā.55), and whenever he is dissociated from the same, he becomes free and never re-enters into the whirlpool of existence.

The subtle body and the bhāvas

The bhāvas constitute eight aspects of buddhi. These are:— (1) merit, (2) wisdom, (3) dispassion, (4) spiritual power, (5) demerit, (6) ignorance, (7) attachment and (8) lack of spiritual power. Of these, the first four are sāttvika aspects while the remaining four of opposites are tāmasa aspects. The classification of these bhāvas into three heads, such as ‘सांस्कृतिक’ (innate) and the like, as well as the divergent views of other Śāmkhya teachers in this connection, have been already discussed above in detail (pp. 181-185). Hence it is needless to repeat the same here.

The subtle body and the bhāvas are inter-related. The former serves as the vehicle of puruṣa in his migration from one embodiment to another, while the latter determine the form of future embodiment. Thus ‘merit’ gives rise to higher birth, while ‘demerit’ drags towards bondage. ‘Wisdom’ leads towards liberation and ‘ignorance’ towards bondage. ‘Dispassion’ brings out absorption into one or other of the eight forms of prakṛti for a specified period, while ‘attachment’ leads to rebirth. Lastly, ‘spiritual power’ removes obstacles to attain perfection while ‘lack of such power’ impedes the individual in his forward march. The bhāvas are antecedents (निर्मित) and the higher birth, degradation, and the like are consequents. It is due to these antecedents and consequents that the subtle body has to play the parts of different actors under the cover of different robes. Without the bhāvas, the subtle body cannot assume the form of a god or a human being or an inferior being. On the other hand, if there were no subtle body, the bhāvas would also find no substratum to stay. The reason is not far to seek. The bhāvas are located in the organs (करणाश्रयोः, kā. 43) which again in their turn form constituents of the subtle body. Moreover, these are to be acquired by acts which cannot be accomplished without a
gross physical body, and even that again cannot function independently by itself without a subtle body. Hence, both the subtle body and the bhāvas are equally indispensable without which biological evolution cannot be explained. It is due to this inter-dependence that Isvarakṛṣṇa goes to introduce two aspects of evolution, one 'विद्वेष' and the other 'भावयस्त्रा' (क. 52). Both of them manifest themselves after the loss of six spiritual powers, called 'प्रकृतिः'.

Pratyaya-sarga

After describing the bhāvas and their consequence, Isvarakṛṣṇa then goes to introduce another aspect of psychical evolution which he calls 'प्रत्ययस्त्रा'. This comprises erroneous view, infirmity of the organs, contentment and achievements. Owing to difference in guṇas it has got fifty sub-divisions. Thus he states:

एव प्रत्ययस्त्रो विवेद्याशक्तिसहित प्रकृतिवाय शः ||
गुणाच्यायुविवर्तं तस्य च मेदास्तु प्रकृतिवाय शः || (क. 46)

Of this four-fold 'प्रत्ययस्त्रा', 'erroneous view' is further classified into five heads, 'disability' into twenty-eight, 'contentment' into nine and 'achievement' into eight—thus making the total fifty. These are more or less discussed by the different commentators. So we do not intend to proceed here with their details.

Now the question naturally arises here as to what is the relation existing between the bhāvas and this new set of four. Apparently, we do not find here any connecting link. The statements made in this connection by the ordinary commentators do not seem to be very convincing. This has led Keith to make the following remark:

"It seems hopeless to try to reconcile these two lists of states: they are too much alike to be regarded as radically different, and the obvious solution of the problem is to assume that they represent views which were held in the school, and which developed the matter in different ways. It is, however, so strange that Isvarakṛṣṇa should have introduced the matter without any hint of the relation of the two sets of the states—except the wholly misleading one that they are the same thing—that conjecture is

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1 सूदाय विद्वेष्याः श्रावपाय भद्रभिशच्चर्यादूर्यां भवति,
—Yuktidipikā, p. 164/15.
justified that the verses (46-51) which deal with them are a later interpolation, added at or before the time when the last three verses were added and the statement made that the tract numbered seventy verses.

—The Sāmkhya system, pp. 96-97.

However, the author of the Yuktidipikā is found to shed some important light here. Unlike other commentators of the Kārikā, he states that 'प्रत्ययसम' forms the ultimate result brought out by the evolved, called व्यक्ता. According to him the evolved has got three aspects. These are: (1) form (रूप), (2) undertaking of initiatives (प्रचलिति) and (3) the result to be obtained therefrom (फल). Of these, forms of the evolved have been already explained by 'तत्त्वसम' which deals with the evolution of the tattvas beginning from mahat and ending in the five gross elements. The second aspect is also explained by 'भावसम' which deals with the eight aspects of बुद्धि and their consequences. The third aspect, called 'result', now remains to be done. And it is this four-fold 'प्रत्ययसम' which forms the result of the evolved. Thus we find him stating (pp. 151-152):—“एवमेष तत्त्वसमों भावसमं व्यक्ताः। एतथा व्यक्तस्य रूपं प्रचलितिः परिकल्पयते। फलमिदाः वक्तां। अहां—कि पुनस्तत्त। फलमिद। तथ्यते—य: खालु 'एव प्रत्ययसमं विषयं यथा विद्विद्यते।' तत: फलमिद वाच्यसे...”

These three aspects of व्यक्ता need further clarification. So far as we know, no other text of Sāmkhya is found to introduce them. Elsewhere in his explanation of the expression 'व्यक्त्वत्व-ब्रह्म-विद्यन' occurring in का 3, the author of the Yuktidipikā is found to offer a brief exposition of these aspects of व्यक्ता in the following lines (p. 24/24-29):—

"तत्र रूप-प्रचलिति-फलक्षणं व्यक्तम। रूपं पुनरेऽमात्रभूतात्। पश्चात्मात्रावेषका-वेदान्तिर्मिन्यं वाच्यम्। समालयत्: प्रचलितिः विवेचनं—विद्विद्यते यथा । अव्यक्तविद्यते प्राणायम्। तत्र दक्षिणं—सिद्धिदक्षिणं विवेचनं व्यक्तम। अद्वयं—अव्ययी स्तव्य: विवेचनं संसारे कर्मप्रचलितम् इत्यतद् व्यक्तम। परां सत्सवर्जनसामं भाष्यद्वाकारानन्तर विशेषत्तिः।"
In this passage, the author goes to speak of the fact that "व्यक्ति" or the evolved principle manifests itself in three ways—through its form (रूप), initiation (प्रस्तुति) and result (फल). Of these, "रूप" or form of vyakta constitutes buddhi, ahankara, eleven organs, the five subtle elements and the five gross elements.

"प्रस्तुति" is synonymous with "आरम्भ". It means initiative to work, endeavour, effort etc. It is usually undertaken for the purpose of attaining what is agreeable and averting what is disagreeable. Its special manifestation is noticed in the working of the springs of activity (karma-yonis) and the life forces. The springs, as already stated above, constitute different motive forces that incite the ordinary individual to undertake such endeavours as give rise to merit, demerit, and the like. The life forces also stimulate the agent for similar purposes.

It is interesting to notice that "प्रतिति" finds a prominent place in the Nyāya system. It is defined there as 'an initiative undertaken either by speech or mind or body'. The initiative comes from passion, aversion and such other inciting factors, called dosas (defilements), which impel the agent towards virtue or vice. The purpose of undertaking such initiatives lies in attaining what is agreeable and averting what is disagreeable. The author of the Nyāya-bhāṣya sheds further light in this connection. While speaking of the cause of the cycle of rebirth, he states that from false conception of objects there arise inclination towards what appears to be agreeable and disinclination towards what appears to be disagreeable. These inclinations and disinclinations give rise to falsehood, malice, delusion, greed and such other defilements as incite the individual to undertake various sorts of endeavours, numbering twenty in all—ten pious and ten vicious. Of these, the pious endeavours lead to the acquisition of merit and the vicious ones to that of demerit. He further states that 'प्रतिति' in this system means merit.

1 'प्रस्तुतिभीम् बैद्धिकारम्', NS. I. i. 17.
2 'प्रतितिनायाक्षण दोषः', ibid I. i. 18. Also see the Bhāṣya—बारारं हि रामायणः प्रतितिनिष्ठ पुण्ये पाते वा.
3 'यवधनंदिधिब बृत्तेक तद्योजनय', ibid I. i. 24. Also see the Bhāṣya—यवधनंदिधिब उत्तमण्यं वा ब्यवस्थायात्तत्त्वाचारिणीयोगसंबंधितव्यः प्रयोजनं सद्विदितां यवधितेतिरूक्तम्। यवधनंदिधिब उत्तमण्यं वा ब्यवस्थायात्तत्त्वाचारिणीयोगसंबंधितव्यः प्रयोजनं सद्विदितां यवधितेतिरूक्तम्। यवधनंदिधिब उत्तमण्यं वा. Cp. ‘हितकामप्रयोजनात्यं, अहितकामप्रतितियोजनात्यं’ of the passage quoted above from the Yuktidipikā.
and demerit. Though it constitutes the means of acquiring merit and demerit, still the means and the end are not to be treated here as different. This he explains by the analogy of the expression 'पदने वे प्राविन्यन; प्राप्ता:' where food itself is equated to life, though actually speaking, the former constitutes the means of sustaining life. This endeavour or initiative to work is the cause of higher or lower birth. From birth proceeds misery. He then summarises his statements and says that false conception, defections, endeavour, birth and misery in their uninterrupted course consitute what is known to be the cycle of rebirth.

(पत्रसामान्यप्राप्तादुनकुठे राम: प्रतिकृतुष्म वें: रामदेवारिकारो अलक्ष्यारो-मायावोगदरो दीप: सहविति। रोज: प्रयुकु: शरीरं प्रवतंमाने विस्तार्तेयविक्रियाविजयमायावाचनरति, वाचार्यप्रथापुरुषमायावाचनरति, मनसा पद्मोऽ वर्तमानः प्राप्तारूपमायावाचनरति। तदेव प्रापसिम्भुका प्रदिष्टस्वरूपस्य। अथ दुःखः-शरीयनन्दा वर्तमानं परिषुद्धबा, वाचार्य पद्मोऽ विनयमायावाचनरति, मनसा द्वारानुक्रमः परिषुद्धबा, वाचार्य पद्मोऽ विनयमायावाचनरति। तदेव प्राप्तिः। अथ वाचार्य प्राप्तिः प्रकरणाणाम् विनयमायावाचनरति। तदेव प्राप्तिः। अथ वाचार्य प्राप्तिः प्रकरणाणाम् विनयमायावाचनरति। तदेव प्राप्तिः। अथ वाचार्य प्राप्तिः प्रकरणाणाम् विनयमायावाचनरति। तदेव प्राप्तिः। अथ वाचार्य प्राप्तिः प्रकरणाणाम् विनयमायावाचनरति। तदेव प्राप्तिः। अथ वाचार्य प्राप्तिः प्रकरणाणाम् विनयमायावाचनरति।

By comparing this conception of 'चित्ति' of the Nyāya system with that of the Yuktidipikā, the difference appears to be slight. According to the ancient teachers of Nyāya, 'चित्ति' refers to merit and demerit. But Śāṅkhyas go a step further. According to this system, the entire set of 'भूक्षण' comprising not only merit and demerit but all the eight aspects of buddhi as well as their consequences are referred to by 'चित्ति'.

The author of the Yoga-bhāṣya also pays due attention to 'endeavour' its cause and after-effect. Speaking of the cause of the cycle of rebirth, he states that merit gives rise to happiness and demerit to misery. From happiness comes passion and from misery aversion. These are followed by endeavour (प्रयत्न) as a consequence of which the individual takes up some

1 'वेद' does not practically differ from 'सत्कृत'. In the Vaiśeṣika system, it is read as synonymous with 'सत्कृत' and 'अब्राह'. It therefore means 'effort', 'endeavour' or 'inspiration'. It is two-fold—one springing from the vital energy and the other from desire or aversion. The former regulates the vital breath at the time of sleep. The latter constitutes the means of attaining what is agreeable and averting what is disagreeable. It also balances the physical body. (प्रयत्न: सत्कृत अब्राह श्रुति प्राप्ता: शितविभिः कृत्यवेदस्वाजित्विक्रियाविकरणः। तत्सत्कृतः अब्राहम: सत्कृति प्रामाण्यमहान्तरिक्ष: इत्यादिः।) For 'सत्कृतवेदस्वाजित', see Yuktidipikā, p. 127/10-15.
initiative either by mind or speech or body, and thereby favours or injures others. Then again follow in their cyclic order merit and demerit; happiness and misery, passion and aversion, and so on. Thus revolves the six-spoked wheel of rebirth whose driver is false conception—the root cause of all afflictions (iv. 11).

(भन्कर सुखमन्मगदुस्खमः। सुखाद्विगु देवसत्कृ प्रवर्ततेन मनसा वाचा कामेन प्रविष्टप्रविष्टि वा। तत्त: पुनर्वायुभावः सुखुःको राजनियांपवित्ति महंसं पर्यं संसारकरः। अष्ठ च प्रविष्टप्रविष्टि मनोविष्टि वानेशी मूलं स्वयंविष्टि निमित्तं हेतु:।)

In the Caraka-samhita also it is stated that delusion, desire and aversion work at the root of all initiatives (सोःकामसंसारम् सुखा प्रकृति, सूर्य, v. 12). It is further stated in this connection that as long as the individual abides within the fold of defilements, he cannot transcend 'प्रकृति'—the root cause of all sins and sufferings. It is 'विद्याम' or abstention from all egoistic endeavours that brings out perfect bliss.

In the B. Gitā, 'प्रकृति' is not equated to 'वाचा' as done in the Nyāya system. Both the terms find their sequential order in the following couplet (xiv. 12):

क्रस्म: प्रविष्टप्रविष्टि वानेशी मूलं स्वयंविष्टि निमित्तं हेतु:।
रक्षयेतानि जान्यानि विनविन्तेन भरतपः।

Greed, impulsion, initiative of actions, unrest and desire—all these spring up when rajas increases. Here 'प्रकृति' means impetus to action; it is the force of desire which motives all personal initiatives. The central interest of the Gitā lies in depicting the fact that the pure self is not associated with any work; nor it makes any scheme or project. All egoistic commencements and their accessories originate from the rising rajas. He who initiates no action, but leaves all works to be accomplished by the gunas of prakrti, is said to have transcended the gunas (सत्वार्तहिपथिविष्टि गृहावली; xiv. 25).

From the evidence of the Gitā, we know that action and its various accessories formed an important topic of discussion in the ancient literature of Sāṅkhya. Thus states the Lord (xviii. 13-15):—'Here from me, oh mighty armed, the five causes that are stated in the Sāṅkhya system (वाचा कामेन प्रकृति) to be indispensable for the accomplishment of all sorts of actions. These five are the physical body, the agent, the various organs and other instruments, various sorts of efforts and destiny. Whatever action, whether just or unjust, man undertakes by means of his body, speech or mind, these five are the indispensable requisites. ('सत्वार्तहिपथिविष्टि कामं प्रकृति नरं सत्बाहिकां गृहावली; xiv. 15).
These couplets have been already referred to in the course of discussing the *karma-yonis* (pp. 276-277). Gîtâ’s interest lies here in pointing out the fact that the pure self is undefiled; it does not take up any initiative of action which proceeds from the *gunas*. He who is of perverted intelligence looks upon the pure self as the doer.

We have traversed a long way off in the course of elucidating the brief statement of the Yuktidipikâ. The viewpoint of Sâmkhya lies in pointing out the fact that the tendency of all the manifested entities is to proceed ultimately towards the acquisition of merit, demerit, and the like. This is what is meant by ‘ध्यात्मप्रदृष्टि’. Evidently, this culminates in ‘भावसम्’.

Let us now turn our attention towards the result of the evolved. This result, as we know from the statement of the Yuktidipikâ, is two-fold, visible as well as invisible. Of these, the visible result comprises achievement, 'contentment, disability and wrong notion. All these constitute what is called ‘प्रत्ययसम्’. The invisible result lies in reaping the harvest of *karman* during the cycle of rebirth.

The relation of ‘प्रदृष्टि’ and ‘फल’ deserves special attention. In the Nyâya system ‘फल’ is defined to be the outcome of initiatives and defilements; it means experience of happiness and misery¹. The Sâmkhya authorities also more or less advocate the same view. But the whole thing is viewed by them on the basis of their doctrine of causality. According to them, the result does not constitute an entirely new phenomenon; it is already existent in the *vyakta* which is characterised by pleasure, pain and delusion. The efficient causes in the shape of merit, demerit, and the like that owe their origin to ‘प्रदृष्टि’, only help to manifest the result lying already in its dormant state in the *vyakta* or the evolved. In other words, these constitute means that help to bring the latent result into its present state; these do not generate something new². Likewise, ‘result’ also in its turn constitutes that

1 ‘प्रश्निदीपरमितिनिषेधः फलम’, NS. I. i. 20; also see the Bhâṣya—‘सुखदेनक विद्वेबन्धोऽक्षः’.
2 See, सत्र फलम निमित्त वर्षवाक्याकस्माय नापुरुषखं विविधार्थोऽक्षः, निमित्त निमित्त निमित्तिक्षान विद्वेबन्धोऽक्षम हृदयं नापुरुषखं विद्वेबन्धम्. Y. Bh. iv. 12.
with a view to which appropriate merit, demerit and the like are brought about, meaning thereby that these are also present and not produced. Both the means and the result follow a sequential order

We have thus made an attempt to show the connecting link between the bhāvas and प्रत्ययस्ति, and in this connection we have spared no pains to tap the different sources. Of the bhāvas, it is ignorance which acting in association with demerit, attachment and lack of power gives rise to wrong notion or error. Similarly, lack of power in association with demerit, ignorance and attachment gives rise to disability of the organs. Merit and spiritual power acting in subservience to dispassion generate contentment. And finally it is wisdom which exclusively gives rise to achievement. Of these, it is achievement or siddhi that leads the individual towards liberation, while error and the like only create obstacles to its attainment.

An interesting account of this four-fold प्रत्ययस्ति has been furnished by the author of the Yuktidipika. In course of suggesting various etymological meaning of the expression प्रत्ययस्ति, he finally states that it is called so because it results from special deliberation (अथवा प्रत्ययपूर्वकः सर्गः प्रत्ययस्ति; बुद्धिपूर्वकः इत्युतः). He then goes to substantiate his view by the following quotation (p. 112/9-16) from Sastra—an ancient authoritative text of Sāṅkhya:

एवं हि शाक्यम्—"महतादिविवेचनात् सर्गो बुद्धिपूर्वकं क्तवात्। क्षत्रियकायां करणस्तु महालम्बारीर। एकाकिनमात्मानमवेश्वरामिवत्वे—हन्तां पुनां सश्रेयः ये मे कर्माणि कर्मविनः, ये मात्यां परं चापरं च बाल्यनिनः। तस्याभिविवायत: पञ्चमुव्वलोकोत्सो

वेदा: प्रार्थ्रमुरू:। तेषाप्रसङ्गं न दुःखः क्षमसे, ततोत्तो तिर्यग्गलोकोत्सोजाधिताल: प्रज्ञिते:। तेषाश्वस्य सतितेष्य संस्कारः। अथापरे नवोद्धर्षोत्सो देवाः प्रार्थ्रमुरू:।

tेषाप्रसङ्गं नेम नूतनं मात्स्यमां मेये। ततोत्तो तिर्यग्गलोकोत्सो नेम:। एवं तस्माद् ब्रह्मोमहादिविवेचनातुः पञ्चमुव्वलोकोत्समां प्रत्ययस्तिः। स विपरीतालयः, अशाक्तालयः

tुष्टालयः शिवालयेति।"

1 See, ये के तु वेश्चकिन वस श्रुतीप्रत्ययस्तिः च मां, न-प्रार्थ्रमूरूः। Y. Bh. IV. 11,
Māhātmya-śarīra, as it is clear from the concluding portion of the passage, refers here to Brahman or Hiranyagarbha, the lord of the universe. Having derived his physical body well equiped with the organs ( kartāyakarana) from prakṛti at the beginning of a cycle of creation, he found himself alone. He then thought within himself—"Let me procreate progenies that will deserve my purpose, and will also feel for myself as well as for others". Thus being called up by his power of will, there appeared five gods indulging in extreme tamas. But he could not rest content by their evolution. So there appeared another batch of twenty-eight dominating in tamas. He was not satisfied even with them. Then appeared another batch of nine dominating in sattva. Still he could not think himself successful. And finally, there appeared another batch of eight dominating in rajas. In this way, these four batches became manifested at the call of Brahman. As this type of creation proceeds from power of will, so it is called pratyayam. It should be always remembered that according to Saṃkhya, the Lord Brahman or such other supreme personality cannot directly create anything. Whatever is called up by such a personality to come into existence is readily generated by the prakṛti from the background. The four batches of gods here to five erroneous conceptions, twenty-eight disabilities of the organs, nine contentments and eight achievements. Such a type of creation is also described in some of the Purāṇas. 

For Māhātmya-śarīra, see above. p. 222.

See the following couplets of the Vāyu-Purāṇa (vi. 35-64):

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<tr>
<th>तत्सृष्टिष्टिनिःसिद्धि</th>
<th>महाय सृष्टिनिःसिद्धितिविविधः प्रविष्टः ।</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>सत्त्वसमस्तकालिको वेश्वरविभाषितः ।</td>
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<tr>
<td>प्रविष्टविष्णुविभाषितः ।</td>
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<td>चिन्तामन्त्रयितृतिश्चितः ।</td>
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<td>तत्त्वन्यन्तरार्थविष्णुविभाषितः ।</td>
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</tbody>
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The different kinds of 'सूक्तत्व' or streams occurring in the passage need some clarification. In this connection it is stated in the Yuktidipika (p. 165/14-15) that 'आयुर्वैक्यालस्तु' abounds in sattva, 'अर्बुक्षोतस्तु' in rajas, 'निर्विक्षोतस्तु' and 'मुख्योतस्तु' in tamas. This is also corroborated by the account of the Vāyu-Purāṇa and Mārkandeya as referred to above. The main difference in every case is thus brought out by the prevailing guna. The entire biological order of creation is classified into four heads according to difference of srotas. The etymological meaning of the expression 'मुख्योतस्तु' cannot be precisely stated. In this connection it is stated in the Vāyu-Purāṇa (vi. 39-40) that intellect and other principal organs (मुख्यानि करणानि) of the beings belonging to this srotas are totally enveloped by darkness. These are like burning lamps inside a jar. So these cannot manifest themselves at all. This is why plants and such other immobiles

For similar description, also see Mārkandeya Purāṇa, 47. 14-35.
are included within this particular srotas. The five kinds of
‘विपर्यय’ are innate in this degraded order of creation. Animals,
birds and reptiles are classified under तिर्यंक्र्योत्स. Here also
the element of तमस is predominant. But it is not so intense as
in the immobiles. Different kinds of organic disabilities are innate
in them. The trend of the stream of their life is horizontal
(तिर्यंक्र्या प्रवत्तते). This speaks of the fact that the movement of their inner
life is neither upward nor downward; for no merit and demerit
can be acquired in these lives. Under ऊर्बर्ष्णोत्स come the gods.
The trend of their stream of life is upward (ऊर्बर्ष्ण प्रवत्तते); for
they always aspire after heaven. Here the element of सत्त्वा
is predominant. Different kinds of contentment are innate in
them. Lastly, mankind is classified under अर्बर्ष्णोत्स. The
trend of their stream of life is downward. Here the element of
वायस is predominant. Achievement is possible only in these lives.

Nothing more can be known of the different kinds of srotas
from the existing texts of Saṃkhya. Of the four-fold प्रत्ययस्पर्शी, it is siddhi which alone leads an individual towards liberation.
It can be attained by human beings only. And even of them, an
infinitesimal fraction is fit to pursue its course. Though the current
of siddhi is perpetually flowing from prakṛti which is its fountain
source, still its flow is obstructed by the remaining three other
aspects of प्रत्ययस्पर्शी. This is why siddhi is not possible in all the
orders of creation. Thus states, the author of the Yukti-dipikā
(p. 163/4-9) :—“नित्यप्रदृःस्यापि प्रजानात सिद्धिक्षोलितो विपर्ययाभिक्षुदक्तिप्रति
वन्यात सर्वभागिन्यप्रवृति। तिर्यंकर्यात तावत स्थायित्व tumarcha. ते हि मुहुत्तक्षोसो
विपर्ययाचात्मनं: अश्लेषित्तिर्यंचु, ते हि तिर्यंक्र्योत्सोद्धचाचात्मनम्:। तुसद्वे अचैत्याम्। ते

1 The different kinds of srotas are also referred to in the dialogue
between Janaka and Yājñavalkya occurring in the Mokṣadharma
section of the Mbh. (xii, 310. 23–24). But ‘मुस्लेष्ठस्य’ does not find its
place there. Again, in the Anugita section, description is made of
the three kinds of srotas. These are :—(1) व्रजक्षोत्स, (2) स्रोतक्षोत्स,
and (3) अर्बर्ष्णोत्स. Of these, व्रजक्षोत्स includes plants, animals,
birds, reptiles, worms, insects and even men who are naturally
dumb, deaf, blind or suffering from any other organic defect (Mbh.
xiv. 36. 25).
Now, siddhi is stated to be eight-fold. It comprises:—
(1) reasoning, (2) oral instruction from the preceptor,
(3) study of philosophical texts, (4,5 & 6) suppression of
three-fold misery, (7) acquisition of friends for guidance
towards spiritual upliftments and (8) purification to be attained
by discriminative knowledge. All these result from wisdom.
So none of these can be attained by those who indulge in erro-
neous views. Consequently there cannot be any siddhi in
the world of immobiles where विषयच्य is innate.

Similarly, the twenty eight disabilities also obstruct siddhi.
Now, if we turn our attention to the eight siddhis as
enumerated above, it becomes evident that these specially
depend upon hearing, reasoning, concentration of mind, grasping
and pursuing some rules of conduct and discipline. So
these cannot be practised by those who suffer from organic
incapacities. Then again, the highest siddhi rests upon
discriminative knowledge. This is possible only when the buddhi
reaches the highest degree of development. Such a stage cannot
be attained by those who suffer from intellectual incapacities;
such beings are always carried away by the current of tamas, and
consequently their intellect remains blunt for ever. This being
the case, no siddhi can be expected in animals, birds and such
other lower lives indulging in tamas. These are naturally
equipped with dull organs and stupified intellect.

Likewise, the nine tushis, four internal and five external, are
also looked upon by the wise as barriers to siddhi. Of these,
the first four rest upon the belief that liberation can be attained
through the grace of prakriti, asceticism, time or good
luck. The external five depend upon the renunciation of the
sensations of colour, taste, odour, touch and sound.

1 ‘दानष तिकनिशती’. Here ‘दान’ does not mean ‘charity’. It is derived from
the root देय चोंचन, and hence means ‘purification’.
This absence of attachment to sense data arises due to the defects involved in their earning, saving, wastage, enjoyment and killing. The gods and some yogins generally rejoice in these tusṭis. They think that the highest end can be attained by depending entirely upon them, and so they do not care to acquire discriminative knowledge by which the puruṣa can be differentiated from the prakṛti. The result is that they remain absorbed in one or other of the eight prakṛtis for a certain period and when the time limit is exhausted they are turned out of their celestial abodes, and are forced again to share the miseries of the world. This being the case, siddhi cannot be expected even in gods, demi-gods and such other higher lives as naturally rejoice in contentments. Consequently, liberation is beyond the reach of even the heavenly bodies. The value of siddhi is much higher than that of tusṭi. Now, tusṭi is to rest content with less than what ought to be achieved; siddhi, on the other hand, lies in achieving the desired end. Again, the former proceeds from dispassion, while the latter does so from wisdom. And it is wisdom through which final release can be attained.

Human beings are best suited for practising siddhi. They occupy the middle plane where the rajas element is predominant. Now, it is well known to the students of Sāṃkhya that all activities proceed from rajas. Siddhi also depends upon pursuing some regulated course of activity. So the rajas element cannot be totally neglected by those who intend to proceed along the path of siddhi. Then again, speaking with reference to siddhi, the value of the physical body of a human being is immense; it is really an asset. Here all the organs can function equally. So the question of organic disability which obstructs siddhi does not naturally arise here. Further, the migrants who are placed in the higher and the lower planes of existence are naturally provided with a ‘मोचवेद’ which speaks of the fact that their physical bodies are specially suited for enjoying the fruits of merits and demerits acquired in their previous lives. These bodies are not capable of undertaking any such new activity as will yield further results to
be enjoyed in future. But the case is otherwise with respect to human beings occupying the middle plane. They aquire a 'कर्मदशा' which is distinct from the 'जोगदशा' as mentioned above. Their physical bodies are not only capable of enjoying the fruits of their past deeds, but also are fit to pursue new course of karman whose harvest is to be reaped later on. All other beings occupying higher or lower planes of existence are naturally deprived of this privilege. Now, if an individual is really bent upon achieving siddhi, he can conquer all the obstacles that may stand in his way. In order to achieve that end, his first duty should be to divert his downward course of activity towards some higher end. He should no longer hanker after the reward of his own karman. He should take up such course of activities as may help to open the barricaded door of wisdom. In this way he is sure to achieve different siddhis one by one. And finally with the appearance of discriminative wisdom, he attains supreme perfection that brings out complete and final suppression of the three-fold misery.

It has been already pointed out above that erroneous notion, organic disability and contentment are impediments to siddhi. Conversely, these three impediments also are undermined at the rise of siddhi. Now, siddhi starts from 'reasoning' (ऊँ) and correct reasoning is possible only when the mind is keen to find out the truth whatever that truth may be. The mind at this stage should be absolutely free from any bias. Such is the mind of the true philosopher. His mind approaches all objects without being obscured by any emotion. His only aim is to attain correct knowledge of the objects. The result is that erroneous notion begins to vanish gradually.

Even such a mind is not always free from error, because it has to depend upon the sense-organs for the supply of the premises. It has no other avenue to derive knowledge. If the defective sense-organ offers a wrong premise, then the conclusion cannot be right however acute the reasoning may be. Then again, what will the reasoning mind alone do if the disabled organ fails to offer any premise at all? In that case no knowledge can be acquired. This
dependence upon the organs can be averted if the mind attains further liberation. When that stage is attained, it no longer needs the services of the sense-organs. It then knows everything directly. Such is the mind of the seer. It is superior to that of the philosopher. One knows everything by intuitive wisdom, while the other knows by reasoning. The mind of the seer is purged of all impurities; it is ever-shining and is unbounded like the sky (बुक्षवन्तव हि भास्वमात्मकशक्षाय, Y. Bh. i. 36). All knowables whether past, present, future, distant, near, intercepted, subtle or gross are reflected herein. Wisdom attained at this stage always bears truth; there is not even a trace of falsehood in it (अत्सम्मरा तत्त्र प्रशान, Y. S. i. 48). It refers to particulars, and so it is distinct from inferential and verbal cognitions which have got only the generals for their objects (षुतातुत्तािनयायमन्याःक्षेत्रविषयं निवृत्तप्रथेर्वचाव, Y. S. i. 49). This stage is attained only when discriminative wisdom prevails. It is the highest siddhi. Cognition derived at this stage is intuitional; its sphere extends everywhere; it operates under all circumstances; it produces knowledge of all objects simultaneously (तारकं सर्वविषयं सर्वभाबलिथयमक्षेति विवेकज्ञानम, Y. S. iii. 55).

When this siddhi is achieved erroneous notions are automatically vanquished like the nocturnal darkness by the rising sun. Organic disabilities also can no longer create any obstruction at this stage. For, the mind then knows everything by intuition, it no longer needs the assistance of the organs. When such a stage is achieved, liberation becomes imminent. Having attained this stage, the individual no longer rejoices even in different contentments. Thus from the dialogue of Āvatya and Jaigīśavya as found in the Yogabhāṣya (iii. 18), we know that even the mastery over the praṇāth which forms the highest form of contentment is placed to the credit of pain by the wise. The joy of contentment is invaluable only in comparison with the pleasures of sensation. Compared to the bliss of liberation it is nothing but pain only. Briefly speaking, if the current of siddhi finds a channel to flow, the three other currents of wrong notion, organic disability and contentment are automatically dried up. The individual then freely moves without being touched by pleasures and pains of the world.
Puruṣa of Śāmkhya constitutes nothing but pure consciousness. It is the soul of all living beings. It is that principle which breathes life into matter. It is postulated to account for the intelligent order of the manifested entities, and also to account for the subjective aspect of reality. It is pure, undefiled, uncaused, eternal, immutable, inactive, unqualified, and without any part. It is the silent spectator of the workings of prakṛti. Ordinarily it finds expression in a physical body having life in it. The difference in the degree of expression is due to the nature of the physical body which constitutes its substratum. It is obscure in the world of plants and resplendent in the superior order of beings.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa and his commentators advance the following arguments in support of the existence of puruṣa (kā, 17). (1) Since all composite bodies are for the use of some one other than themselves, so puruṣa exists. For instance, a bed which forms an assemblage of pillow, blanket, mosquito-curtain and such other things, is meant for the purpose of some one who sleeps upon it. Similarly, the physical body consisting of the organs and the elements is a composite one and as such it is meant for the sake of some one who is nobody but puruṣa. The fact is that the products of the guṇas are not for their own sake; they are to serve the purpose of something other than themselves. (2) Since all manifestations of prakṛti are objects forming different permutations and combinations of the guṇas, there must be a subject, a knower of these manifestations, who should be devoid of the guṇas. (3) Since there must be a presiding entity for which prakṛti produces this variegated universe, and that is no other but puruṣa. (4) Since there must be some one to enjoy the products of prakṛti which are either agreeable or disagreeable, and that is none but puruṣa who exists for the sake of enjoying them. (5) Since there is a tendency towards liberation, puruṣa must exist. Now, liberation consists of the absolute and final cessation of pain, and as such it cannot be attained by buddhi, ahamkāra and such other principles for the simple reason that they by their very nature contain pain as one of their integral components and so there is no
chance on their part to be absolved of their constituent. The conclusion is therefore that there must be some entity other than buddhi and such other products of prakṛti that is capable of attaining liberation, and this is no other but puruṣa. By these sets of arguments, Isvarakṛṣṇa and his commentators go to establish puruṣa as distinct from prakṛti and its products.

Patañjali and specially the author of the Yogabhāṣya are also found to marshall similar arguments against the Buddhists who are not prepared to maintain the separate existence of the self apart from the mind (citta). Thus it is argued in the Yogasūtra¹ (iv. 24) that the mind² diversified with innumerable impressions of karmam exists for the sake of some one other than itself because it is a composite body and as such it works in association with others. Here the author of the Bhāṣya states that just as a house which has been brought into existence by various materials put together is for the sake of another who dwells in it, so also the mind diversified with innumerable impressions is possessed of aggregates and as such it cannot exist for its own sake. The fact is that the mental phenomena of pleasure and pain do not exist for their own sake, nor does knowledge which also is an aspect of the thinking faculty exist for its own interest; all these serve the purpose of another who is none but puruṣa. It is he who experiences the pleasurable and painful cognitions presented by the mind. Similarly, knowledge is also meant for his sake, for it brings out his emancipation. In this way, the mind serves the double purpose of puruṣa—one being enjoyment and the other emancipation. It may, however, be argued that the mind also is for the sake of another of the same nature. But this would ultimately involve regressus ad infinitum. All these can be avoided by postulating the existence of puruṣa who is not a composite body and so does not function in association with others. Hence it is

¹ 'वदर्तस्येवस्यमाननिमित्तमयते परात्म संहोलकारिण्यादृति'

² Manas (mind) and citta are not differentiated in the Yoga-bhāṣya (iv. 23). This view fully tallies with that of Vindhyavāsin according to whom everything is experienced in the mind.
futile to maintain by reasoning, however subtle it may be, that the mind can be made to displace its everpresent cogniser, the purusa. Briefly speaking, there exists a knower apart from the knowables, a seer apart from the objects to be seen, an experiencer apart from the cognitions to be experienced. But the Buddhists strive to disregard altogether the separate existence of a knower or a seer or an experiencer. Their view is criticised in Y. S. iv. 16-24.

The relation of purusa with buddhi has been already treated in detail (pp. 185-189). Conjunction of praktyi and purusa also has been explained above (pp. 220-236), and in doing so several points as regards purusa have received our careful attention. One important point in this connection now remains to be discussed, and this is plurality of purusa. From common experience it is found that the world is experienced by different beings in different ways. The same element appears to be agreeable to one while it turns to be disagreeable to another. This tends to suggest that there are many purusases. The following stock argument is avanced in the Sankhya texts in support of this doctrine of plurality. If there were one and the same purusa existing in all the bodies, then on the birth of one all would be born, on the death of one all would be dead. Then again, one becoming blind all would be blind, one becoming mad, all would be mad, and so on. All these difficulties can be averted by maintaining plurality of purusa.

However, these arguments may appear to be sound at the first instance. But if minutely examined, these cannot be said to be based upon solid foundation. Such arguments may be applied with reference to the empirical selves as are not still freed from the chain of praktyi. Birth, death and disability of organs occur in the kingdom of praktyi, but the pure self is not to be touched by them. The difference among pure selves cannot be established by these lame arguments. It reminds us of the following observation made by Varṣaganyā in refutation to the doctrine of plurality of praktyi: “मुलं चतुर्विध्विधिनिर्धारेष्व निर्वचनं व निर्वलक्ष्यम्”. Herein the revered Sāṁkhya teacher goes to speak of the fact that there are no different

I Quoted in the Yoga-bhāṣya iii. 53; also see above, p. 228 infra.
units of primordial *prakṛti* as there cannot be observed any difference of form or of intervening space or of genus among them; for the notion of distinction among several entities arises only when one or other of these differentiating factors exists. This very argument can be equally applied against the doctrine of plurality of *puruṣa* also. The notion of plurality must depend upon some differentiating factor. But there cannot be any difference of form among several units of pure self; nor can this difference be brought out by intervening space, for all selves are held to be ubiquitous; nor can this distinction be brought out by difference in genus, for all pure selves belong to one genus. Indeed, the doctrine of plurality of *puruṣa* is a drawback of the Sāmkhya system.

*Misery and its source*

Sāmkhya is a speculative science; it aims at liberating man from his worldly existence. In no other system except Buddhism, does the pessimistic view of the universe find such a distinct expression as in Sāmkhya. This system seeks to establish the fact that everything in the kingdom of the *guna*s is painful. An object may appear to be pleasant at the outset, but if it is perfectly analysed it is found that it contains the seed of misery in its womb. When one enjoys an object what happens ultimately is that the very experience creates a burning desire for more with the result that instead of bringing out gratification of the senses, it only adds fuel to the flame. And whenever that desire is unfulfilled, as is often the case most likely, it leads to uneasiness, disappointment and affliction. Even in the course of enjoying an object, there is always an apprehension of some antagonistic element that may disturb it, and so it is not unalloyed. Then again, he who hankers after the objects of pleasure cannot enjoy them without favouring some and afflicting others. As a result of this he acquires merit and demerit, and thereby adds more to his accumulated stock. Finally, all manifestations are the workings of the *guna*s which are hostile to one another. So they cannot always afford pleasure to all. This is why Patañjali emphatically states that all is accounted to be pain by the wise (ii.15). However, the ordinary people who are
accustomed to get themselves plunged into the whirl-pool of metempsychosis are not so much affected by these painful objects. But the case is otherwise with the wise man. He cannot endure even the negligible fraction of misery. He is very sensitive. This is why the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya compares him to an eye-ball (अष्टिप्रतियो हि विद्यान्, ii. 15). Just as the eye-ball cannot tolerate the touch of even a fine thread of wool, but the coarser part of the body is very little affected by such a touch; such is the distinction existing between the wise and the common people. This is why the wise man is very keen to free himself from all sorts of sorrows and sufferings.

_Puruṣa_ is everpure and free. But it experiences misery due to its conjunction with prakṛti. So long as this conjunction exists, it thinks itself to be one with prakṛti and thereby attributes to its own self miseries and such other properties which actually belong to the latter. Just as the transparent crystal is contaminated by the red flower lying very close to it, similarly the _puruṣa_ also becomes contaminated by its close association with the prakṛti. The cause of conjunction of these two distinct and separate principles is ‘अचिंत’ (nescience). Patañjali defines it as ‘cognising the non-eternal as the eternal, the impure as the pure, the painful as the pleasant and the non-self as the self’ (Y.S. ii. 5). Speaking of its characteristic feature, the author of the Bhāṣya observes that it should be regarded as real (कस्तुतत्ततवं विद्ययम्). It is neither valid cognition, nor absence of valid cognition; it forms a kind of knowledge which is opposed to right knowledge (एवमविद्य न प्रामाणं न प्रामानाभावं; किन्तु विद्याविपरीतं ज्ञानान्तरगच्छति).

_Avidyā_ is classified into five heads. These are: तमस् (darkness), मोह (delusion), नमस्त्व (deep delusion), नाशिनि (gloom) and जलस्त्व (dark gloom). Vācaspāti attributes the doctrine of five-fold avidyā to Vārṣagānyā (T{k}. 47). Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not use the term ‘avidyā’ anywhere in his Kārikā. In his opinion, bondage is brought out by ‘viparyaya’ (विपर्ययाविद्यते वमः: कृ.44). It constitutes false conception of a thing whose real form does not correspond to such conception. Thus states Patañjali—‘विपर्ययो निष्ठा चानसत्रहस्त्यतिः’ (Y.S. i.8). It has also got five aspects (यहं विपर्ययानि:, कृ.7), and these fully correspond to those of avidyā. This goes to show that the two entities do not differ fundamentally. The author of the Yoga-bhāṣya also
makes very little distinction between avidyā and viparyaya. In ii. 24, he explains avidyā as potency which is left out by false conception (विद्या—विपर्ययायामवासिनीवाद). Again in iv. 30, he explicitly states viparyaya as the cause of worldly existence (विद्यादे विपर्ययायाम भवत् कारणम्). Further interest is created in ii. 23, where he states that it is 'adarśana' (non-discrimination) that brings out the conjunction of prakṛti and puruṣa. He opens here a symposium to explain this 'adarśana', and in this connection he puts forward several alternative conceptions of the term as offered by different authorities of Sāṃkhya. However, all these conceptions form common ground of the conjunction of prakṛti and puruṣa. Even Vātsyāyana also in his Nyāya-bhāṣya (III. ii. 68) criticises this doctrine of adarśana. It thus goes to show that the doctrine found a prominent place in the circle of the ancient teachers of Sāṃkhya. Iśvarakṛṣṇa also hints at this doctrine in one place (न भमेषुपूर्विते पुनः परमात्र, क्र. 61). Thus we find that the cause of conjunction is somewhere stated to be avidyā, somewhere viparyaya and elsewhere adarśana. All these terms, however, differ very little fundamentally.

This non-discriminative knowledge whether it is called ‘अविश्वा’ or ‘निर्णय’ or ‘अदर्शन’ leads to the fatal confusion between the self and the non-self. So long as this erroneous notion is not removed by discriminative wisdom, liberation from the trap of prakṛti is beyond expectation.

Such a kind of error involves two entities. It arises due to failure of noticing the distinction between them and thus virtually identifying one with the other. Both the entities that are involved here are reals. But it is their fancied relation which is erroneous. This conception of error held by Sāṃkhya is also referred to in the Pañcapadikā-vivaraṇa¹. Error is also explained in the Sāṃkhya-Sūtra². According to it the illusion of redness in the transparent crystal involves two objects, the crystal and redness. Both of these two are given there. But the relation between them is fancied; it is not given. Thus error involves what is given as well as what is not. This is what is called ‘सद्सनह्याति’.

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¹ See, 'सन्तोष सत्तेः तत्त्वसानिति शास्त्रार्थेयेष्व शरीरि: संयम्यम प्रति:’. Śāstrakāra here refers to Sāṃkhya, and this can be known from the statement of the Tattva-dīpana ‘शास्त्रार्थेया शास्त्रीनिवय:’—Brahmasūtra-Sāṅkarabhasyam, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, part I, p. 166.
² ‘ध्यानसन्नि पापमागाधान’, V. 56.
Scholars are generally of opinion that the early Sāmkhya advocated भक्ति. This view does not seem to be plausible as in the case of भक्ति nothing of what was cogised before is sublated (प्रतिवृत्ति). The school of Prabhakara in expounding this doctrine maintains that further knowledge of the object involved in error does not supplant but only supplements what is given before. But this view is not whole-heartedly supported by the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya. Thus in explaining 'विपरीत' he states that false knowledge is sublated by right one. This he illustrates by the case of the visual perception of two moons which is contradicted by the right perception of one moon (तद्व यथा, विपरीतानि विपरीताः विपरीताः विपरीताः विपरीताः, Y.Bh. i. 8). In explaining 'वचन' also, he resorts to this view. Here also he is found to state that 'discrimination contradicts non-discrimination' (प्रतिवृत्ति यथा विपरीताः, Y.Bh. ii. 23). But in सत्यतमिति, the previous knowledge is only supplemented and not contradicted by further knowledge. However, some light may be obtained from his conception of बाध्यतमिति where he is found to state that it constitutes a sort of knowledge which is opposed to right knowledge. Thus he states—विचारकावयों च बाध्यतमितिः (ii. 5). The term 'विचार' is significant here. It goes to indicate that 'विचारकावयों' has been advocated in the Yoga-bhāṣya. Further, it is interesting to note that Udayana makes no distinction between विचारकावयों and बाध्यकावयों. Thus he states in the अत्मतत्त्वa viveka—‘तथायिकावत्सातां मैथिली ज्ञातिकी प्रतियोगिन्; बाध्यमितिः च वैकाशिको’ (pp. 662-663, Bibliotheca Indica edition). In his Tātparyav-परिशिद्ध also he reiterates the same view by the following line—‘विचार्यकावयों बाध्यमितिः च वैकाशिको’ (p. 406, Bibliotheca Indica edition). The fact is that the explanations of these two क्षेत्रमिति may differ in matters of detail, but their underlying principle is the same. However, the term (बाध्यमिति) does not appear anywhere in the Nyāya-bhāṣya or the Vārttika. It first of all occurs in the Tātparya-tīka of Vācaspati. The author of the Sāmkhya-sūtra does not go to any extreme. He takes a synthetic attitude, and so he advocates 'बाध्यमिति'.

Udayana also refers to such a view in his Tātparya-परिशिद्ध, but he totally disregards the same (विचारिकावयों न विचारिकावयों विचारिकावयों. p. 413).

**Iśāna**

At the rise of discriminative wisdom, the paradox by which पुरुषa thinks itself to be one with प्रकृति comes to an end. But mere glimpses of discrimination cannot wipe out the seed of misery for ever. In order to attain full freedom, its flow must be undisturbed and should admit of no intermission even for a moment (विवेकासिद्धिः विचार्यकावयों हानोपि: Y. S. ii. 26). The seven stages of
enlightenment are perceived at this state one after another. These are as follows (Y. Bh. ii. 27): (1) Misery to be escaped from has been known, and nothing further remains to be known of it; (2) the cause of misery has dwindled away, and nothing remains to be dwindled away of it; (3) removal of misery has been directly perceived by means of inhibitive trance; (4) the way to escape misery by means of discriminative wisdom has been contemplated. These four constitute the freedom of wisdom from external phenomena. The remaining three refer to the freedom of the mind. These are: (5) The buddhi has served its final purpose; (6) The guṇas are hurriedly disappearing like supportless blocks of stones rolling down from the mountain peak, never to rise up again; (7) being void of the guṇas, puruṣa then shines forth in its own lustre and becomes stainless and isolated.

Bondage and liberation actually belong to buddhi. These are only ascribed to the puruṣa who is without any attribute, just as defeat and victory belonging to the soldiers are ascribed to the king. But buddhi cannot be said to have attained full liberation until it reaches the highest elevation. This is possible only when there is non-attachment even to illumination of wisdom. The result is that there arises a constant flow of discrimination culminating in the trance known as 'धर्माय' (Y. S. iv. 29). By its attainment, the different kinds of afflictions and the potentialities of good and bad actions are uprooted for ever. Like seeds baked on fire, these are no longer capable of sprouting up again. Buddhi at this state becomes purged of all impurities; various defilements and obscuring elements existing therein are washed away by the incessant shower of the undefiled water of 'धर्माय'. It then becomes serene and tranquil like a sea without any wave. Its range becomes unbounded. Wisdom is then infinite. And in comparison to this infinity, that which is regarded as knowable by the ordinary people appears to be most insignificant to the wise, just as the glowing worm in the unbounded space. In this state, buddhi shines like a transparent mirror, but the owner cares very little to see his face reflected anymore upon it.
This trance of 'धर्ममेघ' is most appraised in the system of Patañjali. This is the result of dispassion (ैराम्य) of highest order. This dispassion should not be confused with the ordinary one which refers to that state of mind when there arises aversion towards the worldly objects of enjoyment because of the defects involved in their earning, saving, decaying, and the like. Such a state of aversion results in 'contentment' (तुष्टि) which again in its turn brings out absorption into the eight-fold prakṛti for a specified period (ैराम्यात प्रकृतित्वः, का. 45). This state also is considered to be a sort of bondage, and it is what is called 'प्रकृतित्वकन्या'. It is connected with the belief in one or other of the eight aspects of prakṛti as the highest reality. Evidently, it is ignorance which works at the root of such a kind of dispassion and this is why it is not much estimated by Iśvarakṛṣṇa and his commentators. Real dispassion steps in when there arises consciousness of freedom from attachment not only towards worldly objects of enjoyment but also to spiritual ones, such as heaven, abnormal power. absorption into prakṛti and the like. Such a stage is attained when the individual by virtue of intellectual enlightenment becomes fully conscious of the defects of the objects of the senses. But the highest order of dispassion prevails when there is absolute non-attachment to the entire kingdom of the guṇas, and such a state is achieved only when there arises a constant flow of spiritual illumination (तत् परं पुरुस्कम्यातेवग्वत्तुप्रप्यम्, Y.S.i. 16). Evidently this refers to धर्ममेघ which arises due to aversion even to intellectual enlightenment called wisdom. (प्रसङ्गावतेवद्यकुलीद्व:); for, wisdom also forms an aspect of buddhi and as such virtually belongs to the province of the guṇas. When such a stage is attained buddhi becomes absolutely taintless. It becomes immensely illuminated, and nothing but spiritual enlightenment shines forth therein. At the rise of such a type of dispassion, the blessed one reflects within himself thus: "Whatever was to be obtained has been attained; the afflictions that should have dwindled have now dwindled; the closely inter-locked joints of the successive worldly existences which so long remain unshattered involving death after birth and birth after death, have now been shattered" (प्रांम्य प्रप्यम्, श्रीना: क्षेतन्या: हेशा:, छिन्न: स्थितपवं भवसंक्षो वस्त्वविच्छेदाजननित्वा स्यवेते मृत्वा
Really speaking, dispassion is the highest consummation that can be reached by wisdom, and isolation is inseparably connected with it (शान्तस्यैव पराकाशा बैराग्यम्, एतस्यैव नान्तरियक्कं कैवल्यमिति, ibid).

This superior order of dispassion is not referred to anywhere in the कारिका. However, the author of the युक्तिदिपिका does not leave it unnoticed. He speaks of two-fold dispassion, one ordinary and the other uncommon. The former is nourished by ignorance, and as such it is disregarded by those who strive to attain final release. The latter is nourished by wisdom, and so it is highly estimated. Thus he states—'dispassion belonging to the wise can not bring out absorption into प्राकृति (नंदि ज्ञातिवरपठम अर्थ प्रकृतित्यवय, p. 151/16). Otherwise, even that type of dispassion which is innate with Kapila would also ultimately bring out bondage. But this is absurd.

Iśvarakṛṣṇa holds wisdom to be the exclusive means of liberation. Thus he states—प्राकृति binds herself by the seven aspects and liberates herself by the one (का. 65). Evidently, this one is no other but wisdom. By its constant culture, पुरुषा can realise the fact that he is not the empiric individual, that nothing of the world of प्राकृति belongs to him and that he is distinct from प्राकृति. This discrimination gives rise to pure and absolute wisdom. Hearin ceases for ever the creative activity of प्राकृति with reference to the particular individual who has attained such a stage. Puruṣa also at this stage becomes serene and tranquil. Being aware of the fact that प्राकृति is not in a position to bind him further, he beholds her with indifference. Prakriti also in her turn realises that she has been understood by the पुरुषा, and so becomes disinterested to him for ever. Speaking of her nature it has been already pointed out by the author of the कारिका that 'प्राकृति is like a bashful maiden; whenever she can understand that she has been seen by the पुरुषा what happens is that she ceases to expose herself anymore to his sight' (का. 61).

1 See, ‘तपि न मि नास्य’ (का. 64). This is variously explained by different commentators. The explanation occurring in the Jayamaṅgalā has been adopted here.
Though their union does not break up forthwith even after the attainment of discriminative wisdom, still there remains no possibility of further evolution.

The physical body of the individual continues to exist for some time even after the attainment of this state. It is not forthwith dissolved. Just as the potter’s wheel by reason of its acquired velocity continues to revolve for some time even after finishing the earthen pot, so also as long as the impressions left by previously acquired merit and demerit are not completely exhausted the individual has to retain his physical body even after the attainment of supreme perfection. This continuity of physical body for a time is called शेषवृत्ति in the Śāmkhya literature. It constitutes one of the ten fundamental principles of Śāmkhya1. Afflictions are uprooted at this stage, good or bad karman cease to operate any longer, and consequently the wise man becomes liberated at this state even when alive (हेषकम्बन्धूतो जीवान्त विद्वान् विसुच्च भवति, Y. Bh. iv. 30). Such a state is necessary for imparting perfect wisdom to the seeking disciple. The person who has attained this state is really fit to be a spiritual guide. Otherwise, the process would be the same when one blind man leads another blind man, and consequently the result would be disappointing.

When the previous stock of merit and demerit is completely exhausted and no trace of them is left upon the buddhi, the physical body has got no necessity of retaining its existence any longer. And with the separation of the physical body, the purusa attains final and absolute release, and never returns to the whirlpool of existence.

1 The author of the Jayamangalā enumerate these ten fundamental principles by a quotation from some other earlier text of Śāmkhya.

Thus he states:—तथा चाहिँ चंप्याकारः—
अरित्वतमेतः चर्चायथ सवर्जनस्यव्यवस्थस्य नित्यन्तः।
दोभो विद्यमण्य बहुः पुमांसः रिभवतः सत्तरस्य च शेषवृत्तः।

But the author of this Samgraha (compilation) whom he refers to is not named anywhere. Paramārtha also quotes this couplet in his Chinese version.
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ABBREVIATIONS

B E F E O. Bulletin de l'École Francaise d'Extrême-Orient
B. Gitā Bhagavad-Gitā.
Br. Up. Brhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad
B. S. Brahma-sūtra
Ch. Up. Chāndogya Upaniṣad
D. Dīgha Nikāya
I. H. Q. Indian Historical Quarterly
Mbh. Mahābhārata
N. Bh. Nyāya Bhāṣya
NG. Nachrichten von der Königliche Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen
NS. Nyāya Sūtra
Sk. Sāṁkhya Kārikā
Śvet. Up. Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad
Tk. Tattva Kaumudi
Y. S. Yoga Sūtra
Y. Bh. Yoga Bhāṣya
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**N. B.** The following two sentences appearing respectively in pp. 157, n1 & 163, n2 are to be deleted:

(i) For further about this Ms., see appendix. (ii) An account of the said Ms. is furnished in the Journal of the Vaṅgīya Sāhitya Parishat.
"A book that is shut is but a block"

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